State: South Dakota
Volume: 90
Term: 1976-1976
Jurisdiction(s): South Dakota
Source: https://static.case.law/sd/90.pdf

MASEK, Appellant v. MASEK, Respondent
(237 N.W.2d 432)

(File No. 11507. Opinion filed January 15, 1976)

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Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith and William G. Taylor, Jr., |
Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith and Carleton R. Hoy,
Sioux Falls, for defendant and respondent.

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JONES, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-mother has appealed from a decision of the trial
court denying her custody of the two sons of the parties, now
ages 8 and 6.

In the original divorce action, custody of the sons was given
to defendant-father by judgment dated August 24, 1973. That
decision was appealed to this court, and a divided court affirmed.
Masek v. Masek, 89 S.D. 62, 1975, 228 N.W.2d 334.

[i The members of the court who heard the original appeal
adhere to the viewpoints expressed by them in that appeal.
However, that decision made res judicata the issue of which
parent was entitled to custody of the children on the facts and cir-
cumstances existing on the date of the original trial court deci-
sion. That decision also determined that these children are of
tender years within the scope of SDCL 30-27-19(2).

Prior to our opinion, the plaintiff petitioned the Circuit
Court of Minnehaha County, alleging a change of circumstances
and praying for modification of the decree of divorce as it related
to custody of the children. We ruled that this petition could be
heard by the trial court notwithstanding the pendency of an ap-
peal from that decision. That petition was heard by the trial court
on March 8, 1974, and plaintiff appeals an adverse decision. Dur-
ing the period that this appeal was being perfected and heard, a
third hearing was held on April 4, 1975, although the record and
issues of that third hearing are not before the court on this ap-
peal.

The plaintiff's request for modification of the custody decree
was primarily based on the claim that her parental shortcomings
as established in the divorce action have since been corrected.
The trial court found that plaintiff had improved her personal
situation, conduct and mental health immeasurably and com-
mended her therefor, but held:

“Therefore, it is the decision of the Court that, absent
any showing of misconduct on the part of the Defendant

SO

father and absent any evidence or showing that the pre-
sent and existing custody award adversely affects the
interests and welfare of the children and absent any
showing that the interests and welfare of the children
would be improved by a change of custody, the Motion of
the Plaintiff is in all things denied.”

The obligation of courts in child custody disputes in divorces
is set out in SDCL 25-4-45:

“In an action for divorce the court may, before or
after judgment, give such direction for the custody,
care, and education of the children of the marriage as
may seem necessary or proper, and may at any time
vacate or modify the same.”

The standards for making these decisions are set out in
SDCL 30-27-19:

“In awarding the custody of a minor or in appoint-
ing a general guardian, the court or judge is to be guided
by the following considerations:

(1) By what appears to be for the best interests of the
child in respect to its temporal and its mental and
moral welfare; and if the child be of a sufficient age
to form an intelligent preference, the court or
judge may consider that preference in determining
the question;

(2) As between parents adversely claiming the
custody or guardianship, neither parent is entitled
to it as of right, but, other things being equal, if the
child be of tender years, it should be given to the
mother; if it be of an age to require education and
preparation for labor or business, then to the
father.”

The issue of whether a decree of divorce should be modified
as it related to child custody has been before this court many

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times. Some of the more recent cases are: Millea v. Millea, 1975,
89 S.D. 112, 229 N.W.2d 95 (trial court’s modification affirmed);
Warder v. Warder, 1973, 87 S.D. 133, 203 N.W.2d 531 (trial court’s
modification based on mother’s change of residence reversed);
Anderson v. Anderson, 1972, 86 S.D. 757, 201 N.W.2d 394 (trial
court’s modification based on wife’s concealment of pregnancy at
time of divorce affirmed); Hershey v. Hershey, 1970, 85 S.D. 85,
177 N.W.2d 267 (trial court’s modification based on wife’s marital
misconduct reversed); Dornbusch v. Dornbusch, 1968, 83 S.D. 524,
162 N.W.2d 283 (trial court’s modification reversed for insuffi-
cient change of circumstances); Moser v. Moser, 1966, 82 S.D. 149,
143 N.W.2d 369 (trial court’s modification reversed because no
change of circumstances shown); Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt, 1966, 82
S.D. 344, 146 N.W.2d 57 (trial court’s refusal to modify affirmed);
Septka v. Septka, 1963, 80 S.D. 299, 122 N.W.2d 766 (trial court’s
refusal to modify because of wife’s relationship with another man
affirmed); Ulver v. Ulver, 1956, 76 S.D. 371, 78 N.W.2d 830 (trial
court’s refusal to modify due to mother’s remarriage affirmed);
Application of Habeck, 1955, 75 S.D. 535, 69 N.W.2d 358 (trial
court's modification reversed because no change of circumstances
shown); Wright v. Stahl, 1949, 73 S.D. 157, 39 N.W.2d 875 (trial
court’s modification based on child’s reaching school age af-
firmed); Wellnitz v. Wellnitz, 1946, 71 S.D. 430, 25 N.W.2d 458
(trial court’s modification based on mother’s change of residence
reversed).

Notwithstanding our many prior decisions, we hope that a
restatement of the principles which will be followed by this court
in change of custody cases might reduce future litigation between
parents.

[It has long been the rule in South Dakota that before a
court can modify a decree of divorce under SDCL 25-4-45 there
must be a change of circumstances. Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 1894,
6 S.D. 348, 61 N.W.42. The degree of change required is a
“substantial and material change of circumstances”. Huckfeldt v.
Huckfeldt, supra; Dornbusch v. Dornbusch, supra; Hershey v.
Hershey, supra; Warder v. Warder, supra.

There is a second factor to be considered by trial courts in

SO
deciding change of custody requests. That is the welfare and best
interests of the children. Wellnitz v. Wellnitz, supra; Wright v.

Stahl, supra; Application of Habeck, supra; Ulver v. Ulver, supra;
and Septka v. Septka, supra.

[i The parent or person seeking modification of the custody
decree has the burden of proving both factors by a
preponderance of the evidence. Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt, supra;
Dornbusch v. Dornbusch, supra; Warder v. Warder, supra.

To state the rule we have adopted in change of custody
cases, the parent seeking modification of custodial rights has the
burden of proving (1) that there has been a substantial and
material change of circumstances since the decree of divorce was
entered, and (2) that the welfare and best interests of the children
require the modification being sought. Either factor standing
alone will not justify a change of custody — both must be present.
This is a heavy burden, but the courts, the parties and especially
the children must be protected from endless and vexatious litiga-
tion and the resulting uncertainty flowing therefrom.

If Starting with the proposition that the parties cannot
relitigate the correctness of the original custody disposition, as
we must, we find that the plaintiff herein has failed to sustain the
burden of proof falling upon her. In borderline cases, as this was,
we recognize that the parent not having custody might be
tempted to relitigate the custody issue in the hope that a change
in the composition of the Supreme Court might change its opin-
ion. But this would not be fair either to the parties or the children
and we will be especially vigilant to avoid rewarding persistence
in this type of case.

HH At the original trial of the divorce action, plaintiff of-
fered evidence that the shortcomings established by defendant's
witnesses had been largely corrected prior to the final divorce
hearing. The trial court and a majority of this court found other-
wise. While the plaintiff's evidence does show a change in her at-
titudes and conduct, it primarily establishes a continuation of the
reformation urged by her at the divorce hearing, and falls short
of showing a substantial and material change of circumstances.

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The fact that the original custody determination presented a
close question does not reduce in any way the burden of the
parent seeking modification of custody provisions of a divorce
decree.

Hl We do not want to end this opinion with any inference
that the plaintiff is without parental strengths. The trial court
commended her for the improvements made and we join therein.
We do feel that these changes would merit consideration by the
trial court in enlarging her visitation rights to the fullest extent
possible under the circumstances of the parties.

The Order of the trial court is affirmed.
WINANS and DOYLE, JJ., concur.
WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., dissent.

JONES, Circuit Judge, sitting for DUNN, Chief Justice, dis-
qualified.

WOLLMAN, Justice (dissenting).
I would reverse.

If reasons ever existed for awarding the children to
defendant-father, as this court held in Masek v. Masek, 89 S.D. 62,
228 N.W.2d 334, then as I read the instant record those reasons
no longer exist.'

The requirement that a substantial or material change of cir-
cumstances be demonstrated before a court may modify a
custody order is a judicially created rule of expediency rather
than a statutory requirement. Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt, 82 S.D.

1. Perhaps it is time to reexamine our rule that findings of fact are not necessary
to support an order issued in proceedings to modify the child custody provisions
ofa divoree decree, see SDCL 15.6-52(a) and , evg., Millea v. Millen, “S.D.—, 229
N.W.2d 95; Christensen v. Christensen, 85 8.b. 653, 190 N.W.24 62; Weins v.
Weins, 70 8.D. 620, 20 N.W.2d 228; Foster v. Foster, 66 S.D. 395, 284 N.W. 54,
and to impose a requirement that findings be made, at least in those cases
where the trial court takes testimony in support of affidavits and exhibits.

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344, 146 N.W.2d 57.? Although the rule is based upon pragmatic,
practical reasons, well expressed in the majority opinion herein
and in the Huckfeldt case, it should be applied to aid trial courts
in carrying out their statutory duty to provide for the best in-
terests of the child, SDCL 30-27-19(1), and should not be allowed
to create a mechanistic barrier to fustrate the performance of
that duty.

SDCL 30-27-19(2) provides that, other things being equal, the
custody of a child of tender years should be given to the mother.
Although “other things” may not have been equal at the time
custody was awarded defendant-father, and I acknowledge that I
am bound by the majority opinion in Masek v. Masek, supra, the
conditions that caused that imbalance in the capacity of the
parties to provide for the best interests of the children have, in
my opinion at least, so ameliorated that plaintiff now stands on at
least an equal plane with defendant-father with respect to her
capacity to care for the children. I would apply the “substantial or
material change” rule in the light of SDCL 30-27-19(2) by holding
that when a mother has demonstrated that she is at least as
capable of caring for her children as is the father she has satisfied
our judicially created test. By so applying the rule, trial courts
can honor both legislatively expressed concerns set forth in
SDCL 30-27-19 and also effectuate the purposes which the rule
was adopted to achieve. To attain a position of parity vis-a-vis the
other parent is a substantial, material change in circumstances.

A number of factors must be considered in determining
whether things are equal between the parties. Of course, minor
children should not be subjected to a shuttlecock existence. Nor
should the courts allow them to be used as pawns in a vindictive
battle between the parties to a failed marriage. Certainly the
trial court should consider the possible adverse effects a change
of custody might have upon the child or children, taking into ac-
count whether the change will drastically upset established liv-

2. We have stated the rule in the disjunctive, Wellnitz v. Wellnitz, 71 S.D. 480, 25
N.W.2d 458; in the conjunctive, Hershey v. Hershey, 85 S.D. 85, 177 N.W.2d 267;
and sometimes both ways in the same case. Huckfeldt v. Huekfeldt, supra. The
words “substantial” and “material” may be tautological in the sense in which
they are used in the rule.

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ing patterns of some duration or will entail relocation to new and
unfamiliar surroundings.

In the instant case the evidence reveals that plaintiff spends
a good deal of time with her children in their home while defend-
ant is at work; plaintiff estimated that the hours she spends with
them would total two-plus days a week. Indeed, it could be said
that plaintiff spends more living time with the children than does
defendant. There is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff
would do anything but continue to reside in the city of Sioux Falls
and continue her career as a mother and part-time college music
instructor. Thus the specter of an interstate, Wellnitz v. Wellnitz,
T1.S.D. 430, 25 N.W.2d 458, transcontinental, Warder v. Warder,
87-S.D. 133, 203 N.W.2d 531, or intercontinental, Bolenbaugh v.
Bolenbaugh, 89 S.D. 639, 237 N.W.2d 12, disruption is not a con-
sideration here.

Because the record convinces me that plaintiff desires
custody for the sole purpose of providing for the welfare of her
children and that she is at least as capable of caring for them as
is defendant, I would reverse the order denying the petition for
change of custody and would direct the trial court to award
custody of the children to plaintiff.

Iam authorized to state that COLER, J., joins in this dissent.

STATE, Respondent v. BARR, Appellant
(287 N.W.2d 888)

(File No. 11457. Opinion filed January 15, 1976)

MAA

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Laurence J. Zastrow, Rapid City, for defendant and ap-
pellant.

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Galen Vaa, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Pierre, Michael J. McGreevy, Warrensburg, Mo., for plaintiff and
respondent.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Defendant was charged with the unlawful distribution of a
controlled substance, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) in viola-
tion of SDCL 39-17-88. He was found guilty by a jury and was
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in the state penitentiary.

The state’s principal witness, one Naomi Church, also known
as Kathy Clark, and as “Fat Kathy,” of whom we have written in
State v. Barr, 89 S.D. 280, 232 N.W.2d 257, and State v. Murphy,
89 S.D. 486, 234 N.W.2d 54, testified that she had been employed
as a narcotics agent by the Pennington County, South Dakota,
sheriff's office and the Rapid City, South Dakota, police depart-
ment on June 1, 1973. She was first introduced to defendant at
Sheridan Lake on or about June 24, 1973. She next saw the
defendant at the Casino Bar in Rapid City during the evening of
June 25, 1973, when she sat at a table with defendant and several
other persons. She testified that during the course of the conver-
sation that defendant was having with his several friends at the
table she overheard defendant talking to one of the persons at the
table about some chocolate mescaline defendant was going to get
for him. She heard defendant state that he was going to get.

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enough chocolate mescaline to, in the witness’ words, “* * * turn
on the two bands that were playing, White Witch and this Black
Oak Arkansas or something * * * And also that he was getting
enough to turn on all of his help.” Ms. Church also heard defend-
ant talking about white crosses, which is the street name for am-
phetamines. In her words, “Well, he was trying to tell me how
many he had taken that night and they'd been putting them in his
drink.”

Ms. Church then asked defendant how much chocolate
mescaline he was getting and whether he could get her some.
After defendant replied in the affirmative, she asked him the
price. Defendant replied that, in the witness’ words, “* ** it
would be about:two dollars a hit, and then he asked me how much
I wanted and I told him about ten.” In response to Ms. Church's
inquiry about when he could get the chocolate mescaline for her,
defendant “ * * * told me that this Mathiason, or whoever he was
getting it from from Hill City, had already left to go back, so it
was too late to get it then, and he [defendant] said he had to go to
Sioux Falls and he’d be back some-time Wednesday or late
Wednesday night, so it would be either Wednesday or Thursday
that I could get it.”

Ms. Church testified that she next saw defendant on June 29,
1978, at approximately 12:35 p.m., when she went to his record
store in Rapid City. After purchasing a record from one of defend-
ant’s employees, Ms. Church approached defendant. According to
her testimony:

“T don’t remember if I asked him or he told me that he’d
got them, but then I—he asked me how many I wanted
and I told him ten, and then I asked him—I asked him
the price and he said two dollars, and then I said ten
again * **”

Defendant then went into the back room of his store and returned
with a cellophane bag containing some brown pills. Defendant
told Ms. Church that there were nine pills in the bag, whereupon
she paid him $18. Ms. Church then left the store and shortly
thereafter turned the pills over to a deputy sheriff. A chemical

a

analysis of two of these nine pills revealed that they contained
LSD.

Defendant testified that he had seen Ms. Church in the
Casino Bar on Monday night, June 25, 1973. He admitted that he
had made the statement that he had intended to turn on the
members of the band, but testified that he was referring to pro-
viding them with liquor and not with drugs. In response to his at-
torney’s question, “Is it pretty much what happened?,” referring
to Ms. Church's testimony regarding the transaction that occur-
red in defendant’s store on June 29, 1973, defendant replied,
“Yes, it is.” It was the thrust of defendant’s direct testimony that
Ms. Church had importuned him to secure drugs for her on
numerous occasions, that he had never distributed or sold drugs
prior to June 29, 1973, and that the idea of purchasing drugs for
and selling them to Ms. Church had originated in her mind rather
than his. On cross-examination, however, defendant admitted
that he had seen one Fred Monson passing some white crosses to
Ms. Church in the Casino Bar on the evening of June 25, that he
learned that Fred Monson had put white crosses into his drink
that evening, and that the conversation he had had with Ms.
Church that evening concerning drugs may have taken place
after he had seen Fred Monson passing some white crosses to Ms.
Church. Defendant further admitted on cross-examination that
he had obtained the drugs in question from one Dave Mathiason
on June 28, 1973, after the latter had come into defendant’s store
and asked defendant whether he knew anyone who wanted to buy
some of the chocolate mescaline that Mathiason had. According to
defendant, he [defendant] replied, “ ‘No, I can’t think of anybody,’
and I went back to my business. Oh, it must not have been more
than two minutes and I thought, ‘This is a good way to get rid of
this girl.’” Defendant then bought all of the alleged mescaline
that Mathiason had, consisting of nine pills, which defendant then
sold to Ms. Church the following day for $18.

[Hf Defendant raises three principal questions on appeal.
First, he contends that SDCL 39-17-88, which is a part of the state
drugs and substances control act, is invalid because of this court’s
decision in State v. Matteson, 87 S.D. 216, 205 N.W.2d 512,
holding Ch. 229, Laws of 1970, unconstitutional because its title

was defective under Art. III, § 21 of the South Dakota Constitu-
tion. Defendant contends that because Ch. 229, Laws of 1970, the
source of SDCL 39-17, was the subject of an action commenced
prior to July 1, 1972, to determine the constitutionality of the
title of said chapter, that chapter could not have been validly
reenacted as part of the Code pursuant to SDCL 2-16-13 because
of the provisions of SDCL 2-16-15.

In the case of State v. Barr, supra, we upheld the validity of
SDCL 89-17 in the face of a similar challenge. We reaffirm that
holding here.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving, over
defendant’s objection, Instruction No. 10, which informed the
jury that:

“The crime of distribution of a controlled
substance, as defined by the statutes of this state, does
not require that a person distributing a controlled
substance know the nature of such substance or that it
is a controlled substance. Therefore, if a person does in
fact distribute a controlled substance, he has committed
the crime, even though he is unaware of the nature of
such substance or that it is a controlled substance or is.
mistaken as to its identity.”

We agree with defendant’s contention that the court erred in
giving this instruction. SDCL 39-17-88 provides that:

“Except as authorized by this chapter, it shall be
unlawful for any person to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense a substance controlled under this chapter, or to
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a substance controlled under this chapter.”

Hil Although it is true that this statute does not specifically
provide that knowledge is an element of the offense therein
stated, we conclude that knowledge is an element of the offense
of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance and that the
jury should have been so instructed. We reach this conclusion for

Ee:

several reasons.

First, we note that courts in other jurisdictions have held
that notwithstanding the absence of the word “knowingly” in
statutes prohibiting the unlawful possession and sale of narcotic
drugs and controlled substances, knowledge is an element of
those offenses. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, Alaska, 522 P.2d 528
(sale); People v. Bowens, 229 Cal.App.2d 590, 40 Cal.Rptr. 435
(possession); Rideout v. Superior Court, 67 Cal.2d 471, 62
Cal.Rptr. 581, 432 P.2d 197 (transporting); People v. Rogers, 5
Cal.3d 129, 95 Cal-Rptr. 601, 486 P.2d 129 (transporting); State v.
Harris, 159 Conn. 521, 271 A.2d 74 (possession); Medlin v. State,
Fla.App., 265 So.2d 515 (unlawful delivery); People v. Truelock, 35
Il.2d 189, 220 N.E.2d 187 (possession); State v. Reeves, Iowa, 209
N.W.2d 18 (possession); State v. Smith, Iowa, 219 N.W.2d 655
(possession); State v. Florine, Minn., 226 N.W.2d 609 (possession);
Applegate v. State, Miss., 301 So.2d 853 (unlawful delivery); Col-
lini v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 487 S.W.2d 182 (possession).

In State v. Kietzke, 85 S.D. 502, 186 N.W.2d 551, this court
recognized that under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, Ch. 94,
Laws of 1968, knowledge of the character of the drug had been
held to be an element of the charge of unlawful possession. See
Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 810. South Dakota is among the states that
have adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, SDCL
89-17. See 1974 Handbook of the National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, Table VII, p. 1034. In keeping with the
statutory direction that we should interpret and construe a
uniform law in such a manner as to effectuate the purpose of mak-
ing uniform the law of the states which enact it, SDCL 2-14-13, we
find persuasive those holdings cited above that have construed
the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act, or variations thereof, to require knowledge as an
element of the offense of unlawful distribution of a substance
such as that involved here.

Second, we note that SDCL 39-17-95 provides that:

“It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
to possess a controlled drug or substance * * *”

TTT

The maximum penalty for a violation of this provision is five
years’ imprisonment or a fine of $5,000, or both such fine and im-
prisonment, unless for a first or second offense of the illegal
possession of marijuana in a quantity of one ounce or less, in
which case the maximum penalty is one year’s imprisonment in
the county jail or a fine of not more than $500, or both such fine
and imprisonment. SDCL 39-17-96. See also SDCL 39-17-105
through 39-17-108, all of which state that “it shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally” to commit the acts
therein proscribed. The maximum penalty for a violation of these
sections is imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of
not more than $10,000, or both such fine and imprisonment. SDCL
39-17-110 makes it an offense, punishable by a maximum sentence
of one year in the county jail and a fine of not more than $500, or
both such fine and imprisonment, to knowingly or intentionally
inhabit a room wherein any controlled drug or substance is being
illegally stored or used. In contrast to the penalties for all of the
above cited violations, the maximum sentence for a violation of
SDCL 39-17-88 is ten years’ imprisonment or a fine of not more
than $5,000 or both such fine and imprisonment. SDCL 39-17-90.

Notwithstanding the serious problem of drug abuse that
prompted the legislature to adopt SDCL 39-17, it seems to us that
it would be anomalous to hold that the legislature intended to re-
quire a lesser burden of proof on the part of the state in those of-
fenses carrying the more serious maximum possible penalty than
in those cases in which, e.g., the penalty could not exceed one
year in the county jail, and, as a matter of common knowledge,
often result in the imposition of a 30-day jail sentence, which is
then suspended upon certain terms and conditions. Granted, the
specific use of the words “knowingly or intentionally” by the
legislature in the above enumerated sections of SDCL 39-17 could
lend itself to the opposite interpretation, i.e., that the legislature
by specifically using those words in the enumerated sections
specifically intended to eliminate the requirement of knowledge
as an element of the offense of unlawful distribution under SDCL
39-17-88. Were it not for the apparently uniform holdings of other
courts —at least the state has called no contrary holding to our at-
tention—that knowledge is an element of the uniformly regarded
serious offense of selling or distributing a controlled substance,

EEE

whether under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act or under the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, or a variation of either of
those acts, the latter conclusion might logically be reached.

[i Finally, the state does not contend that knowledge is not
an element of the offense described in SDCL 39-17-88. On the con-
trary, the state argues that the defendant’s challenge to the in-
struction is based on an erroneous interpretation of the instruc-
tion. The state contends that the instruction merely states that a
person distributing a substance need not know that such an act is
illegal, ie., that it is not necessary for the individual to have
knowledge that the substance he is selling is listed in SDCL 39-17
as a controlled substance. In a word, the state contends that this
instruction merely states that ignorance of the law does not ex-
cuse, and that the instruction cannot be construed to mean that a
factual mistake removing criminal intent does not excuse. From
this premise, the state submits that we should adopt the defini-
tion of “knowingly” found in South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions (Criminal) 1-11-2, which states that “ ‘knowingly’ imports
only a knowledge that the facts exist which bring the act or omis-
sion within the provisions of any statute. It does not require
knowledge of the unlawfulness of such act or omission.” This in-
struction, of course, is taken verbatim from the definition of
“knowingly” set forth in SDCL 22-1-2(1)(b). This argument proves
too much, however, for the instruction clearly does not admit of
the interpretation suggested by the state, and the definition of
“knowingly” set forth in the pattern jury instruction is essential-
ly that definition of knowledge required of one charged under
SDCL 39-17-88, i.e., knowledge of that which he is distributing,
not knowledge that it is a substance.defined as the controlled
substance under the provisions of SDCL 39-17.

In holding that SDCL 39-17-88 includes knowledge as an ele-
ment of the offense of distributing a controlled substance, we do
not intend to overrule our earlier decisions that hold that
knowledge is not an element of certain crimes. For example, in
State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 228, 132 N.W.2d 847, we held that
knowledge that the child was under the age of 15 years is not an
element of the offense of indecent molestation of a child as set
forth in SDCL 22-22-7. Again, in State v. Fulks, 83 S.D. 433, 160

18 Po

N.W.2d 418, we held that knowledge that the female was under
the age of 18 years is not an element of the offense of second
degree rape as set forth in SDCL 22-22-1(1). In State v. Schull, 66
S.D. 102, 279 N.W. 241, this court held that good faith lack of
knowledge of a minor's age is not a defense to a charge of selling
nonintoxicating beer to a person under the age of 18 years. See
also State v. Sasse, 6 S.D. 212, 60 N.W. 858; State v. Dorman, 9
S.D. 528, 70 N.W. 848; State v. Whitman, 52 S.D. 91, 216 N.W. 858.
See also United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43
L.Ed.2d 541, holding that knowledge that a person assaulted was
a federal officer is not an element of the offense of assaulting a
federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111.

What the Klueber, Fulks and Schull cases, supra, involved,
however, were statutes that prohibited certain specified activity
that the legislature clearly intended to protect certain classes of
persons from, activity which the actor could not in any sense of
responsible behavior engage in without perforce being aware of
what he was doing, as compared with an act, e.g., the running of a
traffic light, that one might commit without any specific
awareness at the time. Likewise, under the rationale of these
three cases, knowledge of the fact that the person was under the
age of 18 years would not be an element of the offense giving rise
to enhanced punishment under SDCL 39-17-93 and 39-17-94 for
distributing a controlled drug or substance to a person under the
age of 18 years.

HM Although we conclude that the trial court erred in giv-
ing the instruction in question, such error does not mandate
reversal inasmuch as under the evidence presented it is highly
unlikely that the jury would have reached a different result had
an instruction setting forth the requirement of knowledge been
given. The evidence, including defendant’s own testimony, points
overwhelmingly to the fact that he had knowledge that the pills
that he sold to Ms. Church contained a drug. Indeed, it is not
possible to consider that a responsible, unbiased jury could have
come to any other conclusion but that the defendant knew of this

. fact. That being the case, the outcome would not have been any

different had Instruction No. 10 not been given.' As was stated by
the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Truelock, 35 IIl.2d 189, 220
N.E.2d 187:

“We agree that the trial court erred in giving the
objected to instruction and form of jury verdict in this
case. Without proof that a defendant has knowingly
possessed a narcotic drug, a defendant cannot be con-
victed of the crime of unlawful possession of narcotic
drugs, and the jury in this case should have been so in-
structed. However, we do not think that the error in this
case requires reversal. ‘Even though error may have
been committed in giving or refusing instructions it will
not always justify reversal when the evidence of defen-
dant’s guilt is so clear and convincing that the jury could
not reasonably have found him not guilty.’ (citation omit-
ted) In the present case, the evidence of the defendant's
knowledge of the presence of narcotics is clear and con-
vincing. We do not think that a jury could reasonably
have found the defendant not guilty in this case, and
therefore, reversal is not justified.” 35 Ill.2d at 192, 220
N.E.2d at 190.

See also, Thomas v. State, Alaska, 522 P.2d 528, where because
the inference was compelling that the defendant knew what he
was selling and there was no possibility that the jury’s verdict
would have been different if an instruction on knowledge had
been given, the court held that there was no plain error and
therefore did not reverse the conviction. Accord, People v.
Bowens, 229 Cal.App.2d 590, 40 Cal.Rptr. 435.

HM We have not overlooked defendant’s argument that
because the evidence indicated that the substance that he sold

1. Defendant did not offer a proposed instruction on the element of knowledge.
Had his objection to Instruction No. 10 carried the day, he would hardly have
-been in any better position inasmuch as the question of knowledge would have
as effectively been removed from the consideration of the jury as it was under
the objected-to instruction. Having failed to request an instruction on the ele-
ment of knowledge, defendant will not be heard to claim that the trial court er-
red in not giving such an instruction. SDCL 15-6-51(a); State v. Barr, supra;
State v. Greene, 86 S.D. 177, 192 N.W.2d 712; State v. Nelson, 80 S.D. 574, 129
N.W.2d 54; State v. Vierck, 28 S.D. 166, 120 N.W. 1098.

on

was mescaline rather than LSD the conviction must be set aside.
The fact that defendant thought that the substance was .
mescaline, if in fact that is what he thought, is not fatal to his con-
vietion. Knowledge that it was a hallucinogenic substance was
sufficient to meet the requirement of knowledge that we have
held to be an element of SDCL 39-17-88. Both mescaline and LSD
are Schedule I controlled substances under SDCL 39-17-57 and
the maximum penalty for the unlawful distribution of either is
the same. SDCL 39-17-90. This is not a case in which defendant
can complain that he was misled about the nature of the charges
against him. The evidence is clear that defendant intended to
distribute a controlled substance; he cannot successfully contend
that he committed the act giving rise to the charge against him
under circumstances that would constitute such a mistake of fact
as to disprove any criminal intent. SDCL 22-3-1(5).?

| | Finally, defendant contends that the trial court should
have granted his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal
because the state’s evidence was insufficient to overcome the
defense of entrapment. We have set forth in greater than usual
detail the evidence in this case because we think that it carries
with it the refutation of defendant's contention. With the trial
court’s permission, defendant exercised great latitude in cross-
examining Ms. Church with regard to her background, prior ex-
perience and personal history, including questions regarding tat-
toos on certain portions of her body. Phat done, defendant and his
witnesses proceeded to corroborate by their own testimony
almost all of Ms. Church’s testimony regarding dates, places, con-
versations, persons, etc. In addition, the court on its own motion
instructed the jury that:

2, Had an instruction on knowledge been given, the jury might very well have
reasonably inferred from all the facts and circumstances that defendant in fact
know that the pills contained LSD. See United States v. Moser, 7 Cir. 509 F.2d
1089, for a well reasoned analysis of the legitimate inferences that can be drawn
by juries in narcotics cases involving a variance between the charge and the
roof. See also United States v, Joly, 2 Cir. 409 F-2d 672, and United States v.

livares-Vega, 2 Cir., 495 F.2d 827, which upheld the giving of a “conscious
avoidance” instruction in circumstances where the jury might find that the
defendant deliberately chose not to learn the nature of the substance in ques-
tion in order to be able to assert his ignorance in the event he was discovered
with the substance in his possession. Instructions based upon the rationale ex-
pressed in these three cases should be adequate to meet the issues raised in
most “mistaken identity” narcotics cases.

a

“The testimony of an informer who acts for reasons
of personal profit does not stand on the same footing as
the testimony of an ordinary witness. The jury must
evaluate the informer’s testimony with great care to
determine whether it has been affected by her special
motivations.”

Moreover, the court fully and fairly instructed the jury on the
defense of entrapment. The jury obviously put credence in Ms.
Church’s testimony and concluded that the intent to engage in
the distribution of the controlled substance in question had
originated in the mind of the defendant and that Ms. Church had
merely afforded defendant an opportunity for the commission of
the offense. Such a conclusion could properly have been drawn
from the evidence taken as a whole, and thus the trial court cor-
rectly refused to rule as a matter of law that defendant had been
the victim of entrapment. State v. Shearer, 86 S.D. 711, 201
N.W.2d 180; State v. Williams, 84 S.D. 547, 173 N.W.2d 889.

The conviction is affirmed.

DOYLE and COLER, JJ., concur.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS, J., concur specially.
DUNN, Chief Justice (concurring specially).

I would concur in affirming the conviction. Instruction 10,
which states that knowledge of a controlled substance was not an
element of the crime, was error and would be grounds for rever-
sal except for the fact that defendant’s knowledge or lack of
knowledge that he was distributing a controlled drug was not an
issue or a defense in the case. The only defense submitted to the
jury was whether the defendant was entrapped by Naomi
Church. The defendant testified on cross-examination as follows:

“Q Did you obtain them (controlled substances) in
Rapid City?

“A I did.

“Q
“A
“Q
“A
“Q
“A

“q
CaN
“Q

“A

“Q

“A
“a
“A
“Q
“A

Were they obtained in your store?
They were.

Now, who did you obtain them from?
Dave Mathiason.

Is he from Hill City?

He’s from anywhere. I don’t know.
How do you happen to know him?
An acquaintance.

How did you happen to obtain them from him as
differentiated from somebody else?

He walked in my store, said, ‘Hi.’ I said, ‘Hi.’ We
were busy, and he kind of pulled me off a little bit
like a lot of these people do and says, ‘You know
anybody that wants to buy some of this chocolate
mescaline I have,’ and I said, ‘No, I can’t think of
anybody,’ and I went back to my business. Oh, it
must not have been more than two minutes and I
thought, ‘This is a good way to get rid of this girl.’

Just a moment. At this time was Kathy Clark or
Naomi Church, the same person, was she in the
store then?

No, not at this time. This was early morning.

Of June 28th?

Right.

So then what happened?

So then I bought them from him.

Ss
“Q How many did you buy?
“A She'd asked me for ten, so I told him that I wanted
ten and he said, ‘I don’t have that many.’ So I
bought what he had.

“Q > Which was nine?

“A I don’t know. I know it was more than two and
more than three and I know it was more than
seven, but whether it was nine or ten or eight I
don’t know.

“Q Did you sell all that you obtained to Naomi
Church?

“A Sure did.”

Thus, defendant's own testimony reveals that he knew he
was buying a controlled substance from Dave Mathiason and that
he was selling a controlled substance to Naomi Church. His only
error is that he thought the controlled substance was mescaline
instead of LSD. Thus instruction 10 could not be prejudicial to his
defense.

Iam authorized to state that Justice WINANS joins in this
special concurrence.

KENT FEEDS, INC., Respondent v. STAHL et al., Appellants
(238 N.W.2d 483)

(File No. 11465. Opinion filed January 15, 1976)

Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith and John E. Simko, Sioux
Falls, Richard Spilde, Freeman, for plaintiff and respondent.

Brady, Kabeiseman, Light & Reade and C. E. Light,
Yankton, for defendants and appellants.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Plaintiff brought an action against defendants for the
balance allegedly due on a series of delivery receipt notes that
defendants had signed in consideration for delivery of feed sup-
plement. Defendants alleged in their answer that the notes were
not collectible because of failure of consideration; defendants also
counterclaimed for damages resulting from an alleged breach of
warranty. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff on
its complaint at the close of defendants’ evidence, and the trial
proceeded with defendants’ counterclaim as the only remaining
issue. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants on the counterclaim. We reverse in part and affirm in
part.

Defendants have been engaged in a general farm partner-
ship since 1961. Their partnership farmsteads are located approx-
imately three miles west and one mile south of Freeman, South

26 es

Dakota. Defendants’ diversified farming operation consists of
cultivation of corn, alfalfa, hay and oats, which defendants feed to
livestock. In 1970, defendants utilized three separate feedlots in
their cattle feeding operation, which will be referred to herein as
lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively.

Defendants began purchasing the cattle involved in this
lawsuit from various auction barns in the area in the latter part of
August 1970, and completed the purchases in early November of
that year. The cattle purchased were of two basic types, mixed or
crossbred beef cattle, and Holsteins.

As the cattle were introduced into the several feedlots, they
were started on a ration of hay and commercial protein supple-
ment. Defendants first used a dry supplement, A & D Primer, and
then switched to another dry supplement, 32% Pro X L, both of
which were manufactured by plaintiff. These two supplements
were fed in all three lots until defendants had the opportunity to
purchase a quantity of dry supplement of comparable content at a
lower price from another manufacturer.

In the fall of 1970, Morris Kaufman, an employee of plaintiff
who operated a livestock feed business in Freeman under the
name of Kaufman Milling Service, attempted to interest defen-
dants in purchasing a liquid feed supplement manufactured by
plaintiff called Bovin-O-Lac 440. Kaufman had sold plaintiff's feed
products since 1958. He had known the defendants since the
1940’s and they had been customers of his since 1968. He was
familiar with their feeding operation, the number of cattle they
were feeding, and the type and quality of feed they were using.
He had often traveled to defendants’ farmstead and had visited
with and advised them from time to time about their feeding pro-
gram. It was he who had sold defendants the dry feed supplement
they began using in the fall of 1970. Defendants had no knowledge
of the claimed advantages of the liquid supplement until Kaufman
and plaintiff's district manager discussed the matter with them.

On October 15, 1970, Kaufman, plaintiff's district manager
and another representative of plaintiff met with defendants at
their farm for the purpose of promoting the sale of the liquid sup-

ee

plement. Kaufman told defendants that the Bovin-O-Lac had
marbling factors and health factors that the dry supplement did
not have and that it was also more economical to purchase per
pound and that it had gain rates equivalent to dry supplement in
the tests that had been run. Kaufman testified that he recalled
that defendants were told that the Bovin-O-Lac would do a better
job for them as compared to the feed supplement that they.were
using.

Defendant Jacob Stahl recalled that Kaufman and plaintiff's
district manager had told him that according to tests performed
by plaintiff the Bovin-O-Lac was going to help his cattle gain as
fast or faster than the dry supplement, that it was going to cost
no more than the dry supplement that he was then using, that it
had certain health factors that possibly even the dry supplement
did not have, that the cattle would yield better when sold, that
the Bovin-O-Lac contained a marbling characteristic that ‘would
improve the grade of the cattle, and that the Bovin-O-Lac would
reduce the cost per pound of gain compared to the dry supple-
ment that defendants were then using.

Based upon the enthusiasm of Kaufman and plaintiff's
district manager and on the strength of their representations
concerning Bovin-O-Lac 440, defendants decided to switch from
the dry supplement they were feeding to plaintiff's liquid supple-
ment. They decided to feed the liquid supplement in lots 1 and 2
and to continue feeding a dry supplement in lot 3 for the purposes
of comparison. Accordingly, after the supply of the dry supple-
ment purchased from the competitor manufacturer was ex-
hausted, defendants switched back to plaintiff's dry supplement
Pro X L in lot 3.

The first shipment of Bovin-O-Lac 440 was delivered on or
about December 5, 1970, and was stored in a special holding tank
owned by Kaufman Milling. The holding tank contained a
mechanism for agitating the liquid supplement, inasmuch as it
was necessary to agitate the supplement prior to removing it
from the tank so that a homogenized mixture would be fed to the
livestock.

28 Pe

As manufactured at plaintiff's Muscatine, Iowa, plant, the
Bovin-O-Lac 440 contained the fundamental acids, phosphates,
urea and salt; the other additives, including vitamins, trace
minerals, drugs and regular molasses had to be added at
plaintiff's Sioux City, Iowa, plant. After being completely for-
mulated, the Bovin-O-Lac 440 was transported from the Sioux Ci-
ty plant to the on-farm holding tanks in a truck owned by plain-
tiff. The truck was loaded and unloaded by hoses, but the holding
compartments on the truck did not contain an agitation system.

Each delivery of Bovin-O-Lac 440 was accompanied by a tag
which guaranteed the shipment to include a certain amount of
protein, vitamins and minerals, including calcium, vitamin A and
zine.

In addition to the above described vitamins and minerals,
defendants also ordered the additive diethylstilbestrol
(stilbestrol) to be added to each delivery of Bovin-O-Lac 440. The
supplement was formulated to insure a balanced diet for cattle on
feed; one of plaintiff's witnesses testified that the presence of
calcium, vitamin A and the trace mineral zinc in necessary quan-
tities improved the gainability of cattle on feed and that if the
vitamins and minerals were not present in balanced quantities
the rate of gain would tend to be reduced. Defendant Jacob Stahl
testified that he expected the stilbestrol to account for a fifteen
to seventeen percent reduction in the cost of gain. One of plain-
tiff's witnesses testified that stilbestrol has the reputation for
significantly increasing the rate of gain in cattle and that in the
absence of this additive cattle would not gain as rapidly. Another
of plaintiff's witnesses testified that the use of stilbestrol should
result in an increase of from fifteen to seventeen percent in feed
efficiency, ie., the ability of cattle to convert feed into meat.

Toward the middle of February 1971, having fed the liquid
supplement for approximately 45 to 50 days, defendants became
dissatisfied with the appearance of the cattle in lots 1 and 2
because they did not appear to show the finish or the gain that
the cattle in lot 8 were showing. Defendants made their
dissatisfaction known to Mr. Kaufman, who requested that defen-
dants continue to use the liquid supplement. Because of repeated

ee

complaints by defendants, Mr. Kaufman called in other of plain-
tiffs employees to attempt to assist him in determining what was
wrong with the cattle. On or about April 2, 1971, Mr. Kaufman,
plaintiff's district manager and another of plaintiff's employees
went to defendants’ feedlots, where they observed that the cattle
in lot 3 showed more finish than those in lots 1 and 2. One of plain-
tiffs employees took samples of the silage, the corn and the liquid
supplement that defendants were feeding and advised defen-
dants that the samples would be taken to plaintiff's Muscatine
plant for analysis. Mr. Kaufman had earlier asked a local
veterinarian to check the cattle for disease. Mr. Kaufman himself
could not observe any signs of disease and never received a
report of any disease from the veterinarian. Mr. Kaufman ad-
vised defendants to switch back to plaintiff's Super A & D Primer
dry supplement, which they did on or about April 4, 1971.

On or about April 10, 1971, an inspector for the South Dakota
Department of Agriculture came to defendants’ feedlots at defen-
dants’ request and took two samples of the Bovin-O-Lac 440 from
the holding tank after one of the defendants had agitated the li-
quid supplement within the tank by using the electrically
powered agitating mechanism. Both samples were delivered to
the state chemical laboratory in Vermillion, South Dakota, for
analysis. One of these samples was analyzed for total crude pro-
tein, vitamin A and diethylstilbestrol; the other sample was
analyzed for total crude protein, diethylstilbestrol, vitamin A,
calcium, phosphorous, salt and zine. The results of the analysis on
the two samples when compared with the guaranteed analysis
tags furnished by plaintiff with the delivery of each shipment of
the liquid supplement were as follows:

Found in Stated on guaranteed
Substance Samples analysis tag
Total erude 46.10% (Sample 1) 44.0%
protein 44.99% (Sample 2) 44.0%
Diethylstil- None None
bestrol

Vitamin A 29,400 USP U/lb. 34,000 USP U/lb.

30 Pt

Caleium None Not less than 0.1%
not more than 1.0%
Phosphorous 2.15% Not less than 1.3%
Salt 4.10% Not less than 3.0%
not more than 4.0%
Zine 0.01% Not less than 0.10%
(1000 ppm)

Between the first shipment of liquid supplement on January
18, 1971 (the holding tank had been emptied prior to that date so
that the agitation mechanism could be modified), and the last
delivery on March 4, 1971, the holding tank was never completely
empty. As each successive delivery of the liquid supplement was
made, it was mixed with the liquid supplement remaining in the
tank. Defendants received the last delivery of Bovin-O-Lac on
March 4, 1971, and executed the last delivery receipt note on
April 5, 1971.

The average gain of the 385 cattle fed out in lots 1 and 2 was
448 pounds; the average cost per pound of gain was 29.43 cents.
The average gain of the cattle fed out in lot 3 was 509 pounds; the
average cost per pound of gain was 17.81 cents.

Plaintiff's complaint prayed for judgment in the amount of
$6,158.88 for feed sold and delivered to defendants, including the
Bovin-O-Lac 440. As indicated above, the trial court granted a
directed verdict for plaintiff on this claim, less certain credits to
defendants. -

HH Defendants contend that the trial court erred in inter-
preting our decision in Ralston Purina Co. v. Jungers, 86 S.D. 583,
199 N.W.2d 600, as requiring a verdict to be directed for plaintiff
on its claim for the amount owing for the feed supplement. We
conclude that defendants’ contention is well taken. Failure of con-
sideration is one of those defenses that must be set forth affir-
matively in a responsive pleading. SDCL 15-6-8(c). As an affir-

* mative defense, it is separate and distinct from a claim for
damages properly set forth in a counterclaim. As was stated by
this court in the case of Laney v. Ingalls, 5 S.D. 183, 58 N.W. 572:

es 3

““*** As between the original parties, or those who
stand in their place, it would be repulsive to our prac-
tice, and inconsistent with a fair, economic, and speedy
administration of justice, to hold that a person sued ona
promissory note given for the purchase price of personal
property could not defend on the ground that there was
a failure of consideration or a breach of warranty as to
the quality of such property, which, if proved, would
partially or entirely defeat plaintiff's recovery. ***” 5
S.D. at 186, 58 N.W. at 572.

Want or lack of consideration and failure of consideration
are separate and distinct defenses. One goes to the root of or
reason for the alleged contract; the other is based upon events oc-
curring after the alleged contract has been executed. 17 Am.
Jur.2d, Contracts, § 397; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 129. Indeed, in the
Ralston Purina Co. case we recognized this distinction by first
holding that defendants had not sustained their burden of prov-
ing total lack of consideration and by then citing United States v.
Schaeffer, 9 Cir., 319 F.2d 907, for the proposition that a partial
failure of consideration is ground for abatement of damages.

[i When viewed in the light most favorable to their position,
defendants’ evidence regarding the alleged lack of conformity
between the liquid supplement and that they had ordered and
that which in fact they received was sufficient to warrant submit-
ting their defense of partial failure of consideration to the jury,
although the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling as it did in
view of the fact that in the Ralston Purina Co. case we did not
elaborate on the distinction between the defenses of lack of con-
sideration and failure of consideration.*

Defendants contend that the jury’s verdict against them on
the counterclaim was contrary to the greater weight of evidence

* We do not mean to imply by our holding herein that every trivial or fancied
disparity between that which is agreed upon as the consideration for a contract
and that which is allegedly received will support the affirmative defense of
failure of consideration. It will still be the duty of the trial court in every case to
determine whether the evidence in support of the claimed defense is sufficient
to present an issue of fact for the jury. Cf. Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, 54 S.D.
446, 223 N.W. 585.

82 ee
and was the result of mistake, passion or prejudice.

With respect to the counterclaim, the jury was instructed in
part that:

“You are instructed that this Court has directed a
verdict in favor of the Plaintiff for the amount claimed
to be due for feed supplements sold, delivered, and used
by the Defendants, less certain credits. This removes
from your consideration this part of the case, and you
are no longer to concern yourselves with this phase of
the case.

“There remains, then, for your consideration, the
counter-claim of the Defendants. Defendants in their
counter-claim claim that the feed supplement, Bovin-o-
lace 440, sold by the Plaintiff to Defendants, did not pro-
vide the nutritional balance guaranteed by the Plaintiff.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff, through its agents,
assured them that by using Bovin-o-lac 440, a liquid feed
supplement, instead of the dry feed supplement they
had been using, that the cost of a pound of gain would be
reduced and that the cattle would yield and grade bet-
ter. Defendants allege that the Bovin-o-lac 440 sold to
them was defective and deficient; that the cattle fed
Bovin-o-lac 440 actually gained slower than those on dry
feed and at a higher cost per pound of gain; and that all
of said acts constituted a breach of warranty by the
Plaintiff resulting in a loss to Defendants in the sum of
$10,150.20, * * *”

Instruction No. 9 informed the jury that:

“The Defendants have the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that there were in fact
warranties made with respect to the contents of the
feed supplement Bovin-O-lac 440 together with the pro-
mise of greater gain at less cost per pound; that the war-
ranty was in fact broken, and that the breach of said
warranty was the poximate cause of the loss and

a

damages claimed by the Defendants.

“Tf you find from all of the evidence that Defen-
dants have met their burden of proof as just stated, then
you should return a verdict in favor of the Defendants
for any loss as has been proven by the evidence. If, on
the other hand, you find that the Defendants have failed
to meet their burden of proof on any of the issues con-
cerning which the burden of proof rested on them, then
you should return a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff.”

[i Defendants argue that by instructing the jury that it had
directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the amount claimed to
be due for the feed supplement, the trial court in effect told the
jury that the plaintiff was right and that the defendants were
wrong, with the result that the jury mistakenly concluded that
defendants were not entitled to prevail on their counterclaim.
However, we note that the trial court’s Instruction No. 17 in-
formed the jury that:

“If, in accordance with the Court’s instructions, you
should find that the Defendants, Stahl Brothers, are en-
titled to a verdict against the Plaintiff, Kent Feeds, Inc.,
then it is your duty to award Defendants such damages
as will reasonably compensate them for the loss result-
ing in the ordinary course of events from the breach of
warranty, if such breach of warranty is found by you to
be the proximate cause of such damage or loss. In arriv-
ing at the amount of loss or damage, you must not con-
sider in any way the amount due the Plaintiff for the
feed supplements sold to the Defendants. You must con-
cern yourselves only with the damages, if any, sustained
by the Defendants under their breach of warranty claim.
Whatever adjustments between the parties that may be
necessitated by your verdict will be made by the Court
after your verdict has been received.”

Although defendants contend that the jury could not be ex-
pected to intentionally reduce plaintiff's recovery by awarding
damages on their counterclaim after being informed by the trial

a

court that plaintiff was entitled to fully recover on the pro-
missory notes, they also argue that if their affirmative defense of
partial failure of consideration had been submitted to the jury it
would have been possible for the jury to determine that the
Bovin-O-Lac 440 was worthless, or worth very little, and still find
that defendants were not entitled to recover on their
counterclaim. We think that it is just as realistic to expect that a
jury would follow the court's explicit instructions and decide the
merits of defendants’ counterclaim without any reference to the
fact that plaintiff had been granted a directed verdict on its claim
for the balance due on the supplement as it would be to expect
the jury to find for defendants on their affirmative defense of par-
tial failure of consideration and against them on their
counterclaim for damages for breach of warranty.

From the evidence presented, the jury could very well
have concluded that defendants’ attempted comparison of rates
of gain between the cattle in lots 1 and 2 and those in lot 3 was in-
valid because of a number of factors, e.g., differences in type of
shelter available for each pen, different types of feeding facilities
for each pen, different mud conditions for each pen, different
sources of silage for the cattle in the different pens, the fact that
the weights of the cattle were unknown when the liquid supple-
ment feeding program was started and when it was ended, the
different genetic backgrounds of the cattle in the several pens,
and the fact that the liquid supplement was fed for less than one-
half the time of the total feeding period, that is, for 99 days out of
a total of 223 feeding days.

Accordingly, that portion of the judgment entered on the
jury verdict against defendants on their counterclaim is affirmed;
that portion of the judgment based upon the directed verdict in
favor of plaintiff against defendants on plaintiff's complaint for
the balance due on the delivery receipt notes is reversed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and DOYLE, JJ., concur.

COLER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

COLER, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

ee
I would affirm both the jury verdict and the directed verdict.

As I view the defendants’ answer and counterclaim they
allege total failure of consideration, claiming the feed supplement
was of “no value to Defendants.” They claimed less than total
failure of consideration, however, in their prayer for relief for the
“sum of $28,699.40 less a reasonable sum for the value, if any, of
the * * * supplement.”

The trial court submitted to the jury as a part of damages for
breach of warranty the defendants’ requested jury Instruction #9
as jury Instruction #16 reading as follows:

“16

“The measure of damages for breach of warranty is
the loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary
course of events, from the breach of warranty. In the
case of breach of warranty of quality, such loss, in the
absence of special circumstances showing proximate
damages of a greater amount, is the difference between
the value of the feed supplement at the time of delivery
to the buyers and the value it would have had if it had
answered the warranty. However, where special cir-
cumstances are proven showing proximate damages of a
greater amount, all damages which naturally may result
from a breach of warranty, accrue in favor of the party
injured by such breach of warranty if they are certain
and determinate in nature or amount are also directly
attributable to the breach of the warranty as their
cause.” (emphasis supplied)

By this instruction, the defendants salvaged their claim for
damages for lack of quality even if the trial court erred in denying
the partial failure of consideration claim.

I submit that under the foregoing instruction, coupled with
Instruction #17 set forth in the majority opinion, the issue of
value of the feed supplement has already been submitted to the
jury, under another heading than we might prefer, and resolved

6

against the defendants. It became the law of the case and defen-
-dants are bound by the law they helped establish for the purposes
of this case. SDCL 15-6-51(b).

FARMERS COOPERATIVE ELEVATOR COMPANY
OF REVILLO, Respondent v. JOHNSON, Appellant

(237 N.W.2d 671)

(File No. 11546. Opinion filed January 15, 1976)

s

Gunderson & Gunderson, and Dennis Evenson, Clear Lake,
for appellant.

Austin, Hinderaker & Hackett, Watertown, for respondent.
WINANS, Justice.

A jury in circuit court found the defendant Evan Lee
Johnson, a/k/a Steve Johnson, liable to the plaintiff elevator com-
pany for more than fourteen thousand dollars. Defendant who
represented himself at trial, failed to plead specifically the
statute of frauds and made no objections to the jury instructions
before the close of trial. He now contends that the statute of
frauds is a bar to action, that he pled it sufficiently and that a jury
instruction was improper and substantially prejudiced his case.
Having considered at length all issues raised by the defendant on

ST

appeal we find no reason to reverse the lower court and we
therefore affirm.

Ellsworth Johnson, manager of Plaintiff elevator company,
alleged that Steve Johnson, defendant, entered the elevator of-
fices on May 7, 1973, and asked for a bid on corn. He quoted $1.42
per bushel to him with an August delivery. He testified that on
May 8, 1973, Steven Johnson returned and said “mark it down.”
Introduced into evidence was a small notebook with this notation
on one page: “5/8/73—Steve Johnson 26000 corn—1*— Aug”.
There are no signatures on this memorandum. Plaintiff alleges
that at the time of the purported sale and in reliance thereon it in
turn sold 26,000 bushels of corn to the Bunge Corporation at $1.62
for delivery at Port Bunge in August, 1973. On August 1, 1973,
Plaintiff notified Defendant that his corn was due and Defendant
is said to have responded that he was not going to deliver it.
After further refusals by Defendant, Plaintiff elevator purchased
26,000 bushels of corn on the open market and claimed to have
sustained a net loss in covering its contractual obligation of
$14,154.48. Around August 1, 1973, cash price for corn was bet-
ween $2.15 and $2.30 per bushel. Apparently Defendant sold his
corn to the Nassau Farmers Elevator and denied entering into
any contract to sell and deliver corn to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant for breach of
contract and for fraud. Defendant consulted one or two attorneys
and had one draw up an answer to the complaint but Defendant
did not choose to retain this attorney for further services. In-
stead, he elected to represent himself at trial. His answer denies
allegations of breach of contract and of fraud and further states
“[t}hat at no time on no occasion did the Defendant herein enter
into a contractual obligation, either written or oral, at any
elevator or any market for the Defendant’s shelled corn until the
later part of July when the Defendant herein sold and delivered
the corn in question to the Nassau Farmers Elevator at Nassau,
Minnesota.” There is no specific pleading here of the statute of
frauds although Defendant would like to have his denial of a writ-
ten contract interpreted as such. A trial was held in circuit court
in Grant County on April 30, 1974, and May 1, 1974, and at its con-
clusion the jury found for the plaintiff.

CULE

Defendant through retained counsel on appeal contends that
this action is barred by our statute of frauds and hence the ver-
dict of the jury is a nullity.

SDCL 57-3-1 reads:

“Except as otherwise provided in §§ 57-3-2 and
57-3-3 a contract for the sale of goods for the price of five
hundred dollars or more is not enforceable by way of ac-
tion or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between
the parties and signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought or by his authorized agent or
broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is
not enforceable under this section beyond the quantity
of goods shown in such writing.”

HESDCL 57-2-10 defines as “goods” all things movable at the
time of identification to the contract for sale other than the
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities and
things in action. It specifically includes as “goods” growing crops.
Thus it is clear that the statute of frauds as found in our state law
and taken originally from the Uniform Commercial Code 2-201 ap-
plies to the transaction in question. (See Sacred Heart Farmers
Cooperative Elevator v. Johnson, 1975, Minn., 232 N.W.2d 921, a
case with facts and names similar to the instant case wherein the
statute of frauds, Minn.St. 336.2-201, was found to apply in a pur-
ported corn sale).

HM Acknowledging that the South Dakota statute of frauds
is applicable to the subject matter before us, we must ask
whether or not it must be pleaded specifically and if so whether
or not this was done. SDCL 15-6-8(c) states in part:

“In pleading to a preceding pleading a party shall
set forth affirmatively ** statute of frauds * * * and
any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense.”

a

Fales v. Kaupp, 1968, 83 S.D. 487, 161 N.W.2d 855, is a case for
breach of contract. In that case, on appeal defendants urged that
plaintiffrespondent had waived his right to a certain greater
amount of money. There we said:

“While plaintiff's evidence can be viewed as making this
issue a fact question there is present a basic reason
which prevents us from determining it. Waiver was not
an issue in the trial court. It was not pleaded. This is re-
quired by RCP 8c). [row SDCL 15-6-18(c)]. Nor was it
presented to the jury as an issue by the court’s instruc-
tions. Consequently, it is not before us. Breckweg v.
Knochenmus, 81 S.D. 244, 133 N.W.2d 860. Issues may
not be presented for the first time on appeal.”

Waiver, like statute of frauds, is an affirmative defense which
must be pleaded in this state under SDCL 15-6-8(c). (6 SDCL Ap-
pendix of Forms sets out an illustrative answer presenting
defenses including as the Fourth Defense one of the affirmative
defenses provided for in § 15-6-8(c).) In accord with the foregoing
decision in Fales we are persuaded that the issue of the statute of
frauds is not properly before this court as a bar to this action
because it simply was not pleaded. Our law requires that it be
pleaded as a defense affirmatively. This certainly requires more
than a general denial of the complaint or even the ambiguous
reply couched in a double negative and a negative pregnant that
there was no written contract. Defendant had a duty to plead this
defense in order to claim its protection and, having failed to do so,
he cannot now retry his case on appeal. An affirmative plea in
this situation must at least state that the subject matter of the
complaint falls within the provisions of SDCL 57-3-1 and assert
that there is no writing covering the matter in question and sign-
ed by the party charged.

[i Defendant’s counsel further contends that because Defen-
dant at trial chose to represent himself, and was therefore
presumably less adept at protecting his interests than would
have been a member of the bar, the judge was allowed without
any objection made on Defendant's part to present an erroneous

PO lrrcLlrC(CL

instruction to the jury. The Instruction in question, #12, reads as
follows: :

“The issue to be determined by you in this case is,
did the plaintiff and the defendant enter into an agree-
ment on May 8, 1973, whereby the defendant was to
deliver to the plaintiff in August, 1973, 26,000 bushels of
corn at the rate of $1.42 a bushel.”

In Fales v. Kaupp, supra, defendants-appellants claimed that two
features of the jury instructions were improper and prejudicial.
There we noted:

“On the settlement of the instructions they [appellants]
did not object to the giving of the instruction. This
precludes appellate consideration of their claim. RCP
51(b) [pow SDCL 15-6-51(b)] provides in part that ‘No
grounds of objection * ** to the giving * ** of an in-
struction shall be considered either on motion for new
trial or appeal, unless presented to the court upon the
“settlement” of such instruction.’ ”

Similarly, in the earlier case of Keller v. Merkel, 1950, 73 S.D. 477,
44 N.W.2d 208, we said:

“The other assignments relate to the giving of cer-
tain instructions by the trial court and to the refusal of
the trial court to give certain requested instructions. No
exceptions were ‘taken to any instructions of the court
nor did defendant except to the refusal of the court to
give requested instructions. Under this record,
therefore, the trial court’s instructions becatne the law
of the case and no question concerning the instructions
is before this court.”

We cannot say that the Instruction complained of, in the absence
of an affirmative plea of the statute of frauds and/or an objection
at the settlement of instructions, was prejudicial error.

HM Particularly with regard to his failure to object to the

TT

questioned instruction, appellant raises the issue of his ap-
pearance on his own behalf without other counsel or co-counsel.
He would, it appears to us, seek the special indulgence of this
bench because of his unfamiliarity with the rules of pleading and
trial practice. To acquiesce to his entreaty would be to work in-
justice in the name of justice for it would allow those who freely
elect to act as their own counsel liberties not accorded to those
who seek out members of the bar to represent them in cases such
as this. In Stark v. Stark, 1961, 79 S.D. 178, 109 N.W.2d 904, we
remarked:

“Most troublesome is the question of whether the
evidence justifies the verdict for the full amount of
$15,000 claimed in the complaint. That this resulted
because of defendant's failure to have a lawyer repre-
sent him and acted as his own counsel at the trial may be
the subject of conjecture. He had the right to represent
himself, about which his counsel at oral argument recall-
ed a cliche familiar to all lawyers. He may not capitalize
on his unfamiliarity with law; he is bound by the same
rules of evidence and procedure as is required by those
who are duly licensed to practice law * * *.”

In the same vein is the opinion of the California District Court of
Appeals in Lombardi v. Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank,
1956, 187 Cal.App.2d 206, 289 P.2d 823, which said:

“(I]t is clear plaintiff received the decision to which he
was entitled, * * * since he did not establish any element.
of his case. But, he argues, the judge knew he was a
layman unlearned in legal procedure and the technical
rules of evidence, therefore he should have helped him
out. That would have been an unjust reward for ig-
norance * * *,”

Defendant Johnson failed to assert properly the defense of
the statute of frauds according to the provisions of our law in his
pleading, in the course of the trial or at the settlement of the in-
structions. He cannot now raise this defense on appeal. He had
the right to serve as his own counsel and, having exercised this

ee

right, he is bound to the consequences of his course of action.

Affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.
DOYLE, J., concurs in result.

DOYLE, Justice (concurring in result).

The majority opinion deals with essentially two issues— one
concerning the failure to plead affirmatively the defense of the
statute of frauds, and, next, the failure to request an instruction
on the subject. In my opinion, the statements too narrowly con-
fine this jurisdiction’s attitude toward pleading. While it is true
that the statute of frauds must be affirmatively pled, it is also
true that it is not necessary to plead if the issue is tried by con-
sent, either expressed or implied. The majority opinion, in my
view, adopts an overly formalistic view. I would prefer to bottom
the opinion on the defendant's failure to request an instruction,
which is more in line with the Fales case cited in the opinion: To
decide the case on the failure to request an instruction is in accor-
dance with a long-standing rule in this state. See State v. Henry,
1973, 87 S.D. 454, 210 N.W.2d 169; State v. Barr, 1975, 89 S.D. 280,
232 N.W.2d 257.

STATE, Respondent v. GRIMES, Appellant
(237 N.W.2d 900)
(File No. 11547. Opinion filed January 15, 1976)

a
P|

Robert L. O’Connor, Sioux Falls, Harry H. Smith, Sioux City,
Iowa, for defendant and appellant.

William Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, Earl R. Mettler, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Fort Pierre, Gene Paul Kean, State’s Atty., Sioux
Falls, for plaintiff and respondent.

WINANS, Justice.

In connection with the arrest of her husband a wife, follow-
ing a very convivial pre-Christmas party at a Sioux Falls hotel,
shot and wounded one of the arresting officers. She herself was
arrested, tried and found guilty of shooting with intent to kill. On
appeal she questions the instruction to the jury with regard to
the law on defending the person of another against attack, she ob-
jects to refusal of an instruction on simple assault and she alleges
insufficient evidence to support the verdict.

Defendant, Roxanna K. Grimes, had spent more than six
hours at the Sioux Falls Downtown Holiday Inn attending a
Christmas party held for the benefit of labor union officials and
their staffs on December 12, 1973. At that time she was a
secretary employed at the Sioux Falls Labor Temple and her hus-
band, Raymond Grimes, who was employed by Laborers’ Local
352, had his offices there also. By all accounts there was a large
amount of alcohol consumed by the guests that day and Defen-
dant is estimated to have imbibed as few as five or six and as
many as twenty-five drinks. Sometime after nine in the evening
Mr. and Mrs. Grimes apparently discovered that the car keys for
the vehicle Mrs. Grimes was to drive were missing and they went
in search of an acquaintance who had borrowed them earlier in
the day. Having left the hotel’s first floor area where their
private party was being held, they went up to the Sattellite Bar
on the top floor. While on the top floor Mrs. Grimes behaved in
too spirited a fashion and Officer James McKelvey of the Sioux

46 pe

Falls Police Department, who was employed in his off-hours as
Holiday Inn security guard, approached them and informed them
that the hotel had received several complaints about their
Janguage and their tone of voice and asked them to leave. He then
escorted them down via the elevator to the lobby. On the way
down Defendant pushed most of the elevator’s buttons, causing it
to stop at almost every floor. Once in the lobby Defendant become
somewhat abusive, employing crude and vulgar language, and Of-
ficer McKelvey had a police car summoned. In response to the call
Officer Larry Gulickson arrived and the two attempted to usher
Mrs. Grimes out through the lobby’s north door. Mr. Grimes
reacted to this by lunging at Officer McKelvey from the rear. A
struggle resulted and in short order McKelvey and Mr. Grimes
had passed through two sets of double doors and landed on the
sidewalk along the hotel’s north parking field. Officer Gulickson
was in the process of coming to the aid of McKelvey when he was
twice shot by Mrs. Grimes who had somehow, still unexplained,
obtained McKelvey’s .38 calibre Smith and Wesson revolver
which had been fastened in his shoulder holster. An Officer
Flowers, who was visiting the hotel, came running out and Mrs.
Grimes fired a third time, dropped the revolver, and ran. She was
apprehended almost immediately on the hotel property.

Defendant was arrested and charged with disturbing the
peace, resisting process and shooting with intent to kill. The com-
plaint which this appeal concerns was dated December 13, 1973,
and charges Defendant with “shooting with intent to kill, in viola-
tion of the provisions of SDCL 22-18-9.” A preliminary hearing
was held at Sioux Falls before the Honorable Robert Patterson
on January 10, 1974, and Mrs. Grimes was bound over for trial in
circuit court. She was arraigned on February 8, 1974, and jury
trial was held at Sioux Falls before the Honorable Richard Braith-
waite beginning July 30th. On August 2, 1974, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty to the charge of shooting with intent to kill. On
August 8th Judge Braithwaite sentenced Roxanna Grimes to the
South Dakota Women’s Correctional Facility for no less than
three nor more than eight years.

On appeal Defendant raised four issues. They deal with

es

the standard to be used in justifying a wife’s conduct
in defense of her husband;

a

1)

the possibility of Instruction #19 on the standard
being confusing and inconsistent;

c) the omission of a requested instruction on the lesser

included offense of simple assault and

d

lack of sufficient evidence to support the finding of
shooting with intent to kill Officer Gulickson.

We find the first, second and fourth objections raised above to be
without merit. We also find that the trial court erred in refusing
the defendant’s request for an instruction on the lesser included
offense of simple assault, but in view of the fact that Defendant
Grimes suffered no harm from the error we affirm the decision of
the lower court.

Hi Our statute makes no distinction.among those allowed to
defend themselves or to come to the defense of another, and it
assigns no exclusive right or privilege in the defense of another
to spouses or other relatives nor does it forbid the defense of
unrelated friends or total strangers. SDCL 22-18-4 sets out the
law and applicable standard:

“To use or attempt or offer to use force or violence
upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful
when committed either by the party about to be injured,
or by any other person in his aid or defense, in prevent-
ing or attempting to prevent an offense against his per-
son or any trespass or other unlawful interference with
real or personal property in his lawful possession; pro-
vided the force or violence used is not more than suffi-
cient to prevent such offense.” [emphasis added]

Thus a wife, such as Roxanna Grimes in this case, is entitled to
employ force or violence not more than sufficient to ward off an
offense against the person of her husband should that offense or
assault be unlawful. The same would hold true were she attempt-

48 Pe

ing to defend herself or a stranger. However, as with self-defense,
so also with the defense of any other one is not justified in using
force for protection unless she reasonably believes that there is,
immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm. Instruction 19 in its
first paragraph adequately set out this standard, apparently
adapting it from the above statute directly or from our criminal
Pattern Jury Instruction 2-14-9.

HB Instruction 19, after restating in its first paragraph the
law set out in SDCL 22-18-4 adapting it for the defense of another,
followed it with two paragraphs which read as follows:

“Where an assault is made with only the hands and fists
but with such force and in such manner as is likely to
produce great bodily injury, the spouse of the person at-
tacked may lawfully resist the attack with whatever
force is reasonably and apparently necessary.

“Where an assault with the fists or hands, or by means
not likely to produce great bodily injury, is being made
on a person, but without intent to kill or do great bodily
harm, and if the assault is not likely to produce great
bodily injury, and if the spouse of the person being at-
tacked is not deceived as to the character of such an
assault, she is not justified in using a deadly weapon in
self-defense.”

Appellant contends that the Instruction, taken as a whole, is con-
fusing. A careful reading of all three paragraphs will show that
there is no inconsistency and that the second and third.
paragraphs merely clarify the right of one to come to the defense
of another and set out the appropriate force to be used or not to
be used depending upon the nature of the attack. Instruction 19 is
a correct statement of the law, is not in and of itself confusing,
and was properly given.

Hi The court gave Instruction #12 to the jury, which reads in
part:

“The offense of shooting with intent to kill, with

ee

which Roxanna Grimes is charged in the Information,
necessarily includes the lesser offenses of:

1. Assault with dangerous weapon with intent to
injure.

2. Assault and battery.

8. Gross injury to another.

4, Disturbing the peace.”

Defendant had requested an instruction which read in part:

“The offense of shooting with intent to kill, with
which the defendant is charged in the information,
necessarily includes the lesser offenses of:

* * * * * *

(4) Also included offense is assault, which is any
willful and unlawful attempt or offer, with force or
violence, to do corporal hurt to another.”

SDCL 23-45-23 provides:

“The jury may find the defendant guilty of any of-
fense, the commission of which is necessarily included in
that with which he is charged in the indictment or infor-
mation, or of an attempt to commit the offense charged.”

With regard to the case before us this statute would mean that
the jury could have found Defendant guilty only of simple assault
if simple assault is a lesser offense included in 22-18-9 which
covers shooting with intent to kill and assault and battery with
intent to kill and the attempts to do such. Our law on assault and
battery with intent to kill was established in territorial days and
is now as it was then and we hold that it applies also to shooting
with intent to kill since the latter is but an instance of the former.
This is made even more evident by our legislature’s decision to
deal with them together. In People v. Odell, 1875, 1 Dak. 197, 46
N.W. 601, the Supreme Court of Dakota said that:

50 ee

““*** the man who commits the crime of an assault and
battery with intent to kill ex necessitate has also com-
mitted the lesser offenses of an assault, assault and bat-
tery, and an assault with intent to do bodily harm, and
when charged with the higher might be convicted of
either of the lower. *** It therefore seems to be the ©
settled law that a defendant tried on indictment for
assault and battery with intent to kill, may be convicted
either of the crime charged or of an assault or assault
and battery with intent to do bodily harm, or for assault
and battery, or for a simple assault.”

This was further clarified in Territory v. Conrad, 1877, 1 Dak.
363, 46 N.W. 605, where Mr. Chief Justice Shannon, speaking for
the Supreme Court of Dakota, said: “[t]his court accordingly held,
at the January term, 1876, in the case of People v. Odell * * * on
an indictment for shooting with a shot gun, with intent to kill,
that a defendant ‘may be convicted either of the crime charged,
or of an assault, or assault and battery, with intent to do bodily
harm, or for assault and battery, or for a simple assault’.”

In an Ohio case, State v. Deboard, 1962, 116 Ohio App. 108,
187 N.E.2d 83, defense counsel complained of the court’s giving
instructions on lesser included offenses of assault, assault with a
dangerous weapon, and pointing firearms on a charge of
maliciously shooting with intent to kill or wound. The Ohio Court
of Appeals said:

“We feel that the trial judge was justified in charg-
ing on the three lesser included offenses, in view of the
facts in this case. Not only was he justified but under a
duty so to charge. Had he not so charged it would have
been tantamount to a directed verdict of not guilty of
the lesser included offenses upon which he did not
charge.” .

While we do not agree that the trial judge in the case before us
had a duty on his own motion so to charge, we are in agreement
that he had a duty to give the instruction when it was supported
by the evidence and when it was requested by Defendant in light

eee 51

of our statute SDCL 23-45-23. Judge Rudolph, speaking for this
Court, said:

““* * * Under the law as established in this state it is in-
cumbent upon the trial court to instruct the jury, if re-
quested, upon a lesser offense included in the offense
charged if the evidence warrants a conviction upon the
included offense.” State v. Crofutt, 1955, 76 S.D. 77, 72
N.W.2d 435.

The trial court refused to give Defendant’s requested instruction
on simple assault because it was his “belief that the only dif-
ference in the elements necessary to prove assault and assault
and battery is that the assault culminates in a battery [and] it is
undisputed there was a battery in this case and it would be im-
possible for the jury to find that there was not a battery.” A bat-
tery is defined in SDCL 22-18-1 as “any willful and unlawful use of
force or violence upon the person of another.” Even assuming
that an assault had taken place and that it resulted in the use
upon the person of another of force or violence, it still remained
for the jury to find that such an apparent battery was’ in fact
willful and unlawful. Odell, supra, has held that a simple assault is
necessarily within the elements of assault and battery with in-
tent to kill and we find no reason to say otherwise.

Hf Although we believe the trial court’s refusal to give the
requested instruction was error, it is also clear from the jury’s
verdict that Mrs. Grimes suffered no harm from the error. She
was found guilty of the offense with which she was charged,
shooting with intent to kill, and not of one of the lesser included
offenses contained in the instructions. It appears that the jury
was without reasonable doubt on the charge of shooting with in-
tent to kill, which it could rightly have found from the evidence,
and it has no need to find any lesser offense was committed even
though by the court’s instructions they had the opportunity to so
find. Whether the jury had been offered an assault instruction ap-
parently would not have been of consequence in light of the ver-
dict. Since Defendant suffered no real harm from the error, the
conviction on the charge of shooting with intent to kill is affirm-
ed.

Ro

DUNN, C. J., and DOYLE and COLER, JJ., concur.

WOLLMAN, J., concurs specially.

WOLLMAN, Justice (concurring specially).

Although I agree that the conviction should be affirmed, I do
not agree that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruc-
tion on simple assault. Even if the offense of simple assault is
necessarily included within the offense of shooting with intent to
kill, the evidence did not warrant a conviction on that lesser of-
fense, and thus the trial court-was correct in refusing to give the
requested instruction. State v. Kapelino, 20 S.D. 591, 108 N.W.
335; State v. Crofutt, 76 S.D. 77, 72 N.W.2d 435; State v. O’Con-
nor, 86 S.D. 294, 194 N.W.2d 246.

LeCLAIRE, Appellant v. HOVEY, Respondent
(237 N.W.2d 895)

(File No. 11595. Opinion filed January 15, 1976)

Wally Eklund of Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, Gregory, for
plaintiff and appellant.

William Wernke of Herman & Wernke, Gregory, for defend-
ant and respondent.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in Gregory County of
the Sixth Judicial Circuit of South Dakota. Plaintiff had sought
damages for personal injury and property damage in the amount
of $12,500, and was awarded a verdict of $1,250. Plaintiff appeals
from the judgment? on the grounds that (1) the jury verdict of
$1,250 was grossly inadequate, and (2) the court committed pre-

1. Plaintiff assigns as error the lower court's order denying a new trial. While we
find in the record a motion for a new trial, we can find no written order of the
court denying the motion. We also note that in plaintiff's notice of appeal he
makes no mention of the order denying a new trial in spite of the fact that he
assigns it as error. Therefore, we will disregard plaintiff's assignments of error
as they relate to the alleged denial of a new trial and will consider the appeal as
being solely from the judgment of the trial court.

1

judicial error in permitting a letter from Dr. Giebink in evidence.
We affirm.

This lawsuit resulted from an automobile accident which oc-
curred on October 30, 1972. Both vehicles involved were traveling
west on U.S. Highway 18, approximately two miles east of Burke,
South Dakota. The road was slushy in some spots. Both defendant
and plaintiff were alone in their respective vehicles. The defend-
ant in attempting to pass plaintiff's vehicle collided with the left
front fender of plaintiff's car. Plaintiff's car slid off the road into
the ditch and then proceeded backward up a railroad embank-
ment before settling back down into the ditch. Plaintiff did not
appear to be hurt at the accident scene, but a passing motorist
prevailed upon him to go to the Burke hospital. He subsequently
developed a stiffening in his neck and was kept in the Burke
hospital for two days.

Plaintiff presents two arguments which he feels require that
this court reverse for a new trial. His first argument is that the
jury verdict of $1,250 was grossly inadequate and was given
under the influence of passion and prejudice. His second argu-
ment is that the court erred in admitting into evidence an exhibit
which was inadmissible hearsay and which greatly prejudiced his
case.

we ‘turn first to plaintiff's argument that the damages
awarded by the jury were grossly inadequate and influenced by
passion and prejudice. The record does reveal that plaintiff did
have some uncontroverted evidence of damages. He introduced a
doctor bill from his physician, Dr. Sweet, in the amount of $35.60.
He also introduced a bill from the Burke hospital for $119.30. As
to the damage to his car, a 1966 Ford stationwagon plaintiff
testified that it was worth $500 prior to the accident and he ad-
mitted that he sold the car for $150 after the accident, making his
loss $350. At this point plaintiff's proven damages total only
$504.90.

Plaintiff contends, however, that his neck was seriously in-
jured in the accident. At trial he read into evidence the deposi-
tion of his own physician, Dr. Sweet, and introduced the deposi-

Pe 55

tion of Dr. James Jackson of Yankton. Dr. Jackson is an or-
thopedic specialist. The medical diagnosis of both doctors was
that plaintiff suffered a flexion-extension injury to his neck as a
result of the accident. This is an injury which in layman's terms is
commonly called a “whiplash.” Dr. Jackson testified that plaintiff
had a ten percent disability of his neck. Plaintiff also sought
damages for loss of earnings, claiming that he had to quit his job
because of his injuries. The record shows that he was employed
by the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and his job entailed a great deal of
driving. He alleged that his neck injury precluded him doing any
long-distance driving.

Defendant introduced evidence which tended to show that
plaintiff's injury was relatively minor. Among the evidence which
was put in evidence was a letter from an orthopedic specialist
which concluded that, “I did not find anything very remarkable
wrong with him.” More will be said about this letter in the second
part of this opinion. The jury was made aware of the fact that
plaintiff's total hospitalization resulting from this accident was
only two days. The jury also knew that at the time of the accident
the plaintiff was sixty-eight years of age and this could have
caused it to reduce the damages awarded for plaintiff's alleged
permanent, partial disability to his neck. And, of course, as we
recently pointed out in Kamp Dakota, Inc. v. Salem Lumber Com-
pany, Inc., 1975, 89 S.D. 696, 237 N.W.2d 180, the jury need not
believe any or all of the testimony of an expert witness. Here
they need not have believed Dr. Jackson's estimate that plaintiff
had a ten percent disability of his neck. As to the loss of income,
the jury could have decided that plaintiff's injury was not related
to his quitting his job or that plaintiff could have found some
other suitable employment.

HB Viewing the record as a whole, we cannot say that the ver-
dict of the jury was so grossly inadequate as to merit a new trial
on the issue of damages. The jury heard the evidence and arrived
at a verdict of $1,250. We must presume in the absence of any
‘evidence to the contrary that the jury was comprised of fair-
minded persons and that it was not influenced by passion or pre-
judice. Davis v. Holy Terror Mining Company, 1906, 20 S.D. 399,
107 N.W. 374.

oT

Plaintiff next challenges the admissibility of one of the
pieces of evidence introduced by the defendant. It appears that
before consulting Dr. Jackson in Yankton, the plantiff was ex-
amined by Dr. Robert Giebink, an orthopedic specialist from
Sioux Falls. Dr. Giebink wrote a consultation letter to Dr. Sweet
indicating that his examination of the patient was premature;
“He has scarcely had time for any normal bruise or contusions to
heal.” However, the letter did contain this conclusion which was
objected to by the plaintiff: “I did not find anything very
remarkable wrong with him.” Dr. Sweet kept the letter and made
it a part of plaintiff's medical file. Defendant was made aware of
this letter during the discovery process and sought to have it in-
troduced at trial. The letter, with certain portions which referred
to plaintiff's attorney deleted, was allowed into evidence by the
court.”

2, ROBERT R. GIEBINK, M.D. PHONE 836-2638, DAY OR NIGHT
H. PHIL GROSS, M.D. AREA CODE 605
RICHARD F. NICE, M.D. E, E, HANSSEN, BUS. MGR.

FRANK G, ALVINE, M.D.
ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES, LTD.
Orthopasdic Surgery
Diseases of Bones and Joints
SUITE 102, 1200 EUCLID AVENUE
SIOUX FALLS, 8. DAK. 57105
8 December 1972

Ed Sweet, M.D.
Burke
South Dakota
Re: Phillip LeClaire
Dear Ed:

‘He has scarcely had time for any normal bruise or contusions to heal. I
really see no indication for us to see him.

did not find anything very remarkable wrong with him,

Mr. LeClaire will be coming back to see you and maybe you will have
better success getting him to loosen up than I have, but I didn’t really see
anything in the x-rays and I really don’t think that he should have to wear this
collar too much longer. He does strike me as having a little limited neck motion
and he certainly could have had a neck injury from the sound of the accident,
but it has had adequate time to heal and I think now it is a question of getting it
limbered up and getting the muscles back in shape.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

(s) Robert R. Giebink, M.D.

ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES, LTD.

RRG/mr

Enclosure

Contrary to an assertion made by counsel during oral argument, the unex-
purgated letter from Dr. Giebink does not appear in the official record, although
it was set out in appellant's brief.

a

Plaintiff contends that this letter was inadmissible hearsay
and should not have been admitted into evidence. While it is true
that the letter is hearsay, that fact alone does not automatically
make it inadmissible. Over the years several exceptions have
been made to the hearsay rule. One exception allows for the ad-
mission of business records, even if the records themselves would
otherwise constitute hearsay. This exemption is statutory in
South Dakota and is found at SDCL 19-7-11:

“The term ‘business’ shall include every kind of
business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation of
institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.

“A record of an act, condition, or event, shall in so
far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian
or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the
mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the
regular course of business, at or near the time of the act,
condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the
sources of information, method, and time of preparation
were such as to justify its admission.

“This section may be cited as the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act.”

[i We hold that the letter from Dr. Giebink to Dr. Sweet was
admissible under SDCL 19-7-11 as a business record. It was a
recording of Dr. Giebink’s professional opinion of the plaintiff's
condition, made at or near the time of his examination of the
plaintiff. The letter was sent in the regular course of business to
Dr. Sweet and was made a part of plaintiff's medical record. As
custodian of the record, Dr. Sweet testified at the trial and
established the foundation for its admissibility. In Falcone v. N. J.
Bell Tel. Co., 1967, 98 N.J. Super. 138, 236 A.2d 394, the court con-
sidered the same Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act as it
applied to medical records. We agree with that court when it
stated:

“On principle, the reasoning which justifies the ad-
mission of laboratory and X-ray reports contained in a

38 es

hospital record equally supports the admissibility of a
medical diagnosis made by the treating physician. Such
a diagnosis is no more than the opinion of a scientific ex-
pert (here a doctor of medicine) who has examined the
patient, heard his statement and observed his symp-
toms.” 236 A.2d at 399.

See also Glawe v. Rulon, 8 Cir., 1960, 284 F.2d 495.

Further, we do not find the letter to be so prejudicial as to be
fatal to the plaintiff's case. It was a preliminary opinion given
very shortly after the accident and at a time when it was difficult
to ascertain any permanent limitation of the neck because of nor-
mal bruises and contusions from the accident, and the letter so
states. The jury had the testimony presented by Dr. Sweet and
Dr. Jackson before it also, and it was the jury’s prerogative to
resolve any conflicts of testimony and to make a determination as
to the extent of plaintiff's injury. Accordingly, we hold that the
court did not err in admitting Dr. Giebink’s letter into evidence.

By this holding we do not mean to imply that a physician’s
letter stating his conclusions about a patient’s condition will
always be an acceptable substitute for the physician’s sworn
testimony, either by way of deposition or in open court. In the in-
stant case the plaintiff himself consulted Dr. Giebink about his
symptoms. We have no doubt that had Dr. Giebink’s diagnosis
been more favorable to plaintiff's case, his deposition would have
been taken by plaintiff's attorney and it would have been
presented at the trial. Since his diagnosis was not favorable, the
consultation letter to Dr. Sweet was simply added to plaintiff's
medical records and plaintiff made no attempt to depose Dr.
Giebink. Defendant discovered the letter by accident while con-
ducting his pretrial discovery. Defendant did not ask Dr. Giebink
to examine plaintiff nor did he have anything to do with the letter
being placed in plaintiff's medical file. It is on the basis of these
facts alone that we uphold the circuit court in this evidentiary
ruling.

Having found that the court did not abuse its discretion and
that the defendant’s exhibit was properly admitted we affirm the

es 59

judgment of the trial court.

WINANS, DOYLE and COLER, JJ., concur.
WOLLMAN, J., dissents.
WOLLMAN, Justice (dissenting).

Because I do not believe that a letter setting forth one doc-
tor’s medical opinion regarding the condition of a patient and sent
to another doctor is the type of record the admission of which the
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Acts, SDCL 19-7-11, was

“designed to facilitate, I would hold that the trial court erred in ad-
mitting Dr. Giebink’s letter. See Clark v. Bergen, 75 S.D. 48, 59
N.W.2d 250; Bentz v. Cimarron Insurance Co., 79 S.D. 510, 114
N.W.2d 96; Plank v. Herigs, 83 S.D. 173, 156 N.W.2d 193; Olson v.
Aldren, 84 S.D. 292, 170 N.W.2d 891.

I would adopt the following statement, made with respect to
letters written by physicians setting forth their findings and con-
clusions concerning an allegedly injured plaintiff:

““* * * Moreover they were not confined to a record of
objective acts, conditions, transactions, occurrences or
events which took place at or near the time of recording,
as the statutes require. For in addition to statements of
the observed condition of the plaintiff they contain
many facts relating to his prior history, apparently
given by him to the writers, as well as the writers’ sub-
jective findings and conclusions. The cited statutes
clearly do not authorize the admission of unsworn
statements, such as these, made by a physician to a third
party giving his opinion as to the condition of a patient
whom he has examined. It is incumbent upon a party
who desires to put such an opinion in evidence to call the
physician as a witness at the trial or take his deposition
if otherwise permissible.” Masterson v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 8 Cir., 182 F.2d 793, 796.

For cases indicating that portions of written records which
are merely diagnostic or expressive of opinions or conclusions of

60

doctors are not admissible, see Hussein v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 5
Cir., 405 F'.2d 946, 948. See also Boland v. Jando, Mo., 395 S.W.2d
206; McCormick on Evidence (2d Ed. 1972) § 313.

FRIESSEN CONST. CO., INC., et al., Respondents v.
ERICKSON, et. al., Appellants

(238 N.W.2d 278)

(File No. 11647. Opinion filed January 15, 1976)

2

Gale E. Fisher of May, Johnson & Burke, Sioux Falls, for
plaintiffs and respondents.

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., John Dewell, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Pierre, for defendants and appellants.

DOYLE, Justice.

Respondent taxpayers sued the Minnehaha County.
Treasurer and the South Dakota Secretary of Revenue for a re-
fund of taxes paid under protest. The taxpayers, who installed
concrete pipe for the City of Sioux Falls, were subjected to a usé
tax on the pipe pursuant to SDCL 10-46-5 even though they had

“-never-held title to it. The taxpayers contend that SDCL 10-46-5,
when read with SDCL 10-46-1(2), does not impose a tax on them,
or, in the alternative, that SDCL 10-46-5 is void as inconsistent
with Art. XI, § 5 of the South Dakota Constitution. The trial court
found for the taxpayers on the constitutional grounds cited. We
reverse.

T. Facts.

The taxpayers include five construction firms' which suc-

1. _ The firms have not alleged that they are “instrumentalities” of the city and we
have therefore assumed throughout this opinion that they are independent con.
tractors. We express no opinion herein on a situation involving “instrumen-
talities” of the city. See Hallett Construction Company v. State, 1963, 80 S.D.

68, 119 N.W.2d 117.

TT

cessfully bid on city contracts for the installation of 21,000 feet of
reinforced concrete pipe and appurtenances for an addition to the
central main sanitary sewer in Sioux Falls. Under the terms of
the contract, the city purchased the pipe and caused it to be
delivered to the installation site. The taxpayers, pursuant to
detailed specifications, provided a proper foundation for the pipe,
placed it, and backfilled and restored the surface. The pipe ap-
parently became an integral part of the municipally operated
sewer system.

About two years after the contracts were signed the Depart-
ment of Revenue conducted audits on the taxpayers and gave
each a notice of hearing to determine tax due. Subsequent to
hearing, each taxpayer was assessed a use tax on the pipe it had
installed. The amounts claimed by the state vary from a high of
$6,220.71 to a low of $1,089.89.

IL, Conflict of SDCL 10-46-5 with SDCL 10-46-1(2).

The first issue we must consider is whether SDCL 10-46-5
.and SDCL 10-46-1(2) impose a use tax on a construction firm for
pipe which is owned by a municipal corporation but which the
construction firm installs in furtherance of its contract with the
city.

SDCL 10-46-5 reads in part:

“Where a contractor *** uses tangible personal
property in the performance of his contract * **
whether the title to such property be in the contractor
*** or any other person, or whether the titleholder of
such property would be subject to pay the sales or use
tax, such contractor * * * shall pay a tax at the rate
prescribed by § 10-45-2 * * *.”

It seems abundantly clear that the plain meaning of the
statute is that the use tax is‘to be imposed on a contractor, who,
in the performance of his contract, uses tangible personal pro-
perty, the title to which is in a nontaxable entity, such as a
municipality. The taxpayers apparently admit that there is no

Ss

other logical way to read the statute when the remainder of the
tax code is not considered.

However, the taxpayers argue strenuously that other sec-
tions of the tax code must be considered to give full meaning to
‘the statute. In particular, the taxpayers suggest that the “plain
meaning” construction of SDCL 10-46-5 is at odds with the defini-
tion of “use” contained in SDCL 10-46-1(2). This definition states:

“‘Use’ means and includes the exercise of right or
power over tangible personal property incidental to the
ownership of that property * * *.”

The taxpayers assert that “use,” under SDCL 10-46-5, must
therefore be “incidental to ownership” even though SDCL 10-46-5
specifically states that the tax is to be imposed “whether the title
to such property be in the contractor * * * or any other person.”
The history of the two statutes demonstrates the taxpayers’ con-
tention to be inaccurate. The definition of “use” contained in
SDCL 10-46-1(2) was adopted in 1989 when the overall Use Tax
Act was enacted. The definition included the “incidental to the
ownership” language. See Ch. 276, Sec. 2(2), S.L.1939. In 1964 the
United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Boyd, 378
USS. 39, 84 S.Ct. 1518, 12 L.Ed.2d 713. In Boyd the Supreme Court
held valid a Tennessee statute which imposed a use tax upon a
contractor who employed property belonging to the federal
government in carrying out his contract, but who never himself
held title to that property. In 1966 the South Dakota legislature
enacted Ch. 256, S.L.1966, ie., SDCL 10-46-5, which followed the
language of the Tennessee statute very closely; in particular, it
should be noted that both the Tennessee statute and the South
Dakota statute contain language imposing the tax on the contrac-
tor “whether the title to such property be in the contrac-
tor * * * or any other person” and “whether the titleholder * * *
would be subject to * * * (the) use tax.” See 12 T.C.A. 67-3004;
SDCL 10-46-5.

This history leads us to the conclusion that the South Dakota
legislature intended in 1966 to accomplish what the Tennessee
legislature had already accomplished; it intended to impose the

rr

use tax upgn those who contracted with local, state, federal or
other nontaxable entities and who “used” the property of those
entities in their construction contracts.

This conclusion is bolstered by SDCL 5-18-5.1 enacted in
1978. That section makes specific reference to situations in which
a public corporation supplies tangible personal property for
which the contractor is taxable under SDCL 10-46-5. SDCL
5-18-5.1 states:

“When a public corporation is to supply tangible
personal property to be used in performance of the con-
tract which is taxable to the contractor under § 10-46-5,
the specifications or notice to bidders shall state the
purchase price or fair market value thereof, whichever
is the greater, which shall be the basis for determining
the contractor's liability for tax.”

We regard SDCL 5-18-5.1 as an affirmation by the legislature
of its intention to tax contractors who use property of a municipal
corporation in the furtherance of their contracts.

We have noted above, however, that there does appear to be
a conflict between the taxing statute, SDCL 10-46-5, and the
definitional statute, SDCL 10-46-1(2).

Furthermore, we recognize the general principle that,
“The courts do not favor repeals by implication, and it is the
duty of this court to give effect to both enactments if their provi-
sions can be reconciled’.”. Argo Oil Corporation v. Lathrop, 76
S.D. 70,76, 72 N.W.2d 481, 485, quoting Brookings County v.
Sayre, 53 S.D. 350, 354, 220 N.W. 918, 920. Our analysis has in-
dicated that there is an irreconcilability between the statutes in
question as to whether a contractor may be subject to a use tax
on property owned by the city. The later enacted statute, SDCL
10-46-5, allowing such taxation, must prevail in this regard.
However, SDCL 10-46-1(2), the definitional statute, is still perti-
nent with regard to other sections of the tax law. We therefore
hold, consistent with the principles announced in Lathrop, that in-
sofar as SDCL 10-46-1(2) is in conflict with the taxing statute,

SS

SDCL 10-46-5, the later statute should prevail. However, SDCL
10-46-1(2) retains its validity in any situation not set out in SDCL
10-46-5.

Our construction of these statutes thus allows imposition of a
use tax on the taxpayers here who “used” the property of the
municipality in completing their contracts.

We note that this interpretation is squarely in line with deci-
sions of the Tennessee Supreme Court. In a case very similar to
our own, that court construed 12 T.C.A. 67-3002(h) (an “incidental
to ownership” section comparable to SDCL 10-46-1(2)) with .12
T.C.A. 67-3004 (a use tax on government contractors section com-
parable to SDCL 10-46-5). The Tennessee Court found that a use
tax could be imposed on a contractor who installed a gas pipeline
for the city even though the pipe was owned by the city. The
court decisively rejected the contention that the contractor
necessarily had to exercise power over the pipeline “incidental to
ownership.” Hall Contracting Corporation v. Tidwell, Tenn. 1974,
507 S.W.2d 697. Furthermore, the Tennessee Court has held that
a contractor who installs carpet owned by a tax exempt institu-
tion is liable for the use tax on the carpet. General Carpet Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Tidwell, Tenn. 1974, 511 S.W.2d 241. The Ten-
nessee Court thus has also construed the sections at issue so as to
allow a tax in a situation such as is presented to this court.

III. Constitutionality of SDCL 10-46-5.

[i The final question with which we must deal is whether
Art. XI, § 5 of the South Dakota Constitution invalidates SDCL
10-46-5. Article XI, § 5? reads in part:

“The property of the United States and of the state,
county and municipal corporations, both real and per-

sonal, shall be exempt from taxation * * *.”

The trial court, acting under the authority of that section, struck

2. This constitutional provision is referred to in the first section of SDCL 10-46-7,
which exempts by statute property which may not constitutionally be taxed.

a

down SDCL 10-46-5 as it applied to the taxpayers here. It acted on
the theory that the “all encompassing” provision of the constitu-
tion forbids any levy of taxes which falls directly or indirectly on
the city unless the city somehow consents.*

Our examination of the cases of this court leads us to the con-
viction that the use tax, as directly or indirectly applied to
municipalities, does not fall under the proscription of Art. XI, § 5,
because a use tax is not in law a tax on property itself but rather
it is a tax on its use. We therefore reverse the trial court and hold
SDCL 10-46-5 to be constitutional.

The leading decision on point is State v. City of Sioux Falls,
1932, 60 S.D. 330, 244 N.W. 365. In that case the court considered
whether the state could levy a motor fuel tax on the city for
gasoline used in its business. The court held that such a tax was
proper, concluding that “the tax in question does not purport to
be, and is not in any sense, a tax upon property * * * and the con-
stitutional provision here urged by its express terms has applica-
tion only to the taxation of property, real or personal.” The court
held that a use tax could constitutionally be imposed directly ona
city even when it used property in the transaction of city
business.’ See also City of Pierre v. Stout, 1937, 65 S.D. 597, 276
N.W. 922.

[it only remains to conclude, as we do, that if the use tax is
not unconstitutional as applied directly to the city, it certainly
cannot be held to be unconstitutional as applied to one who con-
tracts with the city.

3, The trial court indicated that it did not consider a use tax on material pur-
chased by the contractor to be repugnant to the constitution even though itis
clear that the ultimate cost would ordinarily be borne by the city,

4, The dissent argues that State v. City of Sioux Falls, supra, should be overruled
in light of the definition of the term “property” it sees as implied by Art. XI, § 2.
As the dissent notes, however, the pertinent amendment to Art. XI, § 2, was
adopted amid attacks in this court on the legislature's power to tax. It would be
anomalous to find that section 2 could be used to restrict the power of the
legislature to tax when the purpose of the amendment to section 2 was clearly
to assure or expand the power of the legislature to tax.

In line with our holding, as stated by the dissent, that this court is bound to
sustain the validity of the legislative enactment unless it appears invalid,
beyond a reasonable doubt, Nelson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 1924, 47 S.D. 228,
197 N.W. 288, we must disagree with the dissent’s proposal to overrule City of
Sioux Falls, supra.

SS
The decision of the trial court holding SDCL 10-46-5 un-

constitutional is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial
court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.
COLER, J., dissents.

COLER, Ji ustice (dissenting).

I would affirm the trial court.

Granting that this court is bound to sustain the validity of a
legislative enactment unless it appears invalid beyond a
reasonable doubt, Nelson v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 1924, 47 S.D.
228, 197 N.W. 288, yet the question was squarely presented and
we must be mindful that

“* * * courts must not ignore the plain provisions of the
Constitution, but should recognize that it is to the courts
alone that the people can look to preserve for them
those rights which have been guaranteed to them
through restrictions placed upon legislation by such
Constitution.” In re McKennan’s Estate, 1910, 25 S.D.
369, 376, 126 N.W. 611, 614; 33 L.R.A., N.S., 606; over-
ruled on other grounds, In re McKennan’s Estate, 1911,
27 S.D. 186, 180 N.W. 33, Ann.Cas.1913D, 745.

I recognize that the Revenue Department, which instigated
the statute in question, had a good motive in seeking federal
dollars even if it meant to add a burden to local government and
its citizens and taxpayers. The Tennessee statute, construed in
United States v. Boyd, 1964, 378 U.S. 39, 84 S.Ct. 1518, 12 L.Ed.2d
718, was utilized in our legislation without the interrelationship
between Article XI, §§ 2 and 5 of our State Constitution and
SDCL §§ 10-46-1(2), 10-46-7 having been fully analyzed.

A good deal is made in the state’s argument and in the ma-
jority opinion of the Tennessee law and the Tennessee decision.

a

The Tennessee Constitution, Article 2, § 28,* is not at all like our
own constitutional provisions and no state constitutional issue
was there involved. The only hurdle that the Tennessee courts
and the United States Supreme Court had in United States v.
Boyd, supra, was whether, under the federal act, the transaction
was taxable as against the implied constitutional immunity of the
United States as a contracting party. The principal point of the
decision in United States v. Boyd, supra, is that the Congress had
recognized prior Court decisions and had amended the Atomic
Energy Act to allow such taxation. I see no relevance in the Ten-
nessee statute or the Boyd case considering disparity of constitu-
tional provisions and the issue before us.

The legislature cannot, as it attempts to do by SDCL 10-46-5,
“either enlarge or restrict the meaning of the term ‘property’ as
such term is used in the Constitution of this state.” National
Surety Co. v. Starkey, 1919, 41 S.D. 356, 170 N.W. 582. I submit
that the legislature is equally denied the right to declare that pro-
perty which the city purchases in their own right is not in fact the
property of the city. It is, as the trial court identified it, a subter-
fuge which is contrary to the Constitution and our statutes.

Even if we were free to disregard the property as such and
its true ownership, what the act in question proposes is a tax on
the “use” to which that property is put and the tax is declared to
be “an excise tax * * * imposed on the privilege of the use * * *.”
SDCL 10-46-2. The “privilege” of use is also a “property” of the
municipality, South Dakota Constitution Article XI, § 2, and is

* The then existing language of Article 2, § 28 of the Tennessee Constitution,
Since amended, reads in part as follows:

“All property real, personal or mixed shall be taxed, but the Legislature may
exeept such as may be held by the State, by Counties, Cities or Towns, and used
exclusively for public or corporation purposes, and such as may be held and
used for purposes purely religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational,
and shall except one thousand dollars worth of personal property in the hands of
each taxpayer, and the direct product of the soil in the hands of the producer,
and his immediate vendee. Al property shall be taxed according to its value,
that value to be ascertained in such manner as the Legislature shall direct, so.
that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. No one species of
property from which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than any
other species of property of the same value, but the Legislature shall have
power to tax Merchants, Peddlers, and privileges, in such manner as they may

irom time to time direct.” :

°°

therefore exempt. SDCL 10-46-7. This position is entirely consis-
tent with decisions of this court which have declared excise taxes
as taxes on a “privilege,” Barnes v. Stout, 1937, 65 8.D. 592, 596,
276 N.W. 920, 922; City of Pierre v. Stout, 1937, 65 S.D. 597, 599,
276 N.W. 922, 924; State v. City of Sioux Falls, 1932, 60 S.D. 330,
335, 244 N.W. 365, 367, thus placing such taxes squarely within
the definition of property as defined by the South Dakota Con-
stitution Article XI, § 2.

The legislature has recognized the mandate of the Constitu-
tion by declaring the exemption of the very property or use of the
property sought to be taxed in this case. SDCL 10-46-7. This
statute is not surplusage or merely a repetition of the constitu-
tional exemption but declarative of the right of exemption.
Scandrett v. Nord, 1945, 70 S.D. 527, 19 N.W.2d 344.

I recognize that what I propose would possibly overrule
State v. City of Sioux Falls, supra, and cases that have relied
upon its reasoning, but I am convinced the time has come to
recognize that that line of reasoning is erroneous in light of the
1912 and 1918 amendments to § 2 of Article XI of our Constitu-
tion and the later amendments to Article XI, § 5 and other deci-
sions of the court which have recognized the changes wrought in
the entire Constitution by those amendments.

I have reached this conclusion upon the analysis of our case
Jaw predating these amendments and including decisions which
were contemporaneous with H.J.R. #12 (introduced on February
9, 1911, delivered to Secretary of State on March 8, 1911) which
was enacted and designated as Chapter 265 of the Session Laws
of 1911 and when ratified in 1912 expanded the definition of “pro-
perty” to include “privileges” under the South Dakota Constitu-
tion Article XI, § 2. This amendment recognized the distinction
drawn by the court between taxation of property in the context
of real and personal property as those terms then appeared in
several provisions of the Constitution and, on the other hand, fees
imposed in the exercise of the police power which were not
covered by the constitutional limitations on the legislature.

I

Considering specifically the first decision of In re
McKennan’s Estate, 1910, 25 S.D. 369, 126 N.W. 611, 33
L.R.A.,N.S., 606 written by Judge Whiting with all judges joining
except Haney, who dissented but filed no opinion, which declared
the inheritance tax law unconstitutional, the legislative enact-
ment of Ch. 265, S.L. 1911, is quite understandable. Prior deci-
sions had assured the legislature that occupational and privilege
taxes or fees were not a tax on property and that the legislative
power was supreme and unfettered. In re Construction of
Revenue Law, 1891, 2 S.D. 58, 48 N.W. 813; In re Assessment and
Collection of Taxes, 1893, 4 S.D. 6, 54 N.W. 818; In re Watson,
1903, 17 S.D. 486, 97 N.W. 463, 2 Ann.Cas. 321. The legislature
could not have anticipated a reversal of the first McKennan’s
opinion during the next legislative session, In re McKennan’s
Estate, 1911, 27 S.D. 186, 180 N.W. 33, Ann.Cas.1913D, 745, or
that on a three to two decision the court would uphold the in-
surance company tax law, Ch. 65, S.L.1907, Queen City Ins. Co. v.
Basford, 1911, 27 S.D. 164, 130 N.W. 44, perhaps rendering the
proposed amendment unnecessary or unwise. The amendment
did, however, redefine property to assure continued legislative
authority.

This court has heretofore recognized that the aforemen-
tioned amendments to Article XI, § 2 have:

(1) “obliterated” the portion of Art. VI, § 17 requiring
that “all taxation shall be equal and uniform,”
Wheelon v. South Dakota Land Settlement Board,
1921, 43 S.D. 551, 181 N.W. 359; Peterson Oil Co. v.
Frary, 1923, 46 S.D. 258, 192 N.W. 366, affirmed in
264 U.S. 570, 44 S.Ct. 334, 68 L.Ed. 854; Commercial
State Bank of Wagner v. Wilson, 1928, 53 S.D. 82,
220 N.W. 152;

(2) “superseded” the $200 property exemption limita-
tion of Art. XI, §§ 6 and 7; State ex rel. Eveland v.
Johns, 1920, 43 S.D. 279, 178 N.W. 945; Dakota
Lodge No. 1, 1.0.0.F. v. Yankton County, 1929, 54
S.D. 402, 223 N.W. 330, affirmed on rehearing in 56
S.D. 234, 228 N.W. 238; Egan Independent Consol.

ee LUE

School Dist. No. 1, Moody County v. Minnehaha
County, 1936, 65 S.D. 32, 270 N.W. 527, 108 A.L.R.
572; and

(8) “bestowed” power on the legislature that is not
diminished by the provisions of Art. XI, §6 Na-
tional College of Business v. Pennington County,
1966, 82 S.D. 391, 146 N.W.2d 731.

I submit, that, in addition to the foregoing modifications, the
1912 amendments which were carried forward by the 1918
amendments to Article XI, § 2 have redefined “property” or at
least “personal property” for the purposes of the Constitution.
The term “property” is now defined as “including privileges,
franchises and licenses to do business in the state” and that prop-
erty of the municipality both physically and in its use is constitu-
tionally exempt. South Dakota Constitution Article XI, § 2; SDCL

10-46-7.

FIRST SECURITY BANK, MORRISTOWN, S.D., Respondent v.
SKJOLDAL et al., Defendants

(237 N.W.2d 675)

(File No. 11577. Opinion filed January 22, 1976)

Robbins & Von Wald, Selby, for Malven Skjoldal and Hazel
Skjoldal, defendants and appellants.

Curtis W. Hanks, Lemmon, for plaintiff and respondent.
WINANS, Justice.

Respondent bank in this case brought an action against
defendants on August 6, 1973, seeking foreclosure of a chattel,
mortgage and foreclosure of a real estate mortgage and the
determination of the rights and interests of the various parties
involved. Appellants Malven and Hazel Skjoldal answered deny-

LU EE

ing all of Respondents allegations pleading lack of consideration
and counterclaiming against Respondent for commercially
unreasonable sale of mortgaged property, conversion, usury and
fraud. In addition to the Skjoldals Defendant John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Company put in an answer. The other
named defendants did not.

Adverse depositions were taken of Walter Schirber, the
Respondent bank’s cashier, and of Malven and Hazel Skjoldal.
Following this, motions for summary judgment were submitted
by Respondent, by Appellants Malven and Hazel Skjoldal and by
Defendant John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. A
hearing was held on all motions at Lemmon in Perkins County,
South Dakota, on January 4, 1974, and on May 18, 1974, the court
issued an order denying the Skjoldals’ motion for summary judg-
ment and granting Plaintiff-Respondent’s motion for summary
judgment. On May 28, 1974, a hearing was held at McIntosh in
Corson County, South Dakota, to determine the amounts due and
owing on the mortgages in question and the interests of the other
named defendants. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were
filed on July 12, 1974.

Defendants Malven and Hazel Skjoldal appeal from the
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the
Respondent Bank and from the court’s summary dismissal of the
various counts of the Defendants’ own counterclaim.

Hl To recite further in detail the facts alleged by either
Respondent or Appellants would needlessly prolong this opinion.
It should be sufficient to say that issues of material fact are
presented which may not be determined on a motion for summary
judgment. See Schneeberger v. Dugan, 1952, 261 Wis. 177, 52
N.W.2d 150. Our law on summary judgment is well set out in
SDCL 15-6-56 and this court has presented guidelines on the sub-
ject in Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Company, 1968, 83 S.D.
207, 157 N.W.2d 19. Of these guidelines we would highlight two at
this time:

“(2) The burden of proof is upon the movant to show
clearly (emphasis added) that there is no genuine issue

es

of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law; * * *(4) A surmise that a party will not
prevail upon trial is not sufficient basis to grant the mo-
tion on issues which are not shown to be sham, frivolous
or so unsubstantial that it is obvious it would be futile to
try them.”

[See also Smyser, The Summary Judgment—Ascertainment of
the Genuine Issue, 16 S.D. Law Rev. 20 (1971)]. We also note that
the making of cross motions for summary judgment does not
remove from consideration the primary question of whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact. Each of the moving
parties merely “ ‘concedes and affirms that there is no issue of
fact only for purposes of his own motion.’” Salmon v. Bradshaw,
1969, 84 S.D. 500, 173 N.W.2d 281.

In Wilson, supra, we said that “[t]he trial court chose to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Since a summary judg-
ment presupposes there is no genuine issue of fact, findings of
fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary.” This remains our
law.

Hl It is clear from our reading of a-rather impoverished
record, one made without any supporting affidavits, in which mo-
tions for summary judgment were made “on evidence presented,
the depositions taken in this matter, and on the files and
pleadings in this proceeding” that Respondent has not estab-
lished clearly that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
any of the counts of the complaint or of the answer and
counterclaim. The order of the trial court granting summary
judgment to Respondent and dismissing summarily the
counterclaims of the Skjoldals is reversed.

All the Justices concur.

SCHUMAKER et ux, Respondents v. IVERS, Appellant
(238 N.W.2d 284)

(File No. 11449. Opinion filed January 27, 1976)

Tidball, Kemnitz, Axtmann & Lovald, Pierre, for defendant
and appellant.

Charles Poches, Jr., Fort Pierre, for plaintiffs and
respondents.

WOLLMAN, Justice.
Defendant appeals from a judgment ordering him to repay to
plaintiffs the purchase price of a certain electric organ. We af-

firm.

On November 30, 1972, plaintiffs went to defendant's music
store for the purpose of looking at electric organs. Plaintiffs look-

TT

ed at several models and discussed the matter with defendant,
who recommended the organ in question, described in the
testimony as a Story Clark Magi model. Defendant suggested
that plaintiffs permit him to deliver the organ to their home on a
trial basis. Plaintiffs agreed that defendant could do so, and the
organ was delivered to plaintiffs’ home on December 7, 1972. Mrs.
Schumaker played the organ on the day it was delivered and
noticed nothing unusual.

On December 11, 1972, Mrs. Schumaker went to defendant's
store and paid in full the purchase price of the organ in the
amount of $1,119.71. According to her testimony, she asked
defendant about the warranty and service on the organ and was
assured by defendant that it would all be taken care of and that
he had a man who serviced organs.

Approximately two weeks after the organ was delivered,
one of the bass pedals failed to play. Shortly thereafter another
bass pedal also failed to play, as did two keys on the keyboard.
Mrs. Schumaker called defendant on or about December 27, 1972,
and told him about the problems she had been having with the
organ. Defendant said that he would send out a serviceman.
Nothing was done, however, until March 13, 1973, when defend-
ant and his serviceman came to plaintiffs’ home and worked on
the organ.1 Following their visit—and here the record is rather
vague with regard to dates— plaintiffs again experienced difficul-
ty with the organ in that one key in every octave in both
keyboards failed to play. Mrs. Schumaker called defendant on
May 11, 1973, and told him that she was still having difficulty
with the organ and that she was unhappy with it and wanted a re-
fund of the purchase price. Defendant and his serviceman came to
plaintiffs’ home and after some discussion, during which defend-
ant refused to accede to Mrs. Schumaker’s request that he take
back the organ and refund the purchase price, plaintiffs agreed to
permit defendant to bring out a replacement organ on the condi-
tion that if it did not work defendant would take it back and re-

1. Defendant testified that the first complaint was received in mid-February of
1973 and that he and his serviceman went to plaintiffs’ home “within a couple of
days” thereafter. There were other sharp disputes in the testimony. It was for
the trial court, of course, to weigh the testimony and determine the facts.

en

fund the purchase price of the first organ. On or about May 22,
1978, defendant brought out a replacement organ. Shortly
thereafter the rhythm system on the second organ began to
malfunction. In response to plaintiffs’ call, defendant’s service-
man attempted to repair the organ on several occasions during
the period from May 24 to June 1, 1973, but was unable to remedy
the problem. During his last service call the serviceman removed
the rhythm system component from the organ. Following this
visit the lower keyboard failed to play.

Sometime after June 1, 1973, defendant’s employees at-
tempted to return the original organ, which defendant claimed
had been put into proper operating condition, to plaintiffs’ home
but were prevented from doing so by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sought
the advice of an attorney, who wrote to defendant on or about
June 15, 1973, regarding the organ.’ On August 3, 1978, plaintiffs
filed suit against defendant in the nature of a rescission action
praying for the return of the purchase price of the organ.

Although plaintiffs styled their complaint and tried the case
on the theory of a rescission action pursuant to SDCL 21-12 and
53-11-2, the trial court correctly elected to treat the action as one
based upon revocation of acceptance pursuant to SDCL 57-7-20
(U.C.C. § 2-608(1)). Moeller Manufacturing, Inc. v. Mattis, 33
Colo.App. 300, 519 P.2d 1218; Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen,
280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161; Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Or. 228, 428
P.2d 398.

SDCL 57-7-20 (U.C.C. § 2-608(1)) provides that:
“The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial
unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if

he has accepted it

(1) On the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity
would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or

2. Plaintiffs’ original attorney did not represent them at trial or on appeal. The
letter does not appear in the settled record, although defendant acknowledged
receipt thereof, inasmuch as plaintiffs’ present counsel did not offer it.

ee

(2) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his
acceptance was reasonably induced either by the dif-
ficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller’s
assurances.”

SDCL 57-7-21 (U.C.C. § 2-608(2)) provides that:

“Revocation of acceptance must occur within a
reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should
have discovered the ground for it and before any
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not
caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the
buyer notifies the seller of it.”

A buyer who has rightfully revoked acceptance may recover
the purchase price paid. SDCL 57-8-28 (U.C.C. § 2-711(1)).

Because we conclude that the trial court correctly treated
this action as one based upon revocation of acceptance under the
Uniform Commercial Code, we need not decide whether the pro-
visions of SDCL 57-7-20 constitute the exclusive remedy available
toa buyer who elects to return the goods and seek a refund of the
purchase price. See J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the
Law under the Uniform Commercial Code § 8-1 (1972).

Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-608 states in part that:

“*** The section no longer speaks of ‘rescission,’ a
term capable of ambiguous application either to transfer
of title to the goods or to the contract of sale and sus-
ceptible also of confusion with cancellation for cause of
an executed or executory portion of the contract. The
remedy under this section is instead referred to simply
as ‘revocation of acceptance’ of goods tendered under a
contract for sale and involves no suggestion of ‘election’
of any sort.”

The term “rescission” should be carefully delimited in cases
involving cases of the Uniform Commercial Code.

0

“A final introductory word should be devoted to
that ambiguous action called ‘rescission.’ Some use the
word rescission to encompass what the Code defines as
a rejection or revocation of acceptance; others use it to
mean simply the buyer's act in returning the goods; still
others use it to cover the buyer’s cancellation of the ex-
ecutory terms of the contract; and finally some might
call it the buyer’s cause of action for fraud (including
presumably the return of the goods, cancellation of the
executory portion of the contract and the return of
money paid). It is the apparent intention of the drafts-
men to restrict the word rescission to a rather limited
number of cases, those involving a mistake or in which
the seller has committed fraud, duress, or the
like. * * * If the seller has not committed mistake, fraud,
or the like, we believe that the Code preempts the field
and that the buyer’s only rights to return the goods are
those stated in Article Two.” J. White & R. Summers,
Handbook, supra, § 8-1, at 248 (1972). (footnotes omitted)

As Professors White and Summers have pointed out,

“The term ‘revocation of acceptance’ is new, and the
courts have not taken to it. What the draftsmen would
call revocation of acceptance and would analyze under
2-608, the courts are likely to define as rescission or re-_
jection and to discuss without reference to the provi-
sions of 2-608. * * *” J. White & R. Summers, Handbook,
supra, § 8-3, at 255.

[i Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s decision, we believe that the trial court was cor-
rect in holding that the defects in the organ substantially im-
paired its value to plaintiffs.

Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-608 states that:
“Revocation of acceptance is possible only where

the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of
the goods to the buyer. For this purpose the test is not

P| at

what the seller had reason to know at the time of con-
tracting; the question is whether the non-conformity is
such as will in fact cause a substantial impairment of
value to the buyer though the seller had no advance
knowledge as to the buyer's particular circumstances.”

In their analysis of U.C.C. § 2-608(2) and of Comment 2, Pro-
fessors White and Summers state in part that:

““* * * Why a buyer should be permitted to measure the
seller’s tender by such subjective standards is not clear.
Insofar as we are able to tell, no appellate case has yet
squarely faced a situation in which the defect would be
such as to cause only an insubstantial impairment on an
objective basis. Doubtless it is an unusual case in which
one will be unable to convince a court or a jury that the
goods are substantially conforming on an objective basis
but will be able to convince the court or jury that they
are substantially defective to a particular plaintiff.
Perhaps we are unduly cynical about the powers of fine
discrimination of courts and juries, but we suspect that
a single standard of objective ‘substantial nonconformi-
ty’ will cover 99.44% of all rejection and revocation
cases.” J. White & R. Summers, Handbook, supra, § 8-3,
at 260. (footnotes omitted)

Hl What constitutes substantial impairment is, of course, a
factual determination to be made by the trier of fact. Hays Mer-
chandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 Wash.2d 348, 474 P.2d 270. Although
the term “substantial impairment” may not be susceptible of
being precisely defined, surely it connotes more than merely
minor, easily repairable defects in the goods. As was stated by
one court:

“A buyer does not sustain his burden of proving
that his revocation of acceptance was justified by his
testimony that the machine was returned because it was
‘unsatisfactory,’ as that term is held to be too vague.
*** Similarly, because of the requirement of showing
‘substantial impairment’ under § 2-608 there can be no

2s

revocation of acceptance merely by proving that there
were defects without showing that they ‘substantially
impair the value of the [contract]. ” Lynx, Inc. v. Ord-
nance Products, Inc., 273 Md. 1, 16, 327 A.2d 502, 513.
(citations omitted)

In holding that the buyer of two valve testing machines had
failed to prove that the alleged nonconformity in the machines
substantially impaired the value of the machines to him, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that:

“*** W]e are not directed to any testimony showing
how and to what extent failure to meet the specification
impaired the value of the machine. There was vague
testimony that a valve set too low might become a
nuisance and indirectly might bear on safety, and that if
set too high a valve might fail to function as a safety
device to protect water heaters; but there was no show-
ing of the bearing of the particular specification on these
possibilities or on the manufacture or marketing of
valves. On this issue the buyer had the burden of proof,
and it failed to sustain that burden.” Axion Corp. v.
G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 359 Mass. 474, 480, 269 N.E.2d
664, 668.

For cases holding that substantial impairment of value had been
proved, see, e.g., Tiger Motor Co., Inc. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283,
224 So.2d 638; Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home
Corp., Colo.App., 530 P.2d 989; Regents v. Pacific Pump & Supply,
Inc., Colo.App., 528 P.2d 941; Irrigation Motor & Pump Co. v.
Belcher, 29 Colo.App. 343, 483 P.2d 980; Campbell v. Pollack, 101
RI. 228, 221 A.2d 615; Hays Merchandise Inc. v. Dewey, supra.
See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1010, § 40.

Ii We conclude that plaintiffs satisfied the burden of
demonstrating that the defects in the organ substantially im-
paired its value to them. Although there were conflicts in the
testimony concerning the exact nature of the defects in the
organ, it was for the trial court to weigh this testimony and deter-
mine whether the defects were of such magnitude as to warrant

P| __83

plaintiffs in revoking their acceptance of.the organ.

Likewise, we conclude that the trial court was correct in
ruling that plaintiffs had notified defendants within a reasonable
time after learning of the defects in the organ that they intended
to revoke their acceptance and to ask for a refund of the purchase
price. SDCL 57-1-14 (U.C.C. §1-204) provides in part that:
““* * * What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on
the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action.” Comment
4 to U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (SDCL 57-7-21) states in part that:

“Subsection (2) requires notification of revocation
of acceptance within a reasonable time after discovery
of the grounds for such revocation. Since this remedy
will be generally resorted to only after attempts at ad-
justment have failed, the reasonable time period should
extend in most cases beyond the time in which notifica-
tion of breach must be given, beyond the time for
discovery of non-conformity after acceptance and
beyond the time for rejection after tender. * * *”

In discussing this section of the Uniform Commercial. Code,
Professors White and Summers state that:

“*** The policies which support a requirement telling
the buyer to act with reasonable speed in notifying the
seller are not mysterious. The obvious policies behind
the notice provisions are to give the seller an opportuni-
ty to cure, to permit seller to assist the buyer in
minimizing the buyer’s losses, and to return the goods to
seller early, before they have substantially depreciated.
If the seller can step in and cure the difficulty and so
save the sale and prevent several months’ lost profit
that the buyer might otherwise suffer, the policy has
been fulfilled. Even if seller’s inspection discloses that
the goods are defective and he agrees to take them back,
the entire loss from the transaction may be minimized
by early action, because the seller may be able to resell
the goods to another party shortly after the sale at a
higher price than the goods would command after they

84 po

had depreciated over a period of time.” J. White & R.
Summers, Handbook, supra, § 8-3, at 260.

We think that the instant case is similar to the fact situation
that existed in the case of Irrigation Motor & Pump Co. v.
Belcher, supra. ‘There, the seller installed an irrigation unit in
January of 1968. The buyer notified the seller that there were
numerous mechanical defects in the machine and the seller made
several unsuccessful attempts to repair the machine during the
following months. The machine never worked properly, however,
with the result that the buyer was unable to use it to irrigate his
crop. On July 27, 1968, the buyer notified the seller that he was
rescinding the contract and then started an action to recover the
money he had paid on the purchase price. The court treated the
action as one for revocation of acceptance. In holding that the
revocation of acceptance occurred within a reasonable time, the
court stated that:

“* * * There is no question here but that there was ade-
quate and timely notice of the breach. The seller was
contacted immediately after the machine was installed
and told that it was not working. The seller thereafter
attempted to repair the machine. Seller argues,
however, that the notice of revocation of acceptance on
July 27, 1968, was not timely because buyer had known
for some time prior to that date of the nonconformity of
the goods. *** The question of reasonableness is a
question of fact and is to be measured by all of the cir-
cumstances of the case. * * * Here, the buyer gave the
seller an opportunity to repair the machine and
withheld his revocation of acceptance until it became ap-
parent that seller could not or would not perform its con-
tract. Under the circumstances of this case, the delay in
the notice in no way prejudiced the seller and the delay
was not unreasonable.” 29 Colo.App. 348, 347, 483 P.2d
980, 982.

[i Defendant contends that because the record reveals that
he at all times stood ready to honor the one-year free parts and
service warranty on the organ, plaintiffs should not have been

ee:

permitted to summarily refuse him the opportunity to do so by
revoking their acceptance of the organ. In view of the numerous
unsuccessful attempts by defendant to satisfactorily repair the
original organ, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
holding that plaintiffs had rightfully revoked their acceptance.
Tiger Motor Co., Inc. v. McMurtry, supra.

As far as the adequacy of the notice is concerned, defendant
acknowledged that Mrs. Schumaker had told him that plaintiffs
wanted him to take the organ back and refund the purchase price.
If this revocation of acceptance was in any way waived by plain-
tiffs’ accepting delivery of the second organ, such waiver was
clearly based upon the condition that the replacement organ
would operate satisfactorily, a condition that failed to
materialize. Plaintiffs moved promptly to send notice through
their legal counsel shortly after the second organ became com-
pletely inoperable.

[i Defendant alleges that certain of the trial court's findings
of fact and conclusions of law are unsupported by the evidence.
Defendant is correct that there was no evidence to support the
trial court’s finding that defendant’s employees had made certain
admissions concerning the condition of the original organ at the
time they attempted to redeliver it to plaintiffs’ home. Because
this particular finding is not material to our disposition of the
case, however, its inclusion in the record is not prejudicial to
defendant.

The judgment is affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

FARMERS ELEV. CO. OF ELK POINT, Respondent v.
LYLE, Appellant

(238 N.W.2d 290)

(File No. 11528. Opinion filed January 27, 1976)

Sam W. Masten, Canton, for defendant and appellant.

Charles A. Wolsky, Vermillion, for plaintiff and respondent.
WOLLMAN, J ustice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment in the amount of $11,480
awarded against him in favor of plaintiff following a trial to the
court on the issue of defendant’s liability on an oral contract to
deliver corn to plaintiff. We affirm.

On April 16, 1973, defendant came to plaintiff's office in Elk
Point, South Dakota, and spoke with William Bowar, plaintiff's
manager, about the market price of corn. After some discussion
about the prospects of the market, defendant asked Bowar what
he could bid for corn, to which Bowar replied that he could bid
$1.22 per bushel. Defendant indicated that he had some 20,000
bushels of corn to sell and asked whether Bowar “ * * * couldn’t
do a little better on a large amount of corn like that * * *,” to
which Bowar replied that $1.22 was the most that he could bid.
Defendant then told Bowar that he would sell him 20,000 bushels
and that one Willis Morse, a local trucker, would haul the corn.
Bowar replied that he did not believe that Morse would be in-

88 es

terested in hauling any grain while the load limits were still in ef-
fect, so that it would have to be a May delivery. Defendant
responded that May delivery was satisfactory with him and in-
dicated that Bowar was to notify Morse when the corn was to be
delivered. Contemporaneously with this discussion, Bowar made
an entry in his ledger indicating that he had purchased 20,000
bushels of corn from defendant for $1.22 per bushel for May
delivery.

The substance of the above described conversation between
Bowar and defendant was confirmed by the testimony of a farmer
from the Elk Point area who had overheard the conversation.

Mr. Morse testified that defendant had stopped at his farm
on the afternoon of a day approximately in the middle of April
1973 and had asked whether Morse would haul some corn for him.
In response to Morse’s inquiry, defendant said that he had sold
the corn at plaintiff's elevator in Elk Point.

On April 17, 1978, Bowar sold ten loads of corn, or approx-
imately 8500 bushels, to a Mr. Norton, and on April 18 or 19, 1973,
sold 20 loads of corn to H & I Grain Company. Although Bowar
was not permitted to fully explain his method of operation in buy-
ing and selling corn, we think that the clear import of his
testimony is that following his purchase of corn from defendant
on April 16, 1973, he sold 30 loads of corn, including the 20,000
bushels he thought he had purchased from defendant, to the two
purchasers named above. The 30 truck loads were picked up by
the purchasers during the period of April 17-18, 1973, and were
made up from an early delivery of corn by another farmer in the
amount of 18,000 to 25,000 bushels, which Bowar was using as a
revolving inventory. As Bowar testified, “ * * * We don’t buy one
man’s corn and keep this one man’s corn and identity preserved,
we buy bushels and we sell bushels.” Further, he testified that it
was not often that he waited for corn to come into the elevator
before he in turn sold it.

On May 7, 1973, Bowar sent Morse out to defendant’s farm to
pick up the corn. When Morse got out to the farm, defendant told
him that he could not haul the corn that day. Defendant came to

Ss :

plaintiff's office later that afternoon and told Bowar, “I can’t
deliver that corn to you, I got a $1.45 in Beresford ** *.” In
response to Bowar's statement that he had sold defendant’s corn
and had to make delivery, defendant replied, “Yes, I know, they
all tell me this, that they sell just the way they are buying but I
have always questioned it or have reservations whether this is
really fact.” Bowar told defendant to think it over some more and
get back in touch with him. Bowar testified that following this
conversation he was “*** still sure he (defendant) would
deliver.”

After hearing nothing further from defendant, Bowar called
him on June 4, 1973, and told him that plaintiff's board of direc-
tors had decided that if defendant didn’t bring the grain in, the
board would take action. Defendant replied that that was plain-
tiff's prerogative. Bowar called defendant three days later and
told him that he would wait several more days before contacting
legal counsel in the event defendant had not delivered the corn
within that time. Defendant made no delivery.

Bowar testified that to cover the sales that he had made on
the strength of the purchase of defendant’s corn, he purchased
10,000 bushels of corn on June 13, 1973, at a cost of $1.88 per
bushel and 10,000 bushels (out of a total purchase of 18,000
bushels that day) on June 26, 1973, at $1.83 per bushel.

Defendant's version of the alleged transaction was that he
had asked Bowar the price of corn and that in response to
Bowar’s questions he replied that he had between 18,000 and
20,000 bushels to sell and that maybe he would sell it. Defendant
denied stopping at Morse’s farm to arrange for hauling the corn
and testified that he told Bowar on May 7, 1973, that he was not
going to deliver the corn.

The trial court found that defendant had agreed to sell
18,000 to 20,000 bushels of corn to plaintiff at $1.22 per bushel;
that defendant in fact had 18,000 bushels of corn to sell; that the
18,000 bushels purchased by plaintiff from defendant on April 16,
1978, was included in the 30 loads of corn sold by plaintiff be-
tween April 17 and 19, 1973; that after the conversation with

0

defendant on May 7, 1973, Bowar was still sure that defendant
would deliver the corn; and that it was on June 4, 1973, that
defendant denied the contract to deliver the corn. The court con-
cluded that plaintiff had substantially changed its position in
reliance on the oral contract by selling 18,000 bushels of corn to
the two third parties in accordance with plaintiff's general
business practice; that defendant knew or should have known
that plaintiff would rely on the contract and would resell defend-
ant’s. corn; that defendant was estopped from invoking the
statute of frauds as a defense to plaintiff's claim; and that plain-
tiffs purchases of corn on June 13 and June 26, 1973, to cover
defendant’s corn were made within a commercially reasonable
time after defendant’s breach.

Hl We conclude that the trial court’s finding that defendant
had agreed to sell 18,000 bushels of corn to plaintiff for $1.22 per
bushel is not clearly erroneous. In fact, the proof in support of
this finding might very well be said to meet the clear and con-
vineing evidence test. Brown v. Warner, 78 S.D. 647, 107 N.W.2d
1; Cromwell v. Hosbrook, 81 S.D. 324, 184 N.W.2d 777.

Defendant contends that the oral contract, if in fact one was
entered into, is not enforceable by virtue of SDCL 57-3-1, which
provides in part that:

“Except as otherwise provided in §§ 57-3-2 and
57-8-3 a contract for the sale of goods for the price of five
hundred dollars or more is not enforceable by way of ac-
tion or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between
the parties and signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought or by his authorized agent or
broker. * * *”

Defendant argues that we should not permit inroads to be made
upon the protection afforded under this provision of the Uniform
Commercial Code. However, we note that SDCL 57-1-25 provides
that:

“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of

this title, the principles of law and equity, including the
law merchant and the law relative to capacity to con-
tract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresen-
tation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions.”

Hl We are not persuaded that there is any good reason why
the doctrine of equitable estoppel should not be applied in a pro-
per case to prevent a party from asserting the statute of frauds
embodied within SDCL 57-3-1. Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 6 Cir.,
349 F.2d 328; 3 Williston on Contracts (8rd Ed. Jaeger) § 533A; J.
White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-6; Dangerfield v. Markel, N.D., 222 N.W.2d
373; Nelson v. Glasoe, N.D., 231 N.W.2d 766.

This court has long recognized that a party may be estopped
by his acts or conduct to claim what would otherwise be his legal
rights. For example, in the case of Somers v. Somers, 27 S.D. 500,
181 N.W. 1091, this court stated that:

“To create an estoppel, there must have been some act
or conduct upon the part of the party to be estopped,
which has in some manner misled the party in whose
favor the estoppel is sought and has caused such party
to part with something of value or do some other act
relying upon the conduct of the party to be estopped,
thus creating a condition that would make it inequitable
to allow the guilty party to claim what would otherwise
be his legal rights. ***” 27 S.D. at 504, 181 N.W. at
1093.

See also Farmers’ Shipping Ass’n v. Nordgren, 56 S.D. 152, 227
N.W. 576; lowa Guarantee Mortgage Corp. v. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp., 62 S.D. 18, 250 N.W. 669; Lehman v. Smith, 40
S.D. 556, 168 N.W. 857; Hood v. Sioux Steel Co., 67 S.D. 1, 287
N.W. 636; Babcock v. McKee, 70 S.D. 442, 18 N.W.2d 750; Weaver
v. Bauer, 76 S.D. 401, 79 N.W.2d 361.

In Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Matson, 68 S.D. 538, 5

92 es

N.W.2d 314, it was stated that:

“This court is committed to the view that the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel may prevent a party to an
oral agreement from invoking the Statute of Frauds.
(citations omitted) The elements of proof which invoke
an estoppel in such case are three, namely, (a) the oral
agreement must be established by satisfactory
evidence; (b) the party asserting rights under the agree-
ment must have relied thereon and have indicated such
reliance by the performance of acts unequivocally
referable to the agreement; and (c) it must appear that
because of his change of position in reliance on the
agreement, to enforce the statute will subject such
party to unconscionable hardship and loss.” (citations
omitted) 68 S.D. at 541, 5 N.W.2d at 315.

The trial court’s memorandum decision referred to the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel as set forth in Restatement, Con-
tracts, § 90, as a basis for holding that defendant was estopped
from raising the statute of frauds as a defense. This doctrine was
first recognized and given effect by this court in Northwestern
Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879.
Although technically this doctrine applies only to those situations
in which an enforceable promise would otherwise not exist, see,
e.g., Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, Minn., 230 N.W.2d 588;
Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, Minn., 232
N.W.2d 921;* Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037; Henderson, “Promissory
Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine,” 78 Yale L.J. 343,
the distinction between promissory estoppel and equitable estop-
pel has not been consistently maintained and the doctrine of
promissory estoppel has been applied to prevent a party from
asserting the defense of the statute of frauds. As stated by one
commentator,

“With minor exceptions, the recent cases pitting
promissory estoppel against the defense of the Statute

* The Minnesota Supreme Court also held in these two cases that the facts
therein did not warrant the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
overeome the defense of the statute of frauds.

a |

of Frauds involve bargains, not gratuitous promises.
They arise from attempts to create original contract
obligations rather than from revisions of existing rela-
tionships. Above all, there is seldom any indication that
the court is not convinced that the oral contract was in
fact made. Given these factors, it is not surprising that
the elements of promissory estoppel tend to be applied
in the language of the tests of bargain consideration.
There is also some tendency in the Statute of Frauds
cases to lump promissory with equitable estoppel, with
some courts apparently taking the position that only
equitable estoppel will preclude the raising of the
Statute. Because doctrines based on estoppel or-fraud
are so often applicable to cases falling within Section 90,
it is not unusual to find a court employing multiple
theories simultaneously in a single case.” Henderson,
supra, 78 Yale L.J. 348, 381 (footnotes omitted)

One noted commentator has stated that:

“The most recent, and quite possibly the most im-
portant, development in the promissory estoppel or § 90
cases has been the suggestion that such contract-based
defenses as the Statute of Frauds are not applicable
when the estoppel (or reliance) doctrine is invoked as
the ground for decision. * * *”” G. Gilmore, The Death of
Contract 90 (1974).

See also 56 A.L.R.3d 1087, § 6.

Indeed in Kelly v. Gram, 78 S.D. 11, 38 N.W.2d 460, this court
stated that the basis for estoppel approved in Federal Land Bank
of Omaha v. Matson, supra, was the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel. Cf., Skillman v. Lynch, 74 S.D. 212, 50 N.W.2d 641; Shaw v.
George, 82 S.D. 62, 141 N.W.2d 405; Williams v. Denham, 88 S.D.
518, 162 N.W.2d 285.

Hl We believe that the facts in the instant case warrant the
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel as set forth in
Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Matson, supra, and our other

LL

decisions cited above. See also Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal.2d
621, 220 P.2d 737. That being the case, there is no particular need
for us to decide whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel con-
stitutes a new and independent ground upon which defendant is
barred from raising the defense of the statute of frauds. Cf.,
McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Haw. 29, 469 P.2d 177.

Hi We turn, then, to the question of damages. Notwithstand-
ing defendant’s claim that he unequivocally informed Bowar on
May 7, 1973, that he was not going to deliver the corn, the trial
court found that Bowar was of the opinion following this conver-
sation that defendant still would deliver the corn. The trial court
found that it was on June 4, 1973, that defendant denied the
alleged contract. Neither finding is clearly erroneous.

When plaintiff became aware on June 4, 1973, that defendant
would not deliver the corn in compliance with the contract, plain-
tiff elected to avail itself of the remedy provided by SDCL 57-8-28
and 57-8-31.

SDCL 57-8-28 provides in part that:

“Where the seller fails to make delivery or
repudiates * * * the buyer may * * *

(1) “‘Cover’ and have damages under §§ 57-8-31 to
57-8-33, inclusive, as to all the goods affected whether
or not they have been identified to the contract * * *.”

SDCL 57-8-31 provides that:

“After a breach within §§ 57-8-28 to 57-8-30, in-
clusive, the buyer may ‘cover’ by making in good faith
and without unreasonable delay any reasonable pur-
chase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution
for those due from the seller.”

SDCL 57-8-32 provides that:

“The buyer may recover from the seller as damages

ee 95

the difference between the cost of cover and the con-
tract price together with any incidental or consequen-
tial damages as hereinafter defined (§§ 57-8-39 and
57-8-40), but less expenses saved in consequence of the
seller’s breach.”

The trial court found that the purchases made by Bowar on
June 13 and June 26, 1973, were made within a commercially
reasonable time after defendant’s breach of contract. SDCL
57-1-14 provides in part that, “ * * * What is a reasonable time for
taking any action depends on the nature, purpose and cir-
cumstances of such action. * * *” The comment to Section 2-712
(SDCL 57-8-31) states in part that:

“The test of proper cover is whether at the time
and place the buyer acted in good faith and in a
reasonable manner, and it is immaterial that hindsight
may later prove that the method of cover used was not
the cheapest or most effective.

“The requirement that the buyer must cover
‘without unreasonable delay’ is not intended to limit the
time necessary for him to look around and decide as to
how he may best effect cover. The test here is similar to
that generally used in this Article as to reasonable time
and seasonable action.” Uniform Commercial Code,
§ 2-712, Comment 2.

As has been well stated, “The drafters (of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code) have hardly left us with a solid basis upon which to
predict whether a given act was or was not ‘reasonable’ * * *.” J.
White & R. Summers, Handbook, supra, § 6-3 at 178.

HMM It has been held that a grain merchant should cover on
the date that he becomes aware of the seller’s repudiation where
cover is easily and immediately available in the well organized
and easily accessible market for purchases of grain to be
delivered in the future. Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 II]_App.3d 918, 296
N.E.2d 871. Because the record in the instant case does not
disclose that cover was immediately available, however, we agree

6 _

with the trial court that plaintiff acted reasonably in making the
first installment of the cover purchase on June 13, 1973. The re-
maining purchase on June 26, 1973, poses a problem, however, in
view of the lack of evidence in the record why the cover could not
have been fully effected on the earlier date. However, in view of
the fact that the June 26 purchase was at a cost of 5 cents per
bushel less than the June 13 purchase, we cannot see how defend-
ant was prejudiced by the additional delay. Moreover, we believe
that plaintiff acted in good faith towards defendant throughout
the entire period from April 16, 1973, until the cover was finally
made, see SDCL 57-1-13, and thus we are not inclined to disturb
the trial court’s finding that plaintiff acted in a commercially
reasonable manner in making the two purchases to cover the corn
that it had sold on the strength of its contract with defendant.

The judgment is affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

KUEHN AND MAIERHAUSER, Appellants v.
FIRST NAT'L BANK IN SIOUX FALLS, et al., Respondents

(238 N.W.2d 490)

(File No. 11475. Opinion filed January 22, 1976)
Petition for rehearing denied February 27, 1976

SL

George A. Bangs of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Sim-
mons, Rapid City, for appellants.

E. G. Jones of Jones & Matthews, Sioux Falls, for respond-
ent, First National Bank.

Louis R. Hurwitz of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith,
Sioux Falls, for respondent, Crippled Children’s Hospital and
School.

James R. Becker of May, Johnson & Burke, Sioux Falls, for
respondent, South Dakota Children’s Home Society.

Tom Lehnert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for respondent, “An
Unknown Maternity Hospital.”

BIEGELMEIER, Justice.*

Max A. Kuehn died leaving a last will under which, after
some bequests, the residue of his estate was left in trust to pay
the income to certain relatives during their respective lifetimes,
with the remainder over to three charitable beneficiaries in the
event that Martha Kuehn Maierhauser, the decedent's grand-
daughter, should die without issue. The First National Bank
(Bank or Trustee Bank herein) and Max A. Kuehn, Jr., a son of
decedent and an income beneficiary during his lifetime, were
named as trustees. Following the death of Max A. Kuehn, Jr. on
September 11, 1971, the Bank became the sole trustee and Jane S.
Kuehn, widow of Max A. Kuehn, Jr., and her daughter, Martha
Kuehn Maierhauser, herein sometimes referred to as petitioners,
became and were during the time here involved the sole income
beneficiaries entitled to such income.

* Retired Supreme Court Justice acting pursuant to SDCL 16-1-5.

1. Following the deaths of petitioners, Jane S. Kuehn and Martha K.
Maierhauser, if the latter should die without issue, remaindermen of the trust
estate are three charitable institutions, two of which—a crippled children's
hospital and a children’s home—are designated specifically by their full names,
and an unnamed and unchosen maternity hospital that may be operated within
certain limitations by a charitable organization in or near Sioux Falls, South
Dakota. It is not shown or claimed that such maternity hospital now exists,
rather, it appears that such contingent beneficiary does not now exist.

CL

On October 9, 1973, the Trustee Bank filed its Fourteenth
Annual Account titled “In the Matter of the MAX A. KUEHN,
JR. TRUST U/W Max A. Kuehn, Deceased,” in circuit court. The
court entered an order and notice of hearing on this account fix-
ing October 31, 1973, as the time for hearing thereon. It appears
that copies of this order were mailed to petitioners, one of whom
resided in Arizona. No appearance or objection having been
made, customarily, as a matter of course,’ the court entered an
order on the date of the hearing—October 31, 1973—approving
that account and setting and allowing trustee and attorney fees.
Tucked in Exhibit A consisting of ten long, wide accounting
sheets—four having two columns of figures and six having nine
columns— were entries showing a sale of a tract of land referred
to in the account as having been confirmed during the accounting
year.

By verified petition dated December 26, 1973, and filed in the
circuit court on December 28, 1973, supplemented by a further af-
fidavit, counsel for Jane S. Kuehn and Martha Kuehn
Maierhauser stated that they were the sole income beneficiaries
of the trust; that upon the death of the survivor of them the trust
would go to the issue, if any, of Martha or, if she died without
issue, to the named and unnamed contingent beneficiaries; that
among the assets of the trust was a one-half interest in certain
lands near Sioux Falls originally appraised and inventoried at
about $35,000, but which by May 24, 1972, had increased in value
to more than $253,000 in accordance with a certificate of appraisal
attached thereto signed by two appraisers and addressed to an
officer of the Trustee Bank; that this tract had been producing an
income of not more than $2,000 per annum, which was substan-
tially less than the current rate of return on trust investments,
and that under such facts it became the duty of the Trustee to sell
the land and make an allocation of principal and income of the pro-
ceeds of such lands when and as they are sold; that 87.95 acres of
such land was sold in 1973 for $181,925 of which amount the trust
received one-half or $65,962.50 all of which amount the Trustee
allocated to principal or corpus; that petitioners did not appear
and make objection at the time fixed for hearing on the Four-

2, We are not unmindful of SDCL 21-22-22 and 21-22-23,

teenth Annual Account for the reason that they were not then ad-
vised from the account and facts concerning their rights or the
duties of the Trustee. The petitioners then asked that the order
approving this account be vacated and set aside for the exclusive
purpose of allowing the court to consider the appropriate alloca-
tion as between principal and income of the proceeds of such sale
and the distribution of an appropriate share of the net sales to the
income beneficiaries. Several sections of Restatement, Second,
Trusts and other authorities were urged in support of peti-
tioners’ contention.

To this on February 4, 1974, the Trustee filed a thirteen-page
verified response and petition which requested the court to re-
ject the petitioners’ prayer and also to determine the authority of
the Trustee regarding the disposition of the remaining trust
estate.* Formal objections incorporating the Trustee’s response
were filed by the named contingent charitable beneficiaries. The

3. Sections 240 and 241, and many other authorities are cited in support of peti-
tioners’ claims. To place the argument in clearer perspective these sections,
without the comments, are quoted in full:

“§ 240, Unproductive Property

nless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, if property held in
trust to pay the income to a beneficiary for a designated period and thereafter
to pay the principal to another beneficiary produces no income or an income
substantially less than the current rate of return on trust investments, and is
likely to continue unproductive or underproductive, the trustee is under a duty
to the beneficiary entitled to the income to sell such property within 2
reasonable time.”
“§ 241. Allocation On Delayed Conversion
(1) Uniess its otherwise provided by the terms of the trust if property held in
trust to pay the income to a beneficiary for a designated period and thereafter
to pay the principal to another beneficiary is property which the trustee is
under a duty to sell, and which produces no income or an income substantially
less than the current rate of return on trust investments, or which is wasting
property or produces an income substantially more than the current rate of
return on trust investments, and the trustee does not immediately sell the prop-
erty, the trustee should make an apportionment of the proceeds of the sale
when made, as stated in Subsection (2).
2) The net proceeds received from the sale of the property are apportioned by
ascertaining the sum which with simple interest thereon at the current rate of
return on trust investments from the day when the duty to sell arose to the day
of the sale would equal the net proceeds; and the sum so ascertained is to be
treated as principal, and the residue of the net proceeds as income.
(8) The net proceeds are determined by adding to the net sale price the net in-
come received or deducting therefrom the net loss incurred in carrying the
property prior to the sale.

4. In the event the court denied the petition the Trustee then withdrew this re-
quest.

2°:

court set February 22, 1974, for hearing on the issues presented.
The foregoing is but an outline of the procedural aspects of the
controversy; further reference of facts that may affect its disposi-
tion may be gleaned from the extensive settled record of over 400
pages of the Max A. Kuehn Estate, the Max A. Kuehn, Jr. Trust
and the Carter A. Kuehn Trust, U/W of Max A. Kuehn, deceased,
as well as the title to the properties originating from the Martin
J. Kuehn Estate, and the extensive briefs which make brevity in
their explanation difficult.

It appears that Max A. Kuehn died April 26, 1957, owning a
half interest in three farms adjoining Sioux Falls and fractional
interest in two buildings. Martin Kuehn, his brother, had died in
1952 owning the other half interest in the three farms and a frac-
tional interest in the two buildings. Martin’s will devised his half
interest as follows: % each to Andrew and Curtis Kuehn,
nephews of Max, Sr. and Martin; % to respondent Trustee in
trust for a son of Max A. Kuehn, Sr., Carter A. Kuehn, which frac-
tion is now held under the Katherine Kuehn Memorial Trust set
up by Martin’s will; and the last 14 to the same Trustee Bank in
trust for Max A. Kuehn, Jr., another son of Max A. Kuehn, Sr.,
which since December 7, 1971, has been owned by Martha Kuehn
Maierhauser, one of the petitioners herein.

The trust estate under the will of Max A. Kuehn, Sr., was
held and operated as two separate trust parcels: the Carter trust
and the Max, Jr. trust. On the death of Carter without issue in
1960, the assets of the parcel held in trust for his benefit were
transferred and combined with the Max A. Kuehn, Jr. trust
which now holds this interest. The above described title changes,
the different interests, times and accounting procedures resulted
in a rather complex, lengthy and extended record, familiar to the
experienced and capable Trustee and its attorney who had lived
with the trusts since their origin, but some problem to one not so
situated. This is especially true with reference to figures in the
accounts which indicated that the Trustee was allocating all the
proceeds of the sales of the real property so as to be held for
distribution to the contingent and charitable beneficiaries rather
than to those who were related by blood or marriage to the
creators of the trusts. The Fourteenth Annual Account, which

02

the court approved on October 31, 1973, contained, among other
things, the receipt of $64,087.50 from the sale to the City of Sioux
Falls of a one-half interest in 85.45 acres and the receipt of $1,875
from the school district for a one-half interest in 2.5 acres. It ap-
pears that neither the income beneficiaries nor their counsel
were at that time aware that they had any claim upon such pro-
ceeds as income. The report of the Trustee makes no reference to
either the values at which these properties were appraised at the
early stages of the trusts or to the current market value of the
farm holdings so as to call attention to the great difference in
those values, the income from past rentals as farm property or
prospective income from a prudent investment of those proceeds.

On November 15, 1973, this court handed down its decision
and opinion in In Matter of Estate of Kuehn, deceased, 1973, 87
S.D. 569, 212 N.W.2d 356, involving a will which established a
trust similar to the one in the Max A. Kuehn, Sr. will with which
we are now concerned. On December 28, 1978, the income
beneficiaries filed their verified petition seeking to vacate the
order of October 31, 1973, for the sole purpose of allowing the
court to consider an appropriate allocation of principal and in-
come of the proceeds of the sale of the real estate. After a hearing
held February 22, 1974, the circuit judge issued a memorandum
opinion on April 2, 1974, and on April 10, 1974, the court entered
an order in accord therewith denying the petition. Petitioners ap-
peal from the original order of October 31, 1973, and the order of
April 10, 1974, denying their petition.

The circuit judge’s opinion points out that RCP 58 (SDCL
15-6-58) states: “A judgment or an order becomes complete and ef-
fective when reduced to writing, signed by the court or judge, at-
tested by the clerk and filed in his office,” and that, while RCP
81(a) and Appendix A thereto provide that SDCL 21-22 (ad-
ministration of trusts) is not governed by the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (RCP) insofar as it is inconsistent or in conflict with this
chapter, “[t]here being no provision of such nature in SDCL 21-22,
[RCP 58, supra, was] applicable [to the pending petition.]” After
citing SDCL 15-6-60(b), the trial judge concluded “[t]he reasons
advanced do not, in my opinion, justify the vacating of a previous
order of the Court.” The trial judge made no comment on § 241,

103

Restatement, Second, Trusts, and entered the aforesaid order
denying the petition. We believe the circuit court abused its
discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion.

SDCL 15-6-60(b) so far as applicable here provides:

“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party ** from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect

* * * * * *

The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after
the * ** order * * * was entered * * *.”

HH The source note thereto shows this or a similar rule has
been in effect in this jurisdiction since territorial days and has
been before the court many times. See Davis v. Interstate Motor
Carriers Agency, 1970, 85 S.D. 101, 178 N.W.2d 204, where the
court stated that each case of this character must be determined
from the particular facts and circumstances. The neglect must be
excusable, yet the term “excusable neglect” has no fixed mean-
ing. In Davis the court wrote that “RCP 60(b) gives trial courts a
wide discretion to relieve of default which should ‘be exercised by
them in the same liberal spirit in which the section (now Rule)
was designed, in furtherance of justice and in order: that cases
may be tried and disposed of upon their merits.’” Gunvordahl v.
Knight, 1951, 73 S.D. 638, 47 N.W.2d 561; Uhlich v. Hilton Mobile
Homes, 1964, 80 S.D. 478, 126 N.W.2d 813; Ackerman v. Burgard,
79 8.D. 119, 109 N.W.2d 10. This liberal spirit runs all through the
rules (which are Chapter 15 of SDCL), and SDCL 15-6-60(b), supra,
finds further support in the wording of SDCL 15-6-1 which states:

“This chapter * * * shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”

eee

That determination, as the above decisions indicate, is preferred
to be made on the merits. Davis v. Interstate Motor Carriers
Agency, supra.

Summarizing, petitioners claim that the record and peti-
tioners’ affidavits show the Fourteenth Annual Account was set
for hearing and notice was mailed to petitioners and others over
ten days prior to the hearing; that upon the death of the survivor
of them, the corpus will go to Martha Kuehn Maierhauser or, if
she dies without issue, to the corporate charities; that among the
assets is a half interest in lands near Sioux Falls originally ap-
praised at $35,000 which has increased in value to more than
$250,000 in accord with a certificate of appraisal which Trustee
had provided but not filed; that the land was producing an income
of $2,000 per annum for the trust which was substantially less on
the increased value than the current rate of return on approved
trust investments; that in accord with § 241, Restatement, Sec-
ond, Trusts, it became the duty of the Trustee to make an alloca-
tion between the principal and income from the proceeds of a
sale; that during 1973 such sales were made of part of the land for
which Trustee received $65,962.50, all of which it allocated to the
corpus; that trust beneficiary Martha lived in Arizona and her at-
torney had had no opportunity for personal contact with her since
receiving the copy of the account, their only communication being
by phone or letter; that neither Martha nor Jane was then aware
that she might have some legal claim upon the proceeds of the
land sale, and, likewise, counsel was unaware of such claim by
reason of the failure of the Trustee to disclose or file the new ap-
praisement it had procured so as to show the greatly enhanced
value and resultant low income production of the land in relation
thereto; that because of a lack of any pertinent decisions in this or
neighboring states they did not make objections to the account;
that not until two weeks after the account was approved (at
which time the Nell Carter Kuehn appeal called attention to the
favor in which living relatives as income beneficiaries are viewed)
was investigation made of the facts not shown in the report and
the law claimed applicable thereto; that petitioners’ counsel im-
mediately on November 17, 1973, wrote letters to an officer of the
Trustee Bank advising it of their claim, followed by an inter-
change of letters between counsel for the Trustee and contingent

105

beneficiaries; that by reason of the apparent failure to arrive at
some settlement of the claim, the pending petition was filed
December 28, 1973.

Hl We believe under the facts herein present that the
neglect of petitioners was excusable and, as they moved prompt-
ly to vacate the order approving the account, the circuit court
should have granted that relief. This result is in furtherance of
justice where, as here, the petition affects no current distribution
of property but an allocation contingent in the future, and it seeks
no claim or liability against the Trustee.

Il We have assumed, as did the circuit court, that SDCL
15-6-60(b) applied to this proceeding. It may be that the general
principles there do apply, yet it is somewhat difficult to fit the
procedure of setting aside a judgment in an action resulting in a
final judgment with its filing of a proposed pleading, an affidavit
of merits, etc., to an application of this nature in the administra-
tion of trust estates.’ Most if not all of the proceedings in the ad-
ministration of trust estates in SDCL 21-22 are in a court of equi-
ty without the usual pleadings in an action, trials by jury, etc.
Lacking a statute such as SDCL 15-6-60(b) extending equitable
principles to judgments at law, the court in the administration of
trusts is acting as a court of equity with authority to exercise its
powers as such. That would include those mentioned in but not
necessarily limited by SDCL 15-6-60(b). Where a proposed answer
setting up a defense on an action may be required in some pro-
ceeding to set aside a judgment, here that is fulfilled by a
pleading or showing that the order challenged was not under the
facts consonant with law.

Counsel for both petitioners and the Trustee have extensive-
ly cited and discussed §§ 231, 232, 240 and 241 of Restatement,
Second, Trusts and many other authorities that may affect the in-
come beneficiaries when it is heard on the merits. However, in
respondents’ brief, counsel for the Trustee asserts that the cir-
cuit court’s ruling “was directed solely to refusing to vacate the
prior final Order of the Court and did not purport to make any

5. Cf. In re Skelly’s Estate, 1907, 21 S.D. 424, 113 N.W. 91.

6

determination on the merits of Petitoners’ application.” We are in
agreement with that contention, and therefore, as the trial court
did not decide the controversy on the merits, we do not reach that
issue and indicate no opinion on it, except as here indicated. Peti-
tioners have presented a debatable question for resolution by the
circuit court, and they are entitled to argue the merits on this or
such additional record as they are disposed to make, unhampered
by the issue and prior doubt of vacating of the order approving
the account. Having concluded, as we do, that the neglect of peti-
tioners was excusable, it is then only necessary to permit vaca-
tion of the order to further show of record or on its face® that the
movants’ claim or defense was “honestly debatable under the law
of the land.” See SDCL 16-16-18. That issue is to be determined at
the hearing on the merits when so held.

Mention should be made that, as petitioners point out,
neither the Trustee nor the contingent beneficiaries have
changed their position nor do petitioners seek to surcharge or
hold the Trustee liable.

At the hearing on the petition the circuit court may consider
petitioners’ request for allowance out of the corpus of the trust of
reasonable fees and expenses of counsel. The order denying the
petition to vacate the order approving the Fourteenth Annual
Account dated October 31, 1973, is reversed with instructions to
vacate that order.

WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER, Justices, and
JONES, Circuit Judge, concur.

BIEGELMEIER, Retired Supreme Court Justice, sitting for
DUNN, Chief Justice, disqualified.

JONES, Circuit Judge, sitting for DOYLE, Justice, dis-
qualified.

6. In footnote 5 of the Davis opinion, cited supra, reference is made to the neces-
sity and function of a proposed answer to raise an issue in an action at law.

107

BECK, Sp. Adm. Estate of Betty Beck, Respondent v.
WESSEL, Appellant

(237 N.W.2d 905)

(File No. 11541. Opinion filed January 22, 1976)

08

Jack R. Von Wald, Robbins & Van Wald, Selby, for plaintiff
and respondent.

Paul O. Kretchmar, Eureka, Arend E. Lakeman, Mobridge,
for defendant and appellant.

Po 109

DUNN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a $75,000 verdict awarded to Betty
Beck’s estate for the benefit of her three minor children in the
Circuit Court of Campbell County which was then in the Sixth
Judicial Circuit. Betty Beck was killed in a head-on collision on
December 25, 1971, on Highway 83 near Mound City, South
Dakota, between automobiles driven by Marvin Beck (Betty’s
husband) and defendant August Wessel. Defendant Wessel
moved for a directed verdict and for judgment n. o. v., and both
motions were denied by the trial court. Defendant appeals claim-
ing that the trial court erred in (1) refusing defendant’s motions
for a directed verdict and judgment n. o. v., (2) failing to instruct
the jury under South Dakota's comparative negligence statute,
(3) not reducing the jury verdict in that Marvin Beck and August
Wessel were joint tort-feasors, and (4) answering a question from
the jury without first consulting with the parties’ attorneys. We
affirm.

This litigation arose as a result of an automobile accident
which took place on December 25, 1971, near Mound City, South
Dakota. At about 11:30 a.m. a car driven by Marvin Beck collided
almost head-on with a car driven by defendant Wessel. The two
vehicles were traveling in opposite directions on U.S. Highway
83.

The day was clear and sunny, but a strong wind was blowing
newly fallen snow onto the highway creating some visibility prob-
lems. The Beck vehicle contained Marvin Beck, his wife Betty,
and their three children. They were proceeding north on
Highway 83, having just left Mound City. Immediately in front of
the Beck vehicle in the same lane of travel was a car pulling an
Airstream travel trailer. Mr. Beck decided to pass the car-trailer
and pulled out twice to check for traffic in the southbound lane.
Seeing none, he pulled out to pass. The Beck vehicle collided with
the Wessel vehicle in the southbound lane approximately 15 to 20
feet ahead of the car pulling the Airstream.

The defendant and his wife were in the Wessel vehicle. They
were traveling south on Highway 83. Because of the blowing

0

snow, defendant had a hard time seeing the painted center line of
the road and he admitted crossing over the center line several
times prior to the collision. Captain William Marshall was driving
the car-trailer combination. He testified that when he first saw
defendant's vehicle it was one-half to two-thirds of the way into
the northbound or wrong lane of travel. Marshall's wife testified
that the Wessel vehicle was completely over into the wrong lane.
Captain Marshall began to take evasive action by slowing down
and moving over to the shoulder of the northbound lane. Approx-
imately 100 yards before reaching the Marshall vehicle the
Wessel car moved back over into its proper lane of travel.

Defendant Wessel testified that he saw the Beck vehicle
passing and attempted to get into the southbound ditch, but he
was unsuccessful in avoiding the collision. Mr. Beck testified that
he did not see the Wessel vehicle until an instant before impact.
He had no time to take evasive action or even to put on his
brakes.

The evidence indicated that defendant Wessel was traveling
at a speed of between 40 and 45 m.p.h. at the time of the collision.
It was estimated that the Beck car was accelerating to get around
the Airstream trailer and was traveling at between 50 and 55
m.p.h. The speed limit at the point where the accident occurred
was 45 m.p.h.

Betty Beck and Mrs. Wessel were killed in the collision.
Donald Beck, special administrator of Betty Beck’s estate, com-
menced a wrongful death suit against defendant Wessel. Subse-

“quently, a wrongful death action on behalf of Mrs. Wessel's estate
was started against Marvin Beck. The two cases were con-
solidated and tried together. The jury found Marvin Beck liable
in the Wessel case and found defendant Wessel liable in the Beck
case. In the Beck case the jury awarded Betty Beck’s estate
damages in the amount of $75,000. The money was awarded for
the benefit of Betty Beck’s three minor children. Marvin Beck
was not allowed to share in the award because of the jury’s deter-
mination that his negligence was also a proximate cause of his
wife’s death. This appeal concerns only the jury’s verdict in the
Beck case and the judgment of the court against Wessel. He

Dn

LE

raises numerous issues on appeal, but we choose to discuss only
four in this opinion.

Defendant first contends that there was insufficient
evidence that his actions were negligent and constituted one of
the proximate causes of the accident. He says that as a matter of
law the trial judge should have directed a verdict in his favor or
granted his motion for judgment n. o. v.

Hl We have carefully reviewed the record, keeping in mind
that in reviewing to determine if, as a matter of law, motions for a
directed verdict or judgment n. o. v. should be granted, the
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff. In addition, we must give the plaintiff the benefit of every in-
ference and every controverted fact must be resolved in
plaintiff's favor. Fossum v. Zurn, 1960, 78 S.D. 260, 100 N.W.2d
805; Weidner v. Lineback, 1966, 82 S.E. 8, 140 N.W.2d 597.

[i We are convinced that the trial judge was correct in deny-
ing both defendant’s motions. The record reveals that the defend-
ant’s automobile crossed over the center line so that at the very
minimum half the auto was in the wrong lane of travel. He con-
tinued to drive his car in the wrong lane until approximately 100
yards before impact. Marvin Beck testified that he did not see
defendant’s car until an instant before impact. With the adverse
driving conditions that already existed that day, it is easy to sur-
mise that Marvin Beck could not see defendant approaching in
the distance if defendant’s car was wholly or partially in the
wrong lane of travel. The trial judge quite properly allowed the
question of defendant's negligence and the proximate cause ques-
tion to go to the jury.

Hl Defendant next makes the argument that the trial court
should have instructed the jury on South Dakota’s comparative
negligence statute. This statute is found at SDCL 20-9-2. We do
not deem it necessary that the statute be specifically set out here.
The essential point to be made is that a comparative negligence
instruction should not be given unless there is some evidence of
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, or in this case plaintiff's
decedent. The record reveals that Betty Beck was merely a

2 po

passenger in the car driven by her husband. Granted, the jury did
find that Marvin Beck was negligent, but, absent evidence to the
contrary, the negligence of the operator of a motor vehicle cannot
be imputed to a passenger simply because they happen to be hus-
band and wife. Dehnert v. Garrett Feed Co., 1969, 84 S.D. 233, 169
N.W.2d 719. Here there is no evidence that Betty Beck was exer-
cising any control over the operation of the Beck vehicle.
Therefore, there is no negligence on her part to be compared with
defendant’s negligence, and the comparative negligence instruc-
tion was properly refused.

Defendant's third argument is based on the South Dakota
uniform contribution among tort-feasors law at SDCL 15-8-11
through 15-8-21. He contends that even assuming he was
negligent he and Marvin Beck were joint tort-feasors and thus
jointly and severally liable for Betty Beck’s wrongful death. He
urges that plaintiff's recovery against him should be reduced by
one-half since Marvin Beck was a joint tort-feasor.

Hl We feel that this issue can be resolved without resort to
further interpretation of our uniform contribution among tort-
feasors law. Here plaintiff had no legal recourse against Marvin
Beck because of our automobile guest statute which is codified at
SDCL 82-34-1. Marvin Beck was not named as a defendant in this
action. There can be no contribution nor can there be a reduction
in the damages which defendant is obligated to pay. As we stated
in Burmeister v. Youngstrom, 1965, 81 S.D. 578, 189 N.W.2d 226:

“We believe it abundantly clear that the right to
contribution is determined by whether there is joint or
several liability rather than by the presence of joint or
concurring negligence. There can be no right to con-
tribution unless the injured party has a possible remedy
against two or more persons.” 81 S.D. at 586, 139 N.W.2d
at 231.

Because of the existence of the guest statute, Marvin Beck and
defendant were not joint and severally liable to plaintiff. There is
no right to contribution and plaintiff is entitled to recover all his
damages from the defendant.

a :

This case was tried to a jury at the courthouse in Mound
City, South Dakota. Instructions were given to the jurors by the
court and they began their deliberations at approximately 3:55
p-m. on May 16, 1974. At approximately 4:15 p.m. the jury sent a
note to the judge asking, “Can you tell us the amount of insurance
each party has?” The attorneys for the parties were not in the
courtroom, having apparently adjourned to one of the local
business establishments to await the verdict. Without attempt-
ing to locate the attorneys, the judge simple wrote “No” on the
same piece of paper as the inquiry and returned the note to the
jury room.

Defendant argues that this was error and that because of it a
new trial must be granted. He contends that the judge’s actions
in answering the note were contrary to the language of SDCL
15-6-51(a). The sixth paragraph of that section is the one which is
relevant and it reads as follows:

“After the jury have retired for deliberation if
there be a disagreement between them as to any part of
the testimony or if they desire to be informed of any
point of law arising in the case, they may require the
officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being
brought into court the information required, if given,
must be given in the presence of, or after notice to the
parties or counsel, and the instruction given shall be
taken down by the court reporter.”

There is no doubt that in a technical sense the court
erred in answering the note sent by the jury without consulting
counsel and following the other procedures set out above. If the
jury had asked for an additional instruction on the law of the case
or for an explanation of an instruction already given, we might be
disposed to remand for a new trial.

Here, however, the situation was quite different. This jury
was inquiring about the amounts of liability insurance owned by
each party. This was not their concern in deliberating on the
questions of liability and damages. Had counsel or any other of
the witnesses mentioned liability insurance during testimony or

114 _ irre

arguments, a mistrial would probably have had to be declared.
Behrens v. Nelson, 1972, 86 S.D. 312, 195 N.W.2d 140. In the in-
stant case one or more members of the jury apparently raised the
possibility that the parties were insured. The judge understand-
ably felt when he received the jury’s note that it was necessary to
get the jury away from the issue of liability insurance and back
onto the issues of liability and damages.

We hold that while the judge erred in not consulting counsel,
the error was not prejudicial in this case and does not merit a
reversal. His “No” to the question was the only answer that could
have been given under the circumstances. He certainly could not
have answered “yes” and then revealed to the jury the limits of
the liability insurance policies involved. Indeed, if he had con-
sulted counsel and called the jury back into open court to ad-
monish them not to consider liability insurance, he may well have
compounded the problem by making a much larger issue of liabili-
ty insurance in the minds of the jury. In the absence of other
evidence, we cannot say that the judge’s error was prejudicial
and we decline to remand for a new trial. A conference between
the judge and all the attorneys involved could not have come up
with a better answer than the simple “No” which was sent back
to the jury.

We consider the defendant’s other assignments of error to
be without merit. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

WINANS and DOYLE, JJ., concur.
WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur specially.
WOLLMAN, Justice (concurring specially).

Although I agree that the judgment should be affirmed, I do
question whether the simple “No” given by the trial court in
response to the jury's question about liability insurance was the
best answer that could have been given. Had counsel been
notified and given an opportunity to express their views concern-
ing the proper answer to be given to this question, I have no
doubt that a more complete answer would have been proposed by

es 15

them and probably given by the court. At the very least, the
answer should have instructed the jury that the question of
liability insurance was not an issue in the case and that they
should not consider the matter of insurance in determining the
questions of liability and the amount of damages.

The record reveals that the jury retired to deliberate at 3:55
p.m. on May 16, 1974, and that at 4:15 p.m. they submitted the
question concerning the amount of insurance. According to ap-
pellant’s brief, counsel for appellant learned of the question and
the answer given by the trial court approximately an hour and a
half after the question had been submitted and answered. At 9:50
p.m., the jury requested clarification of the special inter-
rogatories, at which time the court called the jury back into the
box and gave them further instructions in the presence of
counsel. I would hold that because counsel for appellant did not
make a request that the jury be given an instruction that they
were not to consider the question of insurance in deliberating
upon the questions of liability and damages at a time when it
would have been possible for the court to have given such a sup-
plementary instruction, counsel should be held to have waived
the right to notice and presence provided by SDCL 15-6-51(a). Cf.
Wittmeier v. Post, 78 S.D. 520, 105 N.W.2d 65.

I am authorized to state that Justice COLER joins in this
special concurrence.

CLANCY, Appellant v. CALLAN, Respondent
(238 N.W.2d 295)

(File No. 11661. Opinion filed February 6, 1976)

116

T. R. Pardy, of Mumford, Protsch, Sage & Pardy, Howard,
for plaintiff and appellant.

J. B. Lammers, of Lammers, Lammers & Kleibacker,
Madison, for defendant and respondent.

DOYLE, Justice.

This case presents the question of whether the owner and
renter of a truck achieved an accord and satisfaction of all that
was claimed by the owner by virtue of a particular notation on a
check presented by the renter to the owner and subsequently
cashed by the owner.

pe ui7

The trial court found that there had been a complete accord
and satisfaction. We reverse.

In February 1971, Callan, the defendant-renter, and Clancy,
the plaintiff-owner, agreed that the renter would lease the
owner’s truck to haul corn between two nearby South Dakota
cities, the identities of which are in dispute. According to the
renter, there were to be 50,000 bushels hauled; according to the
owner, 5,000 bushels. The owner claimed that he was to receive
$.02 per bushel hauled. The renter claimed that the owner was to
receive $.04 per bushel hauled.

Very soon after the renter took possession of the truck its
engine broke down near Salem. The renter repaired the truck
and paid for the repair, all without obtaining authorization from
the owner. .

About three weeks later the renter, after unsuccessfully
attempting to contact the owner, dispatched an employee to
Idaho with a load of seed in the truck. The truck’s engine blew up
again east of Lusk, Wyoming. The renter issued a check for a
reconditioned engine but later stopped payment on it because he
learned that the engine would not be warranteed unless certain
repairs were made on the truck.

Soon thereafter, the renter’s employee again set out for
Idaho. The employee traveled some distance before the engine
blew up for a third time. It is disputed whether the truck had
traveled 30 to 40 miles, 250 miles or 300 miles from Lusk west
towards the destination in Idaho. The truck was later returned to
Lusk by the same garage which had serviced it earlier.

Sometime in April 1971, the renter notified the owner that
the truck was in disrepair in Lusk. On July 5, 1971, the owner and
renter met. At this time the location and condition of the truck
were apparently discussed. The renter admits that he made no
mention of the mileage from Lusk, Wyoming to the point of final
breakdown west of Lusk at this meeting or at any time before the
meeting. At some point in the conversation the owner indicated
that he wanted his truck returned, but the renter stated either

us Pe

that the owner would have to get it himself or that the owner
should see the renter’s lawyer about it.

At another point in the conversation the renter gave the
owner the check in question. The owner subsequently cashed it.
On the check was the printed legend:

“BY ENDORSEMENT THIS CHECK WHEN PAID IS

ACCEPTED IN FULL PAYMENT OF THE FOLLOW-

ING ACCOUNT.”

Underneath the printing was the handwritten statement:
“4¢ bu. 1750 bu.
corn
15¢ mile 400 miles
to Lusk Wyo $60.00
Amount of check 130.00.”

The issue presented is whether acceptance of the check with
the foregoing notation constituted an accord and satisfaction of
the debtor’s presumed obligation to return the truck in good
repair, the total mileage on the truck, and any other collateral
obligation.

SDCL 20-7-4, the statute expressing the relevant South
Dakota rule on accord and satisfaction, states:

“Part performance of an obligation, either before or
after a breach thereof, when expressly accepted by the
ereditor in writing in satisfaction, or rendered in pur-
suance of an agreement in writing for that purpose,
though without any new consideration, extinguishes the
obligation.”

The statute thus requires agreement in writing to accept
- partial performance as a condition to accord and satisfaction.

HMMA further consideration in determining whether there
has been an accord and satisfaction is that it is an affirmative
defense and the “burden of proof to establish such defense is on
the party who seeks to rely on it.” Lang v. Burns, 1959, 77 S.D.

119

626, 97 N.W.2d 863. Thus, in this case, the burden of proof is on
the renter. A final general proposition is that to succeed in this af-
firmative defense, the debtor “must make it clear that the check
which he sent is offered only on condition that it is taken in full
payment.” Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Section 1856.
See Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of California, 1951, 37
Cal.2d 592, 234, P.2d 16; 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction,
§14.

[Hl In light of these principles, we find the issue to be
whether the written agreement itself, considered with the speech
and conduct of the parties, supports the trial court’s determina-
tion that the renter demonstrated that his check was offered on
the clearly made condition that it could be taken only in full pay-
ment of all of the owner’s claims.* We find that the renter did not
sustain his burden of proof. _

We will first consider whether there was an accord and
satisfaction for mileage from Lusk, Wyoming to the final point of
breakdown west of Lusk. There is no notation as to the mileage
on the check itself. Moreover, even the renter admits that the
owner had not been told of this final trip west at the time the
check was given. Under these circumstances the trial court’s find-
ing that there had been an accord and satisfaction as to the
mileage west of Lusk is “clearly erroneous.” SDCL 15-6-52(a).

We next consider whether there was an accord and satisfac-
tion as to the other debts claimed to be owing from the renter to
the owner, i.e., charges for return of the truck, removal of the lien
resulting from the owner’s stop payment order on the check to
the garage in Lusk, repair of the truck, and for other matters.
The writing on the check admittedly does not purport to cover
these charges.

Furthermore, the oral and written testimony produced at
the trial strongly indicates that the check was in fact intended to

* The parties have not raised, and we have not considered, any question relating
to the admissibility of evidence as to the intent of the parties in entering into
their agreement. See Kirkeby v. Renaas, 1971, 85 S.D. 515, 186 N.W.2d 518.

120 Pe

apply only to the mileage as noted on the check. We will first con-
sider what the renter himself said at the trial. On examination as
an adverse witness, the renter testified as follows:

“Q > What was the gist of that conversation [at the time
of the giving of the check]?

“A He wanted some money for the use of the truck.
“Q And at this time had you paid him anything?

“A hadn't up until that point. Then I paid him the
four cents on hauling the corn to Salem and I paid
an additional fifteen cents a mile from Howard to
Lusk.”

On cross-examination the renter testified:

“Q And the check you did give Clancy in the amount of
$130 was in payment of the 400 miles to Lusk,
Wyoming, [and] four cents a bushel for the corn
hauled between Argonne and Salem; is that cor-
rect?

“A That's correct.”

Our search of the testimony thus indicates that the renter
himself stated that the payment was intended to cover the
mileage noted on the check and not all the costs of the transac-
tion.

Second, we note that the renter gave the owner a memoran-
dum upon which he had figured the charges he owed the owner.
The memorandum reflects only the local and interstate mileages.
It offers no indication that the check was intended to cover
anything but those mileages.

It might be argued that the renter’s statement that the
owner would have to get the truck himself or should see the
renter’s lawyer if he wished to recover it manifested an intent

that the check be taken only as full payment. However, similar
contentions have been confronted and dismissed by other courts.
As stated in Am. F. & M. Co. v. Lindsay Chair Co., 129 IllApp.
548:

“Tt is one thing to inform a creditor when sending a
check that the debtor will not pay any more and a very
different thing to advise him that the check is sent upon
condition that if he accepts it, he will do so in full settle-
ment of the account.”

See also Selber Bros. v. Newstadt’s Shoe Stores, 1943, 203, La.
816, 14 So.2d 10; National Screen Service Corp. v. Joy Theatres,
Inc., 1970, La.App., 231 So.2d 417.

[If Thus, this court finds that a mere statement that the
claimant will not be paid the remainder of a debt does not carry
with it the clear implication that the check must be taken in total
satisfaction of a debt claimed. In fact, the implication may be to
the contrary.

We hold that the evidence does not support the trial court’s
finding that the renter proved that he had made it clear to the
owner that the check was given only on the condition that it
satisfy all claims of owner against the renter. We conclude,
moreover, that the check did not operate as an accord and
satisfaction of any debt of the renter to the owner except as
specifically noted on the check. Because the finding of the trial
court is “clearly erroneous” in this respect, we are compelled to
reverse. SDCL 15-6-52(a).

We note that this case is to be distinguished from our earlier
holdings which have considered particular wording on checks or
materials accompanying checks. In Qualseth v. Thompson, 1921,
44 S.D. 190, 183 N.W. 116, for example, we held that the endorsing
and cashing of a check marked “ ‘Balance for sawing lumber’”
constituted an acceptance in writing of part performance. We
also found accord and satisfaction in Adams v. Morehead, 1922, 45
S8.D. 216, 186 N.W. 830, when a creditor cashed a debtor's draft
which had been sent “‘to close my account.’” In Eberle v.

2

McKeown, 1968, 83 S.D. 345, 159 N.W.2d 391, the word “final” ap-
peared on checks tendered on a disputed debt and we found ac-
cord and satisfaction. In each of the foregoing situations the writ-
ten agreement clearly purports to set out a final settlement of all
debts. In the case before us today, however, the agreement does
not carry that clear meaning. Our resort to the oral testimony
has, in turn, plainly negated any implication of accord and
satisfaction as to all items of the debt. The cases upon which the
defendant-renter has relied are therefore inapplicable to this set
of facts and his argument must fail.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.

All the Justices concur.

WATKINS PRODUCTS, INC., Appellant v.
LYTLE, et al., Respondents

(238 N.W.2d 299)

(File No. 11668. Opinion filed February 6, 1976)
[|

123

Dudley R. Herman, of Herman & Wernke, Gregory, for
plaintiff and appellant.

Charles Rick Johnson, of Johnson, Johnson & Eklund,
Gregory, for defendants and respondents.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the circuit court dismissing
this action for failure of prosecution by plaintiff. We affirm. The
record reveals that plaintiff filed its summons and complaint on
April 14, 1969, alleging that defendant John Wayne Lytle owed
money on merchandise sold to him by plaintiff. Also named as
defendants were the sureties who had signed the sales contract
and had guaranteed payment. The defendants answered the com-
plaint and the defendant sureties counterclaimed alleging that
the plaintiff fraudulently and intentionally instituted the suit as
part of a scheme to do “business by lawsuit.” The sureties sought
both actual and exemplary damages in the counterclaim.

Plaintiff caused the matter to be noticed for trial and it was
placed on the trial calendar in Brule County on July 1, 1971. On
August 18, 1971, the defendants served on plaintiff's counsel a set
of interrogatories. Counsel for plaintiff then served objections to
the interrogatories. There was a notice of a proposed hearing on
the objections, but no hearing ever took place.

OC ee

On November 11, 1971, defendants moved the court to allow
them to serve a third-party complaint and to serve an amended
answer and counterclaim. At the time set for hearing thereon,
counsel for defendants asked leave of the Court to delay the filing
of the amended answer and counterclaim and third-party com-
plaint until such time as the interrogatories were answered.

The record shows nothing further being done by plaintiff's
counsel until December 1974. Between 1971 and 1974, defendants’
counsel attended six consecutive calendar calls in Brule County.
Counsel for plaintiff did not appear at any of the calendar calls.
At the fifth and sixth calendar calls counsel orally moved for a
dismissal of the action. The court suggested that a formal written
motion to dismiss be made.

Defendants’ counsel took this advice, and on November 27,
1974, he made written motion to have the action dismissed for
lack of prosecution. Thereafter, counsel for plaintiff served his -
answers to the interrogatories on December 13, 1974, and served
objections to the motion to dismiss on December 16, 1974. Oral
arguments were heard by the court on December 16th and the
order dismissing the action was filed on February 27, 1975.

Plaintiff's only point on this appeal is that the trial court
erred in not considering the negligence and delay of defendants
in its decision to dismiss this action for failure to prosecute. Plain-
tiff contends that defendants were as negligent as plaintiff in not
speedily bringing the case on for trial. Our inquiry will therefore
be directed to the question of whether the trial court abused its
discretion in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
SDCL 15-6-41(b).

Plaintiff directs this court’s attention to the case of Welch v.
McCoy, 1918, 40 S.D. 278, 167 N.W. 159. That case involved an ac-
tion to quiet title to real estate. The defendants in the action
counterclaimed and alleged their interest in the real estate. This
court held that the trial court erroneously dismissed the action
for failure to prosecute since by filing the counterclaim the
defendants had as much of a stake in the outcome of the suit as
did the plaintiff. In the instant case, plaintiff asserts that this ac-

125

tion should not have been dismissed because of the counterclaim
of the defendant sureties.

[i Plaintiff is mistaken in assuming that Welch v. McCoy,
supra, is controlling. In that case the claim of the defendant, if
valid, was a matured claim. In the present case, the counterclaim
is not one which is permissible under R.C.P. 13(b) and (e) as the
claim had not matured and would necessarily have been stricken
from the pleading had plaintiff made an apt motion.

“A claim in the nature of malicious prosecution, which
arises out of the bringing of the main action, generally
cannot be asserted either as a compulsory or a per-
missive counterclaim, since such a claim is premature
prior to the determination of the main action.” 3 Moore’s
Federal Practice J 13.13 at p. 13-308.

Counterclaims maturing or acquired after pleading Rule
13(e) were explained thusly:

“To come within the scope of Rule 13 a counterclaim
must have ‘matured’. If the counterclaim has not
matured it states no cause of action. The proposed
counterclaim has not matured because the relief sought
is dependent upon plaintiff's failure to prevail in the
case at bar. Pleading a claim for damages arising from
the wrongful bringing of an action before the final deter-
mination thereof is premature and unauthorized by the
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Marbon Corporation, 1940, D.C.Del., 32 F.Supp. 279 at
280.

Among the essential elements of a cause of action for
malicious prosecution is proof of

“(1) the commencement or continuance of an original
criminal or civil judicial proceeding; (2) its legal
causation by the present defendant against plain-
tiff, * * * (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the
present plaintiff * * *.”

MM

Kunz v. Johnson, 1953, 74 S.D. 577, 582-583, 57
N.W.2d 116, 119, and cases cited at 74 S.D. 583, 57
N.W.2d 116; McIntyre v. Meyer, 1965, 81 S.D. 417,
186 N.W.2d 351.

We are convinced from the record that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action for lack of prose-
eution. The plaintiff started a lawsuit, but it failed by any
reasonable standards to follow through and bring the matter on
for trial. It is certainly true that defendants’ counsel raised all the
usual legal obstacles possible to the prosecution of a collection
case. He filed a counterclaim; he filed extensive interrogatories;
and he filed motions and then sat back and waited for the plaintiff
to proceed. The plaintiff did not answer the interrogatories, or, in
the alternative, bring its objections on for hearing. It brought no
motion on for hearing. Counsel for plaintiff did not attend six con-
secutive calendar calls over a period of three years where the
case was pending so that any action could be taken to hear mo-
tions or set the case for trial. In fact, he did nothing until he
received notice that defendants were moving to have the case
dismissed. He cannot now complain because after almost five
years the action was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

The order of the circuit court is affirmed.

All the Justices concur.
Le

ESTATE OF EVANS

JONES, Appellants v. S.D. CHILDREN’S HOME SOCIETY,
SIOUX FALLS, et al., Respondents

(238 N.W.2d 677)

(File Nos. 11576, 11658. Opinion filed February 13, 1976)

&
aq
aI

Douglas W. Bantz, of Bantz & Gosch, Aberdeen, for con-
testants and appellants.

Daniel R. Fritz, of Maloney, Kolker, Kolker & Fritz, Aber-
deen, for proponent and respondent, William E. Maynard, Ex-
ecutor.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

Appeal No. 11576 is a will contest. Contestants appeal from a
judgment and order admitting the will of Richard T. Evans, dated
April 19, 1972, to probate, alleging (1) that the court erred by
shifting the burden of showing testamentary capacity from the

129

proponent, William E. Maynard, to the contestants, Roland H.
and Rosella Jones; (2) that the court erred in finding that the
testator had the requisite testamentary capacity on April 19,
1972; and (8) that the court erred in not finding that the contested
will was the product of undue influence. We affirm.

In Appeal No. 11658, contestants challenge an order of
December 31, 1974, filed January 6, 1975, for the conveyance of
real property pursuant to agreement of decedent, Richard T.
Evans, dated February 12, 1971, alleging that the decedent was
incompetent to enter into the contract for deed on that date. We
reverse.

Richard T. Evans, a lifelong resident of Brown County, South
Dakota, died in Aberdeen on April 1, 1974. On April 8, 1974,
William E. Maynard petitioned the court for letters testamentary
and probate of a will purporting to be the last will and testament
of Richard T. Evans. The instrument was dated April 19, 1972. On
April 23, 1974, contestants, Rosella and Roland Jones, filed a will
and a codicil with the court which also purported to be the last
will and testament of Richard T. Evans. The will was dated
August 23, 1963, and the codicil was executed on October 22,
1968. The Joneses also filed a petition in opposition to probate of
the April 19, 1972 will.

Trial on the matter was held on July 8, 1974, and after at
least one continuance was concluded on July 22, 1974. At the trial,
the contestants contended that the April 19, 1972 will was invalid
because Richard T. Evans on that date lacked testamentary
capacity and they also contended that the will was procured
through the undue influence of attorney Dennis Maloney. After
hearing all the evidence, the court made findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and filed an order and judgment admitting the
1972 will to probate.

Before considering the specific points which contestants
raised in this appeal, we must first examine the actions of at-
torneys Dennis Maloney and Daniel Fritz of the firm of Maloney,
Kolker, Kolker & Fritz of Aberdeen, South Dakota. The decedent
went to see Mr. Maloney at his law office on April 16 or 17, 1972,

00 I

and expressed a desire to have a new will drawn. He told Mr.
Maloney about the prior will and codicil and how he wanted his
new will to read. Mr. Maloney had never met Mr. Evans. Mr.
Maloney drew up the will and it was executed by Mr. Evans on
April 19, 1972, and witnessed by Maloney and his legal secretary,
Modesta Schnoor.

Apparently because of the fact that the will he had drawn
revoked a past will and because Mr. Evans was in his mid-80s, Mr.
Maloney suspected that there could possibly be a will contest in
the future where Mr. Evans’ testamentary capacity might be
challenged. In an attempt to prove Mr. Evans’ testamentary
capacity, Mr. Maloney had Mr. Evans return to his office on May
18, 1972. He asked Mr. Evans some very leading questions about
the extent of Mr. Evans’ property, his relatives, and his state of
mind. Mr. Evans then gave his unsworn responses. Mr. Maloney
had hired a court reporter who took the entire conversation down
in shorthand and then transcribed it: The statements were later
introduced and admitted at trial.

At the trial, Mr. Maloney took the stand on behalf of the pro-
ponent. He testified not only as to uncontested matters, such as
execution and attestation of the will, but also as to his impres-
sions and observations about Mr. Evans’ competency and mental
capacity to execute the will. His testimony covered matters
which were highly contested and went to the very heart of the
lawsuit. He was then subjected to a most forceful cross-
examination by Mr. Douglas Bantz, the attorney for the con-
testants.

[i There would have been nothing improper at all about Mr.
Maloney testifying if it had not been for the fact that he and his
partner, Mr. Fritz, were at the same time representing the propo-
nent of the will at the trial. While it is true that Mr. Fritz con-
ducted the direct examination of Mr. Maloney and handled the
bulk of the trial, Mr. Maloney was listed as one of the attorneys of
record for the proponent and began the trial by offering the 1972
will to the court for probate.

What Mr. Maloney did was to take the stand and testify as to

eeellllllLU Ee

the highly contested matter of Mr. Evans’ competency to execute
the 1972 will, while at the same time he and his partner, Mr. Fritz,
were representing the proponent of the 1972 will. This con-
stitutes a grave breach of professional ethics. Such action is
specifically covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility of
the American Bar Association. This Code has been adopted by
the State Bar of South Dakota and has been approved by this
court. The Code is set out in full as an appendix to SDCL 16-18.
DR 5-101(B) and 5-102 are the relevant sections. DR 5-101(B) is
very clear in its language and it states as follows:

“A lawyer shall not accept employment in con-
templated or pending litigation if he knows or it is ob-|
vious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as
a witness, except that he may undertake the employ-
ment and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify:

(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an un-
contested matter.

(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of
formality and there is no reason to believe that
substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to
the testimony. .

(8) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and
value of legal services rendered in the case by the
lawyer or his firm to the client.

(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substan-
tial hardship on the client because of the distinctive
value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the par-
ticular case.”

The rationale for this rule is simple and is well illustrated in
the case at bar. Mr. Maloney’s testimony went to the competency
of Mr. Evans to make the 1972 will. If ultimately the proponent
did prevail and the will was admitted to probate, Mr. Maloney
and his firm would be entitled to probate a rather sizeable estate.
If the will was not admitted to probate, Mr. Maloney would not

3.

have the opportunity to render further professional services to
the Evans estate. The conflict of interest presented in this situa-
tion is all too obvious. Mr. Maloney could not be an effective
witness because he had a direct interest in the outcome of the
lawsuit. The roles of an advocate and a witness are totally incon-
sistent, and yet Mr. Maloney attempted to assume both roles at
the same time. We canuot tolerate even the slightest appearance
of impropriety if the law is going to continue to remain an
honored and respected profession.

At this point, we might simply say that a breach of profes-
sional ethics occurred and leave it at that; however, this is the
second time in less than a year that this impropriety has occurred
in a case on appeal before this court. See In Re Estate of Melcher,
1975, 89 S.D. 258, 232 N.W.2d 442. This simply cannot be allowed
to continue. Besides the disciplinary rules cited above, there is
also a provision in the evidence section of our Compiled Laws
which goes to the problem of attorneys testifying as to contested

_ mmatters. SDCL 19-1-3 states:

“When an attorney is a witness for his client upon
any trial except as to merely formal matters such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument or the like, he
shall not further participate in such trial. This section
shall not apply when such attorney's testimony is of-
fered in answer to evidence received on behalf of the
other party and it shall appear to the satisfaction of the
court that such attorney had no reason to anticipate the
necessity of his being a witness. Neither shall this sec-
tion apply to state’s attorneys and the attorney general
and their deputies when engaged in the discharge of of-
ficial duties.” (emphasis supplied) .

Ii The above section of the Compiled Laws originated in
Supreme Court Rule, Part 2, Rule 29, 1919. It may very well have
been promulgated by this court in reaction to the testimony of an
attorney in the case of Johnson v. Shaver, 1919, 41 S.D. 585, 172
N.W. 676. Regardless of its origin, SDCL 19-1-3 makes this prob-
lem a matter of evidence, not simply a matter of ethics.
Therefore, we are hereby making it incumbent upon the judges of

188

the circuit courts of this state to enforce this provision.
Henceforth, if an attorney testifies for his client as to contested
matters, neither he nor any member of his firm will be allowed to
represent that client at any further proceedings directly relating
to that case. If for some reason the attorney does continue to
represent the client after becoming a witness, his testimony will
be considered incompetent and stricken from the record.

In the instant case, we will consider the contestants’
challenge as to the sufficiency of the evidence without reference
to the testimony of attorney Dennis Maloney. We will also not
consider the unsworn statement of Richard T. Evans except
those statements which contestants refer to as strengthening
their case against the 1972 will.

Hl Contestants’ first contention is that the court erred in
shifting the burden of proving the decedent’s mental capacity to
execute a will from the proponent to the contestants. It has been
held by this court without exception that the proponents of a will
have the burden of proving testamentary capacity. In Re Estate
of Melcher, supra; Johnson v. Shaver, supra; In Re Estate of
Anders, 1975, 88 S.D. 631, 226 N.W.2d 170. From the record we
are satisfied that the burden of proving Mr. Evans’ testamentary
capacity was placed squarely on the proponent in this case.

[i The question of whether this burden was met is raised by
contestants’ second point. They claim that the court erroneously
found that Richard T. Evans was competent to execute the will on
April 19, 1972. Our review, of course, is governed by SDCL
15-6-52(a) and In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 1970, 85 S.D. 282, 181
N.W.2d 455. We will not set aside the findings of the lower court
unless they are found to be “clearly erroneous” based upon the
record. For the reasons stated above, we will review the evidence
without regard to the testimony of Mr. Maloney or the unsworn
statements of Mr. Evans which are favorable to the proponent.

In determining the question of the testamentary capacity of
the decedent, we will use the standard previously set down by
this court in Petterson v. Imbsen, 1923, 46 S.D. 540, 194 N.W. 842.

eee

“The law requires soundness of mind, but by this is not
necessarily meant that degrée of intellectual vigor
which one has in youth or that is usually enjoyed by one
in perfect health. It is not necessary that one should
have sufficient capacity to make contracts and do
business generally nor to engage in complex and in-
tricate business matters, but for the purpose of making
a will one has a sound mind who, without prompting, has
full and intelligent knowledge of the act engaged in, and
full knowledge of the property he possesses, and is
capable of comprehending its condition and intelligent
perception and understanding of the disposition he
wishes to make of it and of the persons that he desires
shall be recipients of his bounty and gifts, and to
recollect and apprehend the nature of the claims of
those who are excluded from participating in his
bounty.” 46 S.D. at 546, 194 N.W. at 844.

The record reveals that the decedent was 87 years of age at
his death and was 85 years of age when he executed the 1972 will.
He was a bachelor and had spent almost all of his years farming in
Lincoln Township, Brown County. At death, his only relatives
were his cousin, Wesley Thomas, his sister-in-law, Mrs. W. 0.
Evans, and his second cousin, Mrs. Rosella Jones who is one of the
contestants. In 1964 decedent suffered a stroke which partially
paralyzed one side of his body. He continued to live on his farm,
however, until 1971. In January of 1971 he became a resident of
the Americana Nursing Home in Aberdeen. A short time later he
became seriously ill and was admitted to St. Luke’s Hospital
where he recovered and returned to the Americana Home. He
was residing at the Americana when the 1972 will was executed.

Sometime early in 1971 Mrs. Evans and the Joneses
suspected that the decedent could no longer handle his business
affairs. They hired an attorney who petitioned the court to
declare Richard T. Evans an incompetent and impose a guardian-
ship over his estate. An order to this effect was entered on March
81, 1971, and the First National Bank of Aberdeen was appointed
guardian of the estate. The decedent was apparently given no
notice of the proceedings. In June 1971, the Bank held an auction

185

where decedent's personal property on the farm was sold off and
the assets invested. The evidence indicates that decedent was
angry and hurt when he finally found out about the guardianship.
He was particularly upset when he learned of the sale of his per-
sonal property. He blamed Mrs. Evans and the contestants for
the guardianship and the sale. This seems to be what precipitated
his decision to write a new will.

The 1972 will was not really a radical departure from the
1968 will and the 1968 codicil. Under the 1963 will there were the
following bequests: $5,000 to the First Wesleyan Methodist
Church of Aberdeen; $5,000 to Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home,
Boys Town, Nebraska; $5,000 to the Crippled Children’s Hospital,
Sioux Falls; $5,000 to a cousin, W. R. Thomas; $10,000 to the con-
testants, Roland and Rosella Jones; $5,000 to Mrs. W. 0. Evans;
and $5,000 to decedent’s sister, Mary C. Lewis. The rest and
residue of the estate was left to legatees who survived the dece-
dent. The First National Bank of Aberdeen was named executor
of the estate. In the 1968 codicil the legacy to Mary C. Lewis was
revoked because she had died and the other legacies were in-
creased in amount.

Under the 1972 will, proponent William Maynard was ap-
pointed executor. Mrs. Evans and Mrs. Jones were each to
receive a bequest of $5,000. Of the rest and residue of the estate,
one-half was to be divided between the Crippled Children’s
Hospital, McCrossan Boys’ Ranch, and Father Flanagan’s Boys’
Home. The other one-half of the residue was bequeathed to Lin-
coln Township to be expended in the best interest and welfare of
its residents.

Contestants contend that the preponderance of evidence
supports the view that Richard T. Evans was incompetent to ex-
ecute a will on April 19, 1972. We cannot agree. Even excluding
the testimony of attorney Maloney, the evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that decedent was fully competent when he
executed the will. None of contestants’ witnesses could testify as
to Evans’ mental state at the specific time frame in which the will
was executed. Mrs. Evans and Mrs. Jones testified that Evans
would not communicate with them when they would go to see him

rr

at the Americana Home. As previously stated, Evans blamed
them for selling his property and placing his estate under guar-
dianship. We can well understand why decedent might not be too
outgoing when they tried to visit with him. In addition, it should
be noted that Mr. and Mrs. Jones lived in Minnesota and visited
the decedent very infrequently.

Contestants argue that decedent did not know the nature
and extent of his property. They point to a statement made by
decedent in his transcribed interview with Maloney. In answer to
a question about his property, Mr. Evans stated, “I ain’t got much
property. It is all personal property.” Contestants maintain that
this indicates that he did not know the extent of his property. We
do not think this is the case. At the time when the statement was
made, Evans had sold all of his real property and all he had left
were C.D.s, stocks, bonds, etc. It is quite obvious that when he
spoke of property he was referring to real property.

Decedent did admit that he did not remember much of what
“transpired during his illness in the winter of 1971. However, this
is not relevant because the will was executed more than one year
later and there was testimony that decedent had fully recovered
from his illness by May of 1971.

Contestants also point to decedent’s bequest to Lincoln
Township as evidence of his incompetence. They contend that
this is an unnatural bequest. We cannot agree. Decedent had no
lineal descendants. He had farmed in Lincoln Township for many
years and most of his good friends lived in Lincoln Township.
There is evidence that he wanted to leave some of his estate to
the Township to better the lives of the people living there. We
hardly consider the sentiment expressed by this bequest as
evidence that the man was incompetent.

HB Nor does the fact that a guardian was appointed for his
estate convince us that decedent lacked testamentary capacity.
The guardianship was over his estate, not his person. There is
also evidence that the guardianship was imposed because of his
physical incapacity rather than any mental incapacity.

137

In contrast to contestants’ evidence, proponent’s evidence
strongly suggests that Mr. Evans was competent to execute his
1972 will. Deloris Inman, the administrator of Americana,
testified that she saw Evans just about every day and that his
mind was clear and he was alert in April, 1972. In addition, Evans’
good friends Clarence Haskell and Louis Miller testified as-to his
competence.

We think that it is very significant that nine days before ex-
ecution of the will, decedent’s personal physician, Dr. King, in-
structed Mrs. Inman that decedent should be allowed to leave the
grounds of Americana and travel downtown unaccompanied.
Thereafter, decedent went downtown and bought a three-
wheeled bicycle and was seen at various times pedaling around
the streets of Aberdeen. Mrs. Inman testified that Evans always
returned to Americana at mealtime and no one ever had to go
looking for him.

[i The evidence preponderates in favor of the proponent on
this point. After a careful review of the record, we hold that the
finding of the lower court that Richard T. Evans had testamen-
tary capacity on April 19, 1972, was not “clearly erroneous.”

HH Contestants argue that the 1972 will was also invalid
because of the undue influence of attorney Maloney. Unlike the
question of competency, the burden of proving undue influence is
on the contestants of a will. Johnson v. Shaver, supra. Con-
testants have not sustained this burden. They point to the inter-
view with Mr. Maloney on May 18, 1972, as proof that he was un-
duly influencing Mr. Evans. What they overlook is the fact that
the interview was conducted almost one month to the day after
the will was executed. Maloney and Evans had never even met
until the will was drawn up.

Because the proponent clearly proved testamentary capacity
and the contestants failed to prove undue influence, we hold that
the court correctly ordered that the 1972 will be admitted to pro-
bate.

HAs to the second appeal, No. 11658, on February 10, 1971,

138

Richard T. Evans sold 400 acres of his land to Charles Maynard
and his wife, Sharon Maynard, on a contract for deed. Charles
Maynard is the son of the proponent William Maynard. The con-
tract was executed by the parties on February 12, 1971, in the law
office of attorney Robert Miller of Aberdeen. Under the contract,
the land was to be sold for $70 per acre with 5% yearly interest
on the unpaid balance. After Evans’ death, the Maynards agreed
to pay the unpaid balance in return for conveyance of the prop-
erty by the executor of the Evans estate. The court order allowed
William Maynard as executor to convey the property to Charles
and Sharon Maynard.

Contestants argue that the court erred in entering the order
because Evans was not competent to execute the contract for
deed on February 12, 1971. The test for capacity to contract for
the sale of real property is somewhat different than the test for
testamentary capacity quoted above. As we held in Shearn v.
Anderson, 1951, 74 S.D. 41, 48 N.W.2d 821:

“The rule regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to
establish incompetency has been stated by this court as
follows: ‘Impairment of the faculties by disease or old
age will not invalidate a deed if the party executing it
had sufficient mental capacity to understand his act. It
must be shown that the grantor did not have sufficient
mind and memory to comprehend the nature and
character of the transaction. Mental weakness that does
not amount to inability to comprehend and understand
the nature and effect of the transaction is not sufficient
to invalidate a deed.’ Meyer v. Kiecksee, 68 S.D. 48, 298
N.W. 261; Egan v. Shindelbower, [S.D., 41 N.W.2d 225]
supra.” 74 §.D. at 43, 48 N.W.2d at 822.

Contestants place reliance upon SDCL 30-19-6 which pro-
vides:

“If, upon hearing in the county court, as provided in
§ 30-19-5, the right of the petitioner to have a specific
performance of the contract is found to be doubtful, the
court must dismiss the petition without prejudice to the

139

rights of the petitioner, who may, at any time within six
months thereafter, proceed in the circuit court to en-
force a specific performance thereof.”

They argue that specific performance of the contract is doubtful
because Richard T. Evans’ mental competence on February 12,
1971, is doubtful. Therefore, under the terms of the statute, they
contend that the court should have denied the petition.

Our review of this question cannot be govened by the “clear-
ly erroneous” rule which we employed above. The court made no
findings of fact as to the mental competence of the decedent on
February 12, 1971. No separate evidentiary hearing was ever
held on this question. A hearing was held, but it only amounted to
the presentation of unsworn arguments of the parties’ respective
counsel. No evidence was taken at that time. The only evidence
which goes to this question was presented at the trial of the will
contest. That evidence is quite conflicting. Attorney Robert
Miller, the serivener of the contract for deed, testified that while
he initially had doubts about the decedent’s mental state, he
became convinced that the man was competent after asking him a
few questions. On the other hand, there is evidence that the dece-
dent was very ill at this time. On February 16, 1971, four days
after execution of the contract, the decedent was hospitalized
with what was diagnosed as arteriosclerotic cardiovascular and
cerebrovascular disease and marked cardiac decompensation.
The hospital notes for February 16th and 17th show that Evans
was in a very confused state of mind.

Another point in dispute is the extremely low selling price
for the land and the very favorable rate of interest on the unpaid
balance. Contestants claim that this shows that decedent did not
have the presence of mind to understand the nature of the trans-
action. The Maynards counter by saying that they had been good
friends of Evans over the years and the low selling price and in-
terest rate reflected his gratitude for their friendship. Con-
testants point to the evidence which shows that Evans had pro-
mised to sell some of the land in this transaction to Elmer Blake, a
neighbor, and that Evans was not a man to go back on his word.
The implication, of course, is that Evans did not know what he

en

was doing when he signed the contract on February 12, 1971.

On the record presented, we cannot determine which
evidence preponderates. As we noted, this factual issue has never
been squarely presented to the trial court. Therefore, we hold
that the court erred in granting the petition on the basis of the
evidence presented at the will contest. Specific performance of
the contract is doubtful under SDCL 30-19-6, and therefore the
petitioner has the recourse of suing for specific performance in
the circuit court. There the evidence can all be presented, it can
be heard, and specific findings of fact can be made.

Appeal No. 11576 is affirmed; appeal No. 11658 is reversed
and remanded.

WINANS, DOYLE and COLER, JJ., and HERSRUD, Circuit
Judge, concur.

HERSRUD, Circuit Judge, sitting for WOLLMAN, J., dis-

qualified.

ESTATE OF HOFER
HOFER, Appellant v. HAMRE, Respondent
(238 N.W.2d 496)
(File No. 11579. Opinion filed February 13, 1976)

Petition for rehearing denied March 22, 1976

141

Charles Lacey, Sioux Falls, for petitioner and appellant.
S. D. Sherwood, Clark, for defendant and respondent.
DOYLE, Justice.

This is a contest over the right to administer a will. It was
brought by Ella Hofer (Ella), the executrix named in the will of
David G. Hofer, deceased, against the subsequently appointed ad-
ministrator with will attached, M. S. Hamre. Ella asserts that
Hamre’s letters must be revoked because Hamre was appointed
while her power as executrix, although suspended, was not
revoked, and because the hearing removing her was inadequate.

1

Hamre contends that Ella is estopped to assert that his letters
should be revoked because, among other reasons, Ella requested
his appointment. Ella asserts that she cannot be estopped from
making her challenge because the order appointing Hamre is
void.

The trial court held against Ella. We affirm.

Ella Hofer was named as executrix in the will of David G.
Hofer, deceased, her father. Ella was duly appointed, but on Oc-
tober 13, 1972, David Hofer’s son, Dennis Hofer, filed a petition to
remove his sister, Ella, as executrix. A valid order suspending
Ella was issued on the same day. Subsequently, on October 24,
1972, a hearing was held. The court orally ruled that Ella’s letters
testamentary be revoked and requested the attorney for Dennis
Hofer to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order
to that effect. All parties and the trial court concede that this was
never done.

On November 21, 1972, Ella signed a petition asking for the
appointment of M. S. Hamre as administrator with will annexed.
Joyce Hofer, Ella’s sister, joined in the petition. Hamre was ap-
pointed administrator on December 12, 1972, and has acted in this
capacity until now. On various occasions, between the time of
Hamre’s appointment and Ella’s decision to contest that appoint-
ment, Ella participated in probate proceedings. On June 28, 1974,
roughly a year and a half after she had petitioned for the appoint-
ment of Hamre, Ella submitted a petition asking for the revoca-
tion of Hamre’s letters of administration. The trial court denied
her request.

This court must decide several issues in determining this ap-
peal. First, was the appointment of M. S. Hamre void because
Ella's powers had merely been suspended and had not been
revoked? According to Ella, if we decide that the appointment
was void, our inquiry would end, for one cannot be estopped to
assert that an order is void. Second, if the appointment is not
void, is Ella estopped from asserting the irregularity of the ap-
pointment?

1438

HBAs noted, we must first determine if the order appointing
Hamre is void. Hofer correctly contends that the order revoking
her letters testamentary was not valid because it was not “re-
duced to writing, signed by the court or judge, attested by the
clerk and filed in his office” pursuant to SDCL 15-6-58. See
Stephens v. Faus, 20 S.D. 367, 106 N.W. 56; Foss v. Spitznagel, 77
8.D. 633, 97 N.W.2d 856. Ella next asserts that Hamre’s appoint-
ment must have been void because the court lacked jurisdiction
to grant letters to Hamre while her appointment was still out-
standing. See Griffith v. Frazier, 1814, 8 Cranch 9, 3 L.Ed. 471;
Hyde v. C.LR., 1962, 2 Cir., 301 F.2d 279; Gappert v. Borner, 1952,
78 N.D. 760, 51 N.W.2d 866; 31 Am.Jr.2d, Executors and Ad-
ministrators, § 101. The courts apparently find the appointment
of the second administrator to be void because of the lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Griffith v. Frazier, supra.
The situation in this case, however, is easily distinguishable from
that in the authorities cited. In this case the trial court had in-
disputably entered a valid written order suspending Ella. None of
the cited authorities considers a comparable set of facts.

[In this context, then, we must consider whether the court
here lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant letters to Hamre.
7 Moore’s Federal Practice J 60.25[2], p. 304, sets out the general
rule as to whether a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

“Tn brief * * * except for the rare case where power is
plainly usurped, if a court has the general power to ad-
judicate the issues in the class of suits to which the case
belongs then its interim orders and final judgment,
whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral at-
tack, so far as jurisdiction over the subject matter is
concerned.”

Our examination of the record does not reveal the prerequisite
“plain usurpation” of power so as to bring with it a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. A valid order of suspension had been regular-
ly entered by the trial court and a hearing on the revocation
order itself was held with all parties in attendance and
represented by their attorneys. The trial court, though acting in
error, did not plainly usurp its power.

4 es

Thus, while the appointment of a second administrator may
be void when the powers of the first administrator remain un-
suspended or unrevoked (a question we do not decide here), we
hold that the appointment of a second administrator is not void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after the first ad-
ministrator has been validly suspended and a hearing with notice
has been held upon the revocation of the powers of the first ad-
ministrator.

We note in concluding our discussion of this issue that our
holding is in accord with the principal stated in Moore that “in the
sound interest of finality, the concept of the void judgment must
be narrowly restricted.” 7 Moore’s Federal Practice J 60.25[2].

[Hf The next question for consideration is whether Ella is
estopped from contesting the irregular appointment of Hamre on
the grounds that her powers were unrevoked for the reason that
she requested that appointment. We find that she is estopped.

Our research has revealed that the cases almost universally
hold that one who invites error in a lower court is estopped to
assert that error in the appellate court. Wilhelm v. Johnson, 1948,
72 S.D. 316, 33 N.W.2d 563; Behseleck v. Andrus, 1932, 60 S.D.
204, 244 N.W. 268; 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 713. In one
estate case, for example, a bank could not “appeal from the order
extending the time to file a claim because it had petitioned for
entry of the same.” In re Baumgarten’s Estate, 1961, 12 Wis.2d
212, 107 N.W.2d 169.

We hold that Ella is estopped to deny the validity of the
order appointing Hamre because she joined in the petition to the
court for that order.

Il The next issue which Ella raises is that the hearing
removing her was inadequate. We note that the hearing was ir-
regular in that the only testimony was the unsworn statements of
the attorneys in the case, and Ella was never called to testify.
However, her attorney admitted that some friction existed be-
tween the parties. The court was also cognizant from the file that
Ella, as executrix, had taken some actions without first obtaining

145

the approval of the court. Furthermore, all the parties, including
Ella, had notice, all attended and all were represented by at-
torneys. Ella stated in her petition for final discharge that she
was removed “after due hearing.” Under these circumstances,
Ella will not now be allowed to contest the validity of the hearing
removing her. See Gibbs v. Bergh, 1927, 51 S.D. 432, 214 N.W.
838.

To summarize, we have determined that the order appoint-
ing Hanire as administrator with will attached, while not void,
was irregularly entered. Ella, however, is estopped to assert the
irregularity because she sought the order. We further conclude
that the trial court should consider entry of an order nunc pro
tunc to remedy irregularities in the appointment of Hamre. See
SDCL 15-6-60(a).

Affirmed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.
WINANS, J., concurs in result.
WINANS, Justice (concurring in result).

Iam concurring in the result in the case of Estate of Hofer. I
think the basis for the opinion which should go out of this Court is
“estoppel” and I would bottom the opinion solely on that issue.

The majority opinion asserts that this Court must first
determine if the order appointing Hamre is void, then the opinion
is weakened by stating that “Ella correctly contends that the
order revoking her letters testamentary was not valid * * *.”
Now if Ella correctly makes that contention, that ends the case. I
don’t think her contention is correct and I would not get into it.I
would simply say she is estopped to make such a contention. I am
in some doubt as to whether we should advise a lower court to
consider entry of an order nunc pro tune. If we say that Hamre is
the duly appointed administrator, I see no need for a nunc pro
tune order and if he isn’t acting with jurisdiction, a nunc pro tunc
order would cure nothing.

LARSEN et ux, Appellants v. STATE, Respondent

(238 N.W.2d 684)

(File No. 11641. Opinion filed February 13, 1976)

147

John J. Simpson, Winner, for plaintiffs and appellants.

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Carl W. Quist and Gary F.
Colwill, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pierre, for defendant and respondent.

DOYLE, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted to the
defendant, State of South Dakota, in an inverse condemnation ac-
tion by plaintiffs to recover damages for closing of an access alley
to U.S. Highway 18.

On January 23, 1969, the State of South Dakota and Fred and
Celia Larsen entered into a Right of Way Agreement whereby
the plaintiffs transferred Lot H-1 in Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the
Lueken Addition, City of Winner, to the State of South Dakota as
highway right of way. As compensation, the Agreement provided
for payment of $250.00, the construction of two approaches from
the highway to the Larsen property, the construction of a six-inch
sleeve under the highway to the Larsen property and the
transfer to the Larsens of Lot 1 of Lot N of Tract Lin the SW’ of
Section 21, Township 99 North, Range 76 West. This lot was at
the time owned by the State of South Dakota. This compensation
as stated in the Agreement was for “land conveyed and
damages.” Both parties fully performed in accordance with the

8

convenants set forth in the Agreement. The right of way was
necessary for construction of highway projects F 008-1(1) on State
Highway 44 and F 010-5(5) on U.S. Highway 18 at their intersec-
tion in the City of Winner. As a part of these projects, an alley
located between Lot 1 of the Lueken Addition and said Lot 1 of
Lot N was closed.

On July 27, 1973, the plaintiffs filed an action in inverse con-
demnation in the amount of $40,000, alleging the closing of the
alley impaired access to their property. No action was taken by
the plaintiffs to rescind the Right of Way Agreement executed by
the parties and no offer of restitution of the transferred Lot 1 of
Lot N was made.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the Right of
Way Agreement entered into between the plaintiffs and defend-
ant established compensation for any damage suffered by the
plaintiffs as a result of the highway construction. The plaintiffs
contend that the closing of the alley constituted a separate taking
from their property not connected with the highway construction
and therefore they should be compensated for this alleged taking
beyond the compensation they received in the original Right of
Way Agreement.

The parties to the present action entered into a legally bind-
ing contract when they signed the Right of Way Agreement on
January 23, 1969. The contract was properly executed and was
one that the State Highway Commission was authorized by law to
enter into (SDCL 31-19-1 and 31-19-46). As is stated in 17
Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 21:

“Parties who have reduced their agreement to writing
in plain, unequivocal terms or in terms susceptible of in-
terpretation and construction under recognized rules of
Jaw are bound by the meaning of the contract which is
reached by a proper interpretation.”

The question concerning the effect of a contractual con-
veyance to an agency having the power of eminent domain has
been answered in other jurisdictions. As stated in Hamilton v.

| 9

City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 321, 300 N.W. 631:

“The conveyance of land for a public purpose will or-
dinarily vest in the grantee the same rights as though
the land had been acquired by condemnation. The con-
veyance will be held to be a release of all damages which
would be presumed to be included in the award of
damages if the property had been condemned.’

““* ** All damages that arose from the exercise of
the city’s power of eminent domain or its equivalent ac-
quisition of rights under the contract were satisfied by
that contract.”

See also Busby v. State, 1966, 101 Ariz. 388, 420 P.2d 173; Wescott
v. State Highway Commission, 1964, 262 N.C. 522, 138 S.E.2d 133;
State Highway Department of Georgia v. Ivey, 1961, 217 Ga. 37,
120 S.E.2d 618.

The circuit court found that the language of the Agreement.
clearly encompassed payment for all damages caused as a result
of highway projects F 008-1(1) and F 010-5(5), including any
damage for the closing of the alley in question. Thus, in accord-
ance with SDCL 15-6-56(c) there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact.

In their brief the plaintiffs contend that the question of
whether or not the closing of the alley was within the contempla-
tion of the Right of Way Agreement is disputed and thus the mo-
tion for summary judgment should not have been granted.
Granted, this fact is disputed; however, it is immaterial in the in-
verse condemnation action. It might be a material fact in an ac-
tion seeking rescission of the Right of Way Agreement. Rather,
the plaintiffs are seeking to obtain damages while retaining the
benefits of the Agreement. This is not proper under South
Dakota law since, while the Right of Way Agreement stands, it
constitutes on its face a complete settlement of the question. To
proceed further, the plaintiffs must first try to rescind the Agree-
ment (SDCL 53-11-1 through 53-11-5).

150 po

[i The plaintiffs contend that the closing of the alley was not
specifically mentioned in the Right of Way Agreement and thus
was not covered. The Agreement does not attempt to point out
each item of damage individually nor does it specifically detail all
items of construction. What the Agreement does do is set forth
the compensation to which the plaintiffs were entitled, which,
under South Dakota law, is the difference between the fair
market value of the property before the acquisition minus the fair
market value of the remainder property after the acquisition.
City of Bristol v. Horter, 1950, 73 S.D. 398, 43 N.W.2d 543; State
Highway Commission v. Hayes Estate, 1966, 82 S.D. 27, 140
N.W.2d 680; Basin Electric Power Cooperative, Ine. v. Cutler,
1974, 88 S.D. 214, 217 N.W.2d 798. No breakdown of individual
items of damage is attempted or necessary in the Right of Way
Agreement. The construction plans referred to in the Right of
Way Agreement show a curb line extending across the mouth of
the alley in question, thus closing its entrance onto the highway.
The plaintiffs had notice of this condition by an examination of
this plan when they executed the Agreement.

Wi Further, plaintiffs claim damages due to alleged impair-
ment of access. It is true that if a landowner’s access to his prop-
erty has been materially impaired, he has suffered compensable
damage “ ‘if the consequential injury is peculiar to the owner's
land and not of a kind suffered by the public as a whole.’ ” Hurley
v. State, 1966, 82 S.D. 156, 143 N.W.2d 722. The Hurley case fur-
ther held that where there is no physical encroachment on a land-
owner’s property, impairment of access may constitute a taking
in a constitutional sense if it substantially affects the market
value of the property.

[Hi In the present case there was a physical appropriation
from the property in question. As a part of the highway project
for which the right of way was acquired, an alley adjacent to
plaintiffs’ property was closed. As payment for the right of way
acquired, the landowners were entitled to the difference between
the fair market value of the remainder property after the acquisi-
tion. This figure was arrived at by an agreement between the
parties without action in court. If the closing of the alley con-
stituted impairment of access and if this impairment of access af-

Po 161

fected the fair market value of the remainder property after the
acquisition, it was covered by the provisions of the Right of Way
Agreement.

In this action plaintiffs are attempting to maintain an in-
dependent action for a separate item of damage. This is not pro-
per under South Dakota law, for as was stated in State Highway
Commission v. Hayes Estate, supra:

“‘Any elements of detriment *** which were ap-
preciable and substantial in nature and had a reasonable
tendency to lessen the market value of the land could be
taken into consideration. These items of injury are not
to be allowed as separate items of damage, but are only
to be considered in determining the reduction in value of
the remaining tract.’ ”

[Ii is also contended by plaintiffs that by closing the alley
in question, allegedly without the city’s consent, the defendant
has violated SDCL 31-32-2.* This statute provides for damages in
tort, and the plaintiffs have not complied with proper procedures
for suing the State of South Dakota nor is the statute applicable
to the present case.

Il The plaintiffs have placed great emphasis on the
paragraph in the Resolution and Agreement between the City of
Winner and the State of South Dakota, which provided that the
City of Winner

“*** will save harmless the Commission from any
claim or (of) damage made against it for consequential
damage arising from and out of the construction of such
work undertaken by it whether the claim arises from
and out of changing the grade of streets, causing loss or
inconvenience to the property or business of surround-
ing property owners, or from any cause or causes what-
soever.”

* Repealed by Ch. 242, S.L. 1974.

EL

The City of Winner did not accept this provision of the
Resolution and Agreement, and the State of South Dakota has
subsequently accepted liability for such proper claims as have
been filed; consequently, this provision is not applicable to the
present case.

It is our opinion that the alley in question was closed pur-
suant to the highway construction project, and the Right of Way
Agreement executed by the parties on January 23, 1969, settled
all claims for taking and damage to the Larsen property.

Plaintiffs cite and rely on two cases in support of their posi-
tion, Thom v. State, 1965, 376 Mich. 608, 188 N.W.2d 322, and
Cranley v. Boyd County, 1936, 266 Ky. 569, 99 S.W.2d 737.

Both cases are factually distinguishable. In Thom a highway
was altered many years after the original taking, while Cranley
was, in pertinent part, reversed by Department of Highways v.
Jackson, 1957, Ky., 302 S.W.2d 373.

The summary judgment in favor of the State of South
Dakota is properly granted.

Affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS, J., concur.

WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., dissent.

WOLLMAN, Justice (dissenting).

I would hold that there is a genuine issue of fact to be re-
solved, i.e., whether plaintiffs were aware at the time they signed
the Right of Way Agreement that the alley would be closed by
the construction project. The plans and specifications are not so
crystal clear that it can be said as a matter of law that plaintiffs
had notice of the fact that the alley was to be closed at the time
they executed the Right of Way Agreement.

COLER, Justice (dissenting).

a:

I agree with Justice Wollman that there is a genuine issue of
fact. While affidavits on the part of the State Highway Commis-
sion claim notice and knowledge on the part of appellants, ap-
pellants’ affidavit directly controverts that claim:

“Summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should
be awarded only when the truth is clear and reasonable
doubts touching the existence of a genuine issue as to
material fact should be resolved against the movant.”
Wilson v. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Christopherson,
1968, 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19; SDCL 15-6-56(a).

The agreement relied upon does not set forth curb cuts that
will be made for appellants’ benefit but makes no mention of the
closing of the alley where it ends at the highway to be con-
structed to appellants’ detriment. I see nothing in the affidavits
or in the pleadings which establishes that appellants had even
seen the drawing of the Department of Transportation and I
believe that it is a jury question as to whether a person of com-
mon understanding, who, even if he had seen the drawing, would
comprehend the ascribed meaning that the curb line drawn in-
dicates the closing of a street or alley. I feel that the closing of the
street is something akin to the change of grade which would be a
taking not contemplated and for which damages would be due
above and beyond any settlement between the parties.

De
WELLINGTON et al., Appellants v. STATE et al., Respondents

(238 N.W.2d 499)

(File Nos. 11649, 11655. Opinion filed February 13, 1976)

May, Johnson & Burke and Derald W. Wiehl, Woods, Fuller,
Shultz & Smith, and William P. Fuller, Sioux Falls, for peti-
tioners and appellants.

Gene Paul Kean, State’s Atty., Minnehaha County, Sioux
Falls, William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, for respondents.

WINANS, Justice.

These two cases present to this Court but one question, and
that a matter of first impression before us. The substance of the
issue is whether or not documents accompanying a demand for
extradition must demonstrate probable cause to believe that an
offense was committed in the demanding state and that it was
committed by those sought to be extradited. We have considered
the record in these cases, the relevant arguments of all counsel
and the current state of the law in federal and state jurisdictions.
Noting an apparent division of authority on the subject, we have

ee 155

carefully examined the opinions handed down by courts on both
sides of the matter. It is our conclusion that it is not essential to
show probable cause in demanding extradition in the same
manner in which it must be shown for an ordinary arrest warrant.
We therefore affirm the decision of the circuit court quashing the
writ of habeas corpus, thus permitting the contested extradi-
tions.

Appellants in this case had been arrested at Sioux Falls,
South Dakota, in the late fall of 1974 and were charged with being
fugitives from justice from the State of Minnesota. On December
30, 1974, in response to the application of the County Attorney of
Stevens County, Minnesota, the Minnesota Governor issued a de-
mand to the Governor of South Dakota for their extradition. On
January 2nd of 1975 Governor Kneip authorized their remand-
ment and executed Governor’s warrants of arrest. After several
continuances a joint extradition hearing was held on January 15,
1975, before a Magistrate of the Second Judicial Circuit at Sioux
Falls. During this hearing the State of South Dakota submitted to
the court the Governor’s arrest warrants, the Minnesota Gover-
nor’s requisition papers, and all the documents thereto attached
including two criminal complaints, two arrest warrants and sup-
plementary affidavits. In addition, the State called a witness who
gave testimony regarding the sale of various objects by Ap-
pellants to him, which objects the State attempted to link with
goods the Appellants are charged with stealing. The magistrate
determined that sufficient factual and legal basis existed for ex-
tradition of Appellants.

Subsequently a habeas corpus hearing was held before the
Circuit Court, Minnehaha County. At that hearing the State
adopted a position that the only two matters to be reviewed by
the Court were whether or not a crime had been committed in
Minnesota and whether or not Defendants were the parties
named in the warrants. The Court found that “there is sufficient
probable cause existing from the record... to warrant enforce-
ment of the Order by the Magistrate extraditing the Petitioners.”
The writ was quashed and Defendants brought this appeal.

[It is undisputed that in the area of extradition federal law

156 Pe

is controlling and that any state regulation on the subject is but
supplemental to the federal law and serves only to facilitate it.

Article 4, § 2 of the United States Constitution provides in
part that:

“A person charged in any state with treason, felony
or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found
in another state, shall, on demand of the executive
authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the
crime.”

In order to implement this provision Congress passed the
Federal Rendition Act, now found at 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1964).! This
act fails of itself to spell out the exact procedures to be used by
the states in apprehending and returning fugitives. Further, this
Act does not elaborate on the meaning of “charged” in the con-
stitutional article nor does it set up standards with which an af-
fidavit must comply. To fill in the gaps most states have adopted
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.’ In this state that Act is
found at SDCL 23-24-1 to 23-24-34. SDCL 23-24-2, reads:

“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the provi-
sions of the Constitution of the United States control-
ling, and any and all acts of Congress enacted in pur-
suance thereof, it is the duty of the Governor of this

1. “Fugitives from State or Territory to State, District or Territory.—When-
ever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a
fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Ter-
tory to which sueh person has fled, and produces a copy ofan indietment found
or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the
person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, cer-
tified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory
from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the
State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be
arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand,
or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause
the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent
appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be
discharged. (June 25, 1948, c. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 822.)”

See “Interstate Rendition and the Fourth Amendment,” 24 Rutgers Law
Review 651 (1970).

2.

157

state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive
authority of any other state of the United States any
person charged in that state with treason, felony, or
other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in
this state.”

SDCL 23-248, inter alia, provides that

“[t}he indictment, information, or affidavit made before
the magistrate must substantially charge the person
demanded with having committed a crime under the law
of that state; and the copy of indictment, information, af-
fidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be
authenticated by the executive authority making the de-
mand.”

Appellants argue that the key word in the extradition provi-
sions of the U.S. Constitution is “charged.” They contend that
prior to Wolf v. Colorado, 1949, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed.
1782, and Mapp v. Ohio, 1961, 367 U.S. S.Ct. 1684, 6
L.Ed.2d 1081, a person stood sufficiently charged of a crime for
purposes of extradition once the purely formal acts of filing a
complaint, information and/or affidavit had been satisfied.
However, they argue, with the advent of Wolf and Mapp federal
and state courts have held that the charging documents issued by
a demanding state do not succeed in “charging” a crime as re-
quired by the U.S. Constitution unless they set forth facts which
justify a finding of probable cause pursuant to the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. For this
position they rely heavily on Kirkland v. Preston, 1967, 128
U.S.App.D.C. 148, 385 F.2d 670. In that case the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals, through Judge J. Skelly Wright, said:

“There is no reason why the Fourth Amendment,
which governs arrests, should not govern extradition ar-
rests. Under its familiar doctrine arrests must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause. When an ex-
tradition demand is accompanied by an indictment, that
document embodies a grand jury’s judgment that con-
stitutional probable cause exists. But when the extradi-

158 Pe

tion papers rely on a mere affidavit, even where sup-
ported by a warrant of arrest, there is no assurance of
probable cause unless it is spelled out in the affidavit
itself. Thus Fourth Amendment considerations require
that before a person can be extradited on a Section 3182
affidavit the authorities in the asylum state must be
satisfied that the affidavit shows probable cause.”

Appellants insist that in the case of an affidavit made before
a magistrate, which is the situation before us, probable cause
must be shown and it must be shown on the face of the document.
It is their view that for purposes of satisfying this probable cause
determination by the asylum state, ari arrest warrant is ineffec-
tive in the asylum state if it merely contains a provision to the ef-
fect' that it was issued upon a probable cause showing made on
the strength of additional oral information revealed to a
magistrate under oath but not embodied within the particular re-
quisition document.

In the cases before us two separate criminal complaints had
been issued, one for each of the defendants. Apart from the filling
in of date, place and ownership of the property taken, the
Janguage in each complaint duplicates the text of the Minnesota
theft statute in question. Each complaint asserts that it was made
upon information resulting from the affiant’s own investigation.
They were subscribed and sworn to before a Minnesota county
judge who issued arrest warrants for Defendants the same day.
The arrest warrants recite that the court had found probable
cause for their issuance.

On December 26, 1974, two supplementary form affidavits
were made and filed stating that:

“the circumstances and facts showing the commission of
the crime charged in the complaint[s] against [Ap-
pellants] are as follows: On 9-10-74, two automobile short
blocks and one battery were stolen from Libby
Wholesale, Morris, Minnesota, and were reported stolen

_ on 9-12-74 by the owner. The items were sold at Star-
buck Iron Company, Starbuck, Minnesota, on 9-11-74. ©

pL 159

The individuals selling the items have been identified as
George Richard Wellington and Neal LeeRoy Well-
ington, and said individuals have been identified as
being in the Morris, Minnesota area 9/9/74-9/12/74. At
the time the accused committed the crime aforesaid
[they were] in the state of Minnesota and to avoid prose-
cution [they] fled from the state of Minnesota.”

At the same time as these affidavits were executed the county
judge issued two form certificates stating that affiant, in the
judge’s opinion, was a reputable person to be believed and that
the facts sworn to by him presented a proper cause for requisi-
tion.

The affidavits in the cases before us are but conclusory in
language. If we were to follow the Kirkland holding and to align
ourselves with state jurisdictions such as New York which also
follow Kirkland, it would be difficult to affirm the circuit court, at
least on the basis of the affidavits alone. See People ex rel.
Cooper v. Lombard, 1974, 45 A.D.2d 928, 357 N.Y.S.2d 323,
Supreme Court, App.Div. Such, however, is not our view.

In our view the holding of the United States Supreme Court
in In Re Strauss, 1905, 197 U.S. 324, 25 S.Ct. 535, 49 L.Ed. 774, is
still good law. There Mr. Justice Brewer said for the Court:

“Under the Constitution each state was left with
full control over its criminal procedure. No one could
have anticipated what changes any state might make
therein, and doubtless the word ‘charged’ was used in its
broad signification, to cover any proceeding which a
state might see fit to adopt by which a formal accusation
was made against an alleged criminal. In the strictest
sense of the term a party is charged with crime when an
affidavit is filed, alleging the commission of the offense,
and a warrant is issued for his arrest; and this is true
whether a final trial may or may not be had upon such
charge.”

Continuing, the Court made a notable distinction which clearly

160 Pe

sets extradition arrests apart from a seizure protected by the
Fourth Amendment: .

“[E]xtradition is a mere proceeding in securing arrest
and detention. An extradited defendant is not put on
trial upon any writ which is issued for the purposes of
extradition, any more than he is upon the warrant which
is issued by the justice of the peace directing his
arrest.”

In answering the allegation that sometimes persons are
wrongfully extradited as in the case where a creditor may wan-
tonly swear to an affidavit charging a debtor with obtaining
goods under false pretenses the Court said that:

“{w]hile courts will always endeavor to see that no such
attempted wrong is successful...care must be taken
that the process of extradition be not so burdened as to
make it practically valueless. It is but one step in secur-
ing the presence of the defendant in the court in which
he may be tried, and in no manner determines the ques-
tion of guilt.”

Essentially, Appellants have demanded that the State of
Minnesota show probable cause in these cases on the face of the
affidavits made before the Minnesota magistrate because, in
their view, “it is incumbent upon the asylum state to make its
own independent probable cause determination.” However, we
are in agreement with the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex
rel. Kubala v. Woods, 1972, 52 Ill.2d 48, 284 N.E.2d 286, when it
stated that:

“the scope of inquiry in [an extradition] proceeding to
test the validity of a rendition warrant is limited to
three questions: (1) is the accused substantially charged
with a crime under the laws of the demanding State; (2)
is the person in custody the person charged; (3) is he a
fugitive from justice.”

There that court held that in the case before it even though the
affidavits did not show probable cause they were affidavits made

a

before a magistrate and complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3182 and with
section 8 of the Uniform Extradition Act. They were therefore
sufficient to support the rendition warrant.

The Indiana Supreme Court has taken a similar position. In
Bailey v. Cox, 1973, Ind., 296 N.E.2d 422, that body said that it
was “not impressed with the reasoning of Kirkland v. Preston,
[citation omitted] cited by the Appellant which states that the
asylum state may review the judgment or finding of probable
cause in the demanding state.” It is that court’s view that

“under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the only
issue for the governor of the asylum state is the identity
of the fugitive. No inquiry may be made into the merits
of the criminal charge or whether there is probable
cause for the initiation of criminal proceedings in the
demanding state. Those are all evidentiary issues to be
heard and tried in the demanding state, not in a foreign
jurisdiction.”

Only last year the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
dealt again with the extradition question in In re Ierardi, 1975,
Mass., 321 N.E.2d 921, a case involving an affidavit accompanying
an information. That court stated:

“[w]hether there is probable cause to arrest can be fully
litigated before the courts of the demanding State for ‘in
delivering up an accused person to the authorities of a
sister state ...[we] are not sending him for trial to an
alien jurisdiction, with laws which our standards might
condemn, but are simply returning him to be tried, still
under the protection of the federal Constitution...’
Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 133,
38 S.Ct. 41, 43, 62 L.Ed. 193 (1917). In addition, principles
of comity operate against inquiry into the criminal pro-
cedures of the demanding State.”*

3. This case appears to have subsequently been considered in the federal courts
and a contrary result there obtained. See Ierardi v. Gunter, CA 1, 528 F.2d 929
(1976), 18 Cr. 2380.

eT

Hii Because we are in agreement with In Re Strauss, supra,
and with the courts of Illinois, Indiana and Massachusetts on this
question in the foregoing cases and with those jurisdictions which
support a similar view we hold today that while it is desirable it is
not necessary for the documents accompanying a governor's de-
mand for extradition to show probable cause in the sense which
Appellants would require. Such is demanded neither by the U.S.
Constitution, federal law nor our state statutes. Extradition is a
summary executive procedure whose effect is essentially to
enlarge the territorial area for lawful arrest, the asylum jurisdic-
tion being added to the demanding jurisdiction. In Re Maldonado,
1973, Mass., 304 N.E.2d 419. By our holding the Appellants have
Jost none of their rights, for the need to show probable cause for
their arrest must still be demonstrated at the proper stage in the
Minnesota proceedings.‘ Should that state there fail to meet its
burden the usual remedies continue to be available to Appellants.

The Order of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
All the Justices concur.

HENGEL, BERG & ASSOCIATES, Appellant v.
STATE et al., Respondents

(238 N.W.2d 691)

(File No. 11648. Opinion filed February 20, 1976)

4, See Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3, Warrant or Summons
Upon Complaint, 3.01 to and including 3.04.

eer EE
|

Lynn, Jackson, Shultz, Ireland & Lebrun, Rapid City, for
plaintiff and appellant.

Camron D. Hoseck, Carl W. Quist, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pierre,
for defendants and respondents.

MUNDT, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises out of the action taken by defendant State
Auditor (hereinafter referred to as “Auditor”) in refusing to issue
a warrant on a voucher filed and submitted by plaintiff Hengel,
Berg and Associates for services rendered in the preparation of
plans and specifications for a Physical Research Building for the
State Department of Highways.

In March 1968, a contract was executed between plaintiff
and the State of South Dakota, State Building Committee. Later a
decision was made not to construct the building. An addendum to
the contract was executed in July 1971, which in substance pro-
vided for a pro rata payment to plaintiff for its work product, and
which was to be submitted thirty days after the execution of the
addendum. The work product was not produced within the time
specified and thereupon the contract was cancelled.

In September 1973, plaintiff submitted a voucher to the
Auditor for payment of $48,418.98 for services rendered. This
voucher was submitted directly to the Auditor without the ap-
proval of either defendant State Engineer or defendant Highway
Commission. Upon receipt of the voucher, the Auditor advised
plaintiff that payment of the claim was being denied as being
neither a just nor valid claim.

66

In October 1973, plaintiff took an appeal to the circuit court
of Hughes County by filing and serving upon all defendants a
“Notice of Appeal” from the decision of the Auditor denying and
rejecting its claim. This appeal was taken under the provisions of
SDCL 4-9-7, SDCL 21-33 and SDCL 1-26.

Upon appeal to the circuit court, that court limited the issues
to whether the issuance of a warrant for payment of plaintiff's
claim was illegal, unauthorized or improper. The trial court deter-
mined it was not a just and valid claim and affirmed the Auditor's
action. Plaintiff's request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law was denied.

Plaintiff contends it has never had an opportunity to present
its case at a judicial trial or at an administrative hearing. Its
voucher, it says, was summarily denied by the Auditor without
any opportunity for it to submit evidence or argument as pro-
vided for in SDCL 1-26-18. Since it was deprived of an opportu-
nity to present its claim at the administrative level, it claims it is
entitled to a trial de novo in circuit court. It says further review
on the administrative level would not provide an adequate
remedy. Plaintiff argues that the legislature in enacting the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act has, in fact, prescribed by law the
powers and duties of the Auditor. Even if the legislature has fail-
ed to prescribe a procedure for officers to follow, a person cannot
be denied his constitutional rights, namely, taking property
without due process of law. A constitutional protection requires
no legislation for its enforcement and confers the right to obtain
compensation, regardless of whether or not there is a statutory
provision therefor.

It is defendants’ contention that the matter being appealed
is an administrative decision of the Auditor as a constitutional of-
ficer, and that it does not involve the merits of the claim; that the
Auditor's duties are defined by the legislature, and nowhere in
the statutes is the Auditor given authority to hear contested
cases. It was not until the 1975 legislature enacted Chapter 10,

* Session Laws of 1975, that the Auditor was given authority to
promulgate rules regarding the issuance of warrants.

165

Defendant Auditor further contends that the approval of a
voucher and the issuance of a warrant are ministerial acts where
payment is for a public building. The provisions of SDCL 5-14-2,
the Auditor says, govern her powers in approving vouchers and
issuing warrants. Since the voucher presented to the Auditor by
plaintiff was never approved by the State Engineer, she had no
authority to issue a warrant. Until such approval was obtained it
was her duty under the statutes to deny plaintiff's claim. We find
merit in the Auditor's contention.

SDCL 4-9-7 provides in part that: “The state auditor may
refuse to issue a warrant if he determines that such issue and
payment is or would be illegal, unauthorized, or improper.” SDCL
5-14-2 provides that funds appropriated for the payment of “[t]he
construction of all capital improvenients projects (including the
cost of architectural services) * ** shall be paid on warrants
drawn by the state auditor on vouchers duly approved by the
bureau of administration and the authorized representative of
the agency, board, commission or institution to which the project
appropriation is made.” (At the time the voucher in question was
submitted, SDCL 5-14-2 provided for approval by the state
engineer.)

There is no question but that the voucher in question was
never approved by the State Engineer or by any authorized
representative of the State Highway Commission. In her deposi-
tion, the Auditor repeatedly referred to this fact as the basis of
her denial of payment of the voucher. This deposition, together
with copies of the contract and of the letters between plaintiff's
counsel and the Auditor, was submitted to the trial court and was
made a part of the settled record.

Plaintiff complains that it was not given notice of the
Auditor's intention to disallow its claim nor an opportunity to
present evidence with respect to the merits of the claim.
However, in her letter of September 18, 1973, the Auditor in-
formed plaintiff's counsel that the voucher had not been signed
and approved by the proper officer of the State Highway Depart-
ment. Plaintiff's counsel requested the approval or disapproval of
the voucher by the State Engineer and the State Highway

os

Department by letter dated September 20, 1973. Plaintiff does
not contend that such approval was ever granted. Rather, it
argues in its reply brief that the State Engineer and the State
Highway Department did not provide it with an opportunity for a
hearing. This may very well have been the case, but we think it is
not an issue in the instant appeal.

To summarize, plaintiff was notified in the first instance by
the Auditor that its claim was being rejected because it had not
been properly approved. Plaintiff was apparently unsuccessful in
securing the approval of the State Engineer and the State
Highway Department. It was for this reason that the Auditor
ultimately denied the claim. How could a due process hearing
before the Auditor have possibly altered these facts? If plaintiff
has‘any legitimate grievance, it is based upon the refusal of the
State Engineer and the State Highway Department to approve
its voucher. In the absence of such approval, the Auditor had no
choice but to deny the claim. This is the record that was
presented to the circuit court, and we, therefore, hold that the
record supports the circuit court’s judgment affirming the deci-
sion of the Auditor.

Affirmed.

‘ DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.
COLER, J., concurs specially.
MUNDT, Circuit Judge, sitting for DOYLE, J., disqualified.
COLER, Justice (concurring specially).

Iagree with the majority opinion to the extent of the holding
that the claim of appellant must: be denied by reason of non-
compliance with SDCL 5-14-2. I must disagree, however, with the
implication that the auditor's authority to deny a claim under
SDCL 4-9-7 does not involve a quasi judicial determination of the
legal rights of the appellant thus constituting a “contested case”
within the meaning of SDCL 1-26-1(2). See also SDCL 4-9-2, 4-9-7
and annotations thereunder. The plain import of SDCL 1-26 re-

167

quires an officer having power to determine the issues in a con-
tested case to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law pur-
suant to SDCL 1-26-25. This power is separate and distinct from
rule-making power, the exercise of which is also governed by the
administrative procedure act. The trial court affirmed the
auditor's “decision.” I fail to find a “decision” in the record that in
any way complies with SDCL 1-26-25.

In response to the query of the majority “How could a due
process hearing before the Auditor have possibly altered these
facts?” I would respond that by compliance with SDCL 1-26-16
through 1-26-24, culminating in a decision as defined by SDCL
1-26-25, this court would not have been put in the position of
researching the records for the facts or identifying the statutory
provisions for both the auditor and the trial court that dispose of
the claim in this case. The opinion of the majority has the effect of
determining that the claim of appellant was “adjusted” by the
auditor pursuant to SDCL 4-9-2 and that trial de novo was had in
this court as though the action had been commenced pursuant to
SDCL 21-32-10 and 21-32-11 instead of being appealed under
SDCL 4-9-7,

The majority opinion implies that there is some connection
between Chapter 10 of the Session Laws of 1975 (SDCL 4-9-1.1)
and the auditor’s authority to hear contested cases. This
overlooks the plain language of SDCL 1-26-1(2) which defines
“contested” cases and the requirement for rules of agencies
having power to determine the rights of parties. See SDCL
1-26-13 implemented by the auditor by 1974 ARSD 3:01:01:01, and
subsequently filed rules of the auditor designated as Chapter 3:05
of ARSD implementing SDCL 4-9-1.1.

As originally enacted SDCL 1-26-2 provided in part as
follows:

“In addition to other rule-making requirements im-
posed by law, each agency shall:

* * * * * *

“(2) Adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature

168 po

and requirements of all formal and informal pro-
cedures available, including a description of all forms
and instructions used by the agency * * *.”

That provision was taken from the Revised Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 1964, § 2, 9C U.L.A. The amendment
to SDCL 1-26-2 by Chapter 8, § 4, S.L.1972, while removing the
mandate for a procedural rule, certainly does not dictate that pro-
cedural rules cannot or should not be adopted if either SDCL 1-26
or the statutes governing the agency are not adequate to effect
orderly, due process, determinations. The auditor, in this case,
utilized an informal procedure not provided for by rule and relied
on advice of counsel for the department of transportation in deny-
ing the claim. Nothing in the letters of the auditor to the ap-
pellant, referred to as a “decision,” determines, as the majority
holds, that “The work product was not produced within the time
specified and thereupon the contract was cancelled.” This finding
constitutes a finding of fact which neither the agencies involved
nor the trial court found and which is the determinative issue to
be decided in the contested case.

JANKLOW, Applicant v. KELLER, Respondent
(238 N.W.2d 688)
(File No. 11726. Opinion filed February 20, 1976)
P|

169

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Doyle D. Estes, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Pierre, for applicant.

David V. Vrooman, Sioux Falls, for intervenors.
WINANS, Justice.

This action comes before the Court upon an application of the
Attorney General for the State of South Dakota for an alter-
native writ of prohibition. Upon the application it was ordered
that the Respondent Magistrate desist from any further pro-
ceeding to hear and rule on certain demurrers before him until
the further order of this Court. The facts as they are relevant to
our disposal of the matter are not in dispute and may be sum-
marized briefly as follows: On June 25, 1975, a preliminary pro-
ceeding was commenced in magistrate court before the
Honorable Marvin D. Keller, a law trained magistrate sitting as a

0

committing magistrate in the cases of State v. Rich William
Christianson, State v. Rodney John Ensz, State v. John White,
and State v. Robert William Hadrath. After bond was set, the at-
torney for defendants filed demurrers in each of the cases to the
preliminary informations filed against the defendants challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the statutes which his clients were
charged with having violated. Over objection by the State the
magistrate set a date for hearing upon said demurrers. Upon ap-
plication we issued the writ before referred to and after oral
argument requested submission of written briefs which were
later filed. The magistrate also made a response praying that the
application for the alternative writ of prohibition be dismissed
and that the relief requested be denied.

We have for decision but one broad question: Does a commit-
ting magistrate have jurisdiction to rule on a demurrer filed at
the time of a preliminary hearing to the preliminary information?
For the reasons appearing hereafter, it is our holding that no
magistrate, sitting as a committing magistrate, has such jurisdic-
tion within our state’s judicial system.

Hl Counsel for intervenors-defendants in this matter would
restrict the question to the jurisdiction of a law trained
magistrate to receive demurrers at a preliminary hearing. We
hold, however, that the question pertains to anybody authorized
by our law to sit as a committing magistrate, be that person a
supreme court justice, a circuit judge, a lawyer or a layperson. In
State v. Ferguson, 1925, 48 S.D. 346, 204 N.W. 652, this Court
said:

“A preliminary hearing is in no sense a trial. [cita-
tions omitted] Such county judge, when sitting as a
magistrate, is not sitting as a county court any more
than would a justice of this court, if sitting as a
magistrate upon a preliminary hearing, be sitting as the
Supreme Court.”

Whatever else his or her qualifications for office, whoever sits as
a committing magistrate is sitting solely as a committing
magistrate and we see no distinction in this regard among any of

wn

the possible persons authorized to exercise this very limited func-
tion. Respondent magistrate appears to be of the opinion that he
necessarily had jurisdiction to receive and rule on the demurrers
because our statutes require that the defendant be either
discharged (SDCL 23-27-18) or held (SDCL 23-27-16) upon finding
that a public offense has or has not been committed and finding
that there is or is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant
guilty of the commission of such a public offense.’ If the public of-
fense charged is unconstitutional it is not a public offense at all
and therefore, the magistrate would hold, he could not hold
defendant over for such an apparent violation. While it is true
that our law makes provision for such a demurrer we hold that a
preliminary hearing is not the place for the motion and a commit-
ting magistrate is not the official before whom the motion can be
made.

HM We have previously held that a comnritting magistrate
as such is not a court and does not exercise in any strict sense
judicial power. State v. Wagner, 1972, 86 S.D. 382, 196 N.W.2d
360; State v. Ferguson, 1925, 48 S.D. 346, 204 N.W. 652, The
magistrate’s authority is therefore limited and does not extend to
adjudicating constitutional questions. When the statutes make
him responsible for determining whether or not a public offense
has been committed we understand such a determination to be
only whether or not there is in question an act or omission for
which the law has prescribed a punishment, Stratton v. Com-
monwealth, 1953, Ky., 263 S.W.2d 99, or whether or not an act has

1. SDCL 28-27-18, “After hearing the evidence and the statement of the defend-
ant, if he has made one, if it appears either that a public offense has not been
committed, or that there is no sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty
thereof, the magistrate must order the defendant to be discharged, by an en-
dorsement on or attached to the preliminary information over his signature to
the following effect:

“There being no sufficient cause to believe the within named A. B. guilty of the
offense within mentioned, I order him to be discharged.”

SDCL 23-27-16. “Ii, however, it appears from the examination that a public of-

fense has been committed and that there is sufficient cause to believe the

defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate must, in like manner, endorse on or at-

tach to the preliminary information an order signed by him, to the following ef-
fect:

“It appearing to me that the offense in the within information mentioned (or
any other offense, according to the fact, stating generally the nature thereof)
has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the within
named A. B. guilty thereof, I order that he be held to answer the same.”

172 po

been committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or
commanding it. West v. Territory, 1894, 4 Ariz. 212, 36 P. 207.
The statutes here mean this and no more.”

Intervening defendants are not without recourse or without
opportunity to demur, however. SDCL 23-35-15 permits such a
motion at the arraignment and SDCL 23-36-8 specifies as a
ground for a demurrer a failure of an information or an indict-
ment to describe a public offense. SDCL 23-36-11 in similar
fashion requires presentation of a demurrer in open court at the
arraignment “or at such other time as may be allowed the defend-
ant for that purpose.” SDCL 23-36-9 specifically permits objection
for failure to describe a public offense to be made at trial.

We hold therefore that a committing magistrate is restricted
to making a finding on whether or not a public offense has been
committed in the sense that a law has been violated. It is for
those who preside at arraignments, trials in circuit court and on
appeal to decide the constitutionality of public offenses or
violated laws.

The alternative writ heretofore entered will be made perma-
nent and respondent will be restricted from a ruling on the
demurrers.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN and DOYLE, JJ., concur.

COLER, J., concurs specially.

COLER, Justice (concurring specially).

I agree with the majority of the court that the issue of con-

2, SDCL 22-18, Acts constituting crime—Punishments.—A crime or public of-
fense is an act or omission forbidden by law, and to which is annexed, upon con-
yietion, one or more of the following punishments:

(1) Death;

(2) Imprisonment;

(3) Fine;

(4) Removal from office; or

{5 Disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under
this state.

178

stitutionality of a statute cannot be raised by demurrer in a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate. Neither SDCL 23-35-15,
23-36-8, 23-36-9 nor 23-36-11 et seq. has any application to
preliminary examinations. State ex rel. Stevenson v. Jameson,
1960, 78 S.D. 431, 104 N.W.2d 45. A magistrate has not been given
authority as a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction to issue
original or remedial writs as have judges, S.D.Const. Art. V, § 5,
and I would in no way equate magistrates’ jurisdiction with that
of judges or justices.

ESTATE OF WILLIAMS
HETRICK, Appellant v. WILLIAMS, Respondent
(240 N.W.2d 74)

(File No. 11583. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

Keith A. Tidball of Tidball, Kemnitz & Lovald, Pierre, for
petitioner and appellant.

William G. Porter of Costello, Porter, Hill, Nelson,
Heisterkamp & Bushnell, Rapid City, for petitioner and respond-
ent.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Appellant has appealed from an order that denied her peti-
tion asking that letters of administration with the will annexed of
the estate of A. J. Williams, deceased, be issued to her nominee,
Kenneth W. Steele, and that granted a petition for letters of ad-
ministration with the will annexed filed by Maxine Y. Williams.
We affirm.

ee 115

Following the death of A. J. Williams on September 16, 1967,
his daughter, LaVon W. Hetrick, appellant herein, contested his
will and appealed the order of the circuit court upholding the will.
We affirmed the circuit court’s decision on February 20, 1974. See
In re Estate of Williams, 88 S.D. 55, 215 N.W.2d 489. During the
pendency of the contest proceedings, James J. Curran, the alter-
nate executor named in decedent's will (the designated executor
having filed a declination), served as special administrator until
his death on July 3, 1973, following which Maxine Y. Williams,
widow of decedent's son Pierre Williams, and mother and duly ap-
pointed guardian of her three minor children, who are
beneficiaries under decedent’s will, was appointed special ad-
ministratrix of decedent’s estate.

Appellant, who is the beneficiary of a trust created under
decedent’s will, the trust to consist of an undivided one-fourth of
decedent’s property, filed her petition on April 8, 1974; Maxine Y.
Williams filed her petition on May 6, 1974.

At the hearing on the petitions, counsel for appellant alleged
that it was necessary that a disinterested third party be named
administrator in view of the hostility and conflicts that existed
between appellant and the other heirs and beneficiaries of dece-
dent’s estate, and further alleged that certain lands owned by
Williams Land Co., the majority of the stock of which is owned by
decedent's estate, had been leased by decedent’s surviving son
for $1.00 an acre. Although given opportunity by the trial court to
do so, appellant offered no evidence to support these allegations
or to establish the qualifications of Mr. Steele to act as ad-
ministrator with the will annexed.

Ina lengthy, carefully prepared memorandum opinion, later
incorporated in the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
trial court ruled that because neither appellant nor Maxine Y:
Williams had furnished the court with any facts upon which it
could properly exercise its discretion whether to appoint ap-
pellant’s nominee, the court as a matter of law was required to
grant Maxine Y. Williams’ petition for letters of administration
inasmuch as she occupied the same order of preference that her
children would occupy were they not minors.

116 po

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that
her nominee did not have preference over Maxine Y. Williams
and in failing to take judicial notice of the records and files in the
previous proceedings concerning the estate, which, appellant con-
tends, amply support appellant’s contentions concerning the
hostility and conflicts that exist between her and Maxine Y.
Williams and decedent’s heirs and beneficiaries.

SDCL 30-8-12 provides:

“If the sole executor or all the executors are in-
competent, or renounce or fail to apply for letters, or
qualify, letters of administration with the will annexed
must be issued to the surviving spouse, next of kin, or
others, in the same order and manner as is directed in
§§ 30-9-1 to 30-9-5, inclusive.”

SDCL 30-14-11 provides:

“Tf all such executors or administrators die, resign,
renounce, or become incapable, or the power and
authority of all of them are revoked, the circuit court
must issue letters of administration, with the will annex-
ed or otherwise, to the widow or next of kin, or others, in
the same order and manner as is directed in relation to
original letters of administration on such notice as the
court may direct. The administrators so appointed must
give bond in like penalty, with like sureties and condi-
tions as required of administrators in chapter 30-13, and
shall have like power and authority.”

SDCL 30-9-1 provides in part that:

“Administration of the estate of a person dying in-
testate must be granted to some one or more of the per-
sons hereinafter mentioned, and they are respectively
entitled thereto in the following order:

* * * * * *

177

(2) The children;

* * * * * *

(6) The grandchildren;
x

xe”

SDCL 30-9-4 provides in part that:

“Administration may be granted to one or more
competent persons, though not entitled to the same, at
the written request of the person entitled, filed in the
court.* * *"*

Hiwe conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that
a nominee named by a person having a preferential right of ap-
pointment under SDCL 30-9-1 is not entitled to letters of ad-
ministration as a matter of absolute right, the court having
discretion to appoint such nominee or someone else in a lower
order of preference. In re Bedell’s Estate, 97 Cal. 339, 32 P. 323; In
re Healy’s Estate, 122 Cal. 162, 54 P. 736; In re Brundage’s Estate,
141 Cal. 538, 75 P. 175; In re Enochs’ Estates, Okl. 322 P.2d 197;
Bancroft’s Probate Practice, 2d Ed. § 254; Annot. 113 A.L.R. 780.

[HB Likewise, the trial court was correct in ruling that as the
duly appointed guardian of her minor children, Maxine Y.
Williams stood in the same order of preference that her children
would have under SDCL 30-9-1(6), by virtue of SDCL 30-9-7, which
states that:

“If any person entitled to administration is a minor
or an incompetent person, letters must be granted to his
or her guardian, or any other person entitled to letters
of administration, in the discretion of the court.”

* Inthe case of In re Smith's Estate, 65 S.D. 48, 270 N.W. 646, this court held that
the provisions of SDCL 30-9-1 (then R.C.1919 § 3249) did not apply to estates of
persons dying testate. Apparently in reaction to this decision, the words “to the
surviving spouse, next of kin, or others, in the same order and manner as is
directed in section 35.0501” (now §§ 0-9-1 to 30-9-5) were added to SDCL 30-8-12
by the 1989 Code Commission. The Code Commission also revised R.C. 1919
§ 3825, the predecessor of SDCL 30-14-11.

118 es

-In construing a statute substantially similar to SDCL 30-9-7,
the California Supreme Court held that the guardian of a minor
stands on an equal plane with all others within the same class of
preference as the minor, and that the words “or any other person
entitled to letters of administration, in the discretion of the
court,” refer to other persons in the same order of preference as
the minor, from among whom the court could, in its discretion, ap-
point an administrator in preference to the minor’s guardian. In
re Turner’s Estate, 143 Cal. 438, 77 P. 144. We conclude that the
California Court’s analysis of the statutory counterpart to SDCL
80-9-7 is correct, and we follow that holding here. See also In re
Davis’ Estate, 55 Cal.App.2d 784, 131 P.2d 557; and In re Waltz’
Estate, 244 Cal.App.2d 217, 52 Cal.Rptr. 880. Annot. 185 A.L.R.
585.

HHI With respect to appellant’s contention that the trial
court erred in not taking judicial notice of the contents of the files
and records in the prior proceedings held in connection with dece-
dent’s estate, it is true, of course, that, “A court will take judicial
notice of all the proceedings, pleadings, and jurisdictional papers
in a ease on trial, and the same need not be introduced in
evidence.” Searls v. Knapp, 5 S.D. 325, 327, 58 N.W. 807, 808. It is
also true that the trial court stated in its memorandum decision
that neither petitioner had offered any evidence in support of her
respective petition nor in opposition to the appointment of the
other and that therefore there was no determination of facts to be
made by the court. On the other hand, the court also stated that
“the only possible conflict that may appear on the part of either of
these petitioners is the fact, apparent from the record of this
Estate, that LaVon W. Hetrick was the contestant in the will con-
test which has now been resolved. No evidence has been offered
concerning Mrs. Hetrick’s present attitude towards the con-
firmed admission of this Will to probate.” In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, we will presume that the lower court
considered all of the files and records in the proceedings con-
ducted with respect to decedent’s estate up until the date of the
hearing on the two petitions. Searls v. Knapp, supra. Indeed, at
the hearing on the petitions, the court first considered the ac-
counting made by the executrix of Mr. Curran’s estate with
respect to the period during which Mr. Curran had served as

179

special administrator of the estate and a claim for fees filed by
the attorney who had represented the estate during the period
from decedent’s death until September of 1971. The accounting
and claim are not a part of the record in the instant case, so
presumably they were included in the file of the earlier pro-
ceedings in the estate, the contents of which the trial court must
have considered in approving or disapproving the accounting and
claim for fees.

[i The trial court’s statement that appellant had furnished
the court no facts upon which to exercise its discretion whether
to appoint appellant’s nominee reflects the state of the record.
That the trial court did not choose to regard the allegations, ac-
cusations, charges and countercharges in the instant case or in
the earlier proceedings as facts upon which it could exercise
judicial discretion in ruling upon appellant’s petition does not
compel the conclusion that the trial court did not take judicial
notice of the contents of the files in those proceedings. Cf.
Soyland v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 71 S.D. 522, 26 N.W.2d
696; State ex rel. Kornmann v. Larson, 81 S.D. 540, 188 N.W.2d 1.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur.

JAMESON, Respondent and Cross-Appellant v.
JAMESON, Appellant and Cross-Respondent

(239 N.W.2d 5)
(File Nos. 11632-11634. Opinion filed February 20, 1976)

Petition for rehearing denied March 22, 1976

Le

M. T. Woods of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux Falls,
for plaintiff, respondent and cross-appellant.

Gerald L. Reade of Brady, Kabeiseman, Light & Reade,
Yankton, for defendant, appellant and cross-respondent.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

Defendant has appealed from an order of the circuit court,
dated January 20, 1975, denying his petition to modify the provi-
sions of a divorce decree and from a subsequent order denying a
motion to vacate the January 20th order. Plaintiff has cross ap-
pealed from the same orders which denied her an award of at-
torney fees. We affirm.

Plaintiff Carol Jameson was awarded a divorce from defend-
ant G. Malcolm Jameson in an uncoritested proceeding on
December 15, 1971. The parties entered into and signed a stipula-
tion and agreement covering child support for the three minor
children of the marriage and alimony for the plaintiff. The stipula-
tion and agreement was incorporated into the judgment and
decree of divorce by the circuit court.

On November 7, 1974, defendant filed a petition to amend the
divorce decree. He sought to have the alimony and child support
portion of the decree modified because it was too great an
economic hardship for him. Defendant subsequently filed two
amended petitions to modify the decree.

Trial was to the court on November 26, 1974. After hearing
the evidence, the court issued an order on January 20, 1975, deny-
ing defendant’s amended petition to modify the decree. On
February 14, 1975, the court filed an order denying defendant's
motion to vacate its January 20, 1975 order. The February 14th
order also affirmatively denied plaintiff's application for attorney
fees.

Defendant has made many assignments of error on this ap-

EE

peal. We feel that only two merit a full discussion in this opinion.

[i The primary issue before this court is whether the circuit
court erred in denying defendant’s amended petition for relief
from the support and alimony provisions of the divorce decree. In
South Dakota there can be no modification of a divorce decree
unless there can be shown some change of circumstances affect-
ing one or both parties to the original action. SDCL 25-4-41 pro-
vides as follows:

“Where a divorce is granted for an offense of the
husband, the court may compel him to provide for the
maintenance of the children of the marriage, and to
make such suitable allowance to the wife for her support
during her life or for a shorter period, as the court may
deem just, having regard to the circumstances of the
parties represented; and the court may from time to
time modify its orders in these respects.”

This change of circumstances rule has been used consistently by
this court in cases such as the one at bar. See Matthews v.
Matthews, 1946, 71 S.D. 115, 22 N.W.2d 27; Guinter v. Guinter,
1949, 72 S.D. 554, 37 N.W.2d 452; Kerr v. Kerr, 1952, 74 S.D. 454,
54 N.W.2d 357; Dougherty v. Dougherty, 1956, 76 S.D. 318, 77
N.W.2d 845.

The record reveals that prior to the divorce the defendant
was a medical doctor in general practice at the Donahoe Clinic in
Sioux Falls. At some unspecified time in the past, defendant, had
become romantically involved with Kay Christensen whom he
married shortly after the divorce decree was entered. Although
it was plaintiff who filed for the divorce, defendant was the one
who desperately wanted out of the marriage.

Defendant resigned from the Donahoe Clinic before the
divorce and moved to Yankton where he is presently residing
with his wife, Kay. Plaintiff is a homemaker and continues to
reside with the three children at the family home in Sioux Falls.

Under the terms of the stipulation and agreement, plaintiff

ee 183

was given custody of the three children. She was to have the
home in Sioux Falls and was to receive $1,430 out of the first
$2,300 which defendant earned each month. In addition, she was
to receive 50% of any of the defendant’s earnings which exceeded.
$2,300 per month. Defendant agreed to pay her income tax, the
family’s medical expenses, and assume college expenses for each
of the three children.

Defendant earns approximately $40,000 per year. His pre-
sent wife, Kay, is a surgical nurse and earns approximately $8,000
per year. Defendant’s contention is that the divorce decree
should have been modified by the circuit court because he cannot
adequately live on the money which he is allowed to retain after
paying the alimony and child support, plus plaintiff's income tax.

At trial there was no effort made by defendant to show a
change of circumstances regarding plaintiff except to insinuate
that she should go to work and partially support the family.
There is no indication that her role as a homemaker has changed.
The children are still at home. She has the usual increasing ex-
penses of a growing family, as well as a general battle with infla-
tion.

The defendant has changed location, but his income is almost
identical to that at the time of the decree. His wife, Kay, is
employed full time and is making a modest income.

The real claim is that the defendant signed an uncons-
cionable agreement in the first instance, and the trial court
should have relieved him of his bad bargain. This agreement is a
harsh one, especially where he agrees to pay plaintiff 50% of any
monthly income over $2,300, tax free. After paying taxes at this
income level, he would have little if anything left for himself no
matter how much additional gross income is received. However,
the record indicates that defendant had the advice of an attorney,
as well as tax experts, at the time the agreement was signed. He
surely should have been aware of the hole he was digging for
himself in his effort to rid himself of his marital bonds. His only
excuse was that plaintiff would not consent to a divorce until he
signed such an agreement, and he indicates that it was a case of

184

blackmail. Plaintiff, however, can scarely be faulted in her in-
sistence on a standard of living for herself and family that is com-
mensurate with that she could have expected as the wife of a
medical doctor. She had not precipitated the marital crisis in any
way, and she sought only to salvage what she could from a very
unhappy experience. She drove a hard bargain, but the defendant
accepted it and it was incorporated into the divorce decree.

Defendant alleges in his brief that the change of cir-
cumstances is that he now realizes that he cannot carry out the
terms of the stipulation and agreement. We do not consider this
to be any change of circumstances, much less a change which
would justify a modification of the decree at this time. Defendant
is getting exactly what he bargained for. Therefore, we hold that
thé circuit court correctly decided that there had been no change
of circumstances.

[i Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in fail-
ing to find that he has no duty to support or educate his children
beyond their age of majority or if they marry or become self-
supporting. We note from the record that none of the children
was beyond the age of majority, nor married, nor self-supporting
at the time of trial; therefore, it would have been premature for
the court to rule on defendant’s future duty of support at that
time. Since the circuit court is vested with continuing jurisdiction
to modify its divorce decree, defendant is not precluded from
going into court at some future time and seeking a modification
based on a change of status of any or all of his children, but the
question is premature at this time and the court was correct in
refusing to rule on the issue.

HH We now turn to plaintiff's cross appeal. Basically, plain-
tiff maintains that the court erred in not requiring defendant to
pay her attorney fees for representation at the trial on the
amended petition. Plaintiff points to Paragraph 17 of the stipula-
tion and agreement which states: “Defendant shall pay the
reasonable fees and expenses of plaintiff's attorneys, not only for
the present proceedings but for any necessarily instituted in the
future.” We cannot say that this somewhat ambiguous language
covers a situation like this one where the defendant instituted

185

the action in an effort to obtain a modification of the decree. An
allowance of attorney fees in a divorce action rests with the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on ap-
peal unless there appears to have been an error in the exercise of
that discretion. Baron v. Baron, 1947, 71 S.D. 641, 28 N.W.2d 836;
Kressly v. Kressly, 1958, 77 S.D. 143, 87 N.W.2d 601. We find no
error in the denial of plaintiff's attorney fees in this case.

The court had the duty to consider the equities of the case.
Defendant's attorney has not been paid fees for this action
according to his affidavit. Under the contract incorporated in the
decree which has been left in effect by this decision, the wife has
more net income to pay attorney fees than does the defendant.
The trial court was not in error in refusing to give the defendant
the additional burden of paying plaintiff's attorney fees. We do
not mean to intimate by this decision that defendant can harass
plaintiff with constant proceedings in this matter where no real
change of circumstances has occurred and expect to avoid paying
plaintiff's attorney fees. We deal only with the case before us, and
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not
awarding plaintiff her attorney fees.

The orders of the cireuit court are affirmed in all respects.

All the Justices concur.

STATE, Respondent v. BONRUD, Appellant
(240 N.W.2d 77)
(File No. 11652. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

Order denying petition for rehearing May 20, 1976

186

187
|
Parnell J. Donohue, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Earl R. Mettler, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and respondent.

WINANS, Justice.

Defendant John Eldon Bonrud was charged with robbery in
the first degree and with rape and tried before a jury. He was ac-
quitted of the rape charge but found guilty on the first degree
robbery charge. He has brought this appeal alleging (1) improper-
ly admitted testimony, (2) insufficient evidence to support the
charge, (3) unconstitutionality of the robbery statute and (4)
failure of the trial court to give properly requested jury instruc-
tions. We have examined each assignment of error and find them
to be without merit. The decision of the trial court is therefore af-
firmed.

On Sunday, November 24, 1974, a 19-year-old young woman
was parking her car outside the place of her employment, North-
western Bell Telephone Company in Sioux Falls, shortly before
ten in the evening. As she opened her door a stranger walked up
and demanded a ride. Upon her refusal the stranger forced his
way into her ear, sliding her over on the seat. At that point
another stranger got in the car from the opposite side. The victim
had been ordered by the first intruder to close her eyes and so
she did not see the second individual. The victim identified the
first stranger as one Ron Scirica.

The second stranger was later identified as Defendant
Bonrud. The victim testified that when Bonrud got into the car he
asked if she had any money and then said that he would kill her.
He put something thought to be a knife to victim’s neck and asked
Scirica, “Ron, can I kill her?” Then he asked if he could cut her a
little bit. Scirica then drove the victim's car for a short distance

188 po

through an alley, stopped the car, opened his trousers and forced
the victim to have oral sex with him.

Soon a second car drove up and its driver spoke to Seirica
and Bonrud. Scirica told Bonrud to get into the rear seat and then
Scirica had intercourse with the victim on her car’s front seat.
The third man, the driver of the other car, got into the back seat
and spoke to Bonrud. Together they looked through the victim’s
purse and they commented that there was not much money and
that they should get another. They made the victim get out of the
car, lie down on the ground, and they drove off.

Jake Lottman, a bank security guard, testified at the Bonrud
trial that on the night of November 24th, shortly after ten in the
evening he got into his car, upon leaving work, to go home. He
was accosted by three men who drove up. One got out of his car
and tried to enter the Lottman car from the driver's side while
another ran around the Lottman car and attempted to get in from
the passenger side. Lottman was able to fight them off and to pre-
vent them from getting in. Later on he identified Ron Scirica as
the intruder who tried to enter from the driver's side. The three
drove off and stopped their car about half a block from Lottman’s
ear. Lottman flagged down a Sioux Falls police officer who drove
to the three men’s car and parked in front of it. The three fled on
foot.

Subsequently the three were apprehended and a search war-
rant was obtained for the car. Upon searching the vehicle the vic-
tim’s purse was found inside it. Defendant gave a statement to
the police concerning the events of the evening. After being
found guilty on the first degree robbery charge the defendant
was sentenced, February 12, 1975, to eight years in the state
penitentiary, less time served awaiting trial.

[ll Defendant objects to the admission of testimony concern-
ing Scirica’s sexual assaults on the victim and testimony concern-
ing the Lottman incident which followed the robbing of the vic-
tim. Defendant John Bonrud was charged with both rape and rob-
bery. Integral to the rape charge was the sum total of sexual ac-
tivity involving the victim, Scirica, Bonrud and the third person

189

who is a younger brother of Bonrud. The defendant was seated
next to the victim, facilitating Scirica’s oral sex with her and his
presence in the car, his attempt to put the victim in fear of her life
by holding a knife to her throat and his failure to make any clear
attempt to inhibit or thwart Scirica’s rape of the victim are all
proper considerations within the charge of rape. Evidence of the
defendant's involvement under these circumstances was proper-
ly admitted.

The testimony concerning the attack upon the bank guard
Lottman tended to place Scirica and the two Bonruds in each
other’s company but moments after the rape in question. It also
established the method of operation of the three. In both in-
cidents Scirica attempted to get in the car on one side, the
driver’s, and Bonrud attempted to get in the car from the other.
Testimony concerning the Lottman incident was also necessary
to show how and why the car was seized, the purse found and the
three perpetrators pursued. We have previously stated that:

“What in any case is a part of the res gestae of a crime
depends upon the character and circumstances of the
particular case. We believe what occurred and was said
between defendant’s assault upon his wife, the calling of
the police, and his subsequent arrest was so intimately
connected in time and place with the crime charged that
it constituted a part of the res gestae and was admissi-
ble.” State v. Burtts, 1964, 81 S.D. 150, 182 N.W.2d 209,

In the instant case the sex acts in the automobile, the flight by
Defendant and companions in their car, the attempted robbery of
Lottman immediately after (coupled with the comment that the
victim's purse did not contain enough money and that they should
find another) were all part of the res gestae. Although the assault
on Lottman did constitute a crime in itself, the evidence was not
thereby made inadmissible. As the Court also noted in Burtts,
supra,

“This evidence when a part of the res gestae was proper
if it was related to and tended to prove the crime
charged although it also proved or tended to prove the

190
defendant guilty of another crime.”

Hii Defendant-Appellant further contends that the evidence
presented is insufficient to support the charge of first degree rob-
bery. This is a clear contradiction of the record. The testimony
presented showed that Defendant got into the car, held
something like a knife to the victim’s neck and threated to kill
and/or cut her. There was further testimony that Defendant and
his younger brother looked through the contents of the victim’s
purse while Scirica was having intercourse with her. Our statute,
SDCL 22-30-1 defines robbery as:

“a wrongful taking of personal property in the posses-
sion of another from his person or immediate presence,
and against his will, accomplished by means of force or
fear.”

SDCL 22-30-6 defines robbery in the first degree as robbery ac-
complished by the use of force or by putting the person robbed in
fear of some immediate injury to his person. In the case before us
the victim’s purse was taken from her presence, against her will,
by force and fear. Scirica and the defendant had trapped the vie-
tim between them and had threatened her life. While it is true
that mere presence alone does not generally constitute guilt,
Defendant in this case was actively participating in the crime.
Defendant used force and threats against the victim and he
cooperated in the taking of her purse which he immediately
searched. These facts present ample evidence for the jury’s find-
ing of guilty on the robbery charge.

Defendant next contends that the state statute on
degrees of robbery, SDCL 22-30-6, is unconstitutional because of
ambiguity and uncertainty. This charge is made in the concluding
paragraphs of his brief and is not in any significant way
developed. The statute reads as follows:

“Robbery when accomplished by the use of force or by
putting the person robbed in fear of some immediate in-
jury to his person is robbery in the first degree. When

191

accomplished in any other manner, it is robbery in the
second degree.”

We fail to find in this wording any plausible degree of ambiguity
or uncertainty. The challenge to the statute is without merit.

HM Lastly, Appellant faults the trial court for failure to give
requested instructions. Our examination of the settled record
discloses only two instructions which the trial court refused, and
these pertained to the rape charge on which the defendant was
acquitted. It would be pointless to explore the court’s refusal to
give these. However, Appellant also seems to indicate that he ob-
jected to the court’s failure to give an instruction on larceny as a
lesser included offense under a robbery charge. We do not pass
on the merits of this argument because we note that Appellant
did not request such an instruction at the trial level. As we noted
in State v. Barr, 1975, 89 §.D. 280, 232 N.W.2d 257, “South Dakota
statutory law and case law are clear in that this court cannot on
appeal consider an objection to an instruction which was not
made at the time the instruction was given.” (citations omitted).
In Barr we also noted that for these same reasons the defendant
cannot be heard to object when the trial court failed to give an in-
struction which Defendant had not proposed. Simply stated, Ap-
pellant cannot raise on appeal the issue of an instruction on a
lesser included offense under the robbery charged when he did
not deal with the question according to the provisions of SDCL
23-42-6(5) and 15-6-51(b) at the trial level before the instructions
were given to the jury.

The conviction of John Bonrud is therefore affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.

STATE, Respondent v. WEEKLEY, Appellant

(240 N.W.2d 80)

(File No. 11578. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

Earl R. Mettler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre for plaintiff and
respondent; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.

Steven W. Sanford, of Braithwaite & Cadwell, Sioux Falls,
for defendant and appellant.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Appellant appeals from the judgment entered upon his con-
viction on a charge of escape. We affirm.

Appellant, who was then on trusty status, was discovered to
be missing from his assigned location at the state penitentiary at

193

about 10 p.m., August 13, 1974. He was apprehended approx-
imately one and one-half hours later while walking along South
Minnesota Avenue near Interstate 229 in the City of Sioux Falls.

Appellant was charged by penitentiary officials with a viola-
tion of Title 18, Rule 23 of the Inmate Rule Book, which states in
part, “Absence from any count may result in disciplinary action.”
Appellant pled guilty to the charge of not being present for count
and was ordered to spend five days in isolation by the peniten-
tiary disciplinary board.

Appellant was later charged with escape from the state
penitentiary, SDCL 24-12-1, on the basis of the above-described
incident and was sentenced to serve an additional year in the
state penitentiary upon being found guilty by a jury on that
charge.

Appellant, who pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of
former conviction, SDCL 23-35-17, contends that the trial court
erred in not permitting him to introduce evidence at his trial pur-
suant to SDCL 23-44-19 to establish his contention that he had
already been convicted of the same offense by virtue of the ad-
ministrative discipline imposed by the penitentiary officials for
his violation of Rule 23 of the Inmate Rule Book.

Simply stated, appellant's contention is that he has been
twice subjected to jeopardy for a single act—his escape from the
penitentiary —in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution (and, presumably, S.D.Const. Art. VI, § 9).

Appellant acknowledges that the contention that prosecu-
tion on a state or federal charge of escape is barred by the prior
imposition of administrative discipline by prison authorities has
been rejected almost out of hand in other jurisdictions. See, e. g.,
Fano v. Meachum, 1 Cir., 520 F.2d 374; United States v. Stuckey, 3
Cir., 441 F.2d 1104; Keaveny v. United States, 5 Cir., 405 F.2d 821;
Pagliaro v. Cox, 8 Cir., 143 F.2d 900; United States v. Salazar,
8 Cir., 505 F.2d 72; Hutchison v. United States, 10 Cir., 450 F.2d
930; Alex v. State, Alaska, 484 P.2d 677; State v. Williams, 208
Kan. 480, 493 P.2d 258; State v. Tise, Me., 283 A.2d 666; Common-

194 es

wealth v. Sneed, Mass.App. 322 N.E.2d 435; People v. Bachman,
50 Mich.App. 682, 213 N.W.2d 800; State v. Maddox, 190 Neb. 361,
208 N.W.2d 274; Shuman v. Sheriff of Carson City, Nev., 523 P.2d
841; State v. Lebo, 129 Vt. 449, 282 A.2d 804.

Appellant would have us distinguish these and other similar
cases on the ground that by and large the double jeopardy conten-
tions rejected therein have been given no close judicial attention
but have been rather summarily rejected on the ground that the
administrative discipline imposed following an escape is in the
nature of a civil proceeding resulting in a loss of privileges, e.g.,
the loss of good time or the imposition of isolated confinement.

Appellant contends that he was placed in jeopardy as a
result of the action by the penitentiary disciplinary board
because (1) he suffered a loss of liberty in that he was removed
from trusty status and placed in isolated confinement, and (2) the
objective accomplished by the action of the disciplinary board
was penal in nature.

In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346,
the United States Supreme Court was faced with the question
whether a juvenile who has been the subject of an adjudicatory
hearing in juvenile court may later be prosecuted as an adult ona
charge based upon the facts that formed the basis of the juvenile
court adjudication. In discussing this question, the Court stated:

“As we have observed, the risk to which the term
jeopardy refers is that traditionally associated with ‘ac-
tions intended to authorize criminal punishment to vin-
dicate public justice.’ United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, supra, 317 U.S. 537 at 548-549, 63 S.Ct. 379 at 388,
87 L.Ed. 443. Because of its purpose and potential conse-
quences, and the nature and resources of the State, such
a proceeding imposes heavy pressures and
burdens— psychological, physical, and financial—on a
person charged. The purpose of the Double Jeopardy
Clause is to require that he be subject to the experience
only once ‘for the same offense.’ See Green v. United

_ States, 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199

195

(1957); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 at 331, 90 S.Ct. 1757
at 1762, 26 L.Ed.2d 300; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).” 421
US. at 529, 95 S.Ct. at 1786, 44 L.Ed.2d at 355.

The Court then went on to hold that because there was no per-
suasive distinction between an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile
court and a traditional criminal prosecution in terms of the anxie-
ty and insecurity engendered and the heavy personal strain im-
posed upon a juvenile by reason of being subjected to the ad-
judicatory proceeding, and because both the adjudicatory pro-
ceeding and the criminal prosecution are designed to vindicate
the very vital interest of the government in enforcing its criminal
laws, a juvenile is subjected to jeopardy when the juvenile court
begins to hear evidence at an adjudicatory hearing.

Measured against the standard enunciated in Breed v.
Jones, we conclude that appellant’s claim of double jeopardy
must fail. Although it may very well be true that appellant and
others similarly situated experience some anxiety and insecurity
by virtue of being subjected to administrative discipline by
penitentiary authorities, it would trivialize the protection afford-
ed by the double jeopardy clause of the state and federal constitu-
tions to hold that it applies in this case to bar prosecution on a
state charge of escape. As pointed out in Breed v. Jones, supra,
and cases cited therein, the purpose of the double jeopardy clause
is to require that a person be subject only once to a criminal pro-
ceeding that may result in criminal punishment designed to vin-
dicate public justice. We do not consider administrative discipline
imposed by penitentiary officials as constituting that type of pro-
ceeding. The administrative discipline imposed by penitentiary
officials is designed to serve purposes essential to the orderly ad-
ministration of the penitentiary. A formal criminal prosecution
by the state on a charge of escape, together with the attendant
publicity and potentially severe punishment, is designed to vin-
dicate the vital interest that the citizens of this state have in en-
forcing the law which imposes a sanction for escaping from the
penitentiary. True, some of the purposes of the two types of pro-
ceedings may overlap, e.g., the deterrent effect the adminstrative
and penal sanctions imposed may have upon others who are con-

196 Pe

templating escape; however, other purposes served by the action
taken by penitentiary officials, e.g., the necessity of promptly
confining a returned escapee in order to maintain security within
the institution, may be different from the purposes served by the
prosecution on the charge of escape brought in the name of the
state. Although appellant argues that the deprivation of liberty
resulting from his being confined in isolation did not secure the
objectives of preserving order, preventing escape, or
rehabilitating an escapee, that is a question committed to the con-
sidered judgment of those officials charged with the responsi-
bility of operating the penitentiary. It is for those officials,
possessing expertise with respect to the maintenance of order,
morale and discipline within a penal institution, to decide
whether or not the imposition of administrative sanctions upon a
returned escapee is necessary or desirable to further the objec-
tives of maintaining an orderly institution. In saying this, we are
aware of the fact that by virtue of an order entered by the United
States District Court for the District of South Dakota in the case
of Crowe v. Erickson, Civ. No. 72-4101, the officials of the state
penitentiary are required to provide an inmate notice of and a
hearing on the charges upon which the officials intend to impose
administrative discipline upon an inmate in the way of solitary
confinement or the withholding of good time. It does not follow,
however, that, because penitentiary officials must adhere to the
due process requirements expressed in the order before imposing
solitary confinement or the loss of good time, such administrative
discipline is perforce converted into a criminal proceeding for the
purpose of the double jeopardy clause, any more than it would
follow that because the state must afford a motorist a hearing
before his driver’s license is revoked, such revocation pro-
ceedings are criminal in nature.

In summary, then, we conclude that in the light of the prin-
ciples set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Breed v.
Jones, supra, the proceedings before the penitentiary
disciplinary board and the administrative sanctions imposed by
the board upon appellant are not sufficiently analogous to the
subsequent criminal proceedings brought against appellant on
the charge of escape and the resulting sentence imposed thereon
to warrant a holding that appellant was subjected to jeopardy

197

within the meaning of the state and federal constitution when he
was charged with and found guilty of being absent from count.

Appellant also contends that the punishment imposed by the
trial court upon his conviction is barred by SDCL 22-6-4, which
reads in part:

“An act or omission which is made punishable in dif-
ferent ways by different provisions of this title, or other
penal statute, may be punished under either of such pro-
visions, * * * but in no case can it be punished under
more than one, and an acquittal or conviction under
either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omis-
sion under any other.”

Appellant argues that because the rule that he was con-
victed of having violated was a part of the rules issued pursuant
to the authority to prescribe rules and regulations granted to the
Board of Charities and Corrections pursuant to SDCL 1-15-20, the
rule should be considered in the nature of a penal statute and that
therefore the administrative sanctions imposed by the
disciplinary board upon him constituted punishment that would
bar further punishment on the charge of escape based upon
SDCL 24-12-1. SDCL 1-15-20 provides:

“Such board at any time may prescribe rules and
regulations for the discipline and order of any of such in-
stitutions and the management thereof, and it shall be
the duty of all officers and employees of such institu-
tions to fully comply with all directions and rules or
regulations of such board.”

SDCL 22-1-3 provides that:
“A crime or public offense is an act or omission for-

bidden by law, and to which is annexed, upon conviction,
one or more of the following punishments:

(1) Death;
(2) Imprisonment;

(8) Fine;

(4) Removal from office; or

(5) Disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honor, trust, or profit under this state.”

SDCL 22-1-8 provides that, “No act or omission shall be deemed
criminal or punishable except as prescribed or authorized by this
title or by some other statute of this state.”

In the light of SDCL 22-1-3 and 22-1-8, we do not consider the
authority granted to the Board of Charities and Corrections by
SDCL 1-15-20 as empowering that Board to adopt penal statutes
within the meaning of SDCL 22-6-4. Accordingly, we hold that the
prior imposition of administrative discipline by the penitentiary
disciplinary board does not bar the imposition of punishment on
the state charge of escape.

The judgment is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur.

|
STATE, Respondent v. BUCKINGHAM, Appellant
(240 N.W.2d 84)

_ File No. 11586. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)
| |

199

Harry W. Christianson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff
and respondent. William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Max A. Gors,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief.

Walter J. Bradsky, of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Sim-
mons, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury on a charge of driving
while intoxicated. He appeals from the judgment of conviction,
contending that the trial court should not have admitted the
results of a breathalyzer test because the investigating officer
had failed to place him under formal arrest, had failed to request
that he submit to such a test, and had failed to advise him of his
right to refuse to submit to such test and of the consequences of
such refusal. We reverse.

At approximately 12:45 a.m., July 28, 1974, Officer M. R. Col-
lins of the South Dakota Highway Patrol received a call to in-
vestigate an accident on South Dakota Highway 34 near St. Onge,
Lawrence County, South Dakota. Upon arriving at the scene, Of-

200 PO

ficer Collins observed defendant standing outside his damaged
pickup truck. In response to the officer’s questions, defendant
stated that he had struck a bridge abutment after he had swerv-
ed to the right side of the road to avoid an oncoming vehicle in his
lane of travel. Officer Collins observed that defendant was con-
fused in his directions, smelled of intoxicants, and was unsteady
on his feet. Based upon these observations, Officer Collins told -
defendant that in his opinion defendant had had too much to drink
to be driving and advised defendant that he and the officer would
go to Deadwood for a breathalyzer test. Officer Collins then took
defendant from the scene of the accident to Deadwood, where the
breathalyzer test was administered. Although Officer Collins
testified that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights at the
police station in Deadwood before the test was administered, the
record is clear that he did not request that defendant submit to
the breathalyzer test, and he did not advise him that he had the
right to refuse to submit to such test, nor of the consequences of
such refusal. In fact, Officer Collins testified that:

“The only time that we advise them of the implied con-
sent law is if they refuse to take a blood test or
Breathalyzer test, then the implied consent law is read
to them.”

HN We pass quickly over defendant's contention that
because he was never placed under arrest he should not have
been required to submit to the breathalyzer test. SDCL 23-22-1
provides that, “Arrest is the taking of a person into custody that
he may be held to answer for a public offense.” SDCL 23-22-9 pro-
vides that:

“When arresting a person without a warrant, a
peace officer must inform him of his authority and the
cause of the arrest, except when he is in the actual com-
mission of a public offense, or is pursued immediately
after an escape.”

Although it is true that Officer Collins may not have told defend-
ant in so many words that he was placing him under arrest at the
scene of the accident on a charge of driving while intoxicated, it is

a

clear from the evidence that Officer Collins had probable cause to
arrest defendant on such a charge and that he in fact took the
defendant into custody at the scene and transported him to the
Deadwood police station. Although law enforcement officers
should comply closely with the requirements of the statute,
SDCL 23-22-9, and clearly inform a criminal suspect that he is
being placed under arrest and on what charge, the failure to make
such a statement did not vitiate the legal effect of the de facto ar-
rest here where the officer in fact took defendant into his
physical custody and control at the scene of the accident and
made it clear to defendant that he was being taken to Deadwood
for a breathalyzer test. State v. Thunder Horse, 85 S.D. 76, 177
N.W.2d 19; Application of Kiser, 83 S.D. 272, 158 N.W.2d 596.

[i Defendant contends that because Officer Collins failed to
advise him of his right to refuse the breathalyzer test and of the
consequences of such refusal as set forth in SDCL 32-23-11 and
82-23-12, the results of the breathalyzer test should not have been
admitted in evidence.

SDCL 32-23-10 provides that:

“Any person who operates any vehicle in this state
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical
analysis of his blood, urine, breath or other bodily
substance for the purpose of determining the amount of
alcohol in his blood, as provided in § 32-23-7, provided
that such test is administered at the direction of a law
enforcement officer having lawfully arrested such per-
son for a violation of § 32-23-1.

“Such person shall be requested by said officer to
submit to such analysis and shall be advised by said of-
ficer of his right to refuse to submit to such analysis and
the provisions of §§ 32-23-11 and 32-23-12 in the event of
such refusal with respect to the revocation of such per-
son’s driving license.”

SDCL 32-23-11 provides that:

“Tf any person described in § 32-23-10, after request and ex-

202 Po

planation as therein provided, shall refuse to submit to such
chemical analysis, then such test shall not be given. In such event,
the department of public safety shall revoke for one year his
license to drive and any nonresident operating privilege he may
have in his possession after opportunity for hearing pursuant to
chapter 1-26 if hearing is demanded, it shall find that the law en-
forcement officer complied therewith and the refusal was made
by that person.”

SDCL 32-23-12 provides that:

“Any person whose license has been canceled,
suspended, or revoked by the commissioner under the
provisions of § 32-23-11 shall have the right to file a peti-
tion within thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the
matter in circuit court in the county wherein such per-
son was charged with the violation, and such court is
hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its duty
to set the matter for trial de novo upon ten days’ written
notice to the department, and ‘thereupon to take
testimony and examine into the facts of the case and to
determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to
cancellation, suspension, or revocation under the provi-
sions of § 32-23-11.”

SDCL 32-23-13 provides in part that:

“If any operator of a motor vehicle in this state who
has been requested to submit to such chemical test fails
to invoke the provision in § 32-23-11 which permits him
to refuse to submit to such test; then the failure to in-
voke such provision permitting a refusal to submit to
such test shall constitute consent and authority for any
authorized physician, laboratory technician, registered
nurse, or medical technician or medical technologist to
administer such test * * *.”

In State v. Batterman, 79 S.D. 191, 110 N.W.2d 189, the
defendant driver, who had consented to submit to a blood test
after being advised by the arresting officer that he had the right

203

to refuse to submit to the test, contended that because the ar-
resting officer had failed to advise him of the consequences of
such refusal the results of the test should not have been admitted
at his trial. The pertinent part of the implied consent law as then
in existence was substantially similar to the last paragraph of
SDCL 32-23-10, supra. In rejecting defendant’s contention, this
court stated that:

“From a cursory consideration of this act [now
SDCL 32-23-10] it seems obvious the lawmakers did not
intend one to be subject to the penalty of a revocation of
his driver's privilege unless he be advised that a refusal
of the request to submit to the test will subject him to
that penalty. However, nothing but the letter of the act
offers any support for the contention that the consent of
one who had been advised of his right to refuse to sub-
mit to the test was intended to be invalidated because
he had not been told that had he refused to submit he
would have had his privilege to drive revoked. Because
we can conceive of no reason for believing the
legislature intended such a result, we are of the view
that such an intention cannot soundly be implied from
the mere letter of the quoted language. Therefore, we
hold the contention untenable.” 79 S.D. at 195, 110
N.W.2d at 141.

Some three years later, however, without citing the Batter-
man case this court stated that:

“Since our statute requires it, an arresting officer is
obligated to inform a driver of the consequences in the -
event of his refusal to submit to a test.” Chmelka v.
Smith, 81 S.D. 40, 44, 180 N.W.2d 423, 425.

In the case of Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20, 140 N.W.2d 603,
wherein the evidence revealed that the defendant driver had
been fully informed of the consequences of a refusal to submit toa
blood test, this court recognized the apparent conflict in the
above cited statements in the Batterman and Chmelka cases and
went on to say that:

204

“Once the conditions of the statute are met, refusal to
submit to the test results in mandatory loss of license.
Chmelka v. Smith ***.” 82 S.D. at 25, 140 N.W.2d at
606.

In State v. Spry, 87 S.D. 318, 207 N.W.2d 504, we cited the
Batterman case for the proposition that:

“The statute (SDCL 32-23-10) makes no requirement
that the subject be informed of any more than that he
has the right to refuse and that his license will be
suspended if he does.” 87 S.D. at 324, 207 N.W.2d at 507.1

We conclude that the failure of the arresting officer to com-
ply with the requirements of SDCL 32-23-10 rendered the test
results inadmissible at defendant's trial. To the extent that the
holding in State v. Batterman, supra, is to the contrary, that deci-
sion is overruled. In reaching this result, we look, as did the court
in Batterman, to the letter of the law. It is difficult to see how the
legislature could have been more specific in setting forth the pro-
cedure that arresting officers must follow when they seek to
utilize the powerful evidence-gathering mechanism conferred
upon them by SDCL 32-23-10, the implied consent statute. True,
our statute does not expressly state that the failure of the of-
ficer to comply with the procedural steps will render the test
results inadmissible, as do some implied consent statutes, see,
e.g., State v. Granville, Me., 336 A.2d 861. Implicit in our implied
consent statute, however, is the right to refuse to submit toa test
and, a fortiori, the requirement that a choice be made between
submitting to the test or suffering the consequences of such
refusal. Beare v. Smith, supra; Blow v. Commissioner, 83 S.D. 628,
164 N.W.2d 351. Also implicit in the implied consent law is the
assumption that the choice to be made is of considerable impor-

1, A contention similar to the one raised by the defendant in the instant case was
apparently not advanced in City of Sioux Falls v. Ugland, 79 S.D. 134, 109
.W.2d 144, or in State v. Werlinger, 84 S.D. 282, 170 N.W.2d 470, wherein it

was held the defendants had expressly consented to submit to the test. The
record does not admit of such a finding in the instant case, however, and
because the officer did not advise defendant of his right under SDCL 32-23-11 to
refuse to consent to the test, defendant's failure to invoke his right of refusal
gannot be deemed as constituting consent under the provisions of SDCL

-13.

bE

tance to the arrested driver. Although it may be true that to
some drivers the loss of their license for a period of one year
would be a penalty more severe than being convicted of the of-
fense of driving while intoxicated, see Holland v. Parker, D.S.D.,
354 F.Supp. 196, there no doubt are some who would rather suffer
the loss of their license for one year than to suffer the ignominy of
a conviction for driving while intoxicated, together with the
adverse economic consequences such a conviction entails. If the
offense of driving while intoxicated is considered serious enough
to warrant the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial, Parham-v.
Municipal Court, 86 S.D. 531, 199 N.W.2d 501, then surely it is
serious enough to require law enforcement officers to comply
with the statutorily mandated procedural steps as a prerequisite
to the admissibility of the results of a chemical test conducted
pursuant to the implied consent law.

By holding that law enforcement officers must comply with
the provisions of the implied consent statute, we do not intend in
any way to impose new or onerous requirements to the conscien-
tious, diligent application of the implied consent law. Rather, we
seek only to enforce the requirements that the legislature has
already imposed, and in doing so we reaffirm what this court said
in Beare v. Smith, supra: that our implied consent statute was
adopted to combat the menace and danger caused by drunken
drivers, and that the “* * * threat to person and property from
drunken drivers using the public highways is not an area for
timid or tolerant application of traffie laws.” 82 S.D. at 26, 140
N.W.2d at 607. Indeed, we assume that in the vast majority of
cases our law enforcement officers are faithfully complying with
the statute at the time they arrest motorists whom they suspect
of driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverage and
that the instant case represents but an aberrational departure
from the norm of police conduct.

Also, we do not mean to say by our holding herein that there
may not be situations where literal compliance with the re-
quirements of SDCL 32-23-10 will not be necessary, say, for exam-
ple, in the case of an unconscious or disabled driver, or in the case
of the obstreperous or erudite inebriate who spurns the arresting
officer’s attempted recitation of the right to refuse a test and of

206 PO

the consequences of such refusal. We leave those cases for
another day.

We note that we are not alone in holding that the re-
quirements of the implied consent law must be complied with as a
precondition to rendering the test results admissible. For exam-
ple, the Iowa implied consent statute, I.C.A. § 321B.3, requires,
the arresting officer to make a written request of the arrested
driver to submit to a chemical test. The failure of the officer to
present such a written request renders the test results inadmissi-
ble. State v. Jensen, Iowa, 216 N.W.2d 369. As recently explained
by the Iowa Supreme Court: .

“Under § 321B.3 a peace officer having reasonable
cause to believe a person to have been operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage may
invoke the implied consent procedure after arresting
the person on that charge. In order to invoke the pro-
cedure the officer must make a written request of the
person that he submit to a blood test. State v. Jensen,
216 N.W.2d 369, 372 (lowa 1974); State v. Wallin, 195
N.W.2d 95, 96-97 (Iowa 1972).

* * * * * *

“The State did not get over the first hurdle in this
case. The officer did not make a written request to
defendant that she submit to the blood test. She acceded
to an oral request. We are unable and unwilling to say
defendant’s accession to an oral request obviated the of-
ficer’s duty to make the request in writing.” State v.
Richards, Iowa, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233.

Although we need not decide whether we would require the same
literal compliance with the provisions of our law as the Iowa
Court does with respect to the Iowa statute, the total failure of
Officer Collins to advise defendant in accordance with our implied
consent law, in the absence of any factors making compliance
with the statute impossible or unnecessary, rendered the test
results inadmissible. To hold otherwise would be to read the last
paragraph of SDCL 32-23-10 out of the statute.

Pe 207

The state contends, however, that the implied consent law
aside, the holding in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86
S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, renders the test results admissible. It
is true that in State v. Werlinger, supra note 1, and State v. Spry,
supra, we indicated that in the light of the Schmerber decision,
the results of a blood test would be constitutionally admissible
despite a defendant’s refusal to submit to the test. Indeed, in the
Spry case, we stated, after first holding that the defendant had
voluntarily consented to a blood test after being advised of his im-
plied consent law rights, that “***a defendant’s consent or
refusal is irrelevant to the admission of the results of the blood
test if the test is taken pursuant to a valid arrest.” 87 S.D. at 325,
207 N.W.2d at 508. Upon further reflection, however, we deem
that statement to be too broad an application of the Schmerber
doctrine inasmuch as it fails to consider the implications of our
implied consent law as a limitation on the constitutional authority
of law enforcement officers to withdraw blood from an arrested
driver. Granted that our implied consent statute antedated the
decision in Schmerber, in contrast to the California implied con-
sent statute, see Blow v. Commissioner, supra, 83 S.D. at 633, 164
N.W.2d at 353 n.1, the statute still stands and on its face imposes
procedural requirements above the constitutional safeguards
enunciated in the Schmerber case. Other courts have interpreted
their applicable statutes as constituting a limitation upon the
Schmerber doctrine. In discussing the Schmerber case with
respect to the Illinois consent statute (which required actual con-
sent and did not contain an implied consent provision), the Illinois
Supreme Court stated, “Thus, absent a more limiting statutory
provision, the taking of a blood sample does not require the con-
sent of the donor.” People v. Todd, 59 Ill.2d 534, 545, 322 N.E.2d
447, 453. The Illinois Court then went on to hold that because the
Illinois statute required actual consent, a chemical test taken in
the absence of such consent was not rendered admissible by the
Schmerber case.

Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that:

“The implied consent law, however, gives rights
which are greater than those required by due process. It
specifically provides that at the time of the request to

208 Pe

take the test, the officer shall inform the licensee orally
and in writing ‘of his rights under the law and the prob-
able consequences of refusal to submit to such a test.’”
Vigil v. Motor Vehicle Division, Colo., 519 P.2d 332, 334.

In holding inadmissible the results of a blood test performed
on a blood sample taken over defendant’s protest, the Oregon
Court of Appeals stated:

“No constitutional issue is presented. Nothing in
the United States or Oregon constitutions would pro-
hibit a policeman who has probable cause to believe a -
person was driving under the influence of alcohol from
requiring that person to submit to’a chemical test of his
blood, breath, saliva, urine, etc. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); (other
citations omitted) As in other situations where the
police have probable cause to make a-search, the
driver’s consent or lack thereof would be irrelevant.
Schmerber v. California, supra.

“However, in adopting the Implied Consent Law, the
legislative assembly did not fix the statutory limits at the con-
stitutionally permissible limits. Instead, it is apparent that in
some instances drivers have a statutory right under the Implied
Consent Law to refuse to submit to any and all chemical sobriety
tests.” State v. Annen 12 Or.App. 203, 504 P.2d 1400, 1401.

See also State v. Stover, Or., 531 P.2d 258. For an apparently con-
trary holding, see People v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.3d 757, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 493 P.2d 1145, which has been interpreted by a lower
court as authorizing law enforcement officers to obtain and
utilize chemical analyses pursuant to Schmerber notwithstanding
the failure of the officers to comply with the requirements of
California’s implied consent statute. See People v. Brannon, 32
Cal.App.3d 971, 108 Cal.Rptr. 620, and cases cited therein.

We hold that SDCL 32-23-10 imposes requirements beyond
those mandated by the Schmerber case. To hold otherwise would
be to permit law enforcement officers to render SDCL 32-23-10

209

nugatory at their whim. If the legislature desires that a motorist
arrested on a charge of driving while intoxicated shall no longer
have the right to choose between consenting to a test and losing
his license, then presumably the legislature will say so in terms
as clear as it used in spelling out a motorist’s rights under SDCL
82-23-10. There is certainly nothing in the amendments adopted
in response to the decision in Holland v. Parker, supra, that in-
dicates any such intention on the part of the legislature. See, e.g.,
SDCL 82-23-11, as amended by Ch. 195, § 13, S.L.1973. To the ex-
tent that our decisions in State v. Werlinger and State v. Spry,
supra, express views contrary to those expressed herein with
respect to the admissibility of test results in driving while intox-
icated cases, those decisions are overruled.’ We note that in the
Werlinger case the defendant had consented to the test (but see
State v. Bosanco, 87 S.D. 605, 213 N.W.2d 345), and the Spry case
involved a charge of second degree manslaughter under the pro-
visions of SDCL 22-16-21. We need not decide here, nor did we
need to in the Spry case, whether compliance with SDCL 32-23-10
is required as a condition precedent to the admission of test
results in a prosecution under SDCL 22-16-21 or whether com-
pliance with the requirements of Schmerber will suffice to render
the results admissible.*

The trial court should not have admitted the results of the
breathalyzer test over defendant’s objection. Accordingly, the
judgment of conviction is reversed.

DUNN, C. J., and COLER, J., concur.

WINANS, J., dissents.

WINANS, Justice (dissenting).

2. We do not mean to overrule that portion of the Spry decision that holds that
defendant Spry’s consent was obtained after he had been informed of his im-
plied consent law rights and that it was not necessary for the law enforcement
officers to advise him that someone had been killed in the accident that led to

‘is arrest.

3. See State v. Stover, supra, 531 P.2d at 266 n.10, for a discussion of the amend-
ment to the Oregon implied consent statute that apparently permits test results
not obtained in compliance with the implied consent law fo be introduced in
cases other than prosecutions for driving while intoxicated.

a0 es

Iam dissenting from the majority opinion for reasons herein
set forth. I do not, however, dissent from the majority opinion so
far as the holding on the arrest issue. I agree there was a valid ar-
rest and that to me is the key point on the issue of the use of the
breathalyzer test on the charge of driving while intoxicated.

I do not accept as true the statement in the majority opinion
that defendant was not requested to submit to the breathalyzer
test, because the officer did tell defendant that he (defendant) had
had too much to drink to be driving and advised defendant that
he and the officer would go to Deadwood for a breathalyzer test.
The officer did not “advise him that he had the right to refuse to
submit to such test, nor of the consequences of such refusal.” This
is somewhat similar to State v. Batterman, 79 S.D. 191, 195, 110
N.W.2d 189, 141, where this Court said “[t]he defendant was in-
formed that he had a right to refuse to submit.” In our case he
was not so advised. The Court further said, “Hence, whether the
legislature intended an express consent to be invalid, if received
in the absence of an explanation of the penalty attached to a
refusal to submit, is the narrow question before us.” In our case
the defendant was not advised of the penalty. Our case is
therefore somewhat like Batterman, supra, and somewhat dif-
ferent. We have a valid arrest and a lack of explanation by the of-
ficer. In Batterman no question appears relative to the arrest pro-
cedure, and a partial explanation given by the arresting officer.
In both cases the charge is DWI. The conviction in Batterman was
affirmed.

The majority opinion states that three years later, without
citing Batterman, this Court stated:

“Since our statute requires it, an arresting officer is
obligated to inform a driver of the consequences in the
event of his refusal to submit to a test.” Chmelka v.
Smith, 81 S.D. 40, 44, 180 N.W.2d 423, 425.

I believe in Chmelka v. Smith. I have no quarrel with it. In
Chmelka the proceeding was upon a petition for determination
whether driver’s permit was subject to suspension or revocation
for violation of Implied Consent Law. It is plain that the Court

211

said it was, but also found that the explanation had been made
and dismissed the petition. There was no need to cite Batterman.
Unlike Batterman, this was not a criminal action, and in Chmelka
the Court going no further than upholding the consequence the
statutes provided where the officer might not make them known
to the suspected drunk driver. For all we know Chmelka may or
may not have been tried on the DWI. It is possible, though
speculative, he may have been tried and found not guilty of DWI,
or just the reverse.

Chmelka is also authority for the following views as to the
rights and privileges of driving.

“The operation of a motor vehicle upon the public
highways is not a natural or unrestricted right. It has
been variously denominated as a privilege, a privilege in
the nature of a right, an important right under our pre-
sent mode of living, and as a vested right. Prucha v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415; 110
N.W.2d 75, 88 A.L.R.2d 1055; In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584,
46 S.E.2d 696; Thompson v. Thompson, N.D., 78 N.W.2d
895; Application of Goodwin, 173 Mise. 169, 17 N.Y. S.2d
426. In any event, a permit or license to operate a motor
vehicle, once issued, is of substantial value to its holder
and more especially to persons who depend for their
livelihood upon the operation of a motor vehicle. Even if
the driving of a motor vehicle upon the public highways
be termed a mere privilege, a driver’s permit or license
may be suspended or revoked only in the manner and on
grounds provided by law. 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 160;
annotation, 88 A.L.R.2d 1064.” Chmelka v. Smith, supra,
180 N.W.2d at p. 424.

Beare v. Smith, 82 S.D. 20, 140 N.W.2d 603, is consistent with Bat-
terman, supra, and with Chmelka, supra. At least it does not
uphold the doctrine we are invited to by the majority opinion in
Buckingham. The action in Beare v. Smith is a proceeding to
review revocation of driver’s license and that is all. It plainly
holds that such an action is “separate and distinct” from a
criminal trial. It even cites Batterman to the effect that results of

212 po

a blood test were held admissible in the criminal prosecution
although the officer “did not explain the penalty attached to a
refusal to submit.”

“The right to operate a motor vehicle upon a public
street or highway is not a natural or unrestricted right
but a privilege which is subject to reasonable regulation
under the police power of the state in the interest of
public safety and welfare. Chmelka v. Smith, 81 S.D. 40,
130 N.W.2d 423. The proceeding to determine or review
the propriety of the cancellation, suspension, or revoca-
tion of a driver’s license is separate and distinct from a
criminal trial on a charge of driving while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, and the efficacy
of the revocation by the Commissioner does not hinge on
whether there is a conviction or acquittal on a criminal
charge related to the test. Prucha v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75, 88
A.L.R.2d 1055. In Chmelka in a proceeding by the Com-
missioner we said: ‘Since our statute requires it, an ar-
resting officer is obligated to inform a driver of the con-
sequences in the event of his refusal to submit to a test.’
Contrariwise, in State v. Batterman, 79 S.D. 191, 110
N.W.2d 189, the results of a blood test were held ad-
missible in a criminal prosecution, although the officer
did not explain the penalty attached to a refusal to sub-
mit.” Beare v. Smith, supra, 140 N.W.2d, at 606.

In State v. Spry, 87 S.D. 318, 207 N.W.2d 504, we said that
SDCL 32-23-10

“provides in substance that when a police officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been
driving under the influence of alcohol and has been
charged with a traffic violation, the officer can request
that such person submit to a chemical analysis of his
plood. It also provides that consent to submit to the test
is implied from the fact of his driving.”

In a footnote we cite

eC

“A three judge federal court recently held in Holland v.
Parker, D.C., 1978, 354 F.Supp. 196, that the South
Dakota implied consent statute is unconstitutional to
the extent that it permits a police officer to demand that
a subject submit to a blood test without first making a
lawful arrest.” (emphasis supplied)

Spry was a criminal prosecution and we said “The issue
before the federal court in Holland was the right to revoke
Holland's license under the circumstances. This is not the issue in
our case.” Then most importantly we held,

“Aside from all that, however, we hold that a
defendant's consent or refusal is irrelevant to the admis-
sion of the results of the blood test if the test is taken
pursuant to a valid arrest. Cf. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. Holland v.
Parker, supra.”

The Holland v. Parker, supra, case was an attempt to revoke
a license to drive for failing to submit to the blood test. Paren-
thetically we have since amended our statutes to take care of the
objections made in Holland. The three judge Federal Court
stated in their opinion:

“Thus it would seem ‘that if a police officer, im-
plementing search and seizure procedures in accordance
with constitutional proscriptions, cannot require a per-
son to take a blood test without a warrant unless there
is a lawful arrest and emergency circumstances, then
neither could the officer demand that a licensee submit
to the blood test, without these same constitutional
prerequisites, when refusal would result in automatic
loss of his license. If it were any other way, the Fourth
Amendment protections would be rendered valueless
since asserting them would result in a penalty potential-
ly more severe than conviction for the alleged public of-
fense.” (emphasis supplied)

It also quoted from Schmerber,

a4 ee

“In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct.
1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Fourth Amendment was
found applicable to blood tests. There, within the con-
text of a warrantless search the Supreme Court in-
dicated that if a blood test is to be taken incident to a
legal arrest, there must be probable cause, the arrest
must be lawful, and there must be an emergency:

The interests in human dignity and privacy which the
Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intru-
sions (beyond the body’s surface) on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. * * * Search
warrants are ordinarily required for searches of
dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be
required where intrusions into the human body are
concerned.

Id. at 769-770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d at 917.

The language of the South Dakota statute provides
for neither an emergency circumstance nor a lawful ar-
rest, nor has it been interpreted to contain such.”

Among other things the Court in Holland concluded that the

“Fourth Amendment requires a lawful arrest of a
motorist prior to request for submission to a blood-
alcohol chemical analysis; police officer cannot demand
that a licensed driver submit to a blood test, without
constitutional prerequisite of either lawful arrest or
emergency circumstance, when motorist’s refusal would
result in automatic loss of his license.” (see syllabus 2)

The question in Schmerber v. State of California, 1966; 384
US. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908; was concerned with the
admissibility of a blood sample analysis where such blood had
been withdrawn despite defendant’s refusal, on the advice of his
counsel, to consent to the test. Defendant had been arrested at a
hospital while receiving treatment for injuries suffered in an acci-
dent involving the automobile that he had apparently been driv-

a

ing. At the direction of a police officer a blood sample was then
withdrawn from defendant's body by a physician at the hospital.
It would make this already too long dissent, even longer to
analyze Schmerber, and it had vigorous dissents. However, the
Court allowed the analysis of the blood sample, even under such
circumstances, admitted in evidence. It simply held that defend-
ant’s rights under the Constitution had not been violated. For in-
stance, it held that his claim of privilege under the Fifth Amend-
ment was not violated. It held that the privilege protects an ac-
eused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or
otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use
of the analysis in question did not involve compulsion to these
ends.

Quoting further from Schmerber:
“(T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort com-
munications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material. The objection in prin-
ciple would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and com-
pare his features with a photograph in proof.’ [Holt v.
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021] 218
US., at 252-258, 31 S.Ct., at 6, 54 L.Ed., at 1025.

It is clear that the protection of the privilege
reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form
they might take, and the compulsion of responses which
are also communications, for example, compliance witha
subpoena to produce one’s papers. Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746. On the
other hand, both federal and state courts have usually
held that it offers no protection against compulsion to
submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or
measurements, to write or speak for identification, to
appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or
to make a particular gesture. The distinction which has
emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the

216 Ro

privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’
or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a
suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical
evidence’ does not violate it.”

SDCL 82-23-11 provides:

“If any person described in § 32-23-10, after request
and explanation as therein provided, shall refuse to sub-
mit to such chemical analysis, then such test shall not be
given. In such event, the department of public safety
shall revoke for one year his license to drive and any
nonresident operating privilege * * *.”

There is no language in this section which would make the
chemical analysis in our case not permissible evidence in the
criminal action. The officer told him he was going to take him to
Deadwood for a breathalyzer test. What the officer failed to tell
him, and what defendant contends, is he wasn’t advised of his
right to refuse the breathalyzer test, and the consequences of
such refusal. The consequences as I see it are contained in SDCL
32-23-10 and 32-23-11 and that has to do with the revocation of the
person’s driving license, and not to any privilege to drive while he
is drunk on the public highways of the State.

I believe that by the operation of a vehicle the defendant
should be deemed to have given his consent subject, of course, to
his right to refuse and have his right or privilege to drive taken
from him. This must be especially so where we violate no con-
stitutional right of his.

In summary I would hold that the breathalyzer results are
admissible evidence in the DWI trial. The arrest was lawful and
the implied consent law is sufficient to justify the test, with or
without defendant’s consent. This is consistent with Schmerber
at the federal level and with Spry in our state. It is also consistent
with Holland. :

I would not create a new exclusionary rule of law under the
facts of this case. LO

pe 27

It is not true that the last paragraph of SDCL 32-23-10 places
a restriction on the authority of law enforcement officers to give
a breathalyzer test on those lawfully arrested for a violation of
SDCL 82-23-1, nor is there any constitutional provision to the con-
trary. It can only be said, on the contrary, that the last paragraph
of SDCL 82-23-10 only places a restriction upon the authorities
whereby they cannot use Defendant’s refusal, or his lack of being
informed of his right of refusal and the results of such refusal if
he makes one, to take a test as evidence sufficient to trigger the
one year license suspension.

KRUGER et al., Respondents v. KRUGER, Appellant
(240 N.W.2d 93)

(File No. 11575. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

|
Duane Thurow, Aberdeen, for plaintiffs and respondents.
Rory King, Aberdeen, for defendant and appellant.

DOYLE, Justice.

This action is for the partition or sale of real property under
the provisions of SDCL 21-45. The parties hereto are the children
and heirs of Henry A. Kruger, who died intestate, leaving per-
sonal property and a 640-acre farm, which farm is the subject of
this controversy. The decedent's estate was probated and the
real property in question distributed in equal shares to the
parties by final decree. Plaintiffs, in their complaint and petition,
contend that partition must be by sale in that a partition in kind
cannot be made without great prejudice to the various heirs and
owners of the real property. The defendant, by answer and
counterclaim, contends that he had spent the majority of his adult
life in the operation of the farm, and during this period he made
contributions in money and time for the purchase and improve-
ment thereof, and seeks compensation for such improvements.

Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, basing the motion
on the affidavit of Duane Thurow, plaintiffs’ attorney, who stated
that he had personal knowledge of the facts and “it would be im-
practical to actually partition said property and partition of said
property can not be made without great prejudice to the owners
and therefore plaintiffs are entitled as a matter of right that said
premises be sold * * *.”

Furthermore, the. defendant as the administrator of the
Henry A. Kruger estate filed an amended final account contain-
ing paragraph VIII, which states:

“That your administrator has paid all claims, debts,

es 219

expenses of last sickness, funeral bills, taxes (except in-
heritance taxes which were paid by the individual heirs)
and costs of administration (except attorney’s fees
which will be paid out of the proceeds of the land when it
is sold after distribution) out of his own personal funds,
but in consideration of the distribution hereinafter set
forth, which has been agreed to by all the heirs, he
makes no claim therefor and waives any claim he might
have against the estate therefor,”

and a final decree of distribution in the estate, contending that
even if defendant made improvements upon or contributions
toward the purchase of said real property, any claim is barred by
reason of the foregoing quoted paragraph; furthermore, any such
entitlement would, at the most, constitute a claim against the
estate, and the time within which any claim could be made has
now expired. The plaintiffs further contended that even if such
claims had validity, payment could be made therefor under the
provisions of SDCL 21-45-50.

The defendant, in resistance to plaintiffs’ motion for sum-
mary judgment by affidavit, contended that he made permanent
improvements upon the property of a substantial nature, which
enhanced the value thereof, and he also contends that he is en-
titled to reimbursement for such improvements or a determina-
tion of the value thereof prior to a sale of the premises involved in
this action in order that he be given credit therefor under SDCL
21-45-34 if the defendant becomes a purchaser.

The motion for summary judgment was brought on for hear-
ing before the court on October 9, 1974, and, at such hearing, the
court made the following comments to the record:

“COURT: There isn’t any question in my mind, Mr.
King, that Mr. Thurow is entitled to a partition for sale
of the land. There’s a question whether your client has a
claim that can be decided—you can’t go back of a final
decree, and I have simply decided that a summary judg-
ment is a proper procedure for partition for sale of the
land. I am not deciding whether or not your client is en-

220 po

titled to his improvements, Mr. King. Right now, I am
not so sure that he is. I will not determine that at this
time. We’ll have to determine that after the money has
been paid into court. Then we can determine that by fur-
ther testimony. Mr. Thurow, you can prepare the
order.”

Whereupon the court entered judgment ordering a sale of the
premises pursuant to SDCL 21-45, making no determination in
such judgment as to the merits of defendant's counterclaim.

Thereafter, on October 16, 1974, the court entered a sup-
plemental judgment dismissing the defendant's counterclaim in
all respects on the grounds that the defendant’s claim was barred
by the final decree in the Henry A. Kruger estate and paragraph
VIII of the final account.

Hf SDCL 15-6-56 is the statutory provision for summary
judgment in this jurisdiction. Summary judgment presupposes
there is no genuine contested issue of fact. Wilson v. Great North-
ern Railway Company, 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19. In our view,
the record reflects that the trial court entered summary judg-
ment on the theory that the defendant would have the opportu-
nity to litigate the issues raised in the answer and counterclaim
after sale. This ignores the provision of SDCL 21-45-34, granting a
cotenant purchaser credit for his purchase in relation to his in-
terest in the property sold (it is undisputed that the defendant in-
tends to attempt a purchase of the premises), thus the defendant
is entitled to a determination of the value of improvements, if
any, to the premises prior to the partition sale. The defendant
does not claim that it will not ultimately be necessary to sell the
premises to effect a fair distribution of the property.

HMM The guiding principles on the use of summary judgment
are well stated in Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Company,
supra. In the record before us it is apparent that the estate of the
deceased was settled and closed by stipulation and agreement (in
paragraph VIII of the final account the attorney fees were to be
paid when the real property was sold); we surmise the sale was
then contemplated to be consummated by agreement, thus the

SS —

equities would or could be adjusted at the time of sale. Under cer-
tain conditions a cotenant is entitled to be compensated for im-
provements made to real property, Iverson v. Iverson, 1973, 87
S.D. 628, 213 N.W.2d 708. We are of the opinion that there exist,
in this case, issues of material fact that should be resolved by a
trial. The defendant is entitled under SDCL 21-45-34, under the
circumstances of this case, to have his claim resolved prior to sale
of the premises.

Reversed.
PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion was prepared by Justice James M.
Doyle before his death. It is adopted by the undersigned as the
opinion of this court. See State v. Sioux Falls Brewing Co., 1894, 5
S.D. 360, 58 N.W. 928 (on rehearing).

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ. concur.
COLER, J., dissents.

COLER, Justice (dissenting).

I would affirm the trial court.

The claim of the appellant, if any, exists in equity, not on the
basis of SDCL 21-45-34 and 21-45-50. There is no claim made that
appellant was a cotenant with his ancestors, and his claimed im-
provements preceded any interest he acquired in common with
the respondents.

This court has long recognized the concept of equitable liens
quite apart from SDCL 21-45-34, see Savings Bank v. Mundt,
1924, 47 S.D. 161, 197 N.W. 156, and that an equitable claim is not
barred by failing to file a claim pursuant to SDCL 30-21-7 and
30-21-8. Kline v. Gingery, 1910, 25 S.D. 16, 124 N.W. 958. However,
the claim of the appellant is one which is barred by laches in fail-
ing to pursue the claim during the lifetime of the ancestors. The
trial court, in equity, properly entered a summary judgment.

222

“The principle thus used as a practical rule controlling and
restricting the award of reliefs is designed to promote diligence
on the part of suitors, to discourage laches by making it a bar to
relief, and to prevent the enforcement of stale demands of all
kinds, wholly independent of any statutory periods: of.
limitations.” Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, 5th Ed.,
§ 418.

BASIN ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, Appellant v.
GOSCH, et al., Respondents

(240 N.W.2d 96)

(File No. 11566. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

22:

ic)

John F, Murphy, of Donley & Murphy, Elk Point, for plaintiff
and appellant.

Kennith L. Gosch, of Bantz & Gosch, Aberdeen, for defend-
ants and respondents.

;

224
CHEEVER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the trial court granting a
new trial to defendant landowners. The plaintiff herein contends
that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the order for
a new trial. We affirm the trial court.

Basin Electric Power Cooperative, a corporation, plaintiff
and appellant, commenced this proceeding to condemn under its
power of eminent domain certain lands belonging to defendants
for the purpose of imposing a transmission line easement along
the eastern edge of the West One-Half (W ‘2) of Sections Twelve
(12) and Thirteen (13) in Township 123, Range 78, Walworth Coun-
ty, South Dakota. Plaintiff sought no title to the land involved but
only an easement across the same for the purpose of erecting and
maintaining a power transmission line. The title was to remain in
the landowners who were to have such use and enjoyment of the
same which was not inconsistent with the use to be made by
plaintiff.

At the time of the trial, the transmission line had not been
constructed. One of plaintiff's witnesses, an engineer employed
by Basin Electric, testified that the plans for the transmission
line showed that the towers were to be located along the eastern-
most edge of defendants’ property; that the east legs of the
towers would be from two to eight feet from defendants’ fence
line; that the transmission line would overhang the fence. Nine of
the towers would be situated on tillable land and two on non-
tillable pasture land. He further testified that the towers would
vary in height from 721 to 97'/ feet with a minimum clearance of
the wires above ground of 32 feet.

Defendant Frank Gosch, Jr. testified that in his opinion the
damages resulting from the imposition of the easement on the
land would amount to $19,600. A neighboring farmer testified
that in his opinion the damages resulting to defendants’ farm
would amount to $14,700 and another of defendants’ witnesses, a
real estate agent and auctioneer from Mobridge, testified that in
his opinion the damages would be in the sum of $14,064.65.

Ss

Plaintiff called two valuation witnesses. One, a full-time real
estate appraiser, who testified that in his opinion the damages to
defendants’ property as the result of the taking of the easement
would amount to $2,365. The second valuation witness on behalf
of plaintiff was a farmer-rancher and part-time appraiser who
testified that in his opinion, using the market-value approach, the
damages to defendants’ property would amount to $2,135 and
that using the income approach the damages would amount to
$2,280.

The jury awarded defendants $3,000 for the taking of the
land involved in the easement.

Subsequent to the entry of judgment, defendants’ trial at-
torney withdrew from the case and the present attorneys for the
defendants filed a motion for new trial. Such motion was sup-
ported by several affidavits and supplemental affidavits. The mo-
tion was resisted by plaintiff and the matter came on for hearing
before the trial court. Prior to the time of filing the application
for new trial, construction had commenced on the transmission
line and the steel towers were in place across defendants’ prop-
erty.

The court granted defendants’ motion for a new trial on two
grounds which are briefly summarized as follows: (1) The award
of damages in the sum of $3,000 was inadequate and was given
under the influence of passion or prejudice and was not justified
by the evidence produced at the trial; the low verdict did not
represent even a mere token of the true value of the property
taken, and (2) The discovery of new evidence by defendants which
was material to them and which could not with reasonable
diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial, said
evidence consisting of the following: (a) The height of the towers
placed on defendants’ property was greater than that testified to
by plaintiff's witness at the time of trial, (b) The location of the
towers from the east fence line was different from that testified
to by plaintiff's witness at the time of trial, (c) The actual location
of the east boundary line of defendants was east of the fence line
and contained 1.41 acres more than was brought out at trial, (d)
The actual acres taken by plaintiff were 1.8 acres more than

226 ee

claimed by the plaintiff; and (e) The actual length of the easement
taken across the land of defendants was 253.02 feet more than
shown by plaintiff at the time of trial.

Plaintiff has assigned as error six separate items. Three of
the assignments of error allege in substance that the jury verdict
was based on the only substantial and competent evidence
presented at the trial as to value, and that there is no evidence
that the jury award was inadequate and given under the in-
fluence of passion or prejudice. The other three assignments of
error pertain to the newly discovered evidence asserted by
defendants and allege that there was no clear showing of
reasonable diligence on the part of defendants to discover and
produce such evidence at the time of trial or that such evidence
was material and would have changed the result of the trial.

The authority of the trial court to grant a new trial is limited
by the provisions of SDCL 15-6-59(a). The application for and the
order granting the new trial were based on subdivisions (4), (5)
and (6) of such section.

[i It has been fundamental law in South Dakota for many
years that a motion for a new-trial upon a question of fact is ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that the
granting or the refusing of such new trial will not be disturbed by
the appellate tribunal unless it appears affirmatively from the
record that there has been an abuse of such discretion. This court
has also held that the same rules apply in condemnation pro-
ceedings as in other cases. State Highway Commission v. Madsen,
1963, 80 S.D. 120, 119 N.W.2d 924.

[It is also fundamental law in this state that a stronger
case must be made to justify the appellate court in disturbing a
finding of the trial court granting a new trial than if the trial
court had refused a new trial. The position relative to the grant-
ing of new trials is set forth in the decision of Gould v. Mans, 1967,
82 S.D. 574, 152 N.W.2d 92, and affirmed most recently in Mueller
v. Mueller, 1974, 88 S.D. 446, 221 N.W.2d 39.

The question thus presented is simply whether or not the

ee

record reflects that the trial court did, in fact, abuse its discretion
in granting the new trial.

Hi The record must be examined viewing it most favorably
to the conclusion of the trial court. Ford v. Policky, 1965, 81 S.D.
361, 135 N.W.2d 473, citing Jensen v. Miller, 1963, 80 S.D. 384, 124
N.W.2d 394; Gamble v. Keyes, 1917, 39 S.D. 592, 166 N.W. 134.

[Examining the record pertaining to the granting of a new
trial in that the verdict was inadequate and was given under the
influence of passion or prejudice and not justified by the evidence
produced at the trial, the record reflects, as previously indicated,
that there was a wide variation between the testimony of the
landowners’ witnesses and the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses
as to the damages involved. This is not at all unusual in a condem-
nation action. While plaintiff has asserted in its brief and in the
assignments of error that the testimony of its witnesses was the
only competent testimony which the court should consider, the
fact remains that the trial judge was a participant in the trial. He
was an able and experienced trial judge and was in better posi-
tion to judge the weight and credit to be given to the testimony of
the witnesses than is this court in viewing the cold record of the
transcript. It is true that the verdict was within the range of the
testimony offered by the various witnesses. It was only slightly
above the testimony given by plaintiff's witnesses and less than
25 percent of the lowest of the defendants’ witnesses. In granting
the order for a new trial, the court made a determination that the
award of the jury was inadequate; that it was given under the in-
fluence of passion or prejudice and was not justified by the
evidence produced at the trial. The court is clothed with a
latitude of discretion in passing on such a motion and this court
will not disturb its decision except for clear abuse. The record in
this case does not demonstrate that there was a clear abuse of
this discretion.

We now turn to the second ground upon which the court
granted a new trial, that is, newly discovered evidence which
could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and
produced at the trial. Applications for new trial based solely on
the grounds of newly discovered evidence are frowned upon by

228

the courts. Piper v. Barber Transportation, 1961, 79 S.D. 353, 112
N.W.2d 329; Gaines v. White, 1891, 1 S.D. 484, 47 N.W. 524. In
order to grant such a motion based solely on this ground, the ap-
plicant must demonstrate first that it is newly discovered
evidence and secondly that it could not, by reasonable diligence,
have been determined and produced at the trial and that it would
be believed by the jury and would produce a different result. In
this case, it must be remembered that at the time of trial, the
steel towers had not been erected across defendants’ land. Two of
the grounds urged as newly discovered evidence claim that there
is a variation in the actual location and height of the towers as
constructed from what the location and height of the towers
would be according to the testimony of plaintiff's engineering
witness who was apparently testifying from the plans and blue-
prints of the line. Whether these two items would have affected
the award of the jury or not would be purely speculative, but cer-
tainly they are items to be considered in measuring damages and
could not possibly have been discovered until such time as the
towers had been erected. The other three items of claimed newly
discovered evidence are such as could only have been discovered
by having an actual survey made of the right-of-way easement. At
the time of trial, plaintiff and defendants relied upon a survey
made by plaintiff and introduced and received as Exhibit No. 4.
After the trial, for some reason, defendants apparently doubted
some of the measurements and figures contained in plaintiff's
survey and had an independent survey made prior to the motion
for new trial. This independent survey and the surveyor’s af-
fidavit was incorporated in and made a part of the motion. This
survey shows a discrepancy both as to the number of acres in-
volved and the length of the area over which the easement would
traverse. These items certainly could well have affected the deci-
sion of the jury. It does not clearly appear from the record that
the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial based
upon the secondary grounds of newly discovered evidence.

The order of the trial court is affirmed.
DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur.

CHEEVER, Circuit Judge, sitting for WOLLMAN, J., dis-
qualified.

229
STENBERG, Appellant v. STENBERG, Respondent
(240 N.W.2d 100)

(File No. 11651. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

230 es
Ps

Laird Rasmussen, Dana, Golden, Moore & Rasmussen, Sioux
Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

John E, Burke and Derald W. Wiehl, May, Johnson & Burke,
Sioux Falls, for defendant and respondent.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff husband contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding alimony to the wife in the amount of $1,000
per month, together with the division of property as set out in the
judgment and decree. We affirm.

M. Bennett Stenberg is the plaintiff-appellant and Darlene
Stenberg is the defendant-respondent. The parties were married
on December 10, 1950. Neither party had much in the way of prop-
erty at the time of the marriage nor had either party received
any substantial gifts or inheritances during the marriage. For ap-
proximately nine years after the marriage the parties engaged in
farming on various rented farms in southeast South Dakota. They
then moved to Sioux Falls where plaintiff began working for a
livestock commission firm. In 1964, plaintiff became part owner of
a commission firm in Sioux Falls. The family moved to Louisville,
Kentucky, in 1969 when plaintiff became the manager of a stock-
yards. Plaintiff bought Adams-Dougherty, a livestock commission
firm, in 1972 and the family moved back to Sioux Falls. Plaintiff
subsequently sold one-fourth of the firm and at the time of trial
owned three-fourths of Adams-Dougherty.

The parties have four children. The eldest child is married
and the second child attends college. The two minor children live
at home with the defendant.

On October 28, 1973, plaintiff informed defendant that he
wanted a divorce. He moved out of the family home on December

a

12, 1973. On April 1, 1974, plaintiff moved to Cincinnati, Ohio, and
at the time of trial was working there as the general manager of a
stockyards at a salary of $25,000 per year.

Plaintiff served his summons and complaint on December 14,
1973, and on February 26, 1974, defendant served an amended
answer and a counterclaim for divorce. The case was tried on July
81, and August 2, 1974. In its decision of November 12, 1974, the
court granted defendant a divorce on her counterclaim on
grounds of mental cruelty. She received custody of the two minor
children, alimony of $1,000 per month and child support of $100
per month for each of the two minor children. She also was award-
ed attorney fees in the amount of $1,800. The court divided the
real and personal property of the parties and gave defendant the
family home subject to an existing mortgage, the household
goods and furnishings, an automobile, a two-fifths interest in
some farm property in Miner County, and a two-fifths interest in
some Moody County farm property. Plaintiff was awarded the re-
maining three-fifths interest in the farm property, a recreational
boat and the three-fourths interest in Adams-Dougherty.

Counsel for defendant submitted findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law which were adopted by the trial court. Counsel for
plaintiff submitted findings and conclusions which were refused.
Plaintiff also submitted objections to defendant’s findings and
conclusions. On December 4, 1974, the court entered its judgment
and decree of divorce, and on December 9, 1974, it entered an
amended judgment and decree.

Plaintiff concedes that the court has the power to award
alimony to defendant and divide the property of the parties pur-
suant to SDCL 25-4-41 and 25-4-44, respectively. However, plain-
tiff contends that the court abused its discretion in awarding
defendant alimony of $1,000 per month in addition to the division
of the property.

Hf It is well settled that this court will not modify or set
aside an award of alimony or a division of property unless it clear-
ly appears that the trial court abused its discretion. Tyler v.
Tyler, 1975,.89 S.D. 462, 233 N.W.2d 804; Pochop v. Pochop, 1975,

232 peel

89 S.D. 466, 233 N.W.2d 806; Kressly v. Kressly, 1958, 77 S.D. 143,
87 N.W.2d 601. Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in the instant case. In his brief he assigns values to the
various assets which were divided between the parties. By his
valuations, the defendant was awarded alimony plus slightly
more than 50% of the parties’ real and personal property.

From both the briefs and the oral argument, it is obvious
that the real issue in this case is the valuation of plaintiff's three-
quarters interest in Adams-Dougherty. In arguing that the
defendant received over 50% of the property, plaintiff assigns a
value of $32,250 to his interest in the commission firm. This is
based upon the original purchase price in 1972.

Defendant maintains that the value of Adams-Dougherty is
much higher. She points to the evidence which indicates that
plaintiff's profit from the business in 1973 was $31,153.14 and
$40,112.05 for the first seven months of 1974. She also points to
the fact that the commission company made the 1974 profit while
plaintiff was in Cincinnati earning $25,000 as a stockyards
manager. According to her brief, the business is worth between
$124,612 and $206,256.

This court does not sit as a trier of fact, and thus we will
not attempt to place a valuation on any of the assets involved in
the property settlement. Rather, our review is limited to whether
the trial court divided the assets in an equitable manner. In
Kressly v. Kressly, supra, we set down the principal factors to be
considered by the court in dividing the property of the parties.

“The duration of the marriage, the value of the property
of each, their ages, their health and competency to earn,
the contribution of each to the accumulation of the prop-
erty and the faults and circumstances leading up to the
divorce. Tuttle v. Tuttle, 26 S.D. 545, 128 N.W. 695;
Caldwell v. Caldwell, 58 S.D. 472, 237 N.W. 568; Peter-
son v. Peterson, 71 S.D. 314, 24 N.W.2d 35.” 77 S.D. at
148, 87 N.W.2d at 603-604.

In addition to these factors, we feel that the income-producing

233

capacity of the assets of the parties can be considered by the
lower court. See Fischer v. Fischer, 1966, N.D., 139 N.W.2d 845.
Instead of the present award of alimony and division of property,
it may have seemed more equitable to the plaintiff for the court
to have awarded a flat two-fifths interest in all of the property to
the defendant including the equity in the home and plaintiff's in-
terest in Adams-Dougherty; however, under such an award, the
defendant would receive more in terms of income, and the plain-
tiff would also have the administrative problem of dealing with
another partner—perhaps a hostile one—in his business.

Hl We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
considering the income-producing capacity of the assets, as well
as other factors listed above, in dividing the property and award-
ing alimony. The judgment and decree of the circuit court is af-
firmed.

WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER, Justices, concur.
NEBRASKA ELECTRIC GENERATION & TRANSMISSION
COOP., INC., Appellant v. CADY et ux, Respondents
(241 N.W.2d 139)

(File No. 11519. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

ed
a

235

J. W. Grieves, Winner, for plaintiff and appellant.

Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, Gregory, for defendants and
respondents.

COLER, Justice.

Nebraska Electric Generation & Transmission Cooperative,
Inc., hereinafter referred to as appellant, brought this action
against George Cady and Dena Cady, husband and wife, as
owners of certain land for condemnation of a 100 ft. wide ease-
ment running diagonally across portions of three quarters of land
owned by them and, particularly, the Southwest Quarter of Sec-
tion 3, the Northeast Quarter of Section 10 and the Northwest
Quarter of Section 11, all in Township 35 North, Range 29, West
of the 6th P.M., Todd County, South Dakota.

This case was the second of a series of cases brought before
this court and the nature of the easement was the same as that
taken and referred to in Nebraska, Electric Generation &
Transmission Cooperative, Inc. v. Tinant, 1976, 90 S.D. 284, 241
N.W.2d 184. The easement in this case involves a taking of 17.52
acres and there would be placed on that right-of-way nine 2-pole
structures and one 3-pole structure. The jury awarded damages

236

of $30,000 for that acreage taken and for consequential damages
to the remainder of the land under the unit rule. The ranch unit
consisted of 1200 acres which was owned by respondents, in-
cluding land contiguous to that hereinbefore described, as well as
an 80-acre tract, being the West Half of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 35, Township 36 North, Range 29, West, Todd County,
South Dakota. The jury verdict was given under an instruction
which had as its basis South Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions
(Civil) 141.05 covering “severance” damages. Nebraska Electric
has appealed. We affirm.

Appellant moved for a new trial pursuant to subsections
(5), (6) and (7) RCP Rule 59(a) (SDCL 15-6-59(a)). To the extent that
appellant attempted to use RCP Rule 59(a)(7), it failed in the mo-
tion for new trial to state with particularity wherein evidence ad-
mitted over timely objection constituted a basis for the granting
of a new trial. Although a motion for new trial is not required to
preserve the right of review for the purposes of either subdivi-
sion (6) or (7) of RCP Rule 59(a), yet if the motion for new trial is
made, the requirements of the statement of particulars must be
met in the motion to the trial court. RCP Rule 59(f) (SDCL
15-6-59(f)); SDCL 15-26-20; Lang v. Burns, 1959, 77 S.D. 626, 97
N.W.2d 863; Fales v. Kaupp, 1968, 83 S.D. 487, 161 N.W.2d 855.

. Appellant’s other assignments of error deal with (1) the giv-
ing of an instruction on severance damages which this court has
dealt with in Nebraska Electric v. Tinant, supra, and (2) excessive
damages appearing to have been given under the influence of pas-
sion or prejudice and on the grounds of insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict.

While we stated in Nebraska Electric v. Tinant, supra,
that the term “severance” might not be apropos to “consequen-
tial” damages, appellant proposed no instruction, this case having
been decided by the jury prior to the decision of this court in
Basin Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Cutler, 1974, 88 S.D.
214, 217 N.W.2d 798. Absent such as instruction it became the law
of the case. State Highway Commission v. Fortune, 1958, 77 S.D.
302, 91 N.W.2d 675; SDCL 15-6-51(a). Appellant offered nothing in
the way of evidence to preclude the court from instructing as a

237

matter of law that the entire 1200 acres constituted a unit in its
use and did not controvert the evidence that a test well on the
Southwest Quarter of Section 3, a quarter section which had been
used for growing of crops for feeding respondents’ livestock,
would produce sufficient quantities of quality water for irrigation
and that the land was not only irrigable but necessary for the
maintenance of the unit in the cow-calf and hog operation of
respondents. As in Nebraska Electric v. Tinant, supra, there was
both expert and lay testimony as to the irrigability of the land, its
necessity in the use by the ranch unit and the pros and cons in the
variety of irrigation systems’ initial and operational costs upon
which the jury could have found both unity of use* and conse-
quential damages to the remainder.

HAs to the issue of passion and prejudice we find appellant
has failed in its burden of proof to establish either corruption,
passion or prejudice as the verdict is not so excessive as to war-
rant the inference. State Highway Commission v. Bloom, 1958, 77
S.D. 452, 93 N.W.2d 572. As to the sufficiency of evidence to sus-
tain a verdict, to the extent that those questions were brought
before the trial court in the motion for new trial, appellant,
without particularity, claimed that:

“the great weight of testimony was to the effect that
this property could still be irrigated after the transmis-
sion line was constructed and that production from the
land because of irrigation would be just as great after
construction of the line as prior to the construction of
the line and that this could not possibly result in the
market value damage arrived at by the jury.”

“In this regard, we may examine the record to determine only
whether there is any competent and substantial evidence to sup-
port the verdict. In doing so we are obligated to resolve all con-
flicts in the evidence, and to draw all reasonable inferences aris-
ing therefrom, favorable to the prevailing party.” Bentz v. Cimar-
ron Insurance Co., 1962, 79.S.D. 510, 114 N.W.2d 96; SDCL
15-26-19 and annotations thereunder.

* See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions Civil 2d Ed., 300.18, 300.21, 300.32.

238

[i Separately stated but inseparable from consideration of.
sufficiency of the evidence is appellant's claimed error in the ad-
mission of certain testimony dealing with the planned use of the
Southwest Quarter of Section 3 and the placement of the
transmission line so as to negate the possible use of the center
pivot irrigation system. Whether other systems testified to by
appellant's witnesses were feasible or not, and if not, that the
planned use of the quarter section of land for irrigation to reduce
the cost of feed grain and forage otherwise purchased for the live-
stock operation thus damaged the entire unit were proper ques-
tions for the jury under the instructions given. As this court
stated in State Highway Commission v. Hayes Estate, 1966, 82
S.D. 27, 140 N.W.2d 680:

“Great latitude is allowed in the reception of
evidence to prove the value of property in condemnation
cases, and generally any relevant and material evidence,
if competent under general rules of evidence, is admissi-
ble to prove market value. (citations omitted) No com-
petent evidence should be excluded which an ordinarily
prudent man would take into account before forming a
judgment as to the market value of property which he is
about to purchase. If the proffered evidence tends to aid
the trier of fact in arriving at a conclusion on the issue of
value and damage, it should be received.”

Hl We cannot, having reviewed the entire record, find that
the verdict is unsupported by competent and substantial
evidence.

Judgment is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., coneur.

NEBRASKA ELECTRIC GENERATION & TRANSMISSION
COOP., INC., Appellant v. MARKUS et ux, Respondents

(241 N.W.2d 142)

(File No. 11529. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

239

on!
xt

J. W. Grieves, Winner, for plaintiff and appellant.

Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, Gregory, for defendants and
respondents.

COLER, Justice.

Nebraska Electric Generation & Transmission Cooperative,
Inc., in this condemnation proceeding, joined Lawrence Markus
and Velma Markus, husband and wife, in its original petition.
Taken by the proceeding was a 100 ft. wide easement for the con-
struction of a transmission line that will diagonally traverse
three quarters of land amounting to an actual taking of 13.31

P| 243

acres for the right-of-way upon which would be placed seven
2-pole structures for a 115 KV transmission line. The jury award-
ed the sum of $35,000 for all damages, including consequential
damages to the remainder, and the condemnor appeals. We af-
firm.

Appellant, by timely objections, in its motion for new trial,
assignments of error and on its brief, has preserved the following
issues for the purposes of this appeal: (1) failure of the trial court
to impanel a new jury to hear this case; (2) misconduct of jurors in
considering evidence of previous cases tried; (3) impropriety of
the instruction on the unit rule; (4) excessive damages appearing
to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice
and on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
verdict, and (5) the failure of the trial court to restrict evidence of
planned use and permitting certain testimony to be admitted
without adequate foundation.

This case is the third of four condemnation cases tried in
Tripp County involving condemnation of Todd County land by the
appellant. See Nebraska Electric Generation & Transmission
Cooperative, Inc. v. Tinant, file No. 11500, 1976, 90 S.D. 284, 241
N.W.2d 184, Nebraska Electric Generation & Transmission
Cooperative, Inc. v. Cady, 1976, 90 S.D. 238, 241 N.W.2d 189, and
Nebraska Electric Generation & Transmission Cooperative, Inc.
v. Walkling, file No. 11528, 1976, 90 S.D. 258, 241 N.W.2d 150.
Prior to the commencement of the trial on April 22, 1974, by
letter dated April 11, 1974, counsel for the appellant requested
the impaneling of eighteen new jurors pursuant to SDCL
21-35-12. Appellant further requested that, in the event of denial
of a new panel under SDCL 21-35-12, the trial court consider its
motion to challenge the panel called for the regular term of court
since the jurors from that panel who had served in the two
previous trials necessarily had “pre-conceived notions and at-
titudes about any subsequent case” and, further that the present
jury panel did not conform to SDCL 16-13-1, 16-13-10, and
16-13-10.1. The trial court deferred hearing of and ruling on the
motions of the appellant until after the jury was sworn and
evidence had been introduced. At the noon recess of the first day
of trial the trial court denied the motion made pursuant to SDCL

244 Pe

21-35-12 on the basis that the regular term of court for Tripp
County was still in session, therefore no special term was re-
quired. The court further denied appellant’s challenge to the jury
panel on the ground that no Todd County residents were included
on the panel pursuant to SDCL 16-13-1, 16-13-10, and 16-13-10.1.!

HE The procedure for challenge to a jury panel in civil cases
is governed by statutes relating to criminal proceedings. SDCL
15-14-4. As it relates to this case, a challenge to the panel can only
be grounded on material departures from the forms prescribed
by law, SDCL 23-48-11, and the challenge must specify “plainly
and distinctly the facts constituting the ground of challenge.”
SDCL 23-43-12. We hold that the challenge was not properly
grounded. Had the appellant claimed that a special term of court
for the unorganized county of Todd was required by SDCL
16-5-19,? under the then existing provisions of SDCL 16-5-11, in

1. Inan affidavit filed on July 26, 1974, the Tripp County clerk of courts stated in
part: “That in securing the jury panel for the jury that heard the Markus case
there was an intentional omission of any residents of Todd County, South
Dakota, in the compilation of the jury panel.” We presume that the trial court
was not unmindful ofthe procedure used to impanel a jury for Tripp County by
reason of the statement of the trial judge in denying the motion “for the reason
that Todd County has been attached to Tripp County for the purpose of Court
activity and for the further reason that the Court does not have jurisdiction
over the majority of the residents of Todd County and could not therefore com-
pel them to serve as jurors.”

2. Contrary to appellant's position as ruled upon by the trial court, jurisdiction,
as well as venue, is fixed by law and not by court rule designating terms of court
or by statutes relating to jury selection. Proceedings in condemnation must be
brought in the county in’ which the property taken or damaged is situated.
SDCL. 21-35-1, The land taken or damaged in this case was all situated in Todd
County which, though unorganized, is a separate entity the boundaries of which
may not be changed without a vote ofthe people. S.D.Const. Art.IX,§ 1, SDCL
T-2-1, 1-2-6, T-AT-L, T-17-2.

Neither the caption of the pleadings required by SDCL 15154 to state the
name of both the unorganized county and the organized county to which it is at-
tached, nor the fixing of the regular term of court of the organized county of
Tripp, Supreme Court Rule 7-1, §6 (SDCL 10.54) as amended by Rule 76.2,

hould be considered as repealing by implication the intent expressed by the
legislature in SDCL 16-5-21 that qualified electors of an unorganized county
shall be selected for the infrequent trials required for eauses of action properly
venued therein, though triable in the administrative county pursuant to SDCL
165.22. We do not read the language of SDCL 16-13-10.1 wherein it makes
references to jury selection from “a fair cross-section of the community in the
municipality, district or county where the court convenes”, enacted as it was
prior to judicial reorganization, as controlling venue or abolishing county lines,
which a statute cannot do. We conclude that it would not be proper to inelude
residents of the unorganized eounty of Todd in a jury panel for the organized
county of Tripp any more than itis proper for Tripp County jurors to hear and
determine actions properly triable in Todd County.

pe ae

adequate time for the respondents to have applied for a change of
venue pursuant to SDCL 15-5-11, we might be persuaded that
error occurred. However, that ground was not alleged and we are
not persuaded that the appellant has met its burden of proof that
prejudice resulted, State v. Smith, 1930, 57 S.D. 292, 232 N.W. 26,
nor that the irregularity, if such can be claimed on this record,
deprived appellant of a substantial right. SDCL 16-13-31.

[i In denying appellant’s motion to impanel a new jury
because most members of the panel had served in the two
previous cases tried, the trial court quite properly stated that it
would “excuse any jurors demonstrating implied bias for or
against any of the parties”. The transcript contains none of the
voir dire examination and there is no claim made that the jurors
selected evidenced any bias or prejudice. Appellant filed an af-
fidavit of a juror to the effect that she and other members of the
jury considered the similarity of the evidence and the verdicts in
the two previous cases tried and made comparisons in arriving at
a verdict in this case.

Hl We hold that the affidavit was inadmissible for the pur-
pose offered. It is the “settled law in this state that the testimony
of jurors is inadmissible in support of a motion to set aside a ver-
dict on the ground of mistake, irregularity, or misconduct of the
jury, or some one or more of them, except in the cases expressly
authorized by the legislature.” Edward Thompson Co. v. Gunder-
son, 1897, 10 S.D. 42, 71 N.W. 764; Kredit v. Ryan, 1942, 68 S.D.
274, 1 N.W.2d 818. As stated by this court in Kredit v. Ryan,
supra, :

“Our legislature has not, up to the present moment, ex-
pressly authorized the receiving of jurors’ affidavits by
courts except SDC 33.1605(2) (now SDCL 15-6-59(a)(2)),
and as there is nothing in the facts in the case before us
that could possibly be construed to be governed by sub-
division 2, we must adhere to our former holdings in an
unbroken line of authorities that affidavits of jurors
may not be used to impeach and overthrow their ver-
dicts. * * * In this State the affidavits of jurymen cannot
be received to impeach or defeat their verdict. The pro-

hibition extends beyond cases of willful misconduct on
the part of jurors, and to every case in which the af-
fidavits are attempted to be used as ground for setting
aside a verdict because of a misunderstanding of its ef-
fect by some or all of the jurors who united in its rendi-
tion. The only exceptions to this rule are those in which
the Legislature has by express enactment authorized
such attack upon the verdict by those who rendered it,
and it is not pretended that the present case is within
any such exception.” Kredit v. Ryan, supra, at 279, 1
N.W.2d at 815.

During the course of the trial it became apparent that there
were some parcels of land involved in-the total ranch unit acreage
of 2059 acres which were owned by Lawrence Markus, individual-
ly, and others which he held in joint tenancy with his wife Velma.
After a thorough review of a 244-page transcript of the trial
which, contrary to SDCL 15-29-5, the court reporter failed to in-
dex, and from examination of the nonindexed exhibits, we find
that Lawrence Markus owned in fee all of Section 4 of Township
36 North, of Range 30, West of the Sixth P.M., consisting of 459.40
acres, the south two quarters of which were affected by the tak-
ing and also the North Half of Section 10, Township 36 North, of
Range 30 West, containing 320 acres, with the Northwest
Quarter thereof being the third quarter affected by the transmis-
sion line. Section 4 of Township 36 North, Range 30 West, is con-
tiguous to the North Half of Section 10 constituting the home
place, and Lawrence Markus had acquired another 160 acres to
the north, being the Southeast Quarter of Section 3 and two non-
contiguous 160-acre tracts some one-and-a-half and three miles
distant, being the Northeast Quarter of Section 25 and the South-
west Quarter of Section 13, both in Township 37 North, of Range
30 West. Lawrence and Velma Markus owned in joint tenancy a
full quarter of contiguous land described as the Northwest
Quarter of Section 11, Township 36 North, Range 30 West. They
also had acquired a joint interest under contract for deed, which
was not of record, in the East Half of Section 36, Township 37
North, of Range 30 West, the Northeast Quarter and the South-
west Quarter of Section 31, Township 37 North, of Range 29
West. State Highway Commission v. Miller, 1968, 83 S.D. 124, 155

ee 241

N.W.2d 780. Appellant has not challenged the claimed owner-
ships nor the contiguity of the tracts, apparently on the basis that
the lands were rendered contiguous by lease of Indian lands
which were interspersed with lands of the respondents. These
leases involving some 2588 acres were considered as being ter-
minable and were not claimed as part of the unit.

HM As in Nebraska Electric Generation & Transmission
Cooperative, Inc. v. Cady, and Nebraska Electric Generation &
Transmission Cooperative, Inc. v. Tinant, both supra, the ap-
pellant claims that the rule of this court announced in Basin Elec-
tric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Cutler, 1974, 88 S.D. 214, 217
N.W.2d 798, is controlling and that Instruction #7* was erroneous-
ly given. The evidence in this case so closely parallels the
evidence in both Tinant and Cady as to the irrigation potential
and the need for irrigation as to render it unmeaningful to recite
that evidence. The evidence supported the giving of the instruc-
tion and, no instruction having been offered by the appellant, it
became the law of the case. SDCL 15-6-51(a). Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we
determine appellant’s claims of excessive damages appearing to
be the result of passion or prejudice and the insufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the verdict to be without merit. SDCL
15-26-19 and annotations thereunder.

The more troublesome challenge to the instruction is that ap-
pellant objected thereto “on the grounds there is not unity of
ownership of that number of acres” and cites in its brief portions
of the statement appearing at 27 Am.Jr.2d, Eminent Domain,
§ 320, stating the strict rule as to the requirement of unity of
ownership as follows:

3. | tis established that the land being taken from these defendants by the plain-
tiff isa portion and a part of a larger tract of land belonging to these defendants,
and consisting of 2059 acres more or less.

When, a portion of a tract of land is taken under condemnation proceedings, as
here, just compensation due the landowner is that amount which is equal to the
difference between the fair market value of the entire property immediately
before the taking, and the fair market value of that part remaining immediately
after the taking. In determining the amount of just compensation which you will
award to the landowners in this case, you will consider the value of the property
taken, and also the depreciation in value, if any you shall find, of the part re-
maining after the taking.

248 es

“Tt is the general rule that in order to allow severance
damages where a portion of a parcel or parcels of land
claimed as a single unit is taken in eminent domain,
there must be unity of ownership between the part
taken and the remainder. * * * As a general rule, tracts
held by different titles vested in different persons can-
not be considered as a whole where it is claimed that one
is incidentally injured by the taking of the other for a
public use.” 27 Am.Jur.2d at 148-144.

Respondents on the other hand have commended for our
review 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 140. This court quoted
therefrom in Hurley v. State, 1966, 82 S.D. 156, 143 N.W.2d 722,
as follows:

“There is no single rule or principle established for
determining the unity of lands for the purpose of award-
ing damages in eminent domain cases. While, generally,
there must be unity of title, contiguity of use, and unity
of use, under certain circumstances, the presence of all
these unities is not essential.” Hurley v. State, supra, at
164, 143 N.W.2d at 727.

The respondents would ask this court to adopt a liberal view, as
also expressed in 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 140, to the effect
that “unity of use is given greatest emphasis, and has been called
the controlling and determining factor.” Neither of the parties
has recognized that by virtue of this court’s holding in State
Highway Commission v. Fortune, 1958, 77 S.D. 302, 91 N.W.2d 675
citing 6 A.L.R.2d 1197-1237; City of Menlo Park v. Artino, 151 Cal.
App.2d 261, 311 P.2d 135, 136; and Duggan v. State, 1932, 214
Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98, 99, editorial writers have squarely placed
South Dakota in that category of states adhering to the strict rule
of unity of ownership. See 4A Nichols on The Law of Eminent Do-
main, § 14.31[2], 95 A.L.R.2d 891 n., 896 n.

This court also recognizes that the constitutional provision
of this state, Article VI, §13, has been construed as being
somewhat unique, Searle v. Lead, 1897, 10 S.D. 312, 73 N.W. 101,
39 L.R.A. 345; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Brink, 1903, 16 S.D.

249

644, 94 N.W. 422, though it is less so at the present time, consider-
ing later amendments to our constitution. Further, we observe
that both the constitutional provisions of this state and the re-
quirement of SDCL 21-35-18 that a jury determination of “com-
pensation to be paid for each distinct lot or parcel of land or prop-
erty taken or damaged” is unlike the statutes and rules of those
states upon whose decisions the court relied in State Highway
Commission v. Fortune, supra. See Cal.Const. Art. I, § 14;
Cal.C.Civ.Proc. § 1248, and Iowa Const. Art. I, §18, LC.A.
§ 489.13. :

We have not given emphasis to any one of three elements
necessary for an award of consequential damages in considera-
tion of the purposes to be served by both our constitutional and
statutory provisions and the need to place meaningful restric-
tions on the amount of land that may be stretched beyond reason
by joining parties having no common interest.

The harshness of the rule, if applied strictly in cases where
husband and wife jointly own land which is part of a farm or
ranch unit but itself is not touched by the easement which affects
directly only land owned by one in fee, is shown by the holding of
the Kansas Court in Hogue v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 1973,
212 Kan. 339, 510 P.2d 1308. The Kansas Court, on a factual situa-
tion not unlike that in this case, denied consequential damages to
a 65-acre tract jointly owned by a husband and wife which was a
tract included within the larger tract owned by the husband, and
stated, after relating rule pronounced in Duggan v. State (Iowa),
supra:

“Nor are we oblivious of the charge that strict ap-
plication of the general rule may occasionally result in
what seems to be harsh consequences. Nonetheless, we
prefer to adhere to the general rule, believing it will
avoid many of the perplexities and complications which
are forceable [sic] should we adopt a contrary position.
Mr. and Mrs. Hogue may not have realized all the im-
plications of joint tenancy ownership when they planned
their estate, we assume to their mutual advantage, but
the thread of countervailing factors runs deeply
through the stream of human experience, and expected

250 po

benefits may often be offset, in part at least, by disad-
vantages.” 510 P.2d at 1312.

We do not agree that such harsh consequences should befall a
husband and wife, who, to keep a family farm together and in con-
nection with estate planning, whether or not wisely instructed in
tax or other consequences, choose joint tenancy ownership of a
part but not all of their real estate holdings.

We are impressed with the apparent balance reached by
the Supreme Court of North Dakota which has a constitutional
provision of like origin to our own, North Dakota Constitution Ar-
ticle I, § 14, but whose statute, N.D.C.C. 32-15-22 patterned after
Cal.C.Civ.Proc., § 1248 in part, unlike SDCL 21-35-18, permits the
jury to determine separately the item of consequential damages
contrary to the holding of our court that, by reason of words of
limitation in SDCL 21-35-18, requires a lump sum award. City of
Huron v. Jelgerhuis, 1959, 77 S.D. 600, 97 N.W.2d 314. The North
Dakota Court has recognized that there are circumstances where
the husband and wife, having differing interests in contiguous
lands, may, by direct evidence of contractual relationships or
long-standing practices, show a farm or ranch to be operated by
members of a family in such a manner as to meet all tests of the
unit rule of consequential damages thus making it permissible to
grant an award based upon the unit as a whole. O’Connell v.
Hijelle, 1966, N.D., 143 N.W.2d 251; Sauvageau v. Hjelle, 1973,
N.D., 213 N.W.2d 381. Although this would depart from our quota-
tion with approval from the decision of the Iowa Court, Duggan v.
State, supra, the facts before the court in State Highway Commis-
sion v. Fortune, supra, in which the father and son held the land
not in common or jointly, but in their individual names, should not
control where there is sufficient evidence to show that the unity
of use, coupled with the factors of contiguity of use and unity of
title render varying interest in fee and in equity inseparable for
the purposes of consequential damages.

While reluctant to abrogate entirely the strict rule
adopted in State‘Highway Commission v. Fortune, supra, we hold
that to the extent that husband and wife are owners of property
separately and’ in: joint tenancy, unity of use must be given

251

greater relative weight than unity of ownership under the cir-
cumstances of this case. Though there is nothing in the record
showing present or future right to the land in anyone other than
the respondents, Lawrence Markus and his son John have run the
unit together as a cow-calf operation, running on the average 250
cows and a like number of yearlings. The son, a veteran and mar-
ried, with one child, had been attending courses in irrigation, and
Lawrence, who was 66 years of age, testified as to his intention to
ultimately turn over the farming entirely to John. The utilization
of the various tracts of land for pasturage clearly establishes the
unity of use, though a more complete record could have been
made had appellant earlier challenged the unity of ownership. We
hold that under the circumstances of this case no error occurred
in giving of the instruction on consequential damages.

Appellant has challenged the qualifications of respondents’
witness, Charles Shaykett, who was established to be qualified as
an expert real estate appraiser to give testimony relative to the
market value of irrigable land, as he was not also an expert on ir-
rigation. Both witness Shaykett and appellant’s expert, Robert T.
Carr, had appraised the property and based their valuations on
the market data approach on the full 2059 acres. Neither of these
witnesses had discovered any comparable sales of irrigation land
or established irrigable land with which to compare the Markus
property. Both experts agreed that the highest and best use of
the land was as a diversified cattle ranch and each recognized the
irrigation potential as affecting its continued use as such with
leased lands becoming less available. Although the comparable
sales used by both experts revealed a spread from $88.95 to $114
per acre, the valuation of the unit by them on the basis of irriga-
tion potential was at material variance. Shaykett, over objection,
valued the unit at $150 per acre and Mr. Carr at $180 per acre.
Shaykett estimated the damages at $43,000 while Carr estimated
damages to the same unit at $2800.

HE This court has long recognized that in order for a
witness to give an estimate of damages there must be some basis
shown for his determination thereof. Webster v. White, 1896, 8
S.D. 479, 66 N.W. 1145. The trial court, under the pro-
nouncements of this court in State Highway Commission v.

252 Pe

Bloom, 1958, 77 S.D. 452, 93 N.W.2d 572, and State Highway Com-
mission v. Hayes Estate, 1966, 82 S.D. 27, 140 N.W.2d 680, is given
great latitude in the reception of evidence proving value of prop-
erty in condemnation cases. An expert need not, and indeed can-
not, be an expert in all things.

“Testimony of an expert can be considered though
he did not base his opinion entirely on comparable trans-
actions. The supporting data testified to by the opinion
witness must be relevant and competent although the
use of hearsay, in and of itself, is not sufficient to con-
demn the competency of the opinion, especially where
the witness shows that his own knowledge and ex-
perience require agreement with such hearsay
evidence.” 5 Nichols on The Law of Eminent Domain, 3d
Ed. § 18.421].

Witness Shaykett was thoroughly cross-examined for impeach-
ment purposes and the appellant's witnesses gave ample
evidence to controvert his opinion. We find his opinion was ad-
missible as based upon relevant and competent evidence. As
stated by this court in Gleckler et al. v. Slavens et al., 1894, 5 S.D.
364, 59 N.W. 323:

“It is not required that an expert witness stand at the
head of his class to make his evidence admissible. His
preliminary examination must show such knowledge of
the subject as will enable him to speak with intelligence.
The jury will determine the value of his opinion from the
knowledge’ which he shows himself to possess.’”
Gleckler v. Slavens, 5 S.D. at 384, 59 N.W. at 329. See
also Johnson v. Gilmore, 6 S.D. 276, 60 N.W. 1070, and
Frye v. Ferguson, 6 S.D. 392, 61 N.W. 161.

Appellant also claims that the trial court improperly
allowed John Markus, the son of the respondents, to testify as to
damages to the land. There was no showing that the witness was
either an expert or a landowner such as to render his testimony
of damages of $100,000 admissible. While improperly admitted
and not merely cumulative, Alberts v. Mutual Service Casualty

Pe 258
Insurance Co., 1963, 80 S.D. 303, 123 N.W.2d 96, we hold, on this
record, that the testimony so lacked credibility that it was unlike-
ly that it was given any credence by the jury to the prejudice of
the appellant. Thus a new trial is not warranted. Schoenrock v.
City of Sisseton, 78 S.D. 419, 103 N.W.2d 649.

Judgment ¢ffirmed.

DUNN, C. J. and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

NEBRASKA ELECTRIC GENERATION & TRANSMISSION
COOP., INC., Appellant v. WALKLING et ux, Respondents

(241 N.W.2d 150)

(File No. 11528. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)
Le

254

255

J. W. Grieves, Winner, for plaintiff and appellant.

Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, Gregory, for defendants and
respondents.

COLER, Justice.

Nebraska Electric Generation & Transmission Cooperative,
Ine., commenced this action in condemnation against William
Walkling and Sarah Walkling, husband and wife, for a 100 ft. wide
easement for the construction of a ‘115 KV transmission line. The
line, when constructed, would diagonally cross seven separate
quarters of land owned by William Walkling, amounting to an ac-
tual taking of 28.89 acres of land and there would be placed on the
easement fifteen 2-pole “H” frame tangent structures and one
8-pole angle structure with four associated guides and anchors.
From a verdict and judgment in the sum of $57,000, Nebraska
Electric has appealed. We affirm.

Hi Appellant’s motion for new trial set forth, as one of the
grounds, excessive damages appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice. This point we have

256 PO

previously discussed in Nebraska Electric Generation &
Transmission Cooperative, Inc. v. Tinant, 1976, 90 S.D. 284, 241
N.W.2d 184, and also in Nebraska Electric Generation &
Transmission Cooperative, Inc. v. Cady, 1976, 90 S.D. 233, 241
N.W.2d 139, and Nebraska Electric Generation & Transmission
Cooperative, Inc. v. Markus, 1976, 90 S.D. 238, 241 N.W.2d 142.
The record in this case, as in the cases previously cited, leads us
to conclude, as in the other cases, that appellant has not met its
burden of proof in showing passion or prejudice.

The motion for new trial otherwise questions (1) the admis-
sion of evidence as to the planned use of portions of the property
for irrigation, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence as to the neces-
sity for the utilization of center pivot irrigation systems over
other available systems, and (8) the admission of certain
testimony as lacking foundation.

Considered in the light of the motion presented to the trial
court, our scope of review has been stated most recently in State
Highway Commission v. Miller, 1968, 83 S.D. 124, 155 N.W.2d 780,
as follows:

“The application for a new trial was addressed to
the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its rul-
ing will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of
abuse of that discretion. Jensen v. Miller, 80 S.D. 384,
124 N.W.2d 394. It is reviewed in the same manner and
under the same rules in a condemnation proceeding as in
other cases generally, State Highway Commission v.
Madsen, 80 S.D. 120, 119 N.W.2d 924.”

Upon thorough examination of the record we find no abuse of
discretion by the trial court.

Appellant’s claims of error as to the admission of evidence as
to planned use and sufficiency of the evidence are so necessarily
related to the manner in which the case was tried and submitted
to the jury as to make it desirable to state some of the procedural
aspects in this opinion.

257

This was the fourth in a series of cases tried in Tripp County,
South Dakota, for condemnation of land in the adjoining
unorganized county of Todd. The jury was selected from a panel
distinct from a panel from which jurors were selected in the cases
previously considered by this court, i.e, Nebraska Electric v.
Tinant, supra; Nebraska Electric v. Cady, supra; and Nebraska
Electric v. Markus, supra. The trial of this action commenced five
days after the decision in Basin Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.
v. Cutler, 1974, 88 S.D. 214, 217 N.W.2d 798, was handed down by
this court.

Prior to the jury being sworn, appellant moved that
respondents “be restricted in this evidence to showing damage to
the 160-acre tract described in quarter section descriptions,
across which the transmission line will run and that they not be
permitted to introduce any evidence as to any possible damages
as to any other property and the ranch owned by the defendants
in line with the Cutler * * *.” The trial court did not immediately
rule on that motion but took it under advisement “principally to
permit counsel for the defense to make offers of proof to show
that there is damage to the land other than the 160 acres involved
in the transmission line.” The trial court then admonished
counsel to refer to no damage before the jury other than the
damage to each 160-acre tract upon which the transmission line
was to run until the court had further ruled on the motions.

The ruling on the motions to restrict the evidence was not
made, however, until after appellant's witness, Virgil Schaefer,
the transmission engineer of the Nebraska Public Power District,
consultant to appellant, had by his testimony and exhibits admit-
ted through him established the real property description and
taking required for the easement. Thereafter, respondents’
witness, Charles Shaykett, was permitted to testify on the basis
of expert qualifications in both real estate appraisal and irriga-
tion. No objection was interposed to Mr. Shaykett’s testimony in
which he identified the transmission line as it passed through the
“unit” and that “[t]he ranch is made up of an operating unit of
thirty-eight hundred forty acres of deeded ground, plus approx-
imately three sections of leased ground lying in this general area
and some ground by the buildings.” He further testified, without

258 Po

objection, as to the location and interrelation between the home
headquarters and the unit operated therefrom for both haying
and grazing purposes. Thus, by word and picture, the complete
ranch operation was outlined to the jury.

In spite of the trial court’s early admonition to restrict that
testimony, questions to and answers by Mr. Shaykett evidencing
his total disagreement with the 160-acre unit rule in Basin Elec-
tric v. Cutler, supra, were allowed to stand notwithstanding ap-
pellant’s motion to strike. Thereafter, witness Shaykett, as foun-

, dation for his appraisal on the market data approach, testified at
length as to the comparable sales on family-sized units and it was
not until respondents’ counsel asked Shaykett, “As an appraiser,
what is the effect upon other property on the ranch of Mr. Walk-
ling, of losing available irrigable acres in one of these quarters?”
that counsel for appellant objected to the question as not being
within the scope of the trial. That objection, which was sustained,
was toward the end of the day’s testimony and the jury was ex-
cused.

Following a discussion of Basin Electric v. Cutler, supra, by
the trial court with counsel, counsel for respondents through
witness Shaykett made an offer of proof essentially covering the
same subject matter previously admitted as to unity of use of the
ranch unit. The offer of proof was refused on the basis that the
Cutler case foreclosed consideration of anything other than 160
acres in a unit. Appellant made no objection to the instructions*

1. Selected from among the instructions given set forth below, it will be noted
that while the instructions generally limited the jury. to a consideration of
damages separately as to cach of the 160-aere tracts affected by the easement,
yet instruction No. 8, contrary to the form of verdict supplied, allowed the jury
to consider, without finding, damages to the entire tract.

“3

“It is established that the plaintiff's transmission line will run across the
following seven 160 acre tracts owned by the defendants, and will be within a
100 foot wide easement area across these tracts, as described in Exhibits 1 and
2, as follows:

“NE% Section 9, Twp. 36 N., R. 30 W., covering 5.83 acres

SW’ Section 10, Twp. 36 N., R. 30 W., covering 4.01 acres

SE% Section 10, Twp. 36 N., R. 30 W., covering 5.77 acres

NE‘ Section 15, Twp. 36 N., R. 80 W., covering 1.93 acres

NW Section 30, Twp. 36 N., R. 29 W., covering 3.85 acres

NE‘ Section 30, Twp. 36 N., R. 29 W., covering 6.54 acres

SE% Section 30, Twp. 36 N., R. 29 W., covering 0.96 acres

259

given in line with Basin Electric v. Cutler, supra, or the form of
verdict proposed.”

“"

“When a portion of tracts of land is subjected to an easement under condemna-
tion proceedings, as here, just compensation due the landowner is that amount
which i equal to the difference between the fair market value of exch tract im.
mediately before the imposition of the easement, and the fair market value of
same tract immediately after the imposition of the easement. In determining
the amount of just compensation which you will award to the landowners in this
case, you will consider the value of the property before the imposition of the
easement and also the depreciation in value, if any you shall find, of each tract
after the imposition of the easement.

“In determining the compensation which you will award to the landowners in
this case, you must consider each 160 acre unit crossed by the transmission line
as a separate tract, and determine the damage on each tract separately.

4g

“You are instructed that fair market value is the highest price for which prop- .
erty can be sold on the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer,
neither acting under compulsion, and both exercising reasonable judgment. Or,
to put it another way, fair market value means that sum of money for which the
property could be sold by an owner who is ready, willing and able to sell, to a
person who is ready, willing, and able to purchase or cash, or terms equivalent
to cash, and neither the seller nor the buyer is under a compulsion to sell or buy.
It does not mean the amount which would be obtained on a forced sale. Neither
does it mean the amount which might be obtained from a buyer. in such a posi-
tion that he is under peculiar or unusual pressure to purchase this particular
property.

“In determining the fair market value of the entire tract you may take into
consideration its location, the highest and best uses and purposes for which it is
suitable or adaptable, considering such location, and having regard not only to
the existing business wants of the community in which it is located, but also to
such uses as may be reasonably expected in the near future, together with all
surroundings and conditions as shown in the evidence in this case. And you may
also take into consideration the opinions of witnesses of other bona fide sales or
property in the immediate vicinity and similarly located.

“9

“You are further instructed that in determining the fair market value of the
land in question, you must consider its value for the highest and best use for
which it's available and adaptable. By the terms “highest and best use to which
the land could be put” is meant, either some existing use or one which is so
reasonably likely, in the near future, that the availability of the property for
that future use would affect its present market price and would be taken into
account by a purchaser. This does not mean a use which is remote or merely
speculative.

“In order for this land to be valued for uses or purposes other than that to
which it was being put when taken or damaged, it must first be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence (1) that the property is adaptable to some other
use, (2) that such other use is reasonably probable within the reasonably
foreseeable future, (8) and that the market value of the land has been enhanced
thereby.”

2. The verdict submitted to the jury and returned is set forth as follows:

F'We, the jury, find the amount of compensation to be paid the defendants for
lamaged by the easement in each of the seven following tracts of

the property

260 Re

Hil Instructions given without objection on the part of ap-
pellant become the law of the case. SDCL 15-6-51. Although
respondents objected to the proposed instructions which limited
consideration to each of the quarter sections crossed by the
transmission line, they did not cross appeal. We do not, under the
circumstances, deem the instruction given as prejudicial to the
appellant. The evidence before the jury in this case supported the
treating of the entire tract as one parcel for the purposes of
SDCL 21-35-18, yet appellant had the benefit of the instruction
given and the verdict returned on the 160-acre unit rule.

Hl Appellant's argument relating to the error in admitting
evidence of planned use is based upon the denial by the trial court
of its motion to restrict testimony as to “planned use of the prop-
erty as opposed to the probable and highest and best use of the
property” and as to availability of labor as to any specific type of
irrigation equipment. Although the trial was delayed to accom-
modate the drilling of test holes on respondents’ property for the
purpose of establishing irrigation potential and neither soil tests
nor water rights were yet available, the appellant seems not to
challenge irrigability of the land in question. The highest and
best use of the land as a ranch unit of 3840 acres, plus three sec-
tions of leased Indian lands, was established as being for a cow-
calf operation with 140 head of brood ‘cows, with the balance of
the land as range for 750 yearlings pastured for others during a
five-month period. Respondent, who was 65 years of age, had over
a period of years, reduced cultivated acreage from a high of 1000
acres down to a mere 50 acres. The testimony of William Walk-
ling indicated that he had not seriously considered irrigation
until the condemnation action was commenced and, indeed, did
not himself contemplate farming if the land was irrigated, but

land to be as follows:”

NE% Section 9, Twp. 36 N., R. 30 W., in the amount of $15,000.00.
SW'% Section 10, Twp. 36 N., R. 30 W., in the amount of $10,000.00.
SE‘% Section 10, Twp, 36 N., R..30 W.. the amount of $7, 000.00.
NE% Section 15, Twp. 36 N., R. 30 W. the amount of $3,000.00.
NW“ Section 30, Twp. 36 N., R. 29 W., in the amount of $8,000.00.
NE‘ Section 30, Twp. 36 N., R. 29 W., in the amount of $12,000.00.

29
SE% Section 30, Twp. 36 N., R. 29 W., in the amount of $2,000.00.
Dated this 15th day of May, 197.

R.
‘sl Wayne 0. Shippy

es 261

would lease out the land. There was, however, sufficient evidence
for the jury to have found, given the facts of irrigation in the
neighborhood brought about by rising grain prices and termina-
tion of leases of Indian land, thus limiting land available, that the
highest and best use of some of the quarter sections crossed by
the transmission line would be as irrigation land to produce the
feed and forage necessary for livestock production. Whether in
his hands or in the hands of a subsequent owner the value of land
is enhanced if it has proven irrigation potential. The trial court
properly instructed the jury as to highest and best use under In-
struction No. 9 (see footnote 1). The evidence was admissible
under the broad language of State Highway Commission v. Hayes
Estate, 1966, 82 S.D. 27, 140 N.W.2d 680; Nebraska Electric v.
Cady, supra.

Hi Appellant’s major effort in rebuttal, as in other cases in
this series, was, through its witness, Dr. John Wiersma, to
establish the utility of big gun and stationary irrigation systems
to reduce the loss of irrigable acres when compared to center
pivot irrigation. As in Nebraska Electric v. Tinant, supra, there
was sufficient evidence of the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of various types of irrigation equipment, if applied to
respondents’ land, to make it a jury question as to whether there
were damages occasioned by denial of center pivot irrigation in
the future. The trial court committed no error in denying the mo-
tion for new trial on that ground.

[Bt is not the function of this court to weigh the evidence or
to substitute its judgment for the verdict. As stated in Hopp v.
Thompson, 72 S.D. 574, 38 N.W.2d 133, “This record presents a
substantial conflict in the evidence. The jurors are the exclusive
judges of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses, * *.” 72 S.D. at 577, 38 N.W.2d at 135.

[i The verdict of the jury reflects clearly that, following the
instructions of the court, it found substantially more damage to
those quarter sections of land which had irrigation potential (see
footnote 2). There is in this record both competent and substan-
tial evidence to support the verdict resolving the conflicts in
evidence, and as we are obligated to do, drawing all reasonable in-

262 Pe

ferences arising therefrom favorable to the respondents. Bentz v.
Cimarron Insurance Co., 1962, 79 S.D. 510, 114 N.W.2d 96.

HB Appellant also alleged as error the admission of testimony
of a nonexpert witness in this case. One Duane Swanson of
Bassett, Nebraska, whose business was selling irrigation equip-
ment and who had served customers in the immediate vicinity of
respondents’ land testified he had been on respondents’ land and
claimed to be familiar with the land and was allowed to testify
over objection as to the value of respondents’ land. There was no
showing that Mr. Swanson owned land in the neighborhood or
that he was qualified as an expert. This court has permitted
neighboring property owners to testify with minimal foundation
as stated by the court in State Highway Commission v. Hayes
Estate, supra:

“Whether a witness is properly qualified to render
an opinion as to value is a preliminary question of fact to
be determined by the trial court and generally a wide
discretion is allowed. 1 Orgel on Valuation under Emi-
nent Domain, 2d Ed., §132. Neighboring property
owners usually are permitted to express such opinion on
the theory that being owners they are necessarily ac-
quainted with values. Of course, the witness should be
familiar with the property taken or damaged, but the ex-
tent of his knowledge and familiarity as the foundation
for such opinion rests largely with the trial court and its
decision will ordinarily not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous.” (citations omitted)

Absent some evidence of ownership of land as a neighbor, we
cannot approve the trial judge’s admitting the testimony as to
the land value of the Nebraskan on a foundation of either exper-
tise or as a neighboring property owner.

However, we conclude that the error is without prejudice to
appellant since it was merely cumulative. Swanson’s testimony
was only one of many estimates as to the land value. His valuation
at $300 per acre was substantially below the value assigned by
the other qualified experts and adjoining landowners and that

263

7

testimony was adequately discredited on cross-examination. This
court has held that “[elvidence received though inadmissible
which tends to be cumulative is generally deemed to be nonpre-
judicial.” Alberts v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co., 1963,
80 S.D. 303, 315, 123 N.W.2d 96, 103.

Judgment is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

GOLDEN, Appellant v. OAHE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
et al., Respondents

GOLDEN, Appellant v. OAHE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
a South Dakota Corporation, et al., Respondents

(240 N.W.2d 102)
(File Nos. 11224, 11511. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

Order denying petition for rehearing April 22, 1976

s
a

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a

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Sl.

Ronald G. Schmidt, of Schmidt & Schroyer, Pierre, for plain-
tiff and appellant.

David L. Bergren, of Bergren & Duffy, Fort Pierre, for
defendants and respondents Oahe Enterprises, Inc., Donald F.
Emmick and Robert Emmick.

Thomas C. Adam, of May, Porter, Adam, Gerdes & Thomp-
son, Pierre, William J. Rawlings, of Kindig, Beebe, McCluhan,
Rawlings & Nieland, Sioux City, Iowa, for defendant and respond-
ent Charles A. Cannon, III.

Edward M. Blando, Special Stanley County State’s Atty.,
Pierre, for defendant and respondent Ruth Johnson (successor in
office to Eleanora LaRoche).

WILDS, Circuit Judge.

This case presents a consolidated appeal of the dismissal of
two actions revolving around the exchange of personal property
for shares in a corporation engaged in farming and ranching in
Hughes County. Appeal No. 11224 arises from the dismissal of a
replevin action venued in Stanley County. The second appeal, No.
11511, was instituted in Hughes County and is based on a sale of
corporate assets and the alleged misuse of funds by corporate of-
ficers. The record is a complicated combination of files from four
actions brought by these parties since January of 1968.

The plaintiff and appellant in this action is Warren Golden.
Pursuant to an agreement with Oahe Enterprises, Inc., and its
president Donald Emmick, defendants and respondents, Mr.
Golden transferred personal property consisting of farming and
ranching equipment to the respondent corporation in early
January of 1967. In exchange for these assets, he was to receive

269

stock in the corporation. Golden was elected to the office of
secretary-treasurer of Oahe Enterprises, Inc., on January 20,
1967. He became a director of the corporation shortly thereafter.
The January 24, 1967 minutes of the corporation’s stockholders’
meeting state in part that “378 (sic) shares of stock were issued to
Warren J. Golden * * *.” On July 24, 1967, stock certificate #5,
representing three hundred eighty-seven shares in the name of
Warren Golden was executed. The certificate was never
delivered to Golden; it remained a part of the corporate records
and was later marked “void.” All parties have agreed that this
first certificate represented an incorrect number of shares.

In mid-July of 1967, Golden, through his attorney, tendered
his resignation from the offices he held in the corporation and ex-
pressed his desire to withdraw as a stockholder. In November of
the same year, his attorney made demand on the corporation for
$19,352.32 in payment for the personal property he had transfer-
red to the corporation. The corporation’s Board of Directors
authorized an offer to return the property to Golden and to
negotiate a fair rental price for the use of the equipment or, in the
alternative, corporate stock in the amount of $16,922.32. On
December 28, 1967, stock certificate #8 representing 338.446
shares in the name of Warren Golden was executed. This cer-
tificate was also retained by the corporation.

On January 31, 1968, Oahe Enterprises, Inc., commenced the
first action against Warren Golden. In this Stanley County suit
the corporation alleged fraud, mistake, failure of consideration
and failure to provide good title and sought a rescission of the
contract or, in the alternative, a reformation of the contract to
conform to the evidence. It requested that the circuit court deter-
mine the price originally agreed to or that it set a reasonable
price. Golden-entered a general denial and a cross-claim for the
delivery of stock in the amount of $16,922.32. The trial of this ac-
tion commenced in the summer of 1968 and was submitted to Cir-
cuit Judge Fred Winans in March of 1970.

In December of 1969, the Board of Directors of Oahe
authorized President Emmick to sell the corporate holding for
$175 per acre. Emmick was at that time engaged in negotiations

270

for merger and/or sale with Charles Cannon, a respondent in this
action, who owned land adjacent to that held by Oahe. In January
of 1970, Cannon loaned Donald Emmick $150,000. The stated pur-
pose of the loan was to enable Emmick to buy out the interests of
all the other shareholders in Oahe. On March 16, 1970, a special
meeting of stockholders in Oahe was held at which Emmick was
authorized to enter into an agreement for the sale of real estate
owned by the corporation. Warren Golden was given no notice of
the meeting. Emmick and Cannon executed a contract for the sale
of the corporation’s real property on March 28, 1970; the agree-
ment was adopted and ratified at a Board of Directors meeting
the next day. The agreement provided that Cannon was to assign
the $150,000 promissory note he obtained from Emmick to the
corporation as partial payment for the property. In April of 1970,
the sale agreement was recorded in the offices of the Register of
Deeds for Hughes and Sully Counties. The deed and bill of sale
covering real and personal property purchased by Cannon were
recorded in the same offices in September.

In a letter of November 25, 1970, Circuit Court Judge
Winans advised the parties of his decision to deny the claims of
Oahe and to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor
of Golden. He specifically found that the sale was at arms length,
that the sale was not contingent upon Golden’s furnishing
depreciation schedules and that Golden was at all times ready
and willing to perform. The trial court concluded that Golden was
entitled to the immediate’ issuance of shares in the amount of
$16,922.32. Judgment was entered on December 23, 1970.

On January 15, 1971, Golden informed the Security National
Bank of Sioux City, which was acting as escrow pursuant to the
sale agreement, and Cannon’s attorney that he was a stockholder
in Oahe Enterprises and of.the December 23, 1970 judgment.
Eleven days later the corporation tendered stock certificate #37
representing 150 shares and, alternatively, $16,922.32 cash in set-
tlement of the December 1970 judgment. Golden rejected both
and maintained that the judgment awarded him shares in the
amount of $16,922.32 based on the value per share on January 6,
1967, the date of execution of the bill of sale covering the prop-
erty which Golden transferred to the corporation. On January 29,

SS

1971, Golden filed a motion in circuit court requesting an order
amending the findings of fact and conclusions of law to conform to
the above contention.

On February 5, 1971, while Golden’s motion was pending, the
corporation obtained a temporary restraining order restraining
Golden from interfering in the business affairs of Oahe, par-
ticularly the sale of assets to Cannon. A hearing on the corpora-
tion's request for a preliminary injunction was set for February
19, 1971. The record is devoid of any indication that the hearing
was held as scheduled or at any time thereafter. The preliminary
injunction was neither granted nor denied.

On March 10, 1971, Judge Miller denied Golden’s motion for
an amendment of the judgment entered by Judge Winans in
December of 1970. Two days after Judge Miller denied this re-
quest, Donald Emmick placed $16,922.32 plus $200 in court costs
in escrow to be delivered to Warren Golden in satisfaction of the
1970 judgment. A second application for amendment of the judg-
ment or in the alternative for a new trial was also denied by
Judge Miller in December of 1971. An appeal from this denial was
taken to this court thereafter. The appeal was dismissed by this
court on May 31, 1974, upon a determination that the motion was
one for a new trial and that an appeal from the denial of such a
motion would not lie. Oahe Enterprises, Incorporated v. Golden,
88 S.D. 296, 218 N.W.2d 485.

On ‘April 24, 1972, Golden instituted a replevin action against
Oahe, Donald Emmick and Eleanora LaRoche, the Clerk of Courts
of Stanley County. He sought possession of stock certificate #8
representing 338.446 shares or in the alternative $150,000, the
cash value thereof. Treating the defendants’ motion for dismissal
as one for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the
replevin action on August 11, 1972. This dismissal is one of two
consolidated in this appeal.

On May 20, 1974, the main action currently on appeal was
commenced by Golden against Oahe, Donald Emmick, Robert Em-
mick and Charles Cannon. Golden requested a judgment setting
aside the sale of corporate assets to Cannon, appointing a judicial-

272

ly supervised receivership for all corporate assets, ordering pro-
duction of all corporate records and an accounting by the Em-
micks, payment to the corporation by the Emmicks for loss occa-
sioned by their misconduct, and actual and punitive damages.
Golden also sought and received temporary restraining orders to
prevent the respondents from interfering with, distributing,
transferring or disposing of corporate assets or funds and
restraining Cannon from making any further payments pursuant
to the sale agreement and from assigning or transferring the pro-
missory note he obtained from Emmick. A temporary restraining
order was issued and a hearing on the request for a preliminary
injunction was set for June 10, 1974.

On June 5, 1974, Cannon filed a motion for dismissal and af-
fidavits in support thereof. Additional supporting affidavits were
filed two days later. A hearing on the motion was set for June 10,
1974, the day also set for hearing on the request for a preliminary
injunction.

Judge Miller dismissed Golden's suit against all defendants
by memorandum opinion of July 3, 1974. His decision was based
on findings consistent with six contentions raised by the defend-
ants. No formal findings of fact and conclusions of law were
entered. The informal findings were: (1) Golden’s exclusive
remedy as a shareholder was that set out in SDCL 47-6; (2).the
issues between the parties were res judicata; (8) Golden was
estopped from maintaining the action by laches; (4) Cannon was
an innocent purchaser in good faith for an adequate and
reasonable consideration; (5) Golden had been previously judicial-
ly restrained from maintaining such an action by an order that
was still in effect and (6) Golden was not a shareholder at the time
of the sale to Cannon. In this memorandum opinion, Judge Miller
also denied Golden’s request for dissolution of the temporary
restraining order entered against him on February 5, 1971.

Appellant Golden contends that each and every reason ad-
vanced by the trial court in support of its decision to dismiss was
error warranting reversal and remand for trial on the merits.
Whether the findings of the trial court are supported by the
evidence and the law will be addressed by considering each of the

reasons advanced separately.

I, WAS APPELLENT A SHAREHOLDER AT THE
TIME OF THE SALE OF CORPORATE ASSETS TO
RESPONDENT CANNON?

Respondents have advanced a three-pronged argument in
support of their contention that Golden was not.a shareholder at
the time of the sale of corporate assets to Cannon. They maintain
that he was precluded from enjoying shareholder status because
the stock certificate was never delivered to him, the stock was
not paid for and Golden was never considered to be a stockholder.

HH It is statutorily provided that ownership of stock is
represented by stock certificates. SDCL 47-3-12. It is well
established, however, that such a certificate is mere evidence of
ownership. Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation v. Gunderson, 1939,
8 Cir., 106 F.2d 633-634; Lake Superior Dist. Pow. Co. v. Public
Service Com’n, 1947, 250 Wis. 39, 26 N.W.2d 278, 282; Beck v.
Beck Inv. Co., 1946, 249 Wis. 5, 23 N.W.2d 454, 455. Issuance and
delivery of the stock certificate are not essential to ownership.
Lake Superior Dist. Pow. Co. v. Public Service Com’n, supra;
Pacific Nat. Bank of Boston v. Eaton, 1891, 141 U.S. 227, 11 S.Ct.
984, 35 L.Ed. 702. Thus, the fact that Golden did not have posses-
sion of a stock certificate is insufficient to defeat his claim to
shareholder status.

i Once corporate stock is paid for, it is issued regardless of
whether a stock certificate is executed and delivered. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corporation v. Gunderson, 106 F.2d at 635. It is ob-
vious from the corporate records and the findings of then Circuit
Court Judge Winans that Warren Golden paid for stock in Oahe
Enterprises, Inc., on January 6, 1967, when he executed a bill of
sale and transferred equipment to the corporation. The records
reflect entry of this same equipment as corporate assets on
January 4, 1967.

Hl The June 10, 1974 testimony of Donald Emmick at the
hearing on motions to dismiss that Golden was considered a

2 rT

subscriber rather than a stockholder is of no consequence. It is
well recognized that stockholder status may be created by
subscription for stock. Rank v. Lease Associates, Inc., 1970, 45
Wis.2d 689, 173 N.W.2d 713, 715; Boroseptic Chemical Co. v.
Nelson, 1928, 58 S.D. 546, 221 N.W. 264, 265.

Respondents’ contention that Golden was never considered a
stockholder cannot be reconciled with the corporation's bylaws
regulating the creation of shareholder status. The relevant
bylaws are:

“ARTICLE II
SECTION 6:***The original stock transfer books
shall be prima facie evidence as to who are the
shareholders entitled to examine [the list of
stockholders] or transfer books or to vote at any
meeting of shareholders.”

“ARTICLE VI
SECTION 2:*** The person in whose name shares
stand on the books of the corporation shall be deemed by
the corporation to be the owner thereof for all
purposes.”

A provision identical to that made by Article II, Section 6 is found
in SDCL 47-4-11.

Hl These bylaws form a binding contract between the cor-
poration and its stockholders. Allied Supermarkets, Inc. v.
Grocer’s Dairy Company, 1973, 45 Mich.App. 310, 206 N.W.2d 490,
493; affirmed 391 Mich. 729, 219 N.W.2d 55. In addition to the cor-
poration and its stockholders, the bylaws are binding upon the
directors and third persons who have knowledge of the same and
have been brought into privity with them. American Nat. Bank v.
Wheeler-Adams Auto Co., 1913, 31 S.D. 524, 141 N.W. 396. Cer-
tainly the bylaws reflect the purposes and intentions of the incor-
porators. Thisted v. Tower Management Corporation, 1966, 147
Mont. 1, 409 P.2d 813. Application of the above bylaws and prin-
ciples of law compel the conclusion that Warren Golden was a
stockholder at the time of the sale of corporate assets to Cannon

275

and that the corporation, its shareholders, directors and third
persons in privity are bound to recognize him as such. At the time
of the sale, stock certificate #8 bearing his name as the owner of
338.446 shares was included in the corporate stockbook; thus he
was “deemed by the corporation to be the owner thereof for all
purposes.” Further evidence in support of this conclusion is found
in the minutes of the corporation’s annual meeting of November
6, 1967, wherein Golden is identified as a member of the corpora-
tion.

Il. WERE THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE SUIT
COMMENCED BY GOLDEN ON MAY 20, 1974, RES
JUDICATA?

Respondents successfully contended at the trial court level
that the issues Golden sought to raise had been adjudicated in
Oahe Enterprises, Incorporated v. Golden and were therefore res
judicata by virtue of judgment entered therein on December 23,
1970.

The doctrine of res judicata as applied in this jurisdiction in-
volves the following principles:

“First, a final judgment or decree of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction upon the merits is a bar to any future
action between the same parties or their privies upon
the same cause of action so long as it remains unre-
versed; and, second, a point which was actually and
directly in issue in a former action and was there
judicially passed upon and determined by a domestic
court of competent jurisdiction cannot be drawn.in ques-
tion in any future action between the same parties or
their privies whether the cause of action in the two ac-
tions be identical or different. * * * Under the first rule
the res which is judicata is the cause of action. Under
the second, the res which may be judicata is the par-
ticular issue or fact common to both actions.” Keith v.
Willers Truck Service, 1936, 64 S.D. 274 at 276, 266 N.W.
256 at 257-258.

6

See also Carr v. Preslar, 1951, 73 S.D. 610 at 614-615, 47 N.W.2d
497 at 500; Raschke v. DeGraff, 1965, 81 S.D. 291 at 295, 134
N.W.2d 294 at 296.

For purposes of res judicata, a cause of action is com-
prised of the facts which establish the right a party seeks to en-
force through litigation. Carr v. Preslar, supra. A test employed
by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals for the determination of
whether a cause of action is the same for purposes of applying the
res judicata doctrine is “ ‘whether the wrong for which redress is
sought is the same for both actions.’ ” Hanson v. Hunt Oil Com-
pany, 1974, 8 Cir., 505 F.2d 1237, 1240. A judgment which bars a
second action upon the same claim extends not only to every mat-
ter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand,
but also to all other admissible matters which might have been of-
fered for the same purpose. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 1877, 94
US. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195; Hanson v. Hunt Oil Company, 505 F.2d at
1239; Ramsey Tp; McCook County v. Lake, 1941, 68 S.D. 67, 298
N.W. 356; Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Gillis, 1964,
80 S.D. 617, 129 N.W.2d 532. If, however, the second action is
based upon a different claim or demand, the prior judgment
precludes further consideration only of those issues which were
actually litigated and determined. Cromwell v. County of Sac,
supra.

HA determination of whether the trial court erroneously
relied on res judicata in dismissing the actions below necessitates
a comparison of the cause of action, the issues and the facts ‘in
Oahe Enterprises, Incorporated v. Golden and Golden v. Oahe
Enterprises, Inc., Donald Emmick, Robert Emmick and Charles
Cannon, III.

The parties to the original suit were the corporation and
Golden. The last action has three additional parties: Donald Em-
mick, Robert Emmick and Charles Cannon, III. In addition,
Golden brought suit on behalf of all others similarly situated and
as a derivative suit.

The first action was commenced by the corporation and was
based on the contract with Golden. The last action was com-

277

menced by Golden and is based on the sale of corporate assets to
Cannon and the alleged waste and misconduct of Robert and
Donald Emmick as officers of the corporation.

The first action involved questions of whether the contract.
should be rescinded because of fraud or connivance on the part of
Golden, mistake in giving consent, or failure of consideration. The
counterclaim raised the issue of whether Golden was entitled to
delivery of stock in the amount of $16,922.32. The last action
raises the following issues: whether the Emmicks participated in,
approved and benefited from wrongful conduct as officers and
directors of the corporation, including waste and misapplication
of corporate assets and whether the sale of corporate assets was
effected in a manner contrary to state law.

The facts determined by the court in the first action were: (a)
the corporation’s consent to the agreement was not obtained by
mistake, fraud or connivance, (b) the corporation had received
and used the property promised by Golden, (c) Golden had at all
times been ready and willing to perform, and (d) Golden was en-
titled to stock in the amount of $16,922.32.

The above comparison of causes of action, parties, issues and
factual determinations involved in these suits demonstrates a
degree of dissimilarity that is far too great to support a conclu-
sion that Golden’s action is barred as res judicata. The trial court
erroneously applied this doctrine in dismissing the action below.

III. WAS GOLDEN’S ACTION BARRED BY LACHES?

HEE To support a determination that laches bars Golden’s
action it must be found that he had full knowledge of the facts
upon which the action is based, that regardless of this knowledge
he engaged in an unreasonable delay before commencing the suit
and that allowing him to maintain the action would prejudice
other parties. Federal Home Loan Bank Board v. Elliott, 1967, 9
Cir., 386 F.2d 42, citing 18 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations
(Perm.Ed.) § 5874, p. 279; cert. den., Elliott v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, 390 U.S. 1011, 88 S.Ct. 1260, 20 L.Ed.2d 161. Laches

8

does not depend on the passage of time alone; the plaintiff must
be chargeable with lack of diligence in failing to proceed more
promptly. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company v. Gillis,
supra.

In January of 1971, shortly after learning of the cor-
poration’s proposed transaction with Cannon, Golden notified
Cannon of his interest in the corporation. Within a matter of
weeks, on the motion of Donald Emmick and the corporation, he
was judicially restrained from taking any further action to pro-
tect this interest. He did, however, continue his efforts to obtain a
clarification of the 1970 judgment. It is undeniable that a lengthy
delay ensued from the time Golden learned the facts surrounding
the sale of corporate assets until he filed suit in May of 1974. It is
equally undeniable that the respondents have made major
changes in their positions since the sale agreement was reached
in March of 1970 and that they would suffer financial setbacks if
Golden were allowed to maintain the action and prevailed. But
the record is clear that the respondents must share the respon-
sibility for delay and the hardships resulting therefrom. They did
not apprise Golden of the proposed sale even though he was a
shareholder of record. He did not acquire knowledge of the sale
until nearly a year after the agreement was adopted by the
members of the corporation. He was then restrained from assert-
ing his interests by legal action instituted by the Emmicks. In a
ease such as this, wherein at least part of the delay is attributable
to the defendants, or when the defendants have engaged in con-
cealment, misleading tactics and misrepresentation, laches is not
available as a defense. Miller v. Miller, 1951, 153 Neb. 890, 46
N.W.2d 618; Holden v. Construction Machinery Company, 1972,
Towa, 202 N.W.2d 348. The law will not sustain the defeat of
Golden’s claim because of a delay to which the respondents made
a substantial contribution.

Iv. WAS GOLDEN JUDICIALLY RESTRAINED
FROM MAINTAINING HIS 1974 ACTION AGAINST
THE RESPONDENTS?

A temporary restraining order issued on February 5, 1971,
was the basis of the trial court’s finding that Golden’s action must

ee LE

be dismissed. The order restrained and enjoined Golden from in-
terfering in the business affairs of Oahe and particularly in the
sale of corporate assets to Cannon. With this temporary restrain-
ing order, Judge Miller signed an order setting a hearing on the
corporation’s request for a preliminary injunction enjoining
Golden from the same activities curtailed by the temporary
restraining order. The hearing was scheduled for February 19,
1971; the parties have acknowledged that the hearing was never
held.

The temporary restraining order was issued pursuant to
SDCL 21-8-11 which provides:

“If the court or judge deems it proper that the
defendant, or any of the several defendants, should be
heard before granting the interlocutory injunction, an
order may be made requiring cause to be shown, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should not
be granted, and the defendant may, in the meantime be
restrained.” (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that the above statute contemplates restraining a
defendant only until the time set for hearing on the application
for an injunction.

HM The recognized purpose of a temporary restraining
order is to suspend proceedings until the court can determine
whether an injunction should issue. Becker v. Becker, 1975, 66
Wis.2d 731, 225 N.W.2d 884; Beers v. City of Watertown, 1920, 42
S.D. 441, 176 N.W. 149. Upon grant or refusal of the injunction,
the temporary restraining order terminates automatically. Id.-
Although there is no proof on the record that the injunction re-
quested by Oahe was granted or refused, a finding that the tem-
porary restraining order remained in effect for more than three
years ignores the inherent limitations of such an order. The tem-
porary restraining order issued against Golden was effective only
until the date set for hearing, February 19, 1971. When that date
passed without action on the request for an injunction, the tem-
porary restraining order terminated by operation of law. It had
no legal effect at the time Golden instituted his action against

280

these respondents and therefore could not bar him from main-
taining this action.

Vv. IS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY AVAILABLE TO
GOLDEN CONTAINED IN SDCL 47-6?

Procedures to be followed in the sale of corporate assets and
an avenue for dissenting shareholders are established by SDCL
47-6. After a corporation’s board of directors has passed a resolu-
tion recommending the sale of all or substantially all of the cor-
porate assets, the proposal for sale must be submitted to a vote of
the shareholders. SDCL 47-6-19. The stockholders: are to be
notified of the meeting and its purpose a minimum of twenty days
prior to the date for which it is scheduled. SDCL 47-6-20. A
shareholder who wishes to dissent to the proposed sale must sub-
mit a written objection prior to or at the meeting. If the resolu-
tion is adopted by a two-thirds vote of the shareholders, a dissent-
ing shareholder may, within ten days of the date upon which the
vote was taken, make demand upon the corporation for payment
of a fair value for his or her shares. A shareholder who fails to
make such demand within ten days is bound by the terms of the
proposal. SDCL 47-6-24.

The corporation must pay a dissenting shareholder the fair
value of his shares as of the day prior to the date upon which the
vote was taken, excluding any appreciation or depreciation at-
tributable to anticipation of the sale. SDCL 47-6-25. Within ten
days of the date upon which a sale is effected, the corporation
must notify each dissenting shareholder and make an offer to pay
for his or her shares at a specified price. The notice and offer are
to be accompanied by the latest available corporate balance sheet
and a profit and loss statement for the twelve-month period end-
ing on the date of the balance sheet. SDCL 47-6-28. If a price is
agreed upon within thirty days after the date upon which the sale
is effected, payment must be made for the dissenting
shareholder’s stock within ninety days of the date of the sale.
SDCL 47-6-29. If the dissenting stockholder and the corporation
cannot agree on an acceptable price, either may petition a court
of competent jurisdiction for determination of a fair value. SDCL
47-46-30. Within twenty days of demanding payment for his or her

SS:

shares, a dissenting stockholder must submit his or her stock cer-
tificate to the corporation for a notation of the demand. Upon
failure to submit the certificates for such a notation, the corpora-
tion may terminate the rights of the dissenting stockholder to
surrender his certificates and collect a fair and reasonable value
therefor. SDCL 47-6-38.

HM Respondents urge that this remedy is the only one
available to Golden. To sustain that contention would be the
equivalent of holding that Golden had no remedy at all, for there
was no possibility that he could comply with the requirements of
the chapter. Procedural requirements which are set forth in
statutes creating a right to appraisal and payment for shares
owned by a dissenting shareholder must be complied with. Rath
v. Rath Packing Company, 1965, 257 Iowa 1277, 136 N.W.2d 410,
415; Poss v. Rossen-Poss Agency, Inc., 1966, 3 Mich.App. 726, 143
N.W.2d 616. Golden could not fulfill the requirement that a writ-
ten objection be submitted prior to or at the meeting because he
did not receive notice of the meeting. He could not have demand-
ed payment for his shares within ten days of the shareholders’ ap-
proval since he did not acquire knowledge of it until many months
later. He could not submit his stock certificate to the corporation
within twenty days of making demand for payment so that nota-
tion of demand could be made thereon because the certificate was
retained as part of the stockbook instead of being delivered to
him. The record contains no indication that the respondents met
their responsibilities with regard to obtaining shareholder ap-
proval and they will not be allowed to hold the shareholders to re-
quirements they disregarded. A conclusion to the contrary would
be particularly inequitable. in light of the fact that the
respondents’ actions prevented the appellant from complying
with the statutory procedure.

VI. WAS CANNON AN INNOCENT PURCHASER IN
GOOD FAITH FOR VALUE?

The final issue raised by the trial court’s dismissal is
whether Golden must be precluded from maintaining his action
because Cannon was an innocent purchaser in good faith. To en-
joy the privileges of an innocent purchaser one must make a-pur-

252

chase for value, in good faith and without notice of any outstand-
ing claim. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Advance Realty Co.,.
1956, N.D., 78 N.W.2d 705; Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation v.
Vogt, 1957, 165 Neb. 611, 86 N.W.2d 771. Some guidance in mak-
ing a determination of whether one is a purchaser in good faith is
found in King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 1924, 158 Minn. 481, 198 N.W.
798, wherein the following test is employed:

“Were the circumstances under which the [property
was] offered to defendant such as to cast suspicion on
the title and lead a prudent man to make [inquiry] * * * ?

“Defendant may have been ignorant of the true
state of affairs, but ignorance due to negligence is the
equivalent of notice, and want of notice is an essential
element of bona fides, as that term is used in equity
jurisprudence.” 198 N.W. at 800.

These judicially developed qualifications for an innocent pur-
chaser in good faith must be considered in this case in conjunction
with SDCL 17-1-4 which provides:

“Every person who has actual notice of cir-
cumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon in-
quiry * * * with reasonable diligence, is deemed to have
constructive notice of the fact itself.”

Hl Donald Emmick testified on July 10, 1974, in support of
the respondents’ motions to dismiss, that he told Cannon of the
pending action with Golden prior to the date of the sale agree-
ment. He described the action to Cannon as one to rescind a
subscriber’s application for stock. He further testified that he
told Cannon that Golden did not want any stock in the corpora-
tion. Cannon did not testify in support of the motions for
dismissal. Emmick’s testimony reveals that Cannon had actual
knowledge of the suit in which the corporation was involved.
Reasonable persons might have found that this was sufficient to
charge him with constructive notice of an outstanding claim
against the corporation. If such a finding were made, Cannon
could not enjoy the status of an innocent purchaser in good faith.

283

The issue should have been submitted to a finder of fact. The trial
court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Golden's suit
should be dismissed because Cannon was an innocent purchaser
in good faith. However, we are not sending the case back for a
finding of fact on this issue in view of our holding (infra) that the
sale of corporate assets to Cannon will not be set aside.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the above determination that the dismissal of
Golden’s action cannot be supported by the conclusions of law
reached by the trial court, No. 11511 is hereby remanded to the
trial court for disposition in accordance with the instructions of
this court. It is our conclusion, as set out above, that Golden was
the owner of record of 338.446 shares at the time of the sale. The
trial court shall order delivery of stock certificate #8 represent-
ing said number of shares to Golden.

HH The respondent corporation has since December 1970,
refused and failed to deliver to Golden the stock awarded by the
decision of the circuit court, that is, the $16,922.32 in stock,
valued as of January 1967, as represented by stock certificate #8.
The corporation has repeatedly denied Golden the exercise of his
statutory shareholder rights. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered
that Oahe Enterprises, Inc., be dissolved with an accounting
made of the corporation’s financial affairs to appellant Golden.
Appellant would then be entitled to his pro rata share of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of corporate assets upon dissolution and the
winding up of the corporation’s affairs. If this procedure is not
followed promptly, appellant should seek the assistance of the At-
torney General in bringing a dissolution action under SDCL
47-7-26(8).

Hii Since the respondents did not comply with the statutory
procedural requirements in the sale of all or substantially all of
the corporate assets, it would be entirely in order for this court to
direct that the sale be set aside. However, we are cognizant of the
fact that Golden is the owner of less than one-third of the out-
standing shares and would not be able to significantly affect a
vote of the shareholders on the proposed sale. Therefore, voiding

284 ee

the sale and requiring compliance with the statutory procedure
would accomplish no change in the result. The sale of corporate
assets to Cannon will not be set aside.

Hl The issues as to the wrongful appropriation of corporate
assets by respondents Donald Emmick and Robert Emmick and
the issues of fraud and actual and exemplary damages resulting
therefrom are remanded to the trial court for trial upon the
merits. Although Cannon may or may not have been an innocent
purchaser of the assets of Oahe Enterprises, Inc., appellant
Golden has failed to state a cause of action against him for fraud
which would be a basis for actual damages and which is a
necessary predicate for exemplary damages. SDCL 21-1-4. Thus
the trial court properly dismissed this suit as to Cannon.

All assignments of error not disposed of herein are rendered
moot by the above disposition of No. 11511.

The judgment of the trial court in No. 11224 is hereby
vacated and the issues raised on appeal are rendered moot by the
disposition of No. 11511.

Judgment will be entered by the trial court in accordance
with the foregoing.

All the Justices concur.

WILDS, Circuit Judge, sitting for WINANS, Justice, dis-

qualified.

NEBRASKA ELECTRIC GENERATION & TRANSMISSION
COOP., INC., Appellant v. TINANT, et al., Respondents

(241 N.W.2d 134)
(File No. 11500. Opinion filed March 25, 1976)

Order denying petition for rehearing May 20, 1976

[rey
oO
a

286

287°

J. W. Grieves, Winner, for plaintiff and appellant.

Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, Gregory, for defendants and
respondents.

COLER, Justice.

20s

Nebraska Electric Generation & Transmission Cooperative,
Inc., hereinafter referred to as Nebraska Electric, brought
separate actions in condemnation against Robert and Geraldine
Tinant, husband and wife, and Charles and Mable Tinant, hus-
band and wife, and the actions were consolidated for trial.

The power line easement, 100 ft. in width, diagonally crosses
five different quarter sections of respondents’ lands located in
_three different sections and was acquired for the purposes of the
construction of H-frame structures for a 115 KV electric
transmission line. The right-of-way amounted to, for the purposes
of the taking, 17.84 acres and would accommodate nine 2-pole
structures and one 3-pole structure. The jury awarded damages
of $35,000 and Nebraska Electric has appealed. We reverse.

Appellant’s arguments are essentially that (1) erroneous in-
structions were given relative to the damages to the ranch unit,
(2) excessive damages appeared to have been given under the in-
fluence of passion or prejudice and on the grounds that there was
insufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict and (3) certain
evidence was improperly admitted.

The testimony of respondents indicates that they, as father
and son, owned approximately 3,000 acres in Todd County, South
Dakota, and treated only 1800 of those acres, being the home
place, as a unit affected by the taking beyond the 17.84 acres en-
compassed within the 100 ft. easement.

I Although the issue was not raised by the parties by
reason of a stipulation which consolidated the cases for trial, the
question arises as to the propriety of an award in a lump sum to
separate owners. The lack of unity of ownership in a father-son
ranch operation with properties being separately owned by them,
even though based on a stipulation, was determined to be im-
proper in State Highway Commission v. Fortune, 1958, 77 S.D.
302, 91 N.W.2d 675. In this case, as in State Highway Commission
v. Fortune, supra, the record refers only to the entire unit
without regard to the separate ownership by the father or the

lr

son? and there is nothing in the record as to whether property
noncontiguous to that affected by the immediate taking was
determined to be a part of the ranch unit of 1800 acres. State
Highway Commission v. Bloom, 1958, 77 S.D. 452, 93 N.W.2d 572;
State Highway Commission v. Olson, 1965, 81 S.D. 401, 136
N.W.2d 233.

[Instruction No. 7? taken in essence from the South Dakota
Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 141.05 having treated the
ownership as joint, without proof and contrary to the plain im-
port of the separate actions commenced, causes us to remand for
either separate trials or separate verdicts as it is in the province
of the jury, not the parties, to determine the damage occasioned
by the separate owners. South Dakota Constitution Article VI,
§18; SDCL 21-35-18; State Highway Commission v. Fortune,
supra.

Appellants claim that, although they did not object to In-
struction No.7, the instruction was contrary to the decision of
this court in Basin Electrie Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Cutler,

1, On the record before the jury and the trial court there is no evidence of the
contractual relationship between the father and son which can give rise to our
consideration of the issue of sufficiency of the evidence of unity of ownership to
warrant treatment of the ranch here involved as a unit. See Nebraska Electric
Generation & Transmission Cooperative, Inc. v. Markus, 90 S.D. 238, 241
N.W.2d 142.

“It is established that the land being taken from these defendants by the plain-
tiff is a portion and a part of a larger tract of land belonging to these defendants,
and consisting of 1800 acres more or less.

“When a portion of a tract of land is taken under condemnation proceedings, as
here, just compensation due the landowner is that amount which is equal to the
difference between the fair market value of the entire property immediately
before the taking, and the fair market value of that part remaining immediatel
after the taking. In determining the amount of just compensation which you wil
award to the landowners in this case, you will consider the value of the property
taken, and also the depreciation in value, if any you shall find, of the part re-
maining after the taking. Under the law, this latter element or item of just com-
pensation is called severance, and it means the diminution in value of land which
remains after a part of the land is taken, and which diminution in value is a
result of the taking. You will find and award to the landowner one sum which
will represent the entire difference in value between the entire property before
the taking, and the value of the remainder after the taking, even though
separate and various items or elements enter into your deliberations in arriving
at that sum.”

200

S.D. 214, 217 N.W.2d 798, handed down by this court on May 8,
1974, nearly three months after the jury had returned a verdict in
this case. Appellants argue that Basin Electric Power
Cooperative, Inc. v. Cutler, supra, negates the unit rule of
severance and substitutes a 160-acre unit rule as it relates to elec-
trical highline easements. We do not so construe that decision.
While we acknowledged the concept of severance damages
therein by quoting from State Highway Commission v. Hayes
Estate, 1966, 82 S.D. 27, 140 N.W.2d 680, this court did not declare
that “severance damages” which more appropriately should have
been identified as “consequential” or “incidental” damages, see
State Highway Commission v. Bloom, supra, either may or may
not be occasioned by such a taking but only held that “If the jury
is to be allowed to make a determination of severance damage to
the entire unit there must be evidence of damage to the entire
unit.” The evidence presented in that case referred to “damage to
the immediate area of the easement.” There was “no evidence of
a carry-over to the entire ranch unit.” 217 N.W.2d at 801.

The court decisions annotated at South Dakota Pattern Jury
Instructions (Civil) 141.05, which is the basis for the instruction,
as well as the numerous decisions cited in Basin Electric Power
Cooperative, Ine. v. Cutler, supra, have clearly established the
unit rule of severance damages where a fee is taken and the con-
demned lands are ultimately fenced off to prevent livestock en-
croachment on the ribbons of steel, concrete or asphalt or unford-
able waters which fill an irrigation canal. Railway Company v.
Mason, 1909, 23 S.D. 564, 122 N.W. 601; Railway Co. v. Land &
Cattle Co., 1911, 28 S.D. 289, 183 N.W. 261; State Highway Com-
mission v. Ullman, 1974, 88 S.D. 492, 221 N.W.2d 478; Basin Elec-
tric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Cutler, supra.

We have not been called upon to determine whether the
same rule applies to a highline easement which is perpetual in
nature but does not take fee title and the utility does not fence off
the right-of-way so as to truly sever one part of the property from
another. ,

Hin the petition for condemnation, appellant prayed “That
the interest in the land be condemned and title be vested in the

Ee

plaintiff” and that was the easement granted by the court. As to
whether this amounts to vesting of a fee, we agree with other
jurisdictions that “the taking of an easement in that part of the
strip which is not physically occupied by poles and towers is
deemed tantamount to the taking of a fee.” 5 Nichols on The Law
of Eminent Domain, § 16.103[1].

Hl While there is no severance by an electrical highline, in
the sense that there is no actual division of a parcel of land, thus
making the instruction given inappropriate, yet consequential
damages may flow from such an interference with a farm or ranch
unit which occasions damages by reason of the taking.

I As this court intimated in Basin Electric Power
Cooperative, Inc. v. Cutler, supra, and as is apparent from the
decisions of numerous courts that have considered consequential
damages in highline cases, including those cited both in the briefs
and in oral argument of appellant and respondents’ it is manifest
that:

“Where telegraph, telephone or power lines are
constructed over private lands, and such lands are sub-
jected to an exercise of the power of eminent domain for
such purpose, the question of damages has not received
uniform treatment. Generally, the owner is entitled to
payment of the fair market value of the land actually oc-
cupied by the poles or towers, plus the diminution in
value of the balance of the right of way taken, together
with the depreciation in value of the remainder of the
tract.” 5 Nichols on The Law of Eminent Domain,
§ 16.103[1]; 27 Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 344.
“*** The elements of damage [to the remainder] must

8. Cases cited and reviewed in neighboring states of Iowa and Nebraska, in-
cluded Booras v. lowa State Highway Commission, 1978, 207 N.W.2d 566; Sonn-
tag v. Iowa Public Service Company, 1970, 180 N.W.2d 124; Stortenbecker v.
Towa Power & Light Company, 1959, 250 Iowa 1073, 96 N.W.2d 468; Johnson v.
Nebraska Public Power District, 1971, 187 Neb. 421, 191 N.W.2d 594; Regier v.
Nebraska Public Power District, 1972, 189 Neb. 56, 199 N.W.2d 742. We do not
find these decisions inconsistent with our holding in Basin Electric Power
Cooperative, Ine. v. Cutler, 1974, 88 §.D. 214, 217 N.W.2d 798, nor with the
fo rule stated in 5 Nichols on The Law of Eminent Domain, § 16.103[1] and

29

not be remote, speculative or uncertain; they must be
direct and proximate, and not such as are merely possi-
ble.” 5 Nichols on The Law of Eminent Domain,
§ 16.103[2].

The facts in the present case are clearly distinguishable from
the facts in Basin Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Cutler,
supra, where the land over which the easement was taken was a
part of a cow-calf operation which was the highest and best use of
the property. That parcel subject to easement was used strictly
for grazing purposes, and did not affect the total unit. The
Tinants, on the other hand, operated a sizable dairy operation,
and dug four test wells, some in 1968 and some in 1970, to ascer-
tain the quantity and quality of water. Although they had not ir-
rigated any of the lands suitable for irrigation in the areas to be
occupied by the highline, they purchased approximately 50 more
milk cows in 1978 in anticipation of the additional forage and feed
that could be grown on the land within their unit when irrigated.
Appellants, through their expert witness, did not challenge the
irrigability of the land nor that the highest and best use of the
land would be for the production of food and forage for the dairy
herd.

HM Appellant in its motion for new trial, in its assignments
of error and on the brief claims the verdict to be excessive as “ap-
pearing to have been given under the influence of passion or pre-
judice and on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict.” While we have held that a claim of excessive
damages given under the influence of passion or prejudice is an
appropriate claim of error in condemnation cases, State Highway
Commission v. Bloom, supra, we have also noted that such a claim
is more appropriate to tort actions, State Highway Commission v.
Miller, 1968, 83 S.D. 124, 155 N.W.2d 780. Although the award
may be generous, mere generosity is not enough. We can disturb
the verdict only if the award “is so extremely excessive as to
justify the inference or conclusion that it is the product of corrup-
tion, passion or prejudice.” Tufty v. Sioux Transit Co., 1945, 70
S.D. 352 at 357, 17 N.W.2d 700, 702; Ross v. Foss, 1958, 77 S.D.
358, 92 N.W.2d 147. As stated in Ross v. Foss, supra, at 369, 92
N.W.2d at 153, “Our review of this record reveals no occurrence

293

of that type, nor do we consider the verdict so excessive as to
warrant an inference or conclusion that it is tainted with corrup-
tion, passion or prejudice.” Because such a heavy burden is cast
on the appellant to establish passion or prejudice as a ground for
granting a new trial we will not treat the grounds in the conjunc-
tive as proposed by the appellant but separately consider, then,
the more appropriate claim of sufficiency of the evidence under
RCP Rule 59(a)\6).

Hil Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence
revolves around the basic question as to whether the lines
diagonally crossing the irrigable acres made it impractical to
utilize the center pivot irrigation system. The relative merits in
efficiency and labor costs as well as soil types, land slopes and
susceptibility to erosion given varying rates of water application
with other irrigation systems, namely, the big gun and stationary
systems, were before the jury. Whether a highline, when con-
structed, renders irrigable lands useless to center pivot irriga-
tion and whether that system was the only feasible system are
questions for the jury under proper instructions. Regier v.
Nebraska Public Power District, 1972, 189 Neb. 56, 199 N.W.2d
742,

Hl Had there been an adequate showing of unity of owner-
ship, contiguity of the several tracts of land and the interrelation-
ship of the various tracts of land to the total dairy operation, the
jury may have been justified, we believe, in making an award of
consequential damages to the unit.

Hl As indicated in Instruction No. 7, the court determined
that the unit constituted 1800 acres. Appellant’s witness, Carr, on
the other hand, could account for only 1640 acres. This court has
held that the determination of what constitutes the unit is or-
dinarily a question of fact to be determined by a jury on the
evidence presented. “When there is no dispute in the facts, the
question whether physically separated parcels of land constitute
one parcel because of common use, is a question of law for the
Court.” State Highway Commission v. Fortune, supra, 77 S.D. at
812, 91 N.W.2d at 682; State Highway Commission v. Bloom,
supra; and State Highway Commission v. Olson, supra. The court

294

in Hurley v. State, 1966, 82 S.D. 156, 165, 143 N.W.2d 722, 727,
quoted the general rule governing whether physically separated
parcels of land constituted a unit:

“In many cases the court can, as a matter of law,
determine that lots are distinct or otherwise, but or-
dinarily it is a practical question to be decided by the
jury or other similar tribunal which passes upon mat-
ters of fact, which should consider evidence on the use
and appearance of the land, its legal divisions and the in-
tent of its owner and conclude whether on the whole the
lots are separate or not. * * *’ 4 Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, § 14.31, p. 715.”

The trial court may, however, determine as a matter of law
whether some property which is noncontiguous may be con-
sidered a part of the unit, State Highway Commission v. Bloom,
supra, but should not otherwise substitute its judgment for that
of the jury.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion.

DUNN, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I would dissent.

The majority opinion reverses the judgment on the basis of
two issues that were never passed on by the trial court or raised
as error on this appeal. I am aware that this court can and on occa-
sion does raise new questions on appeal “in the interest of fun-
damental justice.” I see no such interest here. If the parties were
satisfied with the size and the unity of use and ownership of the
unit, I see no purpose in this court requiring a new trial on those

issues.

295

JOHNSON et al., Respondents v. PETROLEUM CARRIERS,
INC., Appellant

(240 N.W.2d 114)

(File No. 11401. Opinion filed March 30, 1976)

Harry H. Smith, Smith & Smith, Sioux City, Iowa, Robert L.
O'Connor, Sioux Falls, for plaintiffs-respondents.

May, Johnson & Burke, John E. Burke and John C. Quain-
tance, Sioux Falls, for defendant-appellant.

296

MYDLAND, Circuit Judge.

As it is before this court this case concerns an action brought
by seven men who had worked for Petroleum Carriers, Inc., and
who had gone out on strike about April 27, 1970. Their sole con-
tention is that they had each earned payment for vacation not
taken prior to the strike. The trial court found in favor of five of
the seven plaintiffs and we affirm.

This action was begun June 7, 1971 and trial was held at
Sioux Falls December 20, 1972. Judgment was filed August 23,
1973 and an appeal was taken. Appellant’s assignments of error
all relate to (1) sufficiency of the evidence to support certain find-
ings, (2) improper designation of certain findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and (3) certain conclusions of law unsupported by
proper findings of fact.

The record in this case is minimal, as only three witnesses
testified and only one exhibit was introduced during the trial.
Subsequent to trial a stipulation was received concerning certain
dates of employment and salary paid to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
asserted that each was entitled to vacation pay or paid vacation
which each had earned and which had not been provided by
Defendant. Defendant claimed that it was company policy that
employees “had to work and be working when their vacation
period came tp and it had to be taken between June 1st and
August 31st.” By prearrangement they could take it at a later
time. Defendant further claimed that there was no company
policy to pay employees for their vacations in lieu of their taking
a vacation. Plaintiffs on the other hand contend that they are in
line for the pay for the vacation periods each had earned (the
vacation period varying for each plaintiff according to length of
employment with Defendant), but had not taken prior to the day
the strike began or to the termination of their employment. They
make no claim to earning benefits during the strike period. The
exhibit introduced by the plaintiffs was a notice announcing an
agreement apparently between Defendant and its drivers. That
notice provides that the rate of pay for vacations (the “vacation
rate”) is “1/52 of previous years (sic) annual wage per week for
vacation earned.” It was received without objection. The trial

UL

court concluded that “[ajt all times material hereto there existed
an oral agreement between the parties buttressed by certain
written notices and memos and by a long standing policy of
Defendant company for the payment of vacation pay to the
employees of the company.”

There had been some discussion about the semantics of vaca-
tion pay, paid vacations, pay for vacations and the like. The
essence of the dispute, however, is not really in question. Either
the plaintiffs were each entitled to a week’s pay for each week of
vacation they had earned but not taken or they were not. The
lower court found that five of them were.

HH As to the possible improper designation of certain find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law the rules of this court require
findings of fact and conclusions of law in cases tried to the court
unless they are waived. RCP 52(a); SDCL 15-6-52(a). However, this
court, while recognizing that the rule requiring that findings of
fact and conclusions of law must be separately stated, has also
recognized that an improper designation or incorporation of one
within the other is not fatal.

““* ** the designation of a finding of fact as a conclusion
of law is not determinative of its true nature. Slimmer v.
Meade County Bank, 38 S.D. 311, 161 N.W. 325. This
court has held that a fact found by the court although ex-
pressed as a conclusion of law will be treated on appeal
as a finding of fact. Dodson v. Crocker, 20 S.D. 312, 105
N.W. 929; State ex rel. Parsons v. Kaufman, 50 S.D. 645,
211 N.W. 691; Cohrt v. Sun Insurance Office, 74 S.D. 153,
49 N.W.2d 589.” State ex rel. Van Loh v. Prosser, 1959,
78 S.D. 35, 98 N.W.2d 329. See also Donovan v. Powers,
1972, 86 S.D. 245, 193 N.W.2d 796.

We find the requisite findings of fact, whether stated as such or
within the conclusions of law, are present to support the trial
court's decision.

HB Appellant also contends that several findings of fact are
unsupported by credible evidence. Each finding of fact attacked

298

dealt with questions which were elements of the controversy and
concerning which there was evidence submitted. The lower court
heard the witnesses and examined the evidence. It is axiomatic in
this court that when we consider whether findings of fact are sup-
ported by the evidence we must accept that version, including in-
ferences which can be fairly drawn therefrom, which is favorable
to the trial court’s action. Because his participation in the trial
reveals to him many things that are helpful and sometimes essen-
tial in deciding fact issues, it is presumed the findings are correct.
Colby v. Costello, 1975, 89 S.D. 217, 232 N.W.2d 81. Viewing all of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs-
respondents we find that the trial court’s findings of fact are sup-
ported by the record and must stand, as they are not clearly
erroneous. In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 262, 181 N.W.2d
455. :

The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
WINANS, WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.
MYDLAND, Circuit Judge, sitting for DUNN, Chief Justice,
disqualified.
a

FARMERS COOPERATIVE ASS'N, Appellant v.
DOBITZ, Respondent

(240 N.W.2d 116)

(File No. 11701. Opinion filed March 30, 1976)

cll PEE
Po

Newell E. Krause, of Lakeman & Krause, Mobridge, for
plaintiff and appellant.

Curtis W. Hanks, Lemmon, for defendant and respondent.
DUNN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the
Eighth Judicial Circuit, dated April 28, 1975, relieving defendant
Dobitz from the terms of a contract dated June 12, 1973, requir-
ing him to sell 10,000 bushels of wheat to the plaintiff elevator at
a fixed price. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in find-
ing that the words “to August Delivery” were vague and am-
biguous, and then concluding that this phrase meant up to the
first day in August, thus relieving defendant of further deliveries
after August 1, 1973. We reverse.

On June 12, 1978, defendant went to plaintiff elevator in
Thunder Hawk, South Dakota, to check on the market price of
wheat. He talked to the elevator manager, Elmer Trautman, and
he and plaintiff entered into a contract whereby defendant
agreed to sell and plaintiff agreed to purchase 10,000 bushels of
wheat. The contract price was to be $2.30 to $2.35, depending on
the protein content of the wheat actually tendered. A written
memorandum of the agreement was prepared and was signed by
both defendant and by Trautman as an agent of the plaintiff. The
memorandum set out the quantity of wheat and the price, and it
also contained the words “to August Delivery.” The words were
apparently written by Trautman. Defendant Dobitz received a
copy of the contract and a copy was retained by the plaintiff.

Since defendant did not have a suitable truck, it was orally

300 PO

agreed that one Hank Uhrig would haul the wheat to plaintiff
elevator. Uhrig was contacted by defendant and agreed to do the
hauling. Trautman was to notify either Uhrig or defendant when
the grain could be delivered. The wheat to be sold was wheat
which had been harvested in previous years and was being stored
in bins on defendant’s farm. According to Trautman’s testimony,
he mentioned to defendant that deliveries to the elevator could
be made as soon as railroad cars became available. Apparently
the elevator was full to capacity throughout that entire summer
and plaintiff could not accept any more grain until it could get
cars to ship out the grain which was already on hand.

According to the testimony of defendant and his wife, they
each made numerous inquiries at the elevator during the month
of July 1973, as to when they could begin bringing in the 10,000
bushels of wheat. They said that each time they inquired they
were told by plaintiff's employees that the elevator was full and
that there were no railroad cars available. The defendant
testified that he wanted to get the wheat shipped because he
needed the bin space on his farm for his upcoming 1973 harvest.

Defendant did deliver 2,509.32 bushels of wheat to plaintiff
between July 28, and August 9, 1973. Uhrig did the hauling for
defendant. Defendant was paid the contract price of $2.30 per
bushel for the wheat delivered, although there is evidence that he
tried to get Trautman to pay him the then current market price
for wheat which was considerably higher than the contract price.

No further deliveries were made in August. On August 29, or
30, 1973, Trautman called defendant and asked him if he was
ready to deliver the rest of the wheat. He said that there was now
sufficient elevator space available. Defendant replied that he
would not deliver any more wheat.

According to the record, defendant sold the bulk of his wheat,
to the McIntosh Equity Exchange at Watauga, South Dakota. He
sold 541.83 bushels at Watauga on August 28, 1973, and 5,014.15
bushels on September 11, 1973. For this wheat he received the
market price which was slightly over $4.00 per bushel.

FEE

Defendant did deliver 2,845.68 bushels of wheat to plaintiff
elevator beginning September 5, 1973. The grain was stored
rather than sold outright. The trial court found that defendant
delivered the grain to Thunder Hawk because the pit in the
-elevator at Watauga was full of water; that Trautman offered to
pay defendant the contract price of $2.35 for the wheat in this
delivery; that defendant refused that price and demanded the
return of his wheat; and that this demand was rejected by plain-
tiff.

On December 13, 1978, defendant and Trautman met and it
was agreed that defendant would be paid the contract price for
the 2,845.68 bushels delivered in September. Defendant contends
that this was in full settlement of the contract, but plaintiff
denies this contention. There was no pleading by the defendant of
the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction under SDCL
15-6-8(c), and the trial court’s finding No. 4 on this point cannot be
supported by the pleadings or the record.

Defendant refused to make further deliveries, and plaintiff
sued for damages based on the balance of wheat due under the
contract, and this trial to the court ensued. After hearing the
evidence, the court found for defendant.

Plaintiff argues that even if the term “to August Delivery”
meant up to August 1st, defendant should not have been relieved
of responsibility to deliver under the contract on that date
because the time of delivery was not an essential term in the con-
tract. He cites SDCL 53-10-83 which provides:

“Time is never considered as of the essence of the
contract, unless by its terms expressly so provided.”

"We agree with the plaintiff. In Western Town Site Co. v.
Lamro Town Site Co., 1913, 31 S.D. 47, 189 N.W. 777, this court
had an opportunity to construe SDCL 53-10-3. In that opinion the
following was written:

“Whether time is of the essence of a contract depends
not so much upon the express wording of the particular

302 ee

contract as upon the object and purposes of the agree-
ment.

“It is a question of construction, and, unless it plain-
ly appears that the object and purpose of the contract
depends upon its being performed by a given date, time
will never be construed to be of the essence of the con-
tract.” 31 S.D. at 57, 189 N.W. at 779.

The above language was cited with approval the same year when
a similar question was presented in Phillis v. Gross, 1913, 32 8.D.
438, 143 N.W. 373.

[i In the instant case the memorandum of the agreement
contained only the words “to August Delivery.” There were no
other words which expressly made time of delivery essential to
the contract. The parties differed in their testimony as to what
they interpreted the term to mean. Defendant said that he
thought that all deliveries of wheat had to be made before August ~
1, 1973. Trautman, plaintiff's manager, testified that he thought
that the term meant that deliveries could be made when boxcars
became available and through August 31, 1973. The court found
as a fact that the term was vague and ambiguous. We fail to see
how time of delivery could be considered an essential term of the
contract when the parties themselves had no meeting of the
minds as to what the term meant.

Furthermore, we can find nothing in the record to indicate
that time of delivery was an essential term. We have considered
the “object and purposes of the agreement” as did the court in
Western Town Site, supra. It is clear that at the time of contract-
ing, defendant wanted to sell 10,000 bushels of his wheat at the
contract price, but it does not plainly appear that the entire
agreement was dependent on plaintiff accepting delivery of all of
the grain before August 1, 1973.

It is true that defendant and his wife inquired numerous
times about when deliveries could be made, and each time plain-
tiff’s employees told them that they could not yet accept any of
the wheat. However, this was not due to any bad faith on the part

LU

of plaintiff, but was simply due to the severe shortage of boxcars
which plagued elevators and farmers throughout the midwest
during the summer of 1973.

Defendant claims that the term did go to the essence of the
contract and that he had to make his deliveries before August 1st
in order to insure adequate bin space for the 1973 wheat crop. We
reject this argument for several reasons. First, nowhere in his
testimony does he indicate that he considered the term “to
August Delivery” to be an essential term in the contract when he
entered into the agreement and signed the memo on June 12,
1978. Second, he testified that he had sufficient bin space for the
harvest after he delivered the first 2,500 bushels of wheat to
plaintiff elevator in late July and early August. Third, the record
reveals that defendant sold 541.83 bushels of wheat at Watauga
on August 28th and 5,014.15 bushels on September 11th. The
former sale occurred only one day before plaintiff called for
delivery of the remainder of the 10,000 bushels and the latter sale
occurred 13 days after the plaintiff called for delivery. Had
defendant needed the bin space that desperately, he should have
sold his grain much earlier than August 28th and September
11th. Thus, finding of fact No. 6 by the trial court was clearly er-
roneous as not being supported by the record. SDCL 15-6-52(a).
The only conclusion that can be reached is that defendant's deci-
sion to deliver to Watauga rather than to plaintiff elevator was"
influenced more by the sharp rise in the market price of wheat
than a shortage of bin space on his farm.

Plaintiff elevator, on the other hand, upon contracting to buy
10,000 bushels of wheat at $2.30 per bushel on June 12, 1978, from
Dobitz, immediately sold that amount of wheat at the going
market price in a hedging operation. Any profits from the rising
market went to speculators in wheat futures in the commodities
market and not to plaintiff. This is not unusual as elevators tradi-
tionally resort to this hedging device in order to maintain a con-
stant profit from their processing without concern for fluctua-
tions in the market. ;

The conclusion that the delivery term was not essential to
the contract is further supported by defendant’s own actions in

304 po

making the initial deliveries to plaintiff elevator. He started haul-
ing wheat on July 28, 1973, and continued to have his trucker
make deliveries through the 9th day of August. This may or may
not have constituted a waiver of the delivery term in the con-
tract. See SDCL 57-83-22 and 57-3-23. What it does show is that
defendant himself could not have felt that the term “to August
Delivery” was that essential as he continued to deliver wheat
pursuant to contract during the first nine days of August.

We therefore hold that the court erred in concluding that the
term “to August Delivery” went to the essence of the contract
and relieved defendant of his contractual obligations after
August 1, 1973. We are convinced that the delivery term was not
essential and that defendant breached the contract by refusing to
deliver the balance of the wheat called for in the contract. See
Nelson v. Glasoe, 1975, N.D., 231 N.W.2d 766; Farmers Elevator
Company v. David, 1975, N.D., 234 N.W.2d 26.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is
remanded for trial on the issue of damages under SDCL 57-8-34. °

All the Justices concur.

LANDRUM, Guardian of George A. Landrum II, Appellant v.
DeBRUYCKER et ux, Respondents

LANDRUM, Appellant v. DeBRUYCKER et ux, Respondents
(240 N.W.2d 119)

(File No. 11642. Opinion filed March 30, 1976)

805

John Mattson of Driscoll, Mattson & Rachetto, Deadwood,
for plaintiffs and appellants.

Thomas E. Simmons and Allen G. Nelson of Bangs, Mc-
Cullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, Rapid City, for defendants and
respondents.

306 Pel

WINANS, Justice.

These two actions were consolidated for purposes of trial.
They are concerned with an accident in which a Volkswagen auto
driven by a sixteen-year-old youth collided with a Black Angus
cow and a calf on a dark highway near Mount Rushmore,
resulting in physical injury to the youth and death to the two
animals. Two questions have been raised on appeal from a trial in
which the jury found for Defendants and against Plaintiff on all of
the issues. The first question relates to the trial judge’s refusal to
admit into evidence testimony concerning repairs to a cattle
guard through which the cattle in question might have exited on-
to the highway. Plaintiff contends that the repairs made shortly
after the accident would indicate Defendants’ control over and
responsibility for the cattle guards and would also impeach
Defendant Ray DeBruycker’s testimony. The second question
relates to the trial judge’s refusal to give a jury instruction on
concurrent negligence, based on a South Dakota Pattern Jury In-
struction, and requested by Plaintiff's counsel. Although we af-
firm the trial judge’s decision with regard to the admission of
evidence on safety repairs subsequent to the accident, we find
that his refusal to give the requested instruction on concurrent
negligence was prejudicial ‘error and we therefore reverse.

On the evening of June 19, 1973, George A. Landrum II, son
of Plaintiff George A. Landrum, accompanied by two companions,
was driving a Volkswagen automobile owned by his father from
his summer employment at Rushmore Cave in the Black Hills
toward Rapid City. Young Landrum at this time was sixteen and
had recently been allowed the use of the car by his father. At ap-
proximately 9:45 about one mile from the Keystone Wye on four
Jane Highway 16 the Landrum vehicle collided with a Black
Angus cow and a calf. Landrum suffered injuries which required
hospitalization and surgery and resulted in the partial loss of vi-
sion in his left eye. Landrum’'s father incurred his son’s medical,
hospital and related expenses and the loss of the Volkswagen
auto. The father brought two actions, one of them as his son’s
guardian, against Ray and Janet DeBruycker who were the
owners of the dead cattle and the owners and lessees of property
adjacent to the highway from which the cattle apparently

es 307

entered upon the road.

Defendants admit ownership of the cattle. These cattle at
the time of the accident were grazing on U.S. Forest Service land
adjacent to the road, land for which the DeBruyckers had a graz-
ing permit. There is an enclosure consisting of a wire fence, gates
and cattle guards running along the highway. At trial Plaintiff in-
troduced evidence through the testimony of several witnesses
that there was a break in the fence enclosing the DeBruycker
cattle and that there had been damage to a cattle guard, both ata
point near the scene of the accident. Further testimony indicated
that there were cattle tracks through the damaged cattle guard.

Defendant Ray DeBruycker testified at trial that he under-
stood it was his duty to maintain the fence on the forest permit
land. In fact, the Forest Service grazing permit issued to the
DeBruyckers for the land in question was introduced into
evidence and in it is found the following language:

“The permittee is responsible for the maintenance or his
proportionate share of the maintenance of the range im-
provements which are essential to the proper manage-
ment of the Bitter Creek and Gordon Gulch Allotments
and are listed in the Allotment Management Plan.”

Ray DeBruycker at trial said that the fence and enclosures
separating his permit area from Highway 16 consisted of a four-
wire fence, four cattle guards with adjacent gates and one gate
without a cattle guard.

DeBruycker also testified that although he previously
repaired the fences, prior to the accident he had done no work on
the gates and guards. There was testimony from a Forest Service
employee that loggers had damaged the cattle guard closest to
the scene of the accident in which the Landrum youth was injured
and that the Forest Service had requested the loggers to make
the necessary repairs. Ray DeBruycker, however, testified that
he had had no knowledge that loggers had caused any such
damage.

308 es

The first issue raised by Plaintiff on appeal is whether or not
the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to allow
Plaintiff to introduce evidence of repairs made to the cattle guard
near the accident’ site by Defendants on the day following the
VW-cattle collision. Plaintiff asserts that he had been prepared to
present testimony proving that Ray DeBruycker on the day after
the accident repaired the cattle guard in question by affixing pine
posts to the guard where it was bent. He urged the trial court
that this was proper testimony in order to show who had control
of the guard and whose responsibility it was to maintain it. The
court ruled such evidence inadmissible.

[i The rule that post-accident changes or repairs are not ad-
missible to show negligence is not before us. All are in agreement
that this is so. In fact, it has been stated that evidence of post-
accident repairs or changes is properly introduced for any pur-
pose except to demonstrate the negligence of a defendant. See
Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 1970, 7 Cir., 419 F.2d 1028.
Nevertheless, the admission of such evidence to establish control,
or for any other acceptable reason, can be highly prejudicial and
remains within the discretion of the trial judge. See Powers v.
J. B. Michael and Co., 1964, 6 Cir., 329 F.2d 674. McCormick has
noted that “before admitting the evidence [of subsequent repairs]
for any of these other purposes, the court should be satisfied that
the issue on which it is offered is of substantial importance and is
actually, and not merely formally in dispute, that the plaintiff
cannot establish the fact to be inferred conveniently by other
proof, and consequently that the need for the evidence outweighs
the danger of its misuse.” McCormick, Evidence 2d, 668-669.
Defendants did not maintain that they had no control over the
cattle guards nor did they deny duty to maintain them. An
understanding of the terms of the Forest Service permit re-
quirements was not in dispute. Those terms, as set out above and
as introduced into evidence by Plaintiff, would imply sufficient
control and duty on part of Defendants to take this question out
of the realm of actual dispute.

Hi Plaintiff also asserted that the evidence of subsequent
repairs to the cattle guard was necessary to impeach testimony of
the defendant. We find nothing in the record or in Plaintiff-

Appellant’s briefs to support this contention.

As Mr. Justice Coler has recently noted for this Court,

“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury * * *.’” Moore v. Kluthe & Lane Ins.
Agency, Inc., 1975, 89 S.D. 419, 234 N.W.2d 260, 268.

Taking into consideration the discretion of the trial judge, the
other evidence in the record tending to establish duty and control
and the absence of a need to impeach Defendant's testimony, we
cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous in excluding
testimony on repairs made subsequent to the accident.

Hl Plaintiff proposed the following instruction, which was
rejected by the trial court:

“More than one person may be responsible for caus-
ing injury to another. If you find that the defendant was
negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause
of the accident involved herein, it is not a defense that
some third person, not a party to this action, was or may
have been partly responsible.”

This instruction was drawn from South Dakota Pattern Jury In-
structions, Vol. 1, #12.04. It cannot be doubted that concurrent
negligence, a doctrine well established in our state, was a ques-
tion in this case. Plaintiff's witness, Curtis Bates, an employee of
the United States Forest Service, testified as follows:

“Q. Did you know about this damage prior to the acci-
dent?
A. Yes.

Q. In your mind had you made any steps to have the
cattle guard repaired by your conduct?

A. Only to the extent that in our contracts with log-
gers they are required to repair any damage to im-
provements that they cause.

Q. You were looking to the loggers to repair that
cattle guard?

A. Yes. This was a definite understanding that they
had, that they would repair that cattle guard.”

This testimony before the jury was sufficient to raise the ques-
tion of the responsibility of individuals other than the defendants
to care for the cattle guard which was admittedly in a damaged
condition for an extended period before the accident in question
and through which the cow and calf possibly escaped. The re-
quested instruction was consequently in order and we find that
refusal to give it was prejudicial error. As we noted in Miller v.
Baken Park, Inc., 1970, 84 S.D. 624, 175 N.W.2d 605, “[rlefusal to
give a requested instruction setting forth law applicable thereto.
is not only error but prejudicial error.” The law encompassed in *
Plaintiff's requested instruction was applicable to the case at
hand and Plaintiff had a right to have the instruction given to the
jury. There was a clear statement by a witness at trial that the
Forest Service looked to the loggers to repair the cattle guard
and we cannot say that such testimony coming from a Forest Ser-
vice employee had no bearing on the jury’s verdict.

The judgment appealed from is reversed.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN, J., concur.

COLER, J., dissents.

COLER, Justice (dissenting).

I would affirm the judgment based on the jury verdict. While
Tagree that, having submitted the case to the jury, the trial court
erred in failing to give the requested jury instruction on concur-

rent negligence, I do not find from a review of the record that the
appellants have met the burden of proof required to show that

a

the error was prejudicial. The jury was adequately instructed as
to the duty of the defendant rancher, proximate cause and con-
tributory negligence.

It is uncontroverted that George A. Landrum II, the driver
of the Volkswagen of an unidentified vintage, proceeding from
the Keystone Wye, on a downhill grade of a four-lane highway,
pushed the vehicle to its top speed for a distance of three-
quarters of a mile to one mile. Although young Landrum testified
that the top speed was 60 miles an hour, the jury, weighing that
testimony, was not bound by his opinion as to the speed obtained,
as no witness looked at the speedometer. This court, in Dwyer v.
Christensen, 1958, 77 S.D. 381, 92 N.W.2d 199, summarized our
rules relative to prejudicial error and stated:

“Error may not be presumed on an appeal. Hardman v.
Lasell, 55 S.D. 176, 225 N.W. 301. Plaintiff having
alleged error must affirmatively establish the existence
of such by the record. Kent v. Dakota Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 2 S.D. 300, 50 N.W. 85. It is incumbent upon ap-
pellant to show not only error but error prejudicial to
him. To show such prejudicial error an appellant must
establish affirmatively from the record that under the
evidence the jury might and probably would have
returned a different verdict if the alleged error had not
occurred.” Dwyer v. Christensen, supra, at 385, 92
N.W.2d at 201.

Not every error in the failure to give instructions constitutes
prejudicial and, therefore, reversible error. It is only when the in-
struction is on a legal question of such importance as applied to
the facts in the individual case that it can be held to be pre-
judicial. Miller v. Baken Park, Inc., 1970, 84 S.D. 624, 175 N.W.2d
605.

Considering the admitted contributory negligence which
was more than slight, I do not see the record establishing the
possibility that “the jury might and probably would have re-
turned a different verdict if the alleged error had not occurred.”
Dwyer v. Christensen, supra.

MATTER OF HEUERMANN

(240 N.W.2d 603)

(File No. 11682. Opinion filed March 30, 1976)

es 313

ee
Eugene C. Mahoney of Doyle & Mahoney, Ellsworth E.

Evans, of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for
petitioner.

Fred J. Homeyer, Pierre, for Judicial Qualifications Commis-
sion.

BY THE COURT.

In 1972 the people of this state adopted Article V of the
South Dakota Constitution, the Judicial Article. Section 9 of that
Article provides that the legislature should create a judicial
qualifications commission. The section states:

“On recommendation of the judicial qualifications com-
mission the Supreme Court, after hearing, may censure,
remove or retire a justice or judge for action which con-
stitutes willful misconduct in office, willful and persis-
tent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemper-
ance, disability that seriously interferes with the perfor-
mance of the duties or conduct prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice which brings a judicial office into
disrepute.”

The legislature in 1973 adopted SDCL 16-1A-1 through
16-1A-13, the Judicial Qualifications Act (Act) which vitalized the
amendment. This court thereafter promulgated rules of pro-
cedure. See SDCL 16-1A Appendix.

After a hearing on a complaint against the petitioner, the
Judicial Qualifications Commission (Commission) recommended
that this court impose censure upon the petitioner “because his
conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice which

my

brought his judicial office into disrepute.

1. The findings of the Commission, in pertinent part, are set forth as follows:

“Count I sets forth several proceedings to determine inheritance taxes,
wherein Mrs. Heuermann was the attorney for the applicant and the orders
issued by Judge Heuermann either found no inheritance tax due or ordered
payment of the stipulated tax. The Commission feels these matters were per-

netory and routine in nature. They could have been performed by a
ministerial officer.

“In some guardianship proceedings, accounts were submitted which required
or requested that attorney's fees to Mrs. Heuermann be fixed.

“In several regular or special probate matters the Court was asked to fix and
direct payment of attorney’s fees to Mrs. Heuermann as Counsel. The record is
often uncertain as to the extent Judge Heuermann actually exercised his
authority to fix her attorney fees. However, it appears undisputed he retained
the power to make such determinations. The Commission feels that his failure
to disqualify himself as to such matters is significant. The shadow of the Court's
power is potent even when the record is uncertain as to the extent it played in
actually setting the fee.

“The charges in Count VI concerning the Farnsworth estate were supported
by evidence which indicated a clear situation where Judge Heuermann showed

‘oss indiscretion in appointing his wife as attorney for the minors and in not
lisqualifying himself in fixing fees for the attorneys.

“SDCL 16-18-3 signals a clear legislative intent that no Judge of a probate
gourt is to benefit financially either directly or indirectly from his functions as a

judge.

“Judge Heuermann testified on direct examination:

‘Q. By the way, how do you handle your spending affairs? Does Laura have her
own bank account, so to speak?
We have a Trust Account’
No, just answer my question.
Yes.
Does she?

es.
And do you and Laura have a joint account that each of you can draw out
of

Yes,

And is that what us old fellows call a grocery aecount?

Yes.
“On Cross-Examination by Mr. Homeyer, Judge Heuermann said this:

Pop SpepeD>

‘Q. Judge Heuermann, as I understood you to say, why your wife maintains a
separate bank account in which she puts the fees which she earns in the
practice of law, is that right?

A. That's right.

Does she use that for her own support, i thatit, or where does it eventual
ly wind up?

A. She does whatever she wants to do with it.

Q. In other words, does she buy clothes with it? Does she—

A. To the best of my knowledge, if she wants to buy clothes, she would put it
in our joint account first. I imagine she—I know she must make transfers
of it on occasion.

Does she use it to educate the children?

pe

Basically, she has paid for most of the education of the children, yes.

ee

The issues which we must resolve in determining whether to
impose a penalty reflect the fact that this is the first case to arise
under the Act. The parties have not, unfortunately, briefed all of
these issues, but their resolution is a prerequisite to action by

this court. The issues to be resolved are (1) the proper standard of _

Q. Then to that extent, at least, she has relieved you of that responsibility?
She assists?

Well, Teouldn’t give you a breakdown, but I know she has paid for the bulk
of it.

. b your income tax return, do you file a joint income tax return?

es, sir,

. And in that is included the salary you receive as County District Judge?
. Yes, sir.

Aad the amount she receives in the practice of law?
. Yes, sir.

“It appears that at least part of the fees received by Laura Heuermann from
matters heard and determined by Judge Heuermann reached their joint check-
ing account, This money was used for groceries, clothes and education and
either directly benefited the Judge or diminished his legal responsibilities of
support. Apparently, joint rather than separate income tax returns were found
advantageous.

“This impropriety was aggravated in the matter of the estate of Johannes W.
Swart a/k/a J. W. Swart deceased, bearing file Number 20379. (See at e C+#4 of
transcript). Judge Heuermann was a witness to decedent's Will. With the ex-
ception of proving the Will, he presided over all proceedings involved in the pro-
bate of this estate. He was requested to fix the fees for, his wife who was the
sole attorney throughout. This did violence to the obvious intent and purpose of
SDCL 16-9-23. We see no justification in the claim that no Judge advised him
these practices were wrong or that 20 one was damaged therefrom.

POPOPO p>

“Count II alleges that Judge Heuermann improperly accompanied law en-
forcement officers to Florida to return four runaway boys and thereafter sat as
the Judge at their hearings. It appears from the testimony of Judge Heuermann
that this occasion in December 1973 was the first in over thirteen and one-half
years on the bench that he found it necessary or advisable to accompany law en-
Yorcement officers to return juvenile subjects.

“It seems ironic that this trip was at a time when the more moderate Florida
climate coincided with the Miami Dolphins playing a home game which he found
convenient to attend. This trip was financed in part by the Bounty and partly by
some of the parents of the returned boys. The parents of these boys were not
then in a position to object to this captive expense since Judge Heuermann sat
in disposition of the cases. The surprising part of this Count is that Judge
Heuermann does not seem to recognize or concede how it could adversely tar-
nish the image of the Court. He seemed to mitigate the experience by two fac-
tors: (1) he paid for the football game tickets and (2) the boys had the benefit of
visiting with him while traveling home.

‘FINDING II

“Count IV. The thrust of this charge is a letter (Ex. 43) from Judge William H.
Heuermann to Attorney Peder K. Ecker of Sioux Falls relating to a juvenile
matter. The most objectionable part of this letter was Paragraph 2 of Page 2
which reads as follows:

"Your letter to Mr. Bahnson was replete with errors, misconceptions,
and unworthy of a member of the South Dakota State Bar. He did not
release this boy from the Training School, and he helped effect his
return, Upon learning of the boy’s release, he contacted the mother,
who advised that the boy was going into the Air Force’

316

proof, (2) the proper scope of review of the Commission's findings
of fact and recommendation, (3) whether the imposition of a penal-
ty is justified by the facts of this case, and (4) finally, whether the
Commission and this court lack the authority to consider actions
which occurred before the effective date of the Act.

Standard of Proof.
Il The first issue we consider is appropriate standard of

“Judge Heuermann mailed copies of that letter to Mr. Ed Lacy of Trent, South
Dakota, the victim of the offense and Mr. and Mrs. Irvin Dubbelde of Sioux
Falls, South Dakota, clients of Mr. Ecker. Obviously the tone of this letter was
not consistent with what is expected of a Judge of a Court of record to a
member of the bar who disagrees with his review of the law. Mailing copies of
the improvident language to lay people and clients was an aggravating eir
cumstance.

“FINDING IV

“In addition to the original Counts, an additional charge known as Count VIII
alleges that Keith B. Schenkel, a juvenile delinquent, was arrested March 8
1966, for forgery.

“Judge Heuermann sentenced him to one year in the County jail, but suspend-
ed it on condition he return to the Army and stay out of South Dakota for one
year. He underwent plastic surgery at the Great Lakes Naval Hospital. While
convaleseing, he returned to Sioux Falls in violation of the suspension. It ap-
pears that without being heard, his suspended sentence was revoked and he
was placed in jail for about one year. While the treatment accorded this juvenile
and his mother offends our basic concepts of fairness and courtesy, this may, as
claimed, have been due to a heavy workload. By current standards such a sum-
mary disposition would be highly improper. Bernal v. Hershman (Wis.) [54
Wis.2d 626] 196 N.W.2d 721.

“In retrospect we then had the benefit of State v. Blder (S.D.) (77 8.D. 540] 95
N.W.2d [592] 594 holding that revocation of an adult's probation must be based
on a factual showing sufficient to justify the exercise of the Court’s discretion,
but that otherwise no particular source, manner or degree of proof was re-
quired. However, the law did not then clearly extend fo juveniles the same
rights afforded adults. Kent v. U.S., 383 US 541, 16 L ed 2d 84, 86 SCt 1045
decided in 1966, and In Re Gault 387 US 1, 18 L ed 2d 527, 87 SCt 1428 decided in
1967 announced that juvenile delinquency proceedings which may lead to com-
mitment must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.

“Regardless of the legal rights and status of juveniles during the time here in-
volved, the Commission wishes to emphasize that judicial inattention or indif-
ference to the basic rights of juveniles as appears in this record should never be

condoned.
“CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

“William Hl. Heuermann testified in his own behalf. The Commission gathered
that he regarded the charges as frivolous and an unwarranted demand on his
time. The Commission does not share that feeling. His attitude, particularly
towards the Examiner, seemed belligerent. This was not appreciated. The Ex-
aminer did his job in a dignified and gentlemanly manner. Based on the above
findings and the Commission finding good cause, it is the unanimous recommen-
dation of this Commission that Judge William H. Heuermann be censured as to
Counts I, 11, IV, V, VI and VIII because his conduct was prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice which brought his judicial office into disrepute.”

SS

proof in proceedings under the Act. We note that it would be in-
apposite to require proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” as this is
not a criminal prosecution. Proof by a mere preponderance of the
evidence is also inapposite because of the severity of the sanction
which can be imposed. We conclude that the proper standard of
proof is by “clear and convincing evidence.” Such a standard pro-
vides adequate protection for the party subject to charges, but at
the same time does not demand so much evidence that the ability
of the Commission and this court to effectively oversee the
judiciary is impaired. We note that this standard has been

~“ adopted in Alaska and California, upon whose statutes our own is
based.? See In Re Hanson, 1975, Alaska, 582 P.2d 303; Geiler v.
Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 1973, 10 Cal.3d 270, 110
Cal.Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1. See also, In Re Haggerty, 1970, 257 La.
1, 241 So.2d 469, 479; In Re Diener, 1973, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d
587; In Re Rome, 1975, 218 Kan. 198, 542 P.2d 676.

Scope of Review.

Il We next consider the proper scope of review of the Com-
mission’s findings and recommendation. A single state, Alaska,
briefly adopted the “substantial evidence” rule. In Re Robson,
1972, Alaska, 500 P.2d 657, 659. However, Alaska retreated from
that stand in 1975 to recognize that the Supreme Court had an
obligation to undertake “an independent evaluation of the
evidence and the recommendation of the Commission.” In Re
Hanson, 532 P.2d at 308. In so doing, Alaska fell in line with vir-
tually every other state which had considered the question, i
cluding California, Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifica-
tions, supra, and Maryland, In Re Diener, supra.

The rationale for requiring an independent evaluation of the
evidence and recommendation is that the Act puts the burden of
imposing the sanction squarely on the Supreme Court; the Com-
mission has power only to recommend. With the power to impose

2. We find that the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure in appellate pro-
ceedings before the Supreme Court would clearly be “inappropriate” with
regard to this issue. See Appendix to Chapter 16-1A, Rule 19(c). Such applica-
tion would presumably result in the use of the “clearly erroneous” rule, SDCL
156-52(a), which would obviously be inconsistent with the duty imposed upon
this court to impose the final sanction. See the text accompanying footnote 3.

318

a punishment comes the concomitant obligation to conduct an in-
dependent inquiry into the evidence to determine whether that
evidence merits imposition of the sanction recommended.*

Thus, in every case brought to this court on a recommenda-
tion from the Commission, we must determine whether the
evidence clearly and convincingly proves that the petitioner
engaged in conduct which, upon our independent inquiry, merits
the imposition of the sanction recommended.

Evidence.

[i With this standard in mind, we will briefly summarize the
results of our inquiry. It is undisputed that petitioner’s wife, a
practicing attorney, frequently appeared before the petitioner in
probate and guardianship matters. This conduct extends back in
time for at least a decade and continued even after the complaint
had been filed against the petitioner.* Furthermore, the peti-
tioner by his own admission persistently violated SDCL 16-18-3 in
that his wife deposited the proceeds of fees realized from practic-
ing in petitioner’s court in a joint checking account, and other-
wise used the funds to pay obligations such as the education of
their children, which fees resulted in a direct financial benefit to
the petitioner (see petitioner's testimony set forth in footnote 1).

In each of the cases referred to, the petitioner approved the
fee to be paid to his wife. In at least one case, the petitioner's wife
submitted a brief to the petitioner on whether a will should be ad-
mitted to probate, a matter which was indisputably contested.
She also participated in the questioning of witnesses before him
in that case.

It is also clear that the petitioner once wrote a letter strong-
ly criticizing a Sioux Falls attorney and sent a copy of the letter
to the attorney’s client. The original of the letter was sent to

3, We reject application of the Rules of Civil Procedure in appellate proceedings
to this issue for the reasons cited in the text above and in footnote 2.

4, _It will be noted that this conduet is now explicitly forbidden by the South
Dakota Gode of Judicial Conduct, Ganon SCUa\ii). Judge Heuermann has
assured the Commission that his wife no longer appears before him.

319

parties who were considering suits against the particular client,
and the letter strongly urged that the suit under consideration be
commenced.

Furthermore, it appears that the petitioner, without a hear-
ing and without attention to the rudiments of fairness, once
revoked a suspension of a one-year sentence imposed upon a
juvenile. In so doing the petitioner refused even to speak to the
young man (who was home on leave from the army) or to his
mother although the mother waited long hours outside of the
petitioner's door after her son was incarcerated. We cannot con-
done the rude and indifferent manner in which judicial action was
so summarily taken. See In Re Rome, 542 P.2d at 685. See also the
discussion at footnote 1, Finding IV.

Finally, the petitioner traveled to Miami, Florida, in
December of 1973, ostensibly to pick up four runaway boys. Dur-
ing that trip he attended a home game of the Miami Dolphins (at
his own expense). The trip was otherwise paid for in part by the
county and in part by certain of the parents of the boys. The peti-
tioner attempted to justify the trip by reasoning that the boys
had the benefit of his company on the return trip and that he
gained some understanding of them through it. While this ex-
planation has surface appeal, we reject it because of the unique
timing and destination of the travel. Furthermore, this was the
first trip of its sort made by the petitioner in over thirteen years
on the bench. It is clear that the trip was, in fact, a junket sub-
sidized by the taxpayers and the parents of the juvenile boys.

Each incident or series of incidents reviewed above speaks
for itself; each is of the quality which seriously undermines the
judicial office.

We therefore conclude that the foregoing actions constitute
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings
a judicial office into disrepute. South Dakota Constitution, Art. V,
§ 9. Furthermore, we conclude, as did the Commission, that cen-
sure is the appropriate sanction for this conduct.*

5. Because the facts do not merit it, we do not consider whether we could impose :

a sanction greater than that recommended by the Commission. See In Re
Diener, supra; In Re Robson, supra.

320 es

Actions Before Effective Date of the Act.

[i The final issue before us is whether the Commission and
this court can properly consider incidents which occurred before
the effective date of the Act.

We note as a preliminary matter that not all of the conduct
complained of occurred before the effective date of the Act, July
1, 1973. Indeed, the petitioner’s wife continued to practice before
him even after the complaint against the petitioner was filed on
March 22, 1974.

Other conduct, however, did take place before the July 1,
1978 date. The petitioner does not argue that the legislature did
not have the power to allow the Commission and this court to con-
sider pre-enactment behavior. He argues only that the legislature
did not clearly evidence an intent that such behavior be con-
sidered and that without such evidence this statute may not be so
applied.®

Our examination of the Act, however, reveals in its various
provisions a clearly expressed intent that it is to apply to of-
fenses predating its existence.

6. Petitioner thus apparently concedes that legislative schemes which are in-
tended to regulate membership of the professions and which set up boards with
authority to consider pre-enactment matters are not invalid as in conflict with
the ex post facto provisions of Art. VI, § 12 of the South Dakota Constitution, or
Art. I, § 10 of the United States Constitution. The ground commonly given is
that such schemes are not penal in purpose but rather their intent is to protect
the public from those unsuited to practice a particular profession. See In Re
Craven, 1930, 178 La. 372, 151 So. 625 (lawyer); Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n
v. Drewry, 1984, 161 Va. 883, 172 S.B. 282 (lawyer); Smith v. State of California,
1964, 9 Cir., 836 F.2d 630 (professional engineer; Hollingsworth v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 1961, 188 Cal.App.2d 172, 10 Cal. Rptr. $43 (doctors); Murrill
v. State Board of Accountancy, 1960, 97 Cal-App-2d 709, 218 P.2d 969 laccoun-
tants). See also Keiser v. Bell, 1971, D.C.Pa., 382 F Supp. 608, in which the court,
in an apparent departure trom the rationale of the eases eited above, deter.
mined that the removal of a judge was, in fact, penal in nature. The court found,
however, that the particular enactment did not deprive the judge of any
substantial procedural protections which he possessed before the enactment.
Hence, although the law allowed for consideration of pre-enactment activities, it
did not violate the ex post facto prohibition. See American Inv. Co. v. County of
Beadle, 5 S.D. 410, 69 N.W. 213; In Re Scott's Estate, 1965, 81 .D. 281, 183

|W.

ee Ea

SDCL 16-1A-10 provides that a judge is disqualified from act-
ing as a judge while there is a felony charge pending against him.
SDCL 16-1A-12 provides for suspension and removal of a judge on
conviction of a felony. It cannot reasonably be said that the
legislature intended that the court would be without power to
remove felons from judgeships, under these portions of the Act, if
the felony occurred before the effective date of the law. Such an
interpretation would make a mockery of the Act, and we decline
to accept it.

Hl Furthermore, it is a basic principle of statutory con-
struction that an enactment of the legislature is to be considered
as a whole. See Western Surety Co. v. Mydland, 1970, 85 S.D. 172,
179 N.W.2d 3. Thus, if retroactive impact is clearly intended for
some of the provisions of an act, it seems logical to assume that
the legislature intended retroactive impact for them all. “A
statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is
animated by one general purpose and intent.” Sutherland on
Statutory Construction, Vol. 2A, § 46.05.

The construction of the statute as retroactive is greatly
bolstered by an appreciation that the legislature was attempting
to induce reform into the judicial system through passage of the
Judicial Qualifications Act. Can it reasonably be believed that the
Commission created by it was to stand idle when there was work
to be done? We think not.

Therefore, given the clear intent that a significant portion of
the Act is to be applied retroactively and the presumption that
the legislature did not create an organ of reform only so it would
remain idle for a period of years we conclude that the Commission
properly considered the conduct of Judge Heuermann which
occurred before the effective date of the Act.’

Our duty, imposed by the state legislature and by the state

7. We have found it unnecessary to directly consider whether the statute at issue
is a “remedial” statute, thus arguably requiring less evidence of legislative in-
tent to merit retroactive application. See State v. Westling, 1964, 81 8.D. 34, 180
N.W.2d 109; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, § 41.09. See also,
Smith v. Fischer, 1931, 58 S.D. 510, 237 N.W. 718, distinguishing remedial from
penal statutes, and see cases cited in footnote 6.

22

constitution, is to maintain a judiciary which is both respected
and trusted. We must be vigorous in uncovering the actions of an
errant judge, but we must at the same time be careful not to find
error or impose punishment merely to appease a public and a bar
which are now demanding more of their judiciary than ever
before. We share this duty with the Commission, whose pro-
ceedings reveal to us a high degree of competence and dedication
to duty. The Commission’s findings and its recommendation are
approved.

Judge William H. Heuermann is hereby censured for conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice which has brought his
judicial office into disrepute.

It is further ordered that costs be and are hereby assessed
against petitioner.

WINANS, WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., and HANSON,
Retired Justice, concur.

HANSON, Retired Supreme Court Justice, sitting for
DUNN, Chief Justice, disqualified.

JANKLOW, Appellant v. KELLER et al., Respondents
CHRISTIANSEN, Appellant v. KELLER et al., Respondents
(241 N.W.2d 364)

(File Nos. 11588, 11589. Opinion filed April 23, 1976)

823

Charles Rick Johnson of Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, for
plaintiffs and appellants.

D. R. Herman of Herman & Wernke, Gregory, for defendant
and respondent, John Keller.

26

Sidney B. Strange of Strange & Lyons, Sioux Falls, Dennis
Roberts, Oakland, Cal., Mary K. O'Melveny of Cohn, Glickstein,
Lurie, Ostrin & Lubell, New York City, for defendants and
respondents, Mark Lane and William Kunstler.

HALL, Circuit Judge.

The captioned cases, which arise from the same facts and
present the same legal questions, were argued together and will
be dealt with together in this opinion.

Plaintiff-appellants brought these actions seeking damages
from the defendants for deceit and defamation. The trial court
dismissed each action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Basically, the dismissals were on the grounds
that the statements complained of were privileged under SDCL
20-11-5(2) because they were made in a judicial proceeding by
counsel, and the statements had some relation to the judicial pro-
ceeding. Plaintiffs have appealed from the orders of dismissal.
We affirm.

David Hill was a defendant in a state court prosecution
charging him and others with riot, arson and similar offenses aris-
ing out of American Indian demonstrations at Custer, South
Dakota, on February 6, 1973. He was represented by attorneys
Keller, Lane and Kunstler. The plaintiff, William Janklow, was a
special prosecutor handling the criminal action for the State of
South Dakota; the plaintiff, Bernard Christiansen, was an agent
of the Division of Criminal Investigation for the State of South
Dakota and one of the principal witnesses for the state in the
prosecution of the criminal actions. The cases against Hill and
other defendants had been the subject of widespread publicity.

On December 10, 1973, Hill, through his attorneys, filed a
petition with the United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota for removal of the state court criminal action to the
federal court. 28 U.S.C. 1448(1) allows removal of a state criminal
action to federal court upon a showing that the case is “(1)
Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts
of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil

325

rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the
jurisdiction thereof.” The petition was signed by the three
defendants, John Keller, Mark Lane and William Kunstler, as at-
torneys for Hill.

A part of the petition for removal was as follows:

“11 Both before and after September 30, 1973, said
John Fitzgerald, who had indicated that he wished
to assist the Custer defendants, met with Mark
Lane and John Keller, defendant’s attorneys and
other attorneys associated with the defense * * *
as well as with the legal workers thereto. Further-
more, said John Fitzgerald used the facilities of his
office to make xerox copies of the files maintained
by defendant’s lawyers. Moreover, trial strategy
for the Custer cases was discussed by counsel and
defendants in Mr. Fitzgerald’s presence at
meetings held in his office and in the Custer Coun-
ty Jail, among others.

“12. Accordingly, petitioner was shocked to learn in
late November of 1973 that Mr. Fitzgerald said
that he had been appointed chief trial counsel for
the South Dakota Attorney General’s Office. Peti-
tioner was further informed that Mr. Fitzgerald
had been under consideration for said position
prior to many of the said consultations and con-
ferences with defense counsel.

“13. During the early hours of December 1, 1973, John
Keller observed Bernard Christiansen, the chief
witness against petitioner and the alleged victim of
the crimes with which he is charged, drinking and
in an apparently inebriated condition, together
with the said John Fitzgerald and respondent
William Janklow, both of whom were in the same
condition, and others associated with the Attorney
General’s office, including respondent Kermit
Sande, in the bar located in the Alex Johnson
Hotel, Rapid City, South Dakota.

326

“14, Prior thereto and on or about November 20, 1973,
after he had agreed to join the Attorney General’s
staff, Mr. Fitzgerald informed Gail Sullivan, a legal
worker associated with the defense, that respond-
ent William Janklow had called him to discuss the
Custer cases,

“15. This obvious invasion of the defense camp has
deprived petitioner of rights guaranteed to him by
the constitution and laws of the United States.”

Prior to hearing on the petition the news media gave exten-
sive publicity to the contents of Paragraph 13.

The State of South Dakota resisted the petitioner’s motion
for removal of the case to federal court and filed a motion to re-
mand the action to the state courts. An evidentiary hearing was
held in the United States District Court in December of 1973, and
the Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, Judge of the United States
District Court, denied the motion for removal and remanded
Hill’s case to the state courts for trial.

In his memorandum opinion, Judge Bogue commented as to
the above-quoted statements in Hill’s petition as follows:

“On the stand in this action, Mr. Keller admitted that
when he signed the petition he had not read the petition,
in direct violation of the dictates of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, when
questioned about the ‘apparently inebriated’ condition
of the respondents, Mr. Keller said that his definition of
‘apparently inebriated’ was anyone who had one drink.
Furthermore, he stated he assumed that anyone who
was in a bar at any late hour must be drunk. This was so
even though the bar in which the respondents were in, is
also a restaurant. In fact, it is undisputed that Mr.
Janklow does not drink at all. Furthermore, there is no
question but that Mr. Christiansen had had nothing to
drink at all. This Court must simply say that the
testimony of John Keller is not believable and will be re-
jected in totality.”

327

By separate complaints, each of the plaintiffs instituted suit
against the defendants. Each complaint is in two counts. Count I
is based on the theory of deceit under SDCL 16-18-19, 16-18-26(1)
and 16-19-3, alleging that the statements in the petition, and par-
ticularly Paragraph 13 thereof, were unlawful, intentional,
wrongful and malicious; that the defendants knew, or should have
known, that the statements relative to each plaintiff were false
and irrelevant; that the statements were made to injure the plain-
tiff and to falsely mislead the United States District Court and
the state courts of South Dakota. Each plaintiff in Count I alleged
damages, including mental anguish, damage to credibility and
profession, and asked for one million dollars actual damages
trebled, and exemplary damages of one million dollars.

Count II of each complaint is based on defamation and libel.
Count II in each complaint realleged the matters set forth in
Count I, and alleged that the publication in the petition for
removal was not privileged because it was knowingly false, made
maliciously with an intent to disgrace and injure the plaintiff, was
totally immaterial and irrelevant to any judicial purpose, and
brought about unnecessary publicity of irrelevant matters. Each
plaintiff, by his cause of action set forth in Count II of his com-
plaint, seeks judgment against the defendants for actual damages
in the amount of one million dollars, and one million dollars ex-
emplary damages.

The defendants moved to dismiss each of the actions on the
ground, among others, that the complaints failed to state a cause
of action upon which relief could be granted. Judge James R.
Bandy granted the motions to dismiss in each case. It is from the
orders of dismissal that these appeals have been taken.

The trial court in dismissing each action accepted defend-
ants’ contention that the statements in Paragraph 18 of the peti-
tion for removal were privileged communication within the
definition of SDCL 20-11-5(2), and the defendants were thereby
granted absolute immunity.

Plaintiffs take a position that under the circumstances here
shown the offending statements were not privileged under SDCL

328

20-11-5(2) to justify the dismissals under absolute immunity. The
pertinent part of SDCL 20-11-5 provides as follows:

“A privileged communication is one made:
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty;

(2) In any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any
other official proceeding authorized by law * * *.”

Restatement, Torts, at page 229 states:
“§ 586. ATTORNEYS AT LAW.

“An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to
publish false and defamatory matter of another in com-
munications preliminary to a proposed, judicial pro-
ceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and
as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he par-
ticipates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto.

Comment:

“a. The privilege stated in this Section is based
upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officer's
of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to
secure justice for their clients. Therefore the privilege
is absolute. It protects the attorney from liability in an
action for defamation irrespective of his purpose in
publishing the defamatory matter, his belief in its truth
or even his knowledge of its falsity. These matters are
of importance only in determining the amenability of the
attorney to the disciplinary power of the court of which
he is an officer. The publication of defamatory matter by
an attorney is protected not only when made in the in-
stitution of the proceedings or in the conduct of litiga-
tion before a judicial tribunal, but in conferences and
other communications preliminary thereto. The institu-
tion of a judicial proceeding includes all pleadings and
affidavits necessary to set the judicial machinery in mo-

Ss

tion. The conduct of the litigation includes the examina-
tion and cross-examination of witnesses, comments upon
the evidence and arguments both oral and written upon
the evidence, whether made to court or jury.

* * * * * *

“c. Relation of statement to proceedings. The privi-
lege stated in this Section is confined to statements
made by an attorney while performing his function as
such. Therefore it is available only when the defamatory
matter has some reference to the subject matter of the
pending litigation, although it need not be strictly perti-
nent or relevant to any issue involved therein. Thus, the
fact that the defamatory publication is an unwarranted
inference from the evidence is not enough to deprive the
attorney of his privilege. So too, the publication of
defamatory matter in a question to a witness may be
within the privilege although the question is withdrawn
or the witness is directed by the judge not to answer it.
On the other hand, the privilege does not cover the at-
torney’s publication of defamatory matter which has no
connection whatever with the litigation.

“d. Judicial proceedings include all proceedings
before an officer or other tribunal exercising a judicial
function, as to which see § 585, Comments c and f.”

Because the above-quoted portion of SDCL 20-11-5 is iden-
tical to a portion of § 47 of California’s Civil Code counsel have
covered extensively the California cases in their briefs and
arguments. See Thornton v. Rhoden, 1966, 245 Cal.App.2d 80, 53
Cal.Rptr. 706; Smith v. Hatch, 1969, 271 Cal.App.2d 39, 76
Cal.Rptr. 350; Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,
1973, 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718; Frisk v. Merrihew,
1974, 42 Cal.App.3d 319, 116 Cal.Rptr. 781, and cases cited in
those decisions in which the California courts have dealt in length
with the absolute privilege granted under the language of SDCL
20-11-5(2), and the subject of § 586, Restatement, Torts.

The application of the absolute privilege granted by
SDCL 20-11-5(2) can best be understood by considering the pur-

330

pose for which the privilege was established. As indicated in the
comment under § 586, Restatement, Torts, above, the purpose is
to secure justice by affording attorneys the freedom to represent
their clients without the fear of harassment through defamation
suits. “‘***[I]t is not intended to protect malicious and un-
truthful persons, but * * * to protect persons * * * who under a
different rule would be liable, not perhaps to verdicts and
judgments against them, but to the vexation of defending
actions.” Friedman v. Knecht, 1967, 248 Cal.App.2d 455, 56
Cal.-Rptr. 540. :

“The obvious purpose * * * is to afford litigants freedom
of access to the courts to secure and defend their rights
without fear of being harassed by actions for defamation
(citations) and to promote the unfettered administration
of justice even though as an incidental result it may in
some instances provide an immunity to the evil-disposed
and malignant slanderer (citations).” Bradley v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 106
Cal.Rptr. 718, 721.

SDCL 20-11-5(1) and (2) have been considered by this court in
the case of Hackworth v. Larson, 1969, 83 S.D. 674, 165 N.W.2d
705, and Brech v. Seacat, 1969, 84 S.D. 264, 170 N.W.2d 348.
Hackworth v. Larson involved a claim for defamation arising
from a press release issued by Miss Larson, as Secretary of State,
concerning the discharge of ‘two employees. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendant and this court af-
firmed, holding that in issuing the press release in question
defendant: Larson enjoyed the absolute privilege offered by the
statute, even if the press release contained false and inaccurate
statements, and that “discovery concerning the truth of the
release or her purpose and state of mind in issuing it would be
meaningless.” Brech v. Seacat, supra, involved a claim for
damages for statements made by a sentencing judge in a letter to
the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, and to the Warden of the
State Penitentiary, concerning the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the crime to which plaintiff's husband had
pleaded guilty, and concerning the criminal defendant’s habits,
disposition and reputation. The plaintiff's complaint alleges that

331

‘the statements were false and maliciously made. In holding that
the defamation action was properly dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted, this court, quoting
with approval from Restatement, Torts, § 585, as to judicial of-
ficers, held that statements made by the judge were absolutely
privileged under SDCL 20-11-5.

| | In granting summary judgment in Hackworth and
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted in Brech, the trial courts held that the defendant in each
case was entitled to the protection of the absolute privilege as a
matter of law, and no issue was presented for submission to the
jury. In granting summary judgment or such dismissals, a court
must view the pleadings and evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Com-
pany, 1968, 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19; 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 426.

Hi Thus, in determining whether the trial court was justified
in taking Janklow’s and Christiansen’s cases from the jury by
granting the motions for dismissal, all of the material allegations
in each complaint must be regarded as true.

The California court in Bradley v. Hartford, supra, held:

“that absolute privilege in judicial proceedings is afford-
ed only if the following conditions have been met: the
publication (1) was made in a judicial proceeding; (2) had
some connection or logical relation to the action; (8) was
made to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) in-
volved litigants or other participants authorized by
law.” 106 Cal.Rptr. at 722.

The California court in Bradley further commenting on the need
to avoid abuse of privileged defamation stated:

“compels the conclusion that in determining whether or
not the defamatory publication should be accorded an
absolute privilege, special emphasis must be laid on the
requirement that it be made in furtherance of the litiga-
tion and to promote the interest of justice.” 106
Cal.Rptr. at 723.

2S

I The tests laid down in Bradley, applied to the Janklow
and Christiansen complaints, show that the statements in
Paragraph 18 of the petition for removal come within the ab-
solute privilege. (1) The petition for removal was clearly filed ina
judicial proceeding as a pleading in the United States District
Court for the District of South Dakota; (2) Although the relief
sought by the petitioner Hill was not granted by the United
States District Court, the statements contained in the petition
had some connection and logical relation to the action; (3) The
statements were made to achieve the objects of the litigation as
explained by Judge Bandy in his memorandum opinion. The peti-
tioner was seeking removal of his case to the federal courts and
one of his principal contentions was that his civil rights could not
be protected in the state courts. One of the reasons which Hill ad-
vanced in support of his petition for removal was that Fitzgerald,
as a public defender, had conferred with the attorneys for the
Custer defendants, indicating that he wished to assist the Custer
defendants. He further contended that Fitzgerald and the at-
torneys for the Custer defendants discussed the strategy of the
defense, and that Fitzgerald not only participated in conferences
but made photocopies of the files maintained by the lawyers for
the Custer defendants. The petition further shows that Fitz-
gerald thereafter was appointed as chief trial counsel for the
South Dakota Attorney General’s office, and thereafter Fitz-
gerald had informed a legal worker associated with the defense
that William Janklow had called him to discuss the Custer cases.
It is with this background that the statements contained in
Paragraph 13 as to the alleged meeting in the early hours of
December 1, 1973, became important. Statements in Paragraph
18 that John Fitzgerald, Christiansen and others were in the bar
“drinking and in an apparently inebriated condition” had a con-
nection and logical relation to the action, and were to achieve the
object of the litigation by endeavoring to show the close associa-
tion of the persons alleged to have been present at the time and
place. The allegations as to drinking were intended to negative
the idea of an accidental or casual meeting, or a momentary en-
counter, and could also be intended to show that Fitzgerald
meeting with others interested in the prosecution of the case
against Hill might be more likely to reveal the strategy and
secrets of the defense than at a sober meeting; and (4) Finally,

333

there is no question that the statements involved litigants or
other participants allowed by law, since the statements were
made by Keller, Lane and Kunstler, and the record is undisputed
that they were each acting as legal counsel for Hill in signing and
filing Hill’s petition for removal. Judge Bandy, in his memoran-
dum opinion, explained the logical relation of the offending state-
ment to Hill’s action and explained that the statements were
made to achieve the objectives of the litigation. His memorandum
further meets the standard of special emphasis on the require-
ment that the statement be made in furtherance of the litigation
and to promote the interests of justice.

Since the complaints on their face show that the defendants,
and each of them, were as a matter of law entitled to the absolute
immunity afforded to an attorney in a judicial proceeding under
our statute, we affirm Judge Bandy’s action in dismissing the
defamation actions.

Each complaint had a separate action for deceit, alleging that
the petition and statements made by the defendants were in
violation of SDCL 16-18-19, and that they were made with intent
to injure the plaintiff and falsely mislead the courts, and that the
petition and statements violated SDCL 16-18-26(1) and 16-19-3.

The statutes relied on are as follows:

“16-18-19. Attorney’s duty to use truthful means. —It is
the duty of an attorney and counselor at law to employ,
for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him, such means only as are consistent with truth, and
never to seek to mislead the judges by any artifice or
false statement of fact or law.”

“16-18-26. Misconduct by attorney as
misdemeanor. —Every attorney at law who:

(1) Practices any deceit or collusion, or consents to
the same with intent to deceive the court or any
party;

* * * * * *

shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

“16-19-83. Deceit and collusion as grounds for disbarment
—Treble damages.—An attorney and counselor who is
guilty of deceit or collusion, or consents thereto, with in-
tent to deceive a court or judge, or party to an action or
proceeding, is liable to be disbarred, and shall forfeit to
the injured party treble damages to be recovered in a
civil action.”

The case of Thornton v. Rhoden, supra, involved actions for
defamation and for abuse of process. In that case, the court
dismissed the defamation action on the basis of absolute
privilege, and commenting on the second action, stated:

“The salutary purpose of the privilege should not be
frustrated by putting a new label on the complaint. If it
is desirable to create an absolute privilege in defama-
tion, not because we desire to protect the shady practi-
tioner, but because we do not want the honest one to
have to be concerned with libel or slander actions while
acting for his client, we should not remove one concern
and saddle him with another for doing precisely the
same thing.” 53 Cal.Rptr. at 719.

Each of the statutes relied upon by the plaintiffs in their ac-
tions for deceit carries a penalty other than action for damages,
and is therefore enforceable. The deceit count in each complaint
simply seeks to recover damages on the same facts and for
basically the same reasons and the same injury as set forth in the
defamation count. We hold that the absolute privilege as a
defense to the defamation count also requires dismissal of the
count for deceit. The dismissal of the count for deceit in each com-
plaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action is
therefore affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

HALL, Circuit Judge, sitting for COLER, J., disqualified.

385
STATE, Appellant v. PIEKKOLA, Respondent
(241 N.W.2d 563)

(File No. 11669. Opinion filed April 23, 1976)

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Doyle D. Estes, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Pierre, for appellant.

Thomas E. Carr, of Stephens, Quinn, Carr & Tschetter, P.C.,
Belle Fourche, for respondent.

WINANS, Justice.

A state statute under which Defendant-Respondent had
been convicted was declared by this Court to be unconstitutional.
Defendant petitioned the lower court to return to him the fine
and the court costs imposed on and paid out by him upon his
guilty plea, this petition being filed subsequent to an order of the
court setting aside Defendant’s conviction. The circuit court
ordered the county treasurer to restore Defendant’s fine and
costs and the State appealed. We affirm the order of the circuit

- court.

What at first blush would appear to be a simple matter easily
resolved by basic equity principles if nothing else has evolved in-
to a classic Catch-22 situation. Kenneth Piekkola was charged
with the crime of unlawful possession of less than an ounce of a
controlled drug in September 1971, and to this charge he entered
a plea of guilty. The district county judge of the fifteenth district,
in and for Lawrence County, sentenced Piekkola to sixty days in
jail and a fine of one hundred dollars and assessed him costs in the
amount of thirty-three dollars and sixty-four cents. Defendant
paid the fine and costs and served all but a small portion of his jail
sentence. Subsequently this Court in State v. Matteson, 1973, 87

ee 337

8.D. 216, 205 N.W.2d 512, held that the statute under which Piek-
kola was charged was unconstitutional and that this unconstitu-
tionality could be asserted as a defense for an alleged offense
committed from July 1, 1970 through July 1, 1972. In view of Mat-
teson the district county judge set aside Defendant’s conviction
and vacated the court’s sentence and released him from probation
on April 20, 1978. In November of that same year Piekkola peti-
tioned the district county court which had sentenced him for a
modification of its April order, praying that the fine and court
costs amounting to one hundred thirty-three dollars and sixty-
four cents be returned to him. A hearing was held in January of
1974 on the petition and the following December the district
county judge issued a memorandum decision in favor of Defend-
ant Piekkola. The following April an order was entered by a
judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit directing the Lawrence
County Treasurer to pay Piekkola the monies in question and
from this order the state has appealed.

The State of South Dakota urges on appeal that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to act on Piekkola’s petition and that
sovereign immunity was a bar to Defendant’s claim. The State
further urges that the fine should not be returned because it was
a voluntary payment by Defendant, even though based on an un-
constitutional statute and an invalid conviction.

[lf Jurisdiction for the court in this case is established in
SDCL Chapter 23-52 on post-conviction proceedings. SDCL
23-52-1 gives the right to an individual who claims to be convicted
in violation of the constitution of this state to institute a pro-
ceeding to secure relief from the conviction or sentence. SDCL
23-52-4 provides that a petition for such relief may be filed at any
time. SDCL 23-52-13 directs that a court finding in favor of peti-
tioner shall enter an appropriate order “with respect to the con-
viction or sentence in the former proceedings, and any sup-
plementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail,
discharge, correction of sentence, or other matters that may be
necessary and proper.” (emphasis supplied). In addition, the
jurisdiction of this Court to review a final judgment entered
under this chapter upon a motion brought by either petitioner or
the state is set out in SDCL 23-52-16. The statutes thus cited,

338 es

together with Chapter 23-52 taken as a whole, set out Defendant’s
right to secure relief from the conviction and resulting sentence
obtained in violation of our state’s constitution and establish the
trial court’s jurisdiction in this matter.

Hl Respondent's right to obtain full relief from the conse-
quences of his conviction should not be doubted. There is no
manifest rationale for terminating his probationary status while
retaining his money. In United States v. Lewis, 1973, 5 Cir., 478
F.2d 835, the court noted that “[jlust as the imposition of a fine is
an incident of a criminal conviction, so is the direction for repay-
ment an incident to the vacating and setting aside of the convic-
tion.” More recently the Supreme Court of Illinois in a case
similar to the one before us concluded:

“We are of the opinion that the money, having been
received in payment of fines imposed as an incident to
judgments of conviction, should be ordered refunded as
an incident to the vacation of the judgments under
which it was ordered paid.” People v. Meyerowitz, 1975,
61 Ill.2d 200, 385 N.E.2d 1.

We agree. Even as the court had the right to set aside
Defendant’s conviction it had the right and the duty to set aside
the resulting sentence, including the fine and court costs im-
posed. Once the conviction had been set aside the state was
without a right to collect or retain the fine and costs and Defen-
dant had a lawful expectation of their return. The refund was inci-
dent to the vacation of the judgment in question.

HH The State in its appeal brief states that there is no
statutory scheme which would permit recovery by Defendant and
comments that it “does not attempt to hide the fact that to not
return the fine and costs to the Defendant appears to be both
harsh and unfair.” The State contends that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity bars this action. Sovereign immunity,
however, is a doctrine properly invoked in questions of suit and
liability for tort as in Conway v. Humbert, 1966, 82 S.D. 317, 145
N.W.2d 524, or in questions of contract (see Mullen & Rouke v.

ee

Dwight, 1919, 42 S.D. 171, 173 N.W. 645). It is not an issue in the
case presently before us. To petition for the return of a fine and of
costs imposed on the basis of unlawful authority is no more a suit
against the state barred by sovereign immunity than to petition
or file for the return of money paid to the government as income
tax in excess of the amount due. To make more of the action than
that offends common sense and severely distorts the image of
justice as fairness.

HH Lastly, the State contends that a long-standing rule of
law would prevent the return of the money. According to the
state, “when one pays a fine voluntarily under a mistake of law,
that fine cannot be recovered unless payment was induced by
fraud or the undue advantage of the party receiving it.” The -
State has presented us with no South Dakota cases in support of
this proposition and we do not find it to be our law. Rather, we
find ourselves much more in line with the sentiments expressed
in a similar situation by Chief Judge Blumenfeld:

“There is little doubt that equity compels the deci-
sion reached in this case.

‘While there are no means available to compensate a
person who has been imprisoned for violating a
statute that is subsequently found constitutionally
void and retrospectively applied, there is always a
means for such a person to recoup his losses when the
loss takes the form of a monetary fine. The Fifth
Amendment prohibition against the taking of one’s
property without due process of law demands no less
than the full restitution of a fine that was levied pur-
suant to a conviction based on an unconstitutional
law. Fairness and equity compel this result, and a
citizen has the right to expect as much from his
government, notwithstanding the fact that the
government and the court were proceeding in good
faith at the time of prosecution.’ United States v.
Lewis, supra, 342 F.Supp. [833] at 836.” United States
v. Summa, 1972, 362 F.Supp. 1177 (D.Conn.)

SDCL 23-48-15 provides that

“(t]he punishments prescribed by statute can be in-
flicted only upon a legal conviction in a court having
jurisdiction. Upon such conviction a duty devolves upon
the court authorized to pass sentence, to determine and
impose the punishment prescribed.”

There is no question that a conviction under an unconstitutional
statute is a nullity. State v. Dove, 1955, 75 S.D. 460, 67 N.W.2d
917. There being no legal conviction as required by SDCL 23-48-15
a punishment, including a fine prescribed by statute, could not
lawfully have been imposed. The issue is not whether or not the
defendant was acting in good faith under mistake of law when he
paid the required fine and court costs. Rather, the issue is
whether or not the state had a right to receive and to retain those
monies. We hold that the state had no such right and that
therefore the order of the trial court is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN, J., concur.
COLER, J., dissents.
COLER, Justice (dissenting).

While I agree with the majority opinion to the extent that it
holds that the respondent is entitled to the return of his fine and
costs, I cannot concur in the opinion because of the procedural
and jurisdictional defects which exist and the precedent which
this decision will set. The order in this case, phrased in language
of a judgment, was entered against Lawrence County, albeit nam-
ing the county treasurer, which was not a party, on a petition in
the original criminal proceeding which is a collateral proceeding.
I am convinced that such a remedy must be enforced by an in-
dependent civil action and the trial court was without jurisdic-
tion, absent the commencement of an action against the real
party or parties in interest to enter the “order.” In addition, the
“order” merely directed payment without directing which fund
should be charged.

Conceding the right of the respondents to be reimbursed, it
is first necessary to determine who are the real parties in in-
terest against whom the action must be commenced. SDCL
15-6-17(a). The second consideration is what procedure is to be
utilized to provide the remedy. Although dealing with
forfeitures, the decisions of this court, namely, State v. Newson,
1896, 8 S.D. 327, 66 N.W. 468 and State v. Davis, 1898, 11 S.D. 111,
75 N.W. 897, indicate that although neither the state nor the
counties benefit from the fines collected under the provisions of
S.D.Const. Art. VIII, § 3 and SDCL 23-48-30, they act as trustees
of the fund and are, therefore, the real parties in interest. State v.
Newson, supra. Neither of the entities receives any payment
from the fund created by the fines collected since the entire fund
is constitutionally required to be allocated to the school districts
and to me it is this fund against which the claim must be made.
8.D.Const. Art. VIII, § 6. See also SDCL 5-10 and SDCL 13-13. The
state as a trustee of the fund has a claim against this sum of
money, the money being personal property under SDCL
2-14-2(17), adverse to the interest of the respondent so that the
state therefore is a proper party defendant. SDCL 15-6-17(a).
Because of the state’s adverse interest in the property, the state
may be sued but it must be by action. SDCL 21-32-8.

The county was not sued as it might have been under SDCL
7-18-1 and no claim had been filed if such a claim is required to be
filed under SDCL 7-18-6. No action was commenced against either
the state or the county as no summons was issued as is required
by SDCL 15-2-30 and there is but one form of action, SDCL 15-6-2.
No process of any nature was served upon a county commissioner
of Lawrence County as is required under SDCL 15-6-4(d)(4)(i). The
judgment or order is void as it relates to Lawrence County.
SDCL 15-2-30 and decisions annotated thereunder.

The procedure utilized in the present case I believe is
analogous to collateral proceedings attempted to be used by the
railroads to collect interest on taxes paid by virtue of overassess-
ment, Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Schmidt and Asper, 1970, 85
S.D. 223, 180 N.W.2d 233. The circuit court in that case was sit-
ting as “another board of equalization” and it was held that under
those circumstances the court was without jurisdiction to assess

342

interest. Under the logic of that decision and by virtue of SDCL
21-32-8 I would hold the trial court should have required an action
to be commenced in which the parties were properly served with
process.

This court has had occasion to provide a remedy where the
statutes were silent as in inverse condemnation suits, Hurley v.
State, 1966, 82 S.D. 156, 143 N.W.2d 722, but we need not fashion
a remedy here on the basis of SDCL 23-52 when an action is
already authorized by SDCL 7-18-1 and SDCL 21-328 and the
claim could be presented pursuant to SDCL 15-39 in small claims.

STATE, Respondent v. OSWALD, Appellant
(241 N.W.2d 566)

(File No. 11659. Opinion filed April 29, 1976)

3:

James R. Haar, Goetz, Hirsch, Haar & Blackburn, Tripp, for
defendant and appellant.

William J. Janklow, Atiy. Gen., Peter H. Lieberman, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and respondent.

WINANS, Justice.

Defendant Jerauld Ray Oswald was convicted in a jury trial
of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and has
appealed to this Court, raising questions with regard to the trial
court’s refusal of two requested instructions and with regard to
the admissibility of testimony concerning his exercise of a
statutory right not to take a blood test. Because we find that a re-
quested instruction was refused to the prejudice of Defendant
and because we also find that the testimony in question was incor-
rectly allowed we reverse the lower court.

Appellant Oswald was arrested for driving while intoxicated
on November 16, 1974, after he had drawn the attention of Police
Chief Wagner to himself at Menno, South Dakota. Chief Wagner
advised Oswald of his rights under our state’s implied consent
statute, apparently two different times that night and each time
Oswald flatly refused to submit to a blood test. A trial was held
on February 18, 1975, in circuit court at which Oswald did not
testify. Over Appellant’s objections two witnesses were per-
mitted to state that Oswald had refused to take the blood test.
Because of the testimony that had been allowed concerning
Defendant’s exercise of his statutory right not to take a blood
test, and because Oswald did not testify, Defendant’s counsel re-
quested that the following instructions be given the jury:

“No. 9 Every Defendant in a criminal case has the ab-
solute right not to testify. You must not drawn (sic) any
inference of guilt against the Defendant because he did
not testify. He is not required to prove himself innocent,
or put in any evidence at all upon that subject. The fact
that the Defendant has not testified in this case raises
no presumption against him, and you must give no
thought to the fact that the Defendant did not testify in
his own behalf in this case, in arriving at your verdict.”

(This appears to be a combination of all of Instruction 1-17 and all
but one sentence of Instruction 1-17 [alternate form] of the South
Dakota Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions.)

“No. 12 You are further instructed that the laws of this
State grant until (sic) the accused a statutory right to
refuse to submit to a blood test.”

Both requested instructions were refused. The jury found Oswald
guilty and he was sentenced to eighteen months in the state
penitentiary.

Right to Exclude Evidence of Refusal
to Take Blood Test

Wi Appellant’s counsel on appeal suggests that Oswald has a
right under both the United States Constitution and the South
Dakota Constitution to refuse to submit to a blood test and a
right not to have testimony concerning such a refusal admitted at
trial. He also contends that such rights are assured Defendant by
our statute, SDCL 32-23-10.

Article Five of the Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution provides in part that:

“No person... shall be compelled, in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself...”

Article VI, § 9 of the South Dakota Constitution states:

345

“No person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to give evidence against himself or be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.”

SDCL 82-23-10 is our implied consent law:

“Any person who operates any vehicle in this state
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical
analysis of his blood, urine, breath or other bodily
substance for the purpose of determining the amount of
aleohol in his blood, as provided in § 32-23-7, provided
that such test is administered at the direction of a law
enforcement officer having lawfully arrested such per-
son for a violation of § 32-23-1.

“Such person shall be requested by said officer to
submit to such analysis and shall be advised by said of-
ficer of his right to refuse to submit to such analysis and
the provisions of §§ 32-23-11 and 32-23-12 in the event of
such refusal with respect to the revocation of such per-
son’s driving license.”*

Because we feel that this matter is adequately disposed of on
statutory grounds we find no need to reach the constitutional
questions.

Quite recently in State v. Buckingham, 1976, 90 S.D. 198, 240
N.W.2d 84, Mr. Justice Wollman for this Court observed:

* 82-23-11. “If any person described in § 82-28-10, after request and explanation as
therein provided, shall refuse to submit to such chemical analysis, then such
test shall not be given. In such event, the department of public safety shall
revoke for one year his license to drive and any nonresident operating privilege
he may have in his possession after opportunity for hearing pursuant io chapter
1.26 if hearing is demanded, it shall find that the law enforcement officer com-
plied therewith and the refusal was made by that person.”

32-28-12, “Any person whose license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked
by the commissioner under the provisions of § 32-23-11 shall have the right to
le a petition within thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in circuit
court in the county wherein such person was charged with the violation, and
such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to set the
matter for trial de novo upon ten days’ written notice to the department, and
thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case and to deter-
mine whether the petitioners lieenge is subject to cancellation, suspension, or
revocation under the provisions of § 32-23-11.”

a6 pe

“Implicit in our implied consent statute, however, is the
right to refuse to submit to a test and, a fortiori, the re-
quirement that a choice be made between submitting to
the test or suffering the consequences of such refusal.
(citations omitted) Also implicit in the implied consent
law is the assumption that the choice to be made is of
considerable importance to the arrested driver.
Although it may be true that to some drivers the loss of
their license for a period of one year would be a penalty
more severe than being convicted of the offense of driv-
ing while intoxicated, (citation omitted), there no doubt
are some who would rather suffer the loss of their
license for one year than to suffer the ignominy of a con-
viction for driving while intoxicated, together with the
adverse economic consequences such a conviction en-
tails. If the offense of driving while intoxicated is con-
sidered serious enough to warrant the constitutional
guarantee of a jury trial, (citation omitted), then surely
it is serious enough to require law enforcement officers
to comply with the statutorily mandated procedural
steps as a prerequisite to the admissibility of the results
of a chemical test conducted pursuant to the implied con-
sent law.”

In the case before us the Defendant was informed of his statutori-
ly guaranteed right and, for whatever reason we do not know, he
elected not to submit to the test. Certainly it is unfair to create
by statute a right not to submit to a chemical test and to allow the
accused to exercise that right and then in open court before a
jury to permit testimony concerning that refusal which can all too
easily work in the minds of the jury members to the prejudice of
the defendant. ‘ ,

Some twenty years ago the Supreme Court of our sister
state to the north had before it a case similar to the one we now
deal with. The reasoning of that court, though their statute may
differ from ours, is appropriate here:

“Whether the statute implies that evidence of a
refusal to take a test may be not received in evidence

347

against a defendant is a question that is not without dif-
ficulty. We are of the opinion, however, that when the
legislature granted an accused person a choice of
whether he would submit to such a test, it intended that
the choice should be absolutely free and not encumbered
by a liability. If the fact that an accused person chooses
not to take a test can be put in evidence and argued to
the jury as evidence of guilt, then the statute places the
defendant in a position where willy-nilly, he must risk
providing evidence for the prosecution by submitting to
a test or certainly provide it by refusing to take one,
although his reason for refusal may have no relation to
the question of guilt or innocence. * * * Thus the policy
of our law appears to be that a defendant may claim a
privilege granted by statute or the constitution, without
being subjected to the liability that his exercise of the
right may be used against him.” State v. Severson, 1956,
N.D., 75 N.W.2d 316.

In an Oklahoma case a witness testified that he thought the
defendant was drunk “because he was red faced and he refused to
take the test.” A police officer also testified that the defendant
refused to take the (intoximeter) test. There the Oklahoma Court
noted:

“* ** the defendant’s refusal to take the test was used
by the state in its case in chief for purely prejudicial pur-
poses. The accused’s refusal should have ended the in-
quiry on the subject. It ill behooves the courts to say you
have a right to refuse to do something, which may prove
either beneficial or detrimental to you, and yet, notwith-
standing your right so to do, we will permit your refusal
to be shown and enable the state to destroy your right
and achieve indirectly by innuendo what it was
prevented by law from accomplishing directly. We can
conceive of no greater inconsistency.” Duckworth v.
State, 1957, Okl.Cr., 309 P.2d 1108 at 1105.

In a New York case testimony was given at trial that the defend-
ant refused permission to a physician to take a blood sample for

348

the determination of alcoholic content. Mr. Justice Coon for the
Appellate Division of that Supreme Court said, after setting out
pertinent testimony:

“That this was damning evidence against the
defendant, when practically the sole issue was his intox-
ication, cannot be denied. The question is whether it was
competent for any purpose. We think not.

The Legislature has provided that evidence of the
aleoholie content of the blood may be received in
evidence. (citation omitted). It has also recognized a per-
son’s right to refuse the test. Vehicle and Traffic Law,
§ T1-a. * * * The courts of this State have long and con-
sistently held that under our self-incrimination laws the
receipt of evidence in a criminal trial of a defendant’s
complete silence or refusal to answer is reversible error.
(citations omitted). This has been on the theory that the
fact that a defendant did what he had an absolute right
to do cannot be used to create any unfavorable inference
against him.” People v. Stratton, 1955, 286 App.Div. 323,
148 N.Y.S.2d 362.

We are also aware that our neighboring state of Minnesota
has refused to allow admission of testimony on an accused’s
refusal to submit to chemical testing for purposes of determining
alcoholic content, at least partially, on constitutional grounds.
See State v. McCarthy, 1960, 259 Minn. 24, 104 N.W.2d 673 and
State v. Andrews, 1973, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863. While we
are not necessarily in disagreement with these opinions we do not
think it required in the instant case to go that far. We have a
South Dakota statute which grants an absolute right to an ar-
rested person to refuse to submit to testing to determine the
alcoholic content of his or her blood, albeit not without certain
consequences. But the consequences of such refusal are provided
by statute and they nowhere include the admissibility of evidence
of such refusal in court on a DWI charge. Defendant Oswald made
timely objection to the introduction of testimony concerning his
refusal to submit to the blood test and the testimony in question
ought not to have been let in. Admission of evidence of Defend-

349
ant’s refusal was reversible error.

Refused Instruction on Defendant's
Failure to Testify

As we have earlier indicated, Defendant Oswald exercised
his right not to testify at his DWI trial. His counsel proposed a
jury instruction, compiled from our pattern instructions, on that
point and the trial judge refused it.

The privilege against self-incrimination is both constitu-
tional and statutory in this state. SDCL 23-44-1 provides:

“In the trial of all indictments, informations, com-
plaints, and other proceedings against persons charged
with the commission of any crime, before any court or
committing magistrate, the person charged shall, at his
own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness,
and his failure to make such request shall not create any
presumption against him.”

In interpreting this statute this Court has stated:

“We think it is clear that a defendant’s failure to
testify in his own behalf, to deny or explain charges
made against him, when the jury know he is present,
hears the charges, and could testify, would raise in the
minds of nearly all jurors a presumption of his guilt, or
at least a prejudicial presumption of something damag-
ing to defendant that he wishes to conceal.

* * * * * *

We think the defendant had the right to have this
presumption of law in his favor, coupled with the fact
that he did not testify, given to the jury in a proper in-
struction substantially as the law had coupled it in sec-
tion 4879 (now SDCL 23-44-1), and that the charge as
given did not substantially cover the charge requested.”
State v. Wimpsett, 1922, 46 S.D. 6, 189 N.W. 983.

0

In State v. Wells, 1928, 53 S.D. 446, 221 N.W. 56, we again dealt
with an instruction on self-incrimination similar in substance to
the one before us now and there we held again that refusal to give
such an instruction which had been requested by the defendant
was reversible error.

This has been our law and it continues to be so. A
defendant has both a federal and a state constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination and the state privilege has in South
Dakota also been made statutory. The exercise of this privilege,
however, is not without peril and counsel act prudently in seek-
ing from the court jury instructions which attempt to negate in
the minds of the jury members any unfavorable inferences which
failure to take the stand may arouse. When the instruction is a
correct statement of the law and when. it has a bearing on the
case before the jury the defendant has a right to have the instruc-
tion properly requested given to the jury, unless, of course, the
sense of the instruction is sufficiently covered in another instruc-
tion. Failure to honor such a request is, as we have held in Wimp-
sett, supra, reversible error.

Rejected Instruction on Defendant's Right
to Refuse a Blood Test

In addition to refusing the requested instruction on Defend-
ant’s failure to testify the trial judge also refused Defendant's re-
quested instruction on his right not to take a blood test. Although
the issue is somewhat mooted by our foregoing treatment of the
erroneous admission of testimony on Oswald’s twice refusing the
blood test, we think it best to make a brief observation.

In State v. Wimpsett, supra, this Court quoted with approval
the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Carnagy, 1898, 106 Iowa 483,
76 N.W. 805:

““The instruction requested contained a correct
statement of the law, and the defendant had the right to
have it given. It related to a special feature of the case,
upon which the giving of instructions was discretionary
if not demanded, but upon which the law should have

351

been stated when requested by the accused, who had
brought himself within its provisions.’ ”

Defendant’s proposed instruction No. 12 is not an incorrect state-
ment of the law, although it could well be enhanced by further
elaboration. In circumstances other than those before us we an-
ticipate that counsel might have a right to have similar instruc-
tion given the jury, but we leave any decision on that question to
turn on the facts of the case while keeping in mind the quote from
Carnagy.

In closing we note that we are in agreement with Mr. Chief
Justice Traynor when he observed that “[iJn a day when ex-
cessive loss of life and property is caused by inebriated drivers,
an imperative need exists for a fair, efficient, and accurate
system of detection, enforcement and, hence, prevention.” People
v. Sudduth, 1966, 65 Cal.2d 543, 55 Cal.Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401.
Nevertheless, our system of justice demands that to achieve
these ends courts cannot dispense with the fundamentals of
fairness for the accused. Since, for the reasons stated, we have
found that Jerauld Ray Oswald received less than a fair trial the
decision of the circuit court is reversed and its judgment vacated.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.

VER MEER, Respondent.v. VER MEER, Appellant
(241 N.W.2d 571)
(File No. 11536. Opinion filed April 29, 1976)

ry
a
&

Sam D. Sechser and Roger A. Schiager, Sioux Falls, for
defendant and appellant.

Derald W. Wiehl and John C. Quaintance, May, Johnson &
Burke, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and respondent.

DOBBERPUUL, Circuit Judge.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married on July 31,

353

1949, at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and were husband and wife
until the divorce was granted on April 19, 1974. Four children
were born as issue of the marriage, two of the children of legal
age and two of the children of ages fifteen and twelve. The trial
court found in Number IV of the findings:

“That the wrongful acts committed by Defendant
against Plaintiff consisted of degrading the Plaintiff, re-
jecting the food and meals, accusing the Plaintiff and the
children of conspiring against him; and that he denied
her funds and told her that the children were her prob-
lem.”

Finding Number V of the trial court:

“That the wrongful acts committed by Plaintiff
against Defendant for some time prior to the commence-
ment of this action consisted of refusal to properly
prepare meals and to maintain the home and living con-
ditions in any semblance of a normal manner of proprie-
ty; that Plaintiff spent great amounts of time away from
the home, many of which absences were unaccounted
for; caused and incurred abnormally heavy long distance
telephone bills for calls to relatives and elsewhere;
mortgaged the automobiles of the parties without
Defendant’s knowledge or consent; registered on two oc-
casions at a motel under a fictious (sic) name; allowed ab-
normal food spoilage in the kitchen; as well as refusing
to remove pet excretions from the living areas for ab-
normal periods of time; all of said acts on the part of the
Plaintiff towards the Defendant being greater in weight
and degree and, therefore, established that Defendant
suffered the greater amount of extreme cruelty.”

On that basis the trial court awarded to the Defendant husband
on his cross-complaint a divorce. He also awarded custody of the
two minor children to the Plaintiff wife and provided for their
support, and made a division of property. The court awarded the
Plaintiff wife alimony in the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) per year.

354

Hi When this appeal was taken, the court on a hearing to
show cause, brought by the Plaintiff for attorneys’ fees, ordered
the Defendant to pay attorneys’ fees to the Plaintiff's attorneys
in the total sum of Seven Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($750.00) for
the purpose of making the appeal. Defendant in his appeal
presents five assignments of error. Number One: Did the Court
err in requiring the Defendant to pay alimony in the sum of One
Dollar ($1.00) per year to the Plaintiff wife when the Defendant
husband had been awarded the decree of divorce from the Plain-
tiff based upon extreme cruelty and conduct by the Plaintiff
towards the husband? The answer to that question is found in
SDCL 25-4-41:

“Where a divorce is granted for an offense of the
husband, the court may compel him to provide for the
maintenance of the children of the marriage, and to
make such suitable allowance to the wife for her support
during her life or for a shorter period, as the court may
deem just, having regard to the circumstances of the
parties represented; and the court may from time to
time modify its orders in these respects.”

This Court dealt with this statute in Bernard v. Bernard,
1952, 74 S.D. 449, 54 N.W.2d 351; in that case a divorce to the hus-
band by the Court because of extreme cruelty of the wife. Pur-
suant to a stipulation, the husband agreed to pay the wife Eighty
Dollars ($80.00) per month for her support and the Court ordered
the husband to pay that Highty Dollars ($80.00) to the wife. Three
years later, the husband brought an Order to Show Cause seek-
ing to have the judgment by the Court modified by striking the
support payment. The Court, acting upon the request, modified
the judgment to a payment of Sixty Dollars ($60.00) per month,
but did not strike the payment in its entirety. The husband ap-
pealed and this Court held that alimony is statutory in origin and
authority for such allowance is granted when the divorce is for
the offense of the husband, and the Court does not have equitable
powers for granting alimony. The ruling of that case is applicable
here even if both parties are guilty of misconduct, but only the
husband is granted the divorce.

|

Assignments of error Two and Three: (1) Did the trial court
err in granting custody of the children, ages fifteen and twelve, to
the mother, since these children were not of tender years and
other considerations between the mother and the father were not
equal but were in favor of the father? (2) That the evidence would
show that the mother was unfit to care for the children?

The trial court talked separately to the minor children in
private and out of the hearing of others, to determine their
preferences. That, as well as other factors covered by the record,
establishes that the court found that considerations between the
father and the mother were not equal, and that the mother, in
spite of her misconduct to her husband, was the proper parent to
have custody of the children.

[It is clear from the record that the discretion invested in
the trial court was not abused. It is well settled that the trial
court must be allowed wide latitude and the exercise of its discre-
tion in awarding custody of minor children, which discretion may
not be interfered with, on appeal, unless the appellate court is
soundly persuaded by the record that the trial court has abused
that discretion. Engle v. Yorks, 1895, 7 S.D. 254, 64 N.W. 132;
Hines v. Hines, 1960, 78 S.D. 464, 104 N.W.2d 375, rehearing
denied, 78 S.D. 502, 105 N.W.2d 70; Howells v. Howells, 1962, 79
S.D. 480, 118 N.W.2d 533.

HH Appellant argues finally,

“{t]hat the Trial Court erred in awarding fees to
counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent for appeal purposes
in the absence of her showing a need for such attorney
fees and in the absence of showing the amount of time
and effort required by her counsel to represent her on
this appeal, and that the fees subsequently awarded by
the Trial Court were excessive and unreasonable.”

The allowance of attorneys’ fees rests in the sound discretion
of the trial court, Baron v. Baron, 1947, 71 S.D. 641, 28 N.W.2d
836, and will not be interfered with by this Court unless it ap-

56

pears there is error in the exercise thereof. Each case must rest
upon its own facts, and there is little to be gained by comparing
the present fee with others which have previously been allowed,
De Witt v. De Witt, 1971, 86 S.D. 59, 191 N.W.2d 177. The trial
court in awarding attorneys’ fees did so after considering the
needs of the Plaintiff and the support for herself and the minor
children. A request was made by the Plaintiff for Eleven Hun-
dred Fifty Dollars ($1150.00) for attorneys’ fees and costs and the
trial court, after a hearing, cut such request to a total of Seven
Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($750.00). A fee for appeal of this type
and in this day of inflation is not unreasonable, and does not give
an impression of abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

The judgment is modified by striking therefrom the award of
alimony, and as so modified is affirmed.

Costs in this appeal, by virtue of our holding being discre-
tionary under SDCL 15-80-7, will be taxed against the appellant
as the modification of the judgment is not substantial.

WINANS, WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.

DOBBERPUHL, Circuit Judge, sitting for DUNN, C. J.

Le
SCHNEIDER, Appellant v. McLAUGHLIN IND. SCHOOL
DIST. NO. 21, Respondent
(241 N.W.2d 574)

(File No. 11587. Opinion filed April 29, 1976)

357

358

A. P. Fuller, Kellar, Kellar, Fuller, Amundson & Furze,
Lead, for appellant.

A. N. Buckmeier, Bormann & Buckmeier, Mobridge, for
respondent.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by an elementary school principal whose

359

contract was not renewed by the respondent school district board
(the board). The circuit court upheld the board’s action. Appellant
contends that if the board’s decision is upheld in this case there
will no longer be a continuing contract law in existence in South
Dakota. We do not share appellant’s apocalyptic view of the con-
sequences of the board’s action, and we affirm the decision of the
circuit court.

Appellant was first hired by respondent in 1964 to fill the
position of classroom teacher and elementary school principal. He
held this combined position until the 1972-73 school year, when he
was given a contract by the board for the position of elementary
school principal. This contract was renewed by the board for the
1973-74 school year.

At the board’s regular monthly meeting held on March 5,
1974, the following statement, signed by eighteen of the nineteen
elementary school teachers in the board’s employ, was presented
to the board by the superintendent of schools:

“To the Board of Education
McLaughlin, South Dakota

“The following personnel submit to the board of
education the following statement:

“We would like to express to the Board of Educa-
tion our concern of a situation in the elementary school.
There seems to be no communication or rapport with
our staff and the elementary administration. This leads
to a situation which is not conducive to an effective pro-
gram of education.

“We feel you should be aware of the problem which
exists in the school.”

This statement had been prepared by Miss Frances Maier,
one of the elementary school teachers, following an incident dur-
ing which appellant angrily shouted at Miss Maier and a fellow
teacher in the hallway near the open door to Miss Maier’s

360

classroom and within the hearing of her students. Miss Maier
secured the signatures of 18 of the 19 elementary school teachers
and then presented the statement to the superintendent of
schools.

The members of the board discussed the contents of the
statement and reviewed the contents of appellant’s personal file
with the superintendent of schools, after which the board decided
to notify appellant of its intention not to renew his contract for
the following year. By letter dated March 8, 1974, the board
notified appellant of its intention not to renew appellant’s con-
tract for the 1974-75 school year and advised appellant that he
was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of SDCL 13-43-9.1.

By letter dated March 15, 1974, the board advised appellant
that pursuant to SDCL 13-43-9.1 he was entitled to a review of his
personal evaluation file, to written reasons on which the board’s
decision was based, and to an informal, private conference with
the board or superintendent of schools. The letter also advised
appellant that the board wanted to meet with him on March 19,
1974, Also by letter dated March 15, 1974, the board notified ap-
pellant that:

“The following are some of the reasons why the
Board of Education is not renewing your contract for
the coming year 1974-75.

1. Very poor working relationship with teaching staff.

2. Non-support of Board of Education and Administra-
tion in confrontation with Mr. Straub and Mr.
Steinberger in the release in 1973.

3. Few if any organizational staff meetings held with
teachers to discuss feelings and problems within the
Elementary School.

4. Did not provide teachers any feedback on meetings
he has attended in the years he has been in
McLaughlin.”

LE

On March 19, 1974, an informal, private conference was held
between appellant and the board.

By letter dated March 20, 1974, the board advised appellant
that:

“You are hereby notified pursuant to SDCL
18-48-10 that the board of education of the McLaughlin
Independent School District has determined not to
renew your contract for the 1974-75 school year.

“You are entitled to the statutory provisions of
SDCL 13-43-10.1 governing continuing contract.”

By letter dated March 26, 1974, the board advised appellant
of the reasons why his contract was not being renewed for the
1974-75 school year. The text of this letter is identical to that of
the letter of March 15, 1974, set forth above.

Pursuant to SDCL 13-43-10.1, a formal conference was held
between the board and appellant on April 18, 1974. By letter
dated April 22, 1974, the board advised appellant that:

“You are hereby notified pursuant to SDCL
18-43-10.1 that the final decision of the Board of Educa-
tion of the McLaughlin Independent School District #21
is that your employment with the district will be ter-
minated at the end of current contract.

“You are entitled to statutory right of appeal as
provided in SDCL 13-46-1.”

Thus it appears that the board faithfully complied with all of
the requirements of the continuing contract law, SDCL 13-43-9.1,
13-43-10 and 13-43-10.1, and appellant does not contend to the con-
trary.

Appellant contends that under the continuing contract law
he had a property right in and to his contract with the board that
entitled him to due process of law in accordance with the prin-

362 ee

ciples expressed in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92
S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
92 S.Ct. 2717, 33 L.Ed.2d 581. We need not analyze this claim in
depth, however, because we conclude that the provisions of our
continuing contract law, cited above, which were faithfully
adhered to by the board in the instant case, afforded appellant all
of the rights to which he contends he was entitled by virtue of his
constitutional right to due process of law. Hensley v. Yankton
Ind. School Dist. No. 1, 88 S.D. 670, 227 N.W.2d 441; Brouillette v.
Bd. of Directors of Merged Area IX, 8 Cir., 519 F.2d 126; Swab v.
Cedar Rapids Community School Dist., 8 Cir., 494 F.2d 353;
Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Central Community School Dist., 8 Cir.,
488 F.2d 237.

Appellant contends that he was deprived of his due process
right to a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal. To buttress
this contention, appellant directs our attention to certain
testimony given by witnesses at the trial de novo in the circuit
court. During his testimony on direct examination, the chairman
of the board testified that upon being presented with the state-
ment signed by the eighteen teachers the board discussed the
statement and other matters presented by the superintendent of
schools and that “ * * * after he (the superintendent) read them to
us, discussed it, and the Board thought not to give him (appellant)
a contract.” On cross-examination appellant’s counsel asked this
witness:

“Q Well but that is what I mean. [t}hat night, being
March 5th, and you are saying that is the night, are
you not, that you decided not to hire Mr. Schneider
for the next year. Isn’t that right?

A After that was presented to the Board. -
Q [t]hat is what I am saying—that was the night?

A Allright.”

Further, appellant directs our attention to the testimony of
the superintendent of schools concerning the action that was

363

taken by the board at its meeting on March 5, 1974. In response to
a question concerning the matter of appellant’s personal file, the
superintendent testified that:

“A Yes, we went over the material in the file.
Q And did the Board then make any decision?

A They made a decision at that time not to renew his
contract after looking at the materials.”

HH The foregoing testimony, argues appellant, conclusively
establishes that the board had completely prejudged the merits
of appellant’s case prior to the time that appellant was afforded
an informal, private conference with the board pursuant to SDCL
13-43-9.1, and the subsequent formal hearing held pursuant to
SDCL 13-43-10.1. We do not so view the record. Although we
agree that appellant is entitled to a fair and impartial considera-
tion of his merits as an elementary school principal, we do not
believe that his right to such a tribunal was not honored here.
SDCL 13-43-9.1 requires a school district board to notify a teacher
of its intention not to renew the teacher’s contract. Appellant
does not explain how a school board is to notify a teacher of its in-
tention not to renew his contract without somehow first deciding
that facts exist that make it prudent for the board to consider the
advisability of dispensing with a teacher’s services for the follow-
ing year. It would be a strange practice indeed for a school board
to send a teacher a notice of intention of nonrenewal without at
least first considering the advisability of not renewing the con-
tract, unless, of course, the matter of nonrenewal is to spring
pristine to the attention of the board for the first time at the con-
ference held following the notice of intention not to renew. If the
requirements of a fair tribunal include the condition that the
members of the board must have had absolutely no prior
knowledge of the facts that might make it advisable not to renew
a teacher’s contract and that they must have not discussed the
matter and not have formed at least some tentative opinion that
the teacher's contract not be renewed prior to the conference
with the teacher, then as a practical matter the nonrenewal provi-
sions of the continuing contract law are not available to a school

364

board. We conclude that it is sufficient to meet the requirements
of a fair tribunal that the board base its decision upon competent,
credible evidence and that there be no evidence of actual bias
toward the teacher whose contract is not being renewed. Any
other holding would require that the postnotice conference be
conducted by an independent hearing examiner or board. We
agree with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that such
a constitutional rule is neither desirable nor necessary.

“*#**The constitutional rule sought here would re-
quire that decisions as to teacher competence be sur-
rendered to a body less familiar with relevant considera-
tions and not responsible under state and local law for
making these decisions. Moreover, it is unrealistic to re-
quire a Connecticut town to provide more than one body
to deal with various aspects of school administration.
We do not believe that due process, varying as it does
with differing factual contexts, requires so much in this
case, absent a showing of actual, rather than potential,
bias.” Simard v. Board of Education of Town of Groton, 2
Cir., 473 F.2d 988, 993 (footnote omitted).

We think that the prior involvement of the board with the merits
of appellant’s position, necessary to the exercise of the board’s
decision to notify appellant of its intention not to renew his con-
tract, was of such a limited nature that it was entirely consistent
with the requirements of due process. Simard v. Board of Educa-
tion of Town of Groton, supra. We find in the record no evidence
of actual bias on the part of the board toward appellant. It was
the action on the part of the teachers under appellant's supervi-
sion, together with the material in appellant’s personal file as
compiled by the superintendent of schools, that prompted the
discussion of appellant's contract at the March 5, 1974, meeting,
and not any action by the board on its own knowledge or ini-
tiative.

[i The record establishes neither actual bias on the part of
the board nor the existence of circumstances that lead to the con-
clusion that an unacceptable risk of actual bias or prejudgment in-
hered in the board’s procedures; consequently, appellant has not

365

met his burden of overcoming the presumption that the board
acted fairly and impartially. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95
S.Ct. 1456, 48 L.Ed.2d 712; Apoian v. State, 89 S.D. 539, 235
N.W.2d 641. See also Sullivan v. Meade Ind. School Dist. No. 101,
8 Cir., 530 F.2d 799, 1976.

HH Moreover, appellant had a trial de novo before the cir-
cuit court pursuant to SDCL 13-46-6, following which the court
made and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law based
upon the evidence presented at the trial. No issue has been raised
concerning the scope of the circuit court's review of the board’s
decision, ef. Dunker v. Brown County Board of Education, 80 S.D.
193, 121 N.W.2d 10, and we conclude that the circuit court’s find-
ings that appellant was incompetent as an administrator and that
the board’s decision not to renew appellant's contract was based
upon substantial evidence and was proper are not clearly er-
roneous. SDCL 15-6-52(a). Specifically, the trial court found,
among other things, that appellant did not do a complete evalua-
tion of all teachers under his supervision, contrary to the provi-
sions of his contract of employment; that appellant reprimanded
teachers before their students and other teachers, which caused
the loss of respect for the teachers by students; that the teachers
disliked talking to appellant about school problems for fear of
being rebuked, which resulted in poor rapport between appellant
and the teachers; that there was a lack of communication between
appellant and the teachers under his supervision; that appellant
had a poor working relationship with the teachers and that he
had failed to conduct regular meetings with his staff as required
by his contract of employment, and that in fact few staff meetings
were held; and that from all the evidence presented appellant
was incompetent in his administrative position. The evidence in
the record supports these findings.

HB Appellant contends that the trial court erred in using the
word “incompetent” in its findings of fact and conclusions of law
inasmuch as incompetency was not one of the reasons given by
the board for not renewing appellant’s contract. The word “in-
competent” is defined as, among other things,

“Jacking the qualities (as maturity, capacity, initiative,

366

intelligence) necessary to effective independent ac-
tion ***.” Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary.

True, appellant was not dismissed pursuant to the provisions of
SDCL 18-43-15, which include incompétency as.a ground for
dismissal. That the board did not use the term “incompetent” or
“incompetency,” however, is not to say that at least some of the
reasons given by the board for not renewing appellant's contract
are encompassed within the definition of those terms, whether
we look to the classical dictionary definition of those terms or
whether we apply a commonsense meaning to the words as they
apply to an elementary school principal’s performance of his
duties. SDCL 2-14-1. Cf. Sullivan v. Meade Ind. School Dist. No.
101, supra. As we read the record, appellant’s principal deficiency
as an administrator lay in his poor working relationship with the
teachers under his supervision. Surely eighteen out of the nine-
teen teachers under appellant's supervision would not have sign-
ed the statement had there not been some reasonable basis for
the allegations set forth in the statement. There is no evidence in
the record to indicate that Miss Maier concocted the statement
out of whole cloth and persuaded her colleagues to sign it as a
part of a cabal whose purpose it was to be rid of appellant out of
petty, vindictive motives. We do not have the advantage granted
to the trial court of observing the demeanor of the witnesses;
thus we cannot detect the subtle antagonisms and resentments
that may have manifested themselves during the testimony given
by appellant, his superior, and the members of the elementary
school teaching staff. We must give due weight to the trial court’s
opportunity to observe the electric-like undercurrents of human
emotions that the witnesses before him exhibited during the ten-
sion of a hard-fought contest. The record does not compel a find-
ing that bad faith or vindictive motives existed on the part of the
members of the board or the witnesses called in the board’s
behalf.

HE Appellant contends that the deficiencies enumerated in
the findings of fact concerning his performance as an ad-
ministrator could have been remedied had they been called to his
attention by the superintendent of schools, and that the failure of _
the school administration to call these problems to his attention

367

prior to the hearing before the board was a denial of due process.
We do not agree. Although SDCL 13-43-9.1 as amended by
Chapter 189, Section 1, Laws of 1975, provides that

“All teachers shall be evaluated and given notice of any
deficiencies during each semester of the first two full
terms of employment,”

this is a statutory requirement that did not exist at the time ap-
pellant’s contract was not renewed and, arguably, would not have
applied to appellant in any event inasmuch as he was neither a
teacher nor serving the first two full terms of his employment.
Whether appellant's deficiencies were remedial or not, it was for
the board to decide whether appellant’s administrative leader-
ship was so deficient that the educational program in the elemen-
tary grades was adversely affected to the point that in the exer-
cise of the board’s considered judgment appellant’s contract
should not be renewed. We think that what was said in
Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Central Community School Dist.,
supra, is apropos here:

“** * It is our holding that the administration of the in-
ternal affairs of the school district before us has not
passed by judicial fiat from the local board, where it was
lodged by statute, to the Federal court. Such matters as
to the competence of teachers, and the standards of its
measurement are not, without more, matters of con-
stitutional dimensions. They are peculiarly appropriate
to state and local administration.” 488 F.2d at 243.

Likewise, in the instant case it was for the respondent board to
determine appellant’s competence as an administrator, whether
the board used that particular term or not, and to determine
whether his continued employment as an administrator was
detrimental to the educational program offered by the district. So
long as the board made this determination on the basis of good
faith and upon competent, credible evidence, that determination
should be upheld on review.

The judgment is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur.

368

MORTWEET, Appellant v. ETHAN BD. OF EDUCATION,
DAVISON CO., Respondent

(241 N.W.2d 580)

(File No. 11621. Opinion filed May 6, 1976)

Ronald D. Olinger, Duncan, Olinger & Srstka, Pierre, for ap-
pellant.

Dennis R. Padrnos and Clyde E. Saukerson, Tinan, Carlson,
Padrnos & Smith, Mitchell, for respondent.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

The appeal from a decision of respondent Ethan Board of
Education not to renew appellant Mortweet’s teaching contract
for the 1974-1975 school year was dismissed by the circuit court.
Appellant appeals to this court contending that the trial court
erred (1) in applying the wrong standard in reviewing the deci-
sion of the respondent board, and (2) in failing to find that the
decision of respondent board was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion and unsupported by substantial evidence. We af-
firm.

Appellant was a first grade teacher in the Ethan Public
School System. She had taught school in Ethan for seventeen
years. On February 5, 1974, she received written notification
from Bob Ruth, the superintendent of schools in Ethan, that he
would not recommend to respondent board that she be rehired
for the 1974-1975 school year. Mr. Ruth again wrote appellant on
February 11th, setting out the reasons why she would not be
recommended for rehiring. The reasons were as follows:

“1) Complaints of parents as stated in the evalua-
tion file which seem to show the teacher to be insen-
sitive towards the needs of students who are not
‘average’.

“2) A reluctance on the part of the teacher to try
new teaching methods or to use different techniques in
her teaching.

“3) Observations seem to show the teacher is very
insensitive to the feelings of her students as shown by
her lack of confidentiality in discussing individual
students.

“4) A lack of energy by the teacher to move around
the room to give individual attention to the students.”

Appellant was notified by respondent that her teaching con-
tract would not be renewed for the 1974-75 school year. The
reasons given were the same as those set out above. Appellant re-
quested a hearing, and one was held before respondent on March
21, 1974. Respondent by a unanimous vote affirmed its decision
not to renew appellant’s contract.

On April 30, 1974, the decision of respondent was appealed to
the circuit court pursuant to SDCL 13-43-10.1. The parties
stipulated for the purpose of the appeal that the respondent had
followed all procedures required by SDCL 13-43-9.1, 13-43-10 and
13-43-10.1. An evidentiary hearing was held in the circuit court on
June 5, 1974. Both sides were given the opportunity to call
witnesses and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. The court
issued its memorandum decision on August 8, 1974. The court
upheld the decision of respondent not to renew appellant’s con-
tract. It subsequently adopted respondent’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Appellant filed objections to respondent’s
findings and conclusions and also submitted findings and conclu-
sions of her own which were refused.

SDCL 13-43-10.1 provides that a teacher aggrieved by a
determination not to renew her teaching contract may appeal

S37

pursuant to SDCL 13-46-1. That section of the Compiled Laws
gives the teacher the right of appeal to the circuit court. Further,
SDCL 13-46-6 states as follows:

“The trial in the circuit court shall be de novo
according to the rules relating to special proceedings of
a civil nature so far as such rules are applicable and not
in conflict with the provisions of this chapter and the
court shall enter such final judgment or order as the cir-
cumstances and every right of the case may require and
such judgment or order-may be enforced by writ of ex-
ecution, mandamus, or prohibition, or by attachment as
for contempt.”

Appellant contends that because she was entitled to a de novo
trial in circuit court the respondent should prove its case against
her by a preponderance of the evidence. The court in this case
based its review upon SDCL 1-26-36. That section is part of the
South Dakota Administrative Procedures Act and provides:

“The court shall not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of
the agency or remand the case for further proceedings.
The court may reverse or modify the decision if substan-
tial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclu-
sions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provi-
sions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole
record; or

MM

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.”

The question of the proper standard of review of a decision
of a school board under SDCL 13-46-6 is not one of first impres-
sion in this case. In Dunker v. Brown County Board of Education,
1963, 80 S.D. 198, 121 N.W.2d 10, we held that the words “de
novo” in SDCL 13-46-6 did not mean that a school board had to
justify its decision in the circuit court by a preponderance of the
evidence. In Dunker the court stated:

“Only when the legislative agency has acted
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or has manifestly abused its
discretion in exercising legislative authority may the
courts interfere with the action of the county boards in
this area. (citations omitted)

“The constitutional separation of powers cannot be
done away with by legislative action. (citations omitted)
Consequently, SDC 1960 Supp. 15.2023 and 15.2344
(which is now SDCL 13-46-6), providing for de novo trials
when county school board matters are appealed to the
circuit court may not be given a literal construction. To
do so would be to presume that the legislature intended
to confer upon the courts powers inconsistent with the
discharge of their inherent judicial functions. This we
may not do.” 80 S.D. at 203-204, 121 N.W.2d at 17.

We are aware of the fact that in Dunker the decision of the
school board involved the formation of school districts rather
than a decision not to renew a teaching contract as is presented
here. Appellant in her brief seeks to distinguish situations such
as in Dunker where a purely legislative function is involved from
the case at bar which she claims involves a quasi-judicial function
of the respondent board. .

HM We are unpersuaded that SDCL 13-46-6 should be read
one way when the issue involves the formation of school districts
and another way when the issue concerns the rehiring of a

ee EE

tenured elementary school teacher. Under our law, the power to
contract with teachers for employment is vested in the local
school boards. See SDCL 13-43-4. The decision to renew or not
renew this contractual relationship is vested with the local school
boards and not with the judiciary. SDCL 13-43-9.1 through
13-43-10.1. In both Dunker and the case at bar, the respective
school boards were exercising administrative functions granted
to them by the legislature. It is not the function of a reviewing
court to substitute its judgment for an administrative board
when it is legitimately exercising administrative power. Applica-
tion of Ed Phillips & Sons Company, 1972, 86 S.D. 326, 195 N.W.2d
400; McKinnon v. State Banking Commission, 1960, 78 S.D. 407,
103 N.W.2d 179.

A question similar to the one here was presented to the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Jaffe v. State Depart-
ment of Health, 1949, 185 Conn. 339, 64 A.2d 330. There the
Department of Health held a hearing and decided to revoke the
appellant’s certificate to practice medicine. Appellant argued
that the reviewing court should substitute its own judgment for
that of the department. The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected
this contention.

“Neither directly nor in the guise of an appeal can
authority be vested in a court to determine upon its in-
dependent judgment the question whether or not a cer-
tificate should be revoked; the court can act only in so
far as judicial questions are involved; and on appeal it
can review administrative action only so far as to deter-
mine whether any illegality has entered into it. Where
upon an appeal the court hears evidence it is solely for
the purpose of determining that question, * * * even
where a statute required that an appeal should be tried
de novo, we held that the court should make an
independent inquiry into the facts but only for the pur-
pose of exercising that function.” (emphasis supplied) 64
A.2d at 338.

HME It is our holding that the trial de novo required by SDCL
18-46-6 permits an independent inquiry into the facts, but only for

374

the purpose of passing on the legality of the board’s decision. It
does not mean that the court may substitute its judgment for that
of the board or that the court must justify its decision by a
preponderance of the evidence received in the trial de novo.
While SDCL 1-26-36 does not specify that it applies to local
governing boards, we hold that the trial court did not err in ap-
plying the standards of this statute to appellant’s appeal from the
respondent's decision not to renew her teaching contract.

Hl Appellant's second point is that even if the court used the
proper standard for review it erred in affirming the respondent’s
decision. Appellant alleges that the decision was not supported
by substantial evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, and con-
stituted an abuse of discretion. We have reviewed the entire
record, and we find that there is substantial evidence to support
respondent's decision. Although the charges that appellant was
reluctant to try new teaching methods and did not move around
the room enough are not well supported by the evidence, there is
substantial credible evidence that appellant was insensitive to
the feelings of her students, especially the “slower” students. We
cannot find any indication from the record that the respondent’s
decision was arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion. Ab-
sent any affirmative evidence to the contrary, we must assume
that respondent acted in good faith. Schneider v. McLaughlin In-
dependent School District (decided April 29, 1976), 90 S.D. 356,
241 N.W.2d 574; Apoian v. State, 1975, 89 S.D. 539, 285 N.W.2d
641.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER, Justices, concur.
IVERSON, Respondent v. IVERSON, Appellant
(241 N.W.2d 583)

(File No. 11605. Opinion filed May 6, 1976)

875

Warren W. May of May, Porter, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson,
Pierre for plaintiff and respondent.

Charles Rick Johnson, of Johnson, Johnson & Eklund,
Gregory, for defendant and appellant.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Defendant husband has appealed from the property award
and child support provisions of the judgment granting plaintiff
wife a divorce for the fault of defendant. We affirm.

The parties were married on September 19, 1968. Plaintiff
was nineteen years old at the time; defendant was twenty-two.

376

One child, a daughter, who was four years old at the time of trial
in July of 1974, was born during the marriage.

After her marriage to defendant, plaintiff, who had been
born and reared in Pierre, South Dakota, moved to a ranch some
twelve miles northwest of Murdo, South Dakota, where she and
defendant lived with defendant’s father, John Iverson, who died
in April of 1970. Plaintiff testified that notwithstanding her
urban background she enjoyed life on the ranch and assisted
defendant in such activities as catching and tagging newborn
calves on the range during the spring of the year as a part of
defendant’s livestock production testing program. Indeed, at one
point during the marriage plaintiff borrowed money from a bank
in Kennebec in order to buy some livestock. At the time of trial
she owned thirteen cows, two heifer yearlings, and ten calves.

The marriage was destined not to be a smooth or happy one
inasmuch as defendant frequently left plaintiff and her young
child at the ranch for extended periods while he journeyed to
places such as Winner and Pierre, where he spent considerable
time drinking in bars. As plaintiff described the situation, defend-
ant would leave the ranch on a Thursday or Friday, not to be seen
again by plaintiff until she returned from church with her
daughter on Sunday morning, at which time defendant would ex-
press remorse for his activities and promise not to repeat them.
He would then spend several days recuperating from his jaunts
to town, all the better to be prepared to leave the following week-
end. During the time that he was present at the ranch defendant
frequently slept until noon and would quite often ask plaintiff to
tell the hired man that he, defendant, was not available when the
hired man came to the ranch house to ask for instructions about
the work that he was to do on the ranch.

In addition to his frequent unexplained absences from home,
defendant began mistreating plaintiff physically. For example,
plaintiff and defendant went to California to visit defendant’s
sister and brother-in-law during the 1973 Christmas vacation
season. While they were there, defendant came home from a trip
to Tijuana, Mexico, in an intoxicated condition. Upon being
questioned by plaintiff about his absence, defendant became

a

angry. He slapped plaintiff, striking the young daughter in the
process, grabbed plaintiff by the hair and threw her to the bed,
leaving a large bruise on her arm. On another occasion, plaintiff
became upset with defendant when she found him talking to a go-
go girl in a Fort Pierre, South Dakota, bar. After plaintiff and
defendant went out to their car, defendant slapped plaintiff and
pulled her hair, leaving plaintiff with bruises on her arms and a
split and swollen lip.

On an occasion in September of 1973, plaintiff observed
defendant’s car parked behind still another bar in Fort Pierre.
Upon going into the bar in search of her husband, plaintiff found
him sitting with a woman, as it turned out, a child psychologist
from Denver, who informed plaintiff that she should not feel
threatened or upset if she, the child psychologist, slept with
defendant that night. Not desiring to participate further in this
conversation, plaintiff left the bar after informing defendant that
she would meet him at the Holiday Inn in Pierre after attending
her sister’s wedding shower. When she went to the appointed
place to meet defendant, plaintiff found him talking on the house
telephone and heard him say, “I really want to go to bed with
you,” at which time plaintiff hung up the phone and asked defend-
ant whom he was talking to. Defendant replied that he had just
received the call, didn’t know who it was and hadn't yet said a
word to the calling party. Defendant then left plaintiff and walk-
ed directly to a room at the motel. Plaintiff left and returned to
the ranch home. Defendant arrived home at about four o'clock the
following morning.

As a result of other dalliances on defendants part, plaintiff
suffered adverse physical consequences more serious than those
detailed above, requiring her on at least two occasions to seek
medical treatment, the nature of which we deem it unnecessary
to detail here.

As might be gathered from the foregoing summary of a por-
tion of the evidence regarding plaintiff's claim of extreme cruel-
ty, defendant does not contest the fact that plaintiff had grounds
for divorce. We recount this evidence to illustrate some of the fac-
tors that the trial judge justifiably took into account in making an

378

equitable division of property between the parties. As far as the
record indicates, plaintiff was not guilty of any misconduct, either
of a sexual nature or otherwise, during the course of the mar-
riage. We will not dwell upon the contents of a post-trial brief
filed by defendant’s trial counsel (defendant's present counsel did
not represent him at trial). :

By the terms of his father’s will, defendant stands to inherit
all of his father’s real and personal property, subject to a bequest
to defendant’s sister in the amount of $50,000, which is to be paid
by defendant from his father’s estate at the rate of $1,000 per
year for a period of twenty years, and then at the rate of $1,500
per year until the balance is paid in full; and subject further to a
bequest to defendant’s mother, payable by defendant at the rate
of $100 per month until defendant’s mother reaches the age of
sixty years (she was born in 1926). At the time of trial in 1974, the
only matter that remained to be completed prior to the entry of a
decree of distribution was the payment of some $36,000 in federal
estate taxes, an amount that defendant was in the process of at-
tempting to have reduced.

Including the property that defendant purchased at the par-
tition sale held in response to this court’s decision in Iverson v.
Iverson, 87 S.D. 628, 213 N.W.2d 708, defendant owned in his own
name and by reason of the imminent decree of distribution in his
father’s estate some 5700 acres of farm and ranch land in Jones
County, South Dakota. Plaintiff's expert witness placed a trial-
date value on this real estate of $150 per acre. The trial court
placed a value of some $100 per acre on the land for purposes of
determining defendant’s net worth. After taking into account
defendant’s other assets, which consisted of livestock, farm
machinery and other personal property, and deducting a mort-
gage to the Federal Land Bank in the amount of approximately
$149,000, together with other smaller indebtednesses to other
creditors, the trial court determined that defendant had a net
worth of some $500,000.

The trial court awarded plaintiff child support in the amount
of $350 per month. To insure payment, the judgment provides
that defendant’s interest in the real estate described above be

379

subject to a lien and further provides that if defendant’s interest
in said property is sold, a net sum of $50,000 from the proceeds
shall be held in trust by a named bank for the payment of the
child support payments, the amount held in trust to be subject to
being reduced as the child advances in years.

The judgment further provides that defendant pay plaintiff
the sum of $5,000; that plaintiff be given the ownership of certain
personal property, the description of which is immaterial here;
and that plaintiff be decreed to be the owner of an undivided fif-
teen percent interest in the real estate described above, such in-
terest to be subject to fifteen percent of the indebtedness owing
on the mortgage to the Federal Land Bank.

The judgment also provides that defendant pay attorney's
fees in the amount of $2500 to plaintiff's attorneys.

SDCL 25-4-41 provides that:

“Where a divorce is granted for an offense of the
husband, the court may compel him to provide for the
maintenance of the children of the marriage, and to
make such suitable allowance to the wife for her support
during her life or for a shorter period, as the court may
deem just, having regard to the circumstances of the
parties represented; and the court may from time to
time modify its orders in these respects.”

SDCL 25-4-42 provides in part that:

“The court may require the husband to give
reasonable security for providing maintenance, or mak-
ing any payments required under the provisions of this
chapter, and may enforce the same by the appointment
of a receiver, or by any other remedy applicable to the
case. ***” .

Although the award of $350 per month for child support
strikes us as being quite generous, we are not persuaded that the
trial court abused its discretion in setting the award at this

380 po

amount in view of the testimony concerning plaintiff's earning
capacity and the cost of providing a suitable home for herself and
her daughter. At the time of trial plaintiff was earning $2.00 per
hour as a sales clerk in a retail business establishment in Rapid
City, South Dakota; her net take-home pay amounted to some
$69.52 per week. She testified that she had attempted to obtain a
better paid position but had been unable to find one.

Il Defendant attempted to impeach plaintiff's testimony
that she was unable to find suitable housing at a lower rental rate
by asking the plaintiff to read and comment on apartment rental
ads in a Rapid City newspaper during her adverse examination.
Although this testimony fills some ten pages of the transcript, it
is hardly so conclusive that it demonstrates that the trial court
was in error in determining that plaintiff would require $350 a
month in child support to maintain the child in a manner commen-
surate with that which plaintiff was able to do prior to the separa-
tion and divorce. Although the record indicates that plaintiff is
living in very comfortable surroundings and indeed might find it
possible to forego some of the amenities to which she has ap-
parently become accustomed, after considering the standard of
living which she and the child were rightfully entitled to enjoy in
defendant’s home we are not convinced that the trial court
abused its discretion in fixing the amount of the award or in im-
posing a trust lien to insure payment.

Defendant is presently leasing the ranch property for
$42,000 per year. He contends that because his fixed obligations,
consisting of payments of interest and principal on the Federal
Land Bank mortgage, real estate taxes, payments to his sister
and his mother under the provisions of his father’s will, and in-
stallment payments on the federal estate tax liability, will total
some $34,000 per year, to say nothing of the maintenance ex-
penses on the ranch and the payment of federal income taxes on
the net rental proceeds, the award to plaintiff of a fifteen percent
interest in the real estate is excessive and unworkable.

SDCL 25-4-44 provides in part that:

“Where a divorce is granted for an offense of either

es 381

husband or wife, the courts shall in such action have full
power to make an equitable division of the property
belonging to either or both, whether the title to such
property is in the name of the husband or the wife. In
making such division of the property the court shall
have regard for equity and the circumstances of the
parties.”

The principal factors to be considered by the trial court in
making a division of property between the parties in a divorce ac-
tion are

“The duration of the marriage, the value of the property
of each, their ages, their health and competency to earn,
the contribution of each to the accumulation of the prop-
erty and the faults and circumstances leading up to the
divorce.” Kressly v. Kressly, 77 S.D. 143, 148, 87 N.W.2d
601, 603.

[i Defendant contends that because little if any of the prop-
erty that he now has an interest in was acquired during the dura-
tion of the marriage and because the bulk of his property consists
of the inheritance from his father’s estate, the award of fifteen
percent is clearly excessive. Although it is true in Swenson v.
Swenson, 85 S.D. 320, 181 N.W.2d 864, and De Witt v. De Witt, 86
S.D. 59, 191 N.W.2d 177, we pointed out that a substantial portion
of the property owned by the defendants therein had been ac-
quired by inheritance, we also pointed out in the Swenson case
that “While the court may consider when and how the property
was accumulated, it is not obligated to do so.” 85 S.D. at 324, 181
N.W.2d at 866. See also Peterson v. Peterson, 71 S.D. 314, 24
N.W.2d 35. Moreover, it is clear from the record in this case that
the trial court considered all of the factors mentioned in the
Kressly case, supra, in making a division of the property between
the parties, and specifically referred to the fact that the bulk of
defendant’s property came to him by way of inheritance from his
father’s estate. The record reflects that the trial court made a
conscientious, studied effort to make an award that would be fair
to plaintiff and yet enable defendant to continue to operate his
ranch as an ongoing, economically solvent enterprise. If, as he

2

contends, defendant is unable to operate the ranch in a manner
that will produce income sufficient to meet his obligations, that
would appear to be a consequence of his own indifference, im-
maturity and profligacy and not the result of the trial court’s
well-considered division of the property between the parties. Cf.
Kuehn v. Kuehn, 74 S.D. 521, 55 N.W.2d 70.

I Finally, although not questioning the amount of the
award, defendant contends that the trial court erred in awarding
attorney’s fees to plaintiff in view of the substantial award of
property to plaintiff. Although plaintiff was awarded the sum of
$5,000 cash, the bulk of the award of property to her was not in
the form of liquid assets. Accordingly, we find no error here.

The judgment is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur.

STATE, Respondent v. STUMES, Appellant
(241 N.W.2d 587)

(File No. 11470. Opinion filed May 6, 1976)

383

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Mare Weber Tobias, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and respondent.

Joe W. Cadwell, Braithwaite & Cadwell, Sioux Falls, for
defendant and appellant.

COLER, Justice.

Appellant was charged with murder, SDCL 22-16-4, and
found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, SDCL 22-16-16,
and he appeals. Appellant asserts as error (1) lack of foundation
for admission of certain exhibits; (2) insufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict and (3) failure to suppress admissions
against interest made by appellant to police officers.

The information charged that appellant

“on or about the 17th day of September, 1973 in the
County of Minnehaha and State of South Dakota
aforesaid then and there did wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, without authority of law and with a

premeditated design to effect the death of one Joyce
Hoff, a human being, did kill the said Joyce Hoff, and the
said Defendant did then and there, and by said means,
commit the crime of murder in violation of the provi-
sions of SDCL 22-16-4 * * *.”

The victim in this case was found lying on her back on the
floor beside her bed in her apartment during the noon hour on
Monday, September 17, 1973. When discovered the body of the
victim was clad in a shorty nightgown and covered with a
blanket. The county coroner of Minnehaha County, a pathologist,
performed an autopsy on the body at approximately 1:45 p.m. on
September 17, 1973. His external examination revealed a bruise
on the victim’s right cheek and cuts on the bridge of her nose and
on her lips. Further examination revealed that a finely ribbed,
plastic-type, spray can top, some one and three-fourths inches in
diameter and in length, had been forced into the victim’s vagina.
The coroner concluded that the cause of death was not natural

- but was caused from a lack of oxygen, either anoxia or asphyxia-
tion. There were no visible marks of strangulation nor were there
any material signs of struggle in the apartment. The coroner
determined that the victim had had intercourse at some time be-
tween midnight and 2:00 a.m. prior to her death. He took samples
of hair from the head and pubic areas of the decedent. Hairs from
various portions of appellant’s body, secured under a warrant,
and pubic hair which was found to have adhered to the dried
blood at the corner of the victim’s mouth and certain other hairs
which were discovered beneath the victim on her left buttocks
were forwarded to the F.B.I. laboratory in Washington, D.C. for
comparison.

Hl Appellant has challenged the chain of evidence in respect
to the handling of these exhibits at the F.B.I. laboratory. We have
reviewed the record and find the showing of the chain of custody
in the process used by the F.B.I. laboratory was sufficient to
justify the admission in evidence of the challenged exhibits under
the standards enunciated by the court in State v. Christmas,
1968, 88 S.D. 506, 162 N.W.2d 125, and determine that that
challenge is without merit.

385

Pursuant to the instructions giver and to which no objection _
was made, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter
in the first degree. The instructions given, including one on the
lesser included offense, manslaughter in the second degree, were
essentially the text of South Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions
(Criminal) 3-7-8320, 3-7-320a, 3-7-320b, 3-7-320d and 3-7-320e, which
are, as indicated in the notes accompanying the pattern instruc-
tions, statements gleaned from statute, SDCL 22-16-16, and deci-
sions of this court. Appellant takes the position that the evidence
adduced in the trial is not sufficient to sustain a conviction under
the language of the instruction.

The particular instruction which is meaningful for the pur-
pose of our decision since it instructs on the law, particularly
SDCL 22-16-16, is Instruction No. 14 reading as follows:

“14.

“The phrase ‘in a cruel and unusual manner’ as used
in our law defining manslaughter in the first degree
means that the commission of the homicide must be
done with some excess of cruelty or refinement or
unusual cruelty under the circumstances sufficiently.
marked to approach barbarity and to make it especially
shocking, and the unusual character of the manner
displayed in the killing must stand out as sufficiently
unusual and unique or peculiar as to astonish and shock
persons of normal sensibilities.”

This instruction, the verbatim text of South Dakota Pattern Jury
Instructions (Criminal) 3-7-320e, has as its genesis a statement ap-
pearing in State v. Lange, 1967, 82 S.D. 666, 152 N.W.2d 635,
which, in turn, borrowed from both State v. Knoll, 1905, 72 Kans.
237, 83 P. 622 and State v. Diggs, 1965, 194 Kan. 812, 402 P.2d 300,
and from decisions of the New York courts, namely, People v.
Vollmer, 1949, 299 N.Y. 347, 87 N.E.2d 291 and People v. Lee,
1950, 300 N.Y. 422, 91 N.E.2d 870. An analysis of these cases and
on the other extreme, State v. Zemina, 1973, 87 S.D. 291, 206
N.W.2d 819 and State v. Pickering, 1973, 87 S.D. 331, 207 N.W.2d
_511, points up that in each case the cause of death and the means

386 me

by which the act was accomplished were clearly identifiable and
involved, under varying circumstances, provocation and physical
combatants. The facts of those cases we do not find controlling in
this case.

Research of comparable law reveals that our vintage law,
SDCL 22-16-16, carried forward from territorial days beginning in
Penal Code of 1877, § 250 and remaining unchanged, has had occa-
sion to be construed by the courts of this state more frequently
than like statutes of other states which have been abandoned for
newer and more definitive classifications of homicide.?

While, contrary to his counsel’s advice, appellant took the
stand and related to the jury the series of events that led up to
his presence in the decedent’s apartment throughout the early
morning hours of the day of her death, the jury need not have
believed his version. He testified to having intercourse with the
decedent with her consent and then, in a drugged sleep, having
been unaware, except for momentary wakefulness, that someone
must have entered the apartment and killed Joyce Hoff. Both the
version he presented to the jury and to the officers during inter-
rogation would account for hair of characteristic like his own
being found on the body of Ms. Hoff. His admissions that he had
struck and choked the decedent with his hands does not explain
her death as the coroner found no bruise marks on the neck which
indicated to him that strangulation, which was the apparent
cause of death, was accomplished by use of a cloth or like material
which left no discernible mark.

[Hj The instruction properly set forth the law. The means
used to cause death by strangulation and the duration and ex-
tremity of the assault upon the decedent might well be found by a
jury to have been cruel and unusual, and indeed, inhuman, in fact.
Hence, the trial court was correct in submitting that phase of the
issue to the jury. People v. Lee, supra.

1. See ND.C.C. § 1227-1712) repeated by Ch. 116, § 41, Session Laws of 1973, ef

N.D.C.C. § 12.116-09; K.S.A. § 21-411, repealed, 1.1969, Ch. 180, § 21-4701, of

§ 21-3203; N.Y. Penal Law of 1909, § 1050, repealed, L.1965, Ch. 1030, § 2,
.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.20, 125.25 (McKinney 1975).

pee 387

Appellant’s remaining claim is that certain admissions given
by him to detectives of the Sioux Falls Police Department,
Sergeant Green and Chief of Detectives Skadsen, while he was in
their custody both in jail in Wisconsin and as a passenger in a
motor vehicle with three law enforcement officers on the return
trip to Sioux Falls from Wisconsin, were improperly admitted by
the trial court. In keeping with State v. Thundershield, 1968, 83
S.D. 414, 160 N.W.2d 408 and State v. Kiehn, 1972, 86 S.D. 549, 199
N.W.2d 594, the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing on the
suppression motion. The testimony at this hearing covers some
160 pages of the transcript and includes that of both officers to
whom the admissions were made and appellant himself as to the
circumstances which brought about the challenged admissions.
As stated in State v. Thundershield, supra, and reiterated in
State v. Kiehn, supra,

“*** it was the province of the judge to consider,
reconcile any differences and decide therefrom if the
[admissions], beyond a reasonable doubt, [were] volun-
tarily made under Miranda guidelines. As with other
decisions of a trial court, we consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to support it.”

It would be impractical to detail the evidence produced at
the suppression hearing but the essential facts before the trial
court were that appellant was taken into custody in Green Bay,
Wisconsin, on or about September 27, 1973, on unrelated felony
charges pending in Minnehaha County, South Dakota. The two
Sioux Falls detectives, previously named, and a Minnehaha Coun-
ty deputy sheriff went from Sioux Falls to Green Bay to return
appellant to South Dakota.

HB Appellant was represented by an attorney from Sioux
Falls employed by his mother to represent him in the pending
felony charges. No charges had been filed against appellant for
murder although the officers acknowledged that he was a
suspect. The attorney who had been hired to represent appellant
advised one of the detectives that he had been in telephone con-
tact with appellant in Wisconsin and that he had advised ap-
pellant not to talk, but “that if he [the appellant] did there was

a8 Po

nothing he [the attorney] could do about it.”? On the morning of.
October 1, 1973, appellant was questioned for approximately one
and one-half hours and again for approximately one-half hour in
the afternoon in facilities provided by the Brown County, Wiscon-
sin, sheriff's office. Officer Green's testimony, supported by Of
ficer Skadsen, was to the effect that during the morning inter-
rogation appellant had been given the Miranda warnings and that
appellant had acknowledged that he understood those rights.
During that same period, appellant admitted that he had been in
the decedent’s apartment the night of her death but made no ad-
missions relative to his complicity in a crime. Later in the morn-
ing, in response to a question as to whether he would take a
polygraph test he replied that he would not answer that question
until he had talked to his attorney. The interrogation ceased at
that point.

The two officers returned to the jail late that afternoon and
continued questioning without restating the Miranda warnings.
Before the close of the afternoon questioning, Officer Green
asked appellant if the death of Joyce Hoff was accidental or
deliberate and appellant answered that it was accidental.
Thereupon appellant stated he did not want to answer any fur-
ther questions until he had talked to his attorney and no further
conversation occurred that afternoon. On the return trip by car,
after a restatement to appellant of his Miranda warnings, he

2. We have also considered in this connection appellant’s contention that since an
attorney had been retained, albeit on other charges, the officers were barred
from questioning appellant as a murder suspect. The logic of that position we
cannot accept as comporting to the purposes of South Dakota Constitution Arti-
cle VI, §9 or as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974. We recognize the ultimate threat of such
a holding in favoring those with means to retain counsel over those less for-
tunate, United States v. Masullo, 1973, 2 Cir., 489 F.2d 217, and agree with the
New York court that, as here, where counsel had not been employed for the
murder charge not then pending, that:

“once the police learn that an attorney has entered the proceeding, it is
offensive to our system of justice, in the absence of a waiver, to permit
further questioning by representatives of the People. Implicit in this ra-
tionale is the concept that the rule does not obtain unless and until the
police or prosecutor learn that an attorney has been secured to assist the
accused én defending against the specific charges for which he is held. It
is, therefore, of no consequence that the law enforcement officials involv-
ed herein learned that an attorney had been assigned at the arraignment
on the robbery charge since this attorney was in no way connected with
She instant eriminal proceeding.” People v. Taylor, 1971, 27 N.Y.2d 821,
318 N.Y.S.2d 1, 266 N.E.2d 630.

389

began sobbing in the back seat and made the statement that
“Taking a human life is so useless.” Subsequently, appellant
recited some, but not all, of the events which took place leading
up to the death of Joyce Hoff. In response to a question of
whether or not he would sign a confession upon his return to
Sioux Falls, he stated that he would and when advised by the of-
ficers that his attorney would probably advise him not to, ap-
pellant was quoted as saying he “didn’t give a damn what his at-
torney said; he could talk to anybody he wanted to.” After being
booked into the Minnehaha County jail, appellant called Captain
Skadsen back to his cell and stated to Skadsen, in the presence of
Green, “I want you to know that the death of Joyce [Hoff] was an
accident. I'm not a vicious killer.”

Appellant, although not denying he was given his statement
of rights on two occasions, insisted that he had smuggled on his
person some L.S.D. tablets and that at all times material to his
being questioned had been taking one or two hits, tending to
refute his being in a position to understand his rights or to exer-
cise those rights intelligently.

Hl At the conclusion of the-evidentiary hearing the trial
court denied from the bench appellant’s motion to suppress the
admissions. No formal order was entered as contemplated by
RCP 7(b) (SDCL 15-6-7(b)). Neither the state nor appellant has
challenged the lack of a “decision” on this motion. It is abundantly
clear, however, that absent the necessary findings of fact and con-
clusions of law which make up a “decision,” RCP 52(a); Bunnell v.
Kindt, 1968, 83 S.D. 377, 159 N.W.2d 923, this court's review is
seriously hampered, if not made impossible, because of the in-
ability of this court to determine the credibility of the witnesses
which determination is within the purview of the trial court
before whom the witnesses appeared.

Under the authority of SDCL 15-26-26 and 15-30-2 and the
precedent established by State v. Faller, 1975, 88 S.D. 685, 227
N.W.2d 433, we may remand for further proceedings. To the same
effect see State v. Iowa Dist. Court in & for Linn Cty., 1975 Iowa,
236 N.W.2d 54.

390 Pe

The total lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
present case causes us to remand this case for a determination of
the factual issue upon the evidence previously adduced.*

[If any of the admissions admitted into evidence are found
to have been involuntary from the “totality of the
circumstances,” State v. Adkins, 1975, 88 S.D. 571, 225 N.W.2d
598, a new trial shall be granted, but if all such statements admit-
ted as evidence are found to be voluntary, the judgment shall be
affirmed. In either event the trial court shall make the “deter-
mination,” as suggested by this court in State v. Thundershield,
supra, reiterated more explicitly in State v. Kiehn, supra, and
which we now hold is required. The determination requiring the
entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law we equate with a
“decision.”

The cause is accordingly remanded for further proceedings.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

3. This court as well as the trial court must be wary of a mistaken construction of
Westover v. United States, or Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, both reported at 384
U,S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Bd.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 as was credited to the
Michi an courts in Michigan v. Mosley, 1975, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46

‘Although apellant took the stand, there was no attempt made in this case to
use the ineulpatory statements for, impeachment purposes. ‘The admissions
were used in the prosecution's case in chief so there is no factual setting here
comparable to that found in Oregon v. Hass, 1975, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43
L.Ed.2d 570, which should occasion either this court or the trial court to impose

reater restrictions on police activity than those the United States Supreme
Gourt holds to be necossary under federal constitutional standards. Oregon v.
Hass, supra.

In connection with this remand the trial court must consider the similarity of
facts in the present ease to those reflected in Williams v. Brewer, 8 Cir., 509
F.2d 227, cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1081, 96 S.Ct. 561, 46 L.Ed.2d 404, 1975, and as
a further corollary in that case, the role that the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law have on appeal.

4. _It should be observed, as it was in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619,
30 L.Hi.24 618, that this court has adopted a stret standard of proof in this type
of proceeding. We have said, by way of suggested procedure, that “[w]hen a con-
fession or an incriminating statement allegedly made by the accused is offered
by the prosecution and objected to, the state has the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt the same was freely and voluntarily made." (emphasis sup-
plied) State v. Thundershield, 1968, 83 S.D. 414, 160 N.W.2d 408, see also State
v. Kiehn, 1972, 86 S.D. 549, 199 N.W.2d 594. Whether a less strict standard
should be applied in light of recent developments in the law, we have not been
asked to decide.

391

STATE, Respondent v. THUNDERSHIELD, Appellant
(242 N.W.2d 159)

* (File No. 11479. Opinion filed May 6, 1976)

Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, and William P. Fuller, Sioux
Falls, for defendant and appellant; Kermit Sande, Atty. Gen., on
the brief.

R. Van Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and
respondent.

COLER, Justice.

es 398

[i Petitioner, in this proceeding under SDCL 23-52, cited as
the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, was originally
charged with murder in the death of one Paul Raymond Gilchrist.
Following negotiations between counsel for petitioner and the
state’s attorney the charge was reduced to manslaughter in the
second degree to which charge petitioner entered a guilty plea.
The post-conviction hearing was held by the trial court at which
was received depositions, oral testimony, including that of peti-
tioner through a duly sworn interpreter, as well as certain ex-
hibits as authorized by SDCL 23-52-2. The trial court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law denying post-conviction
relief. From these findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
constitute a judgment under SDCL 23-52-14, petitioner has ap-
pealed. We affirm.

Petitioner's assignments of error are essentially that the
trial court erred in failing to grant relief on the basis of peti-
tioner’s claims that: (1) certain statements given to Bureau of
Indian Affairs police were used in connection with the
preliminary hearing at which defendant was bound over for trial
on the charge of murder; (2) petitioner did not knowingly, volun-
tarily or understandingly enter a plea of guilty to second degree
manslaughter and (8) petitioner did not intelligently sign the ex-
tradition waiver allowing for his extradition from North Dakota
to South Dakota and was thus not afforded fully his rights under
the North Dakota extradition law.

As evidenced by the memorandum decision? the state’s at-
torney drew findings of fact and conclusions of law purportedly
complying with SDCL 23-52-14. That statute clearly obligates the
trial court to deal with each issue presented by petitioner:

1. The trial court's memorandum decision directing the preparation of the find-
ings of fact and conelusions of law is set forth as follows:
“MEMORANDUM DECISION

“Gentlemen:

“This relates to the Petition and Amended Petition for post-
conviction relief of Bedie Thundershield.

“The Court has reviewed the record and concludes that the
credibility of the Petitioner has been persuasively impeached as
set forth in the briefs of the States Attorney. The Petition is
accordingly denied.

“The States Attorney may prepare and submit Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law pursuant to 23-52-14 8.D.C.L.”

394 es

28-52-14. The court shall make specific findings of
fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating
to each federal, state or other issue presented. This
order is a final judgment for purposes of review.

This statute, essentially taken from the language of the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act, §7, ABA Standards Relating to
Post-Conviction Remedies, §7, appears not to have been com-
plied with but petitioner has not challenged the sufficiency of the
findings of fact or the conclusions of law.’ It would appear from
the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered that the trial
court applied the test of sufficiency of the evidence necessary to
establish the right to relief as established by this court in State v.
Roth, 1969, 84 S.D. 44, 166 N.W.2d 564, to-wit: “The burden of
establishing a basis for relief rests on the petitioner.”

[i The scope of this court’s review is likewise set forth in
State v. Roth, supra, “that this court may disturb a trial court’s
findings of fact only if the evidence preponderates against them.”
84 S.D. at 47, 166 N.W.2d at 565.

Due to the paucity of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law we have reviewed the entire record, much of which is

2. The findings of fact and conclusions of law entered pursuant to the memoran-

dum decision read as follows: :
“FINDINGS OF FACT

“That the Defendant-Petitioner, Bedie Thundershield, a/k/a Bede
Thundershield, was convicted on the 2nd day of November, 1971,
in the Circuit Court in and for the County of Edmunds, State of
South Dakota, charging and convicting the Petitioner with the
charge of second degree manslaughter.

“That the testimony for and on behalf of the Petitioner herein,
Bedie Thundershield, failed to establish the allegations in his Peti-

tion.
“CONCLUSI ‘ONS OF LAW

“This court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter
of the action. on

Petition for Post-Conviction Appeal and the relief demanded

therein is without a foundation by and for the reason that the

creditability of the Petitioner had been impeached. The order and

judgment of this court should be entered denying the Petition for
‘ost-Conviction Relief.”

ptt 395

duplicated in the settled record, and find that the evidence does

not preponderate against the minimal findings of fact entered by
the trial court.

Petitioner, while in custody in Ft. Yates, North Dakota, on
violation of tribal law, was interviewed by two investigators for
the Bureau of Indian Affairs relating to his involvement in the
death of Gilchrist. It developed, during the course of the
preliminary hearing, that there was some question of whether,
during the course of the interrogation and after petitioner had
been given his Miranda rights, petitioner may have requested an
attorney. Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694. The testimony of the two officers involved was in
conflict in that regard and by virtue of the ultimate plea of guilty
no suppression hearing was held or order entered relative to the
admissibility of the statements made. The petitioner, in oral argu-
ment and in both his original and reply briefs sheds little light
upon what, if any, effect the threatened evidence may have had
on the voluntariness of the plea of guilty entered by petitioner to
the lesser offense.

As stated by this court in State ex rel. Condon v. Erickson,
1970, 85 S.D. 302, 182 N.W.2d 304:

“It is well settled that judgment on a plea of guilty
which is entered voluntarily is not rendered invalid
because for some reason the defendant had previously
made a confession under circumstances which might
have rendered it inadmissible, if the defendant had
pleaded not guilty and had gone to trial. This is so
because the plea, if voluntarily and understandably
made, is conclusive as to the defendant's guilt, admitting
all the facts charged and waiving all nonjurisdictional
defects in the prior proceedings against him. The judg-
ment and sentence which follow the plea of guilty are
based solely upon the plea and not upon any evidence
which might have been acquired improperly by the
prosecutor. Thus, a confession in the possession of the
prosecutor which has been illegally obtained cannot be
made the basis of a collateral attack upon a judgment of

396 rr

conviction entered upon a plea of guilty which was
voluntarily and understandably made.” (citations omit-
ted) 85 S.D. at 307, 182 N.W.2d at 306, 307.

HJ Even if we were to assume that the statements
amounted to a confession of guilt and further assume that they
would be inadmissible as evidence upon a trial for the reasons
urged by petitioner, since he pleaded guilty “they are relevant in
the present proceeding only to the extent that they may have af-
fected the voluntary character of his plea.” State ex rel. Condon
v. Erickson, supra, at 307. We are unable to supply the logic
which would support petitioner's claim that the questioned ad-
missions are the sole basis for the guilty plea. Petitioner has not
established that his admissions were the sole evidence linking
him with the crime and on the record before us we cannot engage
in such a presumption. That conclusion would be inconsistent
with the fact of petitioner’s being sought for questioning in the
first instance. Petitioner in this case entered a plea to
manslaughter in the second degree in order to avoid prosecution
on the murder charge. The state’s attorney agreed to forego
prosecution upon a plea to the lesser offense without going into
recommendations as to the sentence to be imposed. The fact that
petitioner accepted the bargain does not spell coercion. Weston &
Palmer v. Erickson, 1972, 86 S.D. 777, 201 N.W.2d 861. We find
petitioner's first contention to be without merit.

The salient point of petitioner's claim that his guilty plea was
not knowingly or understandingly entered is that he lacked suffi-
cient education and comprehension of the English language to
have fully understood his rights, thereby tending to negate
knowledgeable waiver of his constitutional rights by the entry of
a plea of guilty. For the purposes of establishing his claimed lack
of understanding, a deposition of petitioner was taken with the
aid of an interpreter. Throughout the course of that deposition,
attempt was made to show his claimed deficiency. Contrary to
that deposition, which evidence this court is as well qualified to
weigh as was the trial court, Geo. A. Clark & Son, Inc. v. Nold,
1971, 85 S.D. 468, 185 N.W.2d 677, there was other evidence
before the trial court which the trial court obviously determined
to be more credible. From the testimony of one of the attorneys

ee 397

who had represented petitioner at the time of the entry of his
plea of guilty, as well as certain correspondence, some of which
was addressed to the trial court prior to sentencing, which the
trial court obviously believed to be in the handwriting of peti-
tioner, we cannot say that the trial court was in error in disbeliev-
ing the deposition. The deposition, when countered against the
testimony and demeanor of petitioner in the presence of the trial
judge, is such that we must agree with the trial court, which gave
no credibility to his depositional testimony, that petitioner has
not met his burden of proof in his asserting the conviction to have
been obtained by violation of some provision of the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this state.
State v. Roth, supra; Fanning v. State, 1970, 85 S.D. 246, 180
N.W.2d 853. We would necessarily affirm a finding which would
support a conclusion of law, had they been made, that the plea of
petitioner was made with knowledge and understanding and was
voluntary. We are not unmindful that petitioner was no stranger

to criminal proceedings. State v. Thundershield, 1968, 83 S.D. 414,
160 N.W.2d 408.

The record discloses that throughout the proceeding, in-
cluding (1) the arraignment of petitioner on the charge of murder
to which he pled not guilty; (2) the subsequent arraignment on the
lesser offense of manslaughter in the second degree to which peti-
tioner first entered an oral plea of guilty, recanted, and (8) finally
entered his plea, the trial court scrupulously informed petitioner
of his constitutional rights both in the language of the law and in
layman’s language. Subsequent to the entry of a plea of guilty to
the lesser offense, petitioner by letter to the court indicated a
change of mind and heart and the trial court gave him the oppor-
tunity to withdraw his plea. Thereafter petitioner signed a letter
which was prepared by his trial counsel and without objection
presented to the court. Doubtless the most compelling evidence
of the ability of petitioner to understand both the English
language and his rights is evidenced by that writing set forth as
follows:

“Gentlemen:

“After I talked with Mr. Brown yesterday, I

398

have made a decision not to withdraw my plea of
guilty to the charge of Second Degree
Manslaughter. I have given this matter serious
thought and understand that I am free to withdraw
my plea of guilty and have a full jury trial. I
understand that I have pleaded guilty to the
charge of Second Degree Manslaughter and that
the maximum sentence which could be imposed is
ten years in the State Penitentiary. I understand

satisfied with Mr. Brown and Mr. Thurow as my at-
torneys. No promises or threats have been made to
get me to plead guilty to the charge of Second
Degree Manslaughter. I understand that I could
now withdraw my plea of guilty, and then plead not
guilty and would receive a jury trial, but I choose
not to after having considered the matter fully.

“Mr. Brown re-explained all of my constitu-
tional rights in great detail and in words I could
understand, and I believe that I fully understand
those rights.

“I consent to having this letter filed with the
Court.

s/Bedie Thundershield

Bedie Thundershield”

The interlineated words, according to the testimony of one of
petitioner’s co-counsel, were stricken at the request of petitioner
who read the instrument and objected to that statement and ini-
tialed the interlineation.

[ll The record does not preponderate against a finding, had

one been made, by the trial court that petitioner fully understood
his rights and understandably entered his plea of guilty to
manslaughter in the second degree. We find no error in the trial
court refusing to believe contrary testimony of petitioner

399

through his interpreter. Indeed, when the letter was read in open
court and petitioner was asked by one of his counsel “And now
Mr. Thundershield I would like to ask you if that is your
signature and if you still agree with everything it says on it?”,
petitioner personally answered “Yes.” As this court has con-
sistently held and which holding we find controlling here

“the effect of a plea of guilty was more than a confession
the accused did the acts complained of, it was, in itself, a
conviction and nothing remained but to give judgment
and determine punishment. Consonant therewith and
with Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 122, 178 N.W.2d 198,
and State ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 302, 182
N.W.2d 304, the court properly denied the relief
sought.” Runge v. State, 1971, 86 S.D. 9, 190 N.W.2d 381.

We have reviewed petitioner’s final claim of error
relating to the knowledgeable waiver of extradition from North
Dakota to this state. Petitioner does not claim that the waiver
which he executed in the presence of the two investigators of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs on July 20, 1971, is of constitutional
dimension but rather claims that it violates the provisions of
N.D.C.C. 29-30. Unlike SDCL 23-24-24 which provides a waiver of
extradition in South Dakota only upon the waiver being executed
in the presence of a judge of a court of record, the North Dakota
statutes appear to be silent on that subject. No North Dakota
case has been brought to our attention involving waiver of ex-
tradition from North Dakota where no formal request for extradi-
tion has been filed pursuant to their statutes nor need we be con-
cerned with whether state law applied since petitioner was in
eustody of tribal officers in North Dakota. We are mindful that
there has been considerable criticism in the rule announced in
Ker v. Illinois, 1886, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421, see
United States v. Toscanino, 1974, 2 Cir., 500 F.2d 267, however,
there is no showing of either kidnapping or treaty violation alleg-
ed in the case at bar. Although petitioner in this case was brought
into the state under dubious circumstances, the law is clear that
however jurisdiction is obtained once it is obtained and a convic-
tion results “There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a
court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape

400

justice because he was brought to trial against his will.” Frisbie
v. Collins, 1952, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541.

The judgment is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

DEGEN, Respondent v. BAYMAN, Respondent v. OUTBOARD
MARINE CORPORATION, Appellant

(241 N.W.2d 703)

(File Nos. 11336-11338. Opinion filed May 13, 1976)

3 .
J

Franklin J. Wallahan of Hanley, Wallahan & Murray, Rapid
City, for plaintiff and respondent, Norbert Degen; and for plain-
tiff, appellant and cross-respondent, William Degen.

Re 403

William G. Porter of Costello, Porter, Hill, Nelson,
Heisterkamp & Bushnell, Rapid City, for Donald Bayman.

H. L. Fuller of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux Falls,
George Beal, Rapid City, for Outboard Marine Corp.

MYDLAND, Circuit Judge.

This the second time this case has been before this court. See
Degen v. Bayman & Outboard Marine, 86 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d
184, There we held that the case had to be retried because of im-
proper statments made by counsel in closing argument. We also
held that defendant Donald Bayman was not entitled to indem-
nity from defendant Outboard Marine Corporation.

The facts of this case are fully set out in our earlier opinion in
Degen v. Bayman, supra. Since they are set out there, we will
only summarize them here. Plaintiff William J. Degen was
severely injured when a 210 h.p. boat manufactured by defendant
Outboard Marine backed over him and struck his legs with its
propeller. The accident occurred July 28, 1968, on Sheridan Lake
in Pennington County. The operator of the boat was Donald Bay-
man. Bayman had borrowed the boat from his employer. He had
driven the boat at least twice previously and had been operating
it on Sheridan Lake for some time prior to the accident. The boat
was equipped with an automatic push-button transmission
mounted near the throttle control on the right side of the boat.
The shift positions were “forward,” “neutral” and “reverse.” The
evidence is undisputed that the boat was designed to start in any
gear. There was also no warning in the boat to the effect that the
boat would start in gear.

At the first trial, William Degen charged Bayman with
negligent operation of the boat and Outboard Marine with
negligent design of the boat, failure to give an adequate warning
of the danger and breach of an implied warranty of merchant-
ability or fitness for intended use. Later a cause of action against
Outboard Marine was added alleging strict liability under § 402A,
Restatement, Second, Torts.

404 po

During the trial of the first case, Bayman settled with
William Degen for $65,000, and Degen’s mother as his guardian
executed a release relieving Bayman of any further liability to
William Degen as a result of the accident. The jury then found
both Bayman and Outboard Marine liable and set Degen’s
damages at $380,000. We then considered the case on appeal,
reversed and remanded it for a new trial.

At the second trial, Outboard Marine, which had previously
filed a cross claim against Bayman, chose to drop its cross claim
and was granted an order by the trial judge whereby Bayman
was denied active participation in the new trial except as a
witness. Norbert Degen, the father of William Degen, sought to
recover the cost of the medical expenses relating to his son’s in-
jury. Norbert Degen settled with Bayman for $10,000 and ex-
ecuted a release to Bayman relieving him of further liability.
Norbert Degen sued Outboard Marine for the medical expenses
and this suit was consolidated with the retrial of William Degen’s
suit against Outboard Marine.

The case was tried to a jury with Bayman participating only
as a witness. The jury again found for William Degen and against
Outboard Marine. The jury also found for Norbert Degen and
against Outboard Marine in his suit for medical expenses. The
lower court judge advised the jury in his instructions that
William and Norbert Degen had both settled with Bayman for an
unspecified amount of money. The jury was instructed, “If you
find for the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant, you must award
to each of the Plaintiffs the total amount of damages which they
sustained by reason of the accident. You may not make any
deduction whatsoever therefrom by reason of the settlement as
you have not been instructed concerning what amount was paid
by Donald Bayman to the Plaintiffs in connection therewith.”

Pursuant to this instruction, the jury determined that
William Degen’s total damages amounted to $100,000 and that
the total due Norbert Degen for medical expenses was
$22,658.35. The judge then deducted the money settlements paid
by Bayman, plus accrued credits, and gave judgment to William
Degen in the amount of $32,969.63. He deducted the $10,000

405

settlement from the verdict of $22,658.35 and entered judgment
for Norbert Degen in the amount of $12,658.35.

There are three separate appeals from these cases before
this court. In No. 11337, William Degen appeals and alleges
numerous assignments of error at the trial. No. 11338 involves a
cross appeal by Outboard Marine assigning as error the trial
judge’s refusal to grant its motion for a directed verdict against
William Degen. In No. 11336, Outboard Marine appeals from the
judgment against it in favor of Norbert Degen. In each case the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

William Degen presents numerous assignments of error. We
will discuss only two in this opinion as we find the rest to be
without merit.

Degen assigns as error the trial court’s refusal to give the
jury his prepared instructions concerning loss of earning capa-
city, personal inconvenience and loss of ability to enjoy life
because of his injuries. The court gave the following instruction,
which was numbered 22:

“If you decide for the Plaintiffs on the question of
liability, you must then fix the amount of money which
will reasonably and fairly compensate Plaintiff William
J. Degen for any of the following elements of detriment
or damage proved by the evidence to have resulted from
the negligence or breach of warranty of the Defendant,
whether such detriment could have been anticipated or
not, namely:

1. The nature, extent and duration of the injury.
2. The disability experienced and reasonably certain

to be experienced in the future as a result of the in-
jury.

8. The pain, suffering and mental anguish experi-
enced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the
future as a result of the injury,

406

4. The reasonable expense of extra shoes, shoe lifts
and prescriptions for the same which he has incurred
and which are reasonably certain to be incurred in
the future.

5. The time lost from his employment and from pur-
suing his normal activities since his injury, wherein
he has been unable to pursue his occupation and nor-
mal activities. In determining this amount, you
should consider evidence of his earning capacity, his
earnings, and the manner in which he ordinarily oc-
eupied his time before the injury, and find what he
was reasonably certain to have earned in the time
lost had he not been disabled.

6. Such sum also as will compensate him reasonably
for whatever loss of earning capacity you find that he
has suffered as a result of his injury.

7. The reasonable expense of necessary medical care,
treatment and services received by him since he
reached the age of eighteen, his age of majority, and
the reasonable expense of medical care, treatment
and services reasonably certain to be received in the
future.

“Whether any of the foregoing elements of damage have
been proved by the evidence is for you to determine. Your verdict
must be based on evidence and not upon speculation, guesswork,
conjecture or sympathy.”

HB Although Degen’s requested instruction on loss of earning
capacity differed in some respects from the above instruction
given by the court, we do not consider the court’s refusal to be
error. This court has consistently held that jury instructions
must be considered as a whole in determining if error was com-
mitted in giving or refusing to give certain instructions. Duprel v.
Collins, 1914, 33 S.D. 365, 146 N.W. 593; Pollman v. Ahrens, 1974,
88 S.D. 249, 218 N.W.2d 475. We have therefore examined instruc-
tion No. 22 and we are convinced that the elements of detriment

407

or damage relating to lost earning capacity are sufficiently
stated.

_ HPt is settled law in South Dakota that a jury award for per-
sonal injury cannot be based upon speculation or conjecture.
Kressly v. Theberge, 1961, 79 S.D. 386, 112 N.W.2d 232, and
Koenig v. Weber, 1970, 84 S.D. 558, 174 N.W.2d 218. We conclude
that the instruction set out above properly apprised the jury of
the elements of damage for loss of earning capacity so as to
enable the jury to determine a reasonable award that was not
based upon speculation or conjecture. Degen’s requested instruc-
tions did not substantially vary from the instructions given by
the court, but merely amplified those instructions. As we said in
Peters v. Hoisington, 1949, 72 S.D. 542, 37 N.W.2d 410: “It was not
error to refuse to amplify the instructions given which substan-
tially cover the principle embodied in the requested
instructions.”

[i The same reasoning applies to Degen’s proposed instruc-
tion on personal inconvenience and inability to enjoy life.
Although the court refused Degen’s instruction, it did fully in-
struct the jury on damages for pain, suffering and mental
anguish, as well as for time lost from pursuing normal activities.
While the specific words “personal inconvenience and loss of
ability to enjoy life” were not used, their meaning was embodied
therein. Had the court given the refused instruction, it would
have been only cumulative of those already given and might very
well have only confused the jury in its deliberations. We find no
error in the court’s refusal to give this instruction.

After the jury had determined Degen’s total damages, the .
court deducted Bayman’s settlement from the jury verdict before
entering judgment. Degen assigns this as error. He maintains
that the settlement should not have been deducted from the ver-
dict under South Dakota law. South Dakota has adopted the
Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Law which is found at
SDCL 15-8-11 through 15-8-22. The lower court reduced Degen’s
verdict pursuant to SDCL 15-8-17 which provides as follows:

“Joint tort-feasor not discharged by release of

408 Pe

another—Claim reduced by amount stated in
release.—A release by the injured person of one joint
tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not
discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so
provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-
feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the
release, or in any amount or proportion by which the
release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if
greater than the consideration paid.” (emphasis sup-
plied)

Degen maintains that this section is not applicable since there
was never a determination made that Bayman and Outboard
Marine were joint tort-feasors as defined by SDCL 15-8-11.

We cannot accept this contention for two reasons. First, this
court, after reviewing the evidence from the first trial, held in
Degen v. Bayman, supra, that Bayman was not entitled to indem-
nification from Outboard Marine. In that opinion we stated:

“Viewed most favorably, Bayman’s conduct con-
sisted of not less than acts of omission in his duty to
plaintiff which contributed to the proximate cause of the
injury. His negligence was more than passive or
vicarious. Being in pari delicto, he was in no position to
shift the entire liability to Outboard Marine. Indemnity
was not an issue and the trial court should have dis-
missed Bayman’s claim therefor.” 86 S.D. at 605, 200
N.W.2d at 138,

Second, Degen’s amended pleadings alleged that
Bayman and Outboard Marine were joint tort-feasors. We adopt
the view of the Supreme Court of North Dakota as stated in Levi
v. Montgomery, 1963, N.D., 120 N.W.2d 383, that where there has
been no other clear determination as to whether two parties are
joint tort-feasors the plaintiff's pleadings should control:

“Thus the question at issue between the parties is

determined by the pleadings. Even though the plaintiff
now contends that he, in fact, had no cause of action in

es 409

tort against one of the defendants, the court will con-
sider the issues as framed by the pleadings. Where the
plaintiff charges several defendants with tort, and one
of the defendants buys its way out of the suit and is
given a release and covenant not to sue, the court will
not go into the question of liability of such defendant.
The test in such case is: Was the defendant sued as a
tort-feasor? If so, any liability of the remaining defend-
ants to the plaintiff must be reduced by the amount paid
for such release or covenant not to sue by such defend-
ant.” 120 N.W.2d at 388-389.

In view of our previous determination of liability in Degen v.
Bayman, supra, and the amended pleadings filed by Degen in this
action, we find that SDCL 15-8-17 is applicable and that the lower
court was correct in deducting Bayman’s settlement from the
jury verdict.

HM Outboard Marine contends in its cross appeal that the
lower court erred in not granting its motion for a directed verdict
against William Degen. It urges that there was insufficient
evidence at the trial to sustain liability against it on any of
Degen’s three theories. In our review of the denial of the motion
for a directed verdict, “this court will assume that the evidence of
the party against whom a (directed) verdict is demanded is un-
disputed, and will also give such evidence that construction which
is most favorable to such party.” Clinkscales v. Wisconsin
Granite Co., 1916, 38 S.D. 205, 212, 160 N.W. 843, 845. In the in-
stant case, we have examined the record in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff William Degen. We find that on the
basis of the testimony of both his lay witnesses and his expert
witness that there is sufficient evidence to sustain Outboard
Marine’s liability based on any one of the three theories alleged
by Degen. There is competent evidence that the unsafe design of
the boat and Outboard Marine’s failure to give a warning of the
fact that the boat would start in gear were the proximate causes
of the injury which William Degen suffered. It should be noted
that the question of Outboard Marine’s liability has been con-
sidered by two different juries and both have arrived at the same
conclusion as to liability and have returned verdicts against Out-

410 P|

board Marine. Clearly, the trial court was justified in denying its
motion for a directed verdict.

Outboard Marine has also appealed from the judgment
against it in the suit by Norbert Degen for recovery of the
medical expenses incurred as a result of William Degen’s injury.
It raises three issues in this appeal. First, it maintains that the
court erred in not directing a verdict in its favor against Norbert
Degen. The issue was discussed above in connection with William
Degen’s suit and will not be repeated, except to say that in view
of the evidence the court was justified in refusing to direct a ver-
dict against Norbert Degen.

It is uncontroverted that sometime after the accident
on July 28, 1968, William Degen was treated at the Shriners
Hospital for Crippled Children in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the
injury to his legs as a result of the accident; that the reasonable
value of these medical services was $13,490 and that these ser-
vices were rendered to William Degen free of charge. In light of
this, Outboard Marine maintains that the court erred in allowing
Norbert Degen to recover a total of $22,658.35 in medical ex-
penses when $13,490 of those expenses did not have to be paid by
Norbert Degen. A determination of this issue involves considera-
tion of the so-called “collateral source rule” which has been
adopted in many jurisdictions. The rule was stated concisely at 22
Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 207.

“The general rule is that a plaintiff who has been in-
jured by the tortious conduct of the defendant is en-
titled to recover the reasonable value of medical and
nursing services reasonably required by the injury. This
is a recovery for their value and not for the expend-
itures actually made or obligations incurred. Thus,
under this general rule, the fact that the medical and
nursing services were rendered gratuitously to the one
who was injured will not preclude the injured party
from recovering the value of those services as a part of
his compensatory damages. Accordingly, the plaintiff's
recovery will not be reduced by the fact that the medical
expenses were paid by some source collateral to the

ee

defendant, such as by a beneficial society, by members
of the plaintiff's family, by the plaintiff's employer, or by
an insurance company.”

The rationale for this rule is that a tort-feasor should not be
allowed to benefit because the victim of his wrongdoing was able
to receive gratuitous medical and nursing services for his in-
juries. This rule is followed in many jurisdictions including Min-
nesota. See Dahlin v. Kron, 1950, 232 Minn. 312, 45 N.W.2d 833;
Dyson v. Schmidt, 1961, 260 Minn. 129, 109 N.W.2d 262. This court
feels that the rule and the rationale behind it are sound. See
Moore v. Kluthe & Lane Ins. Agency, Inc., 1975, 89 S.D. 419, 234
N.W.2d 260. Accordingly, we hold that where the victim of a tort-
feasor receives gratuitous medical services from a source wholly
independent of the tort-feasor the value of the gratuitous medical
services may not be deducted from the verdict for overall medical
care received. This rule is no less applicable here where Norbert
Degen assumed responsibility for the medical bills of his son and
sued for recovery in his own name. Under our law he was legally
obligated to pay the medical bills and then seek recovery from
the tort-feasor. See SDCL 25-7-7 and Doyen v. Lamb, 1953, 75 S.D.
77, 59 N.W.2d 550. Thus, when a parent pays the medical bills for
an injured child and some of the medical services are rendered
gratuitously, the collateral source rule applies, and no deduction
is allowed for the gratuitous services. See Evans v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, 1957, D.C.Del., 154 F.Supp. 14. In the instant
case the court properly refused to deduct the $13,490 in medical
services provided by the Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children
from the overall verdict for medical expenses.

Hl Outboard Marine also makes the claim that the court
erred in allowing it only a pro tanto credit of $10,000 (the amount
of the Bayman settlement) rather than a pro rata credit of one-
half of the verdict (or $11,329.17) in entering judgment on the jury
verdict of $22,658.35 in the Norbert Degen suit. At this point,
reference must again be made to SDCL 15-8-17 which was quoted
above in its entirety. That section states that the claim should be
reduced by the consideration received for the release “or in any
amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total
claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.”

412

The release which Norbert Degen signed in consideration of the
$10,000 paid by Donald Bayman was silent on the question of ap-
portionment of liability. Outboard Marine asserts that it and
Bayman were both 50% liable and therefore the verdict for
Norbert Degen should be reduced by one-half. We disagree.
There was never a jury determination as to the proportionate
liability of Bayman and Outboard Marine. The reason is that Out-
board Marine dropped its cross claim for contribution against
Bayman and sought and was granted an order barring Bayman
from participation in the second trial except as a witness. Since
Outboard Marine was the party which dropped the cross claim
and sought the order, it cannot now assert that each tort-feasor
was 50% responsible for William Degen’s injuries. Therefore, in
accordance with SDCL 15-8-17, the trial court was correct in
deducting Bayman’s actual settlement from the verdict rather
than reducing the verdict by one-half.

The judgments of the circuit court are in all respects affirm-
ed.

WINANS, WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.
DUNN, C. J., dissents.

MYDLAND, Circuit Judge, sitting for DOYLE, J., who, prior
to his death, disqualified himself from taking part in the decision
in this action.

DUNN, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I would remand for a new trial on damages only.

The failure of the trial court to give Degen’s requested in-
structions on determining lost earning capacity and on personal
inconvenience and loss of ability to enjoy life as a result of the in-
jury was prejudicial. The general charge on damages did not suf-
ficiently cover these items.* In reaching this conclusion, I am
cognizant of the fact that the jury in the first trial, where the

* See South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction 30.07-1(B) and Committee Com-
ments thereto.

413

above mentioned instructions were given, found damages in the
amount of $380,000. The jury’s award of $100,000 in the second
trial is no small amount, but I feel that the error in failing to pro-
perly instruct the jury in the second trial, coupled with the wide
disparity in verdicts, warrants a new trial on damages.

SCHUBLOOM, Appellant v.
DONAVON AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Respondent

(241 N.W.2d 710)

(File No. 11636. Opinion filed May 13, 1976)

a
~
a

| fad
an
a

Rodney J. Steele of Wilkinson Law Firm, De Smet, for plain-
tiff and appellant.

Acie W. Matthews of Willy, Pruitt, Matthews & Jorgensen,
Sioux Falls, for defendant and respondent.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

This is a mechanic’s lien case. Plaintiff Wendell Schubloom,
d/b/a Fair City Glass, supplied material and labor for the con-
struction of a motel on land owned in part by Donavon and
Associates, Inc., the defendant. The motel structure itself was
owned by a partnership of which Donavon and Associates was a
member. The last of the material was delivered May 2, 1974.
Schubloom filed a mechanic’s lien against the defendant on May
17, 1974, and subsequently commenced foreclosure proceedings.

The trial court found that the lien was deficient in that it con-
tained an inadequate notation of the address of the owner and an
insufficient description of the real property upon which the lien
was attached. The court also found that the notice of filing of the
lien had not been sent to the address contemplated by the
statute. We reverse the trial court as to these issues.

The defendant has urged that if its other arguments fail its
position can be sustained on a point argued before the trial court,
but not decided by it—that being that the plaintiff is not one en-

6 ee

titled to the protection of SDCL 44-9-1 because the plaintiff is
merely a supplier to a materialman. We find, however, that the
plaintiff, does come within the protection of the statute as one re-
quested by the owner to supply materials and labor.

The relationships of the parties are intricate, and, since some
knowledge of them is necessary to understand the case, we will
set them out at length. On September 6, 1973, a partnership
known as Motel 1 was formed. Included as partners were Terry
Janssen and Roger Bousquet, both of Foam Bond Company, Jerry
Johnke and the firm of Donavon and Associates, Inc., the defend-
ant here. Donavon and Associates owned part of the land on
which the motel was to be built and it leased the remainder.

Motel 1 named Swift Brothers as its general contractor.
Swift Brothers contracted with Foam Bond Company of South
Sioux City, Nebraska, to supply materials and limited labor for
the project. Foam Bond Company, in turn, contracted with
Wendell Schubloom, d/b/a Fair City Glass of Huron, South
Dakota, for glass for windows and doors and also for the labor
which Foam Bond had agreed to furnish to Swift Brothers. The
meeting at which the Foam Bond-Schubloom agreement was
negotiated took place at the office of Donavon and Associates,
Ine. In attendance were Roger Bousquet and Terry Janssen as ¢
representatives of Foam Bond Company, but who were also part-
ners in Motel 1. Mr. Janssen testified at the trial that he had per-
sonally paid for the land which was held in the name of Donavon
and Associates. Also in attendance was Mr. Donavon Bousquet
who was an employee and incorporator of Donavon and
Associates. Finally, Mr. William Holland was in attendance for at
least a brief time; he was also an incorporator of.Donavon and
Associates and is its registered agent.

Mr. Wendell Schubloom signed one contract for his firm and
immediately afterwards received a purchase order for the re-
mainder of the materials to be supplied. He thereupon began to
deliver and install the glass, and continued to do so until May 2,
1974. He then received a check from Foam Bond Company. He at-
tempted to deposit the check, but it was returned marked “non-
sufficient funds.” After contacting an attorney, Mr. Schubloom

Po rlllrelrr L"EF€E

filed and mailed a notice of filing of a mechanic’s lien to Donavon
and Associates on May 17, 1974. On July 17, 1974, he commenced
foreclosure of the lien by summons and complaint. The trial court
found that the lien had been improperly prepared and mailed and
denied it any effect. Plaintiff Schubloom appeals.

The plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in find-
ing that he failed to mail the notice of the lien to defendant's ad-
dress as mandated by SDCL 44-9-17, which states that the lienor
shall mail a copy of the lien to the owner’s “last known post-office
address, by registered or certified mail * * *.”

The lienor mailed the notice of the lien to “Donavon and
Assoc. 500 E. 9th, S. Sioux City, Na. 68776.” Foam Bond Company
is located at this address. The lienor testified that he chose this
address because the Sioux Falls office of Donavon and Associates
was closed. Furthermore, as noted above, there had been a
meeting at Donavon and Associates at which members of Foam
Bond and Donavon and Associates, in addition to plaintiff, were
present. There were also other evidences of close cooperation
between the members of Donavon and Associates and the
members of Foam Bond.

The trial court held, in effect, that these factors were irrele-
vant in light of the fact that Donavon and Associates was a cor-
poration and found that any communications to it should have
been mailed to the address of its registered agent.

HE We reject this finding. First, our cases have held that a
litigant is not in all instances bound at his peril to know that the
organization with which he is dealing is a corporation. See Rust-
Owen Lumber Co. v. Wellman, 1897, 10 S.D. 122, 72 N.W. 89. See-
ond, there is no evidence in the record that the plaintiff here did
have actual knowledge that Donavon and Associates was a cor-
poration. The only testimony is to the contrary. Third, the
defendant corporation in this case had actual notice. Mr. William
Holland, the registered agent of Donavon and Associates,
testified at the trial that he had received notice through his bank
about a month after the lien was filed. Furthermore, the sum-
mons and complaint, which were served on “Donavon and

EM

Associates, Incorporated,” through Mr. Holland’s wife, also gave
the corporation notice. These papers were served well within the
120-day time for the filing of the lien; indeed, the corporation’s
answer was received within that time span.’

Two factors are relevant to our legal analysis. First, the
lienor did make a good faith effort to mail notice to the correct ad-
dress of the owner. We have held in an analogous situation, that
when a “lienor intentionally and willfully files a false and exag-
gerated claim, he forfeits his lien.” Wittrock v. Hall, 1927, 51 S.D.
39, 211 N.W. 801. We held at the same time that this rule does not
apply in cases such as the one confronting us today in which the
lienor acted in good faith.

[i Second, we can find no prejudice to the owner from the
failure of the claimant to mail the notice to the address of the
owner's registered agent. We think it clear that the purpose of
the mailing statute, SDCL 44-9-17, is simply to insure that the
owner receives actual notice. The legislature never intended that
a failure to send a copy of the lien to the last known correct ad-
dress would be fatal to the claim where the lienor knew that the
owner was no longer at this address, and the owner actually
received notice by the means used by the lienor. We decline to
make such an interpretation of the notice statute.

Hl We hold that when a lienor makes a good faith effort to
mail a notice of a lien to the owner’s correct address and it is later
revealed that the address is the incorrect one the statute is
satisfied if the owner receives actual notice and is not prejudiced
by the faulty mailing. SDCL 44-9-17. Cf, Application of Lycee
Francais De New York, 26 Mise.2d 374, 204 N.Y.S.2d 490; Hopper-
McAllister Corporation v. Pelham, 1928, 241 Mich. 235, 217 N.W.
9. See also Doss v. Gulf Smokeless Coal Co., 1926, 102 W.Va. 470,
135 S.E. 575.

1. We note that in some jurisdictions there is no need to file a lien at all ifa suit to
foreclose is brought within the time for filing. See Burks v. Sims, 1959, 230 Ark.
170, 321 8, W.2d 767, 769; Horton v. Wachtman Drilling Company, 1963, Okl., 385,
P.2d 802, 806. In the case before us it appears that the suit for foreclosure was
brought well within the 120-day period our statute allows for the Sling ofa len,

See SDCL 44-9-15. However, this point was not urged before us and we need not,

rely on it for. our decision.

419

Thus, in this case, even though the mailing may have been in-
adequate if there had been no actual notice, which is a question
we need not decide today, we find that SDCL 44-9-17 is satisfied.

[Mf Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in
holding that the plaintiff had not complied with the rule of SDCL
44-9-16(6) which requires that the lienor state on the lien form the
address of the owner of the property “to the best information
then had * * *.” We think that the facts revealed in the discussion
above demonstrate that the plaintiff complied with this section in
that he did act reasonably and in good faith. We therefore
reverse the trial court’s holding to the contrary as “clearly
erroneous.” SDCL 15-6-52(a).

We find no conflict with Crescent Electric Supply Co. v.
Nerison, 1975, 89 S.D. 203, 232 N.W.2d 76, on this point. In Cres-
cent we held (1) that SDCL 44-9-16, which requires that a claim be
verified under oath, was not complied with as no oath was taken,
and (2) that the itemization under SDCL 44-9-16 was insufficient
to give notice as the list of numbers was no indication of what was
actually owed. However, Crescent specifically endorsed the con-
cept of liberal construction of the mechanic’s lien statute, and
held that “substantial compliance” would satisfy the notice re-
quirements of the subsections to SDCL 44-9-16. We hold here,
under the facts set out above, that the claimant substantially
complied with the statute by his reasonable, good faith action in
giving notice.

Hi The trial court also found that the description of the prop-
erty contained in the lien statement was so uncertain as to be
meaningless. We disagree. While the statement is not a model of
clarity, it is sufficient under the rule set out in Laird-Norton Co.
v. Hopkins, 1894, 6 S.D. 217, 60 N.W. 857. In that case we said:

“If the description, as given in the claim filed, would
notify an ordinarily intelligent and careful man that the
lot intended was the lot upon which the security was
subsequently taken, or even if,it was sufficient to put
such a man upon inquiry which, if prosecuted, would

2)

have developed such fact, then the notice, as to him,
ought to be held adequate.”

The Hopkins decision and others of this court have been
quite liberal in allowing arguably deficient property descriptions
to suffice under the mechanic’s lien law, and we decline to depart
from those precedents today. See Cole v. Custer County
Agricultural, Mineral & S. Ass’n., 1892, 3 S.D. 272, 52 N.W. 1086;
Smith v. Bowder, 1918, 31 S.D. 607, 141 N.W. 786.

[il The defendant next contends that even if all other issues
are decided against him this court should find that the plaintiff
was not a party who can claim the benefit of SDCL 44-9-1. The
part of that statute which is relevant reads as follows:

“Whoever shall, at the request of the owner * * * or
of any contractor or subcontractor, furnish skill,
labor * * or materials for the improvement * * of prop-
erty * * * for the price or lien thereon * * * for the price
or value of the same * * *.”

In essence, the defendant’s argument is that the plaintiff is mere-
ly a supplier to a materialman and is unprotected because the
statute extends protection only to the materialman and not to his
suppliers.

We need not decide whether this contention is a correct
statement of the law in South Dakota for we find that the plaintiff
falls within the statute because he was requested by the “owner”
to provide materials and labor.

First, we note that Mr. Donavon Bousquet, an incorporator
of Donavon and Associates (record owner of the real property and
partner in the company which owned the physical structure), was
present at the meeting at which Foam Bond and Schubloom
agreed on specifications for materials. According to the uncon-
tradicted testimony, Donavon Bousquet was there to approve the
selection of the windows.

Second, Mr. Terry Janssen, ostensibly representing Foam

EE

Bond Company, was also present at the meeting. In addition to
his status as a representative of Foam Bond Company, however,
it appears that Mr. Janssen was also an equitable owner of the
real property in question. He testified at the trial that “[t]he land
that Donavon and Associates has a record ownership of was paid
for by me personally.” Furthermore, he was also a partner in
Motel 1, the firm which owned the physical structure. Mr.
Janssen clearly participated in the negotiations of the contracts
under which Schubloom supplied material and labor on the pro-
ject.

It thus appears that representatives of owners of the real
property and the physical structure who were, in fact, substan-
tially the same parties, were involved in the request for materials
from Mr. Schubloom. See Doss v. Gulf Smokeless Coal Co., supra.
We conclude that Schubloom did, therefore, supply labor and
materials at the request of the owner and he is entitled to the pro-
tection of the statute. SDCL 44-9-1.

The final question which must be resolved is the extent to
which the lien in question applies to the real property and the
motel structure built on it. It is clear that the lienor has a claim on
the real property owned by Donavon and Associates. No claim is
asserted on real property not owned by Donavon and Associates,
although presumably such a claim could have been made. See
SDCL 44-9-2, 44-9-4; Stoneberger v. Davis, 1952, 74 S.D. 300, 51
N.W.2d 873.

HE We do perceive, however, that an adequate claim is
made on the interest of Donavon and Associates in the entire
motel structure.’ The issue which we must resolve is whether the
lien applies to the interest of Donavon and Associates in that part
of the structure which is built on the property only leased by
Donavon and Associates. Our cases recognize that the word
“owner” in SDCL 44-9-1 encompasses the owner of a leasehold
estate. Thorson v. Maxwell Hardware Company, 1966, 82 S.D.

2. In line with our liberal policy regarding pleading, we decline to endorse the

language of F.C. Krotter Co. v. Harbaugh, 1988, 68 S.D. 178, 188,280 N.W. 211,
214, which would arguably require the lienor to separate his claim as to the
physical structure and the real property.

2,

385, 146 N.W.2d 739. Other jurisdictions have taken the logical
step beyond ours to hold that improvements built entirely on
leased land are subject to a lien; thus, the “owner” of the
leasehold estate may be the party who requests the im-
provements. The basis of the theory is that the intent of the
legislature in enacting a mechanic's lien law is “to give mechanics
and materialmen, a lien against the building primarily, and in-
cidentally against the realty.” Hayward Lumber & Investment
Company v. Graham, 1868, 104 Ariz. 103, 449 P.2d 31, 37; see
generally 57 C.J.S. Mechanics’ Liens § 188. Thus it is logical to
find that the lien may fall only against the structure and not
against the land when the leaseholder requests improvements on
the land.

We find the expression of the Arizona Court to be a
reasonable view which we adopt as our own. Therefore, in line
with this precedent, we hold that the mechanic’s lien is valid as to
the interest which Donavon and Associates holds in the entire
physical structure, but is not valid as to the real property not
owned by defendant Donavon and Associates.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.

WINANS, WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.

FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANK & TRUST CO., Respondent
v. JENNINGS, Appellant

(241 N.W.2d 715)

(File No. 11670. Opinion filed May 13, 1976)

423

Carlyle E. Richards of Ronayne & Richards, Aberdeen, for
plaintiff and respondent.

Harvey C. Jewett of Siegel, Barnett, Schutz, O’Keefe &
Ogborn, Aberdeen, for defendant and appellant.

HECK, Circuit Judge.

This case was submitted to the trial court on a stipulation of
facts which are hereafter summarized.

Judy and Richard Ottum, when purchasing an automobile,
obtained financing from plaintiff Farmers & Merchants Bank and
Trust Company, the automobile being used as security for the
loan. Subsequently, Richard Ottum and defendant Fiffel Jennings
were involved in an automobile accident occasioned by the
defendant’s negligence. Ottum and the defendant reached a
settlement of the claim for damages resulting from the collision.
The insurance carrier of defendant, through its adjuster, re-
ceived a letter from plaintiff requesting that plaintiff's name be
placed on the settlement draft. No response was made to the re-
quest. Defendant's insurance carrier delivered the settlement
draft to Ottum. The plaintiff was not named as a payee on the

26

draft. Ottum failed to pay the loan when it became due. An action
was commenced by plaintiff against Ottum upon his promissory
note for the automobile financing. Default judgment was obtain-
ed, and execution was issued, but returned unsatisfied. Plaintiff
next brought an action against the insurer and the adjuster which
was dismissed by the trial court. Plaintiff then brought this ac-
tion against Jennings for damages to the automobile. The trial
court held in favor of plaintiff. We reverse.

In this case, both the mortgagors (Ottums) and the mort-
gagee (Farmers & Merchants Bank and Trust Company) had a
cause of action against the tort-feasor (Jennings) for the damage
to the automobile. Cresbard Grain Co. v. Farnham, 1982, 60 S.D.
179, 244 N.W. 91.

[il The legal issue here is whether or not the defendant was
obligated, upon receipt of notice by the insurance adjuster of the
plaintiff's interest in the damaged property, to see to the applica-
tion of the insurance award to plaintiff's lien. If the defendant had
such an obligation she would be estopped from pleading prior
settlement as a bar to the plaintiff's action. We hold that the
defendant is not under such an obligation. Universal C.L.T. Credit
Corporation v. Trapp, 1958, 232 S.C. 297, 101 S.E.2d 829.

The plaintiff contends that the language used in the case of
Cornwell v. Surety Fund Life Co., 1924, 47 S.D. 421, 199 N.W. 126,
as it relates to “notice” is controlling. The administrator of dece-
dent's estate brought an action against a life insurance company
for the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the life of the dece-
dent for the benefit of creditors. The insurance company had
previously settled all claims under the policy with the named
beneficiary. This court, in holding for the insurer, stated therein:

“{IJn the absence of any act amounting to fraud or collu-
sion, and in the absence of notice that there are others
who have a right to share in the proceeds of the policy, a
compromise settlement made by the insurer and the
beneficiary named in the policy should relieve the in-
surer from further liability on the policy.” 47 S.D. at 425,
199 N.W. at 128.

In Cornwell there was no notice given to or knowledge by
the insurer or the beneficiary that there were any other parties
claiming an interest in the proceeds of the policy. The court there
did not determine whether notice to the insurer or beneficiary
would have estopped the insurer from pleading the settlement as
a bar to the action.

“To create an estoppel, there must have been some
act or conduct upon the part of the party to be estopped,
which has in some manner mislead the party in whose
favor the estoppel is sought and has caused such party
to part with something of value or do some other act
relying upon the conduct of the party to be estopped,
thus creating a condition that would make it inequitable
to allow the guilty party to claim what would otherwise
be his legal rights.” Somers v. Somers, 1911, 27 S.D. 500
at 504, 181 N.W. 1091 at 1093.

See also Kelly v. Gram, 1949, 73 S.D. 11, 38 N.W.2d 460.

Il Neither the defendant nor her insurer made any
statements, committed any acts, or exhibited any conduct upon
which the plaintiff could rely to its detriment, and in the absence
of fraud or collusion, the settlement and release of the tort-feasor
by the mortgagor is a bar to a subsequent action by the mort-
gagee. 15 Am.Jr.2d, Chattel Mortgages, § 187; Motor Finance Co.
v. Noyes, 189 Me. 159, 28 A.2d 235.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
DUNN, C. J., COLER, J., and HERTZ, Circuit Judge, concur.

HECK, Circuit Judge, sitting for WOLLMAN, J., dis-
qualified.

HERTZ, Circuit Judge, sitting for WINANS, J., disqualified.

RIST, Respondent v. KARLEN, Appellant
(241 N.W.2d 717)

(File No. 11646. Opinion filed May 13, 1976)

Rehearing denied June 8, 1976

es

Gale E. Fisher, May, Johnson & Burke, Sioux Falls, Robert
J. Haar, Viborg, for plaintiff and respondent.

James F. Margadant, Andera, Margadant & Erickson,
Chamberlain, for defendant and appellant.

WUEST, Circuit Judge.

The defendant, Merrill Karlen, operates a 30,000-acre ranch
near Reliance, South Dakota. He owns 9,000 acres and leases the
balance. Every year he sells some breeding stock, but some of his
leases were terminating January 1, 1974, so he decided to sell
more than usual. He had the cattle for sale sorted and made ar-
rangements to rent the Walt Bones Sale Barn near Parker, South
Dakota. Karlen paid $500 for the use of the barn, and Mr. Bones
was to take care of the advertisement. Thereafter, Mr. Bones
prepared a sale circular or advertisement which was mailed
without Mr. Karlen’s knowledge. This circular or advertisement
listed “200 Commercial Hereford Cows, 3 yrs. to 8 yrs. old,”
among other cattle to be sold at the “Karlen Reduction Cow
Sale.” When Mr. Karlen discovered the cattle were being adver-
tised as three years to eight years old, he contacted Mr. Bones.
Bones agreed to purchase any cows over eight years of age.

Respondent, Lee Rist, a farmer living near Centerville,
South Dakota, received one of these circulars in the mail and
decided to purchase some of the cows to enlarge his herd. Prior to
the sale he made an attempt to examine the cows but was unable
to ascertain their ages. Before the sale Mr. Karlen sorted out the
cattle he thought were over the age of eight years. Prior to the
commencement of the sale he told respondent the cattle were not
over eight years old, and he gave a short speech to the prospec-
tive bidders on the condition of the cows and told them the cows
over the age of eight years had been sorted out and would be pur-
chased by Mr. Bones. Respondent purchased thirty-six head at a
total cost of $18,055. He trucked the cattle to his farm and placed
them in a separate yard. A few days later he noticed one of the
cows looked sick, so he called his veterinarian. The veterinarian
treated the animal, but it died. The veterinarian and respondent
then examined the dead animal's ear and found that she had a tat-

428
too indicating she was born in 1964.

According to the evidence, heifers kept for breeding pur-
poses are required to be vaccinated for brucellosis between the
ages of three and eight months. When the veterinarian performs
the vaccination he tattoos one of the ears of the animal showing
the year of vaccination. At the same time, an ear tag is placed on
the animal’s ear which contains an identifying number.
Thereafter, the animal can be identified by the ear tag, and the
year of vaccination ascertained. A record of the vaccination, tat-
too marks and ear tag are forwarded to the State Livestock
Sanitary Board where they are maintained. These records are
then available to ascertain whether a particular cow has been
vaccinated for brucellosis. If she is vaccinated at the proper age,
her age can be ascertained from the tattoo marks. These tattoo
marks are placed inside the calf’s ear, which ordinarily becomes
dirty and must be washed before the tattoo mark can be seen.
Thus, in the case of the cow which died first, the tattoo marks in-
dicated she was ten years old. Respondent was not particularly
concerned about the first cow until another lost her calf in March.
Then in April 1974, a cow died from calving complications. An ex-
amination of this cow’s ear showed she had been vaccinated in
1964 and was also ten years old. Respondent cut the ear off this
cow and preserved it in vinegar. Later, two cows quit milking and
could not care for their calves. Respondent tried to bottle feed
the calves and had a veterinarian treat them, but the calves died
within a couple of days. About a week later the same thing hap-
pened and another calf died. As a result of these incidents, Rist
purchased special feed, which, along with other feed, maintained
the cows’ health so they could raise their calves. Mr. Rist called
Mr. Karlen several times and told him about the difficulties and
inquired as to the age of the animals. Mr. Karlen responded by
saying he would contact him again. On a third occasion, Mr.
Karlen told respondent he would make an adjustment, but he
never did. So in June, Mr. Rist caught all of the cows, washed
their ears, and wrote down the tattoos and the numbers on the
ear tags. According to the examination of respondent, he had pur-
chased twenty-six cows that were over eight years of age. Later,
Mr. Karlen’s veterinarian and foreman checked the cattle for tat-
too marks. According to their computation, eleven of the cattle

es 429

were over the age of eight years when sold.

Respondent introduced evidence that the cows over eight
years of age would not be as valuable as those under the age of
eight years. Also received as evidence of damages were the
veterinarian’s expense and the cost of the special feed.

The respondent brought his complaint on the tort theory of
fraud and deceit and alleged actual damages of $7,162 and
punitive damages of $5,000. The trial court instructed the jury as
to fraud and deceit upon the respondent’s request. The trial court
also instructed the jury upon the theory of breach of warranty
pursuant to SDCL 57-8-36 and 57-8-38, at the request of defend-
ant. The jury returned a verdict of $2,700 actual damages and
$5,000 punitive damages. Judgment was entered pursuant to the
verdict.

The defendant does not appeal from the award of actual
damages, apparently believing the actual damages are justified
under the theory of breach of warranty; therefore, we shall not
consider the question of actual damages any further. Defendant
does, however, attack the award of punitive damages.

[i Thus, we will now examine whether the award of punitive
damages can be sustained. To justify such an award under the
facts of this case, it must first be shown that there was a fraud
committed pursuant to SDCL 20-10-1 and 20-10-2, the tort action
of deceit.* Next, it must be shown that the fraud is of the quality
to justify the imposition of such punishment under the punitive
damages statute, SDCL 21-3-2 (as will become apparent, however,
it is unnecessary for us to consider this second question).

Did the respondent bring forth sufficient evidence of the ac-
tion of deceit under SDCL 20-10-1 and 20-10-27

* The parties in their briefs have dwelt upon SDCL 53-4-5 to define the tort of
“deceit.” However, this section sets out the definition of actual fraud applicable
to contract law. SDCL 20-10-1 and 20-10-2, on the other hand, define the
elements of the tort of deceit, which is a species of fraud.

Neilson v. Edwards, 1914, 34 S.D. 399, 148 N.W. 844, pointed out that the
contract-tort distinction of the sections is real although the definitions are ad-
mittedly “similar.” Thus, one who brings an action in tort or in contract should
be careful to distinguish between the two sections.

430 pO

SDCL 20-10-1 states that:

“One who willfully deceives another, with intent to
induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is
liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.”

SDCL 20-10-2 states:
“A deceit within the meaning of § 20-10-1 is either:

(1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true,
by one who does not believe it to be true;

(2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true,
by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it
to be true;

(3) The suppression of a fact by one who is bound to
disclose it, or who gives information of other facts
which are likely to mislead for want of communication
of that fact; or

(4) A promise made without any intention of per-
forming.”

Our decision in Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc.,
83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803, found that the provisions of the fore-
going statutes are declaratory of the common law and com-
prehend an intention to mislead.

Was there, then, sufficient evidence of the intention to
mislead so as to allow submission of the question to the jury? We
find that the evidence was insufficient to justify such submission.
First, the advertisement which incorrectly stated that the cows
at the auction would be three to eight years old was sent out
without the defendant’s consent or knowledge. Furthermore,
shortly thereafter the defendant contacted Mr. Bones who
agreed to correct the problem by purchasing all of the cows over
eight years old. The defendant thereafter went through his herd,
and, referring to shoulder marks and brands, removed the cows

ee

he thought were over the age of eight years and sold them to
Bones. In addition, the defendant, prior to the sale, publicly told
the potential bidders, including the respondent, that there had
been cows over eight years of age in the herd, but that he had
removed them.

This court has previously identified the burden of proof ap-
plicable to cases of fraud and deceit. In Commercial Credit Equip-
ment Corp. v. Johnson, 1973, 87 S.D. 411, 209 N.W.2d 548, we said:
“Fraud is never presumed or lightly inferred and the burden of
establishing fraud rests on the party who is to rely on it for affir-
mative relief * * Fraud must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence, but that evidence must be clear, satisfactory and con-
vineing.”

HH We have noted, furthermore, that “[q]uestions of fraud
and deceit are generally questions of fact and as such are to be
determined by the jury.” Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v.
Johnson, supra. However, when there is no evidence to support
the submission of a question to the jury, it is improper to do so.
Dwyer v. Christensen, 1958, 77 S.D. 381, 92 N.W.2d 199. We find
that the evidence in this case does not allow the implication of an
intention to mislead. We therefore reverse the judgment as to
punitive damages because the issue of whether the tort of deceit,
SDCL 20-10-1 and 20-10-2, had been committed should not have
been submitted to the jury. It is thus unnecessary to take the
next step and discuss whether this case would have been a proper
one for the imposition of punitive damages under SDCL 21-3-2.

The portion of the judgment awarding actual damages,
which was not attacked in this court, is affirmed; and the portion
of the judgment awarding punitive damages is reversed and the
cause remanded to the circuit court for proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this opinion.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.

WUEST, Circuit Judge, sitting for WINANS, J., disqualified.

rs

32
STATE, Respondent v. GERBER, Appellant
(241 N.W.2d 720)

(File No. 11696. Opinion filed May 18, 1976)

433

Mare Weber Tobias, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff
and respondent; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the
brief.

Thomas P. Tonner, of Maynes, Tonner & Maynes, Aberdeen,
for defendant aad appellant.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

434 po

Defendant Gerber appeals from convictions for driving while
intoxicated and possession of a controlled substance. Both
charges arose as a result of a search of his automobile by law en-
forcement officers. He contends that the court erred in not sup-
pressing certain evidence which was obtained in that search. We
affirm.

The record reveals that on December 5, 1974, a call was
received at the headquarters of the Division of Criminal In-
vestigation in Pierre from an unknown person. The caller talked
about possible drug violations in and around Hoven, South
Dakota. This information was relayed to D.C.I. Agent Jerry
Baum. On December 7, 1974, Baum received a message to call a
certain telephone number in Hoven, South Dakota. He was told
by an anonymous person that the defendant was collecting money
from high school students in Hoven and planned to travel to
Watertown, South Dakota, to purchase drugs and transport them
back to Hoven.

Later that same day, Baum received a call from an
anonymous person. That person gave him a description of the car
the defendant would be driving, the license plate number and the
names of the persons who would be traveling to Watertown with
the defendant.

Baum relayed this information to state trooper Dick
Siedschlaw in Watertown with a request that he keep a lookout
for a car matching the description of defendant’s vehicle.
Siedschlaw called Baum around 7 p.m. on December 7, 1974, and
advised him that the automobile in question had entered Water-
town at about 5 p.m. that evening and was presently parked out-
side a residence in Watertown which was known for drug activi-
ty. Siedschlaw called Baum again on December 8th and told him
that the persons in the defendant’s automobile had spent the
night at the residence in Watertown and were seen leaving town
at 9 p.m. heading west on Highway 20.

Baum secured a warrant to search defendant's vehicle from
the justice of the peace of Potter County. The warrant was based
solely on the following affidavit submitted by Baum:

“Jerry Baum, Special Agent Division of Criminal
Invistigation, (sic) State of South Dakota, being first
duly sworn on oath, desposes (sic) and says that he has
reason to believe and does believe that certain in-
dividuals-known to be Clifford Gerber, Rocky Brehmer,
Dan or Donald Hegeman, and A Benson (first name
unknown) have or will have in their possession a con-
trolled narcotic; drug or substance in excess of the
amounts allowed or permitted by law; that the narcotic;
drug or substance will be on the persons of the above
named persons or concealed in a 1972 Mercury 4 dr. HT
green automobile, Serial No. 2H10N521403, South

‘Dakota License No. 54-2777, 1974 owned by Clifford
Gerber; that affiants department at Pierre, S. Dak.
received two anonomous (sic) telephone calls from a
woman at Hoven, South Dakota advising that Clifford
Gerber was callecting (sic) money from various kids in
Hoven for the purpose of going to Watertown to pick up
a load of drugs; that on Saturday, December 7, 1974 af-
fiant received another call from Hoven to the effect that
Clifford Gerber and the other three persons named
above had left Hoven for Watertown, South Dakota;
that as a result of such information affiant contacted the
State Patrolman at Watertown who later advised af-
fiant that the above vehicle, with four occupants arrived
at Watertown at about 5:00 p.m. on December 7, 1974
and were parked in front of a dwelling at 1st Ave. and
llth St. S.E. in Watertown, a dwelling known to
authorities to have had a prior history of drug activities;
that affiants information is that the said occupants will
be returning to Hoven, South Dakota on this date, Sun-
day, December 8, 1974.

“Affiant further says that the above is what he
bases his belief upon and he has personal knowledge of
said facts and believes that a search of the said
outomobile, (sic) and particularly those areas of an
automobile wherein narcotics, drugs or a controlled
substance could be concealed, and of the persons of the
occupants of said vehicle, will produce quantities of nar-

436
coties, drugs, or controlles (sic) substances.

“Wherefore, affiant herein prays that a search war-
rant be issued out of this Court and that the said
automobile and its occupants, when it returns to Potter
County,, (sic) South Dakots, (sic) be ordered searched as
provided by law for the items above mentioned.”

The automobile carrying the defendant and the other oc-
cupants was stopped when it entered Potter County in the early
morning hours of December 9, 1974. A search was made of the
automobile and its occupants. Controlled substances were found
on defendant's person and in the vehicle. These substances were
introduced into evidence at defendant's trial over his strenuous
objections. Defendant was driving the vehicle when it was stop-
ped and he was also arrested for driving while intoxicated. A
subsequent blood test revealed that defendant’s blood alcohol
content was 14%.

Defendant argues that the court erred in not suppressing the
evidence seized when the vehicle was stopped and the results of
his blood test. He maintains that the search warrant was invalid
because there was no probable cause for the justice of the peace
to issue it and therefore the evidence was illegally seized by
Baum and the other officers.

HMM It can be said without resort to citation that searches
and seizures by law enforcement officers can be predicated only
upon probably cause. When a search warrant is applied for, the
police must demonstrate to a neutral and detached magistrate
that there is probable cause to justify a search of a suspect’s per-
son, his house, or his automobile. If there is insufficient probable
cause, the evidence seized in violation of the suspect’s rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments must be sup-
pressed. Mapp v. Ohio, 1961, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6
L.Ed.2d 1081.

[i In reviewing the determination of probable cause by the
justice of the peace, we must consider only the evidence which
was presented in support of the search warrant. Rice v. Wolff,

437

1975, 8 Cir., 513 F.2d 1280; Iverson v. State of North Dakota, 1973,
8 Cir., 480 F.2d 414; McCreary v. Sigler, 1969, 8 Cir., 406 F.2d
1264. In this case the only evidence presented to the justice of the
peace was the affidavit of agent Baum set out above.

Defendant urges that the affidavit here falls short of the in-
formation required for probable cause to issue a search warrant
under Aguilar v. Texas, 1964, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12
L.Ed.2d 728, and Spinelli v. United States, 1969, 393 U.S. 410, 89
8.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637.

Baum’s affidavit was based to a great degree on information
supplied by unnamed informants. The affidavit does not set out
the names or any information about the informants or their in-
terest in the case. The affidavit does set out that the D.C.I officer
had received two anonymous telephone calls from a woman in
Hoven advising that Clifford Gerber was collecting money from
various kids in Hoven for the purpose of going to Watertown to
pick up a load of drugs. The affidavit further sets out that on
December 7, 1974, the affiant, Mr. Baum, received another call
from an individual in Hoven to the effect that Clifford Gerber and
three other persons had left Hoven headed toward Watertown.
This informant gave the names and descriptions of the occupants
of the automobile and an exact description of the automobile. The
affidavit also indicated that this information was passed on to a
Highway Patrolman at Watertown who corroborated much of the
information by stating that the automobile as described and
carrying four individuals as described had arrived in Watertown
about 5 p.m. on December 7th and was parked in front of a dwell-
ing at First Avenue and Eleventh Street Southeast in Water-
town, a dwelling known to authorities to have a prior history of
drug activity.

From this the committing magistrate had to make his finding
of probable cause for a search warrant. He could eliminate some
questions about the informants. They were not paid police in-
formers or professional snitches looking for a few bucks, and they
were not victims of any crime. By the same token, adopting the
commonsense approach suggested in State v. Haron, 1974, 88 S.D.
397, 220 N.W.2d 829, the very fact that these people had made at

438 Pt

least three long distance telephone calls from Hoven as to
Gerber’s activities in collecting money from the kids to buy drugs
in Watertown would indicate that they were concerned citizens
seeking only to protect the kids of Hoven. This being true, these
people should not be put to the same harsh Aguilar-Spinelli rule
of demonstrating credibility and reliability. Naturally, they had
no track record with the police department as to reliability on
prior occasions. Their desire for anonymity is understandable in
view of the dire consequences that come to informants or the
children of informants from the drug pushers. Yet, are
magistrates forced to ignore this accurate information coming
from these people because they have been intimidated into
anonymity? We think not. All of the information furnished as to
the exact description of the automobile, the ownership of the
automobile, the occupants of the automobile, and as to their leav-
ing Hoven for Watertown on December 7, 1974, was corroborated
by the Highway Patrolman before this warrant was issued.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327.

Hl As a choice between some of the despicable paid infor-
mants (generally addicts themselves) used to obtain information
on drug pushing and anonymous tips from concerned citizens, the
latter would seem to engender more confidence and should not be
discouraged by the courts. Admittedly, the D.C.I. agent could
have drawn a more thorough affidavit to at least include the
added information that he testified to at the suppression hearing;
however, as pointed out in Haron, affidavits for search warrants
are to be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a
commonsense and realistic fashion. Considering all of the infor-
mation in the affidavit, and the corroboration of much of the infor- .
mation furnished by the unnamed informants, the magistrate was
justified in considering the information received from anonymous
sources for the purpose of probable cause to issue a search war-
rant.

Hl Once we conclude that the magistrate was justified in con-
sidering the anonymous informants reliable, there seems to be
sufficient underlying circumstances to justify his finding of prob-
able cause. The information as to Gerber collecting money from
the kids in Hoven to buy drugs in Watertown would seem to be

439

sufficient underlying circumstances to go along with the known
information of the actual trip to Watertown which ended at a
residence known for prior drug activity in Watertown.

Defendant argues that the record at the suppression hearing
does not bear out the allegation in the affidavit of prior drug ac-
tivity at this address, as one Watertown police officer testified
that no arrests had been made at or near this residence; however,
we are passing here on the magistrate’s probable cause for issu-
ing a search warrant based on the affidavit alone. Rice v. Wolff,
Iverson v. State of North Dakota, and McCreary v. Sigler, all
supra. Whether the information from the Watertown authorities
upon which Baum made his sworn statement was predicated on
some continuing investigation by the Watertown authorities is
unimportant. Suffice to say that the affidavit did not have to be
based on proof of actual arrest to be considered by the magistrate
in finding probable cause.

[i Probable cause does not require that the magistrate have
before him legal evidence of the suspected act. It is enough if the
apparent facts brought to his attention would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that drugs would be found
in the automobile.

[i Finally, it should be noted that search of a motor vehicle
on the open highway has never been held to the high standards
required of a search of a home. Motor vehicle searches have been
justified under circumstances that would not justify the search of
a home.

“‘{Ajutomobiles and other conveyances may be
searched without a warrant in circumstances that would
not justify the search without a warrant of a house or an
office, provided that there is probable cause to believe
that the car contains articles that the officers are en-
titled to seize.’ Chambers v. Maroney, 1970, 399 U.S. 42,
48, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 426.” State v. Op-
perman, 1975, 89 S.D. 25, 228 N.W.2d 152 at 156.

Under all of these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial

0

court erred in concluding that the magistrate had probable cause
to issue the search warrant.

Gerber’s appeal on the DWI charge is based on the same lack
of probable cause to stop and search the automobile which
resulted in his arrest and conviction on the drug charge.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed on
both the drug and DWI charges.

WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER, Justices, concur.

SNYDER et ux, Appellants v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASS'’N OF RAPID CITY, Respondent

(241 N.W.2d 725)
(File No. 11767. Opinion filed May 13, 1976)

Rehearing denied June 9, 1976.

lll l!LUmL
| |
William J. Rieb, Rapid City, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Charles L. Riter of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Sim-
mons, Rapid City, for defendant and respondent.

MILLER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing
the complaint of plaintiffs, which sought damages from defendant
arising out of a transaction concerning the sale and financing of a
mobile home.

The complaint alleges, and the facts so alleged are con-
sidered as true for the purposes of this appeal, that in October
1971, the plaintiffs purchased a mobile home from a dealer in the
Black Hills area. The plaintiffs apparently being financially
unable to pay cash for the purchase, entered into an installment
sales contract with the dealer. Apparently through some continu-
ing agreement with the dealer, the defendant herein accepted an
assignment of the installment sales contract and obtained a first
lien on the title to the mobile home. Payments thereunder were
to be made directly to defendant.

The complaint alleges that various obvious and also hidden
defects were present in said mobile home, resulting in a breach of
warranty, express or implied, of the dealer and manufacturer
(neither of which is a party to this suit) in which defendant was
“in pari delicto” due to its failure to inspect the mobile home prior
to making the loan. Plaintiffs claim that the defendant was under
a legal duty to make an inspection of the mobile home prior to the
loan closing, and that its violation of this duty was actionable
negligence.

The trial court held that the complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. We agree.

Plaintiffs cite as their primary authority the case of Connor
v. Great Western Savings and Loan Association, 1968, 69 Cal.2d

re

850, 73 Cal.Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609, wherein a lending institution
was held liable for negligence in its failure to follow its duty to
protect the buyers of homes from defects caused by major struc-
tural defects. The facts in Connor are not akin to those here.
There the lending institution was active in the real estate ven-
ture, whereunder it purchased real estate and “warehoused” it
for the developer, realizing a profit from the sale. During con-
struction of homes on the real estate, it made loans to the
developer and realized interest thereon. In addition, when homes
were completed, it either financed the homes being purchased by
the individuals from the developer or received a penalty paid by
the developer in the event it did not provide the financing. It was
held liable for damages for defective workmanship because it:

“became much more than a lender content to lend
money at interest on the security of real property. It
became an active participant in a home construction
enterprise * * * its financing, which made the enterprise
possible, took on ramifications beyond the domain of the
usual money lender.”

This is the first time a case of this type has been before this
court. Cases from other jurisdictions involving claimed liability of
lending institutions which either distinguish the Connor case or
make contrary holdings are: Bradler v. Craig, 1969, 274
Cal.App.2d 466, 79 Cal-Rptr. 401; Christiansen v. Philcent Cor-
poration, 1973, 226 Pa. Super. 157,313 A.2d 249; Callaizakis v.
Astor Development Company, 1972, 4 Ill. App.3d 163, 280 N.E.2d
512; Mortgage Associates, Inc. v. Monona Shores, Inc., 1970, 47
Wis.2d 171, 177 N.W.2d 340; Schenectady Savings Bank v. Bar-
tosik, 1974, 77 Misc.2d 837, 353 N.Y.S.2d 706; Weiss v. Brentwood
Savings and Loan Association, 1970, 4 Cal.App.3d 738, 84
Cal.Rptr. 736.

The allegations and assumed facts before us clearly show
that the defendant was not an active participant in this sale. It
was not in any manner connected with the manufacturer. Its only
relationship with the dealer was to take an assignment of an in-
stallment loan contract to provide financing to the plaintiff. It had
no legal duty to make an inspection of the mobile home for any

2:
defects in workmanship or otherwise.

Because of the total lack of comparable facts between this ac-
tion and those in Connor, supra, we are neither accepting nor re-
jecting the holding therein as a statement of the law in South

Dakota.

The complaint, failing to state a cause of action, was properly
dismissed by the trial court.

Affirmed.

DUNN, C.J., and WINANS, WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ.,
concur.

MILLER, Circuit Judge, sitting as a member of the Court.

PIPER, Respondent v.
NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH CORPS, Appellant

(241 N.W.2d 868)

(File No. 11729. Opinion filed May 18, 1976)

cs
cs
=

Costello, Porter, Hill, Nelson, Heisterkamp & Bushnell,
Rapid City, for appellants.

Lynn, Jackson, Shultz, Ireland & Lebrun, Rapid City, for
respondent.

WINANS, Justice (on reassignment).

Pc clr CLE

This is a Workmen’s Compensation case. The deceased, Rick
Gordon Randolph, lived with his natural mother, Mildred Piper,
the claimant, and Rex Piper, his stepfather. The deceased was
hired by the Neighborhood Youth Corps on a summer job in 1972.
At lunch time on the first day of his job at Angostora Dam, the
decedent went to rest on a raft which lay partly on the shore. The
raft floated away from the shore, Rick jumped into the water and
drowned.

The Director of Department of Manpower Affairs (Director)
found that the accident was within the scope of the decedent's
employment and the trial court affirmed this part of the
Director’s decision. The Director also found that the claimant’s
assertion of dependency could not be sustained. The trial court,
however, reversed this portion of the Director’s decision.

We affirm the trial court’s decision as to scope of employ-
ment but reverse the trial court’s decision as to dependency.

The threshold question is the proper scope of review by this
court of a review by the circuit court of an administrative finding
under the APA.

HM Although not always made explicit, our cases reveal
that in reviewing the circuit court’s judgment under the APA
this court must make the same review of the administrative
tribunal's action as does the circuit court under SDCL 1-26-37.
Furthermore, this court must make its decision as to whether the
administrative decision can be sustained unaided by a presump-
tion that the circuit court’s decision is correct. See Application of
Ed Phillips & Sons Co., 1972, 86 S.D. 326, 195 N.W.2d 400; Valley
State Bank of Canton v. Farmers State Bank of Canton, 1973, 87
8.D. 614, 213 N.W.2d 459; Lemke v. Rabenberg’s Inc., 1975, 89
S.D. 386, 233 N.W.2d 336. See also Application of Jones, 1975, 89
S8.D. 191, 231 N.W.2d 844. With this consideration in mind we turn
to the substantive issues.

The first substantive question presented is whether the
decedent was within the “scope of his employment” when he
drowned in Angostora Dam during his lunch hour.

‘es

The parties agree and we find that an injury may be com-
pensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law even though
it oceurs during a lunch hour break. This would appear to follow
naturally from our decision in Krier v. Dick’s Linoleum Shop,
1959, 78 S.D. 116, 98 N.W.2d 486, in which we recognized that an
injury which occurred when one was returning from dinner after
working hours was compensable when one was required by his
employment to be away from his home. See also, 1 Larson’s
Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 21.21(a).

Although acceding to the foregoing principle, the defendant
vigorously contends that the decedent had abandoned his
employment when he began to rest on the raft. The Krier case of-
fers us guidance as to the point at which one attending to his per-
sonal needs so deviates from his employment as to lose the pro-
tection of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. In Krier we said:

“The controlling factor is whether claimant was en-
gaged in doing something which he might reasonably be
expected to do while in the performance of his duties.”?

We found in Krier that the employee had not deviated from
his employment when he traveled two and one-half miles outside
of the city in which he was staying overnight so as to eat at a par-
ticular restaurant. .

The evidence in the case before us as to this point is as
follows. The decedent was a sixteen-year-old boy. He was taken
to a work site at Angostora Dam about 11 miles from his home.
He was, by force of this circumstance, compelled to stay on the
employer’s grounds. According to the supervisor of the boys, the
decedent, along with the rest of the boys, was warned at lunch
time that he could not go swimming. However, the supervisor’s
testimony also indicated that the boys were expected to con-
gregate by the shore during their lunch break and that there was
nothing forbidden about this. The supervisor said:

1. See also 1 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, § 21.84 in which the author

proposes “implied prohibition” as the test to determine whether an act in the

warsuance of “personal comfort” is to be covered by Workmen's Compensation
aws.

447

“Well, two of the boys finished eating first and Rick and
Montgomery, they ate their lunch, finished before the
rest of us did, myself and the two other boys, and they
started walking around the shoreline which was all right
with me. Wasn't supposed to be working that time of the
day and the other two stood by the pickup... [later] I
was going to get Rick and Montgomery. I figured they
were at the shore.”

The record shows that the two boys discovered a raft which
was lying partially on the shore. The two boys jumped or stepped
onto it, lay on their backs and rested for about 20 minutes. At
about that time they discovered that the raft had become de-
tached from the shore. The decedent’s companion began to swim
to shore while still fully dressed. The companion soon became
tired and kicked off his new boots. At this point the supervisor
appeared on a ridge overlooking the dam and shouted to the dece-
dent that he should remain on the raft. We can infer from other
testimony that the decedent could hear the shout but could not
understand the words his supervisor was saying. The decedent
then jumped, fully dressed, into the water. He soon drowned. His
companion was unable to save him because the water was so dirty
that his companion could not find him.

The case thus presents us with a question of fact: Was the
decedent, by resting on a raft during the noon hour, engaging in
an activity in which he might reasonably be expected to engage
when he had previously been impliedly authorized to rest and
relax on the shore of the dam but further when he had also been
instructed not to swim in the dam?

The Director by implication found that the claimant could
reasonably have been expected to rest on the raft even though he
had been warned not to go swimming. The trial court agreed with
the Director.

SDCL 1-26-36 sets out the guidelines for this court in review-
ing such a determination. It states that “The court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
the evidence on questions of fact.” Furthermore, the court may

448

reverse the determination of the agency when its findings are “(5)
Unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record; (6) Ar-
bitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” (SDCL 1-26-36(1)
through (4) are omitted because they are not at issue here.)

[i Our review of the evidence as recited above does not per-
mit the conclusion that the Director’s decision is “unsupported by
substantial evidence” or is “arbitrary or capricious.” Instead it
appears that the Director has carefully weighed the opposing in-
ferences which may be drawn from the evidence and has arrived
at an easily supportable judgment. We therefore affirm the
Director’s decision and that of the trial court that the action here
was within the scope of the decedent’s employment.

The second substantive issue we consider is whether Mrs.
Piper was “dependent” upon her son at the time of his death.
SDCL 62-4-14. If dependency is established the claimant will be
able to sustain her claim for a percentage of the salary which her
son had been earning. If dependency is not established the claim-
ant is limited to recovery of burial expenses not to exceed $1000,
SDCL 62-4-16.

The Director found that dependency had not been estab-
lished. The trial court reversed.

The South Dakota cases are not of great assistance in defin-
ing the term “dependency” in any context, including that of a
child’s support of a parent. The South Dakota Code from 1939 to
1945 did not even employ the term “dependency” with regard to
parents but instead allowed compensation to a surviving parent
when the decedent was “under a legal obligation to support” the
parent at the time of the accident. See SDC 1939, 64.0402(1); SL
1945, Ch. 352, § 1. See Schwan v. Premack, 1945, 70 8.D. 371, 17
N.W.2d 911, 912. The same “legal obligation to support” language
survived from 1917 to 1973 with regard to whether a widow or
child could receive death benefits. See SL 1917, Ch. 376, § 23; SL
1973, Ch. 312, § 1. (See Demaray v. Mannerud Construction Com-
pany, 1964, 80 S.D. 554, 128 N.W.2d 551, for an example of the
limited case in which both the “legal obligation to support” and

“dependency” language could come into play.)

Before enactment of the 1939 Code, however, South Dakota’s
Workmen's Compensation Law allowed compensation to a parent
who was “dependent upon him for support”. SL 1917, Ch.
876, § 23; RC 1919, § 9458(2). The identical language is employed
in SDCL 62-4-14 which we consider today. The best considered of
the cases decided under the 1917 terminology is Day v. Sioux
Falls Fruit Co., 1920, 43 S.D. 65, 177 N.W. 816. There the court
considered a situation in which a mother had received sums of
$6.00 to $8.00 per week from her son for five or six years before
the son left for service in World War I. This money was used for
family expenses. The son did not make any payment in the two
years he spent in the service but, in the twenty-five days after
returning to his home, he paid a $30.00 grocery bill and a $17.50
house payment. The father was 44 years old, in “good health”,
and regularly employed at $110 per month. One daughter also
contributed $10 to the support of the home. The court held that
the foregoing evidence constituted “reasonable or substantial
evidence” so as to sustain the finding of dependency made by the
Commissioner.

The Day case thus implies that the court in 1920 felt that
dependency could be established when the parents received
regular contributions which they in fact employed for their sup-
port. This interpretation of dependency is in harmony with a
more complete definition offered by 2 Larson’s Workmen's Com-
pensation § 63.11. The author states that

“A showing of actual dependency does not require proof
that, without decedent’s contributions, claimant would
have lacked the necessities of life, but only that dece-
dent’s contributions were relied on by claimant to main-
tain claimant’s accustomed mode of living.”

Thus the question for the Director was whether the claimant
relied upon the contributions of the decedent to maintain her ac-
eustomed mode of living.

This court must therefore in turn examine the evidence to

450

determine whether the evidence sustains the Director’s finding
of no dependency. This consists of an inquiry into exactly how
much the decedent contributed to his parents and into whether
the parents relied on these sums.

The claimant asserts that the decedent’s contributions came
both in money and in labor. According to the evidence the dece-
dent received income from various part-time jobs and from social
security payments.

The record does not reveal how much the decedent earned
from part-time jobs over the years. The decedent’s mother stated
that he “occasionally” used money from these jobs to buy
groceries but that in the main he used it for his personal ex-
penses. Thus the decedent was buying his own car, paying for
auto insurance and purchasing a “lot of his own clothes.”

The social security payments were approximately $80 per
month for seven years and about $130 per month for the last two
years of decedent’s life. The decedent received these because his
natural father had predeceased him.

[i The defendant argues, however, that a parent cannot be
“dependent” upon his son under SDCL 62-4-6 when certain of the
son’s contributions to the parent come from the son’s social
security payments and not from the son’s wages.

We reject this argument. We stated long ago that “The
Workmen’s Compensation Act is remedial, and should be liberal-
ly construed to effectuate its purpose.” Meyer v. Roettele, 1935,
64 S.D. 36, 264 N.W. 191. In Meyer we recognized a broad defini-
tion of the words “injury by accident” so as to insure greater
coverage of the act.

In this case we are concerned with the fundamental issue of
who may be a dependent under SDCL 62-4-16. The defendant, in
effect, asks us to blind ourselves to the fact that a person may ac-
tually be dependent upon another whenever the source of sup-
port is other than the wages of the benefactor. Under this defini-
tion some of those who are actually dependent would inevitably

pC CFE

be found not to be dependent. Such an interpretation would do
violence to the concept of dependency and would undermine the
canon of liberal construction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act
recognized by virtually every court which has considered it.

We hold that dependency may be established without regard
to the source of funds granted by the benefactor.’

The testimony of the claimant as to the use of the social
security fund is therefore critical and is recorded here.

“Q. What was that money used for?
A. We used it for what was necessary if we had to
have it for any specific thing, we used it; otherwise,

we tried to save it for his further education.

Q. Did you have to dip into this fund often?

>

Well, I don’t know what you call often. There were
occasions that we did have to borrow from that
fund, maybe two or three times a year we had to
take larger amounts, but this money was used
basically for his clothes and his needs.

Q. Ever used to help pay any type of family bills?

Yes, we used it for groceries if we needed it.”

2. We do not decide here, however, how or whether contributions from the social
security fund fit into the compensation scheme set up by SDCL 62-4-14 that
“The amount of compensation ... shall be such a perceniage of the sum pro-
vided in § 62-4-12 as the average annual contributions which the deceased made
to the support of such parent. . . during two years preceding the injury bear to
his earnings during such two years.” The obvious dilemma arises because the
soeial security payment could be construed to he included in the torm “contribu
tions” but the definition of “earnings” contained in SDCL 62-1-1(3) would seem
to exclude these payments. A further difficulty arises when the problem is con-
sidered in relation to the desirability of federal-state cooperation in social
welfare programs and the concomitant desirability of avoiding overlap. See
generally, 8 Larson's Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 96.10. The parties have

not dealt with these questions and because we find it unnecessary to do so, we
decline to further consider them here.

ee

The stepfather’s testimony also sheds some light on the use of the
social security moneys.

“Q. Usually when that money was borrowed from his
account, was it ever paid back?

. I believe some of it was. We paid some of it back.
. But would that be half of it or less than half?

. Less than half.

Oo - O&O Pp

. There were times you did make an effort to repay
him what you borrowed?

A. There were a few times.

* * Ea * * *

Q. There were times when you got along and you
didn’t have to touch that at all.

A. Yes.

Q. Most of the time you didn’t have to touch his
money?

A. Most of the time.”

The claimant also asserts that the family received “contribu-
tions” from the decedent by way of labor on the ranch. The
defendant on appeal does not assert that labor may not constitute
a “contribution” under the meaning of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, and we will therefore assume that it may be included.
Contrast Murphy v. Franklin County, 1966, 259 Iowa 703, 145
N.W.2d 465 with Warner v. State, 1973, 190 Neb. 643, 211 N.W.2d
408.

We note to begin with that the record is deficient in that it
does not contain reference to exactly how much labor the dece-

Ss:

dent performed on the ranch although it does disclose that the
boy helped with fencing, and repair of the barns. He also would
help haul feed from town. Some idea of the monetary value of the
work, however, is communicated by the following testimony of
the claimant:

“Q. With regard to the work that Rick did on the ranch
and you are taking care of his horse and calf on the
place, it was a share work type of thing?

A. More or less.
Q. It balanced out evenly between his contribution—

A. Of course not—not the hours that the boy put in
but it gave him an interest in the ranch because he
had his horse and animals there to help.

Q. What you were principally doing was training him
as a young man in the ranch work?

A. Yes.
Q. Giving him a sense of responsibility?
A. Trying to, right.”

The record also discloses that the ranchers in the area often
traded work and that after the death of the decedent the step-
father was forced to do “traded” work which his stepson had
previously done. Further, there is an assertion that the family
was forced to hire labor to do that which the son had formerly
done on the family ranch. However, there is neither any indica-
tion of how much extra “traded” work the father was forced to do
nor is there an estimate of the aggregate cost of additional hired
labor on the ranch.

We pointed out above that our only function on this appeal is
to determine whether the Director's holding can be sustained by
the evidence pursuant to SDCL 1-26-37.

ee

Distilled to its essence, that evidence is merely that the
claimant occasionally took unspecified sums from the joint ac-
count of the decedent to buy groceries and other items for the
family and that the decedent sometimes purchased groceries
from his part-time job pay. The evidence does not reveal how
much was expended or how often it was expended, although it
does demonstrate that the family repaid some of these funds.
There is no claim that the family would have received any regular
contribution from the pay the decedent would have earned on his
new summer job. The record does, however, demonstrate that
the primary purpose of the social security fund was to pay for the
decedent’s education and personal needs and that the primary
use of the part-time job money was to take care of the needs of
the decedent. Finally the evidence shows that the decedent spent
an unspecified amount of time helping his stepfather in the ranch
work,

HBAs we found in examining the issue as to scope of employ-
ment, it appears that the Director has weighed the evidence and
the opposing inferences and arrived at a supportable judgment.
We cannot say that the vague and ambiguous testimony submit-
ted to the Director and to the courts demands a reversal of the
Director’s decision. Therefore, we hold that the Commissioner's
finding as to dependency is supported by substantial evidence.*
The trial court’s opinion to the contrary is therefore reversed.

We note in conclusion that the cases relied on by the claim-
ant are distinguishable from the facts of our own case. In Blue
Ribbon Pie Kitchens v. Long, 1952, 230 Ind. 257, 103 N.E.2d 205,
the deceased son made a regular $10 a week contribution to the
household budget. No evidence of a regular contribution to the
family budget is present here.

8. The defendant invites us to find that no dependency exists under the rule
espoused in 2 Larson's Workmen’s Compensation Law, §§ 63.12 and 63.22 that,
one whose contribution is offset by the value of the board and room he receives
is merely supporting himself and the parents therefore cannot logically be
dependent upon him. We note, however, that it is impossible for us to weigh the
value of the board against the value of the decedent's contributions because
neither side of the equation was presented clearly to the Director, the trial
court, or to this court. Thus we will leave for another day the decision as to
whether this rule should be the law in South Dakota.

455

In Jewell v. Olson Construction Co., 1961, 122 Vt. 484, 175
A.2d 509, it was definitely established that the decedent perform-
ed 20 to 25 hours of labor per week on the farm. In the case before
us we have nothing but a general showing that he did some work
on the farm. We are not informed of whether it was five or fifty
hours per week. Furthermore, in Jewell the income from two
cows owned by the decedent went to the parents. Finally, the
decedent paid his mother $2.50 per week for putting up lunches.

Il We add that in neither the Blue Ribbon case nor in the
Jewell case did the court find dependency as a matter of law. The
courts merely found that they could not, as a matter of law, say
that dependency did not exist. These courts, like our own, are
compelled by statute to give considerable deference to a finding
of the Workmen’s Compensation Board and this consideration
clearly and properly influenced the decisions of the Indiana and
Vermont courts. See generally SDCL 1-26-37.

The decision of the circuit court upholding the finding that
the injury was within the scope of employment is affirmed and
the decision of the circuit court reversing the Director's finding
of no dependency is reversed and remanded for proceedings in
that court not inconsistent with this opinion.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.

STATE, Appellant v. ONE 1972 PONTIAC GRAND PRIX,
TWO-DOOR HARDTOP, VIN 2K57T2A161214, Respondent

(242 N.W.2d 660)

(File No. 11720. Opinion filed May 21, 1976)

456

Doyle D. Estes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and ap-
pellant; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief.

Dan C. Hanson, of Mueller, Bennett & Hanson, Belle

457
Fourche, for defendant and respondent.
DUNN, Chief Justice.

This is a vehicle forfeiture proceeding under the State Drugs
and Substances Control Act against one 1972 Pontiac Grand Prix,
Two-Door Hardtop, VIN 2K57T2A161214 automobile. Plaintiff
State of South Dakota appeals from a judgment and an order of
the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit which granted
summary judgment in favor of the owners of defendant auto-
mobile. We affirm.

Police officers observed the defendant automobile squealing
its tires and hitting a curb near a school in Belle Fourche on the
evening of April 26, 1975. The officers stopped the automobile
which contained four persons. They asked the driver Neil
Newlander for his driver's license and vehicle registration cer-
tificate. The officers smelled what they believed to be marijuana
smoke in the car and observed open containers of beer inside.
Newlander was arrested for exhibition driving and for having
open containers in the vehicle. When one officer conducted a pat-
down search of Tom Reade, an occupant, he found a pipe which
contained marijuana residue. Another officer found a warm pipe
which also contained marijuana residue. The officers searched
the car’s console and found a substance which was later deter-
mined to be-0.4 of an ounce of marijuana seeds. A hypodermic
needle was discovered in the shirt pocket of Steve Satzinger,
another passenger in the car. The men were arrested for posses-
sion of less than one ounce of marijuana and Neil Newlander has
since pleaded guilty to that charge, which is a misdemeanor in
South Dakota. See SDCL 39-17-96.

The registered owners of defendant vehicle are Neil New-
lander and his mother Shirley Newlander Rieb. The First Na-
tional Bank of the Black Hills loaned purchase money and has a
perfected security interest in the vehicle. At the time of seizure,
$3,288.89 was owed to the bank on the automobile.

A summons and complaint dated May 9, 1975, seeking
forfeiture of the vehicle was served by the State on the

458

registered owners. The owners filed an answer and moved for
summary judgment. Plaintiff then also moved for summary judg-
ment. Affidavits supporting summary judgment were filed by
both sides. On July 15, 1975, the court issued a memorandum
opinion granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The judgment
and order was signed by the court on July 25, 1975. Thereafter
findings of fact and conclusions of law were signed and filed by
the court.

Both plaintiff and defendant raise constitutional questions
regarding the provisions in SDCL 39-17-129 through 39-17-1837.
Defendant argues that the forfeiture provisions violate the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States Con-
stitution, as well as those of the South Dakota Constitution. We
deem it unnecessary to reach the constitutional questions on this
appeal.

HHI It is the prerogative of the people of the State of South
Dakota, through their legislature, to determine the necessity for
a vehicle forfeiture law and the type of violations that would re-
quire forfeiture. The Attorney General is vested with the power
to enforce the law, but the standards for enforcement must come
from the legislature. Schryver v. Schirmer, 1969, 84 S.D. 352, 171
N.W.2d 634,

SDCL 89-17-129 provides:

“The following shall be subject to forfeiture and no
property right shall exist in them:

* * * * * *

(4) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or
vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to
transport, or in any manner facilitate the transpor-
tation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of
property described in (1) or (2), except as provided
in §§ 39-17-180 and 39-17-1381 * *.”

ee 2°

Il The above is but a portion of the State Drugs and
Substances Control Act which was adopted by the legislature.
Section 17, Ch. 229, S.L.1970. It had its origin in the Uniform Con-
trolled Substances Act which was approved by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970.
Although SDCL 39-17-129 was changed slightly when adopted by
the legislature, it is substantially the same as § 505 of the
Uniform Act. The Commissioners’ Notes after § 505 set out the
purpose for the forfeiture sections.

“Effective law enforcement demands that there be a
means of confiscating the vehicles and instrumentalities
used by drug traffickers in committing violations under
this Act. The reasoning is to prevent their use in the
commission of subsequent offenses involving transpor-
tation or concealment of controlled substances and to
deprive the drug trafficker of needed mobility.” 9
Uniform Laws Annotated § 505, p. 338. (emphasis sup-
plied)

In United States v. One 1972 Datsun, Vehicle Id. LB1100355950,
1974, D. New Hampshire, 378 F.Supp. 1200, the court was called
upon to interpret 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4). The wording of that section
is identical with the wording of SDCL 39-17-129. There the court
stated:

“The legislative history surrounding these Amend-
ments clearly shows that a purpose of vehicle forfeiture
in the enforcement of the narcotics laws is to prevent
the flow of narcoties by depriving narcotics peddlers of
the ‘operating tools’ of their trade, thereby financially
incapacitating the illegal narcotics activity.” 378
F.Supp. at 1205 (emphasis supplied)

The legislative history of both the Uniform Law and the federal
Jaw indicates that the prime target of vehicle forfeitures is the
“narcoties peddler” and “drug trafficker” and the purpose of
forfeiture is to deny these people mobility and to financially
weaken the narcotics enterprise.

£60

II We have closely examined the language of SDCL
39-17-129(4) in light of the above mentioned legislative history,
and we conclude that the forfeiture provisions do not apply to the
facts presented in this case. First, we are convinced that in pass-
ing the State Drugs and Substances Control Act the legislature
did not intend the harsh result of forfeiture to apply to vehicles
containing misdeameanor amounts of marijuana.’ In this case the
Attorney General is asking this court to construe SDCL
39-17-129(4) so strictly that a $4,000 automobile can be forfeited to
the State because 0.4 ounce of marijuana seeds and some pipes
containing marijuana residue were found in the vehicle when the
driver was stopped for exhibition driving. Yet, it was conceded in
oral argument that had this automobile been stopped in February
of 1976, rather than April of 1975, no forfeiture proceeding would
have been commenced. Apparently the Attorney General agrees
with our construction of SDCL 39-17-129(4) because he has
changed his policy and is no longer forfeiting vehicles containing
misdemeanor amounts of marijuana.” In the absence of a clearer
mandate by the legislature, we cannot construe this statute to
embrace misdemeanor amounts of marijuana found in an
automobile.* To do so would lead to an unconscionable and unjust
result.

1. We note that the legislature in the last session decriminalized possession of
less than one ounce of marijuana, Section 42-6, Ch. 158, $.L.1976, classifies it as
a “petty offense” with the maximum sentence for violation being a $20.00 fine.
This is further evidence of a legislative intent to solve the drug abuse problem
in South Dakota by imposing stiff sentences for possession of “harder drugs”
and for sale of all controlled substances while de-emphasizing enforcement for
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana.

2. It was also conceded in oral argument that even when vehicles containing
misdemeanor amounts were being forfeited, there was no uniformity in enfore-
ing the provisions. The conduct of the person stopped seemed to be a factor in
the decision to forfeit or release the vehicle. The Assistant Attorney General
told the Court of a case where a vehicle would not have been forfeited had not
one of the occupants “slugged” a police officer.

3. The legislature has now cleared up the ambiguity which has resulted from the
wording found in SDCL 39-17-129(4). Section 42-19, Ch. 158, $.L.1976, amends
§ 39-17-129 to read as follows:
“(d) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used,
or intended for use, to transport, or in'any manner facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of property described in (1) or
(2) or marijuana in an amount which would constitute a felony under section
42-6 ofthis Act, except as provided in §§ 89-17-10 and 89-17-81.” emphasis
supplies

461

Accordingly, we construe SDCL 39-17-129(4) to be limited to
vehicles which are involved in the transportation, sale, posses-
sion or receipt of controlled substances that are of the type or
amount which constitute a felony under the law of the State of
South Dakota. To interpret this section otherwise would be to
pervert and demean the basic objectives of the entire Act and the
recent efforts of law enforcement officers to stem the flow of il-
legal drugs in this state.

Hl Second, we hold that the Act requires something more
than a mere showing that controlled substances were contained
in the vehicle at the time it was stopped. SDCL 39-17-129(4) sub-
jects to forfeiture conveyances “used, or intended for use, to
transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession or concealment” of controlled substances. The
instant case involves only possession of marijuana in the defend-
ant automobile. There is nothing in the affidavits to indicate that
the movements of the automobile on April 26, 1975, were directly
related to the possession of marijuana. The automobile was not
used to “facilitate” the possession of marijuana, but was merely
incidental to its possession. As the Supreme Court of Utah stated
in construing the identical language in State v. One Porsche 2-Dr.
LD. No. 911211026, T. PP10026F, etc., 1974, Utah, 526 P.2d 917,
919, “The statute is transportation to accomplish possession, not
simply transportation ‘with’ possession.” (emphasis theirs) Here,
there is no evidence in the affidavits of a conscious design to
transport, sell, receive, possess or conceal a controlled substance
in the defendant automobile.

Had the possession of controlled substances here constituted
a felony, we would remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to
determine if facilitation of possession was involved. However, it
is uncontroverted that the possession of the marijuana was a
misdemeanor. Therefore, summary judgment was properly
granted, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

WINANS, J., concurs.
COLER, J., concurs specially.
WOLLMAN, J., dissents.

2

COLER, Justice (concurring specially).

While I agree with the result reached by the opinion written
by the Chief Justice, I cannot condone the judicial rewrite of the
statute involved to either accommodate the construction given to
the statute by the office of the attorney general or the making
retroactive of Section 42-19 of Chapter 158 of the Session Laws of
1976 which does not become effective until April 1, 1977 (See
§ 43-8, Ch. 158, S.L.1976)

It is too well established to be open to question that this
court

“will pass on the constitutionality of a law only when
necessary to the determination upon the merits of a
cause under consideration (citations omitted) and will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the constitutional question may
be avoided. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust
Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 57 S.Ct. 556, 81 L.Ed. 736, 112 A.L.R.
1455; Goetsch et al. v. Home Owners’ Loan Corporation,
67 S.D. 194, 291 N.W. 575.” Haas v. Ind. School Dist.,
1948, 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707, 710.

However, “it is no part of our duty to determine what ought to be.
We must construe the law as we find it.” Harris v. School District,
1918, 32 S.D. 544, 148 N.W. 898. Whatever construction may have
been given to the statute by the attorney general, if we were to
determine whether or not the law was constitutional, we must
look “not to what has actually been done under the law, but what
the law authorizes to be done under its provisions.” Beveridge v.
Baer, 1932, 59 S.D. 563, 241 N.W. 727.

The constitutional issues need not be reached if this court
were to hold that the attorney general was without authority in
law to proceed as was done in the instant case. The authority to
proceed is not vested in the attorney general but is vested ex-

463

clusively in the state’s attorney under SDCL 21-28-20."

The provisions of SDCL 21-28-20, while authorizing an action,
do not contain post-seizure procedure to accomplish due process
for various interests involved in a forfeiture as did the language
that was embodied in Section 5 of Chapter 95 of the Session Laws
of 1968. These procedural and substantive rights were codified in
the supplements to the South Dakota Compiled Laws in the
1968-69 cumulative pocket parts as SDCL 39-17-25 through
39-17-29 which read as follows:

“39-17-25. The following may be seized without war-
rant by a duly authorized agent of the division of
criminal investigation whenever he has reasonable
grounds to believe they are:

(1) A depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug
with respect to which a prohibited act within the
meaning of § 39-17-22 has occurred;

(2) A drug that is a counterfeit;

(3) A container of such depressant, stimulant or
hallucinogenic drug or of a counterfeit drug;

(4) Equipment used in manufacturing, compounding,
or processing a depressant, stimulant or
hallucinogenic drug with respect to which drug a pro-
hibited act within the meaning of § 39-17-22 has occur-
red;

(5) Any punch, die, plate, stone, labeling, container or
other thing used or designed for use in making a
counterfeit drug or drugs; and

1. The statutory authority for a eause of aetion is found in SDCL 21-28-20 as
ollows:

“21.28.20. Whenever, by the provisions of law, any property, real or per-
sonal, shall be forfeited to the state, or to any officer for its use, an action for
the recovery of such property, alleging the ground of the forfeiture, may be
brought by the state's attorney in the circuit court of the county where the
property is situated.”

6

(6) Any conveyance being used to transport, carry or
hold a depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug
with respect to which a prohibited act within the
meaning of § 39-17-22 has occurred; or any con-
veyance being used to transport, carry or hold a
counterfeit drug in violation of § 39-17-32. As used in
this subdivision the term ‘conveyance’ includes every
description of vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other con-
trivance used, or capable of being used as a means of
transportation on land, in water, or through the air.

“39-17-26. When an article, equipment, conveyance,
or other thing is seized under § 39-17-25, the chief agent
shall, within five days thereafter, cause to be filed in the
circuit court in whose jurisdiction the merchandise is
seized or detained a complaint for condemnation of such
merchandise as herein provided. The proceedings shall
be brought in the name of the state by the prosecuting
attorney of the county in which the article was seized,
and the complaint shall be verified by a duly authorized
agent of the state in a manner required by the law of
this state. The complaint shall describe the merchan-
dise, state its location, state the name of the person,
firm or corporation in actual possession, state the name
of the owner, if known to the duly authorized agent of
the state, allege the essential elements of the violation
which is claimed to exist, and shall conclude with a
prayer of due process to enforce the forfeiture. Upon the
filing of such a complaint, the court shall promptly cause
process to issue to the sheriff or other state law enforce-
ment officer, commanding him to seize the goods
described in the complaint and to hold the same for fur-
ther order of the court. The sheriff or other state law en-
forcement officer shall at the time of seizure, serve a
copy of said process upon the owner of said merchan-
dise. Such service may be made personally, by mail, or
by publication according to the rules governing the ser-
vice of civil process in this state. At the expiration of
twenty days after such seizure, if no claimant has ap-
peared to defend said complaint, the court shall order

PLU
the sheriff to dispose of said seized merchandise.

“39-17-27. Any person, firm or corporation having
an interest in the alleged article, equipment, or other
thing proceeded against, or any person, firm or corpora-
tion against whom a civil or criminal liability would
exist if said merchandise is in violation of § 39-17-22
may, within twenty days following the seizure, appear
and file answer or demurrer to the complaint. The
answer or demurrer shall allege the interest or liability
of the party filing it. In all other respects the issue shall
be made up as in other civil actions.

“39-17-28. Whenever in any proceedings under
§§ 39-17-25 to 39-17-30, inclusive, the condemnation of
any equipment or conveyance or other thing, other than
a drug, is decreed, the court shall allow the claim of any
claimant, to the extent of such claimant’s interest, for
remission or mitigation of such forfeiture if such claim-
ant proves to the satisfaction of the court:

(1) that he has not committed or caused to be commit-
ted any prohibited act referred to in § 39-17-25 and
has no interest in any drug referred to therein,

(2) that he has an interest in such equipment, or other
thing as owner or lienor or otherwise, acquired by
him in good faith, and

(3) that he at no time had any knowledge or reason to
believe that such equipment, or conveyance or other
thing was being or would be used in, or to facilitate,
the violation of the laws of this state relating to
depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drugs or
counterfeit drugs.

“39-17-29. When a decree of condemnation is
entered against the article, equipment, conveyance or
other thing, court costs and fees and storage and other
proper expenses, shall be awarded against the person, if

65

any, intervening as claimant of the article.”

These provisions closely parallel the provisions of the Utah
Code cited as U.C.A. 1953, § 58-37-13, which the minority of the
Utah Supreme Court in State v. One Porsche 2-Dr., LD. No.
911211026, T. PP10026F, ete., 1974, Utah, 526 P.2d 917, found to
be more fair than the Puerto Rico Laws Ann., Tit. 24, § 2512(a)(4),
which the United States Supreme Court previously found as af-
fording the due process in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 1974, 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452.? Such
provisions being absent from our statutes leaves serious doubt in
my mind as to the constitutionality of the provisions of SDCL
39-17-129 to 39-17-1387.

2. It should be observed that the provision enacted in 1968 afforded a greater
protection to a lienholder than do the provisions of Senate Bill 195 enacted by
the 1976 South Dakota legislative session (Chapter 250, Session Laws of 1976),
which provides as follows:

“CHAPTER 250

(S.B. 195)
EXEMPTING CERTAIN CONVEYANCES
FORFEITURES FOR VIOLATIONS OF DRUG
LAWS

‘An Act

ENTITLED, An Act to amend SDCL 39-17 by adding a new section, relating
to conveyances exempt from forfeiture.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF SOUTH

‘That chapter 39.17 be amended by adding thereto a now section reading
as follows:

Notwithstanding subdivision (4) of § 39-17-129, no conveyance shall be
forfeited under the provisions of §§ 39-17-132 to 39-17-139, inclusive, by
reason of any act committed by a person other than an owner of such con-
veyance unless the owner knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should
have known that the conveyance was being used or was intended for use to
transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,

jossession or concealment of any property described in subdivisions (1) and
(2) of § 39-17-129.

Conveyances, as described in subdivision (4) of § 89-17-129, which are sub-
ject to a bona fide perfected security interest at the time of seizure and
forfeited under the provisions of §§ 39-17-132 to 39-17-1239, inclusive, shall be
taken by the chief agent subject to such security interest. The chief agent
shall at his option within sixty days of the forfeiture of such a conveyance:

(1) Return the vehicle to the possession of the secured party;

) Satisfy fully all indebtedness to the secured party secured by such
conveyance; or :

(3) Return the conveyance to the possession of the secured party and re-
quire such secured party to sell within sixty days of receipt of the con-
veyance from the chief agent at public or private sale the conveyance from
the chief agent at public or private sale the conveyance and retain all pro-
ceeds necessary to satisfy fully all indebtedness of the secured party
secured by the conveyance together with all reasonable costs of the sale and
remit to the chief agent all excess proceeds within thirty days of the sale.”

467

On the record before us, I would affirm the summary judg-
ment on the basis of the state’s lack of standing.

WOLLMAN, Justice (dissenting).

Although the majority opinion reaches a result that seems
equitable in the circumstances, I am of the opinion that we should
apply the law as written and not construe it to apply only to the
forfeiture of vehicles used to transport quantities of drugs that
would give rise to a felony charge. See, e.g., United States v. One
1971 Porsche Coupe Auto, D.C., 364 F.Supp. 745; State v. One Cer-
tain Conveyance, Iowa, 211 N.W.2d 297; State v. One 1970 2-Door
Sedan Rambler (Gremlin), 191 Neb. 462, 215 N.W.2d 849.

SHERMAN, Appellant v. UPTON, INC. et al., Respondents
(242 N.W.2d 666)

(File No. 11707. Opinion filed May 21, 1976)

Petition for rehearing denied July 1, 1976.

Vincent J. Protsch, Mumford, Protsch, Sage & Pardy,
Howard, Steven A. Carter, Carter & Blair, Sioux City, Iowa, for
plaintiff and appellant.

Leon J. Vander Linden, Holland, Delaney & Vander Linden,
Webster, for defendants and respondents.

WINANS, Justice.

This is an action to amerce the Day County Sheriff and his
deputy for failure to levy against property after receipt of a writ
of execution delivered to the deputy. The trial court found in
favor of the defendants and we affirm.

HH An amercement is a money penalty in the nature of a
fine imposed upon an officer for some misconduct or neglect of
duty. It is a statutory proceeding and must be strictly construed.
Stein v. Scanlan, 1912, 34 Okl. 801, 127 p. 483. The case law in all
the jurisdictions which we have examined is sparse and here in
our own state we find relatively little on the subject. Amerce-
ment is a remedy which is of its very nature harsh. Were not the
use of such a remedy rare and the grant of such relief strictly
scrutinized, sheriffs and other public officers subject to amerce-
ment would serve at their peril. Bonding companies would

470

likewise, undoubtedly, find that standing surety for such officers
Id become a service to be offered only at high premium rates.
Although we may not have been this explicit before, we find
ourselves unequivocally in accord with the Oklahoma Court when

wou.

it said that a statute

Similarly, the Mississippi Court with which we also agree, noted

that

“providing for the amercement of sheriffs and con-
stables and being penal in its nature, is like all other
penal statutes which are strictly construed, and held to
apply only to default clearly within: their terms, and a
party who seeks to amerce a sheriff must bring himself
both within the letter and the spirit of the law.” First
State Bank of Lovell v. Graybeal, 1934, 169 Okl. 543, 37
P.2d 912.

“[w)herever, indeed, statutes of this character are found
they are regarded as of a character so highly penal that
very slight circumstances are held to exempt officers
from their operation.” W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Hester,
1941, 190 Miss. 329, 200 S. 250.

The law on amercement in South Dakota is found in SDCL

15-21. SDCL 15-21-1 reads:

“If any sheriff or other officer shall refuse or
neglect to execute any writ of execution to him directed
which has come to his hands; or to sell any personal or
real property; or to return any writ of execution to the
proper court on or before the return day; or, on demand
to pay over to the plaintiff, his agent, or attorney of
record, all moneys by him collected or received for the
use of said party at any time after collecting or receiv-
ing the same, except as otherwise provided; or on de-
mand made by the defendant, his agent, or attorney of
record, to pay all overplus received from any sale, such
sheriff or other officer shall, on motion in court upon two
days’ notice thereof in writing, be amerced in the

A

amount of said debt, damages, and costs, with ten per
cent thereon to and for the use of said plaintiff or
defendant, as the case may be.”

[i In 1935 this Court in a terse per curiam opinion upheld a
lower court finding that a sheriff could not be amerced for failure
to make a return on an execution placed in his hands for levy
where there was no property belonging to the judgment debtor
in the sheriff's county subject to levy. Sioux Falls Corrugating
Co. v. Gurius, 1935, 63 S.D. 385, 259 N.W. 275. It based its holding
on Swenson v. Christoferson et al., 1897, 10 S.D. 188, 72 N.W. 459.
In so doing it recognized that this was not the rule of some other
jurisdictions, citing especially Lee v. Dolan, 1916, 34 N.D. 449,
158 N.W. 1007, a case which appears to take an extremely
ominous view of defendant’s liability and neither allows discre-
tion to the court nor requires proof of damages by plaintiff. In
contrast to Lee it is our view that defendant officers are to be
favored and. plaintiffs must exercise strict compliance with all
pertinent laws, showing, inter alia, the fact and the extent of
their damages.

HB Although the wording of our statute might seem to some
to allow us no discretion we do not believe this is true. Were the
words “shall... be amerced in the amount of said debt” to mean
that once a sheriff had refused for any reason to execute a writ
amercement would be nearly automatic, a sheriff would then of
necessity be forced to levy against any property in the county
named by plaintiff regardless of the property’s exempt status.
This is clearly not our law and such has been a matter of record as
far back as Swenson v. Christoferson, supra, where a sheriff was
not amerced though he had returned an execution wholly un-
satisfied because the property within the county claimed by the
plaintiff was exempt. It is evident that in this jurisdiction at least
the wording of the amercement statute is subject to both inter-
pretation and flexibility.

The particulars of the case before us are briefly set out.
Plaintiff Stan Sherman, d/b/a Sherman Produce Co., obtained a
confessed judgment against Upton, Inc., a corporation, in the sum
of $48,508.04 on July 6, 1973. It was entered by the court on July

472 Pe

12th. On August 28rd of 1974 an execution was signed by the Day
County Clerk of Courts and Plaintiff's attorney contacted the
Day County Deputy Sheriff requesting him to execute on per-
sonal property of Upton, Inc., in Webster, South Dakota. The Day
County Sheriff at that time was hospitalized as the result of a
heart attack. The deputy conferred with the state’s attorney and
checked for mortgages against Upton, Inc.’s property with the
Register of Deeds. There the deputy found an indication that
Security Bank and Trust Company had prior liens on Upton, Inc.
The deputy and the state’s attorney verified this with the bank
and the deputy then returned the writ, well within the sixty days
allowed for its execution, to Plaintiff's counsel, endorsed

“Sept 10, 1974
“I Have made a thorough search and found no property
to levy on, therefore I am returning said execution
wholly unsatisfied.

/s/ Michael Breske”

On November 4, 1974, an order to show cause in an amerce-
ment action was signed by the circuit court judge. The motion to
amerce had been dated September 25, 1974. A hearing on. Plain-
tiff’s motion to amerce and on Defendants’ motion to dismiss was
held on November 25th at Webster, S.D., and briefs were filed by
Plaintiff and Defendants subsequently. The court filed its
memorandum decision on March 10, 1975 and entered judgment
April 29, 1975, denying Plaintiff's motion to amerce and granting
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

On appeal Plaintiff challenges the lower court’s finding that
the Security Bank and Trust Company had a prior perfected
security interest in the property in question and that thus
Defendants had no property against which to levy. Plaintiff also
attacks a finding that Plaintiff's counsel did not assist in explain-
ing the property upon which the levy was to be made. Finally,
Plaintiff objects to the court's failure tc find that Defendants
were guilty of a willful and unlawful neglect and refusal to levy
and consequently ought to be amerced.

ee 18

IH As we have already noted, not every refusal to make a
levy upon property following a writ of execution will automati-
cally incur amercement. There might be justifiable cause for such
conduct and a failure or refusal to make the execution in certain
circumstances could invoke its own legal consequences, including
penalties. Following our earlier holdings in Swenson, supra, and
Sioux Falls Corrugating Co., supra, (see also Studebaker Bros.
Mfg. Co. v. Zollars, 1899, 12 S.D. 296, 81 N.W. 292) we are of the
opinion that if Defendants found no suitable property in the coun-
ty upon which to levy after due and diligent search, and if Plain-
tiff directed them to none such within the time allowed for the ex-
ecution of the writ, the trial court’s decision must stand. This
being the case, we must examine Plaintiff's claim that the trial
court erroneously found the Security Bank and Trust Company to
have perfected security interest in the property sought to be
levied upon. If the judgment of the court below was correct, all
property sought to be levied upon was totally encumbered and
there was in fact nothing for the sheriff to execute against. This
does no violence to the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court that

“{t]he true rule to be deduced from the authorities is
this: that when the sheriff returns an execution nulla
bona he does so at his own risk, and, if it is shown that
there is property of the defendant which he might and
ought to have levied upon, he will be responsible.” Dor-
nan v. McCandless, 1892, 146 Pa. 344, 23 A.245.

Financing Statements

In attacking the validity of the bank’s allegedly perfected
security interests, Appellant asserts that neither the financing
statements in question nor the security agreements between the
parties meets the law’s minimum requirements.

HESDCL 57-38 sets out that section of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code dealing with “Secured Transactions—Form and Filing
of Statements.” The sufficiency of the contents of a financing
statement is dealt with in SDCL 57-38-7 which provides:

at Pe

“A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by
the debtor and the secured party, gives an address of
the secured party from which information concerning
the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing
address of the debtor and contains a statement in-
dicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral.
A financing statement may be filed before a security
agreement is made or a security interest otherwise at-
taches. When the financing statement covers crops
growing or to be grown or goods which are or are to
become fixtures, the statement must also contain a
description of the real estate concerned. A copy of the
security agreement is sufficient as a financing state-
ment if it contains the above information and is signed
by both parties.”

We note that this must be read in light of SDCL 57-38-11:

“A financing statement substantially complying
with the requirements of §§ 57-38-7 to 57-38-10, in-
clusive, is effective even though it contains minor errors
which are not seriously misleading.”

There are before us two financing statements. One is numbered
026562 and the other 026563. Both were filed with the South
Dakota Secretary of State January 25, 1973, at 10:30 a.m. The
former covers “[a]ll accounts receivables [sic], contracts and chat-
tel paper, whatsoever, whether now owned or hereafter
acquired.” The latter covers “[alll inventory of every kind what-
soever, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, and all
machinery, equipment, furniture and fixtures, whatsoever,
whether now owned or hereafter acquired.” The box provided for
debtor on each is filled in:

“Upton, Ine.
Webster, South Dakota”

The box for secured party is filled in:

“Security Bank and Trust Co.
Webster, South Dakota”

a 415

In the space provided for signature(s) of secured party is found:

(typed) “SECURITY BANK AND
TRUST CO., WEBSTER, SD
By: (handwriting) R. H. Garry, Pres.”

In the space provided for signature(s) of debtor(s) are found the
handwritten signatures: “Rodney Upton, II
Janet T. Upton”

Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the financing statement
because the signatures on the Uptons appear to be those of the
signers as individuals rather than as corporate officers. While we
acknowledge that better practice would call for some indication
of corporate capacity to accompany each of the signatures we find
that such an omission does not do violence to the notice-giving
purpose of our law and that at worst such lack of precision can be
marked down to the minor errors adverted to in SDCL 57-38-11
which are not seriously misleading. In so finding we refer to a
Maryland case in which there is an issue similar to the one now
before us, Plemens v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 1966, 244 Md. 556, 224
A.2d 464, a case in which the sole question was

“whether the signature of Kenneth C. Slatkoff, without
an indication that he signed [the financing statement] as
an authorized representative of the debtor corporation
named in paragraph 1 of the financing statement, was so
defective as to constitute substantial noncompliance
with the provisions of Article 95B.”

The Maryland Court of Appeals found that “Mr. Slatkoff's
signature on the line designated ‘Signature of Debtor’ indicates
he was signing for the debtor. The name and address of the deb-
tor is clearly indicated in paragraph 1 of the financing statement.
*** There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that any one
searching the records would be misled by the fact that the
signature did not relate the representative capacity of Mr.
Slatkoff.” That court found substantial compliance with the re-
quirements of the UCC there as do we here. In so finding we are
guided by the spirit of SDCL 57-1-4 (UCC § 1-102) which directs

476 pO

that this title “shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies.” We also note that the com-
ment accompanying § 9-402 [SDCL 57-38-11] of the UCC, subdivi-
sion (5), states that this subdivision “is designed to discourage the
fanatical and impossibly refined reading of such statutory re-
quirements in which courts have occasionally indulged
themselves.” We have no intention of going back into the morass
of nit picking from which the UCC has refreshingly led us. It is
evident that Upton, Ine. is in fact the debtor on both of these
financing statements and ample notice is provided for those mak-
ing a good faith search of the official records where further in-
quiry into the details of the listed financing may be directed.

Security Agreements

WB Appellant has also denied the effectiveness of the security
agreements in evidence. There are two transactions in question
and for each of these apparently there were several executed
security agreements. It suffices, however, if there is extant and
before us one adequate agreement in each transaction. Appellant
specifically attacks exhibits 5, 6 and 7. Exhibits 5 and 7 are securi-
ty agreements covering

“fa]ll inventory of every kind whatsoever, whether now
owned or hereafter acquired, and all machinery, equip-
ment, furniture and fixtures, whatsoever, whether now
owned or hereafter acquired.”

One of these documents is apparently a carbon of the other, but
they have each been separately signed.

Exhibit 6 is a security agreement covering:

“{a]il accounts receivables [sic], contracts and chattel
paper, whatsoever, whether now owned or hereafter ac-
quired.”

SDCL 57-36-83 requires the debtor’s signature for a valid security
agreement. Nothing is said of the debtor's seal nor of secured
party’s signature.

417
Exhibit 6 is signed:

“Upton, Ine. “Security Bank & Trust Co.
/s/ Rodney Upton II By /s/ R. H. Garry
Pres. R. H. Garry, President
/s| Janet T. Upton . (Secured Party)”
Sec.
There appears to be no real question presented by this agree-
ment. The signatures are not challenged and the corporate
capacities of all signers are clearly indicated. To the extent that
Exhibit 6, covering intangibles, is at issue in the instant case, we
find Appellant’s attack on it without merit.

Exhibit 5 is signed:

“/s/ Rodney Upton II

Pres. (Debtor)
/s/ Janet T. Upton “By /s/ R. H. Garry

Sec. (Debtor)” R.H. Garry, President (Secured Party)”

Beneath Garry’s name appears the corporate seal of Upton, Ine.
The testimony of Mr. Garry is uncontroverted that he wrote in
the titles “Pres.” and “Sec.” in the presence of the Uptons. Ap-
pellant challenges the sufficiency of all signatures for failure to
indicate corporate capacity of either the Uptons or bank presi-
dent Garry. We delay not with the assault on the Garry
signature. Since our law does not require the secured party’s
signature on a security agreement it matters little how Mr. Garry
signed it, though one should have little doubt on the subject tak-
ing into consideration the title “President” after his name, the
bank's subsequent transfer of the document to the Small
Business Administration, and the filed financing statement in-
dicating both debtor and secured party quite clearly.

[Il The use of the titles “Pres.” and “Sec.” following the
signatures of the two Uptons are indicative of their intention to
appear on these documents as corporate officers. The impression
of the seal of Upton, Inc., on the same document in close proximi-
ty to their signatures can leave little doubt that the Uptons were

478 Ee

signing as officers of the corporation which bore their name and
whose seal was affixed. It would be contrary to the spirit of the
UCC to find that such clear indication of these two parties to sign
in their capacity as corporate officers was inadequate to meet the
demands of SDCL 57-36-3. Since there is at least one sufficiently
executed copy of the security agreement, namely exhibit 5, in the
record, and no more than one is required, we have no need to pass
on the objections to exhibit 7 which is but a copy of exhibit 5. Ap-
pellant’s objections to the validity of both security agreements
thus fail.

Further objections
The trial court found as fact:

“That the plaintiff and plaintiff's attorneys were
fully advised of the above [deputy’s decision to return
the execution wholly unexecuted for want of finding
property to levy upon] yet no action was taken by plain-
tiff or plaintiff's attorney to further assist the Deputy
Sheriff in accomplishing what they were directing the
Deputy Sheriff to do; this with full knowledge of the
existing above facts.”

Appellant cites this as prejudical error. We think that from the
record the trial court’s finding is well substantiated. Although
there was still more than a month to run on the execution after
Deputy Sheriff Breske returned it to Appellant’s counsel during
which time counsel could have examined the bank’s prior
perfected security interest more carefully or sought other
remedies more directly against the debtor, Appellant chose to
seek to amerce, a most drastic step and one which the trial court
and this bench have found to be worthy only of dismissal.

Hl We have found neither willful nor unlawful conduct on
the part of either the sheriff or his deputy. The sheriff was in-
capacitated and had little control over the situation. The deputy
exercised due diligence and carried out the duties of his office in
responsible fashion, seeking the advice of the state’s attorney
and providing prompt return of the unexecuted writ with copies

479

of the pertinent documents on file and a full explanation of the
reason for his conduct to Appellant’s counsel. Whatever may be
the conduct which our amercement statute was intended to
penalize we cannot say that the conduct of either of the defendant
officers in the case before us comes within its proscription.

The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN, J., concur.
COLER, J., dissents.

COLER, Justice (dissenting).

Certainly amercement is a harsh remedy but I do not agree
with the majority opinion in its overly strict scrutiny of the
statute based upon the conjectured effect that it may have on
persons seeking office or on a bond premium for public officers.
The issue in this case, as I see it, is whether the sheriff, or the
holder of either a perfected or unperfected security interest, is
entitled to make a determination, on advice of their common
counsel as to whether the property sought to be levied upon
under an execution is exempt or immune from levy. This issue
revolves around provisions found in SDCL 15-18 and the inter-
relationship of that chapter to SDCL 57.

There is no question but what the judgment was properly
entered and execution issued pursuant to SDCL 15-18. The prop-
erty sought to be levied upon was subject to levy under SDCL
15-18-17 and to the extent the majority opinion deals with the col-
lateral issue of effectiveness of the security agreement it is
academic for it exonerates the officer who fails to make the levy
only if the court later decides he was right in his belief that the
security interest was perfected and covered the subject prop-
erty.

The property sought to be made subject to levy is clearly
available for that purpose under SDCL 15-18-17 which states that

“All property and interests therein and rights ap-

480 ee

purtenant thereto, tangible or intangible, including
shares or interest in any corporations, credits, choses in
action, and whether capable of manual delivery or not,
belonging to the party against whom the execution was
issued, and not exempt by law may be taken on execu-
tion and sold or otherwise applied to the satisfaction of
the judgment as provided by law.”

The cross-references under that statute, though doubtless not all
inclusive, list some ten statutory exemptions created by law, only
eight of which now remain by virtue of various legislative enact-
ments. The effect of the majority opinion is to add one more ex-
emption without foundation in law.

The majority opinion, quoting from the official comment of
the U.C.C. § 9-402(5), states that the U.C.C. has refreshingly led
us from a morass of “nit picking.” If to be rescued from this
morass means that all property under the cloak of an ostensible
security agreement is exempt to the detriment of all general
creditors who pursue their claims to judgment only to be
thwarted by a general lien filing covering all property of the deb-
tor, it hardly strikes one as being refreshing.

The legislature of this state did not adopt the provisions of
U.C.C. § 10-103 which would have, had it been enacted, repealed
all laws in conflict with the U.C.C. and would have brought about
not one code of laws of this state but two. By the adoption of what
is now designated as SDCL 2-16-13, as last amended by Section 1
of Chapter 29 of the Session Laws of 1976, our laws are one code
and no title is an island to be construed apart from the remainder
of the code. I would hold that the sheriff was bound to proceed
pursuant to SDCL 15-18-17. As was pointed out by appellant,

1. The recommended provision of the U.C.C. for general repeal reads as follows:
“§ 10-108. General Repealer.
Except as provided in the following section, all acts and parts of
acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.”
The “following section” referred to in the above section, being § 10-104 relating
to bailment and to the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security
Transfers, has no bearing to the issues here and is therefore not set forth.

ee 481

prior provisions of law set forth in SDC 39.0414? did provide for
the protection of the judgment creditor and the lienholder while
making property subject to a chattel mortgage available to ex-
ecution. Under those provisions there was no need to state ex-
emptions or weigh relative priorities of liens. A search of the in-
dex of the U.C.C. does not reveal any sections which offset the
provisions of SDCL 15-18-30 which reads as follows:

“When the officer has made a levy upon any per-
sonal property pursuant to the provisions of this code,
he shall have a lien thereon for all purposes essential to
carrying out the execution, but no execution shall con-
stitute any lien upon personal property until an actual
levy upon such property has been made thereunder.”

Indeed, this statutory lien is of a type not governed by Art. 9 of
the U.C.C. See § 9-102(2), SDCL 57-35-3. Had the sheriff made the
levy and made an inventory as required under SDCL 15-18 and
sold the property and deposited the proceeds in court there
would have been ample opportunity and a forum for judicial
determination of the issue of perfection of the lien as was con-
sidered by the majority opinion and, perhaps, also whether the
provisions of SDCL 57-37-47 through 57-37-52 applied to the meat
products found in possession of Upton, Inc. The record before us
does not reflect the use to which these products were put or
whether it was appellant’s products which were in the truck
which respondent refused to levy upon. To intimate, as does the
majority opinion, that the attorney for the judgment creditor fail-
ed to do something that he should have done is, in my opinion, not

2. SDC 1939 89.0414 which was repealed, along with the rest of SDC 1939 Ch.
39.04, by section 10-102, Chapter 150, Session Laws of 1966, read as follows:

“39.0414. Attachment or execution on mortgaged property: rights

of mortgagee; proceeds sale. Personal property mortgaged may be

taken under attachment or execution issued at the suit of a creditor

ofa mortgagor. Before the property is so taken, the officer must pay

or tender to the mortgagee or his successor in interest the amount

of the mortgage debt and interest, or must deposit the amount

thereof with the county treasurer, payable to the order of the mort-

gagee. When the property thus taken is sold under process, the of
ficer must apply the proceeds of the sale as follows:

(1) To repayment of the sum paid on the mortgage with interest

from date of such payment; and

(2) The balance, if any, in like manner as the proceeds of sales under

execution are applied in other cases.”

justified upon the record.

I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and thus not

render meaningless the amercement statutes found in SDCL
15-21 or the provisions of SDCL 15-18 providing for execution. I
would leave the legislature its prerogative of specifically exempt-
ing from execution and levy property subject to a security in-

terest if it is their intention to do so.*

HARRELL, Appellant v. MC DONALD, Respondent
(242 N.W.2d 149)

(File No. 11633. Opinion filed May 25, 1976)

Certainly, among the considerations of compatible law would be the lack of
protection for the holder of a security interest under the current provisions
overning proceeds of an execution sale under SDCL 15-19-35 hereafter set

h.

“15-19-85. It shall be the duty of every officer or person who con-

ducts an execution sale to apply the proceeds of such sale:

(1) To the payment of the costs and expenses of the sale;

(2) To the satistaction of the execution under which the sale is made;

(8) To the satisfaction of any other execution in his hands, to which

such proceeds may be lawfully applied;

(4) To pay the surplus, if any, to the defendant, or into court for the

use of the defendant or the person entitled thereto, subject to the

order of the court. If such surplus or any part thereof shall remain in

the court for the term of three months without being applied for, the

court may direct the same to be put out at interest for the benefit of

the defendant, his representatives or assigns, subject tothe order of
e court.

Keith A. Tidball and John S. Lovald, Tidball, Kemnitz &
Lovald, Pierre, for appellant.

R. C. Riter and Robert C. Riter, Jr., Riter, Mayer, Hofer &
Riter, Pierre, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order of the District County Court
of Stanley County, South Dakota, granting letters of administra-
tion to Norah Irene McDonald in the estate of Nellie P. Wilson,
deceased, from which order Florence E. Harrell appeals. We af-
firm.

The facts are not contested on appeal. The decedent, Nellie
P. Wilson, was born in 1885 and was adopted by Mr. and Mrs.
Wallace Wilson in 1893. She died intestate, a single person, on
September 18, 1974. Norah Irene McDonald was born to decedent
out of wedlock in Saint Paul, Minnesota, on December 30, 1912,
and was adopted by Mr. and Mrs. Jens Hansen of Minneapolis,
Minnesota, in April of 1913. Norah first learned the identity of
her natural mother in 1930. Florence E. Harrell is the daughter of
decedent’s adoptive parents.

The question presented in this appeal is whether the adop-
tion of Norah by Mr. and Mrs. Hansen prevents Norah from in-
heriting the estate of her natural mother under the laws of des-
cent and distribution of the State of South Dakota, or whether
her mother’s estate is to be distributed to her mother’s adoptive
family.

We view the cases of Sorenson v. Churchill, 1927, 51 S.D. 118,
212 N.W. 488, and In re Havsgord’s Estate, 1914, 34 S.D. 181, 147
N.W. 378, to be controlling. In In re Havsgord’s Estate, the court
stated:

“The [adoption] statute was passed, not for the benefit
of the natural parent, who must give his consent to the

484

adoption and who, from the time of the adoption is
relieved of all parental duties toward, and responsibility
for, the child so adopted; nor for the benefit of the adopt-
ing parent who may incidentally profit because of the
service or society of the adopted child; but for the sole
benefit of the adopted child.” 34 8.D. at 135, 147 N.W.2d
at 379.

In Sorenson this court said:

“Neither by express statute, nor by necessary im-
plication, nor by prior decisions * * * are we compelled
to ignore the demands of that blood right on which the
statutes of descent are based.* ** Under the law of
adoption, the natural parent and the adopting parent
each must consent to the new relationship before the
child can be legally adopted. By consent each is bound.
The adopted child, the person principally affected by the
transaction, has no choice and gives no consent. His
natural parent, by his consent to his adoption, loses his
right to inherit from his natural son. But no one consents
for the innocent and helpless subject of the transfer that
he shall lose the right to inherit from his natural parent,
whose issue, under section 701, he does not cease to be
when the right to his control passes to another. Nor does
he lose by adoption that right which the law of succes-
sion gives him, except when ‘by the terms of express
statute or by inexorable implication’ the law of succes-
sion has been so limited and restricted.” 51 S.D. at 116,
212 N.W. at 489.

Appellant seeks to distinguish the Sorenson decision on the
ground that in that case the adoptive child was the legitimate
child of the natural parent. Appellant also contends that it would
further the policy goals of adoption if we would reconsider our
decision in the Sorenson case. After considering these
arguments, however, we are of the opinion that what was said by
this court in the Havsgord and Sorenson cases is equally ap-

plicable today, and, absent some legislative enactment, is still the
law in this jurisdiction. We hold that Norah is not prevented from

485

inheriting from the estate of her natural mother merely because
she was adopted by others. Accordingly, the order appealed from
is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS, WOLLMAN and COLER,
Justices, concur.

STATE, Respondent v. SATTER, Appellant
(242 N.W.2d 149)

(File No. 11543. Opinion filed May 25, 1976)

486
| |

Peter H. Lieberman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff
and respondent; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre on brief.

W. A. Hackett of Austin, Hinderaker & Hackett, Water-
town, for defendant and appellant.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of two counts of
murder. He appeals from the judgment of conviction. We affirm.

Defendant was charged under the provisions of SDCL
22-16-7 with killing two men, Jerry Wayne Bowling and Kent
Harold Engle. That statute provides:

“Homicide is murder when perpetrated by any act
imminently dangerous to others and evincing a de-
praved mind, regardless of human life, although without
any premeditated design to effect the death of any par-
ticular individual.”

On April 1, 1973, the sheriff of Codington County received an
anonymous phone call advising him that there were bodies in a
rock pile south of the town of Kranzburg, South Dakota, and that
if the sheriff could not find them himself he should talk to defend-
ant, who was then being held in a local jail on burglary charges. In
response to this call, the sheriff went to the area described by the
caller but was unable to find any bodies. The sheriff returned to
Watertown and questioned defendant about the matter. Defend-
ant told the sheriff that an individual from Minneapolis had come
to the Watertown area to collect his percentage of the proceeds
from some burglaries that had been committed by Jerry Bowling
and another individual, whom defendant claimed not to know, and
had shot these two men after learning that they had spent his
share of the money. According to defendant, this individual came

rr 487

sto him and offered him $1,000 to go out and burn up the two

odies with a cutting torch, something that defendant could not
bring himself to do. Defendant gave the sheriff directions to find
the rock pile where the bodies were buried. The sheriff went to
the described spot and located the two bodies. One of the bodies
had two bullet wounds in the skull; the other body had one bullet
wound in the skull. A pathologist testified that in his opinion the
bodies, which were badly decomposed, had been deposited at the
scene in the fall of 1972 prior to the frost season.

. On April 5, 1973, defendant told an agent of the South
Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation that two individuals
from Minneapolis had come to him and offered him $1,000 to
dispose of two bodies and that on the morning of August 20, 1972,
one of these two individuals gave him $1,000, showed him a map
of where the two bodies were located and directed him to dispose
of the bodies.

On April 11, 1973, defendant signed a written statement,
which was admitted in evidence, to the effect that at about 9:30
a.m. August 20, 1972, he had driven to a trailer house occupied by
Jerry Bowling and Kent Engle that was located near Lake
Pelican. Defendant had put a .22 caliber revolver under his belt
when he left home, as he was expecting trouble. When he entered
the trailer house, he found Kent Engle sitting at the kitchen
table. An argument ensued between the two men concerning
some nude pictures that Kent Engle had taken of defendant’s
sister. Engle then walked over to the wall of the living room and
drew a small pistol, whereupon defendant drew his revolver and
shot directly at Engle’s head, hitting him in the right temple. As
Engle fell to the floor defendant shot him a second time. Jerry
Bowling then came out of a bedroom with a drawn revolver.
Defendant shot at him and was in turn shot at by. Bowling.
Defendant then shot Bowling in the head. Bowling fell to the floor
and defendant shot him once more in the head at close range.
Defendant left the trailer house and returned at about 6:00
o'clock that night, at which time he put the two bodies into the
trunk of his car and washed the blood off the walls of the trailer
house. After dark that night defendant buried the bodies in a
rock pile located southeast of Kranzburg, where they were

488

ultimately found by: the sheriff.

In addition to the information contained in the written state-
ment, defendant told the DCI agent that he had gone to the
trailer house on the day of the killing because he was angry at
Bowling and Engle because of the abuse that Engle had given
defendant's sister and because of nude pictures that the two had
taken of his sister. Defendant stated that he had gone to the
trailer to get the pictures of his sister from Bowling and Engle.
When he went into the trailer house he saw that the opportunity
was ripe to kill the two men. He stated that he had killed them
because he was angry at them for the way they had been treating
his sister, whom the two men had beaten up and had on one occa-
sion tied up in the trailer house.

In addition to these written and oral admissions made by
defendant, the state presented the testimony of one Don Waba,
Jr., who had known defendant since childhood. This witness
testified that on December 16, 1972, he had had a conversation
with defendant during which defendant stated that he had gone
out to a mobile home in late August of that year and had become
involved in an argument with a man in the living room. This man
walked toward the kitchen to get a pistol, at which time defend-
ant shot him in the back of the head. A second individual came out
of the bedroom area in the mobile home with a weapon in his
hand, at which time defendant turned and shot him twice in the
head. Defendant buried the bodies and then later moved them
because he was afraid someone might detect the presence of the
bodies from the smell.

Defendant took the stand in his own behalf. He testified that
he had committed a number of burglaries in South Dakota and in
Minnesota with Jerry Bowling and Kent Engle. He testified that
his sister had been going with Engle and that problems had
developed between defendant and Bowling and Engle because
defendant's sister wanted to terminate her relationship with
Engle, contrary to Engle’s wishes. Defendant was informed by
his sister that some pictures had been taken of her at the trailer
house occupied by the decedents. Defendant attempted to secure
these pictures from Engle, who denied that they existed. Defend-

ee 489

ant found some pictures of his sister in Engle’s car on August 19,
1972, whereupon defendant went looking for Engle but was
unable to locate him on that day. Defendant acknowledged that
he went to the trailer house occupied by Bowling and Engle on
August 20, 1972, armed with a .22 caliber revolver, but testified
that he did not go there with the intention of shooting anyone. Ac-
cording to defendant's version of the incident at the trailer house,
he showed Engle the nude pictures that Engle had taken of
defendant’s sister. Words were exchanged and Engle drew a gun,
whereupon defendant drew his gun and shot Engle twice in self-
defense. As defendant was checking for signs of life in Engle,
Bowling came out of a bedroom with a gun by his side. As Bowling
started to lift his gun defendant shot at him. After Bowling had
shot at and missed defendant, defendant shot at Bowling a second
time and as Bowling hit the floor defendant shot him a third time.
Defendant left the trailer house and returned some two hours
later, put the bodies in the bathroom, and washed the blood off
the walls of the trailer house. He returned again later that day
and put the bodies into his car, along with a television set that
had been struck by one of the bullets. He then buried the bodies
under the rock pile described in the written statement.

On cross-examination, defendant, who had been convicted of
four prior felonies, including a third degree burglary charge on
which he was serving a penitentiary sentence at the time he was
tried on the murder counts, admitted that he had shot Bowling in
the back of the head as Bowling lay on the floor after, he had
already been shot twice by defendant. Defendant acknowledged
that he had been involved in a gunfight with a sheriff in Nebraska
and in a gunfight during an attempted armed robbery in Indiana.
He admitted lying to the sheriff about the story of the man from
Minneapolis who had attempted to hire him to dispose of the two
bodies. He also admitted lying to the DCI agent about collateral
matters. He acknowledged that he was a good shot, that he usual-
ly hit what he aimed at, and that he did not miss with any of the
shots that he had fired at the victims on the day in question.

Defendant has raised two questions on appeal. His first con-
tention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal. Defendant argues that the state

490 Po

failed to prove that his acts evinced a depraved mind at the time
of the shootings. He contends that at most the state’s evidence
proved that at the time of the shootings he was acting in self-
defense.

[i Defendant makes no contention that the court's instruc-
tions, which are not included in the settled record, were er-
roneous in any respect. The lack of a challenge to the court’s in-
struction on the definition of “depraved mind” and the absence of
the instruction itself make it difficult for us to review defendant’s
claim that the evidence is insufficient to prove that his acts evine-
ed a depraved mind at the time of the shootings. We assume that
the court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of murder
as set forth in SDCL 22-16-7.* Suffice it to say that we conclude
that the summary of the evidence set forth above gives lie to
defendant's contention that his acts did not evince a depraved
mind and that the state’s own evidence demonstrated that he was
acting in self-defense. From the evidence presented the jury
could reasonably find the defendant guilty of the two counts of
murder. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s motions for a directed verdict of acquittal. State v.
Bates, 76 S.D. 23, 71 N.W.2d 641. If there were any deficiencies in
the proof adduced by the state in its case in chief, and we do not
intimate that there were any such deficiencies, clearly the
evidence was sufficient to warrant the submission of the case to
the jury after the defendant took the stand and testified in his
own behalf. State v. Zemina, 87 8.D. 291, 206 N.W.2d 819; State v.
Olson, 83 S.D. 493, 161 N.W.2d 858.

In his second assignment of error defendant contends that
the trial court erred in admitting certain color photographs of the
bodies of the two victims inasmuch as the photographs had no

* — It is not unreasonable to believe that the trial court instructed the jury in ac-
cordance with South Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) 3-7-3106,
which states in part that “‘[dlepraved mind’ as used in the statute defining
murder, imports ‘malice’ in the popular sense of ill-will, hatred, spite, or evil in-
tent.” Defendant has not cited any authority that would compel the conclusion
that this definition is incorrect. For definitions of “depraved. mind,” see, e.g.,
State v. Weso, 60 Wis.2d 404, 210 N.W.2d 442, and cases cited therein; Seidler v.
State, 64 Wis.2d 456, 219 N.W.2d 320; Ramsey v. State, 114 Fla. 766, 154 So. 855;
Smith v. State, Fla.App., 282 So.2d 179; Raneri v. State, Fla.App., 255 So.2d 291;
Luke v. State, Fla.App., 204 So.2d 359; Bega v. State, Fla.App., 100 So.2d 455.

ee 491

probative value, were irrelevant and immaterial for any purpose,
and were introduced by the state for no reason but to prejudice
the jury.

[Hl The admission in evidence of photograhs is within the
sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Zobel, 81 S.D. 260, 134
N.W.2d 101. As we said in the Zobel case,

“*#** Admissibility of these slides was, as with the
photographs, within the discretion of the trial judge.
There was no indication they were distorted or did not
portray an accurate representation of the deceased
children. Photographs, slides and X-rays are admissible
when they accurately portray anything which it is com-
petent for a witness to describe in his own words, or
where they are helpful as an aid to a verbal description
of objects or conditions and relevant to some material
issue. They are not rendered inadmissible merely
because they vividly bring to jurors details of a crime or
incidentally tend to arouse passion and prejudice. They
are a common and recognized medium in this day for
depicting events.” 81 S.D. at 279, 184 N.W.2d at 111.

See also State v. Aschmeller, 87 S.D. 367, 209 N.W.2d 369; State v.
Zemina, supra.

[yf Although the pictures are not pleasant to view, they do
show the bullet holes in the skulls of the victims and also depict
the manner in which the bodies had been placed under the rock
pile. Also, one of the pictures was of aid in identifying the body of
Kent Engle. Although defendant argues that it was not necessary
for the state to introduce the photographs to establish the
manner in which the victims were killed or to identify the victims
inasmuch as these elements had been established by defendant's
written statement, we do not believe that the state should have
been required to restrict its proof to defendant’s admissions,
given the tenuousness that admissions of this nature sometimes
develop during the course of a trial. Because the photographs ac-
eurately portrayed that which it was competent for the state’s
witnesses to describe in their own words, and because they were

oo

helpful as an aid to a verbal description of objects and conditions
and were relevant to material issues in the case, i.e., the iden-
tification of the bodies, the nature and location of the death
wounds, the bullet fragments which caused the deaths, and the
manner in which the bodies had been concealed and were found,
the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs in
evidence. State v. Aschmeller, supra; State v. Zemina, supra;
State v. Zobel, supra.

The judgment of conviction entered on the two counts of
murder is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur.

|
KIEL, Appellant v. DE SMET TWP. et al., Respondents
(242 N.W.2d 153)

(File No. 11598. Opinion filed May 25, 1976)

493

Vance R. C. Goldammer, Sioux Falls, argued the cause for
appellant. With him on the brief were Gary J. Pashby and Robert
J. McDowell, of Boyce, Murphy, McDowell & Greenfield, Sioux
Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

Lyle J. Wirt, of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux
Falls, for defendant and respondent Morris Lee.

William G. Taylor, Jr., of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith,
Sioux Falls, for defendants and respondents DeSmet Township,
Leslie Dannenbring and Selmer Skyberg.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Appellant became totally blind as a result of injuries that she
suffered when a car in which she was riding as a passenger ran off
the road at a dead-end intersection on a township road approx-
imately two miles northwest of DeSmet, South Dakota, late at
night on June 27, 1971. She brought suit against the driver of the
ear, the township in which the intersection is located, the
township supervisors, and the private contractor who had main-
tained the road in question for the township. The trial court
entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants except the

494 Po

driver of the car.* Appellant has appealed from the summary
judgment entered in favor of the township and the township
supervisors. We reverse.

The pleadings, depositions and affidavits on file reveal that
the township road in question, which runs north and south, ends
at a“T” intersection with another township road at a point where
the accident occurred. Some years prior to the accident the
township supervisors had placed a road sign bearing the words
“Dead End” on the west shoulder of the road approximately 250
feet north of the intersection. This sign had been knocked down
on numerous occasions by persons transporting farm machinery
and haystack movers over this road, which has a width of some 20
feet.

On or about June 10, 1971, Merle Klinkel, defendant road
contractor referred to above, observed this sign broken over and
lying in the ditch as he was maintaining the road. In accordance
with instructions that he had received from the township super-
visors, he carried the sign to the “T” intersection, where he
placed it facing north in the center of the intersection by insert-
ing it in the fence that is located on the south right-of-way line of
the east-west road with which the road in question intersects. Mr.
Klinkel called one of the township supervisors later that day and
told him that the sign had been knocked down and that he had
placed it in the fence at the intersection.

SDCL 31-32-10 provides in part that:

“In ease any highway, culvert, or bridge shall
become in whole or in part destroyed or out of repair by
reason of floods, fires, or other cause to such extent as to
endanger the safety of public travel, it shall be the duty

* Only the defendant road contractor made a motion for summary judgment.
The township and the defendant supervisors made motions to dismiss, which
were treated by the trial court as motions for summary judgment, apparently
with the consent of all parties. SDCL 15-6-12(b). The trial court made an express

. determination that no just reason existed for delay for the entry of judgment
and directed that judgment be entered. SDCL 15-6-54(b). Cf. Shyrock v. Mitchell
Conerete Products, Inc., 87 S.D. 566, 212 N.W.2d 498; Brasel v. City of Pierre, 87
S.D, 561, 211 N.W.2d 846.

495

of the governing body or board under statutory duty to
maintain such highway, culvert, or bridge upon receiv-
ing notice thereof to cause to be erected for the protec-
tion of travel and public safety, within forty-eight hours
thereafter, substantial guards over such defect or
across such highway of sufficient height, width, and
strength to guard the public from accident or injury and
to repair the same within a reasonable time
thereafter. * **”

SDCL 31-32-11 provides in part that:

“Any person who shall sustain injury to person or
property by reason of any violation of § 31-32-10 shall
have a cause of action against the county, township, city,
or town as the case may be for such damages as he may
have sustained.”

In Dohrman v. Lawrence County, 82 S.D. 207, 143 N.W.2d
865, and in Reaney v. Union County, 69 S.D. 392, 10 N.W.2d 762,
this court held that the failure of the governing board or body to
install adequate signs warning of danger incident to a sharp
curve or steep hill is not a violation of the duty imposed under the
provisions of SDCL 31-32-10. In Jensen v. Hutchinson County, 84
S.D. 60, 166 N.W.2d 827, we said that SDCL 31-32-10 contemplates
only damage to the driving portion of a highway and cannot be
construed to apply to road signs. Appellant asks that we recon-
sider our decision in the Jensen case and adopt the views ex-
pressed by Judge Hanson, joined by Judge Homeyer, in dissent
therein.

Overruling a prior decision, especially a relatively recent
decision, is not something to be lightly done. After due considera-
tion, however, we conclude that appellant's argument is well
taken and that the majority in the Jensen case took too narrow a
view of the duties imposed upon a governing body or board by
SDCL 31-32-10. We adopt the reasoning expressed by Judge Han-
son in his dissenting opinion in the Jensen case, from which we
quote as follows:

“Obviously, the main obligation of a county under
this statute [SDCL 31-82-10] is to repair all defects in a
county highway which endanger the safety of public
travel. Incidentally the statute also imposes a secondary
duty upon the county to erect temporary guards over
defects, where needed, until repairs are made.

* * * * * *

“Significantly, the warning signs involved in the
Reaney and Dohrman cases had never been in existence
so their absence could not be considered a defect which
damaged, destroyed, or caused the highway to be out of
repair. In the present action it is alleged a warning sign
incident to the dangerous curve had originally been in-
stalled and maintained. During some road construction
the warning sign was removed and never replaced.

“Unless the dangerous curve was eliminated by the
road construction the county was under a duty to
replace the warning sign as directed in SDC 1960 Supp.
28.0901 [now SDCL 31-28-6]:

‘The public board or officer whose duty it is to
repair or maintain any public highway shall erect and
maintain at points in conformity with standard
uniform traffic control practices on each side of any
sharp turn, blind crossing, or other point of danger on
such highway ***a substantial and conspicuous
warning sign, which sign shall be on the right hand
side of the highway approaching such point of
danger * * *’,

“It may be assumed that public authorities in the
discharge of their duties under this statute have a
measure of discretion in determining what curves,
crossings, and other points of danger require a warning
sign and failure to erect or install one is not ordinarily
actionable, Reaney v. Union County and Dohrman v.
Lawrence County, supra. However, in the present ac-

pT 497

tion in the exercise of its governmental discretion the
county determined the curve in question was dangerous
and erected a warning sign. It then became a physical
and integral part of the highway. As an appurtenant
part’ of the highway the county had a continuing duty to
maintain and keep the sign in reasonable repair for the
safety of public travel, O’Hare v. City of Detroit, 362
Mich. 19, 106 N.W.2d 538. We may assume, of course,
from the allegations of the complaint that the dangerous
curve continues to exist and the county had actual or
constructive notice of the defect. The situation is not
unlike a warning, danger, or stop sign that has been
knocked over, fallen down, destroyed, or removed by
vandals. A negligent failure to repair or replace the
same after notice of the defect would cause a highway to
be ‘out of repair’ within the contemplation of our
remedial statute.” 84 S.D. at 67, 166 N.W.2d at 831.

In addition to the cases cited in Judge Hanson’s dissent, see
also Smith v. City of Preston, 97 Idaho 295, 543 P.2d 848; Fox v.
City of Columbia, 260 S.C. 367, 196 S.E.2d 105.

HMM To the extent then that Jensen v. Hutchinson County,
supra, holds that SDCL 31-32-10 includes damage only to the driv-
ing portion of a highway and does not contemplate that a highway
can become out of repair by reason of the destruction of an exist-
ing road sign, that decision is overruled. We do not recede from
the holdings in Dohrman v. Lawrence County and Reaney v.
Union County, supra, that the failure of a governing board or
body to install a road sign in the first instance does not give rise
to a cause of action under SDCL 31-32-10 and 31-82-11.

If Whether the absence of the sign in question from its
designated location caused the road to become out of repair, and,
if so, whether such defect was a proximate cause of the accident,
and whether the sign as placed at the intersection by Merle
Klinkel constituted a “substantial guard” within the meaning of
SDCL 31-32-10, ef. Lipp v. Corson County, 76 S.D. 343, 78 N.W.2d
172, are questions to be determined by the trier of fact. We hold
only that a genuine issue of material fact exists for determination

498

and that respondents are not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

In view of our holding, we do not reach appellant’s argument
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity be abolished or the claim
that respondents are liable on the theory that the absence of the
sign created a nuisance.

The order granting summary judgment in favor of the
township and the township supervisors is reversed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur.
STATE HIGHWAY COM’N, Appellant v.
SCHILTZ et al., Respondents

(242 N.W.2d 156)

(File No. 11754. Opinion filed May 25, 1976)

Carl W. Quist and Gary F. Colwill, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pierre,
for plaintiff and appellant; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen.,
Pierre, on the brief.

William J. Holland, of Holland & Brantseg, Sisseton, Vernon
M. Johnson, of Johnson, Milloy & Johnson, Wahpeton, N.D., for
defendants and respondents.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

500

This condemnation action involves the taking of 20.74 acres
of farm land in Roberts County for the construction of U.S. Inter-
state Highway 29. It is a companion case to State Highway Com-
mission v. Anderson (decided this date), 90 S.D. 503, 242 N.W.2d
674. From a jury verdict of $22,050, the state appeals claiming the
trial court abused its discretion and erred in (1) ruling that
evidence of the sale of the condemned land two years before the
taking was inadmissible as a matter of law, and (2) ruling that
evidence of comparable sales introduced for the purpose of ex-
plaining the values placed on the land by expert appraisers was
inadmissible as a matter of law. We reverse and remand for a new
trial.

In addition to the land acquired outright, the plaintiff also
temporarily acquired 2.04 acres as an easement for construction
and road detours. The land area which was determined to con-
stitute the unit is composed of 320 acres. The unit is two quarter
sections of land which are unattached and are located approx-
imately two miles from each other. The “home quarter,” which is
improved, will not be directly affected by the taking. The Inter-
state Highway will cut across the other quarter which is unim-
proved. It is uncontroverted that the total unit will suffer
severance damage, although the bifurcated quarter will be
ultimately connected by a county road which will run over the
Interstate. The declaration of taking was filed June 21, 1973.

The unimproved quarter which will be divided by the Inter-
state was purchased by the defendants in 1971 at $187.50 per
acre. Mrs. Theresa Schiltz, one of the defendants, testified on
direct examination that the quarter had been purchased in 1971.
On cross-examination, counsel for plaintiff asked her to state the
purchase price of the quarter. The question was objected to and
the objection was sustained. Plaintiff put one of its expert ap-
praisers on the stand and asked him if he had considered the 1971
sale of the condemned property in making his appraisal. He
answered that he had. He was then asked to state the considera-
tion for the sale. Again there was an objection, and it was sustain-
ed. Thereafter, an offer of proof was made by plaintiff, but the
court reaffirmed its ruling that the sale price was inadmissible
because of the increase in land values between 1971 and 1978, the

ee
year of the taking.

HM Plaintiff, while conceding that there was an increase in
land prices between 1971 and 1973, contends that the court erred
in refusing to allow the introduction of the selling price. The
general rule which we choose to follow was concisely stated in 5
Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 21.2, thusly:

“When a parcel of land is taken by eminent
domain,the price which the owner paid for it when he ac-
quired it is one of the most important pieces of evidence
in determining its present value. This is so only if the
sale was recent, and was a voluntary transaction be-
tween parties each of whom was capable and desirous of
protecting his own interests, and no change in condi-
tions or marked fluctuation in value has occurred since.”

With this rule in mind we turn to the sale involved. It took
place only two years prior to the taking on June 21, 1973. This
certainly would not make the sale too remote in time. Further,

there is no evidence in the record that the sale was anything but
voluntary between a willing seller (Knudson) and a willing buyer
(Schiltz). In the absence of such evidence we must presume that,
the sale was voluntary and that the price paid reflected the true
market value at the time of sale.

“Forced sales usually involve transactions in which
there is an element of compulsion either on the part of
the seller who is obliged to act with undue haste,
thereby affording him an inadequate period in which to
effect a reasonable deal, or on the part of the purchaser
who for purely personal reasons or necessities is com-
pelled to pay a higher price than an ordinary purchaser
would be willing to pay. However, it has been said that
there is a presumption, in the technical and proper
meaning of that word, that the price of land sold was fix-
ed freely and not under compulsion. In the absence of
evidence warranting a finding that a sale is made under
such compulsion as to make the price inadmissible as
evidence of value, consideration may be given to the

500 ee

sale.” 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 21.32.

The trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible for the
reason that the land has increased in value between the 1971 sale
and the 1973 taking. Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that land
values rose throughout the area during this period and that the
land in question increased in value; however, plaintiff argues that
its expert appraisers took this into consideration in making their
appraisals, which is borne out by their actual appraisal of the land
on the date of the taking. We do not feel that a rise in the price of
land over a two-year period automatically excludes the original
sale price from consideration by the jury. As was stated in the
case of State v. Larson, 1970, 285 Minn. 467, 174 N.W.2d 114:

“Tf the increase in land values was normal, it would not
appear to be an adequate basis upon which to exclude
the purchase-price testimony and a jury could take such
increased land values into account. Some courts have
said that a rise in land prices alone is not enough to pre-
vent admissibility of the purchase price paid. These
courts say the change in value only affects the weight of
the evidence. See Los Angeles County Flood Control
Dist. v. MeNulty, 59 Cal.2d 333, 29 Cal.Rptr. 13, 379 P.2d
493, and cases cited.” 174 N.W.2d,at 118-119.

We agree that, assuming the sale is not too remote in time, a rise
in value goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its ad-
missibility. We therefore hold that the trial court abused its
discretion in not allowing the sale price to be put into evidence.

[i Plaintiff also assigns as error the trial court’s refusal to
receive evidence of comparable sales in the area as foundation for
the appraisal of its two expert witnesses. This subject was
thoroughly discussed in State Highway Commission v. Anderson,
90 S.D. 503, 242 N.W.2d 674. We have examined the sales here
and hold that they should have been admitted into evidence as
foundation for the reasons stated in Anderson.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for a new trial.

ioc)

WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER, Justices, concur.
a

STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, Appellant v.
ANDERSON et al., Respondents

(242 N.W.2d 674)

(File No. 11753. Opinion filed May 25, 1976)

Carl W. Quist and Gary F. Colwill, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pierre,
for plaintiff and appellant; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen.,
Pierre, on the brief.

William J. Holland, Holland & Brantseg, Sisseton, Vernon
M. Johnson, Johnson, Milloy & Johnson, Wahpeton, N.D., for
defendants and respondents.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

This is a condemnation action. The land involved is situated
in Roberts County, South Dakota, and was condemned for the
construction of U.S. Interstate Highway 29. Defendants own 400
acres of land which was determined to be the unit for purposes of
the condemnation action. The land contains improvements. Of the
400 acres, 27.60 acres were taken by condemnation. Since 2.21
acres were previously section line right-of-way, the net taking
amounted to 25.39 acres. In addition 3.48 acres were temporarily
taken by a construction easement. Due to the nature of the con-
demnation, the unit suffered severance damages, although the
separated land will be joined by a road which will run beneath the
completed Interstate Highway.

The jury returned a verdict for defendants in the amount of
$25,000. Judgment for that amount was entered by the court.
Plaintiff subsequently moved for a new trial. That motion was
denied on September 2, 1975. Plaintiff appeals from the whole of
the judgment and the order denying a new trial. We reverse and
remand for a new trial.

The plaintiff State Highway Commission filed its declaration
of taking June 21, 1973. Trial to a jury to determine just compen-

Pcl LEE

sation was held on April 1, 1975. The plaintiff called two land ap- —
praisers to the stand. The court allowed them to give their opin-
ions as to the damages resulting from the taking, but would not
allow them to testify as to specific sales of land which they had
examined and relied upon in making their computations. Defend-
ant, Arthur Anderson, and his son Kenneth took the stand and
gave their opinions as to the value of the property and the
damages sustained by the taking. Defendants also called two ex-
pert appraisers for their opinions. Plaintiff's appraisers’
estimates of the total damages were significantly lower than
those of defendants’ witnesses.

The principal issue raised by plaintiff is that the court erred
in ruling during the trial that evidence of comparable sales of real
estate in the area was inadmissible as a matter of law. Plaintiff
contends that the evidence of comparable sales was not being in-
troduced as substantive evidence, but, rather, was to establish
foundation for the computations of its expert appraisers, Meisner
and Felker.

I While not all of the jurisdictions so hold, the majority
allows evidence of comparable sales to be introduced into
evidence, (1) as substantive proof of the value of the property to
which the comparison relates, and (2) to give an account of the fac-
tual basis upon which the expert founds his opinion on the issue of
the value of the real estate in controversy. See 5 Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain, § 21.3. South Dakota has consistently followed the
majority rule that sales, if they are in fact comparable, are ad-
missible for the above stated purposes. Tidball v. Miller, 1948, 72
S.D. 248, 32 N.W.2d 683; State Highway Commission v. Lacey,
1962, 79 S.D. 451, 113 N.W.2d 50; Nystrom v. State, 1962, 80 S.D.
58, 119 N.W.2d 123; and State Highway Commission v. Hayes
Estate, 1966, 82 S.D. 27, 140 N.W.2d 680.

In this regard, the provisions of SDCL 19-6-12 and 19-6-13 are
pertinent:

“19-6-12. An expert witness may be asked to state
his inferences, whether these inferences are based on
the witness’ personal observation, or on evidence in-

500 ee

troduced at the trial and seen or heard by the witness,
or on his technical knowledge of the subject, without
first specifying hypothetically in the question the data
on which these inferences are based.”

“19-6-13. An expert witness may be required, on
direct or cross-examination, to specify the data on which
his inferences are based.”

In Hayes Estate, supra, we held that when evidence of com-
parable sales is introduced for purposes of foundation of expert
testimony only, the rule of comparability is not nearly as strict as
when the sales are offered as substantive evidence of the value of
the real property in question. See also 5 Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, § 21.3[2], at page 21-50.

In Lacey, Nystrom, and again in Hayes Estate, all supra, we
held that whether this evidence should be admitted or excluded
rests largely within the discretion of the trial court and the trial
court’s ruling will not be disturbed unless there clearly appears
to be an abuse of that discretion. Therefore, our inquiry centers
on the comparability of the land sold with the condemned land of
the defendants and whether there was an abuse of discretion in
refusing this evidence.

Plaintiff's witness Meisner testified that he studied thirty
sales of farm real estate in the area and found three to be par-
ticularly helpful. He was not allowed to testify further about the
sales in the presence of the jury, but an offer of proof was made in
the judge’s chambers. Meisner would have testified about the
following sales:

DISTANCE FROM

IMPROVE- CONDEMNED PRICE
GRANTOR-GRANTEE DATE _ SIZE MENTS PROPERTY PER ACRE
Dystra-Brenberger 10-73 160A. No 8 miles $ 918.75
Lena Estate-Pohl 213 160A. No adjacent $ 127.00
Vietor-Lubke 573 160 A. Yes 14 miles $ 200.00

Witness Felker testified that he examined some sixty-five land
sales in Roberts County and in North Dakota while working on
his appraisal. In the offer of proof he testified to two helpful sales:

poet

DISTANCE FROM

IMPROVE- CONDEMNED PRICE
GRANTOR-GRANTEE DATE SIZE MENTS PROPERTY PER ACRE
Janes Bstate-Widhalms 274 400A. Yes 18 miles § 275.00
Pirmantgen-Widhalms 1-74. 160 A. No 9 miles $ 212.00

Il We decline to rule on whether these sales were com-
parable for purposes of substantive evidence going to the price of
the condemned land. What we do hold is that they were suitably
comparable in time of sale, location, and soil conditions to be in-
troduced into evidence for foundational purposes. Plaintiff and its
experts made no representations that any of the land sold was
identical to the land of defendants. On the contrary, they
recognized the differences in each piece of land and were
prepared to tell the jury how they adjusted the selling price of
each piece of land upward or downward based upon these
variables in arriving at their respective appraisals of defendants’
land and the total damages sustained by the condemnation. This
included an adjustment for inflation of land values from the date
of the sale, which the expert proposed to use in explaining his
valuation, to the date of the taking of subject land. We feel that
this information is essential to a jury in arriving at its verdict.
Other factors not comparable would go to the weight rather than
the admissibility of this evidence. Defendants would have the op-
portunity to cross-examine the expert to bring out all of the
variables—as was aptly shown by the cross-examination on the
offer of proof in chambers. See SDCL 19-6-13, supra.

Hf Unlike other civil actions, condemnation cases largely in-
volve the subjective opinions of experts rather than the objective
observations of lay witnesses. The admission of testimony of the
experts as to value before and after the taking, without being
able to explain their valuations in the light of comparable sales,
renders a real injustice to the plaintiff as the naked valuations of
an out-of-town expert would not aid and would probably do harm
in the minds of a jury. In this battle of experts, the jury must test
not only the credibility of each witness but also his qualifications
as an expert and the precise method by which he arrived at an
ultimate conclusion or opinion. It is therefore crucial that each
side be allowed to introduce evidence to show that its particular
witness used all available methods in making his appraisal. That
is especially true in this case where there was a disparity of be-
tween $8,000 and $10,000 in the damage estimates of plaintiff's
expert witnesses and defendants’ expert witnesses. In view of

508 ee

this, we hold that the plaintiff was prejudiced and that the trial
court abused its discretion in ruling this evidence inadmissible as
a matter of law.

Defendants observe in their brief that plaintiff's experts
gained their information about the sales and price per acre by
talking to the buyer of the land in each case. Defendants’ argue
that since neither the buyer nor seller in each instance testified
in court as to the selling price the evidence is hearsay and is
therefore inadmissible. We cannot agree. We follow the rule that
evidence of price in comparable sales given by an expert witness
in a condemnation case is an exception to the hearsay rule. As
was stated in United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, Btc., 1952, 4
Cir., 200 F.2d 659, 662: “The hearsay and best evidence rules are
important, but they should not be applied to prevent an expert
witness giving in a reasonable way the basis of his opinions.” See
also United States v. 18.46 Acres of Land, Etc., 1963, 2 Cir., 312
F.2d 287.

Plaintiff raises one additional point on appeal. It seems that
during the trial of the case one of the jurors was arrested for an
alcohol related offense by the Bureau of Indian Affairs Police and
was lodged in the Roberts County jail. He was taken from the jail
to sit on the jury and was returned to jail after the jury’s
deliberations. Plaintiff's counsel apparently did not find out
about this fact until after the trial was over. The incarceration of
the juror became one of the grounds in plaintiff's motion for a
new trial and was assigned as error on the appeal. Plaintiff claims
that the court should have told counsel about the juror’s in-
carceration. It is argued that this particular juror would not have
felt too kindly to plaintiff State of South Dakota in this condemna-
tion action having just spent the night in one of its county jails.
This claim of the plaintiff might have been well taken if it had
been established that the court knew of this incident during the
trial, or that the defendants knew of it and failed to advise the
court and plaintiff. The record does not reveal that the court or
the parties knew of this unfortunate situation previous to the mo-
tion for a new trial. In any event, the issue has been rendered
moot in view of our holding that the case must be retried.

SS 5°

The judgment and the order denying a new trial are re-
versed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER, Justices, concur.

RUMSEY, Respondent v.
ST. PAUL MERCURY INS. CO., Appellant

(242 N.W.2d 677)

(File No. 11730. Opinion filed June 3, 1976)

Costello, Porter, Hill, Nelson, Heisterkamp & Bushnell,
Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.

Lynden D. Levitt, Rapid City, for plaintiff and respondent.
WINANS, Justice.

The sole question before us for determination in this appeal
is whether or not the circuit court was in error in finding that

10

Plaintiff's automobile insurance policy had not been canceled
prior to an accident for which Plaintiff seeks recovery. In view of
our finding that the law of the state of Oregon is applicable we
are compelled to reverse.

Plaintiff Kenneth Rumsey purchased an automobile in-
surance policy in September of 1972 from a Portland, Oregon, in-
surance agency which was authorized as an agent for Defendant
St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company. At that time Rumsey was
an Oregon resident and his two vehicles to be insured were licens-
ed and located in Oregon. Plaintiff paid agent the requested
premium of one hundred eight dollars and ninety cents ($108.90)
for coverage from September 20, 1972, to March 20, 1973. The
issued insurance policy covered Plaintiff's 1968 Ford Mustang
and his 1969 GMC %4 ton pickup.

On March 10, 1973, Rumsey was towing his Mustang with his
pickup near Rapid City, South Dakota. The tow bar came loose
causing an accident that resulted in damage to both of Plaintiff's
vehicles in the amount of five hundred eighty dollars and seventy
cents ($580.70). Rumsey made a claim upon the defendant insurer
for the damage to both vehicles, but Defendant denied liability,
asserting that the policy in question had in fact been canceled.

Although Plaintiff had paid the amount requested for six
months’ coverage the settled record discloses that on or about Oc-
tober 2, 1972, the home office of Defendant requested from Plain-
tiff an additional premium payment of ten dollars and twenty
cents ($10.20) to be remitted within ten days, apparently to make
up for an error in the computation of the premium by the
Portland agent. There is also in the record an indication that a
similar notice was issued on November 17 of the same year.
Defendant claims to have sent both notices by mail to Plaintiff's
Oregon address. In its answer to Plaintiff's complaint Defendant
says:

“That on the 17th day of November, 1972, plaintiff

was re-notified of the correct premiums and was rebilled

said additional $10.20 with a notice if such amount was

not paid within ten days said policy would be cancelled

as shown on the attached Exhibit ‘D’.”

SS

It is noteworthy that Exhibit “D”, a copy of the premium dif-
ference notice, does not say that the policy would be canceled if
not paid up within ten days. What it does say is that “[i]f you
agree with the Premium charged, please forward your check for
the difference due within 10 days.” A notice to the agent on the
same page states: “To avoid the possibility of a lapse in coverage,
this money must be sent to us within the next 10 days.” In his
complaint Plaintiff asserted “[t]hat Plaintiff at no time before
March 10, 1973, received any notification that an additional
premium was due nor did Plaintiff receive any notification of the
cancellation of the policy by Defendant.”

On February 1, 1973, Defendant mailed from St. Paul, Min-
nesota, to Plaintiff at his Oregon address by first class mail a
notice that the policy was canceled effective 12:01 A.M. Standard
Time, February 16, 1973. This notice was returned to Defendant
with the envelope stamped MOVED, LEFT NO ADDRESS. The
actual notice, the named insured’s copy, carries the cryptic
message: “Additional premium not paid.” The same notice also
states: “$11.86 return premium is being sent to your agent.”

According to Defendant's brief on appeal a check for $11.86
was mailed to Plaintiff on February 16, 1973, and never returned
to Defendant. On March 26, 1973, some sixteen days after the ac-
cident in question, Plaintiff made an attempt to pay the additional
premium of ten dollars and twenty cents ($10.20) but Defendant
refused to accept the payment.

Plaintiff Rumsey commenced an action against St. Paul Mer-
cury Insurance Company on February 8, 1974, the Plaintiff seek-
ing a declaration of his rights, status and other relations under
his insurance policy, pursuant to SDCL 21-24. Defendant moved
for summary judgment and Plaintiff made a cross motion for sum-
mary’ judgment. On July 31, 1975, summary judgment was
entered in favor of Plaintiff declaring that at the time of the acci-
dent Plaintiff was covered by the insurance policy and that any
attempted cancellation of the policy was ineffective.

The Issue
The applicable provision of Defendant’s Family Auto In-

512

surance Policy in relevant portion reads as follows:

“This Policy may be canceled by the Company by mail-
ing to the Insured named in Item 1 of the declarations at
the address shown in this Policy written notice stating
when not less than ten days thereafter such cancellation
shall be effective. The mailing of notice as aforesaid
shall be sufficient proof of notice.”

Although our law is clear that in a summary judgment pro-

ceeding there is no genuine issue of fact and hence findings of fact
and conclusions of law are unnecessary (First Security Bank,
Morristown v. Skjoldal, 1976, 90 S.D. 71, 237 N.W.2d 675), the trial
court chose to enter them. There the trial judge indicated that:

“A holding which would accept the insurance company’s
position that once proper mailing is proven, that the
policy would be conclusively cancelled as of the date
shown on the cancellation notice, without regard as to
whether the insured Plaintiff received actual notice,
would violate the publie policy of the State of South
Dakota.”

Whether or not South Dakota public policy is violated by a
provision of an insurance contract such as the one now before us
we do not decide. We are well aware of the opinion of the Min-

nesota Supreme Court that:

Such a holding is certainly not without merit. Nevertheless, we
find that the insurance contract in question was made in Oregon

“fi]t would * * * seem to us that knowledge on the
part of the insured concerning the cancellation of an
automobile insurance policy is so vitally important that
a policy ought not to be canceled unless the insurance
company has put forth more effort to communicate its
intention to cancel the policy than would be required
under the provision in question if interpreted as con-
tended for by the insurance company.” Donarski v.
Lardy, 1958, 251 Minn. 358, 88 N.W.2d 7, at p. 12.

SS 3:

and that as a consequence it is the law of the Oregon forum which
must govern. 2 Couch on Insurance 2d § 16:2, pp. 3 ff.

Medford v. Pacific National Fire Insurance Company, 1950,
189 Or. 617, 219 P.2d 142, 222 P.2d 407, 16 A.L.R.2d 1181, dealt
with an insurance policy with an almost identical cancellation pro-
vision. In that case a lower court was reversed because it had sus-
tained Plaintiff's demurrer to Defendant’s answer asserting prior
cancellation of Plaintiff's policy. The Oregon Supreme Court
there observed:

“The provision here is that the policy may be canceled
by mailing to the insured at the address shown in the
policy a written notice. Again, instead of the earlier
type of provision which makes mailing the equivalent of
personal delivery, this policy, by its terms, makes clear
that the mailing is the cancelation and provides that
delivery shall be equivalent to mailing. Finally it is pro-
vided that the mailing of notice as aforesaid, shall be suf-
ficient proof of notice. We hold that the defendant's
answer was not demurrable by reason of the omission
therefrom of an allegation that the mailed notice was
also actually received.”

In response to a petition for rehearing that Court said of their
holding in Medford: “[w]e further held that the provisions of the
policy itself controlled the method by which it might be
canceled.” In light of Medford, which has not been overruled, and
in light of the response to the petition for rehearing in that case,
we conclude that the cancellation provision in the automobile in-
surance policy now before us is not against the public policy in
this regard of the state of Oregon. We further conclude that were
the instant case before an Oregon court it would be found that the
policy in question was in fact canceled on February 16, 1978, prior
to the accident for which Plaintiff seeks recovery. For this reason
the decision of the South Dakota trial court is reversed.

WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.

DUNN, C. J., dissents.

514 PO

DUNN, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I would affirm.

I cannot see any legal or equitable reason to permit an in-
surance company to cancel a man's insurance under these facts.
The insured had paid the premium requested for the six-month
period; through the insurance company’s error, the premium paid
was some $10 short of the premium to be charged. At the time the
notice of cancellation was sent to insured’s last known address,
the insurance company still held unearned premiums sufficient to
keep the policy in effect. Admittedly, the insured did not receive
the notice of cancellation as it was returned to the company with
a post office marking “Moved, left no address.” The record is
unclear as to whether he ever received the check for the unearn-
ed premium on the policy.

I would agree with the Minnesota Court that insurance
coverage is too important to be left to the fine print of an in-
surance policy which permits cancellation of a policy without any
actual notice to the insured—or without any real effort to locate
him. This becomes more reprehensible when the cancellation was
due to a company error, and the company still had unearned
premium available to keep the policy in effect at the time the
notice was mailed.

Thus the company is allowed to cancel a policy without ac-
tual notice for $10.20 deficiency in premium resulting from its
own error at a time when it admittedly held unearned premium in
the amount of $11.86.

be
CITY OF BROOKINGS, Respondent v. JENSEN, Appellant

(243 N.W.2d 71)

(File No. 11594. Opinion filed June 15, 1976)
|

on
a
a

Ronald C. Aho, Brookings, for plaintiff and respondent.

1

Gunderson & Gunderson, Clear Lake, for defendant and ap-
pellant.

COLER, Justice.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury and convicted of driv-
ing while intoxicated in contravention of an ordinance of the City
of Brookings. We reverse.

Appellant was arrested at approximately 2:13 a.m. on March
29, 1973. The first appeal, #11393, was dismissed as no final judg-
ment of conviction had yet been entered. Subsequently, on
November 25, 1974, the judgment of conviction and sentence was
entered and the appeal was allowed.

Appellant’s assignments of error involve the trial court's (1)
refusing to grant appellant’s motion that no evidence in respect
to appellant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer test be admitted
either in the opening statement or in the trial itself and (2) allow-
ing two city patrolmen to testify that appellant refused to take a
breathalyzer test.

Appellant was observed in the early morning hours by a city
patrolman driving alone in his pickup truck going north on
Western Avenue and making a stop at the intersection of
Western Avenue and Sixth Street which is designated as U.S.
Highway 14. The officer observed the pickup making too wide a
turn to the west on Highway 14 to the extent that the vehicle
momentarily went off the shoulder of the road. The officer follow-
ed the vehicle and observed it swerving to some degree though
remaining on the proper side of the roadway and turned on his
warning light. Although there is conflicting testimony, the officer
blew his siren and finally stopped appellant after they had travel-
ed approximately one mile westerly on Highway 14. The officer
testified as to his observance of appellant's breath as smelling of
alcohol and as to the actions of appellant which brought about the
officer's asking appellant to take a field sobriety test which the
officer felt appellant failed. Just as the officer finished the field
test, another officer arrived on the scene and thereafter ap-
pellant was arrested and taken back to the police station. A third

a

officer, Officer Tietjen, who had had courses of training in the
operation of a breathalyzer, was called to the police station and
he explained the breathalyzer to appellant.

At the commencement of the trial, after the prosecutor had
alluded to appellant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer test in his
opening argument, appellant objected to the statement and mov-
ed the court to suppress testimony relative to the refusal to take
a test. That motion was denied.

It appears from the record that appellant was afforded the
opportunity to talk to his lawyer and from the following
testimony received at the trial, over appellant’s objection, the cir-
cumstances upon which appellant’s refusal to take the test are
evidenced. Officer Tietjen testified that he asked appellant if ap-
pellant would voluntarily consent to taking this test. The city at-
torney asked “What was his response, if you recall?” Appellant's
objection was overruled as was his earlier motion. Thereafter,
under questioning of Officer Tietjen by the city attorney the
following appears in the record:

“A He asked me what would happen if I don't.
What was your response?
I said, ‘Nothing.’

Q
A
Q What was his response to your statement then?
A ‘I would rather not take it then.’

Q

Did you have any further conversation with the
defendant at this time?

A Imight have mentioned that South Dakota did not
have the complied [sic] consent law, which is why I
gave him the answer ‘nothing.’

Q What did you notice about the defendant as you ex-
plained to him about the machine?

A He didn’t say too much except that ‘no, I don’t care

to’ or ‘I would rather not.

Earlier in the trial, again over the objection of appellant, the
arresting officer, Dennis Falken, was also allowed to testify that
appellant had refused to take the breathalyzer test.

Hl The statement of Officer Tietjen to the effect that there
was no implied consent law was an obvious reference to the deci-
sion of Holland v. Parker, 1973, 8 Cir., 354 F.Supp. 196, which
brought about the emergency enactment of Chapter 195 of the
Session Laws of 1973. This act became effective, as an emergency
measure, upon the signature of the governor on March 27, 1973,
two days before the arrest of appellant so in fact there was at the
time of arrest an implied consent law. As the foregoing testimony
indicates, appellant was not advised of his rights under SDCL
32-23-10.

Appellant contends that comment on appellant’s refusal to
take the breathalyzer test is violative of both Article 5 of the
amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Section 9 of Article VI
of the South Dakota Constitution. Because of our holding that
State v. Oswald, 90 S.D. 342, 241 N.W.2d 566, controls we need
not and do not reach the constitutional issue.

Respondent would ask this court to find the holding of this
court in City of Sioux Falls v. Johnson, 1960, 78 S.D. 272, 100
N.W.2d 750, as controlling. While it is true that in both Sioux
Falls v. Johnson, supra, and in this case defendant actually took
the stand, the Johnson case is distinguishable in that in that case
defendant denied that a test had been offered and the evidence of
his refusal was adduced for impeachment purposes in the course
of cross-examination and for that purpose the evidence was held
to be admissible. In this case the fact of his refusal was intro-
duced before appellant took the stand and, indeed, the court ruled
that it was admissible before evidence had been introduced in the
trial.

The issue of whether the provisions of SDC 1960 Supp.,
§ 44.0302-1, now SDCL 32-23-7 and 32-23-8, applied to municipal
ordinance violations was not reached in City of Sioux Falls v.

pe a

Johnson, supra, but that issue subsequently arose in City of Sioux
Falls v. Christensen, 1962, 79 S.D. 633, 116 N.W.2d 389, and this
court answered that those provisions were not applicable to
municipal ordinance violations. Thereafter, the legislature
enacted Chapter 122 of the Session Laws of 1964 which at the
time of this proceeding was codified as SDCL 32-28-9 and is set
forth as follows:

“32-23-9. The provisions of §§ 32-23-7 and 32-23-8
shall be applicable in any action for the violation of a
municipal ordinance relating to driving a vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor.”'

The reference in that section to SDCL 32-23-7 and 32-23-8 which
define the levels of weight of alcohol in defendant's blood for the
purposes of giving rise to a presumption of intoxication and the
competency of evidence other than the blood test, respectively,
did not in express terms of SDCL 32-23-9 make the then existing
provisions of. SDCL 32-23-10 apply to municipal ordinance viola-
tions. The language of SDCL 32-23-10, as last amended by Section
12 of Chapter 195 of the Session Laws of 1973, reads as follows:

“32-23-10. Any person who operates any vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent toa
chemical analysis of his blood, urine, breath or other
bodily substance for the purpose of determining the
amount of alcohol in his blood, as provided in § 32-23-7,
provided that such test is administered at the direction
of a law enforcement officer having lawfully arrested
such person for a violation of § 32-23-1.

“Such person shall be requested by said officer to
submit to such analysis and shall be advised by said of-
ficer of his right to refuse to submit to such analysis and
the provisions of §§ 32-23-11 and 32-23-12 in the event of
such refusal with respect to the revocation of such per-

1. This section was repealed by Chapter 76 of the Session Laws of 1974 and
together with other amendments to the statutes abolished the authority of
municipalities to enact or enforce driving while intoxicated ordinances effective
January 7, 1975, at 12:01 p.m. central time.

520 po

son’s driving license.” (Emphasis supplied)

HM Making reference as it does, and as it did prior to its
amendment in 1973, to the provisions of SDCL 32-23-7 necessarily
makes SDCL 82-23-10 applicable to the city ordinance violations
under the then existing provisions of SDCL 32-23-9. Otherwise
the municipality would not have the benefit of the implied con-
sent law and presumptions which were afforded for their prose-
eutions under SDCL 32-23-9.? Clearly, such must have been the
legislative intent and to give meaning to the law we so hold.

We hold, therefore, that the then existing right of a
municipality to require a chemical analysis of blood for the pur-
poses of its ordinances prohibiting driving while intoxicated was
governed by the same statutes as were state charges for the
same offense and that “it is unfair to create by statute a right not
to submit to a chemical test and to allow the accused to exercise
that right and then in open court before a jury to permit
testimony concerning that refusal which can all too easily work in
the minds of the jury members to the prejudice of the defendant.”
State v. Oswald, supra. The admission of evidence of appellant's
refusal was reversible error. State v. Oswald, supra.

The judgment of conviction is reversed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

2. It is obvious that the trial court came to the same conclusion as evidenced by
Instruction No. 9 as set forth as follows:

Evidence has been introduced that the defendant was offered a
breathalyzer test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood, and that
he refused to take such test.

You are instructed that this was a right that the defendant had, and that
you are not to give rise to any inference from his refusal to take such test
that he is guilty of the offense charged.”

The instruction does not overcome the error of having allowed the evidence to
be introduced.

po ccleclttt__C@GY

LARSON, Respondent v. MECKLING FERTILIZER CO., INC.,
Appellant v. ELANCO PRODUCTS CO., Respondent

(243 N.W.2d 167)

(File No. 11734. Opinion filed June 23, 1976)

Frank J. Brady, of Brady, Kabeiseman, Light & Reade, and
Steve M. Johnson, Legal Intern, Yankton, for plaintiff and
respondent.

Timothy J. Nimick, of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux
Falls, for defendant and third-party plaintiff and appellant.

Robert C. Heege, of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith,
Sioux Falls, for third-party defendant and respondent.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict for the plaintiff in the
Circuit Court of Clay County. Defendant maintains on appeal that

523

(1) the evidence was insufficient to submit the case to a jury, (2)
the court erred in not limiting damages to the purchase price of
the Treflan, and (3) assuming liability, the ultimate responsibility
for the verdict should be on the third-party defendant Elanco Pro-
ducts Company. We affirm.

This is an action for breach of warranty. Plaintiff is a farmer
and farms near Gayville, South Dakota. Defendant sells fertilizer
and herbicides and is located in Meckling, South Dakota. Defend-
ant is the distributor for southeast South Dakota of the products
.of the third-party defendant Elanéo Products Company. One of

‘the products made by Elanco and sold by defendant is Treflan, a
pre-emergent herbicide.

In the spring of 1973, plaintiff was planning to plant soy-
beans on a particular 40-acre field. He was concerned about a
possible infestation of weeds, particularly pigweed and firebush.
Plaintiff went to defendant's store in Meckling and spoke to
defendant’s managér Clayton Campbell. Hither plaintiff or Mr.
Campbell mentioned that Treflan, made by Elanco Products,
might do the job. Mr. Clayton related Treflan’s guarantee and
plaintiff said that he would buy it. Mr. Campbell read to plaintiff
the label from a Treflan can which said that it would control
pigweed and firebush. It was agreed that the Treflan would be
mixed with a fertilizer which plaintiff also purchased from
defendant. Mr. Campbell agreed that defendant would properly
mix the Treflan with the fertilizet and apply it to plaintiff's field.
Plaintiff's only responsibility was to see that the mixture was
properly incorporated into the soil by discing and then cross-
discing the field. . ‘

Elanco Products supplied warranty cards with the Treflan.
Plaintiff filled out the warranty card and mailed it in.

Sometime aftet the mixture was applied and the soybeans
were planted, plaintiff notited a great deal of weeds growing in
his soybean field. He notified Mr. Campbell. and it was suggested
that he apply the herbicide 2-4D to the field. This killed the weeds
that had emerged, but it also killed'the soybean plants which had
émerged. Thereafter, thote weeds began to appear in the field. As

524

a result’ of the weeds and the application of the 2-4D, the field
yielded only 7/2 bushels per acre, whereas a similar field farmed
by plaintiff yielded between 25 and 25'/ bushels of soybeans per
acre.

Plaintiff conimenced this action against defendant on
February 11, 1974. Plaintiff alleged a breach of guarantee in the
sale and application of the Treflan and fertilizer. Defendant
brought Elanco Products into the action as a third-party defend-
ant, alleging that all the warranties were made by Elanco and
that defendant should be indemnified for any judgment plaintiff
might receive against it. Trial was held on April 16, 1975. The
jury found for the plaintiff and against the defendant for $4,480.
The jury found against Elanco Products on the third-party com-

. plaint, but awarded defendant no damages. In response to a
special interrogatory, the jury indicated that it found no defect in
the product Treflan.

Defendant subsequently moved for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. This motion was
denied by the trial court.

Defendant contends that the only express warranties which
plaintiff relied upon were those made by the third-party defend-
ant in its advertising and packaging materials. This being so, it
says that the evidence was insufficient for two reasons. First, it
argues it made no independent warranties and that it merely
“parroted” the express warranties of Elanco Products. It con-
eluded that it should not be bound by the warranties of the
manufacturer since it was merely an intermediate seller.

After a careful examination of the evidence presented to
the tria} court, we cannot concur with defendant’s analysis. The
record reveals that Mr. Campbell not only passed on to plaintiff
the written warranties of Elanco Products regarding the product
Treflan but also assured plaintiff that defendant would properly
mix the right amount of Treflan with the right amount of fer-
tilizer and properly apply it to plaintiffs soybean field. Defend-
ant’s argument here assumed that the sale involved only the
Treflan. In actuality, plaintiff purchased a mixture of Treflan and

525

fertilizer. Defendant expressly warranted that the mixture
would be properly mixed and applied. This was defendant’s
guarantee, not Elanco Products’. The jury could properly find a
breach of warranty in the mixing of the Treflan and fertilizer or
the application of the mixture.*

[i Defendant's next argument is that no recovery for breach
of warranty could be had because the jury found no defect in the
Treflan. Again, the jury could have found that the Treflan was
not defective, but that defendant’s mixture was defective or that
it was not properly applied. SDCL 57-4-26 provides that:

“Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an ex-
press warranty that the goods shall conform to the affir-
mation or promise.”

Recently in Swenson v. Chevron Chemical Company, 1975, 89 S.D.
497, 234 N.W.2d 38, we adopted the rule that:

“In order to recover money damages for a breach of
express warranty one must prove:

‘(1) an affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer relating to the goods;

(2) such affirmation of fact or promise became a part
of the basis of the bargain;

(8) that the injured party, in making the purchase,
relied on the representations, affirmations of fact or
promises;

* Assuming, arguendo, that no express warranty was made by defendant regard.
ing the herbieide-fertilizer mixture, liability could be predicated upon breach of
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, SDCL 57-433 states as
follows: “Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is rely-
ing on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is
unless excluded or modified under §§ 57-4-34 to 57-4-39, inclusive, an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.”

526

(4) that the goods sold by the seller failed to comply
with the promises or affirmations of fact made by the
seller;

(5) that the buyer, because of such failure, was finan-
cially injured; and

(6) that such failure to comply was a proximate cause
of the financial injury suffered by the buyer.’ General
Supply and Equipment Co., Inc. v. Phillips, 1972,
Tex.Civ.App., 490 S.W.2d 913.” 234 N.W.2d at 42.

Here the question to be decided was whether the mixture sold
and applied by defendant was defective in that it “failed to com-
ply with the promises or affirmations of fact made by the seller.”
The jury made that factual determination and we find no reason
to disturb it now.

Hf One of the exhibits introduced by defendant during the
trial was Elanco Products’ warranty card with the attached post-
card to be sent in by the purchaser of Treflan in order to register
the guarantee. On the warranty card it states: “Elanco will re-
fund the purchase price of Treflan under the following conditions
***” Defendant maintains that this phrase limited damages to
the purchase price of Treflan only, and that the court erred in
allowing plaintiff to recover damages for the low soybean yield.
There is some question as to whether the quoted language on the
warranty card did limit consequential damages. However, we
need not resolve this issue. The language on the warranty card
dealt only with the Treflan. Defendant piaced no limitation on its
warranty that it would properly mix the Treflan with the fer-
tilizer and apply it to the field. Therefore, we hold that the trial
court properly instructed the jury on the measure of damages.

Hl Defendants last point is that even if liability exists, the
ultimate responsibility lies with Elanco Products. Again we
disagree. The jury found that the problem was with the mixture
and its application rather than with the Treflan manufactured by
Elanco Products.

Pe zt

Hi Under this point, defendant also points out that the jury
returned a verdict in favor of defendant against Elanco Products
on the indemnity question, but awarded no damages. It suggests
that this is evidence that the jury was confused in its delibera-
tions. However, we note from the settled record that of the ver-
dict forms submitted to the jury there was no form by which it
could find in favor of Elanco Products on the third-party com-
plaint. The jury did the only thing that it could do under the cir-
cumstances; the foreman signed the form verdict for the defend-
ant against the third-party defendant, but put “$0” in the space
for damages. Further, any doubt at all was resolved by the
special interrogatory where the jury found that the product
Treflan was not defective. We think that the jury acted con-
sistently in light of the verdict forms which were submitted.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER, Justices, concur.
Pe

FULWIDER et al., Appellants v. FLYNN et al., Respondents

(243 N.W.2d 170)

(File No. 11677. Opinion filed June 23, 1976)
[|

a
i
©

Gary E. Davis, Gregory, argued the cause for appellants.
With him on the brief was Charles Rick Johnson, of Johnson,
Johnson & Eklund, Gregory, for plaintiffs and appellants.

William F. Day, Jr., of Day & Grossenburg, Winner, for
defendants and respondents.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants for damages to
plaintiffs’ alfalfa seed crop allegedly caused by defendants’ ap-
plication of Parathion, an insecticide that defendants had applied
to plaintiffs’ alfalfa in the summer of 1973 to control greenbugs.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged causes of action against defendants
on theories of breach of express warranty, breach of implied war-
ranty, and negligence. At the close of all of the evidence, the trial
court directed a verdict in favor of defendants on plaintiffs’
allegation of breach of implied warranty and submitted the case
to the jury on the theories of breach of express warranty and
negligence, as well as on defendants’ counterclaim for the costs of
the spraying done. The jury returned a verdict against plaintiffs
and in favor of defendants in the full amount of their
counterclaim.

[Mf Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in refusing to
submit their claim of breach of implied warranty to the jury.

529

After reviewing the record, we are of the opinion that plaintiffs’
argument is well taken. Plaintiff Fulwider testified that he had
called defendants on the telephone about spraying his alfalfa for
greenbugs. In response to his questions, defendants informed him
that they had been using Parathion with satisfactory results,
whereupon Mr. Fulwider instructed defendants to go ahead and
spray his alfalfa fields. Defendant Dennis Flynn, the owner of
Gateway Aerial Sprayers, testified that he had been in the spray-
ing business for approximately 16 years, that approximately half
of his spraying work consisted of applying insecticides to control
insects, that he had used Parathion spray since 1958, and that
Parathion was a recommended insecticide to control greenbugs in
alfalfa.

We conclude that the evidence summarized above was suffi-
cient to warrant the submission of plaintiffs’ claim of breach of
implied warranty to the jury under the provisions of SDCL
57-4-33, which provides that:

“Where the seller at the time of contracting has
reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
§§ 57-4-34 to 57-4-39, inclusive, an implied warranty that
the goods shall be fit for such purpose.”

Cf. Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 83 8.D. 57, 154
N.W.2d 803.

[i Plaintiffs contend that the trial court also erred in refus-
ing to admit certain exhibits concerning the production of alfalfa
seed from plaintiff Fulwider’s fields in 1972 and 1974 and from
the adjoining fields of a fellow renter during those two years.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit these exhibits.
Kramer v. Sioux Transit, Inc., 85 S.D. 232, 180 N.W.2d 468.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for retrial on the issue of defend-

0 ee

ants’ alleged breach of implied warranty.

DUNN, C. J., and COLER, J., concur.
WINANS, J., dissents.
WINANS, Justice (dissenting).

I would affirm the lower court’s holding on the issue of im-
plied warranty. I do not believe there was any evidence of any im-
plied warranty so far as the defendants are concerned. True, the
evidence does show that the defendants informed plaintiffs that
they had been using Parathion with satisfactory results. There is
no evidence that this statement was not true and there is
evidence that it was true. The evidence further showed that
Parathion was a recommended insecticide to control greenbugs in
alfalfa. The defendants were hired to apply this insecticide to the
plaintiffs’ crop of alfalfa. This is the extent of the evidence. I do
not believe that this evidence is sufficient to imply a warranty.

CUNNINGHAM et al., Respondents v.
WESTERN CASUALTY & SURETY CO., Appellant

(243 N.W.2d 172)

(File No. 11740. Opinion filed June 23, 1976)

531

T. F. Martin of McCann, Martin & Mickelson, Brookings, for
plaintiffs and respondents.

Timothy J. Nimick of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, Sioux
Falls, for defendant and appellant.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

This declaratory judgment action on an insurance policy was
commenced May 6, 1974. It deals with the question of whether or
not insured parties covered by uninsured motorist coverage as to
two different cars but by one insurance policy can recover
damages up to the total limit arrived at by allowing claims under
each uninsured motorist provision. The lower court found that
such stacking or pyramiding was appropriate. We disagree.

In August of 1973, Alease B. Pittenger and her husband Ken-
neth Pittenger were involved in an automobile accident with an
uninsured motorist in the state of Arizona; the accident resulted
in the death of Alease Pittenger and injury to Kenneth Pittenger.
At the time of the accident, Kenneth Pittenger had in full force
and effect an insurance policy, No. H 414 29 30, with defendant.
That policy, in section III, included protection against uninsured
motorist accidents and specifically covered two different
vehicles—a 1973 Chevrolet 2 ton pickup and a 1969 Rambler
four-door sedan—owned by Kenneth Pittenger. Separate
premiums, equal in amount, were paid for uninsured motorist
coverage for each vehicle.

Following the initiation of this action in Brookings County,
Kenneth Pittenger died from causes unrelated to the accident in
question. Liane Cunningham and Ronald Pittenger as co-
executors of the estates of Kenneth and Alease Pittenger were
substituted as plaintiffs. The case was submitted to the court ona
stipulation of facts. It was agreed that damages to Alease Pit-

er

tenger would be in the sum of $25,000 and damages to Kenneth
Pittenger would be in the sum of $5,000, which damages are ex-
clusive of damages to personal property involved in the accident
and exclusive of doctor, medical and funeral bills.

The policy in question provides coverage of $15,000 per per-
son and $30,000 per accident as to uninsured motorist coverage.
Plaintiffs contend that since the one policy covered two vehicles
and since separate premiums were charged for uninsured
motorist coverage on each vehicle “stacking” of coverage is in
order and the effective limit of the uninsured motorist coverage
is $30,000 per person and $60,000 per accident. Defendant in-
surance company asserts that stacking is prohibited by the
specific terms of the policy and that its liability is limited to
$15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident.

This is a case of first impression in South Dakota. In
Westphal v. Amco Insurance Co., 1973, 87 S.D. 404, 209 N.W.2d
555, this court held that an “other insurance” provision did not
preclude a person from collecting from his own insurance policy if
his total damages exceeded the policy limits for the automobile in
which he was riding when his injuries occurred. This is an entire-
ly different situation from the case at bar where plaintiffs are at-
tempting to stack the uninsured motorist limits of one vehicle on-
to the limits of the vehicle in which their decedents were actually
riding when the accident occurred.

While the holding in Westphal is sound and is followed by
the majority of jurisdictions, we do not believe that it should be
extended to the facts of this case. Defendant is not seeking to
avoid paying the amounts required by SDCL 58-11-9. That statute -
as it was then in effect stated:

“No policy insuring against loss resulting from
liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suf-
fered by any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered
or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any
motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this
state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemen-

533

tal thereto in limits for bodily injury or death set forth
in § 32-85-70, for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death, resulting there-
from.”

And SDCL 32-35-70 provided in pertinent part:

“« * * fifteen thousand dollars because of bodily in-
jury to or death of one person in any one accident and,
subject to said limit for one person, thirty thousand
dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or
more persons in any one accident, and ten thousand
dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of
others in any one accident.”

Defendant acknowledged its liability for the amount required by
the statute and sought to limit its liability to that amount in clear
and unambiguous terms in the policy.

Condition 5. “Coverage K: The limit of liability for
coverage K stated in the declarations as applicable to
‘each person’ is the limit of The Western’s liability for
all damages because of bodily injury sustained by one
person as the result of any one accident and, subject to
the above provision respecting each: person, the limit of
liability stated in the declarations as applicable to ‘each
accident’ is the total limit of The Western’s liability for
all damages because of bodily injury sustained by two or
more persons as the result of any one accident.”

While it is true that the decedents paid a separate premium
for the uninsured motorist coverage on each vehicle, there is an
increased risk because both vehicles could be traveling the
highways at the same time. Further, we see nothing in SDCL
58-11-9 which requires the stacking of the policy coverages for
two separate vehicles. The insureds got exactly what the policy
said they would. The accident happened while they were driving

5

the Rambler, and they can receive the policy limits that apply to
the Rambler. Had both the Pittenger vehicles been involved in ac-
cidents involving uninsured drivers, the policy would allow
recovery up to the limits on each vehicle. In Allstate Insurance
Company v. McHugh, 1973, 124 N.J.Super. 105, 304 A.2d 777, the
court considered a case with facts almost identical to those
presented here. The court stated:

“Tt is conceivable that Frank McHugh could be.
operating one vehicle with multiple passengers therein,
his wife operating the second vehicle with multiple
passengers therein. All the passehgers in both vehicles
are covered under Coverage S. This increased risk pro-
vides sufficient consideration and justification for charg-
ing a separate ptemium at the same rate for additional
cars on the saine poli¢y.” (emphasis theirs) 304 A.2d 778.

Although there is a split of authority, appeal courts in other
states have not allowéd this type of stacking ia the following
eases: Holland v. Hawkeye Secitity Instrance Company, 1975,
Towa, 230 N.W.2d 517; Westchester fire Instance Cornpany v.
Tucker, 1974, Tex., 512 S. W.2d 679; Allstate Insurance Cothpany
v. McHugh, supta; Castle v. United Pacifié Insurance Group,
1968, 252 Or. 44, 448 P.2d 357; Otto v. Allstate Insurance Com-
pany, 1971, 2 Ill. App.3d 58, 275 N.E.2d 766; Doerpinghaus v.
Allstate Insurance Company, 1971, 124 Ga. App. 627, 185 S.E.2d
615; and Morrison Assurance Company, Inc. v. Polak, 1969, Fla.,
230 So.2d 6. It is interesting to note that the Texas Supreme
Court before deciding Tueket, supra, had previously held that
stacking of uninsured motorist policies was allowed where an

“other insufance” provisioh was involved. However, iti Tucker,
the court held that stacking coverage on two sepatate vehicles
would not be pérmitted. °

We do not beliéve that the Westplial décision needs further
expansion by this court. Nor cah we sé¢e whete a different result
is required by SDCL 58-11-9. We think that the insurance policy
should be interpreted as it is written with the applicable limits
being $15,000/$30,000 for thé vehicle involved in the accident.

535

Reversed.

WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., concur.
WINANS, J., dissents.

WINANS, Justice (dissenting).

Although this is a case of first impression for this court, it is
not the first time we have been called upon to construe the provi-
sions of our uninsured motorist law as found in SDCL 58-11-9. In
Westphal v. Amco Insurance Co., 1973, 87 S.D. 404, 209 N.W.2d
555, we found that SDCL 58-11-9 requires a minimum uninsured
motorist coverage to be offered with each policy and that the in-
surer could not escape the mandate of the statute with an “other
insurance” provision. We recognized that stacking of applicable
uninsured motorist coverages was permissible to achieve the re-
quired minimum coverage. In my opinion the majority opinion to-
day undermines what this court recognized as proper in
Westphal because the effect of the decision is to allow the insurer
to limit its liability to less than the minimum required by statute.

In Westphal, supra, this court allowed the passenger in a car
struck by an uninsured motorist to recover from his own insurer,
even though he was also covered by the driver's uninsured
motorist provision. We held that the limitation provided in the
“other insurance” clause of the policy was invalid as an attempt
to avoid the minimum uninsured motorist coverage mandated by
statute. We adopted as our own the rule in Safeco Ins. Co. of
America v. Jones, 1971, 286 Ala. 606, 614, 243 So.2d 736, 742, as
set out in Blakeslee v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Mich.,
1971, 388 Mich. 464, 201 N.W.2d 786, when we said:

“We hold that our statute sets a minimum amount

- for recovery, but it does not place a limit on the total
amount of recovery so long as that amount does not ex-
ceed the amount of actual loss; that where the loss ex-
ceeds the limits of one policy, the insured may proceed
under other available policies; and that where the
premiums have been paid for uninsured motorist

536 —

coverage, we cannot permit an insurer to avoid its
statutorily imposed liability by its insertion into the
policy of a liability limiting clause which restricts the in-
sured from receiving that coverage for which the
premium has been paid.’”

By statute, no automobile liability insurance policy for any
vehicle registered or principally garaged in South Dakota shall be
issued without uninsured motorist coverage as to each vehicle in-
sured. “No policy * * * shall be delivered or issued for delivery
* * * with respect to any motor vehicle * * * unless coverage is
provided therein * * * for the protection of persons insured there-
under * *.” SDCL 58-11-9. I understand this to be mandatory
language requiring that uninsured motorist’ coverage in the
minimum limit set out by statute be provided not collectively for
all cars covered by the policy but separately as to each and every
vehicle listed therein. The analogy to Westphal is clear. In that
case two separate policies of insurance covered the same acci-
dent. The passenger's insurance provided for coverage when the
insured was in other than the vehicle described in the policy, but
sought to limit its liability by use of the “other insurance” clause.
This we held to be invalid as an attempt to avoid the minimum
coverage mandated by statute. Premiums had been paid on both
policies and the injured passenger was entitled to stack the
coverage of the two policies to recover up to the actual loss suf-
fered.

Here we are faced with one policy providing uninsured
motorist coverage for two described vehicles owned by the same
individual. The policy provides identical coverage to the insured
for each described vehicle. Uninsured motorist coverage is ex-
tended to the insured for any accident when the insured is in an
“insured vehicle.” As defined by the policy, “insured vehicle” is a
term that applies to both of the covered vehicles. Because the
plaintiff was injured while operating an insured vehicle, it seems
logical that both policies would afford him protection.

The insurer seeks to avoid this result by placing the follow-
ing limitation in its policy:

poccclcllttllllllLLTTLLCé@iRY

Condition 18. Other Automobile Insurance in The
Western: “With respect to any occurrence, accident or
loss to which this and any other automobile insurance
policy issued to the named insured by The Western also
applies, the total limit of The Western’s liability under
all such policies shall not exceed the highest applicable
limit of liability under any one such policy.”

It is clear that by the above provision the insurer intends to limit
its liability to a minimum. Westphal makes clear that the
minimum cannot fall below the amount dictated by statute, and
yet in this instance that is exactly what the majority allows the
insurer to do.

SDCL 58-11-9 demands a minimum of uninsured motorist
coverage on each vehicle insured and the consequence of such a
mandate is that the purchaser of insurance must receive at least
that much coverage. The Pittengers were covered by the unin-
sured motorist provisions for Auto No. 1 for which a premium
was paid and by the uninsured motorist provisions for Auto No. 2
for which a separate premium was paid. Our law required that
the insurers offer this coverage; once offered, it could not be
diminished by limiting clauses in the policy which were an at-
tempt again to supply less than the statute called for. Were I to
accept the insurer’s position I would in effect be saying that
where more than one vehicle is insured, less uninsured motorist
coverage is required than what the statute demands. This I can-
not do.

Plaintiff was injured while in an insured vehicle. Compensa-
tion should be afforded under both coverages, just as coverage
was afforded under both policies in Westphal. I can see no distine-
tion merely because the coverage extended in this case is provid-
ed by one policy covering two insured vehicles while in Westphal
two separate nolicies provided coverage. Separate premiums
have been paid for both coverages, just as they had been paid on
both policies in Westphal. Condition 18, which seeks to limit the
insurer’s liability in this case, is simply an “other insurance”
clause as was invalidated in Westphal, the only distinction being
that the other insurance in this case is provided by the same in-

538

surer. It constitutes an attempt to provide less coverage than is
demanded by statute.

The insurer contends that Plaintiffs are entitled to no more
recovery by virtue of the double premium they have paid for
coverage the insurer was required to offer than they would have
been entitled to had they insured only one vehicle and paid only
one premium. In this regard it has been well stated:

“{w]hen we pay a double premium we expect double
coverage. This is certainly not unreasonable but, to the
contrary, is in accord with general principles of indemni-
ty that amounts of premiums are based on amounts of
liability. Defendant argues that what plaintiff is seeking
amounts to pyramiding coverage but nothing is said
about pyramiding the premiums which effectuate the
coverages. We would not be understood as implying
that an injured insured can pyramid separate coverages
in the same policy so as to recover more than his actual
loss.” Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 1969,
203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34.

Because I see little difference between one policy on several
vehicles when separate premiums are paid and separate policies
on those vehicles by different insurers, at least with regard to the
impact of their uninsured motorist provisions, I think it ap-
propriate to echo again the words of Mr. Chief Justice Knutson of
the Minnesota Supreme Court in a case concerning four policies
with uninsured motorist provisions:

“{TJhe fact that the legislature required an uninsured-
motorist provision in all policies, added to the fact that a
premium has been collected on each of the policies in-
volved, should result in the policyholder’s receiving
what he paid for on each policy, up to the full amount of
his damages. It is true that such holding results in per-
missible recovery exceeding what he would have re-
ceived if the uninsured motorist had been insured for
the minimum amount required under our Safety
Responsibility Act. But if the question must be resolved

539

on the basis of who gets a windfall, it seems more just
that the insured who has paid a premium should get all
he paid for rather than that the insurer should escape
liability for that for which it collected a premium.” Van
Tassel v. Horace Mann Insurance Company, 1973, 296
Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348.

The public policy expressed in our uninsured motorist
statute requires that coverage, in minimum amounts at least, be
provided as to each car, or “with respect to any motor vehicle”
covered by the policy. One who pays double premiums expects
double coverage. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has held:

“When members of the public purchase policies of in-
surance they are entitled to the broad measure of pro-
tection necessary to fulfill their reasonable expecta-
tions. They should not be subjected to technical encum-
brances or to hidden pitfalls and their policies should be
construed liberally in their favor to the end that
coverage is afforded ‘to the full extent that any fair in-
terpretation will allow.’” Kievit v. Loyal Protective
Life Ins. Co., 1961, 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (emphasis
ours).

In Barbin v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 1975,
La., 315 So.2d 754, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered an
issue quite similar to the one before the court now, and held:

“[T}he clear intent of Graham [v. American Casualty Co.,
261 La. 85, 259 So.2d 22], Deane [v. McGee, 261 La. 686,
260 So.2d 669] and the other cited cases is to the effect
that if a plaintiff is issued insurance on two or more
automobiles, pays premiums for two or more different
uninsured motorist coverages, and sustains damages
thereunder in excess of the mandatory minimal
coverage, he can ‘stack’ coverages and recover his
damages. ** * This intent should not be circumvented
merely because separate vehicle coverages are placed in
one policy, rather than in multiple policies.”

0

In my opinion to disallow stacking of coverages in this situation is
to diminish the effect of our ruling in Westphal.

Appellant contends that the principle I propose today would
create astronomical liability for insurance companies in direct
relation to the number of vehicles covered by any one insurance
policy. Appellant suggests that a fleet of ten vehicles, all covered
by one policy, might be on the road at the same time and each
might be involved in an accident. The result would be to multiply
each of the ten recoveries claimed by ten uninsured motorist
policy coverages. This might well be true in the abstract but lam
cognizant of the fact that the laws of probability rule against such
an unfortuitous concatenation of circumstances. It is, after all, the
likelihood that certain events will or will not transpire that is
calculated when premium rates are fixed and I deem such
hypothetical situations to be most unlikely.

Even should the foregoing be within the range of possibility
it must be borne in mind that the recovery of the insured is still
limited by the actual damages. My rationale does no more than to
provide for the indemnification of the insured within the com-
bined limits of the stacked policies. Should he be covered by ten
uninsured motorist clauses, allowing an aggregate coverage of
$150,000 for one person, and his damages are only $25,000 then
$25,000 will be the limit of his recovery. Along these lines I note
with Prof. Widiss:

“that if this approach to indemnification is adopted, an
insured who is covered by more than one uninsured
motorist endorsement will be better off than he would
have been had he been injured by a negligent motorist
carrying the minimum coverage specified by the finan-
cial responsibility laws. However, the conclusion which
insurance companies draw from this—that they should
be allowed to reduce their liability —does not necessar-
ily follow. A premium has been paid for each of the en-
dorsements and coverage has been issued. It seems both
equitable and desirable to permit recovery under more
than one endorsement until the claimant is fully indem-
nified.” Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist

es 5a
Coverage, 1969, § 2.70, p. 112.
It is my opinion that the cases allowing stacking in this type
of instance represent the preferred approach. Our ruling in
Westphal as well as SDCL 58-11-9 dictates that the coverages in

this case should be stacked and recovery allowed up to the actual
loss. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.

STATE, Plaintiff v. SPRATLIN, Defendant
(243 N.W.2d 386)

(File No. 11660. Opinion filed June 24, 1976)

542

John H. Shepard, of Morman, Smit & Shepard, Sturgis, for
defendant and appellant.

No appearance for the State.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of distributing or
dispensing a controlled substance (amphetamines) in violation of
SDCL 39-17-88. Defendant’s principal contentions on appeal are
that the trial court erred in giving an instruction on an agency
relationship between the person to whom the amphetamines had
allegedly been distributed and a third party, and that the
evidence was not sufficient to warrant a conviction on the theory
of agency. In lieu of filing a brief, the state filed a motion asking
that we reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new
trial because the criminal agency instruction was improperly
given. Defendant resisted the motion, asking that we consider the
appeal on its merits, which we have done. In accordance with our
obligation to do so, we have examined the record to determine

CS:

whether the alleged error conceded by the state in fact justifies
reversal. State v. Pierce, 88 S.D. 359, 220 N.W.2d 254, and cases
cited therein. We have concluded that there was no prejudicial
error and that the conviction should be affirmed.

The information charged that the defendant

““* * * did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute
or dispense a substance controlled under Chapter 39-17
SDCL 1967, as amended, to-wit: did so distribute or
dispense amphetamines to William Conner, within Butte
County, South Dakota, in violation of SDCL 1967
39-17-88, * * *”

The state’s evidence revealed that on August 1, 1974, one
Larry Harris called defendant at defendant’s Rapid City, South
Dakota, telephone number and arranged to meet defendant at
Harris’ home in Belle Fourche later that day for the purpose of
receiving some drugs from defendant. At about 4:00 o’clock that
afternoon, defendant, accompanied by a female companion, arriv-
ed at Harris’ home. Defendant and Harris discussed the price of
the amphetamines that defendant had brought with him, which
was to be $125 per 1000-tablet bag. Defendant, Harris and the girl
then left Harris’ home in defendant's automobile and drove to a
point on a gravel road about five miles out of town for the pur-
pose of hiding the amphetamines. Defendant got out of the car,
opened the hood and removed a package which he gave to Harris.
Harris took the package and hid it in some bushes approximately
15 or 20 feet from the traveled portion of the highway and then
piled three rocks near the side of the road as a marker. The three
then drove back to Belle Fourche, where defendant and his com-
panion left Harris off at the latter's home. No money was ex-
changed between Harris and defendant.’ Harris then met Bill
Conner by prearrangement at a drive-in restaurant and gave
Conner a map showing the area where the drugs were hidden.

Conner had met with Harris earlier in the day. In Conner’s words,

——

1. In late June of 1974, Harris had purchased some amphetamines from defend-
ant near Sturgis, South Dakota. No money was exchanged at the time defend-
ant transferred those drugs to Harris, and defendant later picked the money up
at Harris’ house. Harris testified that prior to August 1, 1974, he had ordered
drugs by calling the number that he had called on August 1, 1974.

aad Pe

“*«**T was trying to get some [drugs] for Rich. He wanted
some.” In response to a question concerning how the ar-
rangements were made, Conner testified that,

“Larry (Harris) made ’em. I was getting ’em from Larry,
and he was getting ‘em from Rapid City.”

After receiving the map from Harris, Conner located
Richard Carlson and went with Carlson to the place where Harris
had hidden the drugs. Conner pretended that he did not see the
bag containing the amphetamines because, in his words, “**I
didn’t want to touch the drugs.” Carlson opened the plastic bag
and removed the enclosed packets of white pills. After counting
the twenty packets, Carlson replaced them in the larger bag and
took them back to Belle Fourche, where, by a prearranged signal
from Carlson, who was an undercover narcotics agent, law en-
forcement officers entered Carlson’s apartment and arrested
Conner.

Conner testified that he had never seen defendant prior to
the preliminary hearing that was held in connection with the in-
stant case. On cross-examination he acknowledged that he did not
know defendant, that he had not purchased anything from de-
fendant on August 1, 1974, or at any time prior to or subsequent
to that date, and that Harris had bought drugs for him “a couple
of times.”

At the conclusion of the state’s case, defendant moved for a
directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that the state’s
evidence had failed to establish that defendant had distributed a
controlled substance to Conner. In response to this motion, the
state’s attorney argued that the theory of the state’s case was
that Harris was working for defendant, that Conner was working
for Harris and that the amphetamines were procured by Conner
through Harris from defendant. Defendant renewed this motion
at the close of all of the evidence.

The court on its own motion, and apparently without any
assistance from the state in the way of legal research or the cita-
tion of any authority, gave the following instruction:

545

“Instruction 3A
“In order to sustain its burden of proof under the
charge contained in the information it is necessary for
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Larry Harris was in fact the agent of William Conner at
the time and place charged in the information.

“In an agency relationship, the party for whom
another acts and for whom he derives authority to act is
known and referred to as a ‘principal’, while the one who
acts for and represents the principal, and acquires his
authority from him, is known and referred to as an
‘agent’. The agent is a substitute or deputy appointed by
the principal with power to do certain things which the
principal may or can do. Pursuant to the grant of
authority vested in him by the principal, the agent is the
representative of the principal and acts for, in place of,
and instead of, the principal.”

Defendant objected to the giving of this instruction on the
ground that it would be tantamount to allowing the state to
amend its pleadings after jeopardy had attached and that it
would allow the state to do indirectly that which it could not do
directly, that is, prove that defendant had sold drugs to Conner.
Defendant also objected to the instruction on the ground that it
did not accurately state the law of criminal agency and on the
ground that there was no showing in the record that Harris was
in fact Conner’s agent at the time the events described above
took place.

SDCL 23-32-5 provides:

“The indictment or information must be direct and
certain as it regards:

(1) The party charged;
(2) The offense charged;

(3) The name of the thing or person upon or against

ae Pe

whom the offense was committed.”
SDCL 23-32-12 provides in part that:

“The indictment or information is sufficient if it can
be understood therefrom:

* * * * * *

(6) That the offense charged is designated in such a
manner as to enable a person of common understand-
ing to know what is intended.”

In State v. Blue Fox Bar, Inc., 80 S.D. 565, 128 N.W.2d 561,
we held that these statutes require the state to set forth in the in-
formation the name of the person to whom a defendant is charged
with having unlawfully sold intoxicating liquor. Defendant
argues that the logical extension of the Blue Fox Bar case is that
not only must the victim or person against whom an alleged act
was committed be named, but that the proper person be named.

Hl We conclude that defendant’s attack upon the sufficiency
of the information must fail for two reasons. First, as a defense to
the charge against him, defendant attempted to establish an
alibi—that he was in Aberdeen, South Dakota, on the day of the
alleged offense and perforce could not have distributed the con-
trolled substance to Conner. That defense, if established, would
have been as effective against a charge that defendant had
distributed the controlled substance to Larry Harris or Richard
Carlson as it would have been to the charge in question. In other
words, we fail to see how defendant can complain that he was pre-
judiced in any way in preparing his defense inasmuch as the
defense he tendered would have been good as against an allega-
tion that he had distributed a controlled substance on August 1,
1974, to any of the individuals involved in the alleged scheme of
distribution.

Ii Defendant's attack on the sufficiency of the information
and the proof adduced thereunder also fails for the reason that
the statute in question does not require that the distribution of

547

the controlled substance must be made directly from the
distributor to the distributee. SDCL 39-17-88 provides that:

“Except as authorized by this chapter, it shall be
unlawful for any person to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense a substance controlled under this chapter, or to
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a substance controlled under this chapter.”

SDCL 39-17-44 provides in part that:

“The following words and phrases, for the purposes
of this chapter, shall have the following meanings,
unless the context otherwise requires:

* * * * * *

(6) ‘Deliver’ or ‘delivery’ means the actual, construc-
tive, or attempted transfer of a controlled drug or
substance whether or not there exists an agency rela-
tionship.”

(7) ‘Dispense’ means to deliver a controlled drug or
substance to the ultimate user or human research
subject, including the packaging, labeling, or com-
pounding necessary to prepare the substance for such
delivery, and a ‘dispenser’ is one who dispenses.

(8) ‘Distribute’ means to deliver a controlled drug or
substance. ‘Distributor’ means a person who delivers
a controlled drug or substance.”

In construing a statute substantially similar to SDCL
89-17-44(6), the Nebraska Supreme Court recently held that,

“To sustain a conviction under section 28-4,125(1)(a),

2 The phrase “whether or not there exists an agency relationship" eliminates
the “procuring agent” defense that was available under prior narcotic dru
laws. See, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 8 Cir., 487 F.2d 1241, and eases cite
therein; People v. Williams, 54 Mich.App. 448, 221 N.W.2d 204.

548 pee

R.S.Supp., 1974, it is not necessary for the State to show
actual physical transfer of a controlled substance from
the defendant. The statutory definition of delivery
clearly encompasses more than actual, direct physical
transfers. It includes constructive and indirect transfer
as well. The evidence in this case was sufficient to show
that the defendant constructively delivered a controlled
substance to Officer Cramer.” State v. Guyott, Neb., 239
N.W.2d 781, 782.

Although in the Guyott case there had been a conversation be-
tween defendant and the officer prior to the time that the officer
picked up the drugs from the place where defendant had told him
they would be, we conclude that the rationale of the case is ap-
plicable to the facts of the instant case.

In interpreting a statute substantially similar to SDCL
39-17-44(6), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico stated that:

“The statement of facts is to the effect that defend-
ant mailed the controlled substance to the juvenile. If
this is true, defendant selected the mails as his delivery
agent. (citation omitted) If properly mailed, there was a
presumption of delivery. (citation omitted) Placing the
controlled substance in the mail had the effect of turn-
ing the controlled substance over to an agent for
delivery. This amounts to a constructive transfer which,
under §§54-11-2(G) and (J), supra, is a
distribution. ***” State v. McHorse, N.M.App., 85
N.M. 753, 756, 517 P.2d 75, 78.

HMI SDCL 39-17-88 does not include the word
“sale,” nor is there any requirement in the statute that
makes the exchange of money or other valuable con-
sideration an element of the offense of unlawful distribu-
tion of a controlled substance. The fact that there was
no exchange of money between defendant and Harris or
between defendant and Conner is without significance.
In other words, the scope of the South Dakota Drugs
and Substances Control Act, SDCL 39-17, is broader in

application than those statutes which require the ex-
change of consideration for the transfer of a drug as a
prerequisite to a criminal charge. As was pointed out
with respect to the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which in pertinent
part is substantially similar to the provisions of SDCL
39-17 quoted above,

“These prior concepts have been discarded in the
Controlled Substances Act which contains no sale or
buying requirement to support a conviction; there is
now an offense of participation in the transaction view-
ed as a whole. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act of 1970 is extremely broad in scope,
no longer restricted to the narrower concepts of buy and
sell, but all inclusive in covering the entire field of nar-
eotics and dangerous drugs in all phases of their
manufacturing, processing, distribution and use. All
distribution is controlled or prohibited, legitimate or il-
legitimate. Any individual who participates in any man-
ner in the unauthorized distribution of such ‘controlled
substances’ is amenable to the Act and the sanctions
provided therein. Congress .undoubtedly intended by
this new Act to make an all-out attempt to combat illicit
drugs by subjecting any individual who knowingly par-
ticipates in the distribution to substantial, and in some
eases severe, penalties while dealing less severely with,
and attempting to aid, the unfortunate individuals who
are the ultimate users of the illicit drugs. * * *” United
States v. Pruitt, 8 Cir., 487 F.2d 1241, 1245.

We think that the same considerations apply to the interpreta-
tion of SDCL 89-17. Cf. State v. One 1972 Pontiac Grand Prix,
90 S.D. 455, 242 N.W.2d 660. One who undertakes to distribute a
controlled substance unlawfully in this state does so at his peril
‘and is not immune from prosecution merely because the person to
whom the controlled substance is deemed delivered was not in
privity with the distributor. The evidence in the instant case ad-
mits but of one conclusion—that defendant must have intended
to distribute the amphetamines to someone other than Harris,

550

else why would he and Harris have driven to a secluded point to
conceal the drugs, and why would defendant not have insisted
upon payment from Harris at the time he transferred the am-
phetamines to him? True, it does not appear on the face of the
record why the state could not have charged defendant with hav-
ing distributed the amphetamines to Harris, but that fact is im-
material in determining whether the charge as actually brought
against defendant is sufficient to support the conviction.

[iin attacking Instruction 3A, defendant cites cases dealing
with the criminal liability of a principal for the acts of his agent.
See e.g., Ex Parte Marley, 29 Cal.2d 525, 175 P.2d 832; People v.
Doble, 203 Cal. 510, 265 P. 184. Instruction 3A, however, was
posited on the premise that Harris was Conner’s agent in the
transaction. Although the instruction might be improved upon
and expanded, we conclude that it was sufficient to apprise the
jury that in order to convict defendant they would have to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris was in fact Conner’s agent
at the time defendant transferred possession of the controlled
substance. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could reasonably have made such a finding.

We have considered defendant's contentions that the am-
phetamines should not have been admitted in evidence because
the chain of evidence was defective, that the exhibits were not
properly identified by investigating officers, and that the manner
in which the exhibits were displayed to the jury during the
course of the trial was improper and prejudicial, and we have con-
cluded that these contentions are without merit.

The conviction is affirmed.

WINANS, J., concurs.

COLER, J., concurs specially.

DUNN, C. J., dissents.

COLER, Justice (concurring specially).

ee 551

I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion but
considering the nature of the charge and the record in this case, I
do not believe the emphasis placed by the appellant on the agency
instruction, Instruction 3A, and this court is warranted.

Appellant was charged in the complaint as a principal in the
distribution or dispensing of amphetamines to another. His pres-
ence at the time of the actual transfer of drugs from the hiding
place selected by him to the go-between, Harris, through Conner
to Carlson, whether he was an agent of Conner, or the appellant,
or an independent contractor matters not, I believe, by reason of
the plain import of SDCL 22-3-3 which reads as follows:

“22.8-8. All persons concerned in the commission of
crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and
whether they directly commit the act constituting the
offense or aid and abet in its commission, though not
present; are principals.” (Emphasis Supplied)

While an instruction might have been given which set forth the
essence of the above quoted statute, I am not aware of any re-
quirement for such an instruction absent a request therefor.

The agency instruction, in my opinion, was unnecessary but
not misleading. If prejudicial at all, the instruction was pre-
judicial to the state in that it placed a burden of proof on the state
which the state would not have, under SDCL 22-3-3, but never-
theless it met that burden.

DUNN, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I believe that there are two grounds upon which defendant's
conviction should be reversed. First, the court’s Instruction 3A
improperly sets forth the agency relationship which the state
was attempting to prove. Instruction 3A states in part:

“In order to sustain its burden of proof under the
charge contained in the information it is necessary for
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Larry Harris was in fact the agent of William Conner at

552 rs

the time and place charged in the information.” (Em-
phasis supplied)

However, the state’s attorney stated that his case proved that
Harris was an agent of the defendant, not William Conner. At
page 127 of the trial transcript he stated (out of the presence of
the jury):

“Quite obviously, from the testimony that’s been
submitted to the Court and jury; the state’s case in chief
is that Larry Harris was working for Mr. Spratlin, that
Mr. Bill Conner was working for Mr. Larry Harris, and
that Richard Carlson was working for the State of South
Dakota as an undercover agent. That it is part of the
chain of evidence that the drugs that were ultimately in-
troduced into evidence in this case were procured by
Mr. Bill Conner through Mr. Harris, from Mr. Spratlin.”
(emphasis supplied)

The court’s instruction said that it had to be proved that Harris
was Conner’s agent while the state’s attorney said that the
evidence showed that Harris was defendant Spratlin’s agent. I do
not see how the jury could help but be confused by Instruction
8A. That erroneous instruction in itself would merit a reversal
and a new trial.

The more serious question is the sufficiency of the informa-
tion. As the proposed opinion notes, the offense charged was that
defendant distributed or dispensed controlled substances to
William Conner. Nothing is said in the information about Larry
Harris or Richard Carlson. In State v. Blue Fox Bar, Inc., 1964, 80
S.D. 565, 128 N.W.2d 561, this court stated:

“Article VI, Section 7 of our Constitution
prescribes that ‘In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right ***to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him * *’. According to
SDC 1960 Supp. 34.3010(6) (now SDCL 23-32-12(6)) the of-
fense charged in the information must be ‘designated in
such a manner as to enable a person of common under-

5538

standing to know what is intended’ and SDC 1960 Supp.
34.3008 (now SDCL 23-32-5) specifically requires that an
indictment or information be direct and certain as it
regards:

(1) The party charged;
(2) The offense charged;

(83) The name of the thing or person upon or against
whom the offense was committed.

The test of the sufficiency of an information under these
provisions is whether it apprises a defendant with
reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation
against him so that he may prepare his defense and
plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecu-
tion for the same offense.” 80 S.D. at 567, 128 N.W.2d at
562-563,

I think that the information here fails to meet either part of
the test. Mr. Conner testified that he had never met nor had he
had any dealings with the defendant. The record reveals nothing
which would indicate that defendant knew Mr. Conner or knew
that Harris was going to turn the drugs over to him. Therefore, I
do not think that Mr. Conner’s name in the information was suffi-
cient to enable the defendant, a man of common understanding, to
know with reasonable certainty the accusation against him. Also,
I do not feel that the information was sufficient to enable defend-
ant to plead the judgment as a bar to a subsequent prosecution.
Since the information did not mention Mr. Harris, defendant
could not plead the judgment as a bar to a prosecution for dis-
pensing a controlled substance to Mr. Harris on August 1, 1974.
This is true even though the evidence shows that the dispensing
to Mr. Harris was only part of the overall transaction.

While I think that the theory of criminal agency is sound,
especially in cases involving chain sales of drugs, the agency
theory should have been set out in the information. The mention
of Mr. Harris as the agent of defendant would have apprised

55

defendant specifically of the accusation and met the test set out
above.

I am also disturbed by the language of the first full
paragraph on page 5 of the opinion. To me, it is saying that
defendant cannot now attack the sufficiency of the information
because he went ahead and put in an alibi defense. Does that
mean that a criminal defendant should be put to the choice of at-
tacking the information on appeal or putting in an affirmative
defense to the charge? I do not think that should be the state of
the law. He should be able to go into court and attack the informa-
tion while contending that he was not even in the county on the
date in question. These defenses are not alternative defenses and
may properly be presented together. A defendant should not be
required to drop his alibi defense in order to preserve the issue of
the sufficiency of the information for appeal. I fear that this is
how that language may be interpreted.

ESTATE OF MILLER

MILLER, Appellant v. STATE
(DIVISION OF TAXATION), Respondent

(243 N.W.2d 788)

(File No. 11821. Opinion filed July 2, 1976)

555

Robert C. Heege, of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith,
Sioux Falls, W. 0. Delzer, of Delzer & Delzer, Arlington, for ap-
pellant.

John P. Dewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for respondent;
William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

556 Pe

This case arises from a proceeding to determine the amount
of inheritance tax due with respect to the estate of William O.
Miller. The South Dakota Division of Taxation denied treatment
of the appellant Nell Miller as a widow, stating that the re-
quirements for a nonceremonial or common-law marriage had not
been met. Appellant was taxed as a person unrelated to the dece-
dent. She applied to the circuit court for a hearing on appraise-
ment and determination of inheritance tax. The court upheld the
determination of the Division of Taxation. We reverse.

In March 1914, William O. Miller and Nell Fletcher were mar-
ried ceremonially in Canton, South Dakota. A son was born to the
Millers in 1914. William and Nell lived together for twenty-one
years, farming first near Montrose and later near Arlington.
Sometime in 1935 Nell left her husband and went to Sioux Falls.
There she worked as a waitress and lived with her sister. Nell
sought and on January 2, 1936, received a default decree of
divorce from William upon grounds of wilful neglect and failure
to provide a home and necessities of life for more than one year.

In late 1987 or early 1938, William arrived in Sioux Falls and
asked Nell to return with him to the farm near Arlington. Asked
at trial what was said by the parties at that time, Nell stated:

“He said, ‘Will you come on back home?’ and I said, ‘O.K.,
will we get married again?’ and he said, ‘Yeah.’”

Nell returned to the farm and lived with William until his
death on April 6, 1974. In December 1952, reciprocal wills were
drawn by an attorney in De Smet. In those wills, William and Nell
Miller referred to each other as “my divorced husband” or “my
divorced wife.”

This court has stated that common-law marriage can exist in
South Dakota. Svendsen v. Svendsen, 1916, 37 S.D. 353, 368, 158
N.W. 410, 414, and Bracken v. Bracken, 1922, 45 S.D. 430, 431, 188
N.W. 46. SDCL 25-1-1 and 25-1-29 require that a marriage be
solemnized; however, SDCL 25-1-29 excepts “any lawful marriage
consented to and subsequently consummated prior to July 1,
1959.” The two requirements of consent and consummation were

Pe 557

contained and defined in the 1919 and 1939 Codes, which pro-
vided:?

“Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a
civil contract, to which the consent of parties capable of
making it is necessary. Consent alone will not constitute
marriage; it must be followed by a solemnization, or by a
mutual assumption of marital rights, duties, or obliga-
tions.”

“The consent to a marriage must be to one com-
mencing instantly, and not to an agreement to marry
afterwards.”

There is no dispute that the Millers had a mutual assumption
of marital rights, duties and obligations. Respondent admitted
and the evidence at trial indicated that William and Nell lived
together as, acted as though, and were generally regarded by
friends and neighbors to be husband and wife. In its memoran-
dum opinion the trial court relied upon the reference in the will to
Nell as William’s “divorced wife,” and found that there “never
was an agreement commencing instantly to be married.”

Appellant raises three issues on appeal. First, she contends
that she and William had a valid common-law marriage. She fur-
ther contends that the state has no standing to attack the validity
of a marital relationship. Lastly, she contends that the divorce is
a nullity because no corroboration was shown.

We feel that the trial court relied too heavily upon the
language in the wills. The reference in the wills to “my divorced
wife” and “my divorced husband” was put in by the draftsman in
an abundance of caution. It is clear from the record that the
words were not chosen by William or Nell Miller. Nell stated that
she did not even read the terms of the will.

HM The statements made in Sioux Falls evidenced a desire
to return to the marital relation. The consent to marry can be

1. R.C. 1919, §§ 102,105; SDC 1939, §§ 14.0101, 14.0104.

558 Pe

shown in many ways. Here, William and Nell resumed their rela-
tionship for a period of thirty-six years following a separation of
only three years during the depression. The lack of a second
ceremony did not affect the permanence of their union. When
asked why there was no ceremony, Nell explained:

“* * * it never happened. We just worked hard * * * and
kept putting it off. You know how things go. I figured,
too, we had been married once and he figured that, too.”

If consent to marry did not exist at the time of Nell’s return to
Arlington, we find it existed when she and William made this con-
clusion. We do not view the term “commencing instantly” to
mean that the parties had to reach mutual consent the instant
they began living together as husband and wife. This consent
could come later, so long as it was a mutual consent at a given
time.

HM Although, as stated above, the principle of common-law
marriage has been recognized by this court, this case is the first
in which we uphold a common-law marriage.’ Several factors lead
to this result. Here, there was a prior ceremonial marriage. The
harsh judicial serutiny of the statements and actions of parties
engaged in a common-law relationship should not be applied to an
informal remarriage. Such a relationship should be encouraged,
not discouraged. In Re Wagner's Estate, 1960, 398 Pa. 531, 159
A.2d 495; In Re Peterson’s Estate, 1961, 148 Colo. 52, 365 P.2d
254. William and Nell Miller were 49 and 45 years old in 1938
when returning to Arlington. They were not blind to the duties
and responsibilities of living as husband and wife “because of the
consuming anticipation of immediate pleasure.” In Re Erickson’s
Estate, 1954, 75 S.D. 345, 355, 64 N.W.2d 316, 321. The time period
of their short separation and the permanent reuniting of the
couple are also indicative of a legitimate relationship. Nell Miller
should be entitled to inheritance tax treatment as William
Miller’s widow.

2, This court has declared an annulment judgment void and a marriage valid
where the minor parties did not obtain the required parental consent for the
marriage license but were of legal age to consent to and consummate a mar-
riage. Lessert v. Lessert, 1985, 64 S.D. 3, 263 N.W. 559.

559

Because of our disposition of this issue, we will not consider
the other issues raised on appeal.

Reversed.

WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER, Justices, and
FOSHEIM, Circuit Judge, concur.

FOSHEIM, Circuit Judge, sitting as a member of the court.

BETTELYOUN et al., Appellants v. SANDERS, Respondent

(243 N.W.2d 790)

(File No. 11785. Opinion filed July 2, 1976)

560

]

Black Hills Legal Services, Inc., Gregory D. Lewis, Rapid
City, for appellants.

561

Robert B. Looby, Pierre, for respondent.

WINANS, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for the
Seventh Judicial Circuit dismissing W. Ray Sanders as a party
defendant in the above-entitled action. Plaintiff's claim is that
the trial court erred in dismissing W. Ray Sanders, individually.
We agree.

HiBefore reaching the merits, there is a matter that must be
settled. Defendant urges that this order is not subject to appeal
because “the order appealed from in this case is expressly subject
to revision at any time before entry of a final judgment determin-
ing all claims, rights and liabilities of all parties.” Relying on RCP
Rule 54(b) Defendant argues that the proper time for appeal in a
case involving dismissal of less than all multiple parties is after a
resolution of the controversy on the merits by the trial court.

SDCL 15-6-54(b) provides:

“When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties
are involved in an action, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
of the claims or parties only upon an express determina-
tion that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order
or other form of decision, however designated, which ad-
judicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not ter-
minate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.”

1. The order dismissing W. Ray Sanders reads in part as follows:
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the name of W. Ray Sanders be
stricken from the caption in this matter”.

562 Pe

For an order subject to RCP Rule 54(b) to become final, and
therefore appealable as a final judgment, two requirements must
be satisfied. First, the trial court must make an express deter-
mination that there was no just reason for delay; secondly, the
trial court must make an express direction for the entry of judg-
ment. Absent that determination and direction in this instance,
the order is not appealable as a final judgment. Shryock v. Mit-
chell Concrete Products, Inc., 1973, 87 S.D. 566, 212 N.W.2d 498;
Brasel v. City of Pierre v. Myers, 1973, 87 S.D. 561, 211 N.W.2d
846; Davis v. Interstate Motor Carriers Agency, 1970, 85 S.D. 101,
178 N.W.2d 204.

RCP Rule 54(b) is not dispositive of the issue, however.
SDCL 15-26-1 provides:

“Appeals to the Supreme Court from the circuit court,
or from the county court except in matters of probate
and guardianship, or from the municipal court may be
taken as provided in this title from:

(1) A judgment;

(2) An order affecting a substantial right, made in any
action, when such order in effect determines the ac-
tion and prevents a judgment from which an appeal
might be taken;

(83) An order granting a new trial;

(4) Any final order affecting a substantial right, made
in special proceedings, or upon a summary application
in an action after judgment;

(5) An order which grants, refuses, continues,
dissolves, or modifies any of the remedies of arrest
and bail, claim and delivery, injunction, attachment,
garnishment, receivership, or deposit in court;

(6) Any other intermediate order made before trial,
any appeal under this subdivision, however, being not

563

a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and
to be allowed by the Supreme Court in the manner
provided by rules of such court only when the court
considers that the ends of justice will be served by
determination of the questions involved without
awaiting the final determination of the action or pro-
ceeding.”

For a judgment or an order of a circuit court to be appealable it
must fall within the‘bounds of one of these subsections. The order
in question is not appealable as a judgment under subsection (1).
“Judgment” is defined by SDCL 15-6-54(a) as “*** the final
determination of the rights of the parties in an action or pro-
ceeding.” In a multiple-party action such as this the absence of
the determination and direction required by RCP Rule 54(b) pre-
vents the order from being appealable as a final judgment at this
time.

Plaintiffs argue that appeal from the trial court’s order is
allowable pursuant to SDCL 15-26-1(2). Appeals under this sub-
section are permitted as a matter of right if three requirements
are met:

“First, the order must affect a substantial right; second,
the order must in effect determine the action; and third,
the order must prevent a judgment from which an ap-
peal might be taken.” Northwestern Engineering Co. v.
Ellerman, 1943, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879, 880-81.

See also Anderson v. Nash Finch Wholesale Fruit & Grocery Co.,
1974, 88 S.D. 59, 215 N.W.2d 125.

While the order does affect a substantial right, it does not in
effect determine the action. SDCL 15-26-1(2) must be read in con-
junction with SDCL 15-6-54(b) in a multiple-party action if both
statutes are to be given effect. RCP Rule 54(b) provides that

“any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates***the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not ter-

minate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order * * * is subject to revision at any time before
the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and
the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”

By statute the order in this case is subject to revision by the trial
court at any time prior to entry of judgment and therefore does
not in effect determine the action, nor does it prevent a judgment
from which an appeal might be taken. Plaintiff is not entitled to
an appeal from this order as a matter of right.

Absent the required determination and direction under RCP
Rule 54(b), any order in a multiple-party suit is an intermediate
order, even if it appears to adjudicate a separate portion of the
controversy. See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, § 2654, at 34 (1973). RCP Rule 54(b), by its own terms, ap-
plies only to entry of a final judgment by the court; it does not
foreclose appeal of an intermediate order. RCP Rule 54(b) is
designed to preclude appeal until there is finality; SDCL
15-26-1(6) is an exception to the finality requirement. The latter
statute provides for appeal from “[a]ny other intermediate order
made before trial * * * being not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion.” Appeal is allowed for such intermediate
orders, “only when the court considers that the ends of justice
will be served by determination of the questions involved without
awaiting the final determination of the action or proceeding.”
Plaintiffs assert that the ends of justice require allowance of
their appeal at this time. We agree.

Hl Defendant contends that even under this statute the ap-
peal must be disallowed, citing In re Weide’s Estate, 1952, 74 S.D.
416, 54 N.W.2d 174. In that case this Court considered the ap-
pealability of the denial of a motion and held:

“The order from which the appeal is taken is an in-
termediate order which requires an order allowing the
appeal by the Supreme Court before the appeal becomes
effective *** No application was made for such
allowance at the time of taking the appeal. Appellant re-
quests that this court enter an order allowing the appeal

a

at this time. However, we perceive no reason for so
doing. All of the questions which appellant seeks to
raise upon this attempted appeal may be raised upon an
appeal from an adverse judgment. We are convinced
that the ends of justice will be better served by con-
sidering the questions which appellant now seeks to
raise after a trial of the issues and a decision, upon the
merits.” (citations omitted)

It is true that the petition required by SDCL 15-26-9 to secure the
allowance of appeal from an intermediate order was not filed by
Plaintiffs.’ Failure to file that petition is not necessarily fatal,
however.

SDCL 15-26-8 provides:

“When a party shall in good faith give notice of ap-
peal, and shall omit, through mistake or accident, to do
any other act necessary to perfect the appeal or make it
effectual *** the Supreme Court or any one of the
judges thereof, may permit an amendment, or the pro-
per act to be done * * *,”

Notice of appeal from the order in this case was filed and served
within the mandates of SDCL 15-26-3 and within the time limit im-
posed by SDCL 15-26-2. As this Court held in Northwestern
Engineering Company v. Ellerman, supra, we acquire jurisdiction
to the extent necessary to act upon Plaintiff's request for permis-
sion to appeal when notice of appeal is served within the
statutory time. “[I]t is the serving of the notice of appeal within
the statutory time that confers jurisdiction upon the court * * *.”
10 N.W.2d at 881. This jurisdiction extends at least to the point of
permitting the performance of “any other act necessary to
perfect the appeal or make it effectual” under SDCL 15-26-8. We
held in Northwestern Engineering Company v. Ellerman, supra,

2, SDGL 15-269 provides: .
“Whenever any party desires to appeal from an intermediate order as
provided in subdivision (6) of § 15-26-1, he must serve and file with his
notice of appeal a petition for allowance thereof, and must provide the
clerk of the court from which such appeal is sought with six additional
copies of such petition.”

566 po

that the act of filing a petition for allowance of appeal from an in-
termediate order falls within that class of “any other act.” It
would be pointless, however, to require that such a petition be
filed at this stage of the proceedings. “[T]he procedure of requir-
ing plaintiff to make such application, under the facts here
presented, would simply be a consumption of time and effort
which’ could add nothing to the facts which now appear in this
court.” 10 N.W.2d at 881. The allowance of appeal would have
been granted if the petition had been filed. Accordingly, no peti-
tion is required. See Hornby v. Hornby, 1946, 71 S.D. 418, 25
N.W.2d 287; Reich v. Martin, 1933, 61 S.D. 311, 248 N.W. 495.

[i The practical effect of the order under consideration is to
determine all claims made against W. Ray Sanders as an in-
dividual adversely to Plaintiffs. Statutes requiring finality as a
prerequisite to appeal are geared toward avoiding multiplicity of
litigation; to dismiss the appeal in this case would defeat that pur-
pose because we are of the opinion that Defendant as an in-
dividual was improperly dismissed. Were the Plaintiffs forced to
await the final termination of the action before they could appeal
the order of dismissal, the result would be another trial on the
same issues and facts. Not only would this result in great incon-
venience to all parties involved, it would also unnecessarily add
to an already overcrowded judicial system. The ends of justice re-
quire that this court allow the appeal at this time and consider
the case upon its merits. Northwestern Engineering Company v.

Ellerman, supra. 7

Plaintiffs are tenants of certain rental property which at the
time the action was commenced was owned by Ray Sanders
Development, Inc. W. Ray Sanders is president of the corpora-
tion. Rent on the leased premises, a trailer house in Black Hawk,
South Dakota, was $135 per month, plus utilities. The tenancy
was on a month-to-month basis.

Plaintiffs originally brought this action against W. Ray
Sanders as an individual, later amending their complaint to in-
clude Ray Sanders Development, Inc. as codefendant. Plaintiffs
allege five causes of action.

567

1) That on April 3d, 1975, Defendants, or their agents,
came and “intentionally, oppressively, and maliciously”
shut off the water to the leased premises; that Defend-
ants, or their agents, rendered the furnace inoperable;
that these acts, as well as others alleged in the com-
plaint, denied them use of their home and rendered it
not fit for human habitation; therefore, Plaintiffs allege
breach of the statutory covenant to provide habitable
conditions in rented premises under SDCL 43-32-8.

2) That on April 5, 1975, Defendants removed Plaintiff's
television from the premises; that Defendants, or their
agents, later locked Plaintiffs out of the trailer, thereby
denying them possession of their personal property,
which Defendants have refused to return; therefore,
Plaintiffs allege an action for conversion;

8) In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek to replevy their per-
sonal property;

4) That by locking Plaintiffs out of their trailer, Defend-
ants have breached the duty imposed by SDCL 43-32-6
—to provide peaceful possession and quiet enjoyment;

5) That Defendants intentionally, maliciously, and op-
pressively inflicted emotional and mental distress on
Plaintiff, Loretta Bettelyoun.

Defendant did not answer the complaint as amended, but in-
stead moved to dismiss the action on the grounds

“That the Defendant named in this action is not the
owner of the property so described in the Complaint and
that therefore, is not the proper party in this action.”

The motion to dismiss W. Ray Sanders was granted and Plaintiffs
appeal, asserting that the dismissal was improper because the
complaint alleges that W. Ray Sanders participated individually
in alleged wrongdoings.

568 Po

Hl For the purposes of review of an order granting a mo-
tion to dismiss we must assume that all facts properly pleaded in
the complaint are true. Hullinger v. Prahl, 1975, 89 S.D. 443, 233
N.W.2d 584; Dunham v. First National Bank in Sioux Falls, 1972,
86 S.D. 727, 201 N.W.2d 227; Akron Savings Bank v. Charlson,
1968, 83 S.D. 251, 158 N.W.2d 523. The grant or denial of a motion
to dismiss is not discretionary with the trial court but must be
based upon sound legal grounds. If the complaint alleges ultimate
facts upon which any relief sought may be granted, the motion to
dismiss should be denied. Ambrose v. Harrison Mutual Insurance
Association, 1978, Iowa, 206 N.W.2d 683.

[i The essence of the motion to dismiss is that the complaint
fails to state a claim against Defendant because he is not the
owner of the property. Taking as true all properly pleaded facts
in the complaint, as we must, we are unable to conclude that there
is no cause of action against W. Ray Sanders upon which some
relief sought could be afforded. The complaint alleges tortious
conduct on the part of both Defendants.

“Tt is true, as defendants suggest, that a director or
officer of a corporation does not incur personal liability
for its torts merely by reason of his official character. If,
however, an officer commits or participates in the com-
mission of a tort, whether or not it is also by or for the
corporation, he is liable to third persons injured
thereby, and it does not matter what liability attaches
to the corporation for the tort.” McFeeters v. Renollet,
1972, 210 Kan. 158, 500 P.2d 47, 50.

See also Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L. Field & Co.,
1975, 5 Cir., 516 F.2d 952, 958-59, where the court held:

“Under general tort and agency law, where an agent
commits a tort while acting within the scope of his
employment as the agent of another, he will be personal-
ly liable in damages, even though his principal is also
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior * * * In
addition, the particular facts in this case indicate that
Field acted in an individual capacity in addition to acting

569

as president of Field Co., and therefore has incurred
liability beyond that of a mere agent.”

This general rule has been applied to actions in conversion and to
an action for replevin. See Pacific & Atlantic Shippers, Inc. v.
Schier, 1969, 109 N.H. 551, 258 A.2d 351; Small v. Bailey, 1962,
Ky., 356 S.W.2d 756; Luther v. National Investment Co., 1936, 222
Towa 305, 268 N.W. 589. See generally W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of
the Law of Private Corporations § 1135 (1965).

If assumed to be true, the facts alleged in the complaint state
a cause of action against W. Ray Sanders; whether it be as an in-
dividual or as an officer of the corporation, who would be liable in-
dividually for torts committed, it is not necessary for us to decide.
It is sufficient that if the allegations are proven at trial, Plaintiffs
may be entitled to some of the relief sought. We have examined
the authorities and arguments considered by both sides and con-
clude that it was improper for the trial court to dismiss W. Ray
Sanders.

Accordingly, the order to dismiss is hereby reversed and the
case remanded for entry of an order overruling Defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss and for further appropriate proceedings.

DUNN, C.J., concurs.

COLER, J., concurs specially.

WOLLMAN, J., dissents.

COLER, Justice (concurring specially).

I agree with the majority opinion that the order of the trial
court striking the name of W. Ray Sanders from the complaint
should be reversed. I would do so, however, not on the basis of
either SDCL 15-26-1(6) or RCP Rule 54(b).

Respondent's motion to dismiss stated, as grounds therefor:

“That the Defendant named in this action is not the

570

owner of the property so described in the Complaint and
that therefore, is not the proper party in this action.”

Though not identified as such, this motion clearly states a
defense under RCP Rule 12(b)(5) (SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5)) in claiming a
“Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” RCP
Rule 12(b) (SDCL 15-6-12(b)) further states in part:

“Tf, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (5) to
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judg-
ment and disposed of as provided in § 15-6-56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by
§ 15-6-56.”

In addition to a voluminous and detailed complaint the trial
court had before it the appellants’ request for admissions made
pursuant to RCP Rule 36 which sought answers from respondent
Sanders to 21 questions. It appears from the record that respond-
ent’s answers to these questions were also before the trial court,
and, as this constitutes matters outside the pleadings, the trial
court erred in failing to proceed in accordance with RCP Rule 56.
SDCL 15-6-56. See 2A Moore’s Federal Practice JJ 12.01, 12.09. I
would reverse on that basis and not imply that this court, under
its discretionary authority, is prone to hear an appeal in a case
properly adjudicated under RCP Rule 54(b).

WOLLMAN, Justice (dissenting).
I would dismiss the appeal. Shryock v. Mitchell Concrete

Products, 87 S.D. 566, 212 N.W.2d 498; Brasel v. City of Pierre, 87
S.D. 561, 211 N.W.2d 846.

eC FEE

STATE, DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff v.
GRUDNIK et ux, Defendants

(243 N.W.2d 796)
(File No. 11795. Opinion filed July 2, 1976)

Rehearing granted July 29, 1976, and Order sustaining opinion on
rehearing filed September 7, 1976.

Carl W. Quist, Camron Hoseck, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pierre, for
plaintiff and appellant; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on
the brief.

Horace R. Jackson of Lynn, Jackson, Shultz, Ireland &
Lebrun, Rapid City, for defendant and respondent, Franchise
Realty Co.

5S

ANDERST, Circuit Judge.

This is an intermediate appeal from an order of the cireuit
court. It involves an interpretation of the South Dakota Rules of
Civil Procedure concerning the taking of a pretrial discovery
deposition of the opponent's expert witness and requiring him to
produce designated books, papers, documents, or tangible things
which are in his possession, custody or control.

Plaintiff, State of South Dakota, brought a condemnation
proceeding for the acquisition of land and temporary easements
needed for the reconstruction of a bridge and abutting highway
over Rapid Creek in Rapid City, South Dakota. Respondent, Fran-
chise Realty Company, served a notice of taking adverse deposi-
tion of William Hobson, plaintiff's retained expert real estate ap-
praiser. At the same time, respondent served a subpoena duces
tecum upon said William Hobson, directing that not only should
he be present but also that he produce certain documents and
papers, among other things, under his control or in his posses-
sion. Plaintiff moved to stay discovery and quash the above
notice and subpoena. After a hearing thereon, an order was
entered by the circuit court denying plaintiff's motion to quash.

Our pretrial discovery rules have been modeled on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with some variations.’ The
leading case concerning discovery, Hickman v. Taylor, 1947, 329
US. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451, sets out the rule, with which
we concur, as follows:

“the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-
honored ery of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his oppo-
nent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litiga-
tion. To that end, either party may compel the other to
disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The
deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the

1. So far as material, our rules here involved are similar to their federal counter-
parts before the federal rules were amended and rearranged in 1970.

SS:

stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the
time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the
possibility of surprise. But discovery, like all matters of
procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.”

Plaintiff's first contention is that the circuit court erred in
refusing to quash the taking of the oral deposition of its expert
witness. SDCL 15-6-26(a) provides that:

“Any party may take testimony of any person, in-
eluding a party, by deposition upon oral examina-
tion * * * for the purpose of discovery * * * The attend-
ance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of sub-
poena as provided in § 15-6-45 * * *,”

The scope of examination by deposition is set out in SDCL
15-6-26(b) as follows:

“Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided
by § 15-6-30(b) or § 15-6-30(d), the deponent may be ex-
amined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
examining party or to the claim or defense of any other
party * * ¥,”

In State Highway Commission v. Earl, 1966, 82 S.D. 139, 143
N.W.2d 88, we held it to be the duty of every citizen to respond to
a subpoena and that expert testimony was not privileged and
could not be suppressed by reason of a contractual or proprietary
interest. Further, “[iJt is settled law in this state that in condem-
nation actions an appraiser for the other party may be called
upon to testify.” Rapid City v. Baron, 1975, 88 S.D. 693, 227
N.W.2d 617. Therefore, since the expert witness could be com-
pelled to testify at the time of trial, it is only logical under a
liberal interpretation of our discovery rules that he can be ex-
amined by a pretrial discovery deposition regarding such
testimony.

Plaintiff further alleges that the circuit court erred in com-

574

pelling its expert witness to produce certain documents and
papers under the subpoena duces tecum. It is its contention that
production of documents for discovery purposes can only be com-
pelled under the provisions of SDCL 15-6-34.? The pertinent pro-
visions of that statute are:

“Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor * * * the court * * * may

(1)order any party to produce * * documents,
papers, books * * * which are in his possession,
custody, or control * * *.” (Emphasis supplied)

We believe the United States Supreme Court stated the ap-
plicable rule in Hickman v. Taylor, supra, that the procedure for
compelling production of documents at a deposition depends on
whether the deponent is or is not a party. SDCL 15-6-34 is limited
to parties to the proceedings, thereby excluding their counsel or
agents. If the deponent is not a party, production of documents
can be compelled only by a subpoena duces tecum issued under
SDCL 15-6-45. The respondent followed the procedures required
by statute in noticing taking of deposition and subpoenaing the
witness. Plaintiff, under such a procedure, has the right to a hear-
ing and the burden of proof, upon the grounds specified in SDCL
15-6-30(b) and 15-6-45(b), to quash or modify the subpoena or to
limit what matters shall be inquired into. Upon the records and
files as presented to us on appeal, the circuit court ruled proper-

ly?

However, the plaintiff no doubt has gone to great expense to
hire Mr. Hobson for the purposes of having him make his ap-

2. Plaintiff cites Alger v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 1969, 84 S.D.
187, 168 N.W.2d 705, as authority for its position. The ruling therein is not ap-
plicable, 28 the motion to produee was made under the provisions of SDC!

5.6-34, We reversed, holding the moving party did not satisfy the statutory
“good cause” requirement.

3. Under Supreme Court Rule 76-3 (SDCL 15-6-26(b)(4)), adopted by the court ef-
fective July 1, 1976, the procedure for obtaining facts known and the opinions of
experts is set out in detail. While these procedures were not followed by the
respondent, as they were not in effect on the dates in question, the trial court
did hear the matters under SDCL 15-6-30(b) and 15-6-45(b) and made its finding
accordingly which we deem to be sufficient under the rules then in force.

ell LE

praisal and ultimately testify at time of trial. It would be grossly
unfair to allow respondent to share in this information without
sharing the cost of hiring the expert witness. As stated in 4
Moore’s Federal Practice, J 26.66[1]:

“Litigants commonly pay experts substantial fees
for obtaining their advice, and, as a general proposition,
it is oppressive and unjust to permit a party to take ad-
vantage of his opponent by obtaining his expert witness’
opinion, before trial, without paying any part of the cost
thereof.”

Under this rule, which we hereby adopt, the circuit court should
make a finding requiring that respondent pay plaintiff's expert
his fees for his attendance at the deposition,‘ and also requiring
that respondent pay plaintiff a reasonable portion of the cost of
having the expert prepare his opinion and make his appraisal
report, before requiring the appraiser to give his deposition.

The case is remanded to the circuit court for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER,
Justices, concur.

ANDERST, Circuit Judge, sitting for DOYLE, J., who prior
to his death, disqualified himself from taking part in the decision
in this action.

EMBLEM MFG. CO., INC., Respondent v.
DISCOVERY CORP., Appellant.

(243 N.W.2d 799)

(File No. 11703. Opinion filed July 2, 1976)

4, See SDCL 15-6-45(c) and SDCL 19-6-10.

Robert A. Warder, Rapid City, for plaintiff and respondent.

David Stanton, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.
COLER, Justice.

This appeal was taken from an order denying a motion to
vacate a default judgment taken by respondent against appellant
for the balance due on a promissory note.

We affirm.

The summons and complaint were served upon appellant on
January 28, 1975. The summons and complaint, together with the
return of service, were all filed with the court on March 11, 1975,
and the judgment by default was entered and filed on the same
date. Thereafter on March 14, 1975, appellant filed its answer,
and subsequently, on March 26, 1975, appellant’s counsel filed a
motion to set aside the default judgment, together with an af-
fidavit over his signature, and a notice of the motion. A like mo-
tion, affidavit and notice were filed on April 17, 1975, which were
accompanied by a certificate of service upon respondent’s at-
torney.

[i Under our rules of civil procedure, RCP Rule 60(b), an af-

517

fidavit of merits is the proper foundation for a show cause hear-
ing on a motion to vacate a judgment. In the case of a corporate
party, that affidavit must be made by one of the officers of the
corporation or the affidavit must disclose why it is not so made.
See Davis v. Interstate Motor Carriers Agency, 1970, 85 S.D. 101,
178 N.W.2d 204 and Gilliland v. Courtesy Motors, Ine., 1975, 89
S.D. 278, 232 N.W.2d 828.

As this case was presented to the trial court prior to the
holding of this court in Gilliland v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., supra,
we consider the applicable portions of the attorney’s affidavit of
merits as follows:

“4, That the action was not filed within ten days after
service thereof, as required by SDCL 15-6-5(e) [sic],
and that in accordance with the provisions of said
statute, the time of service needs be deemed to be
the date of filing of the Notice and proof of service.

“5, That in fact said Default Judgment was taken on
the same day as the filing of the Notice and proof of
service.

“6. That Defendant verily believes upon these facts,
that he was not in default, and that said Default
Judgment hereinbefore entered, is void, within the
meaning of 15-6-60(d) 4 [sic].”

Wb Appellant’s argument is that this court, by its adoption of
Rule 72-4, effective January 1, 1973, which amended RCP Rule
5(d) and is now codified as SDCL 15-6-5(d), has stated a require-
ment for filing of the summons and complaint at least ten days
before the taking of the default judgment. Appellant claims this
requirement arises by implication from certain language, which
we have emphasized, appearing in the first paragraph of RCP
Rule 5(d) reading as fcllows:

“15-6-5(d). The original of all papers served upon a
party or presented to any court or judge in support of
any application or motion and including the summons,

578

all pleadings, notices, demands, offers, stipulations, af-
fidavits and written motions, and orders shall, if not
filed before service, be filed with the court, together
with proof of such service, forthwith upon such service.
The foregoing requirement of filing applies to the notice
of filing of an order and the notice of entry of a judg-
ment together with proof of service thereof, both of
which shall be filed forthwith; if not filed within ten
days after service thereof, the time of service shall be
deemed to be the date of filing of the notice and proof of
service.

“If such papers are not to be served, they must be
filed with the court at the time of their presentation to
the court for any action or consideration.

“In the event of failure to file any paper required to
be filed as herein specified, the adverse party upon
proof of the omission so to file shall be entitled without
notice to an order requiring such papers to be filed
within a time to be specified in the order, and such order
may likewise provide that upon such failure so to file
such papers, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed
without prejudice and that no new action or proceeding
may be commenced without payment of reasonable
terms to be fixed by the court.

“If any process, original pleading, or any other
paper, be lost or withheld by any person, the court may
authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used instead of
‘the original.” (Emphasis Supplied)

It is the underlined language which appellant claims has
somehow modified both SDCL 15-2-30 and RCP Rules 3, 4(a) and
56(a). Such was neither the intention nor the plain language of the
foregoing amendment to our rule.

In large measure, the South Dakota rules of civil procedure
conform to the federal rules of civil procedure. However, our
rules, RCP Rules 3, 4(a) and 4(b), and our statutes, SDCL 15-2-30

579

and 15-2-31, unlike the federal rules, do not require the filing of a
complaint before the issuance of a summons by the clerk, Federal
RCP Rules 3 and 4. Our rules require only the filing thereof as
was done in the instant case “forthwith.”

Appellant having been duly advised by the summons, which
was timely served, that an answer was required within thirty
days and having defaulted and appellant not having presented its
claim for relief under RCP Rule 60(b)(1) but relying only on the
basis of RCP Rule 60(b)(4) andi its reading of RCP Rule 5(d), is en-
titled to no relief.

Affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

PONDEROSA-NEVADA, INC., Appellant v.
VENNERS et al., Respondents

(243 N.W.2d 801)

(File No. 11721. Opinion filed July 2, 1976)

Oo
ire}

581

James W. Olson, of Wilson, Olson & Goodsell, Rapid City, for
plaintiff and appellant.

Thomas E. Simmons, of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye &
Simmons, Rapid City, for defendants and respondents.

WINANS, Justice.

This is an action, brought under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act, SDCL 21-24, which seeks to define the legal status
of a certain piece of property. Plaintiff initially filed a complaint
for reformation, but later amended its complaint to one for
declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that an option agree-
ment had been canceled by the terms of a compromise agreement.
The defendants filed a counterclaim for specific performance of
the option agreement. The trial court found that the option agree-
ment had not been compromised by the compromise agreement
and granted specific performance to the defendants. We affirm.

The origin of this litigation reaches back at least to June 19,
1967. At that time the plaintiff-seller, Ponderosa-Nevada, Inc.,'
was the owner of the Black Forest Inn.? Apparently seeking to ex-
pand its holdings, the seller purchased a contract for deed for
property immediately adjacent to its Black Forest Inn properties.
That property was owned by Mrs. Musekamp, who sold it for
$40,000.

About two years later, on August 22, 1969, the seller entered
a contract for deed with the buyers, John and Hilda Venners,
Richard and Mary Louise Stanley and Louise Humphrey,
whereby the seller contracted to sell the Black Forest Inn prop-
erties to the buyers for $375,000. On the same day, by a separate
document, the same parties executed an option agreement
whereby the seller gave an “irrevocable option” to the buyers to
purchase the Musekamp property. The option states that it

1. Ponderosa-Nevada was then known as Burgess, Incorporated.

2. The Inn was then known as the Pactola Lodge.

582

should remain in effect for five years and that the total price of
‘the property was $35,000. The consideration for the option was
stated as $10.00.

The option agreement does not mention the contract for
deed between the seller and the buyer. However, the contract for
deed mentions the option agreement in these terms.

“EXISTING EASEMENT:

“It is understood by all the parties hereto that the
Buyers have an option to purchase all right, title and in-
terest of Seller in the Contract for Deed between Seller
and Bernice Musekamp dated June 19, 1967, a copy of
said contract being attached hereto as Exhibit C. It is
understood and agreed that the Musekamp property as
dominant property has an easement over the property
contained in this contract as servient property to enable
Bernice Musekamp access to said Musekamp property, a
copy of said easement is attached hereto as Exhibit D.”

About eight months later, after certain litigation had been
commenced, the parties entered into an addendum to contract for
deed, dated April 16, 1970. By this document, several of the
buyers, i.e., Louise Humphrey, Richard and Mary Louise Stanley,
were released from the contract for deed. This document does not
mention the option but it does contain the following language:

“It is further understood and agreed that all of the
terms and conditions of the above described contract for
deed shall be and remain the same as set forth in said
contract except insofar as said terms are specifically
amended hereinafter in this agreement.”

The next transaction took place two years later. The buyers
had apparently concluded that the original arrangement between
themselves and the seller was disadvantageous to them and
sought to reduce their indebtedness. An appraiser was contacted
to verify their new view of the actual value of the Black Forest
properties. The buyers then apparently proposed to the seller

Se

that the buyers’ indebtedness be reduced from $140,000 to
$100,000. $90,000 of this amount would be paid immediately in
cash. $10,000 would be paid by a note. The seller agreed, and ac-
tively worked in the buyers’ behalf to arrange financing for the
buyer so that he would be able to pay the $90,000 in cash. This
transaction was reduced to writing in a document entitled “Com-
promise Agreement.” While this agreement made no direct
reference to the option agreement, the following clauses from the
compromise agreement are pertinent to our analysis:

“PURPOSE:

“The purpose of this agreement is to set forth the
terms and conditions under which the parties agree to
compromise and satisfy that certain Contract For Deed
dated August 22, 1969, as amended by the Addendum to
the Contract For Deed dated April 16, 1970, both of
which are attached hereto and by this reference incor-
porated herein.”

* * * * * *

“COMPLETE PERFORMANCE:

“Performance of the terms of this agreement by the
parties hereto shall be deemed full and complete perfor-
mance of all obligations by the parties to said Contract
and Addendum and shall be deemed payment in full of
said Contract and Addendum.”

As noted above, the seller subsequently sought a declaratory
judgment to the effect that the option agreement had been com-
promised by the compromise agreement. The buyer, after making
tender, sought specific performance of the option agreement on
the grounds that the compromise agreement had not com-
promised the option agreement.

The trial court found that the option agreement had not been
abrogated because it felt that the language in the compromise
agreement did not allow for abrogation. Furthermore, it found

584

that there was no ambiguity on the face of the compromise agree-
ment which would allow extraneous evidence to explain it.

Following the entry of the judgment, plaintiff moved for a
new trial, relying, among other things, on the ground that a
release discovered after the trial constituted newly discovered
evidence. The trial court entered an order denying plaintiff's mo-
tion for a new trial and plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff assigns error to the trial court’s findings of fact that
the option agreement was an agreement separate from the con-
tract for deed. Plaintiff asserts that the option agreement was ex-
ecuted on the same day as the contract for deed, by the same
parties, and dealt with the same subject matter; therefore, they
conclude that the contract for deed, which makes reference to the
option in the “Existing Easements” clause, incorporates the op-
tion into the contract for deed by reference. As part of that con-
tract for deed, plaintiff contends that the option was com-
promised by the compromise agreement.

Hi Where [there are] several contracts relating to the same
matters, between the same parties and made as parts of the same
transaction, they should be considered together and treated as
one contract.” Rasmussen v. Hodges, 1927, 52 S.D. 100, 102, 216
N.W. 862, 863. In construing the writings together, however, it is
the intent of the parties that is controlling; the rule is employed
for that purpose only, and will not be applied where to do so
would be contrary to the intent of the parties or would ignore the
realities of the situation. First Trust & Savings Bank v. McVeigh,
1926, 50 S.D. 604, 211 N.W. 446; Four-Three-O-Six Duncan Corp. v.
Security Trust Co., 1963, Mo., 372 S.W.2d 16. There must be some
reasonable basis for finding that the parties intended that the
two instruments constitute but one contract. We find a lack of
such a reasonable basis in this instance.

Hf Although the two instruments under consideration were
executed at the same time, and involved the same parties, they
pertain to the same subject matter only in the general sense that
they both relate to the sale of real property. Each instrument con-
tains a description of separate pieces of property. Additional

evidence that the intent was to create separate contracts is evi-
dent from the fact that each recites separate consideration and
provides for performance on different dates. See Elliott v.
Richter, 1978, Mo., 496 S.W.2d 860. The trial court accordingly
entered its finding of fact that separate agreements were in-
volved. “We are not at liberty to overrule a factual finding by the
trial court unless it is clearly erroneous.” Richter v. Industrial
Finance Company, Inc., 1974, 88 S.D. 466, 221 N.W.2d 31, 35. We
find no clear error on this issue. See also, Northwestern Nat.
Bank of Sioux Falls v. Brandon, 1974, 88 S.D. 453, 221 N.W.2d 12;
SDCL 15-6-52(a),

Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to
admit parol evidence to disclose the true nature of the transac-
tion. The argument is that the reference to the option agreement
in the contract for deed, coupled with the compromise of the con-
tract for deed, creates a latent ambiguity that permits the in-
troduction of parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity in accord
with the intent of the parties. The trial court found no ambiguity
in the language of the instruments, and refused to consider parol
evidence. We also find a lack of ambiguity.

HH “Language in a contract may be said to be ambiguous
when ‘it is reasonably capable of being understood in more than
one sense.’ ” Jones v. American Oil Co., 1973, 87 S.D. 384, 387, 209
N.W.2d 1, 3, citing Newton v. Erickson, 1950, 73 S.D. 228, 41
N.W.2d 545. In determining whether a contract contains an am-
biguity, however, provisions will not be examined in isolation. “It
is a fundamental rule of contract construction that the entire con-
tract and each and all of its parts and provisions must be given
meaning if that can consistently and reasonably be done.” Dail v.
Vodicka, 1975, 89 S.D. 600, 287 N.W.2d 7, 9; Jones v. American Oil
Co., supra. Considering the contract for deed as a whole, it is clear
from the face of the instrument what property constituted the
subject matter of the agreement. The property is specifically
described, the consideration is specified, and an allocation of the
consideration is made to the property described. The only
reference to the option is in the “Existing Easements” clause, set
out earlier in this opinion. When this clause is read in conjunction
with the rest of the contract, it can be seen that the clause is in-

0

tended to do what its caption indicates—describe an existing
easement. To find that this clause incorporated the option agree-
ment is to ignore the plain meaning of the words on the face of the
instrument. The compromise agreement is likewise clear on its
face; no intent to include the option agreement is evident. After
examining all instruments in question, we do not find that they
are capable of being understood in more than one sense. Each is
clear on its face and is presumed to reflect the intent of the
parties. Brooks, Inc. v. Brooks, 1972, 86 S.D. 676, 201 N.W.2d 128.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly refused to
consider parol evidence.

Plaintiff next assigns error to the trial court’s denial of a mo-
tion for new trial. Plaintiff asserts that a release found after the
trial constitutes newly discovered evidence. The trial court found
that the release was not newly discovered evidence and that even
if such evidence were considered by the court, it would not alter
or modify the judgment.

Hl Applications for new trial are governed by SDCL
15-6-59(a); subsection (4) of that section provides for a new trial
based upon “Newly discovered evidence, material to the party
making the application, which he could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial.” As this
court held in Byre v. Wieczorek, 1974, 88 S.D. 185, 217 N.W.2d
151, 159:

“A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and the court’s decision in
granting or refusing the same will not be disturbed upon
appeal by the appellate court unless it appears affir-
matively from the record that there has been an abuse
of such discretion.”

We have considered the record and the various arguments made
by plaintiff and can find no such abuse. See Basin Electric Power
Cooperative v. Gosch, 1976, 90 S.D. 222, 240 N.W.2d 96; Wieland
v. Loon, 1962, 79 S.D. 608, 116 N.W.2d 391.

After considering plaintiff's various assignments of error,

Po
we find no prejudicial error has been committed. For all the
reasons stated herein, we find that the trial court ruled correctly

and the judgment of that court is affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., coneur.
a

STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, Appellant v.
EMRY et ux, Respondents

(244 N.W.2d 91)

(File No. 11603. Opinion filed July 2, 1976)

Camron D. Hoseck, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and ap-

5

pellant; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Carl W. Quist, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.

Joseph M. Butler, Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Sim-
mons, Rapid City, Robert D. Hofer, Stephens, Riter, Mayer &
Hofer, Pierre, for defendants and respondents.

COLER, Justice.

This case comes to us upon a stipulation of facts which was
presented to the trial court in eminent domain proceedings taken
pursuant to SDCL 31-19. The parties stipulated to the total
amount of damages, both for land actually taken and for conse-
quential damages to the remainder. They also stipulated as to the
amount of the enhanced value to the remainder which was to bea
setoff against the total if that benefit was found by the trial court
to be a special benefit. The trial court awarded $75,000 damages
with $50,000 being designated as payment for the land taken and
$25,000 as damages to the remainder. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.

The stipulation of facts appears as follows:

“y

“This is a condemnation action for a highway pro-
ject involving the defendants’ property. The taking in
this case eliminates an off-ramp which presently takes
westbound traffic past the defendants’ place of business
(a service station, gift shop and cafe) and on to the Bad-
lands National Monument.

“IT

“The project, when completed, will contain a full
diamond interchange which will route the westbound
traffic directly off the interstate to the Badlands Na-
tional Monument over such interchange.

“TI

“The defendants own the two south quadrants of
the proposed diamond interchange.

“IV

“The parties agree that the amount of just compen-
sation due the defendants is the sum of Fifty-Five Thou-
sand Dollars ($55,000.00) if the benefits resulting to the
two south quadrants are determined to be special
benefits as against general benefits. Conversely, if the
benefits accruing to the two south quadrants are held to
be general benefits rather than special benefits, the
parties agree that the amount of just compensation due
the defendants is the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand
Dollars ($75,000.00).

“y

“The north two quadrants of the proposed diamond
interchange are owned by the United States govern-
ment and will be enhanced in value to the same extent
as the south two quadrants owned by the defendants.
The parties further agree that the land adjoining the
highway on either side of the proposed quadrants of the
interchange will also be enhanced in value but to a
lesser degree than the land closest to the off-ramps of
the proposed diamond interchange.

* * * * * *
“VIII

“The taking of right-of-way and temporary con-
struction easements are shown in the Resolution of
Necessity and the Petition and Declaration of Taking on
file herein.

589

590
“TX

“Counsel for the respective parties will provide any
additional information and briefs as may be desired by
the Court to determine the issue of whether the benefits
resulting to the two south quadrants of the diamond
interchange are special benefits or general benefits.”

Paragraphs VI and VII of the stipulation, identifying various
colored lines used on Exhibit 1 to describe the different aspects of
the taking and construction, are omitted in reproducing the ex-
hibit. As can be seen in the exhibit the two sections of land owned
by respondents are outlined, and the present buildings which
have been used by respondents in connection with retail
businesses, i.e., service station, gift shop and cafe, appear in the
lower right. Exhibit 1 appears as follows:

We also relate certain other limited factors reflected in the
briefs of the parties which are supported by the record. The con-
struction project involves a portion of Interstate 90 running
diagonally through respondents’ land in a northwesterly to south-

Ss

easterly direction. A full diamond interchange, as set forth in the
plans and specifications, gives access to the section line highway
running north and south between Section 25, Township 2 South,
Range 18 East and Section 30, Township 2 South, Range 19 East
of the Black Hills Meridian, Jackson County, South Dakota; both
of which are owned by respondents. This project terminates the
preexisting off-ramp which brought westbound traffic choosing
to tour the Badlands by way of alternate U.S. Highway 16 past
respondents’ places of business. The new interchange will allow
either east or westbound traffic to enter onto the relocated por-
tion of alternate Highway 16, the only major highway going
through that scenic area of the state. It is the anticipated in-
crease in traffic past the two south quadrants of the interchange
which appellant claims enhances the value of those two quadrants
and thus constitutes a special benefit to respondents.

Appellant in its brief states:

“Because this case was submitted on stipulated
facts, usual problems do not exist as to proof of damages
or whether proffers thereof should have been admitted
into evidence. Just compensation is to be $55,000 if
special benefits are found to have accrued to the two
south quadrants, $75,000 if the benefits are not deter-
mined to be special. By stipulation it is shown that
monetary enhancement exists if, as a matter of defini-
tion, special benefits are found to exist. Therefore, the
criteria of increased market value set forth in State v.
Bloom is met by said stipulation of facts. The effect of
this is to then confine the issue to one of definition.”

Regardless of how it is phrased, the issues raised by this appeal
include not only a definition of terms, but also whether there was
sufficient evidence before the trial court upon which a determina-
tion might be made that the benefits agreed to are either
“general” or “special,” as a matter of law.

The trial court, by its holding, did not reach the question of a
definition of general and special benefits. Based upon the stipula-
tion of facts, which effectively waives findings of fact and conclu-

50

sions of law, RCP Rule 52(b), the trial court held, as evidenced by
its memorandum opinion, that:

“I conclude that the fact that the property of
defendants was enhanced in value by the construction of
an interstate highway interchange does not establish
that the highway construction resulted in a special
benefit to the property. Upon the stipulation filed by the
parties, the defendant is entitled to judgment in the
amount of $75,000.”

The rationale for this holding is reflected by a further quotation
taken from the trial court’s memorandum opinion:

“In Darnall v. State, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201, the
Court held that a small businessman, whose access to
highway traffic was cut off by the interstate highway
suffered no legal damage due to the fact that the
highway diverted traffic away from his place of
business. It seems to me that the converse of the rule an-
nounced in that case would apply to the issue posed by
this case. If loss of traffic and resulting decrease in prop-
erty value is not a special detriment justifying compen-
sation, then increase in traffic past property with a
resulting enhancement in value would not be a special
benefit permitting a setoff.”

Darnall v. State, 1961, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201, does not,
as recognized by this court in Hurley v. State, 1966, 82 S.D. 156,
143 N.W.2d 722, stand for the proposition that a businessman is
absolutely barred from recovery of damages for deprivation of ac-
cess to a highway upon which his business depends. In Darnall v.
State, supra, the plaintiffs were not owners of land abutting the
highway to which they were being denied access. On the other
hand, in Hurley v. State, supra, the interest of the owners of abut-
ting property and their right to damages for loss of access was
established. The right of access of an abutting owner is
predicated upon the presumption of ownership to the center of
the way under SDCL 43-16-38. See also SDCL 31-19-1; Cuka v.
State, 1963, 80 S.D. 232, 122 N.W.2d 83 and SDCL 31-19-60. As the

po

rule relied upon by the trial court was erroneous, we must
analyze the issues of sufficiency of the evidence and the distinc-
tion between general and special damages.! A rule of law of such
importance to the public cannot be formulated on the scant
evidence in this record. As stated in Nichols on Eminent Domain
at § 8.62:

“When a portion of a tract is taken by eminent do-
main for a use which is beneficial to the remainder of the
tract, the question arises whether such benefit can be
considered in determining the amount of compensation,
and if so, to what extent. Upon this subject there is a
great diversity of opinion and more rules, different from
and inconsistent with each other, have been laid down
than upon any other point in the law of eminent
domain.”

That diversity of opinion is equally apparent from a reading of
the exhaustive annotations at 13 A.L.R.3d 1149. See also 27
Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 357 to 371, 374. In the final
analysis, the determination must hinge upon the constitutional
and statutory provisions of each state.

The South Dakota Constitution Article VI, Section 13 pro-
vides as follows:

“§ 13. Private property shall not be taken for public
use, or damaged, without just compensation, which will
be determined according to legal procedure established
by the Legislature and according to § 6 of this article.
No benefit which may accrue to the owner as the result
of an improvement made by any private corporation

1. A corollary question is whether the provisions of SDCL 31-19-49 apply and, if
so, to what extent relocation assistance might be afforded to the respondents:
“31-19-49. When federal funds are available for payment of direct financial
assistance to persons displaced by highway acquisition, the department of
transportation, boards of county commissioners or county highway boards may
match such federal funds to the extent provided by federal law as of July 1, 1971
and provide such direct finaneial assistance in the instances and on the condi-
tions set forth by federal law and regulations as of July 1, 1971.
“This section and § 31-19-49.1 shall apply to all persons displaced by highway
acquisition subsequent to January 2, 1971.”

shall be considered in fixing the compensation for prop-
erty taken or damaged. The fee of land taken for
railroad tracks or other highways shall remain in such
owners, subject to the use for which it is taken.”

Pertinent to the general concept of off-setting special benefits it
is to be observed that in addition to the provisions of Article VI,
Section 13 there are the somewhat duplicitous provisions of Arti-
cle XVII, Section 18:

“Municipal and other corporations and individuals
invested with the privilege of taking private property
for public use shall make just compensation for property
taken, injured or destroyed, by the construction or
enlargement of their works, highways or improvements,
which compensation shall be paid or secured before such
taking, injury or destruction. The Legislature is hereby
prohibited from depriving any person of an appeal from
any preliminary assessment of damages against any
such corporation or individuals made by viewers or
otherwise; and the amount of such damages in all cases
of appeal shall, on the demand of either party, be deter-
mined by a jury as in other civil cases.”

Antedating both of the foregoing constitutional provisions the
legislature has mandated, since the adoption of Chapter 94 of the
Session Laws of 1891, without differentiating between general
and special benefits, that the jury is to consider benefits in cases
involving condemnation by a municipal corporation. SDCL
21-85-17 provides that:

“In all cases of taking or damaging private property
by a municipal corporation, the jury shall take into con-
sideration the benefits which may accrue to the owner
thereof as the result of the proposed improvement.”

In enacting, by Chapter 113 of the Session Laws of 1939, the first
comprehensive act setting forth the procedure to be followed in
highway condemnation actions, the legislature obviously borrow-
ed from the text of SDCL 21-35-17 in the language of what is now

SDCL 31-19-17? reading as follows:

“31-19-17. In all cases of taking or damaging prop-
erty, the jury shall take into consideration the benefits
which may accrue to the owner thereof as the result of
the proposed improvement.”

The legislature also repeated the text of SDCL 21-35-18, to-wit:

“21-35-18. If the compensation for all the property
taken or damaged is ascertained by the jury upon one
trial, they shall ascertain and return in their verdict the
compensation to be paid for each distinct lot or parcel of
land or property taken or damaged.”

in identical language in what is now SDCL 31-19-16.

This court, in Highway Commission v. Bloom, 1958, 77 S.D.
452, 93 N.W.2d 572, recognized the general rule relating to
general and special benefits which may be taken into considera-
tion in condemnation cases. The context in which the rule was
considered is evidenced by the following quotation from that
case:

“The State requested an instruction as to benefits
in this language taken for the most part from SDC Supp.
28.18A09: ‘In all cases of taking or damaging property,
the jury shall take into consideration the benefits which

We observe that neither SDCL 21-35-17 nor 31-19-17 has been constitutionally
challenged and no challenge has been made by the parties herein. It is of in-
terest to note that the editors of Nichols on Eminent Domain have overlooked
these statutory provisions and have taken out of context certain parts of our
constitution, wherein they state, at § 8.6211[42]:

“By the constitution of South Dakota (citing S.D.Const. Art. VI, § 13) it is pro-

vided that ‘no benefit which may accrue to the owner as the result of any im-
provement, made by any private corporation shall be considered in fixing the
compensation for any property taken or damaged.’ Nevertheless, it has been
held that special benefits may be set off against consequential damages to the
remainder area, but not against the value of the part taken.” (citing State
Highway Commission v. Bloom, supra) and, further, at § 8.6208, that:
“in Arkansas, California, Iowa and South Carolina, it has been held that benefits
cannot be considered at all, and the same result would seem to follow necessari-
ly from the phraseology of the constitutions of Oklahoma and South Dakota.”
Our review of the constitutional provisions and related statutes in those states
leads us to no such conclusion.

596 Pt

may accrue to the owner thereof as the result of the pro-
posed improvement.’ [Now SDCL 31-19-17] Under this
rule the benefits which may be taken into consideration
are not those which may inure to the community in
general or to the public in common, but must be those
benefits which inure to the owner as to the part of the
property not taken proximately resulting from the im-
provement and which are of such a nature as to increase
the market value of that part of the property not taken.
18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, §§ 297-301; Annotation,
145 A.L.R. 7, at page 40; Lineburg v. Sandven, 74 N.D.
364, 21 N.W.2d 808. It will be noted that the statute
refers to ‘benefits’, but under the provisions of Article
VI, Section 18, of the South Dakota Constitution requir-
ing just compensation to be paid for private property
taken or damaged for public use, it would not be just to
charge an owner whose land is taken for a general
benefit received by the public in common. There was no
evidence of special benefits to the land not taken. The
Court properly rejected the requested instruction.” 77
S.D. at 459, 93 N.W.2d at 576.

It is apparent, from reading Highway Commission v. Bloom,
supra, that an explicit definition of special as against general
benefits was not undertaken. It was unnecessary to do so in that
case since there was no evidence of special benefits to the land
not taken.

HBA definition or classification of special benefits within the
meaning of SDCL 21-35-17 or 31-19-17 and Highway Commission
v. Bloom, supra, is, as appellant states, one of first impression
before this court. Rather than attempt to rely upon the reasoning
of other courts leading to divergent results we hold that for
benefits to be deemed special, the benefit to the remaining prop-
erty must be different in kind from that of any other owner in-
volved in the highway improvement and that, though the benefits
to various landowners affected may differ in degree, it is not the
degree of benefit that controls. This holding necessarily follows
from our prior holdings defining the term “special” for the pur-
poses of distinguishing between general and special damages

597

recoverable in eminent domain proceedings. See SDCL 2-14-1;
Hyde v. M., D. & P. Ry. Co., 1912, 29 S.D. 220, 186 N.W. 92, 40
L.R.A. (N.S.) 48; Darnall v. State, supra, and Hurley v. State,
supra.

Because the language of SDCL 21-35-17 and 31-19-17, as
necessarily construed by this court in Highway Commission v.
Fortune, 1958, 77 S.D. 302, 91 N.W.2d 675, limits the jury to
awarding a lump sum for all damages (see Pattern Jury Instruc-
tion (Civil) 141.05 and discussion thereon in Neb. Elec. Gen. &
Trans. Co-op v. Tinant, 1976, 90 S.D. 284, 241 N.W.2d 134 and Neb.
Elec. Gen. & Trans. Co-op v. Markus, 1976, 90 S.D. 238, 241
N.W.2d 142), we would commend to the legislature for their con-
sideration the provisions of N.D.C.C. § 32-15-22 and the Hawaii
statute, Hawaii 101-23¢, either of which would, as contrasted to

8. 82-15-22. The jury, or court, or referee, if a jury is waived, must hear such legal
testimony as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings and
thereupon must ascertain and assess:

1. The value of the property sought to be condemned and all im-
provements thereon pertaining to the realty and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein. If it consists of different parcels, the
value of each parcel and each estate and interest therein shall be
separately assessed;

2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to
be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of-the improvement in the manner pro-
posed by the plaintiff;

3. If the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by
the construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such
damages;

4. If the property is taken or damaged by the state or a public corpora-
tion, separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned and
each estate or interest therein will be benefited, if at all, by the construc-
tion of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff, and if the benefit shall
be equal to the damages assessed under subsections 2 and 3, the owner of
the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the por-
tion taken, but if the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed
the former shall be deducted from the latter and the remainder shall be
the only damages allowed in addition to the value of the portion taken;
5. As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed separately for
property actually taken and for damages to that which is not taken.

4. In part, § 101-23 of the Hawaii Code reads as follows:

“In fixing the compensation or damages to he paid for the condemnation
of any property, the value of the property sought to be condemned with
all improvements thereon shall be assessed, and if any of the im-
provements are separately owned, the value thereof shall be separately
assessed. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a por-
tion of a larger tract, the damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion
sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvements in the

our present law, materially aid both the trial court and the jury in
arriving at just compensation not only for the purposes of the
unit rule of severance damages but also for the purposes of
special benefits.

[i The parties have, in essence, stipulated that the two sec-
tions of land involved constituted a unit notwithstanding that
segments of the property were devoted to two apparently
distinct uses. Principally the land is used in ranching. That por-
tion formerly fronting on the access road to the Badlands Na-
tional Monument has been used for commercial purposes. There
is considerable division of opinion as to whether or not such
distinct uses could be considered as a unit. Nichols on Eminent
Domain §§ 8.6201, 8.6210[1]. In light of our decision in Highway
Commission v. Bloom, supra, more evidence than is in the present
record must be presented in the trial court to resolve that ques-
tion.

The stipulation and the record before this court, not having
dealt with issues of damages for the loss of access, relocation

assistance, unity of use or difference in kind of benefits to
respondents and others affected, further evidence must be taken
for an ultimate determination of the issues in this case.

manner proposed by the plaintiff shall also be assessed, and also how
much the portion not sought to be condemned will be specifically
benefited, if at all, by the construction of the improvement proposed by
the plaintiff. If the benefit shall be equal to the amount of compensation
assessed for the property taken, and for damages by reason of its
severance from another portion of the same tract, then the owner shall
be allowed no compensation, but if the benefits shall be less than the
amount so assessed as damages or compensation, then the former shall
be deducted from the latter and the remainder shall be the amount
awarded as compensation or damages. *** If condemnation is for the
purpose of widening or realigning any existing highway or other public
road, the owner of the property condemned shall be entitled to full com-
pensation for the property actually taken and special benefits shall be
considered only insofar as the value of the benefits shall not exceed the
damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plain-
tiff. That is, if the special benefits shall be equal to the severance
damages, then the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation
except the value of the portion taken, but if the special benefits shall be
less than the severance damages, then the former shall be deducted from
the latter and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addi-
tion to the value of the land taken.”

599

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DUNN, C, J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

MC DONALD, Respondent v. SCH. BD. OF YANKTON
IND. SCH. DIST. NO. 1 OF YANKTON, et al., Appellants

(246 N.W.2d 93)
(File No. 11550. Opinion filed July 9, 1976)

Rehearing Denied September 20, 1976

oS

601

John R. Kabeiseman, Brady, Kabeiseman, Light & Reade,
Yankton, for petitioner and relator, respondent.

William P. Fuller and John E. Simko, Woods, Fuller, Shultz
& Smith, Sioux Falls, for respondents and appellants.

COLER, Justice.

The petitioner in this proceeding in mandamus, on behalf of
his minor son and 152 other persons similarly situated, seeks to
compel the appellant school board and members thereof to
budget for and make available textbooks to students of a non-
public school within the district pursuant to SDCL 13-34-16 and
13-34-16.1. The writ of mandamus was issued by the trial court
which found the statutes to be constitutional under both the
federal and state constitutions, and respondent has appealed. We
reverse.

The appellants challenged both in the trial court and in this
court the constitutionality of the statutes under the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, which was made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 1943, 319 U.S. 105, 108, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87

02

L.Ed.2d 1292; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1940, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60
S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed.2d 1213.

They have further challenged the constitutionality thereof
under the provisions of S.D. Constitution Article VI, § 3, and Arti-
cle VIII, § 16.

The legislature, by amendment to SDCL 13-34-16 by Session
Laws of 1973, Chapter 100, and Session Laws of 1974, Chapter
184, §1, together with the provisions of SDCL 13-34-16.1 first
enacted in 1973 by the same Chapter 100, and subsequently
amended by Session Laws of 1974, Chapter 134, § 2, has clearly
set forth its intent, in unambiguous terms, that school districts of
this state are directed to loan books at their own cost to non-
public school students as follows:

“13-34-16. All textbooks shall be loaned free to all
public and nonpublic school students in grades one
through twelve who are enrolled in schools which are
supervised in accordance with chapter 18-4. The public
school board in each district shall ascertain what text-
books are needed by such students in the district from
time to time and shall order the same and shall furnish
such books upon request.

“13-34-16.1. Textbooks loaned to children enrolled
in a nonpublic school shall be textbooks which are ap-
proved by a public school board for use, whether actual-
ly used or not, in the particular public school district
wherein such nonpublic school is located or in the par-
ticular public school district of which the nonpublic
school student is a resident. Textbooks loaned by any
public school district to nonpublic school students shall
not exceed in value fifteen dollars per nonpublic schoc:
student in any single school year. Such values shall be
determined by the public school district required to fur-
nish the textbooks. The obligation provided herein as to
nonpublic school students shall be the obligation of the
public school district in which such nonpublic school stu-
dent is a resident.”

This court in Haas v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1 of Yankton, 1948,
69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707, in construing the predecessor statute,
SDC 15.1706, determined that the then existing statutory provi-
sion did not purport to make textbooks available to students of
nonpublic schools and thus avoided the determination of the con-
stitutional issue presented here. It is obvious from the legislative
enactments and the history thereof that the legislature made no
attempt to overcome that decision until well after the United
States Supreme Court decision of Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060, was handed down in
1968.

The latest amendments to SDCL 13-34-16 and 13-34-16.1 in-
dicate a heavy reliance on the provisions of New York statutes!

1. _Inpart, the then existing provisions of the New York Statute Education Law,
§ 701, as construed in Board of Education v. Allen, read as follows:

“1. In the several cities and school districts of the state, boards of education,
trustees or such body or officer as perform the functions of such boards, shall
designate text-books to be used in the schools under their charge.

“2. A text-book, for the purposes of this section shall mean a book which a pupil
is required to use as a text for a semester or more in a particular class in the
school he legally attends.

“3. In the several cities and school districts of the state, boards of education,
trustees or such body or officers as perform the function of such boards shall
have the power and duty to purchase and to loan upon individual request, to all
children residing in such district who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve ofa
public or private school which complies with the compulsory education law,
text-books. Text-books loaned to children enrolled in grades seven to twelve of
said private schools shall be text-books which are designated for use in any
public, elementary or seeondary schools of the state or are approved by any

ards of education, trustees or other school authorities. Such text-books are to
be loaned free to such children subject to such rules and regulations as are or
may be prescribed by the board of regents and such boards of education,
trustees or other school authorities.

“4, No school district shall, during the school year nineteen hundred sixty-
six—sixty-seven, the school year nineteen hundred sixty-seven —sixty-eight or
the school year nineteen hundred sixty-eight—sixty-nine be required to pur-
chase or otherwise acquire textbooks, pursuant to this section, the cost of which
shall exceed an amount equal to fifteen dollars multiplied by the number of
children residing in such district who on the first day of October of such school
year are enrolled in grades seven through twelve of a public or private school
which complies with the compulsory education law, or in any subsequent school
year be required to purchase or otherwise acquire textbooks, the cost of which
shall exceed an amount equal to ten dollars multiplied by the number of children
residing in such district and so enrolled on the first day of October of such
subsequent school year; and no school district shall be required to loan text-
books in excess of the textbooks owned or acquired by such district; provided,
however that all textbooks owned or acquired by such district shall be loaned to
children residing in the district and so enrolled in grades seven through twelve
in public and private schools on an equitable basis. :

“5. In the several cities and school districts of the state, boards of education,

5
which were upheld in Board of Education v. Allen, supra.

An analysis of South Dakota statutes relating to school text-
books, SDCL 13-34, which has been significantly amended in re-
cent years, leaves little language pertaining to that subject.
While there are significant differences between the South Dakota
statutes and those of New York, it would appear sufficient
language was adopted by our legislature to accomplish the in-
tended result if the statutes could be held constitutional. While
the school district itself determines what textbooks it will use,
with review preserved by the state board of education, SDCL
13-34-11, that section and the statutes under consideration herein
are all that remain of a once detailed chapter dealing with text-
books.

The trial court’s memorandum decision and findings of fact
do not reflect, nor does the record before us establish, whether
the costs of textbooks are borne by the students or parents of
students, or whether those costs are borne by the sectarian in-
stitution. The fact of the burden falling upon the parents was
found present in both Board of Education v. Allen, supra, and in
Meek v. Pittenger, 1975, 421 U.S. 349, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 44 L.Ed.2d
217. Both of these cases, in keeping with earlier decisions of that
court, see Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 1930,
281 U.S. 370, 50 S.Ct. 335, 74 L.Ed. 913, have acknowledged that
loans of state-owned textbooks to students of sectarian schools
constitutes permissible involvement of church and state under
the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution, provided
the tests therein established have been met by state statute.

HE We do not determine whether the lack of a finding that
the parents bear the cost of textbooks or, as also alleged by the
appellants, the lack of the legislative policy statement? renders

trustees or other school authorities may purchase supplies and either rent, sell
or loan the same to the pupils attending the public schools in such cities and
school districts upon such terms and under such rules and regulations as may be
prescribed by such boards of education, trustees or other school authorities.”

2. The appellants have challenged the statutes in question in that, while they are
patterned after the statutes of New York, there was no policy statement accom-
panying, as was done in New York.

By way of example, the provisions of Section 1 of Chapter 320 of the Laws of

ee TE“

the provisions of our law void under the tests established in
Board of Education v. Allen, supra, and Meek v. Pittenger, supra,
as we determine the provisions of our own state constitution are
controlling.

Hf Mindful of the decisions of this court which have con-
sidered the provisions of S.D.Const. Art. VI, §3 and Art. VIII,
§ 16, namely Synod of Dakota v. State, 1891, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W.
632; Hlebanja v. Brewe, 1931, 58 S.D. 351, 236 N.W. 296; Haas v.
Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Yankton, supra, and South
Dakota High School Inter-Scholastic Activities Association v. St.
Mary’s Inter-Parochial School of Salem, 1966, 82 S.D. 84, 141
N.W.2d 477, we have nevertheless considered in depth recent
decisions of courts of other states, as well as the differing con-
stitutional provisions of those states, in which there has been ac-
tivity in the way of either constitutional amendments or statutes,
or both, to accomplish some acceptable mode of giving aid to non-
public schools. We do not doubt the motives of the legislature of
this state in attempting to do equity, considering the pressing
and ever-increasing financial demands on both the public and
private schools and the burden it places on taxpayers, with a dual
burden on parents of children in the nonpublic schools. We are

New York 1965, reads as follows:

“Section 1. Statement of policy. The security and welfare of the nation
require the fullest development of the mental resources and skills of its
youth, This calls for more adequate educational opportunities and in-
creased efforts to educate more of the talent of our nation and requirin;
the correction of those imbalances in our educational progéams whicl
have led to an insufficient proportion of our population educated in the
fields of science, mathematics, foreign languages and other nonsectarian
subjects. The Congress of the United States has reaffirmed the principle
that the states and local communities retain primary responsibility for
public education. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state
that the public welfare and safety require that the state and local com-
munities give assistance to educational programs which are important to
our national defense and the general welfare of the state.”

The failure of the legislative enactment to set forth a statement of policy we do
not consider as significant since it is a practice not generally followed in this
state. It is the accepted rule of statutory construction in this state that the act
itself must reflect the legislative intent and while preambles or recitals are en-
titled to great weight, they are not binding on this court. Clem v. City of
Yankton, 1968, 83 S.D. 386, 160 N.W.2d 125. A preamble may be looked to to
resolve ambiguities as was recognized by this court in Culhane v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of U.S., 1937, 65 S.D. 337, 274 N.W. 315. Ci. also 82 C.J.S. Statutes
§ 349; 1A Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 4th Bd., § 20.13.

‘As we have stated in the opinion the statute is unambiguous and therefore
such a policy statement is unnecessary for the purpose of construction.

606

not, however, concerned with the wisdom of the legislation, State
v. Nuss, 1962, 79 S.D. 522, 114 N.W.2d 633, but only with its con-
stitutionality.

HMB It has long been the rule of this court that:

“When considering the constitutionality of any
statute there is a presumption of validity and no statute
should be held unconstitutional ‘unless its infringement
of constitutional restrictions is so plain and palpable to
admit of no reasonable doubt’, State v. Black Hills
Transportation, 71 S.D. 28, 20 N.W.2d 683.” In re
Hinesley, 1967, 82 S.D. 552, 150 N.W.2d 834.

Furthermore, as it concerns the power of the legislature, this
court has long recognized that:

“The constitution is not a grant but a limitation upon the
lawmaking power of the state legislature and it may
enact any law not expressly or inferentially prohibited
by state and federal constitutions.” Kramar v. Bon
Homme County, 1968, 83 S.D. 112, 155 N.W.2d 777.

Il We have diligently reviewed the history of our constitu-
tional provisions * and compared them with other states and have

3. Because of this court's well established rule that_a statute is presumed con-
stitutional, we have rigorously researched available history of the 1883, 1885
and 1889 constitutional conventions to determine if the framers of our constitu-
tion, by the language of S.D.Const. Art. VI, §3, Art. VIII, § 16, intended to
establish provisions which are either more restrictive than, or equally restric-
tive to, the restrictions imposed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Respective counsel for both parties have presented commendable
briefs that reflect, however, what our research confirms, that there is no
history, nor is there any indication of constitutional provisions of any other
state having been utilized, to show prior origin which would indicate that the
framers of our constitution relied on anything other than their own concepts
and that they obviously were not parroting the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution. A close comparison of the provisions of Article VI,

3 with its predecessors, Article II, §§ 2 and 8 of the Constitution of 1883 and

rticle VI, fe of the 1889 Constitution and Article VIII, § 16 with Article VIL,
§9 of the 1883 constitutional proposal which became Article VIII, § 16 of the
1889 Constitution fails to disclose that any material changes were made in the
subject matter of these two constitutional provisions that might signify that the
members of the constitutional convention of 1889 felt any compulsion to con-
form this state's constitution to the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution which they could well have done under the first and fourth para-

Se

also analyzed recent opinions of other state courts on the iden-
tical subject. To a large extent we have gone through the same
exercise as has the Nebraska Supreme Court as reflected in Gaff-
ney v. State Department of Education, 1974, 192 Neb. 358, 220
N.W.2d 550. Although the history behind the provisions of Art.
VII, § 11, of the Constitution of Nebraska has been preserved as
set forth at 220 N.W.2d 553, we are not so fortunate. As reflected
in the editor’s notes, certain portions of the manuscript covering
8.D.Const. Art. III, §§ 2, 3, 4 and 5 were not available for publica-
tion as authorized by S.L.1907, Ch. 98 (see S.D. Constitutional
Debates, Vol. I, p. 281). Considering the very active participation
in the 1883, 1885 and 1889 constitutional conventions by one
Alphonso G. Kellam of Brule County, who also served as one of
the three members of this court from 1889 to 1896, the likelihood
of misapprehension of the purpose to be served by the state con-
stitutional provisions by either the same A. G. Kellam, the then
presiding judge of this court, or either of the other two members
of the court is too remote to be seriously entertained. Therefore,
we must recognize that the holding of this court in Synod of
Dakota v. State, supra, to the effect that the provisions of Art. VI,
§ 3 and Art. VIII, § 16 are “self-executing,” and that these provi-
sions are expressions of the framers of the constitution “to pro-
hibit in every form, whether as a gift or otherwise, the appropria-
tion of the public funds for the benefit of or to aid any sectarian
school or institution.” 2 S.D. at 373-374, 50 N.W. at 635.4 Those

raphs of this state's compact with the United States as reflected in $.D.Const.
rt, XXII. Certainly the Omnibus Bill (25 Statutes at Large 676, SDCL Vol. 1
pp. 183 et seq.) which created and prescribed the powers of the 1889 conven-
tions, so often recognized as a limitation on the convention's deliberations (see
South Dakota Debates 1889 pp. 70-76, 101, 102, 316, 319, 324, 334-366, 401-403,
429-445, 449), neither required retention of the preexisting provisions nor
denied their modification had the convention so elected. There is therefore no
evidence to offset this court's prior decision as to intent of the framers as de-
fined in Synod of Dakota v. State, supra, and while it may have been un-
necessary to the decision in Hlebanja v. Brewe, 1931, 58 S.D. 351; 236 N.W. 296,
the statement therein to the effect that Synod of Dakota v. State, supra, left
little if any constitutional question undetermined is still a’ most appropriate
statement.
4, While it is true, as noted in the dissent of Chief Justice Dunn, that this court,
in Synod of Dakota v. State, 1891, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632, had under considera-
tion Chapter 1, Laws of 1890, which established a system for direct payment to
sectarian schools for training teachers, it is significant that the 1890 act was
declared unconstitutional on the basis of our state Constitution and not under
the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Cf. Roemer et al. v.
Board of Publie Works of Maryland et al, 1976, 426 U.S. 736, 96 S.Ct, 2857, 48
.Ed.2d a

08

provisions of our constitution though not identical to any other
state constitution are not mere reiterations of the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution but are more restrictive
as prohibiting aid “in every form.”

Respondents further claim that Synod of Dakota v. State,
supra, is distinguishable from the present case in that that case
dealt with payment of funds to a sectarian institution, while the
statutes here involved only authorize a loan of textbooks. We con-
strue Synod of Dakota v. State, supra, as consistent with the
holding of the Nebraska Supreme Court on construing a similar
constitutional provision that such a contention of indirect benefit
“ignores substance for form, reality for rhetoric, and would lead
to total circumvention of the principles of our Constitution * * * .”
Gaffney v. State Department of Education, supra, 220 N.W.2d at
556.

[i The respondents have also urged this court to affirm the
judgment of the trial court on the basis that school districts, not
being specifically enumerated in Art. VIII, § 16, are not thereby
barred from giving or appropriating money or property to a sec-
tarian or religious society or institution. We find this contention
to be without merit as it ignores the basie fact of the numerous
state funds channeled to school districts with no separate iden-
tifiable local fund set aside to purchase the required textbooks
(see SDCL 13-34-12, repealed by S.L.1974, Ch. 133, § 2) thus
violating the provisions of S.D.Const. Art. VI, § 3. Even if the
funds were so identifiable as to avoid the use of state funds, and
though perhaps not controlling, this court, in construing other
provisions of this state’s constitution has held that the words
“municipal corporations” in their ordinarily accepted and more
enlarged sense of public local corporations may include “school
district.” Egan Con. Sch. Dist. v. Minnehaha Co., 1936, 65 S.D. 32,
270 N.W. 527. Cf. Town of Dell Rapids v. Irving, 1895, 7 S.D. 310,
64 N.W. 149; Sanders v. Sch. Dist. of Sioux Falls, 1915, 35 S.D. 48,
150 N.W. 473.

i | Appellants have assigned as error an implied finding of
the trial court that it had jurisdiction under the provisions of
SDCL 21-29 to proceed in mandamus where there was an ade-

609

quate remedy at law, namely an appeal pursuant to SDCL 13-46-1.
Prior decisions of this court, construing statutes enacted under
the then existing provisions of S.D.Const. Art. V, § 14, which is
not unlike the current provisions of Art. V,-§ 5, have approved
the denial of a writ, But, this court has also acknowledged in
C., M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. R. R. Commrs., 1936, 64 S.D. 297, 266
N.W. 660, that the power, authority and jurisdiction of circuit
courts to issue remedial writs and hear and determine the same
cannot be impaired, diminished or destroyed by the legislature.
Because of the public nature of these questions raised in this ap-
peal, the trial court may well have determined that on appeal
from the school board decision even through a trial de novo in cir-
cuit court pursuant to SDCL 13-46-6, which also contemplates
mandamus as a means of enforcement, a meaningful record could
not have been developed for a final determination of the issues
presented. We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in
entertaining this proceeding.

Hi We therefore hold that the provision of SDCL 13-34-16.1 is
unconstitutional and, to the extent that SDCL 13-34-16 provides
for the loan of textbooks to private school students, it is likewise
unconstitutional under the provisions of S.D.Const. Art. VI, § 3,
and Art. VIII, § 16.

Accordingly, the judgment and order granting the peremp-
tory writ of mandamus are reversed, with direction to quash the
writ and dismiss these proceedings.

No costs shall be taxed as a public question is involved.
McFarland v. Barron, 1969, 83 S.D. 639, 164 N.W.2d 607.

WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

DUNN, C. J., dissents.

DUNN, Chief Justice (dissenting).

The majority opinion holds SDCL 13-34-16 and 13-34-16.1 un-

constitutional under the provisions of Article VI, § 3, and Article
VIII, § 16, of the South Dakota Constitution. It does not reach the

50

question of whether the two statutes violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. I think a review of what the United States Supreme Court
has said in this area is important, not only to determine if the
loaning of texbooks to nonpublic school children by the state
violates the United States Constitution but also as to whether it
violates our own Constitution.

The issue of loans of textbooks to nonpublic school children
first reached the United States Supreme Court in the 1930 case of
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, 50
8.Ct. 335, 74 L.Ed. 913. The specific question there was whether a
Louisiana law providing free books to nonpublic school children
was a taking of public property for private purposes in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The reason the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment was not considered was that the
Court had not yet applied that particular clause to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court upheld
the textbook law and in doing so quoted the language of the Loui-
siana Supreme Court in its opinion as follows:

“‘The appropriations were made for the specific pur-
pose of purchasing school books for the use of the school
children of the state, free of cost to them. It was for
their benefit and the resulting benefit to the state that
the appropriations were made. True, these children at-
tend some school, public or private, the latter, sectarian
or nonsectarian, and that the books are to be furnished
them for their use, free of cost, whichever they attend.
The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries of these
appropriations. They obtain nothing from them, nor are
they relieved of a single obligation because of them. The
school children and the state alone are the
beneficiaries.’” (Emphasis supplied) 281 U.S. at 374-375,
50 S.Ct. at 335, 74 L.Ed. at 915.

This “child benefit” theory was subsequently used by the
Supreme Court when it was faced with a challenge to public ex-
penditures to parochial school children and their parents based
upon the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. In Everson

Se

v. Board of Education, 1946, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711,
the challenge was to a New Jersey law which authorized school
districts to reimburse parents of parochial school children the
cost of transporting the children to school on public transporta-
tion. The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Black, held that
the law did not violate the Establishment Clause, as the benefit of
the law went to the school children and their parents, rather than
to any religious sect or the parochial schools. The Court con-
cluded the opinion by saying:

“The State contributes no money to the schools. It does
not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no
more than provide a general program to help parents
get their children, regardless of their religion, safely
and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.” 330
US. at 18, 67 S.Ct. at 513, 91 L.Ed. at 725.

In 1968 the Supreme Court applied the “child benefit” theory
to a New York law which required school districts to purchase
and loan textbooks to students enrolled in parochial as well as in
public and private schools. The issue was whether the law
violated the mandates of the Establishment Clause. The Court
held that it did not, placing prime reliance on the fact that the
books went directly to the students and did not directly benefit
or aid the parochial schools.

“Appellants have shown us nothing about the necessary
effects of the statute that is contrary to its stated pur-
pose. The law merely makes available to all children the
benefits of a general program to lend school books free
of charge. Books are furnished at the request of the
pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the
State. Thus no funds or books are furnished to parochial
schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and
children, not to schools. Perhaps free books make it
more likely that some children choose to attend a sec-
tarian school, but that was true of the state-paid bus
fares in Everson and does not alone demonstrate an un-
constitutional degree of support for a religious institu-
tion.” Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 at

2

243-244, 88 S.Ct. 1923 at 1926-1927, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 at
1065-1066.

The Allen case is still good law. In more recent years the
Supreme Court has added other tests. These were summarized in
the case of Meek v. Pittenger, 1975, 421 U.S. 349, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 44
L.Ed.2d 217.

“First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose. E.g. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct.
266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228. Second, it must have a ‘primary ef-
fect’ that neither advances nor inhibits religion. E.g.
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 874
U.S. 208, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844. Third, the
statute and its administration must avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion. E.g. Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d
697.” 421 U.S. at 358, 95 S.Ct. at 1760, 44 L.Ed.2d at
227-228.

In Meek the Court applied the above tests to the textbook loan
provisions of a Pennsylvania law. While it struck down other pro-
visions of the law in the face of the Establishment Clause, the
Court upheld loans of textbooks to parochial school children. The
Court stressed that the benefits accrued to the children rather
than to the schools.

“In sum, the textbook loan provisions of Act 195 are
in every material respect identical to the loan program
approved in Allen. Pennsylvania, like New York, ‘mere-
ly makes available to all children the benefits of a
general program to lend school books free of charge.’ As
such, those provisions of Act 195 do not offend the con-
stitutional prohibition against laws ‘respecting an
establishment of religion.’ ” 421 U.S. at 362, 95 S.Ct. at
1761-1762, 44 L.Ed.2d at 230.

Based upon the holdings of the Supreme Court in Allen and Meek,
SDCL 13-34-16 and 13-34-16.1 comport with the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-

eee EE“

tion. These two cases have been cited with approval in the very
recent United States Supreme Court case of Roemer v. Board of
Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 49 L.Ed.2d
179, decided June 21, 1976.

The majority opinion states that the provisions of the South
Dakota Constitution are more restrictive than the Establishment
Clause. I do not feel that a lengthy discussion of whether the
South Dakota provisions are more restrictive than the provisions
of the Establishment Clause or the Pennsylvania Constitution or
the Nebraska Constitution will in any way help resolve the
overall question of the validity of the challenged provisions under
the South Dakota Constitution. Any inquiry should be directed
first to the words of the constitutional sections involved.

Article VI, § 3, states in pertinent part:

“No person shall be compelled to attend or support
any ministry or place of worship against his consent nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious
establishment or mode of worship. No money or prop-
erty of the state shall be given or appropriated for the
benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institu-
tion.”

Article VIII, § 16, states:

“No appropriation of lands, money or other prop-
erty or credits to aid any sectarian school shall ever be
made by the state, or any county or municipality within
the state, nor shall the state or any county or municipali-
ty within the state accept any grant, conveyance, gift or
bequest of lands, money or other property to be used for
sectarian purposes, and no sectarian instruction shall be
allowed in any school or institution aided or supported
by the state.”

It is my feeling that this case revolves around the key words
“benefit of any sectarian or religious society or institution” and
“aid any sectarian school” in the above quoted sections. While the

6

wording of these sections varies greatly from the simple words of
the Establishment Clause, the meaning is the same; state expend-
itures which aid and benefit religious societies or schools are pro-
hibited. Thus the inquiry should be the same under our own Con-
stitution as that used by the Supreme Court with the Establish-
ment Clause: Who reaps the benefits of the challenged legisla-
tion, the schools or the school children? In Cochran, Allen and
Meek, supra, the Supreme Court has said explicitly that when the
state loans school textbooks to parochial school children, the
benefit accrues to the children and the state rather than to any
sectarian institution. Article VI, § 3, and Article VIII, § 16, of our
Constitution clearly state that the expenditures must not benefit
and aid a religious society or institution. Since SDCL 13-34-16 and
13-34-16.1 do not directly benefit these institutions, they should
be upheld by this court.

The majority opinion does not distinguish this court’s
holding in Synod of Dakota v. State, 1891, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632,
from the present case. It states that to attempt to distinguish the
cases would somehow circumvent the principles of our Constitu-
tion. I disagree. I feel that in failing to set out the factual and
legal differences the opinion not only circumvents the principles
of our Constitution but also ignores the plain words of the rele-
vant constitutional sections. The case of Synod of Dakota v. State,
supra, involved payments by the State to Pierre University, a
Presbyterian College, for student tuition. Unlike the instant case,
money was paid directly to a sectarian institution for the benefit
of that institution in its operations. Here we have books loaned to
school children for the benefit of their respective secular educa-
tion and ultimately for the benefit of the state. In short, Synod
cannot be considered as precedent for declaring the challenged
statutes unconstitutional. The difference in the facts of the two
cases is to me the difference between an unconstitutional ap-
propriation of money to sectarian colleges and a constitutional
loan of books to children who happen to attend nonpublic schools.

A quality education is one of the most important gifts that
our children can receive. The legislature, in its collective wisdom,
has sought to insure a quality education for all the children of the
state by loaning secular textbooks to them free of charge. It

615

fulfills a further purpose in insuring that all schools, public or sec-
tarian, abide by a course of study which is set up by the state for
its school children. The use of the same textbooks would serve to
carry out this course of study for all students. I have not changed
my mind on the question of state aid to a sectarian institution for
the benefit of that institution or its operations. This should not be
tolerated, but I do not believe that some children should be
deprived of these books simply because they happen to attend
sectarian schools, nor do I feel that our federal or state Constitu-
tion so mandates. The judgment and order of the circuit court
should be affirmed.

. a
STATE, Respondent v. LEWIS, Appellant

(244 N.W.2d 307)

(File No. 11495. Opinion filed July 28, 1976)

Peter H. Lieberman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and
respondent; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief.

Laurence J. Zastrow, Pennington Co. Public Defender, Rapid
City, for defendant and appellant.

COLER, Justice.

Appellant was charged with the crime of murder in the
shooting death of Doyle Glenn Henry in Pennington County,
South Dakota. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of second
degree manslaughter from which this appeal was taken. We af-
firm.

Appellant waived eleven of her original thirty assignments
of error and the remaining nineteen assignments of error are
covered under fifteen points in her brief. For the purposes of our
review, these points are consolidated into three main issues, to
wit: (1) whether the trial court erred in giving certain instruc-
tions and in failing to accept certain of appellant's proposed in-
structions; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant
conviction for the offense of second degree manslaughter; and (3)
whether certain confessions or admissions were properly admit-
ted.

In a voluminous transcript, several eyewitnesses related the
circumstances which led to the death of Doyle Henry, a well built
construction worker, who, at thirty-four years of age stood six
feet two inches or more and weighed 225 pounds or more. Mr.
Henry’s dislike for a certain Rapid City lawyer, Franklin J.
Wallahan, was well known. Mr. Henry blamed the lawyer for a
significant financial setback he had suffered as a result of a
lawsuit in which Mr. Wallahan represented an interest adverse to
him. Subsequently, Mr. Wallahan was involved as an attorney in
two other matters in which Mr. Henry had some involvement.

es out

Over the course of approximately two and one-half years, it is ap-
parent that there was generated in the mind of Mr. Henry an in-
tense hatred for the five-foot-eight-inch, 165 pound Mr. Wallahan.
On more than one occasion, Mr. Henry had attempted to physical-
ly abuse Mr. Wallahan and on one such occasion, a friend of Mr.
Wallahan’s had thrashed him when he attempted to provoke a
fight with Wallahan.

Both Mr. Henry and Mr. Wallahan were regular customers of
the Anchor Lounge & Restaurant in Rapid City, South Dakota,
and each of them were in and out of that establishment on the
night of July 25, 1973. Mr. Henry, by word and gesture, had at-
tempted to provoke a fight on more than one occasion that eve-
ning but nothing physical occurred until Mr. Henry blocked the
door to Mr. Wallahan’s attempted exit from the lounge at approx-
imately 11:00 p.m. Mr. Henry demanded and got an apology from
him; they shook hands and Mr. Wallahan was allowed to leave.
Mr. Henry also left but both returned later. Mr. Henry, who came
back after Mr. Wallahan had seated himself, propelled Mr.
Wallahan off the barstool and onto the floor. In rapid sequence,
the owner of the lounge, with a can of mace in his hand, positioned
himself over the prone customer and faced the aggressor, Mr.
Henry, to break up what was obviously an unfair fight and one
that he had warned Mr. Henry not to start on his premises. A
male patron of the bar stepped forward to help restrain Mr.
Henry at about the same time the lounge owner attempted to
spray mace at Mr. Henry. There is some question as to whether
the mace was effective but it did momentarily stop the aggres-
sive acts of Mr. Henry and caused the interceding patron to
withdraw and cover his eyes. It was during this moment that ap-
pellant, who was a bartender at the lounge, grabbed the lounge
owner's .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, which was kept
behind the cash register, and at close range fired one shot into
the head of Mr. Henry which brought about his death almost in-
stantaneously.

To establish premeditated design to effect death for the pur-
pose of a murder conviction, SDCL 22-16-4, the state introduced
evidence that for a period of time between March 12, 1973, and
May 22, 1973, appellant had been dating Doyle Henry and that

618 Pe

she shot him out of jealousy since Mr. Henry, at the time of the
shooting, was dating one of appellant’s co-workers at the lounge.
This theory of the state was consistent with a statement at-
tributed to appellant and overheard by two witnesses who, short-
ly after the shooting testified that, when asked why she had shot
Mr. Henry, appellant stated either that “He had it coming” or
that “She owed it to him.” Appellant, on the other hand, testify-
ing at the trial, denied any jealousy. She acknowledged having
dated the decedent but testified that she terminated the relation-
ship out of fear of him. She related how Mr. Henry’s obsessive
dislike for Mr. Wallahan and threats, which Mr. Henry had
related to her concerning Mr. Wallahan, brought about her ter-
minating their relationship. As she saw the situation just prior to
the shooting, the circumstances were such that she was convine-
ed Mr. Henry intended to take the life of Mr. Wallahan and that
he was about to do so at the time she shot him and that her acts
were necessary to protect the life of Mr. Wallahan.

Il In this context, we have reviewed the instructions
adopted by the court. The instructions properly set forth the
lesser includable offenses of manslaughter in the first degree and
manslaughter in the second degree.! We find that the instructions
given by the trial court comply with the requirements of SDCL
23-45-23 which reads as follows:

“23-45-23. The jury may find the defendant guilty of
any offense, the commission of which is necessarily in-
cluded in that with which he is charged in the indict-

1. Instruction No. 19, which ties together the various instructions on the in-
cludable offenses, is set forth as follows:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 19

“The defendant in this case has been charged with a specific offense,
namely, that of murder, as charged in the information.

“Under the laws of the state, the jury may find a defendant who is
charged with a specific offense guilty of an offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the information. Consequently, in this
case, if you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend-
ant is guilty of the offense of murder, as charged in the information, but
are safisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
the offense of manslaughter in the first degree, then you may return a
verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree.

“If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant is guilty of murder, as charged in the information, or of the offense
of manslaughter in the first degree, but are satisfied beyond a reasonable

Ss 619

ment or information, or of an attempt to commit the of-
fense charged.”

Instructions on the lesser includable offenses are clearly required
under the circumstances of this case. See State v. Hubbard, 1905,
20 S.D. 148, 104 N.W.\t120; State v. Stumbaugh, 1911, 28 S.D. 50,
182 N.W. 666; State v. Violett, 1961, 79 S.D. 292, 111 N.W.2d 598
and State v. Zobel, 1965, 81 S.D. 260, 134 N.W.2d 101. Appellant’s
contention that there was no evidence to support the giving of
these instructions is without merit.

From the evidence before the jury they could have found ap-
pellant guilty of murder based upon premeditation, SDCL 22-16-4;
manslaughter in the first degree because of the involvement of a
dangerous weapon, SDCL 22-16-15; or manslaughter in the second
degree, SDCL 22-16-20. We find appellant’s contention to the con-
trary to be unsubstantiated by the record.

HI Appellant proposed several instructions relating to the
defense of excusable or justifiable homicide within the meaning
of SDCL 22-16-16 and 22-16-20. In lieu of appellant's proposed in-
structions the court gave Instruction No. 12, patterned in large
measure from Pattern Jury Instruction (Criminal) § 3-7-350b,
which reads as follows:

“INSTRUCTION NO. 12
“If the defendant at the time of the killing of the
deceased had reasonable cause to believe from the

doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense of manslaughter in the
second degree, then you may return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter
in the second degree. .

“If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
uilty of murder as charged in the information or manslaughter in the
first degree, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which of the offenses
she is guilty of, you should return a verdict of guilty of the lesser offense,
being that of manslaughter in the first degree; if you are satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty either of murder as
charged in the information, manslaughter in the first degree, or
manslaughter in the second degree, but you are not satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt of which offense she is guilty, you will find her guilty of
the lesser offense, being manslaughter in the second degree.

“If you find the defendant neither guilty of murder nor of
manslaughter in the first degree, nor of manslaughter in the second
degree, you should then return a verdict of not guilty.”

words, acts or conduct of the deceased that deceased
had a design to take the life of a third person or to do
such person great bodily injury, and that such design
was about to be accomplished there the defendant had a
right to act on the facts and circumstances as they ap-
peared to her at the time and to kill deceased to prevent
accomplishment of such design. In so defending such
third person, the defendant was not required to nicely
gauge or measure the force used, but she could use any
means that appeared reasonably necessary under the
circumstances. It is not necessary to this defense that
the third person’s danger should have been in fact real
or actual, or that it should have been actually impending
or about to occur, but if the defendant had reasonable
cause to believe and did believe these facts, and killed
the deceased to prevent such expected harm, then you
must acquit the defendant.

“Upon this defense being raised as an issue by
evidence tending to show the same, whether produced
by the defendant or the State, the burden of proving
that the defendant did not act in defense of a third per-
son rests upon the State. So upon considering the
evidence, if any, touching the circumstances of justifica-
tion or excuse on the part of the defendant for the com-
mission of the homicide, together with all of the other
evidence in the case, you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether the defendant committed the homicide in the
lawful defense of another, when there was a reasonable
ground on her part to apprehend a design on the part of
the deceased to do such person some great bodily injury,
and that there was imminent danger of such design
being accomplished, you should find the defendant not
guilty.”

This court has recently had occasion to rule on the issue of a
proper instruction involving the defense of third persons. See
State v. Grimes, 1976, 90 S.D. 43, 237 N.W.2d 900. While in State
v. Grimes, supra, the issue concerned the wife’s right to intercede
in her husband’s behalf and the instruction there given related to

Eee

the provisions of SDCL 22-18-4, we held that the same rules apply
whether a person acts in defense of a spouse or a stranger. In
State v. Grimes, supra, this court also noted a corollary between
the two distinct defenses, namely, the defense of a third person
and self-defense. The trial court in the instant case properly ap-
plied the above'stated rule. The language of SDCL 22-16-35 which
reads as follows:

“22-16-35. Homicide is justifiable when committed
by any person in the lawful defense of such person, or of
his or her husband, wife, parent, child, master, mistress,
or servant when there is reasonable ground to ap-
prehend a design to commit a felony, or to do some great
personal injury, and imminent danger of such design
being accomplished”

clearly does not, by its express terms, extend to appellant the
right to defend a stranger. Further, the language of the instruc-
tion numbered 19? which was approved by this court in State v.
Grimes, supra, does not indicate that appellant was in any way
prejudiced by. the instruction given in the instant case; rather,
she benefited from the instruction given.

HB Appellant twice filed motions to suppress her statements
taken by police officers during her interrogation. A hearing was
held upon the first motion before the municipal judge of Rapid
City in connection with appellant’s preliminary hearing, but no
determination was made on that motion at that level. Thereafter,
the circuit court, upon a renewal of the motion and upon further

2. ‘The portion of that instruction set forth in State v. Grimes at 237 N.W.2d pp.
902, 908, states:
“Where an assault is made with only the hands and fists but with such
force and in such manner as is likely to produce great bodily injury, the
spouse of the person attacked may lawfully resist the ‘attack with
whatever force is reasonably and apparently necessary.
“Where an assault with the fists or hands, or by means not likely to pro-
duce great bodily injury, is being made on a person, but without intent to
kill or do great bodily harm, and if the assault is not likely to produce
at bodily injury, and if the spouse of the person being attacked isnot
jeceived as to the character of such an assault, she is not justified in
using a deadly weapon in self-defense.’ ”
Applying the self-defense rule to defense of third persons, clearly, if the fore-
going limitation on use of a weapon were applied, the act of taking a life by the
appellant was not justified.

622 Pe

and extensive hearings, denied the motion having determined
that the police officers had duly given the Miranda rights to ap-
pellant and that those rights “were fully and completely outlined
and explained to the defendant, and the Court finds that the
defendant voluntarily and understandably and knowingly waived
her rights under the Miranda rule. With respect to the statement
itself, the evidence presented to the Court would indicate and the
Court finds under the Thundershield case, where the standard
there is beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statements were
voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.”

While this “determination” as set forth in the record is not
accompanied by separate findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the trial court obviously applied the standard of proof established
by this court in State v. Thundershield, 1968, 83 S.D. 414, 160
N.W.2d 408. Although the “determination” of the trial court was
not in the form required by RCP Rule 52(a) so as to be subject to
the clearly erroneous rule, this court has, even prior to the adop-
tion of that rule, held that a finding, such as that on the record
here, “not being clearly against the weight of testimony, such
finding is binding upon us.” State v. Allison, 1910, 24 S.D. 622, 124
N.W. 747. The trial court’s finding is not clearly against the
weight of testimony.

We have reviewed appellant's other assignments of error
and find them to be without merit.

Affirmed.
DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.
THOMS, Respondent v. ANDERSEN, Appellant
(244 N.W.2d 311)
(File No. 11864. Opinion filed July 28, 1976)

Rehearing denied September 22, 1976

623

Steve Jorgensen, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and respondent.

David V. Vrooman, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.

COLER, Justice.

On remand, under the prior decision of this court, Thoms v.
Andersen, 1975, 89 S.D. 567, 235 N.W.2d 898, the trial court, con-
sidering secondary evidence as mandated by this court, entered a
decision declaring respondent, Donna Thoms, the winner of the
election. Appellant has challenged the admissibility of the official

2a Pe

canvass as evidence upon which the trial court’s decision was, at
least in part, predicated. We affirm.

This court in Thoms v. Andersen, supra, affirmed the holding
of the trial court that the ballots in precincts 3-4 and 10-2 had
been improperly kept by the election officials and that the re-
count board properly did not count the absentee ballots from
those two precincts. This court relied, in part, upon an early deci-
sion of the North Dakota Court, ie., Howser v. Pepper, 1899, 8
N.D. 484, 79 N.W. 1018, see Thoms v. Andersen, supra, but did not
delve into the reasons for the substitution of the official canvass
results in those two precincts for a count of the ballots which
were held to be tainted as evidence. The North Dakota Court in
Howser v. Pepper, supra, set forth the best evidence rule as it
relates to ballots in the following language:

“It may be stated, as a general principle, that the
original ballots cast are the best evidence from which to
determine the result of an election. The difficulty does
not consist in the rule, but is found in the preliminary
question as to whether the ballots offered to impeach
the returns are the original ballots, and in the same con-
dition as when cast by the electors. The effect of the
original ballots as evidence, and the degree of care re-
quired to continue them as controlling evidence, is
stated by Judge Brewer in Hudson v. Solomon, 19 Kan.
177, in the following language: ‘First. As between the
ballots cast at an election and a canvass of these ballots
by the election officers, the former are primary,—the
controlling evidence. Second. In order to continue the
ballots controlling as evidence, it must appear that they
have been preserved in the manner and by the officers
prescribed by the statute, and that, while in such
custody, they have not been so exposed to the reach of
unauthorized persons as to afford a reasonable prob-
ability of their having been changed or tampered
with.” 79 N.W. at 1019.

In keeping with the prior opinion of this court, respondent of-
fered_as evidence the official canvass which was marked as Ex-

625

hibit #7. This canvass was duly filed and was complete in all
respects save that the signatures of the board were not certified
to and the seal of the county auditor was not affixed as required
by SDCL 12-20-38.

Because of this defect, appellant claims the exhibit was im-
properly received in evidence and, further, even if properly ad-
mitted, the canvass does not prove the results of the vote in the
two precincts in question since the canvass shows the total vote
for each candidate in each precinct without a breakdown of the
machine vote and absentee vote. The latter contention, as well as
appellant’s further contention that the trial court improperly
used a stipulation of counsel relative to the number of absentee
votes cast for each candidate in precinct 3-4 in arriving at its deci-
sion, we find unnecessary to discuss by reason of our prior deci-
sion and our holding herein.

In an early discussion of the best evidence rule, the ter-
ritorial court of Dakota Territory acknowledged that

“Phe principle of the rule requiring the best or
highest evidence, is founded on the presumption that
there is something in the better evidence which is
withheld, adverse to the party resorting to inferior or
secondary evidence. The general effect of the rule is to
prevent fraud, and to induce parties to bring before
juries the kind of evidence least calculated to mislead or
perplex them. And the reason of the rule limits the ex-
tent of its application. Consequently, it does not operate
where the law itself obviates the presumption of fraud,
which would otherwise arise. * **” McCall v. United
States, 1876, 1 Dak. 307, 46 N.W. 608.

Considering that the county auditor, who was responsible
for the care and safekeeping of the ballots returned to him, had
taken such little care in the performance of that duty as to render
the ballots inadmissible as evidence, it would appear, in
retrospect, that no confidence should have been placed by this
court in that officer’s fulfilling the duties imposed by law for the
preparation and preservation of the official canvass.

626 Po

Whether the auditor’s failure to certify the signatures and
affix his seal to the canvass as required by law is purely a
ministerial act or is mandatory, see Smith v. Lawrence, 1891, 2
S.D. 185, 49 N.W. 7, so as to affect the admissibility of the exhibit
under either SDCL 19-7-9 or 19-7-11, we need not determine.

[Il The best evidence rule requires that secondary evidence
must be looked to where the primary evidence has lost credence.
However, a fraud may not be perpetrated in the name of the rule
and the official canvass is not the only secondary evidence that
may be considered.

HHMI As stated in Howser v. Pepper, supra, and quoted with
approval by this court in Thoms v. Andersen, supra, where ballot
boxes have been so improperly supervised that the ballots
themselves have lost “their probative weight as the best
evidence * * * they cannot, therefore, be allowed to impeach the
canvass of the votes by the precinct officers * * *.” 235 N.W.2d at
900. Tally sheets and the official return sheets from precincts 3-4
and 10-2, which constitute official returns for each precinct,
SDCL 12-20-16, are the “canvass of the votes by the precinct of-
ficers” within the meaning of the quoted language from Howser
v. Pepper, supra.

The precinct canvasses for both precincts were, without ob-
jection, before the trial court as official records. RCP Rule 44.
These exhibits are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein, SDCL 19-7-9, and they clearly establish that in precinct
3-4 the absentee votes cast were 42 for appellant, Andersen, and
98 for respondent, Thoms. They also establish that in precinct
10-2, 33 were absentee votes cast for appellant and 43 for
respondent. Those votes, when added together with the un-
challenged results of the recount board declaring the vote of
18,705 for appellant and 18,688 for respondent, show respondent
to be the winner by a vote of 18,829 to appellant’s 18,780.

Affirmed.

WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., BIEGELMEIER, Retired J.,
» and FOSHEIM, Circuit Judge, concur.

627

BIEGELMEIER, Retired J., sitting for DUNN, C. J., dis-
qualified.

FOSHEIM, Circuit Judge, sitting by assignment.

NORTHWESTERN PUBLIC SERVICE CO., Appellant v.
CITY OF ABERDEEN, et al., Respondents

(244 N.W.2d 544)

(Files Nos, 11446, 11592, 11593, 11600 and 11601.
Opinion filed July 28, 1976)

a
q
)

630

|
roe
&

Raymond Schutz, Siegel, Barnett, Schutz, O'Keefe &
Ogborn, Aberdeen, John B. Wehde, Benson, Beach, Wehde &
Martin, Huron, for plaintiff.

Charles B. Kornmann, Richardson, Groseclose, Kornmann &
Wyly, Robert D. Miller, Aberdeen, for defendants.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff Northwestern Public Service Company brought
these actions for declaratory judgments against defendants, City
of Aberdeen, Robert Nikolas, Al Westby, Mae Zemlicka and
Allen Gates, as members of the City Council of Aberdeen, and
Jeff Solem, as Mayor of Aberdeen, to determine the validity of'a
city ordinance regulating electric rates. From verdicts of the Cir-
cuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit upholding the ordinance,
the plaintiff appeals claiming that the trial court erred (1) in
upholding the validity of the ordinance, (2) in not finding that
laches and estoppel applied to the defendants by their ac-
quiescence in the new rates over a considerable period, (8) in not
finding that plaintiff substantially complied with the ordinance as
to its 1973 increase, and (4) in ordering refunds on an individual
basis rather than a lump sum. Defendants also appeal alleging
that the trial court erred (1) in applying the wrong statute of
limitations, (2) in permitting an offset of decreases in electric
rates as against the illegal increases, (3) in figuring interest from
the date of the judgment instead of the dates of the rate in-
creases, and (4) in not finding that defendants were entitled to
recovery for conversion, including attorney fees and costs. We af-
firm in part and reverse in part.

632

Plaintiff, a South Dakota corporation supplying electric.ser-
vices to, among others, the City of Aberdeen and its residents,
commenced declaratory judgment actions to determine whether
a city ordinance regulating electrical rates for the City of Aber-
deen was in effect on July 1, 1973. Defendants answered that
Aberdeen City Ordinance No. 741, approved July 29, 1952, was in
effect and that plaintiff must comply with the provisions of that
ordinance.

A counterclaim was also filed on behalf of defendants and
citizens of Aberdeen for an accounting and refund of charges in
excess of that allowed by Ordinance 741, interest on such over-
charges, and temporary and permanent injunctions to restrain
plaintiff from an August 13, 1973 rate increase. Such temporary
injunction was denied by the trial court on October 5, 1973, but
the court did order a $350,000 surety bond by plaintiff to compen-
sate those customers suffering losses should Ordinance 741 be
declared valid.

By Ordinance No. 749, effective May 7, 1953, and by Or-
dinance No. 878, effective September 9, 1958, the City of Aber-
deen had on two occasions revised its ordinances. Both of these
ordinances stated that they were “a revision of all of the or-
dinances of the City heretofore adopted,” and both contained the
following repealer clause:

“All ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict with
the provisions of this ordinance or relating-to the sub-
ject matter of this ordinance and not reenacted as part
of this ordinance, except as stated in this Chapter, are
hereby repealed * * *.”

The ordinances then contained several specific exceptions to this
repealer. Among these, both ordinances excepted “ordinances
establishing maximum rates and charges for electric
energy * * *,”

On December 12, 1969, the City of Aberdeen adopted Or-
dinance No. 1230 which, too, was designated “a revision of all of
the ordinances of the City heretofore adopted.” Ordinance 1230

contained the same repealing clause as Ordinances 749 and 878,
but the phrase “ordinances establishing maximum rates and
charges for electric energy” was not a part of the exceptions to
the repealer. Plaintiff contends that this shows “unmistakable
legislative intent” to repeal Ordinance 741. Plaintiff urges that
Ordinance 1230 as a subsequent statute revising a whole body of
law repealed the former law, and that any omissions must be look-
ed upon as deliberate. State v. Welbes, 1898, 11 S.D. 86, 75 N.W.
820. While this repeal of Ordinance 741, if effective, would not af-
fect a July 22, 1969 rate increase, it would permit an August 13,

1978 rate increase.

Plaintiff further contends the following:

1.

Defendants claim that the taking and keeping of the funds
from overcharges is conversion by plaintiff in violation of SDCL

Estoppel and laches should be applied to the
defendants to prevent them from claiming any.
refunds from either of the rate increases, defend-
ants having acquiesced in plaintiff's substantial in-
vestments in electric facilities in reliance upon
higher utility rates.

Plaintiff substantially complied with the re-
quirements of Ordinance 741 upon discovering it.

Defendants’ counterclaim for refunds is subject to
SDCL 15-2-15, a two-year statute of limitations
upon recovering moneys into the treasury of the
City of Aberdeen.

If Ordinance 741 is determined still in effect, cer-
tain rate decreases should be declared illegal and
offset as a credit against any refunds from rate in-
creases.

If refunds are ordered, these should be submitted
to the court by plaintiff in a lump sum with the
court ordering disbursement.

6
21-3-3 and that costs and attorney fees should be assessed.

The issue of the validity of Ordinance 741 was tried to the
court on November 19 and 30, 1973. The court ruled that Or-
dinance 741 was in full force and effect. The court also found no
basis for estoppel or laches against the City of Aberdeen. The re-
maining issues were raised in the trial court on May 14 and 15,
and July 1, 1974. On October 22, 1974, the court ruled:

1. That plaintiff was enjoined from violating Or-
dinance 741.

2. Overcharges from 1969 and 1973 rate increases
should be refunded individually with interest of six
percent from August -13, 1973, for the 1973 in-
crease, and from August 12, 1974, for the 1969 in-
crease.

3. Defendants were not entitled to any recovery for
conversion, costs, or attorney fees.

4. Plaintiff was entitled to credit for decreases in
rates made voluntarily.

5. Refunds were ordered until May 1974, but limited
to a two-year period prior to September 11, 1973,
pursuant to SDCL 15-2-15 and 15-2-16.

Ho repeal Ordinance 741, either an express or an implied
repealer must be present in Ordinance 1230. For repeal of a law
to be express it must be “literally declared,” Argo Oil Corp. and
State v. Lathrop, 1955, 76 S.D. 70, 75, 72 N.W.2d 481, 434, and
must “ ‘leave no doubt as to what statute is intended.’” Patter-
mann v. City of Whitewater, 1966, 32 Wis.2d 350, 145 N.W.2d 705,
708. Ordinance 1230 does not mention Ordinance 741 by name nor
use any of the terms plaintiff claims refer to Ordinance 741 in Or-
dinances 749 and 878. We cannot conclude that there is no doubt
as to whether Ordinance 741 is included in the repeal, and
therefore must conclude that there is no express repeal.

635

Hl Upon seeking to discover an implied repeal, we are faced
with the general rule.

“The courts do not favor repeals by implication, and
it is the duty of this court to give effect to both enact-
ments if their provisions can be reconciled.” Brookings
County v. Sayre, 1928, 53 S.D. 350, 354, 220 N.W. 918,
920.

See also Jacobi v. Clarkson, 1932, 60 S.D. 401,244 N.W. 535; 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 291 ¢; 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 397.

HM Plaintiff's contention that an omission in a revision
operates to repeal the former ordinance, State v. Welbes, 1898, 11
S.D. 86, 75 N.W. 820, does not determine the issue. It merely
raises the question of legislative intent. When doubt exists con-
cerning revision of a law, we must look at the law existing, Lewis
v. Annie Creek Mining Co., 1951, 74 S.D. 26, 48 N.W.2d 815, and at
the consequences of the implied repeal of such law.

Plaintiff also urges the court to look at the former law, par-
ticularly the differences between the “saving clauses” in Or-
dinance 1230 and Ordinances 749 and 878. This court, however,
has ruled that the so-called “blanket repeal” which seeks to
repeal all laws inconsistent to the repealer, “of course adds
nothing to the repealing effect of the statute.” A “manifest and
total repugnancy” is required. Jacobi v. Clarkson, 1932, 60 S.D.
401, 404, 244 N.W. 535, 536. Furthermore, in Reaney v. Union
County, 1948, 69 S.D. 392, 10 N.W.2d 762, this court stated:

“‘A mere change of phraseology, or punctuation, or the
addition or omission of words in the revision or codifica-
tion of statutes, does not necessarily change the opera-
tion or effect thereof, and will not be deemed to do so
unless the intent to make such change is clear and un-
mistakable.’” 69 S.D. at 396, 10 N.W.2d at 763.

Not only is such “unmistakable” intent lacking in Ordinance
1230 but the ordinance also contains the additional proviso “fran-
chise ordinances and other ordinances granting special rights to

636

persons or corporations” in its listed exemptions to the repealer.
Such proviso did not appear in Ordinances 749 and 878. By the ad-
dition of this proviso, Ordinances 1230 and 741 are not “so incom-
patible and inconsistent they cannot, by any reasonable construc-
tion, be reconciled and allowed to stand together in toto.” Hauck
v. Bull, 1961, 79 S.D. 242, 246, 110 N.W.2d 506, 508.

Looking at the consequences of an implied repeal, plain-
tiff urges that the City of Aberdeen sought to relinquish its con-
trol of electric rates. Where under a certain reading of an or-
dinance the city commission “would seem to have grossly failed
to perform its duty” of conserving the public interest, “[t]he or-
dinance should have such construction as will avoid that result if
that can reasonably be done.” City of Madison v. Southern
Wisconsin Ry. Co., 1914, 156 Wis. 352, 146 N.W. 492, 497, 10
A.L.R. 910. The trial court’s order and judgment that Ordinance
741 was in effect at the time of the 1969 and 1978 rate increases
and that plaintiff has not complied with such ordinance are af-
firmed.

[Hf Plaintiff maintains that at least as to the 1973 increase it
substantially complied with the pre-filing requirements under Or-
dinance 741. The facts indicate that no data and no bond were
filed previous to the 1973 increase in accordance with the or-
dinance—this in spite of a warning by the city attorney of the
company’s obligation to do so in June of 1973, some two months
before the 1973 increase. The company’s argument is that a bond
ordered by the court to avoid an injunction on October 5, 1973,
and the filing of some data required by the ordinance in January
1974, placed it in substantial compliance with the ordinance, at
least on one of those dates. Under Ordinance 741, the city was en-
titled to this data prior to the filing in order to make a proper
determination as to the merits of the increase, and the citizens of
Aberdeen were entitled to the bond required in the ordinance
prior to the filing in order to protect their interests in the event
the rate increase was later determined to be invalid. The bond
furnished pursuant to court order and the partial data furnished
after litigation was in progress do not meet these standards. We
find nothing in the facts of this case that would indicate a substan-
tial compliance with the ordinance.

637

HM Estoppel or laches is applied to a municipality sparing-
ly and only where there is manifest injustice, City of Rapid City
v. Hoogterp, 1970, 85 S.D. 176, 179 N.W.2d 15, because of a change
in position by the party seeking to prevent assertion of the right.
Schwartzle v. Dale, 1952, 74 S.D. 467, 54 N.W.2d 361. See 31 C.J.S.
Estoppel § 141; 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 129. It is
also generally stated that estoppel may be invoked against a
municipality only for proprietary or private duties and not for
governmental or public duties, i.e., those duties exercised for the
benefit of the public. City of New Castle v. Withers, 1927, 291 Pa.
216, 189 A. 860. The neglect or refusal of a municipality to enforce
an ordinance should not render the ordinance inoperable and
grant immunity where this would undermine a policy adopted to
protect the public. See also 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 138 a.

This court recently ruled that mere municipal ac-
quiescence is not sufficient to permit an estoppel. Some affir-
mative action must have been taken upon which the other party
acted in reliance and substantially changed his position. City of
Rapid City v. Hoogterp, supra.

HE The burden of proving the elements of affirmative ac-
tion, reliance and change of position is upon the party contending
the legal right is waived. Aune v. City of Mandan, 1969, N.D., 167
N.W.2d 754. This burden has not been met. Plaintiff relies entire-
ly upon the failure of defendants to enforce Ordinance 741. No
claim of affirmative action is made. Indeed, the city attorney in
June 1973, did contact plaintiff warning of the existence of Or-
dinance 741. Presuming the ordinance had been repealed, plain-
tiff continued with its plan for a rate increase without compliance
with that ordinance.

Hl The two-year statute of limitations imposed by the trial
court under SDCL 15-2-15 and 15-2-16 is not applicable. The
counterclaim is clearly not “[a]n action upon a statute for a
forfeiture or penalty to the state,”! nor is it an “action to recover
into the treasury of any municipality ** funds illegally ex-
pended ***.”? The latter section applies to funds from a
1. SDOL 16-2-15(2).

2. SDCL 15-2-16.

es

municipal governing body or its officials. See Title to South
Dakota Session Laws of 1957, Chapter 259. Here the counterclaim
seeks recovery for the defendants and citizens of Aberdeen from
plaintiff as the recipient of funds through omission of the city to
enforce Ordinance 741.

Plaintiff's claim that rate decreases made should be declared
illegal and offset against increases in determining a possible re-
fund is based upon paragraph six of Ordinance 741.

“No approved existing rate or charge shall be in-
creased or decreased except by the approval of the
governing body of the City of Aberdeen, provided,
however, that nothing herein shall be construed to pre-
vent the seller from establishing, by its voluntary ac-
tion, general or special rate schedules providing rates
lower than those approved under this ordinance * * *.”

Plaintiff alleges that the first clause of paragraph six requiring
city approval of rate decreases states the rule, and that the ex-
ception for unilaterally lowering rates applies only to
establishing new rate schedules such as the Reddy-Guard rate
schedule for yard lighting. Defendants respond that this excep-
tion must apply to all decreases in the rates approved under Or-
dinance 741 and argues that the City of Aberdeen would not
desire to expend taxpayer money for investigation and hearings
to possibly prohibit a decrease in electric rates.

Hl We feel that to adopt plaintiff's interpretation of the or-
dinance would necessitate reading “new” into the phrase
“general or special rate schedules.” We do not propose to do so.
Without the additional word, the exception appears to be ap-
plicable both to rates for new (special) schedules such as Reddy-
Guard, and to decreases in existing (general) schedules. The use
of “general” usually implies a whole class rather than a specific
group within that class. In addition, as plaintiff has pointed out at
some length, Ordinances 749 and 878 refer to Ordinance 741 as an
ordinance “establishing maximum rates and charges for electric
energy.” (emphasis supplied)

ee LEE

Hl At trial, plaintiff claimed that the requirement of ap-
proval for rate decreases in the first clause of paragraph six of
Ordinance 741 was included to prohibit it from selling electric
power for less than a contemplated competing municipal power
company. However, this claim was not pursued at trial or on ap-
peal. There was also some contention by defendants that the
decreases were due to a “fuel clause” in the contract and the fact
that a reduction was mandated in order to qualify for federal
power. There is no substantial evidence in the record as to the ef-
fect of the “fuel clause” and the necessity of decreasing rates to
obtain a cheaper federal power supply. Regardless of the motiva-
tion, however, these decreases were voluntarily made by plaintiff
without any application by defendants in accordance with
paragraph six of Ordinance 741 which exempts the decreases
from approval by the governing board of the City of Aberdeen.
We find that the trial court misinterpreted the effect of this
paragraph of the ordinance, and we reverse its decision allowing
the rate decreases as an offset.

Hl Interest on the refunds from both rate increases should
be computed from October 29, 1974. The right to recover and the
amount of the refunds did not vest until the judgment was
entered. SDCL 21-1-11.

HE “he illegal rate increases were not a wrongful conver-
sion. Thus costs and attorney fees are not recoverable. “To con-
stitute conversion, nonconsent to the possession and disposition
of the property by the one entitled to the possession thereof is in-
dispensable.” Biesmann v. Black Hills United Mining Co., 1936, 64
S.D. 82, 86, 264 N.W. 518, 520. By acquiescence in the 1969 rate in-
crease and continued payment of increased rates, defendants now
have no claim to a wrongful conversion.

HM «“Defendants’ claim that the City of Aberdeen’s
freedom of speech was restricted by the court’s order of August
14, 1974, enjoining defendants from advising plaintiff's customers
to seek an accounting from plaintiff is moot. Since a determina-
tion of such claim is not necessary to this action, we do not pass
on it. We also feel that as a matter of “convenience based on prac-

640

tical necessity” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in per-
mitting exhibits dealing with customers residing beyond the cor-
porate limits of the City of Aberdeen. Hotovec v. Howe, 1961, 79
S.D. 337, 111 N.W.2d 748, 749.

The manner of making refunds to plaintiff's customers,
including the named defendants and the residents of Aberdeen,
for overcharges should be according to the provisions of Or-
dinance 741. Paragraph 6.(a) provides in part:

“The seller shall keep accounts from which may be
segregated any amounts collected in excess of the ap-
proved rates and charges. Any request of any customer
made to the seller, at its office in Aberdeen, the seller
shall state separately to such customer the amount of
additional charge permitted by reason of this temporary
adjustment procedure. If the proposed increase in rates
be disapproved by the governing body, or approved in
part only, the seller, shall, within a reasonable time
after notice of such action of the governing body, repay
to each customer any and all amounts which the seller
has received in excess of the rates and charges as finally
approved by the governing body.”

Plaintiff stressed at trial and in its brief that it maintained
separate customer accounts in compliance with this section.
Plaintiff also stated that from these accounts the amount of in-
crease for each individual customer could be determined.
Therefore the trial court correctly ruled that refunds should be
made on an individual basis. The lump sum method advocated,
although less costly, would be inequitable and would require
someone other than plaintiff to distribute these funds. Ordinance
741 requires the seller to pay the refunds and, if the records have
been kept as required, the seller is in a much better position to do
so than anyone else.

The order and judgments of the trial court are affirmed in
part and reversed in part consistent with this opinion.

WINANS and WOLLMAN and COLER, Justices, and

641

FOSHEIM, Circuit Judge, concur.

FOSHEIM, Circuit Judge, a as a member of the court.

KRUEGER, Respondent v. STEVENS, Appellant
(244 N.W.2d 763)

(File No. 11697. Opinion filed August 19, 1976)

Richard 0. Gregerson, of Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith,
Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and respondent.

ae Pe
Parnell J. Donohue, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.
WOLLMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's petition
for change of custody of her minor children. We affirm.

The parties were married in 1965 and resided in the city of
Sioux Falls. Two sons were born during the marriage. Defendant
began seeing another man sometime in 1973. Plaintiff commenced
divorce proceedings and was granted a divorce from defendant
on December 28, 1973. The decree of divorce incorporated a
stipulation between the parties entered into on the advice of
counsel that plaintiff should have custody of the two boys, ages 8
and 7 at the time, during the months that they are in school, with.
defendant to have custody during the summer vacation. Visita-
tion rights were also provided for.

Following the divorce, defendant married the man she had
been seeing prior to her divorce from plaintiff and moved to
Storm Lake, Iowa, with him where she remained until September
of 1974, when she left her second husband and returned to Sioux
Falls and enrolled as a student at Sioux Falls College and obtain-
ed employment as a desk clerk at a local motel. At the time of the
hearing in the instant matter she was awaiting a divorce.

Plaintiff is employed as a display manager at a local retail
store in Sioux Falls. He acknowledged that a woman had been liv-
ing with him and his two sons for some time. We were advised in
the briefs and at oral argument that plaintiff married this woman
in September of 1975.

[Hf Although defendant contended that the boys were not
well cared for by plaintiff in that their clothing was frequently
unclean, undersized, and torn, and that their personal appearance
indicated neglect and lack of proper care, there was evidence in-
troduced that tended to negate these allegations. For example,
the principal of the school that the boys attend testified that the
boys are satisfactorily attired, have a satisfactory personal ap-
pearance, have adjusted quite well and are making very satisfac-

643

tory progress in school. With respect to plaintiff's personal rela-
tionship with his live-in female companion, however illicit that
relationship may have been by conventional standards it has
ripened into a formalized marriage. Moreover, similar conduct
has been held not to be a bar to a determination that a mother is a
fit person to have custody of minor children, Wiesner v. Wiesner,
80 S.D. 114, 119 N.W.2d 920, and we know of no reason why a
father should be held to a higher standard of personal conduct.

HM There is no question but that defendant cares for and is
concerned about the children. Pursuant to her visitation rights
she has had the boys in her home on weekends and during vaca-
tions and sees them after school on days that she is not at work.
She buys clothing for them frequently and has taken them swim-
ming, roller-skating, ice-skating and the like. The trial court con-
cluded, however, that it would be detrimental to the best in-
terests of the children to grant custody to defendant. After
reviewing the record in the light of our decision in Masek v.
Masek, 90 S.D. 1, 287 N.W.2d 432, we are persuaded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s petition
for change of custody. Defendant may not now question the cor-
rectness of the original custody disposition, and she has failed to
meet the burden of proving that a substantial and material
change of circumstances has occurred since the decree of divorce
was entered and that the welfare and best interests of the
children require a modification of the custody portion of the
divorce decree.

The order appealed from is affirmed.
DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., coneur.

ZASTROW, J., not having been a member of the Court at the
time this case was orally argued, did not participate.

a
rs
ts

LYNDOE, Appellant v. AMERICAN STANDARD
INS. CO. OF WISCONSIN, et al., Respondent

(245 N.W.2d 278)

(File No. 11722. Opinion filed August 19, 1976)

Ss
|
Lynden D. Levitt, Rapid City, for plaintiff and appellant.

Franklin J. Wallahan and Marvin D. Truhe, Hanley,
Wallahan, Huffman & Truhe, Rapid City, for defendant and
respondent, American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin.

DUNN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff Loren D. Lyndoe appeals from a judgment of the
Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit denying a
declaratory judgment against American Standard Insurance
Company of Wisconsin and Hugo Stender. The court ruled that
the company was not liable under its automobile liability in-
surance policy No. 90-010491, issued to defendant Stender, for in-
juries to plaintiff. We affirm.

Plaintiff was riding in his brother James Lyndoe’s pickup in
downtown Custer, South Dakota, on November 5, 1972. They
spotted Stender, an acquaintance, driving his pickup. The two
vehicles were driven off the main street and onto a gravel side
street where they were parked parallel to each other. Stender’s
vehicle was on the right. While Loren Lyndoe, Stender, and one
Rick Wheeler, a passenger in the Stender vehicle, chatted briefly
about hunting, James Lyndoe removed a saw and a hunting
license from the Stender vehicle’s box and glove compartment.
He then joined the conversation. After a few minutes, the parties
returned to their vehicles. The vehicles were stationary, and it is
unclear from the record whether the engines were running.
Stender attempted to hand a .38 caliber pistol through the
driver's window of his vehicle to plaintiff for his inspection.
Before plaintiff touched the gun it discharged accidentally, strik-
ing plaintiff in the mouth and lodging the bullet in his throat.

On August 28, 1973, Arthur Lyndoe, as guardian ad litem for
his son Loren, commenced a personal injury action against
Stender. American Standard refused to assume liability for any
sums plaintiff might recover as a result of the shooting incident.

6

On February 19, 1974, plaintiff brought an action for a
declaratory judgment against American Standard and Stender to
determine whether the automobile liability insurance policy
covered the incident. Stender filed a cross claim seeking a
declaration of American Standard’s liability under the policy for
injuries to plaintiff. Following the filing of depositions, inter-
rogatories, and answers to interrogatories, plaintiff moved for
summary judgment. Defendant American Standard resisted this,
requesting that the matter be decided as a court judgment upon
the materials submitted by plaintiff. Briefs were submitted to the
court. On January 21, 1975, the court stated its decision in a letter
to the parties. The court ruled that the policy did not provide
coverage for plaintiff's injuries; that the independent cause,
Stender’s conduct, did not constitute an “unloading” of the vehi-
cle. A judgment to that effect was filed April 10, 1975.

American Standard moved for dismissal of this appeal upon
the grounds that a copy of plaintiff's notice of appeal was not
served on Stender, as evidenced by the fact that no certificate of
service appeared in the settled record. The rule under which the
appeal would be dismissed is found at SDCL 15-26-83 which states:

“An appeal must be taken by serving on the
adverse party and filing with the clerk of the court in
which the judgment or order appealed from is entered a
notice, in writing, signed by the appellant or his at-
torney, stating the appeal from the same and whether
the appeal is from the whole or a part thereof, and if
from a part only, specifying the part appealed from.”

The key word appears to be “adverse.” This court has indicated
that if the party not served did not have an adverse interest to
the appealing party, the appeal will not be dismissed. Commercial
Service Corp. of Dell Rapids v. L. Paulle-Midway Fixture & Show
Case Co., Inc., 1954, 75 S.D. 409, 66 N.W.2d 523; Union Bond &
Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 1936, 64 S.D. 596, 269 N.W. 472; Lucey v.
Vilhauer, 1935, 64 S.D. 54, 264 N.W. 203.

In Commercial Service Corp., supra, the court stated:

“SDC 33.0703 (now SDCL 15-26-38) requires that the
notice of appeal be served on ‘the adverse party’. This
court has consistently held that under this code section
if a reversal or modification of the judgment cannot be
accomplished without adversely affecting the interest of
a party not served with the notice of appeal failure to
make such service is fatal to the entire appeal.” 75 S.D.
at 411, 66 N.W.2d at 524.

[i This case is unique in that although American Standard
and Stender were named as codefendants in the declaratory judg-
ment action, the interests of plaintiff and Stender are closer than
those of Stender and American Standard. In his cross claim,
Stender alleged that American Standard was liable under its
policy for the injuries to plaintiff. This, of course, is the same
relief sought by plaintiff in the declaratory judgment action.
Stender would be adversely affected by this court dismissing the
appeal, but he would not be adversely affected by our considering
the appeal. We conclude that Stender is not an adverse party to
plaintiff in this suit under SDCL 15-26-83, and the appeal should
not be dismissed.’

Plaintiff contends that the policy extends coverage to the act
of passing the pistol from the Stender vehicle. He points to the
following language of the policy:

“The company shall pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of:

Coverage A —bodily injury caused by accident and aris-
ing out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the
automobile.

* * * * * *

‘[U]se’ of the automobile includes loading and
unloading.”

1. The motion to dismiss the appeal was made at oral argument. The appellant
was given time to present further evidence of service on Stender or to make
any other showing as to the motion to dismiss. This he failed to do.

oS

Hf Courts have interpreted the “loading and unloading”
clause as an extension of the “use” clause of an insurance policy.
Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Concrete Products Co., 1973, Iowa,
203 N.W.2d 558. To determine what constitutes the “unloading”
process, two theories have been developed. These are the “com-
ing to rest” doctrine and the “complete operation” doctrine.
Under the former, an “unloading” process is comprised of the
removal of goods and their actual coming to rest, and is com-
pleted when every connection with the vehicle is terminated.
Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 1937, 226 Wis. 348, 276 N.W. 629. In the
latter, “unloading” covers the process from the beginning of the
movement of the goods until they reach their destination. State v.
District Court of Second Judicial District, 1940, 110 Mont. 250,
100 P.2d 932. See: Annotation, 160 A.L.R. 1259, § IV. In the case
at bar, the handing of the pistol was undeniably still in process
under either theory. There remains the question of whether the
“unloading” clause in the present policy should be interpreted
broadly enough to encompass the actions of Stender. Some causal
connection between the “use” of the vehicle, including any
“Joading and unloading,” and the accident must exist. Dairyland
Insurance Co. v. Concrete Products, Co., supra; Ohio Farmers In-
surance Company v. Landfried, 1972, D.C.Pa., 348 F.Supp. 486;
LaPointe v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Company, 1972, 361 Mass.
558, 281 N.E.2d 253; Maryland Cas. Co. v. N.J. Mfrs. & C., Ins. Co.,
1958, 48 N.J.Super. 314, 187 A.2d 577.

Plaintiff relies on several cases in which courts have held
that injuries from an accidental discharge of a gun may constitute
a “loading” or “unloading” of a vehicle. The authorities cited by
plaintiff deal with hunting expeditions in which someone was
removing a gun, Allstate Insurance Company v. Truck Ins. Ex-
change, 1974, 63 Wis.2d 148, 216 N.W.2d 205; Unigard Mut. Ins.
Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1972, 10 Cir., 466 F.2d 865;
Viani v. Aetna Insurance Company, 1972, 95 Idaho 22, 501 P.2d
706; Morari v. Atlantic Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 1970,
105 Ariz. 587, 468 P.2d 564; Dorsey v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co.,
Tex.Civ.App. 1932, 52 S.W.2d 775; replacing a gun, Travelers In-
surance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 1973, Tenn., 491 S.W.2d
363; or unloading a gun prior to replacing a gun in a vehicle, La-
viana v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Company, 1963, D.C.Vt., 224

SS «::

F.Supp. 563. In these cases the courts have determined that such
actions can be reasonably expected from persons engaged in
hunting and that accidents sometimes occur during such activity.
They have found the causal connection between the “use” of the
vehicle and the accident present, arising out of the “loading and
unloading” of the hunting gear. The courts have also relied upon
the generally accepted rule that any ambiguities in an insurance
contract are to be interpreted in favor of the insured, finding such
ambiguity in the “use” and “loading and unloading” terms of the
policy.

American Standard presents another line of authority
wherein courts have denied coverage under a “use” clause in a
policy when a person is injured in a vehicle by someone within the
vehicle loading, United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Western Fire
Ins. Co., 1970, Ky., 450 S.W.2d 491; moving, American Liberty In-
surance Company v. Soules, 1972, 288 Ala. 163, 258 So.2d 872; or
toying with a gun, Raines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Company, 1970, 9 N.C. App. 27, 175 S.E.2d 299; Brenner v. Aetna
Insurance Company, 1968, 8 Ariz.App. 272, 445 P.2d 474; Mason v.
Celina Mutual Insurance Company, 1967, 161 Colo. 442, 423 P.2d
24; and in cases where the vehicle is used as a gunrest, National
Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Gibbons, 1972, D.C. N.D.,
338 F.Supp. 430; Norgaard v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Company,
1972, N.D., 201 N.W.2d 871.2 These courts have held that the in-
juries were caused by the independent actions of the careless
party and did not arise or flow from the use of the vehicle as con-
templated by the policy. The vehicle was merely the situs of the
occurrence and had no causal connection to the accident.

Although none of the foregoing cases contains a similar fac-
tual situation to the case at bar, they do aid in interpreting the
present policy. Some of the cases involved efforts by a plaintiff to
include his injuries within an automobile policy providing
coverage under a “use” clause, while others involved an effort by
an insurer to exclude injuries from a homeowner’s policy because

2. Ci. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. Lott, 1960, 5 Cir., 273 F.2d
500, 502, wherein the court found the use of a vehicle as a gunrest to be “ ‘inci-
dent to and arising out of the use of a motor vehicle’ ” because the policy con-
tained no words limiting the definition of “use.”

650

of a clause excluding automobile “use.” In the latter policy the
“use” clause is given a narrow interpretation, while in the former,
courts have adopted a broader interpretation. Therefore the
broader view of the “use” clause must be adopted in this case.

HiHere the parties were within the City of Custer and not on
a hunting expedition. They were merely discussing past and
possible future hunting. The pistol was not to be delivered for the
purpose of hunting nor for any use other than an examination by
plaintiff followed by a return to Stender. It has been held that
under a “loading and unloading” clause, the efficient and
predominating cause of the accident must arise from the “use” of
the vehicle. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Statesman Ins.
Co., 1973, 260 Ind. 32, 291 N.E.2d 897; Bituminous Casualty Corp.
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 1964, 7 Cir., 330 F.2d 96; Clark
v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 1963, 7 Cir., 313 F.2d 160.
Stender’s actions were a continuation of the conversation be-
tween the parties and could well have taken place elsewhere ex-
cept for the temporary storage of the pistol in the vehicle. His in-
dependent act of reaching out the window of the vehicle was the
event which discharged the pistol. Only his hand and arm extend-
ed outside the vehicle. Plaintiff admitted that he could have
reached the pistol from his vehicle which was approximately two
feet away. The vehicle was merely the situs from which Stender
reached in attempting to deliver the pistol to plaintiff. We find
this case more analogous to those cases where a gun was passed
or moved within a vehicle than to those cases where a person
stepped from his vehicle and attempted to remove a gun. We con-
clude that the policy’s provisions cannot be interpreted so broad-
ly as to allow coverage here.

Affirmed.

WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.
COLER, J., dissents.

ZASTROW, J., not having been a member of the court at the
time this case was orally argued, did not participate.

COLER, Justice (dissenting).

The majority opinion acknowledges that none of the
numerous cases cited by the parties “contains a similar factual
situation to the case at bar” and with this statement I agree. The
majority of the court has also, for the purpose of construction,
properly adopted “the broader view of the ‘use’ clause” in an
automobile policy, but in the application of that rule the majority
has accomplished the opposite result by narrowly construing the
clause. I agree with what was stated by the Wisconsin Court in
Allstate Insurance Company v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 1974,
63 Wis.2d 148, 216 N.W.2d 205, wherein that court held that a
“loading and unloading” provision in an insurance contract
“would have to be considered an extension of the ‘use’ clause.
Such a rationale is necessary lest the ‘loading and unloading’ be
considered to mean nothing.”

The majority opinion does not extend, but rather limits, the
“loading and unloading” coverage by requiring a causal connec-
tion between vehicle use and the loading and unloading being
done.

I am convinced that the gun was being unloaded from the
vehicle within the meaning of the policy. Neither Stammer v.
Kitzmiller, 1937, 226 Wis. 348, 276 N.W. 629, nor State v. District
Court of Second Judicial District, 1940, 110 Mont. 250, 100 P.2d
932, is controlling in the instant case for both courts agree that
the process of unloading encompasses every act up to the point
where the process is complete. Those two courts only disagreed
as to when delivery was completed for the purpose of determin-
ing other insurers’ liability.

On the facts that appear in the record I would reverse the
judgment on the basis that “unloading” includes the entire pro-
cess of removal of anything within the motor vehicle to its
destination. It should not matter that the unloading in this case
was intended to be to another vehicle rather than a fixed place or
destination, and nothing within the policy or plain meaning of the
word “unloading” requires an unloading to be permanent as
against temporary.

a
a
ix}

STATE, Respondent v. STRONG, Appellant.
(245 N.W.2d 277)

(File No. 11585. Opinion filed September 3, 1976)

653

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Earl R. Mettler, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and respondent.

Dan C. Hanson, Mueller & Bennett, Belle Fourche, for
defendant and appellant.

COLER, Justice.

This appeal was taken from a conviction of the crime of
distributing marijuana contrary to the provisions of SDCL
39-17-88. We affirm.

Appellant was charged with having sold, on or about May 10,
1973, approximately five pounds of marijuana to an undercover
agent, one Naomi Church, also known as Cathy Clark. Appellant
claims (1) that the statute under which he was charged was un-
constitutional by reason of (a) a defective title to the act, (b) the
unreasonable statutory classification of marijuana as a Schedule I
drug, SDCL 39-17-57(7), and (c) the unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the then existing office of commissioner
of drug and substances control and, further, (2) that the trial court
erred; (a) in allowing the undercover agent to testify; (b) in in-

654 po

structing the jury in the manner it did on the issue of entrap-
ment; (c) by limiting cross-examination of the undercover agent;
and (d) in giving a special instruction in response to a question
from the jury after it had retired for deliberation.

The issue of the defect in the title to Chapter 229 of the Ses-
sion Laws of 1970, the principal source of SDCL 39-17, and the
subsequent codification of the law by Chapter 14 of the Session
Laws of 1972 (see SDCL 2-16-13 et seq.), and, further, the con-
struction and effect of SDCL 2-16-15, is controlled by the decision
of this court in State v. Barr, 1975, 89 S.D. 280, 232 N.W.2d 257
and State v. Murphy, 1975, 89 S.D. 486, 234 N.W.2d 54, and
deserves no further comment. The title to the act is no longer
subject to challenge.

Appellant, as his second challenge to the constitutionality
of the Drug and Substances Control Act, sets forth the claim that
the classification of marijuana as a class I drug or substance,
SDCL 39-17-55 to 39-17-57, inclusive, is unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious, and thus violated his rights under the equal pro-
tection clauses of the South Dakota and United States Constitu-
tions. South Dakota Constitution, Article VI, Section 18; United
States Constitution Amendment 14.

The argument advanced by appellant is the same argument
which was presented to and adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court in People v. McCabe, 49 Ill.2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407. In
essence, the contention is that the classification of marijuana
with numerous other controlled drugs and substances, many of
which are in the category of hard drugs, without providing -
penalties which are commensurate with their narcotic effect or
propensity for addiction is in violation of the equal protection
clause. This claimed lack of uniformity lies in the fact that a con-
viction for a first offense violation of SDCL 39-17-88, covering
both Schedule I and Schedule II controlled drugs or substances,
carries with it a maximum imprisonment of ten years or a fine of
not more than $5,000, or both.

While this court took cognizance of People v. McCabe, supra,
in State v. Shearer, 1972, 86 S.D. 711, 201 N.W.2d 180 (see 86 S.D.

ee 655

p. 717, in. 1), we are asked to reassess our position in light of the
fact that a number of trial and intermediate courts have followed
the reasoning of the McCabe decision. The import of these deci-
sions is that, based upon more enlightened medical and scientific
knowledge relative to both beneficial and harmful effects of mari-
juana, such a classification is violative of the equal protection
rights. Illustrative of cases in which lower courts have taken
testimony, made comparisons between marijuana, barbiturates
and amphetamines and also have likened the use of marijuana to
the use of cigarettes and alcohol to reflect a statutory incon-
sistency is set forth in State v. Anonymous, Conn.Super., 32
Conn.Sup. 324, 355 A.2d 729. While we cannot support the conclu-
sion reached by Judge Berdon in State v. Anonymous, supra, the
decision does provide a rather complete listing of the decisions
and recognized publications lending support to the McCabe
holding.

At the outset, it is a well settled rule of this court that “when
a party assails the constitutionality of an act, he must show
beyond reasonable doubt that it is in violation of the fundamental
law of our government. Every presumption is in favor of the
validity of a legislative enactment, and it is for the attacking
party to show that his rights are invaded by that act, and that it
does not come within the legitimate exercise of the lawmaking
power under the constitution.” State v. Morgan, 1891, 2 S.D. 32,
48 N.W. 314, writ dismissed, 159 U.S. 261, 15 S.Ct. 1041, 40 L.Ed.
145; State v. Reininger, 1931, 59 S.D. 336, 239 N.W. 849. We have
also held that “The passage of the law by the Legislature raises a
presumption of its constitutionality. [citation omitted] To over-
come this presumption there must be facts of which we will take
judicial notice which will permit us to say that there is no rational
basis for the distinction.” Great Northern Ry. v. Whitfield, 1937,
65 S.D. 173, 272 N.W. 787. In this context appellant offered no ex-
pert testimony in the trial court, but has asked this court to take
judicial notice of several medical and legal journals and congres-
sional reports tending to cast doubt on the reasonableness of the
classification of marijuana as a controlled substance for the pur-
pose of imposing criminal sanctions. Admittedly, there is as much
disagreement among the experts and the courts now as there was
at the time that the law in question was enacted.

656 Pe

The statutory scheme here involved does not involve basic
or fundamental rights or interests of appellant and

“the concept of equal protection as embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954),
does not require that all persons be dealt with identical-
ly, but rather that there be some ‘rational basis’ for the
statutory distinctions made, McGinnis v. Royster, 410
USS. 263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1060, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973),
or that they ‘have some relevance to the purpose for
which the classification is made.’” (citations omitted)
Marshall v. United States, 1974, 414 U.S. 417, 94 S.Ct.
700, 38 L.Ed.2d 618.

As stated in McLaughlin v. Florida, 1964, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct.
283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222, “Normally, the widest discretion is allowed
the legislative judgment in determining whether to attack some,
rather than all, of the manifestations of the evil aimed at; and nor-
mally that judgment is given the benefit of every conceivable cir-
cumstance which might suffice to characterize the classification
as reasonable rather than arbitrary and invidious.” Considering
the lack of unanimity in either legal or scientific opinion as to the
effects of marijuana, we agree with the Supreme Court of
Missouri wherein it stated “ “The classification, we believe, is
reasonable and not arbitrary despite the fact that some of the
drugs listed could be classified different.’ ” State v. Burrow, 1974,
Mo., 514 S.W.2d 585.

With specific reference to appellant’s contention that mari-
juana is less harmful than tobacco and alcohol, we find support for
our holding from the United States Court of Appeals, Second Cir-
cuit, which, considering the same challenge to similar provisions
of the federal act, concluded that “If Congress decides to regulate
or prohibit some harmful substances, it is not thereby constitu-
tionally compelled to regulate or prohibit all. It may conclude
that half a loaf is better than none.” United States v. Kiffer, 1973,
2 Cir., 477 F.2d 349, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831, 94 S.Ct. 62, 38
L.Ed.2d 65. Therefore, appellant’s attack upon the constitu-
tionality of the statute, based upon its classification, must fail.

657

[i Collaterally, appellant claims that the provisions of SDCL
39-17-96, which provides for a reduced penalty for certain convic-
tions involving one ounce or less of marijuana, supports his con-
tention of a violation of the equal protection clauses. Further, he
contends that the provisions of SDCL 39-17-69, which authorizes
administrative rescheduling of substances and setting forth cer-
tain standards, are an unlawful delegation of power violative of
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution of South Dakota. Ap-
pellant was charged with the sale, not the possession, of pounds,
and not an ounce or less, or marijuana, and further, marijuana is a
legislatively scheduled substance and not a substance added to
the schedule by administrative action. Appellant is without
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the law not affect-
ing him. State v. Shearer, supra; City of Pierre v. Russell, 1975, 89
8.D. 70, 228 N.W.2d 338; State v. Runge, 1975, 89 S.D. 376, 233
N.W.2d 321.

The state's principal witness against appellant was one
Naomi Church, a paid undercover agent as authorized by SDCL
89-17-121, who for the purposes of her activities operated under
the name of Cathy Clark. It also appears that Ms. Church was a
sworn deputy sheriff of Butte County. After considerable ex-
perience in undercover work in other states, Ms. Church came to
the state of South Dakota under the auspices of the Division of
Criminal Investigation in December of 1972 and continued as an
undercover agent until late August of 1973. In that period of time,
she had made between 200 and 250 buys of controlled drugs and
substances. Ms. Church was either well informed or had the un-
canny ability to locate and frequent establishments, particularly
liquor establishments, which were patronized by persons con-
nected with traffic in controlled drugs and substances. Ms.
Church let it be known that she was in the market for “goodies.”
She first met appellant in January of 1973 and by early May of
1973 had established a rapport with him to the extent that on or
about May 8, 1973, appellant offered to sell to Ms. Church approx-
imately 12 pounds of marijuana for the purpose of raising money
to buy a drug, identified only as MDA, which appellant had ar-
ranged to get from Seattle. Subsequently, on May 9, 1973, ap-
pellant contacted Ms. Church at which time he revealed that he
no longer had 12 pounds but that there remained for sale five

658

pounds of marijuana. Arrangement was made for Ms. Church to
buy the remaining marijuana and it was agreed that the price she
would pay would be $125 per pound. On the following day, May
10, 1973, Ms. Church went to a bank in Belle Fourche and picked
up $1,000 for the purpose of effecting the buy for $625. After pay-
ing this sum to appellant, they drove to a.residence in Belle
Fourche where appellant picked up the marijuana in four green
plastic bags and placed them in a paper sack which he brought
with him and ultimately left in the car driven by Ms. Church.
Later in the day, Ms. Church turned the sack and its contents
over to an officer who had been observing appellant’s and Ms.
Church's activities at a discreet distance.

Counsel for appellant objected to the admission of any
testimony of Naomi Church based upon the grounds that “The ac-
tivities of the undercover agent and Deputy Sheriff, Naomi
Church, in soliciting marijuana from the Appellant, violated the
Appellant's rights of the 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments to the
United States Constitution.”

If The theory that the turning over of contraband to an
undercover agent is violative of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution or to South Dakota Constitution, Arti-
cle VI, Section 11 prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures
has not been definitively treated in prior decisions of this court.
The delivery of incriminating physical evidence to an undercover
agent does not constitute a search within the meaning of either
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Ar-
ticle VI, Section 11 of the South Dakota Constitution. In the first
instance, the drug involved was voluntarily and for consideration
delivered to the undercover agent and the transaction did not
take place within the home of appellant, a protected area within
the meaning of either Constitutional provision. The facts in this
case do not give rise to a claimed violation of a right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In accord, see Lewis v.
United States, 1966, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312,
rehearing denied, 386 U.S. 939, 87 S.Ct. 951, 17 L.Ed.2d 811; State
v. Hamm, 1975, 89 S.D. 507, 234 N.W.2d 60.

HM Appellant also argues that under the Fifth and Sixth

659

Amendments he was entitled to have the Miranda! warnings read
to him by the undercover agent as the investigation had focused
upon him. The plain language of the Miranda decision establishes
that, in speaking “of an investigation which had focused on an ac-
cused,” referred to in Escobedo? the court meant that

“the prosecution may not use statements, whether ex-
eulpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial inter-
rogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial inter-
rogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.” 884 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

It is uncontradicted in the record that appellant was not, in the
course of his dealings with Ms. Church, deprived of his freedom in
any significant way and we therefore determine the argument to
be unsupported by logic or authority.

Wi Appellant has urged that the trial court unduly restricted
cross-examination of Ms. Church. Following the trial court’s sus-
taining a general question as to Ms. Church’s health, appellant
made an offer of proof and the following occurred:

“Q > My question was whether Naomi had an illness last
year while you were in Spearfish?

COURT: What is your offer of proof?

Q My offer of proof, your honor, is that I will
establish that Miss Church suffered a miscarriage
last year while in Spearfish, and two girls helped
her—rescued her—that.

COURT: That is totally inadmissible.

1. Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
2, Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964, 878 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Bd.2d 977.

660 es

Q It goes to her credibility, your honor.

COURT: It does not. Do you have some law to support
your position?

Q The purposes of cross-examination are impeach-
ment and credibility of the witness.

COURT: The court rules that it is inadmissible.

Q I make my exception to your ruling.
COURT: Is there anything further?

Q Well as long as we are at it I also intend to ask her
about any possible physical characteristics and the
way she displayed them during the terms of her
undercover work in Spearfish.

COURT: Well, the court will refuse—that testimony
would be refused as well on the part of the court.”

The first offer of proof is self-explanatory, but the second offer of
proof assumes knowledge on the part of the trial court and
counsel not presented in the offer. Doubtless, at least one of the
physical characteristics alluded to in the offer of proof is reflected
in State v. Barr, supra. The record in that case revealed that Ms.
Church had certain tattoos on her breasts which she occasionally
displayed.

It is a settled rule of this court that “the extent of the cross-
examination in any case is vested largely in the discretion of the
trial judge, and, unless it is apparent that this discretion has been
abused, the ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed by this
court.” State v. Roberts, 1931, 58 S.D. 147, 235 N.W. 506. Con-
siderable latitude was given to counsel for appellant both in
cross-examination of Ms. Church and in the examination of his
witnesses. Appellant had ample opportunity to discredit the
testimony of Ms. Church but he was obviously unsuccessful. We
find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

ee

Hl Over objection of appellant, the court gave Instruction

No. 12 and Instruction No. 13, hereinafter set forth, relating to

the defense of entrapment:

INSTRUCTION NO. 12
“In drug related offenses it is a recognized and per-
missible means of apprehension to have law enforce-
ment personnel infiltrate the illegal activity and gain
confidence of the defendant. Hence, the use of under-
cover personnel does not, in itself, constitute entrap-
ment.”

INSTRUCTION NO. 13
“The law does not tolerate one person, particularly
a law enforcement officer, generating in the mind of
another person who is innocent of any criminal purpose,
the original intent to commit a crime thus inducing such
person to commit a crime which he would not have com-
mitted or even contemplated but for such inducement.

“Tf the intent to commit the crime did not originate
with the defendant and he was not carrying out his own
criminal purpose, but the crime was suggested by
another person for the purpose of entrapping and caus-
ing the arrest of the defendant, then the defendant is
not criminally liable for the acts so committed.

“However, when law enforcement officers are in-
formed that a person intends to commit a crime, the law
permits the officers to afford opportunity for the com-
mission of the offense, and to lend the apparent coopera-
tion of themselves or of a third person for the purpose of
detecting the offender. When officers do this, if the
suspect himself, originally and independently of the of-
ficers, intends to commit the acts constituting a crime,
and if he does acts necessary to constitute the crime, he
is guilty of the crime committed. He has no defense in
the fact that an officer or other person engaged in
detecting crime was present and provided the oppor-
tunity, or aided or encouraged the commission of the of-
fense.

662

“In considering the defense of entrapment the im-
portant question for you to determine is this: Did the
defendant conceive the idea of committing the crime
himself or was the idea conceived by another and sug-
gested to the defendant for the purpose of inducing him
to commit the crime in order to entrap him and cause his
arrest?

“Since evidence has been received on this issue, the
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not induced to commit the unlawful con-
duct for which he is charged by entrapment as herein
defined but that he was merely afforded an opportunity
to commit the offense which he was predisposed or
ready to commit.”

Appellant, on the other hand, offered defendant's proposed in-
structions 1, 2 and 3, which were refused, as follows:

INSTRUCTION NO. 1
“The basis of the entrapment defense is that the
methods used by the police or their agents are repug-
nant to fair play and justice. The significant focus must
be on the conduct of the government agents and not on
the predisposition of the Defendant.

“Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement agent
induces the commission of an offense, using persuasion
or other means likely to cause normally law-abiding per-
sons to commit the offense. Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense does not
constitute entrapment.

“When the police or their agent’s involvement in
criminal activity goes beyond the mere offering of such
an opportunity, and when their conduct is of a kind that
could induce or instigate the commission of a crime by
one not ready and willing to commit it, then, regardless
of the character or propensities of the particular person
induced, entrapment has occurred, for the government

663

has engaged in the impermissible manufacturing of
crime.”

INSTRUCTION NO. 2
“The Defendant has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was entrapped
into the commission of the crime. Preponderance of the
evidence means such evidence as, when weighed with
that opposed to it, has more convincing force and a
greater probability of truth.”

INSTRUCTION NO. 3

“A person is not guilty of a crime when he commits
an act or engages in conduct, otherwise criminal, when
the idea to commit the crime did not originate in the
mind of the Defendant but originated in the mind of
another and was suggested to the Defendant by a law
enforcement officer or by a person acting under the
direction, suggestion or control of a law enforcement of-
ficer for the purpose of inducing the Defendant to com-
mit the crime in order to entrap him or cause him to be
arrested.”

The instruction given by the court is essentially the language of
South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction (Criminal) 2-14-4, which
was promulgated in part from language found in State v.
Williams, 1970, 84 S.D. 547, 173 N.W.2d 889. It is appellant’s con-
tention that his proposed instructions evidence what he terms to
be the modern view as to an instruction on the defense of entrap-
ment. Appellant claims that the instructions proposed would
apply an objective standard relative to the predisposition of a
defendant to commit an unlawful act. Instruction No. 1 proposed
by appellant appears to borrow from text found in State v.
Mullen, 1974, Iowa, 216 N.W.2d 375. Proposed Instructions 2 and
8 were essentially taken from California Jury Instructions
Criminal 4,63 and 4.60, respectively, but no attempt was made to
, propose California Jury Instruction Criminal 4.61 (1974

664 Pe

Revision).?

The instructions given by the court did not place an undue
burden on appellant. The lowa Supreme Court in State v. Mullen,
supra, criticized instructions there given which made reference
to the predisposition of the defendant to commit a crime. No such
language appears in South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction. The
difficulty that has been experienced by the Iowa trial courts in
their attempt to draft an instruction in keeping with State v.
Mullen, supra, is obvious from a reading of State v. Potts, 1976,
Iowa, 240 N.W.2d 654. In Potts, the lowa Supreme Court criticiz-
ed certain language within the entrapment instruction given (see
underlined phrase thereof), but otherwise approved the instruc-
tion reading, in part, as follows:

“Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement agent in-
duces the commission of an offense, using persuasion or
other means likely to cause normally law-abiding per-
sons to commit the offense. Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense does not
constitute entrapment.

* * * * * *

The law permits officers of the government to af-
ford opportunities to citizens to commit a crime. They
may employ artifice and stratagems to catch persons
engaged in criminal enterprise, but they cannot implant
in the minds of innocent persons the disposition to com-
mit a crime and induce its commission in order that they
may prosecute. The test is the effect of the police or

8. California Jury Instruction Criminal 4.61 (1974 Revision) reads as follows:
“Law enforcement officers [or persons acting under their direction, sug-
gestion or control] may provide opportunity for the commission of crime
and extend their apparent cooperation for the purpose of detecting the
offender. If the suspect, originally and independently of the officers [or
other persons], had the intent, whenever the opportunity arose, to com-
mit the acts constituting the crime charged, and if he does acts necessary
to constitute the crime, he is guilty of the crime committed. He has no
defense in the fact that officers [or other persons] engaged in detecting
crime were present and provided the opportunity, or aided or encour:
aged the commission of the offense.”

their agent’s inducements upon an average law-abiding
person’s mind.’”

While it may well be that a better instruction on entrapment
could be designed, we cannot fault the instruction given as
against the instructions proposed. Appellant was not entrapped
as a matter of law and as this court stated in State v. Nelsen,
1975, 89 S.D. 1, 228 N.W.2d 143, “where the evidence is in conflict
as to the origin of the intent to commit the offense the question of
entrapment should go to the jury.

Hf During deliberations the jury returned to the courtroom
and in a note asked the following question of the court “Is there
any chance of getting a record on the $1000 from the bank?”
SDCL 15-6-51(a), RCP Rule 51(a), in part, provides:

“After the jury have retired for deliberation if
there be a disagreement between them as to any part of
the testimony or if they desire to be informed of any
point of law arising in the case, they may require the of-
ficer to conduct them into court. Upon their being
brought into court the information required, if given,
must be given in the presence of, or after notice to the
parties or counsel, and the instruction given shall be
taken down by the court reporter.”

In a consultation with counsel for both the state and the ap-
pellant, the court suggested that the jury be instructed that the
$1000 from the bank was of no concern to the jury. At the request
of appellant, certain language was accepted and the special in-
struction given to the jury read:

“The $1,000.00 from the bank is no concern of the
jury. Your only concern is the purchase price of
$625.00.”

According to the record, after consultation with appellant,
counsel for appellant advised the court that he was “satisfied”
with that instruction. Appellant, by consenting thereto, waived
any claim he might have by reason of his failure to object and the

666
instruction given became the law of the case. RCP Rule 51(b) and
cases annotated thereunder. Further, it is obvious from the in-
struction given that the trial court saw no materiality to the
evidence which the jury solicited and we agree. We find no abuse
of discretion. Myron v. Coil, 1966, 82 S.D. 180, 143 N.W.2d 738.
Affirmed.
DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and WOLLMAN, JJ., concur.

ZASTROW, J., not having been a member of the court at the
time this case was orally argued, did not participate.

PETERSEN, Appellant v. PETERSEN et al., Respondents
(245 N.W.2d 285)

(File No. 11736. Opinion filed September 3, 1976)

Gary E. Davis, Johnson, Johnson & Eklund, Gregory, for
plaintiff and appellant.

pT 667

J. W. Grieves, Winner, for defendants and respondents.

WOLLMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's motion to
set aside a judgment quieting title to and ordering the partition
sale of some 505 acres of land in Mellette County, South Dakota.
We affirm.

In June of 1945 appellant commenced an action for the parti-
tion and sale of the land in question. On November 24, 1945, the
circuit court entered a judgment decreeing appellant to be the
owner of a 15/18ths interest in the land; two of appellant’s
brothers, Chris and Knut Petersen, and a sister-in-law, Mary
Petersen were adjudged to be the owners of the remaining
3/18ths interest in the land. The judgment further decreed that
the land be sold at partition sale and that the real estate taxes
that appellant had paid on the land during prior years should be
held to be in full satisfaction of all rents that appellant might
have been charged with for his use and occupancy of the land (the
court having found that appellant had been in possession of the
land since 1932).

The partition sale was never held, however, and appellant
continued in possession of the land, apparently without incident,
until sometime in 1972 when he asked Attorney William F. Day of
Winner, South Dakota, to commence legal action to determine his
rights in the land, Knut Petersen and Mary Petersen having died.
Mr. Day in turn asked J. M. Grossenburg, who subsequently went
into partnership with him, to work on the matter. Mr. Grossen-
burg prepared a legal memorandum for Mr. Day in which he con-
cluded that appellant’s claim of adverse possession against the
owners of the remaining fractional interest in the land was not
likely to be successful. After discussing the matter with Mr. Day
and having several conferences with appellant, Mr. Grossenburg
prepared and served a complaint asking that appellant be ad-
judged to be the sole owner of the land on the basis of his adverse
possession of the same, or in the alternative that appellant be
decreed to be the owner of a 600/720th interest in the land, that
Chris Petersen and the heirs of Knut Petersen and Mary

868 po

Petersen (hereinafter referred to as defendants) be decreed to be
the owners of their respective shares of the remaining fractional
interest in the land, and that the land be partitioned among the
parties according to their respective interests or sold if actual
partition could not be had.

By letter dated July 9, 1974, Mr. Grossenburg informed ap-
pellant that the action was scheduled to be heard on the morning
of July 23, 1974, and advised appellant to be present at the court-
house in White River, South Dakota, at that time. When appellant
did not appear for trial at the appointed time, Mr. Grossenburg
when to his home in White River. Appellant was not there,
however (appellant testified at the hearing on the motion that he
was lying ill at his ranch home on the morning of trial), and Mr.
Grossenburg was unable to contact him by phone. Mr. Grossen-
burg returned to the courtroom and entered into a stipulation
with defendants’ attorney that appellant’s claim of ownership
based upon adverse possession be withdrawn, that the ownership
of the land be decreed as set forth in appellant’s complaint, that
the trust officer of the Farmers State Bank in Winner be named
as referee for the purpose of making a partition sale, and that the
amount of taxes paid by appellant on defendants’ share of the
land should be offset against plaintiff's use of defendants’ share of
the land. Judgment was subsequently entered decreeing owner-
ship of the land in the proportions set forth in appellant’s com-
plaint and ordering that a partition sale be held.

On July 24, 1974, Mr. Grossenburg sent appellant a two-page
letter which fully and completely explained the actions that Mr.
Grossenburg had taken during the trial on the preceding day. Mr.
Grossenburg explained that he had withdrawn the claim of
adverse possession of the 3/18ths interest because of the fact that
in the 1945 action appellant had admitted that he did not own the
3/18ths interest and also because appellant had apparently
written a letter in 1972 to one of the owners of the fractional in-
terest asking how much she and the other heirs wanted for their
interests in the land. Mr. Grossenburg explained in the letter, as
he apparently had done in office conferences with appellant, that
his purpose in including the adverse possession claim in the com-

669

plaint was to attempt to generate a reasonable settlement with
the owners of the outstanding fractional interest. He pointed out
that because all of the owners of the fractional interest were
living it might be possible to negotiate a settlement with them,
and that failing a settlement the land would be sold at a partition
sale. The letter closed by asking appellant to advise Mr. Day and
Mr. Grossenburg whether he was interested in buying the frac-
tional shares owned by defendants or whether he desired that the
property be sold and the proceeds divided.

On August 16, 1974, Mr. Grossenburg wrote to the trust of-
ficer who had been appointed as referee and asked him to proceed
with the appraisal of the land; a copy of this letter was sent to ap-
pellant. Mr. Grossenburg subsequently sent a copy of the ap-
praisal report to appellant and advised him that defendants’ at-
torney was in the process of obtaining a settlement proposal from
his clients.

By letter dated January 22, 1975, a copy of which was sent to
appellant, Mr. Grossenburg advised defendants of the size of
their undivided fractional interests and the amount of money
those shares would be worth at the appraised price. The letter
stated in part that:

“Our client, Hans Petersen, hereby offers to pur-
chase your share in the 505 acres for the appraised
amount which is listed below. If you want to accept this
offer, please let us know immediately and we will send a
Deed and once the Deed is returned to us signed by you,
we will send a check for the appraised amount.

* * * * * *

“Tf all of the property can not be purchased in this
manner, it will be sold at public auction and the proceeds
distributed.”

Mr. Grossenburg testified that this letter was sent after ap-
pellant had spent a good deal of time with him going over the frac-

670 es

tional interests and computing the amounts due each owner.
Prior to the time the letter was sent appellant had told Mr.
Grossenburg to, in Mr. Grossenburg’s words,

“Definitely sell it if we can sell it for the appraised
price.’ And in fact I believe he had written a check—we
had made an offer to one of the heirs for less than the ap-
praised price and he gave me a check to hold in the file
because that heir refused to take less than the appraised
price.”

On January 27, 1975, appellant wrote to Mr. Grossenburg
and in substance stated that he did not like the way the paper
(presumably the judgment) was made up and that he was going to
go to court with them (presumably the defendants) if he could.
Mr. Grossenburg testified that appellant had expressed unhap-
piness over the fact that he could not acquire full ownership of
the property by adverse possession but had agreed with Mr.
Grossenburg’s advice that he could not get it by adverse posses-
sion and should attempt to resolve the matter by offering to pay
defendants the appraised value for their interests in the prop-
erty. Mr. Grossenburg testified that appellant’s letter of January
27, 1975, was the first time that appellant had made any concrete
objection to the sale of the property.

Sometime late in January of 1975 appellant told the judge
who had heard the partition action that he wanted a trial in his
ease. After being informed of this fact, Mr. Grossenburg wrote to
appellant and again fully set forth the reasons why he entered in-
to the stipulation with counsel for defendants. Apparently ap-
pellant still was not satisfied with the explanation, for on
February 10, 1975, Mr. Grossenburg advised appellant that he
and Mr. Day were withdrawing as appellant’s counsel and advis-
ed appellant to seek other counsel. Appellant did so and on May 8,
1975, his present counsel made a motion pursuant to SDCL
15-6-60(b) to set aside the judgment that had been entered in ac-
cordance with the July 23, 1974, stipulation. The trial court
denied the motion on the grounds that appellant had failed to at-
tend the trial on July 23, 1974, having received ample notice of
the time and place of the hearing, and had failed to make a timely

es en

request for a continuation of the trial or a rehearing of the mat-
ter; that the affidavit filed by appellant in support of his motion
to set aside the judgment, together with his testimony at the
hearing on the motion, established that no different result would
be obtained on a rehearing with respect to appellant’s claim of
adverse possession;* and that the judgment entered subsequent
to the July 23, 1974, hearing was consistent with the alternative
relief sought by appellant in his complaint.

We conclude that the trial court properly denied appellant's
motion. A fair reading of the record leads to the conclusion that
appellant was fully and fairly advised by his trial counsel of the
action that counsel had taken at the July 23, 1974, hearing; that
appellant understood what Mr. Grossenburg had done, notwith-
standing his claim at the hearing on the motion to set aside the
judgment that he had difficulty in reading the correspondence
and legal papers sent to him by his attorney; that he understood
full well the nature of the relief that his counsel were praying for
in the complaint; that he agreed with his counsel that the best
course of action was to attempt to buy the outstanding fractional
interests from the defendants at the appraised price; that he in
fact made an offer to purchase those fractional interests; and that
he first voiced specific objection to a partition sale of the prop-
erty only when it became apparent that defendant Chris
Petersen was unwilling to sell his fractional share at the apprais-
ed price. Indeed, appellant himself testified that, “They wouldn’t
settle with me when I offered what they appraised the land at
and they wouldn’t settle and now I am going to court with it” [all
of the defendants but Chris Petersen had agreed to accept the ap-
praised price for their interests].

It has been held that:

“Even an unauthorized compromise of an action by
an attorney may be ratified, either impliedly or express-
ly, by the client, who is thereafter bound by it despite
the initial defect.” Gran v. City of St. Paul, 274 Minn.
220, 223, 143 N.W.2d 246, 249 (footnote omitted).

* See Iverson v. Iverson, 87 S.D. 628, 213 N.W.2d 708.

672 a

Likewise it has been said that:

“A client ratifies his attorney’s act if he does not
repudiate it promptly upon receiving knowledge that
the attorney has exceeded his authority. In Bawmgart-
ner v. Whinney, 156 Pa.Super. 167, 171, 39 A.2d 738, 740,
that court said, “True, an attorney has no power, in the
absence of express authority, to compromise or settle
his client’s claim. North Whitehall Township v. Keller,
100 Pa. 105. But a client may ratify his attorney's acts;
and “an affirmance of an unauthorized transaction may
be inferred from a failure to repudiate it”: Restatement,
Agency, § 94. Indeed, a client makes his attorney's act
his own if he does not disavow it the first moment he
receives knowledge that his attorney has transcended
his authority. Bredin v. Dubarry, 14 Serg. & R.27; Filby
v. Miller, 25 Pa. 264; Andersen Coal M. Co. v. Sloan,
Howell & Co., 46 Pa.Super. 320; Smuckler v. DiNapoli,
62 Pa.Super. 570.’ Here there is no allegation of any
repudiation of the stipulation until twenty months after
appellant was acquainted with its content.” Yarnall v.
Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 87 A.2d 192, 193.

See also Navrides v. Zurich Insurance Company, 5 Cal.3d 698, 97
Cal.Rptr. 309, 488 P.2d 637; Yahola Sand and Gravel Co. v. Marx ,
Okl., 358 P.2d 366; Annot. 30 A.L.R.2d 944; 7 Am.Jur.2d, At-
torneys at Law, § 127.

We conclude that appellant acquiesced in the action taken by
his counsel to stipulate that judgment be entered in accordance
with the alternative prayer for relief set forth in the complaint
and that although counsel may not have had specific authority to
enter into the stipulation, appellant by his acts and words ratified
the stipulation and the judgment entered in accordance
therewith. Although it is true that appellant did not receive and
retain tangible benefits in the nature of money from the judg-
ment, cf. Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, supra, nor did
defendants change their position in reliance upon the judgment,
by authorizing his trial counsel to make a purchase offer based
upon the determination of ownership set forth in the stipulated

eC 673

judgment and in the amount of the appraisal resulting from the
judgment appellant received at least intangible benefits from the
stipulated judgment. Appellant would understandably have
preferred to obtain the outstanding interest in the land for
nothing. He was perhaps justifiably bitter towards his relatives
for having left it to him to redeem the land from tax sale pro-
ceedings in the darkest days of the depression and drought.
Whatever his personal feelings, however, appellant was not en-
titled to on the one hand rely upon the stipulated judgment as a
mechanism for obtaining the ownership of the outstanding in-
terest and on the other to disclaim the judgment when that at-
tempt did not wholly succeed.

In holding that appellant ratified the actions of his trial
counsel, we do not in any manner recede from the principles set
forth in Northwest Realty Co. v. Perez, 80 S.D. 62, 119 N.W.2d
114, the facts of which are clearly distinguishable from those in
the case at bar inasmuch as in that case counsel did not at any
time inform his client that he had executed the stipulations for
dismissal. Because the client moved to have the stipulations and
order of dismissal set aside as soon as he learned of them, no ele-
ment of ratification was present. As has been detailed above,
however, in the instant case appellant’s trial counsel gave ap-
pellant prompt written explanation of what had been done at the
trial—an explanation that when coupled with the numerous
pretrial and post trial conferences counsel had with appellant
must surely have been completely comprehensible to appellant.
Appellant chose to follow his trial counsel’s recommendation to
purchase defendants’ interests in the land in accordance with the
determination set forth in the judgment and by so doing ratified
the stipulation and judgment by his conduct as surely as if he had
signed the stipulation himself.

The order denying the motion to set aside the judgment is af-
firmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur.

ZASTROW, J., not having been a member of the court at the
time of argument, took no part in this decision.

674

ST. JOHN’S HOSPITAL MEDICAL STAFF et al., Respondents
vy. ST. JOHN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
Appellant
(245 N.W.2d 472)

(File No. 11746. Opinion filed September 3, 1976)

CO
Ft

Glenn A. Fingerson and Everett E. Hoyt, Huron, for plain-
tiffs and respondents.

James E. Doyle, of Doyle & Bierle, Yankton, Horty,
Springer & Mattern, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant and ap-
pellant.

David A. Gerdes, of May, Porter, Adam, Gerdes & Thomp-
son, Pierre, for amicus curiae, South Dakota Medical Association.

MILLER, Circuit Judge.

St. John’s Hospital Medical Staff (hereinafter referred to as
medical staff) is an unincorporated association whose members
are physicians duly licensed to practice medicine in South
Dakota, holding medical staff privileges at and utilizing the
facilities of the St. John Regional Medical Center, Inc., of Huron,
South Dakota. St. John Regional Medical Center (hereinafter
referred to as medical center) is a South Dakota corporation, in-
corporated under the laws regulating nonprofit corporations and
is authorized to operate in the State of South Dakota.

This is an action for declaratory judgment under SDCL
21-24-1 et seq. It was commenced by the medical staff on June 25,
1973, asking the trial court to determine the rights and duties of
the parties under an agreement designated as the “Bylaws,
Rules, and Regulations of St. John’s Hospital Medical Staff”
(hereinafter referred to as medical staff bylaws) as those bylaws
related to the corporate bylaws (hereinafter referred to as
medical center bylaws) enacted by the defendant. Plaintiffs re-
quested the trial court to compel the defendant to abide by the
provisions of certain medical staff bylaws and to invalidate the

es

purported changes unilaterally made by the medical center in
such bylaws. The trial court granted the requested relief and the
medical center appealed. On appeal, the medical center argues (1)
that the trial court erred in holding that a legal contract existed
between the medical staff and the medical center by reason of the
medical staff bylaws, and (2) that the medical staff lacks the at-
tributes of a legal entity necessary to commence this action.

In 1947, and prior thereto, there were two hospitals
operating in Huron; one was Sprague Hospital, operated by the
Huron Clinic Group and the other was the Tschetter Hospital,
operated by the Tschetter-Hohm Clinic Group. Other physicians
practicing in the community but not associated with either group
constituted a third group. In 1944, the Huron Clinie Group en-
couraged the Franciscan Sisters of Chicago to come to Huron and
construct a hospital which is now the medical center. At this
same time, plans were being made and steps were being taken by
the Tschetter-Hohm Group to build a hospital in Huron. Because
of economic factors, however, the Tschetter-Hohm Group aban-
doned its plans to construct a competing hospital and joined in
the construction of the medical center. In October 1947, as con-
struction of the medical center neared completion, the Sisters of
the Franciscan Order proposed certain medical staff bylaws to
regulate the affairs of the physicians wanting to use the hospital.
These bylaws were taken from a book on hospital organization
and management.' They were printed and distributed to the doc-
tors of the area who were considering association with the
hospital. The proposed medical staff bylaws contained an
“Amendment Article” and an “Equally Binding Article.” The in-
terpretation and effect of these articles formulate the main issues
of this action. The “Amendment Article” provides:

“Article VIIL
“These by-laws may be amended after notice given
at any regular meeting of the staff. Such notices shall be
laid on the table until the next regular meeting and shall
require a two-thirds majority of those present for adop-
tion. Amendments so made shall be effective when ap-
proved by the governing body.”

1. McKechrine, Hospital Organization and Management.

677

The “Equally Binding” article provides:

“Article IX
“These by-laws shall be adopted at any regular
meeting of the staff and shall become effective when ap-
proved by the governing body of the hospital. They shall
when adopted and approved, be equally binding on the
governing body and the staff.”

After a great deal of discussion concerning these two provisions,
as well as provisions relating to the internal rotation of staff, the
medical staff bylaws were adopted by the medical staff and ap-
proved by the medical center.

These medical staff bylaws were in effect from 1947 until
1972. During that time, various amendments were made to them
in accordance with the amendment procedure prescribed. In
1972, the medical center wished to make certain changes in the
bylaws.2 The attempted changes were unacceptable to the
medical staff and an impasse developed. Out of this impasse
springs the present lawsuit.

On November 24, 1972, the board of directors of the medical
center unilaterally adopted new medical staff bylaws which were
not approved by the medical staff. The medical center now insists
that the medical staff is bound by the bylaws so adopted. The
medical staff contends and the trial court held that the 1972 revis-
ed medical staff bylaws are null and void by reason of the fact
that they were not enacted according to the provisions set out in
the original 1947 medical staff bylaws.

The main issue raised in this appeal is whether the board of
directors of the medical center has the power to amend the 1947
medical staff bylaws without the participation and approval of
the medical staff as provided for in Article VIII of the medical

2. E.g., one change would allow the Chief Executive Officer of the medical center
to temporarily suspend the clinical privileges of a staff physician upon a deter-
mination that the action must be taken immediately in the best interests of the
patient care in the medical center. Another change would require medical
enter approval of all officers of the medical staif. These examples are for ik
lustrative purposes only.

678

staff bylaws. The medical center argues that the trial court erred
in holding that a legal contract existed between the medical staff
and the medical center by reason of the original 1947 medical
staff bylaws. It raises two policy arguments in support of this
contention: the power to amend the articles must be lodged in the
directors in order (a) to avoid impending loss of accreditation, and
(b) to avoid the possibility of independent hospital liability in
some future case of malpractice. After a review of the record, we
find these arguments to be without merit. The trial court
specifically held that there was no evidence that the hospital
would lose accreditation if it were not allowed to revise the
medical staff bylaws. Further, the medical center’s assertions
regarding independent liability are premature and not vital to
this appeal. We therefore decline to decide that issue.

[i The medical center additionally argues that the medical
staff lacks the attributes of a legal entity necessary to commence
this action. As stated above, the medical staff represents an unin-
corporated association of the individual physicians holding
medical staff privileges at the medical center. SDCL 21-24-2 pro-
vides that:

“The word ‘person’ wherever used in [the
declaratory judgment chapter] shall be construed to
mean any *** unincorporated association, or society
* * of any character whatsoever.”

Therefore, plaintiff medical staff is a proper party to bring this
action. Cf. Schallenkamp v. Stevens, 1965, 81 S.D. 573, 188 N.W.2d
657. See also SDCL 2-14-2(16).

The remaining question to be resolved is whether the trial
court erred in holding that the medical staff bylaws adopted and
approved by both the medical center and the medical staff con-
stitute a contract.

HBAs a general rule, the bylaws of a corporation, so long as
adopted in conformity with state law, constitute a binding con-
tract between the corporation and its shareholders. Allied Super-
markets, Inc. v. Grocer’s Dairy Company, 1973, 45 Mich.App. 310,

LS  «°

206 N.W.2d 490, 498, affirmed 1974, 391 Mich. 729, 219 N.W.2d 55.

Hf An analogous rule in the area of medical staff bylaws is
found in Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Associa-
tion, Inc., 1959, 895 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456, 458, where the court
stated that “[t]he relationship between a hospital association and
a member of the hospital's staff is based on contract * * *.” The
court continued:

“While [the doctor’s] relationship to the hospital
was not that of membership in a voluntary organization,
nevertheless he and the hospital had, in legal contempla-
tion, entered into a contract whereof the provisions of
the staff by-laws, as approved by the hospital’s board of
directors, constitute the legally binding terms. In the
circumstances present, the defendant corporation is
bound by the staff by-laws just as much as a voluntary
association is bound by the provisions of its by-laws. In
both instances, the respective organizations have
enacted and approved the by-laws which are an integral
part of the contractual relationship between such
organizations and their members or ones holding under
them.” 149 A.2d at 459.

See also Joseph v. Passaic Hospital Ass’n, 26 N.J. 557, 141 A.2d
18. In the present case, we hold that the 1947 medical staff bylaws
do constitute a contract which is, by its express terms, subject to
amendment when the amendment is agreed to by both the
medical staff and the medical center.

I The principles which governs the construction of con-
tracts also govern the construction and interpretation of cor-
porate bylaws. State v. Johnson, 1963, 21 Wis.2d 482, 124 N.W.2d
624, 626, 627. See also 18 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, §-168, p. 699.
One such construction principle is that:

““* * * where the terms of a contract are plain and unam-
biguous, the duty of the court is to construe it as it
stands, giving effect to the plain meaning of the
language used * * *.” State v. Johnson, 124 N.W.2d at
626-627.

80

In the instant case, Article IX of the 1947 medical staff
bylaws, governing the effect that their approval shall have, pro-
vides that:

““*** They shall when adopted and approved be
equally binding on the governing body and the staff.”

The medical staff bylaws were so adopted and approved.
Therefore, both the medical staff and the medical center are
bound by them until they are amended in accordance with the
procedure set out in Article VIII as hereinbefore set forth so long
as these bylaws are in conformity with state law. State v.
Johnson and Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital
Association, Inc., supra.

A review of South Dakota law does not disclose any such
nonconformity. SDCL 47-22-63° grants the corporation power to
make or alter bylaws for the administration and regulation of cor-
porate affairs, so long as such bylaws are not inconsistent with
the corporate charter or state laws. SDCL 47-22-33 carries this
power one additional step in that:

“*** The power to alter, amend or repeal the
bylaws or adopt new bylaws shall be vested in the board
of directors unless otherwise provided in*** the
bylaws. The bylaws may contain any provisions for the
regulation and management of the affairs of a corpora-
tion not inconsistent with law or the articles of incor-
poration.” (emphasis supplied)

In the present case the medical staff bylaws did so otherwise pro-
vide.

Wi Clearly, then, South Dakota statutes recognize the power
in a corporation to delegate a voice in the adoption of new bylaws
to another entity. Such is the case here. The original articles of in-
corporation and medical center bylaws authorize the medical

8. SDCL 47-22-63. “Each corporation shall have power to make and alter bylaws,
not inconsistent with its articles of incorporation or with the laws of this state,
for the administration and regulation of the affairs of the corporation.”

ee LEE

staff to promulgate medical staff bylaws.‘ These medical staff
bylaws call for a specific amendment procedure which must be
followed. The medical center by ignoring the procedure set forth
in Article VIII and by not including the medical staff in the at-
tempted bylaws amendment has breached this contractual rela-
tionship with the medical staff.

It is therefore the holding of this court that the 1947 medical
staff bylaws, after approval by the medical center, were binding
upon the medical center and must be amended in accordance with
Article VIII of those bylaws. Therefore, the medical staff bylaws
unilaterally adopted by the medical center are null and void.

Affirmed.

DUNN, C. J., and WOLLMAN and COLER, JJ., and
BRAITHWAITE, Circuit Judge, concur.

MILLER, Circuit Judge, sitting for WINANS, J., dis-
qualified.

BRAITHWAITE, Circuit Judge, sitting as a member of the
Court.

ZASTROW, J., not having been a member of the court at the
time this case was orally argued, did not participate.

4. The medical center bylaws provided, before amendment:

“There shall be By-Laws, rules and regulations for the Medical Staff set-
ting forth its organization and government. Proposed By-Laws, rules and
regulations may be recommended by the Medical Staff, but only those
adopted by the Board of Directors shall become effective.”

682

STATE, Respondent v. SAHLIE, Appellant

(245 N.W.2d 476)

(File No. 11678. Opinion filed September 15, 1976)

2
%
oO

68!

William A. Delaney, Ill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff
and respondent; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.

Kennith L. Gosch of Bantz & Gosch, Aberdeen, for defendant
and appellant.

McKEEVER, Circuit Judge.

Defendant George J. Sahlie was convicted by a jury on a
charge of first degree robbery, and was sentenced to’ ten years
imprisonment. He has brought this appeal alleging numerous
assignments of error, only four of which are treated herein.
Defendant contends that his right to a fair trial was violated by
the prosecution's failure to obey the trial court’s pre-trial orders;
secondly, that the trial court erred when it allowed an in-court
identification of the defendant; thirdly, that the trial court abus-
ed its discretion in refusing to provide him with a fingerprint ex-
pert, and, finally, that the trial court erred by not conducting a
hearing on the remoteness of prior felony convictions before
allowing their use in impeaching the defendant.

At the trial, the evidence established that the defendant
checked into the Breeze Inn Motel in Aberdeen around noon on
January 1, 1975. The state’s principal witness, Joann Loomis, an
employee of the North Star Service Station, testified that some-

686

time during the evening of January 1st she sold a package of rolls
and a quart of milk to a man later identified as the defendant.
Before she finished ringing up the sale, however, the individual
made an additional purchase. This additional item was added to
the original sales slip by Loomis in her own handwriting.

Loomis testified that later, as she was closing up, the same
man again entered the station. He walked to the rear of the sta-
tion and picked up a package of rolls which he brought to the
counter. As he approached her, he pulled out a gun, pointed it at
her, and said, “This is a robbery.” He walked around the counter
and told her to open the till, which she did. The man took the
money and left the station, whereupon Loomis called the police.

On January 2, 1975, after the defendant failed to return to
his motel room, the owner entered the room. In the room he found
a wrapper from a package of rolls and a sales slip which contained
some handwritten numbers. These items were identified by
Loomis as coming from the station. Additionally, she identified
the handwriting on the sales slip as her own. Following an in-
vestigation, the defendant was later arrested and convicted of
first degree robbery.

Initially, the defendant contends that his right to a fair trial
was violated by the prosecution’s failure to obey the trial court’s
pre-trial orders. At the arraignment on February 5, 1975, the trial
court requested that state and defense counsel stipulate to
discovery matters rather than require motions for discovery. The
court informed the parties that if there were any areas of con-
troversy a discovery motion would be heard. After the parties
failed to agree, the court ordered the state, in substance, to pro-
duce (1) a copy of a fingerprint tab taken from the cash register,
(2) a copy of the sales slip containing the handwriting exemplar of
Loomis, and (8) all other physical items of evidence. Additionally,
the state was ordered to take precautionary measures to insure
that prospective jurors would not be permitted to see the defend-
ant in handcuffs, that during the trial the defendant's guards
would not wear their uniforms, that no mention be made of other
criminal charges currently pending against the defendant, unless
related to the case, and that defendant be supplied with the

687

names of other suspects tentatively identified by Loomis at a
photographic lineup. These court orders were not obeyed, which
requires this court to remand for a new trial. Cf. McNabb v.
United States, 1948, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819.

El While it is settled that the state is not required to make
available to the defendant all of its investigations in a case, State
v. Pickering, 1978, 87 S.D. 331, 207 N.W.2d 511, once the trial
court, in its discretion, has ordered production of certain
evidence, those orders must be expeditiously carried out and
obeyed. The record shows that in the instant case the state failed
to do so.

It was argued that if there were negligent violations of
the court’s orders herein such violations resulted only in
harmless error. Several such violations were indeed harmless;
however, the cumulative effect of all the violations herein
resulted in an unfair trial. This is particularly true of the failure
to produce the fingerprint tab which the court had ordered pro-
duced prior to trial. The state argues that the prints were not
identifiable and therefore nonexculpatory. Due process cannot be
satisfied unless the defendant is provided some opportunity to
examine possible exculpatory evidence long enough before trial
so as to have at least an opportunity to determine if such
evidence is or is not exculpatory.

HB Additionally, the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 1963, 373 U.S.
83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, has been the law of this state
since Geelan v. State, 1970, 85 S.D. 376, 182 N.W.2d 311. In Geelan
we stated that “due process requires the sovereign to produce,
upon request, evidence favorable to an accused which is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.” In the present case, the fingerprint
tab and the sales slip both had a direct bearing on the possibility
of guilt. Both items were material to guilt, and each may be poten-
tially exculpatory. Irrespective of exculpation, the items were
ordered to be produced.

The state argues that the case of State v. Pickering, supra, is
controlling. Such is not the case, however. In Pickering, the state

688 po

“fully and conscientiously complied with the court’s written
order to produce and that the state was completely candid in
responding to the court’s interrogation * * *.” 207 N.W.2d at
514-515, The present case can be distinguished on this fact alone.
Here the state was anything but conscientious and candid.

HMMM It is axiomatic to a fair trial that the state obey the
court's orders concerning the conduct of the trial. The state’s con-
duct in the present case is hardly in keeping with the
prosecutor’s “overriding obligation, shared by the court, to see
that defendant receives a fair trial, however guilty he may be.”
State v. Sha, 1972, 292 Minn. 182, 193 N.W.2d 829, 831. It is well to
keep in mind that a prosecutor’s duty is not simply to convict but
to do justice. Berger v. United States, 1935, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct.
629, 79 L.Ed. 1314.

The second issue raised by the defendant relates to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to justify the trial court’s finding of in-
dependent identification.

During the investigation, the police showed Loomis pictures
of a series of possible suspects. All of the photos shown were
black and white “mug shots” except the picture of the defendant,
which was a color snapshot. The defendant argues that this pro-
cedure was so improperly suggestive that it tainted the witness’
in-court identification, and that therefore said in-court identifica-
tion must be suppressed.

HHH It is settled law that in-court identifications are inad-
missible when they stem from photo identification procedures so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Neil v. Biggers, 1972,
409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401; Simmons v. United
States, 1968, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247; State v.
Barcley, 1975, 88 S.D. 584, 225 N.W.2d 875; State v. O’Connor,
1978, 87 S.D. 77, 203 N.W.2d 183. The burden of establishing im-
permissible suggestivity is placed upon the one seeking to sup-
press the evidence, State v. Barcley, supra.

[It is equally true, however, that even where it is shown

689

that an illegal identification procedure was used prior to trial an
in-court identification is admissible if the state proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the in-court identification had an in-
dependent origin (i.e., based upon observations of the suspect
other than the photograph shown to the witness). United States
v. Wade, 1967, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149; State
v. Winston, 1974, 300 Minn. 314, 219 N.W.2d 617; State v. Bash,
1974, Iowa, 214 N.W.2d 219; State v. Salazar, 1978, Iowa, 218
N.W.2d 490; State v. Watts, 1973, 296 Minn. 354, 208 N.W.2d 748.

Assuming the defendant has met his burden by showing that
the identification procedures were impermissively suggestive,
the trial court could still have admitted the in-court identification
by Loomis if it concluded that there was clear and convincing
proof that the in-court identification of the defendant had an un-
tainted origin in Loomis’ observations made prior to any
photographic identification.

Hl The trial court determined that the suggestive
photograph was not the basis for identification but that instead
the in-court identification was based upon the witness’ own
recollections. The appellant’s assertions to the contrary are
without merit, as is his assignment of error.

The defendant additionally contends that the trial court
erred in refusing to provide him with a fingerprint expert. We do
not have sufficient reason from the trial record herein to so hold,
but in that this case is being remanded, it is appropriate for this
court to provide some guidelines for the exercise of the trial
court’s discretion in the appointment of expert witnesses. SDCL
19-6-1 provides:

“Whenever, in a civil or criminal proceeding, issues
arise upon which the court deems expert evidence is
desirable, the court, on its own motion, or on the request
of either the state or the defendant in a criminal pro-
ceeding, or of any party in a civil proceeding, may ap-
point one or more experts, not exceeding three on each
issue, to testify at the trial.”

690

In State v. Geelan, 1963, 80 S.D. 135, 120 N.W.2d 533, this
court held that:

“This provision [did] not create an absolute right to the
appointment of an expert witness. It merely permits the
appointment of such witness in a proper case. Whether
the appointment is made is committed to the discretion
of the court.” 120 N.W.2d at 585.

This provision was given further judicial gloss in Utsler v.
State, 1969, 84 S.D. 360, 171 N.W.2d 739, where this court held
that “neither the federal nor state constitution mandate that an
indigent defendant in addition to counsel is entitled at public ex-
pense to ‘the full paraphernalia of defense’ (citation omitted), or
preparation for a claimed defense.” 171 N.W.2d at 742.

Recently, this court added to the language of Utsler. In State
v. Murphy, 1975, 89 S.D. 486, 234 N.W.2d 54, we stated that SDCL
19-6-1 and the language of Utsler should not “be so narrowly con-
strued as to have them justify a denial of court-appointed expert
witnesses where such are essential to adequate defense.” It
therefore becomes necessary for the trial court to determine the
proper case when expert witnesses are essential to an adequate
defense.

Hil After reviewing a number of similar cases,* we suggest
that the following general guidelines be employed in determining
when court-appointed experts are essential to an adequate
defense. Initially, the request must be made in good faith, The re-
quest must be reasonable in all respects. The request must be
timely and must set forth specific reasons which seem to make
such services needed or necessary to the defendant. The request
must specify that the defendant is financially unable to obtain the
required service himself and that such services would otherwise
be justifiably obtained were the defendant financially able.

* State v. McGhee, 1974, Iowa, 220 N.W.2d 908; State v. Williams, 1973, Iowa,
207 N.W.2d 98; United States v. Chavis, 1978, 155 U.S.App. D.C. 190, 476 F.2d
1187; United States v. Bass, 1973, 9 Cir., 477 F.2d 723; United States v. Hamlet,
1973, 5 Cir., 480 F.2d 556; United States v. Theriault, 1971, 5 Cir., 440 F.2d 713;
United States v. Schultz, 1970, 8 Cir., 431 F.2d 907.

ee 691

The trial court should accord considerable weight to
the application, but it is not in any way bound thereto. It should
make an independent evaluation, taking into consideration all
relevant factors. If the trial court finds the application
reasonable, it should be granted, but, if it is found to be frivolous,
unreasonable, unnecessary for an adequate defense, or without
underlying factual support, it should be denied. In either event,
the trial court should specify on the record the granting or denial
of such request together with the reasons therefor.

HH Additionally, it should be noted, that if the trial court
grants the application the defendant has no right, constitutional
or otherwise, to the appointment of an expert of his own choos-
ing. Cf. United States v. Baldi, 1953, 344 U.S. 561, 73 S.Ct. 391, 97
L.Ed. 549.

Finally, the defendant asserts error in that the trial court
failed to conduct a hearing on the remoteness of prior felony con-
victions before allowing their use in impeaching the defendant.

HM The determination of admissibility of such evidence
should be made by the trial court and should not be disturbed on
appeal except where an abuse of discretion is shown. Allen v.
McLain, 1955, 75 S.D. 520, 69 N.W.2d 390. While this court agrees
with its holding in State v. Flack, 1958, 77 S.D. 176, 89 N.W.2d 30,
that the jury should determine the disparaging effect of such im-
peachment upon the testimony of the witness we reject the im-
plication in Flack that any conviction, no matter how remote, may
be considered by the jury.

HE In the present case, evidence was presented concern-
ing convictions as old as thirty-five years. Although there was a
succession of eight convictions following the first from which the
trial court may have found probative value as to all nine convic-
tions, it should have first determined the number, dates and of-
fenses of which convictions were entered prior to allowing their
use for impeachment purposes. The trial court should especially
scrutinize convictions over ten years old, keeping in mind the ad-
monition found in State v. Van Beek, 1973, 87 S.D. 517, 211
N.W.2d 355, that basic to the use of prior convictions for impeach-

692 Pe

ment purposes is the requirement that the conviction be not too
remote in time.

Therefore, we hold the defendant herein did not get a fair
trial due to the cumulative effect of the state’s noncompliance
with certain pre-trial orders as fully discussed above in the first

assignment of error. Consequently, this case is reversed and
remanded for a new trial. .

DUNN, C. J., and WINANS and COLER, JJ., concur.

McKEEVER, Circuit Judge, sitting for WOLLMAN, J., dis-
qualified.

ZASTROW, J., not having been a member of the court at the
time this case was orally argued, did not participate.

GRIFFIN et al., Appellants v. SEBEK et ux, Respondents
(245 N.W.2d 481)

(File No. 11628. Opinion filed September 15, 1976)

PO

a
Richardson, Groseclose, Kornmann & Wyly, Aberdeen,

Conmy, Feste & Bossart, Ltd., Fargo, N.D., for plaintiffs and ap-
pellants.

Holland & Brantseg, Sisseton, for defendants and
respondents.

COLER, Justice.

Appellants, the son and his father, respectively, commenced
this action for damages based upon the theory of negligence of
respondents, as a licensed on-sale and off-sale dealer in alcoholic
beverages, in an alleged unlawful sale of intoxicants.

The trial court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss the
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5). The appeal is from that order
which determined the action on its merits. SDCL 15-26-1(2),
15-26-1(4). We affirm.

The facts of the case are reflected only in the complaint and

694

the briefs of the parties as no responsive pleading was made or
filed and no matters outside the pleading were presented to the
court to require the motion to be treated as a motion for summary
judgment. RCP 12(b), RCP 56.

Appellants allege that respondents, as licensed dealers,
violated laws of both South Dakota and North Dakota by selling
alcoholic beverages on a Sunday, April 30, 1972, throughout the
early morning hours to seventeen-year-old Robert James Griffin
and his companion, eighteen-year-old David L. Hager, and that
respondents continued to sell intoxicants to the latter after he
became intoxicated, contrary to SDCL 35-4-78. It is further claim-
ed that respondents sold intoxicants contrary to the provisions of
SDCL 35-4-81.1, ie., Sunday sales. In their brief appellants seem
to acknowledge that the alcoholic beverage sold was low-point
beer, which is governed by SDCL 35-6. Low-point beer is general-
ly excluded from the provisions of SDCL 35-4 by SDCL 35-4-1 ex-
cept as provided in SDCL 35-6-27. Assuming that it might be
established that respondents violated the provisions of SDCL
35-6-27 or some other statute, the question presented by ap-
pellants brief is whether in the absence of a Civil Damage Act,
otherwise referred to as a “Dram Shop Act,” the common law
now authorizes or should be liberalized to afford a remedy. In this
instance, the remedy we are asked to provide would authorize
recovery against a licensee to both a person who was sold an
alcoholic beverage and is injured in a motor vehicle accident in
North Dakota, alleged to have been caused by an intoxicated
driver to whom respondents also supplied an alcoholic beverage,
and to the father of a minor so injured and who incurred substan-
tial medical expense for his son’s care.

After a thorough review of the legislative history of civil
damage acts and dramshop acts in this state, as well as the
numerous decisions of this court construing those acts, we decline
the invitation to so legislate. This court, early in its history,
stated “That the creation of rights and remedies in these civil
damage acts is a proper exercise of legislative power has been so
long settled that no citation of authorities is necessary.” Kennedy
v. Garrigan, 1909, 23 S.D. 265, 121 N.W. 783.

es 695

Appellants acknowledge the general rule that:

“At common law, and apart from statute, no
redress exists against persons selling, giving, or fur-
nishing intoxicating liquor, or their sureties, for
resulting injuries or damages due to the acts of intox-
icated persons, whether on the theory that the dispens-
ing of the liquor constitutes a direct wrong or con-
stitutes actionable negligence, and, there being no
remedy in favor of the person injured, no remedy may
be asserted by his surviving spouse. This rule is based
on the theory that the proximate cause of the injury is
the act of the purchaser in drinking the liquor and not
the act of the vendor in selling it.” 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating
Liquors § 430. See also 75 A.L.R.2d 835.

Appellants claim, however, that the modern and more liberal
view expressed by the New Jersey court in Rappaport v. Nichols,
1959, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 75 A.L.R.2d 821, which, absent a
dramshop act, permitted cases such as the one at bar to go to the
jury on common law negligence, should be adopted by this court.
Granted that Rappaport v. Nichols, supra, has been quoted with
favor and indeed followed in several jurisdictions, see Waynick v.
Chicago’s Last Department Store, 1959, 7 Cir., 269 F.2d 322, 77
A.L.R.2d 1260; Berkeley v. Park, 1965, 47 Misc.2d 381, 262
N.Y.S.2d 290; Elder v. Fisher, 1966, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847;
Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 1968, 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18, it
is observed that the New Jersey court recognized that the
legislative activity of that state in the area was limited. As stated
by that court, “During prohibition days, New Jersey had a Civil
Damage Law which imposed strict liability for compensatory and
punitive damages upon unlawful sellers of alcoholic beverages.
See L.1921, c. 103, p. 184; L.1922, ¢. 257, p. 628. The law was
repealed in 1934 (L.1934, c. 32, p. 104) along with other
miscellaneous liquor enactments in the light of the abandonment
of prohibition and its replacement by the Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Act, L.1933, c. 436, p. 1180; R.S. 33:1-1 et seq., N.J.S.A.” Rap-
paport v. Nichols, supra.

Had our legislature failed to consider the evil to be remedied

696 ————EEE

for a like period of time some justification might be found for this
court’s embarking on such a course. However, the statutory
history in this state does not reflect callousness or lack of
legislative concern or action. :

During the two periods in this state’s history in which we ex-
perienced prohibition, that is from the years 1890 to 1896 and
again from 1917 to 1935, as evidenced by the historical note
following S.D.Const. Art. XXIV, the right of action against illicit
sellers of intoxicating liquor was granted to various classes of
persons under varying degrees of proof and during each period
both actual and exemplary damages could be recovered.'

1. The provisions of Laws of 1890, Ch, 101, § 15, read as follows:

“Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person who
shall be injured in person or property, or means of support by any intox-
ieated person, or in consequence of intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of
any person, such wife, child, parent or guardian, or employer shall have a
right of action in his or her own name, against any person who shall by
selling, bartering or giving away intoxicating liquors in violation of the
provisions of this act having caused the intoxication of such person in
whole or in part, for all damages actually sustained, as well as for ex-
emplary damages; and a married woman shall have the right to bring
suits, prosecute and control the same, and the amount recovered, the
same as if unmarried; and all damages recovered by a minor under this
act shall be paid either to such minor or to his or her parent, guardian or
next friend, as the court shall direct; and all suits for damages under this
act shall be by civil action in any of the courts of this State having
jurisdiction thereof.”

Subsequently, Laws of 1917, Ch. 261, § 80, codified as R-Pol.C.1919, § 10809 read
as follows:

“Every wife, husband, child, parent, guardian or other person who shall
be injured in person or property or means of support or otherwise, or by
an intoxicated person, by reason of the selling, giving or furnishing to
any person of any intoxicating liquors in violation of the provisions of this
act, shall have a right of action in his or her name against any person
(pattnership), or corporation who shal, by selling or giving aay [any]
sueh liquors have caused or contributed to the intoxication of such person
or persons, or who shall have caused or contributed to any injury, and in
any action provided for in this section, the ‘Plaintiff’ shall have a right to
recover actual and exemplary damages in [such] sum as the court or jury
shall determine. Actual damages may be recovered for mental angitishy
suffering, disgrace, wounded feelings or loss or standing in society suf-
fered by the plaintiff by reason of the intoxication and the result and con-
sequences thereof, of such person or persons, even though no proof is
Produced of actual infury to the person or property or means of support
of the plaintiff, and in all [such} cases of this kind proof that the defendant
sold, gave, furnished or delivered any intoxicating liquors to [such] per-
son oF persons, contrary to law, shall be prima facie evidence that the
same was done oppressively and maliciously. In case of the death of
either party, the action or right of action given by this section shall sur-
vive to or against his or her executor or administrator, and in every ac-
tion by [a] husband [or] wife, parent or child, the general reputation of the
relation of husband and wile, parent and child, shall be prima facie
evidence of such relation.”

697

Following the repeal of the then provisions of Article XXIV
of the Constitution of the State of South Dakota, by a vote of the
people in November 1896 pursuant to the Laws of 1895, Ch. 38,
the legislature carried forward similar provisions imposing
liability upon licensed dealers and also authorized an action on
the bond of the licensee.

When liquor was again legalized the legislature, by the Laws
of 1897, Ch. 72, § 6 as amended by the Laws of 1901, Ch. 141, §3
and codified as R.Pol.C.1903, § 2839, required the execution of a
bond by a licensee in the sum of $2,000 and further provided, in
part, that

“in all actions brought upon said bond for damages by
reason of the violation of any of the provisions thereof,
the plaintiff in such action shall, in the event of recover-
ing a judgment of any amount, also recover his costs of
suit.”

The foregoing provision related back to a covenant required to be
in the bond, the recital being as follows:

“Whereas, the said principal has covenanted and
agreed and doth hereby covenant and agree, as follows,
to-wit: That he will not directly or indirectly by himself,
his clerk, agent or servant at any time sell, furnish, give
or deliver any spirituous, malt, brewed, fermented or
vinous liquors, or any mixed liquors, or any mixture or
compound, any part of which is spirituous, malt, brewed,
fermented or vinous liquors to a minor or to any adult
person whatever who is at the time intoxicated, nor to
any person in the habit of getting intoxicated, when
notified in writing that such person is in the habit of get-
ting intoxicated nor to any person when forbidden in
writing to do so by the husband, wife, parent, child,
guardian or employer of such person or by the super-
visor of the township, mayor of the city or president ora
trustee of any town or member of the board of county
commissioners of the county in which such person shall
reside or temporarily remain, that he shall also pay all

698 Pe

damages, actual and exemplary, that may be adjudged
to any person or persons for injuries inflicted upon him
or them either in person or property or means of sup-
port or otherwise by reason of his selling, furnishing,
giving or delivering any such liquor. Now the conditions
of this obligation are such that if said principal shall well
and truly keep and perform all and singular the fore-
going covenants and agreements and shall pay any judg-
ment for actual or exemplary damages which may be
recovered against him in any court of competent
jurisdiction and all fines and costs that may be imposed
upon him for any violation of this act, then this obliga-
tion shall be void and of no effect, otherwise the same
shall be in full force and effect.”

In addition to the foregoing provision the procedure was
established and the parties to whom the right of a cause of action
enured were spelled out in the Laws of 1897, Ch. 72, § 16, as
codified in R.Pol.C. 1903, § 2849 as follows:

“The damages in all cases arising under this article,
together with the costs of suits, shall be recovered in an
action before any court of competent jurisdiction; and in
any case where parents shall be entitled to such
damages, either the father or mother may sue alone
therefor, but the commencement of suit and recovery by
one of said parties shall be a bar to the suit brought by
the other. And it shall be lawful for any married woman
or any other person at her request to institute and main-
tain in her own name a suit on any such bond mentioned
in this article for all damages sustained by her or by her
children on account of such traffic; and the money when
collected shall be paid over for the use of herself and
children. On the trial of any suit under the provisions of
this article the cause and foundation whereof shall be
the acts done or injuries inflicted by a person under the
influence of liquor, it shall only be necessary to sustain
the action to prove that the defendant or defendants
sold or gave away the liquors to the person so intox-
icated or under the influence of liquor, whose acts or in-

juries are complained of, on that day or about that time
when said acts were committed or said injuries were
received; and in an action for damages brought by a mar-
ried woman or other person whose support legally
devolves upon a person disqualified by intemperance
from earning the same, it shall only be necessary to
prove that the defendant has given or sold intoxicating
drinks to such person during the period of such dis-
qualification.”

As observed in Garrigan v. Thompson, 1903, 17 S.D. 132, 95 N.W.
294, the provisions of R.Pol.C.1903, § 2849 did not provide for ex-
emplary damages as had been the case under the prohibition act.

This legislation was construed several times by this court,
and most significantly in Paulson v. Langness, 1903, 16 S.D. 471,
93 N.W. 655, where the court observed that the legislative
scheme gave the wife a right of action against not only the licens-
ed dealer but also on the bond of the dealer. This court further
observed in that case that the “legislature has provided no
remedy in the nature of an action for damages against illicit
dealers”, 16 S.D. at 473, 93 N.W. at 656, which had been the case
under the prior law. See Sandige v. Widmann, 1899, 12 S.D. 101,
80 N.W. 164; Nordin v. Kjos, 1900, 13 S.D. 497, 83 N.W. 578 and
Stafford v. Levinger, 1902, 16 S.D. 118, 91 N.W. 462, wherein the
legislative intent of the prior law is discussed. The statutes above
cited remained the law until their repeal following the re-
adoption of Article XXIV of the Constitution of South Dakota as
proposed by the Laws of 1915 and adopted in November 1916.
Thereafter and until 1935 the liability of illicit dealers was im-
posed by the second prohibition act previously set forth in
R.Pol.C.1919, § 10309, see footnote 1.

[i Following the repeal of prohibition for the second time,
pursuant to the provisions of the Laws of 1933 (Special Session),
Ch. 128 and adopted in November 1934, the legislature adopted
legislation appearing as Chapter 134 of the Session Laws of 1935
in which there was no provision made comparable to
R.Pol.C.1903, §§ 2839 and 2849 fixing liability on dealers. There

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was carried forward a bond provision appearing as SDC 5.0208
which this court noted did not authorize suit upon the bond in the
case of a widow seeking damages for loss of the husband's socie-
ty, affection or consortium. Swanson v. Ball, 1940, 67 S.D. 196, 291
N.W. 577. The legislature responded to the foregoing decision by
the amendment of SDC 5.0208 by Chapter 8 of the Session Laws
of 1941. That added to the then existing provisions of SDC 5.0208
the following language:

“Any person injured by reason of the failure of any such
licensee to faithfully obey and abide by all the provi-
sions of this title, or any act amendatory thereto, shall
have a direct right of action upon said bond for the pur-
pose of recovering the damage sustained by such per-
son, which action may be prosecuted in the name of the
person injured.”

This provision remained a part of the law throughout the later
amendments of SDC 5.0208, ie., S.L.1943, Ch. 11, $.L.1959, Ch. 8
(1960 Supp. 5.0208) and appeared in the original Volume 11 SDCL
as § 35-4-38. That a common law right of action exists in favor of a
wife or widow in cases involving unlawful sales of intoxicants is
established by the pronouncement of this court “that independ-
ent of any specific statute the wife has a cause of action against
anyone wrongfully interfering with the marital relationship
regardless of the agency or instrumentality employed to inflict
the loss.” Swanson v. Ball, 1940, 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482. See
more recently Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 1959, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d
669, under which the right of recovery would have been enhanced
had the right to sue on the bond been retained by statute. The
repeal of SDCL 35-4-38 by Chapter 211, § 121 of the Session Laws
of 1971 terminated the right to join the sureties on the bond but
the right of the cause of action by a wife remains.

Parenthetically, we observe that what is now SDCL 35-6,
governing sales of low-point beer, had as its origin Chapter 12 of
the laws of the Special Session of 1933 captioned as an act
“RELATING TO THE MANUFACTURE, SALE AND
TRANSPORTATION OF NON-INTOXICATING LIQUOR
(BEER AND WINE)” which gave some respite to prohibition.

Ee
Throughout the history of that law no provision has been made to
attach liability to a retailer for unlawful sales. This oversight, if
such can be claimed, together with the holding of this court in
Moberg v. Scott, 1919, 42 S.D. 372, 175 N.W. 559 and alluded to in
Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. at 164, 290 N.W. 482, to the effect that
the wife’s action for loss of consortium does not give rise to a fur-
ther cause of action for wrongful death under SDCL 21-5-1 would
both be resolved had the provisions of House Bill No. 905, in-
troduced in the 1973 legislative session, become law.”

Hl While this court has reviewed the statutes and decisions
of several states* we find controlling the statement of this court
set forth in Kennedy v. Garrigan, supra, to-wit:

“One thing must be constantly borne in mind when con-
sidering these civil damage acts—the right and the
remedy created by these statutes are exclusive. No
right of action exists save that expressly given by the
statute, and the remedy prescribed cannot be enlarged
except by further legislative enactment.” 23 S.D. at 268,
121 N.W. at 785.

2. That proposed enactment reads as follows:
“HOUSE BILL NO. 905
Introduced by: Mr. MeFarland
FOR AN ACT ENTITLED, An.Act to provide for causes of action by certain
persons against persons violating the provisions of title 36 of the South
Dakota Compiled Laws.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF SOUTH

Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person
who shall be injured in person or property or means of support by any in-
toxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or other-
wise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name
against any person who shall, by selling or giving to another, contrary to
the provisions of title 35 of the South Dakota Compiled Laws, any intox-
ieating liquors or low-point beer, cause the intoxieation of such person,
for all damages actually sustained including wrongful death pursuant to
chapter 21-5, as well as exemplary damages.”

3. Ina very recent decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court, Holmes v. Circo,
1976, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65, Justice Brodkey, the writer thereof, has
reviewed not only that state’s legislative history but has also cited several deci-
sions construing statutes which were similar to the Nebraska statute 53-180,
B.R.S.1943, and which are not unlike SDCL 35-4-78. The Nebraska court also
considered the landmark cases of Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 1959,
7 Cir., 269, F.2d 322, 77 A.L.R.2d 1260 and Raj paport v. Nichols, 1959, 31 N.J.
188, 156 A.2d 1 in relation to their statutes and decisions and have, by that pro-

cess, arrived at the same conclusion reached by this court.

[i The order appealed from is affirmed.

WOLLMAN and ZASTROW, JJ., concur.
DUNN, C. J., dissents.

WINANS, J., concurs in dissent.

DUNN, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I would respectfully submit that the time has come for this
court to recognize a common law cause of action by an injured
party against a seller of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated per-
son who causes injury by his intoxication. While it is true that
this right of recovery was not recognized originally, there is a
great difference between an intoxicated person driving a horse
and buggy on a dirt road in 1889 and an intoxicated teenager
hurtling down the highway at great speed in a five-thousand-
pound automobile in 1972.

“It is understandable that early cases did not recognize
any duty of an innkeeper to the traveling public because
a serious hazard did not exist. Through lack of necessity,
this phase of negligence liability did not develop. How-
ever, there did exist General Common Law Rules of neg-
ligence liability based on foreseeability and proximate
cause. It is a well established, sound principle of legal
philosophy that the common law is not static. Under the

. skillful interpretation of our Courts, it had been adapted
to changing times and conditions of our civilization.”
Berkeley v. Park, 1965, 47 Misc.2d 381, 262 N.W.S.2d
290, 293,

Other jurisdictions have already recognized a common law
right of action. The New Jersey Supreme Court did so in 1959 in
the case of Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1. As part
of its opinion the court in that case stated:

“When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern
keeper to a minor or to an intoxicated person, the

703

unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor or the
intoxicated person but also to members of the traveling
public may readily be recognized and foreseen; this is
particularly evident in current times when traveling by
car to and from the tavern is so commonplace and ac-
cidents resulting from drinking are so frequent. (Cita-
tions and references omitted.) If the patron is a minor or
is intoxicated when served, the tavern keeper's sale to
him is unlawful; and if the circumstances are such that
the tavern keeper knows or should know that the patron
is a minor or is intoxicated, his service to him may also
constitute common law negligence.” 156 A.2d at 8-9.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also
recognized a common law cause of action in 1959 in a diversity of
citizenship suit. The case was Waynick v. Chicago’s Last Depart-
ment Store, 7 Cir., 269 F.2d 322. At page 326 of that opinion the
court held:

“In applying the common law to the situation
presented in this case, we must consider the law of tort
liability, even though the chain of events, which started
when the defendant tavern keepers unlawfully sold in-
toxicating liquor to two drunken men, crossed state
boundary lines and culminated in the tragic collision in
Michigan. We hold that, under the facts appearing in the
complaint, the tavern keepers are liable in tort for the
damages and injuries sustained by plaintiffs, as a prox-
imate result of the unlawful acts of the former.”

While it is true that South Dakota presently does not have a
Dram Shop Act, the legislature has expressly made the conduct
of these defendants unlawful. SDCL 35-6-27 provides:

“No licensee under this chapter shall sell or give
any low-point beer to any person who is less than eight-
een years old or to any person to whom the sale of other
alcoholic beverages is prohibited under the provisions of
subdivision (2) of § 35-4-78.”

04 Pe

Subdivision (2) of SDCL 35-4-78 covers “ * * * any person who is
intoxicated at the time, or who is known to the seller to be an
habitual drunkard.” If the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint are
true, there is no question that the defendants violated these pro-
visions by selling low-point beer to David Hager when they knew
or should have known that he was intoxicated. This being so,
negligence can be predicated on this criminal act. This court held
in Zakrzewski v. Hyronimus, 1965, 81 S.D. 428, 186 N.W.2d 572,
that “violation, without legal excuse, of a statute enacted for
reasons of safety constitutes negligence per se and not merely
prima facie evidence of negligence.” 81 S.D. at 432, 186 N.W.2d at
574. The only question which then remains is whether SDCL
35-6-27 and 35-4-78 were enacted for reasons of safety. I am con-
vinced that they were and agree fully with the statement of the
court in Waynick v. Chicago’s Last Department Store, supra, at
pages 325-326:

“The Illinois act making unlawful the sale of
alcoholic liquor to any intoxicated person is for the pro-
tection of any member of the public who might be in-
jured or damaged as a result of the drunkenness to
which the particular sale of alcoholic liquor contributes.
Obviously the plaintiffs in the case at bar are entitled to
the protection given by § 181 of the Illinois Act.”

I would hold that a cause of action was created by the very

. presence of §§ 35-6-27 and 35-4-78 in the South Dakota Codified

Laws.*

Had this cause of action not been dismissed, plaintiffs would
still face substantial factual and legal obstacles before any
monetary recovery could be had. It appears that there are very
grave questions presented concerning causation and con-
tributory negligence. However, these are questions which are not
for consideration at this time. It is my belief that plaintiffs state a
cause of action in their pleadings and they should be allowed to

* For a good statement covering all of the issues, I would suggest reading the
dissent by Chief Justice Hallows in Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis.2d 724, 176
N.W.2d 566, at page 572, which was joined in by Justices Wilkie and Heffernan.

705

“have their day in court.” I would reverse the order of the circuit
court dismissing this case.

I am authorized to state that Justice WINANS joins in this
dissent.