State: New Jersey
Volume: 231
Term: 0-0
Jurisdiction(s): New Jersey
Source: https://static.case.law/nj/231.pdf

171 A.3d 195
IN THE MATTER OF BENJAMIN NAZMIYAL, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 034882009)
D-10 Sept.Term 2017
080069

September 28, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court
pursuant to Rule 1:20-15(k) a recommendation (DRB 17-304) that
BENJAMIN NAZMIYAL, formerly of FORT LEE, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 2010, and who has been
temporarily suspended from the practice of law since June 14,
2016, by Orders of the Court filed May 13, 2016, June 28, 2016,
February 8, 2017, March 1, 2017, and April 11, 2017, be suspended
from the practice of law and compelled to pay a monetary sanction
to the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for failure to comply with
the determination of the District IIB Fee Arbitration Committee
in District Docket No, IIB-2015-0062F, and good cause appear-
ing;

It is ORDERED that BENJAMIN NAZMIYAL be temporarily
suspended from the practice of law, effective October 27, 2017, and
until respondent complies with the determination of the District
IIB Fee Arbitration Committee in District Docket NO. IIB-2015-
0062F and pays a sanction of $500 to the Disciplinary Oversight
Committee, and until the further Order of the Court; provided,
however, that this Order shall be vacated automatically if the
Disciplinary Review Board reports to the Court that prior to the
effective date of the suspension respondent has satisfied all obli-
gations under this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that if respondent seeks to be heard on this matter,
he shall file with the Clerk of the Court within ten days of the file
date of this Order a written request for the issuance of an Order
to Show Cause; and it is further

ORDERED that BENJAMIN NAZMIYAL remain suspended
from the practice of law pursuant to the Orders of the Court filed
May 18, 2016 (D-117-15; 077666 and D-118-15; 077667), June 28,
2016 (D-148-15; 077899 and D-149-15; 077900), February 8, 2017
(D-74-16; 078810), Mareh 1, 2017 (D-90-16; 078988), and April
11, 2017 (D-114-16; 079133 and D-115-16; 079134), and pending
his compliance with the fee arbitration determinations entered in
District Docket Nos. IIB-2014-009F, VC-2013-0591F, and IIB-
2015-034F, IIB-2015-0028F, IIB-2015-0025F, IIB-2016~-0004F,
TIB-2015-0069F, and IIB-2015-0074F), and payment of the sane-
tions of $500 in each matter to the Disciplinary Oversight Commit-
tee; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent continue to be restrained and
enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension
and that he comply with Rule 1:20-20,

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

171 A.3d 196

IN THE MATTER OF ERIC SALZMAN, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 031752005)

D-143 Sept.Term 2016
079375

October 04, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-824, concluding that as a matter of final
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(c), ERIC SALZMAN of NUT-

LEY, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 2007, and who
has been temporarily suspended from the practice of law since
June 30, 2016, by Order of the Court filed May 31, 2016, should be
suspended from practice for a period of two years based on
respondent’s disorderly persons adjudication and conviction of a
third degree crime, conduct in violation of RPC 8.4(b) (commission
of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer);

And the Disciplinary Review Board having further determined
that prior to reinstatement to the practice of law, respondent
should be required to: 1) comply with the determination of the
District VC Fee Arbitration Committee, 2) conelude all of respon-
dent’s open municipal court matters, including, but not limited to,
open arrest warrants and the payment of all court-imposed fines
and costs, and 3) provide proof that respondent has overcome his
drug addiction and that he is otherwise fit to practice law;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that
following reinstatement to practice, respondent should be required
to continue supervised drug treatment and to submit to random
drug-testing to be monitored by the Office of Attorney Ethics until
the further Order of the Court;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that ERIC SALZMAN is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two years, effective immediately,
and until the further Order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that prior to reinstatement to the practice of law,
respondent shall 1) comply with the Order of the Court filed on
May 31, 2016, that ordered respondent to comply with the deter-
mination of the District VC Fee Arbitration Committee in District
Docket No. VC-2015-0018F; 2) conclude all open municipal court
matters, including all open arrest warrants and the payment of all
court-imposed costs and fines; 8) submit proof to the Office of
Attorney Ethics of his fitness to practice as attested to by a

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mental health professional approved by the Office of Attorney
Ethics; and it is further

ORDERED that following reinstatement to practice, respondent
shall continue his supervised drug treatment program and submit
to random drug-testing on a schedule to be determined by the
Office of Attorney Ethics until the further Order of the Court;
and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent’s fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent's petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 197
IN THE MATTER OF NANCY I. OXFELD, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 004421977)
D-131 Sept.Term 2016
079312

October 4, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-277, concluding that NANCY I. OXFELD of
NEWARK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1977,
should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months for violating RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence), and RPC
1.4(b)(failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status
of a matter);

And the Court having determined from its review of the matter
that a three-month term of suspension is the appropriate quantum
of discipline for respondent’s unethical conduct;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that NANCY I. OXFELD is suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three months, effective Novem-
ber 8, 2017, and until the further Order of the Court; and it is
further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent's fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

a

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 197

IN THE MATTER OF TODD DAVIS VAN SICLEN, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 025912000)

D-140 Sept.Term 2016
079364

October 4, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-274, concluding that as a matter of reciprocal
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-14, TODD DAVIS VAN SICLEN
of CRANFORD, who was admitted to the bar of this State in
2000, should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two years based on discipline imposed in the State of New York
for unethical conduct that in New Jersey constitutes violations of
RPC 1.7(a)(2)(prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if
there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client, or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer),
and RPC 8.4(c\conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation), and good cause appearing;

Dn

It is ORDERED that TODD DAVIS VAN SICLEN is suspend-
ed from the practice of law for a period of two years, effective
November 8, 2017, and until the further Order of the Court; and
it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent's fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 198
IN THE MATTER OF JAIME MERRICK KAIGH, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 027271983)
D-121 Sept.Term 2016
079180
October 5, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-282, concluding that JAIME MERRICK

8 |

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KAIGH of WESTMONT, who was admitted to the bar of this
State in 1988, should be reprimanded for violating RPC 1.3 (lack
of diligence), RPC 1.4(b)(failure to keep a client reasonably in-
formed about the status of the matter or to promptly reply to
reasonable requests for information), and RPC 8.1(b)(failure to
respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary
authority), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JAIME MERRICK KAIGH is hereby
reprimanded; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 199

IN THE MATTER OF FRANCIS CHARLES BABCOCK, JR.,
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 009791990)

D-180 Sept.Term 2016
079311

October 5, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-823, concluding that FRANCIS CHARLES
BABCOCK, JR., of JERSEY CITY, who was admitted to the bar
of this State in 1990, should be reprimanded for violating RPC
1.1(a)(gross neglect), RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence), RPC 1.4(b)(fail-

| 9

ure to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter, RPC 8.1(b) and Rule 1:20-3(g)(8) (failure to cooperate with
disciplinary authorities), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that FRANCIS CHARLES BABCOCK, JR.,
is hereby reprimanded, and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 199

IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL LEVITIS, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 029761999)

D-145 Sept.Term 2016
079418

October 12, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-828, recommending that as a matter of final
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(c), MICHAEL LEVITIS,
formerly of BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, who was admitted to the
bar of this State in 2000, and who has been temporarily suspended
from the practice of law since March 15, 2012, be disbarred based
on his guilty plea in the United States District Court, Eastern
District of New York to knowingly and willfully making a false,
fictitious and fraudulent statement and representation in a matter

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related to political fundraising, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(2), conduct that in New Jersey violates RPC 8.4(b)(com-
mission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer), and RPC
8.4(c)(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion);

And MICHAEL LEVITIS having been ordered to show cause
why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined;

It is ORDERED that MICHAEL LEVITIS be disbarred,
effective immediately, and that his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys;

ORDERED that MICHAEL LEVITIS be and hereby is per-
manently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is
further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by MICHAEL LEVITIS pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be restrained
from disbursement except on application to this Court, for good
cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial institution
to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to deposit the
funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the further
Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that MICHAEL LEVITIS comply with Rule 1:20-
20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

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171 A.3d 200

IN THE MATTER OF THOMAS ALAN BLUMENTHAL, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 016741987)

D-171 Sept.Term 2016
079613

October 12, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-411, recommending that THOMAS ALAN
BLUMENTHAL of RIDGEFIELD PARK, who was admitted to
the bar of this State in 1988, be disbarred for violating RPC 1.8(a)
(improper business transaction with client), RPC 1.15(a), the prin-
ciples of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979) and In re
Hollendonner, 102 N.J. 21, 504 A.2d 1174 (1985) (knowing misap-
propriation of client trust funds and escrow funds), RPC 8.4(c)
(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation),
and RPC 8.4(d)(conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice);

And THOMAS ALAN BLUMENTHAL having been ordered to
show cause why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disci-
plined; And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that THOMAS ALAN BLUMENTHAL be
disbarred, effective immediately, and that his name be stricken
from the roll of attorneys;

ORDERED that THOMAS ALAN BLUMENTHAL be and
hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing
law; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by THOMAS ALAN BLUMENTHAL pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be
restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court,
for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial
institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to

a

deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the
further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that THOMAS ALAN BLUMENTHAL comply
with Rule 1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is
further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in.

Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 201

IN THE MATTER OF KRISTI A. FREDERICKS, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 016002002)

D-78 Sept.Term 2016
078860

October 13, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-136, recommending that as a matter of
reciprocal discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-14(a)(4), KRISTI A.
FREDERICKS, formerly of MARLTON, who was admitted to
the bar of this State in 2002, and who has been temporarily
suspended from the practice of law since May 3, 2017, be dis-
barred based on her disbarment in the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania for unethical conduct that in New Jersey constitutes vi-
olations of RPC 1.15(a)(failure to safeguard and the knowing

ee 8 = |:

misappropriation of funds), the principles of In re Wilson, 81
NJ, 451, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979) and In re Hollendonner, 102 N.J.
21, 504 A.2d 1174 (1985)(knowing misappropriation of client and
escrow funds), and RPC 8.4(c)(conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation);

And KRISTI A. FREDERICKS having failed to appear on the
order directing her to show cause why she should not be disbarred
or otherwise disciplined;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that KRISTI A. FREDERICKS be disbarred,
effective immediately, and that her name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys;

ORDERED that KRISTI A, FREDERICKS be and hereby is
permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it
is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing in any New
Jersey financial institution maintained by KRISTI A. FREDER-
ICKS pursuant to Rule 1:21-6, which were restrained from dis-
bursement by Order of the Court filed May 3, 2017, shall be
transferred by the financial institution to the Clerk of the Superior
Court, who is directed to deposit the funds in the Superior Court
Trust Fund pending further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that KRISTI A. FREDERICKS comply with Rule
1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual

expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 202

IN THE MATTER OF MATTHEW S. NEUGEBOREN, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 025832002)

D-184 Sept.Term 2016
079646

October 13, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-412, recommending that as a matter of final
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(¢), MATTHEW S. NEUGE-
BOREN, formerly of BRICK, who was admitted to the bar of this
State in 2002, and who has been temporarily suspended from the
practice of law since June 2, 2015, be disbarred based on his guilty
plea in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey to a two-count information charging respondent with one
count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count
of tax fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C, § 7206, conduct in violation
of RPC 8.4(b)(commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer),
and RPC 8.4(e\(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation);

And MATTHEW S. NEUGEBOREN having failed to appear
on the Order directing him to show cause why he should not be
disbarred or otherwise disciplined;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that MATTHEW S, NEUGEBOREN be
disbarred, effective immediately, and that his name be stricken
from the roll of attorneys;

ORDERED that MATTHEW S. NEUGEBOREN be and here-
by is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law;
and it is further

es =

—E—E

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by MATTHEW S. NEUGEBOREN pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be
restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court,
for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial
institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to
deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the
further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that MATTHEW S. NEUGEBOREN comply with
Rule 1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 202

IN THE MATTER OF CHIRAYU A. PATEL, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 031521996)

D-174 Sept.Term 2016
079616

October 13, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-390, recommending that CHIRAYU A. PA-
TEL of PARK RIDGE, who was admitted to the bar of this State
in 1996, and who has been temporarily suspended by consent from

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the practice of law by Order of this Court filed December 5, 2012,
be disbarred for violating RPC 1.15(a), the principles of In re
Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 409 A.2d 1158 (1979) and In re Hollendonner,
102 N.J. 21, 504 A.2d 1174 (1985)(knowing misappropriation of
trust and escrow funds), RPC 1.15(b)(failure to promptly deliver
funds to a client or third party having an interest in the funds),
RPC 8.1(b)(knowingly making false statements of material fact to
a disciplinary authority), RPC 8.4(b)(engaging in criminal conduct
that reflects adversely on a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer), and RPC 8.4(c)(conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation);

And CHIRAYU A, PATEL having been ordered to show cause
why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined;

And the Court being in agreement with the decision of the
Disciplinary Review Board with the exception of the Board’s
characterization that respondent’s fraudulent scheme was a “Pon-
zi” scheme;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that CHIRAYU A. PATEL be disbarred,
effective immediately, and that his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys;

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing in any New
Jersey financial institution maintained by CHIRAYU A. PATEL
pursuant to Rule 1:21-6, which were restrained from disbursement.
by Order of the Court filed December 5, 2012, shall be transferred
by the financial institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who
is directed to deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund
pending further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that CHIRAYU A. PATEL be and hereby is
permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it
is further

ORDERED that CHIRAYU A, PATEL comply with Rule 1:20-
20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

LL

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 203

IN THE MATTER OF JOHN MICHAEL IOANNOU, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 031851982)

D-177 Sept.Term 2016
079639

October 13, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-433, recommending that as a matter of final
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(¢), JOHN MICHAEL IOAN-
NOU of MANHASSET, NEW YORK, who was admitted to the
bar of this State in 1983, and who has been temporarily suspended
from the practice of law since April 8, 2014, be disbarred based on
his conviction in the Supreme Court of New York of one count of
first-degree scheme to defraud in violation of New York Penal
Law § 190.6591)(b), one count of identity theft, in violation of New
York Penal Law § 190.80, two counts of third-degree insurance
fraud, in violation of New York Penal Law § 172.20, one count of
first-degree offering a false instrument for filing, in violation of
New York Penal Law § 175.35, two counts of second-degree grand
larceny, in violation of New York Penal Law § 155.40(1), and four
counts of third-degree grand larceny, in violation of New York

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Penal Law § 155.35(1); conduct that in New Jersey violates RPC
8.4(b)(commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer), and RPC
8.4(¢)(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion);

And JOHN MICHAEL IOANNOU having failed to appear on
the order directing him to show cause why he should not be
disbarred or otherwise disciplined;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JOHN MICHAEL IOANNOU be dis-
barred, effective immediately, and that his name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys;

ORDERED that JOHN MICHAEL IOANNOU be and hereby
is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and
it is further

ORDERED that JOHN MICHAEL IOANNOU comply with
Rule 1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 204
IN THE MATTER OF BRYNEE KYONNE BAYLOR, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 040392000)
D-192 Sept.Term 2016
079716

October 18, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-026, recommending that as a matter of
reciprocal discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-14(a)(4), BRYNEE
KYONNE BAYLOR, formerly of WASHINGTON, D.C., who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 2000, be disbarred based on
her disbarment in the state of Maryland and the District of
Columbia, for unethical conduct that in New Jersey constitutes
violations of RPC 1.15(a), the principles of In re Wilson, 81 N.J.
451, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979)(knowing misappropriation of client
funds), and RPC 8.4(c)(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation);

And BRYNEE KYONNE BAYLOR having failed to appear on
the order directing her to show cause why she should not be
disbarred or otherwise disciplined;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that BRYNEE KYONNE BAYLOR be dis-
barred, effective immediately, and that her name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys;

ORDERED that BRYNEE KYONNE BAYLOR be and here-
by is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law;
and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by BRYNEE KYONNE BAYLOR pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be
restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court,

0

for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial
institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to
deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the
further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that BRYNEE KYONNE BAYLOR comply with
Rule 1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 205

IN THE MATTER OF SASHA C. INTRIAGO, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 028452006)

D-124 Sept.Term 2016
079214

October 20, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 13-263, that SASHA C. INTRIAGO of ELIZA-
BETH, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 2007, should
be reprimanded for violating RPC 8.4(b)(committing a criminal act.
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that SASHA C. INTRIAGO is hereby repri-
manded; and it is further

ee =| 2

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 205
IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL HARTWYK,
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 026901985)
D-123 Sept.Term 2016
079187

October 20, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16~266, concluding that as a matter of final
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(c), CHRISTOPHER MI-
CHAEL HARTWYK of SOUTH ORANGE, who was admitted to
the bar of this State in 1985, should be reprimanded for violating
RPC 8.4(b)(commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on
the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer) and
RPC 8.4(c)(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL
HARTWYK is hereby reprimanded; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

171 A.3d 206

IN THE MATTER OF MARY R. MOTT, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 025081989)

D-120 Sept.Term 2016
079179

October 20, 2017—Corrected: October 26, 2017

CORRECTED ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-253, concluding that MARY R. MOTT of
BAPTISTOWN, who was admitted to the bar of this State in
1989, should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six months and permanently barred from future service as a
municipal prosecutor for violating RPC 1.7(a)(2) (engaging in a
conflict of interest); RPC 1.16(a) (failing to decline or terminate
representation in violation of the RPCs); RPC 3.1(asserting an
issue with no basis in law or fact); RPC 8.3(a)(1) (knowingly
making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal),
RPC 3.3(a)(4) and (5) (candor toward a tribunal); RPC 8.1(a)
(false statements to disciplinary authorities); and RPC 8.4(a) (¢),
and (d) (false swearing);

And the Court having determined from its review of the matter
that the appropriate discipline for respondent’s unethical conduct
is a six-month term of suspension and a five-year prohibition
against serving as a municipal prosecutor;

es —_

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that MARY R. MOTT is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months and until the further
Order of the Court, effective November 20, 2017; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall be prohibited from serving as
a municipal prosecutor for a period of five years; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent's fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

4

)

171 A.3d 620

DEBRA DUGAN, ALAN FOX, AND ROBERT CAMERON ON BE-
HALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SIT-
UATED, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. TG] FRIDAYS, INC.,
CARLSON RESTAURANTS WORLDWIDE, INC., ON BEHALF
OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. ERNEST BOZZI, ON BEHALF
OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. OSI RESTAURANT PARTNERS,
LLC, T/A CARRABBA’S ITALIAN GRILL, ET AL, DEFEN-
DANTS-APPELLANTS,

A-92 Sept.Term 2015
A-93 Sept.Term 2015
077567 and 077556
Argued April 4, 2017—Decided October 4, 2017

25

Ua

a

_

30

31

2

ra

Sander D. Friedman argued the cause for appellants in Dugan
y. TGI Fridays, Inc., (A-92-15) (Law Office of Sander D. Fried-
man, attorneys; Sander D, Friedman and Wesley G. Hanna, on
the briefs).

Stephen M. Orlofsky argued the cause for respondents in Dugan
v. TGI Fridays, Inc., (A-92-15) (Blank Rome and LeClair Ryan,
attorneys; Stephen M. Orlofsky, David C. Kistler, Jeffrey L.
O’Hara, and Matthew S. Schultz, of counsel and on the briefs).

LD

David G. McMillin argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal
Services of New Jersey in Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc, (A-92-15)
(Legal Services of New Jersey, attorneys; Melville D, Miller, Jr.
and David G. MeMillin on the brief).

Michael A. Galpern argued the cause for amicus curiae New
Jersey Association for Justice in Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Ine. (A-
92-15) (Locks Law Firm, attorneys; Michael A. Galpern, Andrew
P, Bell, and James A. Barry on the brief).

Jeffrey S. Jacobson argued the cause for amicus curiae New
Jersey Civil Justice Institute in Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Ine., (A-
92-15) (Lowenstein Sandler and Kelley Drye & Warren, attor-
neys; Jeffrey S. Jacobson and Gavin J. Rooney on the brief).

Stephen M. Orlofsky argued the cause for appellants in Bozzi v.
OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC (A-93-15) (Blank Rome and
Briggs Law Office, attorneys; Stephen M. Orlofsky, David C.
Kistler, Michael A. Iannucci, Norman W. Briggs, and Adrienne
Chapman, of counsel and on the briefs),

Donald M. Doherty, Jr. argued the cause for respondent in
Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC (A-93-15) (Law Office of
Donald M. Doherty, attorneys; Donald M. Doherty, Jr. on the
brief).

Jonathan Romberg argued the cause for amicus curiae Seton
Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice in Dugan
y. TGI Fridays, Inc. (A-92-15) and Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant
Partners, LLC (A-93-15) (Seton Hall University School of Law
Center for Social Justice, attorneys; Jonathan Romberg on the
briefs).

David R. Kott argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey
Business & Industry Association in Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Ine.
(A-92-15) and Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC (A-93-15)
(McCarter & English, attorneys; David R. Kott, Edward J.
Fanning, Zane C. Riester, and Elizabeth K. Monahan, of counsel
and on the briefs).

Se

JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In these consolidated appeals, the plaintiffs allege that the
defendant operators of New Jersey restaurants engaged in unlaw-
ful practices with respect to the disclosure of prices charged to
customers for alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. Based upon
different theories of ascertainable loss and causation, plaintiffs in
the two actions demand damages and other relief against defen-
dants under the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -
206, They also seek damages, civil penalties, and other relief under
the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act
(TCCWNA), N.J.S.A, 56:12-14 to -18.

In each case, the trial court certified the action as a class action
pursuant to Rules 4:32-1 and 4:32-2. In Dugan v. TGI Fridays,
Inc, 445 N.J.Super. 59, 135 A.3d 1008 (App. Div. 2016), an
Appellate Division panel reversed the trial court's certification of a
class. The Appellate Division denied the defendant’s motion for
leave to appeal in Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC. We
granted leave to appeal in both actions.

Applying the class action certification standard of Rule 4:32-1 to
the CFA claim asserted in Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., we hold
that plaintiffs have failed to show that common questions of law
and fact predominate over individual issues, as Rule 4:32-1 re-
quires. As an alternative to presenting proof of ascertainable loss
and causation as to each member of the class, the Dugan plaintiffs
propose to demonstrate, for a class numbering in the millions, that.
TGIF charged each member of the class $1.72 more than the
“fair” or “reasonable” prices that it would have charged had it
disclosed its beverage prices on the menu. Because our CFA class
action jurisprudence rejects “price-inflation” theories, such as the
theory presented by the Dugan plaintiffs, as incompatible with the
CFA’s terms, we conclude that the Dugan plaintiffs have not
established predominance with respect to their CFA claims. We
accordingly modify and affirm the Appellate Division’s determina-
tion that the Dugan class was improperly certified for purposes of

ee =| 3

———

the CFA claims asserted in that action and remand for a determi-
nation of the individual plaintiffs’ CFA claims.

We reach a different conclusion with respect to the CFA claims
asserted by plaintiff Ernest Bozzi in Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant
Partners, LLC. Although Bozzi asserts general claims that the
defendant restaurants failed to disclose prices, his allegations
focus primarily on a specific pricing practice. He alleges that the
defendant restaurants violated the CFA by increasing the price
charged to a customer for the same brand, type, and volume of
beverage in the course of the customer's visit to the restaurant,
without notifying the customer of the change. Bozzi’s counsel
represents that this price-shifting claim is supported by claimant-
specific receipts showing that each customer making this claim
was charged different prices for the same brand, type, and volume
of beverage in the course of a single visit to one of the defendant’s
restaurants.

We hold that if the Bozzi class is redefined to include only
customers who make that specific CFA claim, and the claim is
limited accordingly, plaintiff Bozzi has met the requirements of
Rule 4:32-1 and may attempt to prove that claim on behalf of the
class. We modify and affirm the trial court’s determination as to
the CFA claim in Bozzi and remand for the certification of a class
that is limited accordingly.

With respect to the claims based on the TCCWNA in both
appeals, we conclude that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the
predominance requirement of Rule 4:32-1. We therefore reverse
the trial courts’ class certification determinations in both cases
with respect to those claims and remand for a determination of
plaintiffs’ individual TCCWNA claims.

I.

We base our summary of the factual allegations and procedural
history of each action on the complaints and the class certification
record presented to the trial court in each case.

|
A
In the first of the two putative class actions, Dugan v. TGI
Fridays, Inc., plaintiffs Debra Dugan and Alan Fox (Dugan plain-
tiffs) assert claims against defendants TGI Fridays, Inc. and
Carlson Restaurants, Inc., ! (collectively, TGIF), owners and oper-
ators of TGIF restaurants in New Jersey.

The Dugan plaintiffs claim that TGIF maintained a practice of
offering certain beverages in New Jersey TGIF restaurants’ men-
us without listing the prices of those beverages.” They allege that
TGIF violated the CFA by engaging in unconscionable commercial
practices contrary to NwJ.S.A, 56:8-2. They also assert, among
other claims, that TGIF violated a regulatory provision, N.J.S.A.
56:8-2.5, by selling, attempting to sell, or offering for sale “mer-
chandise that is not price marked at the point of purchase.” The
Dugan plaintiffs premise their claim under the TCCWNA on the
allegation that TGIF violated a “clearly established legal right of a
consumer or responsibility of a seller” by offering beverages for
sale “without notifying the consumer of the total selling price at
the point of purchase.” (citing N.J.S.A. 56:12-15; N.J.S.A. 56:8-
2.5). The Dugan plaintiffs demand damages, civil penalties, and
other relief under the TCCWNA.

In the Dugan plaintiffs’ original complaint, Dugan was the sole
plaintiff and representative of the putative class. Dugan asserted
that, during visits to a company-owned TGIF restaurant in Mount
Laurel, she purchased “unpriced soft drinks, mixed drinks, and
beer off Defendants’ otherwise comprehensively priced menus.”
Dugan alleged that on each visit she was not made aware of the

1 Carlson Restaurants Worldwide, Inc., which was named as a defendant, is
the former name of Carlson Restaurants, Inc.

2The Dugan plaintiffs alleged there were thirty-eight TGIF restaurants in New
Jersey. TGIF’s answers to interrogatories indicated that there were thirty-four
‘TGIF restaurants in New Jersey, twenty that were company-owned and fourteen.
that were operated as franchises. In their complaint, the Dugan plaintiffs alleged
that TGIF controls the content of the menus in all TGIF restaurants, whether
those restaurants are company-owned or franchises.

LL

prices charged for the beverages until TGIF staff presented her
with a check. In her original complaint, she claimed that during a
visit to a TGIF restaurant she was charged $2.00 for a beer at the
bar and later charged $3.59 for the same brand of beer after
moving to a table.

Dugan alleged that her claims were typical of the claims of the
class and asserted that she met all of the requirements for class
certification under Rule 4:32-1, She sought certification of a class
consisting of “all customers of New Jersey TGI Friday's who
purchased items from the menu that did not have a disclosed
price.”

TGIF moved before the trial court to dismiss Dugan’s complaint
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss. An Appellate Division panel
denied TGIF’s motion for leave to appeal. We granted TGIF’s
motion for leave to appeal and summarily remanded the matter to
an Appellate Division panel for consideration of the merits of the
appeal. In an unpublished opinion, the panel concluded that Dugan
had adequately pled her CFA and TCCWNA claims and affirmed
the trial court’s determination. Dugan then filed a first amended
complaint, expanding her allegations regarding her visits to the
TGIF restaurant in Mount Laurel.

The parties conducted class certification discovery. In her depo-
sition, Dugan admitted that during the 2008 visit to a TGIF
restaurant in which she paid different prices for two orders of
identical beverages at the bar and at the table, she did not read
the beverage section of the menu. She stated that she did not
realize until she later reviewed her receipt that she had paid $2.00
for a beer at the bar and later paid $3.59 for a beer at a table.
Dugan later submitted a certification stating that she had looked
at the TGIF menu on many occasions and expected to pay the
same price at the bar that she paid when she sat at a table.

Among the documents produced by TGIF in discovery were
documents characterized by the Dugan plaintiffs as training mate-

8

rials for TGIF servers. Those documents stated that servers
seating customers should hand opened menus to customers.

TGIF also produced what the Dugan plaintiffs characterize as
“market research.” Plaintiffs’ counsel stated at oral argument that.
those documents reflect a TGIF consultant’s analysis of consumer
behavior in the ordering of beverages in restaurants. The Dugan
plaintiffs contend that the market research demonstrates custom-
ers’ tendency to order less expensive or fewer beverages if
beverage prices are listed on the menu than they order if the
prices are unlisted. As the research is described by the Dugan
plaintiffs, one group of customers studied was informed of bever-
age prices when visiting a restaurant and the other group was not.
The customers informed of beverage prices spent an average of
$1.72 less per visit than the customers to whom the prices were
not disclosed. Relying on the marketing research, the Dugan
plaintiffs claim that TGIF is in a position to charge a higher price
for a beverage than the price that it would be compelled by
market forces to charge if it were to disclose its beverage prices
on restaurant menus.

On that basis, the Dugan plaintiffs stated their intention to
prove that each member of their putative class suffered the same
ascertainable loss of $1.72 as a result of unconscionable commer-
cial practices and regulatory violations committed by TGIF. They
indicated that they would use the $1.72 figure to calculate global
damages for their entire class.

Relying on that theory of classwide proof of ascertainable loss
and causation, Dugan moved for class certification.’ Between the
filing and the determination of that motion, Dugan filed a second
amended complaint, further detailing her allegations about her
visits to the TGIF restaurant, omitting references to the specific
prices that TGIF charged her, and naming Fox as an additional

3TGIF cross-moved for summary judgment, which was denied by the trial
court.

LD

————

plaintiff and class representative.’ Fox described visits to TGIF
restaurants and alleged that he would have ordered different or
fewer beverages during one of those visits had he been informed
about the prices that would be charged.

The trial court concluded that the Dugan plaintiffs had satisfied
the requirements of Rule 4:32-1 and granted their motion for class
certification. The court included in the class definition all persons
who visited a company-owned TGIF restaurant “from January 12,
2004 to June 18, 2014, relied upon [TGIF]’s menu, and purchased
an offered but unpriced soda, beer or mixed drink.” The court
later granted the Dugan plaintiffs’ motion to expand the class
definition for purposes of providing notice to the class. As expand-
ed, the class defined by the trial court consisted of “[aJll persons
who visited a [TGIF] restaurant in New Jersey that is owned by
[TGIF] (i.e. company owned store) from January 12, 2004 to July
14, 2014, and purchased an offered but unpriced soda, beer or
mixed drink.”

After the trial court denied its motion for reconsideration and/or
to decertify the class, TGIF filed a motion for leave to appeal class
certification and to stay class notice pending appeal. An Appellate
Division panel denied the motions. TGIF moved before this Court
for leave to appeal and for a stay. This Court granted leave to
appeal, stayed class notice and further proceedings before the trial
court, and remanded the matter to the Appellate Division for
consideration of the merits of the appeal.

4 The second amended complaint also included claims asserted by a third class
representative plaintiff, Robert Cameron, whose allegations related to a visit to a
franchise-owned TGIF restaurant, After excluding customers who exclusively
visited franchise TGIF restaurants, the trial court dismissed Cameron’s claims.

STGIF represents that the company retained to provide notice to the class
certified by the trial court estimated that the class consists of thirteen to fourteen
million members. The Dugan plaintiffs state that the number of class members
may be substantially less than that estimate, as the estimate may reflect individu-
al customers’ repeat visits to TGIF restaurants.

40

An Appellate Division panel reversed the trial court’s class
certification determination, Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Ine. 445
N.J.Super. 59, 79, 185 A.3d 1003 (App. Div. 2016).6 The panel
concluded that the Dugan plaintiffs had failed to meet Rule 4:32-
l’s requirement “that common issues of fact as to ... TGIF’s
customers who purchased unpriced soda, beer or mixed drinks
predominate over issues that pertain to individual class members.”
Id. at 74, 185 A.3d 1008. The panel held that the trial court had
improperly included in the class definition all persons who pur-
chased an unpriced soda, beer, or mixed drink “regardless of
whether they reviewed the menu before purchasing the bever-
ages” and had therefore included in the class customers who could
not establish an ascertainable loss as a result of unlawful conduct,
as the CFA requires. Ibid.

The panel also determined that the Dugan plaintiffs had failed
to establish predominance under Rule 4:32-1 with respect to their
TCCWNA claims. Id, at 77-79. The panel noted the need for
“{iIndividualized inquiries ... to determine whether each class
member was handed a menu that lacked beverage pricing” and to
assess actual damages under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17. Id, at 79. Given its
finding on the issue of predominance, the panel did not reach Rule
4:32-1’s other class certification requirements.

We granted the Dugan plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal. 226
NJ, 548, 145 A3d 1084 (2016). We also granted the motions of
Legal Services of New Jersey, the New Jersey Association for
Justice, the Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social
Justice, the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute, and the New
Jersey Business and Industry Association to appear as amici
curiae.

6 The panel noted that the Dugan plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a
cross-appeal, challenging the trial court's limitations on the scope of the class.
Dugan, supra, 445 N.J.Super. at 70-71, 135 A.3d 1003. In light of its class
certification decision, the panel did not reach the cross-appeal.

De

B.

The second appeal before the Court arose from another putative
class action, Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC. The action
was filed by plaintiff Bozzi against OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC
(OSD, an entity that, according to plaintiffs, maintains control of
Carrabba’s Italian Grill (Carrabba’s) restaurants in New Jersey.
In his initial complaint, Bozzi asserted claims based solely on the
pricing practices of OSI’s Carrabba’s restaurants. In his amended
complaint, Bozzi expanded his claim to include other New Jersey
restaurants that OSI has allegedly owned, controlled, and operat-
ed, including Outback Steakhouse, Bonefish Grill, Fleming’s Prime
Steakhouse and Wine Bar, and Cheeseburger in Paradise restau-
rants,

In his amended complaint, Bozzi asserted a CFA regulatory
violation claim based on OSI’s alleged contravention of N.J.S.A,
56:8-2.5 and a more general CFA claim based on OSI’s alleged
practice of “intentionally mislead{ing] customers through stealth
price adjustments.” He alleged an ascertainable loss under the
CFA based on a contention that customers who are uninformed
about beverage prices pay higher prices and are “depriv[ed] ... of
their legitimate expectation of an objectively reasonable price.”
Bozzi sought an injunction, treble damages, and other relief under
the CFA, and a judgment declaring that he satisfied the require-
ments of his CFA claim, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment
Act, N.J.S.A, 2A:16-53. He also pled a claim under the TCCWNA,
based on OSI’s claimed violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5, and sought
damages and civil penalties under that statute.

Although Bozzi relied on the same statutes cited by the Dugan
plaintiffs, he focused more narrowly on OSI’s alleged practice of
increasing the prices of beverages in the course of a customer's
visit without disclosing that change to the customer. Bozzi’s indi-
vidual factual allegations relate primarily to a 2010 visit to a
Carrabba’s restaurant in Maple Shade. He asserts that, during
that visit, neither the restaurant's menu nor any placards or
displays disclosed drink prices and that there were no signs,

0

notices, or displays indicating that there was a discount on drink
prices in effect. He asserts that he ordered two Peroni beers
during his meal and discovered when he received his check that
the first beer cost $3.25, and the second cost $4.25. According to
Bozzi, he protested the pricing disparity to a restaurant staff
member, who told him that “the computer changes the price at
certain times” and that it was the restaurant’s policy to charge
customers accordingly.

Bozzi moved before the trial court for certification of a class
pursuant to Rule 4:32-1. Although Bozzi had proposed, in his
initial complaint, a subclass limited to “persons who were charged
different prices for the same drinks during a trip to the Defen-
dants’ establishment,” he sought certification of a broader class of
customers who visited an OSI restaurant and purchased a bever-
age offered on the menu or table placard without a price. Bozzi’s
counsel represented to the trial court that the expansive class
definition was necessary for his TCCWNA claim, which was
premised on the general allegation that OSI failed to disclose
beverage prices on its restaurants’ menus. He advised the trial
court that for purposes of the CFA, the claimed ascertainable loss
was a “price differential loss,” based on OSI’s alleged practice of
charging different prices for the same beverage on the same visit.
Counsel did not explain to the trial court how he intended to prove
ascertainable loss and causation on a classwide basis. He acknowl-
edged that he expected a later challenge to his claim that OSI’s
alleged practice of charging different prices for the same beverage
gave rise to a CFA violation.

The trial court granted Bozzi’s motion for class certification.
The court defined the class to include “[aJll persons who: (a)
visited any OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC or Bloomin’ Brands,
Inc.,7 restaurant in New Jersey, from 12/23/04 to the present
date; and (b) purchased an item offered on the menu or table

7The record does not reveal Bloomin’ Brands Inc.'s relationship to OSI, or its
alleged role in the conduct at issue.

LD

—~

placards for which no price was disclosed on the menu or table
placard.”

The trial court also granted Bozzi’s motion for injunctive relief.
It ordered OSI to “list all prices in the menus for all items
contained in their menus,” and to “list prices for any items
displayed on a table placard or similar display available to custom-

vs,” within ten days. The court granted a stay of proceedings
before it, including the injunction, in anticipation of OSI’s motion
for leave to appeal its orders.

OSI moved before the Appellate Division for leave to appeal. An
Appellate Division panel denied that motion and denied OSI’s
motion for reconsideration.

We granted OSI’s motion for leave to appeal. 226 N.J. 543, 145
A.3d 1084 (2016). We also granted the motions of the Seton Hall
University School of Law Center for Social Justice and the New
Jersey Business and Industry Association to appear as amici
curiae.

IL.

A.

In Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., plaintiffs argue that the Appel-
late Division panel’s decision diverged from this Court’s class
certification jurisprudence, which endorses the class action device
as a method of resolving disputes between plaintiffs with small
claims for damages and institutional defendants. The Dugan plain-
tiffs argue that although there are individualized questions that
must be resolved to determine their claims, common questions of
law and fact predominate. They contend that they can prove their
CFA and TCCWNA claims for the class as a whole because TGIF
subjected all customers to a price-gouging strategy, and they need
not present proofs of each customer's interaction with the server
or motivation in purchasing a beverage. The Dugan plaintiffs
argue that damages can be calculated for the class as a whole

using the same methodology as would apply to assess damages in
an individual plaintiff's ordinary bad faith contract case.

TGIF contends that the Appellate Division panel properly re-
versed the trial court’s grant of class certification. It maintains
that the Dugan plaintiffs cannot prove that the class members
suffered an ascertainable loss as a result of the allegedly offending
practices, as required by N.J.S.A. 56:8-19, without demonstrating
that loss for each individual claimant in a class estimated to
involve thirteen to fourteen million beverage purchases. TGIF
contends that to establish a claim under the TCCWNA, each class
member would be required to prove that he or she was given a
menu, and to individually prove damages, and that common ques-
tions of law and fact do not predominate over individual questions
as to the TCCWNA.

B.

In Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC, OSI asks the Court
to reverse the trial court’s grant of class certification. OSI con-
tends that, in finding that common questions predominate over
individual issues in the resolution of plaintiffs’ CFA claim, the trial
court ignored the requirement that plaintiffs prove that OSI’s
conduct caused an ascertainable loss in order to prevail under
N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. It argues that Bozzi’s claim is predicated solely
on OST’s alleged “secret shift” of beverage prices and that Bozzi’s
individual theory of ascertainable loss and causation diverges from
the theory that applies to other members of the class. OSI asserts
that to establish liability under the TCCWNA each claimant must
show that he or she was provided with a menu that violated the
law and consequently sustained damages and that the necessity of
individual determinations of the TCCWNA claims precludes effec-
tive management of a class action in this case. Finally, OSI argues
that the trial court should not have granted injunctive relief.

Bozzi contends that the Court should construe N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5
to mandate that restaurants post prices for beverages on menus or
placards and inform consumers if prices change. He proposes

three alternative class definitions: (1) an expansive class asserting
a TCCWNA claim, consisting of all customers who visited an OSI
restaurant and were presented with a menu; (2) a more limited
class, asserting a CFA claim, consisting of all customers who
purchased an unpriced beverage at an OSI restaurant; and (3) the
narrowest class, asserting a CFA claim, consisting of customers
who paid different prices for the same beverage during a visit to
an OSI restaurant. Bozzi represents that to prove ascertainable
loss for members of the latter class, he intends to rely on receipts
showing that customers paid different prices for the same bever-
age during the same restaurant visit.

C.

Amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey contends that class
certification is essential to the vindication of low-income consum-
ers’ small claims. It asserts that the Dugan plaintiffs met the
predominance requirement of Rule 4:32-1 because the CFA does
not require reliance, that the omission of prices from TGIF menus
gave rise to an inference of causation for purposes of the CFA,
and that the offering of menus without beverage prices satisfied
the “provision” requirement of the TCCWNA.

Amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice contends that
the practices of TGIF in Dugan generally violate the CFA and the
TCCWNA, thus satisfying the predominance requirement of Rule
4:32-1 for purposes of the liability claim, and that distinctions
among the damages claims of class members should not defeat
class certification in that case.

Amicus curiae Seton Hall University School of Law Center for
Social Justice contends that because of TGIF’s alleged practice of
not including drink prices on the menu and the marketing re-
search disclosed in discovery, the Dugan plaintiffs are in a position
to present collective proof of ascertainable loss and causation. It
contends that the entire class may demonstrate ascertainable loss
based on the difference between the price that TGIF charged and
the price that it would have charged had it not instituted a pricing

scheme, or, alternatively, based on the difference between the
price charged and a reasonable price. Seton Hall University
School of Law Center for Social Justice argues, in both Dugan and
Bozzi, that the plaintiffs’ TCCWNA claims are even more appro-
priate for classwide resolution than their CFA claims because the
TCCWNA does not require proof of ascertainable loss or causa-
tion.

Amicus curiae New Jersey Civil Justice Institute argues that a
court should never certify a class action to pursue a claim under
the TCCWNA unless there is evidence that, at a minimum, all
class members received and reviewed the allegedly offending
contract. It contends that the TCCWNA contemplates individual
litigation and that the prospect of a civil penalty and an award of
attorneys’ fees under the TCCWNA provides a sufficient incentive
for aggrieved consumers to bring individual actions.

Amicus curiae New Jersey Business and Industry Association
urges the Court to adopt a rule barring class certification for the
litigation of TCCWNA claims. It contends that the TCCWNA’s
civil penalty provisions provide ample incentives for individual
litigation and that those provisions are unduly punitive when
imposed on behalf of a large class of claimants.

IIL.

HM A “class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named
parties only.’” Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 108,
922 A.2d 710 (2007) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,
700-01, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2557, 61 L.Ed.2d 176, 192 (1979)). The class
action device “furthers numerous practical purposes, including
judicial economy, cost-effectiveness, convenience, consistent treat-
ment of class members, protection of defendants from inconsistent
obligations, and allocation of litigation costs among numerous,
similarly-situated litigants.” Id. at 104, 922 A.2d 710. In light of
those objectives, our courts have “consistently held that the class
action rule should be liberally construed.” Lee v, Carter-Reed Co.,

208 N.J. 496, 518, 4 A.8d 561 (2010) (quoting Iliadis, supra, 191
Nd, at 108, 922 A.2d 710).

Pursuant to our court rules, a trial court considering a putative
class action “shall, at an early practicable time, determine by
order whether to certify the action as a class action,” and, if
certification is granted, enter an order defining “the class and the
class claims, issues or defenses” and appointing class counsel. R.
4:32-2(a).

HM Rule 4:32-1 prescribes the standard for the determination
of a motion to certify a class. Subsection (a) of that Rule imposes
four initial requirements, frequently termed “numerosity, com-
monality, typicality and adequacy of representation,” in order for a
class to be certified. Lee, supra, 203 N.J, at 519, 4 A.3d 561 (citing
In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93 N.J. 412, 424-25, 461 A.2d
736 (1983)). The Rule provides:

(a) General Prerequisites to a Class Aetion. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
Jaw or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

TR, 4:82-1(0).]

If the plaintiff satisfies Rule 4:32-1(a)’s requirements, the court
then considers the standard of Rule 4:32-1(b)(8):

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of paragraph (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(8) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The factors pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class;

(©) the desirability or undesirability in concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and

8

(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action,

Hs To determine predominance under Rule 4:32-1(b)(3), the
court decides “whether the proposed class is ‘sufficiently cohesive
to warrant adjudication by representation.’” Iliadis, supra, 191
N.J. at 108, 922 A.2d 710 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Wind-
Sor, 521 U.S, 591, 623, 117 S.Ct. 2281, 2249, 188 L.Bd.2d 689, 712
(1997). Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) does not demand a showing “that there
is an ‘absence of individual issues or that the common issues
dispose of the entire dispute,’ or ‘that all issues [are] identical
among class members or that each class member [is] affected in
precisely the same manner.’” Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 520, 4 Ad
561 (alterations in original) (quoting Miadis, supra, 191 N.J. at
108-09, 922 A.2d 710). Nor must a plaintiff demonstrate that the
number of common issues exceeds the number of individual issues.
Varacallo v, Mass. Mut. Life Ins, Co., 832 N.J.Super. 31, 45, 752
A.2d 807 (App. Div. 2000).

HMM The predominance factor, however, is “‘far more de-
manding’ than Rule 4:32-1(a)(2)’s requirement that there be ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class.” Castro v. NYT Televi-
sion, 384 N.J.Super. 601, 608, 895 A.2d 1173 (App. Div. 2006)
(quoting Amchem Prods., supra, 521 U.S, at 624, 117 S.Ct. at 2250,
138 L.Ed.2d at 713). As the Court observed in Lee, supra, the
predominance requirement mandates “a qualitative assessment of
the common and individual questions rather than a mere mathe-
matical quantification of whether there are more of one than the
other.” 203 N.J. at 519-20, 4 A.3d 561 (citing Iliadis, supra, 191
N.J. at 108, 922 A.2d 710). As the Court has observed, “the answer
to the issue of predominance is found ... in a close analysis of the
facts and law.” Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J, at 109, 922 A2d 710
(alteration in original) (quoting Cadillac, supra, 93 N.J. at 434, 461
A.2d 736). The Court has stressed the importance of such an
analysis in the context of a CFA class action, rejecting the
contention that the identity of a defendant’s conduct toward each
plaintiff class member obviates the need for a searching inquiry
into each plaintiff's particular response to that identical conduct.

LD

Int'l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No, 68 Welfare Fund v.
Merck & Co., Inc., 192 N.J, 372, 390-91, 929 A.2d 1076 (2007).

IZ A class action plaintiff must also demonstrate that “a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.” R. 4:32-1(b)(8). A court
analyzing that factor must undertake “(1) an informed consider-
ation of alternative available methods of adjudication of each issue,
(2) a comparison of the fairness to all whose interests may be
involved between such alternative methods and a class action, and
(3) a comparison of the efficiency of adjudication of each method.”
Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J. at 114-15, 922 A2d 710 (quoting Cadillac,
supra, 93 N.J. at 436, 461 A.2d 736); see also Int'l Union, supra,
192 N.J, at 383, 929 A.2d 1076 (holding that “superiority” require-
ment mandates “‘a comparison with alternative procedures’ to
evaluate both fairness and efficiency of the class action proceed-
ing” (quoting Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J. at 114, 922 A2d 710).

Hl In determining a motion for class certification, a court
“must ‘accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint,’ and
consider the remaining pleadings, discovery (including interrogato-
ry answers, relevant documents, and depositions), and any other
pertinent evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff.” Lee, supra, 203
NJ, at 505, 4 A.3d 561 (quoting Int'l Union, supra, 192 N.J. at 376,
929 A.2d 1076); accord iadis, supra, 191 NJ, at 96, 922 A2d 710.

Hs The deferential standard by which the court views the
facts alleged, however, does not apply to a plaintiff's assertion that
a given case is appropriate for class certification. To the contrary,
a court deciding class certification “must undertake a ‘rigorous
analysis’ to determine if the Rule’s requirements have been satis-
fied.” Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J. at 106-07, 922 A2d 710 (quoting
Carroll _v, Celleo P’ship, 313 N.J.Super, 488, 495, 718 A.2d 509
(App. Div. 1998)). “That scrutiny requires courts to look ‘beyond
the pleadings [to] ... understand the claims, defenses, relevant
facts, and applicable substantive law.’” Id. at 107 (alteration in

|

original) (quoting Carroll, supra, 313 N.J. Super, at 495, 713 A.2d
509).

HE When an order granting or denying class certification
is reviewed on appeal, the “appellate court must ascertain whether
the trial court has followed” the class action standard set forth in
Rule 4:32-1. Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 506, 4 A.3d 561. In general, an
appellate court reviews a trial court’s class action determination
for abuse of discretion. See Cadillac, supra, 93 N.J. at 438-39, 461
A.2d 736 (determining whether trial court abused its discretion in
certifying class); Muise v. GPU, Inc., 371 N.J.Super. 18, 29, 851
A2d 799 (App. Div. 2004) (reviewing trial court’s determination
that class certification was not warranted for abuse of discretion);
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2.2.3 on
R, 4:32-1(b)(8) (2017).

Iv.

A.

In accordance with Rule 4:32-1 and our case law, we review the
trial court’s certification of a class for the determination of the
CFA claims asserted in each of the two appeals before the Court.
As an initial step in that inquiry, we review the substantive law
that governs the plaintiffs’ CFA claims. See Iliadis, supra, 191
NJ. at 107, 922 A.2d 710 (finding that court determining class
certification must analyze claims and defenses); Lee, supra, 203
NJ. at 506, 4 A.3d 561 (noting need to review substantive law).

HI The CFA was enacted to “provide[ ] relief to consumers
from ‘fraudulent practices in the market place.” Lee, supra, 203
N.J. at 521, 4 A8d 561 (quoting Furst v. Einstein Moomijy, Inc.,
182 N.J, 1, 11, 860 A.2d 435 (2004)). Originally, the CFA permitted
no private right of action; rather, it authorized “the Attorney
General to combat the increasingly widespread practice of de-
frauding the consumer.” Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 188 N.J. 2,
14, 647 A.2d 454 (1994) (quoting S. Comm. Statement to 8. 199
(1960) (L. 1971, ¢, 247, § 7). In 1971, the Legislature amended the

CFA “to permit individual consumers to bring private actions to
recover refunds, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 to -2.12, and treble damages
for violations, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.” Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173
N.J. 238, 248, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) (citing Lemelledo v. Beneficial
Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 255, 264, 696 A.2d 546 (1997); Riley
vy. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 226, 294 A.2d 7 (1972)).

The CFA’s private cause of action is an “efficient mechanism to: (1) compensate
the victim for his or her actual loss; (2) punish the wrongdoer through the award of
treble damages; and (3) attract competent counsel to counteract the ‘community
scourge’ of fraud by providing an incentive for an attorney to take a case involving
a minor loss to the individual.”

[D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J, 168, 183-84, 78 A.3d 627 (2013) (quoting
Weinberg, supra, 173 N.J. at 249, 801 A.2d 281).]

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 expansively defines the conduct that violates the

CFA:
The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial
practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the
knowing[ ] concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent
that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with
the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent
performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact
been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice.

HN An “unlawful practice” contravening the CFA may
arise from (1) an affirmative act; (2) a knowing omission; or (8) a
violation of an administrative regulation. Thiedemann_y. Mer-
cedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 NuJ. 234, 245, 872 A.2d 783 (2005);
Cox, supra, 138 N.J. at 17, 647 A.2d 454, A showing of intent is not
essential if the claimed CFA violation is an affirmative act or a
regulatory violation, but such a showing is necessary if the claimed
violation is an omission pursuant to N.J.S.A, 56:8-2. Bosland_v.
Warnock Dodge, Inc, 197 N.J, 548, 556, 964 A.2d 741 (2009);
Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 605, 691 A.2d 350
(1997); Cox, supra, 188 N.J, at 17-18, 647 A.2d 454.

In addition to generally alleging unconscionable commercial
practices under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, the Dugan plaintiffs and Bozzi
allege that the defendant restaurants committed a regulatory
violation by contravening N.J.S.A, 56:8-2.5. Under that section of
the CFA, it is an “unlawful practice” “to sell, attempt to sell or

ee

offer for sale any merchandise at retail unless the total selling
price of such merchandise is plainly marked by a stamp, tag, label
or sign either affixed to the merchandise or located at the point
where the merchandise is offered for sale.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5; see
also In re Johnny Popper, Inc., 413 N.J.Super, 580, 588-89, 997
A.2d 257 (App. Div. 2010) (concurring with Division of Consumer
Affairs’ determination that used car dealer’s practice of listing
vehicle prices only on price list in its building, rather than affixing
prices to vehicles or listing them near vehicles, violated N.J.S.A.
56:8-2.5). That provision is central to plaintiffs’ CFA and
TCCWNA claims in these appeals.

HH To prevail under the CFA, a plaintiff must not only prove
“unlawful conduct by defendant,” but must also demonstrate “an
ascertainable loss by plaintiff’ and “a causal relationship between
the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.” D'Agostino,
supra, 216 N.J. at 184, 78 A.3d 527 (quoting Bosland, supra, 197
NJ, at 557, 964 A.2d 741), The statute provides that

[alny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or
personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of any method,
act or practice declared unlawful under this act .., may bring an action .... In
any action under this section the court shall, in addition to other appropriate legal
or equitable relief, award threefold the damages sustained by any person in
interest. In all actions under this section ... the court shall also award reasonable
attorneys’ fees, filing fees and reasonable costs of suit,

INJ.S.A, 56:8-19.]

HN Although “the Attorney General does not have to
prove that the victim was damaged by the unlawful conduct, a
private plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an ‘ascertain-
able loss.’” Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 110 N.J. 464,
478, 541 A2d 1063 (1988) (quoting N.J.S.A. 56:8-2); see_also
Weinberg, supra, 173 NJ. at 251, 801 A2d 281 (“[TJhe plain
language of the Act unmistakably makes a claim of ascertainable
loss a prerequisite for a private cause of action ....”); Lee, supra,
203 N.J. at 522, 4 A.3d 561 (“To establish causation, a consumer
merely needs to demonstrate that he or she suffered an ascertain-
able loss ....”). As this Court has noted, “[tJo raise a genuine
dispute about [an ascertainable loss claim], the plaintiff must

Ls:

————— Sl

proffer evidence of loss that is not hypothetical or illusory.”
Thiedemann, supra, 183 N.J. at 248, 872 A.2d 783.

HE sON..J.S.A. 56:8-19’s causation element—the requirement
that plaintiff prove that he or she suffered an ascertainable loss
“as a result of” the defendant’s unlawful “method, act or prac-
tice”—is “not the equivalent of reliance.” Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at
522, 4 A.3d 561; accord Gennari, supra, 148 N.J. at 607, 691 A.2d
350. Instead, the CFA requires a showing of “a causal relationship
between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.” Bosland,
supra, 197 N.J. at 557, 964 A.2d 741; see also NJ. n Action
v. Schering-Plough Corp., 367 N.J.Super. 8, 12-13, 842 A.2d 174
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 249, 887 A.2d 1092 (2008). “The
limiting nature of the requirement allows a private cause of action
only to those who can demonstrate a loss attributable to conduct
made unlawful by the CFA.” Thiedemann, supra, 183 N.J. at 246,
872 A.2d 783 (citing Meshinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 478, 541 A.2d
1063).

The CFA elements of ascertainable loss and causation are the
focus of the parties’ dispute regarding Rule 4:32-1 predominance
in these appeals.

B.

L

HE Guided by the statutory language and jurisprudence de-
fining a private cause of action under N.J.S.A. 56:8-19, we review
the Appellate Division panel’s determination that the Dugan plain-
tiffs failed to demonstrate predominance under Rule 4:32-1(b)(3)
with respect to their CFA claims,

For purposes of our analysis, we assume the truth of the Dugan
plaintiffs’ allegation that TGIF, prompted by its market research,
declined to list prices for its beverages on its menus in order to
increase its revenue from beverage sales. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J.
at 505, 4 A.8d 561; Liadis, supra, 191 N.J, at 96, 922 A2d 710. We
also assume the truth of the Dugan plaintiffs’ allegation that

during visits to TGIF restaurants, the class members purchased
beverages for which prices were not listed on the menus. Ibid. We
accept as true for purposes of the appeal the testimony of class
representatives Dugan and Fox that, during their visits to TGIF
restaurants, they would not have ordered the beverages that they
ordered, or they would have ordered fewer or less expensive
beverages, had they been informed of the beverage prices. Ibid.

In our “qualitative assessment of the common and individual
questions,” Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 519, 4 A.3d 561, we note that
plaintiffs’ pricing claims are inherently different from the CFA
claims in our prior CFA class action case law. Here, plaintiffs do
not allege that they purchased defective or deficient goods, as the
claimants contended in several of this Court's CFA class certifica-
tion decisions. See, e.g., id. at 526-28, 4 A.3d 561 (stating that if
plaintiffs proved allegations that defendants made false claims
about dietary supplement, product is worthless “bottle of broken
promises” and each purchase, unless refunded, “is an out-of-pocket
loss”); Furst, supra, 182 N.J. at 9, 860 A.2d 435 (“{WJhen a
merchant violates the [CFA] by delivering defective goods and
then refusing to provide conforming goods, a customer's ascertain-
able loss is the replacement value of those goods.”); Cadillac,
supra, 93 N.J, at 434-85, 461 A.2d 736 (concluding that predomi-
nance requirement was met by class of claimants who purchased
vehicles with allegedly defective engines). The beverages at issue
in these appeals were not defective; instead, it appears that those
beverages were precisely what the customers ordered. According-
ly, plaintiffs do not contend that they are entitled to a refund of
money spent on a worthless or deficient item.

Instead, the Dugan plaintiffs contend that they were charged an
excessive price for the alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages that
they purchased at defendants’ restaurants. Their predominance
claim is complicated by the fact that the products at issue are
beverages sold in restaurants at a range of prices and purchased
by consumers with divergent motivations, beverage preferences,
and budgetary constraints.

DD

The Dugan plaintiffs do not represent that they can present
individualized proof that every claimant in their multi-million-
member class would have purchased fewer or less expensive
beverages, or none at all, had TGIF informed him or her of the
beverage prices® Instead, citing breach of contract law, they
propose classwide proofs of ascertainable loss and causation. They
seek to predicate a uniform finding of ascertainable loss and
causation on the difference between what they contend would be
“fair” or “reasonable” prices for beverages and the prices that
TGIF actually charged. Although TGIF’s market research in-
volved only a small number of consumer subjects, plaintiffs seek to
extend the results of that research to the beverage purchases of
their entire class.’ The Dugan plaintiffs urge the Court to con-

8We do not share our dissenting colleague's conclusion that plaintiffs have
proven a CFA violation in the Dugan case. See post at 79, 171 A.3d 620
(attributing to TGIF a “cynical corporate policy of profiteering from violating”
the CFA); post at 83, 17! A.3d 620 (contending that TGIF maintains a ‘‘corpo-
rate policy of willful disregard of the CFA"); post at 85, 171 A.3d 620 (citing
TGIF's apparent “business decision not to list beverage prices for the sake of
higher profits, notwithstanding that its policy violated the CFA"); post at 90, 171
A.3d 620 (citing a “corporate policy of ignoring provisions of the CFA"). TGIF
has not stipulated that it violated the CFA, No jury has considered the Dugan
plaintiffs’ claims, let alone rendered a verdict for plaintiffs. No trial court has
entered summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor in the Dugan case. Only a motion
to dismiss was denied by the trial court, and that action was affirmed by the
Appellate Division. We do not review that determination in these appeals. Our
role in this case is to review the trial courts’ class certification decisions, not to
act as a factfinder with respect to plaintiffs’ substantive claims.

9The Dugan plaintiffs suggest that a figure set forth in TGIF’s marketing
research, $1.72, would represent the difference between the average price
charged by TGIF for a beverage and a “fair” or “reasonable” price that should
have been charged for that beverage, and would therefore be the measure of a
class member's ascertainable loss. The Dugan plaintiffs misconstrue the import
of the figure of $1.72 that appears in TGIF’s marketing research. Based on the
limited record on that market research, it does not appear that the $1.72 figure
set forth in the research documents related to the price charged for a single
beverage. Instead, that figure evidently represented the difference between the
average amount of money that the research subject customers, who were not
informed about beverage prices, would spend on a given restaurant visit and the

clude, based on that theory of ascertainable loss and damages,
that common issues of law and fact predominate over individual
issues, as Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) requires.

In some settings in which a contract’s price term is undefined,
our law authorizes the court to determine what would constitute a
reasonable price and calculate damages accordingly. See N.J.S.A.
12A;2-805(1) (stating factors to determine “a reasonable price”
when “{t]he parties conclude[d] a contract for sale even though the
price [was] not settled”); Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J.
236, 240, 254, 778 A.2d 1121 (2001) (remanding to allow more
discovery on issue of good faith in case in which price term was
left open); Truex v. Ocean Dodge, Inc., 219 N.J.Super. 44, 50-52,
529 A.2d 1017 (App. Div. 1987) (finding lack of price agreement
did not indicate lack of contract and remanding for determination
of damages).

Those principles, however, cannot simply be extrapolated from a
specific contract dispute, in which a court hears evidence of the
parties’ intent, to a class action CFA claim involving millions of
beverage purchases. Significantly, the able counsel for the parties
and amici cite no decisions in which a theory analogous to that
proposed by the Dugan plaintiffs has been accepted as a method
of proving ascertainable loss and causation in a CFA class action.
To the contrary, our case law has consistently rejected “price-
inflation” theories—closely related to fraud on the market theo-
ries—as a substitute for proof of ascertainable loss or causation in
CFA claims,

We first considered a “fraud-on-the-market” theory in a class
action setting in Kaufman vy. i-Stat Corp., 165 N.J. 94, 754 A.2d
1188 (2000). In Kaufman, the plaintiff class allegedly “purchased
securities in the secondary markets at attractive prices that had
been artificially affected by an issuer's misrepresentations and
omissions.” Id. at 97, 754 A.2d 1188. The plaintiffs sought to prove

average amount that the research subject customers, who were informed about
beverage prices, would spend on a visit.

reliance, an element of their common-law fraud claim, by demon-
strating that the defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions
resulted in an inflated share price that all class members had paid
for the securities. Ibid.

Rejecting the Kaufman plaintiffs’ fraud-on-the-market theory,
we noted that plaintiffs in certain federal securities-fraud class
actions may collectively prove reliance based on evidence that the
defendant's fraudulent conduct affected the price of the securities
at issue. Id. at 103-08, 754 A.2d 1188 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988)). We
analyzed the extensive federal and state case law and academic
research rejecting the fraud-on-the-market theory outside of the
securities-fraud context in which the theory arose. Id. at 118-18,
‘754 A.2d 1188, We concluded that

[alecepting fraud on the market. as proof of reliance in a New Jersey common-law
fraud action would undereut the public interest in preventing forum-shopping,
weaken our law of indirect reliance, and run contrary to the policy direction of the
Legislature and Congress. We decline to expand our law regarding satisfaction of
the reliance element of a fraud action on the basis of 2 complex economic theory
that has not been satisfactorily proven.

[Id at 118, 754 A.2d 1188.)

In International Union, supra, we applied that principle in the
setting of a CFA claim in which plaintiffs had the burden of
proving ascertainable loss and causation, but not reliance. 192 N.J.
at 392, 929 A.2d 1076. There, the class representative plaintiff
asserted that the putative class of third-party pharmaceutical
benefit payors had paid more for the prescription drug Vioxx
because the defendants allegedly fraudulent marketing had driven
up the price of the drug. Id. at 390, 929 A.2d 1076, The plaintiffs
proposed to prove ascertainable loss and causation for the class as
a whole by demonstrating the extent of that price inflation. Id. at
392, 929 A.2d 1076.

Noting that, in Kaufman, a fraud-on-the-market theory was
“rejected ... as being inappropriate in any context other than
federal securities fraud litigation,” we declined to accept, as a
method of classwide proof, the plaintiffs’ theory “that the price

58

charged for Vioxx was higher than it should have been as a result
of defendant’s fraudulent marketing campaign.” Ibid. We observed
that

[pllaintift argues that it should be permitted to demonstrate classwide damages
through use of a single expert who would opine about the effect on pricing of the
marketing campaign in which defendant engaged. To the extent that plaintiff
intends to rely on a single expert to establish a price effect in place of a
demonstration of an ascertainable loss or in place of proof of a causal nexus
between defendant’s acts and the claimed damages, however, plaintiff's proofs
would fail, That proof theory would indeed be the equivalent of fraud on the
market, a theory we have not extended to CFA claims,

{d, at 392, 929 A.2d 1076.)

Other courts have similarly rejected class representatives’ con-
tentions that ascertainable loss and causation could be proven for
a class in a CFA case on the theory that the defendants’ unlawful
practices enabled them to charge more for the goods sold, affect-
ing every member of the class. In N.J, Citizen Action, supra, the
panel affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action in which
plaintiffs asserted a “fraud on the market or price inflation
theory,” based on the allegation that defendant’s allegedly fraudu-
lent direct-to-consumer marketing caused class members to pay
“artificially inflated prices.” 367 N.J.Super. at 12-14, 842 A.2d 174,
The court noted that the plaintiffs’ theory would effectively elimi-
nate the ascertainable loss and causation requirements that differ-
entiate consumer CFA claims from Attorney General enforcement
actions under the statute. Id. at 16, 842 A.2d 174,

In Dabush v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 378 N.J.Super. 105,
874 A.2d 1110 (App. Div.), ce denied, 185 N.J. 265, 883 A.2d
1062 (2005), another Appellate Division panel rejected a class
plaintiff's theory that all members of the class of lessors had paid
an inflated price for a vehicle model’s navigation system, and that
this inflated price constituted the entire class’s ascertainable loss:

‘Though couched in different terms, plaintiff advances the same “price-inflation”

theory that we rejected in [N.J. Citizen Action]. He claims he paid for the lease of a

vehicle that he expected to contain a navigation system that had all roads and

highways and, therefore, he must have paid a higher price for the less effective

produet which did not contain full coverage of every road. Adopting this theory of
ascertainable loss would “fundamentally alter the concept of causation in the CFA

ee =:

context,” and would effectively afford private citizens rights that the Legislature

has expressly reserved for the Attorney General.

Ud. at 123, 874 A.2d 1110 (quoting N.J. Citizen Action, supra, 367 N.J.Super. at 16,

842 A.2d 174).]

In Fink v. Ricoh Corp., 365 N.J.Super. 520, 587, 545-47, 839
A.2d 942 (Law Div. 2003), the court declined to certify a nation-
wide class to pursue CFA and other claims against the manufac-
turer of a digital camera that was allegedly marketed with mis-
leading promotional materials. The court rejected the plaintiffs’
suggestion that they could prove ascertainable loss and causation
for all class members—whether or not they had ever viewed the
promotional materials—based on the promotional materials’ al-
leged impact on the demand for and price of the camera. Id. at
551-55, 839 A.2d 942. The court noted the lack of case law
“approv[ing] the ‘price inflation’ theory as an accepted means of
proving proximate cause or an ascertainable loss under the [CFA]
or any comparable consumer fraud statute,” and concluded “that
the price inflation theory is not relevant to the issue of proximate
cause and is too speculative to establish an ascertainable loss.” Id.
at 554, 839 A.2d 942,

Applying the CFA and its Delaware counterpart, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently rejected a
putative class’s price-inflation theory of ascertainable loss and
causation. In Harnish v. Widener University School of Law, 833
F.3d 298, 309-13 (3d Cir. 2016), the proposed class consisted of law
students claiming that they paid higher tuition because of the
defendant law school’s allegedly misleading graduate employment
statistics. Id. at 302. The plaintiffs sought to avoid the necessity of
proving the impact of the allegedly false statistics on individual
class members’ educational choices by arguing that “the misrepre-
sentations empowered [the law school] to charge more across the
entire market.” Id. at 312.

Affirming the district court’s decision not to certify the class,
the Third Circuit concluded that the district court had improperly
labeled the plaintiff's theory of classwide proof a “fraud-on-the-
market” theory and that plaintiffs’ contention was more accurately

described as a “price-inflation theory.” Id. at 312-13. Citing Inter-
national Union and other New Jersey and Delaware consumer-
fraud case law, the Third Circuit found the distinction “immaterial
because the state courts have refused to recognize either theory
outside the federal securities fraud context.” Id. at 313.

The Dugan plaintiffs similarly seek to predicate a classwide
finding of ascertainable loss and causation on a “price-inflation”
theory, premised on the contention that TGIF’s unlawful pricing
practices empowered it to overcharge its customers. They postu-
late that by virtue of its policy of leaving beverage prices off its
menu, TGIF was able to inflate beverage prices across its market
without reducing customer demand.

HM As we determined in International Union and the Third
Circuit decided in Harnish, the proposed price-inflation theory
does not establish ascertainable loss and causation in this CFA
class action case. Individual plaintiffs may be able to establish
ascertainable loss and causation by showing that they would not
have purchased the beverages or would have spent less money on
them had they been informed of their cost. The Dugan plaintiffs
cannot establish ascertainable loss and causation, however, by
demonstrating that TGIF’s beverage prices were higher than they
would have been had TGIF listed its prices on its restaurant
menus. A “fair” or “reasonable” price derived from the per-visit
expenditures of marketing research subjects is no substitute for
proof of the actual claimants’ ascertainable loss and causation.
Plaintiffs’ price-inflation theory does not globally establish those
elements of the CFA for the vast and varied class of restaurant
customers for which the Dugan plaintiffs seek certification."

10 The Dugan plaintiffs suggest that members of the class who cannot establish
ascertainable loss and causation can be identified and excluded from the class in
the post-verdict claims process. However, plaintiffs’ burden is to demonstrate
that the class members’ CFA claims can be proven with common issues predomi-
nating over individual questions of fact and law, and they cannot rely on the
post-verdict claims process as a substitute for competent proof in a fair trial. See

Other than to distinguish these appeals from this Court’s deci-
sion in International Union because the plaintiffs relied on a single
expert in that case, post at 48, 171 A.3d 620, our dissenting
colleague does not address the authority clearly establishing that
plaintiffs’ price-inflation theory cannot give rise to classwide proof
of ascertainable loss and causation. Int’l Union, supra, 192 N.J. at
391-92, 929 A.2d 1076; N.J. Citizen Action, supra, 367 N.J.Super.
at 12-14, 842 A.2d 174; Dabush, supra, 378 N.J.Super, at 123, 874
A2d 1110; see also Harnish, supra, 833 F.3d at 309-13. Instead,
our colleague mischaracterizes our holding as a global rejection of
statistical evidence in class actions, thus refuting a proposition
that we simply do not assert. Post at 4042, 171 A.3d 620.

In that regard, our dissenting colleague relies on three deci-
sions: the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Tyson Foods,
Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. ——, —, 186 S.Ct. 1036, 1046, 194
L.Ed.2d 124, 184-35 (2016), and two federal district court deci-
sions, In re Scotts EZ Seed Litigation, 304 F.R.D. 397 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) and Goldemberg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 317
F.R.D, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Post at 40-42, 171 A.3d 620. None of
those decisions bears the slightest relationship to the issues
presented by these appeals.

Tyson Foods was an appeal of a judgment in favor of a class of
meat processing plant employees who alleged that the defendant
employer violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 201 to -209, by failing to pay the employees overtime for the
time that they spent donning and doffing protective equipment.
577 U.S, at —, 136 S.Ct. at 1045, 194 L.Ed.2d at 133. Rejecting
the defendant’s challenge to the jury’s verdict, the Supreme Court
held that the trial court had properly permitted the plaintiffs to
rely on employee testimony, video recordings and an expert’s
study regarding the average time that “various donning and
doffing activities took” in the defendant’s plant. Id. at ——, 136

R._4:32-1(b)(3) (requiring finding that class action is superior method ‘“for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”).

S.Ct. at 1048, 194 L.Ed.2d at 132. The plaintiffs’ use of fact and
expert testimony in Tyson Foods to demonstrate the time con-
sumed by the donning and doffing activities at issue is simply
unrelated to the price-inflation theory that the Dugan plaintiffs
seek to assert as a classwide substitute for that proof of ascertain-
able loss and causation that the CFA requires.

The federal district court's decision in Scotts EZ Seed arose in a
setting very different from that of Dugan: consumer claims
premised on New York and California false advertising law.
There, the plaintiffs asserted two contentions against the defen-
dant manufacturer of grass seed advertised as capable of growing
grass “50% Thicker with Half the Water”: that “nobody was able
to grow grass using EZ Seed,” and that the plaintiffs had “paid an
inappropriate premium for EZ Seed based on Scotts’ allegedly
false 50% thicker claim.” 304 F.R.D. at 408-09. The district court
held that the alleged falsity of the contested advertising claim was
subject to generalized proof, and that under the governing New
York statute harm could be proven classwide based on plaintiffs’
alleged purchase of a “worthless product” or payment of a premi-
um “based on the false 50% thicker claim.” Id. at 409. The district
court construed the California false advertising statute not to
require individualized proof of causation “because causation as to
each class member is commonly proved more likely than not by
[the] materiality” of the false claim. Id. at 410 (quoting Guido v.
L’Oreal, USA, Ine., 284 F.R.D. 468, 482 (C.D. Cal. 2012), Thus,
the district court’s determination that common issues of fact and
law predominated in Scotts EZ Seed derived from the contention
that every member of the class was damaged by an economic
decision that he or she would not have made but for the false
advertising: the purchase of a product alleged to be, at a mini-
mum, ineapable of performing as advertised, or entirely worthless.
Ibid. That uniform consumer choice—allegedly prompted by a
single false advertising claim directly material to the value of the
product—stands in stark contrast to the class members’ disparate
decisions to purchase beverages at restaurants in the Dugan case.

Ln

Finally, our dissenting colleague relies on a decision involving
alleged mislabeling, Goldemberg, supra, 317 F.R.D. at 385-94.
There, the district court applied New York, California and Florida
law to the plaintiffs’ claims that the defendant’s Aveeno products
were falsely labeled “Active Naturals®” because they “contain
unnatural, synthetic ingredients.” Id. at 882. The court premised
its class action predominance determination on New York, Califor-
nia, and Florida case law addressing a method of proving damages
for all claimants in a false-advertising class: a computation of the
“price premium” of mislabeling, measured as “the difference be-
tween the cost of the second best product in the product class
(without a deceiving label) and the cost of the product at issue
(with the label).” Id. at 394. Even under the law of the states at
issue in Goldemberg, the “price premium” theory of classwide
proof addressed by the district court would have no place in a
CFA claim premised on the claimants’ purchases of millions of
beverages, none of which is alleged to have been mislabeled or
falsely advertised. The Goldemberg case is simply irrelevant here.

In short, the decisions cited by our dissenting colleague do not
in any respect undermine the authority on which we rely to reject
the Dugan plaintiffs’ price-inflation claims.

Accordingly, we concur with the Appellate Division panel that
the Dugan plaintiffs failed to establish, with respect to their CFA
claim, that “the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individ
ual members.” R. 4:32-1(b)(8). We do not reach the question
whether the Dugan plaintiffs satisfied the remaining requirements
of Rule 4:32~1. We hold that the panel properly reversed the trial
court’s certification of a class with respect to that claim.

2.

We apply the standard of Rule 4:32-1 to the CFA claims
asserted in Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC. For purposes
of that inquiry, we assume the truth of Bozzi’s allegations regard-
ing OSI’s alleged practices and his testimony regarding his bever-

age purchases at an OSI restaurant. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at
505, 4 A8d 561; Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J. at 96, 922 A2d 710.

Hl Before this Court, Bozzi did not assert that he could prove
ascertainable loss and causation on behalf of his proposed class
through the use of a price-inflation theory such as the theory
asserted in Dugan. Instead, he focused on a category of OSI
restaurant customers identified as a subclass in his original com-
plaint: customers who, in the course of a single visit to an OSI
restaurant, were charged different prices for beverages of the
same brand, type, and volume. Bozzi represents that, in discovery,
OSI produced receipts documenting the prices paid by each class
member who makes the price-shifting claim and that he is there-
fore in a position to prove that OSI charged each claimant two
different prices for the same beverage in a single visit. Bozzi also
states that he can demonstrate that class members were unaware
that after purchasing a beverage at one price, they would be
charged more for a second or subsequent beverage.

For purposes of class certification analysis, we do not determine
whether Bozzi’s price-shifting allegations, if proven, would give
rise to a CFA violation. That claim has not yet been challenged in
a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion, and the merits
of that claim are not before the Court in these appeals. Iliadis,
supra, 191 N.J, at 107, 922 A.2d 710; Olive v. Graceland Sales
Corp., 61 N.J. 182, 189, 298 A.2d 658 (1972). We consider only
whether Bozzi’s proposed class for purposes of his CFA claim, as
limited to customers who ordered more than one beverage on a
visit to an OSI restaurant and were charged a higher price for the
second or subsequent beverage of the same brand, type, and
volume, !! meets the standard of Rule 4:32-1.

With respect to Bozzi’s price-shifting CFA claim, the proposed
class satisfies the four requirements of Rule 4:32-1(a). The class

1 The “volume” of a beverage may be measured in ounces, in pints or half-
pints, or in other units.

clearly includes numerous claimants.” In Bozzi’s CFA claim, there
are common questions of fact relating to OSI’s pricing practices
and at least one common question of law—whether increasing the
price of a beverage during a customer's restaurant visit without
informing the customer constitutes an unlawful practice under
N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, When the class’s allegations are limited to the
price-shifting CFA claim, Bozzi’s claim is typical of the claims
asserted by the class; supported by a receipt, Bozzi contends that
during a 2010 visit to the Carrabba’s restaurant in Maple Shade,
he was charged two different prices for Peroni beers, the second
price higher than the first. Finally, the record indicates that “the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class.” R. 4:32-1(a).

HAs limited, Bozzi’s CFA claim also satisfies Rule 4:32-
1(b)(8)’s. predominance requirement.’ With the assistance of
claimant-specifie records, both parties will be in a position to
determine the dates and locations of the visits at issue and may be
able to identify the reasons for the inconsistent prices. Even if
discovery proves that the price disparity alleged by the class
derived not from a single corporate policy but from restaurant-
specific happy hour or other pricing practices, the trial court may
be in a position to evaluate the disputed practices on a restaurant-
by-restaurant basis. If plaintiffs prove an unlawful practice under
the CFA, the receipts, in combination with other evidence, may
support a finding of ascertainable loss and causation. The trial
court would clearly be confronted with the task of adjudicating

12 During oral argument, Bozzi's counsel stated that the proposed class con-
sists of two hundred sixty-three thousand OSI restaurant customers. It is unclear
whether that estimate applies to the entire class certified by the trial court or to
the more limited class of claimants who assert the price-shifting CFA claim.

18 Bozzi's contention regarding predominance is limited to claimants who can
demonstrate that they paid different prices for the same brand, type, and volume
of beverage in the same visit to an OSI restaurant, He has not identified any
method of proving ascertainable loss and causation for other members of the
class certified by the trial court.

individual questions, but the existence of individual questions does
not preclude a finding of predominance. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J.
at 526-28, 4 A8d 561 (finding predominance notwithstanding
existence of individual questions); Cadillac, supra, 93 N.J. at 430-
35, 461 A.2d 736 (same).

HH Such a class would also satisfy the requirement that a
class action provide a superior method “for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.” R. 4:32-1(b)(8);_ see also liadis,
supra, 191 N.J. at 114-15, 922 A.2d 710 (noting superiority inquiry
involves informed consideration of alternative available methods of
adjudication of each issue, comparison of fairness of class action
and alternative methods, and comparison of efficiency of each
method). Bozzi’s price-shifting CFA claim involves modest individ-
ual claims that are unlikely to be brought in an alternative forum.
See Iliadis, supra, 191 N.J. at 104, 922 A2d 710 (“[T]he class
action’s equalization function opens the courthouse doors for those
who cannot enter alone.”). Those claims would not be efficiently
resolved on an individual basis.

Importantly, the certification of the class as limited will not
deprive OSI of the opportunity to evaluate and respond to plain-
tiffs’ allegations, Based on Bozzi’s representation, it appears that
the parties have documents indicating where and when each class
member was charged disparate prices for the same brand, type,
and volume of beverage on the same restaurant visit. OSI will be
in a position to contest plaintiffs’ allegations of unlawful practices
under the CFA with respect to the prices imposed by individual
restaurants at various times. It may argue in a summary judg-
ment motion, and/or at trial, that a given restaurant’s beverage
pricing or the restaurants’ practices as a whole did not violate the
CFA. A limited class may be certified without compromising the
fairness of the proceeding. Bozzi’s proposed CFA class action
meets Rule 4:32-1’s requirement of superiority.

In sum, Bozzi has met the requirements for class certification
with respect to his CFA claim, if the class is limited to claimants
who were charged different prices for beverages of the same

67

brand, type, and volume in the course of the same restaurant visit.
We therefore reverse the trial court’s class certification order and
remand for the certification of a redefined class. See Muise, supra,
371 NJ. Super, at 19, 64, 851 A.2d 799 (affirming trial court’s
decertification of class and remanding for certification of “more
limited ... class of customers [of electrical utility] whose outages
directly resulted from the alleged negligence in delaying the
replacement of transformers at the [utility’s] Red Bank substa-
tion”).

The trial court should define the class as follows:

All persons who ordered more than one beverage of the same brand, type, and

volume during a single visit to an OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC, or Bloomin’

Brands, Inc., restaurant in New Jersey from January 23, 2004 to the present date,

and were charged a higher price for a second or subsequent beverage of the same

brand, type, and volume ordered during the same visit, without notice of the
change in prices.

HH On remand, the trial court should certify the class solely
for the purpose of pursuing CFA claims based upon the defendant
restaurants’ alleged practice of charging a customer different
prices for beverages of the same brand, type, and volume during
the same restaurant visit."

v.

A.

HM The second statutory claim asserted by the putative
classes in both appeals is based on the TCCWNA. That statute
was enacted in 1981 “to prevent deceptive practices in consumer
contracts.” Kent Motor Cars, Ine. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co.,

44 The trial court should also vacate the injunction, requiring OSI restaurants
to include prices for all beverages on its menus, that was entered following its
certification of the class based on the claims of that entire class. OSI challenged
that injunction in this appeal, and Bozzi offered no argument in support of the
trial court's injunctive relief. Following certification of the more limited class set
forth above, the trial court may consider any application for injunctive relief
made on behalf of that class.

207 N.J. 428, 457, 25 A8d 1027 (2011). The Legislature observed
that

{flar too many consumer contracts, warranties, notices and signs contain provisions

which clearly violate the rights of consumers, Even though these provisions are

legally invalid or unenforceable, their very inclusion in a contract, warranty, notice
or sign deceives a consumer into thinking that they are enforceable, and for this
reason the consumer often fails to enforce his rights,

[Sponsor's Statement to A. 1660 2 (1980).]

As the TCCWNA’s legislative history reflects, the Legislature
“did not recognize any new consumer rights but merely imposed
an obligation on sellers to acknowledge clearly established con-
sumer rights and provided remedies for posting or inserting
provisions contrary to law.” Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214
NJ. 419, 432, 70 A.3d 544 (2018) (citing N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 to -16);
see_also Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 149 N.J. 620, 641,
695 A.2d 264 (1997) (setting forth purpose and provisions of
TCCWNA).

The TCCWNA provides in part:

No seller, lessor, creditor, lender or baile shall in the course of his business offer
to any consumer or prospective consumer or enter into any written consumer
contract or give or display any written consumer warranty, notice or sign after the
effective date of this act which includes any provision that violates any clearly
established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor,
lender or bailee as established by State or Federal law at the time the offer is
made or the consumer contract is signed or the warranty, notice or sign is given or
displayed.

Q 56:12-15.]

The TCCWNA imposes a range of remedies against a defendant

who violates the statute:

‘Any person who violates the provisions of this act shall be liable to the aggrieved
consumer for a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 or for actual damages, or both
at the election of the consumer, together with reasonable attorney's fees and court
costs. This may be recoverable by the consumer in a civil action in a court of
‘competent jurisdiction or as part of a counterclaim by the consumer against the
seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee or assignee of any of the aforesaid, who
aggrieved him, A consumer also shall have the right to petition the court to
terminate a contract which violates the provisions of [N.J.S.A. 66:12-15] and the
court in its discretion may void the contract.

INS. 12-17.)

Two requirements of the TCCWNA are relevant to the class
certification issues raised on these appeals. First, in order to

obtain a remedy under the TCCWNA, a plaintiff must be an
“aggrieved consumer”—a consumer who satisfies the elements of
the TCCWNA. A. 56:12-17. The TCCWNA defines “con-
sumer” as “any individual who buys, leases, borrows, or bails any
money, property or service which is primarily for personal, family
or household purposes.” N.J.S.A, 56:12-15,

The TCCWNA does not specifically define what makes a “con-
sumer” an “aggrieved consumer” for purposes of N.J.S.A, 56:12—
17. In several settings, however, courts have examined the interac-
tion between the parties and the nature of the contract or other
writing in order to determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to
relief under the TCCWNA. See, e.g., Manahawkin Convalescent v.
O'Neill, 217 NJ. 99, 125-26, 85 A3d 947 (2014) (analyzing
TCCWNA claim in case involving nursing home and third-party
payment guarantors); Shelton, supra, 214 N.J, at 486-42, 70 A3d
544 (concluding that TCCWNA applies to transactions between
plaintiffs and internet seller of restaurant coupons and certificates
based on detailed analysis of transactions); United Consumer Fin.
Servs. Co. v. Carbo, 410 N.J.Super. 280, 306, 982 A.2d 7 (App. Div.
2009) (applying TCCWNA when retail installment sales contract
contravened provisions of Retail Installment Sales Act); Bosland
v. Warnock Dodge, Inc,, 396 N.J.Super, 267, 278-79, 983 A.2d 942
(App. Div. 2007) (applying TCCWNA to dealership’s registration
overcharges), aff'd, 197 N.J. 543, 562, 964 A.2d 741 (2009).

HH Second, in order to be found liable under the TCCWNA, a
defendant must have violated a “clearly established legal right” or
“responsibility.” N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. To make that determination,
courts assess whether the CFA or another consumer protection
statute or regulation clearly prohibited the contractual provision
or other practice that is the basis for the TCCWNA claim. See,
e.g, Miadenov v. Wegmans Food Mkts. Inc., 124 F.Supp.3d 360,
380 (D.N.J. 2015) (holding that plaintiffs who failed to state viable
claims under CFA or federal food labeling regulation established
no violation of “clearly established legal right” under TCCWNA);
United Consumer Fin. Servs., supra, 410 N.J.Super, at 306-07, 982

A.2d 7 (applying TCCWNA based on violation of “clearly estab-
lished” right under Retail Installment Sales Act, N.J.S.A. 17:16C-
50); Bosland, supra, 396 N.J.Super. at 278-80, 933 A.2d 942
(holding that plaintiff presented prima facie proof that defendant
dealership that overcharged car buyers for vehicle registration fee
in contravention of consumer regulation violated “clearly estab-
lished” right).

TH The “clearly established” standard accordingly requires a
case-specific evaluation whether a “written consumer contract[,]
... Warranty, notice or sign” violates a legal right or responsibili-
ty that was “clearly established” by “State or Federal law at the
time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed or the
warranty, notice or sign is given or displayed.” N.J.S.A. 56:12-15.
That inquiry may give rise to different results, depending on the
timing of the offer, contract, or warranty. Ibid.; see, e.g., Mattson
y. Aetna Life Ins. Co, 124 F.Supp.3d 381, 393 (D.N.J. 2015)
(ruling that plaintiff's asserted statutory right not to be subjected
to subrogation claim was not “clearly established” when allegedly
offending notices were sent).

B.

Against that backdrop, we consider whether the trial courts
properly applied Rule 4:32-1’s predominance requirement when
they certified the classes proposed by the Dugan plaintiffs and by
Bozzi for adjudication of their respective TCCWNA claims.!* We
do not determine whether a defendant restaurant’s presentation of

15 We do not reach the broader issue, raised by amici curiae New Jersey Civil
Justice Institute and New Jersey Business and Industry Association but not by
any party, whether class certification should ever be granted as a method of
adjudicating a TCCWNA claim. See State v. Lazo, 209 NJ. 9, 25, 34 A3d 1233
(2012) (“As a general rule, an amicus curiae must accept the case before the
court as presented by the parties and cannot raise issues not raised by the
parties.” (quoting Bethlehem Twp. Bd, of Educ. v. Bethlehem Twp. Educ. Ass'n,
91 N.J. 38, 48-49, 449 A.2d 1254 (1982))); accord State v. 0" I, 215 NJ.
461, 479, 73 A.3d 496 (2013); State v. Gandhi, 201 NJ. 161, 191, 989 A.2d 256
(2010).

vel

a menu that omits beverage prices gives rise to a TCCWNA claim.
In the predominance inquiry, however, we look beyond the plead-
ings and examine the factual and legal bases of plaintiffs’
TCCWNA claim. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J, at 526-28, 4 A.3d 561
(applying predominance standard to CFA claim); Iliadis, supra,
191 NJ. at 107, 922 A2d 710 (establishing requirements of
predominance in class certification analysis); see also In re Hy-
drogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.8d 305, 310-12 (8d Cir.
2008) (analyzing predominance in context of antitrust case).

HH In these appeals, plaintiffs contend that by failing to list
prices for beverages on the menus, the defendant restaurants
violated plaintiffs’ “clearly established” legal rights and defendants
failed to meet their “clearly established” legal responsibilities
under N.J.S.A, 56:8-2.5; they contend that the statute required
defendants to “plainly mark” the beverages that they sold “by a
stamp, tag, label or sign” in the location where the beverages were
offered for sale. Plaintiffs assert that when the defendant restau-
rants’ employees presented menus to members of the putative
TCCWNA class, they “offerfed]” contracts that violated N.J.S.A.
56:8-2.5 to those consumers. Plaintiffs seek an award of damages
and the imposition of $100 per violation civil penalties on defen-
dants for each alleged TCCWNA violation.

HI We conclude that plaintiffs have not met the predomi-
nance requirement of Rule 4:32-1 with respect to their TCCWNA
claims in either appeal. First, the requirement that a plaintiff be
an “aggrieved consumer” in order to pursue a TCCWNA claim
gives rise to a range of individual questions regarding the interac-
tion between the customer and the server in this case. By its very
terms, the TCCWNA addresses “contract{s],” “warrantfies],” “no-
tice[s],” and “sign[s]” and does not apply when a defendant fails to
provide the consumer with a required writing. N.J.S.A. 56:12-15;
see also Jefferson Loan Co. v. Session, 397 N.J.Super. 520, 540-41,
938 A.2d 169 (App. Div. 2008). Here, the writing on which plain-
tiffs rely is the restaurant menu. Plaintiffs concede that, at a
minimum, a claimant must prove that he or she was presented

with a menu during his or her visit to the defendants’ restaurant
in order to establish the defendant’s liability under the TCCWNA.
That critical inquiry cannot be resolved by customer receipts or
other documents. Even if we accept plaintiff's theory of liability
under the TCCWNA, the testimony of the individual claimant or
another witness would be necessary to prove that the plaintiff
satisfies the statute’s requirements and is thus an “aggrieved
consumer.”

Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, they cannot meet their bur-
den under the TCCWNA by presenting evidence that TGIF
servers were instructed to hand menus to customers.’ The train-
ing documents on which plaintiffs rely do not prove that any
individual consumer received a menu, much less demonstrate the
critical interaction between any single member of the putative
class and the allegedly offending menu. Moreover, we do not agree
with the Dugan plaintiffs that the post-verdict claims process
provides an appropriate forum for determining an element that is
essential to liability under the TCCWNA. Under the TCCWNA,
plaintiffs have the burden to prove the statute’s elements at trial.
NJ.S.A. 56:12-15, -17.

Accordingly, a claimant who does not, at a minimum, prove that
he or she received a menu cannot satisfy the elements of the
TCCWNA and is not an “aggrieved consumer.” In that critical

16 Our dissenting colleague contends that plaintiffs are entitled to an inference
“that TGIF's servers complied with corporate policy and that patrons received
menus.” Post at 89, 171 A.3d 620. In the predominance inquiry, we do not
simply accept a class plaintiff's contention that an element of their claim can be
proven for the class as a whole with a single piece of evidence; instead, we
subject that claim and other aspects of the case to a “rigorous analysis.” Iliadis,
supra, 191 NJ. at 106-07, 922 A.2d 710 (citations omitted). Here, not even
plaintiffs contend that an indication in training documents that servers were
instructed to hand customers menus is proof of a universal practice; they
concede that not all customers received the menu that is the foundation of their
TCCWNA claims. TGIF’s training documents do not obviate the need for plain-
tiffs to prove—for each claimant—the contention at the core of their TCCWNA
claim: the customers’ receipt of a writing that violated that statute. N..S.A.
56:12-15.

3

regard, individual questions would predominate over common is-
sues at trial.

HM Sccond, the question whether the defendant restaurants
violated a “clearly established legal right” or a “clearly established
... legal responsibility” raises the specter of disparate results for
different members of the class. The sole published decision con-
struing the source of plaintiffs’ asserted “right,” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5,
addresses a used car dealership’s sale of vehicles without posting
their prices on or near them in the dealership’s lot. In re Johnny
Popper, Inc., supra, 413 N.J.Super. at 583, 997 A2d 257. No
published opinion holds that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 prohibits restau-
rants and other food service businesses from offering food or
beverages to customers without listing the prices for those items
on their menu. Moreover, as plaintiffs acknowledge, many food-
service businesses in New Jersey—ranging in size from corporate
chain restaurants to family-owned delicatessens and diners—rou-
tinely offer customers food and beverage specials and other items
without designating in writing the prices for those items. Although
A. 56:8-2.5 has been in effect for several decades, there is no
evidence that the Attorney General, charged to enforce the CFA,
has ever taken the position that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 requires the
prices of all food and beverages served in restaurants to be listed
on menus. In short, nothing in the record suggests that N.J.S.A.
56:8-2.5 was previously invoked against the restaurant practices at
issue in this case.

The Dugan plaintiffs maintain that even if their legal rights and
TGIF’s responsibilities under N.J.S.A. 56;8-2.5 were not “clearly
established” before they brought their claims, those rights and
responsibilities were confirmed when an Appellate Division panel
affirmed the trial court’s denial of TGIF’s motion to dismiss in an
unpublished decision. They contend that, in the wake of that
decision, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5's application to restaurant menus was
“clearly established” for purposes of the TCCWNA.

In its 2011 decision, however, the Appellate Division did not
hold that TGIF violated the Dugan plaintiffs’ “clearly established”

right within the meaning of the TCCWNA. The panel determined
only that plaintiff Dugan adequately pled violations of the CFA
and the TCCWNA under the lenient standard of Rule 4:6-2(e); it
properly noted that “[w]hether [Dugan] can prove any, or all, of
that is not before us.” Even if that decision could fairly be
construed to clearly establish plaintiffs’ rights under N.J.S.A.
56:8-2.5, it would not apply to all members of the Dugan plaintiffs’
class, which at plaintiffs’ request was defined to include claimants
who visited restaurants from 2004 to the present. Plaintiffs have
not established predominance with respect to that element of their
TCCWNA claim.

Moreover, even if a menu lacking beverage prices were to
constitute a “contract,” “warranty,” “notice” or “sign” within the
meaning of the TCCWNA, it is far from clear that the statute was
intended to apply as plaintiffs contend that it should. As the
Dugan plaintiffs concede, if plaintiffs were to prove that each of
the thirteen to fourteen million restaurant visits by a member of
the plaintiff class gave rise to a TCCWNA violation warranting a
civil penalty of $100, TGIF would be liable for penalties amounting
to more than a billion dollars. Plaintiffs assert that the court could
reduce that penalty by remittitur. See R. 4:49-1; see generally
Cuevas _v. Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480, 144 A.3d 890 (2016)
(clarifying appropriate use of remittitur). Nothing in the legislative
history of the TCCWNA, which focuses on sellers’ inclusion of
legally invalid or unenforceable provisions in consumer contracts,
suggests that when the Legislature enacted the statute, it intend-
ed to impose billion-dollar penalties on restaurants that serve
unpriced food and beverages to customers. See Sponsor’s State-
ment to A. 1660, supra (noting legislative objective to deter sellers
from including unlawful provisions in contracts, warranties, no-
tices, and signs).

Accordingly, we hold that in both Dugan v. TGI Fridays Ine.
and Bozzi v. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC, plaintiffs have not
met Rule 4:32-1’s class certification standard for purposes of the

Wey

TCCWNA claims, and that the trial courts improperly granted
class certification as to those claims.

VI.

In Dugan v. TGI Fridays Inc. we affirm and modify the
Appellate Division’s judgment concerning class certification. We
remand the matter to the trial court for the determination of the
individual CFA and TCCWNA claims asserted by plaintiffs Dugan
and Fox.

In Bozzi y. OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC, we affirm in part
and reverse in part the trial court’s class certification determina-
tion. We remand the matter to the trial court for the certification
of a class with a revised class definition, as set forth in this
opinion, solely for purposes of plaintiffs’ CFA claim based on
OSTI’s alleged price-shifting practice, and for the determination of
the individual TCCWNA claim asserted by plaintiff Bozzi.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE
PATTERSON’s opinion.

JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE SOLOMON did not participate.

JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting.

Today’s decision denying plaintiffs the right to proceed with a
class-action lawsuit against TGI Fridays, Ine. and Carlson Restau-
rants, Inc. (collectively, TGIF) is at odds with decades of this
Court’s jurisprudence and steepens the path to justice for consum-
ers with small claims. The decision will make it more difficult for a
class of many thousands of defrauded consumers to act collectively
in pursuit of a common remedy against a corporate wrongdoer.

In knowing violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
(CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -206, TGIF does not list beverage prices
on its menus. TGIF pursues this policy because it knows—through

its own study—that a consumer will pay, on average, $1.72 more
per meal if beverage prices are not placed on menus. Plaintiffs
allege that TGIF, by not listing beverage prices in violation of
N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5, reaped an illicit benefit while TGIF patrons
suffered an ascertainable loss. To be sure, TGIF is free to charge
whatever it wishes. But if it does so, it must comply—tike all
restaurants—with the law.

A single consumer does not have the economic wherewithal to
litigate against a corporate giant over a $1.72 claim. However,
thousands of similarly defrauded consumers banding together in a
class action gain “a measure of equality against” a defiant corpo-
rate adversary. Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., 203 N.J. 496, 517-18, 4
A.3d 561 (2010).

Unlike the majority, I believe that plaintiffs have presented a
viable legal theory under the CFA and our class-action jurispru-
dence. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs, as we must at this stage, TGIF engaged in an uncon-
scionable commercial practice that caused an ascertainable loss to
its patrons. TGIF has calculated that loss to be $1.72 per meal
when beverage prices are not listed on menus. TGIF has conelud-
ed that uninformed consumers make purchases exceeding the
“fair” price they otherwise would have paid. Thus, each class
member’s ascertainable loss is the difference between what the
patron in fact paid and what the patron would have paid had TGIF
listed beverage prices at the point of sale, as required by N.J.S.A.
56:8-2.5.

In the setting before us lies a stark reality. There is no
reasonable substitute for a class action to vindicate the rights of
TGIF’s victimized patrons. There will not be individual complaints
filed in small claims court to recover a loss of $1.72. The majority’s
decision to overthrow the trial court's certification of the class
ensures that there will be no judicial action holding TGIF account-
able for its wrongdoing. The majority also has given TGIF a
perverse incentive to continue violating the CFA and an unde-

7

served advantage over competitor restaurants that comply with
our consumer-fraud laws.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

I.

A.

Plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit against TGIF, alleging that
the chain restaurant engaged in a systematic scheme to violate the
Consumer Fraud Act in pursuit of higher profits.! Plaintiffs claim
that TGIF deliberately does not list beverage prices on its menus
“to induce[ ] consumers to pay higher than reasonable prices for
those beverages.” TGIF does not list beverage prices on its
menus, notwithstanding N.. . 56:8-2.5, which requires that the
“selling price” of merchandise, including food and beverages, be
“plainly marked ... at the point where the merchandise is offered
for sale.”*

In a per curiam opinion issued on October 25, 2011, the Appel-
late Division declared, as a matter of law, that TGIF’s failure to
list beverage prices on its menus violates the CFA. In rejecting
TGIF’s argument, the Appellate Division stated: “TGIF engages
in legal gymnastics in a futile attempt to convince us that bever-
ages are not embraced within the definition of merchandise in
N.JS.A. 56:8-2.5.” At oral argument before this Court, TGIF
conceded that it was bound by the Appellate Division's ruling.
Because that ruling is the controlling law and is not contested
before this Court, TGIF is in violation of the CFA. The only
remaining issue is whether the CFA violation—the failure to list

1 At this stage, the allegations in the complaint and evidence of record must be
viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, who are seeking class certifica-
tion, Lee, supra, 203 NJ. at 505, 4 A.3d 561

2The CFA defines “merchandise” as “any objects, wares, goods, commodities,
services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J.S.A.
56:8-I(c).

beverage prices—caused an ascertainable loss to the class of TGIF
patrons.

TGIF does not pretend to be in compliance with the law;
rather, its defense is that a class action is not a proper vehicle to
be used by the patrons victimized by TGIF’s practices. However, a
single consumer, even if defrauded, cannot engage in costly litiga-
tion over a sum involving, at most, several dollars. Only through a
class action that aggregates thousands of small claims of similarly
defrauded patrons can a viable lawsuit proceed.

B.

In support of its application for class certification, plaintiffs rely
on marketing studies commissioned by TGIF that analyzed con-
sumer responses to menu pricing.’ In one study, TGIF tested
pricing decisions made by patrons in thirty restaurants—fifteen
that listed beverage prices on menus and fifteen that did not.
TGIF’s statistical study revealed that when alcohol prices are
placed on menus, TGIF loses on average $1.72 per customer on a
meal. In the study, the informed patrons “traded down” to the
optimal price they could afford.

In other studies, TGIF determined the “fair” price and “think-
twice” price for the purchase of meals with and without alcoholic
beverages. The “think-twice” price, apparently, is the price at
which bells go off in patrons’ heads and purchases decline because
consumers do not want to exceed their “check thresholds.” From
TGIF’s perspective, the beauty of not placing beverage prices on
menus in violation of the CFA is that uninformed patrons do not
know when their purchases have exceeded the “fair” price and
reached the “think-twice” price.

8 TGIF consulted with Simon-Kucher & Partners, a firm that specializes in
pricing strategies and refers to itself as “the world’s leading pricing consultan-
cy.” Pricing, Simon-Kucher & Partners, httpy/www.simon-kucher.conven/
pricing (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).

79

TGIF learned through the study what is commonly known—that
an informed consumer will make rational pricing decisions. Be-
cause restaurants “with alcohol pricing on the menu experienced a
[$]1.72 [per-person average] decline as guests traded down,” TGIF
made the corporate decision that “alcohol pricing will not be
placed on the menu.”! In other words, TGIF determined that it
did not pay to conform to the law and that it was more profitable
to capitalize on the ignorance of its patrons. From TGIF’s own
statistical analysis comes the calculation of ascertainable loss to its
patrons and the gain to itself.

In passing N.J.S.A, 56:8-2.5 and requiring that the price of an
item be “plainly marked,” the Legislature intended to empower
consumers with knowledge. TGIF has pursued, and continues to
pursue, a cynical corporate policy of profiteering from violating
that statute.

Hl.

The Consumer Fraud Act makes it unlawful for a business to
engage in an “unconscionable commercial practice,” N.J.S.A. 56:8-
2, such as selling merchandise, including food and beverages,
without listing the price when it is offered for sale, N.J.S.A. 56:8-
2.5.5 The Act “provides a private cause of action to consumers who
are victimized by fraudulent practices in the marketplace.” Gonza-
lez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 576, 25 A.3d 1108 (2011).
The statutory scheme empowers citizens “to act as ‘private attor-
neys general’ in bringing civil actions to enforce the Act.” Stein-
berg v. Sahara Sam’s Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 361, 142 A.3d 742
(2016). This private right of action is particularly important when

4The study also inclided an analysis of non-alcoholic beverage pricing,
indicating that customers will trade down when the cost of a meal exceeds a
certain threshold.

5 NS.A, 56:8-2.5 makes it unlawful “for any person to sell ... or offer for
sale any merchandise at retail unless the total selling price of such merchandise
is plainly marked by a stamp, tag, label or sign either affixed to the merchandise
or located at the point where the merchandise is offered for sale.”

the Attorney General—perhaps due to inadequate resources—
does not exercise his enforcement powers, see N.J.S.A. 56:8-8 to -
8, -11, -15 to -18, -20, as here, to compel chain restaurants to
comply with price-listing requirements mandated by statute.

A plaintiff must satisfy three elements to prove that a business
is liable for consumer fraud. The plaintiff must show that the
business engaged in “an unlawful practice,” that she suffered an
“ascertainable loss,” and that the “ascertainable loss” is causally
related to the unlawful practice. Gonzalez, supra, 207 N.J. at 576,
25 A.3d 1108 (quoting Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 521, 4 A.3d 561); see
also N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. If the plaintiff succeeds in her proofs, she is
entitled to legal and/or equitable relief, treble damages, and
reasonable attorneys’ fees. N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.

TGIF’s own commissioned study establishes that, on average,
TGIF patrons who purchased beverages paid $1.72 more per meal
than they would have if prices had been listed on TGIF menus,
That $1.72 constitutes, on average, an ascertainable loss per
person, per meal, causally related to TGIF’s unlawful practice of
not disclosing prices. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 522, 4 A.3d 561;
see also N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.5

According to the study, TGIF will lose money if it complies with
the CFA by listing beverage prices on its menus. If TGIF
conforms to the law, then it has two options. It can maintain its
current pricing, and informed consumers will trade down rather
than purchase drinks that exceed what TGIF has pegged as the
“fair” price patrons will pay per meal. Or it can set prices for
beverages and meals at rates at which patrons will not trade
down. Under either scenario, the consumer benefits if TGIF
follows the mandate of the CFA.

6 In plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, they allege that TGIF's
practice of offering certain beverages without prices ... is designed to...
enable [TGIF] to charge slightly excessive prices on some drinks without
losing sales; facilitate [TGIF’s] practice of charging grossly excessive prices
on other drinks; and facilitate price discrimination and/or charging different
prices for the same product based on undisclosed and arbitrary criterifa].

Thus, TGIF’s patrons who purchase drinks are victimized by
the unlawful omission of beverage prices on menus. TGIF sets the
overall pricing of its meals and beverages based on its decision not
to list beverage prices on menus. Importantly, under the CFA,
plaintiffs merely have to show that the unlawful practice caused
the ascertainable loss. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 522, 4 A.3d 561;
Int'l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v.
Merck & Co., 192 N.J, 372, 389, 929 A.2d 1076 (2007),

IL

A class action is the only vehicle that will permit the large
number of patrons defrauded by TGIF to band together and
prosecute a lawsuit on equal terms with TGIF. See Lee, supra,
203 NJ. at 517-18, 4 A.3d 561. The trial court correctly certified
the class of customers who purchased unpriced alcoholic and non-
alcoholic beverages at company-owned New Jersey TGIF restau-
rants between January 12, 2004 and July 14, 2014 because the
requirements for class certification under Rule 4:32-1 have been
met.

Certain issues are not in dispute: the class of TGIF beverage-
purchasing consumers is too numerous for joinder of all members,
R, 4:32-1(a)(1); “there are questions of law or fact common to the
class,” R, 4:32-1(a)(2); there are claims and defenses “typical” to
the class, R. 4:32-1(a)(3); and the representative party “will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class,” R, 4:32-1(a)(4).
The parties disagree, however, on whether “the questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members” and whether “a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.” See R. 4:32-1(b)(8).

Under our court rule, predominance does not mean that “all
issues [must] be identical among class members.” Iliadis v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 108, 922 A.2d 710 (2007). To satisfy
the predominance requirement, plaintiffs do not have to show “the
absence of individual issues or that the common issues dispose of

the entire dispute.” Ibid. Nor is it necessary to show that “each
class member [is] affected in precisely the same manner.” Id, at
108-09, 922 A.2d 710. Indeed, it is almost certain that individual
questions will remain after the resolution of the common questions
of law and fact. See id. at 108, 922 A.2d 710. The heart of the
matter is whether the common issues are “qualitatively” more

ificant than the individual ones, See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at
519-20, 4 A.3d 561.

The common issue of law among all class members is that TGIF
does not list its beverage prices in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5.
The common issue of fact is that all members of the class suffer
from TGIF’s unlawful practice of not listing beverage prices. The
loss suffered by patrons resulting from TGIF’s violation of the
CFA is dispersed over the entire class of beverage purchasers,
with individual patrons incurring greater or lesser losses.

That individual loss determinations must be made is not unusual
in class actions. For example, in Lee, supra, the class-action
lawsuit alleged that a dietary supplement pill called Relacore was
sold to thousands of New Jersey consumers through various mass-
marketing deceptions in violation of the CFA. 203 N.J. at 504, 4
A.3d 561. We found that common issues of law and fact predomi-
nated, notwithstanding that individual questions concerning each
class member’s ascertainable loss had to be addressed. Id. at 528,
4 A8d 561. We recognized that the individual questions would
include “[t]he number of bottles of Relacore purchased by a class
member, the price of each bottle, and whether a refund was
received.” Ibid. That information could come from the corporate
defendant’s records or through a customer’s proof of purchase.
Ibid. We concluded that “the individual questions posed” did not
present an “insuperable obstacle.” Ibid.

Similarly, in Iliadis, supra, we addressed the certification of a
class of hourly employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. who alleged
that they were denied their contractual and statutory right to rest
and meal breaks. 191 N.J, at 96, 922 A.2d 710. We held that the
predominance prong was met, even though certain individual

questions persisted, including: how much time each employee
worked off-the-clock; “whether employees worked off-the-clock
with the expectation of compensation; and how much in damages
employees suffered.” Id, at 112, 922 A.2d 710. The presence of
those issues did not defeat the certification of the class because
the common issues were qualitatively more significant. Id. at 112-
18, 922 A.2d 710.

The individual questions that would remain in this case surely
are no more difficult or weighty than those faced in Lee and
Iliadis. As was true in those cases, the common issues of law and
fact predominate over any individual ones.

In addition, a class action unquestionably is “superior” to any
other means of fairly adjudicating the claims against TGIF. The
many defrauded patrons will not file actions in small claims court
to recover their minor monetary losses. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J.
at 528, 4 A3d 561. As we noted in Lee, “[t]he discovery and
litigation costs, including expert-witness fees, make a lawsuit
against a determined corporate adversary a costly undertaking.”
Ibid. A class action “provide[s] a diffuse group of persons, whose
claims are too small to litigate individually, the opportunity to
engage in collective action and to balance the scales of power.” Id.
at 528-29, 4 A.3d 561. Moreover, TGIF will not likely reverse its
corporate policy of willful disregard of the CFA if just a few
patrons seek relief for the small amounts they overpaid. Here,
there will be a class action or no action at all.

Iv.

A.

The statistical evidence establishing that patrons suffer a com-
mon ascertainable loss by TGIF’s nondisclosure of beverage prices
on menus comes from TGIF’s own files. The type of statistical
evidence offered here is not foreign to our jurisprudence.

In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, the United States Su-
preme Court approved of the use of a statistical or representative

sample of members of a class of workers, who claimed that they
were shorted on their wages, to establish the basis for a class-
action lawsuit, 577 U.S. ——, ——, 186 S.Ct. 1036, 1046, 194
L,Ed.2d 124, 184-85 (2016). In that case, employees of Tyson
Foods brought a class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201 to 219, claiming that their employer
denied them their rightful overtime wages for the time they
expended donning and doffing protective equipment. Id. at ——,
186 S.Ct, at 1041, 194 L.Ed.2d at 129, Tyson Foods contended that
the variance in protective gear worn by employees rendered
impossible any uniform calculation of time each employee spent
putting on and taking off the gear, and therefore “the employees’
claims were not sufficiently similar to be resolved on a classwide
basis.” Id. at —, 186 S.Ct, at 1042-48, 1046, 194 L.Ed.2d at 131,
134-35.

The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court permitted plaintiffs to
rely on expert statistical analysis that determined the average
time taken for employees to change into the necessary protective
gear. Id. at ——, 186 S.Ct, at 1044-45, 194 L.Ed.2d at 138.
Because “each employee worked in the same facility, did similar
work, and was paid under the same policy,” the experiences of a
representative subset of employees was “probative as to the
experiences of all of them.” Id, at ——, 186 S.Ct. at 1048, 194
L.Ed.2¢ at 187.

Courts have allowed market research analysis to calculate dam-
ages for a class of plaintiffs based on the price premium consum-
ers paid resulting from a company’s misrepresentation about its
product. One such example in the class action setting is In re
Scotts EZ Seed Litigation, 304 F.R.D, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). In that
case, consumers in California and New York brought a class action
under their respective state consumer laws, alleging that Scotts’
description of their grass as “50% thicker with half the water
compared to ordinary seed” was misleading. Id. at 404-05 (internal
quotations omitted). At the class certification stage, the plaintiffs’
expert presented a damages model to specifically isolate the

additional amount of money—or “price premium”—that consum-
ers paid based on the alleged misrepresentation. Id. at 414. The
United States District Court held that the proposed model satis-
fied the standard for showing that damages could be measured on
a classwide basis. Id. at 415. Moreover, while the Scotts Court
emphasized that under the federal standard an expert was not
required to “perform his analyses at the class certification stage,”
it did point to compelling evidence that had been provided in
support of the actual existence of a price premium, including
“internal documents suggesting the existence of a premium based
on the [allegedly false claim].” Id. at 414. See also Goldemberg v.
Johnson_& Johnson Consumer _Cos., 317 F.R.D, 374, 896-97
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding damages measurable on classwide basis
where plaintiffs had presented model that isolates portion of price
attributable to company’s alleged misrepresentations about its
products).

Here, TGIF’s internal documents determined the loss attribut-
able to consumers when it did not list beverage prices. The market
analysis conducted by the experts in Scotts and Goldemberg are
comparable to the market research used by TGIF to justify its not
listing beverage prices.

B.

Based on its marketing studies, TGIF apparently made a busi-
ness decision not to list beverage prices for the sake of higher
profits, notwithstanding that its policy violated the CFA. Certain-
ly, statistical evidence that was sufficiently clear and compelling to
guide TGIF in shaping its business policy is equally relevant in
this class-action suit to establish that TGIF’s unlawful practice
caused an ascertainable loss on average of $1.72 per person, per
meal.

Plaintiffs have established that common issues of law and fact
predominate over individual ones and that a class action is not
only a superior vehicle but is the only vehicle for vindicating the
rights of the aggrieved class of patrons.

V.

Plaintiffs are not advancing a “fraud-on-the-market” theory—a
theory that typically applies in securities cases. Ante at 60, 171
A8d 620, In an open securities market, the price of stocks
depends on all available material information. Peil v. Speiser, 806
F.2d 1154, 1160 (d Cir. 1986). The fraud-on-the-market theory
recognizes that the issuance of a material misleading statement by
a company will influence the pricing of its stock. See Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S, 224, 241-42, 108 §.Ct, 978, 989, 99 L.Ed.2d 194,
215 (1988). Based on that premise, in a securities-fraud case, stock
purchasers can pursue a fraud claim without showing that they
relied on the misrepresentations. Ibid. Under the fraud-on-the-
market approach, a rebuttable presumption of reliance applies to
satisfy the causal requirement between a defendant’s misrepresen-
tation and plaintiff's purchase of the stock at the fraudulently
inflated price. Id. at 248, 244-47, 108 S.Ct. at 989-92, 99 L.Ed.2d
at 216-18. In Kaufman vy. i-Stat Corp., we did not allow the
plaintiffs in a common-law fraud action to “prove the element of
reliance through the presumption of a fraud on the market.” 165
N.J. 94, 97, 118, 754 A.2d 1188 (2000) (emphases added).

In this case, plaintiffs do not seek to satisfy an element of their
claim through a presumption of fraud on the market. First, “the
CFA ‘does not require proof of reliance,’ but only a causal
connection between the unlawful practice and ascertainable loss.”
See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 528, 4 A.8d 561 (quoting Gennari v.
Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 604, 607, 691 A.2d 350
(1997)). Second, plaintiffs here do not seek the benefit of a
presumption to satisfy their burden of proving a causal nexus
between TGIF’s statutory violation and the ascertainable loss
suffered by TGIF’s patrons.

The present case is unlike International Union, supra, in which
the plaintiff sought “to be relieved of the usual requirements that
plaintiff prove an ascertainable loss” by showing only that the
price charged for Vioxx was higher than it should have been as a
result of defendant’s fraudulent marketing campaign.” 192 N.J. at

392, 929 A.2d 1076. There, the plaintiff intended to use “a single
expert who would opine about the effect on pricing of the market-
ing campaign in which defendant engaged.” Ibid. (emphasis add-
ed).

Here, plaintiffs do not rely on a “single expert” to establish the
price effect of TGIF’s statutory violation. See ibid. Instead, plain-
tiffs have presented the study commissioned by TGIF that caleu-
lates the ascertainable loss to its patrons when beverage prices
are not listed on menus. TGIF’s own study is offered as direct
evidence and, at this procedural stage, is entitled to deference as a
statistically accurate calculation of the loss incurred by patrons.
Although the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable
to plaintiffs, the majority draws negative inferences to cast doubt
on the validity of TGIF’s study. Significantly, this case is merely
at the class-certification stage, and plaintiffs are entitled to intro-
duce expert-witness testimony to further bolster their claims of
ascertainable loss based on TGIF’s study.

Moreover, the majority is mistaken if it is suggesting that the
CFA does not protect consumers from price gouging. See, e.g.,
N.JS.A, 56:8-88(b) (prohibiting ticket scalping at exorbitant
rates).” The purpose of requiring that the price of merchandise be
listed at the point of sale pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 is to allow
consumers to make informed decisions in making purchases. In-
deed, the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 makes this very
point. See Sponsor’s Statement _to A. 1172 (1972) (“Consumers
have a right to know the price of all items they wish to purchase

. Clear indication of the price of all merchandise will aid in

TN.J.S.A, 56:8-33(b) provides:
No person other than a registered ticket broker shall resell or purchase with
the intent to resell a ticket for admission to a place of entertainment at a
maximum premium in excess of 20% of the ticket price or $3.00, whichever
is greater, plus lawful taxes. No registered ticket broker shall resell or
purchase with the intent to resell a ticket for admission to a place of
entertainment at a premium in excess of 50% of the price paid to acquire the
ticket, plus lawful taxes.

preventing discriminatory sales practices and capricious pricing by
merchants”).

Additionally, the greater the number of victims of a CFA
violation should not diminish the right to a remedy. The fact that
plaintiffs have presented a large discrete class of victimized pa-
trons makes this case a more, not less, compelling case for class
certification.

VI.

T also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiffs have
failed to make out a claim under the Truth-in-Consumer Contract,
Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), NJ.S.A, 56:12-14 to -18.8
Plaintiffs have presented evidence to satisfy the four elements of a
TCCWNA claim. Plaintiffs have established that (1) they are
consumers; (2) TGIF is a seller; (8) TGIF displays menus, which
constitute a written notice or sign for purposes of the TCCWNA;
and (4) the omission of beverage pricing on the menus violates
state law—N.J,S.A. 56:8-2.5. See N.J.S.A. 56:12-15,

The majority contends that plaintiffs are not “aggrieved custom-
er[s]” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:12-17, positing that plaintiffs have
not met the evidentiary threshold of showing that TGIF patrons
were given menus before purchasing their meals. Ante at 69-70,
171 A.8d 620. To reach that conclusion, the majority denies
plaintiffs the benefit of the most favorable inferences to be drawn
from TGIF’s corporate policy of requiring its servers to hand each
customer a menu, At this stage, the fair inference is that TGIF’s

8 Although the discussion here is directed toward the Dugan case, the reason-
ing and conclusion apply equally to the Bozzi case.

9 N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 provides:
No seller ... shall in the course of his business offer to any consumer or
prospective consumer ... or display any written ... notice or sign
which includes any provision that violates any clearly established legal right
of a consumer or responsibility of a seller ... as established by State or
Federal law at the time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed
or ... notice or sign is given or displayed.

servers complied with corporate policy and that patrons received
menus. Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing that the
class of patrons here meets the definition of aggrieved customers.

Additionally, the majority has erred in finding that TGIF’s
obligation to display beverage pricing was not clearly established
by the CFA’s point-of-sale statute, N.J.S.A, 56:8-2.5. Ante at 71-
72, 171 A.3d 620. The plain and simple statutory language clearly
indicates that TGIF is required to list beverage prices on its
menus. N.J.S.A, 56:8-2.5 prohibits the sale of “merchandise” with-
out a price at the point of sale. Merchandise “include{s] any
objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered,
directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J.S.A, 56:8-1(¢).
Clearly, beverages are goods, and at the very least, beverages
meet the description of “anything offered ... to the public for
sale.” Ibid. (emphasis added). TGIF did not have to wait for a
published opinion by this Court to reach this common-sense
conclusion,

In this case, the Appellate Division expressed its confidence that
“Gf the legislature intended to excise beverage sales at restaurants
from the sweep of the CFA ..., it would have done so in plain
language without the necessity of an advanced degree in either
logic or linguistics.” In other words, divining the meaning of
“merchandise” is not rocket science. Significantly, no party has
argued before us that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 does not mandate that a
restaurant list beverage prices on its menus.

Incredibly, the majority hints that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 may not
apply to the sale of beverages by restaurants. If that were true,
NJ.S.A, 56:8-2.5 would not require restaurants to post any meal
prices, Under the statutory definition of merchandise, there is no
logical distinction between food and beverage served in restau-
rants. It cannot be that a hamburger is merchandise but a
milkshake is not.

The majority notes that it is unaware of whether the Attorney
General has taken action to compel restaurants to list beverage
pricing on menus pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5. Ante at 70, 171

A.3d 620. The failure of the Attorney General to enforce a CFA
provision, however, is not evidence that a restaurant is complying
with the law. Indeed, the CFA vests individuals with the power to
act as private attorneys general as a separate enforcement mecha-
nism. Steinberg, supra, 226 N.J. at 361, 142 A3d 742. This Court,
moreover, has the ultimate authority to construe the meaning of
NWJ.S.A. 56:8-2.5, and if there is any doubt about the Appellate
Division’s interpretation, the majority should have certified that
issue separately. Why has the majority remanded the Bozzi class-
certification case for further proceedings if there is a question
about whether restaurants must place beverage prices on their
menus? Judicial economy certainly is not advanced by letting a
class action proceed if there is no statutory authority to support a
claim.

Additionally, the majority does not explain why in the Bozzi
case it vacated the trial court’s injunction, which mandated that
OSI restaurants list beverage prices on menus. The right to
equitable relief compelling those restaurants to comply with the
price-listing requirements of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 was not dependent
on class certification. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. The right to equitable
relief depended only on whether N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 requires disclo-
sure of beverage prices on menus, an issue that the majority
refuses to address even though it overturns the trial court’s
injunction. Last, if the application of TCCWNA to small claims in
this case is too blunt an instrument, as argued by amici curiae, the
Legislature is the proper forum to address this issue.

Vil.

The majority’s decision is a major blow to consumer rights
advanced in both the CFA and TCCWNA. The decision ensures
that thousands of patrons victimized by TGIF’s violation of our
consumer-fraud laws have no meaningful remedy. Additionally,
TGIF now has little incentive to alter its corporate policy of
ignoring provisions of the CFA. TGIF’s compliance with N.J.S.A.
56:8-2.5’s requirement that beverage prices be listed at the point

91

of sale may well depend on whether the Attorney General exercis-
es his powers to enforce our consumer-fraud laws.

For the reasons expressed, I respectfully dissent.

171 A.3d 1252

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BERGEN
COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE; FRANK PUCCIO, CUSTO-
DIAN OF RECORDS FOR THE BERGEN COUNTY PROSECU-
TOR’S OFFICE, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS,

M-180 September Term 2017
078074

October 4, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of the Libertarians for Trans-
parent Government for leave to file a brief and argue as amicus
curiae is granted. The parties may serve and file briefs in re-
sponse on or before November 6, 2017. Oral argument is limited to

five minutes.

171 A.3d 1252
IN THE MATTER OF THE JOINT LETTER DECISION ON ACPE
DOCKET NO. 29-2016, UPL DOCKET NO, 12-2016, AND CAA
DOCKET NO. 65-2016, (JAMS-PETITIONER)
R-3 Sept.Term 2017
079531

October 4, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the notice of petition for review is
granted; and it is further

ORDERED that JAMS may serve and file a supplemental brief
on or before November 18, 2017, and the Attorney General on
behalf of the committees may serve and file a brief in response on
or before December 18, 2017.

171 A.3d 1252

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
ADRIAN C, HICKEN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-184 Sept.Term 2017
079206

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003675-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1253

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v, DAVID
ARISTE, A/K/A D-BRIM, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,.

C-185 Sept. Term 2017
079286

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001892-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

171 A3d 1253

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y, EUGENE C. TAYLOR, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.

M-248 Sept.Term 2017
079950

October 20, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to file a motion for
leave to appeal as within time (M-243) is granted.

171 A.3d 1253

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. M.Z., DBFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-228 Sept.Term 2017
079480

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000464-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1254

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. B.H.M., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-219 Sept.Term 2017
079399

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002660-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1254

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. WILLIAM F. SAPONARO, JR., DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-230 Sept.Term 2017
079577

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000741-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1254

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DER-
RICK M. MILLER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ARTHUR L. THOMPSON, A/K/A
NASHEED, DEFENDANT.

C-223 Sept.Term 2017
079425

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~4022/4055-12
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1255

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. YERO C. BAILEY A/K/A BAILEY C. YERO,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C~229 Sept.Term 2017
079481

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001527-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1255

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. TIQUAN
WHITEHURST, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-~215 Sept.Term 2017
079857

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~-000511-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1255

TOWNSHIP OF LONG BEACH, PLAINTIFF, v.
LYDIA ZINZI, DEFENDANT-MOVANT,

M-259 Sept.Term 2017
080178

October 20, 2017
ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion to stay construction activities
is granted, only pending the Court’s disposition of the appeal.

171 A.3d 1255

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JER-
MAINE EASON, A/K/A JULITO EASON AND JERMAINE
JULITO, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-221 Sept.Term 2017
079408

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000527-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1256
IN RE: ACCUTANE LITIGATION

M-186 Sept.Term 2017
079958

October 20, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of Kenneth S. Broun, Daniel J.
Capra, Joanne A. Epps, David L. Faigman, Laird Fitzpatrick,
Michael M. Martin, Liesa Richter, and Stephen A. Saltzburg for
leave to appear as amicus curiae is granted limited solely to the
brief that accompanied the motion. The parties may serve and file
briefs in response on or before November 15, 2017.

171 A.3d 1256

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. HIRAM
A. CELESTINE, A/K/A LEROY JOHNSON, LEROY A. JOHN-
SON, ANDRE FOSTER, ANDRE JOHNSON, ANDRE JONES,
DIAMOND SIMS, ANDRE JOYNER, HIRAM CELSTINE, HIR-
EN CELESTINE, CURTIS L. BEATON AND ANDY JOHNSON,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-220 Sept.Term 2017
079405

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002803-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1257

FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LIMITED AND CRUM & FOR-
STER HOLDINGS CORP., PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v.
S.A.C. CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., S.A.C. CAPITAL AD-
VISORS, L.L.C., S.A.C. CAPITAL ASSOCIATES, L.L.C., SIGMA
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., STEVEN A. COHEN, ROCK-
ER PARTNERS, L.P., COPPER RIVER PARTNERS, L.P., DAVID
ROCKER, THIRD POINT L.L.C., DANIEL S. LOEB, JEFFREY
PERRY, JAMES S. CHANOS, AND KYNIKOS ASSOCIATES, L.P.,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND INSTITUTIONAL
CREDIT PARTNERS, L.L.C., ET AL., DEFENDANTS, AND

100

EXIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC.,, EXIS CAPITAL, L.L.C.,
EXIS DIFFERENTIAL PARTNERS, L.P., EXIS INTEGRATED
PARTNERS, L.P., ADAM D, SENDER, ANDREW HELLER, AND
MORGAN KEEGAN & COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANTS-RE-
SPONDENTS, AND SPYRO CONTOGOURIS, ET AL., DEFEN-
DANTS,
C-204 Sept.Term 2017
079412

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000963-12
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

171 A.3d 1257

DIANNA QUAMINA, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER,
v. STELLA GARDENS APARTMENTS,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT,

C-212 Sept.Term 2017
079309

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002910-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

101

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1258
SQUIRETOWN PROPERTIES, LLC, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v.

TOWNSHIP OF LIVINGSTON AND LIVINGSTON TOWNSHIP
COUNCIL, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS,

C-200 Sept.Term 2017
079695

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000528-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

171 A.3d 1258

VINCENT INNARELLA, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. WEDGE-
WOOD CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATES, INC.. WEDGEWOOD
GARDEN CONDO ASSOCIATION, INC., PROGRESSIVE BUILD-
ING MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., GARDEN HOMES, INC.,
THE PROGRESSIVE COMPANIES, AND LAKEVIEW GAR-
DENS, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-203 Sept. Term 2017
079694

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002542-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

171 A.3d 1258

FRANCINE REIBMAN, A MARRIED WOMAN, PLAINTIFF-PETI-
TIONER, v. JAY H. MYERS, A/K/A JAY M. MYERS, A MARRIED
MAN, DEFENDANT, AND WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., TRUS-
TEE FOR CARRINGTON MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, SERIES
2006-NC3 ASSET-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
A NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-210 Sept.Term 2017
079841

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

nn ———  —Vo3—V—
|

| A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000332-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-

ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

171 A.3d 1259

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
CONOR R. MAHONEY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-226 Sept.Term 2017
079466

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-008251-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-

ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1259

SHAKEEM MALIK HOLMES, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. JERSEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-73 Sept. Term 2017
079457

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001634-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

171 A.3d 1259

TOWNSHIP OF LONG BEACH, PLAINTIFF, v.
JEAN VELTEN, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.

M-250 Sept.Term 2017
080179

October 20, 2017
ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion to stay construction activities
is granted, only pending the Court’s disposition of the appeal.

105

171 A.3d 1259

TOWNSHIP OF LONG BEACH, PLAINTIFF, v. LISA
A. TOMASI, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.

M-258 Sept.Term 2017
080177

October 20, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion to stay construction activities
is granted, only pending the Court’s disposition of the appeal.

171 A.3d 1260

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
JAY R. GOLDBERG, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-222 Sept. Term 2017
079410

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001340-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1260

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. RAYMOND C. GRAVATT, JR., DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C~231 Sept. Term 2017
079816

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002878-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1260

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v, JOHANNA CASSIMORE, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-225 Sept.Term 2017
079436

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-919/2793-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

a

171 A.3d 1261

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. SAINT H.

MERILAN A/K/A, SAINT HILAIRE MERILAN, SAINT H. MER-

IALN, SAINT MERILAN, JASON WILLIAMS, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-217 Sept. Term 2017
; 079388

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002826-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1261

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. DENNIS AIELLO, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-227 Sept.Term 2017
079468
October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004514-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1262

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ALEXAN-
DER RUIZ-NEGRON, A/K/A ALEXANDER RUIZ AND ALEX-
ANDER RUIZNEGRON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. STATE
OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. RAMON D. RUIZ-PEREZ,
A/K/A RAMON PEREZ, PEREZ RAMON, RAMIN RUIZPEREZ,
RAMON RUIZ AND RAMON D. RUIZ, DEFENDANT. STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. LUIS R. GARCIA, A/K/A RICO.
GARCIA AND LOUIS LUISITO, DEFENDANT,

C-182 Sept.Term 2017
079161

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-1993/2903/5473-
14 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1262

CATHY MITCHELL, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. GERALD
SKEY, S. BHATTACHARYA, SKEY BHATTACHARYA
LAW FIRM, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-199 Sept.Term 2017
079649

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001657-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

171 A.3d 1262

ANTHONY CASTRONOVA, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. COUNTY
OF BERGEN, DEFENDANT, AND BERGEN COUNTY PROSE-
CUTOR’S OFFICE (BCPO) STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND BER-
GEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR JOHN MOLINELLI, DEFEN-
DANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-209 Sept.Term 2017
079691

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000933-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

171 A.3d 1263

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. IBNMAU-
RIC ANTHONY, A/K/A IBNMAURICE ANTHONY AND IB-
NMAURICE RASHA ANTHONY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-159 Sept.Term 2017
079344

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005429-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted
limited to the issue of the State’s failure to comply with the
requirements of State v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48, 902 A.2d 888 (2006);
and it is further

ORDERED that the appellant may serve and file a supplemen-
tal brief on or before December 19, 2017, and respondent may
serve and file a supplemental brief forty-five (45) days after the
filing of appellant’s supplemental submission, or if appellant de-
clines to file such a submission, on or before February 2, 2018.

11

171 A.3d 1263

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER,
vy. MICHAEL RICHARD POWERS, DEFENDANT.

C-213 Sept.Term 2017
078794

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003764-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1264

CASTLE REALTY MANAGEMENT, LLC, ASSIGNEE OF CC
DAHMS, LLC, T/A RE/MAX CONNECTION REALTORS, PLAIN-
TIFF-RESPONDENT, v. KEVIN BURBAGE, AUGUSTA INVEST-

MENTS, INC. D/B/A RE/MAX PREFERRED, DEFENDANTS-
PETITIONERS.

C-202 Sept.Term 2017
079840

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005399-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

171 A.3d 1264
IN RE APPEAL OF THE APPLICATION FOR NJ

FIREARMS PURCHASER ID CARD, ET AL.
(MARK SCOTT-PETITIONER)

C-207 Sept.Term 2017
079584

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000845~-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs,

113

171 A.3d 1264
BANC OF CALIFORNIA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION DBA BANC
HOME LOANS, PLAINTIFF, v. RITU MADHOK,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.
C-211 Sept.Term 2017
079479

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003081-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1264

KEVIN KILLEEN AND NOEL KILLEEN, PLAINTIFFS-RESPON-
DENTS, v. JENSON & MITCHELL, INC., A/K/A J & M NATION-
AL SPRING, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, AND NSPC, INC., THIRD-
PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY
COMPANY OF AMERICA, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-PETI-
TIONER.

C~-208 Sept.Term 2017
079490

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000001-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

171 A.3d 1265

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. TARIQ
S. GATHERS, DEFENDANT-MOVANT,

279 Sept.Term 2017
079274

October 20, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to file a supplemental
respondent's brief as within time (M-279) is granted.

171 A.3d 1265

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. T.S., DEFENDANT-PE-
TITIONER, AND M.B. AND E.P., DEFENDANTS. IN THE MAT-
TER OF N.S, AND T.B., MINORS-RESPONDENTS.

C-201 Sept.Term 2017
079245

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

115

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004936-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1265
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

vy. SHIQUAN D. BELLAMY, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-218 Sept.Term 2017
079390

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003369-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

116

171 A.3d 1266

FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LIMITED AND CRUM & FOR-
STER HOLDINGS CORP., PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-RESPON-
DENTS, v. S.A.C. CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., ET AL., DE-
FENDANTS, AND EXIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC,, ET
AL., DEFENDANTS, AND MORGAN KEEGAN & COMPANY,
INC., DEFENDANT-CROSS-PETITIONER, AND SPYRO CON-
TOGOURIS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

C-205 Sept.Term 2017
079412

October 20, 2017

ON CROSS PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A cross-petition for certification of the judgment in A-000963-12
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the cross-petition for certification is
denied, with costs.

171 A.3d 1266

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. M.D.M., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-2L6 Sept.Term 2017
079368

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

117

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000854-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1266
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

y. TERRANCE 0. HOOKS, A/K/A TERRENCE
HOOKS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-214 September Term 2017
079285

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002574-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1267
IN RE: ACCUTANE LITIGATION

M-183 Sept.Term 2017
079958

October 20, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of the Healthcare Institute of
New Jersey, the New Jersey Business & Industry Association, the
Commerce and Industry Association of New Jersey, and the New
Jersey Chambers of Commerce for leave to file a brief and argue
as amicus curiae is granted. The parties may serve and file
response briefs on or before November 15, 2017. If the petition for
certification is granted, oral argument is limited to five minutes.

171 A.3d 1267

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ALEXANDER RUIZ-
NEGRON, A/K/A ALEXANDER RUIZ AND ALEXANDER RUIZ-
NEGRON, DEFENDANT, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAIN-
TIFF, v. RAMON D, RUIZ-PEREZ, A/K/A RAMON PEREZ, PER-
EZ RAMON, RAMIN RUIZPEREZ, RAMON RUIZ AND RAMON
D. RUIZ, DEFENDANT. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAIN-
TIFF-RESPONDENT, v. LUIS R. GARCIA, A/K/A RICO GARCIA
AND LOUIS LUISITO, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-183 Sept.Term 2017
079161

October 20, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

119

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~1993/2903/5473-
14 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1268
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. DERRICK M. MILLER,
DEFENDANT. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RE-

SPONDENT, v. ARTHUR L. THOMPSON, A/K/A NASHEED, DE-
FENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-224 Sept.Term 2017
079425

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-4022/4055~12
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1268

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ALEXANDER RUIZ~
NEGRON, A/K/A ALEXANDER RUIZ AND ALEXANDER RUIZ-
NEGRON, DEFENDANT. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAIN-
TIFF-RESPONDENT, v. RAMON D. RUIZ-PEREZ, A/K/A RA-
MON PEREZ, PEREZ RAMON, RAMIN RUIZPEREZ, RAMON
RUIZ AND RAMON D. RUIZ, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. LUIS R. GARCIA,
A/K/A RICO GARCIA AND LOUIS LUISITO, DEFENDANT.

C-181 Sept.Term 2017
079161

October 20, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~1993/2903/5473-
14 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

171 A.3d 1269

FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LIMITED AND CRUM & FOR-
STER HOLDINGS CORP., PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-RESPON-
DENTS, v. S.A.C, CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C,, S.A.C. CAPI-
TAL ADVISORS, L.L.C., S.A.C. CAPITAL ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.,
SIGMA CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C,, STEVEN A. COHEN,
DEFENDANTS-CROSS-PETITIONERS, AND ROCKER PART-
NERS, L.P., COPPER RIVER ET AL., DEFENDANTS, AND
EXIS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS,
AND SPYRO CONTOGOURIS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS,

C-206 Sept.Term 2017
079412
October 20, 2017
ON CROSS PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

121

A cross-petition for certification of the judgment in A-000963-12
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the cross-petition for certification is
denied, with costs.

171 A.3d 1269
IN RE: ACCUTANE LITIGATION

M-185 Sept.Term 2017
079958

October 20, 2017

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court, it is
ORDERED that the motion of Ronald S. Connelly, Esquire, a
member of the District of Columbia and Maryland bars, to appear
pro hac vice on behalf of the Medical Society of New Jersey, the
American Medical Association, the American Academy of Derma-
tology, the Society for Investigative Dermatology, the American
Acne and Rosacea Society, and the Dermatological Society of New
Jersey is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that Ronald S. Connelly, Esquire shall abide by
Rule 1:21-2, including his obligation to adhere to the Rules of
Professional Conduct and to make his required annual payment to
the Disciplinary Oversight Committee and the Lawyers’ Fund for
Client Protection, said payment to be made within ten days of the
filing date of this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of
New Jersey is hereby appointed as agent upon whom service of
process may be made for all action against Ronald S. Connelly,

Esquire, and that may arise out of his participation in this matter;
and it is further

ORDERED that Ronald S. Connelly, Esquire, shall notify the
Court immediately of any matter affecting his standing at the bar
of any other court; and it is further

ORDERED that all pleadings, briefs and other papers filed with
the Court shall be signed by New Jersey counsel, authorized to
practice law in the State of New Jersey, who shall be responsible
for his conduct of the cause and the attorney especially admitted

herein.

171 A.3d 1270
IN RE: ACCUTANE LITIGATION

M-184 Sept.Term 2017
079958

October 20, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of the Medical Society of New
Jersey, the American Medical Association, the American Academy
of Dermatology, the Society for Investigative Dermatology, the
American Acne and Rosacea Society, and the Dermatological
Society of New Jersey for leave to appear as amicus curiae is
granted limited solely to the brief that accompanied the motion.
The parties may serve and file briefs in response on or before
November 15, 2017.

172 A.3d 542
IN THE MATTER OF ERIC A. KLEIN, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 019961987)
D-194 September Term 2016
079764

October 25, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-039, recommending that as a matter of final
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(¢), ERIC A. KLEIN, formerly
of HARRINGTON PARK, who was admitted to the bar of this
State in 1987 and who has been temporarily suspended from the
practice of law since July 27, 2005, be disbarred based on his
conviction in the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of felony wire fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 1348, conduct that in New
Jersey violates RPC 8.4(b)(commission of a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer), and RPC 8.4(c)(conduet involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation);

And ERIC A, KLEIN having failed to appear on the Order
directing him to show cause why he should not be disbarred or
otherwise disciplined, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that ERIC A. KLEIN be disbarred, effective
immediately, and that his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys;

ORDERED that ERIC A. KLEIN be and hereby is permanent-
ly restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by ERIC A. KLEIN pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be restrained from
disbursement except on application to this Court, for good cause

124

shown, and shall be transferred by the financial institution to the
Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to deposit the funds
in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the further Order of
this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that ERIC A. KLEIN comply with Rule 1:20-20
dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

172 A.3d 542
IN THE MATTER OF PETER FLOYD ANDERSON, JR., AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 008161982)
D-173 September Term 2016
079615

October 25, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16437, recommending that as a matter of
reciprocal discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-14, PETER FLOYD
ANDERSON of STONY POINT, NEW YORK, who was admit-
ted to the bar of this State in 1983, and whose license to practice
law in New Jersey was administratively revoked pursuant to Rule
1:28-2(¢) effective September 12, 2016, be disbarred for his admis-
sions under oath that he knowingly misappropriated escrow funds,

125

conduct in violation of RPC 8.4(e)(conduct involving fraud, dishon-
esty, deceit, or misrepresentation) and the principles of In re
Hollendonner, 102 N.J. 21, 504 A.2d 1174 (1985);

And said PETER FLOYD ANDERSON having failed to ap-
pear on the Order directing him to show cause why he should not
be disbarred or otherwise disciplined;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that PETER FLOYD ANDERSON be dis-
barred, effective immediately, and that his name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that PETER FLOYD ANDERSON be and hereby
is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law and
from seeking readmission to the practice of law, whether by Rule
1:24 or otherwise; and it is further

ORDERED that PETER FLOYD ANDERSON comply with
Rule 1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondents file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

172 A.3d 543

IN THE MATTER OF BRIAN MCDEVITT, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 037281989)

D-11 September Term 2017
080072

November 1, 2017

ORDER

This matter have been duly presented pursuant to Rule 1:20-
10(b), following a granting of a motion for discipline by consent in
DRB 17-249 of BRIAN McDEVITT of NORRISTOWN, PA, who
was admitted to the bar of this State in 1989;

And the Office of Attorney Ethics and respondent having signed
a stipulation of discipline by consent in which it was agreed that

127

respondent violated RPC 1.2(d)(counseling or assisting in conduct
that the lawyer knows is illegal, criminal or fraudulent), RPC
1.7(a)(concurrent conflict of interest), RPC 8.3(a)(1), RPC 3.3(a)(4),
RPC 3.3(a)(5)(lack of candor to a tribunal), RPC 4.1(a)(1)(making a
false statement of material fact of law to a third person), RPC
8.1(a)(knowingly making a false statement of material fact in
connection with a disciplinary matter), RPC 8.4(¢)(conduct involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and RPC
8.4(d)(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice);

And the parties having agreed that respondent’s conduct violat-
ed RPC 1.2(d)(counseling or assisting in conduct that the lawyer
knows is illegal, criminal or fraudulent); RPC 1.7(a)(coneurrent
conflict of interest); RPC 3.3(a)(1), (a)(4), and (a)(5)(lack of candor
to a tribunal); RPC 4.1(a)(1)(making a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person); RPC 8.1(a)(knowingly making a
false statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary
matter); RPC 8.4(c)(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation); and RPC 8.4(d)(conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice), and that said conduct warrants six-
month suspension from practice or such lesser discipline as the
Board deems appropriate;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that a
six-month suspension from practice is the appropriate discipline
for respondent’s unethical conduct and having granted the motion
for discipline by consent in District Docket No, XIV-2017-0152E;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having submitted the record
of the proceedings to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for the
entry of an order of discipline in accordance with Rule 1:20-16(e);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that BRIAN McDEVITT of NORRISTOWN,
PA is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six months and until the further Order of the Court, effective
November 30, 2017; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent's fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

172 A.3d 545

IN THE MATTER OF JAY I. LAZEROWITZ, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 030861983)

D-20 September Term 2017
080152

November 1, 2017

ORDER

JAY I. LAZEROWITZ, formerly of GLEN ROCK, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 1983, and who has been
temporarily suspended from the practice of law since January 27,

129

2016, having tendered his consent to disbarment as an attorney at
law of the State of New Jersey, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JAY I. LAZEROWITZ is disbarred by
consent, effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent’s name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys and that he be permanently restrained and enjoined
from practicing law; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

172 A.3d 545
IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT B. DAVIS, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 001482005)
D-32 September Term 2017
080248

November 1, 2017

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented, it is ORDERED that
ROBERT B. DAVIS of JERSEY CITY, who was admitted to the
bar of this State in 2005, and who was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year, retroactive to February

27, 2012, by Order of this Court filed September 13, 2017, be
restored to the practice of law, effective immediately.

172 A.3d 545
IN THE MATTER OF BENJAMIN MORTON, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 050681998)
D-12 September Term 2017
080073

November 1, 2017

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented pursuant to Rule 1:20-
10(b)(1), following a granting of a motion for discipline by consent
in DRB 17-229 of BENJAMIN MORTON of NEWARK, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 1998;

And the Office of Attorney Ethics and respondent having signed
a stipulation of discipline by consent in which it was agreed that
respondent violated RPC 1.15(d)(failure to comply with the record-
keeping requirements of Rule 1:21-6);

And the parties having agreed that respondent’s conduct violat-
ed RPC 1.15(d)(failure to comply with the recordkeeping require-
ments of Rule 1:21-6), and that said conduct warrants a censure or
such lesser discipline as the Board may deem appropriate;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that a
reprimand is the appropriate discipline for respondent's unethical
conduct and having granted the motion for discipline by consent in
VA-2016-0004E and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that BENJAMIN MORTON is hereby repri-
manded; and it is further

131

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

172 A.3d 546
IN THE MATTER OF NANCY KENNEDY BRENT, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 028852003)
D-16 September Term 2017
080094

November 1, 2017

ORDER

This matter have been duly presented pursuant to Rule 1:20-
10(b), following a granting of a motion for discipline by consent in
DRB 17-202 of NANCY KENNEDY BRENT of VINELAND,
who was admitted to the bar of this State in 2003;

And the Office of Attorney Ethics and respondent having signed
a stipulation of discipline by consent in which it was agreed that
respondent violated RPC 3.4(c)(knowingly disobeying an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal), RPC 5.5(a)(1) (unauthorized practice
of law) and RPC 8.4(d)(conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice;

And the parties having agreed that respondent’s conduct violat-
ed RPC 3.4(c)(knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal), RPC 5.5(a)(1) (unauthorized practice of law)) and
RPC 8.4(d)(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,

and that said conduct warrants a reprimand or lesser discipline as
the Board may deem appropriate;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having declined to find the
stipulated violation of RPC 8.4(d) and having determined that a
reprimand is the appropriate discipline for respondent’s unethical
conduct and having granted the motion for discipline by consent in
District Docket Numbers IV-2015-0019E and IV-2016-0024E;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having submitted the record
of the proceedings to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for the
entry of an order of discipline in accordance with Rule 1:20-16(e);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that NANCY KENNEDY BRENT of VINE-
LAND is hereby reprimanded; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

172 A.3d 547

IN THE MATTER OF BRIAN R. DECKER, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 008862009)

D-146 September Term 2016
079419

November 2, 2017
ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-831, concluding on the record certified to the

138

Board pursuant to Rule 1:20-4(f)(default by respondent) that
BRIAN R. DECKER of CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, who was admit-
ted to the bar of this State in 2009, and who has been temporarily
suspended from the practice of law since December 28, 2018
should be reprimanded for violating RPC 1.4(b)(failure to ade-
quately communicate with client), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that BRIAN R. DECKER is hereby repri-
manded; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent remain suspended from the prac-
tice of law pursuant to the Order of the Court filed November 22,
2013; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

172 A.3d 547

IN THE MATTER OF CRAIG R. MITNICK, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 039821987)

D-29 September Term 2017
080238

November 13, 2017
ORDER

This matter have been duly presented pursuant to Rule 1:20-
10(b), following a granting of a motion for discipline by consent in

DRB 17-310 of CRAIG R. MITNICK of HADDONFIELD, who
was admitted to the bar of this State in 1987;

And the Office of Attorney Ethics and respondent having signed
a stipulation of discipline by consent in which it was agreed that
respondent violated RPC 1.15(a)(negligent misappropriation and
commingling), RPC 1.15(d), and Rule 1:21-6 (recordkeeping viola-
tions);

And the parties having agreed that respondent’s conduct violat-
ed RPC 1.15(a), RPC 1.15(d) and Rule 1:21-6, and that said
conduct warrants a reprimand or lesser discipline;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that a
reprimand is the appropriate discipline for respondent’s unethical
conduct and having granted the motion for discipline by consent in
District Docket No. XIV-2015-0505E;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having submitted the record
of the proceedings to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for the
entry of an order of discipline in accordance with Rule 1:20-16(e);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that CRAIG R. MITNICK of HADDON-
FIELD is hereby reprimanded; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17,

135

172 A.3d 548

JOHN GIOVANNI GRANATA, PLAINTIFF, v. EDWARD F. BRODER-
ICK, JR., ESQ, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW OF THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY; BRODERICK, NEWMARK & GRATHER, DE-
FENDANTS. ROTENBERG, MERIL, SOLOMON, BERTIGER &
GUTILLA, P.C.; AND ELLIOT H. GOURVITZ, ESQ., INTERVE-
NORS-APPELLANTS. JOHN GIOVANNI GRANATA, PLAIN-
TIFF, v. EDWARD F. BRODERICK, JR., ESQ, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; BRODERICK,
NEWMARK & GRATHER, DEFENDANTS. OKS REALTY, IN-
TERVENOR-RESPONDENT, AND ROTENBERG, MERIL, SOL-
OMON, BERTIGER & GUTILLA, P.C.; AND ELLIOT H. GOUR-
VITZ, ESQ., INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS,

A-31 September Term 2016
A-32 September Term 2016

078207
Argued October 24, 2017—Decided November 14, 2017

Robert L. Podvey argued the cause for appellant Rotenberg,
Meril, Solomon, Bertiger & Gutilla, P.C. (Connell Foley, attorneys;
Robert L. Podvey, of counsel and on the brief).

Ari H. Gourvitz argued the cause for appellant Elliot H. Gour-
vitz, Esq. (Gourvitz & Gourvitz, attorneys; Ari. H. Gourvitz, on
the briefs).

Robyne D. LaGrotta argued the cause for respondent OKS
Realty (LaGrotta Law, attorneys; Robyne D. LaGrotta, of counsel
and on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

The Court granted certification to review petitioners’ challenges
to the Superior Court, Appellate Division’s determinations regard-
ing the distribution priorities of the attorney’s fee award, more
specifically the rulings that an attorney’s pledge of anticipated
attorney’s fees can be considered an account receivable and se-

cured under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
and that the lender here complied with the requirements of the
UCC to perfect its security interest by filing a financing statement
covering the collateral of the anticipated attorney's fees. Having
considered the parties’ arguments presented in their briefs and at
oral argument, the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed
substantially for the reasons expressed in those parts of Judge
Guadagno’s opinion addressing the distribution priorities of the
attorney's fee award, reported at 446 N.J. Super. 449, 143 A3d
309 (App. Div. 2016).

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and
TIMPONE join in this opinion.

172 A.3d 549
IN THE MATTER OF MAURO C. CASCI, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 003511978)
D-28 September Term 2017
080237

November 15, 2017

ORDER

This matter have been duly presented pursuant to Rule 1:20-
10(b), following the granting of a motion for discipline by consent
in DRB 17-809 of MAURO C. CASCI of LEONARDO, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 1976;

And the District IX Ethics Committee and respondent having
signed a stipulation of discipline by consent in which it was agreed
that respondent violated RPC 1.15(b)(failure to promptly notify a
client or third person of receipt of funds or to deliver those funds),
RPC 1.15(c)(failure to keep separate funds in which the lawyer

137

and another claim an interest, until there is an accounting and
severance of their interests), RPC 3.4(c)(knowingly violating an
obligation under the rules of the tribunal), and RPC 8.4(d)(conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice);

And the parties having agreed that respondent’s conduct violat-
ed RPC 1.15(b), RPC 1.15(¢), RPC 3.4(c) and RPC 8.4(d), and that
said conduct warrants a reprimand or lesser discipline;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined to dis-
miss the charged violation of RPC 1.15(b), for lack of sufficient
facts to support this violation;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that a
reprimand is the appropriate discipline for respondent’s unethical
conduct and having granted the motion for discipline by consent in
District Docket No. [X-2015-0006E;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having submitted the record
of the proceedings to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for the
entry of an order of discipline in accordance with Rule 1:20-16(e);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that MAURO C. CASCI of LEONARDO is
hereby reprimanded; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

138

172 A.3d 1079
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
JULIAN B, HAMLETT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
M-271 September Term 2017
079145
November 2, 2017

ORDER
It is ORDERED that the motion of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union of New Jersey for leave to file a brief and argue as
amicus curiae is granted. The parties may serve and file briefs in
response on or before December 4, 2017. Oral argument is limited
to five minutes.

172 A.3d 1079

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR EXPUNGEMENT
OF MARTIN V. CARLUCCIO. (MARTIN V.
CARLUCCIO—PETITIONER)

C-266 September Term 2017
079895

November 2, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court;

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005110-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

139

172 A.3d 1079
MTK FOOD SERVICES, INC., PLAINTIFF, v. SIRIUS AMERICA
INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANTS. (ARCHER & GREIN-
ER, P.C., AND RICHARD GRUNGO, JR., ESQ.—MOVANTS)
M-256 September Term 2017
080034

November 2, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal is granted
and the matter is summarily remanded to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division to consider on the merits.

172 A.3d 1080

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v, ALLEN ALEXANDER, A/K/A KARON KEENAN,
DEFENDANT-MOVANT,

M-25L September Term 2017
078515

November 2, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for a limited remand is
granted, in part, and the trial court is hereby authorized to
consider a motion by defendant to reduce or modify bail. The
Court notes that it takes no position on the merits of any bail-
related motion and also that this limited remand does not in any
way stay the proceedings in the appeal pending before the Su-
preme Court.

172 A.3d 1080

ANTHONY PACE, SR., PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, AND DIANE
PACE, HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFF, v. TOWNSHIP OF NUTLEY,
TOWNSHIP OF NUTLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT, LT, KEVIN
WATTS, AND POLICE OFFICER GERARD TUSA, DEFEN-
DANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-264 September Term 2017
079871

November 2, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005310-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

172 A.3d 1080

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. DOUGLAS JOHNSON, A/K/A DOUGIE AND D-
MURDER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-289 September Term 2017
079497

November 2, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002157-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

141

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1081
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. J.D., JR. DEFEN-

DANT-PETITIONER, AND J.G,, DEFENDANT. IN THE MAT-
TER OF J.D., IH, A MINOR-RESPONDENT.

C-268 September Term 2017
078479

November 2, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003716-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1081

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. DOUGLAS JOHNSON, A/K/A DOUGIE AND D-
MURDER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-289 September Term 2017
079497

November 2, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002157-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1081

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
TYRONE HOWARD, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-277 September Term 2017
078037

November 9, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001713-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1082

IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM R. HENDRICKSON, JR.,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, (WILLIAM
R. HENDRICKSON, JR.—PETITIONER)

C-270 September Term 2017
079885
November 9, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003675-15

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

172 A.3d 1082

YOAV KRILL, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. IDT CORPORATION,
INC., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, AND HOWARD JONAS,
DEFENDANT.

C-271 September Term 2017
079928

November 9, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005664-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

144

172 A.3d 1082

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. AA., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-281 September Term 2017
079486

November 09, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003459-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1083
A.L.I., PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. D.W., DEFENDANT.

C-235 September Term 2017
079836

November 9, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005230-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1083

NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
vy. TROOPER NICOLE CUSANELLI #6166,
RESPONDENT-PETITIONER.

C-263 September Term 2017
079152
November 9, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005611-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs,

172 A.3d 1083

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. WILBERT HANNAH, A/K/A RABE,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-280 September Term 2017
079467
November 9, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003515-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

146

172 A.3d 1084

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. BRIAN
M. RICHARDSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-278 September Term 2017
079004

November 9, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003619-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1084

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST
OF LT., A MINOR. (L.T.-PETITIONER)

C-992 September Term 2016
079112

November 9, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001491-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

147

172 A.3d 1084

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. SHAR-
EEF HOLDER, A/K/A PUMPKIN HOLDER, SHAREEF T.
HOLDER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-282 September Term 2017
079488

November 9, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000497-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1085

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
| ADRIAN ZIMMERMAN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-286 September Term 2017
079495

November 9, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~-005770-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1085

MARIE OLSSON, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. RICHARD OLS-
SON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. MARIE CONNORS, F/K/A
MARIE OLSSON, PLAINTIFF, v. RICHARD OLSSON, DEFEN-
DANT-PETITIONER.

C-276 September Term 2017
079499

November 9, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-1707/3559-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

172 A.3d 1085

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. NATHAN CRAFT, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C~-290 September Term 2017
079508
November 9, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001219-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

149

172 A.3d 1086

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. WAYNE
B. HIX, A/K/A WAYNE BILAL HIX, WAYNE HICKS, AND
WAYNE B. HICKS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C~283 September Term 2017
079472

November 9, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005887~14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1086

FISHER, KRYSTAL AND DAVID, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS,
vy. CITY OF MILLVILLE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT,

C-267 September Term 2017
079748

November 9, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-008861-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

172 A.3d 1086

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ROBERT
G. CASON, A/K/A ROBERT CASON, ROBERT GUY CASON, R.
GUY CA’SON, ROBERT GUY CASOM, JAMES WISON, DEFEN-
DANT-PETITIONER.

C-320 September Term 2017
079790

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002594-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1087

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
DANIEL BEDFORD, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-812 September Term 2017
079517

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~-003518-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

151

172 A.3d 1087

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. KYREE
T. JOHNSON, A/K/A KYRE JOHNSON, KYREE JAQUAN JOHN-
SON, TYREE JOHNSON, AND JOHNSON TYREE, DEFEN-
DANT-PETITIONER.

C-316 September Term 2017
079655

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003796-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1087

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. WIL-
LIAM A. MARSHALL, A/K/A BILL A. BERRY, DOLLAR BI
MARSHALL, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-288 September Term 2017
079506

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002974-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1088

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. T.M., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-293 September Term 2017
079526

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000506-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1088

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy, R.F., DEPENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-315 September Term 2017
079593

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005659-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

153

172 A.3d 1088

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. MICHAEL E, MITCHELL, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C~-311 September Term 2017
079502

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000675-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1089

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y, JOHN HELLER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-325 September Term 2017
079956

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005819-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1089

LISA R. MOSES, APPELLANT-PETITIONER, v. BOARD
OF REVIEW, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C-300 September Term 2017
077699

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003726-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1089

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. THOMAS WOLFE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-310 September Term 2017
079185

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004256-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

155

172 A.3d 1090

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
ROBERT ALLEN, JR., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-317 September Term 2017
079658

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003722-15

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

172 A.3d 1090

JOSHUA HAINES, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, y. JACOB W. TAFT,
BONNIE L. TAFT, JOINTLY, SEVERALLY AND/OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS, AND JOHN

MCHENRY, DEFENDANT. TUWONA LITTLE, PLAINTIFF, v.
JAYNE NISHIMURA, DEFENDANT.

C-296 September Term 2017
079600

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~5503-14 and A~

727-15 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

157

173 A.3d 184

EQR-LPC URBAN RENEWAL NORTH PIER, LLC AND EQR-LIN-
COLN URBAN RENEWAL JERSEY CITY, LLC, PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS, v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, DEFENDANT-RE-
SPONDENT.

A-16 Sept.Term 2016
078268

Argued October 11, 2017—Decided November 15, 2017

ee

Craig M. White (Baker & Hostetler of the Illinois bar, admitted
pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellant (Baker & Hostetler
and K & L Gates, attorneys; Craig M. White, Anthony P. La
Rocco and Benjamin I. Rubinstein, on the brief).

Jeremy A. Farrell and Philip S. Adelman argued the cause for
respondent (Jeremy A. Farrell, Corporation Counsel, City of New
Jersey, attorney; Mary Ann Murphy, Assistant Corporation coun-
sel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

The judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Division is
affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in the PER
CURIAM opinion, reported at 452 N.J. Super, 309, 178 A.3d 243
(App. Div. 2016),

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON
join in this opinion. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not participate.

173 A.3d 184

IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH 1. ROSENZWEIG, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 012011988)

D-179 September Term 2016
079641

November 17, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-878, concluding that as a matter of reciprocal
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-14, JOSEPH I. ROSENZWEIG
of WOODINVILLE, WASHINGTON, who was admitted to the
bar of this State in 1983, should be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six months based on discipline imposed in the
State of New York that in New Jersey constitutes violations of
RPC 8.4(b)(commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects) and RPC 8.4(e)(conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation);

159

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that the
suspension should be retroactive to July 16, 2012, the date of
respondent's suspension in New York;

And the Court having determined that the retroactive term of
suspension should be effective November 17, 2014, the date on
which respondent became administratively ineligible to practice
law in New Jersey for failure to satisfy his continuing legal
education requirements;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JOSEPH I. ROSENZWEIG is suspend-
ed from the practice of law for a period of six months, effective
November 17, 2014, and until the further Order of the Court; and
it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent's fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

160

173 A.3d 185
IN THE MATTER OF FRANK CATANIA, JR., AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 012501991)
D-207 September Term 2016
079919
November 17, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-056, recommending that FRANK CATANIA,
JR., of NORTH HALEDON, who was admitted to the bar of this
State in 1991, be disbarred for the knowing misappropriation of
client and escrow funds, conduct that violates RPC 1.15(a)(know-
ing misappropriation), RPC 8,4(c)(conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and the principles of In re
Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979), and In re Hollendonner,
102 N.J. 21, 504 A.2d 1174 (1985);

And FRANK CATANIA, JR., having been ordered to show
cause why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that FRANK CATANIA, JR., be disbarred,
effective immediately, and that his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys;

ORDERED that FRANK CATANIA, JR., be and hereby is
permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it
is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by FRANK CATANIA, JR., pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be restrained
from disbursement except on application to this Court, for good
cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial institution
to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to deposit the
funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the further
Order of this Court; and it is further

161

ORDERED that FRANK CATANIA, JR., comply with Rule
1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

173 A.3d 186
IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD J. VAPNAR, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 025351999)
D-172 September Term 2016
079614

November 17, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-362, concluding that RICHARD J. VAPNAR
of MAYWOOD, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1999,
should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year for unethical conduct in four client matters including multiple
violations of RPC 1.1(a)(gross neglect), RPC 1.1(b)(pattern of
neglect), RPC 1.4(¢)(failure to explain matter to the extent reason-
ably necessary to permit the client to make an informed decision
regarding the representation), RPC 3.3(a)(1)(lack of candor toward
a tribunal), RPC 4.1(a)(1) (making a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person), RPC 8.1(a)(knowingly making a
false statement in connection with a disciplinary matter), and RPC

8.4(¢)(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion); and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that RICHARD J. VAPNAR is suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective
December 15, 2017, and until the further Order of the Court; and
it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent’s fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

173 A.3d 187
IN THE MATTER OF GORDON A. WASHINGTON, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 033671985)
D-175 September Term 2016
079617

November 17, 2017—Corrected November 21, 2017

CORRECTED ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-365, concluding that GORDON A. WASH-
INGTON of MADISON, who was admitted to the bar of this State
in 1985, should be suspended from the practice of law for a
retroactive period of one year for violating RPC 1.1(a)(gross
neglect), RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence), RPC 1.5(b)(failing to set
forth, in writing, the basis or rate of the fee), RPC 1.7(a)(1)(con-
flict of interest), RPC 5.3(a)(failure to supervise a nonlawyer),
RPC 1.15(b)(failure to promptly deliver funds or other property to
the client or a third person), RPC 8.4(b)(commission of a criminal
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthi-
ness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects), and RPC 8.4(¢)(con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and
good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that GORDON A. WASHINGTON is sus-
pended from the practice of law for a period of one year: May 26,
2010 through May 25, 2011; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

164

173 A.3d 187

IN THE MATTER OF DAVID E. TIDER, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 001841990)

D-159 September Term 2016
079462

November 17, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-829, concluding that DAVID E. TIDER of
TEANECK, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1990,
should be censured for violating RPC 1.6(a)(revealing information
relating to the representation without the client’s consent), RPC
1.8(a)(prohibited business transaction with a client), RPC
1.8(b)(using information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the client), RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and RPC 8.4(d)(conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice), and good cause ap-
pearing;

It is ORDERED that DAVID E. TIDER is hereby censured;
and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17,

173 A.3d 188

IN THE MATTER OF ALI A. ALI, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 008072009)

D-144 September Term 2016
079413

November 17, 2017—-Corrected December i, 2017

CORRECTED ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-830, concluding that ALI A. ALI of PRINCE-
TON, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 2009, should be
reprimanded for violating RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence), RPC 3.2
(failure to expedite litigation), RPC 3.5(b) (making improper ex
parte communications), RPC 3.4(c)(knowingly disobeying an obli-
gation under the rules of a tribunal), and RPC 8.4(d)(conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice);

And the Disciplinary Review Board having further concluded
that (1) respondent practice under the supervision of an Office of
Attorney Ethics approved proctor, to as long as the Office of
Attorney Ethies deems necessary; (2) respondent complete a
Continuing Legal Education course in law office management;
and (3) respondent complete two ethics courses, in addition to
those required for Continuing Legal Education credit. Respondent
is to provide proof to the Office of Attorney Ethics of completion
of the courses within one year from the date of the Court’s Order;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that ALI A. ALI is hereby reprimanded; and
it is further

ORDERED that (1) respondent practice under the supervision
of an Office of Attorney Ethics approved proctor, for as long as
the Office of Attorney Ethics deems necessary; (2) respondent
complete a Continuing Legal Education course in law office man-
agement; and (8) respondent complete two ethics courses, in

addition to those required for Continuing Legal Education credit;
and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

173 A.3d 188
IN THE MATTER OF SALEEMAH MALIKAH BROWN, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 044482006)
D-160 September Term 2016
079521

November 17, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-889, concluding that SALEEMAH MALI-
KAH BROWN of HACKENSACK, who was admitted to the bar
of this State in 2008, should be censured for violating RPC 1.3
(lack of diligence), RPC 1.4(b)(failure to communicate with the
client), RPC 3.4(g) (threatening to present criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in a civil matter), RPC
7.1(a)(4)(making a false or misleading communication about the
attorney's legal fee), and RPC 8.4(c)(conduct involving dishonesty),
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that SALEEMAH MALIKAH BROWN is
hereby censured; and it is further

167

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

173 A.3d 189
IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL AUGUSTINE AMATO, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 006081990)
D-43 September Term 2017
080319

November 27, 2017

ORDER

This matter have been duly presented pursuant to Rule 1:20-
10(b), following the granting of a motion for discipline by consent
in DRB 17-332 of MICHAEL AUGUSTINE AMATO of BRICK,
who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1990;

And the Office of Attorney Ethics and respondent having signed
a stipulation of discipline by consent in which it was agreed that
respondent violated RPC 1.8(a)(entering into a prohibited business
transaction with a client);

And the parties having agreed that respondent’s conduct violat-
ed RPC 1.8(a), and that said conduct warrants a reprimand or
censure;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that a
reprimand is the appropriate discipline for respondent’s unethical

168

conduct and having granted the motion for discipline by consent in
District Docket No. XIV-2016-0492E;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having submitted the record
of the proceedings to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for the
entry of an order of discipline in accordance with Rule 1:20-16(e);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that MICHAEL AUGUSTINE AMATO of
BRICK is hereby reprimanded; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

173 A.3d 190
IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT JOHN BARON, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 027041983)
D-44 September Term 2017
080339

November 28, 2017

ORDER

ROBERT JOHN BARON of LEONIA, who was admitted to
the bar of this State in 1988, having tendered his consent to
disbarment as an attorney at law of the State of New Jersey, and
good cause appearing;

169

It is ORDERED that ROBERT JOHN BARON is disbarred
by consent, effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent’s name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys and that he be permanently restrained and enjoined
from practicing law; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by ROBERT JOHN BARON pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 shall be
restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court
for good cause shown and shall be transferred by the financial
institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to
deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending
further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondents file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17,

173 A.3d 190

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
ROLANDO TERRELL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

A-25 September Term 2016
077730

Argued September 25, 2017—Decided November 29, 2017

Joseph E, Krakora, Public Defender, argued the cause for
appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Joseph
E. Krakora and Alison Perrone, of counsel and on the brief).

Lucille M. Rosano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Robert D.
Laurino, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Lucille M.
Rosano, of counsel and on the brief).

Sarah E. Ross, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for
amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Christopher S.
Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah E. Ross, of counsel
and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

The judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Division is
affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in the majority’s
PER CURIAM opinion, reported at —- N.J. Super. —-, —
A3d — (App. Div. 2016).

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and
TIMPONE join in this opinion,

JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate opinion, dissenting in part.

171

JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting in part.

The trial court erred in the second trial by removing a deliber-
ating juror without determining whether her expressed emotional
discomfort was related to juror discussions or conflicts with other
jurors. A juror cannot be relieved of her duty because the
deliberations are unpleasant or difficult, causing emotional turmoil
or anxiety. To avoid the potential of improperly removing a juror
for reasons related to the deliberative process, our trial judges
must engage in a thorough yet precise colloquy.

The trial court’s limited dialogue with Juror Number Two failed
that test. Although the court questioned Juror Number Two about
her emotional ability to continue, the court asked no questions
concerning the source of her emotional distress. Precisely directed
questions could have eliminated the possibility that the court
unwittingly was removing a dissenting juror who felt put upon by
the majority. Because the removal of Juror Number Two without
adequate cause compromised defendant’s right to a fair trial, I
agree with Judge Higbee that a new trial should have been
granted.

Rule 1:8-2(d)(1) governs the removal of a juror after the com-
mencement of deliberations. It provides that, during deliberations,
a court may select an alternate juror only if “a juror dies or is
discharged by the court because of illness or other inability to
continue.” R. 1:8-2(d)(1). Here, we are concerned about the “ina-
bility to continue” provision of that rule. We have restrictively
construed that provision “to protect a defendant’s right to a fair
jury trial.” State v. Jenkins, 182 N.J. 112, 124, 861 A.2d 827 (2004).
A trial court is forbidden from removing a deliberating juror when
the “removal is in any way related to the deliberative process.”
Ibid.; see_also State v. Musa, 222 N.J. 554, 566, 120 A8d 214
(2015) (“{T]he removal of a juror because he is disputatious and
does not share the views of other jurors would undermine the very
essence of the free and open debate that is expected of jury
deliberations.”).

172

A juror cannot be excused unless the circumstances “relate
exclusively to the personal situation of the juror himself and not to
his interaction with the other jurors or with the case itself.” State
y. Valenzuela, 136 N.J. 458, 468, 648 A.2d 582 (1994) (quoting State
y. Trent, 157 N.J.Super, 231, 239, 384 A.2d 888 (App. Div. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251, 898 A.2d 1271 (1979)).
Moreover, a juror may not be removed “unless the record ‘ade-
quately establish[es] that the juror suffers from an inability to
function that is personal and unrelated to the juror’s interaction
with the other jury members,’” Jenkins, 182 N.J. at 124-25, 861
A.2d 827 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hightower, 146
N.J. 289, 254, 680 A.2d 649 (1996)). A juror’s emotional or psyeho-
logical inability to function because of the death or illness of a
family member, a work-connected crisis, or a threat directed to
her outside the jury room are personal to her and unrelated to the
deliberative process. Those may be adequate reasons for the
removal of a juror consistent with Rule 1:8-2(d)(1). A physical or
mental illness that renders a juror unable to deliberate also would
be an adequate reason. Emotional angst caused by the grueling
and sometimes harsh give-and-take among jurors is not.

On the first day of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the
court advising that, earlier in the day, a man outside the court-
house had said to Juror Number Two, as she passed by, “not
guilty.” The trial court interviewed each juror, including Juror
Number Two, and all said the event would not affect their ability
to serve and remain impartial. The jury continued to deliberate
that day and for two additional days. On the third day, Juror
Number Two and another juror asked to be removed as deliberat-
ing jurors.

The court engaged in a colloquy with Juror Number Two,
advising her not to reveal anything about the jury deliberations.
Their brief dialogue follows:

‘The Court: Do you feel that there is emotionally an inability for you to proceed

and perform your duties as a deliberating juror?

The Juror: Yes.

178

‘The Court: Do you feel that these emotions that you have, again, would impact,
upon your ability to perform your function in this case?
The Juror: No. I know it's not balanced in what I’m saying, but there's reasons
why I can't speak without giving away—
‘The Court: I don't want you to talk about that, But emotionally, you feel you can’t
continue?
‘The Juror: Correct.
‘The Court: I'm going to leave it at that for now. Thank you,

Based on that perfunctory exchange, which elicited contradictory

responses, the court removed Juror Number Two.

Nowhere in the colloquy did the court ensure that Juror Num-
ber Two’s “emotions” were unrelated to the jury deliberations.
The court could have pointedly asked whether her reasons to be
removed concerned a personal matter—such as illness or a family
problem—unrelated to the deliberations, and if she said yes, the
court could have made further inquiry. The court also could have
asked the juror whether her “emotions” related to her earlier
encounter outside the courthouse, even though after the incident
she averred she could be impartial. If she said yes, that would
have been a legitimate basis for her removal. Last, the court could
have requested the juror to give a simple yes or no answer to the
question of whether her emotional discomfort related to the
deliberative process with her fellow jurors—while expressly ad-
monishing the juror to say nothing about the actual deliberations
or any juror’s views or the vote count. The court’s colloquy was
fatally flawed because it did not adequately establish that the
juror’s emotional distress was “unrelated to the juror’s interaction
with the other jury members.” See id. at 125, 861 A2d 827.

After Juror Number Two's removal and the selection of an
alternate juror, the jury returned a verdict in less than two and a
half hours, The court’s removal of Juror Number Two without
determining that she was unable to function in accordance with
Rule 1:8-2(d)(1) constituted unwarranted judicial interference with
the integrity of the deliberative process. I coneur with Judge
Higbee’s conclusion that defendant was entitled to a new trial.

174

173 A.3d 193
IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH F. MCGOWAN, JR., AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 031001985)
M-175 September Term 2017
080075
November 29, 2017

ORDER

This matter having been opened to the Court by the Director of
the Office of Attorney Ethics and with the consent of JOSEPH F.
McGOWAN, JR., formerly of CHERRY HILL, who was admitted
to the bar of this State in 1986, and who has been temporarily
suspended from the practice of law since September 20, 2012, to
be transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to Rule 1:20~
12;

And the Office of Attorney Ethics and JOSEPH F. McGOW-
AN, JR., through his counsel, having agreed that respondent lacks
the capacity to engage in the practice of law or assist in his own
defense in pending disciplinary proceedings and should be trans-
ferred to disability inactive status in accordance with Rule 1:20-
12(e);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JOSEPH F. McGOWAN, JR., is hereby
transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to Rule 1:20-
12(e), effective immediately, and until the further Order of the
Court; and it is further

ORDERED that JOSEPH F. MeGOWAN, JR., is hereby re-
strained and enjoined from practicing law during the period that
he remains on disability inactive status, and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-12(e), all disciplinary
proceedings against respondent shall be deferred during the peri-
od that JOSEPH F. McGOWAN, JR., remains on disability
inactive status, and until further Order of the Court; and it is
further

175

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by JOSEPH F. McGOWAN, JR., pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be
restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court,
for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial
institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to
deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the
further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that JOSEPH F. McGOWAN, JR., comply with
Rule 1:20-20 governing incapacitated attorneys.

176

173 A.3d 596

DUTCH RUN-MAYS DRAFT, LLC, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER,
v. WOLF BLOCK, LLP, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-269 September Term 2017
079825

November 9, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000922-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

173 A.3d 596

ALEX GLOUCK, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ANTON
SKVORTSOV, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, AND.
IRINA G. HYMAN, DEFENDANT.

C-803 September Term 2017
079892

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000531-15

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

17

173 A.3d 596

CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE, PLAINTIFF-
PETITIONER, v. NORTHERN NJ ORTHO SPECIALISTS,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-306 September Term 2017
079740

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001669-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

173 A.3d 597

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, vy.
JOHN S, HILKEVICH, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-308 September Term 2017
078961

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~004984~13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

178

173 A.3d 597

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. TERREL MANN A/K/A TERRELL MANN AND
TYRELL MANN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-292 Sept.Term 2017
079516

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004091-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

173 A.3d 597

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
FLORIBERT B, NAVA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-22 September Term 2017
079820

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003436-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

179

173 A.3d 598

MICHAEL TOMPKINS, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. JOHN SCOTT
THOMSON, LOUIS VEGA, CHRISTINE JONES-TUCKER, CITY
OF CAMDEN, CAMDEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR, DEFEN-
DANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND ARTURO VENEGAS AND
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS.

C-298 September Term 2017
079750

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003676-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

173 A.3d 598

JOSHUA HAINES, PLAINTIFF, v. JACOB W. TAFT, BONNIE L.
TAFT, JOINTLY, SEVERALLY AND/OR IN THE ALTERNA-
TIVE, DEFENDANTS, AND JOHN MCHENRY, DEFENDANT.
TUWONA LITTLE, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAYNE
NISHIMURA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-297 September Term 2017
079600

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

180

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-5503~14 and A~
727-15 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

173 A.3d 598
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
IRINA IUDINA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, AND VASLILY

VYPRYATHKIN, AND BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.. DEFEN-
DANTS,

C-804 September Term 2017
079935

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002993-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

181

173 A.3d 599

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DAREL
ASHLEY A/K/A DARRELL D, ASHLEY, ANDRE D. ASHLEY,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-809 September Term 2017
079052

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004849-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

173 A.3d 599

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. DARRELL SCOTT, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-284 September Term 2017
079489

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002045-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

182

173 A.3d 599

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. RONALD T. DANIELS, SR., DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-819 Sept.Term 2017
079743

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003944~15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

173 A.3d 600

MYEONG H. CHOI, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. JAMES
JIN CHOI, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-299 September Term 2017
079561

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000757-15

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

173 A.3d 600

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. A.D., DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER, AND S.R. AND J.M., DEFENDANTS. IN THE
MATTER OF A.D.-R. AND N.R., MINORS-RESPONDENTS.

C-805 September Term 2017
079264

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000642-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

173 A.3d 600

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. WAL-
LACE GASKINS, A/K/A WALLACE N, GASKINS, WALLACE MI-
CHAEL, WALLACE MILLER, WALLACE N. MILLER AND
WALLACE N. MOORE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-287 September Term 2017
079498

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001283-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

173 A.3d 601

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. ROBERT EARLY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-814 Sept.Term 2017
079575

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~004743-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

173 A.3d 601

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. N.B., DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER, AND B.S., E.R. AND T.J.D., DEFENDANTS, IN
THE MATTER OF THE T.B, AND E.R., MINORS-RESPON-
DENTS.

C-301 September Term 2017
079496

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005159-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

173 A.3d 601

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. LAZARO R. GUITEREZ, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-823 September Term 2017
079847

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000801-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

173 A.3d 602
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. HUM-
BERTO GONZALEZ, A/K/A SANTOS SOLARES, JOSE ROBE,

SANTOS HOMBERTO M., SANTOS JOSE R., DEFENDANT-PE-
TITIONER.

C-294 September Term 2017
079528

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002784-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

187

173 A.3d 1089
IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD M. ROBERTS, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 261581971)
D-37 September Term 2017
080300

November 15, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court
pursuant to Rule 1:20-15(k) a recommendation (DRB 17-365) that
RICHARD M. ROBERTS, formerly of NEWARK, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 1971, and who has been
suspended from the practice of law since November 24, 2015, be
suspended from the practice of law and compelled to pay a
monetary sanction to the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for
failure to comply with the determination of the District VA Fee
Arbitration Committee in Docket No. VA-2016-0003F, and good
cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that RICHARD M. ROBERTS be temporari-
ly suspended from the practice of law, effective December 15,
2017, and until respondent complies with the determination of the
District VA Fee Arbitration Committee in District Docket No.
VA-2016-0003F, pays a sanction of $500 to the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee, and until the further Order of the Court; provid-
ed, however, this Order shall be vacated automatically if the
Disciplinary Review Board reports to the Court that prior to the
effective date of the suspension respondent has satisfied all obli-
gations under this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that if respondent seeks to be heard on this matter,
he shall file with the Clerk of the Court within ten days of the file
date of this Order a written request for the issuance of an Order
to Show Cause; and it is further

ORDERED that RICHARD M. ROBERTS remain suspended
from the practice of law pursuant to the Orders of the Court filed

October 26, 2015, November 4, 2015, and February 3, 2016, and
pending his compliance with the determinations of the District VA
Fee Arbitration Committee in those matters, and pays the sanc-
tions of $500 imposed in each matter to the Disciplinary Oversight
Committee, and until the further Order of the Court; and it is
further

ORDERED that respondent continue to comply with Rule 1:20-
20 dealing with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from
practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he
comply with Rule 1:20-20.

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this

State.

173 A.3d 1089
IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH PETER HOWARD, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 040162010)
D-163 September Term 2016
079539

December 6, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-408, concluding on the record certified to the
Board pursuant to Rule 1:20-4(f)(default by respondent) that
JOSEPH PETER HOWARD of CHERRY HILL, who was ad-
mitted to the bar of this State in 2010, should be censured for
violating RPC 1.1(b)(pattern of neglect), RPC 1.3 (lack of dili-
gence), RPC 1.16(d)(failure to take steps reasonably practicable to

189

protect a client’s interests on termination of representation), RPC
3.2 (failure to expedite litigation), and RPC 8.1(b)(failure to coop-
erate with disciplinary authorities), and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JOSEPH PETER HOWARD is hereby
censured; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

173 A.3d 1090
IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD PATRICK EARLEY, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 026761998)
D-141 September Term 2016
079365

December 7, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-283, concluding on the record certified to the
Disciplinary Review Board pursuant to Rule 1:20-4(f)(default by
respondent) that RICHARD PATRICK EARLEY of CHELMS-
FORD, MASSACHUSETTS, who was admitted to the bar of this
State in 1998, should be censured for violating RPC 1.1(a)(gross
neglect), RPC 1.3 (lack of diligence), RPC 1.4(b) (failure to keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter and to
comply with reasonable requests for information), and RPC

8.1(b)(failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities), and good
cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that RICHARD PATRICK EARLEY is
hereby censured; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

173 A.3d 1090
IN THE MATTER OF DAN A. DRUZ, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 022091980)
D-8 September Term 2017
080028

December 8, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-086, concluding that DAN A. DRUZ of
BELMAR, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1981,
should be censured for violating RPC 1.15(d) and Rule 1:21-6
(recordkeeping violations);

And the Disciplinary Review Board having further determined
that respondent should be required to: (1) take courses in legal
ethics, attorney trust accounting and law office management as
part of respondent’s continuing legal education (CLE) require-
ments; (2) submit to the Office of Attorney Ethics monthly

191

reconciliations of his attorney accounts, on a quarterly basis, for a
period of two years; and (3) submit proof of his fitness to practice
law;

And the Court this date having transferred respondent to
disability inactive status, effective immediately;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that DAN A. DRUZ is hereby censured; and
it is further

ORDERED that if and when respondent is transferred to active
status, he shall: (1) enroll in and complete the courses in law office
in legal ethics, attorney trust accounting and law office manage-
ment as part of his CLE requirements; (2) submit to the Office of
Attorney Ethics monthly reconciliations of his attorney accounts
on a quarterly basis, for a period of two years and until the
further Order of the Court; and (8) provide proof of his fitness to
practice law as attested to by a mental health professional ap-
proved by the Office of Attorney Ethics; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall remain restrained and en-
joined from practicing law as long as he remains on disability
inactive status; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

192

173 A.3d 1091

IN THE MATTER OF SEAN R. SEXTON, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 010612004)

D-126 September Term 2016
079222

December 8, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-252, concluding on the record certified to the
Board pursuant to Rule 1:20-4(f)(default by respondent) that
SEAN R. SEXTON of JERSEY CITY, who was admitted to the
bar of this State in 2004, should be censured for violating RPC
5.5(a)(1) (practicing law while ineligible), and good cause appear-
ing;

It is ORDERED that SEAN R. SEXTON is hereby censured;
and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

193

173 A.3d 1092
IN THE MATTER OF PAUL FRANKLIN CLAUSEN, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 015951982)
D-178 September Term 2016
079640

December 8, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-426, concluding on the record certified to the
Board pursuant to Rule 1:20-4(f) (default by respondent), that
PAUL FRANKLIN CLAUSEN of CLINTON, who was admitted
to the bar of this State in 1982, should be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years for violating RPC
1.15(a)(commingling of funds), RPC 1.15(d)(failure to comply with
recordkeeping requirements and disbursing trust account checks
against uncollected funds), RPC 3.3(a)(1)(false statement of mate-
vial fact or law to a tribunal), RPC 3.3(a)(5)(candor toward a
tribunal), RPC 8.1(a)(false statements to disciplinary authorities),
RPC 8.1(b)(failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities), RPC
8.4(c)(conduct involving dishonesty fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion), and RPC 8.4(d)(conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice);

And the Disciplinary Review Board having further determined
that respondent should be required to complete courses in law
office management and ethics, and the after reinstatement he
should be required to submit to the Office of Attorney Ethics
monthly trust account reconciliations of his attorney trust account,
on a quarterly basis, for a period of two years;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that PAUL FRANKLIN CLAUSEN is sus-
pended from the practice of law for a period of three years,

effective January 8, 2018, and until the further Order of the Court;
and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall enroll in and successfully
complete a course in law office management and a course in ethics,
and submit proof thereof to the Office of Attorney Ethics; and it
is further

ORDERED that after reinstatement to practice, respondent
shall submit to the Office of Attorney Ethics monthly reconcilia-
tions of his attorney trust account, on a quarterly basis, for a
period of two years and until the further Order of the Court; and
it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent's fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

195

173 A.3d 1093
IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER WEST HYDE, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 031441987)
D-161 September Term 2016
079522

December 8, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-385, concluding that CHRISTOPHER WEST
HYDE of NEWTON, who was admitted to the bar of this State in
1987, should be censured for violating RPC 1.5(b)(failure to set
forth in writing the basis or rate of a fee) and RPC 8.1(b) (failure
to cooperate with an ethics investigation), and good cause appear-
ing;

It is ORDERED that CHRISTOPHER WEST HYDE is here-
by censured; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

196

174 A.3d S03

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ANDRE
MELLS, A/K/A RAHMEL JONES, RAMEEL JONES, JOSH
MELLS, RAHJAN MILLS, ANDRE WHITE, AUNDRE MELLS,
TYREE WHITE, JAMALE EDWARDS, TYRELL WHITE, TYR-
EE SCOTT, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-94 September Term 2017
079261

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001035-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 503

DEEDRA L, BOWEN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. HYUNDAI
MOTOR AMERICA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-167 September Term 2017
079625

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004188-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

I
|

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 503

JOSH WILLNER, AN INFANT BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM,
LESTER WILLNER, LESTER WILLNER, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND AMY WILLNER, INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-RE-
SPONDENTS, v. VERTICAL REALITY, AN ENTITY DOING
BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND VERTICAL.
REALITY MANUFACTURING, INC., AN ENTITY DOING BUSI-
NESS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS, AND
IVY LEAGUE CAMP, AN ENTITY DOING BUSINESS IN THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT, AND NUMATICS,
INC., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-104 September Term 2017
079626

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003870-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

198

174 A.3d 504

THE IRWIN LAW FIRM, P.A., PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v.
RICHARD GRABOWSKY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-178 September Term 2017
079513

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004800-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 504

TRANSLAND INVESTMENTS, LLC, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. LING YAN QUAN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-187 September Term 2017
079168

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000884~-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

199

174 A.3d 504

STRUCTURED ASSETS TRUST, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
RANDALL R. LONG, DEFENDANT, AND CHARLOTTE F.
LEWIS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-140 September Term 2017
079329

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000164-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 505

IN THE MATTER OF KEITH LAYTON, ANCORA PSYCHIATRIC
HOSPITAL, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES.
(KEITH LAYTON—PETITIONER)

C-147 September Term 2017
079631

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000463-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

174 A.3d 505
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. C.D., DEFENDANT-

PETITIONER, AND A.H., DEFENDANT. IN THE MATTER OF
THE GUARDIANSHIP OF K.D., A MINOR—RESPONDENT.

C-170 September Term 2017
078827

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001394-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

201

174 A.3d 506
BEN GROSS, A/K/A BEZALEL GROSSBERGER, PLAINTIFF-
PETITIONER, v. OSNATE WEINSTEIN, DEFENDANT.
C-196 September Term 2017
079427

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001476-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied. The
Court finds plaintiff's repetitive, frivolous, and nonconforming
submissions to be an abuse of process. The Clerk is directed not to
accept any additional submissions from plaintiff for filing except
for motions and petitions for certification that are fully compliant
with the Rules of Court, including the rules governing the pay-
ment of applicable filing fees.

174 A.3d 506

ROBERT D. FERGUSON, KANSA INTERNATIONAL CORPORA-
TION, LTD., BANKRUPTCY ESTATE, MILO FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, IMIPOLEX LLC, AND OMPHALOS, LLC,
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY, DEFENDANT, AND EXECUTIVE RISK SPECIAL-
TY INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-134 September Term 2017
079243

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

202

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~000028-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 506
AMERICAN DREAM AT MARLBORO, LLC, PLAINTIFF-RESPON-
DENT, v. PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP OF MARL-
BORO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, AND PATRICIA CLEARY, DE-
FENDANT/INTERVENOR-PETITIONER, AND ALBERT W.
RUDEL, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

C-141 September Term 2017
079673

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000547-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

203

174 A.3d 507

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. PABLO ANTONIO ACEVEDO, A/K/A ERIC RUIZ,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-197 September Term 2017
079458

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000304~15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 507

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
yv. RYAN T. MARTIN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-154 September Term 2017
079303

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005762-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

a

174 A.3d 507

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
SEAN P. FARRELL, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-178 September Term 2017
077941

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001842-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 508

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAMIE
SPARKS, A/K/A JAMEEL GATLIN, JAMMIE SPARKS, JAMMIE
L, SPARKS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-150 September Term 2017
079282

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~005388-11
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

205

174 A.3d 508

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. S.L., DEFENDANT-PE-
TITIONER, AND L.M., DEFENDANT. IN THE MATTER OF
M.A.M.-L., A MINOR, RESPONDENT.

C-166 September Term 2017
079258

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000159-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 508

BRUCE STEVENS, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. MARY
K, GONZALEZ AND ADRIAN K. GONZALEZ,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-172 September Term 2017
079627

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001540-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 509

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. DANIEL J. SMITH, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-193 September Term 2017
079417

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001351-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

207

174 A.3d 509

JACQUELINE JALIL, LUISA ROJAS, AND TANIA MENA, PLAIN-
TIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v, PILGRIM MEDICAL CENTER AND
DR. NICHOLAS CAMPANELLA, DEFENDANTS-PETITION-
ERS.

C-142 September Term 2017
079512

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002906-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 509

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v,
SADDIQUE WILLIAMS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-152 September Term 2017
079294

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005700-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

208

174 A.3d 510

TIMOTHY CLARKE, PETITIONER-PETITIONER, v. BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN’S RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-146 September Term 2017
079284
October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004684-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 510

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. JOSE CARRANZA, A/K/A JOSE LACHIRA,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-190 September Term 2017
079348
October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002777-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

209

174 A.3d 510

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. MICHAEL DERRY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-192 September Term 2017
079395

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005674-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174.A.3d 511

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. JUAN COLON, A/K/A B-BOY JUAN AND B-BOY,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-153 September Term 2017
079295

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004003-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

210

174 A3d 511
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
MARINA L. BARTLOM, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.
C-155 September Term 2017
079330

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000447-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted;
and it is further

ORDERED that the appellant may electronically serve and file
a supplemental brief on or before December 11, 2017, and respon-
dent may serve and file a supplemental brief forty-five (45) days
after the filing of appellant’s supplemental submission, or, if

appellant declines to file such a submission, on or before January
25, 2018,

174 A.3d 512

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y, ANIL NAYEE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-186 September Term 2017
079328

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

21

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000931-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 512
IN THE MATTER OF CWA LOCAL 1040, CWA DISTRICT ONE AND
STATE OF NEW JERSEY (JUVENILE JUSTICE), RESPON-

DENTS-RESPONDENTS, v. JUDY THORPE, CHARGING PAR-
TY-PETITIONER.

C-174 September Term 2017
079251

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-852-18 and A—
866-14 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 512

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. RICKEY
H. WILLIFORD, A/K/A RICKEY H. WILLIFORD, JR., RICKY
H. WILLIFORD, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-165 September Term 2017
079358

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000476-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 513

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y, SHARIF O, LEE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-195 September Term 2017
079422

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004399-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

213

174 A.3d 513

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JON-
ATHAN WALKER, A/K/A JONATHAN L. WALKER AND JO-
NATHON WALKER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-194 September Term 2017
079407

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001894-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 513

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. ERIC DARDEN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-164 September Term 2017
079356

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003975-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 514

FARIBORZ ASHTYANI, M.D., AND HACKENSACK SLEEP & PUL-
MONARY CENTER, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. CRITICAL
CARE UNIT RESOURCES, LLC AND LEON L. TING, M.D.,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-145 September Term 2017
079893

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002250-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 514

N.E., AS LEGAL GUARDIAN FOR INFANT J.V., PLAINTIFF-PETI-
TIONER, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAM-
ILY SERVICES, NUSSETTE PEREZ, AND FELIX UMETITI,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C~-75 September Term 2017
079337

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

215

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003717-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

174 A3d 514

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. JAMES
T. PRITCHETT, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-158 September Term 2017
079343

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003761-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-

ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

216

174 A.3d 515

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. JATINCHANDRA PATEL, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-189 September Term 2017
079297

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004984-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 515

KATHLEEN LEGGETTE, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. GOVERN-
MENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY (“GEICO”), DE-
FENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND DERICK HARRIS, DEFEN-
DANT.

C-110 September Term 2017
079620

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001911-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

217

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

174.A.3d 515

DAVANNE REALTY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
THE DIAL CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-138 September Term 2017
079696

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005144-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

218

174 A.3d 516

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v, SCHYLER A. MAY A/K/A SCHYLER ANTHONY
MAY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-151 September Term 2017
079289

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000692-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174.A.3d 516

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. RONALD BURNS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-188 September Term 2017
079292

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000446-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

219

174 A.3d 516

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
JACQUIM LOVELY, A/K/A JACQUIN LOVLEY, YASIM
ANDERSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-157 September Term 2017
079341

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004025-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174.A.3d 517

KEVIN ALEXANDER, APPELLANT-PETITIONER, v. NEW.
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C-143 September Term 2017
079491

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002081-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 517

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
BRIAN E. KILLION, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-168 September Term 2017
079355

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005025-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 517

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. J.I., DEFENDANT-PE-
TITIONER, AND L.R., SR., DEFENDANT. IN THE MATTER OF
THE GUARDIANSHIP OF L.R., JR., A MINOR-RESPONDENT.

C-144 September Term 2017
079267

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-3457/3458-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 518

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. NICHOLAS H. NIGRO, III, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER,

C-149 September Term 2017
079280

October 16, 2017 +
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005246-10
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 518

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. CHRISTOPHER M. JACKSON, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-198 September Term 2017
079735

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003605-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 518

NEW JERSEY INTERGOVERNMENTAL INSURANCE FUND,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. LORRAINE SELECKY AND
JOEL I. RACHMIEL, ESQ., DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.

C-168 September Term 2017
079782
October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001292-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 519

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y, DONNELL W. ANCRUM, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-161 September Term 2017
079347
October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000932-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 519

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAMES
L. WALDREN, A/K/A JAMES JOHNSON AND JAMES L.
PARKER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-187 September Term 2017
079273

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005594-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 519

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. ERIC D. CURRY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-156 September Term 2017
079340

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001978-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

224

174 A.3d 520

ROBERT MELLET AND BETTY EVANS, ON BEHALF OF THEM-
SELVES AND OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. AQUASID, LLC, T/A FUTURE
FITNESS POWERED BY AFC, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-175 September Term 2017
0797389

Oetober 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004438-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs,

174 A.3d 520

CHEE LI AND FENG LI, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. BMW
OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-177 September Term 2017
079727

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~000453-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

225

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 520

PERFEITO ESTEVES AND MARIA ESTEVES, H/W, PLAINTIFFS-
PETITIONERS, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, COUNTY OF PAS-
SAIC AND BOROUGH OF HAWTHORNE, DEFENDANTS, AND
AJM CONTRACTORS, INC., DEFENDANT/THIRD PARTY
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, AND BOROUGH OF HAW-
THORNE, DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. ROCH-
DALE INSURANCE COMPANY, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT.

C-169 September Term 2017
079487

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004527-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 521

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. SHIRLENE FOAT-LEITH, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-162 September Term 2017
079350

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004790-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 521

GINO S. RAMUNDO, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v.
RITA RAMUNDO, N/K/A RITA FORCELLATI,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-171 September Term 2017
079349

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004729-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

174A.3d 521

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. M.P., DEFENDANT-PETI-
TIONER, IN THE MATTER OF A.P., A MINOR-RESPONDENT.
C-136 September Term 2017
079059

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000556-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 522

CHANTAL BAUDOUIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS GUARDIAN AD
LITEM ON BEHALF OF CASSANDRA BAUDOUIN AND RAC-
HELLE BAUDOUIN, MINOR CHILDREN, PLAINTIFFS-PETI-
TIONERS, vy. THE NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, ET
AL, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND TOWNSHIP OF
BLOOMFIELD, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. JOSEPH F. O’CON-
NELL, ITI, ESQ., AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
JOEL BAUDOUIN, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v.
THE NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, ET AL., DEFEN-
DANT-RESPONDENT, AND TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMFIELD, ET
AL., DEFENDANTS.

C-176 September Term 2017
079482

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

228

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003903-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

174 A.3d 522

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v, MIGUEL A. SOTO, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-160 September Term 2017
079345

October 16, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001204-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

174 A.3d 523

ROBERT D, FERGUSON, KANSA INTERNATIONAL CORPORA-
TION, LTD., BANKRUPTCY ESTATE, MILO FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, IMIPOLEX LLC, AND OMPHALOS, LLC,
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, AND EXECUTIVE

7 RISK SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT.

C-135 September Term 2017
079243

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000028-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

174 A.3d 523

STRUCTURED ASSETS TRUST, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. RANDALL R, LONG, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,
AND CHARLOTTE F. LEWIS, DEFENDANT.

C-189 September Term 2017
079829

October 16, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000164-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

231

174 A.3d 972
IN THE MATTER OF DAN A. DRUZ, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 022091980)

M-1474 September Term 2016
(M-1343-16; 079559)

December 8, 2017

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court on the
motion of DAN A. DRUZ, seeking to be transferred to disability
inactive status pursuant to Rule 1:20-12(e); and good cause
appearing;

It is ORDERED that the motion is granted and DAN A. DRUZ
IS hereby transferred to disability inactive status, effective imme-
diately, and until the further Order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that DAN A. DRUZ is hereby restrained and
enjoined from practicing law during the period that he remains on
disability inactive status; and it is further

ORDERED that the pending disciplinary proceedings against
DAN A. DRUZ are hereby deferred pursuant to Rule 1:20-12(e)
until further Order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that DAN A. DRUZ comply with Rule 1:20-20
governing incapacitated attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by DAN A. DRUZ pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be restrained from
disbursement except on application to this Court, for good cause
shown, and shall be transferred by the financial institution to the
Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to deposit the funds
in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the further Order of
this Court; and it is further

Cc

232

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this

state.

174 A.3d 972
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN J. MURRAY, JR., AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 025571997)
D-162 Sept.Term 2016
079538

December 8, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-883, concluding on the record certified to the
Board pursuant to Rule 1:20-4(f)(default by respondent) that
JOHN J. MURRAY, JR., of SOUTH AMBOY, who was admitted
to the bar of this State in 1998, should be reprimanded for
violating RPC 8.1(b)(failure to cooperate with disciplinary authori-
ties) and RPC 1.15(d)(recordkeeping violations;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JOHN J. MURRAY, JR., is hereby
reprimanded; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

174 A.3d 973

IN THE MATTER OF ERIKA J. INOCENCIO, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 010672002)

D-128 Sept. Term 2016
079298

December 8, 2017

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-218, concluding that ERIKA J. INOCENCIO
of EAST ORANGE, who was admitted to the bar of this State in
2002, should be censured for violating RPC 1.15(d) and Rule 1:21-
6 (recordkeeping); RPC 5.5(a)(2)(assisting a nonlawyer in the
unauthorized practice of law); and RPC 8.4(c)(econduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation);

And the Disciplinary Review Board having further concluded
that respondent should be required to complete twelve hours of
continuing legal education over the next two years, in addition to
the annual continuing legal education requirements, and that two
hours of the additional continuing legal education should be in the
area of trust accounting;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that ERIKA J. INOCENCIO is hereby cen-
sured; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent should be required to complete
twelve hours of continuing legal education over the next two years,
in addition to the annual continuing legal education requirements,
and that two hours of the additional continuing legal education
should be in the area of trust accounting; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

234

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

174 A.3d 973
PHILIP VITALE, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. SCHERING-
PLOUGH CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

A-20 September Term 2016
078294

Argued September 26, 2017—Decided December 11, 2017

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Gavin J. Rooney argued the cause for appellant (Lowenstein
Sandler, attorneys; Douglas S. Eakeley, of counsel, and Gavin J.
Rooney and Joseph A. Fischetti, on the briefs).

239

Craig M. Rothenberg argued the cause for respondent (Rothen-
berg, Rubenstein, Berliner & Shinrod, attorneys; Craig M. Roth-
enberg, of counsel and on the briefs, and Elizabeth H. Hamlin, on
the briefs).

Jay A. Gebauer argued the cause for amicus curiae Allied
Barton Security Services, LLC (Fowler, Hirtzel, McNulty &
Spaulding, attorneys; Jay A. Gebauer and Quinn M. McCusker,
on the brief).

Nancy Erika Smith argued the cause for amicus curiae New
Jersey Association for Justice (Smith Mullin, attorneys; Nancy
Erika Smith, of counsel and on the brief, and Virginia A. Pallotto,
on the brief).

Shalom D. Stone submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute (Stone Conroy, attorneys).

Richard M. Schall and Bennett D. Zurofsky submitted a brief on
behalf of amici curiae National Employment Lawyers Association
of New Jersey and New Jersey Industrial Union Council (Schall &
Barasch, attorneys for National Employment Lawyers Association
of New Jersey and Bennett D. Zurofsky, attorney for National
Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey and New Jersey
Industrial Union Council).

JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers an employee’s agreement at
the inception of his employment to prospectively waive third-party
claims against his employer’s customers, in the event that he were
to sustain injuries in a workplace accident at a customer’s facility.

Plaintiff Philip Vitale was hired by Allied Barton Security
Services (Allied Barton) as a security guard. When it hired Vitale,
Allied Barton required him to execute an agreement entitled
“Worker's Comp Disclaimer” (Disclaimer) as a condition of his
employment. In the Disclaimer, Vitale agreed to “waive and
forever release any and all rights” that he may have had to assert
a claim “against any customer ... of Allied Security to which

[Vitale] may be assigned, arising from or related to injuries which
are covered under the Workers’ Compensation statutes.”

Allied Barton assigned Vitale to provide security services at a
facility operated by its customer, defendant Schering-Plough Cor-
poration (Schering-Plough). While on duty at that facility, Vitale
was seriously injured in an accident. After recovering benefits
under the Workers’ Compensation Act, N.J.S,A. 34:15-1 to -146,
Vitale filed a third-party action, alleging that Schering-Plough
negligently maintained its premises and that its negligence caused
his injuries. Schering-Plough moved for summary judgment, as-
serting that Vitale waived his negligence claims against Schering-
Plough when he executed the Disclaimer. The trial court held that
the Disclaimer was void as contrary to public policy and denied
Schering-Plough’s motion; the matter proceeded to trial. A jury
returned a verdict in Vitale’s favor and awarded substantial dam-
ages.

An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of
summary judgment and the jury’s determination of damages. The
panel, however, reversed the trial court’s determination to bar the
jury from considering Vitale’s negligence and allocating a percent-
age of fault to him and remanded for a new trial limited to the
issue of liability. We granted certification limited to the question of
the Disclaimer’s enforceability.

We hold that the Disclaimer contravenes public policy as ex-
pressed in two provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
First, N.J.S.A. 34:15—40 (section 40) provides that an employee’s
right to workers’ compensation benefits does not preclude his or
her assertion of common-law personal-injury or wrongful-death
claims against a liable third party, and that the employer’s work-
ers’ compensation carrier may be granted a lien against the
employee’s recovery in the third-party claim. By virtue of its
waiver of any third-party action, the Disclaimer would alter the
balancing of interests of the employer, the employee, and a
potentially liable party that the Legislature envisioned when it
enacted that provision.

241

Second, subject to an exception that is inapplicable here,
N.J.S.A. 34:15-39 (section 39) expressly declares any “agreement,
composition, or release of damages made before the happening of
any accident” to be contrary to public policy. Section 39 is not
limited to agreements to waive workers’ compensation benefits; it
governs Vitale’s pre-accident agreement to forego any third-party
claim against Schering-Plough in the event that he sustained a
workplace injury on its premises. Section 39’s plain language voids
the Disclaimer in this case.

Accordingly, we affirm as modified the Appellate Division’s
judgment, and remand to the trial court for a new trial on the
issue of liability.

I,

We derive our account of the facts from the summary judgment
record presented to the trial court.

Pursuant to the terms of a Master Vendor Agreement between
Allied Barton and Schering-Plough, effective July 27, 2002, Allied
Barton agreed to assign supervisory and general security officers
to provide security services at Schering-Plough facilities. Under
that agreement, the security officers would be Allied Barton
employees but would report to work at Schering-Plough.

In August or September 2005, Allied Barton hired Vitale to
work as a security officer. On September 27, 2005, Vitale signed
the Disclaimer, which provided:

I understand that state Workers’ Compensation statutes cover work-related
injuries that may be sustained by me, If I am injured on the job, I understand
that I am required to notify my manager immediately. The manager will inform
‘me of my state's Workers’ Compensation law as it pertains to seeking medical
treatment. This is to assure that reasonable medical treatment for an injury will
he paid for by Allied’s Workers’ Compensation insurance,
As a result, and in consideration of Allied Security offering me employment, I
hereby waive and forever release any and all rights I may have to:

—make a claim, or

—commence a lawsuit, or

—recover damages or losses

Co

242

from or against any customer (and the employees of any customer) of Allied
Security to which I may be assigned, arising from or related to injuries which are
covered under the Workers’ Compensation statutes.

Allied Barton assigned Vitale to Schering—Plough’s Kenilworth
facility. Between 2005 and 2008, Vitale worked as a security
officer. Vitale described his job duties in the position as “[oJbserv-
ing, reporting, holding a post, touring the facility or the post
area,” and monitoring security cameras. In 2008, Allied Barton
promoted Vitale to the position of field manager, with responsibili-
ties to train and supervise other Allied Barton officers at the
Schering-Plough facility.

One of Vitale’s responsibilities as a field manager was to ensure
that the security officers under his supervision had appropriate
uniforms. Beginning in 2008, the security officers’ uniforms were
stored in the basement of the main guardhouse of the Kenilworth
facility. On ten to fifteen occasions, Vitale descended the stairs to
retrieve uniforms for the officers.

While on duty on August 31, 2009, Vitale fell down the stairs
that led to the guardhouse basement. Another security officer
turned on the light in the stairwell and saw Vitale “laid out at the
bottom of the stairs.” The officer who found Vitale attributed his
fall to the “cluttered” condition of the entrance to the stairwell.
Vitale sustained injuries to his head, neck, shoulder, and lower
back as a result of the accident.

Vitale filed a claim pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act
in the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Develop-
ment, Division of Workers’ Compensation. In a settlement agree-
ment incorporated in an Order Approving Settlement dated March
7, 2011, Vitale and Allied Barton resolved the workers’ compensa-
tion claim. Vitale, who had received temporary disability benefits
at a rate of $549.92 per week for thirty weeks, was awarded “30%
of partial total (disability],” allocated among lower back, shoulder,
and neurological injuries, for 180 weeks at a rate of $252.90 per
week. Vitale did not return to his employment with Allied Barton.

243,

Vitale then filed this action. He asserted that Schering-Plough
owed him a duty of care as a business invitee working on its
premises, that he was injured because Schering-Plough had negli-
gently maintained its facility and failed to warn him of a danger-
ous condition, and that he was entitled to compensatory damages.

After obtaining a copy of the Disclaimer in discovery, Schering
Plough moved before the trial court for summary judgment pursu-
ant to Rule 4:46-2(c). It argued that Vitale’s negligence claims
were barred by the Disclaimer. The trial court denied Schering-
Plough’s summary judgment motion. The court reasoned that a
ruling barring Vitale’s claims against Schering-Plough would con-
travene public policy.

The case was tried before a jury. The trial court granted
Vitale’s motion for a directed verdict on the question of his
comparative negligence. The court did not permit the jury to
consider whether Vitale was negligent in descending the stairs
without turning on the stairwell light, or to allocate fault to him
pursuant to the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1
to -5.8. The jury determined that Schering-Plough was negligent
and that its negligence was a proximate cause of Vitale’s injuries
and awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages. The trial court
denied Schering—Plough’s motion for a new trial.

Schering-Plough appealed. An Appellate Division panel af-
firmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s judgment.
Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 447 N.J. Super. 98, 107, 146 A.3d
162 (App. Div. 2016). The panel affirmed the trial court’s denial of
Schering-Plough’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 110-18,
146 A.8d 162. It relied on the “joint employer” or “special employ-
ee” doctrine, stating that in that doctrine, the Workers’ Compen-
sation Act had long recognized and accommodated “the type of
relationship between plaintiff, defendant, and Allied Barton.” Id.
at 118, 146 A.3d 162, The panel considered the Disclaimer to be a
contract of adhesion that was substantively unconscionable be-
cause it was contrary to public policy. Id, at 109-15, 146 A.3d 162.
It also invalidated the Disclaimer on the ground that it was an

244

exculpatory contract that violated public policy. Id. at 110-14, 146
A.3d 162.

The panel, however, held that because of evidence admitted at
trial that Vitale descended the stairs without turning on the
stairwell light, the trial court should have instructed the jury to
consider whether Vitale’s negligence was a proximate cause of his
accident and to decide whether a percentage of fault should be
allocated to him. Id. at 118-22, 146 A.3d 162. It therefore reversed
the trial court’s judgment in part and remanded the matter for a
new trial on the question of liability, Id. at 121, 146 A3d 162.

We granted Schering-Plough’s petition for certification, in
which Schering-Plough raised only the question of whether it was
entitled to summary judgment by virtue of the Disclaimer. 228
N.J. 421, 157 A.8d 842 (2016). We denied Vitale’s cross-petition for
certification, in which he challenged the Appellate Division’s grant
of a new trial as to liability, 228 N.J. 480, 157 A.3d 847 (2016).

IL.

Schering-Plough urges the Court to reverse the Appellate
Division’s judgment and enter summary judgment in its favor. It
argues that because New Jersey courts routinely enforce contracts
limiting an employee's rights if they are clear and unambiguous,
the Disclaimer should bar Vitale’s claim. Schering-Plough asserts
that the Disclaimer does not adversely affect the public interest
because Vitale had ample notice that his employment as a security
guard for Allied Barton’s customers entailed a risk of injury. It
also contends that the Disclaimer is consonant with the objectives
of the Workers’ Compensation Act because it preserves the reme-
dies against the employer prescribed by that statute.

Vitale asserts that because the Disclaimer is a contract of
adhesion and an exculpatory contract, it must be scrutinized to
determine whether it is contrary to public policy. He argues that
the Disclaimer contravenes both the deterrent objective of tort law
and the protective policies of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as
expressed in section 89, section 40, and other provisions of the Act.

245

Amicus curiae Allied Barton contends that the Disclaimer
serves the legitimate business objective of shielding Allied Bar-
ton’s clients from litigation, and notes that the Disclaimer had no
impact on Vitale’s right to recover the benefits to which he was
entitled under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Amicus curiae New Jersey Civil Justice Institute argues that
because the Disclaimer protects Allied Barton’s clients and en-
sures that Vitale receives appropriate workers’ compensation ben-
efits, it strikes an appropriate balance in the employer-employee-
client business relationship. New Jersey Civil Justice Institute
contends that the Disclaimer does not create a disincentive to a
client company’s maintenance of a safe premises because Allied
Barton’s clients will in any event be motivated to ensure a safe
workplace for their own employees.

Amici curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New
Jersey and New Jersey Industrial Union Council assert that
Vitale received no valid consideration for his execution of the
Disclaimer. They contend that the Disclaimer is void as a matter
of public policy because it provides no benefit that compensates
the employee for the loss of his third-party claim, and it reduces
the client company’s incentive to maintain a safe workplace.

Amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice notes that the
Workers’ Compensation Act is remedial social legislation and
should therefore be liberally construed. It argues that the Dis-
claimer violates public policy because it encourages Allied Barton's
clients to perpetuate inadequate health and safety practices and
affords to Allied Barton an unfair competitive advantage over
companies that do not compel their employees to enter into
exculpatory contracts.

IL

A.

Hl The trial court premised its denial of Schering~Plough’s
motion for summary judgment on its conclusion that the Disclaim-

er was contrary to public policy, and thus unenforceable. We
review that legal determination de novo, affording “no deference
to an interpretation of law that flows from established facts.” State
v. Perini Corp., 221 N.J. 412, 425, 113 A.8d 1199 (2015); see also
State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83, 90, 160 A.3d 23 (2017).

B.

HM The agreement at the center of this appeal is a private
contract, subject to the general principle that parties “are afforded
the liberty to bind themselves as they see fit.” Stelluti v. Casapenn
Enters., LLC, 208 N.J. 286, 302, 1 Ad 678 (2010); see also
Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 127 N.J. 344,
358, 605 A.2d 681 (1992) (“[T]he basic tenet of freedom of compe-
tent parties to contract is a factor of importance.” (quoting Hen-
ningsen y. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386, 161 A.2d 69
(1960))). Freedom of contract is, however, “not such an immutable
doctrine as to admit of no qualification.” Rodriguez v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 348, 361, 138 A.8d 528 (2016) (quoting
Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 388, 161 A.2d 69). “The right must recede
‘to prevent its abuse, as otherwise it could be used to override all
public interests.’” Ibid. (quoting Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 388, 161
A.2d 69).

In this appeal, Vitale contends that the Disclaimer is unenforce-
able on two closely-related grounds: that it is a contract of
adhesion that is unconscionable because it offends public policy,
and that it is an exculpatory contract that is contrary to public
policy. We consider these arguments in turn.

HE “[Tyhe essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it
is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standard-
ized printed form, without opportunity for the ‘adhering’ party to
negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars.” Rudbart, 127 N.J.
at 353, 605 A.2d 681; accord Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 301, 1 A.3d 678.
Although a contract of adhesion is not per se unenforceable, a
court may decline to enforce it if it is found to be unconscionable.
Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 301, 1 A.3d 678.

LL  —————————————_—__

247

HM In evaluating a claim that an adhesion contract is uncon-
scionable, courts consider four factors that “focus on procedural
and substantive aspects of the contract ‘to determine whether the
contract is so oppressive, or inconsistent with the vindication of
public policy, that it would be unconscionable to permit its enforce-
ment.” Rodriguez, 225 N.J. at 367, 138 A.3d 528 (quoting Delta
Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 40, 912 A.2d 104 (2006).
Those factors are “the subject matter of the contract, the parties’
relative bargaining positions, the degree of economic compulsion
motivating the ‘adhering’ party, and the public interests affected
by the contract.” Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 356, 605 A.2d 681; accord
Rodriguez, 225 N.J. at 367, 188 A.3d 528; Stelluti, 203 N.J. at 301,
1 Abd 678.

Vitale makes no claim on appeal that the Disclaimer is proce-
durally unconscionable. Vitale, 447 N.J. Super. at 111, 146 A.3d
162. Instead, relying on the fourth factor identified in Rudbart,
Vitale contends that the Disclaimer is substantively unconsciona-
ble because it is contrary to public policy. Thus, in order to decide
Vitale’s claim that the Disclaimer is an unconscionable contract of
adhesion, we determine whether the agreement comports with
public policy. See Rodriguez, 225 NJ. at 367, 188 A.8d 528;
Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 354-56, 605 A.2d 681.

HB Exculpatory agreements “violate the aims underlying our
tort law: deterrence of careless behavior and compensation by the
wrongdoer for injuries sustained by victims.” Marcinezyk v. State
Police Training Comm'n, 203 N.J. 586, 593, 5 A.3d 785 (2010). Such
contracts are subjected to “close judicial scrutiny.” Stelluti, 203
N.J. at 303, 1 A3d 678. “[T]o be enforceable, an exculpatory
agreement must ‘reflect the unequivocal expression of the party
giving up his or her legal rights that this decision was made
voluntarily, intelligently and with the full knowledge of its legal
consequences.’” Id. at 304-05, 1 A.8d 678 (quoting Gershon _v.
Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 237, 247, 845 A.2d 720
(App. Div. 2004)).

HH oOur law “does not demand a per se ban against enforce-
ment of an exculpatory agreement based on the mere existence of
a duty recognized in the common law in respect of premises
liability.” Stelluti, 208 N.J. at 306, 1 A.3d 678, Instead, we assess
whether the contractual elimination of a common-law duty would
contravene public policy. Ibid.; see also Steinberg v. Sahara Sam’s

Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 859-60, 142 A.3d 742 (2016) (finding pre-
injury release “that exculpates a business owner from liability for
tortious conduct resulting from the violation of a duty imposed by
statute or from gross negligence contrary to publie policy and
unenforceable”); Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323, 335,
901 A.2d 381 (2006) (declining, based on public policy reflected in
parens patriae doctrine, to enforce parents’ waiver of potential
personal injury claims on behalf of child).

HEM “To the extent that any contract of adhesion also
would require review to determine whether its enforcement impli-
cates a matter of public interest, that test overlaps, and is
subsumed by the more precise analysis employed when assessing
whether to enforce an exculpatory agreement.” Stelluti, 203 N.J.
at 802, 1 A.8d 678. In the setting of this appeal, in which a contract
of adhesion that would eliminate a legal duty is challenged exclu-
sively on public policy grounds, the standard of substantive uncon-
scionability that governs a contract of adhesion and the test by
which we evaluate an exculpatory agreement converge; the sole
question is whether the agreement at issue is contrary to public
policy, See ibid.

In the contrasting settings of Stelluti and Rodriguez, we consid-
ered the public-policy implications of an allegedly unconscionable
contract of adhesion. Stelluti arose from an accident that occurred
while the plaintiff was using exercise equipment at a health club.
Id, at 294, 1 A8d 678. In the membership agreement that the
plaintiff signed when she joined the health club, she assumed all
risk of the health club’s negligence, and waived any right “to bring
a legal action against the club for personal injury or property
damage.” Id, at 293, 1 A.38d 678.

249

We affirmed the determination of the trial court and Appellate
Division that the disputed provision was enforceable to bar the
negligence claim asserted by the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact
that the provision was a contract of adhesion and an exculpatory
agreement. Id, at 300-06, 1 A.3d 678. We reasoned that although
there is a public interest in compelling a health club to maintain its
facility in a safe condition, public policy does not require the
imposition of liability on that club based on ordinary negligence
for the recognized risk of injury that arises when an individual
uses exercise equipment. Id. at 807-11, 1 A.3d 678.

In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs employment application included a
provision by which the employee “agree[d] to bring any employ-
ment-related cause of action against the [defendant] employer
within six months of the challenged employment action and [to]
waive any statute of limitations to the contrary.” 225 N.J. at 346,
188 A.8d 528. Had the agreement been enforced, that six-month
limitation would have governed claims brought under the Law
Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, which are
subject to a two-year statute of limitations under Montells_v.
Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 291-92, 627 A.2d 654 (1998). Id. at 356-57,
188 A.3d 528.

We reversed the determination of the Appellate Division, which
had affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the employee's action
based on the six-month limitations period prescribed by the agree-
ment. Id, at 362-66, 188 A.3d 528. We found the employment
agreement’s abbreviated limitations period to contravene the
LAD’s objectives, particularly because that period was incompati-
ble with the election of remedies procedures set forth in the LAD,
Id. at 361-65, 188 A.3d 528. We therefore held the statute of
limitations provision in the employment agreement to be unen-
forceable as contrary to the public policy expressed in the LAD.
Ibid.

Cc.

As we did in Stelluti and Rodriguez, we consider the public-
policy implications of the agreement at issue in this appeal.

250

HI For more than a century, the Workers’ Compensation Act
has provided employees injured in the workplace “medical treat-
ment and limited compensation ‘without regard to the negligence
of the employer”” Estate of Kotsovska ex rel. Kotsovska_v.
Liebman, 221 N.J. 568, 584, 116 A.3d 1 (2015) (quoting N.J.S.A.
34:15-7). Pursuant to the Act, “although ‘the employer assumes an
absolute liability[,] [hle gains immunity from common-law suit,
even though he be negligent, and is left with a limited and
determined liability in all cases of work-connected injury.’” Id. at
585, 116 A3d 1 (quoting Whitfield v. Bonanno Real Estate Grp.,
419 N.J. Super. 547, 553, 17 A.8d 855 (App. Div. 2011) (alterations
in original)),

If the employee’s “injury or death is compensable” pursuant to
the Act, “a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or
otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or
omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as
the [employee who was] injured or killed, except for intentional
wrong.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-8; see also Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs.
Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449, 459, 45 A.3d 965 (2012) (“The Act’s
exclusivity can be overcome if the case satisfies the statutory
exception for an intentional wrong.”); Millison v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 169-70, 501 A.2d 505 (1985) (same).

Hs The compensation scheme presented “in article 2 of
the [Alect, enters by operation of law into every contract of hiring
made in this state unless there be an affirmative rejection of the
plan for the alternative common law liability for negligence as
modified by the provisions of article 1 of the [Alct.” Gotkin v.
Weinberg, 2 N.J. 305, 308, 66 A.2d 488 (1949) (citation omitted).
The remedial objective of the Workers’ Compensation Act is “to
make benefits readily and broadly available to injured workers
through a non-complicated process.” Tlumae v. High Bridge Stone,
187 N.J. 567, 573, 902 A.2d 222 (2006). We afford the Act “liberal
construction in order that its beneficent purposes may be accom-
plished.” Kotsovskova, 221 N.J. at 584, 116 A.3d 1 (quoting Cruz v.

251

Cent. Jersey Landscaping, Inc., 195 N.J. 38, 42, 947 A2d 1228
(2008).

In section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Legislature
addressed the employee's right to file a tort action against poten-
tially liable third parties:

Where a third person is liable to the employee or his dependents for an injury or
death, the existence of a right of compensation from the employer or insurance
cartier under this statute shall not operate as a bar to the action of the employee
or his dependents, nor be regarded as establishing a measure of damage therein.
(N.JS.A. 34:15-40.]1

HI In enacting section 40, the Legislature did not express a
policy in favor of an employee’s recovery of damages based on his
or her tort claims, or otherwise address the merits of the third-
party common-law claim that the statute preserves. Ibid. It
sought, however, to regulate “the rights and responsibilities of the
several parties concerned in compensation payments where, in the
course of his employment, injury or death comes to a workman as
the result of the fault of a third party.” U.S. Cas. Co, v. Hercules
Powder Co., 4 N.J. 157, 165, 72 A.2d 190 (1950); accord Lambert
vy. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 447 N.J. Super. 61, 78, 145 A.3d
1095 (App. Div. 2016).

HM “Section 40 permits a workers’ compensation insurance
carrier to seek reimbursement of benefits it pays when a
third[ Jparty, other than the employer, caused the employee’s
injury.” Talmadge v. Burn, 446 N.J. Super. 418, 416, 142 A3d 757
(App. Div. 2016); see also Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maran & Maran,
142 N.J. 609, 613, 667 A.2d 680 (1995). Pursuant to section 40, the
Act imposes a lien in favor of the workers’ compensation carrier
“{ilf the sum recovered by the employee or his dependents from
the third person or his insurance carrier is equivalent to or
greater than the liability of the employer or his insurance carrier”
under the Act. N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(b).

associations, societies, firms, partnerships and joint stock companies as well as

| 1Section 40 defines “third person” to include “corporations, companies,
individuals.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-40.

Po

HI Thus, “the legislative scheme which emerges is a plan to
permit an injured worker to collect worker{s’] compensation bene-
fits and pursue his common law remedy against the third-party
tortfeasor.” Danesi_v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 189 N.J. Super.
160, 165, 459 A.2d 686 (App. Div. 1983). The Legislature envi-
sioned that if the employee recovered damages in his or her third-
party action, any award to the employee in that action would
ameliorate the burden imposed on the employer's workers’ com-
pensation carrier, thus promoting the equitable balancing of com-
peting interests that the statutory scheme is designed to achieve.
N.JS.A. 34:15-40.

HI In section 39, the Legislature declared a public policy
regarding certain agreements entered into in advance of a work-
place accident:

No agreement, composition, or release of damages made before the happening of

any accident, except the agreement defined in section 34:15~7 of this title shall be

valid or shall bar a claim for damages for the injury resulting therefrom, and any
such agreement is declared to be against publie policy.

INJS.A. 34:15-89.]2

That provision addressing pre-accident agreements has been a
component of the Workers’ Compensation Act since 1913, when
section 39’s similarly-worded predecessor statute was enacted as
an amendment to the Act. L. 1913, ¢. 174, § 8 (enacted as First
Supplement to Compiled Statutes, p. 1651 § 23 (section 23)). The
provision has been construed in several decisions to void a pre-
accident agreement by which the employee purports to waive his
or her right to the workers’ compensation benefits authorized by
the Act. See Gotkin, 2 N.J. at 308, 66 A.2d 438 (invoking section 39
to invalidate choice-of-law provision in employment agreement
that would have deprived employee of workers’ compensation
benefits under Act); Stroebel_v. Jefferson Trucking & Rigging

2The “agreement defined in section 34:15-7 of this title” refers to an employer
and employee's “agreement ... [to] accept the provisions of this article” with
respect to the “compensation for personal injuries to, or the death of, such
employee by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.” N.J.S.A.
34:15-7

Co., 125 N.J.L. 484, 487, 15 A.2d 805 (E. & A. 1940) (noting that
section 23 “restricts the exercise of the parties’ contractual power
to the statutory agreement” prior to a workplace accident (quoting
P. Bronstein & C Hoffman, 117 N.J.L. 500, 503-04, 189 A, 121
(E. & A. 1936)); jer_v. Nat'l Chair Co., 127 N.J.L. 414, 416-19,
22 A2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (applying section 23 to invalidate
choice-of-law provision by which employee waived protection of
Workers’ Compensation Act), aff'd, 129 N.J.L. 98, 28 A.2d 125 (E.
& A, 1942); Wallace v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 N.J. Mise. 224, 229,
26 A.2d 704 (Dep’t Labor 1942) (“In compensation law even the
signing of a release would be no bar to a meritorious consideration
of petitioner's claim.”); Davis v. City of Newark, 19 N.J. Mise. 85,
87, 17 A.2d 305 (Dep’t Labor 1941) (“Releases have no legal status
in a compensation case.”); Castagno v. Lavine Express, 13 NJ.
Mise. 88, 89, 176 A. 679 (Dep’t Labor 1935) (voiding employment
agreement based on statutory bar on employers and employees
making “any other arrangement than that set forth in section 2 of
the Compensation [A]et in lieu of the legal liability set forth in
section 1”), Those decisions make clear that, unless authorized by
N.J.S.A. 84:15-7, a pre-accident employer-employee agreement
that prospectively deprives the employee of workers’ compensa-
tion benefits is contrary to public policy pursuant to section 39.

HH The Legislature, however, did not restrict section 39 or its
predecessor statute to the waiver of workers’ compensation bene-
fits through pre-accident agreements, as it could have by means of
a simple modification of the statutory language. Instead, the
Legislature chose expansive terminology in section 39. It provided
that no pre-accident “agreement, composition, or release of dam-
ages,” other than an agreement authorized by N.J.S.A. 34:15-7,
would bar a claim for “damages”—the same term that appears in
section 40 to describe the remedy that an employee would pursue
in a third-party claim. See N.J.S.A. 34:1540(f). As we have
frequently noted, “[w]e cannot ‘write in an additional qualification
which the Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own enact-
ment.’” DiProspero_v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039

254

(2005) (quoting Craster v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 9 N.J. 225, 230, 87 A.2d
721 (1952)). We decline to do so here. We construe section 39's
broad language to encompass not only pre-accident agreements
waiving the employee's right to assert the statutory claim for
workers’ compensation benefits, but agreements waiving the em-
ployee’s right to assert a common-law action for damages against
a third party based on a workplace accident, that is addressed in
section 40.3

Our interpretation of section 39 is consistent with a decision
construing section 39’s predecessor statute, section 23, shortly
after the provision was enacted. In Delaware, Lackawanna _&

Western Railroad Co. v. Smyth, 93 N.J. Eq. 80, 82-83, 115 A. 65
(Ch, 1921), the court invalidated a pre-accident agreement be-

tween an employee and his employer, entitled “Accident Release,”
by which the employee would have prospectively waived the right
to pursue a third-party claim against a common carrier on whose

3 We recognize that our interpretation of section 39 diverges from that of the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Bowman v. Sunoco,
Inc., 620 Pa. 28, 65 A.3d 901, 906-08 (2013), the only out-of-state case cited by
Schering-Plough in which the court considered a provision analogous to section
39, In Bowman, the majority construed section 204(a) of Pennsylvania's Work-
ers’ Compensation Act "to apply only to agreements to bar a claim against an
employer.” Id. at 908. We find persuasive the reasoning of the dissenting justice
in that case, who viewed the provision to be “absolute in its language that ‘no
agreement, composition or release of damages’ shall preclude ‘a claim for
damages,’ and that ‘any such agreement is void as against the public policy of
the Commonwealth.’ Id. at 91! (Baer, J., dissenting) (quoting 77 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 71(a)). Although Schering-Plough cites three other decisions upholding
employer-employee agreements, none of those decisions applies a statutory
provision analogous to section 39. See Edgin v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 331
Ark, 162, 961 S.W.2d 724, 727 (1998) (upholding a third-party liability disclaim-
er despite Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-108(a), which addresses only an employee's
agreement “to waive his or her right to compensation"); Brown v. 1301 K St.
Ltd. P’ship, 31 A.3d 902, 905 (D.C. 2011) (interpreting D.C. Code § 32-1517,
which voids only “assignment, release or commutation of compensation or
benefits due or payable under this chapter,” not to govern agreements waiving
third-party tort claims); Horner v. Bos. Edison Co., 45 Mass.App.Ct. 139, 695
N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (1998) (upholding employee's agreement to waive third-party
claim based on Massachusetts’ workers’ compensation law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
152, § 15, which contains no provision similar to section 39).

255

premises the employee was assigned to work. Ibid. The court
noted that section 23 was “general in its terms, and renders
invalid all such agreements or releases as that contained under the
caption ‘Accident Release.’” Id, at 82. Based on section 23, the
court declared the disputed agreement “to be against the public
policy of this state.” Id. at 83. No later opinion of this Court, or
published opinion of the Appellate Division, has construed section
39 to apply only to agreements waiving the right to seek workers’
compensation benefits.

In sum, we view sections 39 and 40 of the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act to state public policy governing this appeal. Under section
40, the Act does not bar or limit common-law premises liability
claims against potentially liable third parties, but provides for a
lien on the employee’s recovery that may relieve the financial
burden of a compensation award on the employer’s workers’
compensation carrier. N.J.S.A. 34:15-40(b) and (f). To ensure that
the statutory scheme properly balances the interests of the em-
ployee, the employer, the employer’s workers’ compensation carri-
er and any potentially liable third party, the Legislature declared
in section 39 that any pre-accident “agreement, composition or
release of damages” other than that defined in N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, is
contrary to public policy, N.J.S.A. 84:15-39.

D.

Applying the contract principles set forth in Rudbart, Stelluti,
and Rodriguez, we conclude that the Disclaimer is void because it
is contrary to the public policy expressed in sections 39 and 40 of
the Workers’ Compensation Act.

4We do not concur with the Appellate Division panel's reliance on the “joint
employer” or “special employee” doctrine to invalidate the Disclaimer. Vitale,
447 N.J. Super, at 116-17, 146 A.3d 162. Under that doctrine, two employers
may be deemed liable to an employee for workers’ compensation benefits, and
the employee is consequently barred from pursuing a common-law negligence
action against either employer. Volb v. G.E. Capital Corp., 139 N.J. 110, 116-18,
651 A.2d 1002 (1995); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Popovich, 18 N.J. 218, 225,

The Disclaimer, by which Vitale waived “any claims arising from
or related to injuries which are covered under the Workers’
Compensation statutes,” constitutes an “agreement, composition
or release of damages made before the happening of any acci-
dent.” N.J.S.A. 84:15-89, It is not an agreement authorized by
N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, and is therefore not within the sole exception
identified in section 89. Ibid. Accordingly, the Disclaimer is in the
category of employment agreements that the Legislature has
declared to be “against public policy.” Ibid.

Moreover, were the Disclaimer to be enforced, it would under-
mine the Legislature’s purpose when it enacted section 40 of the
Workers’ Compensation Act. It would not only deprive Vitale of
the opportunity to pursue a common-law action against a poten-
tially culpable third party, but would eliminate Allied Barton's
workers’ compensation carrier’s lien on any damages awarded to
Vitale in his third-party action. The Disclaimer would disrupt the
balancing of interests that the Legislature sought to achieve when
it incorporated section 40 into the statutory scheme.

Accordingly, we concur with the trial court’s determination that
the Disclaimer is unenforceable because it contravenes public
policy. We hold that the trial court properly denied Schering—
Plough’s motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2.

Iv.
We affirm as modified the judgment of the Appellate Division,

and remand for a new trial on the issue of liability.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
ALBIN, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join
in JUSTICE PATTERSON’ opinion.

113 A.2d 666 (1955), In this appeal, no party asserted before the trial court, or
contends on appeal, that Schering-Plough was Vitale's “joint employer” for
purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and that doctrine is accordingly
irrelevant.

257

174 A.3d 986
IN THE MATTER OF LOUIS MACCHIAVERNA, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 016221997)
D--56 September Term 2017
080458

December 14, 2017

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented, it is ORDERED that
LOUIS MACCHIAVERNA, formerly of LAVELLETTE, who
was admitted to the bar of this State in 1998, and who was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years
effective July 18, 2015, by Orders of this Court filed July 17, 2014
(D-118-13; 74382 and D-76-138; 073990), be restored to the
practice of law, effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED that LOUIS MACCHIAVERNA continue to com-
ply with the conditions imposed by Orders of this Court filed
October 21, 2010 and July 12, 2018, requiring respondent to
submit quarterly reconciliations of his attorney accounts to the
Office of Attorney Ethics for a period of two years, and until the
further Order of the Court.

174 A.3d 987

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM
BURKERT, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

A-6 Sept.Term 2016
077623
Argued September 11, 2017—Decided December 19, 2017

a

EEE EEE EEE EEE EEE
&

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Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for
appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney;
Sarah Lichter, of counsel and on the briefs).

Steven J. Kaflowitz argued the cause for respondent (Caruso
Smith Picini, attorneys; Steven J. Kaflowitz on the briefs and
Timothy R. Smith, of counsel and on the briefs).

Edward L. Barocas argued the cause for amicus curiae Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas,
Legal Director, and Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinie Center
for Law & Justice, attorneys; Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M.
LoCicero, Alexander R. Shalom, and Ronald K. Chen, of counsel
and on the brief).

J. Gregory Crane and Eugene Volokh of the California bar,
admitted pro hac vice, submitted briefs on behalf of amicus curiae
Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment (Scott & Cyan
Banister First Amendment Clinie, UCLA School of Law, attor-
neys; J. Gregory Crane and Eugene Volokh, on the briefs).

JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The free-speech guarantees of our Federal and State Constitu-
tions safeguard not only polite and decorous conversation and
debate but also speech that we hate—speech that is crude, obnox-
ious, and boorish. A commitment to free discourse requires that
we tolerate communication of which we strongly disapprove. This
ease tests the limits to which a broadly worded harassment statute
can criminalize speech.

William Burkert and Gerald Halton were corrections officers,
who held positions in different unions representing distinct classes
of corrections officers. Their relationship became particularly
strained after Burkert read online comments attributed to Hal-
ton’s wife that Burkert felt insulted him and his family. In
response, Burkert downloaded a wedding photograph of Halton

and his wife that was posted on social media and then inscribed
degrading and vile dialogue on copies of the photograph. Copies of
those photographs were found strewn in the employee parking
garage and locker room of the Union County Jail.

Halton filed three complaints in municipal court charging Bur-
kert with harassment in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(0), which
makes it an offense to have engaged in a “course of alarming
conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or
seriously annoy [a] person.” Halton’s private attorney prosecuted
this quasi-criminal offense on behalf of the State while Halton
contemporaneously pursued a civil action against Burkert. A mu-
nicipal court judge found Burkert guilty of harassment on two of
the complaints, as did a Law Division judge after a trial de novo
on the record.

The Appellate Division vacated Burkert’s conviction, determin-
ing that although the flyers were wholly unprofessional and inap-
propriate for the workplace, they did “not amount to criminal
harassment” in light of our constitutional free-speech guarantees.

We affirm. Criminal laws targeting speech that are not clearly
drawn are anathema to the First Amendment and our state
constitutional analogue because they give the government broad
authority to prosecute protected expressive activities and do not
give fair notice of what the law proscribes. Such laws also chill
permissible speech because people, fearful that their utterances
may subject them to criminal prosecution, may not give voice to
their thoughts.

To ensure that N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not exceed its constitu-
tional reach in cases involving the prosecution of pure speech,
repeated acts to “alarm” and “seriously annoy” must be read as
encompassing only repeated communications directed at a person
that reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or security or
that intolerably interfere with that person’s reasonable expectation
of privacy. We consider that approach to be faithful to the
legislative purpose in enacting subsection (¢) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4
and consonant with the constitutional guarantees of free speech.

Burkert’s intent to annoy was not a crime, and he did not engage
in the type of repetitive acts contemplated by the statute. There-
fore, Burkert is not guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense,
although he may be subject to workplace discipline or a civil tort
action. The language on the flyers, despite its vulgarity and
meanness, is constitutionally protected from a criminal prosecution
for harassment.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division,
which dismissed the charges against Burkert.

A

On September 30, 2011, Halton filed three separate complaints,
alleging that Burkert committed the petty disorderly persons
offense of harassment on January 8, 9, and 11, 2011, in violation of
NJ.S.A. 2C:38-4(0).! A three-day trial was held in the Elizabeth
Municipal Court. Halton’s privately retained attorney prosecuted
the case on behalf of the State.”

At trial, Halton and Burkert testified, as did two other correc-
tions officers. The testimony, much of which was undisputed,
elicited the following.

1A petty disorderly persons offense is punishable by up to thirty days in jail.
NJ.S.A. 2€:43-8.

2.Our court rules do not permit an attorney to appear as a private prosecutor
on behalf of the State, except in cases involving cross-complaints, and then only
on motion to the municipal court after review of "an accompanying certification
submitted on a form approved by the Administrative Director of the Courts.” R.
7:8-7(b). No objection was made to Halton’s attorney acting as the prosecutor in
the municipal court. After the conclusion of the municipal court proceedings, the
Union County Prosecutor's Office represented the State in all matters concerning
this case. Going forward, our municipal courts must strictly enforce Rule 7:8-
7(b), which has the beneficent purpose of ensuring that quasi-criminal actions
brought in the name of the State proceed in a disinterested manner.

As of January 2011, Halton and Burkert had both worked as

Union County correctional officers for more than twenty years.

Halton served as a sergeant and also as the vice president of the

Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), a union representing high-

ranking corrections officers. Burkert served as a corrections offi-

cer and also as the treasurer of the Policemen’s Benevolent

1 Association (PBA), a union representing rank-and-file corrections

officers, The rivalry between those two unions evidently caused

friction in their personal relationship. The tension became much

more acute when Burkert learned that Halton’s wife was posting

derogatory comments about him and his family on a public inter-

net forum. Halton’s wife referred to Burkert and his two broth-

ers—who also were corrections officers—as bullies. According to

Burkert, the postings also described him as “fat” and one of his
brothers as “quirky” and “kind of retarded.”

Angered by the insulting online comments, Burkert retaliated.
Burkert downloaded the Haltons’ wedding photograph, which
Halton’s wife apparently had posted on a social media website. He
then copied the photograph and made two flyers, writing lewd
dialogue in speech bubbles over the faces of the bride and groom.
On Flyer #1, over Halton’s face were the words, “I know I’m a
pussy with a little dick. Don’t do the inmates please Laura,” and
over his wife’s face were the words, “I wish you had a cock like the
inmates.” On Flyer #2, over Halton’s face, the writing stated,
“Fam, I got me another whore.” According to Halton, “fam” is a
term denoting the corrections officers as family, and the dialogue
on the flyers obliquely referenced his prior wife, a former correc-
tions officer who he claimed had relations with another officer and
an inmate.

Halton testified that on January 8, 2011, at approximately 10:45
p.m., he arrived at the employee garage of the Union County Jail,
parked his vehicle, and saw papers “blowing all over the place.”
He picked one up and discovered Flyer # 1. Halton was offended
and humiliated by the scurrilous writing over his wedding photo-
graph. As he approached the gun locker area, Burkert and his

fC

brother, Sergeant Kevin Burkert, stood in his path. As he walked
between them, Halton asked, “What's up,” and Burkert replied,
“You're what’s up.” Later, while Halton was working at the
booking area, he received a call from Burkert. During their
conversation, Burkert mentioned that Halton’s wife had called him
fat; Halton denied having any knowledge of it. When asked,
Burkert denied knowing about the flyers. The conversation came
to an inconclusive end.

The next day, January 9, when Halton arrived at work, a
sergeant handed him Flyer # 2, which the sergeant had found in
the area of the officers’ locker room. Halton identified the hand-
writing on both flyers as Burkert’s,

On January 11, while Halton was off his usual schedule and
engaged in union negotiations for the FOP, a lieutenant handed
him Flyer # 2, stating, “This came out the other night.” The flyer
was the same one turned over to Halton two days earlier Halton
indicated that he “was a mess in negotiations,” went home, and
never returned to work. Halton explained that he felt embarrassed
and concerned for his safety and received psychological counseling
and treatment. He received workers’ compensation benefits for
this work-related injury and retired on November 1, 2011. Halton
acknowledged that he did not know who was responsible for
placing the flyers in the various locations.

Ten months after the January incidents, Halton filed the crimi-
nal harassment charges. Halton stated that he filed the charges
only because the county had failed to properly discipline Burkert.
He also filed a civil lawsuit against Burkert.

Hl During the county’s investigation into the flyers, Sergeant
Stephen Pilot interviewed Burkert. Sergeant Pilot advised Bur-
kert that a refusal to give a statement would jeopardize his

Lieutenant Patricia Mauko testified that she found twenty to thirty copies of
one of the flyers during a routine inspection of the corrections officers’ locker
room on January 11,

4 Burkert received a work-imposed suspension for his conduct.

267

employment. Burkert admitted to Pilot that he had prepared the
flyers but denied circulating them>

Burkert testified that he had been friends with Halton and
became angry when he discovered that Halton’s wife had been
posting insulting comments about him and his brothers on a
website for more than two years. While on the website, Burkert
clicked a link to the wife’s screen name, and the Haltons’ wedding
photograph appeared. He admitted downloading the photograph,
inseribing the bubble dialogue over the Haltons’ faces, and attach-
ing the two flyers to the wall behind his desk in his union office.
He denied, however, circulating the flyers that were later discov-
ered in the garage and locker room. According to Burkert, on the
evening of January 8, after the telephone conversation earlier
described by Halton, he went to see Halton and said, “Here. I
made the pictures. This is payback for what you did to my family.”
Burkert explained that he expressed himself through the flyers
rather than “get physical with the guy.” Burkert retired as a
corrections officer in September 2012.

No testimony was elicited that Burkert worked either on Janu-
ary 9 or 11, 2011.

The municipal court entered a guilty verdict against Burkert for
harassing Halton on January 8 and 11 in violation of N.J.S.A.
2C:33—4(c).6 The court found that Burkert made and circulated the

5 At trial, Burkert claimed that the admission of his statement violated Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct, 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). The Garrity
rule generally stands for the proposition that a statement taken from a public
employee, threatened with termination from employment if he refuses to cooper-
ate, is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution on the ground that such official
coercion “interferes with the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.” State v. Graves, 60 N.J. 441, 450, 291 A.2d 2 (1972). The
municipal court did not formally rule on the defense’s objection and did not
reference Sergeant Pilot's testimony in its factual findings. The Garrity issue is
not before us

6 Although the court made no mention of the complaint relating to the January
9 incident, the municipal court disposition sheet indicates that complaint was
“merged” into the two other charges.

flyers in the garage and locker room, that the bubble dialogue
inseribed on the Haltons’ wedding photograph was “lewd and
obnoxious,” and that such language would “seriously annoy any
person, in this case Mr. Halton.” The court imposed fines of $500
for each conviction and additional financial assessments and costs.

B.

In a de novo trial on the record before the Law Division, the
court found Burkert guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of commit-
ting acts of harassment on January 8 and 11. The court deter-
mined that Burkert created and circulated the photographs and
did so with the purpose to harass, and further that the harassing
conduct was not protected by the First Amendment. More specifi-
cally, the court held that Burkert’s intent in placing the vulgar
language on the photos was to seriously annoy Halton in violation
of N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4(c). The Law Division imposed the same fines,
assessments, and costs as the municipal court.

Cc

A panel of the Appellate Division reversed Burkert’s conviction,
concluding that “the commentary [Burkert] added to [Halton’s]
wedding photograph was constitutionally protected speech.” State
y. Burkert, 444 N.J. Super. 591, 594, 135 A.3d 150 (App. Div,
2016).7 The panel accepted the argument that “the altered photo-
graph ... was not directed to [Halton],” but rather to an audience
of possibly willing listeners—other corrections officers. Id. at 601-
02, 185 A.8d 150. The panel determined that the evidence did not
support a finding that the flyers “were a direct attempt to alarm
or seriously annoy” Halton or to invade his privacy rights. Id. at
601, 185 A.3d 150. The panel stated that the “uncouth annotations
to [Halton’s] wedding photograph” amounted to “constitutionally

7 The Appellate Division did not consider the Garrity question because of its
finding that Burkert's “conduct was non-actionable protected speech.” Id. at
599, 135 A.3d 150,

269

protected expression, despite its boorish content, which bothered
or embarrassed [Halton].” Ibid. The panel also found that the
vulgar commentary on the flyers, although “unprofessional, puer-
ile, and inappropriate for the workplace,” did not constitute crimi-
nal harassment. Id. at 608, 185 A3d 150. The panel did not
address whether the flyers exposed Burkert to employment disci-
pline, Ibid.

We granted the State’s petition for certification. 227 N.J. 377,
151 A.3d 977 (2016). We also granted the motions of the Pennsyl-
vania Center for the First Amendment and the American Civil
Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU-NJ) to participate as
amicus curiae.

IL.

A.

The State argues that the Appellate Division erred in vacating
Burkert’s harassment conviction on First Amendment grounds
and that Burkert’s conduct in creating and distributing the flyers
was sufficient to justify the conviction. According to the State,
“{t]he harassment statute restricts conduct, not speech,” and the
right to free speech “does not encompass a right to abuse or
annoy another person intentionally.” The State contends that
“speech or writing used as an integral part of the harassing
conduct is not entitled to First Amendment protection.” The State
rejects the notion that Burkert engaged in permissible speech
with an audience that included willing listeners, suggesting that
inmates may have been part of that audience and that a “work-
place audience is ‘captive.’” The State emphasizes that N.J.S.A.
2C:33-4(c) requires that a defendant act with the purpose to
harass—‘“with a conscious object ... to annoy”—to demonstrate
that permissible speech will not fall within the statute’s sweep. To
establish that Burkert’s “course of conduct was alarming and
injurious,” the State points to Burkert’s admission that “he made
the flyers as an alternative to physically assaulting Halton” and,

270

from that admission, reasons that Burkert intended “the flyers to
have the same effect as a fight.”

B.

Burkert contends that the Appellate Division properly vacated
his conviction, reasoning that “{ulnder the First Amendment, the
State cannot prosecute an individual for publicly taunting another,
even if done through crude language and with an intent to annoy.”
Burkert asserts that the speech on the flyers constituted an
opinion and cannot be criminalized by labeling it conduct. Burkert
asks this Court to “reaffirm” that “the mere fact that expressive
activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not
render the expression unprotected.”

c.

Amicus Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment submits
that the Appellate Division correctly reversed Burkert’s conviction
for the following reasons: (1) New Jersey jurisprudence has
“applied the criminal harassment statute only to repeated commu-
nication to an unwilling listener, not speech about an unwilling
listener”; (2) the flyers at issue conveyed words and pictures—
traditional means of speech—and cannot be reclassified as conduct
to evade the protections of the First Amendment; (8) the speech
here did not fall into the category of speech integral to a criminal
offense because the flyers were not ancillary to other conduct—
rather, the expressions on the flyers were the only target of the
prosecution; (4) speech does not lose its First Amendment protec-
tion, however vulgar the content, even when its purpose is simply
to offend; and (5) Burkert’s speech was no less deserving of
constitutional protection because the matters addressed were per-
sonal rather than political.

D.

Amicus ACLU-NJ proposes that this Court adopt a “sensible
construction” of the language “purpose to harass” in N.J.S.A.

271

2C:33-4(¢) that will keep the statute within constitutional bounds.
The ACLU-NJ contends that a defendant's use of speech with the
intent “to insult, embarrass or even humiliate” should not be
sufficient to justify a harassment conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-
4(c), even though such conduct may trigger civil consequences,
such as a private tort action or employment discipline. The
ACLU-NJ suggests that we construe N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4(c) to re-
quire that a “defendant have the conscious object to cause in the
vietim the fear or apprehension of intrusion into the victim’s
safety, security, or seclusion.” According to the ACLU-NJ, that
interpretation is consistent with our case law and will make clear
that the statute cannot criminalize “insulting and even vulgar
communications” of the type in this case that are an inevitable
part of the aggravations of daily existence.

Ill.

The issue before us is whether Burkert is guilty of harassment.
because, as he intended, the lewd flyers seriously annoyed Halton.
In addressing that issue, we must determine whether the Legisla-
ture intended N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) to criminalize the type of speech
in this case.

To understand the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), we must look
not only to the statutory language, but also to related provisions in
surrounding statutes. State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 452, 901 A.2d
924 (2006) (“[W]e do not read [statutory words] in a vacuum, but
rather ‘in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the
legislation as a whole.’” (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J.
477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005))). We begin with N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4,
which provides:

[A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass

another, he:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymous-
ly or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any
other manner likely to eause annoyance or alarm;

b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or
threatens to do so; or

272

¢. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed

acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.

The statute distinguishes between “communications” and “lan-
guage” that violate the statute in subsection (a), and “conduct” and
“acts” that do so in subsection (c). Likewise, in surrounding
statutes, the Legislature has clearly indicated when language and
communication can be the basis for a criminal prosecution. The
“disorderly conduct” statute targets “unreasonably loud and offen-
sively coarse or abusive language” in a public place, N.J.S.A.
2C;:88-2(b) (emphasis added), and the “cyber-harassment” statute
targets certain online “communication[s],” N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1 (em-
phasis added), The Legislature has made clear when its primary
objective is to classify speech as criminal in nature.

Although a “course of alarming conduct” or “repeatedly commit-
ted acts” can occur through communications and language alone, it
is far from clear that the Legislature had in mind offensive speech
as the object of N.J.S.A. 2C:88-4(c). This point comes into better
focus by examining the Model Penal Code (MPC) Section 250.4,
which is the source of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; 1
The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report § 2C:33-4 (Criminal
Law Revision Comm’n 1971); State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 606,
92 A3d 656 (2014) (“When a provision of the Code is modeled
after the MPC, it is appropriate to consider the MPC and any
commentary to interpret the intent of the statutory language.”).

MPC Section 250.4, which is entitled “Harassment,” provides:
‘A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another, he:
(2) makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communication; or

(2 insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or
disorderly response; or

(3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient
hours, or in offensively coarse language; or

(4) subjects another to an offensive touching; or
(6) engages in any other course of alarming conduet serving no legitimate purpose
of the actor.
Subsections (1) through (8) of MPC Section 250.4 correspond to
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). The MPC Commentaries indicate that “[s]ub-

273

sections (1) through (8) of [MPC Section 250.4] proscribe harass-
ment by communication.” Model Penal Code (MPC) § 250.4 emt. 6
(Am. Law Inst. 1962). On the other hand, MPC Section 250.4(5),
which directly corresponds to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), primarily pro-
hibits “harassment by action rather than by communication,” ibid.,
and does not apply to harassment covered by the other subsec-
tions, id. § 250.4 emt. 5. The MPC drafters provide three illustra-
tions of conduct proscribed by subsection (5); “burning a cross on
the lawn of a black family,” “leaving animal carcasses on a
neighbor's stoop,” and “shining a spotlight into a parked car in
order to embarrass or frighten the occupants.” Ibid. Those exam-
ples suggest that subsection (5) focused on conduct intended to
cause fright and threaten a person’s safety, security, or reasonable
expectation of privacy.

Under subsection (5), the MPC drafters acknowledge a potential
scenario “of harassing conduct [that] is so imbued with expressive
content as to implicate first-amendment concerns.” Id. § 250.4
cmt. 6. Nevertheless, the drafters believed that such concerns
‘svould probably be excluded by the statutory requirements that
the action serve no legitimate purpose of the actor and that there
be a purpose to harass.” Ibid.

Unlike MPC Section 250.4(5), N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) allows for a
harassment conviction based on conduct that “seriously annoys”
another. As a consequence, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(¢) criminalizes a
much broader swath of conduct than the MPC. Additionally, unlike
the MPC, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not limit prosecutions to
expressive acts or conduct that have “no legitimate purpose.”
Overall, compared to our state harassment statute, MPC Section
250.4) is more narrowly drawn to insulate it from potential First
Amendment concerns.

That the primary thrust of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) is not to inter-
dict speech, but rather conduct, is reinforced in State v. Hoffman,
149 N.J. 564, 695 A.2d 236 (1997). In that case, we found that a
defendant who ripped up a court support order and sent it to his
estranged wife did not constitute harassment under N.J.S.A.

274

2C:33-4(a). Id. at 584, 695 A.2d 236. In rendering that decision, we
distinguished subsection (c) from subsection (a) of N.J.S.A, 2C:33~
4. We explained that

[tlhe purpose of subseetion (¢) is to reach conduct not covered by subsections (a)

and (b). For example, if a person were to ring a former companion’s doorbell at

3:00 p.m. on Sunday, flash bright lights into her windows on Monday at 6:00 p.m.,

throw tomatoes into her front door on Tuesday at 6:30 p.m., throw eggs on her car

‘on Wednesday, and repeat the same conduct over a two-week period, a judge could

find that subsection (c) has been violated, We do not imply by that example that,

five or more episodes are required to establish a course of alarming conduct.

[Id, at 580-81, 695 A.2d 236.)

The example given in Hoffman indicates that the Court consid-
ered subsection (¢)—which makes unlawful a “course of alarming
conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or
seriously annoy”—as targeting harassment by action. Despite the
Hoffman example, we do not doubt that, in certain clearly defined
circumstances, speech can take the form of conduct and therefore
be the appropriate focus of a subsection (c) prosecution. It is
evident, however, that the Legislature was not homing in on
speech in subsection (c),

In the cyber-harassment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1, which be-
came effective in 2014, the Legislature made it a crime when a
defendant, through an online electronic communication, “threatens
to inflict injury or physical harm”; “threatens to commit any
crime against [a] person or [a] person’s property”; or knowingly
sends lewd or obscene material with the “intent to emotionally
harm a reasonable person.” The cyber-harassment statute limits
the criminalization of speech mostly to those communications that
threaten to cause physical or emotional harm or damage. The
cyber-harassment statute’s precise and exacting standard thus
stands in contrast to the more loosely worded language of N.J.S.A.
2C:33-4(c).

One further observation. At the time the Legislature passed the
New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 104-9, it
repealed New Jersey’s last criminal libel statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:120-
1. L, 1978, ¢, 95, § 2C:98-2 (eff. Sept. 1, 1979). In doing so, the
Legislature signaled that the criminal law would not be used as a

275

weapon against defamatory remarks, thereby aligning our new
criminal code with the Model Penal Code.

The MPC Commentaries reveal that a criminal libel provision
was not included in the MPC because “penal sanctions cannot be
justified merely by the fact that defamation is evil or damaging to
a person in ways that entitle him to maintain a civil suit.” Model
Penal Code (MPC Tentative Draft) § 250.7 cmt. 2 (Am. Law Inst.,
Tentative Draft No. 18, 1961). Criminal laws are usually reserved
“for harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs the communi-
ty’s sense of security,” not for “personal calumny.” State_v.
Browne, 86 N.J. Super, 217, 228, 206 A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1965)
(quoting MPC Tentative Draft § 250.7 emt. 2)

Accordingly, the Legislature framed the New Jersey Code of
Criminal Justice with a conscious deference to the right of free
expression. We now turn to the constitutional constraints placed
on overly broad criminal statutes that threaten the right to free
speech.

Iv.

A.

The First Amendment protects “freedom of speech,” U.S.
Const. amend. I., as does Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey
Constitution, which states that “(elvery person may freely speak,
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that right.”

HE Laws may “not transgress the boundaries fixed by the
Constitution for freedom of expression.” Winters v. New York, 333
US. 507, 515, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948). Accordingly, “the
scrutiny to be accorded legislation that trenches upon first amend-

8 Defamatory speech that is protected from criminal prosecution may nonethe-
less be subject to a civil action and damages. New Jersey, like many other states,
has made tort remedies available to those who suffer such affronts. See, e.2.,
Senna y. Florimont, 196 N.J. 469, 958 A.2d 427 (2008).

ment liberties must be especially scrupulous.” State v. Cameron,
100 N.J. 586, 592, 498 A.2d 1217 (1985). The constitutional guaran-
tee of free speech, moreover, imposes higher “standards of cer-
tainty” on criminal laws than civil laws. Winters, 333 U.S. at 515,
68 S.Ct. 665, “Penal laws ... are subjected to sharper scrutiny
and given more exacting and critical assessment under the vague-
ness doctrine than civil enactments.” Cameron, 100 N.J. at 592,
498 A.2d 1217.

Hs Criminal laws touching on speech must give fair notice of
where the line is set between what is permissible and proscribed
and must be drawn “with appropriate definiteness.” Winters, 333
US. at 515, 68 S.Ct. 665 (quoting Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S.
306, 311, 62 S.Ct. 237, 86 L.Ed. 226 (1941); accord Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940).
Vague and overly broad laws criminalizing speech have the poten-
tial to chill permissible speech, causing speakers to silence them-
selves rather than utter words that may be subject to penal
sanctions. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72, 117 S.Ct. 2329,
138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S, 415, 433, 83
S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Such laws also give government
authorities undue prosecutorial discretion, thus increasing “the
risk of discriminatory enforcement.” See Reno, 521 U.S. at 872,
117 S.Ct. 2329 (citing Denver Area Educ. Teleomms. Consortium
y. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 116 S.Ct. 2874, 185 L.Ed.2d 888 (1996)).

HM “A court can invalidate a statute that is substantially
overbroad on its face” if “the statute ‘reaches a substantial amount.
of constitutionally protected conduct.’” State v. Mortimer, 135
N.J. 517, 530, 641 A.2d 257 (1994) (quoting Houston ll, 482
U.S. 451, 458-59, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). Such a
drastie remedy, however, is not the only—and not even the
preferred—approach. State Chamber of Commerce v. Election
Law Enft Comm’n, 82 N.J. 57, 81, 411 A.2d 168 (1980) (holding
that “narrow and discriminate construction of the key terms of the
legislation serves to overcome its major overbreadth objections”
and is done “to salvage the Legislature’s own product”), When a

277

statute’s constitutionality is subject to doubt because of ambiguity
in its wording, we proceed under “the assumption that the legisla-
ture intended to act in a constitutional manner.” State y. Johnson,
166 N.J. 528, 540-41, 766 A.2d 1126 (2001) (quoting Right to
Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 311, 450 A.2d 925 (1982)), Provided
that a statute is “reasonably susceptible” to an interpretation that
will render it constitutional, we must construe the statute to
conform to the Constitution, thus removing any doubt about its
validity. State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 350, 266 A.2d 579 (1970); see
also State Bd. of Higher Educ, v. Bd. of Dirs, of Shelton Coll., 90
N.J. 470, 478, 448 A.2d 988 (1982).

In short, we must construe a statute that criminalizes expres-
sive activity narrowly to avoid any conflict with the constitutional
right to free speech. For example, in State v. Rosenfeld, this
Court affirmed the overturning of the defendant’s conviction under
N.JS.A. 24:170-29(1) for using foul language (the words “Mother
F ing”) in a school auditorium during a municipal discussion on
racism. 62 N.J, 594, 603-04, 303 A.2d 889 (1973). N.J.S.A. 2A:170-
29(1)—a predecessor statute to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 and -4—made it
an offense for a person to “utter[ ] loud and offensive or profane or
indecent language in any ... place to which the public is invited.”
The Court noted, “the State has no right to cleanse public debate
to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most
squeamish among us.” Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. at 603, 303 A.2d 889
(quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29
L.Ed.2d 284 (1971)). The Court constrained the broadly worded
statute so that it only “prohibits indecent language which is
spoken loudly in a public place and is of such nature as to be likely
to incite the hearer to an immediate breach of the peace.” Ibid.
(emphasis added).

In rendering its decision, the Rosenfeld Court cited extensively
to Gooding v. Wilson, in which the United States Supreme Court
vacated the conviction of a defendant who violated a Georgia
misdemeanor statute that prohibited the use of “opprobrious
words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the

278

peace.” Rosenfeld, 62 N.J. at 600, 308 A.2d 889 (quoting Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972)).
The United States Supreme Court found the statute unconstitu-
tionally overbroad because the statute made it a misdemeanor
“merely to speak words offensive to some who hear them.” Ibid.
(quoting Gooding, 405 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. 1103).

Significantly, this Court has construed the language in subsec-
tion (a) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4—which proscribes communications
made in any “manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm”—as
encompassing, “for constitutional reasons, only those modes of
communicative harassment that ‘are also invasive of the recipient’s
privaey,’” Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 404, 718 A.2d 390 (1998)
(quoting Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 588, 695 A.2d 236), and that
constitute threats to safety, see id. at 414-15, 718 A.2d 390. In that
vein, our courts have upheld harassment convictions pursuant to
NJ.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) where a defendant scrawled racially offensive
graffiti on a victim’s home, Mortimer, 135 N.J. 517, 641 A.2d 257,
made persistent unwanted telephone calls, which included a racial
slur, to the vietim’s workplace, State v. Fin. Am. Corp., 182 N.J.
Super. 33, 440 A.2d 28 (App. Div. 1981), and repeatedly knocked
on the door and rang the doorbell of a home in which the
defendant’s physically abused wife had sought shelter, State v.
Reyes, 172 N.J. 154, 796 A.2d 879 (2002).

B.

How courts in other states have addressed harassment statutes
is also instructive.

In People v. Norman, the Colorado Supreme Court declared the
state’s harassment statute unconstitutional due to vagueness, 703
P.2d 1261, 1267 (Colo. 1985). Colo, Rev. Stat. Section 18-9-
111(1)(d) (1978) (repealed, H.B. 90-1118, 57th Gen. Assemb., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1990))—like N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4(¢)—provided that a
person commits the crime of harassment if, “with intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm another person,” he “engages in conduct or
repeatedly commits acts that alarm or seriously annoy another

279

person and that serve no legitimate purpose.” The Colorado high
court found the statute constitutionally infirm on due process
grounds because it provided no limiting standards “to assist
citizens, courts, judges or police personnel to define what conduct
is prohibited and, conversely, what conduct is permitted” and gave
prosecutors “unfettered” discretion. Norman, 703 P.2d at 1267.

Norman followed an earlier Colorado Supreme Court decision
that struck down a subsection of Colorado’s harassment statute
similar to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). Bolles v. People, 189 Colo, 394, 541
P.2d 80, 84 (1975). The court found that the statute was impermis-
sibly overbroad and impinged on free-speech rights. Ibid. The
court determined that the terms “annoy” and “alarm” were so
vague that even innocuous comments about noteworthy but un-
pleasant topics might subject a person to criminal prosecution. Id.
at 82-83,

Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit struck down on vagueness grounds a Texas harassment
statute similar to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d
174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit found that the absence
of clear enforcement guidelines gave prosecutors “unbounded
discretion” and subjected the exercise of First Amendment rights
to an “unascertainable standard.” Ibid,

In People v. Dietze, the New York Court of Appeals declared a
subsection of New York’s harassment statute, N.Y. Penal Law
§ 240.25(2) (1988) (current version at N.Y. Penal Law § 240.26),
overbroad and therefore unconstitutional because of its potential
infringement on free-speech rights. 75 N.Y.2d 47, 550 N.Y.S.2d
595, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 1167 (1989). N.Y. Penal Law Section
240.25(2) stated: “A person is guilty of harassment when, with
intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person ... {iJn a public
place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene
gesture.” In overturning subsection (2), the Court of Appeals
cautioned that “any proscription of pure speech must be sharply
limited to words which, by their utterance alone, inflict injury or

Po

tend naturally to evoke immediate violence or other breach of the
peace.” Dietze, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595, 549 N.E.2d at 1168.

Those cases reinforce the notion that harassment statutes must
be written with sufficient precision to ensure that protected
speech does not fall within the realm of a potential criminal
prosecution and to give fair notice of where free speech ends and
criminal conduct begins.

We conelude that the vaguely and broadly worded standard in
N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4(c) does not put a reasonable person on sufficient
notice of the kinds of speech that the statute proscribes. The
statute’s vagueness also gives prosecuting authorities undue dis-
cretion to bring charges related to permissive expressive activities.
That, in turn, means that the statute—if not more narrowly
defined—has the capacity to chill permissible speech.

Although patterned after the MPC, N.J.S.A. 2C:838-4(c) is more
broadly written than its MPC counterpart and therefore more
likely to impinge on protected expressive activities. Whereas
NJ.S.A, 2C:88-4(c) permits the conviction of a person who acts
with the purpose to “seriously annoy” another person, under the
corresponding MPC provision a conviction may be premised only
on “alarming conduct.” Unlike its MPC counterpart, N.J.S.A.
2C:38-4(c) is not restricted to conduct that serves “no legitimate
purpose of the actor.” See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(¢).

The circularity of the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, moreover,
does not place limits on the statute. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33~4, an
accused may not be convicted unless he acts “with the purpose to
harass.” However, one common definition of harass is to annoy.
See Black’s Law Dictionary 784 (9th ed. 2009); Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 1031 (1981). Accordingly, the words
“harass” and “annoy” are interchangeable. By that reckoning,
under subsection (c), a person who, with the purpose to seriously

281

annoy another, does seriously annoy another is guilty of harass-
ment.

Hl Speech, however, cannot be transformed into criminal con-
duct merely because it annoys, disturbs, or arouses contempt. See
Houston, 482 U.S. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (stating that speech
cannot be punished unless it is “likely to produce a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest” (quoting Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949))); ef.
Snyder v, Phelps, 562 U.S, 448, 458, 181 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d
172 (2011). “There is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the
First Amendment’s free speech clause.” Saxe v. State Coll. Area
Sch, Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2001).

Hs The First Amendment protects offensive discourse, hate-
ful ideas, and crude language because freedom of expression needs
breathing room and in the long run leads to a more enlightened
society. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4, 69 S.Ct. 894. Outside of the
category of obscenity, courts should not play the role of censor by
engaging in a weighing of an expression’s value or “relative social
costs and benefits.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470,
180 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010); see also Brown v. Entm't
Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 792-98, 181 S.Ct. 2729, 180 L.Ed.2d
708 (2011). Speech cannot be criminalized merely because others
see no value in it. “The First Amendment generally prevents
government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct,
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.” R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (citations
omitted).

HES -Nonetheless, neither the First Amendment nor Article
I, Paragraph 6 of our State Constitution prohibits the State from
criminalizing certain limited categories of speech, such as speech
that is integral to criminal conduct, speech that physically threat-
ens or terrorizes another, or speech that is intended to incite
imminent unlawful conduct. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S.

Po

282

709, 717, 182 S.Ct. 2587, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012); cf. Hamilton
Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 264, 716 A.2d 1137
(1998). For example, a robber’s command that a victim turn over
money is unprotected speech because the expressive activity is
integral to the commission of a crime. Likewise, laws that punish
threats of physical harm are constitutional because the State has a
strong interest in “protecting individuals from the fear of violence,
from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388,
112 S.Ct, 2588; see also United States v, Turner, 720 F.3d 411,
420-21 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that defendant’s threatening state-
ments to judges, despite political content, were not protected by
First Amendment).

HE The First Amendment also does not bar states from
enacting laws that punish expressive activity when “substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner.” See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct. 1780. Although the
“presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve auto-
matically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense,”
the government, for example, may “prohibit intrusion into the
privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be
totally banned from the public dialogue.” Ibid. A speaker using a
bullhorn in a town square may voice objectionable ideas to passing
members of the public who are seemingly a captive audience
without offending the First Amendment, but the Constitution will
not protect the speaker with a bullhorn bellowing outside a home
in the early morning hours. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
484, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) (noting that although
“[olne important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the
unwilling listener,” “ ‘we are often “captives” outside the sanctuary
of the home and subject to objectionable speech’ ” (quoting Rowan
v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d
736 (1970))).

In Hoffman, we determined that the catchall language of
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a)—“any other manner likely to cause annoyance

or alarm”—was intended to “encompass only those types of com-
munications that also are invasive of the recipient’s privacy,” a
purpose that would not run amiss of any constitutional proscrip-
tion. See 149 N.J. at 588-84, 695 A.2d 236. According to another
court, the constitutional right to free expression does not protect
one who “repeatedly invade[s]” another person’s reasonable expec-
tation of privacy “through the use of acts and threats that
evidence a pattern of harassment designed to inflict substantial
emotional distress.” People v. Borrelli, 77 Cal.App.4th 708, 91
Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 859-60 (2000).

Recognizing that the First Amendment and Article I, Para-
graph 6 of our State Constitution allow the State to punish
threatening speech or speech that invades a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in an intolerable manner informs our analy-
sis in construing the broad language of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) within
constitutional bounds.

B.

Unlike some of our sister jurisdictions that have struck down
overly broad and vague harassment statutes, our approach is to
conform subsection (c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 “to the Constitution in
a way that the Legislature would have intended.” See State v,
Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485-86, 878 A.2d 724 (2005). In adopting
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(¢), which was patterned after its MPC counter-
part, the Legislature’s apparent intent was to address harassment
by action rather than communication. See MPC § 250.4 emt. 6. We
cannot say that the Legislature intended to criminalize speech that
poses no threat to a person's safety or security or speech that does
not intolerably interfere with a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy. We have come to that conclusion by comparing subsection
(c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4 to subsection (a), to N.J.S.A. 20:33-2, and
to the cyber-harassment statute; by our analysis of the MPC
Commentaries; and by our review of case law, including the
example given in Hoffman of conduct proscribed by subsection (c).
We also find the limitations that we have placed on the catch-all

provision of subsection (a) instructive. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 404,
414-15, 718 A.2d 390; Hoffman, 149 NJ. at 588, 695 A.2d 236.

The constraint we place on the overbroad language of subsec-
tion (c) is compelled by the principles animating our free-speech
guarantees, We now return to the specific language of the statute
at issue,

on
HH N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 provides:

IA] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass
another, het

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed

acts with purpose to alavm or seriously annoy such other person.

In cases based on pure expressive activity, the amorphous terms
“alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose to alarm or seriously
annoy” must be defined in more concrete terms consonant with
the dictates of the free-speech clauses of our Federal and State
Constitutions. Narrowly reading the terms alarm and annoy—as
we have done in past cases involving subsection (a) of N.J.S.A.
2C:338-4—will save the statute from constitutional infirmity. See
Cesare, 154 N.J. at 404, 718 A.2d 390 (stating that “provision in
N.JS.A. 2C:33-4(a) prohibiting conduct communicated in any
manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm encompasses, for
constitutional reasons, only those modes of communicative harass-
ment that ‘are also invasive of the recipient’s privacy’” (quoting
Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 583, 695 A.2d 236)). We believe the Legisla-
ture would prefer a subsection (¢) prohibiting verbal harassment
that conforms to the First Amendment than no such provision at
all.

Therefore, for constitutional reasons, we will construe the terms
“any other course of alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose to
alarm or seriously annoy” as repeated communications directed at
a person that reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or
security or that intolerably interfere with that person’s reasonable

285

expectation of privacy. Of course, the Legislature may decide to
amend subsection (c) with other language that conforms to the
requirements of our free-speech clauses.

To be clear, the standard set forth above applies only in those
cases where the alleged harassing conduct is based on pure
expressive activity. Under that standard, repeated threats or
menacing communications that reasonably place a person in fear
for his safety or security are not protected expressive activities,
Likewise, a person who repeatedly makes unwanted communica-
tions to a subject, thereby intolerably interfering with his reason-
able expectation of privacy, will not find shelter behind the First
Amendment. Thus, a person who every day, over the course of a
week, either repeatedly yells outside an ex-partner’s house during
the night, or repeatedly follows closely next to a woman importun-
ing her for a date or making other unwanted comments, despite
constant demands to stop, would violate subsection (c).

Subsection (c) was never intended to protect against the com-
mon stresses, shocks, and insults of life that come from exposure
to crude remarks and offensive expressions, teasing and rumor
mongering, and general inappropriate behavior. The aim of sub-
section (c) is not to enforce a code of civil behavior or proper
manners.

The prosecution in this case targeted purely expressive activity
and therefore we apply the heightened standard of subsection (¢)
set forth above.

VI.

HI We recognize that neither the municipal court nor Law
Division judge who sat in this case had the benefit of the standard
developed in this opinion. They applied the statute as written.
Although in other circumstances a remand might be appropriate,
‘we see no point here because even the most indulgent view of the
record favoring the State would not support a harassment convic-
tion under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c).

First, we note that, based on the issuance of separate summons-
es, Burkert was charged with and convicted of committing acts of
harassment on discrete dates, January 8 and 11, 2011. However, a
conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4(c) requires the finding of a
“course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with
purpose to alarm or seriously annoy.” Neither the municipal court
nor Law Division judge specifically found that Burkert engaged in
a course of conduct or repeatedly committed acts.

The record soundly supports the municipal court’s finding that
Burkert circulated the flyers in the correctional facility's garage
on January 8. Although the municipal court found that Burkert
distributed the flyers discovered in the locker room on January 11,
no testimony was offered that Burkert worked on that date.

The record unquestionably supports the finding of the municipal
court—echoed by the Law Division—that the bubble dialogue
Burkert scribbled on Halton’s wedding photograph was “lewd and
obnoxious” and seriously annoyed Halton as it would have any
reasonable person. Burkert clearly intended to seriously annoy
Halton because he believed that Halton’s wife had insulted Bur-
kert and members of his family on an internet website, The issue
is not whether Burkert’s expressive activity—placing offensive
dialogue on Halton’s wedding photograph and then circulating the
flyers—was boorish, crude, utterly unprofessional, and hurtful. Of
that there can be no doubt. Within a workplace setting, such
conduct was grossly inappropriate.

However, our task here is to determine whether Burkert violat-
ed a criminal statute. Even assuming that the circulation of the
flyers constituted a course of conduct or repetitive acts, the State
did not present sufficient evidence to support a conviction under
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). The flyers were intended to and did humiliate
Halton. The flyers, however, did not threaten or menace him.
Nothing in the record suggests that Halton’s safety or security
were put at risk by the flyers, or that any inmates got ahold of
them.

287

The record, moreover, does not establish that Burkert had
repeated unwanted communications with Halton. Burkert’s only
direct interaction with Halton concerning the flyers occurred on
January 8. The rude and loutish dialogue on the flyers obliquely
referred to a matter apparently of common knowledge among
many corrections officers—that Halton’s former wife allegedly had
relations with a corrections officer and inmate. Although Burkert
displayed appalling insensitivity, he did not engage in repeated
unwanted communications with Halton that intolerably interfered
with his reasonable expectation of privacy.

The facts in this case—even when viewed in the light most
favorable to the State—do not satisfy the elements necessary for a
subsection (¢) violation of the harassment statute.

Having come to that conclusion does not foreclose other poten-
tial remedies or sanctions for the behavior at issue in this case.
Indeed, workplace discipline was imposed on Burkert, and Halton
filed a civil action.

VIL.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate
Division, which dismissed the harassment charges.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE join in
JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion, JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a
separate opinion, dissenting in part.

Justice Solomon, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(¢)
(harassment statute) required clarification because subsection (c)’s
language is impermissibly vague when viewed through the lens of
First Amendment free speech protections. However, even under
the majority’s clarification of the statutory requirements for sub-
section (c), I find that defendant Burkert’s conduct violates the
harassment statute. Thus, I respectfully dissent as to the majori-

288

ty’s conelusion that Burkert escapes prosecution under the Court’s
clarification of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c)’s statutory requirements.

Preliminarily, as a reviewing court, we cannot “disturb the
factual findings ... of the trial judge unless we are convinced that
they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend
the interests of justice.” Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins,
Co,, 65 NJ. 474, 484, 323 A.2d 495 (1974). “However, legal issues
are subject to de novo review; the appellate court owes no
deference to legal conclusions drawn by the trial court.” H.S.P. v.
J.K., 223 N.J. 196, 215, 121 A.3d 849 (2015) (citing M.S. v. Millburn
Police Dep't, 197 N.J. 236, 246 n.10, 962 A.2d 515 (2008)). Here,
Burkert admitted under oath that he created, posted, and person-
ally handed the offensive flyers to Halton. The trial court found
that Burkert circulated the flyers in the parking garage of the
correctional facility and in the employee locker room. Burkert
further admitted under oath that he created and posted these
flyers only “as payback for what [Halton] did to [Burkert’s]
family.” As the majority concedes, “Burkert clearly intended to
seriously annoy Halton.” Ante at 286, 174 A.3d at 1003,

Burkert’s conduct conflicts with the majority’s enunciated re-
quirements of subsection (c)(1)—“constru[ing] the terms ‘any oth-
er course of alarming conduct’ and ‘acts with purpose to alarm or
seriously annoy’ as any repeated communications directed at a
person that reasonably puts that person in fear for his safety or
security.”

The flyers were copied and posted in the men’s locker room and
in the employee parking lot of Halton’s place of employment, the
Union County Jail, where Halton worked as a sergeant. As a
sergeant, Halton had frequent contact with inmates and held a
position of authority over other correctional officers. Moreover,
Burkert knew Halton’s position and duties within the jail because
they worked together for twenty years. Thus, Burkert knew that
Halton’s safety could reasonably be threatened by posting the

289

flyers within the jail where co-workers and inmates could easily
see them.

The content of the flyers, see ante at 265, 174 A.3d at 991, was
such as to inspire mockery and potential disobedience by inmates.
Halton testified that the flyers made him fearful because inmates
might have seen or redistributed the flyers. Halton testified that
“inmates clean [the locker room] ... {slo I was afraid that an
inmate got a hold of it ... part of my anxiety [was] that they got a
hold of it and they were showing it to all the inmates in the jail
and that my authority was going to be undermined.” Halton also
testified that he felt the flyers undermined his authority with co-
workers as well, which led him to fear that his safety at the jail
was in jeopardy. As this Court stated in Cesare v. Cesare,
although “courts should not consider the victim’s actual fear,
courts must still consider a plaintiff's individual circumstances and
background in determining whether a reasonable person in that
situation would have” felt fearful. 154 N.J. 394, 408, 713 A.2d 390
(1998). Here, it was reasonable to find that Halton feared for his
safety considering he worked in a position of authority in a county
jail where Burkert distributed the two profane flyers.

I now turn to the majority’s contention that the flyers were not
“repeated communications.” New Jersey jurisprudence has scant
instruction on the boundaries of what constitutes “repeated” con-
duct in the context of harassment. What instruction is available
points toward a broad definition of “repeated communications.”
See N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)(2) (defining “{rlepeatedly” as conduct
“on two or more oceasions” in the context of stalking); Webster’s
Second New College Dictionary 939 (2d ed. 2001) (defining “re-
peat” as “[t]o do or say something again”). Therefore, “repeated”
conduct, as generally understood by a person of ordinary intelli-
gence, is conduct done more than once. See State v. Goodwin, 224
N.J. 102, 112, 129 A.3d 316 (2016) (noting that, in construing
statutes, courts “ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary
meaning and significance” and view those words in context (quot-
ing State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 452, 901 A.2d 924 (2006))).

Although the majority does not directly cite to State v. Hoff-
man, 149 N.J. 564, 695 A2d 286 (1997), to support a narrow
construction of “repeatedly,” Hoffman must be distinguished to
avoid confusion. In Hoffman, this Court did not come to its holding
based on the number of mailings (two) the defendant sent to the
victim. 149 N.J. at 583, 695 A.2d 236. Rather the Court found the
two mailings were insufficient to run afoul of N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4(a)
because the mailings “were not sent anonymously, or at an
extremely inconvenient hour, or in offensively coarse language”—
thus, the mailings did not invade the victim’s privacy. Ibid.

However, as noted by the majority, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) was
modeled after Model Penal Code (MPC) Section 250.4(5), See
State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 606, 92 A3d 656 (2014). The
comments to MPC Section 250.4(5) provide three illustrations of
conduct that would fall within the subsection and be considered
harassment. MPC § 250.4 emt. 5 (Am. Law Inst. 1980). The
illustrations include “burning a cross on the lawn of a black
family,” “leaving animal carcasses on a neighbor's stoop,” and
“shining a spotlight into a parked car in order to embarrass or
frighten the occupants.” Ibid. Using the majority's logic in this
case, the MPC illustrations would not be harassment if the perpe-
trator did not directly interact with the black family regarding the
cross burning or if the spotlight shone into the car illuminated
conduct that was “common knowledge” to some of the community.
The majority’s interpretation adds unreasonable and illogical re-
quirements to “repeated communication” under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-
4(c).

Burkert’s conduct also conflicts with the majority’s new require-
ments for subsection (2)—“repeatedly makes unwanted communi-
cations to a subject that intolerably interfere with that person's
reasonable expectation of privacy.” New Jersey recognizes a limit-
ed right to privacy in the workplace. See Stengart v. Loving Care
Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300, 322, 990 A.2d 650 (2010) (finding
plaintiff had reasonable expectation of privacy in “e-mails ...
exchanged with her attorney on her personal, password-protected,

291

web-based e-mail account, accessed on a company laptop”); Hen-
nessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 102, 609 A.2d
11 (1992) (finding employer’s safety concerns could override em-
ployee’s right to privacy in mandating drug testing in workplace);
Bresocnik v. Gallegos, 367 N.J. Super. 178, 183, 842 A.2d 276 (App.
Div. 2004) (finding “a single hand-delivered letter to a work place
does not illegally invade privacy”).

New Jersey also recognizes the common law tort of intrusion
upon seclusion, Hennessey, 129 N.J, at 94, 609 A.2d 11. Although
that tort is not at issue here, its elements are instructive and are
as follows: an “intentional[ ] intru[sion], physical[ ] or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns ... if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B (Am.
Law Inst. 1977). Because New Jersey case law regarding privacy
in the workplace focuses on the limits of illegal searches, intrusion
upon seclusion is an illustrative parallel to this case.

I believe that, under New Jersey jurisprudence, it is clear that
Halton had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal
relationship with his wife. Included in that expectation of privacy
is the expectation that his personal life would not be brought into
his place of employment for all of his co-workers, and possibly
inmates, to see, discuss, and ridicule. Furthermore, unlike cases
that have balanced an employer or the public’s interest against the
employee’s interest in privacy, the employer in this case does not
have a competing interest. The flyers in this case served no
overarching purpose or interest other than to harass Halton.

Thus, following subsection (2), Burkert’s conduct constitutes the
criminal act of harassment. The communications found in the
flyers were “unwanted” by Halton. The communications were
repeated, as previously discussed, And the communications “into-
lerably interfere[{d} with [Halton’s] reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.”

292

It is clear to me that Burkert’s conduct falls squarely within the
prohibited conduct of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(¢) as interpreted by the
majority. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

293

175 A.3d 152

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v.
TARIQ S. GATHERS, DEFENDANT.

S-140 September Term 2016
079274

July 6, 2017

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court on the State’s
application seeking emergent relief related to a pending appeal
(A-80-16), in the form of a stay of the Superior Court, Appellate
Division’s March 21, 2017 published decision; and

A single justice of the Court having referred the application to
the full Court for consideration of the State's request for a stay;
and

The Court having reviewed the instant application and attach-
ments, including any brief(s) to the Appellate Division filed by the
parties on the motion for a stay, the Appellate Division’s June 6,
2017 disposition of the motion for a stay, and the Appellate
Division’s published opinion of March 21, 2017, and for good cause
shown; it is

ORDERED that the State’s request for a stay of the Appellate
Division’s judgment is granted.

175 A3d 152

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
GLENROY A. DEER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-259 September Term 2017
079932
October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000430-16

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 152
ROBINHOOD PLAZA, INC., INTERNATIONAL CHAIN ENRICO
CORP., AND AVNER NETTER, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS,
vy, CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY, DEFEN-
DANT-PETITIONER.
C-242 September Term 2017
079890

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001070-15

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

295

175 A.3d 153

STEVEN GROHS, APPELLANT-PETITIONER, v. NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

C-255 September Term 2017
079247

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000820-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 153

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. RICHARD BARGE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-257 September Term 2017
079869

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000385-15

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied
without prejudice to any application defendant may make to the
trial court regarding alleged newly discovered evidence.

175 A.3d 153

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. LESLIE D, HILL, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-256 September Term 2017
079822

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002678-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A3d 154

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. DEREK BETHEA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-245 September Term 2017
078957

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005738-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

297

175 A.3d 154

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
JAMES S, RUSSELL, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-261 September Term 2017
079979

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004808-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 154

L.C., PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. S.C., DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT, AND W.S., DEFENDANT.

C-240 September Term 2017
079581

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001817-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

298

175 A.3d 155

MARGARET BELL, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. RICHARD C.
KLEIN, ESQUIRE, RICHARD C. KLEIN, P.C., AND SPECTOR,
GADON & ROSEN, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.

C-244 September Term 2017
079865

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003523-14

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

175 A3d 155
ALL RISK, INC., D/B/A ALL RISK RESTORATION AND DAMAGE,
CONTRACTORS, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. MERION RE-
ALTY, LLC, AND MERION INN MANAGEMENT, INC., DEFEN-
DANTS-PETITIONERS, AND VICTORIA WATSON, DEFEN-
DANT.
C~232 September Term 2017
078870

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001583-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

299

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

175 A.3d 155

JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v.
HOPEWELL VALLEY REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD
OF EDUCATION, A CORPORATE BODY IN THE COUNTY OF
MERCER, AND MATTHEW HOFFMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HIS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF
THE HOPEWELL VALLEY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DEFEN-
DANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-236 September Term 2017
079514

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000142-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

300

175 A.3d 156

MATTHEW KEEFE, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. XAVIER FER-
NANDEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, AND BOROUGH OF RIDGE-
FIELD, RIDGEFIELD FIRE DEPARTMENT, TRUSTEES OF
RIDGEFIELD LADDER COMPANY NO. 1, GARY CHARTOFF,
AND ANDREW CHARTOFF, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS,
AND MELISSA CHARTOFF, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-241 September Term 2017
079899

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~003760-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

175 A.3d 156

JAMES A. YURCHAK, APPELLANT-PETITIONER, v. NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C-262 September Term 2017
080038

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

301

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~004140-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 156

AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
PEDRO L. PEREZ, HIS HEIRS, DEVISEES AND PERSONAL.
REPRESENTATIVES AND HIS SUCCESSORS IN RIGHT, TI-
TLE AND INTEREST, MRS. PEREZ, WIFE OF PEDRO L.
PEREZ, HER HEIRS, DEVISEES, AND PERSONAL REPRE-
SENTATIVES, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS, AND CITIBANK
AND FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, DEFENDANTS.

C-234 September Term 2017
079808

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-008184-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs,

175 A.3d 157

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. NOEL MANGUAL, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-251 September Term 2017
078866

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004326-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 157

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. HARRY
CAMPBELL, JR., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-249 September Term 2017
079392

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003518-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

303

175 A.3d 157

MIHAI PASNICU, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v.
DOLORES MUZZICATO, DEFENDANT.

C-252 September Term 2017
079223

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004452-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 158

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
OLEG SHTUTMAN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-250 September Term 2017
079403

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000812-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 158

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. KEVIN D. WALSH, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C~-248 September Term 2017
079354

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003033-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 158

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. KEVIN WRIGHT, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-260 September Term 2017
079938

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000791-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 159

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
VERNON K. JOHNSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-254 September Term 2017
079791

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001106-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 159

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. R.M., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-247 September Term 2017
079296

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005596-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 159

SCOTT VALENTINE, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v.
MAXIMO ALMANZAR AND ANA ALMANZAR,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-238 September Term 2017
079685

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002207-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

175 A.3d 160

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
SHAKEEM S. YOUNG, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-246 September Term 2017
079119

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000796-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

307

175 A.3d 160

KAPIL GOEL, APPELLANT-PETITIONER, v. NEW,
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C-239 September Term 2017
079809

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001532-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

175 A.3d 160

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-~-RESPONDENT, v.
GERALD C. VAUGHN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-253 September Term 2017
079391

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003591-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 161

COLEEN A. SMALL, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER,
yv. AT & T, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-243 September Term 2017
079040

October 26, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002634~-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

175 A.3d 161

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
DANILO I. LEONEN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-258 September Term 2017
079903

October 26, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004764-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

309

175 A.3d 161

JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-RESPON-
DENTS, v. HOPEWELL VALLEY REGIONAL SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, A CORPORATE BODY IN THE
COUNTY OF MERCER, AND MATTHEW HOFFMAN, INDIVID-
UALLY AND IN HIS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AS AN
EMPLOYEE OF THE HOPEWELL VALLEY BOARD OF EDU-
CATION, DEFENDANTS-CROSS-PETITIONERS.

C-237 September Term 2017
079514

October 26, 2017

ON CROSS PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A cross-petition for certification of the judgment in A~000142-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the cross-petition for certification is
denied, with costs.

175 A.3d 162

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y, SHAQUAN BEST, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-318 September Term 2017
079722

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003607-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 162
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

v, STEPHEN HERNANDEZ, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C~285 September Term 2017
079492

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~004705-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

311

175 A.3d 162

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
JAMES A. BAILEY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-818 September Term 2017
079533

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004998-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 163

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. RICARDO J, SALAZAR A/K/A RICO,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-291 September Term 2017
079515

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000219-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

312

175 A.3d 163

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. DEVON PORTER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-321 September Term 2017
079801

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003153-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 163

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
ANDREAS MOTLEY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-824 September Term 2017
079868

November 14, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001233-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

313

175 A.3d 164

DAVID SCHWARTZ, PAT IURILLI, GEORGE MANIKAS AND RAY-
MOND KOHLER, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. BOROUGH
OF HIGHLAND PARK AND SCOTT LUTHMAN, DEFEN-
DANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-307 September Term 2017
079951

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002988~-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

175 A.3d 164

JOHN S. HILKEVICH, PETITIONER-PETITIONER,
v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,
RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C-295 September Term 2017
079110

November 14, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000079-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

314

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 164

THOMAS LIDDELL, APPELLANT-PETITIONER, v. NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C-838 September Term 2017
079493

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005380-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 165

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. RONALD LONG, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-339 September Term 2017
078976

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

315

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-008798-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 165

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
ROBERTO BURGOS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-352 September Term 2017
079569

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~-000740-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

316

175 A.3d 165

VICTOR H. BOYAJIAN AND LYNN BOYAJIAN, PLAINTIFFS-PETI-
TIONERS, v. MICHAEL CAMMARATA AND GRETEL CAM-
MARATA, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. VICTOR H. BOYA-
JIAN AND LYNN BOYAJIAN, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v,
MICHAEL CAMMARATA AND GRETEL CAMMARATA, DE-
FENDANTS, AND TOWNSHIP OF HARDING, PAUL FOX,
TOWNSHIP ENGINEER OF HARDING TOWNSHIP, GAIL
MCKANE ADMINISTRATOR OF HARDING TOWNSHIP AND
KAREN ZABORSKY, ZONING OFFICER OF HARDING TOWN-
SHIP, DEFENDANTS.

C-833 September Term 2017
080040

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~3968-14 and A-
12-15 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs,

175 A.3d 166

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EDGAR
TORRES, A/K/A TORRES EDGAR AND TORRES C# 245239
EDGAR, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-350 September Term 2017
079566

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

317

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005901-18
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 166
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. T.F.,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-880 September Term 2017
079459

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001813-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

318

175 A.3d 167

GDBT 1 TRUST 2011-1, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
DENARD C. TRAPP, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-837 September Term 2017
079860

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001489-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

175 A.3d 167

J.T, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-834 September Term 2017
078749

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-4942/5335-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

319

175 A.3d 167

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. VINCENT LAING, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-346 September Term 2017
079555

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000289-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.
—

175 A.3d 168

KEVIN DUGAN, PLAINTIFF, AND ROMAN ZIELONKA,
PLAINTIFF, v. BEST BUY CO. INC., AND
GARRETT HETRICK, DEFENDANTS.

M-344 September Term 2017
080016

November 17, 2017
ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of the New Jersey Civil
Justice Institute for leave to appear as amicus curiae is granted,
limited solely to the filing of the brief that accompanied the

motion.

320

175 A.3d 168

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. JOHN H, KINCH, A/K/A JOHN LANG-KINCH,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-341 Sept.Term 2017
079249

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~005136-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 168

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
DWAYNE S. JOHNSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-842 September Term 2017
079527

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002758-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

821

175 A.3d 169

IN THE MATTER OF RUBY SAUNDERS.
(RUBY SAUNDERS—PETITIONER)

C-357 September Term 2017
079681

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~002623-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

175 A.3d 169

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ERIC
EPPS, A/K/A CHARLES WATKINS, DWIGHT MITCHELL
AND COREY GRUBBS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-356 September Term 2017
079576

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004094-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 169

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-MOVANT,
vy. REHAN ZUBERI, DEFENDANT.

M-335 September Term 2017
079909

November 17, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to file an answering
brief as within time is granted.

175 A.3d 169

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
v. PEDRO SOLER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-345 September Term 2017
079069

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003745-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

323

175 A.3d 170

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. ANDRE DEMELO, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-353 September Term 2017
079571

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003903-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 170

ESTATE OF PATRICIA M. QUINN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. MICHAEL F. QUINN (DECEASED), DEFENDANT.
(MARITA QUINN-PETITIONER)

C-327 September Term 2017
079877

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001490-15

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

324

175 A.3d 170

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
JUAN D, OSBORNE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-349 September Term 2017
079565,

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003984~14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 171

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. ALFRED PETROSSIAN, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER,

C-343 September Term 2017
079552

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001257-15

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied;
and it is further

325

ORDERED that the notice of appeal is dismissed.

175 A3d 171

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
HIRAM VALENCIA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-851 September Term 2017
079074

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003399-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 171

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DAVID.
MACKOON, A/K/A MIKE MACKOON, MICHAEL MACKOON,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-340 September Term 2017
078977

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003774-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 172
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
VASILIO KOUTSOGIANNIS, A/K/A VASILIO KOUTS-
GIANNIS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-855 September Term 2017
079574

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005772-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

a
ee

327

175 A.3d 172

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. I.D., DEFENDANT-PE-
TITIONER, AND R.B., J.B., AND K.H., DEFENDANTS. IN THE
MATTER OF RA.B.,, J.B, AND R.H., MINORS-RESPONDENTS.

C-826 September Term 2017
079503

November 17, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005785-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 172

KEVIN DUGAN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, AND ROMAN
ZIELONKA, PLAINTIFF, v. BEST BUY CO. INC., AND
GARRETT HETRICK, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.

C-336 September Term 2017
080016

November 17, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001897-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

328

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

175 A.3d 173

KEVIN DUGAN, PLAINTIFF, AND ROMAN ZIELONKA,
PLAINTIFF, v. BEST BUY CO. INC., AND
GARRETT HETRICK, DEFENDANTS.

M-345 September Term 2017
080016

November 17, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of Paul W. Cane, Jr., Esquire,
a member of the California bar, to appear pro hac vice on behalf of
the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that Paul W. Cane, Jr., Esquire shall abide by Rule
1:21-2, including his obligation to adhere to the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and to make his required annual payment to the
Disciplinary Oversight Committee and the Lawyers’ Fund for
Clint Protection, said payment to be made within ten days of the
filing date of this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of
New Jersey is hereby appointed as agent upon whom service of
process may be made for all actions against Paul W. Cane, Jr.,
Esquire, that may arise out of his participation in this matter; and
it is further

ORDERED that Paul W. Cane, Jr., Esquire, shall notify the
Court immediately of any matter affecting his standing at the bar
of any other court; and it is further

329

ORDERED that all pleadings, briefs and other papers filed with
the Court shall be sighted by New Jersey counsel, authorized to
practice law in the State of New Jersey, who shall be responsible
for his conduct of the cause and the attorney especially admitted

herein.

175 A.3d 173

MAIN STREET AT WOOLWICH, LLC, WOOLWICH COMMONS,
LLC, AND WOOLWICH CROSSINGS, LLC, PLAINTIFFS-RE-
SPONDENTS, v. AMMONS SUPERMARKET, INC., BENJAMIN
AMMONS, DEFENDANTS, AND R.S. GASIOROWSKI, ESQUIRE,
AND GASIOROWSKI & HOLOBINKO, DEFENDANTS-PETI-
TIONERS.

C-331 September Term 2017
080036

November 29, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000713-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

175 A.3d 174

MELISSA KOLLAR, PETITIONER-PETITIONER, v. BOARD OF ED-
UCATION OF THE TOWN OF HARRISON, HUDSON COUNTY,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. (COMMISSIONER OF EDU-
CATION—RESPONDENT)

C-967 September Term 2017
079983

November 29, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005203-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 174

MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. COUNTY OF PASSAIC, DEFENDANT, AND CITY OF
CLIFTON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-328 September Term 2017
080084

November 29, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003318-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

331

175 A.3d 175

JEANNE FINNEGAN, PLAINTIFF, v. INDUCTOTHERM CORP.,
DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
GREENTREE FOOD MANAGEMENT, INC., THIRD-PARTY DE-
FENDANT/FOURTH-PARTY PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER,  v.
FRED DUNHOUR AND THE DUNHOUR AGENCY, FOURTH-
PARTY DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.

C-366 September Term 2017
080086

November 29, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004267-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

175 A.3d 175

RUPERT E, BAPTISTE, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER,
vy. FATOU A, JALLOW-BAPTISTE N/K/A
FATOU A. JALLOW, DEFENDANT.

C-359 September Term 2017
079394

November 29, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

332

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001172-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A3d 175
DEXTER & KILCOYNE, ESQS., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v.

ANTHONY X. ARTURI, JR., ESQ. AND ARTURI, D’ARGENIO,
GUAGLARDI & MELITI, LLP, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.

C-868 September Term 2017
080113

November 29, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~004862-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

175 A.3d 176
VERONICA CARTER, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. JOSEPH
POPOVICH, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT,
C-860 September Term 2017
079653

November 29, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001072-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

175 A.3d 176

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, PLAINTIFF~
RESPONDENT, v. JUDITH MESSINEO, DEFENDANT-PETI-
TIONER, AND DOMINIC F. COLETTA, MARY COLETTA,
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, COUNTY OF MONMOUTH, SYED S.
AHMAD, SYED AHMAD, M.D., PLEASANT DENTAL CENTER
P.A.,, ADAMAR OF NEW JERSEY, INC., GARY AXELRAD, M.D.,
COUNTY OF ATLANTIC, HOSPITAL AND DOCTORS SERVICE
BUREAU, SPIRAS CLOTHING INC., 600 KINDERKAMACK
ROAD OPERATING COMPANY, L.L.C., D/B/A ORADELL
HEALTH CARE CENTER, AND UNITED STATES OF AMER-
ICA, DEFENDANTS.

C-363 September Term 2017
079829

November 29, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

334

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000979-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

175 A.3d 177
AMANDA KERNAHAN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. HOME

WARRANTY ADMINISTRATOR OF FLORIDA, INC. AND
CHOICE HOME WARRANTY, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.

C-265 September Term 2017
079680

November 29, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001355-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

335

175 A.3d 177

ADAM MOGUL, PETITIONER-PETITIONER, v. BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN’S RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C-364 September Term 2017
080060

November 29, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002214-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

175 A.3d 177

MAIN STREET AT WOOLWICH, LLC, WOOLWICH COMMONS,
LLC, AND WOOLWICH CROSSINGS, LLC, PLAINTIFFS-RE-
SPONDENTS, v. AMMONS SUPERMARKET, INC., BENJAMIN
AMMONS, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS, AND R.S. GASIO-
ROWSKI, ESQUIRE, AND GASIOROWSKI & HOLOBINKO, DE-
FENDANTS.

C-332 September Term 2017
080036

November 29, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

336

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000713-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

33)

3

175 A.3d 932

A.T., AN INFANT BY HER MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN,
T.T., AND T.T., INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v. M. COHEN, M.D., KHALID SAVAGED, M.D., CINDY GALEO-
TA, C.N.M., JULIO CABAN, M.D., BAOHUONG TRAN, M.D., AND

NEWARK BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER, DEFENDANTS-
RESPONDENTS.

A-12 September Term 2016
077821

Argued September 25, 2017—Decided December 14, 2017

ia

339

Alan W. Roth argued the cause for appellants (Bendit Wein-
stock, attorneys; Alan W. Roth and Nikhil S. Agharkar, on the
briefs).

Lauren M. Strollo argued the cause for respondents (Vasios,
Kelly & Strollo, attorneys; Lauren M. Strollo, of counsel and on
the briefs, and Douglas M. Singleterry, on the briefs),

Thomas M. Comer argued the cause for amicus curiae New
Jersey Association for Justice (Lomurro, Munson, Comer, Brown
& Schottland, attorneys; Thomas M. Comer and Abbott S. Brown,
of counsel and on the brief, and Christina Vassiliou Harvey, on the
brief).

Eric S. Poe argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey
Physicians United Reciprocal Exchange (Erie S. Poe, of counsel
and on the brief, and Abbey True Harris, on the brief).

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

T.T., individually and on behalf of her three-year-old daughter,
A.T., filed this medical malpractice action seeking damages from a
hospital and several medical professionals for injuries caused
during the child’s birth.! The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to defendants and dismissed the action with prejudice be-
cause plaintiff failed to serve a timely affidavit of merit. The
Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting plaintiff's argument that the
circumstances should have supported entry of a dismissal without.
prejudice under Rule 4:37-1(b). A.T. ex rel. T.T. y. Cohen, 445
N.J, Super. 300, 308, 137 A.3d 1218 (App. Div, 2016).

One panel member dissented, maintaining that a dismissal
based on a failure to comply with the affidavit of merit require-

1 The Court adopts the terminology used in the published Appellate Division
opinion and refers to T.T. and A.T. collectively as “plaintiff,” notwithstanding
their individual claims.

340

ment should not invariably be with prejudice when appropriate
circumstances are present. Id, at 310, 187 A.8d 1218 (Fisher,
P.J.A.D., dissenting). The dissent found appropriate circumstances
present in respect of the tort claims involving this minor child.

We now reverse the grant of summary judgment to defendants
and remand the matter for further proceedings. A combination of
circumstances, not the least of which was the failure to schedule a
pretrial conference to address the affidavit of merit requirement
as our case law directed, warrants allowing the untimely affidavit
to be filed. The equities militate in favor of permitting a facially
meritorious action to proceed here, particularly because any preju-
dice to defendants may be addressed through costs imposed by
the trial court.

We decline to approve recourse to a voluntary dismissal without
prejudice under Rule 4:37-1(b) as an appropriate avenue for
addressing failures to comply with the affidavit of merit require-
ment, including when a minor is involved. Rather, we will require
modification of the Judiciary’s electronic filing and notification
case management system to ensure that, going forward, necessary
and expected conferences are scheduled to enhance parties’ com-
pliance with requirements under the Affidavit of Merit Statute
(AMS or the statute), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, in furtherance of
the statutory policy goals.

I

As alleged in the complaint, T.T. gave birth to A.T. at Newark
Beth Israel Hospital (the Hospital) on May 19, 2011. At the
Hospital, T.T. and A.T. were under the care of Morris Cohen,
M.D., Khalid Savaged, M.D., Cindy Galeota, C.N.M., Julio Caban,
M.D., and Bauhuong Tran, M.D. (collectively, with the Hospital,
defendants). As a result of defendants’ care, A.T. suffered a birth
injury known as Erb’s Palsy, also described as a right brachial
plexus injury. In her amended complaint filed on September 25,
2013, plaintiff alleges that defendants’ treatment of T.T. and A.T.
fell below the accepted standard of care and caused A.T.’s injury

341

and birth defects. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants’ negli-
gence caused T.T. the loss of A.T.’s society, companionship, and
support.

Defendants? filed an answer on December 5, 2013, denying the
allegations set forth in the amended complaint and demanding,
among other things, that plaintiff produce an affidavit of merit
(AOM) pursuant to the AMS.? Under the statute, plaintiff had
sixty days from that date—or 120 with leave of the court—to file
an AOM with respect to each defendant.

By February 3, 2014, sixty days had elapsed since defendants
filed their answer, and plaintiff had not served defendants with an
AOM. In the interim, plaintiff never sought leave of the trial court
to extend the AOM deadline. At no time prior to the sixty-day
mark or at any time thereafter did any court personnel attempt to
convene a Ferreira‘ conference, and at no time was one requested
or waived by counsel. This Court’s direction that such a conference
be conducted unless waived by the parties, see Paragon Contrac-
tors, Ine, v. Peachtree Condo. Ass’n, 202 N.J. 415, 424, 997 A.2d
982 (2010), appears to have been overlooked. By April 4, 2014, 120
days had elapsed since defendants filed their answer, and plaintiff
still had not supplied defendants with an AOM.

Three days later, on April 7, 2014, defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment. In support, defendants relied on plaintiff's
failure to produce an AOM within the statutorily mandated time
frame and claimed entitlement to dismissal with prejudice. Plain-
tiff opposed defendants’ motion. In opposition papers filed on May

2Dr. Savaged was not included in the answer filed, and the record does not
disclose any other pleading on his behalf.

3A filing complication with the answer was corrected by submission of
confirmation that plaintiff had consented to additional time for the filing of
defendants’ answer.

4 Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144, 154-55, 836 A.2d 779
(2003) (directing that accelerated case management conference be held in

malpractice actions to address discovery issues, including AOM requirements).

342

30, 2014, plaintiff claimed that the need to obtain medical records,
which she did not receive in full until May 5, 2014 according to
attached emails, impeded her ability to secure a timely AOM. With
those papers, plaintiff submitted an AOM dated May 22, 2014.

A hearing was held on defendants’ motion on June 20, 2014.
Prior to argument on the underlying motion, plaintiff's then-
current counsel made an oral application for a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:37-1(b). Counsel revealed,
for the first time, that plaintiff's failure to timely submit an AOM
was due to counsel’s own oversight, which stemmed from plaintiff's
stipulation granting defendants extra time to file an answer. After
a colloquy between counsel and the court, the court carried
defendants’ summary judgment motion in order to permit the
engagement of a co-counsel, who was present but not yet retained
and who was experienced in handling medical malpractice matters
involving New Jersey's AMS requirements. Thereafter, present
counsel, Alan Roth, Esq., entered an appearance for plaintiff and
filed a written motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.

On July 25, 2014, the court heard argument on both plaintiff's
motion for dismissal without prejudice to permit the matter to be
refiled with an AOM and defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment based on plaintiffs failure to submit a timely AOM. With
regard to the former, plaintiff argued that the failure to hold a
Ferreira conference and the former attorney’s oversight were
extraordinary circumstances that would justify the court’s use of
its discretion to grant a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
Plaintiff also advanced a constitutional argument, contending that
the AMS constitutes a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. In response, defendants noted that if the court were to
permit voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the court would be
enabling a circumvention of the AMS, which requires the court to
dismiss with prejudice when a plaintiff has failed to timely submit
an AOM.

The court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue and
denied plaintiffs motion for a voluntary dismissal. The court

granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed
the action with prejudice.

Tn explaining its finding that no extraordinary circumstances
excused the noncompliance in this matter, the court interpreted
Paragon to foreclose the possibility that failure to conduct a
Ferreira conference ever would amount to an extraordinary cir-
cumstance unless the circumstances of the case demonstrated
some substantial attempt at compliance with the AMS. Moreover,
the court reasoned that neither an attorney's admitted confusion
about the time requirements of the AMS nor the minor status of
plaintiff A.T. gave rise to an extraordinary circumstance. Deter-
mining that there was no attempt to comply substantially with the
AMS, the court rejected the request for a dismissal without
prejudice:

‘The plaintiff seeks a dismissal without prejudice, on terms that if [the case] gets re-

filed then the [AOM] would be with it. That’s basically ... engaging in a fiction to

make it look like I'd be doing something that was allowed, that really wasn’t
allowed, which would be extending the time beyond the 120 days. And no matter
how you dressed it up and no matter how many orders I put around it, that is
essentially what I would be doing. ... And so the {eJourt believes that to grant the
plaintiff's motion of a dismissal without prejudice, would essentially be to engage in

a fictional practice aimed at making it look like the [cJourt was complying with the

legislative directive, when in fact it was not.

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, reiterating that a
dismissal without prejudice was appropriate given A.T.’s minor
status and suggesting that the court set conditions for re-filing in
order to mitigate potential prejudice to defendants. The court
rejected those arguments and again declined to reach plaintiff's
argument that the AMS is unconstitutional, noting the argument.
was not properly before the court.

Plaintiff appealed, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in
dismissing the case with prejudice; and (2) the AMS is unconstitu-
tional. Plaintiff asserted that the trial court should have granted a
dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4:37-1(b) because there
were many years remaining on the statute of limitations for the
minor’s claim and there had been no prejudice to defendants
because they had expended no resources on discovery.

A majority of the Appellate Division panel concluded that
“permitting a voluntary dismissal in these circumstances would
render the AOM statute meaningless in the case of a minor
plaintiff.” A.T., 445 N.J. Super. at 308, 187 A.3d 1218, Seeing no
substantial compliance or extraordinary circumstances, the Appel-
late Division rejected the assertion that attorney oversight was
sufficient reason to grant a voluntary dismissal under the cireum-
stances, Id, at 306-07, 187 A3d 1218. Moreover, the majority
found it significant that the Legislature opted not to carve out an
explicit exception for minors in the AOM time frames. Id. at 309,
137 A.8d 1218, Accordingly, the Appellate Division majority de-
clined to accept the proposition that A.T.’s minor status warranted
protection from the AMS beyond the protections afforded by the
tolling of the statute of limitations. Ibid. The panel affirmed the
order granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing
the matter with prejudice. Ibid.

Judge Fisher dissented. The dissent took issue with the majori-
ty’s reliance on an earlier decision of the Appellate Division that
had addressed a failure to comply with the AMS in a similar
factual setting. Id. at 311, 187 A.3d 1218 (Fisher, P.J.A.D., dissent-
ing) (citing Kubiak v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J.
Super. 280, 238, 753 A.2d 166 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that failure
to comply with AMS must result in dismissal with prejudice, even
where plaintiff is a minor)). The dissent viewed Kubiak’s holding
as inconsistent with the protective care courts of this state have
traditionally accorded the tort claims of minors. Id. at 310, 187
A.8d 1218. The dissent disputed Kubiak’s premise that “[a] dis-
missal for failure to comply with the [AMS] is not any different
than a dismissal after plenary or summary adjudication” because
the purpose of the AMS is to require plaintiffs merely to make a
facial showing of a meritorious claim and not to demonstrate any
likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 311, 187 A.3d 1218 (first

3 The panel declined to address plaintiff's argument concerning the constitu-
tionality of the AMS because it was not properly raised before the trial court. Id.
at 305, 137 A.3d 1218.

345

alteration in original) (quoting Kubiak, 332 N.J. Super. at 238, 753
A.2d 166).

Moreover, the dissent asserted that a finding of exceptional
circumstances would have been appropriate here, notwithstanding
plaintiff's failure to advance that claim, and that such a finding in
this case would not be disproportionate to other cases in which
courts have found extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 313, 187
A,.3d 1218, The dissent compared the minor's attorney's “fumbling
of the [AOM] requirement” here to the attorney’s failure in
Paragon, and argued that it should have been within the trial
court’s discretion to either find extraordinary circumstances on
the facts of this case or to have granted a dismissal without
prejudice, particularly because defendants have suffered little by
way of prejudice. Id, at 313-14, 187 A.3d 1218. Thus, the dissent
would have reversed the judgment of the trial court in order to
“foster[ ] disposition of cases on their merits rather than on
procedural missteps.” Id, at 314, 1837 A8d 1218. In sum, the
dissent would have ordered entry of a dismissal without prejudice
in light of A.T.’s minor status, her attorney's mishandling of the
AOM, and the relatively little prejudice defendants have suffered,
and would have allowed the trial court the ability to impose
conditions on the re-filing of plaintiff's claims.

This matter is now before us on an appeal as of right from the
dissent. R, 2:2-1(a)(2). In this appeal, the parties repeat argu-
ments they advanced below. We also granted amicus curiae status
to the New Jersey Association for Justice and the New Jersey
Physicians United Reciprocal Exchange.

Il.

The AMS requires a plaintiff to serve an affidavit of merit
within sixty days of the filing of defendant’s answer; an additional
sixty days may be granted by a court upon good cause found.
N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. The affidavit was identified early on by this
Court as a required “threshold showing” that a malpractice claim
is not frivolous. In re Petition of Hall, 147 N.J. 379, 391, 688 A.2d

346

81 (1997). We have recognized the Legislature’s intent that the
statute facilitate the weeding-out of frivolous lawsuits, Galik_v.
Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341, 350, 71 A.2d 1141 (2001);
accord Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 242, 708
A.2d 401 (1998).

I The failure to provide the affidavit or its legal equivalent is
“deemed a failure to state a cause of action,” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29,
and, not long after the AMS was enaeted, this Court construed the
statute to require dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance,
Cornblatt, 158 N.J. at 247, 708 A.2d 401. However, we have
recognized equitable exceptions to “temper the draconian results
of an inflexible application of the statute,” Ferreira, 178 N.J. at
151, 836 A.2d 779 (acknowledging applicability of doctrine of
substantial compliance and extraordinary circumstances), and we
have created mechanisms to draw attention to and facilitate
satisfaction of this statutory obligation and its goals, id. at 154-55,
836 A.2d 779 (establishing discovery-stage case management con-
ference to encourage and facilitate compliance with AMS require-
ments, to avoid dismissal of meritorious claims due to inadver-
tence, and to promote AMS’s goal of weeding out insubstantial
claims).

The Ferreira conference was designed to be the Judiciary’s key
tool to promote satisfaction of the AMS's salutary policy goals. We
mandated the conference and imposed requirements on both
courts and defendants to discover and address issues as to the
sufficiency of a plaintiff's AOM. Id. at 155, 886 A.2d 779. In the
companion case to Ferreira, we stressed that the Ferreira confer-
ence is required and reiterated that defendants must raise any
objections to an AOM that has been served:

Our decision in Ferreira requires that an accelerated ease management conference

be held within ninety days of the service of an answer in all malpractice actions.

That conference will allow the courts to head off potential diseovery problems

before they become the stuff of motions. At the case management conference, the

defendant will be obliged to bring to the plaintiff's attention any deficiency in an
affidavit of merit already served in order to give the plaintiff the opportunity to

cure the defect within the 120-day period. In the event that the affidavit has not
been served, the court will remind the parties of their respective obligations. We

347

trust that early court intervention will make the circumstances of this case unlikely
to recur.
[Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 182, 836 A.2d 794 (2003) (emphases added),}

See also Saunders ex rel. Saunders v. Capital Health Sys, at
Mercer, 398 N.J. Super. 500, 510, 942 A.2d 142 (App. Div. 2008)
(“Contrary to defendants’ contention and the motion judge’s deci-
sion, Ferreira mandates a case management conference within
ninety days of the filing of an answer in a professional malpractice
case.”),

All that said, in 2010, we wrestled with the fact that mandatory
Ferreira conferences were not being routinely conducted as ex-
pected, which was thwarting the salutary purpose of the confer-
ence requirement. We had sought in Ferreira “[to] ensure that
discovery related issues, such as compliance with the [AMS], do
not become sideshows to the primary purpose of the civil justice
system—to shepherd legitimate claims expeditiously to trial.”
Paragon, 202 N.J. at 423, 997 A.2d 982 (quoting Ferreira, 178 N.J.
at 154, 836 A.2d 779). The conference was designed to serve as
reminder of the obligation and to facilitate early identification of
“any deficiency in [an] affidavit” already served by a plaintiff. Id,
at 423-24, 997 A.2d 982 (quoting Ferreira, 178 N.J. at 155, 886
A.2d 779). In Paragon, we confronted competing decisions in the
Appellate Division and trial courts over whether the failure to
conduct a Ferreira conference worked a tolling or abeyance of the
time period for assessing the timeliness of a late AOM.

Ferreira and Knorr indicated that the conferences were manda-
tory, but we clarified in Paragon that, “[aJlthough Ferreira confer-
ences should be held as a matter of course, they may be omitted
[upon submission of a proposed consent order indicating that] ‘the
Affidavit of Merit has been provided by plaintiff and all defendants
have waived any objections to its adequacy.’” Id, at 424, 997 A.2d
982 (emphasis added) (quoting Waiver of Affidavit of Merit Con-
ference, 176 N.J.L.J. 1006 (2004)). Explaining that it is not “a
tolling device,” we acknowledged that the conference “was never
intended, nor could it have been, as an overlay on the statute that
would effectively extend the legislatively prescribed filing period.”

Id, at 419, 997 A.2d 982. Although extraordinary circumstances
were found to exist in Paragon due to confusion about the tolling
role of the Ferreira conference, id, at 425, 997 A.2d 982, we
offered counsel for the future. Our decision added that, “going
forward, reliance on the scheduling of a Ferreira conference to
avoid the strictures of the Affidavit of Merit statute is entirely
unwarranted and will not serve to toll the statutory time frames.”
Id, at 426, 997 A.2d 982.

UL

A.

I No Ferreira conference was conducted in this matter, and,
when defendants filed a motion for summary judgment at the
conclusion of the 120-day period, plaintiff included an AOM with
her response to the motion. Nevertheless, the trial court felt
constrained to dismiss with prejudice.

That result worked a double frustration. The Judiciary’s key
tool to promote satisfaction of the AMS’s salutary policy goals was
not employed. And the pruning of plaintiff's claim was not the
pruning that the AMS is intended to achieve. The statute’s intend-
ed objective—to curtail insubstantial claims through the claimant’s
inability to present a supportive affidavit early on, before signifi-
cant litigation time and expense are incurred—was not advanced.

Although the failure to conduct a Ferreira conference alone may
not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, a confluence of
factors persuades us to recognize this case as sufficiently extraor-
dinary to allow the untimely affidavit to be accepted and to require
that the matter proceed on its merits.

Our warning in Paragon that the failure to conduct a Ferreira
conference would not routinely toll the time for submission of an
AOM was not meant to foreclose the finding of extraordinary
circumstances when a combination of events occurred. Here, just
such circumstances occurred, as noted in the dissent’s distillation
of what took place in the early stages of this proceeding.

349

An inexperienced practitioner became confused by timelines and
was “not as assiduous as he could or should have been” in securing
an AOM on a minor's tort claim, filed well before any statute of
limitations period was close to expiring. Paragon, 202 NJ. at 425,
997 A.2d 982. While that type of “attorney inadvertence” will not,
standing alone, support a finding of extraordinary circumstances,
see Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 405, 774 A.2d 501
(2001) (citing Cornblatt, 153 N.J. at 247, 708 A.2d 401), in this
ease, the Judiciary failed to do what this Court expected, namely
to act as a backstop. No Ferreira conference was scheduled, which
would have assisted in keeping the parties focused on the timing
of the necessary affidavit. Counsel here did secure an affidavit
when defendants filed a motion for summary judgment three days
after the time frame for submission of the AOM had expired. We
presume from plaintiff's swift compliance upon the filing of the
motion that we are dealing with a non-frivolous matter, not the
type of case that the AMS intended to weed out.

Yet, the harsh consequence of dismissal with prejudice was
meted out in this matter despite the fact that there is no prejudice
to defendants that the equitable powers of our courts cannot
address. Defendants are aware of the claim, so allowing it to
proceed should not impair their ability to mount a substantive
defense to the merits of this claim. Permitting the claim to go
forward now, as opposed to proceeding by way of a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice, eliminates the problem of the future
prospect of an action being filed again, at some indefinite point,
before the child’s age of maturity plus the expiration of the statute
of limitation period. Amicus New Jersey Physicians United Recip-
rocal Exchange raised a concern about the prospect of a minor’s
claim, dismissed without prejudice, being re-raised in the future as
posing a problem for medical professionals required to secure
malpractice insurance as a condition of licensure. See N.J.S.A.
45:9-19.17 (requiring all physicians who maintain medical practice
in New Jersey to obtain medical malpractice liability insurance);
NJ.A.C. 13:35-6.18 (providing minimum standards of either medi-
cal malpractice liability insurance coverage or letters of credit for

350

physicians practicing in New Jersey). And again, the trial court
has the discretion to require plaintiff to reimburse defendants for
the costs incurred in the extra proceedings that took place as a
result of the delayed compliance with the AMS, which can mitigate
prejudice to defendants.

Although this matter does not fit neatly into the factual scenar-
ios of past extraordinary-circumstances cases, we are persuaded
that equitable relief should be afforded to plaintiff. We regard the
circumstances of this case as extraordinary, viewed in combination
with the Judiciary’s failure here. The lack of a scheduled Ferreira
conference significantly contributed to an almost perfect storm of
injustice. Plaintiff should not be denied the opportunity to have
her facially valid claim move forward and be addressed on its
merits.

B.

Hl Notwithstanding our determination to reverse the order of
dismissal entered by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate
Division, we further determine not to resort to a voluntary dis-
missal without prejudice under Rule 4:37-1(b) as an appropriate
avenue for addressing the circumstances presented.

Except in certain types of actions inapplicable here, a plaintiff
may dismiss voluntarily an action without obtaining a court order
provided that either the dismissal occurs before the adverse party
has filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment, whichever
oceurs first, or the plaintiff files a stipulation signed by all parties
who have appeared in the action. R, 4:37-1(a). Unless otherwise
specified, the dismissal is without prejudice in such circumstances.
Ibid. Otherwise, “an action shall be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance only by leave of court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems appropriate.” R. 4:37-1(b). Dismissals under
subsection (b) are without prejudice unless directed differently by
the court. Ibid,

351

Hs Generally stated, a dismissal with prejudice is regarded
as “on the merits” of the claim, but a dismissal “based on a court’s
procedural inability to consider a case” is entered without preju-
dice. Watkins y. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Ine., 124 N.J. 398,
415-16, 591 A.2d 592 (1991); Tsibikas v. Morrof, 5 N.J. Super. 306,
310, 68 A.2d 889 (App. Div. 1949); 4:37-2(d) (“Unless the
order of dismissal otherwise specifies, a[n involuntary] dismissal
under R, 4:37-2(b) or (c) and any dismissal not specifically provid-
ed for by R. 4:37, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,
operates as an adjudication on the merits.”). A dismissal specifying
that it is “with prejudice constitutes an adjudication on the merits
‘as fully and completely as if the order had been entered after
trial.’” Velasquez v, Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 507, 589 A.2d 148 (1991)
(quoting Gambocz v. Yelenesics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (8d Cir. 1972)).

Reviewing courts of this state frown on the use of a dismissal
without prejudice under Rule 4:37-1(b) as a mechanism for salvag-
ing a case that has run aground on requirements established in
statutes or in the Rules of Court. In rejecting use of Rule 4:37-1
in such a situation, the Appellate Division explained the reasons
for deterring such interference with the orderly and efficient
administration of litigation:

[When] plaintiff faced defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and moved for a
voluntary dismissal in response, the discovery end date had passed. At that point,
absent court order, plaintiff was prohibited from offering his late expert report in
opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment and from offering expert
testimony at the time of trial. Instead of confronting this difficulty directly—by
seeking an extension of discovery pursuant to Rule 4:24-1(c)—plaintiff opted for a
solution that, when granted, severely prejudiced defendants by guaranteeing the
unnecessary duplication of past efforts.

The permission given to plaintiff to pursue a new, identical complaint without
consequence also served to minimalize the central purpose of our court rules: the
fair and efficient administration of justice. See Ragusa v. Lau, 119 N.J. 276, 283,
575 A2d 8 (1990); Handelman v. Handelman, 17 N.J. 1, 10, 109 A.2d 797 (1954).
Were we to endorse the order in question, we would legitimize a gaping loophole in
the “Best Practices” rule amendments, which were intended to “improve” and not
frustrate “efficieney and expedition of the litigation process.” Pressler, Current
N.J. Court Rules, emt, on R. 1:1-2 (2006). The process authorized by Rule 4:37-1(b)
camnot be the means of avoiding the requirements of Rule 4:24-1(c) or the means
for creating less efficient or an uneven method for adjudicating disputes. Our

352

modern procedures could not have evolved to the present day only to prove
irrelevant and ineffectual when faced with an artifice such as plaintiff created here.

Plaintiff's claim to relief from his “logistics problem” should have been pursued
directly, not disingenuously. Instead of resorting to the charade of @ voluntary
dismissal coupled with the unveiling of a new complaint waiting in the wings,
plaintiff should have first been obligated to seek relief from the discovery end date.
Because plaintiff opted not to pursue that proper course, we conclude that the trial
judge erred in granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which had the
undesirable effect of unraveling all that had been accomplished in this litigation.
[Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super, 91, 102-03, 895 A.2d 1234 (App. Div, 2006).]

As Shulas makes evident, dismissal under Rule 4:37-1(b)’s provi-
sions—requiring court order and on terms as appropriate—serves
to protect a defendant from being subjected to duplicate costs of
litigation if forced to defend another action based on the same set
of claims. See also Union Carbide Corp. v. Litton Precision Prods.
Inc. 94 N.J. Super. 815, 817, 228 A.2d 99 (Ch. Div. 1967) (recogniz-
ing same policy goals), That said, we stress that to the extent that
Shulas seemed to suggest the presence of bad faith, that concern
is not present here.

Cracking open the use of dismissals of actions without prejudice
to allow more time whenever a plaintiff runs aground on the
requirements of the AMS would prolong litigation and potentially
eviscerate the AMS policy of weeding out, early on, non-meritori-
ous malpractice cases. While the dissent here did not suggest such
a broad use and emphasized the extraordinary circumstances
present, we decline to send the matter back for entry of a
dismissal without prejudice and instead rely on the presence of
extraordinary circumstances to reverse the dismissal entered be-
low. We caution courts to adhere to the spare use of dismissals
without prejudice as prior case law instructs. See Shulas, 385 N.J.
Super. at 102-03, 895 A.2d 1234.

c.

In conclusion, this Court will take additional administrative
steps to promote adherence to the AMS’s salutary goal of prompt-
ly culling frivolous malpractice claims and to promote the effective
use of court and attorney resources so that meritorious cases may

advance efficiently. We designed our Ferreira conference require-
ment to promote such purposes. We made the conference manda-
tory to underscore its importance. We imposed the burden of
complying with the conference requirement on both attorneys and
the Judiciary. We created that failsafe mechanism within our
system of case management envisioning that the required confer-
ence would be held unless it were knowingly waived. But systems
ean be imperfect, as this case reflects.

The failure of the Judiciary’s current mechanisms to ensure the
scheduling of the required Ferreira conference will not be permit-
ted to work an injustice in this matter. More improvement in our
mechanisms is necessary, however.

Going forward, advancements in our automated case manage-
ment system will permit electronic notification of (1) the AOM
filing obligation and (2) the scheduling of a Ferreira conference.
The electronic case management system will be updated to issue
notices to counsel and accomplish those tasks. Further details
concerning those improvements will be provided through the
Administrative Office of the Courts.

With our announcement of those improvements comes a caution-
ary note. Counsel are on notice that disregarding the scheduling of
the conference, or waiving the conference, will not provide a basis
for relief from AMS obligations.

Iv.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. The matter
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN,
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, AND
TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.

g

175 A.3d 942

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, vy, A.B., DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT. IN THE MATTER OF A.F., MINOR.

A-27 September Term 2016
077664

Argued September 26, 2017—Decided December 21, 2017

Witt

as
|

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON
join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.

Clara S. Licata, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for
appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender Parental Repre-
sentation, attorney; T. Gary Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender, of
counsel, and Clara S. Licata, of counsel and on the briefs).

Sara M. Gregory, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause
for respondent New Jersey Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney;
Andrea §. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and

1 Joyce Calefati Booth, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief),

Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued
the cause for respondent A.F. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defend-
er Law Guardian, attorney; Melissa R. Vance, on the brief),

Mary M. McManus-Smith argued the cause for amicus curiae
Legal Services of New Jersey (Melville D. Miller, Jr., President,
attorney; Mary M. McManus-Smith, Melville D. Miller, Jr., and
Jeyanthi C. Rajaraman, on the brief).

JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case comes before us as a matter of right from a divided
Appellate Division panel. The panel majority upheld the trial
court’s determinations that defendant A.B. abused or neglected
AF., her sixteen-year-old daughter; that A.B, willfully abandoned
AF; and that remarks attributed to A.B.’s sister, J.F., were
subject to suppression as embedded hearsay. The dissenting pa-
nelist disagreed with all three determinations.

We now affirm the panel majority’s judgment that the New
Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency met its
burden of proof concerning A.B.’s abuse or neglect of A.F. We

find, however, insufficient proof of willful abandonment and there-
fore reverse on that issue. We also find that the hearsay evidence
was properly suppressed.

1.
We marshal the following facts from the record.

Sixteen-year-old A.F. and her infant son lived with her biologi-
cal mother, defendant A.B., in an apartment owned by A.B.’s
sister, J.F. A.F. and A.B. had a tumultuous relationship, which
spurred the incidents that resulted in this case.

On October 2, 2012, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection
and Permanency (the Division) received a referral that A.F. had
run away with her infant son in September 2012. The referral
included concerns that A.F. smoked marijuana, consumed alcohol,
and exhibited inadequate parenting. The Division dispatched a
caseworker to interview A.B. at her apartment, where she told the
caseworker she had been having difficulty with A.F., who was very
disrespectful. A.B. disclosed that A.F, had run away with her
infant son several days earlier when A.B, took away A.F.’s laptop
and cellphone as punishment for being suspended from school for
cursing at a teacher. A.B. tried to reach A.F. by cellphone but,
when she refused to answer, A.B. cancelled A.F.’s cellphone
service.

In October 2012, in response to a call from A.F.’s high school,
the caseworker went to the high school and met with A.F. During
this meeting, A.F. related that she had been staying with various
friends since leaving home. A.F. indicated that she had previously
returned home to reconcile with A.B. and that they had gone
together to the school to have A.F. reinstated. During the confer-
ence with the school’s Management Crisis Team, A.F. and A.B.
got into an argument, and A.B. “made statements that she was
close to kicking [A.F.] out of her home.” Near the end of the
conference, A.F. expressed that she had “no intention of returning
to her mom’s home,” and in fact did not.

359

Later that day, the caseworker discovered that A.F. and her
infant son were staying with a friend, L.V., whose residence lacked
electricity. The caseworker attempted to gain entry to the resi-
dence to assess its suitability for a young runaway and her infant.
She was refused entry. The caseworker immediately conveyed to
A.B. her apprehensions regarding the safety of A.F. and her
infant son, as well as the suitability of A.F.’s living arrangement.
A.B. voiced concern but was “still not willing to allow the children
to come back and reside with her,” emphasizing “she was not
willing to take [A.F.] back” given that A.F. “was very disrespect-
ful.”

A.B. asserted that she lived with her sister, J.F., who owned the
apartment and was unwilling to allow A.F. back into the home “as
well.” A.B. could think of no one else with whom A.F. could stay.
She was also unwilling to consent to an order of emergency
removal for A.F. The Division resorted to an emergency removal
process and placed A.F. and her son in a resource home. The
Division then filed a verified complaint in the Family Part of the
Superior Court, Chancery Division, seeking continued legal custo-
dy of A.F, At an order to show cause hearing, the court deter-
mined that the Division’s removal was proper and that the Divi-
sion would retain custody of A.F. The court later continued the
Division's custody of A.F.

On February 19, 2013, the court conducted a fact-finding hear-
ing to determine whether A.B. abused, neglected, or willfully
abandoned A.F. within the meaning of Title 9, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21
to -8.73. As a preliminary matter, defense counsel objected to the
admission of embedded hearsay in the form of statements attrib-
uted to J.F., A.B.’s sister, within the Division’s referral, reports,
and documents. The court sustained that objection.

At the fact-finding hearing, the Division’s caseworker was its
only witness. During the Law Guardian’s cross-examination of the
caseworker, the Law Guardian asked if J.F. ever told her that
“she was not willing to let AF. stay in her house.” Defense
counsel objected on the basis of inadmissible hearsay; the judge

sustained the objection. During the defense’s summation, the
Division objected when defense counsel attempted to reference
J.F’s refusal to allow A.F. into her home, The judge similarly
sustained the objection on hearsay grounds. During defense coun-
sel’s cross-examination of the caseworker, the Division objected
when defense counsel intimated that J.F. refused to allow AF.
back into the apartment, arguing that it was not a proper question
for that witness to answer. The judge sustained the objection.

In an oral decision rendered on the record, the judge deter-
mined that A.B. neglected A.F. in violation of subsections (4)(a)
and (5) of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), explaining that “refusing to allow a
16 year old child into her home who has an infant herself would be
gross negligence. It’s just reckless disregard for the safety of her
child.”

A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed in an unpublished
opinion. The panel majority rejected A.B.’s contention that a
finding of abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) could not
be sustained because A.F. was not actually harmed in any way,
reasoning that “the statute makes expressly clear that actual
impairment of the child is not required to support a finding of
neglect.” The panel majority similarly dismissed A.B.’s argument
that the judge failed to make an explicit finding that A.F. was in
imminent danger as defined by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(¢)(4). “[T]he risks
inherent in barring a sixteen-year-old child from the family home
without arranging any alternative source of shelter or support are
obvious,” the majority observed.

The panel majority affirmed the judge’s finding of willful aban-
donment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c¢)(5), holding that the record
contained substantial and credible evidence that A.B. willfully
abdicated any responsibility for her daughter. The panel majority
found support for that finding in evidence that A.B. refused to
permit A.F. to return home despite being informed by the Division
that A.F.’s living arrangement was ill-advised, as well as A.B.’s
failure to make other arrangements for A.F.’s care and support.

361

Lastly, the panel majority rebuffed the dissent’s argument that
A.B.’s due process rights were violated by the suppression of
hearsay testimony concerning J.F.’s alleged refusal to allow A.F.
back into the apartment. The panel majority noted that the judge
had discretion to determine the credibility of the evidence adduced
at the fact-finding hearing and found no error in the judge’s
conclusion that the hearsay testimony regarding A.B.’s sister was
unreliable.

The dissenting panel member disagreed with the majority’s
refusal to consider evidence of the sister's ownership of the
apartment and her decision not to re-admit A.F,, contending that
the caseworker’s testimony on the matter was competent, materi-
al, and relevant evidence.

The dissent further took issue with the panel majority's finding
of abuse or neglect, reasoning that even if A.B. had precluded A.F.
from returning home, that act does not justify an abuse or neglect
finding because there was neither evidence of actual harm to A.F.
nor the threat of harm. The dissent noted that A.F. ran away on
other occasions and each time returned home unscathed.

The dissent further disputed the panel majority's finding of
abandonment under the statute. The dissenting panelist main-
tained that abandonment required a finding that a parent must
exhibit a willful forsaking of her parental responsibilities, whereas
A.B. gave no indication that she intended to permanently bar her
daughter or was abdicating her parental rights and duties.

A.B. appealed to this Court as of right. See R. 2:2-1(a)(2). We
granted leave to Legal Services of New Jersey (LSNJ) to appear
as amicus curiae.

IL

A.

A.B, advances three arguments on appeal and urges this Court
to reverse the decision of the panel majority. First, she asserts

362

that it was error to exclude hearsay testimony alleging that her
sister J.F, was instrumental in prohibiting A.F. from returning to
her apartment. A.B. argues that the panel majority’s reliance on
Division of Youth & Family Services y. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245,
800 A.2d 182 (App. Div. 2002), to support exclusion of the hearsay
statements was misplaced. Rather, A.B. argues that the J.Y.
decision established a shield to protect against the State’s misuse
of hearsay and casual non-evidential assertions as evidence in a
Title 9 case and that the Family Part judge flouted J.Y.’s demand
for “fairness and formality in a Title 9 trial.” A.B, also adopts the
dissenting judge’s assertion that the exclusion of the hearsay
statements constituted a due process violation.

Second, A.B. argues that the Division did not present sufficient
evidence to sustain a finding of abuse or neglect against her under
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). Specifically, A.B. contends that the Divi-
sion was required to show:

(2) that A.F.'s physical, mental, or emotional condition was impaired or in imminent

danger of becoming impaired; (2) that A.B. failed to exercise a minimum degree of

care in providing her daughter with adequate shelter(;] and (3) that she was
financially able to do so or had been offered the financial means to do so.

A.B. maintains that the Division did not meet its burden of
proving any of those elements. As to the harm or impairment
prong, A.B. argues that the panel majority created a categorical
rule in holding that “the risks inherent in barring a sixteen-year-
old from the family home without arranging any alternative source
of shelter are obvious.” A.B, asserts that this Court condemned

n_of Child Protection &

such rules in the Title 9 context in Dis
Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 192-93, 121 A.3d 832 (2015).
A.B. maintains that even if V.L.’s home lacked electricity, that
alone would not indicate that A.F. was in danger of impairment.
A.B. argues that the Division did not make the requisite showing
of imminent peril to A.F. A.B. further asserts that the Division
failed to provide evidence of her financial ability to provide shelter.

Lastly, A.B, argues that the trial court’s finding of abandonment
under Title 9 must be reversed because there were no proofs
presented to demonstrate that she intended to willfully forego her

363

parental responsibilities. A.B. stresses that the record indicates
she had no intent of abandoning A.F. as evidenced by the fact that
she allowed A.F. to return to the family home on several occa-
sions.

B.

The Division counters that it demonstrated abuse or neglect of
A.F. by A.B. by a preponderance of the evidence and asks this
Court to affirm the panel majority. The Division echoes the trial
court’s finding that A.B.’s refusal to allow A.F. back into the
apartment amounted to gross negligence and evidenced her reck-
less disregard for A.F.’s safety. The Division also adopts the panel
majority’s holding that “the risks of leaving a teenager without a
source of shelter are ‘obvious.’” The Division notes that A.B.
refused services offered to her, including substance abuse treat-
ment, and failed to seek assistance even after A.F. had left the
home. In addition, the Division alleges that A.B. thwarted its
attempts to provide her with assistance when she failed to apprise
the Division of her issues with A.F.

The Division underscores that the trial court acted within its
discretion in excluding the hearsay statements at issue because
those statements were not credible and A.B. sought and was
granted their exclusion. A.B. cannot now argue that precluding the
statements was error, the Division argues, under the doctrine of
invited error. The Division notes that A.B.’s argument was not
raised below.

The Division urges this Court to affirm the panel majority's
finding of abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5). The Division
contends that A.B.’s refusal to allow A.F. back into the home
amounted to a “willful or intentional act” under the statute.

Cc.

The Law Guardian, appearing on behalf of A.F., argues that the
court properly excluded as hearsay statements regarding J.F.’s

refusal to allow A.F. to return to the apartment, stressing that
those statements did not qualify for an enumerated exception
because they were unreliable and lacked corroboration. The Law
Guardian agrees that the Division properly showed, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, A.B.’s abuse or neglect of A.F. under
subsections (4) and (5) of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. The Law Guardian
submits that the risks that arise from “leaving a child without
adequate shelter need not be explained” and are plainly evident.
The Law Guardian also supports the finding of abandonment
under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(¢)(5), arguing that A.B. had an obligation
to “provide or arrange housing for her child” and her not doing so
amounted to a failure to “provide for her child’s safety and well-
being.”

D.

As amicus curiae, LSNJ urges this Court to reverse the panel
majority’s holding and argues that the Division should not have
initiated abuse or neglect proceedings. Rather, LSNJ contends,
the Division should have performed its “duty to provide the
resources necessary to ensure adequate housing” instead of plac-
ing the onus on A.B. for not “seek[ing) help from the Division to
shelter her daughter.” LSNJ advocates that for the Division to
meet its burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a), it must
prove either that the parent had the financial means to provide for
his or her child or that the Division affirmatively offered the
financial or other resources necessary to secure adequate housing.
LSNJ additionally contends that the Division could have provided
shelter for A.F. under the New Jersey Homeless Youth Act,
codified in relevant part at N.J.S.A, 9:12A-1.

LSNJ advances that A.B.’s refusal to allow A.F. to return home
was simply an acknowledgment of her lack of options. According
to LSNJ, A.B. exhibited her intent to continue to parent A.F.;
LSNJ therefore takes issue with the panel majority's finding of
willful abandonment.

365

I.

A.

The New Jersey Constitution dictates that the Superior Court
include a family part. N.J. Const. art. VI, § 3, 13. Accordingly,
our Constitution assigned to the Family Division the formidable
task of adjudicating some of the most sensitive and precarious
issues within contemporary society. See, e.g, Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. LS., 214 NJ. 8, 14, 66 A.3d 1271 (2018) (“Family
courts are expected to address many difficult situations ....”).

IH] The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the
fundamental right of individuals to “establish a home and bring up
children” as “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.” Meyer
y. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1928),
The Supreme Court later stated that “the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court.” Troxel _v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147
L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). The sacrosanct obligations involved in chil-
drearing extend beyond even longstanding legal doctrine. The
bearing and raising of children is one of the most intimate
endeavors society pursues. It is for this very reason that we have
“invest[ed] the family court with broad discretion because of its
specialized knowledge and experience in matters involving paren-
tal relationships and the best interests of children.” Div. of Youth
& Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 427, 48 A.8d 1075 (2012);
see also Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 418, 713 A.2d 390 (1998)
(“Because of the family courts’ special jurisdiction and expertise in
family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family
court factfinding.”); Div, of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III,
201 N.J. 828, 343, 990 A.2d 1097 (2010). Indeed, we defer to family
part judges “unless they are so wide of the mark that our
intervention is required to avert an injustice.” F.M., 211 N.J. at
427, 48 A.3d 1075.

B.

HN We first consider whether the judge properly excluded
the embedded hearsay statements at issue. “Trial judges are given
wide discretion in exercising control over their courtrooms” and
have “the ultimate responsibility of conducting adjudicative pro-
ceedings in a manner that complies with required formality in the
taking of evidence and the rendering of findings.” Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. J.Y., 852 N.J. Super. 245, 264, 800 A.2d 132 (App.
Div. 2002). Appellate courts review evidentiary determinations by
a trial court, including hearsay determinations, for abuse of discre-
tion. See Carmona v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 189 N.J. 354, 379,
915 A.2d 518 (2007).

Before the fact-finding hearing, defense counsel objected to the
admission of embedded hearsay contained in the referral docu-
ment and the Division’s reports, and, specifically, to any hearsay
statements from J.F.’s boyfriend and J.F. The judge concurred
and sustained the objection. During the fact-finding hearing, de-
fense counsel raised a hearsay objection when the Law Guardian
referenced J.F.’s refusal to allow A.F. back into her apartment.
Later, the Division objected on the same grounds when defense
counsel referenced the refusal in his summation. The Division
similarly objected when defense counsel implied in cross-examin-
ing the caseworker that J.F. refused to allow A.F. back into the
apartment, arguing that it was not a question for the witness to
answer—an apparent shorthand for a hearsay objection. As with
defense counsel’s preliminary objection, the court sustained all
three objections and excluded the challenged testimony as inad-
missible hearsay. The panel majority affirmed.

The dissenting judge, citing to Smith vy, Delaware & Atlantic
Telegraph & Telephone Co., 63 N.J. Eq. 98, 95, 51 A. 464 (Ch.
1902), aff'd, 64 N.J. Eq. 770, 53 A. 818 (E. & A. 1902), concluded
that this Court’s jurisprudence requires that “hearsay evidence
not objected to should be considered evidential.” The dissent
wrote that “A.B,’s statement that her sister objected to A.F.’s
return to the home entered the record without objection and

367

should have been given its natural and logical probative effect”
particularly because “if the decision to bar A.F, was made by J.F.,
A.B, cannot be held responsible for not allowing her daughter to
return to the home.” Those arguments were largely adopted by
A.B. on appeal to this Court.

The reasoning underpinning those arguments is problematic.
The hearsay statements at issue were the subject of objection and
were excluded early in the proceedings. Importantly, it was de-
fense counsel who objected at the commencement of the fact-
finding hearing to “any hearsay statements from ... [J.F.].”

HM This Court has long recognized the doctrine of invited
error, which “operates to bar a disappointed litigant from arguing
on appeal that an adverse decision below was the product of error,
when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition
now alleged to be error.” Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, 144 NJ.
479, 503, 677 A.2d 705 (1996); accord State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J.
347, 358, 840 A.2d 242 (2004). A.B. succeeded in having the trial
court take a certain course of action; she cannot now condemn the
very determination for which she advocated merely because the
consequences of that determination have proved unfavorable. The
doctrine of invited error is predicated “on considerations of fair-
ness and preservation of the integrity of the litigation process.”
Brett, 144 N.J. at 503, 677 Ad 705. Here, A.B. attempts to
accomplish precisely what our jurisprudence prohibits.

HM Hearsay, which may not be admitted into evidence unless
it falls into a recognized exception, N.J.R.E. 802, is defined as “a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” N.J.R.E. 801(c). When a hearsay statement
contains, in turn, another hearsay statement, the embedded hear-
say must independently fall within one of the exceptions set forth
in N.J.R.E. 808 or 804 to be admissible. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency vy. N.T., 445 N.J. Super. 478, 497, 139 A.3d 108 (App.
Div. 2016); see also N.J.R.E. 805.

368

Here, J.F.’s purported refusal to allow A.F. to return to the
apartment was referenced in documents about which the case-
worker was asked. Although the documents themselves benefitted
from an exception to the hearsay rule, it was not an abuse of the
trial court’s discretion to find that the remarks within those
reports attributed to J.F.—who did not testify—were hearsay
within hearsay that did not fall within an independent exception.
Thus, even absent invited error, the judge did not abuse her
discretion in excluding the hearsay statements, and we affirm the
panel majority’s determination on that point.

C

We next turn to the findings of abuse or neglect and of
abandonment, both in violation of Title 9. The focus of Title 9 “is
not the ‘culpability of parental conduct’ but rather ‘the protection
of children.’” E.D.-0,, 223 N.J. at 178, 121 A.3d 832 (quoting G.S.
y. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 177, 723 A.2d 612 (1999)).
Title 9 delineates the standards for adjudicating cases of abuse or
neglect. The act provides interim relief for children at risk and
defines “the standards for abuse and neglect proceedings against
parents and guardians.” Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L.,
218 NJ. 1, 18, 59 A.8d 576 (2013). The “paramount concern” of
Title 9 is to ensure the “safety of the children,” so that “the lives
of innocent children are immediately safeguarded from further
injury and possible death.” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8.

Title 9 defines an abused or neglected child as

a child less than eighteen years of age ... whose physical, mental, or emotional
condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the
result of the failure of his parent or guardian ... to exercise a minimum degree of
care... in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education,
medical or surgical care though financially able to do so or though offered financial
or other reasonable means to do so.

INDS.A, 9:6-8.21(6)(4)(0).]

Included under Title 9 is a separate category of abuse or neglect:
“willful abandonment.” A child less than 18 years of age may be

found to be abused or neglected if the child has been willfully
abandoned by his parent or guardian. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(¢)(5),

The panel majority affirmed the judge’s findings that A.B.
abused or neglected A.F. under subsections (4)(a) and (5) of
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21. We analyze each finding in turn. In doing so, we
review the judge's legal conclusions de novo. Manalapan Realty,
LP. v, Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658
A.2d 1230 (1995). As we have stressed, however, “appellate courts
should accord deference to family court factfinding” in recognition
“of the family courts’ special jurisdiction and expertise in family
matters.” Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413, 713 A.2d 390; see also M.C. III,
201 N.J. at 348, 990 A.2d 1097.

1.

I We tum first to the finding that A.F. was abused or
neglected under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a). To prove abuse or
neglect under that subsection, the Division must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the child’s physical,
mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in immi-
nent danger of becoming impaired; and (2) the impairment or
imminent impairment results from the parent’s failure to exercise
a minimum degree of care.

HH In GS,, we elaborated on the standard required to meet
the “minimum degree of care” element. We adopted the intermedi-
ary position between simple negligence and the intentional inflic-
tion of harm. G.S., 157 N.J. at 179, 723 A.2d 612. Simply put, we
have held that “a guardian fails to exercise a minimum degree of
care when he or she is aware of the dangers inherent in a situation
and fails adequately to supervise the child or recklessly creates a
risk of serious injury to that child.” Id, at 181, 723 A.2d 612. To
determine if a parent or guardian failed to exercise a minimum
degree of care, we must additionally “account for the surrounding
circumstances,” E.D.-O., 223 N.J. at 180, 121 A.3d 832 (citing G.S.,
157 N.J, at 181-82, 723 A.2d 612), given that “[a]buse and neglect

cases ‘are fact-sensitive,” ibid, (citing Div. of Youth & Family

Servs. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 309, 24 A.3d 290 (2011)).

HM In AL., we considered whether a newborn whose stool
tested positive for cocaine metabolites was abused or neglected by
his mother under Title 9 if she used drugs during pregnancy. 213
NJ. at 8-9, 59 A.3d 576, We explained that circumstances in which
actual impairment is lacking will still meet the impairment ele-
ment if there is “evidence of imminent danger or substantial risk
of harm.” Id, at 22, 59 A.3d 576. Intuitively, a court need not sit
idly by until a child is actually impaired by parental inattention or
neglect. Id. at 28, 59 A.3d 576, The plain language of the statute
reveals that if the Division can prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a child faces imminent danger of impairment, the
statutory element will be satisfied. See ibid.

Guided by this framework, we find sufficient support for the
determination that A.B. neglected AF. under N.J.S.A. 9:6~
8.21(¢)(4). A.F. was sixteen years old and caring for a premature
infant. When A.F.’s school became aware that she had run away,
the school referred the issue to the Division. The Division then
asked A.B. to contact them pertaining to A.F.; A.B. never did so.
Only later did A.B. concede that she was unaware of A.F.’s
whereabouts. The caseworker then unearthed that A.F. was living
in a residence lacking electricity, so she visited the home to
determine its adequacy. When the caseworker concluded that the
home was unsuitable, she implored A.B. to sign an emergency
removal or to allow the children to return home; A.B. refused
both entreaties.

Viewing those facts collectively, we agree with the panel majori-
ty regarding N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) and hold that A.B.’s conduct
here was grossly negligent because she was clearly aware of the
dangers inherent in the situation. The perils facing a sixteen-year-
old caring for a four-month-old infant, who is left to fend for
herself, bereft of any parental supervision, guidance, or care, are
self-evident. A.B. not only failed to adequately supervise A.F. but
exacerbated the existing dangers to her daughter by terminating

871

A.F’’s cellphone service and refusing to allow the children back
into the apartment after the Division caseworker explicitly delin-
eated the hazards they faced. The panel majority correctly con-
cluded that “the risks inherent in barring a sixteen-year-old child
from the family home without arranging any alternative source of
shelter or support are obvious.” Clearly, A.B. failed to exercise the
minimum degree of care. That failure placed A.F.’s physical,
mental, and emotional condition in imminent danger of becoming
impaired.

We affirm the panel majority's finding of A.B.’s abuse or neglect
of AF. per N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(€)(4)..

2.

HM Finally, we address the Division's allegation that A.F. was
abandoned under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5).

Abandonment of a child shall consist in any of the following acts by anyone having
the custody or control of the child: (a) willfully forsaking a child; (b) failing to care
for and keep the custody and control of a child so that the child shall be exposed to
physical or moral risk without proper and sufficient protection; (¢) failing to care
for and keep the control and custody of a child so that the child shall be liable to be
supported and maintained at the expense of the publie, or by child caring societies
or private persons not legally chargeable with its or their eare, custody and control.
INJS.A. 9:6-1.]

The Division argues that A.B.’s actions, including her refusal to
allow AF. and her infant son to return home, amounted to a
“willful or intentional act” that qualified as abandonment under
the statute. The judge found that the State had met its burden of
proof and that A.B, had abandoned A.F. The panel majority
affirmed.

In Lavigne v. Family & Children’s Society, Chief Justice Van-
derbilt, writing for the Court, set forth the standard required for
the State to prove abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5):

[thhe statutory notion of abandonment does not necessarily, we think, imply that

the parent has deserted the child, or even ceased to feel any concern for its

interests, It fairly may, and in our judgment does, import any conduct on the part
of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and

yelinguish all parental claims to the child.

[11 N.J. 478, 480, 95 A.2d 6 (1953) (emphasis added) (quoting Winans v. Luppie, 47
N.J. Bq. 302, 304, 20 A. 969 (B. & A. 1890)).)

Conduct by a parent that evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child is an
extremely high bar, The facts here do not support that A.B.’s
conduct amounted to a “settled purpose” to forego her parental
rights. The dissent suggested several factors from the record
indicating that A.B, had no intention of abdicating her parental
rights and duties: A.B. periodically permitted A.F. back into the
dwelling; A.B. accompanied A.F. to school to help her get rein-
stated after suspension; and A.B., upon receiving her own hous-
ing, permitted A.F. to return to live with her.

While A.B. undoubtedly took questionable actions and had bouts
of ambivalence concerning her daughter that we hold to be
neglectful under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c¢)(4), the facts here give no
indication that she willfully relinquished her parental rights. Stat-
ed plainly, to find abandonment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5), the
trial court must make specific findings concerning the conduct of
the parent or guardian evidencing a true forsaking of the child. No
such conduct is present here.

For those reasons, we reverse the finding of the panel majority
and hold that the State did not meet its burden in proving that
A.B. willfully abandoned A.F. per NJ.S.A, 9:6-8.21(¢)(5).

Iv.

The panel majority’s judgment affirming the finding that A.B.
abused or neglected A.F. under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(¢)(4)(a) is af-
firmed. The judgment affirming the finding that A.B. abandoned
AF, per N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(¢)(5) is reversed.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON
join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.

3

|

175 A.3d 953

DOREEN HAYES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BARBARA
DELAMOTTE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND GEICO
INSURANCE COMPANY |, DEFENDANT.

A-4 September Term 2016
077819

Argued September 12, 2017—Decided Junuary 10, 2018

1 Plaintiff's original complaint included GEICO Insurance Company, but the
party's name was subsequently amended to GEICO Insurance Group.

374

ie
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eevee —————EEEEEEee—E—EeEEE*

HH

Kimberly L. Gozsa argued the cause for appellant (Levinson
Axelrod, attorneys; Kimberly L. Gozsa, on the brief),

Stephen A. Rudolph argued the cause for respondent (Rudolph
& Kayal, attorneys; Stephen A. Rudolph, on the brief).

Donald A. Caminiti argued the cause for amicus curiae New
Jersey Association for Justice (Breslin & Breslin, attorneys; Don-
ald A. Caminiti and Jessica E, Choper, on the brief).

JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Following an automobile accident, plaintiff Doreen Hayes filed a
complaint against Barbara Delamotte and the GEICO Insurance
Company (collectively, defendants) seeking damages for personal
injuries. At the first jury trial, defendants presented, by video-
taped deposition, the expert testimony of an orthopedic surgeon

379

who had examined plaintiff. Defendants’ expert compared what he
described as two different Magnetic Resonance Images (MRIs) of
plaintiff's cervical spine, one that he identified as a pre-accident
image taken in 2007 and one that he identified as an image taken
after the 2008 accident. The doctor also testified, over plaintiff's
objection, to the opinions contained in reports of non-testifying
physicians.

Although the doctor identified the MRIs he referenced as pre-
and post-accident images, the MRIs, which were labeled, bore the
same post-accident “Exam Date.” The parties did not address the
MRI labeling issue at the time of the deposition or during trial.
Plaintiffs counsel, however, sought to replay a portion of the
videotaped deposition during summation to show that both MRIs
bore labels reflecting the same post-accident date. Defense counsel
objected. The trial court denied plaintiff's request, reasoning that
expert testimony would be necessary to establish that the MRIs in
the video were in fact the same.

The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff
moved for a new trial, which was granted by the trial court on the
ground that plaintiff “did not receive substantial justice” because
“the jury gave greater weight” to the testimony of defendants’
expert than to that of plaintiff's expert.

During the second trial, the defense expert testified again via a
video deposition taken for use at the second trial. The second trial
ended in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. Defendant appealed,
and the Appellate Division reversed. The appellate panel conclud-
ed that the trial court improperly granted plaintiff's motion for a
new trial and reinstated the jury’s finding from the first trial in
favor of defendants.

We now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and
reinstate the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff following the
second trial. Because the trial court’s error in preventing plaintiff
from replaying a portion of the deposition during summation at
the first trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the trial court
properly granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

380

L

A.

We derive the facts pertinent to this appeal from the record of
the first trial.

In 2001, prior to the accident and injury at issue, plaintiff was
diagnosed with a syrinx, or fluid-filled hole, in her thoracic spine,
which caused back, chest, neck, arm, and leg pain. MRIs were
taken to monitor the syrinx’s growth every six to nine months.
That same year, plaintiff suffered a neck injury in an accident, and
ultimately underwent surgery for a cervical fusion at her C4-5 and
C5-6 vertebrae in 2002. Following that surgery, plaintiff received
physical therapy but no other continued treatment. Plaintiff's last
MRI, prior to the accident at issue in this case, was taken in May
2007.

In 2008, plaintiff was a front-seat passenger in a vehicle operat-
ed by her mother, defendant Barbara Delamotte. The vehicle left
the roadway and collided with trees and a telephone pole, alleged-
ly to avoid a collision with an unidentified vehicle. Emergency
personnel extracted plaintiff and her mother from their car using
the “jaws of life” and transported them to the hospital, where they
were treated and released.

After the 2008 accident, plaintiff's family physician provided
treatment and ordered a cervical MRI. Because plaintiff's condi-
tion did not improve, she consulted a pain management specialist,
an orthopedic surgeon, and a neurosurgeon. The neurosurgeon,
Dr. Robert Sabo, examined plaintiff, ordered another MRI, and
ultimately performed spinal fusion surgery on plaintiff's C6~7 and
C7-T1 vertebrae.

B.

Plaintiff filed a complaint claiming that her mother and the
unidentified vehicle caused the 2008 accident. Plaintiff alleged that
she sustained permanent injuries in that accident, and her com-

381

plaint named Delamotte and plaintiff's own insurance carrier,
GEICO Insurance Company, with whom plaintiff had uninsured
motorist coverage, as defendants, along with “John Doe” defen-
dants connected with the unknown vehicle. Before trial, defen-
dants retained Dr. Arthur Vasen, an orthopedic surgeon, to exam-
ine plaintiff and review her medical records, including cervical
MRIs taken before and after the 2008 accident. Defendants took
Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition for use at trial rather than call
him to give in-court testimony. At trial, plaintiff moved in limine to
have portions of Dr. Vasen’s deposition referring to reports of
non-testifying doctors stricken from the video, arguing that those
reports presented opinions on complex medical issues and that
plaintiff's counsel was unable to cross-examine those experts. The
trial court denied the motion.

At trial, defendants presented Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposi-
tion. Prior to playing Dr. Vasen’s testimony, the trial court gave
the jury a limiting instruction regarding the use of non-testifying
experts’ opinions. The trial court explained, “I instruct you as the
jury in this case you are not to consider any such out of Court
statements by any non-testifying experts as substantive proof of
the content of those statements.”? Dr. Vasen testified that there
were no differences between the MRIs purportedly taken on May
4, 2007 (before the accident) and May 17, 2008 (after the accident).
However, the films that Dr. Vasen showed in the tape were both
labeled May 17, 2008. The parties did not address that issue at Dr.
Vasen’s deposition or before the close of evidence at trial.

At the conclusion of the parties’ evidence, plaintiff's counsel
requested the opportunity to replay Dr. Vasen’s testimony during
summation, and comment on the testimony, to demonstrate to the
jury that the doctor compared MRI films marked with the same

20n direct examination, plaintifi’s expert, Dr. Sabo, discussed the treatment
plaintiff received while under the care of other doctors. Dr. Sabo was also asked
about the findings of other non-testifying doctors during cross-examination. The
court gave the same instruction before the testimony of Dr. Sabo.

date? Defendant objected to the request. After conducting a
N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing and reviewing Dr. Vasen’s videotaped
deposition outside the presence of the jury, the trial court upheld
defendant’s objection to plaintiff's showing and commenting on a
part of the doctor’s testimony during summation. The judge
reasoned that there was no expert testimony from Dr, Vasen, Dr.
Sabo, or the radiologist who took the MRIs to differentiate
between the films or to evaluate their potential mislabeling.

Cc.

Prior to the parties’ closings, the trial court found that defen-
dants’ negligence caused the accident as a matter of law. Based on
that finding, the court explained that the jury would have to assess
the percentage of fault attributable to plaintiff's mother and the
unknown vehicle and to determine whether plaintiff sustained a
permanent injury proximately caused by the 2008 accident. In its
charge to the jury, the trial court provided an additional limiting
instruction as to the reports of non-testifying experts that mir-
rored its earlier instruction. Ultimately, the jury determined that
plaintiff's mother was solely responsible for the 2008 accident but
found that plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury proximately
caused by that accident. Therefore, judgment was entered in favor
of defendants.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that it was reversible
error for the court to bar counsel from showing a part of Dr.
Vasen’s videotaped testimony or commenting on Dr. Vasen’s com-
parison of the MRI films during summation. In assessing plain-
tiff’s argument, the trial court found that its decision to bar the
video replay was legally correct. The court reasoned that replay-
ing the testimony would have been prejudicial. Despite those
findings, the court granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial,

$3 During arguments on the objection, defense counsel noted that, in addition to
the issue with the dates, the MRIs were labeled “lumbar views” when they were,
in fact, “cervical films.”

383

concluding that plaintiff “did not receive substantial justice” be-
cause “the jury gave greater weight to Dr. Vasen’s testimony than
to Dr. Sabo.”

Thereafter, a second trial was conducted. Because the first trial
resulted in a determination that plaintiff's mother (hereinafter
“defendant”) was solely responsible for the accident, the second
trial concerned only the issue of whether plaintiff sustained a
permanent injury as a result of the 2008 accident. Dr. Vasen’s
videotaped deposition was retaken for use at the second trial.
Although Dr. Vasen resolved the issues as to the dates of the
MRIs he reviewed, plaintiff once again moved in limine to bar Dr.
Vasen’s testimony about the findings of non-testifying doctors.
This time, the court granted plaintiff's motion in limine, citing
Agha vy. Feiner, 198 N.J. 50, 965 A.2d 141 (2009), on the ground
that the opinions of the non-testifying experts were being used
improperly to validate Dr. Vasen’s opinions. After the second trial,
the jury found that plaintiff sustained a permanent injury proxi-
mately caused by the 2008 accident and awarded her $250,000 in
damages.

Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division found that the trial
court improperly granted a new trial and reinstated the jury’s
verdict in favor of defendant from the first trial.

The appellate panel noted that “there was no credible evidence
or expert testimony in the record that the MRI films were
incorrectly used,” and determined that the trial court “aptly held
that an expert would have been required to testify that [Dr.}
‘Vasen was reviewing the same MRI films or that there was a
mislabeling in order to challenge his credibility.” The panel agreed
with the trial court that the decision to bar the video replay was
legally correct, because it would have been prejudicial to allow the
testimony to be replayed. The appellate panel determined that,
arguably, the video replay would have given rise to unfair sur-
prise.

The Appellate Division also held that the trial court usurped the
jury’s function as factfinder when it found that the “jury gave

greater weight to Dr. Vasen’s testimony than to Dr. Sabo.” As a
result, the panel held there was no ruling in the first trial that
prejudiced either party, reversed the trial court’s grant of a new
trial, and reinstated the jury’s verdict in favor of defendants. This
Court granted plaintiff's petition for certification. 227 N.J. 376, 151
A.8d 977 (2016). We granted leave to appear as amicus curiae to
the New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ).

i.

A.

Plaintiff claims that the Appellate Division erred in reversing
the trial court’s order granting a new trial and in reinstating the
jury’s verdict in favor of defendant.

Plaintiff asserts that an attorney may comment in summation on
any evidence admitted at trial. Relying on Condella v. Cumberland
Farms, Inc., 298 N.J. Super. 531, 585-36, 689 A.2d 872 (Law Div.
1996), plaintiff argues that attorneys can replay videotaped testi-
mony during summation because it is actual testimony admitted at
trial.

Plaintiff also argues that, at the first trial, defendant improperly
elicited medical opinions of non-testifying doctors that were con-
sistent with those of defendants’ expert, Dr. Vasen. Thus, plaintiff
asserts, the panel’s ruling conflicts with James v, Ruiz, 440 N.J.
Super. 45, 51, 111 A8d 128 (App. Div. 2015), in which the
Appellate Division held that counsel should not ask a question for
the purpose of having the jury consider absent experts’ hearsay
opinions about complex and disputed matters.

The NJAJ, aligned with plaintiff, first argues that the video
replay did not “constitute the introduction of new evidence” and as
such counsel should have been permitted to play Dr. Vasen’s
testimony without additional “expert testimony to address any
inconsistencies in the evidence presented.” Second, the NJAJ
asserts that the trial court properly precluded the admission of
non-testifying experts’ hearsay opinions in the second trial, pursu-

385

ant to James, 440 N.J. Super at 51, 111 A.3d 128. In raising its
first argument, the NJAJ emphasizes that Dr. Vasen’s video
testimony was introduced by the defense and could thus be
properly replayed during summation by plaintiff. In addition, the
NJAJ notes that plaintiff “was not obligated to alter or cure any
deficiencies in the testimony of defendant’s medical expert.” In the
alternative, the NJAJ posits that if counsel were required to have
expert testimony to note the inconsistencies with the MRIs, Dr.
Vasen’s testimony should have been stricken in its entirety.

B.

Defendant points out that the trial court first indicated that it
did not know what swayed the jury but then, in granting a new
trial, held that “it is clear that the jury gave greater weight to Dr.
Vasen’s testimony than to Dr. Sabo.” Defendant agrees with the
appellate panel that Dr. Vasen’s testimony “was not the exclusive
means by which the jury could have reached its verdict” and that
the verdict could have been based on a number of considerations,
including the jury’s rejection of Dr. Sabo’s testimony or plaintiff's
testimony,

Finally, defendant highlights the panel’s agreement that the
trial judge’s “decision to bar the video replay was legally correct
because ‘a video replay during summation would have been preju-
dicial given the lack of testimony by any medical expert or
radiologist who could have explained the discrepancy in the films
displayed by [Dr.] Vasen during his testimony.’ ”

Ul

A

HH “A jury verdict is entitled to considerable deference and
‘should not be overthrown except upon the basis of a carefully
reasoned and factually supported (and articulated) determination,
after canvassing the record and weighing the evidence, that the
continued viability of the judgment would constitute a manifest

denial of justice.’” Risko vy, Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206
N.J. 506, 521, 20 A.Bd 1123 (2011) (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont
Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597-98, 379 A.2d 225 (1977)). A trial court
therefore grants a motion for a new trial only “if, having given due
regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility
of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was
a miscarriage of justice under the law.” Crawn v. Campo, 186 N.J.
494, 511-12, 643 A.2d 600 (1994) (quoting R. 4:49-1(a)).

Hl “The standard of review on appeal from decisions on
motions for a new trial is the same as that governing the trial
judge—whether there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.”
Risko, 206 N.J. at 522, 20 A.3d 1123; accord R. 2:10-1 (“The trial
court’s ruling on such a motion shall not be reversed unless it
clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the
law.”). We have explained that a “miscarriage of justice” can arise
when there is a “manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to
support the finding,” when there has been an “obvious overlooking
or under-valuation of crucial evidence,” or when the case culmi-
nates in “a clearly unjust result.” Risko, 206 N.J. at 521-22, 20
A.3d 1128 (quoting Lindenmuth v. Holden, 296 N.J. Super. 42, 48,
685 A.2d 1351 (App. Div. 1996)).

Here, the trial court found that it had properly barred plaintiff's
counsel from replaying the video because the request to replay the
video “was not based on any evidential foundation established in
the trial record” and because “the showing would be highly
prejudicial to the defendants.” The court found, nevertheless, “that
if a new trial is not granted on at least the damages aspect of the
case, the plaintiff herself would likely suffer an injustice” given
that “the jury gave greater weight to Dr. Vasen’s testimony than
to Dr. Sabo[’s testimony].”

HM We have noted that, when evaluating the decision to
grant or deny a new trial, “an appellate court must give ‘due
deference’ to the trial court’s ‘feel of the case.’” Id. at 522, 20 A.3d
1128 (quoting Jastram v. Kruse, 197 N.J. 216, 230, 962 A.2d 503
(2008)). That is not to say, however, that we must accept the trial

387

court’s legal reasoning: “[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law
and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are
not entitled to any special deference.” Manalapan Realty, L.P. v.
Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d
1230 (1995). We also note that “it is well-settled that appeals are
taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions, oral
decisions, informal written decisions, or reasons given for the
ultimate conclusion.” Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J.
191, 199, 773 A.2d 706 (2001) (collecting cases). A trial court
judgment that reaches the proper conclusion must be affirmed
even if it is based on the wrong reasoning. Isko v. Planning Bd., 51
N.J. 162, 175, 238 A.2d 457 (1968); see also Macfadden v. Macfad-
den, 49 N.J. Super. 356, 359, 139 A.2d 774 (App. Div. 1958) (“The
written conclusions or opinion of a court do not have the effect of a
judgment. From them no appeal will lie. ‘It is only what a court
adjudicates, not what it says in an opinion, that has any direct
legal effect.” (quoting Suburban Dep’t Stores v. City of East
Orange, 47 N.J. Super. 472, 479, 186 A.2d 280 (App. Div. 1957))).

B.

With those principles in mind, we turn to the evidentiary
determination that plaintiff claims created an injustice and sup-
ports the trial court’s grant of a new trial: the decision to bar her
from replaying and commenting on Dr. Vasen’s deposition during
summation.

1,

HB “(Clounsel is allowed broad latitude in summation.” Co-
lucci v. Oppenheim, 326 N.J. Super. 166, 177, 740 A.2d 1101 (App.
Div. 1999). That latitude is not without its limits, and “counsel’s
comments must be confined to the facts shown or reasonably
suggested by the evidence introduced during the course of the
trial.” Ibid.; accord State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 140, 98 A.2d 295
(1953). Further, counsel “should not misstate the evidence nor
distort the factual picture.” Colucci, 326 N.J. Super. at 177, 740

A.2d 1101 (quoting Matthews v. Nelson, 57 N.J. Super. 515, 521,
155 A.2d 111 (App. Div. 1959), Within those limits, however,
“{clounsel may argue from the evidence any conclusion which a
jury is free to reach.” Ibid. “Indeed, counsel may draw conclusions
even if the inferences that the jury is asked to make are improba-
ble....” Ibid.

HI in Condella, the trial court found that “it is within the
trial court’s discretion to allow counsel to show portions of the
videotaped trial testimony and make comment thereon during
summation.” 298 N.J. Super. at 535, 689 A.2d 872. We agree with
that holding but note that the exercise of such discretion depends
upon whether counsel’s comments are “confined to the facts shown
or reasonably suggested by the evidence introduced during the
course of the trial.” Colucci, 326 N.J. Super. at 177, 740 A.2d 1101;
accord Bogen, 13 N.J. at 140, 98 A.2d 295.

HE sWe also agree that the following safeguards suggested
in Condella should be considered when portions of videotaped trial
testimony are utilized during summation. First, the replay during
summation “should not be so lengthy as to constitute a second
trial emphasizing only one litigant’s side of the case.” Condella,
298 N.J. Super. at 536, 689 A.2d 872. Second, “to guard against the
edited portions of the videotape misstating the evidence” and to
prevent them from being “presented out of context,” the propo-
nent should raise the issue with the court before playing an edited
part of the tape. Ibid; see N.J.R.E. 104(a),! Those safeguards
ensure that one party’s side of the case is not “unduly empha-
size[d]” over the other, Condella, 298 N.J. Super. at 586, 689 A.2d

4 In Condella, the plaintiff requested permission to replay a portion of the
defense expert's testimony as well as defense counsel's opening. 298 N.J. Super.
at 533, 689 A.2d 872. The video at issue in Condella was taken via cameras in
the courtroom. Ibid. The court granted the plaintiff's request to replay the trial
testimony, but denied the plaintiff's request as to the defense’s opening state-
ment. Here, Dr. Vasen’s testimony was recorded and presented as testimony at
trial. We discern no difference between the request made in Condella related to
trial testimony and the request in this case.

872, and that any edited portions “are a fair and accurate repre-
sentation of the witness’ testimony,” id. at 537, 689 A.2d 872.

HI Here, plaintiff requested to have brief portions of Dr.
Vasen’s testimony replayed to demonstrate that the MRIs com-
pared by the expert bore the same date. Use of those portions
would not have constituted a “second trial” overemphasizing plain-
tiffs case. The proposed use of the video would not have been an
attempt to misuse Dr. Vasen’s testimony, but merely a legitimate
attempt to emphasize a certain aspect of his testimony, namely,
the dates on the MRIs to which he pointed in the video. Lastly,
the trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearing and reviewed the
video. In its opinion granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the
trial court found that the proposed video replay “was not overly
lengthy” but because “the plaintiff's application ... was not based
on any evidential foundation established in the trial record,” the
replay “would misstate the evidence and mislead the jury.” How-
ever, the trial court did not make a finding and defendant did not
claim that the video had been edited or that Dr. Vasen’s testimony
was taken out of context. The portion of the videotaped deposition
sought to be played thus met the requirements of Condella, which
we now adopt as modified.

We further find that Dr. Vasen’s videotaped deposition was in
evidence once it was played at trial. As with any other piece of
evidence adduced at trial, counsel was permitted to fairly comment
upon it and play portions during closing argument. See Condella,
298 N.J. Super, at 535, 689 A.2d 872; see also State vy. Muham-
mad, 359 N.J. Super. 361, 372~73, 820 A.2d 70 (App. Div. 2003)
(concluding it was proper for a prosecutor to replay video testimo-
ny during summation in criminal matters). Counsel was free to
argue the import of the dates on the MRIs and to draw conclu-
sions from those dates, so long as those conclusions were ground-
ed in the evidence. See Colucci, 326 N.J. Super. at 177, 740 A.2d
101.

Hl We disagree with the determination “that an expert would
have been required to testify that [Dr.] Vasen was reviewing the

same MRI films or that there was a mislabeling in order to
challenge his credibility.” Under this State’s jurisprudence, expert
testimony “concern[s] a subject matter that is beyond the ken of
the average juror.” State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208, 478 A.2d 364
(1984). Merely pointing to dates on MRIs or other images does not.
require expert testimony because reading the dates and realizing
that they are the same is not beyond the “ken of the average
juror.”

In sum, we hold that counsel may refer to, read, or play
portions of videotaped fact or expert testimony given at trial
during closing, as long as (1) “counsel’s comments [are] confined to
the facts shown or reasonably suggested by the evidence intro-
duced during the course of the trial,” Colucci, 826 N.J. Super. at
177, 740 A.2d 1101, and (2) the concerns set forth in Condella are
met. It was, in short, error to preclude the video replay during the
first trial.

We next consider whether that error produced a miscarriage of
justice, warranting a new trial.

2.

HM During both trials, the dispositive issue was whether
plaintiff sustained a permanent injury proximately caused by the
2008 accident. That issue was fleshed out for the jury by the
testimony of plaintiff, plaintiff's husband, and the parties’ expert
witnesses. The parties’ experts came to opposite conclusions re-
garding the 2008 accident’s impact on plaintiffs spine. Their
testimony was key to the outcome of the first trial and the jury's
determination as to whether plaintiff sustained a permanent inju-
ry. We have concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by
not allowing plaintiff to point out what was plainly visible on the
videotaped testimony of Dr. Vasen played at trial—that the MRIs
examined and compared by Dr. Vasen bore the same date. Plain-
tiffs counsel should have been able to raise that fact and argue
that it undermines the reliability of Dr. Vasen’s testimony that
plaintiff did not suffer a permanent injury in the 2008 accident.

391

Because expert testimony was vital to the outcome of the trial, the
trial court’s refusal to allow plaintiff's counsel to replay a portion
of Dr. Vasen’s deposition was an error that resulted in a “miscar-
riage of justice under the law,” warranting a new trial. R. 2:10-1.

Defendant claims “it is unfair and inequitable for [p]laintiff to
play any portion of Dr. Vasen’s video during summations, as that
same opportunity was not available to defendant (to play portions
of Dr. Sabo’s trial testimony, as he testified live).” However, it was
defendant who chose to utilize a videotaped deposition of Dr.
Vasen in lieu of in-court testimony. In addition, both defendant
and plaintiff were aware of the contents of the video. The fact that
plaintiff chose to present Dr. Sabo’s testimony live does not make
it “unfair” or “inequitable” for plaintiff to utilize Dr. Vasen’s
videotaped deposition to her advantage during summation. Nor
does defense counsel’s failure to discover the labeling discrepancy
render plaintiff's use of the video during summation “inequitable.”

HE The Appellate Division found that, arguably, the re-
play would have constituted unfair surprise. Unfair surprise is a
proper basis to exclude evidence not properly provided to the
opposing party during discovery. See Balian v. Gen. Motors, 121
N.J. Super. 118, 127, 296 A.2d 317 (App. Div. 1972). The prohibi-
tion against unfair surprise prevents the introduction of evidence
not properly disclosed by the opposing party, id. at 127, 296 A.2d
817, but does not prevent counsel from using to their strategic
advantage the evidence properly presented at trial by an adver-
sary. A party’s use of evidence in its closing argument cannot be
an “unfair surprise” to the adverse party that properly produced,
introduced, and admitted the same evidence at trial.

Here, plaintiff was entitled to replay the deposition and draw
the jury’s attention to the discord between the dates stamped on
the MRIs to which Dr, Vasen pointed and the dates he ascribed to
them. Because the trial turned on the weight assigned to expert
testimony, we find that the denial of that opportunity worked an
injustice. Thus, although we disagree with the reason for which
the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial, we agree

392

that a new trial was necessary. We therefore reverse the judg-
ment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the verdict of the
second jury.

Iv.

Having resolved that a new trial was properly granted by the
trial court, we address only briefly plaintiff's argument that, at the
first trial, Dr. Vasen’s videotaped testimony regarding the reports
of non-testifying experts was inadmissible hearsay.

A.

HE “(UJnder N.J.R.E. 703, an expert may give the reasons
for his opinion and the sources on which he relies, but that
testimony [cannot] establish the substance of the report of a non-
testifying [expert].” Agha, 198 N.J. at 64, 965 A.2d 141. In other
words, an expert may not “alert[] the jury to evidence it would
not otherwise be allowed to hear.” State v. Burris, 298 N.J. Super.
505, 512, 689 A.2d 860 (App. Div. 1997). That is because “expert
testimony [cannot] serve as ‘a vehicle for the wholesale [introduc-
tion] of otherwise inadmissible evidence.’” Agha, 198 N.J. at 63,
965 A.2d 141 (quoting State v. Vandeweaghe, 351 N.J. Super. 467,
480-81, 799 A.2d 1 (App. Div. 2002) (alteration in original) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 177 N.J. 229, 827 A.2d 1028
(2008).

Hs Although a testifying expert may detail the reasons
underlying his or her opinion and the sources upon which his or
her opinion is based, “[a]n expert witness should not be allowed to
relate the opinions of a nontestifying expert merely because those
opinions are congruent with the ones he has reached.” Krohn v.
N.J. Full Ins. Underwriters Ass'n, 316 N.J. Super. 477, 486, 720
A.2d 640 (App. Div. 1998). Said in a different way, the contents of
a non-testifying expert’s report may not be used as a “tie breaker”
between competing experts. James, 440 N.J. Super. at 72, 111
A.3d 128. Even when admitted, therefore, hearsay statements

393

relied upon by an expert may be used for the limited purpose of
apprising the jury of the basis of the testifying expert’s opinion,
but not for the correctness of the non-testifying expert’s conclu-
sion, and the trial court must, upon request, instruct the jury
regarding the limited use of the hearsay. Agha, 198 N.J. at 63, 965
A.2d 141,

B.

HM Here, before the first trial, plaintiff moved in limine to
preclude Dr. Vasen from referring to the opinions of non-testifying
experts, The trial court denied the motion, admitted the testimony,
and gave the following limiting instruction: “I instruct you as the
jury in this case you are not to consider any such out of Court
statements by any non-testifying experts as substantive proof of
the content of those statements.”

Over the course of his direct examination, defense counsel asked
Dr. Vasen whether a non-testifying doctor “indicate[d] that there
was a problem” at a specific part of plaintiff's spine and additional-
ly asked whether doctors noted a “problem at” the location of the
purported injury. That testimony impermissibly sought to estab-
lish the substance of the reports of non-testifying physicians, see
Agha, 198 N.J. at 64, 965 A.2d 141, and “alert[ed] the jury to
evidence it would not otherwise be permitted to hear,” Burris, 298
N.J. Super, at 512, 689 A.2d 860. Notwithstanding the cautionary
instruction given, the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Vasen to
bolster his testimony using “congruent” opinions in reports of non-
testifying doctors during the first trial rather than simply explain
the sources of information used in formulating his opinion.

v.

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the
Appellate Division and reinstate the jury’s verdict in favor of
plaintiff following the second trial.

394

175 A.3d 965

IN THE MATTER OF GENE S. ROSEN, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 246361968)

D-186 September Term 2016
079699

January 10, 2018.

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-008, concluding that as a matter of reciprocal
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-14(a)(4), GENE S. ROSEN of
MIAMI, FLORIDA, who was admitted to the bar of this State in
1968, should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three years based on discipline imposed in Florida that in New
Jersey constitutes violations of RPC 1.15(d)(recordkeeping viola-
tions), RPC 1.2(d)(assisting a client in conduct the attorney knows
is illegal, criminal or fraudulent), and RPC 8.4(¢)(conduet involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation);

And the Disciplinary Review Board having further concluded
that respondent should not be reinstated to practice in New
Jersey unless and until he is reinstated to practice in Florida;

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that GENE S. ROSEN is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years, effective immediately,
and until the further Order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall not be reinstated to the
practice of law in New Jersey unless and until he is reinstated to
practice in Florida; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

395

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent's fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent's petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a

permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

175 A.3d 966
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN A. KLAMO, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 009161982)
D-185 September Term 2016
079647

January 10, 2018

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-448, concluding on the record certified by the
Board pursuant Rule 1:20-4(f) (default by respondent), that JOHN
A. KLAMO of CHERRY HILL, who was admitted to the bar of
this State in 1982, should be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of three months for violating RPC 1.1(a)(gross
neglect), RPC 1.2(a)(failure to abide by a client’s decision concern-

ing the scope and objectives of the representation), RPC 1.3 (lack
of diligence), RPC 1.4(b)(failure to keep a client reasonably in-
formed about the status of a matter), RPC 5.5(a) and Rule 1:21-
1A(a)(8)(unauthorized practice of law), RPC 8.4(¢)(conduct involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and RPC
8.4(d)(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); and
good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that JOHN A. KLAMO is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three months, effective February 9,
2018, and until the further Order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent's fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reinapurse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

397

175 A.3d 966

IN THE MATTER OF KEITH T. SMITH, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 024721989)

D-188 September Term 2016
o79711

January 11, 2018

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-007, concluding on the record certified to the
Board pursuant to Rule 1:20-4(f) (default by respondent) that
KEITH T. SMITH of EGG HARBOR TOWNSHIP, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 1989, should be censured for
violating RPC 1.15(d) and Rule 1:21-6 (recordkeeping); and RPC
8.1(b) and Rule 1:20-3(g)(8); and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that KEITH T. SMITH is hereby censured;
and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

175 A.3d 967

IN THE MATTER OF GWENDOLYN FAYE CLIMMONS, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. MJP000706)

D-165 September Term 2016
079542

January 11, 2018

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision DRB 16-406, concluding that as a matter of final disci-
pline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(c)(2), GWENDOLYN FAYE
CLIMMONS of HOUSTON, TEXAS, who became registered as a
multijurisdictional practitioner (MJP) in this State in 2013, and
who has been suspended from practicing as an MJP by Order of
this Court filed October 17, 2014, should be permanently barred
from practice in New Jersey as an MJP, based on respondent’s
conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division, of conspiracy to commit
health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and health care
fraud and aiding and abetting health care fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1347 and § 2, conduct that violates RPC 8.4(b) (commis-
sion of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects),
and RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that GWENDOLYN FAYE CLIMMONS is
hereby permanently barred from practicing law as a multijurisdie-
tional practitioner in New Jersey and from applying for admission
to practice law in New Jersey in any other manner, effective
immediately, and until further Order of the Court; and it is
further

399

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney in this State;
and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

176 A.3d 210

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. PIERRE A. DENEUS, A/K/A HARRY JEAN-
PIERRE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-877 September Term 2017
079676

November 30, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003133-15

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 210

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE AR-
REST/CHARGE RECORDS OF T.B. IN THE MATTER OF THE
EXPUNGEMENT OF THE ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF
J.N.-T. IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE
ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF R.C. (J.N.-T.—PETITIONER)

C-274 September Term 2017
079813

November 30, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-1516/1517/1518-
16 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

401

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted;
and it is further

ORDERED that the appellant may electronically serve and file
a supplemental brief on or before January 18, 2018, and respon-
dent may serve and file a supplemental brief forty-five (45) days
after the filing of appellant’s supplemental submission, or, if
appellant declines to file such a submission, on or before March 5,

2018.

176 A.3d 211

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
DAVID FERNANDEZ, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-378 September Term 2017
079721

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004313-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 211

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. SAMMY MOORE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-382 September Term 2017
080049

November 30, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003682-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 211

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. ERIC LUNSFORD, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-876 September Term 2017
079534

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003991-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 212

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. DERRICK WASHINGTON, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-384 September Term 2017
079802

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001181-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 212

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. REINALDO GONZALEZ, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-883 September Term 2017
080167

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003679-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 212

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. ANTONIO DIAZ, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-385 September Term 2017
080193

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002154-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 213

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. KENNETH B. GREEN,
DEFENDANT, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPON-
DENT, v. LOUIS ADAMS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-870 September Term 2017
079114

November 30, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-2342/3251-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

405

176 A.3d 213

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER,
v. MARJORIE ANNA STUBBLEFIELD,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-872 September Term 2017
079586

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002112-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.
ee

176 A.3d 213

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. DANNY SOTO, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-386 September Term 2017
080194

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004633-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 214

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
yv. RAKEEM SCOTT, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-379 September Term 2017
080169

November 30, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~004173-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 214

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. MICHAEL E. DAY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-881 September Term 2017
079913

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002920-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

407

176 A.3d 214

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. HASSAN E, BEY, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-871 September Term 2017
079585

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001872-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 215

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. EDDIE J. MARTE, A/K/A MARTE EDUARDO,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-378 September Term 2017
079597

November 30, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004377-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

408

176 A.3d 215

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
NAFEISHA T. BROWN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-875 September Term 2017
079598

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002037-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 215

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
LUIS HERNANDEZ, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-387 September Term 2017
080195

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003402-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

409

176 A.3d 216

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v, KEN-
NETH B. GREEN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. LOUIS ADAMS, DEFENDANT.

C-369 September Term 2017
079114

November 30, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-2342/3251-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 216

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE AR-
REST/CHARGE RECORDS OF T.B, IN THE MATTER OF THE
EXPUNGEMENT OF THE ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF
J.N.-T. IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE
ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF R.C. (T.B.-PETITIONER)

C-273 September Term 2017
079813

November 30, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-1516/1517/1518-
16 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted;
and it is further

ORDERED that the appellant may electronically serve and file
a supplemental brief on or before January 18, 2018, and respon-
dent may serve and file a supplemental brief forty-five (45) days
after the filing of appellant’s supplemental submission, or, if
appellant declines to file such a submission, on or before March 5,
2018.

176 A.3d 217

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE AR-
REST/CHARGE RECORDS OF T.B, IN THE MATTER OF THE
EXPUNGEMENT OF THE ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF
J.N.-T. IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE
ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF R.C. (R.C.-PETITIONER)

C-275 September Term 2017
079813

November 30, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-1516/1517/1518-
16 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted;
and it is further

ORDERED that the appellant may electronically serve and file
a supplemental brief on or before January 18, 2018, and respon-
dent may serve and file a supplemental brief forty-five (45) days
after the filing of appellant's supplemental submission, or, if

411

appellant declines to file such a submission, on or before March 5,
2018.

176 A.3d 217

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE AR-
REST/CHARGE RECORDS OF T.B. IN THE MATTER OF THE
EXPUNGEMENT OF THE ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF
J.N-T, IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE

ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF R.C.

M-324 September Term 2017
079813

November 30, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of J.N.-T., for a stay is
granted, in part, and the stay is limited to the portion of the
judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Division, that vacated
J.N.-T’s order of expungement.

176 A.3d 218

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE AR-
REST/CHARGE RECORDS OF T.B. IN THE MATTER OF THE
EXPUNGEMENT OF THE ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF
J.N.-T. IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE
ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF R.C.

M-325 September Term 2017
079818

November 80, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of R.C., for a stay is granted,
in part, and the stay is limited to the portion of the judgment of
the Superior Court, Appellate Division, that vacated R.C.’s order
of expungement.

176 A.3d 218

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE AR-
REST/CHARGE RECORDS OF T.B, IN THE MATTER OF THE
EXPUNGEMENT OF THE ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF
J.N.-T. IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF THE
ARREST/CHARGE RECORDS OF R.C.

M-823 September Term 2017
079813

November 30, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of T.B., for a stay is granted,
in part, and the stay is limited to the portion of the judgment of
the Superior Court, Appellate Division, that vacated T.B.’s order
of expungement.

413

176 A.3d 218

IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT
OF P.P., SVP~711-15. (P.P.-PETITIONER)

C-365 September Term 2017
079862

December 1, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004011-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.
De

176 A.3d 219

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
TIMOTHY C. AMAN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-874 September Term 2017
079591

December 1, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001029-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

414

176 A.3d 219

IN THE MATTER OF STATE AND SCHOOL EMPLOYEES HEALTH
BENEFITS COMMISSIONS’ IMPLEMENTATION OF I/M/O
PHILIP YUCHT. (CWA, AFL-CIO AND CLINICAL SOCIAL
WORK GUILD 49-PETITIONERS)

C-272 September Term 2017
079966
December 1, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005550-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted,
limited to the issue of whether the Commissions’ implementation
of In re Yucht, No, A-006298-10 (App. Div. Sept. 8, 2018),

: provided adequate notice to potentially affected members.

176 A.3d 219

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. R.L.M., DEFENDANT,
AND J.J.. DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. IN THE MATTER OF
THE GUARDIANSHIP OF R.A.J., A MINOR-RESPONDENT.

C-335 September Term 2017
079473

December 1, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

415

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-2849/3277-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

176 A.3d 220
IN THE INTEREST OF L.C., A JUVENILE. (L.C.-PETITIONER)

C-861 September Term 2017
079968

December 1, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000537-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

416

176 A.3d 220

LISA HUNT, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF HAILEY ROSINA

HUNT, A MINOR, AND LISA AND RUSSELL HUNT, AS PAR-
ENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS OF HAILEY ROSINA
HUNT, AND LISA AND RUSSELL HUNT, INDIVIDUALLY,
PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. VIRTUA HEALTH, INC., VIR-
TUA WEST JERSEY HOSPITAL VOORHEES, LINDA FARA-
GASSO, RB. . CHRISTINE PEASE, R. AND BARBARA
JONES, R.N., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDE! , AND WOMEN’S
GROUP FOR OB/GYN, PAMELA KOPELOVE, M.D., JEAN TOR-
RANCE, R.N.C., NOREEN PALMAY, R.N., AND DR. LYNCH,
DEFENDANTS.

C-358 September Term 2017
079863

December 1, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004196-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-

ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

417

176 A.3d 221

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. LARRY AUSTIN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-348 September Term 2017
079562

December 1, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005132-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 221

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
JOSE CONTRERAS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-354 September Term 2017
079573

December 1, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002769-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

418

176 A.3d 221
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. DENNIS OBADO
A/K/A DENNIS ABADO, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.
M~471 September Term 2017
079196

December 5, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to file a reply brief is
denied.

176 A.3d 221
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. LEO C. PINKSTON, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.
P-02 September Term 2017
080118

December 7, 2017

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court on defendant's
motion for leave to appeal from the Appellate Division's order
affirming the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion for pretrial
detention, State v. Leo C. Pinkston, No. A-004528-16 (App. Div.
Aug. 29, 2017); and

The Court having reviewed the parties’ submissions and for
good cause shown; it is

ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal is granted. The

Clerk is directed to schedule oral argument in this matter for the
session of March 12-13, 2018.

419

Should any entity wish to file a motion to participate as amicus
curiae, the motion and any proposed brief must be served and
filed on or before noon on January 8, 2018. The State and the
defendant may file answers to any such amicus motion, together
with a proposed response brief to the amicus brief, on or before
noon on February 5, 2018. No further submissions shall be accept-
ed unless requested by the Court. All dates set forth in this order
are final.

176 A.3d 222

IN RE: ACCUTANE LITIGATION (HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE INC.
AND ROCHE LABORATORIES INC.-PETITIONERS)

C-389 September Term 2017
079933

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-4760-14 and A-
164-16 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

420

176 A.3d 222

COLIN ANDREWS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, v. JOHN A. FRANK,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, AND TERRY ANDREWS, DE-
FENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF v. CLIFFORD S. AN-
DREWS, II, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/FOURTH-PARTY
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOHN A. FRANK AND STEVEN
P. FORD, FOURTH-PARTY DEFENDANTS.

C-395 September Term 2017
079057

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~-005524-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

176 A.3d 223

MONTANA CONSTRUCTION CORP., INC., PLAINTIFF-MOVANT, v.
FRANKLIN TWP. SEWERAGE AUTH. AND DIACO CONTRACT-
ING, INC, D/B/A GRADE CONSTRUCTION, DEFENDANTS-RE-
SPONDENTS.

M~433/434/435 September Term 2017
080158

December 8, 2017
ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to file an overlength
brief (M433) is granted; and it is further

421

ORDERED that the motion for acceleration (M-434) is dis-
missed as moot; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for a stay (M-435) is denied.

176 A.3d 223

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF SOUTH BRUNSWICK, COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX.

M-~450/453 September Term 2017
080180

December 8, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of the Township of South
Brunswick motion for permission to rely on the South Brunswick
Township Planning Board’s Appellate Division brief, and alterna-
tive requested relief (M-453) is granted in part, only to allow
movant to rely on the Planning Board’s Appellate Division brief;
and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal (M-450) is
denied.

422

176 A.3d 223

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. MICHAEL J. DIEDUAR-
DO, A/K/A MICHAEL JOHN DIEDUARDO, ANTHONY DIED-
UARDO, JOHN TETELMAN, DEFENDANT. STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. MICHAEL SHORTER,
A/K/A MICHAEL SHORTOR, MICHAEL LAMONT SHORTER,
MIKE WILLIAMS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. CARMELO SOTO, DEFENDANT.

C-405 September Term 2017
079621

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-236/984/1044-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 224

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS JOINT OPINION 732, THE COMMITTEE ON
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING JOINT OPINION 44, AND THE
COMMITTEE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
JOINT OPINION 54.

M~424/426 September Term 2017
079852

December 8, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of the Consumers for a
Responsive Legal System for leave to file a notice of petition for
review as within time (M424) is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for leave to waive the filing fee of
$250.00 (M~426) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the petitioner shall submit the $250.00 filing
fee in light of the Court’s order.

176 A.3d 224

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. LUIS A. PEREZ, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-380 September Term 2017
079826

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005274-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted
and the matter is summarily remanded to the trial court for a
post-conviction relief hearing. Jurisdiction is not retained.

424

176 A.3d 224

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v, KELVIN
REYES, A/K/A KEVIN REYES, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-421 September Term 2017
079678

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003397-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 225
ZIA H. SHAIKH, PLAINTIFF-MOVANT, v, LAURA
L. GERMADNIG-SHAIKH, DEFENDANT.
M-458/459 September Term 2017
078989

December 8, 2017

ORDER
It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration as within time (M458) is granted; and it is
further
ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
order denying the motion for leave to appeal and proceed as
indigent (M-459) is denied.

425

176 A.3d 225,

RS,, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. S.C., DEFENDANT-RESPON-
DENT, AND W.S., DEFENDANT. R.S., PLAINTIFF, v. S.C.,
DEFENDANT, AND W.S., DEFENDANT.

C403 September Term 2017
079806

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-1185~13 and A-
2102-14 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court
having considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

176 A.3d 225

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ABDUL.
AZIZ, DEFENDANT-MOVANT,

M-~439/440 September Term 2017
079734

December 8, 2017
ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal (M-439) is
denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for a stay (M-440) is dismissed as

moot,

426

176 A.3d 226

CITIMORTGAGE, INC., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. THOMAS
AVELLINO, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-392 September Term 2017
079401

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005058-14

having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

176 A.3d 226

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF SOUTH BRUNSWICK, COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX.

M-451/452 September Term 2017
080180

December 8, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of the South Brunswick
Township Planning Board for leave to file a motion for leave to
appeal as within time (M-451) is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal (M—452) is
denied.

427

176 A.3d 226

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF, v. A.S.K., AND T.T., DEFENDANTS, AND
E.M.C., DEFENDANT-MOVANT. IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF N.D.K,, A.E.C., AND E.S.K., MINORS.

M-448 September Term 2017
079700

December 8, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to file an answering
brief as within time is granted.

176 A.3d 227

GIVAUDAN FRAGRANCES CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-MOVANT,
vy, AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY A/K/A TRAVEL-
ERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, ET AL., DEFEN-
DANTS-RESPONDENTS.

M-427 September Term 2017
080033

December 8, 2017

ORDER
It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal is denied.

428

176 A.3d 227

IN RE: ACCUTANE LITIGATION (ANGELO
ANNUZZI—CROSS-PETITIONER)

C-390 September Term 2017
079933

December 8, 2017
ON CROSS PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A cross-petition for certification of the judgment in A-4760-14
and A-164-15 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court
having considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the cross-petition for certification is
granted.

176 A.3d 227

BEAVER LAKE REALTY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF,
y. NJ DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL,
PROTECTION, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.

M-421 September Term 2017
080162

December 8, 2017
ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to file an answering
brief as within time is granted.

8

176 A.3d 775
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
RYAN SUTHERLAND, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT,
A-14 September Term 2016
077807

Argued October 10, 2017—Decided January 11, 2018

g

431

Joseph P. Rem, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (Rem Law
Group, attorneys; Joseph P. Rem, Jr., of counsel, and Tamra
Katcher, of counsel and on the brief).

Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Christopher 8. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney; Claudia Joy Demitro, of counsel and on the brief, and
Paula C. Jordao, Assistant Morris County Prosecutor, on the
brief).

Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas,
Legal Director, attorney; Alexander R. Shalom, Edward L. Baro-
cas and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief).

Paula C. Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, submitted a letter brief
on behalf of respondent (Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prose-
cutor, attorney).

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

This Court has acknowledged that a reasonable mistake of fact
on the part of a police officer will not render a search or arrest
predicated on that mistake unconstitutional. See State v. Handy,
206 N.J. 39, 538-54, 18 A.3d 179 (2011). In this matter, a police
officer pulled over a car under the belief that the vehicle was in
violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66 because one of the vehi-
cle’s taillights was not operational. The trial court determined that
the officer was mistaken about the law and granted defendant’s
motion to suppress the fruits of the motor vehicle stop. The
Appellate Division reversed. The panel determined that the rele-
vant motor vehicle statutes were ambiguous and that, applying the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Heien v. North
Carolina, 674 U.S. —, 185 S.Ct. 580, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014), the
officer’s stop of defendant’s car constituted at most an objectively
reasonable mistake of law that should be treated in the same

432

manner as a mistake of fact. Accordingly, the panel held that the
officer's mistake of law did not require suppression of the motor
vehicle stop.

We now reverse. The Appellate Division erred in concluding
that the holding in Heien is applicable here. Because the motor
vehicle statutes pertinent here are not ambiguous, we need not
consider importing Heien into the determination of this matter.
Thus, we do not address the arguments raised herein that Heien’s
mistake-of-law analysis is not reconcilable with our state constitu-
tional jurisprudence. The officer’s stop of defendant’s motor vehi-
cle was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law that gave rise
to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop was therefore
unconstitutional. We remand to the Appellate Division for its
consideration of the State’s alternative argument, which the panel
did not reach, that the stop should be sustained based on the
community caretaking doctrine.

L

A

At the suppression hearing in this matter, the following facts
were adduced. Officer Michael Carletta of the Mount Olive Police
Department was the sole witness.

At about 9:00 p.m. on the evening of February 3, 2014, Officer
Carletta was on motor vehicle patrol traveling southbound on
Route 206. A Toyota Camry passed him traveling northbound.
Looking in his rearview mirror, the officer observed that the
northbound vehicle appeared to have a malfunctioning taillight.
Although the vehicle had four taillights in total, two on each side,
and although only one light on the rear passenger side was not
illuminated, Officer Carletta believed that the vehicle was in
violation of the motor vehicle code. He made a U-turn and began
to follow the vehicle. After confirming that one of the vehicle’s
taillights was not illuminated, he executed a motor vehicle stop.

Officer Carletta testified that, in such situations, it is typical police
practice to give the driver a warning rather than a summons.

After stopping and approaching the vehicle, Officer Carletta
asked the driver, defendant Ryan Sutherland, for his driver's
license, motor vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Defen-
dant initially stated that he did not have his driver’s license with
him but then quickly admitted that he did not have a valid driver’s
license. After obtaining defendant’s name and date of birth, Offi-
cer Carletta returned to his vehicle to check defendant’s informa-
tion with police dispatch.

Upon confirming that defendant’s license was in fact suspended,
Officer Carletta issued defendant two summonses: driving with a
suspended license in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, and failure to
maintain the vehicle's “lamps” in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-66.
Officer Carletta explained to defendant that he had been stopped
because one of his taillights was not working and that he could no
longer drive the vehicle because he had a suspended driver’s
license. The officer allowed defendant to leave the scene on the
condition that his passenger drive the car to its intended destina-
tion.

B.

On June 2, 2014, defendant was charged in municipal court with
fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license
suspension in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. A Morris County
grand jury later indicted defendant and charged him with fourth-
degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license
suspension for a second or subsequent driving-while-intoxicated
conviction in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26().

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop and to
dismiss the indictment,' arguing that the traffic stop constituted

1 The Appellate Division opinion treats defendant as having filed two separate
motions: a motion to suppress the stop and a motion to dismiss the indictment.

an unreasonable seizure because his vehicle had three operable
taillights, in compliance with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:3-
61(a) and -66, The State countered that the stop was lawful
because the malfunctioning taillight provided Officer Carletta with
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and because the stop was
lawful under the “community caretaking” function by which police
officers engage in protecting public safety. Officer Carletta testi-
fied at the hearing that he had stopped the vehicle both because
he believed that any malfunctioning taillight constituted a violation
of the statute and because he was engaging in community caretak-
ing by letting defendant know that his vehicle was not in proper
working order.

The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence
resulting from the motor vehicle stop, but the court denied his
motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of faulty instruc-
tions provided to the grand jury. On the motor vehicle stop, the
trial court agreed with defendant that Officer Carletta’s under-
standing of the maintenance-of-lamps statute had been “incorrect”
and that defendant had not violated the statute because he had at
least one functioning taillight on each side of the vehicle. Relying
heavily on State v. Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. 378, 878 A.2d 857 (App.
Div. 2005), as well as an unpublished 2009 Appellate Division
decision, the trial court concluded that Officer Carletta’s erroneous
interpretation of the law—even though it was a “common sense”
and “practical” approach to interpreting the statute—could not
pass constitutional scrutiny.

The State sought leave to appeal on the grounds that (1) Officer
Carletta had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop; (2)
Puzio’s continuing vitality was put into question by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Heien, in which the Supreme
Court held that objectively reasonable mistakes of law can provide

However, it appears from the record that defendant filed one motion to dismiss
the indictment for two discrete reasons: (1) because the charge resulted from an
unconstitutional stop; and (2) because the prosecutor gave improper instruc-
tions to the grand jury.

the reasonable suspicion necessary for a constitutional stop; and
(8) the stop was lawful under the community caretaking doctrine.
The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and reversed the
trial court in a published opinion. State v. Sutherland, 445 N.J.
Super. 358, 188 A.3d 551 (2016).

Relying extensively on Heien, the panel determined that “even
if the officer was mistaken that the inoperable tail light constituted
a Title 39 violation, he had an objectively reasonable basis for
stopping defendant’s vehicle.” Id. at 360, 188 A.3d 551. In reaching
that conclusion, the panel questioned the continuing vitality of
Puzio, which had held “that where an officer mistakenly believes
that driving conduct constitutes a violation of the law, but in
actuality it does not, no objectively reasonable basis exists upon
which to justify a vehicle stop.” Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. at 383, 878
A.2d 857 (collecting cases)? The panel reasoned that Puzio had
been decided before Heien and that Heien’s “well-reasoned” hold-
ing had cast doubt on Puzio’s continuing validity. Sutherland, 445
NJ. Super. at 366-67, 188 A.3d 551. The panel went on to
conclude that the statute at issue here was ambiguous and that
even if Officer Carletta’s interpretation of the statute was an
objectively reasonable mistake of law, the stop was permissible
pursuant to Heien “[blecause the Fourth Amendment tolerates
objectively reasonable mistakes of law.” Id. at 368-70, 188 A3d
551. The panel’s reasoning made it unnecessary to reach the
State’s argument about the applicability of the community caretak-
ing doctrine. Id. at 371, 188 A8d 551.

Defendant sought leave to appeal from this Court, which we
granted. 228 N.J. 246, 156 A.3d 167 (2016). We also granted the
motion of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
(ACLU-NJ) to appear as amicus curiae.

2The panel below also disagreed with the holding in the unpublished decision
referenced by the trial court, which, the panel noted, is unpublished and thus
does not constitute precedential authority. Sutherland, 445 N.J. Super. at 365,
138 A.3d 551

IL

The parties’ arguments are largely those advanced in the pro-
ceedings before the trial and appellate courts.

Defendant argues that the Appellate Division’s adoption of
Heien is at odds with prior New Jersey precedent, which has
traditionally provided greater protections under our state ana-
logue to the Fourth Amendment than those provided by the
Federal Constitution. Specifically, he argues that Puzio, 379 N.J.
Super. at 383, 878 A.2d 857, correctly held that a traffic stop based
on an incorrect interpretation of law can never be objectively
reasonable, That holding, defendant argues, is a natural extension
of this Court’s decision in State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519
A.2d 820 (1987), which held that our State Constitution does not
contemplate good faith mistakes by law enforcement as an excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule. Defendant also contends that the
statutory provisions at issue here were plain and unambiguous and
did not apply to his vehicle, undermining any basis for reasonable
suspicion. In essence, defendant's argument challenges Officer
Carletta’s interpretation of those provisions as not reasonable,

The State argues that the Appellate Division correctly held that
Officer Carletta’s belief that defendant was in violation of the
motor vehicle code was objectively reasonable and provided him
with reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle. Relying on
Heien, the State posits that just as we have held that reasonable
mistakes of fact can pass constitutional scrutiny, so too should we
hold that reasonable mistakes of law do not run afoul of our
constitution. Such a result is not inconsistent with Puzio, the State
argues, because Puzio involved an objectively unreasonable mis-
take of law, whereas here, Officer Carletta was forced to interpret
a confusing and outdated set of statutes ambiguous enough to be
open to differing and equally reasonable interpretations. Addition-
ally, the State maintains that it preserved its argument that
Officer Carletta had lawful authority to stop defendant’s vehicle
based on the community caretaking doctrine, which provides police

437

with the power to ensure the safety and welfare of the public
independent of their law enforcement objectives.

Amicus curiae ACLU-NJ argues that the statutes at issue here
are not ambiguous and that the rule of lenity requires strict
construction of those statutes in defendant’s favor. ACLU-NJ
further argues that a stop based on a police officer’s misunder-
standing or ignorance of the law can and should be differentiated
from mistakes of fact, and that such ignorance or misunderstand-
ing of the law must always be unreasonable and thus unconstitu-
tional under our Article I, Paragraph 7 jurisprudence. Like defen-
dant, ACLU-NJ maintains that that conclusion flows naturally
from state constitutional case law, most specifically from Novem-
brino, Heien, the ACLU-NJ argues, is inconsistent with that
jurisprudence and thus should not be adopted by this Court.

Il.
A.

Hl Under previous case law in this state, a police officer's
objectively reasonable mistake of fact does not render a search or
arrest unconstitutional. Consistent with federal jurisprudence, we
have held that Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitu-
tion provides “room ... for some mistakes [by police].” Handy,
206 N.J. at 54, 18 A.3d 179 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Illinois _v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111
L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). However, that principle applies only when
“the police ... behave[] reasonably.” Ibid.; see_also State _v.
Green, 318 N.J. Super. 346, 352-58, 723 A.2d 1012 (App. Div. 1999)
(holding reasonable but mistaken belief leading to arrest did not
warrant suppression).

In Handy, a police dispatcher, erroneously relying on a record
of a warrant containing a name and date of birth that did not
match the defendant’s reported information, advised a police offi-
cer to execute that warrant without taking necessary steps to
clarify discrepancies. 206 N.J, at 41-42, 18 A.3d 179. Our Court

concluded that the dispatcher’s conduct was not objectively rea-
sonable. Id. at 54, 18 A.3d 179. Therefore, we determined that the
arrest violated the defendant’s federal and state constitutional
rights, and we suppressed the evidence found during the search
incident to the arrest. Id. at 42, 18 A3d 179.

The facts in Handy led us to a different conclusion than the
mistake of fact in State v. Green, in which the error was deter-
mined to be objectively reasonable. In Green, which we cited
approvingly in Handy, the Appellate Division upheld an arrest and
search of defendant Green, where Green closely matched the
description of another man named Lovett—for whom the warrant
was issued—and where the police encountered Green outside
Lovett’s residence. Green, 318 N.J. Super. at 352-53, 723 A.2d
1012. In those circumstances the Appellate Division rightly con-
cluded that the arrest was premised on an objectively reasonable
mistake of fact and was thus lawful. Ibid.

Until the Appellate Division decision in this case, the jurispru-
dence of our state appellate courts had not held that reasonable
mistakes of law would pass constitutional muster. In fact, courts
had reached the opposite conclusion. See Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. at
382-83, 878 A.2d 857.

In Puzio, an officer stopped a moving vehicle with commercial
license plates, believing the driver was operating it in violation of
N.J.S.A. 39:4-46(a) because the vehicle had no placard on the right
side of the vehicle displaying the name and address of its business.
Id. at 380, 878 A.2d 857. The Appellate Division determined as a
matter of law that the stop was in error because the statute relied
on by the officer plainly excluded “passenger vehicles,” like the
one driven by the defendant, from the “placard” requirement. Id.
at 382-84, 878 A.2d 857.

Importantly, the Puzio decision noted “a clear distinction be-
tween the present situation and those presented in cases where
the officer correctly understands the statute but arguably misin-
terprets the facts concerning whether a vehicle, or operator, has
violated the statute,” Id. at 382, 878 A.2d 857. In explaining its

439

reasoning, the panel stated that “{i]f officers were permitted to
stop vehicles where it is objectively determined that there is no
legal basis for their action, ‘the potential for abuse of traffic
infractions as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the
costs to privacy rights excessive.’” Id. at 384, 878 A.2d 857
(quoting United States v, Lopez~Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th
Cir, 1999)). The panel also viewed the creation of an exception for
a mistake of law as inconsistent with the exclusionary rule because
“4t would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they
properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce
and obey.” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d
1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

Another mistake-of-fact case—the State’s assertions to the con-
trary notwithstanding—is State _v. Williamson, 188 N.J. 302, 650
A.2d 348 (1994), mson dealt with a police officer’s reasonable
suspicion that a motorist had “affected traffic” so as to be in
violation of the motor vehicle code by failing to use a turn signal.
Id. at 303-04, 650 A.2d 348. The officer was required to make a
judgment that involved interpreting facts, namely whether the
motorist had actually affected traffic; there was no mistake about
what the law meant. See id. at 304, 650 A.2d 348. We held that
“the State need prove only that the police lawfully stopped the car,
not that it could convict the driver of the motor-vehicle offense.”
Ibid. At its core, Williamson involved a factual dispute: whether
the officer could have an objectively reasonable belief, even if
mistaken, that the defendant's driving behavior “affected traffic,”
to justify the stop. See also State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470, 724
A.2d 234 (1999) (noting that State is not required to prove that
motor vehicle violation occurred in order to meet standard of
reasonable suspicion).

Thus, at the time of the Appellate Division’s decision here,
neither this Court nor the Appellate Division had authorized
reliance on a reasonable but mistaken understanding of the law to
support a search or arrest. In the appellate judgment under
review, the panel relied on, as persuasive, the intervening decision

440

of the United States Supreme Court in Heien to support its
holding. We turn therefore to that decision in setting forth the
background to this appeal.

B.

In Heien, the United States Supreme Court considered a police
officer’s reasonable but erroneous interpretation of a motor vehicle
statute. In that case, a North Carolina Sheriff's Officer observed a
vehicle traveling along the highway with a malfunctioning brake
light. Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 534. Believing the faulty brake light to be
in violation of the state’s motor vehicle code, the officer executed a
traffic stop. Ibid. During the stop, the officer received permission
to search the vehicle and discovered illegal drugs in a duffel bag.
Ibid.

The defendant sought to suppress the evidence uncovered dur-
ing the search, contending that the stop had violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 585. The trial court denied
the suppression motion, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the initial stop was invalid “because driving
with only one working brake light was not actually a violation of
North Carolina law.” Ibid. The State appealed, and the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer’s inter-
pretation of the motor vehicle code—even if incorrect—was not
unreasonable and thus not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Ibid,

The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion noted that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Id. at 536 (quoting Riley _v.
California, 573 U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 2478, 2482, 189 L.Ed.2d 430
(2014)). After explaining that “[{t]o be reasonable is not to be
perfect,” and that the Fourth Amendment allows for reasonable
mistakes of fact, the Chief Justice went on to explain that the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry applies to mistakes of
law just as it applies to mistakes of fact:

441

[Reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such mistakes are no less
compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion (than mistakes of fact].
Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an officer's understanding of
the facts and his understanding of the relevant law. The officer may be
reasonably mistaken on either ground. Whether the facts turn out to be not what,
was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the
same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the
text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be
acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of faet, but not when
reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.

[Ibid.}

Based on the language of the North Carolina statute involved in
Heien, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the officer’s error of
law was reasonable and thus provided the officer with reasonable
suspicion to justify the traffic stop. Id, at 540, Importantly, Justice
Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a concurrence that has
garnered support with states that have chosen to follow the Heien
approach in their own search and seizure analyses.

Justice Kagan’s concurrence contained several important cave-
ats, Critical to her agreement with the majority was her belief
that erroneous interpretations of the law will pass Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny only when the law at issue is “‘so doubtful in
construction’ that a reasonable judge could agree with the officer’s
view.” Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting The Friendship,
9 F. Cas, 825, 826 (No. 5,125) (C.C.D, Mass, 1812)), Thus, “{ijf the
statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s
judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has
made a reasonable mistake. But if not, not.” Ibid, Such cases must
necessarily involve a “really difficult” or “very hard question of
statutory interpretation” and will thus be “exceedingly rare.” Ibid.

A number of states have subsequently adopted Heien’s holding.
See, e.g., Sevilla~Carcamo v. State, 885 Ga.App. 788, 783 S.E.2d
150, 158 n.12 (2016) (dicta); Williams v, State, 28 N.E.3d 298, 294-
95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 30
N.E.8d 880, 886-88 (2015); State v. Hirschkorn, 881 N.W.2d 244,
248-49 (N.D. 2016); State v. Lerma, 884 N.W.2d 749, 750-53 (S.D.
2016). However, some of those states had already developed a
jurisprudence prior to Heien allowing for reasonable mistakes of

442

law on the part of police officers. See, e.g., Sevilla-Carcamo, 783
S.E.2d at 153 n.12 (noting that Heien is in accord with established
Georgia case law); State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 791, 796-99 (S.D.
2010) (suggesting that objectively reasonable mistake of law can.
provide basis for constitutional traffic stop).

Importantly, however, a number of states have either followed
or acknowledged Justice Kagan’s narrow interpretation of an
objectively reasonable mistake of law when deciding similar issues
under the rubric of Heien’s analysis. See State v. Stoll, 239 Ariz.
292, 370 P.8d 1130, 1184 (App. 2016) (citing Justice Kagan’s
concurrence for proposition that statute must be “genuinely am-
biguous” and require “hard interpretive work” to find that officer
has made reasonable mistake); People v. Gaytan, 392 Ill.Dec. 333,
32 N.E.3d 641, 652 (2015) (same); State v. Eldridge, 790 S.E.2d
740, 7483-44 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (same); State v. Hurley, 198 Vt.
552, 117 A.3d 438, 441 (2015) (noting Justice Kagan’s indication
that “the bar is high in cases in which a stop is predicated on a
mistake of law”); State v. Houghton, 364 Wis.2d 234, 868 N.W.2d
143, 158-60 (2015) (noting Justice Kagan’s view that objectively
reasonable mistakes of law will be “exceedingly rare”); see also
State v. Dopslaf, 356 P.3d 559, 563-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (citing
Justice Kagan’s concurrence as support for proposition that police
officer’s potential mistake of law was reasonable).

In this state, we have had only one prior occasion to consider
Heien; that opportunity presented itself in State v. Seriven, 226
N.J. 20, 140 A.3d 585 (2016). However, we ultimately did not reach

3Some states have changed their views entirely in light of Heien. Compare
Williams, 28 N.E.3d at 293-95 (Indiana Court of Appeals reversing on rehearing
and following Heien's holding that reasonable mistakes of law can provide
reasonable suspicion for traffic stop), with Gunn v, State, 956 N.E.2d 136, 141
(ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting party's acknowledgement of “Indiana decisions
determining that an officer's mistake of law can never be reasonable”); see also
Guthrie, 30 N.E.3d at 885 (noting prior appellate precedent in New York that
“mistake of law cannot justify a traffic stop").

443

the question of whether to adopt Heien and find that an objective-
ly reasonable mistake of law could support reasonable suspicion
for a constitutional police stop. Id. at 36, 140 A.3d 535. Instead, we
held that the officer's mistake of law in that case was not
objectively reasonable, see ibid., and thus did not qualify as the
type of “rare” case that involves an objectively reasonable mistake
of law.

With that background in mind, we turn to the motor vehicle
statutes that, the State contends, give rise to an objectively
reasonable mistake of law in this matter.

Iv.

Hl Defendant’s traffic stop was premised on perceived viola-
tions of two statutes.

N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a), relating to the types of “lamps and reflec-
tors” required on certain motor vehicles, provides in relevant part:
Every motor vehicle other than a motor cycle and other than a motor-drawn
vehicle shall be equipped on the front with at least two headlamps, an equal
number at each side, and with two turn signals, one on each side; and on the
rear with two tail lamps, two or more stop lamps, as preseribed by section 2 of L.
2013, c, 230 (N.J.S.A.] 39:3-66.3), two turn signals, and two reflectors, one of
each at each side; except that a passenger vehicle manufactured before July 2,
1954, and registered in this State may be equipped with one stop lamp, one
reflector, and one tail lamp and is not required to be equipped with turn signals.

[ (emphasis added).]
N.J.S.A. 39:3-66, which specifies the proper maintenance of such
lamps and reflectors, provides:
All lamps, reflectors and other illuminating devices required by this article shall
be Kept clean and in good working order and, as far as practicable, shall be
mounted in such a manner as to reduce the likelihood of their being obscured by
mud or dust thrown up by the wheels,
[(emphasis added).]

HH When interpreting a statute we look first, and foremost,
to its actual language and ascribe to its words their ordinary
meaning. Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 68, 951 A.2d 1017

(2008) (citing DiProspero v, Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039
(2005). “If in ascribing to those words their ‘ordinary meaning

444

and significance,’ the Legislators’ intent is self-evident, we need
not search further for guidance.” Simon v. Cronecker, 189 N.J.
804, 332, 915 A.2d 489 (2007) (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492,
874 A.2d 1039),

HH The statutes read together require that a motor vehicle
only have two working rear lamps, with at least one working lamp
on each side. See N.J.S.A. 89:3-61(a); N.J.S.A. 39:3-66, Addition-
ally, N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 mandates that the lamps “required by this
article” must be kept in good working order. Thus, if there is only
the minimum one taillight on each side of a vehicle and either of
those taillights is not working, an officer can lawfully stop the
vehicle and issue a citation for failure to maintain lamps. When a
vehicle has more than the minimum of two rear taillights, for
example the vehicle has two taillights on each side, an officer can
lawfully stop the vehicle when one side’s taillights are both out,
even though the vehicle has two or more taillights illuminated on
the other side. In other words, the statutes require one working
taillight on each side of a vehicle. Thus, if a vehicle has two
taillights on each side of the vehicle—more than the law re-
quires—and one of those multiple taillights on one side is not
working, a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:8-Gl(a) and -66, as was as-
sumed and charged here, has not occurred.

I We find the language unambiguous and therefore need not
resort to legislative history. Were that history to be examined on
the relevant question, we would note, as the State points out, that
the Legislature did at one point begin consideration of an amend-
ment; that amendment would have worked a different interpreta-
tion of existing law as we read it, and as it was applied in a prior
unpublished decision that received legislative attention. As origi-
nally introduced at the outset of the 2012 Legislative Session,
Assembly Bill 354 would have amended N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 and
N.J.S.A. 89:3-61 to establish that “an equipment violation [will be
found] if any lighting device installed on a vehicle is not in working
order.” Those proposed amendments were never adopted by the
Legislature, as the Appellate Division noted in its opinion. Suther-

445

land, 445 N.J. Super. at 367 n.3, 188 A.3d 551. We do not ascribe
much weight to legislative inaction but note merely that there has
been no legislation to alter prior application of the pertinent
statutes. Cf. State v. Smith, 197 N.J. 325, 335, 963 A.2d 281 (2009).

Finally, we reject the argument that N.J.S.A. 39:3-48, which
addresses visibility specifications for vehicle lights, can inject
ambiguity into the clear wording of the statutes at issue here. Nor
does the permissive repair provision in N.J.S.A. 39:3-61()—which
does not have applicability in the present situation or in most
modern malfunctioning-taillight cireumstances—convert the in-
terpretative question before us into one that rises to the level of
difficulty envisioned as the “rare” case of an objectively reasonable
misunderstanding of the law. See Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 541 (noting
that such cases must necessarily involve “very hard question[s] of
statutory interpretation”).

Putting the statutes in question to rigorous analysis, we fail to
find them unclear, as the State suggests. We find that the officer's
erroneous application of the functioning taillight requirement was
not an objectively reasonable mistake of law. This case does not
present a basis for considering the application of Heien and the
Appellate Division erred in reaching that determination based on
the error here. Simply put, this was not a good stop. Even Heien
could not save it, were we ever to consider adopting such an
approach for the truly rare case that rose to the level of an
objectively reasonable mistake of law. But this was not that case.
The judgment of the Appellate Division, premised on an applica-
tion of Heien to the stop in this matter, is reversed.

‘That, however, does not end the matter.

Vv.

Tl The State also asserted community caretaking as an alter-
native basis to support the stop. It is a rule that allows police
officers to conduct warrantless searches where necessary to “pre-
serve life or property.” State y. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 141-42, 47
A.8d 787 (2012) (summarizing community caretaking rule), The

rationale for the community caretaking rule is that searches made
pursuant to the rule are “divorced from the detection, investiga-
tion, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute.” Id. at 142, 47 A8d 787 (quoting Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 483, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1978)).

That doctrine was raised at the suppression hearing and there
‘was testimony from the officer on the point. Although raised on
appeal, the Appellate Division did not reach the argument in light
of the manner in which it resolved the case. Accordingly, a remand
is appropriate to allow the Appellate Division to address the
unresolved argument advanced by the State.

VI.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. We remand
the matter for further proceedings in the Appellate Division.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN,
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, AND
TIMPONE join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion.

176 A.3d 785

IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM E, WACKOWSKI, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 013962001)

D-190 September Term 2016
079713

January 11, 2018
ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-084, concluding on the record certified to the

447

Board pursuant to Rule 1:20-4(f)(default by respondent) that
WILLIAM E. WACKOWSKI of POINT PLEASANT, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 2001, should be reprimanded
for violating RPC 1.4(b)(failure to communicate with the client),
and RPC 8.1(b) (failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities),
and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that WILLIAM E. WACKOWSKI is hereby
reprimanded; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

176 A.3d 785
IN THE MATTER OF DENNIS F. WAGENBLAST, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 019741977)
D-67 September Term 2017
080565

January 12, 2018

ORDER

DENNIS F. WAGENBLAST of TOMS RIVER, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 1977, having tendered his
consent to disbarment as an attorney at law of the State of New
Jersey, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that DENNIS F. WAGENBLAST is dis-
barred by consent, effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent’s name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys and that he be permanently restrained and enjoined
from practicing law; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by DENNIS F. WAGENBLAST pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 shall be
restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court
for good cause shown and shall be transferred by the financial
institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to
deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending
further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17,

176 A.3d 786

IN THE MATTER OF GARETH DAVID DE SANTIAGO-KEENE,
AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 200011980)

D-199 September Term 2016
079774

January 12, 2018
ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-052, concluding that as a matter of final

449

discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(¢), GARETH DAVID DE
SANTIAGO-KEENE of NEW MILFORD, who was admitted to
the bar of this State in 1980, should be censured for violating RPC
1.4(b) (failure to keep a client reasonably informed about the
status of a matter), RPC 1.4(c) (failure to explain a matter of the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation), RPC 1.7(a) (2) (concur-
rent conflict of interest), RPC 1.16(d) (improper termination of
representation), and RPC 8.4 (c) (conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and RPC 8.4(d) (conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice), and good cause ap-
pearing;

It is ORDERED that GARETH DAVID DE SANTIAGO-
KEENE is hereby censured; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

176 A.3d 786

IN THE MATTER OF BARRY 0. BOHMUELLER, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 03231995)

D-191 September Term 2016
079715

January 12, 2018
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-428, concluding that as a matter of reciprocal

450

discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-14(a)(4), that BARRY O. BOH-
MUELLER of HARLEYSVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 1996, should be suspended
from practice for a period of two years;

And the Court having determined on its own motion, pursuant
to Rule 1:20-16(b), to review the matter;

It is ORDERED that BARRY 0. BOHMUELLER show cause
before this Court on March 13, 2018, at 2:00 p.m. in the Supreme
Court courtroom, Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, why he
should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined; and it is further

ORDERED that the Director of the Office of Attorney Ethics,
or the Director’s designee, present this matter to the Court; and it
is further

ORDERED that respondent shall file an original and eight
copies of his brief with the Clerk of the Court and serve two
copies of the brief on the Office of Attorney Ethics on or before
February 5, 2018, and the Office of Attorney Ethics shall serve
and file a responding brief on or before March 2, 2018.

176 A.3d 787

IN THE MATTER OF PAUL WALTER GRZENDA, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 033591985)

D-30 September Term 2017
080239

January 17, 2018
ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-188, recommending that PAUL WALTER
GRZENDA of SOUTH PLAINFIELD, who was admitted to the

451

bar of this State in 1985, be disbarred for violating RPC 1.15(a),
and the principles of In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 409 A.2d 1153
(1979) and In re Hollendonner, 102 N.J. 21, 504 A.2d 1174 (1985)
(knowing misappropriation of client and escrow funds);

And PAUL WALTER GRZENDA having been ordered to
show cause why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disci-
plined, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that PAUL WALTER GRZENDA be dis-
barred, effective immediately, and that his name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys;

ORDERED that PAUL WALTER GRZENDA be and hereby
is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and
it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by PAUL WALTER GRZENDA pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be
restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court,
for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial
institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to
deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the
further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that PAUL WALTER GRZENDA comply with
Rule 1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent's file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

=

52

176 A.3d 788

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ALEXIS
SANCHEZ-MEDINA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

A-10 September Term 2016
077883

Argued October 10, 2017—Decided January 18, 2018

=.
Es

Tamar Y. Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attor-
ney; Tamar Y. Lerer, of counsel and on the briefs).

Elizabeth R. Rebein, Assistant Bergen County Prosecutor, ar-
gued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County
Prosecutor, attorney; Gurbir S. Grewal, of counsel and on the
brief).

Ronald K. Chen argued the cause for amicus curiae American
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal
Director, and the Rutgers University School of Law-Newark
Constitutional Rights Clinic, attorneys; Ronald K. Chen, Edward
L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero and Alexander R. Shalom, of
counsel and on the brief).

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the
Court.

This criminal case involves charges of sexual assault. Defendant
testified on his own behalf at trial and denied the allegations. At

the start of his cross-examination, the prosecution asked whether
he had come to the United States legally. Over an objection, the
jury learned that defendant had not. That highly charged evidence
was irrelevant and should not have been admitted, as the State
now concedes.

Only in a rare case will it be appropriate for a prosecutor to
elicit testimony about a defendant’s immigration status. In most
instances, that type of evidence has no bearing on the crimes
charged or a witness's credibility. It can also substantially preju-
dice the accused because of the inflammatory nature of the issue.

This appeal presents a second issue as well. Although the
allegations related to different incidents that involved four sepa-
rate victims, the case rested heavily on an identification by a
single witness. No other victim could identify her assailant. De-
spite that, neither party requested a jury charge on eyewitness
identification, and the trial court did not instruct the jury on the
subject. In light of the overall strength of the proofs presented,
that error was significant.

The cumulative effect of both errors denied defendant his right
to a fair trial. We are therefore required to vacate defendant’s
convictions and remand for a new trial.

1

A jury convicted defendant Alexis Sanchez-Medina of various
sexual-assault crimes that involved four separate victims: R.D.,
D.J., A.M., and A.B. We refer to the victims by their initials to
protect their identity. To recount the distinct criminal episodes, we
rely on the victims’ testimony at trial.

A.

On July 27, 2012, at around 8:30 p.m., R.D. was walking with
her three-year-old son in Englewood. A man on a bicycle ap-
proached R.D. from behind, tried to push her, and grabbed her
buttocks. He then rode up and down the street for several blocks,

456

threw kisses at her, and again tried to push her. He also made
comments in Spanish that R.D. did not follow.

R.D. was headed to her boyfriend’s house and, as she ap-
proached it, the man shoved her onto the lawn and kept moving on
his bicycle. R.D. later noticed that a pink dress she had been
carrying in a bag was missing. Days after, she saw the dress on a
pole where she had last seen her assailant.

R.D. contacted the police almost three weeks later after she
watched a news report “about a rapist” in the area. The next day,
she met with detectives from the Englewood Police Department
and gave a statement. She described her assailant as a Hispanic
male with a ponytail. She said he wore a royal blue hat and t-shirt,
short blue jeans, and sneakers at the time of the attack.

R.D. was the only witness to identify defendant. She selected his
picture out of an array of six photographs. At first, she told a
detective that she was 75 percent certain that the person in the
photo had attacked her, Soon after, she said she was 100 percent
sure. R.D. also identified defendant in court.

B.

D.J. was inside her basement apartment in Englewood on
August 9, 2012, at about 11:00 p.m., when she noticed the window
air conditioner unit move. She went outside to investigate but did
not see anyone. As D.J. walked back to her apartment and called a
friend, someone lifted her from behind, “slammed [her] into the
concrete,” and pinned her down. The attacker reached down her
pants and inside her underwear, touched her clitoris, and smelled
his hand. The man then got up and ran away.

D.J. admitted that she did not get a good look at the attacker,
who was behind her the whole time. She described him as a light-
skinned African American or Hispanic male. She added that he
had muscular arms, wore his curly black hair in a ponytail, and
was dressed in dark clothing and white sneakers.

457

C.

At about 10:00 p.m. on August 10, 2012, A.M. was walking to a
convenience store in Dumont. She saw a “shadow of a guy”
approach her from behind. The man grabbed both of her arms
from behind and gripped them tightly. She tried to resist, and he
eventually released her and ran away.

A.M. did not see her attacker’s face. She said he appeared to be
about 5’3” to 5’7" in height, had a medium build, and had short
dark hair. She noted that he wore a sweatshirt and cargo pants.

Dz

About twenty minutes after the prior incident, A.B. was assault-
ed in Dumont. After she took out the garbage and placed it in a
dumpster near her apartment, a man charged at A.B. from behind,
forced her to the ground, and put his fingers up her shorts and
inside her vagina. A.B. screamed and tried to push the attacker off
of her, and he ran away.

A.B, never saw the man’s face. As he ran, she saw the back of
his head and his silhouette. She did not deseribe him other than to
note that he wore dark shorts and a dark shirt.

E.

As part of an investigation into the attacks, the police detained
an individual on August 14, 2012, who partially fit the victims’
descriptions. Officers questioned the suspect, defendant Sanchez-
Medina, at the Dumont Police Department. The interrogation
began at about 11:40 p.m. and lasted until close to 4:00 am.

At the outset, defendant disclosed that he was born in Hondu-
ras. After he waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), he explained that he had
been in the United States since 2008 and provided additional
background information,

Defendant repeatedly denied any involvement in the attacks. He
also made certain admissions. Because no one referred to the
victims by name, some of defendant’s comments cannot be readily
matched to particular victims.

The early part of the interview appears to have focused on the
incidents in Dumont. Defendant said that he might have hurt a
‘woman when he knocked her to the ground while running. Be-
cause she screamed, he ran on. At another point, defendant said a
woman “got caught on the bicycle” and tripped. After repeated
denials, defendant admitted that he accidentally fell on a second
woman when she tripped, and he grabbed her waist. Defendant
did not admit touching the genitalia of either woman.

The interview later turned to the incidents in Englewood, and
defendant consistently denied any involvement. After extended
questioning, he admitted that he hit a woman with a bicycle while
he was drunk. The woman was with a child. Defendant said that
he wanted to touch her “butt” but instead passed her on the
bicycle and grabbed only a shopping bag. He said the woman was
carrying pants.

Defendant also admitted that he grabbed a woman by the
stomach, from behind, while she was talking on a phone. Toward
the end of the interview, a detective asked, “And when she was on
the ground, you tried to put your hand on her vagina?” Defendant
responded, “yes,” and added that he put his hand on her to touch
her and left when she screamed. He did not admit that he
penetrated her.

None of defendant’s statements appear to match A.M.’s account
of her attack.

A Bergen County grand jury returned an indictment against
defendant that charged him with three counts of second-degree
attempted sexual assault, against R.D., D.J., and A.M., contrary to
NJ.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:14-2(c)(1) (counts one, three, and five);
two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, against R.D.
and D.J., contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) (counts two and four);

459

and one count of second-degree sexual assault, against A.B.,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(e)(1) (count six).

F

All four victims testified at trial and relayed the above details.
Defendant testified as well. He denied that he had ever seen any
of the victims or done anything to them. His defense was misiden-
tification. Defendant also claimed he made false admissions to the
police,

The prosecution began its cross-examination of defendant with
this question: “You're from Honduras, right?” After defendant
said “yes,” the prosecution asked, “And you didn’t come into the
United States legally?”

Defense counsel objected, and the trial judge overruled the
objection. Both the court and the prosecution mistakenly recalled
that defendant had testified he had no prior involvement with the
police and no record.! The court explained that defendant could
not “have it both ways” and improperly allowed the line of inquiry
to test defendant’s credibility. Defendant then confirmed that he
had not “come into this country legally.”

The judge gave conflicting limiting instructions about that evi-
dence. After defendant’s testimony, the judge instructed the jury

as follows:
You heard testimony from the defendant and there was a reference to his illegal
status. You're not to use that as proof of guilt{ ] concerning the offenses listed in
the indictment. You can, however, use that information to test the credibility of the
defendant as to whether o not he follows the rules of society and therefore it could
make a difference concerning the issue of credibility, but not as proof of the
underlying offenses.

Later in the day, after closing arguments, the trial judge gave
final instructions to the jury and advised them on the issue again:
(Elarlier I gave you an instruction as to [the] immigration status of the defendant.

I want you to disregard the earlier instruction and completely focus on this
particular limiting instruction, all right, limiting instruction slash charge.

1 Our holding does not turn on this mistake.

460

You have heard evidence that the defendant is in this country illegally. You may
not use the mere fact that the defendant may be illegally in the country to conclude
that he is less likely to comply with our society’s rules and therefore committed the
‘crimes in the indictment.
The judge did not instruct the jury on how it might use the
testimony in the record about defendant’s immigration status.

In addition, although R.D.’s identification of defendant was
central to the case, neither party asked the judge to instruct the
jury on how to evaluate the evidence. The court did not instruct
the jury specifically on that point on its own.

The jury found defendant not guilty of attempted sexual assault
of R.D. (count one), but guilty of the lesser-included offense of
simple assault. The jury reached the same verdict as to the attack
against A.M. (count five). The jury found defendant guilty of
criminal sexual contact with R.D. (count two), attempted sexual
assault against D.J. (count three), criminal sexual contact with
D.J. (count four), and sexual assault against A.B. (count six).

The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of impris-
onment of 18.5 years, with 18.6 years of parole ineligibility.

G

In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Defendant raised nine issues, only two of which are relevant at
this time.

On appeal, the State acknowledged that the prosecution should
not have elicited testimony about defendant’s immigration status.
The panel found that defendant was not prejudiced by the testimo-
ny in light of the trial court’s limiting instructions.

The Appellate Division also found that the trial court should
have charged the jury on identification. The panel, though, con-
cluded that the omission did not constitute plain error in light of
the strong evidence that corroborated R.D.’s identification, specifi-
cally, defendant's statement.

461

The panel vacated defendant’s conviction on count three—
attempted sexual assault against D.J.—because the jury instrue-
tion on attempt was erroneous.

We granted defendant's petition for certification limited to the
following issues: the admissibility of defendant’s immigration sta-
tus for impeachment purposes; and the trial court’s failure to
instruct the jury on identification, 228 N.J. 57, 154 A.3d 688 (2016),

i.

This appeal presents an unusual situation in that both parties
now agree that it was error to question defendant about his
immigration status and error not to give the jury an instruction on
eyewitness identification. The parties and amicus have different
views on the effect of those errors.

Defendant contends that evidence of his immigration status was
not only inadmissible but also so prejudicial and inflammatory that
it deprived him of his right to a fair trial. He contends that the
eross-examination was improper under the rules of evidence and
undermined his credibility before the jury. He also submits that
the trial court’s limiting instructions failed to cure the error.

Defendant adds that an identification charge was required be-
cause identification was the key issue in the case. He maintains
the charge was also needed to enable the jury to evaluate the
reliability of the single eyewitness victim. In defendant’s view,
because the State’s case “rested on an unreliable identification and
an incomplete and inconsistent statement” to the police, the failure
to charge the jury on eyewitness identification constituted revers-
ible error.

In the alternative, defendant argues that the cumulative effect
of both errors warrants a new trial.

The State argues that, although defendant’s immigration status
should not have been admitted for impeachment purposes, defen-
dant was not denied a fair trial. According to the State, the
evidence against defendant was overwhelming, the prosecution did

462

not dwell on his immigration status, and the judge’s limiting
instructions cured the error.

The State also claims that the lack of an identification charge
was not plain error. The State points to “strong corroborating
evidence” linking defendant to the attacks and to defendant’s
statement. In addition, the State maintains that if the estimator
variables outlined in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 27 A.3d 872
(2011), apply to this case, they support the reliability of R.D.’s
identification.

We granted the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
(ACLU) leave to appear as amicus curiae. The organization ad-
dresses the immigration issue and reinforces defendant’s position.
The ACLU stresses that evidence of a defendant's federal immi-
gration status is rarely probative of a relevant substantive issue
and can “arous{e] public passion and prejudice against undocu-
mented immigrants.” The ACLU also contends that the jury
instruction in this case exacerbated the error. The group instead
highlights a recent model jury charge on the topic.

Ill.

Tl The State rightly concedes that it was improper to question
defendant about his immigration status. As a general rule, that
type of evidence should not be presented to a jury.

To be admissible at trial, evidence must be relevant—that is, it
must have “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of
consequence to the determination of the action.” N.J.R.E. 401.
Whether a defendant entered the country legally tells a jury
nothing about whether he committed an act of sexual assault. In
this case, it is simply not relevant to the offenses for which
defendant Sanchez-Medina was on trial.

Even if relevant, “evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of ... undue preju-
dice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury.” N.J.R.E. 408.
Both today and in late 2013 when this trial took place, evidence of

a defendant’s undocumented immigration status could appeal to
prejudice, inflame certain jurors, and distract them from their
proper role in the justice system: to evaluate relevant evidence
fairly and objectively.

In limited circumstances, proof of a person’s immigration status
can be admissible. If the prosecution, for example, promised a
witness favorable immigration treatment in exchange for truthful
testimony, a jury would be entitled to assess the witness’s credibil-
ity in light of that promise. Or if a defendant had lied about his
immigration status to obtain government benefits as part of a
scheme to defraud, his true status would be relevant to the crime
charged. Still, exceptions like those are rare. In most cases, the
immigration status of a witness or party is simply irrelevant, and a
jury should not learn about it.

Before attempting to introduce this type of evidence, parties
should raise the issue with the court outside of the jury’s presence,
under N.J.R.E. 104. If the evidence is admitted, the court should
give an appropriate limiting instruction. See Model Jury Charges

Criminal), “Credibility—Immigration Consequences of Testimo-
ny” (rev. June 6, 2016).

Other federal and state courts have reached the same conclusion
about the relevance of a witness’s immigration status. See, eg.,
Solis _v. SCA Restaurant Corp., 938 F.Supp.2d 380, 401 n.11
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that “immigration status was irrelevant to
issues in the case and not probative on the issue of the credibility
of the witnesses”); Velasquez v. Centrome, Inc., 233 Cal.App.4th
1191, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 168 (2015) (“(I]mmigration status alone
has no tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact material
to the issue of a party’s credibility.”); Ayala v. Lee, 215 Md.App.
457, 81 A.3d 584, 598 (2013) (“Immigration status alone does not
reflect upon an individual’s character and is thus not admissible
for impeachment purposes.”); see also Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d
76, 79 (4th Cir. 1989) (“An individual’s status as an alien, legal or
otherwise ... does not entitle the Board (of Immigration Appeals]
to brand him a liar.”),

Courts have also highlighted the prejudicial effect of the evi-
dence. In Serrano v. Underground Utilities Corp., for example, the
Appellate Division upheld a protective order that restricted discov-
ery relating to the plaintiffs’ immigration status. 407 N.J.Super.
253, 258, 970 A.2d 1054 (App. Div. 2009). As the panel observed,
courts “must be cognizant of the risks of undue prejudice if [the
parties’] illegal immigration status is disclosed to a jury at the
time of trial.... Their illegal status in this country is very likely
to trigger negative sentiments in the minds of some jurors.” Id, at
274, 970 A.2d 1054,

Other jurisdictions agree. See, e.g., Andrade v. Walgreens-
OptionCare, Inc., 784 F.Supp.2d 588, 585 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Many
courts have opined that references to a party's immigration status
expose that party to a substantial risk of unfair prejudice.”);
Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., 73 N.E.38d 663, 675 (Ind. 2017)
(recognizing that plaintiff's immigration status carries risk of
unfair prejudice); TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 280, 244
(Tex. 2010) (finding that “prejudicial potential” of party’s immigra-
tion status “substantially outweighed any probative value”); Salas
vy. HiTech Erectors, 168 Wash.2d 664, 230 P.3d 583, 587 (2010)
(finding low probative value of plaintiff's undocumented status,
with regard to lost future earnings, “is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice”); Gonzalez v. City of Franklin,
187 Wis.2d 109, 403 N.W.2d 747, 760 (1987) (noting “the obvious
prejudicial effect” of party’s undocumented status); see also San-
doval v. State, 264 Ga. 199, 442 S.E.2d 746, 747 (1994) (noting that
“an appeal to ... prejudice is improper in a court of justice”).

Hl A defendant’s immigration status is likewise not admissible
under other rules of evidence. It is not proof of character or
reputation that can be admitted under Rules 404 or 608.? Proof of
status alone is also not evidence of a prior criminal conviction. See

2 Subject to a few exceptions, Rule 404(a) bars the admission of character
evidence to prove that a person “acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion.” Rule 608 is one of the exceptions to the rule. NJ.R.E. 404(a)(3).

465

N.J.R.E, 609. Nor is a person’s immigration status admissible as a
prior bad act under Rule 404(b). To be admissible, such evidence
must be “relevant to a material issue,” and its probative value
“must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.” State v.
Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 388, 605 A.2d 230 (1992) (factors one and
four of multi-factor test). Proof of a defendant’s immigration
status fails on both counts.

I In this case, the error was significant. Although counsel did
not dwell on defendant’s undocumented status, the evidence was
hard to miss. The prosecution's first questions on cross-examina-
tion focused on defendant’s status and set the tone for what
followed. To compound the error, the trial court issued conflicting
instructions about whether jurors could consider the evidence to
determine whether defendant “follows the rules of society.” The
final instruction correctly told the jury not to consider defendant’s
immigration status “to conclude that he is less likely to comply
with our society’s rules and therefore committed the crimes in the
indictment.” But the jury was not told that it could not rely on the
evidence to assess defendant’s credibility.

The better course would have been to strike the evidence
altogether and tell the jury not to consider it at all. Instead, the
evidence remained part of the trial record. Without a clear instruc-
tion to disregard the evidence entirely, we cannot be certain
whether and how the jury might have relied upon it during
deliberations.

Iv.

I We turn now to the failure to instruct the jury on identifi-
cation evidence, which the State appropriately recognizes was an

Rule 608(a) allows character evidence in the form of reputation or opinion
testimony only as it relates to the witness's character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness. Specific instances of conduct are generally not admissible to prove a
character trait. N.J.R.E. 608(a). There are two exceptions to that rule: proof that
a “witness made a prior false accusation against any person of a crime similar to
the crime with which defendant is charged,” N.J.R.E, 608(b); and proof of a
criminal conviction, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 609. Neither exception applies here.

error. R.D.’s identification of defendant was central to this case.
She was the sole witness to identify defendant, and his defense at
trial was misidentification. When eyewitness identification is a
“key issue,” the trial court must instruct the jury how to assess
the evidence—even if defendant does not request the charge.
State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 325, 865 A.2d 660 (2005).

A.

Hl This Court has addressed the topic of eyewitness identifica-
tion on a number of occasions in recent years. In 1999, in State v.
Cromedy, the Court considered social science studies that revealed
that identifications are less reliable when a witness and a perpe-
trator are of different races. 158 N.J. 112, 121, 727 A2d 457
(1999). The Court concluded that jury instructions on the reliabili-
ty of cross-racial identifications are required in certain cases. Id.
at 182, 727 A.2d 457. Years later, in State v. Romero, the Court
recognized that “{jJurors likely will believe eyewitness testimony
‘when it is offered with a high level of confidence, even though the
accuracy of an eyewitness and the confidence of that witness may
not be related to one another at all.’” 191 N.J. 59, 75, 922 A.2d 693
(2007) (quoting Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352, 101 S.Ct.
654, 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Based on
additional social science evidence, the Court ordered that juries be
instructed on that point when appropriate. Ibid.

In 2011, the Court examined expert testimony and scientific
studies about a number of variables that affect human memory.
Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 27 A.3d 872. Based on that body of
evidence, the Court directed that new jury instructions be devel-
oped. Id. at 298-99, 27 A.3d 872. The following year, the Court
approved new model jury charges on eyewitness identification,
which addressed various factors like memory decay, stress, and
the duration of the crime. Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Identi-
fication: In-Court and Out-Of-Court Identifications” (rev. July 9,
2012). The charges went into effect on September 4, 2012—more
than a year before the trial in this case began.

467

I Even though the alleged assaults here took place before
the effective date of the new model charge, the court should have
used the revised charge at trial in 2013. In much the same way,
new rules of evidence that do not lower the level of proof needed
to convict a defendant generally apply at trial, even if they are
adopted after the commission of a crime but before trial. See State
v. Rose, 425 N.J.Super. 463, 468-70, 42 A.8d 172 (App. Div. 2012)
(discussing Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 518, 522, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146
L.Ed.2d 577 (2000).

The jury in this case should have been instructed about some of
the factors discussed in Henderson. R.D. initially made an identifi-
cation several weeks after the offense. At first, she said she was 75
percent certain; soon after, she stated that she was 100 percent
sure. In her direct examination at trial, R.D. told the jury that she
was “[a] hundred percent sure.” At a charge conference, the
parties and the court should have considered whether charges on
memory decay, confidence, stress, duration, lighting, and other
factors were warranted. Henderson, 208 N.J. at 261-62, 264, 267,
296-99, 27 A.3d 872.

The jury, however, did not hear any charge on identification.
Neither the defendant nor the public are well-served when that
happens in a case like this. To be sure, the judge should have
given the charge on his own because R.D.’s identification was a
“key issue.” Cotto, 182 N.J. at 825, 865 A.2d 660. But counsel for
the State and the defense are very much a part of the trial process
as well. It is imperative that both sides carefully evaluate and
propose relevant jury instructions before and during trial, rather
than after a verdict. That practice helps protect defendants
against unfair trials, avoids putting witnesses through the ordeal
of testifying twice, and respects the jury’s time.

The Judiciary has compiled model criminal jury charges that
are available online. https:/Avww,judiciary.state.nj.us/attorneys/
criminalcharges.html. We invite the State and the Public Defender

to consider how best to use those resources in a systematic way in
advance of trial.?

B.

HM The missing instruction on identification is reviewed for
plain error. State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 455, 163 A.3d 302 (2017);
Cotto, 182 N.J. at 326, 865 A.2d 660. The error must be evaluated
“in light of the overall strength of the State’s case.” State v.
Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 388, 45 A.3d 310 (2012) (quoting State v.
Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 90, 999 A.2d 450 (2010) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Defendant’s convictions rest largely on the testimony of four
victims, only one of whom could identify him. No forensic evidence
linked defendant to the crimes charged, and no other witnesses
observed or could corroborate any of the incidents.

The witnesses’ descriptions of their assailants varied. Two de-
scribed a man with a ponytail, one said he had short hair, and the
fourth did not describe his features. Only two victims described
the attacker's race: one said he was a Hispanic male, and the
other described a light-skinned African American or Hispanic
male. For the Dumont attacks, which were twenty minutes apart,
the first victim said her assailant wore a sweatshirt and cargo
pants, and the second described a dark shirt and dark shorts,

In addition, although the assaults shared some similarities, they
differed from one another in key ways. R.D. testified that a man
grabbed her buttocks from behind. D.J. and A.B, each explained
how a man reached into her pants and touched her genitalia. And
A.M. recounted how a man grabbed her arms tightly behind her.
Only one incident involved a bicycle. The assaults were not

3 The trial court ably instructed the jury that the State had the burden to prove
each element of the offenses charged and that defendant was the actor who
committed the crimes. As a result, we need not address at length defendant's
argument, based on Cotto, 182 N.J. at 326, 865 A.2d 660, that that aspect of the
charge was insufficient.

469

“signature” crimes that, on their own, suggest the same person
carried out each attack. See Cofield, 127 N.J. at 336, 605 A.2d 230.
One of the victims, in fact, did not describe a sexual assault.

Defendant’s statement to the police, which he recanted at trial,
offers some corroboration. Yet he also denied the core of the
aecusations during the interview. In addition, as the State con-
ceded at oral argument, the statement contains no details about
the assault on A.M. In fact, there was no evidence introduced at
trial of an attempted sexual assault against A.M. The jury proper-
ly acquitted defendant on that charge.

Looking at all of the proofs together, the evidence against
defendant was not overwhelming, as the State suggests.

Vv.

II Even if an individual error does not require reversal, the
cumulative effect of a series of errors can cast doubt on a verdict
and call for a new trial. State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 478, 940
A.2d 269 (2008). For that reason, we need not decide if either
error in isolation warrants reversal.

Here, the jury received no guidance about how to assess the
single identification of defendant—a critical issue at trial that
defendant disputed. And the jurors were not told to ignore provoc-
ative evidence about defendant’s immigration status. Together,
those errors undermined defendant's right to a fair trial. They
raise serious questions about whether the outcome was just,
particularly in light of the strength of the evidence presented. See
R. 2:10-2. We therefore have no choice other than to vacate
defendant's convictions.

VI.

For the reasons set forth above, we vacate defendant’s convic-
tions and remand the case to the Law Division for a new trial.

470

JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion.

176 A.3d 798

IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE N. PAPPAS, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 239711967)

D-51 September Term 2017
080349

January 19, 2018

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court
pursuant to Rule 1:20-15(k) a recommendation that GEORGE N.
PAPPAS, of HOBOKEN, who was admitted to the bar of this
State in 1967, be suspended from the practice of law and com-
pelled to pay a monetary sanction to the Disciplinary Oversight
Committee for failure to comply with the determination of the
District VI Fee Arbitration Committee in Docket No. VI-2017-
OO1I1F, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that GEORGE N. PAPPAS be temporarily
suspended from the practice of law, effective February 20, 2018,
and until respondent complies with the determination of the
District VI Fee Arbitration Committee in Docket No. VI-2017-
OO1IF, pays a sanction of $500 by money order to the Disciplin-
ary Oversight Committee, and until the further Order of the
Court; provided, however, this Order shall be vacated automati-
eally if the Disciplinary Review Board reports to the Court that.
prior to the effective date of the suspension, respondent has
satisfied all obligations under this Order; and it is further

471

ORDERED that if respondent seeks to be heard on this matter,
he shall file with the Clerk of the Court within ten days of the file
date of this Order a written request for the issuance of an Order
to Show Cause; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from
practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he
comply with Rule 1:20-20.

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this

State.

176 A.3d 799
IN THE MATTER OF RONALD H. CARLIN, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 049311998)
D-49 September Term 2017
080348

January 19, 2018

ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court
pursuant to Rule 1:20-15(k) a recommendation that RONALD H.
CARLIN of FREEHOLD, who was admitted to the bar of this
State in 1999, be suspended from the practice of law and com-
pelled to pay a monetary sanction to the Disciplinary Oversight
Committee for failure to comply with the determination of the
District IX Fee Arbitration Committee in Docket No. IX-2016-
0454F, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that RONALD H. CARLIN be temporarily
suspended from the practice of law, effective February 20, 2018,
and until respondent complies with the determination of the

District District IX Fee Arbitration Committee in Docket No. IX-
2016-0454F, pays a sanction of $500.00 to the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee, and until the further Order of the Court; provid-
ed, however, this Order shall be vacated automatically if the
Disciplinary Review Board reports to the Court that prior to the
effective date of the suspension, respondent has satisfied all
obligations under this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that if respondent seeks to be heard on this matter,
he shall file with the Clerk of the Court within ten days of the file
date of this Order a written request for the issuance of an Order
to Show Cause; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from
practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he
comply with Rule 1:20-20; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State.

176 A.3d 799
IN THE MATTER OF RONALD H. CARLIN, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 049311998)
D-48 September Term 2017
080347

January 19, 2018
ORDER

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court
pursuant to Rule 1:20-15(k) a recommendation that RONALD H.
CARLIN of FREEHOLD, who was admitted to the bar of this
State in 1999, be suspended from the practice of law and com-

BT

473

pelled to pay a monetary sanction to the Disciplinary Oversight
Committee for failure to comply with the determination of the
District IX Fee Arbitration Committee in Docket No. IX-2016-
0051F, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that RONALD H. CARLIN be temporarily
suspended from the practice of law, effective February 20, 2018,
and until respondent complies with the determination of the
District IX Fee Arbitration Committee in Docket No, [X-2016-
0051F, pays a sanction of $500 to the Disciplinary Oversight
Committee, and until the further Order of the Court; provided,
however, this Order shall be vacated automatically if the Disciplin-
ary Review Board reports to the Court that prior to the effective
date of the suspension, respondent has satisfied all obligations
under this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that if respondent seeks to be heard on this matter,
he shall file with the Clerk of the Court within ten days of the file
date of this Order a written request for the issuance of an Order
to Show Cause; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from
practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he
comply with Rule 1:20-20.

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this

State.

4

74

176 A.3d 800
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. KARLTON L, BAILEY, A/K/A CARLTON L.
BAILEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
A-96 September Term 2015
077141

Argued September 12, 2017—Decided January 22, 2018

LL

19
i
+

Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued
the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Daniel V. Gautieri, of counsel and on the briefs).

Joie Piderit, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respon-
dent (Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney;
Joie Piderit, of counsel and on the briefs).

Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for amicus curiae Office of Attorney General (Christopher S.
Porrino, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; and Carol M.
Henderson, of counsel and on the brief).

JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Court considers the propriety of defendant’s conviction
under the Certain Persons Not to Have Weapons Statute, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-7, when the redacted evidence prevented the jury from
confirming that defendant’s prior conviction was indeed an enu-
merated offense under the statute.

477

The “certain persons” subject to prosecution under N.J.S.A.
2C:39-7 are those who previously have been convicted of a particu-
lar offense identified within that statute. Proof of a prior convic-
tion for an enumerated offense is a necessary predicate to prove a
certain persons charge. In the majority of cases, that evidence is
proffered through stipulation. When a defendant declines to stipu-
late to a predicate offense, the State is put to its proofs. The trial
court’s role in such cases is to take steps to “sanitize” the State’s
evidence to avoid jury prejudice while the State attempts to prove
the elements of the certain persons statute to that defendant.

Here, we deal with a trial in which the defendant, Karlton
Bailey, declined to stipulate. The trial court duly sanitized the
State’s evidence of his previous convictions. The court did so to
such an extent that the jury heard only the degree of the offense
and date of the judgment but nothing else. In other words, the
jury did not learn how the offense related to any of the predicates
listed in the certain persons statute. The court instructed the jury
in keeping with the companion model charge. The jury convicted
defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed but observed the
“troublesome” nature of the sanitization requirements.

The heart of the concern is that the prescribed sanitization and
model jury charge infringe a defendant’s constitutional right to be
tried by a jury on all necessary elements of each charged offense
because over-sanitization renders the proof insufficient to demon-
strate that the defendant previously violated a predicate offense
enumerated within the certain persons statute.

For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand the judg-
ment of the Appellate Division. Any future sanitized version of
defendant’s prior record must have sufficient proof that defendant
previously has been convicted of one of the “certain persons”
predicates. We hold, further, that the model jury charge on this
issue must be revised.

Il

We derive the following facts from the pre-trial motion hearings
and the trial record.

418

On July 24, 2011, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Carlos Guerrero
and Alex Mejia were walking in New Brunswick after a night of
drinking. A video surveillance camera captured defendant ap-
proaching Guerrero from behind and putting his hand in Guerre-
ro’s back pocket. Guerrero’s level of intoxication prevented him
from reacting to the encounter and from identifying the assailant.
Mejia, however, responded to the situation by running across the
street to confront defendant. The conflict quickly turned violent.
Upon seeing defendant draw a gun, Mejia held his hands up in the
air and backed away. Defendant did not relent. Instead, he
followed Mejia into the street, struck him in the face, searched his
pockets, and fled the scene.

Myrna Ayala approached defendant just as he punched Mejia in
the face. Defendant fled; Ayala called 911. When New Brunswick
Police Officers Pedro Rodrigues and Joseph Nieves responded,
they found Mejia on the curb, bleeding from the face. At the
hospital, doctors treated Mejia for a nasal bone fracture, a broken
nose, and a laceration. The officers uncovered surveillance footage
that captured the encounters, including defendant wielding a gun.
The officers tracked defendant to a house approximately two
blocks from the crime scene.

On October 27, 2011, a Middlesex County Grand Jury returned
an indictment (“Indictment 1650”) against defendant, charging him
with second-degree possession of a firearm by certain persons not
to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b), A second indictment
(“Indictment 1817”), issued on September 5, 2012, charged defen-
dant with first-degree robbery of Carlos Guerrero, N.J.S.A.
2C:15-1; first-degree robbery of Alex Mejia, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1;
third-degree aggravated assault of Alex Mejia, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-
1(b)(2); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A, 2C:39-4(a).

In February 2013, a jury found defendant guilty on all counts of
Indictment 1817. A separate jury trial on the certain persons
indictment immediately followed, At that trial, defendant did not

479

stipulate to the predicate convictions that prohibited him from
possessing a firearm. The parties agreed that evidence of defen-
dant’s prior convictions would be sanitized, that is, “redacted
except for the date and the degree of the offense.” The trial court
properly advised the jury that they “must disregard [their] prior
verdict, and consider anew the evidence previously admitted on
possession of a weapon.”

The State produced testimony from one witness, Investigator
David Carmen, who identified two separate judgments of convie-
tion. The predicate offenses were a 1994 conviction for third-
degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with
the intent to distribute and a 2006 conviction for third-degree
aggravated assault. The trial court, relying on State v. Brown, 180
N.J. 572, 585, 858 A.2d 260 (2004), and footnote five of the model
jury charge for certain persons offenses, determined that the
judgments of conviction needed to be redacted so as to include
only the date and degree of each offense. As a result, Investigator
Carmen simply noted the dates and degrees of defendant’s predi-
cate offenses. The State marked the redacted judgments of convic-
tion for identification, but they were not admitted into evidence.

The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the certain
persons offense. The judge explained that to convict defendant,
the jury must find that defendant possessed a firearm and that
“defendant is the person who ... previously has been convicted of
third-degree crimes.” The trial court further advised the jury that
it could use the evidence of defendant's prior crimes only for the
limited purpose of establishing the prior-conviction element of the
certain persons offense, not to decide that defendant has a propen-
sity to commit crime. The jury convicted defendant of the certain
persons charge.

The trial court sentenced defendant on Indictment 1817 to an
aggregate term of incarceration of thirteen years, subject to
eighty-five percent parole ineligibility in accordance with the No
Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a). The trial court addition-
ally sentenced defendant on Indictment 1650 to a consecutive

seven-year term of incarceration, with a five-year period of parole
ineligibility on the certain persons offense.

Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in an
unpublished opinion. The panel found the procedure used and the
trial court’s charge, based upon the model jury charge, disquiet-
ing. Defendant did not stipulate to the existence of a predicate
offense, and “no proof of any predicate crime was admitted before
the jury.” The panel questioned the continuing use of the model
charge, but nonetheless determined that any error was invited.
The panel concluded that no injustice occurred as the State was
ready and able to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior convic-
tions but redacted them on defense counsel’s request.

On August 4, 2016, we granted defendant's petition for certifica-
tion, 227 NJ. 144, 149 A.38d 290 (2016). We also granted the
Attorney General of New Jersey leave to appear as amicus curiae.

Il.

A.

Defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had been previously convicted of an
enumerated predicate offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). Defen-
dant contends that the State’s proofs showed only that he had
been convicted of “third-degree offenses” but not whether those
offenses were specifically enumerated in the certain persons stat-
ute. Defendant emphasizes that constitutional principles should
encourage the Court to revisit the portion of Brown requiring
sanitization of a non-stipulating defendant’s prior conviction in a
certain persons case.

In regard to his certain persons challenge, defendant contends
that certain language in Brown, 180 N.J. at 585, 853 A.2d 260—“If
the defendant does not stipulate, then the trial court should
sanitize the offense or offenses and limit the evidence to the date
of the judgment”—has effectively removed the State’s burden of
proving that a defendant has been convicted of an enumerated

offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b), Defendant argues that the
Brown standard, which was incorporated into the model jury
charge, effectively denied him the right to a fair trial because an
essential element of the offense charged was presented as conclud-
ed or settled. (citing State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 218, 482 A.2d
912 (1981)). According to defendant, the jury here was prevented
from finding that he had been convicted of a predicate offense
because the sanitization of his convictions treated the element as
proven. Defendant asserts that the practice presently employed is
constitutionally invalid because it undermines the factfinder’s re-
sponsibility at trial to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable
doubt. (citing Cty. Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S, 140, 156,
99 S.Ct. 2218, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979).

Defendant contends that the Appellate Division compounded the
error in applying the invited error standard to his certain persons
challenge. His premise is that he did not invite the error because
the judge, aware of the sanitization requirement, was obligated to
sanitize no matter the position of defense counsel on the issue. As
a fallback position, defendant maintains that even if the error was
invited, the invited error standard should not apply because
appellate courts may consider invited errors on appeal if the error
cut mortally into the defendant's substantive rights. (citing State
vy. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345-46, 526 A.2d 1046 (1987).

B.

The State argues that defendant’s failure to object to the
sanitization of the prior-convictions evidence effectively conceded
to the jury that the prior convictions were for predicate crimes
under the certain persons statute. The State concludes that any
error in sanitizing the nature of defendant's prior convictions was
invited by defense counsel's failure to object to the charge.

The State nevertheless recommends an adjustment to the saniti-
zation requirement, suggesting that trial courts sanitize the judg-
ment of conviction to shield the trier of fact from the nature of the
crime but reveal the statutory citation, degree, and date of the

482

crime. The State maintains that any error was the result of an
excess of caution to protect defendant, which led to an “over-
sanitization” of defendant’s prior convictions.

The State urges the Court to apply that rule prospectively. The
State represents that countless certain persons convictions have
been tried using the current model jury charge and that retroac-
tive application of a new rule of law would serve no purpose other
than to disrupt thousands of sound convictions.

Cc.

The Attorney General urges this Court to modify Brown’s
holding to provide that a prior conviction should not be sanitized
in a certain persons prosecution unless a defendant stipulates that
it is for a predicate offense. Instead, the Attorney General propos-
es that if a defendant chooses not to stipulate, the State is entitled
to present the nature of the prior conviction to establish that the
defendant was previously convicted of an enumerated predicate
offense.

The Attorney General argues that its approach is in line with
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 191-92, 117 S.Ct. 644, 186 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997),
which held that when a defendant is charged with possession of a
weapon by a felon, and he or she offers to stipulate the fact of the
qualifying conviction, it is an abuse of discretion to spurn the
defendant’s stipulation offer and admit the full record of the
judgment of conviction. The Attorney General notes that Old Chief
permits the State to offer a redacted judgment of conviction when
a defendant does not stipulate to the predicate offense, provided
the defendant consents to the redacted conviction and agrees to a
jury instruction that makes “clear that the redacted judgment was
enough to satisfy the status element remaining in the case.”
(quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191 n.10, 117 S.Ct. 644), The
Attorney General argues that it is the defendant, then, who
dictates the way a prior predicate offense is proven in a certain
persons trial.

483

Moreover, the Attorney General contends that the sanitization
of defendant's prior conviction in this case did not lead to the
State’s failure to meet its burden of proof. The Attorney General
submits that defendant implicitly acknowledged that the convic-
tions were predicate offenses under the certain persons statute by
insisting that the records be redacted and by failing to object to
testimony about the convictions. In that regard, the Attorney
General argues that the Appellate Division correctly applied the
invited error doctrine as “any error was induced by defendant
counsel and was not grounds for reversal.”

UL

A.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees that no one will be deprived of liberty “without due process
of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
that “[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” U.S.
Const, amend. VI. Those cherished, fundamental rights have been
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; State v. Koedatich, 112 NJ.
225, 267, 548 A.2d 939 (1988).

The United States Supreme Court has held that “these provi-
sions require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determina-
tion that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 115 S.Ct, 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995)
(emphasis added) (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-
78, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). This Court has
likewise stressed that “in a criminal prosecution in which the
accused has a constitutional right to a trial by jury, each element
of the crime must be decided by the jury and none of those
elements may be withheld from the jury and decided by the judge

as a matter of law.” State v. Anderson, 127 N.J. 191, 208-09, 608
A.2d 928 (1992).
NJ.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) provides that

{a] person having been convicted in this State or elsewhere of the crime of

aggravated assault, arson, burglary, eseape, extortion, homicide, kidnapping, rob-

bery, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, bias intimidation in violation of

(N.LS.A.] 2C:16-1, endangering the welfare of a child pursuant to [N.J.S.A]

2C:24-4, stalking pursuant to [L, 1992, ¢, 209 (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10)] or a crime

involving domestic violence as defined in section 3 of [L. 1991, ¢. 261 (NWI.S.A.
2C:25-19)], ... or a person having been convicted of a crime pursuant to the
provisions of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:35-8 through [N.J.8.A.] 2C:35-6, inclusive; section 1 of

[L, 1987, ¢. 101 (N.LS.A. 2C:95-7)}; [NJS.A.] 2C:35-11; [NJ.S.A.] 20:39-3;

(N.JS,A.] 2C:39-4; or [N.J.S.A.] 2C:89-9 who purchases, owns, possesses or

controls a firearm is guilty of a crime of the second degree and upon conviction

thereof, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court.

Because the offense requires proof of a specific prior conviction,
a certain persons charge automatically entails a risk of prejudice
to a defendant in a jury trial. Our rules of evidence recognize,
cireumscribe, and regulate the introduction of prior-offense evi-
dence in a jury trial to forestall the potential for juries to find guilt
on the impermissible basis of perceived criminal propensity rather
than on the facts of the case alone. See N.J.R.E. 403(a), 404(b),
608(b). This Court has, in several decisions, set out the procedural
path that certain persons trials must follow to avoid the creation of
undue prejudice in establishing the essential element of a predi-
cate conviction.

In State v. Ragland, this Court held that when a defendant is
charged with an additional crime beyond the certain persons
offense, the trial must be bifurcated. 105 N.J. 189, 193, 519 A.2d
1861 (1986). A bifurcated proceeding is necessary “since proof that
defendant was a convicted felon (required in the trial of the
[certain persons] charge) clearly tends to prejudice the jury in
considering the [additional charge].” Ibid. For efficiency, the same
jury may try both charges in succession and may decide the
certain persons charge based on the same evidence presented as
part of the State’s proofs for the unlawful possession charge. Id. at
195-96, 519 A.2d 1361. Because efficiency must be subsumed to
due process, we mandated that a strong jury instruction be given

to ensure that the jury “consider anew the evidence previously
admitted but to disregard completely its prior verdict.” Id, at 195,
519 A.2d 1361. Critically, we explained that
the defendant is entitled to that instruction for on the “new” trial, the defendant is
entitled to the presumption of innocence and, as a consequence of that, to an
instruetion that each and every material fact that makes up the crime, including
obviously the fact of possession, must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable
doubt.

(Ibid)

The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in Old
Chief, 519 U.S. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 644. Old Chief involved a
defendant charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and
possession of a firearm by someone with a prior felony conviction,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Id. at 174-75, 117 S.Ct. 644,
To prevent his prior conviction from being admitted at trial, the
defendant offered “to solve the problem ... by stipulating, agree-
ing and requesting the Court to instruct the jury that he has been
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year.” Id. at 175, 117 S.Ct. 644. The trial court rejected the
defendant’s offer and allowed the government to admit the judg-
ment order containing the defendant’s prior conviction. Id. at 177,
117 S.Ct. 644, A jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.
Ibid. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. Ibid.

The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
trial court should have accepted the defendant’s offer to stipulate.
See id, at 190-92, 117 S.Ct. 644. The Court acknowledged that
“there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of
the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the
defendant ... [that] will vary from case to case.” Id. at 185, 117
S.Ct. 644. The Court noted that the defendant’s offer to stipulate
to the predicate offense would eliminate some of that prejudice
and would “have been not merely relevant but seemingly conclu-
sive evidence of the element.” Id. at 186, 117 S.Ct. 644.

Despite the general principle that “the prosecution is entitled to
prove its case free from any defendant’s option to stipulate the
evidence away,” id. at 189, 117 S.Ct. 644, the Court determined

that the State’s right to present its case as it sees fit did not apply
because that right has “virtually no application when the point at
issue is a defendant’s legal status, dependent on some judgment
rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later
criminal behavior charged against him,” id, at 190, 117 S.Ct. 644,
The Court then held that when a defendant stipulates to a
predicate conviction,

{tlhe most the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the defendant

falls within the class of crimes that Congress thought should bar a convict from

possessing a gun, and this point may be made readily in a defendant's admission
and underscored in the court's jury instructions.

{Id. at 190-91, 117 8.Ct. 644.)

In Brown, this Court declined to extend Ragland to cases in
which the State proceeds only on a certain persons offense. 180
NJ. at 582, 853 A.2d 260. Brown involved a defendant charged
with unlawful possession of a weapon and possession of a weapon
by certain persons not to have a weapon. Id, at 575, 853 A.2d 260.
The trial on the indictment was to be bifurcated, as required
under Ragland, but the State moved to dismiss the unlawful
possession charge after jury selection. Ibid. A single trial was then
held on the certain persons charge and the jury entered a guilty
verdict. Id. at 576, 853 A.2d 260.

On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction be-
cause “when the ‘State elects ... to proceed solely on [a] posses-
sion by a convicted felon charge, the issue of ‘possession’ must be
tried first, absent any knowledge by the trier of fact of the
defendant’s prior conviction.’” Ibid, (alterations in original) (quot-
ing State v. Brown, 362 N.J. Super. 62, 64, 826 A.2d 813 (App. Div.
2003).

I We reversed, deciding that a bifurcated proceeding was not
required, and instead held “that the elements of an offense should
be tried in a unitary trial in which prejudice is minimized by
appropriate curative jury instructions.” Id, at 582, 853 A.2d 260.
The State does not have to first prove the element of possession in
one proceeding and then prove the element of the defendant's
conviction of a predicate offense in a separate proceeding; it may

487

prove both in a single proceeding. Mindful of the prejudice that
introduetion of a defendant’s criminal convictions may create, this
Court required a strong limiting instruction and sanitization of the
predicate-offense evidence. Id, at 583-84, 853 A.2d 260,

Then, in dicta, this Court added that “if [a] defendant stipulates
to the offense, the jury need be instructed only that defendant was
convicted of a predicate offense. If the defendant does not stipu-
late, then the trial court should sanitize the offense or offenses and
limit the evidence to the date of the judgment.” Id. at 585, 853
A.2d 260,

In the wake of Brown, the model jury charge for Certain
Persons Not to Have a Weapon was modified to reflect the Court’s
statement about sanitization. Specifically, the model charge in-
structs that:

In order for you to find defendant guilty, the State must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. Exhibit is a firearm [or that there was a firearm].
2, Defendant purchased, owned, possessed, or controlled the firearm [on the date
alleged in the indictment].
3. Defendant is a person who previously has been convicted of {a crime of the
degree] OR [a predicate offense).

{Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Certain Persons Not to Have Any Firearms
(N.GS.A, 2C:39-7(b)(1))” 1-2 (rev. June 13, 2005).]

In explaining what crimes are set forth as predicate offenses in
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b), the model jury charge further explains how
to sanitize the record of a defendant’s predicate offense. Specifical-
ly, the charge notes:

Unless the defendant stipulates, the prior crimes should be sanitized. Thus, the

trial court should refer to them as crime(s) of the appropriate degree. For example,

if the offense were aggravated sexual assault, the court would indicate that
defendant previously was convieted of a erime of the first degree. Nothing prevents

a defendant, however, from choosing to inform the jury of the name of the prior

crime of which he/she was convicted.

{Id. at 1 n.4 (citations omitted).)

The portion of the model jury charge pertaining to a defendant
who does not stipulate to a predicate offense instructs that “(t]he
third element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is

that defendant is a person who previously has been convicted of
the crime(s) of the degree.” Id. at 4.

B.

We now consider the adequacy of that model charge and the
appropriate level of sanitization when a defendant does not stipu-
late to a predicate conviction.

If a defendant chooses to stipulate, evidence of the predicate
offense is extremely limited: “[t]he most the jury needs to know is
that the conviction admitted by the defendant falls within the class
of crimes that ... bar a convict from possessing a gun{.J” Old
Chief, 519 U.S. at 190-91, 117 S.Ct. 644. A defendant who stipu-
lates can therefore prevent the State from presenting evidence of
the name and nature of the offense. Provided that the stipulation
is a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, placed on the record
in defendant’s presence, the prosecution is limited to announcing
to the jury that the defendant has committed an offense that
satisfies the statutory predicate-offense element.

The dicta in Brown, as incorporated into the model jury charge
for certain persons offenses, essentially requires that the predi-
cate-conviction evidence be sanitized to such degree that the
evidence be no more informative than a stipulation. Such over-
sanitization is problematic.

TI The over-sanitization called for in the model charge injects
a constitutional defect into any trial on a certain persons offense
where a defendant declines to stipulate. The elements of the
certain persons offense are straightforward: conviction of a predi-
cate offense and possession of a firearm. See N.J.S.A. 2C:39~
7(b)(1). In a certain persons trial, the State must prove that the
defendant was convicted of an enumerated predicate offense and
later possessed a firearm. Each element must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. By preventing the State from providing the jury
with evidence that the prior conviction was for a predicate of-
fense—as opposed to another offense that does not lead to a

489

weapons bar—the model charge actually prevents a jury from
finding beyond a reasonable doubt a required element of the
certain persons offense—a clear constitutional infirmity.

I Returning to the circumstances before us, defendant high-
lights that the State’s proofs at trial consisted of testimony only
that defendant was convicted of third-degree offenses. Defendant
adds that when the trial court instructed the jury as to the
elements of the certain persons charge, the court told the jury
that it had to find defendant had been convicted of a third-degree
offense, not an enumerated offense in the statute. The jury thus
found defendant guilty on the strength of his prior conviction of a
third-degree offense.

Many third-degree offenses are not among the predicate of-
fenses for a certain persons conviction. An essential element of the
certain persons offense—prior conviction of an enumerated predi-
cate offense—could not be and was not found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.

All parties involved—defendant, defense counsel, the prosecu-
tor, and the trial court—knew that the predicate conviction on
which the State sought to rely was for a crime sufficient to trigger
criminal liability under the certain persons statute. The jury did
not. For that reason, the jury could not have made a finding on
that issue.

I A major strand of the right to a jury trial resides in the
“nondelegable and nonremovable responsibility of the jury to
decide the facts.” Ingenito, 87 N.J. at 211, 482 A.2d 912; see also
United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1003 (Sth Cir. 1977)
(quoting United States v. Casale Car Leasing, Inc., 385 F.2d 707,
712 (2d Cir. 1967) (“When the jury is not given an opportunity to
decide a relevant factual question, it is not sufficient ‘to urge that
the record contains evidence that would support a finding of guilt
even under a correct view of the Jaw.’”)). In this case, the jury
could not satisfy that obligation.

Because the State never proved an essential element of the
certain persons charge to the jury, we find that defendant’s
conviction cannot stand.

Cc.

Hsin v0 holding, we decline to apply the doctrine of invited
error on which the appellate panel relied. “Under that settled
principle of law, trial errors that ‘were induced, encouraged or
acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are
not a basis for reversal on appeal. ...’” State v. A.R., 213 NJ.
542, 561, 65 A.3d 818 (2013) (quoting Corsaro, 107 N.J. at 345, 526
A2d 1046 (alteration in original)). The invited error “doctrine
acknowledges the common-sense notion that a ‘disappointed liti-
gant’ cannot argue on appeal that a prior ruling was erroneous
‘when that party urged the lower court to adopt the proposition
now alleged to be error’” Id, at 561, 65 A3d 818 (quoting
Corsaro, 107 N.J. at 340, 526 A.2d 1046). “The doctrine prevents
litigants from ‘playing fast and loose’ with, or otherwise manipulat-
ing, the judicial process.” State v, Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 359, 840
A.2d 242 (2004) (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 632, 667
A.2d 684 (1995)).

Here, defendant asked the trial court to comply with the model
jury charge based on this Court’s dicta in Brown. This is not the
sort of gamesmanship-driven scenario to which the invited error
doctrine is traditionally applied. We do not apply it here because
the error cut mortally into defendant’s due process right to have
the jury decide each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

D.

Hi In sun, we hold that a certain persons conviction cannot
stand without proof that a defendant has been previously convict-
ed of an offense specifically enumerated in the certain persons
statute. When a defendant refuses to stipulate to a predicate
offense under the certain persons statute, the State shall produce
evidence of the predicate offense: the judgment of conviction with

491

the unredacted nature of the offense, the degree of offense, and
the date of conviction.

To the extent that Brown mentioned in dicta that, in cases
where the defendant does not stipulate, all that is required is the
date of the judgment, 180 N.J, at 585, 853 A.2d 260, we now clarify
that point. We refer this case to the Committee on Model Criminal
Jury Charges so that it may revise the certain persons charge
accordingly.

Iv.
The judgment of the Appellate Division, affirming defendant’s

conviction, is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON
join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.

176 A.3d 810
IN THE MATTER OF VISHAL S, PETIGARA, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 045792006)
M-508 September Term 2017
080457

January 24, 2018

ORDER

The Office of Attorney Ethics having filed with the Court a
petition pursuant to Rule 1:20-8(g)(4) and Rule 1:20-11, seeking
the immediate temporary suspension from the practice of law of
VISHAL S. PETIGARA of PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVA-

492

NIA, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 2007, and good
cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that VISHAL S. PETIGARA is temporarily
suspended from the practice of law, effective immediately and
until the further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that VISHAL S. PETIGARA be restrained and
enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension;
and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by VISHAL S. PETIGARA pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be restrained
from disbursement except on application to this Court, for good
cause shown, pending the further Order of this Court; and it is
further

ORDERED that VISHAL S. PETIGARA comply with Rule
1:20-20 dealing with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of the respondent's file as an attorney at law of

this State.

176 A.3d 811

IN THE MATTER OF BARRY DEAN FRIEDMAN, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 037951991)

M-441 September Term 2017
080346

January 24, 2018
ORDER

The Office of Attorney Ethics having filed with the Court a
petition pursuant to Rule 1:20-8(g)(4) and Rule 1:20-11, seeking

493

the immediate temporary suspension from the practice of law of
BARRY DEAN FRIEDMAN of TEANECK, who was admitted
to the bar of this State in 1991, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that BARRY DEAN FRIEDMAN is tempo-
rarily suspended from the practice of law, effective immediately
and until the further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that BARRY DEAN FRIEDMAN be restrained
and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspen-
sion; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by BARRY DEAN FRIEDMAN pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 be
restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court,
for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial
institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to
deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the
further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that BARRY DEAN FRIEDMAN comply with
Rule 1:20-20 dealing with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of the respondent’s file as an attorney at law of

this State.

494

176 A.3d 812
IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD DONNELL ROBINSON, AN
ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 001912004)
D-166 September Term 2016
079549

January 24, 2018

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 16-393, concluding on the record certified to the
Board pursuant to Rule 1:20-4(f)(default by respondent), that the
formal ethics complaint filed against RICHARD DONNELL
ROBINSON of MOUNT HOLLY, who was admitted to the bar of
this State in 2004, should be dismissed;

And the Court having determined on its own motion, pursuant
to Rule 1:20-16(b), to review the matter;

It is ORDERED that RICHARD DONNELL ROBINSON
show cause before this Court on March 18, 2018, at 2:00 p.m. in
the Supreme Court courtroom, Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton,
why he should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined; and it is
further

ORDERED that the Director of the Office of Attorney Ethics,
or the Director’s designee, present this matter to the Court; and
it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall file an original and eight
copies of his brief with the Clerk of the Court and serve two
copies of the brief on the Office of Attorney Ethics on or before
February 16, 2018, and the Office of Attorney Ethics shall serve
and file a responding brief on or before March 6, 2018.

495

176 A.3d 812
IN THE MATTER OF YANA CHECHELNITSKY, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 012222005)

D-195 September Term 2016
079765

January 24, 2018

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The Disciplinary Review Board having filed with the Court its
decision in DRB 17-048, concluding that as a matter of final
discipline pursuant to Rule 1:20-13(¢), that YANA CHECHEL-
NITSKY of SAYREVILLE, who was admitted to the bar of this
State in 2005, should be suspended from practice for a period of
six months and that the suspension should be suspended;

And the Court having determined on its own motion, pursuant
to Rule 1:20-16(b), to review the matter;

It is ORDERED that YANA CHECHELNITSKY show cause
before this Court on March 12, 2018, at 2:00 p.m. in the Supreme
Court courtroom, Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, why she
should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined; and it is further

ORDERED that the Director of the Office of Attorney Ethics,
or the Director’s designee, present this matter to the Court; and
it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall file an original and eight
copies of her brief with the Clerk of the Court and serve two
copies of the brief on the Office of Attorney Ethics on or before
February 16, 2018, and the Office of Attorney Ethics shall serve
and file a responding brief on or before March 6, 2018.

496

176 A.3d 813
IN THE MATTER OF MARK WEISSMANN, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO, 011631985)
D-74 September Term 2017
080627

January 29, 2018

ORDER

MARK WEISSMANN of MAHWAH, who was admitted to the
bar of this State in 1986, having tendered his consent to disbar-
ment as an attorney at law of the State of New Jersey, and good
cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that MARK WEISSMANN is disbarred by
consent, effective immediately; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent's name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys and that he be permanently restrained and enjoined
from practicing law; and it is further

ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing or hereinaf-
ter deposited in any New Jersey financial institution maintained
by MARK WEISSMANN pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 shall be re-
strained from disbursement except on application to this Court for
good cause shown and shall be transferred by the financial institu-
tion to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to deposit
the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending further
Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with disbarred attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual

497

expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in

Rule 1:20-17.

176 A.3d 813

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v. S.N., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

A-60 September Term 2016
079320

Argued September 11, 2017—Decided January 30, 2018

S

499

Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for
appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney;
Sarah Lichter, of counsel and on the brief; Jeffrey L. Weinstein,
Hunterdon County Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

Philip De Vencentes argued the cause for respondent (Galantuc-
ci, Patuto, De Vencentes, Potter & Doyle, attorneys; Philip De

500

Vencentes, on the briefs; Richard G. Potter, of counsel and on the
briefs).

Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting As-
sistant Prosecutor Director, argued the cause for amicus curiae
County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Richard T. Burke,
President, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of counsel and on the brief;
Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, on the brief).

Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas,
Legal Director, attorney; Alexander R. Shalom, Edward L. Baro-
cas, and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief),

Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant Deputy Publie Defender, argued
the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender (Joseph
E. Krakora, Publie Defender, attorney; Elizabeth C. Jarit, of
counsel and on the brief).

JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we determine the proper standard for appellate
review of pretrial detention decisions under the Criminal Justice
Reform Act (CJRA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. After doing so, we
must apply that standard to the facts of the present appeal.

We conclude that the proper standard of appellate review is
whether the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an
impermissible basis, by relying upon irrelevant or inappropriate
factors, by failing to consider all relevant factors, or by making a
clear error in judgment.

Here, we affirm the Appellate Division's judgment reversing the
trial court’s decision to detain defendant. We do so because the
trial court relied on inappropriate factors and failed to consider all
relevant factors in finding that there was sufficient evidence
before the court to overcome the presumption of defendant’s
release.

501

L

The facts and procedural history are culled from the record of
defendant’s detention hearing.

In March 2017, law enforcement obtained an arrest warrant for
defendant S.N.! for acts alleged to have been committed against
his stepdaughter? in 2012. In a complaint-warrant, the State
charged defendant with first-degree aggravated sexual assault on
a person under the age of thirteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); fourth-
degree lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4(b)(1); and second-degree child
endangerment, N.J.S.A. 2C:244(a)3 The affidavit of probable
cause in support of the complaint-warrant stated that the victim
told a staff member at her school that defendant came into her
bedroom and sexually assaulted her approximately fifty times
while she was in the sixth and seventh grades. The affidavit also
disclosed that, in 2015, the victim told a friend that defendant had
“touched her in a sexual manner.” In addition, the State prepared
a preliminary law enforcement incident report (PLEIR), which
stated that “defendant was known to the victim as [flamily.”

Following defendant’s arrest, a pretrial services officer pre-
pared a Public Safety Assessment (PSA) ‘ that rated defendant a 1
out of 6—the lowest possible risk score—for both failure to appear

1As per Rule 1:38-3(c)(12), initials will be used to preserve the confidentiality
of the victim in this case.

2 Defendant and the victim's mother were never married and defendant is not
the victim’s biological father.

3Two months after defendant's arrest on the complaint-warrant, he was
indicted for first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); sec
ond-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); second-degree endangering the
welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1); and fourth-degree lewdness, N.LS.A.
2C:14-4(b\(1).

4The PSA is a tool that “assesses the level of risk for failure to appear and for
new criminal activity on a scale of 1 to 6, with 6 being the highest, and may
include a flag to denote new violent criminal activity.” State v, Robinson, 229
NJ. 44, 62, 160 A.3d 1 (2017). In addition, “[t]he PSA ... recommends whether
to release a defendant and what, if any, conditions of release to impose.” Ibid

and new criminal activity. The PSA noted that defendant did not
have any prior criminal history or failures to appear, but the
current charges pending against defendant stemmed from a vio-
lent offense. Despite the low risk scores, the PSA concluded “No
Release Recommended.”

The State moved for pretrial detention, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2A:162-19. In support of its pretrial detention motion, the prosecu-
tion certified that the charged crime could subject defendant to
“an ordinary or extended term of life imprisonment,” * there is a
“serious risk” that “defendant will not appear in court,” and
“defendant will pose a danger to any other person or the commu-
nity.” In addition, the certification stated, “[dJefendant’s victim is
his step-daughter. Defendant is a risk to harm and intimidate his
victim and her mother and to obstruct justice by interfering with
the investigation and witnesses. Defendant is a risk of flight
because his biological mother and sister live in Canada.”

At the detention hearing, the State submitted the affidavit of
probable cause in support of the complaint-warrant, the PLEIR,®
and the PSA. The prosecutor claimed that the PSA did not take
into account defendant’s dual citizenship or the risk to the victim
because “[defendant} knows where she lives. He knows where her
mother lives. And the fear is that if he’s released, he will harm
them physically.” Regarding the potential for obstruction, the
prosecutor stated that

Itlhese sorts of cases are sensitive in the sense that if a defendant has access to the
vietim or other family members, we know—and it’s common sense—that the
defendant often tries to obstruet justice by trying to convince family members and
other people in the family to say it didn’t happen, or put pressure on the vietim,

5 The State had not, in fact, charged defendant with an offense that carried an
ordinary or extended term of life imprisonment. The prosecutor corrected this
assertion on the record at the pretrial detention hearing.

6It is not clear from the transcript that the PLEIR was offered or admitted
into evidence. However, probable cause is not disputed and, therefore, it does
not affect the ultimate outcome of this case.

The State also sought a restraining order to prohibit defendant
from having contact with the victim, her mother, and his three
biological children (the victim’s half-siblings).

Defense counsel countered that the State did not present clear
and convincing evidence to support its detention motion, and that
the State’s arguments were based on “mere speculation.” Defense
counsel further noted that defendant had no prior record, inelud-
ing no disorderly persons offenses, had no failures to appear, was
gainfully employed, and had the support of his adoptive parents,
who live in New Jersey. Regarding defendant's biological mother
in Canada, defense counsel stated defendant has not had “tele-
phonic or face-to-face contact with her” and defendant “doesn’t
even know where she lives.” Counsel noted that defendant’s
biological mother had visited New Jersey “more than a decade
ago,” but it “ended in [defendant's] getting a restraining order
against her, [and] her being physically removed from his house by
the police.”

Further, defense counsel claimed that defendant lived in the
same home as the vietim “until a couple of years ago” and that “no
further problems apparently ... have been even alleged.” Defense
counsel also asserted that defendant is involved in the lives of his
three biological children and has had “constant contact” with them
despite no longer living in the same household.

The trial court issued an oral ruling at the end of the detention
hearing granting the State’s motion for pretrial detention and the
restraining order. The court found that the State had established
probable cause that defendant committed the charged offenses. In
making the pretrial detention determination, the judge reviewed
the circumstances of the charged offenses, the potential sentence
if convicted, defendant’s risk of flight in light of his dual U.S. and
Canadian citizenship, and the potential for defendant’s obstruction
of the criminal justice process “[blased on the fact that this is
essentially a he said, she said situation.”

The court gave great weight to “the nature and seriousness of
the danger to any other person or community that would be posed

by the defendant's release.” Also, the court specifically found that
defendant is eligible for detention under the statute “because this
is a first degree [offense] with No Early Release attaching to it
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a)(1).” The court summarized its
detention decision as follows:
Based on the factors I've outlined, the Court does find that the nature and
cireumstances should be given great weight, as well as the flight risk due to dual
citizenship. Also, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community,
as well as the fact that—and/or the defendant will not obstruct or attempt to
obstruct the criminal justice process,
In making my decision today I've given great weight to NERA,7 the fact that this
is a NERA offense and first degree, the dual citizenship, due to the extensi[ve]
exposure of inearceration if convicted, the fact that release was not recommended,
and the fact that this is considered a violent offense. Therefore, based on all of the
above the Court will grant the State's motion and pretrial detention will occur.
In “{t]he history and characteristics of the defendant” section of
the pretrial detention order, the court wrote, “[rJisk of flight—
family in Canada, no prior record, dual citizenship, employed.
Resident of NJ.” Under “[{t]he nature and seriousness of the
danger to any other person or the community that would be posed
by the defendant's release,” the court wrote that the alleged crime
was a first-degree aggravated sexual assault and further noted
“NERA.” Regarding the risk of obstruction, the court wrote
“potential to intimidate.” The court also listed “Further Reasons
for Pretrial Detention”:
- NERA offense—(first degree]

{DJual citizenship creates a high risk of flight due to the extensive exposure to
incarceration

Release not recommended

Violent offense
Pursuant to Rule 2:9-13, defendant appealed from the trial
court’s pretrial detention order, and the Appellate Division re-
versed and released defendant with conditions. The panel, citing
State v. C.W., 449 N.J. Super. 281, 156 A.3d 1088 (App. Div. 2017),
found that “(t]he trial court abused its discretion by not consider-
ing defendant’s age, level of prior criminal involvement and ties to

7 "NERA" refers to the “No Early Release Act," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

505

the community.” The Appellate Division required as part of defen-
dant’s release that “defendant must report to pretrial detention as
frequently as necessary to determine his compliance with restrain-
ing orders prohibiting him from having any contact with the victim
or her family .... [and] must surrender his passport.”

This Court granted the State’s emergent motion for leave to
appeal and for a stay of the Appellate Division’s order to release
defendant on conditions. 280 N.J. 349, 350, 167 A.3d 644 (2017).
We granted leave to appear as amicus curiae to the American Civil
Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU), the Office of the Public
Defender (OPD), and the County Prosecutors Association of New
Jersey (CPANJ). Following oral argument, we lifted the stay,
allowed defendant’s release, and directed that “the trial court may
enforce the Appellate Division’s order reversing the order for
defendant's pretrial detention, including establishing the schedule
for defendant to report ‘as necessary to determine his compliance
with restraining orders.’” 230 N.J. 585, 170 A3d 932 (2017).

I.

We summarize the parties’ arguments on appeal as follows.

A.

The State urges this Court to adopt an abuse of discretion
standard and claims that the appellate panel essentially reviewed
the detention decision de novo, substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court. The State further contends that the
Appellate Division compounded its error by imposing conditions of
release without a remand to the trial court.

The State asserts that, in its detention order, the trial judge
highlighted facts that pertain “to every subcategory of N.J.S.A.
2A:162-20, which is merely a permissive list of factors a court may
consider” and, therefore, the trial court did not fail to consider any
relevant factors, and did not err in ordering pretrial detention.
The State posits that “(t]he PSA is only a starting point” and that

506

the court “properly gave great weight to the nature and circum-
stances of the offense charged” and properly “considered the risk
that defendant would contact the victim ... and that defendant
knows how to contact the victim as she is [his] stepdaughter.” The
State also notes that the court was permitted to consider defen-
dant’s dual citizenship as an indication of an enhanced flight risk.

Lastly, the State, citing C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 231, 156 A.3d
1088, asserts that the panel was required to identify factors that
the trial court should have considered and then remand to the trial
court.

B.

Noting that a majority of circuit courts have adopted a standard
of independent review, defendant urges the Court to reject a more
deferential standard and to adopt a standard that “calls for
independent review, while according deference to the trial judge’s
factual findings that are clearly and convincingly supported by the
evidence presented by the prosecutor.”

Defendant asserts that “[t]here is a significant difference be-
tween the nature of the liberty interest involved for a defendant
between seeking a review of an order setting unreasonable release
conditions ... and an order denying release under any condi-
tions.” The latter type of review is at issue in this case; it
“necessarily requires an independent review” of the evidence to
determine whether that evidence clearly and convincingly sup-
ports the State’s motion for pretrial detention.

Regardless of which standard the Court adopts—abuse of dis-
cretion or independent review with deference—defendant argues
that the panel was correct to reverse the trial court’s order of
detention because the State failed to produce clear and convincing
evidence to rebut the presumption of pretrial release. Defendant
claims the State offered “little more than its boilerplate recitation”
that defendant posed a risk of flight and of obstruction.

507

c.

The amici all urge the Court to adopt an abuse of discretion
standard. The ACLU and the OPD assert that the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering detention. Conversely, the
CPANJ asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The ACLU argues that “the trial court abused its discretion by
considering inappropriate factors, by failing to consider necessary
factors and by engaging in a clear error of judgment.” The ACLU
notes that defendant is an United States citizen, that his dual
citizenship alone is not probative of risk of flight, and that “there
is no evidence, other than [dJefendant’s relationship to the com-
plaining witness, to suggest he would interfere in the investigation
or prosecution of the case.”

The ACLU asserts that the court incorrectly held the fact that
the case “is essentially a he said, she said situation” against
defendant because “a defendant should not be deemed to be
higher risk because there is less evidence.”

The ACLU also claims that the trial court failed to consider
necessary factors such as defendant’s employment, ties to the
State of New Jersey, age, and lack of a criminal record. The
ACLU therefore contends that the court abused its discretion by
failing to consider factors that would make it more likely that
defendant would appear in court when required.

The OPD makes similar arguments. It contends that the trial
court failed to make an individualized risk assessment by failing to
consider defendant’s age, employment, residence, and lack of
criminal record. The OPD further argues defendant “received the
lowest PSA scores, had no violence flag,® was gainfully employed,
had absolutely no criminal history, and had strong family ties in
New Jersey.” According to the OPD, the court also “inappropri-

8 Violence flags are generated as part of a PSA “‘if there is a statistical
likelihood that the defendant would engage in a New Violent Criminal Activity.”
State v. C.W., 449 N.J. Super. 231, 240, 156 A.3d 1088 (App. Div. 2017).

ately considered the defendant’s dual citizenship and familiarity
with the complaining witness as evidence of risk of flight and
obstruction when neither fact establishes an actual risk that the
defendant would engage in such future conduct.” Additionally, the
OPD argues that the court did not provide any statement to
support its finding that defendant posed a danger to the communi-
ty.

The OPD claims that the trial court ordered defendant detained
pretrial based solely on the charged crime, even though first-
degree sexual assault is not one of the enumerated offenses that
the Legislature identified in the CJRA. The OPD reaches this
conclusion “[b]ecause the only other reasons put forward—that
[defendant] has dual citizenship and knows the victim—even if
properly considered, could not be sufficient to overcome a pre-
sumption of release.”

The CPANJ similarly asks this Court to confirm “that the
appropriate appellate standard of review in pretrial detention
cases is abuse of discretion, with de novo review only appropriate
when the pretrial detention hearing court has misapplied the law.”
According to the CPANJ, this standard comports with the purpose
of the CJRA and “the historical standards of review for pretrial
and post-conviction decisions.” The CPANJ claims that, before the
CJRA, appellate courts reviewed bail determinations for abuse of
discretion, and “(t]here is no legal or public policy reason to
disturb a legal standard that advances the efficient administration
of pretrial justice and appropriate risk management.”

Finally, according to the CPANJ, assuming the judge abused
her discretion, the panel should have remanded the case “for
consideration in light of the appellate court’s ruling.”

qi.

A.

Our initial task is to determine the scope of appellate review of
pretrial detention decisions made by the trial court under the

CJRA. Although this is the first time this Court has confronted
the issue, guidance is provided by the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U.S. —,, 187 S.Ct.
1159, 197 L.Ed.2d 500 (2017).

In McLane, the Supreme Court employed a two-part test to
determine the appropriate standard of appellate review in the
absence of an “explicit statutory command.” 187 S.Ct. at 1166-67.
In Pierce v. Underwood, a case involving the award of counsel fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), the
Court provided an example of what would qualify as a “relatively
explicit statutory command” that would reveal “the standard of
appellate review”: “[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 487 U.S, 552,
558, 108 S.Ct, 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (alterations in original)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Absent such a command, a court first
must “ask whether the ‘history of appellate practice’ yields an
answer. Second, at least where ‘neither a clear statutory prescrip-
tion nor a historical tradition exists,’ we ask whether, ‘as a matter
of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better
positioned than another to decide the issue in question.’ ” McLane,
187 S.Ct. at 1166-67 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558-60, 108 S.Ct.
2541).

1

To determine whether there is a “clear statutory prescription”
in favor of a particular review standard, we look to the text of the
CJRA. We note that the CJRA does not specify a standard of
review, unlike the example furnished in Pierce. That does not
mean, however, that the statute cannot provide guidance as to the
appropriate level of review. Indeed, although the United States
Supreme Court did not find an “explicit statutory command” in
the legislation at issue in Pierce, it found the use of permissive
language highly significant:

We turn first to the language and structure of the governing statute, It provides

that attorney's fees shall be awarded “unless the court finds that the position of the

510

United States was substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis
added). This formulation, as opposed to simply “unless the position of the United
States was substantially justified,” emphasizes the fact that the determination is for
the district court to make, and thus suggests some deference to the distriet court
upon appeal. That inference is not compelled, but certainly available.

(Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559, 108 S.Ct. 2541.)

We therefore review the applicable provisions of the CJRA. We
do so in the context of the statutory requirement that the CJRA
“shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of primarily
relying upon pretrial release by non-monetary means to reason-
ably assure” that a defendant will “appearf] in court when re-
quired,” will not endanger “the safety of any other person or the
community,” and “will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the
criminal justice process.” N.J.S.A, 24:162-15,

The CJRA provides that, “following the issuance of a complaint-
warrant,” as occurred in this case, a defendant “shall be tempo-
rarily detained to allow the Pretrial Services Program to prepare
a risk assessment with recommendations on conditions of release.”
NWJ.S.A. 2A:162-16(a); see_also N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25. Thereafter,
the CJRA authorizes trial courts, “upon motion of a prosecutor,”
to order a defendant detained pretrial “when it finds clear and
convineing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions
can reasonably assure the effectuation of [the] goals” of safeguard-
ing against danger, flight, and obstruction. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15.

When considering a prosecutor’s detention motion, trial courts
must consider the risk assessment and recommendations and
“shall make a pretrial release decision” within forty-eight hours of
the “defendant’s commitment to jail.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(1). To
make that decision, the “court shall hold a hearing to determine
whether any amount of monetary bail or non-monetary conditions
or combination of monetary bail and conditions ... will reasonably
assure” that the three goals set forth above are met. N.J.S.A.
2A:162-19(e). If, as in this case, the prosecutor moves for deten-
tion where there is no indictment, the prosecutor must first
establish at the hearing that probable cause exists that the
defendant committed the charged offense. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-

511

19(e)(2). Unless the defendant is charged with murder or a crime
for which he would be subject to an ordinary or extended life
term, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b), the CJRA imposes a presumption
against pretrial detention, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(b); R. 3:4A(b)(5).
The State can rebut that presumption of release only by present-
ing “clear and convincing evidence.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1); see
also R. 3:4A(b)(5).

HM At a pretrial detention hearing, the defendant has the
right “to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses
who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer
or otherwise.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(1). The State need not pres-
ent a live witness at a detention hearing, State v. Ingram, 230 N.J.
190, 218, 165 A.3d 797 (2017), but it has the option to do so.
Additionally, “the trial court has discretion to require direct
testimony if it is dissatisfied with the State’s proffer.” Ibid.

At the hearing, the court “may take into account” various
factors, including “[t]he nature and circumstances of the [charged]
offense”; the weight of the evidence proffered against the defen-
dant; characteristics of the defendant as he or she stands before
the court, including his or her employment status, familial ties,
and length of residence in the community; “[tJhe nature and
seriousness of the danger” that would be posed to other persons
or the community if the defendant were released; the risk that the
defendant will obstruct the criminal justice process; and the PSA
recommendation. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20.

If the court orders pretrial detention, it shall “include written
findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the
detention.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(a)(1); see also R, 3:4A(c). A defen-
dant may appeal a pretrial detention order as of right, pursuant to
court rules. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(c); see also R. 2:9-13(a). Because
the defendant remains detained pending appeal, the court shall
hear the defendant’s appeal in an expedited manner, N.J.S.A.
2A:162-18(c); R. 2:9-13(a).

512

TE Although the CJRA does not explicitly set forth the appro-
priate scope of appellate review of trial court detention decisions,
its language supports that the proper standard of appellate review
is abuse of discretion. First, the Legislature used both “may” and
“shall” in various provisions of the CJRA. See generally N.J.S.A.
2A:162-15 to -26. “Where a statutory provision contains both the
words ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ it is presumed that the lawmaker intended
to distinguish between them, ‘shall’ being construed as mandatory
and ‘may’ as permissive.” Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162
N.J. 318, 325, 744 A.2d 175 (2000).

Under the CJRA, “the court may take into account” certain
information. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20 (emphasis added). If the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of
release will be sufficient, “the court may order, before trial, the
detention of an eligible defendant.” N.J.S.A, 2A:162-18(a)(1) (em-
phasis added). By contrast, the trial court must provide a written
statement of reasons if it orders detention, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-
21(a)(1). The pointed use of the permissive “may” in those provi-
sions establishes the trial court’s significant discretion in making
pretrial detention decisions and suggests that deferential review is
appropriate. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559, 108 S.Ct. 2541.

Nevertheless, because the statutory language is not sufficiently
explicit to dispose of the question here, we apply the two-part
McLane test.

2.

Turning to the first inquiry under that test, we find further
support for the abuse of discretion standard in “the history of
appellate practice.” McLane, 137 S.Ct. at 1166.

Since the 1800s, appellate courts have acknowledged that bail
determinations were discretionary and not readily reviewable by
appellate courts. See Parsell_v. State, 30 NJ.L. 580, 546 (1863)
(finding that “the law confides ‘the exclusive order and directions
in such cases [ (referring to discharging bail, &c.,)] to the legal
discretion and judgment of the court having jurisdiction over the

subject matter; and courts of error will not deem themselves at
liberty to review the same’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Wright v. Green, 11 N.J.L. 334, 337 (Sup. Ct. 1830) (involving trial
court’s decision to set aside amercement and discharge debtor) ) ).

As a result, over many decades, appellate courts have reviewed
many bail determinations for abuse of discretion. See State _v.
Fajardo-Santos, 199 N.J. 520, 581, 5838-34, 973 A.2d 938 (2009)
(stating that a trial court “engage[s] in a fact-sensitive analysis in
setting bail” and noting our Court “us[ed] [an] abuse of discretion
standard to review [the] fact-sensitive determination whether to
remit forfeited bail” in State v. Ventura, 196 N.J. 208, 206, 952
A.2d 1049 (2008) ); State v. Korecky, 169 N.J. 364, 378, 777 A.2d
927 (2001) (“The imposition of a bail condition is a matter of
judicial discretion.”); State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 364, 294 A.2d
245 (1972) (noting that “bail liberty is a matter for the discretion
of the trial courts” and that “discretion must be exercised reason-
ably”); State v. Steele, 430 N.J. Super. 24, 34, 61 A3d 174 (App.
Div. 2013); State v. Petrucelli, 37 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 116 A.2d 721
(App. Div, 1955) (noting that “[t]he amount of bail is left to sound
judicial discretion” and that appellate courts are “not warranted in
nullifying a trial court’s exercise of judicial diseretion in the
absence of showing that its action was clearly unreasonable”).
There is no indication that the Legislature intended to change that
practice under the new system. See C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 254—
56, 156 A.3d 1088,

3.

The second part of the Supreme Court’s test in McLane is
whether “as a matter of sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue
in question.” 187 S.Ct, at 1166-67 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S, at 559-
60, 108 S.Ct. 2541). We have long deferred to trial courts’ factual
determinations because they “hear and see the witnesses and ...
have the ‘feel’ of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.”
State _v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161, 199 A.2d 809 (1964). As a

514

consequence, trial courts are “better positioned” than appellate
courts to make factual determinations.

With respect to detention determinations, trial courts regularly
handle detention motions under the CJRA and, going forward, will
continue to develop expertise in the CJRA’s application. See
Ingram, 230 N.J. at 212, 165 A3d 797 (stating that under CJRA,
“the State moved for detention in 7824 cases in the first half of
2017” with “[clourts h[olding] hearings in 5548 of those cases”).

‘The Legislature’s significant use of permissive language in the
CJRA, the history of appellate deference to the factual findings of
trial courts, the history of appellate review of bail decisions for
abuse of discretion, and the ongoing development of trial court
expertise in applying the CJRA, all suggest that abuse of discre-
tion is the appropriate appellate standard of review for determina-
tions made in pretrial detention hearings under the CJRA.

B.

In C.W., cited by the Appellate Division here, the panel also
concluded that an abuse of discretion standard should apply to
detention determinations under the CJRA. 449 N.J. Super. at 235,
252-54, 156 A.3d 1088. The panel found support in the words and
policy objectives of the CJRA—“the objectives of the [CJRA] in
attaining the expeditious resolution of criminal cases could be
thwarted if this court routinely second-guessed decisions on pre-
trial detention motions simply because we personally would have
reached a different result than the trial judge.” Id. at 256, 156
A.8d 1088,

C.W. correctly recognized that, “[iJn many instances, the pre-
trial hearing may entail no witness testimony and no need for
credibility findings by the trial court, to which we ordinarily
aecord great deference.” Id. at 257, 156 A.3d 1088. Nevertheless,
regardless of whether the evidence is live testimony, a videotaped
statement, or documentary evidence, deference is owed to the trial
court’s determinations of fact and credibility. State _v. S.S., 229
N.J. 360, 379, 162 A.3d 1058 (2017) (“[A] standard of deference to

515

a trial court’s fact findings, even fact findings based solely on
video or documentary evidence, best advances the interests of
justice in a judicial system that assigns different roles to trial
courts and appellate courts.”); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244,
927 A.2d 1250 (2007).

HN We conclude that the appellate panel in C.W. identified
the proper standard of review of detention decisions under the
CJRA—abuse of discretion. We find that the panel correctly

enunciated the standard when it stated that,
[while the concept is difficult to define with precision, an appellate court “may find
an abuse of diseretion when a decision ‘rest{s] on an impermissible basis’ or was
‘based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors.” Steele, 430
NJ. Super. at 34-35, 61 [61 A.3d 174] (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171
N.J. 561, 571 (796 A.2d 182] (2002) ). An appellate court can also discern an abuse
of discretion when the trial court fails to take into consideration all relevant factors
and when its decision reflects a clear error in judgment. State v. Baynes, 148 N.J.
434, 444 [690 A.2d 594] (1997). Likewise, when the trial court renders 2 decision
based upon a misconception of the law, that decision is not entitled to any
particular deference and consequently will be reviewed de novo. See, eg., State v.
Stein, 225 N.J. 582, 593 [189 A.3d 1174] (2016); State v. Williams, 441 N.J. Super.
266, 272 [117 A.3d 1247) (App. Div. 2015).
{C.W,, 449 N.J. Super. at 255, 156 A.3d 1088,]
Under that standard, “[a] reviewing court generally will give no
deference to a trial court decision that fails to ‘provide factual
underpinnings and legal bases supporting [its] exercise of judicial
diseretion,’” C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255, 156 A.3d 1088 (second
alteration in original) (quoting Clark y. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61,
72, 57 A.3d 1 (App. Div. 2012) ), In other words, a trial court’s
detention decision not supported by articulable facts is not entitled

to deference and may constitute an abuse of discretion.

Iv.

HM Our final task is to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering defendant's detention. This deter-
mination requires a review of whether the trial court’s decision
“rest{s] on an impermissible basis,” “was based upon a consider-
ation of irrelevant or inappropriate factors,” “failfed] to take into
consideration all relevant factors and whe[ther] [the] decision

516

reflects a clear error in judgment.” C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255,
156 A.3d 1088 (first alteration in original) (internal citations omit-
ted).

Where, as here, the defendant has not been indicted, the CJRA
requires trial courts to determine at a detention hearing whether
the State established probable cause and demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that a defendant’s danger, risk of flight,
and risk of obstruction overcomes the presumption of release. See
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1); -19(e)(2); -20(a), (b). Because the finding
of probable cause is not at issue here, we confine our consideration
to the trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s danger, risk of
flight, and risk of obstruction overcame the presumption of his
release. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1); -19(e)(2); -20(a), (b).

HE We repeat the following principles that guide our final
determination. The State’s burden to overcome the statutory
presumption of release is substantial because “[iJn our society
liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is
the carefully limited exception.” State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 68,
160 A.8d 1 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 789, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ).
If the court orders pretrial detention, it shall “include written
findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the
detention.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(a)(1); see_also R. 3:4A(c). Indeed,
“{a] reviewing court generally will give no deference to a trial
court decision that fails to ‘provide factual underpinnings and legal
bases supporting [its] exercise of judicial discretion.” C.W., 449
N.J. Super. at 255, 156 A.3d 1088 (second alteration in original)
(quoting Clark, 429 N.J. Super. at 72, 57 A.3d 1).

The CJRA specifically delineates the kind of evidence that the
court may consider in making a detention decision. N.J.S.A.
2A:162-20. As noted above, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20, the
court may take into account various factors, including “{t]he
nature and circumstances of the [charged] offense;” “the weight of
the evidence” proffered against the defendant; characteristics of
the defendant as he stands before the court, including his or her

517

employment status, familial ties, and length of residence in the
community; “[t]he nature and seriousness of the danger” posed to
other persons or the community if the defendant were released;
the risk that the defendant will obstruct the criminal justice
process; and the PSA recommendation.

The court here considered the nature of the offense charged and
gave it “great weight.” The court acknowledged the weakness of
the State’s case by stating that the proofs were limited to “he said,
she said.” Even though the weakness of the State’s case generally
militates in favor of release, the court used this factor to support
the prosecutor's claim that there was a risk of obstruction. That
‘was so, even though there was no past conduct by defendant or
empirical evidence offered by the prosecutor to support the con-
tention that

{[tlhese sorts of cases are sensitive in the sense that if a defendant has access to the

victim or other family members, we know—and it’s common sense—that the

defendant often tries to obstruct justice by trying to convince family members and
other people in the family to say it didn’t happen, or put pressure on the vietim.

Defendant’s characteristics as he stood before the court, pursu-
ant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162~20, were as follows: he was fifty years of
age; he had a PSA score of 1/6—the lowest score—for both
“{flailure to appear” and “[nJew criminal activity”; he was gainfully
employed, had no criminal history, had no violence flags, and had
strong ties to the community including the support of his adoptive
parents and his relationship with his biological children; he was
born in Canada, but adopted shortly thereafter, and has lived in
the United States; because he was born in Canada, defendant has
dual U.S.-Canadian citizenship; and his birth mother visited him
on one occasion more than ten years ago, and the visit ended with
defendant obtaining a restraining order against her.

In addition, defense counsel proffered, without dispute by the
prosecutor, that defendant had “no telephonic or face-to-face
contact with [his mother]” and “doesn’t even know where to go
find her”; defendant lived in the same home as the victim “until a
couple of years ago” and “no further problems apparently ...
have been alleged”; and defendant is involved in the lives of his

518

three biological children and has had “constant contact” with them
despite no longer living in the same household.

The nature and circumstances of the offense are pertinent to
whether the statutory presumption of release has been overcome.
However, the court based its detention decision almost entirely
upon the offense charged, even though that charge does not carry
a presumption of detention. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(b). The court
also relied on unsupported conclusory statements by the prosecu-
tor to establish risk of obstruction even though there was no
evidence of defendant’s obstructive conduct. As defense counsel
noted, defendant lived in the same home as the victim “until a
couple of years ago” and “no further problems apparently ...
have been alleged.”

The court based defendant's risk of flight upon his dual U.S.-
Canadian citizenship even though the evidence presented at the
detention hearing was that defendant had “lived in New Jersey
{for] almost his entire life” and that defendant has no ties to
Canada because he has no contact with his biological mother and
does not know where she lives.

In summary, the trial court, in ordering defendant detained,
failed to properly consider defendant’s characteristics as he stood
before the court. Furthermore, the trial court relied upon general,
conclusory statements put forward by the prosecutor at the deten-
tion hearing. For example, at the detention hearing, the prosecu-
tor asserted in a conclusory fashion that defendant’s dual citizen-
ship created a risk of flight and that because defendant knows
where the victim and her mother live “the fear is that if he’s
released, he will harm them physically.” Lastly, the prosecutor
stated, without factual support, that “[t]hese sorts of cases are
sensitive” because “defendant has access to the victim and other
family members” and that “it’s common sense ... that the defen-
dant often tries to obstruct justice by trying to convince family
members and other people in the family to say it didn’t happen, or
put pressure on the victim.” Because the court’s detention decision

519

does not set forth articulable facts supporting its exercise of
judicial discretion, it is not entitled to deference.

We are thus constrained to find that the evidence at the
detention hearing did not overcome the CJRA’s presumption of
release, The trial court’s detention decision constituted an abuse of
discretion because it “rest[s] on an impermissible basis,” “was
based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors,”
“failfed] to take into consideration all relevant factors,” including
defendant's characteristics as he stood before the court, and
“reflects a clear error in judgment.” C.W., 449 N.J. Super. at 255,
156 A.3d 1088 (first alteration in original) (internal citations omit-
ted),

Having determined that the trial court abused its discretion by
detaining defendant, the next appropriate procedural step is to
remand the matter to the trial court to determine the suitable
conditions of release. Remand is required because the trial court
has the opportunity at a detention hearing to “hear and see
witnesses” and gain a “ ‘feel’ of the case which a reviewing court
cannot enjoy.” Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161, 199 A.2d 809. Trial courts
are therefore better positioned to determine conditions of release.

Vv.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm as modified the
judgment of the Appellate Division and remand to the trial court
for a hearing to determine the appropriate conditions of release.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,

ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE
join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.

520

177 A.3d 106
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. OMAR
SHAHEER THOMAS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.
C-424 September Term 2017
079686

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000469-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 106

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. COBY T.
RICHARDSON, A/K/A COLBY RICHARDSON, COLBY TIMOTHY
RICHARDSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. JEFFERY RICHARDSON, A/K/A JEF-
FERY OSBORNE RICHARDSON, JEFFREY RICHARDSON,
JEFFERY 0. RICHARDSON, JEFFREY RICHRARDSON, DE-
FENDANT.

C-418 September Term 2017
079661

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~4021/4026-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

521

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 106

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. AS.K., AND T.T., DE-
FENDANTS, AND E.M.C., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. IN
THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.D.K, AEC,

M-449 September Term 2017
079700

December 8, 2017

ORDER
It is ORDERED that the motion of A.E.C. to strike is denied.

522

177 A.3d 107

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. COBY T. RICHARDSON,
A/K/A COLBY RICHARDSON, COLBY TIMOTHY RICHARDSON,
DEFENDANT. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RE-
SPONDENT, v. JEFFERY RICHARDSON, A/K/A JEFFERY OS-
BORNE RICHARDSON, JEFFREY RICHARDSON, JEFFERY 0.
RICHARDSON, JEFFREY RICHRARDSON, DEFENDANT-PE-
TITIONER.

C-419 September Term 2017
079661

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-4021/4026-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 107
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y, CHINUA S. ANDERSON, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C410 September Term 2017
079650

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

523,

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004654-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 108
IRMA PINTO, PETITIONER-PETITIONER, v. BOARD OF

TRUSTEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C-391 September Term 2017
079977

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~003263-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

177 A.3d 108

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. LATIA R. HARRIS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-412 September Term 2017
079656

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001528-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 108

CMR CONSTRUCTION CORP., PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
ROBERTA GREENING, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-398 September Term 2017
080008

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004442-16
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

525

177 A.3d 109

DAVID L, FELIX AND LUIS M. FELIX, PLAINTIFFS-RESPON-
DENTS, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., DE-
FENDANT-MOVANT, AND JACK DANIELS VOLKSWAGEN,
DEFENDANT, EDUARDO DEANG, PLAINTIFF, v. VOLKS-
WAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., DEFENDANT-MOVANT,
AND JACK DANIELS VOLKSWAGEN, DEFENDANT.

M-886 September Term 2017
079897

December 8 2017

ORDER
It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal is denied.

177 A.3d 109

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. CARLIA M. BRADY, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.

M-428 September Term 2017
080201

December 8, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal is denied;
and it is further

ORDERED that the trial be conducted forthwith.

526

177 A.3d 109

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. WIL-
LIAM D. BROWN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. NIGIL J. DAWSON, DEFEN-
DANT.

C-344 September Term 2017
079553

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-4898/5221-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted;
and it is further

ORDERED that the appellant may electronically serve and file
a supplemental brief on or before February 6, 2018, and respon-
dent may serve and file a supplemental brief forty-five (45) days
after the filing of appellant’s supplemental submission, or, if
appellant declines to file such a submission, on or before March 23,
2018.

527

177 A.3d 110

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER,
v, ANTHONY IRIZARRY A/K/A TONE,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C422 September Term 2017
079684

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001518-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 110

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
vy. BARRINGTON G. MCDONALD, DEFENDANT-
MOVANT.

M-~436/437/438 September Term 2017
079683

December 8, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motions for relaxation of the Court
Rules on copying requirements (M-436), and to file a reply brief
(M-438) are granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal (M-487) is
denied.

177 A.3d 110

BRIGHT AND VARICK URBAN RENEWAL COMPANY, LLC,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JERSEY CITY PLANNING
BOARD, JERSEY CITY ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,
THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY,
ROBERT BYRNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CITY
CLERK, ANTHONY CRUZ, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR, HOUSING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
COMMERCE AND CITY OF JERSEY CITY, DEFENDANTS.
VAN VORST PARK ASSOCIATION, INC., INTERVENER-PETI-
TIONER.

C401 September Term 2017
079679

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002040-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

177 A3d LIL

MICHAEL BESEN, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. SANDRA
WEISS, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-404 September Term 2017
080105

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

529

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000268-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs; and it is further

ORDERED that the notice of appeal is dismissed.

177 A.3d 111

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
HEATHER QUINTANA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-413 September Term 2017
079657

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:
A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003254-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-

ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A3d 111

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. ANTHONY AURIEMMA, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C409 September Term 2017
079630

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001399-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 112

S.S., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, v. SYED ARIF ALI JAFFERY,
BT AL., DEFENDANTS-MOVANTS.

M-384 September Term 2017
080091

December 8, 2017

ORDER
It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal is denied.

531

177 A.3d 112

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
CARLTON L. CLARK, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-420 September Term 2017
079675

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005065-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 112

IN RE: ACCUTANE LITIGATION (HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE INC.
AND ROCHE LABORATORIES INC.—PETITIONERS)

C-388 September Term 2017
079958

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-4698-14 and A-
910-16 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

532

177 A.3d 113

JOVSIM LLC, PLAINTIFF-MOVANT, v. NEW BRUNSWICK
CITY, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

M-4L7 September Term 2017
080176

December 8 2017

ORDER
It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to appeal is denied.

177 A3d 113

CAROLYN GILLIAM, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v.
ATRIUM AT PRINCETON, LLC, T/A ATRIUM
HEALTH, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C-399 September Term 2017
079970

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002514-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 113

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. WILLIAM D. BROWN,
DEFENDANT. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPON-
DENT, v. NIGIL J. DAWSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-347 September Term 2017
079556

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~4898/5221-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted;
and it is further

ORDERED that the appellant may electronically serve and file
a supplemental brief on or before February 6, 2018, and respon-
dent may serve and file a supplemental brief forty-five (45) days
after the filing of appellant’s supplemental submission, or, if
appellant declines to file such a submission, on or before March 23,
2018.

534

177 A3d 114

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. GERMANIA TERRERO, A/K/A XIOMARA,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-425 September Term 2017
079687

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001635-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 114

MARK AND KATHERINE SMITH, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v.
SOUTH BRUNSWICK TOWNSHIP, PUBLIC SERVICE ELEC-
TRIC & GAS COMPANY, AND TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. MARK AND
KATHERINE SMITH, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. SOUTH
BRUNSWICK PLANNING BOARD, PUBLIC SERVICE ELEC-
TRIC & GAS COMPANY, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

C-302 September Term 2017
079563

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

535

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-1218/8014-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

177 A.3d 115
IN RE PETITION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO CONDUCT A REFER-
ENDUM ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BOROUGH OF
WOODCLIFF LAKE FROM THE PASCACK VALLEY REGION-
AL SCHOOL DISTRICT. (TOWNSHIP OF RIVER VALE-PETI-
TIONER)

C-393 September Term 2017
079924

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004084-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A3d 115

IN THE MATTER OF THE RELEASE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ATTORNEY REGISTRATION STATEMENTS OF
MAURICE J. DONOVAN, ESQUIRE

M-416 September Term 2017
080074

December 8, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of Benjamin M. Del Vento,
P.A. and Benjamin M. Del Vento, requesting the release of
attorney registration statements and information is granted, in
part. The OAE is directed to provide copies of Mr, Donovan’s
registration statements to the extent they are still available, and
also copies of the OAE’s electronic records of the statements
provided, however that all personal identifiers are to be redacted.

177 A3d 115

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DENNIS
OBADO, A/K/A DENNIS ABADO, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.

M-429 September Term 2017
079196

December 8, 2017
ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion to vacate the order of dismiss-
al and reinstate the notice of petition for certification is denied.

537

177 A.3d 116

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ALEXIS
ANDERSON, A/K/A ALEXIS ALLEN ANDERSON, ALEXANDER
ANDERSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-416 September Term 2017
079667

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003728-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 116

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ELMO
M. RIVADENEIRA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C407 September Term 2017
079623

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003348-11
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

538

177 A.3d 116

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
JAMES WOODS, A/K/A AARON DAVIS AND JAMES
GREEN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-411 September Term 2017
079652

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004161-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A3d 117

BEAVER LAKE REALTY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF, v. NJ
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

M-422 September Term 2017
080162

December 8, 2017
ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion of Robert Moss for leave to
appeal is denied.

539

177 A.3d 117

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. TARI D.
TURPIN, A/K/A TARID TURPIN, TARI TURRIN AND TARI
DEMOND TURPIN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C408 September Term 2017
079629

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001745-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 117

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. CHRISTOPHER DESA A/K/A CHRISTOPHER L.
DESA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C406 September Term 2017
079622

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005226-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 118

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-CROSS-RESPONDENT,
vy, ANTHONY IRIZARRY A/K/A TONE, DEFENDANT-
CROSS-PETITIONER.

C423 September Term 2017
079684

December 8, 2017

ON CROSS PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A cross-petition for certification of the judgment in A-001518-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the cross-petition for certification is

denied.

177 A.3d 118

IN RE PETITION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO CONDUCT A REFER-
ENDUM ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BOROUGH OF
WOODCLIFF LAKE FROM THE PASCACK VALLEY REGION-
AL SCHOOL DISTRICT. (BOROUGH OF HILLSDALE-PETI-
TIONER)

C-394 September Term 2017
079924

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004084-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

541

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 118

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-MOVANT, v. AS.K., AND T.T., DEFEN-
DANTS, AND E.M.C., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. IN THE
MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.D.K,, A.E.C., AND
E.S.K., MINORS., (A.E.C-RESPONDENT)

M-454 September Term 2017
079700

December 8, 2017

ORDER
It is ORDERED that the motion to expand the record is denied.

177 A.3d 119

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
ROBERT RUCKER, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C417 September Term 2017
079670

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003295-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 119

BRIGHT AND VARICK URBAN RENEWAL COMPANY, LLC,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JERSEY CITY PLANNING
BOARD, JERSEY CITY ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,
DEFENDANTS, AND THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF JERSEY CITY, ROBERT BYRNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS CITY CLERK, ANTHONY CRUZ, IN HIS OFFI-
CIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR, HOUSING ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT AND COMMERCE AND CITY OF JERSEY CITY,
DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS. VAN VORST PARK ASSOCIA-
TION, INC., INTERVENER.

C400 September Term 2017
079679

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002040-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

543,

177 A.3d 119

COLIN ANDREWS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, v. JOHN A. FRANK,
DEFENDANT, AND TERRY ANDREWS, DEFENDANT/THIRD-
PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. CLIFFORD S. ANDREWS, III, THIRD-
PARTY DEFENDANT/FOURTH-PARTY PLAINTIFF-RESPON-
DENT, v. JOHN A. FRANK, FOURTH-PARTY DEFENDANT,
AND STEVEN P. FORD, FOURTH-PARTY DEFENDANT-PETI-
TIONER.

C-896 September Term 2017
079057

December 8, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005524-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

177 A.3d 120

COLIN ANDREWS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, v. JOHN A. FRANK,
DEFENDANT, AND TERRY ANDREWS, DEFENDANT/THIRD-
PARTY PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. CLIFFORD S. ANDREWS,
Il, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT/FOURTH-PARTY PLAIN-
TIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOHN A. FRANK AND STEVEN P.
FORD, FOURTH-PARTY DEFENDANTS.

C-397 September Term 2017
079057

December 8, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005524~-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

177 A.3d 120

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS JOINT OPINION 732, THE COMMITTEE ON
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING JOINT OPINION 44, AND THE
COMMITTEE ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
JOINT OPINION 54.

M-425 September Term 2017
079852

December 8, 2017

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court, it is
ORDERED that the motion of Thomas M. Gordon, Esquire, a
member of the District of Columbia and Maryland bars, to appear
pro hae vice on behalf of the Consumers for a Responsive Legal
System is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that Thomas M. Gordon, Esquire shall abide by
Rule 1:21-2, including his obligation to adhere to the Rules of
Professional Conduct and to make his required annual payment to
the Disciplinary Oversight Committee and the Lawyers’ Fund for
Client Protection, said payment to be made within ten days of the
filing date of this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of
New Jersey is hereby appointed as agent upon whom service of
process may be made for all action against Thomas M. Gordon,

545

Esquire, that may arise out of his participation in the matter; and
it is further

ORDERED that Thomas M. Gordon, Esquire, shall notify the
Court immediately of any matter affecting his standing at the bar
of any other court; and it is further

ORDERED that all pleadings, briefs and other papers filed with
the Court shall be signed by New Jersey counsel, authorized to
practice law in the State of New Jersey, who shall be responsible
for his conduct of the cause and the attorney especially admitted
herein.

177 A.3d 121

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. MARC GALLUCCI, DE-
FENDANT. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPON-
DENT, v. STEPHANIE R. TYLKA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,

C-453 September Term 2017
079754

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-$609/5239-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

546

177 A.3d 121

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOSEPH
A. LICCIARDELLO, A/K/A JOSEPH A. LICCIADELLO,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C450 September Term 2017
079744

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002651-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 122

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-CROSS-PETITIONER, v.
LAURIE WINT A/K/A LAURIE A. WINT, JR., LAURIE AINS-
WORTH WINT, LANCE, DEFENDANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT.

C-415 September Term 2017
079660

December 13, 2017

ON CROSS PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A cross-petition for certification of the judgment in A-002182-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the cross-petition for certification is
granted; and it is further

547

ORDERED that the cross-appellant may electronically serve
and file a supplemental brief on or before February 13, 2018, and
cross-respondent may serve and file a supplemental brief forty-
five (45) days after the filing of cross-appellant’s supplemental
submission, or, if cross-appellant declines to file such a submission,
on or before April 2, 2018.

177 A.3d 122

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v, JOSEPH WATSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C438 September Term 2017
080215

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005066-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 122

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v, ENZO R, PENA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-442 September Term 2017
079697

December 18, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000350-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 123

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. KABA-
KA ATIBA, A/K/A CLARENCE BROWN, KABAKA ATITA
AND KABAKA ATIDA, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-444 September Term 2017
079705

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005606-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

549

177 A.3d 123

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. ALFREDO LOPEZ, A/K/A BUGSY,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C446 September Term 2017
079708

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000070-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 123

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DANIEL
A. CATALANO, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C448 September Term 2017
079737

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A~002368-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 124

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
DAVID RICHARDSON, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-451 September Term 2017
079745

December 18, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005810-12
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 124

ATLANTIC AMBULANCE CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-RESPON-
DENT, v. JOHN G. CULLUM AND MARY CLARE COLLUM, DE-
FENDANT-MOVANTS. ATLANTIC AMBULANCE CORPORA-
TION, PLAINTIFF, v. HALA HITT] AND ANTOINE HITTI,
DEFENDANTS.

M-455/456/457 September Term 2017
079804

December 13, 2017

ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for leave to impound the
record (M~457) is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the motions to expand the record (M456) and
for leave to appeal (M--455) are denied.

551

177 A.3d 124

DIRECT COAST TO COAST, LLC AND SELECTIVE TRANSPORTA-
TION CORPORATION, PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. JOSEPH
PETERSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN AGENT OF THE
BANFIELD GROUP, LLC, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND
LISA MARIE HARRISON, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS AN
AGENT OF THE BANFIELD GROUP, LLC AND JERRY KET-
EL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AN AGENT OF THE BANFIELD
GROUP, LLC, DEFENDANTS.

C-429 September Term 2017
079901

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001384-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

177 A.3d 125

JPRC, INC. T/A LIQUID ASSETS, PETITIONER-PETITIONER, v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C-434 September Term 2017
079984

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

552

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001736-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

177 A.3d 125

NASRIEN AWADALLAH, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
BAHA AWADALLAH, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-432 September Term 2017
079090

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002381-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

177 A.3d 126

JOSE CONTRERAS MORALES, BY AND THROUGH HIS
GUARDIAN AD LITEM, LILIANA MORALES FERNANDEZ,
PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. SUSSEX COUNTY COMMUNI-
TY COLLEGE AND SOPHIE DUTKOWSKI, DEFENDANTS-
RESPONDENTS, AND CARROLL SERVICES, INC., DEFEN-
DANT, AND FIDEL RODRIGUEZ AND CAMPBELL’S
SMALL ENGINE SALES AND SERVICE, INC., DEFEN-
DANTS.

C433 September Term 2017
080107

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000805-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

177 A.3d 126

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF D.M., A JUVENILE-
RESPONDENT. (STATE OF NEW JERSEY-
PETITIONER)

C436 September Term 2017
079999

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

554

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000216-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted;
and it is further

ORDERED that the appellant may electronically serve and file
a supplemental brief on or before February 13, 2018, and respon-
dent may serve and file a supplemental brief forty-five (45) days
after the filing of appellant’s supplemental submission, or, if
appellant declines to file such a submission, on or before April 2,
2018.

177 A.3d 127

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
y. CLAUDIO J. MARQUEZ-GUZMAN,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-445 September Term 2017
079707

December 18, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-000820-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 127

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. BRIDGETTE N. ARCHUT, DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER.

C-439 September Term 2017
079511
December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005737-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 127

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ANDREW
ALFORD, A/K/A ALFRED ANDREW L. BROCKINGTON, AL-
FORD ANDREW L., ALFORD ANDREW, BROCKINGTON
AMOS, BROCKINGTON ALFORD, ALFORD DAMON, AND
ALFRED ANDREW, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C456 September Term 2017
079770

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001446-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

556

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 128
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMA-
NENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. K.D., DEFENDANT-
PETITIONER. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF
S.S., MINOR-RESPONDENT.

C435 September Term 2017
079818

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-2651/5513-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

557

177 A3d 128

LIEUTENANT JOHN KAMINSKAS AND CHIEF DANIEL VANISKA
OF THE UNION COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, APPEL-
LANTS-PETITIONERS, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPART-
MENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, OFFICE OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

C426 September Term 2017
080128

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-003528-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted.

177 A.3d 128

JAMES MONTAG, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. BOROUGH OF
HO-HO-KUS, STEVEN SHELL, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COUNCILMAN FOR THE BOROUGH
OF HO-HO-KUS, DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS,

C-437 September Term 2017
080057

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005315-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,
with costs.

177 A.3d 129
MUSTAFA MUHAMMAD, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER,
y. ALLEN SELTZER AND EXTRA STORAGE
SPACE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

C428 September Term 2017
078839

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION

To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002275-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

559

177 A3d 129

T.DJ., PLAINTIFF, v. J.B.-J., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. STATE
OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. J.B—J.,
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C441 September Term 2017
079688

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-2061-15 and A~
828-16 having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having
considered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 129

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. M.E.D., DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C447 September Term 2017
079720

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001810-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 130

MICHAEL DOBLIN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v.
LINDA DOBLIN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C427 September Term 2017
080007

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-005066-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied,

with costs.

177 A.3d 130

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. RASHAAN LEWIS, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-440 September Term 2017
079518

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001215-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

561

177 A.3d 130

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DION L.
CROMWELL, A/K/A MALIK CROMWELL, DEON CROMWELL,
DION FLEMING, AND DEON FLEMING, AND MALIK CRON-
WELL, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-443 September Term 2017
079698

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002941-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 131

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EY-
VONNE ALEXANDER, A/K/A EYVONNE D. ALEXANDER,
EVYONNE D. BULLOCK, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-449 September Term 2017
079738

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-001124-15
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 131

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
v. MARK LOVETT, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

C-452 September Term 2017
079746

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002572-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 131

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. LORET-
TA C. BURROUGHS, A/K/A LORETTA D. DOYLE, LORETTA
DOYLD, LORETTA THOMAS, LORETTA C. TOKASH, DEFEN-
DANT-PETITIONER.

C455 September Term 2017
079755

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-004590-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 132

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. MARC.
GALLUCCI, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. STATE OF NEW JER-
SEY, PLAINTIFF, v. STEPHANIE R. TYLKA, DEFENDANT,

C-454 September Term 2017
079754

December 13, 2017
ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-3609/5239-13
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is denied.

177 A.3d 132

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. JOSEPH
WATSON, DEFENDANT-MOVANT.

M-~404 September Term 2017
080215

December 13, 2017
ORDER

It is ORDERED that the motion for a stay is dismissed as
moot. (See disposition in C-438-17).

177 A.3d 132
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v, LAURIE
WINT A/K/A LAURIE A. WINT, JR, LAURIE AINSWORTH
WINT, LANCE, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.
C-414 September Term 2017
079660

December 13, 2017

ON PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
To the Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification of the judgment in A-002182-14
having been submitted to this Court, and the Court having consid-
ered the same;

It is ORDERED that the petition for certification is granted;
and it is further

ORDERED that the appellant may electronically serve and file
a supplemental brief on or before February 13, 2018, and respon-
dent may serve and file a supplemental brief forty-five (45) days
after the filing of appellant’s supplemental submission, or, if
appellant declines to file such a submission, on or before April 2,

2018.

565

177 A.3d 754
IN THE MATTER OF BARRY J. BERAN, AN ATTORNEY
AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 019301980)
D-72 September Term 2017
080604

January 31, 2018—Corrected January 31, 2018

CORRECTED ORDER

This matter have been duly presented pursuant to Rule 1:20-
10(b), following a granting of a motion for discipline by consent in
DRB 17-360 of BARRY J. BERAN of CHERRY HILL, who was
admitted to the bar of this State in 1981;

And the Office of Attorney Ethics and respondent having signed
a stipulation of discipline by consent in which it was agreed that
respondent violated RPC 1.15(a)(negligent misappropriation of
trust funds and commingling of funds), RPC 1.15(d) and Rule
1:21-6 (recordkeeping violations);

And the parties having agreed that respondent's conduct violat-
ed RPC 1.15(a), RPC 1.16(d) and Rule 1:21-6, and that said
conduct warrants a three-month suspension from practice;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that a
three-month suspension is the appropriate discipline for respon-
dent’s unethical conduct and having granted the motion for disci-
pline by consent in District Docket No. XIV-2016-0410E;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having further determined
that respondent should be required to submit monthly reconcilia-
tions of his attorney accounts to the Office of Attorney Ethics on a
quarterly basis for a period of two years;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having submitted the record
of the proceedings to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for the
entry of an order of discipline in accordance with Rule 1:20-16(e);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that BARRY J. BERAN of CHERRY HILL
is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
months, effective March 1, 2018, and until the further Order of the
Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall submit monthly reconcilia-
tions of his attorney accounts to the Office of Attorney Ethics on a
quarterly basis for a period of two years and until the further
Order of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing
with suspended attorneys; and it is further

ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 1:20-20(c), respondent’s fail-
ure to comply with the Affidavit of Compliance requirement of
Rule 1:20-20(b)(15) may (1) preclude the Disciplinary Review
Board from considering respondent’s petition for reinstatement
for a period of up to six months from the date respondent files
proof of compliance; (2) be found to constitute a violation of RPC
8.1(b) and RPC 8.4(d); and (8) provide a basis for an action for
contempt pursuant to Rule 1:10-2; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a
permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this
State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Over-
sight Committee for appropriate administrative costs and actual
expenses incurred in the prosecution of this matter, as provided in
Rule 1:20-17.

56"

3

177 A.3d 755

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. TORMU.
E. PRALL, A/K/A JUDDS EMMANUEL, BUTLER JAMES AND
PRALL MANUEL, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

A-28 September Term 2016
078169

Argued October 23, 2017—Decided January 31, 2018

568

Fy
8

2

|
ee
Jennifer E, Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for appellant (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney; Jennifer E. Kmieciak, of counsel and on the briefs).
Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued

the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Stephen W. Kirsch, of counsel and on the briefs).

JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Defendant Tormu Prall was charged with and convicted of the
arson murder of his brother, John Prall (John), and the attempted
murder of John’s girlfriend, Kimberly Meadows (Kimberly).

The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction finding
that: his prior threat to kill his girlfriend, Jessie Harley (Jessie),
was admitted in error and without a limiting instruction; the State
improperly utilized prior bad act evidence in closing; and state-
ments by John to Kimberly were inadmissible hearsay and did not
qualify as dying declarations or excited utterances.

We granted the State’s petition for certification and now reverse
the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate defendant’s
convictions. We agree with the appellate panel’s legal conclusions
that the trial court erred by allowing evidence that defendant

572

threatened to burn down Jessie’s homes and by admitting John’s
hearsay statements to Kimberly that defendant was responsible
for the arson. However, we find the errors were not capable of
producing an unjust result because of the overwhelming weight
and quality of the evidence against defendant.

L

We rely upon the trial transcript and the appellate record for
the following facts and procedural history.

A.

John moved into his late mother’s house in Trenton (the Tren-
ton home), where defendant also lived and where defendant's
girlfriend, Jessie, stayed four to five times per week. At that time,
the utilities were turned off at the Trenton home for nonpayment;
they were restored when John satisfied the outstanding utility
bills.

About two weeks after John moved in with defendant and one
week before the fire, John and defendant argued about defen-
dant’s failure to contribute to the bills and engaged in a physical
altercation.! The Friday before the fire, John prevented Jessie and
defendant from entering the Trenton home, and defendant and
John argued again about the bills. Jessie persuaded defendant to
leave with her and stay at her house that night.

The following morning, Jessie drove defendant back to the
Trenton home. Kimberly was there visiting John. Kimberly testi-
fied that she heard the two argue again about the bills, and heard
defendant tell John, “you food, you food,” before a physical
altercation? broke out between the brothers.? During the argu-

1 Jessie testified at trial that John “grabbed him and they began to tussle’ and
“they was fighting a little bit.”

2Kimberly testified that she was downstairs when the altercation began, but
stated she heard “a lot of scuffling like bumping around and stuff like that.”

573

ment, Jessie was waiting in the car in front of the Trenton home.
She testified that as defendant exited the home he yelled to John,
“you're going to die, you’re going to die, you're going to die.”
Jessie then took defendant back to her house.

That night, at around 7:30 p.m., defendant asked Jessie to
return him to the Trenton home. Jessie did so and, while waiting
in the car, heard yelling from inside. Defendant then returned to
the car “with a gas can in his hand” and said, “I’m going to set the
mo**erfu**er on fire. Would you take me to the gas station so I
can get some gas?” Jessie declined and, while driving defendant to
her house, defendant yelled, “f**k him, I’m going to kill him.” At
Jessie’s house, defendant continued to talk about John, stating
that “Cain killed Abel and [I’m] going to kill [my] brother.”

Two days later, in the morning, defendant was at Jessie’s house
when she left for work as a school bus driver; defendant was not
there when Jessie completed her route and returned home. Jessie
testified that defendant returned to her house around one o'clock
in the afternoon and told her that he had just come from town,
where he had argued again with his brother and, in front of many
people, said he was going to kill him.

That incident was corroborated by Kimberly, who testified that
John had taken her to a bank in downtown Trenton that morning
and “h[ad] words” there with his brother. Kimberly heard defen-
dant tell John, “you’s a dead man, you dead, you food, you food”
and “you are going to die tonight.” As John and Kimberly walked
away, defendant followed, still trying to argue and calling John a
“dead man.”

Later that same day, Jessie took defendant into town again and
returned to work to complete her afternoon bus route, After
completing her afternoon route, Jessie located defendant in North
Trenton. When she found him, defendant was “still kind of upset.”
Shortly after returning to Jessie’s house, defendant fell asleep.

3 According to Kimberly's testimony at trial, “food” means “dead” in street
slang.

574

Jessie then left to pick up her children from a movie and took
them to another house she owned, where she stayed that evening.
When Jessie left defendant, he was wearing a yellow T-shirt.

Kimberly testified that she and John fell asleep that night. An
unknown amount of time went by before she “started feeling
something ... hot on [her] right side.” Laying on her side she
asked John, “[WJhy do you feel so hot?” She then rolled over to
find John on fire from his waist up. Kimberly noticed that her own
legs were also on fire. When Kimberly awakened John, he began
“hollering and screaming saying oh, my God. My brother, my
brother.” Kimberly and John were able to exit the Trenton home.
An ambulance arrived shortly thereafter and transported them to
a hospital. Both were later transferred to the burn unit at Temple
University Hospital. John died four days later.

B.

The investigation of the fire by the Trenton Police Department
and Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office revealed the following
evidence, which was admitted at trial.

During the search of the Trenton home, a trained dog alerted
officers to the presence of ignitable liquids in the second-floor
front bedroom, where John and Kimberly had been sleeping. A
red gas can, a BIC lighter, matches, and a can of WD-40 oil were
located in the second-floor rear bedroom. At trial, Jessie identified
the red gas can as the one defendant had retrieved from the
Trenton home two days before the fatal fire. A qualified expert in
K-9 handling, fire investigation, and accelerant detection testified
at trial that the fire was incendiary, intentionally set, and fueled
by an accelerant. He further determined that the fire had two
points of origin: the second-floor doorway leading into the front
bedroom and the mattress in the same bedroom.

Paul Bethea, a City of Trenton sanitation worker, testified that
he personally witnessed the argument between John and defen-
dant in front of the downtown bank on the Saturday before the
fire. Bethea also testified that, on the morning of the fire, he drove

575

by the scene on his way to work and saw defendant standing on a
nearby corner “staring at the fire.” Bethea stated that he then
went into the work-yard to prepare his truck for the day, which
took approximately twenty minutes; after he left the work-yard,
defendant was still “staring at the fire.”

Based on the information gathered during the investigation,
detectives filed charges against defendant and issued a warrant
for his arrest. Almost a year later, defendant was located in
Connecticut. After returning defendant to New Jersey, a detective
noticed and photographed “severe burns to [defendant’s] hands.”
Detectives also learned from Jessie and others that approximately
one month before the fire, defendant threatened to burn down
both of Jessie’s houses when she attempted to end their relation-
ship. As a result, Jessie obtained a restraining order against
defendant. Jessie also admitted the following: after the fire, she
found the yellow T-shirt defendant wore on the night of the fire;
the T-shirt had dried blood and skin on it; and she discarded the
T-shirt out of fear of defendant.

An indictment was returned by a Mercer County grand jury
charging defendant with first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3(a)(8) (count one); first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(2) (count two); second-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S.A.
2C:17-1(a)(1) (count three); and first-degree attempted murder,
NJ.S.A. 2C:11-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 (count four).

Before trial, the State sought a preliminary determination of the
admissibility of Jessie’s testimony that defendant threatened to
burn down her houses. In response, the court scheduled a Cofield 4
hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b) to address the admissibility of
that evidence of prior bad acts. After the hearing, the court
determined that the evidence was inadmissible because the “ap-
parent prejudice” outweighed any probative value. The court
concluded that “{t]his is exactly the type of [propensity] evidence
that N.J.R.E. 404(b) seeks to exclude.”

4 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338, 605 A.2d 230 (1992).

c

1

At trial, during direct examination by the State, Jessie testified
that, two days after the fire, she found the yellow T-shirt defen-
dant wore the night of the fire with “dry blood and skin on it.” She
further testified that she “threw it in the trash” because officers
had not found defendant and “[she] was scared.” Defense counsel
objected to Jessie’s further testimony regarding her fear of defen-
dant, but the court allowed it, instructing the prosecutor to ask
“{IJeading questions ... so we don’t get too far off the chart.” The
prosecutor asked Jessie, “and specifically he threatened to kill
you,” drawing another objection. The court sustained the objection
and instructed the jury to disregard the question.

On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Jessie’s delay
in reporting the yellow, blood-stained T-shirt she had found, and
challenged whether she was truly afraid of defendant:

Q Have you reported—you ever reported to anyone that you were seared of Mr.
Prall?

A: Just when we was in a relationship, yes, When he threatened me, I reported it
to the police, yes.

Q But you never filed charges in that case, correct?

lo.

: You filed a restraining order?

es, just a restraining order.

Q: That you later dismissed, right?

es.

): But for that one instance, you never reported to anyone that you were scared of
him, correct?
A: No, I haven't.

At the conclusion of Jessie’s cross-examination, the prosecutor
argued at sidebar that he should be permitted to question Jessie
on re-direct examination regarding the specific threats defendant
made to her because defense counsel “opened the door.” Finding a
distinction between direct evidence and rebuttal evidence, the
court ruled that the prosecutor could explore the nature of the

BIT

threats. On re-direct examination, the prosecutor questioned Jes-

sie about defendant's threats to kill Jessie:
Q: He threatened to kill you over the next few days, did he not?
A: Yes, he did.

Q: He threatened to burn your house down, both houses in Burlington and the one
in Trenton; did he not?

A: Yes, he did.
Q: He told you all I need is a gallon of gas to do it? Didn't he tell you that?

A: Yes.

Q: And didn't he also call your employer and told your supervisor he was going to
Kidnap you and your schoo! bus and then kill you?

A: Yes,

On re-cross-examination, Jessie testified that she did not report to
law enforcement that she found and discarded the yellow T-shirt
because she was afraid of defendant.

During the State’s summation, the prosecutor repeated defen-
dant’s threats against Jessie:

Jessie says promise me—talking to the defendant—you won't do anything to your
brother, Defendant says, “I can't promise you that,” Why did Jessie ask him that?
Well, there's only one explanation. Jessie must have really thought he was going to
do it because why would she ask him to promise me you won't Kill your brother?
Why would she say that if she didn't think—and she was there with him—that he
was going to kill his brother? Now, think about what she’s thinking in her mind.
He's already—defendant’s already threatened to kill Jessie a month earlier. He
tells her a month earlier I'm going to—not just anything, not going to kill you. But
what _does he use? What does he say? I'm going to set_your house on fire, your
house in Burlington and your house here. That's how he thinks. That's how he gets
revenge on people. That's how he does it, He sets houses on fire. And all I need is a
gallon of gasoline,

[ (emphasis added).]

Those statements did not elicit an objection from defense counsel.

2.

During the trial, Kimberly testified—without objection—that
when John awoke in flames he shouted repeatedly, “my brother,
my brother” as he attempted to extinguish the fire and flee from
the Trenton home. During a break, the court expressed concern
that those statements were impermissible hearsay. The prosecutor
argued that two hearsay exceptions applied—excited utterance

578

under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2), and dying declaration under N.J.R.E.
804(b)(2). Defense counsel did not respond, and the court reserved
its ruling until after both parties had the opportunity to research
the issue.

Ultimately, the court found that it was error to admit the
testimony but concluded that an appropriate instruction would
cure the error. The curative instruction was given to the jury
twelve days later, immediately before summations and after the
defense presented its only witness, Dr. Mark Taff, a forensic
pathologist who disputed the origin of scars on defendant’s hands.
The court instructed the jury to disregard Kimberly's testimony
about John’s references to defendant and said the following:

‘The reason I am instructing you to disregard the testimony is that it is hearsay. T
wrestled with that and did research and so forth, I heard it as did you, but it has no
probative value in this case, and it has the potential really to incite, to inflame,
things of that nature, and it should not be used,

One has to, therefore, evaluate what is the basis for the statement, and there are
many exceptions in the law. Excited utterance, somebody sees something happen-
ing and sereams. I see a face in the window and it’s so and so. And it may have
happened under extreme circumstances, In this case if John Prall had said, “My
brother's at the window” or something like that or John Jones is at the window,
that might be acceptable under certain rules, but that’s not the case .

Before charging the jury, the trial judge placed on the record a
request from defense counsel that he specifically not “mention
again in the charge to the jury to disregard the testimony of
[Kimberly] concerning the alleged statements by John Prall.” No
other jury instructions regarding defendant’s threats to Jessie or
John’s “my brother, my brother” statements were requested or
given,

38.

The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts, and the court
sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of life plus twenty
years in prison—life for John’s murder, plus twenty years for
defendant’s attempted murder of Kimberly—with an eighty-five

579

percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early
Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant appealed.

The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s convictions, con-
cluding that evidence of “the dangerously prejudicial fact that
defendant had threatened to use the same means for [Jessie's]
demise a month earlier” should not have been admitted. The panel
also noted that the State’s improper use of the evidence in
summation compounded the trial court’s failure to promptly in-
struct the jurors on how to use the information,

The appellate panel also found, relying on N.J.R.E. 701, that
John’s cries blaming defendant for the fire should have been
excluded because John would not have been competent to testify
to an opinion not rationally based on his perception. Therefore,
Kimberly was not permitted to do so, either.

The State petitioned for certification, which this Court granted.
228 N.J. 501, 158 A.8d 585 (2017).

I

A.

First, the State argues that the trial court “properly exercised
its discretion in concluding that defense counsel’s cross examina-
tion of ... Jessie ... opened the door for the prosecution to elicit
testimony regarding defendant’s specific threats to kill her.” Ac-
cording to the State, the threats against Jessie were of special
significance because she believed defendant had carried out the
same threats against John.

The State also claims that the victim’s statements “my brother,
my brother,” as testified to by Kimberly, were admissible dying
declarations or excited utterances.

Finally, the State contends that, even if the challenged testimo-
ny was admitted in error, it was not reversible error because “the
jury’s verdict is amply supported by overwhelming evidence in the
record.”

580

B

Defendant asserts that the prosecutor used evidence of prior
bad acts to show propensity, which is “exactly the type of evidence
that N.J.R.E. 404(b) seeks to exclude.” Defendant concedes that
defense counsel went too far in cross-examining Jessie on her fear
of defendant, but claims that counsel’s transgression opened the
door for re-direct examination only on the purported death threat,
not on its precise nature.

Defendant agrees with the Appellate Division that John’s hear-
say statements—“my brother, my brother”—constituted improper
lay-witness testimony under N.J.R.E. 701 and claims the court
compounded this error by its delay in issuing a curative instruc-
tion. Defendant also avers that, even if the instruction was timely,
it was tainted by the court’s acknowledgment to the jury that the
question of admissibility was one that the court had “wrestled
with.”

Il.

HMM This appeal requires our review of the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings regarding prior bad acts and hearsay. The trial
court's evidentiary rulings “are reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard because, from its genesis, the decision to
admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial
court's discretion.” Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins,
Co,, 202 N.J. 369, 383-84, 997 A.2d 954 (2010). As the appellate
panel recognized here, we do not set such rulings aside unless it
appears that “there has been a clear error of judgment.” State vy.
J.AC., 210 N.J. 281, 295, 44 A.3d 1085 (2012) (quoting State v.
Brown, 170 N.J. 188, 147, 784 A.2d 1244 (2001)). Said differently,
we must be convinced that “the trial court’s ruling is so wide of
the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.” Ibid. (quoting
Brown, 170 N.J. at 147, 784 A.2d 1244 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

581

HH Our review of the evidentiary determinations cannot end
our analysis when we find an abuse of discretion; rather, we must
then determine whether any error found is harmless or requires
reversal. The State offered evidence of prior bad acts on a number
of occasions—by pretrial motion, during Jessie’s direct and redi-
rect examination, and in summation. On some occasions the evi-
dence elicited an objection; on others it did not. Issues regarding
the repetition of John’s hearsay statements “my brother, my
brother” were raised sua sponte by the trial judge. Under those
circumstances, we will disregard any error or omission “unless it
is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an
unjust result.” R. 2:10-2; see also State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 326,
337-38, 273 A.2d 1 (1971). Accordingly, we must determine wheth-
er either claimed “error [was] ‘sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a result it otherwise might
not have reached.’” State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95, 861 A.2d 808
(2004) (second alteration in original) (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at
336, 278 A.2d 1).

To apply those principles, we review both disputed evidentiary
rulings and then consider their potential impact on defendant's
convictions.

Iv.

A

Il We first consider the determination that prior bad acts
evidence was admissible here because defense counsel challenged
Jessie’s purported fear of defendant. We review the admissibility
of defendant’s threats in the context of N.J.R.E. 404(b), which
excludes “evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts ... to prove
the disposition of a person in order to show that such person acted
in conformity therewith.”

HME Because of the “underlying danger” that a “jury may
convict the defendant because he is a ‘bad’ person in general,”
State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496, 514, 95 A.3d 236 (2014) (quoting

State _v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336, 605 A.2d 230 (1992), “to be
admissible, such evidence must be ‘relevant to a material issue,’
and its probative value ‘must not be outweighed by its apparent
prejudice,’” State v, Sanchez—Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 463, 176 A.3d
788, 2018 WL 475170, at *8 (2018) (quoting Cofield, 127 N.J. at
338, 605 A.2d 280 (factors one and four of multi-factor test)).> The
mere bolstering of a witness's credibility does not satisfy the
relevancy element of the Cofield test. Skinner, 218 N.J. at 520, 95
A8d 236; State _v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509, 520-21, 809 A2d 138
(2002). Also, if the evidence withstands a Cofield analysis, before
its admission the trial “court must instruct the jury on the limited
use of the evidence” and “explain precisely the permitted and
prohibited purposes of the evidence.” Cofield, 127 N.J. at 341, 605
A.2d 230.

After a Cofield hearing, the trial court here determined that
evidence about defendant's threats against Jessie was inadmissible
because the “apparent prejudice” outweighed any probative value.
The court concluded that “[t]his is exactly the type of [propensity]
evidence that N.J.R.E. 404(b) seeks to exclude.” Later, however,
the judge found that defense counsel “opened the door” to evi-
dence of defendant’s threats to burn down Jessie’s houses.

HM The “opening the door” doctrine is “a rule of expanded
relevancy and authorizes admitting evidence which otherwise
would have been irrelevant or inadmissible in order to respond to
(1) admissible evidence that generates an issue, or (2) inadmissible
evidence admitted by the court over objection.” State v. James,
144 NJ. 588, 554, 677 A.2d 734 (1996) (emphases omitted), In
other words, it permits “a party to elicit otherwise inadmissible
evidence when the opposing party has made unfair prejudicial use

5 There is no dispute that the second element of the Cofield analysis, requiring
that the prior act be “similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense
charged,” Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338, 605 A.2d 230, is satisfied, Likewise, the clear-
and-convincing element of the Cofield test is not in dispute because the testimo-
ny concerning the threat came directly from the victim of the threat, whom the
trial judge found to be credible.

583

of related evidence.” Ibid. (citation omitted). The “doctrine oper-
ates to prevent a defendant from successfully excluding from the
prosecution’s case-in-chief inadmissible evidence and then selec-
tively introducing pieces of this evidence for the defendant’s own
advantage, without allowing the prosecution to place the evidence
in its proper context.” Ibid. The doctrine is limited, however, by
weighing the probative value against the prejudicial nature of the
evidence under N.J.R.E. 403. Ibid.

To the extent that evidence of the threats was intended to
bolster Jessie’s credibility as a witness, we emphasize that such
use of prior bad acts evidence does not satisfy the relevancy
element of the Cofield test. Skinner, 218 N.J. at 520, 95 A.3d 236,
Furthermore, even if defense counsel did “open the door” to
testimony about defendant’s threat, rendering it relevant, the
probative value of that testimony would nevertheless need to
outweigh its apparent prejudice to be admissible. See James, 144
N.J. at 554, 677 A.2d 734 (subjecting “opening the door” argument
to probative/prejudice balancing test).

Here, defense counsel challenged Jessie’s representation that
she feared defendant, which did—as defendant concedes—render
potential rebuttal evidence relevant. On re-direct examination,
however, the prosecution did not limit itself to the subject of
Jessie’s fear, Rather, the prosecutor impermissibly expanded that
subject by eliciting testimony about the specific nature of defen-
dant’s threat and its similarity to what occurred in this case. The
prosecutor then fatally undermined any claim by the State that it
was seeking merely to rebut defense counsel’s cross-examination
by improperly arguing propensity in closing:

But what does he use? What does he say? I’m going to set your house on fire, your
house in Burlington and your house here. That's how he thinks. That’s how he gets
revenge on people. That's how he does it. He sets houses on fire. And all I need is a

gallon of gasoline.
[ (emphases added).]

Defendant correctly argues that the State could have directed
the jury’s attention to defendant’s death threats without relaying
the specific nature of the threats; such testimony would be admis-

sible to rebut any implication that Jessie and defendant “were
involved in minor domestic squabbles” only and that she was
overstating her fear of him. The specific nature of the threats,
however, is highly prejudicial propensity evidence without justify-
ing relevance, which N.J.R.E. 404(b) explicitly prohibits. See, e.g.,
State _v. P.S., 202 N.J. 282, 260, 997 A.2d 163 (2010) (holding
evidence of unrelated sex crime tending to show propensity inad-
missible because “unmoored from the principles informing
N.J.R.E. 404(b)”). Essentially, even if defense counsel “opened the
door,” counsel did not open it so wide as to allow in inadmissible
evidence of prior bad acts.

We hold, therefore, that it was a “clear error of judgment” and
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit Jessie’s
testimony on redirect examination that defendant threatened to
kill her by burning down her houses. That evidence was not
“relevant to a material issue,” and its probative value was “out-
weighed by its apparent prejudice.” Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. at
465, 176 A.8d at 795, 2018 WL 475170, at *8 (quoting Cofield, 127
NJ. at 388, 605 A.2d 230). The error was magnified by the trial
court’s failure to “instruct the jury on the limited use of the
evidence” before its admission. Cofield, 127 N.J. at 341, 605 A.2d
230.

B.

We next consider whether the admission of Kimberly’s hearsay
testimony that, after waking up engulfed in flames, John hollered
“my brother, my brother,” was also error and, if so, whether the
error was remedied by the court’s curative instruction. In deciding
the admissibility of the hearsay statements, we must review the
applicable exceptions to the rule against hearsay.

1

To begin, N.J.R.E. 801(¢) defines hearsay as “a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

585

asserted.” Hearsay is generally inadmissible “except as provided
by [the Rules of Evidence] or by other law.” N.J.R.E. 802. In the
present appeal, the State relies on two exceptions to the hearsay
rule to support admissibility—the excited-utterance exception and
the dying-declaration exception.

N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2) defines an excited utterance as “[a] statement,
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant
was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition and without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate.” A
dying declaration, which is a “[s]tatement under belief of imminent
death,” is also “admissible if it was made voluntarily and in good
faith and while the declarant believed in the imminence of declar-
ant’s impending death.” N.J.R.E. 804(b)(2). Although there is no
controlling New Jersey authority explaining “belief of imminent
death,” the United States Supreme Court has held that “[dlespair
of recovery may indeed be gathered from the circumstances if the
facts support the inference.” Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S.
96, 100, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933).

HM The State contends that John’s statements to Kimberly—
“my brother, my brother’—made while John was engulfed in
flames, are excited utterances and dying declarations, Neverthe-
less, they are not allowable as hearsay exceptions unless they
would be admissible if testified to at trial by the declarant. 6
McCormick on Evidence § 18 (2006); see_also N.J.R.E. 701;
McCormick at § 272, 313. An excited utterance or dying declara-
tion may be excluded if the declarant did not have direct personal
knowledge of the statement’s basis. Ibid. Thus, to be admissible,
John’s statements to Kimberly must have been based upon John’s
“firsthand” observations. Ibid.

The fire started while John and Kimberly were asleep, and John
did not awaken until he was engulfed in flames. The record does
not contain evidence that John made any observations or had
direct knowledge that defendant started the fire. Thus, whether
offered as dying declarations or excited utterances, John’s state-
ments, “my brother, my brother,” were inadmissible hearsay

because they were not based on actual knowledge. The statements
should not have been admitted.

2.

HH Although the trial court allowed Kimberly to testify about
John’s statements blaming his brother for the arson, the court
ultimately disallowed the testimony and gave a curative instruc-
tion. Therefore, we consider whether the trial court’s curative jury
instruction sufficiently mitigated any prejudice caused by the
admission of the hearsay.

HE «When inadmissible evidence is admitted in error by
the trial court, a curative instruction may sometimes be a suffi-
cient remedy. See State _v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 646, 477 A.2d 323
(1984). An effective curative instruction needs to be “firm, clear,
and accomplished without delay.” State _v. Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122,
184, 965 A.2d 1181 (2009); see also State vy. Wakefield, 190 N.J.
397, 452, 921 A.2d 954 (2007) (noting trial court issued “immediate
curative instruction” to deal with issues raised by State’s com-
ments “promptly and effectively”); State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J.
565, 614, 751 A.2d 40 (2000) (explaining that State expert’s testi-
mony regarding defendant’s guilt was improper but that “trial
court’s curative instructions given immediately after [the] state-
ments ... were sufficient to remedy [the] improper testimony”);
State _v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 203-05, 699 A.2d 596 (1997)
(concluding that trial court’s curative instruction was sufficient to
mitigate prejudice to defendant caused by reference to unindicted
suspect’s polygraph results where instruction to disregard evi-
dence was immediate); Winter, 96 NJ. at 649, 477 A2d 323
(holding curative instruction sufficient because, “[b]efore defense
counsel even objected, the court struck the offending remark” and,
after brief recess, gave “sharp and complete curative instruction”);
State v. LaPorte, 62 N.J. 312, 318, 301 A.2d 146 (1978) (“The trial
judge immediately instructed the jury in the strongest terms to
disregard the offending remark.”).

HM Moreover, in curing potentially prejudicial testimony, a
judge must not confuse a jury by disclosing the court’s own
reasons for denying or admitting evidence, which are extraneous
and potentially suggestive. Cf, State v. Ridout, 299 N.J, Super.
238, 240-41, 690 A.2d 1066 (App. Div. 1997) (finding reversible
error in trial judge’s potentially influential statements to jury
which “effectively took that issue out of its hands” and collecting
cases from other jurisdictions finding that trial courts’ references
to reasoning behind their evidentiary decisions can be so sugges-
tive as to taint jurors’ consideration of admitted evidence).

Here, the curative instruction was given before summations,
twelve days after the improper testimony; it was not given imme-
diately. In giving the instruction, the trial judge discussed, among
other things, the excited utterance hearsay exception and the fact
that he had “wrestled with” the statements’ admissibility and
barred them after conducting “research and so forth.”

Therefore, although the judge properly informed the jury of the
specific evidence they were to disregard, he did so neither soon
enough nor sufficiently firmly, clearly, and effectively to “remedy
[the] improper testimony.” See Papasavvas, 163 N.J. at 614, 751
A.2d 40. We thus find an abuse of discretion in the admission of
the hearsay evidence and a failure to sufficiently remedy that
error via curative instruction.

HM We take this opportunity to remind our trial courts that
when delivering curative instructions, judges should limit their
comments to the ruling itself and not add commentary that could
cause confusion or dilute the instruction’s effect. Ridout, 299 N.J.
Super. at 240, 690 A.2d 1066.

v.

HB Having found that the trial court abused its discretion
through the improper admission of both hearsay and prior bad
acts evidence and the failure to properly instruct the jury as to
either, we now consider whether those errors were “clearly capa-

ble of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. We repeat that, to
warrant reversal of defendant’s conviction, those errors, singly or
collectively, must “raise a reasonable doubt” as to whether they
affected the result reached by the jury. Macon, 57 N.J. at 336, 273
A2d 1. Also, “[t]he error[s] must be evaluated ‘in light of the
overall strength of the State’s case.’ ” Sanchez~Medina, 231 N.J. at
468, 176 A.3d at 797, 2018 WL 475170, at *10 (quoting State v.
Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 388, 45 A.3d 310 (2012)).

Here, there was overwhelming fact and expert evidence proper-
ly offered against defendant. On numerous occasions and before
many witnesses, defendant threatened to kill his brother. On at
least one occasion, two days before the fire, defendant told Jessie
he would burn his brother to death. Indeed, on that occasion,
defendant retrieved a gas can from his home and asked Jessie to
take him to fill it. That same gas can was later recovered from the
scene of the fire by investigators and identified at trial by Jessie.
Investigators determined that the fire originated in the bedroom
where John and Kimberly slept. Jessie also provided testimony
that she last saw defendant in a yellow T-shirt and then found the
same shirt after the arson with dried blood and skin on it. Paul
Bethea, the City of Trenton sanitation worker, testified that he
witnessed defendant and John arguing in front of a Trenton bank
and that he saw defendant at the scene of the fire, standing on the
corner “staring at the fire” for a period of at least twenty minutes.
Defendant fled the state after the fire. Nearly a year later,
detectives located defendant and observed burn scars on his
hands.

This is a rare case in which we find significant errors by the
trial court to be harmless because, when evaluated in light of the
vast evidence against defendant, those errors were not “sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [they] led the jury to a
result it otherwise might not have reached.” Daniels, 182 N.J. at
95, 861 A.2d 808 (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at 336, 273 A.2d 1); see
also State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 497, 691 A.2d 293 (1997)
(finding insufficient instruction as to other crimes evidence harm-

8

less because, in “consideration of the near overwhelming evidence
of guilt,” instruction “did not tip the scales”), Here, there was
overwhelming admissible evidence on which to convict defendant,
and his convictions should therefore not have been disturbed.

VI.

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the
Appellate Division and reinstate defendant’s convictions.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and TIMPONE
join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.

177 A.3d 768

MARGO S. ARDAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BOARD OF RE-
VIEW, LOURDES MEDICAL CENTER OF BURLINGTON
COUNTY, INC, AND ALLIANCE HEALTHCARE, DEFEN-
DANTS-RESPONDENTS.

A-35 September Term 2016
077771

Argued October 11, 2017—Decided February 1, 2018

g
B

591

Fy |
a
8

39
ex
6

594

595

Sarah S. Hymowitz argued the cause for appellant (Legal
Services of New Jersey, attorney; Sarah S, Hymowitz, Keith
Talbot, Anisa Rahim, and Melville D. Miller, on the briefs).

Christopher J. Hamner, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent Board of Review (Christopher S. Porrino,
Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel, and Robert M. Strang, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).

Cindy M. Perr, Associate General Counsel, argued the cause for
respondent Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, Inc.
(Lourdes Health System, attorney; Cindy M. Perr, on the brief.)

JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

New Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Law provides that
a person who leaves work “voluntarily without good cause attribut-
able to such work” is ineligible for unemployment benefits until
she is “reemployed and works eight weeks in employment” in a
new position, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). A regulation prescribes an ex-
ception to that rule. It provides that if the claimant left a previous
job “due to a physical and/or mental condition or state of health”
that “does not have a work-connected origin but is aggravated by
working conditions,” she is not disqualified from receiving bene-
fits, “provided there was no other suitable work available which

the [claimant] could have performed within the limits of the
disability.” N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b).

Applying that statute and regulation, we must determine wheth-
er the Appellate Division properly denied plaintiff Margo S.
Ardan’s application for unemployment benefits. We disagree with
the Appellate Division’s holding that, in all cases, a claimant must
prove that she notified her previous employer of her medical
condition and sought an accommodation in order to establish the
unavailability of “other suitable work” for purposes of N.J.A.C.
12:17-9.8(b). No notice-and-inquiry requirement appears in the
regulation as currently drafted; such a mandate may be imposed
only by rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31.

We concur with the Appellate Division panel, however, that in
the circumstances of this case, Ardan did not meet her burden to
prove that she is within N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.8(b)’s exception to the
disqualification rule of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We also agree with the
panel’s conclusion that although Ardan would be eligible for
unemployment benefits pursuant to an amendment to N.J.S.A.
43:21-5(a) enacted three years after she filed her application, that
amendment does not apply retroactively to her case. See L. 2015,
¢. 41 (amending N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) ).

We therefore affirm as modified the Appellate Division’s judg-
ment affirming the denial of Ardan’s application for unemployment
benefits.

L

We derive our summary of the facts from the record presented
to the Department of Labor and Workforce Development Appeal
Tribunal and the Board of Review.

On September 7, 2010, Ardan was employed as a registered
nurse at Lourdes Medical Center of Burlington County, Ine.
(Medical Center). Although she was hired as a part-time employ-
ee, Ardan typically worked thirty-six hours per week. At the

597

conclusion of Ardan’s employment, the Medical Center paid her
$29.76 per hour. As part of her patient-care responsibilities, Ardan
was required to walk substantial distances, as well as to bend, lift,
shift, and transfer patients.

According to her testimony and medical records, Ardan suffered
from chronic neck, lower-back, and left-knee pain for many years
before she began working at the Medical Center. Her treatment
records for the period in which she was employed at the Medical
Center indicate that her condition was permanent and that her
pain made it difficult for her to do her job. Ardan did not disclose
her orthopedic condition to her employer during her tenure at the
Medical Center and did not request less strenuous duties.

In 2012, Alliance Healthcare (Alliance) hired Ardan as a health-
care communicator. Ardan characterized the Alliance job as “ex-
actly what [she] had been looking for”—a nursing “desk job” that
would “reduce the physical impact on [her] body” but did not
entail a substantial reduction in her hourly wages. Ardan resigned
from the Medical Center by letter dated November 7, 2012. In her
resignation letter, Ardan stated that she was leaving “to seek
another opportunity.” She did not mention any medical condition
as a factor in her departure.

Ardan began work for Alliance on November 12, 2012. Seven
weeks later, on December 27, 2012, Alliance terminated her em-
ployment. Ardan attributed her termination to her failure to pass
certification examinations that were required for her position.

On December 28, 2012, Ardan applied for unemployment com-
pensation. The Deputy Director of the Division of Unemployment
and Disability Insurance disqualified Ardan from receiving bene-
fits because her “reason for leaving was personal”; her reason did
“not constitute good cause attributable to the work”; and although
she had obtained subsequent employment, Ardan had “not earned
at least ten times [her] weekly benefit rate in at least eight weeks
of employment as required by law.”

598

Ardan appealed to the Appeal Tribunal. Appearing pro se at the
hearing before the Tribunal, Ardan did not disclose that she had
resigned from the Medical Center because her work had aggravat-
ed her preexisting orthopedic condition. Instead, she testified
generally that the physical demands of the job were “way too
much.” Ardan confirmed that she advised the Medical Center only
that she was leaving for another opportunity, and conceded that
she “didn’t talk to anybody” representing her employer about her
departure. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Deputy Director's
ruling disqualifying Ardan from unemployment benefits under
N.J.S.A. 48:21-5(a).

Ardan retained counsel and appealed to the Board of Review.
For the first time, Ardan relied on N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b)’s medical
exception, and presented evidence that her orthopedic condition
prompted her departure from the Medical Center. She explained
to the Board of Review that she had not detailed her medical
condition to the Appeal Tribunal because she had considered
“where I choose to work and why I choose to leave a job” to be a
private matter.

The Board remanded the case to the Appeal Tribunal for a new
hearing and decision based on the medical evidence that Ardan
submitted. At the hearing on remand, Ardan testified that she did
not request that the Medical Center explore an alternative posi-
tion for her because “it was not an option; it was not available to
request accommodations or to ask for another position.” She
stated that the Medical Center assigned nurses to “light duty” but
only on a temporary basis; that she was compelled to work as a
registered nurse as a condition of a scholarship that the Medical

1Ardan presented to the Board of Review a treating physician's report, in
which her physician recommended that she leave her position at the Medical
Center for a job that would be less physically demanding. That report was dated
July 16, 2013, almost a year after Ardan’s departure from the Medical Center.
Ardan testified that to the best of her recollection, the physician had advised her
during her employment at the Medical Center as well as after the conclusion of
that employment that she should seek a less demanding job.

599

Center’s nursing school had awarded her; that she lacked the
educational qualifications for “any kind of management or admin-
istrative” position; and that the only available positions would be
“lower positions like becoming a Nursing Assistant which also has
... the same physical requirements as [the job of a registered
nurse].” As her testimony made clear, Ardan arrived at those
conclusions on her own, without communicating with her employer
regarding her medical condition.

Following the hearing on remand, the Appeal Tribunal again
determined that Ardan had left her position with the Medical
Center voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work,
and disqualified her from unemployment benefits pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Ardan appealed to the Board of Review. The
Board of Review affirmed the Appeal Tribunal’s denial of benefits,
and Ardan again appealed.

An Appellate Division panel affirmed the determination of the
Board of Review. Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 444 N.J. Super. 576,
590, 134 A.3d 1018 (App. Div. 2016). The panel concluded that the
Board of Review had properly construed N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) to
require an employee “to notify an employer of a medical condition
that was aggravated by the working conditions, request an accom-
modation, and afford the employer an opportunity to address the
matter to determine whether there was other suitable work avail-
able.” Id, at 586, 134 A.3d 1018, The panel noted that although the
medical evidence established that Ardan was unable to work at the
Medical Center “due to a non-work connected medical condition
that was aggravated by her working conditions, [Ardan] made no
attempt whatsoever to protect her employment.” Id. at 585-86,
134 A.3d 1018.

The panel concluded that Ardan was disqualified for benefits not
only under N.J.S.A. 48:21-5(a), but pursuant to a regulation that
deems an employee “who leaves work ‘[t]o accept other work’ ...
to have left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to
the work.” Id. at 586, 184 A.3d 1018 (quoting N.J.A.C. 12:17-
9,1(e)(9) ). The panel rejected Ardan’s argument that the 2015

600

amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), which would have allowed her
to receive benefits, should apply retroactively to her. Id. at 586-90,
184 A.3d 1018,

We granted certification. 229 N.J. 185, 160 A.3d 693 (2017).

Il.

Ardan argues that her case is governed by N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b)
because she left her job at the Medical Center due to a medical
condition that was not work-related and there was no suitable
work available for her at that facility. She contests the Appellate
Division’s holding that an employee must prove that she advised
the former employer of the medical condition and formally re-
quested an accommodation in order to avoid disqualification from
benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Ardan contends that no such
requirement is imposed by the relevant statutes, regulations, or
judicial decisions, and that the Department of Labor could impose
such a mandate only through rulemaking. In the alternative,
Ardan contends that the Court should retroactively apply the 2015
amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) to her case and that she is
entitled to benefits under that amendment.

The Board of Review counters that Ardan left her position at
the Medical Center voluntarily without good cause attributable to
her work, and is therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits
under N.J,S.A, 48:21-5(a). It argues that N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b)
requires a claimant who left a position due to a non-work-related
medical condition to prove that the claimant requested alternative
work that she could have performed despite her medical condition,
The Board of Review asserts that the 2015 amendment to N.J.A.C.
12:17-9.3(b) is prospective only, and is therefore irrelevant to this
appeal.

The Medical Center adopts the Board of Review's arguments.
In statements made for the first time at oral argument, the
Medical Center represents that when an employee informs it of a
medical condition and requests an accommodation, it engages in
an interactive process in accordance with the Americans with

601

Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(8).
The Medical Center asserts that in such cases, its Human Re-
sources Department determines whether there are suitable posi-
tions available to the employee. The Medical Center states that its
network of two acute care hospitals and nearly 100 physician
practices employs more than 2000 employees.

UL
A.

1

The Legislature enacted the Unemployment Compensation Law
to further an important public policy: alleviating the burden of
involuntary unemployment, a burden that “now so often falls with
crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family.”
NWJ.S.A. 43:21-2. The statute establishes “a cushion for the work-
ers of New Jersey against the shocks and rigors of unemploy-
ment.” Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 212, 704 A.2d 547
(1997) (quoting Carpet Remnant Warehouse v. Dep't of Labor, 125
NJ. 567, 581, 593 A.2d 1177 (1991) (internal quotation marks
removed) ). It is intended to “provide some income for the worker
earning nothing, because he is out of work through no fault or act
of his own.” Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Review, 114 N.J. 371,
375, 554 A.2d 1837 (1989) (emphasis removed) (quoting Schock v.
Bd. of Review, 89 N.J. Super. 118, 125, 214 A.2d 40 (App. Div.
1965) ).

I “In order to further its remedial and beneficial purposes,
the [Unemployment Compensation Law] is to be construed liberal-
ly in favor of allowance of benefits.” Id. at 874, 554 A.2d 1387. We
“must carry in mind the dire and distressing situations against
which the statute, as a matter of stated public policy, is directed.”
Brady, 152 N.J. at 212, 704 A.2d 547 (quoting W.T. Grant Co. v.
Bad, of Review, 129 N.J.L. 402, 405, 29 A.2d 858 (1948) ).

602

TI We have also recognized, however, the importance of “pre-
serv[ing] the [unemployment insurance trust] fund against claims
by those not intended to share in its benefits. The basic policy of
the law is advanced as well when benefits are denied in improper
cases as when they are allowed in proper cases.” Ibid. (second
alteration in original) (quoting Yardville, 114 N.J. at 374, 554 A.2d
1337). The Unemployment Compensation Law “is designed to
serve not simply the interest of the unemployed, but also the
interest of the general public.” Ibid.

Hl The Unemployment Compensation Law “protects not only
workers who are involuntarily unemployed—those who are laid-off
or terminated from their jobs by their employers—but also those
who voluntarily quit their jobs for good cause attributable to their
work.” Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J. 584, 543-44, 946 A.2d 1039
(2008). The Legislature “amended the statute in 1961 to disqualify
claimants who left work for purely personal reasons.” Brady, 152
NJ. at 218, 704 A.2d 547, The statute provides that a claimant is
disqualified from receiving benefits “[flor the week in which the
individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attribut-
able to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individu-
al becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment.”
NJS.A. 43:21-5(a).

HI Im applying that provision, “a court must ‘differentiate
between (1) a voluntary quit with good cause attributable to the
work and (2) a voluntary quit without good cause attributable to
the work.” Brady, 152 N.J. at 218-14, 704 A.2d 547 (quoting Self
v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 457, 453 A.2d 170 (1982) ).

IB As it appears in N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), the phrase “good
cause attributable to such work” denotes “a reason related directly
to the individual’s employment, which was so compelling as to give
the individual no choice but to leave the employment.” N.J.A.C.
12:17-9.1(b), “The test of ‘ordinary common sense and prudence’
must be utilized to determine whether an employee’s decision to
leave work constitutes good cause.” Brady, 152 N.J. at 214, 704

A.2d 547 (quoting Zielenski 85 N.J. Super. 46, 52,
203 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1964)). A regulation sets forth a non-
exhaustive list of examples in which a claimant’s separation from
employment “shall be reviewed as a voluntarily leaving work
issue”:

1. Laek of transportation;
._ Care of children or other relatives;
. School attendance;
Self-employment;
Lack of housing;
;. Relocating to another area for personal reasons;
. Relocating to another area to accompany a spouse, a civil union partner, or
other relatives;
& Voluntary retirement;
9. To accept other work; or
10. Incarceration,
IN.JAC. 12:17-9.1).]

Porc)

nes

In the wake of a voluntary departure from work, the claimant
bears the burden “to establish good cause attributable to such
work for leaving.” N.J.A.C, 12:17-9.1(¢); see also Brady, 152 N.J.
at 218, 704 A.2d 547.

In 1998, the Department of Labor promulgated a regulation
that exempted from disqualification under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)
certain claimants who left prior work due to medical conditions
exacerbated by their working conditions:

An individual who leaves a job due to a physical and/or mental condition or state of

health which does not have a work-connected origin but is aggravated by working

conditions will not be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work without
good cause “attributable to such work,” provided there was no other suitable work
available which the individual could have performed within the limits of the
disability

IN.J.A.C. 12:17-9.30).]

Although the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that
she is within the parameters of N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.8(b), the regula-
tion does not prescribe what proofs the claimant must present to
demonstrate that there was no “suitable work” that could be
performed “within the limits of the disability.” Ibid. Prior to this
case, neither this Court nor the Appellate Division had specified

the showing that a claimant must make to demonstrate that she is
within N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.8(b)’s exception to disqualification under
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).?

2.

HE Against that backdrop, we review the Board of Review’s
determination that Ardan left her position at the Medical Center
voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work,

Hl We conduct that inquiry in accordance with a familiar
standard of review. In an appeal from a final agency decision, an
appellate court is “in no way bound by the agency’s interpretation
of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue.” US
Bank, N.A. v. Hough, 210 NJ. 187, 200, 42 A.3d 870 (2012)
(quoting Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48, 921 A.2d 1122 (2007) ).

I Nonetheless, we “defer to an agency’s interpretation of
both a statute and implementing regulation, within the sphere of
the agency’s authority, unless the interpretation is plainly unrea-
sonable.” In re Election Law Enft Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 01-
2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262, 989 A.2d 1254 (2010) (quoting Reilly v.
AAA Mid-Atl. Ins. Co. of NuJ., 194 N.J. 474, 485, 946 A.2d 564
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) ). That deference derives
from our “understanding that a state agency brings experience
and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulat-
ing a legislative enactment within its field of expertise.” Ibid.

I “To apply the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard, we first
consider the words of the statute, affording to those words ‘their
ordinary and commonsense meaning.’” In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-

2Before NJ.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) was promulgated, this Court observed that
“[t]he only recognized exception to [N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)'s disqualification] rule
exists where an employee, unable to work because of illness, nevertheless makes
an attempt to protect his or her employment.” Yardville, 114 N.J. at 376, 554
A.2d 1337.

605

to-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 588, 542, 189 A.3d 1146 (2016)
(quoting In re Election Law Enft Comm'n, 201 N.J. at 263, 989
A.2d 1254). “In that inquiry, [w]e interpret a regulation in the
same manner that we would interpret a statute.’” Ibid, (alteration
in original) (quoting US Bank, N.A., 210 NJ. at 199, 42 A.3d 870).

Rejecting Ardan’s contention that she is within the exception
provided by N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.8(b), the Board of Review construed
the regulation to globally require proof that the claimant notified
the employer of her medical condition, and requested an aceommo-
dation. The Appellate Division panel agreed. Ardan, 444 N.J.
Super. at 586, 134 A.3d 1018,

We do not view N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) to generally impose a
notice-and-inquiry requirement on every claimant who has depart-
ed her work because that work aggravated a medical condition. By
its plain terms, the regulation defines what the claimant must
prove: that there was “no other suitable work available which the
individual could have performed within the limits of the disability.”
N.J.A.C, 12:17-9.3(b).

Applied to a vast range of workplace settings, that standard
ealls for an individualized determination; it does not mandate in
every case that the claimant demonstrate that she notified the
employer of the medical condition and sought an alternative
position that would accommodate that condition. In some cases,
the claimant's medical proofs, combined with evidence of the
physical demands of the former employment, the small size of the
workplace, or other relevant factors, will be sufficient to satisfy
the claimant’s burden to demonstrate the unavailability of alterna-
tive “suitable work.” In other circumstances, a claimant will not be
in a position to meet that burden absent proof that she notified the
employer and sought an aceommodation prior to resigning from
the job.

TH To be sure, the imposition of a notice-and-inquiry require-
ment in N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.8(b) would prompt some employees and
employers to jointly address the employee’s working conditions

606

and consider accommodations, thus advancing the public policy
expressed in the Unemployment Compensation Law. Any such
requirement, however, may be generally imposed only by rule-
making pursuant to the APA. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4; see also In re
Provision of Basic Generation Serv. for Period Beginning June 1,
2008, 205 N.J. 339, 848-50, 15 A.38d 829 (2011) (“Agencies should
act through rulemaking procedures when the action is intended to
have a ‘widespread, continuing, and prospective effect,’ deals with
policy issues, materially changes existing laws, or when the action
will benefit from rulemaking’s flexible fact-finding procedures.”
(quoting Metromedia, Ine. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313,
331, 478 A.2d 742 (1984) ) ). As this Court has observed, an agency
action constitutes rulemaking if it appears, “in many or most of
the following circumstances,” that the action
(1) is intended to have wide coverage encompassing a large segment of the
regulated or general publie, rather than an individual or a narrow seleet group; (2)
is intended to be applied generally and uniformly to all similarly situated persons;
8) is designed to operate only in future eases, that is, prospectively; (4) prescribes
a legal standard or directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly
and obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization; (5) reflects an
administrative policy that (j) was not previously expressed in any official and
explicit agency determination, adjudication or rule, or (ji) constitutes a material and
significant change from a clear, past ageney position on the identical subject
matter; and (6) reflects a decision on administrative regulatory policy in the nature
of the interpretation of law or general policy.
(Metromedia, 97 N.J. at 831-82, 478 A.2d 742.)

We noted that “[tJhese relevant factors can, either singly or in
combination, determine in a given case whether the essential
agency action must be rendered through rule-making or adjudica-
tion.” Id. at 332, 478 A.2d 742.

The “agency action” in this case—the Board of Review’s imposi-
tion of a general requirement that a claimant prove notice to the
employer and a request for an accommodation in order to satisfy
the burden imposed by N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.8(b)—meets the Me-
tromedia test. That action would establish a “legal standard or
directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or clearly and
obviously inferable from the enabling statutory authorization.” Id.
at 331, 478 A.2d 742. It would state an administrative policy that.

was not previously expressed in “any official and explicit agency
determination, adjudication or rule.” Ibid. That legal standard and
agency policy cannot be implemented by means of the adjudication
of this or any other action. It requires rulemaking.

Accordingly, we find that aspect of the Board of Review's
interpretation of N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) to be plainly unreasonable.

HM Nonetheless, even if N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) is not read to
impose a general notice-and-inquiry requirement, Ardan failed to
meet the burden imposed by the regulation. N.J.A.C. 12:17-
9.3(b)’s plain language compels a showing that, at the time of the
claimant’s departure, either the employer had no position available
that would accommodate the claimant’s condition or the claimant
would not have been assigned to any such position. Here, Ardan
worked for a medical and surgical hospital that employs hundreds
of employees. See Consumer Reports, All Hospital Ratings:
Lourdes Medical Center, https:/Avww.consumerreports.org/health/
hospitals/lourdes-medical-center-of-burlington-county/hospital-
information/6220547/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2018); Am. Hosp. Ass'n,
AHA Guide to the Health Care Field at A-425 (2017 ed.). Despite
the substantial size of her employer’s facility, Ardan did not
investigate alternative nursing opportunities, either with the assis-
tance of human resources personnel or on her own. Instead, Ardan
surmised that the Medical Center would have denied her a “light
duty” nursing assignment, that it would have deemed her unquali-
fied for management or administrative jobs, that it would have
restricted her opportunities because of the conditions of her
scholarship, and that at best, it would have demoted her to a
lower-ranking but physically demanding job as a nursing assistant.

Nothing in the record supports Ardan’s conclusory assertion
that any effort to secure a reassignment to “suitable work” at the
Medical Center would have proven futile. As our dissenting col-
leagues emphasize, Ardan testified that she did not contact her
employer to explore alternative positions because she did not
believe that the Medical Center would offer her light duty work or

a less demanding position. Post at 615-16, 177 A.3d at 783-843
Ardan, however, presented no proof that “suitable work” was
unavailable to her at the Medical Center. She submitted no job
descriptions or other documents indicating what positions were
open when she left her employment. Ardan conceded that she told
the Medical Center nothing about her medical condition because
she considered that information private, that she sought no accom-
modation, and that she represented to the Medical Center that she
was leaving for another position, not that she was unable to
perform her job duties for medical reasons. As her testimony
confirms, Ardan’s contention that no accommodation was available
to her at the Medical Center was premised on nothing but
speculation. In short, Ardan failed to establish that no “suitable
work” was available to her at the Medical Center.

We therefore conclude that the Board of Review properly found
that Ardan failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that her case
is within the exception prescribed by N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.8(b) and
that, for purposes of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), she “left work voluntarily
without good cause attributable to such work.”

B.

HI We review de novo the Appellate Division’s determination
that the 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) does not retroac-
tively apply to Ardan’s application for unemployment compensa-
tion. See Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386, 143
A.8d 254 (2016) (noting that question of retroactivity of statute “is
a purely legal question of statutory interpretation” subject to
plenary review).

3. Our dissenting colleagues stress that Ardan’s testimony about her reasons for
not inquiring about available positions was “uncontroverted” and “uncontradict-
ed.” Post at 615-16, 177 A.3d at 783-84. Because Ardan presented only her
subjective view as to what would have occurred had she sought an accommoda-
tion rather than evidence of an actual inquiry, it is unclear how the Board of
Review or the Medical Center could have rebutted her testimony in that regard.

609

The amendment at issue created an exception to the general
rule that a claimant who left her work “[t]o accept other work” is
deemed to have departed voluntarily without “good cause attribut-
able to such work.” NJ.S.A. 43:21-5(a); NJAC. 12:17-9.1(e).
Under the amended statute, that rule

shall not apply to an individual who voluntarily leaves work with one employer to

accept from another employer employment which commences not more than seven

days after the individual leaves employment with the first employer, if the
employment with the second employer has weekly hours or pay not less than the
hours or pay of the employment of the first employer.

[NWS.A, 43:21-5(a),]

All parties agree that if N.J.S.A, 43:21-5(a) as amended in 2015
were to apply retroactively to Ardan’s 2012 claim for unemploy-
ment benefits, she would not be disqualified for unemployment
benefits under the statute. If, as the Appellate Division held, the
amendment applies only prospectively, Ardan’s application for
benefits was properly denied.

The 2015 amendment is silent as to the question of retroactivity.
See Its legislative history indicates that the Legislature
understood the amendment to effect a significant change in the
law:

Current law ... disqualifies an individual who voluntarily leaves a job from

receiving [unemployment insurance] benefits and requires the individual to become

reemployed and work at least eight weeks, earning at least 10 times the individual's
weekly [unemployment insurance] benefit rate, before again being eligible for

{unemployment insurance] benefits. This bill makes an exception from that require-

ment for an individual who leaves one job to accept a subsequent job at least equal

in hours or pay, but is laid off from the subsequent job.

[A. Appropriations Comm, Statement to S. 2082 (Feb. 5, 2015).]

As explained by one of its sponsors, the amendment was intend-
ed “to take a system right now where people are falling through
the cracks to ensure that they don’t.” Hearing on S. Comm,
Substitute for S, 2082 before the S. Labor Comm., 216th Leg., at
11 (statement of Sen. Fred Madden, Jr.).

TE “Settled rules of statutory construction favor prospec-
tive rather than retroactive application of new legislation.” James
yv. NJ, Mfrs. Ins, Co., 216 N.J. 552, 563, 83 A.3d 70 (2014). Those

610

rules are “based on our long-held notions of fairness and due
process.” Id, at 563, 83 A.3d 70 (quoting Cruz v. Cent. Jersey
Landscaping, Inc., 195 N.J. 33, 45, 947 A.2d 1228 (2008)). We
consider (1) “whether the Legislature intended to give the statute
retroactive application” and (2) whether retroactive application
“will result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested
rights or a manifest injustice.” Id. at 563, 83 A.3d 70 (quoting In re
D.C., 146 NJ. 81, 50, 679 A2d 634 (1996) ). Applying the first
prong of the retroactivity standard, we recognize three cireum-
stances that justify affording “a statute retroactive effect: (1) when
the Legislature expresses its intent that the law apply retroactive-
ly, either expressly or implicitly; (2) when an amendment is
curative; or (3) when the expectations of the parties so warrant.”
Ibid.

HE We apply that standard to the 2015 amendment to
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), Although an “expression of legislative intent
[to make a statute retroactive] should be given effect absent a
compelling reason not to do so,” id, at 564, 83 A.3d 70, we find no
such expression in the statute at issue here. We are unpersuaded

4 In support of her argument that the 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)
should apply retroactively to her case, Ardan relies in part on the Bureau of
Program Services & Standards’ Administrative Instruction dated July 21, 2015.
That Administrative Instruction stated that “[pler a recent decision by the
Superior Court of New Jersey, any voluntary quit separation that meets the
conditions of [N.J.S.A. 43:21-S(a) as amended] must be adjudicated under the
revised statute regardless of the date of the voluntary quit.” Bureau of Program
Servs. & Standards, Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., Administrative Instruc-
tion: Voluntary Quit for Other Work, at 6 (July 21, 2015). As the Board of Review
confirmed at oral argument, that Administrative Instruction, which was issued in
response to an unpublished decision of an Appellate Division panel, was super-
seded by an Administrative Instruction issued after the Appellate Division
decision in Ardan, 444 N.J. Super. at 590, 134 A.3d 1018. The subsequent
Administrative Instruction provided that “{pler a recent court ruling, a voluntary
quit determination under the revised laws cannot be applied retroactively. The
new [voluntary quit] law is effective May 4, 2015 and can only be applied to
separations occurring from that date or later.” Bureau of Program Servs. &
Standards, Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., Administrative Instruction: Volun-

tary Quit for Other Work, at 5 (June 1, 2016).

6ll

by the evidence of legislative intent invoked by our dissenting
colleagues: the amendment’s sponsor's statement that the amend-
ment would provide benefits to claimants who, under current law,
“fall through the cracks.” Post at 619, 620-21, 177 A.3d at 786, 787.
To the contrary, that statement confirms that the Legislature
intended to expand its clear and unambiguous statute so that a
broader category of claimants would qualify for benefits in the
future.

HE “Moreover, we do not consider the amendment “cura-
tive” for purposes of retroactivity analysis. To be “curative,” a
statutory provision must be “designed to ‘remedy a perceived
imperfection in or misapplication of a statute.’” Ibid. (quoting
Schiavo v. John F. Kennedy Hosp, 258 N.J. Super. 380, 386, 609
A.2d 781 (App. Div. 1992), aff'd, 181 N.J. 400, 620 A.2d 1050
(1993) ). “[A]n amendment is curative if it does ‘not alter the act in
any substantial way, but merely clarifie[s] the legislative intent
behind the [previous] act.’” Ibid. (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting 2nd Roc-Jersey Assocs. v. Town of Morristown,
158 N.J. 581, 605, 731 A.2d 1 (1999) ). “Generally, curative acts are
made necessary by inadvertence or error in the original enactment
of a statute or in its administration.” Ibid, (quoting 2 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, § 41.11 at 417 (th ed. 1991) ).

The 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) is not “curative,” as
that term is used in retroactivity analysis. There is no evidence
that the Legislature revised N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because the prior

5 The two cases on which our dissenting colleagues rely with respect to the
issue of legislative intent are distinct from this appeal; in both, the Court found
evidence that the Legislature had intended its amendment to apply retroactively.
See D.C. 146 NJ. at 54, 679 A.2d 634 (holding that the Legislature had
amended the civil commitment statute “not only to validate the Attorney Gener-
al's exercise of authority through its retroactive application, but also to recognize
the validity of the actions taken" by the Attorney General in the commitment
proceeding at issue and other prior proceedings); Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 520-21
n.4, 432 A.2d 80 (citing Senate Judiciary Committee's statement that a provision
in a prior draft, stating that the amendment was prospective only, was deleted
“to make (the amendment] applicable to pending actions"). In this case, howev-
er, there is no indication that the Legislature envisioned that the 2015 amend-
ments to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) would apply retroactively.

612

version of the statute contained an error or ambiguity. Instead, as
the statutory text reflects and the legislative history confirms, the
amendment was intended to expand the law; it made unemploy-
ment benefits available to a group of claimants who were excluded
under prior law because they had left work for another job.
NWJ.S.A. 43:21-5(a); see also A. Appropriations Comm. Statement
to S. 2082 (Feb, 5, 2015); Hearing on S. Comm. Substitute for S.
2082 before the S. Labor Comm., 216th Leg., at 11 (statement of
Sen. Fred Madden, Jr.). The 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-
5(a) significantly altered that statute’s reach; it is not within the
“curative exception to the general rule favoring the prospective
application of statutes.” James, 216 NJ. at 572, 83 A8d 70.

HH Our dissenting colleagues contend that because the Legis-
lature recognized that N.J.S.A. 48:21-5(a) excluded certain claim-
ants and acted to expand and improve the law, the statute should
be deemed “curative” for purposes of retroactivity analysis. Post.
at 620-21, 177 A.8d at 786-87. That contention would starkly
expand the definition of a “curative” amendment. As an Appellate
Division panel observed:

‘Nor can the curative exeeption be invoked merely because an amendment is
deemed to better a statutory scheme, Presumably, each time the Legislature
amends a statute it acts in good faith and seeks, by the amendment, to improve the
scheme. If this was all that was required in order to meet the curative exception,
every amendment would automatically be subject to retroactive application and the
exception would engulf the rule of prospectivity.

(Kendall v. Snedeker, 219 N.J. Super. 283, 289, 580 A.2d 334 (App. Div. 1987).)

HE Under our retroactivity analysis, a legislative amendment
is not considered “curative” merely because the Legislature has
altered a statute so that it better serves public policy objectives.
See, e.g., James, 216 N.J. at 572, 83 A.3d 70 (rejecting argument
that N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.1(f), barring application of “step-down” pro-
visions in business entities’ motor vehicle insurance policies to
limit uninsured motorist/underinsured motorist coverage, was “cu-
rative”); Johnson, 226 N.J. at 391-92, 148 A.8d 254 (holding that
statutory amendment “based on public policy considerations,”
barring insurers providing Personal Injury Protection coverage

618

from receiving reimbursements that “would prevent the injured
party from being made whole,” was not curative). The amendment
at issue here is similarly beyond the narrow definition of a
“curative” change to a statute.

Finally, retroactive application of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) is not
warranted by the “expectations of the parties” in this case. Id, at
565, 88 A.3d 70 (quoting Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 528, 482
A.2d 80 (1981) ). As is reflected by the evidence submitted to the
Appeal Tribunal in 2013, all parties expected the matter to be
governed by the version of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) in effect at that
time, and by N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(9), which unambiguously dis-
qualified individuals who left work “[t]o accept other work” from
unemployment benefits. Thus, the “expectations of the parties”
prong of our retroactivity analysis has no bearing here,

In sum, an application of our retroactivity analysis to this case
clearly indicates that the Legislature intended the disputed
amendment to apply prospectively.* The Appellate Division panel
properly decided this appeal based on the version of the statute
that was in effect when Ardan applied for unemployment benefits
in 2012.

Iv.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES FERNANDEZ-
VINA and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA filed a separate, dissenting opinion, in
which JUSTICES ALBIN and TIMPONE join.

6 Because we conclude that the 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) was
not intended to apply retroactively, we do not reach the question of whether
retroactive application would give rise to “either an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with vested rights or a manifest injustice.” James, 216 N.J. at 563, 83 A3d
70 (quoting D.C, 146 N.J, at 50, 679 A.2d 634 (internal quotation marks
omitted) ).

614

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, dissenting.

Appellant Margo S. Ardan left her nursing position at Lourdes
Medical Center because she suffered from a debilitating medical
condition exacerbated by her employment. She believed that seek-
ing an accommodation from Lourdes before leaving her employ-
ment would have been an exercise in futility. Indeed, no statute or
regulation required that she make a futile application as a condi-
tion of later receiving unemployment benefits. Yet now the majori-
ty—like the Board of Review and the Appellate Division—faults
her for not doing so and denies her those benefits to which she is
entitled.

The majority, moreover, denies Ardan the benefit of a statutory
amendment—enacted while her case was on appeal—specifically
intended to protect the workers that fit within her class. As
applied to this case, the amendment would allow Ardan to receive
the unemployment benefits she has been denied. The denial of
benefits here is not only unjust, but cannot be squared with the
unemployment statute's “remedial and beneficial purposes,” in
deference to which the law must be “construed liberally in favor of
allowance of benefits.” Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Review, 114
N.J. 371, 874, 554 A.2d 1387 (1989).

1

NJ.S.A. 48:21-5(a) provides that a person shall be disqualified
from unemployment benefits “[flor the week in which the individu-
al has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such
work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes
reemployed and works eight weeks in employment.” As defined by
the implementing regulations, “‘good cause attributable to such
work’ means a reason related directly to the individual’s employ-
ment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice
but to leave the employment.” N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). However,
there are several exceptions to that requirement, including when a
person leaves his or her employment due to health or other
medical reasons.

615

Specifically, N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b) states:

An individual who leaves a job due to a physical and/or mental condition or state of
health which does not have a work-connected origin but is aggravated by working
conditions will not be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work without
good cause “attributable to such work,” provided there was no other suitable work
available which the individual could have performed within the limits of the
disability. When a non-work connected physical and/or mental condition makes it
necessary for an individual to leave work due to an inability to perform the job, the
individual shall be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work.

Ardan believes she met this exception, and her position is sup-
ported by uncontroverted testimony before the appeal tribunal.

As to her health during her employment at Lourdes Medical
Center, Ardan testified that her chiropractor had told her, on
several occasions, “that the type of work I was doing was aggrava-
ting the situation, making things worse and I probably won't feel
better unless I found a different kind of work.” Her physician
also noted in a letter that was admitted into evidence that

[als a direct result of long hours standing and walking on the hard surfaces lifting
and moving patients ... Ms. Ardan was unable to continue to maintain gainful
employment in that specific area of nursing. Consequently based on my best
medical recommendation and those of other physicians and therapists caring for
her I strongly recommend that she stop working at Lourdes in that capacity and
get a less physically demanding job.

Concerning whether there was other “suitable work” available,
Ardan testified that there was not. When asked about the possibil-
ity of Lourdes providing her with an accommodation, she testified
as follows:

For one I know that they do offer the option of light duty for some people if you

get ... you know, let’s say you trip and fall and break your arm you can request

light duty but it’s on a temporary basis. It is not a permanent situation. You know,
light duty is for a specified period of time and that light duty is just not an option
for an RN. You know, the care of the patient is ... primarily falls in my ... under

my responsibility and if I can't perform the duties then I can’t be an RN there. I

was hired as an RN. I was under contract as an RN because of ... I had taken

scholarship money from Lourdes Nursing school which is where I had gone to
school and I had agreed to work for them as an RN after graduating from school
for a certain period of time. I don’t have the education necessary to move into any

Kind of management or administrative ... they require bachelor degrees. I

continue to work on my bachelor’s degree in hope of that becoming an available

opportunity to me but at that time the only position[s) that would have been
available were lower ... lower positions like becoming a Nursing Assistant which

616

also has ... has the same physical requirements as an RN. So there ... it was not

an option; it was not available to request accommodations or to ask for another

position,

There is nothing to suggest that this testimony was in any way
unreliable; the only party that could have disputed such testimo-
ny—Ardan’s employer—did not bother to appear at the hearing at
which that testimony was adduced. Ferdinand v. Agric. Ins. Co.,
22 N.J. 482, 498, 126 A.2d 323 (1956) (“[W]here the uncontradicted
testimony of a witness, interested or otherwise, is unaffected by
any conflicting inferences to be drawn from it and is not improba-
ble, extraordinary or surprising in its nature, or there is no other
ground for hesitating to accept it as the truth, there is no reason
for denying the verdict dictated by such evidence.”).

Despite that uncontradicted evidence in the record, the adminis-
trative agency denied Ardan unemployment benefits because she
did not provide her employer with advance notice of her medical
problems and thus did not give her employer a chance to accom-
modate her needs. The Appellate Division, in reviewing the deci-
sion, affirmed that requirement. But no such requirement appears
in the plain language of N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b). Rather, that prior
notice requirement appears in N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(c), which states:

Notwithstanding (b) above, an individual who has been absent because of a

personal illness or physical and/or mental condition shall not be subject to

disqualification for voluntarily leaving work if the individual has made a reasonable
effort to preserve his or her employment, but has still been terminated by the
employer. A reasonable effort is evidenced by the employee's notification to the
employer, requesting a leave of absence or having taken other steps to protect his

or her employment,
[ (emphasis added).}

The Appellate Division’s analysis conflated the requirements of
NJ.A.C. 12:17-9.8(b) and (¢). However, the fact that a notice
requirement appears in (c) and not in (b) is evidence that such a
requirement should not be read into section (b) to Ardan’s disad-
vantage. See GE Solid State, Inc. v. Dir, Div. of Taxation, 182
N.J. 298, 308, 625 A.2d 468 (1998) (“[W]here the Legislature has
carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another,
it should not be implied where excluded.”).

617

The “notice” requirement imposed upon Ardan by the adminis-
trative agency, and condoned by the Appellate Division, finds no
support in the statutory or regulatory language. N.J.A.C. 12:17-
9.3(b) contains no provision requiring notice to the employer, and
so Ardan’s uncontested testimony before the appeal tribunal that
there was no other suitable work available should have been
sufficient to meet her burden under that regulation.

The notice requirement here is, in fact, a new rule of general
applicability that must meet the demands required for formal
agency rulemaking. See Metromedia, Ine. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation,
97 NJ. 313, 331-82, 478 A2d 742 (1984) (listing factors for
determining whether agency has engaged in rulemaking). The
majority agrees that the Board of Review's interpretation of
N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.8(b) is unreasonable and that the regulation must
be amended through the rulemaking process in order to impose a
general notice-and-inquiry requirement. Nevertheless, the majori-
ty holds that Ardan’s “conclusory assertion” that her efforts to
find suitable work within Lourdes would have been futile does not
meet the evidentiary burden imposed by the regulation. In that
sense, the majority imposes not so much an evidentiary burden
but essentially the same notice requirement as the tribunals
below.

It is unclear how Ardan was supposed to know the exact
parameters of that burden either when leaving employment or at
the hearing when such a requirement is not present in the
applicable regulation. Although she was asked by the appeal
tribunal whether she had ever requested an accommodation from
her employer, she was never given any indication of an explicit
requirement that she put her employer on notice of her medical
problems by requesting an accommodation or that proof of such a
request would form part of her burden before the appeal tribunal.
The after-the-fact imposition of this new requirement is profound-
ly unfair. Any such requirement must be clearly imposed if the
unemployment compensation laws are to meet their beneficent
purposes.

618

It is also difficult to understand how that burden was not met
where her employer—the only other party with information on
accommodation procedures—did not bother to participate at the
second hearing before the appeal tribunal. Had the employer
appeared, relevant information concerning its accommodation pro-
cedures—and what was or was not common knowledge about
them—could have been brought before the appeal tribunal, and
Ardan’s testimony could have been rebutted. Instead, the employ-
er chose not to involve itself in the matter until after the agency
proceedings had concluded. The employer’s belated effort to inter-
ject into a record new information that was not before the agency
is profoundly unjust. In my view, the majority errs by relying, to
any extent, on untested information and representations that the
employer, without leave, sought to insert into this matter during
oral argument before this Court. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v.
Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 452, 916 A.2d 440 (2007)
(“Our appellate courts will not ordinarily consider evidentiary
material that is not in the record below.”); ef. R. 2:5-5(b) (provid-
ing procedure for supplementation of administrative record). The
majority’s efforts on its own to bolster the record in favor of the
employer is nothing other than baffling.

Il.

Faulting Ardan for failing to meet a previously unknown eviden-
tiary burden to provide alternative notice to her employer and to
prove an employer's inability to provide “other suitable work” is
particularly unjust because it is plain that a person in her cireum-
stances was meant to be protected under the terms of a 2015
amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). That amendment removes from
the general strictures of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) any

individual who voluntarily leaves work with one employer to accept from another
employer employment which commences not more than seven days after the
individual leaves employment with the first employer, if the employment with the
second employer has weekly hours or pay not less than the hours ot pay of the
‘employment of the first employer.

[N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(a).]

619

There is no dispute that Ardan meets that statutory safe harbor.
Yet, the majority labors to find that retroactive application to this
one individual would wreak havoc on retroactivity jurisprudence.
Only an antiseptic application of our retroactivity law could reach
such a conclusion. In my view, retroactive application of the
amendment to Ardan’s disputed claim is appropriate.

Our retroactivity analysis focuses on two factors: “The first part
questions whether the Legislature intended to give the statute
retroactive application. The second part involves whether retroac-
tive application of that statute will result in either an unconstitu-
tional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.”
James y. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 563, 83 A.3d 70 (2014)
(quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 81, 50, 679 A.2d 634 (1996) ). The
first prong of the test recognizes three circumstances that warrant
“giving a statute retroactive effect: (1) when the Legislature
expresses its intent that the law apply retroactively, either ex-
pressly or implicitly; (2) when an amendment is curative; or (3)
when the expectations of the parties so warrant.” Ibid.

The retroactive application of the statute, raised as an issue
here, is not about opening dozens of prior cases but rather
concerns one person who narrowly missed the protection of a
statutory amendment. Although she filed her claim before the
amendment was enacted, her claim was still being contested on
appeal when the amendment became law. Not to afford Ardan that
protection is to deny her the benefit of a remedial and beneficent
statutory scheme, and an amendment that clearly focused on
expanding the remedial reach of that beneficent program. Ardan
is exactly the type of person the Legislature was concerned would
“fall through the cracks” based on the existing wording of the
unamended statutory scheme. That statement is evidence both
that the Legislature intended to make the amendment retroactive
and that the amendment is curative in nature.

First, such statements previously have been determined to be
evidence of a legislative intent that a statute is to be applied
retroactively. In Gibbons v. Gibbons, for example, we found that

620

“giving the [subject] statute retroactive application will fulfill the
essential purpose of retroactivity, ‘to effectuate the current policy
declared by the legislative body,” 86 N.J. 515, 524-25, 432 A.2d
80 (1981) (quoting Kruvant v. Twp. of Cedar Grove, 82 N.J. 435,
440, 414 A.2d 9 (1980)). And in D.C. we found a statutory
amendment to be retroactive where the Legislature “intended to
enact remedial legislation to effectuate its purpose” and to address
a statutory flaw. 146 N.J. at 55, 679 A.2d 634, A retroactive
legislative intent may also be inferred where the Legislature
attempts to address a particular problem resulting from an exist-
ing loophole. See id. at 54-55, 679 A.2d 634 (finding that Legisla-
ture intended retroactive application of statutory amendment
where “{t]he legislative history demonstrates that the Legislature
pointedly intended the amendments to address cases such as [the
case before the Court]” and where problem at issue was “the
primary motivating factor behind the Legislature's enactment of
these amendments”).

Second, the amendment is demonstrably curative in nature. A
“curative” statutory amendment is “designed to ‘remedy a per-
ceived imperfection in or misapplication of a statute.’” James, 216
N.J. at 564, 88 A.3d 70 (quoting Schiavo v. John F, Kennedy
Hosp., 258 N.J. Super. 380, 386, 609 A.2d 781 (App. Div. 1992),
affd, 131 N.J. 400, 620 A.2d 1050 (1998) ). In D.C., this Court
made clear that a statutory amendment that merely adds language
without changing or eliminating any of the statute’s original
language can be curative in nature. 146 N.J. at 51-52, 679 A.2d
634. We further stated that a curative “amendment explains or
clarifies existing law and brings it into ‘harmony with what the
Legislature originally intended.’” Id. at 51, 679 A.2d 634 (quoting
Schiavo, 258 N.J. Super. at 386, 609 A.2d 781); see also Gibbons,
86 N.J. at 524, 432 A.2d 80 (stating that statutory amendment may
be “curative insofar as it reflects the Legislature’s attempt to
improve a statutory scheme already in existence”).

Here, the language added to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) was meant to
prevent people such as Ardan from “fall[ing] through the cracks”

621

of the legislative scheme. The amendment thus was pointedly
addressed at people in Ardan’s position and was designed to
remedy a perceived statutory shortcoming whereby those in Ar-
dan’s position were being unfairly denied the benefits of the
unemployment compensation safety net. Our case law acknowl-
edges that such targeted action on the Legislature’s part provides
evidence of an intent to give an amendment retroactive effect.
D.C., 146 N.J. at 54, 679 A.2d 634 (“The legislative intent to apply
{statutory] amendments retroactively is further bolstered by a
consideration of the specific purpose of those amendments and the
contextual circumstances surrounding their passage.”). Moreover,
contrary to the majority’s assertion, ante at 612-18, 177 A.3d at
782, the curative nature of the legislative action here cannot be
analogized to cases involving legislative amendatory action that
affects contracts or insurance. See, e.g., Johnson _v. Roselle EZ
Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 375, 397, 143 A.3d 254 (2016) (holding
that statutory amendment providing “that a personal injury pro-
tection (PIP) insurance provider may be reimbursed for payments
made to an injured insured party by the tortfeasor’s insurer only
after the injured party’s claim is fully satisfied” should not be
given retroactive effect); James, 216 N.J. at 555-56, 574-75, 83
A.3d 70 (holding that statutory enactment relating to use of “step-
down” provisions in employer uninsured or underinsured motorist
coverage should not be given retroactive effect). Rather, the
amendatory statute raised here relates directly to furthering the
remedial and altruistic purposes underlying the unemployment
laws. Yardville Supply Co., 114 N.J. at 874, 554 A.2d 1337; see also
2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 41:1 at 385-86 (7th ed.
2009) (explaining that curative amendments encompass legislative
efforts to conform legal rights and relationships to “reflect the
desires of ... the legislature”).

Our Court should fulfill that beneficent amendatory intent and
give the curative amendment retroactive effect for Ardan, who has
steadfastly persisted in her efforts to obtain unemployment bene-
fits, Giving Ardan the benefit of the amendatory legislation would
align the unemployment benefit program with the legislative effort

to have the program’s implementation better reflect the desires of
the Legislature, as that intent has been more specifically ex-
pressed. In my view, to deny Ardan those benefits in the face of a
legislative intent to the contrary is to elevate form over substance
for purposes of retroactivity analysis and to frustrate the purposes
of a remedial legislative scheme.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.