State: Virginia
Volume: 267
Term: 2004-2004
Jurisdiction(s): Virginia
Source: https://static.case.law/va/267.pdf

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VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court
Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 16th day of January,
2004.

Daniel E. Hines, Appellant,

against Record No. 022678
Circuit Court No. 00-7969

John R. Kuplinski, Administrator
of Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail, Appellee.

Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of coun-
sel, the Court is of opinion that there is no error in the judgment of
the circuit court dismissing Daniel E. Hines’ petition for a writ of
habeas corpus because it was not filed within the limitations period
established by Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).

On December 5, 1994, the Circuit Court of York County entered
final judgment convicting Hines of rape in violation of Code § 18.2-
61 and imposing a ten-year suspended sentence. Hines did not appeal
that judgment. On June 15, 2000, Hines filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus claiming that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel because his trial attorneys erroneously told him that he could
challenge his conviction on the basis of newly discovered evidence at
any time in the future. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss
the petition because it was not filed within the two-year limitations
period established in Code § 8.01-654(A)(2). The circuit court sus-
tained the Commonwealth’s motion and dismissed the petition.

Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) provides in relevant part:

A habeas corpus petition attacking a criminal conviction or
sentence . . . shall be filed within two years from the date of
final judgment in the trial court or within one year from either
final disposition of the direct appeal in state court or the time
for filing such appeal has expired, whichever is later.

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The statute contains no exception allowing a petition to be filed after
the expiration of these limitations periods. Hines contends that, if
applied to him, this section violates the bar against suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, Art. I, §9 of the Constitution of Virginia,
because he was not able to discover the basis for his claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel within the time period provided for fil-
ing a petition.!

Hines’ argument fails in this case because the record does not
support the predicate for his claimed right to a late filed petition: that
he was unable to discover the basis for his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel within the period provided by Code § 8.01-
654(A)(2).

Hines’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on his
allegation that counsel advised him that his criminal conviction could
be challenged at any time on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
Hines asserts that he learned that his counsels’ advice was wrong
only when he attempted to file a motion for a new trial in 1999
However, Hines was aware of the information he characterizes as
newly discovered evidence within two years of his conviction. The
delay in filing Hines’ petition for habeas corpus occurred because he
did not seek to take any action on that information until 1999.

During his criminal trial, Hines admitted having sex with the vic-
tim but maintained that the sex was consensual. The “newly discov-
ered evidence” upon which Hines relied as the basis for a new trial
consisted of the testimony of two persons, Jennifer Pearson and T.J.
Tuck. Pearson and Tuck allegedly would testify that shortly after the
July 1993 incident, the victim told Pearson and Tuck that “she had
engaged in consensual sex that evening” with Hines. Hines was
aware of these witnesses and their potential testimony well before
1999.

During preparation for trial in 1994, Hines’ mother was informed
that Pearson and Tuck “had information that could help” Hines.
Mrs. Hines’ attempt to set up a meeting with Pearson was unsuccess-
ful but she told Hines’ counsel of the potential witnesses. Neither
Pearson nor Tuck was contacted. In May 1995, less than a year after
Hines’ conviction, Pearson contacted Mrs. Hines and told her of the
victim’s alleged statement of consensual sex. Mrs. Hines contacted

' Article I, § 9 states: “[T]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
unless when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public safety may require.”

2 Rule 1:1 requires that a challenge to a final judgment be brought within 21 days after the
entry of the judgment.

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Hines’ attorney and, although counsel told her she needed a second
witness, neither Hines nor Mrs. Hines attempted to locate Tuck at
that time. Finding Tuck “became a priority” for Mrs. Hines when
Hines was arrested for forgery in 1997. At that point, Mrs. Hines was
concerned that Hines’ ten-year suspended sentence for rape would be
revoked because of the new charges and that he would be sent to
prison. Mrs. Hines did locate Tuck in March 1999, two days before
the hearing in which Hines’ suspended sentence for the rape was
indeed revoked and he was incarcerated.

This record shows that Hines could have discovered the basis for
his habeas claim well within the limitations period established by
Code § 8.01-654(A)(2). Hines knew of the witnesses and the sub-
stance of their testimony no later than May 1995. Had Hines taken
any action to seek to establish his innocence in a new trial based on
this information at that time, he would have discovered his trial
counsels’ alleged error well within two years of his December 5,
1994 conviction for rape. Counsels’ allegedly erroneous advice can-
not serve to excuse Hines’ delay in seeking exoneration when the
basis for such exoneration was known to him.

Because the record does not support Hines’ assertion that he
could not have discovered the grounds for his claim of habeas corpus
within the period established by Code § 8.01-654(A)(2), we need not
address Hines’ constitutional argument.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus is affirmed. The appellant shall pay to the
appellee thirty dollars damages.

This order shall be certified to the said circuit court and shall be
published in the Virginia Reports.

A Copy,

Teste:
0a. (aq

Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court
Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 16th day of January,
2004.

Christy Rawlings, Appellant,
against Record No. 030085
Circuit Court No. CL00-4694
Pablo Lopez, Appellee.
Crystal Crayton, Appellant,
against Record No. 030086
Circuit Court No. CL00-4693
Pablo Lopez, Appellee.

Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of coun-
sel, the Court is of opinion there is error in the judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of Greensville County.

The appellants were passengers in an automobile that was
involved in an accident. The appellants and the driver of the automo-
bile filed separate motions for judgment against Lopez, the appellee,
alleging negligence. Neither of the appellants were parties to the
driver’s suit and did not appear of record in that proceeding. The
driver’s suit was the first to be tried and resulted in a jury verdict for
Lopez.

Lopez then filed pleas in bar alleging that appellants’ suits were
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The
circuit court sustained the pleas in bar and dismissed the appellants’
motions for judgment by final order entered October 10, 2002.

Appellants have assigned error to the circuit court’s judgment that
their claims are barred by either collateral estoppel or res judicata.
We agree with the appellants and will reverse the circuit court’s
judgment.

“Under the concept of collateral estoppel, ‘the parties to the first

action and their privies are precluded from litigating [in a subsequent
suit] any issue of fact actually litigated and essential to a valid and
final personal judgment in the first action.’ ” Norfolk & Western Ry.
v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 640, 272 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1980)
(quoting Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671, 202 S.E.2d 917, 921
(1974)). In Bailey, this Court reaffirmed Virginia’s adherence to the
principle of mutuality which holds that “a litigant is generally pre-
vented from invoking the preclusive force of a judgment unless he
would have been bound had the prior litigation of the issue reached
the opposite result.” Jd. (citing Bates, 214 Va. at 671 n.7, 202 S.E.2d
at 921 n.7). There was no mutuality in the case at bar because, had
the jury in the first action found against Lopez, he would not have
been bound by that verdict in the subsequent suits brought by the
appellants. See Anderson yv. Sisson, 170 Va. 178, 182, 196 S.E. 688,
689 (1938). Moreover, as noted below, the record does not reflect
any relation of privity between the appellants and the driver of the
car who was the plaintiff in the first suit.

Lopez’s claim of res judicata also fails because in order “[t]o
establish the defense of res judicata, the proponent of the doctrine
must establish identity of the remedies sought, identity of the cause
of action, identity of the parties, and identity of the quality of the
persons for or against whom the claim is made.” State Water Control
Board v. Smithfield Foods, 261 Va. 209, 214, 542 S.E.2d 766, 769
(2001) (citing Balbir Brar Assocs. v. Consol. Trading & Servs. Corp.,
252 Va. 341, 346, 477 S.E.2d 743, 746 (1996)) (emphasis added).
The appellants in the case at bar were not parties to the first suit
brought by the driver. Therefore, the preclusive effect of res judicata
cannot be sustained unless, as Lopez argues, there was privity
between the driver and the appellants.

The record reflects no relationship existing between appellants
and the driver that would have permitted the driver to assert the
appellants’ legal rights during the first suit. Thus, no privity existed
between the parties and res judicata did not bar the appellants’ suits.
See Smithfield Foods, 261 Va. at 214, 542 S.E.2d at 769 (2001)
(“The touchstone of privity for purposes of res judicata is that a
party’s interest is so identical with another that representation by one
party is representation of the other’s legal right.’’).

For these reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court of Greens-
ville County is reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.

This order shall be certified to the Circuit Court of Greensville
County and shall be published in the Virginia Reports.

A Copy,

Teste:

Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk

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DoGwooD VALLEY CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
V.

WILLIAM A. WINKELMAN
Record No. 031053
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Stephenson, S.J.

George H. Dygert (Dygert, Wright & Hobbs, on briefs), for
appellants.

Frank K. Friedman (Richard C. Maxwell; Woods, Rogers &
Hazlegrove, on brief), for appellee.

CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
L

The sole issue that we consider in this appeal is whether a non-
stock Virginia corporation is a property owners’ association within

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the intendment of the Property Owners’ Association Act, Code
§§ 55-508 through -516.2.

IL

William A. Winkelman filed his bill of complaint against the
Dogwood Valley Citizens Association, Inc. (“DVCA”) and others.
He alleged that DVCA improperly conducted a non-judicial sale of
two lots that he owned. He asserted, among other things, that DVCA
is not a property owners’ association within the intendment of the
Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act because DVCA’s
recorded declarations do not contain an express duty that required it
to maintain the roads or other common areas in the Dogwood Valley
subdivision. Alternatively, Winkelman argued that if the Act were
applicable, the Act only permitted DVCA to sell a unit on which
DVCA has a recorded lien as opposed to the vacant lots that Winkel-
man owned.

At the conclusion of a bench trial, the circuit court held that
DVCA is a property owners’ association within the intendment of the
Property Owners’ Association Act. However, the court held that
Code § 55-516(1) of the Act applied only to a “unit” and, therefore,
this statute did not confer authority upon DVCA to sell Winkelman’s
vacant lots. The court entered a decree that voided the deeds that
conveyed Winkelman’s lots to the purchasers. DVCA appeals from
the court’s final decree, and Winkelman assigns cross-error.

tl.

The circuit court considered the following evidence that is rele-
vant for our resolution of this appeal. Winkelman is the record owner
of two lots in the Dogwood Valley subdivision. The subdivision con-
sists of approximately 320 lots that were divided during several
phases. Declarations affecting the lots were recorded among the land
records in Greene County. The declarations were imposed by the
developers, Kermit R. Gallihugh, Barbara A. Gallihugh, Bradley K.
Haynes, Betty G. Haynes, and B.K. Haynes Corporation. The devel-
opers transferred the roads and other common areas to DVCA by a
deed dated December 5, 1978, which is recorded among the land
records in Greene County.

DVCA is a non-stock corporation. According to its articles of
incorporation, DVCA was created to provide for the maintenance of
the roads and common facilities of the Dogwood Valley subdivision.
These articles and DVCA’s bylaws purportedly authorized DVCA to

impose fees and special assessments on the property owners in the
subdivision pursuant to the applicable restrictive covenants.

The December 1978 deed that transferred the roads and common
areas from the developers to DVCA contains the following
paragraphs:

“WHEREAS, in the aforesaid Deeds of Dedication and
Protective Covenants, the Grantor has reserved the right to use,
keep and maintain all of the roads and common facilities in the
aforesaid subdivision; and

“WHEREAS, the aforesaid Deeds of Dedication and Pro-
tective Covenants provide that the rights, duties and responsi-
bilities as are created therein may be delegated by the Grantor
to a committee of lot owners approved by the Grantor; and

“WHEREAS, the property owners of Dogwood Valley
have united and formed a corporation referred to herein as the
Grantee, whose purpose is to see that the roads, public facili-
ties and other common areas of Dogwood Valley Subdivision
are properly maintained; and

“WHEREAS, it is the desire of the Grantor herein, B. K.
Haynes Corporation, now to convey to the Grantee, Dogwood
Valley Citizens Association, Inc., all of the rights, duties and
responsibilities which were created or may have been created
by the aforesaid Deeds of Dedication and Protective Cove-
nants; and

“WHEREAS, it is the desire and intent of the Grantee to
receive from the Grantor and accepts herein by the recordation
of this deed all of the rights, duties and obligations which the
Grantor has pursuant to the aforesaid Deeds of Dedication and
statement of Protective Covenants.

“The Grantor hereby further QUITCLAIMS, ASSIGNS,
RELEASES and REMITS unto the Grantee, Dogwood Valley
Citizens Association, Inc. any and all rights which it may
have, both legal and equitable in all of the roads within the
aforesaid subdivision, together with any other common areas
or public areas not specifically set forth in this deed.”

ee

Certain restrictive covenants that affect the subdivision are con-
tained in deeds of dedication, recorded from 1968 through 1973.
These covenants confer upon the developers and their assignees the
power to assess an annual fee “‘for the use, upkeep, and maintenance
of the roads ... and. . . other common facilities,” and the covenants
impose various obligations and restrictions on the developers and lot
owners. Furthermore, the covenants applicable to parts of the subdi-
vision, recorded among the land records in 1972 and 1973, authorize
an increase in the maintenance fee based upon increased maintenance
costs.

In 1997, DVCA adopted a special assessment of $35 per lot for
all lots in the subdivision. Payment of the special assessment was
due February 1, 1998. DVCA notified all property owners in the sub-
division, including Winkelman, of the amount of the assessment and
the due date. Winkelman failed to pay the assessment timely. DVCA
informed Winkelman that a memorandum of lien would be filed
against his lots unless he promptly paid the assessment. Winkelman
failed to do so. DVCA published a notice of the sale of Winkelman’s
lots in a newspaper of general circulation and notified him of the sale
by certified mail pursuant to the provisions of Code § 55-516(I).
DVCA conducted a non-judicial sale of Winkelman’s lots at a public
auction. Gary E. and Karen H. Lowe purchased one of Winkelman’s
lots, and Jason E. Tinder purchased the other lot.

Iv.

Winkelman, relying upon the Property Owners’ Association Act
and this Court’s decision in Anderson v. Lake Arrowhead Civic Asso-
ciation, Inc., 253 Va. 264, 483 S.E.2d 209 (1997), argues that DVCA
is not a property owners’ association within the intendment of the
Property Owners’ Association Act because DVCA does not have a
duty, set forth in a document recorded among the land records in
Greene County, that requires DVCA to maintain the roads or com-
mon areas. Therefore, Winkelman argues that DVCA lacked the stat-
utory authority to conduct a non-judicial sale of his lots because such
authority can only be exercised by a property owners’ association.
Responding, DVCA contends that the circuit court correctly con-
cluded that DVCA is a property owners’ association and that
DVCA’s duties to maintain the roads and common areas are con-
tained in the declarations of the recorded documents. We disagree
with DVCA.

rs
pC

HMM The Property Owners’ Association Act is applicable “to
developments subject to a declaration . . . initially recorded after Jan-
uary 1, 1959, associations incorporated or otherwise organized after
such date, and all subdivisions created under the former Subdivided
Land Sales Act.” Code § 55-508(A). The Act defines “property
owners’ association” as “an incorporated or unincorporated entity
upon which responsibilities are imposed and to which authority is
granted in the declaration.” Code § 55-509. The Act defines “decla-
ration” as

“any instrument, however denominated, recorded among the
land records of the county or city in which the development or
any part thereof is located, that either (i) imposes on the asso-
ciation maintenance or operational responsibilities for the com-
mon area or (ii) creates the authority in the association to
impose on lots, or on the owners or occupants of such lots, or
on any other entity any mandatory payment of money in con-
nection with the provision of maintenance and/or services for
the benefit of some or all of the lots, the owners or occupants
of the lots, or the common area.”

Id.

We discussed the application of the Property Owners’ Associa-
tion Act in Anderson v. Lake Arrowhead Civic Association, supra. In
Anderson, we summarized the following facts. H. Ryland Heflin and
his wife, Lucille W. Heflin (collectively, Heflin), developed the Lake
Arrowhead subdivision in Stafford County. The plats included the
reservation of easements for the individual lots over roads and to the
other common areas of the subdivision. Each recorded plat was sub-
ject to identical restrictive covenants that were recorded by deeds of
dedication among the land records of Stafford County. When Heflin
conveyed his interest in an individual lot to a purchaser, the deed
referenced the easements contained in the plat of the section in which
the lot was located and the covenants associated with that plat. 253
Va. at 267, 483 S.E.2d at 210.

Covenant 12 of the easement granted to Heflin the power to
assign “all of the rights and powers, title, easements and estates
reserved” to him, provided that the assignee would have the same
“obligations and duties with respect to the land area concerned.”
Covenant 13 of the easement required each purchaser of a lot to pay
Heflin or his assignee $20 each year for the first lot owned and $10

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per year for each additional lot owned ‘“‘to be used for general main-
tenance.” Covenant 13 states that the “maintenance fee shall be a
lien on the real estate.” These covenants did not expressly require
that Heflin, or his assignee, actually maintain the common areas of
the subdivision. Id.

Subsequently, Lake Arrowhead Civic Association, Inc., a Virginia
non-stock corporation, was incorporated and its articles provided that
the association’s purpose was to “further and promote the commu-
nity welfare of the property owners in the Lake Arrowhead Subdivi-
sion . . . and to handle and supervise any funds received for commu-
nity betterment.” The articles were subsequently amended to require
that ‘“‘[eJach owner of any lot by acceptance of a deed therefore,
whether or not it shall be expressed in any such deed or other con-
veyance, . . . [shall] covenant and agree to pay [the association]: 1)
annual assessments or fees and, 2) special assessments for capital
expenditures.” 253 Va. at 267-68, 483 S.E.2d at 211. Later, Heflin
conveyed to the association various parcels of land consisting prima-
tily of roads, lakes, beaches, and park areas within the subdivision.
The language in these deeds did not impose any duty upon the asso-
ciation to maintain the common areas. 253 Va. at 268, 483 S.E.2d at
211.

Hl We applied Code §§ 55-508 and -509, and we held that

“{rjeading these two definitions together, it is clear that in
order to qualify under the [Property Owners’ Association Act]
an association must possess both the power to collect a fixed
assessment or to make variable assessments and a correspond-
ing duty to maintain the common area. In addition, these con-
ditions must be expressly stated in a recorded instrument in the
land records of the jurisdiction where some portion of the
development is located.”

253 Va. at 271-72, 483 S.E.2d at 213. We pointed out in Anderson
that the language of the deed that conveyed the common areas from
Heflin to the association failed to expressly require the association to
maintain the common areas. Id.

Hl Applying the plain language of Code § 55-509, as well as our
decision in Anderson v. Lake Arrowhead Civic Association, we hold
that DVCA is not a property owners’ association within the meaning
of the Property Owners’ Association Act. DVCA has failed to iden-
tify any document, recorded among the land records of the jurisdic-

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tion where some property of the development is located, that
expressly requires DVCA to maintain the common areas or the roads.
This duty must be expressly stated in the recorded documents and
may not be inferred or implied.

It is true, as DVCA observes, that Paragraph 3 of the subdivi-
sion’s deed of dedication references an annual lot assessment not to
exceed $15 for “the use, upkeep and maintenance of the roads . . .
and... other common facilities.” That declaration also provides that
“[t]he right and responsibilities as created by this paragraph may be
delegated by the grantors to a Committee of lot owners within said
subdivision . . . .” Additionally, other paragraphs in the declaration
and the statements of protective covenants refer to maintenance fees.
And, we note that one covenant specifically states:

“The following shall be an additional covenant ‘Each lot
owner shall be responsible for damages to subdivision roads
and other common facilities by his agents. It is the intent of
this covenant to limit the liability of the road maintenance
fund for the cost of repair of roads and other common facili-
ties, when the damage to the roads and common facilities was
caused by the act or acts of an individual lot owner or his
agent.’ ”

DVCA’s reliance on these provisions, however, is misplaced.
DVCA is unable to identify any language in any recorded instrument
that expressly requires DVCA to maintain the roads or common
areas. DVCA’s failure to do so is fatal to its assertion that DVCA is a
property owners’ association within the meaning of the Property
Owners’ Association Act. In view of this holding, we do not consider
the litigants’ remaining arguments.

Vv.

Hi Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred when it con-
cluded in its decree that DVCA is a property owners’ association
within the meaning of Code § 55-508, et seq. We will reverse that
portion of the circuit court’s decree. We will vacate the remaining
portions of the circuit court’s decree that were based on the Virginia
Property Owners’ Association Act. We will affirm those portions of
the decree that voided the deeds that purported to transfer Lots 1 and
2 from Winkelman to the Lowes and Mr. Tinder. We will also affirm

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those portions of the decree that relate to the recordation of the cir-
cuit court’s order and the payment of real estate taxes on the lots.

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and final judgment.

CHARLES WHEELER JONES, ET AL.
v.

Davip W. K. PEACOCK, JR., EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE UNDER
THE WILL OF GERALDINE M. JONES, DECEASED, ET AL.

Record No. 030123
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Stephenson, S.J. |

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John B. Russell, Jr. (Alan P. Gernhardt; DurretteBradshaw, on
briefs), for appellants.

Robert W. McFarland (William H. Baxter, II; Dana G. Fitzsi-
mons, Jr; Jeffrey L. Marks; Sarah L. Allgeier; Michael R.
Katchmark; McGuireWoods; Willcox & Savage, on briefs), for
appellees.

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, Charles Wheeler Jones and Richard Franklin Jones
ask this Court to reverse the trial court’s judgment that their father,
B. Franklin Jones, did not have the requisite mental capacity to exe-
cute a claim for an elective share of his deceased wife’s augmented
estate pursuant to Code § 64.1-13. Because we conclude that the trial
court utilized the wrong standard for mental competency and that the
record does not show Franklin Jones was incompetent to execute the
claim, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the
case for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Geraldine M. and B. Franklin Jones (the Joneses) were married
for 15 years. During the marriage the Joneses lived at Westminster
Canterbury, a retirement home and nursing facility. For the last five
years of the marriage, Mrs. Jones resided in the health care section of
the facility. Although they lived apart, the Joneses saw each other on
a daily basis and generally dined together.

Mrs. Jones died on May 15, 2000. Her will, dated April 11, 1995,
was admitted to probate. According to the terms of the will, the
majority of Mrs. Jones’ estate was to be held in trust for the lifetime
benefit of Franklin Jones. Upon his death, any remaining assets were
to be distributed to certain named beneficiaries. Mrs. Jones had no
children, but Franklin had two sons by a prior marriage.

At the time of his wife’s death, Franklin resided in the assisted
living section of Westminster Canterbury. On August 22, 2000, he
was moved to a nursing home level of care because he refused to
take food, fluids, or medication, had expressed a desire to die, and
was found wrapping a call bell cord around his neck.

On August 24, 2000, Richard Jones visited his father. During this
visit Richard gave his father a completed but unsigned Notice of
Claim for Elective Share of Augmented Estate (Notice of Claim).
Franklin signed the Notice of Claim and his signature was notarized
by Harriet Smith, an employee of Westminster Canterbury. Richard
Jones filed the Notice of Claim with the clerk of the Circuit Court

a °

for the City of Virginia Beach later that day. Franklin died two days
later on August 26, 2000 at the age of 90.

David W. K. Peacock, Executor and Trustee of Mrs. Jones’ estate
(Executor), filed an amended bill of complaint for advice and gui-
dance asserting that the Notice of Claim was not valid because
Franklin Jones was not competent to execute it on August 24, 2000.
The executor argued that Code § 64.1-13 requires a notice of claim
to be recorded under the same conditions as other recorded instru-
ments such as deeds and contracts, and thus, a notice of claim is
analogous to a contract. Therefore, according to the Executor, the
mental capacity required to validly execute a deed or contract should
also be required in order to validly execute a notice of claim under
Code § 64.1-13.! Based on the deposition testimony and medical
records in this case, the Executor argued that Franklin Jones did not
have the requisite mental capacity to validly execute the Notice of
Claim on August 24, 2000.

The respondents, Charles and Richard Jones, asserted that the
Notice of Claim was analogous to a testamentary document and,
therefore, the requisite mental capacity should be that applicable to
the execution of wills.? Continuing, the sons maintained that regard-
less of which standard was applied, Franklin Jones was competent to
validly execute the Notice of Claim on August 24, 2000.

With the agreement of the parties, the case was submitted to the
trial court on the pleadings, deposition testimony, medical records,
and argument of counsel. Applying the level of competence required
to execute a deed or other legally binding contract, the trial court
held that Franklin Jones “did not understand the nature of the notice
of claim and the consequences of signing it” and therefore, the
Notice of Claim was invalid. We granted the sons this appeal.

DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Competency to Execute a Notice of Claim

I The parties and the trial court recognized that we have not
previously considered the appropriate competency standard for exe-

A party is competent to execute a deed or contract if at the time of execution, the party has
sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the transaction and agree to its provi-
sions. Hill v. Brooks, 253 Va. 168, 175, 482 S.E.2d 816, 821 (1997).

2 A party is competent to execute a will if the party has sufficient mental capacity at the
time of execution to “recollect[] his property, the natural objects of his bounty, and their
claims upon him, and kn[o]w the business about which he was engaged and how he wished to
dispose of his property.” Fields v. Fields, 255 Va. 546, 550, 499 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1998).

20 Lee
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cuting a notice of claim under the augmented estate statutes. Resolv-
ing the issue is a matter of law, and we apply a de novo standard of
review to the judgment of the trial court. Firebaugh v. Whitehead,
263 Va. 398, 402, 559 S.E.2d 611, 614 (2002).

HEB In concluding that execution of a notice of claim requires
the same level of mental capacity as that required to execute a deed
or contract, both the trial court and the Executor relied in part on
Code § 64.1-13. Subsection A of that section prescribes that a written
notice of claim filed with the clerk of court be “upon such acknowl-
edgment or proof as would authorize a writing to be admitted to
record under Chapter 6 (§ 55-106 et seq.) of Title 55.” The trial
court concluded, and the Executor argues, that Code § 64.1-13
implicitly suggests a similarity between contracts, deeds, and notices
of claim because the referenced sections in Chapter 6 of Title 55
govern other recorded instruments such as deeds and contracts.

We do not find this argument persuasive. The referenced sections
in Title 55 address only the form that a document must meet to be
admitted to record. There is nothing in these statutory provisions, or
any other, that establishes the level of competence required to exe-
cute a notice of claim.

The parties and the trial court also looked to cases from other
jurisdictions for guidance: Foman v. Moss, 681 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1997); In re Dellow’s Estate, 287 N.W. 420 (Mich. 1939); In re
Estate of Disney, 550 N.W.2d 919 (Neb. 1996); In re Estate of Ber-
gren, 47 N.W.2d 582 (Neb. 1951); Rau v. Krepps, 133 S.E. 508 (W.
Va. 1926). The trial court relied primarily on language contained in
the West Virginia case of Rau v. Krepps. In that case, the surviving
spouse had not executed any written document claiming a statutory
share of the estate, and the issue was whether such election could be
implied by the actions of the surviving spouse. Rau, 133 S.E. at 510-
12. The mental capacity of the surviving spouse was not at issue.
Neither Rau nor any of the cases cited by the parties directly equated
the competency level for taking an elective share of a deceased
spouse’s property with that required for executing a contract, deed, or
will.

Hl Implicit in these cases, however, is the proposition that the
execution of an instrument claiming an elective share is not the same
as the execution of a contract or will. We agree. A contract involves
a bilateral exchange, a meeting of the minds, and an understanding of
obligations undertaken — factors not present in taking an elective
share. A will requires action by only the testator and does not affect

ey 21
a

the testator’s present or future interests. Choosing an elective share
over provisions made in a will, although a unilateral act, does affect
future interests of the surviving spouse. Indeed, the courts in each of
the cases relied upon by the parties described the level of compe-
tence in terms of the consequences of the action at issue. Disney, 550
N.W.2d at 924 (whether surviving spouse was capable of understand-
ing and protecting his or her own interests when instrument exe-
cuted); Foman, 681 N.E.2d at 1117, citing Bergren, 47 N.W.2d at
589 (whether widow had “‘the capacity to understand what she was
doing and to decide intelligently whether she desired to execute the
instrument”); Dellow, 287 N.W. at 422 (“If [the widow] was capable
of reasoning and taking reasonable action, she was competent to
make an election”). We agree that the distinct nature of an election
warrants a level of competency uniquely connected to that act.
HM We hold that at the time an election is made under Code
§ 64.1-13, the surviving spouse must have the capacity to understand
his right to elect against the will and receive a share of the estate
established by law and to know that he is making such an election.
Competency to execute the notice of claim does not require a surviv-
ing spouse to know the specific amount that will be received as a
result of such an election. Indeed, that amount may not be deter-
mined without litigation. Chappell v. Perkins, 266 Va. 413, 418, 587
S.E.2d 584, 586-87 (2003). Whether a surviving spouse exercises
good judgment when making an election is not relevant to the issue
of mental capacity to make such a choice. See, e.g., Thomason v.
Carlton, 221 Va. 845, 855, 276 S.E.2d 171, 177 (1981) (an unwise
decision or mistake in judgment in making a will is not evidence of
incompetency); Smyth Bros.-McCleary-McClellan Co. v. Beresford,
128 Va. 137, 169-70, 104 S.E. 371, 382 (1920) (capacity to make a
contract controls, not the propriety or impropriety of any dispositions
of the maker’s property that may be made therein); Greer v. Greers,
50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 330, 333 (1852) (testator does not lack capacity
merely because his disposition appears unreasonable or imprudent).
HM Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in applying
the standard for mental capacity required to execute a deed or con-
tract to the execution of a notice of claim pursuant to Code § 64.1-
13. Although the trial court applied the wrong standard, the parties
have acknowledged that because the evidence in this case was solely
in the form of deposition testimony, we need not remand this case
for a determination of competency, but can resolve that issue based

° |

on the record before us. Kaplan v. Copeland, 183 Va. 589, 593, 32
$.E.2d 678, 679 (1945).

B. Factual Finding Regarding Competency

HH In determining whether a party was competent to make an
election under Code § 64.1-13, we begin with the presumption that
all persons are competent, and the party challenging this presumption
has the burden of establishing incompetency. Brown v. Resort Devel-
opments, 238 Va. 527, 529, 385 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1989).

Franklin Jones’ two treating physicians testified by deposition.
Dr. Jerry H. Morewitz, a psychiatrist, began treating Franklin Jones
for mild to moderate depression in February 2000. Throughout his
treatment, Dr. Morewitz found Jones alert and with appropriate
mental skills. The last time Dr. Morewitz saw Jones was August 22,
2000, the day Jones had been transferred to the health care facility
because he would not take food, water, or medications. On that occa-
sion, Jones would not communicate with Dr. Morewitz.

Dr. Otarod Bahrani, Jones’ primary care physician, also saw
Jones on August 22, 2000. Jones did communicate with Dr. Bahrani.
According to Dr. Bahrani, Jones was alert and oriented on that date.

Both doctors testified that Franklin’s weakening condition could
cause his mental state to fluctuate, but neither doctor could form an
opinion as to whether Franklin Jones was competent to sign the
Notice of Claim form on August 24, 2000.3

HB Nothing in the testimony of either physician indicates that
Franklin Jones lacked the capacity to understand his right to claim an
elective share under Code § 64.1-13 or to know that he was execut-
ing such a claim on August 24, 2000. In fact, the evidence of record
suggests the contrary.

Ms. Harriet Smith testified that she knew Franklin Jones “fairly
well” and visited him throughout his residency at Westminster Can-
terbury. She recalled that when she was called to his room to notarize
the Notice of Claim on August 24, 2000, he recognized her and
called her by name. Ms. Smith testified that when he signed the
Notice of Claim he “was alert.”

3 Dr. Bahrani testified that he did not think Franklin Jones was competent to execute a
contract, to buy a car, or purchase a house. However, on cross-examination he explained that
the complexity of matters associated with buying a house such as finances and insurance would
be difficult for someone “just in the hospital” to undertake, although many people at the end
of life can make decisions “‘in the last minute” and he did not know “about Mr, Jones in this
case.”

a 23
a

Richard Jones testified that he brought the Notice of Claim to his
father on August 24, 2000 pursuant to his father’s request. Franklin
recognized Richard and “appeared glad” to see him. Richard told his
father about the Notice of Claim and told him that his signature
would have to be notarized if he chose to sign the document. Richard
testified that his father read the Notice of Claim before signing it.
Richard also testified that his father raised the subject of the elective
share some years before and that Richard had assisted his father in
getting the answers to some questions regarding the elective share.

Hl Based on the record before us, we conclude that the Execu-
tor failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that on August 24,
2000, Franklin Jones did not have the mental capacity to understand
his right to elect against the will and take a share of the estate as
prescribed by statute or to understand that he was executing such an
election when he signed the Notice of Claim on August 24, 2000.
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

8

CecILIA ANN WRIGHT
Vv.

Troy D. ECKHARDT
Record No. 030181

January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J.

N
n

Robert B. Jeffries for appellant.
Mona Schapiro Flax for appellee.

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether the doctrine of res judicata
bars giving full faith and credit to a judgment of the Texas Court of
Appeals.

The relevant facts are undisputed. Cecilia Ann Wright and Troy
D. Eckhardt were divorced in 1993. Pursuant to the divorce decree
entered by the District Court of Nueces County, Texas, Wright was
awarded a portion of Eckhardt’s military retirement benefits when he
retired. In 1998, after Eckhardt retired from active military service,
Wright obtained a clarifying order from the Texas court establishing
the formula for computing her share of Eckhardt’s pension. Later that
same year, Wright came to Virginia, where Eckhardt resided, and
filed suit in the City of Virginia Beach General District Court seek-
ing a judgment against Eckhardt for unpaid amounts due under the
Texas decree. The general district court entered judgment in favor of
Wright for $3,331.44.

° a

Eckhardt appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of the City of
Virginia Beach. Prior to a hearing on his appeal, Eckhardt obtained a
second clarifying order from the Texas court. In that order, issued
June 3, 1999, the Texas court concluded that Wright was not entitled
to payments based on Eckhardt’s military retirement because Eck-
hardt was still a member of the Fleet Reserve and therefore not
retired. At the August 24, 1999 hearing of Eckhardt’s de novo appeal
from the general district court, the Circuit Court of the City of Vir-
ginia Beach entered judgment in favor of Eckhardt based on the sec-
ond clarifying order of the Texas court.

Wright did not appeal the August 24, 1999 order of the Circuit
Court of the City of Virginia Beach but did appeal the June 3, 1999
second clarifying order of the Texas court to the Texas Court of
Appeals.* The Texas Court of Appeals entered judgment on Novem-
ber 9, 2000 reversing the second clarifying order and holding that
Wright was entitled to payments based on Eckhardt’s military
retirement.

In November 2001, Wright filed the instant action in the Circuit
Court of the City of Virginia Beach seeking $9,325.28 plus interest
and attorney’s fees based on the November 2000 judgment of the
Texas Court of Appeals. The trial court dismissed Wright’s action,
holding that the doctrine of res judicata as applied in Kessler v. Fau-
quier National Bank, 195 Va. 1095, 81 S.E.2d 440 (1954), precluded
Wright’s action based on the Texas Court of Appeals’ November
2000 order. We awarded Wright an appeal.

DISCUSSION

Eckhardt asserts here as he did in the trial court that the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude Wright from pursuing
an action based on the November 2000 order of the Texas Court of
Appeals. We disagree.

HEB The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from relitigat-
ing a cause of action when a valid final judgment has been entered
on the matter; a factual issue actually litigated and essential to a final
judgment may not be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Scales v. Lewis, 261 Va. 379, 382,
541 S.E.2d 899, 901 (2001). The party seeking to apply either doc-

* Apparently, at the August 24, 1999 hearing the trial court did not inquire whether the June
1993 order was a final order, and neither Eckhardt nor Wright, who appeared pro se via tele-
phone, volunteered any information about an appeal of the Texas order.

a 27
PF

trine has the burden of establishing that the claim or issue is pre-
cluded by the prior judgment. Id.

Il Eckhardt asserts that the issue resolved in the August 24,
1999 order of the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach is the
same issue that Wright is asserting in the instant case. According to
Eckhardt, the issue in both cases was whether the retirement pay-
ments should be paid to Wright. However, the Virginia courts were
never asked to determine whether Wright was entitled to retirement
payments; the issue in each Virginia case was whether a judgment of
a foreign jurisdiction should be given full faith and credit by a Vir-
ginia court.

HM When considering questions of full faith and credit, the Vir-
ginia court is not concerned with whether the foreign judgment is
legally correct. The Virginia court’s inquiry focuses on whether the
foreign court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment. Bloodworth v.
Ellis, 221 Va. 18, 21-22, 267 S.E.2d 96, 98 (1980). The jurisdiction
of the Texas courts to enter the various orders was not challenged in
either Virginia proceeding. The issue resolved by the August 1999
order of the Virginia court was whether full faith and credit should
be given to the second clarifying order of the Texas trial court. The
issue in the instant case is whether full faith and credit should be
given to the November 2000 judgment of the Texas Court of
Appeals. In the absence of an identity of claims or issues, the
defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel fail.

Finally, Kessler does not require a different result. That case
involved a claim by Oliver Kessler that he was the surviving spouse
of Rose Kessler and entitled to participate in the distribution of her
estate, even though Rose Kessler had obtained a divorce from him in
Florida. In his first suit, Kessler maintained that the Florida court did
not have jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree. After considering
evidence on the issue of jurisdiction, the Virginia trial court held that
the Florida court did have jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree,
and therefore Kessler was not Rose Kessler’s surviving spouse and
not entitled to take from the proceeds of her estate. Kessler, 195 Va.
at 1098-99, 81 S.E.2d at 442.

Following that decision, Kessler instituted a suit in Florida in
which the Florida court declared the divorce decree void for lack of
jurisdiction. Kessler then filed a second suit in Virginia, asking that
the Virginia court give full faith and credit to the Florida decree
holding that the divorce decree was void and allow him to participate

in the distribution of his wife’s estate. The Virginia court declined to
do so. Id. at 1100-01, 81 S.E.2d at 442-43.

Hi In affirming the trial court, we pointed out that, in the first
proceeding, the Virginia court was entitled to and did address
whether the Florida court had jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree.
Thus, the substantive issue of jurisdiction was litigated and resolved
by the Virginia court. In his second Virginia proceeding, Kessler
sought full faith and credit for a Florida decree that addressed the
same substantive issue already decided by the Virginia court: whether
the Florida court had jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree. Con-
cluding that consideration of full faith and credit included applying
the doctrine of res judicata to matters of jurisdiction, we held that
Kessler’s second action was barred because the Virginia court had
decided the issue of jurisdiction in the prior proceeding. Jd. at 1101-
02, 81 S.E.2d at 443.

Unlike Kessler, in the present litigation the issue of jurisdiction
has not been raised or addressed in either the Virginia or Texas pro-
ceedings, and the order of the Virginia court in the first proceeding
did not resolve any issue subsequently addressed by the Texas Court
of Appeals. The factual differences between Kessler and the instant
case make the decision in that case inapplicable here.

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

id
‘oO

JAMES BRYANT HUDSON
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 031461

January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J.

Buddy A. Ward for appellant.
Paul C. Galanides, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

ee 31
|

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Hl James Bryant Hudson received a death sentence upon plead-
ing guilty to a charge of capital murder for the “willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the
same act or transaction.” Code § 18.2-31(7). Although Hudson
waived his right to appeal, Code § 17.1-313 requires that we review
the imposition of the death sentence to determine whether the death
sentence “was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or
any other arbitrary factor” and whether the death sentence is “exces-
sive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, con-
sidering both the crime and the defendant.”

Background

Hl Pursuant to established principles of appellate review, we
recite the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
party prevailing below. Commonwealth v. Bower, 264 Va. 41, 43, 563
S.E.2d 736, 737 (2002).

A single driveway connected Hudson’s home and the home of
Linda and Walter Stanley Cole to State Route 658, known as Virgie
Cole Road. On July 3, 2002, Stanley and his brother, Thomas Wesley
Cole, were riding in a truck on the driveway towards Hudson’s home
when they encountered Hudson’s vehicle stopped in the middle of
the driveway facing them. Wesley, the driver, stopped the truck and
got out. Hudson and Wesley stood at the driver’s side of the truck
and talked for a few minutes. Wesley then got back into the truck
and began driving down the road, when according to an eyewitness,
Hudson took a 12-gauge shotgun from his vehicle. Then, the eyewit-
ness heard Wesley ask “Why do you shoot . . . why do you shoot
us,” as Hudson fired the shotgun through the front windshield of
Wesley’s truck. The eyewitness heard more shots as he ran to get
help.

A neighbor then saw Hudson drive around the front of the Coles’
home and stop in the driveway beside the garden where Patsy A.
Cole, Wesley’s wife, was working. The neighbor saw Hudson get out
of his truck, take a shotgun from the back of his truck, and raise the
gun. Patsy Cole, seeing Hudson, asked ‘What are you doing?” Hud-
son shot her, climbed back into his truck, and drove away.

After the shootings, Hudson returned to his home where he
parked the truck, got more ammunition, and left in another truck.
Hudson telephoned his sister-in-law and stated that “the had done
some shooting.”

32 ee
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When police officers arrived in response to a call from the Coles’
neighbor, they found Patsy Cole’s body and subsequently discovered
the bodies of Stanley and Wesley Cole. Patsy died from a hemor-
thage caused by a shot that penetrated the vital organs of her chest
and abdomen.

Stanley Cole’s body was found in the passenger’s side of the
truck slumped over towards the middle of the cab. Stanley had sus-
tained multiple pellet wounds to his head and neck and a fatal shot-
gun wound behind the left ear measuring approximately two and one
half inches wide. Two expended 12-gauge shotgun shells were found
on the driveway near the driver’s side door of Wesley Cole’s truck.
There were shotgun blasts to the center, front windshield, rear wind-
shield, and passenger door of the truck.

Wesley’s body was found lying in a ditch approximately five
yards from the rear of the truck. He apparently suffered a nonfatal
gunshot wound to his right arm inside the truck before fleeing the
truck in an attempt to escape. Wesley sustained a fatal gunshot
wound to the head,

The Halifax County Sheriff’s office obtained warrants for Hud-
son’s arrest that afternoon and apprehended Hudson the next day
without incident. At the time of the arrest, Hudson had a 12-gauge
semi-automatic shotgun and a pistol in his truck. Subsequent analysis
determined that Hudson had used that shotgun and “Number 00
Buck” pellets to kill the Coles.

Proceedings

In September 2002, a grand jury indicted Hudson for the capital
murder of Stanley Cole and Wesley Cole, the capital murder of Wes-
ley Cole and Patsy Cole, and the capital murder of Stanley Cole and
Patsy Cole in violation of Code § 18.2-31(7) (the “willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the
same act or transaction”). Hudson was also indicted for the first-
degree murders of Stanley Cole, Wesley Cole, and Patsy Cole, Code
§ 18.2-32, and six counts of unlawfully and feloniously using a fire-
arm in the commission of a felony, Code § 18.2-53.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hudson pled guilty to the capital
murder of Stanley Cole and Wesley Cole, the first-degree murder of
Patsy Cole, and two counts of unlawfully and feloniously using a
firearm in the commission of a felony, and the Commonwealth
agreed to nolle prosequi the remaining charges. After determining

Sl’

that Hudson’s pleas of guilty were freely, intelligently, and volunta-
rily made, the trial court accepted the guilty pleas.

At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth sought the death
penalty based on the aggravating factors of vileness and future dan-
gerousness. The Commonwealth presented the presentence report,
victim impact statements, the testimony of Hudson’s brother, and the
testimony of various persons affected by the loss of the Coles. Hud-
son refused to present mitigating evidence and instructed his attorney
not to do so. The trial court found that the evidence in this case
supported a finding of both vileness and future dangerousness. Based
upon this finding, the trial court imposed the penalty of death
because Hudson had a history of “significant criminal activity;”
showed no evidence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
lack of mental capacity, or history of mental retardation; and had
engaged in deliberate, execution-style murders that were ‘“cold-
blooded, pitiless, [and] senseless slayings.” The trial court also com-
mented that Hudson showed no remorse, justification, or motive for
killing innocent people.

On May 12, 2003, Hudson signed a waiver of his right to appeal
his death sentence. On that same date, the trial court conducted an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Hudson’s waiver of his
right to appeal was proper. The court entered an order on May 19,
2003 based upon a finding that Hudson knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived his right to appeal.

Discussion

Hl A defendant may voluntarily waive his right to appeal a sen-
tence of death and instruct his attorney to refrain from seeking a
commutation of that sentence. A defendant cannot, however, waive a
review of the death sentence pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(A) and (C)
because “the purpose of the review process is to assure the fair and
proper application of the death penalty statutes in this Common-
wealth and to instill public confidence in the administration of jus-
tice.” Akers v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 358, 364, 535 S.E.2d 674,
677 (2000).

Accordingly, we review Hudson’s death sentence to determine
whether the trial court imposed that sentence “under the influence of
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor” and whether the sen-
tence “is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” Code
§ 17.1-313(C)(1)-(2).

34 Le
a

Il First, we address whether the trial court imposed Hudson’s
death sentence “under the influence of passion, prejudice or any
other arbitrary factor.” Code § 17.1-313(C)(1). We find no evidence
in the record indicating that the trial court ruled under such influ-
ences. We further observe that the trial court, although not mandated
to do so, offered Hudson more than one opportunity to present miti-
gating evidence at the sentencing hearing. Hudson refused to present
any such evidence.

Il Next, we consider whether the sentence is excessive or dis-
proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant. Code § 17.1-313(C)(2). This Court
has accumulated the records of all capital murder cases where a
defendant received a death sentence as well as those where a defen-
dant received a life sentence. Code § 17.1-313(E).

We have reviewed the capital murder cases where a defendant
killed more than one person as part of the same act or transaction
and where the Commonwealth sought the death penalty based upon
the aggravating factors of vileness and future dangerousness. After
such review, we find that the defendant’s sentence was not excessive
or disproportionate to the sentences imposed in capital murder cases
comparable to this case. See Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 631,
553 S.E.2d 520 (2001) (defendant stabbed to death his daughter and
his ex-girlfriend’s daughter); Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442,
470 S.E.2d 114 (1996) (defendant killed five people by shooting
them multiple times with a pistol); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245
Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 394 (1993) (defendant shot his estranged wife
and infant son in the head).

HB Hudson’s counsel argues that the death penalty is dispropor-
tionate in this case because there is no evidence of prolonged suffer-
ing and, therefore, that the acts of murder were less heinous than
other acts for which the death penalty was imposed. We disagree.
Hudson committed unprovoked offenses using ““Number 00 Buck”
pellets to inflict the maximum damage on the three defenseless vic-
tims, showing his disregard for human life. See Chichester v. Com-
monwealth, 248 Va. 311, 332, 448 S.E.2d 638, 652 (1994); see also
Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 260, 267, 435 S.E.2d 636, 640
(1993). As the trial court noted in this case, Hudson committed three
deliberate, execution-style murders that were “cold-blooded, pitiless,
[and] senseless slayings.” In conducting the proportionality review,
we strive “to reach a reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify
the imposition of the death penalty. Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va.

Pe 35
|

390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999). We do not ‘insure complete
symmetry.’ Id.” Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 109, 580
S.E.2d 834, 850 (2003).

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

Affirmed.

6
_—————_

ALEXANDER WAYLAND HUDSON
Vv.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 030294
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, CJ., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Stephenson, S.J.

| |
|
a

38

Christopher K. Kowalczuk for appellant.
Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KEENAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in
rejecting a defendant’s claim that he was denied his right under Code
§ 19.2-243 to a “speedy trial.”

Alexander W. Hudson, a juvenile, was indicted by a grand jury in
Franklin County for capital murder in the commission of robbery, in
violation of Code § 18.2-31(4), and for robbery, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-58. Before trial, Hudson filed a motion to dismiss the charges
on the ground that he was denied a speedy trial in violation of Code
§ 19.2-243. The circuit court denied Hudson’s motion.

A jury acquitted Hudson of the capital murder charge and the
lesser-included offense of first degree murder, but found him guilty
of the robbery charge. The circuit court sentenced Hudson to 35
years’ imprisonment and suspended the sentence conditioned on his
remaining in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice until
his twenty-first birthday.

Hudson appealed from his conviction to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. Hudson v. Common-
wealth, 39 Va. App. 240, 242, 250, 572 S.E.2d 486, 487, 491 (2002).
The Court of Appeals concluded that Hudson was not denied his stat-
utory right to a speedy trial because his affirmative agreement to the
trial date in the circuit court constituted a waiver of his right to be
tried within the time period established in Code § 19.2-243. Id. at
249-50, 572 S.E.2d at 490-91. Hudson appeals.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. On December 31, 2000,
when Hudson was 14 years old, he was charged in two petitions ini-
tiated in the Franklin County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Dis-
trict Court for the offenses of capital murder and robbery. Hudson
was arrested and taken into custody on that date.

___eeeeill

On February 1, 2001, the circuit court conducted a “docketing
conference” with the parties for the purpose of setting a trial date in
anticipation that Hudson’s charges would be transferred from the
juvenile and domestic relations district court to the circuit court and
that Hudson would be indicted on those charges. Hudson’s attorneys
agreed to a trial date of July 18, 2001, and the circuit court entered
this trial date into its automated case management system.

On February 12, 2001, the juvenile and domestic relations district
court conducted a preliminary hearing in which it found probable
cause to believe that Hudson had committed the charged offenses and
transferred the case to the circuit court for Hudson’s trial as an adult.
The circuit court entered an order permitting the Commonwealth to
seek indictments and on March 5, 2001, a grand jury indicted Hud-
son on the capital murder and robbery charges. Hudson’s trial on
these indictments began on July 18, 2001.

In its opinion affirming Hudson’s conviction, the Court of
Appeals held that there is “no difference between a waiver of the
defendant’s right to be tried within the statutory period by agreeing
to . . . a continuance beyond the time period permitted under the
statute, and the defendant initially agreeing to . . . a trial date beyond
the statutory period.” Hudson, 39 Va. App. at 249, 572 S.E.2d at
490. The Court of Appeals further stated:

The trial dates were never changed, and at no time did Hudson
or his attorney ever object to the dates. Furthermore, there was
neither a demand for a prompt trial nor any showing of actual
prejudice to Hudson as a result of the delay. Consequently, it
was proper for the trial court and the Commonwealth to con-
clude that the scheduled trial date, agreed to by Hudson, would
be met.

Id, at 249, 572 S.E.2d at 491.

On appeal to this Court, Hudson argues that the Court of Appeals
erred in requiring him to demonstrate “actual prejudice” because the
language of Code § 19.2-243 does not require such a showing. Hud-
son also contends that a criminal defendant does not waive his right
to a speedy trial under the statute merely because he does not
demand that a trial date be set within the prescribed time period.
Hudson asserts that such requirements would render the speedy trial
statute meaningless.

40 ee
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Hudson further argues that he could not have waived his right to
a speedy trial during the docketing conference on February 1, 2001,
because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over his case,
which was not certified to the circuit court until February 12, 2001.
Hudson also contends that his agreement to the trial date did not
waive the provisions of the speedy trial statute because the trial date
was not memorialized in an order of the circuit court.

In response, the Commonwealth argues that Hudson’s statutory
right to a speedy trial was not violated. The Commonwealth asserts
that when a defendant agrees to, or acquiesces in, the entry of an
order that effectively continues his case, the statutory period is tolled
during the time set by the court in that order. The Commonwealth
contends that Hudson affirmatively agreed to the July 18, 2001 trial
date, which effectively continued the case until that day.

HH In resolving this issue, we first consider the language of
Code § 19.2-243, which provides in relevant part:

Where a general district court has found that there is probable
cause to believe that the accused has committed a felony, the
accused, if he is held continuously in custody thereafter, shall
be forever discharged from prosecution for such offense if no
trial is commenced in the circuit court within five months from
the date such probable cause was found by the district court;
and if the accused is not held in custody but has been recog-
nized for his appearance in the circuit court to answer for such
offense, he shall be forever discharged from prosecution there-
for if no trial is commenced in the circuit court within nine
months from the date such probable cause was found.

If there was no preliminary hearing in the district court, or
if such preliminary hearing was waived by the accused, the
commencement of the running of the five and nine months
periods, respectively, set forth in this section, shall be from the
date an indictment or presentment is found against the
accused,

The provisions of this section shall not apply to such
period of time as the failure to try the accused was caused:

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Le

4. By continuance granted on the motion of the accused or his
counsel, or by concurrence of the accused or his counsel in
such a motion by the attorney for the Commonwealth, or by
the failure of the accused or his counsel to make a timely
objection to such a motion by the attorney for the
Commonwealth.

IB We agree with Hudson that the Court of Appeals erred in
basing its holding in part on the lack of prejudice to Hudson result-
ing from the July 18, 2001 trial date, as well as on Hudson’s failure
to make an affirmative demand for a speedy trial. The issue whether
a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial has been violated does
not rest, even in part, on the existence of prejudice from any delay in
his trial date, or on his failure to make an affirmative demand for a
speedy trial. Instead, the statute, subject to the exceptions stated
therein, focuses strictly on the length of time that has passed from
the date of the defendant’s preliminary hearing in the district court
or, if there was no preliminary hearing, from the date of indictment
or presentment in the circuit court.*

Il The protections afforded to a defendant under Code § 19.2-
243 are not self-operative and are subject to being waived. Heath v.
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 389, 393, 541 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001); Ste-
phens v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224, 230, 301 S.E.2d 22, 25
(1983); Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 321, 171 S.E.2d 243, 246
(1969). In addition, the exceptions stated in the statute are not meant
to be all-inclusive, and other exceptions of a similar nature are
implied. Stephens, 225 Va. at 230, 301 S.E.2d at 25.

We conclude that the present case is controlled by our holding in
Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 260 Va. 293, 533 S.E.2d 622 (2000).
There, the defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of
malicious wounding, in violation of Code § 18.2-51, and was held
continuously in custody until his trial. On October 23, 1996, a pre-
liminary hearing was held on these charges, which were certified to a
grand jury. Id. at 295, 533 S.E.2d at 623. Following his indictment in

* This statutory focus presents a distinct contrast with the balancing test employed by the
United States Supreme Court to determine whether there has been a violation of a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), the
Supreme Court stated four factors that must be considered and balanced in determining
whether a speedy trial violation has occurred under the Sixth Amendment, Those factors are
length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant. Jd, We do not consider these factors in the present case, however,
because Hudson has not assigned error in this Court on the basis of a Sixth Amendment right.

the circuit court, the defendant agreed to a trial date of June 6, 1997.
This was the original date set for trial and neither the Commonwealth
nor the defendant requested a continuance to that date. Id.

Hl We concluded that the defendant’s agreement, within the five-
month period fixed by Code § 19.2-243, to the order setting the trial
date “constituted a continuance of the trial date within the intend-
ment of Code § 19.2-243(4).” Id. at 297-98, 533 S.E.2d at 625.
Therefore, we held that the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy
trial was not violated because he affirmatively agreed to the trial date
that was set beyond the time period prescribed by the statute. Id. at
298, 533 S.E.2d at 625.

In the present case, Hudson also agreed to an original trial
date beyond the five-month period fixed by Code § 19.2-243.
Because Hudson’s agreement to the trial date was confirmed by the
circuit court before he was indicted, we do not charge Hudson with
the time pending before his indictment, but remove from the five-
month period only the time between his indictment in the circuit
court on March 5, 2001, and his trial on July 18, 2001. When that
time is subtracted from the total time Hudson was held continuously
in custody from the date of his preliminary hearing, the record shows
that Hudson was tried on the capital murder and robbery charges
well within the five-month limitation period of Code § 19.2-243.

Hl We find no merit in Hudson’s argument that his agreement to
the original trial date is not subject to the exception provided in Code
§ 19.2-243(4), because a preliminary hearing had not been held when
the trial date was set, and an order was not entered memorializing the
trial date. The circuit court had authority to set trial dates for all
cases to be tried in that court. The court’s action setting Hudson’s
trial date necessarily was conditioned on the charges against Hudson
being certified to the circuit court after a preliminary hearing.

Ii In addition, we observe that the language of Code § 19.2-243
did not require that the circuit court enter an order specifying the
trial date. Therefore, the court was free to memorialize the trial date
by its chosen method of entering the date into the court’s automated
case management system.

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we will affirm the Court of
Appeals’ judgment confirming Hudson’s conviction.

Affirmed.

eel

JOHN W. RICHARDSON, SUBSTITUTE GUARDIAN FOR THE
ESTATE OF CHRISTINA ELIZABETH BROWN, A MINOR

v.
AMRESCO RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE CORPORATION, ET AL.
Record No. 030390
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J., and Whiting, RJ.

45

Megan E. Burns (Stephen G. Test; Williams Mullen, on briefs),
for appellant.

Christopher J. Wiemken (Donald C. Schultz; James E. Brydges;
Chandra D. Lantz; Crenshaw, Ware & Martin; Taylor & Walker;
Hirschler, Fleisher, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, on briefs), for appellees.

JUSTICE KEENAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether the chancellor erred in ruling
that certain mortgagees were entitled to protections afforded third
parties under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, as codified in
Kentucky and Virginia (the Act). Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 385.012 through 385.252 and Virginia Code §§ 31-37 through -59.
This issue arose from the mortgagees’ asserted right to enforce liens
secured by real property that a custodian had transferred from a cus-
todial estate to herself by a quitclaim deed. We also consider whether
the chancellor erred in holding that the quitclaim deed was valid,
notwithstanding an attack on the deed by the beneficiary of the cus-
todial estate.

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PC

The relevant facts are not in dispute. In 1990, Christina E.
Brown, a one-year-old resident of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
received about $700,000 from the settlement of a wrongful death
action brought in Kentucky by the administrator of her father’s
estate. Christina’s natural mother, Dana R. Brown (Brown), was
appointed guardian of Christina’s estate by the District Court of
Shelby County, Kentucky (the Kentucky court). The Kentucky court
prohibited Brown from “invading or otherwise using the principal or
personal estate of [Christina] unless approved” by order of that
court.

In August 1996, Brown moved her residence from Kentucky to
the City of Virginia Beach, and brought Christina with her. Brown
used a portion of the estate’s assets to purchase certain real property
in Virginia Beach, which was conveyed by deed to Brown in her
capacity as the “Custodian for Christina Elizabeth Brown under the
Kentucky Uniform Transfers to Minors Act.” The deed was recorded
in the clerk’s office of the Circuit Court for the City of Virginia
Beach (the circuit court).

In March 1997, Brown, in her capacity as Christina’s custodian,
conveyed the property to herself, individually, by a “quitclaim” deed
that was recorded in the circuit court clerk’s office on April 3, 1997.
Brown conveyed the property to herself without consideration in
order to use it as security for a personal loan. The parties have stipu-
lated that this quitclaim deed is part of the ‘“‘chain of title” to the
property.

Brown obtained a personal loan in the amount of $139,750 from
AMRESCO Residential Mortgage Corporation (AMRESCO). The
loan was secured by a deed of trust on the property dated April 15,
1997.

Before executing the loan, AMRESCO retained an attorney,
Charles D. Pittman, Jr., to determine whether Brown held valid title
to the property. A title search revealed both the deed in which Brown
acquired the property in her custodial capacity (the original deed)
and the quitclaim deed in which she conveyed the estate property to
herself individually. However, Pittman failed to advise AMRESCO
regarding either deed.

In June 1997, the Kentucky court removed Brown as the guardian
of Christina’s estate based on her failure to make a required appear-
ance in that court and her failure to file with the court certain peri-

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odic and final settlement reports. In July 1997, the circuit court
appointed Brown as guardian of Christina’s estate.’

In January 1998, Brown obtained a personal loan in the amount
of $35,000 from CENIT Bank, FSB, formerly known as Princess
Anne Bank (CENIT).? The loan was secured by a deed of trust on
the property dated January 5, 1998.

Before executing the loan, CENIT retained an attorney, Henry C.
Frenck, II, to conduct a title examination of the property. His title
search revealed the existence of both the original deed and the quit-
claim deed. Frenck advised CENIT that Brown owned the property
in her individual capacity.

In October 1998, Victor W. Brizendine, III, Christina’s guardian
ad litem, filed a petition in the circuit court seeking to remove Brown
as the guardian of Christina’s estate. In December 1998, the chancel-
lor “enjoined and restrained” Brown from “selling, destroying, giv-
ing away, disposing of, changing, adjusting or causing to be dimin-
ished in value any assets of the guardianship.”

In March 1999, despite the chancellor’s order, Brown entered
into a contract to sell the property to Carter H. and Lynn M.
Coupland (the Couplands). In June 1999, the chancellor entered a
decree prohibiting Brown from selling or transferring the property. In
July 1999, the chancellor removed Brown as the guardian of
Christina’s estate and appointed John W. Richardson as the estate’s
substitute guardian.

Richardson filed an ““Amended Bill of Complaint to Quiet Title
to Real Estate” against various parties, including AMRESCO and
CENIT (collectively, the mortgagees).? Richardson asked the chan-

' The record does not show that the circuit court was informed of Brown’s removal as
guardian by the Kentucky court at the time the circuit court entered its order.

2 Since the filing of the present case, CENIT has merged with SouthTrust Bank, which has
become the successor in interest to CENIT in its deed of trust and in the present proceedings.
Upon the parties’ agreement in this appeal, we have substituted SouthTrust Bank in place of
CENIT Bank, FSB, as the proper party of record in this appeal.

3 AMRESCO filed a third-party bill of complaint against its attorney, Charles D. Pittman,
J, and Charles D. Pittman, P.C., requesting judgment against them for any damages suffered
by AMRESCO in the suit filed against it by Richardson. This suit was consolidated with Rich-
ardson’s suit, and the chancellor ultimately entered final judgment in favor of all the original
respondents, including Pittman and Charles D, Pittman, P.C., and Henry C. Frenck, III, upon
resolving the allegations in Richardson’s complaint in favor of the mortgages. On appeal,
Pittman and Charles D. Pittman, P.C., have filed a joint brief with AMRESCO. Therefore, in
stating the mortgagees’ arguments in this opinion, those arguments also represent the position
of Pittman and Charles D. Pittman, P.C., in this appeal. CENIT also filed a third-party bill of
complaint against its attorney, Henry C. Frenck, III, requesting judgment against him for any

a

cellor, among other things, to declare that the quitclaim deed was
“null and void” and to declare that Christina’s estate owned the
property “free and clear of all liens and encumbrances.” The chan-
cellor, however, ordered that the property be sold to the Couplands
under the terms of their sales contract with Brown, and further
directed that all proceeds from the sale be placed in trust pending the
outcome of the present litigation.

Richardson filed a motion for summary judgment in which he
argued that the quitclaim deed was void under Kentucky law, and
voidable under Virginia law, and that the mortgagees had actual and
constructive notice of Brown’s “fiduciary self-dealing.” In response,
the mortgagees argued that they were entitled to rely on the quitclaim
deed under the Act’s “safe harbor” provision, as codified in Ken-
tucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 385.162 and Virginia Code § 31-52.

Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 385.162, which contains language
substantively identical to that found in Virginia Code § 31-52, pro-
vides, in relevant part:

A third person in good faith and without court order may act
on the instructions of or otherwise deal with any person pur-
porting to make a transfer or purporting to act in the capacity
of a custodian and, in the absence of knowledge, is not respon-
sible for determining:

(1) The validity of the purported custodian’s designation;

(2) The propriety of, or the authority . . . for, any act of the
purported custodian;

(3) The validity or propriety . . . of any instrument or instruc-
tions executed or given either by the person purporting to
make a transfer or by the purported custodian; or

(4) The propriety of the application of any property of the
minor delivered to the purported custodian.

The chancellor denied Richardson’s summary judgment motion
and held that the mortgagees were entitled to the protections afforded
third parties under the Act. The chancellor stated that while the exis-
tence of the quitclaim deed should have “raised a red flag,” the Act
was “‘sufficient to warrant the court to deny” Richardson’s motion.

damages suffered by CENIT in the suit filed against it by Richardson. However, Frenck has not
participated in the present appeal.

ee

After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the chancellor held that
Brown’s conveyance of the property to herself in her individual
capacity was a valid transfer. The Chancellor further held that the
mortgagees’ deeds of trust were valid and enforceable liens against
the proceeds of the sale of the property. Richardson appeals.

Richardson asserts that the chancellor erred in holding that the
quitclaim deed was valid because under Virginia law, a deed in
which a fiduciary transfers property to herself, individually, is void-
able and must be set aside at the beneficiary’s request. The mortga-
gees do not dispute this basic principle of law, but argue that the
“safe harbor” provisions of the Act and the mortgagees’ alleged sta-
tus as bona fide purchasers protect their interest in the property from
Christina’s attack on the quitclaim deed. We disagree with the mort-
gagees’ arguments.

HMMM We address the validity of the quitclaim deed under estab-
lished principles of Virginia law, which govern this issue because the
property conveyed by that deed is located in this Commonwealth.
Ware v. Crowell, 251 Va. 116, 119, 465 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1996); Sea-
ton v. Seaton, 184 Va. 180, 183, 34 S.E.2d 236, 237 (1945); Mort v.
Jones, 105 Va. 668, 671-72, 51 S.E. 220, 221 (1905). With regard to
transfers of property by a fiduciary, we have stated:

[I]t is a settled principle of equity that trustees and all persons
acting in a confidential character with respect to [a] subject of
sale are disqualified from purchasing the property for them-
selves. The characters of buyer and seller are incompatible,
and cannot be safely exercised by the same person. The valid-
ity of a sale in such case does not depend upon its fairness, but
the sale is voidable, and when attacked, must be set aside,
although the price was fair, or the best to be had, and the
motive pure.

Smith v. Credico Indus. Loan Co., 234 Va. 514, 516, 362 S.E.2d 735,
736 (1987) (quoting Smith v. Miller, 98 Va. 535, 541, 37 S.E. 10, 11-
12 (1900)); accord Whitlow v. Mountain Trust Bank, 215 Va. 149,
152, 207 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1974); Owens v. Owens, 196 Va. 966, 973,
86 S.E.2d 181, 185-86 (1955). Such a sale by a person acting as a
fiduciary constitutes a constructive fraud, and must be set aside when
attacked by the fiduciary’s beneficiary in order to uphold the fiduci-
ary relationship that existed at the time of the sale. Whitlow, 215 Va.
at 152, 207 S.E.2d at 840.

0
FP

Hl Applying these principles, we hold that Christina’s attack on
the quitclaim deed requires that the deed be set aside, and that the
chancellor erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. Therefore, we
will now consider whether the mortgagees’ asserted interest in the
property is protected under the “safe harbor” provisions of the Act
or by the mortgagees’ alleged status as bona fide purchasers.

Richardson contends that the Act does not protect the mortga-
gees’ interest in the property because the Act shields only third par-
ties who ‘‘act on the instructions of or otherwise deal with any per-
son purporting to. . . act in the capacity of a custodian.” Kentucky
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 385.162; see also Virginia Code § 31-52. He argues
that because the mortgagees dealt with Brown in her individual
capacity seeking personal loans, rather than in her capacity as custo-
dian for Christina’s estate, the mortgagees did not “deal with”
Brown within the meaning of the Act. Richardson also argues that
the mortgagees do not qualify as bona fide purchasers because both
had constructive knowledge of Brown’s fiduciary self-dealing.

In response, the mortgagees argue that they “dealt with” Brown
in her capacity as the custodian of Christina’s estate, within the
meaning of the Act, when they relied on the quitclaim deed in the
chain of title that Brown executed in her custodial capacity. Thus,
they assert that their interest in the property is protected under the
Act’s “safe harbor” provisions because they lacked knowledge that
Brown’s acts were unauthorized or improper. We disagree with the
mortgagees’ arguments.

I As we have stated, the Kentucky and Virginia statutes adopt-
ing the Act’s “safe harbor” provisions are substantively identical.
We also note that there is no jurisprudence in either jurisdiction inter-
preting these unique statutory provisions. Thus, we need not decide
whether the disputed provisions of the Act should be interpreted
under the Kentucky statute or the Virginia statute, and we focus our
inquiry on the Act’s language that is contested by the parties.

HM We hold that the language at issue is unambiguous and,
therefore, we examine this language in accordance with its plain
meaning. See Woods v. Mendez, 265 Va. 68, 74-75, 574 S.E.2d 263,
266 (2003); Mozley v. Prestwould Bd. of Dirs., 264 Va. 549, 554, 570
8.E.2d 817, 820 (2002); Industrial Dev. Auth. v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002). We conclude
that because the Act’s plain language encompasses only third parties
who “‘deal with” a “person purporting to make a transfer or purport-
ing to act in the capacity of a custodian,” such protections do not

a *
PC

extend to those who merely rely on various acts of a custodian. See
Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 385.162; Virginia Code § 31-52.

HE Because Brown’s conveyance to herself by the quitclaim
deed was not a “‘transfer” as defined by the Act,* the mortgagees can
obtain protection under the Act only to the extent that they can show
that they dealt with Brown when she was “purporting to act in the
capacity of a custodian.” See Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 385.162;
Virginia Code § 31-52. The mortgagees, however, did not deal with
Brown in her capacity as a custodian, but only in her individual
capacity to lend her money for her personal use. Therefore, the pro-
tections afforded by the Act do not apply to the mortgagees’ transac-
tions with Brown.

We next consider whether the mortgagees were bona fide pur-
chasers of the property, thereby entitling them to retain their security
interest in the property notwithstanding Christina’s attack on the quit-
claim deed. Although the chancellor did not reach this issue in his
analysis of the case, we decide the issue here based on our conclu-
sion that it can be resolved on the present record as a matter of law.*

Hl A mortgagee may assert the status of a bona fide purchaser
to the extent of the mortgagee’s interest in the real property. See
Puckett v. Campbell, 151 Va. 213, 216, 144 S.E. 434, 435 (1928);
Gordon v. Rixey, 76 Va. 694, 698 (1882); Cammack v. Soran, 71 Va.
(30 Gratt.) 292, 295 (1878); Garrard Glenn, Mortgages, Deeds of
Trust, and Other Security Devices as to Land § 32, at 208, § 378, at
1541-42 (1943). However, to attain the status of a bona fide pur-
chaser, a mortgagee must establish that it purchased its interest in the
property for value, without actual or constructive notice of the latent
equity of another. See Tauber v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 520, 538,
562 S.E.2d 118, 127 (2002); Richmond v. Hall, 251 Va. 151, 157,
466 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1996); Guss v. Sydney Realty Corp., 204 Va.
65, 72, 129 S.E.2d 43, 49 (1963).

Hl ‘The recordation of an instrument gives constructive notice
of all the facts expressly stated in the instrument and other[] matters
therein suggested which might be disclosed upon prudent inquiry.”
Shaheen v. County of Mathews, 205 Va. 462, 478, 579 S.E.2d 162,
172 (2003) (quoting Chavis v. Gibbs, 198 Va. 379, 382, 94 S.E.2d

* A “transfer” is defined as a transaction that creates custodial property under the provisions
of the Act. Kentucky Rey. Stat. Ann. § 385.012; Virginia Code § 31-37.

+ Our resolution of this issue is based on the common law and, therefore, does not address
the meaning of the phrase “tin the absence of knowledge,” as found in the Act. See Kentucky
Rey. Stat. Ann, § 385.162 and Virginia Code § 31-52.

es
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195, 197 (1956)). Thus, a purchaser of real property has constructive
notice not only of the facts appearing on the face of recorded docu-
ments in the chain of title, but also of such other facts of which the
purchaser is placed on inquiry based on those recorded instruments.
Shaheen, 265 Va. at 477, 579 S.E.2d at 171-72; Allen v. Green, 229
Va. 588, 594, 331 S.E.2d 472, 476 (1985); Kiser v. Clinchfield Coal
Corp., 200 Va. 517, 523, 106 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1959); Chavis, 198
Va. at 382-83, 94 S.E.2d at 197-98.

In the present case, the recorded instruments in the chain of
title to the property placed the mortgagees under a duty of inquiry.
On its face, Brown’s transfer of the property by quitclaim deed to
herself raised a question of fiduciary self-dealing, and further inquiry
concerning the conveyance would have yielded additional facts
revealing the unauthorized nature of the transfer. Thus, we conclude
that the mortgagees had notice of the questionable validity of
Brown’s transfer of the property to herself. This notice refutes their
claim that they were bona fide purchasers and, therefore, their inter-
est in the property is defeated by Christina’s successful attack on the
quitclaim deed. See Tauber, 263 Va. at 538, 562 S.E.2d at 127; Rich-
mond, 251 Va. at 157, 466 S.E.2d at 106; Guss, 204 Va. at 72, 129
S.E.2d at 49.

HM Accordingly, we conclude that the mortgagees do not have
valid liens on the proceeds now held in trust from the sale of the
property, and that the Estate of Christina Elizabeth Brown is entitled
to those proceeds free and clear of the mortgagees’ claims. We will
remand the case to the chancellor for entry of an order to be recorded
among the land records voiding the quitclaim deed and the mortga-
gees’ deeds of trust.

For these reasons, we will reverse the chancellor’s judgment and
remand the case for entry and recordation of the above-described
order.

Reversed,
final judgment,
and remanded.

Nn
Lvs)

SHERMAINE A. JOHNSON
Vv.
COMMONWEALTH OF: VIRGINIA
Record No. 031306

January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Stephenson, SJ.

ss a

57

William P. Irwin, V (Cary B. Bowen; Bowen, Champlin, Carr &
Rockecharlie, on brief), for appellant.

Katherine P. Baldwin, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry
W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KEENAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal of a judgment confirming a death sentence imposed
in a resentencing proceeding in a capital murder case, we consider a
range of issues including the question whether the trial court erred in |
refusing to impose a life sentence pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002) (Atkins III). We also consider the constitutionality of
Code § 19.2-264.3, which provides that a resentencing proceeding on

58 |
a

remand be held before a different jury than the jury that originally
tried the defendant.

I. PROCEEDINGS

In July 1998, the defendant, Shermaine A. Johnson, was con-
victed in a jury trial of the capital murder of Hope D. Hall in the
commission of rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-31(5), and of rape,
in violation of Code § 18.2-61. The circuit court sentenced Johnson
in accordance with the jury verdict to death for capital murder and to
life imprisonment for rape. We affirmed the circuit court’s judgment
in Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 684, 529 S.E.2d 769,
786-87, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 981 (2000).

After exhausting his remedies on direct appeal, Johnson filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Johnson alleged, among other
things, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the
penalty phase of his capital murder trial because his trial counsel
failed to request an instruction informing the jury that Johnson would
be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment for capital
murder.

Based on the holding in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S.
154, 156 (1994), that a defendant whose future dangerousness is at
issue is entitled to have the jury informed of his parole ineligibility
during the penalty phase of his trial, we awarded Johnson a writ of
habeas corpus and vacated his death sentence on the capital murder
conviction. We remanded the case to the circuit court for a new sen-
tencing proceeding on that conviction.

At the resentencing hearing, a different jury fixed Johnson’s pun-
ishment for capital murder at death based on findings of both “future
dangerousness” and “‘vileness.” The circuit court sentenced Johnson
to death on the capital murder charge in accordance with the jury
verdict. Johnson appeals.

I. THE EVIDENCE

In Johnson’s original appeal to this Court, we stated in detail the
facts relating to his convictions on the capital murder and rape
charges. Johnson, 259 Va. at 662-66, 529 S.E.2d at 773-76. We will
recite those facts from our previous opinion that are relevant to the
present proceedings:

On July 11, 1994, the nude body of 22-year-old Hope Denise
Hall was found on the bedroom floor of her apartment in

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Petersburg. She had been stabbed 15 times, including fatal stab
wounds to her back, chest, and neck.

Hall’s body had abrasions on the nose and left cheek. The
body also had a broken, ragged fingernail that Dr. Deborah
Kay, an assistant chief medical examiner for the Common-
wealth, testified was a “‘defense-type” injury. Dr. Kay also tes-
tified that death “is not generally immediate” with wounds
such as those suffered by Hall, and that she initially would
have remained conscious after the wounds were inflicted.

The police found blood on two “steak” knives, which
were lying on a counter in Hall’s kitchen. Blood was also
found on a piece of a broken drinking glass located on the
kitchen counter, and there was additional blood on the kitchen
counter and floor. The police recovered from the kitchen floor
an earring, five strands of hair, and a partial shoe print con-
taining some blood. The matching earring was found in Hall’s
bedroom.

The outside door to Hall’s apartment was locked, and the
police found a partial fingerprint and smears of blood on the
inside panel of that door, which was located near the kitchen.
The police recovered two additional “steak” knives, one on
Hall’s bed and one in her bathroom. The telephone wires in
her bedroom had been pulled out of the wall.

A smear of blood and blood splatters were located on the
bedroom wall near the victim’s body. The police found addi-
tional blood on the bedroom floor, dresser, sheets, and bed-
spread. There was no sign of forced entry into the apartment.

DNA Evidence

Jean M. Hamilton, a forensic scientist employed by the
Virginia Division of Forensic Science, testified that she per-
formed DNA testing using the “polymerase chain reaction,”
or PCR, technique on evidence recovered from the crime scene
and a blood sample and vaginal swabs collected from Hall’s
body during an autopsy. Hamilton concluded that the DNA
from the blood found on the knife on the bed, the knives in the
kitchen, the kitchen countertop, and the front door all matched
the DNA from Hall’s blood sample.

Hamilton determined that the DNA from Hall’s blood did
not match the DNA from the blood on the handle of the knife

60

found in the bathroom. However, the blood from the broken
glass in the kitchen and one bloodstain on the bedspread con-
tained a mixture of Hall’s DNA and DNA from the same per-
son whose blood was on the handle of the knife found in the
bathroom.

Hamilton testified that DNA from sperm detected in two
semen stains on the sheets and DNA from another stain on the
bedspread came from the same person as the DNA from the
blood on the bathroom knife. However, the DNA from the
sperm detected in the vaginal swab taken from Hall’s body
came from more than one person.

Hamilton then performed a more discriminating type of
DNA analysis, known as “restriction fragment length poly-
morphism” or RFLP testing, on the DNA from two semen
stains found on the sheet and the bedspread. After obtaining
the DNA profile from those two stains, Hamilton searched the
DNA data bank maintained by the Division of Forensic Sci-
ence to determine if the DNA profile obtained from the crime
scene evidence matched any DNA profile on record in the
DNA data bank. Hamilton did not find a matching DNA pro-
file at the time of her initial search in March 1996, at which
time there were about 5,000 samples in the DNA data bank.

In August 1996, Hamilton performed a second search of
the DNA data bank after about 2,500 more samples had been
added to the bank. Hamilton’s second search revealed that one
DNA profile contained in the data bank was consistent with
the DNA profile that she had obtained from the crime scene
evidence. This matching DNA profile belonged to the defen-
dant, Shermaine A. Johnson, who was incarcerated in the
Southampton Correctional Institute.

Other Crimes Evidence

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth gave Johnson notice that
it intended to present evidence during the guilt phase of the
trial that Johnson had raped 21-year-old Lavonda Scott on July
2, 1994, and 15-year-old Janel Chambliss on August 31, 1994.
Over Johnson’s objection, the trial court permitted both Scott
and Chambliss to testify about these crimes, after finding that

= 2 «

there were “numerous” similarities between the crimes com-
mitted against Scott and Chambliss and the pending charges
against Johnson.

The trial court cited the following factors in its decision to
permit the testimony of Scott and Chambliss. All three victims
were young African-American women. Scott and Chambliss
both knew Johnson and allowed him to enter their homes.
There was no sign of forced entry into Hall’s apartment. John-
son assaulted both Scott and Chambliss after requesting a glass
of water. He then seized knives from their kitchens. There was
a broken drinking glass in Hall’s kitchen, and the knives used
to kill Hall came from her kitchen.

Johnson forced both Scott and Chambliss to remove all
their clothing before raping them. Hall’s body was totally nude
and her clothes were found near her body. Johnson threatened
both Scott and Chambliss, stating that he would kill them if
they did not follow his directions. When Chambliss resisted
and struggled with Johnson, he stabbed her. There was evi-
dence of a struggle in Hall’s apartment and Hall was fatally
stabbed. All three crimes occurred within a [60]-day period in
1994,

Id. (Footnote omitted).

Before the resentencing proceeding on remand, Johnson filed
various motions in the circuit court. In one motion, Johnson asked
the circuit court to prohibit the Commonwealth from using “live”
testimony to present evidence of his guilt and to require the Com-
monwealth to “rely on the transcript as previously made to introduce
this evidence.” However, during another argument before the circuit
court, Johnson objected to the Commonwealth’s “use [of] transcripts
versus live testimony and how it hinders the defense in its ability to
cross-examine witnesses . . . and how it could have a prejudicial
[e]ffect on the jury.” Johnson also asked the circuit court to allow
him to present evidence of his “innocence” during the resentencing
hearing. The circuit court denied Johnson’s requests and granted the
Commonwealth’s motion to prohibit Johnson from presenting evi-
dence, cross-examining witnesses, or making any argument in rela-
tion to his claim of innocence.

Johnson also requested that the circuit court impose a life sen-
tence on the ground that the jury in his first trial would have fixed
punishment at life imprisonment on the capital murder charge had the

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jury been properly instructed concerning his ineligibility for parole.
In support of this motion, Johnson presented affidavits from two
jurors who served during Johnson’s first trial. In the affidavits, the
jurors stated that had they “known that Mr. Johnson would receive a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole,” they “would have
recommended that sentence instead of the death penalty.” The circuit
court denied Johnson’s motion.

Johnson also asked the circuit court to impose a life sentence on
the ground that he was 16 years old at the time of these offenses.
The circuit court denied this motion, as well as Johnson’s motion that
the capital murder and death penalty statutes be declared unconstitu-
tional on various grounds.

Johnson further requested that the circuit court impose a life sen-
tence based on his alleged ‘‘mental illness.”’ Johnson asserted that he
had been diagnosed as suffering from ‘Dissociative Identity Disor-
der” (DID), a mental condition which Johnson described as featuring
“the presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states
that recurrently take control of behavior.” Johnson also represented
that assessments of his intellectual functioning showed that he had an
1.Q. score of 75 in 1991, and an LQ. score of 78 in 1992.

A psychological evaluation, prepared in February 1991 by a certi-
fied school psychologist for the Franklin City Public Schools, con-
cluded that Johnson was “a young man of limited intellectual poten-
tial whose academic achievement and other school-related skills are
commensurate with expectations for the slow learning student.” The
report described Johnson’s I.Q. score:

[Johnson’s] Full Scale 1.Q. places him in the “borderline”
range of cognitive development, with a 95% chance that his
true score falls between 69 and 81. He obtained a Verbal Scale
score of 81, a Performance Scale score of 72, and a Full Scale
Intelligence Quotient of 75.

Although the report classified Johnson as a “slow learner,” it stated
that Johnson’s “learning status does not . . . indicate eligibility for
special education services.” The report concluded that Johnson was
“in great need of emotional and academic support within the school
setting.”

Johnson argued to the circuit court that his low I.Q. scores could
“qualify him to be considered as mentally retarded” and thus ineligi-
ble to receive the death penalty under the United States Supreme

| 63
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Court’s ruling in Arkins III. Johnson further asserted that his low
intelligence and his DID diagnosis indicated that he suffered from a
“mental impairment sufficient to make him ineligible for the death
penalty.”” The Commonwealth argued in response that there was no
evidence indicating that Johnson was mentally retarded.

At the time of Johnson’s resentencing proceeding, the General
Assembly had not yet enacted legislation providing procedures to
resolve claims of mental retardation raised by defendants in capital
murder cases. In considering Johnson’s claim, the circuit court relied
on a definition of mental retardation found in proposed legislation
that at the time had been approved by the Senate of Virginia but had
not been voted upon by the House of Delegates. The circuit court
stated:

[T]he Senate passed the bill, and it has the same definition for
mental retardation as the American Psychiatric Association.
And under that bill . . . it had a two part definition of mentally
retarded: In order to be considered mentally retarded inmates
must have substantial subaverage, general intellectual function,
existing concurrently with significant limitations and adaptive
functioning, both of which were before the age of 18. The bill
defines significantly subaverage general intellectual function-
ing at an IQ of 70 or below as measured by scientifically rec-
ognized and standardized intelligence quotient testing.

Significant limitations and adaptive intellectual functioning
means significant limitation in two or more skill areas such as
communication, self-care, home living, social and interpersonal
skills, and health and safety according to the bill.

The circuit court concluded that it had “not been presented any evi-
dence as of this point of [mental] retardation under the definition
which the Court adopts.” The court denied Johnson’s motion but
indicated that he could renew his request upon presenting further evi-
dence regarding his claim of mental retardation.

During Johnson’s resentencing hearing, the Commonwealth
presented to the jury evidence of Johnson’s guilt. The parties stipu-
lated that Johnson’s blood was found on a knife taken from Hall’s
bathroom and on a broken glass discovered in Hall’s kitchen. The
jury also was informed that Johnson’s sperm was found on Hall’s bed
sheets, bedspread, and in a “vaginal cervical swab” taken from
Hall’s body. In addition, the parties stipulated that Johnson had

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admitted to the police that he had been in Hall’s apartment on the
night of her murder.

The Commonwealth also presented evidence of Johnson’s crimi-
nal record and of certain unadjudicated acts. The evidence showed
that in August 1992, when Johnson was 14 years old, he sexually
assaulted Elsie Soto in the State of New Jersey. In January 1994, he
raped Nicole Lisa, also in the State of New Jersey.

On June 29, 1994, Johnson raped Tiffany Burgess in the State of
New York. A few days later, Johnson raped Lavonda Scott in the
City of Franklin, Virginia. In August 1994, he raped and abducted
Janel Chambliss in the City of Franklin. Johnson also was convicted
of breaking and entering into Chambliss’ home with the intent to
rape her.

In conjunction with this evidence of prior convictions, the Com-
monwealth presented the transcribed testimony of Tiffany Burgess
given in Johnson’s first trial, and read that testimony into evidence
before the jury. Burgess testified that she was 15 years old when
Johnson lured her to a friend’s apartment under the pretext of show-
ing her a present he was planning to give to her friend. Burgess
stated that once they arrived at the apartment door, Johnson grabbed
her from behind, placed her in a ‘“‘choke hold” while wielding a “big
knife,” and forced her inside the apartment. Burgess also stated that
Johnson ordered her to remove all her clothing and to perform oral
sodomy on him before he raped her at knifepoint.

Elsie Soto testified that she was 12 years old when Johnson sexu-
ally assaulted her. Soto stated that Johnson, who attended her school,
had arrived at her house one day and asked to talk with her. Soto
stated that after she refused to let Johnson come into the house, he
gained forcible entry through a kitchen window. Soto testified that
Johnson held her down on a bed and repeatedly hit her in the face
while he exposed himself and fondled her breasts and vagina.

Nicole Lisa testified that she was 13 years old when Johnson
raped her in January 1994. Lisa’s testimony revealed that as she was
leaving her apartment for school one morning, Johnson grabbed her
from behind and placed a “steak knife” against her neck. Johnson
“dragged” Lisa to the “back hallway elevator shaft” of her apart-
ment building, where he ordered her to remove all her clothing
before raping her at knifepoint.

Janel M. Chambliss testified that she was 15 years old and was
babysitting her seven-month-old nephew when Johnson raped her.
Johnson, who was Chambliss’ neighbor, arrived at Chambliss’ house

2°

and requested a glass of water. About that time, her nephew began to
cry. When Chambliss picked up her nephew, Johnson approached her
from behind and placed a “steak knife” against her throat. Johnson
told Chambliss that “he came to do one thing and one thing only,”
and that he would kill both Chambliss and her nephew if she did not
follow his instructions.

Chambliss then attempted to thwart Johnson’s attack. During the
ensuing struggle, Johnson stabbed Chambliss. Once Johnson gained
physical control over Chambliss, he ordered her to perform oral sod-
omy on him. When she refused, Johnson raped her.

Lavonda S. Scott testified that she was 21 years old when John-
son raped her. Scott’s testimony indicated that Johnson was a family
friend and that she had known him for eight years before the attack.
Johnson, who was 16 years old, did not have a place to live and had
been spending some nights at Scott’s house.

One night, when Scott’s children were in the home, Johnson
approached Scott from behind, pulled her hair, and pressed a “‘steak
knife,” which he had obtained from Scott’s kitchen, “deep into [her]
throat.” Johnson told Scott that if she did not remove her clothing,
he would stab and kill her. Johnson forced Scott to remove her
clothes and to perform oral sodomy on him. Johnson then raped
Scott while holding the knife against her body.

The Commonwealth next presented testimony from several of
Hall’s relatives, including her mother and her son, who related the
impact of Hall’s death on their lives. At the conclusion of the Com-
monwealth’s evidence, Johnson moved to strike the evidence on the
ground that the Commonwealth had failed to present sufficient evi-
dence to establish either “future dangerousness” or “vileness.”” The
circuit court denied Johnson’s motion.

Johnson presented testimony from Annie Mae Stephens, his great
aunt. Stephens testified that when Johnson was about 12 years old,
she went to visit Johnson and his mother, Angela, at their house.
Stephens stated that upon arriving at the house, she observed Johnson
leaving a room. Stephens stated that Johnson appeared to be “aggra-
vated,” “‘hurt,” and “angry.” Stephens further testified that she
entered the room that Johnson had left and discovered Angela in the
room, “bleeding between her legs.” Stephens stated that Angela
informed her that she had been raped by her boyfriend. Stephens was
unaware whether Johnson had observed “any act going on” in the
room.

66 Le
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Stephens testified that Johnson was close to his mother and that
she was “good to him.” Stephens also testified, however, that
Angela abused drugs and was abusive toward Johnson when she dis-
ciplined him.

Virginia Dancy, Johnson’s grandmother, testified that Johnson’s
stepfather was addicted to heroin and was “an abusive husband” to
Angela. Dancy stated that Angela became addicted to heroin after
she married Johnson’s stepfather, and that Johnson had been exposed
to their drug use. Dancy also stated that Angela had died of AIDS,
and that Johnson’s “problems with the law” did not begin until after
his mother’s death.

Dancy further testified that she had found Johnson and Angela in
a “crack house” when Johnson was three years old, and that Johnson.
was standing in a large room among “a lot of people” who were
using cocaine. Dancy stated that she took Johnson to the bathroom
and that when he attempted to urinate, he informed her that his penis
hurt. Dancy testified that when she observed that Johnson’s penis
was “red and swollen,” he told her that “a lady did it.” Dancy
stated that when she informed Angela of Johnson’s condition and his
comment regarding the “lady,” Angela replied that nobody had
“been bothering” Johnson and that he merely had a bladder
infection.

Sheila Wilson, Johnson’s cousin and pastor, testified that she had
visited Johnson in prison over the previous “year or two.” Wilson
stated that during her last visit with Johnson, which occurred several
weeks before Johnson’s resentencing hearing, he related two child-
hood memories that he had not mentioned before. Wilson testified
that Johnson told her that he remembered sitting in the backseat of a
car, which had been parked in a public park, while his mother and
her boyfriend used heroin in the front seat. Wilson stated that John-
son also told her that he remembered discovering his mother lying in
a bathtub with a syringe stuck in her arm.

Johnson also presented the testimony of Delores Dungee-
Anderson, a licensed clinical social worker who qualified as an
expert in the diagnosis of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), for-
merly known as “multiple personality disorder,” and “borderline
personality disorder.” After interviewing Johnson on three occasions
before the resentencing hearing and examining his psychological
reports, Dungee-Anderson concluded that Johnson suffered from DID
and a possible borderline personality disorder.

= 2°

Dungee-Anderson testified that DID often occurs as the result of
a childhood trauma, such as severe emotional, physical, or sexual
abuse. According to Dungee-Anderson, children exposed to such
trauma often create “fragmented parts” within their minds as a sur-
vival tactic to allow them to escape mentally from any harm that
they may be experiencing. These “fragmented parts” or “alters” are
separate and distinct personalities that exist within the mind of an
individual afflicted with DID. Different “alters” are “‘triggered’”’ and
emerge when the individual feels threatened or encounters certain
other external stimuli. When an “alter” “takes control of the per-
son,” the other “alters” are often unaware of what is happening to
the individual.

Dungee-Anderson concluded that Johnson had two separate
“alters” that were distinct from Johnson’s own personality. She testi-
fied that Johnson had an “alter” named “Shy,” and that Johnson
was consciously aware of that “alter,” a phenomenon that she
termed “co-consciousness.””

According to Dungee-Anderson, Johnson described “Shy” as
being different, stating that “I am very shy. . . . Sometimes I can’t
find the right words to talk to people. I don’t know what to say,”
whereas “Shy is very confident; he can talk to the ladies. He is very
different from me. He knows what to say.”” When Dungee-Anderson
suggested to Johnson that “Shy” was an alternative personality,
Johnson claimed that he was “not crazy” and that “Shy is me; he is
not different from me; he is me.”

Dungee-Anderson stated that during one of her interviews with
Johnson, a different “alter” emerged that was characterized by
“rage.” Dungee-Anderson “called out” to this “alter” while she
was leading Johnson through a relaxation technique. She stated that
when the “rage alter” emerged, there was a “surge of energy” and
the “rage alter” proclaimed that Johnson’s mother, who had died in
1992, was in the room.

The “‘rage alter” stated that he was “mad” at his mother because
she lied to him when she told him that “‘she wouldn’t go anywhere”
and then left him “in this world by [himself].” The “rage alter”
mentioned Johnson’s stepfather and then repeatedly stated, “nothing
but abuse.” The “rage alter” stated that he had “nothing but hate
and contempt” for Johnson’s stepfather because he had abused John-
son’s mother.

When Dungee-Anderson asked the “rage alter” what he did
when he experienced such strong feelings, the “rage alter” replied,

“T strike out.” After Dungee-Anderson asked him in what manner
did he “strike out,” the “rage alter” replied, “Whatever the situation
calls for.” When Dungee-Anderson asked him for specific examples
of such behavior, Johnson’s own personality reemerged. Johnson
claimed that he did not remember any of the conversation between
Dungee-Anderson and the “rage alter.”

Dungee-Anderson testified that she did not believe that Johnson
was lying about his condition in an attempt to convince her that he
suffered from DID. She noted that Johnson did not want to continue
with the interview when she sought more information, and that per-
sons who attempt to deceive her about their condition typically wish
to engage in further conversation with her. Dungee-Anderson further
stated that Johnson experienced a “terrible migraine headache” when
his personality “switched”? between the “alters,” which is a typical
characteristic of those suffering from DID.

Dungee-Anderson also noted that Johnson had claimed to “hear
voices,” which is often symptomatic of DID. She stated that the
memory loss Johnson experienced during episodes of conduct by his
personality ‘“‘alters” is another symptom of DID. Dungee-Anderson
conceded, however, that Johnson could recall attacking Hall and
most of his other victims.

Dungee-Anderson testified that DID is different from mental
retardation and that based on Johnson’s test results, he did not appear
to have a “mental retardation problem.” She also stated that Johnson
had never been diagnosed as being mentally retarded.

Dungee-Anderson further testified that individuals suffering from
DID typically have lower LQ. scores because various “alters” may
learn different information of which the individual as a whole may
be unaware. Dungee-Anderson observed that “[i]Jf you are not in
school for some information, you can’t repeat it when you do the IQ
testing. That is well-known in testing.”

At the conclusion of the evidence, Johnson renewed his motion to
strike the Commonwealth’s evidence on the ground that the Com-
monwealth failed to establish “future dangerousness” or “vileness.”
The circuit court denied Johnson’s motion.

The jury fixed Johnson’s punishment at death, finding that there
was a “probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.” The jury
also found that Johnson’s “conduct in committing the offense is out-
rageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved

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torture[,] depravity of mind[,] [and] aggravated battery to the victim
beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of murder.”

At the sentencing proceeding in the circuit court following the
jury verdict, Johnson introduced in evidence Dungee-Anderson’s
“psychological diagnostic assessment” of Johnson, which included
much of the information she had provided to the jury. The circuit
court also considered a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), which
stated that Johnson had completed the fifth grade and that he had
exhibited “significant behavior and academic problems in school.”
However, attached to an earlier PSI was a “sex offender evaluation
report,” which stated that Johnson had completed the eighth grade
while attending school in the State of New York.

Before imposing sentence on Johnson, the circuit court inquired
whether Johnson wanted “to address whether there [was] any evi-
dence to indicate that the jury imposed the sentence of death under
influence of any passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor.” John-
son replied that he did not wish to make such an argument.

The circuit court sentenced Johnson to death in accordance with
the jury verdict. In explaining its ruling, the court stated:

Upon a mature consideration of all of the evidence, includ-
ing the defendant’s mitigating evidence, the violent nature of
this crime, and the defendant’s past record which includes five
rapes within a seven month period, the Court finds no good
cause to overturn the jury’s verdict.

Ill. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED

Hi Johnson raises certain arguments that we resolved against him
in his first appeal to this Court, consistent with our previous deci-
sions on these issues. We reaffirm our earlier holdings and reject the
following arguments:

A. Virginia’s capital murder sentencing statutes fail to provide
meaningful guidance to the jury concerning the meaning of the terms
“future dangerousness” and “vileness.” Rejected in Johnson, 259
Va. at 667, 529 S.E.2d at 776; accord Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266
Va. 423, 430, 587 S.E.2d 532, 538 (2003); Wolfe v. Commonwealth,
265 Va. 193, 208, 576 S.E.2d 471, 480, cert. denied, __ U.S. __,
124 S.Ct. 566 (2003); Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 61, 515
S.E.2d 565, 569 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000); Cherrix
v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 299, 513 S.E.2d 642, 647, cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999).

‘ iii

B. Virginia’s statutory scheme fails to properly inform and
instruct the jury concerning its consideration of mitigation evidence.
Rejected in Johnson, 259 Va. at 667, 529 S.E.2d at 776; accord Jack-
son, 266 Va. at 429, 587 S.E.2d at 538; Morrisette v. Commonwealth,
264 Va. 386, 398, 569 S.E.2d 47, 55 (2002); Walker, 258 Va. at 61,
515 S.E,2d at 569; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299, 513 S.E.2d at 647; Goins
v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 452, 470 S.E.2d 114, 122, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996).

C. Virginia’s capital murder sentencing statutes improperly allow
the Commonwealth to prove “future dangerousness” by the use of
unadjudicated criminal conduct, thereby omitting any standard of
proof for the admission of such evidence. Rejected in Johnson, 259
Va. at 667, 529 S.E.2d at 776; accord Green v. Commonwealth, 266
Va. 81, 107, 580 S.E.2d 834, 849 (2003); Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299,
513 S.E.2d at 647; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 635, 499
S.E.2d 538, 545 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999).

D. Virginia’s capital murder sentencing statutes are unconstitu-
tional because they allow, but do not require, the court to set aside a
death sentence on a showing of good cause and permit the court to
consider hearsay evidence in the pre-sentence report. Rejected in
Johnson, 259 Va. at 667-68, 529 S.E.2d at 776; see also Bell v. Com-
monwealth, 264 Va. 172, 203, 563 S.E.2d 695, 716 (2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003); Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451,
459, 544 S.E.2d 299, 303-04, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001);

. Walker, 258 Va. at 61, 515 S.E.2d at 569; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 299,
513 S.E.2d at 647.

HE. Johnson also raises an issue that was not presented in his
first appeal but has been decided adversely to his position in our
previous decisions. Johnson asserts that this Court fails to conduct its
proportionality and “passion-prejudice” review consistent with con-
stitutional requirements. We perceive no reason to modify our previ-
ously-expressed views rejecting this argument. See Beil, 264 Va. at
203, 563 S.E.2d at 716; Lenz, 261 Va. at 459, 544 S.E.2d at 304;
Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 228, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826
(1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 (1993).

IV. CHALLENGES TO RESENTENCING PROCEDURES
AND TESTIMONY

Hil Initially, we observe that Johnson argues that the resentencing
proceeding violated his constitutional protection against double jeop-
ardy. He bases this claim chiefly on the affidavits executed by two

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jurors at his first trial stating that they would not have voted for the
death penalty if they had been properly instructed regarding John-
son’s ineligibility for parole. Johnson also argues that his resentenc-
ing violated double jeopardy principles because the prosecution acted
in “bad faith” at his first trial by failing to require that the jury be
instructed correctly regarding the parole eligibility issue. We do not
reach the merits of these arguments, however, because Johnson did
not argue during the resentencing proceedings any issue regarding
double jeopardy or “bad faith” by the prosecution. See Rule 5:25.

Johnson next argues that the resentencing procedure provided in
Code § 19.2-264.3 violates his constitutional right of due process by
improperly shifting the burden of proof, thereby requiring him to
prove that he should receive a life sentence instead of the death pen-
alty. Johnson further contends that the jury at the resentencing pro-
ceeding was not able to “gain the same feel” for the case due to his
inability to challenge the Commonwealth’s evidence of guilt and to
raise issues of “residual doubt.” Johnson argues, therefore, that the
jury at his resentencing proceeding was more biased in favor of
imposing the death penalty, and that the circuit court should have
imposed a life sentence based on these defects in the statutory
scheme, as well as on the two juror affidavits from his first trial. We
disagree with Johnson’s arguments.

HMM Code § 19.2-264.3 provides, in relevant part:

If the sentence of death is subsequently set aside or found
invalid, and the defendant or the Commonwealth requests a
jury for purposes of resentencing, the court shall impanel a
different jury on the issue of penalty.

The resentencing procedure set forth in this statute did not violate
Johnson’s due process rights. During any resentencing proceeding
conducted under the statute, the Commonwealth bears the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the death sentence should be
imposed based on evidence of the defendant’s “future dangerous-
ness” or on the “vileness” of the crime committed, or on proof of
both aggravating factors. Because the issue of a defendant’s guilt has
already been decided at the guilt phase of a capital murder trial, the
defendant is not permitted to challenge the Commonwealth’s evi-
dence of guilt during the penalty phase, whether in the original trial
or in a resentencing proceeding. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 260
Va. 375, 379-80, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314-15 (2000) (Atkins IN), rev’d on

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other grounds, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241
Va. 192, 210-11, 402 S.E.2d 196, 206-07, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902
(1991); Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 393-94, 345 S.E.2d
267, 283 (1986). For the same reason, a defendant may not argue
during the penalty phase proceedings that there is a “residual doubt”
concerning his guilt. See Atkins II, 260 Va. at 379-80, 534 S.E.2d at
314-15; Lilly v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 558, 579, 499 S.E.2d 522,
537 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Stockton,
241 Va. at 211, 402 S.E.2d at 207.

HH All the evidence presented at Johnson’s resentencing proceed-
ing was relevant to the issues of “future dangerousness” and “vile-
ness.” In addition to the evidence presented by the Commonwealth,
the jury heard extensive evidence from witnesses who testified on
Johnson’s behalf. Therefore, we find no merit in Johnson’s argument
that the resentencing proceeding in this case was “biased,” requiring
the circuit court to impose a life sentence in place of the jury verdict.

Hi We also observe that in Johnson’s habeas corpus petition filed
after his original direct appeal, Johnson requested, among other
things, a new sentencing proceeding. Having received the remedy he
sought, Johnson cannot complain now that his request was granted.
See Bell, 264 Va. at 185, 563 S.E.2d at 705; Board of Supervisors v.
Sentry Ins. A Mut. Co., 239 Va. 622, 624 n.*, 391 S.E.2d 273, 274
n.* (1990); Newsom v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 844, 847, 153 S.E.2d
235, 237 (1967).

Johnson further argues that the circuit court erred in allowing the
Commonwealth to present both live and transcribed testimony while
prohibiting Johnson from challenging the veracity of that testimony
before the jury. This argument, however, is partially inconsistent with
earlier arguments he made in the circuit court. As stated above,
before his resentencing proceeding, Johnson initially asked the circuit
court to prohibit the Commonwealth from presenting its evidence
through “live” witnesses, rather than from transcripts of the original
trial. Later in the proceedings, however, Johnson changed his posi-
tion and objected to the Commonwealth’s use of transcripts, claiming
that such use would eliminate his ability to cross-examine the
witnesses.

Il We conclude that Johnson’s re-framed argument on appeal
has no merit. With regard to the admission of transcribed testimony
from the first trial, we observe that Tiffany Burgess was the only
witness whose testimony was presented in this manner. We hold that
the admission of such transcribed testimony at a resentencing pro-

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ceeding conducted under Code § 19.2-264.3 is a matter submitted to
the circuit court’s discretion. See Hills v. Commonwealth, 262 Va.
807, 811, 553 S.E.2d 722, 724 (2001); Stockton, 241 Va. at 205-07,
402 S.E.2d at 203-05; Fogg v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 164, 168,
207 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1974). Here, the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Burgess’ testimony because it was relevant to
the issue of Johnson’s “future dangerousness,” and Johnson had
been afforded a full opportunity to cross-examine her entire testi-
mony at the original trial.

HM We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in allowing the Commonwealth to present “live” witnesses and
in restricting Johnson from cross-examining those witnesses on mat-
ters related to Johnson’s guilt. The jury at the resentencing proceed-
ing was required to consider the circumstances of the murder in
determining whether the Commonwealth had proved the statutory
predicates of “future dangerousness” or “‘vileness,” and in ascertain-
ing the proper penalty to be imposed for the crime. See Code § 19.2-
264.2. In addition, because Johnson’s guilt was not a matter at issue
in the resentencing proceeding, the circuit court properly restricted
Johnson from cross-examining the witnesses regarding his commis-
sion of the murder.

V. CLAIM OF MENTAL RETARDATION

Johnson argues that because he presented extensive evidence of
“mental illness” at the resentencing proceeding, he is entitled under
Code § 8.01-654.2 to have his case remanded to the circuit court for
a jury to consider whether he is mentally retarded. He contends that
he has presented sufficient evidence, including evidence of his low
LQ. scores and his DID, which demonstrates that his claim is not
frivolous and that he may suffer from mental retardation “‘as it is
commonly defined.” Thus, he asserts that his case should be
remanded to the circuit court for a determination whether he is men-
tally retarded under Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1 and this Court’s most
recent opinion in Atkins, 266 Va. 73, 581 S.E.2d 514 (2003) (Atkins
IV). We disagree with Johnson’s arguments.

HE After the circuit court entered final judgment in Novem-
ber 2002 imposing the death sentence fixed by the jury in the resen-
tencing proceeding, the General Assembly enacted Code §§ 8.01-
654.2 and 19.2-264.3:1.1. These statutes provide a mandatory proce-
dure for the consideration of issues of mental retardation raised by

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defendants in capital murder cases. Code § 8.01-654.2 provides, in
relevant part:

[AJny person under sentence of death whose sentence became
final in the circuit court before April 29, 2003, and who
desires to have a claim of his mental retardation presented to
the Supreme Court, shall do so by one of the following meth-
ods: (i) if the person has not commenced a direct appeal, he
shall present his claim of mental retardation by assignment of
error and in his brief in that appeal . . . . A person proceeding
under this section shall allege the factual basis for his claim of
mental retardation. The Supreme Court shall consider a claim
raised under this section and if it determines that the claim is
not frivolous, it shall remand the claim to the circuit court for
a determination of mental retardation; otherwise the Supreme
Court shall dismiss the petition. The provisions of §§ 19.2-
264.3:1.1 and 19.2-264,3:1.2 shall govern a determination of
mental retardation made pursuant to this section.

Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) states, in relevant part:

“Mentally retarded” means a disability, originating before the
age of 18 years, characterized concurrently by (i) significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning as demonstrated by per-
formance on a standardized measure of intellectual functioning
administered in conformity with accepted professional practice,
that is at least two standard deviations below the mean and (ii)
significant limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in
conceptual, social and practical adaptive skills.

HM in Atkins IV, we explained that the General Assembly
enacted these statutes after the United States Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Atkins III, which gave the individual states the task of devel-
oping procedures for enforcing constitutional restrictions on the exe-
cution of the death penalty. Atkins IV, 266 Va. at 79, 581 S.E.2d at
517. Because Johnson’s sentence of death became final in the circuit
court before April 29, 2003, we consider pursuant to Code § 8.01-
654.2 whether his claim of mental retardation is frivolous.

HH In Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A), the General Assembly has
articulated a two-fold test that a criminal defendant is required to
meet to establish that he is mentally retarded. Thus, a criminal defen-
dant who seeks to demonstrate to this Court that his claim of mental

= 2°

retardation is not frivolous must be able to point to credible evidence
in the record supporting the requirements set forth in the statutory
test.

Hl In the present case, we hold that Johnson’s claim of mental
retardation is frivolous. Johnson’s own evidence directly refutes his
assertion of mental retardation. As stated above, his expert witness,
Dungee-Anderson, testified that Johnson is not mentally retarded.
The record also shows that Johnson was administered two standard-
ized tests, commonly known as I.Q. tests, which met the descriptive
criteria of Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A)(i). His scores of 75 and 78 on
these I.Q. tests exceed the score of 70 that the General Assembly has
chosen as the threshold score below which one may be classified as
being mentally retarded. See id.; American Psychiatric Association,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 39 (4th ed.
1994) (DSM-IV).

We further observe that Johnson conceded at oral argument in
this appeal that the record contains no evidence showing that his
alleged DID condition is indicative of mental retardation as defined
by the General Assembly in Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A). Therefore, we
decline Johnson’s request that a jury consider his allegation of mental
retardation because the present record shows as a matter of law that
Johnson is unable to meet the statutory definition of ‘mentally
retarded.”

HHI Johnson argues, nevertheless, that based on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Atkins III barring execution of the mentally
retarded, the circuit court erred in refusing to impose a life sentence
at his resentencing on the capital murder conviction. We find no
merit in this assertion. Because we have concluded that Johnson’s
claim of mental retardation is frivolous, we necessarily conclude that
the circuit court did not err in refusing to impose a life sentence
based on Johnson’s unsupported allegation.

VI. CHALLENGE TO DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED ON
JUVENILE DEFENDANT

Johnson argues that the circuit court should have imposed a life
sentence because he was 16 years old at the time of these offenses.
Johnson acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court, in
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), upheld the death
sentence imposed on a capital murder defendant who was 16 years
old at the time of the offense. Nevertheless, Johnson contends that
the United States Supreme Court has indicated by its Atkins III deci-

sion a willingness to depart from some of its other precedent
rejecting Eighth Amendment challenges of “cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.” Johnson contends that this Court should apply a similar
analysis as that employed in Atkins III and conclude that under
“evolving standards of decency” and recent trends in the various
states, the execution of juvenile defendants also constitutes “cruel
and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.*
We disagree with Johnson’s arguments.

HE We apply the holding of Stanford that the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not
forbid the imposition of the death sentence on a person who commits
capital murder at 16 or 17 years of age. 492 U.S. at 380; accord
Jackson, 255 Va. at 647, 499 S.E.2d at 552; Wright v. Common-
wealth, 245 Va. 177, 181, 427 S.E.2d 379, 383 (1993), vacated on
other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994). In the absence of such a con-
stitutional prohibition, we hold that any further determination
whether 16 and 17-year-old persons convicted of capital murder
should be eligible to receive the death penalty in Virginia is a matter
to be decided by the General Assembly, not by the courts.

Hl In teaching this conclusion, we directly reject Johnson’s
argument that we should anticipate that the United States Supreme
Court may reexamine and reverse its holding in Stanford under an
analysis similar to the one that the Court applied in Atkins III. When
a precedent of the Supreme Court has direct application in a case, we
are not at liberty to ignore that precedent in favor of other Supreme
Court decisions employing a similar analysis in a different factual
and legal context. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see also United States v.
Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S.
236, 252 (1998). As the Supreme Court has stated, courts “should
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme]
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de
Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484,

HMM We also find no merit in Johnson’s argument that he
received the death penalty in part based on crimes he committed
before he reached 16 years of age. Johnson raped and murdered
Hope Hall when he was 16 years old and he was sentenced to death
for the capital murder of Hall, and for no other crime. The history of

* We note that in this appeal Johnson does not challenge under any provision of the Consti-
tution of Virginia the imposition of the death penalty for 16 and 17-year-old persons convicted
of capital murder.

Len 71
be

his prior criminal conduct was properly placed before the jury pursu-
ant to Code § 19.2-264.2, because the jury was required to determine
the appropriate punishment for Johnson’s act of capital murder,
including the issue whether Johnson represented a continuing serious
threat to society.

Vil. SENTENCE REVIEW

HM Under Code § 17.1-313(C), we review the death sentence
imposed on Johnson to determine whether it (1) was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; or
(2) is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.

Passion and Prejudice

HM Johnson does not contend that the jury verdict fixing the
death penalty reflects the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor. Nevertheless, we have conducted an indepen-
dent review of the record, and we conclude that the jury verdict does
not reflect the influence of any such impermissible factors.

Excessiveness and Proportionality

HE Johnson does not contend in this appeal that his sentence
is disproportionate and excessive when compared to the penalties
imposed on other defendants who committed similar offenses. Not-
withstanding this fact, we are directed by Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) to
make an independent determination regarding this question. In con-
ducting our proportionality review, we must determine “whether
other sentencing bodies in this jurisdiction generally impose the
supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes, considering both
the crime and the defendant.” Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va.
445, 461, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036
(1993); accord Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 362, 551
S.E.2d 620, 638 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002); Schmitt
v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 152, 547 S.E.2d 186, 203 (2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094 (2002); Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257
Va. 328, 342, 513 S.E.2d 634, 642, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952
(1999).

HH We compare the record in the present case with the records
of our other capital murder cases, including those cases in which a
life sentence has been imposed. We have reviewed the records of all
capital cases considered by this Court under Code § 17.1-313(E).

78 Le!
a

Because the jury in this resentencing proceeding imposed the death
sentence based on both statutory predicates of future dangerousness
and vileness, we give particular consideration to other capital murder
convictions in which the death sentence was based on both
predicates.

HM Johnson’s age at the time he raped and murdered Hope Hall
is only one factor that we consider in determining whether juries
generally impose the death penalty for similar crimes. The record
also shows that Johnson committed five rapes within a period of
seven months, and that he stabbed one of these rape victims.

Johnson inflicted multiple stab wounds on Hope Hall in the
course of murdering her. These numerous stab wounds inflicted on
Hall are indicative of the vileness of the present murder and repre-
sent the culmination of a pattern of escalating violence over the
course of Johnson’s commission of the numerous rapes referenced
above.

HM Juries in this Commonwealth generally, with some excep-
tions, have imposed the death sentence for convictions of capital
murder based on findings of vileness and future dangerousness in
which the underlying predicate offenses involved violent sexual
crimes and the defendant had committed violent crimes on other
occasions. See, e.g., Morrisette, 264 Va. 386, 569 S.E.2d 47; Vinson
v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 522 S.E.2d 170 (1999), cert. denied,
530 U.S. 1218 (2000); Hedrick, 257 Va. 328, 513 S.E.2d 634; Cher-
rix, 257 Va. 292, 513 S.E.2d 642; Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va.
216, 509 S.E.2d 293 (1999); Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va.
161, 477 S.E.2d 270 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997); Wil-
son v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 452 S.E.2d 669, cert. denied, 516
U.S. 841 (1995); Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 450
S.E.2d 365 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995); Breard v.
Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 445 S.E.2d 670, cert. denied, 513 US.
971 (1994); Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 422 S.E.2d 380
(1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993); Spencer v. Common-
wealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1093 (1990); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d
864 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984). Based on this
review, we hold that Johnson’s death sentence is neither excessive
nor disproportionate to penalties imposed by other sentencing bodies
in this Commonwealth, considering both the crime and the defendant.

2 2 —®

VIII. CONCLUSION

HM We find no reversible error in the circuit court’s judgment.
Having reviewed Johnson’s death sentence under the provisions of
Code § 17.1-313, we decline to commute the sentence of death.
Accordingly, we will affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

°

THE BARTER FOUNDATION, INC. ET AL.

v.
GorDON L. WIDENER, ET AL.
Record No. 022409
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Russell, S.J.

60

83

Byrum L. Geisler (Penn, Stuart & Eskridge, on briefs), for
appellants.

Michael A. Bragg (Emmitt F. Yeary; Yeary & Associates, on
brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KOONTZ delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider the rights of owners of land with
respect to an adjoining undeveloped parcel that was dedicated for use
as a public street in 1944, but which has never been formally
accepted by the governing public authority.

BACKGROUND

On April 22, 1940, Investors Service Corporation conveyed to
Benson S. Alleman a 50-acre tract in the Town of Abingdon (the
Town) that formerly had been a portion of the land owned by, and

84 es
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containing the buildings of, Stonewall Jackson College.' Alleman
subdivided two sections of that property by separate plats in May and
June of 1943 respectively. These platted subdivisions were desig-
nated as ““White Addition No. 1” and “White Addition No. 2.” The
certificates filed with the plats when both were recorded in the land
records of Washington County provide that they “‘shall operate to
create a public easement or right of passage over said portion of the
premises platted, as is on this plat set apart for streets, or other public
use.”

On May 25, 1944, Alleman recorded a plat and certificate show-
ing the subdivision of the remaining section of the property,
designating this subdivision as the “College Building Tract.” The
plat depicted seventy lots numbered consistent with the scheme used
to identify the lots depicted on the White Addition No. 1 and No. 2
subdivision plats. The plat also depicted a large unnumbered lot con-
taining four former college buildings. As did the certificates for the
first two platted subdivisions, the certificate accompanying the Col-
lege Building Tract subdivision plat stated that it “shall operate to
create a public easement or right of passage over said portion of the
premises platted, as is on this plat set apart for streets, or other public
use.””

The College Building Tract subdivision plat depicts Court Street,
an existing public street on the western edge of the property, and a
portion of “White Avenue,” a proposed street that appears on the
White Addition No. 1 subdivision plat and which is today known as
“White Street.” In addition, the plat depicts three other streets, two
of them being forty feet wide and the other twenty-five feet wide.
One of the forty foot wide streets connects with White Avenue and
runs north between lot 120 and lots 20 to 24, and then east between
the lot containing the college buildings and lots 120 to 137. This
street, currently known as “Barter Drive,”” has been accepted by the
Town and has been widened to forty-five feet as the result of a sub-
sequent dedication. Barter Drive has been partially paved and opened
to public use. The end of Barter Drive is maintained by The Barter
Foundation, Inc. and is used as a parking area.

t Although the property was deeded to Alleman, both Alleman and his wife executed the
subsequent subdivision certifications and conveyances related to this property. We will refer to
both parties as “Alleman” hereafter.

? The two plats depict existing public streets that were not part of the property Alleman
acquired in 1940 as well as proposed streets that were the subject of the “public easement or
right of passage” granted in the certificates accompanying the plats.

___eeeil

The other forty foot wide street depicted on the College Building
Tract subdivision plat runs south from the eastern end of Barter
Drive between lot 137 and lot 99 to an intersection with White Ave-
nue. As with Barter Drive, a subsequent dedication of an additional
five feet to the right-of-way increased the width of the street to forty-
five feet. However, this street has not been paved or otherwise
opened to public use and remains in a more or less natural state,
being covered with grass and trees.

The twenty-five foot wide street depicted on the College Building
Tract subdivision plat, which is the property at issue in this appeal,
runs north from the intersection of the two forty foot wide streets
along the eastern boundary of the lot containing the four college
buildings, terminating at the southern boundary of lot 139 as shown
on the White Addition No. 2 subdivision plat. This proposed street
has never been accepted formally by the Town. With the exception of
the creation of a “Shakespearean Garden” maintained by a garden
club at one point along its route, the street has remained undeveloped
and in a more or less natural state to the present day.

On May 25, 1944, the same day that the College Building Tract
subdivision plat was recorded, Alleman conveyed to S. H. Rivers the
lot containing the four college buildings. The metes and bounds
description of the lot in the deed and the depiction of the lot on an
incorporated plat establish that the conveyance did not include the
area designated as the twenty-five foot wide street.

On October 17, 1945, Rivers conveyed a portion of his property
to E. A. Hines. As described in the deed and depicted on an incorpo-
rated plat, the southeast corner of the property acquired by Hines was
located at the intersection of Barter Drive and the twenty-five foot
wide street. The deed also references the plat incorporated in the
Alleman/Rivers deed, stating that “[i]t is understood between the
parties hereto that the streets as shown on said plat . . . have been
dedicated for the purpose of and are public streets for the use of the
owners of said lots described on said plat . . . and the public gener-
ally.” Subsequent conveyances of this property make reference to the
twenty-five foot wide street and contain language similar to that in
the Rivers/Hines deed indicating that it has been dedicated as a pub-
lic street.

3 See the attached copy of an excerpt from a 1944 plat that was incorporated in the Alleman/
Rivers deed. We have altered this plat to highlight the disputed street and to generally identify
the various locations of the properties of the parties with respect to that street and other streets
referenced in various deeds and plats. It is intended only as a general schematic depiction.

86 ee
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Through this chain of title, The Barter Foundation, Inc. ultimately
became the owner of the property containing the four college build-
ings formerly owned by Alleman and lying west of the twenty-five
foot street. Mary Dudley Porterfield and Gordon L. Widener are the
owners of the properties lying east of the twenty-five foot wide
street.’ It is undisputed that the properties lying east of the twenty-
five foot wide street were not part of the property acquired by
Alleman in 1940, and none of these properties are landlocked such
that they would require use of the twenty-five foot wide street for
ingress and egress.

A plat prepared for Widener of his property in January 1996
shows the street in question as ‘“(25’ STREET UNDEVELOPED)”
along his property’s western edge. This plat also indicates that the
two forty foot wide streets have been widened to forty-five feet as
the result of a “5’ DEDICATION OF STREET TO TOWN OF
ABINGDON.”

On June 7, 1999, Widener received a letter from Graham M.
Newman, Abingdon Town Manager, confirming an earlier conversa-
tion between Widener and Newman concerning Widener’s desire “to
make the [twenty-five foot wide street] right-of-way useable to
access [his] property.” Newman indicated that the Town had no
objection to Widener’s request to “mow the right-of-way, remove
some trees and stumps (clearing and grubbing) and [undertake] minor
leveling of the grade . . . as long as it is done reasonably, without
creating a nuisance.” Newman further stated, however, that “the
right of way in question has not been opened by the Town to public
use and has not been accepted by the Town for maintenance
purposes.”

On November 10, 1999, The Barter Foundation, Inc. and Mary
Dudley Porterfield (collectively, Barter) filed an amended bill of
complaint against Widener and the Town seeking a determination
that the dedication of the proposed twenty-five foot wide street has
been abrogated through lack of use by the public, and that as a result
“Barter is the owner of the real property free and clear of the pro-

4 Widener’s son, Christopher D. Widener, daughter, Karen W. Koontz, and son-in-law,
‘Thomas F. Koontz, also have an interest in his property and were named as parties to the suit
from which this appeal arises and are parties to this appeal. However, “Widener was treated by
the parties for the purposes of this litigation as the equitable owner of [their] property.”
Accordingly, for convenience, we will refer to these parties collectively as “Widener.”

| 87
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posed easement.” Barter further sought a permanent injunction
prohibiting Widener from “entering or damaging” the property.°

Widener filed an answer to the bill of complaint asserting essen-
tially that Barter could not claim ownership of the disputed property
because it was estopped to do so by language in the deeds in its
chain of title acknowledging the dedication of the property as a pub-
lic right-of-way. Widener further asserted that the Town owned the
disputed property because it had accepted the dedication of all the
proposed streets depicted on the College Building Tract subdivision
plat.6

On August 29, 2001, following an extended period of discovery,
the chancellor conducted an ore tenus hearing at which evidence in
accord with the above-recited facts was received from a land sur-
veyor, Town officials, the parties, and other witnesses. In addition,
the chancellor heard evidence concerning use of the twenty-five foot
wide street by the public over the last sixty years. Specifically, Wid-
ener testified that his father-in-law “used to use it to go to work” in
the 1960s. Widener’s wife testified that in her youth she and other
children would walk to school over the street and that automobiles
sometimes would drive over it.

In a final decree dated July 16, 2002, the chancellor found that
the Alleman plats “were a dedication to the public of all the streets
shown thereon.” Based upon the evidence and a view taken of the
property, the chancellor further found that “although . . . Barter
Drive and the street extending from Barter Drive to White Street
have been accepted by the Town of Abingdon, the Town has not
accepted the dedication of the subject 25 foot [wide] street.”” How-
ever, in part based on the wording of the certificate filed with the
College Building Tract subdivision plat, the chancellor also found
that “a public right of way or easement . . . exists separately and
independently from whether the Town has accepted the dedication”
and, thus, “the Wideners and . . . other members of the public have
and own a right of way or easement to travel across and use the said

5 Altemately, Barter asserted that Widener could not undertake the proposed clearing of the
twenty-five foot wide street because such action was contrary to certain provisions of the Code
of the Town of Abingdon regarding the opening of previously unopened rights-of-way. This
assertion does not impinge upon our resolution of this appeal and, accordingly, we express no
opinion thereon.

6 The Town did not file an answer, although counsel for the Town participated in the subse-
quent proceedings. Counsel stated that “{tJhe Town does not favor one party over the other in
this action.” The Town is also a party to this appeal, but did not file a brief.

88 bn |
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25 foot [wide] street as a public way.” Accordingly, the chancellor
decreed that Barter did not “own the fee simple title to the 25 foot
[wide] street . . . set out in the Alleman plat,” decreed that Barter’s
requested injunctive relief was “without merit,” and dismissed Bar-
ter’s bill of complaint “with prejudice.”

We awarded Barter this appeal and also accepted an assignment
of cross-error raised by Widener.

DISCUSSION

For its part, Barter contends that the chancellor erred in finding
that there can be a right-of-way or easement over the twenty-five
foot wide street in favor of the public in the absence of an accept-
ance of the dedication of that right-of-way by the Town. Barter fur-
ther contends that the chancellor erred in failing to find that the dedi-
cation of the street in question has been abandoned and, as a result,
that Barter has become the fee simple owner of the property. Wid-
ener, by assignment of cross-error, contends that the chancellor erred
in not finding that the Town had accepted dedication of the twenty-
five foot wide street by implication. We will consider the assignment
of cross-error first, because a determination that there has been an
acceptance of the dedication by implication would moot the remain-
ing issues of the appeal.

The parties do not challenge the chancellor’s finding that
Alleman’s 1944 recorded plat and certificate for the subdivision of
the College Building Tract constituted a dedication to the public of
all the streets depicted thereon. The record is unclear, however,
whether the chancellor considered that dedication to be in compli-
ance with the statutory scheme applicable to such dedications in
1944 or whether the chancellor considered the dedication to be gov-
erned by common law. For purposes of our resolution of the issue
raised by Widener upon cross-error, the distinction is not critical.
Fundamental and long established principles regarding land convey-
ances under the then applicable statutory scheme or the common law
make this clear.

HM Because a definite and certain grantee was required in order
to take land by conveyance or grant at common law, a landowner
could not effectively convey or grant an interest in his land to the
general public as grantee. However, in order to facilitate the creation
of public streets and other public areas for the benefit of the general
public, the doctrine of dedication evolved and recognized the rights
acquired by the public by estopping the dedicator from disputing

ee

those rights. Payne v. Godwin, 147 Va. 1019, 1024-25, 133 S.E. 481,
482-83 (1926). We have explained in numerous cases that:

“Dedication, at common law, was a grant to the public, by a
landowner, of a limited right of use[] in his land. No writing or
other special form of conveyance was required; unequivocal
evidence of an intention to dedicate was sufficient. Until the
public accepted the dedication, it was a mere offer to
dedicate.”

Brown v. Moore, 255 Va. 523, 529, 500 S.E.2d 797, 800 (1998)
(quoting McNew v. McCoy, 251 Va. 297, 299, 467 S.E.2d 477, 478
(1996)). We have further explained that:

Prior to acceptance, the offer to dedicate imposed no responsi-
bilities upon the public and was subject to unilateral with-
drawal at any time by the landowner. Acceptance could be for-
mal and express, as by the enactment of a resolution by the
appropriate governing body, or by implication arising from an
exercise of dominion by the governing authority or from long
continued public use[] of requisite character.

Brown v. Tazewell County Water & Sewerage Auth., 226 Va. 125,
129-30, 306 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1983).

HM In Brown, we recounted the legislative history of a series of
laws enacted since 1887 relating to dedications of streets and other
public areas within platted, recorded subdivisions. We noted that
under the statutory scheme applicable in 1944 the acknowledgement
and recording of a properly approved subdivision plat operated “to
create a public easement or right of passage over streets shown on
the plat.” Jd. at 130, 306 S.E.2d at 891; see also Code (1942) § 5219
(providing that the acknowledgement and recording of a plat comply-
ing with Code (1942) § 5217 is equivalent to a deed in fee simple).
However, we stressed that “although such ‘dedication by map’ was
irrevocable by the dedicator, the rights of the public were merely
inchoate, and that the dedication was not complete until accepted by
competent public authority.”7 Jd. at 130, 306 S.E.2d at 891.

[i In view of these principles, the critical question to our resolu-
tion of the issue raised by Widener’s cross error is whether the evi-

7 The current statutory scheme for the recordation of plats dedicating land for public streets
is contained in Code § 15.2-2265.

90 Le
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dence established that the Town has manifested an intent to accept
the dedication of the property at issue as a public street. Whether
there has been a sufficient manifestation of such intent is a mixed
question of law and fact. When reviewing the judgment of a chancel-
lor upon such an issue, we review the application of the law de novo,
while giving deference to the chancellor’s factual findings. See
Caplan v. Bogard, 264 Va. 219, 225, 563 S.E.2d 719, 722 (2002).

Hl The record supports the chancellor’s finding that the Town
has not formally accepted Alleman’s dedication of the twenty-five
foot wide street depicted in the College Building Tract subdivision
plat and referenced in the certification. Widener, relying on Ocean
Island Inn v. City of Virginia Beach, 216 Va. 474, 479, 220 S.E.2d
247, 252 (1975), contends that the Town should be deemed to have
accepted the dedication of that street because the chancellor found
that the Town had accepted the two forty foot wide streets, thus man-
ifesting an intent to accept all the streets depicted on the plat.

El The doctrine of implied acceptance of a dedication of prop-
erty for public use provides that:

where a governing body has accepted part of the streets
appearing on a recorded plat and no “intention to limit the
acceptance” is shown, such partial acceptance constitutes
acceptance of all of the streets, provided the part accepted is
sufficiently substantial to evince an intent to accept the com-
prehensive scheme of public use[] reflected in the plat.

Id. (quoting Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 435,
101 S.E. 326, 330 (1919) and Village of Lee v. Harris, 69 N.E. 230,
232 (Ill. 1903)).

Hl However, in Ocean Island Inn, and in other cases where we
have considered whether there was an acceptance by implication of
an offer of dedication, the evidence was not merely that the gov-
eming authority had accepted some of the property offered for dedi-
cation, but rather that there had been ‘“‘an ‘exercise of jurisdiction
and dominion’ by the governing authority” over the property dedi-
cated to the public, such as the paving of streets or installation and
maintenance of public utilities. Jd. at 477, 220 S.E.2d at 250 (quoting
Staunton v. The Augusta Corporation, 169 Va. 424, 436, 193 S.E.
695, 699 (1937)); see also, Greenco Corp. v. City of Virginia Beach,
214 Va. 201, 208-09, 198 S.E.2d 496, 501-02 (1973); City of Rich-
mond v. Gallego Mills Co., 102 Va. 165, 171, 45 S.E. 877, 879

bn | 91
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(1903). We are of opinion that the evidence in the present case does
not rise to the level necessary to find an acceptance by the Town of
the dedication of the twenty-five foot wide street by implication.

HM The evidence showed that of the three streets dedicated to
public use on the 1944 plat of the College Building Tract, only Bar-
ter Drive has actually been opened to public use, and the Town main-
tains only a portion of that street. Barter has not challenged the chan-
cellor’s finding that the dedication of the other forty foot wide street
has been accepted by the Town, and, for purposes of this appeal, we
accept that finding. However, the evidence further showed that this
street has never been paved or otherwise opened to public use, and
this property remains in a more or less natural state. By contrast,
there was express testimony from Town officials that the Town had
not accepted dedication of the twenty-five foot wide street. Under
these facts, placing the burden of maintenance and liability of owner-
ship on the Town by finding an acceptance of the dedication of the
twenty-five foot wide street by implication is not warranted. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the chancellor correctly ruled that the Town has
not accepted the dedication in the 1944 College Building Tract subdi-
vision plat of this street.

We then must consider Barter’s assignments of error. Initially,
Barter asserts that the chancellor erred in finding that the dedication
of the twenty-five foot wide street depicted on the 1944 College
Building Tract subdivision plat created a right-of-way to travel across
and use that property as a public way in favor of the general public
even in the absence of the acceptance of that dedication by the Town.
We disagree.

HE Barter’s assertion fails to distinguish between a right of
passage over a platted street which inures to the benefit of the gen-
eral public and a platted street which becomes a public street or
highway upon acceptance by the governing body of the jurisdiction
in which the platted street is located. This distinction is significant.
As we have explained above, whether at common law or by the then
applicable statutory scheme, a street dedicated by plat to public use
did not impose the duty of maintenance or potential liability upon the
governing body until that dedication was accepted by the governing
body. Nevertheless, the general public could accept the dedication by
use of the right of passage granted by the dedicator. It was in this
context, that we stated in Payne that dedication by plat of a street “is
an inchoate right vested in the public, and the street . . . does not

92 ee
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become a highway until established or accepted by competent author-
ity.” Payne, 147 Va. at 1026, 133 S.E. at 483.

HM There can be no question, and the parties do not dispute, that
Alleman intended to dedicate the property in question as well as the
other areas depicted as streets on the 1944 College Building Tract
subdivision plat to be used for public streets. In addition, the fact that
Alleman did not convey the property comprising the streets when he
sold the adjoining property shows that he intended, and undoubtedly
presumed, the Town would accept the dedication of that property and
use it as streets open to public use. Because the Town did not do so
with regard to the twenty-five foot wide street, that property never
became a public highway for which the Town assumed the duty to
maintain. Nevertheless, the general public had the right to use the
property for passage in accord with the expressed intent of Alleman’s
certificate and plat. The record reflects such use by the public,
although it was infrequent.

We next consider Barter’s contention that the chancellor erred in
failing to find that the dedication of the street in question has been
abandoned. The essence of Barter’s position is that, because the
Town has not accepted the 1944 dedication of this street and the
general public has not used the right-of-way for an extended period
of time, the dedication should be deemed abandoned through nonuse
even without a court proceeding to confirm that abandonment has
occurred.®

HE The abandonment of an offer to dedicate property to pub-
lic use may be proven in the same manner as the abandonment of an
easement. See Magee v. Omansky, 187 Va. 422, 430-31, 46 S.E.2d
443, 448 (1948). “The party claiming abandonment of an easement
. . . has the burden to establish such abandonment by clear and une-
quivocal evidence. Nonuse of an easement coupled with acts which

® Relying on our holding that when such an abandonment is found and “the dedicator does
not reserve or dispose of the fee in the street, it vests in the purchasers of the abutting lots,”
Payne, 147 Va. at 1025, 133 S.E. at 483, Barter further contends that, because it is the only
adjoining landowner in privity of title with Alleman, the chancellor should have found that
Barter is vested with fee simple title to the property of the proposed twenty-five foot wide
street, Because of the view we take that Barter failed to carry its burden to establish that the
dedication has been abandoned, we need not address the applicability, if any, of this proposi-
tion articulated in Payne to the determination of the fee title of this property had abandonment
of the dedication been established. Moreover, because we are unable to determine from the
record whether the 1944 plat complied with the then applicable statutory scheme for dedication
of streets, we are unable to determine the fee title of the disputed property in this proceeding,
and it is unnecessary that we do so.

ee 93
as

evidence an intent to abandon . . . constitutes abandonment... .
However, mere nonuse will not suffice to establish an abandon-
ment.” Hudson v. Pillow, 261 Va. 296, 302, 541 S.E.2d 556, 560
(2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

While the Town has not accepted the dedication of the
twenty-five foot wide street, either by formal resolution or by impli-
cation, it does not necessarily follow that the Town has abandoned.
the offer of dedication of that property. To the contrary, the evidence
showed that the Town was aware of the offer of dedication and,
although it had “not been accepted by the Town for maintenance
purposes,” nonetheless considered the property to be an “unopened
right[jof way . . . useable to access” the adjoining property. Indeed,
it exercised a degree of dominion and control over the property by
requiring its permission for Widener to clear the right-of-way for his
use. In other words, the Town recognized both the public’s present
tight of passage over the twenty-five foot wide street under the lan-
guage of the certification filed with the 1944 College Building Tract
subdivision plat and the Town’s inchoate right to open the right-of-
way at some future date by assuming a duty to maintain the property
as a public street. We hold that this evidence is sufficient to establish
that the Town has not abandoned the offer of dedication.

HH Additionally, we do not find that the evidence in this case
would support a finding that the public’s right of passage has been
abandoned. Although the evidence in this record of actual use by the
general public of the disputed street over many years is slight, “mere
nonuse will not suffice to establish an abandonment.” Jd. The chan-
cellor viewed the property and we can assume that no substantial
changes or uses of the property inconsistent with a right of passage
were revealed by the view.

HM The record also shows that every deed relating to the
adjoining property expressly mentions the existence of the right-of-
way for public use, thereby confirming the original grant of that right
by the 1944 College Building Tract subdivision plat and certification.
Similarly, every plat in the record depicting the environs shows the
property as a public right-of-way. Thus, the evidence does not sup-
port a finding of “acts which evidence an intent to abandon,” Hud-
son, 261 Va. at 302, 541 S.E.2d at 560, but to the contrary show a
continuing recognition of the existence of the public’s right-of-way.
‘We hold that under these circumstances, Barter, which had the bur-
den to do so, failed to show by clear and unequivocal evidence an
abandonment of the public’s right to use the property.

‘ ii

CONCLUSION

HM For these reasons, we will affirm the chancellor’s decree
reflecting the findings that although the Town has not accepted dedi-
cation of the twenty-five foot wide street, neither has that dedication
been abandoned and, thus, Barter has not acquired fee simple owner-
ship of the property, and the Wideners and the general public have a
right-of-way or easement to use that property as a public way.

Affirmed.

PF »
—
SUBDIVISION ora PORTION
STONEWALL JACKSON.
COLLEGE. PROPERTY
SEALE Is 100"
Now owned:
by Porterfield
Now owned:
by Widener
%g Forty Foot Wider
White
Street
STREET

96

MICHAEL MAURICE WHITE
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 030476
January 16, 2004

Present: All the Justices

i
a

98 Lee

Monte E. Kuligowski for appellant.

| 99
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Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kil-
gore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KOONTZ delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether the evidence was sufficient to
support the defendant’s conviction under an indictment charging him
with felony escape in violation of Code § 18.2-479(B). The issue
presented is whether the defendant was in “custody” within the
meaning of that statute prior to his flight from a police officer.

BACKGROUND

“As required by established principles of appellate review, we
will recite the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the [trial] court, and
we will accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly
deducible from that evidence.” Stephens v. Commonwealth, 263 Va.
58, 59-60, 557 S.E.2d 227, 228 (2002).

On August 9, 2001, Michael A. Rushak, a motorcycle officer
with the City of Chesapeake Police Department, observed a vehicle
being operated without a front license plate. Rushak requested a
registration check of the vehicle and was advised that the number on
the rear license plate was registered to a vehicle of a different make
and model. Rushak stopped the vehicle and asked the driver for his
license and registration. The driver, who identified himself as
Michael Maurice White, told Rushak that his driver’s license had
been suspended and that he had no other form of identification.
White also told Rushak that the vehicle belonged to White’s sister,
and that he was aware that the license plate “doesn’t belong on
here.”

Rushak ordered White to step out of his vehicle, telling him that
it would be towed. As White stepped from the vehicle, Rushak
noticed that White’s “left hand was trembling and wouldn’t stop.”
Concerned that White was uncharacteristically nervous for a person
stopped for a routine traffic infraction, Rushak called for assistance.
Officer Meredith Bowen, who was on patrol in a marked police car
nearby, arrived at the scene.

Rushak directed White to place his hands on his vehicle and pro-
ceeded with a protective pat-down search of White. When Rushak
placed his hand on White’s right front pants pocket, White “tensed
up” and said, “Don’t go in my pocket.” Rushak felt what seemed to
him to be “little rocks in a plastic bag” inside the pocket and asked

White if this was crack cocaine. At that point, White “came off the
car,” and a struggle ensued. Using what Rushak described as
“roundhouse punches” while “swirling and turning,” White
attempted to push away from Rushak. Rushak took hold of White’s
T-shirt, which ripped from White’s body as he fled.

Rushak and Bowen pursued White. William Goodnoh, a city
employee working in a park near where White’s vehicle had been
stopped, saw White fleeing and observed him reach into his pocket
and then toss an object into some bushes. When other officers
arrived, Goodnoh directed one of them to the location where White
had tossed the object, and the officer recovered a small bag contain-
ing crack cocaine from that area. White was later found hiding in a
backyard some distance away by one of the officers who arrived to
aid in the search.

On February 5, 2002, the grand jury returned an indictment
charging that White:

On or about the 9th day of August, 2001, after lawfully
having been confined in jail or after lawfully having been in
the custody of a court, officer thereof, or a law enforcement
officer on a charge or conviction of a felony, escape[d] such
confinement or custody, in violation of § 18.2-479(B) of the
Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended.

In a bench trial held on April 25, 2002, the Circuit Court of the
City of Chesapeake (the trial court) heard evidence in accord with
the above-recited facts.' In addition, Bowen testified in response to a
question from the trial court that she did not “believe that [White]
was under arrest” at the time she arrived on the scene. She also testi-
fied that she did not see White punch or kick Rushak, but that it
appeared that he was “doing a spin and trying to get away.”

Rushak testified that he conducted the pat-down search because
“the sooner I know I’m dealing with somebody that appears not to
have any weapons, the more comfortable I feel.”” He further testified
that he intended to arrest White and that when he reached for his
handcuffs and they made a noise, White made some comment to the

' In the same trial, White was tried and convicted on indictments charging him with posses-
sion of cocaine with intent to distribute, Code § 18.2-248, and assault and battery of a law
enforcement officer, Code § 18.2-57(C). This appeal, however, is limited to White’s conviction
for felony escape. Accordingly, we need not recount the incidents of trial relevant to the other
offenses.

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effect that he was going to be arrested. On cross-examination, con-
ceding that White was not under arrest at the time he conducted the
pat-down search, Rushak testified that White “was being detained.”
Rushak further testified that when he suspected White was in posses-
sion of cocaine, he decided that White “was going into custody. We
were working our way there.”

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, White
moved to strike the evidence of felony escape, asserting that the evi-
dence failed to establish that White was in custody within the mean-
ing of Code § 18.2-479(B) when he fled from Rushak. The Common-
wealth responded that White had been in custody because Rushak
“was about to place him under arrest” and he “was going to place
him in custody for driving on a suspended license.” The trial court
described the evidence as to whether White was in custody as being
“a little close,” but ruled that it was sufficient to sustain the Com-
monwealth’s burden “at this stage.”

White testified on his own behalf. He recounted that he thought
he was “‘just going to get a summons” when he was initially stopped
by Rushak. White maintained that after the pat-down search he did
not “know whether [Rushak was] going to lock me up or I’m going
to get a summons . . . but I’m pretty sure that it ain’t going to turn
out for the good” and he “had a feeling that I might get locked up.”
White denied deliberately striking Rushak.

White further testified that although he purposely fled from
Rushak, he knew the police would ultimately find him because he
had given Rushak his correct name and other identifying information.
White claimed that he intended to turn himself in after getting his
paycheck later that week.

After concluding his testimony, White rested his case and argued
against a conviction on the felony escape charge. He contended that
“the elements of escape are simply not met” because under the facts
of the case he was not told that he was under arrest and he “wasn’t
in custody.” The trial court noted that White testified that “the knew
he was going to be arrested because he wanted to come down Friday
and give himself up.” White conceded that this was his subjective
understanding, but asserted that the “case falls short” because the
evidence showed that he was not under arrest and the officer was
merely conducting a pat-down search when he ran away from the
officer.

The trial court convicted White of felony escape, with White not-
ing his objection. Following consideration of a presentence report,

102 Le
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the trial court sentenced White to three years in prison for felony
escape and suspended the entire sentence.

White filed a petition for appeal in the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. Relevant to the issue raised here, the Court of Appeals denied
White’s petition, finding that “[t]he Commonwealth’s evidence was
competent, was not inherently incredible, and was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt” that White “was in Rushak’s custody
when he escaped.” We awarded White an appeal limited to the ques-
tion whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that White was
“in police custody at the time of his flight.”

DISCUSSION

IM Before addressing the merits of the issue presented in this
appeal, we first consider the procedural default asserted by the Com-
monwealth to limit the scope of White’s assignment of error. As rele-
vant to the facts of this case, Code § 18.2-479(B) defines as a class 6
felony the escape of “any person . . . lawfully in the custody of...
any law-enforcement officer on a charge or conviction of a felony.”
In his petition for appeal in this Court, White limited his assignment
of error to the question whether the evidence was sufficient to prove
that he was “in police custody at the time of his flight.” In briefing
that assignment of error in the petition, White similarly limited his
argument to contesting whether he was in custody, and did not
address the further provision of the statute that requires the custody
to be “on a charge or conviction of a felony.” Our order awarding an
appeal to White, as noted above, limited the appeal to the issue
argued in his petition, quoting verbatim the language of the assign-
ment of error as White had framed it.

In his opening brief, however, White modified his assignment of
error to include language asserting that his conviction was barred
because he was not in “custody on a charge or conviction of a fel-
ony.” (Emphasis added). The Commonwealth, while not expressly
objecting to the modification of the assignment of error, contends
that White did not raise the issue of this requirement of the custody
contemplated by Code § 18.2-479(B) in the trial court. Accordingly,
the Commonwealth further contends that White’s appeal, or at least
so much of it as is directed to the question whether he was in cus-
tody ‘“‘on a charge or conviction of a felony,” is barred by Rule 5:25.

2 Code § 18.2-479(A) defines as a class 1 misdemeanor escape while “on a charge or con-
viction of a misdemeanor.”

[| 103
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Hl Although we agree with the Commonwealth that White did
not expressly make the same argument and objection to his convic-
tion in the trial court which he now asserts, we need not consider
whether the argument and objections that were made below are suffi-
cient under Rule 5:25 to preserve the issue for appeal as now
asserted by White. The order awarding White this appeal set forth
the assignment of error as it was worded in his petition. It is imper-
missible for an appellant to change the wording of an assignment of
error, “especially when the assignment is set forth in the order of
this Court awarding the appeal.” Hamilton Development Co. v.
Broad Rock Club, Inc., 248 Va. 40, 43-44, 445 S.E.2d 140, 142-43
(1994); see also Santen v. Tuthill, 265 Va. 492, 497 0.4, 578 S.E.2d
788, 791 n.4 (2003).

IB The improper modification of an assignment of error, how-
ever, will not prevent the appellant from arguing and having his
appeal considered on the issue actually asserted in the trial court and
for which an appeal was granted, provided that he has adequately
briefed that issue. See Hudson v. Pillow, 261 Va. 296, 301-02 and
n.8, 541 S.E.2d 556, 559-60 and n.8 (2001). White has presented
argument in his brief relevant to the issue whether he was in police
custody at the time of his flight. Consequently, we will limit our
consideration in this appeal to the narrow issue raised in White’s ini-
tial assignment of error, disregarding any argument on and expres-
sing no opinion with respect to the additional issue interjected by the
improper modification of that assignment of error in the opening
brief.

HE We turn now to consider the merits of the issue presented in
this appeal. Initially, we note that the term “custody” is not defined
by Code § 18.2-479, and heretofore we have not addressed the mean-
ing of that term in the context of that statute.

In determining the intent of the General Assembly from the lan-
guage used in this statute, we may presume that the term “custody”
was carefully chosen. Undoubtedly, the General Assembly was well

3 The Court of Appeals in Cavell v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 484, 506 S.E.2d 552
(1998) (en banc), concluded that the defendant was not in custody within the meaning of that
term under Code § 18.2-479 where the police officer did not touch the defendant and the defen-
dant did not submit to the officer's show of authority. The Court held that the defendant “was
not under arrest and, thus, was not in custody when he fled.” Jd. At 487, 506 S.E.2d at 553.
We agree with the Commonwealth that to the extent that Cavell stands for the proposition that
a formal arrest is necessary to establish custody as contemplated by Code § 18.2-479, it was
erroneously decided.

‘ 7

aware that, depending on the circumstances, the face-to-face interac-
tion of an individual with a law enforcement officer generally may
be classified as a consensual encounter, a temporary investigative
detention, or an arrest. These classifications, when properly deter-
mined upon the particular facts involved, have well-established legal
significance insofar as the rights and obligations of the individual
and those of the police are concerned.

HM In the context of our present considerations, a consensual
encounter does not require any justification and may be terminated at
will by the individual. Investigative detentions, so called “Terry
stops,” require a justification of reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). During a Terry
stop, the individual is not free to leave, but he is not under arrest. See
United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2003). To be
lawful, an arrest (without a warrant) requires a demonstration of
probable cause regarding criminal conduct and occurs when the
officer actually restrains the individual or the individual submits to
the authority of the officer. See Howard v. Commonwealth, 210 Va.
674, 677, 173 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1970).

HE Although custody is not defined by Code § 18.2-479, the
term connotes a deprivation of liberty, a condition beyond a tempo-
rary investigative detention, but involving less deprivation of liberty
than absolute confinement. Moreover, in a related context, the Gen-
eral Assembly has provided by statute that an individual can be in
“custody” even when a formal arrest will not follow. See Code
§ 19.2-74 (authorizing release of a person “in the custody of an
arresting officer” upon issuing a summons for most misdemeanors);
Code § 46.2-936 (same for most traffic offenses). But see Lovelace v.
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 588, 596, 522 S.E.2d 856, 860 (1999) (hold-
ing that such custody is not “equivalent to an actual custodial
arrest”). Viewed in this context, it is clear that for purposes of
prohibiting an escape under Code § 18.2-479, the General Assembly
must have intended that the term “custody” would include a degree
of physical control or restraint under circumstances other than those
also necessary to constitute an actual custodial arrest. Stated differ-
ently, while an individual under arrest is always in custody for pur-
poses of applying Code § 18.2-479, the individual need not be under
formal arrest in order for the Commonwealth to prove that the indi-
vidual was in custody.

HE Accordingly, we are of opinion that an individual is in
“custody,” as contemplated by Code § 18.2-479, when a law

enforcement officer has lawfully curtailed the individual’s freedom of
movement to a “degree associated with a formal arrest,” even when
a formal custodial arrest has not been effected. See California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (addressing the
meaning of “in custody” for purposes of requiring Miranda warn-
ings). Applying an objective standard, the inquiry is whether the
officer, with proper authority to do so, had by his words or use of
physical force, curtailed the individual’s freedom of movement
beyond that required for a temporary investigative detention.

HM The record evidence in this case demonstrates that initially
Rushak lawfully detained White because the vehicle White was driv-
ing was not properly tagged. Once Rushak determined that White did
not have a valid driver’s license, the propriety of continuing the
detention beyond the time necessary to write a summons for the
offense that occasioned the stop was established. Although Rushak
could have taken White into custody in order to bring him before a
magistrate under these circumstances, see Code §§ 46.2-936 and
46.2-940, it is clear that Rushak was still considering what action to
take at that time. Thus, White was not yet in custody, but was only
being detained.

HM Similarly, when Rushak directed White to exit his vehicle
and determined, based upon his observations, that a protective pat-
down was appropriate, the encounter was still clearly an investigative
detention. Accordingly, we cannot say that White’s permitting the
pat-down amounted to a curtailing of his freedom of movement to a
degree associated with a formal arrest. Otherwise, we would be
forced to conclude that every investigative detention would transform
into custody of the individual as soon as the individual acquiesced in
the officer’s request to permit such a search.

HMM Nor can we say, as the Commonwealth would assert, that
Rushak’s belief that White was in possession of crack cocaine, while
arguably sufficient to permit him to question White further, con-
verted the temporary detention into a custody pending an arrest on
that charge. Rushak’s suspicion that White was in possession of ille-
gal drugs, while reasonable, did not yet rise to the level of probable
cause. See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 574-75, 570
S.E.2d 836, 839 (2002).

Hl Undoubtedly, Rushak’s action in reaching for his handcuffs,
White’s reaction to their telltale clink, and Rushak’s stated intention
that White “was going into custody,” are all indicative that Rushak
intended to take White into custody for the purpose of placing him

106 [|
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under arrest. It is undisputed, however, that Rushak had not yet
restrained White for that purpose, and it was at that propitious
moment that White chose to flee rather than submit to Rushak’s
authority.

In sum, we hold that under Code § 18.2-479, an individ-
ual is in the custody of a law enforcement officer only where there
has been a clear and effective restraint of the individual by the
officer, either by having the individual in his physical control or by
the individual’s voluntary submission to the officer’s authority, such
that the individual’s freedom of movement is curtailed to a degree
associated with a formal arrest.* The record in this case establishes
that at the point Rushak determined to place White in custody, he did
not have White under sufficient restraint to have physical control
over him, and White fled before Rushak could obtain that degree of
control. Under these circumstances, White was not in custody and his
flight was not an escape as contemplated by Code § 18.2-479(B).
Accordingly, we further hold that the trial court erred in finding the
evidence sufficient to convict White of felony escape under Code
§ 18.2-479(B).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we will reverse the order entered by the Court
of Appeals and dismiss the underlying indictment.

Reversed and final judgment.

+ Although we have found no case precisely on point with the facts here, our decision is in
general accord with decisions of other jurisdictions. See, ¢.g., Ex parte McReynolds, 662 So. 2d
886, 888 (Ala. 1994) (“One cannot escape from custody until one is in custody . . . [which] is
defined as a restraint or detention ‘pursuant to a lawful arrest’; Hubbard v. State, 800 P.2d
952, 954 (Alaska 1990) (“if an officer approaches an offender for the purpose of making an
arrest, which he is unable to do because the other eludes him by running away, there has been
no ‘escape’”); People v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 729, 734 (Colo. 1996) (“for a suspect to be ‘in
custody’ . . . an officer must have effected the suspect’s arrest by establishing physical control
of the suspect sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the suspect will not leave”); State
v. Ryan, 612 P:2d 102, 103 (Haw. 1980) (“once the defendant has submitted to the control of
the officer and the process of taking him to the police station or to a judge has commenced, his
arrest is complete, and he is in ‘custody,’ for the purposes of the escape statute”).

PAUL WARNER POWELL
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 031421
January 16, 2004

Present: All the Justices

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Matthew L. Engle (Mark B. Williams; Carroll A. Weimer, Jr.; Vir-
ginia Capital Representation Resource Center; Weimer & Boyce, on
briefs), for appellant.

Robert Q. Harris, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W.
Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KOONTZ delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction and sen-
tence of death imposed upon Paul Warner Powell for the murder of
Stacey Lynn Reed in the commission of, or subsequent to, attempted
rape. Code § 18.2-31(5).

I. BACKGROUND
A. Powell’s First Trial and Appeal

Powell was originally convicted of the capital murder of Stacey
Lynn Reed in 2000 and sentenced to death. See Powell v. Common-
wealth, 261 Va. 512, 530, 552 S.E.2d 344, 354 (2001). In the same
trial, Powell was convicted of the abduction, rape, and attempted
capital murder of Stacey’s younger sister, Kristie Erin Reed, and was
sentenced to three terms of life imprisonment and fines totaling
$200,000 for those crimes.! Id.

Upon review of the capital murder conviction and the death sen-
tence imposed upon Powell, this Court reversed the conviction on
various grounds including a finding that the indictment charging
Powell with capital murder in the commission of robbery and/or
attempted robbery had been improperly amended to include a charge

' The abduction, rape, and attempted capital murder convictions, as well as a conviction for
grand larceny, were affirmed in the prior appeal and are not at issue in this appeal. Powell had
also been tried for robbery and attempted robbery, Code § 18.2-58, and three counts of use of a
firearm, Code § 18.2-53.1. He was acquitted of those crimes.

Le 117
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of capital murder “during the commission of or subsequent to rape
and/or attempted rape and/or sodomy and/or attempted sodomy.” Id.
at 532, 552 S.E.2d at 355-56. Upon review of the record, we further
held that the wording of the indictment limited the Commonwealth to
proving that the “gradation crime was a rape occurring before or
during the killing,” id. at 538-39, 535 S.E.2d at 359, and there was
“no evidence upon which the jury could have found that Powell
committed the rape of Kristie before or during the murder of
Stacey.” Id. at 541, 535 S.E.2d at 361.

We summarized the consequence of these holdings in the conclu-
sion of the opinion, stating:

there is simply no evidence upon which the jury could have
telied to find that Powell committed or attempted to commit
any sexual assault against Stacey before or during her murder,
or that the rape of Kristie did not occur after the murder of her
sister. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the
evidence at best would have supported a conviction for first
degree murder.

For these reasons, we will reverse Powell’s conviction for
capital murder . . . and remand the case for a new trial on a
charge of no greater than first degree murder for the killing of
Stacey Reed, if the Commonwealth be so advised.

Id, at 545-46, 552 S.E.2d at 363.

The mandate from this Court to the trial court tracked the lan-
guage of the opinion, and directed that “the case is remanded . . . for
a new trial on a charge of no greater than first degree murder for the
killing of Stacey Reed, if the Commonwealth be so advised.”

B. Events and Proceedings Following Remand
Powell’s Letter

On October 21, 2001, Powell wrote an obscenity-laced letter to
the Commonwealth’s Attorney who had prosecuted Powell in his first

2 Following the presentation of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief in Powell’s first trial, the
Commonwealth had conceded that there was no evidence of forcible sodomy or attempted
forcible sodomy against Kristie. Powell, 261 Va. at 525, 552 S.E.2d at 351. Thus, that aspect of
the amended indictment for capital murder from Powell’s first trial is not relevant to any issue
raised in this appeal.

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trial.2 Powell stated in the letter that, because he believed he could
not be retried for capital murder, “I figured I would tell you the rest
of what happened on Jan. 29, 1999, to show you how stupid all y’all
... are.” Admitting that he “planned to kill the whole family” on
that day, Powell further stated that “I had other plans for [Stacey]
before she died.” Powell described how he had attempted to initiate
consensual sexual intercourse with Stacey, which he had previously
admitted. Powell then revealed that when Stacey resisted his
advances, he pushed her onto her bed and, while sitting on top of
her, told Stacey “that we could do it the easy way or the hard way.”

Powell then described how Stacey had “started fighting with me
and clawed me [sic] face.” Powell stated that he “slammed her to
the floor . . . sat on top of her and pinned her hands down again.”
Powell claimed that Stacey relented “and I told her if she tried fight-
ing with me again I would kill her.”

Continuing, Powell stated that, at his direction, Stacey began to
disrobe, but stopped when the telephone rang. Stacey put her clothes
back on so that she could answer the telephone. Powell refused to
allow Stacey to answer the telephone and ordered her to resume dis-
robing. When she refused, Powell “pushed her back and pulled out
{his] knife.” When Stacey attempted to leave the bedroom, Powell
stabbed her. Stacey fell back and Powell removed the knife. Stacey
then stumbled to another bedroom and collapsed. Powell “saw that
she was still breathing” and “started stomping on her throat” until
he “didn’t see her breathing anymore.”

The New Indictment

Armed with this new evidence, the Commonwealth elected to
nolle prosequi the indictment in the remanded case, under which it
was limited to trying Powell for first degree murder under our man-
date, and sought a new indictment against Powell for capital murder.
On December 3, 2001, the grand jury returned an indictment charg-
ing Powell with the capital murder of “Stacey Lynn Reed during the
commission of or subsequent to the attempted rape of Stacey Lynn
Reed.”

3 Powell had previously written to the Commonwealth’s Attorney on July 4, 2001, proposing
a plea agreement for a first degree murder charge for the killing of Stacey Reed.

ees} 119

C. Powell’s Second Trial
Motions to Dismiss the Indictment

On April 24, 2002, Powell filed a motion to dismiss the Decem-
ber 3, 2001 indictment. Powell asserted that “[w]hen the Supreme
Court of Virginia issues an opinion concerning a case, this opinion
becomes the law of the case’ and, thus, the directive of the opinion
and mandate from this Court in his first appeal limited his retrial to a
charge no greater than first degree murder, regardless whether that
trial was conducted under the original indictment or a new indict-
ment. The Commonwealth filed a response to this motion, asserting
that the judgment of this Court in Powell’s first appeal was not appli-
cable to the December 3, 2001 indictment because Powell had
“never [previously] been charged with the capital murder of Stacey
Reed in the commission or attempted commission [of] sexual assault
against [Stacey Reed] because, at the time of [Powell’s first] trial, no
such evidence existed.” Accordingly, the Commonwealth contended
that the December 3, 2001 indictment was “‘a new charge, one that
has never been litigated in trial nor considered by the Virginia
Supreme Court.” Following a hearing on this and other pre-trial mat-
ters, the trial court overruled Powell’s motion to dismiss the indict-
ment in an order dated May 6, 2002.

On May 17, 2002, Powell filed a second motion to dismiss the
December 3, 2001 indictment. The briefs filed in the trial court in
support of and in opposition to this motion parallel the arguments
made on appeal with respect to this issue and, accordingly, we will
only summarize the essential points of those arguments here. The
import of Powell’s argument was that his prior trial and the reversal
of his conviction by this Court acted as an “implied” or “judicial”
acquittal of the attempted rape of Stacey, thus barring his retrial for
her capital murder premised on that gradation offense. The Common-
wealth responded that the issue whether Stacey had been the victim
of a sexual assault was not before the jury in his first trial because
the bill of particulars provided at Powell’s request indicated that only
Kristie was the victim of the sexual assault gradation offenses
charged in the amended indictment. Similarly, the Commonwealth
contended that our comments concerning the insufficiency of the evi-
dence to prove a sexual assault or attempted sexual assault against
Stacey were not directed toward any finding of the jury, but to the
contrary were indicative of the fact that the jury did not consider
whether Stacey had been the victim of such an assault or attempt.

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On June 5, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on Powell’s sec-
ond motion to dismiss the indictment. After hearing argument, the
trial court stated that by identifying Kristie as the victim of the rape
or attempted rape in the bill of particulars, the Commonwealth had
clearly identified her as the victim of those gradation crimes in the
amended indictment for capital murder. The trial court also agreed
with the Commonwealth that this Court’s reference to the lack of
evidence to prove any sexual assault or attempted sexual assault
against Stacey was merely a comment on the record, and not an
assertion that this was a theory of the case presented by the Com-
monwealth in Powell’s first trial. On July 3, 2002, the trial court
entered an order overruling Powell’s second motion to dismiss the
indictment.

Other Pre-trial Motions

On April 25, 2002, Powell filed a motion to have Virginia’s statu-
tory scheme for charging a capital crime and imposing a death sen-
tence declared unconstitutional on various grounds. On appeal, Pow-
ell reasserts only some of these arguments and does so only in
summary fashion. Accordingly, we will not summarize those argu-
ments in detail here, but will address them within the discussion of
the relevant assignment of error, infra.

On April 26, 2002, Powell filed a motion seeking to have the
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office disqualified from prosecuting his
case. Powell contended that the Commonwealth’s Attorney had a
conflict of interest because he was a key “chain of custody witness”
with respect to his receipt of Powell’s October 21, 2001 letter “‘con-
fession” to the attempted rape of Stacey. Powell further contended
that the offensive nature of that letter and his other conduct toward
the Commonwealth’s Attorney had created such a level of animosity
that the Commonwealth’s Attorney would not be able to objectively
pursue justice, but would instead seek to satisfy a personal vendetta
against Powell. Powell further contended that this taint of bias
extended to every attorney in the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office,
and further asserted that these attorneys would be potential witnesses
called to give testimony concerning the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s
personal animus against Powell.

* Powell further contended that one of the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorneys while in
private practice had represented Powell in an unrelated criminal matter and, thus, had a conflict
of interest. Powell does not reassert this issue on appeal.

Lee 121
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On May 1, 2002, the Commonwealth filed responses to Powell’s
motions to have Virginia’s statutory scheme for charging a capital
crime and imposing a death sentence declared unconstitutional and to
disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office. With respect to the
former, the Commonwealth asserted that all the issues raised therein
had previously been considered and rejected by this Court, and there
was no cause for the trial court to revisit them. As to the latter, the
Commonwealth asserted that there was no evidence of bias on the
part of the Commonwealth’s Attorney or other members of his office
and denied that there was any such bias, that the manner of establish-
ing the chain of custody of Powell’s letter was not the defense’s con-
cern, and that the questions of an appearance of impropriety should
be raised through a disciplinary complaint proceeding.

On May 6, 2002, in the same hearing in which the trial court
heard argument of Powell’s first motion to dismiss the indictment,
the trial court also heard argument on Powell’s motions to have Vir-
ginia’s statutory scheme for charging a capital crime and imposing a
death sentence declared unconstitutional and to disqualify the Com-
monwealth’s Attorney’s office from prosecuting the case. Following
that hearing, the trial court entered an order overruling these motions
without comment.

On December 11, 2002, Powell filed a motion to exclude any
evidence concerning his abduction, rape, and attempted murder of
Kristie Reed from his trial. Powell contended that because he was
charged only with the capital murder of Stacey Reed predicated on
an attempted rape of her, evidence of his subsequent attack on Kris-
tie was irrelevant or that any probative value it might have would be
overborne by its unduly prejudicial effect on the jury. The Common-
wealth did not file a response to this motion, but during oral argu-
ment in a hearing held December 23, 2002, the Commonwealth
asserted that evidence concerning the attack on Kristie was part of a
continuing criminal enterprise and was relevant to show Powell’s
motive and intent in attempting the rape of Stacey.

Also on December 11, 2002, Powell, alleging that the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002) had called into question prior judgments of this Court con-
cerning the issue, filed a motion seeking to have Code § 19.2-
264.4(B) declared unconstitutional because it permits a jury to con-
sider evidence relating to the future dangerousness and vileness
aggravating factors without full protection of due process to the
defendant to confront witnesses. Powell also asserted that the statu-

122 Lee
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tory definitions of the aggravating factors are vague and, thus, would
likely result in “unreliable” jury verdicts. The Commonwealth filed
a brief in response to this motion, asserting that the issue of the con-
stitutionality of Code § 19.2-264.4(B) is settled law.

On December 16, 2002, Powell filed a motion to suppress vari-
ous statements he made to police during the initial investigation of
the crimes. Powell alleged that after giving an initial statement fol-
lowing waiver of his Miranda rights, he advised police that he had
nothing more to say. Thereafter, Powell contended, any statement he
made to police without a readvisement and waiver of his Miranda
tights should be suppressed. The Commonwealth responded that the
suppression issue had been decided in Powell’s first trial and, thus,
the doctrine of res judicata barred consideration of the issue in his
second trial.> Powell filed a supplemental motion on December 17,
2002 asserting that a statement taken by an investigator on Novem-
ber 2, 2001, while Powell was in prison following his first trial,
should be suppressed because his counsel was not present. The Com-
monwealth responded that Powell had been advised of and waived
his Miranda rights prior to giving this statement and that he was not
entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment at that time because
he had not yet been indicted for the offense for which he was then on
trial, and the formal proceedings on the prior indictments had
concluded.

In summarizing its rulings on these motions during the December
23, 2002 hearing, the trial court stated that it found Powell had
waived his Miranda rights with respect to the statement made after
his first trial but prior to the bringing of the second indictment and,
thus, the statement was not barred by either the Fifth or Sixth
Amendments. The trial court also indicated that it would deny the
motion to suppress the statements from the initial investigation of the
crimes, incorporating by reference the finding made during the first
trial with respect to those statements. The trial court further found
that evidence of Powell’s attack on Kristie was admissible as being
part of a common scheme and to show consciousness of guilt. The
trial court entered an omnibus order denying all these motions as
well as the motion challenging the constitutionality of Code § 19.2-
264.4(B).

5 Powell did not contest the trial court’s failure to suppress his statements in the appeal of
his first conviction.

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Jury Voir Dire

Powell’s second trial commenced on January 13, 2003. The trial
court conducted voir dire of the venire in panels of five potential
jurors. In questioning the first panel, the trial court inquired whether
“any of you have acquired any information about the alleged
offense, or of the accused from the news media, or other sources “in
this particular matter?” The five panel members indicated that they
had not. The Commonwealth further inquired whether “{iJf during
the course of trial you should hear something which would jog your
memory about the publicity, would you be able to set that aside and
render your verdict based solely on what you hear in the court-
room?” The five panel members each indicated that they could do
so.

During his voir dire of the first panel, Powell’s counsel attempted
to ask the following question:

You’re going to hear in this case that the Defendant has
already been tried and convicted of capital murder at one
point, and he’s serving life sentences for other crimes. You’re
also going to hear that the Supreme Court of Virginia over-
turned the —

At this point, the Commonwealth objected and during a bench
conference, referencing Barker vy. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 375,
337 S.E.2d 729, 733 (1985), asserted that, as the panel had already
indicated that they had not heard of the case previously, Powell’s
counsel’s question concerning the prior trial and appeal “may, in
fact, taint” the members of the panel and disqualify them from serv-
ing on the jury. Powell’s counsel responded that because the evidence
would disclose the fact of his prior convictions and the reversal of
his capital murder conviction and death sentence on appeal, the pro-
hibition of Barker did not apply. He further contended that because a
jury’s knowledge of a prior conviction was potentially prejudicial to
the defendant, it was a “tactical decision that we’ve made . . . and
we wish this evidence to come forward.” Thus, he contended that it
was proper to explore the potential jurors’ bias that would result
from hearing that evidence.

The trial court ruled, even though it agreed that this was a
“unique case” because the evidence would establish the fact of the
prior conviction and appellate reversal, “the Barker case is still good
law.” Accordingly, the trial court concluded that “‘we have to start

off with a jury that does not have” knowledge of the prior trial, con-
viction, and appeal. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Powell
could not question the jurors about their potential bias based upon
such evidence being likely to be presented during the trial.

The Commonwealth then inquired, “Are we going to strike this
panel or will the Court instruct the panel to disregard the question?”
When the trial court indicated that it would instruct the panel to dis-
regard the question, Powell’s counsel objected that he was “‘not sure
that instructing them is sufficient . . . if they’ve already been told —.”
The trial court cut off the objection, stating that the members of the
panel had already indicated they were unaware of the case and that
“all I can do is tell them to disregard the question.”

Guilt-Determination Phase

Apart from the new evidence of Powell’s October 21, 2001 letter
to the Commonwealth’s Attorney in which Powell confessed to the
attempted rape of Stacey, the evidence presented during the guilt-
determination phase of Powell’s second trial was not markedly differ-
ent from that received during the first trial. Because we have thor-
oughly recounted that evidence in reviewing his first trial, see Pow-
ell, 261 Va. at 518-520, 552 S.E.2d at 347-348, and Powell does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence except with respect to proof
of the attempted rape of Stacey, we need not reiterate the full extent
of the evidence, but will suffice with a summary of the essential
details.

Powell, who was twenty years old at the time of the crimes, had
been acquainted with Stacey and her family for approximately two-
and-a-half years. Powell, a self-avowed racist and white supremacist,
objected to Stacey dating Sean Wilkerson, a black classmate of
Stacey’s. Id. at 518, 552 S.E.2d at 347.

Stacey arrived home just before noon on January 29, 1999 to find
Powell waiting for her. When Powell learned that Robert Culver, a
friend of the girls’ mother, would be home shortly for lunch, Powell
left, but returned at about 12:45 p.m., after Culver had left. When
Powell returned, he was armed with a survival knife, a butterfly
knife, a box cutter, and a 9-millimeter pistol. Id.

During the initial investigation, Powell claimed that he and
Stacey had argued about her relationship with Wilkerson and in an
ensuing struggle, Powell drew the survival knife from his belt and
Stacey “got stuck.” Id. Although Powell denied stabbing Stacey
deliberately or otherwise injuring her, an autopsy revealed that she

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had suffered multiple blunt force injuries to her head, neck, and
upper body not consistent with her merely having fallen during a
struggle, but consistent with a deliberate stomping. The autopsy also
showed that the wound to Stacey’s chest was consistent with the
knife having been twisted and partially withdrawn and reinserted. Id.
at 520, 552 S.E.2d at 348.

Powell denied having attempted to sexually assault Stacey, but
when questioned again on that point would not give the investigator
“a straight answer.” Powell later told police that he “probably”
raped Kristie because he “didn’t get any with Stacey.”

Leaving Stacey for dead, Powell smoked a cigarette and drank a
glass of iced tea in the living room of the home, waiting for Kristie
to return home from school. When she arrived, Powell met her at the
door. Shortly thereafter, Kristie discovered her sister’s body. Powell
then forced her to go to the basement of the home where he brutally
raped her and attempted to kill her by strangulation and by cutting
her wrists and throat. Jd. at 519, 552 S.E.2d at 347.

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Powell
moved to strike the evidence on the ground that the Commonwealth
had not presented sufficient evidence to corroborate Powell’s confes-
sion in the October 21, 2001 letter that he had attempted to rape
Stacey. The Commonwealth pointed to the physical circumstances,
such as the disheveled condition of Stacey’s bedroom, Stacey’s
defensive wounds, and the fact that when her body was discovered
her pants’ zipper was slightly undone, as corroborating Powell’s con-
fession. The trial court denied the motion to strike. Thereafter, Pow-
ell elected not to offer any evidence.

The jury was instructed, heard closing arguments, and retired to
consider its verdict. After two hours of deliberation, the jury found
Powell guilty of capital murder. Powell requested a poll of the jury,
which confirmed that the verdict was unanimous.

Penalty Determination Phase

During the penalty determination phase, the Commonwealth
presented evidence of Powell’s criminal record, including three con-
victions for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, two larceny
convictions, and his convictions for the abduction, rape, and
attempted capital murder of Kristie. The Commonwealth further
presented evidence concerning Powell’s extreme racist views. Addi-
tional evidence showed that Powell had tortured cats when he was
younger and that he told an investigator that he wanted to purchase a

gun to “[k]ill somebody. Kill a lot of somebodies. . . . Just for some-
thing to do.” Powell also told the investigator that he admired
Charles Manson and Adolf Hitler, saying that “‘[t]hey were cool.”
The Commonwealth also presented evidence that Powell wrote an
abusive letter to Stacey’s mother in which he included a porno-
gtaphic picture of a woman who resembled Stacey.

Powell presented evidence from his parents and younger brother,
a social worker, a psychologist, and a probation officer. This evi-
dence dealt primarily with Powell’s upbringing and transfer of cus-
tody from his mother to the Department of Youth and Family Ser-
vices following his juvenile offenses. The psychologist described
Powell’s home environment as “toxic.” The psychologist further tes-
tified that, following his incarceration, Powell had received
“[mJedication to help stabilize his mood,” and while medicated
Powell “has not had any serious disciplinary infractions.” The psy-
chologist did not offer a specific diagnosis for Powell’s “mental-
health problems,” but testified that Powell’s clinical history sug-
gested an “‘anti-social personality disorder” and that his behavior as
a child suggested Powell had “an under controlled temperament.”
The psychologist further testified that the medication Powell had
received in the past was “used for manic depressive illness which is
now called bi-polar disorder and for certain forms of serious
depression.”

After ninety minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a unani-
mous verdict sentencing Powell to death. The jury indicated that the
sentence was predicated on both the future dangerousness and vile-
hess aggravating factors.

Sentencing

On May 8, 2003, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and
received a pre-sentence report and victim impact evidence from
Stacey’s mother. Powell’s counsel argued that imposition of the death
sentence was not appropriate, asserting that so long as Powell were
confined and properly medicated, he did not present a continuing
danger to society and that a life sentence without possibility of parole
was adequate punishment. The Commonwealth responded that Pow-
ell had shown no remorse following his conviction in the first trial.
The trial court then confirmed the jury’s sentence of death. We con-
solidated the automatic review of Powell’s death sentence with his
appeal of the capital murder conviction and expedited the appeal on
our docket. Code § 17.1-313(F).

IL. DISCUSSION

Powell raises twelve assignments of error, the first two of which
merely restate the elements of the statutory review of any death sen-
tence mandated by Code § 17.1-313(C). We will review Powell’s
arguments in the order in which the trial court considered the issues
below.

A. Failure to Dismiss the Capital Murder Indictment

In his sixth and seventh assignments of error, Powell contends
that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the capital
murder indictment against him. This was the principal issue
addressed by the parties during oral argument before this Court. The
various positions under which Powell asserts that he was not subject
to trial under the capital murder indictment can be generally summa-
tized as follows:

(1) The opinion and mandate of this Court from Powell’s first
trial limited his retrial for the killing of Stacey Reed to a
charge no greater than first degree murder on any indictment.

(2) Even if retrial on a charge of capital murder was not barred
under a nev indictment, Powell had been acquitted, either
actually or ‘by implication, of the attempted rape of Stacey
Reed in his first trial and, thus, the law of the case doctrine
barred his being tried for capital murder based upon the
attempted rape of Stacey as the gradation offense.

(3) Principles of double jeopardy bar his retrial for a violation
of Code § 18.2-31(5) because the indictment in his first trial
did not specify the victim of the gradation offense.

Effect of Prior Opinion and Mandate

Il We recognize the principle of the “‘mandate rule,” stated by
the Court of Appeals of Virginia in a different context, that:

A trial judge is bound by a decision and mandate from [an
appellate court], unless [the court] acted outside [its] jurisdic-
tion. A trial court has no discretion to disregard [a] lawful
mandate. When a case is remanded to a trial court from an
appellate court, the refusal of the trial court to follow the
appellate court mandate constitutes reversible error.

128 Le}
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Rowe v. Rowe, 33 Va. App. 250, 257-258, 532 S.E.2d 908, 912
(2000); see also Frank Shop, Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.,
264 Va. 1, 6, 564 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2002) (holding that “a trial court
cannot permit what this Court . . . [has] said is unlawful” in a man-
date reversing the trial court’s prior judgment and remanding the
case).

Relying on this principle, Powell contends that the trial court was
without authority to retry him on a new indictment charging him
with the capital murder of Stacey Reed. Powell’s reliance, however,
is misplaced.

HM It is self-evident that while the opinion of an appellate
court, under the doctrine of stare decisis, applies to all future cases in
the trial courts, the mandate, which is the directive of the appellate
court certifying a judgment in a particular case to the court from
which it was appealed, speaks only to that case. Moreover, the man-
date is controlling only “as to matters within its compass.” Sprague
y. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939). Thus, while the
directive of this Court’s mandate binds the circuit court, that court is
not thereby prohibited from acting on matters not constrained by the
Janguage of the mandate, construed in light of the appellate court’s
opinion. The mandate rule “is merely a ‘specific application of the
law of the case doctrine,’ [and] in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances, it compels compliance on remand with the dictates of a
superior court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or
impliedly decided by the appellate court.” United States v. Bell, 5
F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d
247, 251 (Ast Cir. 1993)).

Hl Undoubtedly, had the trial court permitted the Commonwealth
to retry Powell for capital murder on the original amended indict-
ment invalidated by our decision in reviewing his first conviction,
this would have been violative of our mandate and reversible error.
Similarly, had the Commonwealth dismissed that indictment and
sought a new indictment charging Powell with the capital murder of
Stacey Reed prior to the rape of Kristie Reed, it would have been
error for the trial court to permit that indictment to stand.

HB However, nothing in our opinion or mandate from Powell’s
first appeal required the Commonwealth to retry Powell on the origi-
nal indictment, abridged to cure the defects found by this Court to
charge only first-degree murder. To the contrary, the directive of the
mandate expressly stated that Powell was to be retried on that indict-

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ment based on the record that was before this Court at that time, only
“if the Commonwealth be so advised.”

Nor did our opinion or mandate expressly preclude the possibility
of trying Powell on a new indictment charging capital murder pre-
mised on a different gradation offense after dismissal of the former,
defective indictment. Powell’s October 21, 2001 letter to the Com-
monwealth’s Attorney in which he revealed that he had attempted to
rape Stacey before he killed her is an exceptional circumstance that
merits a narrow application of the mandate rule.

Il We recognize that, generally, serial prosecutions are not per-
mitted where the Commonwealth deliberately refrains from bringing
criminal charges arising out of the same act or transaction while
prosecuting others in order to gain the advantage of having multiple
trials. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970). Such
was not the case here, however, given the unexpected and possibly
unique circumstance of evidence of an uncharged offense that was
not previously known or available coming to light after the conclu-
sion of the first trial in the form of the defendant’s voluntary
confession.

Hl Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that
the opinion and mandate of this Court from Powell’s prior appeal did
not bar the Commonwealth from dismissing the indictment against
him and bringing a new indictment charging him with capital murder
premised upon a gradation offense not previously charged by the
Commonwealth and based upon evidence that was not previously
known or available to the Commonwealth at the time of his first trial.

Acquittal under the “Law of the Case”

Powell contends that although he was not charged in a separate
indictment with the attempted rape of Stacey in his first trial, the
Commonwealth nonetheless presented evidence tending to show that
he attempted to rape Stacey to bolster its claim that her murder was
related to a sexual assault. To support this claim, Powell relies upon
statements made by the Commonwealth’s Attorney during his first
trial that the evidence would show that Powell “wanted something
more from [Stacey] and she wasn’t going to give it to him and for
that she lost her life.” Powell further notes that during his first trial
the Commonwealth had argued against his motion to strike the evi-
dence on capital murder by stating, in part, that “we have evidence
. . . [that Powell] was having sex or attempting to have sex with
[Stacey].”

130 a
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Powell contends that as neither the amended indictment for capi-
tal murder nor the instructions given to the jury specified the victim
of the sexual assault gradation crimes, the Commonwealth intended
for the jury in his first trial to consider the possibility that Powell
attempted to rape Stacey. Powell notes that because the jury in his
first trial sent a question to the trial court “seeking clarification
whether the rape of Kristie could satisfy the gradation crime require-
ment for the capital murder of Stacey,” Powell, 261 Va. at 526, 552
S.E.2d at 352, this indicated that the jury had considered and rejected
the theory that he had attempted to rape Stacey. Relying on Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1957), Powell asserts that
because the jury in his first trial rejected that theory of the crime, it
impliedly acquitted him of the gradation offense and, thus, he con-
tends that the law of the case prohibits the Commonwealth from
retrying that issue under a new indictment.6 Powell further points to
statements in the opinion from his first appeal concerning the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to prove an attempted sexual assault of Stacey
as confirming that he was charged with capital murder based on that
gradation offense.

The Commonwealth contends that by identifying Kristie as the
victim of the rape or attempted rape in responding to Powell’s
motion for a bill of particulars, it had clearly indicated that Powell
was not charged or on trial for the capital murder of Stacey in the
commission of the attempted rape of Stacey. Therefore, the Com-
monwealth asserts that Powell was never placed in jeopardy for the
commission of that crime and, thus, cannot have been “acquitted” of
that crime or of its gradation offense.

Powell contends that “the bill of particulars is irrelevant to the
issue of whether the [Supreme] Court previously decided that Powell
was charged with capital murder in the commission of the attempted
rape of Stacey Reed in his first trial.” Powell bases this contention
on the statements in the opinion reversing his first conviction for
capital murder that “[t]he record as a whole is devoid of any evi-
dence that Powell attempted to rape . . . Stacey,” Powell, 261 Va. at
534, 552 S.E.2d at 357, and that “‘there is simply no evidence upon
which the jury could have relied to find that Powell committed or
attempted to commit any sexual assault against Stacey,” id. at 545,

© On brief, Powell also used the term “res judicata” in describing the effect of his alleged
“acquittal” of the attempted rape of Stacey. During oral argument of this appeal, he conceded
that he was relying only on the “law of the case” doctrine in asserting the preclusive effect of
his prior trial and appeal.

Lee 131
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552 S.E.2d at 363. Powell contends that by these statements we indi-
cated that the question whether he had raped or attempted to rape
Stacey had been at issue in his first trial. We disagree.

Hl The question, simply put, is whether the jury in Powell’s first
trial considered whether Powell attempted to rape Stacey Reed and
concluded that he did not. Our guide in resolving that question is
Ashe, supra, wherein the United States Supreme Court held that an
issue will be precluded from being retried in a subsequent criminal
prosecution by the law of the case doctrine if, in light of the entire
record, the previous jury necessarily decided that issue against the
prosecution. But if “a rational jury could have grounded its verdict
upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose
from consideration,” the prior judgment will not be taken as deciding
that particular issue. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444. “The inquiry ‘must be
set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circum-
stances of the proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting Sealfon v. United States,
332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948)).

Hl Powell’s view of the record of his first trial, and of this
Court’s observation that the evidence therein was insufficient for the
jury to have found that he attempted to rape Stacey, as showing that
the previous jury necessarily decided that issue against the prosecu-
tion fails to take into account the effect of the bill of particulars. “It
is true the bill of particulars is not for the purpose of charging the
offense. The indictment must do that.” Livingston v. Commonwealth,
184 Va. 830, 837, 36 S.E.2d 561, 565 (1946). “However, the bill of
particulars and the indictment must be read together. The function of
the bill of particulars is to supply additional information concerning
an accusation.” Jd. A bill of particulars not only informs the accused
of the charges against him with sufficient precision to enable him to
prepare his defense and avoid surprise, it also enables him to plead
his acquittal or conviction in bar of any further prosecution for the
same offense. See Wade v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 359, 363, 388
S.E.2d 277, 279 (1990); see also United States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d
1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988).

HM The bill of particulars in Powell’s first trial clearly limited
the prosecution of the capital murder of Stacey under Code § 18.2-
31(5) to proof of the rape or attempted rape of Kristie. Nevertheless,
Powell asserts that the various statements of the Commonwealth dur-
ing his first trial with respect to Powell’s effort to initiate consensual
intercourse with Stacey, and his frustration at being rebuffed by her,
suggested a motive for his subsequent attack on her sister and

132 a
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attempted to influence the jury into believing that Stacey was also
the victim of an attempted sexual assault. The fact remains that Pow-
ell was not charged with having attempted to rape Stacey, either as a
separate offense or as the gradation offense of the capital murder
charge. Thus, it is not possible to conclude that the jury necessarily
decided that issue against the prosecution.

HH Powell is also mistaken in his interpretation of our state-
ments regarding his first trial that the record contained insufficient
evidence for the jury to have found that Powell attempted to rape
Stacey. A careful reading of our opinion shows that these statements
were not intended to convey that this issue was before the jury. To
the contrary, these statements were observations made to clarify that
the amended indictment must have been intended to charge Powell
with the capital murder of Stacey premised upon the gradation
offense of the rape of Kristie, but was insufficient to do so because
of a drafting error.”

Powell also contends that even if the jury had not impliedly
acquitted him of the capital murder of Stacey premised on the grada-
tion offense of her rape or attempted rape, the effect of this Court’s
decision in the appeal of his first conviction nonetheless was to
expressly acquit him of that crime because we found the evidence in
that trial insufficient to support a finding of rape or attempted rape of
Stacey. Relying on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1978),
Powell asserts that, because we held that the evidence at his first trial
at best would have supported a conviction for first degree murder,
the trial court was bound by that determination in any subsequent
retrial. Powell contends that Burks stands for the proposition that the
determination of an appellate court that the trial court erred in per-
mitting the jury to consider a charge not supported by the evidence
acts as an acquittal on that charge and that a retrial for the same
offense is barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy.

HM Our conclusion that, lacking evidence of a sexual assault on
Stacey or the attempt to commit one, Powell could be retried only for
first degree murder was based upon “the circumstances of this case.”
Powell, 261 Va. at 545-46, 552 S.E.2d at 363. Nothing in that state-
ment implies that Powell had been acquitted of capital murder pre-
mised on any possible gradation offense, nor, as we have already

7 We also held that the amendment of the indictment, even if properly drafted, would not
have been permitted because the grand jury “was never called upon to consider [the rape of
Kristie] as the gradation crime for the capital murder of Stacey.” Powell, 261 Va. at 534, 552
S.E.2d at 357,

Lees} 133
a

demonstrated, did it preclude the Commonwealth from seeking to
indict Powell for the capital murder of Stacey with the attempted
rape of Stacey as the gradation offense under the exceptional circum-
stances occasioned by Powell’s voluntary confession.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying
Powell’s motions to dismiss the indictment for capital murder on the
ground that the Commonwealth was prohibited from proving Powell
attempted to rape Stacey by the law of the case of his former trial
and appeal.

Double Jeopardy

Powell also contends that the trial court should have dismissed
the indictment against him because his prosecution under that indict-
ment violated the guarantee of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States against being twice placed in jeopardy for
the same offense. Specifically, he asserts that having been indicted
once for a violation of Code § 18.2-31(5) for the murder of Stacey
Reed, his constitutional guarantee of protection against being placed
in double jeopardy prohibited the Commonwealth from indicting him
a second time for that murder under the same subsection of the capi-
tal murder statute.

HM During oral argument of this appeal, Powell acknowledged
that the Commonwealth may indict and convict an accused for multi-
ple counts of capital murder of a single victim under different sub-
sections of Code § 18.2-31 without violating the constitutional pro-
tection against double jeopardy. See Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259
Va. 723, 747, 529 S.E.2d 570, 584, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000)
(a single indictment may charge two counts of capital murder of the
same victim under Code §§ 18.2-31(7) and 18.2-31(12)). Moreover,
we have held that where a particular subsection of Code § 18.2-31
lists multiple gradation offenses, the Commonwealth may indict the
accused for separate offenses of capital murder of a single victim
premised on each specific gradation offense. Payne v. Common-
wealth, 257 Va. 216, 228, 509 S.E.2d 293, 301 (1999) (indictments
properly charged separate violations of Code § 18.2-31(5) premised
on rape and object sexual penetration of the same victim). In Payne,
we said that “‘it is clear, as well as logical, that the General Assem-
bly intended for each statutory offense [in Code § 18.2-31] to be
punished separately ‘as a Class 1 felony.’ Id.

HE By statutory definition, capital murder is limited to the
“willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person” under

134 Ln}
a

specific circumstances or in the commission or attempted commis-
sion of certain crimes enumerated in Code § 18.2-31. We have fre-
quently referred to these crimes as gradation offenses because, when
committed as part of the same transaction as a murder, they elevate
what would otherwise constitute murder of the first degree pursuant
to Code § 18.2-32 to capital murder. Pertinent to the present case,
Code § 18.2-31(5) specifies gradation offenses of “rape or attempted
rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or object sexual
penetration.” In Payne, we concluded that the rape and object sexual
penetration of the same victim are separate and distinct gradation
offenses and, therefore, support two capital murder convictions con-
sistent with double jeopardy protections. Id. While Payne is instruc-
tive insofar as it establishes that separate and distinct gradation
offenses are enumerated in Code § 18.2-31(5), it does not resolve
Powell’s case.

Powell’s contention that he was charged with the same crime
rather than with two separate crimes under the amended indictment
and the 2001 indictment is principally premised upon the fact that the
former failed to identify the victim of the rape or attempted rape.
Because the amended indictment in his first trial, while identifying
Stacey as the victim of the murder, did not specify a victim of the
gradation offenses of rape or attempted rape, Powell contends that
proof of the identity of the victim was not an element of those
offenses. Thus, he argues that he was placed in jeopardy regardless
of whether Stacey or Kristie were proven to be the victim of the
gradation offenses of rape or attempted rape, and the subsequent
indictment that expressly identified Stacey as the victim of attempted
rape violated his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

HR «We agree with Powell that when an indictment does not
specify the identity of the victim of a gradation offense to the crime
of capital murder, the identity of the victim of the gradation offense
is not an element of the crime. Powell, however, has again over-
looked the significance of the bill of particulars provided by the
Commonwealth in his first trial. As we have already explained, the
Commonwealth expressly identified Kristie as the victim of the gra-
dation offenses for the capital murder of Stacey under Code § 18.2-
31(5). The bill of particulars was filed well in advance of the trial
and before jeopardy had attached. See Commonwealth v. Washington,
263 Va. 298, 307, 559 S.E.2d 636, 641 (2002) (‘The right not to be
subjected to double jeopardy attaches in a criminal case when the
jury is impaneled and sworn’’).

Lee 135
|

During oral argument of this appeal, Powell contended that the
bill of particulars only limits the Commonwealth’s ability to argue a
specific theory of the crime, does not amend the indictment, and
jeopardy attaches as to the indictment as worded regardless of
whether a bill of particulars has been filed. We disagree.

HH As noted above, while “[i]t is true the bill of particulars is
not for the purpose of charging the offense . . . the bill of particulars
and the indictment must be read together.” Livingston, 184 Va. at
837, 36 S.E.2d at 565. Thus, we hold that where, prior to the attach-
ment of jeopardy, the Commonwealth limits the prosecution of a cap-
ital murder, undifferentiated in the indictment by the identity of the
victim of the gradation offense, by naming a specific victim of the
gtadation offense in a bill of particulars, jeopardy will attach only to
the capital murder charge as made specific by the bill of particulars.

For these reasons, we further hold that the trial court did not err
in refusing to dismiss the indictment for capital murder as violative
of Powell’s double jeopardy protection.

B. Constitutionality of Virginia's Capital Murder Statutes

Hl Iv his third and eleventh assignments of error, Powell attacks
the trial court’s order overruling his motions to have the Virginia
capital murder statutes declared unconstitutional. With respect to the
motion filed April 25, 2002 and overruled by the trial court on May
6, 2002, Powell has restated, in summary fashion, five of his argu-
ments advanced in the trial court, without citation to authority. The
failure to adequately brief an assignment of error constitutes a waiver
of the argument. See, e.g., Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307,
318, 541 S.E.2d 872, 880, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001)
(assignments of error not briefed are waived even where trial record
contains written argument addressing same issue).

HM Moreover, the arguments raised by Powell have been previ-
ously considered and rejected by this Court. The arguments raised by
Powell and recent decisions rejecting those arguments are:

® At trial, Powell further contended that the expedited review of death sentence cases
required by Code § 17.1-313 violated a defendant’s constitutional right to equal protection.
Powell contended that by eliminating an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a defen-
dant is denied the opportunity to perfect the issues and arguments he wishes to make on appeal.
He further contended that expediting death sentence appeals on our docket “disadvantaged
death-sentence defendants by providing them with substantially less time than other criminal
defendants to protect their legal rights.” Powell does not reassert these issues on appeal.

136 Le
a

That the statutes fail to provide meaningful guidance with respect
to the vileness and future dangerousness aggravating factors and that
the jury is not provided adequate guidance with respect to the appli-
cation of aggravating and mitigating factors. Rejected in Morrisette v.
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 386, 397, 569 S.E.2d 47, 55 (2002), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 928, 72 U.S.L.W. 3392 (2003).

That permitting evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct to be
used to establish the defendant’s future dangerousness fails to meet
the “heightened reliability requirement” of the 8th and 14th Amend-
ments. Rejected in Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 203, 563
S.E.2d 695, 716 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003).

That the trial court is improperly vested with discretion whether
to set aside the death sentence for good cause shown and is permitted
to consider hearsay evidence in the pre-sentence report. Rejected in
Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 459, 544 S.E.2d 299, 303-04,
cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001).

That the mandatory proportionality review procedures employed
by this Court fail to meet constitutional standards. Rejected in Lovitt
v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 509, 537 S.E.2d 866, 874 (2000),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001); Bailey, 259 Va. at 740-42, 529
S.E.2d at 580-81, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000).

With respect to the December 11, 2002 motion, overruled by the
trial court on December 23, 2002, Powell asserts, as he did in the
trial court, that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), requires that “many of the procedural
safeguards that heretofore have only been required during the
guilt/innocence phase of trial must now be extended to the sentenc-
ing phase.” Powell reasons that because Ring held that it was imper-
missible in a jury trial to allow the trial judge to determine whether
there were aggravating factors sufficient to warrant the imposition of
the death penalty, id. at 609, the aggravating factors required to be
found by Code § 19.2-264.4(B) before a sentence of death may be
imposed are “to be treated as elements of the offense of a death-
eligible capital murder.” Powell contends that the standards of proof
and rules of evidence applicable to the determination of guilt must
also be applied to the determination of sentence, and that, contrary to
decisions of this Court made prior to Ring, this precludes the Com-
monwealth from presenting under a “relaxed evidentiary standard”
evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct or hearsay evidence
when the declarant is not available for cross-examination as required
by the confrontation clause.

The Commonwealth responds that Ring does not alter the analy-
sis of the constitutionality of the procedures applied during the pen-
alty determination phase of a capital murder trial in Virginia. Rather,
the Commonwealth contends that the procedures for the admission of
relevant evidence during the penalty determination phase under Code
§ 19.2-264.4(B) continue to be fully in accord with the Sixth Amend-
ment due process concerns underpinning the decision in Ring. We
agree with the Commonwealth.

HE First, we note that Powell’s expansive reading of Ring is
unwarranted for the obvious reason that the statutory scheme at issue
in that case, which permitted the judge in a capital murder jury trial
to assume the role of the jury in determining whether aggravating
factors permitting the imposition of the death penalty were present, is
markedly different from that of Virginia’s death penalty sentencing
statute. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 588. Moreover, nothing in the United
States Supreme Court’s opinion in Ring suggests that the Court
intended to revisit broader issues of due process protections afforded
in the penalty determination phase of all capital murder trials.

We further reject Powell’s contention that there is a
“relaxed evidentiary standard” applicable to the penalty determina-
tion phase of a capital murder trial in Virginia. To the contrary, Code
§ 19.2-264.4(B) expressly provides, and we have consistently held,
that the Commonwealth must prove the existence of one or both
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Clark v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 212, 257 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980). Powell’s contention that the introduc-
tion of evidence of unadjudicated criminal acts is not admissible
because Ring somehow refines the need for “heightened reliability”
in capital sentencing is, as the Commonwealth notes, nothing more
than a reassertion of the same argument raised in his prior motion
and consistently rejected by this Court. Jackson, Jerry v. Common-
wealth, 267 Va. 178, 189, 590 S.E.2d 520, 526 (2004) (today
decided). Powell’s assertion that Code § 19.2-264.4(B) permits the
introduction of hearsay evidence not otherwise subject to an excep-
tion is simply wrong.’ See, e.g., Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 259,
585 S.E.2d 801, 826 (2003); Jackson, 267 Va. at 206, 590 S.E.2d at

° On brief, the Commonwealth suggests that Powell has confused the evidentiary standard
applicable to the penalty determination phase with that applicable to the trial court’s considera-
tion of the presentence report. Powell did not respond to this assertion in his reply brief and
does not otherwise assert that Ring has any implication to the post-verdict sentencing proce-
dure. Accordingly, we express no opinion on that issue.

138 ee
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526. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in
overruling Powell’s motion to have the Virginia capital murder stat-
utes declared unconstitutional.

C. Failure to Disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney

In his tenth assignment of error, Powell contends that the trial
court erred in failing to grant his motion to disqualify the Common-
wealth’s Attorney and his office from prosecuting Powell on the new
indictment. Powell asserts the “grossly offensive personal attacks”
on the Commonwealth’s Attorney in Powell’s October 21, 2001 let-
ter, created a direct conflict of interest because the Commonwealth’s
Attorney “had a personal stake in the outcome of this case.” This is
so, Powell contends, because the personal attacks in his letter
“undoubtedly led [the Commonwealth’s Attorney] to have feelings
of animosity towards Powell.” The Commonwealth responds that the
Commonwealth’s Attorney represented to the trial court that he could
impartially prosecute the case and that it was a matter within the trial
court’s discretion to determine whether to disqualify him. We agree
with the Commonwealth.

HM The due process rights of a criminal defendant under
both the Virginia and United States Constitutions are violated when a
Commonwealth’s Attorney who has a conflict of interest relevant to
the defendant’s case prosecutes the defendant. See Cantrell y. Com-
monwealth, 229 Va. 387, 394, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26-27 (1985); Ganger
v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967). However, the question
whether there is a conflict of interest is dependent upon the citrcum-
stances of the individual case, and the burden is on the party seeking
disqualification of the prosecutor to present evidence establishing the
existence of disqualifying bias or prejudice. The determination
whether the evidence supports a finding of a conflict of interest is a
matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Lux v.
Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 561, 569, 484 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1997).

The issue may arise where the prosecutor has had an attorney-
client relationship with the parties involved whereby he obtained
privileged information that may be adverse to the defendant’s interest
in regard to the pending criminal charges. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Kilgore, 15 Va. App. 684, 694, 426 S.E.2d 837, 842 (1993). A
second situation is where the prosecutor has some direct personal
interest arising from a financial interest, kinship, or close friendship
such that his objectivity and impartiality are called into question. See,

e.g., Cantrell, 229 Va. at 391-94, 329 S.E.2d at 24-27. Neither of
these circumstances applies to the present case.

Beyond these categories of clear and direct conflicts of
interest and ethical bars to a particular attorney prosecuting a particu-
lar defendant, there is the broader consideration of whether, on the
facts of a particular case, the adversarial nature of the judicial pro-
cess has resulted in such enmity toward the defendant on the part of
the prosecutor that it will overbear his professional judgment in seek-
ing fairly and impartially to see justice done. See Lux, 24 Va. App. at
569, 484 S.E.2d at 149. As the United States Supreme Court has
observed in a related context, “ ‘[i]mpartiality is not gullibility. Dis-
interestedness does not mean child-like innocence.’ ” Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (quoting Jn re J. P. Linahan,
Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2nd Cir. 1943). We are of opinion that the
same can be said of the prosecutor’s role.

The adversarial nature of criminal prosecutions unsurprisingly
tends to engender some level of friction between the prosecutor and
the defendant in difficult cases, especially where, as here, the defen-
dant seems intent on showing his contempt and disrespect for the
prosecutor. However, merely demonstrating a history of one-sided
acrimony between the defendant and the prosecutor is insufficient to
establish a conflict of interest or prosecutorial misconduct with
respect to an otherwise proper prosecution. See, e.g., Phelps v. Ham-
ilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1067 (10th Cir. 1995). If such were not the case,
a defendant would have an incentive to deliberately incite such
enmity. The evidence must reflect that the prosecutor is acting not
within the dictates of the law, but has strayed outside those parame-
ters in furtherance of a personal animus against the defendant.

HHI Powell’s October 21, 2001 letter undoubtedly was intended
to insult, if not incense, the Commonwealth’s Attorney. But, the trial
court was within its discretion to accept the Commonwealth’s Attor-
ney’s assurance that it had not had an effect on his professional judg-
ment in seeking fairly and impartially to see justice done. Moreover,
nothing in the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s conduct of the trial
evinces any lack of such professional judgment on his part. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in over-
ruling Powell’s motion to disqualify the Commonwealth’s Attorney.

D. Failure to Exclude Testimony of Kristie Reed

In his ninth assignment of error, Powell contends that the trial
court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to call Kristie as a wit-

140 Leen
Le

ness and to give testimony concerning Powell’s rape and attempted
murder of her during the guilt determination phase of his trial.!° He
asserts that evidence of the events following the murder of Stacey
was not relevant to prove his culpability for that crime and that such
evidence was, in any case, unduly prejudicial.!!

“The Commonwealth responds that evidence of the rape and
attempted murder of Kristie, including her testimony and its support-
ing exhibits, was admissible because those acts were interrelated
parts of a common criminal plan and, thus, were relevant to prove
Powell’s identity, motive, and intent as the perpetrator of all the
crimes committed in the course of carrying out that plan. In addition,
the Commonwealth contends that evidence of the subsequent attack
on Kristie was probative of Powell’s state of mind during the entire
criminal enterprise and, thus, admissible to show premeditation in the
killing of Stacey to rebut Powell’s claim that the killing was acciden-
tal. We agree with the Commonwealth.

HE Generally, evidence of other offenses is inadmissible in a
criminal prosecution, but it is a well-established exception that such
evidence is admissible to show a common criminal scheme when the
various acts are naturally explained as the constituent parts of the
defendant’s general plan. See Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va.
220, 230, 421 S.E.2d 821, 828 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933
(1993); Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d
802, 805 (1970); McWhorter v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 857, 870-71,
63 S.E.2d 20, 26 (1951). In Kirkpatrick we explained that:

[e]vidence of other offenses is admitted if it shows the conduct
and feeling of the accused toward his victim . . . or if it tends
to prove any relevant element of the offense charged. Such
evidence is permissible in cases where the motive, intent or
knowledge of the accused is involved, or where the evidence is
connected with . . . the offense for which the accused is on
trial.

'© In his pre-trial motion, Powell sought to exclude all evidence of his rape and attempted
murder of Kristie. On appeal, he has limited his argument to the exclusion of her testimony and
the exhibits introduced in its course.

"| Powell also asserts that Kristie’s testimony was unnecessary because it was cumulative of
other evidence and should more properly have been received as “‘victim impact testimony”
during sentencing. These arguments were not made at trial and, thus, are barred from consider-
ation in this appeal. Rule 5:25.

211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805; see also Satcher, 244 Va. at 230,
421 S.E.2d at 828.

HM There can be no question that it was the Commonwealth’s
theory in this trial, and taking the evidence in the light favorable to
the Commonwealth it is an unassailable fact, that Powell went to the
Reed home with the intention of raping and killing both Stacey and
Kristie. As such, the evidence of Powell’s rape and attempted murder
of Kristie was directly probative of his motive and intent in the
attempted rape and murder of Stacey. Moreover, Kristie’s eyewitness
testimony placing Powell in the home when she arrived and identify-
ing him as her assailant was critical to establishing Powell’s identity
as the perpetrator of the crimes that preceded the criminal acts com-
mitted against her.

HE Powell’s contention that the graphic and emotional testi-
mony of the victim of a brutal rape and attempted murder should
have been excluded because its probative value was outweighed by
the prejudice it would cause in the minds of the jury is equally with-
out merit. All evidence tending to prove guilt is prejudicial to an
accused, but the mere fact that such evidence is powerful because it
accurately depicts the gravity and atrociousness of the crime or the
callous nature of the defendant does not thereby render it inadmiss-
ible. Moreover, direct evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, is
rarely subject to exclusion on the ground that it would be unduly
prejudicial. In any case, determination of the issue is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. Spencer v. Commonwealth,
240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 617, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908,
(1990). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing
to grant Powell’s pre-trial motion to exclude the testimony of Kristie
Reed from the guilt determination phase of the trial.

E. Failure to Suppress Powell’s Statements to Police

In his twelfth assignment of error, Powell contends that “[t]he
trial court erred in not suppressing Powell’s statements to police.”
Although he uses the plural term “‘statements” in the assignment of
error and makes references to the ability of an accused to revoke a
prior waiver of his right to remain silent, Powell does not expressly
restate the contention made in the trial court that statements made
during the initial investigation prior to his first trial should have been
suppressed because at the conclusion of his first interview he stated
that he had nothing more to say. Because Powell has not expressly

142 Leen
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raised this issue on brief or during oral argument, it has been waived
and we will not address it. Burns, 261 Va. at 318, 541 S.E.2d at 880.

Powell does assert that the trial court erred in not suppressing the
statement concerning Powell’s October 21, 2001 letter that he made
on November 2, 2001 while in prison to an investigator. Powell con-
tends that because he was still represented by counsel from his first
trial, the investigator should not have questioned him without his
counsel being present.

The Commonwealth responds that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had not attached with respect to the crime for which the
investigator was gathering evidence and for which Powell would be
indicted as a result of the evidence in his October 21, 2001 letter.
Moreover, as Powell executed a waiver of his Fifth Amendment
rights immediately prior to giving the November 2, 2001 statement,
the Commonwealth contends that the statement was properly admit-
ted. We agree with the Commonwealth.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel “arises from the
fact that the suspect has been formally charged with a particular
crime and thus is facing a state apparatus that has been geared up to
prosecute him.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685 (1988); see
also Alston v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 433, 437, 570 S.E.2d 801,
803 (2002). We have already determined that the crime for which
Powell was tried and convicted in the present case was a separate
offense from those for which he had been previously convicted. Pow-
ell had not been formally charged with that offense when he was
interviewed on November 2, 2001 and, thus, he was not entitled to
have his counsel from his prior trial present during that interview.
Eaton vy. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 252, 397 S.E.2d 385, 394
(1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991). As Powell does not dis-
pute that he freely and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment right
to counsel at the time of the interview, we hold that the trial court
did not err in failing to suppress Powell’s statement.

F. Limiting Voir Dire and Failure to Strike Jury Panel

Hl in his fourth assignment of error, Powell contends that the
trial court erred in not permitting him to question prospective jurors
about whether knowledge of Powell’s prior conviction for capital
murder and its subsequent reversal on appeal would influence their
opinion as to his guilt. Powell concedes that a prospective juror with
knowledge of a defendant’s prior conviction is subject to disqualifi-
cation on that ground. Barker, 230 Va. at 375, 337 S.E.2d at 733. But

Ls 143
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see Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984) (refusing to grant a
new trial where several jurors had pretrial knowledge of the defen-
dant’s prior conviction for the same crime). Powell contends, how-
ever, that in his case the jury would ultimately learn of his prior
conviction during the trial and, thus, asserts that he should have been
able to question jurors on the effect this evidence would have on
them.

HH The purpose of voir dire is “to ascertain whether [a prospec-
tive juror] is related to either party, or has any interest in the cause,
or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or
prejudice therein.” Code § 8.01-358. To that end, prospective jurors
may be asked any question relevant to determine whether they may
be subject to being removed from the venire for cause.

The test of relevancy is whether the questions relate to any of
the four criteria set forth in the statute. If an answer to the
question would necessarily disclose, or clearly lead to the dis-
closure of the statutory factors of relationship, interest, opin-
ion, or prejudice, it must be permitted.

LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653
(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984)

HH The question that Powell attempted to ask the first panel of
the venire was not one that “would necessarily disclose, or clearly
lead to the disclosure of the statutory factors of relationship, interest,
opinion, or prejudice” of the prospective jurors. The panel had
already indicated that they had no prior knowledge of the case and
had not formed an opinion as to Powell’s guilt or innocence. Pow-
ell’s question would not have revealed any preexisting opinion or
bias with respect to his case, but would instead have served to test
the jurors’ potential response to the evidence that he expected the
Commonwealth to present.

HM Whether to permit a party to ask a question that goes beyond
what is permissible under Code § 8.01-358 is a matter entirely within
the trial court’s discretion. Jd. We hold that the trial court did not err
in refusing to permit Powell to test the potential response of the
jurors to the evidence that would be adduced at trial concerning his
prior conviction.

In his eighth assignment of error, Powell contends that, having
denied him the opportunity to question the potential jurors on this
point, the trial court should have disqualified for cause the five mem-

bers of the first panel because his attempt to question them provided
them with knowledge that he had been previously convicted for the
capital murder of Stacey Reed. Thus, he contends that these jurors
were subject to automatic exclusion under Barker.

HM Even if we were to agree that Powell’s curtailed question
provided the five prospective jurors with sufficient information to
raise the concern for potential prejudice that the jurors’ full knowl-
edge of the defendant’s prior conviction raised in Barker, that cir-
cumstance arose here through Powell’s own conduct during the voir
dire. The record demonstrates that Powell’s counsel was fully aware
that advising the prospective jurors that Powell had been previously
convicted of capital murder carried with it the potential for creating
bias against his client, but apparently deemed this risk acceptable in
order to seek the strategic advantage of being able to test the jurors’
potential response to the evidence concerning that conviction during
the trial. Counsel further recognized the risk that the trial court
would not permit him to pursue that line of questioning, and, as we
have just determined, was within its discretion to do so.

HM Under the “invited error” doctrine Powell may not benefit
from his counsel’s voluntary, strategic choice to place Powell at a
potential disadvantage in the hope, unproductive though it was, of
gaining some advantage. See, e.g., Moore v. Hinkle, 259 Va. 479,
491, 527 S.E.2d 419, 426 (2000); Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211
Va. 399, 400, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970); Clark v. Commonwealth,
202 Va. 787, 791, 120 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1961). “‘No litigant, even a
defendant in a criminal case, will be permitted to approbate and rep-
robate — to invite error. . . and then to take advantage of the situa-
tion created by his own wrong.” Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va.
403, 417, 374 S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028
(1989). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in refus-
ing to strike the members of the first voir dire panel for cause under
the particular circumstances created by Powell in this case.

G. Failure to Strike the Evidence

In his fifth assignment of error, Powell contends that the trial
court erred in failing to strike the evidence as to capital murder on
the ground that the Commonwealth had not adequately corroborated
his confession in the October 21, 2001 letter of having attempted to
rape Stacey. Thus, Powell contends that the evidence at best would
have supported a conviction for first degree murder. We disagree.

Lee 145,
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HH Although the Commonwealth may not establish an essential
element of a crime by the uncorroborated confession of the accused
alone, “ ‘only slight corroborative evidence’ ” is necessary to show
the veracity of the confession. Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va.
168, 175, 360 S.E.2d 361, 366 (1987) (quoting Clozea v. Common-
wealth, 228 Va. 124, 133, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1230 (1985)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988). What is
more, if “[t]his corroborating evidence is consistent with a reason-
able inference” that the accused committed the crime to which he
has confessed, the Commonwealth need not establish through direct
evidence those elements of the crime that are proven by the confes-
sion. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 646, 499 S.E.2d
538, 551 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999).

HM Contrary to Powell’s contention that there is not even
“slight” corroborative evidence to support the reliability of his con-
fession, the forensic evidence and direct testimony are consistent
with and substantiate Powell’s version of “the rest of what hap-
pened” in every relevant respect. Powell’s going to the home armed
when he knew Stacey would be there alone, Stacey’s defensive
wounds, the evidence that her pants’ zipper was slightly undone, the
subsequent rape of Kristie, and Powell’s later concession that he
raped Kristie because he “didn’t get any with Stacey” all corroborate
his confession to the attempted rape of Stacey in the October 21,
2001 letter. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in
overruling Powell’s motion to strike the evidence as to capital mur-
der premised on the attempted rape of Stacey.

H. Mandatory Sentence Review

In his first and second assignments of error, Powell contends that
the jury imposed the sentence of death under the influence of pas-
sion, prejudice, or some other arbitrary factor and that the sentence
of death is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in other cases
considering both the crime and the defendant. As noted above, these
two assignments of error parallel the mandatory review of every
death sentence this Court conducts pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C).
Accordingly, we will combine the mandatory review of Powell’s
death sentence with our discussion of the issues raised by Powell in
his assignments of error.

Powell contends that “‘[t]he sensational nature of [Kristie Reed’s]
testimony virtually assured [Powell] would receive a sentence of
death.” This is so, he asserts, because “the graphic and irrelevant

146 Ln
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evidence about the attack on Kristie” would have enraged the jury
and rendered it unable to reach an impartial verdict.

HE “We have already determined that evidence of the rape
and attempted murder of Kristie was relevant and admissible during
the guilt determination phase of the trial. Similarly, Powell’s rape
and attempted murder of Kristie was relevant for the jury’s consider-
ation of his future dangerousness during the penalty determination
phase of the trial. Accordingly, Powell’s assertion that the jury was
influenced by “irrelevant” evidence is without merit. However,
while graphic evidence of a violent crime is admissible in the guilt
determination phase of a capital murder trial, we will also consider
the potential impact such evidence may have had on the jury’s deci-
sion to impose the death sentence during the penalty determination
phase.

The brutal rape and attempted murder of a thirteen-year-old child
are undoubtedly among the most abhorrent crimes that can be placed
in evidence before a jury contemplating whether to impose a sen-
tence of death upon a defendant. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the
jury is presented with such evidence does not raise a presumption
that the jury will be unable to set aside its natural emotions and fairly
consider all the evidence. See Bailey, 259 Va. at 751, 529 S.E.2d at
586 (evidence of infanticide and uxoricide, though abhorrent crimes,
did not preclude jury from making a rational sentencing determina-
tion in a capital murder trial).

Powell further contends that the trial court erred in submitting to
the jury a verdict form that permitted it to impose a sentence of life
imprisonment and a fine but which did not expressly parallel the trial
court’s sentencing instructions by stating that this form was to be
used if the jury found that neither aggravating factor had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. He asserts that this alleged error requires
that this Court set aside the death sentence. Powell concedes that he
did not raise this issue at trial, but nonetheless contends that it is
proper for this Court to consider his argument as part of the
mandatory review of his sentence, apparently contending that an
erroneous verdict form would constitute an “arbitrary factor” that
would influence the jury’s sentencing decision.

Hl Our review of the record in this case does not disclose that
the jury failed to give fair consideration to all the evidence both in
favor and in mitigation of the death sentence. Moreover, the jury was
properly instructed upon the sentences available and the basis for
imposing them and the record supports the jury’s determination to

| 147
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impose a sentence of death upon a finding that both aggravating fac-
tors were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We find nothing to sug-
gest that the jury, or the trial court in reviewing the verdict, imposed
the death sentence under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other
arbitrary factors. Accordingly, we hold that the sentence of death was
not imposed under passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor.

HH In a separate section of his brief, ostensibly related to the
assignment of error paralleling the passion, prejudice and arbitrary
factor aspect of our mandatory review, Powell asserts that the alleged
error in the wording of the life sentence verdict form should result in
the reversal of his death sentence and a remand for a new sentencing
proceeding. While we consider the entire record of a capital murder
trial to determine whether the sentence of death should be set aside
because of improper influence on the jury, we have previously
rejected the contention that the “arbitrary factor” language of Code
§ 17.1-313(C)(1) permits a defendant to raise as a separate issue on
appeal an issue barred by the failure to make a proper objection in
the trial court by contending that the error influenced the jury’s sen-
tencing decision. See Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 148
n.6, 152 n.7, 295 S.E.2d 643, 653 n.6, 656 n.7 (1982) (rejecting
assertion in dissenting opinion that mandatory review permitted chal-
lenge to form of jury verdict to be raised for the first time on
appeal). Accordingly, while Powell is not precluded from arguing
that the alleged error in the life sentence verdict form improperly
influenced the jury’s sentencing decision as a basis for commuting
the death sentence, we will not consider his separate argument under
the same assignment of error as a basis for reversing that sentence
and ordering a new sentencing proceeding.!?

Powell contends that the death sentenced imposed upon him is
excessive or disproportionate when compared to similar cases consid-
ering both the crime and the defendant. Powell’s sole contention is
that his history of mental health problems and his failure to receive
adequate treatment when in state custody as a juvenile militates

® Powell also contends that the “ends of justice” exception of Rule 5:25 would permit us to
consider the alleged error in the life sentence verdict form as a basis for reversing his death
sentence and ordering a new sentencing proceeding. However, as Powell cannot argue for
reversal of his death sentence under the assignment of error paralleling the mandatory review
of that sentence and failed to make this issue the subject of a separate assignment of error, the
issue is not properly before us. Rule 5:17. Accordingly, we will not address this issue as a
basis for reversing the sentence of death and remanding for a new sentencing proceeding.

148 Len
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against the appropriateness of the death penalty in his case. We
disagree.

HE Code § 19.2-264.4(B) lists as a mitigating factor the fact
that “the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
significantly impaired.” The psychologist called by Powell did not
offer a specific diagnosis of Powell’s mental health problems, merely
classifying them generally as suggesting an anti-social personality
disorder and “‘a mood disorder, primarily depressive in nature . . .
characterized by irritability, short temper and so forth.” The psychol-
ogist did not testify that Powell lacked the ability to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or that his condition significantly impaired
his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

HM The jury heard this testimony concerning Powell’s mental
health problems, and we must assume that the jury followed the trial
court’s instruction to consider evidence presented in mitigation. The
jury clearly concluded that Powell’s history of mental health
problems did not mitigate his offense. See Swann v. Commonwealth,
247 Va. 222, 238-39, 441 $.E.2d 195, 206-07, cert. denied, 513 U.S.
889 (1994) (death sentence imposed despite “history of mental
health hospitalization and treatment”); Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237
Va. 303, 313, 377 S.E.2d 595, 601, cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989)
(death sentence imposed despite evidence of defendant’s prior con-
finement in nine or ten mental hospitals); Giarratano v. Common-
wealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1076-79, 266 S.E.2d 94, 101-103 (1980)
(death sentence imposed despite mitigating evidence of defendant’s
“schizoid personality disturbance” and “extreme mental and emo-
tional disturbance’’).

HE Apart from Powell’s contention that his history of mental
health problems should preclude the imposition of a death sentence
in his case, we are required by Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) to conduct a
comparative review of the death sentence imposed in this case with
other capital murder cases, including those where a life sentence was
imposed. “The purpose of our comparative review is to reach a rea-
soned judgment regarding what cases justify the imposition of the
death penalty.” Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519
S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000). In con-
ducting this statutorily mandated review in this case, we have
focused on cases in which the victim was murdered during the com-
mission of rape or attempted rape, and in which the sentence of death
was imposed based on findings of both future dangerousness and

Le 149
a

vileness. See, ¢.g., Patterson v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 301, 551
S.E.2d 332 (2001); Swisher v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 471, 506
S.E.2d 763 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999); Pruett v. Com-
monwealth, 232 Va. 266, 351 S.E.2d 1 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
931 (1987); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864
(1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984); Mason v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 1091, 254 S.E.2d 116, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919
(1979); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135
(1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). We have also considered
cases in which defendants received life sentences, rather than the
death penalty, for capital murder during the commission of rape or
attempted rape. See, e.g., Horne v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 339
S.E.2d 186 (1986); Keil v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 99, 278 S.E.2d
826 (1981). Considering all the factors revealed by the record, both
those favoring imposition of the death sentence and those in mitiga-
tion against it, we hold that the sentence is neither excessive nor
disproportionate to the penalties imposed by other sentencing bodies
in the Commonwealth for comparable crimes.

TI. CONCLUSION

HM Having found no error below and perceiving no other reason
to commute or set aside the sentence of death, we will affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

50
PC

TAZEWELL COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD
V.

GEORGE BROWN
Record No, 030109
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ., and
Carrico, S.J., and Whiting, RJ.

a)
a
4

154

E. William Chapman (Kathleen S. Mehfoud; Travis A. Sabalew-
ski; Kelly A. Sherrill; C. Eugene Compton; Reed Smith; Compton &
Compton, on briefs), for appellant.

Warren David Harless (Robyn S. Gray; Robert B. Altizer; Chris-
tian & Barton; Gillespie, Gart, Altizer & Whitesell, on brief), for
appellee.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal involves two grievance procedures that are mandated
by different sections of Title 22.1 of the Code. The provisions of
Code § 22.1-308 require the Board of Education to prescribe one of
the grievance procedures, which we shall call the “‘State Grievance
Procedure.” Another statute, Code § 22.1-79(6), directs a school
board to establish the other grievance procedure, which we shall call
the “Local Grievance Procedure.”

Hl The dispositive question is which one of these grievance pro-
cedures applies to a school principal who is suspended. Because we
conclude that a principal is covered by the State Grievance Procedure
even though a dispute involving a suspension is not a grievable mat-
ter under that procedure, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit
court finding that the principal in this case was covered by the Local

|:
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Grievance Procedure and that he presented a grievable matter under
that procedure.

I. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

George Brown was employed as the principal of Richlands High
School located in Tazewell County. By a letter dated November 16,
2001, the division superintendent, Donald W. Hodock, suspended
Brown with pay from his position as principal.! In a subsequent letter
dated November 28, 2001, Hodock informed Brown of his right to a
hearing before the Tazewell County School Board (“School Board’’)
and suggested that the hearing could be arranged for the December 3,
2001, meeting of the School Board if Brown so requested.

Brown did not ask for that hearing before the School Board but
instead requested a hearing before an advisory fact-finding panel pur-
suant to Step 4 of Part II of the State Grievance Procedure. He was
subsequently told that he needed to file the appropriate grievance
form in accordance with Step 2 of Part II of the State Grievance
Procedure. On December 7, 2001, Brown filed a statement of his
grievance on the specified form. He identified the action being
grieved as his “{s]uspension from job duties” and requested
“fijmmediate reinstatement to position as [p]rincipal of Richlands
High School.”

After a series of letters between the parties and their respective
counsel, exchange of information, and a meeting between Hodock
and Brown, Hodock advised Brown by letter dated February 7, 2002,
that he was adjusting the grievance and would recommend to the
School Board that Brown be reassigned to another administrative
position. In two subsequent letters, Hodock also notified Brown of
his intention to recommend to the School Board that Brown be reas-
signed to a classroom teaching position for the 2002-03 school year.
In two other letters, both dated February 8, 2002, Hodock ruled that
Brown’s December 7 grievance did not state a grievable matter
because suspension with pay could not be the subject of a grievance.
In one of the letters, Hodock again informed Brown that he would
recommend to the School Board at its next meeting that Brown be
reassigned as principal at a different school in the Tazewell County
school system.

" It is not necessary to summatize the stated reasons for Brown’s suspension in order to
resolve the issues presented on appeal.

5
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Hodock subsequently requested the School Board to determine
whether Brown’s December 7 statement of grievance presented a
grievable matter. After requesting written arguments from both par-
ties on the issue, the School Board ruled at its meeting on March 11,
2002, that suspension with pay is not a grievable matter. The School
Board also accepted Hodock’s recommendation to reassign Brown to
a classroom teaching position and to reduce his salary accordingly.

Brown then filed with the School Board a notice of appeal to
circuit court, challenging the School Board’s determination that his
suspension with pay was not a grievable matter. In accordance with
the provisions of Code § 22.1-314, the School Board transmitted the
notice of appeal, exhibits, and other relevant documents to the circuit
court. Upon considering argument of counsel, the parties’ memo-
randa, and the record from the School Board, the court issued a letter
opinion, finding that Brown’s suspension presented a grievable issue.

The circuit court reasoned in a letter opinion and subsequent
order that Code § 22.1-79(6) requires a school board to establish a
grievance procedure for all its employees except a division superin-
tendent and those employees covered under Articles 2 and 3 of
Chapter 15, Title 22.1 of the Code. Interpreting the reference to
employees covered under Articles 2 and 3 to mean “coverage under
a grievance procedure specifically provided under either Article 2 or
Article 3,” the court concluded that Brown was not such an
employee. Instead, the court found that the only class of employees,
other than superintendents, that falls within the coverage exception
provided in Code § 22.1-79(6) consists of teachers. Stated differently,
the court concluded that neither Article 2 nor Article 3 of Chapter
15, Title 22.1 creates a grievance procedure for principals and that,
therefore, Brown did not come within the coverage exception set out
in Code § 22.1-79(6).

The court also found that this section requires the grievance pro-
cedure to include a method to resolve disputes between a school
board and covered employees regarding, among other things, a “sus-
pension.” Therefore, the court decided that Brown could pursue his
grievance under the procedure established by the School Board pur-
suant to Code § 22.1-79(6) and that he had presented a grievable
matter. Finally, the court rejected the School Board’s argument that
Brown’s grievance was moot because he had been reinstated as a
principal and then reassigned to a classroom. In a final order, the
court directed the School Board to afford Brown “‘a timely and fair

7
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method of resolution of [his] grievance.”? The School Board appeals
from the circuit court’s judgment.

IL ANALYSIS

In this appeal, the School Board presents several assignments of
error that challenge the circuit court’s findings and its interpretation
of the relevant statutory provisions. Specifically, the School Board
asserts that the court erred by holding that Brown is covered by the
grievance procedure mandated by Code § 22.1-79(6) and that
Brown’s grievance was grievable under that procedure, by refusing to
affirm the School Board’s determination that Brown’s grievance was
not a grievable matter, and by refusing to dismiss Brown’s appeal for
Jack of subject matter jurisdiction. The School Board also assigns
error to the court’s refusal to dismiss Brown’s appeal as moot. Since
this last assignment of error presents a threshold question, we will
address it first.

(A) MOOTNESS

The School Board argues that, once Brown’s suspension was
lifted and he was reinstated to the position of principal at an elemen-
tary school, his grievance concerning his suspension became moot.
While this appeal was pending, the School Board also filed a motion
to remand the case to the circuit court with instructions that it be
dismissed as moot because Brown resigned his position as an
employee of the School Board and the Tazewell County public
school system effective August 7, 2003. We do not agree that the
issues presented are moot.

HMM As the circuit court noted in addressing the question of
mootness, Brown has been “adversely affected in his professional
reputation by the actions of the Tazewell County School Board, and
those actions are not undone by his later reinstatement and reassign-
ment.” Nor are they “undone” by his subsequent resignation. The
fact of and reasons for his suspension are contained in his personnel
file and will remain there unless removed based upon a determina-
tion that the information therein was unfounded. See Code § 22.1-
295.1. Thus, the question whether Brown presented a grievable issue
that he could pursue through a grievance procedure to establish that
information in his personnel file was unfounded is not moot. See

? The circuit court vacated its final order pending resolution of the School Board’s motion to
reconsider. The court subsequently denied the motion and reinstated its final order.

Story v. Commonwealth, 175 Va. 615, 616-17, 9 S.E.2d 344, 345
(1940) (because nature of evidence admitted bore upon appellant's
fitness to be granted a certificate of registration, issues were not
moot merely because certificates of registration had expired). In
other words, if Brown prevailed in this appeal, there is relief, other
than reinstatement to his former position, that could be afforded to
him under the circuit court’s judgment directing the School Board to
resolve his grievance. See RF & P Corp. v. Little, 247 Va. 309, 315,
440 S.E.2d 908, 912 (1994) (where relief can be provided, issue is
not moot); Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach, 182 Va. 642, 643-44,
29 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1944) (same). Thus, this appeal and the issues
presented are not moot.?

(B) BROWN’S GRIEVANCE

The remaining issues raised in this appeal require the Court to
address the statutory provisions regarding grievance procedures for
public school employees and suspensions of those employees. We
begin by surveying the two grievance procedures that are mandated
by the provisions of Code §§ 22.1-308 and -79(6). Our examination
of those statutory provisions and the grievance procedures created
thereunder will illustrate certain inconsistencies that give rise to the
issues before us. We also include in our analysis the separate statu-
tory provision dealing with suspension of public school employees,
Code § 22.1-315.

Hi We turn first to the State Grievance Procedure mandated by
the provisions of Code § 22.1-308. That statute requires the Board of
Education to prescribe a grievance procedure, which shall include
certain elements enumerated in the statute. Pursuant to that mandate
and its authority in Code § 22.1-16 to “promulgate such regulations
as may be necessary to carry out its powers and duties and the provi-
sions of” Title 22.1, the Board of Education established a “Proce-
dure For Adjusting Grievances,” 8 VAC 20-90-10 et seg. (the State
Grievance Procedure). The School Board adopted this grievance pro-
cedure “‘in accordance with the Standards of Quality for the statutory
mandate of Chapters 13.2 and 15, Article 3, Title 22.1” of the Code.*

> Accordingly, we will deny the School Board’s motion to remand and dismiss this case.
+ ‘The version adopted by the School Board is identical to the version promulgated by the
Board of Education, except in some aspects that do not have any bearing on the issues
presented here. Thus, when we refer to the State Grievance Procedure, we mean the version
adopted by the School Board unless we specifically cite 8 VAC 20-90-10 et seq.

|!
PF

HH The State Grievance Procedure contains three parts. Part I
consists of definitions, Part II governs employment disputes other
than dismissals or probation, and Part III controls disputes involving
dismissals or probation. Each of these parts has some bearing on the
resolution of the issues presented in this appeal.

The relevant definitions in Part I are for the terms
“ ‘Tg]rievance,’ ” “ ‘[t]eacher,’” and “‘ ‘[s]upervisory employee.’ ”
In pertinent part, the term “ ‘{g]rievance’ means, for the purpose of
Part III, a complaint or dispute by a teacher relating to his or her
employment involving dismissal or placing on probation. The term
‘grievance’ shall not include a complaint or dispute by a teacher
relating to . . . suspension of a teacher .. . .” The exclusion of a
dispute involving a suspension is consistent with the statutory defini-
tion of the term “ ‘[gJrievance.’”’ The definition of that term in
Code § 22.1-306 expressly excludes “‘a complaint or dispute by a
teacher relating to . . . suspension of a teacher... .” Next, the term

“[t]eacher” or “teachers” means, for the purpose of Part II,
all employees of the school division involved in classroom
instruction and all other full-time employees of the school
division except those employees classified as supervising
employees. “Teacher”? means, for the purpose of Part III, all
regularly certified/licensed professional public school person-
nel employed under a written contract as provided by § 22.1-
302 of the Code of Virginia by any school division as a
teacher or supervisor of classroom teachers but excluding all
superintendents.

Finally, in pertinent part, the term “ ‘[s]upervisory employee’ means
any person having authority in the interest of the board . . . (ii) to
direct other employees; or (iii) to adjust the grievance of other
employees ....”

Hl Based on these definitions, the parties agree on two points,
and we concur. First, if a principal such as Brown is covered by the
State Grievance Procedure, such coverage is created only in Part IIL
since he is a supervisory employee. Second, for the purposes of Part
IH, a dispute involving a suspension is not included within the defi-
nition of the term “ ‘[g]rievance.’ ” Thus, if the State Grievance Pro-
cedure applies to Brown, a point he disputes, his suspension was not
a grievable matter and the circuit court erred in finding otherwise.

Fe

HB The other grievance procedure at issue, the Local Grievance
Procedure, is mandated by Code § 22.1-79(6). That statute requires a
school board

[iJn instances in which no grievance procedure has been
adopted prior to January 1, 1991, [to] establish and administer
by July 1, 1992, a grievance procedure for all school board
employees, except the division superintendent and those
employees covered under the provisions of Article 2 (§ 22.1-
293 et seq.) and Article 3 (§ 22.1-306 et seq.) of Chapter 15 of
this title, who have completed such probationary period as
may be required by the school board, not to exceed eighteen
months. The grievance procedure shall afford a timely and fair
method of the resolution of disputes arising between the school
board and such employees regarding dismissal, suspension, or
other disciplinary actions and shall be consistent with the pro-
visions of the Board of Education’s procedures for adjusting
grievances except that there shall be no right to a hearing
before a fact-finding panell.]

Code § 22.1-79(6).

HH In 1993, the School Board adopted the Local Grievance Pro-
cedure for “[s]upervisory and [c]lassified [e]mployees” in accor-
dance with this statutory mandate. That grievance procedure defines
the term “[s]upervisory employees” to include “principals.” How-
ever, it also provides that the dismissal or probation of a supervisory
employee is governed by Part III of the State Grievance Procedure.
The term “ ‘[cJlassified employees’ is defined as that group of those
school board’s employees whose members do not hold certificates as
promulgated by the Virginia Board of Education.” According to its
express terms, the Local Grievance Procedure provides that “/ajil
full-time classified employees, including those assigned to the admin-
istrative salary schedule, who have successfully completed a proba-
tionary period, shall have access to the . . . grievance procedures
{created therein] for matters specified as grievable.” (Emphasis
added.) In other words, the procedures created in the Local Griev-
ance Procedure do not cover “[s]upervisory employees,” such as
“principals.”> The grievable matters enumerated in the Local Griev-

5 In finding that Brown could utilize the Local Grievance Procedure required by Code
§ 22.1-79(6), the circuit court never explained how Brown fell within the definition of the term.

|

ance Procedure do, however, include a dispute involving a
suspension.

This summary of the two grievance procedures brings us to the
question whether the circuit court erred in finding that Brown was
covered by the Local Grievance Procedure mandated by Code § 22.1-
79(6) and not the State Grievance Procedure. Brown argues, and the
circuit court concluded, that the exception in Code § 22.1-79(6) for
“employees covered under the provisions of Article 2... and Arti-
cle 3... of Chapter 15 of this title [22.1]” excepts employees cov-
ered “under a grievance procedure specified under either Article 2
or Article 3.” (Emphasis added.) To hold otherwise, argues Brown,
would render the provisions of Code § 22.1-79(6) and the grievance
procedure mandated therein meaningless because all school board
employees, not just teachers and principals, are covered by some of
the Code sections in Article 2 and would therefore fall in that stat-
ute’s coverage exception.

Hl Brown is correct in that certain sections of Article 2 are
applicable to most, if not all, public school employees. See e.g., Code
§§ 22.1-295.1 (unfounded information shall not be maintained in any
employee personnel file); -296(B) (providing reimbursement for pri-
vate transportation to all school board employees); -296.1 (requiring
as a condition of employment certification that an applicant has not
been convicted of a felony or other specified crimes); -296.2 (requir-
ing all applicants for employment to submit to fingerprinting). How-
ever, Brown’s position, as well as the circuit court’s conclusion,
ignores the word “‘and” in Code § 22.1-79(6). The grievance proce-
dure required by that statute applies to all school board employees
except “those employees covered under the provisions of Article 2

. . and Article 3.”° Code § 22.1-79(6). (Emphasis added.) Brown
and the circuit court interpret this phrase as though it excepted those
employees covered under the provisions of Article 2 or Article 3.
While many public school employees are covered in some respects
by certain sections in Article 2, the same cannot be said about Article
3. For the exception in Code § 22.1-79(6) to apply, a public school
employee must be covered by both articles.

HM Thus, we hold that the language of Code § 22.1-79(6) is
plain and unambiguous. It is not necessary to add language to the

“[ellassified employees.” Nor does Brown address that issue or the anomaly created by saying
that he could utilize a grievance procedure that, by definition, does not apply to him.

6 Although not relevant to our discussion, Code § 22.1-79(6) also excepts a division
superintendent.

a
FC

statute as the circuit court did in order to ascertain its meaning and
applicability. ““Where the legislature has used words of a plain and
definite import the courts cannot put upon them a construction which
amounts to holding the legislature did not mean what it has actually
expressed.” City of Winchester v. American Woodmark Corp., 250
Va. 451, 457, 464 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1995). A court “cannot change
or amend a statute under the guise of construing it.”” Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. of Roanoke, Inc. v. County of Botetourt, 259 Va. 559, 565,
526 S.E.2d 746, 750 (2000). We also note that to insert the phrase
covered by a grievance procedure under Article 2 or Article 3 is
illogical because there is no grievance procedure established in Arti-
cle 2.

Nevertheless, Brown asserts that he was not a school board
employee covered under Article 3 and that, therefore, he does not fall
within the exception set forth in Code § 22.1-79(6). He argues that
Article 3 applies only to teachers and not to principals because the
term “principal” is not mentioned in that article. Relying on this
Court’s decision in Lee-Warren v. School Bd. of Cumberland County,
241 Va. 442, 445, 403 S.E.2d 691, 692 (1991), Brown contends that
principals and teachers are not the same and that the term “teacher”
as used in Article 3 cannot be interpreted to include the position of
principal. We do not agree.

HM As already explained, the Board of Education promulgated
the State Grievance Procedure pursuant to the directive set forth in
Code § 22.1-308. It is true that the term “/gJrievance’’ is defined in
Code § 22.1-306 to mean “a complaint or dispute by a teacher” and
that the term “principal” is not used in the various provisions per-
taining to the State Grievance Procedure set out in Article 3. How-
ever, the term “teacher” is not defined for the purposes of Article 3.
Consequently, under its rule-making authority, see Code § 22.1-16,
the Board of Education defined that term in Part I of the State Griev-
ance Procedure. 8 VAC 20-90-10.

HM The definition of the term “teacher” for purposes of Part II
of the State Grievance Procedure includes “‘all regularly certified/
licensed professional public school personnel employed under a writ-
ten contract . . . as a teacher or supervisor of classroom teachers.” A
principal is required to “‘hold licenses as prescribed by the Board of
Education,” Code § 22.1-293, and to have a written contract, see 8
VAC 20-440-10 and 8 VAC 20-440-30. And, a principal is clearly a
supervisor of classroom teachers. Thus, a principal such as Brown
fell within the definition of the term “teacher” for purposes of Part

Ss
PF

Il of the State Grievance Procedure. Accordingly, he was an
employee covered by both Article 2, see Code § 22.1-293, and Arti-
cle 3 of Chapter 15, Title 22.1.

HM The fact that a suspension is specifically excluded as a
grievable matter under the State Grievance Procedure does not
change that result. The provisions of Code § 22.1-79(6) creating the
coverage exception at issue require only that the employee be cov-
ered under both articles, not that any specific type of employee dis-
pute be covered. Nor does the fact that the authority for the Board of
Education to define the term “‘teacher” derives from Code § 22.1-16
rather than Article 3 change our conclusion. In other words, Brown
was covered by Articles 2 and 3 and therefore was not entitled to
utilize the Local Grievance Procedure established pursuant to Code
§ 22.1-79(6). Thus, we hold that the circuit court erred in finding that
Brown did not come within the exception carved out in Code § 22.1-
79(6). .

HB This conclusion is consistent with an opinion of the Attorney
General. Noting the definition of the term “teacher” adopted by the
Board of Education for purposes of Part III of the State Grievance
Procedure, the Attorney General opined “that principals and supervi-
sors who meet the State Board’s . . . definition of ‘teacher,’ have the
same grievance procedure rights with regard to disciplinary proba-
tion, dismissal or suspension as outlined for teachers in [Code]
§ 22.1-308.” 1983-84 Op. Atty. Gen. 309. “[W]e have repeatedly
held that the General Assembly is presumed to have knowledge of
the Attorney General’s interpretation of statutes, and the General
Assembly’s failure to make corrective amendments evinces legisla-
tive acquiescence in the Attorney General’s interpretation.” Ameri-
can Woodmark, 250 Va. at 458, 464 S.E.2d at 153. The General
Assembly has taken no legislative action to change the statutory
interpretation set forth in this opinion of the Attorney General.

Hl Additionally, the Board of Education promulgated the defi-
nition of the term “teacher” in order to implement the grievance
procedure mandated by Code § 22.1-308. An “elementary rule of
statutory interpretation is that the construction accorded a statute by
public officials charged with its administration and enforcement is
entitled to be given weight by the court.” Commonwealth v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 202 Va. 13, 19, 116 S.E.2d
44, 48 (1960). We presume that the General Assembly is cognizant
of the construction of the term “teacher” adopted by the Board of
Education and, since that construction has continued for a long

TT
Pe

period without any change by the General Assembly, we further pre-
sume that it has acquiesced in the particular construction of that
term. See id.

Contrary to Brown’s argument, our decision in Lee-Warren does
not compel a different result. There, the issue was “ ‘[w]Jhether under
Virginia law, a school principal with continuing contract status
retains that status upon accepting a job as principal in another school
division within Virginia[.] ” 241 Va. at 443, 403 S.E.2d at 691. To
resolve that question, we had to compare two statutory provisions,
Code § 22.1-294 dealing with continuing contract status for a princi-
pal, assistant principal or supervisor, and Code § 22.1-303 addressing
continuing contract status for a teacher. Because the former provision
dealt only with principals, assistant principals, and supervisors while
the latter statute addressed only teachers, we concluded that certain
transfer provisions found only in Code § 22.1-303 applied solely to
teachers. 241 Va. at 446, 403 S.E.2d at 693. In the present case, we
do not have statutory provisions dealing with teachers and principals
in separate and distinct ways. And, the definition of the term
“teacher” promulgated by the Board of Education does not conflict
with any statutory definition of that term since the General Assembly
did not include one.

HM This brings us to the last step of our analysis. The circuit
court found that Brown had presented a grievable issue and
remanded his grievance to the School Board for resolution. The
court’s jurisdiction to review a school board’s determination of

- grievability is found in Code § 22.1-314, which is part of Article 3
and the State Grievance Procedure.’ That statute allows a decision of
a school board regarding grievability to be appealed to the circuit
court “having jurisdiction in the school division for a hearing on the
issue of grievability.”” However, the definition of the term “griev-
ance” in Code § 22.1-306 and in the Part I of the State Grievance

7 In light of our holding that Brown was covered by Part III of the State Grievance Proce-
dure, it is not necessary to decide whether the right to appeal a school board’s determination of
grievability to the circuit court is also part of the Local Grievance Procedure. Brown argues
that it is because of the language in Code § 22.1-79(6), providing that “[tJhe grievance proce-
dure shall . . . be consistent with the provisions of the Board of Education’s procedures for
adjusting grievances except that there shall be no right to a heating before a fact-finding
panel.” The School Board disagrees with that position. If the right to appeal a school board’s
determination regarding grievability is not required by Code § 22.1-79(6) and thus not part of
the Local Grievance Procedure, then a circuit court would not have subject matter jurisdiction
to hear a grievability issue on appeal when the grievant was proceeding under the Local Griev-
ance Procedure.

Ss  (
PC

Procedure specifically excludes a dispute involving a suspension as a
grievable matter. Thus, the circuit court erred in finding that Brown
had presented a grievable issue.

HEM This result does not mean that Brown had no remedy. The
provisions of Code § 22.1-315, which are contained in Article 4 of
Chapter 15, Title 22.1, afford “[a] teacher or other public school
employee” who has been suspended “an opportunity for a hearing
before the school board in accordance with [Code] §§ 22.1-311 and
22.1-313, if applicable.” In fact, Hodock advised Brown of his right
to such a hearing by letter dated November 28, 2001, but Brown
never requested that hearing.§

CONCLUSION

HMM For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred in
finding that Brown’s December 7, 2001, grievance regarding his
“fsjuspension from job duties” presented a grievable matter. Thus,
we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court and enter final judg-
ment here for the School Board. We will also deny the School
Board’s motion to remand this case with directions to dismiss it as
moot.

Reversed and final judgment.

* Given our holding that Brown was covered by Part III of the State Grievance Procedure
which excludes a dispute involving a suspension, it also is not necessary to decide whether
Code § 22.1-315 provides the exclusive remedy for a public school employee who has been
suspended, irrespective of which grievance procedure would otherwise cover the employee.
Brown argues that it does not because of the provision in Code § 22.1-79(6) stating that the
grievance procedure shall afford a method of resolving disputes concerning, among other
things, a suspension. The School Board, however, claims that the 1996 amendment of Code
§ 22.1-315 adding the phrase “other public school employee” implicitly repealed that portion
of Code § 22.1-79(6) dealing with a suspension.

166 |
Le

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
v.

KurVYN DARNELL MINOR
Record No, 030401
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ.,
and Compton, S.J.

i

168 eee}

Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellant.

(Brent A. Jackson; L. Wendell Allen; Fred A. Dixon; Hill, Tucker,
Marsh & Jackson, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether a defendant, who was
indicted for offenses against three victims occurring on three differ-
ent dates, should have been granted separate trials for the offenses
allegedly committed against each victim. We conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to sever
the charges because evidence of the other crimes was not relevant to
the only contested issue, whether each victim did or did not consent
to sexual intercourse. We will therefore affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s judgment and the
defendant’s convictions.

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

The defendant, Kurvyn Darnell Minor, was charged with 14
offenses that arose out of three separate incidents involving three dif-
ferent victims. First, he was charged with the April 3, 2000, abduc-
tion of C.M. and use of a firearm in the commission of that felony.
Second, he was charged with the April 13, 2000 abduction, rape,
robbery, oral sodomy, attempted anal sodomy, credit card theft, and
use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, all against W.S.
Third, the defendant was charged with the September 30, 2000,
abduction, rape, robbery, oral sodomy, and anal sodomy of G.C.

Minor filed a motion to sever the charges, asking that he be tried
separately for the offenses related to each victim. He asserted that
evidence admissible in the trial of the charges involving one victim
would not be relevant to the other offenses involving different vic-
tims. The Commonwealth opposed the defendant’s motion and
moved for joinder of the charges in a single trial. In a memorandum
in support of its motion for joinder, the Commonwealth stated that,
“TiJn the present case, modus operandi, opportunity, relationship to
the victims, absence of mistake or accident and interconnection of
the offenses are all relevant to the trial of these three cases.” The
Commonwealth also stated that “[t]he place of attack, the type of
victim, the method of transportation, the topics of conversation and

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other factors are sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit an inference of
pattern or purpose for proof showing a common predator or common
modus operandi.”

At a hearing on the parties’ motions, the Commonwealth admit-
ted that there was no dispute regarding the identity of the perpetrator
in the charged offenses. Despite that admission, the Commonwealth
stated that the evidence of other crimes was admissible “to show that
the defendant’s modus operandi was the same.” The defendant, how-
ever, suggested that the only contested issue was whether the victims
consented to sexual intercourse. Defense counsel acknowledged that
Minor had admitted, in a statement to the police, that he knew these
women and had contact with them, including sexual intercourse.
Defense counsel then stated, “I don’t think that it’s going to be the
Commonwealth’s position necessarily that on the issue of whether it
was consensual or not that there was — there’s something so unique
that occurred between the women that [the Commonwealth] would
need to try all the cases on the same day in order to present that
issue.” The Commonwealth did not disagree with that statement.

The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion for joinder of
the indictments for trial, finding that joinder was proper under Rule
3A:10(c). At trial, Minor did not testify. The court instructed the jury
on the issue of consent only with regard to the victim identified as
W.S. That instruction stated:

Consent by [W.S.] is an absolute bar to a conviction of
rape. However, consent, once given, may be withdrawn prior
to sexual intercourse. If after consideration of all of the evi-
dence you have a reasonable doubt as to whether [W.S.] con-
sented to have intercourse with the defendant, then you shall
find him not guilty.

The jury convicted Minor of three counts of abduction; two
counts each of rape, oral sodomy, and robbery; and one count each
of anal sodomy, attempted anal sodomy, credit card theft, and use of
a firearm in the commission of abduction. The jury fixed Minor’s
total punishment for these convictions at two life sentences plus 113
years imprisonment. The trial court, however, struck the charge of
attempted anal sodomy and reduced the defendant’s sentence to 108
years plus two life sentences.

Minor appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of
Appeals. In an unpublished opinion reversing the judgment of the

trial court, the Court of Appeals held that, under Rule 3A:10(c), jus-
tice required separate trials because “[n]either the number of alleged
victims nor the strength of similarities between or among the
offenses has any bearing on the admissibility of evidence of other
offenses where, as here, the only issue genuinely in dispute is
whether the acts were consensual or forcible.” Minor v. Common-
wealth, No. 3105-01-2, slip op. at 11 (Dec. 31, 2002). The Common-
wealth appeals from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

MATERIAL FACTS

The three incidents at issue occurred in the late evening to early
morning hours on the respective dates alleged in the indictments.
Minor approached each pedestrian victim within the same relative
area on the north side of the City of Richmond and identified himself
as “Kevin Wilkinson” to C.M. and as “Kevin” to W.S. He offered
each one a ride in his vehicle, which C.M. and WS. willingly
accepted by getting into Minor’s vehicle. Although G.C. initially
accepted Minor’s offer of a ride to her home, she refused to get into
his car when Minor told her that he wanted to take her to his house.
At that point, Minor pulled out a knife, held it to G.C.’s throat, made
her get into his vehicle, and told her that he was going to rape her.

After each victim got into his vehicle, whether willingly or other-
wise, Minor drove along Interstate 95, taking each victim to a
secluded area in Hanover County. Minor took C.M. and WS. to a
location near a church, and he took G.C. to a wooded area about a
mile away from the same church.

C.M. testified that, as she and Minor traveled to Hanover County,
they discussed “getting together, having sexual performance or act,
and I, you know, didn’t mind at that particular time.” She further
testified that she and Minor agreed to stop at a gasoline station,
where she purchased a condom using Minor’s money. According to
C.M., Minor then told her “that he wanted anal sex.” At that point,
C.M. objected, “I said no, that’s okay. I change my mind. I don’t
want to do that.” C.M. testified that Minor’s “whole tone and atti-
tude just change[d]” then and “‘his voice [got] real harsh and nasty.”

When Minor stopped his vehicle near the church, he took the
keys out of the ignition and went back to the trunk of the vehicle. As
he started to reenter the vehicle, C.M. “jumped out” and went over
by the church. Minor then drove away “real fast” but suddenly
stopped, backed up, and told C.M. that he was not going to leave her
there. He ordered C.M. to get back into the vehicle, but she refused.

Minor pointed an “object out of the car that look[ed] like a gun,”
and C.M. started running behind the church. As she ran, C.M. heard
a sound “[l]ike a firecracker or a pop.”

When W.S. got in Minor’s car, he offered her $100 “[t]o have
some sex.” W.S. agreed and testified that, as they were driving
along, Minor was “a very nice, very nice guy.” However, W.S.
stated that ‘“‘all of a sudden on the interstate, he started getting —
attitude start{ed] changing, . . . he really was getting very forceful
....” According to W.S., Minor forced her to perform oral sodomy
on him while he was driving on the interstate.

Minor stopped his vehicle in the middle of a road near the
church. W.S. testified that they had vaginal sexual intercourse in the
front seat of the vehicle and that she did so because she was scared.
Minor also attempted to have anal sodomy with W.S. Eventually,
Minor drove to another location where he pulled out a gun and
pointed it at W.S.’s head, telling her not to scream. W.S. then opened
the passenger door, and as she was trying to exit the vehicle, Minor
grabbed her purse, which contained her identification and a credit
card. He then drove away. In the early morning hours of April 13,
2000, Minor attempted to use that credit card three times at two dif-
ferent automatic teller machines.

After Minor made G.C. get into his car, he drove along Interstate
95 and stopped in a wooded area. According to G.C., Minor dragged
her out of his vehicle with a knife held to her throat and then took
her back to the vehicle where he started removing her clothes. G.C.
testified that Minor forced her to engage in acts of vaginal inter-
course, oral sodomy, and anal sodomy, while “‘poking” her with the
knife or “‘bang[ing]” her head on the vehicle. Minor drove off, leav-
ing G.C. in the woods and taking most of her clothes, her cellular
telephone, a pager, and approximately $40 in cash.

Evidence established that, during a traffic stop in May 2000, a
police officer seized a handgun from Minor. That seizure took place
after the first two incidents at issue had transpired but before the
third one occurred.

ANALYSIS

HHMI It is well established in our jurisprudence that evidence of
other offenses is generally not admissible to prove guilt of the crime
for which a defendant is presently on trial. See Stockton v. Common-
wealth, 227 Va. 124, 142, 314 S.E.2d 371, 383 (1984); Moore v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 72, 76, 278 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1981); Eccles

y. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 20, 22, 197 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1973). This
is so because “[s]uch evidence implicating an accused in other
crimes unrelated to the charged offense . . . may confuse the issues
being tried and cause undue prejudice to the defendant.” Guill v.
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998).
There are, however, some recognized exceptions to this general
principle:

“Evidence of other offenses is admitted if it shows the
conduct and feeling of the accused toward [the] victim . . . or
if it tends to prove any relevant element of the offense
charged. Such evidence is permissible in cases where the
motive, intent or knowledge of the accused is involved, or
where the evidence is connected with or leads up to the
offense for which the accused is on trial. Also, testimony of
other crimes is admissible where the other crimes constitute a
part of the general scheme of which the crime charged is a
part.”

Satcher y. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 230, 421 S.E.2d 821, 828
(1992) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176
S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970)); accord Scates v. Commonwealth, 262 Va.
757, 761, 553 S.E.2d 756, 759 (2001); Turner v. Commonwealth, 259
Va. 645, 651, 529 S.E.2d 787, 790-91 (2000). For such evidence to
be admissible under one of these exceptions, the legitimate probative
value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. Guill, 255
Va. at 139, 495 S.E.2d at 491-92; Satcher, 244 Va. at 231, 421
S.E.2d at 828.

Hl The question whether an accused, pursuant to Rule 3A:10(c),
can be tried in a single trial for all offenses then pending against that
defendant is a matter resting within a trial court’s sound discretion.
Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 33, 393 S.E.2d 599, 603
(1990) (citing Fincher v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 552, 553, 186
S.E.2d 75, 76 (1972); Bryant v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310, 315, 53
S.E.2d 54, 56 (1949)). Thus, on appeal, a trial court’s decision to join
different offenses for trial will not be reversed absent a showing that
the court abused its discretion. Cheng, 240 Va. at 33-34, 393 S.E.2d
at 603.

HB The issue in this appeal is whether “justice” required sepa-
rate trials under Rule 3A:10(c). To resolve that issue, we must deter-
mine whether evidence showing the defendant’s rape of one victim

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a

was relevant to prove that a different victim did not consent to sexual
intercourse. The only contested issue identified at the hearing on the
defendant’s motion to sever the charges was whether the victims con-
sented. Similarly, the Court of Appeals stated that “the only issue
genuinely in dispute [was] whether the acts were consensual or forc-
ible.”! Minor, No. 3105-01-2, slip op. at 11.

Before answering that evidentiary question, we must clarify one
matter with regard to a defendant’s intent to commit the crime of
rape vis-a-vis a victim’s lack of consent to sexual intercourse. The
Commonwealth never articulated at trial exactly to what relevant
issues the evidence of other crimes pertained. However, the Com-
monwealth maintains on appeal that such evidence was admissible to
show the defendant’s intent and thus the victims’ lack of consent to
sexual intercourse. In its argument, the Commonwealth seems to
equate those two issues. For example, the Commonwealth states on
brief, “Simply put, the other crimes evidence here showed the defen-
dant’s intent, in each instance, to force the victim to submit to sexual
contacts of various sorts, regardless of the victim’s wishes.” In dis-
cussing the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, the Com-
monwealth asserts that “the Court of Appeals has established a rule
of law that prohibits the introduction of other crimes evidence in rape
cases when the principal issue to be resolved is whether the sexual
act was consensual.” But, in the same paragraph, the Commonwealth
states that the decision in Moore “clearly holds that other crimes
evidence is admissible on the issue of intent.”

HH However, a defendant’s intent to commit the crime of rape
is not the same issue as whether a victim consented to sexual inter-
course. Those two issues are distinct and should not be blurred.

Although proof of rape requires proof of intent, the
required intent is established upon proof that the accused
knowingly and intentionally committed the acts constituting the
elements of rape. The elements of rape . . . consist of engaging
in sexual intercourse with the victim, against her will, by
force, threat, or intimidation. (Emphasis added.)

Clifton v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 178, 184, 468 S.E.2d 155,
158 (1996); see also, People v. Mangiaracina, 424 N.E.2d 860, 863
(il. App. Ct. 1981) (“{W]hether the defendant intended to commit

' On appeal to this Court, neither party challenged the scope of the contested issue
addressed by the Court of Appeals.

174 [|
a

the offenses without the victim’s consent is not relevant, the critical
question being whether the victim did, in fact, consent. This involves
her mental state, not the defendant’s.””); Commonwealth v. Grant,
464 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Mass. 1984) (the crime of rape does not require
proof that the defendant harbored a “specific intent that the inter-
course be without consent”); State v. Ayer, 612 A.2d 923, 925 (N.H.
1992) (Rape is generally considered to be “a general intent, rather
than a specific intent, crime. . . . [T]he general intent requirement for
rape means that ‘no intent is requisite other than that evidenced by
the doing of the acts constituting the offense.’ ”’) (citations omitted).
The issue of a victim’s consent pertains to the element of rape requir-
ing proof that sexual intercourse was against the victim’s will, not to
whether a defendant “knowingly and intentionally committed” the
acts constituting rape. Clifton, 22 Va. App. at 184, 468 S.E.2d at 158.

Hi We now turn to the dispositive evidentiary question. In doing
so, we recognize that evidence showing that a defendant committed
similar sexual offenses against an individual other than the victim in
a particular case is, on occasion, admissible to prove certain con-
tested matters, such as a defendant’s identity or the attitude of a
defendant toward a victim, provided the probative value of the evi-
dence outweighs its prejudicial effect. See Satcher, 244 Va. at 231,
421 S.E.2d at 828. Indeed, if the evidence of other similar offenses
had been offered as proof on a contested issue about the defendant’s
identity in these offenses, that evidence would likely have been
admissible.

In fact, this Court reached that exact result in Satcher, a case in
which the defendant denied committing the crimes and identity was
an issue. Satcher was convicted in one trial of the robbery, assault
and battery, and attempted rape of Deborah Abel; and the robbery,
rape, and capital murder of Ann Elizabeth Borghesani. Jd. at 225,
421 S.E.2d at 824. We upheld the trial court’s denial of Satcher’s
motion for separate trials. Id. at 229, 421 S.E.2d at 827. We stated
that the evidence of the Abel offenses would have been admissible in
a separate trial for the Borghesani offenses because that evidence
established Satcher as the assailant in both crimes. Id. at 229-30, 421
S.E.2d at 827; see also Turner, 259 Va. at 651, 529 S.E.2d at 790-91
(evidence of similar offenses involving different victims was admiss-
ible to prove a common perpetrator); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240
Va. 78, 89, 393 S.E.2d 609, 616 (1990) (same); Hewston v. Common-
wealth, 18 Va. App. 409, 412, 444 S.E.2d 267, 268-69 (1994)
(same); cf. Herron v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 326, 327-28, 157

S.E.2d 195, 196-97 (1967) (evidence of other incidents of sexual
intercourse with the same victim was admissible to show the defen-
dant’s disposition with respect to the particular act charged).

Also, in Moore, a case discussed at length by the Commonwealth
on brief, we approved the admission of evidence concerning a sexual
offense against a third party but not for the purpose of proving the
victim’s lack of consent. There, the defendant was charged both with
enticing a male child under the age of 14 to enter a house for the
purpose of fondling or feeling the sexual or genital parts of the child
and with the actual fondling of that child. 222 Va. at 73, 278 S.E.2d
at 823. The challenged testimony concerned the defendant’s subse-
quent attempted homosexual act upon the third party, also a teen-
ager. That subsequent offense occurred at the defendant’s office when
the victim and the third party were both present. During that encoun-
ter, the defendant described homosexual acts he had performed with
other boys, offered the victim and the third party money to engage in
similar acts with him, pulled down the third party’s pants, told the
victim to hold the third party, and attempted to perform a sexual act
upon the third party. Jd. at 75, 278 S.E.2d at 824. Although the evi-
dence involved an offense against a third party, we noted that it also
concerned the victim and “showed the conduct or attitude of the
defendant toward [the victim], indicated the ongoing nature of their
relationship, and negated the possibility that the defendant’s touching
of [the victim] in the [prior] incident was accidental or for a purpose
misunderstood by [the -victim].” Id. at 77, 278 S.E.2d at 825.

Hl In our view, evidence showing that a defendant raped one or
more individuals other than the victim in the crime charged is gener-
ally not relevant to the question whether that victim did or did not
consent to sexual intercourse with the defendant. This is so because
“Tt}he fact that one woman was raped . . . has no tendency to prove
that another woman did not consent.” Lovely v. United States, 169
F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1948); accord Foster v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.
App. 316, 320, 362 S.E.2d 745, 747 (Va. Ct. App. 1987); see also
Brown v. State, 459 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind. 1984) (where the only
issue was consent of the prosecutrix, evidence of prior rapes was not
admissible because the fact that one woman was raped did not tend
to prove that another woman did not consent); State v. Christensen,
414 N.W.2d 843, 847 (lowa Ct. App. 1987) (“[nJeither . . . does one
woman’s lack of consent to intercourse with a man imply a different
woman’s lack of consent to intercourse with the same man’’); State v.
Hatcher, 372 So.2d 1024, 1034 n.1 (La. 1979) (in a prosecution for

rape where the only issue is consent, “‘[t]he lack of consent by other
victims is not probative of lack of consent by the complainant of the
charged offense’’); State v. Alsteen, 324 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Wis.
1982) (evidence of defendant’s prior acts had no probative value on
the issue of the complainant’s consent because “[c]onsent is unique
to the individual”); cf Winfield v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 211, 218,
301 S.E.2d 15, 19 (1983) (‘there is no logical connection between a
woman’s willingness to submit to the defendant accused of raping
her, and her willingness to share intimacies with another man with
whom she might have had a special relationship”).

HM As the court in Lovely explained, “evidence of other similar
offenses is held admissible for the purpose of establishing intent in
cases of assault with the intent to commit rape .. . , and evidence of
other offenses of like character is admissible in prosecutions for
crime involving a depraved sexual instinct.” 169 F.2d at 390. How-
ever, the court observed that “the overwhelming weight of authority
is that such evidence is not admissible in prosecution for rape” for
obvious reasons.” Jd. “Other attempts to ravish have a tendency to
show that an assault under investigation was made with like intent.
Acts showing a perverted sexual instinct are circumstances which
with other circumstances may have a tendency to connect an accused
with a crime of that character.” Id. But, as already noted, the issue of
consent concerns a victim’s state of mind and is unique with regard
to each individual victim.>

Hl Based on the specific circumstances presented in this case,
we hold, as did the Court of Appeals, that “the testimony of each
victim . . . was inadmissible at the trial for the offenses allegedly

? We recognize that the decision in Lovely predates the adoption of Fed. R. Evid. 413, How-
ever, that rule states that evidence of a defendant’s commission of similar sexual offenses is
admissible and “may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”
(Emphasis added.)

3 The Commonwealth argued on brief that the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the decision in
Lovely was misplaced because of the later decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1981), We do not agree. In Beahm, the court
approved the admission of testimony from two male witnesses, neither of whom was a victim
in the case being tried. That testimony showed that the defendant had made sexual advances to
them within three years prior to the offenses at issue. The evidence was admissible because the
“defendant was insisting that under the Virginia statute the burden was on the government to
show that defendant’s acts were performed with lascivious intent and did not occur by acci-
dent.” Id. at 417. The evidence was not admitted to prove whether the victim consented.

eee} 177
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committed against each of the other victims.”* Minor, No. 3105-01-
2, slip op. at 11. For that reason, we conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to sever the
charges and will therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

Affirmed.

4 As the Court of Appeals noted, it is not necessary to decide whether the charged offenses
satisfied the requirements of Rule 3A:6(b) because “justice” required separate trials. Rule
3A:10(c).

178 es
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JERRY TERRELL JACKSON
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record Nos. 031517 and 031518
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J.

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184

Andrew A. Protogyrou (Patrick D. Kelley; Protogyrou & Rigney,
on brief), for appellant.

Paul C. Galanides, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

A jury convicted Jerry Terrell Jackson of two counts of capital
murder for the premeditated killing of Ruth W. Phillips in the com-
mission of rape or attempted rape, and in the commission of robbery
or attempted robbery in violation of Code §§ 18.2-31(5) and -31(4),
respectively. The jury also convicted Jackson of statutory burglary, in
violation of Code § 18.2-90; robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-58;
rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-61; and petit larceny, in violation of
Code § 18.9-96. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of a bifur-
cated trial, the jury fixed Jackson’s punishment at death on each of
the capital murder convictions, finding “that there is probability that
he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society.” The jury also fixed punishment
of two life sentences for the rape and the robbery convictions, a 20-
year sentence for the burglary conviction, and a 12-month sentence
for the petit larceny conviction. The circuit court sentenced Jackson
in accordance with the jury’s verdict.!

Jackson appealed his non-capital convictions to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Code § 17.1-406(A). We certified that appeal
(Record No. 031518) to this Court under the provisions of Code
§ 17.1-409 for consolidation with the defendant’s appeal of his capi-
tal murder convictions (Record No. 031517) and the sentence review

' The circuit court also imposed fines in the total amount of $102,500 as fixed by the jury.

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mandated by Code § 17.1-313. After considering Jackson’s assign-
ments of error and conducting our sentence review, we find no error
in the circuit court’s judgments and will affirm Jackson’s convictions
and the imposition of the death penalty.

I FACTS
A. GUILT PHASE

Around 7 p.m., on Sunday, August 26, 2001, Richard Phillips
discovered the body of his 88-year-old mother, Ruth Phillips, lying
“twisted and exposed” on a bed in her bedroom. Phillips explained
that his mother’s “leg was twisted around, and her pubic region was
exposed[; hJer breast was exposed[; and hJer nightgown was up
around her neck.” Mrs. Phillips lived alone in an apartment located
in Williamsburg, and her son had become concerned about her well-
being that day because she had not attended church and was not
answering her telephone. After finding his mother’s body, Phillips
went outside and used a cellular telephone to call the “911” emer-
gency number. While waiting for emergency personnel to arrive, he
noticed that the screen on a bathroom window in the apartment had
been removed.

A subsequent autopsy of Mrs. Phillips’ body revealed a contusion
on her nose and some hemorrhaging of minute blood vessels in her
cheeks and eyes. There were also two lacerations to her vagina, one
on the exterior area and the other one on the interior area. The medi-
cal examiner who performed the autopsy opined that the cause of
death was asphyxia. Death by asphyxia, according to the medical
examiner, occurs when the brain is without a supply of oxygen for
four to six minutes although unconsciousness may come about within
15 to 30 seconds.

An investigator with the James City County Police Department,
Jeff Vellines, went to Mrs. Phillips’ apartment and collected several
items of physical evidence. He found a window screen, mirror case,
and cosmetic items outside the apartment near the master bathroom
window. Inside, Vellines discovered a black pocketbook lying on the
floor next to Mrs. Phillips’ bed, and a brown wallet underneath the
pocketbook. The wallet did not contain any money. However, a white
square piece of paper found in the wallet contained one latent finger-
print of value for identification purposes. That fingerprint was later
compared with the fingerprints of the defendant and found to be
“one and the same.”

6
FT

Another investigator at the crime scene recovered a hair from
Mrs. Phillips chest area and another hair on the bed below the stom-
ach area. During the autopsy of Mrs. Phillips’ body, additional hairs
were collected from her left thigh area. Microscopic examination of
those hairs by a forensic scientist revealed that one of the hairs
recovered from Mrs. Phillips’ thigh area and the other two hairs were
pubic hairs, but they were not consistent with samples of Mrs. Phil-
lips’ pubic hair. These same three hairs along with samples of the
defendant’s blood and hair were later subjected to mitochondrial
DNA analysis. According to the forensic scientist who performed the
testing, Jackson could not be excluded as the source of the hairs
found on Mrs. Phillips’ body and bed. The “mtDNA sequence data”
of each of those hairs matched the “corresponding mtDNA sequence
of the blood” taken from the defendant.

In December 2001, Vellines and Eric Peterson, also an investiga-
tor with the James City County Police Department, interviewed Jack-
son in the James City County Law Enforcement Center. After waiv-
ing his Miranda rights, Jackson admitted entering Mrs. Phillips’
apartment, searching through and taking money out of her purse, and
then exiting through a back window. Jackson stated that he did not
know that Mrs. Phillips was at home, and that, when he turned on
the light and was going through her purse, Mrs. Phillips, who was
lying in bed, confronted him and stated, “What do you want? Pll
give you whatever, just get out.” In the defendant’s words, “[I]t just
scared me and I covered her up[.]” Jackson acknowledged that he
held a pillow over her face for two or three minutes and tried to
make her “pass out” so she could not identify him. Jackson stated
that, when Mrs. Phillips stopped screaming, that was his “cue that
she [had] passed out.” He also admitted that he inserted his penis
into her vagina while he was holding the pillow over her face.

Continuing, Jackson stated that he took Mrs. Phillips’ automobile
when he left her apartment and drove it to another apartment com-
plex, where he abandoned the vehicle with the keys lying on top of
it. He also used $60 that he had taken from her purse to purchase
marijuana. Throughout the interview, Jackson denied that anyone
else was with him during this incident and insisted that he did not
mean to kill Mrs. Phillips. .

At trial, Jackson testified to a different version of the events that
supposedly transpired at Mrs. Phillips’ apartment.? The defendant
claimed that, on the day in question, he had been playing basketball
until around midnight at the apartment complex where Mrs. Phillips
lived. Jackson stated that, as he was leaving, he came in contact with
Alex Meekins and Jasper Meekins. Jackson decided to participate in
their plan to break into Mrs. Phillips’ apartment. According to Jack-
son, Alex entered the apartment through a window and then let Jas-
per and the defendant in through the front door. While Jackson was
looking through Mrs. Phillips’ purse, she woke up and asked what
was going on. Jackson testified that the following events then took
place in Mrs. Phillips’ bedroom:

Jasper Meekins, he put the pillow over her face and
smothered her. While he was smothering her, I think she was
struggling, but I told him at the end when I heard some sound,
she was gurgling, I told him to stop. I pushed him off. As we
were leaving, I pulled her nightgown down. I put the blanket
over her, and I picked the pillow up initially and I didn’t like
what I saw, so I put the pillow back.

Jackson explained that he confessed to Peterson because he
thought that was what Peterson wanted to hear, and because he just
wanted to “get out of there as fast as [he] could.” Jackson also
explained that he never told the investigators about Jasper’s and
Alex’s participation in the crime because he was “scared for [his]
family on the streets” and had concerns about being a “snitch.” At
trial, Jackson denied raping or killing Mrs. Phillips. He also denied
having any knowledge about who raped Mrs. Phillips or about how
his pubic hairs got on her body.?

B. SENTENCING PHASE

During the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial, the Common-

wealth introduced into evidence 18 orders showing Jackson’s convic-

tions or adjudications of delinquency for such offenses as grand lar-
ceny, petit larceny, trespassing, drug possession, receiving stolen

2 Jackson also testified at a hearing on a motion to suppress his confession. His testimony at
that hearing also differed from his statement to the police.

3 A mitochondrial DNA analysis of blood taken from Alex Meekins showed that his mtDNA
sequence did not correspond to the mtDNA sequence of the three hairs recovered from Mrs.
Phillips’ body.

188 es
PC

property, contempt of court, identity fraud, statutory burglary, credit
card theft, and obtaining money under false pretenses. The jury also
heard evidence from two correctional officers about two incidents
involving the defendant while he was incarcerated. In the first inci-
dent, Jackson refused to obey the orders of a correctional officer, and
that refusal led to a scuffle with several officers as they attempted to
remove Jackson’s hand cuffs. The other incident involved an alterca-
tion between the defendant and another inmate.

In mitigation of the offenses, Jackson presented evidence about
his adjustment and behavioral problems when he was a youth. In
1993, he was diagnosed with an “adjustment disorder with depressed
mood and attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder.” Jackson was
evaluated again in 1996 because he was having behavioral problems
at home and was not doing well in school. Jackson expressed resent-
ment toward his stepfather and acted out his negative feelings by
behaving aggressively. However, testing indicated that Jackson had
average intellectual functioning.

During his school years, Jackson took medication for attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder, but his mother reported to Jackson’s
pediatrician that her son continued to have behavioral problems at
school, including fights. The defendant was eventually placed in a
special school for students who cannot be controlled in a regular
classroom setting. There was also evidence that the defendant suf-
fered physical abuse as a child.*

IL ANALYSIS
A. DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENTS

Jackson assigns error to the circuit court’s refusal to dismiss the
capital murder indictments on the basis that Code § 19.2-264.4(B) is
unconstitutional. The defendant raised this claim in a pre-trial motion
and supporting memorandum. The circuit court denied the motion.
Jackson now argues that Code § 19.2-264.4(B) contains ‘“‘a relaxed
evidentiary standard that leads to inherently unreliable determinations
of aggravating factors and unreliable death sentences.” Citing the
decisions in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),
Jackson also seems to suggest that, in Virginia, the aggravating fac-
tors of future dangerousness and vileness are not decided by a jury

4 We will summarize additional facts and proceedings as necessary to address specific
issues.

es 189
PC

based on proof of those factors beyond a reasonable doubt.> We find
no merit in the defendant’s arguments.

Ii First, before the sentence of death may be imposed, the Com-
monwealth must prove at least one of the statutory aggravating fac-
tors beyond a reasonable doubt. Code § 19.2-264.4(C). Pursuant to
Code § 19.2-264.3, a jury makes that determination, unless a jury
trial is waived. Code § 19.2-257. Thus, to the extent Jackson suggests
otherwise, he is incorrect.

HEM Next, Code § 19.2-264.4(B) does not contain a relaxed evi-
dentiary standard or produce unreliable determinations of aggravating
factors. Evidence relevant to sentencing in the penalty phase of a
capital murder trial is admissible, “subject to the rules of evidence
governing admissibility.” Jd. We have held that this statute does not
permit admission of irrelevant evidence. See Powell v. Common-
wealth, 267 Va. 107, 137, 590 S.E.2d 537, 555 (2004) (decided this
day); Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 357, 551 S.E.2d
620, 634-35 (2001). Presentence reports from probation officers are
specifically not admissible. Jd. And, in Virginia, hearsay evidence
also is not admissible during a penalty phase proceeding. Lovitt v.
Warden, 266 Va. 216, 259, 585 S.E.2d 801, 826 (2003).

Il Finally, we note that, although the defendant argues that the
full procedural safeguards employed during the guilt phase of a capi-
tal murder trial must also be provided in the penalty phase, he never
identifies what procedural safeguards were missing in his penalty
phase proceeding. He also fails to enunciate what unreliable informa-
tion was admitted into evidence during the penalty phase of his trial
as a result of the supposed relaxed evidentiary standard. In other
words, Jackson’s complaints about the provisions of Code § 19.2-
264.4(B) are merely hypothetical in nature. Thus, we conclude that
the circuit court did not err in refusing to dismiss the indictments.

B. SUPPRESSION OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT

Jackson filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the statement that he
made to the police investigators. After hearing evidence and argu-
ment of counsel, the circuit court denied the motion, finding that
Jackson’s statement was voluntary and not the product of any psy-
chological or physical coercion.

’ Any argument about the vileness aggravating factor is irrelevant because Jackson’s sen-
tence of death was predicated on the jury’s finding of future dangerousness.

190 ee
pt

HMMM The defendant assigns error to the court’s decision and
argues that, “[bJased on the totality of the circumstances, [his] will
was overcome, his capacity for self-determination was critically
impaired and his confession was not the product of a free and uncon-
strained choice.” Jackson claims that the investigators who ques-
tioned him engaged in trickery and deceit because of statements such
as, “I will work with you . . . I will be with you, thick and thin, boy
. . . I will be in your corner” and “I’m here for you.” As further
evidence that his will was overborne, Jackson points to his repeated
denials of culpability during the first part of the interrogation, his
initial confession to a different crime, and his lack of knowledge that
the crime for which he was being interrogated carried a possible sen-
tence of death. In accordance with his testimony at the suppression
hearing, Jackson claims that he simply told the investigator what the
investigator wanted to hear so that he, the defendant, would be free
to go.

We find no merit in Jackson’s arguments. The circuit court found,
and we agree, that there was no evidence of any promises of leni-
ency, any force, any threats, any intimidation, any coercion, or any
deprivation of the defendant’s physical or mental needs. Such “sub-
sidiary factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of cor-
rectness.”” Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 231, 441 S.E.2d
195, 202 (1994). The court also noted that the defendant had a
reported IQ score of 100 and an educational level sufficient to read
and write. Furthermore, Jackson signed a waiver of his Miranda
tights at the beginning of the interview. And, he obviously under-
stood the implications of making statements to the police because he
had been charged with crimes on two previous occasions after con-
fessing to those crimes.

HM A defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights is valid if made
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Id.; Jenkins v. Common-
wealth, 244 Va. 445, 453, 423 S.E.2d 360, 366 (1992). “The test for
voluntariness is whether the statement is the ‘product of an essen-
tially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,’ or whether the
maker’s will ‘has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired.’ Id. at 453-54, 423 S.E.2d at 366
(quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). When
determining whether a defendant’s statement was voluntarily given,
we examine the totality of the circumstances, which include the
defendant’s background and experience as well as the conduct of the
police in obtaining the waiver of Miranda rights and confession.

es 191
FC

Swann, 247 Va. at 231, 441 S.E.2d at 202; Correll v. Commonwealth,
232 Va. 454, 464, 352 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987).

HH Using these principles, we conclude that the defendant’s
statement was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Thus,
the circuit court did not err in admitting Jackson’s incriminating
statement.

C. JURY SELECTION

HE The defendant assigns error to the circuit court’s failure
to strike three prospective jurors for cause. An accused has a consti-
tutional right to be tried by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const.
amends. VI and XIV; Va. Const. art. I, § 8. By statute, a trial court is
required to excuse any prospective juror who cannot “stand indiffer-
ent in the cause.” Code § 8.01-358. However,

[bJecause the trial judge has the opportunity, which we lack, to
observe and evaluate the apparent sincerity, conscientiousness,
intelligence, and demeanor of prospective jurors first hand, the
trial court’s exercise of judicial discretion in deciding chal-
Jenges for cause will be not disturbed on appeal, unless mani-
fest error appears in the record.

Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 123-24, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358
(1987) (citing Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 258-59, 307
S.E.2d 896, 898 (1983)); accord Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172,
191, 563 S.E.2d 695, 709 (2002); Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va.
105, 115-16, 546 S.E.2d 446, 451 (2001); Stewart v. Commonwealth,
245 Va. 222, 234, 427 S.E.2d 394, 402 (1993). Thus, on appellate
review, we defer to the trial court’s decision whether to retain or
exclude prospective jurors. Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459,
467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999). Guided by these principles, we will
now review the voir dire of the three jurors that the defendant claims
should have been struck for cause. In doing so, we consider the pro-
spective juror’s entire voir dire, not just isolated portions. Id.; Mack-
all y. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 252, 372 S.E.2d 759, 767 (1988).

(1) Juror Reinsberg

HM The defendant moved the circuit court to excuse this pro-
spective juror because, among other reasons, she indicated at one
point during her voir dire that she would probably require the
defense to put on evidence during the trial. However, her overall

2
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responses to voir dire questions relevant to this particular issue reveal
that she could “‘stand indifferent to the cause” and would not require
the defendant to present evidence to establish his innocence:

(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you have any feelings about the
case from what you have read in the Gazette or from what you
may have read in the Daily Press earlier?

MS. REINSBERG: The seriousness of it.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Other than the seriousness?

MS. REINSBERG: The charges.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Would you require the defense to put
on evidence to change your mind or influence your decision
considering what you have read?

MS. REINSBERG: Probably.

THE COURT: Let me ask, what do you mean by that?

MS. REINSBERG: From what we have read, I don’t know, I
was thinking the newspaper —

THE COURT: Is accurate?

MS. REINSBERG: Is accurate, so I would — I would want to
know, it was accurate or inaccurate. Sometimes certain parts
can be made up. That shouldn’t be.

DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I go on?

Considering that response, have you formed an opinion of
some sort as to the guilt or innocence of the Defendant if you
are going to require us to put on evidence?

MS. REINSBERG: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s based on what you have seen
or read?

MS. REINSBERG: (Nods head.) Just the one article.
DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Have you formed an opinion on
what you have heard, the facts of what you have read, have
you formed an opinion as to what punishment Mr. Jackson
should receive as a result of what you —

MS. REINSBERG: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You said that you would probably
require us to put on some evidence. Tell us what you would be
looking for from the defense.

es 193
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MS. REINSBERG: Well, were there other people involved, for
one.

RR
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: Judge, just a couple
[of] follow-up questions if I may.

Ms. Reinsberg, one of the questions [defense counsel]
asked you involved a response in which you said you would
want to hear if other people were involved. Understanding that
you read the newspaper, correct?

MS. REINSBERG: Right.

[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: That was Saturday’s
Gazette?

MS. REINSBERG: Right.

[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY}: Are you willing to put
aside any opinions or thoughts you have regarding that news-
paper article and judge this case based on the facts presented
during the course of the trial?

MS. REINSBERG: Definitely.

[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: And are you going to
hold the Commonwealth; that is, myself and Mr. McGinty, in
our case to the proper burden of we have to prove the case
beyond a reasonable doubt?

MS. REINSBERG: Uh-huh.

{[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: And you understand
that at sentencing, if the jury has convicted the Defendant of
capital murder, that the burden is on us to prove certain things
beyond a reasonable doubt —

MS. REINSBERG: Right.

[(COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: — before you can
impose the death penalty?

MS. REINSBERG: Right, I understand.
[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: Are you open-minded
to both the death penalty and life in prison?

MS. REINSBERG: Definitely.

[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: Do you agree with the
concept that the Defendant does not have to present any evi-
dence at trial?

194 es
pt

MS. REINSBERG: Right.

[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY): In fact, the Defendant
doesn’t have to present any evidence at sentencing?

MS. REINSBERG: Right.

[COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY]: Are you willing to fol-
low that principle of law?

MS. REINSBERG: Yes.

The voir dire of prospective juror Reinsburg demonstrates that
the circuit court correctly concluded that this juror understood both
the Commonwealth’s burden of proof and the fact that the defendant
did not have to present any evidence. As we have previously stated,
“{t]he real test is whether jurors can disabuse their minds of their
natural curiosity and decide the case on the evidence submitted and
the law as propounded in the court’s instructions.” Townes v. Com-
monwealth, 234 Va. 307, 329, 362 S.E.2d 650, 662 (1987); accord
Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 247, 397 S.E.2d 385, 392
(1990). Prospective juror Reinsberg satisfied this test. Thus, we find
no manifest error in the circuit court’s decision refusing to strike this
juror for cause.

(2) Juror Baffer

Relying on the following series of questions, Jackson claims that
the circuit court erred in refusing to strike prospective juror Baffer
for cause:

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Do you hold the belief that death is
the appropriate punishment for a person who commits a mur-
der, rape and/or robbery unless he can convince you
otherwise?
MR. BAFFER: Yes.
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Why is that?
MR. BAFFER: Because I believe in the State of Virginia, the
Penal Code in the — it’s prescribed.

OR
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: You were asked an “automatic”

question by the Commonwealth. Would you automatically vote
to impose the death penalty on a person you determine beyond

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a reasonable doubt constituted a continuing serious threat to
society?
MR. BAFFER: Yes.

This isolated portion of juror Baffer’s voir dire is misleading

because this prospective juror, when asked by the Commonwealth
whether he would automatically impose the death penalty if the
defendant were found guilty of capital murder, answered “No.” The
circuit court then engaged in the following exchange with prospec-
tive juror Baffer:

THE COURT: Mr. Baffer, let me ask you one question.
[Defense counsel] asked you a question. He said that if you
found beyond a reasonable doubt that a consideration of the
Defendant’s history and background there is a probability that
he would commit criminal acts of violence that would consti-
tute a continuing serious threat to society, he asked you if you
found that, would you always vote to impose the death pen-
alty, and you said yes. Is that your understanding of what the
law in Virginia is?

MR. BAFFER: I’m not sure what the law of Virginia is on
that. You said automatically impose the death penalty?

THE COURT: If you found — you convicted the Defendant of
capital murder and then you made a second finding, go to the
second phase where evidence is presented regarding the possi-
ble sentence. You have two possible sentences, life in prison or
death, and the Court would instruct you that before you could

impose the death penalty, you must find beyond a reasonable

doubt that after consideration of the Defendant’s history and
background, there is a probability that he would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society, you made that finding, is it your understand-
ing that you must then impose the death penalty?

MR. BAFFER: I don’t know that I must impose. I mean, get

him out of society. Life without parole removes him from
society.

THE COURT: That’s correct.

MR. BAFFER: If he would pose a danger, that would be ade-

quate that he doesn’t come back into society.
THE COURT: What would be adequate, life without parole?

196 es
PC

MR. BAFFER: That would be adequate too, life without
parole.

THE COURT: The question [defense counsel] asked you is if
you found that this future danger existed, would you automati-
cally vote to impose the death penalty?

MR. BAFFER: No, I would say no to that, if the alternative is
he got life without parole, that would be adequate.

THE COURT: Well, that is your alternative. You only have
two choices. If the Defendant is found guilty of capital murder,
you have two choices: One is the death sentence; the other is
life in prison without parole. They are your only two options,
and if you were to find the Defendant guilty of capital murder,
and if you found the condition of future dangerousness existed,
could you consider both?

MR. BAFFER: I could consider both.

THE COURT: Would you automatically impose the death pen-
alty if you found future dangerousness existed?

MR. BAFFER: No, if he was removed from society.

HE As stated previously, we must consider this juror’s entire
voir dire. See Vinson, 258 Va. at 467, 522 S.E.2d at 176. Upon doing
so, it is clear that, while prospective juror Baffer stated at one point,
in response to confusing questions by defense counsel, that he would
automatically impose the death penalty, he subsequently clarified his
position and stated that he would follow the court’s instructions and
consider both sentencing alternatives. We have held that it is
improper to ask prospective jurors speculative questions regarding
whether they would automatically impose the death penalty in certain
hypothetical situations without reference to a juror’s ability to con-
sider the evidence and follow the court’s instructions. Schmitt v.
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 141, 547 S.E.2d 186, 196 (2001).
Thus, we conclude that the circuit court ruled properly in seating this
juror.

(3) Juror Berube

Hl Jackson moved to strike prospective juror Berube on the
basis that she answered “No” to one question asking whether she
would be able to consider all mitigating factors in making her deci-
sion whether to impose a life sentence without parole or the death
penalty. However, the answer to this one isolated question does not

ee 197
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accurately portray this juror’s positive assertions during voir dire that
she would follow the court’s instructions and consider all mitigating
evidence when making her sentencing decision. Furthermore, when
overruling the defendant’s motion to strike this juror, the circuit court
noted that juror Berube had given careful thought to her answers and
that she did not initially understand what mitigating factors are.
Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in finding that
this juror would be fair and impartial.

D. JUROR MISCONDUCT

HH During a recess on the third day of trial, the jurors asked
whether they could discuss among themselves the evidence and testi-
mony that had already been presented. The parties and the circuit
court agreed that the jurors should not do so until after the close of
all the evidence and the jury’s deliberations began. When the jury
returned to the courtroom after the recess, the court instructed the
jurors that they should deliberate and discuss the evidence only after
all the evidence had been introduced. The court further admonished
the jurors to keep an open mind and to refrain from deciding any
issue until the case was submitted to them for their deliberations.

The defendant did not object to those instructions or ask for a
mistrial at that time. Thus, to the extent that Jackson now argues that
the court should have granted a mistrial as soon as it learned of the
jury’s question, which suggested, in Jackson’s view, that the jury had
already been discussing the case, such a claim was not preserved for
appeal. See Rule 5:25.

Jackson filed a post-trial motion for a new trial and/or an eviden-
tiary hearing based on allegations that the jury had discussed his guilt
or innocence prior to the close of all the evidence. In support of the
motion, the defendant submitted an affidavit from alternate juror
Picataggi. In the affidavit, Picataggi stated that she had “witnessed
and heard discussion of this case, and its outcome, among the jurors
before the close of evidence and in direct violation of the instructions
of the court.”

At a hearing on Jackson’s motion, defense counsel advised the
court that he had contacted all the jurors after the conclusion of the
trial because of his concerns about the jury’s question on the third
day of trial. Counsel also told the court that this alternate juror
agreed to speak with him but that many of the jurors would not do so
or stated that such alleged discussions among the jurors did not occur
before the close of the evidence. Defense counsel asked the court to

summons all the jurors to an evidentiary hearing and to question
them individually about what, if any, discussions occurred before the
jury retired to deliberate. The court decided to summons only alter-
nate juror Picataggi to a hearing for the purpose of questioning her
about the allegations stated in her affidavit.

At that hearing, Picataggi explained, in response to questions
from the court, that she had heard three discussions, two in the jury
room and one at a local restaurant where the jury had gone for lunch.
She acknowledged that no third person, such as the restaurant owner
or a waitress, participated in any of those discussions, either by com-
ments to the jury or by comments from any of the jurors. Picataggi
could not recall whether any discussions ensued after the jurors
asked the court during a recess whether they could discuss the evi-
dence they had already heard.

Picataggi also could not remember exact words used, but she
described

a discussion in regard to the testimony of the detective and
[the defense counsel’s] questioning him in regard to the video-
tape and that was discussed among the jurors in that — well,
they didn’t particularly like the way that he was questioning
the detective, but that ultimately he got to the truth or to the
bottom of it.

However, she admitted that at no time did any juror come to a con-
clusion about Jackson’s guilt or imnocence. During cross-examination
by the defendant, Picataggi indicated that the discussions concerned
things that had happened in the courtroom and matters that had been
presented there, and were not necessarily limited to comments about
the lawyers’ styles of questioning.

After hearing Picataggi’s testimony, the circuit court denied the
defendant’s motion for further investigation and for a new trial. The
court concluded that the jurors’ comments addressed the cross-
examination of investigator Peterson and defense counsel’s tech-
niques of attacking that witness’s credibility. The court found “no
probable misconduct and clearly no prejudice” to the defendant.

On appeal, Jackson argues that the evidence of jurors’ discus-
sions “establishes a probability of prejudice and brings into question
the fairness of the trial.” The defendant also asserts that the comment
that “the got to the truth or to the bottom of it” went to the issue of
guilt or innocence. At a minimum, the circuit court, according to

es 199
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Jackson, should have conducted an evidentiary hearing at which all
the jurors should have been questioned. We do not agree with the
defendant’s position.

HEE [0 Virginia, we strictly. adhere “ ‘to the general rule that
the testimony of jurors should not be received to impeach their ver-
dict, especially on the ground of their own misconduct.’ ” Jenkins,
244 Va. at 460, 423 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Hulvey, 233 Va. 77, 82, 353 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1987)). We have also
generally “ ‘limited findings of prejudicial juror misconduct to activ-
ities of jurors that occur outside the jury room.’ ” Jd. (quoting Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 233 Va. at 83, 353 S.E.2d at 751.) For example, in
Haddad v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 325, 330-331, 329 S.E.2d 17, 20
(1985), evidence showing juror misconduct in the form of expressing
an opinion to third persons during trial proceedings was sufficient to
establish a probability of prejudice to the accused.

Applying this same probability of prejudice standard, we find that
Jackson failed to carry his burden to establish such prejudice. See id.
Upon reviewing Picataggi’s affidavit, the circuit court properly con-
vened an evidentiary hearing to investigate further her allegations of
juror misconduct. See Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736, 743, 91 S.E.2d
648, 653 (1956) (when allegations of jury misconduct are sufficient
to indicate the verdict was affected thereby, a trial court has a duty to
investigate and determine whether, as a matter of fact, the jury did
engage in misconduct). The evidence presented at that hearing amply
supported the court’s conclusions that there was probably no miscon-
duct and clearly no prejudice to the defendant.

At best, Picataggi could only recall juror discussions regarding
defense counsel’s techniques of cross-examination and the comment
“he... got to the bottom of it.” She could not remember any other
specific comments by the jurors, or whether any juror discussions
about the evidence transpired after the court instructed them not to
do so in response to the jury’s question. And, Picataggi admitted that
no juror expressed an opinion about Jackson’s guilt or innocence.
That fact distinguishes this case from Haddad.

Thus, we conclude that neither a new trial nor any further investi-
gation by the circuit court was warranted. We said many years ago
that “[i]f gossip of [jurors] among themselves, or surmise, is to be
the basis of new trials there would be no end to litigation.” Margi-
otta y. Aycock, 162 Va. 557, 568, 174 S.E. 831, 835 (1934). That
statement remains true today.

200 es
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E. VIDEO-TAPED CONFESSION AND TRANSCRIPT

Jackson asserts that the circuit court erred in allowing the jury to
use a transcript of his video-taped confession while the video was
played during the trial, in overruling his motion for a mistrial
because of problems that occurred while watching the video tape and
using the transcript, and in allowing the jury to review the video-
taped confession during their deliberations. We find no merit to any
of these claims.

The circuit court directed that a transcript of the video tape be
prepared because portions of the video tape were inaudible and the
court concluded that it would be helpful for the jurors to have the
transcript while they were viewing the video tape. At trial, Jackson
claimed the transcript was not accurate and thus objected to the
jury’s use of it. The circuit court disagreed and found that the tran-
script was as accurate as it could be and that it was incomplete
because some portions of the video tape were inaudible.

Before the jurors watched the video tape, the court instructed
them that the transcript was “merely a guide . . . [and was] not evi-
dence.” The court further instructed that the evidence was the tape
itself and the audio portion of it, and that the transcript would be
retrieved after the video tape was played and could not be taken into
the jury room during deliberations. Finally, the court told the jury
that, although there would be places in the transcript stating that the
video tape was inaudible, it was, nevertheless, the jury’s “responsi-
bility to listen to the tape and determine what, in fact, [was] being
said.” The court reminded the jurors of these instructions when they
finished viewing the video tape.

“A court may, in its discretion, permit the jury to refer to
a transcript, the accuracy of which is established, as an aid to under-
standing a recording.” Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 413,
374 S.E.2d 46, 52 (1988); accord Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va.
307, 330, 541 S.E.2d 872, 888 (2001). Although Jackson argues on
appeal that the transcript was inaccurate, he points only to the fact
that some words were missing because the video tape was inaudible
at certain points, that the transcript was incorrectly paginated, and
that one page was missing. However, those problems did not render
the transcript inaccurate. In light of the lengthy instructions that the
circuit court gave the jurors regarding the purpose of the transcript
and their use of it, we are persuaded that the court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the jury to use the transcript of the defendant’s

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video-taped confession. See id. (trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by allowing jury to use transcript that was not complete).

HM During the playing of the video tape, it was discovered that
the pages in one juror’s transcript were partially out of order. After
that problem was corrected, the court directed the Commonwealth to
tewind the video tape approximately two minutes. Subsequently, it
was discovered that the jurors’ transcripts were missing one page.
Playing of the video tape was momentarily stopped while that prob-
lem was corrected. Because of these problems and Jackson’s asser-
tion that the jurors rarely looked up from the transcript and thus did
not watch the video tape, he moved for a mistrial at the conclusion
of the playing of his video-taped confession. The circuit court over-
tuled the motion, finding that the jurors had paid close attention to
both the video tape and the transcript. The court also noted that the
amount of the video tape that was replayed was minimal and that all
the problems with the transcripts were quickly corrected. The court
did not err in overruling the motion for a mistrial.

HM Finally, Jackson claims that undue emphasis was placed
on his confession and investigator Peterson’s testimony regarding his
interrogation of the defendant because the jury was allowed to take
the video tape into the jury room during deliberations. However,
Code § 8.01-381 provides that “[e]xhibits may, by leave of court,
be” carried into the jury room. “Exhibits requested by the jury shall
be sent to the jury room or may otherwise be made available to the
jury.” Id. Thus, any exhibit introduced into evidence, including a
defendant’s written or recorded statement, is available to jurors dur-
ing their deliberations. See Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App.
82, 90, 428 S.E.2d 16, 23 (1993). That jurors may put emphasis on
certain evidence, perhaps a particular exhibit or testimony of a cer-
tain witness, is simply part of what they do when weighing and con-
sidering the evidence. Jd. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion
in allowing the jury to take the video tape into the jury room during
deliberations.

E PHOTOGRAPHS

HMM Jackson first challenges the circuit court’s ruling allowing
the Commonwealth to use an “‘in-life’” photograph of the victim.
Mrs. Phillips’ son identified the photograph during his direct exami-

2
Po

nation,® and the Commonwealth displayed the photograph during its
closing argument in the guilt phase of the trial for approximately
seven seconds. The court did not allow the jury to take the photo-
graph into the jury room. The defendant claims that the photograph
had no probative value and was used to arouse the sympathies of the
jury.

We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the use of the “in-life’” photograph of Mrs. Phillips. See
Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 471, 374 S.E.2d 303, 317
(1988) (no abuse of trial court’s discretion to admit photograph
showing victim one month before she died). The photograph was dis-
played only twice for brief periods of time. Additionally, the photo-
graph was not given to the jury or taken into the jury room during
deliberations.

The defendant also claims that the circuit court erred in
admitting into evidence photographs of Mrs. Phillips taken during the
autopsy. He specifically challenges the admission of duplicate photo-
graphs of Mrs. Phillips’ face and an enlarged photograph of her vagi-
nal area. The defendant asserts that any probative value of these pho-
tographs was outweighed by their prejudicial and inflammatory effect
upon the jury.

Although Jackson does not identify the challenged photographs
by exhibit number, we assume that he is complaining about two pho-
tographs of Mrs. Phillips’ face, Commonwealth Exhibit Numbers 47
and 48; and the enlarged photograph of her vaginal area, Common-
wealth Exhibit Number 51. These are the photographs to which the
defendant objected at trial. The Commonwealth introduced each of
these during the medical examiner’s testimony. Number 47 depicted
the front of Mrs. Phillips’ face, and number 48 was a side view.
Number 51 showed a laceration in the rear portion of her vaginal
area. Each photograph depicted different injuries suffered by Mrs.
Phillips.

We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the two facial
photographs were “not shocking” or “gruesome” and that Number
51 was simply “part of the facts of this particular case.” Thus, the
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these photographs. The
photographs were relevant to the issues of premeditation, intent, and
malice. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 342, 356 S.E.2d

6 The circuit court noted for the record that the “‘in-life” photograph of Mrs. Phillips was
displayed in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief for approximately 15 to 20 seconds but that it
was not passed to the jury.

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157, 173 (1987); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 144, 314
S.E.2d 371, 384 (1984). And, contrary to the defendant’s argument,
any prejudicial effect of the photographs did not outweigh their pro-
bative value.

G. USE OF PILLOW FOR DEMONSTRATIVE PURPOSES

During closing argument, the Commonwealth used a pillow to
demonstrate the length of time that Jackson held the pillow over Mrs.
Phillips’ face. The Commonwealth asked the jury how such an act
could not be indicative of a specific intent to kill. The defendant
objected on the basis that the Commonwealth was not using the
actual pillow found at the crime scene and that the demonstration
would incite and inflame the jury. The circuit court overruled the
objection but directed the Commonwealth to tell the jury that the
pillow was “not the actual size and shape of the pillow used” to
suffocate Mrs. Phillips and that the Commonwealth was using a pil-
low only for demonstrative purposes.

“Admission of items of demonstrative evidence to illus-
trate testimonial evidence is . . . a matter within the sound discretion
of a trial court.” Mackall, 236 Va. at 254, 372 S.E.2d at 768. We
conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. As
directed by the court, the Commonwealth instructed the jury that the
pillow was not the actual pillow found at the crime scene and that it
was being used for demonstrative purposes. Furthermore, the court
also told the jury that the pillow was not the one found on Mrs.
Phillips’ bed. Finally, the Commonwealth’s demonstration did not
distort the evidence concerning the manner of Mrs. Phillips’ death.

H. AUTOPSY REPORT

Jackson asserts that the circuit court erred in admitting the
autopsy report into evidence and allowing that report to be given to
the jury. When the defendant objected to the introduction of the
report, the court indicated that it would redact any opinion expressed
by the medical examiner in the report. Although Jackson asserts on
brief that the report was admitted into evidence during the medical
examiner’s testimony, that factual statement is not accurate. The
defendant cross-examined the medical examiner about his report, but
at no point during his testimony was the autopsy report admitted into
evidence. The report is not marked as an exhibit and is only stamped
as having been filed in both the General District Court and the Cir-
cuit Court of the City of Williamsburg and County of James City.

HEM Although Code § 19.2-188 provides that “[rleports of inves-
tigations made by the Chief Medical Examiner, his assistants or med-
ical examiners . . . shall be received as evidence in any court or other
proceeding,” the autopsy report concerning Mrs. Phillips was not
admitted into evidence in this case. Thus, this claim has no merit.’

J. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Jackson moved to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence as to guilt
on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he pos-
sessed the willful, premeditated, and deliberate intent to kill Mrs.
Phillips. The defendant asserts that his testimony showed that the
death of Mrs. Phillips was accidental and not premeditated. We do
not agree.

«When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on
appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party at trial, in this case the Commonwealth, and accord
to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Common-
wealth v. Bower, 264 Va. 41, 43, 563 S.E.2d 736, 737 (2002); Hig-
ginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537
(1975). We are obliged to affirm the judgment of the circuit court
unless that judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it. Code § 8.01-680; Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 282,
427 S.E.2d 411, 421 (1993). When proof of premeditation is the sub-
ject of a sufficiency challenge, evidence showing that the premedita-
tion was only slight or momentary is sufficient to sustain the convic-
tion. Id. This is so because “[p]remeditation is an intent to kill that
needs to exist only for a moment.” Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va.
81, 104, 580 S.E.2d 834, 847 (2003) (citing Peterson v. Common-
wealth, 225 Va. 289, 295, 302 S.E.2d 520, 524 (1983)). The question
of premeditation is generally a factual issue. Jd.

HM Despite Jackson’s self-serving testimony that he did not
smother Mrs. Phillips with a pillow and told Jasper Meekins to stop
doing so, the jury could have concluded, based on the defendant’s
confession, that he placed a pillow over Mrs. Phillips face and held it
there for four to six minutes even though she would have become
unconscious within 15 to 30 seconds. That evidence is sufficient to
show that the defendant had a willful, premeditated, and deliberate

7 In Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 630, 292 S.E.2d 798, 806-07 (1982), we
held that the Commonwealth was not required to elect between introducing an autopsy report
or a medical examiner’s testimony.

es (ft
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intent to kill Mrs. Phillips. See id. Thus, we will not reverse the
jury’s finding of premeditation.

J. TESTIMONY FROM VICTIM’S SON

Jackson claims that the circuit court abused its discretion by
allowing Mrs. Phillips’ son to testify during the sentencing phase of
the trial because he remained in the courtroom after he testified dur-
ing the guilt phase in violation of the court’s order sequestering the
witnesses. According to the defendant, the son’s presence in the
courtroom throughout the trial unduly influenced the jury. We do not
agree.

HE Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 19.2-265.01, a vic-
tim, which includes Mrs. Phillips’ son, see Code § 19.2-11.01(B),
“may remain in the courtroom and shall not be excluded unless the
court determines, in its discretion, the presence of the victim would
impair the conduct of a fair trial.”” We cannot say in this case that the
court abused its discretion by allowing Mrs. Phillips’ son to remain
in the courtroom after he testified during the guilt phase of the trial.
The court correctly concluded that Mrs. Phillips’ son did not learn
anything while he was present in the court that would have changed
or affected his victim impact testimony during the penalty phase.
Thus, the defendant was not prejudiced by the fact that Mrs. Phillips’
son testified during the penalty phase after having heard much of the
testimony during the guilt phase. See Bennett, 236 Va. at 465, 374
S.E.2d at 314 (a trial court has discretion to decide whether a witness
who violates an order excluding witnesses from the courtroom can
testify, and prejudice to the defendant is one factor to consider when
answering that question).

K. ISSUES PREVIOUSLY DECIDED

HH in assigning error to the circuit court’s denial of the defen-
dant’s pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of Virginia’s
capital murder statutes, Jackson presents several reasons why he con-
tends that the death penalty on its face and as applied violates the
Sixth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I,
§§ 8, 9, and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. We have previously
rejected these arguments and find no reason to depart from our
precedent.

(1) The aggravating factor of future dangerousness is unconstitu-
tionally vague because it does not provide meaningful guidance to

20
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the sentencing jury so as to avoid an arbitrary and capricious inflic-
tion of the death penalty — rejected in Bell, 264 Va. at 203, 563
S.E.2d at 716; Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 508, 537
S.E.2d 866, 874 (2000); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 476-
78, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148-49 (1978).

(2) Virginia’s capital murder statutes do not require instructions
to the jury regarding the duty to consider mitigating evidence, the
meaning of mitigating evidence, the absence of any burden of proof
on a defendant with regard to the mitigation evidence presented, and
the liberty that each juror has to consider and give effect to mitigat-
ing evidence — rejected in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-
76 (1998); Lovitt, 260 Va. at 508, 537 S.E.2d at 874; Mickens v.
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 315, 320, 478 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1996);
Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 82-83, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865
(1995).

(3) The use of unadjudicated conduct to prove the aggravating
factor of future dangerousness fails to comport with the constitutional
requirement of reliability for capital sentencing — rejected in Bell,
264 Va. at 203, 563 S.E.2d at 716; Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244
Va. 220, 228, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826 (1992); Stockton v. Common-
wealth, 241 Va. 192, 210, 402 S.E.2d 196, 206 (1991).

(4) A sentence of death under Code § 19.2-264.5 is unconstitu-
tional because a trial court may consider hearsay evidence contained
in a post-sentence report — rejected in Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261
Va. 451, 459, 544 S.E.2d 299, 303-04 (2001); Cherrix v. Common-
wealth, 257 Va. 292, 299-300, 513 S.E.2d 642, 647 (1999).

(5) A sentence of death under Code 19.2-264.5 is unconstitutional
because a trial court is not required to set aside a death penalty upon
a showing of good cause — rejected in Chandler v. Commonwealth,
249 Va. 270, 276, 455 S.E.2d 219, 223 (1995); Breard v. Common-
wealth, 248 Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675-76 (1994).

(6) Virginia’s death penalty statutes do not provide for meaning-
ful appellate review, including the proportionality review — rejected
in Emmett v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 374-75, 569 S.E.2d 39, 46
(2002); Lenz, 261 Va. at 459, 544 S.E.2d at 304; Bailey v. Common-
wealth, 259 Va. 723, 740-42, 529 S.E.2d 570, 580-81 (2000);
Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 S.E.2d at 826.

(7) The expedited review of death penalty cases is unconstitu-
tional — rejected in Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 386, 398,
569 S.E.2d 47, 55 (2002).

L. ISSUES WAIVED

HH At oral argument, the defendant indicated that he was with-
drawing assignment of error number 8, that the circuit court “erred
in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss capital murder indictment
for failure to allege aggravating elements.” In response to questions
from the Court, he also acknowledged that he was no longer asking
the Court to reverse his conviction on the basis that the circuit court
erred by failing to grant a change in venue, as asserted in assignment
of error number 7. Specifically, defense counsel stated, ““We could
[seat] a jury. . . . So to say that venue alone is not what I am seeking
in this case for an error.” Thus, we will not consider these two
assignments of error.

HB Next, we note that the defendant did not brief assignment of
error number 20, that the circuit court “erred in allowing the prose-
cutor in his argument during the penalty phase to argue matters
beyond those introduced during that phase of the case.” In accor-
dance with our precedent, we will not consider this assigned error.
See Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 207, 576 S.E.2d 471, 479
(2003); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 413, 508 S.E.2d 57, 60
(1998).

Il. STATUTORY REVIEW
A. PASSION AND PREJUDICE

HH Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 17.1-313(C), we are
required to determine whether the defendant’s sentence of death was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary
factors. On this issue, Jackson claims that the jury’s verdict fixing his
punishment at death was the result of passion and prejudice because
the circuit court failed to grant a change of venue and because the
court did not strike prospective jurors Reinsberg, Baffer, and Berube
for cause. As already noted, we rejected the substantive issue regard-
ing those three jurors and did not address the change of venue ques-
tion because the defendant withdrew it as a substantive basis for a
reversal of his conviction. We nonetheless have examined both of
these issues to ascertain whether they created an atmosphere of pas-
sion and prejudice that influenced the jury’s sentencing decision. We
conclude that they did not do so.* We also find no other indication

® We note that a jury was seated with relative ease in this case. See Thomas v. Common-
wealth, 263 Va. 216, 231, 559 8.B.2d 652, 660 (2002) (‘“The ease with which an impartial jury
can be selected is a critical element in determining whether the prejudice in the community

208
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that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of pas-
sion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors.

B. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

HM We are also required to determine whether the sentence of
death in this case is “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defen-
dant.” Code § 17.1-313(C)(2). To comply with this statutory direc-
tive, we compare this case with “similar cases” by focusing on
instances where the victim was murdered during the commission of
robbery or rape and the death penalty was imposed based upon the
future dangerousness aggravating factor. The purpose of our propor-
tionality review is to identify and invalidate the aberrant death sen-
tence. See Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d
808, 817 (1999).

HM Our review in this case leads to the conclusion that the
defendant’s sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to
sentences generally imposed in this Commonwealth for capital
murders comparable to Jackson’s murder of Mrs. Phillips. Although
we consider all capital murder cases presented to this Court for
review, see Burns, 261 Va. at 345, 541 S.E.2d at 896-97; Whitley v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 81-82, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171 (1982), we
cite the following cases as examples: Roach v. Commonwealth, 251
Va. 324, 468 S.E.2d 98 (1996); Beavers, 245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d
411; Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 410 S.E.2d 254 (1991);
O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 364 S.E.2d 491 (1988). With
tegard to the proportionality analysis, the imposition of the death
penalty in Beavers is particularly persuasive because of the striking
similarity between the facts in that case and those presented here.
Both cases involved elderly women who were raped by their assail-
ant and smothered with a pillow.

IV. CONCLUSION

HH For the reasons stated, we find no error in the judgments of
the circuit court or in the imposition of the death penalty. We also

stemming from pretrial publicity is so wide-spread that the defendant cannot get a fair trial in
that venue.”)

a OC’

see no reason to commute the sentence of death in this case. There-
fore, we will affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

Record No. 031517 — Affirmed.
Record No. 031518 — Affirmed.

0
pC

CLEAN SWEEP PROFESSIONAL PARKING Lor
MAINTENANCE, INC., ET AL.

Vv.

FRANK TALLEY, SR.
Record No. 030058
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J.

211

Julia B. Judkins (Melissa H. Katz; Trichilo, Bancroft, McGavin,
Horvath & Judkins, on brief), for appellants.

Thomas W. Williamson, Jr. (Charles F. Purcell; Michael C.
Kildoo; Williamson & Lavecchia; Purcell & Purcell, on brief), for
appellee.

JUSTICE LEMONS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in over-
ruling pleas in bar based upon the exclusivity provisions of the Vir-
ginia Workers’ Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-100 et seg. (‘the
Act’),

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

In August 1997, Virginia Paving Company (“Virginia Paving’’)
was engaged in the repaving of certain portions of Interstate High-
way 95 in Spotsylvania County, under a contract from the Virginia
Department of Transportation (“VDOT’’). The contract required Vir-
ginia Paving to undertake all aspects of the repaving process includ-
ing milling the existing road surface, removing the milled asphalt,
sweeping away loose debris, and repaving the roadway with fresh
asphalt supplied by Virginia Paving.

Because of the size of the project, in addition to utilizing its own
equipment and workforce, Virginia Paving hired subcontractors to
assist in certain portions of the work. Virginia Paving hired J. E.
Coleman Trucking Company (“Coleman Trucking”) to assist Vir-
ginia Paving in transporting asphalt from Virginia Paving’s plant to
the jobsite, loading asphalt into the paving machines, and hauling the
millings from the jobsite back to the plant. Virginia Paving also hired
Clean Sweep Professional Parking Lot Maintenance, Inc. (‘Clean
Sweep”’) to help Virginia Paving clear the roadway of asphalt after it
was loosened by the milling machines.

On August 27, 1997, Frank Talley, Sr. (“Talley”), a truck driver
employed by Coleman Trucking, loaded fresh asphalt at the Virginia
Paving plant, delivered it to the jobsite, dumped the asphalt into the
paving machine, and reloaded the truck with asphalt millings. Before
returning to the Virginia Paving plant, Talley responded to a call to
diagnose a disabled Coleman truck that was also at the site. While
Talley was underneath the truck, it was struck by one of Clean
Sweep’s sweeper trucks operated by John J. O’Connor
(“O’Connor”). As a result of the accident, Talley sustained back
injuries.

Talley sued Clean Sweep and O’Connor, alleging that Talley was
injured by O’Connor’s negligence and recklessness in operating the
sweeper truck. Clean Sweep and O’Connor filed pleas in bar stating
that the Act is Talley’s sole avenue for recovery and precludes any
and all other remedies. The trial court overruled the pleas in bar. The
jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of Talley in the amount

Ss 2:
PC

of $900,000. Clean Sweep and O’Connor appeal the trial court’s
judgment refusing to sustain the pleas in bar.

IL. Analysis

On appeal, Clean Sweep and O’Connor maintain that the trial
court erred by failing to sustain the pleas in bar. They assert that
Coleman Trucking and Clean Sweep were both subcontractors of
Virginia Paving and they were engaged in the trade, business, or
occupation of Virginia Paving. Further, they maintain that because
Coleman Trucking’s employee, Talley, was injured by the actions of
Clean Sweep’s employee, O’Connor, Talley’s exclusive remedy is
provided by the Act.

Hl Whether a person is subject to the exclusivity provision of the
Act presents a mixed question of law and fact that must be resolved
in light of the facts and circumstances of each case. Burch v. Hech-
inger Co., 264 Va. 165, 169, 563 S.E.2d 745, 747 (2002). We review
de novo the trial court’s determination that Talley and O’Connor
were not statutory fellow employees.

HM The rights and remedies provided in the Act are exclusive
of all other rights and remedies of an employee or his estate at com-
mon law or otherwise. Peck v. Safway Steel Prods., Inc., 262 Va.
522, 525, 551 S.E.2d 328, 329 (2001). The only exception to this
exclusivity provision is provided in Code § 65.2-309(A) permitting
an action to be maintained against an “‘other party.” “[T]o be an
‘other party,’ a defendant must have been a stranger to the trade,
occupation, or business in which the employee was engaged when he
was injured.” 262 Va. at 525, 551 S.E.2d at 329. Additionally, we
have held:

[B]ecause he is not a “stranger to the employment,” an alleg-
edly negligent employee of one contractor, engaged in the
same business or project of an owner as an injured employee
of another contractor, is not an “other party” amenable to suit

Evans v. Hook, 239 Va. 127, 131, 387 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1990). See
also Pfeifer v. Krauss Construction Co., 262 Va. 262, 266-67, 546
S.E.2d 717, 719 (2001).

Talley does not argue that O’Connor was not a statutory
employee of the general contractor, Virginia Paving. On appeal, Tal-
ley maintains that Talley’s actions on behalf of his employer, Cole-

2
pt

man Trucking, were not in the trade, business, or occupation of Vir-
ginia Paving.

The trial court held that Coleman Trucking was engaged in “a
function which was solely as a supplier or deliverer of goods and, of
course, to haul off goods.” Citing Burroughs v. Walmont, 210 Va. 98,
168 S.E.2d 107 (1969), the trial court concluded that Coleman
Trucking’s work consisted of mere delivery and hauling and as such,
Coleman Trucking was not engaged in the trade, business, or occupa-
tion of Virginia Paving. Consequently, Talley was not a statutory
employee of Virginia Paving and could not be a statutory fellow
employee of O’Connor. We disagree.

In Burroughs, the plaintiff, an employee of a trucking company,
was injured while carrying plasterboard into one of several houses
being constructed by the general contractor. 210 Va. at 99, 168
S.E.2d at 108. The trucking company had agreed to deliver and stack
specified quantities of the plasterboard in the rooms in the various
houses under construction. Jd. at 98, 168 S.E.2d at 108. We held that
“the stacking of [plasterboard] in the several rooms constituted the
final act of delivery, not an act of construction.” Jd. at 100, 168
S.E.2d at 108. Consequently, the plaintiff was not engaged in the
general contractor’s trade, business, or occupation, and, therefore, the
general contractor was an “‘other party” and subject to being sued.
Id. at 100, 168 S.E.2d at 109.

Similarly, in Yancey v. JTE Constructors, Inc., 252 Va. 42, 471
S.E.2d 473 (1996), a general contractor was hired by the Virginia
Department of Transportation to design and install a sound barrier
along an interstate highway. Id. at 43, 471 S.E.2d at 474. The general
contractor engaged a subcontractor merely to design, manufacture,
and deliver concrete wall panels to the job site. Jd. The plaintiff, an
employee of the subcontractor, was injured while he was inspecting
one of the panels. Id. at 43, 471 S.E.2d at 474. We held that the
plaintiff’s inspection and patching activities “were the final acts of
delivery required by the contract” and that the plaintiff was not
engaged in the general contractor’s trade, business, or occupation. Id.
at 45, 471 S.E.2d at 475.

But not all cases that initially appear to be “delivery” cases have
resulted in a holding that the plaintiff was not engaged in the trade,
business, or occupation of the general contractor. In Bosher v. Jamer-
son, 207 Va. 539, 151 S.E.2d 375 (1966), we considered a case
involving an employee of a trucking company who delivered sand to
a construction site but also participated in the spreading of the sand

°
PC

to create a foundation under the direction of the general contractor.
An employee of the general contractor was injured by negligence of
the employee of the trucking company during the sand spreading
process. Id. at 540-41, 151 S.E.2d at 376. In applying the exclusivity
rule and barring the suit for personal injuries, we held that

at the time of the accident [the driver] was performing work
on behalf of his employer, [the trucking company], that was
part of the trade, business or occupation of [the general con-
tractor]. If [the driver] was performing such work, [the truck-
ing company], though an independent contractor, is not an
“other party” against whom [the general contractor’s
employee’s] right of action is preserved under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, and [the general contractor’s employee’s]
right to recover for the injury is limited to the compensation
provided under the Act.

Id. at 542, 151 S.E.2d at 377. See also Floyd v. Mitchell, 203 Va.
269, 274, 123 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1962).

Smith v. Horn, 232 Va. 302, 351 S.E.2d 14 (1986), concerned a
suit for personal injuries sustained in a collision of three vehicles
involving employees of two subcontractors of a coal company. One
subcontractor’s vehicle was delivering supplies to a mine while
another subcontractor’s vehicle was hauling coal from a mine to the
coal company’s processing plant. Jd. at 307, 351 S.E.2d at 17. In
approving the trial court’s ruling sustaining the plea in bar, we held
that the coal company’s business

involved the mining, processing, and sale of coal from proper-
ties it owned or leased. [The subcontractors] were independent
contractors engaged to mine coal on land owned or leased by
[the coal company] and to transport the coal to [the coal com-
pany’s] preparation plant. Horn and Smith, as employees of
these two contractors, were performing duties within this pur-
pose — Smith hauling supplies to the Carrie mine and Horn
driving a load of coal from the Potter mine to the [coal com-
pany’s] plant. As both Smith and Horn were acting within the
scope of their employment and as both contractors were carry-
ing out a part of the trade, business, or occupation of [the coal
company], Smith and Horn were fellow statutory employees of
[the coal company] and Smith’s common-law action against
Horn was barred under [the exclusivity provision of the Act].

26
PF

Id. at 307, 351 S.E.2d at 17.

In Peck, an employee of a general contractor was killed when he
fell from scaffolding on which he was working. 262 Va. at 524, 551
S.E.2d at 328. The subcontractor, Safway, was contracted to supply
and install scaffolding for the project to repair and replace brick
masonry on a 12-story building. Jd. In erecting, modifying, and dis-
mantling the scaffolding system, Safway provided over 5,000 man-
hours of labor. Clearly, Safway was engaged in an essential part of
the work that the general contractor was required to perform under
its contract. Jd. at 528, 551 S.E.2d at 330. Accordingly, we held that
Safway was not merely engaged in a final act of delivery, was not a
stranger to the general contractor’s work, and that Safway’s work
was integral to the construction done on the building. Id. We
approved the trial court’s sustaining of the plea in bar.

In Burch, the plaintiff was employed as a sales representative for
a plant wholesaler. The plaintiff agreed to be present after delivery of
the plants to assist in the display of the retailer and to answer cus-
tomer’s questions. She was injured by the alleged negligence of an
employee of the retailer and subsequently sued for damages. 264 Va.
at 167-68, 563 S.E.2d at 746. We rejected the plaintiff’s contention
that she was involved in mere delivery; rather, her participation in
the display of plants and providing service to the retailer’s customers
removed her from the category of “other person” because she was
then engaged in the business, trade, or occupation of the retailer. Id.
at 170-71, 563 S.E.2d at 748. We approved the trial court’s sus-
taining of the plea in bar based upon the exclusivity provision of the
Act. Id, at 171, 563 S.E.2d at 748.

Il The case before us is less like Burroughs and Yancey and
more like Bosher, Floyd, Smith, Burch, and Peck. Coleman Trucking
was not simply delivering goods. To the contrary, its duties extended
beyond the mere delivery of fresh asphalt and were integral to the
construction process. Virginia Paving was responsible for milling the
surface of the road, removing the milled asphalt, sweeping away
loose debris, and repaving the roadway with fresh asphalt supplied
by Virginia Paving. Virginia Paving employed its own equipment and
workforce to complete these tasks but, because of the magnitude of
the project, Virginia Paving engaged subcontractors to assist in the
project. Coleman Trucking was not merely delivering its own inde-
pendently manufactured parts. Rather, it was hauling asphalt millings
to Virginia Paving’s plant and delivering the recycled asphalt from
the plant back to the road project to be used in new paving. Clearly,

similar to the defendant in Peck, Coleman “‘was engaged in an essen-
tial part of the work that [Virginia Paving] was required to perform
under its contract with [VDOT.]” See 262 Va. at 528, 551 S.E.2d at
330.

Hl Coleman Trucking was not a stranger to the work of Virginia
Paving, and its employee, Talley, was a statutory employee of Vir-
ginia Paving. There is no controversy over whether Clean Sweep was
engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of Virginia Paving.
Consequently, Talley and O’Connor were fellow statutory employees
of Virginia Paving. Talley’s suit is precluded by the exclusivity pro-
vision of the Act.

HB Finally, we reject Talley’s claim that his investigation of a
disabled truck was a “discrete activity” “far removed from the con-
struction process Virginia Paving had contracted to perform for
VDOT.” We hold that the investigation of the disabled truck on the
premises of the project was not “far removed” or “discrete” such
that it removed Talley’s activity from the trade, occupation, or busi-
ness of Virginia Paving. See Burch, 264 Va. at 170-71, 563 S.E.2d at
748.

Hl For the reasons stated, we hold that Talley and O’Connor are
statutory fellow employees for purposes of the exclusivity provision
of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act. Accordingly, we will
reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment in
favor of Clean Sweep and O’Connor sustaining the pleas in bar.

Reversed and final judgment.

218

Roser I. JONES, SR.
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ET AL.
Record No. 030310
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J.

ron
— |

220

Roger T. Creager (John C. Shea; Marks & Harrison, on briefs),
for appellant.

Catherine Crooks Hill, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kil-
gore, Attorney General; Judith Williams Jagdmann, Deputy Attorney
General; Edward M. Macon, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on
brief), for appellees.

Amicus Curiae: The Virginia Trial Lawyers Association (Mal-
colm Parks; Maloney, Parks, Clarke & Nathanson, on brief), in sup-
port of appellant.

JUSTICE LEMONS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether the University of Virginia
(“the University”) is a governmental entity for the purposes of deter-
mining its status as a statutory employer under the Virginia Workers’
Compensation Act (“the Act”), Code §§ 65.2-100 to -1310.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

Robert I. Jones, Sr. (“Jones”) was employed by Waco, Inc.
(Waco’’), an independent contractor employed by the University to
perform asbestos abatement in a building on the grounds. Part of this
work included the removal of electrical conduits. Jones received an
electrical shock while attempting to remove an electrical conduit.

es 221
PC

Jones filed a motion for judgment against the University and its
employees alleging that they had negligently informed him that the
electrical power to that conduit had been turned off when the conduit
actually contained live wires. The defendants each filed pleas in bar
based on the Act. The Commonwealth of Virginia, on behalf of the
University, and the individual defendants asserted that the University
was the statutory employer of Jones because it is a governmental
entity with a statutory mandate to maintain its buildings and Jones
was engaged in the maintenance of a University building.

The trial court sustained the defendants’ pleas in bar, dismissing
Jones’s action, and denied Jones’s motion to reconsider on November
20, 2002. Jones appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court.

IL. Analysis

Jones asserts that the trial court erred by holding that the Univer-
sity is a governmental entity and that its trade or business included
asbestos removal from buildings under its care and control. Further,
Jones argues that the trial court erred in applying the exclusivity pro-
vision of the Workers’ Compensation Act despite the language of the
Virginia Tort Claims Act stating that “the Commonwealth shall be
liable . . . where the Commonwealth . . ., if a private person, would
be liable .. . .” Code § 8.01-195.3.

HM The Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act provides that:

When any person (referred to in this section as “owner”)
undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of
his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other
person (referred to in this section as “subcontractor”) for the
execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of
the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner,
the owner shall be liable to pay to any worker employed in the
work any compensation under this title which he would have
been liable to pay if the worker had been immediately
employed by him.

Code § 65.2-302(A). This “statutory employer” provision is
designed to ensure that owners do not escape liability for workers’
compensation benefits by having their work performed by others.
Henderson v. Central Tel. Co., 233 Va. 377, 381, 355 S.E.2d 596,
598-99 (1987); Smith v. Horn, 232 Va. 302, 305-06, 351 S.E.2d 14,
16 (1986).

222 ee
|

HM In this case, the University was the owner of the building
on which Jones was working when he was injured. Once an owner is
found to be a statutory employer, it is subject to all the mandates,
duties, and rights as to its statutory employee mandated by the Act,
including the “exclusivity rule.” The exclusivity rule provides that
when an employee is eligible for remedy under the Act, he or she
may not seek any other remedy against the employer or his fellow
employees. See Code § 65.2-307(A).

As discussed below, the analysis of the liability as an owner for
governmental entities and private entities differs. In other words,
state agencies, municipalities, and counties are treated differently
from private corporations and individuals. Jones argues that we have
never extended governmental entity status to a college or university
under the Act. However, both statutory language and case law indi-
cate that the University is entitled to governmental entity status.

Hl The most obvious difference between a governmental entity
and a private entity is that the control of a governmental entity ulti-
mately lies with publicly elected officials. Code § 23-69 establishes
the Board of Visitors of the University as a public corporation that is
“at all times subject to the control of the General Assembly.” It
would challenge reason to suggest that an institution, subject at all
times to the control of the legislature, is not a governmental entity.

In Phillips v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 97 Va. 472, 474,
34 S.E. 66, 67 (1899), we held that buildings owned by the Univer-
sity could not be subject to mechanic’s liens because the University’s
buildings were protected by the general rule that mechanic’s liens
“do not, in the absence of express provisions, apply to public build-
ings erected by States, counties, and towns for public uses.” In deter-
mining “the nature of the University of Virginia,” we noted that
“the University, from its foundation, has been wholly governed,
managed, and controlled by the State . . . and private individuals
have no interest in or control over it.” Id. at 475, 34 S.E. at 67. We
pointed to language nearly identical to that in the current Code
“provid[ing] that the Rector and Visitors should be at all times sub-
ject to the control of the General Assembly.” Jd. We concluded that
the University’s property should be treated like the property of a
state, county, or town because

the University . . . is in the strictest sense a public institution,
and that its grounds and buildings are public property, the
property of the State; that it is governed and controlled solely

ee 223
a

by the State; that its grounds and buildings are wholly dedi-
cated to public uses; and that the interest of the public consti-
tutes its ends and aims.

Id, at 475-76, 34 S.E. at 67.

[ll The reasoning that led to our holding in Phillips applies here
with equal force. The characteristics of the University informing our
decision in that case are the same here. Although we did not use the
specific term “governmental entity” in Phillips, certainly an entity
that is established by statute, is governed and controlled solely by the
General Assembly, owns property through money appropriated by
the General Assembly, and whose very essence is public use and
service is a governmental entity, is to be treated in the same manner
as municipalities for the purposes of the Act.

Hi In a situation in which an employee of an independent con-
tractor sues a private entity that owns a project, we have applied the
“normal work test’? to determine whether the injured party was
engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the owner at the time
of his or her injury. See Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. McReynolds,
216 Va. 897, 902-03, 224 S.E.2d 323, 326-27 (1976); Johnson v. Jef-
Jerson Nat’l Bank, 244 Va. 482, 485, 422 S.E.2d 778, 780 (1992).
However, the normal work test does not apply to the determination
of the trade, business, or occupation of a governmental entity.

Hl In Nichols v. VVKR, Inc., 241 Va. 516, 403 S.E.2d 698
(1991), we held:

A governmental entity or a public utility does not share the
ability to choose its activities. Therefore, if the project’s owner
is a governmental agency or a public utility, any activity which
the owner is authorized or required to do by law or otherwise,
is considered the trade, business, or occupation of the owner.

Id. at 521, 403 S.E.2d at 701. See Henderson, 233 Va. at 383-85, 355
S.E.2d at 599-601; Ford v. City of Richmond, 239 Va. 664, 667, 669,
391 S.E.2d 270, 271-73 (1990). The unique nature of a governmental
entity requires examination of statutory authorization and mandated
duties to determine the entity’s trade, business, or occupation. What
the legislature has authorized or required an entity to do is the trade,
business, or occupation of the entity, whatever the frequency with

224 be
as

which the task is performed or the number of employees directly
employed to perform the task.*

Jones relies on Board of Supervisors v. Boaz, 176 Va. 126, 10
S.E.2d 498 (1940), to support his argument that the University was
not his statutory employer because building repair is not the Univer-
sity’s trade, business, or occupation. Boaz, however, is inapplicable.
The opinion in Boaz was based largely on the fact that the Act at that
time did not include the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions
in its provisions. Id. at 130, 10 S.E.2d at 499. The Act has long since
been amended to specifically include the Commonwealth and its sub-
divisions. We have previously noted that Boaz is no longer applicable
law. See Ford at 668-69, 391 S.E.2d at 272-73.

The University is a governmental entity. Its powers and
duties, exercised by the Rector and Visitors of the University, are
created by statute and are controlled by the General Assembly. Code
§§ 23-62 to -91.23:1. Applying the rule established in Nichols, any
activity of the University authorized or required by statute is the
trade, business, or occupation of the University for purposes of the
Act. Pursuant to Code § 23-76, the University’s Board of Visitors
“shall be charged with the care and preservation of all property
belonging to the University.” Accordingly, the care and preservation
of the University’s buildings is part of the trade, business, or occupa-
tion of the University. The asbestos abatement performed by Jones
and Waco was part of the maintenance of the University’s buildings;
therefore, Jones was involved in the trade, business, or occupation of
the University at the time of his injury. The University was his statu-

* We have held cities, a ferry district, and a turnpike authority to be governmental entities
whose trade, business, or occupation is defined by statute, irrespective of the number of the
entity's own employees engaged in the work that resulted in injury to a contractor’s employee.
See Ford v. City of Richmond, 239 Va. 664, 669, 391 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1990) (holding that the
city of Richmond was the statutory employer of the employee of a contractor hired to repair
the roof on a water reservoir); Roberts v. City of Alexandria, 246 Va. 17, 19-20, 431 S.E.2d
275, 276-77 (1993) (holding that the City of Alexandria was the statutory employer of an
employee of a medical services provider contracted to provide medical services at the city jail);
Williams v. E.T. Gresham Co., 201 Va. 457, 464-65, 111 S.E.2d 498, 503-04 (1959) (holding
that the Chesapeake Bay Ferry District was the statutory employer of the employees of a con-
tractor hired to drive piles for a ferry landing even though Ferry District employees had never
driven piles on their own); Anderson v. Thorington Construction Co., 201 Va. 266, 271-72, 110
S.E.2d 396, 400-01 (1959) (holding that a tumpike authority was the statutory employer of the
employee of an engineering firm contracted to consult on the construction on a portion of the
turnpike despite the fact that the Authority did not directly employ any individuals engaged in
construction-related work). The statutory language on which these decisions have been based
has not been materially altered and the reasoning in these cases is instructive here.

Pe 225
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tory employer; consequently, Jones is barred from seeking a remedy
in tort against the University and its employees.

HE Additionally, Jones argues that the Virginia Tort Claims
Act, Code §§ 8.01-195.1 to -195.9, requires the court to treat a gov-
ermmental entity as though it were a private person under the Work-
ers’ Compensation Act. We disagree. The Tort Claims Act is a
waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity in certain circumstances
allowing the imposition of liability equivalent to that of a private
entity. Jd. Because the Tort Claims Act is a statute in derogation of
the common law, its limited waiver of immunity must be strictly
construed. See Baumgardner v. Southwestern Va. Mental Health Inst.,
247 Va. 486, 489, 442 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1994); Hyman v. Glover, 232
Va. 140, 143, 348 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1986); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Vir-
ginian Ry., 110 Va. 631, 646, 66 S.E. 863, 868 (1910). The Tort
Claims Act does not waive other jurisdictional bars or defenses avail-
able to the Commonwealth and its agencies. Code § 8.01-195.3. The
exclusivity bar under the Workers’ Compensation Act is a jurisdic-
tional bar independent of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, apply-
ing to private and governmental entities in like manner.

TMM For the reasons stated, we hold that Jones is a statutory
employee of the University of Virginia and is barred by the workers’
compensation exclusivity rule from pursuing his tort claim against
the University and its employees. The trial court did not err in grant-
ing the defendants’ pleas in bar and we will affirm its judgment.

Affirmed.

226 ee
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
V.

KENNETH LAMONT JACKSON
Record No. 031186
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ.,
and Carrico and Compton, S.JJ.

N
XQ

Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry
W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellant.
Christopher P. Reagan for appellee.

JUSTICE LEMONS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether a trial judge must recuse
himself from presiding over a probation revocation hearing if he was
the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the jurisdiction at the time and
place of the defendant’s original criminal conviction. The Court of
Appeals held that recusal was mandatory under such circumstances.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 343, 579 S.E.2d 375 (2003).
We disagree.

228 ee
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I. Facts and Proceedings Below

In 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, Kenneth Lamont Jackson
pled guilty in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk to two counts
of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced
to 20 years in the penitentiary with 18 years suspended. After his
release from confinement, he was accused of violating the terms of
his suspended sentence and ordered to show cause why the sus-
pended sentence should not be revoked.

Judge Charles D. Griffith, Jr. was the presiding judge at Jackson’s
revocation hearing. Counsel for Jackson requested Judge Griffith to
recuse himself because he was the elected Commonwealth’s Attorney
in Norfolk at the time Jackson was convicted of the offenses result-
ing in the suspended sentence. Judge Griffith took the oath of office
as a judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk after the date
of Jackson’s original sentencing. Judge Griffith denied Jackson’s
motion, and after hearing the evidence found that Jackson had vio-
lated the terms of his suspended sentence. Judge Griffith revoked the
previously suspended sentence.

Jackson appealed the judgment of the trial court alleging that
Judge Griffith erred by failing to recuse himself from the case. Pur-
suant to Code § 17.1-402(D), the appeal was heard by the Court of
Appeals, en banc “upon its own motion.” The Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court citing concern for “maintain-
ing the integrity of the judicial system.” Jackson, 40 Va. App. at
347, 579 S.E.2d at 376-77. Holding that the probation revocation
hearing “was a continuation of the proceedings of [Jackson’s] under-
lying criminal conviction,” id. at 347, 579 S.E.2d at 377 (internal
quotation marks omitted), the Court of Appeals concluded that
“Judge Griffith served as both the accuser at the original trial, and
the trier-of-fact in the continuation of the same proceeding” and,
therefore, had “abused his judicial discretion as a matter of law, in
refusing to recuse himself in this matter.” Id. at 348, 349, 579 S.E.2d
377, 378. The Commonwealth appealed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

IL. Analysis

Jackson’s basis for demanding Judge Griffith’s recusal was
Canon 3(E)(1)(b) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct for the State of
Virginia. This Canon states in pertinent part that a judge shall dis-
qualify himself or herself if “[t]he judge served as a lawyer in the
matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously

ee 229
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practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning
the matter.” While the Canons may be helpful, the case law of the
Commonwealth determines whether failure to recuse warrants rever-
sal of a judgment. A purported violation of the Canons alone is not
enough to mandate reversal. See Welsh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.
App. 300, 317, 416 S.E.2d 451, 461 (1992); Davis v. Commonwealth,
21 Va. App. 587, 591, 466 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1996).

HM in Green v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 191, 195-96, 557
S.E.2d 230, 233 (2002), we held that, in Virginia, while a probation
revocation hearing is a criminal proceeding, it “is not a stage of a
criminal prosecution.” See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
782 (1973). Our decision in Green overrules any implication to the
contrary in Merritt v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 506, 509, 528
S.E.2d 743, 744 (2000), and is controlling over any dicta to the con-
trary in Grimsley v. Dodson, 696 F.2d 303, 305 (4th Cir. 1982).

Our holding in Green undercuts the primary basis for the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, which was that “Judge Griffith served
as both the accuser at the original trial, and the trier-of-fact in the
continuation of the same proceeding.” Jackson, 40 Va. App. at 348,
579 S.E.2d at 377. In fact, Judge Griffith was not the trier-of-fact at
a continuation of the same proceeding. He was the trier-of-fact at a
separate proceeding. We have not required a judge to recuse him or
herself from a case merely because he or she has seen or had indirect
knowledge of the defendant on a previous occasion, without a show-
ing of bias or prejudice. See Deahl v. Winchester Dept. of Social
Services, 224 Va. 664, 672-73, 299 S.E.2d 863, 867 (1983); Davis,
21 Va. App. at 591, 466 S.E.2d at 743.

TB Jackson’s argument would result in per se disqualification of
any judge who had served as Commonwealth’s Attorney in any mat-
ter involving individuals who had committed a crime or been prose-
cuted at the time that the judge was Commonwealth’s Attorney with-
out any indication of the judge’s actual prior involvement in the case
or other evidence of bias or prejudice. We have rejected, and con-
tinue to reject, such a per se rule. See Justus v. Commonwealth, 222
Va. 667, 673, 283 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1981).

i In a case such as this one, the party moving for recusal of a
judge has the burden of proving the judge’s bias or prejudice. Jack-
son has not met this burden.

HM In the absence of proof of actual bias, recusal is properly
within the discretion of the trial judge. See id. at 674, 283 S.E.2d at
908; Motley v. Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 251, 262, 536 S.E.2d 101,

230 ee
a

106 (2000). In this case, Judge Griffith did not abuse his discretion.
The revocation proceeding, while criminal in nature, is not the same
proceeding as the original trial or sentencing. Additionally, there is
no evidence that Judge Griffith treated Jackson in a biased or preju-
dicial manner at the revocation hearing.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be
reversed, the case will be remanded to the Court of Appeals with
direction that the Court of Appeals remand the case to the trial court,
and the trial court’s judgment shall be reinstated.

Reversed and remanded.

FREDERICK COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD
Vv.

JoHN HARRIS HANNAH, JR., ETC., ET AL.
Record No. 022984
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JI.,
and Stephenson, S.J.

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233

Patrick C. Asplin (Mark D, Obenshain; Keeler Obenshain, on
brief), for appellant.

Steven M. Frei (Holly Parkhurst Essing; Hall, Sickels, Rostant,
Frei & Kattenburg, on brief), for appellees.

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.
L

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred
in denying a school board’s motion to reduce the plaintiffs’ ad
damnum clause to $50,000, the limit on liability the school board
alleged was set by Code § 22.1-194. For the reasons that follow, we
will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

236
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IL.

John Harris Hannah, Jr. (“Hannah”), a minor who sues by his
mother and next friend, Barbara Foster, now Barbara Ruffner
(“Ruffner”), and Ruffner, individually (collectively, “the Plain-
tiffs”), instituted an action against the Frederick County School
Board (‘the School Board’’), seeking damages for personal injuries
and other loss sustained by Hannah and Ruffner as a result of a
school bus accident. The School Board admitted its negligence
caused the accident, but contended damages were limited to $50,000
by Code § 22.1-194. Alternatively, the School Board asserted the
Plaintiffs’ right to recover was barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity if the $50,000 limit did not apply.

The School Board is a member of the Virginia School Board
Association (““VSBA”) which operates a self-insurance pool (the
“Pool’’), as authorized by Code § 15.2-2703. The School Board is a
member of the Pool, which provides various lines of self-insurance to
the School Board, including liability coverage of up to $1,000,000
for motor vehicle accidents.

The School Board filed a motion to reduce the Plaintiffs’ ad
damnum clause to $50,000, arguing Code § 22.1-194 limited its lia~
bility in this case to $50,000 because the School Board met the self-
insurance qualification of Code § 22.1-190(D). Even though the
School Board admitted it had never obtained the certificate of self-
insurance from the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles required by Code § 22.1-190(D), it contended members of the
Pool were exempt from that requirement by Code § 15.2-2704.

The trial court disagreed and found the specific statutory provi-
sion of Code § 22.1-190(D) controlling. The trial court ruled that a
certificate of self-insurance from the Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles is required when the liability limit of Code
§ 22.1-194 is to be claimed by reference to Code § 22.1-190. The
trial court therefore denied the motion to reduce the ad damnum and
awarded Hannah damages of $74,500 and Ruffner damages of
$4,510. We awarded the School Board this appeal.

A.

The resolution of the issues on appeal depends on the statutory
interpretation of three different Code sections which state in pertinent
part:

| 3
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A. Every vehicle shall be covered in a policy of liability and
property damage insurance issued by an insurance carrier
authorized to transact business in this Commonwealth, in the
amounts of at least $50,000 for injury, including death, to 1
person, $200,000 for injury, including death, to all persons
injured in any 1 accident, and $10,000 for damage, including
destruction, to the property of any person, other than the
insured... .

D. This insurance shall not be required in cases where pupils
are transported in vehicles which are owned or operated by a
. .. School board which has qualified for and received a certif-
icate of self-insurance from the Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles, following a certification of financial
responsibility equal to that required under subsection A of this
section.

Code § 22.1-190(A) and (D) (emphasis added).

In case the locality or the school board is the owner, or opera-
tor through medium of a driver, of, or otherwise is the insured
under the policy upon, a vehicle involved in an accident, the
locality or school board shall be subject to action up to, but
not beyond, the limits of valid and collectible insurance in
force to cover the injury complained of or, in cases set forth in
subsection D of § 22.1-190, up to but not beyond the amounts
of insurance required under subsection A of § 22.1-190 and
the defense of governmental immunity shall not be a bar to
action or recovery.

Code § 22.1-194 (emphasis added).

A group self-insurance pool shall be deemed a self-insurer for
motor vehicle security under § 46.2-368. Members of the pool
participating in the motor vehicle self-insurance provided by
the pool shall be deemed to meet the requirements of security
as required and an application for a certificate of self-
insurance under § 46.2-368 shall not be required.

Code § 15.2-2704 (emphasis added).

Hi Pursuant to Code § 22.1-194, a school board is subject to a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity when its vehicle is “involved
in an accident.” Immunity is waived either to “the limits of valid
and collectible insurance in force to cover the injury” or the cover-
age set by Code § 22.1-190(A) when the certificate of self-insurance
under Code § 22.1-190(D) has been obtained.

The School Board argues that it is entitled to the liability limit
derived from Code § 22.1-190(A), $50,000 in this case, although it
has not obtained the certificate of self-insurance required by Code
§ 22.1-190(D). The School Board avers that, as a member of the
Pool, Code § 15.2-2704 exempts it from the self-insurance certificate
requirement of Code § 22.1-190(D), and thus, that it qualifies for the
Code § 22.1-190(A) limitation level.

The question to be answered is whether the School Board, with-
out meeting the requirements of Code § 22.1-190(D), may nonethe-
less qualify for the limited liability by virtue of Code § 15.2-2704.
Application of accepted rules of statutory construction answer that
inquiry in the negative.

B.

Hl “(When one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and
another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific man-
ner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and where they con-
flict, the latter prevails.” Virginia Nat’l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336,
340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979); accord County of Fairfax v. Cen-
tury Concrete Servs., 254 Va. 423, 427, 492 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1997);
Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Service, 241 Va. 89, 94-95, 400
S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991).

Hl Code § 15.2-2703 authorizes a variety of designated political
subdivisions! to join self-insurance pools while Code § 15.2-2704
establishes the powers of those pools. Code § 15.2-2704 exempts all
covered political subdivisions in such self-insurance pools from
obtaining a certificate of self-insurance under Code § 46.2-368.?

' Political subdivision, for purposes of Code § 15.2-2703, “means any county, city, or town,
school board, Transportation District Commission, or any other local governmental authority or
local agency or public service corporation owned, operated or controlled by a locality or local
government authority, with power to enter into contractual undertakings.” Code § 15.2-2701.

2 A certificate of self-insurance under Code § 46.2-368 refers to Chapter 3 of Title 46.2, but
does not address the particular requirements of insurance coverage for specific categories or
functions of political subdivisions. By contrast, Code § 22.1-190 and Code § 22.1-194 are
located in Chapter 12, Article 2 of Title 22.1, which deals specifically with insurance provi-
sions for pupil transportation.

es 7
PT

Neither the self-insurance pool statutes nor Code § 46.2-368 refer-
ence the self-insurance certificate requirement set out in Code § 22.1-
190(D).

[| By contrast, Code § 22.1-190 sets forth insurance require-
ments, specific only to school boards, that must be met with respect
to vehicles used in the transportation of students. One of these
requirements is that a school board obtain a certificate of self-
insurance from the Department of Motor Vehicles, set out in Code
§ 22.1-190(D), in order to benefit from the lower statutory liability
limits available in Code § 22.1-194.

Hl Other noteworthy evidence exists demonstrating the General
Assembly’s intent to differentiate between the use of insurance pools
by political subdivisions generally and by school boards specifically.
For example, Code § 15.2-2704, the more general statute, exempts
the Pool from providing uninsured motorist coverage otherwise man-
dated by Code § 38.2-2206. In comparison, Code § 22.1-190(A), the
specific statute, sets a minimum required liability coverage of
$50,000 for school boards and mandates that “the policy of insur-
ance shall provide coverage for loss or damage caused by an unin-
sured motorist... .”

The School Board argues that Code § 15.2-2704 and Code
§ 22.1-190(D) “can be reasonably construed to give full force and
effect to each.” The School Board does so by reading the exemption
for a certificate of self-insurance in Code § 15.2-2704 as an implied
exemption to the Code § 22.1-190(D) certificate requirement. It is
incongruous for the School Board to rely on Code § 15.2-2704, the
statute of general application, to waive the certification requirement
but then claim that Code § 22.1-190, the statute of specific applica-
tion, establishes the ad damnum limitation of $50,000. As noted
above, the School Board’s reasoning creates a conundrum in the case
of uninsured motorist coverage.

HH The School Board’s proposed reading ignores the General
Assembly’s expressed intent to regulate the insurance requirements
for motor vehicles used to transport students by a specific statutory
framework as opposed to the general requirements of the Pool for all
other permitted political subdivisions. The more specific statutory
provisions must prevail. The General Assembly has specifically
required school boards to meet different requirements regarding
motor vehicle insurance than other political subdivisions. Among
those requirements is obtaining a certificate of self-insurance where

the liability limit of Code § 22.1-194 is to be claimed by reference to
Code § 22.1-190.

Construing the statutes in this manner ‘“harmonize[s] Code
§$ 22.1-190(D) and Code § 15.2-2704 so as to give full force and
effect to both” without undermining the important governmental pur-
pose and benefit that self-insurance pools provide. Such a construc-
tion has no effect on any political subdivision, other than school
boards, which is the evident intent of the General Assembly through
its more specific statutes in Title 22.1. School boards who wish to
join self-insurance pools and take advantage of the liability limit
under Code § 22.1-194, as in this case, need only apply for a certifi-
cate of self-insurance from the Commissioner of the Department of
Motor Vehicles as mandated by the plain language of the statute.

Cc.

The School Board alternatively argues that if it is not entitled to
the $50,000 statutory liability cap, the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Initially, the School Board argues the reference to “‘the policy” in
the first sentence of Code § 22.1-194 means only a policy as set out
in Code § 22.1-190(A) which must be “‘issued by an insurance car-
tier authorized to transact business in this Commonwealth.” In reli-
ance upon Code § 15.2-2709, which provides group self-insurance
pools are not an insurance company or an insurer, the School Board
then reasons the Code § 22.1-194 provision for “valid and collectible
insurance in force” must come only from “the policy”. In other
words, since the Pool’s self-insurance is not insurance in the form of
“the policy”, then Pool funds cannot be “valid and collectible
insurance.”

I The School Board, however, reads only part of the first sen-
tence in Code § 22.1-194. The plain reading of the statute reflects
that a school board is ‘‘subject to action up to .. . the limits of valid
and collectible insurance in force” in two circumstances. The first
instance is where “the school board is the owner... of .. . a vehicle
involved in an accident . . . .” The second instance is where the
school board “otherwise is the insured under the policy upon[] a
vehicle involved in an accident . . . .” (emphasis added).

HH By writing the statute in the disjunctive, the General Assem-
bly has clearly provided that the School Board, solely by virtue of its
ownership of “a vehicle involved in an accident” is liable up to “the
limits of valid and collectible insurance.” While a school board may

also be liable when it “otherwise is the insured under the policy,”
that circumstance is not a condition precedent for the School Board’s
liability when it owns “a vehicle involved in an accident.”

It is uncontested that the School Board owned the vehi-
cles involved in the accident in this case. By the plain language of
the statute, that is sufficient to subject the School Board to liability
up to “the limits of valid and collectible insurance.” While not the
proceeds of an insurance “policy,” in the strictest sense of that term,
the insurance protection provided by the Pool is nonetheless “valid
and collectible insurance in force to cover the injury complained of.”
See generally USAA Casualty Insurance v. The Hertz Corp. 265 Va.
450, 578 S.E.2d 775 (2003).

Hl Finally, the School Board argues that since it did not satisfy
the requirements of Code § 22.1-190(D), it cannot be required to pay
the judgment because Code § 22.1-194 prohibits using school funds
to satisfy motor vehicle claims “except where approved self-
insurance has been provided pursuant to § 22.1-190 D.” Requiring
the School Board, via Pool payment, to pay the appellees’ judgment
does not violate Code § 22.1-194’s prohibition against using school
funds to satisfy motor vehicle claims. Payments from the assets of
the Pool are no longer “school funds,” but are Pool funds. To hold
otherwise would be tantamount to holding that a school board’s
insurance premiums paid to an insurance company constitute “‘school
funds,” for purposes of Code § 22.1-194, when the insurance com-
pany pays a motor vehicle claim.

IL.

Hl For the reasons set forth above, the School Board is not enti-
tled to the $50,000 liability limit of Code § 22.1-190(A) as derived
through Code § 22.1-194 because it failed to obtain a certificate of
self-insurance from the Department of Motor Vehicles as required by
Code § 22.1-190(D). Code § 22.1-194 abrogated the School Board’s
sovereign immunity up to the limits of its coverage through the Pool,
which is sufficient to satisfy the Plaintiff's award in this case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

Affirmed.

SENIOR JUSTICE STEPHENSON, with whom JUSTICE LACY
and JUSTICE KEENAN join, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. It is well established that, when two stat-
utes are in apparent conflict, a court, if reasonably possible, must
give them such a construction as will give force and effect to both.
Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609
(1998); Board of Supervisors v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 761, 214
S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975).

In the present case, it is reasonably possible to construe and har-
monize Code § 22.1-190(D) and Code § 15.2-2704 so as to give full
force and effect to both. Code § 22.1-190(D) reasonably can be read
to govern school boards that are individually self-insured for school
bus accidents, requiring such school boards to apply for and receive
a certificate of self-insurance. However, when a school board is not
individually self-insured but is a member of a self-insurance pool,
Code § 15.2-2704 provides that it “shall be deemed to meet the
requirements of security as required and an application for a certifi-
cate of self-insurance . . . shall not be required.” (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, the School Board qualified for the limit on liability
despite its lack of a certificate of self-insurance.

In reaching this conclusion, I have given weight to the intent of
the General Assembly in approving self-insurance pools for political
subdivisions such as school boards. That intent is expressed in Code
§ 15.2-2700 as follows:

The General Assembly hereby finds and determines that
insurance protection is essential to the proper functioning of
political subdivisions; that the resources of political subdivi-
sions are burdened by the high cost of and frequent inability to
secure such protection through standard carriers; that proper
risk management requires the spreading of risk so as to mini-
mize fluctuation in insurance needs; and that, therefore, all
contributions of financial and administrative resources made
by a political subdivision pursuant to an intergovernmental
contract as authorized by this chapter are made for a public
and governmental purpose, and that such contributions benefit
each contributing political subdivision.

The trial court’s ruling and the holding of the majority in the
present case undermine the important governmental purpose and ben-
efit that self-insurance pools provide. School boards, without the

(7)
pt

$50,000 limit on liability, would be reluctant to become members of
and reap the benefit from a self-insurance pool.

I would hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in denying the
School Board’s motion to reduce the Plaintiffs’ ad damnum to
$50,000 and in awarding damages in excess of the $50,000 limit.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand
the case for a redetermination of damages.

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THE RECTOR AND VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Vv.
TINA MARIE CARTER
Record No. 030258
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J.

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ESS

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G. Rodney Young, II (Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, on briefs), for
appellant.

Gail Starling Marshall (Leila H. Kilgore; Kilgore & Smith, on
brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (““UVA’”)
appeal an interlocutory order of the Circuit Court of the City of
Charlottesville pursuant to Code § 8.01-670.1. On appeal, UVA
argues that the Virginia Tort Claims Act (Code §§ 8.01-195.1 through
-195.9) provides for limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the
Commonwealth but leaves intact the sovereign immunity of the
Commonwealth’s agencies.

i
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I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This case arises from a medical malpractice action brought by
Tina Marie Carter (“Carter’’) alleging negligence in the insertion of
an epidural catheter. Carter timely filed a motion for judgment
against the University of Virginia Health System (“UVHS”), and a
resident physician. The resident physician filed a plea of sovereign
immunity and was dismissed as a party. UVHS then moved for sum-
mary judgment asserting it is not capable of being sued because it is
not a legal entity. In response, Carter moved to amend her motion for
judgment to substitute UVA as the sole defendant in place of UVHS.
The trial court granted Carter’s motion to amend. The Common-
wealth is not named as a party defendant in Carter’s pleadings.

UVA filed a plea of sovereign immunity, which the trial court
denied by order dated October 26, 2001. With Carter’s consent, UVA
moved the trial court to certify an interlocutory appeal from that
order pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-670.1. The trial court entered
the order of certification dated January 29, 2003. We granted UVA
this appeal.

Il. ANALYSIS
HMM The Virginia Tort Claims Act (the “Act”), provides that:

the Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for money . . . on
account of . . . personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting
within the scope of his employment under circumstances
where the Commonwealth . . ., if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant for such . . . injury or death.

Code § 8.01-195.3 (emphasis added). UVA argues that the Act pro-
vides an express, limited waiver only of the Commonwealth’s sover-
eign immunity but does not disturb the sovereign immunity of the
Commonwealth’s agencies. We agree.

HMM Absent an express statutory or constitutional provision
waiving sovereign immunity, the Commonwealth and its agencies are
immune from liability for the tortious acts or omissions of their
agents and employees. Patten v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 654, 658,
553 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2001); Baumgardner v. Southwestern Va.
Mental Health Inst., 247 Va. 486, 489, 442 S.E.2d 400, 401 (1994).
“In 1981, the General Assembly stated in the Act an express, limited
waiver of the Commonwealth’s immunity from tort claims.” Patten,

es 8 =—245
a

262 Va. at 658, 553 S.E.2d at 519; see also Baumgardner, 247 Va. at
489, 442 S.E.2d at 402. The limited waiver provided for in the Act
will be strictly construed because the Act is a statute in derogation of
the common law. Patten, 262 Va. at 658, 553 S.E.2d at 519; Baum-
gardner, 247 Va. 486, 489, 442 S.E.2d at 402.

HMM Under the plain language of the Act, the Commonwealth
(and certain “transportation districts” not here relevant) are the only
entities for which sovereign immunity is waived. See Code § 8.01-
195.3 (stating that “the Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for
money’’). The Act contains no express provision waiving sovereign
immunity for agencies of the Commonwealth, which we have stated
repeatedly is a mandatory requirement before waiver occurs. Id. As
an agency of the Commonwealth, UVA is entitled to sovereign
immunity under the common law absent an express constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary. There is no such waiver in the
Act or elsewhere. See James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 51, 282 S.E.2d 864,
868 (1980) (noting that UVA is entitled to the sovereign immunity
granted to the Commonwealth under the common law).

Hl Carter argues that Code § 8.01-195.4, which states that “the
Commonwealth shall be a proper party defendant” in all actions
brought against the Commonwealth under the Act, implies that the
Commonwealth is not a necessary party to litigation under the Act.
Because of the strict construction accorded to statutes in derogation
of the common law and the lack of an express provision limiting the
immunity of the Commonwealth’s agencies, we decline to adopt this
view. The Act’s waiver of the Commonwealth’s immunity would
make the Commonwealth both a proper party, and given UVA’s
immunity, a necessary party to a claim by Carter.

Carter points out that Code § 8.01-195.6 requires plaintiffs bring-
ing suit under the VTCA to file a written statement “which includes
the time and place at which the injury is alleged to have occurred
and the agency or agencies alleged to be liable.” The fact that the
statute refers to “the agency or agencies alleged to be liable,” serves
as proof, Carter argues, that the sovereign immunity of those entities
has been waived. However, this language does not expressly waive
agencies’ sovereign immunity or even mention the concept. More-
over, as Carter admits, Code § 8.01-195.6 is simply a notice require-
ment apprising the Attorney General or the Director of the Division
of Risk Management of the essential facts of the claim.

Hl Finally, Carter asserts that “i]t is axiomatic that the ‘Com-
monwealth’ can act, and thus can commit torts, only through its

6
a

agencies and employees.” The reality, of course, is that “agencies”
are nothing more than administrative divisions of the Commonwealth
and do not, in and of themselves, act. Ultimately, only an agency’s
employees can commit torts. Yet, since enactment of the VTCA, we
have held on multiple occasions that employees of the Common-
wealth are entitled to sovereign immunity. See e.g., Lohr v. Larsen,
246 Va. 81, 88, 431 S.E.2d 642, 646 (1993); Gargiulo v. Ohar, 239
Va. 209, 215, 387 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1990); Lentz v. Morris, 236 Va.
78, 83, 372 S.E.2d 608, 611 (1988). The VTCA waives the sovereign
immunity of the Commonwealth only.

Tl If the General Assembly desired in the Act to waive the
sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth’s agencies in addition to
the immunity of the Commonwealth, it could have easily done so. It
did not. Given the Act’s lack of an express waiver of the common
law sovereign immunity afforded the Commonwealth’s agencies,
UVA retains its sovereign immunity from the claim brought by
Carter. Accordingly, the trial court was in error when it failed to
grant UVA’s plea of sovereign immunity in its October 26, 2001
order.

Il. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we will reverse the trial court’s
order denying UVA’s plea of sovereign immunity. The case will be
remanded for entry of an order sustaining the defendant’s plea of
sovereign immunity and dismissing the case.

Reversed and remanded.

247

NATIONAL HOUSING BUILDING CORPORATION
Vv.

ACORDIA OF VIRGINIA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.
T/A ACORDIA OF VIRGINIA

Record No, 030269

January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, SJ.

J. Gray Lawrence, Jr. (Faggert & Frieden, on briefs), for
appellant.

Michael D. Lorenson (Bowles, Rice, McDavid, Graff & Love, on
brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

National Housing Building Corporation (“NHBC”) brought suit
against Acordia of Virginia Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Acordia”), for
negligence and breach of an oral contract by failing to include
NHBC as a named insured on a policy of builders risk insurance.
The trial court granted Acordia’s motion to strike NHBC’s evidence
for failure to prove “a covered cause of loss,” even though it found
that Acordia was negligent in failing to list NHBC as a named
insured on the policy.

On appeal, NHBC asserts ten assignments of error, all of which
revolve around the trial court’s refusal to allow recovery for expenses
incurred in “mitigating” defects in the construction covered by the
policy.

For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

IL

Madison Ridge, L.P. (“Madison Ridge”) hired NHBC as a gen-
eral contractor to build the Madison Ridge apartment complex in
Harrisonburg, Virginia, (the “Project’”’?). National Housing Corpora-
tion (“NHC”), as agent for NHBC, negotiated with Acordia to pro-
cure a builders risk insurance policy covering NHBC and other enti-
ties for work on several construction projects, including the Project.
Acordia obtained a builders risk insurance policy from Security
Insurance of Hartford (“Security”) and intended that NHBC be an
insured under that policy (“the Policy”). Acordia admitted, however,
that it never asked Security to list NHBC as a named insured and, in
fact, NHBC was not a named insured under the Policy.

The Project was built on a steep slope that required the construc-
tion of multiple retaining walls. The retaining walls constrained the
earth behind them which, in turn, supported apartment buildings fur-
ther up the slope from the walls. NHBC does not dispute that it
defectively designed and built the retaining walls because its specifi-
cations failed to properly consider the steep incline of the Project.

In the early months of 1998 NHBC requested that a civil engi-
neer examine one of the retaining walls (Wall 1-2) that had moved
forward approximately eight feet so that it was no longer straight.
This condition concerned NHBC and its engineer because the soils
retained by Wall 1-2 supported the other walls and the foundations of
the apartment buildings uphill. Due to his concern about the struc-
tural collapse of Wall 1-2, the engineer recommended taking reme-

250
pt

dial measures to ensure the stability of the foundations for the uphill
apartment buildings. NHBC instituted the suggested remedial mea-
sures and eventually replaced Wall 1-2 with one designed to properly
accommodate the topography of the project. Although the other walls
had not failed and the apartment buildings suffered no physical dam-
age, NHBC adopted the engineer’s suggested remedial measures to
underpin the foundations of those structures so as to prevent any loss
or damage. No loss or damage occurred to the apartment buildings.

NHBC notified Acordia of its claimed loss for the remedial mea-
sures, and on May 5, 1998, NHBC formally requested that Acordia
submit a claim under the Policy to Security. On several occasions
executives at Acordia notified NHBC of its duty to mitigate any loss,
but did not affirm a coverage determination had been made. Security
initially denied NHBC’s claim based on an exclusion in the Policy

error, omission or deficiency in designs, plans or specifications,” due
to the defective wall design. Subsequent to its first denial of NHBC’s
claim and the filing of a suit by NHBC to recover insurance pro-
ceeds, Security notified NHBC that it “was not and never had been a
named insured under the policy claimed and sued upon.”

NHBC then filed a motion for judgment claiming breach of con-
tract and negligence by Acordia for the failure to include NHBC as a
named insured under the Policy. NHBC claimed damages from
Acordia “for engineering, repairing, and stabilizing the affected
walls, and underpinning buildings whose structural integrity and
safety had been compromised” (the “remediation expenses”). NHBC
alleged these “losses would have been covered by the policy if it had
been a named insured thereunder.”

At trial, Acordia questioned whether NHBC was the proper party
to bring suit since Madison Ridge paid the remediation expenses.
Acordia asserted that NHBC was not obligated to cover the remedia-
tion expenses because Madison Ridge incurred the expenses and
failed to “‘purchase or maintain” all-risk insurance covering NHBC
as required by the contract between NHBC and Madison Ridge.

At the conclusion of all the evidence, Acordia renewed a motion
to strike NHBC’s evidence. The trial court found that NHBC had
sustained damages in the amount of $518,690.25 for the remediation
expenses and that Acordia was negligent as a matter of law in failing
to include NHBC as a named insured on the Policy.

HMMM The trial court then determined that NHBC could not
recover against Acordia because even if NHBC had been a named

Ss 25!
PC

insured under the Policy, its “loss” was not covered by the Policy.
Since NHBC could not have recovered under the Policy, then it
could not recover against Acordia. The trial court then granted
Acordia’s motion to strike because NHBC failed “to prove a covered
cause of loss.” We granted NHBC this appeal.

I.

[A] court must adhere to the terms of a contract of insurance
as written, if they are plain and clear and not in violation of
law or inconsistent with public policy. It is not our function to
“make a new contract for the parties different from that
plainly intended and thus create a liability not assumed by the
insurer.”

Blue Cross & Blue Shield y. Keller, 248 Va. 618, 626, 450 S.E.2d
136, 140 (1994) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Crosswhite, 206 Va.
558, 561, 145 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1965)).

NHBC’s claim against Acordia rests on the premise that had
Acordia properly fulfilled its duty as an insurance broker and caused
NHBC to be listed on the Policy, then NHBC would have recovered
from the insurer the remediation expenses caused by the defective
wall. In other words, if NHBC could have recovered under the Pol-
icy, it could recover against Acordia.

In sustaining Acordia’s motion to strike, the trial court opined
from the bench.

I don’t want to substitute my judgment for the jury, but the
Court is making a legal finding that it doesn’t fall within the
policy, and that if the jury did come back and award
$518,690.25, quite frankly I would have to take it away. . . .
But the facts are what the facts are. It’s true that Acordia
screwed up. They didn’t list [NHBC] as a named insured. If
they had listed them as a named insured then the result would
have been the same.

We agree with the trial court.

Ill The Policy provides coverage “‘for ‘loss’ to Covered Property
from any of the Covered Causes of Loss.” The term “Covered
Causes of Loss” is then defined as “Risks of Direct Physical ‘Loss’
to Covered Property except those causes of ‘loss’ listed in the exclu-
sions.” (Emphasis added).

25
_

The Exclusions provision of the Policy then plainly provides:

2. We will not pay for a “loss” caused by or resulting
from any of the following:

e. Defective materials or poor workmanship; error, omis-
sion or deficiency in designs, plans or specifications.

This exclusion does not apply to resultant “loss” to
other Covered Property.

There is no dispute about, and NHBC does not assign error to,
the trial court’s finding that Wall 1-2 was defectively designed and
the activities NHBC undertook in anticipation of the prospect that
Wall 1-2 would fail are the basis of the remediation expenses.
Despite the Policy’s plain language excluding loss caused by defec-
tive design from coverage under the Policy, NHBC nonetheless
claims its remediation expenses are compensable under the “Duties
in the Event of Loss” section of the Policy, which provides in perti-
nent part:

C. DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF LOSS

You must see that the following are done in the event of
“Joss” to Covered Property:

4. Take all reasonable steps to protect the Covered
Property from further damage and keep a record of your
expenses necessary to protect the Covered Property, for
consideration in the settlement of the claim. This will
not increase the Limit of Insurance. However, we will
not pay for the subsequent “loss” resulting from a
cause of loss that is not a Covered Cause of Loss.

Essentially, NHBC claims it would have been under a contractual
duty, had it been listed as a named insured, to have undertaken the
mitigation resulting in the remediation expenses in order to prevent
loss to the uphill apartment buildings, which are “Covered Property”
under the Policy. That duty, if it existed, does not afford a right to
compensation to NHBC under the facts of this case.

Hi No damage occurred to the apartment buildings or other Cov-
ered Property. Therefore, as the trial court noted, there was no “loss”

SS °s:
Pt

to Covered Property. Such loss is a condition precedent to any com-
pensation under the “‘Duties in the Event of Loss” section. A “ ‘loss’
to Covered Property”, the Policy’s predicate to mandatory mitiga-
tion, did not occur, and therefore no obligation to compensate NHBC
arose under the Policy.

Hl Moreover, subparagraph 4 of the “Duties in the Event of
Loss” section further limits any obligation of the insurer because the
contractor’s expenses to protect Covered Property are to be consid-
ered “‘in the settlement of the claim.” The claim, under the facts of
this case and policy, would be “resulting from a cause of loss that is
not a Covered Cause of Loss” and therefore not compensible.

HM In effect, NHBC attempts to bootstrap its remediation
expenses into a covered claim through the “Duties in the Event of
Loss” provision, despite the clear exclusion from coverage for loss
caused by NHBC’s defective design. We agree with the trial court
that the Policy’s plain language does not permit NHBC to circumvent
the exclusion from coverage in this manner and recoup its remedia-
tion expenses. See Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 83
Cal. App. 3d 747, 759-60 (1978) (“The duty of an insured to prevent
and mitigate insurable loss and the obligation of the insurer to reim-
burse for expenses so incurred are separate questions. The fulfillment
of the duty to mitigate does not necessarily give rise to the obligation
of reimbursement... .”).

Il Even if the Policy does not permit NHBC to recover its
remediation expenses, NHBC claims that its common law duty to
mitigate damages allows recovery of the remediation expenses from
Acordia. Usually, the failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative
defense and, therefore, on that point the breaching party, not the
injured party, has the burden to produce evidence. Marefield Mead-
ows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 245 Va. 255, 266, 427 S.E.2d 363, 369 (1993).
However, this case does not involve a failure to mitigate damages.

HMM In a case such as this, where the injured party asserts as
part of his recovery the expense of taking corrective measures to mit-
igate the potential liability of the defendant, the cost of mitigation is
simply another element of his damages. It is axiomatic that where
“there is no liability, . . . there can be no recovery.” Southern Rail-
way Co. v. Lewis, 113 Va. 117, 120, 73 S.E. 469, 470 (1912).
NHBC’s theory of liability is that but for Acordia’s negligence, its
damages, including the cost of mitigation, would have been recover-
able under the insurance contract. As we have demonstrated, how-
ever, those losses were not a liability covered by the policy and, thus,

254
pt

Acordia’s negligence was not a proximate cause of NHBC’s losses.
Regardless of whether NHBC premises its theory of recovery on
contract law or common law, it cannot recover damages where there
is no liability.

I.

HM For the reasons stated above, we find that even if NHBC had
been a named insured on the Policy, the Policy did not provide cov-
erage for the remediation expenses it now seeks against Acordia.
Consequently, NHBC has no cognizable claim against Acordia either
in contract or tort. The trial court did not err in granting Acordia’s
motion to strike NHBC’s evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the
trial court will be affirmed.*

Affirmed.

* Having resolved NHBC’s assignments of error in favor of Acordia, we do not address any
of Acordia’s assignments of cross-error.

255

KARYN LYNN ALGER
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 030848

January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J.

No
A
an

S. Jane Chittom for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Karyn Lynn Alger (“Alger”) was convicted in the Circuit Court
of Page County for unlawfully possessing a firearm after having been
convicted of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. She was
sentenced to five years in prison with three years suspended.

On appeal, Alger does not dispute that she was a convicted felon
or that she possessed a firearm in her home on the date of the
offense. Instead, Alger contends, as she did in the trial court and the

es 251
Pe

Court of Appeals, that Code § 18.2-308.2, as amended and reenacted
by the General Assembly, permitted her to possess a firearm within
her residence. The Commonwealth responds that Code § 18.2-308.2
allowed Alger to possess a stun weapon or taser in her residence, but
not a firearm.

The issue before the Court is whether, at the time of the offense,
Code § 18.2-308.2 permitted Alger to possess a firearm in her home.
For the reasons that follow, we answer that inquiry in the negative
and will therefore affirm Alger’s conviction.

IL

In the 2001 session of the General Assembly, Code § 18.2-308.2
was amended by adding a subclause (b) to the first sentence of sub-
section A. As amended in 2001 and in force on the date of the
offense, the statute provided in pertinent part:

Tt shall be unlawful for (i) any person who has been convicted
of a felony . . . to knowingly and intentionally possess or
transport any (a) firearm or (b) stun weapon or taser as
defined in § 18.2-308.1 except in such person’s residence or
the curtilage thereof or to knowingly and intentionally carry
about his person, hidden from common observation, any
weapon described in subsection A of § 18.2-308.

Code § 18.2-308.2(A) (as amended 2001) (emphasis on amended
language).!

' For reasons unknown, when the 2001 version of the Code of Virginia was printed by the
contract publisher, Michie Law Publishers, a comma appeared in Code § 18.2-308.2(A)
between the first reference to “§ 18.2-308.1” and the word “except.” The publisher subse-
quently issued an errata sheet which corrected the error by removing the erroneous comma and
showing the statute in conformity with the Acts of Assembly. See Acts, 2001, cc. 811, 854
(showing enactment by the General Assembly with no comma). However, on September 7,
2001, the date of the charged offense, the publisher’s version of the cumulative supplement to
the Code of Virginia reflected the erroneous comma in the text of Code § 18.2-308.2(A).

Alger does not contend on appeal that the uncorrected cumulative supplement pamphlet for
2001, erroneously published with a comma before the “except” clause, has any legal efficacy.
‘We consider only the language actually adopted by the General Assembly, which did not have
a comma before the “except” clause.

The General Assembly subsequently amended Code § 18.2-308.2 in 2002 and 2003. The
most recent version of Code § 18.2-308.2(A) states in pertinent part that:

It shall be unlawful for (i) any person who has been convicted of a felony . . . to

knowingly and intentionally possess or transport any firearm or stun weapon or taser as
defined by § 18.2-308.1 or to knowingly and intentionally carry about his person, hid-

258 es
fF

It is uncontested that on September 7, 2001, Alger was a con-
victed felon and intentionally possessed a shotgun inside her home.
The trial court determined that the clause “except in such person’s
residence or the curtilage thereof” (the “except” clause) only modi-
fied “stun weapon or taser as defined by § 18.2-308.1,” and not
“firearm.” Accordingly, the trial court rejected Alger’s reading of
Code § 18.2-308.2(A) that the “except” clause modified “firearm”
so as to permit a convicted felon to possess a firearm in her resi-
dence. Alger was then convicted of the offense charged.

On review, the Court of Appeals, citing Cummings v. Fulghum,
261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001), reviewed the statute “in
its entirety, rather than by isolating particular words or phrases.”
Alger v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 89, 93, 578 S.E.2d 51, 53
(2003). The Court of Appeals rejected Alger’s interpretation of the
statute finding that it would “yield an absurd result.” Jd. We granted
Alger this appeal.

IL

Alger argues that Code § 18.2-308.2 “appears on its face to per-
mit a convicted felon to possess firearms and stun weapons/tasers,
within her own residence.” In support of this interpretation of the
statute, Alger asserts that conventions of legal drafting require items
tabulated in an enumeration to be of the same class and that words
preceding or following the enumeration shall apply to each item in
the series. Therefore, in Alger’s view, the “except” clause modifies
both ‘‘(a) firearm or (b) stun weapon or taser.” Alternatively, Alger
asserts that Code § 18.2-308.2, as a penal statute, must be strictly
construed against the Commonwealth and in her favor to resolve any
ambiguity. Further, Alger argues the Court of Appeals improperly
considered the legislative history of the statute without expressly
finding the statute to be ambiguous.

The Commonwealth disagrees with Alger’s interpretation of the
amended language of Code § 18.2-308.2(A) and argues the “except”
clause only modifies subclause (b) concerning stun weapons and
tasers.

Although our analysis differs from that of the Court of Appeals,
we reach the same result.

den from common observation, any weapon described in subsection A of § 18.2-308.
However, such person may possess in his residence or the curtilage thereof a stun
weapon or taser as defined by § 18.2-308.1.

Code § 18.2-308.2(A) (as amended 2003); Acts, 2003 ¢. 110; Acts, 2002 c. 362.

Il.

HMB In reviewing the language of Code § 18.2-308.2, we adhere
to the familiar principle that

[uJnder basic rules of statutory construction, we determine the
General Assembly’s intent from the words contained in the
statute. When the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts
are bound by the plain meaning of that language and may not
assign a construction that amounts to holding that the General
Assembly did not mean what it actually has stated.

Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271, 576 S.E.2d 468, 470
(2003) (citations omitted). Prior to the 2001 amendments to Code
§ 18.2-308.2, it is clear the obvious intent of that statute was to pro-
hibit persons convicted of felonies from possessing firearms. See e.g.,
Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 583, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144
(2002) (“the legislative intent of Code § 18.2-308.2 is to prohibit
convicted felons from possessing ‘any firearm’’’). The General
Assembly added language to Code § 18.2-308.2 in 2001 that
expanded the proscription against possessing firearms by a convicted
felon to include stun guns or tasers. See Acts, 2001 cc. 811 and 854.
Concurrently with the addition of this language, the General Assem-
bly also added the exemption for possession in the home or sur-
rounding curtilage.”

HBB While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed
against the Commonwealth in criminal cases, “we will not apply ‘an
unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute’ that would sub-
vert the legislative intent expressed therein.” Armstrong, 263 Va. at
581, 562 S.E.2d at 144. To avoid an “unreasonably restrictive” inter-
pretation of the statute, we may employ established rules of statutory
construction. One such rule, sometimes referred to as the last antece-
dent doctrine, is particularly applicable here and can be summarized
as follows:

Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no con-
trary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. The
last antecedent is ‘the last word, phrase, or clause that can be
made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sen-

? We mention the legislative history of Code § 18.2-308.2 only to provide context to the
amended language at issue here. As it is not the basis of our interpretation of the statute we
need not consider Alger’s argument in that regard,

260 a
Fe

tence.’ Thus a proviso usually is construed to apply to the pro-
vision or clause immediately preceding it.

2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.33
(6th rev. ed. 2000); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, __ U.S. _.
124 S.Ct. 376, 380 (2003) (explaining and applying ‘“‘the grammati-
cal ‘rule of the last antecedent,’ according to which a limiting clause
or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun
or phrase that it immediately follows .. . .”); Nobelman v. American
Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 330 (1993) (noting that construction of
a statute according to the last antecedent rule is “quite sensible as a
matter of grammar”).

[il In the case at bar, the phrase “‘stun weapon or taser as defined
in § 18.2-308.1” is the last antecedent before the “except clause.”
As such, “stun weapon or taser” is the referential and qualifying
phrase. Thus, according to the last antecedent rule of construction,
the “except” clause modifies only “stun weapon or taser” and not
“firearm.” See e.g., Keene v. Travelers Indemnity Company of Illi-
nois, 73 F. Supp. 2d 638, 641 (W.D. Va. 1999) (employing the last
antecedent doctrine to interpret an insurance contract); Sun Valley
Foods Co. v. Ward, 596 N.W.2d 119, 123 (Mich. 1999) (employing
last antecedent doctrine to interpret a statute). The wording of the
amendment to the statute further reinforces this reading because the
General Assembly differentiated between “firearms” and “stun
weapons or taser” by inserting the “‘a” and “‘b” designations before
those terms.

HH Alger argues that “[wJhen items are tabulated in an enumer-
ation, the conventions of legal drafting provide that the enumerated
items must all be of the same class and that the words preceding and
following the enumeration shall apply to each item in the series.”
Inspection of the source material Alger cites for this proposition,
however, makes clear that the statutory language of Code § 18.2-
308.2 is not what is contemplated as items “tabulated in an enumera-
tion.” See generally Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal
Drafting § 6.3 (1965); see e.g., Code § 18.2-308.7 (items tabulated in
an enumeration).

2 Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting § 6.3 at 86 (1965):
‘The following provision exemplifies the sentence form of tabulation:
Any person punishable under this chapter who:
(1) commits an offense punishable under this chapter, or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, or procures its commission; or

es 261
pC

HM Moreover, had the General Assembly intended to permit
convicted felons to possess a firearm in their residence it would have
done so. We “assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words
it used when it enacted the relevant statute.” Barr v. Town & Coun-
try Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990).

Hl For these reasons it is evident that Code § 18.2-308.2 did not
permit Alger, as a convicted felon, to possess a firearm within her
home, the curtilage thereof or anywhere else. We will therefore
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Affirmed.

(2) causes an act to be done that if directly performed by him would be pun-
ishable under this chapter;
is a principal.
The following provision exemplifies the list form of tabulation:

‘The Trustee may buy any of the following:
(1) United States Government bonds.
(2) State bonds.
(3) Municipal bonds.
(4) Preferred stock.
(5) Common stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

262

RIVER HEIGHTS ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL.
Vv.
ALICE BATTEN, ET AL.
Record No. 030180
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico and Compton, S.JJ.

HLL

Ny
fon
b

Grayson P. Hanes (Aaron S. Book; Reed Smith, on briefs), for
appellant.

a
FT

Christopher J. Smith (Jones & Green, on brief), for appellee.

SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Procedural Background

Tn a bill of complaint for declaratory judgment, Alice Batten and
other owners of lots in the Carrsbrook Subdivision in Albemarle
County (collectively, Batten)! sought a declaration favoring the
enforceability of restrictive covenants prohibiting commercial use of
four unimproved lots in the same subdivision, namely, Lots 1, 2C,
and 2D in Section C and Lot | in Section E. River Heights Associ-
ates Limited Partnership is the record owner of Lot 1, Section C,
which it acquired in 1998, S.V. Associates is the record owner of
Lots 2C and 2D, Section C, which it acquired in 1978, and First
Gold Leaf Land Trust is the record owner of Lot 1, Section E, which
it acquired in 1986. Batten named these record owners as the defen-
dants in her bill of complaint.

Although the entities just listed hold title to the four lots in ques-
tion, the briefs describe Wendell W. Wood and his wife, Marlene C.
Wood, as the beneficial owners of the lots. While the Woods were
not named as defendants below and are not parties to this appeal, the
appellants in the case are referred to collectively in the briefs as
“Wood,” and we will follow the same practice.

‘Wood demurred to the bill of complaint on the grounds, inter
alia, that Batten had failed to state a cause of action upon which
relief could be granted and had failed to allege the existence of a
controversy pursuant to Code § 8.01-184, a part of the declaratory
judgment statutes, so as to confer jurisdiction over the claims
asserted in the bill of complaint. The trial court overruled the demur-
rer on these grounds but sustained it on other grounds not pertinent
here and allowed Batten to file an amended bill of complaint.

Batten filed an amended bill not differing in substance from her
original bill. Wood filed an answer to the amended bill in which he
denied the essential elements of Batten’s claim for relief. In a section
styled ‘Affirmative Defenses,” Wood contended that Batten had
failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted,
that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable, and that the covenant

' The other lot owners are James W. Craig, Anthony A. Hastoglis, Elizabeth S. Hastoglis,
Joseph T. Mason, Nancy P. Mason, Thomas A. McQueeney, Catherine C. Teague, Joseph W.
‘Teague, Jr., Edith L. B, Turner, Robert E. Whitworth, John W. Wolcott, III, and Karen Wolcott.

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did not apply to his property. Wood also contended that he had no
knowledge of the covenant.

Evidentiary Background

Carrsbrook Subdivision is located on the eastern side of U.S.
Route 29 between the northern city limits of Charlottesville and the
Rivanna River. The four lots here in dispute are located at the west-
em edge of the subdivision and are the only lots with frontage on
U.S. Route 29.

The restrictive covenants were established in a deed dated May 6,
1959, from Norman Kelsey and wife to Charles W. Hurt (the Kelsey-
Hurt deed), which conveyed an unsubdivided 40-acre portion of “the
land known as ‘Carrsbrook.’ ” The conveyance was made subject to
“certain restrictions . . . which shall be considered as covenants run-
ning with the land.” Only one of the restrictions is pertinent here:
“The property is to be used for residential purposes only and no
rooming house, boarding house, tourist home, or any other type of
commercial enterprise, or any church, hospital, asylum, or charitable
institution shall be operated thereon” (the restrictive covenant).

In October 1960, Section C of Carrsbrook was subdivided into 19
lots, all made “‘subject to the restrictive covenants applicable to Carr-
sbrook Subdivision of record.” An attached plat shows Lot 1 as con-
taining 3.04 acres bordering Carrsbrook Drive, Indian Spring Road,
and Route 29. Lot 2 is shown as containing 2.55 acres bordering
Indian Spring Road and Route 29. A notation on the plat states that
“[lJots 1 & 2 restricted to non access on Rte. 29 if lots are used for
residential purposes” (the plat note).

In 1962, Lot 2, Section C, was resubdivided into four lots,
namely, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D. Lots 2C and 2D border Route 29. Lots
2A and 2B border only Indian Spring Road, leaving Lots 2C and 2D
without direct access to the residential roads in the subdivision and
Lots 2A and 2B without direct access to Route 29. In addition, Lots
2C and 2D, along with Lot 1C, are subject to the plat note.

In 1969, Albemarle County adopted its first comprehensive zon-
ing ordinance. The lots in question were zoned to a depth of 200 feet
from Route 29 in a B-1 classification, a commercial district in which
residential use is prohibited.? This zoning classification was contin-
ued in a comprehensive rezoning in 1980, with the result that pres-

? The southern portion of Lot 1C remains residentially zoned.

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ently the lots in question are zoned for commercial use but are sub-
ject to the restrictive covenant prohibiting such use.

When Carrsbrook Subdivision was created in 1969, Route 29 was
a two-lane road with residences and small businesses located on each
side of the road. In, the area where the lots in question are located,
Route 29 is today an eight-to ten-lane road that is highly developed
commercially on both sides with shopping centers, hotels, restau-
rants, automobile dealerships, and other types of businesses. No resi-
dential uses have been implemented along Route 29 since 1959.
There have been no changes within the Carrsbrook Subdivision other
than the aging of homes and the maturing of trees.

The Trial Court's Decision

At the conclusion of an ore tenus hearing, the trial court held that
the restrictive covenant against commercial use did apply to the four
lots in question and that the covenant was enforceable. The court
entered a final decree declaring the covenant enforceable and
enjoining the use or operation of the lots in violation of the covenant,
including developing the lots commercially in the future. We
awarded Wood this appeal.

Entitlement to Declaratory Relief

Wood has assigned three errors. One of the assignments alleges
that the trial court “erred as a matter of law in overruling Wood’s
Demurrer, Motion to Strike, and his renewal of the Motion to Strike
[at] the conclusion of all the evidence on the basis that the declara-
tory judgment suit was improper under the declaratory judgment stat-
utes [in] the Code of Virginia.”’?

Wood’s Demurrer

HEB In support of his demurrer, Wood cites City of Fairfax v.
Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 135 S.E.2d 773 (1964), a case where we dis-
missed a motion for declaratory judgment. Quoting Shanklin, Wood
says the test for determining the efficacy of a declaratory judgment
proceeding is whether “[t]he controversy [is] one that is justiciable,
that is, where specific adverse claims, based upon present rather than
future or speculative facts, are ripe for judicial adjustment.” Id. at
229, 135 S.E.2d at 775. And, Wood adds, Shanklin teaches that
courts are not vested with authority “to render advisory opinions, to

3 Code §§ 8.01-184 to -191 comprise the Declaratory Judgment Act.

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decide moot questions or to answer inquiries which are merely spec-
ulative.” Jd. at 229-30, 135 S.E.2d at 776. Wood argues that the alle-
gations of Batten’s bill of complaint did not meet this test and that
this case should never have proceeded past the demurrer stage.

Hl Wood correctly states the rules enunciated in Shanklin. But
the case is inapposite; its facts differ substantially from those in the
case at bar. In Shanklin, a taxpayer sought to have declared invalid
provisions of the city zoning ordinance that conferred on the Board
of Zoning Appeals authority to issue special permits for the construc-
tion of apartments. We held that no justiciable controversy existed
because no specific case regarding apartment usage within the city
was involved and because the Board might never again be called
upon to act on an application for a special permit for apartments.
Therefore, we said, too much was left to speculation. Jd. at 231, 135
S.E.2d at 776. Here, a specific case is involved, and it places in con-
troversy the use of land for commercial purposes.

Wood also argues that the bill of complaint failed to allege an
imminent threat of development necessary to maintain a suit for
declaratory judgment. Wood acknowledges that “[tJhis Court has not
held that a party (such as Wood) must establish a vested right or
obtain the benefit of some significant governmental act before other
affected landowners can utilize the declaratory judgment process to
determine the rights of the parties.” Yet, Wood submits, “something
more than mere speculation — which is all that exists here — is
required [to] invoke the power of the Courts.” Then, citing Hoffman
Family, L.L.C. yv. Mill Two Associates P’ship, 259 Va. 685, 529
S.E.2d 318 (2000), Wood says the “something more” consists of
“ ‘substantial steps,’ such as the expenditure of significant monies or
the development of specific plans, to create a justiciable controversy
under the Declaratory Judgment Act.”

HB We did point out in Hoffman that the developer there had
“taken substantial steps, with significant financial expense, in devel-
oping specific plans for the development” involved in that case. Id.
at 693-94, 529 S.E.2d at 323. But we did not establish the require-
ment that such “significant financial expense, in developing specific
plans for . . . development,” must be alleged and proven in every
case where declaratory judgment relief is requested. Rather, the case
merely represents one example of where proof and allegation are suf-
ficient to take a prospective development out of the realm of specula-
tion. The important precedential value of the case is found in its
holding that a developer need not have governmental approval to

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proceed with a project before a party adversely affected may seek
relief via declaratory judgment. Id.

The present case is akin to Cupp v. Board of Supervisors of
Fairfax County, 227 Va. 580, 318 S.E.2d 407 (1984). There, Cupp
and his wife, owners of a nursery, applied for a special exception to
permit modification of the layout of their nursery. The Planning
Commission recommended that the application be approved on the
condition that the Cupps construct a right turn lane for entrance to
the nursery and dedicate a right-of-way up to 100 feet from the cen-
terline of the highway. The Cupps objected to the requirement for
construction and dedication. The Board denied the application, and
the Cupps filed a motion for declaratory judgment challenging the
requirement. 227 Va. at 584-88, 318 S.E.2d at 408-10.

The Board contended there was no controversy between the par-
ties sufficient for the Cupps to maintain a claim for declaratory judg-
ment. The trial court held the Cupps could maintain their suit and we
affirmed, holding that although the Board had not yet imposed the
restrictions and conditions, “it claimed it had the power to do so and
this claim of power threatened the Cupps [and thus] a controversy,
within the contemplation of the Declaratory Judgment Act, existed.”
Id. at 593, 318 S.E.2d at 414.

I Here, Batten’s bill of complaint alleged Wendell Wood had
met with members of the Carrsbrook Subdivision and “indicated that
he intended to commercially develop the properties at issue [and] he
spoke of developing a commercial three (3) story office building with
related parking facilities.” Further, the amended bill alleged that
Richard E. Carter, an attorney, had written Wendell Wood a letter
stating that the “properties [in question] were bound by restrictive
covenants and could not be used commercially.”* In response, Wen-
dell Wood told the attorney “that he did not believe the restrictions
applied to his property and that it was his express intention to
develop any of the properties he owned on Route 29 as commercial
property and that he wanted to make sure that there was no mistake
as to his intentions.”

The bill also alleged that Donald A. Swofford, a local architect,
had stated in a letter to one of the complainants that Wendell Wood
had asked Swofford ‘“‘to provide him with a proposal to do a planned
development for the sites [in question, using a style called

“ When Carter testified later in the ore tenus hearing, he said that he had been contacted by
a resident of Carrsbrook Subdivision to render an opinion on whether “two lots in Carrsbrook
could be used for commercial purposes.”

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‘Albemarle-Georgian’], including an entry to the Carrsbrook neigh-
borhood.” Swofford also stated that he was providing Wendell Wood
“‘with that proposal now to the end that we would have drawings and
sketches for the neighborhood to review in approximately two
months.”>

Hi In overruling Wood’s demurrer, the trial court stated that Bat-
ten had “pled sufficient facts establishing an actual case or contro-
versy under the Declaratory Judgment Act.” We agree with the trial
court. Just as in Cupp, Wood’s assertion here that he had the power
to develop the lots in question for commercial use and that he would
exercise that power threatened Batten. And the imminence of the
threat was supplied by the statement in Swofford’s letter about hav-
ing “drawings and sketches for the neighborhood to review in
approximately two months.” Thus, a controversy within the contem-
plation of the Declaratory Judgment Act was sufficiently alleged in
Batten’s bill of complaint, and the trial court did not err in overruling
Wood’s demurrer.

Proof of Justiciable Controversy

This brings us to the denial of Wood’s motions to strike Batten’s
evidence at the ore tenus hearing. Wood argues that the motions
should have been granted because Batten did not prove the allega-
tions of her bill of complaint and thus failed to establish a justiciable
controversy under the declaratory judgment statutes. Wood says it
was unrebutted at trial that he “did not have plans prepared at his
request to immediately develop the property”; he “never stated that
he would proceed with development without the Complainants’ con-
sent”; he “did not ask a local architect to provide him with a propo-
sal to do a planned development’’; he “‘never hired a planner”; he
had no “plans underway to prepare drawings in approximately two
months;” and he “‘never incurred significant financial expense — or
any expense whatsoever — with respect to the development of these
properties.”

Tl if this analysis of the record were accurate, we might be
inclined to agree with Wood that Batten failed to prove a justiciable
controversy entitling her to declaratory judgment relief. But the anal-
ysis is not accurate. It completely disregards the most significant evi-
dence in the case on the issue of Batten’s entitlement to declaratory

5 In his testimony at trial, Swofford waffled somewhat about his arrangement with Wood.
However, on demurrer, we take as true the facts alleged in Batten’s bill of complaint for
declaratory judgment.

a

judgment relief — the evidence of Wood’s meeting with the property
owners in Carrsbrook Subdivision.

Wood requested this meeting. He says he wanted the meeting to
avoid a lawsuit and he proposed a compromise under which he
would spend up to $50,000.00 to build an entranceway into Carr-
sbrook Subdivision provided the Carrsbrook lot owners consented to
his plan to develop the property in question with an office complex.
In these circumstances, it is clear that an actual controversy existed
over whether Wood could develop the property in question for com-
mercial purposes. Indeed, Wood’s offer to pay $50,000.00 to make
peace with the Carrsbrook lot owners is proof that an actual contro-
versy existed. Furthermore, Wood’s offer to pay the $50,000.00,
made in light of his statement that “he wanted to make sure there
was no mistake as to his intentions” to develop the property with or
without the consent of the Carrsbrook lot owners, bespeaks immedi-
acy; in other words, consent now or suffer the consequences. Hence,
there was a justiciable controversy, one “ripe for judicial adjust-
ment,” Shanklin, 205 Va. at 229, 135 S.E.2d at 775, and the trial
court did not err in denying Wood’s motions to strike Batten’s
evidence.

The Restrictive Covenant Vis-a-Vis The Plat Note

In another assignment of error, Wood alleges that “[t]he Trial
Court erred in failing to resolve the conflict between the restrictive
covenants on Lots 2C and 2D, and preventing the commercial use of
these two lots as zoned.” It will be recalled that the restrictive cove-
nant prohibits commercial use of the three lots and the plat note pro-
hibits access from the lots to Route 29 if they are used for residential
purposes.

Wood says there is a fundamental inconsistency between the
restrictive covenant and the plat note in this case — the restrictive
covenant prohibits commercial use of the three lots and the plat note
denies access to the lots fronting Route 29 when used for residential
purposes, leaving Lots 2C and 2D without any useable access. This
creates a patent ambiguity, Wood maintains, and since restrictive
covenants must be strictly construed, Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v.
BMC Properties, 255 Va. 75, 80, 496 S.E.2d 64, 67-68 (1998), the
doubt must be resolved against the covenant and in favor of the free
use of the property. Wood concludes that when the doubt here is
resolved in favor of the free use of the lots in question, it is clear that
“[bly restricting access to Route 29 to only non-residential uses, the

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[plat note] specifically contemplated use of the parcels for commer-
cial uses.”

I We disagree with Wood. No ambiguity exists between the
restrictive covenant and the plat note. The restrictive covenant deals
only with the use that may be made of the property, without any
reference to access. The plat note deals only with access to the prop-
erty, without any reference to use, and it cannot be construed, there-
fore, as a basis for saying that the note restriction “specifically con-
templated use of the parcels for commercial uses.”

HM A further reason exists for saying that the plat note did not
“specifically contemplate[] use of the parcels for commercial uses.”
The plat and the instrument to which it was attached created the Sub-
division of Section C “Carrsbrook,” including Lot 2, the parcel from
which Lots 2C and 2D later evolved. The instrument provided that
the numbered lots shown on the plat “are subject to the restrictive
covenants applicable to the Carrsbrook Subdivision of record in the
Clerk’s Office of the Circuit Court of Albemarle County, Virginia, in
Deed Book 348 page 235.” The covenants recorded in that deed
book include the very covenant that prohibits commercial use of lots
in Carrsbrook Subdivision, without excepting Lots 2C and 2D. So,
when the plat note and the restrictive covenant are read together, as
they must be read, it is certain that the plat note could not possibly
have contemplated commercial use of the parcels.

HE «Wood complains that the result of the trial court’s deci-
sion “‘is to allow Wood no use of these lots for anything other than
open space,” resulting in a serious dimunition in the value of the
lots. However, Booker v. Old Dominion Land Co., 188 Va. 143, 152,
49 S.E.2d 314, 319 (1948), is authority for the proposition that the
effect on the value of property resulting from the enforcement or a
refusal to enforce a restrictive covenant “ ‘is of slight if any conse-
quence’ ” (quoting Allen v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 143
N.E. 499, 502 (Mass. 1924)). Furthermore, Wood had at least con-
structive notice from the record chain of title of both the restrictive
covenant that prohibits commercial use of his property and the plat
note that denies Lots 2C and 2D access to Route 29 if developed
residentially.

HE Wood claimed he did not know of the restrictions or thought
they would expire in twenty years. However, the very deed by which

Wood acquired title to Lots 2C and 2D® specifically provided that the
lots were subject, without any time limitation, (1) to the restrictions
set forth in the Kelsey-Hurt deed of 1959, which included the non-
commercial use restriction, and (2) the restrictions set forth in “an
instrument with the plat of Subdivision of Section C, Carrsbrook,”
the plat containing, of course, the restriction denying Lots 2C and 2D
access to Route 29 if developed residentially. But, whether Wood
actually knew of the existence of the restrictions or their length, his
fate is to be determined by what he should have known, harsh though
the result might be. “Equity should not set at naught solemn cove-
nants voluntarily made, when to do so would enrich the covenan-
tor[’] and injure the covenantee.”® Booker, supra, 188 Va. at 152, 49
S.E.2d at 319.

Change of Conditions

In his remaining assignment of error, Wood alleges that “[t]he
trial court erred in failing to remove the residential restrictive cove-
nant as to all four lots (Lots LE, 1C, 2C, and 2D) in light of the
overwhelming evidence that established a change of conditions so
radical as practically to destroy the essential objects and purposes of
the restriction.”

Wood stresses the changes, outlined supra, that have taken place
in the Route 29 corridor since Carrsbrook Subdivision was created in
1969, viz., the previous two-lane road with residences and small busi-
nesses strung along each side has become a heavily traveled eight-to
ten-lane thoroughfare lined on each side with shopping centers,
hotels, restaurants, automobile dealerships, and other types of busi-
nesses. Further, Wood also stresses the fact that “no residential
houses have been built or used from the city limits of Charlottesville

© This deed, from Charles W. Hurt and Letitia H. Hurt to Wendell W. Wood, was dated
December 7, 1968, and recorded among the land records of Albemarle County in Deed Book
452 at Page 475.

7 Wood concedes the obvious ~ “the property was more valuable for commercial rather than
for residential uses.”

* Batten presented evidence about how the residents of Carrsbrook Subdivision would be
damaged if Wood is allowed to develop his property commercially. The prospective damage
took the form of decreased value of Carrsbrook property, additional noise and artificial light,
and increased traffic congestion on Carrsbrook Drive, the primary entranceway for the
subdivision.

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to the South Rivanna River on either the east or west side of Route
29 in the last thirty years.””°

HM The test for determining whether changed conditions warrant
the nullification of a restrictive covenant was enunciated in Deitrick
v. Leadbetter, 175 Va. 170, 8 S.E.2d 276 (1940), as follows:

“No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when changed
conditions have defeated the purpose of restrictions, but it can
be safely asserted the changes must be so radical as practically
to destroy the essential objects and purposes of the
agreement.”

175 Va. at 177, 8 S.E.2d at 279 (quoting Rombauer v. Compton
Heights Christian Church, 40 S.W.2d 545, 553 (Mo. 1931)).

Wood takes the trial court to task, saying that the court “ignored
the radical changes that have occurred in and around the subject
properties since 1959, but rather focused myopically on whether or
not there have been changes within the interior of the Subdivision.”
This is an unfair representation of what the trial court ruled in this
case.

In a letter opinion, the trial court wrote: “[Wood has] failed to
prove that radical changes both in and around the neighborhood have
occurred such that the purpose of the restrictive covenant is
destroyed.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is clear the court did not
focus upon conditions in Carrsbrook Subdivision alone but on condi-
tions “around the neighborhood” as a whole.

This is in accord with Virginia law. In Booker, supra, relief was
sought from a restrictive covenant prohibiting commercial uses of
residential lots in a subdivision. It was alleged that there had been a
change of conditions so radical as to destroy the essential objectives
and purposes of the covenant. These changes included the operation
of a nearby zipper factory, the conversion of one of the lots into a
hard-surfaced road leading to the factory, the widening of the road
on which all the lots abutted from a two-lane roadway, carrying a
small amount of traffic, to a heavily traveled four-lane federal high-
way, the construction nearby of a large shopping center, and the

° Wood also stresses the zoning changes that have occurred along both sides of Route 29
since the restrictive covenant was created. However, in Ault v. Shipley, 189 Va. 69, 75, 52
S.E.2d 56, 58 (1949), this Court said that “‘a zoning law cannot constitutionally relieve land
within the district covered by it from lawful restrictive covenants affecting its use for business
purposes.”

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presence of a skating rink across the road from one of the lots. 188
Va. at 149, 49 S.E.2d at 317.

HM The trial court refused to remove the restrictive covenant.
This Court affirmed. We said that “if a radical change takes place in
the whole neighborhood so as to defeat the purpose of the restrictions
and render their enforcement inequitable and oppressive, equity will
not compel observance of them by injunction.” Jd. at 148-49, 40
S.E.2d at 317. (Emphasis added.) See also Marks v. Wingfield, 229
Va. 573, 576, 331 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1985).

Wood seemingly would have the rule the other way —
ignore the circumstances within the property protected by a restric-
tive covenant and focus only upon the surrounding area. However,
common sense tells us that when the issue is whether a restrictive
covenant still serves its intended purpose and that purpose is to pro-
tect the lots in a particular subdivision from commercial uses, the
conditions existing within the subdivision must be examined along
with those existing in the surrounding area in order to determine the
issue fairly. To ignore the conditions within the subdivision and to
hold the covenant unenforceable solely because of changed condi-
tions elsewhere would deny the lot owners the protection to which
they are entitled according to a solemn covenant voluntarily made,
and that would be grossly unfair.

What is required, therefore, is a leveling exercise in which fair
consideration is given both to conditions in the subdivision and those
in the surrounding area. Here, the facts are that there have been no
changes within Carrsbrook Subdivision other than the aging of
homes and the maturing of trees but there have been substantial
changes within the surrounding area. After giving fair consideration
to both situations, we are of opinion the changes are not so radical as
to defeat the purpose of the covenant.

Hl Finally, Wood cites Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Center
Associates, L.P. v. Smith, 264 Va. 350, 568 S.E.2d 676 (2002). That
case involved a covenant that restricted the use of one piece of prop-
erty to protect a historic home located on other property across the
toad. Later, the historic home was moved to a different location and,
in the meantime, the surrounding area had been transformed into a
thriving commercial area. This Court affirmed the trial court’s nullifi-
cation of the covenant, holding that such a radical change satisfied
the standard articulated in Booker and its progeny. Id. at 356-57, 568
S.E.2d at 680. However, Chesterfield Meadows is inapposite. Lack-
ing here is a radical change like moving a historic home from its

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protected location, which negates the very purpose of the restrictive
covenant.

Conclusion
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court will be
affirmed.

Affirmed.

ROBERT MICHAEL MCMINN
v.

SCOTT CHRISTOPHER ROUNDS, ET AL.
Record No. 030286

January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Compton, S.J.

Jean-Pierre Garnier (Garnier & Garnier, on brief), for appellant.
Jack A. Robbins, Jr. (Brault, Palmer, Grove, White & Steinhilber,
on brief), for appellees.

SENIOR JUSTICE COMPTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this civil action based upon an alleged assault and battery in
which the defense of self-defense was raised, the sole question
presented is whether the trial court erred in admitting testimonial evi-
dence of a prior, specific act of alleged assaultive or combative
behavior on the part of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff Robert Michael McMinn filed a motion for judgment
against defendants Scott Christopher Rounds and Pops II Incorpo-
rated, t/a Broos, seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly sus-
tained on July 12, 2000. The plaintiff claimed he was assaulted and
battered by Rounds, a Broos employee, in an altercation while an
invitee upon the premises of Broos, a restaurant and bar located in
Sterling. In grounds of defense, the defendants denied liability to the
plaintiff and, among other things, pled that Rounds acted in self
defense during the altercation.

Although the plaintiff sought recovery upon several theories, the
case eventually was submitted to a jury upon the claim that, “with-
out just cause or provocation,” Rounds “struck and with force of
arms assaulted the plaintiff.”

The jury found in favor of the defendants. Upon consideration of
the plaintiff’s motion to set the verdict aside, the court entered judg-
ment on the verdict in a November 2002 order, from which the plain-
tiff appeals.

A detailed recitation of the facts is unnecessary to present the
issue we decide. The plaintiff was among a group of persons attend-
ing a meeting of an investment club on the premises of Broos restau-
rant and bar during the evening of the day in question. Before and
during the meeting, many in the group, including the plaintiff, con-
sumed various quantities of alcoholic beverages.

After some time, the plaintiff decided to leave the premises. An
argument ensued involving a Broos waitress and the plaintiff over
how his share of the “tab” could be paid. Eventually, defendant
Rounds, the Broos bartender, became involved. According to the evi-
dence, as the bartender was “escorting” the plaintiff “out the door”
amid foul language, a fight took place between the two resulting in
injury to the plaintiff.

During their testimony, the plaintiff and Rounds each claimed
that the other was the aggressor in the tussle. Denying he cursed or
threatened anyone, the plaintiff testified that, as he was leaving the
premises, Rounds “‘in a fairly agitated state, . . . came rushing up
behind me.” The plaintiff stated: “The next thing I know I’m on the
ground with my arm twisted behind my back, and Mr. Rounds has
me by the throat with his hand, pretty much a choke-hold.”

Rounds, on the other hand, testified that during “‘the later part of
the evening,” the plaintiff, who Rounds did not know, became
“argumentative,” used vulgar language toward the waitress, and
appeared to be intoxicated. According to Rounds, he told the plaintiff
twice to leave the premises. As he was walking out of the premises,
the plaintiff “turned around and struck me with his hands on one
side of my face and one side of my chest,” Rounds said. The defen-
dant stated he then put his arms around the plaintiff’s chest “and
yelled at him to tell him to calm down. At that point, . . . he was
starting to fight at me and . . . our feet got tangled up and we both
just fell to the floor backwards.”

Over the plaintiff’s objection, the trial court permitted the defen-
dants to present evidence of an incident involving the plaintiff occur-

280 Lee
a

ring in Loudoun County on December 17, 1996, about three and one-
half years prior to the event sued upon. In that incident, according to
the testimony, the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle that was
stopped behind another vehicle at an intersection. The plaintiff was
“honking his horn and flipping [the other driver] the bird and
screaming.”

As the other vehicle was driven into a nearby apartment complex,
the plaintiff followed, and according to the other driver, ‘‘pulled
around and cut me off and pulled out right in front of me.” The
plaintiff then “jumped out and just immediately attacked [the other
driver],” proceeding “‘to beat him up.” The evidence showed that the
plaintiff “‘was intoxicated . . . very violent and aggressive.”

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred “in
allowing evidence of a single dissimilar instance of prior aggressive
behavior by McMinn.” The plaintiff says, “In the face of a plea of.
self-defense, evidence of prior acts by the victim which are suffi-
ciently probative of the issue of whom was the aggressor . . . is
admissible under Virginia law if connected in time and circumstances
to the assault and battery in issue.” Here however, the plaintiff
argues, the trial court erred in admitting the evidence “not merely
because the earlier event was remote in time, but because that single
prior episode was not sufficiently similar to bear any relevance to the
incident in question.”

The defendants say “‘the basis upon which the evidence of the
prior incident was offered in this particular case was for the purpose
of establishing McMinn’s character, i.e. - a propensity to undertake
unprovoked physical attacks against individuals when consuming
alcohol.” The defendants argue that the trial court “properly consid-
ered whether or not there was a nexus of relevancy between the prior
conduct or character of McMinn and his behavior on the night of the
incident giving rise to this litigation, and after determining that such
nexus existed, properly allowed the jury to consider the evidence.”
We do not agree.

Tl Initially, we dispose of a procedural matter. We reject the
defendants’ contention that the plaintiff waived his objection to the
evidence in question by not objecting to an amended instruction on
the subject offered by the defendants. A procedural waiver may
occur when the trial court is not afforded an opportunity to rule intel-
ligently on the issue presented. Wright v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 245
Va. 160, 167-70, 427 S.E.2d 724, 728-29 (1993).

| en 281
a

On numerous occasions before, during, and after the trial, the
plaintiff made known to the trial court his objection to admission of
the evidence. At those stages of the proceeding, the trial court was
afforded full opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue. Plaintiff’s
attorney merely responded, “‘That’s fine, Your Honor,” when the ten-
dered instruction was amended. Thus, there was no waiver. See King
v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 582, 570 S.E.2d 863, 866 (2002);
WJLA-TV v. Levin, 264 Va. 140, 159, 564 S.E.2d 383, 394 (2002);
Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 622-23, 499 S.E.2d 829,
832-33 (1998).

Hi We now consider the substantive issue. Preliminarily, we note
“there is a vast difference between reputation and character, and our
chief means of ascertaining character is by evidence of general repu-
tation.” Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541, 562, 127 S.E. 368,
375 (1925). Quoting Henry Ward Beecher, the Court has said:
“ ‘Character is what one really is; reputation is what others believe
him to be.’ ” Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 871, 55 S.E.2d
24, 29 (1949).

HEME In Virginia, the rule in criminal cases is that, when a defen-
dant adduces evidence of self-defense, proof of specific acts is
admissible to show the character of the victim for turbulence and
violence, even when the defendant is unaware of such character.
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 24, 25-26, 197 S.E.2d 189, 190
(1973); Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789, 794, 180 S.E.2d 504,
508 (1971). When admissible, such evidence bears upon the ques-
tions of who was the aggressor or what was the reasonable apprehen-
sion of the defendant for his safety.

HH Upon the question of who was the aggressor, the issue is
what the victim probably did, and evidence of recent acts of violence
toward third persons ought to be received, if connected in time,
place, and circumstance with the crime, as to likely characterize the
victim’s conduct toward the defendant. Randolph v. Commonwealth,
190 Va. 256, 265, 56 S.E.2d 226, 230 (1949). See Burford v. Com-
monwealth, 179 Va. 752, 766-67, 20 S.E.2d 509, 515 (1942); Ras-
nake v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 677, 697-98, 115 S.E. 543, 549-50
(1923). We perceive no sound reason why this rule for criminal cases
should not be applied under the special circumstances of this civil
case.

Il As we have said, the rule speaks of multiple acts, not a single
act. The crucial question then becomes whether only one specific act
of alleged aggressiveness and violent conduct was admissible for the

282 PC
Pe

purpose of establishing the plaintiff’s character. We hold that it was
not.

A single act of bad conduct does not establish one’s unfavorable
character. While evidence of a series of bad acts may collectively be
admissible to establish poor character, the conduct in a single inci-
dent is insufficient. See Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. at 871, 55
S.E.2d at 29 (extrinsic proof of specific act of bad conduct inadmiss-
ible to rebut testimony tending to establish good reputation of
accused for personal traits of character involved).

Indeed, this Court has so ruled in the context of a civil case. In
Homestead Fire Ins. Co. v. Ison, 110 Va. 18, 65 S.E. 463 (1909), the
trial court refused to admit evidence of one Craft upon the general
character of the plaintiff. In affirming the lower court’s action, this
Court said: “General reputation among the people who know the
man is the issue in such a case. The witness Craft expressly states
that he knows nothing about the reputation of the [plaintiff] in this
sense. All he professed to know was his special reputation formed on
a single occasion. . . .” Id. at 25, 65 S.E. at 466.

HM Neither Barnes nor Stover, primarily relied upon by the
defendants, is authority for the admission of the evidence in question;
those cases deal with proof of multiple prior acts to establish
character.

In Barnes, the defendant and the victim had been drinking beer
and liquor prior to the victim being shot and killed by the defendant,
who pled self-defense. The trial court refused to admit the testimony
of the victim’s wife and a rehabilitation counselor about their knowl-
edge of the victim’s “drinking problem” and “aggressive tenden-
cies” when intoxicated. 214 Va. at 25, 197 S.E.2d at 190. Reversing
the trial court, this Court stated that the evidence of prior drinking
activity was admissible to support the defendant’s statement in justi-
fication of the homicide. Jd. at 26, 197 S.E.2d at 190. The Court set
forth the rule as follows: “[When], as here, there is evidence that the
victim was intoxicated at the time of the shooting, evidence of his
character . . . for turbulence when in such condition is admissible on
the issue of self-defense.” Id. Barnes, however, involved proof of
multiple acts of drinking, not just a single incident.

In Stover, deciding an issue under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), this Court reversed a conviction when there had been sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused. The
nondisclosed items were statements of complaining witnesses con-
cerning prior incidents of violence. In the course of ruling on the

| een 283
|

Brady question, the Court said: “[When] an accused adduces evi-
dence that he acted in self-defense, evidence of specific acts is
admissible to show the disposition and character for turbulence and
violence of the deceased and of complaining witnesses.” 211 Va. at
794, 180 S.E.2d at 508. The Court stated that defendant “was denied
the opportunity to show that he was set upon by persons who had
recently committed acts of violence evidencing turbulence of disposi-
tion.” Id. at 795-96, 180 S.E.2d at 509. Again, the Court spoke of
specific “acts,” not a single “act.”

Hl Consequently, because the trial court committed reversible
error in admitting the evidence in question, we will annul the judg-
ment in favor of the defendants and will remand the case for a new
trial.

Reversed and remanded.

284

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
v.
ERIC CHERRON JONES
Record No. 030589
January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ.,
and Compton and Stephenson, S.JJ.

285

Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kil-
gore, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant.
Michael N. Herring (Bricker & Herring, on brief), for appellee.

SENIOR JUSTICE STEPHENSON delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient
to support convictions of robbery and of use of a firearm in the com-
mission of robbery.

I

In a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton, Eric
Cherron Jones was convicted of robbery and of use of a firearm in
the commission of robbery.* Jones was sentenced to 10 years in

* Jones also was convicted of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a
felony. He did not appeal that conviction,

286 ee
|

prison, with seven years suspended, for the robbery conviction and to
. three years in prison for the use-of-a-firearm conviction.

In his appeal before the Court of Appeals, Jones contended, as he
did in the trial court, that, as a matter of law, the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support the robbery conviction and, therefore, also insuffi-
cient to support the conviction for use of a firearm. The Court of
Appeals reversed both convictions and remanded the case for a new
trial for larceny, if the Commonwealth be so advised. Jones v. Com-
monwealth, 39 Va. App. 545, 574 S.E.2d 767 (2003). We awarded
the Commonwealth this appeal from the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

I

Hi We must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the prevailing party at trial. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505,
514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786, cert. denied, ___ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 444
(2003). On February 17, 2001, Jones entered a store known as Shoe
Carnival, in the City of Hampton. Bobby Ray Baker, the store man-
ager, immediately began to watch Jones through a video camera
because Jones previously had stolen merchandise from the store.
Baker watched as Jones picked up shoes in each aisle of the store.
Baker then walked down to the floor to watch Jones. From that van-
tage point, Baker saw Jones put a pair of boots in his pants and walk
out of the store. Jones neither paid for the boots nor had permission
to take them.

Baker followed Jones out of the store and approached him in
“the [store’s] parking lot.” When Baker was “a little less than ten
feet” from Jones, he asked Jones to return the boots. Jones denied
having the boots, and Baker told Jones that he had seen Jones put the
boots in his pants. At that point, Jones withdrew a firearm from a
pocket of his jacket, pointed it at Baker, and said, “You better back
. .. off me.” Baker was frightened, and he ran and hid behind a
parked vehicle. Jones then fled in a nearby car.

Il

HMB Robbery, a common-law offense, is defined as “ ‘the tak-
ing, with intent to steal, of the personal property of another, from his
person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimida-
tion.’ ” George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 277, 411 S.E.2d 12,
20 (1991) (quoting Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 532, 138
S.E.2d 28, 31 (1964)). We have held that, in order to establish a

ee 287
a

robbery, the violence or intimidation “‘must occur before or at the
time of the taking.” Branch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 91, 94, 300
S.E.2d 758, 759 (1983).

Jones contends that the violence or intimidation did not precede
or occur at the same time as the taking. More specifically, he asserts
that he

completed the act of petty larceny by concealing the boots in
his pants. Although [the store manager] could have intervened
to prevent the shoplifting, he failed to do so and allowed Jones
to remove the stolen goods from the store. The record contains
no evidence that Jones employed force to conceal the goods,
or for that matter, to remove them from store property. Instead,
... Jones resorted to a showing of force when [the store man-
ager] attempted to prevent his escape.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, summarizes its conten-
tion as follows:

[The store manager] followed Jones out of the shoe store and
approached him to retrieve the boots that Jones had taken, but
for which he had not paid. While Jones’ original intent may
have been to commit only larceny, his intention changed to
robbery. In order to accomplish the theft, Jones introduced a
firearm to overcome the interference of the manager with
Jones’ asportation of the property. The asportation of the vic-
tim’s property began when Jones picked up the boots inside
the store and continued throughout the time that he pointed the
gun at [the manager] and carried the boots away from [the
manager’s] presence.

The trial court properly found that the larceny was continu-
ing when Jones introduced the weapon.

(Footnote omitted.)

In reversing the trial court’s judgment, the Court of Appeals ruled
that Jones “carried the hidden boots from the store to the parking lot
unhindered,” and, in doing so, “he severed the boots from the pos-
session of the owner.” Jones, 39 Va. App. at 549, 574 S.E.2d at 769.
The Court of Appeals concluded that, when Jones produced the fire-
arm, he used it “to assist in retention of the boots or to facilitate
[his] escape.” Jd. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the
Court of Appeals erred.

288 ee
a

Iv

In support of their contentions, the parties rely in large measure
on three of our cases. Those cases are Pritchard v. Commonwealth,
225 Va. 559, 303 S.E.2d 911 (1983); Durham v. Commonwealth, 214
Va. 166, 198 S.E.2d 603 (1973); and Mason v. Commonwealth, 200
Va. 253, 105 S.E.2d 149 (1958).

In Mason, the accused broke a store’s display window and
entered the store. He picked up a portable television set about two
and one-half feet from the hole in the window and handed it to a
confederate who was outside the store. Just as the accused was hand-
ing the television set to his confederate, the store owner, who had
been hiding behind the display window, struck the accused with a
board. The accused then threw a portable radio at the owner and
fired a pistol four times towards the owner. 200 Va. at 254-55, 105
S.E.2d at 150. The owner testified that “‘ ‘the television was out of
{the accused’s] arms and in the arms of [the accused’s] companion
before [the accused] threw the radio set and started shooting.’ ” Id. at
255, 105 S.E.2d at 150.

In holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a robbery
conviction, we stated the following:

Here no force was used towards [the owner] and there was
no intimidation until accused had taken the television set in his
arms and handed the article to a confederate who made off
with it. The taking and asportation preceded both the violence,
and the intimidation for neither occurred until after accused
had passed the article to his companion and been struck by
[the owner].

The facts and circumstances unquestionably show that in
time sequence the taking and asportation occurred before there
was any violence or intimidation by throwing the radio or by
presentation of firearms.

Id, at 256-57, 105 S.E.2d at 151-52. Unlike the present case, the
accused in Mason had succeeded in removing the merchandise from
the presence and constructive possession of the owner before the
accused introduced violence toward the owner.

In Durham, a mother and her daughter were found stabbed to
death in the daughter’s home. The accused and an accomplice had
broken into and entered the home with the intent to commit larceny.
214 Va. at 167, 198 S.E.2d at 605. We reasonably inferred from
proven facts that, while the thieves were in the process of carrying

ee 289
|

out their intended act, the victims appeared on the scene and sur-
prised them. It was then that the thieves’ intention “changed from
the commission of larceny to robbery to accomplish their original
purpose by overcoming [the victims’] interference with the taking.”
Id. at 169, 198 S.E.2d at 606.

HB In Durham, we stated the following:

Where the owner of personal property, or another having
custody or constructive possession of the same, interposes
himself to prevent a thief from taking the property, and the
force and violence used to overcome the opposition to the tak-
ing is concurrent or concomitant with the taking, the thief’s
action constitutes robbery.

Id. We also said that “[a]n intent to commit robbery does not have to
exist for any particular length of time. It may occur momentarily.”
Id.

[Hl In the present case, Jones, like the thieves in Durham, origi-
nally intended to commit larceny. While Jones was in the process of
carrying out that intention and the larceny was continuing, the store
manager interposed himself to prevent Jones from taking the mer-
chandise. At that time, Jones produced the firearm to overcome the
manager’s opposition to the taking, and his crime became robbery,
not merely larceny.

Finally, in Pritchard, the proprietor of a gasoline service station
filled the tank of the accused’s car. When the proprietor asked the
accused for payment, the accused produced and cocked a firearm.
The proprietor ran into the station, and the accused drove away with-
out paying for the gasoline. 225 Va. at 560-61, 303 S.E.2d at 912.

Pritchard contended that he did not commit a robbery “because
he presented no deadly force or intimidation to {the proprietor] until
after the asportation of the stolen gasoline was complete.” Jd. at 561,
303 S.E.2d at 912. Pritchard claimed that the asportation occurred
when the proprietor pumped the gasoline into the tank of his car.
According to Pritchard, when the pumping of the gasoline ended, the
proprietor had surrendered to him “‘ ‘control and possession’ ” of the
gasoline; thus, the taking was unaccompanied by force or violence
and was merely a petit larceny. Id.

Hl We rejected Pritchard’s contention and focused upon the dis-
tinction, in the context of larceny, between possession and custody.
Id. at 562, 303 S.E.2d at 913. We held that Pritchard had committed
a robbery because, when the gasoline was pumped into the car’s

290 PC
a

tank, Pritchard “became a bare custodian of the gasoline” while the
proprietor “remained in constructive possession [of the gasoline]
pending payment.” Id. at 563, 303 S.E.2d at 913 (emphasis added).
Concluding, we said the following:

When Pritchard produced the firearm, he exerted intimidation
upon [the proprietor]. This subdued [the proprietor’s] ability to
resist and enabled Pritchard to convert his custody into posses-
sion by carrying the goods away in violation of the condition,
with the intent to steal. The use of force preceded this conver-
sion and enabled Pritchard to obtain possession.

Td.

The rationale in Pritchard applies in the present case. When
Jones seized and hid the boots, he had custody of them, not posses-
sion. The store manager, as he observed Jones, retained constructive
possession of the merchandise. As Jones’ larceny was continuing, but
before his custody was converted into possession, the manager inter-
posed himself to prevent the theft. When Jones introduced force and
violence by producing the firearm, his crime was transformed into
robbery.

Vv

Hi In sum, for the reasons stated, we hold that the evidence is
sufficient to support the convictions of robbery and of use of a fire-
arm in the commission of robbery. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals will be reversed, the case will be remanded to the
Court of Appeals with direction that the Court of Appeals remand the
case to the trial court, and the trial court’s judgment shall be
reinstated.

Reversed and remanded.

LAWRENCE KEVIN BLEVINS
Vv.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 031022

January 16, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ.,
and Compton and Stephenson, S.JJ.

8
Ss

Robert D. Finch, Jr. for appellant.
Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry
W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

SENIOR JUSTICE STEPHENSON delivered the opinion of the
Court.

The issue in this appeal involves a trial court’s refusal to declare
a mistrial based on alleged juror partiality.

Ln 293
a

I

In a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke, Law-
rence Kevin Blevins was convicted of object sexual penetration,
malicious wounding, and abduction with intent to defile. Blevins was
sentenced to a total prison term of life, plus 40 years.

Thereafter, Blevins appealed his convictions to the Court of
Appeals. On April 29, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion
affirming the convictions. Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App.
412, 579 S.E.2d 658 (2003). We awarded Blevins an appeal, limited
to the assignment of error as follows: “The trial court erred in over-
ruling the [defendant’s] motion for mistrial based on juror untruthful-
ness during voir dire.”

t
A

A brief summary of the facts relating to the crime will suffice.
On the evening of January 16, 2001, the victim had finished her
work and was walking to her automobile, parked in a parking garage
in the City of Roanoke. She was alone, and, as she put her key into
her car door lock, “all hell broke loose.”” At that moment, the victim
came face to face with the accused, who began to strike her with his
fists. The accused told the victim that, if she would cooperate by
performing a sex act with him, he would stop hitting her. The beating
stopped, and the accused unzipped the victim’s pants and inserted a
finger into her vagina. He also fondled the victim’s breasts.

Several minutes later, and before the accused could rape the vic-
tim, a car approached the victim’s vehicle. When the approaching car
stopped, the victim was able to escape to it, and the accused fled the
scene.

B

The facts pertaining to the issue in this appeal are as follows.
During voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors whether
“any of you or any members of your immediate family [have] ever
been the victim of a serious offense?” AIl members of the venire
answered negatively.

Immediately following the conclusion of Blevins’ trial, Deputy
Jessie W. Roberts encountered juror Bonnie Divers in the jury room.
Divers told Roberts that she was waiting for someone to walk with
her to her car, which was parked in a lot several blocks away. Rob-

294. |
|

erts offered to escort Divers to her car. Roberts informed Divers that,
if she had parked her car in a nearby parking garage, she would have
been reimbursed for her parking expenses. Divers replied that she did
not park in the parking garage because, 13 to 15 years previously,
she had been the victim of an armed robbery in a parking garage.

Thereafter, Roberts informed the Commonwealth’s Attorney of
this conversation, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney reported the
information to defense counsel. Six days after the trial, Blevins filed
a motion for a mistrial based upon Divers’ failure to reveal that she
had been the victim of a serious offense.

On September 4, 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
motion. At the hearing, the trial court asked Divers why she had not
answered affirmatively when the court had asked, during voir dire,
whether any prospective juror had been the victim of a serious
offense. The following exchange then occurred:

DIVERS: Obviously, I didn’t hear you or I didn’t understand. I
would have raised both hands up to have not been on
this trial. I mean I don’t like excitement. I would
have let you known, had I heard you and understood
what you were asking.

THE
COURT: So you didn’t deliberately withhold that information?

DIVERS: Oh, no, no, definitely not. This is not my thing. I
don’t like excitement.

THE Now, the next question is: Because you either didn’t

COURT: hear, or misunderstood, or didn’t understand, having
not answered that question, did the prior bad experi-
ence you went through in any way affect your ability
to fairly and impartially hear Mr. Blevins’ case?

DIVERS: Absolutely not; I did my judgment on the evidence
and the evidence only. It was nothing personal be-
tween nobody, because I don’t know anybody here,
so why would I want to do something like that. That
would be . . . wrong of me, but it had no effect on
my decision at all.

Divers further stated, in answer to questions by the Common-
wealth’s Attorney, that her verdict “was strictly on the evidence,
nothing about my personal life.” She also said that she was “not
bias[ed].”

De 295
|

Il
A

Hi in the present case, the post-trial hearing that the trial court
conducted on Blevins’ motion for a mistrial was the appropriate rem-
edy for allegations of juror partiality. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209, 215 (1982). Following the hearing, the trial court rendered a
written opinion, finding, inter alia, that Blevins

has failed to show that the juror failed to answer honestly to a
material question posed by the court during voir dire. Juror
Divers did not give a correct answer to the question posed, but
she was not deliberately evasive. Either she did not hear the
question or she did not understand the question. She was not
dishonest. She even wondered why she was not asked about
the incident during voir dire. She disclosed the incident to the
deputy sheriff without reservation. Her actions do not reveal
dishonesty but mere inattention or a lack of understanding.
The Court finds that the defendant has not shown that the juror
failed to answer honestly to a material question during voir
dire.

The trial court also found that “there was no valid basis for a chal-
lenge for cause because the juror was not biased.”
The court further found the following:

Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the Court
has determined that Juror Divers was not biased against the
defendant and decided the case based solely on the evidence
presented at trial. She testified that the robbery did not affect
her ability to hear the Blevins case. She further testified that
she was not biased against Mr. Blevins and did not deliberately
deceive the Court. She based her decision strictly on the evi-
dence. Thus, the Court finds that she was not biased and
served as an impartial juror in the defendant’s case. Therefore,
Mr. Blevins’ constitutional rights to due process and an impar-
tial jury were not violated.

Finally, the trial court found “beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Divers] gave [Blevins] a fair and impartial trial” and that, “‘[bJased
upon the lack of deception by [Divers], combined with the over-

whelming guilt of [Blevins], . . . Divers’ presence did not result in
actual prejudice to . . . Blevins.”

B

The Court of Appeals, after a meticulous review of the evidence
and the applicable law, affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Court of
Appeals concluded that, “[bJecause the evidence supported the trial
court’s findings that the juror’s failure to answer the subject voir dire
question was accidental rather than intentional and that she stood
impartial to the cause, its denial of [Blevins’] motion for mistrial was
not error.” Blevins, 40 Va. App. at 429, 579 S.E.2d at 666.

Iv

Blevins asserts that, if Divers had “honestly reveal[ed]” that she
had been a robbery victim during jury voir dire, he would have had a
valid basis to challenge Divers for cause. Blevins also asserts that he
was denied the opportunity to use a peremptory strike in the event a
challenge for cause was denied. Thus, Blevins contends, he was
denied a fair jury trial.*

HM The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States provides, in pertinent part, that, “‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a. . . trial, by an impartial jury.”
The right to an impartial jury is applicable to the states by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968); Manns v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 322, 323, 191 S.E.2d 810,
811 (1972). Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of Virginia also
guarantees an accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury, and
due process requires “a jury capable and willing to decide the case
solely on the evidence before it.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217.

HB In McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S.
548, 556 (1984), the Supreme Court enunciated a two-part test to be
applied in determining whether a litigant is entitled to a new trial in
cases alleging juror dishonesty during voir dire. The Supreme Court
held that, in order to obtain a new trial in such situations, a litigant

* Blevins also contends that the trial court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial “could
weaken public confidence in the integrity of criminal trials.” We will not consider this conten-
tion because it was not raised in the trial court, Rule 5:25. Additionally, Blevins contends that
he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. This contention, however, is not
cognizable on direct appeal. Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 460, 544 8.B.2d 299, 304,
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1003 (2001).

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must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a
material question on voir dire, and then further show that a
correct response would have provided a valid basis for a chal-
lenge for cause. The motives for concealing information may
vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror’s impartiality
can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.

Id. The Supreme Court also noted that it has long held that a litigant
is entitled to a fair, but not perfect, trial, as there are no perfect trials.
Id. at 553.

In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 12, 14, 486 S.E.2d 108,
109 (1997), aff’d per curiam, 256 Va. 214, 505 S.E.2d 378 (1998), a
juror in a murder-by-use-of-a-firearm case had failed to state during
voir dire that her husband had been robbed at gunpoint earlier in the
year. The Court of Appeals, applying the McDonough test, affirmed
the trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial and, in so doing,
observed that “there was no dispute at trial that [the juror] stood
indifferent to the cause.” 25 Va. App. at 18, 486 S.E.2d at 111. The
Court further stated that, “[b]ecause there was no basis for a chal-
lenge for cause, [the juror’s] presence on the jury did not affect the
essential fairness of the trial.” Id.

HMM An appellate court must give deference to a trial court’s
factual finding regarding a juror’s impartiality because the trial court
“ “sees and hears the juror.’ ” Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236,
246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824 (1991)
(quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426 (1985)). Thus, we
will reverse a trial court’s finding with respect to juror impartiality
“only upon a showing of manifest error.” Weeks v. Commonwealth,
248 Va. 460, 475, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
829 (1995).

Hl In the present case, the findings of the trial court are fully
supported by the evidence. Divers did not intentionally give a wrong
answer on voir dire; she either did not hear or did not understand the
court’s question. Divers also was not biased against Blevins, and she
decided the case impartially based upon the evidence presented at
trial. Clearly, therefore, Blevins failed to establish either part of the
two-part McDonough test.

v

Hl Blevins, however, asserts not only a claim based upon alle-
gations of juror dishonesty, but also a general Sixth Amendment

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claim of juror bias. In Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 362-63
(4th Cir), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 956 (1998), the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that “[fJailure to satisfy the requirements
of McDonough does not end the . . . inquiry . . . when the [accused]
also asserts a general Sixth Amendment claim challenging the parti-
ality of a juror based upon additional circumstances occurring outside
the voir dire.” Therefore, regardless of whether a juror’s answer is
honest, an accused has the right to demonstrate that the juror was
actually biased. Id. at 363.

Hl In the present case, at the post-trial hearing, Blevins failed to
show actual bias. As we have previously noted, the trial court’s find-
ings are fully supported by the evidence and clearly establish that
Divers was free of bias and acted impartially. Therefore, the trial
court did not err in overruling Blevins’ motion for a mistrial, and the
Court of Appeals properly affirmed Blevins’ convictions.

VI

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

Affirmed.

es 299

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court
Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 20th day of Febru-
ary, 2004.

Jeffrey Bourke Rice, Appellant,
against Record No. 031823
VSB Docket No. 02-052-0197
Virginia State Bar, Appellee.

Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument by the
appellant, in proper person, and by counsel for the appellee, the
Court is of opinion there is error in the order appealed from.

I. Rule 1.3(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct

The record supports the finding of the Virginia State Bar Discipli-
nary Board (‘Disciplinary Board”) that Jeffery Bourke Rice
(“Rice”) violated Rule 1.3(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(“[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”)

On February 8, 2001, Curtis Lee Thompson (“Thompson”)
retained Rice as counsel to represent him in seeking a sentence
reduction in the Circuit Court of Madison County. Pursuant to Code
§ 19.2-303, the sentence reduction was possible only so long as
Thompson remained in a local jail. Thompson had been in jail for
over a year and was subject to being transferred to the custody of the
state Department of Corrections at any time, which would foreclose
reconsideration of his sentence. Although Rice was aware of these
circumstances and could have taken action within a matter of a few
days, he failed to obtain the necessary documentation and to file a
motion to reconsider with the trial court until March 21, 2001. Along
with the motion, Rice filed a praecipe requesting that the matter be
placed on the trial court’s April 11th motions’ day docket. Thompson
was transferred to the custody of the Department of Corrections on

300
FC

March 22, 2001 and his motion to reconsider was denied when it was
heard on April 11th.

Upon review of the facts presented, the Court is of the opinion
that there is no error in the Disciplinary Board’s finding that Rice
failed to exercise proper diligence as required by Rule 1.3(a).

IL. Rule 8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct

The Disciplinary Board’s determination that Rice violated Rule
8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct is not supported by the
Disciplinary Board’s findings of fact.

Following the filing of a complaint against Rice by Thompson,
the Disciplinary Board sent Rice a copy of Thompson’s complaint.
On May 8, 2002, Rice met with a Virginia State Bar investigator.
Rice received written notices on August 21 and September 26, 2002
that his appearance was required at a November 19, 2002 discipli-
nary committee hearing. On October 22, 2002, Rice was personally
served with a summons to appear at the November 19th hearing.
Despite three forms of notice, Rice did not appear at the November
19th hearing, apparently because he failed to note the date on his
calendar.

Rule 8.1(c) provides that a lawyer shall not “fail to respond to a
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary
authority.” In argument before this Court, Rice suggested that Rule
8.1(c) is inapplicable to this case because a summons to appear at a
disciplinary hearing cannot be considered a demand for information.
He asked the Court to hold that 8.1(c) cannot be used as a basis to
sanction a lawyer for failure to appear at a disciplinary hearing.

The purpose of Rule 8.1 is to ensure a lawyer’s cooperation in
maintaining the integrity of the bar. The rule does not define the
phrase “demand for information.” We hold that a hearing before a
disciplinary committee may be a demand for information and an inte-
gral part of an investigation of misconduct. A hearing provides the
first opportunity for the Bar, in the course of its investigation, to
obtain testimony under oath from the respondent and others. A sum-
mons to appear at a hearing, if it is found that a purpose of the hear-
ing is to gather sworn testimony from the respondent, may be consid-
ered a demand for information.

While Rule 8.1(c) may be violated by failure to appear at a hear-
ing before a disciplinary committee or Board, in this case, the Disci-
plinary Board’s findings of fact do not support its conclusion that
Rice violated the rule. While the Disciplinary Board found that Rice

es 301
Fe

failed to appear, it made no finding that the committee was unable to
gather information from Rice as a result of Rice’s failure to appear.
Therefore, the Disciplinary Board’s determination that the Bar proved
a violation of Rule 8.1(c) by clear and convincing evidence is unsub-
stantiated. This charge is dismissed.

III. The Sanction

In its order, the Disciplinary Board suspended Rice’s license to
practice law for one year. The sanction was based on Rice’s violation
of Rule 1.3(a) and Rule 8.1(c). Because we have dismissed the
Board’s finding that Rice violated Rule 8.1(c), we will remand the
matter to the Disciplinary Board to reconsider the sanction to deter-
mine whether the one-year suspension is merited for Rice’s violation
of Rule 1.3(a) alone.

Accordingly, the order of the Disciplinary Board, dated May 5,
2003, is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for recon-
sideration of the sanction for Rice’s violation of Rule 1.3(a).

This order shall be certified to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary
Board and shall be published in the Virginia Reports.

JUSTICE KOONTZ, JUSTICE LEMONS, and SENIOR JUSTICE
COMPTON, dissent from Sections Il and MI.

A Copy,

Teste:
QALA. (2g

Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk

302

TERESA WILSON BEAN LEWIS
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 032153
March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

isa)
a

Thomas Blaylock (David A. Furrow; Allen W. Dudley, Jr; Fur-
row & Dudley, on briefs), for appellant.

Katherine P. Baldwin, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry
W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

As required by Code § 17.1-313, we review the sentences of
death imposed upon Teresa Wilson Bean Lewis.

L

On November 20, 2002, the defendant was indicted by a grand
jury for the following offenses: capital murder for hire of Charles J.
Lewis in violation of Code § 18.2-31(2); capital murder for hire of
Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., in violation of Code §§ 18.2-31(2); conspir-
acy to commit capital murder in violation of Code §§ 18.2-22 and
-31; robbery of Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., in violation of Code § 18.2-
58; use of a firearm to commit the murder of Julian Clifton Lewis,
Jr, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1; use of a firearm to commit the
murder of Charles J. Lewis in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1; and use
of a firearm to commit the robbery of Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., in
violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.

The defendant pled guilty to these offenses. Before accepting the
pleas, the circuit court questioned the defendant and made a determi-
nation that her guilty pleas were made voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly. Additionally, the court considered a competency assess-
ment of the defendant made by Barbara G. Haskins, M.D., a board-
certified forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Haskins opined that the defendant
had the capacity to enter pleas of guilty to charges of capital murder
and had the ability to understand and appreciate the possible penal-
ties that might result from her pleas.

Haskins stated the following in her competency assessment:

“Ms. Lewis is aware of her charges and the possible penal-
ties she is facing (life without parole or death). She knows
who her attorneys are and feels comfortable working with

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them. She is able to provide them with information, and to ask
questions.

“Cognitive testing showed a Full Scale IQ of 72. Verbal
IQ was 70, and Performance IQ was 79. This places the defen-
dant in the borderline range of mental retardation (Borderline
Intellectual Function).”

Haskins opined that Lewis, who had graduated from high school and
had completed one year of college, was competent to stand trial,
make a plea agreement and enter pleas.

The Commonwealth submitted, and the circuit court accepted, a
written summary of the evidence that the Commonwealth would have
presented had the case proceeded to a trial. The circuit court sched-
uled a separate hearing to consider evidence before fixing punish-
ments. The circuit court also received the probation officer’s report
in the manner prescribed by law.

After considering the evidence adduced during the sentencing
hearing and the written summary of the Commonwealth’s evidence,
the circuit court found that the defendant’s conduct was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman and sentenced her to death for
both capital murder offenses. The court fixed her punishments for the
remaining convictions as follows: 20 years imprisonment for each
conspiracy charge; life imprisonment for the robbery charge; and 13
years imprisonment for the firearms charges.

The court conducted a post-sentencing hearing and clarified its
decision regarding the imposition of the sentences of death. The
court stated that the defendant’s sentences of death were based upon
the statutory vileness predicate because her acts reflected a depravity
of mind. The court also concluded that the actual murderers had
committed aggravated batteries upon each victim and those aggra-
vated batteries were imputed to the defendant.

IL.

Julian Clifton Lewis, Jr., had been employed for several years by
Dan River, Inc. His first wife, who had been ill for a long time, died
in January 2000. In March or April 2000, Julian Lewis met the
defendant, who was also employed by Dan River. The defendant
began to live with Julian Lewis at his home in Danville in June
2000. Subsequently, Julian Lewis married the defendant.

In December 2001, Julian Lewis’ older son, Jason Clifton Lewis,
died in a car accident. Julian Lewis was the beneficiary of his son’s

life insurance policy, and Julian Lewis received proceeds in excess of
$200,000. He placed those proceeds in a draft account with Pruden-
tial Securities, Inc. The proceeds of the account were accessible only
by use of drafts bearing the signature of Julian Lewis.

In February 2002, Julian Lewis purchased a five-acre parcel of
Jand in Pittsylvania County. He also purchased a mobile home and
placed it on the property, where he and the defendant resided.

In August 2002, Julian Lewis’ younger son, Charles J. Lewis, an
Army reservist, was required to report for active duty with the
National Guard in Maryland. According to Lieutenant Michael
Booker, Charles Lewis’ commanding officer, Lewis made estate
arrangements in the event he died while on active duty. Charles
Lewis executed a will and identified his father as his primary benefi-
ciary and his stepmother, the defendant, as the secondary beneficiary.
Charles Lewis obtained a policy of life insurance in the amount of
$250,000 payable in the event of his death. He designated his father
as the primary beneficiary of the life insurance policy and the defen-
dant as the secondary beneficiary.

In the autumn of 2002, Rodney L. Fuller and Matthew J. Shallen-
berger met the defendant at a retail store. Prior to this meeting, the
defendant did not know these men. After a conversation, Shallen-
berger and the defendant exchanged telephone numbers and began to
communicate frequently. Shallenberger and the defendant discussed
the possibility that Shallenberger, with Fuller’s help, would kill
Julian Lewis, and they would share any insurance proceeds that the
defendant might receive.

One day, the defendant and her 16-year-old daughter, Christie
Bean, met Shallenberger and Fuller at a parking lot in Danville.
Christie, who had never met Fuller previously, had sexual intercourse
with him in one car while the defendant and Shallenberger engaged
in sexual intercourse in another vehicle. On a later date, Fuller and
Shallenberger went to the defendant’s home where she performed a
“lingerie show” for the men, and she had sexual intercourse with
both men.

On October 23, 2002, the defendant met Shallenberger and Fuller
at a shopping center in Danville. The defendant went to a bank and
obtained $1,200 in cash that she gave to the men to use to purchase
firearms and ammunition to kill Julian Lewis. Antwain D. Bennett,
an acquaintance of Shallenberger, used the money to purchase three
firearms. Two of the firearms were shotguns. Additionally, Bennett
purchased ammunition for the weapons.

On that same date, the defendant told Shallenberger and Fuller
the route that Julian Lewis traveled from his place of employment to
his home. The men planned to kill Julian Lewis and “make the mur-
der . . . look like a robbery.” While the defendant remained at her
home, the men were “to follow and stop Julian Lewis on the high-
way and kill him.” The plan, however, was unsuccessful.

Consequently, the defendant, Shallenberger, and Fuller decided to
kill Julian Lewis at his home on October 30, 2002. They also
decided to kill his son, Charles Lewis, when he returned to Virginia
to attend his father’s funeral and share the proceeds from Charles
Lewis’ policy of life insurance. However, when the conspirators
learned that Charles Lewis would be with his father at the mobile
home on October 30, 2002, they decided to kill him and his father
simultaneously.

During the early morning of October 30, 2002, Shallenberger and
Fuller drove a vehicle past the Lewis’ home about three times. The
men did not stop their vehicle because they observed that lights were
on in the home. Eventually, Shallenberger and Fuller entered the resi-
dence through a rear door that the defendant had unlocked. Each man
carried one of the shotguns that had been purchased with the $1,200
cash the defendant had given them. Shallenberger and Fuller awak-
ened the defendant, who was in bed with her husband. Shallenberger
told the defendant, “Teresa, get up.” The defendant got out of her
bed and walked into the kitchen, and she heard gunshots. Shallen-
berger shot Julian Lewis several times. The defendant went to the
bedroom where her husband lay bleeding, retrieved Julian Lewis’
pants and wallet, and returned to the kitchen with Shallenberger.

Fuller entered a room that was occupied by Charles Lewis. Fuller
shot Charles Lewis three times. Then Fuller went to the kitchen
where he observed the defendant and Shallenberger “pulling money
from a wallet.” Fuller told the defendant and Shallenberger that
Charles Lewis “wouldn’t die.” Fuller got Shallenberger’s shotgun
and returned to the bedroom occupied by Charles Lewis where Fuller
shot him two more times. The men retrieved most of the shotgun
shells, and they divided $300 in cash that had been taken from Julian
Lewis’ wallet.

After shooting the victims, Shallenberger told the defendant that
he was sorry she “had to go through something like this; hugged her
and kissed her; and the men left.”” The defendant waited about 45
minutes after the “last shot was fired,” and she made a telephone

308 Len
a

call to her former mother-in-law, Marie Bean. Next, she made a tele-
phone call to her best friend, Debbie Yeatts.

On Wednesday morning, October 30, 2002, approximately 3:55
a.m., the defendant placed a telephone call to emergency response
personnel in Pittsylvania County. She reported that an intruder had
entered her home and shot her husband and his adult son. She stated
that both men were dead. She said that she had been in the bed with
her husband when an intruder armed with a pistol entered her bed-
room and said, “‘Get up.” Her husband told her to go into the bath-
room, and her husband asked the intruder, ‘““What’s going on?” The
defendant said that her husband was shot four or five times while she
was in the bathroom. She reported that the shooting had occurred at
3:15 or 3:30 am.

Sheriff deputies Harris Silverman and Corey Webb arrived at the
murder scene at approximately 4:18 a.m., 23 minutes after the defen-
dant made the telephone call to the emergency response personnel.
The deputies met the defendant at the front door of her home, and
she stated that her husband’s body was on the floor in one bedroom
and that her stepson’s body was in another bedroom. When Deputy
‘Webb entered the master bedroom, he learned that Julian Lewis was
alive. Julian Lewis “made slow moans” and uttered, “[BJaby, baby,
baby, baby.” Deputy Webb asked the victim his name, and he
responded, “Julian.” Deputy Webb asked Julian Lewis if he knew
who had shot him, and the victim responded, “My wife knows who
done this to me.”

While the deputies tried to assist the victims, Deputy Webb
observed the defendant conversing on the telephone, and he heard
her state, “I told C.J. [Charles Lewis] about leaving that back door
unlocked.” Julian Lewis died in his residence. When Deputy Webb
informed the defendant that her husband and stepson were dead, she
did not appear upset.

Investigator J.T. Barrett of the Pittsylvania County Sheriff’s
Office arrived at the murder scene approximately 7:00 a.m. on Octo-
ber 30, 2002. Barrett interviewed the defendant twice. Investigator
Keith N. Isom also interviewed the defendant. During one of the
interviews, the defendant claimed that her husband had physically
assaulted her a few days before his death, and she denied knowledge
of her husband’s killer. She said that she would not kill her husband
or have him killed.

Investigator Barrett asked the defendant what she and her hus-
band did before they went to bed on the night of the murders. She

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said that she talked with her husband, and that they prayed together.
She told her husband that she was going to pack his lunch, and he
went to sleep. She prepared a lunch and placed it in the refrigerator.
She wrote a note on the lunch bag that stated, “I love you. I hope
you have a good day.” A picture of a “smiley face” was drawn on
the bag and inscribed in the “smiley face” was the message, “I miss
you when you’re gone.”

Mike Campbell, Lewis’ supervisor, testified that Julian Lewis did
not use bags to bring his Junch to work. Rather, Julian Lewis took
his lunch to work in a blue and white cooler.

Investigator Isom interviewed the defendant again on November
7, 2002. During this interview, the defendant admitted that she had
offered Matthew Shallenberger money if he would kill her husband.
After the interview, the defendant again spoke with Investigator
Isom. The defendant told Isom that she had met her husband’s killer
at a retail store and that he was from New York. The defendant
stated that she had “let him in” her mobile home, and he shot both
Julian Lewis and Charles Lewis, took some money, and left. She told
the investigator that she had agreed to give Shallenberger half of the
insurance proceeds that she expected to receive, but she changed her
mind and decided to keep all the money. She informed the investiga-
tor of Shallenberger’s address, and Isom and the defendant went to
Shallenberger’s residence where she identified him.

On November 8, 2002, the defendant, who was in the Danville
City Jail, requested to speak with Investigator Isom. He interviewed
her at the jail, and she told Isom that Rodney Fuller was also
involved in the murders of her husband and stepson. The defendant
also stated that her daughter had assisted with the murders. The
defendant “acknowledged that after the shooting and after the men
left the house [on the night of the murders], she had waited about
thirty minutes to call 911.”

On the day of the murders, the defendant made a telephone call
to Campbell and told him that her husband had been killed, and that
she wanted his paycheck. Campbell informed the defendant that she
could not retrieve the paycheck before 4:00 p.m. on that day. The
next day, October 31, 2002, the defendant again called Campbell and
asked for Julian Lewis’ paycheck. Campbell responded that he could
not give the paycheck to her.

Lieutenant Michael Booker, Charles Lewis’ commanding officer,
called the defendant to express his condolences early on the after-
noon of October 30, 2002, the day of the murders. The defendant

310 Lee
a

told him, “I’m still in shock. The police had me in Chatham today,
all in my face. There is no way I would have killed my husband and
stepson. They guessed that because I didn’t get shot that I might
have done it. My husband told me to go into the bathroom, so I did.”
The defendant informed Booker that she was the secondary benefici-
ary on the life insurance policy of Charles Lewis, and that she
wanted the insurance proceeds.

On November 4, 2002, the defendant called Booker by telephone
and left a message for him because he was not available. When
Booker spoke to her later that day, the defendant asked him about
Charles Lewis’ personal effects. Booker advised the defendant that
she could not have them because she was not the beneficiary of
Lewis’ estate. The defendant asked Booker whether she was still
entitled to the life insurance proceeds in the amount of $250,000.
Booker told the defendant that she was, and she responded, “[W]ell,
Kathy [Charles Lewis’ sister] can have all his stuff as long as I get
the money.”

Before the murders, the defendant told a woman, Debbie Ander-
son, that the defendant was just “using Julian for money and that he
would buy her things.” Bobby Demont, who had known Julian
Lewis and the defendant for several years, heard the defendant say
“a couple months before the murders” that if Julian died, “she
would get the money, and if [Charles Lewis] was killed and Julian
was dead, she would get that money, too.”

The defendant told Kathy L. Clifton, Julian Lewis’ daughter, that
the defendant waited 45 minutes after the murders and then called
her ex-mother-in-law, Marie Bean, and her best friend, Debbie
Yeatts, before she “called 911 for help.” On the day of the victims’
funerals, the defendant told Kathy Clifton that the defendant had pur-
chased a beautiful suit to wear to the funeral. The defendant asked
Clifton, ““[Y]ou don’t think I had anything to do with this, do you?”
The defendant also offered to sell the mobile home and land to Clif-
ton. After the murders, but before the funeral, the defendant made a
number of statements in Clifton’s presence to the effect that the
defendant had ample money to pay for the funerals and that she
would benefit financially because of the deaths of Julian Lewis and
Charles Lewis.

After the murders, the defendant tried to withdraw $50,000 from
Julian Lewis’ account with Prudential Securities. The defendant
appeared at a bank and presented a check, purportedly signed by
Julian Lewis and made payable to her in the amount of $50,000. A

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a

bank employee refused to negotiate the check because the signature
on the check did not match Julian Lewis’ signature in the bank’s
records.

The deputy sheriffs searched a mobile home where Matthew
Shallenberger and Rodney Fuller resided. Two shotguns were recov-
ered from the residence and delivered to a forensic science laboratory
for analysis. The shotgun shells recovered from the room where
Julian Lewis was murdered were fired by one of the shotguns recov-
ered from the mobile home where Shallenberger and Fuller lived.
The deputies also found two pairs of rubber household gloves in a
closet in Shallenberger’s bedroom. Primer residue caused by the dis-
charge of a firearm bullet or shell was present on the gloves.

Assistant Chief Medical Examiner Susan E. Venuti performed
autopsies on the bodies of Julian Lewis and Charles Lewis. She
determined that each man died as a direct result of multiple shotgun
wounds. Julian Lewis suffered shotgun wounds to the upper left arm,
shoulder, abdomen, pelvis, penis, thighs, legs, arms, and chest. The
bullets destroyed or removed large areas of tissue in his upper arm,
shoulder, and upper chest. The bullets also fractured several ribs.
Plastic wadding from a shotgun shell was lodged in his left lung
tissue. Julian Lewis eventually died from extensive blood loss.

Charles Lewis received a total of eight wounds from an undeter-
mined number of discharges of a shotgun. He suffered wounds to his
back, abdomen, chest, neck, left upper arm and shoulder, elbow, left
thigh, face, and forearm.

IL.
A.

The defendant argues that “because Virginia has never executed a
female who (i) lacks a violent criminal history, (ii) accepted respon-
sibility for her offenses, (iii) merely contracted for the murders giv-
ing rise to the offenses, and (iv) observed co-defendants receive life
sentences despite their roles as actual triggermen, the circuit court
erred by sentencing [her] to death in that such sentence[s] [are]
excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” We disagree
with the defendant.

Hi Initially, we observe that we do not and cannot consider the
defendant’s gender in determining whether the sentences of death are
excessive and disproportionate when considering both the crime and
the defendant. All criminal statutes in this Commonwealth must be

312 [|
|

applied without regard to gender. Therefore, we decline the defen-
dant’s invitation to apply Virginia’s capital murder statutes in a dis-
criminatory fashion based upon gender.

B.

The defendant argues that her sentences are excessive and dispro-
portionate when compared to similar cases. She states that she “did
not physically engage in conduct giving rise to the deaths;” rather,
she was convicted of capital murder because she was the employer of
the men who committed the actual murders. Continuing, she con-
tends there is no reported case in which this Court approved the
death penalty for a “mere hirer” due to the vileness predicate alone.

Hl Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) requires that this Court consider and
determine “‘[w]hether the sentence[s] of death [are] excessive or dis-
proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant.” The test of proportionality that
we apply is whether ‘‘juries in this jurisdiction generally approve the
supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes.” Wolfe v. Com-
monwealth, 265 Va. 193, 226, 576 S.E.2d 471, 490, cert. denied, ___
US. __, 124 S.Ct. 566 (2003) (quoting Hedrick v. Commonwealth,
257 Va. 328, 342, 513 S.E.2d 634, 642, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952
(1999)); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136, 145, 431 S.E.2d 48,
54, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993).

HMB In conducting this review, this Court considers the records
of all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court, including cases in
which the defendant received a life sentence. In conducting the pro-
portionality review, it is not the function of this Court to understand
why the trier of fact imposed the sentence of life instead of the sen-
tence of death. Rather, “[t]he purpose of our comparative review is
to reach a reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify the impo-
sition of the death penalty. We cannot insure complete symmetry
among all death penalty cases, but our review does enable us to iden-
tify and invalidate a death sentence that is ‘excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.’ ” Orbe v. Common-
wealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999), cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1113 (2000). Simply stated, this Court’s proportionality
review enables this Court to identify and invalidate the aberrant sen-
tence of death. And, we emphasize that in making the determination
whether a sentence of death is aberrant, this Court must consider the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant.

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I We have examined the records of all capital murder cases
reviewed by this Court when, as here, the death penalty was based
upon murder for hire. Wolfe, 265 Va. 193, 576 S.E.2d 471; Williams
v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 3, 472 S.E.2d 50, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
998 (1996); Murphy, 246 Va. 136, 431 S.E.2d 48; Fisher v. Common-
wealth, 236 Va. 403, 374 S.E.2d 46 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1028 (1989); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 314 S.E.2d
371, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
Even though the facts in all capital murder cases differ, we are confi-
dent that given the special heinousness associated with the murder
for hire in this particular case, emphasizing that the defendant was
the mastermind of the plan to kill her husband and stepson solely for
greed and monetary gain, the sentences of death are neither excessive
nor disproportionate to sentences generally imposed by other sen-
tencing bodies in this Commonwealth for crimes of a similar nature
considering the crime and the defendant.

Hl The defendant also argues that her punishment is excessive or
disproportionate because her accomplices, Shallenberger and Fuller,
did not receive a sentence of death. However, as we have repeatedly
stated, “[u]pon our prior determinations of excessiveness and dispro-
portionality, we have rejected efforts by defendants to compare their
sentences with those received by confederates.” Murphy, 246 Va. at
145, 431 S.E.2d at 53; Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 26, 419
S.E.2d 606, 620, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992); King v. Com-
monwealth, 243 Va. 353, 371, 416 S.E.2d 669, 679, cert. denied, 506
U.S. 957 (1992); Evans v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 766, 780, 284
S.E.2d 816, 823 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982), aff’d on
remand, 228 Va. 468, 323 S.E.2d 114 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1025 (1985). Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s effort to make a
similar comparison here.

Cc.

The defendant argues that the circuit court “erroneously imputed
the vileness of [the] co-defendants to [her] to determine if [her] con-
duct satisfied the aggravated battery sub-element [sic] to the vileness
predicate.” Continuing, the defendant also argues that the circuit
court erred by concluding that her acts reflected a depravity of mind.

Code § 19.2-264.2 states:

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“In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an
offense for which the death penalty may be imposed, a sen-
tence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury
shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of con-
victions of the defendant, find that there is a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that
his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands
charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty
of death be imposed.”

We have stated that “depravity of mind” as used in Code
§ 19.2-264.2, is “‘a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debase-
ment surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal mal-
ice and premeditation.” Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 245,
427 S.E.2d 394, 409, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993); Thomas, 244
Va. at 25, 419 S.E.2d at 619-20. We observed in Beck v. Common-
wealth, 253 Va. 373, 387, 484 S.E.2d 898, 907, cert. denied, 522
U.S. 1018 (1997) that

“Tal finding of ‘vileness’ must be based on conduct which
is ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that
it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery
to the victim.’ Code § 19.2-264.2. Proof of any one of these
three components will support a finding of vileness. Jd.; Muel-
ler v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 411, 422 S.E.2d 380, 395
(1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1043 . . . (1993).”

Additionally, in Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. at
339-40, 513 S.E.2d at 640, we stated that

“a mere inspection of the statutory language in [Code § 19.2-
264.2] demonstrates clearly that the term ‘vileness’ includes
three separate and distinct factors, with the proof of any one
factor being sufficient to support a finding of vileness and
hence a sentence of death. Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va.
423, 442, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282 [1983]... . We have also stated
that ‘Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C) define vileness as con-
duct that involves torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated
battery to the victim; the use of the disjunctive word ‘or,’

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rather than the conjunctive ‘and,’ signifies the availability of
alternative choices.’ ”

Hl Applying these principles, we need not, and do not, decide
whether the circuit court erred in imputing the aggravated battery
committed by Fuller and Shallenberger to the defendant. The circuit
court held that the defendant’s acts were vile because they demon-
strated depravity of mind and, without question, the evidence of
record is overwhelming that the defendant’s conduct showed a
depravity of mind.

As we have already stated in Part II of this opinion, the defendant
was the mastermind of these gruesome crimes, which would not have
occurred but for her actions. The evidence shows that she married
her husband because she was interested in his money. She planned to
kill him and her stepson so that she could acquire her husband’s
assets and proceeds from her stepson’s life insurance policy. She
made a prior unsuccessful attempt along with Shallenberger and
Fuller to kill her husband, and, when that plan failed, she initiated
another plan which resulted in the deaths of her husband and her
stepson while they lay asleep in their home. She involved her 16-
year-old daughter in the plan to kill the victims, and she encouraged
her daughter to have sexual relations with one of the murderers. The
defendant also paid for the shotguns and ammunition used to kill her
husband and stepson.

After Shallenberger and Fuller had shot the victims several times
with shotguns, the defendant went to her husband’s bedroom and
took his pants and wallet. She removed cash from her husband’s wal-
let and gave it to the murderers while her husband lay bleeding to
death from the wounds that he had suffered. Even then, however, the
defendant waited at least 45 minutes, while her husband was still
alive suffering and bleeding from the bullet wounds, before she
reported the crimes by calling emergency response technicians by
telephone. Once the deputy sheriffs arrived at the residence, at least
one hour after her husband and stepson had been shot, defendant’s
husband remained alive, suffering and bleeding to death. After her
husband’s death, the defendant showed no emotion or remorse, and
she initially denied any involvement in this murder. Moreover, on the
night of the murders, prior to the killings, the defendant prayed with
her husband and arranged for her daughter to speak to her husband
so that he would not think that something was awry.

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Additionally, we observe that the defendant was the wife of one
victim and the stepmother of the other victim. As we have already
stated, but for the conduct of this defendant, who was the mas-
termind of these heinous acts, the killings would not have occurred.
We hold that the evidence sufficiently establishes the defendant’s
depravity of mind that supports a finding of vileness.

D.

The defendant also claims that the circuit court erroneously sen-
tenced her to death in that “such decision was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice and other arbitrary factors.” Continu-
ing, the defendant states that her cohorts, “despite being actual trig-
germen, did not receive death sentences.”” Defendant maintains “her
sentences of death were influenced by passion, prejudice or other
arbitrary factors because (i) evidence indicated that her two co-
defendants were more directly culpable in the slayings, (ii) the same
Judge sentenced all three defendants, and (iii) vileness was the only
predicate relevant to the death sentence inquiry (and vileness of the
crime, of course, applies to all defendants here in that it is the same
crime).” We disagree.

HH We have reviewed the evidence of record, and we find no
evidence that would permit us to conclude that the sentences of death
were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, and other
arbitrary factors.

E.

HH We do not consider defendant’s assertions that the circuit
court erroneously denied her motion to declare Virginia’s death pen-
alty statute unconstitutional. The defendant’s sole argument on brief
is “‘[t]he Virginia death penalty statute is unconstitutional for reasons
contained in Teresa’s Memoranda contained in the Appendix.” The
defendant’s constitutional arguments were waived by the entry of her
guilty pleas. Murphy, 246 Va. at 141, 431 S.E.2d at 51; Savino v.
Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 539, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278, cert. denied,
498 U.S. 882 (1990); Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 131-32,
376 S.E.2d 288, 291, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989).

HH The defendant argues that the circuit court “erroneously sen-
tenced [her] to death because indictments for which death was
imposed omitted essential aggravating elements.” We do not con-
sider defendant’s assertion. Defendant failed to assert this argument

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in the circuit court and, therefore, she may not assert the argument on
appeal. Rule 5:25.

Iv.

We have considered all the defendant’s remaining arguments, and ,
they are without merit. Having reviewed the sentences of death, find-
ing no reversible error in the record, and perceiving no reason to
commute the death sentences, we will affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.

Affirmed.

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UPON REHEARING

MICHAEL W. LENZ
v.

WARDEN OF THE SUSSEX I STATE PRISON
Record No. 012883
March 5, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons,
and Agee, JJ.

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Pi
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Jennifer L. Givens for petitioner.
Robert Q. Harris, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W.
Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for respondent.

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Il In this case we granted a rehearing to the Warden to consider
whether trial counsel were ineffective because they did not object to
the verdict form given to the jury in the sentencing phase of peti-
tioner’s capital murder trial. The Warden argues that the verdict form
the jury considered was proper under this Court’s holding in Atkins v.
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 178, 510 S.E.2d 445, 456 (1999), and
that trial counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to antici-
pate this Court’s subsequent decision in Powell v. Commonwealth,
261 Va. 512, 545, 552 S.E.2d 344, 363 (2001), requiring that the jury
teceive a verdict form that specifically states that a life sentence may
be imposed even after finding one or both aggravating circumstances.
The Warden is correct.

In Atkins the jury was not given a verdict form that allowed it to
impose a life sentence if the Commonwealth proved neither of the
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 257 Va. at 178-79,
510 S.E.2d at 456-57. The defense had offered the statutory verdict
form, Code § 19.2-264.4, that allowed this sentencing option, but the
trial court refused that form. Jd. at 171-72, 510 S.E.2d at 452. We
held that the total absence of any jury verdict form allowing imposi-
tion of a life sentence if neither of the aggravating factors was
proven was reversible error. Id. at 179, 510 S.E.2d at 457. We noted

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that, had the trial judge selected the statutory verdict form Atkins’
counsel offered, the missing sentencing option would have been sub-
mitted to the jury. Id. at 178, 510 S.E.2d at 456. That issue is not
present in this case, however, because the jury received the statutory
verdict form absent in Atkins.'

Ill The issue petitioner raises here is whether the verdict form
must specifically provide the option of imposing a sentence of life
when the Commonwealth has established one or both aggravating
factors. We addressed that issue for the first time in Powell. 261 Va.
at 542, 552 S.E.2d at 361. Powell was not decided until after peti-
tioner’s capital murder trial concluded. Therefore, trial counsel could
not have been ineffective for failing to anticipate this Court’s subse-
quent decision in Powell, Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1360
(4th Cir. 1995), and petitioner is not entitled to a new sentencing
hearing on that basis.

In light of this holding, we must address the claims in petitioner’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus relating to the sentencing phase of
his capital murder trial.? These claims are allegations of improper
jury contacts and communications in connection with his sentencing
hearing, Claims I and II, and various allegations of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in the sentencing proceeding, Claim VII.

CLAIMS I AND II

In Claim I, petitioner asserted that the bailiff in his trial provided
ex parte answers to jurors’ questions about the court’s sentencing
instructions and, in Claim II, that Juror Anita J. Durrett was improp-
erly seated and that one or more jurors consulted a Bible in the jury
room during sentencing deliberations. We referred Claims J and II to
the Circuit Court of Augusta County for an evidentiary hearing by
order entered June 17, 2002.

Following the evidentiary hearing on August 9, 2002, the circuit
court issued a letter opinion stating its findings of fact, conclusions

' ‘The verdict form before the jury in the sentencing phase of petitioner’s capital murder trial
comporis with the language contained in Code § 19.2-264.4(D):

We, the Jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of Capital Murder,
as charged in the indictment, and having considered the evidence in aggravation and
mitigation of the offense, fix his punishment at imprisonment for life.

2 Petitioner raised ten claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In our original opinion
we specifically declined to address petitioner’s claims relating to his prior sentencing hearing
and dismissed all his claims except the claim involving the verdict form, Lenz v. Warden, 265
Va. 373, 379, 381-82, 579 S.E.2d 194, 197-99 (2003).

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of law, and recommendations. The circuit court recommended
rejecting both claims, finding that the petitioner did not carry his bur-
den of proof to establish that the jury had asked the bailiff questions
concerning their sentencing instructions, that there was no evidence
that Juror Durrett was biased in favor of the death penalty, and that
there was “no reasonable possibility that the jury verdict was influ-
enced by an improper communication in the form of a quotation
from the Bible.”

Petitioner filed a brief with this Court raising a number of objec-
tions to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court. The Com-
monwealth filed a brief responding to petitioner’s arguments and
supporting the circuit court’s conclusions. Petitioner filed a reply
brief>

We begin by addressing two preliminary matters: the Common-
wealth’s assertion that Claims I and II are procedurally barred by the
tule in Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974), and
petitioner’s complaint that the circuit court erred by limiting the evi-
dentiary value of affidavits submitted in the case.

A. Procedural Bar

The Commonwealth asserts that Slayton precludes consideration
of petitioner’s Claims I and II in this habeas corpus proceeding
because petitioner did not raise those claims at trial and on direct
appeal. We disagree.

El Slayton holds that one may not use a habeas corpus proceed-
ing as a substitute for appeal. 215 Va. at 29, 205 S.E.2d at 682. Slay-
ton makes clear, however, that this procedural bar operates when the
petitioner “has been afforded a fair and full opportunity to raise and
have adjudicated” the constitutional issue at trial and on appeal. Id.
If the petitioner did not have that “fair and full opportunity” during
his criminal trial and direct appeal, the rule in Slayton does not apply.
See DiPaola y. Riddle, 581 F.2d 1111, 1113-14 (4th Cir. 1978).

HHMI In this case, the Commonwealth asserts that the Slayton bar
operates because the petitioner could have procured information from
the jurors regarding communications with the bailiff and the presence
and use of the Bible during sentence deliberations “‘sooner — imme-
diately after trial, in fact.” Adopting the Commonwealth’s rationale
for applying the Slayton bar in this case would in effect impose a

> Petitioner also filed a supplemental brief that was rejected by order dated February 23,
2003.

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requirement on defense counsel to poll jurors and any other persons
involved with the criminal trial immediately following the trial, often
at the same time that counsel is involved in filing post-trial motions
and preparing for appeal. Failure to conduct such a poll or investiga-
tion in every case would then subject counsel to an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim in a habeas corpus proceeding. We decline to
impose such a requirement. Absent any indication that counsel or
petitioner knew or should have known of the complained of conduct
at a time when the trial court could address the misconduct allega-
tions, the procedural bar in Slayton does not apply.

In this case there is no evidence that trial counsel or petitioner
had any information indicating that counsel should have interviewed
the jury members or the bailiff, and the Commonwealth suggests
none. Accordingly, we conclude that S/ayton does not bar petitioner’s
Claims I and U.

B. Affidavits

In its opinion letter, the circuit court stated that it based its find-
ings on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing and that it relied
on the affidavits the petitioner and respondent filed only as they
affected the credibility of the witnesses.

Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in not considering the
affidavits as substantive evidence. He suggests that because Code
§ 8.01-660 allows the use of affidavits as evidence in a habeas
corpus proceeding and because at least some of the affiants did tes-
tify, the circuit court should have either found that the affidavits were
credible testimony or resolved any credibility questions he had
through cross-examination of the testifying affiants.

HEE Code § 8.01-660 provides that

In the discretion of the court or judge before whom the peti-
tioner is brought, the affidavits of witnesses taken by either
party, on reasonable notice to the other, may be read as
evidence.

This statute makes consideration of affidavits as substantive evidence
a matter in the court’s discretion. Accordingly, we apply an abuse of
discretion standard when reviewing the circuit court’s decision
regarding the use of the affidavits in this case.

Hl The circuit court identified a number of reasons why it did
not consider the affidavits as substantive evidence, including that

they had no indicia of inherent credibility, were taken without benefit
of a transcript, and were taken a significant time after the events
occurred. Based on this record, we cannot say that the circuit court
abused its discretion in refusing to consider the affidavits as substan-
tive evidence.

Hi We now turn to the circuit court’s findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law regarding the claims that were the subject of the eviden-
tiary hearing. When we refer a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving a capital murder case to a circuit court for an evidentiary
hearing, we give deference to the circuit court’s factual findings and
consider those findings binding upon this Court unless they are
plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. Hedrick v. War-
den, 264 Va. 486, 496, 570 S.E.2d 840, 847 (2002). We review de
novo any questions of law or mixed questions of fact and law that
the circuit court addressed. Id.

C. Improper Communications with the Bailiff

HN sResponding to jury inquiries regarding sentencing
instructions without notifying defendant or his counsel violates a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Rogers v. United
States, 422 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1975); Remington v. Commonwealth, 262
Va. 333, 360, 551 S.E.2d 620, 636-37 (2001); Palmer v. Common-
wealth, 143 Va. 592, 605, 130 S.E. 398, 402 (1925). Petitioner
claimed that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right because
the bailiff provided ex parte responses to juror questions regarding
the instructions the jurors received in the sentencing phase of his
capital murder trial. Petitioner has the burden to establish that such
improper contact occurred. Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743
(4th Cir. 1988).

As recited above, the circuit court found no credible evidence to
support petitioner’s allegations of improper contact and rejected peti-
tioner’s misconduct claim. Petitioner challenges these findings,
asserting that the “most credible evidence” shows that the jurors had
questions about the sentencing instructions during deliberations and
the bailiff answered some of their questions. Petitioner’s attack on
the sufficiency of the evidence relies wholly on statements in peti-
tioner’s affidavits; however, as we stated above, the circuit court did
not and was not required to consider those affidavits as substantive
evidence.

HB A teview of the record shows that some of the jurors and the
bailiff could not recall whether the bailiff was asked any questions at

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all; other jurors recalled that they asked the bailiff some questions.
No juror testified that any of the questions that may have been asked
related to the trial court’s instructions. Thus, the circuit court’s fac-
tual findings are neither plainly wrong nor without evidence to sup-
port them and therefore are binding on us. Hedrick, 264 Va. at 496,
570 S.E.2d at 847.

Accordingly, we find that petitioner failed to carry his burden to
show that an improper contact occurred, and we reject this claim.

D. Extraneous Influence

HM The second claim we referred to the circuit court for an evi-
dentiary hearing was that petitioner was denied his rights under the
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution because jurors read from and relied upon passages in the
Bible in making their sentencing determination. The United States
Supreme Court set out the following standard for evaluating a claim
of extraneous jury contact:

In a criminal case, any private communication, contact or tam-
pering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about
the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons,
deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of
known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of
the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the par-
ties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests
heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and
hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was
harmless to the defendant.

Remmer vy. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).

The circuit court found as a matter of fact that one juror “had at
least one Bible and perhaps a ‘Woman’s Devotional’ with her in the
jury room during the deliberations in the penalty phase of the trial.”
The circuit court also found that the Bible was open during delibera-
tions, that one juror read from it, and that other jurors looked at it.
The circuit court assumed that those jurors who looked at the Bible
did read from it but found that there was no evidence showing what
Bible passage or passages were read.

HB The circuit court, applying Remmer, Burch v. Corcoran, 273
F, 3d 577 (4th Cir. 2001), and Stockton, concluded that, absent any
probative evidence that a juror relied on the contents of a passage in

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the Bible in making the sentencing decision, there was ‘no reason-
able possibility that the jury verdict was influenced by an improper
communication in the form of a quotation from the Bible.”

Petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in a number of par-
ticulars in finding that there was no indication that the “jury verdict
was influenced by an improper communication in the form of a quo-
tation from the Bible.” The petitioner first complains that the circuit
court’s factual findings ignore various jurors’ testimony that the
Bible was read aloud and was consulted for purposes of determining
what punishment was appropriate for the crime of murder. As with
his complaints regarding the factual findings regarding communica-
tions with the bailiff, the petitioner bases this challenge on statements
in the petitioner’s affidavits, not on testimony at the evidentiary hear-
ing. As we have previously stated, the trial court was not required to
credit the statements in the affidavits. Our review of the record
shows that the circuit court’s factual findings are consistent with the
hearing testimony and are not plainly wrong. Thus, those factual
findings are binding upon us. Hedrick, 264 Va. at 496, 570 S.E.2d at
847.

HM The petitioner also complains that the circuit court improp-
erly misallocated the burden of proof in his claim of extraneous jury
contact. The Remmer presumption of prejudice arises upon a show-
ing of two elements: that an extraneous contact with or by a member
of the jury took place and that such contact was “about the matter
pending before the jury.” Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. The character of
the extraneous contact must “reasonably draw into question the
integrity of the verdict.” Stockton, 852 F.2d at 743. Once the peti-
tioner shows both elements, the presumption arises, the petitioner is
relieved of proving actual prejudice, and the burden shifts to the gov-
ernment to establish that the potentially prejudicial contact was harm-
less. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.

HH In this case, the petitioner established the first element but
did not establish the second: the relevance of the contact to the pend-
ing matter. The circuit court found that extraneous material, the
Bible, was present in the jury room during deliberations, but the cir-
cuit court also found that there was no evidence of what Bible
passages were read. Implicit in this finding is a determination that no
evidence showed that jurors read Bible passages relating to the sen-
tencing decision. Thus, petitioner did not establish that the “contact”
with the Bible was ‘about the matter pending before the jury.”

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Petitioner concedes that no evidence shows which Bible passages
were read. Nevertheless, petitioner argued strenuously to this Court
that “the evidence clearly established that several of the jurors read
passages regarding the appropriate punishment for murder.” Our
review of the record indicates otherwise.

At the evidentiary hearing, petitioner read Juror Durrett a portion
of the affidavit she gave to the petitioner in which she stated that she
had a Bible with her during the trial and that while deliberating on
the sentence “some jurors were able to point to passages in the Bible
that support the death penalty for anyone who kills another person.”
In response to petitioner’s questions about these statements, Juror
Durrett testified that she could not recall which jurors had asked
about the Bible, that another juror had identified a book of the Bible
which contained information about death, that jurors had referred to
the location of passages in the Bible from memory, that she had her
Bible in the room but did not think that she had it open during delib-
erations, and that no one had “read out loud” from the Bible.

Juror Sallie Zirkle testified that a “female juror” did read from
the Bible, but Juror Zirkle could not remember which juror did the
reading, what verse was read, why it was read, or if the reading
occurred during the jury’s deliberations regarding guilt or sentencing.

Juror Barbara Pack testified that, while a Bible was on the table
in the jury room, she did not know if anyone other than the owner of
the Bible read or looked at the Bible. Juror Pack “assumed” the
owner of the Bible was reading it when she “looked” at it.

Juror John M. Harmon testified that nothing was read aloud from
the Bible. He did not know what the owner of the Bible read, if
anything, when “looking through” it. Juror Joan Lafferty testified
that the Bible was a Women’s Devotional Bible and that neither the
owner nor any other juror read from this book.

The only reference to a matter related to the sentencing decision
was Juror Durrett’s testimony that a juror recited, by memory, the
location of a Bible passage relating to the appropriate punishment for
murder. This is not evidence that the jury consulted, read aloud, or
discussed the referenced passage or any other Bible passage.

HM The circuit court’s implicit and explicit factual findings —
that there was no evidence establishing that the jurors’ contact with
extraneous material involved the “subject matter” before the jury —
are supported by the record and not plainly wrong. Based on these
factual findings, we agree that the petitioner failed to carry his bur-
den of showing an extraneous contact with the jury about the pend-

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ing sentencing decision such that the integrity of the jury’s verdict
was reasonably drawn into question. Therefore, petitioner has not
made the threshold showing entitling him to the presumption of
prejudice. See Burch, 273 F.3d at 591.

Petitioner also challenged the seating of Juror Durrett based on
the statement in her affidavit that the “Bible says that the death pen-
alty is the appropriate punishment for murder.” This statement, he
asserts, shows that seating her violated the principles set forth in
Morgan y. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992), because she would
automatically vote for the death penalty in every case. The circuit
court rejected this claim. After reviewing Juror Durrett’s voir dire
testimony during the capital murder trial, the circuit court found that
she “was specifically asked whether she would consider both alterna-
tives available to her, either life without parole or death, and that she
answered she would.” Based on this finding, the circuit court con-
cluded that there was no support for the proposition that Juror Dur-
tett was biased in support of the death penalty and recommended that
this claim be denied.

HM We also reject petitioner’s claim that Juror Durrett was
biased in support of the death penalty. The record supports the circuit
court’s findings of fact. The single statement in her affidavit regard-
ing an “appropriate punishment” is insufficient evidence upon which
to find that Juror Durrett herself concurred with the statement and
that she would automatically apply this “‘appropriate punishment”’ in
every capital murder case. During voir dire, Juror Durrett was specif-
ically asked whether she had any religious, philosophical, or moral
beliefs that would prevent her from imposing the death sentence and
she responded ‘“‘no.” She was also asked if she would consider both
life imprisonment without parole and death as alternative penalties
and she responded that she would. Accordingly, we conclude that
seating Juror Durrett did not violate the requirements of Morgan v.
Illinois.

Accordingly, we reject Claim II.

CLAIM VII

In Claim VII, petitioner asserted that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase of his capital murder
trial because counsel failed to investigate and present the circum-
stances of the offense, evidence regarding petitioner’s religion, and
evidence regarding petitioner’s background; failed to develop rele-
vant evidence regarding petitioner’s mental illness, to investigate the

32

implications of petitioner’s medications, and to obtain the assistance
of an independent expert; and unreasonably failed to seek additional
time to investigate, all of which individually and collectively
prejudiced him.

HE To prevail on these claims, petitioner bears the burden of
showing that his counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and
that the deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In applying the performance prong of
this test, the issue is whether counsel’s acts or omissions were unrea-
sonable in light of all the circumstances. Id. at 688. That determina-
tion begins with a strong presumption that counsel’s actions fall
within the wide range of adequate professional assistance, and this
presumption bars an inadequate assistance claim if the complained of
conduct might have been the result of tactics or strategy. Id. at 689;
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185-86 (1986).

HM The “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test requires the
petitioner to show that there is a “‘reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is
more than a “possibility” of prejudice; it is a “probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Jd. The errors must have
“actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Id. at 693.

Hl Further, in applying this two-prong test, we need not deter-
mine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before addressing
the prejudice prong. If the petitioner fails to show the requisite
prejudice, we need not scrutinize counsel’s performance. Jd. at 697.

A. Failure to Seek Additional Time to Investigate

HH On April 17, 2000, counsel for petitioner requested a contin-
uance based on difficulties they were experiencing in meeting with
petitioner and contacting other potential witnesses. The trial court
granted a two-month continuance. Counsel did not seek a second
continuance. Petitioner asserts that his counsel should have sought a
second continuance because of difficulties in obtaining information
and testing regarding petitioner’s background. We reject this claim.
Petitioner recites that “the trial court would have likely granted” a
second continuance if counsel had sought one and that without the
continuance counsel “were . . . unable to investigate and present all
relevant evidence” regarding petitioner’s background, religion, and
mental health history. The evidence petitioner proffers in support of
this claim is that some experts were not appointed until shortly

Lr EE
a

before trial, and affidavits from his trial counsel and mitigation spe-
cialist explaining difficulties in meeting with petitioner and expres-
sing the opinion that “[e]veryone . . . could have used” more time.
Many of the difficulties the mitigation expert experienced in
meeting with petitioner were the result of her schedule and location.
Even in light of those difficulties, the mitigation expert affirmed
counsel’s mitigation strategy. There is no evidence that any of peti-
tioner’s experts told his counsel that they needed more time. Under
these circumstances we cannot say that counsel’s failure to seek a
second continuance was unreasonable under the circumstances and,
accordingly, we reject this claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

B. Failure to Investigate and Present
Circumstances of the Offense

HH Citing affidavits his fellow inmates submitted, petitioner
asserts that his trial counsel should have investigated and introduced
evidence regarding petitioner’s dedication to the Asatru religion,
including his belief in, and fear of, “life-threatening black magic,”
which the victim, Brent H. Parker, allegedly was using against peti-
tioner. Such evidence, petitioner claims, would have demonstrated to
the jury that he did not kill Parker because of a depraved mind but
because he feared for his life.*

We reject this claim. First, the petitioner presented this evidence
to the jury through his own testimony. Petitioner testified about the
nature of the Asatru religion and his dedication to it as well as his
relationship with the victim and the threats the victim made toward
him.

Petitioner also asserts that the inmate’s testimony would have
shown that the killing was not related to petitioner’s depravity of
mind, one of the grounds for establishing the vileness aggravating
factor. However, this assertion does not address the other grounds
supporting a finding of vileness — torture and aggravated battery. The
evidence that the victim was stabbed 68 times supports a finding of
vileness based on torture or aggravated battery. Furthermore, the jury
also found that petitioner would be a future danger to society. Noth-
ing in the alleged missing testimony would have affected that
finding.

* We do not treat petitioner’s arguments as asserting a claim of self-defense. At issue here is
the sentencing proceeding, at which point the jury had already rejected such claim.

334 ee
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Accordingly, we reject petitioner’s claim because he failed to
show that, had the additional testimony he cites been presented to the
jury, there would have been a reasonable probability of a different
result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

C. Failure to Investigate and Present Relevant
Evidence Regarding Petitioner’s Religion

HM Petitioner claims that presenting evidence of the Asatru
religion and his immersion in it solely through his own testimony
was insufficient to inform the jury of the true nature of the religion
and its significance in his life. Without receiving this information
from other witnesses such as fellow inmates or acquiring an under-
standing of prison dynamics from an expert in prison life, petitioner
asserts, the jury was left with the “sole impression that Lenz’s relig-
ion was nothing more than a dangerous and scary cult.” If the jury
had such information, petitioner concludes, “there is a reasonable
probability that the jury would not have sentenced Lenz to death.”

We reject this claim. Nothing in the record suggests that the
ptison life expert petitioner asserts counsel should have called, James
E. Aiken, had any knowledge of the Asatru religion or of petitioner’s
involvement in it. The record shows only that Aiken had qualified as
an expert in “prison operations and classifications” and would have
testified regarding the probability of petitioner’s future
dangerousness.

The record does show that petitioner called as a witness the
ptison psychologist who had interviewed him following the murder.
The witness described some of the tenets of the Asatru religion. The
witness testified that he believed petitioner was sincere in his dedica-
tion to this religion.

The record shows that petitioner’s trial counsel did attempt to put
on the dynamics of the prison atmosphere and religious groups
through the prison psychologist. Counsel ceased that line of question-
ing when the witness’ answer indicated a lack of violence connected
with the Asatru religious group and when the trial court barred fur-
ther inquiries regarding violent acts by other religious groups in the
prison. Counsel’s decision to end this line of questioning apparently
was a strategic decision based on the court’s ruling and the testimony
of the prison psychologist.

Similarly, the inmate testimony petitioner asserts that the jury
should have heard did not involve the substance of the Asatru relig-
ion. That testimony described the contrast between petitioner’s

en = — 335
Le

immersion in his religion and the victim’s aggressive, bullying, non-
religious character, as well as the relationship between petitioner and
his victim. Petitioner himself testified to this evidence, and as previ-
ously stated, other testimony related to the sincerity of petitioner’s
religious beliefs.

This record does not support a finding that petitioner’s counsel
acted unreasonably in light of all the circumstances or that the failure
to present testimony of other inmates and James Aiken raises a rea-
sonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 694.

D. Failure to Properly Investigate and Present Relevant
Evidence Regarding Petitioner’s Background

Hl Petitioner complains, in part, that trial counsel were ineffec-
tive because they failed to investigate and develop information about
petitioner’s family history of alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental ill-
ness. We reject this part of the claim.

Petitioner obtained an affidavit from trial counsel stating that
efforts were made to locate petitioner’s biological father but that they
“never located [petitioner’s] biological father, or any other members
of his biological paternal family.” Counsel did not make a decision
that finding these persons was unnecessary, compare Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); rather their investigation of these mat-
ters was unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that
counsel’s actions “fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

Hl Petitioner also complains that his trial counsel were ineffec-
tive because they did not present detailed information regarding his
psychiatric institutionalizations, diagnoses, and treatments. We reject
this claim also.

First, petitioner does not assert that counsel were deficient in fail-
ing to investigate his background. Petitioner acknowledges that coun-
sel had obtained the records relevant to the evidence he now asserts
should have been presented to the jury. “[C]ounsel had . . . stacks of
records regarding Lenz’s treatment and diagnoses.” He also acknowl-
edges that both petitioner and his mother testified regarding his
childhood and institutionalizations. That testimony provided the jury
with the following information.

Petitioner’s mother met his biological father, Michael W.
Stagenga, while Stagenga was a student at the United States Naval
Academy, and they married upon Stagenga’s graduation. When peti-

336 es
a

tioner was born in 1964, Stagenga was stationed in Vietnam. Peti-
tioner’s parents divorced in 1967, in part because his mother was
concerned that his father had a drinking problem.

Petitioner and his mother returned to Virginia. His mother mar-
tied Bill Lenz, a Navy helicopter pilot, in April 1968. Bill Lenz
wanted to and eventually did adopt petitioner. Mrs. Lenz testified
that Bill Lenz never told petitioner that “che loved him” and was
intense and strict with petitioner. Bill Lenz told Mrs. Lenz not to
“hug” petitioner all the time.

The Lenz family moved a number of times as Bill Lenz’s station
assignments changed. In first grade, Mrs. Lenz was told that her son
was “rough on the play ground” and “fidgety in class.” When he
was in second grade, petitioner’s brother Lance was born.

‘When petitioner was in fourth grade, his parents sent him to San
Diego Children’s Home, a day school, because he was having trouble
controlling his anger. The family went to counseling although Bill
Lenz “didn’t like it.” The next year the family returned to Virginia
when Bill Lenz left the Navy and joined the Secret Service. Peti-
tioner attended public schools in Woodbridge and needed no special
help. He was involved in scouting, soccer, and church activities. Mrs.
Lenz testified that petitioner and Bill Lenz had no close father-son
relationship and that Bill Lenz disciplined petitioner by making him
go to his room for long periods of time. There was no physical
abuse.

When petitioner was 14 years-of-age, his mother was looking
after a neighbor’s house and car while the neighbor was away. Peti-
tioner and a friend took the car keys and drove the car around. When
confronted, petitioner was “‘scared”, and, according to Mrs. Lenz,
held a kitchen knife and threatened to take his own life. As a result
of this incident, petitioner’s parents admitted him to Potomac Hospi-
tal, a crisis center, in Woodbridge, Virginia. He was transferred to
Dominion Psychiatric Treatment Center (Dominion) in Falls Church,
Virginia, a few weeks later because he was showing depression and
repressing anger. The family participated in counseling, although Bill
Lenz was embarrassed “about it” and didn’t like doing it.

A few months after petitioner was released from Dominion, he
and a boy he had met at Dominion burglarized a home and stole
some jewelry. Petitioner was returned to Potomac Crisis Center at the
insistence of Bill Lenz. At the hearing on the burglary charges, the
juvenile court judge sent petitioner to Commonwealth Psychiatric
Hospital (Commonwealth) in Richmond as an alternative to jail. The

DL
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family participated in counseling while petitioner was at
Commonwealth.

When released from Commonwealth, petitioner was enrolled in
Gladden School, a school for boys with behavioral problems. That
school closed. Petitioner again got “‘into trouble” and this time was
sent to Beaumont Learning Center. He acquired his general
equivalency diploma while at Beaumont. After one trip home from
Beaumont, petitioner did not return to Beaumont as required. He
went to Virginia Beach for two days.

When petitioner was released from Beaumont, his parents had
moved to New Jersey. He went to New Jersey and enrolled in a small
college. After a “‘short time,” petitioner was in “trouble” again and
sentenced to jail in New Jersey. When released, his mother, who had
moved to Jowa, returned to New Jersey and helped him find a place
to stay there. Eventually petitioner returned to Virginia.

Petitioner complains that this evidence is inadequate because it
does not recite the specific diagnoses and treatments he underwent in
the various institutions. However, those records show that at age 14
petitioner tested at or above grade level in all tested areas but spell-
ing, had a verbal IQ of 112, a performance IQ of 117 and a full scale
IQ of 116. He was classified in the bright to normal range. His psy-
chological evaluations showed that he had poor impulse control,
exhibited destructive behavior, had been using “pot” for over a year,
had used LSD, and had used cocaine for five months before he was
placed in Dominion. Petitioner also admitted he was “dealing” to
finance his drug supply. He was evaluated as not psychotic but
“demanding, infantile, depressed and angry.” The evaluator recom-
mended help in improving his self-esteem and controlling his anger.
Later evaluations reinforced the notion that petitioner was “above
average” in intelligence but continued to abuse drugs and alcohol.

In light of the information contained in the reports and evalua-
tions from the various institutions in which petitioner received treat-
ment, counsel’s decision not to present more detail regarding those
reports was not unreasonable. The particulars of those reports would
have represented a “two edged sword” that counsel often confront
when constructing the strategy most likely to assist rather than harm
a client. Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 980-81 (4th Cir. 1995)
(cross-purpose evidence capable of aggravation and mitigation).

HM Finally, petitioner has failed to show what the jury could
have heard that would have had a reasonable probability of changing
the sentencing result. The jury heard about petitioner’s unloving and

338 es
a

demanding step-father, his natural father’s drinking problem, his sui-
cidal tendencies, his low self-esteem and feelings of worthlessness,
and his own extensive drug and alcohol use. The possibility that
description of these facts could have been presented in more detail
does not support a finding of a reasonable probability that the jury
would have reached a different result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

E. Failure to Develop Relevant Evidence
Regarding Petitioner’s Mental Illness

Hl Petitioner claims that his social and psychiatric history indi-
cates that he suffers from a “cognitive dysfunction” and that this
dysfunction leads to low self-esteem, suspiciousness, paranoia, and
eccentric behavior — actions that were documented by prior evalua-
tions of petitioner. Such dysfunction, petitioner asserts, “helps
explain” petitioner’s loss of control and extreme reaction to the vic-
tim’s behavior. Thus, petitioner concludes, his counsel were ineffec-
tive because they did not sufficiently develop this information
regarding his mental illness.

Again we reject this claim. We note that petitioner is not assert-
ing that counsel failed to engage in any investigation of petitioner’s
mental state; rather, petitioner’s complaint is that counsel’s develop-
ment and presentation of the evidence was inadequate.

Petitioner’s argument relies primarily on the affidavit of a clinical
neuropsychologist who tested petitioner and reviewed his records
years after the capital murder trial. At the time of trial, petitioner had
never been diagnosed with a mental illness of any type. Petitioner’s
psychiatric evaluations had identified psychological problems but
never suggested a mental illness or “cognitive dysfunction” amount-
ing to a mental illness.

Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to develop a
“mental illness” theory to use in mitigation when such a condition
had not even been suggested by any expert or individual who had
evaluated petitioner. See Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1418-19
(4th Cir. 1992).

FE. Failure to Obtain Assistance of an Independent Expert

HH At trial, petitioner sought the assistance of James Aiken as
an expert witness on the operation and classification of inmates in
the Virginia prison system. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion
to appoint this expert, saying that the services of the expert were
“expensive” and that the information petitioner sought was available

from persons who were in Virginia and who could “tell you better
how it’s done.” Counsel for petitioner noted his objection but made
no further argument. At trial, petitioner called the Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections Director of Operations and the Assistant Warden
of Operations at Red Onion Prison to testify on the system of pris-
oner classification and security.

Petitioner argues that under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985), he was entitled to an independent expert and that the expert
petitioner sought could have assisted in “‘preparing a defense to the
Commonwealth’s case for future dangerousness” in the context of a
prison environment. Such assistance, petitioner argues, would not
have been forthcoming from employees of the Commonwealth’s
prison system. Counsel’s failure to advise the trial court of the need
for this independent expert constituted ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, according to petitioner.

We reject this claim. Trial counsel appealed the denial of peti-
tioner’s motion for the appointment of the expert at issue on direct
appeal. This Court resolved the issue, holding that Ake did not
require the trial court to appoint the expert. Lenz v. Commonwealth,
261 Va. 451, 462, 544 S.E.2d 299, 305 (2001).

HM To the extent petitioner is complaining that counsel’s inef-
fectiveness is based on their failure to make the argument that the
expert would be testifying not only to prison classifications and oper-
ation but also opining on petitioner’s future dangerousness in the
context of a prison setting, we also reject the claim. We have held
that Code § 19.2-264.2 does not limit the consideration of whether
the defendant would pose a continuing threat to society to a “prison
society” because a defendant would be sentenced to life imprison-
ment without parole. Lovitt vy. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 517, 537
S.E.2d 866, 879 (2000). While Lovitt was decided one month after
petitioner’s sentencing proceeding, we cannot conclude that counsel
was ineffective for failing to advance an argument that we have sub-
sequently rejected.

G. Failure to Investigate Implications
of Petitioner’s Medications

Hl Petitioner asserts that he was being treated with the steroid
prednisone and the antihistamine Benadryl at the time of the murder
and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek expert assis-
tance to determine if these medications negatively affected petitioner.

30
a

We reject this claim. Petitioner’s mitigation theory revolved
around the sincerity of his religious beliefs and his feelings of low
esteem and repressed anger stemming from his relationship with his
step-father. Petitioner never suggested that he was not in control of
his actions when he stabbed and killed Parker or that the sincerity of
his religious beliefs was the product of some adverse reaction to
medication. Decisions regarding trial strategy often require rejection
of other potential strategies. The course of actions petitioner suggests
in this habeas proceeding is inconsistent with the trial strategy his
trial counsel elected. We cannot conclude that trial counsel’s actions
were deficient for failing to make the argument petitioner suggests.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

H. Cumulative Prejudice

Hl Lastly, petitioner complains that the cumulative effect of
trial counsel’s actions and omissions during the sentencing phase
“individually and cumulatively, prejudiced Lenz.” We reject this
claim. Having rejected each of petitioner’s individual claims, there is
no support for the proposition that such actions when considered col-
lectively have deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 586
n.22 (4th Cir. 1999), Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir.
1998).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we deny the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.

Writ denied.

JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL and
JUSTICE KEENAN join, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. At its core, the issue that Michael W. Lenz
raises in this habeas corpus case ultimately evolves from our recent
consideration of a defendant’s rights in view of the awesome respon-
sibility statutorily entrusted to the jury in a capital murder case to
determine whether a defendant shall be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment. The jury’s determination is aided by two fundamental
and pertinent principles. A death sentence may not be imposed unless
the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or both of the so-
called aggravating factors of future dangerousness or vileness have

ee = 34)
|

been proven. However, the jury may fix the defendant’s punishment
at life imprisonment even when it finds that one or both of these
aggravating factors have been proven. Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-
264.4. In this context, our decision in Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257
Va. 160, 178, 510 S.E.2d 445, 456 (1999), was premised upon the
well established rule that “it is materially vital to the defendant in a
criminal case that the jury have a proper verdict form” reflecting all
of its sentencing options. In my view, the majority either ignores the
rationale of Atkins or unduly limits that rationale to the specific facts
of that case. Our subsequent decision in Powell v. Commonwealth,
261 Va. 512, 552 S.E.2d 344 (2001), illustrates the point that it is
reversible error when the jury is not given complete or adequate ver-
dict forms that comport with the correct statement of the law given
to the jury by the trial court in its sentencing instructions regarding
the sentencing options available to the jury, regardless of the specific
manner in which those forms are incomplete or inadequate. For the
reasons that follow, I would vacate Lenz’s death sentence and
remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

Beyond question, the jury in Lenz’s case was not given a verdict
form that specifically reflected the jury’s option of imposing a life
sentence, or a life sentence and a fine of not more than $100,000,
even if the jury found that the Commonwealth had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt one or both of the aggravating factors necessary for
imposing a sentence of death. The trial court was required to provide
the jury with a verdict form expressly providing this sentencing
option, and we expressly so held in Powell, 261 Va. at 545, 552
S.E.2d at 363.

The Warden in this case misses the mark when arguing essen-
tially that there is no “Atkins error” in the verdict forms given to
Lenz’s jury because unlike Atkins the jury in Lenz’s case was given
the statutory verdict form provided by Code § 19.2-264.4. That statu-
tory verdict form was also given to the jury in Powell and there we
explained:

The issue is not whether the jury was provided with the means
to discharge its obligation. If that were the only goal, it could
be achieved by providing the jury with a generic verdict form
and advising the jury to fill in the particulars of the sentence
from the instructions. Rather, the issue is whether the jury is
likely to be confused where it is instructed that it may impose
a sentence other than death if it finds one or both of the aggra-

3
a

vating factors have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
but receives verdict forms that do not expressly state that the
jury is allowed to fix a sentence of life imprisonment even
though one or both aggravating factors are present.

Id. at 545, 552 S.E.2d at 363. We applied the rationale of Atkins in
Powell and the specific deficiency in the verdict forms given to the
jury in the former case was not material to our analysis in the latter
case. Id.

The majority does not dispute that, in the absence of the procedu-
ral differences in the two cases, Powell would control the verdict
form issue raised by Lenz in this case. In Powell, the inadequacy of
the jury verdict forms was an issue raised at trial and preserved for
appeal. Id. In Lenz’s case, the very same issue was not raised at trial
and preserved for appeal. In Lenz’s direct appeal we raised the issue,
sua sponte, and asked the parties to address it in view of our decision
in Atkins. We ultimately held, however, that the issue was procedur-
ally defaulted under Rule 5:25 because Lenz had neither raised the
issue in the trial court nor assigned error to the verdict forms before
this Court. Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 472, 544 S.E.2d
299, 311 (2001). The issue is now before this Court on Lenz’s claim
that his counsel was ineffective in not preserving the issue of the
inadequate jury verdict forms used in his capital murder trial.

Adopting the position asserted by the Warden in Lenz’s habeas
corpus case, the majority concludes that Lenz’s counsel was not inef-
fective because “trial counsel could not have been ineffective for
failing to anticipate this Court’s subsequent decision in Powell.” I
agree, but counsel did not need to anticipate our decision in Powell.
In my view, trial counsel was ineffective in not recognizing after our
decision in Atkins, which was rendered one and one half years prior
to Lenz’s trial, that it was materially vital to Lenz that the jury be
given a proper verdict form reflecting all of its sentencing options.
Specifically, any reasonably effective counsel would have recognized
after Atkins that a jury form that did not specifically reflect the jury’s
option of imposing a life sentence, or a life sentence and a fine of
not more than $100,000, even if the jury found that the Common-
wealth had proven beyond a reasonable doubt one or both of the
aggravating factors necessary for imposing the death sentence, would
not comport with the correct statement of law given to the jury by
the trial court in its sentencing instructions. In such a case, the jury
would be presented “‘with a confusing situation in which the trial

a
a

court’s instructions and the form the jury was given to use in dis-
charging its obligations [would be] in conflict.” Atkins, 257 Va. at
179, 510 S.E.2d at 457. Indeed, that was the reason we raised this
issue sua sponte in Lenz’s direct appeal. Our concern was the appli-
cation of the rationale of Atkins, not the specific manner in which the
verdict forms were inadequate in that case, and not the decision we
would render in Powell.

In short, in view of this Court’s decision in Atkins, Lenz’s coun-
sel was ineffective in failing to object to the inadequate verdict form
given to the jury at Lenz’s capital murder trial. That failure precluded
Lenz from having his sentence determined by a jury with verdict
forms that reflected all of its sentencing options under the Jaw or
receiving relief on direct appeal. Lenz obviously was prejudiced by
counsel’s failure. Accordingly, I would vacate Lenz’s death sentence
and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.*

* Because I would remand the case for a new sentencing hearing based upon the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the failure to object to the improper verdict
form, I would not reach the other issues addressed by the majority and express no opinion
thereon.

w

" _

JOHN REX PHIPPS
v.

CECILA RENE LIDDLE
Record No. 030800

March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

345

Alan K. Caudell for appellant.
John D. Eure (Ronald M. Ayers; Johnson, Ayers & Matthews, on
brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal we consider the applicable limitations period for
refiling a previously non-suited action when the order granting the
non-suit was appealed to, and affirmed by, this Court.

FACTS

John Rex Phipps filed a personal injury action against Cecila
Rene Liddle on May 2, 2000. By order entered December 15, 2000,
the circuit court granted Phipps a voluntary non-suit. Liddle appealed
the December 15, 2000 non-suit order to this Court. On March 1,
2002, this Court issued its mandate affirming the trial court’s Decem-
ber 15, 2000 order granting the non-suit. The mandate was entered
by the trial court on March 22, 2002 pursuant to Code § 8.01-685.

Phipps re-filed his personal injury action against Liddle on
August 15, 2002. Liddle filed a special plea asserting that Phipps’
motion for judgment was untimely. Following briefing and argument
of counsel, the trial court sustained Liddle’s plea and dismissed
Phipps’ motion for judgment holding that Code § 8.01-229(E)(3)

346 a
_

required Phipps to re-file his non-suited action within six months of
the December 15, 2000 order of non-suit. We awarded Phipps an
appeal.

DISCUSSION
Hl Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) provides in pertinent part:

If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit . . . the statute of limi-
tations with respect to such action shall be tolled by the com-
mencement of the nonsuited action, and the plaintiff may
recommence his action within six months from the date of the
order entered by the court... .

(Emphasis added).

Liddle argues that the only order by which Phipps suffered a non-
suit was the December 2000 order, in which the trial court dismissed
his action without prejudice. Thus, Liddle concludes, without a spe-
cific statutory provision tolling the limitations period, Phipps had to
re-file his non-suited action within six months of the December 2000
order.

Il Relying on Code § 8.01-685, Phipps responds that the phrase
at issue “the order entered by the court,” refers to the March 22,
2002 order entering the mandate of this Court affirming the Decem-
ber 2000 order of non-suit. Code § 8.01-685 states in relevant part
that the court “from which any case may have come to an appellate
court shall enter the decision of the appellate court as its own.”
Thus, Phipps maintains, the trial court’s March 22, 2002 order enter-
ing the decision of this Court “as its own’? is the order identified in
Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) as the order from which the six-month refiling
period commences.

HM We resolve the conflict in this case by applying a well-
established principle of statutory construction. If possible, we must
harmonize apparently conflicting statutes to give effect to both. Lake
Monticello Owner’s Assoc. v. Lake, 250 Va. 565, 570, 463 S.E.2d
652, 655 (1995); Albemarle County v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 761,
214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975). If the language at issue in Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3) refers to the trial court’s December 2000 order of non-suit,
as Liddle contends, it conflicts with Code § 8.01-685, which by its
terms required the trial court to enter the mandate of this Court
affirming the order of non-suit “‘as its own” order.

a 347
Pe

HM This conflict can be avoided by construing the “order
entered by the court” in Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) as the order entered
“as its own” by the trial court on March 22, 2002. This construction
harmonizes these statutes and gives each meaning. It also reflects the
fact that, although Phipps was granted a non-suit by the December
2000 order, that order was subject to change because of Liddle’s
appeal. Phipps was not finally entitled to the non-suit until the appeal
was resolved in his favor in March 2002. Finally, by so construing
these two statutes we avoid the incongruity of a simultaneous appeal
and trial of a single cause of action, a circumstance Liddle’s con-
struction of the statute would permit.

I For the above reasons, we conclude that Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3) required Phipps to re-file his non-suited action within six
months of March 22, 2002, the date the trial court entered “‘as its
own” the mandate of this Court affirming the trial court’s December
15, 2000 order. Because Phipps re-filed his action within that time
period, the trial court erred in dismissing his action as untimely.
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

w
BR
oo

LaraTe Kinaspvr, Ll
V.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 031016
March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

349

Charles B. Lustig, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kil-
gore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Lafate Kingsbur, I, appeals the judgment of the Court of
Appeals affirming his conviction for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. Kingsbur contends
that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the handgun he possessed qualified as a firearm under the stat-
ute. Because we conclude that the trial court’s factual determination
that the handgun was a firearm was not plainly wrong or without

350 es
pt

evidence to support it, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS

On the evening of October 1, 2001, two officers of the Ports-
mouth Police Department saw Kingsbur outside Swanson Homes, a
Portsmouth housing project. One of the officers saw a white grocery
bag “wrapped up” in Kingsbur’s hand. When the officers
approached, Kingsbur put the bag down next to a trash can. The
officers told Kingsbur that he was under arrest for trespassing.

Suspecting that Kingsbur had a weapon or drugs, the officers
retrieved the white bag and found a handgun inside. Kingsbur told
the officers he had found the gun in a park earlier and was “trying to
find somewhere to throw it down.” Kingsbur testified that he wanted
to dispose of the handgun because he did not want it to fall into a
child’s hands and that he knew the gun did not work because the
“chambers . . . fell off” when he picked up the gun. He also testified
that he put the gun down by the trash can because he did not want to
get caught with it. There were no bullets in the gun. Kingsbur was
charged with a violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.

The certificate of analysis admitted as an exhibit at Kingsbur’s
bench trial stated that the gun was a Davis Industries, Model P-32,
.32 caliber automatic pistol. The certificate also stated that the pistol
“does not function and could not be test fired” because there were
ten missing parts. Kingsbur argued that the handgun’s state of disre-
pair rendered it inoperable and, therefore, that the Commonwealth
failed to show that the handgun he possessed was a firearm within
the meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2.

The trial court applied the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Arm-
strong v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 312, 549 S.E.2d 641 (2001)
(en banc). In that opinion, the Court of Appeals held that for pur-
poses of Code § 18.2-308.2 a “firearm” was an instrument “made
with the purpose to expel a projectile by gunpowder or other explo-
sion” and that proof of present operability was not required. Id. at
321-22, 549 S.E.2d at 645-46. Accordingly, the trial court rejected
Kingsbur’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence based on
the inoperability of the handgun. Kingsbur was convicted of posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon and sentenced to five years in
prison.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Kingsbur’s conviction based on
this Court’s opinion in Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573,

584, 562 S.E.2d 139, 145 (2002). Kingsbur v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.
App. 307, 311, 579 S.E.2d 357, 359 (2003).

DISCUSSION

Kingsbur argues here, as he did in the Court of Appeals, that the
trial court should have granted his motion to strike the Common-
wealth’s evidence because the evidence failed to show that Kingsbur
possessed a firearm within the meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2. King-
sbur asserts that, under this Court’s opinion in Armstrong, a firearm
that has lost the characteristic of firing a projectile by means of an
explosion is no longer a firearm for purposes of the statute. Here the
evidence showed that the handgun at issue could not be test fired, did
not function, was missing parts, and “came apart” in Kingsbur’s
hands when he first picked it up. These facts, Kingsbur asserts, show
that the handgun was in such a state of disrepair that it ceased to
function as a firearm within the meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2.
Kingsbur also asserted that it was the burden of the Commonwealth
to prove that the handgun had not lost its characteristics as a firearm.

HE in Armstrong, we approved the holding of the Court of
Appeals that a firearm is an instrument which was “designed, made,
and intended to expel a projectile by means of an explosion.” 263
Va. at 585, 562 S.E.2d at 146. In a footnote we stated:

Common sense and experience leave no room for doubt that an
instrument originally designed, made, and intended to expel a
projectile by force of an explosion can lose this characteristic
in many ways such that it would no longer be fairly considered
a firearm.

Id, at 584 n.6, 562 S.E.2d at 145 n.6. This statement, upon which
Kingsbur relies, refers to exceptional circumstances and not simply a
showing of disrepair that might preclude expelling a projectile by
explosion at a particular point in time. Jd. at 584, 562 S.E.2d at 146.

Hl Contrary to Kingsbur’s assertions, the Commonwealth did not
have the burden of disproving that the handgun lost its characteristics
as a firearm. The Commonwealth had the burden of presenting prima
facie evidence on all elements of the crime charged and, once the
Commonwealth met that burden, Kingsbur had the option of present-
ing evidence raising a reasonable doubt regarding one or more of
those elements. However, the ultimate burden of persuasion always
remained on the Commonwealth and if, considering the evidence as a
whole, both for the Commonwealth and Kingsbur, there existed a

reasonable doubt of his guilt, he was entitled to be acquitted of the
offense. See Dobson v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 71, 74-75, 531
S.E.2d 569, 571 (2000); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 338, 342,
228 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1976).

Hl We therefore turn to Kingsbur’s challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence. Applying well-known principles of appellate review,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Common-
wealth and will not set aside the verdict unless it is plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it. Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va.
268, 281-82, 427 S.E.2d 411, 421 (1993).

HB Here, the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the handgun in Kingsbur’s possession was
designed, made, and intended to fire or expel a projectile by means
of an explosion. It was not obligated to prove that the handgun was
operable. Armstrong, 263 Va. at 584, 562 S.E.2d at 145. The certifi-
cate of analysis identified the specific model of the handgun. King-
sbur considered it a handgun because he did not want a child to
“T[get] ahold of it” and, as a convicted felon, he knew he should not
get caught with it. This evidence supports a finding that the handgun
Kingsbur possessed was designed, made, and intended to expel a
projectile by means of an explosion.

Il The evidence Kingsbur cites to support his position falls far
short of the exceptional circumstance identified in Armstrong. The
evidence of inoperability because of the missing parts indicates in
this case, as it did in Armstrong, that the handgun could have been
repaired. Id. at 584, 562 S.E.2d at 146. Kingsbur’s testimony that the
chambers of the handgun “just fell off of it” is insufficient to sup-
port a finding that the handgun in question lost its characteristic as a
firearm. Furthermore, the arresting officer testified that the handgun
appeared to be “intact,” and the certificate of analysis did not reflect
that the handgun was in more than one piece.

Hl For the above reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err
in concluding that the handgun in issue was a firearm for purposes of
Code § 18.2-308.2 and in refusing to grant Kingsbur’s motion to
strike.

Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Pe 353
a

DANIELL E. GAMBRELL
v.
Crry or NoRFOLK
Record No. 030295
March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

354

Andrew R. Sebok (Jeffrey G. Haverson, on briefs), for appellant.
Harold P. Juren, Chief Deputy City Attorney (Bernard A. Pishko,
City Attorney, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KEENAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal is from a judgment in favor of a defendant municipal
corporation in a personal injury action involving a “slip and fall”
accident on snow and ice in a city-owned parking lot. The dispositive
issue is whether the circuit court erred in sustaining the defendant’s
plea of sovereign immunity. We consider whether, at the time of the
plaintiff’s fall, the municipality was exercising a “governmental

355
FC

function” during snow removal operations after a snowstorm and,
therefore, was immune from liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. Daniell E. Gam-
brell was an employee of Bank of America (the Bank) at one of its
offices in the City of Norfolk (the City). The Bank leased for its
employees’ use about 900 out of 1100 available parking spaces in a
parking lot owned and operated by the City (the parking lot). The
Bank paid the City $375,000 per year for the lease. The Bank’s
employees parked their vehicles in the parking lot and traveled to
and from their place of employment in a “‘shuttle” bus.

On January 25, 2000, a snowstorm in the City resulted in an
accumulation of 4.7 inches of snow. On January 26 and 27, 2000, the
City closed the parking lot and instructed the Bank’s employees to
park their vehicles at a parking garage in a nearby shopping mall.

The following day, January 28, 2000, the City reopened the park-
ing lot after informing the Bank that its employees could resume
parking their vehicles there. On that date, as Gambrell was walking
from her parked vehicle in the parking lot to the “shuttle bus pick-up
area,” she allegedly “‘slipped and fell” on “‘snow and ice” and sus-
tained “serious and permanent injuries.”

Gambrell filed a motion for judgment against the City alleging
that she was injured as a result of the City’s negligent failure to
remove snow and ice from the parking lot and its failure to place
warning signs “around said area.” The City responded by filing,
among other things, a “Special Plea of Governmental Immunity.”
The City contended that it was immune from liability for Gambrell’s
alleged injuries because they occurred during the City’s exercise of
its governmental function of “emergency snow and ice removal
activities necessitated by a severe snowstorm.”

The circuit court conducted a hearing and received evidence con-
cerning the City’s special plea. The City introduced into evidence
meteorological records prepared by the National Climatic Data
Center, which indicated that on January 25th, 2000, the high temper-
ature in the City of Norfolk was 36 degrees Fahrenheit, the low tem-
perature was 29 degrees Fahrenheit, and there was an accumulation
of 4.7 inches of snow. From January 26 through January 27, 2000,
the high temperatures ranged between 29 and 31 degrees Fahrenheit,
and four inches of snow remained on the ground. On January 28,
2000, the high temperature was 33 degrees Fahrenheit, the low tem-
perature was 19 degrees Fahrenheit, and there were three inches of
snow on the ground.

356
FC

John D. Snowden, Jr., the operations manager for the Division of
Streets and Bridges of the City’s Department of Public Works, testi-
fied regarding the City’s snow removal plan. He explained that the
snow removal plan, found in the City’s Emergency Operations Man-
ual, is activated when there are snow accumulations between one and
two inches or whenever there is a possibility that the surfaces of the
City’s roads and bridges may freeze. Snowden stated that the City
activated the snow removal plan from January 25 through January
28, 2000, and that the City’s work crews were assigned only to snow
and ice removal tasks during that entire time period.

Snowden also testified that the work crews worked 24 hours per
day in two 12-hour shifts through January 27, 2000. The length of
the work crews’ shifts was reduced on January 28, 2000, because the
main arteries of the City’s roadways were clear and the work crews
had begun to remove snow from the secondary streets. Snowden
stated that no personnel could be allocated to remove snow from the
City’s public parking lots on January 28, 2000, because the secon-
dary streets still needed to be cleared and freezing temperatures had
prevented the snow from melting on those streets. Snowden also
stated that the City lacked sufficient snow removal equipment to
clear all the City’s streets within a few days after a “major snow-
storm,” and that he considered a snowfall of 4.7 inches to be a
“major snowstorm.”

Linda C. Davis, administrator of the City’s Division of Parking,
also testified at the hearing on the special plea. She stated that the
City and the Bank agreed to reopen the parking lot on January 28,
2000, with the “stipulation that all employees were [to be] told [that]
there [were] still icy spots on the lot and that they should exercise
caution when parking there.”

Gambrell testified at the hearing that when she entered the park-
ing lot in her vehicle on January 28, 2000, she observed that there

as “ice and snow everywhere” in the parking lot. Gambrell stated,
“[AJll I saw was ice and snow. I didn’t see any cleared areas whatso-
ever.” Gambrell also stated that it was daylight outside and that she
could see where she was walking.

The circuit court sustained the City’s special plea. In explaining
its ruling, the circuit court stated that the City’s “continued effort to
dig out from the storm was a governmental function and subject to
governmental immunity.” Gambrell appeals from the circuit court’s
judgment.

es 357
_———_

Gambrell argues that the circuit court erred in sustaining the spe-
cial plea. She asserts that the City’s lease of spaces in the parking lot
for pecuniary benefit and the City’s maintenance of the lot are pro-
prietary functions that do not immunize the City from tort liability.
Gambrell contends that the governmental function of snow and ice
removal was not the proximate cause of her injuries because the City
had failed to clear the parking lot of snow and ice at the time she
was injured. Gambrell further contends that any emergency situation
that may have existed was no longer present on January 28, 2000.

In response, the City argues that the circuit court correctly sus-
tained the special plea because the emergency removal of snow from
the City’s streets and public parking lots is a governmental function.
The City contends that emergency conditions still existed on January
28, 2000, because three inches of snow remained on the ground and
temperatures remained at or below the point of freezing. The City
also asserts that its lease of spaces in the parking lot for a fee did not
affect the governmental character of its emergency snow removal
activities. We agree with the City’s arguments.

Hl In considering the issue presented, we are guided by estab-
lished principles. A plea of sovereign immunity presents distinct
issues of fact that, if proved, create a bar to a party’s alleged right of
recovery. Whitley v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 482, 493, 538 S.E.2d
296, 302 (2000); Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 480, 468 S.E.2d
882, 884 (1996). The party advancing the sovereign immunity plea
bears the burden of proving those issues of fact. Whitley, 260 Va. at
493, 538 S.E.2d at 302; Tomlin, 251 Va. at 480, 468 S.E.2d at 884.

HM In Virginia, municipal corporations exercise two types of
functions, governmental and proprietary. Harrell v. City of Norfolk,
265 Va. 500, 502, 578 S.E.2d 756, 757 (2003); Niese v. City of Alex-
andria, 264 Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002); Fenon v. City
of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 555, 125 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1962). A func-
tion is governmental in nature if it is directly related to the general
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. Niese, 264 Va. at 239, 564
§.E.2d at 132; Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 171, 375
S.E.2d 747, 750 (1989). In contrast, a function is proprietary in
nature if it involves a privilege and power performed primarily for
the benefit of the municipality. City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael
Dev. Co., 259 Va. 493, 499, 527 S.E.2d 778, 782 (2000); Hoggard v.
City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 147-48, 200 S.E. 610, 611 (1939).
As a general rule, when an allegedly negligent act involves the rou-
tine maintenance or operation of a service being provided by a

358 es
pC

municipality, the function is considered to be a proprietary one.
Carter v. Chesterfield County Health Comm’n, 259 Va. 588, 592, 527
S.E.2d 783, 785 (2000); Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. at 499, 527
S.E.2d at 782; Woods v. Town of Marion, 245 Va. 44, 45, 425 S.E.2d
487, 488 (1993).

Hj A municipality is immune from liability for negligence in the
exercise of a governmental function, as well as for negligence in the
failure to exercise a governmental function. Harrell, 265 Va. at 502,
578 S.E.2d at 757; Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d
at 782; Woods, 245 Va. at 45, 425 S.E.2d at 488. However, a munici-
pality is liable, in the same manner as an individual or a private
entity, for injuries resulting from negligence in the performance of
proprietary functions. Harrell, 265 Va. at 502, 578 S.E.2d at 757;
Woods, 245 Va. at 45, 425 S.E.2d at 488.

Hi Gambrell alleged in her motion for judgment that the City
“negligently allowed snow and ice to remain on the [parking] lot,
and negligently failed to place any warning signs or markings around
said area.” At the hearing on the special plea, the City did not dis-
pute Gambrell’s contentions that at the time of the accident, the park-
ing lot had not been plowed and warning signs had not been placed
in the lot. Thus, our consideration of the circuit court’s ruling on the
special plea is limited to the question whether the removal of snow
and ice from a municipal parking lot and the placement of warning
signs at the location of such snow and ice are governmental or pro-
prietary functions.

We previously have considered cases in which a municipality was
engaged in emergency snow removal operations at the time a plain-
tiff sustained an alleged injury. In Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339,
340, 429 S.E.2d 11, 11-12 (1993), the plaintiffs allegedly were
injured when a bus in which they were riding collided with a city-
owned truck that was engaged in spreading salt during a snowstorm.
We held that the conduct of driving and spreading salt in a snow-
storm was “an integral part of the governmental function of render-
ing the city streets safe for public travel.” Id. at 344, 429 S.B.2d at
13.

Shortly before our decision in Stanfield, we reached the same
conclusion in our holding in Bialk v. City of Hampton, 242 Va. 56,
405 S.E.2d 619 (1991). There, a plaintiff allegedly was injured when
he was struck by snow propelled from the blade of a snowplow that
was being operated by an employee of a municipal corporation. Id. at
57, 405 S.E.2d at 620. We concluded that because the municipality’s

es 359
FC

snow removal operations were actions taken for the common good in
coping with an emergency, those actions involved the exercise of a
governmental function. Id. at 59, 405 S.E.2d at 621.

The case before us also involves the actions of a municipality in
the course of emergency snow removal operations. The evidence
showed that the City activated its emergency snow removal plan after
a major snowstorm occurred. Because freezing temperatures for three
days after the snowstorm prevented the snow from melting, the
City’s work crews had to spend all their time clearing snow from the
City’s streets and were not able to remove snow from the City’s pub-
lic parking lots.

Hl The City’s decision to restrict its snow removal operations to
its public streets, and its failure to place emergency warning signs in
the parking lot, involved the City’s exercise of a governmental, rather
than a proprietary, function. We reach this conclusion because these
actions and omissions occurred in the context of an extended period
of snow emergency and dealt with the determination of priorities
directly related to the general health, safety, and welfare of the citi-
zens. See Niese, 264 Va. at 239, 564 S.E.2d at 132; Edwards, 237 Va.
at 171, 375 S.E.2d at 750. Thus, those actions and omissions were
functionally different and unrelated to the City’s routine maintenance
of municipal streets and parking lots, which involves the exercise of
a proprietary function. See Carter, 259 Va. at 592, 527 S.E.2d at 785;
Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782; Woods, 245
Va. at 45; 425 S.E.2d at 488.

HM Our conclusion that the City was exercising a governmen-
tal, rather than a proprietary, function at the time of Gambrell’s fall
is not changed by the fact that the City charged the Bank fees for use
of parking spaces in the parking lot. The charging of fees did not
alter the fundamental character of the municipal function at issue,
because that function was not one of routine maintenance but one of
implementation of an emergency snow removal plan for the general
safety and welfare of the citizenry. Thus, the governmental nature of
the City’s actions following the snowstorm is controlling. See Carter,
259 Va. at 593, 527 S.E.2d at 786; Edwards, 237 Va. at 172, 375
S.E.2d at 750. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was suffi-
cient to support the circuit court’s ruling sustaining the City’s special
plea of sovereign immunity.*

* Based on our determination that the City was immune from liability for the injuri
alleged by Gambrell in her motion for judgment, we need not consider Gambrell’s additional
claim that the circuit court erred in sustaining the City’s demurrer to the motion for judgment.

For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

361

THE DUNBAR Group, LLC, ET AL.
v.

ARCHIE F. TIGNOR, ET AL.
Record No. 030638

March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

Thomas F. Coates, III (John Penn Crawford; Coates & Daven-
port, on brief), for appellants.

es (:
Pe

No brief or argument for appellees.

JUSTICE KEENAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal from a judgment ordering the dissolution of a lim-
ited liability company, the dispositive issue is whether the evidence
was sufficient to support the chancellor’s judgment.

XpertCTI, LLC (Xpert), is a limited liability company that pro-
vides “‘computer telephony integration” (CTI) software to dealers
and manufacturers for installation in certain telephone systems and
equipment. CTI software enables the use of computers to “interface”
with and control telephone systems.

Xpert was formed in March 2000, by The Dunbar Group, LLC
(Dunbar), and Archie F. Tignor, who each owned a membership
interest of 50 percent in Xpert. Edward D. Robertson, Jr., a computer
software developer and consultant, was the sole member and man-
ager of Dunbar.

Tignor, a commercial telephone and telecommunications equip-
ment dealer and installer, owned 50 percent of the stock of X-tel,
Inc. (X-tel), a telecommunications sales firm. Tignor served as the
president of X-tel, which was a dealer in equipment for Samsung
Telecommunications America, Inc. (Samsung), a manufacturer, dis-
tributor, and seller of telecommunications equipment.

Dunbar and Tignor executed an “Operating Agreement” for
Xpert under which they were the sole managers of Xpert. Dunbar
created Xpert’s proprietary software, or “source code,” and con-
ducted the daily operations of the company. Tignor’s main function
was to provide Xpert with access to his business contacts in the tele-
communications industry, including Samsung.

Xpert’s operating agreement provided a procedure for a company
member to assert a breach of the agreement by another company
member. The agreement specified that if the breach was not timely
cured by the defaulting member, the complaining member had the
“right to petition a court of competent jurisdiction for dissolution of
the Company.” The agreement also stated that the “dissolution of a
[mJember or occurrence of any other event that terminates the con-
tinued membership of a [mJember in the Company shall not cause
the dissolution of the Company.”

In December 2000, Xpert entered into a contract with Samsung to
supply Samsung with software-driven security devices called “don-
gles,” which were to be included in all telecommunications systems
sold by Samsung. Xpert received about $20,000 per month from the

Samsung contract. The Samsung contract contained a provision spec-
ifying the contract’s duration:

This Agreement shall come into force and effect on the date
written above [December 5, 2000] and shall remain in full
force and effect for consecutive periods of thirty-six (36)
months thereafter... . After this time the contract will con-
tinue on an annual basis unless terminated by either party giv-
ing 90 days notice before the anniversary of the contract date.

Certain disputes arose between Robertson and Tignor over mat-
ters primarily related to the management and disbursement of Xpert’s
assets. In May 2002, Dunbar’s counsel sent a letter to Tignor’s coun-
sel stating that it was apparent to Robertson that “his continued
working relationship with Mr. Tignor [was] no longer possible.”
Dunbar’s counsel further stated that “Mr. Robertson is of the opinion
that it is in the parties’ best interest to sever their ties as fully and
quickly as possible.”

In September 2002, Dunbar, Xpert, and Robertson, in his capac-
ity as a manager of Xpert, (collectively, Dunbar) filed an amended
bill of complaint against Tignor and X-tel requesting, among other
things, entry of an order “expelling and dissociating Tignor as a
member of Xpert pursuant to Virginia Code § 13.1-1040.1(5).” Dun-
bar alleged that Tignor engaged in “‘numerous acts of misconduct as
a member and manager of Xpert,” including the commingling of
Xpert’s funds with the funds of Tignor and “‘his corporate alter ego,
X-tel.””

HB Code § 13.1-1040.1, which provides for a court-ordered
expulsion of a member of a limited liability company, states in rele-
vant part:

[A] member is dissociated from a limited liability company
upon the occurrence of any of the following events:

5. On application by the limited liability company or another
member, the member’s expulsion by judicial determination
because:
a. The member engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely
and materially affected the business of the limited liability
company;

es (
Pe

b. The member willfully or persistently committed a material
breach of the articles of organization or an operating agree-
ment; or

c. The member engaged in conduct relating to the business of
the limited liability company which makes it not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business with the member.

Tignor filed a separate “Application for Judicial Dissolution”
against Dunbar and Xpert. Tignor requested, among other things, the
dissolution of Xpert under Code § 13.1-1047 on the ground that “it
is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of [Xpert] in
conformity with the Articles of Organization and [the] Operating
Agreement.” Tignor alleged that ‘‘serious differences of opinion as
to company management have arisen between the members and man-
agers” of Xpert, and that the company was “deadlocked” in its abil-
ity to conduct its business affairs, including contracting with custom-
ers for goods and services and the “receipt and disbursement of
[Xpert’s] assets and company funds.”

The chancellor consolidated for trial Dunbar’s amended bill of
complaint and Tignor’s application for judicial dissolution. At a hear-
ing, the chancellor received evidence relating to both pleadings.

The evidence showed that Tignor commingled Xpert’s funds with
X-tel’s funds by placing several checks, which were made payable to
Xpert, into X-tel’s bank account. Tignor provided inaccurate informa-
tion to Robertson concerning one of those checks, which was made
payable to Xpert in the amount of about $47,000. Tignor used the
proceeds from that check to pay some of X-tel’s expenses and to
meet X-tel’s payroll, including the payment of Tignor’s own salary.

Without informing Robertson, Tignor also authorized a change in
the status of Xpert’s checking account that prevented checks from
being written on the account. When Robertson, who was unaware of
the change, wrote a check payable to one of Xpert’s vendors, the
check “bounced.”

Although Dunbar had been renting office space from X-tel,
Tignor evicted Robertson from X-tel’s premises. Tignor also
restricted Robertson’s access to various testing equipment located in
X-tel’s offices, reducing Robertson’s ability to test Xpert’s products.
Robertson needed access to this equipment to ensure the quality of
Xpert’s products before they were delivered to Xpert’s customers.
Due to Robertson’s restricted ability to test Xpert’s products, Xpert’s

36 EE
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customers did not receive their orders in a timely manner and prod-
ucts were sent to customers “in less than quality condition.”

Tignor also terminated Robertson’s e-mail account with Xpert
without giving him prior notice. This sudden termination of Robert-
son’s e-mail account created “‘a lot of confusion” among Xpert’s
customers, giving the appearance that Xpert had “gone out of
business.”

In December 2002, the chancellor entered an order in which he
found that Tignor commingled Xpert’s funds with his own funds and
the funds of X-tel. The chancellor also concluded that Tignor’s
actions had been contrary to Xpert’s best interests and had
“adversely affected Xpert’s ability to carry on its business.” The
chancellor further determined that Tignor had acted “in violation of”
subparagraph five of Code § 13.1-1040.1.

The chancellor ordered that Tignor be “immediately expelled as
an active member of Xpert’” and that Robertson “shall continue to
operate Xpert” and provide to Tignor a monthly accounting of
Xpert’s finances. The chancellor also ordered:

Xpert . . . shall continue the arrangement pursuant to this order
until its contract with [Samsung] expires or otherwise termi-
nates, including any extensions. Following the fulfillment or
non-renewal of the [Samsung] contract, the court orders that
Xpert . . . be dissolved and its assets distributed pursuant to
the Virginia Code and the operating agreement of Xpert.

Dunbar appeals.

Dunbar does not challenge that part of the chancellor’s order
expelling Tignor as a member of Xpert, but attacks only the portion
of the order providing for the dissolution of Xpert. Dunbar argues
that the evidence is insufficient to support the dissolution of Xpert
because the evidence did not satisfy the standard required by Code
§ 13.1-1047 for the judicial dissolution of a limited liability com-
pany. In support of this argument, Dunbar primarily asserts that the
record fails to show that after the expulsion of Tignor as a member
of Xpert, it would not be reasonably practicable to carry on Xpert’s
business.*

Hi In resolving Dunbar’s claim, we first observe that an estab-
lished standard of review governs our inquiry. Because the chancellor
heard the evidence ore tenus, his decree is entitled to the same

* Tignor did not file a brief in this appeal.

sl
PF

weight as a jury verdict. Shooting Point, L.L.C. v. Wescoat, 265 Va.
256, 264, 576 S.E.2d 497, 501 (2003); Chesterfield Meadows Shop-
ping Ctr. Assocs., L.P. v. Smith, 264 Va. 350, 355, 568 S.E.2d 676,
679 (2002). Therefore, on appeal, we will not set aside the chancel-
lor’s findings unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to
support them. Shooting Point, L.L.C., 265 Va. at 264, 576 S.E.2d at
501; Tauber v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 520, 526, 562 S.E.2d 118,
120 (2002).

Il The chancellor resolved the dissolution issue in Tignor’s
favor. Thus, we consider the evidence relating to the dissolution
determination in the light most favorable to Tignor. See Barner v.
Chappell, 266 Va. 277, 283, 585 S.E.2d 590, 594 (2003); Jenkins v.
Bay House Assocs., L.P., 266 Va. 39, 41, 581 S.E.2d 510, 511 (2003).

Hi This appeal presents our first opportunity to consider the stat-
utory standard provided in Code § 13.1-1047 for the judicial dissolu-
tion of a limited liability company. The statute states that

{o]n application by or for a member, the circuit court of the
locality in which the registered office of the limited liability
company is located may decree dissolution of a limited liabil-
ity company if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business in conformity with the articles of organization and
any operating agreement.

Id.

HB Because this statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
we apply the plain meaning of that language. See Woods v. Mendez,
265 Va. 68, 74-75, 574 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2003); Industrial Dev. Auth.
y. Board of Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623
(2002). The statutory standard set by the General Assembly for dis-
solution of a limited liability company is a strict one, reflecting legis-
lative deference to the parties’ contractual agreement to form and
operate a limited liability company. Only when a circuit court con-
cludes that present circumstances show that it is not reasonably prac-
ticable to carry on the company’s business in accord with its articles
of organization and any operating agreement, may the court order a
dissolution of the company.

IH The record here, however, does not show that the chancellor
evaluated the evidence in light of the fact that Tignor was being
expelled as a member and manager of Xpert. Although Tignor’s
actions in those capacities had created numerous problems in the

3
pt

operation of Xpert, his expulsion as a member changed his role from
one of an active participant in the management of Xpert to the more
passive role of an investor in the company. The record fails to show
that after this change in the daily management of Xpert, it would not
be reasonably practicable for Xpert to carry on its business pursuant
to its operating authority.

Hl Moreover, we observe that the terms of the chancellor’s dis-
solution order refute a conclusion that dissolution was appropriate
under the statutory standard of Code § 13.1-1047. While the chancel-
lor concluded that judicial dissolution of Xpert was warranted, he
nevertheless ordered that Xpert continue operating as a limited liabil-
ity company for as long as the Samsung contract remained in effect.
This provision in the chancellor’s order indicates that he concluded
that Tignor’s expulsion from Xpert would make it reasonably practi-
cable for Xpert to continue to operate for an extended period of time.

Hl Accordingly, we hold that the evidence does not support that
part of the chancellor’s order providing for the dissolution of Xpert.
Further, because the evidence is insufficient to support such a judi-
cial dissolution, we do not reach Dunbar’s additional argument that
the chancellor erred under Code § 13.1-1047 in ordering that Xpert
be dissolved at an uncertain, future date.

For these reasons, we will affirm that part of the chancellor’s
judgment expelling Tignor as a member of Xpert, reverse that part of
the judgment ordering the dissolution of Xpert, and enter final
judgment.

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and final judgment.

a 369
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MARGARET BARKLEY
v.

GEORGE E. WALLACE
Record No. 030744
March 5, 2004
Present: All the Justices

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70

Robert J. Haddad (Elizabeth L. Montagna; Shuttleworth, Ruloff,
Giordano & Swain, on brief), for appellant.
Joseph M. Young (Hall, Fox and Atlee, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KEENAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a personal injury action in
which a plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries as a result of a motor
vehicle collision. We consider whether the circuit court erred in rul-
ing that evidence of the plaintiff’s medical bills and expenses that
were discharged in bankruptcy was inadmissible for the limited pur-
pose of proving her pain and suffering caused by the accident.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. In September
1994, Margaret Barkley was operating a motor vehicle that collided
with another vehicle driven by George E. Wallace. Barkley filed a
motion for judgment against Wallace alleging that she was injured as

| 371
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the result of Wallace’s negligence in making “an unsafe lane change
from the center lane into the right-hand lane of travel.”

After filing her motion for judgment, Barkley filed a bankruptcy
petition in a United States Bankruptcy Court, and her medical bills
were discharged as a result of proceedings in that court. Wallace filed
a motion in limine in the circuit court to preclude Barkley from
introducing evidence of her medical bills and expenses as proof of
her alleged damages. In response, Barkley asked the circuit court to
allow her to present evidence that the total amount of her medical
bills was $11,365.33, because “jurors oftentimes use the total
amount of medical bills to try and determine a fair amount of ‘pain
and suffering.’ ”

The circuit court granted Wallace’s motion, prohibiting Barkley
“from presenting at trial any evidence of the medical bills and medi-
cal expenses she incurred regarding her medical treatment following
the accident.” The circuit court based its ruling on the sole ground
that those bills and expenses had been discharged in bankruptcy.
After this ruling, Wallace admitted liability for the accident, and the
case was set for a jury trial on the issue of damages.

At trial, Barkley testified that she received medical treatment,
physical therapy, and chiropractic care for her injuries. She stated
that she did not obtain any medical treatment after April 1995,
because she no longer could afford to pay her medical bills. Barkley
explained that she missed some physical therapy appointments
because she lacked transportation, had constant pain, was unable to
pay for continued treatment, and experienced forgetfulness resulting
from certain medications she was taking.

Barkley also testified that she was unable to perform her duties as
a financial consultant and insurance agent because of continued pain
and an inability to sit or stand for long periods of time. She stated
that she still experiences headaches and pain in her neck and shoul-
ders and is limited in her ability to perform ordinary tasks, such as
sewing clothes and lifting her grandchildren.

Linda Schneider, M.D., Barkley’s treating physician, testified that
from September 1994 through April 1995, she treated Barkley for
injuries caused by the accident. Dr. Schneider stated that Barkley ini-
tially complained of headaches, nausea, difficulty sleeping and focus-
ing her eyes, and pain in her neck, back, and shoulders. Dr. Schnei-

' Barkley also named Wallace’s employer, the City of Hampton, as a defendant. However,
the City was later dismissed from the action without prejudice by an order of nonsuit.

372 a
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der diagnosed Barkley as suffering from, among other things, spasms
in her neck and lower back. Dr. Schneider referred Barkley for physi-
cal therapy and chiropractic care to facilitate her recovery and to ease
her back pain.

Dr. Schneider further testified that when she last examined Bar-
kley in April 1995, Barkley still was experiencing intermittent stiff-
ness and pain in her neck and lower back, and she could not sit in
one position for longer than ten minutes at a time. Dr. Schneider
stated that at the time of this last examination, she thought that Bar-
Kley’s condition would improve within six months.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in
Barkley’s favor, awarding her damages of $10,000, and the circuit
court entered final judgment on the verdict. Barkley appeals.

Barkley argues that the circuit court erred in prohibiting her from
presenting to the jury the total amount of the medical bills she
incurred after the accident. She asserts that she was entitled to intro-
duce this evidence to demonstrate to the jury the extent of her medi-
cal treatment to support her claim of pain and suffering caused by the
accident.

In response, Wallace argues that the circuit court properly
excluded from evidence the total amount of Barkley’s medical
expenses because, at the time of trial, Barkley was no longer respon-
sible for the payment of her medical bills. Wallace contends that the
total amount of Barkley’s medical expenses would not have assisted
the jury in understanding the extent of Barkley’s medical treatment.
He further observes that Barkley “had every opportunity at trial to
present testimony outlining the extent of her medical care.”

Hl In resolving this issue, we first emphasize the limited nature
of the question presented. Barkley did not seek to have the amounts
she was charged for medical services admitted into evidence to
obtain recovery of those amounts as an element of compensatory
damages. Thus, we are not presented with and do not decide the
question whether evidence of medical bills is admissible to recover
the amount charged for such treatment when a plaintiff has obtained
a discharge of those medical bills in bankruptcy proceedings.? We
decide only the issue whether the excluded evidence was admissible
to prove the extent of Barkley’s medical treatment to support non-
monetary elements of her compensatory damages claim.

2 For the same reason we do not consider whether, for purposes of trial in a tort action,
medical bills discharged in bankruptcy are “incurred” by a plaintiff.

a 373
FC

HM Generally, a litigant is entitled to introduce all competent,
material, and relevant evidence that tends to prove or disprove any
material issue in the case, unless that evidence violates a specific rule
of admissibility. Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Smiley Block Co., 250
Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1995); Barnette v. Dickens, 205
Va. 12, 15, 135 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1964). Every fact that tends to
establish the probability or improbability of a fact at issue is relevant.
Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 205, 585
S.E.2d 557, 566-67 (2003); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Dungee,
258 Va. 235, 260, 520 S.E.2d 164, 179 (1999); Wood v. Bass Pro
Shops, Inc., 250 Va. 297, 303, 462 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1995). There-
fore, evidence is relevant if “‘it tends to establish a party’s claim or
defense or adds force and strength to other evidence bearing upon an
issue in the case.” Breeden v. Roberts, 258 Va. 411, 416, 518 S.E.2d
834, 837 (1999); accord McNeir v. Greer-Hale Chinchilla Ranch,
194 Va. 623, 628, 74 S.E.2d 165, 169 (1953).

We have not previously addressed the exclusion of medical bills
offered only to prove non-monetary elements of a compensatory
damages claim, such as pain and suffering, when those bills have
been discharged in bankruptcy. However, in a different context not
involving a bankruptcy discharge, we considered the admissibility of
medical bills offered for the limited purpose of establishing pain and
suffering as an element of damages.

In that decision, Parker v. Elco Elevator Corporation, 250 Va.
278, 462 S.E.2d 98 (1995), a plaintiff failed to comply with an
agreed discovery deadline requiring him to specify all monetary dam-
ages he claimed from an injury allegedly sustained as a result of the
defendant’s negligence. Because of this discovery violation, the cir-
cuit court prohibited admission of the plaintiff’s medical bills despite
his request that they be received for the limited purposes of showing
that he received medical treatment for his injuries and to support his
claim of pain and suffering. We held that the circuit court erred in
excluding evidence of the medical bills for those limited purposes.
Id. at 280, 462 S.E.2d at 100.

HMB Like the medical bills in Parker, the medical bills before us
were relevant because they tended to establish the probability of Bar-
Kley’s claim that she experienced pain and suffering as a result of the
accident. Evidence of the medical bills also was relevant to establish
the inconvenience that Barkley experienced because of Wallace’s
negligence.

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These subjects were directly related to the central issue before the
jury, the extent of Barkley’s damages. Moreover, the fact that the
bills had been discharged in bankruptcy was irrelevant to the ques-
tion whether Barkley experienced pain, suffering, and inconvenience
as a result of the accident. Thus, the circuit court erred in excluding
the medical bills on the ground of Barkley’s prior bankruptcy.

HHI We therefore must decide whether the exclusion of this rele-
vant evidence was reversible error. In a civil case, the erroneous
exclusion of evidence is reversible error when the record fails to
show plainly that the excluded evidence could not have affected the
verdict. Pace v. Richmond, 231 Va. 216, 226, 343 S.E.2d 59, 65
(1986); see Code § 8.01-678. Thus, we consider the potential effect
of the excluded evidence in light of all the evidence that was
presented to the jury.

HEME We observe that both Barkley and Dr. Schneider testified
regarding the pain Barkley experienced. Nevertheless, we think that
the jury could have viewed the evidence of the medical bills as per-
suasive and objective corroboration of the subjective descriptions of
pain related by Barkley in her own testimony.

The jury also could have viewed evidence of the bills as objec-
tive corroboration of Dr. Schneider’s testimony, which necessarily
relied in part on Barkley’s subjective complaints of pain. As Dr.
Schneider explained during her testimony, complaints of pain and
tenderness are “‘subjective” in nature. Therefore, we conclude that
the record fails to show plainly that the evidence of Barkley’s medi-
cal bills was merely cumulative in nature such that its exclusion
could not have affected the verdict. See Code § 8.01-678; May v.
Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 363, 568 S.E.2d 690, 693 (2002). Accordingly,
we hold that the circuit court’s exclusion of this evidence for the
limited purposes sought by Barkley was reversible error.

For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s judgment
and remand the case for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

3 We note that the nature of the proof that Barkley sought to have admitted was made clear
to the circuit court in a pretrial motion. Thus, no additional proffer of that excluded evidence
‘was required to preserve her claim of reversible error. See Holles v. Sunrise Terrace, Inc., 257
Va. 131, 135, 509 S.B.2d 494, 497 (1999),

Pd 375
Pe

JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE
AGEE join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority opinion except with regard to its dispo-
sition of the question whether the trial court’s exclusion of the evi-
dence of the plaintiff’s medical bills was harmless error. Considering
the form of the evidence and the limited purpose for which it was
offered, I conclude that the evidence in question was merely cumula-
tive in nature and its exclusion could not have affected the verdict.
See May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 363, 568 S.E.2d 690, 693 (2002).

It is important to emphasize that the plaintiff assigns error to the
trial court’s refusal to allow her to present to the jury the total
amount of her medical bills. In other words, she is not asserting on
appeal that she should have been allowed to introduce the actual bills
for the purpose of proving pain and suffering.* This distinction is
important because a single figure representing the total amount of an
individual’s medical bills does not demonstrate the number of times
the person received treatment or the nature of the treatment. In some
instances, one noninvasive diagnostic test can cost as much as many
visits to a physical therapist or chiropractor.

As the majority notes, the plaintiff’s treating physician, Linda
Schneider, M.D., testified about her findings when she first examined
the plaintiff on September 26, 1994. Dr. Schneider also stated that
she referred the plaintiff for physical therapy treatments in order to
speed up the recovery and later for a chiropractic evaluation because
the plaintiff continued to experience significant symptoms. Dr.
Schneider, however, still treated the plaintiff while she underwent the
physical therapy and did so until April 1995. Based on a stipulation
by the parties that the plaintiff missed 17 out of 41 scheduled physi-
cal therapy appointments, it is apparent that she underwent at least
24 treatments by a physical therapist.

Considering this testimony along with the plaintiff’s complaints
about her continued pain and inability to perform her duties at work
and at home, I conclude that evidence showing the total amount of
the plaintiff’s medical bills would not have corroborated the plain-
tiff’s subjective complaints of pain or Dr. Schneider’s testimony. This
is so because that dollar and cents figure did not reveal the kind or
duration of treatment the plaintiff received. For example, if the total
amount of the medical bills was comprised primarily of the charges

* At trial, the plaintiff moved the circuit court to allow her to submit her medical bills in
“summary form” and to tell the jury the total amount of the bills.

376 a
FT

incurred when she was examined in a hospital emergency room and
underwent x-rays on the day of the accident, then that figure would
not have corroborated the plaintiff’s testimony that she suffered pain
for many months. However, if the figure represented many visits to
Dr. Schneider, the physical therapist, and the chiropractor, and also
included charges for pain medications, then the total amount of the
medical bills would have been objective corroboration of the plain-
tiff’s complaints of pain, suffering, and inconvenience.

Without any itemization and explanation of the individual charges
included in the total amount of the plaintiff’s medical bills, I con-
clude that the numerical figure which the plaintiff sought to introduce
would not have assisted the jury in resolving any disputed issue in
this case. See May, 264 Va. at 363, 568 S.E.2d at 693. Its exclusion
by the trial court could not have possibly affected the jury’s verdict
and was therefore harmless error. For that reason, I respectfully con-
cur in part and dissent in part and would affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.

377

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
v.
CARLTON WENDELL DUNCAN
Record No. 031036
March 5, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, J5.,
and Compton, S.J.

20 |
> .
on

379

Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kil-
gore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellant.
LeeAnn N. Barnes for appellee.

JUSTICE KEENAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing a circuit court’s holding that a defendant’s acts and omis-
sions in the care of his six-month-old son were “so gross, wanton
and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life” under
former Code § 18.2-371.1.*

Hi Carlton W. Duncan was indicted for the criminal abuse and
neglect of his son, Carlton W. Duncan, II (Carlton), in violation of
what is now Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1), which states:

Any parent, guardian, or other person responsible for the
care of a child under the age of 18 whose willful act or omis-
sion in the care of such child was so gross, wanton and culp-
able as to show a reckless disregard for human life shall be
guilty of a Class 6 felony.

* Code § 18.2-371.1 was amended in 2003. Paragraph B of the former statute, under which
Duncan was indicted, is now set forth in identical language as paragraph (B)(1) in the amended
‘statute. We will use the current numbering in this opinion.

380 Le
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Duncan was convicted of the offense after a bench trial in the Circuit
Court of the City of Williamsburg and James City County. The cir-
cuit court sentenced Duncan to a term of five years’ imprisonment,
with four years suspended.

Duncan appealed from his conviction to the Court of Appeals. A
panel of that Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and dis-
missed the indictment in an opinion that was withdrawn when the
Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for a rehearing en banc.

On rehearing en banc, the Court reversed Duncan’s conviction
and dismissed the indictment in an unpublished memorandum opin-
ion, Duncan v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1060-01-1 (April 8,
2003). The Court held that the “evidence was insufficient, as a mat-
ter of law, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Duncan’s willful
acts and omissions in caring for his child were so gross, wanton, and
culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life.” The Com-
monwealth appeals from the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

We will state the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the circuit court, and will
accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences
fairly deducible from that evidence. Zimmerman v. Commonwealth,
266 Va. 384, 386, 585 S.E.2d 538, 539 (2003); Murphy v. Common-
wealth, 264 Va. 568, 570, 570 S.E.2d 836, 837 (2002); Common-
wealth v. Hill, 264 Va. 541, 543, 570 S.E.2d 805, 806 (2002). The
evidence showed that Jennifer Dansby, Eliza L. Nemo, and Michelle
Cribbs shared a residence in James City County. On June 11, 2000,
the three housemates were introduced to Duncan and his six-month-
old son, Carlton, through a mutual acquaintance.

The next day, about 3:30 p.m., Dansby returned home from work
to find Cribbs and some other friends at the house. Although Carlton
also was there, Duncan was not present. Dansby and the other adults
took turns holding Carlton, but they did not feed him because there
was no baby food or formula in the house.

Nemo arrived at the house later that night and joined the other
adults in caring for Carlton. An “impromptu party’ soon started as
several more friends arrived and began drinking beer and using ille-
gal drugs.

About 10:30 p.m., Duncan arrived at the house with a small bag
of marijuana. Duncan’s eyes appeared to be “glazed over,” and the
whites of his eyes were “yellowed” in appearance. After his arrival,
Duncan did not feed Carlton or “care for the baby in any way,” but
began drinking beer.

Le 381
a

Around midnight, Carlton became “fussy” and began to cry
loudly. Duncan announced that he would “take care of the problem,”
and he took Carlton into a bedroom.

Nemo was concerned about Carlton’s welfare because she per-
ceived a negative tone in Duncan’s voice when he said that he would
“take care of the problem.” After she entered the bedroom where
Duncan and Carlton were located, Duncan went to the kitchen.

Dansby, who was seated in the living room, saw Duncan enter
the kitchen. Dansby heard the refrigerator door being opened and
closed, which she thought was “odd”? because the refrigerator only
contained beer and “‘wine coolers.” About five minutes later, Dansby
saw Duncan leaving the kitchen carrying a baby bottle.

Duncan returned to the bedroom and handed the baby bottle to
Nemo. Duncan then left the room and joined some people on the
porch.

Nemo began feeding the contents of the baby bottle to Carlton
and returned with him to the living room. As Nemo, who was still
holding Carlton, sat down on a couch, she noticed an unusual odor
coming from the bottle. Both Nemo and Dansby, who were sitting
together on the couch, thought that the odor “smelled like alcohol.”
They also observed that the liquid in the bottle was a “milky pinkish
color.” A friend tasted the liquid inside the bottle and concluded that
the liquid contained alcohol.

Dansby went into the kitchen and opened the refrigerator door.
She saw that a bottle of “wine cooler” was missing from the refrig-
erator, and that an open bottle of “wine cooler” had been placed
behind some “bags of trash” on the kitchen counter next to the
refrigerator. The liquid inside the “‘wine cooler” bottle was pink in
color and “about three inches” of liquid had been removed from the
bottle. Dansby became more concerned, telephoned the police, and
placed the baby bottle in a safe location until the police arrived.

Lieutenant Stout and Officer P.A. Nacastro of the James City
County Police Department arrived at the house in response to
Dansby’s telephone call. Lieutenant Stout opened the baby bottle and
observed that the liquid inside the bottle was a “milky color” and
“smelled like an alcoholic beverage of some type.” Officer Nacastro
observed that the baby bottle contained a “liquid substance” that was
of a “whitish, . . . pinkish color,” and that the “wine cooler” bottle
contained a liquid that was “pinkish” in color.

According to Officer Nacastro, Duncan’s eyes were “very blood-
shot,” his speech was “slightly mumbled,” and “[t]here was an odor

382 |
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of intoxicant about his person.” The police officers placed Duncan
under arrest and seized both the baby bottle and the bottle of “wine
cooler.”

A certificate of analysis admitted into evidence indicated that the
baby bottle contained a “[c]loudy, pink-ish colored liquid” that had
an alcohol content of 2.8% ethyl alcohol by volume. The certificate
also reflected test results from an examination of the contents of a
12-ounce bottle labeled “‘Seagram’s Wild Berries Flavored Cooler.”
These test results showed that the bottle of “wine cooler” contained
a “{cJlear, pink liquid” that had an alcohol content of 3.2% ethyl
alcohol by volume.

Duncan also testified at the trial. He maintained that Carlton was
with him during the entire day of June 12th, 2000, and that earlier in
the day, he had fed Carlton some cereal. Duncan testified that about
7:30 p.m., he took Carlton to a friend’s house, which was located
next to Dansby’s residence. Duncan stated that Carlton ate part of a
banana and drank some baby formula there. Duncan further testified
that he and Carlton left the friend’s house about 9:30 p.m., and went
next door to Dansby’s residence.

Duncan admitted giving Nemo the baby bottle, but denied plac-
ing any “wine cooler” into the bottle, and said that he did not know
that there was any substance other than milk in the bottle. Duncan
conceded that he had drunk “three or four beers” on the night in
question.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court found Duncan
guilty of criminal abuse and neglect of his child, as charged in the
indictment. In explaining its decision, the circuit court stated:

I find that Mr. Duncan is not a believable witness. I reject
his testimony as to the explanation. I find the Common-
wealth’s witnesses . . . to clearly show and prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant took the baby back to the
back bedroom . . . , he then is the one who goes to the kitchen
area, he comes back with a bottle that has this clear pinkish
substance in it, he gives the bottle to Ms. Nemo, then he walks
out.

Feeding alcohol to a six-month[-old] baby is clear neglect.
Coupled with all the other acts, omissions and commissions
that he did, I find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the felony charge.

| 383
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Duncan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The Court stated
that although “Duncan was negligent in caring for his child” and
that “[h]is conduct was inexcusable and cannot be condoned,” a
finding of negligence was not sufficient to convict Duncan of the
felony of child abuse and neglect for which he was indicted. The
Court noted that although Duncan had just met the women at
Dansby’s residence the day before leaving his baby with them, there
was no evidence to show that the women were irresponsible, incap-
able, or unwilling to care for Carlton. The Court further stated that
there was no evidence that Carlton was hungry or otherwise in dis-
tress during the time that the women cared for him in Duncan’s
absence.

The Court also observed that “when the baby [later] became
fussy and started to cry loudly,” Duncan, in spite of his “apparent”
intoxicated state, “responded to him” and “took steps to feed him,
albeit with a bottle containing a liquid mixture, part of which was
wine cooler.” In further explaining its holding, the Court stated:

Plainly, at some quantitative level, based on the alcoholic con-
tent and volume of the liquid ingested, feeding a six-month-old
child liquid that contains alcohol would . . . constitute a danger
to the child’s life. In this case, however, there was no evidence
presented to show that feeding a six-month-old child up to
eight ounces of a liquid that is 2.8% ethyl alcohol by volume
endangers the child’s life. Such a conclusion would, therefore,
have to be based on pure conjecture and speculation, rather
than on the evidence or inferences reasonably drawn there-
from. Hence, we conclude the evidence did not support such a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt by the trial court.

On appeal to this Court, the Commonwealth argues that the total-
ity of Duncan’s acts and omissions were so gross, wanton, and culp-
able as to show a reckless disregard for his son’s life. The Common-
wealth contends that while Duncan’s most culpable act was placing
an alcoholic beverage into Carlton’s bottle, he also committed other
“teckless” acts, such as failing to feed his son for several hours,
which demonstrated Duncan’s “disregard for his infant son’s life.”

In response, Duncan argues that the Commonwealth failed to
establish that his acts or omissions were “‘so gross, wanton and cul-
pable as to show a reckless disregard for human life,” within the

384 Lee
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meaning of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1). He asserts that although his
actions were “irresponsible and less than what one expects of a par-
ent,” he did not endanger Carlton. Duncan also contends that the
evidence was insufficient because there was no expert testimony con-
cerning the amount of “wine cooler” necessary to endanger a child’s
life or health. Duncan asserts that without such evidence, any claim
that Carlton’s life was endangered rests on mete conjecture and
suspicion.

Hi We consider these arguments under an established standard of
review. When a defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence on
appeal, the reviewing court must give the judgment of the circuit
court sitting without a jury the same weight as a jury verdict.
McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 492, 545 S.E.2d 541, 547
(2001); Zarpley v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 256, 542 S.E.2d 761,
763 (2001); Hickson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 383, 387, 520 S.E.2d
643, 645 (1999). The appellate court has the duty to review the evi-
dence that tends to support the conviction and to uphold the circuit
court’s judgment unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it. Code § 8.01-680; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178,
204, 590 S.E.2d 520, 535 (2004); McCain, 261 Va. at 492-93, 545
S.E.2d at 547; Tarpley, 261 Va. at 256, 542 S.E.2d at 763.

Hi We have not previously had occasion to address the elements
of the crime of child abuse and neglect set forth in the language of
what is now Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1). Initially, we agree with the
Court of Appeals’ observation that the statutory language does not
apply to acts of simple negligence. We base our conclusion on the
express language of the statute prohibiting “willful act[s] or omis-
sion[s] . . . so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless
disregard for human life.” Id.; see also Cable v. Commonwealth, 243
Va. 236, 240, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992); Davis v. Commonwealth,
230 Va. 201, 206, 335 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1985); Bell v. Common-
wealth, 170 Va. 597, 611-12, 195 S.E. 675, 681 (1938); Ellis v. Com-
monwealth, 29 Va. App. 548, 555, 513 S.E.2d 453, 457 (1999).

Hl The statutory requirement that such conduct be “willful”
means that the conduct must be knowing or intentional, rather than
accidental, and be done without justifiable excuse, without ground
for believing the conduct is lawful, or with a bad purpose. See Bryan
y. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998); United States v. Mur-
dock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933); Ellis, 29 Va. App. at 554, 513
S.E.2d at 456. Thus, the term “willful,” as used in Code § 18.2-

De 385
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371.1(B)(1), contemplates an intentional, purposeful act or omission
in the care of a child by one responsible for such child’s care.

Il Unlike Code § 18.2-371.1(A), the plain language of Code
§ 18.2-371.1(B)(1) does not require that a child actually suffer seri-
ous injury as a result of a defendant’s acts or omissions. The absence
of an injury requirement in subsection (B)(1) reflects the lesser
nature of the offense, a Class 6 felony, and demonstrates a legislative
intent to prohibit conduct that also has the potential of endangering a
child’s life.

Hl Notably, subsection (B)(1) does not limit the prohibited con-
duct to acts and omissions that subject a child to an actual risk of
death, but proscribes conduct that is so “gross, wanton and culpable”
as to demonstrate a “reckless disregard” for the child’s life. Id.
Therefore, we hold that such “reckless disregard’? can be shown by
conduct that subjects a child to a substantial risk of serious injury, as
well as to a risk of death, because exposure to either type of risk can
endanger the child’s life.

HH Applying these principles, we disagree with the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support
Duncan’s conviction. We examine the totality of the evidence, and do
not limit our review of the record to Duncan’s act of placing “wine
cooler” in the baby bottle for Carlton’s consumption. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence showed
that Duncan left his infant son for several hours with people he
barely knew, and that he did not give them any food or formula to
ensure that the baby would be fed. As a result, Carlton did not
receive any food or liquids for more than seven hours.

After returning to the house, Duncan did not attend to Carlton but
joined a group of people who were drinking alcohol and using illegal
drugs. Duncan appeared impaired and his eyes were “glazed over.”
When Carlton started crying, Duncan poured an alcoholic beverage
into Carlton’s bottle and handed the bottle to an acquaintance for her
to feed to Carlton.

Hl In addition, the circuit court found that Duncan was not a
“believable witness,” and directly rejected his explanation of the
events in question. As finder of fact, the circuit court was entitled to
infer that Duncan was lying to conceal his guilt. See Shackleford v.
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 196, 209, 547 S.E.2d 899, 907 (2001);
Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 469, 536 S.E.2d 437, 442
(2000); Phan v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 506, 511, 521 S.E.2d 282,
284 (1999),

386 Le
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HM The above record demonstrates a pattern of neglect over an
extended period that ended in Duncan’s knowing and reckless deci-
sion to feed an alcoholic beverage to his baby who had been
deprived of food and hydration for several hours. Thus, we conclude
that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the circuit
court’s determination that Duncan’s acts and omissions were willful
and, considered as a whole, were so gross, wanton, and culpable as
to demonstrate a reckless disregard for Carlton’s life.

HM Contrary to Duncan’s contention, the Commonwealth was
not required to produce expert testimony showing that consumption
of alcohol by a six-month-old baby who had not had any food or
liquids for at least sever hours presented a substantial risk of serious
injury or risk of death to the baby. Based on the evidence presented,
the dangers inherent in such a situation could be inferred by the fact
finder as a matter of common knowledge. Therefore, we hold that the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support Duncan’s conviction.

[Ml For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and reinstate Duncan’s conviction in accordance with the
circuit court’s judgment order.

Reversed and final judgment.

Len 387
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DeBRA BATES, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF FANNIE MARIE BANKS, DECEASED

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 030396
March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

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Bradford M. Young (Karl L. Santone; Chandler, Franklin &
O’Bryan, on briefs), for appellant.

Wesley G. Russell, Jr. (Karen A. Gould, Gould & Russell, on
brief), for appellee.

Amicus Curiae: The Virginia Trial Lawyers Association (Carolyn
C. Lavecchia,; Joshua D. Silverman; Williamson & Lavecchia, on
brief), in support of appellant.

JUSTICE KOONTZ delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal arises from a wrongful death action filed by Debra
Bates (Bates), administrator of the estate of Fannie Marie Banks
(Banks), her deceased daughter, against the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia pursuant to the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Code §§ 8.01-195.1
through 8.01-195.9. The issue to be resolved is whether Bates filed a
notice of claim sufficient to comply with the requirements of Code
§ 8.01-195.6 with regard to the identification of the “place” at which
Banks’ injury was alleged to have occurred.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

The relevant facts are not in dispute. On July 21, 2000, Banks
was admitted as an inpatient at the University of Virginia Medical
Center! in Charlottesville (the hospital). During the course of her

‘ During the relevant years, the hospital in question, which provides inpatient medical care,
was designated interchangeably as the “University of Virginia Health Sciences Center” and the
“University of Virginia Medical Center.” Because the identity of this hospital is not at issue
here, we will refer to it in this opinion as the University of Virginia Medical Center or simply
the hospital.

390 Le)
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treatment at the hospital, Banks required the use of a ventilator at
various times to help her breathe while sleeping. In the early morn-
ing hours of October 14, 2000, Banks, although on a ventilator, was
found asystolic and unresponsive by hospital personnel. She suffered
irreversible brain damage and, after being removed from a life sup-
port system, died in the hospital on October 21, 2000.

On August 14, 2001, Bates mailed a notice of claim by certified
mail, return receipt requested, to the Attorney General of Virginia in
which she essentially asserted that the medical personnel at the hos-
pital had been guilty of medical malpractice that proximately caused
the brain damage and ultimate death of Banks. The notice of claim
contained allegations that these personnel had negligently failed to
place the ventilator properly in service, failed to observe the mal-
function of the ventilator, or failed to observe that Banks was not
receiving proper oxygenation from the ventilator. Pertinent to the
issue presented by this appeal, the notice of claim identified the
“PLACE OF INJURY” as “University of Virginia Health Sciences
Center, Charlottesville, Virginia.”

Thereafter, on March 15, 2002, Bates filed a motion for judgment
in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville (the trial court)
against the Commonwealth of Virginia for the wrongful death of
Banks. In response, the Commonwealth filed its grounds of defense,
plea of sovereign immunity, and a motion to dismiss pursuant to the
Virginia Tort Claims Act.

On November 19, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the Commonwealth’s plea of sovereign immunity and motion to dis-
miss. In order to address the issue of the Commonwealth’s sovereign
immunity, the focus of the hearing, which was conducted on the
pleadings, was whether Bates had sufficiently identified in her notice
of claim the place at which Banks was injured. There was no dispute
that the University of Virginia Medical Center is a state-supported
hospital and, while located in Charlottesville, is composed of multi-
ple buildings, which contain multiple floors and multiple rooms.
Relying principally upon Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248,
252, 467 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1996), the Commonwealth maintained that
the notice of claim filed by Bates did not sufficiently identify the
place where Banks’ injury was alleged to have occurred at this hospi-

2 The University of Virginia was also named as a defendant in Bates’ motion for judgment,
but was subsequently dismissed as a party by agreement. The Virginia Tort Claims Act pro-
vides for the limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth and does not
waive the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth's agencies. The Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia v. Carter, 267 Va. 242, 246, 591 S.B.2d 76, 78 (2004).

tal to satisfy the requirements of Code § 8.01-195.6. Consequently,
the Commonwealth asserted that its plea of sovereign immunity was
well taken and its motion to dismiss should be granted. The trial
court ultimately agreed with the Commonwealth and by final order
entered on December 13, 2002, relying principally upon Halberstam,
dismissed Bates’ claim against the Commonwealth with prejudice.
We awarded this appeal to Bates.

IL. DISCUSSION

HMB As noted by the Commonwealth in the present case and as
we have repeatedly held, “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is
alive and well in Virginia.” Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230,
238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002). “In the absence of express statu-
tory or constitutional provisions waiving the Commonwealth’s immu-
nity, the Commonwealth and its agencies are immune from liability
for the tortious acts or omissions of their agents or employees.” Pat-
ten v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 654, 658, 553 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2001).
The Virginia Tort Claims Act constitutes an express limited waiver of
the Commonwealth’s immunity from tort claims. Jd. In this context
and in pertinent part, Code § 8.01-195.3 provides that:

Subject to the provisions of this article, the Commonwealth
shall be liable for claims for . . . personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee while acting within the scope of his employment
under circumstances where the Commonwealth . . ., if a pri-
vate person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage,
loss, injury or death.

(Emphasis added).

Hi The limitation upon the waiver of the Commonwealth’s sover-
eign immunity emphasized above is expressly addressed in Code
§ 8.01-195.6. In pertinent part, this statute provides that:

Every claim cognizable against the Commonwealth . . . shall
be forever barred unless the claimant or his agent, attorney or
representative has filed a written statement of the nature of the
claim, which includes the time and place at which the injury is
alleged to have occurred and the agency or agencies alleged to
be liable.

(Emphasis added).

392 Lee)
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[ll In the present case, the parties agree that in the absence of
compliance with the mandate of Code § 8.01-195.6, the trial court
would lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of Bates’ claim against
the Commonwealth because in such circumstances the Common-
wealth’s sovereign immunity is not waived. Filing and receipt of the
notice of claim are not at issue. The parties, as they did in the trial
court, dispute the sufficiency of Bates’ notice of claim to identify the
place at which Banks’ injury was alleged to have occurred as con-
templated by the above-emphasized provision of Code § 8.01-195.6.
Their dispute is based upon their sharply contrasting interpretations
of our holding in Halberstam.

In Halberstam, the claimant fell and was injured when she
stepped into a pothole in a parking lot at George Mason University, a
state-supported university, as a result of the alleged failure of the
university to properly maintain the surface of the parking lot. In her
notice of claim, which was admittedly received by the proper public
official pursuant to Code § 8.01-195.6, the claimant identified the
place where her injury occurred as “the school parking lot.” It was
stipulated that the university had “‘a number of parking lots and more
than one campus.”

HH We held that because the claimant did not specify in which
parking lot she was injured, her notice of claim was “in essence, no
notice at all.” 251 Va. at 250-51, 467 S.E.2d at 784-85. In holding
that the claimant’s notice of claim did not satisfy the requirements of
Code § 8.01-195.6 with regard to the place at which the injury
occurred, we also held that actual knowledge of that place by the
Commonwealth does not obviate the duty of the claimant to strictly
comply with the notice provisions of this statute. Id. at 252, 467
S.E.2d at 785. With regard to the purpose of the statute, we observed
that “‘ ‘[uJnless explicit notice in writing of the time and place of an
accident is furnished the proper public official substantially in accor-
dance with the statute, when there is a claim of [the Common-
wealth’s] negligence, the likelihood of prompt attention to the matter
to protect the interests of the [Commonwealth] and the public is
materially diminished.’ ” Id. (quoting Town of Crewe v. Marler, 228
Va. 109, 113-14, 319 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1984)).

Bates contends that the trial court’s reliance upon Halberstam
was in error. She contends that this is so because her case is distin-
guishable on a number of grounds. Initially, Bates stresses that
Halberstam was a premises liability case in which the claimant
asserted injury due to a defect in one of a number of parking lots at a

multi-campus state university. She notes that only one hospital in
Charlottesville is designated as the University of Virginia Medical
Center. Bates also asserts that in a premises liability case the “‘pre-
cise location” of the alleged defect is relevant to the determination of
the owner’s actual or constructive notice of the defect. She contends
that in a medical malpractice case the focus is upon the actions of
people and the specific location where the negligent conduct occurs
is irrelevant. Bates seems to suggest that a different rule should apply
to medical malpractice claims against the Commonwealth for this
reason.

In a similar vein, Bates contends that the claimant in Halberstam
initially had superior knowledge of the place where the alleged injury
occurred. She argues that in her case it is the hospital that has the
superior knowledge because Banks was an inpatient at the hospital
for approximately three months, and the hospital kept track of her
location on a daily basis. Furthermore, she argues that Banks was
moved to different places within the hospital during her stay, and
there is no reason to believe that Bates had any control over such
moves. Bates concludes that such superior knowledge held by the
hospital distinguishes Halberstam from her case.

Finally, Bates contends that this Court erred when it recognized
in Halberstam that the Virginia Tort Claims Act “is a statute in dero-
gation of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity and,
therefore, must be strictly construed.” Id. at 250-51, 467 S.E.2d at
784. She maintains that this Act should be given a liberal construc-
tion so that it achieves its remedial purposes.

The Commonwealth responds by asserting that Halberstam was
correctly decided and is indistinguishable from the present case. As it
did in the trial court, the Commonwealth ‘notes that in Halberstam
there were multiple campuses and multiple parking lots; in the
instant case, there are multiple buildings, with multiple floors and
multiple rooms. In Halberstam, the claimant did not specify the cam-
pus or parking lot in her notice of claim; in the instant case, the
claimant did not specify the building, floor, or room in her notice of
claim. Thus, under Halberstam, Bates has failed to provide notice
under Va. Code § 8.01-195.6, and her suit was properly dismissed.

HE For the reasons that follow, we are of opinion that, under
the circumstances of this case, the notice of claim filed by Bates
sufficiently complied with the requirements of Code § 8.01-195.6
regarding the identification of the place at which the injury to Banks
was alleged to have occurred. In reaching this opinion, however, we

394 Le)
|

expressly reject a number of the assertions related above by which
Bates contends that her case may be distinguished from Halberstam
or, indeed, that Halberstam was erroneously decided.

The degree of specificity sufficient to comply with the require-
ment of notice of the place at which the injury is alleged to have
occurred contemplated by this statute is not dictated or varied by
whether the claimant asserts a premises liability, medical malprac-
tice, or some other cognizable tort claim against the Commonwealth.
Superior knowledge of that place is also not a factor in determining
the sufficiency of the mandated notice. And most importantly, we
continue to be of opinion that the Virginia Tort Claims Act must be
strictly construed because it was enacted in derogation of the com-
mon law of sovereign immunity. In short, Halberstam was correctly
decided, and we in no way retreat from our holding in that case.

Because the Virginia Tort Claims Act constitutes a lim-
ited waiver of the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity rather than a
blanket waiver, one obvious purpose of the requirements of Code
§ 8.01-195.6 is to provide notice to the Commonwealth of a facially
cognizable claim so that the Commonwealth is in a position to inves-
tigate and evaluate that claim. The statute’s mandate that the notice
of claim include the “place at which the injury is alleged to have
occurred” contemplates the reasonable identification of that place so
that the purpose of the notice to the Commonwealth is accomplished
in a particular case.

The concept of reasonableness does not lend itself to a bright-line
test or dictate separate and distinct tests based on the nature of the
asserted claim. Rather, its proper analysis and application is directed
to the specific allegations of a notice of claim in a particular case.
Thus, in Halberstam, the failure to identify the parking lot in which
the claimant’s injury was alleged to have occurred was not reason-
ably calculated to give the Commonwealth notice of that place
because the university had a number of parking lots and more than
one campus where the claimant’s injury might have occurred.

HE In the present case, there is only one University of Vir-
ginia Medical Center in Charlottesville. Bates’ notice of claim identi-
fied that place and also stated that Banks was admitted to that hospi-
tal and “while a patient” there was injured by the alleged medical
negligence of the employees of that hospital. In combination, these
assertions reasonably identified the place at which Bates alleged
Banks was injured so that the Commonwealth could investigate and
evaluate the claim. Under these circumstances, Code § 8.01-195.6

Lee 395

does not mandate that Bates was required to identify the floor or
room within the hospital at which the alleged injury to Banks
occurred because that degree of specificity was unnecessary to
accomplish the purpose of the statute.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in sustaining the
Commonwealth’s plea of sovereign immunity and dismissing Bates’
claim with prejudice. The judgment of the trial court will be reversed
and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

396

Larry BILL ELLIOTT
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.
Record Nos. 031610 & 031611
March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

Lad
conv
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Daniel H. Bromberg (Edwin L. Fountain; Christian G. Vergonis;
Jones Day, on briefs), for appellant.

Katherine P. Baldwin, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry
W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KOONTZ delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we review the capital murder conviction and death
sentence imposed on Larry Bill Elliott for the murder of Dana L.
Thrall, Code § 18.2-31(7) (willful, deliberate, and premeditated kill-
ing of more than one person as part of the same act or transaction),
along with his convictions for the first degree murder of Robert A.
Finch, Code § 18.2-32, and firearm offenses related to these two
murders, Code § 18.2-53.1.

BACKGROUND

In accordance with well-established principles of appellate
review, we will recount the evidence as reflected in the record in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party
below. Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 198, 576 S.E.2d 471,
474, cert. denied, ____ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 566 (2003).

The Murders

At approximately 4:00 a.m. on the morning of January 2, 2001,
Mary Bracewell, a newspaper delivery person, was traveling her
route in the Woodbridge community of Prince William County, Vir-
ginia. Bracewell was aware that there had been several recent vehicle
break-ins in the neighborhood and became suspicious when she saw
a man standing beside a pick-up truck parked on Belfry Lane.
Bracewell observed the man, who appeared to be carrying a flash-

es 401
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light, walk to the north end of Belfry Lane, cross the street, walk
onto a grassy area between two townhouses, and then disappear from
her view. Bracewell called police on her cellular telephone to report
her observations.

At 4:15 a.m., Officer Marshall T. Daniel of the Prince William
County Police Department received a radio dispatch directing him to
respond to Bracewell’s call. He arrived at Belfry Lane three minutes
later. Bracewell indicated the parked pick-up truck to Daniel and
related to him what she had observed. Daniel noted that the pick-up
truck, which was locked, had a Department of Defense windshield
identification sticker and that there was a cellular telephone on the
passenger seat.

At 4:27 a.m., Officer Daniel received a radio call to respond to a
report of a domestic disturbance at a townhouse located at 3406
Jousters Way. Jousters Way is located approximately 300 yards north
of Belfry Lane. Although the two streets do not intersect, one can
reach Jousters Way on foot from Belfry Lane by walking in the same
direction that Bracewell had seen the man beside the pick-up truck
walking.

Tina Miller, who lived in an adjoining townhouse, had made the
report of a domestic disturbance at 3406 Jousters Way. Miller tele-
phoned police after being awakened by a crashing sound coming
from 3406 Jousters Way at approximately 4:20 a.m. As she placed
the call, Miller heard three or four “hollow” sounds followed by
“the most horrible scream” she had ever heard. Miller thought that
the screaming voice sounded like that of Thrall, one of the occupants
of 3406 Jousters Way.

Tommy Young, who lived in a townhouse on the opposite side of
the street from 3406 Jousters Way, was walking his dog in front of
his home at about the same time Miller was awakened by the crash-
ing sound. Young heard two loud “banging noises” coming from
3406 Jousters Way, followed by the sound of a female scream and
three more banging noises. Young went back to his house and told
his wife to call the police. A few minutes later, Young looked out his
front window and saw that the front storm door of 3406 Jousters
Way, which had earlier been closed, was swaying back and forth.
Young also noted that the front window shades of the home, which
were normally left half-drawn, were fully closed.

Officer Scott Bigger of the Prince William County Police Depart-
ment arrived at 3406 Jousters Way at 4:25 am. Officer Bigger
knocked on the front door, but got no response. Officer Daniel

402 es
FC

arrived a few minutes later and walked around to the back of the
townhouse. The backyard was enclosed by a privacy fence, and
Officer Daniel could hear a large dog barking “‘pretty hysterical[ly],
angry” inside the yard.

Returning to the front of the home, Officer Daniel observed that
Officer Bigger had still received no response to his knocking on the
front door. Looking through a gap between the shades of a front win-
dow, Officer Daniel was able to see the legs of a person lying prone
and motionless in the foyer of the home. Officer Bigger opened the
unlocked front door and he and Officer Daniel saw Finch, who lived
with Thrall in the home, lying on the floor dead. Finch had suffered
three gunshot wounds: one to his head, one to his back, and one to
his chest.

Officer Daniel immediately returned to the back of the home to
secure that area while Officer Bigger waited at the front of the home
for additional officers to arrive. When those officers arrived, Officer
Daniel immediately returned to the location on Belfry Lane where
the pick-up truck had been parked. He arrived at that location at 4:38
a.m. The truck was gone.

Officer Sheldon R. Creamer, one of the officers who had
responded to the call by the other officers for assistance, arrived at
3406 Jousters Way at approximately 4:45 a.m. Entering the home, he
heard “a muffled breathing sound” coming from the kitchen at the
back of the home. In the kitchen he found Thrall, shot and lying in a
pool of blood. Emergency medical personal called to the scene took
Thrall by ambulance to a helicopter, which in turn evacuated her to
the Washington Hospital Center in the District of Columbia, where
she later died. Thrall had suffered multiple gunshot wounds including
a defensive wound to her right hand, three to her head, and one to
her chest. She also suffered a blunt force trauma to the back of her
head consistent with a pistol-whipping.

Officer Creamer found that the backdoor was locked by its door-
knob lock, but that the door’s deadbolt lock was not engaged. He
could hear the dog barking in the back yard. Entering the yard from
the kitchen, Officer Creamer found that the dog had calmed down.
He then determined that the gate of the privacy fence was secured
with a locked padlock.

Meanwhile, because Officer Daniel had reported seeing a child
looking out of a second floor back window, Officer Bigger reentered
the home and went upstairs. There he found Thrall’s two sons, aged

es 403
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six and four, who were crying and upset. Police officers removed the
children from the home.

The Investigation

Officer Thomas Leo, a crime scene analyst with the Prince Wil-
liam County Police Department, collected bloodstain samples at vari-
ous locations inside the townhouse. Subsequent DNA testing of these
samples confirmed that the blood was that of Thrall and Finch. Leo
also found a bloodstain on the inside of the gate of the privacy fence.
Subsequent DNA testing of this sample showed that it was consistent
with Elliott’s DNA to a degree that a match would occur “once in
the entire world population.”

Although a murder weapon was never recovered, forensic testing
of ten bullets recovered from the home and during the autopsies of
Thrall and Finch confirmed that all had been fired by the same
weapon. The bullets were of a type used only in a revolver-type
handgun. Gary Arnsten, a firearms expert with Virginia’s Division of
Forensic Science, testified at trial that because no weapon of this
type could hold more than five or six bullets in its revolving cham-
ber, he was certain that the weapon had been reloaded during the
commission of the murders.

Detective Charles Hoffman of the Prince William County Police
Department spoke with Finch’s sister, Jennifer Finch, the day of the
murders. She informed Detective Hoffman that Finch had a prior
romantic relationship with Rebecca Gragg. She also told him that
Finch and Gragg had been involved in a bitter custody dispute over
their two children. Detective Hoffman went to Gragg’s residence in
Dale City, Virginia, located about six miles from the crime scene.
Gragg was not at home, but there were two vehicles parked in front
of the residence. One of the vehicles was registered in Elliott’s name.

Gragg returned to her home later that day and was interviewed by
two detectives. At that time, Gragg maintained that Elliott was her
“friend and business partner.” She denied knowing anything about
the murders, but stated that Finch had many enemies.

The following day, January 3, 2001, Detective Hoffman and
another detective traveled to Fort Meade in Hanover, Maryland,
where Elliott worked as a civilian employee for the United States
Army as a counterintelligence expert. The detectives had learned that
Elliott owned a pick-up truck and wanted “‘to determine whether that
truck could, in fact, have been the truck that was seen nearby the
[crime] scene.” The detectives located the truck in a parking lot at

404 es
a

Fort Meade, and Detective Hoffman observed that there was a flash-
light, a cellular telephone, and a box of bandages on the seat of the
truck.

As Detective Hoffman was taking photographs of the truck, Elli-
ott approached him, identified himself as the owner of the truck, and
agreed to talk to the detectives. During that conversation, Elliott told
the detectives that Gragg was an employee at a brewing company he
owned in West Virginia. He admitted that he had supplied Gragg
with a credit card in the name of “Rebecca L. Elliott,” but main-
tained that this had been for business purposes. He also told the
detectives that he had been traveling over the New Year’s holiday, as
had Gragg, and that during that time he had spoken with her several
times on his cellular telephone in an effort to arrange a business
meeting with her.

Elliott told the detectives that he was aware that Gragg and Finch
were involved in a dispute regarding the custody of their two chil-
dren. Elliott related that Gragg had traveled to Florida over the New
Year’s holiday and had taken the children with her. He further related
that Gragg had told him that she was having car trouble and would
not be able to return to Virginia with the children in time to return
them to Finch at 2:00 p.m. on New Year’s Day as she was required
to do under a visitation agreement. Elliott claimed that he had driven
to Gragg’s residence in the early afternoon of New Year’s Day “in
case Robert Finch showed up so that [Elliott] could explain to him
the problems Rebecca was having with getting back.” Elliott denied
he had any relationship with Gragg other than as her employer. He
also denied knowing Finch and claimed that he had seen him only
once.

Although Detective Hoffman told Elliott that his truck had been
seen in Finch’s neighborhood in the early morning hours of the day
of the murders, Elliott denied having been in the area. Elliott claimed
that he had spent the night of January first to second sleeping in his
truck at a rest area in Maryland.

Elliott voluntarily accompanied the detectives to the Anne Arun-
del County, Maryland Police Department. During the course of an
interview there, Elliott admitted the true nature of his involvement
with Gragg. He told the detectives that he had initiated a relationship
with Gragg in mid-1999 after viewing her photograph on an Internet
website called “Adult Friend Finders.” In her advertisement, Gragg
had indicated that she was looking for a “‘sugar daddy.” During their
first meeting, Gragg told Elliott that she had worked as a stripper and

es 405
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“private escort,” a euphemism for a “call-girl” prostitute. Gragg
told Elliott that she wanted to turn her life around and needed finan-
cial support to start a business designing and selling costumes for
strippers. She told Elliott that she was not interested in having a
romantic or sexual relationship with him. Elliott agreed to this
arrangement, saying that he wanted only friendship from Gragg.

Elliott subsequently provided Gragg with significant financial
support, including paying private school tuition for her children, pay-
ing the mortgage on one house Gragg owned in West Virginia and
rental on others where she lived with her husband and children at
various times, providing her with cars, and permitting her to use his
credit cards. Elliott also paid for breast augmentation surgery for
Gragg, who had begun operating a pay-to-view pornographic web-
site. Elliott admitted that his support of Gragg had placed a signifi-
cant financial burden on him and that he had to sell investments to
pay her credit card debts.

Elliott further admitted that he knew where Finch lived and that,
after he had gone to Gragg’s house on the afternoon of January 1,
2001, he had driven to Finch’s house. He denied getting out of his
truck, however, and claimed that he had seen “a black man with a
slinky walk going to the front door of the home.” Elliott maintained
that he had then driven to a large national retail store and a restaurant
before driving to the rest stop in Maryland where he had spent the
night. He then claimed that he had driven back to Gragg’s residence
about 3:00 a.m. on the morning of January 2, 2001, to retrieve a case
of motor oil that he had seen there the day before. He then went to a
convenience store where he called Gragg’s cellular telephone on a
pay telephone. Elliott claimed that he used the pay telephone because
his own cellular telephone’s battery had run down. Telephone com-
pany records showed that a call had been placed from the pay tele-
phone to Gragg’s cellular telephone at 3:28 a.m. on January 2, 2001.

Elliott admitted that after calling Gragg, he drove to Finch’s
neighborhood. He admitted leaving his truck, claiming that he did so
only because he needed to urinate. Elliott stated that after urinating
by a guardrail on the side of the road, he walked by Thrall’s and
Finch’s townhouse. He denied going onto the property and stated that
he had not heard gunshots, a scream, or anything unusual. At the
conclusion of this interview, Detective Hoffman took a photograph
of an abrasion he had noticed on one of Elliott’s hands.

On January 4, 2001, Gragg, accompanied by her lawyer, was
again interviewed by detectives investigating the murders of Thrall

and Finch. During that interview, she admitted receiving a telephone
call early on the morning of the murders, but claimed that the call
had come from Finch. Gragg claimed that Finch had threatened to
call the police if she did not return their children to him that after-
noon. Gragg also told the detectives that she did not believe that
Elliott had committed the murders.

On January 7, 2001, Detective Hoffman conducted another inter-
view with Elliott during which Elliott admitted that he had been in
Finch’s neighborhood “hundreds of times.” He further admitted
walking through the neighborhood, but again denied that he had ever
been on the property of the townhouse where Thrall and Finch lived.

On January 8, 2001, Officer Leo, the crime scene analyst, took
possession of Elliott’s pick-up truck pursuant to a search warrant. He
determined that the interior of the truck had recently been cleaned,
noting that the carpet was wet and that the seats and interior had
been covered with a “silicone type base cleaner.” Nonetheless, test-
ing of samples collected from the underside of the truck’s floor mats
showed a trace residue of blood, though the samples were too small
for accurate DNA testing. A further blood sample found in the seat
cushion was consistent with Elliott’s DNA.

Detectives investigating the murders interviewed Gragg on Janu-
ary 12, 2001 and again on January 19, 2001. She continued to deny
any knowledge of the murders. Based on the results of a polygraph
examination that Gragg had agreed to take, police suspected that
Gragg was not being fully forthcoming, but they were not certain to
what extent she had knowledge of the murders or whether she may
have been directly involved. Over the next several months, Gragg
had continuing contact with the police concerning the investigation
of the murders, but she did not provide any additional information
concerning Elliott.

On May 9, 2001, Elliott was arrested in Maryland and charged
with capital murder. At that time, according to Maryland State
Police, Elliott was “leaving [in his vehicle] at a high rate of speed,”
and there was some concern that he was attempting to flee. Elliott
claimed, however, that he had intended to turn himself in.

On May 10, 2001, Prince William County detectives again inter-
viewed Gragg. During that interview, Gragg agreed to submit to a
second polygraph examination. After the polygraph examiner and
Detective Hoffman told Gragg that her responses to questions con-
cerning her knowledge of the murders indicated that she was being
untruthful, Gragg asked to speak with her attorney.

es 401
FC

After consulting with her attorney, Gragg told the police that the
telephone call she had received early on the morning of the murders
was not from Finch, although initially she had assumed it was
because the connection was not good and she could not hear the
caller clearly. Gragg then related that when the caller realized that
she thought she was talking to Finch, the caller said he was “tired of
this s*** and was going to take care of it” and hung up. Gragg then
realized that the call had come from Elliott. She attempted to call his
cellular telephone, but the call was answered by a voice mail system.

Gragg told the detectives that she received several more calls on
her cellular telephone from Elliott later on January 2, 2001. During
one call, Elliott told her that ‘“‘all of our problems had been taken
care of.” In another call, Elliott claimed that “Jerry,” a cryptic fig-
ure Elliott supposedly knew through his work with military counter-
intelligence, “had come out of nowhere to help him, that he had to
go clean up this mess.” Later, Elliott told Gragg that he was looking
for a place “to dump . . . these bloodied black trash bags from the
mess that Jerry had made.”

Gragg told the police that she had not been truthful in her prior
interviews because she was afraid of Elliott and “Jerry,” because
Elliott had once told her that “Jerry” was watching her and that he
would kill her or her family if she went to the police. Once Elliott
was in custody and the police had assured her that there was no
“Jerry,” she stated that she had decided to be truthful. Gragg’s attor-
ney confirmed that she had told him on several occasions that she
feared Elliott would harm her if she told the police what she knew.

Indictment and Pre-trial Proceedings

On August 6, 2001, the Prince William County grand jury
returned indictments charging Elliott with the capital murder of
Thrall, the first degree murder of Finch, and two counts of the use of
a firearm in the commission of a felony. Elliott was tried on these
indictments initially in a jury trial in July 2002. After the jury had
found Elliott guilty and sentenced him to death, the trial court
declared a mistrial after it had been determined that a juror had
improperly discussed the case with a third party during the trial.

Prior to the July 2002 trial, Elliott had filed numerous motions,
among which were motions to have the Virginia capital murder and
death penalty statutes declared unconstitutional and to have the jury
instructed that, if the Commonwealth presented evidence of vileness
during the penalty determination phase of the trial, the jury was to be

408 Ce
FC

unanimous in its determination of the elements of the act that caused
it to be vile. The trial court denied these motions without comment.
After the mistrial was declared, Elliott did not renew any of these
motions or otherwise request that the trial court adopt the pre-trial
tulings of the first trial and apply them to the conduct of the retrial.

Prior to the retrial, Elliott filed motions seeking disclosure of
exculpatory and impeaching information within Rebecca Gragg’s ini-
tial statement to police and related police reports. Elliott maintained
that, as a result of Gragg’s testimony during the first trial, he now
believed that the Commonwealth was in possession of statements by
Gragg or police reports contradicting her testimony. Elliott also
sought an in limine ruling from the trial court to permit the introduc-
tion at trial of a videotape of Gragg’s polygraph examinations. Elliott
maintained that the polygraph evidence would show that Gragg had a
motive to fabricate a story implicating him when she learned that
police knew that she had been untruthful in her prior interviews
when she denied any knowledge of or involvement in the murders.

The trial court, by letter to counsel, directed the Commonwealth
to disclose to Elliott all statements, whether exculpatory or not,
“authored by Rebecca Gragg and furnished to the Office of the
Commonwealth’s Attorney at some point during the pendency of this
prosecution.” The record shows that the Commonwealth provided
Elliott with additional material not previously provided under a
Brady order entered in the first trial, including a forty-eight-page
statement “generated by Ms. Gragg.” The Commonwealth averred in
a cover letter to the packet containing this material that Elliott had
thus been “provided . . . with transcripts or summaries of all material
contacts between Ms. Gragg and the police concerning this . . .
case.”

On February 10, 2003, and in anticipation of Elliott’s second
trial, a hearing was conducted on Elliott’s motion to permit the
videotape of Gragg’s polygraph examinations into evidence. During
that hearing, Elliott’s counsel asserted that he should be permitted to
establish that Gragg had changed her “‘story” after the police told
her that she had “failed” the polygraph examinations. The trial court
ruled that during cross-examination of Gragg, Elliott could establish
that police had confronted her on May 10, 2001, with the assertion
that she had been untruthful in her prior interviews and that is why
she had made prior inconsistent statements to the police. The trial
court reasoned that Elliott’s right to cross-examination could be con-

ducted “without getting into this morass of polygraph, no polygraph,
passing, failing and the like.”

Guilt Determination Phase

Elliott’s second trial commenced on March 24, 2003.! During the
guilt determination phase of the trial, the Commonwealth presented
evidence in accord with the above-recited facts concerning the
murders and the subsequent police investigation. During the course
of the guilt determination phase, several issues arose which princi-
pally relate to the polygraph examinations of Gragg and are the sub-
ject of various assignments of error asserted by Elliott in this appeal.
For clarity, we will confine our recitation here to the facts relevant to
the murders and subsequently recite additional facts where appropri-
ate to address those assignments of error.

Brandon T. Jackson, an employee of the United States Army
Intelligence & Security Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, had
known Elliott since 1991. He testified that on December 26, 2000,
Elliott had sent him an e-mail stating that Elliott and some co-
workers at Fort Meade wanted to establish a gun range for practice
shooting. Jackson recounted that Elliott knew that Jackson had a fed-
eral firearms dealer’s license, and that Elliott wanted to know if Jack-
son could acquire gun silencers because these were needed for use at
the gun range to avoid complaints from neighbors.

Jackson testified that he ignored the e-mail because he believed
Elliott’s request was “ludicrous.” He explained that gun silencers
would never be used for practice shooting because the repeated use
of silencers made them less effective at reducing the sound of gun-
fire. He also testified that obtaining gun silencers legally was a com-
plex process. Several days after sending the e-mail, Elliott telephoned
Jackson and asked if he had received the e-mail. He also asked Jack-
son detailed questions about gun silencers and whether Jackson
thought Elliott could purchase a silencer at a gun show.

Gragg testified at length concerning her relationship with Elliott.
While not denying her willingness to financially exploit Elliott’s
attraction to her, she maintained that from the outset she had made it
clear to Elliott that she was not seeking a romantic or sexual relation-
ship. Gragg testified, however, that Elliott had once claimed to her
that they had sexual intercourse while Gragg had been under the

' Elliott has not assigned error to any aspect of the jury selection process. Accordingly, we
need not recount the incidents of that portion of the trial.

410 es
Fe

effects of a pre-operative sedative the night before her breast aug-
mentation surgery.

Following this incident, Elliott was “constantly” professing his
love to Gragg and provided her with more and more financial sup-
port and material goods. Though continuing to accept these gifts,
Gragg became uncomfortable with the relationship and began refus-
ing to see Elliott socially. Elliott then began making excuses to see
Gragg allegedly on business related matters and would arrive unan-
nounced at places where he knew Gragg would be.

Elliott had employed a private investigator to aid Gragg in her
child custody dispute with Finch. When the investigator failed to pro-
vide Elliott with any useful information, Elliott told Gragg that “he
knew people that could do it better.” Gragg, who still had romantic
feelings for Finch, told Elliott not to interfere.

Eventually, Gragg revealed to Elliott that she had resumed her
relationship with Finch and was still in love with him. Elliott then
told Gragg that “Jerry” was “checking up” on her so that Elliott
could “‘keep [Gragg] in line.” When Gragg made light of this claim,
Elliott grabbed her by the arm and told her that she should take him
seriously because “‘people’s lives were in danger.” Elliott also told
her that if she went to the police, these people would be killed. Elli-
ott specifically mentioned Finch as one of the people who would be
killed.

In mid-December 2000, Elliott told Gragg that she “had gotten
him into this mess,” and that she had to help him get out of it. Elliott
said that, if Gragg refused, he did not know what “Jerry” might do.
Elliott gave Gragg personal information about his wife’s financial
accounts and had her pose as his wife on the telephone to make
transfers out of those accounts. Elliott threw the paper with the infor-
mation on it away, but Gragg retrieved it and later turned it over to
the police.

On December 26, 2000, the same day that Elliott sent the e-mail
to Jackson inquiring about obtaining gun silencers, Elliott sent a ram-
bling e-mail to Gragg to “give [her] a little more information con-
cerning a couple of issues that are in the works.” Indicating that he
had sent her a carbon copy of his e-mail to Jackson, Elliott further
stated that Jackson was “only one of two people that I am working
this issue with.” Elliott claimed that the other person, who he identi-
fied as “Mac,” was “into anything that went bang and he just may
have some connections.” Elliott further indicated that he had to meet

with “Mac” personally because “[h]e is the type of guy that would
bolt if I mentioned any of this in an email.”

Throughout the e-mail, as he had in previous communications to
Gragg, Elliott made references to having “this one issue resolved”
and the possibility of he and Gragg “hav[ing] a relationship when
[her] problem [is] taken care of.” Gragg testified that she understood
that by the “issue” and the “problem” Elliott was referring to the
child custody dispute with Finch. Elliott concluded the e-mail with a
postscript telling Gragg to remember that he loved her even “if eve-
rything goes south.”

After the Commonwealth rested, Elliott recalled Detective Hoff-
man for the limited purpose of inquiring into one of the issues, previ-
ously referenced herein, that had arisen during the Commonwealth’s
presentation of evidence. Elliott otherwise did not offer any evidence.
After being instructed by the trial court and hearing argument from
the Commonwealth and the defense, the jury retired to consider its
verdicts. During deliberations, the jury sent a question to the trial
court asking to view a videotape of the crime scene that had been
admitted into evidence. With the concurrence of the parties, the trial
court permitted the jury to view the videotape. The record does not
reflect that there was any other communication from the jury during
this phase of the trial.

After four hours of deliberation, the jury returned its verdicts,
convicting Elliott of the capital murder of Thrall, the first degree
murder of Finch, and the two related firearm offenses. At the request
of the defense, the jury was polled and each juror indicated agree-
ment with the verdicts.

Penalty Determination Phase

Elliott has not assigned error to the conduct of the evidentiary
portion of the penalty determination phase of his trial. Accordingly,
we will recount the evidence presented in summary fashion. The
Commonwealth called Thrall’s mother, brother, and sister-in-law as
witnesses to give victim impact testimony. Each recounted the effect
of Thrall’s murder on her family, including the effect it had on her
two sons.

Elliott called his wife and six of his co-workers as character wit-
nesses. Their testimony consisted principally of assertions of Elliott’s
good character, mild manner, and strong work ethic, including his
twenty years enlisted service in the United States Army as a counter-

intelligence specialist and his subsequent civilian employment in that
same capacity.

Elliott’s wife testified that they had married in 1976 and that they
had a daughter. Elliott also had children from a prior marriage. She
admitted that Elliott had not had a close relationship with their
daughter. She maintained, however, that he was not a violent person
and “would not hurt anybody.” On cross-examination, Elliott’s wife
maintained that she had been unaware of Elliott’s relationship with
Gragg. Mrs. Elliott also testified that she was unaware until after the
murders that Elliott had dissipated about $200,000 of her separate
assets during the course of his, relationship with Gragg.

The trial court, having ruled that the Commonwealth could not
argue Elliott’s future dangerousness to society as an aggravating fac-
tor supporting the imposition of the death penalty, ruled that the case
would be submitted to the jury only on the vileness aggravating fac-
tor. During consideration of the jury instructions, Elliott’s counsel
stated that he agreed with the proposed instruction which, in relevant
part, defined the vileness aggravating factor as requiring that the
murder of Thrall “was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated
battery of the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish
the act of murder.”

Elliott did not request an instruction requiring that the jury agree
unanimously on the basis for finding the murder to have been vile, as
he had requested in his pre-trial motion prior to his first trial. Rather,
Elliott’s sole assertion at this point was that, “for the record,” he
objected to the jury being instructed on capital murder because the
evidence would not support a finding that the murder of Finch was
vile. While conceding that he had no authority other than “a new
article [he had] read,” Elliott’s counsel contended that where the cap-
ital murder charge was premised on there having been one or more
killings as part of the same transaction, the jury was required to find
that all the killings were vile. The trial court overruled this objection
and again asked if Elliott concurred with the instructions. Elliott’s
counsel replied, “Yes, other than the objection I’ve made.”

While the jury was deliberating, it sent a question to the trial
court asking clarification on where the money to pay a fine imposed
on Elliott would come from and “where would the money go.” With
concurrence of the parties, the trial court instructed the jury that it
was not to concern itself with these matters. The record does not

reflect that there was any other communication from the jury during
this phase of the trial.

The jury returned its verdicts, sentencing Elliott to death for the
capital murder of Thrall, to life imprisonment for the first degree
murder of Finch, and to a total of eight years imprisonment for the
two firearm offenses. At the request of the defense, the jury was
polled and each juror indicated agreement with the verdicts.

Sentencing

After the jury returned its verdict imposing the death sentence,
the trial court ordered the preparation of a post-sentence report in
accord with Code § 19.2-264.5. In that report, Elliott claimed for the
first time that his relationship with Gragg had in fact evolved into a
sexual, though not necessarily romantic, arrangement. Elliott main-
tained that he had not disclosed this fact to the police at Gragg’s
request. Elliott continued to maintain his innocence.

Following preparation of the post-sentence report, the trial court
held a sentencing hearing on May 22, 2003. During that proceeding,
the trial court overruled several post-verdict motions filed by Elliott.
To the extent these motions are pertinent to issues raised in this
appeal, we will address their substance within the discussion of the
relevant assignments of error. Addressing the trial court prior to the
imposition of sentence, Elliott denied any involvement in the
murders of Thrall and Finch, asserting that he was the victim of “lies
that were told in [the] courtroom” and “a police department that
practices Gestapo techniques.” The trial court imposed sentence in
accord with the jury’s verdicts.

We consolidated the automatic review of Elliott’s death sentence
with his appeal of the capital murder conviction. Code § 17.1-313(F).
Elliott’s appeal of his non-capital convictions was certified from the
Court of Appeals, Code § 17.1-409, consolidated with his capital
murder appeal, and the consolidated appeals were given priority on
our docket.?

DISCUSSION

Elliott raises twenty assignments of error with respect to the con-
duct of his trial and the imposition of the death sentence. The Com-
monwealth contends that many of Elliott’s assignments of error either

2 Except to the extent that Elliott asserts that errors in the general conduct of his trial would
require a reversal of all his convictions, Elliott does not directly challenge his convictions or
sentences for the non-capital crimes.

were not properly preserved in the trial court or otherwise have been
procedurally defaulted. We will address Elliott’s assignments of error
seriatim, considering the Commonwealth’s assertions of waiver
where relevant.

The “Reasonable Doubt” Jury Question Issue

In preparing for this appeal, Elliott’s appellate counsel? discov-
ered in the trial court’s manuscript record a handwritten note, appar-
ently composed by a juror, which reads:

Can you supply a more simplistic definition of reasonable
Doubt from a guilt or im (sic) innocence point of View?

In his first assignment of error, Elliott contends that the trial
court erred in failing to inform his counsel of this jury question. Elli-
ott asks that this Court remand the case to the trial court for an evi-
dentiary hearing “to determine whether the jury asked the reasonable
doubt question appearing in the record.”

Because the existence of the “reasonable doubt” jury question
was not discovered until after the trial court’s jurisdiction had
expired, no inquiry was made in the trial court as to whether the jury
had intended for this question to reach the trial judge. The Common-
wealth contends that because the alleged failure of the trial court to
inform Elliott of the question was not the subject of any objection in
the trial court, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Rule 5:25. Elliott responds that ‘“‘a party can{not] waive an argument
before becoming aware of the error.”

Il As we previously noted herein, there is no indication in the
record that the trial court received any inquiry from the jury other
than the request to view the crime scene videotape during the guilt
determination phase and the question concerning the imposition of a
fine during the penalty determination phase. Unlike the questions
received by the trial court, the “reasonable doubt” jury question con-
tains no response from the trial court. Beyond these facts, the matter
reduces itself to one involving pure speculation, and we decline to
speculate whether the jury actually intended to send the purported

3 Elliott’s trial counsel had sought to withdraw from representation following the mistrial of
Elliott’s first trial. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw, and trial counsel represented
Elliott pro bono publico during the second trial. Subsequently, Elliott’s appellate counsel were
substituted and served pro bono publico.

es 41s
_

jury question at issue to the trial court for a response. Accordingly,
we will take no further consideration of this issue in this appeal.4

Polygraph Evidence Issues

HEME [n his second assignment of error, Elliott asserts that the
trial court erred in overruling his motion in limine to have the video-
tape of Gragg’s polygraph examinations admitted into evidence. Elli-
ott acknowledges that evidence of polygraph examinations is not
admissible to show the correctness of the results of such examina-
tions. Relying on Crumpton v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 131, 384
S.E.2d 339 (1989), he contends that evidence of a polygraph exami-
nation may be admissible to explain “the motive for, or context
underlying, testimony or statements given by a witness after the wit-
ness is told of the results of his polygraph examination.” The Com-
monwealth responds that Elliott’s reliance on Crumpton is misplaced
and that the trial court’s ruling in this case is in accord with our
decision in Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 155, 341
S.E.2d 159, 167 (1986), where we held that results of a polygraph
examination may not be used to impeach a witness. We agree with
the Commonwealth.

In Crumpton, the Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant
had a right to give a full explanation of his prior inconsistent state-
ments to the police “‘so long as that explanation did not also necessa-
tily invoke the polygraph examination results as proof that he had
been truthful” when he testified. 9 Va. App. at 137, 384 S.E.2d at
343. The Court in Crumpton emphasized that its holding was based
upon “‘the particular facts and procedural posture” in which the issue
arose in that case. Id. Moreover, the Court expressly acknowledged
our clear precedent, as expressed in Robinson, 231 Va. at 156, 341
S.E.2d at 167, that the results of polygraph examinations are not
admissible whether they favor the accused or are agreed to by both
the accused and the Commonwealth. Crumpton, 9 Va. App. at 135,
384 S.E.2d at 342.

Crumpton is inapplicable to the present case. It is evident that
Elliott sought to impeach Gragg’s credibility by the introduction of
evidence of Gragg’s polygraph examinations as reflected in the
videotape of those examinations. Accordingly, our decision in Robin-
son is controlling, and we hold that the trial court did not err in

* Moreover, the relief that Elliott seeks, a remand for an evidentiary hearing in the trial
court, is not one that may be afforded in a direct appeal.

denying Elliott’s motion in limine to admit into evidence the video-
tape of Gragg’s polygraph examinations.

The remaining polygraph issues raised by Elliott in this appeal
arose at trial in the following context. During Elliott’s counsel’s
cross-examination of Detective Hoffman in the guilt determination
phase of the trial, the following exchange occurred:

Q. Now there is a gentleman in your police department — and I
don’t necessarily want you to tell me what he does, but I want
to ask you the question. There is a Mr. Meyers; you are famil-
iar with that name?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He is a person that interviewed Rebecca [Gragg] as well as
you; am I right?
A. I believe you’re referring to the polygrapher?

Elliott’s counsel immediately requested a bench conference.
Counsel asserted that he had specifically framed his question so that
Detective Hoffman would not identify Meyers as a polygraph exam-
iner. The trial court agreed and asked, “[w]hat if anything do you
want to do?” Elliott’s counsel asserted that Hoffman had “opened
the door and I want to go in it.” The trial court reflected that it was
“a little dismayed by the answer [Hoffman] gave,” excused the jury,
and proceeded to question Hoffman.

The trial court questioned Detective Hoffman on why he had
teferred to Meyers as “the polygrapher.” Hoffman explained that
there were two officers in the police department named Meyers. He
conceded upon further questioning, however, that the other officer
was a patrolman who had not been involved in the investigation of
the Thrall/Finch murders.

Elliott’s counsel maintained that because the jurors were now
aware that Gragg had taken a polygraph examination, they would
naturally assume that she had passed the examination and, thus, tend
to find her testimony more credible. The trial court offered to instruct
the jury either that it should disregard Detective Hoffman’s last
answer and/or to specifically instruct the jury that the fact that a wit-
ness may have taken a polygraph examination should not lend
credence to the witness’s testimony. Elliott’s counsel indicated that
he would prefer that the jury only be instructed to disregard the
answer, and that he agreed to this remedy “under protest.”

Elliott’s counsel then moved for a mistrial, stating that “<[i]t was
the responsibility on the part of the Commonwealth to inform
{Detective Hoffman] not” to make reference to Gragg having taken
polygraph examinations. Elliott’s counsel further stated that while he
did not “know why [Hoffman] did it . . . he has been a police officer
long enough to know that he shouldn’t be discussing polygraphs in
courtrooms . . . it was intentional in that regard.” The trial court
denied the motion for mistrial. The trial court then instructed Detec-
tive Hoffman that he was not to mention the polygraph examinations
again. When the jury returned, the trial court instructed the jurors
that they “will disregard the last answer given by this witness.”

Elliott subsequently filed a post-verdict motion for a new trial,
asserting that the jury would have been unable to follow the trial
court’s instruction and disregard Detective Hoffman’s answer indicat-
ing that Meyers was a polygraph examiner. During the sentencing
hearing, the trial court expressly found that Hoffman had inadver-
tently mentioned Meyers’ role as a polygraph examiner, and that,
without a more definitive assertion that Gragg had undergone poly-
graph examinations, it would require ‘“‘an inference upon inference
upon inference” for the jury to have concluded that Gragg had
passed the examinations. The trial court denied the motion for a new
trial, ruling “that one can assume to the extent that answer has any
effect at all, that [the jury] did in fact follow the Court’s instructions
to” disregard the answer.

Tn his third assignment of error, Elliott contends that the trial
court erred in not permitting him to introduce the results of Gragg’s
polygraph examinations to rebut the false impression that Gragg had
been truthful in her statements to the police. Elliott contends that the
jury would naturally have such an impression from Detective Hoff-
man’s reference to a “polygrapher” having interviewed Gragg. Elli-
ott asserts, as he did at trial, that Hoffman’s response “opened the
door” to the admission of the results of Gragg’s polygraph examina-
tions. We disagree.

HB The term “opening the door” is a catchphrase often used to
refer to the doctrine of curative admissibility. Curative admissibility,
in its broadest form, allows a party to introduce otherwise inadmissi-
ble evidence when necessary to counter the effect of improper evi-
dence previously admitted by the other party. See Clark v. State, 629
A.2d 1239, 1244-45 (Md. Ct. App. 1993); see also 1 John H. Wig-
more, Wigmore on Evidence, § 15 (Rev. ed. 1983). The specific facts
of this case do not implicate the application of this doctrine. We are

418 es
Fe

of opinion that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to give
a curative instruction to the jury under the circumstances rather than
to permit Elliott to introduce otherwise inadmissible and unreliable
evidence.

HB In his fourth and fifth assignments of error, Elliott contends,
respectively, that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for
mistrial and in not granting his motion for a new trial on the ground
that the curative instruction given by the trial court was not adequate
to cure the prejudice caused by Detective Hoffman’s testimony.

A trial court exercises its discretion when it determines
whether it should grant a motion for mistrial. Whether
improper evidence is so prejudicial as to require a mistrial is a
question of fact to be resolved by the trial court in each partic-
ular case. Unless this Court can say that the trial court’s reso-
lution of that question was wrong as a matter of law, it will
not disturb the trial court’s decision on appeal. A judgment
will not be reversed for the improper admission of evidence
that a court subsequently directs a jury to disregard because
juries are presumed to follow prompt, explicit, and curative
instructions.

Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 280, 427 S.E.2d 411, 420,
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993) (citations omitted).

IB As the trial court noted during the sentencing hearing, the
oblique reference to a “polygrapher” is not so inherently prejudicial
as to require the trial court to grant a mistrial or to set aside the
verdict and order a new trial. See Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va.
214, 234, 294 S.E.2d 882, 893-94 (1982) (holding that a witness’s
mention of the word “polygraph” did not cause harmful error
because the reference was elicited “without definition or elabora-
tion”). We hold that in this case the giving of a prompt curative
instruction to disregard the reference, which the jury is presumed to
have obeyed, was sufficient to avoid any prejudice to Elliott and,
thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motions for a mistrial and for a new trial.

Gragg’s Alleged False Testimony

During his cross-examination of Gragg, Elliott’s counsel
attempted to impeach Gragg by asserting that she had embellished
her trial testimony with inculpatory details that had not been included

es 19
a

in the interview she gave to police on May 10, 2001. Specifically,
Elliott’s counsel contended that, in contrast to her trial testimony, she
had not told police that Elliott had said during one of the telephone
calls after the murders that he was “covered with blood” and that the
police were “swarming” around. Gragg testified that while these
details were not in the transcript of her interview with the police, she
had “told [Detective Hoffman] everything when we were outside”
taking a cigarette break and that “when I came back inside they
made me — they wrote it down.” Under further questioning, Gragg
was uncertain whether the police had written the statement contain-
ing these additional details for her to sign or whether she had written
the statement herself.

Elliott’s counsel, noting that such a statement “has not been pro-
vided to the Defense,” requested that Elliott be provided a copy of
this written statement. The Commonwealth’s Attorney advised the
trial court that he had no knowledge of the written statement’s exis-
tence. As it was late in the day, the trial court called a recess and
directed the Commonwealth’s Attorney to make inquiries regarding
the existence of the written statement.

After the Commonwealth’s Attorney and Elliott’s counsel jointly
interviewed Detective Hoffman, the Commonwealth’s Attorney
advised the trial court that, according to Hoffman, “no such docu-
ment was created by him or by anyone . . . he did not have [Gragg]
sign anything or read over anything” on May 10, 2001. Elliott’s
counsel stated that he wanted “a stipulation from the government
that there is no such statement.” The trial court ruled that either the
Commonwealth could agree to such a stipulation or Elliott could call
Hoffman “‘to establish that no such statement exists . . . absent the
stipulation by the Commonwealth the statement does not exist,
you’re entitled to prove that it doesn’t exist.” The trial court then
asked Elliott’s counsel, “What else do we need to do?” Elliott’s
counsel replied, “Not a thing.”

Elliott’s counsel then asked the Commonwealth’s Attorney
whether he would stipulate that the statement did not exist. The
Commonwealth’s Attorney replied, ““We don’t know it doesn’t exist,
we don’t have any evidence on it. You’ve just got to argue that to the
jury that there is no such document.” The trial court again asked,
“Well, what else can we do today?’’ Elliott’s counsel replied, “That’s
it, your Honor.”

When the trial resumed the following morning, Elliott’s counsel
continued his cross-examination of Gragg. Gragg conceded that she

420 es
PT

did not mention Elliott saying he was “covered in blood” or that
police were “‘swarming” in either the May 10, 2001 interview or in a
written statement she later prepared for the police.>

Elliott’s counsel then questioned Gragg about the written state-
ment she alleged contained these details, asking her to describe the
paper it had been written on and to clarify whether she or Detective
Hoffman had written the statement. Gragg testified that she could not
recall whether the statement had been written on a pad or on loose
paper, but that she believed Hoffman had written the statement and
she had read it and signed it. Gragg further testified that when she
later asked the Commonwealth’s Attorney for a copy of this state-
ment, he told her to ask Detective Hoffman, who “told me that he
could not find it.”

After Elliott’s counsel concluded his cross-examination of Gragg,
the trial court called a bench conference and asked the Common-
wealth’s Attorney if he had any recollection of having been asked by
Gragg about the May 10, 2001 written statement or referring her to
Detective Hoffman. The Commonwealth’s Attorney stated that he
had no such recollection.

Elliott’s counsel stated that while he was “not suggesting that
[the Commonwealth] did anything improper’? concerning Gragg’s
testimony, his “concern is how do we proceed knowing there is no
such statement.” The trial court again opined that Elliott could call
Detective Hoffman to testify that the statement did not exist. Elliott’s
counsel then stated that he was concerned the Commonwealth might
try to rehabilitate Gragg in redirect examination. The trial court then
asked whether Elliott’s counsel was asserting that “the Common-
wealth knows this is . . . perjury.” Elliott’s counsel responded he was
not making that assertion. Although the Commonwealth conducted a
brief redirect examination of Gragg, it did not return to the issue of
the alleged May 10, 2001 written statement.

After the Commonwealth rested, Elliott recalled Detective Hoff-
man and asked him whether he had prepared a written statement for
Gragg to sign on May 10, 2001. Hoffman testified that neither he nor
any other officer prepared a statement for Gragg to sign on that day.

Elliott filed a post-verdict motion for an evidentiary hearing “to
determine the factual circumstances surrounding the existence of a
written statement allegedly signed by Rebecca Gragg at the behest of
the police on May 10, 2001.” Elliott contended that either “Gragg

5 This written statement was the one provided to Ellioit during the pre-trial proceedings.

es a1
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lied on the stand in a deliberate attempt to make her story appear
more credible and consistent” or “the written statement was signed
by her off the record, and the police and/or the Commonwealth lost it
or suppressed it.” Elliott stated that an evidentiary hearing was nec-
essary because “any possibility of witness perjury or police miscon-
duct must be fully explored.”

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ruled that the matter had
been “explored before this jury to the extent . . . that the Defendant
saw fit to do so... . [T]o conduct an additional hearing at this point
on the same issue . . . is not warranted.” The trial court denied the
motion for an evidentiary hearing in the sentencing order.

In his sixth assignment of error, Elliott contends that “[tJhe trial
court erred in failing to declare a mistrial based upon the presentation
of false testimony by the Commonwealth’s witness Rebecca Gragg
that she had signed a written statement during an interview with the
police on May 10, 2001.” In his seventh assignment of error, Elliott
contends that “[t}he trial court erred in failing to require the Com-
monwealth to cure the false testimony by its witness Rebecca Gragg
that she had signed a written statement during an interview with the
police on May 10, 2001.” In briefing these assignments of error,
Elliott directs the Court to two points in the trial transcript, asserting
that at these points “the trial court failed to declare a mistrial, to
require the Commonwealth to take steps to correct the falsehood
offered by its star witness, or to otherwise remedy the introduction of
this testimony.”

The Commonwealth contends that the record does not show that
Elliott requested a mistrial or otherwise requested the trial court to
“remedy the introduction of this testimony.” Accordingly, the Com-
monwealth asserts that Elliott may not raise these issues for the first
time on appeal. Rule 5:25.

Tn his eighth, ninth, and tenth assignments of error, Elliott con-
tends, respectively, that the trial court erred “in failing to find that
the Commonwealth violated its obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence,” in failing to grant his post-trial motion for an evidentiary
hearing to inquire into the existence of Gragg’s alleged written state-
ment, and “‘in failing to grant a mistrial based upon the Common-
wealth’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.” The Common-
wealth contends that Elliott, though purporting to relate these
assignments of error to the question presented in which he argued his
sixth and seventh assignments of error, failed to adequately brief
these issues.

422 es
Fe

Hl We have reviewed the trial transcript at the two points refer-
enced by Elliott with respect to the trial court’s failure to grant a
mistrial or provide him with some other remedy for Gragg’s alleged
false testimony. In addition, we have considered the entire record of
Gragg’s testimony concerning the statement that she alleged she
signed on May 10, 2001 and the various bench conferences related to
that testimony. At no point in the record can we discern where Elliott
requested that the trial court declare a mistrial, sought a directive
from the trial court requiring the Commonwealth to “cure” Gragg’s
false testimony, or asked the trial court for any specific remedy.

At best, the record shows that Elliott’s counsel asked whether the
Commonwealth would stipulate that Gragg had not signed any state-
ment on May 10, 2001. In response, the trial court opined that in the
absence of such a stipulation, Elliott’s recourse was to call Detective
Hoffman to rebut Gragg’s testimony. In each instance where the trial
court offered this opinion, Elliott’s counsel did not object or other-
wise assert that this course of action was not adequate. Moreover,
Elliott availed himself of that remedy by calling Detective Hoffman
as his own witness. Thus, we agree with the Commonwealth that
Elliott did not preserve for appeal in the trial court the issues raised
in assignments of error six and seven.

HM Similarly, we can discern no argument of assignments of
error eight, nine, and ten within Elliott’s opening appellate brief. The
failure to brief an assignment of error constitutes a waiver of the
argument. See, e.g., Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 318, 541
S.E.2d 872, 880, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001). Moreover, as
with assignments of error six and seven, there does not appear to be
any point in the record were Elliott requested the trial court to rule
that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence,
assuming that Gragg’s alleged statement could be considered excul-
patory, or sought a mistrial on that ground. Thus, even if argued on
brief, these assignments of error would be barred in any case by the
lack of preservation in the trial court.

HE I his reply brief, Elliott contends that even if he is pre-
cluded from raising these issues by his failure to preserve them in the
trial court, “the ends of justice would demand that this Court address
[these issues] because the false testimony by a government witness
strikes at the very heart of the legitimacy of the judicial system.”
Even if we were to assume, and indeed there is support in the record
for making the contention, that Gragg fabricated her testimony con-
cerning the May 10, 2001 written statement, the record is amply

es 423
pC

clear that the jury was aware of this possibility. Every instance in
which it is possible, or even probable, that a witness has been
untruthful with respect to some part of her testimony does not require
the declaration of a mistrial, the striking of the witness’s testimony,
or some other intervention on the part of the trial court. To the con-
trary, one of the principal duties of a jury as factfinder is to make
judgments on the credibility of the witnesses and “[a] factfinder who
appreciates a heightened possibility of perjury will respond with
heightened scrutiny.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 764
(2000).

HM Elliott thoroughly cross-examined Gragg about her claim to
having signed the May 10, 2001 written statement and called Detec-
tive Hoffman to rebut that testimony.° The record reflects that in the
guilt determination phase of the trial, the question of Gragg’s credi-
bility was a central theme of Elliott’s closing argument. Moreover,
Elliott consistently maintained at trial that he did not ascribe any
misconduct to the Commonwealth with respect to Gragg’s question-
able testimony. Under these circumstances, we perceive no reason to
invoke the ends of justice exception in order to permit Elliott to raise
here issues that were never presented to or ruled on by the trial court.

For these reasons, we hold that Elliott has waived the issues
raised in assignments of error six, seven, eight, and ten by failing to
preserve those issues in the trial court, and that he has waived the
issue raised in assignment of error nine by failing to brief that issue
in this appeal.

Exclusion of Evidence of Third Parties’
Animosity Towards Finch

During the trial, Elliott sought to question Gragg about an inci-
dent in which Gragg’s husband had brandished a gun at Finch. The
trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection, ruling that
“unrelated acts of violence would have no bearing on the case... I
don’t see that it’s relevant.” In his eleventh assignment of error, Elli-
ott contends that the trial court erred in not permitting him to intro-
duce this evidence. Elliott contends that the evidence was relevant to
show that Gragg’s husband “had as much motivation as [Elliott] to
murder Mr. Finch, and the evidence of his prior brandishment of a

© In his post-trial motion for an evidentiary hearing, Elliott contended that he wanted to
question other police detectives who might have knowledge of whether the statement existed.
As the trial court indicated in denying that motion, Elliott had ample opportunity to call wit-
nesses at trial.

42a es
a

gun against Mr. Finch shows that he was capable of acting on that
motivation.”

HEM “‘Proffered evidence that merely suggests a third party
may have committed the crime charged is inadmissible; only when
the proffered evidence tends clearly to point to some other person as
the guilty party will such proof be admitted. We have stated that a
large discretion must and should remain vested in the trial court as to
the admission of this class of testimony.”’ Johnson v. Commonwealth,
259 Va. 654, 681, 529 S.E.2d 769, 784, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 981
(2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As in John-
son, the evidence proffered by Elliott “‘bore no direct relation to the
crimes charged,” but tended only to show a prior history of a bad
relationship between one of the victims and a third party. Id., 529
S.E.2d at 785; of. Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 766-67, 99
S.E. 562, 565 (1919) (holding evidence of recent death threats by
third party admissible). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in ruling that this evidence was ixrelevant and
inadmissible.

HH Elliott also sought to question Detective Hoffman on
whether he was aware of an allegation by Finch, found in an affida-
vit in the record of Gragg’s and Finch’s custody dispute, that Gragg
had induced some acquaintances to assault Finch. The trial court
ruled that the statement was inadmissible hearsay. In his twelfth
assignment of error, Elliott contends, citing Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), that the trial court should not have
“applied [the hearsay rule] mechanistically to defeat the ends of jus-
tice.” Id. The Commonwealth responds that Elliott did not argue for
a Chambers exception to the hearsay rule in the trial court and, thus,
this argument is barred by Rule 5:25.

We need not consider whether Elliott’s generalized objection to
the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence as hearsay was adequate to
encompass the argument he now makes on appeal. Even if the due
process argument under Chambers were cognizable on this appeal,
unlike the direct or exculpatory proof noted by the United States
Supreme Court in that case, here the evidence is too tenuous and
speculative to have relevance to prove that Gragg or some other third
party acting for her may have committed the murders. Accordingly,
we hold that the trial court properly excluded this evidence.

es 425
PC

Sufficiency of the Evidence

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s presentation of evi-
dence in the guilt determination phase of the trial, Elliott made a
motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence “to preserve the
record.” However, Elliott did not offer any express argument that the
Commonwealth had failed to make out a prima facie case for capital
murder or the other crimes with which he was charged. The trial
court denied the motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence.

In a post-trial motion for “a new trial,” Elliott contended that the
evidence was not sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to prove that
he committed the murders.” Elliott contended in that motion that the
Commonwealth had failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
his innocence. Elliott further contended that even if the evidence
were sufficient to prove that Elliott committed the murders, the Com-
monwealth failed to prove that Finch’s murder preceded Thrall’s
murder. Though citing no authority for the proposition, Elliott con-
tended that a capital murder premised upon the “killing of more than
one person as a part of the same act or transaction” under Code
§ 18.2-31(7) required proof that the victim of the capital murder was
killed after some other person had been killed. Following argument
at the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied this motion without
comment. :

HH In his thirteenth assignment of error, Elliott contends that the
trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to strike during the
guilt determination phase of the trial. In his fourteenth assignment of
error, he contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his
“motion to set aside the verdicts for insufficiency of the evidence
(denominated a motion for a new trial).” Elliott failed to expressly
telate either of these assignments of error to a question presented and
in reviewing his questions presented, we do not find any that would
incorporate these issues. Moreover, we cannot discern any argument
within his brief that expressly addresses these assignments of error.
Accordingly, we hold that Elliott has waived these assignments of
error.® See Burns, supra.

7 Tt goes without saying that if the trial court had concurred in Elliott's contention that the
evidence had not proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law, the relief to
which he would have been entitled was the setting aside of the verdicts and a dismissal of the
indictments with prejudice, not a new trial.

* Tn any case, when considering challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal
trial, we will not disturb the factfinder’s verdict unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence
to support it. Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 146, 314 S.E.2d 371, 385, cert. denied,

426 Ss
Pe

Vileness Aggravating Factor Issues

In his fifteenth assignment of error, Elliott contends that the trial
court erred in overruling his motion to have Virginia’s capital murder
and death penalty statutes declared unconstitutional “on the ground
that the ‘vileness’ aggravator . . . is unconstitutionally vague on its
face and as applied in this case and therefore fails to provide mean-
ingful guidance to the jury.” This contention is an amalgam of three
arguments raised by Elliott in the omnibus motion filed prior to his
first trial challenging the constitutionality of the capital murder and
death penalty statutes.

In his sixteenth assignment of error, Elliott contends that “[t]he
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the narrowing con-
struction of the ‘vileness’ aggravator adopted by this Court.’”’?
Although it is not entirely clear from the argument he makes on brief
with respect to this assignment of error, it would appear that Elliott is
asserting the same argument as was made in one section of the omni-
bus motion to have the capital murder and death penalty statutes
declared unconstitutional filed prior to his first trial. In any event, we
can find nothing in the record of his second trial to suggest that he
sought an instruction giving a “narrowing construction” of the vile-
ness aggravator.

In his seventeenth assignment of error, Elliott contends that
“ft]he trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to instruct the
jury to agree unanimously upon a single element of ‘vileness.’ ” This
argument was also raised in the omnibus motion filed prior to Elli-
ott’s first trial and in a separate motion filed prior to the first trial
seeking a specific jury instruction. Elliott did not proffer an instruc-
tion to this effect during the penalty determination phase of his sec-
ond trial.

The Commonwealth asserts that because Elliott did not renew the
pre-trial motions from his first trial or ask that the trial court adopt

469 U.S. 873 (1984). The record of Elliott’s second trial is adequate to support the jury’s
verdicts convicting him of the murders of Thrall and Finch and the related firearm offenses.

9 Blliott does not expressly state how the definition of the vileness aggravating factor should
have been narrowed or limited in jury instructions, Presumably, Elliott is contending that the
killing of Thrall lacked one or more of the elements tending to show that it involved “torture,
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim.” Elliott provides no authority for his
assertion that this Court has “adopted” instructions to this effect, although we have permitted
trial courts the discretion to provide further guidance as to the meaning of these terms. See
Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 446, 323 S.E.2d 554, 564-65 (1984), cert. denied, 472
US. 1012 (1985).

es 427
Pe

its prior rulings on those motions in his second trial, he failed to
preserve these issues for appeal. The Commonwealth further con-
tends that by agreeing to the jury instruction defining the vileness
aggravating factor in his second trial and not proffering any alterna-
tive instructions, he has waived his claims that the trial court should
have given “narrowing construction” and ‘“‘single element of vile-
ness unanimity” instructions.

In his reply brief, Elliott asserts that he was not required to reas-
sert his pre-trial motions from his first trial because “the rulings in
the first trial automatically carry over to the second one.” For the
same reason, Elliott contends that he was not required to proffer his
alternative instructions limiting the vileness aggravating factor or
requiring a unanimous determination of the elements making the
crime vile, because the trial court had ruled on these issues prior to
his first trial.

The cases that Elliott relies upon for his assertion that rulings
from a mistrial carry over to a subsequent retrial are inapposite and
distinguishable. In Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002),
the federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that where a
trial court had determined that an entrapment instruction was
required in a trial that ended in a mistrial, the instruction was also
required to be given in the subsequent retrial where “no additional
evidence to the contrary” rebutted the prior ruling. Jd. at 1098. Thus,
Bradley does not stand for the proposition that all rulings of a trial
court in a prior mistrial carry over to a subsequent trial but, rather,
that the rationale underlying a particular ruling in the first trial had
been correct and should have been applied to identical circumstances
in the retrial.

In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 538
ESupp. 1328 (N.D. Ohio 1981), the trial court did observe that ‘a
mistrial does not affect or invalidate any of the pre-trial proceedings
in the case.” Jd. at 1330. However, that statement is made in an
opinion addressing a motion to have the pre-trial rulings from a mis-
trial adopted in the retrial. Moreover, the rulings at issue were those
in orders disposing of discrete claims within a complex litigation, not
rulings on issues of law related to matters that would arise during the
retrial. In commenting on the rationale of the Cleveland Electric
decision, the federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
opined that the trial court is not bound in a subsequent trial by the
rulings of a prior mistrial, so much as it has the discretion to “recog-
nize and enforce prior rulings . . . but also retains the power to

428 es
pt

reconsider previously decided issues as they arise in the context of a
new trial.” United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1990).

HE «We concur in the view expressed by the Commonwealth
in the present case that when a criminal case ends in a mistrial, the
rulings made by the trial court prior to or during the aborted trial do
not automatically carry over to a subsequent retrial. Thus, a defen-
dant may not rely upon objections made at an aborted trial to pre-
serve issues for appeal following his conviction in a subsequent trial.
See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 122 F.3d 215, 221 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“objections made at the aborted trial have no bearing on the retrial,
as the two are entirely separate affairs’). Similarly, a defendant may
not assert that rulings made on pre-trial motions prior to a mistrial
are binding upon the trial court in a subsequent trial unless the trial
court adopts those rulings on its own motion or in addressing a
motion of one or both of the parties. See, eg., United States v.
Oakey, 853 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1033 (1989). In the absence of a ruling in the second trial adopting
the rulings of the aborted trial, the defendant is required to renew his
motions with specificity in order to preserve the record of the trial
court’s rulings and the defendant’s objections thereto for any subse-
quent appeal of the retrial.

HE Eliott does not assert that the trial court adopted its prior
rulings for purposes of his second trial, and we have not been
directed to any place in the record where such was done or
requested. Accordingly, we hold that under these circumstances Elli-
ott is barred from raising the issues asserted in this appeal in assign-
ments of error fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen. Additionally, we also
agree that Elliott’s failure to proffer in his second trial alternative
instructions limiting the definition of the vileness aggravating factor
or requiring unanimity on the elements of vileness acts as a waiver
of the claim that the trial court should have given such instructions to
the jury.’°

© We note further that, as framed within the omnibus pretrial motion challenging the consti-
tutionality of Virginia’s capital murder and death penalty statutes, Elliott’s contention that the
vileness aggravating factor is vague is a reassertion of an argument previously rejected by this
Court on numerous occasions. See, e.g. Wolfe, 265 Va. at 208, 576 S.B.2d at 480 and cases
cited therein. Shortly before Elliott’s first trial commenced, the United States Supreme Court
released its opinion in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In briefing his argument in this
appeal that the vileness aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague, Elliott for the first time
asserts that Ring somehow implicates our prior consideration of this issue. Elliott’s failure to
argue the application of Ring in the trial court, despite the fact that nine months elapsed
between that opinion’s release and the commencement of his second trial, not only constitutes a

Statutory Review

Elliott’s eighteenth and nineteenth assignments of error merely
restate the elements of the statutory review of any death sentence
mandated by Code § 17.1-313(C). Accordingly, we will combine the
mandatory review of Elliott’s death sentence with our discussion of
the issues raised by Elliott in his assignments of error.

HM Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) requires that we determine whether
the jury imposed the sentence of death under the influence of pas-
sion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Elliott makes no particu-
larized argument that the jury’s verdict was not the product of a rea-
soned and dispassionate deliberation. Nor does our review of the
record in this case disclose that the jury failed to give fair considera-
tion to all the evidence both in favor and in mitigation of the death
sentence, or was otherwise improperly influenced in favor of impos-
ing the death penalty. Accordingly, we hold that the sentence of
death was not imposed under passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary
factor.

With respect to the consideration “(w]hether the sentence of
death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in simi-
lar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant,” Code
§ 17.1-313(C)(2), Elliott contends that “[t]he Commonwealth has
never imposed such a sentence upon a man with as long and accom-
plished a record of service to his country as” Elliott. He further con-
tends that “this case lacks the characteristics that normally distin-
guish the cases in which the death penalty is imposed based upon
multiple homicides and vileness from those in which juries choose to
impose life imprisonment.”

HM During the penalty determination phase of the trial, the jury
heard testimony recounting Elliott’s service as a soldier and non-
commissioned officer in, and later as a civilian employee of, the
United States Army. The jury also heard evidence throughout the
course of the trial that Elliott betrayed his wife of twenty-three years,
pursuing a former prostitute and squandering hundreds of thousands
of dollars on this illicit relationship. The evidence showed that Elliott

waiver of that issue on appeal, but demonstrates the necessity of prohibiting a defendant from
attempting to rely upon rulings from a prior aborted trial. In any event, we have already
addressed the claim that Ring affects our prior consideration of constitutional issues in death
penalty cases and have determined that “nothing . . . in Ring suggests that the Court intended
to revisit broader issues of due process protections afforded in the penalty determination phase
of all capital murder trials.” Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 137, 590 S.B.2d 537, 555
(2004).

murdered two innocent people in a brutal and premeditated manner,
showing no remorse for and purposefully seeking to conceal his
crimes. The murder of Thrall was particularly heinous in that it
appears she was a victim of opportunity, killed while her young chil-
dren were nearby and simply because she was present in the home
with Finch or perhaps because she saw and could have identified
Elliott.

The jury could reasonably have concluded from Elliott’s actions
in his secret relationship with Gragg that he had renounced the val-
ues he purported to support and follow in his public life. Faced with
the incongruent reality of Elliott’s two lives, the jury was well within
its province to determine that the mitigating value of Elliott’s years
of service in the armed forces did not outweigh his culpability for the
death of Thrall under the circumstances of that murder.

HH Because of the statutory directive that we compare this case
with “similar cases,” we have focused on cases in which an individ-
ual was murdered as part of the same act or transaction as another
killing and the death penalty was imposed upon a finding of the vile-
ness aggravating factor. However, our proportionality review
includes all capital murder cases presented to this Court for review
and is not limited to selected cases. Even though no two capital mur-
der cases are identical, we are confident that, given the heinousness
associated with the murder of Thrall, the sentence of death imposed
on Elliott is neither excessive nor disproportionate to sentences gen-
erally imposed by other sentencing bodies in this Commonwealth for
crimes of a similar nature considering the crime and this defendant.
See, e.g., Hudson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 29, 590 S.E.2d 362
(2004); Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 529 S.E.2d 570, cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407,
508 S.E.2d 57 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999); Woodfin v.
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 372 S.E.2d 377 (1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1009 (1989).

HH In his twentieth assignment of error, Elliott contends that
“[tJhe trial court erred in sentencing appellant to death.” Elliott pur-
ports to relate this assignment of error to the questions presented
addressing his challenges to the constitutionality of the vileness
aggravating factor and the mandatory review of his death sentence.
Within the sections of his brief addressing those questions presented,
we can discern no particularized argument that the trial court erred in
imposing the sentence of death in accord with the jury’s verdict.
Thus, we conclude that this assignment of error is merely an asser-

es 431
FC

tion of general or cumulative error in the conduct of the trial. We do
not consider such generalized assertions of error.

CONCLUSION

HM Having found no error below and perceiving no other reason
to commute or set aside the sentence of death, we will affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

2
FC

TIMOTHY JERMAN
v.
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Record No. 030461

March 5, 2004

Present: Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Compton, S.J.

David B. Hargett (Hargett & Watson, on brief), for petitioner.
Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry
W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for respondent.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under the Court’s
original jurisdiction, we address claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel with regard to the petitioner’s conviction for abduction. Con-
cluding that there is not a reasonable probability that, but for coun-
sel’s alleged deficiencies, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different, we will dismiss the petition.

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS AND PRESENT HABEAS CLAIMS

Timothy Jerman, the petitioner, was indicted in the Circuit Court
of Fairfax County for first-degree murder and abduction. A jury con-
victed him of second-degree murder and abduction. The Court of
Appeals of Virginia reversed Jerman’s abduction conviction. Jerman
v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 323, 328, 541 S.E.2d 307, 309
(2001). However, this Court subsequently reversed the judgment of

the Court of Appeals and reinstated the abduction conviction. Com-
monwealth v. Jerman, 263 Va. 88, 94, 556 S.E.2d 754, 758 (2002).

Jerman then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
this Court’s original jurisdiction. See Code § 17.1-310; Rule 5:7. By
order dated October 8, 2003, this Court placed on its privileged
docket the following claims raised in the petition:

Claim (2)(C), in which petitioner alleges that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to
raise at trial or on direct appeal (1) that the evidence was con-
stitutionally insufficient to convict petitioner of abduction; and
(2) that petitioner “‘was denied his rights to due process, to a
fair trial, and to be free from double jeopardy when the con-
viction for abduction was based on the restraint inherent from
the underlying assault.”

Claim (2)(D), in which petitioner alleges that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel when “counsel failed to
present a jury instruction that the restraint inherent in the
assault/murder cannot serve as the sole basis for a separate
abduction conviction. “[']

RELEVANT FACTS

At trial, the evidence established that Jerman made plans with
several of his friends, Micah A. Bohn (‘“‘Bohn’’), with whom Jerman
was living, Joe Kern (“Joe”) and his brother Frank Kern (“Frank”’),
and Lisa A. Panko (“‘Panko’’), to have a party to celebrate the high
school graduation of Cassie Bohn, Jerman’s girlfriend. The party was
to take place at Jerman’s home. Some of the group decided to
purchase 100 Ecstasy pills for the party.”

Panko made arrangements to purchase the pills from the victim,
Justin Rhatigan (“Rhatigan”). Bohn, Panko, and Frank met Rhatigan
at an ice cream store where Bohn and Rhatigan completed the drug
transaction. According to Panko, Rhatigan then “bolted” out of the
store. Before leaving the store, Panko and the others discovered that
Rhatigan had sold them aspirin instead of Ecstasy. They tried to page
Rhatigan, but he did not respond.

' In the same order, the Court held that the writ should not issue as to the other claims
raised in Jerman’s habeas corpus petition.

2 “Eostasy” is metholanedioxine, an amphetamine. See Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va.
193, 203, 576 S.B.2d 471, 477, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 566 (2003).

5
PT

After several weeks of trying to contact Rhatigan, Panko was
finally able to do so through a friend. Panko asked Rhatigan why he
had not sold them Ecstasy, and he responded that he needed money
to repay some people. In the same conversation, Rhatigan supposedly
threatened to kill Bohn. Panko and Rhatigan then made plans to
“hangout” sometime during the upcoming weekend. Panko told
Bohn about her conversation with Rhatigan, and Bohn asked her
where they could all meet so he could get back the money that he
had paid Rhatigan for the imitation pills.

Panko and Rhatigan subsequently decided to get together on Sat-
urday evening, July 10, 1999. Panko informed Rhatigan that one of
her friends was coming to her house that same night, but Rhatigan
did not object. Panko also told Bohn that Rhatigan would probably
be at her house on that particular Saturday evening and that they
could confront him there about the money.

Sometime between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on that Saturday,
Jerman, Bohn, and Joe drove to Panko’s house in Bohn’s van. From
the time they arrived until around midnight, Panko paged Rhatigan
several times, but he did not respond to the pages. During this same
period of time, Jerman, Bohn, and Joe decided that, when Rhatigan
arrived, they would position themselves on each of the three floors of
the house, with Joe in the basement, Bohn in the kitchen on the sec-
ond floor, and Jerman upstairs on the third floor. Their strategy was
to keep Rhatigan from getting away if he tried to run. Panko testified
that, at some point during this same period of time, Joe brought a
baseball bat into the house and told the others there to hit Rhatigan
only in the legs, not in the head.

Finally, between 12:30 a.m. and 1:00 a.m., Rhatigan called Panko
in response to her prior pages. She told him that several of her
friends were at her house and they “all wanted to trip.” Panko
arranged to pick Rhatigan up and drive him back to her house. She
did not tell Rhatigan her true reason for bringing him there, so her
friends could confront him about the money.

When Panko returned home with Rhatigan and both walked
upstairs to the living room, Jerman, Bohn, and Joe emerged from
their respective positions in the house. Panko testified that the three
men grabbed Rhatigan near the front door, and then “‘they went all
the way downstairs.” Panko heard Bohn ask Rhatigan, “Remember
me?” And, she then heard Rhatigan saying, “Oh, stop, stop.” Panko
remained in the kitchen.

A minute or two later, Jerman came upstairs and asked Panko
how to open the gate located in the backyard fence. She told him that
the gate was “boarded shut” and that there was no way to get to the
other side of the fence. A 13-year-old neighbor, Joseph R. Worsham
(“Worsham”), observed two people emerge from Panko’s house,
carry a body-like object through the yard to the fence, and then run
back into the house without the object. Worsham also saw a third
person fixing the curtains inside the house and someone running
back out to the fence. Soon thereafter, everyone left Panko’s house.

Testifying on his own behalf, Jerman admitted that he knew that
Bohn and Panko “had been ripped off” by Rhatigan. On the Satur-
day evening in question, Jerman heard Panko and Bohn discussing
the fact that Rhatigan might be coming to her house and that, if he
did, Bohn could get his money back from Rhatigan. Jerman thought
there might be an altercation if Bohn confronted Rhatigan about the
money. According to Jerman, Joe brought three baseball bats into the
house after Panko left to pick up Rhatigan because they thought
some of Rhatigan’s friends might come back with him. Joe carried
one of the baseball bats up to the third level of the house where
Jerman was sitting. While Jerman denied ever picking up that base-
ball bat, he acknowledged hearing Joe’s statement to hit Rhatigan in
the legs, not in the head.

Jerman testified that, after Panko and Rhatigan arrived at the
house, Jerman first heard the verbal exchange between Bohn and
Rhatigan and then heard “a bunch of racket[; nJo words, just a bunch
of commotion.” Jerman claimed that he then ran from the top level
of the house to the middle level where Panko was standing and on
down to the basement. There, he saw Bohn and Joe each holding a
baseball bat and Rhatigan lying on a couch.

Continuing, Jerman admitted that Bohn and Joe picked up Rhati-
gan’s body, carried it through the backyard, and tossed it over the
fence. He also admitted that he was the other person that Worsham
had seen running out to the fence. Jerman claimed that he tried to
open the fence gate so he could determine if Rhatigan was “okay”
before everyone left Panko’s house. Jerman acknowledged that, when
he departed, he knew an unconscious man had been left lying on the
ground behind the fence.

Rhatigan’s body was discovered in the early morning hours on
Sunday. Rhatigan was taken to a hospital where he eventually died.
The cause of death was blunt force trauma to his head.

8S
Fe

ANALYSIS

Hi In this collateral attack on the abduction conviction, Jerman
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Green v. Young, 264
Va. 604, 608, 571 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2002); Nolan v. Peyton, 208 Va.
109, 112, 155 S.E.2d 318, 321 (1967). To prevail on the claims, Jer-
man must satisfy both parts of a two-part test established in Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Jerman must first
prove that his counsel’s “performance was deficient,” meaning that
“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Id. Jerman must next show that “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense,” that is to say “‘counsel’s errors were so seri-
ous as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Id. Unless Jerman
establishes both prongs of the two-part test, his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel will fail. Id.

HH To resolve Jerman’s claims, we will proceed directly to the
prejudice prong of the Strickland two-part test. We do so because it
is not necessary to determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before deciding whether Jerman suffered any prejudice
because of the alleged deficiencies. See id. at 697. The test for deter-
mining prejudice is whether “there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694.

All Jerman’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel turn on
his assertion that the abduction conviction was based solely on the
restraint inherent in the physical attack on Rhatigan that led to his
death, and that there was no evidence of any restraint separate and
apart from that necessary to carry out the assault. Thus, he claims
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew a motion to
strike on that basis at the close of all the evidence and for failing to
offer a jury instruction stating that the restraint inherent in the
assault/murder of Rhatigan could not serve as the sole basis for a
conviction for abduction.? He also claims that appellate counsel was

3 Trial counsel moved to strike at the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence. Counsel
argued, among other things, that there was no evidence of any restraint separate and apart from
that inherent in the assault, After presenting evidence on behalf of the defense, trial counsel did
not renew the motion to strike, In an affidavit filed as an exhibit to the respondent’s memoran-
dum of law in support of his motion to dismiss the habeas petition, trial counsel stated that he
did not renew the motion to strike at the conclusion of the evidence because he “believ[ed] it

a
PT

ineffective for failing to raise sufficiency of evidence and double
jeopardy questions on direct appeal of his abduction conviction.

Jerman was convicted of abduction in violation of Code
§ 18.2-47, That statute, in relevant part, states that “[a]ny person,
who, by force, intimidation or deception, and without legal justifica-
tion or excuse, seizes, takes, transports, detains or secretes the person
of another, with the intent to deprive such other person of his per-
sonal liberty . . . shall be deemed guilty of ‘abduction[.]’ ” In Scott v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526, 323 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1984), we
held that Code § 18.2-47 changed the common-law rule requiring
proof of asportation in order to sustain a conviction for abduction.
Now, under the statute, mere detention is sufficient, id, and the
asportation or detention can be accomplished by either force, intimi-
dation, or deception. Code § 18.2-47. However, when one is accused
of abduction by detention and another crime involving restraint of
the victim, both arising out of a continuing course of conduct, con-
victions for separate offenses with separate penalties are permitted
“only when the detention committed in the act of abduction is sepa-
rate and apart from, and not merely incidental to, the restraint
employed in the commission of the other crime.” Brown v. Common-
wealth, 230 Va. 310, 314, 337 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1985).

Hl Focusing on our decision in Brown, Jerman argues that “the
charges of abduction and murder grew out of a continuing course of
conduct, and the detention committed in the act of abduction was
merely incidental to, not separate and apart from, the restraint
employed in the commission of the assault.” Jerman’s argument
ignores the evidence establishing two acts of abduction that clearly
were not inherent in, but were distinct from, the physical attack upon
Rhatigan.

I The first abduction was accomplished through asportation by
deception, which is proscribed by Code § 18.2-47. Panko picked
Rhatigan up and drove him to her house on the pretext that some of
her friends were there and they “all wanted to trip.” She did not
disclose to Rhatigan the fact that Jerman, Bohn, and Joe were await-
ing him with baseball bats. Jerman, along with the others, knew
about and participated in the scheme to lure Rhatigan to Panko’s
house for the purpose of confronting him about the money paid for
the imitation pills.

to be a futile gesture in lieu [sic] of the evidence that had been introduced during the course of
the trial.”

0
PC

The second abduction occurred when Bohn and Joe carried Rhati-
gan’s body out of the house, through the backyard to the fence, and
then tossed him over the fence. This occurred when Jerman, even by
his own testimony, was in the basement; he admitted seeing Bohn
and Joe pick Rhatigan’s body up off the couch. Jerman also admitted
that he was the person who ran back out to the fence and who asked
Panko how to open the gate.

HB [n both acts of abduction, Jerman acted, at a minimum, as
a principal in the second degree.* See Jones v. Commonwealth, 208
Va. 370, 372, 157 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967) (“A principal in the sec-
ond degree, or an aider or abettor as he is sometimes termed, is one
who is present, actually or constructively, assisting the perpetrator in
the commission of the crime.”) Thus, we conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to convict Jerman of abduction. Consequently, under
the Strickland prejudice prong, there is not a reasonable probability
that there would have been a different outcome if Jerman’s trial
counsel had moved, at the close of all the evidence, to strike the
evidence on the abduction charge. Such a motion would have been
without merit.

HH We further conclude that there is not a reasonable probability
that the jury would have acquitted Jerman of the abduction charge if
trial counsel had requested a jury instruction stating that the restraint
inherent in the assault of Rhatigan could not serve as the sole basis
for a separate abduction conviction. The jury in this case was
instructed that the crime of abduction requires, among other things,
“[t}hat the defendant by force, intimidation or deception did seize,
take, transport, detain or hide Justin Rhatigan.” Under that instruc-
tion, the evidence in this case proved abduction by deception before
the assault and abduction by force after the assault. Neither involved
the restraint or force inherent in the act of murdering Rhatigan. It is
that restraint which is the subject of the instruction now proposed by
Jerman. Thus, Jerman’s defense was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s
failure to offer the instruction. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

HEB Finally, with regard to his claim of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel, we again find no prejudice under the Strickland
test. Based on the evidence of abduction already discussed, there is
not a reasonable probability that a different result would have been
obtained on appeal if appellate counsel had challenged the suffi-
ciency of that evidence or raised a double jeopardy claim. Moreover,

* The jury was instructed with regard to the law concerning a principal in the second degree.

A

appellate counsel’s performance was not deficient under the Strick-
land test. Appellate counsel could not have successfully challenged
Jerman’s abduction conviction for lack of evidence because that
argument was procedurally defaulted when trial counsel failed to
renew the motion to strike at the close of all the evidence. See Span-
gler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 436, 438, 50 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1948);
Rule 5:25. Counsel does not render ineffective assistance when mak-
ing a strategic decision to appeal certain errors and not to appeal
weaker claims. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see
also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we conclude that Jerman’s claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel are without merit. Thus, we will dismiss
the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Dismissed.

AAA DISPOSAL SERVICES, INC., ET AL.
Vv.

JAMES R. ECKERT
Record No. 030465
March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

443

Timothy S. Coyne (J. David Griffin; Fowler, Griffin, Coyne,
Coyne & Patton, on briefs), for appellants.
Thomas J. Stanton (Stanton & Associates, on briefs), for appellee.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a confession of
judgment for the amount specified in an ad damnum clause is valid
and binding in the absence of a plaintiff’s willingness to accept that
amount of principal and interest. We conclude that such a confession
of judgment is not valid in light of the plain terms of Code § 8.01-
431 requiring that a plaintiff be willing to accept a judgment for the
principal and interest contained in a confession of judgment. There-
fore, the circuit court did not err in granting the plaintiff’s motion to
nonsuit this action.

es
a

James R. Eckert filed a motion for judgment against AAA Dispo-
sal Services, Inc., and Miguel A. Aragon-Campos (collectively, “the
defendants”’), alleging personal injury as a result of an automobile
accident and seeking damages in the amount of $60,000.' More than
two months before a scheduled trial date, Eckert moved the court for
leave to increase the ad damnum in his motion for judgment to
$350,000. Eckert claimed that, instead of sustaining merely soft tis-
sue injuries, he had suffered a herniated disc as a result of the acci-
dent and would require surgery to correct that condition. A few days
later, the defendants moved the court for leave to amend their
responsive pleadings by admitting liability. At a subsequent hearing,
the circuit court denied Eckert’s motion to increase the ad damnum
because the motion came too close to the trial date, but the court
granted the defendants’ motion to admit liability.

The defendants then filed a confession of judgment, stating that
they, “jointly and severally, [are] justly indebted to and do hereby
confess judgment in favor of JAMES R. ECKERT in the total sum of
Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,000.00), which is the amount sued for
in the ad damnum of the plaintiff’s motion for judgment, as well as
the plaintiff’s costs and interest as allowed by law as pled in the
original motion for judgment.” Aragon-Campos executed the confes-
sion of judgment in his own behalf, and Steven A. Smith, Assistant
General Manager, signed the document on behalf of Republic Ser-
vices of Virginia, L.L.C., the successor in interest to AAA Disposal
Services. However, the acknowledgement by the notary public stated
that Tim Hayes executed the confession of judgment for AAA Dispo-
sal Services.

The circuit court clerk’s office accepted the confession of judg-
ment for filing on December 4, 2002. The next day, Eckert filed a
motion to nonsuit his case. At that time, no entry of judgment had
been docketed, nor had a final order been entered in the case. Eckert
had not consented to entry of a judgment by confession for the
amount for which he had sued.

The circuit court subsequently heard oral argument on Eckert’s
motion for a nonsuit. Eckert asserted that a confession of judgment
was not a submission to the court for a decision within the meaning
of Code § 8.01-380 and that, therefore, he was entitled to a nonsuit
as a matter of right. The defendants argued that a confession of judg-

' Several automobiles were involved in the accident, one of which was a truck owned by
AAA Disposal Services and driven by its employee, Aragon-Campos.

a
|

ment for the amount requested by Eckert in the ad damnum clause of
his motion for judgment effectively ended the case and that a nonsuit
could not be taken after a case is concluded.

In a letter opinion, the circuit court first reasoned that the confes-
sion of judgment was “ineffective” because the person recited as
confessing judgment for AAA Disposal Services was not the person
who actually did so. The court further explained that, pursuant to the
provisions of Code § 8.01-432, judgment may be confessed “for only
such principal and interest as [the] creditor may be willing to accept
a judgment for.” This language, in the court’s view, implied that a
creditor must be willing to accept the confessed judgment before it is
final and that Eckert had not done so.? For these reasons, the circuit
court concluded that the case had not been submitted to the court for
a decision within the meaning of Code § 8.01-380(A) and that Eckert
therefore was entitled to a nonsuit. The court entered an order non-
suiting the case without prejudice. The defendants appeal from that
judgment, and Eckert assigns cross-error to the circuit court’s refusal
to allow him to amend the motion for judgment by increasing the
amount of the ad damnum.

The dispositive inquiry in this appeal is whether the confession of
judgment was valid and binding on Eckert in the absence of his will-
ingness to accept the amount of principal and interest specified in
that judgment. We conclude that it was not.

HMB As previously noted, the defendants confessed judgment in
this case pursuant to Code § 8.01-431. In relevant part, that statute
allows a defendant in any suit to “confess a judgment in the clerk’s
office for so much principal and interest as the plaintiff may be will-
ing to accept a judgment or decree for.” (Emphasis added.) The
underscored language is clear and unambiguous. Hence, we construe
such language according to its plain meaning without resort to rules
of statutory interpretation. Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593,
598, 587 S.E.2d 561, 564 (2003); Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316,
321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985); see also Industrial Dev. Auth. v.
Board of Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002).

HMB The plain terms of Code § 8.01-431 require that a plaintiff
be willing to accept the amount of principal and interest for which a
defendant is confessing judgment. See Beazley v. Sims, 81 Va. 644,
647 (1886) (“Lif a creditor accepts and ratifies a confession of judg-

2 The circuit court cited Code § 8.01-432, but the defendants confessed judgment pursuant to
the provisions of Code § 8.01-431. However, Code § 8.01-431 contains language similar to that
quoted by the court.

446 Po
|

ment in his favor, it becomes, from the moment of its acceptance,
valid”). Such acceptance is absent in this case. The written statement
of facts filed pursuant to Rule 5:11(c) specifies that Eckert “shad not
consented to entry of a judgment by confession for the amount sued
for.” Furthermore, the defendants confessed judgment for “‘interest
as allowed by law as pled in the original motion for judgment.” The
record on this appeal is silent as to whether the amount of interest
confessed included pre-judgment interest under Code § 8.01-382, and
if it did not, whether Eckert would have accepted a judgment that did
not include such interest.

Relying on the principle that a plaintiff cannot recover more than
the amount sued for, see Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins,
249 Va. 387, 400, 457 S.E.2d 356, 365 (1995), the defendants, never-
theless, assert that Eckert’s acceptance in this case was implied
because they confessed judgment for the full amount of the ad
damnum requested in the motion for judgment. The defendants argue
that, upon confessing judgment for that amount, the case was ended
and could not thereafter be nonsuited.

HMM We agree that a plaintiff cannot recover more than the
amount sued for, but that principle does not allow this Court to
ignore the plain words of Code § 8.01-431 requiring a plaintiff’s
acceptance of the amount of a confessed judgment. Notably, a prior
version of this statute provided that a defendant “may confess a
judgment in the clerk’s office . . . for the whole amount of the plain-
tiff’s demand in his writ or declaration set forth, and costs, or such
part thereof as the plaintiff may be willing to accept a judgment for.”
2 Virginia Revised Code app. VI c. 1, p. 585 (1819). The General
Assembly deleted the reference to the “whole amount of the plain-
tiff’s demand” in the 1849 version of the statute, Code (1849) tit. 51
c. 171, § 41, and has not included that language in the current statute,
Code § 8.01-431. Thus, the General Assembly obviously knows how
to allow a defendant to confess judgment for the amount sued for
without a plaintiff’s consent when it wishes to do so. We assume that
the General Assembly’s change in a statute is “purposeful and not
unnecessary or vain.”” Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum
Co., 229 Va. 596, 600, 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985); accord Virginia-
American Water Co. v. Prince William County Serv. Auth., 246 Va.
509, 517, 436 S.E.2d 618, 623 (1993).

[il In the absence of Eckert’s willingness to accept the amount of
the principal and interest contained in the confession of judgment, we
conclude that it was not valid and binding on him. See Beazley’s

es
PC

Adm’r, 81 Va. at 647. Thus, this action had not ended, nor had any-
thing been submitted to the circuit court for decision. Under the pro-
visions of Code § 8.01-380, Eckert was therefore entitled to take a
nonsuit.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

3 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to address Eckert’s assignment of cross-error.

9 ee
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KING GEORGE COUNTY SERVICE AUTHORITY
Vv.
PRESIDENTIAL SERVICE COMPANY TIER II, INc.
Record No. 030592
March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

cory
+
|

50
a
John A. Gibney, Jr. (Christina E. Kearney; Thompson & McMul-

lan, on briefs), for appellant.
R. Scott Pugh for appellee.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether alleged contracts
for the purchase of a privately owned utility system by a county ser-
vice authority can be specifically enforced in the absence of a resolu-
tion by the service authority’s board authorizing or ratifying the con-
tracts. Concluding that such a resolution is necessary, we will reverse
that portion of the circuit court’s judgment specifically enforcing one
of the alleged contracts and directing the service authority to
purchase a certain portion of the utility system.

MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The appellant, King George County Service Authority (‘Service
Authority”), was created in 1992 pursuant to the provisions of the
Virginia Water and Waste Authorities Act, Code § 15.2-5100, et seq.
The Service Authority is a “public body politic and corporate.”
Code § 15.2-5102(A); see also Short Pump Town Ctr. Cmty. Dev.
Auth, v. Hahn, 262 Va. 733, 742, 554 S.E.2d 441, 445 (2001). Its
initial purpose was to acquire existing, privately owned water and
sewer systems in King George County.

The appellee, Presidential Service Company Tier II, Inc. (“‘Presi-
dential”), owned a small water system that served some residences
located in Section 14 of Presidential Lakes Subdivision (“Section
14”), which is situated in King George County. This 354-lot residen-
tial development was designed to have individual septic tanks on
each lot and one drilled well to supply potable water. As of 1993,
only 33 homes had been allowed to connect to the water supply on
account of certain health regulations, and individual septic tanks had
been difficult to permit because of soil conditions.

Due to a need for affordable housing in King George County that
would be served by a central water and sewer system, the general
manager of the Service Authority wrote Presidential in June 1993
and advised that

SS 351
PF

it is the intention of the King George County Service Author-
ity to take over ownership and operation of all private utility
systems in the County. This policy is in keeping with the
adopted Comprehensive Plan which calls for a central sewer
and water system owned and operated by the County... .

As part of that effort, the systems owned by Presidential Ser-
vices Corporation Tier [II] are intended for acquisition.

Accordingly, in July 1993, the Service Authority’s board author-
ized the general manager to seek funding for the purpose of purchas-
ing the existing water system owned by Presidential, improving and
expanding that water system, and constructing a central sewer system
for Section 14. The Service Authority then prepared a letter agree-
ment, dated September 2, 1993, in which it offered to purchase the
existing water system owned by Presidential for the sum of
$280,000. The offer provided that the price would be “held firm
until January 31, 1994 and if closing [was] delayed beyond that date,
the price [would] escalate at the rate of 1/2 of one percent per
month.” However, the Service Authority’s “obligation to purchase
the system [was] subject to [its] ability to obtain financing by not
Jater than April 1, 1994. The Service Authority’s general manager
signed the letter agreement on behalf of the Service Authority, and
Presidential accepted the offer as evidenced by the signature of its
president on the document.!

On March 15, 1994, the Service Authority’s board ratified the
letter agreement entered into by the Service Authority and Presiden-
tial for the purchase of the existing water system. The board’s resolu-
tion stated that the agreement would expire on March 31, 1994,
because the Service Authority’s obligation to purchase the existing
water system was subject to its ability to obtain financing no later
than April 1, 1994, In light of that fact, the Service Authority’s
board, in its resolution, ratified and confirmed the agreement for the
purchase of the existing water system, and authorized the Service
Authority’s general manager to secure short-term financing in order
to proceed with that acquisition.?

' The letter agreement also stated that, upon Presidential’s acceptance of the offer, a more
definitive agreement would be prepared. The parties never executed such an agreement
although the Service Authority prepared one and sent it to Presidential.

? The resolution also authorized the general manager to obtain short-term financing for other
acquisitions as well as development of a sewer system for Section 14.

Pe

5
fe

During the ensuing weeks, representatives of both parties dis-
cussed an alternative approach for providing a central water and
sewer system for Section 14. A letter dated April 21, 1994, from
Presidential to the general manager of the Service Authority con-
firmed that Presidential would construct an expanded water system, a
sewer collection system, and a treatment plant, and that the Service
Authority would then purchase the completed system from Presiden-
tial instead of the Service Authority undertaking the construction.
The letter also specified that, if the Service Authority could not
obtain financing through a particular government agency, then it
would complete the acquisition with bond financing.

Presidential subsequently prepared a ‘“‘Cost [S]ummary of Presi-
dential Lakes Section 14 Sewer & Water System,” detailing the esti-
mated costs of each component of the central water and sewer sys-
tem, including acquisition of the existing water system. The
estimated costs, which included a ten percent administrative fee,
totaled $1,616,146 before debt service. A subsequent memorandum
dated November 29, 1994, also prepared by Presidential, confirmed
the purchase of the existing water system for the sum of $280,000
plus interest at 6 percent from January 31, 1994. The memorandum
further provided that the Service Authority would reimburse Presi-
dential for “‘all engineering, administrative, interest, construction and
any other costs for expansions” of the existing water system. How-
ever, according to the terms of the memorandum, the sewer system
would be constructed by Presidential and sold to the Service Author-
ity “at a cost of reimbursement of cost to produce.”

In a letter dated December 1, 1994, the general manager of the
Service Authority advised a financial institution, which was financ-
ing the construction work by Presidential, that the Service Author-
ity’s application for funds from a particular government agency had
been approved and that the purchase of both the expanded water sys-
tem and the sewer system was included in the Service Authority’s
project list. However, on its December 1997 project list, the Service
Authority showed no funds designated for acquisition of the Section
14 water and sewer system. The Service Authority admitted that, in
1999, it advised Presidential that the Service Authority took the posi-

2 Presidential asserted that the November 29, 1994 memorandum memorialized its oral
agreement with the Service Authority regarding expansion of the existing water system and
construction of the sewer system.

ES
PF

tion that it had no binding obligation to purchase the water and sewer
system in Section 14.4

This litigation then ensued. In an amended bill of complaint,
Presidential sought specific performance of the alleged agreements
for purchase of the existing water system, the expanded water sys-
tem, and the sewer system for Section 14. The circuit court referred
the matter to a commissioner in chancery. Based on evidence
presented, the commissioner in chancery found, in an initial report,
that there was ‘“‘a meeting of the minds” and that “[t]he terms of the
contract were sufficiently certain and complete, and that negotiations
had been concluded such that the [Service] Authority would purchase
both the water and the sewer systems as finally constructed by [Pres-
idential] per plans adopted by the [Service] Authority’s engineers at
its costs, including a ten (10) percent administrative fee.” The com-
missioner in chancery concluded that specific performance was war-
ranted and that Presidential’s claim was not barred by the statute of
frauds. The circuit court overruled both parties’ objections to the
commissioner’s report and referred the matter back to the commis-
sioner in chancery to determine the amount owed by the Service
Authority to Presidential.

In a supplemental report, the commissioner in chancery found
that the purchase price of the existing water system was “a flat
$280,000.00 with interest at 6% beginning on February 1, 1994.”
The commissioner in chancery concluded that the purchase price of
the expanded water system and the sewer system was $1,604,380.91,
which included a 10 percent administrative fee. Finally, the commis-
sioner in chancery found that Presidential was entitled to prejudg-
ment interest on the purchase price of the expanded water system and
the sewer system.

After considering the parties’ exceptions to the supplemental
report filed by the commissioner in chancery, the circuit court held,
in a final decree, that Presidential was “entitled to specific perform-
ance of the . . . agreement to convey the central water and sewer
system for Section 14 of Presidential Lakes Subdivision to the [Ser-
vice Authority] for the purchase price of $280,000.00 for the preex-
isting water system, which price increases at the rate of 6% per year
from February 1, 1994, until paid, and for the purchase price of
$1,604,380.91 for the expansion of the water system and the con-

4 Presidential received authorization from the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of
Health, in May 1996, to operate the sewer system in Section 14 and, in February 2000, to place
the water system in Section 14 in service.

55
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struction of the sewer system.”’ However, the circuit court agreed
with the Service Authority’s position that Code § 15.2-1244 bars
Presidential’s recovery of any prejudgment interest on the
$1,604,380.91 purchase price. The Service Authority appeals from
the circuit court’s final decree, and Presidential assigns cross-error.>

ANALYSIS

Although the Service Authority raises several issues on appeal,
we need to address only one. The dispositive question is whether the
Service Authority’s board adopted a resolution authorizing or ratify-
ing either of the alleged agreements with Presidential, and if not,
whether the agreements can be specifically enforced in the absence
of such a resolution.

In County of York v. King’s Villa, Inc., 226 Va. 447, 449, 309
S.E.2d 332, 333 (1983), this Court addressed whether a county
administrator had contractually “attempted to lock [a] connection fee
in place and by that attempt [had] intruded into an area exclusively
reserved for” a county board of supervisors. We held that the power
to fix or change such fees rested solely with the board of supervisors
and that the county administrator never had the authority to fix rates
and fees. Id. at 450, 309 S.E.2d at 333-34. Thus, the only way in
which the connection fee could have been locked into place indefi-
nitely was through some express action by the board of supervisors,
such as adopting a resolution to that effect or ratifying the portion of
the contract concerning the connection fee. Id., 309 S.E.2d at 333.

Hil King’s Villa, Inc., the other party to the contract signed by the
county administrator purportedly on behalf of the county, had “dealt
in good faith with a public servant who exceeded the bounds of his
authority.” Jd., 309 S.E.2d at 334. We reiterated “‘that those who deal
with public officials must, at their peril, take cognizance of their
power and its limits.” Jd. (citing Richard L. Deal & Assocs., Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 618, 623, 299 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1983);
South Hampton Apartments, Inc. v. Elizabeth City County, 185 Va.
67, 78-79, 37 S.E.2d 841, 846 (1946)). Finally, we explained that
“where a contract executed by an agent of the government is ultra
vires it is void ab initio and of no legal effect; thus no performance
by either party thereto can give the unlawful contract validity or

5 We also awarded a separate appeal to Presidential. Presidential Serv. Co. Tier Il, Inc. v.
King George County Serv. Auth., Record No. 030593 (August 7, 2003).

serve as the basis of any right of action upon it... .” Id. at 452, 309
S.E.2d at 335.

HB Similarly, in American-LaFrance & Foamite Indus., Inc. v.
Arlington County, 169 Va. 1, 192 S.E. 758 (1937), we explained that
a court will not enforce a contract that is invalid:

If the contract is . . . invalid, or is based upon a transaction
involving no moral turpitude, and is simply contrary to some
legal provision relating to the manner, method, or terms of its
performance, with no penalty provided other than its invalid-
ity, the court will not require performance of either the express
contract or a contract by implication.

Id. at 9, 192 S.E. at 761.

HMMM As we stated earlier, the Service Authority is, by statute, a
“public body politic and corporate.” Code § 15.2-5102(A). The pow-
ers of the Service Authority are exercised by a board, Code § 15.2-
5113(A), and the vote of a majority of the board’s members is neces-
sary for any action taken by the Service Authority, Code § 15.2-
5113(B). Thus, employees of the Service Authority, such as the gen-
eral manager, can enter into contracts on behalf of the Service
Authority only when authorized to do so by a majority vote of its
board members. See King’s Villa, 226 Va. at 450, 309 S.E.2d at 333;
see also County of Campbell v. Howard, 133 Va. 19, 59, 112 S.E.
876, 888 (1922) (holding that a board of supervisors could obligate a
county “only at authorized meetings duly held, and as a corporate
body, by resolution duly adopted; and not by the action of its mem-
bers separately and individually”).

HH The record in this case is replete with evidence regarding
the negotiations between the general manager of the Service Author-
ity and Presidential about the terms of the alleged agreements and
confirming the provision of engineering services to the Service
Authority not only with regard to the plans for constructing the
expanded water system and the sewer system but also as to monitor-
ing the construction by Presidential. However, the record does not
contain a resolution by the Service Authority’s board authorizing or
ratifying either the purchase of the expanded water system and sewer
system or the terms of the alleged contract between the Service
Authority and Presidential for the purchase of those particular facili-
ties. Nor is there a resolution authorizing the general manager to
enter into a contract with Presidential on behalf of the Service

So
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Authority to purchase the Section 14 expanded water system and
sewer system.® The provisions of Code § 15.2-5113(B), however,
specifically require that “the vote of a majority of board members
shall be necessary for any action taken by the authority.” Subsection
E of that statute authorizes the board members to appoint a chief
administrative or executive officer but requires such person to
“enforce the orders and resolutions adopted by the board members
and perform such duties as may be delegated to him by the board
members.”

HM Thus, we conclude that the alleged contract between the
Service Authority and Presidential is unlawful for lack of a resolu-
tion by the Service Authority’s board. King’s Villa, 226 Va. at 450,
309 S.E.2d at 333. For that reason, we will not require performance
of the alleged oral contract. See id. at 452, 309 S.E.2d at 335; Ameri-
can-LaFrance, 169 Va. at 9, 192 S.E. at 761. The general manager
could not bind the Service Authority or enter into a contract on its
behalf in the absence of such a resolution. Anyone dealing with an
officer or employee of a public body must ascertain the extent and
nature of that person’s authority. South Hampton Apartments, 185 Va.
at 78-79, 37 S.E.2d at 846. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court
erred in entering a final decree directing the Service Authority to
purchase the newly constructed sewer system and expanded water
system from Presidential for the sum of $1,604,380.91.

HN However, the Service Authority’s board, by resolution on
March 15, 1994, ratified the September 2, 1993, letter agreement
entered into by the Service Authority’s general manager and Presi-
dential for the purchase of the existing water system located in Sec-
tion 14. That agreement is not unlawful for lack of a resolution by
the Service Authority’s board. Thus, we conclude that the circuit
court did not err in specifically enforcing the letter agreement and
directing the Service Authority to purchase the existing water system
from Presidential for the sum of $280,000, increasing at the rate of
6% per year from February 1, 1994, until paid.’

6 The general manager of the Service Authority during the period from 1989 until the end of
1994 testified that the Service Authority’s board had “to take formal action” before any con-
tract could be signed and that he never presented any formal proposal to the board for the
purchase of the “to be constructed . . . Section 14 sewer and water system.”

7 We find no merit in the assertion by the Service Authority that the circuit court’s final
decree directing purchase of the existing water system violated the “law of the case” doctrine.
‘The Service Authority contends that the commissioner in chancery, in the initial report, found
that the parties had agreed that the Service Authority would purchase all the utility systems for
costs plus a ten percent administrative fee. We do not agree with that interpretation. Neverthe-

ee |

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we will affirm that portion of the circuit
court’s final decree pertaining to the purchase of the existing water
system. We will reverse that portion of the circuit court’s final decree
concerning the purchase of the expanded water system and sewer
system.®

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and final judgment.

Jess, even if the Service Authority is correct, the circuit court was free to modify its ratification
of the initial report upon receiving the supplemental report in which the commissioner in chan-
cery set out a separate sum for purchase of the existing water system. The decree ratifying the
initial report was not a final decree. See Rule 1:1. Thus, any purported relitigation of the
purchase price of the existing water system was not foreclosed as claimed by the Service
Authority.

8 Presidential assigns cross-error to the circuit court’s final decree. In one of the cross-errors,
Presidential challenges the circuit court’s ruling that Code § 15.2-1244 barred an award of
interest on the purchase price of the expanded water system and sewer system, That issue is
also the subject of the separate appeal awarded to Presidential, see footnote five supra, and will
not be addressed in this opinion. In its other assignment of cross-error, Presidential asserts that
the circuit court erred by permitting the Service Authority to raise defenses that were not dis-
closed as ordered by the court. Although Presidential does not clearly identify on brief what
defenses the Service Authority supposedly failed to disclose, we find no merit in this claim.

HOWELL Russ

v.
JAMES DESTIVAL
Record No. 030892,

March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

459

Edward L. Weiner (Lawson D. Spivey, II; Weiner & Associates,
on brief), for appellant.

Julia B. Judkins (Trichilo, Bancroft, McGavin, Horvath &
Judkins, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The sole question in this appeal is whether a jury instruction stat-
ing that a bicyclist has a duty to refrain from entering or crossing an
intersection in disregard of “close or approaching” traffic is an inac-
curate statement of law. In light of the plain terms of Code § 46.2-
924(B), we answer that question in the affirmative and thus conclude
that the circuit court erred in granting the instruction.

Howell Russ, the appellant, filed a motion for judgment against
James Destival, the appellee, claiming damages for personal injuries

460 Le!
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allegedly sustained as a result of an accident that occurred at the
intersection between Braddock Road and Prestwick Drive in Fairfax
County. Russ was riding a bicycle westbound along a path that runs
adjacent to Braddock Road and, as he proceeded across Prestwick
Drive, he was struck by an automobile driven by Destival.!

Braddock Road is a four-lane highway divided by a median strip.
Prestwick Drive is a two-lane street that provides ingress and egress
to a residential neighborhood and has a posted speed limit, according
to Russ, of 25 miles per hour. As Destival traveled along Prestwick
Drive and approached the intersection between these two roads, he
came to a stop sign and white “stop line” at the end of Prestwick
Drive. According to his trial testimony, Destival stopped his vehicle
behind the white line but then “eased” his vehicle forward, beyond
the white line, to within six to eight feet of the eastbound lanes of
Braddock Road in order to see oncoming traffic more clearly. He
intended to turn left and proceed westbound on Braddock Road.
When he accelerated forward to cross the eastbound lanes to the
median, he heard a yell and a “large thud.” Destival admitted that he
never saw Russ before the impact.

Russ testified that, as he approached the intersection in question,
he saw Destival’s vehicle come to a stop beyond the white line “but
not in the path of the bike path.” He stated that Destival’s vehicle
“roll[ed] through the stop sign and stop[ped] just before the end of
the bike path.” Russ admitted that he never stopped his bicycle
before crossing Prestwick Drive in front of Destival’s vehicle.

During argument on jury instructions, Destival offered Jury
Instruction Q, which stated:

A bicyclist has a duty to use ordinary care when he is rid-

ing on or crossing the hard surface of a highway:

(1) to keep a lookout for motor vehicles;

(2) to refrain from entering or crossing an intersection or
the hard surface of a highway in disregard of traffic
which is close or approaching in such a manner that a
reasonable person would not attempt to enter or cross;
and

(3) to step or move from his course into a place of safety
if it reasonably appears to him that he is in danger of
being struck by a motor vehicle.

' Russ was towing a trailer in which his three-year-old son was riding.

Le 461
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If a bicyclist fails to perform any one or more of these
duties, then he is negligent.

Destival had modified the instruction from its original version to
include the word “‘close” in subsection 2. The circuit court granted
the jury instruction over Russ’ objection, and the jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of Destival.

Russ filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict and enter judg-
ment in his favor, or in the alternative, to grant him a new trial. The
circuit court denied Russ’ motion. This Court granted Russ an appeal
limited to the following assignment of error:

The court erred in its rulings regarding the jury instructions
on the appropriate law, and further in failing to grant the plain-
tiff judgment notwithstanding the verdict on these grounds.

A. The court erred when it approved defendant’s Instruc-
tion Q, as modified by the defendant, as it was an inaccurate
and misleading statement of Virginia law.

Il As Destival correctly argues, the sole issue before us is
whether Instruction Q was a correct statement of Virginia law. Any
question about whether that instruction was applicable to the facts of
this case is not encompassed within the assignment of error. Thus,
we will confine this opinion to the narrow issue raised by Russ’
assignment of error. See Wolfe v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 260 Va.
7, 14-15, 532 S.E.2d 621, 624-25 (2000) (we do not consider argu-
ments that are not the subject of an assignment of error).

Russ’ contention that Instruction Q was an inaccurate statement
of law focuses on the insertion of the word “close” in subsection 2.
He contends that the instruction as modified altered the provisions of
Code § 46.2-924 establishing a pedestrian’s right-of-way and that the
jury was thus presented with an inaccurate legal standard regarding
his duty of care.

HM The relevant provisions of Code § 46.2-904 state that “[a]
person riding a bicycle . . . on a sidewalk, shared-use path, or across
a roadway on a crosswalk, shall have all the rights and duties of a
pedestrian under the same circumstances.”? A pedestrian’s right-of-
way vis-a-vis a vehicle is set forth in Code § 46.2-924(A):

2 In light of the statute, we will use the terms “bicyclist” and “pedestrian” interchangeably.
The term “crosswalk” is defined as “that part of a roadway at an intersection included
within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway

462 Le!
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A. The driver of any vehicle on a highway shall yield the
right-of-way to any pedestrian crossing such highway:

1. At any clearly marked crosswalk, whether at mid-block
or at the end of any block;[°]

2. At any regular pedestrian crossing included in the pro-
longation of the lateral boundary lines of the adjacent sidewalk
at the end of a block;

3. At any intersection when the driver is approaching on a
highway or street where the legal maximum speed does not
exceed thirty-five miles per hour.

However, Code § 46.2-924(B) states, in pertinent part, that “[nJo
pedestrian shall enter or cross an intersection in disregard of
approaching traffic.” This latter provision is determinant of the issue
in this appeal.

HEE Subsection 2 of Instruction Q informed the jury that a bicy-
clist has a duty to refrain from entering or crossing an intersection in
disregard of traffic that is either “close or approaching.” The addi-
tion of the word “close” altered the statutory duty of a bicyclist. The
provisions of Code § 46.2-924(B) require a bicyclist to refrain from
entering or crossing an intersection in disregard of “approaching traf-
fic.” The statute does not include traffic that is “close.” To state in a
jury instruction that a bicyclist must refrain from entering or crossing
an intersection in disregard of traffic that is “close,” i.e., stopped,
runs afoul of the plain terms of Code § 46.2-924(B) and a pedes-
trian’s right-of-way established in subsection A of that statute.

Hi Contrary to Destival’s argument, this Court’s decisions in
which we have used words such as “near,” “in close proximity,”
“close,” or “dangerously near” in describing those vehicles that a
pedestrian should see and heed do not support a different result. In
Hopson vy. Goolsby, 196 Va. 832, 839, 86 S.E.2d 149, 153 (1955)
(quoting Hooker v. Hancock, 188 Va. 345, 356, 49 S.E.2d 711, 716
(1948)), we stated that “if a person having a duty to look ‘carelessly
undertakes to cross without looking, or, if looking, fails to see or
heed traffic that is obvious and in dangerous proximity and continues

measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable road-
way; or any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedes-
trian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface.” Code § 46,2-100.

3 The pictures introduced into evidence demonstrate that there was not a marked crosswalk
at the intersection of Braddock Road and Prestwick Drive.

Le 463
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on into its path, he is guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
Accord Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135, 140, 427 S.E.2d 189, 192
(1993); Cofield v. Nuckles, 239 Va. 186, 190, 387 S.E.2d 493, 495
(1990); Straughan v. Nash, 215 Va. 627, 632, 212 S.E.2d 280, 283
(1975). Elaborating on a pedestrian’s duty to keep a lookout for vehi-
cles, we explained that “[t]he duty of looking is based on the wis-
dom of seeing whether traffic is approaching, where and at what
speed” and “[i]f looking discloses approaching traffic, then the right
to proceed is to be tested by whether a person of ordinary prudence
would attempt it.” Hopson, 196 Va. at 839, 86 S.E.2d at 153 (citing
Rhoades v. Meadows, 189 Va. 558, 562, 54 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1949)).
These cases and the others cited by Destival emphasizing a pedes-
trian’s duty to see and heed “approaching” traffic are consistent with
the directive in Code § 46.2-924(B) requiring a pedestrian not to
enter or cross an intersection in disregard of “approaching traffic.”
They do not alter a pedestrian’s duty in that instance.

Il Thus, we hold that Instruction Q was not an accurate state-
ment of Virginia law and that the circuit court erred in giving the
instruction to the jury.* Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of
the circuit court and remand this case for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

+ We express no opinion regarding whether Instruction Q without the modification applies to
the facts of this case or whether, in a new trial, the circuit court should give such an instruction
to the jury.

464 ee
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RICHARD J. ELLIOTT
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 003014

JONATHAN O’MARA
Vv.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 010038
March 5, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J. Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Compton, S.J.

val
oO

Ne)
+

a

James O. Broccoletti (Zoby & Broccoletti, on briefs), for appel-
lant. (Record No. 003014)

William H. Hurd, State Solicitor (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney Gen-
eral; Maureen Riley Matsen, Deputy State Solicitor; William E. Thro,
Deputy State Solicitor, on brief), for appellee. (Record No. 003014)

Kevin E. Martingayle (Stallings & Richardson, on briefs), for
appellant. (Record No. 010038)

William H. Hurd, State Solicitor (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney Gen-
eral; Maureen Riley Matsen, Deputy State Solicitor; William E. Thro,
Deputy State Solicitor, on brief), for appellee. (Record No. 010038)

JUSTICE LEMONS delivered the opinion of the Court.

On remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, we
consider the proper construction of the prima facie evidence provi-
sion of Code § 18.2-423 and the severability of the provision from
the core provisions of the statute. Additionally, we consider whether
the convictions of the defendants should be vacated and dismissed,
vacated with the opportunity for the Commonwealth to retry the
defendants, or whether the convictions should be affirmed.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

On the night of May 2, 1998, Richard J. Elliott, (“Elliott”) and
Jonathan S. O’Mara (“‘O’Mara’”’) erected a cross in the yard of James
S. Jubliee, Elliott’s next-door neighbor, and attempted to ignite it.
According to the record, Elliott conceived of the cross burning as
tevenge against Jubliee because Jubliee had complained to Elliott’s
mother about gunfire in Elliott’s backyard. Elliott convinced two
friends, O’Mara and David Targee, to aid him in the burning.

The Commonwealth prosecuted Elliott and O’Mara for attempted
cross burning and conspiracy to commit cross burning under Code
§§ 18.2-423, 18.2-16, and 18.2-22. O’Mara pled guilty to attempted
cross burning and conspiracy to commit cross burning but condi-
tioned his plea upon the reservation of his right to challenge the con-
stitutionality of Code § 18.2-423 on appeal. Elliott chose to be tried
by a jury. The trial court instructed the jury that in order to find
Elliott guilty of attempted cross burning, “The Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [that the defendant had the

468 ee
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intent of intimidating any person or group of persons.” No instruc-
tion based upon the prima facie evidence provision of Code § 18.2-
423 was given. A jury found Elliott guilty of attempted cross burning
but acquitted him of conspiracy to commit cross burning.

In Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 553 S.E.2d 738 (2001),
an appeal consolidating the Elliott and O’Mara cases with a third
case involving Barry E. Black (“Black”), who was charged under
§ 18.2-423 for burning a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally, we held that
§ 18.2-423 was facially invalid as selective regulation of speech
based upon content. Our ruling was premised upon the language of
the statute and our interpretation of the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). We
held that the statute was underinclusive, because it singled out “a
particular form of intimidating symbolic speech” for punishment
while leaving other forms unregulated. Black v. Commonwealth, 262
Va. at 773-76, 553 S.E.2d at 743-45. Additionally, we held that the
language of the prima facie evidence provision of the statute was
overbroad because of its chilling effect upon the exercise of free
speech under the First Amendment. Jd. at 777-78, 553 S.E.2d at 746.

The Commonwealth appealed our decision to the United States
Supreme Court. In a plurality opinion authored by Justice O’Connor,
the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth may engage in con-
tent discrimination “{w]hen the basis for the content discrimination
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue
is proscribable.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361 (2003). Thus,
the Commonwealth may prohibit cross burning with intent to intimi-
date, even though it fails to prohibit the burning of other objects,
because cross burning is significantly more likely to intimidate. Id. at
363.

Although it concluded that the core provisions of Code § 18.2-
423 were constitutional, the Supreme Court held that the prima facie
evidence provision of the statute was unconstitutional because it
“strips away the very reason why a State may ban cross burning” —
the intent to intimidate. Id. at 365. Using the language of the jury
instruction given in the case involving Black as the interpretation of
the prima facie evidence provision, the Supreme Court held that the
provision “as interpreted by the jury instruction” was unconstitution-
ally overbroad. Id. at 364.

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Black v. Common-
wealth, dismissed the case against Black, and remanded the Elliott
and O’Mara cases to this Court to determine whether the jury

ee 469
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instruction given in Black’s trial was the proper interpretation of the
prima facie evidence provision, whether the prima facie evidence
provision could be severed from the statute if a constitutional inter-
pretation could not be found, and the proper disposition of the cases
against Elliott and O’Mara. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 367-68.

IL. Analysis

A. Constitutionality of the Prima
Facie Evidence Provision

HH Code § 18.2-423, in effect at the time defendants committed
the offenses, provided:

It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the
intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn
or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a
highway or other public place . . .

Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence
of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.

A violation of this section is punishable as a Class 6 felony.

In Black v. Commonwealth, we held that the prima facie evidence
provision “sweeps within its ambit for arrest and prosecution, both
protected and unprotected speech.” 262 Va. at 778, 553 S.E.2d at
746. We based our holding directly on the language of the statute,
not the language of the jury instruction used at Black’s trial, because
the statute itself was the common thread among the three procedur-
ally and factually distinct cases.

Hl Although the Commonwealth suggests an alternate interpreta-
tion for the prima facie evidence provision,* we hold that the instruc-
tion given at Black’s trial properly interprets the prima facie evidence
provision of Code § 18.2-423. The instruction provided: “The burn-
ing of a cross, by itself, is sufficient evidence from which you may
infer the required intent.” Of course, no one jury instruction contains
all of the applicable law in a given case. The law applicable to the
case is contained in multiple instructions which, taken collectively,
give proper guidance to the jury. See Van Duyn v. Matthews, 181 Va.

* The Commonwealth argues that adding a statement to the instruction explaining to the
jury that prima facie evidence is rebuttable would properly interpret the statute and remove all
concerns regarding constitutionality.

256, 261, 24 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1943); Adamson v. Norfolk & Ports-
mouth Traction Co., 111 Va. 556, 561, 69 S.E. 1055, 1058 (1911).

Hl The subject instruction must be read in context with the gen-
eral instructions given in virtually every criminal jury trial in Virginia
concerning reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence, and the
credibility of witnesses. These additional instructions reflect general
principles of criminal law and procedure including that the defendant
is not required to produce any evidence, that the Commonwealth
bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on every ele-
ment of the offense, that the jury must give impartial consideration to
all the evidence presented, and that the jury must weigh the credibil-
ity of witnesses but may not arbitrarily disregard believable testi-
mony. Taken in context of the other instructions, the subject instruc-
tion concerning the prima facie evidence provision of Code § 18.2-
423 properly interprets the provision, but it does not save the provi-
sion from unconstitutionality.

HB In Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. at 777-78, 553 S.E.2d
at 745-46, we held that the statutory provision concerning prima
facie evidence of intent to intimidate affects both protected and
unprotected speech, and consequently, is overbroad. The plurality in
Virginia v. Black agreed:

The prima facie evidence provision permits a jury to convict in
every cross-burning case in which defendants exercise their
constitutional right not to put on a defense. And even where a
defendant like Black presents a defense, the prima facie evi-
dence provision makes it more likely that the jury will find an
intent to intimidate regardless of the particular facts of the
case. The provision permits the Commonwealth to arrest, pros-
ecute, and convict a person based solely on the fact of cross
burning itself.

It is apparent that the provision as so interpreted ‘‘ ‘would cre-
ate an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.’ The act
of burning a cross may mean that a person is engaging in con-
stitutionally proscribable intimidation. But that same act may
mean only that the person is engaged in core political speech.
The prima facie evidence provision in this statute blurs the line
between these two meanings of a burning cross. As interpreted
by the jury instruction, the provision chills constitutionally
protected political speech because of the possibility that a State
will prosecute — and potentially convict - somebody engaging

a 7
FC

only in lawful political speech at the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect.

538 U.S. at 365 (citations omitted). The plurality opinion in Virginia
v. Black properly noted that we “had the opportunity to expressly
disavow the jury instruction.” 538 U.S. at 364. We did not disavow
it then and we do not accept the invitation to do so now. Accord-
ingly, we affirm our prior holding that the prima facie evidence pro-
vision of Code § 18.2-423 is overbroad.

B. Severability of the Prima
Facie Evidence Provision

Elliott and O’Mara have argued that the unconstitutional prima
facie evidence provision cannot be severed from the remainder of the
statute and that, even if it is otherwise possible to sever the prima
facie evidence provision, the procedural history of these cases pre-
vents us from severing the provision on remand. We reject both
arguments.

1. Severability

Hl Code § 1-17.1, first enacted in 1986, provides that “[t]he pro-
visions of all statutes are severable unless (i) the statute specifically
provides that its provisions are not severable; or (ii) it is apparent
that two or more statutes or provisions must operate in accord with
one another.” Prior to the enactment of this statute, “[a]bsent a sev-
erability provision, a legislative act [was] presumed to be non-
severable.” Board of Sup. of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va.
128, 147, 216 S.E.2d 199, 214 (1975). Code § 1-17.1 changed that
rule and provided a rule of construction for the courts to apply to
interpret even statutes passed prior to 1986. If the General Assembly
intended for § 1-17.1 to apply only to statutes passed after 1986, it
could have included such language in the section. Instead, the statute
refers broadly to “[t]he provisions of statutes in this Code,” without
reference to dates of enactment.

HE Code § 18.2-423 does not fall within either of the excep-
tions to the rule of severability established in § 1-17.1. The cross
burning statute does not contain language stating that its parts are not
severable, nor is the prima facie evidence provision necessary to the
operation of the remainder of the statute. The fact that the provision
is not inextricably intertwined with the rest of the statute is illustrated

472 |
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by the fact that the cross burning statute, now codified at § 18.2-423,
existed for 16 years, from 1952 to 1968, without the prima facie
evidence provision. See Code § 18.1-365 (Supp. 1968). The statute
was and can be effective now in punishing intimidation without the
prima facie evidence provision. Therefore, we hold that the prima
facie evidence provision is severable.

2. Waiver of Severability

HM Elliott and O’Mara argue in this proceeding that the Com-
monwealth waived the issue of severability by failing to raise it prior
to the appeal to the United States Supreme Court. We disagree.

First, it would be incongruous to place the burden of raising sev-
erability on the Commonwealth in this case when neither Elliott nor
O’Mara relied specifically on the unconstitutionality of the prima
facie evidence provision prior to the Commonwealth’s appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. The Commonwealth properly
responded to the arguments raised by Elliott and O’Mara in their
briefs to this Court, which revolved around the unconstitutionality of
banning cross burning as a general matter.

A more elemental flaw in the waiver argument advanced
by Elliott and O’Mara is that it presumes that severability is an issue
that must be raised by one of the parties. Severability, as codified in
§ 1-17.1, is a rule for judicial construction of statutes. As such, the
possibility of severance cannot be waived by a party to a suit by
failure to raise it. Rather, it is the duty of the Court, faced with a
constitutional challenge to a statute, to consider sua sponte whether
an invalid portion of a statute may be severed to permit the contin-
ued operation of the constitutional portion of the statute. The Court
cannot be forced to accept a flawed construction of a statute or pre-
vented from saving a statute from invalidity simply because of an
oversight or tactical decision by one or both of the parties. For these
reasons, we hold that the prima facie evidence provision of Code
§ 18.2-423 is severable from the remainder of the statute.

C. Application of the Brandenburg Standard

HHI Because we held that Code § 18.2-423 was unconstitutional
for other reasons in Black v. Commonwealth, we found it unneces-
sary to address challenges to the constitutionality of the statute based
upon Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). Nonetheless, the
parties addressed Brandenburg issues before the United States
Supreme Court. The plurality opinion of the United States Supreme

es 473
a

Court is silent concerning Brandenburg; however, the language of
the opinion precludes any consideration of Brandenburg on remand.

The oft-cited case of Brandenburg v. Ohio involved a Ku Klux
Klan rally not unlike the facts presented in Black’s case. The United
States Supreme Court held that

the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.

395 USS. at 447.

Elliott and O’Mara argue that because we chose not to address
Brandenburg challenges in Black v. Commonwealth and the United
States Supreme Court plurality opinion in Virginia v. Black is silent
concerning Brandenburg, that we should consider such a challenge
on remand. We disagree.

Clearly, Brandenburg addresses First Amendment concerns.
Equally clearly, the United States Supreme Court plurality opinion in
Virginia v. Black held that “‘[a] ban on cross burning carried out with
the intent to intimidate is fully consistent with our holding in R.A.V.
and is proscribable under the First Amendment.” 538 U.S. at 363.
With the Brandenburg issues before the Supreme Court of the United
States, it is inconceivable that the Court could make such a clear
statement about cross burning with the intent to intimidate being
“proscribable under the First Amendment” if it had any concerns
about failure to meet the Brandenburg tests.

D. Constitutionality of § 18.2-423
under the Virginia Constitution

HM In Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. at 778 n.10, 553 S.E.2d
at 746 n.10, we declined to address claims that Code § 18.2-423 vio-
lates Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia. On remand, quot-
ing Robert v. City of Norfolk, 188 Va. 413, 420, 49 S.E.2d 697, 700
(1948), Elliott and O’Mara argue that the “Constitution of Virginia is
broader than that of the United States in providing that — ‘any citizen
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects.’ ”
Elliott and O’Mara accurately recite the statement from Robert; how-
ever, it is dictum. We take this opportunity to declare that Article I,
§ 12 of the Constitution of Virginia is coextensive with the free

es
————

speech provisions of the federal First Amendment. Consequently,
consistent with the plurality opinion of the United States Supreme
Court in Virginia v. Black, we hold that, after severance of the provi-
sion concerning prima facie evidence of intent, Code § 18.2-423 does
not violate the First Amendment or Article I, § 12 of the Constitution
of Virginia.

E. Disposition of Elliott and O’Mara’s Convictions

HE In the trial court, Elliott was tried by a jury; however, no
jury instruction involving the prima facie evidence provision was
given. In the trial court, O’Mara pled guilty, reserving his right to
challenge the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-423 on appeal. In its
remand, the Supreme Court of the United States “[left] open the pos-
sibility that . . . Elliott and O’Mara could be retried under § 18.2-
423.” 538 U.S. at 367. Elliott and O’Mara argue that retrial would
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is not
necessary to address their concerns regarding retrial because we hold
that retrial is not required under the procedural postures of these
cases.

Elliott was convicted by a jury that did not receive an instruction
regarding the prima facie evidence provisions. He was convicted by
the jury as if the provision was not in the statute. He cannot be heard
to complain about the unconstitutionality of a provision of the stat-
ute, found severable, that played no part in his trial.

O’Mara’s plea agreement in the trial court recites in part:

Pursuant to Section 19.2-254 of the Code of Virginia, the
Commonwealth consents to allowing the defendant to plead
guilty to both charges, conditioned upon the reservation of
right to appeal the ruling . . . regarding the constitutionality of
Section 18.2-423 of the Code of Virginia. If the defendant
prevails at the conclusion of the appeal process, he shall be
allowed to withdraw his plea.

Additionally, a written Stipulation of Facts was signed by O’Mara,
his counsel, and the attorney for the Commonwealth that stated:

On May 2, 1998, David Targee had approximately fifteen indi-
viduals, including Jonathan O’Mara and Richard Elliott, at his
residence in Virginia Beach. They were all consuming alcohol.
Elliott complained to Targee and O’Mara about his neighbor
and about how he wanted to “‘get back” at him. It was sug-

ee 475
a

gested (not by O’Mara) that they burn a cross in Elliott’s
neighbor’s yard. O’Mara and Targee agreed, and they all went
to Targee’s garage where a cross was built. They all got in
Targee’s truck and drove to Munden Point Road in Virginia
Beach. Targee was driving, with O’Mara in the front passenger
seat and Elliott in the back seat. Once there, Elliott handed the
cross to O’Mara, who also grabbed a can of lighter fluid and
went outside and placed the cross in the yard of Elliott’s
neighbor. He then poured lighter fluid on the cross, set it on
fire, and ran back to the car. Targee drove them back to his
house. The next morning, Elliott’s neighbor, James Jubilee,
came out of his house and observed the partially burned cross
in his yard. He broke the cross and placed [it] in the garage.
He later called the police.

Lastly, on the form entitled “Questions Asked the Defendant Before
the Court Accepts a Plea of Guilty,” O’Mara answered “yes” to the
written question, “Are you entering the plea of guilty because you
are, in fact, guilty of the crime(s) charged?”

HH On appeal to this Court from the trial court, O’Mara never
argued that the prima facie evidence provision of the statute rendered
the statute unconstitutional. His claim of unconstitutionality was
based upon arguments related to the R.A.V. case and the Brandenburg
case. The prima facie evidence provision clearly played no part in his
plea agreement and no part in his appeal to this Court. O’Mara has
waived any claim of error based upon the unconstitutionality of the
prima facie evidence provision. Rule 5:25.

Finally, in our order of August 29, 2003, we directed the parties
to address certain issues on remand from the United States Supreme
Court. One of those issues concerning the prima facie evidence pro-
vision was:

If the final sentence is not amenable to an interpretation that
would render it constitutional, but it is severable, could Rich-
ard J. Elliott and/or Jonathan O’Mara be retried under § 18.2-
423? More specifically, should the Court order (a) that Elliott’s
and/or O’Mara’s convictions stand with no right to retrial, (b)
that Elliott’s and/or O’Mara’s convictions are vacated, but the
Commonwealth may retry either or both appellants, or (c) that
Elliott and/or O’Mara’s convictions are vacated, but the Com-
monwealth may not retry either or both defendants?

476 ee
|

In response, O’Mara only argued that his conviction should be
vacated and that he should not be retried. We note that O’Mara does
not assert that he has the right to withdraw his guilty plea. Further,
we note that O’Mara has not prevailed on any issue he raised on
appeal.

If. Conclusion

THM For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the prima
facie evidence provision of Code § 18.2-423 is unconstitutionally
overbroad under the First Amendment and Article I, § 12 of the Con-
stitution of Virginia. We hold that the statute is severable and that the
core provisions of the statute that remain do not violate the First
Amendment or Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Virginia. There
is no need to order retrials; consequently, the convictions of Richard
J. Elliott and Jonathan S. O’Mara will be affirmed.

Affirmed.

| 471
|

JessICcA WYNN SPERO AND ELLA MADISON SPERO,
AN INFANT WHO SUES BY JESSICA WYNN SPERO,
HER MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND

Vv.

Davip Topp HEATH
Record No. 030495
March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

478

William G. Shields (James A. Eichner; Shields & Associates, on
brief), for appellant.

John H. Click, Jr. (Blackburn, Conte, Schilling & Click, on brief),
for appellee.

JUSTICE LEMONS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether a trial court erred in deter-
mining that a name change was in the best interest of a child, when
the child bore the mother’s surname and the natural father petitioned
the court to change the child’s surname to the father’s.

Ella Madison Spero (“Ella”), born October 30, 2001, is the
daughter of David Todd Heath (“Heath”) and Jessica Wynn Spero
(“Spero”). Heath and Spero were never married and ended their

| 479
a

relationship in 2001, before Ella’s birth. Also before Ella’s birth,
Spero told Heath that he was not Ella’s father. Consequently, Ella
received the surname “Spero.” A paternity test, completed in Janu-
ary 2002, confirmed that Ella was Heath’s child.

Heath filed a petition to change Ella’s surname. At the hearing on
the petition, Heath and Spero contradicted one another concerning
the amount, type, and quality of support provided by Heath for Ella’s
care. Spero alleged that Heath was a drug dealer and was planning to
move to Amsterdam, which Heath denied. Heath produced evidence
that Spero had been convicted of “driving under the influence of
alcohol within one year” of Ella’s birth. Finally, both Heath’s and
Spero’s mothers testified about the effect, as they experienced it, of
having a different surname than their children.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found “that it is
in the best interest of the child that she have the last name of the
petitioner, David Todd Heath.” Spero filed a motion to reconsider.
The trial court heard argument on the motion but reaffirmed the prior
judgment changing Ella’s surname to “Heath.” The trial court sus-
pended “the effect” of the order until resolution of the expected
appeal to this Court. Spero appeals the adverse judgment of the trial
court.

I We will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
the respondent, Heath, the prevailing party below. In Virginia, Code
§ 8.01-217 delineates the method for changing the name of a minor.
It requires that the person seeking the name change “apply . . . to the
circuit court of the county or city in which the person whose name is
to be changed resides.” It further requires reasonable notice to the
parent who does not seek the name change and a hearing to deter-
mine whether the name change is in the best interest of the minor.
Code § 8.01-217.

HM The parent petitioning to change the surname of the minor
bears the burden of proving that the change is in the minor’s best
interest. See May v. Grandy, 259 Va. 629, 632, 528 S.E.2d 105, 106
(2000); Rowland v. Shurbutt, 259 Va. 305, 308, 525 S.E.2d 917, 919
(2000); Beyah v. Shelton, 231 Va. 432, 434, 344 S.E.2d 909, 911
(1986); Flowers v. Cain, 218 Va. 234, 237, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113
(1977). The petitioning parent may prove that the name change is in
the best interest of the minor by showing that:

1) The parent sharing his or her surname with the minor has
“abandoned the natural ties ordinarily existing between par-
ent and child,”

480 a
Pe

2) The parent sharing his or her surname with the minor “has
engaged in misconduct sufficient to embarrass the [minor] in
the continued use” of the parent’s name,

3) The minor “otherwise will suffer substantial detriment” by
bearing the surname he or she currently bears, or

4) The minor “is of sufficient age and discretion to make an
intelligent choice and . . . desires that [his or her] name be
changed.”

See, e.g., Flowers, 218 Va. at 236-37, 237 S.E.2d at 113. A “change
of name will not be authorized . . . merely to save . . . minor incon-
venience or embarrassment” to the parent or the minor. Jd. at 237,
237 S.E.2d at 113.

HM Although our previous cases often use gender specific terms
in enunciating the test for determining whether a name change is in
the best interest of a child, that language should not be read to mean
that there is a presumption that a child should have the father’s sur-
name or that the mother always bears the burden of proof for or
against a petition for name change. Nothing in the language of the
statute suggests such a presumption. Under the statute, a petition for
changing a child’s name must be considered on the particular facts of
the case before the court. The burden is upon the petitioning party to
“prove by satisfactory evidence that the change is in the child’s best
interest.” Rowland, 259 Va. at 308, 525 S.E.2d at 919; May, 259 Va.
at 632, 528 S.E.2d at 106.

HMM In this case, Heath, the parent petitioning to change Ella’s
surname, did not offer evidence tending to show any of the criteria
required by Flowers. Spero’s DUI conviction within a year of Ella’s
birth does not rise to the level of misconduct sufficient to embarrass
the child in the continued use of the parent’s surname. The record
does not reflect that Ella will suffer any form of detriment by contin-
uing to use the surname “Spero.” The record does not reflect that
Spero has failed to care for Ella, nor that she has engaged in miscon-
duct sufficient to embarrass Ella in the continued use of the surname
“Spero.” The testimony of Ella’s grandmothers fails to rise beyond a
catalogue of minor inconveniences and embarrassment. Based on the
record before us, Heath has not satisfied his burden of proof as the
petitioning parent because he has not offered sufficient evidence to
show that a name change is in Ella’s best interest.

We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the
change in Ella’s surname. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment

of the trial court. The trial court’s order of December 12, 2002 will
be vacated and the petition for name change will be dismissed.

Reversed, vacated, and dismissed.

BILL BECK, ET AL.
Vv.

GORDON SHELTON, ET AL.
Record No. 030723

March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

|
roe)
+t

485

Howard H. Stahl (Steven K. Davidson; John FE. O’Connor;
Michael J. Baratz; Steptoe & Johnson, on briefs), for appellants.

David Zachary Kaufman (Michael Barnsback; Kaufman Law;
Dimuro, Ginsburg & Mook, on brief), for appellees.

Amicus Curiae: Virginia Municipal League and The Virginia
Association of Counties (Howard W. Dobbins; Elizabeth Mason
Horsley; Williams Mullen, on brief), in support of appellants.

Amicus Curiae: American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc.
(Rebecca K. Glenberg, on brief), in support of appellants.

Amicus Curiae: Virginia Coalition for Open Government (J. Jack
Kennedy, Jr.; Harry Hammitt, Megan H. Rhyne, on brief), in support
of appellants.

JUSTICE LEMONS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider several issues relating to The Virginia
Freedom of Information Act (““FOIA” or the “Act’’), Code §§ 2.2-
3700 to -3714, including: 1) whether “members-elect” are “mem-
bers” of a public body for the purpose of application of FOIA; 2)
whether the use of electronic mail (“e-mail”) for communication
between three or more members of a public body constitutes a
“meeting” for the purposes of FOIA; and, 3) whether a particular
gathering of citizens attended by three members of the Fredericks-
burg City Council constituted a “meeting” under the Act.

486 Le
a

Facts and Proceedings Below

Gordon Shelton, Anthony Jenkins, and Patrick J. Timpone (col-
lectively, ““Shelton’’) filed an 18-count petition for writ of mandamus
and injunction against William M. Beck, Mayor of the City of Fred-
ericksburg; W. Scott Howson III, Vice-Mayor of the City of Freder-
icksburg; and three Councilmen, Thomas P. Fortune, William C.
Withers, Jr., and Matthew J. Kelly’ (collectively, “Defendants” or
“Beck”’). While citing multiple incidents of alleged violations of
FOIA, the gravamen of the complaint was that Defendants “‘deliber-
ately e-mailed each other in a knowing, willful and deliberate attempt
to hold secret meetings, avoid public scrutiny” and “discuss City
business and decide City issues without the input of all the council
members and the public.” Shelton asserted that various exchanges of
e-mail, face-to-face meetings, and one public gathering on the streets
of Fredericksburg constituted “meetings” under FOIA for which
there was no notice pursuant to Code § 2.2-3707 and no emergency
or other exception which would relieve the Defendants from the obli-
gations imposed upon them concerning public meetings.

Defendants prevailed on demurrers or at trial on fourteen of the
eighteen counts and Shelton voluntarily dismissed three other counts
before trial.? The trial court held that the Act did not apply to con-
duct of members-elect of the Fredericksburg City Council, that cer-
tain e-mail communications did constitute a ‘“‘meeting” as defined in
FOIA, and that a particular gathering of citizens and council mem-
bers, the Charlotte Street gathering, was not a “‘meeting” under the
Act. While holding that Defendants violated the open meeting provi-
sions of FOIA, the trial court found that the violations were not
“willful or knowing,” declined to impose any penalty, and declined
Shelton’s motion for attorney’s fees. The final order was silent
regarding Shelton’s request for a writ of mandamus or injunctive
telief. Beck appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court and
Shelton assigns cross-error.

Application of FOIA to “Members-elect”

In Counts I — IX of his petition, Shelton alleged various viola-
tions of FOIA by face-to-face meetings and e-mail communications
between Mayor Beck, Vice Mayor Howson, and then council mem-
bers-elect Kelly, Fortune, and Withers. Kelly, Fortune, and Withers

' Fortune and Withers are not appellants herein.
2 Only Counts I — IX, XI, XIV, and XVII are specifically before us on appeal.

Le 487
as

did not become council members until they took their respective
oaths of office and began their respective terms on July 1, 2002.
Under the facts of this case, pursuant to Code § 2.2-3701, an infor-
mal assemblage of three members may trigger the application of the
open meeting requirements of FOIA.> In these counts, Shelton
alleges “‘meetings” between two members of council and three mem-
bers-elect. Defendants demurred to Counts I — IX, asserting that as a
matter of law the application of FOIA does not extend to members-
elect of a public body. If FOIA does not apply to members-elect,
then only two members are alleged to have met and the threshold
requirement of an assemblage of three members was not met. The
trial court agreed and sustained the demurrers.

In support of his assignment of cross-error, Shelton argues that
the definition of “public body” specifically contemplates that “pri-
vate sector or citizen members” may be included as a part of a pub-
lic body, that members-elect have a “statutory obligation to become
familiar with the requirements of the Act,” and that the provisions of
FOIA are to be “liberally construed.” For these reasons, Shelton
maintains that the provisions of FOIA are applicable to conduct of a
member-elect as if she were a member of the public body.

HH Under Code § 2.2-3701, the definition of “public body” is
extended to

(ii) any committee, subcommittee, or other entity however des-
ignated, of the public body created to perform delegated func-
tions of the public body or to advise the public body. It shall
not exclude any such committee, subcommittee or entity
because it has private sector or citizen members.

This provision simply includes committees, subcommittees, or enti-
ties within the types of public bodies covered by FOIA, irrespective
of participation by private sector or citizen members. It does not
expand the meaning of “members” in the definition of “meetings”
also contained in Code § 2.2-3701. Furthermore, the City Council
does not have private sector or citizen members and did not use a
committee or subcommittee structure. The full body or a quorum of

3 The definition of “meeting” in Code § 2.2-3701 would apply to a quorum, if less than
three. Four members represent a quorum of the City Council; consequently, under the circum-
stances of this case, a meeting of at least three members is required before FOLA open meeting
requirements are implicated,

the City Council cannot logically be presumed to be a committee or
subcommittee of itself.

Hl Additionally, it is true that members-elect are to familiarize
themselves with the provisions of FOIA after they are elected and
before they take office.

Any person elected, reelected, appointed or reappointed to any
body not excepted from this chapter shall (i) be furnished by
the public body’s administrator or legal counsel with a copy of
this chapter within two weeks following election, reelection,
appointment or reappointment and (ii) read and become famil-
iar with the provisions of this chapter.

Code § 2.2-3702. However, nothing in this statutory provision alters
the application of FOIA or modifies the meaning of “members” in
Code § 2.2-3701.

HM Finally, Shelton argues that the statutory admonition of
“Tiberal construction” found in the policy statement of Code § 2.2-
3700(B) justifies extending the term “members” in Code § 2.2-3701
to include “‘members-elect.” We do not believe that the legislature
was inviting the judiciary, under the guise of “liberal construction,”
to rewrite the provisions of FOIA as we deem proper or advisable.
To the contrary,

[w]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we
are bound by the plain meaning of that statutory language.
Thus, when the General Assembly has used words that have a
plain meaning, courts cannot give those words a construction
that amounts to holding that the General Assembly meant
something other than that which it actually expressed.

Lee County v. Town of St. Charles, 264 Va. 344, 348, 568 S.E.2d
680, 682 (2002) (citations omitted).

HI We will not rewrite Code § 2.2-3701 to change the word
“members” to the phrase “members or members-elect.” It is not our
prerogative. If the legislature chooses to do so, it is properly within
its power to do so. The trial court did not err in holding that the open
meeting provisions of FOIA did not apply to meetings of members of
a public body that reach the required threshold of participants under
Code § 2.2-3701 only by inclusion of members-elect.

E-mail Communications

It is not disputed that on several occasions after July 1, 2002,
more than three members of City Council corresponded with each
other concerning specific items of public business by use of e-mail.
It would serve no useful purpose to relate the particular subjects of
the communications because the issue before us involves the method
of communication. Succinctly stated, assuming all other statutory
requirements are met, does the exchange of e-mails between mem-
bers of a public body constitute a “meeting” subject to the provi-
sions of FOIA? Beck assigns error to the trial court’s holding that it
does.*

Indisputably, the use of computers for textual communication has
become commonplace around the world. It can involve communica-
tion that is functionally similar to a letter sent by ordinary mail, cou-
rier, or facsimile transmission. In this respect, there may be signifi-
cant delay before the communication is received and additional delay
in response. However, computers can be utilized to exchange text in
the nature of a discussion, potentially involving multiple participants,
in what are euphemistically called “chat rooms” or by “instant mes-
saging.” In these forms, computer generated communication is virtu-
ally simultaneous.

Hl in the case before us, the e-mail communications did not
involve virtually simultaneous interaction. Rather, the e-mail commu-
nications at issue in this case were more like traditional letters sent
by ordinary mail, courier, or facsimile. The record contains printed
copies of the e-mails in question. The shortest interval between send-
ing a particular e-mail and receiving a response was more than four
hours. The longest interval was well over two days.

HM The trial court held that such use of e-mail constituted a
“meeting” pursuant to Code § 2.2-3702 and that Defendants held
such meetings in private, without notice to the public and without
opportunity for the public to attend in violation of the open meeting
requirements of Code § 2.2-3707. The trial court held that the issue
was not the electronic nature of the transmission; rather, “It is how
the e-mail is used.” While we agree with the trial court that “how
the e-mail is used” is the dispositive consideration, we disagree that

‘ Shelton raises for the first time on appeal that a vote was taken by e-mail. Nothing in the
record supports such an allegation and furthermore it is barred from consideration under Rule
5:25.

this case presents circumstances constituting a “meeting” for the
purposes of FOIA.

HE FOIA deals with public access to records and meetings of
public bodies. There is no question that e-mails fall within the defini-
tion of public records under Code § 2.2-3701. As previously stated,
the issue in this case is whether the exchange of e-mail also consti-
tutes a “meeting” under FOIA. Code § 2.2-3708 provides that

[ilt shall be a violation of this chapter for any political subdivi-
sion or any governing body . . . to conduct a meeting wherein
the public business is discussed or transacted through tele-
phonic, video, electronic or other communication means where
the members are not physically assembled.

By definition, a violation under § 2.2-3708 presumes a “meeting” as
defined in FOIA. Code § 2.2-3701 provides in part:

“Meeting” or “meetings” means the meetings including work
sessions, when sitting physically, or through telephonic or
video equipment pursuant to § 2.2-3708, as a body or entity, or
as an informal assemblage of (i) as many as three members or
(ii) a quorum, if less than three, of the constituent membership,
wherever held, with or without minutes being taken, whether
or not votes are cast, of any public body. The gathering of
employees of a public body shall not be deemed a “meeting”
subject to the provisions of this chapter.

HE Clearly, the conduct in question did not involve “sitting
physically” in a “‘work session.” Consequently, the key to resolving
the question before us is whether there was an “assemblage.” The
term “assemble” means “‘to bring together” and comes from the
Latin simul, meaning “together, at the same time.’ Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 131 (1993). The term inherently entails
the quality of simultaneity. While such simultaneity may be present
when e-mail technology is used in a “chat room” or as “instant mes-
saging,”> it is not present when e-mail is used as the functional
equivalent of letter communication by ordinary mail, courier, or fac-
simile transmission. The General Assembly anticipated this type of
communication when it provided:

5 This issue is not before us and we do not decide it today.

nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit (i) sep-
arately contacting the membership, or any part thereof, of any
public body for the purpose of ascertaining a member’s posi-
tion with respect to the transaction of public business, whether
such contact is done in person, by telephone or by electronic
communication, provided the contact is done on a basis that
does not constitute a meeting as defined in this chapter .. .

Code § 2.2-3710(B). Under the terms of this provision, it is antici-
pated that some electronic communication may constitute a “‘meet-
ing” and some may not. As previously stated, the key difference
between permitted use of electronic communication, such as e-mail,
outside the notice and open meeting requirements of FOIA, and those
that constitute a “meeting” under FOIA, is the feature of simultane-
ity inherent in the term “assemblage.”

HM The Attorney General of Virginia has had occasion to render
an opinion on this subject. 1999 Op. Atty. Gen. 12. The question
presented to the Attorney General was “whether § 2.1-343.1(A), a
portion of The Virginia Freedom of Information Act, §§ 2.1-340
through 2.1-346.1 of the Code of Virginia, prohibits an elected mem-
ber of a local governing body from sending electronic mail commu-
nications to three or more other members of the governing body.”
Id. The Attorney General did not consider the dynamics presented in
“chat rooms” or “instant messaging,” but did consider the precise
use of e-mail at issue in this case. For the purposes of the Opinion,
the Attorney General used the following definition:

Electronic mail is commonly understood to be the electronic
transmission of keyboard-entered correspondence over commu-
nication networks. An electronic mail system enables the
sender to compose and transmit a message to a recipient’s
electronic mailbox, where the message is stored until the recip-
ient retrieves it. The message may be sent to several recipients
at the same time.

Id. at 13. Concluding that “[t]ransmitting messages through an elec-
tronic mail system is essentially a form of written communication,”

6 The question was premised upon FOIA prior to its recodification in Title 2.2 of the Code
of Virginia. The language involved is substantially the same in the recodification. See Code
§§ 2.1-340 to -346.1 (1968).

the Attorney General opined that such communication does not con-
stitute a “meeting” under FOIA. Id.

HM While it is not binding on this Court, an Opinion of the
Attorney General is “entitled to due consideration.” Twietmeyer v.
City of Hampton, 255 Va. 387, 393, 497 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1998).
This is particularly so when the General Assembly has known of the
Attorney General’s Opinion, in this case for five years, and has done
nothing to change it. “The legislature is presumed to have had
knowledge of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statutes,
and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative
acquiescence in the Attorney General’s view.” Browning-Ferris, Inc.
y. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62, 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06
(1983).

HB We hold that the trial court erred in its determination that the
e-mail communications at issue in this case constituted a “meeting”
under FOIA. Count XI of Shelton’s petition must fail because it is
premised upon e-mail communications constituting a meeting under
FOIA.

E-mails Concerning Historic Preservation

In Count XIV of Shelton’s petition, it is alleged that a “meeting”
took place by e-mail communication between at least three members
of City Council. The trial court granted summary judgment to
Defendants, holding that the alleged meeting was for information
purposes only and was not for the purpose of discussing public busi-
ness. Shelton assigns cross-error to the trial court’s holding. Shelton
argues that the trial court too narrowly construed what it means to
“discuss” the public’s business. It is unnecessary to address this
assignment of cross-error because we have held that the e-mail com-
munications at issue in this case do not constitute a “meeting” under
FOIA.

The Charlotte Street Gathering

In July 2002, citizens living near the intersection of Charlotte
and Weedon Streets in the City of Fredericksburg were concerned
about the lack of a stop sign at the intersection and other issues
related to traffic safety. Two city employees and three members of
City Council were separately invited by concerned citizens to attend
a gathering at the intersection in the middle of the day on July 25,
2002. Approximately 20 people were in attendance. After hearing

testimony and the arguments of counsel, the trial court found as a
matter of fact that the gathering was

scheduled as a consequence of citizen inquiry; that the meet-
ing’s purpose, in essence, was an informational forum in refer-
ence to traffic issues in a given neighborhood or on a specific
street; that the three members of Council who appeared did
not, according to the testimony which is uncontradicted, . . .
discuss anything with each other as a group of three or
otherwise.

On appeal, Shelton maintains that such a gathering was a
“meeting” under the terms of FOIA. We disagree. The public policy
of the Commonwealth “ensures the people of the Commonwealth
ready access to public records in the custody of a public body or its
officers and employees, and free entry to meetings of public bodies
wherein the business of the people is being conducted.” Code § 2.2-
3700(B). But FOIA “shall not be construed to discourage the free
discussion by government officials or employees of public matters
with the citizens of the Commonwealth.” Id. Obviously, the balance
between these values must be considered on a case-by-case basis
according the facts presented. Here, FOIA gives additional guidance:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the gath-
ering or attendance of two or more members of a public body
(i) at any place or function where no part of the purpose of
such gathering or attendance is the discussion or transaction of
any public business, and such gathering or attendance was not
called or prearranged with any purpose of discussing or trans-
acting any business of the public body or (ii) at a public
forum, candidate appearance, or debate, the purpose of which
is to inform the electorate and not to transact public business
or to hold discussions relating to the transaction of public busi-
ness, even though the performance of the members individu-
ally or collectively in the conduct of public business may be a
topic of discussion or debate at such public meeting.

Code § 2.2-3707(G).

HB The trial court was not plainly wrong or without evidence to
support its judgment that the Charlotte Street gathering was a citizen-
organized “‘informational forum” and that no part of the purpose of
the gathering or attendance was the discussion or transaction of any

494 fe
PF

public business. The undisputed evidence at trial was that City Coun-
cil did not have any business pending before it on the issue of traffic
controls, nor was it likely to have such matters come before it in the
future. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to
Defendants on Count XVII.

Conclusion

HB The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for
Defendants on Counts I — IX of Shelton’s petition. These counts
were premised upon FOIA being applicable to members-elect of a
public body. Members-elect are not “members” under the plain lan-
guage of Code § 2.2-3701. Count XI of Shelton’s petition is premised
upon e-mail communications constituting a “‘meeting” under FOIA.
Under the facts of this case, such e-mail communications did not
constitute a “meeting” under FOIA, and the trial court erred in hold-
ing that they did. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Count XIV on the basis that the e-mails were
for informational purposes and did not constitute a meeting. We need
not address this reason for the trial court’s holding because we have
already concluded that e-mail communications in this case did not
constitute a “meeting” under FOIA. Finally, the trial court did not
err in holding that the Charlotte Street gathering was not a ‘“‘meet-
ing” under FOIA. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment with
respect to Counts I - IX and XVII. We will affirm the trial court’s
judgment with respect to Count XIV, albeit for different reasons. We
will reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to Count XI. Hav-
ing disposed of all matters, and nothing remaining for the trial court
to consider, we will enter final judgment for Defendants.

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and final judgment.

a 495
PC

DONALD L. SHIPMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE, ET AL.
v.

FREDERICK R. KRUCK, JR., EsQ.
Record No, 030500
March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

as

ae
n

Mary Mertz Parnell (David E. Sher; Sher, Cummings and Ellis,
on briefs), for appellants.

Danny M. Howell (Paige A. Levy; Sands, Anderson, Marks &
Miller, on brief), for appellee.

a 499
Fe

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The determinative issue in this appeal is when the appellants’
cause of action for legal malpractice accrued for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On January 16, 1998, Donald L. Shipman and his wife, Kym L.
Shipman (collectively, “the Shipmans’’) hired Frederick H. Kruck,
Jr. (“Kruck”) to defend them in an action brought by one of the
Shipmans’ creditors. The Shipmans informed Kruck that shielding
their residence from the collection efforts of creditors was their pri-
mary objective. The Shipmans also informed Kruck that the resi-
dence was held in trust under a 1984 Declaration of Trust (“the
Trust”). The Shipmans gave Kruck an unsigned and undated copy of
the Declaration of Trust, reflecting Mr. Shipman was the Trust’s trus-
tee holding the trust property for the benefit of Mrs. Shipman and
their children. The Shipmans had conveyed their residence by deed
to Mr. Shipman as Trustee under the Trust.!

On March 9, 1998, Kruck filed a joint Chapter 7 petition on
behalf of the Shipmans in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. The Shipmans agreed to the bankruptcy
filing based on Kruck’s advice.

Kruck represented the Shipmans in the initial stages of the bank-
tuptcy proceedings, but certain of the Shipmans’ creditors and the
Bankruptcy Trustee asserted the Trust was revocable and therefore
the Trust’s assets were nonexempt property of the Shipmans’ bank-
tuptcy estate subject to sale and administration by the Bankruptcy
Trustee. On January 19, 1999, Kruck withdrew as the Shipmans’
counsel and advised them that he would be more valuable as a wit-
ness in the bankruptcy proceedings concerning the Trust. The Ship-
mans promptly hired new counsel to represent them in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings.”

During the subsequent bankruptcy proceedings Kruck testified
that he erroneously assessed the trust documents as establishing an
irrevocable trust when he advised the Shipmans to file bankruptcy.
On March 8, 2000, the bankruptcy court entered an order declaring

' By an examination of land title records, Kruck verified the real estate conveyances to the
trust, but found no copy of the trust document on record.

2 The parties disagree as to whether new counsel was hired explicitly to cure Kruck’s negli-
gence. Our resolution of this case does not depend on why, or even if, the Shipmans hired new
counsel.

the Trust to be a revocable trust and authorizing the Bankruptcy
Trustee to sell the Shipmans’ residence as an asset of the bankruptcy
estate for the payment of the Shipmans’ creditors. To prevent their
residence from being sold to a third party, the Shipmans purchased
the residence for $427,000 from the Bankruptcy Trustee on June 29,
2001.

On January 8, 2002, the Shipmans filed a motion for judgment
against Kruck in the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria alleging
counts for negligence, breach of contract, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. They asserted that Kruck was negligent in failing
to advise them that the Trust was revocable and could be revoked by
the Bankruptcy Trustee if they filed for bankruptcy. Kruck filed a
demurrer and plea in bar alleging the Shipmans lacked standing to
bring their suit because any claims they might have belonged to the
bankruptcy estate and must be asserted by the Bankruptcy Trustee.
Before argument on Kruck’s demurrer and plea in bar the Shipmans
requested a nonsuit which the trial court granted on March 12, 2002.

The Shipmans then requested and received an order from the
bankruptcy court abandoning any interest in an action for malpractice
against Kruck as part of the bankruptcy estate. Armed with the aban-
donment order, the Shipmans filed a new motion for judgment
against Kruck on September 11, 2002, in which they renewed the
counts for negligence and breach of contract. Kruck filed another
demurrer and plea in bar alleging that the Shipmans’ action was
barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to breach of
an oral contract. He asserted that the limitations period expired on
January 19, 2002, three years after Kruck’s representation of the
Shipmans terminated.

The trial court determined that because the action was based
upon an oral contract, the applicable statute of limitations period was
three years. The trial court further held that the Shipmans’ cause of
action accrued when Kruck’s representation of the Shipmans termi-
nated on January 19, 1999, and that filing the nonsuit did not toll the
running of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the trial court sus-
tained Kruck’s plea in bar>

The Shipmans filed a motion for reconsideration alleging a writ-
ten contract existed (and thus the correct limitations period was five
years) and that their legal malpractice claim did not accrue until there

> The trial court did not rule on Kruck’s demurrer and the Shipmans did not assign error to
the trial court’s ruling on the effect of the nonsuit.

a 501
FC

was payment on a judgment creating damages. The trial court denied
the motion, ruling the Shipmans failed to prove the existence of a
written contract and that, in any event, it was not pled. With regard
to the accrual issue, the trial court held that the Shipmans’ cause of
action accrued “when counsel was retained and paid,” referring to
the counsel substituted for Kruck.

On appeal, the Shipmans assert two assignments of error. First,
they contend the trial court erred in granting Kruck’s plea in bar and
denying their motion for reconsideration because their action was
filed within the applicable three year limitations period.* Second,
they assert the trial court erred in holding that their cause of action
accrued when Kruck’s representation of them ended and new counsel
was retained and paid because there was no evidence in the record as
to when new counsel was paid.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HH “A cause of action for legal malpractice requires the exis-
tence of an attorney-client relationship which gave rise to a duty,
breach of that duty by the defendant attorney, and that the damages
claimed by the plaintiff client must have been proximately caused by
the defendant attorney’s breach.” Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Wolz
and Kelly, 264 Va. 310, 313, 568 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2002). The statute
of limitations for legal malpractice actions is the same as those for
breach of contract because although legal malpractice actions sound
in tort, it is the contract that gives rise to the duty. MacLellan v.
Throckmorton, 235 Va. 341, 343, 367 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1988);
Oleyar v. Kerr, 217 Va. 88, 90, 225 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1976)); see
also Code § 8.01-246 (setting forth the limitations periods for breach
of contract actions).

Ol. ANALYSIS

The parties agree the alleged negligent act, the breach of Kruck’s
duty to the Shipmans, occurred when the bankruptcy petition was
filed on March 9, 1998. The parties differ, however, in affixing the
date when the statute of limitations on the Shipmans’ legal malprac-
tice action accrued.

HH Code § 8.01-230 states, in pertinent part, that “[iJn every
action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the right of action

4 No assignment of error was made to the trial court's ruling that the five year statute of
limitations applicable to written contracts did not apply. The parties now agree the applicable
statute of limitations is three years, the period applicable to oral contracts.

shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall
begin to run . . . when the breach of contract occurs in actions ex
contractu and not when the resulting damage is discovered.” We
have previously stated that “[a] right of action is a remedial right to
presently enforce a cause of action.” Stone v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 232
Va. 365, 368, 350 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1986). Although a cause of
action and a right of action may accrue simultaneously, a right of
action cannot arise until a cause of action exists. Id.

The Shipmans contend that until the bankruptcy court finally
adjudicated the Trust to be revocable and therefore a nonexempt part
of the Shipmans’ bankruptcy estate, they had no cause of action (and
thus no right of action) against Kruck. This is so, the Shipmans con-
tend, because until that point in time they had no injury or damages
— an essential element of a legal malpractice cause of action. Alterna-
tively, citing Allied Productions v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 232
S.E.2d 774 (1977), the Shipmans argue there could be no damages
until there was payment on an underlying judgment under the so-
called “payment rule.” The Shipmans contend the “payment” did
not occur, and the limitations period did not begin to run, until June
29, 2001, when they purchased their residence from the Bankruptcy
Trustee to prevent its sale.

Kruck asserts the statute of limitations began to run when the
bankruptcy petition was filed, subject to the “continuous representa-
tion rule” set forth in Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 352 S.E.2d 327
(1987).

A. DETERMINATION OF INJURY

I The parties agree that Kruck breached his duty to the Ship-
mans on March 9, 1998, when the bankruptcy petition was filed. The
issue in controversy is whether on that date, or at a later time, the
Shipmans sustained injury or damage sufficient to constitute a cause
of action.

HM We have stated on more than one occasion that “[d]amage
is an essential element of a cause of action. Without some injury or
damage, however slight, a cause of action cannot accrue.” Keller,
232 Va. at 520, 352 S.E.2d at 332; see Stone, 232 Va. at 365, 368-69,
350 S.E.2d at 631-32; accord First Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225
Va. 72, 82, 301 S.E.2d 8, 13-14 (1983); Locke v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 221 Va. 951, 957, 275 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1981); Caudill v. Wise
Rambler, 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969). “In the
absence of any injury or damage, there is no cause of action.” Rut-

P| 503
PC

ter, 254 Va. at 313, 568 S.E.2d at 695. Moreover, we have said that
it is immaterial whether all the damages resulting from the negligent
act were sustained at the time that act occurred. The running of the
limitations period will not be tolled by the fact that the actual or
substantial damages did not occur until a later date. Stone, 232 Va. at
369, 350 S.E.2d at 632; Housing Authority v. Laburnum Corp., 195
Va. 827, 839, 80 S.E.2d 574, 581 (1954)).
i In Virginia,

[w]e have followed the general rule that the applicable period
of limitation begins to run from the moment the cause of
action arises rather than from the time of discovery of injury
or damage, and we have said that difficulty in ascertaining the
existence of a cause of action is irrelevant.

Virginia Military Institute v. King, 217 Va. 751, 759, 232 S.E.2d 895,
900 (1977) (hereinafter “VMI’”) (citing Laburnum, 195 Va. at 838,
80 S.E.2d at 580-81). In VMI we commented that this rule may pro-
duce inequities by triggering a statute of limitations “when the injury
or damage is unknown or difficult or even incapable of discovery
....” Id, at 760, 232 S.E.2d at 900. Nevertheless, we concluded that
it was the role of the General Assembly, not the judiciary, to change
a rule of law that has been relied upon by bench and bar for so long.
Id. We continue to adhere to that principle. Under Code § 8.01-230
the injury is deemed to accrue “when the breach of contract occurs
. .. not when the resulting damage is discovered.”

HE «Upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition the Shipmans
incurred a legal injury. Although the injury could not be delineated as
a sum certain or reflected as a final judgment on the merits, there
was injury sufficient to commence a cause of action for legal mal-
practice. First and foremost, the Shipmans lost control of their assets
to the Bankruptcy Trustee, including the power to revoke the Trust
and receive the reversion. The filing of the bankruptcy, in and of
itself, vested those rights in the Bankruptcy Trustee as a matter of
Taw. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, 544, 704 (2000). This injury in particular
countermanded their express wishes to protect the Trust property
from their creditors. Even the Shipmans’ right to bring a legal mal-
practice claim vested in the Bankruptcy Trustee, which necessitated
their initial nonsuit. See National Am. Ins. Co. v. Ruppert Landscap-
ing Co., 187 F.3d 439, 441 (4th Cir. 1999) (“If a cause of action is
part of the estate of the bankrupt then the trustee alone has standing

504 es
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to bring that claim.”); Ellwanger v. Budsberg, 140 Bankr. 891, 903
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1992) (state court actions for legal malpractice
are property of the bankruptcy estate); Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 Bankr.
578, 579 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (state court actions for legal malpractice
are property of the bankruptcy estate). Further, the Shipmans admit-
ted in their motion for judgment that in addition to the costs of repur-
chasing their residence, they incurred “additional costs in legal fees,
litigation costs, and other costs associated with the bankruptcy filing
and litigation.” (Emphasis added). The Shipmans’ own pleadings
thus admit that the filing fee for the bankruptcy itself is a recoverable
damage.> As we note below, these damages need only be incurred,
not paid.

HM The unity of duty, breach, and damage required to establish
a cause of action occurred on March 9, 1998, when the bankruptcy
petition was filed. It was at that time the Shipmans’ cause of action
against Kruck attached, albeit vested in the Bankruptcy Trustee. Hav-
ing determined that the Shipmans’ cause of action existed as of the
time the bankruptcy was filed, the question then becomes, under
Code § 8.01-230, whether the Shipmans’ right of action came into
existence simultaneously with their cause of action or whether it
accrued at another time.

B. THE CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION RULE

HE Code § 8.01-230 dictates the right of action shall accrue
at the time of the breach. Thus, in this case, the Shipmans’ right of
action came into existence and their cause of action accrued contem-
poraneously with the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In other
words, the Shipmans could have brought an action against Kruck at
any time after the bankruptcy petition was filed. However, that does
not necessarily establish the date the statute of limitations began to
run for purposes of a legal malpractice action. In Keller we held that

when malpractice is claimed to have occurred during the repre-
sentation of a client by an attorney with respect to a particular
undertaking or transaction, the breach of contract or duty
occurs and the statute of limitations begins to run when the
attorney’s services rendered in connection with that particular
undertaking or transaction have terminated.

5 The Shipmans also allege their credit rating was damaged by the bankruptey filing.

a 505
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Keller, 232 Va. at 518, 352 S.E.2d 330. This axiom is commonly
termed the “continuous representation rule,” which takes into con-
sideration the special trust and confidence inherent in the attorney-
client relationship. Jd. at 518, 352 S.E.2d at 331. “The relationship
between a lawyer and his client is a fiduciary relationship, one which
commands the highest fidelity to a most solemn trust, for the lawyer
is the expert and the client is utterly dependent upon his knowledge,
his skill, and his honor.’’ Duesterdick, 217 Va. at 767, 232 S.E.2d at
716-71 (Poff, J., dissenting); see also MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels,
255 Va. 314, 318, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1998) (noting “the highly
confidential and fiduciary relationship between an attorney and
client’’).6

HR [in Keller we made clear that the continuous representa-
tion rule applies “only when a continuous or recurring course of pro-
fessional services relating to a particular undertaking is shown to
have taken place over a period of time.” Keller, 232 Va. at 518, 352
S.E.2d at 331. The proper inquiry is not whether a general attorney-
client relationship has ended, but instead, when the attorney’s work
on the particular undertaking at issue has ceased. Id. If malpractice is
alleged with respect to “‘a single, isolated act, Code § 8.01-230...
dictates that the statute of limitations begins to run when that act is
performed, regardless of the time of its discovery.” Id. at 518-19,
352 S.E.2d at 331.

HH Applying the criteria of the continuous representation rule to
the case at bar the record reflects that the attorney-client relationship
between Kruck and the Shipmans was for the particular undertaking
concerning the creditor’s action and the resulting bankruptcy. Kruck’s
advice to the Shipmans to file for bankruptcy was an important and
integral part of his representation in that matter. For statute of limita-
tions purposes, the continuous representation rule effectively tolled
the accrual of the Shipmans’ cause of action from the filing of bank-
ruptcy until January 19, 1999, the date Kruck’s representation termi-
nated regarding the particular undertaking for which he was engaged.

§ Code § 8.01-230 was amended in 1996, However, the changes do not materially affect the
issue under consideration here and the statute as amended does not explicitly abrogate the
continuous representation rule this Court expressed in Keller: See Weathers v. Commonwealth,
262 Va. 803, 805, 553 S.B.2d 729, 730 (2001) (‘When the General Assembly acts in an area in
which one of its appellate courts already has spoken, it is presumed to know the law as the
court has stated it and to acquiesce therein, and if the legislature intends to countermand such
appellate decision it must do so explicitly.”)

506 es
pt

Hl For purposes of the continuous representation rule, it is irrel-
evant whether substitute counsel is acquired or when that occurs. The
date the alleged negligent attorney’s representation of the client ter-
minates is the relevant date which commences the running of the
statute of limitations. Unless another rule of law tolls the accrual date
further, the Shipmans thus had until January 19, 2002, to timely file
their legal malpractice claim against Kruck.

C. THE “PAYMENT RULE”

In Duesterdick this Court held that a motion for judgment assert-
ing legal malpractice that fails to allege actual damages fails to state
a cause of action, and is demurrable.

[WJhen a client has suffered a judgment for money damages as
the proximate result of his lawyer’s negligence such judgment
constitutes actual damages recoverable in a suit for legal mal-
practice only to the extent such judgment has been paid. Here,
the motion for judgment failed to allege such actual damages.
It failed, therefore, to state a cause of action, and the trial court
correctly sustained the demurrer.

217 Va. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776. The Shipmans aver that our deci-
sions in Duesterdick and Rutter stand for the “payment rule,” which
they construe to mean “‘that a cause of action for legal malpractice
does not accrue until there is actual injury or damages, and there is,
at a minimum, a judgment in any underlying litigation on an issue
central to the malpractice claim.” They argue that the outcome in
Rutter was based on this view of the Duesterdick “payment rule.”

According to the Shipmans, application of the “payment rule”
means the statute of limitations did not begin to run until they had
suffered a judgment (the bankruptcy court’s March 8, 2000 order
declaring the Trust revocable) and they had made payment on that
judgment by purchasing the residence from the Bankruptcy Trustee
on June 29, 2001. The Shipmans thus contend they had three years
from that date, until June 29, 2004, to bring their malpractice action.
Since Kruck’s alleged breach of duty occurred on March 8, 1998
with the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the Shipmans’ “payment
rule” would allow them to file their malpractice claim more than six
years after the breach.

Kruck responds that Duesterdick is “not a statute of limitations
or accrual case but instead simply stands for the proposition that
attorneys are only liable for actual damages which their errors proxi-

P| 507
PC

mately cause their clients to incur.” Moreover, Kruck asserts the
“payment rule” only applies “when a client has suffered a judgment
for money damages as the proximate result of his lawyer’s negli-
gence.” Duesterdick, 217 Va. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776.

Neither Duesterdick nor Rutter involved a statute of limitations
issue. In Duesterdick, the trial court sustained a demurrer to a motion
for judgment which failed to sufficiently plead damages. The motion
for judgment did not allege the plaintiff had made any payment upon
a default judgment which was the basis of the alleged legal malprac-
tice. In affirming the trial court, we never considered the statute of
limitations in any way.

Rutter involved a legal malpractice claim brought by the executor
of an estate against a law firm that had drafted the decedent’s will
and trust documents. The estate alleged that the testamentary docu-
ments failed to distribute charitable donations according to the dece- ©
dent’s wishes, resulting in a significant estate tax liability. The estate
contended a cause of action against the law firm arose during the
decedent’s lifetime because she was entitled to recover the fees paid
to the law firm for drafting defective testamentary documents. We
held, however, that the additional amount of estate tax, not the fee
decedent paid to the attorneys, was the injury or damage proximately
caused by the legal malpractice. Rutter, 264 Va. at 314, 568 S.E.2d at
695. Therefore, no cause of action came into existence during the
decedent’s lifetime as to the estate tax liability and thus the claim did
not survive her death. Id.

The distinctly different interpretations of the “payment
rule” expressed by the litigants illustrates the difficulty in construing
our holding in Duesterdick with our decisions in Stone, Laburnum,
VMI, and Keller and other cases for purposes of the accrual of the
Statute of limitations. If, as we have consistently held, even slight
damage sustains a cause of action, it is difficult to discern how the
existence of a cause of action can be postponed until some payment
in partial or whole satisfaction of the client’s damage has occurred.
The infirmities of such a rule are obvious.

First and foremost, adherence to a payment rule would vest the
aggrieved client with the power to forestall the running of the statute
of limitations by the deferral of payment, regardless of whether he
has already suffered damages sufficient to give rise to his cause of
action. It is the legislature that decides when causes of action shall
accrue, not plaintiffs.

HM Second, such a rule does not protect a client who, due to
bankruptcy or insolvency, cannot afford to pay whatever damage he

has suffered. “If the client has no cause of action until he has paid
the judgment against him, then the larger the judgment, the greater
the client’s burden and the lawyer’s impunity; the greater the injury
wrongfully inflicted, the less the liability of the wrongdoer.” Dues-
terdick, 217 Va. at 767, 232 S.E.2d at 777 (Poff, J., dissenting).

Hl Finally, the “payment rule”, in a statute of limitations con-
text, would work an injustice on attorneys who may be forced to
defend allegations of malpractice brought many years after the
alleged breach occurred, dependent entirely upon the ability or whim
of the complaining client to pay the resulting damages. In this regard
the “‘payment rule” defeats the primary objectives of statutes of limi-
tations, such as compelling “the exercise of a right of action within a
reasonable time,” Street v. Consumers Min. Corp., 185 Va. 561, 575,
39 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1946), preventing surprise, and avoiding
problems “incident to the gathering and presentation of evidence
when claims have become stale.” Truman v. Spivey, 225 Va. 274,
279, 302 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1983). Application of the “payment rule”
to the facts of the case at bar, as the Shipmans urge, illustrates these
defects.

Hl Even if we determined that when the Shipmans hired the
second attorney they incurred legal fees, and thus damages sufficient
to establish a cause of action, there is no indication in the record as
to when those fees were paid. If they had given a retainer to that
attorney on their first visit, presumably the “payment rule” would
then be satisfied and their cause of action would begin to accrue.
Suppose, instead, the Shipmans did not pay their attorney for six
months, one year, or longer. Such a scenario exemplifies why the
payment rule would frustrate the will of the legislature and circum-
vent the objectives of the statutes themselves if made applicable in a
statute of limitations context.

In the context of a judgment entered against a client by
virtue of his attorney’s purported negligence, we said in Duesterdick,
“until the client has made a payment on that debt he has suffered no
actual loss or damage.” 217 Va. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776. For the
reasons set forth above, we conclude that this is an incorrect state-
ment of law. As Justice Poff stated in his dissent in Duesterdick, a
client who suffers the entry of a judgment against him indeed suffers
a legal injury or damage.

There is little remote, speculative, or contingent about a money
judgment. Indeed, it is a legal creature of singular dignity.
Such a judgment calls into existence what did not exist before,

a 509
pC

viz., a liquidated debt. Except for jurisdictional defect, that
judgment and the debt it creates cannot be collaterally attacked
and is actionable in every state. The recorded judgment consti-
tutes a continuing lien (securing the debt and the interest as it
accrues) on the debtor’s assets (presently owned and later
acquired), a lien that is enforceable by public sale. Subject to
the statute of limitations, the debt survives the debtor’s death
and may be revived against his personal representative. Code
§ 8-396 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Some judgments, such as that suf-
fered by the client here, survive bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 35.

Id., 217 Va. at 768, 232 S.E.2d at 777.

Accordingly, our prior decision in Duesterdick is overruled and
cannot be viewed as supporting the Shipmans’ argument, which we
teject.

IV. CONCLUSION

HM “When the trial court has reached the correct result for the
wrong reason, we will assign the correct reason and affirm that
result.” Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 191, 523 S.E.2d 246, 253
(2000); accord Hartzell Fan, Inc. v. Waco, Inc., 256 Va. 294, 303,
505 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1998); Ridgwell v. Brasco Bay Corp., 254 Va.
458, 462, 493 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1997); Harrison & Bates, Inc. v.
Featherstone Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 253 Va. 364, 369, 484 S.E.2d
883, 886 (1997). Although the trial court was initially correct in its
ruling from the bench, it later held, incorrectly, that the Shipmans’
cause of action accrued “when counsel was retained and paid.”

HM For the reasons stated above, the Shipmans’ cause of action
for legal malpractice accrued at the time of the attorney’s breach,
subject to the continuous representation rule.’ Therefore, the Ship-
mans failed to timely prosecute their claim against Kruck and the
trial court correctly granted Kruck’s plea in bar. We will therefore
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

7 No argument was made in the present litigation concerning any tolling effect of the bank-
ruptcy on the Shipmans’ malpractice claim under federal law or Code § 8.01-229, or concern-
ing the statute of limitations effect on the nonsuit of the original motion for judgment. Hence,
we express no opinion on such arguments in the present disposition.

JENNIFER WRIGHT
v.

RICHARD C. KAYE, MD.
Record No. 030658

March 5, 2004

Present: All the Justices

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Charles J. Zauzig, III (Claire E. Keena; Nichols, Bergere, Zauzig
& Sandler, on brief), for appellant.

Richard L. Nagle (Michael E. Olszewski; Hancock, Daniel, John-
son & Nagle, on brief), for appellee.

a 515
FC

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Prior to trial in this medical malpractice case, the trial court
struck three standard of care expert witnesses designated by plaintiff
Jennifer Wright (“Wright”), based on the fact that none had per-
formed a urachal cyst excision, the exact medical procedure per-
formed upon the plaintiff by the defendant, Dr. Richard C. Kaye
(“Dr. Kaye”). With leave of court Wright designated a fourth expert
witness who had performed that procedure, but the trial court also
struck that expert. The trial court then granted a motion for summary
judgment by Dr. Kaye, denied Wright’s motion for reconsideration,
and dismissed Wright’s case with prejudice.

On appeal to this Court, Wright assigns error to the trial court’s
tulings striking all of her expert witnesses, the use of depositions as a
basis for the court’s decisions, the grant of summary judgment, and
the denial of her motion for reconsideration. She also assigns error to
the trial court’s denial of certain motions in limine.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 20, 1997, Dr. Kaye performed diagnostic laparoscopic
surgery on Wright to discover the source of her chronic pelvic pain.
During the procedure he found a cyst on her urachus.' Using an
internal surgery and suturing device known as an endo-GIA surgical
stapler, Dr. Kaye excised the cyst and stapled the affected area
closed, noting in his operative report that “[i]t appeared that this was
done away from the bladder.”

Following removal of the cyst, Wright’s bladder was filled with
methylene blue and Dr. Kaye noted none was observed in the pelvis.
Dr. Kaye did not perform a cystoscopy to visualize the dome of the
bladder to determine whether staples were inserted into it during the
cyst excision procedure.

Following the surgery, Wright began to experience urinary fre-
quency and urgency with bladder spasms. Eventually she consulted
physicians other than Dr. Kaye when her symptoms continued
unabated. Approximately one year after the surgery, another surgeon
discovered and removed six surgical staples from Wright’s bladder,

' The “urachus” is “{a]n epithelioid cord surrounded by fibrous tissue extending from the
apex of the bladder to the umbilicus. In the embryo, it is continuous with the allantoic stalk;
postnatally it forms the middle umbilical ligament of the bladder.” Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical
Dictionary 2180 (19th ed. 2002).

516 a
_

apparently left from the urachal cyst laparoscopy. Wright continues
to suffer permanent bladder dysfunction.

Prior to trial Wright designated three expert witnesses?
(“Wright’s experts”) to testify regarding the applicable standard of
care. Wright’s experts specialized in the same field of medicine as
Dr. Kaye, obstetrics and gynecology, and two of them had sub-
specialties in urogynecology. Although Wright’s experts had all per-
formed multiple laparoscopic surgeries, including the removal of
cysts in the female pelvic area near the bladder in procedures
employing a surgical stapler, each testified in depositions they had
never removed a cyst located on the urachus. Dr. Kaye moved the
trial court to strike Wright’s experts on the basis that “none of these
experts have ‘recently engaged in the actual performance of the pro-
cedures at issue in [the] case.’ ” Approximately four weeks prior to
trial, the trial court granted Dr. Kaye’s motion and struck Wright’s
experts, finding they lacked “knowledge of this particular specialty.”

After Wright’s experts were stricken, Dr. Kaye moved for sum-
maty judgment claiming Wright did not have the required experts to
support her allegations of breach of the standard of care. Wright
moved for a continuance and leave to designate a new expert wit-
ness. The trial court deferred ruling on Dr. Kaye’s motion until the
trial date and granted Wright’s motion to file a supplemental designa-
tion of experts. The trial court did not rule on Wright’s motion for a
continuance, but took it under advisement pending the trial date to
await the designation of an expert. Wright timely designated a new
expert witness, Dr. Charles M. Jones (“Dr. Jones”).

Dr. Kaye had previously designated a standard of care expert, Dr.
Hans-Barthold Krebs (“Dr. Krebs’’), a shareholder in the same pro-
fessional corporation as Wright’s current treating physician, Dr. Jef-
frey A. Welgoss (‘‘Dr. Welgoss”), who was to testify for Wright.
Wright filed a motion in limine to exclude and disqualify Dr. Krebs
as an expert witness asserting it would be a conflict of interest for
him to testify because of the professional relationship between Drs.
Krebs and Welgoss. Further, Wright contended that Dr. Krebs’ testi-
mony would violate the patient-physician relationship protected by
Code § 8.01-399. Wright’s motion was denied.

Wright also filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any testi-
mony regarding pre-operative discussions between Wright and Dr.

2 For purposes of this opinion Dr. Bruce A. Rosenzweig, Dr. Mickey M. Karram and Dr.
Michael A. Ross are included in the term “Wright’s experts.” Dr. Charles M. Jones is excluded
from that term and referred to by name.

a 517
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Kaye concerning the risks of surgery. Wright argued that since she
did not claim that Dr. Kaye failed to obtain her informed consent,
any testimony concerning discussion of the risks of surgery was not
relevant to either negligence or causation and would only confuse the
jury. The trial court denied Wright’s motion.

Wright filed additional motions in limine to exclude testimony by
Dr. Kaye of an intraoperative consultation he undertook by telephone
with Dr. Guillermo Gil-Montero (‘‘Dr. Gil-Montero”) during
Wright’s surgery and to prohibit testimony about a prior urachal cyst
surgery performed by Dr. Kaye on an unrelated patient. The trial
court denied both motions.

On October 28, 2002, the date set for trial, the trial court found
that Wright’s designation of Dr. Jones raised new issues prejudicial to
Dr. Kaye such that Dr. Jones would not be permitted to qualify as an
expert witness and testify.

The trial court then denied Wright’s motion for a continuance and
granted Dr. Kaye’s motion for summary judgment.? Subsequently, the
trial court denied Wright’s motion for reconsideration of its prior
decisions and dismissed Wright’s case with prejudice. We granted
Wright this appeal.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court’s exercise of its discretion in determining
whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be overturned on
appeal absent evidence that the trial court abused that discretion.”
May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 362, 568 S.E.2d 690, 692 (2002) (citing
John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 320, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002)). Likewise,
“whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is ‘largely
within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” Perdieu v. Black-
stone Family Practice Center, Inc., 264 Va. 408, 418, 568 S.E.2d
703, 709 (2002) (quoting Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va. 795, 800, 250 S.E.2d
TA1, 744 (1979)); see also Swersky v. Higgins, 194 Va. 983, 985, 76
S.E.2d 200, 202 (1953). However, in an action alleging medical mal-
practice, we will overturn a trial court’s exclusion of a proffered
expert opinion “when it appears clearly that the witness was quali-
fied.” Perdieu, 264 Va. at 418, 568 S.E.2d at 709 (quoting Noll, 219
Va. at 800, 250 S.E.2d at 744).

3 Wright objected to the use of deposition testimony as a basis for striking Wright’s experts
and, in turn, granting summary judgment. As later noted, we do not reach that issue in the
resolution of this appeal.

518 a
FC

Il. WRIGHT’S EXPERTS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Il A physician licensed in Virginia is presumed to know the
standard of care in that physician’s specialty or field of medicine.
Code § 8.01-581.20(A). The presumption also attaches to out-of-state
physicians who meet the educational and examination requirements
of the statute.* See, e.g., Black v. Bladergroen, 258 Va. 438, 443, 521
S.E.2d 168, 170 (1999). It is uncontradicted that Wright’s experts
were specialists in the medical field of obstetrics and gynecology,
with extensive experience in laparoscopic surgery in the female pel-
vic region near the bladder including the removal of cysts. All had
experience with the endo-GIA surgical stapler and in performing cys-
toscopies to inspect the dome of the bladder. Accordingly, the statu-
tory presumption that Wright’s experts knew the standard of care for
Dr. Kaye’s specialty field of medicine applied to each of them.

IB The issue in this case, although not specifically articulated by
the trial court, is whether that presumption was rebutted so as to dis-
qualify Wright’s experts from testifying as expert witnesses in this
case. Under Code § 8.01-581.20(A), a witness to whom the presump-
tion applies may nonetheless be disqualified as an expert witness if
he does not meet either of two statutory requisites: (1) to “demon-
strate[ ] expert knowledge of the standards of the defendant’s spe-
cialty and of what conduct conforms or fails to conform to those
standards” (“knowledge requirement’’) or (2) to show that he had an
“active clinical practice in either the defendant’s specialty or related
field of medicine within one year of the date of the alleged act or
omission forming the basis of the action” (“active clinical practice
requirement”). Conversely, “‘[a] witness shall be qualified to testify
as an expert” if both statutory requisites are met. Code § 8.01-
581.20(A) (emphasis added).

Citing our opinion in Sami v. Varn, 260 Va. 280, 535 S.E.2d 172
(2000), Dr. Kaye moved to strike Wright’s experts alleging that
“none of these experts have ‘recently engaged in the actual perform-
ance of the procedures at issue in [the] case.’ ” Dr. Kaye thus con-
tended that Wright’s experts failed to meet the active clinical practice
requirement.

The trial court granted Dr. Kaye’s motion and struck Wright’s
experts because they did “not have sufficient expert knowledge

+ It was uncontested that Dr. Ross is a Virginia licensed physician and Drs. Rosenzwieg and
Karram met the educational and examination requirements for licensure in Virginia. All were
board certified in Obstetrics and Gynecology.

a 519
pC

regarding the medical procedure at issue in this case (i.e., urachal
cystectomy) to qualify them as expert witnesses pursuant to . . . Code
§ 8.01-581.20.” The trial court did not rule directly on Dr. Kaye’s
claim that Wright’s experts failed to meet the active clinical practice
requirement, but based its decision on failure to satisfy the knowl-
edge requirement. As support for its ruling, the trial court referenced
our decision in Lawson v. Elkins, 252 Va. 352, 477 S.E.2d 510
(1996), and noted the uncontested facts that

[nJone of these three witnesses have ever performed an urachal
cystectomy in the past; none have ever seen it performed; none
have ever been taught how to perform it; none have ever pub-
lished, lectured, or attended continuing medical education
courses in reference to urachal cystectomies.

Wright asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in striking her
experts because Dr. Kaye did not rebut the statutory presumption.
She avers her experts met both statutory requisites when viewed in
the context of the medical procedure at issue. Wright’s position is
that excision of an urachal cyst is not the relevant medical procedure
for evaluating either statutory requisite because that is not the alleged
act upon which the claim of malpractice is based. Instead, she con-
tends the medical procedure at issue is the performance of
laparoscopic surgery in the female pelvic region near the bladder
using a surgical stapler and it is upon that basis the qualification of
her experts must be judged.

Dr. Kaye urges affirmance of the trial court, contending the fail-
ure to actually perform, witness or be schooled in removal of a cyst
from the urachas proves Wright’s experts fail the knowledge require-
ment and the statutory presumption is thereby rebutted. Dr. Kaye also
contends, as an alternate ground of affirmance, that the failure to
actually perform urachal cyst excision within the statutory time win-
dow confirms that Wright’s experts fail to meet the active clinical
practice requirement as now defined under our decisions in Sami and
Perdieu. Dr. Kaye’s position is that urachal cyst excision is the only
relevant medical procedure by which either the knowledge or active
clinical practice requisites are to be measured in this case. He argues
removing an urachal cyst is such a unique procedure that it mandates
a specific esoteric knowledge and practice requirement as a condition
precedent for any expert witness.

HH For the reasons stated below, we disagree with Dr. Kaye
and hold the trial court’s grant of the motion striking Wright’s
experts was in error.

The question whether a witness is qualified to testify as an
expert is “largely within the sound discretion of the trial
court.” Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va. 795, 800, 250 S.E.2d 741, 744
(1979) (citing Swersky v. Higgins, 194 Va. 983, 985, 76 S.E.2d
200, 202 (1953)). In the context of a medical malpractice
action, this determination must be made with reference to
Code § 8.01-581.20. “‘A decision to exclude a proferred expert
opinion will be reversed on appeal only when it appears
clearly that the witness was qualified.” Noll, 219 Va. at 800,
250 S.E.2d at 744, (citing Landis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va.
797, 800, 241 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1978)).

Perdieu, 264 Va. at 418, 568 S.E.2d at 709.

However, we will reverse a holding that a witness is not
qualified to testify as an expert when it appears clearly from
the record that the witness possesses sufficient knowledge,
skill, or experience to make him competent to testify as an
expert on the subject matter at issue. Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va.
795, 800, 250 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1979).

Sami, 260 Va. at 284, 535 S.E.2d at 174.

Hl Wright does not allege in her motion for judgment any injury
to the urachus or that removal of the urachal cyst by laparoscopic
surgery using a stapler, in and of itself, was a deviation from the
applicable standard of care. Indeed, Wright represented to the trial
court that “‘the decision of the Defendant Kaye to remove the urachal
cyst during the diagnostic laparoscopic surgery for pelvic pain, pro-
ceeding with a laparoscopic approach to remove the cyst and to use
the Endo stapler as a method of excising the cyst have not been
criticized.”

What Wright does allege is that Dr. Kaye deviated from the
applicable standard of care when he failed to follow proper medical
procedures by injuring an organ (the bladder) away from his opera-
tive field (the urachus). Specifically, she pled Dr. Kaye got too close
to the bladder when firing staples because he failed to properly visu-
alize the plane of the bladder during the surgery, causing the staples
to enter the dome of the bladder. Further, she pled that Dr. Kaye

violated the standard of care required when operating in the vicinity
of the bladder by failing to inspect the dome of the bladder cys-
toscopically prior to concluding surgery. Accordingly, Wright argues
the medical procedure at issue to evaluate the statutory requisites is
laparoscopic surgery in the female pelvic region near the bladder.

Hl The record does not reflect evidence establishing a unique
standard of care for urachal cyst surgery as it relates to the injury of
the bladder or other organs outside that operative field which differs
from the standard of care for other surgery adjoining the bladder. The
medical literature Dr. Kaye references supports Wright’s position that
urachal cyst excision is the application of general surgery techniques
for related procedures:

“Laparoscopic technique for urachal sinus/cyst excision is an
extension of the surgical principles used in the reported cases.
The skill and expertise necessary for performing this particular
operation were acquired in performing the other procedures.”

Nelson M. Stone, et al., Laparoscopic Excision of a Urachal Cyst, 45
Urology 161, 163 (1995).

Dr. Kaye’s own proffered deposition testimony established he
“intended to stay clear of the bladder” which was “at least two cen-
timeters, three centimeters” from the urachal cyst. He also testified
that in performing Wright’s surgery he intended “to not incorporate
the bladder into the procedure because it wouldn’t have furthered the
procedure and benefitted the patient in any manner.” Further, Dr.
Kaye also stated that he knew placing a staple into the bladder could
cause injury to it and “would not have served any constructive pur-
pose in her surgery to staple the dome of the bladder.”

Hl We determined in Lawson that the rejected expert failed to
meet the knowledge requirement of the statutory test because he did
not have sufficient knowledge of the applicable standards of care for
the medical procedure at issue. 252 Va. at 354-55, 477 S.E.2d at 511.
While the location of the intended medical treatment in Lawson was
a disc (whereas here it was the urachus), chemonucleolysis was the
medical procedure at issue for purposes of determining the knowl-
edge requirement. Id. Similarly, the issue in the instant case is the
standard of care for laparoscopic surgery in the vicinity of the blad-
der involving use of a surgical stapler.

If Wright’s theory of the case were pled to claim injury to the
urachus or that removing the urachal cyst with a stapler, in and of

itself, was below the standard of care, Dr. Kaye’s argument might
prevail. But the acts Wright claims form the basis of her action and
violate the standard of care are medical procedures applicable during
laparoscopic surgery in the female pelvic region in the vicinity of the
bladder. Whether Wright’s experts had knowledge of the standard of
care for those procedures determines whether they met the statutory
requisites.

When seen in terms of the medical procedure at issue in the case
at bar, it is clear that Wright’s experts were qualified as to the knowl-
edge requirement of the statutory requisites. Perdieu, 264 Va. at 418,
568 S.E.2d at 709. It is uncontested that Wright’s experts, by educa-
tion, training and practice have extensive and contemporary knowl-
edge of the standard of care in Dr. Kaye’s field of medicine involv-
ing female pelvic laparoscopic surgery, including the removal of
cysts and similar pathologies around the bladder by surgical stapler.
The record reflects Wright’s experts possess “sufficient skill, knowl-
edge, or experience to make [them] competent to testify as an expert
on the subject matter at issue.” Sami 260 Va. at 284, 535 S.E.2d at
174, Dr. Kaye thus failed to rebut the statutory presumption and the
trial court therefore erred in granting the motion to strike Wright’s
experts.

While we conclude the trial court erred in its application of the
knowledge requirement of the statutory requisites, that does not end
our inquiry. Dr. Kaye’s motion to strike Wright’s experts also alleged
failure to meet the active clinical practice requirement. He argues on
appeal this is an alternative basis upon which the trial court’s judg-
ment should be affirmed, as failure to meet either statutory requisite
would disqualify a proffered expert witness.

HR The General Assembly has required in § 8.01-581.20(A)
that an expert witness in a medical malpractice action have “had
active clinical practice in. . . the defendant’s specialty . . . within one
year of the date of the alleged act or omission forming the basis of
the action.” As with the knowledge requirement, determining
whether a proffered witness meets the active clinical practice require-
ment is also determined by reference to the relevant medical proce-
dure. In this case, we have already determined that procedure to be
laparoscopic surgery in the female pelvic area near the bladder
involving a surgical stapler. The uncontested evidence is that
Wright’s experts had such a practice within the required statutory
window of time. Accordingly, Wright’s experts would appear to sat-
isfy the active clinical practice requirement.

a 923
Pe

However, Dr. Kaye contends that our decisions in Sami and
Perdieu restrictively define “defendant’s specialty” in the context of
the active clinical practice requirement. Dr. Kaye avers that we used
the phrase “actual performance of the procedures at issue” to create
an active clinical practice requirement that an expert witness must
have performed the same medical procedure with the same pathology
in all respects as gave rise to the alleged act of malpractice at issue
in order to have practiced in the defendant’s specialty. In this case,
although the alleged act of malpractice is stapling of the bladder due
to defective visualization and failure to perform a cystoscopy, Dr.
Kaye argues that experience with female pelvic laparoscopic opera-
tions near the bladder is insufficient because the alleged negligent act
was preceded by, or in the course of, an urachal cyst excision. Dr.
Kaye misreads our decisions.

HE n Sami we said:

The purpose of the requirement in § 8.01-581.20 that an expert
have an active practice in the defendant’s specialty or a related
field of medicine is to prevent testimony by an individual who
has not recently engaged in the actual performance of the pro-
cedures at issue in a case. Therefore, we conclude that, in
applying the “related field of medicine” test for the purposes
of § 8.01-581.20, it is sufficient if in the expert witness’
clinical practice the expert performs the procedure at issue and
the standard of care for performing the procedures is the same.

260 Va. at 285, 535 S.E.2d at 175.

The issue in Sami was whether an obstetrician-gynecologist testi-
fying as to the standard of care for pelvic exams performed by an
emergency room physician fell within the “‘related field of
medicine” test when evaluating the active clinical practice require-
ment. The related field of medicine test is not at issue in this case.
Further, in evaluating either statutory requisite, the term “actual per-
formance of the procedures at issue” must be read in the context of
the actions by which the defendant is alleged to have deviated from
the standard of care. In this case, as noted above, that is not excision
of the urachal cyst, but injury to the bladder.

Taking examples from our recent cases, Dr. Kaye would read
Sami to require of an expert witness testifying under the facts in
Lawson as to treatment of a herniated disc at L4, to have actually
treated a disc at L4 and not LS or L3. Otherwise, the proffered expert

would not have an active clinical practice in the defendant’s spe-
cialty. Similarly, Dr. Kaye’s reading as applied to the facts in Perdieu
would require an expert witness to have performed the actual fracture
procedure as existed in that case. If the injured party had fractured
the left hip, Dr. Kaye would argue that Sami requires only perform-
ance of the actual procedure of treating a fractured left hip within the
one-year practice window, and not a fractured right hip, meets the
active clinical practice requirement. The General Assembly did not
intend to write such a narrow test>

HM The phrase “actual performance of the procedures at issue in
a case” is not to be given a narrow construction inconsistent with the
plain terms of the statute. As with the statute’s knowledge require-
ment, the relevant medical procedure for purposes of satisfying the
active clinical practice prerequisite is actual performance of female
pelvic laparoscopic procedures around the bladder for the reasons
heretofore explained.®

HH Accordingly, because the record reflects Wright’s experts
demonstrated knowledge of the standard of care in Dr. Kaye’s spe-
cialty and that they had an active clinical practice in that specialty,
they were qualified as expert witnesses in this case. The trial court
was therefore in error to strike Wright’s experts and enter summary
judgment for Dr. Kaye based on Wright’s lack of expert witnesses to
support her allegations of the breach of the standard of care.’

IV. DR. KREBS

The next issue for consideration is whether the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to exclude Dr. Krebs as an expert witness for
the defendant. It did not.

* While expert testimony might establish a significant medical distinction for a differing
standard of care between a medical procedure at L3 as opposed to LA or the right hip fracture
as opposed to the left hip fracture, that distinction is not to be assumed. Once the statutory
presumption applies, the burden rests on the party opposing the proposed expert to produce
some evidence establishing any distinction affecting the standard of care regarding the medical
procedures at issue. There is none in this case,

© Our use of the phrase “actual performance of the procedures at issue” in Perdieu is con-
sistent with this explanation. The proposed and correctly rejected experts in that case were not
found to lack an active clinical practice because they had treated a left versus a right hip
fracture. They were rejected as experts because they had not treated any fractures of any kind
during the statutory window of time for satisfying the active clinical requirement.

7 As the trial court’s decision to strike Wright’s experts is reversed, we do not reach
Wright’s assignment of error that the trial court erred in basing its decision in part on the
discovery depositions of Wright’s experts, Similarly, we do not reach Wright’s assignment of
error to the trial court’s ruling striking Dr. Jones as an expert witness.

a 525

Dr. Krebs is a member of Northern Virginia Pelvic Surgery Asso-
ciates, P.C. (““NVPSA”) as is Dr. Welgoss. Subsequent to the surgery
by Dr. Kaye and the later removal by another surgeon of the staples
in her bladder, Wright had an initial office consultation with Dr.
Welgoss. Wright was moving to Colorado and Dr. Welgoss referred
her to a physician in that state. Upon returning to Virginia, Wright
resumed her doctor-patient relationship with Dr. Welgoss, who also
agreed to testify on Wright’s behalf as an expert witness. Prior to
Wright’s return to Virginia, but after the initial consultation with Dr.
Welgoss, Dr. Krebs agreed to assist Dr. Kaye as an expert witness in
the present litigation.

Wright asserts that unless she consents, Dr. Krebs is barred from
serving as an expert witness. She argues that a doctor affiliated with
a treating physician is automatically barred from testifying for a
party adverse to the patient. In addition, Wright argues that Code
§ 8.01-399 bars physicians and affiliated physicians from offering
testimony regarding a patient’s care without the patient’s consent.
The trial court rejected both of Wright’s arguments. We agree with
the trial court’s judgment.

A. Affiliated Experts

The question of affiliated experts presented by Drs. Krebs and
Welgoss is one of first impression in Virginia. The issue is whether,
in the medical malpractice context, a physician employed in the same
medical practice as the plaintiff’s medical expert may testify on
behalf of the defendant without the plaintiff’s consent.

HB In Zurner v. Thiel, 262 Va. 597, 553 S.E.2d 765 (2001), we
addressed a somewhat related issue concerning an expert employed
by one party who later switched sides and assisted an opposing party,
commonly termed “side-switching” experts. In Turner, we adopted
the test employed by the majority of courts to consider that issue.
The side-switching expert test is whether it was “objectively reason-
able for the first party who claims to have retained the expert witness
to conclude that a confidential relationship existed between that party
and the expert” and, if so, “did the first party disclose any confiden-
tial or privileged information to the expert witness.” Id. at 601, 553
S.E.2d at 768 (citations omitted). The party seeking disqualification
bears the burden as to both elements. Jd.

HE ‘Tbe majority of courts analyzing the affiliated expert
issue utilize a test similar to the side-switching expert test adopted in
Turner. Under the majority rule, a court must determine whether the

moving party has produced “evidence that any substantive informa-
tion about the case has been exchanged between the affiliated
experts.” City of Springfield v. Rexnord Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 71,
75 (D. Mass. 2000); In re Malden Mills Indus., Inc., 275 B.R. 670,
673 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (“If an expert witness is affiliated with
an expert for the other side, the test for disqualification still revolves
around the transfer of confidential information.”). As in side-
switching cases, the party seeking disqualification bears the burden
of proof. Rexnord Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d at 73.

We find the majority rule comparable to our test for side-
switching experts in Turner and hereby adopt the majority rule gov-
erning affiliated experts. Therefore, we must decide whether Wright,
the party seeking disqualification, has offered sufficient evidence that
Drs. Krebs and Welgoss exchanged confidential information regard-
ing her treatment. The trial court correctly found that Wright failed to
carry this burden.

Wright notes that NVPSA’s files are centrally located and that the
members of the firm occasionally discuss a particular patient’s care.
However, Wright has offered no evidence that Dr. Krebs and Dr.
Welgoss shared confidential information (or any information of any
kind) regarding her care. Wright asserted in her motion to exclude
Dr. Krebs that she was not required to prove an actual exchange of
information because a court should impute an exchange in the con-
text of affiliated experts. She is mistaken. Absent evidence of an
actual exchange of confidential information, an affiliated expert
should not be excluded and no disqualifying conflict exists.

B. Code § 8.01-399

HH Alternatively, Wright argues that Code § 8.01-399 bars a
physician affiliated with a treating physician from testifying
adversely to a patient. That statute provides:

Except at the request or with the consent of the patient, or as
provided in this section, no duly licensed practitioner of any
branch of the healing arts shall be required to testify in any
civil action, respecting any information that he may have
acquired in attending, examining or treating the patient in a
professional capacity.

Code § 8.01-399(A).

P| 527
a

HM The plain language of Code § 8.01-399(A) leads to the con-
clusion that Dr. Krebs is not barred by the statute from serving as an
expert for Dr. Kaye. First, Code § 8.01-399 states that no practitioner
of the healing arts “shall be required’”’ to offer testimony. Dr. Krebs
agreed to testify voluntarily — his testimony was in no way
“required”. Second, the type of testimony barred is that acquired by
a practitioner “in attending, examining or treating the patient in a
professional capacity.” It is uncontested that Dr. Krebs did not
attend, examine, or treat Wright and thus could not offer any testi-
mony with respect to information he never so received.

Hl Finally, the statute applies only to the “practitioner,” a term
not defined to include the practitioner’s partners or practice entity.
That the General Assembly did not intend for “‘practitioner” to be an
all-inclusive term is evidenced by Code § 8.01-399(D)(1) describing
communications between “practitioners” and “‘that practitioner’s
employers, partners, agents, servants, employees, [or] co-
employees.” Clearly, the General Assembly demonstrated in this
very statute that it knows how to differentiate between the “practi-
tioner” and his “partners” and did so. This negates any inference
that “‘practitioner” is an expansive term encompassing the practi-
tioner’s affiliated physicians.

For the reasons set forth above, the trial court correctly denied
Wright’s motion to exclude Dr. Krebs.

V. TESTIMONY REGARDING PRIOR SURGERY

Wright argues the trial court erred in denying her motion in
limine to exclude testimony concerning Dr. Kaye’s performance of a
previous surgery with Dr. Krebs for the removal of an urachal cyst
on an unrelated patient. The trial court determined that testimony was
admissible because “‘it would go to the experience and training that
was received by Dr. Kaye as well as who provided the experience
and training . . . in this particular matter.”

Wright contends that testimony from Drs. Kaye or Krebs that Dr.
Kaye had previously performed the urachal cyst procedure would
amount to evidence that their “customary method” was tantamount
to the requisite standard of care. However, Wright confuses the issue
of the standard of care, for which evidence about the customary
method of treatment would not be admissible, see King v. Sowers,
252 Va. 71, 471 S.E.2d 481 (1996), with the common and relevant
topic of a party physician’s training and education.

528 P|
PC

HE We have consistently recognized that a physician’s train-
ing and experience are relevant and probative of whether expert testi-
mony is admissible in a medical malpractice action. Grubb v.
Hocker, 229 Va. 172, 176, 326 S.E.2d 698, 700-01 (1985) (“[T]he
knowledge necessary to qualify a witness to testify as an expert
might be derived from study alone, or experience, or both.”) (citing
Noll, 219 Va. at 801, 250 S.E.2d at 745); see, e.g., Perdieu, 264 Va.
at 420, 568 S.E.2d at 710 (witnesses not qualified because they had
not “recently engaged in the actual performance of the procedures at
issue”); Sami, 260 Va. at 284, 535 S.E.2d at 174 (overruling trial
court’s disqualification of expert witness who had requisite knowl-
edge of standard of care for pelvic examinations).

Jt would create an anomalous and inequitable circumstance
should the proffered experts in a medical malpractice action be
required to show their training and experience in order to qualify as
an expert to testify as to the defendant’s conformance to the standard
of care, but yet prohibit that same defendant from presenting the
identical information about himself. Evidence that Dr. Kaye had pre-
viously performed an urachal cyst procedure is relevant and proba-
tive as to his training and experience to undertake’ and perform a
laparoscopic female pelvic operation near the bladder in accordance
with the applicable standard of care. We thus find no error in this
ruling of the trial court.

VI. RISK OF SURGERY DISCUSSIONS

Wright filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of discus-
sions between herself and Dr. Kaye as to the risk of injury to the
bladder during an urachal cystoscopy. The trial court denied Wright’s
motion, ruling from the bench:

I think indeed the jury knows that a prudent doctor must
advise patients concerning any risk prior to surgery. If you
don’t show that, immediately you’ve implied that maybe this
doctor is negligent to begin with. So I would find that it cer-
tainly would be fair to show that he did what a prudent doctor
would do and advise of that particular risk.

HM Under the facts of this case, we hold the trial court’s ruling
to be erroneous. In resolving this issue, it is a particularly salient fact
that Wright does not plead or otherwise place in issue any failure on
the part of the defendant to obtain her informed consent. Her claim is

a 529
pC

simply that Dr. Kaye was negligent by deviating from the standard of
care in performing the medical procedure at issue.

Seen in that context, evidence of information conveyed to Wright
concerning the risks of surgery in obtaining her consent is neither
relevant nor material to the issue of the standard of care. Further, the
pre-operative discussion of risk is not probative upon the issue of
causation: whether Dr. Kaye negligently performed the procedure.

HM Wright’s awareness of the general risks of surgery is not a
defense available to Dr. Kaye against the claim of a deviation from
the standard of care. While Wright or any other patient may consent
to risks, she does not consent to negligence. Knowledge by the trier
of fact of informed consent to risk, where lack of conformed consent
is not an issue, does not help the plaintiff prove negligence. Nor does
it help the defendant show he was not negligent. In such a case, the
admission of evidence concerning a plaintiff’s consent could only
serve to confuse the jury because the jury could conclude, contrary to
the law and the evidence, that consent to the surgery was tantamount
to consent to the injury which resulted from that surgery. In effect,
the jury could conclude that consent amounted to a waiver, which is
plainly wrong. See Waller v. Aggarwal, 688 N.E.2d 274, 275-76
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996).

Accordingly, we hold the failure to grant Wright’s motion in
limine on this issue was error by the trial court.

VIL STATEMENTS OF DR. GIL-MONTERO

Wright also sought to bar Dr. Kaye from testifying at trial regard-
ing an intraoperative consultation he had with an urologist, Dr. Gil-
Montero. According to the proffered testimony, Dr. Kaye would tes-
tify that Dr. Gil-Montero consulted with him during Wright’s surgery
and informed him he was far enough from the bladder to safely use
the Endo-stapler and that no cystoscopy was needed prior to closing
the surgery. However, Dr. Gil-Montero could not testify, much less
be cross-examined, as to the truth or falsity of what Dr. Kaye would
testify he said, because it is uncontested Dr. Gil-Montero has no rec-
ollection of the events.

The trial court denied Wright’s motion, ruling from the bench
that Dr. Kaye’s proposed testimony of Dr. Gil-Montero’s statements
was not offered “for the truth of what indeed the doctor said, that is
Dr. Gil-Montero, but simply to show why Dr. Kaye did what he did
in this particular matter . . . . I think it would be the exception to the

hearsay rule, that it does state why Dr. Kaye is doing what he did

Wright argues the trial court erred because Dr. Kaye’s testimony
would be inadmissible hearsay offered to prove the truth of the state-
ments made and justify his conformance to the standard of care by
confirming he was away from the bladder and was justified in not
performing a cystoscopy. We agree with Wright.

Hl In Williams v. Morris, 200 Va. 413, 105 S.E.2d 829 (1958),
we stated:

Heresay evidence has been defined as evidence which derives
its value, not solely from the credit to be given the witness on
the stand, but in part from the veracity and competency of
some other person. It is primarily testimony which consists in
a narration by one person of matters told him by another. A
clear example of hearsay evidence is where a witness testifies
to the declaration of another for the purpose of proving the
facts asserted by the declarant.

Id. at 416-17, 105 S.E.2d at 832 (citations omitted).

HE Ass 2. narration of a conversation between them, Dr.
Kaye’s testimony of statements purportedly made to him by Dr. Gil-
Montero is classic hearsay. See Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va.
462, 465, 237 S.E.2d 779, 781 (1977). The issue is whether any of
the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule would nonetheless per-
mit Dr. Gil-Montero’s statements into evidence through Dr. Kaye. We
find no such exception.

While Dr. Gil-Montero’s statements would be some evidence of
Dr. Kaye’s state of mind (why he proceeded in Wright’s procedure as
he did), that would be true, to some degree, of almost any hearsay
statement offered by its proponent. In its obvious and central thrust,
Dr. Gil-Montero’s statements would go directly to the ultimate issue
of the standard of care: that Dr. Kaye was not too close to the blad-
der when he fired the staples and the standard of care did not require
inspection of the bladder by cystoscopy before closing Wright’s sur-
gery. Allowing Dr. Kaye to relay Dr. Gil-Montero’s statements would
be tantamount to admitting unqualified expert testimony. Addition-

8 In CSX Transportation v. Casale, 247 Va. 180, 441 S.E.2d 212 (1994), we stated:
A medical expert’s recital of the confirming opinion of an absent physician is inadmis-
sible hearsay. McMunn v. Tatum, 237 Va. 558, 566, 379 S.E.2d 908, 912 (1989).
Although Code § 8.01-401.1 authorizes admission into evidence of an expert’s opinion

a 531
pt

ally, it is clear Dr. Kaye’s statements were offered to prove the truth
of the facts stated therein and are inadmissible hearsay.

The trial court erred in denying Wright’s motion in limine as to
Dr. Gil-Montero’s statements.

VIII. CONCLUSION

HM For the reasons heretofore given, we hold the trial court
erred in striking Wright’s experts and granting summary judgment to
Dr. Kaye. We also hold the trial court erred in failing to grant
Wright’s motions in limine to exclude the discussions about risk of
surgery and to bar Dr. Kaye’s testimony about Dr. Gill-Montero’s
statements.

We will affirm the trial court’s judgment which denied Wright’s
motion in limine to bar Dr. Krebs’ testimony because of his relation-
ship with Dr. Welgoss. We will also affirm the trial court’s judgment
denying Wright’s motion in limine to exclude evidence as to Dr.
Kaye’s prior performance of an urachal cyst excision.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and remanded.

that may be based in whole or in part upon inadmissible hearsay, “the statute does not _
authorize the admission of any hearsay opinion on which the expert’s opinion was
based.” Todd v. Williams, 242 Va, 178, 181, 409 S.B.2d 450, 452 (1991). This is
because “admission of hearsay expert opinion without the testing safeguard of cross-
examination is fraught with overwhelming unfairness to the opposing party. No litigant
in our judicial system is required to contend with the opinions of absent ‘experts’
whose qualifications have not been established to the satisfaction of the court, whose
demeanor cannot be observed by the trier of fact, and whose pronouncements are
immune from cross-examination.” McMunn, 237 Va. at 566, 379 S.B.2d at 912.
Id, at 182-83, 441 S.E.2d at 214.

532

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Vv.

JAMES SYLVESTER JONES
Record No. 030942
March 5, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J.

Nn
oo
wo

Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W.
Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellant.
Vanessa E. Hicks, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

534 es
|

SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question for decision in this appeal is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the doctrine of inevitable discovery
was inapplicable to support the trial court’s refusal to suppress evi-
dence seized in a search purportedly lacking in probable cause. Find-
ing the Court of Appeals’ holding erroneous, we will reverse.

The question stems from indictments charging James Sylvester
Jones (Jones) with attempted possession of cocaine and possession of
a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. In a bench trial,
the court found Jones guilty of both offenses and sentenced him to
serve a total of eight years in the penitentiary, with five and one-half
years suspended.

In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
weapons conviction but reversed the cocaine conviction. We granted
the Commonwealth an appeal from the reversal of the cocaine
conviction.!

The evidence shows that about 10:30 p.m. on July 23, 2000,
Officer Brian O’Donnell of the Charlottesville Police Department
and two fellow officers were on patrol in response to numerous com-
plaints of drug sales occurring at a residence located at 321 Sixth
Street, S.W., in Charlottesville. The officers approached the residence
through the backyards of other homes and observed a group of men
standing on the sidewalk in front of the residence.

When the officers came into view, the men ran. Officer
O’Donnell flashed his light on Jones and saw that he had a gun in his
tight hand. O’Donnell yelled “[g]un” and ordered Jones to “[g]et on
the ground.” O’Donnell then wrestled Jones to the ground and heard
Jones’ gun hit the pavement “right beside [a] minivan.” O’Donnell
called to one of his fellow officers to “‘[g]et the gun, he put it under
the van.” O’Donnell placed Jones under investigative detention,
handcuffed him, and began to search him. While O’Donnell was con-
ducting the search, the other officer recovered Jones’ gun, a revolver
that appeared to be in operating condition.

In the search, O’Donnell found in Jones’ right rear pants pocket a
“knotted plastic bag containing nine off-white, rock-like sub-
stances.”” At that point, O'Donnell arrested Jones for possession of
drugs and transported him to the police station. There, after Jones

' In a separate petition, Jones appealed the Court of Appeals affirmance of his weapons
conviction, but this Court refused his petition. (Record No. 031019, Sept. 9, 2003.)

ee 535
|

had been advised of his Miranda? rights, he said that the rocks were
cocaine worth approximately $120.00 and that he mixed the cocaine
with marijuana.?

Upon arrival at the police station but before interviewing Jones,
Officer O’Donnell ran “a criminal history” on Jones, which,
O’Donnell testified, he “would do in the normal ordinary course of
business when [he finds] somebody in the possession of a firearm.”
Jones’ criminal history disclosed he had been found guilty as a juve-
nile of an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult.
He was then charged with the firearms offense.

In considering Jones’ motion to suppress, the trial court stated
that Officer O’Donnell’s detention of Jones was reasonable as a valid
pat-down stop under Terry° but that O’Donnell did not have probable
cause to search Jones. Yet, the court continued, the discovery of the
drugs would have been inevitable and, on this basis, the court denied
Jones’ motion to dismiss.

Jones concedes that his “initial detention was valid based on the
officer observing him running away from the area with a firearm in
hand,” and the Commonwealth does not question the trial court’s
ruling that Officer O’Donnell did not have probable cause to search
Jones. Jones argues that once the trial court found the search was
without probable cause, it should have excluded the evidence con-
cerning the drugs and held the doctrine of inevitable discovery inap-
plicable. The Commonwealth argues the trial court properly held that
the doctrine was applicable.

Hl Ordinarily, evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful
search is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Hart v. Commonwealth, 221 Va.
283, 287, 269 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1980). However, not all illegally
obtained evidence is subject to suppression. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).

Hl One of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule is the doctrine
of inevitable discovery. This Court recognized the exception in War-
lick v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 263, 266, 208 S.E.2d 746, 748
(1974), and Keeter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 134, 140 n.2, 278

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966).

3 Upon analysis, the rocks were determined to be aspirin.

+ Officer O’Donnell testified he did not conduct a record check with respect to the firearm at
the time of arrest because he “was going to bring [Jones] to the police department and [he]
didn’t have time to check.”

5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

536 Pe
Le

S.E.2d 841, 845 n.2, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053 (1981). Later, the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized the exception in Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the Court holding that evidence
obtained by unlawful means is nonetheless admissible “[i]f the pros-
ecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means.” Id. at 444.

Hl In reversing the trial court on the ground that the doctrine of
inevitable discovery was inapplicable in Jones’ case, the Court of
Appeals cited its earlier decision in Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.
App. 639, 656, 347 S.E.2d 175, 185 (1986). In turn, Walls cited and
embraced United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (Sth Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987). In Cherry, the Fifth Circuit rec-
ognized the inevitable discovery rule enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Nix but said the Supreme Court had failed to state what
must be shown to establish that the discovery of evidence in a partic-
ular case is inevitable. 759 F.2d at 1204. Filling this purported void
and only citing one of its own decisions, United States v. Brookins,
614 F.2d 1037, 1042 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit held that
the prosecution must show:

(1) a reasonable probability that the evidence in question
would have been discovered by lawful means but for the
police misconduct, (2) that the leads making the discovery
inevitable were possessed by the police at the time of the mis-
conduct, and (3) that the police also prior to the misconduct
were actively pursuing the alternative line of investigation.

Cherry, 759 F.2d at 1204; see also United States v. Hernandez-Cano,
808 F.2d 779, 784 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).

Hl The Court of Appeals found that the Commonwealth failed to
satisfy items (2) and (3) of the Cherry test, and Jones cites this same
failure on appeal. With respect to item (2), the Court of Appeals said
“[t}here was no specific complaint concerning Jones, so there were
no leads for the police to follow prior to the police misconduct.”
While neither Cherry nor Walls specifies what is necessary to satisfy
item (2), nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nix or our opin-
ions in Warlick and Keeter suggests that, to be sufficient, a lead must
relate to the specific offense with which the suspect is ultimately
charged.

| 537
a

| | Here, Officer O’Donnell had a lead sufficient to satisfy item
(2). After observing Jones fleeing the scene with a gun in hand,
Officer O’Donnell, “pursuant to normal police practices,” United
States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1108 (Sth Cir. 1993), would have run
“a criminal history” and discovered Jones’ prior adjudication of guilt
for an offense equivalent to a felony, would have arrested Jones for
the weapons offense, and then would have found the drugs on Jones’
person as a result of a search incident to arrest or pursuant to normal
booking procedures.

Hl With respect to item (3) of the Cherry test, the Court of
Appeals held the item was not satisfied because Officer O’Donnell
“was not actively pursuing any alternative line of investigation.” The
Commonwealth urges us to reject item (3) because the test it creates
is “unnecessarily rigid.” Jones responds that the test is not unneces-
sarily rigid and that we should reject the Commonwealth’s proposal.

Again, we find nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nix or
our opinions in Warlick and Keeter requiring a showing that the
police were actively pursuing an alternative line of investigation.
And the precedential value of Cherry, upon which the Court of
Appeals relied in Walls, is now suspect. Without mentioning its deci-
sion in Cherry or the requirement of an alternative line of investiga-
tion, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Seals, supra, applied the
inevitable discovery rule to uphold the challenged seizure of a vehi-
cle following a search without a warrant. The court stated that police
procedures required an inventory of impounded vehicles, and the
questioned evidence would have been inevitably discovered “during
the normal inventory procedures” of the police department. Id. at
1108.

Other federal circuits have disapproved the requirement for an
alternative line of investigation. United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d
736, 745-46 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207,
210 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499-500
(6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392,
1399 (9th Cir. 1989).

The Court of Appeals opined in Walls that the requirement for an
alternative line of investigation is necessary to ensure “that the inevi-
table discovery exception will be applied consistently with the over-
all purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter police miscon-
duct.” 2 Va. App. at 656, 347 S.E.2d at 185. The court also said that

“ “contrary result would cause the inevitable discovery exception to
swallow the [exclusionary] rule by allowing evidence otherwise

538 Pe
a

tainted to be admitted merely because the police could have chosen
to act differently and obtain the evidence by legal means.’ ” Jd.
(quoting Cherry, 759 F.2d at 1205).

Hi However, as noted in Nix, while the prosecution should not be
put “in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality
had transpired,” 467 U.S. at 443, neither should the prosecution be
“put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police error
or misconduct” when the evidence would inevitably have been dis-
covered. Jd. The requirement for an alternative discovery line of
investigation would tip the scales against the prosecution and put it
in a worse position than it would have been in had no illegality tran-
spired. And, if the requirement is allowed to stand, rather than hav-
ing the exception swallow the rule, the requirement would swallow
the exception. Eliminating the requirement would level the playing
field.

It is clear, at least “by a preponderance of the evidence,”
Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, that the drugs “ultimately and inevitably would
have been discovered by lawful means.” Jd. The trial court did not
err, therefore, in admitting the evidence related to drugs under the
doctrine of inevitable discovery. Accordingly, we will reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of convic-
tion, and enter final judgment in favor of the Commonwealth.

Reversed and final judgment.

es 3!
pC

MONDELL H. WASHINGTON
v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF AMERICA, ET AL.
Record No. 030637

March 5, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ., and
Compton, S.J.

+
wy

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PF
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PC

Bradford M. Young (George L. Townsend; Chandler, Franklin &
O'Bryan, on briefs), for appellant.

Patricia C. Arrighi (Christopher J. Wiemken; Taylor & Walker,
on brief), for appellees.

SENIOR JUSTICE COMPTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this workers’ compensation case, the sole issue properly before
the Court is whether the Court of Appeals of Virginia erred in
affirming the Workers’ Compensation Commission, which refused
the claimant’s request to assess a 20% penalty against the employer’s
insurance carrier for its failure to pay the claimant benefits as pro-
vided in an open award.

Mondell H. Washington, the claimant, worked in the Fredericks-
burg area as a “‘preloader” for United Parcel Service of America, the
employer, which was insured by Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Com-
pany, the carrier.

The claimant sustained injury to his right knee by accident during
his employment on three separate occasions: June 18, 1997, August
4, 1998, and September 15, 1999. Although various aspects of the
claims for benefits arising from these accidents were considered
together by the Commission, this appeal directly involves only the
September 1999 accident.

In the employer’s First Report of Accident filed for the 1999
incident, the claimant’s injury was described: “WALKING DOWN
STEEP DRIVEWAY IN RAIN & SLIPPED. FELT RIGHT KNEE
POP.” In an Award Order dated May 16, 2000, the Commission
approved an Agreement to Pay Benefits, and directed the payment of
temporary total compensation of “$469.91 weekly, during incapac-
ity,” beginning September 16, 1999.

On May 10, 2001, the claimant, by counsel, notified the Commis-
sion that “Mr. Washington has not been paid compensation pursuant
to the Award Order.” Counsel, referring to the provisions of Code

2
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§ 65.2-524, asked that the carrier be ordered to pay the claimant “all
compensation due and payable to him, along with a 20% penalty.”

In a letter to the Commission on the next day, May 11, 2001,
claimant’s counsel wrote: ““Please accept this letter as the Claimant’s
request for additional benefits based on a change in condition .. .
The Claimant’s doctor removed him from the work force on March
28, 2001.” Also, counsel noted that the claimant was “‘under an open
award” and that “[h]e is not receiving benefits.”

On June 4, 2001, the carrier filed with the Commission forms
stating: ““This claim is denied” for the reasons that: “Any disability
is unrelated to compensable accident or disease” and “‘[t]he medical
treatment is unrelated to the industrial injury or disease.”

On June 7, 2001, the Commission, noting that it had been
advised that payments pursuant to the “May 16, 200[0] Award” had
not been timely made (the Commission erroneously referred to
2001), entered an order assessing a 20% penalty on all compensation
greater than two weeks in arrears to be paid “immediately” along
with the compensation owed.

On June 27, 2001, the Commission granted the claimant’s request
to consolidate for hearing the claims arising from the three accidents
and set the hearing for September 4, 2001.

On July 9, 2001, the Commission entered an order requiring the
carrier to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for fail-
ing to comply with the June 7, 2001 order.

In a July 18, 2001 letter, the carrier, by counsel, acknowledged
receipt of the June 7 penalty order and the July 9 show cause order.
It stated that its “records reflect that the claimant was paid temporary
total disability compensation beginning September 17, 1999 through
May 17, 2000 at a rate of $469.[9]1. At that time he obtained a full
duty release and returned to his pre-injury employment. It appears
that the carrier sent out agreement forms to the claimant which were
never returned.” Counsel asked “‘that any decision on whether a pen-
alty is due be deferred until the carrier can obtain the necessary
information from the employer.”

Responding in a July 23, 2001 letter to the parties, the Commis-
sion denied the carrier’s request for a continuance of the September
hearing date. The Commission also advised the claimant’s attorney
that the carrier “‘will soon file an application alleging that the claim-
ant returned to work at his pre-injury wage” and that if such applica-
tion is filed timely, the Commission “would certainly consider hear-
ing that issue simultaneously with the other pending claims.”

 ((:
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In a Notice of Hearing to the parties for the September 4, 2001
hearing in the present claim (arising from the September 1999 acci-
dent), the Commission stated the “Subject” of the hearing to be the
claimant’s request for benefits filed in April 2001, “to be heard
with” the claims arising from the accidents of June 1997 and August
1998.

The Commission’s reference to the April request was to a change
in condition application dated April 6, 2001 seeking benefits, includ-
ing temporary total disability, beginning March 28, 2001.

Following the typically informal hearing before a deputy com-
missioner, at which brief, disjointed testimony and comments from
counsel were received, the deputy rendered a written opinion on Sep-
tember 27, 2001, which decided matters arising from all three acci-
dents. In a separate section of the opinion, the deputy commissioner
set forth the issue in the claim arising from the instant September
1999 accident as follows: “Whether the May 16, 2000, award should
be terminated because the claimant was released to return to full
duty.”

The deputy found a physician “released the claimant to full duty
as of June 8, 2000,” and concluded that “[a]ny disability suffered by
the claimant after that date is causally unrelated to the September 15,
1999, injury.” The deputy terminated the May 16, 2000 Award
Order, and denied the claimant’s April 2001 change in condition
application. In the award, the deputy also quashed the show cause
order and stated “[t]here is no penalty owing.”

In another section of the opinion, which dealt with the August
1998 injury, not the September 1999 injury, the deputy commissioner
stated the second issue relating to that claim to be: “Whether the
carrier is liable for a 20% penalty for indemnity benefits pursuant to
Va. Code 65.2-524 under the May 16, 2000, award of the Commis-
sion.” Noting that on the date of the hearing the May 2000 award
“remained open,” the deputy found that the claimant was released
“to full duty as of June 8, 2000. . . . Therefore, any disability which
the claimant suffered after that date is causally unrelated to the
August 4, 1998, injury.” Continuing, the deputy ruled: “While the
defendants were woefully remiss in not terminating the May 16,
2000, award, the claimant was paid indemnity benefits until he
returned to work. The claimant was not owed further benefits, there-
fore, no penalty is awarded because there were no benefits in
arrears.”

544 ee
|

Upon the claimant’s application for review, the full Commission
affirmed the deputy’s opinion. On review, the Commission rejected
the claimant’s contention that the only issue properly before the dep-
uty at the September 2001 hearing relating to the 1999 injury was
whether a statutory penalty should be assessed against the carrier.
Thus, the Commission, noting the deputy correctly ruled on the
causal connection issue, determined “the Deputy Commissioner did
not err in terminating the claimant’s outstanding Award in [the file
relating to the September 1999 accident]. Since the claimant is not
entitled to compensation benefits after June 8, 2000, no penalty is
owed.”

Upon further review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commis-
sion. Washington v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 39 Va. App. 772, 576
S.E.2d 791 (2003). We awarded the claimant this appeal because the
case involves a matter of significant precedential value. See Code
§ 17.1-410@).

In the Court of Appeals, one of the questions the claimant
presented was: “That the Commission erred as a matter of law in
considering issues not properly before it and in granting relief not
requested by the Defense.” However, the Court of Appeals stated:
“On appeal, Washington contends only that the commission erred in
refusing to grant him benefits under the open May 16, 2000 award
and that the commission erred in refusing to assess the 20% penalty
against [the carrier] for failing to pay him benefits consistent with the
award.” Id. at 778, 576 S.E.2d at 794,

Because the Court of Appeals did not directly discuss the claim-
ant’s contention regarding just what issues properly were before the
deputy commissioner, a contention raised throughout the proceedings
below and in this Court, we shall address that question initially.

Hl We hold that the issue of causation was not properly before
the deputy, and should not have been decided given the procedural
posture of the matter. Although there is some vague reference in the
hearing transcript to an off-the-record discussion of “the posture of
this case and what issues are properly before the Commission,” we
have found no concession in the record by the claimant that the cau-
sation issue was viable for decision.

Indeed, the Notice of Hearing made no mention of the issue, or
that the Commission was considering terminating the outstanding
award based upon the claimant’s change in condition application, see
Code § 65.2-708(A) (Commission, upon ground of change in condi-
tion, may end compensation previously awarded). In addition, despite

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the Commission’s warning to the claimant’s attorney in the July 23,
2001 letter, the carrier did not file an employer’s application alleging
the claimant returned to work at his pre-injury wage, which would
have enabled the deputy, with notice to the claimant, properly to con-
sider the causation issue at the hearing. The carrier only relied upon
a doctor’s release to defend against Washington’s claim, and the
Commission relied on that release to deny the claim.

Hl This procedural snafu prevented the claimant from preparing
an adequate response on the causation question and from being pre-
pared to resist termination of the award based on his change in con-
dition application. He was not afforded the minimal due process to
which he was entitled. This was materially unfair to him and consti-
tuted reversible error.

Now, we shall address the only substantive issue properly
before the Court, that is, the penalty question. Code § 65.2-524, deal-
ing with payment of workers’ compensation, provides, as pertinent,
that “{i]f any payment is not paid within two weeks after it becomes
due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount
equal to twenty percent thereof. . . .” Commission Rule 1.4(C)(1)
requires compensation to be paid through the date an employer’s
application for a hearing is filed unless “[t]he application alleges the
employee returned to work, in which case payment shall be made to
the date of the return.”

Il As we have said, the carrier failed to file a change in condi-
tion application with the Commission alleging the claimant had
returned to work and requesting termination of the May 16, 2000
open award. Rather, the carrier unilaterally terminated payment of
benefits after it learned that the claimant had returned to work with-
out restrictions.

HH In deciding the penalty issue, the Court of Appeals correctly
stated that the relevant statutes do not give an employer or carrier the
unilateral right to cease paying compensation benefits to a disabled
employee under an outstanding award, when that employee returns to
work and the employer or carrier does not file an application or
agreed statement of facts along with a supplemental memorandum of
agreement. Washington, 39 Va. App. at 779, 576 S.E.2d at 794.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals noted the “laudable purpose” of the
foregoing Commission rule as a method of policing the tendency of
employers and carriers to terminate first and litigate later. Id.

Hl Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals excused the carrier’s uni-
lateral action. Indicating that it did not “condone” the carrier’s fail-

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ure to file an application to terminate the May 16, 2000 award, the
Court of Appeals said that the Commission’s equitable power, as
exemplified in the doctrine of imposition, includes the power to
render decisions based on justice as shown by the total circumstances
of each case, even when no fraud, mistake or concealment has been
shown. Id. at 780, 576 S.E.2d at 795. The doctrine of imposition
grants the Commission “jurisdiction to do full and complete justice
in each case.” Harris v. Diamond Const. Co., 184 Va. 711, 720, 36
S.E.2d 573, 577 (1946). Accord John Driggs Co. v. Somers, 228 Va.
729, 734, 324 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1985).

Noting the claimant returned to work in June 2000 without physi-
cal restrictions, the Court of Appeals stated he was not released from
full-duty work again, by a physician, until March 28, 2001. On that
date, a physician released him from work for a third arthroscopic
surgery, “which the commission found was causally unrelated to the
injury upon which the May 16, 2000 award was based.” Washington,
39 Va. App. at 780, 576 S.E.2d at 795.

Also, the Court of Appeals said there was no evidence that the
employer or carrier “intentionally failed to file the appropriate
paperwork requesting termination of the award, or that [the carrier]
possessed any ill intent in failing to do so.” Jd. at 780-81, 576 S.E.2d
at 795.

Concluding, the Court of Appeals stated: ‘““Therefore, as the com-
mission found that Washington was no longer entitled to benefits
under the award after June [8], 2000, we find no error in the com-
mission’s determination that no benefits or penalty should be
awarded.” Id. at 781, 576 S.E.2d at 795.

Hl The Court of Appeals erred. As we already have said, the
issue of causal connection should not properly have been before the
Court of Appeals because that issue was not properly before the
Commission. Without the finding of no causal connection between
the September 1999 accident and the claimant’s condition after
March 28, 2001, there was no basis for the Commission or the Court
of Appeals to find, as is implicit in the rulings below, that the claim-
ant would be unjustly enriched because he may have received bene-
fits to which he was not entitled.

HE Consequently, the May 16, 2000 award of benefits
remains valid, and the refusal to assess a 20% penalty was error. The
carrier violated the mandate of Code § 65.2-524 because benefits
were not paid within two weeks after they became due. And, without

es
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a finding of no causal connection, there is no basis to employ the
doctrine of imposition.

HM Therefore, the judgment from which this appeal was taken
will be reversed and the case will be remanded to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals shall remand the case to the Workers’
Compensation Commission for further proceedings in connection
with the claim arising from the September 1999 injury.

Upon remand, the Commission shall enter an award of benefits to
the claimant for the period from March 28, 2001 to September 27,
2001 (for the weeks when he was unable to work), as requested by
the claimant in this Court, plus an additional 20% of the total amount
due for that period of time.

Reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL joins,
dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The sole assignment of error raised by the
claimant in this appeal is: “The Court of Appeals erred in upholding
the Commission’s ruling that Mr. Washington’s release to full-duty
status in June 2000 served to terminate the May 2000 award.” By
restricting his appeal to this single assignment of error, the claimant
has, of his own accord, limited the scope of the appeal before this
Court.

The majority, however, reaches beyond this assigned error to
review an additional question not before this Court, namely, whether
the deputy commissioner properly considered the issue of causation.
Despite the claimant’s procedural abandonment of this issue, the
majority’s holding is predicated on a sua sponte resolution of that
question. Thus, I must conclude that the majority has decided this
appeal in contravention of Rule 5:17(c), which states in material part:
“Only errors assigned in the petition for appeal will be noticed by
this Court.”

Both the deputy commissioner and the Commission held that the
claimant was not entitled to benefits for the period after March 28,
2001, because the claimant’s surgery on that date was not related to
the September 15, 1999 injury. Not only did the claimant fail to
assign error on these grounds in this Court, the claimant also failed
to challenge this holding of the Commission in the Court of Appeals.
In his “Questions Presented” before the Court of Appeals, the claim-
ant asked, “Did the Commission err as a matter of law in consider-

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ing issues not properly before it and in granting relief not requested
by UPS?” However, in neither his opening brief nor in his reply
brief before the Court of Appeals did the claimant argue that the
deputy commissioner and the Commission improperly considered the
issue of causation. Instead, the claimant merely asserted that the
Commission lacked authority to terminate the claimant’s benefits in
the absence of an application from UPS. Thus, as asserted by UPS
before this Court, the Commission’s determination that the claimant’s
March 2001 surgery was not causally related to his compensable
injury became the law of this case and is binding on appeal before
this Court.

Given this binding determination, an analysis of the issue
presented in this appeal must begin with the conceded fact that the
complainant was seeking benefits for injuries that were unrelated to
the open award of May 2000. Once that concession is placed into the
framework of this appeal, the entire appeal collapses.

Examined in this context, the claimant’s argument effectively is
reduced to an assertion that a penalty should have been imposed on
the employer for its failure to make payments that the claimant was
not entitled to receive in the first place. Such a contention plainly
amounts to no more than a request for unjust enrichment, which the
Court of Appeals properly denied.

I agree that the employer was required to file an application
under Commission Rule 1.4(C) to terminate the open award upon the
claimant’s return to work in June 2000. Nevertheless, I would hold
that the employer’s failure to file that application does not entitle the
complainant to receive payment of a penalty, when he was not enti-
tled to the compensation payments on which such penalty would be
based. Accordingly, I would further hold that, under the doctrine of
imposition, which gives the Commission “jurisdiction to do full and
complete justice in each case,” Harris v. Diamond Construction
Company, 184 Va. 711, 720, 36 S.E.2d 573, 577 (1946), the Com-
mission did not err in declining to impose a penalty on the employer.
On this basis, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

549

HARRISON-WYATT, LLC
Vv.
DONALD RATLIFF, BT AL.
Record No. 030634
March 5, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Stephenson, S.J.

J. Scott Sexton (Monica Taylor.Monday; Gentry, Locke, Rakes &
Moore, on briefs), for appellant.

Peter G. Glubiak (Glubiak Law Office, on brief), for appellees.

Amicus Curiae: The Virginia Oil and Gas Association, Inc.
(James R. Kibler, Jr., on brief), in support of appellees.

SENIOR JUSTICE STEPHENSON delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This appeal presents a significant question of first impression in
Virginia, to-wit: Where a surface owner of a tract of land, or his
predecessor-in-title, has conveyed all the coal in and under his land,
has title to the coal bed methane (CBM) passed to the coal owner
along with the coal?

I

Harrison-Wyatt, LLC (the Coal Owner), is the successor grantee
under three coal severance deeds from the 19th century. Donald Rat-
liff and others (the Plaintiffs) own the surface land and all minerals
upon and within it, except the coal. The Plaintiffs filed a declaratory
judgment action, pursuant to Code § 8.01-184, seeking, inter alia, a
determination that they own the CBM produced from the coal seams.
The Coal Owner denied that the Plaintiffs own the CBM and alleged,
to the contrary, that it, as the owner of the coal estate, owns the
CBM.

Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the Plain-
tiffs, holding that the grant of the coal did not include the CBM. The
Coal Owner appeals.

I
A

The land involved in this case is located in Buchanan County,
Virginia, and is designated as Mineral Tracts 18, 19, and 56. The
severance deeds for Tracts 18 and 19 were recorded on August 2,
1887, and convey “all the coal in, upon, and underlying” the tracts.
The severance deed for Tract 56, executed on October 13, 1887, con-
tains similar language.

B

Scientific evidence revealed how coal and CBM are formed. Coal
is formed over millions of years from decaying plant material that
settles on the bottom of swamps. By a microbiological process, this
plant material is first converted into peat. Over time, the peat sinks
deeper into the earth and, ultimately, as a result of a chemical reac-
tion that increases its carbon content, is transformed into coal. This
process of transforming peat into coal is known as “coalification.”

CBM, sometimes referred to as “marsh gas,” is produced during
coalification. Coal is porous, and the CBM is held to the porous sur-
face of the coal by weak forces known as van der Waals forces.
When the pressure on the coal is reduced, the forces that hold the
CBM to the coal are reduced, and the CBM is released from the
surface of the coal. Such a release may occur through natural geolog-
ical shifts or when coal is fractured during the mining process.

There are three methods for fracturing coal in order to capture
CBM as an economic resource. One method is by drilling wells from
the surface into the coal seam. A second method is by the use of
horizontal degasification wells from inside the coal mine. The third
way is by employing what are called “gob” wells relating to long-
wall mining.

Cc

Hi CBM, like any form of methane, is an extremely explosive
gas. At the time the severance deeds were executed in the present
case and for about a century thereafter, CBM was known as the
“miner’s curse.” Indeed, during these years, a great many mine
explosions occurred, killing or maiming thousands of miners.

Also during this time, coal owners were required to ventilate the
CBM from mines as a safety measure. This ventilation was accom-

plished by using very large fans and wells to discharge the CBM into
the atmosphere.

HB During the 1970’s, however, it became apparent that CBM
could be a valuable energy source. Consequently, in 1990, the Gen-
eral Assembly enacted The Virginia Gas and Oil Act, Code § 45.1-
361.1 et seq. (the 1990 Gas Act), whereby CBM could be captured
for commercial use rather than merely discharged into the atmos-
phere.! The General Assembly, however, left for future judicial deter-
mination the question of CBM’s ownership, except when there was
“an agreement among all claimants,” and mandated that the royalties
from the production of CBM be held in escrow.”

D

The Coal Owner sought to establish the meaning of the severance
deeds with the following 19th-century descriptions of coal. The
American Cyclopaedia described coal, in part, as

a term now commonly used to denote all kinds of mineral fuel
.... [A]t the present time, when wood and charcoal are fast
giving place to the mineral varieties of fuel, the term coal is
applied to that class of this fuel in general use. . . . Under the
term coal we may therefore embrace all classes of mineral fuel
that will ignite and burn with flame or incandescent heat. . . .
The combinations of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen
with earthy impurities, to which the term mineral fuel may be
properly applied, are infinite, ranging through all the grades of
coal, from the hard, dense anthracite to the asphaltic varieties,
and from the solidified petroleum to the gaseous naphtha.

IV THE AMERICAN CYCLOPAEDIA: A POPULAR DICTIONARY OF GENERAL
KNOWLEDGE 726 (Ripley and Dana eds., 1873). In addition, the same
teference stated the following:

All kinds of coal vary considerably both in mechanical struc-
ture and chemical composition . . . . The gradations of carbon,
hydrogen, and oxygen compounds, from the almost pure fixed
carbon in anthracite, through the more volatile bituminous

' The 1990 Gas Act defines CBM as “occluded natural gas produced from coalbeds and
rock strata associated therewith.” Code § 45.1-361.1.

2 In this declaratory judgment action, Plaintiffs sought distribution to them of all escrowed
amounts held by the Virginia Gas and Oil Board pursuant to Code § 45.1-361.22.

varieties of coal, to the free carbon and hydrogen of naphtha,
are infinite; and no formula can truly express the relative pro-
portions which limit these compounds to the various classes of
coals, or as mineral fuel.

Id. at 728. The Encyclopaedia Britannica described coal, in part, as
follows:

Coal is an amorphous substance of variable composition,
and therefore cannot be as strictly defined as a crystallized or
definite mineral can... .

Coal is perfectly amorphous... .

. . Gases, consisting principally of light carburetted
hydrogen or marsh gas, are often present in considerable quan-
tity in coal, in a dissolved or occluded state, and the evolution
of these upon exposure to the air, especially when a sudden
diminution of atmospheric pressure takes place, constitutes one
of the most formidable dangers that the coal miner has to
encounter.

VI ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 45 (9th ed. 1877).
aut

After examining the plain language of the severance deeds, the
trial court concluded that the term “coal” was not ambiguous. The
court noted that, “[w]hile encyclopedia definitions of the time cited
by the coal owners make it clear that it was common knowledge that
CBM was contained within the coal, . .. CBM was not considered a
chemical constituent of the coal itself.” The court found significant
the lack of chemical bond between coal and CBM and ruled that
CBM “is simply a by-product” of coal and a severable estate. The
court stated, therefore, that “[t]he grant of coal rights does not
include rights to CBM absent an express grant of coalbed methane,
natural gases, or minerals in general.” Consequently, the court held
that “the surface owners retain the CBM.”

Iv

Although the issue before us is one of first impression in Vir-
ginia, other state courts and the Supreme Court of the United States
have ruled on it. A review of these cases reveals a split of authority.

554 ee
Le

A

In 1983, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided United
States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983). In that case,
the fee owners, in a 1920 deed, had conveyed to United States Steel
Corporation “[aJll the coal” and specifically reserved the right “to
drill and operate through said coal for oil and gas without being held
liable for any damages.” Jd. at 1382. Relying upon the characteristics
and origins of gas and its history of development, the court held that
“such gas as is present in coal must necessarily belong to the owner
of the coal, so long as it remains within his property and subject to
his exclusive dominion and control.” Jd. at 1383. The court further
held that the surface owner “has title to the property surrounding the
coal, and owns such of the coalbed gas as migrates into the surround-
ing property.” Id.

The Supreme Court of Alabama considered the issue in NCNB
Texas Nat. Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So.2d 212 (Ala. 1993). In that
case, the original owner, in virtually identical 1953 and 1954 deeds,
bad conveyed “all the coal,” but had reserved “all of the oil, gas,
petroleum and sulphur” and the exclusive right to drill for and pro-
duce them. Id. at 219-20. All of the parties agreed that coal and
CBM were separate, severable interests in real property. Id. at 221.
The court found, however, that the reservation of “all... gas” could
not impair the coal owner’s incidental right to ventilate CBM for
mine safety. Recognizing the migratory nature of CBM, the court
held that the coal owner had the right to recover the CBM found
within the coal seam and that the owner of the gas estate had the
tight to the possession of the CBM that escapes into the surrounding
strata. Id. at 228-29.

The Supreme Court of Montana also considered the issue in Car-
bon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680 (Mont. 1995).
In that case, the deed in question had conveyed “all coal and coal
tights,” but had made no mention with respect to CBM, natural gas,
or minerals. Jd. at 682. The court concluded that “coal seam methane
gas is not a constituent part of coal and, thus, it may be severed from
the coal estate.” Id. at 687. The court then held that the deed had not
conveyed the CBM to the coal owner. Jd. at 688. After noting that
Montana is an “ownership-in-place state,” the court ruled that the
owners of the gas estate had the right to drill for and produce CBM
within the coal seam. Jd. at 688-89. The court further held, however,
that the coal owner had a “‘mutual, simultaneous right to extract and
to capture such gas for safety purposes, incident to its actual coal

es 955
PC

mining operations.” Id, at 689. The court then left “to the agreement
of the parties or to some future case the issue of whether, and if so,
to what extent, the gas estate owner . . . is entitled to be compensated
by the coal owner for gas extracted and captured incident to the coal
owner’s mining operations.” Id.

In Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land Co., 53 P.3d 540, 542 (Wyo.
2002), the Supreme Court of Wyoming considered a deed that had
conveyed “all coal and minerals commingled with coal,” but had
reserved to the landowners “all oil, gas and other minerals.” From
the unambiguous language of the deed and the facts and circum-
stances surrounding its execution, the court held that the CBM was
not conveyed to the coal owner but, instead, was reserved to the
landowners. Id. at 549-50. The court explained that “[cloalbed meth-
ane, being a gas, remained the landowners’ property.” Jd. at 550.

Finally, we consider Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135
(W. Va. 2003), a case decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia involving two virtually identical standard oil and gas
Jeases of “all of the oil and gas and all of the constituents of either
in and under the land.” Jd. at 139. The leases made no mention of
coal bed methane. The issue before the court was whether the leases
conveyed the right to develop CBM, absent any specific language to
that effect. Id. at 143. The court held that the lessor did not intend to
convey to the lessee the right to drill into the lessor’s coal seam for
CBM. Id. at 146.

B

In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865
(1999), the Supreme Court of the United States considered land pat-
ents that had been issued to western settlers, pursuant to the Coal
Land Acts of 1909 and 1910, 30 U.S.C. §§ 81, 83-85 (the Federal
Acts), conveying the land and everything in it, except “all coal,”
which had been reserved to the Federal Government. These patented
lands included reservation lands previously ceded by the Southern
Ute Indian Tribe (the Tribe) to the United States. In 1938, the United
States restored to the Tribe, in trust, title to the ceded reservation
lands still owned by the Federal Government, including the reserved
coal lands. These lands contain large quantities of CBM within the
coal formations. The Tribe brought an action, claiming the right to
the CBM. Id. at 870-71.

The Supreme Court rejected the Tribe’s claim, holding that the
term “coal,” as used in the Federal Acts, does not encompass CBM.

556 es
_

Id. at 880. The Court explained, inter alia, that it was “persuaded
that the common conception of coal at the time Congress passed the
1909 and 1910 Acts was the solid rock substance that was the coun-
try’s primary energy resource.” Id. at 874. The Court further stated
that coal would not have encompassed CBM “both because it is a
gas rather than a solid mineral and because it was understood as a
distinct substance that escaped from coal as the coal was mined,
rather than as a part of the coal itself.” Id. at 874-75.

Vv

HH In the present case, the trial court relied, in part, upon the
Amoco opinion and the various definitions of “coal” set forth
therein. The Coal Owner contends that, in doing so, the trial court
erred because it considered evidence outside the record on the mean-
ing of the term “coal.” The Coal Owner further contends that the
trial court should have limited its consideration to the evidence it
offered, as set forth in Part II, D, of this opinion. We do not agree.
Courts routinely resort to various reference materials for the defini-
tions of terms contained in documents. In doing so, they are not lim-
ited to definitions, if any, that may be offered into evidence by a
litigant. Although Amoco is not controlling in the present case, the
trial court did not err in relying upon the definitions cited therein.

VI

Even though Amoco is not controlling in the present case, we
find it to be very persuasive, as did the trial court. We do not believe
the term “coal,” as it was used in the late 19th century, is ambigu-
ous. As commonly understood at the time, the term “coal” meant a
solid rock substance used as fuel, and nothing in the record indicates
that CBM is a part of coal itself. On the other hand, although CBM
has a weak physical attraction to coal and escapes from coal when
coal is mined, it is a gas that exists freely in the coal seam and is a
distinct mineral estate. Accord Newman and Carbon County, supra.
Moreover, the parties could not have contemplated at the time the
severance deeds were executed that CBM would become a very valu-
able energy source. We hold, therefore, that title to the CBM did not
pass to the Coal Owner, and the trial court did not err in holding that
the CBM is owned by the Plaintiffs and that the Plaintiffs are entitled
to distribution of the royalties held in escrow.

es 951
PF

VIL

We have considered all of the Coal Owner’s assignments of error
and find no error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be
affirmed.>

Affirmed.

3 The trial court also made the following finding: “The surface owners’ rights to the CBM
only extend to that which has separated from the coal. The surface owner does not have the
right to frac[ture] the coal in order to retrieve the CBM.” This finding was not in response to
an issue brought by either party at trial or on appeal, and, therefore, we express no opinion
regarding this finding.

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court
Building in the City of Richmond on Tuesday, the 30th day of
March, 2004.

Dennis Mitchell Orbe, Petitioner,
against Record No. 040597
William Page True, Warden,
Sussex I State Prison, Respondent.
ee

Upon consideration of the “Second Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus” and “Motion for Expedited Consideration and Application
for a Stay of Execution” filed March 22, 2004, the respondent’s
motion to dismiss, and the petitioner’s opposition to motion to dis-
miss and reply in support of the motion for stay of execution, the
Court is of the opinion that the respondent’s motion should be
granted, petitioner’s stay of execution should not issue, and the writ
should not issue.

Petitioner alleges that his execution by lethal injection, “without
first changing to a more humane protocol,” will violate his rights to
due process and constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Virginia and United States Constitutions. However, Petitioner
acknowledges in his petition that “this is not an appropriate claim to
raise in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,” and that the “‘instant
petition is prophylactic. Orbe has filed it to provide an alternative
mechanism for relief.” He further states:

The reason why this is not an appropriate habeas corpus claim
is that Orbe does not challenge either the fact or duration of
his imprisonment, does not challenge his death sentence, and
does not seek a determination that he is entitled to immediate
or speedier release. These are the distinguishing hallmarks of a
habeas claim, as the Court spelled out in Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973). Virginia law similarly confines the scope
of habeas corpus actions.

We agree with Orbe. Consequently, we hold that this Court does
not have original jurisdiction to consider his petition. Accordingly,
the petition is dismissed.

A Copy,

Teste:

Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk

560 _
PC

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court
Building in the City of Richmond on Tuesday, the 30th day of
March, 2004.

Dennis Mitchell Orbe, Appellant,

against Record No. 040598
Circuit Court No. CH-04-419-1

Gene M. Johnson, Director, Virginia
Department of Corrections, et al., Appellees.

= = = —— : = = Circuit Court of York

County directed that the sentence of death imposed upon Dennis
Mitchell Orbe (“Orbe”) be carried out on March 31, 2004. On
March 5, 2004, Orbe filed a Bill of Complaint for Declaratory Judg-
ment and Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond seeking an adjudication that the particular method of imple-
mentation of lethal injection employed by the Commonwealth and
anticipated to be utilized in his execution “constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment and violates due process of law under Article I, Sec-
tions 9 and 11, of the Constitution of Virginia.” Additionally, Orbe
requested the issuance of a permanent injunction “barring [the Com-
monwealth] from carrying out [his] execution using a protocol that
will cause unnecessary pain.” In a separate motion, Orbe requested
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunc-
tion “to protect the status quo ante” and enjoining the Common-
wealth from carrying out Orbe’s execution on March 31, 2004. In
pleadings before this Court, Orbe states that he makes no federal
constitutional claims in this action.

On March 10, 2004, the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond
denied Orbe’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction holding that it was
“without jurisdiction to grant the motion, pursuant to Virginia Code
§ 53,.1-232.1,” that Orbe’s claim ‘“‘is a habeas corpus claim and does
not lie in a declaratory judgment proceeding,” and that even “‘if the

court had jurisdiction and declaratory judgment was the proper pro-
ceeding, the court would find that [Orbe] could not demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits.” By order dated March 12, 2004,
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond dismissed the entire Bill
of Complaint, holding that Orbe’s claim “‘is a habeas corpus claim
which does not lie in a declaratory judgment proceeding, and that
[the court] is without jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus claims
brought by persons sentenced to death pursuant to Virginia Code
§ 8.01-654(C).”

On March 22, 2004, Orbe filed his notice of appeal from the
denial of a preliminary injunction and from the dismissal of the
entire Bill of Complaint. On appeal, Orbe asserts:

1. The circuit court erred in denying a preliminary injunction
on the ground that it supposedly lacked jurisdiction to do
so under Code § 53.1-232.1.

2. The circuit court erred in denying a preliminary injunction
on the ground that the issue in Plaintiff’s bill of complaint
for declaratory judgment supposedly was a habeas corpus
claim.

3. The circuit court erred in denying a preliminary injunction
on the ground that Plaintiff could not demonstrate a likeli-
hood of success on the merits.

4. The circuit court erred in dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the Plaintiff’s bill of complaint was a second
or successive habeas petition.

Orbe requests this Court to remand the declaratory judgment
action to the trial court for trial and to issue a preliminary injunction
or remand to the trial court with directions to enter such an injunc-
tion prohibiting the Commonwealth from “‘carrying out Orbe’s exe-
cution using their current protocol.”

Orbe’s bill of complaint is not a claim for habeas relief. See Den-
nis Mitchell Orbe v. William Page True, Warden, decided today.
Orbe’s action is one for declaratory judgment. However, it may not
be sustained. Because Orbe is deemed to have selected lethal injec-
tion rather than electrocution, he has waived any challenge to the
constitutionality of lethal injection under the Constitution of Virginia.
Orbe’s claim is based upon Article I, Sections 9 and 11, of the Con-
stitution of Virginia. He specifically disclaims any federal constitu-

562 Pe
a

tional claims. Under Virginia law, he cannot use a declaratory judg-
ment action to decide an issue he has waived by prior act.

Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 53.1-234, Orbe had the right
to choose whether his execution will be by lethal injection, as it is
administered in Virginia, or by electrocution. If the condemned pris-
oner has not made a choice by at least fifteen days prior to the sched-
uled execution, the statute provides that the method of execution
shall be by lethal injection. Under these circumstances, the con-
demned prisoner may affirmatively choose electrocution, affirma-
tively choose lethal injection, or choose the statutory consequences
of a failure to specify, namely, lethal injection. In any case, it is the
condemned prisoner’s choice.

We have previously held that execution of prisoners by electrocu-
tion does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172,
202, 563 S.E.2d 695, 715 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003);
Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 419, 437 S.E.2d 566, 569
(1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994),
cert. denied after remand, 514 U.S. 1085 (1995); Stockton v. Com-
monwealth, 241 Va. 192, 215, 402 S.E.2d 196, 209-10 (1991); Mar-
tin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 439, 271 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980);
Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 743-44, 109 SE. 582, 587
(1921). We take this occasion to hold that execution of prisoners by
electrocution also does not violate Article I, Sections 9 and 11, of the
Constitution of Virginia.

When a condemned prisoner has a choice of method of execu-
tion, the inmate may not choose a method and then complain of its
unconstitutionality, particularly when the constitutionality of the
alternative method has been established. In Stewart v. LaGrand, a
case involving a challenge to execution by lethal gas, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that

Walter LaGrand, by his actions, has waived his claim that exe-
cution by lethal gas is unconstitutional. At the time Walter
LaGrand was sentenced to death, lethal gas was the only
method of execution available in Arizona, but the State now
provides inmates a choice of execution by lethal gas or lethal
injection, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-704(B) (creating a default
rule of execution by lethal injection). Walter LaGrand was
afforded this choice and decided to be executed by lethal gas.
On March 1, 1999, Governor Hull of Arizona offered Walter

LaGrand an opportunity to rescind this decision and select
lethal injection as his method of execution. Walter LaGrand,
again, insisted that he desired to be executed by lethal gas. By
declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over the
state’s default form of execution — lethal injection — Walter
LaGrand has waived any objection he might have to it.

526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999).

Orbe’s circumstances are legally indistinguishable from those
presented to the United States Supreme Court in LaGrand. As previ-
ously discussed, under Code § 53.1-234, Orbe could have chosen
electrocution or he could have chosen lethal injection. Instead, he
chose to allow the statutory default provisions to apply. The Com-
monwealth did not make his choice. The Commonwealth only pro-
vided the choices for him, including the choice of allowing the
default provisions to apply. Orbe has waived any right he may have
to complain about lethal injection as it is administered in Virginia.

The effect of his waiver removes Orbe’s claims from those that
may be properly considered by declaratory judgment under Virginia
law. Declaratory judgment proceedings were not available at com-
mon law. This statutory cause of action is dependent upon “cases of
actual controversy.” Code § 8.01-184. Declaratory judgment is not
intended to provide advisory opinions. Erie Ins. Group v. Hughes,
240 Va. 165, 170, 393 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1990). Orbe’s waiver of the
right to contest the constitutionality of lethal injection as it is admin-
istered in Virginia removes the requirement of “actual controversy”
from the case. Simply stated, Orbe has no cognizable cause of action.

Additionally, a declaratory judgment action is not a substitute for
an appeal or collateral attack upon conviction. Declaratory judgment
“does not provide a means whereby previous judgments by state or
federal courts may be reexamined, nor is it a substitute for appeal or
post conviction remedies.” Shannon v. Sequeechi, 365 F.2d 827, 829
(10th Cir. 1966). “A declaratory judgment action is not part of the
criminal appellate process.” State v. Brooks, 728 N.E.2d 1119, 1122
(Ohio Ct. App. 1999). The issue Orbe presents in his declaratory
judgment action should have been raised before the trial court in
Orbe’s criminal case and on direct appeal from that judgment.

While the trial court erred in characterizing Orbe’s claim as one
for habeas corpus rather than declaratory judgment, the trial court did
not err in dismissing the action. It is unnecessary to address each of
Orbe’s assignments of error because they are predicated upon the

564 Le
a

legitimacy of the underlying declaratory judgment action itself.
Orbe’s appeal from the judgment orders of the trial court dated
March 10, 2004 and March 12, 2004 is denied. All of Orbe’s other
motions attendant to this appeal are denied.

JUSTICE LACY, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting.

In denying the petition for appeal, the majority states that Orbe’s
circumstances are “legally indistinguishable” from that in Stewart v.
LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115 (1999). In my opinion, the circumstances are
both factually and legally different.

Unlike LaGrand, where the issue was whether death by the
administration of any poisonous gas was cruel and inhuman punish-
ment, Orbe is complaining that the specific chemical protocol of the
Jethal injection to be used is the constitutional offender, not lethal
injection per se. Moreover, the defendant in LaGrand affirmatively
elected the specific method of execution of which he then com-
plained. Contrary to the view taken by the majority, Orbe did not
elect a method of execution.

The majority’s rationale is that by not exercising his right to
select the method of execution, Orbe effectively selected his method
of execution and, thus, waived his right to challenge the constitution-
ality of that method. I disagree.

Code § 53.1-234, in pertinent part, states: “The method of execu-
tion shall be chosen by the prisoner. In the event the prisoner refuses
to make a choice at least fifteen days prior to the scheduled execu-
tion, the method of execution shall be by lethal injection.” The
majority would add language to the statute to the effect that if “the
prisoner refuses to make a choice . . . he shall be deemed to have
selected lethal injection.” “But, courts are not permitted to add lan-
guage to a statute nor are they permitted to accomplish the same
result by judicial interpretation.” Shackleford v. Commonwealth, 262
Va. 196, 213, 547 S.E.2d 899, 909 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 511, 544
S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001). Rather, when the language of a statute is
unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain meaning of that lan-
guage and may not assign a construction that amounts to holding that
the General Assembly did not mean what it actually has stated. Wil-
liams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271, 576 S.E.2d 468, 470
(2003).

The plain meaning of Code § 53.1-234 is that where the prisoner
fails to make the selection between the two available methods of exe-

Le! 565
|

cution within the required time, the Commonwealth makes the selec-
tion of the method of execution. In the absence of an affirmative act
by the prisoner, there can be no waiver of the right to challenge the
constitutionality of the method of execution. Were this not the case,
then the rationale expressed by the majority would result in the
inability of a prisoner to challenge this statute under any circum-
stances. Accordingly, I would hold that Orbe has not waived his right
to challenge the constitutionality of the method of his execution.

The majority further holds that “a declaratory judgment action is
not a substitute for an appeal or collateral attack upon conviction.”
While I agree that this is a correct statement of the law with regard
to declaratory judgments, the majority misconstrues Orbe’s request
for declaratory judgment. Orbe expressly states that he is not chal-
lenging the legality of his conviction and sentence, but rather that he
is challenging the specific chemical protocol of the lethal injection to
be used to carry out that sentence.

Similarly, the majority’s assertion that “[t]he issue Orbe presents
in his declaratory judgment action should have been raised before the
trial court in Orbe’s criminal case and on direct appeal from that
judgment,” is unavailing in my opinion. I recognize that in LaGrand,
the Court held that the defendant’s failure to raise the question of the
constitutionality of lethal gas as a method of execution was barred by
his failure to raise that claim at the time of his direct appeal. How-
ever, at the time of LaGrand’s trial, lethal gas was the only method
of execution in use in Arizona. LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 117. The Court
further noted that

there was sufficient debate about the constitutionality of lethal
gas executions that Walter LaGrand cannot show cause for his
failure to raise this claim. Arguments concerning the constitu-
tionality of lethal gas have existed since its introduction as a
method of execution in Nevada in 1921. In the period immedi-
ately prior to Walter LaGrand’s direct appeal, a number of
states were reconsidering the use of execution by lethal gas,
and two United States Supreme Court Justices had expressed
their views that this method of execution was unconstitutional.
In addition, lethal gas executions have been documented since
1937, when San Quentin introduced it as an execution method,
and studies of the effect of execution by lethal gas date back to
the 1950s.

LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 119-20 (internal citations omitted).

566 Le!
Le

Here, the record shows that the debate about the efficacy of the
specific chemical protocol of the lethal injection has only recently
arisen. Moreover, the Commonwealth only provided Orbe with the
particulars of the protocol less than a month ago. Thus, even assum-
ing that Orbe could have raised his challenge to the method of exe-
cution at trial, but see People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544, 578 (Cal.
1999) (holding that a challenge on direct appeal to the legality of the
method of execution for a death sentence must be “rejected out of
hand” because it does not challenge “the validity of the sentence
itself”), under these circumstances I would hold that there was
“cause and prejudice to excuse the default,” LaGrand, 526 U.S. at
117, arising from his failure to do so.

In the case of Nelson v. Campbell, 347 F.3d 910 (11th Cir.), cert.
granted, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 835 (2003), presently on review
before the United States Supreme Court, the principal issue to be
determined is whether a prisoner may challenge the method of his
execution through a civil proceeding. While I recognize that the
issues in Nelson relate to federal law and the federal constitution, the
similarity of that case to the circumstances and procedures here are
undeniable.

Given that “[t]he awesome severity of a sentence of death makes
it qualitatively different from all other sanctions,” Satterwhite v.
Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 262 (1987) (Marshall, J. concurring), and cog-
nizant of the fact that the forthcoming decision in Nelson may inform
our decision, I believe that the proper course in this case would be to
grant the appeal and award a stay of execution, so that the Court
might have time to more fully explore the issues raised herein.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

This order shall be certified to the said circuit court.

A Copy,

Teste:

Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court
Building in the City of Richmond on Wednesday, the 31st day of
March, 2004.

Dennis Mitchell Orbe, Appellant,

against Record No. 040598
Circuit Court No, CH-04-419-1

Gene M. Johnson, Director, Virginia
Department of Corrections, et al., Appellees.

Upon a Petition for Rehearing

Dennis Mitchell Orbe petitions for rehearing of the Court’s order
denying his appeal. Rule 5:20 permits the filing of a petition to
rehear; however, a Petition for Rehearing may not raise issues that
were not presented in the Petition for Appeal. Orbe raises federal
constitutional issues for the first time in his Petition for Rehearing. In
his petition for appeal, he specifically disclaimed any federal consti-
tutional basis for his appeal. Rather, he proceeded exclusively under
Article I, Sections 9 and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. Under
our Rules, Orbe is barred from advancing new issues in his Petition
for Rehearing under Rule 5:20.

On consideration of the petition of the appellant to set aside the
judgment rendered herein on the 30th day of March, 2004 and grant
a rehearing thereof, the prayer of the said petition is denied.

A Copy,

Teste:
QOna. {ry

Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk

568 TC
PF

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court
Building in the City of Richmond on Wednesday, the 31st day of
March, 2004.

Dennis Mitchell Orbe, Appellant,
against Record No. 040673

Gene M. Johnson, Director, Virginia
Department of Corrections, et al., Appellees.

Appellant did not move to proceed in forma pauperis. Nonethe-
less, we grant him the right to do so.

Yesterday, the Court denied Dennis Mitchell Orbe’s Petition for
Appeal from a dismissal of his Bill of Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond. Orbe v. Johnson, et al., Record No. 040598 (March 30,
2004). The Court denied his petition for rehearing today. His prior
action sought an adjudication that the particular method of imple-
mentation of lethal injection employed by the Commonwealth and
anticipated to be utilized in his execution “‘constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment and violates due process of law under Article I, Sec-
tions 9 and 11, of the Constitution of Virginia.” Additionally, Orbe
requested the issuance of a permanent injunction “barring [the Com-
monwealth] from carrying out [his] execution using a protocol that
will cause unnecessary pain.” In a separate motion, Orbe requested
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunc-
tion “to protect the status quo ante” and enjoining the Common-
wealth from carrying out Orbe’s execution currently scheduled to be
carried out at 9:00 p.m. tonight. Orbe raised no federal constitutional
questions in his prior appeal. We dismissed the appeal for the reasons
stated in the order.

Orbe has filed another Bill of Complaint for Declaratory Judg-
ment and Injunctive Relief in the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond. The trial court denied the request for injunctive relief and dis-
missed the Bill of Complaint for Declaratory Judgment.

Le 569
|

Orbe appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court maintaining
that “(t]he circuit court erred in denying a temporary restraining
order and dismissing Orbe’s federal constitutional claims.” The trial
court did not err in refusing to grant injunctive relief that would stay
Orbe’s execution. Pursuant to Code § 53.1-232.1, “[oJnce an execu-
tion date is scheduled, a stay of execution may be granted by the trial
court or the Supreme Court of Virginia only upon a showing of sub-
stantial grounds for habeas corpus relief.” The “trial court” referred
to in Code § 53.1-232.1 is the sentencing court, in this case, the Cir-
cuit Court of York County. The Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond does not have the power to issue an injunction staying Orbe’s
execution. While a court ordinarily has the power to issue orders
necessary to preserve its own jurisdiction, that power has been
expressly limited by the General Assembly when the subject matter
is the stay of an already scheduled execution. Additionally, Orbe
does not demonstrate “‘substantial grounds for habeas corpus relief.”
Rather, he has filed an action for declaratory judgment.

Additionally and independently, as more fully explained below,
Orbe may not maintain an action for declaratory judgment under Vir-
ginia law. Consequently, relief ancillary to an improper bill of com-
plaint cannot be granted. A declaratory judgment action is not a sub-
stitute for an appeal or collateral attack upon conviction. Declaratory
judgment “does not provide a means whereby previous judgments by
state or federal courts may be reexamined, nor is it a substitute for
appeal or post conviction remedies.” Shannon v. Sequeechi, 365 F.2d
827, 829 (10th Cir. 1966). “‘A declaratory judgment action is not part
of the criminal appellate process.” State v. Brooks, 728 N.E.2d 1119,
1122 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). The issue Orbe presents in his declara-
tory judgment action should have been raised before the trial court in
Orbe’s criminal case and on direct appeal from that judgment.

Also and independently, declaratory judgment does not lie under
Virginia law when there is no actual controversy. Orbe has removed
the actual controversy by his selection of the method of execution.
Pursuant to the provisions of Code § 53.1-234, Orbe had the right to
choose whether his execution will be by lethal injection, as it is
administered in Virginia, or by electrocution. If the condemned pris-
oner has not made a choice by at least fifteen days prior to the sched-
uled execution, the statute provides that the method of execution
shall be by lethal injection. Under these circumstances, the con-
demned prisoner may affirmatively choose electrocution, affirma-
tively choose lethal injection, or choose the statutory consequences

570 Fe
Pe

of a failure to specify, namely, lethal injection. In any case, it is the
condemned prisoner’s choice.

We have previously held that execution of prisoners by electrocu-
tion does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172,
202, 563 S.E.2d 695, 715 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003);
Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 419, 437 S.E.2d 566, 569
(1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994),
cert. denied after remand, 514 U.S. 1085 (1995); Stockton v. Com-
monwealth, 241 Va. 192, 215, 402 S.E.2d 196, 209-10 (1991); Mar-
tin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 439, 271 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980);
Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 743-44, 109 S.E. 582, 587
(1921). When a condemned prisoner has a choice of method of exe-
cution, the inmate may not choose a method and then complain of its
unconstitutionality, particularly when the constitutionality of the
alternative method has been established.

In Stewart v. LaGrand, a case involving a challenge to execution
by lethal gas, the Supreme Court of the United States held that:

Walter LaGrand, by his actions, has waived his claim that
execution by lethal gas is unconstitutional. At the time Walter
LaGrand was sentenced to death, lethal gas was the only
method of execution available in Arizona, but the State now
provides inmates a choice of execution by lethal gas or lethal
injection, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-704(B) (creating a default
tule of execution by lethal injection). Walter LaGrand was
afforded this choice and decided to be executed by lethal gas.
On March 1, 1999, Governor Hull of Arizona offered Walter
LaGrand an opportunity to rescind this decision and select
lethal injection as his method of execution. Walter LaGrand,
again, insisted that he desired to be executed by lethal gas. By
declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over the
state’s default form of execution — lethal injection — Walter
LaGrand has waived any objection he might have to it.

526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999).

Orbe’s circumstances are legally indistinguishable from those
presented to the United States Supreme Court in LaGrand. As previ-
ously discussed, under Code § 53.1-234, Orbe could have chosen
electrocution or he could have chosen lethal injection. Instead, he
chose to allow the statutory default provisions to apply. The Com-

Le 571
a

monwealth did not make his choice. The Commonwealth only pro-
vided the choices for him, including the choice of allowing the
default provisions to apply. Orbe has waived any right he may have
to complain about lethal injection as it is administered in Virginia.

The effect of his waiver removes Orbe’s claims from those that
may be properly considered by declaratory judgment under Virginia
law. Declaratory judgment proceedings were not available at com-
mon law. This statutory cause of action arises only “[i]n cases of
actual controversy.” Code § 8.01-184. Declaratory judgment is not
intended to provide advisory opinions. Erie Ins. Group v. Hughes,
240 Va. 165, 170, 393 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1990). Orbe’s waiver of the
right to contest the constitutionality of lethal injection as it is admin-
istered in Virginia removes the requirement of ‘“‘actual controversy”
from the case. Simply stated, Orbe has no cognizable cause of action
under Virginia law.

In his prior Bill of Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Orbe
based his claims entirely upon Article I, Sections 9 and 11 of the
Constitution of Virginia. He presents virtually the same claims in this
declaratory judgment action except that he bases his claims upon the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion. We find his claims without merit.

In summary, Orbe may not maintain an action for declaratory
judgment under Virginia law because he may not use declaratory
judgment as a substitute for appeal or habeas corpus. He should have
taised these issues before the trial court during his criminal trial and
on appeal from his conviction. Additionally and as an independent
basis for this Court’s judgment, Orbe waived any right he may have
had to challenge lethal injection as it is administered in Virginia
because he had a choice among lethal injection, electrocution, or the
default of lethal injection provided by statute upon his refusal to
specify. For this reason there is no controversy upon which declara-
tory judgment may properly lie. Finally, and independently, the trial
court did not err in refusing to grant injunctive relief staying the exe-
cution. The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond has no jurisdiction
under Code § 53.1-232.1 to grant such relief.

Orbe’s appeal from the judgment order of the trial court dated
March 31, 2004 is denied. His request that this Court enter a stay of
execution is denied.

572 FC
PC

JUSTICE LACY, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ joins, dissenting.

We would grant the appeal and proceed in the manner and for the
reasons expressed in the dissent filed in Orbe v. Johnson, et al., Case
No. 040598, filed March 30, 2004.

This order shall be certified to the said circuit court.

A Copy,

Teste:
QA. \L25

Patricia H. Krueger, Clerk

573

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
V.

Kevin LAMONT Hicks
Record No. 011728
April 23, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and Lemons, JJ.,
and Compton, S.J.

NS
wn

Lee 575
|

William E. Thro, Deputy State Solicitor (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attor-
ney General; William H. Hurd, State Solicitor; Maureen Riley Mat-
sen, Deputy State Solicitor, on briefs), for appellant.

Amanda Frost (Steven D. Benjamin; Betty Layne DesPortes;
Brian Wolfman; Benjamin & DesPortes; Public Citizen Litigation
Group, on brief), for appellee.

Amicus Curiae: William G. Broaddus; City of Richmond and
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority john A. Rupp,
City Attorney; Norman B. Sales, Senior Assistant City Attorney;
William H. Baxter, Il; McGuireWoods, on briefs), in support of
appellant.

Amicus Curiae: Housing and Development Law Institute (Adam
N. Harrell, Jr.; Lisa Walker Scott; Harrell & Chambliss, on brief), in
support of appellant.

Amicus Curiae: American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc.
(Rebecca K. Glenberg, on brief), in support of appellee.

Amicus Curiae: The Thomas Jefferson Center for The Protection
of Free Expression (J. Joshua Wheeler; Robert M. O’Neil, on brief)
in support of appellee.

Amicus Curiae: Richmond Tenants Organization, Charlottesville
Public Housing Association of Residents, and ENPHRONT (Sylvia
M. Brennan; Hong Tran; Joshua N. Auerbach; Debra Gardner;
National Housing Law Project; Northwest Justice Project; Public Jus-
tice Center, on brief), in support of appellee.

CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
L

In this proceeding, which has been remanded to this Court from
the Supreme Court of the United States, we consider whether a rede-
velopment and housing authority’s trespass policy is void for vague-

576 Leer
a

ness under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and whether that policy violates a defendant’s right of intimate
association guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

IL.

In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 264 Va. 48, 58, 563 S.E.2d 674, 680
(2002)', we held that a trespass policy implemented by the Richmond
Redevelopment and Housing Authority (Housing Authority) was
overly broad and, therefore, violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court disagreed with our holding and concluded that the
challenged policy was not overly broad in violation of the First
Amendment. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, __, 123 S.Ct. 2191,
2199 (2003). The Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court so
that we could consider whether Hicks may challenge his conviction
on other bases, assuming that those claims had been properly pre-
served. This Court entered an order directing Hicks and the Com-
monwealth to identify issues that had been asserted in the circuit
court that the litigants thought had been preserved for this Court’s
consideration. Subsequently, this Court entered an order directing the
litigants to address the following questions:

“1. Whether the Housing Authority’s trespass policy vio-
lates appellee’s right of association in violation of the First
Amendment?

“2. Whether the Housing Authority’s trespass policy is
unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to appellee?

“3. Whether the Housing Authority’s trespass policy vio-
lates appellee’s [rights to] freedom of intimate association in
contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment?”

The litigants agree, in view of the Supreme Court’s holding that
the Housing Authority’s trespass policy did not affect Hicks’ First
Amendment right to expressive association, that this Court need not

' Hicks was charged with trespass in violation of Code § 18.2-119, and he was convicted in
the City of Richmond General District Court. He appealed the convictions to the Circuit Court
of the City of Richmond where he was convicted. He appealed the judgment to the Court of
Appeals. A. panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, Hicks v. Commonwealth, 33
Va. App. 561, 535 $.B.2d 678 (2000), but the Court of Appeals, en banc, disagreed with the
panel and vacated Hicks’ conviction because the Housing Authority’s trespass policy contra-
vened the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Hicks v.
Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 49, 52, 548 S.E.2d 249, 251 (2001).

Le 577
a

consider the first question stated above. Therefore, we limit our con-
sideration to the remaining questions set forth in this Court’s order.

I.

The Housing Authority is a political subdivision of the Common-
wealth of Virginia. The Housing Authority owns and operates several
housing developments in the City of Richmond for low-income
residents, including a housing development known as Whitcomb
Court.

In an effort to eradicate illegal drug activity in its housing devel-
opments, including Whitcomb Court which was described as an
“open-air drug market,” the Housing Authority decided to deny
access to its property to persons who did not have legitimate reasons
to visit the housing developments. The majority of persons who had
been arrested for drug crimes at the Whitcomb Court housing devel-
opment were people who did not reside there.

The Richmond City Council enacted an ordinance that “closed to
public use and travel and abandoned as streets of the City of Rich-
mond,” streets and sidewalks in Whitcomb Court because the streets
and sidewalks were “no longer needed for the public convenience.”
The City conveyed the streets and sidewalks by recorded deed to the
Housing Authority.

The Housing Authority, in its capacity as owner of the private
streets and sidewalks, authorized

“each and every Richmond Police Department officer to serve
notice, either orally or in writing, to any person who is found
on Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority property
when such person is not a resident, employee, or such person
cannot demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose for
being on the premises. Such notice shall forbid the person
from returning to the property. Finally, Richmond Redevelop-
ment and Housing Authority authorizes Richmond Police
Department officers to arrest any person for trespassing after
such person, having been duly notified, either stays upon or
returns to Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority
property.”

Defendant, Kevin Lamont Hicks, was convicted in the City of
Richmond General District Court for trespass upon the Housing
Authority’s property on December 12, 1997. The general district
court sentenced Hicks on February 10, 1998.

Gloria S. Rogers, a manager for the Housing Authority, gave
Hicks a letter dated April 14, 1998. The letter states in part:

“This letter serves to inform you that effective immedi-
ately you are not welcome on Richmond Redevelopment and
Housing Authority’s Whitcomb Court or any Richmond Rede-
velopment and Housing Authority property. This letter is an
official notice informing you that you are not to trespass on
[the Housing Authority’s] property. If you are seen or caught
on the premises, you will be subject to arrest by the police.

“A copy of this notice is on file and another copy will be
provided to the Richmond Police Department for [its] record.

“Virginia Code, Section 18.2-119
“Trespass After Having Been Forbidden to do
So

“If any person without authority of law goes
upon or remains upon the lands, buildings, or
premises of another, or any part, portion or area
thereof, after having been forbidden to do so, either
orally or in writing by the owner, lessee, custodian,
or other person lawfully in charge thereof, or after
having forbidden to do so by a sign or signs posted.
... on such lands, buildings, premises or portion of
area thereof at a place or places where it may be
reasonably seen . .. he and/or she shall be guilty of
a Class I Misdemeanor.

“Thank you for your cooperation.

“Sincerely,
“[Signed Gloria S. Rogers]
“Housing Manager

“[Whitcomb]
“Development

“I, the undersigned, acknowledge receipt of this

notice.
“[Signed Kevin Hicks] [4-14-98]
“Signature Date received

“[Signed Alfonzo Joyner] [4-14-98]
“Witnessing Officer Date”

Even though Hicks signed and received the letter dated April 14,
1998 informing him that he could not appear on the Housing Author-
ity’s property, he re-entered the property and was arrested for tres-
pass by the Richmond Police Department on April 20, 1998. He
appeared in the City of Richmond General District Court on June 26,
1998, and he was convicted of trespass in violation of Code § 18.2-
119.

On January 20, 1999, Richmond Police officer, James Laino, was
driving his police cruiser in the Whitcomb Court housing develop-
ment. He observed Hicks, whom he had known from previous
encounters. Laino had been present when Hicks was arrested for a
prior trespass offense on the Housing Authority’s property.

Officer Laino stopped his “police car and started to speak with
Mr. Hicks. [Laino] said, ‘I know you’re not supposed to be out
here.’ ” Hicks responded that he was “just getting pampers for his
baby.” Laino issued a summons to Hicks for trespassing. During
Hicks’ bench trial in the circuit court, Officer Laino testified that the
buildings at the Whitcomb Court housing development where the
defendant was arrested for trespass contained “red and white” signs
that stated that the streets in Whitcomb Court “are privatized and all
the property is privatized, no trespass.”

Gloria Rogers gave the following testimony during the trial:

“Q: All right. Please tell the Court, has [Hicks] come and
have you banned him from the [Housing Authority’s]
property?

“A: Yes.

“Q: All right. Please tell the Court how that came about.

“A: It came about in two respects. Number one —.. .

“Number one, when the police see a person in the devel-
opment and they say that they live someplace, they confirm
with the office. And Kevin Hicks, they quite often saw him in
the development and he gave them an address and I would pull
the file and confirm he didn’t live there.

“Secondly, because of the domestic violence in the
development.

“THE COURT: . . . Ma’am, have you told him to stay off
the property before?

“THE WITNESS: Yes.

“THE COURT: How many times?

580 Ln
|

“THE WITNESS: I talked to Kevin Hicks in person
twice.”

The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond convicted Hicks of
trespass in violation of Code § 18.2-119. This conviction is the sub-
ject of this remand from the Supreme Court.

Iv.
A.

Hicks argues that the Housing Authority’s trespass policy is
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.? He asserts that the Housing
Authority’s trespass policy grants its employees and police officers
“sweeping powers to define as criminal the innocent conduct of
using streets and sidewalks near public housing.” Continuing, Hicks
claims that the Housing Authority’s trespass policy is similar to an
anti-loitering ordinance that the Supreme Court of the United States
held was invalid in Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
Responding, the Commonwealth asserts that Hicks may not chal-
lenge whether the trespass policy is unconstitutionally vague because
his conduct was clearly proscribed by that policy, and the ordinance
that the Supreme Court invalidated in Morales is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the Housing Authority’s trespass policy.

HM The Supreme Court, in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoff-
man Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982), stated the following princi-
ples which are pertinent to our resolution of this proceeding:

“In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of
a law, a court’s first task is to determine whether the enact-
ment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must
fail. The court should then examine the facial vagueness chal-
lenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitution-
ally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the
enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A
plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly pro-
scribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore

2 Hicks also argues that the Housing Authority’s trespass policy violates Article 1, Section 8
of the Constitution of Virginia. Hicks did not make this argument in the circuit court and,
therefore, we will not consider it.

Le 581
a

examine the complainant’s conduct before analyzing other
hypothetical applications of the law.”

Id. at 494-95 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Supreme Court
stated in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974), that: “One to
whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully chal-
lenge it for vagueness.” Accord Gibson v. Mayor of Wilmington, 355
F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2004); Fuller v. Decatur Public School Board
of Education School District 61, 251 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2001);
Joel v. Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1063-64 (6th Cir. 1999); Woodis v. Westark
Community College, 160 F.3d 435, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1997); Love v. Butler,
952 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1991); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of
the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hill v. City of
Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1127 (Sth Cir. 1986), aff’d, 482 U.S. 451
(1987); Gallaher v. City of Huntington, 759 F.2d 1155, 1160 (4th Cir.
1985).

HH It is clear that Hicks, who was engaged in conduct prohib-
ited by the Housing Authority’s trespass policy, may not complain
that the policy is purportedly vague. Hicks was arrested and con-
victed for violation of Code § 18.2-119, which states in relevant part:

“Tf any person without authority of law goes upon or
remains upon the lands, buildings or premises of another, or
any portion or area thereof, after having been forbidden to do
so, either orally or in writing, by the owner, lessee, custodian
or other person lawfully in charge thereof, or after having been
forbidden to do so by a sign or signs posted by such persons
. .. he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”

Prior to the conviction that is involved in this proceeding, Hicks had
been convicted of two other charges of criminal trespass on the
Housing Authority’s property in violation of Code § 18.2-119. Hicks
had also received a hand-delivered letter, which he signed and
acknowledged, that directed him not to return to the Housing Author-
ity’s property. That letter also informed Hicks that if he returned to
the Housing Authority’s property, he would be prosecuted for tres-
pass. Hicks cannot now complain that the Housing Authority’s tres-
pass policy is somehow vague. Certainly, as to him, the Housing
Authority’s trespass policy could not have been any clearer.

582 Le
|

The Supreme Court’s decision in Morales does not support
Hicks’ contention that he may assert that the Housing Authority’s
trespass policy is facially unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Morales simply has no application to this case.

The facts in Morales are as follows. The Chicago City Council
enacted an ordinance that prohibited “criminal street gang members”
from “loitering” with one another or with other persons in any pub-
lic place. The ordinance created a criminal offense punishable by a
fine not to exceed $500, imprisonment for not more than six months,
and a requirement that anyone convicted of violating the ordinance
perform a maximum of 120 hours of community service. Commis-
sion of the crime involved four elements: a police officer must rea-
sonably believe that at least one of two or more persons present in a
public place is a criminal street gang member; the persons must be
“Joitering” which was defined as “remaining in any one place with
no apparent purpose”; “the officer must then order ‘all’ the persons
to disperse and remove themselves ‘from the area’ ”’; and the “‘per-
son must disobey the officer’s order.” The ordinance defined “public
place” as “‘the public way and any other location open to the public,
whether publicly or privately owned.” 527 U.S. at 45-47.

The Supreme Court recognized that

“the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the ‘lib-
erty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We have expressly identified this ‘right to
remove from one place to another according to inclination’ as
‘an attribute of personal liberty’ protected by the Constitu-
tion. . . . Indeed, it is apparent that an individual’s decision to
remain in a public place of his choice is as much a part of his
liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is ‘a
part of our heritage,’ . . . or the right to move ‘to whatsoever
place one’s own inclination may direct’ identified in Black-
stone’s Commentaries. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 130 (1765).”

527 USS. at 53-54 (citations omitted).
In Morales, the Supreme Court permitted the defendants to assert
a facial challenge based upon vagueness to the ordinance:

“For it is clear that the vagueness of this enactment makes a
facial challenge appropriate. This is not an ordinance that
‘simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter
requirement.’ See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman

Le 583

Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). It is a criminal law
that contains no mens rea requirement, see Colautti v. Frank-
lin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979), and infringes on constitutionally
protected rights . . . . When vagueness permeates the text of
such a law, it is subject to facial attack.”

Id. at 55.

Unlike the ordinance that was implicated in Morales, Hicks was
convicted of violation of a criminal trespass statute, Code § 18.2-119,
which has an intent requirement because the Commonwealth was
required to prove that Hicks committed an act of intentional trespass.
See Reed v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 65, 70-71, 366 S.E.2d 274,
278 (1988). Also, unlike the ordinance in Morales, the Housing
Authority’s trespass policy is not a penal ordinance. The Housing
Authority’s policy is intended to regulate the behavior of people who
appear on private property owned by the Housing Authority, which
provides safe and affordable housing for low- and moderate-income
individuals. The Housing Authority’s trespass policy is not a penal
ordinance and, indeed, one could be arrested and convicted for tres-
pass on the Housing Authority’s privately-owned property even if the
trespass policy did not exist. And, unlike the ordinance in Morales
that affected persons on public property, the Housing Authority’s
trespass policy only applies to persons who commit acts of inten-
tional criminal trespass upon the Housing Authority’s privately-
owned real property.

B.

Hicks argues that the Housing Authority’s trespass policy violates
his right to freedom of intimate association with his family guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Continuing, Hicks states that he “was permanently prohibited from
visiting his mother and his children in their homes [in Whitcomb
Court] simply because a government official decided, without provid-
ing [him] any procedural protections or even an explanation, that [he]
did not have a ‘legitimate purpose’ to be on the streets and sidewalks
near the Whitcomb Court housing project.” Hicks says that this gov-
ernmental intrusion violates his constitutional right of association
with his family members. We disagree.

HM The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part: “No
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The right to
create and maintain certain intimate or private relationships is guar-

anteed under the substantive due process component of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme
Court has stated:

“The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of
Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford
the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly per-
sonal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State. E.g., Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Without precisely identifying every con-
sideration that may underlie this type of constitutional protec-
tion, we have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have
played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation
by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the
individual and the power of the State. See, e.g., Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-386 (1978); Moore v. East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). . . .
Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships
reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their
emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting
these relationships from unwarranted state interference there-
fore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s iden-
tity that is central to any concept of liberty. . . .

“The personal affiliations that exemplify these considera-
tions, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on
the relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitu-
tional protection, are those that attend the creation and suste-
nance of a family — marriage . . . ; the raising and education of
children . . . ; and cohabitation with one’s relatives.”

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (cita-
tions omitted). The Supreme Court has also stated that:

“Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing
of children are among associational rights this Court has
ranked as ‘of basic importance in our society,’ Boddie [v. Con-
necticut], 401 U.S. [371] at 376 [(1971)], rights sheltered by
the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s unwarranted
usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.”

eee! 585
a

MLB. v. SLJ. 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996); accord Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).

Hl We conclude, based upon the facts in the record before this
Court that Hicks, who purportedly was delivering diapers to the
mother of his child at a specific location, has not established the
existence of an intimate relationship between Hicks and his child or
Hicks and his mother. The record simply does not support such con-
clusion. However, assuming the existence of an intimate relationship,
we hold that this right of intimate association is not without limita-
tions. Certainly, Hicks does not have the constitutional right to visit
either his mother or his child at the Housing Authority’s private
property where he has been barred because of his prior criminal con-
duct. Hicks’ alleged right of intimate association does not permit him
to commit intentional acts of criminal trespass upon property owned
by the Housing Authority.

HM We also note that the Housing Authority’s trespass policy
does not impair any rights of intimate association that Hicks may
have with his mother or his child. Hicks remains free to exercise
whatever rights of intimate association he may possess with his
mother and his child; he simply may not do so on property owned by
the Housing Authority. The Housing Authority’s trespass policy does
not prevent Hicks from developing and nurturing those relationships.
Rather, the Housing Authority’s policy, when enforced in conjunc-
tion with Virginia’s criminal trespass statutes, bars trespassers from
entering the Housing Authority’s property.

VI.

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, and we will enter a final judgment affirming the conviction
of trespass entered by the circuit court.

Reversed and final judgment.

6
FC

COMMISSARY CONCEPTS MANAGEMENT CorpP., ET AL.
v.
FALAKI MZIGUIR
Record No. 031233
April 23, 2004
Present: All the Justices

John A. Keats for appellants.
Benjamin D. Pelton (Sean O’Malie; Pelton, Balland, Demsky,
Baskin & O’Malie, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Falaki Mziguir filed a malicious prosecution action against Com-
missary Concepts Management Corporation (Commissary Concepts)
and Generous George’s Positive Pizza, Inc.* The jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of Mziguir awarding him $25,175 in compensatory
damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. Commissary Concepts
and Generous George’s Positive Pizza, Inc. filed this appeal, assert-
ing that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a finding of
malicious prosecution and that the jury’s damage awards were
excessive.

Since Mziguir obtained a jury verdict that the trial court
approved, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to him
in determining whether there was evidence to support the verdict.
Stanley v. Webber, 260 Va. 90, 92, 531 S.E.2d 311, 312-13 (2000).

* Mziguir’s motion for judgment initially included counts of false imprisonment and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and named Mary Holder as a defendant. Mziguir non-
suited the additional counts prior to trial, and the trial court granted Holder’s motion to dismiss
following the close of Mziguir’s evidence.

8S
PC

Commissary Concepts provided management services for and
supervised the daily operation of Generous George’s pizza restaurant.
Mary Holder was the chief operating officer and chief financial
officer for Commissary Concepts and Todd J. Kamber was the gen-
eral manager of the restaurant. Mziguir was employed as a manager
at the restaurant.

The restaurant’s standard operating procedure required that the
manager on duty at the close of business fill out a daily sales recon-
ciliation form, complete a deposit slip for the deposit of the money
received that day, and put the slip and the money in the restaurant’s
safe. The manager on duty the following morning was responsible
for depositing the funds in the bank.

On October 13, 2000, Kamber met with Mziguir and the restau-
rant’s other managers to discuss recent problems with missing funds,
including funds missing during Mziguir’s shifts. At that meeting,
Kamber told the group that he would “catch” the person taking the
money and “prosecute him.”

On October 16, 2000, Kamber, as the manager on duty at the
close of business, filled out the daily reports and a deposit slip and
put the deposit slip and money in the safe. Mziguir was on duty the
following day. Due to the high volume of business at the restaurant,
Maziguir did not make the bank deposit until early afternoon. When
he took the deposit to the bank, the teller informed him that the
deposit contained more cash than the deposit slip indicated. Mziguir
took the excess money in cash, amounting to $297, back to the res-
taurant where he put the bank envelope containing the excess money
into another envelope, on which he wrote “Don’t open 10/17/00 To
Mary Holder.”’ He then put both envelopes inside the safe at the res-
taurant. Although Holder was at the restaurant throughout the day
and early evening, Mziguir did not mention the money to her or any-
one else at the restaurant for the remainder of the day.

The following morning, Commissary Concepts’ accounting staff
discovered the $297 discrepancy between the deposit slip and the
daily sales reconciliation paperwork. When the staff told Holder of
the missing money, she discussed the matter with Kamber and con-
tacted the bank. The bank informed her that $297 had been returned
to Mziguir.

Mziguir was not at the restaurant that day because he was not
scheduled to work until October 19. Holder did not discuss the mat-
ter with him. Kamber and Holder searched the office area and the
office safe but did not find the missing money. Holder authorized
Kamber to contact the police. When Officer Rick Elkins arrived at

EE
PT

the restaurant and interviewed Holder and Kamber, they told Elkins
about the missing money and the information they received from the
bank. They also told Elkins that they suspected that Mziguir had
“possibly embezzled” the money and that the management of the
testaurant was “interested in proceeding forward with charges . . . if
this offense was found to be valid.”

Elkins left the restaurant and conducted an interview with the
bank teller who repeated the course of events to him. Based on these
conversations, Elkins obtained a warrant from a magistrate for the
arrest of Mziguir.

On the morning of October 19, 2000, Elkins served Mziguir with
the arrest warrant at his apartment, handcuffed him, walked him
through his apartment building, and took him by police car to the
Alexandria police station. At the police station, Mziguir told Elkins
that he did not take the money from the business and that the cash
was in the safe at the restaurant. Elkins testified that Mziguir said
that he “felt he was being set up and that he hid it until he could talk
to somebody else about the money.” Elkins telephoned Holder, ask-
ing her to search the safe again for the missing money. Holder did
not locate the money until Mziguir gave her specific instructions
regarding where in the safe he had put the money. Holder informed
the officer that the money was in an envelope inside some documents
in a part of the safe where money was not normally kept. At that
point, Elkins and Holder agreed that the charges against Mziguir
would be dropped.

DISCUSSION

Hl In an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing that the prosecution was malicious, instituted by
or with the cooperation of the defendant, without probable cause, and
terminated in a manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff. Lee v. South-
land Corp., 219 Va. 23, 26, 244 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978). Commissary
Concepts contends that the evidence in this case was insufficient to
support a finding of malicious prosecution because Mziguir did not
establish that the prosecution was malicious, instituted without prob-
able cause, and with Commissary Concepts’ cooperation.

HM Malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause, but a
lack of probable cause cannot be inferred from malice. Bill Edwards
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Carey, 219 Va. 90, 100, 244 S.E.2d 767, 773
(1978). Accordingly, we begin by considering whether the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. We have
defined probable cause, in the context of malicious prosecution, as

0
Fe

“ ‘knowledge of such a state of facts and circumstances as excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on such facts and circumstances,
that the plaintiff is guilty of the crime of which he is suspected.’ ”
Id. at 97, 244 S.E.2d at 772, quoting Virginia R. & P. Co. v. Klaff,
123 Va. 260, 266, 96 S.E. 244, 246 (1918). Whether probable cause
existed is determined as of the time when the complained of action
was taken. Jd, at 98, 244 S.E.2d at 773.

HM A person who is entrusted with possession of another per-
son’s property and who converts such property to his own use or
benefit is guilty of the statutory offense of embezzlement. Code
§ 18.2-111; Evans v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 292, 297, 308 S.E.2d
126, 129 (1983). When Holder suggested to Officer Elkins that
Mziguir may have embezzled the missing money, Holder knew that
the bank teller discussed with Mziguir the discrepancy between the
amount of money in the deposit and the amount of money the
deposit slip listed and that Mziguir had not deposited the excess
funds in the bank but had left the bank with the funds in his posses-
sion. Officer Elkins independently confirmed these facts when he
talked to the bank teller. Holder knew that she had seen Mziguir at
the restaurant following his return from the bank and that Mziguir
had not mentioned the deposit discrepancy or the excess funds to her
that day. Holder knew that the restaurant’s policy required employees
to report discrepancies of more than $10 to management. Finally,
Holder knew that money had been missing previously during
Mzguir’s shifts.

These circumstances would “excite the belief in a reasonable
mind” that Mziguir had embezzled the missing funds. He had not
deposited the funds in the bank, had taken the funds from the bank,
and had not told anyone that the funds were in the restaurant’s safe,
although he was at the restaurant throughout the remainder of the
day. Accordingly, we find the evidence insufficient as a matter of
law to support a finding that the prosecution against Mziguir was
instituted without probable cause. Thus, the trial court erred in deny-
ing Commissary Concepts’ motion to strike the evidence and motion
to set aside the jury verdict. In light of this holding, we need not
address the remaining assignments of error.

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and
enter final judgment here.

Reversed and final judgment.

591

JONATHAN R. DANDRIDGE
Vv.

ALBERT R. MARSHALL
Record No. 031457

April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

5

92

Martin R. Johnson (John H. Herbig; Parker, Pollard & Brown,
on briefs), for appellant.

D. Cameron Beck, Jr. (Kathleen L. Rhoades; Morris and Morris,
on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Jonathan R. Dandridge filed a personal injury action against
Albert R. Marshall seeking damages of $300,000. In this appeal,
Dandridge asserts that due to the trial court’s error in three of its
evidentiary rulings, the jury awarded him only $15,000. For the rea-
sons we state below, we will remand the case for a new trial on

es 593
pC

damages because the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony
and allowing other testimony.

Facts

On December 5, 1999, Dandridge and Marshall were involved in
an automobile accident. An ambulance service transported Dan-
dridge, complaining of nausea, blurred vision, and a severe headache,
to the Medical College of Virginia Hospital for treatment.

Dandridge filed a motion for judgment alleging that Marshall’s
negligence caused the accident. Prior to trial, Marshall admitted lia-
bility but contested the extent of Dandridge’s injuries stemming from
the accident. The case was submitted to the jury on the issue of dam-
ages only.

At trial, Dandridge testified that he had suffered a concussion in a
prior automobile accident two months before his accident with Mar-
shall. According to Dandridge, the concussion from his prior accident
forced him to withdraw from classes he was taking at Virginia Com-
monwealth University and left him with “moderate” headaches, neck
pain, and an inability to study due to medication. By the time of the
second accident, Dandridge testified he “still had some residuals of
neck pain and from [sic] minor headaches, but nothing that was
debilitating,” and that his health generally was improving.

Dr. Ross Bullock, a neurosurgeon and Dandridge’s treating physi-
cian after his first accident, testified that in the first accident Dan-
dridge had suffered whiplash and “mild to moderate traumatic brain
injury” and that Dandridge would still have been feeling the effects
of those injuries at the time of his second injury.

After his second concussion, Dandridge’s symptoms included sig-
nificantly more severe headaches, blurred vision, nausea, and diffi-
culty concentrating. Dr. David X. Cifu treated Dandridge after his
second accident and diagnosed him with “‘post-concussive syn-
drome” due to his two accidents. According to Dr. Cifu, 85-90% of
those who suffer a single concussion make a full recovery within
eighteen months, and patients rarely show any improvement beyond
that time. While Dandridge was improving steadily before his acci-
dent with Marshall, in Dr. Cifu’s opinion, the second concussion
intensified his symptoms. Because Dandridge continued to suffer the
effects of these concussions as of his last visit with Dr. Cifu on Janu-
ary 24, 2002, Dr. Cifu suggested that Dandridge seek treatment from
a psychiatrist or a pain-management specialist. Another physician,
Dr. Martin Stein, treated Dandridge with pain medication, but Dr.

594 a
FC

Stein’s treatment of Dandridge ended when Dr. Stein’s medical
license was suspended on October 21, 2002.

Dr. Joel J. Silverman performed a psychiatric evaluation of Dan-
dridge pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 4:10, and portions of his dep-
osition were read at trial. Dr. Silverman testified that Dandridge suf-
fered from chronic depression, and that his headaches were not
caused by the second accident but by stress, depression, or a biologi-
cal predisposition to headache. Dr. Silverman concluded that the
intensification of Dandridge’s headaches was not the result of the
second accident.

In this appeal, Dandridge assigns error to three of the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings. Dandridge asserts first that the trial court erred in
sustaining Marshall’s objection to Dandridge’s testimony regarding
his treatment by Dr. Martin Stein. Dandridge also assigns error to the
trial court’s rulings that permitted certain testimony by Dr
Silverman, specifically, that Dandridge had admitted he hoped to
meet financial obligations with proceeds of the lawsuit and that Dan-
dridge had purchased an “assault weapon” rather than securing fur-
ther medical treatment. We consider these issues in order.

I.

Dr. Stein treated Dandridge in 2002 following termination of Dr.
Cifu’s treatment. Dandridge’s treatment consisted primarily of pre-
scriptions for pain medications. Dr. Stein’s medical license was sub-
sequently revoked. On the day of trial, Marshall filed a motion in
limine to preclude Dandridge from introducing any testimony regard-
ing the treatment Dandridge received from Dr. Stein. Marshall’s
objection to this testimony was that Dr. Stein was not going to testify
at trial and that, under McMunn v. Tatum, 237 Va. 558, 569, 379
S.E.2d 908, 914 (1989), only Dr. Stein could testify whether the
treatment. Dandridge received was reasonable and related to the
accident.

Hi Marshall correctly recites the principle that only a physician
can testify as to the reasonableness of treatment and its causal con-
nection to an event. However, the testimony that Dandridge wished
to present regarding Dr. Stein’s treatment did not address those
issues. As he argued at trial and reasserts here, Dandridge wanted to
testify that when Dr. Cifu told Dandridge he could not provide any
further helpful treatment and Dandridge should seek treatment with a
psychiatrist or pain management specialist, Dandridge followed those
instructions and secured treatment with Dr. Stein, a psychiatrist spe-

a 595

cializing in pain management. Such testimony bears not on the medi-
cal necessity of Dr. Stein’s treatment but on Dandridge’s heeding of
Dr. Cifu’s instructions.

Il Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court erred in
sustaining Marshall’s objection to Dandridge’s testimony that Dan-
dridge followed the advice of Dr. Cifu and secured pain management
treatment by Dr. Stein. This testimony was relevant in a number of
particulars. It showed that Dandridge followed the recommendation
of Dr. Cifu, his treating physician, that Dandridge spent money on
further treatment — in contradiction to Dr. Silverman’s testimony —
and it also supported Dandridge’s claim of a permanent injury,
because Dandridge continued to seek medical treatment even though
his treatment with Dr. Cifu ended over a year before the litigation.

Our conclusion requires that we reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the case for a new trial on damages. Because the
other issues Dandridge raises in this appeal may arise on retrial, we
will address them here.

IL.

Hl Dandridge complains that the trial court erroneously overruled
his objection to the following exchange during Marshall’s question-
ing of Dr. Silverman:

Q. Now, Doctor, did you discuss at any point the motiva-
tion for this lawsuit or the basis for this lawsuit.

A. Mr. Dandridge volunteered that he had heavy financial
obligations, and that he hoped that he could better meet some
of those obligations as a result of the litigation.

Dr. Silverman’s statement, according to Dandridge, improperly
injects his financial standing into consideration of his damages.
Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. Deahl, 126 Va. 141, 150, 100 S.E.2d
840, 843 (1919). Marshall counters that this statement is admissible
as an admission that is probative on the issues of injuries and the
extent of damages, citing Breeden v. Roberts, 258 Va. 411, 518
S.E.2d 834 (1999).

In Breeden, a personal injury action, the plaintiff denied making a
statement to a third party “‘about how much money [he was] going to
get out of the] lawsuit.” Jd. at 415, 518 S.E.2d at 837. Unlike Dan-
dridge, the plaintiff in Breeden neither objected to the question nor

sought to have the answer stricken. Jd. Nevertheless, in considering
whether the defendant could introduce further evidence to contradict
the plaintiff’s testimony, we observed that the plaintiff’s statement
regarding the money he would receive from the lawsuit “related to
and tended to cast light upon the issue of his injuries and the extent
of his damages.” Id. at 416, 518 S.E.2d at 837. While this statement
is dicta, we agree with Marshall that, like the statement in Breeden,
Dandridge’s statement here was relevant because it was not, as Dan-
dridge argues, limited to his financial status but “cast light” on a
matter contested at trial: Dandridge’s credibility regarding the extent
of his injuries. Jd. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting
this statement into evidence.

I.

Finally, Dandridge asserts that the trial court erred in allowing
Dr. Silverman to testify that Dandridge used his money to purchase
an “assault weapon” and ammunition rather than seeking further
medical treatment. This testimony occurred by deposition and in the
context of Dr. Silverman’s explanation that impulsive behavior and
irrational decisions are relevant factors in the evaluation of a person
who is depressed.

Hl In determining whether evidence should be admitted, the trial
court must apply a balancing test in assessing the probative value of
the evidence and its prejudicial effect. Brugh v. Jones, 265 Va. 136,
140, 574 S.E.2d 282, 284-85 (2003). This determination rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal
only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Lombard v.
Rohrbaugh, 262 Va. 484, 492, 551 S.E.2d 349, 353 (2001).

Hi Dx. Silverman testified that irrational decisions including
impulsive purchasing are relevant to the mental examination of a
depressed person. However, an expert need not identify every act
that person performed to offer an opinion on the mental condition of
the person under examination. In this case, the prejudicial effect of
identifying an assault weapon as one of Dandridge’s impulse
purchases substantially outweighs the probative value of identifying
the object of an impulsive purchase. The mention of an assault
weapon and ammunition distracts the jury from the matter at issue
and prejudices Dandridge. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court committed error because it abused its discretion in allowing Dr.
Silverman to testify that Dandridge purchased an assault weapon.

Pd 597
Pe

HM Finally, we reject Marshall’s suggestion that any error the
trial court committed in the three evidentiary rulings at issue was
harmless error. Well established principles require that error be pre-
sumed prejudicial unless the record clearly shows that the error could
not have affected the result. Spence v. Miller, 197 Va. 477, 482, 90
S.E.2d 131, 135 (1955). “There is no presumption that error is harm-
less.” Breeding v. Johnson, 208 Va. 652, 659, 159 S.E.2d 836, 842
(1968). Marshall bases his argument primarily on his theory that the
jury returned a verdict of only $15,000 because it did not find Dan-
dridge credible. Nothing in the record of this case clearly shows that
Dandridge’s credibility alone was the basis of the jury’s verdict or
that the errors of the trial court did not affect Dandridge’s credibility.

For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the case for a new trial consistent with this opinion
on the question of damages.

Reversed and remanded.

598 ee
as

RICHMEADE, LP.
v.

Ciry oF RICHMOND
Record No. 031513
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

C. Richard Cranwell (M. Quentin Emick, Jr; Alan A. Diamon-
stein; Cranwell, Moore & Bullington; Patten, Wornom, Hatten &
Diamonstein, on briefs), for appellant.

Francis A. Cherry, Jr. (John A. Rupp, City Attorney; Jan T. Reid,
Assistant Attorney General; Bonnie M. Ashley; Randolph, Boyd,
Cherry and Vaughan, on brief), for appellee.

0
pC

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal we consider whether this action for inverse con-
demnation is subject to the three-year statute of limitations for an
implied contract, Code § 8.01-246, or the five-year limitations period
for injury to property, Code § 8.01-243.

Richmeade, L.P., owns approximately 25 acres of land in the City
of Richmond, known as the Windsor Apartment Complex.! On Feb-
tuary 17, 1997, Richmeade acquired an option to purchase real prop-
erty located next to the Windsor Apartment Complex. In order to
develop the two parcels as a single apartment development,
Richmeade requested that the City vacate certain streets within the
proposed development. By ordinance adopted February 22, 1999, the
City vacated the streets pursuant to Code §§ 15.2-2006 and 15.2-
2007.1. In April 1999, the City reconsidered its February 22, 1999
action and denied the request for vacating the streets.

On September 10, 2002, Richmeade filed an inverse condemna-
tion action pursuant to the declaratory judgment statute, Code § 8.01-
184 et seq., seeking a declaration that the City’s actions constituted a
“taking and/or damaging” of its property and property rights and a
trial by jury “on the issue of taking and damaging of property rights
and of just compensation.” The City filed a plea of the statute of
limitations asserting that Richmeade’s action was time-barred
because it was not filed within the three-year limitations period
established for implied contracts by Code § 8.01-246. Richmeade
argued that its action was an action for “damage to property” and
therefore was subject to the five-year limitations period in Code
§ 8.01-243. Following briefing and argument of counsel, the trial
court, relying on Prendergast v. Northern Virginia Regional Park
Authority, 227 Va. 190, 313 S.E.2d 399 (1984), concluded that an
action for inverse condemnation was subject to the three-year statute
of limitations and entered an order dismissing Richmeade’s motion
for judgment.

DISCUSSION

HMM Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia confers
on a property owner a right to just compensation from the govern-

' The trial court decided the case without an evidentiary hearing on the City of Richmond’s
special plea to the statute of limitations. For purposes of this appeal, we recite the facts as
alleged in the motion for declaratory judgment. While the City filed a demurrer asserting that
the property was never taken or damaged, the facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute.

ment when the government takes or damages the owner’s property
for public use. Va. Const. art. I, § 11; State Hwy. & Transp. Comm’r
v. Linsly, 223 Va. 437, 443, 490, 290 S.E.2d 834, 838 (1982); C. &
O. Ry. Co. v. Ricks, 146 Va. 10, 18, 135 S.E. 685, 688 (1926). As
early as 1919, this Court held that a landowner could enforce this
right under a tort or contract theory of recovery; however, because
the sovereign was not liable for injuries based on negligence, a land-
owner could waive recovery under the tort theory and sue on the
contract between the landowner and the government that Article I,
Section 11 implies. Nelson County v. Loving, 126 Va. 283, 299-300,
101 S.E. 406, 411 (1919). Since 1919, this Court has consistently
held that when the government failed to condemn private land taken
for public purposes, the landowner’s recourse was to file an action
for inverse condemnation based on the implied contract between the
government and the landowner. The terms of that implied contract
require the government to pay the landowner “such amount as would
have been awarded therefor, if the property had been condemned
under the eminent domain statutes.” Nelson County v. Coleman, 126
Va. 275, 279, 101 S.E. 413, 414 (1919); Burns v. Bd. of Supervisors,
218 Va. 625, 627, 238 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1977).

In Prendergast, the case relied upon by the trial court, water from
restoration work conducted by the Park Authority leaked into the
lower level of a building on an adjacent lot. The owner of the build-
ing filed a five-count motion for judgment against the Authority. In
Count 5 of the motion for judgment, the building owner initially
alleged that the government took or damaged his property “without
due process of law and without payment of just compensation.”
Prendergast, 227 Va. at 192, 313 S.E.2d at 400. In repleading that
Count, the building owner realleged a taking of property without due
process and just compensation and asked that the trial court direct the
Authority to file condemnation proceedings for the purpose of ascer-
taining the amount of just compensation due for the damaged build-
ing. Id. at 192-93; 313 S.E.2d at 400.

The building owner argued that Count 5 was subject to the five-
year limitations period of Code § 8.01-243(B) (injury to property),
while the Authority asserted that the three-year limitations period for
implied contracts under Code § 8.01-246(4) applied. In concluding
that the three-year period applied, this Court held that Count 5
“sounded in inverse condemnation,” that inverse condemnation is
based on an implied contract, and that “[o]nce the trial court cor-
rectly concluded that the essence of Count 5 was an action based on

EL
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an implied contract it follows that application of the period of limita-
tions contained in Code § 8.01-246(4) was proper.” Prendergast, 227
Va. at 195, 313 S.E.2d at 402 (citing Burns, 218 Va. at 627, 238
S.E.2d at 825).

HMM The facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in
Prendergast. Here there is no dispute that Richmeade’s action is an
“action for inverse condemnation” seeking an “award of damages
for the condemnation of Plaintiffs’ property and/or property rights.”
As we explained in Burns, an inverse condemnation action is based
on an implied contract that the government will justly compensate
Jandowners for land it has taken. 218 Va. at 627, 238 S.E.2d at 825.
Therefore, the cause of action is subject to the three-year limitations
period of Code § 8.01-246(4). Prendergast, 227 Va. at 195, 313
S.E.2d at 404.

Richmeade asserts, however, that the decision in Prendergast is
incompatible with the principle that the object of the litigation and
not its form determines the applicability of a statute of limitations.”
Friedman v. Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, 208 Va. 700, 703, 160 S.E.2d
563, 565 (1968); Birmingham v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 98 Va.
548, 551, 37 S.E. 17, 17 (1900). According to Richmeade, if this
principle is applied to an inverse condemnation case, the correct stat-
ute of limitations is the five-year limitations period of Code § 8.01-
243(B) because the object of every inverse condemnation action is to
recover for injury to property. We disagree.

HM The object of an inverse condemnation action, according to
Richmeade, is to recover compensation for damage to private prop-
erty. But an inverse condemnation action is a specific type of pro-
ceeding based on a constitutionally created right connected to the
“taking” or “damaging” of property by the government. To take or
damage property in the constitutional sense does not require that the
sovereign actually invade or disturb the property. Taking or damaging
property in the constitutional sense means that the governmental
action adversely affects the landowner’s ability to exercise a right
connected to the property. Prince William County v. Omni Homes,
253 Va. 59, 72, 481 S.E.2d 460, 467 (1997); City of Lynchburg v.
Peters, 156 Va. 40, 48-49, 157 S.E. 769, 772 (1931); Lambert v. City

? Richmeade also cites Hampton Roads Sanitation District v. McDonnell, 234 Va. 235, 360
S.E.2d 841 (1987), in support of its position because the five-year limitations period was
applied to an inverse condemnation count in that case, Both Richmeade and the City acknowl-
edge, however, that unlike Prendergast, the proper limitations period was not at issue in
McDonnell, and for that reason McDonnell does not control or affect the result in this case.

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of Norfolk, 108 Va. 259, 265, 61 S.E. 776, 778 (1908). Thus, an
action for inverse condemnation is an action seeking redress for the
government’s action in limiting property rights the landowner holds.
In that regard, the act giving rise to the breach of implied contract is
not an act aimed at the property, but rather an act that limits the
landowner’s ability to exercise his property rights without paying the
Jandowner for that limitation. The mere fact that the measurement of
that compensation may be based on a decline in the value of the
subject property does not make the action one for injury to property.

This conclusion is consistent with the result we reached in Pigott
y. Moran, 231 Va. 76, 341 S.E.2d 179 (1986), where the issue was
whether an action for constructive fraud was an action for “injury to
property” subject to the five-year limitations period of Code § 8.01-
243(B) or a “personal action” subject to the shorter limitations
period then provided for by Code § 8.01-248. In that case, purchasers
of a house sued their real estate agent for fraud, maintaining that the
agent misrepresented to them that the property abutting the property
they eventually purchased was zoned for residential purposes when
in fact the property was zoned for commercial and industrial pur-
poses. The purchasers identified their damage claim as a financial
loss based on the difference between the value of the land if it abut-
ted residential property and the actual value of the land abutting
commercial and industrial property. Jd. at 78-79, 341 S.E.2d at 180-
81. The purchasers argued that even though they had filed an action
for constructive fraud, the five-year limitations period of Code
§ 8.01-243(B) applied because the action was an “action for injury to
property.” We rejected the purchaser’s position, finding that the
“gist” of the purchasers’ claim was that the wrongful act was aimed
at the purchasers “personally and not their property” even though
the damages claimed involved a decrease — or injury — to the prop-
erty’s value. Id. at 81, 341 S.E.2d at 182.

Hl The gist of Richmeade’s claim in this case is that the wrong-
ful act of the government was aimed at Richmeade and not at the
property. The government’s wrongful act in this case was the failure
of the City of Richmond to pay Richmeade for the limitations the
City placed on Richmeade’s ability to exercise its rights over its
property. Thus, as in Pigott, the object of this action is not injury to

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property. It is the injury suffered by Richmeade because the City
breached its implied contract to pay just compensation.?

Hl Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
applying the three-year limitations period of Code § 8.01-246(4) to
this inverse compensation action and we will affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

Affirmed.
JUSTICE KOONTZ and JUSTICE LEMONS dissent.

3 We also note that this result is consistent with the Revisers’ Note to the 1977 revision of
‘Title 8.01 explaining that the five-year limitations period for injury to property does not apply
to actions resulting from a breach of contract. See Revisers’ Note, Code § 8.01-243.

605

Kaney F. O’ NEILL
v.

‘WINDSHIRE-COPELAND ASSOCIATES, L.P., ET AL.
Record No. 031824
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

Dn

106

E. Duncan Getchell, Jr. (Amy M. Pocklington; Irwin M. Zalkin,
Michael Zimmer; McGuireWoods; Zalkin & Zimmer, on briefs), for
appellant.

Steven W. Bancroft (Michael J. Carita; J. Justin McKenna, Jr;
Frank K. Friedman; Ellen S. Moore; Trichilo, Bancroft, McGavin,
Horvath & Judkins; Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, on brief), for
appellees.

JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.

On July 30, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit entered an order of certification requesting that we
exercise our certification jurisdiction, Va. Const. art. VI, § 1, Rule
5:42, and answer the following question:

3.
FT

If the defendant-owner of an apartment building is negligent
per se because the protective railing on its apartment balcony
does not comply with the height requirements of a municipal
building code, and if that negligence is a proximate cause of
the plaintiff’s fall from the balcony and her resulting injuries,
is the plaintiff’s contributory negligence available to the defen-
dant as a complete defense?

Resolving the issue will determine the outcome of the proceeding
in the Court of Appeals. We accepted the certified question by order
entered October 28, 2003. For the reasons stated below, we answer
the certified question in the affirmative.

The order of certification from the Court of Appeals sets forth the
following facts. Kaney F. O’Neill became a quadriplegic when she
fell backward over a second-story balcony railing at an apartment
complex in Newport News, Virginia, on September 15, 1999. When
the apartment was built in 1963, the Newport News Building Code
required such balcony railings to be forty-eight (48) inches high. See
Code of City of Newport News § 10-3 (1962) (incorporating the
National Building Code); Nat’] Bldg. Code § 605.4 (1955). The bal-
cony railing at issue here, however, was only thirty-two (32) inches
high.!

O’Neill filed suit in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia, asserting that the owner of the apartment
complex, Windshire-Copeland Associates, L.P.; its general partner,
Robert Copeland; and the management company for the apartment
complex, Hercules Real Estate Services, Inc., (collectively ““Wind-
shire”) were negligent because the balcony’s height did not comply
with the requirements of the Newport News Building Code at the
time the apartment complex was built and that such negligence was a
proximate cause of her injuries. At trial, testimony was admitted
showing that O’Neill was familiar with the balcony and that she had
consumed alcohol prior to the accident.

At the close of the evidence, the trial court held Windshire negli-
gent per se because its balcony violated the height requirement of the
Newport News Building Code. The trial court also held that Wind-
shire’s negligence did not bar its defense of contributory negligence
and, accordingly, submitted that issue to the jury. The jury found
O’Neill contributorily negligent. Based on that finding, the trial court

' Virginia adopted a statewide building code in 1973 that requires balcony railings to be at
least forty-two (42) inches high.

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entered judgment in favor of Windshire, and O’Neill appealed that
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.

DISCUSSION

The discussion by the Court of Appeals, in its certification order,
and the arguments the parties advanced focused primarily on whether
Virginia has adopted § 483 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965). That section provides that, when a defendant’s negligence
consists of the violation of a statute, a plaintiff’s contributory negli-
gence bars his recovery for injuries caused by the negligence of the
defendant “unless the effect of the statute is to place the entire
responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon the defendant.”
Comment (c) to § 483 explains that a statute places the entire respon-
sibility for harm on the defendant “where it is enacted in order to
protect a certain class of persons against their own inability to protect
themselves.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 483, cmt. c, at p. 539
(1965). Comment (d) goes on to state that even though “those for
whose benefit the statute is enacted may be expected to be, and are
in fact, fully able to protect themselves,” the statute may neverthe-
less relieve such persons from doing so and place on the defendant
the entire responsibility for avoiding the harm. ,

O’Neill maintains that the concept embodied in § 483 is one
“firmly entrenched in the common law” and “embraced for nearly a
century by this Court.” Applying that concept here, O’Neill argues
that the building code is one of those statutes that places on the
defendant the responsibility for injury resulting from a violation of
its provisions and, thus, O’Neill’s negligence should not defeat her
recovery.

Hl As O'Neill acknowledges, the cases upon which she primarily
relies for the proposition that Virginia has adopted the concepts
embodied in § 483 of the Restatement, Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Bell, 149 Va. 720, 141 S.E. 838 (1928), Clinchfield Coal Corp. v.
Hawkins, 130 Va. 698, 108 S.E. 704 (1921), and Carter Coal Co. v.
Bates, 127 Va. 586, 105 S.E. 76 (1920), addressed whether a defen-
dant could plead the assumption of the risk defense when the defen-
dant’s violation of a statutory requirement was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff’s injury.? The theory of the defendants advanced in those

2 O'Neill also relies upon Gallagher v. Stathis, 186 Va. 444, 43 S.E.2d 33 (1947), for her
position that Virginia has recognized and adopted § 483. In Gallagher, the trial court refused a
jury instruction that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent because they agreed to live in a

Ss “(
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cases was that the plaintiffs had known that the defendants had not
complied with the statutory requirement and, therefore, the plaintiffs
had assumed the risk of harm resulting from such lack of
compliance.

The seminal case in this Commonwealth rejecting an attempt by
a defendant to raise the assumption of the risk defense under these
circumstances involved a coal company’s failure to provide for a
“conspicuous light”? on the front and rear of coal hauling machinery
as required by statute. Carter Coal, 127 Va. at 598-99, 105 S.E. at
80. The Court’s decision in that case was based on the principle that,
if the mining-safety legislation at issue had not abrogated this com-
mon law defense, the “systematic violation” of the statute through
the purported risk-assumption by the plaintiff would defeat the stat-
ute’s purpose. Id. at 601-02, 105 S.E. at 81. As we later stated in
Atlantic Coastline:

[If the employer may avail himself of the defense that the
employee agreed in advance that the statute should be disre-
garded, the court would be measuring the rights of the persons
whom the law makers intended to protect by the common law
standard of the reasonably prudent person, and not by the defi-
nite standard set up by the legislature. This would be practi-
cally a judicial repeal of the act.

149 Va. at 735, 141 S.E. at 842, citing 18 R.C.L. § 169 at 680-81
(1917) (quoting D.H. Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 62 N.E. 492, 496
(Ind. 1902)).

O’Neill argues that because assumption of the risk and contribu-
tory negligence are ‘“‘doctrinally related” and “ ‘often overlap,’ ” the
rationale precluding the defense of assumption of the risk in these
cases “applies with equal force to the defense of contributory negli-
gence.” However, the rationale we utilized in Bell and its predeces-
sors for excluding assumption of the risk cannot extend to the
defense of contributory negligence.

[ll The difference between assumption of the risk and contribu-
tory negligence as they relate to a defendant’s negligence per se

house with only one staircase in violation of the building code. This Court affirmed the trial
court's action because there was no evidence to support the granting of an instruction on the
theory of contributory negligence, id. at 451, 44 S.E.2d at 37, and any implication to be drawn
from the citation to foreign authority on the issue of the availability of contributory fault as a
defense was therefore, at most, dicta.

0 TT
_

stemming from a statutory violation was explained in Pocahontas
Consolidated Collieries Co. v. Johnson, 244 F. 368 (4th Cir. 1917),
the case upon which Carter Coal relied in rejecting the defense of
assumption of the risk:

Assumption of risk and contributory negligence stand in a dif-
ferent legal relation to the violation of a . . . statute. Assump-
tion of risk imports no delict on the part of an employee]
.... Contributory negligence . . . is a delict or neglect of duty
by the employe[e], and hence he cannot recover for the delict
of the employer, . . . if his own delict has contributed to his
injury as a proximate cause.

Id. at 372.

Hl This fundamental difference between the effect of the
assumption of the risk and contributory negligence defenses negates
the proposition that our jurisprudence precluding the use of assump-
tion of the risk defense also precludes the use of the contributory
negligence defense that § 483 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides.

Il Nevertheless, we recognize that there are circumstances in
which a legislative body may determine that, because of the nature of
the regulation or the class of persons the regulation was intended to
protect, the defendant should bear the entire responsibility for harm
that the failure to comply with the regulation causes. For example,
the General Assembly has specifically made such a determination in
Code § 8.01-58 by providing that contributory negligence “shall not
bar a recovery” in actions brought by employees against a common
carrier where death resulted from the common carrier’s violation of
“any statute enacted for the safety of employees.” See also Code
§§ 46.2-932.1, -934, 56-416, and former Code § 56-4173

We need not decide here whether application of that princi-
ple can be implied in statutes that do not specifically state that the
defense is not available. In this case, nothing in the Newport News

3 Violations of the child labor laws are also not subject to the defense of contributory negli-
gence because children under the age of 14 are presumed incapable of contributory negligence,
Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Dungee, 258 Va. 235, 246-47, 520 S.B.2d 164, 171 (1999),
and, regardless of any violation of such Iaws, child employees are subject to the Workers’
Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-100, et seq., which does not allow the defenses of assumption
of the risk or contributory negligence. Roller v. Basic Const: Co., 238 Va. 321, 327, 384
S.E.2d 323, 325 (1989); Rasnick v. The Pittston Co., 237 Va. 658, 660, 379 S.E.2d 353, 354
(1989).

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Building Code indicates that the purpose of the code was to place the
entire responsibility for injuries stemming from a code violation on
the defendant building owner. Unlike Code § 8.01-58, nothing in the
Newport News Building Code allows recovery regardless of a plain-
tiff’s negligence. The code protects no specific class; it is the public
in general that benefits from its provisions. Indeed, a person who
never entered a building but only stood outside could be injured as a
result of a building code violation. Nor would allowing the defense
of contributory negligence in this case defeat the building code’s pur-
pose of height requirements and “ ‘work a judicial repeal of the
Act’” as O’Neill asserts. Only if a combination of a defendant’s
code violation and a plaintiff’s independent negligence caused the
plaintiff’s injury would the plaintiff be unable to recover. Under
these circumstances, allowing a contributory negligence defense
neither compromises nor subverts the policy advancing compliance
with the building code.

Ill For these reasons, we conclude that § 483 of the Restatement
(Second) has not been adopted in this state and hold that the defense
of contributory negligence is available when the defendant’s violation
of a municipal building code is negligence per se and a proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.

Certified question answered in the affirmative.

CANDICE L. FILAK, ET AL.
v.

PAMELA S. GEORGE
Record No. 031407

April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

a
=
-

David D. Hopper (Cook, Heyward, Lonnes, Lee & Hopper, on
briefs), for appellants.

Kenneth F. Hardt (Kevin V. Logan; Lori E. Lohr; Sinnott, Nuck-
ols & Logan, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KEENAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal is from a judgment for a defendant in an action alleg-
ing breach of contract and constructive fraud based on an insurance
agent’s alleged failure to procure a fire insurance policy with certain
provisions. We consider whether the circuit court erred in sustaining
the defendant’s demurrer to the constructive fraud claim and in grant-
ing the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s evidence on the
breach of contract claim.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. Christian B. Mas-
sey and Candice L. Filak, husband and wife, (collectively, the plain-
tiffs) owned a 36-acre horse farm in Chesterfield County. The plain-
tiffs lived in an apartment located in a barn on the farm. |

In 1990, the plaintiffs began building their “dream home” on the
property. The plaintiffs, who both had been employed in the con-
struction industry, purchased all the building materials and equip-

a 61s
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ment required for the construction project and performed their own
labor in building the house.

The plaintiffs held a “rural fire” insurance policy on their prop-
erty issued by Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
(Farm Bureau). That policy provided a $150,000 limit of liability for
the loss of a dwelling on the farm.

In September 1996, while the house was still under construction,
Filak contacted Farm Bureau, which assigned one of its agents,
Pamela S. George, to meet with the plaintiffs. George informed the
plaintiffs that they could obtain an “elite” insurance policy that
would provide at least $481,000 in “total replacement” costs for
their new house and its contents in the event that the house was
destroyed by fire. The plaintiffs agreed to purchase the “elite” policy
and paid a premium to Farm Bureau to secure the policy.

According to the plaintiffs, George told them that in the event of
a “full, total, devastating loss” of the house, they would receive
under the “elite” policy the total replacement costs “within a few
days or the next day” after sustaining such a loss. However, the
“elite” policy issued by Farm Bureau provided that in the event of a
complete loss, the plaintiffs were entitled to receive total replacement
costs only if they repaired and replaced the house within six months
after receiving payment for the “actual cash value of the damage.”!

In July 1997, before construction was completed, lightning struck
the house causing a fire that completely destroyed the structure. The
plaintiffs filed a claim with Farm Bureau for the total replacement
costs of the house. Farm Bureau paid the plaintiffs about $190,000
for the “actual cash value” of the house and informed them that
under the terms of their policy they had ‘180 days . . . to present a
claim for any amount over the actual cash value” that they had been
paid. The plaintiffs did not rebuild the house.

The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment against Farm Bureau
seeking recovery of the total replacement costs of their house.
George was not named as a defendant in this action. The plaintiffs
eventually settled their lawsuit with Farm Bureau for $100,000,
which they received in addition to the earlier $190,000 payment rep-
resenting the “actual cash value” of the destroyed structure.

After reaching this settlement with Farm Bureau, the plaintiffs
filed an amended motion for judgment against George alleging,

' This policy provision is in accord with the requirements of Code § 38.2-2119.

among other things, breach of contract and constructive fraud.? The
plaintiffs alleged, in relevant part:

[George] told [pJlaintiffs that the insurance coverage would
cover the full replacement cost of at least $481,000 for the
house and building materials while the house was under con-
struction. [George] stated that should [p]laintiffs’ house burn to
the ground, under the insurance she would procure on their
behalf, [Farm Bureau] would promptly write them a check for
the full replacement cost.

The plaintiffs also asserted that the settlement with Farm Bureau
resulted in a total payment that was “‘at least $200,000 less than the
replacement costs of the house.”

The plaintiffs further alleged that they “placed their trust and
confidence in [George] to advise them properly” and to procure for
them “the appropriate insurance coverage,” and that they agreed to
purchase insurance from her based on her “representations to them
and undertakings on their behalf.” The plaintiffs asserted that George
“misrepresented the procurement . . . of appropriate and adequate
coverage, and the terms of the coverage procured,” and that they
reasonably relied on those misrepresentations to their detriment. The
plaintiffs further alleged that George’s “misrepresentations” consti-
tuted a “breach of [her] duty” to the plaintiffs.

George filed a demurrer to the amended motion for judgment.
The circuit court sustained the demurrer to the constructive fraud
claim based on the plaintiffs’ “inability to clearly allege the exis-
tence of a common law duty.” Citing the “economic loss rule,” the
circuit court further held that a claim for constructive fraud is not
actionable when such a claim essentially alleges negligent perform-
ance of contractual duties.

At a jury trial on the contract claim, Massey testified that George
stated that the “elite” policy would provide coverage to Filak and
Massey in the event of a “full, total, devastating loss.” According to
Massey, George explained that if, for example, the house “burned to
the ground and there’s nothing left,” then “the next day, if every-
thing was totally gone, she would pay us the $481,000.” Massey also
stated that George told him that the policy would provide payment

2 The plaintiffs also asserted against George claims of actual fraud and “malpractice.” The
circuit court ultimately dismissed these claims, which are not before us in this appeal.

a 617
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“immediately [for] replacement [costs] for my home the moment it
was lost.”

Massey testified that when he received the written “elite” policy
from Farm Bureau, he did not review the policy “that closely”
because he relied on George’s representations concerning the policy
contents. Massey stated that he did not have any concerns about the
policy because George had explained the policy “very thoroughly.”
With regard to the plaintiffs’ alleged damages, Massey conceded that
the damages claimed against George were “exactly the same dam-
ages that [the plaintiffs] claimed in the Farm Bureau case.”

Filak testified that George stated that she would procure an insur-
ance policy for the plaintiffs that would provide $481,000 in total
replacement costs for the house and that “in the event of a total loss,
we would be paid immediately. As a matter of fact, she said within a
few days or the next day they would come out and pay us.”

At the end of the plaintiffs’ case, George moved to strike the
evidence on the contract claim on various grounds relating to the
sufficiency of the evidence. The circuit court sustained the motion to
strike and dismissed the plaintiffs’ case with prejudice. The plaintiffs
appeal.

The plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in sustaining
George’s demurrer to their constructive fraud claim. The plaintiffs
note that they alleged George made material misrepresentations,
which caused them to enter into both the alleged oral contract with
George and the insurance contract with Farm Bureau, and that the
plaintiffs reasonably relied on George’s misrepresentations to their
detriment. The plaintiffs contend that the “economic loss rule” does
not bar their constructive fraud claim because George had a “‘com-
mon law duty” to be truthful to them. We disagree with the plain-
tiffs’ arguments.

HMB A demurrer admits the truth of all facts alleged in a motion
for judgment but does not admit the correctness of the pleader’s con-
clusions of law. Blake Constr. Co. v. Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth.,
266 Va. 564, 570-71, 587 S.E.2d 711, 714-15 (2003); Yuzefovsky v.
St. John’s Wood Apartments, 261 Va. 97, 102, 540 S.E.2d 134, 136-
37 (2001). The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency
of the facts alleged. Glazebrook v. Bd. of Supervisors, 266 Va. 550,
554, 587 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2003); W.S. Carnes, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 252 Va. 377, 384, 478 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1996). Because our
review of a circuit court’s decision sustaining a demurrer addresses

that same legal question, we review the circuit court’s judgment de
novo. Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 554, 587 S.E.2d at 591.

HM Applying these principles, we conclude that the circuit court
properly sustained George’s demurrer to the constructive fraud claim
under the “economic loss rule.” As we explained in Sensenbrenner
v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 425, 374
S.E.2d 55, 58 (1988), losses suffered as a result of the breach of a
duty assumed only by agreement, rather than a duty imposed by law,
remain the sole province of the law of contracts. The rationale for
this rule lies in the distinctly different policy considerations distin-
guishing the law of torts from the law of contracts.

Hi The primary consideration underlying tort law is the protec-
tion of persons and property from injury, while the major considera-
tion underlying contract law is the protection of bargained for expec-
tations. Jd. Thus, when a plaintiff alleges and proves nothing more
than disappointed economic expectations assumed only by agree-
ment, the law of contracts, not the law of torts, provides the remedy
for such economic losses. Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 262
Va. 473, 480, 551 S.E.2d 596, 599 (2001); Ward v. Ernst & Young,
246 Va. 317, 325, 435 S.E.2d 628, 632 (1993); Rotonda Condo. Unit
Owners Ass’n v. Rotonda Assocs., 238 Va. 85, 90, 380 S.E.2d 876,
879 (1989); Sensenbrenner, 236 Va. at 425, 374 S.E.2d at 58.

Hl Here, the plaintiffs’ claim against George merely sought
recovery for losses allegedly suffered as a result of George’s failure
to fulfill her oral contract to procure a policy that would pay the total
replacement costs of the plaintiffs’ home within a few days after sus-
taining a total loss. The purely economic nature of this alleged loss is
illustrated by Massey’s testimony in which he conceded that the
plaintiffs sought to recover the very same damages in their separate
lawsuits against George and Farm Bureau.

HM Further, contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion, George did not
have a common law duty to the plaintiffs arising out of the parties’
dealings. The law of torts provides redress only for the violation of
certain common law and statutory duties involving the safety of per-
sons and property, which are imposed to protect the broad interests
of society. See Ward, 246 Va. at 324, 435 S.E.2d at 631; Sensenbren-
ner, 236 Va. at 425, 374 S.E.2d at 58; Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 233
Va. 31, 34-35, 353 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1987); Kamlar Corp. v. Haley,
224 Va. 699, 706, 299 S.E.2d 514, 517 (1983). Therefore, we hold
that the plaintiffs did not assert a valid claim of constructive fraud

a 619
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against George because whatever duties George may have assumed
arose solely from the parties’ alleged oral contract?

I The plaintiffs also argue that the circuit court erred in sus-
taining George’s motion to strike their claim for breach of contract.
Among other arguments, the plaintiffs address the element of dam-
ages and assert that as a result of George’s breach of her oral agree-
ment, their Farm Bureau policy effectively was worth only $290,000,
the amount they actually recovered from Farm Bureau. The plaintiffs
contend that, therefore, they sustained damages measured by the dif-
ference between the full replacement costs of their home and the
amount they actually were paid by Farm Bureau. We disagree with
the plaintiffs’ arguments and conclude that they failed as a matter of
law to establish any damages resulting from George’s alleged breach
of contract.

The elements of a breach of contract action are (1) a
legally enforceable obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff; (2) the
defendant’s violation or breach of that obligation; and (3) injury or
damage to the plaintiff caused by the breach of obligation. Brown v.
Harms, 251 Va. 301, 306, 467 S.E.2d 805, 807 (1996); Fried v.
Smith, 244 Va. 355, 358, 421 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1992); Westminster
Investing Corp. v. Lamps Unlimited, Inc., 237 Va. 543, 546, 379
§.E.2d 316, 317 (1989). In considering the circuit court’s decision
striking the evidence on the contract claim, we view the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs and draw all fair inferences from
those facts. See Howerton v. Mary Immaculate Hosp., Inc., 264 Va.
272, 273, 563 S.E.2d 671, 671 (2002); Baysden v. Roche, 264 Va. 23,
25-26, 563 S.E.2d 725, 726 (2002); Gina Chin & Assocs. v. First
Union Bank, 260 Va. 533, 536, 537 S.E.2d 573, 574 (2000).

HMM The evidence showed that George procured for the plaintiffs
a policy providing full replacement costs of their home in the event
that it was totally destroyed by fire. However, contrary to their
alleged agreement with George, the policy required the plaintiffs to
rebuild their home within six months of receiving payment for the
actual cash value of the damage before they were entitled to receive
full replacement costs. Therefore, the proper measure of damages in
this case is the difference between the policy that the plaintiffs alleg-
edly bargained for, one that would pay full replacement costs within
a few days of a total loss, and the policy that the plaintiffs actually

3 Our conclusion in this regard is applicable both to the plaintiffs’ original motion for judg-
ment and to their amended motion for judgment.

received, one that required them to rebuild their house within the
time period specified in the policy before being entitled to payment
of full replacement costs. See Estate of Taylor v. Flair Prop. Assocs.,
248 Va. 410, 414, 448 S.E.2d 413, 416 (1994); Bryant v. Peckin-
paugh, 241 Va. 172, 178, 400 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1991).

HM The plaintiffs, however, failed to establish any damages
resulting from their inability to obtain full replacement costs within a
few days after the fire. Although the plaintiffs testified that they were
unable to rebuild their home without receiving the full replacement
costs within the shorter time period promised by George, the plain-
tiffs did not present any evidence to support this claim. Notably, the
plaintiffs failed to show that they attempted, but were unable, to
obtain alternative financing to rebuild the home within the six
months required by the policy terms. They also failed to prove the
additional cost of any alternative financing for which they could have
qualified, or other “delay” damages attributable to the policy provi-
sion requiring them to rebuild their house before receiving full
replacement costs.

HH Based on this record, the only testimony relating to damages
was the plaintiffs’ unsupported assertion that they could not rebuild
the house without receiving immediate payment of full replacement
costs from Farm Bureau. This mere assertion failed as a matter of
law to establish damages resulting from the difference in the policy
George allegedly agreed to procure for the plaintiffs and the policy
that she actually obtained for them. Therefore, we hold that the cir-
cuit court properly struck the evidence on the contract claim at the
conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case.*

For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

+ Given this resolution of the plaintiffs’ contract claim, we need not address George’s addi-
tional arguments that the alleged oral contract failed for lack of consideration and was barred
under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. We also express no opinion on whether an action
for breach of an alleged contract, such as the one asserted here, will lie against an employee
insurance agent based solely on that employee’s actions assisting a policyholder in the procure-
ment of an insurance policy issued by her employer.

621

‘VIDEO ZONE, INC.
v.

KF&F PROPERTIES, L.C.
Record No. 031486
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

fon

Von L. Piersall, III (Levin, Levin & Tuthill, on brief), for
appellant.
John R. Lockard (Vandeventer Black, on brief), for appellee.

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JUSTICE KEENAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred in
holding that the terms of a commercial lease required a tenant to
replace certain heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
equipment located primarily on the roof of the leased premises.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. KF&F Properties,
L.C. (KF&F), owns the Rodman Shopping Center in the City of
Portsmouth. In 1996, KF&F leased certain property within the shop-
ping center to Video Zone, Inc. (Video Zone), for the purpose of
operating a ‘“‘video store” on the premises. The lease had an initial
term of five years and was renewed in 2001 for a second five-year
term.

The leased property included HVAC equipment. Although some
of the HVAC equipment was installed in the interior of the building,
the major component of the system was located on the roof.

The lease provision addressing the maintenance of the property,
including the HVAC equipment, stated in relevant part:

MAINTENANCE. Lessor covenants that it will, at its own
expense, keep and maintain the exterior of the said building,
roof and parking facilities, in good order and repair... .
Lessee covenants that at its own expense, it will keep and
maintain in good order and repair the entire interior of the said
building, including all plumbing, heating, cooling (Lessor will
maintain cooling and heating during the first year) and electri-
cal equipment.

Throughout the term of the lease, Video Zone paid for the repair
and maintenance of the HVAC equipment installed on the leased
premises, including the HVAC equipment located on the roof. In
2002, however, the HVAC system totally malfunctioned.

Dan Korzeniowski, Video Zone’s president, obtained several
price quotations for replacing the HVAC equipment. After conclud-
ing that the quoted prices were too high, Korzeniowski asked the
managing partner of KF&F, J. Ovid Keene, to obtain a price estimate
for a replacement system. Korzeniowski thought that Keene could
obtain a “‘better price” based on his business “contacts.”

Keene received a bid from Professional Heating and Cooling, Inc.
(Professional), to replace the HVAC equipment at a cost of $8,939.
This price was lower than the estimates obtained by Korzeniowski.

PF

Professional replaced the entire HVAC system. Most of the
equipment replaced was located on the roof of the building. The only
work that Professional conducted in the interior of the building was
“ductwork and work to bring the HVAC system up to building code
requirements.”

Professional submitted an invoice to Keene in the amount of
$8,939, which KF&F paid. KF&F then requested reimbursement
from Video Zone for the full amount of the invoice. At that time,
Video Zone no longer employed Korzeniowski and, under the direc-
tion of a new president, refused KF&F’s request for reimbursement
of the invoice amount.

KF&F filed a warrant in debt in the City of Portsmouth General
District Court (the district court) seeking to recover $8,939 from
Video Zone for its failure to reimburse KF&F for the cost of replac-
ing the HVAC equipment. The district court awarded KF&F $650
plus costs. KF&F appealed from the district court’s judgment to the
Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth.

At a trial de novo in the circuit court, Keene testified that when
he informed Korzeniowski of Professional’s bid, Korzeniowski
agreed that KF&F would contract for the HVAC replacement work
and that Video Zone would reimburse KF&F for the cost of that
work. Keene also stated that Video Zone drafted the lease and that
neither he nor anyone employed by KF&F participated in the draft-
ing process.

Korzeniowski testified that he never agreed to pay KF&F for the
cost of the replacement equipment. Korzeniowski further stated that
he did not draft the lease and that Keene had produced the lease at
the time the parties signed it.

James Hensley, a vice president of Professional, testified that he
inspected the malfunctioning HVAC equipment at Keene’s request.
Hensley stated that while the HVAC equipment could have been
repaired, such repairs would not have been cost effective “given the
age and condition of the equipment.” Hensley further stated that the
“most cost effective approach was to replace the HVAC equipment.”

The circuit court held in favor of KF&F and entered judgment
against Video Zone in the amount of $8,939, plus costs and interest.
The court held that the language of the lease was ‘“‘potentially ambig-
uous” and concluded that the parties’ actions “indicated that they
understood the [lease] to mean that Video Zone was responsible for
all HVAC equipment wherever it was located.” In support of its find-
ing concerning the parties’ intent, the court cited Korzeniowski’s

es
Pt

actions in obtaining estimates for replacing the equipment and in
paying for past repairs as evidence that Video Zone understood that it
was responsible for replacing the HVAC equipment. The court also
concluded that the phrase “keep and maintain in good order and
repair” required Video Zone not only to repair the HVAC equipment,
but also to “maintain the equipment in good working order, includ-
ing replacing the equipment, if necessary.” Video Zone appeals.

Video Zone argues that the circuit court’s holding is contrary to
the lease terms, which are unambiguous and do not make Video
Zone responsible for replacement of the HVAC equipment. Video
Zone contends that because KF&F was obligated under the lease to
maintain and repair the exterior of the building, that obligation
included replacement of the HVAC equipment located on the build-
ing’s roof.

In response, KF&F also argues that the lease terms are unambig-
uous, but claims that these terms required Video Zone to replace the
HVAC equipment in order to meet its duty to maintain that equip-
ment in a state of good order and repair. Alternatively, KF&F con-
tends that even if the lease terms are ambiguous, the circuit court
made a factual finding that the parties intended that Video Zone
replace the HVAC equipment irrespective whether the equipment was
located in the interior or on the exterior of the building. KF&F
asserts that the evidence supported the circuit court’s finding that
Video Zone agreed to pay for the cost of replacing the HVAC
equipment.

| | In resolving this issue, we first consider the circuit court’s
holding that the lease terms are ambiguous. The issue whether a con-
tract provision is ambiguous presents a question of law, not of fact.
Utsch v. Utsch, 266 Va. 124, 129, 581 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2003); Pyra-
mid Dev., L.L.C. v. D&J Assocs., 262 Va. 750, 754, 553 S.E.2d 725,
727 (2001); Pollard & Bagby, Inc. v. Pierce Arrow, L.L.C., HI, 258
Va. 524, 528, 521 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1999). Therefore, on appeal, we
do not accord the circuit court’s resolution of this question any defer-
ence and we are afforded the same opportunity as the circuit court to
consider the terms of the contract. Pyramid Dev., L.L.C., 262 Va. at
754, 553 S.E.2d at 727; Musselman v. The Glass Works, L.L.C., 260
Va. 342, 346, 533 S.E.2d 919, 921 (2000); Donnelly v. Donatelli &
Klein, Inc., 258 Va. 171, 180, 519 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1999).

HMMM The language of a contract is ambiguous if “it may be
understood in more than one way or when it refers to two or more
things at the same time.” Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock

Me
PC

Corp., 263 Va. 624, 632, 561 S.E.2d 663, 668 (2002) (quoting Gran-
ite State Ins. Co. v. Bottoms, 243 Va. 228, 234, 415 S.E.2d 131, 134
(1992)); accord Westmoreland-LG&E Partners v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 254 Va. 1, 11, 486 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1997). Such an
ambiguity, if it exists, must appear on the face of the instrument.
Salzi v. Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 263 Va. 52, 55, 556
S.E.2d 758, 760 (2002); S.F (Jane Doe) v. West Am. Ins. Co., 250
Va. 461, 464, 463 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1995). In determining whether
the disputed terms are ambiguous, we consider the words employed.
in the contract in accordance with their usual, ordinary, and popular
meaning. See Haisfield v. Lape, 264 Va. 632, 637, 570 S.E.2d 794,
796 (2002); Pocahontas Mining Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Jewell Ridge Coal
Corp., 263 Va. 169, 173, 556 S.E.2d 769, 772 (2002).

Hl We conclude that the contested lease language is ambiguous
because it can be understood in more than one way. During the first
year of the lease, KF&F was responsible, without any exception con-
cerning equipment location, for the condition of all heating and cool-
ing equipment. After that first year, however, the lease language
requires Video Zone to “keep and maintain in good order and repair
the entire interior of the said building, including all . . . heating,
[and] cooling . . . equipment.”

On the other hand, the lease language also states that KF&F is
responsible during the entire lease term for “the exterior of the said
building, roof and parking facilities.” Thus, the lease assigns KF&F
responsibility for the exterior of the premises, without stating
whether that responsibility extends to the HVAC equipment located
outside the building. Conversely, the lease charges Video Zone with
responsibility for the condition of the interior of the building, includ-
ing all heating and cooling equipment, without specifying whether
that responsibility extends to the HVAC equipment located on the
exterior portion of the premises. Accordingly, we hold that these
lease terms do not unambiguously indicate which party is responsible
for the condition of the HVAC equipment located on the roof, and
that the lease could be read to charge either party with that
responsibility.

HM When the terms of an agreement are ambiguous, a court
will consider parol evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties.
Eure, 263 Va. at 632, 561 S.E.2d at 667-68; Tuomala v. Regent Univ.,
252 Va. 368, 374, 477 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996). Parol evidence “is
admissible, not to contradict or vary contract terms, but to establish
the real contract between the parties.” Id.; accord Prospect Dev. Co.

a

v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 84, 515 S.E.2d 291, 296 (1999). Such con-
struction of an ambiguous contract is a matter submitted to the fact
finder, who must consider the extrinsic evidence in determining the
parties’ intent. Tuomala, 252 Va. at 374, 477 S.E.2d at 505; Cascades
N. Venture Ltd. P’ship v. PRC Inc., 249 Va. 574, 579, 457 S.E.2d
370, 373 (1995).

Hi Generally, the parties’ interpretation and dealings with regard
to contract terms are entitled to great weight and will be followed
unless doing so would violate other legal principles. Donnelly, 258
Va. at 186, 519 S.E.2d at 142; Federal Ins. Co. v. Starr Elec. Co.,
242 Va. 459, 467, 410 S.E.2d 684, 688 (1991); Dart Drug Corp. v.
Nicholakos, 221 Va. 989, 995, 277 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1981); First
Nat’! Exch. Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 169 Va. 99, 115,
192 S.E. 764, 771 (1937). Thus, uncertain rights of parties may be
determined and fixed by their practical dealings with each other.
John H. Maclin Peanut Co. v. Pretlow & Co., 176 Va. 400, 410, 11
S.E.2d 607, 611 (1940); First Nat’! Exch. Bank of Roanoke, 169 Va.
at 115-16, 192 S.E. at 771.

Il Here, the circuit court determined the rights of the parties in
accordance with their practical dealings. The court concluded that the
parties’ actions demonstrated their understanding that Video Zone
was responsible for the condition of the HVAC equipment, including
the equipment located on the roof, and was obligated to replace the
HVAC equipment if necessary. The court’s holding was supported by
Keene’s testimony that Video Zone agreed to reimburse KF&F for
the cost of replacing the HVAC equipment. The holding further was
supported by Korzeniowski’s testimony that Video Zone paid for
prior maintenance of the equipment located on the roof, and that
when the equipment totally malfunctioned, he obtained several price
estimates for replacing the system.

Il Because there is evidence to support the circuit court’s factual
finding concerning the parties’ intent, we are required to affirm the
court’s judgment.* See Code § 8.01-680; Shooting Point, L.L.C. v.
Wescoat, 265 Va. 256, 264, 576 S.E.2d 497, 501 (2003); Tauber v.
Commonwealth, 263 Va. 520, 526, 562 S.E.2d 118, 120 (2002);
Tuomala, 252 Va. at 375, 477 S.E.2d at 506. This determination ren-

* Our conclusion is not altered by Video Zone’s contention that such a result would be
“illogical” because the lease provides that all fixtures owned by Video Zone remain its prop-
erty and may be removed from the premises after the original lease term. The ownership of the
HVAC equipment is not a subject of this appeal, and we will not engage in a speculative
discussion of that issue.

Co
FC

ders it unnecessary for us to consider the circuit court’s interpretation
of the phrase “keep and maintain in good order and repair,” or the
court’s interpretation of that phrase in relation to our decision in
Seoane v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 249 Va. 469, 457 S.E.2d 93 (1995).
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

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a

NorMaN H. SLAGLE
v.
HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST
Record No. 031052
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

oo
No)

631

Robert L. Mills (Rutter Mills, on brief), for appellant.
Gary Bryant (Kevin L. Keller; Andre D. Wiggins; Willcox & Sav-
age, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KOONTZ delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal of a declaratory judgment action, we consider
whether an injured person who did not previously occupy or immedi-
ately intend to occupy an insured motor vehicle was “using” the
insured motor vehicle within the meaning of Code § 38.2-2206(B) at
the time he was injured and, thus, entitled to underinsured motorist
coverage.

BACKGROUND

The material facts are undisputed. On November 18, 1999, at
approximately 5:00 a.m., Norman H. Slagle, the vice-president and
construction manager of Vico Construction Corporation (Vico), met
Tim Askew, an employee of Vico, at the corporation’s road widening
project on Kempsville Road in the City of Chesapeake. Slagle’s mis-
sion was to indicate to Askew where a large piece of construction
equipment was to be located after it was unloaded from a tractor-
trailer Askew had driven to the site. The tractor-trailer was owned by
Vico and insured under a commercial automobile insurance policy
issued by Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest (Hartford),

providing $1,000,000 in uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage.

Along the course of the road widening project, Kempsville Road
consisted of two through traffic lanes flanked by right and left turn
Janes. In order to unload the construction equipment from the tractor-
trailer at the desired location, it was necessary for Askew to back the
vehicle from a driveway and then along the right side of Kempsville
Road. To assist Askew in accomplishing that maneuver, Slagle stood
behind the tractor-trailer and gave hand signals that Askew was able
to observe through the tractor’s side view mirror. Askew activated
the emergency flashers located on the tractor and at the rear of the
trailer. The vehicle also had an audible back-up alarm, which was
activated when Askew began to back the vehicle.! Although Askew
had portable orange hazard triangles available in the vehicle, he did
not utilize them.

While Slagle was directing the tractor-trailer into the desired
position, he was struck by a vehicle driven by Liberty G. Billones.
At that time, Slagle was standing 10 to 30 feet behind the tractor-
trailer, and Billones was traveling in the far right lane of Kempsville
Road. Slagle subsequently brought suit against Billones for injuries
he suffered as a result of the accident. Billones’ insurance company
tendered the full amount of liability insurance coverage available
under her policy. Hartford refused to also provide underinsured
motorist coverage to Slagle under its policy issued to Vico.

While his suit against Billones was pending, Slagle filed a motion
for declaratory judgment against Hartford seeking a declaration that
he was an insured under the underinsured motorist provisions of the
policy Hartford had issued to Vico. Hartford responded, denying that
Slagle was an insured under the terms of the policy. Specifically,
Hartford asserted that Slagle was not an insured under the policy
because he “was not an operator or occupant of [the insured] vehicle
at the time of the accident. He was a pedestrian.”

The matter ultimately matured for resolution at a hearing before
the trial court. By agreement of the parties, the trial court received
into evidence and considered a stipulation of facts, a deposition of
Billones, and ore tenus testimony from Slagle reflecting the cireum-
stances under which the accident occurred. Slagle and Hartford filed
motions for summary judgment and supporting briefs.

1 The tractor was also equipped with a pole-mounted, rotating amber caution light. The
record is unclear whether this light was activated. However, as will become clear, whether this
light was activated at the time of the accident is not pertinent to our resolution of this appeal.

 «:
Fe

On December 6, 2002, the trial court issued an opinion letter stat-
ing that “Code of Virginia §38.2-2206(B) affords [Slagle] no relief
under the facts presented in this case.” On February 7, 2003, the trial
court entered a final order awarding summary judgment to Hartford.”
We awarded Slagle this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Hi Slagle’s claim to underinsured coverage under Hartford’s pol-
icy in this case is premised upon the mandate of Code § 38.2-
2206(A) that motor vehicle liability insurance policies provide unin-
sured and underinsured coverage to persons insured under the poli-
cies. That Billones’ vehicle was underinsured is not at issue. The
parties’ dispute is whether Slagle is an insured under Hartford’s pol-
icy covering Vico’s tractor-trailer. Code § 38.2-2206(B), in pertinent
part, defines “insured” as “any person who uses the motor vehicle
to which the policy applies” with the consent of the named insured.
(Emphasis added). Consent is not an issue. Thus, the focus of our
analysis in this case is whether Slagle was using the tractor-trailer in
question at the time he was struck by Billones’ vehicle.

Determining the circumstances under which persons not occupy-
ing or actually operating the insured vehicle at the time they are
injured in a motor vehicle accident are entitled to uninsured or under-
insured motor vehicle insurance has been the subject of a number of
our prior decisions. Apparently, the issue continues to vex litigants
and the trial courts as evidenced by the contrasting positions asserted
here by Slagle and Hartford in their markedly differing interpreta-
tions of those decisions.

Slagle asserts that use of a motor vehicle as contemplated by
Code § 38.2-2206(B) does not require operation, occupancy, or con-
tact of the insured vehicle. He further asserts that this Court has iden-
tified the following three factors relevant to the resolution of the
issue of use of an insured vehicle by a non-occupant: “(1) causal
relationship between the accident and the use of the vehicle as a
vehicle, (2) use of the vehicle to perform an integral part of the mis-
sion and (3) use of vehicle [safety] equipment, including warning
lights and flashers.” In support of these assertions, and the further
assertion that he has satisfied all of these factors, Slagle relies upon

2 Judge Frederick H. Creckmore, Sr. presided during the evidentiary hearing on the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment and issued the opinion letter stating the rationale underly-
ing the ruling in this case. Judge Creekmore also oversaw the post-judgment proceedings. The
record does not disclose the reason for Judge Grissom entering the final judgment order.

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Edwards v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 256 Va. 128, 500
S.E.2d 819 (1998); Newman v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 256 Va.
501, 507 S.E.2d 348 (1998); Randall v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., 255 Va. 62, 496 S.E.2d 54 (1998); and Great American Insur-
ance Co. v. Cassell, 239 Va. 421, 389 S.E.2d 476 (1990).

Relying upon these same decisions, Hartford concludes that this
Court has never extended coverage under Code § 38.2-2206(B)
where the injured person did not previously occupy or immediately
intend to occupy the insured vehicle. In addition, Hartford asserts
that even when prior occupancy or the immediate intent to occupy
the insured vehicle is established, the injured person must have also
used specialized safety equipment or tools from the vehicle as an
integral part of his mission in order to qualify as using the insured
vehicle. Hartford relies upon United States Fire Insurance Co. v.
Parker, 250 Va. 374, 463 S.E.2d 464 (1995) and Insurance Company
of North America v. Perry, 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418 (1964) to
support this assertion.

Il We take this opportunity to revisit certain prior decisions in
an effort to give additional insight and guidance to the proper resolu-
tion of the issue presented under Code § 38.2-2206(B) with regard to
the required use of an insured motor vehicle. Initially, we agree with
Hartford that our prior decisions on this subject have dealt exclu-
sively with instances in which the injured person had previously
occupied, or had the immediate intent to occupy, the insured vehicle.
See Newman, 256 Va. at 503, 507 S.E.2d at 349 (injured child cross-
ing street to board school bus); Edwards, 256 Va. at 130, 500 S.E.2d
at 819-20 (injured person changed flat tire and intended to drive car
to service station); Randall, 255 Va. at 63, 496 S.E.2d at 54-55
(injured highway worker drove employer’s truck to place closure
signs along highway work site); Parker, 250 Va. at 376, 463 S.E.2d
at 465 (injured landscape gardener drove company truck to work
site); Cassell, 239 Va. at 422, 389 S.E.2d at 476 (injured firefighter
traveled to scene of fire in fire pump truck); Perry, 204 Va. at 834,
134 S.E.2d at 419 (injured police officer drove police car to serve
warrant). However, we have not previously considered a case, such
as the present one, where the injured party neither previously occu-
pied nor immediately intended to occupy the insured vehicle.

A careful review of these cases reveals that occupancy or imme-
diate intent to occupy the insured vehicle did not dictate the distinc-
tions we drew and the different results we reached in them. In Cas-
sell, where we held that the injured firefighter was using the fire

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a

truck, we distinguished Perry, where we held that the injured police
officer was not using the police car. We noted that the firefighter was
“engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the fire truck when
he was killed.” 239 Va. at 424, 389 S.E.2d at 477. We also noted
that, in contrast, the police officer in Perry was not using the police
car when he was struck and killed by a passing vehicle 164 feet
away from the police car while he was in the process of serving a
warrant. Id.

Following Perry and Cassell, we again considered the issue of
use of an insured vehicle as contemplated by Code § 38.2-2206(B) in
Parker. In that case, a landscape gardener was injured by a passing
vehicle while she was planting cabbages adjacent to the public road.
She had driven her employer’s truck to the work site to transport the
cabbages and tools necessary to plant them. She parked the truck in a
position to provide a safety barrier to protect her from speeding
motorists. She was struck while digging a hole for the cabbages 12 to
15 feet from the truck. Parker, 250 Va. at 376, 463 S.E.2d at 465. In
Parker, we observed that the critical inquiry in determining the issue
of use contemplated by the statute is whether there was “a causal
relationship between the incident and the employment of the insured
vehicle as a vehicle.” Id. at 377, 463 S.E.2d at 466. We addressed
that inquiry and distinguished Cassell, finding that Parker was not
engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the insured vehicle
when she was injured. Id. at 378, 463 S.E.2d at 466.

In Randall, we held that an injured highway worker was using
the insured truck for purposes of Code § 38.2-2206(B) while placing
Jane closing signs along the highway because the “truck’s warning
equipment, and the procedures prescribed for putting out the lane
closure signs which incorporated the use of the warning equipment,
made [the injured party’s] truck, like the fire truck in Cassell, a spe-
cialized vehicle, one designed to be used for more than simply trans-
portation.” Randall, 255 Va. at 67, 496 S.E.2d at 57. In reaching our
decision in Randall, we distinguished Parker on the grounds that the
insured vehicle in that case had no special warning lights and was
not required by the employer to be positioned to create a safety zone
and, thus, was . . . “ ‘merely used as a means of transportation’ ” to
the work site. Jd., 496 S.E.2d at 56 (quoting Parker, 250 Va. at 378,
463 S.E.2d at 466). Most significantly, we noted that “[i]f the
injured person is using the insured vehicle as a vehicle and as an
integral part of his mission when he is injured, he is entitled to
[underinsured] coverage under § 38.2-2206.” Randall, 255 Va. at 66,

6
Pe

496 S.E.2d at 56. We also noted that the coverage mandated by this
statute for use of a vehicle is not limited to the transportation func-
tion of the vehicle. Id.

In Edwards, we determined that Randall and Cassell compelled
the conclusion that the person injured by a passing vehicle while he
was in the process of changing a flat tire on an insured vehicle by
using the vehicle’s jack and spare tire was using the vehicle as con-
templated by Code § 38.2-2206(B). Edwards, 256 Va. at 133, 500
S.E.2d at 821. We reasoned that his mission was to drive the vehicle
to a service station to have the tire repaired and that an integral part
of that mission required the use of the vehicle’s equipment. Thus, we
held that the injured person was “in the process of performing a
transaction essential to the use of the insured vehicle when he was
struck.” Jd. As we had in Randail and in Parker, we again noted that
in determining whether an injured person was using the insured vehi-
cle at the time he was injured the relevant inquiry is whether “there
was a causal relationship between the accident and the use of the
insured vehicle as a vehicle.” Jd. at 132, 500 S.E.2d at 821.

Finally, in Newman we relied upon Randall and Edwards and
concluded that a student ‘“‘was using the school bus as a vehicle at
the time he was injured, based on his use of the bus’ specialized
safety equipment and his immediate intent to become a passenger in
the bus. Those facts establish the required causal relationship
between the accident and [the student’s] use of the bus as a vehicle.”
Newman, 256 Va. at 509, 507 S.E.2d at 352.

HH It should become apparent from this review of these cases
addressing the requirements for an injured person to qualify as a per-
son who “uses” an insured vehicle as contemplated by Code § 38.2-
2206(B), that the critical inquiry is whether there was a causal rela-
tionship between the incident and the employment of the insured
vehicle as a vehicle. It should also be apparent that because the reso-
lution of that inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the particular
factual circumstances of each case, the inquiry does not lend itself to
resolution by strict guidelines or a set formula. Rather, we have
established some general guidelines. The injured person must be
using the insured vehicle as a vehicle and as an integral part of his
mission. Actual use of the vehicle as a vehicle is not restricted to its
transportation function. See, e.g., Randall, 255 Va. at 66, 496 S.E.2d
at 56. Use of the vehicle need not be the direct, proximate cause of
the injury “‘in the strict legal sense.” State Farm Mutual Auto Insur-
ance Co. v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 500, 318 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1984).

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fF

In this context, the assertions made by both parties in the present
case miss the mark. To the extent that Slagle suggests that we have
established a list of factors that are dispositive in resolving the issue
of use contemplated by Code § 38.2-2206(B), we disagree. To the
extent that Hartford suggests that occupancy or the immediate intent
to occupy the insured vehicle is a prerequisite to the coverage
afforded by this statute or that in the latter circumstance the injured
person must have utilized the special safety equipment of the insured
vehicle, we also disagree. Occupancy, the immediate intent to occupy
the insured vehicle, and the utilization of special safety equipment
are several of many factors, if relevant in a particular case, which
may be considered in resolving the issue of use contemplated by the
statute,

Il In the present case, the insured tractor-trailer was being
employed to transport and ultimately position a large piece of con-
struction equipment along a public road which was to be widened by
Vico. In order to position the construction equipment at the desired
place at the construction site, it was necessary for the driver to back
the tractor-trailer from a driveway and then along the side of the
toad. Slagle, in his capacity as vice-president and construction man-
ager of Vico, was present at the scene before the driver began this
maneuver. Slagle’s mission was to direct the driver to the place
where the equipment was to be located when it was unloaded from
the tractor-trailer. Slagle did so by giving hand signals, which were
observed by the driver through the tractor’s side view mirror, while
Slagle stood 10 to 30 feet behind the vehicle. Clearly the tractor-
trailer under those circumstances was being used as a “vehicle”
within the meaning of Code § 38.2-2206(B). The question is whether
Slagle was using it in that capacity.

HH Although the driver of the tractor-trailer activated the vehi-
cle’s emergency flashers and audible back-up alarm, there is no fac-
tual basis to conclude that this safety equipment effectively created a
safety zone for Slagle. Moreover, there is no factual basis for a con-
clusion that Slagle relied upon them for that purpose. Nevertheless,
Slagle’s hand signals to the driver effectively determined the direc-
tion and movement of the tractor-trailer and were required by the
driver for the completion of the intended maneuver of the vehicle.
Accordingly, there was a causal relationship between the incident in
which Slagle was injured and the employment of the tractor-trailer as
a vehicle because Slagle’s acts in assisting the driver of that vehicle
were an integral part of Slagle’s mission to locate the construction

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equipment at a particular place on his company’s construction site.>
In reaching this conclusion we note that it was not necessary for
Slagle to have physical contact with the tractor-trailer to assist the
driver. Indeed, in order for Slagle to have an adequate field of view
and to see and communicate with Askew, it would have been neces-
sary for him to be some distance away from and to the side and rear
of the vehicle. Similarly, it was not necessary for Slagle to have pre-
viously occupied or immediately intended to occupy the tractor-
trailer to use that vehicle to accomplish his mission. Contrary to
Hartford’s assertion, under the undisputed facts of this case Slagle
was not a mere pedestrian at the time he was injured.

Hl For these reasons, we hold that, under the circumstances of
this case, Slagle was using the tractor-trailer in a manner contem-
plated by Code § 38.2-2206(B) and, thus, was an insured entitled to
the underinsured motorist coverage applicable to that vehicle. We
further hold that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment
for Hartford and denying summary judgment to Slagle.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court and
enter final judgment for Slagle.

Reversed and final judgment.

JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, dissenting.

Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, today’s decision will
“unreasonably expand the class of persons entitled to uninsured and
underinsured coverage to include police officers directing traffic,
tower dispatchers directing the movement of trucks in freight yards,
and other similar cases.” Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

In deciding whether uninsured or underinsured coverage is man-
dated by the provisions of Code § 38.2-2206 in a factual context such
as the present one, the dispositive question is whether “the injured
person [was] using the insured vehicle as a vehicle and as an integral
part of [his/her] mission when . . . injured.” Randall v. Liberty

3 Expanding on an argument made on brief, Hartford asserted during oral argument of this
appeal that direction of a vehicle by visual and audible signals cannot constitute use of the
vehicle because this would unreasonably expand the class of persons entitled to uninsured and
underinsured coverage to include police officers directing traffic, tower dispatchers directing
the movement of trucks in freight yards, and other similar cases. We emphasize that our deci-
sion in this case is predicated on the specific facts under which Slagle’s injury occurred.

es «3
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Mutual Insurance Co., 255 Va. 62, 66, 496 S.E.2d 54, 56 (1998); see
also, Newman v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 256 Va. 501, 508, 507
S.E.2d 348, 352 (1998); United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Parker,
250 Va. 374, 377-78, 463 S.E.2d 464, 466 (1995); Great American
Insurance Co. v. Cassell, 239 Va. 421, 424, 389 S.E.2d 476, 477
(1990). Under the specific facts of this case, the relevant question is
whether Norman H. Slagle (‘Slagle’), is entitled to coverage under
Code § 38.2-2206 when he did not occupy the insured vehicle, did
not use the vehicle’s specialized equipment, and had no immediate
intent to occupy the vehicle? I answer that question in the negative.

As the majority acknowledges, the driver of the tractor-trailer
activated the emergency flashers and audible back-up alarm on the
vehicle, but Slagle did not utilize that safety equipment to accom-
plish his mission of directing the tractor-trailer to the location where
the construction equipment was to be unloaded. Nor did the safety
equipment create a zone of safety for Slagle because he was standing
10 to 30 feet behind the tractor-trailer. Instead, Slagle merely gave
hand signals to the driver of the tractor-trailer in order to assist in the
movement of the vehicle to a particular place. In my view, the giving
of hand signals unaccompanied by the use of any specialized equip-
ment on the tractor-trailer is insufficient to constitute use of the vehi-
cle “as a vehicle” within the meaning of Code § 38.2-2206(B). I do
not dispute that the tractor-trailer was being used as a vehicle. But,
as the majority notes, the “question is whether Slagle was using it in
that capacity.” Slagle’s use of the vehicle is the factor missing in this
case. Our prior decisions illustrate that point.

In Cassell, we found that a fire fighter was using a fire truck
when he was struck and killed by a hit-and-run driver because he
was engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the fire truck at
the time of the accident. There, the fire truck and its specialized
equipment were used “to extinguish the fire, control traffic and pro-
tect the fire fighters, including Cassell.” 239 Va. at 424, 389 S.E.2d
at 477. Next, in Randall, we concluded that a worker was using his
employer’s pickup truck when he was struck and killed by a motorist
as he placed lane closure signs along a highway. 255 Va. at 67, 496
S.E.2d at 57. “The truck’s warning equipment, and the procedures
prescribed for putting out the lane closure signs which incorporated
the use of the warning equipment, made [the pickup] truck, like the
fire truck in Cassell, a specialized vehicle, one designed to be used
for more than simply transportation.” Id. When the worker was

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struck, he “was using the truck’s specialized equipment to perform
his mission.” Id.

Similarly, in Edwards v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,
256 Va. 128, 132, 500 S.E.2d 819, 821 (1998), we focused on the
injured individual’s use of the insured vehicle’s equipment to accom-
plish his mission. There, that individual was using the vehicle’s jack
to remove a flat tire and to place a spare tire on the vehicle so that he
could then drive the vehicle to a service station to have the flat tire
repaired. Id. at 133, 500 S.E.2d at 821. The individual was “‘in the
process of performing a transaction essential to the use of the insured
vehicle when he was struck” by an automobile driven by an unin-
sured motorist. Jd. Because of the use of the vehicle’s equipment and
the immediate intent to drive the vehicle, we concluded “that there
was a causal relationship between the accident and [the injured indi-
vidual’s] use of the vehicle as a vehicle.” Jd. Likewise, we held in
Newman, 256 Va. at 509, 507 S.E.2d at 352, that a child “was using
[a] school bus as a vehicle at the time he was injured, based on his
use of the bus’ specialized safety equipment and his immediate intent
to become a passenger in the bus.”

By contrast, in Parker, a closer case on the facts than the present
one in my view, we found that a pickup truck, which had no special-
ized equipment or emergency warning lights and which was used by
landscape gardeners to carry them, their cabbages, and necessary gar-
dening tools to their worksite, “‘merely was used as a means of trans-
portation.” 250 Va. at 378, 463 S.E.2d at 466. The gardeners parked
“the truck at the site in such a position as to provide a ‘safety bar-
rier’ to protect them from speeding motorists” and left the door of
the truck open in order to hear a two-way radio and receive messages
from their supervisor. Jd. at 376, 463 S.E.2d at 465. The injured gar-
dener was struck by a speeding vehicle while she was digging a hole
in a flower bed approximately 15 feet from the pickup truck. Id. We
found those facts insufficient to bring that case within the Cassell
precedent and denied underinsured motorist coverage to the injured
gardener. Id, at 378, 463 S.E.2d at 466-67.

Unlike the fire fighter in Cassell, the worker in Randall, the indi-
vidual changing the tire in Edwards, or the child in Newman, Slagle
was not using any of the tractor-trailer’s specialized equipment at the
time of the accident to perform his mission. I do not necessarily
believe that Slagle had to occupy the vehicle or had to have an
immediate intent to do so. Nor do I disagree with the majority’s
assertion that “Slagle’s acts in assisting the driver of [the tractor-

es
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trailer] were an integral part of Slagle’s mission to locate the con-
struction equipment at a particular place on his company’s construc-
tion site.”” Nevertheless, the fact remains that the only action Slagle
took with regard to the tractor-trailer was to use hand signals to
direct the driver. Without something more such as utilizing the vehi-
cle’s specialized equipment, Slagle was not using the insured vehicle
“as a vehicle” within the meaning of Code § 38.2-2206(B). Thus,
there can be no causal relationship between the accident and Slagle’s
use of the vehicle “as a vehicle” because he never used the tractor-
trailer.

The majority’s decision today will indeed expand the class of
persons entitled to uninsured and underinsured coverage. If a passing
motorist had stopped to assist the driver of the tractor-trailer by giv-
ing hand signals to direct the movement of that vehicle, the motorist
would now be entitled to coverage under Code § 38.2-2206. For the
reasons stated, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment
of the circuit court.*

* Slagle’s argument that he was a “named insured” under the policy in question is not
encompassed within his assignments of error. Thus, I will not address that argument.

eT
PF

VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
AND STATE UNIVERSITY, ET AL.

Vv.
INTERACTIVE RETURN SERVICE, INC.
Record No. 030965
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

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645

Charles K. Seyfarth (Christopher C. Spencer; Jerry D. Cain,
General Counsel and Special Assistant Attorney General; Kay Heid-
breder, Associate General Counsel and Special Assistant Attorney
General; Brian C. Riopelle; Robert M. Tyler; Bowman and Brooke;
McGuireWoods, on briefs), for appellants.

David A. Kikel (James S. Rixse; Hogan and Hartson, on brief),
for appellee.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The primary question in this appeal is whether a reasonably pru-
dent person in the position of the contracting parties would have con-
sidered the type of damages claimed in this case to be the natural
consequence of a breach of certain agreements dealing with the
assignment of intellectual property rights. Answering that question
affirmatively, we conclude that the circuit court did not err by admit-
ting evidence of consequential damages. We also conclude that the
circuit court did not err in instructing the jury on the issue of waiver.

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Interactive Return Service, Inc. (“IRS”), filed a breach of con-
tract action against Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univer-
sity (“Virginia Tech”), Virginia Tech Intellectual Properties, Inc.
(“VTIP”’), and William Landsidle, Comptroller.! IRS sought dam-
ages against Virginia Tech for its alleged breach of a sponsored
“Research Agreement” (“SRA”) entered into between IRS and Vir-

1 IRS sued Landsidle in his official capacity as Comptroller for the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia pursuant to Code § 8.01-193.

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ginia Tech, and damages against both Virginia Tech and VTIP for
their alleged breach of an “Industry Project Agreement” (“IPA”)
entered into between IRS, Virginia Tech, VTIP and the Center for
Innovative Technology (“‘CIT’’). A jury returned a verdict in favor of
IRS against both Virginia Tech and VTIP and fixed damages in the
amount of $110,000. The circuit court entered judgment against Vir-
ginia Tech and VTIP, jointly and severally, in that amount. Virginia
Tech and VTIP (sometimes referred to as “the defendants”) along
with Landsidle appeal from that judgment.”

RELEVANT FACTS

The terms of the SRA entered into between Virginia Tech and
IRS in January 1995 provided that IRS would sponsor research at
Virginia Tech to develop “an Interactive Response Unit for use with
IRS’ patent pending [for an] [I]nteractive and [V]ideo [D]ata
[S]ervice [S]ystem.” According to the SRA, “[t]he Interactive
Response Unit . . . is a device that interprets a television transmitted
audio signal and analyzes coordinates of a position on the television
screen directed by a laser beam and transmits a signal to a local
repeater station using IVDS (Interactive and Video Data Service).”
The Interactive Response Unit supposedly allows a television viewer
to interact with the television by purchasing an advertised product,
responding to a polling question presented during a news program, or
connecting to the “Internet.”

Under the terms of the SRA, Virginia Tech was required to
“make every effort[] to develop mass production engineering proto-
types of the system . . . in compliance with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission[’s] . . . rules for IVDS that will allow manufactur-
ers to produce reliable products that are affordable to the general
public and reliable products for the IVDS network providers.” IRS
agreed to reimburse Virginia Tech, on a monthly basis, for a portion
of the costs of the research and development of the prototype. Vir-
ginia Tech was to submit monthly billings to IRS for the costs that
had been incurred in the performance of the SRA, and IRS was obli-
gated to pay promptly 80 percent of the billings, with the remaining
20 percent to be paid after Virginia Tech delivered the prototype.

2 At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, Virginia Tech and VTIP moved to strike the evi-
dence and enter judgment in their favor. The trial court granted the motion with regard to IRS’s
claims for breach of an oral contract, inverse condemnation, and breach of an implied contract.
A claim for breach of the SRA and a separate claim for breach of the IPA remained in the case
and were decided by the jury.

Ss 7
a

Finally, Virginia Tech had “the right to cease to perform any addi-
tional effort upon written notice to IRS to that effect, only after a
material breach of this agreement [had] occurred.” In that event, Vir-
ginia Tech was required to produce “a final report describing the
effort at such time as the effort ceased.”

The SRA also addressed the ownership of inventions resulting
from the research. The title and ownership of inventions resulting
from research conceived solely by researchers at Virginia Tech would
be assigned to CIT For inventions resulting from research conceived
jointly by Virginia Tech researchers and IRS, title and ownership
would reside jointly with IRS and CIT. Finally, inventions resulting
from research conceived solely by IRS would be owned by IRS.

Virginia Tech began the research in 1995. The research was sup-
posed to be completed in nine months at a cost of $201,505, but
Virginia Tech requested several work extensions and additional
research costs. Although IRS agreed to these extensions and
increased costs, IRS repeatedly advised Virginia Tech that it had no
revenues and that its only source of cash was to sell “equity partici-
pation (IRS[] Shares) or by selling technology rights.” According to
IRS, its major assets were its proprietary technology and the relation-
ship with Virginia Tech and CIT.

IRS paid Virginia Tech slightly more than $103,000. However,
after December 1995, IRS did not make any further payments on the
research costs owed to Virginia Tech under the SRA.‘ Virginia Tech
sent several letters to IRS demanding payment of the unpaid costs.
IRS never denied the indebtedness but responded by offering to work
out a payment schedule that delayed payment of the past due amount
until the research produced a working prototype. IRS also offered to
pay interest on the unpaid balance. In approximately June 1996, IRS
informed Virginia Tech that it could not make any further payments
until it received the finished product. Nonetheless, IRS admitted at
trial that it owed Virginia Tech approximately $750,000.>

3 At about the same time Virginia Tech and IRS entered into the SRA, IRS and CIT exe-
cuted an agreement setting forth the terms under which CIT would license to IRS any inven-
tions assigned to CIT by Virginia Tech pursuant to the SRA. This agreement, among other
things, granted IRS the option to acquire an exclusive, worldwide license of the Interactive
Response Unit.

* The last payment made in December 1995 was for the July 1995 billing.

5 Virginia ‘Tech’s records showed that it had billed IRS the cumulative amount of
$678,745.01.

During the same period of time, June 1996, IRS, Virginia Tech,
VTIP, and CIT, entered into the IPA. In that agreement, the parties
acknowledged their desire that the technology related to the Interac-
tive Video and Data Service System “‘be used in the public interest
and be available to the public quickly and efficiently.” CIT agreed to
“cost-share” the research project by providing $73,500 to Virginia
Tech. In return for CIT’s funding, IRS agreed to repay CIT the
amount of $147,000, double CIT’s investment, out of “net revenues
arising from the selling, leasing, licensing, sublicensing, or in any
other manner generating revenue from the transfer or use of any
products and/or services using” the technology related to the Interac-
tive Video and Data Service System. IRS also agreed to sponsor the
research project at Virginia Tech by providing $416,131 to Virginia
Tech. Pursuant to the terms of the IPA, Virginia Tech was obligated
to assign any “Discoveries . . . conceived, developed, or reduced to
practice during the Term of the Research Program” to VTIP, which
would in turn “‘assign to CIT all intellectual property rights related to
the Discoverf[ies].”®

After execution of the IPA, Virginia Tech requested additional
extensions and cost increases for the research project, but IRS still
did not make any payments to Virginia Tech. In a “Call/Visit Docu-
mentation” dated July 10, 1996, a contracts and grants administrator
for the Virginia Tech Office of Sponsored Programs noted “‘as of”
June 26, 1996 that “[s]ponsor [IRS] will not have money until he
receives finished product and can sell it. He will pay us then. We are
to keep invoicing him.” According to IRS, Virginia Tech agreed in
the fall of 1996 to continue the research project until a working pro-
totype was developed and to give IRS 90 days thereafter to pay its
indebtedness to Virginia Tech. In December 1996, Virginia Tech
requested a ‘no-cost extension” of the research project to June 30,
1997.

However, soon after December 1996, Virginia Tech stopped
working on the project. It did not deliver a final report to IRS as
required by the SRA. In a July 1997 letter, Virginia Tech advised
IRS that, in light of the fact that the research results and intellectual
property derived from the project remained with Virginia Tech, it
would assign these rights to VTIP unless IRS’s obligation was paid
in full within 45 days. Virginia Tech further advised IRS that VTIP,

© Virginia Tech and VTIP did not have any different practices and procedures for dealing
with inventions under a sponsored research agreement than for dealing with discoveries under
an industry project agreement.

upon receiving the assignment, intended to execute a license with
Proceso Interactivo S. A. de C.V. (“PISA”) and that the terms of that
license would include an obligation by PISA to repay to Virginia
Tech the outstanding indebtedness of IRS.”

IRS did not pay as requested. Consequently, in an August 1997
document titled “Virginia Tech Intellectual Property Disclosure,”
Virginia Tech captured the results of the research so that it could be
licensed to PISA.® The type of work listed in the disclosure was
“{nteractive Video Data Service ([VDS) System,” and the disclosure
stated that “the rights to use this technology will be assigned to
PISA.” Virginia Tech assigned the intellectual property and research
results to VTIP, and one day later, VTIP licensed those rights to
PISA. The intellectual property rights related to the research project
were never assigned to CIT as required by the terms of both the SRA
and the IPA.

In October 1997, IRS entered into an agreement with The HAGO
Company, Inc. (“HAGO”) for the sale and exclusive use of certain
intellectual property rights in the United States of America. In the
agreement, IRS stipulated that it had a research and development
contract with Virginia Tech and that the ownership of the software
and other results of that research were in dispute. Accordingly,
HAGO agreed to pay IRS “a monthly payment equal to the greater
amount between fifty US cents per each Audio-Link in operation and
the minimum monthly amount” of $10,000. HAGO agreed to
increase the minimum monthly amount to $60,000 “thirty days after
[Virginia Tech] deliver[ed] the software and results of” the research
and development project and “a letter of no action against” IRS or
“thirty days after [a] final appealable order instruct[ed Virginia Tech]
to deliver the software and results of” the research and development
to IRS.

7 In an email message dated June 17, 1997, Virginia Tech indicated that it was proposing
“to grant exclusive world wide rights for all of the work done at [Virginia] Tech (audio coding,
circuit design and software) to PISA in return for a down stream license payment.” Virginia
Tech took the position that the audio coding, circuit design and software developed during the
research project was intellectual property belonging to Virginia Tech, not IRS.

8 Virginia Tech had previously prepared two other intellectual property disclosures with
regard to the research project. In one of those documents, Virginia Tech acknowledged that IRS
had “exclusive licensing options for use [of the intellectual property listed] in an interactive
television application.” All three intellectual property disclosures arose out of the research
project but none were assigned to CIT.

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After executing the agreement with HAGO, IRS sent Virginia
Tech a copy of the contract. About two months later, IRS presented a
pecuniary claim against Virginia Tech, and this litigation followed.

ANALYSIS

Hi Armed with a jury verdict approved by the circuit court, IRS
holds “the most favored position known to the law.” Stanley v. Web-
ber, 260 Va. 90, 95, 531 S.E.2d 311, 314 (2000). On appeal, we view
the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the pre-
vailing party, IRS, and we will not set aside the judgment of the
circuit court unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it. Id., Code § 8.01-680. Using these principles of appellate review,
we turn now to the assignments of error presented in this appeal.

Virginia Tech and VTIP assign three errors to the circuit court’s
judgment. Initially, they assert that IRS was the first party to commit
a material breach of “‘the contract” and that the circuit court, there-
fore, erred in overruling the defendants’ motion to strike and Virginia
Tech’s motion to vacate the final order and enter summary judgment
in its favor. Next, Virginia Tech and VTIP contend that the circuit
court “erred by instructing the jury on waiver and by denying
[dJefendants’ motion to strike” and Virginia Tech’s post-trial motion
for summary judgment because there was no “evidence that Virginia
Tech waived its right to payment under the contract.’”’!° In the third
assignment of error, Virginia Tech and VTIP assert that the circuit
court “erred by admitting evidence of consequential damages even
though the evidence failed to establish that those damages were
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.”

Hil In order to understand the posture of this case and to address
the first two assignments of error, we begin by restating the ques-
tions presented to the jury for decision. The circuit court instructed
the jury that the issues in the case were whether the SRA was a
contract between IRS and Virginia Tech, and if so, whether either
party breached it; and whether the IPA was a contract to which IRS,
Virginia Tech, and VTIP were parties, and if so, whether any party
breached it. The jury was further instructed that it should find its
verdict in favor of IRS and against Virginia Tech if it found that
there was a contract between those parties; that IRS did not breach
that contract, or if it did, Virginia Tech waived the breach; and that

° Only Virginia Tech filed a post-trial motion to vacate the final order and enter summary
judgment in its favor.
10 By its terms, the second assignment of error speaks only to Virginia Tech.

5
_

Virginia Tech breached the contract. The jury was similarly
instructed with regard to VTIP. Based on these instructions, the jury
necessarily concluded that VTIP breached the IPA since that was the
only contract to which it was a party. However, given the general
verdict form, it is impossible to know whether the jury concluded
that Virginia Tech breached the SRA, the IPA, or both.

I However, as IRS observes, the defendants’ argument in the
opening brief with regard to the first assignment of error addresses
only the SRA. Virginia Tech and VTIP state that “[bJecause it was
undisputed that IRS committed the first material breach of the [Spon-
sored] Research Agreement, IRS was precluded as a matter of law
from recovering for breach of the agreement.”’ With regard to VTIP,
it is irrelevant whether IRS was the first party to commit a material
breach of the SRA because VTIP was not a party to that contract. As
to Virginia Tech, it is not necessary to decide the merits of the first
assignment of error because we conclude that the circuit court prop-
erly instructed the jury with regard to the issue of waiver, which is
the subject of the second assignment of error.

HH In that regard, Virginia Tech argues, and we agree, that it
never waived the contractual right to be paid under both the SRA
and the IPA. Even IRS acknowledged that fact by its admission at
trial that it owed Virginia Tech approximately $750,000. Also, during
closing argument, IRS suggested that the jury should reduce any
award of damages to IRS by the amount of its indebtedness to Vir-
ginia Tech. The relevant question, however, was whether Virginia
Tech waived its contractual right to timely payment by IRS, not
whether Virginia Tech waived the right to all payment.

On the issue of waiver, the circuit court instructed the jury that
“fa] waiver occurs when a party intentionally gives up a contractual
tight which would have been beneficial to it. A waiver may be
expressly stated or it may be implied from conduct. A party cannot
waive a right unless he has full knowledge of it.” The court further
instructed that “{t]he burden rests on a party claiming the other party
has waived a right under a contract to prove the other party waived
that [right] by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence, direct or
implied.” In addressing the defendants’ objection to these instruc-
tions, the circuit court correctly stated, “The waiver question is did
they waive prompt payment. Not payment but prompt payment.”

HB “(Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known
tight.” Stanley’s Cafeteria, Inc. v. Abramson, 226 Va. 68, 74, 306
S.E.2d 870, 873 (1983). Two elements are necessary to establish

waiver: ‘knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right and
the intent to relinquish that right.” Employers Commercial Union
Ins. Co. of America v. Great American Ins. Co., 214 Va. 410, 412-13,
200 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1973); accord Horton v. Horton, 254 Va. 111,
117, 487 S.E.2d 200, 204 (1997); Stanley’s Cafeteria, 226 Va. at 74,
306 S.E.2d at 873. The party relying on a waiver has the burden “to
prove the essentials of such waiver . . . by clear, precise and une-
quivocal evidence.” Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Indem. Co., 210 Va.
769, 773, 173 S.E.2d 855, 858 (1970).

I Virginia Tech clearly knew of its contractual right under the
SRA to receive prompt payment from IRS of 80 percent of the
research costs as billed on a monthly basis and its right to stop the
research project if IRS materially breached its obligations under the
SRA. Virginia Tech also was aware that, as of December 1995, IRS
ceased making any payments on its indebtedness and that the
December 1995 payment was for the July 1995 billing. The question
here is whether Virginia Tech intended to relinquish its contractual
right to receive prompt payment from IRS.

There is sufficient evidence to make that question a jury issue.
From the beginning of the research project, IRS did not promptly pay
the bills submitted by Virginia Tech and failed to make any payments
after December 1995. Nevertheless, Virginia Tech continued to con-
duct research and requested several extensions and cost increases for
the project. As early as August 1995, IRS informed Virginia Tech
that its only sources of cash for the next few years would be by
selling shares of stock in IRS and by selling technology rights. IRS’s
inability to pay until it received a working prototype was the subject
of discussions and correspondence between IRS and Virginia Tech. A
July 1996 internal Virginia Tech document acknowledged that fact,
and according to IRS, Virginia Tech agreed in the fall of 1996 to
give IRS 90 days after receipt of a working prototype to pay the
indebtedness to Virginia Tech. As late as December 1996, Virginia
Tech requested a no-cost extension of the research project. All this
evidence is consistent with IRS’s position that Virginia Tech had
agreed to wait for payment until 90 days after it provided a working
prototype to IRS.

I This is not a case in which Virginia Tech merely acquiesced
in IRS’s failure to pay its indebtedness promptly. See Stanley's Cafe-
teria, 226 Va. at 74, 306 S.E.2d at 874 (“[a]cquiescence, that is, the
failure to protest or object, is an element of waiver; but does not of
itself constitute waiver”). Instead, there is sufficient evidence from

which the jury could fairly infer that Virginia Tech intended to relin-
quish its contractual right to receive prompt payment by IRS in order
to produce a working prototype. Rather than standing on its contrac-
tual rights and treating the SRA as ended, Virginia Tech, by its con-
duct, see Cocoa Products Co. of Am. v. Duche, 156 Va. 86, 96, 158
S.E. 719, 722 (1931) (contractual rights may be waived by course of
dealing), kept the SRA alive for itself and for IRS, see Richmond
Leather Mfg. Co. v. Fawcett, 130 Va. 484, 506-07, 107 S.E. 800, 808
(1921) (“series of dealings in which delayed deliveries are accepted
and paid for, and further deliveries demanded, justifies the party in
default in the absence of anything to the contrary, in concluding that
the contract will not be rescinded on account of such delayed deliv-
eries without notice,” thereby “keep[ing] the contract alive”).

ll Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in
instructing the jury on the issue of waiver and in refusing to grant the
defendants’ motion to strike and Virginia Tech’s post-trial motion.
That conclusion renders irrelevant the question whether IRS was the
first party to commit a material breach of the SRA. Assuming the
jury’s verdict against Virginia Tech was based on its finding that Vir-
ginia Tech breached the SRA, not the IPA, the jury could have
reached that verdict either by finding, per its instructions, that IRS
did not breach the SRA, or that it did but Virginia Tech waived the
breach. For that reason and because VTIP was not a party to the
SRA, neither defendant can obtain any relief under the first assign-
ment of error.

HM Virginia Tech and VTIP, nevertheless, argue in the reply
brief that IRS was also the first party to commit a material breach of
the IPA. They contend that the IPA did not alter IRS’s obligation to
pay Virginia Tech for the costs of the research project and that, under
the terms of the IPA, IRS was required to sponsor the research by
providing $416,131 to Virginia Tech. However, the terms of the IPA
did not specify whether this sum reflected the balance owed to Vir-
ginia Tech at the time the parties entered into the IPA or whether it
was additional money to be paid by IRS. Nor does the evidence in
the record answer this question. Moreover, the IPA does not contain
any terms regarding when IRS was to pay that sum to Virginia Tech.
Thus, the evidence at trial failed to demonstrate a material breach of
the IPA by IRS.

Finally, with regard to the issue of consequential damages, Vir-
ginia Tech and VTIP argue that, when they contracted with IRS, they
could not have contemplated that IRS would create an arrangement

with a third party that tied royalty payments to IRS to its securing a
final judgment against Virginia Tech. They also contend that the
HAGO agreement was ‘“‘a sham, nothing more than a thinly veiled
attempt to manufacture consequential damages where no damages
exist{ed].”” Thus, according to the defendants, the circuit court erred
in admitting evidence of consequential damages based on the HAGO
agreement. We do not agree.

HH “Consequential damages are those which arise from the
intervention of ‘special circumstances’ not ordinarily predictable.”
Roanoke Hosp. Ass’n v. Doyle & Russell, Inc., 215 Va. 796, 801, 214
S.E.2d 155, 160 (1975); accord NAJLA Assocs., Inc. v. William L.
Griffith & Co. of Va., Inc., 253 Va. 83, 86, 480 S.E.2d 492, 494
(1997). Consequential damages “‘are compensable only if it is deter-
mined that the special circumstances were within the ‘contemplation’
of both contracting parties.” NAJLA Assocs., 253 Va. at 87, 480
S8.E.2d at 494. The term “contemplation” used in this context means
both ‘“‘what was actually foreseen and what was reasonably foresee-
able.” Roanoke Hosp., 215 Va. at 801 n.4, 214 S.E.2d at 160 n.4;
accord Danburg v. Keil, 235 Va. 71, 76, 365 S.E.2d 754, 757 (1988).
The question “[w]hether special circumstances were within the con-
templation of the parties is a question of fact.’ Roanoke Hosp., 215
Va. at 801, 214 S.E.2d at 160.

HE We need look no further than the terms of the SRA and
IPA to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to make the question
whether the type of damages claimed by IRS was within the contem-~
plation of the parties an issue for the jury to resolve. See Fairfax
County Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Hurst & Assocs. Consult-
ing Eng’rs, Inc., 231 Va. 164, 168, 343 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1986).
Under the terms of the SRA, Virginia Tech was obligated to “‘make
every effort[ ] to develop mass production engineering prototypes of
the system .. . that will allow manufacturers to produce reliable
products that are affordable to the general public and reliable prod-
ucts for the TVDS network providers.” The introductory section of
the IPA, which both Virginia Tech and VTIP executed, stated that
IRS had “an interest in developing and commercializing technology
related to [the] Interactive Video and Data Service System.” In that
same section, the parties to the agreement expressed their desire that
such technology be made available to the public, and CIT stated its
interest in helping IRS commercialize the technology. In return for
CIT’s “‘cost-share funding” to Virginia Tech, IRS agreed to repay
CIT from its worldwide “net revenues arising from the selling, leas-

«5
Fe

ing, licensing, sublicensing, or in any other manner generating reve-
nue from the transfer or use of any products and/or services using”
the technology developed in the research program by Virginia Tech.
In turn, CIT was required to distribute to Virginia Tech a propor-
tional share of each payment received from IRS.

Based on the provisions of the SRA and the IPA, it was reason-
ably foreseeable to the parties that, following research and the devel-
opment of intellectual property and technology related to the Interac-
tive Video and Data Service System, there would be licensing, manu-
facturing, and/or marketing contracts for those rights and that such
contracts would generate revenues to IRS. IRS’s agreement to sell
intellectual property rights to HAGO was such a contract. Thus, the
consequential damages claimed by IRS were of the nature and type
of damages within the contemplation of the parties, i.e., reasonably
foreseeable, at the time of contracting. See Krauss v. Greenbarg, 137
F.2d 569, 570-71 (3rd Cir. 1943) (in Pennsylvania, the determinative
question is whether the breaching party knew that the breach would
probably result in the kind of special damages claimed). Stated dif-
ferently, a reasonably prudent person in the position of Virginia Tech
and VTIP at the time of contracting would have considered this type
of damages to be the natural consequence of their breach of the SRA
and/or the IPA when they failed to assign the intellectual property
rights to CIT so those rights could be licensed to IRS. See Contempo
Design, Inc. v. Chicago & Northeast Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters,
226 F3d 535, 554 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1078
(2001).

HR 1 was not necessary for the parties actually to foresee
that type of consequential damages. See Roanoke Hosp., 215 Va. at
801 n.4, 214 S.E.2d at 160 n.4; see also Passaic Distrib., Inc. v. The
Sherman Co., 386 F. Supp. 647, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying New
Jersey law, “[a]ctual foresight of the specific injury of a particular
amount in money is not required”). Neither was it necessary that the
HAGO agreement in particular or the exact consequential damages
claimed by IRS be in fact foreseen or reasonably foreseeable by the
parties.! See Sabraw v. Kaplan, 211 Cal. App. 2d 224, 228 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1962) (“it is not necessary that the exact manner by which

1 To the extent that Virginia Tech and VTIP argue that the quantum of consequential dam-
ages claimed by IRS was speculative or that the HAGO agreement was entered into for fraudu-
lent purposes, those arguments are not encompassed within the assignment of error. See Rule
5:17(c). We note that the defendants asserted those particular arguments in their motion in
limine before the circuit court.

damages occur by reason of breach of contract be foreseeable’);
Stern & Stern Assocs. v. Timmons, 423 S.E.2d 124, 125 (S.C. 1992)
(“the defendant need not foresee the exact dollar amount of the
injury, the defendant [need only] know or have reason to know the
special circumstances”). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in
admitting evidence of consequential damages. There was suificient
evidence of special circumstances within the contemplation of the
parties to submit this factual issue to the jury and to sustain the jury’s
verdict.

CONCLUSION

In summary, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury
could have concluded that Virginia Tech waived its contractual right
to receive prompt payment from IRS. Thus, the circuit court did not
err by instructing the jury on the issue of waiver. Consequently, it is
irrelevant whether IRS was the first party to commit a material
breach of the SRA. And, there is no evidence that IRS was the first
party to commit a material breach of the IPA. Finally, the evidence
demonstrated that special circumstances giving rise to the type of
consequential damages claimed by IRS were within the contempla-
tion of the parties at the time of contracting. For these reasons, we
will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

657

JOSHUA MADDOX, AN INFANT WHO SUES BY HIS
PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, TOM AND AMY MADDOX

v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 031064
April 23, 2004
Present: Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons and Agee, JJ.

ral :
oO

659

Jayne A. Pemberton (Temple W. Cabell; Schaffer & Cabell, on
briefs), for appellant.

Peter R. Messitt, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kil-
gore, Attorney General; Judith Williams Jagdmann, Deputy Attorney
General; Edward M. Macon, Senior Assistant Attorney General;
Catherine Crooks Hill, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for
appellee.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Joshua Maddox (“Maddox”), an infant suing by his parents and
next friends, Tom and Amy Maddox, brought an action against the
Commonwealth of Virginia (“Commonwealth”) for personal injuries
Maddox suffered in a bicycle accident. In his motion for judgment,
Maddox asserted separate claims for negligent construction and neg-
ligent maintenance of a sidewalk, and separate claims for creating a
nuisance and maintaining a nuisance due to the alleged dangerous
condition posed by the design of the sidewalk. The circuit court
granted the Commonwealth’s plea of sovereign immunity and dis-
missed the motion for judgment. Maddox appealed to this Court on
the sole issue of whether a claim against the Commonwealth sound-
ing in nuisance is barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.'
Because we conclude that Maddox’s nuisance claims are precluded
by the legislative function exception to the Commonwealth’s waiver

' Maddox has not raised on appeal any issue concerning the circuit court’s dismissal of the
counts alleging negligent construction and maintenance.

660 De
|

of sovereign immunity in the Virginia Tort Claims Act (“the Act”),
specifically Code § 8.01-195.3(2), we will affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.

RELEVANT FACTS?

Maddox was injured while riding his bicycle on a public side-
walk along Washington Street in an area known as “Amelia Village”
located in Amelia County. The front tire of his bicycle caught on the
inside edge of the sidewalk, propelling Maddox and his bicycle into
the air. There was a ‘“‘sharp and sudden drop off from the sidewalk
into the adjoining yard.” Maddox was thrown into the yard where he
landed on his left elbow, injuring it.

The sidewalk was part of a project constructed by the Common-
wealth and known as “‘the Route 1003 State Highway Project, No.
1003-004-172-501” (“the Project”). Maddox alleged that the Com-
monwealth “was negligent in creating the sharp and sudden drop off
from the sidewalk into the adjoining yard where the accident
occurred” and in maintaining that drop off. Continuing, he asserted
that the Commonwealth could have prevented the resulting danger-
ous condition “by constructing a retaining wall and/or adequately
backfilling the adjoining area.” In the negligence counts, Maddox
alleged that the Commonwealth “‘failed to use ordinary care in both
planning and constructing the changes and alterations to the area at
issue” and ‘“‘in the maintenance of the area.”

Incorporating by reference his allegations set forth in the negli-
gent construction and maintenance counts, Maddox further alleged
that the Commonwealth created a nuisance by failing “to take mea-
sures to guard against the sharp and dangerous sidewalk ledge” and
the “sharp drop off,” thereby imperiling the safety of the public
sidewalk. Finally, he asserted that, by allowing himself and “other
members of the community to be continuously exposed to the dan-
gerous sidewalk ledge,” the Commonwealth maintained a nuisance
that imperiled “the safety of the public sidewalk area at issue” and
that was “dangerous and hazardous in and of itself.”

2 Because the circuit court decided this case upon a plea of sovereign immunity without an
evidentiary hearing, we will state the facts as alleged in the pleadings and take those facts as
true for the purpose of resolving the issue presented. Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230,
233, 564 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2002).

Len 661
as

ANALYSIS

HM This Court has previously recognized that the Common-
wealth and its agencies are immune from liability for the tortious acts
of their agents, employees, and servants absent express statutory or
constitutional provisions waiving immunity. University of Virginia v.
Carter, 267 Va. 242, 244, 591 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2004); Baumgardner v.
Southwestern Virginia Mental Health Inst., 247 Va. 486, 489, 442
S.E.2d 400, 401 (1994); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Hampton
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 217 Va. 30, 32, 225 S.E.2d 364, 367
(1976); Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 456-57,
117 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1961); Kellam v. School Bd. of the City of
Norfolk, 202 Va. 252, 254, 117 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1960); Eriksen v.
Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 657, 79 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1954). The General
Assembly provided an express, limited waiver of the Common-
wealth’s immunity in 1981 by enacting the Virginia Tort Claims Act,
Code §§ 8.01-195.1 through -195.9. Because the Act is a statute in
derogation of the common law, its waiver of immunity must be
strictly construed. Carter, 267 Va. at 245, 591 S.E.2d at 78; Melan-
son v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 178, 181, 539 S.E.2d 433, 434
(2001); Baumgardner, 247 Va. at 489, 442 S.E.2d 402.

HMB In pertinent part, the Act imposes liability on the Common-
wealth for

damage to or loss of property or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee while acting within the scope of his employment
under circumstances where the Commonwealth . . ., if a pri-
vate person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage,
loss, injury or death.

Code § 8.01-195.3. There are, however, exceptions to the Common-
wealth’s waiver of immunity. At issue here is the exception for
“fajny claim based upon an act or omission of the General Assembly
or district commission of any transportation district, or any member
or staff thereof acting in his official capacity, or to the legislative
function of any agency subject to the provisions of this article.”
Code § 8.01-195.3(2). In other words, the provisions of Code § 8.01-
195.3(2) preserve the Commonwealth’s immunity from liability in
tort for any act or omission in the exercise of the legislative function
of an agency of the Commonwealth.

Maddox argues that the term “legislative function” includes such
activities as setting rates for public utilities, classifying criminal
offenses, levying taxes, drafting statutes, and promulgating rules for
governing prisons but does not encompass creating and maintaining a
nuisance. In his view, the latter does not involve the determination of
legislative policy. Relying on the statement that “[a] function is con-
sidered governmental if it is the exercise of an entity’s political, dis-
cretionary, or legislative authority,” Carter v. Chesterfield County
Health Comm’n, 259 Va. 588, 591, 527 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2000),
Maddox posits that ‘‘an agency’s ‘legislative function’ is a subset of
its broader governmental function” and that the two terms, therefore,
cannot be used interchangeably. Finally, he asserts that the rationale
used in Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 240 Va. 367, 397 S.E.2d 832
(1990), to hold that sovereign immunity did not bar a nuisance claim
against a municipality is applicable to the facts of the present case
and defeats the Commonwealth’s claim of sovereign immunity. We
do not agree with Maddox’s arguments.

HMMM A sidewalk such as the one at issue is, by definition, part of
a street. See Messick v. Barham, 194 Va. 382, 387, 73 S.E.2d 530,
533 (1952) (“It is generally accepted that the word ‘street’ is all
inclusive and means all that portion of a highway set apart and desig-
nated for such use, that is, embraces both that portion of the highway
set apart for vehicular traffic and that part set aside for pedestrians”’);
McCrowell v. City of Bristol, 89 Va. 652, 662, 16 S.E. 867, 870
(1893) (“It is true that a sidewalk along a public street is part of the
street’””). In Virginia, the General Assembly “has supreme powers to
open, improve, repair, discontinue, or abandon public highways.”
Ord v. Fugate, 207 Va. 752, 759, 152 S.E.2d 54, 59 (1967) (citing
former Constitution of Virginia, § 63; City of Lynchburg v. Peters,
145 Va. 1, 9, 133 S.E. 674, 677 (1926)). But, of course, “[p]ractical
necessity requires that the administration of those powers be dele-
gated to appropriate subordinate officials, and this the legislature has
done.” Ord, 207 Va. at 759, 152 S.E.2d at 59. The General Assembly
has delegated to the Commonwealth Transportation Board and the
Department of Transportation authority over the supervision, man-
agement, construction, improvement, and maintenance of public
highways and roads. See, e.g., Code §§ 33.1-12, -25, -49, and -69.

HMM The issue here is whether the alleged acts or omissions by
an agency of the Commonwealth in regard to the sidewalk fall within
the “‘legislative function” exception to the Commonwealth’s waiver
of immunity. Resolution of that issue does not turn on the theory of

Le 663
a

tort liability asserted by Maddox. In both nuisance claims, the only
acts or omissions on the part of the Commonwealth alleged by Mad-
dox were the failure to construct a retaining wall along the edge of
the sidewalk and/or to backfill the adjoining yard. Thus, Maddox
must rely on those allegations to support his claims for creating and
maintaining a nuisance. See Hawthorn v. City of Richmond, 253 Va.
283, 289, 484 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1997). Maddox did not allege that
the sidewalk’s construction had deviated from the Project’s plans or
that the sidewalk had fallen into a state of disrepair.

In the context of streets controlled by a municipality, we
have held that, when a municipality selects and adopts a plan for the
construction of its public streets, it “acts in a governmental capac-
ity.” City of Norfolk v. Hall, 175 Va. 545, 551-52, 9 S.E.2d 356, 359
(1940). Further, determining the need for such devices as “{t]raffic
lights, blinking lights, warning signals, roadway markings, railings,
barriers, guardrails, [and] curbings” and “the decision to install or
not to install them calls for the exercise of discretion.” Freeman v.
City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 60, 266 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1980); see also
Taylor, 240 Va. at 370, 397 S.E.2d at 835 (a city’s failure “to use
reasonable care to install lights, a barricade, and other safety devices,
and in designing and constructing” a particular street involved dis-
cretionary governmental functions). In exercising that discretion, a
municipality “is performing a governmental function and is not lia-
ble for its negligent performance of the function.” Freeman, 221 Va.
at 60, 266 S.E.2d at 886.

HH For purposes of today’s decision, we do not equate a munici-
pality’s exercise of a governmental function with the exercise of a
legislative function by an agency of the Commonwealth. However,
the rationale underlying our decisions holding that a municipality’s
planning and designing its streets is a governmental function also
supports the conclusion that the design of a sidewalk by an agency of
the Commonwealth is a legislative function. In either instance, the
decision-making process by the municipality or the state agency
entails the exercise of discretion. Deciding whether the plan and
design of the sidewalk at issue would include installing a guardrail
along the edge of the sidewalk and/or backfilling the area adjacent to
the sidewalk necessarily called for the exercise of discretion by an
agency of the Commonwealth. It required the agency to determine
whether public funds should be expended to install those particular
safety features. Thus, the alleged acts or omissions in this case were
a legislative function.

664 Ln
|

[T]he right to regulate the use of the highways of the State or
of the streets of a city is clearly a governmental power, and its
exercise, whether by the State or by a municipal corporation as
an agency of the State, is legislative and discretionary; and
being legislative and discretionary, a municipal corporation, as
an arm of the State, is no more liable for the failure to exercise
the power or for its improper exercise than the State itself
would be.

Jones v. City of Williamsburg, 97 Va. 722, 725, 34 S.E. 883, 883
(1900).

HH Our decision in Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, does not, as
asserted by Maddox, support a contrary conclusion. There, the city
had “placed no signs, guardrails, lights, reflectors, painted lines,
sidewalks, or curbs to mark the end of [a] road” beyond which lay
the edge of a steep precipice. 240 Va. at 369, 397 S.E.2d at 834. The
city’s site plan for the street reflected the defective and dangerous
condition. Jd. Among other things, the plaintiffs sought recovery for
wrongful death on the basis that the city had created and maintained
a public nuisance. Jd. at 372, 397 S.E.2d at 835. We reversed the trial
court’s judgment sustaining the city’s demurrer to the nuisance count.
Id. at 374, 397 S.E.2d at 837. In reaching that conclusion, we
restated the rule “that if a municipal corporation creates or maintains
a nuisance, it is not protected by the immunity doctrine unless (1) the
condition claimed to be a nuisance is authorized by law, and (2) the
act creating or maintaining the nuisance is performed without negli-
gence.” Id. at 373, 397 S.E.2d at 836 (citing Virginia Beach v. Steel
Fishing Pier, 212 Va. 425, 427, 184 S.E.2d 749, 750-51 (1971)).

We also concluded in Taylor that the city’s reliance upon our
decision in Kellam v. School Board, 202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 96
(1960), was misplaced because Kellam involved a school board,
which was a state agency and not a true municipal corporation as
was the City of Charlottesville. Id. at 374, 397 S.E.2d at 836. In
Kellam, the plaintiff slipped and fell as she walked down the aisle of
a school auditorium. 202 Va. at 253, 117 S.E.2d at 97. She sued the
school board alleging that the board had failed to maintain the aisle
in a reasonably safe condition and that the aisle was dangerous and
constituted a nuisance. Jd. The Court held that the school board had
acted in a governmental capacity and was therefore immune from
liability for both the negligence and nuisance claims. Id. at 257-58,
117 S.E. at 99-100.

De 665
|

HM Specifically with regard to the latter claim, we emphasized
that a school board is an agent or instrumentality of the state, not a
true municipality, and therefore “ ‘partake[s] of the state’s sover-
eignty with respect to tort liability.’ ” Id. at 259, 117 S.E.2d at 100
(quoting Bingham v. Board of Education of Ogden City, 223 P.2d
432, 436 (Utah 1950)). In other words, we did not strip away the
school board’s immunity derived from its status as an arm of the
state merely because the plaintiff there sought recovery for injuries
sustained as a result of an alleged nuisance.? Nor do we strip away
the Commonwealth’s immunity in this case merely because Maddox
sought recovery for injuries resulting from an alleged nuisance. As
already stated, the pertinent inquiry is whether the alleged acts or
omissions arose out of the exercise of a legislative function by an
agency of the Commonwealth.

CONCLUSION

Hl In preserving the Commonwealth’s absolute immunity for
claims arising out of its agencies’ exercise of legislative functions,
the Act does not distinguish among theories of tort liability or “ ‘the
adjectives used in the complaint.’ Kellam, 202 Va. at 259, 117
S.E.2d at 100 (quoting Bingham, 223 P.2d at 436). Because the nui-
sance claims in this case are predicated on the acts or omissions of
an agency of the Commonwealth in the design of the sidewalk, those
claims are barred by the “legislative function” exception to the
Commonwealth’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See Code § 8.01-
195.3(2). Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

3 We recognize that Kellam was decided before the passage of the Act.

666 ee
a

JERALD LORENZO JACKSON
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 031867
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

ej
eo}

669

Mark L. Williams for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE KINSER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Relying on a tip from an anonymous informant, a police officer
conducted an investigatory stop of an automobile in which the defen-
dant was a passenger. The issue is whether the information from the
anonymous caller, corroborated in part by police officers’ observa-
tions, provided reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the investi-
gative traffic stop. We conclude that it did not and that, therefore,
evidence seized from the defendant during a subsequent search
should have been suppressed by the trial court.

PRIOR RELEVANT PROCEEDINGS

The appellant, Jerald Lorenzo Jackson, was indicated in the Cir-
cuit Court for the City of Newport News for possession of cocaine in

violation of Code § 18.2-250, and possession of a firearm while in
possession of a controlled substance in violation of Code § 18.2-
308.4(A). He was also charged with a misdemeanor, possession of a
concealed weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.! Jackson filed a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence, specifically a firearm and
cocaine, seized during a warrantless search of his person. He asserted
that the police did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion justify-
ing the investigative traffic stop. The trial court denied the suppres-
sion motion and convicted Jackson of the charged offenses.
Jackson appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. That court affirmed the convictions and the judgment of the
circuit court. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 624, 576
S.E.2d 206 (2003). Upon granting Jackson’s petition for a rehearing
en banc, Jackson vy. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 88, 578 S.E.2d 51
(2003), the Court of Appeals again affirmed the convictions, Jackson
v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 211, 583 S.E.2d 780 (2003). We
awarded Jackson this appeal limited to the question whether the cir-
cuit court erred in denying Jackson’s pretrial motion to suppress.

RELEVANT FACTS

At approximately 2:10 a.m. on June 17, 2001, M. A. Cook, a
police officer with the City of Newport News Police Department,
received a dispatch, based on information from an anonymous caller,
regarding a firearm. According to Officer Cook, “[uJnits were dis-
patched to 34th [Street] and Jefferson [Avenue]. . . . in reference to
three black males in a white Honda that were disorderly and one of
the subjects brandished a firearm.” There was a small bar and a gas-
oline station situated at that location. As Officer Cook was approach-
ing the specified intersection approximately five minutes after receiv-
ing the dispatch, he observed a white Honda automobile that was
occupied by three black males. The vehicle was leaving the gasoline
station and “pulled out right in front of” Officer Cook, allowing the
headlights of his vehicle to shine into the window of the Honda auto-
mobile. At that point, Officer Cook executed a “U-turn” and pro-
ceeded to follow the Honda automobile until other police units
arrived. He then executed a traffic stop, causing the automobile to
pull into the parking lot of a fast-food restaurant. Officer Cook
approached the driver of the vehicle and explained the reason for the

' The misdemeanor charge was on appeal to the circuit court. See Code § 16.1-132.

es 67
J

traffic stop. The defendant was sitting in the front passenger seat of
the vehicle.

Sergeant James Hogan, another police officer who responded to
the dispatch, assisted Officer Cook in the traffic stop. Sergeant
Hogan approached the stopped Honda vehicle from the rear and
moved up to the front door on the passenger side. He then shined his
flashlight into the vehicle and spotted Jackson sitting in the front
passenger seat.

The defendant had his arms folded across his stomach, but Ser-
geant Hogan noticed a bulge in Jackson’s shirt under his arms just
above the waistband of his pants. According to Sergeant Hogan,
“[the] bulge . . . obviously was not part of [Jackson’s] body[;] . . . it
was too big” to be anything other than a firearm. Sergeant Hogan
asked Jackson if he had a firearm, and Jackson responded, “No.”
Sergeant Hogan requested Jackson to move his hands, but Jackson
just raised his hands and put them back on his stomach. Sergeant
Hogan then asked Jackson to pull his shirt up, but Jackson merely
pulled his shirt out a few inches and then put it back, placing his
arms back across his stomach.

Due to Jackson’s unwillingness to cooperate with Sergeant
Hogan’s requests, Sergeant Hogan pulled his firearm out of its hol-
ster, pointed it at Jackson, and directed him to get out of the vehicle.
As Jackson was doing so, Officer Brendan D. Bartley, who was
standing behind Sergeant Hogan, reached around Jackson and
removed a firearm from the waistband of Jackson’s pants. The fire-
arm was underneath Jackson’s shirt. Officer Bartley handcuffed Jack-
son and proceeded to search him subsequent to arrest. During that
search, Officer Bartley found four, individually wrapped “rocks of
cocaine” in the left pocket of Jackson’s pants.

Officer Cook acknowledged that the driver of the Honda automo-
bile was not violating any traffic laws and that he would not have
stopped the vehicle except for the dispatch. He also did not have any
information other than what was contained in the original dispatch to
the police officers. Similarly, Sergeant Hogan knew of no efforts to
confirm the information received by the dispatcher. Like Officer
Cook, he saw the white Honda automobile and it matched the
description of the vehicle for which they were looking. So, Sergeant
Hogan turned his police vehicle around and followed Officer Cook,
who was pursuing the white Honda automobile. Likewise, Officer
Bartley responded to the original dispatch and saw the white Honda
vehicle turning southbound on Jefferson Avenue. He did, however,

testify that he had a clear vision of the entire parking lot at the small
bar and he did not see another white Honda automobile there.

ANALYSIS

HM The Fourth Amendment protects “persons” from “unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. An investiga-
tory stop (sometimes referred to as a “Terry stop”), such as the traf-
fic stop at issue in this case, constitutes a seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “even though the purpose
of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see United States v. Has-
san El, 5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 1993). Consequently, such action by
a police officer “must be justified by probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, of unlawful con-
duct.” Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 729; see Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va.
470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 923-24 (2000) (“stop of an automobile
. . . is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent a reason-
able, articulable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or that the
automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant
is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of the law”); United
States v. Bell, 183 F.3d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1999) (“An investigative
stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the police have rea-
sonable suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants are involved in
criminal activity.”) If evidence is seized during an illegal stop, it is
not admissible at trial under the doctrine known as “the fruit of the
poisonous tree.” Hassan El, 5 F.3d at 729; see Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The issue we decide in this appeal is
whether the anonymous tip together with the police officers’ observa-
tions of the white Honda automobile and its occupants provided rea-
sonable articulable suspicion to justify the investigative traffic stop.

HEME In deciding that issue and reviewing the trial court’s denial
of Jackson’s motion to suppress, we consider the evidence and all
reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. Bass,
259 Va. at 475, 525 S.E.2d at 924. Since the constitutionality of a
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment involves questions
of law and fact, we give deference to the factual findings of the trial
court but independently decide whether, under the applicable law, the
manner in which the challenged evidence was obtained satisfies con-
stitutional requirements. McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483,
490, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); see Ornelas v. United States, 517

es 673
J

U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996). The Commonwealth carries the burden of
showing that a warrantless search and seizure was constitutionally
permissible. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 204, 380
S.E.2d 656, 659 (1989). However, a defendant must show, when
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Common-
wealth, that the denial of the motion to suppress evidence was
reversible error. McCain, 261 Va. at 490, 545 S.E.2d at 545; Fore v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980).

HE The constitutionality of the traffic stop in this case turns on
whether the anonymous tip sufficed to give rise to reasonable suspi-
cion. Reasonable suspicion is something “more than an ‘inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.”
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). However, it is something less than probable
cause. Bass, 259 Va. at 475, 525 S.E.2d at 923. In Alabama y. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), the Supreme Court of the United States
explained that

[rJeasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than prob-
able cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can
be established with information that is different in quantity or
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also
in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informa-
tion that is less reliable than that required to show probable
cause.

The “totality of the circumstances,”’ which includes “the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliabil-
ity,” ie., “quantity and quality,” must be considered when determin-
ing whether reasonable suspicion exits. Jd. “[I]f a tip has a relatively
low degree of reliability, more information will be required to estab-
lish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the
tip were more reliable.” Jd.; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
233 (1983) (“‘a deficiency in one [the informant’s ‘veracity’ or ‘relia-
bility’ and his or her ‘basis of knowledge’] may be compensated for,
in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as
to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability”). The converse is
likewise true. See State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Wis.
2001) (“‘if there are strong indicia of the informant’s veracity, there
need not necessarily be any indicia of the informant’s basis of
knowledge’).

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The interplay between an informant’s reliability and the inform-
ant’s basis of knowledge is illustrated by comparing the decision in
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, with the decision in Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In the former case, the police received a
telephone call from an anonymous informant who stated that the
defendant would leave a particular address “at a particular time in a
brown Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight lens broken,”
would drive to a named motel, and would be in possession of
cocaine inside a brown attaché case. White, 496 U.S. at 327. The
police proceeded to the specified address where they observed both
the automobile as described by the informant and the defendant as
she left the building and drove away in the automobile. Id. The
police followed the vehicle as it proceeded along the most direct
route to the named motel. Id. The police stopped the defendant’s
vehicle shortly before it reached the motel and conducted a consen-
sual search of the station wagon. Jd. During the search, the police
found the brown attaché case, which contained marijuana. Jd. They
also discovered cocaine in the defendant’s purse. Id. At trial, the
defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search
on the basis that the police officers did not have a reasonable suspi-
cion justifying the initial investigative stop. Id. at 327-328.

Although the Supreme Court described White as a “close” case,
it concluded “‘that under the totality of the circumstances the anony-
mous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to
justify the investigatory stop” of the defendant’s vehicle. Jd. at 332.
The Court acknowledged that the police officers had not verified
every detail mentioned by the anonymous caller but that they had
corroborated certain facts, including that a woman had left a particu-
lar building, had gotten into the described automobile, and had
driven along the most direct route toward the named motel. Jd. at
331. The Court stated that it was “important that . . . ‘the anonymous
[tip] contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained
facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future
actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.’ ” Id. at 332
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 245). The Court explained that the police
officers’ finding an automobile exactly as the anonymous caller had
described in front of a particular building was an example of readily
obtained facts which anyone could have known. Jd. at 332. However,
“{w]hat was important was the caller’s ability to predict [the defen-
dant’s] future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information —
a special familiarity with [the defendant’s] affairs” that the general

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public would have no way of knowing. Id. Once the police verified
the caller’s predictions, it was reasonable to conclude that the caller
had reliable information about the defendant’s illegal activities. Id.
That “basis of knowledge” provided the anonymous caller with suf-
ficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop. Jd. at
329.

In contrast, the decision in Adams y. Williams turned on the
informant’s veracity rather than the informant’s basis of knowledge.
There, an informant approached a police officer and stated that “an
individual seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had
a gun at his waist.” 407 U.S. at 144-45. The informant was person-
ally known by the police officer and had provided him with informa-
tion in the past. Id. at 146. Based on the informant’s tip, the police
officer approached the vehicle and, when the defendant rolled down
the window, the officer reached into the vehicle and removed a fully
loaded firearm from the defendant’s waistband. Id. at 145. The fire-
arm was not visible to the police officer from outside the automobile,
but it was located precisely where the informant had indicated. Id.
During a subsequent search incident to arrest, police officers found
heroin, a machete, and another firearm. Id.

Emphasizing that the police officer personally knew the inform-
ant and had received information from him in the past, the Supreme
Court concluded that the officer “acted justifiably in responding to
his informant’s tip.” Id. at 146. The Court stated that this case was
“stronger” than one involving “an anonymous telephone tip”
because “[t]he informant here came forward personally to give infor-
mation that was immediately verifiable at the scene.” Id. Also
important in the Court’s analysis was the fact that the informant
might have been subject to immediate arrest for making a false com-
plaint had the officer’s investigation proved the tip to be false. Id. at
147.

This analysis brings us to the Supreme Court’s most recent case
involving an anonymous informant, Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266
(2000). There, an anonymous caller reported to the police “that a
young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a
plaid shirt was carrying a gun.” Jd. at 268. There was no audio
recording of the call, and the police did not know anything about the
caller. Id. Proceeding on the information provided by the informant,
the police went to the bus stop and observed three black males there.
Id. One of them, J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Id. Apart from the
anonymous tip, the police did not observe any suspicious behavior,

676 Po
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nor did the officers see a firearm. Jd. Nevertheless, “[o]ne of the
officers approached J. L., told him to put his hands up on the bus
stop, frisked him, and seized a gun from J. L.’s pocket.” Id. J. L. was
charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license and pos-
sessing a firearm while under the age of 18. Id. at 269. At trial, he
moved to suppress the introduction of the firearm that was seized
from him on the basis that it was “the fruit of an unlawful search.”
Id.

The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the
anonymous tip pointing to J. L. had the required indicia of reliability
as enunciated in Adams and White. Id. at 270. In J. L., the officers’
suspicion that the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon came
not from their own observations “‘but solely from a call made from
an unknown location by an unknown caller.” Jd. Thus, the Court
concluded that, unlike a tip such as the one in Adams where the
informant was known and could be held responsible if the allegations
were proven to be false, “ ‘an anonymous tip alone seldom demon-
strates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.’ ” Id. (quoting
White, 496 U.S. at 329).

The tip concerning J. L. also lacked the indicia of reliability pres-
ent in White because the anonymous caller did not provide any “pre-
dictive information” which the police could use to test the inform-
ant’s basis of knowledge or credibility. Jd. at 271. The fact that the
informant provided an accurate description of an “observable loca-
tion and appearance” served only to “help the police correctly iden-
tify the person whom the tipster [meant] to accuse.” Id. at 272. The
reasonable suspicion at issue in J. L. was whether the informant was
reliable in the assertion of concealed criminal activity, “not just in
[the tip’s] tendency to identify a determinate person.” Id. Thus, since
all the police had in J. L. was “the bare report of an unknown, unac-
countable informant who neither explained how he knew about the
gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information
about J. L.,” the Court concluded that the investigatory stop and
ensuing search were unconstitutional. Jd. at 271.

The Court also rejected a “firearm exception” to its well-
established reliability analysis. Such an exception would allow a stop
and frisk when a tip alleges an illegal firearm even if the tip lacked
sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. at 272. But, the Court pointed out
that it was not saying that there could never be “‘circumstances under
which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to

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justify a search even without a showing of reliability,” such as infor-
mation that a person is carrying a bomb. Jd. at 273.

HM Turning now to the case before us, we agree with the state-
ment that “[rJarely are the facts of two cases as congruent as the
facts in J. L. and this case.” Jackson, 41 Va. App. at 240, 583 S.B.2d
at 795 (Benton, J., dissenting). As in J. L., Officer Cook had nothing
more to go on than an anonymous, unaccountable informant who
neither explained how he knew that Jackson was brandishing a fire-
arm nor furnished any basis for believing that he had inside knowl-
edge about Jackson. Both the “quantity and quality” of the informa-
tion supplied to the police here lacked sufficient indicia of reliability
to justify the investigatory stop. Nor did the police officers observe
any suspicious behavior once they spotted the white Honda
automobile.

HE Unlike the informant in Adams, the caller in this case
was not known to the police nor did he or she personally appear
before an officer. Thus, the informant was not subjecting himself or
herself to possible arrest if the information provided to the dispatcher
proved false. See Code § 18.2-461. In other words, the informant was
not placing his or her credibility at risk and could “lie with impu-
nity.” J. L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). There also is
no evidence that the caller had supplied information on any previous
occasions. When, as in this case, there are virtually no indicia of the
informant’s veracity, more information is required in order “‘to estab-
lish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the
tip were more reliable.” White, 496 U.S. at 330.

HE The tip in this case, however, also lacked sufficient infor-
mation to demonstrate the informant’s basis of knowledge and to
establish the “requisite quantum of suspicion.” Id. The Court of
Appeals correctly noted that Officer Cook verified six details
reported by the informant: the make and color of the vehicle; its
location; and the number, race, and gender of the vehicle’s occu-
pants. Jackson, 41 Va. App. at 229, 583 S.E.2d at 789. Based on the
officer’s verification of these details, the Court of Appeals concluded
that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe “that the
remaining portion of the tip — that one of the suspects had brandished
a firearm only moments before ~ was likewise true.” Id. We do not
agree. The tip included only “easily obtained facts and conditions
existing at the time of the tip” which anyone could have known,
including the allegation of brandishing a firearm. White, 496 U.S. at
332. It failed to include the kind of details critical to the Supreme

678 Le
a

Court’s analysis in White, predictions about the defendant’s future
behavior. Such details are important because they demonstrate
“inside information” that would not be available to the public gener-
ally. Id.

Thus, as in J. L., “[t]he anonymous call . . . provided no predic-
tive information and therefore left the police without means to test
the informant’s knowledge or credibility.” 529 U.S. at 271. That the
officers in fact found a gun when they searched Jackson does not
mean that, prior to the search, they had a reasonable basis for believ-
ing that Jackson had engaged in criminal conduct. See id. Even when
an informant reports the commission of an open and obvious crime,
if the tip is truly anonymous and provides no explanation for how the
informant acquired the information, i.e., the informant’s basis of
knowledge, there remains a “layer of inquiry respecting the reliabil-
ity of the informant that cannot be pursued.” J. L., 529 U.S. at 275
(Kennedy, J., concurring).

The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from J. L. and
found the tip here

“reliable in its assertion of illegality” because this tip — unlike
the “carrying a gun” tip in J.L. — provided information permit-
ting the officers reasonably to infer that it (i) came from a
concerned citizen making a contemporaneous eyewitness
report, (ii) involved an open and obvious crime rather than
mere concealed illegality,[?] and (iii) described criminality pos-
ing an imminent danger to the public.

Jackson, 41 Va. App. at 235, 583 S.E.2d at 792 (quoting J. L., 529
U.S. at 272) (internal citation omitted). However, the first factual
predicate is not supported by the record, the second factor does not
distinguish this case from J. L., and the third element was rejected by
the Supreme Court in J. L.

2 The Court of Appeals stated that “[wJhen an anonymous caller reports an open and obvi-
ous crime. . . , the Fourth Amendment may require no showing that the caller have inside
information about the suspect capable of predicting his future conduct.” Jackson, 41 Va. App.
at 227, 583 S.B.2d at 788. In support of that assertion, the court, in a footnote, cited its deci-
sion in Beckner v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 533, 535, 425 $.B.2d 530, 531 (1993). How-
ever, in Beckner, it was not necessary for the informant to have predicted future action by the
defendant because the informant had “a face-to-face confrontation with the police officer.” Id.,
425 S.E.2d at 532. Thus, the informant had subjected himself to possible prosecution if he gave
false information.

ee 679
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As to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that this tip came from a
concerned citizen making an eyewitness report, the record contains
the testimony of two police officers concerning the dispatch that
directed them to proceed to 34th Street and Jefferson Avenue. Officer
Cook stated that “[w]e were dispatched in reference to three black
males in a white Honda [who] were disorderly and one of the sub-
jects brandished a firearm.” Sergeant Hogan testified that he was
backing up Officer Cook “on a call that someone was brandishing a
firearm and that they were getting, he and two other guys were get-
ting into a car and leaving.” This testimony is the police officers’
recitation of the information reported to them by the police dis-
patcher. The dispatcher did not testify nor is there any evidence that
the informant’s call was audio-recorded or its content preserved in
some other manner.

HEM Thus, even when viewing the police officers’ testimony
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and imputing the
dispatcher’s knowledge to the officers, see Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d
843, 849 (6th Cir. 2003), there simply is no evidence from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn that the informant in this case was
a concerned citizen making an eyewitness report as a crime was
being committed as opposed to a prankster or someone with a grudge
against Jackson. The informant provided no details about himself or
herself, cf. State v. Williams, 623 N.W.2d 106, 114 (Wis. 2001)
(informant provided “self-identifying information”); no descriptive
facts showing that he or she personally observed the firearm instead
of having received information from another person; and no time
frame for when the illegal activity was observed, cf: United States v.
Thompson, 234 F.3d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (tipster stated that he
“just saw” the defendant with a gun).? In other words, the anony-
mous informant here provided no basis for his or her knowledge.

HH Implicit in the second factor central to the Court of Appeals’
holding is its statement that one fact alone distinguishes this case
from J. L., that the informant here asserted specific illegal activity
while the informant in J. L. made no assertion of illegality. However,
as the dissent noted, “[i]f . . . the issue in J. L. concerned the failure
of the informant’s tip to convey evidence of criminal conduct, the
resolution of that case would not have required any discussion about
the informant’s reliability.” Jackson, 41 Va. App. at 242, 583 S.E.2d

3 The evidence showed only that Officer Cook arrived at the scene approximately five min-
utes after receiving the dispatch.

680 ee
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at 796 (Benton, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected
any suggestion that a report of illegal conduct justifies a stop and
frisk: “[t]he mere fact that a tip, if true, would describe illegal activ-
ity does not mean that the police may make a Terry stop without
meeting the reliability requirement.” 529 U.S. at 273 n. *. The Court
made no distinction between concealed criminal conduct and open,
obvious criminal activity.

HM Additionally, as already discussed, the police here had no
way to test the anonymous informant’s basis of knowledge and to
determine his or her reliability. The informant did not provide, con-
trary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, any “first-person, present-
tense” details of the alleged illegal conduct. Jackson, 41 Va. App. at
233, 583 S.E.2d at 791. See, e.g., Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d at 519
(unidentified motorist reported, by cellular phone, erratic driving by
another motorist and that he or she was in the vehicle in front of the
swerving pickup). Nor did the informant provide any information
about the defendant’s future behavior. We do not suggest that every
anonymous tip must include predictive information, see United States
v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (‘“‘the predictive aspects
of an anonymous tip may be less applicable to tips purporting to
describe contemporaneous, readily observable criminal actions as in
the case of erratic driving witnessed by another motorist”); but, even
when an informant reports open and obvious criminal conduct, suffi-
cient indicia of reliability must be present before a stop and frisk is
justified.

Hl Finally, with regard to the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the
imminent danger to the public, the Supreme Court declined to carve
out a “firearm exception” to its established reliability requirements
for anonymous tips. J. L. 529 U.S. at 272. The Court stated that “an
automatic firearm exception . . . would rove too far” because it
“would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion
an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person sim-
ply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target’s
unlawful carriage of a gun.” Id. See also Harris v. Commonwealth,
262 Va. 407, 416, 551 S.E.2d 606, 611 (2001) (a police officer’s
“hunch” that the defendant was trespassing could not be raised to
the level of reasonable suspicion based on an anonymous informant’s
assertion that the defendant was armed; the Commonwealth could not
“bootstrap[ ] the legitimate concern for law enforcement officers’
safety, which permits a protective search of a legally detained sus-
pect, to serve as the basis for detaining the suspect”).

HB Nor are we persuaded by the cases relied on by the Com-
monwealth and the Court of Appeals. Those cases are either inappo-
site or involved tips that contained indicia of reliability not present
here. For example, Wheat, 278 F.3d 722; State v. Walshire, 634
N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001); Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516; and State v.
Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000), all addressed the reliability of anon-
ymous reports of erratic or drunk drivers. That circumstance and the
imminent public danger associated with it are not factors in this case.
As the court in Boyea recognized, “a drunk driver is not at all unlike
a ‘bomb,’ and a mobile one at that.” 765 A.2d at 867. We agree that
“TiJn contrast to the report of an individual in possession of a gun, an
anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on the highway
presents a qualitatively different level of danger, and concomitantly
greater urgency for prompt action.” Id.

Continuing, in Williams, 623 N.W.2d 106, the informant was not
truly anonymous. There, the caller identified her location; indeed, she
teferred to it as “‘my house.” Jd. at 114. The court concluded that the
informant had provided “self-identifying information” and therefore
put her “anonymity at risk.” Id. “Risking one’s identification inti-
mates that, more likely than not, the informant is a genuinely con-
cerned citizen as opposed to a fallacious prankster.” Jd. at 114-15.
Similarly, the informant in Rutzinski “exposed him — or herself to
being identified” because the informant told the police “that he or
she was in the vehicle in front of Rutzinski’s pickup.” 623 N.W.2d at
525.

CONCLUSION

Hl Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, the
anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the
investigatory stop of the vehicle in which Jackson was a passenger.
Thus, the stop was illegal as well as the subsequent search of Jack-
son’s person. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing
to grant Jackson’s pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence seized
from him. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and dismiss the indictments against Jackson.

Reversed and dismissed.

8S
a

SOUTHERN FLOORS AND ACOUSTICS, INC.
v.

ANTHONY MAX-YEBOAH
Record No. 031097

Foop Lion, INc.
V.

ANTHONY MAX-YEBOAH, ET AL.
Record No. 031140
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

n |
29
a

Jeannie P. Dahnk (Glover & Dahnk, on brief), for appellant.
(Record No. 031097)

Robert P. Dwoskin for appellee. (Record No. 031097)

James F. Neale (Amy M. Pocklington; McGuireWoods, on briefs),
for appellant. (Record No. 031140)

Robert P. Dwoskin for appellee Anthony Max-Yeboah. (Record
No. 031140)

JUSTICE LEMONS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether a customer who is injured by
tripping over a stack of floor tiles in a grocery store where the floor
is being re-tiled is contributorily negligent as a matter of law and, if
not, whether both the independent contractor installing the new floor
and the store owner can be held liable to the customer for his
injuries.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

Anthony Max-Yeboah (“Max-Yeboah”) tripped over a stack of
tiles in an aisle of a Food Lion, Inc. (“Food Lion’”’) grocery store in
Charlottesville, Virginia and broke his ankle. On the evening of Max-
Yeboah’s accident, employees of Southern Floors and Acoustics, Inc.
(“Southern Floors”), a subcontractor, were installing new floor tiles

SY
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in the aisle where Max-Yeboah was injured. The Southern Floors
employees had spread glue on part of the floor of the aisle an hour
before Max-Yeboah entered it and were waiting for the glue to
become “tacky” so that new tiles could be installed. One end of the
aisle was completely blocked by caution tape. Conflicting testimony
was offered concerning whether, and to what degree, the other end of
the aisle was blocked by a fan used to dry the glue, and caution tape.

Between 15 and 20 Southern Floors employees were working in
the aisle on a number of tasks associated with the tiling process at
the time of the accident. Although Max-Yeboah testified at trial that
he was not aware that work was being performed on the floors when
he entered the aisle, he was aware that work associated with the
remodeling of the store was occurring throughout the store.

Max-Yeboah entered the aisle where the tile work was occurring
to get some frozen food. He testified at trial that he did not see the
stack of tiles he eventually tripped over, although he had walked past
them on his way into the aisle, because he was looking at a freezer
case for frozen food. While Max-Yeboah was standing in front of the
freezer case, a Southern Floors employee told Max-Yeboah to “go
back” because he was standing in the glue which was not yet dry.
Max-Yeboah alleges that the man yelled at him and pointed which
led Max-Yeboah to believe that something was falling toward him.
At trial, the employee recalled addressing Max-Yeboah but did not
recall yelling. In response to the instruction from the Southern Floors
employee, Max-Yeboah turned quickly to exit the aisle, tripped over
a foot-high stack of tiles placed next to the freezer unit, and broke
his ankle.

Max-Yeboah filed suit against both Southern Floors and Food
Lion. At trial, the jury was given conflicting instructions. One
instruction provided that “[a] person who hires an independent con-
tractor is not liable for his actions.” The jury was also instructed
that, “where the owner of the premises had control and oversight at
the site where work was being done by the contractor, he is responsi-
ble for the negligent actions of an independent contractor.”

The trial court overruled Food Lion’s objection to the latter
instruction. The jury returned a verdict for Max-Yeboah, finding
Food Lion and Southern Floors jointly and severally liable and
awarding Max-Yeboah damages in the amount of $30,000. Food
Lion and Southern Floors appeal the judgments adverse to them.

C6
a

If. Analysis
A. Contributory Negligence

Southern Floors and Food Lion maintain on appeal that the trial
court should have held that Max-Yeboah was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law because the tiles that he tripped over were an open
and obvious condition, which he noticed or should have noticed
when he initially entered the aisle. They maintain that Max-Yeboah
tripped over the tiles because he failed to be reasonably aware of his
surroundings. Max-Yeboah contends that he was distracted by the
yelling and pointing by the Southern Floors employee and that these
special circumstances excused his failure to see the tiles.

HB When a plaintiff is injured by an open and obvious defect,
it is his burden “to show conditions outside of himself which pre-
vented him seeing the defect or which would excuse his failure to
observe it... . When they do not exist the law charges the party
with failure to do what was required of him.” City of South Norfolk
y. Dail, 187 Va. 495, 505, 47 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1948); see also Hill v.
City of Richmond, 189 Va. 576, 584, 53 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949).
However, “more is needed than a simple allegation of a distraction
to create a jury issue. It [is] necessary for [the] plaintiff to establish
that his excuse for inattention was reasonable, i.e., that the distraction
was unexpected and substantial.” West v. City of Portsmouth, 217 Va.
734, 737, 232 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1977).

Hl While the one-foot high stack of tiles Max-Yeboah tripped
over was clearly an open and obvious hazard, Max-Yeboah offered
evidence of an extrinsic condition, in the form of the Southern Floors
employee’s yelling and pointing to excuse his inattention. If believed,
the condition was unexpected, placed him in fear of bodily harm, and
constituted a substantial distraction. Determining the credibility and
the weight of the evidence is the province of the finder of fact, in
this case, the jury. Therefore, the question of Max-Yeboah’s contribu-
tory negligence was properly submitted to the jury. The trial court
did not err in refusing to hold that Max-Yeboah was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law.

B. Liability of Food Lion

Food Lion maintains that, even if Max-Yeboah is not contribu-
torily negligent, Food Lion cannot be held liable because its employ-
ees were not involved in the work, it had no duty to supervise an
independent contractor, and it had no actual or constructive notice of

es =—o7
|

the defect. Further, Food Lion argues that the trial court erred in
giving conflicting and irreconcilable instructions to the jury on this
issue. We agree.

HH Southern Floors was clearly an independent contractor. As
we have previously stated, “An independent contractor is one who
undertakes to produce a given result without being in any way con-
trolled as to the method by which he attains that result.” Craig v.
Doyle, 179 Va. 526, 531, 19 S.E.2d 675, 677 (1942).

If under the contract the party for whom the work is being
done may prescribe not only what the result shall be, but also
direct the means and methods by which the other shall do the
work, the former is an employer, and the latter an employee.
But if the former may specify the result only, and the latter
may adopt such means and methods as he chooses to accom-
plish that result, then the latter is not an employee, but an
independent contractor.

Craig, 179 Va. at 531, 19 S.E.2d at 677; MacCoy v. Colony House
Builders, 239 Va. 64, 67-68, 387 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1990).

Hi In cases involving liability of owners of property for injuries
to third parties arising from conditions on the premises caused by
independent contractors, the possible theories of recovery include
vicarious liability of the owner for the acts of the independent con-
tractor,' and independent liability for the separate negligence of the
owner.

' ‘The general rule regarding liability of an owner of property for the negligence of an inde-
pendent contractor has been clearly stated: “As a general rule, an owner who employs an
independent contractor is not liable for injuries to third persons caused by the contractor’s
negligence.” Kesler v. Allen, 233 Va. 130, 134, 353 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1987); C & P Telephone
Company v. Properties One, 247 Va. 136, 140-41, 439 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1994). In Kesler, we
noted:
Exceptions exist, and the doctrine of respondeat superior may become applicable, if
the independent contractor’s torts arise directly out of his use of a dangerous instru-
mentality, arise out of work that is inherently dangerous, are wrongful per se, are a
nuisance, or are such that it would in the natural course of events produce injury unless
special precautions were taken. Broaddus v. Standard Drug Co., 211 Va. 645, 649, 179
S.E.2d 497, 501 (1971); N. & W. Railway v. Johnson, 207 Va. 980, 983-84, 154 S.E.2d
134, 137 (1967); Smith Adm’r. v. Grenadier, 203 Va. 740, 747, 127 S.E.2d 107, 112
(1962); Ritter Corp. v. Rose, 200 Va. 736, 742, 107 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1959).

Kesler, 233 Va. at 134, 353 S.E.2d at 780. None of the enumerated exceptions exist in this

case,

68S ee
a

| | Initially, we note that Food Lion moved to dismiss Max-
Yeboah’s claim of vicarious liability of Food Lion for the negligent
acts of Southern Floors. The trial court granted the motion and, in a
pretrial order, dismissed all claims of vicarious liability from the
case. In its order, the trial court held that “[t]his dismissal shall have
no effect on plaintiff’s general negligence claims against Food
Lion.” With the claim of vicarious liability removed from the case,
the only claim remaining against Food Lion was for its alleged inde-
pendent liability for separate negligence in “failing to see that proper
warnings and safety conditions existed at the scene of the work.”

Curiously, and over the objection of Food Lion, the trial court
instructed the jury that Food Lion could be held “responsible for the
negligent actions of an independent contractor.” It was error to
instruct the jury on a claim that had been removed from the case.

On appeal, most of Max-Yeboah’s argument concerning liability
of Food Lion is stated in terms of vicarious liability, a claim
removed from the case prior to trial.2 However, Max-Yeboah does
argue that our decisions in Love v. Schmidt, 239 Va. 357, 389 S.E.2d
707 (1990), and Kesler v. Allen, 233 Va. 134, 353 S.E.2d 777 (1987)
together support the liability of Food Lion under the facts of this
case and the issues remaining at trial.

Hl Our holding in Kesler was explicit: “We hold that a landlord,
in the absence of one of the exceptions to the general rule, has no
vicarious liability to a tenant for the negligence of an independent
contractor in making repairs or improvements.” Id. at 134, 353
S.E.2d at 780. Kesler dealt with vicarious liability, not independent
liability of the owner of property. It has no application to this case.

Hi In Love, the plaintiff was injured when she fell off a loose
toilet seat. We affirmed the judgment against the landlord-owner,
holding that “if a duty to maintain a premises in a safe condition is
imposed by contract or by law, it cannot be delegated to an indepen-
dent contractor.” Love, 239 Va. at 357, 360-61, 389 S.E.2d at 709.
Unlike circumstances involving discrete and isolated repair and
improvement, the work at issue in Love involved regular and routine
maintenance, repair, and janitorial services. We characterized the
owner’s arguments against imposition of liability as “‘an attempt to
delegate the landlord’s common-law duty to maintain his premises in
a reasonably safe condition.” Jd. at 361, 389 S.E.2d at 710.

2 For example, Max-Yeboah states on brief, “The issue of Food Lion’s responsibility for the
negligence of Southern Floors . . . was an issue for the jury,” and “[tJhe jury was correct in
finding Food Lion, Inc. responsible for the negligence of its contractor.”

De BS
|

HM With regard to Food Lion’s independent liability to Max-
Yeboah, the jury was properly instructed that:

An occupant of the premises has the duty to an invitee:

1. To use ordinary care to have the premises in a reasonably
safe condition for an invitee’s use consistent with the invita-
tion; but an occupant does not guarantee an invitee’s safety;
and

2. To use ordinary care to warn an invitee of any unsafe condi-
tion which the occupant knows, or by the use of ordinary
care should know, about; except that an occupant has no
duty to warn an invitee of an unsafe condition which is
open and obvious to a person using ordinary care for his
own safety.

If an occupant fails to perform either or both of these duties,
then he is negligent.

HJ Food Lion argues correctly that Max-Yeboah presented no
evidence that Food Lion had either actual or constructive notice of
the alleged hazard, the stack of tiles. It is hard to imagine that Food
Lion could have known about the tiles because the work was ongo-
ing and the conditions in the aisle were constantly changing.

HB Additionally, Max-Yeboah argues that Food Lion negligently
failed to supervise Southern Floors in its work. Southern Floors was
a subcontractor of a general contractor with whom Food Lion had
contracted for store renovations. Southern Floors was neither selected
nor actually supervised by Food Lion. As previously noted, Southern
Floors was an independent contractor. It is illogical and antithetical
to the definition of an independent contractor to impose a duty to
supervise upon the principal when the essence of the relationship is
lack of power and control to supervise. Food Lion had no duty to
supervise the means and method of the work of Southern Floors and
cannot be found independently negligent for failing to do so. Mac-
Coy, 239 Va. at 69, 387 S.E.2d at 762; Craig, 179 Va. at 531, 19
S.E.2d at 677.

II. Conclusion

HH We hold that the question of Max-Yeboah’s contributory
negligence was properly submitted to the jury and the trial court did
not err in refusing to hold that he was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. However, the trial court did err in its instruction to the

0
|

jury that Food Lion could be held liable for the negligence of South-
ern Floors. Further, we hold that Food Lion is not independently neg-
ligent because it did not have a duty to supervise Southern Floors in
its means and method of work, nor did Food Lion have actual or
constructive knowledge of the stack of tiles in the aisle. Accordingly,
the judgment against Southern Floors will be affirmed and the judg-
ment against Food Lion will be reversed.

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
final judgment.

Le 691
a

JONATHAN PEREL, AS TRUSTEE FOR
THE BALLYSHANNON TRUST, ET AL.

Vv.

SCOTT BRANNAN, ET AL.
Record No. 031291
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

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695

Howard H. Stahl (March D. Coleman; Steptoe & Johnson, on
briefs), for appellants.

Michael P. Falzone (Chandra D. Lantz; Hirschler Fleischer, on
brief), for appellees.

JUSTICE LEMONS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we consider the enforcement of certain restrictive

covenants applying to a lot in a residential subdivision, and the reme-
dies for breach of these covenants.

IL. Facts and Proceedings Below

In 1998, Locke Lane, L.C. (“Locke Lane’) purchased a tract of
Jand from the Science Museum of Virginia Foundation, Inc. and Sci-
ence Museum Foundation Real Estate, L.L.C. (collectively, the “Sci-
ence Museum”’) for the purpose of developing a residential subdivi-

sion named “River Locke.” In the summer of 1998, Locke Lane and
the Science Museum jointly requested a special use permit and
approval of a subdivision plan from the Richmond City Council. The
plan met with opposition from Jonathan S. Perel (‘Perel’), the sole
trustee of the Ballyshannon Trust (“the trust”), which owned a par-
cel of land adjacent to the proposed subdivision.

In November 1998, the Science Museum, Locke Lane, and Perel,
as trustee for the Ballyshannon trust, entered into a Settlement
Agreement. Under the Settlement Agreement, Perel agreed not to
object to or contest the approval by the City of the special use permit
or subdivision plan. In return, the Science Museum and Locke Lane
agreed to certain restrictive covenants running with the land on River
Locke lots abutting the trust’s property. The restrictive covenants are
contained in a properly recorded document titled, “Amended and
Restated Declaration of Rights, Restrictions, Affirmative Obligations
and Conditions Applicable to All Property in River Locke” (the
“Declaration”). Locke Lane also agreed “to sell Lot 4 of River
Locke Subdivision . . . to Perel, or such entity or person as he may
designate by assignment or otherwise.” River Locke Lot, L.L.C.,
now owns Lot 4,

Part V of the Declaration contains covenants restricting the per-
missible location and type of buildings in River Locke. Part V, para-
graph l(c) describes the buffer, setback, and “‘[nJo [bJuilding
[aJreas” that are part of each lot and restricts the actions that are
permissible within each area. Part VII makes clear that the covenants
and other provisions of the Declaration run with the land.

Part I, paragraph 9 of the Declaration establishes an Architectural
Review Committee (‘““ARC’’) composed of three members. The ARC
is granted the authority to “waive compliance with the provisions
contained herein which are subject to architectural review (except
with respect to Part V, subparagraphs 1(c) and (d) and Part VI, para-
graph 1) when such waiver is reasonably necessary . . . or where no
other reasonable alternative is acceptable.” According to Part I, para-
graph 1, a property in River Locke owner must have his or her plans
for improvements approved by the ARC before construction may
begin.

In December 1999, William S. “Scott” Brannan and Melissa
Brannan (‘‘the Brannans”) purchased “Lot 1” in the River Locke
subdivision. On June 28, 2000, Scott Brannan submitted a site plan
for Lot 1 to the ARC and it was approved on July 12, 2000. The

ARC approved a separate landscape plan for Lot 1 on September 24,
2001.

Construction began on the Brannan home in the summer of 2000,
shortly after the ARC’s approval of the site plan. Due to the slope of
the site and the location of some rock outcroppings, excavation was
required for construction of the house the Brannans had chosen to
build. The excavation removed part of the hillside on the rear portion
of the lot and cut into the designated setback and buffer areas. Sub-
stantial vegetation and eight large trees were also removed from the
buffer area. A retaining wall was then constructed in the setback area
to stabilize the remaining soil. Between the back of the house and the
retaining wall, the Brannans installed a patio. A covered porch
extended from one corner of the house into the setback area but was
altered just before trial to remedy the encroachment.

Perel and River Locke Lot, L.L.C. (collectively, “Perel’’) filed an
amended bill of complaint against the Brannans, Locke Lane, and the
three members of the ARC, in their individual capacities,! on March
15, 2002, alleging that the Brannans’ porch and retaining wall
encroached on the setback area of Lot 1 in violation of the covenants
and that the excavation and removal of vegetation performed by the
Brannans also violated the covenants. Perel asked the trial court for
an injunction preventing the Brannans from further encroachment on
the buffer and setback areas; an order requiring the Brannans to
restore the buffer and setback areas “to their prior state;” and an
“order that the Brannans must modify their rear porch.”

In the same amended bill of complaint, Perel accused Locke Lane
of breaching “its contractual obligation to enforce the covenants,
conditions, and restrictions contained in the Settlement Agreement
and the Amended Declaration.” He asked the court to order Locke
Lane to enforce the covenants against the Brannans. Perel also asked
for compensatory damages against the Brannans and Locke Lane but
withdrew the request shortly before trial. All parties eventually
sought attorneys’ fees.

Three days before trial, the Brannans sought to amend their
response to a request for admissions submitted by Perel three months
earlier and completed by the Brannans three weeks after the request
was submitted. In their response to the request for admissions, the
Brannans admitted “that they caused eight trees to be removed from
the Lot 1 Buffer before August 20, 2001 after receiving approval

' The ARC members successfully demurred and have been dismissed from the suit.

from the ARC to do so.” The Brannans moved the trial court to
permit them to change their response to deny that they had caused
eight trees to be removed from the buffer area, characterizing their
original admission as “inadvertent.” The trial court denied the Bran-
nans’ motion.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the Brannans
had violated the covenants by removing “‘the eight trees and other
vegetation from the buffer area” and constructing a below-grade
patio in the setback area. However, the trial court found that the
Brannans’ excavation on Lot 1 and construction of the retaining wall
did not violate the covenants. The trial court denied both parties’
requests for attorneys’ fees; ordered the Brannans to replace the veg-
etation that had been removed, except the eight large trees, because
of feasibility concerns; and ordered the Brannans “to remove the
patio and any other improvements in the setback area.”

Perel appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court, assigning
error to: the trial court’s holding that the retaining walls do not vio-
late the covenants; the trial court’s refusal to order the Brannans to
replace the eight trees that were removed; the trial court’s holding
that Locke Lane has no contractual duty to enforce the covenants;
and the trial court’s denial of attorneys’ fees. The Brannans and
Locke Lane responded with five assignments of cross-error,
assigning error to: the trial court’s refusal to permit them to amend
their response to Perel’s request for admissions; the trial court’s order
requiring removal of the patio; the trial court’s finding that the patio
breached the covenants; the trial court’s failure to give the approval
of the Brannans’ plans by the ARC sufficient weight in its decision;
and the trial court’s rejection of the argument that Perel was pre-
cluded from receiving equitable relief under the “unclean hands”
doctrine.

Il. Standard of Review

HB The trial court’s judgment in this case involves both findings
of fact and conclusions of law. As to purely factual determinations
made by the trial court, we will not disturb those findings unless they
are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. However, we
review the trial court’s interpretation of covenants and other written
documents de novo. See Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187-88,
313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984).

eee 699
a

Ill. Analysis
A. Removal of the Retaining Wall

In its letter opinion, the trial court held that “[t]he retaining wall
was a necessary adjunct to the permitted excavation to prevent the
collapse of the soil and rock which remained after the cut was com-
plete,” apparently holding that necessity is an exception to the
restrictions on development in the setback area enumerated in the
Declaration. The trial court also noted, “{pJarenthetically, should the
excavation have been determined to violate the covenants, there is no
evidence on which the court could prepare an enforceable order that
the excavated area be returned to its pre-excavation state” implying
that even if the retaining wall was a violation of the covenants, the
trial court would not order removal of the wall.

HM The Brannans concede that the retaining wall lies in the rear
and side setback areas of Lot 1. Part V, paragraph 1(c) of the Decla-
ration states in part:

No building, structures or other improvements other than a
fence or a driveway . . . may be permanently or temporarily
constructed or erected in any buffer area or rear building set-
back area . . . except as follows:

Gi) Rear and Side Yard Setback Areas. Within the portion
of the rear and side yard setback areas outside of the buffer
areas on the Restricted Lots, clearing, at grade patios and
walkways are permitted, and children’s play equipment and
swing sets, properly screened so as not to be visible from con-
tiguous property presently owned by the Adjoining Owner, are
permitted.

Walls of any type are absent from the list of permitted structures and
improvements. We conclude that no walls are permitted in the set-
back areas for any reason and the retaining wall erected by the Bran-
nans, therefore, violates the covenants. The language in Part V, para-
graph 1(c)(i) of the Declaration, permitting “privacy fences or walls”
in buffer areas, cannot save the Brannans’ retaining wall because that
language does not apply to the setback area.

Hl While the retaining wall is clearly in violation of the cove-
nants, Perel is not automatically entitled to have the retaining wall
removed. When parties have a dispute over an alleged violation of a

700 a
a

restrictive covenant, the plaintiff, or covenantee, may file suit in the
court for equitable enforcement of the restrictive covenant. A restric-
tive covenant may be enforced by injunctive relief or through spe-
cific performance. The party seeking enforcement of the restrictive
covenant bears the burden of proving the validity and meaning of the
covenant. Mid-State Equipment Co. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 140, 225
S.E.2d 877, 884 (1976); Sonoma Development, Inc. v. Miller, 258 Va.
163, 167-69, 515 S.E.2d 577, 579-81 (1999). The party seeking
enforcement must also establish that the restrictive covenant has been
violated by the acts of the defendant, Hening v. Maynard, 227 Va.
113, 117, 313 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1984); Forbes v. Schaefer, 226 Va.
391, 400, 310 S.E.2d 457, 463 (1983), and request a remedy.

Once the plaintiff satisfies proof requirements, he or she is enti-
tled to the remedy requested unless the defendant can establish one
of several defenses or the court finds enforcement unusually difficult.
See Bond v. Crawford, 193 Va. 437, 444, 69 S.E.2d 470, 475 (1952)
(Generally, where a contract respecting real property is in its nature
and circumstances unobjectionable, it is as much a matter of course
for courts of equity to decree specific performance of it, as it is for a
court of law to give damages for a breach of it.””); Spilling v. Hutche-
son, 111 Va. 179, 183, 68 S.E. 250, 252 (1910) (“‘The injunction in
this case is granted almost as a matter of course upon a breach of the
covenant. The amount of damages, and even the fact that the plaintiff
has sustained any pecuniary damages, are wholly immaterial.’”’).

HB A defendant may avoid imposition of the remedy requested if
such a remedy would create a hardship or injustice that is out of
proportion to the relief sought? if performance by the defendant
would be impossible,’ or if the enforcement of the decree would be
unusually difficult for the court.t However, on the questions of hard-
ship, injustice, or impossibility, the defendant bears the burden of
proving the elements of the defense. See Harper v. Virginian Ry., 86
S.E. 919, 922 (W. Va. 1915) (“In suits to enforce specific perform-
ance of a contract like the one involved here it is for the defendant to
show by way of defense that it is no longer able to perform the cove-
nant consistently with its duty to the public in general, or that per-

2 Springer v. Gaddy, 172 Va. 533, 541, 2 S.B.2d 355, 358 (1939); Cheatham v. Taylor, 148
Va. 26, 39, 138 S.B. 545, 549 (1927).

3 Shepherd v. Colton, 237 Va. 537, 541, 378 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1989); Jones v. Tunis, 99 Va.
220, 222, 37 S.B. 841, 841 (1901).

4 See, e.g., Rayner v. Stone, 2 Eden 128, 130 (1762).

een) 701
a

formance thereof will be burdensome and oppressive or otherwise
inequitable.’’).

Hil In order to establish the hardship defense, a defendant must
show that specific performance would create a hardship or injustice
that is out of proportion to the relief sought. Spinger v. Gaddy, 172
Va. 533, 541, 2 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1939); Cheatham v. Taylor, 148 Va.
26, 39, 138 S.E. 545, 549 (1927). The defendant must prove a level
of hardship beyond “‘inconvenience.” Spilling, 111 Va. at 182, 68
S.E. at 251. It is not enough for the defendant to show merely that
the loss to the defendant will be disproportionate to the benefit to the
plaintiff, where the defendant’s violation of a restrictive covenant
“was made with full knowledge and understanding of the conse-
quences” of his or her actions. Sonoma, 258 Va. 169-70, 515 S.E.2d
at 581. Where an assignee of the covenantor does not have actual or
constructive notice of the covenant, a lesser showing of hardship may
be acceptable. See Springer, 172 Va. at 541, 2 S.E.2d at 358;
Sonoma, 258 Va. 169-70, 515 S.E.2d at 581.

Hl Impossibility is also a defense to specific performance or
injunctive relief requested. Fishburne v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 321, 328, 7
S.E. 361, 364-65 (1888). It may be a defense even when the defen-
dant “intentionally rendered himself unable to perform the contract.”
Jones v. Tunis, 99 Va. 220, 222, 37 S.E. 841, 841 (1901).

HB Similarly, a requested remedy may be denied if it is impossi-
ble for the court to precisely define the specific actions to be per-
formed or if the decree would necessarily be of the type whose
enforcement would “unreasonably tax the time, attention and
resources of the court.” John Norton Pomeroy, Pomeroy on Specific
Performance of Contracts § 307, at 393 (2d ed. 1897). See also Flint
v. Brandon, 32 Eng. Rep. 314 (1803) (dismissing a bill seeking spe-
cific performance of a covenant to fill a pit formerly used for digging
gravel partly out of concer that “if a specific performance is
decreed, a question may arise, whether the work is sufficiently
performed.’’).

Il In this case, the Brannans’ construction of a retaining wall in
the rear setback area of Lot 1 violated the restrictive covenants
intended to benefit Perel. Perel has satisfied his burden of proving a
violation of the covenants and has requested certain relief. Therefore,
it is the Brannans’ burden to prove, by their evidence, defenses to the
remedy requested. Of course, the court may disapprove of the rem-
edy requested because of difficulty in enforcement.

HM The trial court erred in holding that the retaining wall did
not violate the covenant. This matter will be remanded to the trial
court for further evidentiary proceedings in accordance with the
proof requirements set forth above.

B. Tree Removal

The Brannans maintain that despite their admissions, the trial
court erred in concluding that the removal of eight large trees from
the buffer zone was a violation of the covenants because the ARC
approved their site and landscape plans, including the removal of the
trees, in good faith.

Part V, paragraph (1)(c)(@) of the Declaration states: “‘Notwith-
standing anything in Section 1 of Part II to the contrary, all existing
vegetation and trees within the buffer areas shall be preserved, except
that dead, fallen or diseased vegetation or trees may be removed and
may be replaced and supplemental plantings shall be permitted
therein.” Part I, paragraph 9 states: “The Architectural Review Com-
mittee shall be charged with making all interpretations, determina-
tions and necessary approvals under Paragraph 1 of Part I, Paragraph
1 of Part I, and all of Part V ... (b) The Architectural Review
Committee shall have the power to waive compliance with the provi-
sions contained herein which are subject to architectural review
(except with respect to Part V, subparagraphs I(c) and (d) and Part
VI, paragraph 1) when such waiver is reasonably necessary.”
(emphasis added).

HM The language from Part V of the Declaration is clear. No
trees or other vegetation are to be removed from the buffer area
unless dead, fallen, or diseased. There was no allegation that any of
the trees removed were dead, fallen, or diseased. Therefore, the trial
court properly found that the removal of the trees and other vegeta-
tion violated the covenants.

Hl Despite finding that the removal of the trees was a violation
of the covenants, the trial court declined to order the Brannans to
replace those trees with similar trees because Perel had not produced
evidence to show that eight 80- to 100-foot trees could be success-
fully replanted in the buffer area. As previously discussed, it is the
Brannans’ burden to prove defenses to the relief requested. As previ-
ously stated, those defenses may include hardship or injustice, impos-
sibility, or difficulty of enforcement by the court. Therefore, we will
vacate that portion of the trial court’s order denying replacement of

Le 703
a

the trees and remand the issue to the trial court for further proceed-
ings and receipt of evidence.

C. Locke Lane and the Duty to Enforce the Covenants

Perel claims that the trial court ignored language in the Settle-
ment Agreement when it dismissed the claims against Locke Lane in
its final order. Perel argues that paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agree-
ment imposes a duty on Locke Lane to enforce the covenants when it
states that, “[i]mpermissible deviations [from the norms of uniform
treatment of lots and lot owners] would, for example, be . . . the
developer unilaterally modifying or arbitrarily enforcing and/or fail-
ing to carry out or enforce the [covenants] or by-laws once
approved.”

HM There are two flaws in Perel’s argument. First, the Declara-
tion, containing the covenants, limits Locke Lane’s power of enforce-
ment. The only enforcement power given to Locke Lane, by Part VI,
paragraph 2(f), is the power to levy assessments against a property
owner for failure to clean and paint the exterior of the house; failure
to maintain the landscape; failure to complete the construction of a
house in eighteen months or less; and failure to follow guidelines,
tules, or regulations imposed by Locke Lane or the homeowners’
association. The covenants violated in this case do not fall under the
types of actions that Locke Lane may remedy by assessment.

HM Second, the Declaration specifically notes that if the cove-
nants are violated, “[Locke Lane] . . . and any Property Owner shall
have the right to proceed at Jaw or in equity to compel compliance
with the terms hereof or to prevent the violation or breach.” Having
the right to sue a violator is not the equivalent of having a duty to
enforce the covenants against a violator. The trial court did not err in
holding that Locke Lane had no legal duty to enforce the covenants
against the Brannans.

D. Attorneys’ Fees

HH Perel argues that the trial court erred in denying River Locke
Lot, L.L.C., attorneys’ fees under the Property Owners’ Association
Act, Code §§ 55-508 through -516.2. Perel did not properly plead
that the property in question was subject to the Property Owners’
Association Act or that he was entitled to attorneys’ fees under the
Act. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to award the
fees requested by Perel.

E. Motion to Amend Response to Request for Admissions

The trial court found, based on the Brannans’ response to Perel’s
request for admissions, that the Brannans had removed eight large
trees and other vegetation from the buffer area, which violated the
covenants’ restrictions on activities in the buffer area. The Brannans
had moved the court to allow them to amend their response to Perel’s
request for admissions to deny that the trees removed had been in the
buffer area. The trial court overruled their motion because it “comes
too late” and was “‘prejudicial to the plaintiff.”

HE Rule 4:11(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia states that “the court may permit withdrawal or amendment
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the
court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintain-
ing his action or defense on the merits.” (emphasis added). The per-
missive word “may” makes the court’s decision on the issue discre-
tionary. We, therefore, examine the trial court’s decision not to grant
permission to amend the response under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard. See Shaheen v. County of Mathews, 265 Va. 462, 475, 579
S.E.2d 162, 170 (2003).

HE Rule 4:11(b) creates a two-prong test within which the
trial court must exercise its discretion. Shaheen, 265 Va. at 473-74,
579 S.E.2d at 169. Here, the trial court based its decision on the
second prong of the test, which “requires the non-moving party to
demonstrate that amendment or withdrawal of an admission will
prejudice that party.” Id. at 474, 579 S.E.2d at 170. The requisite
prejudice may occur “because of the sudden need to obtain evidence
with respect to the questions previously answered by the admis-
sions.” Id. Pere] argued to the trial court that the Brannans’ motion
to amend came only three days before trial and that he had not pre-
pared to prove the location of the trees at trial. In light of these argu-
ments, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Bran-
nans’ motion as prejudicial to Perel.

EF, The Patio

HM it is well-established that courts may address only those
issues properly pled. Rule 1:4; Ted Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal
Alum. & Construction Co., 221 Va. 1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 228, 229
(1981). In this case, Perel never mentioned the Brannans’ patio in his
amended bill of complaint. Accordingly, the trial court’s order requir-
ing the Brannans to remove the patio will be reversed.

ee 705
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G. Impact of the ARC’s Approval of Building Plans
on the Trial Court’s Findings of Covenant Violations

The Brannans maintain that, because the ARC approved their
landscape and site plans, they did not violate the covenants by build-
ing a retaining wall in the setback area or by removing the eight
large trees from the buffer area. The Brannans argue that if the trial
court had shown proper deference to the ARC’s interpretations of the
covenants, it could not have found that their actions violated the cov-
enants. They point to Part I, paragraph 9 of the Declaration as grant-
ing the ARC authority to make “all interpretations, determinations
and necessary approvals under Paragraph 1 of Part I, Paragraph 1 of
Part II, and all of Part V.” However, according to Part I, paragraph
9(b) of the Declaration, the ARC may not waive compliance with
Part V, paragraph 1(c) of the Declaration, which expresses the
restrictions on activity in the setback and buffer areas.

HR The ARC’s approval of the Brannans’ plans did not state
the ARC’s reasons for granting approval of the plans. If the ARC
approved the plans because it decided to waive the requirements of
Part V, paragraph 1(c) of the Declaration, its decision is not entitled
to deference because it did not have the authority under the cove-
nants to waive those requirements. If the ARC approved the plans
because it interpreted Part V, paragraph 1(c) of the Declaration to
allow the Brannans’ construction of the retaining wall and removal
of the trees, its interpretation was contradictory to the plain language
of the covenants. Even when an entity’s interpretation of a document
is entitled to deference, an interpretation of the document that is con-
trary to the plain language of the document may be properly rejected
by the court. Virginia High Sch. League v. J.J. Kelly High Sch., 254
Va. 528, 531, 493 S.E.2d 362, 363-64 (1997) (“[W]hen bylaw lan-
guage is unambiguous, we need not defer to an interpretation of a
corporation’s various boards and committees.”). The trial court did
not err in finding that the Brannans violated the covenants by build-
ing a retaining wall in the setback area and removing trees from the
buffer area, despite the ARC’s approval of such actions.

H. Unclean Hands Doctrine

HE The Brannans maintain that Perel is barred from seeking
any equitable remedy for any violations of the covenants committed
by the Brannans under the “unclean hands” doctrine. In Richards v.
Musselman, 221 Va. 181, 187, 267 S.E.2d 164, 168 (1980), we
stated:

[T]he maxim that a party must come into a court of equity
with clean hands only applies to the particular transaction
under consideration, for a court will not go outside of the case
for the purpose of examining the conduct of the complainant in
other matters or questioning his general character for fair deal-
ing. The wrong must have been done to the defendant himself
and must have been in regard to the matter in litigation.

Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). Here, Perel’s alleged
“unclean” act was trespass upon the Brannans’ property for the pur-
pose of taking photographs. Perel’s alleged trespass is not part of the
“particular transaction under consideration” here because it could
not have encouraged, invited, aided, compounded, or fraudulently
induced the Brannans’ violation of the covenants. Whether or not
Perel’s alleged trespass was proper, it does not bar him from seeking
equitable relief in this case.

IV. Conclusion
HM For the reasons stated, we hold that:

1. The trial court erred in its judgment that the retaining walls
did not violate the covenants;

2. The trial court erred in its judgment, without evidence to
support it, that replacement of the eight trees was not
feasible;

3. The trial court did not err in its judgment that Locke Lane
has no contractual duty to enforce the covenants at issue;

4. The trial court did not err in refusing to award attorneys’
fees and costs to Perel under the Property Owners’ Associa-
tion Act;

5. The trial court did not err in refusing to permit the Bran-
nans’ to amend their response to Perel’s request for
admissions;

6. The trial court erred by ordering relief that was not pled,
namely that the Brannans’ must remove the patio;

7. The trial court did not err in its consideration of the Archi-
tectural Review Committee’s approval of the Brannans
plans nor in refusing the Brannans’ defense of “unclean
hands.”

This case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings including
receipt of evidence concerning the remedy requested by Perel for the

Le 707
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encroachment of the retaining walls and the removal of eight large
trees,

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and remanded.

708 Le!
|

VIRGINIA JONES
v.

TAMMIE L. HILL
Record No. 031514
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

709

Thomas E. Lacheney (Deal & Lacheney, on brief), for appellant.
Russell O. Slayton, Jr. (C. Ridley Bain; Slayton, Bain and Clary,
on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE LEMONS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether a lien may attach to the
vested interest of a remainderman who takes from a life tenant with
full power to dispose of the entire corpus of the estate, and whether a
creditor may enforce the lien after the death of the life tenant, when
the remainderman predeceases the life tenant.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

Thomas N. Jones (“Thomas Jones’) died in 1993. He was sur-
vived by his wife, Annie K. Jones (“Annie Jones”) and five chil-
dren, among them, Robert Vaiden Jones (“Vaiden Jones”). In
Thomas Jones’s will, which was not admitted to probate until
December 28, 2000, he left to Annie Jones “‘all of my real and per-
sonal estate for life, and, having full confidence in her, I authorize
her to use and consume so much of the income, corpus and principal
of my estate as she, in her sole discretion, deems necessary for her
comfort, maintenance, welfare and support.” He further specified
that, “{a]t my wife’s death, I give, devise, and bequeath that all my
property, real and personal, be equally divided between all my
children.”

Vaiden Jones died on December 10, 2000. He was survived by
his siblings; his mother, Annie Jones; and his wife, Virginia N. Jones
(“Virginia Jones”). Virginia Jones was the sole beneficiary of his
will.

Annie Jones died on December 17, 2001. At that time, a parcel of
real property in Brunswick County (“the parcel”) remained from the
property bequeathed by Thomas Jones. Virginia Jones and the surviv-
ing children of Annie and Thomas Jones sold the Brunswick County
Jand on July 19, 2002 in order to divide the proceeds equally as
instructed in the Thomas Jones will.

Tammie L. Hill (“Hill”) had previously obtained a judgment
against Vaiden Jones and had previously docketed the judgment in
the Circuit Court of Brunswick County. The lien, docketed on
August 29, 2000, was in the amount of $10,000 with eight percent
interest from April 23, 1993 and costs. Hill sought to enforce her lien
against the proceeds of sale from the parcel that was intended for
distribution to Virginia Jones, Vaiden Jones’s widow.

The purchaser of the Brunswick County land, W. Curtis Outten
(“Outten”), filed an interpleader action in the Circuit Court of
Brunswick County on October 2, 2002. Outten asserted that both
Jones and Hill claimed $12,528.86 of the purchase price of the land.
He asked the trial court to determine the proper distribution of the
funds.

The trial court held “that the interest of R. Vaiden Jones, in the
real property of which Thomas N. Jones died seized, was a vested
interest against which the judgment lien of Tammie Hill attached and
accordingly Tammie L. Hill is entitled to the funds in dispute.” Vir-
ginia Jones appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court.

IL. Analysis

On appeal, Virginia Jones asserts that Hill’s lien had not attached
to the parcel because “Vaiden Jones never became possessed or enti-
tled to the Brunswick Property.” Hill maintains that her lien attached
to Vaiden Jones’s remainderman’s interest in the parcel subject to
divestment by Annie Jones during her lifetime. Because the parcel
was not disposed of by Annie Jones there was no divestment and
Hill asserts that her lien is valid.

Hl The trial court was correct in its characterization of Vaiden
Jones’s interest as a remainder subject to divestment. As noted in
Minor on Real Property:

If the words importing contingency are a part of the descrip-
tion of the remainderman, the remainder is contingent. If, on
the other hand, the words of contingency describe an event, the
happening of which is to take away from the remainderman an
interest, which in the absence of such event he would retain,
the remainder is vested subject to be divested.

Frederick D.G. Ribble, Minor on Real Property § 713, at 932 (2d ed.
1928).

HM To determine when a remainder interest vests we apply the
so-called “early vesting rule,” which provides that:

where a bequest or devise is made and the property is not to
be enjoyed in possession until some future period or event, it
will, where no special intent to the contrary is manifested in
the will, be held to be vested in interest immediately on the
death of the testator, rather than contingent upon the state of
things which may happen to exist at the period when the lega-
tees or devisees are entitled to the possession of the property
given.

French v, Logan, 108 Va. 67, 69, 60 S.E. 622, 623 (1908). See also
Coleman v. Coleman, 256 Va. 64, 66, 500 S.E.2d 507, 508 (1998);
Boyd v. Fanelli, 199 Va. 357, 360, 99 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1957). In this
case, Virginia Jones conceded, both in her brief and at oral argument,
that the trial court correctly applied the early vesting rule in its deter-
mination that Vaiden Jones had a vested remainder subject to divest-
ment in the property bequeathed by Thomas Jones in his will. Vaiden

12 iT
PC

Jones’s remainder interest vested immediately upon Thomas Jones’s
death in 1993.

HI While Vaiden Jones had a vested remainder interest in the
property left by his father, that interest was subject to divestment if
his mother, Annie Jones, elected to dispose of the property during
her life. However, Vaiden Jones’s interest in the parcel was not
divested because Annie Jones had not disposed of it at the time of
her death.

HH Code § 8.01-458 provides that:

Every judgment for money rendered in this Commonwealth by
any state or federal court or by confession of judgment, as pro-
vided by law, shall be a lien on all the real estate of or to
which the defendant in the judgment is or becomes possessed
or entitled, from the time such judgment is recorded on the
judgment lien docket of the clerk’s office of the county or city
where such land is situated.

It is not disputed that Hill’s judgment was properly recorded in
Brunswick County. Therefore, beginning in August 2000, she had a
lien on “all the real estate of or to which” Vaiden Jones was or
became possessed or entitled.

HM To be “entitled” to something is to have some claim or
legal right over it. See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 758
(1993); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 532 (6th ed. 1990). Vaiden
Jones’s vested interest in the land was a legally cognizable right that
was subject to his creditor’s actions to satisfy legally enforceable
debts. See Scott v. Patterson, 104 Va. 455, 456-57, 51 S.E. 848, 848-
49 (1905) (a vested remainder may be held liable for the remainder-
man’s debts). Consequently, Hill had a lien on Vaiden Jones’s
remainder interest in the parcel when her judgment was docketed.

IM Vested interests in land may be sold or inherited. When
Vaiden Jones died, his vested interest passed to Virginia Jones, his
wife. However, her inheritance of Vaiden Jones’s remainder interest
in the parcel before the death of Annie Jones did not destroy Hill’s
lien because a lien attaches to property, not to the person against
whom judgment is awarded. Hardy v. Norfolk Mfg. Co., 80 Va. 404,
418 (1885). Consequently, Hill’s lien remained attached to the parcel
when it passed to Virginia Jones, and Hill is entitled to enforce her
lien against that portion of the proceeds from the sale of the parcel
intended for Virginia Jones.

Fe 713
PC

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

714

BARBARA A. MAITLAND
v.

WILBERT C. ALLEN, ET AL.
Record No. 031224
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

715

Bradley P. Marrs (Julia B. Adair; Meyer, Goergen & Marrs, on
brief), for appellant.
Jill C. Dickerson for appellees.

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether one of two life tenants may
compel partition of real property against the other life tenant and the
yemaindermen. The Circuit Court of Lunenburg County, citing Car-
neal v. Lynch, 91 Va. 114, 20 S.E. 959 (1895), held the life tenant
could compel partition as to her co-life tenant. Citing Whitby v. Over-
ton, 243 Va. 20, 413 S.E.2d 42 (1992), the trial court held partition
could not be compelled by the life tenant as to the remaindermen.
For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm, in part, the judg-
ment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The relevant facts are undisputed. Barbara A. Maitland
(“Maitland”) (then Barbara Allen) and her husband, Wilbert C.
Allen (“Allen”), executed five deeds of gift in 1997 conveying sepa-
rate parcels of land to each of their five adult children (collectively,

the “‘children”). The deeds reserved a joint life estate for Maitland
and Allen in the parcels conveyed with the remainder vested in the
named children. Maitland and Allen were later divorced and
Maitland filed a bill of complaint in the trial court seeking to compel
partition of the parcels of land she and Allen previously had con-
veyed to the children.

Allen and the children answered and filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing this Court’s decision in Whitby barred partition of
the parcels by Maitland as a life tenant. Maitland responded by
asserting that the owner of a joint life estate may compel partition
against the co-tenant and the remaindermen pursuant to this Court’s
decision in Carneal.

The trial court denied summary judgment for Allen, ruling that
Maitland may compel partition as to him as a joint life tenant. How-
ever, the trial court granted summary judgment for the children, rul-
ing that Maitland could not force partition against the remaindermen.
On appeal to this Court Maitland assigns error to the trial court’s
tuling denying partition against the remaindermen. Allen and the
children assign cross-error to the trial court’s ruling allowing parti-
tion as to the life estate.

Il. ANALYSIS
A. Partition by Life Tenant as to the Remaindermen

HEM Partition is governed by statute in Virginia. Code § 8.01-81
provides that “[t]enants in common, joint tenants, executors with the
power to sell, and coparceners of real property . . . shall be compel-
lable to make partition and may compel partition.” Tenants in com-
mon can thus compel partition and are compellable to partition under
the statute. But as we recognized in Whitby, “‘the statute does not
explicitly authorize a life tenant to compel partition.” 243 Va. at 22,
413 S.E.2d at 43.

Hl Recognizing this fact, Maitland argues that her status as a
tenant in common with Allen as to the life estate in all the real prop-
erty is sufficient to compel partition of the whole estate under our
decision in Carneal. We disagree.

The case at bar is factually indistinguishable from that
before us in Whitby. The party seeking partition of the remainder
interest in Whitby was the surviving joint life tenant. 243 Va. at 21,
413 S.E.2d at 42. While Maitland does have a joint life tenant in esse
(Allen), this is a distinction without a difference. Maitland is not a
tenant in common with the remaindermen, and it is only that rela-

tionship which determines whether partition may lie as to the remain-
der.! Distinguishing Carneal, we reviewed and answered this issue in
Whitby:

[In the present case, unlike Carneal, the life tenant seeks to
establish a tenancy in common between the life tenant and the
remaindermen in the life tenant’s undivided moiety. . . . Here,
the remaindermen have no right to hold and occupy the land in
question because the surviving life tenant has not died. In Car-
neal, both the life tenant and the fee simple owners of the
other undivided moiety had the right to hold and occupy the
land because there existed two separate undivided moieties in
the property and the title to each was held by different owners.
In order for a life tenant to be a tenant in common with other
owners of the property there must be coequal rights of occu-
pancy, and such rights are not present in this case.

Because this life tenant is not a tenant in common with the
temaindermen, it follows that he has no right to compel parti-
tion of the property against the owners of the remainder inter-
est...

Whitby, 243 Va. at 24, 413 S.E.2d at 44.

The Supreme Court of Colorado recently reached the same con-
clusion in Beach v. Beach, 74 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2003), holding that parti-
tion could not lie by a life tenant against the remaindermen:

[P]artition applies only to concurrent interests, meaning inter-
ests that are held simultaneously in time. Thus, a present life
estate cannot be partitioned from a future remainder interest
because the holders of the two interests possess the property
successively, rather than concurrently.

' A deed to one of the parcels of real property conveyed to one of the children reflects that
child owned an undivided interest in that property at the time Maitland and Allen conveyed the
remainder interest to him of the portion they owned. That child’s ownership interest could
create a tenancy in common with Maitland, as to that parcel, and distinguish it from the other
remainder interests as to the right of partition. However, no such argument was pled by
Maitland or presented to the trial court. No assignment of error is made as to this parcel based
on the child’s fee simple ownership of a portion. Accordingly, we do not consider the forego-
ing in the resolution of this appeal. See Rule 5:25; Rule 5:17(c).

By definition, the holder of a present life estate and the
holder of a future remainder interest do not own concurrent
interests because each holder uses the property exclusively
during her respective time of possession. Although the holders
of the life estate and successive remainder interest do share a
common interest in the property, “this variety of simultane-
ously existent interests does not constitute the concurrent own-
ership, the splitting of which is the function of partition.”

Id, at 3 (citation omitted).

Hl Because Maitland and the children as remaindermen hold the
successive estates of a life tenancy and a remainder interest, they are
not tenants in common and thus partition does not lie. Carneal is not
authority to the contrary and is limited to its specific facts. Accord-
ingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the
children.

B. Partition Between Life Tenants

HH Allen and the children assign cross-error to the trial court’s
denial of summary judgment for him and the ruling that Maitland
may have partition as to their joint life estate. The trial court’s judg-
ment as to partition of Maitland and Allen’s life estate is not a final
order and no appeal was taken under Code § 8.01-670.1. No final
order on the issue of the cross-error is before us and thus we do not
address it.2 Code § 8.01-670.

Il. CONCLUSION

For the reasons enumerated in Whitby, we will affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court granting summary judgment to the children. In
the absence of a final order, we do not consider the cross-appeal and
that portion of the trial court’s judgment denying summary judgment
for Allen. Therefore, we will remand the case for such further pro-

2 The order granting summary judgment in this case expressly dismissed the action as
against the children as the holders of the remainder interests in the subject properties. Because
their interests, and the grounds upon which the action was dismissed as to them, are separate
and distinct from issues in the remaining claims against Allen, the other life tenant, the disposi-
tion as to the children is appealable under the “severable” interest rule. See Dalloul v. Agbey,
255 Va. 511, 515 n.*, 499 S.E.2d 279, 282 n.* (1998); Leggett v. Caudill, 247 Va. 130, 134,
439 S.E.2d 350, 352 (1994); Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 628-29, 151 S.E.2d 422, 432-33
(1966). See also Hinchey v. Ogden, 226 Va. 234, 236-37 & n.l, 307 S.E.2d 891, 892 & nl
(1983).

eee 719
a

ceedings as may be required to complete the cause with regard to
partition among the joint life tenants, Allen and Maitland.

Affirmed in part and remanded.

7 es
_

LIFESTAR RESPONSE OF MARYLAND, INC.
v.

PEGGY VEGOSEN
Record No. 031376
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

4
a
6

Le

Carol T. Stone (Jordan, Coyne & Savits, on briefs), for appellant.
Nicholas A. Balland (Pelton, Balland, Young, Demensky, Baskin
& O’Malie, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this appeal is whether Code § 8.01-288 cures a
plaintiff’s failure to serve upon the defendant a notice of motion for
judgment when the defendant was served with a copy of the
amended motion for judgment and had actual notice of the lawsuit.

I, BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Peggy Vegosen (““Vegosen”’) filed a motion for judgment against
Lifestar Ambulance Service, Inc. alleging personal injuries sustained
during her transport in an ambulance. Lifestar Ambulance Service,
Inc., entered a special appearance claiming it was not the proper
defendant. With leave of court, Vegosen filed an amended motion for
judgment against Lifestar Response of Maryland, Inc. (“Lifestar”).
Lifestar Ambulance Service, Inc. was dismissed as a defendant. A
private process server then served the amended motion for judgment
on the registered agent for Lifestar. According to the affidavit of ser-
vice, a “Summons, Complaint, and Attachments’! were included in
the service of process.

Lifestar did not make an appearance or file a responsive pleading.
Vegosen filed a motion for default judgment which it served upon
Lifestar. The trial court granted Vegosen’s motion for default judg-
ment and, after an ore tenus hearing, awarded damages in the amount

' While the affidavit makes the recital quoted in the text that a “Summons” was served as
part of the papers delivered to the defendant's registered agent, the record is clear in this case
that no summons or notice of any kind was affixed to the motion for judgment delivered to
defendant’s registered agent. Hence we do not address in this opinion the issue whether a
notice that is improperly titled is valid. See Rule 3:3(¢) (““The notice to be given of the motion
for judgment shall be substantially in this form”) (emphasis added).

Ss 7:
a

of $100,000. Subsequently, Lifestar moved to vacate the default
judgment pursuant to Code § 8.01-428(A)(ii).

In support of its motion Lifestar argued that it had not been
served with a notice of motion for judgment as required by Rule 3:3
and therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction over it to enter
the default judgment. Lifestar contended that the default judgment
was thus void and should be set aside under Code § 8.01-428(A)(ii).
Vegosen responded that Lifestar had failed to prove no notice of
motion for judgment had been served and that, even if that allegation
was true, the saving provision of Code § 8.01-288 cured any defec-
tive service because Lifestar had actual notice of the proceedings.

The trial court ruled by letter opinion

that the mere absence of a Notice of Motion for Judgment
does not automatically render a default judgment void where
the defendant has been served with an Amended Motion for
Judgment and has actual notice of the litigation. While [Lifes-
tar] is correct that Rule 3:3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
of Virginia provides that the Notice of Motion for Judgment is
the process required to give notice to the defendant of a law-
suit, the saving provision of Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-288 cures a
defect of service where process is shown to have actually
“reached the person to whom it is directed within the time
proscribed by law.”

The trial court found that while Lifestar had been served with an
amended motion for judgment, the required Rule 3:3(c) notice pre-
pared by the clerk was not served or otherwise received by Lifestar.
The trial court also found Vegosen’s counsel had communicated by
telephone to Lifestar’s registered agent on the date the amended
motion of judgment was served that Lifestar had three weeks to file a
tesponsive pleading. Concluding that Lifestar “had actual notice of
the lawsuit and of the time for filing a responsive pleading,” the trial
court ruled Code § 8.01-288 cured any defect in service of process
because actual notice cures “any defect whatsoever.” The trial court
denied Lifestar’s motion to vacate the default judgment. We awarded
Lifestar this appeal.

I. ANALYSIS

HMM Under Rule 3:3(a), “[aJn action shall be commenced by fil-
ing in the clerk’s office a motion for judgment.” Rule 3:3(c) sets out
the proper form of “[t]he notice to be given of the motion for judg-

7 es
PT

ment,” which is issued by the clerk and notifies the party being sued
that unless a responsive pleading is filed in the clerk’s office within
twenty-one days after service of the notice of motion for judgment,
default judgment for the plaintiff may be entered. Rule 3:3(c) then
provides that “[t]he clerk shall issue the notice and attach it to a
copy of the motion for judgment, and the combined papers shall
constitute the notice of motion for judgment to be served as a single
paper.” Rule 3:3(c) (emphasis added).

HM The plain language of Rule 3:3(c) mandates that the notice
of motion for judgment to be served on the defendant has two con-
stituent parts, both of which are required to constitute “process”: a
copy of the motion for judgment and the notice issued by the clerk.
See Bendele v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 395, 398, 512 S.E.2d
827, 829 (1999) (in equity, “process” is the “subpoena in chancery,
which the clerk would have attached to a copy of the filing”). Rule
3:3(c) then underscores that these two documents, “served as a sin-
gle paper,” constitute “process” because “[nJo judgment shall be
entered against a defendant who was served with process more than
one year after commencement of the action against him.” Id.
(emphasis added).

The trial court held that failure to serve the defendant with
the “notice” portion of the notice of motion for judgment does not
void a default judgment when the defendant has been served with an
amended motion for judgment and has actual notice of the suit. We
disagree. Receiving a notice of motion for judgment is the sine qua
non to having been served with process. Indeed, under the plain lan-
guage of Rule 3:3(c), “process” is the notice of motion for judgment
which must consist of “the combined papers . . . to be served as a
single paper.” Without either the notice prepared by the clerk or the
copy of the motion for judgment, there is no notice of motion for
judgment and no “process.” It is the “process” which must reach
the defendant to vest the court with jurisdiction. Without service of
the “process,” the court acquires no jurisdiction. A plaintiff who
fails to serve a notice of motion for judgment on the defendant has
failed to serve process and cannot benefit from the entry of a default
judgment because the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant.

I Nonetheless, Vegosen argues that the saving provision of
Code § 8.01-288 cures any defect of service so as to give the court
jurisdiction. Again, we disagree.

When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,
it will be construed according to its plain meaning. Smith Mt. Lake

72
fF

Yacht Club, Inc. v. Ramaker, 261 Va. 240, 247, 542 S.E.2d 392, 396
(2001); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 370, 514 S.E.2d 153, 155
(1999). Code § 8.01-288 states, in pertinent part, that “process which
has reached the person to whom it is directed within the time pre-
scribed by law, if any, shall be sufficient although not served or
accepted as provided in this chapter.” (Emphasis added). By its plain
language the statute applies only when “process” has reached “the
person to whom it is directed.” Id. “Process” under Code § 8.01-288
is the same “process” as defined under Rule 3:3(c). In the case at
bar, “process” never reached Lifestar because the papers served on it
did not constitute a notice of motion for judgment under Rule 3:3.

HH Under its clear terms, Code § 8.01-288 is designed to cure
defects in the manner in which “process” is served. It cannot cure
defects in the “process” itself.? Since Lifestar never received “pro-
cess,” Code § 8.01-288 does not apply. The trial court erred in con-
cluding otherwise.

Ul. CONCLUSION

HEM “Vegosen’s failure to serve Lifestar with a notice of
motion for judgment pursuant to Rule 3:3 meant Lifestar never
received process and was not properly before the trial court. Since
the process was defective, as distinguished from the manner of ser-
vice, the saving provision of Code § 8.01-288 does not apply.
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lifestar, it erred in
entering a default judgment. Since the default judgment is void for
lack of jurisdiction, the trial court also erred in failing to grant Lifes-
tar’s motion to set that judgment aside under Code § 8.01-428(A)(ii).
‘We will therefore vacate the default judgment entered May 17, 2002,
reverse the trial court’s final judgment order entered June 10, 2002,
and remand the case.

Reversed, vacated and remanded.

2 Vegosen also argues that even if the trial court’s determination that the saving provision
Code § 8.01-288 cured the defective service of process is in error, Lifestar’s subsequent receipt
Of notice of default judgment under Code § 8.01-296(2)(b) cures any defect in service. The trial
court rejected this argument, as do we. Nothing in Code § 8.01-296(2)(b) purports to validate
jurisdiction to a court for entry of default judgment when the court has not otherwise acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant. Further, Rule 3:17 states that “[a] defendant who fails to plead
to a notice of motion for judgment within the required time is in default.” (Emphasis added).
Lifestar did not receive a notice of motion for judgment and therefore could not have been in
default,

x
iS)
an
) |

LENNA Jo DYER
Vv.

DAIRYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY
Record No. 031532
April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

~
N
~

Matt Danielson (J. Thomas McGrath; Law Offices of Tom
McGrath, on briefs), for appellant.
Paul C. Kuhnel (WootenHart, PLC, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal we determine whether the plaintiff’s recovery for
the negligence of one tortfeasor under the liability provision of an
automobile insurance policy precludes recovery under the underin-

728 es
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sured motorist provision of the same policy for the negligence of a
joint tortfeasor.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Lenna Jo Dyer (“Dyer”) was the passenger on a motorcycle
owned and operated by Kerry B. Atkinson (“Atkinson”). Atkinson’s
motorcycle was involved in a collision with a motorcycle owned and
operated by Ricky M. Roberts (“Roberts”). As a result of the colli-
sion, Dyer received injuries and suffered damages in excess of
$100,000. Atkinson and Roberts were jointly and concurrently negli-
gent and their negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.

Dairyland Insurance Company (“Dairyland”) insured the Atkin-
son motorcycle under a policy providing bodily injury liability cover-
age in the amount of $100,000 per claimant and uninsured/underin-
sured motorist (“UM” or “‘UIM” respectively) coverage of $100,000
per claimant. Under the Atkinson policy, Dairyland tendered to Dyer
the full $100,000 of bodily injury liability coverage based on Atkin-
son’s liability. Dairyland also insured the Roberts motorcycle under a
policy providing $25,000 of bodily injury liability coverage per
claimant and UM/UIM coverages in the same amount. Dairyland ten-
dered the full $25,000 of bodily injury liability coverage to Dyer
based on Roberts’ liability under his policy.

Dyer obtained a judgment against Roberts in the amount of
$275,000. She then argued in the trial court that she was entitled to
$75,000 in UIM coverage under the Atkinson policy. Dyer averred
Roberts was underinsured in an amount equal to the difference
between his $25,000 of bodily injury liability coverage and the
$100,000 of UIM coverage under the Atkinson policy. Dairyland
responded that it was not obligated to provide Dyer with UIM cover-
age under the Atkinson policy because it had already tendered the
full amount of the bodily injury liability coverage under that policy.
On cross-motions for summary judgment the trial court held that
Dairyland was not obligated to provide UIM coverage to Dyer under
the Atkinson policy. We awarded Dyer this appeal.

I. ANALYSIS

HMM Code § 38.2-2206(A) requires an insurer under a motor
vehicle liability policy “to make payment for bodily injury . . .
caused by the operation or use of an underinsured motor vehicle to
the extent the vehicle is underinsured, as defined in subsection B.”
Under that subsection:

es 729
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A motor vehicle is “underinsured” when, and to the extent
that, the total amount of bodily injury and property damage
coverage applicable to the operation or use of the motor vehi-
cle and available for payment for such bodily injury or prop-
erty damage . . . is less than the total amount of uninsured
motorist coverage afforded any person injured as a result of
the operation or use of the vehicle.

Dyer argues she is underinsured under the Atkinson policy as to
the Roberts vehicle within the meaning of Code § 38.2-2206(B). She
further contends the resolution of this case is governed by this
Court’s decision in Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Hill, 247 Va. 78, 439
S.E.2d 335 (1994). We agree with Dyer.

In Hill, Rebecca H. Henley (“Henley”), a passenger in a vehicle
driven by Mary Ann Forsyth (“Forsyth”), died in an automobile
accident involving another vehicle driven by Martin W. Jones
(“Jones”). Henley’s estate obtained judgment in the amount of
$1,000,000, jointly and severally, against Forsyth’s estate and Jones.
247 Va. at 80-81, 439 S.E.2d at 336.

The Forsyth vehicle was insured under an automobile liability
policy issued by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (‘‘Nation-
wide”) which provided $50,000 of bodily injury liability coverage
per claimant and UM/UIM coverage of the same amount. Jones was
uninsured. Nationwide paid the full $50,000 of its bodily injury lia~
bility to the Henley estate based on Forsyth’s negligence, but denied
UM coverage attributable to Jones’ negligence. Id. at 81, 439 S.E.2d
at 336.

The administrator of Henley’s estate then filed a declaratory judg-
ment action asking for a determination that Henley was insured
under the UM provision of the Nationwide policy because Jones was
an uninsured motorist. Nationwide argued that the provisions in its
UM endorsement required a set-off of any payments received from
the bodily injury liability coverage against any recovery payable
under the UM coverage. Id. at 83, 439 S.E.2d at 338. We approved
the trial court’s determination that the set-off provisions of the
Nationwide UM endorsement violated Code § 38.2-2206 and were
contrary to public policy. Nationwide was liable for payment of the
full policy amount as to each tortfeasor: $50,000 of bodily injury
liability coverage attributable to Forsyth and $50,000 of UM cover-
age attributable to Jones. Id. at 86, 439 S.E.2d at 339.

730 es
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Dairyland asserts on appeal that the outcome of this case is not
governed by Hill, but instead by two more recent cases, Superior
Insurance Co. v. Hunter, 258 Va. 338, 520 S.E.2d 646 (1999) and
Kramer v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 128, 556 S.E.2d 761 (2002).
Dairyland avers these later cases bar Dyer from recovering under
both the bodily injury liability and UIM provisions of the Atkinson
policy. We disagree.

HMM The issue in Hunter was whether the UIM “provision of a
tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurance policy is available to sat-
isfy claims of passengers in the tortfeasor’s vehicle who are insured
under the same policy and whose claims for damages exceed the lim-
its of the policy’s liability coverage.” Hunter, 258 Va. at 340, 520
S.E.2d at 647. We concluded that the General Assembly, by virtue of
Code § 38.2-2206, “did not intend that a vehicle could be ‘underin-
sured’ with respect to itself.” Id. at 344, 520 S.E.2d at 649. Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff in Hunter had no claim to UIM coverage where
the full bodily injury liability coverage limit had been paid and there
was only one tortfeasor and one insurance policy.*

Likewise, Kramer involved a state employee killed by an unin-
sured driver. The Commonwealth’s Risk Management Plan only pro-
vided $25,000 in UM coverage but allowed for $50,000 of UIM cov-
erage. The decedent’s estate sought to combine and collect both the
UM and UIM coverages. We reiterated the principle expressed in
Hunter that the Commonwealth’s Risk Management Plan could not
“be underinsured with respect to itself in order to provide additional
coverage.” Kramer, 263 Va. at 133, 556 S.E.2d at 763.

In contrast to Hunter and Kramer, the case at bar is the result of
the joint negligence of two tortfeasors, Atkinson and Roberts, who
were insured under separate policies. Under the plain terms of Code
§ 38.2-2206(B), the Roberts vehicle was underinsured because his
policy’s bodily injury liability coverage was “less than the total
amount of uninsured motorist coverage [under the Atkinson policy]
afforded any person [Dyer] injured as a result of the operation or use
of the vehicle.” Dyer’s entitlement to the UIM coverage under the
Atkinson policy does not mean the Atkinson motorcycle was under-
insured as to itself. Instead, it means that Roberts, a joint and several
tortfeasor, was underinsured and therefore Dyer is entitled to the
UIM coverage under the Atkinson policy.

* Some language in Hunter could be read to limit recovery under both the bodily injury
liability coverage and UIM provisions of a single policy; however, that language must be read
in the context of a claim with one policy and one tortfeasor.

es
fe

Hi Hill is clear and commanding authority to apply the same rule
in the UIM setting, where joint tortfeasors and multiple policies are
present, as already applies to UM coverage. If we determined Hill
was inapplicable to the case at bar, it would create the discrepant
circumstance in which Dyer would be in a worse position than if
Roberts had been uninsured. The General Assembly specifically
eliminated this anomaly in the 1982 amendments to former Code
§§ 38.1-381(b) and (c) which are now Code §§ 38.2-2206(A) and
(B). See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Scott, 234 Va.
573, 576, 363 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1988).

Hl Dairyland also maintains that the Atkinson policy prohibits an
insured from collecting both liability and UIM coverage. Because the
policy was not entered into the record, we need not address Dairy-
Jand’s argument in this regard. Moreover, such a provision would
conflict with the requirements of Code §§ 38.2-2206(A) and (B) as
we explained above. “The provisions of the statute [Code § 38.2-
2206] are part of [the] contract of insurance, and we will not con-
sider language in [a] policy that, arguably, is inconsistent with the
statute as we have construed it.” Id. at 577, 363 S.E.2d at 705.

III. CONCLUSION

Il This Court’s rationale in Hill applies with as equal force to
UIM coverage as it does to UM coverage. We therefore hold that
Dyer is entitled to UIM coverage under the Atkinson policy equal to
the difference between Robert’s coverage under his policy ($25,000)
and the available UIM coverage under the Atkinson policy
($100,000), a total of $75,000. The trial court thus erred in granting
summary judgment to Dairyland and in failing to grant summary
judgment to Dyer. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the
trial court and enter final judgment for Dyer.

Reversed and final judgment.

ELMER MILTEER

Vv.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No, 031558

April 23, 2004

Present: All the Justices

R

J. Roger Griffin, Jr. (Christie, Kantor, Griffin & Smith, on brief),
for appellant.

John H. McLees, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W.
Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE AGEE delivered the opinion of the Court.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On March 28, 2001, Norfolk police officers Steve Stephens
(“Stephens”) and Maurice S$. Joseph (‘Joseph’) were screening
packages for narcotics at a Federal Express facility in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia. While doing so, the officers noticed two packages similar in
size, shape and labeling to packages determined through prior inves-
tigations to contain unauthorized (commonly referred to as
“pirated”) compact discs (““CDs’’) and videocassettes. The officers

De 735
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opened the packages pursuant to a search warrant and discovered that
they did indeed contain CDs and videocassettes.!

The packages were addressed to “Guy” at a business address,
407 Pretlow Street, in the City of Franklin, Virginia. In conjunction
with the Franklin police department, Joseph posed as a Federal
Express employee and delivered both packages to that address. Dur-
ing the first attempt to deliver the packages, no one at that address
would accept the packages and pay the charges due upon delivery.
Joseph then made a second delivery attempt and found Elmer Milteer
(“Milteer”) standing behind a vehicle in the parking lot at 407 Pret-
low Street talking on a cellular telephone. Joseph approached Milteer
and told him he had a delivery and the charge was $101.40. Milteer
accepted the packages without comment or examining the contents,
but gave Joseph $102.00 and told him to keep the change.

Stephens and another police officer observed Milteer place the
packages in the back of his vehicle and drive away. Stephens fol-
lowed Milteer’s vehicle for several blocks before police officers in a
marked police vehicle stopped Milteer. The officers arrested Milteer
and searched his vehicle where they recovered the packages Joseph
had just delivered to Milteer, but also found separate boxes contain-
ing 183 CDs and 72 videocassettes. In addition to the CDs and vide-
ocassettes, officers discovered receipts for shipments from New York
and a business license from Murfreesboro, North Carolina indicating
Milteer was in the business of selling, inter alia, T-shirts and CDs.
Officers also recovered a business license from Hertford County,
North Carolina and, from Milteer’s wallet, a handwritten price list
titled “the Underground Wholesale Price List.”

After his arrest Milteer told a Franklin police officer that he sold
items from the back of his truck in Franklin and in the area of North
Carolina where he lived. Milteer denied knowing it was illegal to sell
the CDs and videocassettes for which he was arrested and offered to
help the officers apprehend the person from New York who shipped
the packages. He also stated that the CDs or videocassettes would be
worth $3.00 to $5.00 each if he were to sell them.

Milteer was the subject of four indictments involving: (1) viola-
tion of Code § 59.1-41.3 by possession for the purpose of selling
videocassettes produced, manufactured, distributed or acquired in
violation of Chapter 3.1 of Title 59.1, (2) possession of videocasset-

' Stephens testified that at least one of the videocassettes was a copy of a movie that opened
in theaters the previous weekend.

736 Le
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tes whose labels did not reflect the true names and addresses of their
manufacturers, Code § 59.1-41.4, (3) violation of Code § 59.1-41.3
by possession for the purpose of selling CDs produced, manufac-
tured, distributed or acquired in violation of Chapter 3.1 of Title
59.1, and (4) possession of CDs whose labels did not reflect the true
names and addresses of their manufacturers, Code § 59.1-41.4. None
of the indictments charged a violation of Code § 59.1-41.2 or men-
tioned that statute. The two indictments which cited Code § 59.1-41.4
made no reference to Code § 59.1-41.3.

At trial the Commonwealth presented testimony from Phillip
Brooks (“‘Brooks”’), an official with the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America. As an expert on music piracy, Brooks testified that
he examined the 113 CDs delivered to Milteer by Joseph and con-
cluded all were counterfeit. He also stated that none of the CDs were
labeled with the name and address of the true manufacturer (i.e., the
counterfeiter). In addition, Brooks examined the 183 other CDs
found in Milteer’s vehicle and determined that all but four of those
CDs were counterfeit.

The Commonwealth also presented testimony from Robert W.
Hunter (“Hunter”), an investigator for the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America. Hunter, as an expert in the field of counterfeit vide-
ocassettes, testified that he had examined the 90 videocassettes con-
tained in the package Joseph delivered to Milteer and all were
counterfeit. Furthermore, the videocassettes were not labeled with the
name or address of the true manufacturer. Hunter also testified that
another 72 videocassettes found in Milteer’s vehicle were also coun-
terfeit and did not contain the true address or name of the
manufacturer.

At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, Milteer moved to
strike the evidence. Although trial counsel’s arguments are hard to
follow at points, he contended there should only be one charge
against Milteer under Code §59.1-41.3 and Code § 59.1-41.4
because these statutes were not intended to establish two separate
offenses: “if you say he’s violating .3 then what statute are you look-
ing at? . . . You’ve got to look at another statute first . . . I don’t
think if your underlying offense is .4 you can go up and get .3 also”.
Milteer also asserted that the CDs and videocassettes retrieved from
his vehicle should be consolidated for purposes of prosecution
instead of permitting the Commonwealth to charge possession of the
delivered packages separately from the CDs and videocassettes
already in his vehicle.

After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court struck two
of the indictments so Milteer was tried on one indictment regarding
videocassettes under Code § 59.1-41.3 (“the videocassette charge”)
and the other as to CDs under Code § 59.1-41.4 (“the CD charge”).
The trial court then convicted Milteer on both indictments by these
conviction orders:

(1) The videocassette charge

Elmer Milteer, Jr did unlawfully and feloniously possess for
purpose of selling or renting . . . VHS video cassettes that
have been produced, manufacture[d], distributed or acquired in
violation of Chapter 3.1 of Title 59.1 of the 1950 Code of Vir-
ginia as amended, Virginia Code Section 59.1-41.3 ....

(2) The CD charge

Elmer Milteer, Jr did unlawfully and feloniously possess . . .
compact disc for the purpose of sale, rental or transfer by any
manufacture[r], . . . without having on its packaging the true
name and address of the manufacturer, Virginia Code Section
59.1-41.4....

Upon sentencing for the videocassette charge and the CD charge,
Milteer’s existing probation for a prior drug conviction was revoked.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Milteer argued he
could not be convicted under both Code §59.1-41.3 and Code
§ 59.1-41.4 because conduct under Code § 59.1-41.4 can only be a
criminal offense when read in conjunction with Code § 59.1-41.3.
The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions, noting that the acts
charged in the indictments could separately violate the proscriptions
of Code §§ 59.1-41.2 and 59.1-41.4 and “defendant was culpable
pursuant to Code § 59.1-41.3 for both offenses.” The opinion did not
directly address the issue that Milteer’s indictment and conviction
order on the CD charge for violating Code § 59.1-41.4 made no ref-
erence to Code § 59.1-41.3 or any other statute which directly
denominates particular conduct as a crime.

We awarded Milteer this appeal. For the reasons set out below,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and the case remanded.

Il. ANALYSIS

On appeal to this Court Milteer asserts that he could not be con-
victed of violating Code § 59.1-41.3 and separately violating Code

738 Lee
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§ 59.1-41.4. He also contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his convictions and, consequently, that it was error to find he vio-
lated his probation in effect at the time of his convictions.

A. Convictions under Code § 59.1-41.3
and Code § 59.1-41.4

HB We are mindful that “[p]enal statutes must be ‘strictly con-
strued against the State’ and . . . ‘cannot be extended by implication
or construction, or be made to embrace cases which are not within
their letter and spirit.’ ” Commonwealth, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v.
Athey, 261 Va. 385, 388, 542 S.E.2d 764, 766 (2001) (quoting Berry
v. City of Chesapeake, 209 Va. 525, 526, 165 S.E.2d 291, 292
(1969)). “‘It is unquestionably true that before an accused can be con-
victed of the violation of a statute, the crime charged must fall within
the provisions thereof. It is also true that where no offense is charged
in an indictment, the appellate court will reverse the judgment of the
trial court.” Xippas v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 497, 501, 126 S.E.
207, 207 (1925); see also Commonwealth v. Doss, 159 Va. 968, 973-
74, 167 S.E. 371, 373 (1933); Smith v. Commonwealth, 160 Va. 943,
946, 169 S.E. 550, 551 (1933).

HMM Code §59.1-41.3 makes it “unlawful for any person to
knowingly sell, rent, cause to be sold or rented, or possess for the
purpose of selling or renting any recorded device that has been pro-
duced, manufactured, distributed, or acquired in violation of any pro-
vision of this chapter.” Code §59.1-41.4 mandates that “every
recorded device sold, rented or transferred or possessed for the pur-
pose of sale, rental or transfer . . . shall contain on its packaging the
true name and address of the manufacturer.”

HE While the possession of recorded devices for sale that do
not have the “‘true name and address of the manufacturer” may be
contrary to the provisions of Code § 59.1-41.4, the plain text of Code
§ 59.1-41.4 contains no provision making such possession a crime.
Under the General Assembly’s writing of Chapter 3.1 of Title 59.1, it

2 The full text of Code § 59.1-41.4 reads as follows:
Ninety days after July 1, 1972, every recorded device sold, rented or transferred or
possessed for the purpose of sale, rental or transfer by any manufacturer, distributor,
or wholesale or retail merchant shall contain on its packaging the true name and
address of the manufacturer. The term “manufacturer” shall not include the manufac-
turer of the cartridge or casing itself. The term “recorded device” means the tangible
medium upon which sounds or images are recorded or otherwise stored, and includes
any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, videocassette, film or other medium now
known or later developed on which sounds or images are recorded or otherwise
stored.

is only through Code §59.1-41.3 that possession of prohibited
recorded devices contrary to the standard of Code § 59.1-41.4
becomes a criminal act. Yet, neither Milteer’s indictment nor convic-
tion order for the CD charge under Code § 59.1-41.4 makes any ref-
erence to Code § 59.1-41.3, either directly or indirectly, by citation
or narrative.

I By contrast, Milteer’s indictment and conviction order on the
videocassette charge recite that he possessed the videocassettes,
which “have been produced, manufactured, distributed or acquired in
violation of Chapter 3.1 of Title 59.1 . . . Virginia Code § 59.1-
41.3.” By the reference to violation of Chapter 3.1, the videocassette
charge could bring within its ambit either or both a violation of Code
§ 59.1-41.2 for possessing videocassettes of unauthorized recordings
or having a mislabeled videocassette as set out in Code § 59.1-41.4.
As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, either act is made a crime
by virtue of Code § 59.1-41.3, which makes it unlawful to possess
the videocassettes “in violation of any provision of this chapter.”

Il Provided the evidence of guilt is sufficient, possession of the
pirated videocassettes as charged against Milteer is a crime under
Code § 59.1-41.3. This is because the videocassette charge was spe-
cifically made by reference to a statute which makes the charged
conduct a crime: Code § 59.1-41.3.

Hl However, the indictment and conviction order for the CD
charge are markedly different. The only act for which Milteer was
charged and convicted in the CD charge was possessing CDs “with-
out having on its packaging the true name and address of the manu-
facturer, Virginia Code Section 59.1-41.4.” Neither the indictment
nor conviction order states Milteer’s act was “in violation of Chapter
3.1 of Title 59.1” as set out in the videocassette charge. Further,
there is no direct or indirect reference in the CD charge to Code
§ 59.1-41.3, which the structure of Chapter 3.1 uses as the vehicle to
make an act under § 59.1-41.4 a crime. It is only with the imprimatur
of Code § 59.1-41.3 that the General Assembly deems acts under
Code § 59.1-41.4 to be criminal acts. The fatal flaw in Milteer’s con-
viction on the CD charge is that it was obtained based on a statute
which, by itself, does not criminalize Milteer’s actions.

Hl [f the Commonwealth had charged and convicted Milteer
under Code § 59.1-41.3 on the CD charge by virtue of acts contrary
to Code § 59.1-41.4, then Milteer would have been properly con-
victed of acts that the General Assembly has denominated as a crime.
However, the Commonwealth did not do so and ignored the clear

740 De
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statutory requirements of Chapter 3.1, which do not make acts under
Code § 59.1-41.4, standing alone, a crime.

HM Accordingly, the trial court was in error convicting Milteer
of the CD charge and should have granted his motion to strike that
indictment. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that conviction.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming Milteer’s con-
viction under Code § 59.1-41.4 on the CD charge will be reversed.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

HH Milteer also asserts that the Commonwealth’s evidence was
insufficient to show he “knew these tapes delivered to him were not
made in compliance with the statutory requirements.” In view of our
disposition of the CD charge above, we only consider the sufficiency
argument with regard to the videocassette charge.

As an initial matter, the Commonwealth contends that Milteer’s
claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence was procedurally
defaulted in the trial court. The Commonwealth asserts that Milteer
only alleged that the evidence failed to prove his intent to sell or
distribute the videocassettes, not that he did not know the videocas-
settes he possessed were illegal reproductions. The Court of Appeals
agreed with the Commonwealth and determined that at trial Milteer
only argued the Commonwealth’s failure to prove he “had the intent
to distribute or sell these items.” Milteer v. Commonwealth, Rec. No.
0939-02-1, slip op. at 7 June 3, 2003). We disagree with the Court
of Appeals on this point.

The record shows that, in support of his motion to strike, Milteer
argued at trial that “[t]he Commonwealth has not proven . . . that my
client [acted] knowingly or with the intent to sell or distribute these
items.” (Emphasis added). This argument, based on the alternate
grounds of both “knowledge” and “intent,” is sufficient to preserve
the issue for appeal. Having determined Milteer’s sufficiency claim is
not procedurally defaulted, we address the merits.

“Applying well-established principles of appellate review, we
will consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deduc-
ible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the’
prevailing party below.” Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459,
461, 536 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2000).

HM The evidence presented at trial proved that Milteer accepted,
paid for, and transported two packages known by police officers to
contain pirated CDs and videocassettes. When the police stopped
Milteer they discovered, in addition to the delivered packages, an

additional 183 CDs and 72 videocassettes, all but four of which were
pirated and mislabeled. Milteer had a price list in his wallet titled
“the Underground Wholesale Price List.”

At trial, Franklin police officer Richard Harvey (““Harvey’’) testi-
fied that he had previously seen Milteer selling CDs, clothing and
jewelry from the back of his truck in the City of Franklin. After his
arrest, Milteer admitted to Harvey that he sold items from the back
of his truck throughout Franklin and the area of North Carolina
where he lived. Milteer admitted, and the “underground” price list
found in his wallet reflected, that the CDs and videocassettes would.
sell for between $3.00 and $5.00 — prices significantly lower than
those at retail stores.

The evidence also showed that some of the videocassettes in
Milteer’s possession were copies of a movie that had opened in thea-
ters the weekend prior to his arrest. The trial court could reasonably
infer that these videocassettes were therefore unavailable for
purchase at a retail store and therefore unavailable for sale to the
public.

In sum, there was more than sufficient evidence to prove that
Milteer knowingly possessed illegal reproduction videocassettes for
sale. The trial court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to
convict Milteer of the videocassette charge.

C. Probation Revocation

The trial court sentenced Milteer to two years in prison with one
year and six months suspended for each of the two convictions. At
the time he committed the instant offenses Milteer was on probation
with a fifteen year suspended sentence for sale of cocaine. Upon con-
viction for the CD and videocassette charges, the trial court revoked
the suspended sentence and then re-suspended twelve years. Milteer
thus received three years to serve on the prior offense after serving
the new six-month sentences.

Hl Milteer argues on appeal that revocation of his probation by
the trial court should be reversed if his convictions on the instant
charges are reversed by this Court. Although we have determined
that his conviction under Code § 59.1-41.4 for the CD charge was
improper, his conviction under Code § 59.1-41.3 on the videocassette
charge will be affirmed. However, since it cannot be determined
from the record the extent to which the trial court’s judgment revok-
ing Milteer’s probation and previously suspended sentence was based
upon the conviction for the CD charge, we must reverse the proba-

742 Lee
a

tion revocation judgment and remand to the trial court for considera-
tion in view of our opinion in this case.

Ul. CONCLUSION

Code §59.1-41.4, by its plain language, contains no provision
criminalizing the failure to abide by its labeling requirements. Acts in
contravention of that statute are only made criminal under the present
version of the Code when an offense is charged through Code § 59.1-
41.3. Since Milteer was charged and convicted on the CD charge
solely under Code § 59.1-41.4, we will reverse his conviction on the
CD charge and dismiss the indictment. We also find the evidence
sufficient that Milteer knowingly possessed illegally reproduced vide-
ocassettes for sale in violation of Code § 59.1-41.3 and we will
affirm his conviction on the videocassette charge. Finally, in view of
our reversal of the CD charge, we will reverse the trial court’s judg-
ment revoking Milteer’s probation and remand the case for a new
proceeding on the probation revocation if the Commonwealth be so
advised.

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and remanded.

Lee 743
a

Gary DEAN BULLARD
V.

Diné M. ALFONSO
Record No. 031519
April 23, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Carrico, S.J.

William L. Perkins, III (Price, Perkins, Larkin & Donnelly, on
brief) for appellant.

Thomas C. Dawson, Jr (J. Andrew Basham; McKenry,
Dancigers, Warner, Dawson & Lake, on brief), for appellee.

SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this personal injury case, the sole question for decision is
whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of lost income
allegedly suffered by the plaintiff. Finding the exclusion erroneous,
we will reverse.

In a motion for judgment filed below, the plaintiff, Gary Dean
Bullard, sought to recover from the defendant, Dina M. Alfonso,

Lee 745
a

damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff in an automo-
bile accident allegedly caused by the defendant’s negligence. In the
motion, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that as a direct and proximate
result of the defendant’s negligence he “‘was prevented from attend-
ing to his lawful affairs, thereby losing wages, earnings and profits.”

At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was a drywall hanger
and plasterer employed by Grant Drywall and Plastering, Inc., a Sub-
chapter S corporation of which the plaintiff was sole stockholder and
president. The plaintiff claimed that, as a result of his injuries, he
was unable to perform his duties as a drywall hanger and plasterer
for approximately six months and suffered a wage loss of $4,500.00
per month, for a total of $27,000.00.

In a discovery deposition, the plaintiff testified that his employer
had continued to pay him his monthly salary of $4,500.00 during the
six-month period he was unable to work.* The defendant then filed a
motion in limine seeking “to exclude any attempted claim by the
plaintiff to assert a lost wage claim since he continued to receive his
salary without reduction and without sick leave, vacation or any
other collateral source.”

After argument on the motion, the trial court, the Honorable Alan
E. Rosenblatt presiding, granted the motion in limine. Then, in a trial
before a jury, the Honorable Robert B. Cromwell, Jr., presiding, the
evidence of lost wages was excluded and the plaintiff was awarded
the sum of $15,000.00 as damages for his injuries. The plaintiff
moved to set aside the verdict for the court’s “refusal to allow the
Plaintiff to introduce testimony and other evidence of wage loss as
proffered into the record.” The court denied the motion and entered
final judgment on the verdict. We awarded the plaintiff this appeal.

HHI Code § 8.01-35 is pertinent to resolution of the question
before us. It provides as follows:

In any suit brought for personal injury or death, provable dam-
ages for loss of income due to such injury or death shall not be
diminished because of reimbursement of income to the plain-
tiff . . . from any other source, nor shall the fact of any such
reimbursement be admitted into evidence.

* The plaintiff testified later at trial that the funds used to pay his salary during his disability
consisted of “prior years’ earnings” that had been left in “the business account.” He said he
had “already been taxed on that money.”

746 eee
as

Hl Also pertinent is the collateral source rule. The Court first
recognized this rule more than one hundred years ago in Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co. v. Wightman, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 431 (1877), where we
held that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit evidence
offered by the defendant in a tort case to show that the wife and
children of a deceased had received the proceeds from life insurance
policies in the sum of $5,000.00. We said: “The mere fact that the
family of the deceased received money from some other source
would not justly influence the measure of compensation to be made
by the defendant for injuries attributable to the misconduct of its
employees and agents.” Jd. at 446.

We recently applied the collateral source rule in Acuar v.
Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 188-89, 531 S.E.2d 316, 320 (2000).
There, we held that the portions of bills for medical expenses written
off by a plaintiff’s health care providers could not be deducted from
the amount of damages owed by a tortfeasor. Id. at 192, 531 S.E.2d
at 322. We said that “‘the injured party should be made whole by the
tortfeasor, not by a combination of compensation from the tortfeasor
and collateral sources.” Id. at 192-93, 531 S.E.2d at 323. See also
Acordia of Virginia Ins. Agency, Inc. y. Genito Glenn, L.P., 263 Va.
377, 387, 560 S.E.2d 246, 251 (2002); Schickling v. Aspinall, 235 Va.
472, 474, 369 S.E.2d 172, 174 (1988); Walthew v. Davis, 201 Va.
557, 563, 111 S.E.2d 784, 788 (1960); Burks v. Webb, 199 Va. 296,
304, 99 S.E.2d 629, 636 (1957); Johnson v. Kellam, 162 Va. 757,
764, 175 S.E. 634, 636 (1934); Owen v. Dixon, 162 Va. 601, 608,
175 S.E. 41, 43 (1934).

The plaintiff contends that Code § 8.01-35 is a codification of the
collateral source rule. The defendant contends that it is not. The
defendant notes that in Schickling we said that, under the collateral
source rule, “compensation or indemnity received by a tort victim
from a source collateral to the tortfeasor may not be applied as a
credit against the quantum of damages the tortfeasor owes,” 235 Va.
at 474, 369 S.E.2d at 174 (emphasis added), while Code § 8.01-35
provides that such damages “shall not be diminished because of
reimbursement of income to the plaintiff.” (Emphasis added.)

The defendant maintains that Code § 8.01-35 “thas replaced the
common law Collateral Source Rule” so that now the focus is not
upon the receipt of compensation for loss of income but upon the
reimbursement of income. Here, the defendant says, the plaintiff lost
no income, there was nothing to be reimbursed and, therefore, Code
§ 8.01-35 is inapplicable.

Le 747
a

Hl We do not agree that the use of the word “reimbursement” in
Code § 8.01-35 has the effect of altering the collateral source rule as
it was enunciated in Schickling. A person reimbursed for loss of
income certainly receives compensation as a result, so if there is any
distinction between receiving compensation and obtaining reimburse-
ment in the context of the collateral source rule, it is a distinction
without a difference.

The defendant also argues that the salary payments made to the
plaintiff in this case were not from “any other source,” as contem-
plated by Code § 8.01-35. Rather, the defendant says, “the Plaintiff
continued to receive his same salary of $4,500 per month from his
corporation as an employee of his corporation.”

Il The defendant misreads Code § 8.01-35. As noted supra, the
Code section provides that a plaintiff’s claim for loss of income shall
not be diminished because of reimbursement “from any other
source.” The defendant would have us read the words “from any
other source” as meaning a source not collateral to the defendant but
to the plaintiff, thus excluding any compensation received from such
a source in determining whether a plaintiff’s damages for loss of
income are diminished within the meaning of Code § 8.01-35. To
adopt this meaning would, in effect, overrule the previous decisions
in which we have applied the collateral source rule.

Correctly read, the words “from any other source” mean a
source collateral to the defendant, i.e., a source other than the defen-
dant. See Schickling, 235 Va. at 474, 369 S.E.2d at 174 (compensa-
tion from source collateral to the tortfeasor not deductible); Kellam,
162 Va. at 764-65, 175 S.E. at 636-37 (compensation from a source
wholly independent of the defendant not deductible); Black’s Law
Dictionary 256 (7th ed. 1999) 256 (defining “‘collateral-source rule”
as meaning that compensation “from a source independent of the
tortfeasor . . . should not be deducted from the damages that the
tortfeasor must pay).”

The question then becomes whether the compensation paid to the
plaintiff by his employer in this case is deductible from the damages
the tortfeasor owes. Our earlier decisions are informative. In Acordia,
supra, we quoted with approval Comment b to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 920A (1979):

If the plaintiff was himself responsible for the benefit, as by
maintaining his own insurance or by making advantageous
employment arrangements, the law allows him to keep it for

748 ee
a

himself. If the benefit was a gift to the plaintiff from a third
party or established for him by law, he should not be deprived
of the advantage that it confers.

263 Va. at 387, 560 S.E.2d at 251.
Although not cited in Acordia, Comment c(2) to the above sec-
tion of the Restatement is also helpful:

c. The rule that collateral benefits are not subtracted from the
plaintiff’s recovery applies to the following types of benefits:

(2) Employment benefits. These may be gratuitous, as in the
case in which the employer, although not legally required to
do so, continues to pay the employee’s wages during his
incapacity.

And, in Schickling, we said:

In the early cases, the collateral compensation involved was
money paid {to} the plaintiff by his own insurer. Later cases
have applied the rule to social security benefits, public and pri-
vate pension payments, unemployment and workers’ compen-
sation benefits, vacation and sick leave allowances, and other
payments made by employers to injured employees, both con-
tractual and gratuitous.

235 Va. at 474, 369 S.E.2d at 174.

Finally, in Phillips v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Va.
1960), the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and his
salary was gratuitously paid by his employer during the period of his
disability. Interpreting Virginia law, the District Court held the plain-
tiff was “nevertheless, entitled to recover for loss of time” from
work under the collateral source rule. Jd. at 317.

Here, the plaintiff argues that the salary payments made to him
by his employer were, in fact, from a source collateral to the defen-
dant and that under the collateral source rule and Code § 8.01-35, he
should have been permitted to submit his wage-loss claim to the jury.
On the other hand, the defendant argues that “this Court has never
actually held, as opposed to stated in dicta, that a plaintiff who actu-
ally continued to receive a salary can make a claim for lost wages.”

[Hl It is true that none of our previous cases involved a situation
where an employer continued to pay an employee’s salary during the

| ee 749
a

period of the employee’s disability. However, our earlier references
to such a situation were part of the rationale for the decisions then
made and, therefore, not dicta. But if there be any doubt about the
matter, we now expressly hold that under the collateral source rule
and Code § 8.01-35, compensation paid by an employer to an
employee during the period of the employee’s disability is not
deductible from the quantum of damages the tortfeasor owes. And it
follows that evidence of the employee’s loss of income is admissible
in evidence at trial and that, under Code § 8.01-35, the fact of any
reimbursement to the employee by the employer shall not be admit-
ted into evidence.

Hl But, argues the defendant, the plaintiff was not entitled to
have his claim submitted to the jury because he continued to perform
his duties as corporate president and “[t]he corporation . . . generated
income from the employees who performed drywall and plastering
services as well as from subcontracting work to other entities.”
Although the defendant takes considerable liberty with the record
concerning these matters, we will assume for the purpose of discus-
sion that he has correctly stated what the record shows. But whether
the plaintiff continued to perform his duties as corporate president
and the corporation generated income from the employees who per-
formed drywall and plastering services as well as subcontracting
work to other entitles is all irrelevant to the question whether the
plaintiff’s evidence of lost income was properly excluded in the trial
below.

The fact remains, and it is undisputed by the defendant, that the
plaintiff was disabled from performing his drywall hanging and plas-
tering duties for six months. Yet his employer continued paying him
his monthly salary of $4,500.00 notwithstanding his inability to per-
form such duties. We hold that this constitutes reimbursement “from
any other source” under Code § 8.01-35 and that reimbursement can-
not be used to diminish the plaintiff’s “provable damages for loss of
income . . . nor shall the fact of any such reimbursement be admitted
into evidence.”

Il The plaintiff should have the opportunity to prove his dam-
ages for loss of income. Accordingly, for the trial court’s error in
excluding the plaintiff’s evidence on that point, we will reverse the
judgment appealed from and remand the case for a new trial limited
to the issue of damages consistent with the views expressed in this
opinion. Any recovery for such loss shall, of course, be in addition to

750 eee
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other damages the jury finds the plaintiff suffered for his personal
injuries.

This disposition gives the plaintiff a chance to bring his case
within the purview of the collateral source rule, which is

to strike a balance between two competing principles of tort
Jaw: (1) a plaintiff is entitled to compensation sufficient to
make him whole, but no more; and (2) a defendant is liable for
all damages that proximately result from his wrong. A plaintiff
who receives a double recovery for a single tort enjoys a wind-
fall; a defendant who escapes, in whole or in part, liability for
his wrong enjoys a windfall. Because the law must sanction
one windfall and deny the other, it favors the victim of the
wrong rather than the wrongdoer.

Schickling, 235 Va. at 474-75, 369 S.E.2d at 174.

Reversed and remanded.

751

MARC ANDRE SCHWARTZ
v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 031698
April 23, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, JJ.,
and Compton, S.J.

752

John W. Luxton (Morchower, Luxton & Whaley, on brief), for
appellant.

Margaret W. Reed, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

SENIOR JUSTICE COMPTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Shortly after midnight on Monday, May 28, 2001, defendant
Marc Andre Schwartz and three male companions, all teenagers and
fueled by consumption of alcoholic beverages, embarked on a van-
dalism spree in western Henrico County. During the next several
hours, the group broke windows in school busses and an automobile
with bats and tools, and slashed tires on motor vehicles with a knife.
Shortly before 2:45 a.m., in heavy rain, the vandals arrived at the
residence of Michael Wayne Drye, whom they did not know.

Drye’s two vehicles, a Ford pickup truck with a camper shell on
the rear and a Ford Explorer sport utility vehicle, were parked in his
driveway adjacent to one another. The truck was three to four feet
from the dwelling and the Explorer was six to eight feet from the
home.

P| 753
a

The boys first attempted unsuccessfully to overturn the truck.
Then, using diesel fuel found in containers within the camper shell,
the culprits, with difficulty, set fire to the truck, left and, after
returning to the scene several times, eventually fled the area. The fire
spread from the truck to the sport utility vehicle and then to the resi-
dence, which became engulfed in flames.

The vehicles were destroyed and the home heavily damaged.
Drye’s property loss was estimated to be in the sum of $250,000.
Drye, who was alone in the house at the time, escaped without
injury.

Following detention of the defendant on June 1, 2001, charges
against him were transferred from the juvenile and domestic relations
district court to the circuit court, where he was indicted for three
felonies. In one indictment, defendant was charged with malicious
burning of an occupied dwelling, in violation of Code § 18.2-77. In
two separate indictments, he was charged with malicious burning of
personal property, the pickup truck and the Explorer, in violation of
Code § 18.2-81.

Following a bench trial in the circuit court, the defendant was
found guilty of all three charges of arson and sentenced in January
2002 to incarceration, most of which was suspended. Upon review,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions. Schwartz
vy. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 61, 581 S.E.2d 891 (2003).

We awarded defendant this appeal, limited to consideration of
one assignment of error, that is, whether: “The trial court erred in
finding Schwartz guilty of three counts of arson when the evidence
revealed there was only one point of ignition, a pick-up truck, which
later spread to another vehicle and the residence.”

In this appeal, the defendant does not contest his conviction for
arson of the occupied dwelling. Rather, he seeks dismissal of the two
convictions for burning the vehicles, Drye’s personal property.

The defendant argues: “There was only one act of ignition for
the residence and the two vehicles. The three properties had one
owner. . . . Clearly there was only ‘one discrete criminal act’ com-
mitted and Schwartz has been convicted and punished for three
offenses.”

We do not agree with defendant’s argument. The decision of this
appeal turns upon application to these facts of the relevant statutes’
clear terms.

HI Code § 18.2-77(A), as pertinent, provides: “If any person
maliciously (i) burns, or by use of any . . . substance destroys, in

whole or in part, or causes to be burned or destroyed, or (ii) aids,
counsels or procures the burning or destruction of any . . . occupied
... house ..., he shall be guilty of a felony ... . Any person who
maliciously sets fire to anything, or aids, counsels or procures the
setting fire to anything, by the burning whereof such occupied dwell-
ing house . . . is burned shall be guilty of a violation of this
subsection.”

Hl Code § 18.2-81, as pertinent, provides: “If any person mali-
ciously . . . set fire to or burn or destroy by any . . . substance, or
cause to be burned, or destroyed by any . . . substance, or aid, coun-
sel, or procure the burning or destroying by any . . . substance, of
any personal property, . . . he shall, if the thing burnt or destroyed,
be of the value of $200 or more, be guilty of a Class 4 felony.”

Hl We agree with the Court of Appeals’ statement that “the plain
language” of the foregoing statutes demonstrates that the General
Assembly “intended to allow multiple arson convictions under cir-
cumstances such as those presented in this case.” Schwartz, 41 Va.
App. at 74, 581 S.E.2d at 897-98.

Hil In contending there was only one criminal act, the defendant
has argued that the word “anything” in § 18.2-77 means the personal
property referred to in § 18.2-81. However, the term “anything” in
§ 18.2-77 refers to the accelerant used to start the fire of a dwelling,
not the object of the fire. The statutory language proscribes “the set-
ting fire to anything, by the burning whereof such occupied dwelling
house . . . is burned.”

HEM In separate statutes, the legislature has criminalized the
arson of an occupied dwelling, on the one hand, and the arson of
personal property, on the other. The personal property here was two
distinct, different vehicles that were separately identified and parked
outside the dwelling. The dwelling and the two vehicles occupied
different locations. Thus, we hold the legislature intended that, under
these circumstances, there should be three units of prosecution, viz.,
for the burning of the dwelling and for the burning of each vehicle.

Hl While we agree with the foregoing statement of the Court of
Appeals, we disagree with that Court’s further observation that
“Code § 18.2-81, by its plain language, creates a single and separate
unit of prosecution for each item of personal property destroyed as
the result of arson.” Id. at 75, 581 S.E.2d at 898.

As the Court of Appeals’ Chief Judge pointed out in her concur-
rence in Schwartz, “[t]his could be construed as permitting a separate
arson prosecution for every item destroyed in a home or car, such as

en 755
a

a shoe, a sock, a pillow, etc.” Id. at 77, 581 S.E.2d at 899. As she
noted, that literal construction of the statute would improperly yield |
an absurd result. Id. |

Tl We conclude that the circuit court did not err in finding the
defendant guilty of three counts of arson. Therefore, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals confirming these convictions will be

Affirmed.*

* This decision, of course, leaves in place the Court of Appeals’ order of remand to the
circuit court for modification of the sentencing order, regarding the defendant’s convictions for
vandalism and possession of alcohol, to reflect they were actually juvenile convictions as

opposed to adult convictions. See 41 Va. App. at 76, 581 S.E.2d at 898-99.

156
PC

DONALD H. COCHRAN, ET AL.
Vv.
FAIRFAX COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, ET AL.
Record No. 030982

VIRGINIA C. MACNEAL
v.

TOWN OF PULASKI BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, ET AL.
Record No. 031770

BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
v.
JACK PENNINGTON, ET AL.
Record No. 031771
April 23, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons and Agee, JJ., and
Russell, SJ.

n
Va)
6

ra)
é

Ss 7°
Fe

J. Patrick Taves, Deputy County Attorney (Donald H. Cochran;
Joann A. Cochran; Dean Salman; Diane E. Salman; Wallace T. San-
sone; David P. Bobzien, County Attorney; F. Hayden Codding, Assis-
tant County Attorney, on briefs), for appellants. (Record No. 030982)

Brian M. McCormack (Dunn, McCormack & MacPherson, on
brief), for appellee. (Record No. 030982)

Susan E. Grogan (John L. McBride; Vanderpool, Frostick &
Nishanian, on briefs), for appellant. (Record No. 031770)

Randolph D. Eley, Jr. (Douglas E. Crockett; Charles R. Beller,
III; Eley & Associates, on brief), for appellees. (Record No. 031770)

B. Kay Wilson, Associate City Attorney (Leslie L. Lilley, City
Attorney, on brief), for appellant. (Record No. 031771)

No brief or argument for appellees Jack Pennington, et al.
(Record No. 031771)

SENIOR JUSTICE RUSSELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

These three cases involve decisions by local boards of zoning
appeals (collectively and individually, BZA) upon applications for
variances from the local zoning ordinances. Although the facts and
proceedings differ in each case, and will be discussed separately, the
governing principles of law are the same. We therefore consider and
decide the cases in a single opinion.

THE FAIRFAX CASE

Michael R. Bratti was the owner of a tract of land containing
approximately 20,470 square feet, in the McLean area of Fairfax
County. The property was zoned R-2, a residential classification per-

1
Fe

mitting two dwelling units per acre, and was improved by a home in
which Bratti had resided for eight years. The zoning ordinance
required side yard setbacks of at least 15 feet from the property lines.
Bratti’s existing home fit well within the setbacks.

Bratti filed an application with the BZA for four variances. He
proposed to demolish his existing home and erect a much larger
house on the site. The proposed structure would come within 13 feet
of the northerly property line, rather than the 15 feet required by the
ordinance, and would be further extended into the setback area by
three exterior chimneys which would extend beyond the northerly
wall of the house. The proposed house would be 71 feet wide and 76
feet from front to back. The proposed encroachment into the side
yard setback would extend the entire 76 foot depth of the house.

It was undisputed that Bratti’s proposed house could be built
upon the existing lot without any need for a variance by simply mov-
ing it two feet to the south, plus the additional distance required by
the chimneys. Bratti explained to the Board, however, that he desired
to have a “side-load” garage on the south side of his house and that
a reduction of two feet of open space on the south side would make
it inconvenient for vehicles to turn into the garage. The present house
had a “‘front-load” garage which opened directly toward the street.
When it was pointed out to Bratti that he could avoid this problem
by reconfiguring his proposed house to contain a “front-load”
garage, he responded that such a house would have less “curb
appeal” than the design he proposed.

If the house were built in its proposed location, but reduced in
size by two feet to comply with the zoning ordinance, there would be
a resulting loss of 152 square feet of living space. The topography of
the lot was such that it rose 42 feet vertically throughout its 198-foot
depth from the street to the rear property line. However, there were
two relatively level areas shown on the plans for the proposed dwell-
ing, one in front of the house and one in the rear. It was conceded
that an additional 152 square feet of living space could have been
constructed in either of these areas, but Bratti explained that he
wanted to use the level area in front of the house as a play area for
children and for additional parking, and that he was unwilling to
encroach upon the level area in the rear because he desired to use it
as a large outdoor courtyard which he said was “the central idea in
the house.”

The proposed dwelling had two stories. A third story could have
been added as a matter of right, without variances. Bratti conceded
that this could easily be done and would more than accommodate the

ST 71
Pe

152 square feet lost by compliance with the zoning ordinance, but
that it would be aesthetically undesirable, causing the house to
appear to be a “towering structure” as seen from the street.

Over the opposition of a number of neighbors, the BZA granted
all four variances. The BZA made findings of fact, including the fol-
lowing: “3. The lot suffers from severe topographical conditions
which the applicant has worked hard to accommodate. . . . 5. The
requests are modest.” This was followed by a conclusion of law:

THAT the applicant has satisfied the Board that physical con-
ditions as listed above exist which under a strict interpretation
of the Zoning Ordinance would result in practical difficulty or
unnecessary hardship that would deprive the user of all reason-
able use of the land and/or buildings involved.

The objecting neighbors petitioned the circuit court for certiorari.
The Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County obtained leave of court
to enter the case as an additional petitioner, opposing the variances.
The court, after a hearing, affirmed the decision of the BZA and
entered an order dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari. The
objecting neighbors and the Board of Supervisors brought this
appeal.

THE PULASKI CASE

Jack D. Nunley and Diana M. Nunley owned a corner lot in the
Town of Pulaski that contained .6248 acre. The lot was bounded by
public streets on three sides. A street 40 feet wide ran along the front
of the property and the intersection of that street with a street
approximately 30 feet wide formed the southeastern corner of the lot.
The 30-foot street ran northward from the intersection, forming the
eastern boundary of the lot, and then curved to the west to form the
lot’s northern boundary. The curvature was gradual, having a radius
of 34.53 feet. This curve formed the northeasterly corner of the lot.

The property was zoned R-1, a residential classification which
contained a special provision relating to corner lots:

The side yard on the side facing the side street shall be at least
15 feet from both main and accessory structures.

Town of Pulaski, Va., Zoning Ordinance, art. IV § 2.6.2 (2002).

The Nunleys petitioned the BZA for a variance from the required 15-
foot set back to zero feet, in order to construct a garage at the north-
east comer of the lot, the northeast corner of which would be placed

162 rr
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tangent to the curving property line. There was no existing garage on
the property, and the Nunleys explained that placing a garage in this
location would provide the easiest access to the street. The topogra-
phy of the lot was difficult, the curve along the 30-foot street lying at
a considerable elevation above the floor level of the existing house.
The garage could be constructed closer to the house without the need
for a variance, but this would require construction of a ramp that
would add considerably to the expense of the project. Also, the
Nunleys explained, there was a stone retaining wall, five feet in
height, behind the house that would be weakened or destroyed if the
garage were to be built closer to the house.

Neighbors objected, pointing out to the BZA that the construction
of the garage so close to the corner would create a blind area that
would be dangerous for traffic coming around the curve on the 30-
foot street. They also complained that it would be an “eyesore” and
would destroy existing vegetation.

The BZA had some difficulty with the question whether the
Nunleys’ request involved a “hardship” as required by law. The
BZA held four meetings to discuss the question and obtained an
opinion from the town attorney. The BZA eventually granted the
Nunleys a modified variance, permitting an accessory structure no
closer than five feet from the northern projected boundary and no
closer than 15 feet from the eastern projected boundary of the prop-
erty. The modified variance also provided that construction should
not “alter or destroy the aesthetic looks of existing vegetation bor-
dering the northern projected boundary” of the property.

Virginia C. MacNeal, a neighbor who had objected to the vari-
ance before the BZA, filed a petition for certiorari in the circuit
court. The court, in a letter opinion, affirmed the decision of the
BZA and denied the petition for certiorari. Virginia C. MacNeal
brought this appeal.

THE VIRGINIA BEACH CASE

Jack and Rebecca Pennington owned a 1.25-acre parcel of land in
a subdivision known as Avalon Terrace, in the City of Virginia
Beach. The property was improved by their home, in which they had
lived for many years, and a detached garage containing 528 square
feet which they had built in 1972. The property was zoned R-10, a
single-family residential classification permitting four dwelling units
per acre. The ordinance contained a limitation on “accessory struc-
tures” by requiring that they “do not exceed five hundred (500)
square feet of floor area or twenty (20) percent of the floor area of

SS 7:
PC

the principal structure, whichever is greater.” The size of the Pen-
ningtons’ home was such that the 500 square-foot limitation applied
to their property.

The Penningtons applied to the BZA for a variance permitting
accessory structures containing a total of 816 square feet, in lieu of
the 500-square foot limitation. They explained that the purpose of the
request was to permit the construction of a storage shed, 12 by 24
feet, adjacent to the garage, and also to bring into conformity the 28
square feet by which the existing garage exceeded the limitation
imposed by the zoning ordinance.

The Penningtons could have built the storage shed as an appen-
dage or as an addition to the existing house without the need for any
variance, but their representative explained to the BZA that their lot
was so large that the shed would be nearly invisible from the street
and would have no impact upon neighboring properties. He con-
tended that the obvious purpose of the size limitation on accessory
structures, as contained in the ordinance, was to inhibit the erection
of large, unsightly outbuildings on small lots. He pointed out that the
Penningtons’ lot was so large that four dwelling sites could be carved
out of it, and that therefore the impact of a small additional outbuild-
ing would be minimal and would not contravene the spirit of the
zoning ordinance. He also pointed out that a number of the neighbors
were related to the Penningtons and that no neighbors had any objec-
tion to their request.

The zoning administrator of the City of Virginia Beach opposed
the request, pointing out that there was no need for a variance
because the desired storage shed could be built as an appurtenance to
the existing house. The zoning administrator had no objection to a
variance to the extent of the 28 square feet needed to bring the
existing garage into conformity with the zoning ordinance. The BZA
granted the variance to bring the garage into conformity, but denied
the remainder of the Penningtons’ request on the ground that no
“hardship” existed.

The Penningtons filed a petition for certiorari in the circuit court.
At a hearing on the petition, counsel for the Penningtons asserted a
claim of hardship that had not been presented to the BZA: Mr. Pen-
nington was seriously ill and disabled. His wife had full-time
employment, was the “bread-winner” of the family and was there-
fore unable to care for him during the day. The Penningtons’ daugh-
ter, who had recently graduated from college, had returned to live
with the Penningtons and assist in the care of her father. The storage
shed was needed as a place to store her belongings. The court ruled

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that a hardship existed, overruled the decision of the BZA and
granted the Penningtons’ requested variance. The BZA brought this

appeal.
ANALYSIS

HH Zoning is a valid exercise of the police power of the Com-
monwealth. West Brothers Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 281,
192 S.E. 881, 885 (1937). Zoning ordinances, of necessity, regulate
land use uniformly within large districts. It is impracticable to tailor
such ordinances to meet the condition of each individual parcel
within the district. The size, shape, topography or other conditions
affecting such a parcel may, if the zoning ordinance is applied to it
as written, render it relatively useless. Thus, a zoning ordinance,
valid on its face, might be unconstitutional as applied to an individ-
ual parcel, in violation of Article 1, §11 of the Constitution of
Virginia.

Because a facially valid zoning ordinance may prove unconsti-
tutional in application to a particular landowner, some device
is needed to protect landowners’ rights without destroying the
viability of zoning ordinances. The variance traditionally has
been designed to serve this function. In this role, the variance
aptly has been called an “escape hatch” or “escape valve.” A
statute may, of course, authorize variances in cases where an
ordinance’s application to particular property is not unconstitu-
tional. However, the language used in Code § 15.1-495(b)
[now § 15.2-2309(2)] to define “unnecessary hardship” clearly
indicates that the General Assembly intended that variances be
granted only in cases where application of zoning restrictions
would appear to be constitutionally impermissible.

Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 122, 267 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1980)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).

HM Therefore, the BZA has authority to grant variances only to
avoid an unconstitutional result. We said in Commonwealth v. County
Utilities, 223 Va. 534, 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982):

All citizens hold property subject to the proper exercise of
police power for the common good. Sanitation Commission v.
Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 1148, 87 S.E.2d 153, 158 (1955). Even
where such an exercise results in substantial diminution of
property values, an owner has no right to compensation there-
for. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), Hadacheck v.

Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). In Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the
Supreme Court held that no taking occurs in the circumstances
unless the regulation interferes with all reasonable beneficial
uses of the property, taken as a whole.

Id, at 542, 290 S.E.2d at 872 (emphasis added).

HM The BZA, when considering an application for a variance,
acts only in an administrative capacity. See Gayton Triangle v. Hen-
rico County, 216 Va. 764, 222 S.E.2d 570 (1976).? Under fundamen-
tal constitutional principles, administrative officials and agencies are
empowered to act only in accordance with standards prescribed by
the legislative branch of government. To hold otherwise would be to
substitute the will of individuals for the rule of law. See e.g., Thomp-
son v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 379, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (1930); Bell v.
Dorey Electric Company, 248 Va. 378, 380, 448 S.E.2d 622, 623
(1994); York v. City of Danville, 207 Va. 665, 672, 152 S.E.2d 259,
264 (1967); Assaid v. City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 47, 50, 18 S.E.2d
287, 288 (1942). The General Assembly has prescribed such stan-
dards regulating the authority of the BZA to grant variances by
enacting Code § 15.2-2309(2) which provides, in pertinent part:

Boards of zoning appeals shall have the following powers
and duties:

(2) To authorize . . . such variance as defined in § 15.2-2201
from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the
public interest, when, owing to special conditions a literal
enforcement of the provisions will result in unnecessary hard-
ship; . . . as follows:

. .. Where by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or
other extraordinary situation or condition of the piece of prop-
erty .. . the strict application of the terms of the ordinance
would effectively prohibit or unreasonably restrict the utiliza-
tion of the property or where the board is satisfied, upon the
evidence heard by it, that the granting of the variance will alle-
viate a clearly demonstrable hardship approaching confisca-

2 By contrast, when the BZA considers applications for special exceptions or special use
permits, it acts in a legislative capacity and its decision must be sustained if the record shows
the issue to be “fairly debatable.” Ames v. Town of Painter, 239 Va, 343, 348, 389 S.E.2d 702,
704 (1990).

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Fe

tion, as distinguished from a special privilege or convenience
sought by the applicant... .

No such variance shall be authorized by the board unless it
finds:
(a) That the strict application of the ordinance would produce
undue hardship... .

Adhering to the rule in Packer, we construe the statutory
terms “effectively prohibit or unreasonably restrict the utilization of
the property,” “unnecessary hardship” and “undue hardship” in that
light and hold that the BZA has no authority to grant a variance
unless the effect of the zoning ordinance, as applied to the piece of
property under consideration, would, in the absence of a variance,
“jnterfere with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken
as a whole.”? County Utilities Corp., 223 Va. at 542, 290 S.E.2d at
872.

CONCLUSION

Hl Notwithstanding the presumption of correctness to which the
decision of the BZA is entitled, Code § 15.2-2314, each of the pres-
ent cases fails to meet the foregoing standard. The proposed house in
Fairfax could have been reconfigured or moved two feet to the south,
avoiding the need for a variance. Indeed, the project could simply
have been abandoned and the existing use continued in effect. The
proposed garage in Pulaski could have been moved to another loca-
tion on the lot, or the project abandoned. The shed in Virginia Beach
could have been built as an addition to the existing house, or the
project abandoned. Without any variances, each of the properties
retained substantial beneficial uses and substantial value. The effect
of the respective zoning ordinances upon them in no sense “inter-
fere[d] with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a
whole.”

3 The Fairfax BZA argues that in Natrella v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 451, 345
$.E.2d 295 (1986), we pointed out that the foregoing statutory terms are written in the disjunc-
tive and therefore implied that ‘unnecessarily restrict the use of the property” meant some-
thing less than an unconstitutional interference with property rights, thereby departing from the
rule in Packer. On the contrary, Natrella involved the conversion of a rental apartment project
into a condominium with no physical change to the land or buildings. A statute, Code § 55-
79.43, expressly protected such conversions from the impact of zoning ordinances, a situation
foreseen in Packer: “A statute may, of course, authorize variances in cases where an ordi-
nance’s application to particular property is not unconstitutional.” Packer, 221 Va. at 122, 267
S.E.2d at 142 (emphasis added).

77
Pe

HH Compelling reasons were presented in favor of each of the
applications for variances: The desires of the owners, supported by
careful planning to minimize harmful effects to neighboring proper-
ties; probable aesthetic improvements to the neighborhood as a
whole, together with a probable increase in the local tax base; greatly
increased expense to the owners if the plans were reconfigured to
meet the requirements of the zoning ordinances; lack of opposition,
or even support of the application by neighbors; and serious personal
need, by the owners, for the proposed modification.

HN When the impact of the zoning ordinance is so severe as to
meet the foregoing standard, the BZA becomes vested with wide dis-
cretion in tailoring a variance that will alleviate the “hardship” while
remaining “in harmony with the intended spirit and purpose of the
ordinance.” Code § 15.2-2309(2). Factors such as those advanced in
support of the variances in these cases are appropriate for considera-
tion by the BZA in a case that falls within that discretionary power,
but they are immaterial in a case in which the BZA has no authority
to act. The threshold question for the BZA in considering an applica-
tion for a variance as well as for a court reviewing its decision, is
whether the effect of the zoning ordinance upon the property under
consideration, as it stands, interferes with “all reasonable beneficial
uses of the property, taken as a whole.” If the answer is in the nega-
tive, the BZA has no authority to go further.

Hl For these reasons, we will reverse the judgments of the cir-
cuit courts in each of the cases, vacate the resolutions of the Boards
of Zoning Appeals of the County of Fairfax and the Town of Pulaski,
respectively, reinstate the resolution of the Board of Zoning Appeals
of the City of Virginia Beach, and enter final judgments here.

Record No. 030982 — Reversed and final judgment.
Record No. 031770 — Reversed and final judgment.
Record No. 031771 - Reversed and final judgment.

oe
_

FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
Berry L. SLEIGH, ET AL.
Record No. 031515
April 23, 2004

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, JJ.,
and Russell, S.J.

769

David E. Lynch (John R. McNeer; Williams & Lynch, on brief),
for appellant.

Michael A. Kernbach (Burgess, Kernbach & Perigard, on brief),
for appellee Betty L. Sleigh.

SENIOR JUSTICE RUSSELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal from a declaratory judgment, we revisit the fre-
quently-litigated question of the extent of the coverage provided pur-
suant to the uninsured/underinsured motorist statute, Code § 38.2-
2206.

Betty L. Sleigh was employed by the City of Alexandria Police
Department as a Parking Enforcement Officer. Her unrefuted testi-
mony was the only evidence in the record concerning the facts of the
case. She testified that on May 10, 1999, she went to the 400 block
of North Royal Street, in Alexandria, to enforce “street cleaning
hours” when parking was prohibited by local ordinance on certain
days of the week. Finding a car parked in violation of the ordinance,
she stopped her police vehicle “alongside it,” got out, walked to a
position between the two vehicles, and began to write a citation.

Before Sleigh could complete the citation and place it on the
parked car, a young woman, later identified as Crystal A. Gibson, ran
out of a nearby building and “jumped into the vehicle,” striking

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Sleigh in the arm with the driver’s-side door as she opened it to enter
the parked car. Apparently realizing that she had failed to bring her
keys with her, Gibson “yelled to a woman behind us . . . bring her
the keys.” The woman produced the keys and Gibson opened the
door, striking Sleigh a second time as she got out of the car to
retrieve the keys. Opening the door a third time, Gibson “jumped
back into the car” with the keys and Sleigh “kind of pushed the door
back to defend myself.” At this point, Gibson “started yelling” and
“jumped out the door and slammed the door up against me . . . she
come [sic] flying out of the car and pushed the door very, you know,
really very hard, and I turned to move and she then pushed me where
my left side went up against the car.” Sleigh further testified that this
final blow from Gibson’s car door drove her back into the side of her
police vehicle with such force that she sustained permanent back
injury requiring surgery. Sleigh tried to make a radio call requesting
“backup” but Gibson seized her radio, threw it to the ground,
“jumped in her car and took off.”

Ei Sleigh filed a motion for judgment against Gibson in the trial
court to recover damages for her injuries and took the position that
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (the insurer) afforded coverage
to her under the uninsured motorist provisions of a policy the insurer
had issued on Sleigh’s personal automobile. The insurer brought the
present motion for declaratory judgment against Sleigh seeking an
adjudication that the uninsured motorist coverage provided by its pol-
icy does not apply to Sleigh’s “altercation” with Gibson. It is undis-
puted that Sleigh was an “insured” under the policy and that Gibson
was an “operator of an uninsured motor vehicle” as defined by Code
§ 38.2-2206 and as contemplated by the policy. The only dispute is
whether the coverage applies under the facts of the case.

The parties, by agreement, submitted the case to the court on
Sleigh’s deposition and the policy, further agreeing that the facts
were undisputed. The court, in a letter opinion, ruled that the
insurer’s policy afforded coverage to Sleigh, and dismissed the
motion for declaratory judgment.

Hl ©» appeal, the insurer contends that Gibson was not using her
car as a vehicle when she struck Sleigh with the car door, but was
rather using the car, or a part of it, as a weapon. The uninsured
motorist clause of the policy provides:

The Company will pay . . . all sums which the insured . . .
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner
or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily

es 77
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injury sustained by the insured . . . caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such unin-
sured motor vehicle.

The governing statute, Code § 38.2-2206, provides, in pertinent part,
that automobile insurance policies issued in Virginia must contain:

. .. provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums that he
is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle... .

The insurer contends that Gibson’s use of the uninsured vehicle
as a weapon is inconsistent with the concept of “use of the vehicle
as a vehicle,” a prerequisite to uninsured motorist coverage under
our decisions, citing Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Smelser,
264 Va. 109, 114, 563 S.E.2d 760, 763 (2002). The insurer argues
that the tortfeasor’s intent was to use the car door to inflict injury,
not for the ordinary purposes for which the door was designed, and
that this is determinative.

Sleigh argues that the tortfeasor’s intent is irrelevant because the
true test is whether the uninsured vehicle was being employed in the
ordinary manner for which it was designed and constructed, rather
than in a manner foreign to its designed purpose, and whether such
employment was causally related to the injury sustained. The trial
court, after an extensive review of our decisions, agreed.

In Lexie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 251 Va. 390,
396-97, 469 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1996), applying similar policy language,
we said, “The principal focus is upon the manner in which the [unin-
sured] vehicle, whether moving or stationary, is being employed, not
upon the activity or role of any assailant who may be in, upon, or
around the uninsured vehicle.” In Utica Mutual v. Travelers Indem-
nity, 223 Va. 145, 147-48, 286 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1982), we found an
insurer liable for injuries sustained by its insured’s passenger as a
result of a willful tort by an uninsured motorist who deliberately ran
the insured’s car off the road.

Thus, it is clear that in Virginia the intent of the uninsured
tortfeasor is irrelevant to the question of coverage; rather, the deter-
minative issue is the nature of the employment of the uninsured vehi-
cle. Where such a vehicle is employed in a manner foreign to its
designed purpose, e.g., Lexie, supra (drive-by shooting from moving
vehicle); Travelers Insurance Company v. LaClair, 250 Va. 368, 463
S.E.2d 461 (1995) (shooting from behind door of stopped car, using
it as a shield), there is no coverage under the uninsured motorist pro-

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visions because the resulting injury does not arise out of the “use”
of the uninsured vehicle as a vehicle, but instead arises from its
employment in a manner contemplated neither by its designers, its
manufacturer, nor the parties to the insurance contract.

Hl On the other hand, where the injury arises out of the employ-
ment of the uninsured vehicle in the manner for which it was
designed and as reasonably contemplated by the parties to the insur-
ance contract, coverage exists under such policies where there is a
causal relationship between such use and injury sustained by the
insured, regardless of the intent of the uninsured motorist. See,
Smelser, supra (passenger in moving car driven by uninsured motor-
ist reached out window and seized straps of purse carried by insured
pedestrian; forward movement of uninsured car dragged victim along
the pavement).

Car doors are designed and manufactured to be opened and
closed. It is clearly within the contemplation of the parties to an
insurance contract that injury may sometimes be caused by the act of
using a car door as designed, either negligently or willfully. Here,
Gibson’s use of her car door as designed was use of the uninsured
vehicle “as a vehicle” and was causally related to Sleigh’s injury.
We agree with the trial court’s analysis and will affirm the judgment.

Affirmed.