State: Montana
Volume: 389
Term: None-None
Jurisdiction(s): Montana
Source: https://static.case.law/mont/389.pdf

Se '
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

KYLE WADE NELSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0535.
Submitted on Briefs August 2, 2017
Decided September 26, 2017.
2017 MT 237,

389 Mont. 1.

402 P.3d 1239.

For Appellant: Nathaniel S. Holloway, Paul T. Ryan, Paul
Ryan & Associates, PLLC, Missoula.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Mardell Ployhar, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Kirsten
Pabst, Missoula County Attorney, Brittany Santorno, Deputy
County Attorney, Missoula.

JUSTICE WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

1 Kyle Wade Nelson (Nelson) appeals from the District Court's
denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.
{2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

Did the District Court err when it denied defendant’s motion to

suppress?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q3 On July 25, 2015, Kittrell Saunders (Saunders), a waitress, called
911 to report a drunk individual driving away from a restaurant.
Saunders called 911 while a coworker, Justin Sharbono (Sharbono),
watched the individual leave the restaurant, get in his vehicle, and
drive away. Saunders reported her first and last name, the location of
where she was calling from, her place of employment, a make, model,
and license plate number of the vehicle, as well as the location of
travel. Saunders reported Sharbono’s name and that they were both
willing to sign a complaint about what they witnessed. Saunders spoke
with both the 911 operator and Sharbono simultaneously. Saunders
informed dispatch that the man was “walking into stuff, and he was
going all over the place. He couldn’t walk in a straight line to save his
life, and then he got in the, stumbled around and got in the vehicle.”
Sharbono, while not the caller, could be heard by the dispatcher say,
“he just bounced off that wall.”

{4 Montana Highway Patrol Trooper Luke Burson was on patrol in
the area when he received the report from dispatch. Eleven minutes
after the initial report, Trooper Burson located the van in a hotel
parking lot. He observed the vehicle drive from the check-in area to a
spot in the parking lot. Trooper Burson activated his lights and made

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contact with the driver, Nelson. Trooper Burson conducted a driving
under the influence (DUD investigation after he smelled alcohol on
Nelson. Trooper Burson arrested Nelson for DUI.
q5 On July 25, 2015, the Missoula County attorney charged Nelson
with DUI. In the Justice Court, Nelson filed a motion to suppress
evidence of the stop based on Trooper Burson’s lack of particularized
suspicion based on an informant’s tip. The State responded and an
evidentiary hearing was held. The Justice Court granted Nelson’s
motion. The State appealed to the District Court, which reviewed the
issue de novo. Nelson filed a motion to suppress, again arguing
particularized suspicion did not exist and the “Pratt factors” were not
met in order to create particularized suspicion based on Saunders’ and
Sharbono’s report. The State responded and the District Court held an
evidentiary hearing on May 9, 2016. Saunders, Sharbono, and Trooper
Burson testified at the hearing. The District Court denied Nelson’s
motion. Nelson entered a nolo contendere plea pursuant to a plea
agreement in which he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress. Nelson appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
{6 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress to
determine whether the court's findings are clearly erroneous and
whether those findings were applied correctly as a matter of law. State
v. Gill, 2012 MT 36, 10, 364 Mont. 182, 272 P.3d 60.

DISCUSSION

(7 Did the District Court err when it denied defendant’s motion to
suppress?

q8 Nelson argues the District Court erroneously denied his motion to
suppress the evidence of the stop. Specifically, Nelson argues the
citizen informant’s tip was unreliable and that Trooper Burson did not
have particularized suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The
State asserts Trooper Burson was provided with a reliable citizen
informant’s tip which created the particularized suspicion necessary to
conduct an investigatory stop.

{9 Both the United States Constitution and the Montana
Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Mont. Const. art. II, § 11. Under
Montana law, a law enforcement officer “may stop any person or
vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized
suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Section 46-5-401(1),

‘ a

MCA; State v. Peters, 2011 MT 274, | 57, 362 Mont. 389, 264 P.38d
1124; Hulse v. DOJ, Motor Vehicle Div., 1998 MT 108, {] 12, 289 Mont.
1, 961 P.2d 75.

10 Particularized suspicion exists when an officer has “objective data
and articulable facts from which an officer can make certain inferences,
and a resulting suspicion that the subject is, or has been, engaged in
wrongdoing.” City of Missoula v. Moore, 2011 MT 61, { 16, 360 Mont.
22, 251 P.38d 679. Whether particularized suspicion exists is a question
of fact, which is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. Gill,
{| 15. When evaluating the totality of the circumstances a court
considers the quantity or content of the information available and the
quality or degree of reliability of that information. Gill, 1 15.

11 Ml An arresting officer may rely on information conveyed by a
reliable third person to form the particularized suspicion necessary to
justify an investigative stop. State v. Pratt, 286 Mont. 156, 162, 951
P.2d 87, 41 (1997). To determine the reliability of a third person report
and thus the sufficiency of an officer’s particularized suspicion based
on that report, this Court has adopted three factors to use in its
evaluation. State v. Clawson, 2009 MT 228, {] 11, 351 Mont. 354, 212
P.3d 1056 (citing Pratt, 286 Mont. at 164-65, 951 P.2d at 42-43). The
factors are: (1) whether the informant identified herself to the
authorities; (2) whether the informant’s report is based on personal
observation; and (3) whether the officer’s observations corroborate the
informant’s information. Pratt, 286 Mont. at 164-65, 951 P.2d at 42-43.
12 Nelson argues, contrary to the facts in the record, that Saunders’
report was unreliable because she did not identify herself, she was not
the personally observing party, and that she was not willing to sign a
complaint. Nelson argues Sharbono’s report was insufficient to believe
Nelson was drunk. Therefore, the citizen informant’s tip was
insufficient to give Trooper Burson particularized suspicion for an
investigatory stop.

13 [J The first Pratt factor is whether the informant identified
herself to the authorities. Pratt, 286 Mont. at 165, 951 P.2d at 42. An
informant’s tip may be considered more reliable where the citizen
identifies himself or herself, thus exposing himself to civil and criminal
liability. State v. Foster, 2017 MT 118, | 18, 387 Mont. 402, 394 P.3d
916 (citing Pratt, 286 Mont. at 165, 951 P.2d at 42). However, a citizen
reporter is not required to self-identify or provide specific pieces of
personal information in order for the report to be deemed reliable.
Foster, | 13 (citing State v. Brander, 2004 MT 150, 321 Mont. 484, 92
P.3d 1178; State v. Lee, 282 Mont. 391, 395, 938 P.2d 637, 640 (1997)).
A citizen reporter is not required to sign or be willing to sign a

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complaint in order for the report to be considered reliable. See City of
Missoula v. Tye, 2016 MT 153, {| 3, 384 Mont. 24, 372 P.3d 1286.

114 Nelson concedes Sharbono’s report satisfies the first factor
because he was identified and willing to sign a complaint that Nelson
was drunk. However, Nelson contests the reliability of Saunders’
report. As the record disclosed, Saunders told and spelled to dispatch
her first and last name, agreed to sign a complaint, provided her place
of work and stated she could be reached there. Saunders testified at
the evidentiary hearing to the above. This Court does not require a
citizen informant to identify himself or herself or be willing to sign a
complaint in order for the report to be deemed reliable. Here, Saunders
both identified herself and was willing to sign a complaint. The District
Court’s finding that the first Pratt factor was satisfied is supported by
substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous.

15 The second Pratt factor is whether the informant’s report is based
on personal observation. Pratt, 286 Mont. at 165, 951 P.2d at 42. An
officer is allowed to infer that a report is based on a citizen informant’s
personal observations if “the report contains sufficient detail that it is
apparent that the informant has not been fabricating the report out of
whole cloth and the report is of the sort which in common experience
may be recognized as having been obtained in a reliable way.” Moore,
{| 21. A citizen informant’s belief that a person is DUI must be based
on his or her personal observations. Moore, {| 21. Innocent details,
personally observed by the citizen informant, are also relevant in
assessing the reliability of the report. Moore, 21.

{16 Nelson argues Saunders’ and Sharbono’s personal observations
are insufficient to allow Trooper Burson to infer the observations were
made personally. Nelson argues because Saunders relayed Sharbono’s
personal observations the report was insufficiently based on personal
observations.

17 This Court has determined that a report is made on personal
observations sufficient to create particularized suspicion when a citizen
informant relays information from a third party who is
contemporaneously observing the behavior of the individual in
question. See Pratt, 286 Mont. at 166, 951 P.2d at 43. Recently, this
Court reviewed this issue in State v. Zietlow, 2017 MT 148, {] 18, 388
Mont. 26, 396 P.3d 740. Similar to Saunders’ and Sharbono’s report,
the caller in Zietlow related information regarding a possible drunk
driver to the dispatcher which was relayed to her by a coworker and
the caller relayed her own personal observations to the dispatcher.
Zietlow, | 18. This Court determined the report was sufficient to
satisfy Pratt because “the circumstances clearly establish the conduct

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was occurring as [caller] was talking to dispatch and that [caller] was
relating what [coworker] was contemporaneously reporting and
observing,” and that separate calls by each to law enforcement were
not necessary. Zietlow, J 13.

4118 Here, Saunders was on the phone with the dispatcher while
Sharbono watched Nelson drive away. Saunders spoke with both
Sharbono and the dispatcher, contemporaneously relaying information
from Sharbono. In fact, while Sharbono was not the caller, dispatch
could hear him over the phone state that “he just bounced off that
wall.” Saunders then informed dispatch that she observed the man
“walking into stuff, and he was going all over the place. He couldn’t
walk in a straight line to save his life, and then he got in the, stumbled
around and got in the vehicle.” The District Court’s finding that the
report was based on the personal observations of Saunders and
Sharbono is supported by substantial evidence and is not clearly
erroneous.

19 The third Pratt factor is whether the officer's observations
corroborate the informant’s information. Pratt, 286 Mont. at 165, 951
P.2d at 43. An officer corroborates an informant’s report by observing
illegal activity or by finding “the person, the vehicle, and the vehicle’s
location substantially as described by the informant.” Gill, 1 30 (citing
Pratt, 286 Mont. at 165, 951 P.2d at 43). Where the first and second
factors have been satisfied, an officer may corroborate the citizen
informant’s report by observing wholly innocent behavior. Gill, {] 30.
Nelson argues that the first two Pratt factors were not satisfied;
therefore, Trooper Burson was required to observe independently
illegal activity or evidence of impairment to form particularized
suspicion before making the investigatory stop. Pratt, 286 Mont. at
168, 951 P.2d at 44.

20 We determined above that the District Court’s findings were not
clearly erroneous and were based on substantial evidence when it
determined the first two Pratt factors had been satisfied. Therefore,
Trooper Burson could corroborate Saunders’ and Sharbono’s report by
observing wholly innocent behavior. Nelson concedes that Trooper
Burson corroborated Saunders’ description of the vehicle and license
plate number, its location, and its direction of travel. The District
Court’s finding that the third Pratt factor was satisfied is supported by
substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous.

CONCLUSION
121 Hl Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that
the District Court’s determination that particularized suspicion existed

a /
is not clearly erroneous. Saunders’ and Sharbono’s report contained
sufficient indicia of reliability to form the basis for Trooper Burson’s
particularized suspicion. The District Court did not err in denying
Nelson’s motion to suppress.

22 Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES BAKER, SANDEFUR
and SHEA concur.

—
ZIRKELBACH CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DOWL, LLC dba DOWL HKM,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 16-0745.
Argued July 12, 2017.
Submitted July 18, 2017.
Decided September 26, 2017
2017 MT 238,

389 Mont. 8.
402 P.3d 1244

For Appellant: W. Scott Green (Argued), Daniel L. Snedigar

(Argued), Patten, Peterman, Bekkedahl & Green, PLLC, Billings.
For Appellee: Matthew F. McLean (Argued), Kelsey E.

Bunkers, Griffin B. Stevens, Crowley Fleck, PLLP, Bozeman.
JUSTICE WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

a = =—

1 Zirkelbach Construction, Inc. (Zirkelbach) appeals from the order
ofthe Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, granting
DOWL, LLC’s (DOWL) motion for partial summary judgment. We
affirm.
{2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

Did the District Court err in granting DOWL’s motion for partial

summary judgment?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

3 This case arises out of the construction of a FedEx Ground facility
(Facility) in Billings, Montana. SunCap Billings, LLC (SunCap) is the
owner of the real property upon which the Facility was to be
constructed. SunCap hired Zirkelbach as the general contractor to
construct the Facility. Zirkelbach is an experienced construction
company maintaining offices in Florida, South Carolina and Montana.
The construction of the Facility was Zirkelbach’s forty-second project
for FedEx. Zirkelbach hired DOWL to provide design work for the
Facility. Likewise, DOWL is an experienced, professional design
company.
{4 Zirkelbach and DOWL entered into an agreement’ for
professional services (Agreement). Both parties presented their own
form contracts, but ultimately, DOWL’s form contract was agreed upon
and signed by both parties. The Agreement provided for Zirkelbach to
pay DOWL $122,967 for services rendered. Subsequently, the parties
made several addenda to the Agreement. The subsequent addenda
raised the fee for any additional services being rendered by DOWL.
DOWL’s final fee for its services relating to the design of the Facility
totaled approximately $665,000.
{5 Sub-section 5(D) of the Agreement between Zirkelbach and DOWL
provides as follows:

D. Consequential Damages/Limitation of Liability

To the fullest extent permitted by law, DOWL HKM and Client.

waive against each other, and the other’s employees, officers,

directors, agents, insurers, partners, and consultants any and all

claims for or entitlement to special, incidental, indirect, or

consequential damages arising out of, resulting from, or in any

way related to the Project and agree that DOWL HKM’s total

liability to Client under this Agreement. shall be limited to

1 The parties have stipulated to the accuracy of the documents memorializing the
Agreement.

Ts

$50,000.
This sub-section was set forth in the initial Agreement and no
subsequent addenda altered this provision.
{6 Initially, Zirkelbach filed suit on July 30, 2014, against Knife
River, a subcontractor employed by Zirkelbach, over construction liens
relating to the Facility. Nearly six months after filing suit, Zirkelbach
filed a third-party complaint? against DOWL alleging claims of
negligence and breach of contract. Zirkelbach claims that due to
DOWL’s negligence and breach of contract, Zirkelbach incurred
$1,218,197.93 resolving problems caused directly by DOWL’s design
plans.
{7 On August 22, 2016, DOWL filed a motion for partial summary
judgment arguing, pursuant to the Agreement’s § 5(D) provision, that.
DOWL cannot be liable to Zirkelbach under the contract for any
amount exceeding $50,000. Zirkelbach countered that the contractual
limitation of liability found within § 5(D) violates § 28-2-702, MCA, and
therefore is unenforceable. On November 16, 2016, the District Court
granted DOWL’s motion for partial summary judgment. Zirkelbach
filed a timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

q8 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same criteria of M. R. Civ. P. 56 as the district court.
Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 2013 MT 354, {| 9, 373
Mont. 1, 313 P.3d 839. We review a district court’s conclusions of law
to determine whether they are correct and its findings of fact. to
determine whether they are clearly erroneous. Pilgeram, {] 9. Under
Rule 56(c), summary judgment will be granted if the moving party can
show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled toa judgment as a matter of law. Roe v. City of
Missoula, 2009 MT 417, { 14, 354 Mont. 1, 221 P.3d 1200.

DISCUSSION
{9 Did the District Court err in granting DOWL’s motion for partial
summary judgment?
10 Zirkelbach argues on appeal that the District Court erred in
granting partial summary judgment in favor of DOWL. Specifically,

“In response to Zirkelbach’s suit, Knife River filed a counterclaim and third-party
complaint against Zirkelbach and several other companies involved in the construction
of the Facility.

ee

Zirkelbach contends that Montana law clearly disfavors the limitation
of liability clause found within the Agreement because it is against
public policy. Zirkelbach further maintains that the contract is
ambiguous because the limitation of liability clause reflects a lack of
meeting of the minds as to who shall bear the burden of liability.
{411 DOWL counters that the District Court correctly granted partial
summary judgment concluding that the limitation of liability clause
within the Agreement did not violate public policy. Further, DOWL
argues Zirkelbach should be estopped from asserting the argument
that the contract is ambiguous because Zirkelbach failed to present the
same argument to the District Court. Moreover, DOWL asserts that
§ 5(D) is clear and unambiguous.
12 As a threshold matter, it is well-established we will not address
an issue raised for the first time on appeal, nor will we address a
party’s change in legal theory. Becker v. Rosebud Operating Servs.,
2008 MT 285, {| 17, 345 Mont. 368, 191 P.3d 435. We will not address
Zirkelbach’s arguments that were not raised to the District Court.
However, we agree with the District Court that the limitation of
liability clause is subject to only one interpretation and therefore the
clause is clear and unambiguous. Section 28-3-401, MCA; Mary J.
Baker Revocable Trust v. Cenex Harvest States, Coops., Inc., 2007 MT
159, 1 19, 338 Mont. 41, 164 P.3d 851.
q13 “The fundamental tenet of modern contract law is freedom of
contract; parties are free to mutually agree to terms governing their
private conduct as long as those terms do not conflict with public laws.”
Winter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 MT 168, {] 26, 375 Mont.
351, 328 P.3d 665 (internal citations omitted). “This tenet. presumes
that parties are in the best position to make decisions in their own
interest.” Arrowhead Sch. Dist. No. 75 v. Klyap, 2003 MT 294, {] 20,
818 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d 250. “A contract must be so interpreted as to
give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the
time of contract, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.”
Section 28-3-301, MCA; Mary J. Baker Revocable Trust, 21. “To
permit the avoidance of a written contract because the terms of the
contract now appear burdensome or unreasonable would defeat the
very purpose of placing a contract into writing.” Marco & Co., LLC v.
Deaconess / Billings Clinic Health Sys., 1998 MT 26, {| 16, 287 Mont.
293, 954 P.2d 1116.
q14 Contract terms that violate § 28-2-702, MCA, are unenforceable.
Miller v. Fallon Cnty., 222 Mont. 214, 222, 721 P.2d 342, 347 (1986).
Section 28-2-702, MCA, provides:

All contracts that have for their object, directly or indirectly, to

a

exempt anyone from responsibility for the person’s own fraud, for
willful injury to the person or property of another, or for violation
of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the
law.
15 This Court first interpreted § 28-2-702, MCA, in Miller. In Miller,
the plaintiff signed a release form stating, “I hereby waive any rights
whatsoever against Pre-Fab Transit Co.” Miller, 222 Mont. at 217, 721
P.2d at 344. The Court found that private parties generally may
contract away liability so long as the parties have equal bargaining
power and the interest of the public is not involved. Miller, 222 Mont.
at 220, 721 P.2d at 346 (citing Haynes v. Cnty. of Missoula, 163 Mont.
270, 279-80, 517 P.2d 310, 376 (1973)). However, the Court held that
the release waiver contractually exculpated the company from any
liability; consequently, the waiver under § 28-2-702, MCA, violated
public policy. Miller, 222 Mont. at 222, 721 P.2d at 347.
{16 Since Miller, this Court has addressed § 28-2-702, MCA, in two
cases holding that the statute is not violated when business entities
contractually limit liability but do not eliminate liability entirely.
Keeney Constr. v. James Talcott Constr. Co. , 2002 MT 69, 309 Mont.
226, 45 P.3d 19; Five U’s, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 1998 MT 216, 290
Mont. 452, 962 P.2d 1218. In Keeney, the Court found that the contract
barred recovery for any damages attributed to a delay. Keeney, {| 22.
This recovery bar applied only to a narrow type of damages, not all
damages, and therefore it did not exculpate the company from liability.
Thus, we held that § 28-2-702, MCA, didnot apply. Keeney, {] 22.
Similarly, in Five U’s, we held that a rent abatement clause did not
exculpate the defendant from all liability; rather, it only limited
damages for any period the building was rendered unusable. Five U’s,
| 23. Ultimately, the contract terms were enforceable under § 28-2-702,
MCA, because the contracts did not exculpate the companies from all
liability.
417 Further, we find Magistrate Judge Lynch’s order in Baldwin
Lynch Energy Corp., v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 2013 WL 12130400
(D. Mont. Nov. 12, 2013), persuasive. In Baldwin, two oil and gas
companies entered into a contract to perform a cement squeeze
procedure to preserve production of an oil well. The contract contained
a limitation of liability clause specifically capping the damages to the
costs of services provided. Judge Lynch found that the limitation of
liability clause was valid under Montana law unless the trier of fact
found that Baldwin Lynch was in a “substantially weaker bargaining
position.” 2013 WL 12130400 at *11. Judge Lynch’s rationale is
consistent with our previous interpretation of § 28-2-702, MCA, holding

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that contracts containing clauses that limit liability between two
business entities, with equal bargaining power, would not contravene
§ 28-2-702, MCA.

18 Zirkelbach and DOWL’s Agreement is enforceable unless it is
deemed against public policy under § 28-2-702, MCA. As noted above,
we have interpreted § 28-2-702, MCA, to prevent parties from
contracting away all liability. Here, Zirkelbach and DOWL entered into
an Agreement containing a limitation of liability clause that capped
damages at $50,000. Similar to Keeney and Five U’s, the limitation of
liability clause does not exempt Zirkelbach from all liability, only limits
liability to the amount agreed upon by the parties. And although
Zirkelbach asserts this limitation acts as an exculpatory clause, it does
not exempt DOWL from liability under the Agreement. Therefore, we
conclude that the limitation of liability clause does not exempt
Zirkelbach from all liability and thus, § 28-2-702, MCA, is not violated.
q419 Next, Zirkelbach argues that the limitation of liability clause
indirectly exculpates DOWL from liability because it is a nominal
amount compared to DOWL’s total fees. This Court is not persuaded.
At the time the Agreement. was signed by both parties, the $50,000
limitation was nearly 40% of DOWL’s fees. After the subsequent
addenda were executed by the parties, DOWL’s fees totaled $665,000
but the limitation of liability amount remained the same. Upon
completion of the Facility, DOWL's liability to Zirkelbach under the
Agreement was approximately 8% of DOWL’s total fee. The failure of
Zirkelbach to address or renegotiate the limitation of liability clause
during the execution of each addendum has made the term of the
contract more burdensome than previously anticipated by Zirkelbach.
This Court is unwilling to allow Zirkelbach to avoid a term of the
contract simply because it has become more burdensome due to its own
failure to renegotiate. Furthermore, enforcing the contractual clause
does not deny Zirkelbach a remedy because DOWL remains exposed to
liability on the negligence claim.

20 Finally, Zirkelbach maintains that this Court should follow
California case law in interpreting the statute. Montana’s
interpretation is consistent with California case law. Section 28-2-702,
MCA, was adopted verbatim from California and this Court has
previously found California case law persuasive in its interpretation of
the statute. Miller, 222 Mont. at 220-21, 721 P.2d at 346. Zirkelbach
relies heavily on Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal.
1963), for the proposition that the limitation of liability clause found
within the Agreement is against public policy. However, in Tunkl, the
court was dealing with an exculpatory clause, not a limitation of

a

liability. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 442. Further, the court in Tunkl noted that
“no public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one
party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk ....” Tunkl, 383 P.2d
at 446. Furthermore, in CAZA Drilling (California), Inc. v. TEG Oil &
Gas U.S.A., Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 453 (2006), the court concluded that
it would be difficult to imagine a situation where a contract between
relatively equal business entities would be able to meet the required
characteristics of a transaction that implicated public interest. CAZA
Drilling, 142 Cal. App. 4th at 469.

121 [ Although this Court has found Tunkl persuasive in previous
interpretations of § 28-2-702, MCA, it is apparent from subsequent
California case law that two sophisticated businesses are in the best
position to accurately determine their risk of economic loss and
contract to reflect that assessment. See Miller, 222 Mont. at 220-21,
721 P.2d at 346. Here, Zirkelbach and DOWL are experienced,
sophisticated businesses that had equal bargaining power when they
voluntarily entered into the Agreement for professional services. Thus,
Zirkelbach’s reliance on Tunkil is misplaced and the limitation of
liability found in the Agreement under § 5(D) is enforceable.

122 [I Therefore, we hold that the District Court did not err in
granting partial summary judgment to DOWL on Zirkelbach’s breach
of contract claim.

CONCLUSION
23 For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the District Court’s order
granting DOWL’s motion for partial summary judgment.
q24 Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES BAKER, McKINNON,
SANDEFUR, SHEA and RICE concur.

——————— =

CLAIMANT: Danreuther Ranches

OBJECTORS: Farmers Cooperative Canal
Company; Teton Cooperative Canal Company;
Eldorado Cooperative Canal Company;
United States of America (Bureau of Indian
Affairs); Danreuther Ranches

COUNTEROBJECTORS: Farmers Coop
Canal Company.

No. DA 16-0573.
Submitted on Briefs August 2, 2017
Decided October 3, 2017
2017 MT 241.

389 Mont. 15.

403 P.3d 332.

For Appellants: John E. Bloomquist, Abigail J. St. Lawrence,

a

Bloomquist Law Firm P.C., Helena.
For Appellee: Stephen R. Brown, Katelyn J. Hepburn,
Garlington Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 This is an appeal from the Water Court’s August 30, 2016 “Order
Regarding Danreuther Ranches Water Right Claims.” We affirm in
part. and reverse in part.
2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
Issue One (Canal Companies): Whether the Water Court erred in
its orders regarding Danreuther Claim Nos. 410 156802-00; 410
156804-00; 410 156805-00; and implied Claim No. 30106965.
Issue Two (Danreuther cross-appeal): Whether the Water Court
erred in its orders regarding Danreuther Claim No. 410 156804-
00.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

{3 The following facts are taken from the Water Court’s decision.
This appeal concerns certain water rights of the Danreuther Ranch,
located along the Teton River north of Carter, Montana. Lands in that
area generally require irrigation to produce crops and the Teton River
is the only reliable source of surface water with the exception of a
spring in Captain Nelse’s Coulee. Danreuther Ranch raises crops, hay
and livestock, and seeks to irrigate 182.8 acres north of the River and
69.7 acres south of the River. The Ranch also claims stockwater from
the River and from the Coulee spring.

q4 The Danreuther Ranch was part of the Edward Reichelt ranch
that began in 1888 with the acquisition of land and water rights along
the Teton River. In 1935 Edward divided his ranch between his two
sons, Dan and Bruno, and Danreuther is the successor in interest to
Dan. Danreuther filed statements of claim in the water adjudication
process, for irrigation and stockwater. The claims are based upon an
1874 claim statement by Nelson Vieux; notices of appropriation filed
in 1914 by Horace Hibbard and Helen Hibbard; and a notice of
appropriation filed in 1921 by Clara Lamphear.

{5 Danreuther’s most senior water claims are based upon activity
beginning in 1874 by an early settler named Nelson Vieux, who came
to the Fort Benton area in the 1860s and settled on land along the
Teton River. Vieux’s settlement was about 20 miles west of Fort
Benton and became a regular second-night stop for freight wagons

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traveling the Whoop-Up Trail to Canada.' It was located at the mouth
of the Nelse Coulee (named for Vieux) that provided the heavy freight
wagons a passage out of the Teton River valley. The peak activity on
the Trail was between 1874 and 1883, and the Water Court found that
there was “significant development” at the Vieux ranch during this
time. Vieux applied for a homestead in 1882.

q6 On February 19, 1874, Vieux filed a written notice with Teton
County stating that he intended to “claim and appropriate” water from
the Teton River “for irrigating and agricultural purposes.” He also
claimed the right to float logs down the River to his settlement,
unimpeded by any dams or obstructions upstream. The 1874 Vieux
filing did not provide any other information about the intended use of
water. According to Chouteau County tax records, Vieux did not claim
any improvements on his land until 1881, but he paid taxes on “over
100 head of livestock every year.” The Water Court found that the
evidence did not support a conclusion that Vieux was irrigating crops
until “the 1880s” and that there was no “compelling evidence” that
Vieux was irrigating at an earlier date.

7 The Water Court found that the “best evidence” that. Vieux was
irrigating came in his May 7, 1887 homestead claim filing. Vieux stated
that he moved his family to the Teton River land in 1880, when he
“established a permanent residence, and took up farming.” The 1887
filing states that. Vieux farmed nine acres in 1880 and farmed 50 acres
by 1887. The Water Court determined that since “cultivation in this
area is pointless without irrigation,” the evidence of cultivation is “a
strong indication of irrigation.” In addition, Vieux claimed ownership
of farming equipment including plows, harrows, scythes, a rake and a
mowing machine. The homestead claim filings also support ownership
of 100 open range cattle and 60 open range horses, with four horses,
three cows and some chickens and hogs “on the homestead.” The Water
Court found that this was consistent with the tax records showing that
Vieux was keeping livestock and using the Teton River for their water
source. Vieux received a homestead patent on 160 acres that is now
part of the Danreuther Ranch.

q8 The Water Court concluded that the preponderance of the
evidence showed that Vieux appropriated stockwater from the Teton
River and from a spring in Nelse’s Coulee as early as 1874. The Water
Court also concluded that the preponderance of the evidence showed

' See the attached diagram of the Whoop-Up Trail. Vieux’s settlement is labeled
“Capt Nels’ Leavings.”

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that Vieux was irrigating nine acres by 1880; that he had increased
that to 50 acres by 1887; and that these water appropriations were
made on his settlement on the Teton River.”

q9 The Water Court found that in 1888 Edward Reichelt acquired a
homestead on the Teton River downstream from Nelson Vieux.
Reichelt. developed his own water rights and acquired property and
water rights from others including Vieux, Horace Hibbard, Helen
Hibbard, and Clara Lamphear. In 1904 Reichelt secured rights of way
for ditches over neighboring lands and on January 25, 1905, he filed a
notice of appropriation for 10 cubic feet of water per second (cfs) from
the Teton River. The “Reichelt Ditch” has since been the only ditch on
the north side of the Teton River capable of carrying water from the
River to Reichelt’s various parcels of land. Reichelt acquired the Vieux
property and water rights by 1914. He combined the Vieux rights with
other rights and ran them through the Reichelt Ditch for irrigation. By
1922 Reichelt acquired the Hibbard properties and water rights.

{10 In 1935 Reichelt split his ranch between his sons Dan and Bruno.
Dan’s upstream parcel later became the Danreuther Ranch after
succession to his daughter Janet who married into the Danreuther
family. Danreuthers later filed statements of claim for the Vieux,
Horace Hibbard (4 cfs) and Helen Hibbard (1 cfs) water rights for use
on the upper ranch. Bruno’s part of the Reichelt Ranch is still in the
Reichelt name, and it claims water rights developed by Edward
Reichelt. These Danreuther and Reichelt water rights are all
distributed for irrigation through the Reichelt Ditch.

11 The Water Court reviewed the conflicting testimony by opposing
experts concerning the amount of land that the Danreuthers irrigated
through the Reichelt Ditch system. While much of the testimony was
based upon analysis of aerial photographs from the 20th century,
Danreuther’s expert additionally conducted field examination of the
ditches. Based upon the aerial information and the field inspection,
Danreuther’s expert determined that “182.80 acres is within the
historical range of irrigation on the Danreuther property.” The Water
Court determined that the combination of aerial photograph survey

? In 2009 Objector Farmers Co-op Canal sought summary judgment to invalidate
Danreuther’s Vieux-based claim. The Water Court Master concluded that the 1874 Vieux
filing was not a valid notice of appropriation and therefore could not support the claimed
priority date. The Water Court reviewed this decision and in 2013 concluded that the
Vieux filing could be used to support the claimed priority date and that the burden of
proof to support the contents of the Danreuther statement of claim had not shifted to the
claimant.

——————— =

with field examination of the sites was important and “provides
additional credibility” to the conclusions. The Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation (DNRC) review of Danreuther’s claims
also supported the conclusion that 182.80 acres were under irrigation.
The western part of the ranch, including the Vieux homestead, is
sprinkler irrigated from the Reichelt Ditch, while the eastern part is
flood irrigated from the same source.

12 Danreuther’s water claims for irrigation arising from this history
are No. 410 156804-00, based upon the 1874 filing and subsequent use
by Nelson Vieux; and Nos. 410 156805-00 and 410 156806-00, based
upon the 1914 notices of appropriation by Helen Hibbard and Horace
Hibbard. All three claims specify the Teton River as their source and
the Reichelt Ditch as the means of diversion. The statements of claim
by Danreuther Ranches claimed a flow rate of 6.9 cfs and a place of use
of 182.8 acres for each of the three rights. The Water Court noted that
the source for the claimed 6.9 cfs flow rate “is a mystery.”

13 The Water Court carefully examined the available evidence on the
Danreuther claim for the right to sprinkler irrigate 69.7 acres south of
the Teton River based upon a 1921 notice of appropriation filed by
Clara Lamphear. The evidence showed that there was little likelihood
that the land covered by the Lamphear notice was ever irrigated
because it is steep, broken and not irrigable. The evidence showed that
Dan Danreuther developed his sprinkler system for the land south of
the Teton River in 1972. This is Claim No. 410 156807-00.

q14 Danreuther Ranch also filed two claims for stock water use
directly from the water source. Claim No. 410 156801-00 was a use
right for 201 animal units from a spring in Captain Nelse’s Coulee with
a priority date of 1870 (changed by rule to December 31, 1870). Claim
No. 410 156802-00 covers the right to use stockwater for 201 animal
units from the Teton River based upon the 1874 filing by Nelson Vieux.
q15 The Water Court also noted a stipulation entered between
Danreuther and Reichelt to amend certain statements of claim. The
stipulation provides that a portion of Danreuther’s Claim No. 410
156804-00 should be transferred to Reichelt so that the right to use
5.64 cfs to irrigate 149.4 acres remains with Danreuther, while 1.26 cfs
goes to Reichelt to irrigate 33.4 acres. This stipulation resolved the
issue of whether Danreuther’s claim to 6.9 cfs from the Teton River
was a single claim or was three separate claims for that amount of
water. As a result, Danreuther’s Claim Nos. 410 156804-00, 410
156805-00, and 410 156806-00 represent claims to a total flow from
the Teton River of 6.9 cfs.

416 The Water Court reached conclusions of law based upon these

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facts. The Court concluded that Danreuther’s properly-filed statements
of claim are prima facie evidence that the information in them is true,
§ 85-2-227(1), MCA. As a result, Objectors have the burden to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that any challenged claim elements
“do not accurately reflect the beneficial use of the water rights as they
existed prior to July 1, 1973.” Weinheimer Ranch, Inc. v. Pospisil, 2013
MT 87, {[ 21, 369 Mont. 419, 299 P.3d 327. The Water Court generally
upheld the water rights claimed in Danreuther’s statements of claim,
with modifications.

17 The Canal Companies (Farmers, Teton, and Eldorado) appeal and
Danreuther cross-appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

18 This Court reviews the Water Court’s findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard. Skelton Ranch v. Pondera County Canal &
Reservoir Co., 2014 MT 167, {] 26, 375 Mont. 327, 328 P.3d 644. Under
this standard a finding of fact may be clearly erroneous if it is not
supported by substantial evidence; ifthe Water Court misapprehended
the effect of the evidence; or if a review of the record demonstrates that
amistake has been made. Skelton Ranch, | 27. “Substantial evidence”
is evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if the evidence is weak or conflicting.
Skelton Ranch, | 27. This Court reviews the Water Court’s conclusions
of law to determine whether they are correct. Skelton Ranch, {| 26.

DISCUSSION

{19 Isswe One (Canal companies): Whether the Water Court erred in its
orders regarding Danreuther Claim Nos. 410 156802-00; 410 156804-
00; 410 156805-00; and implied Claim No. 30106965.

{20 Danreuther Claim No. 410 156804-00 represents a claim to the
right to divert water from the Teton River for irrigation, based upon
Nelson Vieux’s 1874 filing with Chouteau County. While the Water
Court found sufficient evidence that Vieux was raising and watering
stock by 1874, it found that there was insufficient evidence that Vieux
was also irrigating crops by that time. The Court noted that by 1888
Vieux had been on the property 20 years; established a freight station;
farmed the homestead; and raised cows. Based upon the declarations
in Vieux’s homestead claim filings, the Water Court concluded that
Vieux was irrigating 9 acres of crops by 1880 and that he was
irrigating an additional 41 acres by 1887. Based upon this evidence of
water use, and the fact that crops would not grow there without
irrigation, the Water Court determined that Vieux had perfected those

——————  °

rights to irrigate out of the Teton River.

21 The Canal Objectors dispute the validity of the Water Court’s
decision, arguing that Vieux’s 1874 filing with Chouteau County was
insufficient to establish a water right. The Objectors correctly note that
prior to 1885 the sole method for perfecting a water right was to
actually put water to a beneficial use. Gilcrest v. Bowen, 95 Mont. 44,
51, 24 P.2d 141, 144 (1933). That is why the Water Court dated the
priority of the two Vieux appropriations from the date of the first
evidence of actual water use in 1880 and 1887. Those would have been
the priority dates for these two rights whether or not the 1874 filing
was ever made.

22 Objectors also point to the absence of evidence of when Vieux
commenced his ditches; when he completed the ditches; the volume of
water diverted; or the actual beneficial use of water. Certainly, the
record would be clearer if it included precise information as to Captain
Vieux’s activities in the 1870s and 1880s. This Court has recognized
that. proof of precise facts as to persons’ activities over one hundred
years ago is often not possible, even where written records are kept. In
cases where the existence of a public road is at issue, for example, we
have examined the record as a whole rather than focusing on strict
compliance with statutory requirements, recognizing that otherwise
there would be an unjustifiable burden to prove the existence of a
public road 100 years later. Leticia Land Co. v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge
County, 2015 MT 323, 1 15, 381 Mont. 389, 362 P.38d 614; Sayers v.
Chouteau County, 2013 MT 45, ] 26, 369 Mont. 98, 297 P.3d 312 (citing
Reid v. Park County, 192 Mont. 231, 627 P.2d 1210 (1981)).

123 In this case, not only do we recognize the difficulty of proving
precise facts and dates of activities that took place over 140 years ago,
but also the express requirement noted above that the contents of a
statement of claim are to be presumed true unless overcome by a
preponderance of the evidence. Section 85-2-227(1), MCA; Weinheimer
Ranch, { 21. Here the objectors rely primarily upon an absence of
evidence showing exactly what Vieux did and when he did it. However,
the evidence that Vieux was cropping a precise number of acres in 1880
and in 1887, coupled with the unassailable fact that crops will not grow
in that area without irrigation, firmly support the Water Court’s
conclusion regarding Claim No. 410 156804-00. The Water Court
properly concluded that the Objectors failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the claim should be rejected.

24 Objectors have not demonstrated that the Water Court’s findings
or conclusions are clearly erroneous, or that the Court misapprehended
the evidence, or that a clear mistake was made. To the contrary, the

a

Water Court carefully noted and weighed the evidence to reach the
decision and we find no error.

{25 Danreuther Claim No. 410 156802-00 is a right to water stock
directly from the Teton River, based upon the claims and activities of
Nelson Vieux. The Water Court determined that the evidence,
particularly Vieux’s declarations filed in support of his homestead
entry, showed that he had a stockgrowing operation on the Teton River
by 1874, and that the River was one of the few reliable water sources
in the area. The Water Court further concluded that evidence of
historical accounts of the Whoop-Up Trail, newspaper articles, tax
records and homestead documents support Danreuther’s statement of
claim to the right to water 201 animal units from the Teton River.
Vieux listed the precise number of animals kept at his homestead,
along with additional animals that he allowed to openly graze. These
stock numbers, plus the fact that the Teton River was the primary
reliable source of stock water then, supported the Water Court’s
determination of the extent of this water right.

26 The Water Court concluded that the Objectors’ arguments failed
to overcome the statutory presumption in favor of the truth of the
elements set out in Danreuther’s statement of claim. On appeal, they
again point to the absence of precise facts as to Vieux’s stock numbers
in the 1870s and of their watering habits, but this absence of evidence
does little to dilute the actual numbers supplied by the historical
record cited by the Water Court.

{27 Danreuther Claim No. 410 156805-00 is a right to irrigate on
182.8 acres north of the Teton River based upon a September 8, 1914
notice of appropriation filed by Helen Hibbard. Danreuther initially
claimed a flow rate of 6.9 cfs, but the Water Court reduced the claim
to 1.0 cfs to match the appropriation claimed by Hibbard.

128 Canal Objectors contend that the Water Court should have
rejected this claim because the lands that Hibbard originally listed as
the place of use are now owned by the State of Montana, and because
there is no evidence in the record that the Hibbard claim was ever
transferred to Danreuther. The Water Court concluded from the
evidence that Danreuther and predecessors had used the Helen
Hibbard right along with other rights on the 182.8-acre parcel of land,
and that this aspect of the right should remain as claimed. The Water
Court reduced the flow rate to 1 cfs to reflect the original appropriation
by Hibbard.

29 Danreuther points out that the issue concerning the chain of title
to the Hibbard water right was not raised below and so there was no
cause to present evidence on that point. In addition, the contents of the

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Danreuther claim are presumed true unless overcome by a
preponderance of the evidence. Objectors have not demonstrated that
the Water Court’s findings or conclusions are clearly erroneous, or that
the Court misapprehended the evidence or that a clear mistake was
made. To the contrary, the Water Court carefully noted and weighed
the evidence to reach the decision and we find no error.

80 Issue Two (Danreuther cross-appeal): Whether the Water Court
erred in its orders regarding Danreuther Claim No. 410 156804-00.
31 Danreuther cross-appeals from the Water Court’s decisions
regarding Claim No. 410 156804-00, the right to irrigate from the
Teton River based upon the original Vieux appropriations. The Water
Court altered Danreuther’s claim for a single irrigation right with an
1874 priority date, recognizing instead two separate rights dated 1880
and 1887. Danreuther argues it is entitled to the presumption of truth
of the matters stated in the original statement of claim with an 1874
priority. In addition, Danreuther points to the evidence that Vieux was
in fact irrigating by 1880 and argues that it is entitled to relate the
irrigation right priority date back to 1874 when Vieux filed notice of his
intent to appropriate.

32 The Water Court reviewed the history of the claim based upon the
1874 Vieux declaration of intent, concluding that at that time there
was no statutory procedure for posting notice of appropriation of water.
At that time, the law required that a claimant initiate work on a
diversion of water and then complete the work in a reasonable amount
of time. If so, then the claimant could date the water right from the
time the work began on the diversion. Gilcrest, 95 Mont. at 51, 4 P.2d
at 144. By contrast, the Water Court determined that Vieux’s 1874
notice established only that he had an intention to use water at some
time in the future.

483 The Water Court determined that while Danreuther’s evidence did
not show that Vieux irrigated in 1874, it supported a conclusion that
he was irrigating by 1880. The Water Court found that there were no
tax records or crop yields from 1874 and that evidence of Vieux’s
involvement with the “Whoop-Up Trail is too speculative to have any
credibility.” The Water Court found that the most credible evidence of
irrigation on the Vieux property came from his homestead filings,
newspaper accounts from the time and the testimony of Dan
Danreuther. The Water Court concluded that this evidence showed
that Vieux was “cultivating land and harvesting crops by 1880” and
that he “produced sufficient yields to indicate irrigation.”

34 The Water Court determined that it was “more likely than not”
that Vieux was irrigating 9 acres in 1880 and that he “brought an

a

additional 41 acres under irrigation by 1887.” The Water Court
concluded that this evidence showing an increase in cropped acres
between 1880 and 1887 supported an “implied” second water right,
with the 1887 priority date. Danreuther contends that this was not a
second separate appropriation, but rather that the evidence shows a
continued development of the irrigation begun by at least 1880.

85 While Danreuther claimed a flow rate of 6.9 cfs, the Water Court.
also determined that there was “no evidence supporting a specific flow
rate based on [Vieux’s] historical use.” The Water Court applied
guidelines from the DNRC that establish a“17 gpm [gallon per minute]
(1.5 miner’s inches) flow rate per acre guideline to all use and filed
rights.” The Water Court noted that the DNRC did not reduce
Danreuther’s flow rate below the claimed 6.9 cfs because applying the
DNRC guideline to 182.8 acres results in a flow rate of 17 gpm per
acre. Nonetheless, the Water Court decided that Danreuther’s claim
should be measured by the 17 gpm per acre flow rate, as applied to the
acreage of the two Vieux appropriations (1880 for 9 acres and 1887 for
41 acres). Under this calculation the Water Court concluded that
Danreuther was entitled to total Vieux rights of 850 gpm per acre, or
1.9 cfs. Danreuther objects to the Water Court’s rejection of the
claimed flow of 6.9 cfs.

136 The Water Court found that the evidence established that Edward
Reichelt acquired Vieux’s water rights, combined them with other
rights, and used that water “throughout the irrigated portion of his
property.” When Reichelt split the ranch in 1935, his successors
“continued to share the water rights to some extent.” Subsequently,
“Danreuther marshaled the rights it received from Edward on a total
of 182.8 acres” and did so “well before 1973.”

37 The Water Court concluded that prior to 1973 appropriators could
change their point of diversion, or the place or purpose of use, as long
as it did not harm other appropriators. At the same time, such a
change could not increase the flow rate or total volume of water used.
The Water Court found that while Danreuther’s irrigation of 182.8
acres was a significant increase over Vieux’s 50 acres, there was no
evidence that Danreuther or its predecessors increased the diversion
rate or total volume of water over that used by Vieux. Additionally, the
irrigation of the 182.8 acres was assisted by the use of other rights in
addition to the Vieux appropriations.

{38 Therefore, the Water Court affirmed Danreuther’s right to use the

——————— ©

Vieux rights, along with other rights, to irrigate the 182.8 acres.*

39 We agree with the Water Court’s analysis of the evidence to
conclude that the flow rate for Danreuther’s irrigation right should be
based upon the acres that Vieux irrigated beginning in 1880. As the
Water Court concluded, there was no actual evidentiary support for a
diversion rate of 6.9 cfs.

[40 However, we find that the Water Court misapprehended the effect.
of the evidence showing that Vieux’s irrigated acreage increased from
9 in 1880 to 50 in 1887. We agree with Danreuther that, considering all
the circumstances, and recognizing the passage of time and the scant
records, this increase actually represents evidence of Vieux’s continued
work to consummate the diversion he began by 1880.

41 Danreuther’s Vieux-based claims are governed by the law in effect
at the time of the appropriation. Marks v. 71 Ranch, 2014 MT 250,
15, 376 Mont. 340, 334 P.3d 373. When Vieux started irrigating in
1880, Montana had not yet adopted the subsequent (1885) statutes
which allowed an appropriator to post and file a notice of appropriation
and then complete the diversion and use of water. When an
appropriator did so, the priority date of the right related back to the
date the notice was posted. Montana DNRC v. Intake Water Co., 171
Mont. 416, 430, 558 P.2d 1110, 1118 (1976).

42 Before 1885, however, the primary way to appropriate water was
to put it to beneficial use. Axtell v. M.S. Consulting, 1998 MT 64, {| 26,
288 Mont. 150, 955 P.2d 1362. The law allowed an appropriator to
commence work on the headgate and ditches, and upon completion of
the system to relate the appropriation back to the date the
appropriation work was actually commenced. Gilcrest, 95 Mont. at 51,
4 P.2d at 144. The question of whether an appropriator diligently
worked on the means of diversion was made on a case-by-case basis
considering all the facts and circumstances of the situation. Intake
Water Co., 171 Mont. at 434, 558 P.2d at 1120.

43 We recognize that in this case Danreuther is entitled to the
presumption that his properly-filed statements of claim are prima facie
evidence that the information in them is true, § 85-2-227(1), MCA.
Weinheimer Ranch, { 21. We also recognize that the Objectors had the
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this
information in the claim is incorrect. Teton Co-Op Canal Co. v. Teton

° Because the flow rate of the Vieux right was decreased from 6.9 cfs to 1.9 cfs, the
Water Court determined that the 2009 Danreuther-Reichelt stipulation dividing the 6.9
cfs should no longer be enforceable.

oT

Coop Reservoir Co., 2015 MT 344, {| 21, 382 Mont. 1, 365 P.3d. 442.
44 The Objectors did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Vieux made or intended to make two separate appropriations
dated to 1880 and 1887. In fact, on appeal, the Objectors contend that
Vieux never made any valid appropriation and that Danreuther’s claim
should be voided. While the Water Court construed the evidence as
establishing two separate water rights (one an implied right), we
conclude that the Water Court misapprehended the evidence and that
in this water rights context it shows a continuation of the irrigation
effort begun in 1880 and completed in 1887, with a single priority date
in 1880.

45 [J Examining the record as a whole, we agree with Danreuther’s
argument of entitlement to a single irrigation right from the Teton
River based upon Vieux’s water use in the 1880s. This claim should
have a priority date of 1880 when Vieux commenced the irrigation
project, and should encompass water sufficient for irrigation on 50
acres. We therefore agree with the Water Court’s determination as to
the flow rate of 1.9 cfs provided by this right.

CONCLUSION
46 The Water Court’s decision is affirmed in part, reversed in part
and remanded for further proceedings.
JUSTICES WHEAT, BAKER, SHEA and RICE concur.

Mashe's River

= a

IN THE MATTER OF:
S.M.,
Respondent and Appellant.

No. DA 15-0762.
Submitted on Briefs July 19, 2017.
Decided October 3, 2017.
2017 MT 244.

389 Mont. 28.

403 P.3d 324.

For Appellant: Nick K. Brooke, Smith & Stephens, P.C.,
Missoula.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Tammy A. Hinderman, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Steven
N. Eschenbacher, Lake County Attorney, Polson.

JUSTICE BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

{1 The State filed a petition to involuntarily commit S.M. after he
told a friend he was going to commit suicide. At the initial hearing,
S.M. advised the court that he wished to waive counsel and represent
himself. The District Court ultimately denied S.M.’s request and
appointed counsel over S.M.’s objection. S.M., together with his

a "

appointed counsel, entered into a stipulation for commitment to
community-based treatment. The District Court approved the
stipulation and ordered S.M.’s commitment. On appeal, S.M. contends
that Montana law prohibiting waiver of the right to counsel violates his
rights under the United States Constitution. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
q2 In November 2015, S.M. asked a friend to watch his dog because
he intended to commit suicide. The friend called 9-1-1. When law
enforcement officers arrived at S.M.’s house, they found a noose with
a chair below it. S.M. told them he was going to kill himself. The
officers brought S.M. to the hospital. At the hospital, S.M. denied that
he intended to harm himself, but he told health care providers “that he
does have a rope long enough and has been looking for someone to look
after his dog when he is gone.” S.M. agreed that he needed help but
refused any treatment more restrictive than outpatient treatment.
Because the medical professional who examined S.M. believed
outpatient treatment would be inadequate due to S.M.’s suicidal
ideation, the State filed a petition to involuntarily commit S.M. The
District Court determined that there was probable cause to proceed
with the petition and appointed a public defender to represent S.M.
3 At the initial hearing on the petition, S.M. requested that the
District Court dismiss his appointed counsel because he wished to
represent himself. He stated further that “for the purpose of the record
Td note that I have a right to proceed pro se under Ferrata [sic] versus
California and shadow counsel may be appointed, but the attorney will
not represent me.” The District Court and the public defender agreed
with S.M. that he had “the absolute right” to represent himself. The
District Court then appointed the public defender “to serve only as
standby counsel.” The District Court explained to S.M. that appointed
counsel was merely “backup” whom S.M. could “use ... to the extent
[S.M.] wish[ed].”
q4 On November 20, 2015, Erica Weber, a certified mental health
professional, examined S.M. and submitted her report to the District
Court. Weber reported that S.M.’s symptoms include “high risk
behaviorsl,] impulsivity, and suicidal ideation” and that S.M.
“remain[ed] a high risk to attempt [suicide] without outside
assistance.” She expressed concern that S.M. would not follow through
with a voluntary treatment plan if the District Court dismissed the
involuntary commitment petition. Weber recommended court-ordered,
community-based treatment.
{5 On that same day, standby counsel filed a notice with the District

" a

Court that, pursuant to § 53-21-119(1), MCA, “[t]he right to counsel
may not be waived” in involuntary commitment proceedings. The
notice explained that under this Court’s decision in In re N.A.,
2013 MT 255, 7 15, 371 Mont. 531, 309 P.3d 27, standby counsel was
insufficient representation.

q6 Inresponse to the notice, the District Court informed S.M. at the
next hearing that he could not waive appointed counsel. The District
Court told S.M. that the proceeding would continue “in a fashion that
doesn’t walk all over the top of your ability to represent yourself.” S.M.
protested that he was “very well aware” of his rights and that he had
represented himself in various civil and criminal proceedings in the
past, as well as representing other people in the tribal court system.
He also agreed that he was in need of mental health intervention.

q7 When the District Court attempted to grant a recess to give S.M.
an opportunity to read Weber’s report and to confer with his counsel,
S.M. instead requested to meet with both his appointed counsel and
the prosecutor, “so that we can get through this and get: to the point of
the hearing, which is me getting mental health.” During the recess, the
parties negotiated a stipulation in which they agreed that S.M.
suffered from a mental illness and was in need of commitment. They
stipulated that the least restrictive treatment alternative was
placement in a community outpatient treatment facility. Appointed
counsel, the prosecutor, and S.M. all signed the agreement. The
District Court approved the stipulation and entered an order of
commitment requiring S.M. to comply with the agreed-upon plan of
care.

q8 S.M. appeals the commitment order and facially challenges the
prohibition against waiving counsel in civil commitment proceedings
contained in § 53-21-119(1), MCA, as a violation of his rights under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

q9 Constitutional issues are questions of law; our review of such
questions is plenary. In re Mental Health of T.M., 2004 MT 221, {] 7,
332 Mont. 394, 96 P.3d 1147.

110 Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional.
Williams v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Missoula Cnty., 2013 MT 243,
{| 23, 371 Mont. 356, 308 P.3d 88. The party challenging a statute has
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it is
unconstitutional. Williams, | 23. To prevail on a facial challenge, the
party making the challenge must show that “no set of circumstances
exists” under which the statute would be valid or that the statute lacks

a ”

any “plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008)
(citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Mont. Cannabis
Indus. Ass’n v. State, 2016 MT 44, | 14, 382 Mont. 256, 368 P.3d 1131.

DISCUSSION
11 Whether § 53-21-119(1), MCA, prohibiting a person from waiving
the right to counsel in a civil commitment proceeding, violates the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
112 Montana’s civil commitment statutes provide respondents to
involuntary commitment petitions with numerous procedural rights.
They include the right to notice in advance of any hearing,
§ 53-21-115(1), MCA; to be present, to offer evidence, and to present.
witnesses, § 53-21-115(2), MCA; to know in advance the names and
addresses of opposing witnesses and to cross-examine them,
§ 53-21-115(3)-(4), MCA; to remain silent, § 53-21-115(6), MCA; to be
examined by the professional of the respondent’s choice,
§§ 53-21-115(9), -118, MCA; to be dressed in the respondent’s own
clothes, § 53-21-115(10), MCA; and to either refuse to take or to
voluntarily take medication before any hearing, § 53-21-115(11)-(12),
MCA. Section 53-21-119(1), MCA, allows a respondent to “mak[e] an
intentional and knowing decision” to waive these rights. Along with the
above listed rights, the statute guarantees the right to counsel in no
fewer than three provisions. See § 53-21-115(5), MCA (guaranteeing
“the right to be represented by counsel”); § 53-21-116, MCA
(guaranteeing the right to counsel at any hearing or trial and providing
for appointed counsel); § 53-21-117, MCA (guaranteeing the right to
secure an attorney of the respondent’s choice). Unlike its treatment of
other rights, § 53-21-119(1), MCA, prohibits a respondent from waiving
the right to counsel.
q13 S.M. alleges that the language in § 53-21-119(1), MCA, that “[t]he
right to counsel may not be waived” violates his right to represent
himself under the Sixth Amendment and his right to substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.’

1S.M. alludes to the Montana Constitution, which provides greater protection of
some rights than the United States Constitution guarantees. State v. Covington,
2012 MT 31, | 20, 364 Mont. 118, 272 P.3d 43. A party asserting such greater protection
“must establish sound and articulable reasons that the Montana Constitution affords
greater protection for a particular right.” Covington, 1 20. Because S8.M. failed to provide
separate legal analysis regarding any possible greater protections the Montana
Constitution affords, the Court declines to decide those issues here

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q14 S.M. argues first that the right to act as counsel for oneself rests
on the Sixth Amendment. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819,
95S. Ct. 2525, 2533 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that
the right to present one’s own defense in a criminal prosecution,
though not explicitly provided for in the text, was “necessarily implied
by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment.” S.M. argues that the Sixth
Amendment's right to self-representation applies equally to
involuntary civil commitment proceedings.

15 The State counters, and we agree, that the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution does not apply to civil commitment
proceedings. By its very language the Sixth Amendment is limited to
“criminal prosecutions.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Martinez v. Court
of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 159-60, 120 S. Ct. 684, 690 (2000) (“The
Sixth Amendment identifies the basic rights that the accused shall
enjoy in ‘all criminal prosecutions.’ They are presented strictly as
rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial
itself.”); Middendorf v. Henry, 435 U.S. 25, 37, 96 S. Ct. 1281, 1289
(1976) (“That a proceeding will result in loss of liberty does not ipso
facto mean that the proceeding is a ‘criminal prosecution’ for purposes
of the Sixth Amendment.”). We have explained that “although
affording an individual with certain ‘criminal’ due process rights, the
involuntary commitment process does not invoke” the Sixth
Amendment. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, 7 39,
306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485. Although we overruled In re K.G.F. on other
grounds in In re J.S., 2017 MT 214, J 19, 388 Mont. 397, 401 P.3d 197,
we reaffirmed the principle “that the right to effective assistance of
counsel in civil commitment proceedings is premised upon the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution” and companion
State constitutional provisions, not upon the Sixth Amendment. In re
J.S., J 15. Because civil commitment constitutes “a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection,” Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1809 (1979), a
constitutional right to self-representation in civil commitment
proceedings, if any exists, must be found in the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, not.
in the Sixth Amendment.

q16 S.M. argues that § 53-21-119(1), MCA, also violates his
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. S.M
contends that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects
his right to represent himself in involuntary civil commitment
proceedings because such a right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117S. Ct. 2258,

a "

2268 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1938 (1977)). Such fundamental rights may not be
infringed “at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (quoting Reno v. Flores,
507 USS. 292, 302, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993)); see also Newville v.
Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 267 Mont. 237, 249, 883 P.2d 793, 800 (1994)
(“[T]he due process clause contains a substantive component which
bars arbitrary governmental actions regardless of the procedures used
to implement them, and serves as a check on oppressive governmental
action.”).

117 Analyzing substantive due process claims under the federal
Constitution is a two-step process. First, we must determine whether
the Due Process Clause protects a purported right as a fundamental
right. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21, 117 S. Ct. at 2268. In making
this determination, we look to see if the right is “objectively deeply
rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21, 117 S. Ct.
at 2268 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Critical to this
inquiry is a “careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 117S. Ct. at 2268 (citations and
internal quotations omitted). The second step depends on the outcome
of the first step. If the purported right is fundamental, any
governmental restriction must pass strict judicial scrutiny.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 117 S. Ct. at 2268. If the purported right
is not fundamental, rational basis review applies. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 728, 1175S. Ct. at 2271.

18 In making the initial determination as to whether a fundamental
right is at stake, we must carefully define the purported right in a way
that “avoids over generalization in the historical inquiry.” Hawkins v.
Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 747 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 722-23, 117 S. Ct. at 2268-69). A “careful description” of the
purported right S.M. asserts is the right to represent oneself in a civil
commitment proceeding.

419 We next turn to whether such a right is “found to be deeply rooted
in our legal tradition.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722, 117S. Ct. at 2268.
Unlike the right to self-representation that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees to criminal defendants, there is far from a “nearly
universal conviction,” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817, 95 S. Ct. at 2532, that.
persons in involuntary civil commitment proceedings have a right to
represent themselves. The right to waive counsel in civil commitment

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proceedings “varies among the states from allowing self-representation
as in other suits, to giving the court discretion as to whether waiver
and self-representation should proceed, to making the presence of
counsel unwaivable.” 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mentally Impaired Persons § 35
(2017) (footnotes omitted). Decisions from various jurisdictions
illustrate the different policy choices that states have made on this
issue. Compare Conservatorship of Joel E., 132 Cal. App. 4th 429, 440
(2005) (holding that neither the state statute nor the United States
Constitution provided a right to self-representation in civil
commitment proceedings); In re Penelope W., 19 A.3d 813, 815 (Me.
2011) (noting that in criminal cases self-representation “is a limited
right” and that the Maine statute’s requirement for representation by
counsel in civil commitment proceedings “does not violate a patient's
constitutional rights”); In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. 1995)
(stating that the Minnesota statute does not give a person in civil
commitment proceedings a right to self-representation); and In re
G.G., 165 A.3d 1075, 1091 (Vt. 2017) (holding “that. the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause precludes a patient in a continued
treatment or involuntary medication hearing, or in an appeal
concerning those issues, from representing him or herself”), with In re
Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 686 (Ariz. 2007) (holding “that the intended
beneficiary ofa statute may waive its benefit”); In re Civil Commitment
of D.Y., 95 A.3d 157, 161, 171 n.7 (N.J. 2014) (declining to reach the
constitutional question and determining, based on statutory text and
a tradition of self-representation, that a party may waive
representation in a civil commitment proceeding under New Jersey’s
Sexually Violent Predator Act without reaching whether it would hold
the same for other civil commitment proceedings); In re R.Z.,
45 N.W.2d 486, 488 (N.D. 1987) (stating that North Dakota relies on
criminal cases “to define the rights of respondents in mental health
proceedings” and that a respondent may waive counsel if the waiver is
“knowing and intelligent and voluntary”); In re Det. of J.S., 159 P.3d
435, 440 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the right to self-
representation was protected by the constitution of the State of
Washington and interpreting the statute to not require counsel); and
In re S.Y., 469 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Wis. 1991) (concluding that the right
to self-representation in civil commitment proceedings is protected by
the constitution of the State of Wisconsin). This disparate case law
shows that there is no universal agreement among the states whether
a person in a civil commitment proceeding has the right to proceed pro
se.

{20 S.M. cites two cases in support of his argument that self-

a =

representation in civil commitment proceedings has a long history in
the United States. Neither case discusses involuntary civil
commitment proceedings specifically. The first case on which S.M.
relies addresses the history of self-representation in civil cases
generally, not civil commitment proceedings specifically, and states
that the right is protected “simply by statute” and not by the
Constitution. Jannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 556 (2d Cir. 1998). The
second case pertains to the control and guardianship of the property of
an elderly farmer. In re Vanauken, 10 N.J. Eq. 186 (1854). Although
S.M. quotes the line, “[tJhe alleged lunatic has a right ... to make his
defence [sic] by himself or counsel,” Vanauken was in fact represented
by counsel. 10 N.J. Eq. at 190. The case does not analyze any right to
proceed without that representation. We do not find either of these
cases convincing as establishing a long history in the United States of
a right to self-representation in civil commitment proceedings.

(21 To the contrary, as the State points out, formal proceedings for
involuntary civil commitment are relatively modern developments.
Early American statutes dealing with mental illness during the
Colonial era primarily were concerned with the guardianship and
control of any assets the person may have had. 1 Michael L. Perlin,
Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal § 2A-2.1b, 58 (2d ed. 1998)
(hereafter Perlin, Mental Disability Law). During this time, very few
facilities existed for those with mental illness, and commitment into
these institutions was viewed “strictly as administrative,” with an
application from “the local overseer of the poor” or a family member
generally sufficient to commit an individual. 1 Perlin, Mental
Disability Law § 2A-2.1b, 54.

22 Between 1810 and 1840 institutions to house the mentally
disabled proliferated, and a “cult of asylum” swept across the United
States. Alan Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventative Confinement in
Anglo-American Law Part II: The American Experience, 43 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 781, 804-05 (1974) (internal quotations omitted) (hereafter
Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventative Confinement ). During this
time, involuntary commitment involved little more than a certification
from a medical professional that. commitment was proper. 1 Perlin,
Mental Disability Law § 2A-2.1b, 54; Samuel Jan Brakel et al., The
Mentally Disabled and the Law 14 (3d ed. 1985).

23 In the years after the Civil War, courts and legislatures concerned
about abuse in these informal systems “promulgated safeguards
designed to prevent. confinement of persons who were sane.”
Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement 845. Many states
during this time instituted procedural reforms, such as requiring trial

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by jury, presence of the patient at judicial hearings, right to appeal,
and “reasonable opportunity to correspond with friends.” Dershowitz,
The Origins of Preventative Confinement 842.

24 Since the 1890s, reform efforts “have gone through repeated cycles
driven primarily by whether the public at the time is (1) concerned that
people with mental illness are not getting the treatment they need or
(2) focused on the possibility of unjust detention.” Paul S. Appelbaum,
A History of Civil Commitment and Related Reforms in the United
States: Lessons for Today, 25 Dev. Mental Health L. 18, 17 (2006).
Pertinent to our purpose today, this history tells us that self-
representation in civil commitment proceedings has not. been protected
since the beginning of the Nation. In fact, strong procedural safeguards
to protect the interests of those facing involuntary civil commitment
are a rather recent development. and have focused on improving the
fairness and accuracy of the process.

25 The history tells us further that the process afforded to
respondents in civil commitment proceedings is the subject of a
“considered legislative response,” and we should be cautious to extend
constitutional protections that “place the matter outside the arena of
public debate and legislative action.” Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne,
557 U.S. 52, 73, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S. Ct. at 2268). Unlike the
penal purpose of criminal law, a primary purpose of the civil
commitment statutes in Montana is to “secure for each person who
may be suffering from a mental disorder and requiring commitment
the care and treatment suited to the needs of the person and to ensure
that the care and treatment are skillfully and humanely administered
with full respect for the person’s dignity and personal integrity.”
Section 53-21-101(1), MCA. A companion purpose is to “ensure that
due process of law is accorded” to any person in civil commitment
proceedings. Section 53-21-101(4), MCA. To further that purpose, the
statutes are replete with process requirements. This Court requires
strict adherence to all process due in these proceedings. See, e.g., In re
J.S., 118. Civil commitment proceedings operate on an expedited time
frame, § 53-21-122(2)(a), MCA, (hearing on the petition must be within
five days of initial appearance), and the respondent may not be
detained in a jail or other correctional facility pending commitment,
§ 53-21-124(4), MCA. In order to initiate an involuntary civil
commitment proceeding, the court first must find probable cause based
on evidence contained in the State’s petition that the person is
suffering from a mental disorder “that has substantial adverse effects
on an individual’s cognitive or volitional functions.” Section

a 7

58-21-102(9)(a), MCA (definition of “mental disorder”); § 53-21-121(c),
MCA (requiring the petition to contain facts supporting the allegation
of mental disorder); § 53-21-122(2)(a), MCA (requiring the judge to
dismiss the petition if no probable cause is found). The statutes are
designed to protect a respondent’s civil and legal rights, as well as the
safety of the community, while ensuring the orderly consideration and
prompt disposition of petitions for involuntary confinement. In this
context, the Montana Legislature has determined that counsel cannot
be waived. Section 53-21-119(1), MCA.
26 The core of due process “emphasizes fairness between the State
and the individual dealing with the State.” Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.
387, 405, 105 S. Ct. 830, 841 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). This
means that concerns about fairness, integrity, and accuracy of the
process carry great weight. And especially so in civil commitment
proceedings. The State has no interest in involuntarily committing
people who do not suffer from a mental disorder that makes them a
danger to themselves or others under the statutory criteria of
§ 53-21-126(1)(a)-(d), MCA. Thus, the State has an important interest.
in seeing that proceedings lead to fair and accurate outcomes. The
United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Martinez that “[n]o one
.. attempts to argue that asa rule pro se representation is wise,
desirable or efficient.” Martinez, 528 U.S. at 161, 120 S. Ct. at 691.
There is a very real risk that self-representation in civil commitment
proceedings would increase the likelihood of an unfair or erroneous
result rather than enhancing the fairness or accuracy of the
proceeding.
27 The United States Supreme Court noted in Indiana v. Edwards,
554 U.S. 164, 175, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2386 (2008), that “[mlental illness
itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time.
It interferes with an individual’s functioning at different times in
different ways.” If the United States Constitution guaranteed self-
representation in civil commitment proceedings, courts would have to
reassess throughout the proceeding whether the person before them
was competent to waive counsel. As the Supreme Court of Vermont
pointed out, self-representation in involuntary commitment
proceedings “creates a circularity problem.” Jn re G.G., 165 A.3d
at 1090. It is quite possible that a person in a civil commitment
proceeding who proceeded pro se and was found in need of commitment
“would then be in a position to challenge the initial waiver of counsel
as not knowing, intelligent or voluntary[,] and thereby [claim] a right
to a new hearing with counsel.” In re G.G., 165 A.3d at 1090. Such
potential disruptions not only implicate the state interest in expedient

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resolution of cases, but also delay getting the respondent any
treatment and care he or she needs.

28 The forgoing discussion demonstrates that the Legislature has
taken extensive measures to preserve the integrity of the process and
to uphold the interests of persons involved. Prohibiting the waiver of
counsel is one such measure. Our examination reveals that a right to
self-representation in civil commitment proceedings is neither “deeply
rooted in our Nation’s history,” nor “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 117S. Ct. at 2268 (citations and
internal quotations omitted). The Due Process Clause, therefore, does
not establish as fundamental the right to represent oneself in civil
commitment proceedings.

29 Because a fundamental right is not implicated in this case, the
United States Constitution requires only that the statute “be rationally
related to legitimate government interests.” See Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 728, 117 S. Ct. at 2271; see also Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n, | 21
(“Where a fundamental right is not. implicated, ‘[slubstantive due
process analysis requires a test of the reasonableness of a statute in
relation to the State’s power to enact legislation.’ ” (quoting Satterlee
v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 2009 MT 368, {| 33, 353 Mont. 265,
222 P.3d 566)).

480 Evident from the above discussion is the State’s substantial
interest in preserving the integrity and fairness of civil commitment
proceedings. Because the statute is based on the sound public policy
that persons in civil commitment proceedings should be represented by
counsel to preserve fairness, integrity, and accuracy in the civil
commitment process, the prohibition against waiver is “reasonably
related to a permissible legislative objective.” Mont. Cannabis Indus.
Ass’n, {| 21. The challenged language in § 53-21-119(1), MCA, has a
“plainly legitimate sweep,” and so S.M.’s facial challenge must fail.
Wash. State Grange, 522 U.S. at 449, 128 S. Ct. at 1190 (citations and
internal quotations omitted).

31 Although the United States Constitution does not require courts
to allow persons in civil commitment proceedings to represent
themselves, we do not minimize the important autonomy interests a
respondent has relating to “the inestimable worth of free choice” and
“respect for the individual.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S. Ct.
at 2540-41 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Even though
respondents cannot waive counsel under § 53-21-119(1), MCA, this
does not mean that they cannot participate extensively in the
proceedings as appropriate, which S.M. did. The statute guarantees
certain procedural safeguards, including the right to be present and to

a "

offer evidence, among other rights. Section 53-21-115(2), MCA. These
rights to be present and to offer evidence mean that a respondent may
offer his or her perspective to the court, explain why he or she should
not be committed, or explain why a less restrictive placement is proper
under the circumstances.

32 S.M. did just this. In the initial hearing, S.M. requested the court
to move him within the facility at which he was being held to the side
where he could go outside, stating, “I have not been disruptive. I have
been cooperative and I’m pretty much coherent.” S.M. participated
extensively in the proceedings at the next hearing. He made arguments
in support of his federal rights before the court and he made the
decision to meet with both his counsel and the prosecutor to negotiate
a stipulation. Although he could not waive counsel entirely, S.M. was
able to participate in such a manner that protected his personal
autonomy under the circumstances.

33 Our prior interpretations of § 53-21-119(1), MCA, support this
outcome. In In re N.A., 110, the respondent’s counsel “assisted in cross
examination, conducted direct examination of [the respondent], and
addressed the District Court concerning matters of legal significance,”
but the respondent performed a majority of the cross-examinations and
delivered a closing argument. We held that the respondent’s
participation did not reduce counsel to standby counsel and did not
make counsel’s performance ineffective. In re N.A., 1] 17, 38. Such
extensive participation was appropriate under the circumstances of
that case, just as S.M.’s extensive participation was appropriate under
the circumstances of this case. The appropriate level of participation
in each case will depend on the circumstances and the individual
capacity of the respondent in the civil commitment proceeding. Judges
should allow such participation, when appropriate, to promote the
respondent’s individual autonomy and dignity, so long as such
participation protects the respondent’s statutory rights and will not
prevent the fair, orderly, and accurate administration of the
proceeding.

34 We also note that Montana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14(a)
states that “[wJhen a client’s capacity to make adequately considered
decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether
because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the
lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with the client.” Part of a normal attorney-
client relationship includes “reasonably consultling] with the client
about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
accomplished,” M. R. Prof. Cond. 1.4(a)(2), and “abid[ing] by a client’s

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decisions concerning the objectives of representation,” M. R. Prof.
Cond. 1.2(a). These rules highlight that when an attorney represents
a client during a civil commitment proceeding, the attorney has an
ethical duty to seek the client’s input and, if the client so chooses, to
allow for the client’s participation in the defense “as far as reasonably
possible.” M. R. Prof. Cond. 1.14(a).

135 [Ef Section 53-21-119(1), MCA, as interpreted by this Court, thus
does not raise any due process concerns. Although the statute requires
counsel, a respondent in a civil commitment proceeding still has a right
to participate personally in the proceeding and, depending on the
respondent’s circumstances and capacity, to participate extensively.

CONCLUSION
136 We affirm the District Court’s order of commitment and uphold
the constitutionality of § 53-21-119(1), MCA. The judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES McKINNON, WHEAT,
SANDEFUR, SHEA and RICE concur.

a °

NEILL FISHMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

GRBR, INC., and DOES 1-5,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 17-0214.
Submitted on Briefs September 6, 2017.
Decided October 5, 2017.
2017 MT 245.
389 Mont. 41.
403 P.3d 245.

For Appellant: John M. Wagner, Wagner Law Firm, PC,
Whitefish.

For Appellee: Antonia P. Marra, Marra Evenson & Bell, PC,
Great Falls.

JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1 Neill Fishman (Fishman) appeals the entry of summary judgment
by the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County in favor of
GRBR, Inc. (GRBR). We affirm, addressing the following issue:

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Did the District Court err by granting summary judgment to the
defendant pursuant to the “Equine Activities Act”?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{2 GRBRisa Montana corporation owned by Don Gaynor (Don) and
operated by Don and his wife, Nancy Gaynor (Nancy). GRBR offered
guest cabins and trail horse rides near Whitefish, Montana, providing
about 1,000 trail rides per year. Fishman was a participant on aGRBR
trail ride in June 2014.

q3 Sometime before the day of the ride, Fishman called GRBR and
booked a trail ride for himself and some relatives. During the call, Don
asked Fishman for his height and weight to determine which horse
would work best for him. Fishman stated he was over 6 feet tall and
weighed 210 pounds. Based on Fishman’s size, Don chose the horse,
“Big,” a large horse capable of carrying heavier riders, for Fishman to
ride. Big’s saddle and associated tack are specifically designed for him.
[4 GRBR presented Fishman with a Supervised Equine Rental
Agreement and Release Form (Agreement) prior to the trail ride. The
Agreement stated that “saddle girths (fasteners around the horse’s
belly) may loosen during equine activity, which may cause slippage of
the saddle and the potential fall from the horse.”' Fishman read and
signed the Agreement.

5 GRBR’s standard pre-ride procedure includes saddling the horses
and checking saddle cinches a minimum of three (3) times before a
riding participant mounts the horse. Don saddled Big before Fishman
arrived and, consistent with procedure, Big’s saddle cinch was checked
several times before the horse was mounted. A wrangler rode Big
before Fishman arrived and the saddle cinch was checked again.

(6 After the participant mounts the horse, GRBR wranglers give oral
instructions and observe the participant riding the horse around the
corral ina safety check to address any equipment adjustments, observe
how the participant manages the horse, provide instruction, and
answer questions or concerns. Participants are instructed to ask for
help if they believe something is wrong. Fishman had a low level of
riding experience, and Don explained to him how to hold the reins and
direct Big’s movements. Fishman then rode Big around the corral.
Nancy noticed Fishman was leaning to one side and tipping the saddle.
Nancy instructed Fishman to shift his weight and to keep the saddle

“The term “girth” may be used interchangeably with “cinch,” which is defined as
agirth for a saddle or pack. Oxford Am. Dictionary 136 (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc. 1999).

a “

centered over the horse. Fishman complied before departing the corral
for the trail.

{7 Upon completion of the safety check, the ride participants were
taken out on the trail. Nancy, on horseback, led the riders out of the
corral and down the trail at.a walking pace. During the ride, Fishman
attempted to re-center the saddle by shifting back and forth in the
stirrups. Nancy became aware Fishman was having a problem when
Fishman yelled at her. Nancy observed Fishman sliding to one side and
then attempting to jump off the horse, landing on the ground. The
saddle remained affixed on the horse, but resting on its side. Big did
not buck or react during the incident.

q8 Fishman filed this damage action against GRBR, asserting
negligence generally and specifically mentioning only inaction by
Nancy as the apparent assertion of breach of duty, and not referencing
the actions of GRBR’s other personnel: “Nancy Gaynor never physically
touched or inspected Neill’s saddle after it was place[d] upon his horse
Big, nor after she noticed it was off center and told Neill to recenter,
and at no time before or after Neill mounted Big.” GRBR moved for
summary judgment, arguing Fishman’s accident was caused by a risk
inherent in equine activities for which liability is precluded under § 27-
1-727, MCA. Fishman also moved for summary judgment, arguing
Nancy failed in the duty to inspect the saddle, which satisfied an
exception to the liability protection of the equine statute.

{9 Concluding there were no genuine issues of material fact, the
District Court granted summary judgment to GRBR, reasoning that.
“among the risks inherent to equine activities is the risk that saddle
girths may loosen during a ride and cause slippage of the saddle, which
may result in a fall. It is out of this very type of inherent risk—of which
[Fishman] was specifically warned in the Agreement and of which he
acknowledged his understanding—that Fishman’s negligence claim
arises....” The Court further concluded that Fishman had failed to
establish that a statutory exception applied, reasoning that “Fishman
has not alleged or shown that any piece of tack or equipment broke,
was otherwise defective or did not work or perform as expected.”
Fishman appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
110 We review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of summary
judgment, applying the same criteria of M. R. Civ. P. 56 as a district.
court. Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 2013 MT 354, 119,
373 Mont. 1, 313 P.3d 839. Summary judgment is appropriate when
the moving party demonstrates both the absence of any genuine issues

“ a

of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. M. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Bird v. Cascade Cnty., 2016 MT 345, 1] 9, 386 Mont. 69,
386 P.3d 602. We review a district court’s conclusions of law to
determine whether they are correct. Pilgeram, 9.

DISCUSSION
11 Did the District Court err by granting summary judgment to the
defendant pursuant to the “Equine Activities Act”?
12 Sections 27-1-725 through -727, MCA, commonly referred to as the
“Equine Act” or “Equine Activities Act,” states that “the policy of the
state of Montana’ is “that a person is not liable for damages sustained
by another solely as the result of risks inherent in equine activities if
those risks are or should be reasonably obvious, expected, or necessary
to persons engaged in equine activities.” Section 27-1-725, MCA. We
have stated that the “practical effect” of the Act is to “pronounce that
equine activity sponsors do not havea duty to protect participants from
unavoidable risks, or the inherent risks of equine activities of which
the participant is or should be aware,” explaining that:
If the injury is due to an inherent risk of equine activities and the
participant expected that risk, then the equine activity sponsor
cannot have been negligent—the injury was due to an unavoidable
risk of which the participant was aware, so the sponsor could not.
have breached any duties to warn of or eliminate the risk. Thus,
so long as the participant expects a risk inherent in equine
activities, pursuant to the statute, the equine activity sponsor
may not be held liable for injury suffered as a result of that risk.
McDermott v. Carie, 2005 MT 293, {| 18, 329 Mont. 295, 124 P.3d 168.
13 The Act provides, in pertinent part:
Equine activity liability limitations. (1) Except as provided in
subsections (2) and (3), an equine activity sponsor or an equine
professional is not liable for an injury to or the death of a
participant engaged in an equine activity resulting from risks
inherent in equine activities.
(2) An equine participant shall act in a safe and responsible
manner at all times to avoid injury to the participant and others
and to be aware of risks inherent in equine activities.
Section 27-1-727(1), (2), MCA. The Act further defines the term, “risks
inherent in equine activities,” as “dangers or conditions that are an
integral part of equine activities,” and provides a non-exhaustive list
of such dangers. Section 27-1-726(7), MCA.
q14 Fishman does not contest the District Court’s determination that.
the circumstances of his accident come within the statutory definition

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of “risks inherent in equine activities,” and thus cannot form the basis
of a liability claim under § 27-1-727(1), MCA. However, Fishman
argues that the District Court erred in concluding that his claim does
not fall within an exception to the general rule, as set forth in § 27-1-
727(3), MCA, which states:

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply:

(a) if the equine activity sponsor or the equine professional:

(i) provided the equipment or tack and the equipment or tack

caused the injury because the equine activity sponsor or equine

professional failed to reasonably and prudently inspect or

maintain the equipment;
Fishman argues that Nancy’s failure to inspect the equipment and tack
he was using caused the accident, and thus his claim comes within the
exception stated in § 27-1-727(3)(a)(i), MCA, and permits his claim.
15 We first note that Fishman did not allege that the equipment or
tack failed, was improperly maintained, or was otherwise defective.
Further, although Fishman focuses solely on Nancy’s personal actions
or inaction, it is an undisputed material fact that the subject
equipment and tack was repeatedly checked and inspected by the
equine sponsor prior to the trail ride to insure they were working
properly. Fishman makes no showing whatsoever that these
inspections were not performed “reasonably and prudently,” as
required by § 27-1-727(3)(a)(i), MCA, for his claim. The fact that the
cinch nonetheless loosened during the ride underscores that this
occurrence is an inherent danger or condition of equine activity, about
which Fishman was expressly advised.
16 [ll The District Court also properly determined that the material
facts of the case are not in dispute. Fishman argues that there were
differing accounts of the communications that occurred between Nancy
and Fishman in the corral before the trail ride, but these
communications are not material to whether the accident was caused
by an inherent risk and whether the equipment was reasonably and
prudently inspected. Fishman argues that the District Court went too
far by excusing liability on the basis of the Agreement he had signed,
which he argues cannot, in itself, release an equine sponsor from
liability. While Fishman is correct that liability cannot be excused on
the basis of an Agreement, see McDermott, 1 19, the District Court did
not, in our view, apply the protections of the Equine Act solely on the
basis of the Agreement. Rather, the District Court considered the
Agreement in the context of whether Fishman was aware of the
inherent risks of horseback riding. Its ultimate decision was premised
upon the circumstances of this accident coming within the inherent

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risks of equine activity as defined in the Equine Act, and not within the
statute’s exception to that liability limitation.
q17 Affirmed.

JUSTICES McKINNON, BAKER and SANDEFUR concur.

JUSTICE WHEAT, dissenting.
18 I respectfully dissent from the majority. I would reverse and
remand because the District Court resolved issues of disputed fact. In
my opinion, the majority overlooks the dispute of material fact between
Fishman and GRBR as to whether Fishman’s slipping during the ride
was an inherent danger or condition of equine activity, or if it was a
product of improper equipment inspection.
419 GRBR knew the cinch was loose during the safety check when
Fishman began to slip. GRBR attributed the slip to a shift in weight by
Fishman and directed him accordingly to keep his weight centered.
Fishman and other riders were then taken out on the trail. While on
the trail, Fishman’s saddle again slipped; this time Fishman had to
jump off the horse. The majority states that “the fact that the cinch
nonetheless loosened during the ride underscores that this occurrence
is an inherent danger or condition of equine activity.” Opinion, {| 15.
However, this characterization of the saddle slippage erroneously
ignores that the cinch was not tightened properly by GRBR prior to
hitting the trail.
{20 Further, GRBR was on notice that Fishman’s cinch was loose
through observations during the safety inspection and through
Fishman’s own communications with the trail guide. However, the
majority side-stepped the safety inspection dispute by stating
“Fishman makes no showing whatsoever that these inspections were
not performed ‘reasonably and prudently, as required by § 27-1-
727(3)(a)(i), MCA, for his claim.” Opinion, {| 15. The majority also
concludes the communications between Fishman and GRBR as “not
material to whether the accident was caused by an inherent risk and
whether the equipment was reasonable and prudently inspected.”
Opinion, {] 16. In my opinion, such conclusions overlook the dispute of
fact. as to whether the cinch was not reasonably and prudently
inspected by GRBR after they observed that the cinch was loose or that
the cinch became loose during the ride as a condition of equine activity.
This dispute of fact should be left for a jury to resolve.
21 This Court has long adhered to the proposition that “summary
judgment is an extreme remedy that should never be a substitute for
a trial on the merits if a controversy exists over a material fact.”
Corporate Air v. Edwards Jet Ctr. Mont. Inc., 2008 MT 283, {| 24, 345
Mont. 336, 190 P.3d 1111. The majority interprets the Equine

a “

Activities Act too narrowly and thereby deprives an injured person of
the right to have the facts of their claim decided by a jury rather than
by a judge’s expansive interpretation of an immunity statute.

22 For these reasons, I dissent.

Ts
KILBY BUTTE COLONY, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 17-0162.
Submitted on Briefs August 2, 2017.
Decided October 10, 2017.

2017 MT 246.

389 Mont. 48.

403 P.3d 664.

For Appellant: Torger S. Oaas, Attorney at Law, Lewistown.
For Appellee: Guy W. Rogers, Jon A. Wilson, Brown Law Firm,
P.C., Billings.

a °

JUSTICE SHEA delivered the Opinion of the Court.
qi Plaintiff Kilby Butte Colony, Inc., (“Kilby Butte” or “Colony”)
appeals the order by the Fourteenth Judicial District Court,
Musselshell County, denying its summary judgment motion and
granting summary judgment to Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). We address the
following issue:
Whether the District Court erred by granting summary judgment
to State Farm on the grounds that the Stahls did not qualify as
insureds under Kilby Butte Colony’s State Farm Policy.
q2 We affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

q3 On December 15, 2018, Mary Ann and Ivan Stahl were injured in
an automobile accident when traveling in Saskatchewan, Canada. At
the time of the accident, the Stahls were passengers in a motor vehicle
owned by a Canadian Hutterite Colony. Another individual was at
fault for the accident.
{4 The Stahls are members of the Kilby Butte Hutterite Colony.
Kilby Butte is a Montana religious corporation with a community
treasury that engages in business for the common benefit of its
members. Hutterite colony members own assets of the community
collectively; therefore, the Stahls cannot own a vehicle in their
individual capacities. Kilby Butte owns multiple vehicles all titled and
insured in the Colony’s name. All of the Colony’s auto insurance
policies were purchased through State Farm at State Farm’s agency
office in Lewistown. No individual Colony members were listed as
named insureds on any vehicle owned by the Colony.
5 The Colony submitted a claim to State Farm on behalf of the
Stahls under its 2006 Freightliner Policy (“Policy”) that provided
underinsured motorist coverage (“UIM Coverage”) in the amount of
$50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. State Farm declined the
Stahls’ claim because the Stahls were not occupying the Freightliner
at the time of their accident and did not meet the definition of
“insured” under the Policy. The declaration page for the Policy listed
the named insured as “Kilby Butte Colony.” The UIM Coverage is
detailed in Policy Form 9826A “State Farm Car Policy Booklet” as
follows (emphasis in the original):

Insuring Agreement

We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury an insured

is legally entitled to recover from the owner or driver of an

underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be:

TT

1. sustained by an insured; and
2. caused by an accident that involves the operation, maintenance,
or use of an underinsured motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
Policy Form 9826A defines “insured” as follows in regards to UIM
Coverage (emphasis in the original):
Insured means:
1. you;
2. resident relatives;
3. any other person who is not insured for underinsured motor
vehicle coverage under another vehicle policy and only while that.
person is occupying a car:
a. that is used within the scope of your consent;
b. the ownership, maintenance, or use of which is provided
liability coverage by one of the State Farm Companies; and
c. that is either:
(1) owned by:
(a) the first person shown as a named insured on the
Declarations Page or that named insured’s spouse who resides
primarily with that named insured; or
(b) any resident relative; or
(2) a temporary substitute car.
Such other person occupying a vehicle used to carry persons for
a charge is not an insured; and
4. any person who has not sustained a bodily injury but is
entitled to recover compensatory damages as a result of bodily
injury to an insured as defined in 1., 2., or 3. above.
Policy Form 6926A.2 “Amendatory Endorsement” amends the
definition of “insured” in regards to UIM Coverage as follows
(emphasis in the original):
6. UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE
a. Additional Definitions
Item 3. of Insured is changed to read:
8. any other person who is not insured for underinsured motor
vehicle coverage under another vehicle policy and only while
that person is occupying a vehicle that would qualify as:
a. “your car’,
b. a “newly acquired car’, or
c. a “temporary substitute car”
as defined in Definitions of any vehicle policy providing
Liability Coverage issued by the State Farm companies to
you or any resident relative. Such vehicle must be used

es ©

within the scope of your consent. Such other person
oceupying a vehicle used to carry persons for a charge is not.
an insured...
The Policy is also subject to Policy Form 6030BF.1 “Business Named
Insured,” which provides in pertinent part (emphasis in the original):
This endorsement is a part of the policy. Because of the type of
named insured shown on the Declarations Page of this
policy and the changes made below, all references to
resident relatives and non-owned cars in the policy are
deleted. Except for the changes this endorsement makes, all
other provisions of the policy remain the same and apply to this
endorsement.
You or Your is changed to read:
You or Your means the named insured or named insureds
shown on the Declarations page.
Policy Form 6030BF.1 amends the definition of insured in regards to
UIM Coverage as (emphasis in the original):
4. UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE and
UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE
Additional Definitions
Insured is changed to read:
Insured means:
1. any person while occupying:
a. your car;
b. a newly acquired car; or
c. a temporary substitute car.
Such vehicle must be used within the scope of your
consent. Such person occupying a vehicle used to
carry persons for a charge is not an insured; and
2. you or any person entitled to recover compensatory
damages as a result of bodily injury to an insured defined in
item 1. above.
Policy Form 9826A defines “newly acquired car,” “occupying,” “owned
by,” “temporary substitute car,” and “your car” as (emphasis in the
original):
Newly Acquired Car means a car newly owned by you.

Occupying means in, on, entering, or exiting.

Owned By means:
1. owned by;

TT

2. registered to; or
8. leased, if the lease is written for a period of 31 or more
consecutive days, to.

Temporary Substitute Car means a car that is in the lawful
possession of the person operating it and that:
1. replaces your car for a short. time while your car is out of use
due to its:

a. breakdown;

b. repair;

¢. servicing;

d. damage; or

e. theft; and
2. neither you nor the person operating it own or have registered.

Your Car means the vehicle shown under YOUR CAR on the

Declarations Page. Your Car does not include a vehicle that you

no longer own or lease.
{6 After State Farm declined the Colony’s UIM claim submitted on
behalf of the Stahls, the Colony filed suit. The parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment, and the District Court held oral
arguments on April 23, 2015. On March 1, 2017, the District Court
granted State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the
Colony’s Motion, and determined that the Stahls did not qualify for
UIM Coverage because the Stahls did not satisfy the definition of an
“Insured” within the terms of the policy. Relying on Hanson v. Emp’rs
Mut. Cas. Co., 336 F.Supp.2d 1070 (D. Mont. 2004), Am. States Ins. Co.
v. Flathead Janitorial & Rug Servs., 2015 MT 239, 380 Mont. 308, 355
P.3d 735, and Stonehocker v. Gulf Ins. Co., 2016 MT 78, 383 Mont. 140,
868 P.3d 1187, the District Court held that “so long as an insurance
policy is unambiguous, a claimant must satisfy the policy definition of
an insured in order to qualify for UIM Coverage. It is not a violation of
a claimant’s reasonable expectations for a corporate insurance policy
to restrict the class of insureds for which its policy provides coverage.”

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
{7 We review a district court’s entry of summary judgment de novo.
Stonehocker, {| 9 (citing McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co., 2015 MT 222, 1 8,
380 Mont. 204, 354 P.3d 604). “Summary judgment is appropriate
when the moving party demonstrates both the absence of any genuine
issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.”
Stonehocker, {9 (citing M. R. Civ. P. 56). When there are cross-motions

a ©

for summary judgment, a district court must evaluate each party’s
motion on its own merits. Halenga v. Schwein, 2007 MT 80, 1] 18, 336
Mont. 507, 155 P.38d 1242. On cross-motions for summary judgment,
where the district court is not called to resolve factual disputes and
only draw conclusions of law, we review the district court’s conclusions
of law to determine whether they are correct. Bud-Kal v. City of
Kalispell, 2009 MT 98, {1 15, 350 Mont. 25, 204 P.3d 738.

{8 The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law
that we review de novo to determine whether the district court is
correct. Stonehocker, 10 (citing Tidyman’s Mgmt. Servs. v. Davis,
2014 MT 205, {| 13, 376 Mont. 80, 330 P.3d 1139).

DISCUSSION

q9 Whether the District Court erred by granting summary judgment

to State Farm on the grounds that the Stahls did not qualify as

“insureds” under Kilby Butte Colony’s State Farm Policy.

110 We use the following approach to interpret insurance contracts:
General rules of contract law apply to insurance policies and we
construe them strictly against the insurer and in favor of the
insured. Courts give the terms and words used in an insurance
contract their usual meaning and construe them using common
sense. Any ambiguity in an insurance policy must be construed in
favor of the insured and in favor of extending coverage. An
ambiguity exists where the contract, when taken as a whole,
reasonably is subject. to two different interpretations. Courts
should not, however, seize upon certain and definite covenants
expressed in plain English with violent hands, and distort them
so as to include a risk clearly excluded by the insurance contract.

Mecca v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2005 MT 260, {1 9, 329 Mont. 73, 122 P.3d

1190 (quoting Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Ribi Immunochem

Research, Inc., 2005 MT 50, | 17, 326 Mont. 174, 108 P.3d 469). We

read insurance policies as a whole and reconcile the policy’s various

parts to give each part meaning and effect. Section 33-15-316, MCA;

Newbury v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. of Bloomington, Ill., 2008 MT

156, {] 19, 343 Mont. 279, 184 P.3d 1021. We recognize the reasonable

expectations doctrine and have consistently held that the objectively

reasonable expectations of insurance purchasers regarding their policy
terms should be honored, even if a painstaking study of the policy
negates expectations. When applying the doctrine, an insurance
contract is to be interpreted from the viewpoint of a consumer with
average intelligence, with no training in the law or insurance.
Flathead Janitorial, | 22 (citing Leibrand v. Nat'l Farmers Union

TT

Prop. & Cas. Co., 272 Mont. 1, 7, 898 P.2d 1220, 1224 (1995)).

11 Simply because a party claims a contract provision is ambiguous
or disagrees with the meaning of a provision does not make it so.
Giacomelli v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2009 MT 418, ]] 32, 354 Mont. 15, 221
P.3d 666. Courts will not distort the language of a contract provision
to create an ambiguity that does not exist. Giacomelli, ] 32.

12 The Colony contends that the Policy and its endorsements limit
UIM Coverage to injured persons who both own and occupy an insured
motor vehicle. The Colony argues that individual Colony members can
never qualify for UIM Coverage because Colony members cannot own
Colony motor vehicles. Thus, the Colony contends the Policy’s UIM
Coverage is illusory. The Colony asserts the Stahls are entitled to the
UIM Coverage based on public policy considerations espoused in
Chaffee v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. , 181 Mont. 1, 591 P.2d 1102
(1979), and Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 261 Mont. 386,
389, 862 P.2d 1146, 1148 (1993) (“The public policy embodied in these
decisions is that an insurer may not place in an insurance policy a
provision that defeats coverage for which the insurer has received
valuable consideration.”).

113 The Colony maintains UIM Coverage is “personal and portable”
and is provided even if the UIM claimant is not occupying an insured
vehicle. See Mitchell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2003 MT 102, {] 40, 315
Mont. 281, 68 P.3d 703. An exception to this rule, however, exists for
corporate or business auto insurance policies that require occupancy
of the corporate owned vehicle as a condition of coverage. The problem
with this exception as applied to this case, the Colony argues, is that
most individuals can purchase UIM Coverage for themselves through
their personal auto insurance policies. See Stonehocker, J 17; Flathead
Janitorial, 1] 18, 28; Chilberg v. Rose, 273 Mont. 414, 903 P.2d 1377
(1995). Because Colony members, like the Stahls, cannot purchase
personal UIM Coverage, the Colony contends the Policy's UIM
Coverage remains illusory for individual Colony members.

14 State Farm responds that the Stahls do not satisfy the Policy
definition of “insured” because they were not occupying a vehicle that
satisfies the Policy definition of “your car,” a “newly acquired car,” or
a “temporary substitute car” at the time of their accident. State Farm
contends that corporate policies, such as the Colony’s, may restrict the
class of beneficiaries for which UIM Coverage is provided to individuals
occupying covered vehicles. See Stonehocker, {] 15-17; Flathead
Janitorial, 1] 18, 23; Hanson, 336 F.Supp.2d at 1076. State Farm also
contends this restriction is not a violation of the Colony’s reasonable
expectations under the plain language of the Policy. See Flathead

a ©

Janitorial, | 22. Because the Stahls would be entitled to recover UIM
Coverage had they been occupying a vehicle that satisfies the Policy
definition of “your car,” a “newly acquired car,” or a “temporary
substitute car” at the time of the accident, State Farm argues the
Policy does not provide illusory coverage. We agree.

15 [ll The Stahls do not satisfy any definition of “insured” under the
Policy. Nor were the Stahls occupying a covered vehicle at the time of
the accident. The Stahls would qualify for UIM coverage under the
Policy if they were occupying a Colony covered vehicle at the time of
the accident; thus, the Policy is not illusory, as the Colony claims. The
requirement that a Colony member occupy a covered vehicle to obtain
UIM Coverage is not a violation of its reasonable expectations of the
Policy terms, even when interpreting the Policy from the Colony’s
viewpoint. Flathead Janitorial, | 22. The Policy is a business or
corporate policy, and “as long as it is legal for an insurer to sell an
automobile liability policy to a corporation, which is the named
insured, it is legal for the insurer to limit the class of covered
individuals to those who are occupying covered vehicles at the time
they are injured.” Hanson, 336 F.Supp.2d at 1076. “We have not
expanded coverage to injured persons involved in the corporation who
are not occupying vehicles covered under the policy at the time of the
accident.” Stonehocker, {| 17 (quoting Lee v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 2008
MT 80, {| 16, 342 Mont. 147, 182 P.3d 41). UIM Coverage is not so
personal and portable that insurers are required to sell UIM Coverage
irrespective of an auto insurance policy. Hanson, 336 F.Supp.2d at
1076.

CONCLUSION
16 [ll The Colony contracted with State Farm for UIM Coverage to
insure occupants of its covered vehicles. The fact that the Stahls do not
meet the definition of “insured” because they were not in a covered
vehicle at the time of their accident does not defeat coverage and
render any coverage State Farm promised to provide illusory. See
Newbury, {{] 20, 27. The District Court did not err in finding the Stahls
do not satisfy the unambiguous definition of “insured” under UIM
Coverage in the Policy and that they are not entitled to those benefits.
The District Court was correct. in determining the Policy did not
provide illusory coverage. We affirm the District Court’s order granting
State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and denying the Colony’s
motion for summary judgment.
JUSTICES WHEAT, SANDEFUR, BAKER and RICE concur.

7 a

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
KERSTYN JADE OLD BULL,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0266.
Submitted on Briefs August 9, 2017.
Decided October 10, 2017.
2017 MT 247.

389 Mont. 56.

403 P.3d 670.

For Appellant: Craig Kevin Shannon, Attorney at Law,

a "
Missoula.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Gerald
“Jay” Harris, Big Horn County Attorney, Hardin.

JUSTICE SHEA delivered the Opinion of the Court.

{1 Defendant Kerstyn Jade Old Bull appeals from the sentence and
judgment of the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn
County. The District Court sentenced Old Bull to ten years in the
Montana Women’s Prison (MWP), parole restricted for the entire term,
on her conviction for criminal endangerment in violation of § 45-5-207,
MCA; and ten years in MWP, parole restricted for seven and one-half
years, on her conviction for obstructing justice in violation of § 45-7-
3803, MCA, to be served consecutively to her criminal endangerment
sentence.

2 We address the following issues:

Issue One: Whether the District Court erred by imposing a parole

eligibility restriction on Old Bull’s sentence for obstructing justice.

Issue Two: Whether the District Court erred by requiring Old Bull

to register as a violent offender.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

q3 On March 2, 2015, Old Bull and her boyfriend Clint Hogan took
Hogan’s unresponsive six-year-old daughter, K.H., to Hardin Hospital.
K.H. was then transported to Denver Children’s Hospital where she
died from her injuries. When interviewed separately, Hogan and Old
Bull independently reported that K.H. was in good health when Hogan
left to go to the store, that she was unresponsive when Hogan
returned, and that she never regained consciousness. According to the
Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) ordered by the District Court,
Old Bull and Hogan waited roughly two hours before seeking medical
attention for K.H. During the State’s investigation into K.H.’s death,
Old Bull told law enforcement that K.H. fell in the shower, which led
to her injury. This account conflicted with the treating hospital
assessment that K.H.’s injuries resulted from a traumatic forceful blow
to the head and blunt force trauma that could not have been caused by
an accidental fall. K.H. also “had evidence of both fresh and historical
bruising over her entire body, consistent with habitual abuse.” Old Bull
later admitted that she provided false information to law enforcement
regarding Hogan’s involvement in the crime because she was scared to
stand up to Hogan.

{4 The State initially charged Old Bull with deliberate homicide of
KH. On November 18, 2015, the State amended these charges,
pursuant to a plea agreement, to criminal endangerment and

= a

obstructing justice. Old Bull pled guilty to these charges. As part of the
plea agreement, Old Bull admitted that she “engaged in conduct that
created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another,
specifically [K.H].” She also admitted to providing the police with false
information regarding Hogan’s role in K.H.’s death. At sentencing, Old
Bull never disputed that K.H. died due to blunt force trauma; however,
Old Bull did dispute whether she had been the cause of K.H.’s injury.
q5 Due to what the District Court characterized as Old Bull’s
“heinous” conduct that resulted in K.H.’s death, the Court: restricted
Old Bull’s parole eligibility for the entire ten-year sentence for criminal
endangerment and for seven and one-half years of the consecutive ten-
year sentence for obstructing justice. Hogan received a ten-year
suspended sentence for obstructing justice during the investigation
into K.H.’s death.

q6 At Old Bull’s sentencing, the District Court stated on the
record—without distinguishing between the criminal endangerment
charge and the obstructing justice charge—its rationale for the parole
restrictions. The Court stated: “You have a child who is dead here;
[she] has passed away. And there is evidence that this child endured
habitual abuse. The Court will not turn a blind eye to that.” The Court
further stated that it could see no “justification for treating a child the
way this child was treated or engaging in conduct that would allow for
such treatment” and found it “appropriate ... [to] impose an equally
severe sentence.” The Court also emphasized the lasting trauma to the
family and community caused by K.H.’s death. Further, the District
Court stated that the parole restrictions would ensure that Old Bull
have access to programs while in MWP to help address anger and
emotional issues and, therefore, have a chance at rehabilitation. The
District Court specified that the rationale for imposition of the
sentence and judgment were also “the reasons for ineligibility for
parole,” reemphasizing that the death of K.H., a young child, required
a “sufficient level of punishment and accountability.”

{7 + Old Bull argued against any parole restriction on the basis that it
would limit the Parole Board’s exercise of authority and discretion. Old
Bull made no other specific objections to the parole restrictions.

{8 In its written judgment, the District Court enumerated thirty-
three recommended terms and conditions for “any period of community
based supervision” for the felony obstructing justice conviction,
including the requirement that Old Bull register as a violent offender.
The Court also restated its reasons for restricting Old Bull’s parole;
specifically, the “heinous nature” of Old Bull’s criminal conduct that
“resulted in severe bodily injury to the child victim, [K.H.], from which
the child ultimately died,” evidence in the PSI indicating habitual

a "

abuse of K.H., justice for the horrific circumstances of the crime, and,
finally, that sufficient time, in confinement would allow Old Bull to
engage in rehabilitative programming. Old Bull appeals the District
Court’s parole eligibility restriction on her sentence for obstructing
justice and the parole condition that she register as a violent offender.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

q9 We review for legality a district court’s restrictions on parole
eligibility and sentencing on criminal sentences that include at least
one year of incarceration. State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, {| 174, 338
Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815. Whether a restriction or sentence is legal is
a question of law, and our review is de novo. Ariegwe, |] 174-75; see
also State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83, | 9, 342 Mont. 187, 179 P.3d 1164;
State v. Paulsrud, 2012 MT 180, 1 9, 366 Mont. 62, 285 P.3d 505. Ifa
sentencing condition is legal, we then review the challenged condition
for abuse of discretion. City of Bozeman v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40, { 11,
369 Mont. 81, 296 P.3d 461; State v. Blake, 274 Mont. 349, 908 P.2d
676, 677 (1995).

DISCUSSION

{110 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred by imposing a parole
eligibility restriction on Old Bull’s sentence for obstructing justice.

{11 Generally, we will not review on appeal an issue that a party
failed to preserve through objection at trial. State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT
17, 1 8, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892; see also Ashby, {| 22 (explicitly
refusing to review an unchallenged condition in light of a defendant’s
failure to object in district court). We will, however, review a criminal
sentence alleged to be illegal or in excess of statutory mandates even
absent a defendant’s raised objection in district court. State v. Lenihan,
184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979). A sentencing condition
is illegal “if the sentencing court lacked statutory authority to impose
it, if the condition falls outside the parameters set by applicable
sentencing statutes, or if the court did not adhere to the affirmative
mandates of the applicable sentencing statutes .” State v. Heddings,
2008 MT 402, {| 11, 347 Mont. 169, 198 P.3d 242 (citing State v.
Stephenson, 2008 MT 64, J 15, 342 Mont. 60, 179 P.3d 502) (internal
citations omitted). Conversely, a sentence that is merely disparate does
not rise to the level of illegality. State v. Webb, 2005 MT 5, {] 8, 325
Mont. 317, 106 P.3d 521; see also State ex rel. Greely v. District Court,
180 Mont. 317, 327, 590 P.2d 1104, 1109-10 (1979) (holding that a
defendant has the right to have a sentence reviewed for equality or
disparity by the Sentence Review Board and citing §§ 46-18-901-905,

" a

MCA); see also State v. Simtob, 154 Mont. 286, 288, 462 P.2d 873, 874
(1969) (clarifying that sentence disparity and equality should be
reviewed by a sentencing board, whereas this Court reviews a sentence
to determine legality). A district court’s failure to abide by a statutory
requirement may rise to an objectionable sentence, though not
necessarily an illegal one. Kotwicki, {| 13; see also State v. Bullplume,
2013 MT 169, 7 17, 370 Mont. 453, 305 P.3d 753. Thus, when a district
court, “if provided the opportunity to consider the error now asserted
on appeal, could nevertheless have imposed the same sentence, the
illegality requirement of the Lenihan exception has not been met.”
Bullplume, 17.
12 Old Bull argues that her parole restriction of seven and one-half
years for obstructing justice is illegal, and therefore reviewable by this
Court under Lenihan because: (1) it led to an unreasonably disparate
sentence as compared to Hogan’s sentence; (2) the District Court failed
to orally pronounce the reasons for the parole restriction specifically as
to the obstructing justice conviction as required by § 46-18-115(6),
MCA; and (3) the District Court exceeded its statutory authority under
§ 46-18-202(2), MCA, when it restricted parole as to obstructing justice
based on conduct punished by Old Bull’s criminal endangerment
sentence. The State counters that the District Court legally imposed
parole restrictions on the obstructing justice sentence, and that Old
Bull waived any other challenges as to the reasonableness of the
restrictions when she failed to raise specific objections at the time of
sentencing.
{13 Old Bull’s first argument fails because a sentence or restriction
within the statutory parameters that is merely disparate or different
than a co-defendant or other charged defendant does not rise to the
level of illegality. Webb, {] 8. Old Bull and Hogan were separately
convicted of obstructing justice in violation of § 45-7-303, MCA; Old
Bull was sentenced to serve ten years with a parole restriction for the
first seven and one-half years of the sentence. Hogan received a ten-
year suspended sentence. Both sentences fell within the statutory
maximum sentence of imprisonment of ten years. Section 45-7-303,
MCA. Any challenge to the sentence or parole restriction based on
disparate treatment is best directed toward the Sentence Review
Division. Sections 46-18-901 et seq., MCA; Simtob, 154 Mont. at
287-88, 462 P.2d 574-75; see also State v. Rickman, 2008 MT 142,
{1 11, 16, 20, 343 Mont. 120, 183 P.3d 49.
14 Second, Old Bull asserts that the parole restriction is illegal
because the Court failed to orally pronounce its rationale for the
restriction. Section 46-18-115(6), MCA, provides:

In felony cases, the court shall specifically state all reasons for the

a "

sentence, including restrictions, conditions, or enhancements
imposed, in open court on the record and in the written judgment.
This argument also fails because the parole restriction neither exceeds
the statutory authority of ten years imprisonment, § 45-7-303, MCA,
nor falls outside the affirmative mandates of the sentencing statutes;
the restriction is therefore legal, Heddings, 1] 11, 20. The District
Court orally detailed its rationale for imposing parole restrictions on
Old Bull’s sentence during the sentencing hearing. The District Court
stated that its aim was to provide appropriate punishment for Old
Bull’s admitted criminal conduct, with an emphasis on the extremely
tragic results of such conduct, as well as to protect the community from
any such conduct in the future. Finally, the District Court stated the
restriction would provide Old Bull with the opportunity to engage in
rehabilitative and self-improvement programs while in confinement.
Although the District Court did not specifically reference which
conduct was attributable to which count, the Court. articulated its
reasons for the sentence and legally sentenced Old Bull within
statutory parameters. See Bullplume, | 17.
15 Third, Old Bull argues that the District Court’s parole restriction
as to the obstructing justice conviction was illegal because the
restriction was based on conduct more reasonably attributed to her
criminal endangerment conviction. We disagree. Old Bull’s obstructing
justice sentence, including the parole restriction, was within the
statutory power of the District Court. See Heddings, | 11. District
courts may limit parole eligibility under § 46-18-202(2), MCA, which
provides:
Whenever the sentencing judge imposes a sentence of
imprisonment in a state prison for a term exceeding 1 year, the
sentencing judge may also impose the restriction that the offender
is ineligible for parole and participation in the supervised release
program while serving that term. If the restriction is to be
imposed, the sentencing judge shall state the reasons for it in
writing. If the sentencing judge finds that the restriction is
necessary for the protection of society, the judge shall impose the
restriction as part of the sentence and the judgment must contain
a statement of the reasons for the restriction.
State v. Branham, 2012 MT 1, {| 27, 363 Mont. 281, 269 P.3d 891; see
also Paulsrud, {| 15-16. As detailed above, the District Court provided
its rationale for the parole restrictions both in its oral pronouncement
and in its written judgment. The Court legally imposed restrictions on
Old Bull's eligibility for parole for obstructing justice and acted within
the scope of its statutory authority under §§ 46-18-202(2), 115(6), and
45-7-303, MCA. See Lenihan, 184 Mont. at 343, 602 P.2d at 1000.

. a

16 J District courts have broad discretion to consider various
factors and holistically fashion sentences, including parole restrictions.
Paulsrud, 11 15-16 (reiterating that a district court retains broad
discretion to make parole eligibility decisions, consider all relevant
facts and circumstances, including evidence relating to the crime, the
“defendant’s character, background history, mental and physical
condition, and any other evidence the court considers to have probative
force”). The District Court’s parole restriction on Old Bull's obstructing
justice sentence was not illegal. At sentencing, Old Bull objected only
generally to the imposition of any parole restriction because of the
limitation it would place on the Parole Board’s future exercise of
discretion. She did not make the objections she now wishes us to
consider on appeal. Because Old Bull failed to preserve her objections
to what is otherwise a legal sentence, our review is limited under
Lenihan. See Kotowicki, 11 8, 13.

17 We affirm the District Court’s imposition of a seven and one-half
year parole restriction on Old Bull’s obstructing justice sentence.
118 Issue Two: Whether the District Court erred by requiring Old Bull
to register as a violent offender.

19 [HM Violent offender status is “determined purely by statute.”
State v. Miller, 1998 MT 177, { 41, 290 Mont. 97, 966 P.2d 721 (1998).
A district court lacks statutory authority to require violent offender
registration for a conviction not listed among the “ ‘violent offenses’ ”
that require registration. State v. Rowe, 2009 MT 225, I] 32-33, 351
Mont. 334, 217 P.3d 471. Neither of the crimes of which Old Bull was
convicted are included among the crimes requiring violent offender
registration. See Rowe, {| 33. Old Bull therefore argues that the violent
offender requirement imposed by the District Court’s judgment is
illegal, and reviewable under Lenihan. The State concedes this issue
and agrees the condition should be stricken from the judgment.
Therefore, we remand for the sole purpose of striking the condition
requiring Old Bull to register as a violent offender.

CONCLUSION
20 We affirm the District Court’s imposition of a seven and one-half
year parole restriction on Old Bull’s obstructing justice sentence. We
remand for the sole purpose of striking the condition that Old Bull
register as a violent offender.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT, SANDEFUR
and RICE concur.

— ©

CITY OF HELENA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CHRISTOPHER G. BROWN,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 17-0019.
Submitted on Briefs September 13, 2017.
Decided October 10, 2017.
2017 MT 248.
389 Mont. 63.
403 P.3d 341,

For Appellant: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Ryan W. Aikin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Leo Gallagher,
Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Helena.

For Appellee: Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Kristina
L. Neal, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena.

JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

a

{1 The State of Montana appeals the order entered by the First
Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, reversing the Helena
Municipal Court’s order denying Christopher Brown’s motion to
suppress evidence related to his arrest for driving under the influence
of alcohol (DUI). We reverse the District Court’s order, addressing the
following issue:

Did the District Court err by concluding that particularized

suspicion did not exist for the investigatory stop?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{2 On March 4, 2015, at around 2 a.m., Officer Noal Petty initiated
a traffic stop near the walking mall on Last Chance Gulch in Helena.
While engaged in the stop, Officer Petty heard a vehicle excessively
revving its engine in the small parking garage located on the walking
mall and became concerned that the driver’s intention was to squeal its
tires or to exit the garage unsafely at a high rate of speed. Because he
was occupied with a traffic stop, Officer Petty radioed to see if another
officer was available to investigate.
{3 Officer John Cook was already en route to provide backup to
Officer Petty for the initial traffic stop. As Officer Cook was arriving,
Officer Petty saw a pickup truck exit the parking garage and pull up
to the intersection between the parking garage and Officer Petty’s
location. As both parties acknowledge, Officer Petty again heard the
revving of an engine, but this time seeing the source vehicle. Officer
Petty pointed out the truck to Officer Cook and told Officer Cook to
stop the vehicle.
q4 Officer Cook headed toward the pickup truck and saw the truck
emit a large quantity of smoke as it pulled away from the intersection,
and suspected from the excessive smoke that Brown was operating a
non-compliant vehicle. Officer Cook initiated a stop of the truck based
on the directive he received from Officer Petty and his own observation
of excessive smoke. The driver of the vehicle was Christopher Brown,
who acknowledged revving the engine. The stop thereafter ripened into
a DUI investigation, resulting in Brown’s arrest on that charge.
{5 In the Municipal Court, Brown moved to suppress evidence
obtained from the traffic stop, arguing Officer Cook did not have
particularized suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the traffic stop. The
Municipal Court denied the motion, reasoning that particularized
suspicion for Officer Cook’s stop arose “because of the excessive
smoke,” but that, even if Officer Cook did not have the requisite
particularized suspicion based upon his own observations, “the stop
may nonetheless be made if the [] officer receives from another officer

i °

a request to stop the vehicle if the other officer from whom the request

was received possessed a reasonable suspicion that a criminal conduct

had occurred, was occurring, or was about to occur.”

{6 Brown appealed to the District Court, which reversed the

Municipal Court, reasoning that:
The trial court’s finding that Brown was apprehended under
Mont. Code Ann. § 61-9-403, for a mechanical violation because he
had a faulty muffler or poorly adjusted engine, is clearly
erroneous. Brown was stopped for alleged behavior. As stated
repeatedly by the testifying officers, Brown was believed by the
reporting officer to have excessively revved his engine and by the
arresting officer to have produced excessive smoke due to revving.
However, even if it was assumed that the same truck both revved
loudly and created a cloud of smoke, the law of Montana furnishes
no basis upon which to conclude that there had been any
wrongdoing.

(Emphasis in original.) The State of Montana appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{7 +Inan appeal from a municipal court, the district court functions
as an appellate court and the appeal is confined to a review of the
record and questions of law. Section 3-10-115(1), MCA. We review a
district court’s grant of a motion to suppress to determine whether the
court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court’s
interpretation and application of the law are correct. State v. Seaman,
2005 MT 307, {| 10, 329 Mont. 429, 124 P.3d 1137 (citations omitted).
We review the case as if the appeal was originally filed in this Court
and we examine the record independently of the district court’s
decision. Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, {] 26, 334 Mont. 489, 148
P.3d 643. A court’s determination that particularized suspicion exists
is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. State v. Gill, 2012
MT 36, {1 10, 364 Mont. 182, 272 P.3d 60. A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the lower
court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review
of the record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. State v. Wagner, 2013 MT 159, 1 9, 370 Mont.
381, 303 P.3d 285 (citing State v. Cooper, 2010 MT 11, 1.5, 355 Mont.
80, 224 P.3d 636).

DISCUSSION
{8 Did the District Court err by concluding that particularized
suspicion did not exist for the investigatory stop?

a

q9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. These protections extend to
investigative stops of vehicles. State v. Flynn, 2011 MT 48, {| 7, 359
Mont. 376, 251 P.3d 143. Before effectuating a stop, a police officer
must observe circumstances that create “a particularized suspicion
that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Section 46-5-401(1),
MCA. The State bears the burden of proving that an officer had
particularized suspicion to stop a vehicle by showing: (1) objective data
and articulable facts from which an experienced officer can make
certain inferences, and (2) a resulting suspicion that the occupant of a
certain vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing or was a witness
to criminal activity. State v. Larson, 2010 MT 236, 9 19, 358 Mont. 156,
243 P.3d 1130 (citing Brown v. State, 2009 MT 64, 1 20, 349 Mont. 408,
203 P.3d 842). The focus is on objective data and our precedent has
established that an “inquiry into the subjective motivations of law
enforcement ... is inappropriate in assessing the validity of an arrest.”
State v. Crawford, 2016 MT 96, {| 21, 383 Mont. 229, 371 P.3d 381.
10 “Particularized suspicion does not require certainty; it depends on
the totality of the circumstances in which the officer is making the
determination.” City of Missoula v. Sharp, 2015 MT 289, 19, 381 Mont.
225, 358 P.3d 204 (citing Larson, | 19). This Court has held that an
officer who is unaware of the factual basis for a particularized
suspicion may make an investigatory stop upon a directive or request
for action from another officer. State v. Gouras, 2004 MT 329, | 22, 324
Mont. 130, 102 P.3d 27 (citing State v. Olmsted, 1998 MT 301, {] 34,
292 Mont. 66, 968 P.2d 1154).

{11 In its challenge to the District Court’s order, the State analogizes
this case to Larson, where two officers were engaged in a traffic stop
when they heard screeching tires at a nearby intersection. Both officers
observed a truck spin its tires and cross the intersection with its engine
revving. One officer followed the truck for a short distance and
observed that the truck had oversized tires and lacked mud flaps,
which was a potential vehicle code violation. Larson, | 9. We
determined that these circumstances, taken together with rational
inferences, reasonably justified the traffic stop. Larson, {| 23.

12 In response, Brown relies on Grinde v. State, 249 Mont. 77, 813
P.2d 478 (1991). In Grinde, officers observed a vehicle lawfully drive
down a street and turn the corner. When the vehicle was out of sight,
the officers heard a revving engine and tires squealing. Grinde, 249
Mont. at 78, 813 P.2d at 474. We held that particularized suspicion did

——— ©

not exist because the officers’ personal observations were limited to the
car operating in a “safe and prudent manner.” Grinde, 249 Mont. at 80,
813 P.2d at 475.
q13 Unlike in Grinde, the observations of the officers here were not.
limited to a vehicle operating in a safe manner. Officer Petty heard an
engine revving inside the parking garage, and had concerns that, at
2:00 a.m., the vehicle may exit into the walking mall unsafely. Petty
then observed a pickup truck leaving the same parking garage, with an
engine that was revving. Responding to Officer Petty’s instruction,
Officer Cook approached the same truck and observed it emitting
excessive smoke, a potential vehicle code violation. Section 61-9-403,
MCA. As in Larson, when these observations are taken together with
rational inferences, they constitute objective data that reasonably
warranted the stop and support a finding of particularized suspicion.
Larson, {| 23.
14 [In reversing the Municipal Court, the District Court posited
that on a cold night “it may likely be difficult to distinguish
unnecessary exhaust smoke with water vapor emitted from the
tailpipe.” However, Officer Cook need not have been certain that
Brown had actually violated a vehicular statute for the purpose of
initiating a traffic stop, only particularized suspicion about such a
violation. See Sharp, | 9; State v. Britt, 2005 MT 101, {] 12, 327 Mont.
1, 111 P.3d 217. The excessive smoke emitting from the vehicle
supported a reasonable suspicion that Brown was operating a
noncomplying vehicle. Officer Cook was also entitled to rely on the
directive from Officer Petty based on Petty’s earlier observations. See
Gouras, {| 22. From his observation and those of Officer Petty, Officer
Cook had particularized suspicion to stop Brown’s vehicle.
15 [Hf On review from a municipal court of record, a district court is
confined to review of the record and questions of law. Section 3-10-
115(1), MCA. Here, the District Court erroneously found from the
evidence that Brown was stopped for “alleged behavior,” which
required its own assessment and speculation about the record. Rather,
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Municipal
Court’s findings of fact about the reasons that Brown’s vehicle was
stopped. We conclude the District Court erred in reversing the
Municipal Court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
q16 Reversed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES BAKER, WHEAT and
SHEA concur.

= a

IN RE THE PARENTING OF:
R.J.N. and H.E.N.,
Minor Children.

CHELLIE NEWMAN,
Petitioner and Appellant,
and
WILLIAM H. NEWMAN,
Respondent and Appellee.

No. DA 17-0041.
Submitted on Briefs August 30, 2017.
Decided October 10, 2017.

2017 MT 249.

389 Mont. 68.

403 P.3d 675.

For Appellant: Jeremy S. Yellin, Attorney at Law, Havre.

For Appellee: John P. Nesbitt, Jr., Attorney at. Law, Bozeman.
JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

{1 Chellie Newman (Chellie) appeals the summary dismissal of her
petition to modify the parenting plan for her two sons with William
Newman (William), by the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin

a ="

County. We affirm, addressing the following issue:
Did the District Court err by dismissing the petition to modify the
parenting plan without conducting a hearing?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{2 Chellie and William were married in 1999 and had two children
together, R.J.N. and H.E.N. The marriage was dissolved in 2007, and
the parties’ stipulated parenting plan was approved and ordered.

q3 In 2011, Chellie gave notice of her intention to move to California,
and proposed a parenting plan amendment that would substantially
restrict William’s time with the children. In response, William also
moved to modify the parenting plan. The Standing Master conducted
a hearing on the proposed modifications and, on January 10, 2013,
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order adopting an
amended parenting plan that provided the children would spend a
majority of their time with William. The Master concluded that a
threshold change of circumstances necessitating a hearing had
occurred because of Chellie’s intention to relocate to California with the
children, and her asserted “acts of parental alienation” against
William. The Master found that Chellie had “engaged in various acts
which are forms of parental alienation,” including refusing to allow
William to exercise his scheduled time with the children despite his
repeated requests, and found that there was “strong evidence that
Father’s relationship with his children has been severely damaged as
a result of [Chellie’s] proposed relocation to California with the
children.”

q4 In February 2015, Chellie moved to modify the 2013 Amended
Parenting Plan. Her motion stated “[t]he basis for this motion is that
R.J.N. will be fifteen [15] years of age as of April, 2015, and H.E.N. is
twelve [12] years of age, and both children desire a change from the
children residing primarily with [William] to a new parenting plan
where they reside primarily with [Chellie.]” Her supporting affidavit
simply reiterated the children’s ages and their desire to live primarily
with Chellie. William moved to dismiss Chellie’s motion, arguing that
it failed to demonstrate changed circumstances necessary for a hearing
to be conducted on modification of the parenting plan. The Master
entered an order summarily denying Chellie’s motion. Chellie filed
objections, arguing the Master should have held an evidentiary hearing
and conducted an in camera interview of the children. After briefing
and a hearing in which argument was received, the District. Court
affirmed the order, reasoning that “Chellie failed to meet the threshold
showing for a hearing, and the Standing Master correctly granted

" a

[William’s] Motion to Dismiss. ...” Chellie appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{5 When considering parenting plan modifications, we review
conclusions of law for whether they are correct. In re Marriage of
Guffin, 2010 MT 100, {| 20, 356 Mont. 218, 232 P.3d 888. Two
standards of review are relevant in a case involving both a standing
master and the district. court: the standard the district. court applies to
the master's report and the standard we apply to the district court’s
decision. In re Marriage of Davis, 2016 MT 52, {| 4, 382 Mont. 378, 367
P.3d 400 (citing In re Marriage of Kostelnik, 2015 MT 283, {] 15, 381
Mont. 182, 357 P.3d 912). We review a district court’s decision de novo
to determine whether it applied the correct standard of review to a
standing master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Kostelnik,
q 15 (citing In re Marriage of Patton, 2015 MT 7, | 17, 378 Mont. 22,
340 P.3d 1242). A district court reviews a standing master’s findings
of fact for clear error, Patton, {| 24, and its conclusions of law to
determine if they are correct. Patton, {| 43.

DISCUSSION
{6 Did the District Court err by dismissing the petition to modify the
parenting plan without conducting a hearing?
{7 Chellie argues that because one of the children was fourteen years
of age, and wished to reside primarily with her, these circumstances
provided sufficient grounds to warrant a hearing on her proposed
modification to the parenting plan. William responds that the Standing
Master and District Court correctly concluded Chellie did not satisfy
her burden under the statute to establish a change in circumstances
necessary to justify a hearing on modification.
{8 Section 40-4-219(1), MCA, provides the standards for modification
of a parenting plan, requiring a change of circumstances to have
occurred and a finding that an amendment is necessary to serve the
best interest of the child:
The court may in its discretion amend a prior parenting plan if it
finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior plan
or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of the prior
plan, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child
and that the amendment is necessary to serve the best interest of
the child.
As provided, these standards are to be satisfied “upon the basis of facts
that have arisen since the prior plan or that were unknown to the court
at the time of the entry of the prior plan.” Section 40-4-219(1), MCA.

a °

{9 Pursuant to § 40-4-220(1), MCA, the party seeking modification
“must file a motion and supporting affidavit showing cause for
modification.” In re Marriage of D’Alton, 2009 MT 184, 1 9, 351 Mont.
51, 209 P.3d 251. Requests for parenting plan modifications “must
satisfy an initial statutory threshold of changed circumstances.” In re
Marriage of Whyte, 2012 MT 45, 23, 364 Mont. 219, 272 P.3d 102;
D’Alton, | 9. A demonstration of changed circumstances is a
“prerequisite” to amendment of a parenting plan, and “a district court
may not modify an existing custody arrangement” without such a
finding. In re Marriage of Jacobsen, 2006 MT 212, J 17, 333 Mont. 323,
142 P.2d 859 (citing In re Marriage of Oehlke, 2002 MT 79, {] 12, 309
Mont. 254, 46 P.3d 49). The party seeking modification of a parenting
plan “carries a heavy burden of proof.” D’Alton, {| 11. Section 40-4-
220(1), MCA, provides that a court “shall deny the motion unless it
finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion is established by the
affidavits, based on the best interest of the child, in which case it shall
set a date for hearing ....”

110 Here, Chellie argues the District Court erred in denying her
request for a hearing. The District Court concluded that the assertions
in Chellie’s motion and affidavit about R.J.N.’s age and the children’s
desire to live primarily with her “do not constitute a sufficiently
changed circumstance warranting a hearing under § 40-4-220(1),
MCA.” It cited our statement in D’Alton that “the mere aging of
children so that they are now in school could hardly be considered
‘unknown to the court at the time of the entry of the prior plan’ as
required by § 40-4-219(1), MCA,” D’Alton, 4] 11, to conclude that “[t]he
mere passage of time is not sufficient to establish a changed
circumstance of the child.”

11 We recognize that one of the statutory criteria in determining a
child’s best interest is whether “the child is 14 years of age or older and
desires the amendment,” which the District Court may discretionarily
consider and weigh. Section 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA. While we have not
adopted a blanket rule that the aging of a child, in conjunction with
consideration of his or her desires, can never constitute a change in
circumstances warranting a hearing on modification, we agree with the
District Court’s conclusion that such a change was not demonstrated
here. The parties’ parenting plan was recently revised after substantial
litigation, and though the children’s wishes were not expressly
considered at that time, their ages were noted and their circumstances
were extensively assessed. Chellie’s pleadings simply noted the
children’s current ages and their desire to live primarily with her. With
nothing more, Chellie’s assertions appeared to merely return the case

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to the core issue litigated shortly before, in 2013: Chellie’s desire to
have the children move with her to California, a plan that was found
at that time to have “severely damaged” the children’s relationship
with William.
12 [A district court has “broad discretion when considering the
parenting of a child.” In re Marriage of Tummarello, 2012 MT 18, 134,
363 Mont. 387, 270 P.3d 28. However, in a modification context, such
discretion is contoured by an initial determination of changed
circumstances, a legal conclusion. See, e.g., Jacobsen, | 17; Oehlke,
12; Whyte, | 28. The statute promotes stability for the children and
discourages unnecessary litigation over parenting plans. Whyte, {| 23.
We conclude the District Court correctly concluded that the Standing
Master’s decision dismissing the petition was legally correct as failing
to demonstrate a change in circumstances.
13 Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT and BAKER
concur.

JUSTICE BAKER, concurring.
14 In light of the statutory standards for amendment of a parenting
plan and our case law, the circumstances of this case—particularly the
recent litigation over the parenting plan—did not mandate a hearing
as a matter of law on Chellie’s petition, and I agree with the Court’s
disposition of her appeal. But today’s decision should not be read to
minimize the expressed wishes of teenaged children who are coping
with their separated families.
15 I agree with most of what Justice McKinnon expresses in her
Dissent. The problem is that § 40-4-219, MCA, requires a showing of
changed circumstances “and that the amendment is necessary to serve
the best interest of the child.” (Emphasis added.) The statute provides
that a teenage child’s wishes are to be considered “[i]n determining the
child’s best interest,” not in determining whether there has been a
change in circumstances. Section 40-4-219(1), MCA. We thus have held
that age alone does not automatically qualify as a “changed
circumstance” sufficient to justify a parenting plan amendment. See
D/Alton, J 11 (concluding that children’s “changed circumstances” of
being six years older than at time of parenting plan did not “satisfy the
initial threshold criteria for this Court to order a show cause hearing
to amend the parenting plan”); Whyte, {| 24 (holding that change in
child’s age did not constitute a “changed circumstance” sufficient to
justify district court’s amendment of the parties’ parenting plan). But
as a child grows up, that child’s circumstances may change in myriad
ways that no one thought about when the parenting plan was adopted.

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Developments in a child’s life, seemingly routine from a court’s
perspective, may have significant consequences to an adolescent at a
vulnerable time in life. The child’s wishes are entitled to serious
consideration in order to protect the best interest of the child, even if
it means dragging the court back into the family’s affairs.
16 In light of the language and interpretation of the statute, parents
who want to maintain control over the governance of their own family
may be able to prevent ongoing court involvement by negotiating
parenting plans in the first place that acknowledge the importance of
their children’s changing needs and desires as the children grow up.
For example, parents could agree to an opportunity for review of the
plan and of the child’s best interest if the child expresses a desire to
change the plan after turning fourteen. This assumes, of course, that
the parents start with the child’s best interest truly at heart and
maintain that focus on putting the child’s interest first. That is key to
the success of any parenting plan. To guard against manipulation, the
parenting plan could include a requirement that the moving party pay
the other parent’s attorney fees if the court determines that a
modification request is not pursued in good faith based on the child’s
best interest.
17 It is important that parties have effective and equal access to the
courts to resolve contentious parenting disputes, or in cases where
collaborative solutions are not appropriate given the family’s dynamics.
But court processes can be inadequate means to handle “the custody
and placement of innocent children.” In re Brockington, 2017 MT 92,
37, 387 Mont. 260, 400 P.3d 205 (McGrath, C.J., dissenting); see also
Whyte, | 45 (Baker, J., dissenting). Participants in our justice system
must continue to find ways to help families recognize the best interest
of their children and meet the needs of all family members without
court intervention. If court intervention is needed, the district court is
in the best position to determine the weight to be given a child’s
expressed desires. See In re Marriage of Graham, 2008 MT 435, {] 8,
847 Mont. 483, 199 P.3d 211; In re Marriage of Burk, 2002 MT 173,
{1 20-24, 310 Mont. 498, 51 P.3d 1149. In most cases the court at least.
should consider those desires before summarily denying a motion to
amend. Here, however, Chellie’s petition fell short of what we have
required to compel a hearing.

JUSTICE McKINNON, dissenting.
{18 Section 40-4-219, MCA, is the statute in Montana dedicated to
amending parenting plans. A court may amend a parenting plan if it
finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior parenting
plan, that: (1) a change in the circumstances of the child has occurred,

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and (2) the amendment is necessary to serve the best interests of the
child. Section 40-4-219(1), MCA. Section 40-4-219, MCA, directs the
court in its substantive analysis of whether an amendment is
necessary. Importantly, § 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA, expressly provides that
the court may consider that “the child is 14 years of age or older and
desires the amendment.” Other statutory factors warranting further
inquiry by the court, which are also expressly set forth, are whether
“the parents agree to the amendment,” § 40-4-219(1)(a), MCA; whether
“the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with
consent of the parents,” § 40-4-219(1)(b), MCA; whether “one parent
has willfully and consistently ... refused to allow the child to have any
contact with the other parent” or “attempted to frustrate or deny
contact with the child ...,” § 40-4-219(1)(d), MCA; and, whether one
parent has changed “the child’s residence in a manner that
significantly affects the child’s contact with the other parent,”
§ 40-4-219(1)(e), MCA. The Legislature enumerated these specific
considerations on equal footing and priority, thus indicating that a
child who is 14 years of age is entitled to have his or her wishes
considered for purposes of amending a parenting plan. Importantly,
§ 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA, which is set forth in a statute dedicated to
amending a parenting plan, is distinct from the requirement that the
court consider “the wishes of the child” when determining the child’s
best interests at the initial parenting plan proceeding pursuant to § 40-
4-212, MCA. Section 40-4-212(1)(b), MCA.

{19 Section 40-4-220, MCA, provides the procedure for invoking the
provisions of § 40-4-219, MCA. Section 40-4-220(1), MCA, requires
that, in the absence of agreement, the party seeking an amendment
must file an affidavit setting forth facts supporting the amendment.
Here, Chellie gave notice in February 2015 that she wanted to amend
the 2013 parenting plan on the basis that R.J.N. was almost 15 years
old and H.E.N. was 12 years old, and both wanted to reside primarily
with Chellie. At the time the District Court affirmed the Standing
Master’s dismissal of Chellie’s petition, R.J.N. was close to 17 years old
and H.E.N. was 14 years old. Chellie’s motion was supported by an
affidavit indicating that both R.J.N. and H.E.N. wished to amend the
parenting plan. No opposing affidavit was filed by William.

20 I would conclude that Chellie’s motion and affidavit, together with
the express provision of § 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA, presented “adequate
cause for hearing [Chellie’s] motion” and that a hearing on an order to
show cause should have been granted. Section 40-4-220(1), MCA. The
District Court, however, concluded on the basis of In re Whyte that.
“despite R.J.N.’s age and apparent desire to amend the Parenting Plan

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(even if established at an evidentiary hearing), these facts alone do not
constitute a sufficiently changed circumstance warranting a hearing
under § 40-4-220(1), MCA.” The District Court observed that “Chellie
failed to cite any case, nor has this Court come across any such
Montana case in its research, that supports Chellie’s position.”

21 In my opinion, the provisions of § 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA, supported
Chellie’s request and she did not need to recite authority from this
Court to merit further inquiry into her children’s wishes. This Court,
however, states it agrees “with the District Court’s conclusion that
such a change [of circumstances] was not demonstrated here” and that
“Chellie’s pleadings simply noted the children’s current ages and their
desire to live primarily with her.” Opinion, { 11. Where no opposing
affidavit contests the applicability of § 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA, or sets
forth other facts relevant to the children’s best interests, Chellie has
met the threshold inquiry of demonstrating the children desire an
amendment and there is adequate cause for a hearing. We are not
addressing here whether an amended parenting plan should have been
granted; rather, we are deciding whether a hearing should have been
ordered because a child 14 years of age or older desired an amendment.
Indeed, filed with Chellie’s motion was a request that the court inquire
into the children’s wishes in the privacy of the court’s chambers.

122 Importantly, the District Court did not base its decision on the
findings this Court makes: that the parenting plan was recently
revised after substantial litigation; that the children’s wishes were not
expressly considered in previous litigation, but their circumstances
were extensively assessed; and that Chellie’s assertions appeared to
merely return the case to the core issue litigated in 2013. Opinion,
| 11. None of these findings were made or even noted by the District
Court. The District Court determined, as a matter of law, that a child
who is 14 years of age and desires an amendment has not met the
threshold inquiry of demonstrating a substantial change in
circumstances. To be more precise, the District Court reviewed the
Standing Master’s order dismissing Chellie’s petition for the reasons
“set forth in [William’s] Motion and Reply.” I cannot accept that this
gave adequate consideration to Chellie’s motion in light of the specific
statutory provision requiring an adolescent's wishes be heard.

23 In In re Whyte, a trial court granted a Mother’s motion to amend
a parenting plan and this Court reversed. In re Whyte, 1] 12, 24. The
trial court expressly considered the wishes of an eleven year old child
and other circumstances in the child’s life. In re Whyte, {] 12. We
vacated the amended parenting plan, concluding that the evidence the
trial court received was “insufficient to establish the statutory

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standard for amendment of the parenting plan.” In re Whyte, {| 24. In
our analysis of § 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA, we stated, “(w hile consideration
of the child’s desires is statutorily required when the child is 14 years
old, the ultimate decision is for the court to make, based upon the
evidence, and cannot be delegated to the child.” In re Whyte, {| 28
(emphasis added). Thus, in In re Whyte we expressly stated that
§ 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA, requires a court consider the child’s desires
when the child is fourteen years old. We determined the provision did
not apply to the parenting plan at issue in In re Whyte because the
child was only eleven years old. In re Whyte, {| 28. Here, in contrast,
Chellie provided an affidavit that the children, at least one of them
older than 14, desired an amendment pursuant to § 40-4-219(1)(c),
MCA. No opposing evidence was presented. It is patently clear that the
District Court dismissed the petition on what it believed was a matter
of law. Although we add facts to our decision which were not
articulated by the District Court so the court’s dismissal might be
justified, our conclusion that Chellie has not met her threshold
statutory burden conveys to an adolescent that his or her growth,
maturity, and desire to direct and take control of his or her own life is
not worthy ofa hearing and consideration by the court. I am very much
opposed to the suggestion that a child’s voice does not merit
consideration by a court in a parenting proceeding, particularly when
the Legislature has concluded otherwise.

124 In 1983 the Legislature added what is now § 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA.
SB 371, 48th Leg. (Mont. 1983). The provision, introduced as Senate
Bill 371, was titled, “An Act Providing that if it is in the Best Interest
of the Child, a Child Custody Decree May be Modified When a Child
Aged 14 Years or Older Desires that it be Modified; Amending Section
40-4-219, MCA.” Proponents of the provision expressed concern that,
under the existing statutory framework, a child of appropriate age was
disenfranchised from expressing his or her wishes and desires as to a
parenting plan amendment. Senate Committee on Judiciary Hearing,
Exhibit A, 1 (February 11, 1983). Proponents believed that “our young
people have a right to input their desires requesting a custody
modification upon a court.” Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing,
Exhibit A, 1 (February 11, 1983). The Senate intended the provision to
“allow a 14-year-old child to express their desires as to which parent
they are placed with” without binding the court to the child’s desires.
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing Minutes, 4 (February 15, 1983).
The House of Representatives noted that the provision would not
permit a child to choose who he or she lived with “as a matter of right,”
but instead the provision would allow a judge to take a child’s desire

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“into consideration once the child reaches [age 14].” House Judiciary
Committee Hearing Minutes, 6 (March 14, 1983). Despite subsequent
amendments to § 40-4-219, MCA, a child of age 14 or older still has the
right to express his or her desire for an amended parenting plan
pursuant to § 40-4-219(1)(c), MCA, and we must ensure that right is
protected.

25 Contested parenting proceedings are hard for everyone—the
parents, the family, the witnesses, the court; but most particularly, the
children for whom the proceedings are designed to serve and protect.
The proceeding should not shut out the voice of the very individual
upon which the proceeding is focused. While the court obviously is not
required to adopt a parenting plan consistent with the child’s wishes,
it is nonetheless important for the child that he or she is heard by the
court. Given the contentious nature and substantial amount of
litigation in these proceedings, as noted by the Court, it would seem
particularly appropriate that the voices and wishes of R.J.N. and
H.E.N.—here, two adolescents—be heard, through any means the court
deemed appropriate. At least, in such a fashion, they would have the
benefit of knowing that their wishes were heard and considered. In my
opinion and as explained above, this was what the Legislature
contemplated when it allowed for the amendment of a parenting plan
to consider the wishes of a child who is 14 years of age or older. Section
40-4-219(1)(c), MCA.

{26 I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision that Chellie’s
motion and uncontroverted affidavit did not establish adequate cause
for a hearing.

7 a

IN THE MATTER OF:
M.C.,
A Youth in Need of Care.

No. DA 17-0181.
Submitted on Briefs September 27, 2017.
Decided October 17, 2017.
2017 MT 252.
389 Mont. 78.

403 P.3d 1266.

For Appellant: Katy Stack, Attorney at Law, Missoula.
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, C.
Mark Fowler, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Stephen
Eschenbacher, Lake County Attorney, Benjamin Ancieaux,
Deputy County Attorney, Polson.

JUSTICE McKINNON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
q1 J.C. (Mother) appeals an order of the Twentieth Judicial District
Court, Lake County, terminating her parental rights to her minor
child, M.C. Mother raises three issues, however only one issue is
properly before this Court for review. We affirm and address the
following issue:

Did the District Court properly admit Mother’s psychological

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evaluation at the termination hearing?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{2 In March 2015, the Department of Public Health and Human
Services (the Department), filed a Petition for Emergency Protective
Services (EPS), Adjudication of Child as Youth in Need of Care, and
Temporary Legal Custody (TLC). The District Court granted EPS and
Mother subsequently stipulated to TLC. The Department prepared a
treatment plan for Mother, which she signed and the District Court
approved and ordered on May 21, 2015.
q3 As part of her treatment plan, Mother agreed to undergo a
psychological evaluation:
Psychological Evaluation. To identify all of Mother’s mental
health issues and narrowly tailor future treatment, Mother will
submit to a psychological evaluation with a professional approved
by CPS. Mother will follow recommendations made by the
professional, including any recommendations that may lead to a
higher level of care, including in-patient or out-patient mental
health treatment and/or anger management classes.
(Emphasis in original). The treatment plan specifically stated the
psychological evaluation’s two purposes: (1) to identify Mother’s mental
health issues; and (2) to narrowly tailor future treatment. Mother
agreed to follow the evaluation’s recommendations in working towards
reunification with M.C. when she signed the treatment plan.
q4 Dr. Theresa Reed (Dr. Reed), a Licensed Clinical Psychologist,
performed Mother’s psychological evaluation on September 3, 2015.
The evaluation consisted of various sections, including background
information, family and personal health history, legal history, mental
status examination, test results, and conclusions and
recommendations.
{5 The Department and Mother worked together for over a year to
reunify M.C. with Mother. The reunification efforts were unsuccessful,
however, and in November 2016, the Department filed a petition to
terminate Mother's parental rights. The District Court held a
termination hearing in January 2017, at which time the court issued
oral findings of fact and conclusions of law immediately terminating
Mother’s parental rights.
q6 A supervisor for Child Protective Services, Jeanne Frolander
(Frolander), testified for the Department at the termination hearing.
During its direct examination of Frolander, the Department moved for
admission of Mother’s September 3, 2015, psychological evaluation
performed by Dr. Reed. Mother’s counsel objected to the evaluation’s
admission on grounds that it was inadmissible hearsay. The

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Department contended the evaluation was admissible under the
business records exception to the hearsay rule. After additional
dialogue between the parties and the Judge, the District Court
admitted the psychological evaluation as a business record but limited
its use to the recommendations made therein. Mother appeals the
District. Court’s evidentiary ruling, arguing the District Court
improperly admitted the psychological evaluation into evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
{7 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion and “will not reverse evidentiary rulings absent a manifest
abuse of discretion.” In re A.N., 2000 MT 35, {| 22, 298 Mont. 237, 995
P.2d 427 (quoting In re Inquiry into M.M., 274 Mont. 166, 169, 906
P.2d 675, 677 (1995)).

DISCUSSION
{8 Did the District Court properly admit Mother’s psychological
evaluation at the termination hearing?
q9 A natural parent’s “right to the care and custody of a child is a
fundamental liberty interest.” In re A.D.B., 2013 MT 167, | 42, 370
Mont. 422, 305 P.3d 739. Therefore, an individual's parental rights are
protected and, in the case of an abuse and neglect proceeding, may only
be terminated pursuant to strict statutory guidelines. See §§ 41-3-601
to 41-3-612, MCA. A court may order termination of the parent-child
relationship if “the child is an adjudicated youth in need of care” and
(1) “an appropriate treatment plan that has been approved by the court
has not been complied with by the parents or has not been successful”
and (2) “the conduct or condition of the parents rendering them unfit
is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.” Section
41-8-609(1)(f)(i)-(ii), MCA. See also In re A.D.B., | 42; In re D.B., 2012
MT 231, 1 19, 366 Mont. 392, 288 P.3d 160.
10 Ml In “determining whether the conduct or condition of the
parents is unlikely to change within a reasonable time” the court must
find that continuing the parent-child relationship “will likely result in
continued abuse or neglect or that the conduct or the condition of the
parents renders the parents unfit, unable, or unwilling to give the child
adequate parental care.” Section 41-3-609(2), MCA. To make such a
determination, the court is required to consider certain factors,
including “emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the
parent ....” Section 41-3-609(2)(a), MCA. Thus, a court is statutorily
obligated to examine a parent’s mental health when deciding whether
or not to terminate parental rights.
11 At the onset of an abuse and neglect proceeding, a petition is filed

a .

in district court pursuant to § 41-3-422, MCA, and the court must
conduct a show cause hearing within 20 days. Section 41-3-432, MCA.
Either at the show cause hearing or pursuant to § 41-3-437(1), MCA,
the court will adjudicate a child as a youth in need of care if necessary.
The court’s “[aldjudication must determine the nature of the abuse and
neglect and establish facts that resulted in state intervention and upon
which disposition, case work, court review, and possible termination
are based.” Section 41-3-437(2), MCA. The court is statutorily
authorized to “order ... examinations, evaluations, or counseling of the
child or parents in preparation for the disposition hearing ... .”
Section 41-3-437(7)(b)(ii), MCA. Additionally, a parent’s treatment plan
may require the parent obtain “medical or psychiatric diagnosis and
treatment ...” or “psychological treatment or counseling.” Section
41-3-443(3)(b)-(c), MCA.

12 [In this case, the District Court approved and ordered Mother's
treatment plan, which required her to undergo a psychological
evaluation and follow its recommendations. The District Court was
well within its statutory authority to require the evaluation pursuant
to § 41-3-437(7)(b)(ii), MCA, in preparation for the disposition hearing,
and § 41-3-443(3)(b)-(c), MCA, in ordering Mother’s treatment plan.
When she signed her treatment plan, Mother agreed to follow the
evaluation’s recommendations. The court ordered psychological
evaluation thus became part of the court proceedings and allowed the
court to consider any part. of the evaluation for purposes of disposition
of the case. Accordingly, the District. Court. was free to consider Dr.
Reed’s psychological evaluation at the January 2017 termination
hearing in deciding whether to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
113 Such a conclusion is consistent with the statutory scheme and
objectives of youth in need of care proceedings. A distinct purpose of
the evaluation was to identify Mother’s mental health issues, a factor
the District Court must consider when deciding whether or not to
terminate parental rights pursuant to § 41-3-609(2)(a), MCA. Indeed,
Mother’s compliance with the recommendations of the previously
ordered evaluation was one of the salient issues to be assessed by the
District Court at the termination hearing. A district court should not.
be precluded from considering at a later time in the same proceeding
an evaluation it previously ordered in a treatment plan that was
agreed to by Mother and approved by the court. If Mother needed the
doctor for cross-examination or confrontation, Mother could have
subpoenaed Dr. Reed before the January termination hearing to ensure
the doctor’s presence and availability for questioning. As the
evaluation was previously ordered by the court and became part of the
court proceeding, it did not have to be admitted under a hearsay

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exception. Therefore, we do not. consider whether the evaluation is a
business record. Our decision is based on the unique statutory scheme
of youth in need of care proceedings and the requirement that a
parent’s mental health be considered in assessing the parent's ability
to continue to parent. Parents may always dispute the validity of an
evaluation by subpoenaing the evaluator and raising an objection at
the appropriate time.

14 Finally, Mother also argues her due process rights were violated
because TLC expired in May 2016 and the Department's petition filed
in September of 2016 was a request to extend TLC, rather than a
petition to adjudicate M.C. as a youth in need of care. We do not
address this issue because Mother waived it in September 2016 when
she agreed to the Department’s request that TLC be extended for six
months and represented to the court it was not necessary for the
Department to file a new petition to adjudicate M.C. as a youth in need
of care. Mother also contends the Department failed to accommodate
her reading disability and provide an appropriate treatment plan as
required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). This Court
does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal “because it
is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule
correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider.”
In re T.E., 2002 MT 195, {] 20, 311 Mont. 148, 54 P.3d 38 (quoting In
re D.H., 2001 MT 200, {] 41, 306 Mont. 278, 33 P.3d 616). Therefore,
“(ijn order to preserve a claim or objection for appeal, an appellant
must first raise that specific claim or objection in the district court.” In
re T.E., | 20. Here, Mother did not preserve her accommodation and
ADA claims for appeal because she did not raise the issues in District
Court.

CONCLUSION

415 During an abuse and neglect proceeding, a court may order the
psychological evaluation of a parent pursuant to multiple statutes. If
a treatment plan requires a parent follow a psychological evaluation’s
recommendations, a court must have access to the evaluation to
determine whether a parent complied with his or her treatment plan.
Furthermore, court ordered psychological evaluations help a court.
evaluate a parent’s mental health during termination proceedings.
Such evaluations are part of the court record and may be used by the
court throughout an abuse and neglect proceeding.
q16 Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SHEA, WHEAT and
SANDEFUR concur.

a "

IN THE MATTER OF:
N.R.A. and V.A.A.,
Youths in Need of Care.

No. DA 16-0276.
Submitted on Briefs September 20, 2017.
Decided October 17, 2017.
2017 MT 253.
389 Mont. 83.
403 P.3d 1256.

For Appellant: Dana A. Henkel, Terrazas Clark Henkel, P.C.,
Missoula.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Mark E.
Westveer, Glacier County Attorney, Cut Bank.

JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.
qi A.N. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to
her children, N.R.A. and V.A.A., by the Ninth Judicial District Court,

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Glacier County. Mother raises three issues on appeal, but we address
only the following issue, and affirm:
Did the District Court err by denying Mother’s motion to set aside
her relinquishment of parental rights?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND!

q2 On April 24, 2013, the Department of Public Health and Human
Services, Child and Family Services Division (DPHHS or Department),
filed a Petition for Emergency Protective Services and Temporary
Investigative Authority as to N.R.A., then two years old, and V.A.A.,
six months old. The children had been left with family members by
their parents. The family members discovered that V.A.A. had severe
diaper rash, urine burns, and a yeast infection. The parents were
arrested on outstanding warrants, and Father admitted they had used
methamphetamine in front of the children, though Mother denied this
allegation. DPHHS took protective custody of the children and placed
them with relatives in Cut Bank, who lived near the parents. In
September 2013, the Cut Bank relatives were no longer able to care for
the children, and they were moved to another kinship placement in
Gardiner, a significant distance from the parents. Mother asserted that
this placement made visitation very difficult, and the District Court
ordered DPHHS to make “every effort” to increase visits between her
and the children.

q3 In December 2013, the District. Court determined the children
were youths in need of care due to physical neglect and exposure to
dangerous drugs, and granted temporary legal custody to DPHHS.
Treatment plans were approved for both parents. The parties would
later dispute whether a proper adjudicatory hearing had been
conducted.

q4 In November 2014, DPHHS filed a petition to terminate Father's
and Mother's parental rights based on their failure to successfully
complete their treatment plans. In May 2015, the District. Court
terminated Father’s parental rights due to continued drug use, failure
to complete treatment, and exposing the children to a sex offender,
among other grounds. However, with regard to Mother, the District
Court concluded that, while Mother had initially done poorly on her
treatment plan, she had made positive improvements in her life, and
“earned the right to try to parent her children.” The District Court

“The three-year factual and procedural history of this case is complex, and is here
summarized, focusing on the facts relevant to the relinquishment issue.

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approved a second treatment plan.

{5 In August 2015, the DPHHS case worker met with Mother and
explained that she was not complying with the second treatment plan,
and that the Department was contemplating filing a second time for
termination of her parental rights. The case worker told Mother that
she could avoid a second termination proceeding by voluntarily
relinquishing her parental rights. Mother testified that she was
advised by DPHHS representatives that it was more likely she would
be able to see her children after her rights were terminated if she
voluntarily relinquished them. Mother declined voluntary
relinquishment, and canceled the relinquishment counseling that had
been scheduled for her.

{6 On December 1, 2015, DPHHS filed a petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights, based on her failure to complete her second
treatment plan. The same day, Mother notified DPHHS that she
wanted to relinquish her parental rights. On December 4, 2015, a
DPHHS permanency planning specialist met with Mother and
conducted a three-hour counselling session regarding relinquishment,
as required by § 42-2-409, MCA. At the end of the session, Mother
signed an affidavit waiving all her parental rights and relinquishing
her children for adoption, affirming therein that she was signing
voluntarily and without undue influence. Although encouraged to
speak with her attorney, Mother declined the opportunity to do so
before signing.

{7 On January 6, 2016, Mother’s attorney asserted during a hearing
that Mother was acting under duress when she had waived her rights
to the children, and she wished to withdraw her relinquishment. On
February 1, 2016, the District Court conducted a hearing to consider
the validity of Mother’s relinquishment. Mother, the DPHHS case
worker, the placement specialist, and a CASA advocate testified. On
March 10, 2016, the District Court entered an ordering denying
Mother’s motion to revoke her relinquishment of parental rights,
finding that Mother’s relinquishment was made “knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily,” and concluding that the Department
had presented evidence that refuted Mother’s claim that she was
subjected to duress by the Department.

{8 Based on the relinquishment, the District Court terminated
Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals, arguing that her due process
right to an adjudicatory hearing was violated, that DPHHS violated
Montana law by not making reasonable efforts to reunify the children
with their Mother, and that the District Court erred by accepting
Mother’s relinquishment of parental rights.

7 a

STANDARD OF REVIEW

q9 Aparent or legal guardian’s right to revoke a relinquishment and
consent to adoption is governed by statute. Section 42-2-417, MCA; see
also In re Adoption of S.R.T., 2011 MT 219, { 11, 362 Mont. 39, 260
P.3d 177. We review a district court’s interpretation and application of
a statute, which is a conclusion of law, for correctness. In re Adoption
of S.R.T., 11 (citations omitted).

110 We review a district court’s findings of fact to determine whether
those findings are clearly erroneous. In re Adoption of S.R.T., {| 12
(citations omitted). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is not
supported by substantial evidence, if the trial court misapprehended
the effect. of the evidence, or if a review of the record convinces us that
a mistake has been committed. In re J.C., 2008 MT 127, {] 34, 343
Mont. 30, 183 P.3d 22 (citations omitted). It is well established that
“the trial court is in the best position to observe and judge the
credibility of witnesses, therefore we do not second guess the district
court's determination regarding the strength and weight of conflicting
testimony.” In re Adoption of S.R.T., {| 25 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

11 Did the District Court err by denying Mother’s motion to set aside
her relinquishment of parental rights?
12 The Legislature established the grounds to set aside a
relinquishment of parental rights:

The court shall set aside a relinquishment and consent to adopt if

the individual who executed the relinquishment and consent.

establishes:

(a) by clear and convincing evidence, before a decree of adoption

is issued, that the consent was obtained by fraud or duress ....
Section 42-2-417(1), MCA. The statute places a burden of clear and
convincing proof upon the parent seeking to revoke a relinquishment
of parental rights. “In the context of termination of parental rights
cases, we have defined clear and convincing evidence as simply a
requirement that a preponderance of the evidence be definite, clear,
and convincing, or that a particular issue must be clearly established
by a preponderance of the evidence or by a clear preponderance of
proof.” In re D.B., 2007 MT 246, {] 29, 339 Mont. 240, 168 P.3d 691
(citations omitted).
13 [Ml Under the statute, a relinquishment must be set aside if the
parent establishes her consent “was obtained by fraud or duress ....”
Section 42-2-417(1)(a), MCA. While we have defined fraud in the

a "

context of this statute, see In re Adoption of S.R.T., 1] 16-17 (parent
asserted relinquishment obtained by fraud), we have not stated a
definition of duress for purposes of the statute. The District Court used
a definition from Black’s Law Dictionary 504 (6th ed. 1990), which
provided, in part, “[alny unlawful threat or coercion used by a person
to induce another to act (or to refrain from acting) in a manner he or
she otherwise would not (or would) ....”
14 The primary definition of duress in the current version of Black’s
Law Dictionary still reflects the historical meaning of the term as “the
physical confinement of a person or the detention of a contracting
party’s property ....” Black’s Law Dictionary 614 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,
10th ed. 2014). However, the law of duress has undergone what has
been described as “radical changes” through the nineteenth and
twentieth century, and “[tloday the general rule is that any wrongful
act or threat. which overcomes the free will of a party constitutes
duress.” 7 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 28.2 (Joseph
M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2017). Consistent therewith, Black’s Law
Dictionary currently includes the following secondary definition of
duress:
2. Broadly, a threat of harm made to compel a person to do
something against his or her will or judgment; esp., a wrongful
threat made by one person to compel a manifestation of seeming
assent by another person to a transaction without real volition.
Duress practically destroys a person’s free agency, causing
nonvolitional conduct because of the wrongful external pressure.
Black’s Law Dictionary 614 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014).
Recognizing this trend, we will consider, in determining whether a
parent’s consent to the relinquishment of parental rights was obtained
by duress, whether the parent was subjected to a wrongful act. or
threat that overcame her free will.”

° Section 28-2-402, MCA, a remnant of the Field Code, provides an antiquated
definition of duress:
(1) unlawful confinement of the person of the party, of the husband or wife of
such party, or of an ancestor, descendant, or adopted child of such party,
husband, or wife;
(2) unlawful detention of the property of any such person; or
(3) confinement of such person, lawful in form but fraudulently obtained or
fraudulently made unjustly harassing or oppressive.
In the adoption and child custody context, the Legislature did not intend the
definition of duress to be limited to the physical confinement ofa person or her property.
Therefore, pursuant to § 1-2-107, MCA, we conclude that the Legislature has expressed

= a

q15 Mother argues that her relinquishment was obtained as a result
of the DPHHS’s wrongful conduct. She testified that she felt pressured
by repeated attempts of the Department to convince her to relinquish
her parental rights. Mother estimated that DPHHS contacted her over
a dozen times to discuss relinquishment, and testified that DPHHS
told her she had a better chance of being able to visit her children if she
voluntarily relinquished her rights. Mother testified that at the time
she signed the relinquishment, she was depressed due to the alienation
of her children, which she attributed to the Department placing the
children so far from her, and failing to make adequate arrangements
for visitation. She testified that she believed that voluntary
relinquishment was her only choice.

416 The State counters Mother’s duress claim by pointing out that
Mother initiated the contact with DPHHS that led to her
relinquishment, and participated in three hours of counseling with a
long-term placement. specialist, who was not the case worker who
Mother alleges pressured her. The counselor testified that she carefully
discussed relinquishment alternatives with Mother, who did not raise
any concerns about duress or undue influence with the counselor, and,
rather, explained to the counselor that she believed relinquishment
was in the best interest of her children. During the course of the
proceeding, Mother had a long time to consider relinquishment and
had previously canceled relinquishment-related counselling
appointments. The counselor testified to her belief that Mother had
provided the relinquishment intelligently and voluntarily. The State
also argues that the DPHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother
throughout the proceedings, providing a list of actions taken, and offers
that Mother's own conduct is often what prevented her from visiting
her children.

117 Hf Conflicting testimony was presented to the District Court,
particularly about Mother’s emotional state when she signed the
relinquishment, and about the reunification efforts taken by DPHHS.
Based upon this evidence, and upon its assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses, the District Court determined that Mother's
relinquishment was not obtained by duress, reasoning that Mother “did
not provide clear and convincing evidence ... that the Department used
improper pressure that overcame her will or compelled her to
relinquish.” These findings are substantially supported by the

a contrary intention, and we decline to apply the Title 28 definition of duress to
relinguishment of parental rights.

a =

testimony of the DPHHS case worker and placement specialist, and
Mother has not established that the District Court’s factual
determinations are clearly erroneous. Thus, we affirm the District
Court’s denial of Mother’s motion to set aside her relinquishment of
parental rights.
18 Mother also challenges the propriety of the adjudicatory hearing,
and of the Department's efforts to reunify her with the children, as
separate legal issues. However, given our conclusion that Mother's
consent to the relinquishment was valid, these issues have become
moot and we need not address them. Adjudication of the children as
youths in need of care, or the reasonableness of reunification efforts,
are not separate legal requirements when termination of parental
rights is based upon relinquishment. See In re H.T., 2015 MT 41, 9] 15,
378 Mont. 206, 343 P.3d 159; § 41-3-609(1)(a), MCA.
q19 Affirmed.

JUSTICES WHEAT, BAKER, McKINNON and SANDEFUR
concur.

oT

JOYCE CROUSE,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, AND MADISON COUNTY, MONTANA,
Respondents and Appellees.

No. DA 17-0163.
Submitted on Briefs September 20, 2017.
Decided October 17, 2017.
2017 MT 254.
389 Mont. 90.
403 P.3d 1260.

= °

[|

For Appellant: Brian K. Gallik, Gallik, Bremer & Molloy, P.C.,
Bozeman.

For Appellee Madison County: Maureen H. Lennon, Mitchell
A. Young, MACo Defense Services, Helena.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 This is an appeal from a decision by the Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board (Board), and affirmed by the Fifth Judicial District
Court, denying Joyce Crouse’s (Crouse) claim for unemployment
compensation benefits. We affirm.
{2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

Whether the District Court erred when it affirmed the Board’s

conclusion that Crouse was disqualified for unemployment benefits

because her voluntary termination did not constitute “good cause”

pursuant to § 39-51-2302, MCA.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
q3 Crouse was hired as Madison County Sanitarian in December
2013.1 Her job duties included inspecting establishments for
compliance with sanitation requirements and issuing septic permits to
contractors. During her employment Crouse experienced a number of
issues, including problems with contractors and co-workers.
q4 Onnumerous occasions, contractors complained about how Crouse
performed her job. Crouse attributes the contractor complaints to her
being less flexible in approving septic permits and being more strict
than her predecessor. Crouse also found an email from her secretary
to Crouse’s mentor, calling Crouse “clueless” and claiming other co-
workers “dislike[d] her very much and would love to see her gone.” This
caused Crouse to frequently close herself off in her office.
q5 Crouse expressed her concerns about her working environment to
the Madison County Commissioners (Commissioners). One
Commissioner told her to “hang in there.” Crouse’s secretary was
suspended and later let go by the Commissioners.
q6 On August 6, 2014, the Commissioners sent Crouse her first
written warning, which stated that she could expect disciplinary action
if she failed to change her behavior regarding missed appointments,

' The following facts are taken from the Hearing Officer's February 12, 2016
decision and the District Court’s order.

a

scheduling problems, and lack of communication. Many of the
complaints received from contractors and customers concerned
Crouse’s timeliness in making it to appointments as well as the
amount of time it took for Crouse to process applications. The
Commissioners also expressed concern with Crouse double-booking
appointments due to lack of communication with her secretary.
{7 + InApril 2015, the Commissioners issued a second written warning
to Crouse for being late to two more appointments. The Commissioners
informed Crouse that she must call contractors when she was running
late.
q8 Crouse performed many inspections during the summer of 2015.
Crouse denied three permits because the soil did not support the septic
systems the contractors installed. A soil scientist agreed with Crouse’s
evaluations. One contractor went to Crouse’s office and expressed his
frustration with her denial of his permit. Other contractors contacted
Commissioner James Hart, expressing their frustration with Crouse.
One such interaction turned into a heated confrontation.
q9 It was also during the summer of 2015 that additional concerns
arose regarding Crouse’s work performance. On September 2, 2015, the
Commissioners hand-delivered Crouse a “due process letter,” informing
her that it appeared she had violated county policies and that
“termination due to an inability to adequately perform [her] duties may
be warranted.” The due process letter listed five areas of concern:
1. Regularly missing scheduled appointments with customers.
2. Lack of timely responses to customer e-mails, phone calls,
appointments, permit approvals or disapprovals.
8. Lack of communication with your immediate supervisors to
inform them of your request for time off from work.
4, Have not returned the County car to Madison County per
Commissioners’ request.
5. Consistently late with time sheet.
Crouse was given forty-eight hours to present her response to the
Commissioners either verbally or in writing. While Crouse was denied
the list of complaints, she was given a list of names of those who made
the complaints.
{10 On September 4, 2015, Crouse met with the Commissioners and
asked for additional time to submit her responses in written form. Her
request was denied. Crouse then presented her response to the
Commissioners and they informed her they would reach a decision in
ten to fourteen days.
{11 Before the decision was reached Crouse handed in her written
resignation notice, dated September 14, 2015. The resignation letter

a

stated that Crouse had no other choice but to quit because of
retaliation for performing her job duties, harassment, inability to work
in a hostile work environment, and because she felt that she was facing
certain termination.

12 After her resignation, Crouse filed a claim for unemployment
benefits. Crouse asserted that the County’s conduct created a hostile
work environment which effectively amounted to constructive
discharge. She contends she had good cause to leave work, entitling her
to benefits under § 39-51-2302(1), MCA.

13 The parties called in for a telephonic hearing before a Montana
Department of Labor and Industry Department Hearing Officer on
February 9, 2016. On February 12, 2016, the Hearing Officer concluded
that Crouse resigned without good cause and denied her claim for
unemployment benefits. Crouse appealed to the Unemployment
Insurance Appeals Board. On March 23, 2016, the Board adopted the
Hearing Officer’s report, including the findings of fact.

q14 Crouse filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Fifth Judicial
District Court. On February 21, 2017, the District Court affirmed
Crouse’s denial of unemployment compensation benefits. Crouse
appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

415 When reviewing the finality of a decision on claims for
unemployment benefits made by the Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board, this Court must apply a statutory standard of review.
Pursuant to § 39-51-2410(5), MCA, “the findings of the board as to the
facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, are
conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court is confined to questions of
law.” More specifically, the findings of fact must be supported by
substantial evidence. Johnson v. W. Transp., LLC, 2011 MT 13, {| 16,
359 Mont. 145, 247 P.3d 1094 (citing Ward v. Johnson, 242 Mont. 225,
228, 790 P.2d 483, 485 (1990)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion ....” Noone v. Reeder, 151 Mont. 248, 252, 441 P.2d 309, 311-
12 (1968) (citations omitted). It is more than a scintilla, but less than
a preponderance of the evidence. Johnson, {| 17 (citations omitted).

16 District courts review Board of Labor Appeals decisions on
conclusions of law for correctness. Sayler v. Mont. Dep’t of Labor &
Indus., 2014 MT 255A, {| 18, 376 Mont. 369, 336 P.3d 358 (citations
omitted). This Court applies the same standard when reviewing the
district court decision. Gary & Leo’s Fresh Foods, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of

a

Labor & Indus., 2012 MT 219, 1 12, 366 Mont. 313, 286 P.3d 1218
(citations omitted).

DISCUSSION
17 Issue: Whether the District Court erred when it affirmed the
Board’s conclusion that Crouse was disqualified for unemployment
benefits because her voluntary termination did not constitute “good
cause” pursuant to § 39-51-2302, MCA.
18 An individual who leaves work without “good cause attributable
to the individual’s employment” will be disqualified for benefits.
Section 39-51-2302(1), MCA. Part 23 of Title 39, chapter 51 in the
Montana Code Annotated covers disqualification for benefits and does
not define good cause. However, part 12 of Title 39, chapter 51, which
addresses paid unemployment benefits that are chargeable to the
employer’s account, does. Good cause is clarified in § 39-51-1214, MCA.
It provides good cause exists when: “(i) the claimant had compelling
reasons arising from the work environment that caused the claimant
to leave and the claimant; (A) attempted to correct the problem in the
work environment; and (B) informed the employer of the problem and
gave the employer reasonable opportunity to correct the problem.”
Section 39-51-1214(2)(a)(i)(A), (B), MCA. That definition is adopted by
the Department of Labor and Industry in the Administrative Rules of
Montana. Admin. R. M. 24.11.457(1)(a)(i), (ii). Compelling reasons
include but are not limited to: “unreasonable actions by the employer
concerning hours, wages, terms of employment, or working conditions
...” or “unreasonable rules or discipline by the employer so severe as to
constitute harassment.” Section 39-51-1214(3)(b), (d), MCA; Admin. R.
M. 24.11.457(2)(b), (d). The claimant bears the burden of proof to
establish good cause. Johnson, {] 30.
{19 The Board reviewed the record pursuant to Admin. R. M. 24.7.306
and found specific reasons for affirming the Hearing Officer's findings
of fact. This Court must determine whether the Board’s findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence. If there is substantial evidence,
the Board’s factual findings are conclusive. Johnson, ]| 17 (citing Phx.
Physical Therapy v. Unemployment Ins. Div. , 284 Mont. 95, 99, 943
P.2d 523, 526 (1997)).
20 The District Court found all but two of the Board’s findings were
supported by substantial evidence. The first finding that lacked
substantial evidence was that Crouse did not work after September 4.
There is substantial evidence in the record showing that Crouse
returned to work on September 7 and worked through September 9.
Second, the Board found that Crouse never requested additional time

a

to present written findings before meeting with the Commissioners on
September 4. There is substantial evidence in the record showing that
Crouse did make such a request and that it was denied. We agree with
the District Court. However, these two findings did not impact the
Board’s final decision and thus do not affect our review.

121 [Ml To establish she had good cause to leave her position as
Sanitarian, Crouse is required to demonstrate she had a compelling
reason arising from her work environment. Admin. R. M.
24.11.457(1)(a). Crouse alleges she had a compelling reason to leave
her employment because she feared a potential unfavorable decision by
the Commissioners regarding termination and that personality
differences between co-workers and contractor aggression created a
hostile working environment. She contends the Commissioners acted
unreasonably.

22 This Court has yet to directly discuss the “compelling reasons”
language of § 39-51-1214(3), MCA, in a published opinion.” However,
Admin. R. M. 24.11.457 was cited by this Court in Cruson v. Missoula
Elec. Coop., Inc., 2015 MT 309, {| 19, 381 Mont. 304, 359 P.3d 98.
Although the “reasonable opportunity” prong of the good cause test and
not the “compelling reason” prong was at issue in Cruson, we still find
the analysis helpful because this Court held that while Cruson may
have had good reasons to leave his job at MEC, “evidence supports the
Board’s decision that those reasons were not ‘compelling,’ as defined by
Admin. R. M. 24.11.457(2), in light of MEC’s responsive actions.”
Cruson, {| 35.

23 We have reached decisions regarding Board of Labor Appeals
cases by applying the term “good cause” more broadly. In McCarthy v.
Mont. Power Co., a woman voluntarily terminated her employment so
that she could accompany her husband to California for three months.
McCarthy v. Mont. Power Co., 143 Mont. 134, 138, 387 P.2d 438, 440-41
(1963). This Court held that while the woman may have subjectively
thought she had good reason to leave her employment, her desire to be
with her husband did not constitute good cause and thus, she was
properly denied unemployment benefits. McCarthy, 143 Mont. at 140,
387 P.2d at 442. In Sheila Callahan & Friends, Inc. v. Mont. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., a woman voluntarily terminated her employment so

“The District Court attempted to address this gap by noting this Court's rationale
from an unpublished opinion, Huset v. State Bd. of Labor Appeals, 2014 MT 271N, 377
Mont. 432, 348 P.3d 169. However, the Huset opinion is unpublished and the District
Court did not cite it as precedent.

a

that she could care for her mother. Sheila Callahan & Friends, Inc. v.
Mont. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 2012 MT 133, 71 5, 18, 365 Mont. 283,
280 P.3d 895. This Court held that the woman did not have good cause
to leave her employment and she was denied unemployment benefits.
Callahan, {| 20. While the District Court refers to these cases in its
order, they are factually distinguishable. Crouse’s voluntary
termination was due to circumstances arising out of her work
environment, whereas in McCarthy and Callahan, the employees
voluntarily terminated their employment for familial reasons and
circumstances arising outside of the work environment.

24 [lf Crouse alleges she had a compelling reason to quit her position
as Sanitarian because she felt she was facing certain termination as a
result of the due process letter, creating a hostile work environment.
Government employees are entitled to fair termination proceedings. To
initiate a formal termination, public employers must send a “due
process letter” to the employee. It describes the employer’s concerns
with the employee’s work performance. The public employee is given
an opportunity to respond and address those concerns. See Bird v.
Cascade Cnty., 2016 MT 345, {I{] 4, 6, 7, 386 Mont. 69, 386 P.3d 602
(Cascade County Board of Commissioners properly terminated the
employment of a woman by sending her a reprimand letter that
addressed job performance concerns, and later a due process letter
further detailing the Commissioners’ reasons for discharge). Here, the
Commissioners sent the due process letter to Crouse after sending
warning letters in August 2014 and April 2015. Despite these
warnings, the Commissioners continued to receive complaints. The due
process letter gave Crouse the opportunity to demonstrate to the
Commissioners that they should continue her employment. However,
Crouse did not avail herself of that opportunity. Crouse did not have
a compelling reason to quit because she feared termination after
receiving a due process letter.

125 [Crouse alleges that the tension with co-workers, and a lack of
response from the Commissioners regarding this tension, contributed
to a hostile work environment that provided her with a compelling
reason to voluntarily terminate her employment. The District Court
determined that allegations of hostile working conditions did not
support her argument that she had good cause to resign. Other courts
have reached similar conclusions. In Esselman v. Job Serv. N.D., the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that although Michelle Esselman
felt intimidated and verbally attacked by her co-workers, she did not
have good cause to quit. Esselman v. Job Serv. N.D., 548 N.W.2d 400,

=

403-05 (N.D. 1996). The North Dakota Supreme Court also noted
testimony that “the stress and tension in the office was primarily
caused by ‘a lack of communication’ and ‘maybe some personality
conflicts.’” Esselman, 548 N.W.2d at 404. The tension between Crouse
and her co-workers did not give her a compelling reason to leave her
position as Sanitarian.

{26 Crouse faced numerous complaints from contractors. Crouse
argues these complaints added to the hostile work environment and
that the Commissioners failed to address them, giving her a compelling
reason to voluntarily terminate her employment. Crouse did not
present evidence as to any specific actions that the County should have
taken. In fact, a review of the record shows that the Commissioners did
address contractor complaints. Commissioner Hart met with
contractors who were upset with Crouse’s work performance and even
defended Crouse in a heated meeting with one contractor.

{27 It was also these complaints that gave rise to the reprimand
letters sent to Crouse. While Crouse argues complaints were made
because she was stricter in her enforcement. of sanitation rules,
evidence in the record indicates other factors. Crouse missed and was
late to numerous appointments with contractors, and that conduct
apparently continued even after the Commissioners’ first letter was
given to Crouse. Noting that she was asked by a Commissioner at the
September 4 meeting why she refused to issue a particular permit,
Crouse asserts the Commissioner asked her to violate her duties and
the law. However, Commissioner Shultz testified that the
Commissioners never asked Crouse to violate the law, and in fact, none
of the reprimand letters sent to Crouse mentioned concern with
Crouse’s application of the law as Sanitarian. The record does not
support this assertion.

128 [Ml Crouse voluntarily resigned her position with the County.
Montana law precludes awarding unemployment benefits to former
employees unless they can demonstrate they had good cause to resign.
Section 39-51-2302(1), MCA. Administrative Rule of Montana
24,.11.457 further defines the term good cause in the context of
employment disputes. The claimant had to have a compelling reason
based within the employment relationship to leave, and must have
made an attempt to resolve the problem and give the employer an
opportunity to correct it.

CONCLUSION
129 Crouse has not satisfied her burden to establish that she left her
position as Madison County Sanitarian for good cause. The findings of

a

the Board were supported by substantial evidence; as such they are
conclusive. The District Court correctly affirmed the Board’s decision
to deny Crouse’s claim for benefits because she voluntarily resigned
her position.
q30 Affirmed.

JUSTICES SHEA, BAKER, WHEAT and SANDEFUR concur.

a «

TANYA L. MLEKUSH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Respondent and Appellee.

No. DA 16-0670.
Submitted on Briefs July 26, 2017,
Decided October 24, 2017.
Amended November 14, 2017.
2017 MT 256A.

389 Mont. 99.

404 P.3d 704,

For Appellant: Rick J. Pyfer, Patrick T. Fox (argued), Doubek,
Pyfer & Fox, PC, Helena.

For Appellee: Paul R. Haffeman (argued), Davis, Hatley,
Haffeman & Tighe, P.C., Great Falls.

For Amicus Montana Trial Lawyers Association: Justin P.
Stalpes, Beck, Amsden & Stalpes, PLLC, Bozeman.

For Amicus Montana Defense Trial Lawyers: Nicholas J.
Pagnotta (argued), Peter B. Ivins, Williams Law Firm, P.C.,
Missoula.

JUSTICE WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1. This appeal arises from a November 3, 2016 District Court order
denying a motion for attorney fees.
2 We restate the sole issue on appeal as follows:
Whether an injured first-party insured who is compelled to sue for
UIM benefits and recovers more at trial than the last insurance
company offer is entitled to recover his or her attorney fees.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
3 OnJanuary 15, 2011, Tanya L. Mlekush (Mlekush) was injured in
a two-vehicle collision. At the time, Farmers Insurance Exchange
(Farmers) insured Mlekush under a policy that provided underinsured
motorist (UIM) coverage. After the accident, Mlekush retained counsel.
4 On January 22, 2011, Farmers sent Mlekush a letter regarding
the collision and her options for repair of her vehicle. In August. 2012,
the other driver admitted liability and tendered the liability insurance
policy limits of $50,000. On October 2, 2012, Mlekush’s counsel sent
Farmers a letter requesting a UIM claim be opened and to have the
assigned adjuster contact counsel. Farmers and Mlekush exchanged
information regarding Mlekush’s claim and medical expenses over the
next few months.
q5 In January 2013, Farmers had not yet made a determination
regarding Mlekush’s claim. Farmers sent Mlekush a letter informing
her that it needed more information regarding her claimed injuries
because “at this time it is not clear if the [injuries] are causally/directly
related to the accident in question.”
q6 On January 24, 2013, Mlekush filed a complaint in District Court
for “all sums due and owing” from Farmers. Mlekush stated her reason
for initiating litigation at this point was that Farmers questioned
causation on a clear medical record and denied advance payment of
surgical costs. For the next seventeen months, the parties exchanged
settlement offers, requests for advanced payment for medical
procedures, and additional medical information.
{7 On June 26, 2013, Farmers offered Mlekush $18,831.25 to settle
her claim; however, Farmers suggested it might be too early to settle
because Mlekush’s medical condition had not stabilized. The letter did

not specify if acceptance required a full and final release of Farmers
based on this claim. Mlekush responded by demanding her UIM policy
limits. Farmers denied Mlekush’s demand. Mlekush agreed to
mediation. Mediation occurred on September 27, 2013, but was
unsuccessful.

{8 On October 7, 2013, Farmers offered Mlekush $60,000 to settle
her claim. Mlekush counteroffered for $187,500. Farmers refused the
offer. The parties continued to exchange information. On March 18,
2014, Farmers offered Mlekush $75,000 to settle the claim; Mlekush
refused and demanded her UIM policy limits. Farmers refused the
offer. On July 1, 2014, Farmers extended its final offer of $77,500 to
settle the claim.

q9 <A jury trial took place July 7-9, 2014. All information and
documentation concerning Mlekush’s injuries that had been provided
to Farmers was admitted into evidence at trial. The jury returned a
verdict of $450,000 in favor of Mlekush. Judgment was entered for the
policy limit amount of $200,000.

q10 Mlekush then filed a memorandum of costs and a motion for
attorney fees and nontaxable costs under the insurance exception to
the American Rule. On January 12, 2015, the District Court denied
Mlekush’s motion for attorney fees, finding the insurance exception did
not apply to Mlekush’s claim because Mlekush initiated the action
prematurely; she was therefore not “forced to assume the burden of
legal action.” Mlekush appealed.

11 This Court in Mlekush v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2015 MT 302, 381
Mont. 292, 358 P.3d 913, concluded that the District Court’s exclusive
reliance on when Mlekush initiated her action was error; “the
determination of whether an insured is entitled to attorney fees under
the insurance exception, though a matter of law, necessitates factual
findings that take into consideration both parties’ actions during the
entire process leading up to the ultimate resolution of the claim.”
Mlekush, 413. This Court remanded the issue to the District Court for
development of the factual record to determine if Mlekush was entitled
to attorney fees because Farmers forced her to assume the burden of
legal action to obtain the full benefit of her UIM policy.

12 The parties then filed a joint statement of undisputed facts and
presented arguments on August 19, 2016. On November 3, 2016, the
District Court denied Mlekush’s motion for attorney fees. The District
Court found that an exception to the American Rule does not apply to
disputes over the value of an insurance claim, that Farmers did not
deny her claim, and that Farmers’ conduct during the claim
investigation and in negotiations was in good faith and reasonable.

Mlekush appeals. This Court heard oral argument on July 26, 2017.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

13 A district court’s determination whether legal authority exists for
an award of attorney fees is a conclusion of law, which we review for
correctness. Mlekush v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2015 MT 302, { 8, 381
Mont. 292, 358 P.3d 913. We apply de novo review to mixed questions
of law and fact. Mlekush, | 8. Thus, although we review a district
court's factual determinations for clear error, whether those facts
satisfy the legal standard is reviewed de novo. Mlekush, | 8. This
bifurcated standard of review “affords appropriate deference to the
trial court’s fact-finding role and responsibility, while providing this
Court with the opportunity to review legal conclusions and the
application of legal standards de novo.” Mlekush, {| 8 (quoting State v.
Kaufman, 2002 MT 294, {| 12, 313 Mont. 1, 59 P.3d 1166).

DISCUSSION

14 Whether an injured first-party insured who is compelled to sue for
UIM benefits and recovers more at trial than the last insurance
company offer is entitled to recover his or her attorney fees.
115 Montana follows the American Rule regarding attorney fees: each
party is ordinarily required to bear his or her own expenses absent a
contractual or statutory provision to the contrary. Mt. W. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 2003 MT 98, 7 14, 315 Mont. 231, 69 P.3d 652.
However, this Court recognizes several equitable exceptions to this
rule, including in the area of insurance. Winter v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 MT 168, {| 31, 375 Mont. 351, 328 P.3d 665.
416 This Court has determined that an exception exists where a first-
party insured has incurred attorney fees based on an insurer’s breach
of the duty to defend. See Goodover v. Lindey’s Inc., 255 Mont. 430, 448,
843 P.2d 765, 776 (1992); Truck Ins. Exchange v. Woldstad, 212 Mont.
418, 423, 687 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1984); Lindsay Drilling v. U.S. Fidelity
& Guar., 208 Mont. 91, 97, 676 P.2d 203, 206 (1984); Home Ins. Co. v.
Pinski Brothers, Inc., 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d 945 (1972).
17 In Brewer, we expanded the exception to include cases when the
insurer disputed coverage and the first-party insured incurred attorney
fees litigating the dispute and was successful in proving coverage
existed. After reviewing case law from other jurisdictions, the Court in
Brewer reasoned as follows:

We find the above cited authority compelling to hold an insurer

liable for attorney fees when the insurer breaches its duty to

indemnify. We decline to further propagate the arbitrary legal
fiction that a substantive distinction exists between a breach of
the duty to defend and the breach of the duty to indemnify. It
seems inherently inconsistent that courts universally afford
attorney fees incurred to establish a contested duty to defend and
yet, simultaneously, reject such an award incurred in coverage
disputes brought to preserve or eviscerate the obligatory defense.
As Appleman indicates, this notion appears nothing more than an
a [sic] mere exercise in semantics. Accordingly, we hold that an
insured is entitled to recover attorney fees, pursuant to the
insurance exception to the American Rule, when the insurer forces
the insured to assume the burden of legal action to obtain the full
benefit of the insurance contract, regardless of whether the
insurer’s duty to defend is at issue.
Brewer, | 36 (emphasis added).
q18 Faced with facts similar to this case, the United States District.
Court for the District of Montana in Riordan v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., adopted the reasoning in Brewer to hold that “the insurance
exception to the American Rule applies to a first-party claim for UIM
benefits” when the first-party insured is compelled to commence legal
action to obtain bargained-for UIM benefits. Riordan v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47734, *17, 2008 WL
2512023 (D. Mont. June 20, 2008). The court in Riordan rejected a
narrow reading of Brewer, as advocated by the insurer, when it stated:
[T]he [Brewer] Court made clear that whenever an insurer forces
its insured to assume the burden of litigation to obtain what the
insured is entitled to under an insurance contract, the insured is
entitled to recover attorney fees. The Court forcefully declared
that it will not embrace any “arbitrary legal fiction” that would
allow an insurer to evade paying attorney fees, when the insurer
has forced the insured to assume the burden of litigation. The
language of paragraph 36 leaves no room for State Farm to
suggest that a “substantive distinction” exists between a first-
party insured seeking to recover UIM benefits from a first-party
insured seeking indemnification under a liability policy. State
Farm’s argument to the contrary is “nothing more than a mere
exercise in semantics.”
Riordan, *11-12 (citing Brewer, J 36).
{19 Mlekush argues that the insurance exception to the American
Rule for attorney fees applies in her case as well, because if she had not
initiated litigation and proceeded to a jury trial, she would not have

received the full value of her UIM insurance coverage. Farmers argues,
just as State Farm did in Riordan, the insurance exception has not.
been extended to cases where the value of an underinsured motorist
claim is in dispute but insurance coverage is not disputed. Farmers
urges this Court to uphold the District Court’s decision. We decline to
do so.

q20 A contract of insurance is one of adhesion, created by the
insurance company and offered to the consumer on a “take it or leave
it” basis. Modroo v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2008 MT 275, 161,
345 Mont. 262, 191 P.38d 389. The insurance company has all the
bargaining power and the consumer has no ability to bargain for better
rates or coverage. Modroo, {| 61. However, insurance contracts are a
necessary commodity for consumers seeking personal liability and
injury protection. Thus, when a first-party insured buys insurance, like
UIM protective coverage in this case, he or she does so with the
reasonable expectation that they will be treated fairly and will not
have to resort to expensive, time-consuming litigation in order to
recover what they are rightfully entitled to under the terms of their
insurance policy. Brewer, 133. But, when they are compelled to sue for
their benefits and they recover more at trial than was offered by the
insurance company, they are entitled to recover their attorney fees.
21 Farmers argues that a legitimate dispute about value of a UIM
claim should not penalize the insurer with threat of attorney fees. But
the Insurance exception is not a bad faith concept; it simply recognizes
that the insured should not bear the expense when she has to resort to
litigation in order to recover the benefits for which the insured has
contracted and paid premiums. Brewer, {| 36. Further, Farmers’
suggestion that the trial court conduct a post-judgment “objective view”
of the entire case to determine whether the Insurance exception
applies inevitably would result—as it did here—in another round of
legal proceedings. Such a review, in addition to imposing additional
expense and litigation burden on the insured, often will require inquiry
into the insurer’s basis of knowledge—including the claims file—and
possible disclosure of confidential mediation communications. Section
26-1-813, MCA; Kluver v. PPL Mont., LLC, 2012 MT 321, 1152-60, 368
Mont. 101, 293 P.3d 817. Forcing a first-party insured to bear the
burden of attorney fees, when the insured seeks only the full benefit of
her insurance claim, defeats the purpose of having an insurance
exception.

22 Based on the rationale expressed in Brewer, centered on an
insured’s expectations when she purchases coverage, we conclude that
the solution we announce today implements a workable standard for

administering the Insurance exception to the American Rule. The
question of reasonableness, importantly, is still in play, as the trial
court must determine the reasonableness of the fees to be awarded. See
Chase v. Bearpaw Ranch Ass’n, 2006 MT 67, {| 38, 331 Mont. 421, 133
P.3d 190. Through this determination—similar to the process used any
time a court considers a fee award—the court can account for a
plaintiffs actions that unreasonably multiply the litigation or increase
costs.
123 [MM Therefore, we hold that, when a first-party insured is
compelled to pursue litigation and a jury returns a verdict in excess of
the insurer’s last offer to settle an underinsured motorist claim, the
insurer must pay the first-party insured’s attorney fees in an amount
subsequently determined by the district court to be reasonable. To be
clear, if a first-party insured goes to trial and obtains a verdict in
excess of the insurer’s last offer, this constitutes prima facie proof that
the insured was forced to assume the burden of legal action to obtain
the full benefit of the policy, thus obviating the need for an inquiry as
to whether or not the insurance exception applies. However, in cases
in which the policy limits are tendered prior to a verdict. being
returned, the district court may consider the entirety of the litigation
to determine “whether, and to what extent, [the] insured was forced to
assume the burden of legal action in order to recover the full benefits
of the insurance contract.” Mlekush, | 11; see also Riordan v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47734, 2008 WL
2512023. To the extent this Opinion is inconsistent with our previous
holding in Mlekush v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2015 MT 302, 381 Mont. 292,
358 P.3d 918, it is overruled.
124 In the case at hand, Mlekush was compelled to sue and the
jury returned a verdict higher than the amount of the last offer made
by Farmers to settle her underinsured motorist claim. Farmers is
required to pay Mlekush’s attorney fees.
425 Accordingly, the District Court Order denying fees is reversed and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion. Upon remand, the District Court will consider a reasonable
amount of fees, costs, and interest to which Mlekush is entitled.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES McKINNON, SHEA,
SANDEFUR, BAKER and RICE concur.

HSBC BANK USA, National Association,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
RICHARD G. ANDERSON; and
LIMEGROVE OVERSEAS, LTD.,
Defendants and Appellants.

No. DA 16-0546.
Submitted on Briefs August 16, 2017.
Decided October 24, 2017.

2017 MT 257.

389 Mont. 106.

406 P.3d 416.

For Appellants: Elizabeth L. Griffing, Axilon Law Group,
PLLC, Helena; Frederick P. Landers, Axilon Law Group, PLLC,
Bozeman.

For Appellee: Charles E. Hansberry, Jenny M. Jourdonnais,
Hansberry & Jourdonnais, PLLC, Missoula.

JUSTICE McKINNON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1 Richard G. Anderson (Anderson) and Limegrove Overseas, Ltd.,
(Limegrove) appeal from an Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead
County, order granting HSBC Bank USA, N.A.’s (HSBC) two motions
for summary judgment and motion to exclude Anderson’s expert. We
affirm.
q2 Anderson presents the following issues for review:

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding

Anderson’s expert witness?

2. Did the District Court err when it concluded Montana law

governs HSBC’s underlying foreclosure and New York law governs
any defenses and counterclaims?
3. Did the District Court err in granting HSBC summary judgment
to foreclose?
4. Did the District Court err in granting HSBC summary judgment
on Anderson's counterclaims?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
q8 Anderson, a Canadian citizen, is the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of Wilton Resources, Inc., a publicly traded oil and
gas exploration company, headquartered in Calgary. Limegrove is a
corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.
Anderson informally runs the day-to-day operations of Limegrove and
its sole shareholder is the Karesmay Trust, an irrevocable offshore
trust organized under the laws of Jersey, Channel Islands. Anderson’s
two adult children are the only beneficiaries of the Karesmay Trust.
Limegrove’s only asset is a vacation property located at 3542 East

Lakeshore Drive, Whitefish, Montana (the Limegrove Property). The
Limegrove Property consists of “nine (9) cultivated acres of land
situated on Whitefish Lake and includes a 10,000-plus square foot
vacation home, a four-bay garage, 538 feet. of lakeshore, and a 2-boat
docking system.” Anderson may use the Limegrove Property under an
oral lease agreement. The ownership arrangement was set up for tax
and estate planning purposes at Anderson’s attorneys’ suggestion.
Anderson is not a shareholder in Limegrove and does not own property
in Montana. Anderson spends no more than 90 days per year at the
Limegrove Property.

q4 HSBC is a federally chartered bank with offices in various cities
throughout the United States, primarily New York City. Anderson
contacted HSBC in the spring of 2006 looking for financing to facilitate
the $17.5 million’ acquisition of the Limegrove Property. Anderson
worked with Frank Drury, an HSBC domestic private banking
“Relationship Manager” specializing in customers with high net-worth.
After negotiating, HSBC and Anderson agreed to a two-year loan for
15.5 million with a $2 million down payment. The loan required
Anderson pay down the balance by half during the first year so the
outstanding principal would be no more than $8.75 million. Trust
indentures on the Limegrove Property, the Roxbury Property,” and
750,000 shares in First Calgary Petroleum secured the loan as
collateral.

5 In accordance with these terms, three loan documents were
drafted and executed. The loan documents consisted of (1) a Promissory
Note (Note); (2) a Term Loan Agreement (TLA); and (3) a Trust
Indenture Security Agreement and Fixture Filing, and Assignment of
Leases, Rents and Agreements (Trust Indenture). The TLA, executed
on May 9, 2006, stated a maturity date of May 8, 2008.

(6 The Note and TLA contained choice of law provisions indicating
New York law governed the agreements. The Trust Indenture is the
only loan document containing a provision indicating Montana law
governed the agreement. HSBC and Limegrove are the parties to the
Trust Indenture and Limegrove’s director signed the agreement.

' All references to dollar amounts are in USD unless otherwise indicated.

2 The Roxbury Property was another piece of property located on Whitefish Lake
with an ownership arrangement similar to the Limegrove Property, thatis, it was owned
by a foreign corporation with its sole shareholder an offshore trust and Anderson’s
children as the trust’s beneficiaries. At the time it was pledged as collateral, its
estimated value was $6.5 million.

Anderson was not a party to or signatory of the Trust Indenture. The
Trust Indenture pledged the Limegrove Property as collateral for the
obligations under the Note and TLA. The Trust Indenture provided for
certain events of default including if Anderson failed to pay any
obligation or if the closing price of a share of First Calgary Petroleum
fell below $6 Canadian (CAD). An event: of default entitled HSBC the
right to take possession or foreclose on the Limegrove Property.

{7 Two events of default occurred by August 16, 2007. Anderson
failed to pay down the outstanding principal amount of the loan by half
and the value of a First Calgary Petroleum share fell below $6 CAD.
HSBC transferred Anderson’s loan to its Special Credit Unit and
assigned it to Salvatore Gullo (Gullo) to manage. Anderson and Gullo
discussed entering a forbearance agreement to give Anderson
additional time to perform the loan obligations. HSBC does not have
formal policies concerning forbearance agreements, although they are
“common practice.” On May 6, 2008, two days prior to the loan’s
maturity date, Anderson and Gullo executed a Forbearance
Agreement, in which HSBC agreed to forbear exercising its rights due
to existing defaults until February 9, 2009, and Anderson agreed to pay
down the principal by $2,750,000 and pledge 400,000 additional shares
of First Calgary Petroleum as collateral.

q8 In the Forbearance Agreement, Anderson reaffirmed the
obligations under the TLA, Note, and Trust Indenture. The
Forbearance Agreement was subsequently amended seven times, each
time allowing Anderson additional time, ranging from two to nine
months, to perform his obligations. In between the second and third
amendments, on September 15, 2009, Anderson signed a Replacement
Promissory Note (Replacement Note) subject to the terms and
conditions of the TLA. The Replacement Note contained a choice of law
provision indicating New York law governed the agreement.

{9 Most of the seven amendments to the Forbearance Agreement
required Anderson to make a payment toward the outstanding
principal in exchange for HSBC extending the maturity date of the
loan. Two amendments required Anderson pay an extension fee, one
for $100,000 and another for $5,000. Each of the seven amendments
contained a choice of law provision indicating New York law governed
the amendment. Before the seventh amendment, Anderson had paid
down the principal to $9 million. The seventh and final extension
required several payments be made by specific deadlines and matured
completely on January 15, 2012.

410 During the seventh amendment’s extension period, Anderson and
Gullo discussed an eighth amendment. However, in an email Gullo

sent to Anderson, Gullo indicated he did “not have credit approval to
extend” Anderson’s loan. Anderson failed to make one of the required
payments and did not pay off the loan by its January 15, 2012,
maturity date. Anderson acknowledged he had not fulfilled his
obligations and that he withheld payment because he assumed he
would get another extension.

q11 On February 16, 2012, HSBC sent Anderson a formal default
letter and demanded payment in full by February 29, 2012. Anderson
did not pay. On June 8, 2012, HSBC initiated a judicial foreclosure
action against Anderson and Limegrove in Montana’s Eleventh
Judicial District Court, Flathead County. Anderson and Limegrove
asserted affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver and
counterclaimed breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, breach of implied contract, and violation of the Montana
Consumer Protection Act.

12 The District Court entered a scheduling order and set the close of
discovery for November 24, 2015. At Anderson’s request, the parties
informally agreed to delay expert disclosures from the original deadline
of November 18, 2015, by eleven days to coincide with the close of
discovery on November 24, 2015. On that date, HSBC disclosed two
expert witnesses, a banking expert and an appraiser. Anderson
disclosed one, an appraiser. On January 19, 2016, pursuant to a
stipulation between the parties, Limegrove dismissed its affirmative
defenses and counterclaims, leaving only Anderson’s. Prior to trial,
HSBC moved for summary judgment on the foreclosure, Anderson’s
affirmative defenses, and Anderson’s counterclaims.

q13 On March 11, 2016, after the discovery deadline, Anderson filed
a supplemental expert disclosure disclosing an additional expert
witness, a banking expert, James Shires (Shires). Anderson also filed
Shires’s declaration. Anderson did not ask for leave to file the
supplemental expert disclosure or declaration. On March 21, 2016,
HSBC filed a pretrial motion to exclude Shires’s testimony at trial and
strike his affidavit. HSBC relied on M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) and argued
Anderson’s late disclosure of Shires’s testimony merited its exclusion.
Anderson responded and argued the late disclosure was “substantially
justified due to HSBC’s late disclosure of certain written policies.”
q14 On March 22, 2016, the District Court held a hearing on the
pretrial motions. The District Court found that Anderson’s “failure to
timely disclose Shires[] as an expert witness was not substantially
justified and was not harmless.” Further, the District Court found
Anderson “did not move for or suggest an alternative sanction.” The
District Court, relying on Doherty v. Fannie Mae, 2014 MT 56, 7 15,

374 Mont. 151, 319 P.8d 1279, concluded that absent substantial
justification, harmlessness, or a motion for a lesser sanction, Shires’s
testimony must be excluded and his affidavit stricken.

15 The District Court granted HSBC’s three pretrial motions in a 42-
page order dated August 30, 2016. On October 12, 2016, the District
Court entered its final judgment and decree of foreclosure. The District
Court awarded judgment to HSBC against Anderson for “$6,434,971.86
in principal, $1,885,689.62 in interest (for a base total amount owing
of $8,320,661.48), together with additional interest accruing (at a rate
of $1,340.62 per day) from January 4, 2016 until the present [October
12, 2016,] and HSBC’s reasonable out-of-pocket expenses (including
attorneys’ fees) ....”

116 Anderson appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

17 A district court’s exclusion of expert witness testimony is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Sunburst School Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc.,
2007 MT 183, {| 68, 338 Mont. 259, 165 P.3d 1079. A court abuses its
discretion if it acts “arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or
exceed[s] the bounds of reason.” Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, | 65,
336 Mont. 225, 154 P.38d 561 (quoting Lopez v. Josephson, 2001 MT
133, 1 14, 305 Mont. 446, 30 P.3d 326). This Court reviews decisions on
choice of law de novo. Masters Group Intl., Inc. v. Comerica Bank, 2015
MT 192, 7 33, 380 Mont. 1, 352 P.3d 1101 (citation omitted)
(hereinafter, Comerica). A motion for summary judgment should be
granted, “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on
file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “We review de novo a district court’s
ruling on summary judgment, applying the criteria of M. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3).” Mt. Water Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 2017 MT 117, {| 7, 387
Mont. 394, 394 P.3d 922 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

18 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding
Anderson’s expert witness?

19 The parties initially dispute the appropriate standard of review for
this issue. Relying on Lorang v. Fortis Insurance Company, 2008 MT
252, | 53, 345 Mont. 12, 192 P.3d 186, Anderson contends that this
Court reviews decisions to exclude evidence de novo. HSBC argues that
the correct standard of review for M. R. Civ. P. 37(c) sanctions is for an

abuse of discretion. “A district court possesses broad discretion in
ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony, and without a showing
of abuse of discretion, the district court’s ruling will not be disturbed
on appeal.” Sunburst, {| 68 (citing State v. Vernes, 2006 MT 32, {| 14,
831 Mont. 129, 130 P.3d 169); see also McCulley v. U.S. Bank, 2015 MT
100, {| 22, 378 Mont. 462, 347 P.3d 247 (“We review a district court’s
discovery ruling for an abuse of discretion.”); Serrania v. LPH, Inc.,
2015 MT 113, {| 12, 379 Mont. 17, 347 P.3d 1237 (“This Court reviews
sanctions orders for abuse of discretion.”); Doherty, J 12 (“We review
a district court’s decision regarding the imposition of sanctions for
alleged discovery abuse to determine whether the district court abused
its discretion.” (citation omitted)). We review the imposition of
sanctions pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 37(c) for an abuse of discretion.
{20 On appeal, Anderson argues disclosing Shires late was
substantially justified by HSBC’s late production of certain policies and
entries in its online Credit and Accounts Receivable Management
System (CARMS). Anderson argues the District Court inappropriately
relied on dicta from Doherty to conclude Shires’s information must be
excluded and its exclusion of Shires was “extremely harsh.” Instead of
Doherty, Anderson argues this Court should apply the three-part test
outlined in Maloney v. Home & Investment Center, Inc., 2000 MT 34,
q 35, 298 Mont. 218, 994 P.2d 1124, used to determine the
appropriateness of excluding witnesses. Relying on Maloney,
Anderson argues this Court should reverse the District Court’s decision
to exclude Shires.

21 HSBC responds by arguing that its late production of credit
policies and CARMS does not provide Anderson “substantial
justification.” HSBC points out that Anderson initially asked for
HSBC’s credit policies in January 2013, and HSBC objected to the
disclosure on the basis that the request was “overly broad, vague and
unlimited in scope or time” and sought “proprietary, trade secret
and/or confidential business information.” Anderson never responded
to HSBC’s argument that the credit policies were undiscoverable, but
three years later, on January 18, 2016, requested the policies again. On
appeal, HSBC argues that by then it decided to just provide the policies
in order to avoid a discovery dispute. Further, HSBC argues that the
late-disclosed policies do not provide any justification for Anderson’s
late expert disclosure because the policies were not identified, quoted,
or analyzed in Shires’s disclosure and only mentioned once in his
declaration. HSBC argues the CARMS were produced multiple times
and for the first time in March 2013, well before the close of discovery.
At Anderson’s request, they were reproduced after. HSBC

distinguishes Maloney and asserts that its test is no longer applicable
because M. R. Civ. P. 37 was amended in 2011 and is now self-
executing, meaning the sanction of exclusion is automatic. HSBC
argues the District Court correctly excluded Shires’s testimony.
22 During discovery, litigants can be required, by scheduling order,
to disclose their expert witnesses, their opinions, and the basis for
those opinions. M. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i); Sunburst, J 70.
If a party fails to provide information requested in accordance
with these rules or fails to disclose information regarding opinions
of a witness as required by Rule 26(b)(4), the party is not allowed
to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion,
at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless.
M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). On motion, the court may impose other
appropriate sanctions in addition to exclusion or instead of exclusion.
M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(C). “If the court does not find the failure
substantially justified or harmless, and if there is no motion for
alternative sanctions, the information must be excluded.” Doherty,
{ 15, (citing M. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(¢)(1); Yeti
by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1106
(9th Cir. 2001) (describing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) as self-executing and
automatic); Olson v. Mont. Rail Link, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 550, 552 (D.
Mont. 2005) (noting exceptions to automatic sanctions under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(c)(1) if failure is substantially justified or harmless)).
23 Here, Anderson does not argue that the late expert disclosure
was harmless and did not move the District. Court for an alternative
sanction. Anderson contends the late disclosure was substantially
justified by HSBC’s late production. We disagree. HSBC produced
CARMS and credit policies after the close of discovery; however, the
CARMS were also timely produced and HSBC timely objected to
producing the credit policies. Further, Anderson does not explain why
he could not disclose Shires until HSBC produced the CARMS and
credit policies. He does not, for example, claim that Shires’s
examination of those documents was somehow critical and, without
them, he would not have selected or required an expert. We conclude
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Shires’s
information and testimony.
24 Anderson asserted affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver and
counterclaimed breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, breach of implied contract, and violation of the Montana
Consumer Protection Act. Anderson bore the burden of proving these
affirmative defenses and counterclaims. The District Court found, “It

is reasonable to think that Anderson should have anticipated, from the
outset, that in a case such as this, the opinions of an expert on banking
practices would be required.” We agree with the District Court. Even
excluding the evidence provided by HSBC in January 2016, Anderson
should have known that he would need a banking expert and timely
disclosed one. The District. Court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Anderson’s late disclosure was not substantially
justified. The District Court did not err in excluding Anderson’s expert
witness.
25 2. Did the District Court err when it concluded Montana law
governs HSBC’s underlying foreclosure and New York law governs any
defenses and counterclaims?
26 The parties agree Montana law governs the foreclosure action. The
parties disagree on which state’s law governs Anderson’s defenses and
counterclaims. The District Court applied the Comerica choice of law
test and concluded New York law governed Anderson’s affirmative
defenses and counterclaims. Comerica, {| 55. On appeal, Anderson
argues Montana law was the parties’ choice in the Trust Indenture,
which allowed HSBC to foreclose, and his defenses and counterclaims
are “part and parcel” to the foreclosure action. Montana law should,
Anderson argues, govern the entire dispute despite the choice of law
provisions in the other loan documents. HSBC argues Anderson’s
defenses and counterclaims arise from the other loan documents, which
Anderson is a party to and all contain New York choice of law
provisions. Further, HSBC argues Anderson cannot rely on the Trust
Indenture because he was nota party to or signatory of it. Additionally,
HSBC indicates that Limegrove was a party to the Trust Indenture;
however, in a document filed on January 19, 2016, Limegrove
dismissed its affirmative defenses and counterclaims with prejudice.
27 Statute dictates choice of law as to real property. “Real property
within this state is governed by the law of this state ....” Section 70-1-
107, MCA. “A court may not act directly upon the title to real property
in a foreign jurisdiction.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McElvain, 221 Mont.
1838, 147, 717 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1986). Judicial foreclosures must occur
in the jurisdiction where the property is located. Here, Montana law
must govern the Trust Indenture in order to allow foreclosure of the
Limegrove Property as a remedy.
28 “We recognize and enforce a clear and unambiguous contract term,
unless that term ‘violates public policy or is against good morals.’ ”
Comerica, | 54 (quoting Youngblood v. Am. States Ins. Co., 262 Mont.
391, 395, 866 P.2d 203, 205 (1993)).

In the construction of an instrument, the office of the judge is

simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance
contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit.
what has been inserted. Where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as
will give effect to all.
Section 1-4-101, MCA.
29 In Comerica, we recognized the test Montana courts apply to
choice of law disputes. We apply the law of the state chosen by the
parties to govern their contractual rights unless the following three
factors are met:
(1) but for the choice of law provision, Montana law would apply
under [Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws § 188]; (2)
Montana has a materially greater interest in the particular issue
than the parties|’] chosen state; and (3) application of the chosen
state’s law would contravene a Montana fundamental policy.
Comerica, | 55 (quotation and citations omitted). All three factors must
be met and if a clear choice of law provision does not violate Montana
public policy, there is no reason to analyze factors (1) and (2).
Comerica, {] 55 (citations omitted). If the parties’ chosen state’s law
does not contravene Montana public policy, it will be applied.
80 To determine whether the terms in the loan documents are clear
and unambiguous, we first examine the provisions. Ten contracts
explicitly state New York law governs them. The TLA states:
Section 8.5. Governing Law. This Agreement and the Loan
Documents shall be governed by and construed in accordance with
the laws of the State of New York without giving effect to the
conflicts of law principles thereof (other than Section 5-1401 of the
New York General Obligations Law), and except as otherwise
specifically set forth in the Mortgages with respect to each
Mortgage and the Mortgaged Premises (in which event the laws
of the jurisdiction in which the Mortgaged Premises is located
shall apply).
(Emphasis in original.) The Note states “THIS PROMISSORY NOTE
SHALL BE GOVERENED BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK.” (Emphasis in original.) The Replacement Note states “THIS
REPLACEMENT PROMISSORY NOTE SHALL BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.” (Emphasis in original.)
Each of the seven amendments to the Forbearance Agreement include
the same provision stating, “[t]his Amendment shall be governed by,
and construed under, the internal laws of the State of New York,
without regard to principles of conflicts of law.” These contracts clearly
and unambiguously indicate the parties agree to the application of New

York law.
31 The Trust Indenture is the only document indicating Montana law
governs it.
Section 13. Law Governing. This Indenture of Trust shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the
jurisdiction in which the Land is located.
(Emphasis in original.) It is undisputed the land at issue, the
Limegrove property, is located in Montana. This provision is clear and
unambiguous. The Forbearance Agreement does not contain a choice
of law provision but does contain a provision reaffirming the
obligations set forth in the TLA and other loan documents. If possible,
our goal will be to give effect to each choice of law provision in each
instrument. Section 1-4-101, MCA.
32 The District Court found it significant that Anderson was not a
party to the Trust Indenture, the only contract selecting Montana law,
and was a party to each of the loan documents selecting New York law:
Although they relate to the foreclosure, none of Anderson’s
defenses or claims raise questions or issues that concern or
directly affect interest in the property. Rather Anderson’s
defenses and counterclaims are based on allegations concerning
HSBC’s conduct with respect to the underlying debt. Issues which
do not affect interest in the land, although they relate to the
foreclosure, are determined by the law which governs the debt for
which the mortgage was given. Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws [§] 229 cmt. e. Anderson’s affirmative defenses and
counterclaims arise out of the contracts that establish the
underlying debt—the Note, Replacement Note, TLA, Forbearance
and forbearance amendments (extensions). Anderson is a party to
all of these contracts and all of these contracts either contain or
incorporate New York choice of law provisions.
433 Litigants lack standing to enforce obligations of a contract if they
are nota party to, or third-party beneficiary of, that. contract. See
Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 MT 213, | 15, 366 Mont. 285,
291 P.3d 1082. Anderson is not a party to the Trust Indenture and
cannot enforce its choice of law provision.” Anderson asserted
affirmative defenses and counterclaims. However, Anderson’s defenses
and counterclaims cannot. arise from the Trust Indenture he is not a

® Anderson does not argue he is a third-party beneficiary to the Trust Indenture.
He does argue he owes obligations under the Trust Indenture and is named as
“borrower,” but fails to develop this argument.

party to.

134 [Hf Anderson is a sophisticated businessperson and CEO of a
publicly traded corporation. He has experience orchestrating similar
ownership arrangements for other vacation properties in order to
accomplish his tax and estate planning goals. Multiple attorneys
represented Anderson during the formation, review, and execution of
the loan documents between Anderson, Limegrove, and HSBC. Based
on Anderson’s sophistication, experience, and access to legal
representation, the District Court found “i]t is reasonable to interpret
Anderson’s and HSBC’s action of including a choice of (New York) law
provision in the contracts as their intention that the provision apply to
claims and affirmative defenses arising from those contracts.” (Citation
omitted.) We agree with the District Court. Anderson agreed, ten
separate times, to the application of New York law, and was not a
party to the only instrument indicating Montana law applied. He
cannot now invoke a provision of a contract he was not a party to in
order to avoid a choice of law selection he explicitly, and repeatedly,
agreed to unless that provision contravenes Montana public policy.
35 We now consider whether New York law contravenes Montana
public policy. Comerica, | 55. The District Court found “Anderson has
not identified any aspect of [] either his affirmative defenses or claims
to which application of New York law would somehow contravene
Montana’s public policy.” On appeal, Anderson does not suggest New
York law contravenes Montana’s public policy, he maintains only that
the parties chose Montana law. We disagree that the parties chose
Montana law. Instead, we believe the parties chose New York law, as
evidenced by the ten separate and explicit provisions. New York law
was generally the parties’ choice, but they were required by statute to
include a Montana choice of law provision in the Trust Indenture to
facilitate foreclosure within the state.

36 The District Court found New York and Montana law comparable
as it relates to Anderson’s defenses and counterclaims. The District
Court found “there is no substantive difference between Montana and
New York law on the defenses of equitable estoppel” or waiver. In
Montana, a prima facie claim of equitable estoppel is established by six
elements outlined in Turner, { 30. Likewise, in New York, courts
recognize six similar elements to establish equitable estoppel (three
elements concerning the party estopped and three concerning the party
asserting the doctrine). Wallace v. BSD-M Realty, LLC, 142 A.D.38d
701, 703 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). In both Montana and New York, waiver
is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Comerica, 181; Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Products Corp.,

56 N.Y.2d 175, 184 (N.Y. 1982).

{87 As to Anderson’s counterclaims, the District Court found, “[Ilike
Montana, New York recognizes claims for breach of the implied
covenant and breach of implied contract and also has its own consumer
protection statute.” Citing 19 Recordings Ltd. v. Sony Music Enter., 97
F. Supp. 3d 483, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (implied covenant); Maas v.
Cornell Univ., 721 N.E.2d 966, 970 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (implied
contract); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 (footnote omitted). The law
governing Anderson’s defenses and counterclaims are similar in
Montana and New York and the District Court held “application of
New York law to Anderson’s affirmative defenses and claims would not
contravene Montana public policy.”

188 [Il We agree with the District Court. Based on the similarity
between New York and Montana law relating to Anderson’s defenses
and counterclaims we conclude that applying New York law does not
offend Montana public policy. Further examination of the remaining
two factors is not required. Comerica, | 55. The District Court did not
err in concluding Montana law governed HSBC’s judicial foreclosure
action and New York law governed Anderson’s defenses and
counterclaims.

(39 3. Did the District Court err in granting HSBC summary judgment
to foreclose?

40 “The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden
of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Semenza v. Kniss, 2008
MT 238, {1 18, 344 Mont. 427, 189 P.3d 1188 (citation omitted). If met,
“the burden shifts to the non-moving party” to avoid summary
judgment by “establishling] with substantial evidence, as opposed to
mere denial, speculation, or conclusory assertions, that a genuine issue
of material fact does exist or that the moving party is not entitled to
prevail under the applicable law.” Semenza, 118 (quotation and
citations omitted). The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences are to
be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Redies v.
Attys. Liab. Protec. Socy., 2007 MT 9, | 26, 335 Mont. 233, 150 P.3d
930 (quotation and citations omitted).

41 In Montana, “[t]o make a prima facie case for foreclosure, the bank
is obligated to prove the following three elements: (1) the debt of
defendants [Anderson and Limegrove]; (2) non-payment of the debt;
and (3) ownership of the debt by the complaining party [HSBC].” Farm
Credit Bank v. Hill, 266 Mont. 258, 264, 879 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1993)

(citing First Natl. Bank v. Quinta Land and Cattle Co., 238 Mont. 335,
339, 779 P.2d 48, 50 (1989). The District Court concluded HSBC, the
moving party, proved all three elements. At the District Court,
Anderson argued against summary judgment, claiming principles of
equitable estoppel and waiver precluded HSBC’s foreclosure. On
appeal, Anderson argues HSBC failed to prove the second
element—non-payment of the debt—because HSBC waived its right to
payment.’

42 Waiver is a relinquishment of a known right. Nassau, 56 N.Y.2d
at 1269. Anderson argues HSBC waived its right to payment by
continuing to give him extensions. Anderson argues he did not pay off
the loan at the end of the seventh extension because he assumed he
would get another extension. However, evidence provided to the
District Court indicated HSBC only waived its rights as to maturity of
the debt for the defined period indicated in the Forbearance Agreement
and its amendments and had not waived its right to full, eventual
payment. Each amendment to the Forbearance Agreement stated a
specific maturity date, that it was the parties’ “entire agreement,” and
that it could not be modified except by a signed, written agreement.
Anderson acknowledged he was never promised an eighth extension
period. Additionally, email correspondence between Anderson and
Gullo indicated Gullo told Anderson he did not have credit approval to
extend the loan again.

143 [ll The District Court found, “Anderson has not submitted any
evidence which raises a question of material fact as to the second
element, non-payment of the debt. In his deposition testimony,
Anderson acknowledged that, although he was making payments on
the interest, he had not paid off the principal.” The District Court also
found, “Anderson has not provided any evidence that raises a question
of fact as to whether HSBC waived its rights for all time or for any
period of time after the January 15, 2012 maturity date under the
Seventh Forbearance Amendment.” Viewing the evidence in
Anderson’s favor, we conclude no issue of material fact existed to
dispute or excuse Anderson’s non-payment of the debt. The District
Court did not err in granting HSBC summary judgment to foreclose.

* Anderson also claims “HSBC was first to breach the TLA,” but does not explain
how this would excuse Anderson’s payment. It is not this Court’s job to conduct legal
research on Anderson’s behalf, to guess as to his precise position, or to develop legal
analysis that may lend support to that position. See Johansen v. Dept. of Nat. Resources
& Conserv., 1998 MT 51, 24, 288 Mont. 39, 955 P.2d 653 (citations omitted). We do not
consider this argument.

44 4. Did the District Court err in granting HSBC summary judgment
on Anderson's counterclaims?

q45 At the District Court, Anderson asserted three counterclaims. On
appeal, Anderson argues the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment to HSBC regarding only two: breach of the implied covenant.
of good faith and fair dealing and violation of the Montana Consumer
Protection Act. Like at the District Court level, Anderson cites only to
Montana authority to support his contentions on appeal because he
disagrees that New York law governs his counterclaims. However, New
York law governs Anderson’s counterclaims.

446 Anderson argues HSBC breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by acting dishonestly in negotiating and granting
him extensions. On appeal, Anderson does not cite to any specific
dishonest action, instead arguing generally that he had “presented
more than sufficient evidence to show that Gullo’s actions displayed
actual dishonesty and HSBC’s actions were outside of accepted
commercial practices.” The District Court granted HSBC summary
judgment because Anderson failed to present admissible evidence to
raise an issue of fact regarding his breach of implied covenant claim.
47 Evidence considered for summary judgment purposes must be
admissible. Hiebert v. Cascade Co., 2002 MT 233, {| 29, 311 Mont. 471,
56 P.3d 848. A party opposing summary judgment cannot create an
issue of material fact by contradicting prior sworn statements. Kaseta
v. N.W. Agency, 252 Mont. 135, 188, 827 P.2d 804, 806 (1992) (citation
omitted). Referring to its exclusion of Shires’s testimony, the District
Court cited M. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) and held “Anderson cannot rely on
inadmissible evidence to raise a question of fact in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment.” Additionally, the District Court
refused to consider a sworn statement of Anderson because it directly
contradicted an earlier sworn statement.

48 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing “embraces a pledge
that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits
of the contract.” 19 Recordings Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (quoting
Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 87 N.Y.2d 384, 389 (N.Y. 1995)). “The
implied covenant cannot be used to create independent obligations
beyond the contract.” 19 Recordings Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d at 438
(quotation omitted). Anderson does not argue HSBC destroyed or
injured his right to receive the fruits of any of the contracts he entered
into. Anderson’s argument that HSBC breached the implied covenant
by failing to grant an eighth extension must fail because the implied
covenant does not create obligations beyond the contract. See 19

Recordings Ltd., 97 F. Supp. 3d at 488. HSBC was not obligated by the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to amend the
forbearance agreement an eighth time. Therefore, HSBC did not
breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

q49 Anderson also counterclaimed HSBC violated the Montana
Consumer Protection Act, a Montana specific statute. On appeal,
Anderson cites § 30-14-103, MCA, which prohibits “[ulnfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce ....” As set forth above, New York law, not
Montana law, governs Anderson’s counterclaims. The District Court
noted New York law also prohibits “deceptive acts or practices” under
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a). However, Anderson did not allege a
violation of New York law. Anderson does not allege HSBC violated an
applicable law. The District Court did not err in granting HSBC
summary judgment on Anderson’s counterclaims.

CONCLUSION

{50 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
Shires’s expert testimony pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 37(c). The District
Court did not err in its conclusion on choice of law. The District Court
did not err in granting HSBC summary judgment to foreclose and did
not err in granting HSBC summary judgment on Anderson’s
counterclaims.
q51 Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SANDEFUR, SHEA
and RICE concur.

ELAINE MITCHELL, and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

GLACIER COUNTY, and
STATE OF MONTANA,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 16-0716.
Argued August 9, 2017.
Submitted August 22, 2017
Decided October 25, 2017.
2017 MT 258.

389 Mont, 122.

406 P.3d 427.

For Appellants: Lawrence A. Anderson (argued), Attorney at
Law, P.C., Great Falls.

For Appellees: Kirk D. Evenson (argued), Marra, Evenson &
Bell, P.C., Great Falls (Attorney for Glacier County); Gary M. Zadick,
James R. Zadick (argued), Ugrin, Alexander, Zadick & Higgins, P.C.,
Great Falls (Attorneys for State of Montana).

JUSTICE BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Elaine Mitchell, a resident of Glacier County, began paying her
property taxes under protest in 2015 in response to an independent
audit that revealed deficiencies in the County’s budgeting and
accounting practices. Mitchell, on behalf of herself and other County
residents, sued the County over its alleged financial mismanagement
and the State over its failure to take legal action against the County.
The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that Mitchell and
the putative class (collectively Taxpayers) did not have standing to sue
either the County or the State. Taxpayers appeal. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
{2 Taxpayers own real property and pay property taxes in Glacier
County. They have been paying their taxes under protest in response
to a March 2015 independent audit of the County’s finances for fiscal
years 2013 and 2014. The audit identified budget: deficits in numerous
County funds and stated that the County had exceeded its budgetary
authority in many of those funds. A subsequent County Treasurer's
report showed ongoing deficit balances in a number of the County’s

funds.
3 Taxpayers sued Glacier County and the State of Montana, alleging
that both entities had failed to comply with budgeting and accounting
laws. They asked the District Court for numerous forms of relief,
including: (1) permission to prosecute the case as private attorneys
general; (2) a declaration that the County had failed to comply with
generally accepted governmental accounting standards; (3) a
declaration that the County was in violation of laws designed to ensure
“strict accountability” of government finances; (4) a declaration that
County officials who incurred financial obligations in excess of
appropriations were personally liable for the resulting budget deficits;
(5) an order requiring the State to withhold public funds from the
County under the Single Audit Act until the County complied with its
budgeting obligations; (6) an order requiring the State to hold County
officials personally liable for their failure to ensure strict
accountability; (7) an order appointing a receiver for the County; (8)
permission to prosecute the case as a class action; (9) an order allowing
Taxpayers to continue paying their taxes under protest until the
County complied with its budgetary duties; and (10) a determination
that the County violated Taxpayers’ right to know under the Montana
Constitution.
q4 In their Second Amended Complaint, Taxpayers made the
following assertion regarding their alleged injury:
Based on the 2013 and 2014 Audits of the county, and the
deficiencies described therein, it is foreseeable that the county’s
residents and taxpayers would be injured as a result of the State’s
failure to enforce the terms of the Single Audit Act to “insure
strict accountability of all revenues received and money spent” by
the county.
Taxpayers moved for partial summary judgment, and the State and
County challenged Taxpayers’ standing to sue.
{5 The District Court denied Taxpayers’ motion for partial summary
judgment, denied class certification, and dismissed the case for lack of
standing. It explained that Taxpayers had “failed to demonstrate [they
have] suffered a concrete injury to [their] property or to [their]
individual constitutional or statutory rights sufficient to establish
standing under Montana law.” It reasoned that Taxpayers’ “vague,
speculative statement” that it was “foreseeable that the county’s
residents and taxpayers would be injured” was insufficient to establish
the injury requirement for standing. The court noted that the legal
provisions under which Taxpayers alleged injury—Article VIII, Section
12, of the Montana Constitution and the Single Audit Act, Title 2,

chapter 7, Part 5, MCA—did not establish private rights and did not
grant Taxpayers the right to judicial relief. Taxpayers appeal the
court’s dismissal of their case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
{6 Standing is one of several justiciability doctrines that limit
Montana courts to deciding only cases and controversies. Heffernan v.
Missoula City Council, 2011 MT 91, {| 29, 360 Mont. 207, 255 P.3d 80.
The determination of a party’s standing to maintain an action is a
question of law that we review de novo. Heffernan, {| 28.

DISCUSSION

{7 Taxpayers argue that they have standing to sue the County over
its alleged financial mismanagement and to sue the State over its
failure to hold County officials accountable for their unlawful actions.
They contend that the County and the State violated Montana
budgeting and accounting laws and that it is “foreseeable” that these
violations will cause Taxpayers to “suffer additional property tax
burdens because of the County’s unauthorized deficit’ spending,
accounting failures, and disregard of audits.” They assert also that
they should be permitted to pursue this suit under the private attorney
general doctrine and the Declaratory Judgments Act.

q8 Taxpayers seek the following specific remedies on appeal: (1) a
declaration that they may continue to pay taxes under protest until the
County complies with its statutory duties; (2) a declaration that the
County is in violation of the laws that implement the “strict
accountability” provision of the Montana Constitution; (3) an order
requiring the State to withhold public funds from the County under the
Single Audit Act until the County complies with its responsibilities; (4)
an order requiring the State to hold County officials accountable under
the law for their financial mismanagement; (5) an order appointing a
receiver for the County; and (6) a declaration that the County has
violated their right to know under the Constitution.’

q9 Courts lack “power to resolve a case brought by a party without

Although Taxpayers state on appeal that the County violated their constitutional
right to know, they make no argument as to how the County violated this right. “[Wle
are not obligated to develop arguments on behalf of parties to an appeal, nor are we to
guess a party’s precise position, or develop legal analysis that may lend support to his
position.” McCulley v. Am. Land Title Co., 2013 MT 89, { 20, 369 Mont. 433, 300 P.3d
679. We therefore decline to address Taxpayers’ contention that the County violated
their right to know.

standing—i.e., a personal stake in the outcome—because such a party
presents no actual case or controversy.” Heffernan, {| 29. Standing is a
threshold jurisdictional requirement. Heffernan, {| 29. “There are two
elements to standing: the case-or-controversy requirement imposed by
the Montana Constitution, and judicially created prudential limitations
imposed for reasons of policy.” Schoof v. Nesbit, 2014 MT 6, {] 15,
873 Mont. 226, 316 P.3d 831 (citing Heffernan, { 31).

{10 Under the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement, the
plaintiff must show, “at an irreducible minimum,” that he or she “has
suffered a past, present, or threatened injury to a property or civil
right, and that the injury would be alleviated by successfully
maintaining the action.” Schoof, | 15 (citation and internal quotations
omitted); accord Chipman v. Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2012 MT
242, I] 26-27, 366 Mont. 450, 288 P.3d 193. The alleged injury must
be “concrete” rather than “abstract.” Schoof, {| 20 (citation and internal
quotations omitted). To qualify as “concrete,” an injury must be “actual
orimminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Heffernan, 132. In other
words, “the plaintiff must show that he has sustained, or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury ... and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally.” Schoof, {| 20 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
q11 A plaintiffs standing may arise from an alleged violation of a
constitutional or statutory right. See Schoof, {| 23 (holding that
plaintiffs allegation that County Commissioners violated his
constitutional and statutory rights to know and to participate by
adopting a policy at an unannounced meeting satisfied standing
requirements). The Legislature “may enact statutes creating legal
rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury
would exist without the statute.” Heffernan, 1 34 (citation and internal
quotations omitted). If the alleged injury “is premised on the violation
of constitutional and statutory rights, standing depends on whether
the constitutional or statutory provision ... can be understood as
granting persons in the plaintiffs position a right to judicial relief.”
Schoof, | 21 (citation and internal quotations omitted). “[IJn all
events,” however, “the standing requirements imposed by the
Constitution”—i.e., a showing of an alleged injury—“must always be
met.” Heffernan, {| 34.

12 Article VIII, Section 12, of the Montana Constitution provides,
“The legislature shall by law insure strict accountability of all revenue
received and money spent by the state and counties, cities, towns, and
all other local governmental entities.” The Legislature responded to

this directive by enacting the Single Audit Act, §§ 2-7-501 to -522,
MCA, and the Local Government Budget Accounting Act, §§ 7-6-4001
to -4036, MCA.

113 The Local Government Budget Accounting Act requires local
government officials to not “make a disbursement or an expenditure or
incur an obligation in excess of the total appropriations for a fund.”
Section 7-6-4005(1), MCA. Further, “A local government official who
violates subsection (1) is liable for the amount of the excess
disbursement, expenditure, or obligation personally.” Section
7-6-4005(2), MCA. “(T]he governing body, each county or municipal
official, and the district courts are limited to the amount of
appropriations and by the classifications in the annual appropriation
resolution provided for in 7-6-4030 when making disbursements or
expenditures or incurring liabilities.” Section 7-6-4033, MCA.

14 The Legislature enacted the Single Audit Act in part to “improve
the financial management of local government entities with respect to
federal, state, and local financial assistance.” Section 2-7-502(2)(a),
MCA. This Act directs the Montana Department of Administration
(Department) to “prescribe by rule the general methods and details of
accounting for the receipt and disbursement of all money belonging to
local government entities” and to establish a uniform financial
reporting system for such entities. Sections 2-7-503(2), -504(1), MCA.
Local government entities must “conform with the accounting
standards prescribed by the department.” Section 2-7-504(1), MCA.
{115 Under the Single Audit Act, local government entities must
submit to independent financial audits every two years. Section
2-7-503(3), MCA. Once an entity receives a completed audit report, the
entity must file the report with the Department and inform the
Department what corrective actions it plans to take in response to
“deficiencies or recommendations contained in the audit report.”
Sections 2-7-514(1), -515(1), MCA. Local government entities must
“adopt measures to correct the report findings” and submit a
“corrective action plan to the department.” Section 2-7-515(3), MCA.
16 Ifa local government entity fails “to resolve findings or implement
corrective measures,” the Act. provides that such failure “shall result
in the withholding of financial assistance in accordance with rules
adopted by the department pending resolution or compliance.” Section
2-7-515(3), MCA. If an officer or employee of a local government entity
violates the law or fails to perform a duty, that individual “must be
proceeded against by the attorney general or county, city, or town
attorney as provided by law.” Section 2-7-515(4), MCA. “If the county,
city, or town attorney fails or refuses to prosecute the case, the

department may refer the case to the attorney general to prosecute the
case.” Section 2-7-515(4), MCA. The Department also may withhold
financial assistance from or issue fines to a local government entity
that fails to comply with financial reporting requirements. Section
2-7-517(1)-(2), MCA.

{17 Pursuant to the Single Audit Act, the County submitted to an
independent audit of its finances for fiscal years 2018 and 2014. The
audit report begins with a statement of the County’s “Net Position.”
For 2018, the report lists the County’s total assets at $17,356,224, its
total liabilities at $6,349,818, and its resulting “Total net position” at
$11,006,406. The report states further that, for 2014, the County’s total
assets were $16,626,470, its total liabilities were $6,036,077, and its
“Total net position” was $10,590,393. The report also summarizes the
County’s revenues and expenditures for each fiscal year. The County’s
total combined expenditures among its various funds exceeded
revenues by $384,256 in 2013 and by $216,434 in 2014.

18 The audit report proceeds with a discussion of the financial state
of the County’s individual funds. For 2013, the report notes that the
General fund, the Road fund, the Ambulance fund, and “Other
Governmental Funds” had positive fund balances, while the Public
Safety (Law Enforcement) fund, the Glacier County Transit fund, the
Sheriff Law Enforcement Grant, the Community Transportation
Enhancement Program (CTEP), and the DEQ/DOE/ARRA Grant.
posted deficit fund balances. For 2014, the report again identifies the
General fund, the Ambulance fund, and “Other Governmental Funds”
as having positive balances; the Road fund, the Public Safety (Law
Enforcement) fund, CTEP, the Museum fund, the Glacier County
Transit fund, the Sheriff Law Enforcement Grant, the Glacier County
Ambulance Capital fund, and the DEQ/DOE/ARRA Grant all had
deficit balances. The report notes that the funds with deficit balances
“will not have adequate amount of resources to cover expenditures or
pay liabilities” and that the County had exceeded its budgetary
authority with respect to many of those funds. Despite these deficit
balances in many of the County’s individual funds, the report. states
that. the County’s “Total Government Funds” balance stood at
$4,208,721 for 2013 and at $4,038,997 for 2014.

419 The audit report includes findings of “certain deficiencies in
internal control” that the auditors considered “material weaknesses.”
The report highlights instances of different County departments or
funds failing to maintain accurate ledgers or proper records of assets
or cash transactions. The report also discusses the County’s efforts at
compliance with its financial obligations and its attempts to correct the

deficiencies that the audit identified. The report notes that the “County
complies with generally accepted accounting principles” and with
relevant “Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)
pronouncements.” For each fund that the report identifies as having a
negative balance, it contains brief descriptions under the heading,
“How Deficit will be Eliminated,” of the County’s plans to balance that
fund’s budget.
{20 In the “Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs,” the report
notes the County’s budgeting and accounting deficiencies with regard
to specific funds, departments, and financial practices. In response to
each deficiency listed, the report summarizes the County’s planned
response under the heading, “Views of Responsible Officials and
Planned Corrective Action.” For instance, with respect to the report’s
finding that the Ambulance Fund inadequately accounted for its
revenues, the report states, “The County plans to implement policies
and procedures requiring the entry of revenues when report is received
from EMS, and performing a monthly reconciliation to determine if
error exists.” Finally, the audit notes that the “prior audit report
contained twenty five recommendations” for improving the County’s
financial management. The audit reports that, of those twenty-five
recommendations, the County has “implemented” eighteen. The audit
lists seven recommendations as “repeated” from the previous audit,
meaning that the County has yet to implement those
recommendations.
21 Taxpayers assert that the audit demonstrates the County’s
financial mismanagement and their threatened injury from the State
and local entities’ failures to address this mismanagement.

A. Taxpayers’ Standing to Sue the State.
22 Taxpayers argue that they have standing to sue the State because
the State has failed to enforce the law against the County for its
alleged financial mismanagement. They contend that the State has not
fulfilled its fiduciary duty to ensure “strict accountability” under the
Constitution and that the State has abdicated its enforcement
obligations under the Single Audit Act. In Taxpayers’ view, these
alleged failures violate their rights and grant them standing to sue the
State.
23 We have held that “non-self-executing clauses of constitutions are
non-justiciable political questions.” Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist.
No. 6 v. State, 2005 MT 69, {| 15, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d 257
(hereafter Columbia Falls). A constitutional provision that is
“addressed to the Legislature” is “non-self-executing.” Columbia Falls,
q 16. Article VIII, Section 12, of the Montana Constitution addresses

the Legislature and requires it to take action to ensure “strict
accountability.” For this reason, the “strict accountability” clause of
Article VIII, Section 12, is not self-executing. Friends of the Wild Swan
v. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation, 2005 MT 351, {| 25, 330 Mont.
186, 127 P.3d 394 (citing Reep v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 191 Mont. 162,
169, 622 P.2d 685, 689 (1981)). The clause therefore is non-justiciable.
See Columbia Falls, 15.

24 Taxpayers nonetheless argue that, according to our holding in
Columbia Falls, the State’s alleged violations of the legislation
implementing the “strict accountability” clause—namely the Single
Audit Act—grant them standing. In Columbia Falls, we held that the
plaintiffs had standing to sue the State over its administration and
funding of public schools, which allegedly violated Article X, Section
1(3), of the Montana Constitution. Columbia Falls, | 19. That
provision mandates that the Legislature “provide a basic system of free
quality public elementary and secondary schools.” Mont. Const. art. X,
§ 1(3). We explained that this constitutional provision “must be read in
conjunction with Section 1 of Article X, which guarantees a right to
education.” Columbia Falls, 19. The constitutional provision at issue
in Columbia Falls thus implicated the express constitutional right to
an education. Columbia Falls, | 19. We noted that once the Legislature
has “executed” a constitutional provision “that implicates individual
constitutional rights, courts can determine whether that enactment
fulfills the Legislature’s constitutional responsibility.” Columbia
Falls, 17 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

25 By contrast to Columbia Falls, the “strict accountability” clause
does not implicate specific “individual constitutional rights.” Columbia
Falls, 17. It directs the Legislature to pass legislation ensuring strict
accountability of revenue. Mont. Const. art. VIII, § 12. Unlike with
Article X, Section 1(3), which, when “read in conjunction” with the
Constitution’s right to an education, grants individual constitutional
rights, there is no separate individual constitutional right to “strict
accountability” of revenues. Columbia Falls, {| 19. The “strict
accountability” clause therefore cannot “be understood as granting
persons in [Taxpayers’] position a right to judicial relief.” Schoof, J 21.
126 Taxpayers’ reliance on Columbia Falls would be more apropos to
an argument that the Legislature’s enactments under Article VIII,
Section 12—i.e., the Single Audit Act and the Local Government
Budget Accounting Act—failed to “fulfill[ ] the Legislature’s
constitutional responsibility” of ensuring “strict. accountability of all
revenue.” Columbia Falls, || 17; Mont. Const. art. VIII, § 12; see

Friends of the Wild Swan, { 25. Taxpayers do not allege that the
Legislature failed to comply with its constitutional mandate when it
enacted these Acts. Their allegations of violations of the “strict
accountability” clause therefore are not justiciable and do not establish
standing.
27 Taxpayers respond that “the implementing statutes confer rights”
and that the Court must hold the Executive Branch accountable as a
co-equal branch for carrying out its obligations under the Constitution.
Yet the Legislature defines the Executive Branch’s accountability
through its legislative enactments. See, e.g., Friends of the Wild
Swan, | 25. Here, the Legislature enacted laws—such as the Single
Audit Act—that set forth the Executive Branch’s responsibility for
enforcing the “strict accountability” clause of the Constitution. See
§§ 2-7-501 to -522, MCA. That clause does not allow a claim
independent of the statutes that implement it. See Friends of the Wild
Swan, { 25. We thus turn to the legislative enactment implementing
the “strict accountability” clause—the Single Audit. Act—of which
Taxpayers claim the State has run afoul.
128 Taxpayers argue that the State violated the terms of the Single
Audit Act and that they may sue the State to redress these alleged
violations. Taxpayers do not argue that the Single Audit Act expressly
confers private rights of action on individuals in Taxpayers’ position.
See generally §§ 2-7-501 to -522, MCA. They contend instead that the
Act obligated the State to withhold financial assistance from the
County and that they may sue to compel the State to take legal action
against local officials because “every person who suffers detriment from
the unlawful act of another has a remedy” under Montana law. (Citing
§ 27-1-202, MCA.)
29 The Act provides that, when a local government entity fails to
comply with financial reporting requirements, “the department may
issue an order stopping payment of any state financial assistance to
the local government entity.” Section 2-7-517(1), MCA (emphasis
added). It provides further that, after an entity submits a corrective
action plan to the Department, “Failure to resolve findings or
implement corrective measures shall result in the withholding of
financial assistance in accordance with rules adopted by the
department pending resolution or compliance.” Section 2-7-515(3),
MCA. Under the corresponding Department rule,
If the department does not receive an acceptable response or
corrective action plan [from the local government entity] ... it can
request, pursuant to 2-7-515, MCA, that state agencies withhold
payments of financial assistance from the local government entity

pending receipt of an acceptable response or corrective action
plan. The department, after consultation with the appropriate
state agency or agencies, may designate the financial assistance
payments to be withheld.
Admin. R. M. 2.4.409(12).
{30 The plain language of the Single Audit Act gives the Department
authority to review a local government’s audit response and to
determine whether to withhold financial assistance. The Act’s directive
that. an entity’s “[flailure to resolve findings or implement corrective
measures shall result in the withholding of financial assistance” is
followed by language bestowing discretion on the Department to craft
rules determining the circumstances under which such withholding
will occur. Section 2-7-515(3), MCA. The statute does not dictate the
Department’s sufficiency review, does not impose a time limit or
specific requirements for an entity’s submission of a corrective action
plan to the Department, and does not direct the manner in which the
local government entity must “resolve findings or implement corrective
measures.” Section 2-7-515(3), MCA. The Department’s corresponding
rule states that it may withhold financial assistance if it “does not
receive an acceptable response or corrective action plan” from the
County. Admin. R. M. 2.4.409(12). Taxpayers do not challenge the
validity of the rule. Read in conjunction, § 2-7-515(3), MCA, and
Admin. R. M. 2.4.409(12), provide the Department. discretion to
determine whether and how to withhold financial assistance from local
government entities.
31 The Single Audit Act provides:
In cases where a violation of law or nonperformance of duty is
found on the part of an officer, employee, or board, the officer,
employee, or board must be proceeded against by the attorney
general or county, city, or town attorney as provided by law ... If
the county, city, or town attorney fails or refuses to prosecute the
case, the department may refer the case to the attorney general
to prosecute the case.
Section 2-7-515(4), MCA (emphases added). Taxpayers argue that this
language requires the State to prosecute County officials. The plain
language of the statute, however, states that the Department may
refer officials for prosecution if the local attorney declines to prosecute
the case. Section 2-7-515(4), MCA. And prosecuting authorities are
“provided by law,” § 2-7-515(4), MCA, with broad discretion to
determine when to undertake criminal actions, State v. Strong,
2015 MT 251, 7 23, 380 Mont. 471, 356 P.3d 1078 (“{Wle afford
prosecutors ‘broad discretion to determine whether to prosecute an

offender and what offense to charge.’ ”) (quoting State v. Tichenor,
2002 MT 311, { 26, 313 Mont. 95, 60 P.3d 454). The statute thus does
not mandate the Department’s prosecution of local government
officials.
132 JH Although the Single Audit Act grants the Department
authority to take enforcement action against local government entities
that fail to comply with their financial duties, it affords the
Department wide latitude in determining when and under what.
circumstances to take action. See §§ 2-7-515(3), (4), MCA. A party in
Taxpayers’ position cannot compel the State to take discretionary
action. See Doty v. Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices, 2007 MT 341,
| 15, 340 Mont. 276, 173 P.3d 700 (holding that a writ of mandamus
cannot “compel performance of a discretionary function”). Taxpayers
therefore cannot show that their claims against the State assert a
legally cognizable injury to a civil right sufficient to confer standing.
See Schoof, | 15.
133 [EM In addition, § 27-1-202, MCA, does not support Taxpayers’
argument for standing. It reflects established principles of standing by
requiring that a person “suffer! | detriment” in order to be entitled to
a remedy. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that
Taxpayers have not demonstrated that their claimed potential for
increased property taxes in response to the County’s financial situation
constitutes a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing in this case.
B. Taxpayers’ Standing to Sue the County.
34 Taxpayers assert that the County is running a budget deficit and
that it does not have sufficient financial resources to meet its
obligations. They allege that this deficit threatens them with economic
injury because it is “foreseeable” that the County will raise property
taxes to compensate for its imbalanced budget. Taxpayers argue
further that the County has violated statutes that implement the
“strict accountability” clause of the Montana Constitution—including
the Single Audit Act and the Local Government Budget Accounting
Act—and that these violations confer standing on them. Taxpayers
assert that the County’s financial violations are ongoing.
435 Taxpayers argue that our holding in Helena Parents Commission
v. Lewis and Clark County Commissioners , 277 Mont. 367, 922 P.2d
1140 (1996), supports their contention that the County’s financial
deficiencies threaten them with increased property taxes and give
them standing to sue. The plaintiffs in Helena Parents Commission
sued the county and the school district, alleging that the defendants
had improperly invested public funds. Helena Parents Comm’n, 277

Mont. at 370, 922 P.2d at 1142. The plaintiffs’ complaint specifically
alleged that the county’s and the school district’s actions had resulted
in a loss of approximately $5.5 million, as a result of which the local
government would need to raise revenues and reduce public services
in order to compensate for the loss. Helena Parents Comm’n, 277 Mont.
at 370, 922 P.2d at 1142. In holding that the plaintiffs had standing to
sue, we explained that “plaintiffs alleged that the government will
impose tax burdens on them as it seeks to recoup losses and that the
investments will result in a lessening of governmental services. These
allegations of an economic injury satisfy the injury requirement.”
Helena Parents Comm'n, 277 Mont. at 372, 922 P.2d at 1143.

36 This case differs significantly from Helena Parents Commission.
First, the contested issue—and the focus of our analysis in that
case—was on the second requirement for standing: whether the alleged
injury was distinguishable from the injury to the public generally.
Helena Parents Comm’n, 277 Mont. at 372-74, 922 P.2d at 1143-44.
Second, unlike the Helena Parents plaintiffs, Taxpayers did not
specifically allege in their complaints that the County’s financial
mismanagement resulted in a quantifiable amount of overspending
that would require an increase in property taxes. Taxpayers’ second
amended complaint states only that, based on the “deficiencies”
described in the audit, “it is foreseeable that the county’s residents and
taxpayers would be injured.” (Emphasis added.) Taxpayers have not
made concrete allegations that the County squandered a specific
amount of money that it would need to recoup through increased
property taxes. See Helena Parents Comm’n, 277 Mont. at 372,
922 P.2d at 1143. Helena Parents Commission is not analogous.

37 The audit findings would not support such allegations in any
event. The audit report notes the County’s financial deficiencies,
including budget deficits in numerous individual funds and
expenditures in excess of revenues. Yet the report shows that the
County’s “Total Government Funds” balance stood at $4,208,721 for
2013 and at $4,038,997 for 2014. Its “Total net position’—the
difference between its assets and its liabilities—was $11,006,406 for
2013 and $10,590,393 for 2014. The report thus shows that the County
has more than adequate financial resources to meet its liabilities. The
fact that the County has inadequately budgeted for certain funds does
not require it to raise revenue to balance those funds. It conceivably
could use its overall surplus in assets and its excess “Total Government
Funds” balance to redistribute money across its individual funds so
that all are balanced. Whether such actions would comply with State
budgetary laws or recognized accounting principles is not the issue

here. The threshold problem is that Taxpayers cannot show, based on
the audit report, that the threat of the County raising property taxes
is “actual or imminent,” rather than “conjectural or hypothetical.”
Heffernan, {| 32; see Schoof, | 20.

38 Taxpayers contend, however, that the County’s failure to take
corrective action to cure its alleged financial violations supports their
position that tax increases are foreseeable. The report, though,
summarizes the County’s responses to its financial deficiencies and
reflects its continuing efforts to implement proper financial
management strategies. For each deficiency in the County’s funds,
departments, and financial practices that the report identifies, it
describes the County’s planned corrective action. The report states that
County officials were aware of negative cash balances in some of the
County’s major funds and that the County had “implemented a more
conservative plan in making only the essential expenditure
transactions.” It notes further that the County has adopted eighteen
of the twenty-five recommendations from the prior audit report. The
face of the audit demonstrates where the County has taken and
continues to take corrective action to remedy its deficiencies. Again,
the allegations fall short of the concrete injury needed to demonstrate
standing. Taxpayers’ alleged foreseeable economic injury therefore is
insufficient to satisfy the constitutional “case-or-controversy”
requirement for standing to sue the County. Schoof, J 15.

q39 Taxpayers argue further that the County would be immunized for
its alleged violations of the Single Audit Act and the Local Government
Budget Accounting Act if the Court fails to grant them standing to seek
judicial review of the County’s financial mismanagement. Taxpayers
rely in part on our holding in Grossman v. Department of Natural
Resources, 209 Mont. 427, 682 P.2d 1319 (1984), for their contention
that the County’s alleged statutory violations are sufficient to establish
standing. They highlight our statement that “[w]e will recognize the
standing of a taxpayer, without more, to question the state
constitutional validity of a tax or use of tax monies where the issue or
issues presented directly affect the constitutional validity of the state
or its political subdivisions acting to collect the tax, issue bonds, or use
the proceeds thereof.” Grossman, 209 Mont. at 438-39, 682 P.2d at
1825. As the District Court observed, Taxpayers do not “challenge the
constitutional validity of Glacier County’s collection of taxes nor its use
of the funds.” Taxpayers allege that the County committed errors in its
budgeting and accounting of revenues, not that its collection or
expenditures of the funds was unconstitutional. Grossman therefore
does not apply.

140 Instead, the above analysis resolves Taxpayers’ claim. As
Taxpayers implicitly acknowledge, neither the Single Audit Act nor the
Local Government Budget Accounting Act contains any express
provision granting private rights of action to individuals in Taxpayers’
position. But even if the County violated one or more provisions of
these Acts—a question that we do not decide here—Taxpayers have not
shown, “at an irreducible minimum,” that they have “suffered a past,
present, or threatened injury” that “would be alleviated by successfully
maintaining the action.” Schoof, | 15. Without demonstrating a
concrete injury, Taxpayers cannot establish standing to sue for
violations of the Single Audit Act or the Local Government Budget
Accounting Act. See Schoof, 1 20.

C. Taxpayers’ Additional Standing Theories.
41 Finally, Taxpayers invoke the private attorney general doctrine
and the Declaratory Judgments Act as additional bases for standing.
The private attorney general doctrine allows parties in certain cases to
recover attorney fees “when the government, for some reason, fails to
properly enforce interests which are significant to its citizens.” Clark
Fork Coalition v. Tubbs, 2017 MT 184, {] 14, 388 Mont. 205, 399 P.3d
295 (citation and internal quotations omitted). The private attorney
general doctrine entitles a party to seek and recover attorney fees. See
Clark Fork Coalition, {| 15-16. It is not a cause of action. Taxpayers
cite no authority that the doctrine establishes a right to judicial relief
independent of recognized standing requirements.
42 MM The Declaratory Judgments Act provides, “Any
person ... whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by
a statute ... may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of
rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Section 27-8-202,
MCA. We have held that “the requirement of justiciable controversy []
applies to declaratory judgment actions.” Marbut v. Sec’y of State, 231
Mont. 131, 1385, 752 P.2d 148, 150 (1988). As discussed earlier in this
Opinion, Taxpayers have not adequately alleged a concrete, threatened
injury, and therefore have not established standing. Without an
independent ground for standing, they cannot assert a claim under the
Declaratory Judgments Act. See Marbut, 231 Mont. at 135-36, 752 P.2d
at 151 (“[Wle have found no case granting standing to a complainant
or applicant who shows no injury or threatened injury.”). Neither the
private attorney general doctrine nor the Declaratory Judgments Act
grants Taxpayers standing to seek relief in this case.

CONCLUSION

443 The District Court determined correctly that Taxpayers lack
standing to sue either the County or the State. The judgment is
affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES McKINNON, SHEA,
SANDEFUR and RICE concur.

JUSTICE WHEAT, dissenting.
44 I respectfully dissent from the majority. I would reverse and
remand because the Taxpayers have standing to go forward with the
lawsuit against Glacier County. In my opinion, the majority improperly
finds that the Taxpayers have failed to allege an injury.
45 The majority’s attempt to distinguish Helena Parents Comm'n is
unavailing. The majority distinguishes the case at hand from Helena
Parents Commission on two grounds: (1) the foremost issue in Helena
Parents Commission was not whether an alleged injury had occurred,
and (2) the plaintiffs in Helena Parents Commission alleged a
quantifiable injury. Opinion, {| 36. As to the first ground, whether the
issue was the foremost issue in the case is irrelevant. The Court in
Helena Parents Commission concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged
an injury to satisfy the standing requirement. Helena Parents Comm’n,
277 Mont. at 372, 922 P.2d at 1143.
446 As to the second ground, Helena Parents Commission’s conclusion
that the plaintiffs had standing is akin to the case at hand. The Court
stated “plaintiffs alleged that the government will impose tax burdens
on them as it seeks to recoup losses and that the investments will
result in a lessening of governmental services. These allegations of an
economic injury satisfy the injury requirements.” Helena Parents
Comm'n, 277 Mont. at 372, 922 P.2d at 1143. Here, Taxpayers alleged
asimilar economic injury. Taxpayers alleged that the mismanagement
of public funds by the County will impose additional tax burdens on
them or reductions in public services to compensate for any deficits. In
my opinion, based on Helena Parents Commission, the Taxpayers have
alleged an actual threatened injury sufficient to allow them to proceed
with their case.
47 To justify their reasoning, the majority picks and chooses specific
facts from the audits. The majority focuses only on the “Total
Government Funds” balance but does not consider any other part of the
audits. Opinion, {] 37. The majority concludes based on this that the
Taxpayers have not met the injury requirement to have standing. Such
analysis is misleading. For example, the audits revealed “material
weaknesses” and “significant deficiencies” in the County’s management

of public funds that provide public services. The audits specifically
stated, “(flor fiscal year 2014, the County does not have adequate
resources to meet current liabilities causing a deficit fund balance.”
Additionally, the Taxpayers point to eight serious deficiencies
highlighted in the audits that have continued throughout several years
in their complaint.

48 The majority’s conclusions about the validity of the audit should
be left to ajury, not ajudge. Based on the deficiencies found within the
audits, the Taxpayers should be afforded the opportunity to fully
explore and develop the alleged mismanagement of public funds.
Standing requirements should not be barriers to justice. Thus, in my
opinion, based on Helena Parents Commission and the deficiencies
noted in the audits, the Taxpayers have alleged an injury that is not so
speculative that we should reject it outright so as to deny Taxpayers
the opportunity to purse their claims.

49 For these reasons, I dissent.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
DAVID DERELL RASMUSSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0403.
Submitted on Briefs August 30, 2017.
Decided October 31, 2017.

2017 MT 259.

389 Mont. 139.

404 P.3d 719.

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Koan
Mercer, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena.
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,

Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Kirsten
H. Pabst, Missoula County Attorney, Karla Painter, Deputy County
Attorney, Missoula.
JUSTICE BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

{1 David Rasmussen was arrested in Missoula for driving under the
influence of alcohol (DUD. The State charged him with felony DUI
because Rasmussen had four prior DUI convictions. Rasmussen moved
to dismiss, arguing that two of his prior convictions were obtained in
violation of his constitutional right to counsel. The District Court held
a hearing on the motion at which Rasmussen testified as the only
witness. After the hearing, the court denied Rasmussen’s motion to
dismiss on the ground that he had not met his burden of rebutting the
presumption of regularity that attached to the prior convictions.
Rasmussen appeals that ruling. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2 Rasmussen was arrested in April 2015 and charged with felony
DUI under § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. The State based its felony
enhancement on the fact that Rasmussen had four prior qualifying
DUI convictions: on March 4, 1996, March 25, 1996, August 9, 2001,
and April 3, 2008.

43 Rasmussen moved to dismiss the charge. He asserted that the
State had obtained the two March 1996 convictions in violation of his
constitutional right to counsel and that these convictions could not be
used for felony DUI enhancement purposes. Rasmussen submitted an
affidavit with his motion to dismiss. As to the proceedings for the
March 4, 1996 conviction, Rasmussen asserted that “he didnot have an
attorney and that he did not sign a waiver of his right to an attorney
and he did not understand that he had a right to an attorney.” As to
the March 25, 1996 proceedings, Rasmussen’s affidavit stated that “he
did not have an attorney and did not sign any document waiving his
right to an attorney.”

q4 The District Court held a hearing in September 2015 on
Rasmussen’s motion to dismiss. The parties agreed that there were no
records in existence of Rasmussen’s 1996 DUI proceedings, other than
an e-mail from the Missoula Justice Court clerk advising that that
court’s file on Rasmussen’s March 4, 1996 conviction had been
shredded and including some coding notes from the court’s “old
system.” Rasmussen was the only witness at the hearing. His
testimony on direct examination essentially repeated his statements
in the affidavit. As to the March 4, 1996 proceedings, he testified that
he did not have an attorney, that he did not sign a waiver of his right

to an attorney, and that he did not understand that he had a right to
an attorney. With regard to the March 25, 1996 proceedings, he
testified that he did not have an attorney and did not sign a waiver of
his right to an attorney.

q5 At the conclusion of Rasmussen’s direct examination, the State
argued that Rasmussen had failed to meet his burden to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the 1996 convictions. The District Court
asked for cross-examination, noting that it was “reserving [its]
decision” on whether Rasmussen had satisfied his burden until a more
complete record could be developed.

q6 On cross-examination, Rasmussen testified that he knew at the
time he executed his affidavit that no court records existed for the 1996
convictions that could contradict his affidavit. Rasmussen confirmed
that his attorney had secured court records for the August. 2001
conviction, that the records showed that Rasmussen was represented
by counsel in those proceedings, that the 2001 case was the first time
he “ever did need an attorney,” and that he was not challenging the
validity of that conviction. Rasmussen acknowledged that challenging
a prior DUI conviction had “worked for [him] in the past” in a separate
case. He agreed that he was previously convicted of multiple jailable,
traffic-related offenses prior to 1996 and that he was arrested for DUI
in 1983. Rasmussen testified that he remembered the judge, he
remembered “not signing any waiver” of his right to counsel, and he
remembered that he did not have an attorney in the 1996 proceedings.
{7 The prosecutor asked specifically, “Do you agree with me that
that’s a pretty specific memory, right, that you were never advised of
the right to an attorney? That’s pretty specific.” Rasmussen replied,
“I—well, I was never asked to sign anything for an attorney.” The
prosecutor asked Rasmussen for other details about the 1996
proceedings. Rasmussen stated what he recalled about the presiding
judges and then responded, “This has been 20-some years ago.” When
the prosecutor remarked to Rasmussen that it was “curious” that he
remembered specifically that he did not sign a waiver of his right to
counsel but that he could “not remember anything else” from the
proceedings, Rasmussen responded, “I do remember not signing
anything.” The prosecutor again asked, “As to your 1996 justice court
conviction, in your affidavit, you assert that you were never advised of
your right to an attorney; is that right?” Rasmussen responded,
“Correct.” She continued, “You never signed any waiver of your right
to an attorney.” Rasmussen again replied, “Correct.” Rasmussen
confirmed his assertion that, despite having eight prior jailable
offenses before 1996, he never knew that he had the right to counsel.

q8 The day after the hearing, the District Court denied Rasmussen’s
motion to dismiss. In a brief, written order denying the motion, the
court summarized Rasmussen’s and the State’s arguments. The court
then stated that, “[blased on the contents of [Rasmussen’s] Affidavit
and his own testimony during the hearing,” Rasmussen had not met
his burden to rebut the presumption of regularity in his 1996
convictions.

q9 A Missoula County jury subsequently found Rasmussen guilty of
DUI. The court imposed a felony DUI sentence of thirteen months in
the Department of Corrections’ WATCh program, followed by a five-
year suspended commitment to the Department. Rasmussen appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

q10 Whether a prior conviction may be used for sentence enhancement
is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Maine, 2011 MT
90, 1 12, 360 Mont. 182, 255 P.3d 64. However, in determining whether
a prior conviction is invalid, a district court may first need to make
findings of fact, based on oral and documentary evidence presented by
the parties, regarding the circumstances of that conviction.
Maine, 1 12. We will not disturb such findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. Maine, {| 12.

DISCUSSION

{11 Rasmussen contends that the District Court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss. He argues that the court erred as a matter of law by
making a “categorical ruling” that a defendant’s “self-serving”
testimony is never sufficient to satisfy the defendant’s burden to
overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to prior convictions.
Rasmussen contends that a defendant’s testimony is categorically
insufficient only if it is both self-serving and conclusory. His testimony,
although self-serving, was not conclusory in his view because it
described the facts and circumstances of his 1996 convictions. He
asserts that his testimony therefore constituted “affirmative evidence”
sufficient to satisfy his burden.

112 The Due Process Clause of Article II, Section 17, of the Montana
Constitution “protects a defendant from being sentenced based upon
misinformation.” State v. Chaussee, 2011 MT 203, 9, 361 Mont. 433,
259 P.3d 783 (citing State v. Phillips, 2007 MT 117, 1 17, 337 Mont.
248, 159 P.3d 1078). “A constitutionally infirm prior conviction used for
enhancement purposes constitutes ‘misinformation of constitutional
magnitude.’” Chaussee, |] 9 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.

a

443, 447, 92 S. Ct. 589, 592 (1972)). The State therefore “may not use
a constitutionally infirm conviction to support an enhanced
punishment.” Chaussee, | 9 (quoting State v. Okland, 283 Mont. 10, 15,
941 P.2d 431, 434 (1997)).

13 Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution guarantees
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
the assistance of counsel. “The fundamental right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases extends only to those cases in which a sentence of
imprisonment is actually imposed.” State v. Hass, 2011 MT 296, { 20,
363 Mont. 8, 265 P.3d 1221 (citing State v. Walker, 2008 MT 244, J 17,
344 Mont. 477, 188 P.3d 1069)."

14 ‘(AJ rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to [a] prior
conviction, and we presume that the convicting court complied with the
law in all respects.” State v. Krebs, 2016 MT 288, {] 12, 385 Mont. 328,
384 P.3d 98 (citation and internal quotations omitted). “(T]he
defendant has the burden to overcome the presumption of regularity
by producing affirmative evidence and persuading the court, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the prior conviction is
constitutionally infirm.” Chaussee, | 13. “Affirmative evidence” is
evidence showing “that certain facts actually exist or, in the context of
a collateral challenge, that certain facts actually existed at some point
in the past—e.g., that an indigent defendant actually requested the
appointment of counsel but counsel was actually refused.” Hass, 16.
“Ambiguous documents, self-serving and conclusory inferences, and
forcing the State to prove the validity of the prior conviction, when
such validity is already presumed, do not suffice as affirmative
evidence for purposes of meeting the defendant’s burden.” Hass, 4 16
(citing Chaussee, {| 18). If the defendant satisfies his burden, the
burden shifts to the State to rebut the defendant’s evidence.
Chaussee, {| 10. “Nevertheless, the defendant has the ultimate burden
of proof to both produce and persuade ‘by a preponderance of the
evidence that the conviction is invalid.’” State v. Hancock, 2016 MT 21,
] 12, 382 Mont. 141, 364 P.3d 1258 (quoting Maine, {| 12).

{115 We do not agree with Rasmussen’s assertion that the District
Court “made a categorical ruling” in this case. Rasmussen relies on the
following statement from the District Court’s order: “(T]he State
argues that the Montana Supreme Court has stated that ‘[s]elf-serving

‘Phere is no evidence in the record revealing whether Rasmussen was sentenced
to jail for his 1996 DUI convictions. The Presentence Investigation Report indicates the
disposition simply as “Convicted per driving history.”

statements by the defendant that his or her conviction is infirm are
insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity and bar the use
of the conviction for enhancement.’” (Quoting State v. Chesterfield,
2011 MT 256, {| 27, 362 Mont. 243, 262 P.3d 1109) (emphasis added).
Contrary to Rasmussen’s assertion, this statement is not an expression
of the court’s rationale for its decision. Rather, it is part of the court’s
summary of the arguments. The court’s order did not adopt the State’s
reasoning. Instead, following its summary, the court explained:
During the September 14, 2015, hearing Defendant restated the
contents of his Affidavit and the State had the opportunity to
cross-examine Defendant regarding his Affidavit’s contents. Based
on the contents of Defendant’s Affidavit and his own testimony
during the hearing, this Court has determined that Defendant has
not met his burden to overcome the “presumption of regulalrity]
by producing affirmative evidence and persuading the Court, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior convictions are
constitutionally infirm.”
(Quoting Chesterfield, | 20). The plain language of the order
demonstrates that the court based its decision on the evidence before
it and not on a categorical rule that a defendant’s testimony could
never satisfy the burden to rebut the presumption of regularity.
16 We are not convinced from the evidence that the court clearly
erred in finding that Rasmussen failed to satisfy his burden.
Rasmussen testified that he knew prior to executing his affidavit that
no court records existed from his 1996 convictions that could contradict.
his assertions of constitutional violations. His testimony established
that he remembered certain details of the 1996 proceedings—namely,
that he did not sign a waiver of his right to counsel—but that he could
not remember other details of the proceedings. Although Rasmussen
asserted that he did not know at the time of his March 4, 1996
proceedings that he had a right to an attorney, he acknowledged that
he had an extensive criminal history prior to those proceedings that
included jailable offenses—for which he may have had a right. to
counsel. Rasmussen’s affidavit and testimony could have led the court
reasonably to question his credibility and the probative force of his
statements. It was “exclusively within the province” of the District
Court to determine Rasmussen’s credibility, and “we will not reweigh
the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Nixon, 2012 MT
316, { 21, 367 Mont. 495, 291 P.3d 1154.
117 Even more, Rasmussen did not specifically allege that he did
not waive his right to counsel. Rasmussen asserted only that he did not
sign a waiver of his right to counsel. In State v. Anderson, 2001 MT

a s

188, 306 Mont. 243, 32 P.3d 750, Anderson claimed in part that he had
been denied his right to counsel in a prior DUI proceeding. He
submitted as evidence a copy of a disposition form that failed “to make
any notation or indication that [he] at any time waived his right to
counsel.” Anderson, {| 21. We explained,
The fact that the disposition form fails to show that [Anderson]
waived his right to counsel ... is not direct evidence that Anderson
was denied his right to an attorney ... it is not proof of anything.
It is absence of proof. And it is wholly insufficient to shift the
burden of proof to the State ... Simply submitting a document that.
does not prove regularity does not meet this burden [of showing
irregularity].
Anderson, {| 22. We have explained similarly that “the lack of evidence
showing that the prior conviction is valid is not proof, by affirmative
evidence, that the conviction is invalid.” Chaussee, {] 25.
18 HJ Rasmussen’s testimony that he did not sign a waiver of his
right to counsel does not show that he did not waive his right to
counsel. Although a defendant may waive his right to counsel only if
such waiver is made “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,”
Chesterfield, {| 16, there is no requirement that a defendant sign a
document affirming his waiver of this right. Asserting that he did not
sign a waiver of his right to counsel “is not proof of anything. It is
absence of proof.” Anderson, {| 22. Rasmussen’s testimony that he did
not sign a waiver of his right thus does not constitute “affirmative
evidence” “that the prior conviction is constitutionally infirm.”
Chaussee, {] 13.
19 Finally, Rasmussen argues that our holdings in State v. Howard,
2002 MT 276, 312 Mont. 359, 59 P.8d 1075, and State v. Walker,
2008 MT 244, 344 Mont. 477, 188 P.3d 1069, establish that his
“unequivocal” sworn testimony is sufficient to satisfy his burden of
rebutting the presumption of regularity in his 1996 convictions. In
Howard, we held that the defendant’s prior conviction was
constitutionally infirm in part because the defendant asserted in an
affidavit, “I was not advised of my right to court-appointed counsel
before I entered my plea of guilty, nor did I waive my right to court-
appointed counsel.” Howard, {|] 4, 18. We held that these statements
constituted “direct evidence” sufficient to satisfy the defendant’s
burden. Howard, {| 18. In Walker, the defendant filed an affidavit
stating that she was not advised “that if she could not afford a lawyer,
one would be appointed to represent her.” Walker, {] 11. We held that
Walker met her burden of showing that her prior convictions were

“irregular.” Walker, {| 14.

{20 Our decision in Maine expressly modified the framework of
analysis applied in Howard and Walker by imposing the burden on the
defendant to prove by affirmative evidence that the prior conviction
was constitutionally infirm. Maine, | 34. Unlike the defendants in
Howard and Walker, Rasmussen did not make “unequivocal”
statements that he was not advised of his right to counsel or that he
did not waive that right. Howard, {| 13; Walker, 9 14. Rasmussen
asserted only that he was not aware of his right to counsel during the
March 4, 1996 proceedings and that he did not sign a waiver of that
right in either of the proceedings. He reiterated on direct examination
that, as to the March 4, 1996 proceedings, he did not “understand that
[he] had a right to an attorney.” Although he answered affirmatively
to one of the prosecutor’s questions misquoting a statement in his
affidavit, his allegations do not amount to “unequivocal” testimony
sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity that attached to his
prior convictions. Howard, | 13; Walker, 14. Howard and Walker are
therefore distinguishable.

21 The District Court based its decision on the evidence before it, and
that evidence did not show affirmatively that the 1996 convictions
violated Rasmussen’s constitutional right to counsel. The court’s
finding that Rasmussen had not satisfied his evidentiary burden to
rebut the presumption of regularity in his 1996 convictions was not
clearly erroneous. See Maine, | 12. Its determination that those
convictions could be used for felony enhancement purposes was correct.

CONCLUSION
122 The District Court’s judgment is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT, McKINNON,
SHEA, SANDEFUR and RICE concur.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
BRUCE A. ERICKSON,
Deceased.

No. DA 17-0100.
Submitted on Briefs August 9, 2017.
Decided October 31, 2017.
Rehearing Denied December 5, 2017
2017 MT 260.

389 Mont. 147.

406 P.3d 1.

For Appellant: W. Bjarne Johnson, Steven M. Johnson, Eric
B. Biehl, Church Harris Johnson & Williams PC, Great Falls.

For Appellee, Cross-Appellant and Personal Representative:
David M. Wagner, Griffin B. Stevens, Crowley Fleck PLLP,
Bozeman.

For Appellees: John T. Jones, Kathryn J. Maehl, Cole A.
Derks, Moulton Bellingham PC, Billings.

JUSTICE WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 This appeal comes from the District Court’s denial of a motion for
relief from a judgment or order under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

Issue One: Did the District Court err in determining M. R. Civ. P.

60(b) did not apply?

Issue Two: Did the District Court err in denying Gail’s motion to

modify a formal testacy order under § 72-3-317(4), MCA?

Issue Three: Did the District Court err in denying Gail’s request for
imposition of a constructive trust?

Issue Four: Is the Personal Representative entitled to attorney fees
and costs pursuant to § 72-12-206, MCA?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
q3 Bruce A. Erickson (Decedent) died on November 18, 2015. At that
time, he was married to Gail Erickson (Gail); he had two grown
children, Tyler Erickson (Tyler) and Taylor Wortman. Gail is not the
biological parent of either child. Decedent executed a Last Will and
Testament on May 2, 1995. After his first wife died, Decedent executed
a Codicil to the Last Will and Testament on February 5, 2008. The
Codicil nominated Tyler to act as Personal Representative of the
Estate.
q4 On December 16, 2015, Gail filed an Application for Informal
Appointment of Personal Representative in Intestacy. The District
Court Clerk granted Gail’s application and appointed her Personal
Representative.
{5 On December 18, 2015, Tyler filed a Petition for Formal Probate
of Will, Determination of Testacy and Heirs, and Appointment of
Personal Representative. At that time, the Last Will and Testament.
and Codicil were submitted collectively as the Decedent’s Will. The
District Court issued an order setting a hearing on the Formal Petition
for January 26, 2016, and directed anyone who intended to contest the
Will and/or object to the appointment of Tyler as the Personal
Representative was required to give written notice to the attorneys and
the District Court no later than January 5, 2016. A copy of the order
was provided to Gail personally, as well as counsel.
q6 On January 22, 2016, Gail’s counsel notified Tyler’s counsel that
Gail would not object to the probate of the Will and Codicil, the
appointment of Tyler as Personal Representative, or the determination
that Montana is the situs for the probate. On January 25, 2016, the
day before the hearing, Tyler’s counsel provided Gail’s counsel with
drafts of a Proposed Order and Letters of Appointment that would be
presented to the Court for issuance. That same day Gail’s counsel sent
an email to Tyler’s counsel providing him with a draft of “the Idaho
document I mentioned,” told him that § 72-3-314, MCA, addresses the
probate of more than one document, and that the parties could discuss
it at the hearing.
q7 + Atthe January 26, 2016 hearing, Gail’s counsel advised the court
that he had reviewed the Proposed Order and Letters of Appointment
from Tyler’s counsel, and had no objection. No party raised any issues

related to “the Idaho document” (hereinafter referred to as the 6 Point
Document). Thus, without objection, the District Court issued an Order
of Formal Probate and appointed Tyler as Personal Representative.
Gail did not appeal the order.

q8 Almost five months later, on June 3, 2016, Gail’s counsel filed a
Verified Creditor’s Claim asserting the 6 Point Document is a written
contract by the Decedent to make payments of money and provide
benefits to or on behalf of Gail, and that it is a contract to make a will
or devise that provides for said payment of money and provision of
benefits. On August 16, 2016, Gail’s counsel filed a Petition for Elective
Share, Homestead Allowance, Exempt Property, and Family
Allowance. On September 15, 2016, Tyler as the Personal
Representative, filed a Notice of Disallowance of the Verified Creditor’s
Claim.

q9 OnSeptember 16, 2016, Gail obtained new counsel. On November
14, 2016, Gail’s counsel petitioned the District Court to allow her
creditor claim. However, on November 21, 2016, before the court could
rule on that motion, Gail’s counsel filed a Motion for Relief From
Formal Testacy Order entered 1/26/2016; or alternatively for
Imposition of Constructive Trust. Gail’s counsel argued the 6 Point
Document should have been included in the Order of Formal Probate
of the Will. The issue was fully briefed. On January 9, 2017, Gail
withdrew her creditor claim against the Estate.

10 On January 18, 2017, the District Court denied Gail’s Motion for
Relief From Formal Testacy Order entered 1/26/2016; or alternatively
for Imposition of Constructive Trust. Gail appeals the denial of her
Motion for Relief. We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

11 We review a district court’s ruling denying a motion to alter or
amend its judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), M. R. Civ. P., for an abuse
of discretion. Heller v. Gremaux, 2002 MT 199, 4] 7, 311 Mont. 178, 53
P.3d 1259.

12 The interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of law,
and we review whether the district court interpreted and applied a
statute correctly de novo. State v. Triplett, 2008 MT 360, 7 13, 346
Mont. 383, 195 P.3d 819.

13 This Court reviews factual findings to determine whether they are
clearly erroneous. Roland v. Davis, 2013 MT 148, { 21, 370 Mont. 327,
302 P.3d 91. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported
by substantial evidence, if the court misapprehended the effect of the
evidence or if, upon reviewing the record, this Court is left with the

definite and firm conviction that the district court made a mistake.
Roland, 21.

DISCUSSION
14 Issue One: Did the District Court err in determining M. R. Civ. P.
60(b) did not apply?
15 Gail asserts that M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) governs her January 26,
2016 Motion for Relief From Formal Testacy Order, or alternatively for
Imposition of Constructive Trust, not § 72-3-317, MCA. Gail argues the
District Court erred when it determined that M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) does
not apply to formal testacy orders because it is inconsistent with § 72-
8-317, MCA.
{16 Rule 60(b) applies generally to final judgments, orders, or
proceedings, while § 72-3-317, MCA, applies specifically to formal
testacy orders. Rule 1 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure states
“these rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings
in the district courts of the state of Montana, including probate
proceedings, unless specifically provided to the contrary in the Uniform
Probate Code.” Montana adopted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) in
1947 as codified in § 72-1-101, MCA, et seq. (formerly R.C.M., 91A-1-
101(1947)). The UPC, § 72-1-207, MCA, provides that “unless
specifically provided to the contrary in this code or unless inconsistent
with its provisions, the rules of civil procedure, including the rules
concerning vacation of orders and appellate review, govern formal
proceedings under this code.”
117 [ll Therefore, the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all
probate actions and proceedings, unless specifically provided to the
contrary in the UPC or the Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent
with the provisions of the UPC.
18 For the case at hand, the UPC, § 72-3-317, MCA, specifically
provides that a formal testacy order is “final as to all persons with
respect to all issues.” When a petitioner seeks relief from a formal
testacy order, their petition is “subject to appeal and subject to
vacation as provided in 72-3-318 and this section.” Section 72-3-317,
MCA. The plain language of the statute allows for an appeal or
vacation from a formal testacy order only under the terms provided in
§§ 72-3-317 and -318, MCA.
119 [ll Section 72-3-317, MCA, is inconsistent with M. R. Civ. P. 60
because no petition for probate of any other instrument may be
entertained unless the final testacy order is first appealed or vacated
as stated in § 72-3-317, MCA.

20 Gail cites a list of non-jurisdictional UPC cases asserting that final
testacy orders are subject to collateral attack under M. R. Civ. P.
60(b).' After review of these cases, we disagree with their application
to the case at hand. Under the facts of this case, a petition for relief
from a formal testacy order based on a later offered will, are
entertained under §§ 72-3-317 and -18, MCA.

21 [Ml The District Court properly interpreted M. R. Civ. P. 60 and
§ 72-3-317, MCA, correctly determining that Gail’s motion for relief
from the formal testacy order must be considered under § 72-3-317,
MCA. Therefore, we decline to address Gail's analysis of the motion for
relief from formal testacy order under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

22 Issue Two: Did the District Court err in denying Gail’s motion to
modify a formal testacy order under § 72-3-317(4), MCA?

23 In the District Court, Gail asserted § 72-3-317(4), MCA, allows for
modification of the Final Probate Order; thereby, allowing the 6 Point
Document to be included in the order as a codicil to the will. Gail
asserted in her motion and in her appeal that her previous counsel was
grossly negligent regarding the introduction of the 6 Point Document
to the District Court, that previous counsel was negligent in their
unfamiliarity with Montana law, and that the Estates’ Personal
Representative breached his fiduciary duties by failing to present the
6 Point Document at the January 26, 2016 hearing. Gail asserted this
created an appropriate circumstance to provide relief under § 72-3-
817(4), MCA. The District Court denied Gail’s claim, finding § 72-3-
317(4), MCA, cannot be read separately from section 1 and Gail failed
to satisfy either condition required in section 1 justifying relief. On
appeal, Gail asserts this was error, as § 72-3-317(4), MCA, clearly
stands alone as an avenue of relief, separate and apart from the
statutes other sections.

24 When we interpret a statute, this Court’s purpose is to implement
the objective the Legislature sought to achieve. In re Estate of Martelle,

1 See Mathieson v. Hubler , 92 N.M. 381, 588 P.2d 1056 (N.M. App. 1978); In re
Bourne, 99 N.M. 694, 662 P.2d 1361 (N.M. App. 1983) (judgement was not final); In re
Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah 1986) (argument denied based on failure to
file timely motion); In re Estate of Pepper, T11 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985) (The Utah
Supreme Court while interpreting a separate and distinct statute, § 75-3-1001, UCA,
Formal proceedings terminating administration—Testate or intestate—Order of general
protection, did state “no reason ... appears why such an order should be treated any
differently than any other final order or judgment of the court which is always subject
to a timely Rule 60(b) attack.” However, that interpretation of a different statute is not
relevant here.)

2001 MT 194, {] 18, 306 Mont. 253, 32 P.3d 758. The court’s role is to
ascertain and declare what is in “terms or in substance contained” in
a statute, and not to insert what is omitted or omit what is inserted.
Section 1-2-101, MCA; State v. Cooksey, 2012 MT 226, {| 32, 366 Mont.
346, 286 P.3d 1174. The intent of a statute must be ascertained from
a holistic survey of the statute’s text, language, and structure. State v.
Triplett, 2008 MT 360, {| 25, 346 Mont. 383, 195 P.3d 819. Legislative
intent must first be determined from the plain words used in the
statute, and when that is possible, no other means of interpretation are
proper. City of Missoula v. Cox, 2008 MT 364, {| 9, 346 Mont. 422, 196
P.3d 452. Courts may not disregard the plain language of a statute.
Bank of America v. Ivey, 2010 MT 131, {| 10, 356 Mont. 388, 234 P.3d
867.
25 Section 72-3-317, MCA, provides:
Subject to appeal and subject to vacation as provided in 72-3-318
and this section, a formal testacy order under 72-3-313 through 72-
3-316, including an order that the decedent left no valid will and
determining heirs, is final as to all persons with respect to all
issues concerning the decedent’s estate that the court considered or
might have considered incident to its rendition relevant to the
question of whether the decedent left a valid will and to the
determination of heirs, except that:

(1) the court shall entertain a petition for modification or
vacation of its order and probate of another will of the decedent if
it is shown that the proponents of the later-offered will:

(a) were unaware of its existence at the time of the earlier
proceeding; or

(b) were unaware of the earlier proceeding and were given no
notice of the proceeding, except by publication;

(2) if intestacy of all or part of the estate has been ordered, the
determination of heirs of the decedent may be reconsidered if it is
shown that one or more persons were omitted from the
determination and it is also shown that the persons:

(a) were unaware of their relationship to the decedent;

(b) were unaware of the decedent’s death; or

(c) were given no notice of any proceeding concerning the
decedent’s estate, except by publication;

(8) a petition for vacation under either subsection (1) or (2)
above must be filed prior to the earlier of the following time limits:

(a) if a personal representative has been appointed for the
estate, the time of entry of any order approving final distribution
of the estate or, if the estate is closed by statement, 6 months after

the filing of the closing statement;

(b) whether or not a personal representative has been
appointed for the estate of the decedent, the time prescribed by
72-3-122 when it is no longer possible to initiate an original
proceeding to probate a will of the decedent;

(c) 12 months after the entry of the order sought to be vacated;

(4) the order originally rendered in the testacy proceeding may
be modified or vacated, if appropriate under the circumstances, by
the order of probate of the later-offered will or the order
redetermining heirs. (Emphasis added.)

126 [I The above quoted statute is clear that a formal testacy order
is final with respect to all issues concerning the decedent’s estate,
including those issues which the court considered or might have
considered, relevant to the question of whether the decedent left a
valid will. It is equally clear that the court will not “entertain” a
modification or vacation request unless the petitioner can show she
was either unaware of the later-offered wills existence at the time of
the earlier proceeding or was unaware of the earlier proceeding and
was given no notice of the proceeding. Section 72-3-317(1), MCA. By
the terms of the statute, a court cannot issue an order of probate of a
later-offered will without the proponent of such a document satisfying
either burden of § 72-3-317(1), MCA.

27 The District Court’s interpretation of the statute is correct; §§ 72-
8-317(1)(a) and (4), MCA, are meant to be read together. Section 72-3-
317, MCA, authorizes a modification or vacation from a formal testacy
order under certain circumstances. Section 72-3-317(1)(a), MCA,
requires the court to entertain a petition for modification or vacation,
when the proponent of a later-offered will of the decedent, was either
“anaware of its existence at the time of the earlier proceeding” or
“anaware of the earlier proceeding and were given no notice of the
proceeding, except by publication.” Then, if the required showing is
sufficient under § 72-3-317(1), MCA, the court may modify or vacate
the original probate order through the order of probate of the later-
offered will, if appropriate. Section 72-3-317(4), MCA.

128 El Gail does not assert she would be successful under § 72-3-317,
MCA, if it required a showing of either condition in § 72-3-317(1),
MCA. The factual record shows Gail and her counsel were both aware
of the 6 Point Document and the hearing. The District Court correctly
determined that Gail had failed to carry the burden necessary to seek
relief under § 72-3-317(4), MCA.

29 Issue Three: Did the District Court err in denying Gail’s request for
imposition of a constructive trust?

430 Gail argues the Court should impose a constructive trust for her
benefit; without imposition of a constructive trust, the decedent’s
children would be unjustly enriched and the decedent’s express
testamentary intent would be denied. The District Court determined
that based on the facts in this case, Gail is not entitled to the equitable
remedy of a constructive trust.

31 In her petition to be the Personal Representative, Gail
represented to the District. Court that she “exercised reasonable
diligence to determine if Decedent died testate and is unaware of any
unrevoked testamentary instrument relating to property having situs
in Montana.” Gail filed a creditor claim against the Estate based on the
6 Point Document. When her claim was denied, Gail then sought to
have the Formal Order of Probate modified or vacated to include the
6 Point Document based on its testamentary intent. The court denied
Gail’s claim, finding Gail created the error of which she complains
based on her legal strategy. The Decedent’s children and Personal
Representative oppose the imposition of a constructive trust.

32 A constructive trust serves as a proper remedy to unjust
enrichment. A constructive trust arises when a person holding title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the
ground that the person holding title would be unjustly enriched if the
holder were permitted to retain it. Section 72-38-123, MCA. However,
a party cannot expect equitable relief unless she comes into court with
clean hands. Schindler v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 2011 MT 129, 1] 24,
860 Mont. 528, 254 P.3d 583. Gail had knowledge of and exclusive
control of the 6 Point Document when she filed her temporary intestacy
petition and represented to the District Court that she was “unaware
of any unrevoked testamentary instrument.” The District Court and
the Personal Representative for the Estate relied on Gail's
representations when creating the Probate Order and Gail did not
object to the Probate Order. Gail cannot now expect an equitable
remedy in order to avoid the alleged wrong, the handling of the 6 Point
Document.

133 [Ef The District Court found sufficient grounds to deny the
imposition of a constructive trust. The District Court did not
misapprehend the facts, nor did the District Court err in its
interpretation of law. The District Court’s denial of an imposition of a
constructive trust was not clearly erroneous.

34 Issue Four: Is the Personal Representative entitled to attorney fees
and costs pursuant to § 72-12-206, MCA?

35 The Personal Representative (PR) seeks attorney fees under § 72-
12-206, MCA. Gail asserts attorney fees should be denied because Gail

did not contest the “validity or probate of the will,” the District Court
impliedly denied an award of attorney fees, and that the PR’s request
for attorney fees is untimely.
436 A motion for attorney fees filed after entry of a judgment is
treated as a motion to alter or amend a judgment. Associated Press v.
Crofts, 2004 MT 120, {| 36, 321 Mont. 193, 89 P.3d 971. M. R. Civ. P.
59(d) controls a motion to alter or amend a judgment and the motion
must be filed within twenty-eight days of entry of judgment. However,
once an appeal is filed, the District Court no longer has jurisdiction
over a case. Powder River Cnty. v. State, 2002 MT 259, I] 27-28, 312
Mont. 198, 60 P.3d 357. “After notice has been filed, the District Court
retains jurisdiction only to correct clerical errors and jurisdiction over
ancillary matters, as well as some jurisdiction over matters involving
appeal such as undertaking of costs, stay of judgment, and matters
involving transcript on appeal.” Powder River Cnty., || 27 (citing
Powers Mfg. Co. v. Leon Jacobs Enterprises, 216 Mont. 407, 411, 701
P.2d 1377, 1380 (1985)).
187 Here, the PR filed the Notice of Entry of Order on January 27,
2017; the PR had until February 24, 2017, to file his motion for
attorney fees. However, Gail filed an appeal in this Court on February
16, 2017, before the twenty-eight days to file a M. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
motion to amend or alter the judgment seeking attorney fees expired.
Thus, the PR was prevented from filing a motion to amend or alter
seeking attorney fees in the District Court after February 16.
38 However, after an opposing party files a timely appeal, the
petitioner may file a cross-appeal within fifteen days; which is exactly
what the PR did here. M. R. App. P. 4; Neumann v. Rogstad, 232 Mont.
24, 29, 757 P.2d 761, 765 (1988). Gail filed her appeal on February 16,
2017, the PR filed his cross-appeal on March 1, 2017. The PR’s
cross-motion for attorney fees is properly before this Court.
439 Next, we must determine if the PR is entitled to attorney fees
under § 72-12-206, MCA, which provides:
Fees and expenses—by whom paid. When the validity or
probate of a will is contested through court action, the attorney
fees and costs, as provided in 25-10-201, incurred in defending the
validity or probate of the will must be paid by the party contesting
the validity or probate of the will if the will in probate is
confirmed.
40 HJ The PR argues that he is entitled to fees pursuant to the
statutory criteria: he defended the probate of a contested will, and the
will was confirmed. Gail asserts that she did not contest the probate of

a will, but instead moved for relief from the Formal Probate Order. We
disagree. While Gail did not initially contest the probate of the Will
and Codicil, after her creditor’s claim was denied, Gail challenged the
Final Probate Order. Gail’s motion to amend or alter is predicated on
the argument that the current probate of the Will and Codicil is
incorrect and that the 6 Point Document is a second codicil. The PR
contested the 6 Point Document as a second codicil while defending the
probate of the Will and Codicil. In re Estate of Edwards, 2017 MT 93,
{1 85-90, 387 Mont. 274, 393 P.3d 639. The PR defended the probate
of the Will pursuant to Gail’s motion, and the Will and Codicil in
probate were confirmed. If a party successfully defends a will, he is
entitled to both attorney fees and costs. In re Estate of Edwards, { 87.
The PR is entitled to attorney fees and costs under § 72-12-206, MCA.

CONCLUSION

41 The District Court’s interpretation of the statutes is correct.
Under the facts of this case, a motion for relief from a formal testacy
order must be considered under § 72-3-317, MCA. Section 72-3-317(1),
(1)(a) and (4), MCA, are meant to be read together in order to
determine if a proponent of a later-offered will can modify or vacate the
final probate order. Gail failed to make the necessary showing under
§ 72-3-317(1), MCA, to justify relief from the final probate order. The
District Court correctly determined that Gail had failed to carry the
burden necessary to seek relief under § 72-3-317(4), MCA. The District
Court’s denial of an imposition of a constructive trust was not clearly
erroneous. The Personal Representative is entitled to costs and fees
under § 72-12-206, MCA.
142 Affirmed and remanded to the District Court for determination of
reasonable costs and fees.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES McKINNON, SHEA and
RICE concur.

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CITY OF BILLINGS, ex rel.,
JAMES JOSEPH HUERTAS,
Relator and Petitioner,
v.
BILLINGS MUNICIPAL COURT,
The Honorable Sheila R. Kolar,
and
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
the Honorable Michael G. Moses,
Respondents.

No. DA 17-0084.
Submitted on Briefs August 23, 2017.
Decided October 31, 2017.

2017 MT 261
389 Mont. 158.

404 P.3d 709.

159

For Petitioner: Lisa J. Bazant, Attorney at Law, Billings.
For Respondents: Brent Brooks, Billings City Attorney,
Benjamin J. Halverson, Deputy Billings City Attorney, Billings.

OPINION AND ORDER.

JUSTICE McKINNON delivered the Opinion and Order of the
Court.
1 Petitioner James Joseph Huertas (Huertas) requests this Court
exercise supervisory control over the Billings Municipal Court and
conclude the Municipal Court placed Huertas in double jeopardy when
it granted the City’s motion for a mistrial and subsequently scheduled
a new trial.
{2 Montana Constitution, Article VIL, Section 2(2), grants this Court
general supervisory control over all other courts. This Court exercises
supervisory control on a case-by-case basis, as it is an extreme remedy.
M. R. App. P. 14(3). Supervisory control is appropriate “when urgency
or emergency factors exist making the normal appeal process
inadequate, when the case involves purely legal questions, and when
one or more of” three enumerated circumstances exist. M. R. App. P.
14(3). We accepted supervisory control over this matter on March 22,
2017, concluding the double jeopardy issue was appropriate for
supervisory control pursuant to Keating v. Sherlock, 278 Mont. 218,
924 P.2d 1297 (1996).
q3 We reverse the Municipal Court’s order denying Huertas’s motion

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to dismiss and address the following issue:
Did the Municipal Court abuse its discretion in declaring a
mistrial and err in concluding that double jeopardy did not bar
Huertas’s retrial?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{4 The City of Billings (City) charged Huertas with Partner or
Family Member Assault (PFMA) following an incident between
Huertas and alleged victim L.H. The Municipal Court set Huertas’s
trial for January 20, 2017, at which time a jury was impaneled and
sworn. During its case-in-chief, the City called L.H. to the stand. The
City asked L.H. if she wanted to be there and she replied that she did
not. When asked, “Are you only here because of a court-ordered
subpoena?” she responded, “I am,” and indicated that she was unhappy
testifying. The City did not inquire further into the subpoena and
proceeded with its direct examination.
{5 After the City completed its questioning of L.H., defense counsel
Lisa Bazant (Bazant) began cross-examining L.H. During cross-
examination, the following exchange occurred:

[Bazant]: Did members of the Billings Police Department try to

get you to testify a particular way? ... Were you visited by the

Billings Police Officer yesterday?

[L.H.]: Yes.

[Bazant]: And did that officer attempt to influence your testimony

today?

(L.H.]: Yes.

[Bazant}: Influence you in a way that it would be more toward the

prosecution’s—

[City]: I'd like to object. May we approach?
The Judge allowed counsel to approach, and after an inaudible
conversation excused the jury but asked the parties to remain. The jury
left the courtroom and L.H., still under oath, explained the interaction
at issue. L.H. testified that the night before trial, at approximately
11:00 p.m., Billings Police Officer LaMantia (Officer LaMantia) served
her a subpoena requiring her to appear at the trial as one of the City’s
witnesses. L.H. said her roommate let Officer LaMantia into their
home and Officer LaMantia sat next to L.H. on the couch.
{6 Before L.H. explained more, the Judge asked the City if it knew
about the interaction. The City said the information was a “surprise”
that had a “significant impact” on its case and relayed two main
concerns. First, if what L.H. alleged was true, Officer LaMantia

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engaged in witness tampering and he needed the opportunity to
respond to L.H.’s allegations. Second, if the allegations were true, the
City needed to declare a mistrial because the City was unfairly
prejudiced by the information. If the trial moved forward after the jury
heard L.H.’s testimony, the City needed to investigate Officer
LaMantia’s actions and contemplated that it may have to dismiss the
case. On the other hand, the City observed that if the case moved
forward and Huertas was acquitted, it would then be “too late” to
address the allegations. The City concluded it was unable to proceed
with the new, very significant, information because it needed to
interview Officer LaMantia and L.H.
{7 Bazant agreed that the information had a significant impact on
the case and expressed concern that L.H., the City’s own witness, may
have been inappropriately influenced by an officer. The Judge
responded that she was “not going to put the City Prosecutor” in an
unfavorable light because “[hle didn’t know.” During this discussion
both Bazant and the Judge alluded to the fact that there was a
preexisting relationship between Officer LaMantia and Huertas. While
we cannot ascertain the exact nature of their relationship from our
review of the record, it is clear that Huertas, Officer LaMantia, and
L.H. were personally familiar with one another at the time the
subpoena was served. The Judge expressed serious concern about the
events, stating that if Officer LaMantia behaved as alleged “the City
is put at disadvantage unbeknownst to them.” The City reported it had
asked a sergeant to serve the subpoena and did not know Officer
LaMantia was going to serve it.
q8 The Judge then asked L.H. to explain more about what happened
the night before. L.H. testified that Officer LaMantia and another
officer served her the subpoena in the presence of her roommate. L.H.
said that, after giving her the document, Officer LaMantia wanted to
give her “friendly advice as a friend.” L.H. testified that Officer
LaMantia told L.H. she needed to be at trial so Huertas would be
“punished for everything that he has done.” The Judge responded,
“(Blut he didn’t tell you to testify. He just said you needed to be there.
It’s a Subpoena. You are under Subpoena so he did do that.” L.H.
responded, stating that Officer LaMantia told her to “ignore the
uniform” and that he, “as a friend,” was telling her she needed to be at
trial to “tell them exactly what happened.” Based on these allegations,
the following exchange occurred between L.H., Bazant, and the Judge:
[Judge]: [I]t is a Subpoena, and you are subpoenaed, and you do
need to be here because you were subpoenaed, and as a friend or

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whatever he says. Is that all he said to you?
L.H.]: Honestly, I was a mess. I don’t—
Judge]: Is that all he said to you?
Bazant]: Did he encourage you to testify one way or the other?
Judge]: No.
L.H.]: Yes, he enc—he did though.
Judge]: You just told me, stated to me that he just said you need
to be there and tell the truth. Did he not say—
L.H.]: But in a negative light.
Judge]: And what do you mean a negative light?
L.H.]: In that he wanted to see [Huertas] punished even though,
he, I told him that—
Judge]: He wanted to see [Huertas] punished. Okay. So that’s a
personal vendetta or something.
L.H.]: Yes.
Judge]: I don’t know, between the two. But he said he wanted to
see him punished. But did he tell you how to testify.
L.H.]: No, I guess not.
{9 The Judge stated that the interaction did not go “far enough” for
her; that Officer LaMantia was simply serving a subpoena. She asked
the City if it thought there was an issue, and the City started to
discuss the other people present during the interaction and indicated
there may be police body camera recordings of the interaction. The
Judge interrupted the City, stating, “Well, she hasn’t indicated that he
influenced her how to testify. He served a subpoena .... But what she
testified earlier that he influenced her testimony or whatnot, the jury’s
already heard it. And honestly that’s not what she’s saying to me right
now.”
{10 The Judge observed an inconsistency between L.H.’s testimony in
front of the jury, where she said she was influenced by an officer, and
L.H.’s testimony outside the presence of the jury, where she said
differently. The fact that the jury heard potentially inaccurate
information concerned the Judge. The City began a conversation about
how the situation should proceed, moving for a mistrial in the process:
[City]: So what I would suggest to deal with this situation moving
forward is that [L.H.] be given the opportunity to be contacted by
a detective to get a statement regarding her conversation with
Officer [LaMantia] that—
[Judge]: And they should pull this record and listen to what she
had to say today, too, as well.
[City]: And they should pull this, and they need to get all the

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[body camera footage], and I’m asking for a mistrial because there
is no way that I would’ve had knowledge about that that until
just—
[Judge]: Well, and it’s not even fit knowledge is this what she says
to me right now, and what was said on the record is a huge
disadvantage and a conflict, and I don’t think it can be remedied.
I really don’t.

(Emphasis added).

11 The Judge asked the defense for its position regarding the City’s

request for a mistrial, and Bazant responded:
Well, I do hate to go forward but, or I mean to hate to go forward
in such a manner that we're going to do, cause some problems
later. Listening to what [L.H.] is saying now versus what I had
thought was her testimony earlier, it was more than just, you
know, a vendetta with Huertas and [Officer LaMantial. It was, it
was more, [L.H.], you need to testify this way so he does get.
(inaudible).

The Judge answered, contemplating the testimony’s impact on the jury

and suggesting she was inclined to declare a mistrial:
Right, and that was your impression. When you were going to
cross examine her or, or, and honestly that’s how she testified on
the record, and then the jurors already been poisoned, and I think
it is a mistrial. I don’t think there’s any way we can remedy that,
I really don’t. And, and I am going to tell you that you will, if we
do this mistrial, we’re going to have to have a date certain again

The City pointed out that it needed to investigate the circumstances

surrounding the subpoena’s service, but the Judge had already decided

LH. was not improperly influenced by Officer LaMantia:
Well, you know, I still believe we could go on even though this
may have happened. What she testified to, I don’t think it needs
to come up, and that’s up to you guys, and that will delay the trial
longer if you guys want to get into it. I don’t believe what she
stated on the record goes that far. He should’ve never served it.
He may have an issue with the Defendant, but I don’t believe with
what she just stated that he told her that you, it’s pretty much
you need to testify he needs to be punished, not you need to
testify ... don’t say the truth or whatever. So that isn’t what I got
from this, but it still poisoned our jury, and we were moving along
quite nicely. We’re going to have to set a date certain. ... This
needs to go forward.

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Bazant agreed that more investigation needed to occur, but did not say

anything about the mistrial:

Well, I think it does need to go forward, and I think we do need to
hear from [L.H.’s roommate] and, you know, listen to the [body
cameras]. Because I think if she was feeling threatened, whether
or not he was as, you know, it would be really stupid for an officer
to say you need to testify (inaudible).

The Judge responded to Bazant and definitively declared a mistrial:
Yeah, but the point is is she’s supposed to be here today, and it
sounds like she’s not having any problem holding her own. Okay?
And she’s going to testify to what she believes the truth is. And if
that’s an issue that happened, that’s between the City of Billings
Police Department if it gets investigated. It doesn’t need to come
back into this courtroom. I can tell you that because I don’t think
that she’s having any problem with what she wants to testify. I
don’t believe she was influenced by him. She’s here today. She was
influenced, but she was subpoenaed, she has to be here. ... It’s a
mistrial, and what is our new [trial] date? ...

12 The parties started to talk about a new trial date and witness

availability. The Judge stated the City may need time to investigate

the subpoena situation, but she still did not believe that the

“information will be relevant for the trial.” She asked the parties if

they agreed to that, and Bazant again emphasized further

investigation, responding, “I want to see what’s on [the body camera].

I want to hear how it came down. I mean as I said—’ The Judge

interrupted Bazant, stating:

Well, and even if it, if he even did influence her how to testify or
not to testify, I don’t believe at this point she was influenced by
anything. And when the trial day comes, I don’t believe that, I
think again it’s between the City and their officer, and
investigation, internal investigation if that’s what happened.

The City reminded the Judge that witness tampering does not have to

be successful in order for it to be a crime, but the Judge re-emphasized

that, even if Officer LaMantia was prosecuted, the incident would not
have “any bearing on this case because I do not believe that [L.H.] was

influenced by it.” The Judge then inquired as to the best dates for a

retrial and ultimately rescheduled Huertas’s trial for February 14,

2017.

113 On February 6, 2017, Huertas filed a motion in Municipal Court

to dismiss the PFMA charge, contending further prosecution would

violate his constitutional rights which protect him from being twice

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placed in jeopardy for the same offense. He argued the City moved for
a mistrial because it knew it was unlikely to secure a conviction
following L.H.’s testimony. Huertas emphasized that his right to have
his case decided by that particular tribunal, a right “at the core of the
constitutional protection to be free from double jeopardy,” would be
violated if he was retried. One day later, on February 7, 2017, the
Municipal Court issued a one-page order, summarily denying Huertas’s
motion to dismiss without addressing his legal arguments. Following
the denial, Huertas petitioned the District Court for a Writ of
Mandamus or Other Appellate Relief, asking the District. Court to
vacate the Municipal Court’s denial and grant his motion to dismiss.
The District Court denied the petition, holding the case was not
appropriate for its review because Huertas had a “plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law” as provided in § 27-26-
102(2), MCA. The District Court observed Huertas adequately
preserved his constitutional objections which could be raised on appeal
if necessary after the Municipal Court entered final judgment.’
Huertas then filed a petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, asking
this Court to direct the Municipal Court to dismiss the criminal
proceeding against him on double jeopardy grounds. The Municipal
Court temporarily vacated Huertas’s retrial and the case is now
pending our decision.

1 With respect to the District Court’s conclusion that Huertas had an adequate
remedy of appeal, we reiterate our statements made in Keating, 278 Mont. at 224, 924
P.2d at 1300, which was also the basis for our decision to accept supervisory control in
the instant proceeding

Both the U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment and the Montana Constitution,
Article II, Section 25, protect individuals from being twice placed in jeopardy.
If those guarantees are to have any significance, they require that the
prohibition must be given effect prior to, not after, the second trial. If, as the
State argued, Keating proceeded with a second trial and were convicted, he
could appeal on the basis of double jeopardy. This Court could vacate the
conviction. However, vacating the conviction would not change the fact that
Keating would have been “put in jeopardy.” The same would hold true even if
Keating were acquitted in the second trial. That is, the acquittal would not
alter the fact that, in being tried a second time, he was again placed in
jeopardy of being convicted. The constitutional prohibition is designed to
prevent the individual from being put at risk of conviction at a second trial.
Once he endures the second trial, regardless of conviction or acquittal, he has
incurred the risk; he has been put in “jeopardy,” and that fact cannot be
remedied or expunged after the fact.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

14 This Court reviews a trial court’s declaration of a mistrial for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Cates, 2009 MT 94, {] 21, 350 Mont. 38, 204
P.3d 1224 (citing State v. Flores, 1998 MT 328, {| 12, 292 Mont. 255,
974 P.2d 124). We will affirm a trial judge’s decision if he or she acted
rationally and responsibly in declaring a mistrial. Cates, | 21 (citing
Flores, | 12).

q15 A trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss criminal
charges on double jeopardy grounds is a question of law that we review
for correctness. State v. Stone, 2017 MT 189, J 10, 388 Mont. 239, 400
P.3d 692 (citing Cates, | 22; State v. Maki, 2008 MT 379, {| 9, 347
Mont. 24, 196 P.3d 1281).

DISCUSSION

116 Did the Municipal Court abuse its discretion in declaring a
mistrial and err in concluding that double jeopardy did not bar
Huertas’s retrial?

{17 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article II,
Section 25, of the Montana Constitution protect citizens from being
placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V
(“[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy ....”); Mont. Const. art. II, § 25 (“No person shall be again
put in jeopardy for the same offense previously tried in any
jurisdiction.”). These constitutional safeguards are important because
the prosecution, “with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense ....” Cates, | 30 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424
U.S. 600, 606, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 1079 (1976)) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Accordingly, these provisions seek to provide finality
for a criminal defendant. State v. Carney, 219 Mont. 412, 416, 714 P.2d
582, 534 (1986) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91S.
Ct. 547, 554 (1971)).

18 Ml During a jury trial, jeopardy attaches as soon as the jury is
impaneled and sworn. Cates, {30 (citing Carney, 219 Mont. at 417, 714
P.2d at 535). When a mistrial is declared after jeopardy attaches, “the
defendant’s valued right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal is also implicated.” Cates, J 31 (citing Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 606,
96 S. Ct. at 1079) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In this
case, jeopardy undisputedly attached when the jury was impaneled and
sworn at the start of trial on January 20, 2017. Thus, Huertas’s right

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to be free from double jeopardy is clearly implicated. The question now
before the Court is whether retrying Huertas for the PFMA charge
would violate his federal and state constitutional rights to be free from
double jeopardy.
19 Hl After a defendant’s double jeopardy rights are implicated and
a mistrial is declared, a “second criminal trial is barred unless there
was a manifest necessity to terminate the trial or the defendant
acquiesced in the termination.” Cates, | 33 (quoting Carney, 219 Mont.
at 417, 714 P.2d at 535) (internal omissions, quotations, and citations
omitted). Manifest necessity to discontinue a trial exists when
“particular circumstances manifest a necessity for so doing, and when
failure to discontinue would defeat the ends of justice.” Cates, ] 33
(quoting Carney, 219 Mont. at 417, 714 P.2d at 535; Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684, 690, 69 S. Ct. 834, 838 (1949)). A mistrial is an
“exceptional remedy,” State v. Miner, 2012 MT 20, {| 13, 364 Mont. 1,
271 P.3d 56 (quoting State v. Novak, 2005 MT 294, {| 26, 329 Mont.
309, 124 P.3d 182), and therefore a “remedial action short of a mistrial
is preferred unless the ends of justice require otherwise.” Novak, ] 26.
Where there are only “technical errors or defects that. do not. affect the
substantial rights of the defendant” a mistrial is inappropriate. Miner,
q13.
{20 In Carney we recognized that the key word “necessity” cannot be
interpreted literally when analyzing a claim of double jeopardy.
Carney, 219 Mont. at 417, 714 P.2d at 535 (adopting the United States
Supreme Court’s manifest necessity explanations from Wade, 336 U.S.
at 690, 69 S. Ct. at 838, and Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506-
09, 98S. Ct. 824, 831-32 (1978)). Instead of a literal interpretation, we
observe necessity in terms of degree, and sufficient manifest necessity
in the double jeopardy context. requires a high degree of necessity.
Carney, 219 Mont. at 417, 714 P.2d at 535. To determine what degree
of necessity exists in a given case we must undertake an individualized
and fact-intensive inquiry:
The question whether that “high degree” has been reached is
answered more easily in some kinds of cases than in others. At.
one extreme are cases in which a prosecutor requests a mistrial in
order to buttress weaknesses in his evidence. Although there was
a time when English judges served the Stuart monarchs by
exercising a power to discharge a jury whenever it appeared that.
the Crown’s evidence would be insufficient to convict, the
prohibition against double jeopardy as it evolved in this country
was plainly intended to condemn this “abhorrent” practice ...

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Thus, the strictest scrutiny is appropriate when the basis for the
mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution evidence, or
when there is reason to believe that the prosecutor is using the
superior resources of the State to harass or to achieve a tactical
advantage over the accused.
At the other extreme is the mistrial premised upon the trial
judge’s belief that the jury is unable to reach a verdict, long
considered the classic basis for a proper mistrial...
Carney, 219 Mont. at 417, 714 P.2d at 535 (quoting Arizona, 484 U.S.
at 506-09, 98 S. Ct. at 831-32) (omissions in Carney). Furthermore, a
“more stringent manifest necessity standard applies when atrial court
considers declaring a mistrial without the defendant’s request or
consent.” State v. Partin, 287 Mont. 12, 16, 951 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1997).
21 With these considerations in mind, we now address whether there
was manifest necessity to discontinue Huertas’s trial. At the time the
Municipal Court declared a mistrial, L.H. had only made two
potentially damaging statements in the presence of the jury. She
answered “yes” to the question of whether she was visited by an officer
and “yes” to the question of whether the officer attempted to influence
her testimony. Immediately, the City objected and asked to approach
the bench before L.H. could answer Bazant’s third question. At this
stage of the proceeding, the City still could have rehabilitated L.H.
through redirect examination. This is especially true in light of the
knowledge the City acquired through the subsequent inquiry made by
the court and parties regarding the incident. The Judge questioned
L.H. outside of the presence of the jury to clarify the circumstances
surrounding the subpoena’s service and was convinced that L.H. was
not improperly influenced by Officer LaMantia. Significantly, L.H.’s
responses to the questions were sufficient enough to demonstrate to
the Judge that nothing inappropriate occurred when the subpoena was
served—similar questioning could have occurred in front of the jury to
demonstrate the same. Instead, the Judge believed L.H.’s testimony
could not be remedied because the jury was already “poisoned,” an
opinion she reiterated throughout the questioning and subsequent
conversation. The Judge also emphasized that L.H.’s testimony put the
City at a “huge disadvantage” and, in her opinion, presented a
significant conflict that could not be remedied. The Judge’s statements
that the City did not know about the circumstances of the subpoena’s
service, that the City was disadvantaged by the testimony, that a
conflict now existed, and that the jury was “poisoned” do not
demonstrate manifest necessity to terminate the proceeding,

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particularly when remedial measures were available.

22 J Furthermore, we must note that L.H. was the City’s witness.
The City was ultimately responsible for serving its own witness, albeit
ahostile one, with a subpoena to ensure her presence at trial. The fact
that the witness testified to the circumstances of the service in an
unexpected light does not create manifest necessity sufficient to justify
anew trial. We have no reason to believe the City used the service to
improperly achieve some sort of tactical advantage, but the City’s
simple lack of knowledge that the subpoena was served as alleged by
L.H. is not persuasive—the City could have easily discovered
information regarding the service, as the City’s own police officer
served the subpoena on the City’s own witness. The Judge articulated
no conditions that enable us to conclude manifest necessity obliged the
trial’s termination; nor do we find support for such a determination
from our review of the record. We therefore conclude the Municipal
Court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial because there was
no manifest necessity.

23 Even though no manifest necessity exists in this case, Huertas
may still be retried if he acquiesced in the trial’s termination. A
defendant acquiesces in a trial’s termination “if the totality of the
circumstances and the affirmative conduct of the defendant show that
she waived her right to object to the termination of trial proceedings.”
Cates, 35. This Court rejected in Cates the notion that acquiescence
or “implied consent” could be “inferred from a defendant’s ‘statements
or silences’ or a failure to object to the termination.” Cates, | 34
(quoting Keating, 278 Mont. at 227-29, 924 P.2d at 1302-03). Instead,
this Court held that a retrial is not barred when the defendant's
affirmative conduct, combined with the totality of the circumstances,
demonstrates a waiver of the right to object to the termination of trial
proceedings. Cates, {| 35. Our focus was on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the termination of the proceedings and
whether the defendant’s affirmative conduct demonstrated a waiver of
the right against retrial. In Cates, this Court rejected the approach
that a waiver could be implied only from a defendant’s “silence or
passive assent.” Cates, 1] 35, 36.

24 In Cates, we held Cates could be retried because he affirmatively
waived his right to object to the trial’s termination. Cates, | 36. Our
decision was based on the totality of the circumstances, but of primary
significance was the fact that Cates moved for a mistrial on two
separate grounds before the district. court declared a mistrial sua
sponte following the prosecution’s motion for a mistrial. Cates, 1] 9-11,

” Pe

36, 39-40. We decided that. Cates’s mistrial motions “demonstrated that
he was clearly willing to give up his valued right to have his trial
completed by the particular tribunal which was sworn and impaneled
... which right is at the core of the constitutional protection to be free
from double jeopardy.” Cates, {] 36 (citing Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 606, 96S.
Ct. at 1079) (internal quotations omitted). Cates had the opportunity,
after the district court declared a mistrial, to be heard and object, but
he did not withdraw his previous motions for a mistrial or otherwise
object. Cates, {] 36. Instead, one of Cates’s attorneys “affirmatively
offered that he had nothing to say” and the other “thanked the
prosecution team for coming forward.” Cates, {| 36. We decided those
circumstances amounted to more than “mere silence or passive assent”
and were sufficient to demonstrate an affirmative waiver of Cates’s
right to object to the termination of the proceedings. Cates, | 36.

125 Considering the totality of the circumstances in this case and
evaluating any affirmative conduct by Huertas, we conclude a waiver
of Huertas’s right to object to the termination of the proceedings has
not been demonstrated. The specifics of this case are notably different
than those of Cates. Unlike in Cates, where the defendant requested a
mistrial on two separate grounds prior to the court’s ruling, here
Huertas never requested a mistrial. Thus, Huertas did not
demonstrate a willingness to give up his right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal the way Cates did. Additionally, in
Cates we found it important that Cates had the opportunity, after the
court declared a mistrial, to be heard and object. The same opportunity
to be heard was not present in this case, as Bazant was interrupted
several times when she tried to state Huertas’s position regarding the
mistrial. As Bazant attempted, multiple times, to emphasize that an
investigation into the events of the subpoena’s service needed to occur,
the Judge simply highlighted the fact that she had already decided
that those circumstances had no bearing on the PFMA trial.

26 Furthermore, none of Huertas’s actions or the statements of his
attorney can be construed as affirmative conduct waiving his right to
object to the termination of the proceedings. Bazant’s comments such
as, “I do hate to go forward ... in such a manner that we're going to ...
cause some problems later;” “I think it does need to go forward” for
more investigation; and “I want to see what’s on [the body camera]” do
not amount to affirmative conduct evidencing a waiver by Huertas of
his right to object to the termination of the proceedings. The City and
Bazant were both focused on investigating the circumstances of the
subpoena’s service, while the Judge had already decided nothing

Pe "

improper occurred and moved on to declaring a mistrial before the
parties were able to precisely state their positions or properly object.
27 Hl Where Huertas did not request a mistrial, made no affirmative
statements waiving his right to object to the termination of the
proceedings, and was frustrated in his opportunity to be heard, we
cannot conclude that a waiver has been demonstrated. Therefore,
retrying him for the PFMA charge would violate his right to be free
from double jeopardy.

CONCLUSION

428 Retrying Huertas for the PFMA charge would violate his federal
and state fundamental constitutional rights to be free from double
jeopardy. There was no manifest necessity to discontinue the trial and
Huertas’s conduct did not demonstrate a waiver of his right to object.
to termination of the proceedings and to a retrial. The Municipal
Court’s denial of Huertas’s motion to dismiss the PFMA charge is
reversed and the case is dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Municipal Court’s February 7, 2017,
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Right to Due Process
and/or Right to be Free from Double Jeopardy is REVERSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Municipal Court of the City of
Billings, Case No. TK 2016-4035, is DISMISSED with prejudice
because retrying Huertas would violate his constitutional right to be
free from double jeopardy.

The Clerk is directed to provide a true copy of this Opinion and
Order to all counsel of record, to the Clerk of the Thirteenth Judicial
District, the Clerk of the Billings Municipal Court, and to the presiding
judges.

DATED this 31st day of October, 2017.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT, BAKER and
SHEA concur.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

MICHAEL KEITH SPELL,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 15-0411.
Submitted on Briefs September 20, 2017.
Decided November 1, 2017.
2017 MT 266.
389 Mont. 172.
404 P.3d 725.

For Appellant: Wendy Holton, Attorney at Law, Helena.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Tammy A. Hinderman, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Mike
Weber, Richland County Attorney, Joel Thompson, Special Deputy
County Attorney, Sidney.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1 This is an appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court's
determination that Michael Spell (Spell) was competent to stand trial
and that, at the time of the offense, Spell was able to appreciate his
behavior and conform to the requirements of the law. We affirm.

{2 Spell presents the following issues for review:

1. Whether the District Court erred when it found Michael Spell

competent to stand trial.

2. Whether the District Court erred when it found that, at the time

of the offense, Michael Spell was able to appreciate his behavior

and conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

3. Whether sentencing Michael Spell to prison violated his

constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual

punishments and to human dignity.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

q3 On January 7, 2012, Gary Arnold returned home after a morning
walk and noticed his wife, Sherry Arnold (Arnold) was not there.' As
she was an avid walker and jogger, Gary assumed Arnold had gone out
for ajog. Gary became concerned when Arnold did not return home and
went out to look for her. When Gary could not find Arnold, he contacted
family and local law enforcement. A search for Arnold ensued.

4 The search for Arnold turned up one of her running shoes on one
of her known jogging routes along Holly Street, otherwise known as the
“Truck Route” in northeast Sidney, Montana. An investigation

' The following facts are taken from the Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave
to File an Amended Information, the District Court’s Order Finding Defendant
Competent to Stand Trial, the District Court’s May 18, 2015 Judgment and Sentence
Order, testimony given at the competency hearing on March 24 and 25, 2015, and
testimony given at the sentencing hearing on April 17, 2015.

regarding Arnold’s disappearance began. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) joined the investigation on January 9, 2012.

{5 On January 11, 2012, law enforcement received information
regarding communications made between Spell and his family
members concerning a woman that he and another man, Lester Waters
(Waters), kidnapped and killed. The tip stated that Spell contacted his
girlfriend, Angel Cruz (Cruz), and told her he was stranded in North
Dakota and was attempting to get home to Parachute, Colorado. Cruz
stated that Spell and Waters left Parachute on January 4, 2012, ina
green Ford Explorer to look for work in the oil fields near Williston,
North Dakota. Spell’s father was also aware of Spell’s involvement in
the kidnapping and homicide of a woman.

q6 On January 12, 2012, FBI Special Agents spoke with Cruz, who
informed them that Spell and Waters abducted a woman and killed
her. Cruz told the agents that Spell said Waters made Spell shove the
woman’s face in a “puddle of mud, like water, until she was dead” and
then forced Spell to bury the woman’s body. Spell said he was afraid
that Waters would kill him. Spell also told Cruz that Waters made
Spell smoke crack cocaine while driving to North Dakota, and that he
was now in Rapid City, South Dakota.

q7 Also on January 12, 2012, a 1993 green Ford Explorer with a
Colorado license plate was located by police officers in Williston, North
Dakota. The driver matched Waters’ description. Waters was arrested
and detained for questioning. An inventory of Waters’ personal
belongings revealed a purchase receipt dated January 7, 2012, froma
Walmart in Williston for items including a shovel.

q8 OnJanuary 13, 2012, FBI Special Agents located and interviewed
Spell. Spell confessed that he and Waters abducted and killed Arnold
and provided the following narrative to investigators. Spell stated he
and Waters left Parachute, Colorado, two or three days before they
abducted Arnold while she was jogging. Waters was smoking crack
cocaine during their trip and Waters told Spell that crack cocaine
brought “the devil” out in Waters. Waters began talking about
kidnapping and killing a female. When the two were driving through
a town and saw a woman running along the road, Waters told Spell to
grab and pull her into their vehicle as she jogged by. Waters parked on
the side of the road and Spell got out of the vehicle, grabbed the
woman, and forced her into the vehicle. In doing so, the woman’s shoe
fell off. This made Waters mad, and he threw Spell’s knit hat into the
ditch as punishment. Spell’s hat was later found in a large ditch near
the area where Arnold’s shoe was recovered.

{9 Spell stated that once the woman was in the car, Waters got into
the back seat and “choked her out.” Waters said he would kill Spell and
Spell’s family if he ever told anyone what happened. Waters then
threw the woman’s clothes in a dumpster behind a truck stop before he
and Spell dropped off Arnold’s body outside of town. They went back
into Williston and purchased a shovel at Walmart. At the direction of
Waters, Spell dug a hole near where they dropped Arnold’s body off
and placed her in it. Afraid of what Waters might do next, Spell stole
Waters’ telephone and began hitchhiking until he got to Rapid City,
South Dakota.

q10 On February 28, 2012, Special Agent Overby of the Williams
County Law Enforcement Center, Williston, North Dakota, interviewed
Michael Pruit, who had been incarcerated with Spell at the Williams
County Law Enforcement Center Jail. Pruit stated Spell told him
Waters was the instigator in the kidnapping of Arnold and told Spell
what to do. Spell said Arnold was jogging on a path and he approached
her. Spell said Arnold said “hi” as they passed each other. Spell said he
turned around and speared Arnold in the back of the head and knocked
her down, choked her, pushed her face into some water, and drowned
her. Spell told Pruit the reason for the kidnapping was that he and
Waters were high on drugs and Waters wanted to have sex.

qj11 On March 19, 2012, Waters assisted in the search for Arnold. He
and Special Agent Overby found Arnold’s body buried outside
Williston, North Dakota. An autopsy revealed a black and gritty, but
unidentified material in Arnold’s stomach and trachea.

q12 On February 17, 2012, the Richland County Attorney filed an
Information, charging Spell with Aggravated Kidnapping, a felony. On
February 28, 2012, Spell entered a plea of not guilty to this charge. On
April 27, 2012, additional felony charges were brought against Spell
including Deliberate Homicide and Attempted Kidnapping. On May 15,
2012, Spell entered a plea of not guilty to these two charges.

13 Trial was scheduled to begin on January 6, 2014. This date was
continued because on October 31, 2013, Spell filed a motion for an
order to determine his ability to understand the proceedings against
him and to assist in his own defense, and to determine whether he was
suffering from a developmental disability that rendered him unable to
appreciate the criminality of his behavior or to conform his behavior to
the requirements of the law. On November 4, 2013, the District Court
committed Spell to the Montana State Hospital for an examination
pursuant to § 46-14-202, MCA. Spell was transported to the Montana
State Hospital in Warm Springs (State Hospital), Montana, on
November 13, 2013. Following a lengthy evaluation, mental health

professionals at the State Hospital determined Spell was fit to proceed.
This determination was contrary to the findings of J. Gregory Olley,
Ph.D. (Dr. Olley), and Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D. (Dr. Beaver), the defense
experts.

q14 On March 24 and 25, 2014, a hearing was held to determine
Spell’s competency to stand trial. The District Court heard testimony
from and read the reports of expert witnesses Dr. Olley, Dr. Beaver,
and Dr. Virginia Hill (Dr. Hill).? The District Court concluded that
while “the quality of the Defendant’s presentation at the two day
hearing and his proposed findings and brief are very impressive. ...
[T}he test of competency is not dependent upon appearances.” On May
16, 2014, the District. Court determined that Spell was competent to
stand trial.

{15 On October 22, 2014, pursuant to a written Acknowledgment of
Rights and Plea Agreement, Spell pled guilty to the Deliberate
Homicide charge. The District Court ordered a presentence
investigation. The plea agreement provided that the Attempted
Kidnapping charge would be dismissed, and it was dismissed by the
District Court after holding a sentencing hearing on April 17, 2015. On
May 18, 2015, the District Court sentenced Spell to the Montana State
Prison for a term of 100 years for Deliberate Homicide, a felony, and
violation of § 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
416 When reviewing a district court’s finding of competence, we
inquire whether substantial evidence supports the district court’s
decision that the defendant was fit to proceed to trial. State v.
McCarthy, 2004 MT 312, { 20, 324 Mont. 1, 101 P.3d 288 (citations

°-Dr. Olley is an expert in intellectual disability and is a licensed psychologist with
aPh.D. in psychology. He is a member of the American Psychological Association, which
is the division on intellectual and developmental disabilities. Dr. Olley interviewed Spell
and others. Dr. Beaver is licensed to practice psychology and holds a clinical Ph.D. in
psychology and diplomate status in clinical neuropsychology. He interviewed Spell,
Spell’s uncles and aunts, brother, special education teacher, art teacher, and former
sister-in-law. Dr. Beaver observed an interview January 13, 2014, by Dr. Hill and Dr.
Tim Casey at the State Hospital. Dr. Hill is a psychiatrist at the State Hospital who is
board certified in forensic psychiatry. Her report was prepared from information derived
from a social worker on Spell’s case, background information available to her,
observations by herself and staff at the State Hospital, the assessments by a
psychologist, a physician, rehabilitation staff, nursing staff, psychiatric technicians,
testing, lab tests, interviews, and twenty-four/seven observations for sixty days. Dr. Hill
met with staff two hours each day to get reports over three shifts

omitted). The evidence may conflict, but it is substantial if any
reasonable trier of fact could rely upon the evidence in support of its
conclusion. State v. Statczar, 228 Mont. 446, 456, 743 P.2d 606, 613
(1987).

117 This Court reviews a criminal sentence that imposes a year or
more of actual incarceration for legality. State v. Herman, 2008 MT
187, {1 11, 343 Mont. 494, 188 P.3d 978. The district court’s
determination of the existence of mental disease, disorder, or
developmental disability pursuant to § 46-14-311, MCA, is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Gallmeier, 2009 MT 68, {| 11, 349 Mont.
424, 203 P.3d 852 (citations omitted). A district court abuses its
discretion when it “acts arbitrarily without employment of
conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in
substantial injustice.” State v. Burke, 2005 MT 250, 1 11, 329 Mont. 1,
122 P.3d 427.

18 This Court will exercise plenary review of constitutional issues,
anda district court's decisions on constitutional issues are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Egdorf, 2003 MT 264, {] 12,317 Mont. 436, 77 P.38d
517 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION
19 1. Whether the District Court erred when it found Michael Spell
competent to stand trial.
{20 Section 46-14-103, MCA, sets the standard for determining
whether a criminal defendant is mentally competent to stand trial. It
states,
A person who, as a result of mental disease or disorder or
developmental disability, is unable to understand the proceedings
against the person or to assist in the person’s own defense may
not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an
offense so long as the incapacity endures.
Section 46-14-1083, MCA. The District Court must determine “whether
[the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.” McCarthy, {| 21.
21 All three expert. witnesses agree that Spell is intellectually
disabled. His raw IQ score is around 70. Although he completed the
ninth grade, he reads at a third-grade level. For many activities, he has
the mental age of an eleven-year-old. However, Dr. Olley testified at
Spell’s competency hearing that some intellectually disabled persons
“can learn and can communicate adequately with their attorneys to be

able to work with their attorneys,” while Dr. Beaver agreed that
intellectually disabled persons may still be “competent to proceed with
their cases in court.”

22 Although intellectually disabled, substantial evidence in the
record shows Spell was competent to stand trial and enter his guilty
plea. Whereas Dr. Olley and Dr. Beaver spent a limited number of
hours interviewing Spell and administering tests, the State Hospital
utilized a multi-disciplinary team assessment, including staff
observations of Spell on a twenty-four-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week
basis for sixty days. In doing so, the State Hospital witnessed and gave
more weight to Spell’s actual adaptive functioning at the time of his
competency evaluation. Dr. Hill testified Spell was “very motivated for
the things he wanted,” and that she had “rarely seen so much
perseverance, relentless pursuit of the goals of his choosing,” such as
getting to Level 3 at the State Hospital so he could play video games.
Spell was also motivated to stay at the State Hospital, especially after
he learned that you cannot smoke in prison.

23 Spell complained of depression, anxiety, sleep problems, paranoia,
voices, and poor memory, but his behavior was not consistent with
those complaints. Dr. Hill testified that Spell’s psychiatric complaints
seemed to increase towards the end of his time at the State Hospital,
and after he learned about the type of symptoms that generally can
lead to a finding of guilty but mentally ill. Spell did not appear to
experience any of these symptoms when interacting with other
patients, as he would laugh, joke, enjoy games, and watch television.
Spell was also vocal about his cognitive functioning while at the State
Hospital. Dr. Hill testified this was unusual as patients with
intellectual disabilities generally “pretend they understand, they try
to fit in, they don’t like an emphasis on their impairments ....” Dr. Hill
also thought it unusual that Spell gravitated toward higher-
functioning patients rather than other developmentally disabled
patients, and was observed manipulating lower-functioning peers and
being duplicitous with staff. Spell’s behavior made it difficult for Dr.
Hill to find a deficit in adaptive functioning during Spell’s time at the
State Hospital.

24 Dr. Hill acknowledged Spell’s deficits in his adaptive functioning
growing up, but also acknowledged how Spell has matured since being
a teen. Dr. Hill and staff at the State Hospital “were quite impressed
that his adaptive functioning was a lot higher than [they] expected.”
Dr. Hill attributed Spell’s progress to brain development and his
abstention from alcohol and drug use for the two years prior to his
evaluation. Spell admitted he smoked marijuana almost every day that

he could get. ahold of it since the age of thirteen until his arrest in this
case.

25 A Colorado court determined Spell was incompetent to stand trial
when he was younger. In one case, two professionals examined Spell,
and came to differing conclusions regarding Spell’s competency.
However, the doctor who determined Spell was incompetent concluded
Spell’s factual understanding of courtroom proceedings was not
impaired, his memory of the event was not impaired, and he was able
to consult with his attorney to a reasonable degree. Despite these
findings, Spell was found incompetent because he was unable “to make
a decision whether or not to testify on his own” without the assistance
of counsel.

{26 Years later, Spell seems to have a good understanding of the legal
process and criminal proceedings. Spell made progress in and asked
pertinent questions regarding defending his case in the Legal
Pathways group, where State Hospital patients are taught about
courtroom and legal processes. Dr. Hill interviewed Spell five times
using a modified competency assessment instrument, and he
adequately answered questions regarding criminal proceedings. Dr.
Hill also testified that Spell had “a very good relationship with his
attorneys, he respects their competence, he trusts them. He is able to
talk quite clearly about the events that pre-dated the alleged crime and
also talk about events right after the alleged crime.” In discussions
with Dr. Hill, Spell was “polite and rational and cooperative with
questions.” He understood he could not be compelled to testify in court
and was aware of the possible pleas. He knew that if he did not
understand what was going on in court, he could whisper to his
attorney to get things clarified.

27 Ml As the District Court put it in its Order Finding Defendant
Competent to Stand Trial, Spell “knew what behaviors would allow
him to meet his goals” and allow him to serve his sentence at the State
Hospital instead of the Montana State Prison. Spell has the ability to
consult with and understand his lawyer and understands the
proceedings against him. Substantial evidence supports the District
Court’s finding that Spell is competent to stand trial and was
competent when he entered his guilty plea.

28 2. Whether the District Court erred when it found that, at the time
of the offense, Michael Spell was able to appreciate his behavior and
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

{29 Pursuant to § 46-14-311, MCA, if a defendant pleads guilty and
the sentencing court concludes that such defendant suffers “from a
mental disease or disorder or developmental disability that rendered

the defendant unable to appreciate the criminality of the defendant’s
behavior or to conform the defendant’s behavior to the requirements of
law” at the time of the offense, the court must order a presentence
investigation and a report on the investigation. Section 46-14-311(1),
(2), MCA. If the opinion concludes that the defendant could not
conform his or her behavior to requirements of the law according to
§ 46-14-312(1), MCA, the court shall commit the defendant to the
custody of the director of the Department of Public Health and Human
Services (DPHHS). Section 46-14-312(2), MCA; Gallmeier, 113; Burke,
| 14-15. It is the defendant’s burden to prove that he or she suffered
from a mental disease or defect as defined in § 46-14-311, MCA, at the
time of the offense. Gallmeier, | 13 (citing State v. Rathbun, 2003 MT
210, 4 15, 317 Mont. 66, 75 P.3d 334).

30 Spell argues that he suffered from a developmental disability at
the time of the offense that rendered him unable to conform his
behavior to the requirements of the law. Further, Spell alleges that
because Dr. Beaver opined that Spell’s intellectual disability prevented
him from being able to conform his behavior to the law, the District
Court should have sentenced Spell to the custody of the Director of
DPHHS so that he could be treated by a staff that is trained and
knowledgeable about adults who are intellectually disabled. Spell
emphasizes his inability to withstand the controlling influence Waters
had over him and his overall gullibility and difficulty with
understanding consequences. However, substantial evidence in the
record supports the District Court’s finding that Spell’s developmental
disability did not render him unable to appreciate his behavior or
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the
offense.

31 At Spell’s sentencing hearing, Dr. Beaver opined that Spell could
appreciate the difference between right and wrong, but that he was
unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the
time of the offense. Dr. Beaver based his opinion on Spell’s intellectual
disabilities, intoxication at the time of the crime, and his subservient
relationship with Waters. Dr. Beavers testified that Waters influenced
Spell’s conduct more than Spell’s intoxication did. However, during
Spell’s pre-sentence investigation, Spell was asked what reason he had
for his involvement in Arnold’s kidnapping and homicide. Spell
responded in part by stating that Waters gave him “a lot of crack
cocaine to smoke” and it made him lose control of his actions. Dr.
Beaver acknowledged it was unusual that Spell did not mention
Waters’ influence over Spell or Spell’s fear of Waters in his response.

32 Evidence in the record shows that Spell was able to withstand
Waters’ influence and threats. Spell was able to withstand Waters’
directives during an attempt to kidnap a different woman prior to
Arnold’s kidnapping and murder. While at a gas station, Waters told
Spell to put a woman in a sleeper hold and then into the truck. Spell
told Tara Zody, a probation and parole officer with the Department of
Corrections, that he purposely waited too long and the woman got in
her car and left. Further, even though Spell alleges he was afraid of
and threatened by Waters, Spell stayed with Waters for days after the
incident. Spell could have gotten away from Waters earlier, when the
two went to Walmart. While there, Spell did not ask for help from
anyone or try to leave.
33 Although neither testified at the sentencing hearing, Dr. Hill and
another doctor working for the State Hospital, Dr. Tim Casey,
indicated in their initial report that Spell had the capacity to conform
his behavior to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense.
The report stated:
As noted above, we saw no evidence of mental disease or defect or
developmental disability that included disorganized thoughts,
confusion, severely intrusive delusions or hallucinations, or mood
impairment. And we do not believe his intellectual disability was
so incapacitating that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of
his behavior or consider alternatives other than the alleged
directives of the co-defendant at the time of [the] crime.
34 Hf The District Court did not abuse its discretion because
evidence in the record supports its conclusion that Spell’s intellectual
disability did not prevent him from being able to appreciate his
behavior and conform his conduct to the law. Although Spell’s
intellectual disability made him susceptible to Waters’ influence, Spell
knew his actions were wrong and he had the ability to stop himself
from kidnapping and killing Arnold.
435 3. Whether sentencing Michael Spell to prison violated his
constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishments
and to human dignity.
436 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article II, Section 22 of the Montana Constitution prohibit the
imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. Spell alleges his
sentence to the Montana State Prison will subject him to cruel and
unusual punishment because his intellectual disabilities make him
susceptible to manipulation by others and because the “Montana State
Prison has a history of not addressing the needs of those with
disabilities.”

37 Ml There is no law to support Spell’s assertion that an
intellectually disabled person’s right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment is violated by being sentenced to prison instead of
committed to a treatment facility. Spell cites two decisions by this
Court to support his argument: Wilson v. State, 2010 MT 278, 358
Mont. 438, 249 P.3d 28, and Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, 316 Mont.
103, 68 P.38d 872. However, in those cases, mentally ill inmates
challenged the conditions of their confinement, not their actual
sentence to prison. This Court did not hold that the mentally ill
inmates’ sentences were cruel and unusual punishment in either case.
We also agree with the District Court that the holding in Atkins v. U.S.
does not extend to protect an intellectually disabled defendant from
being sentenced to prison. Atkins simply prohibits a court from
sentencing an intellectually disabled defendant to death. Atkins v.
U.S., 586 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002). Spell’s
constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment were not
violated by being sentenced to prison.

CONCLUSION

38 Spell has not satisfied his burden to establish that he was
incompetent. when he made his guilty plea. Substantial evidence
supports the District Court’s competency finding. The District Court
did not abuse its discretion when it found Spell appreciated his
behavior and could conform his conduct to the law, and thus, the
District Court was not required to sentence Spell to DPHHS. The
District Court’s decision to sentence Spell to prison did not subject him
to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section
22 of the Montana Constitution.

q39 Affirmed.

JUSTICES BAKER, WHEAT, McKINNON and RICE concur.

MONTANA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
(“MACo”), LEO GALLAGHER, ADRIAN M.
MILLER, MONTANA ASSOCIATION OF
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, and
ACLU OF MONTANA FOUNDATION, INC.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE STATE OF MONTANA, by and through
TIMOTHY C. FOX, in his official capacity as
Attorney General, and COREY STAPLETON,
in his official capacity as Secretary of State,
Respondents.
No. OP 17-0358.
Decided November 1, 2017.
2017 MT 267.

389 Mont. 183.
404 P.3d 733.

184

For Petitioners: Kyle Anne Gray, Brianne C. McClafferty,
Holland & Hart LLP, Billings; James P. Molloy, Gallik, Bremer &
Molloy, P.C., Bozeman (Attorneys for MACo); Alex Rate, Legal
Director, ACLU of Montana Foundation Inc., Missoula (Attorney for
ACLU of Montana Foundation, Inc.).

For Respondents: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Dale Schowengerdt, Solicitor General, Rob Cameron, Deputy
Attorney General, Helena.

For Amici: Maxon R. Davis, Tyler C. Smith, Davis, Hatley,
Haffeman & Tighe, P.C., Great Falls; Kathleen M. Sullivan (Pro Hac
Vice), Christine H. Chung (Pro Hac Vice ), Quinn, Emanuel,
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, New York (Attorneys for Marsy’s
Law for Montana, LLC); Martha Sheehy, Sheehy Law Firm, Billings
(Attorney for “The Montana Newspapers”); William V. Ballew, Spoon
Gordon Ballew PC, Missoula (Attorney for National Crime Victim Law
Institute); Lawrence A. Anderson, Attorney at Law, P.C., Great
Falls; James H. Goetz, Goetz, Baldwin & Geddes P.C., Bozeman
(Attorneys for Constitutional Convention Delegates, Retired Montana
Supreme Court Justices and Law Professors).

OPINION AND ORDER

JUSTICE McKINNON delivered the Opinion and Order of the
Court.
11 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Constitutional
Initiative 116 (CI-116), commonly known as Marsy’s Law, in an
original petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The
merits of CI-116 and the policy choices behind it are not at issue in this
case. The only question before this Court is whether the procedure by
which CI-116 was submitted to voters conformed to Montana’s
constitutional requirements.
q2 This Court has original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment
actions “when urgency or emergency factors exist making litigation in
the trial courts and the normal appeal process inadequate and when
the case involves purely legal questions of statutory or constitutional
interpretation which are of state-wide importance.” M. R. App. P. 14(4).
See also Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(1)-(2); §§ 3-2-201 and -202(1), MCA.
In this case, normal litigation and appeal processes are inadequate
because implementation of CI-116 is imminent. Furthermore, the
question of whether CI-116 violates the Montana Constitution involves
purely legal questions of constitutional interpretation because analysis
of Montana Constitution, Article XIV, Section 11’s separate-vote
requirement focuses on the manner in which a constitutional
amendment is submitted to the voters at an election. What is in issue
and what this Court must adjudge is not directed by a factual record
or inquiry, but rather is directed to the legality of the enactment or
adoption process itself. Indeed, it is precisely because we are
addressing only the enactment process and whether that process
survives constitutional scrutiny that a factual record evidencing a
dispute or conflict surrounding the numerous provisions of CI-116 is
unnecessary. Thus, this case is properly before the Court as an original
proceeding and we accordingly accept jurisdiction. See Marshall v.
State, 1999 MT 33, 15, 293 Mont. 274, 975 P.2d 325.
q3 We conclude that the single-subject requirement, set forth in
Article V, Section 11(3), of the Montana Constitution, applies to bills
of the Legislature and not to constitutional amendments. We further
conclude that CI-116 violates the separate-vote requirement, set forth
in Article XIV, Section 11, of Montana’s Constitution, and is therefore
void in its entirety.
q4 We restate the dispositive issue as whether CI-116 violates the
separate-vote requirement contained in Montana Constitution, Article
XIV, Section 11.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q5 On November 8, 2016, a majority of Montana voters approved CI-
116, a constitutional amendment proposed by popular initiative. As
enacted, CI-116 amended Article II of Montana’s Constitution by
adding a new Section 36, titled Rights of Crime Victims.’ By way of
description, CI-116 contains four sections. CI-116(1) enumerates
eighteen rights to which crime victims are entitled. These rights are
meant “[t]o preserve and protect a crime victim’s right to justice, to
ensure a crime victim has a meaningful role in criminal and juvenile
justice systems, and to ensure that a crime victim’s rights and interests
are respected and protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than
the protections afforded to a criminal defendant and a delinquent
youth.” Among some of the rights afforded to victims by CI-116 are the
right “to due process,” CI-116(1)(a); the right “to privacy, including the
right to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request and
to set reasonable conditions on the conduct of any interaction to which
the victim consents,” CI-116(1)(f); the right to “notice of’ and to be
“present at all proceedings involving the criminal conduct, plea,
sentencing, adjudication, disposition, release, or escape of the
defendant or youth ... and any proceeding implicating the rights of the
victim,” CI-116(1)(g); the right to be “heard in any proceeding involving
the release, plea, sentencing, disposition, adjudication, or parole of the
defendant or youth,” CI-116(1)(i); the right to “proceedings free from
unreasonable delay and to a prompt and final conclusion of the case
and any related postjudgment proceedings,” CI-116(1)(o); and the right
to be informed of the enumerated rights and advised that “the victim
may seek the advice and assistance of an attorney with respect to”
those rights, CI-116(1)(r).

{6 CI-116(2) provides the manner in which victim’s rights are to be
recognized and effectuated. A victim, the victim’s attorney or
representative, or the prosecuting attorney “may assert and seek
enforcement of the rights enumerated” in any “trial or appellate court
or any other authority with jurisdiction over the case as a matter of
right.” The court “shall act promptly on the request, affording a remedy
by due course of law for the violation of any right. The reasons for any
decision regarding disposition of a victim’s right must be clearly stated
on the record.”

' The full text of CI-116 is attached as Appendix A and can be found online at
hittps://perma.ce/VQ76-WRAJ. CI-116 is currently recorded as Article IT, Section 36, of
the Montana Constitution (2017).

q7 + CI-116(3) ensures that the enumerated rights “may not be
construed to deny or disparage” other victims’ rights and provides that
CI-116 “applies to criminal and youth court proceedings, is self-
executing, and requires no further action by the Legislature.”

q8 CI-116(4) provides definitions for “crime” and “victim.” A “crime”
to which a victim’s enumerated rights apply includes felonies,
misdemeanors, and delinquency proceedings. The definition of “victim,”
CI-116(4)(b), includes the victim, who has suffered direct or threatened
harm, and his or her “spouse, parent, grandparent, child, sibling,
grandchild, or guardian.” Victim also includes someone with a
“relationship to the victim that is substantially similar” to the
relationship of a spouse, parent, grandparent, child, sibling,
grandchild, or guardian. Finally, “victim” does not include the accused
or someone the “court believes would not act in the best interests of a
minor or of a victim who is deceased, incompetent, or incarcerated.”
q9 CI-116 was to become effective July 1, 2017. Mont. Cnty. Attorneys
Ass'n v. State, No. OP 16-0720, 387 Mont. 534, 391 P.3d 734 (table)
(Jan. 3, 2017). However, on June 20, 2017, the Petitioners, Montana
Association of Counties, Leo Gallagher, Adrian M. Miller, Montana
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and ACLU of Montana
Foundation, Inc. (together, MACo), filed an original petition for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. We ordered a response from
the State of Montana (State) and additional briefing from the parties.
On June 30, 2017, we stayed implementation of CI-116 to allow
thorough consideration of the parties’ arguments, relevant case law,
and the applicable provisions of Montana’s Constitution.

10 MACo, supported by amici,” requests this Court declare void the
enactment of CI-116, enjoin CI-116’s implementation and enforcement,
and decertify the election results with respect to CI-116. MACo argues
CI-116 violates two provisions of the Montana Constitution: the single-
subject requirement of Article V, Section 11(3), and the separate-vote
requirement of Article XIV, Section 11. MACo reasons CI-116 violates
the single-subject requirement because involving a victim’s kin in
criminal justice decisions is a subject separate from providing rights to

® Two groups filed briefs supporting the Petitioners: Constitutional Convention
Delegates, Retired Montana Supreme Court Justices, and Law Professors; and “The
Montana Newspapers,” including Lee Enterprises, The Billings Gazette, The Missoulian,
The Helena Independent Record, The Ravalli Republic, The Great Falls Tribune, and
The Bozeman Daily Chronicle:

traditional victims.’ Regarding the separate-vote requirement, MACo
argues the “extensive language” of CI-116 amends at least eight
sections of Montana’s Constitution and, thus, a vote was needed to
amend each section individually.’

{11 The State, also supported by amici,’ responds that the single-
subject’ requirement does not apply to constitutional initiatives.
Alternatively, the State maintains that crime victims’ rights is CI-116’s
only subject. The State also contends CI-116 does not violate the
separate-vote requirement because the initiative does not “change or
formally alter” any preexisting constitutional provision. The State
further urges this Court to not follow the “amendment-by-implication”
theory advanced by MACo, but, in any event, maintains that CI-116
does not impliedly amend other parts of the Constitution. Finally, the
State contends that construing the separate-vote requirement as
MACo requests would essentially abolish the constitutional initiative
process in Montana.

DISCUSSION
12 Montana’s Constitution may be amended in three ways, all of
which are set forth in Article XIV: (1) by constitutional convention,
Mont. Const. art. XIV, §§ 1-7; (2) by legislative referendum, Mont.
Const. art. XIV, § 8; and (3) by popular initiative, Mont. Const. art.
XIV, § 9. Here we are only concerned with amendment by popular
initiative. The people of this State have the “exclusive right of
governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent state” and
“may alter or abolish the constitution and form of government
whenever they deem necessary.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 2. Where the
people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by
which it may be revised or amended, any attempt to amend the

° The Petitioners acknowledge that “[elxtending rights to traditional vietims of
crime is a single, fairly contained subject.”

* Specifically, the Petitioners argue CI-116 amends Article II, Section 17’s due
process guarantee in criminal proceedings; Article VII, Section 2(3)’s grant of power to
the Supreme Court to regulate attorney conduct; Article II, Section 9's right to know;
Article II, Section 10’s right of privacy; Article II, Section 20’s initiation of criminal
proceedings; Article II, Section 21’s right to bail; Article II, Section 24’s right to a speedy
trial; and Article II, Section 28’s principles guiding laws punishing crime

° Two groups filed briefs supporting the State: Marsy’s Law forMontana, LLC; and
National Crime Victim Law Institute

fundamental law in violation of a self-imposed restriction is
unconstitutional. Accordingly, as long as Montana’s Constitution is in
effect, “the people may amend the constitution by initiative only in the
manner provided by the constitution.” State ex rel. Mont. Citizens for
Pres. of Citizen’s Rights v. Waltermire, 227 Mont. 85, 90-91, 738 P.2d
1255, 1258 (1987). The constitutional limitations on the initiative
process are important because “[t]he sovereignty of the people is itself
subject to those constitutional limitations which have been duly
adopted and remain unrepealed.” Waltermire, 227 Mont. at 91, 738
P.2d at 1258 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392, 89 S. Ct.
557, 561 (1969)).

113 Montana’s 1972 Constitution provided citizens with a new way to
amend their Constitution: by popular initiative. Compare Mont. Const.
of 1889, art XIX, § 9 with Mont. Const. art. XIV, §§ 1-11. The addition
was consistent with the overall theme of the 1972 Constitutional
Convention of constructing a flexible Constitution subject to popular
control. Anthony Johnstone, The Constitutional Initiative in Montana,
71 Mont. L. Rev. 325, 341 (2010). The Constitutional Convention
Delegates (Delegates) focused on creating a Constitution that would
reflect the notions of popular sovereignty and self-government
embodied in Article II. Johnstone, supra, at 340, 342. The
Constitutional Revision Committee (Committee) proposed the initiative
power because it believed the power was “an inherent right in a body
politic whose Constitution is to be the embodiment of the will of the
people.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Committee Proposals,
February 12, 1972, p. 363 (hereinafter Committee Proposal). The
Committee wanted to ensure the 1972 Constitution provided a
constitutional revision process that “hit a happy and workable
medium.” Committee Proposal, p. 364.

114 Consequently, while providing for initiative power, the 1972
Constitution also imposed limitations on the initiative process. Such
limitations included signature gathering and geographic distribution
requirements. Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 9(1). The Committee
determined limitations were necessary because it was “not
unreasonable to demand strict standards when dealing with something
as fundamental and important as Constitutional change.” Committee
Proposal, p. 363. The Committee noted another check on the
constitutional amendment process: the separate-vote requirement.
Committee Proposal, p. 363. Indeed, the official voter pamphlet for the
new Constitution explained to voters that the only limit on how
constitutional amendments may be submitted at an election was the
requirement that each amendment ‘be clearly designated on the ballot

so that they can be voted on separately.” Concerned Citizens for
Constitutional Improvement, The Proposed 1972 Constitution for the
State of Montana, Montana Newspapers, 1972, at 5.
115 The separate-vote requirement is one of eleven sections in Article
XIV directing the manner in which Montana’s Constitution may be
revised. In particular, the separate-vote requirement pertains to
submission of a proposed amendment, providing that if more than one
constitutional amendment is presented to voters during the same
election, voters must have the option to vote on each amendment
separately:

Submission. If more than one amendment is submitted at the

same election, each shall be so prepared and distinguished that it.

can be voted upon separately.
Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 11.° The separate-vote requirement was
“designed to aid voters in casting their votes on Constitutional issues,
and as a check on the possible action of grouping several issues under
one innocuous title.” Committee Proposal, p. 363. The separate-vote
requirement has a long history in Montana. Montana’s 1884’ and
1889* Constitutions both contained a separate-vote requirement, and
the requirement was adopted unanimously during the Constitutional
Convention of 1972. Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim
Transcript, March 1, 1972, pp. 1195-96. The separate-vote requirement
has two well-recognized objectives. The first is to avoid voter confusion
and deceit of the public by ensuring proposals are not misleading or the
effects of which are concealed or not readily understandable. The

° We refer to Montana Constitution, Article XIV, Section 11, as the “separate-vote
requirement” throughout this Opinion. We refer to Montana Constitution, Article V,
Section 11(8), as the “single-subject requirement” throughout this Opinion.

’ The 1884 provision was stylistically different than the current provision. It
stated, “Should more amendments than one be submitted at the same election, they shall
be so prepared and distinguished by numbers or otherwise that each can be voted upon
separately.” Mont. Const. of 1884, art XVI, § 13.

* Montana’s 1889 Constitution contained the exact same provision as the 1884
Constitution but also placed a three-amendment per-election limit. Mont. Const. of 1889,
art XIX, § 9. The 1972 Delegates removed the three-amendment per-election limit.
Johnstone, supra, at 346. The Delegates believed that the people, through the initiative
process, should have the freedom to place as many proposed constitutional amendments
on the ballot as they wish, as long as voters maintained the ability to vote on each
amendment separately. Johnstone, supra, at 346 (citing Montana Constitutional
Convention, Verbatim Transcript, February 18, 1972, p. 517).

second is to avoid “logrolling” or combining unrelated amendments into
a single measure which might not otherwise command majority
support. By combining unrelated amendments, approval of the
measure may be secured by different groups, each of which will support
the entire proposal in order to secure some part, even though not
approving all parts of a multifarious amendment. Fugina v. Donovan,
104.N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn. 1960). See also In re Initiative Petition No.
314, 625 P.2d 595 (Okla. 1980); Kerby v. Luhrs, 36 P.2d 549 (Ariz.
1934).

{116 This Court’s interpretation of the separate-vote requirement has
narrowed over time as the processes by which the Constitution can be
amended have changed. In the early twentieth century, before
Montana’s Constitution could be amended by initiative, we held the
separate-vote requirement satisfied as long as all provisions of the
proposed constitutional amendment related to one subject matter or a
single plan. See, e.g., State ex rel. Corry v. Cooney, 70 Mont. 355, 365,
255 P. 1007, 1011 (1924) (concluding the separate-vote requirement
satisfied if “the operation of the amendment relates to a single plan or
purpose”); State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 404, 142 P. 210,
213 (1914) (holding the separate-vote requirement satisfied as long as
all parts of the proposed constitutional amendment “may be logically
viewed as parts or aspects of a single plan”); State ex rel. Teague v. Bd.
of Comms, 34 Mont. 426, 430, 87 P. 450, 451 (1906) (holding a
proposed amendment constitutional under the separate-vote
requirement because it was not “three separate propositions” but
instead was “only one matter and one subject”).

117 We revisited our Cooney, Hay, and Teague separate-vote
reasoning and jurisprudence following ratification of the 1972
Constitution and introduction of the petition by popular initiative.
Notably, our 1999 decision in Marshall v. State overruled Cooney, Hay,
and Teague to the extent those decisions failed to recognize a
distinction between the single-subject and separate-vote requirements.
Marshall, | 23. In Marshall we explained that a proposed amendment
could relate to a single plan or purpose, but still violate the separate-
vote requirement because it contained more than one amendment to
Montana’s Constitution. Marshall, | 22. Central to our decision in
Marshall was the fact that Cooney, Hay, and Teague were decided
when constitutional amendments could only be proposed by the
Legislature—before Montana’s Constitution could be amended by
initiative. Marshall, | 19. We found this distinction remarkable
because when a constitutional amendment is proposed by the

Legislature through referendum, representatives debate and deliberate
the proposition. Marshall, 4] 19. On the other hand, when a
constitutional amendment is proposed by initiative, Montana voters do
not have the same opportunity to consider and debate the proposition.
Marshall, 1 19.

118 Based on these observations, we noted that the separate-vote
requirement “is a cogent constitutional recognition of the
circumstances under which Montana voters receive constitutional
initiatives.” Marshall, |] 19. Voters do not have the opportunity to
consider, discuss, and potentially change constitutional amendments
proposed by initiative in the same way the Legislature does those
proposed by referendum. Therefore, the separate-vote requirement
serves as an important check on the initiative process, confirming the
integrity of the vote and ensuring the voters actually approve of a
particular amendment. Our interpretation of the separate-vote
requirement in Marshall ensured Montana voters always have the
option to independently select or reject each constitutional amendment,
guaranteeing the people have complete control over Montana’s
fundamental law. Marshall, 1] 19, 22.

{19 Prior to Marshall and adoption of our 1972 Constitution, this
Court analyzed the separate-vote provision based on whether a
proposed constitutional amendment contained one subject. or matter.
The 1972 Constitution’s amendment by initiative interjected a new
element into the separate-vote requirement, leading to some confusion
regarding the difference between the separate-vote and single-subject
requirements. While we distinguished the separate-vote and single-
subject requirements in Marshall, holding each provision is
substantively different, we implied that both provisions apply to
constitutional amendments proposed by initiative. Marshall, {] 18,
22. We decided the test for the separate-vote requirement is stricter
than that of the single-subject requirement. Marshall, {| 22. We noted
that reading the separate-vote requirement narrower than the single-
subject requirement made sense “because the act of amending the
constitution is significantly different from enacting or enabling
legislation.” Marshall, | 22. We explained in Marshall that a proposed
constitutional amendment could satisfy the single-subject requirement
but be invalid under the separate-vote requirement. Marshall, {| 22.
Because the Court found CI-75 unconstitutional pursuant to the
separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, a narrower
requirement than the single-subject requirement, we never addressed
the applicability of Article V, Section 11(3)’s_ single-subject

requirement.

20 We now directly consider whether the single-subject requirement
applies to constitutional amendments proposed by initiative and decide
that it does not. The Montana Constitution contains both a single-
subject requirement for bills proposed by the Legislature, Article V,
Section 11(3), and a separate-vote requirement for constitutional
amendments, Article XIV, Section 11. The single-subject requirement
provides the guidelines by which the Legislature must present bills to
the electorate:
Each bill, except. general appropriation bills and bills for the
codification and general revision of the laws, shall contain only
one subject, clearly expressed in its title. If any subject is
embraced in any act and is not expressed in the title, only so much
of the act not so expressed is void.
Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(8).
121 Montana’s single-subject requirement necessitates that bills
developed by the Legislature contain only one subject. In contrast,
constitutional amendments developed via initiative never go through
the Legislature. Therefore, the Legislature has no control over a
constitutional amendment proposed by initiative. It follows that Article
V, governing the way in which the Legislature prepares and proposes
bills, does not also govern constitutional amendments raised by
initiative, a power lying exclusively with the people and provided for
in Article XIV.
22 The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959
P.2d 49 (Or. 1998), guided our Marshall decision. Marshall, {| 22.
However, the Montana Constitution differs from Oregon’s Constitution.
Oregon’s Constitution has a single-subject requirement that applies
directly to constitutional initiatives. Or. Const. art. IV, § (1)(2)(d) “A
proposed law or amendment to the Constitution shall embrace one
subject only and matters properly connected therewith.”). Conversely,
and significant to our analysis here, Montana’s Constitution, Article
XIV, guiding constitutional revision, does not have a single-subject
requirement. Montana’s single-subject requirement relied on by MACo
is contained in Article V, which pertains to the Legislature. To the
extent our holding here conflicts with our analysis of the single-subject
requirement in Marshall, we clarify that the single-subject
requirement contained in Article V, Section 11(3), of the Montana
Constitution does not apply to constitutional amendments.
Nonetheless, the distinction made in Marshall between the separate-
vote and single-subject requirements, the reasoning in support thereof,
and our relianceon Armatta’s separate-vote analysis were well-

reasoned and remain valid. Because we hold that the single-subject
requirement does not apply to constitutional amendments, we do not
address MACo’s contention that CI-116 violates Montana Constitution,
Article V, Section 11(3).

23 While Marshall is significant for its explanation of the separate-
vote requirement in the context of an amendment by initiative,
particularly in distinguishing the separate-vote requirement from the
less arduous single-subject requirement, the Court invalidated CI-75
based on the express language of the initiative itself, which specifically
amended other provisions of the Constitution. Marshall, | 24. We
determined these express amendments each needed a separate vote
pursuant to Article XIV, Section 11. Marshall, { 24. While explaining
that CI-75 also affected other parts of the Constitution by limiting
legislative spending, we did not incorporate these implied amendments
into our reasoning because our discussion of the three express changes
was sufficient to demonstrate CI-75’s violation of the separate-vote
requirement. See Marshall, | 24n.2. In deciding Marshall in this
manner, we left unanswered what is a “separate amendment” for
purposes of the separate-vote requirement.

24 Before turning to that question, however, we are compelled to
address the State’s assertion that we completely rejected the
amendment-by-implication theory in Marshall. Deciding Marshall on
alternative grounds, without addressing amendment-by-implication,
does not mean we rejected such an analysis. In fact, we left open the
possibility in Marshall of expanding upon our separate-vote analysis
should the need arise, as it has here. Marshall, | 24 n.2. More
importantly, we conclude our reasoning would be fundamentally flawed
if we limited the separate-vote requirement to only those multifarious
amendments which expressly refer to other constitutional provisions.
Such an interpretation would allow the separate-vote requirement to
be easily undermined by simple drafting techniques. In the context of
constitutional amendments by initiative, voters act as legislators. It is
this Court’s obligation to ensure that interest groups and individuals
advocating for passage or defeat of a measure do not undermine the
right of the voters to decide upon each constitutional change
separately, either as a result of expressly incorporating more than one
change or doing so by implication. We endeavor now to answer the
question left open in Marshall; that is, how to determine whether an
amendment by initiative contains two or more separate amendments
in violation of Montana Constitution, Article XIV, Section 11.

25 It is our task to interpret the Constitution by giving “effect to the

intent of the people adopting it.” State ex rel. Hinz v. Moody, 71 Mont.
473, 481, 230 P. 575, 578 (1924). This intent “is to be found in the
instrument itself’ by looking at “the natural signification of the words
employed.” Moody, 71 Mont. at 481-82, 230 P. at 578-79. The separate-
vote requirement states, “If more than one amendment is submitted at
the same election, each shall be so prepared and distinguished that it
can be voted upon separately.” Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 11. The clear
import of this provision is that voters must be allowed to express their
separate opinion as to each proposed constitutional amendment.
Accordingly, this Court is obligated to ensure that voters have the
opportunity to cast separate votes for separate amendments. At the
same time, we must apply the separate-vote requirement in a manner
that does not encumber the right of the people to amend the
Constitution.

26 There is considerable variance in the way other state courts
interpret their separate-vote requirements. See Cambria v. Soaries,
776 A.2d 754, 762-65 (N.J. 2000). At one end of the spectrum are states
that make only a slight distinction between the broader single-subject
requirement and the separate-vote requirement, requiring the parts be
rationally or logically related to each other. See Fugina, 104 N.W.2d at
915. Other states have adopted a more narrow interpretation, but are
still deferential to the single-subject analysis and do not make a
measurable distinction between single-subject and separate-vote
requirements. See, e.g., Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v.
Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 830-31 (Mo. 1990); Milwaukee Alliance Against
Racist and Political Repression v. Elections Bd. of Wis, 317 N.W.2d
420, 425 (Wis. 1982); Carter v. Burson, 198 S.E.2d 151, 156 (Ga. 1973);
Ohio ex rel. Roahrig v. Brown, 282 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio 1972). The
narrowest interpretation of the separate-vote requirement clearly
distinguishes it from the single-subject requirement by requiring there
be a single subject to the proposed amendment and parts so
interdependent that they constitute a whole and cannot be separated.
See Kerby, 36 P.2d at 554 (“[TJhe different changes contained in the
proposed amendment [did not] cover matters necessary to be dealt with
in some manner, in order that the Constitution, as amended, shall
constitute a consistent and workable whole on the general topic
embraced in that part which is amended, and if, logically speaking,
they should stand or fall as a whole, then there is but one amendment
submitted.”). See also Lee v. Utah, 367 P.2d 861, 864 (Utah 1962);
Farris v. Munro, 662 P.2d 821, 825 (Wash. 1983); Armatta, 959 P.2d at
63.

{27 InArmatta, which this Court relied upon in Marshall, the Oregon
Supreme Court concluded the proper inquiry was “whether, if adopted,
the proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution that
are substantive and that are not closely related.” Armatta, 959 P.2d at
64. If the “proposal would effect two or more changes that are
substantive and not closely related, the proposal violates the separate-
vote requirement ... because it would prevent the voters from
expressing their opinions as to each proposed change separately.”
Armatta, 959 P.2d at 64. “In some instances, it will be clear from the
text of the proposed initiative whether it runs afoul of [the separate-
vote requirement]. In other instances, it will be necessary to examine
the implications of the proposal before determining whether it contains
two or more amendments.” Armatta, 959 P.2d at 64.
28 We conclude that the proper inquiry is whether, if adopted, the
proposal would make two or more changes to the Constitution that are
substantive and not closely related. This conclusion is based upon the
language of Article XIV, Section 11; our decision in Marshall
distinguishing between the single-subject and separate-vote
requirements in the context of constitutional amendment by initiative;
our conclusion that the single-subject requirement contained in Article
V, Section 11(3), is inapplicable to constitutional amendments; and the
transcripts of the 1972 Constitutional Convention. Furthermore, if a
proposed constitutional amendment adds new matter to the
Constitution, that proposition is at least one change in and of itself.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Rogers, 288 P.3d 544, 547 (Or. 2012) (citing Lehman
v. Bradbury, 37 P.3d 989, 996 (Or. 2002)). Then, “if a measure has the
effect of modifying an existing constitutional provision, it proposes at
least one additional change to the constitution, whether that effect is
express or implicit.” Rogers, 288 P.3d at 548 (citing Meyer v. Bradbury,
142 P.3d 1031, 1036 (Or. 2006)).
29 Our separate-vote inquiry begins by focusing on the changes CI-
116 makes to the Montana Constitution. We employ well-understood
legal meanings in considering whether changes are substantive: “[aln
essential part of constituent or relating to what is essential.” Black’s
Law Dictionary 1429 (Henry C. Black ed., 6th ed. 1990). Additionally,
numerous factors may be considered in determining whether the
provisions of a proposed constitutional amendment are “closely
related.” These factors may include:

[Whhether various provisions are facially related, whether all the

matters addressed by [the proposition] concern a single section of

the constitution, whether the voters or the legislature historically

has treated the matters addressed as one subject, and whether the
various provisions are qualitatively similar in their effect on
either procedural or substantive law.
McLaughlin v. Bennett, 238 P.3d 619, 622 (Ariz. 2010) (quoting Ariz.
Together v. Brewer, 149 P.3d 742, 746 (Ariz. 2007)). The Oregon
Supreme Court explained Armatta’s “closely related” prong:
First, we examine the relationship among the constitutional
provisions that the measure affects, both explicitly and implicitly.
If the affected provisions of the existing constitution themselves
are not related, then it is likely that changes to those provisions
will offend the separate-vote requirement. That conclusion makes
sense, because it is difficult to make related changes to
unrelated constitutional provisions. However, we decline to
speculate whether the fact that a proposed amendment affects
unrelated provisions of the constitution will be fatal in every case,
because, in doing so, we might underestimate the ability of
initiative petitioners to design careful, constitutionally sound
amendments for the voters to consider. Nonetheless, the fact that.
a proposed amendment asks the people, in one vote, substantively
to change multiple provisions of the Oregon Constitution that are
not themselves related is one indication that the proposed
amendment might violate the separate-vote requirement.
Next, we must consider the constitutional changes themselves.
That is, assuming that the constitutional provisions affected by
the measure are related, we must determine whether the changes
made to those related constitutional provisions are closely related.
If they are closely related, the measure under consideration
survives scrutiny under [the separate-vote requirement). If they
are not, it does not.
Lehman, 37 P.3d at 998 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). See
also League of Or. Cities v. Oregon, 56 P.3d 892, 910 (Or. 2002)
(applying the same closely-related analysis to a proposed constitutional
amendment).
30 Consideration of whether the proposed constitutional changes are
closely related gives appropriate effect to the separate-vote
requirement by ensuring each constitutional amendment receives its
own vote without unduly restricting constitutional change. Other
states have applied similar closely-related analyses to proposed
constitutional amendments and upheld the amendments as
constitutional, demonstrating that a properly constructed
constitutional amendment could certainly be found constitutional

pursuant to our reasoning today. See, e.g., Rogers, 288 P.3d at 552-53
(applying Armatta’s separate-vote analysis to and upholding a
proposed amendment. to Oregon’s Constitution imposing the death
penalty because the changes to multiple areas of the constitution were
closely related); Cambria, 776 A.2d at 765 (applying Armatta’s
separate-vote analysis to and upholding a proposed amendment to New
Jersey's Constitution dedicating revenue streams because the
amendment “constitu[ted] a reasonably integrated whole in which the
parts are closely related to one another”).
q31 We turn now to the text of CI-116 to determine whether its
submission to Montana voters violated the separate-vote requirement.
CI-116 expressly amends Article II of the Montana Constitution by
adding a new Section 36, providing for specific crime victim rights.
Adding a new constitutional provision constitutes one change. CI-116
does not expressly mention, repeal, or otherwise modify any other
areas of the Constitution. However, CI-116 implicitly substantively
changes multiple provisions of Montana’s Constitution, some of which
we now discuss.”

A. CI-116(1)(a) Provides a New Due Process Right for Crime

Victims.
32 Article II, Section 17, of Montana’s Constitution provides an
individual the right of due process:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without.

due process of law.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 17. CI-116 supplements this preexisting
provision with another due process right—one exclusive to crime
victims.
33 The first right CI-116 provides to a crime victim is the right “to
due process and to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s
dignity.” CI-116(1)(a). Accordingly, subsection (1)(a) of CI-116, standing
on its own, creates a new due process guarantee for, specifically, crime
victims. This new due process right for crime victims is a change in
itself because, unlike our existing due process clause, it identifies a
particular group of persons entitled to due process protections.
Identifying and defining a group of persons who are entitled to

° MAGo suggests CT-116 makes at least eight implied changes to the Constitution,
While CI-116 would violate the separate-vote requirement if it made only two
substantive changes that are not closely related, for purposes of illustration we choose
to address six discrete, not closely related, changes CI-116 makes to the Montana
Constitution.

expressly enumerated due process protections may also implicitly
change other areas of the Constitution by effectuating a substantive
change which is not closely related to a victim’s due process right, thus
violating the separate-vote requirement. Although it is difficult to
imagine that a proposed provision granting a due process guarantee to
crime victims would not be closely related to Montana’s existing grant
to persons of a due process guarantee as contained in Montana
Constitution, Article II, we decline to speculate on whether submission
of only CI-116(1)(a) would violate the separate-vote requirement. By
way of illustration, the definition in CI-116 of “crime” and “victim,”
appears broader through its inclusion of various individuals and types
of proceedings than that ascribed to “person” as embodied in our
existing constitutional provision. Nonetheless, for purposes of our
decision today, it is clear that CI-116 as a whole enumerates many
other crime victim rights that are not closely related to our existing
due process guarantee contained in Article II, Section 17.
Consequently, it is unnecessary to determine whether CI-116(1)(a) is
closely related to Article II, Section 17, as CI-116(1)(a) undisputedly
adds matter to an existing constitutional provision and constitutes one
change in itself.

B. CI-116()@) and (2) Affect Montana Constitution Article VII,

Section 2(3)’s Grant of Power to the Supreme Court to Regulate

Attorney Conduct.
134 Article VII, Section 2(3), of Montana’s Constitution provides the
Supreme Court with the authority to “make rules governing ...
admission to the bar and the conduct of its members.” A prosecutor, as
a member of the bar, must obey the Montana Rules of Professional
Conduct (Rules). For example, the Rules prohibit a prosecutor from
“prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
probable cause.” M. R. Pro. Cond. 3.8(a).
435 The purpose of CI-116 is to provide rights to victims “[t]o preserve
and protect a crime victim’s right to justice, to ensure a crime victim
has a meaningful role in criminal and juvenile justice systems, and to
ensure that a crime victim’s rights and interests are respected and
protected by aw in a manner no less vigorous than the protections
afforded toa criminal defendant and a delinquent youth.” CI-116(1)
(emphasis added). One of the ways CI-116 effectuates those purposes
is by giving a victim the right to “confer with the prosecuting attorney.”
CI-116(1)(j). CI-116 also provides that “the prosecuting attorney at the
request of the victim may assert and seek enforcement of the [victim’s]
rights ....” CI-116(2).
86 MM CI-116 changes a prosecutor's duties in a criminal

adjudication. CI-116 requires prosecutors to confer with a victim for
the purposes of preserving and protecting the victim’s right to justice,
ensuring the victim has a meaningful role in the justice system, and
ensuring the victim’s rights and interests are respected and protected
in a manner as vigorous as the protections afforded to a criminal
defendant. CI-116 also gives prosecutors the option to, at the victim’s
request, seek enforcement of the victim’s rights. CI-116 changes the
way a prosecutor must handle a criminal case in which there is a
victim, thus affecting the Supreme Court’s power under Article VII,
Section 2(3), to make rules governing attorney conduct. We conclude
Montana Constitution Article VII, Section 2(3), is substantively
changed by CI-116(1)() and (2), and that the provisions relating to
crime victims’ rights are not closely related to this Court’s
constitutional authority to regulate attorney conduct. Accordingly,
asking the people in one vote to substantively change multiple
provisions of the Constitution which are not closely related violated the
separate-vote requirement.

C. CI-116(1)(g) and (i) Affect Montana Constitution Article II,

Section 21’s Right to Bail.
37 Article II, Section 21, of Montana’s Constitution provides the right
to bail:

All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for

capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption is

great.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 21.
138 [Mj CI-116 affords victims the right to “notice of and to be present
at all proceedings involving the ... release ... of the defendant or youth,”
CI-116(1)(g), and the right “to be heard in any proceeding involving the
release ... of the defendant or youth,” CI-116(1)@). Thus, CI-116
changes an accused’s right to bail provided in Montana Constitution
Article II, Section 21, by constitutionally prohibiting a court from
releasing a defendant or youth on bail until all victims, including
kinship and those having a “substantially similar relationship” to the
victim, are present and heard by the court. CI-116 constitutionally
requires a court not release a defendant until the victim appears and
is heard, substantively affecting Article II, Section 21’s requirement of
bail upon sufficient surety. We conclude Montana Constitution Article
II, Section 21, is substantively changed by CI-116(1)(g) and (i), because
CI-116(1)(g) and (i) add new constitutional requirements to the
preexisting bail provision. The constitutional provision regarding an
accused’s right to bail is not closely related to victims’ rights and the
separate-vote requirement was violated when voters were asked to

consider these multiple amendments in one measure.
D. CI-116(1)(g) and (i) Affect Montana Constitution Article IT,
Section 20’s Criminal Procedure Rules.
39 Article II, Section 20, of Montana’s Constitution provides
constitutional guidelines for initiating criminal proceedings:
(1) Criminal offenses within the jurisdiction of any court inferior
to the district court shall be prosecuted by complaint. All criminal
actions in district court, except those on appeal, shall be
prosecuted either by information, after examination and
commitment by a magistrate or after leave granted by the court,
or by indictment without such examination, commitment or leave.
(2) A grand jury shall consist of eleven persons, of whom eight
must concur to find an indictment. A grand jury shall be drawn
and summoned only at the discretion and order of the district
judge.
Mont. Const. art II, § 20.
440 CI-116 provides a victim with the right “to receive reasonable,
accurate, and timely notice of and to be present at all proceedings
involving the criminal conduct, plea, sentencing, adjudication,
disposition, release, or escape of the defendant or youth accused of
delinquency and any proceeding implicating the rights of the victim.”
CI-116(1)(g). The initiative further grants victims the right “to be
heard in any proceeding involving the release, plea, sentencing,
disposition, adjudication, or parole of the defendant or youth accused
of delinquency and any proceeding implicating the rights of the victim.”
CI-116(1)(4).
141 MI CI-116 thus requires courts give the victim notice of, allow the
victim to be present at, and give the victim the opportunity to be heard
at various hearings. These rights given to the victim add steps to the
procedures a court is constitutionally required to take under Article II,
Section 20, in initiating proceedings against a defendant and drawing
a grand jury. We conclude Article II, Section 20, of Montana’s
Constitution is substantively changed by CI-116(1)(g) and (i) and that
the preexisting constitutional provision related to initiation of criminal
proceedings is not closely related to crime victims’ rights.
E. CI-116(1)(e) and (f) Affect Montana Constitution Article II,
Section 24’s Rights of the Accused.
42 Article II, Section 24, of Montana’s Constitution provides rights of
the accused:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel; to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the witnesses against.

him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf, and a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have
been committed, subject to the right of the state to have a change
of venue for any of the causes for which the defendant may obtain
the same.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. As a “corollary to [Article II, Section 24’s]
fundamental right to defend,” a defendant has “the right to conduct
investigations and otherwise prepare a defense to the charges.” State
v. Couture, 2010 MT 201, | 77, 357 Mont. 398, 240 P.3d 987.
443 CI-116 provides a victim with the right “to prevent the disclosure
of information that could be used to locate or harass the victim or that
contains confidential or privileged information about the victim.” CI-
116(1)(e). The initiative further provides a victim with the right “to
privacy, including the right to refuse an interview, deposition, or other
discovery request and to set reasonable conditions on the conduct of
any interaction to which the victim consents.” CI-116(1)(f).
144 MCI-116 changes the accused’s constitutional rights enumerated
in Article II, Section 24. CI-116(1)(e) changes a defendant’s right to
discover any information he or she may be entitled to under Article II,
Section 24, that “could be used to locate or harass the victim or that
contains confidential or privileged information about the victim.”
CI-116(1)(f) also changes a defendant’s right to discover information he
or she may be entitled to under Article II, Section 24, by giving victims
and those close to the victim as defined in CI-116(4)(b)(i) the right to
“refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request.” We
conclude Montana Constitution, Article II, Section 24, is substantively
changed by CI-116(1)(e) and (f). Further, sections (1)(e) and (f) are not
closely related to our preexisting constitutional provision establishing
basic constitutional rights of the accused, including the right to
discover information, meet accusers, and prepare a defense.
F. CI-116(1)(f) and (4)(b) Affect Montana Constitution Article II,
Section 9’s Right to Know and Section 10’s Right of Privacy.
445 Article II, Section 9, of Montana’s Constitution provides the
public’s right to know:
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or
to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state
government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the
demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public
disclosure.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 9.
{46 Article II, Section 10, of Montana’s Constitution provides for an

individual's right of privacy:

The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a

free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a

compelling state interest.
Mont. Const. art II, § 10. The public’s right to know, Article II, Section
9, is balanced against the individual's right of privacy, Article II,
Section 10. Montana Constitutional Convention, Committee Proposals,
February 23, 1972, p. 631. Consistent with this interpretation by the
Delegates, we have likewise found the two constitutional provisions are
evaluated using a carefully designed, fact-intensive, balancing test.
See, e.g., Billings Gazette v. Billings, 2013 MT 334, {] 14-16, 372 Mont.
409, 318 P.3d 129; Missoula Cnty. Pub. Sch. v. Bitterroot Star, 2015
MT 95, {1 11, 378 Mont. 451, 345 P.3d 1035. The right of privacy is an
individual right and therefore cannot be invoked by all legally defined
“persons,” such as corporations or other groups. Montana
Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, p.
1680; Great Falls Tribune v. Mont. PSC, 2003 MT 359, | 33, 319 Mont.
88, 82 P.3d 876. Thus, the right to know, Article II, Section 9, is limited
only by a natural person’s right of privacy, and may not be limited by
the privacy interests of corporations or groups. Great Falls Tribune,
37.
47 CI-116(1)(f) provides a crime victim with the right “to privacy,
including the right to refuse an interview, deposition, or other
discovery request and to set reasonable conditions on the conduct of
any interaction to which the victim consents.” Thus, CI-116 creates an
entirely new privacy interest for victims, extended family members,
and others with “similar relationships.”
148 MM CI-116 affects Article II, Section 10’s right of privacy and the
balancing test between the right of privacy and the right to know.
Aside from providing a new constitutional right to a particular class of
persons—crime victims—which is a change in itself to the
Constitution, CI-116 affects the balancing test employed between two
preexisting constitutional provisions, the right of privacy and the right
to know. Further, CI-116 gives the right of privacy to extended family
members and others with similar relationships to the victim. Finally,
CI-116(4)(b) specifically defines a victim as a “person” who suffers
direct. or threatened harm. In contrast, the term “person,” as
recognized by the Delegates, includes corporations and other non-
human entities. Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim
Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1680. Accordingly, “persons” entitled to
a right to privacy under CI-116 would be different than under the
constitutional provisions of Article II, Section 9, the public’s right to

know, and Section 10, an individual’s right of privacy. We conclude
Montana Constitution Article II, Sections 9 and 10, are substantively
changed by CI-116(1)(f) and (4)(b) and that the people should have been
afforded the right to vote on each amendment separately.

q49 To summarize, CI-116 adds a new Section 36 to Article II of
Montana’s Constitution, substantively changing the Constitution by
enumerating rights for victims. The preexisting constitutional
provisions that are substantively changed by CI-116 include Article
VII, Section 2(3)’s grant of power to the Supreme Court to govern
attorney conduct; Article II, Section 21’s right to bail; Article II, Section
20’s criminal procedure rules; Article II, Section 24’s rights of the
accused; Article II, Section 9’s right to know; and Article II, Section
10’s right of privacy.

{50 Some of these provisions are related in the broad sense that they
are implicated during a criminal prosecution. For example, Article II,
Section 21’s right to bail, Article II, Section 20’s criminal procedure
rules, and Article II, Section 24’s rights of the accused all seek to
protect an accused’s fundamental rights during a criminal proceeding.
However, a broad relationship between various provisions or a broad
single subject does not satisfy the narrower interpretation of the
separate-vote requirement we adopted in Marshall because voters did
not have the opportunity to convey their opinions as to each
constitutional provision changed by CI-116. For instance, voters should
have had the option to independently decide if they wished to change
the accused’s right to bail by adding CI-116(1)(g) and/or (i); if they
wished to change criminal procedure rules by adding CI-116(1\(g)
and/or (i); if they wished to change rights of the accused by adding CI-
116(1)(e) and/or (f); and if they wished to change the right to know and
the right of privacy by adding CI-116(1)(f) and/or (4)(b). Further, not all
of the affected provisions share even the broad connection of relating
to a criminal prosecution or victim’s rights. For example, attorney
conduct, Article VII, Section 2(3), is not closely related to the right of
privacy, Article II, Section 10, and neither of those provisions is closely
related to the accused’s right to bail, Article II, Section 21. Each of
these amendments should have been presented to the electorate
individually. Separate votes on each change would have protected the
integrity of the vote and ensured that voters had complete control over
each amendment made to the Montana Constitution.

151 [J CI-116 violates the separate-vote requirement and for that
reason is void in its entirety. The Montana Constitution may only be
amended pursuant to Article XIV. A constitutional amendment is
invalid unless it is formed and adopted in a manner consistent with

Article XIV. Marshall, | 26 (citing Waltermire, 227 Mont. at 90-91, 738
P.2d at 1258). Moreover, a constitutional amendment submitted to the
electorate in violation of the separate-vote requirement is void in its
entirety because the constitutional “defect lies in the submission of
[the proposed amendment] to the voters of Montana with more than
one constitutional amendment.” Marshall, {25 (emphasis in original).
52 CI-116 impliedly changed Montana’s Constitution in numerous
ways and we deem those changes to be both substantive and not closely
related. When voters were required to vote “yes” or “no” for CI-116 in
its entirety, they were forced to vote for or against multiple, not closely
related, changes to the Montana Constitution with one vote. Voters
had no way to express their opinions as to each proposed constitutional
change. The way in which CI-116 was submitted to the electorate
violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11.
Therefore, we declare CI-116 void in its entirety. We void the
enactment of CI-116, enjoin its implementation and enforcement, and
decertify the election results with respect to CI-116.

453 We reiterate that our decision is not based on the merits of the
constitutional changes proposed by CI-116. Montana Constitution,
Article XIV, Section 9, clearly grants the people initiative power to
popularly amend the Constitution as they deem necessary, even if an
amendment affects other portions of the Constitution. However, the
procedure by which the Montana Constitution is amended must comply
with existing constitutional requirements. Article XIV, Section 11, is
specifically designed to ensure voters have complete control over each
and every constitutional change. Our decision today is based solely on
our conclusion that CI-116 contains more than one constitutional
amendment, each of which required a separate vote under Article XIV,
Section 11.

CONCLUSION
54 We hold Montana Constitution, Article V, Section 11(3)’s single-
subject requirement does not apply to constitutional amendments.
Therefore, we do not address MACo’s argument that CI-116 violates
Article V, Section 11(3). We expand upon our analysis of Montana
Constitution, Article XIV, Section 11’s separate-vote requirement and
hold a proposed constitutional amendment violates the separate-vote
requirement if it substantively changes two or more parts of the
Constitution that are not closely related. Applying that analysis to CI-
116, we hold CI-116 violates the separate-vote requirement and is
therefore void in its entirety.
DATED this 1st day of November, 2017.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SHEA, WHEAT and
SANDEFUR concur.

JUSTICE RICE, dissenting.
{55 I believe the Court has adopted a deeply flawed test for
application of the submission requirement of Article XIV, Section 11,
of the Montana Constitution, which is not rooted in the text of the
Constitution. The effect of this decision may be to significantly
undermine, if not eliminate, the right of Montanans to amend the
Constitution by initiative. This is not merely my opinion, but the
experience of other courts. Respectfully, I believe the Court has failed
to “apply the separate-vote requirement in a manner that does not
encumber the right of the people to amend the Constitution.” Opinion,
q 25.
{56 Before discussing these concerns, I begin with the threshold
concern that the Court has, in my view, violated justiciability
principles by exercising original jurisdiction of this constitutional
challenge. The judicial power of Montana’s courts is limited to
‘Susticiable controversies.” Reichert v. State, 2012 MT 111, | 53, 365
Mont. 92, 278 P.3d 455. This constitutional limitation, deriving from
Article VII, Section 4(1) of the Montana Constitution, “embodies the
same limitations as are imposed on federal courts by the ‘case or
controversy’ language of Article III” of the United States Constitution.
Mont. Immigrant Justice Alliance v. Bullock, 2016 MT 104, { 18, 383
Mont. 318, 371 P.8d 480 (citing Plan Helena, Inc. v. Helena Regi
Airport Auth. Bd., 2010 MT 26, {1 6, 355 Mont. 142, 226 P.3d 567).
Among the central components of justiciability is the doctrine of
ripeness, which is concerned with whether the case presents an
“actual, present” controversy. Reichert, 154 (citing Mont. Power Co. v.
Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 2001 MT 102, {| 32, 305 Mont. 260, 26 P.3d
91). The “prudential component” of the ripeness doctrine includes a
fitness inquiry. Reichert, 1 56. “The principal consideration under the
fitness inquiry is whether there is a factually adequate record upon
which to base effective review.” Reichert, | 56 (citing Havre Daily
News, LLC v. City of Havre, 2006 MT 215, {| 20, 333 Mont. 331, 142
P.3d 864). “The more the question presented is purely one of law, and
the less that additional facts will aid the court in its inquiry, the more
likely the issue is to be ripe, and vice-versa.” Reichert, {| 56 (citing
Havre Daily News, {] 20).
57 Similarly, the doctrine of judicial restraint cautions against the
premature exercise of judicial authority. “Neither federal nor state
Constitution has granted such power” to decide “abstract differences

of opinion,” but rather cases and controversies must be “real
controversies.” Hardy v. Krutzfeldt, 206 Mont. 521, 526, 672 P.2d 274,
276 (1983) (citing Chovanak v. Matthews, 120 Mont. 520, 525-26, 188
P.2d 582, 584 (1948)). “We have followed this same principle of judicial
restraint” under our new Constitution, as under the former
Constitution. Roosevelt v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 1999 MT 30, {] 48,
293 Mont. 240,975 P.2d 295 (citing Olson v. Dept of Revenue, 223
Mont. 464, 469-70, 726 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1986)). Especially when a
“constitutional violation is claimed to have occurred,” the plaintiff must
allege “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of
issues. ...” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703, 7 L. Ed.
2d 663, 678 (1962). We have explained that:
This Court ... has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either
of a state or of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with
the constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal
rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the exercise of that
jurisdiction, it is bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly
adhered: one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other never to
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied.
Roosevelt, {| 49 (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-22, 80
S. Ct. 519, 522-23, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529-30 (1960) (emphasis added).
58 Beyond fitness and judicial restraint principles, this Court is to
exercise original jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment matter only
when constitutional issues of statewide importance are involved,
urgency and emergency factors exist making the normal appeal process
inadequate, and “the case involves purely legal questions of statutory
and constitutional construction.” Hernandez v. Bd. of Cnty. Comms,
2008 MT 251, 1 9, 345 Mont. 1, 189 P.3d 638 (citing Montanans for the
Coal Trust v. State, 2000 MT 13, {| 27, 298 Mont. 69, 996 P.2d 856)
(emphasis added); see also M. R. Civ. P. 14(4); Mont. Const. art. VII,
§§ 1-2.
{59 Consequently, the requisite questions are 1) whether there is
concrete adverseness and not an “abstract difference of opinion,” 2)
whether we are faced with purely legal questions of constitutional
construction, and 3) whether there is a factually adequate record for
effective review. However, the task of answering these questions in this
case has been complicated by the Court’s adoption, discussed below, of
acomplicated constitutional test requiring multiple determinations to

be made for its application. While the issue as framed by the Court
sounds in procedure—whether there was error “in the submission of
[CI-116] to the voters of Montana,” Opinion, {| 51,—in reality, the test.
requires the Court to analyze the substantive content and effect of the
initiative, which, in turn, makes a factual record even more critical.
60 Here, as the Court notes, CI-116 has not yet been implemented.
With no information about its implementation, Petitioners have
theorized about its application to allege their injury. See Petitioners’
briefing (petitioner MACo members will be required to “seek tax
increases, etc.” and “to hire victim-support staff and additional
attorneys;” petitioner county attorney will be injured “via raised taxes
or fees, or fewer services;” petitioner lawyer’s “ability to serve her
[victim] clients will be injured by diminished funding for victim-
services”). Petitioner Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys alleges
simply that the rights of its members’ clients to “traditional” due
process protections “will be diminished.” Petitioner ACLU of Montana
Foundation alleges in like fashion that “some [of its members] will in
the future be accused of a crime and be injured by application of
Section 36.” However, no factfinding whatsoever has occurred to
confirm any of these assertions, and they are, at this stage, merely
“abstract differences of opinion” regarding the impact of the
implementation of CI-116, dependent upon how a court interprets and
applies its provisions to particular circumstances. Hardy, 206 Mont. at
526, 672 P.2d at 276.

{61 The Court states that “the question of whether CI-116 violates the
Montana Constitution involves purely legal questions of constitutional
interpretation,” Opinion, {| 2, but Petitioners’ untethered allegations
and absence of a record force the Court to make factual assumptions,
such as its vague findings that CI-116 “changes a prosecutor’s duties”
and will “add steps” to criminal proceedings. Opinion, {| 36, 41. This
problem is notable within the Court’s analysis of the right to privacy
in Issue 1f. Lacking a factual record of an actual privacy claim by a
victim, the Court makes the assumption that any such claim would
“substantively change[]” Article II, Sections 9 and 10, and fails to
recognize that the privacy interest created by CI-116 is textually much
different. Opinion, {] 48. Article II, Section 10 provides a broad-based
privacy right to every individual, potentially applicable to any number
of circumstances, as “essential to the well-being of a free society.” In
contrast, the text of CI-116 recognizes a more limited right of privacy
applicable to crime victims during a criminal proceeding. The right
granted under CI-116 may well lead to claims that are narrower in
scope and warrant a narrower remedy, which may be possible to

harmonize with the Article II privacy right, as is our duty. Indeed,
other jurisdictions have determined that victim rights of privacy do not
create an absolute right, but rather a flexible right allowing courts to
weigh the circumstances of each case. See e.g. State v. Gonzalez, 912
P.2d 297, 300 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting argument that victims’
rights amendment created an “absolute” privilege against inspection
of victim’s medical records by the trial court or subsequent disclosure
to other parties); State of Maryland v. WBAL-TV, 975 A.2d 909, 922-23
(Md. Ct. App. 2009) (victims’ right amendment “does not ... provide
victims with an absolute right to veto a request to access and copy
court records”).

{62 Similarly, the problem is notable in the Court’s application of a
prosecutor’s duties in issue 1(b). The Court acknowledges that the text
of CI-116(1)G) gives a victim only a right to “confer with the
prosecuting attorney,” a limited right that is already common practice.
Opinion, {| 35. Lacking a factual record, the Court must assume how
the provision will be applied, and concludes that a victim’s right to
confer with a prosecutor will “change[] the way a prosecutor must
handle a criminal case.” Opinion, {| 36. The court first reasons that a
prosecutor “must obey the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct”
which prohibit “prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause.” Opinion, {| 34. Then, the Court assumes
that prosecutors will interpret a victim’s right to “confer with the
prosecuting attorney” as tantamount to giving the victim the power to
force prosecutions, in turn forcing the prosecutor to pursue a case that
is “not supported by probable cause[,]” and will thus affect our ability
to make rules governing attorney conduct. Opinion, {| 34-36. These
assumptions stray from the limited right for a victim to meet with a
prosecutor, which may be possible to harmonize with existing
constitutional provisions. At this point, we do not know how the new
constitutional interests will be raised and what remedy will be claimed.
The Court is basing its constitutional ruling upon its deduction about
how the provisions will be interpreted and applied.

q63 As we stated earlier in this case, “we use the same rules of
construction to interpret constitutional initiatives that we use to
interpret statutes.” Mont. Cnty. Attys. Ass’n v. State, 387 Mont. 534, *2
(citation omitted). “Where there are several statutory provisions or
particulars, the Court construes them, if possible, to give effect to all.
Section 1-2-101, MCA.” Olson v. Daughenbaugh, 2001 MT 284, {1 16,
307 Mont. 371, 38 P.3d 154. Likewise, we are to interpret provisions “in
a manner that gives effect to the legislature’s intent if possible.”
Weidow v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 2010 MT 292, {| 22, 359 Mont.

77, 246 P.3d 704. However, we cannot now know if our interpretational
duty to harmonize these constitutional provisions is possible to fulfill.
Without a specific claim and a factual record, it is impossible to
properly determine whether a constitutional conflict exists that cannot
be reconciled.

64 This is likewise true of the other constitutional conflicts that the
Court perceives in CI-116. Without a factual record, the Court cannot
determine whether it is possible to balance competing constitutional
interests, a duty we are often compelled to perform. See Galt v. State,
225 Mont. 142, 148, 731 P.2d 912, 916 (1987) (balancing the
constitutional interests of private landowners under Article IX, Section
7 and Article II, Section 3 with the public’s property interest in water
under Article IX, Section 3); Krakauer v. State, 2016 MT 230, {| 36, 384
Mont. 527, 381 P.3d 524 (competing constitutional interests should be
addressed in a case-by-case basis and according to the facts of each
case). How particular constitutional rights will be weighed and
balanced with other such rights is a matter that can only be decided in
the factual context of an actual, concrete legal dispute.

165 Because “additional facts [would] aid the court in its inquiry,”
Reichert, {| 56, and decisively so, I would conclude that the petition
fails to present a ripe issue, that we are not faced with purely legal
questions of constitutional interpretation, and that the factual record
is inadequate for effective review. While the Court offers that “normal
litigation and appeal processes are inadequate because implementation
of CI-116 is imminent,” Opinion, {| 2, this provides no basis under our
precedent to exercise original jurisdiction. All enacted laws become
imminently enforceable.

{66 While I could stop at this point, my deep concerns about the
Court’s new test for application of the separate-vote requirement of
Article XIV, Section 11, lead me to discuss the merits of the Court’s
constitutional analysis. In Marshall v. State, 1999 MT 33, 293 Mont.
274, 975 P.2d 325, this Court invalidated CI-75 for violating the
separate vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11. We first found
that “CI-75 specifically amends three parts of Montana’s Constitution.”
Marshall, | 24. The Court determined that the text of CI-75 expressly
amended Article VIII, Article II, Section 18, and Article VI, Section 10,
of the Constitution. Marshall, | 24. Then, the Court concluded
“[blecause CI-75 expressly amends three parts of Montana’s
Constitution but does not allow a separate vote for each amendment,
we hold that CI-75 violates Article XIV, Section 11, of Montana’s
Constitution.” Marshall, {| 24.

q67 The Court in Marshall was guided by the Oregon Supreme Court’s

decision in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49 (Or. 1998). Although

acknowledging that the Montana Constitution differs from the Oregon

Constitution, Opinion, {| 22, the Court today more fully incorporates

principles from Armatta, which, in my opinion, do not correspond to the

Montana Constitution. The Court also adds additional requirements

of its own to formulate a new test. The Court holds:
[T]he proper inquiry is whether, if adopted, the proposal would
make two or more changes to the constitution that are substantive
and not closely related. Moreover, if a proposed constitutional
amendment adds new language to the constitution, that.
proposition is at least one change in and of itself. Then ‘if a
measure has the effect of modifying an existing constitutional
provision, it proposes at least one additional change to the
constitution, whether that effect is explicit or implicit.’

Opinion, {| 28, (citations omitted).

{68 Then, the Court adopts further holdings from the Armatta line of

authority to instruct its “closely related” component:
First, we examine the relationship among the constitutional
provisions that the measure affects, both explicitly and implicitly.
If the affected provisions of the existing constitution themselves
are not related, then it is likely that changes to those provisions
will offend the separate-vote requirement...

Next, we must consider the constitutional changes themselves.
That is, assuming that the constitutional provisions affected by
the measure are closely related, we must determine whether the
changes made to those related constitutional provisions are closely
related. If they are closely related, the measure under
consideration survives scrutiny under [the separate-vote
requirement]. If they are not, it does not.
Opinion, {] 29.
469 Thus, under the Court’s new test, if a constitutional initiative adds
new language to the constitution, “that proposition is at least one
change in and of itself.” Opinion, {| 28. Then, if the initiative “has the
effect of modifying” an existing constitutional provision in a way that
is deemed “unrelated” to the new text, whether such modification is
express or implied, then such an “effect” must also be counted as “one
additional change to the constitution,” requiring a separate vote.
Opinion, {| 28. Applying the new test here, the Court concludes that CI-
116 is invalid in seven different. ways, reasoning that the initiative
“affects” seven different existing provisions of the Montana
Constitution, each of which required a separate vote, in addition to the

vote taken on the text of CI-116 itself, for a total of eight votes.
Opinion, {| 31-49.

{70 This new formula, whereby a textual “proposition” is counted as
“one change in and of itself,” while the measure’s “effect” upon an
existing constitutional provision is counted as a second change,
Opinion, {] 28, is inconsistent with the language of Article XIV,
Section 11, which is premised upon the concept of “amendments,” not
“propositions” and “effects.” The distinction is illustrated by the Court's
analysis of the right to privacy.

71 CI-116 provides that crime victims have the right “to privacy,
including the right to refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery
request and to set reasonable conditions on the conduct of any
interaction to which the victim consents.” CI-116(1)(f). Applying its
new test to this clause, the Court first reasons that CI-116 “providles]
a new constitutional right to ... crime victims” which is a “change in
itselfl.!” Opinion, | 48. Then the Court reasons that this new clause
also “substantively changels]” Article II, Section 9, the publie’s right to
know, and Section 10, an individual's right to privacy, which requires
a separate vote because of how it “affect[{s]” the two constitutional
provisions, thus concluding that the clause must receive a separate
vote for its adoption. Opinion, | 48. However, what has been lost in the
application of the test’s components is that the two concepts identified
by the Court are two sides of the same amendment coin: one side is the
new text, while the other side is the effect of the new text. Article XIV,
Section 11, does not require separate votes for text and effect, but for
wholly separate amendments, and we should analyze the issue in that
way—as we did in Marshall.

72 To be clear, I agree with the Court that a constitutional initiative
could have the effect of amending one or more articles of the
Constitution even though the initiative’s text does not expressly
identify or add new language to the amended articles. Thus, I concur
with the Court’s assessment that in Marshall, n.2, we left open the
possibility that such an initiative could run afoul of Article XIV,
Section 11. Opinion, | 24.' My disagreement lies in the test adopted by
the Court for identifying these separate amendments. As recognized by
other courts, the Court’s test is problematic because it will lead to the
invalidation of challenged constitutional initiatives that do not actually
effectuate multiple amendments, severely undermining citizen rights.

1] also concur with the Court’s statement that the single-subject requirement does
not apply to constitutional amendments. Opinion, | 20.

q73 The Armatta approach—that is, adoption of “an exacting
functional relationship test” for application of a constitutional
separate-vote requirement, as the Court does here by way of its
“closely-related” requirement, Opinion, {|{] 28-29—has been recognized
as the “minority rule” among the states, and was once thought
dormant. Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson, 134 P.38d
299, 322 (Cal. 2006) (explaining that the Armatta approach was “an
essentially dormant minority position until the Supreme Court of
Oregon—without citing any of them or acknowledging the majority
tule cases discussed above—revived this strict interpretation of the
separate-vote provision in 1998.”). While courts must faithfully
interpret their own unique constitutions, the majority and minority
positions on this issue have been acknowledged in case law and
scholarship, wherein it is recognized that “it is clear” the full Armatta
approach “is indeed a demanding one” that leads to the predictable
conclusion that “most proposed constitutional amendments will fail”
under its application. McPherson, 134 P.3d at 322-23 (“Indeed, in the
few other jurisdictions that recently have embraced (explicitly or
implicitly) Armatta’s interpretation of the separate-vote provision
under their own constitutions, the results have, with one exception,
been consistent with the recent Oregon experience” of striking down
challenged initiatives.). Commentary has noted the difficulty in
drafting an initiative that can survive application of the Armatta test.
See Phillip Bentley, Armatta v. Kitzhaber: A New Test Safeguarding
the Oregon Constitution from Amendment by Initiative, 78 Or. L. Rev.
1139, 1154-56 (1999).

74 This precipitous invalidation of initiatives likely will occur under
the Court’s analysis here. I note again the Court’s analysis of CI-116’s
right to privacy provision. If CI-116, in its entirety, would have
provided only that victims have a right “to privacy, including the right
to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request and to set
reasonable conditions on the conduct of any interaction to which the
victim consents,” see CI-116(1)(f), and said nothing else, it would
nonetheless still violate the separate-vote requirement under the
Court’s test, and be invalid. This is because it adds a new section to the
Constitution—requiring one vote—and also constitutes an “unrelated”
implied change to the existing privacy provision—requiring a second
vote. See Opinion, {| 31-49. Few initiatives will survive the

microscopic judicial review created herein.”

{75 Instead, we should use the test that is consistent with the
language of Article XIV, Section 11, our constitutional history,” and our
case law. In Marshall, while taking “guidance” from Armatta, we did
not adopt that holding wholesale. Rather, we employed an analysis
founded upon our own Constitution, which is premised on whole
“amendments.” We made a straight-forward determination that the
text of CI-75 amended the Constitution in three ways—without regard
to the numerous concepts employed here by the Court. Marshall, 124.
The same approach can be used for initiatives that amend the
Constitution without the use of explicit language—as the Court

? Similarly, if CI-116, in its entirety, would have provided only that “crime victims
have the right to due process and be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s
dignity,” see CI-116(1)\(a), and said nothing else, it would nonetheless still violate the
separate-vote requirement under the Court's test, and be invalid. This is because it adds
anew section to the Constitution—requiring one vote, and also constitutes an unrelated
implicit change to the existing due process provision—requiring a second vote. See
Opinion, 1 33.

* The Court states that the 1972 Constitution changed the separate-vote
requirement because the new constitution allowed amendment by initiative. Opinion,
{] 19 (concluding “the 1972 Constitution’s amendment by initiative interjected a new
element into the separate-vote requirement. ...”). However, nothing in the text or history
of the separate-vote requirement would support this contention. Rather, the 1972
drafters unanimously adopted the same separate amendment rule from the prior
constitution, Mont. Const. Conv. Proc. Vol. I, 354 (1972) (hereafter Committee Report),
and made only stylistic changes to the rule. See Mont. Const. Conv. Proc. Vol. IV, 1195
(1972). The Style and Drafting Committee simplified the language to its present form:
“If more than one amendment is submitted in the same election, each shall be so
prepared and distinguished that it can be voted upon separately.” The language from the
1889 separate-amendment rule read: “Should more amendments than one be submitted.
at the same election, they shall be so prepared and distinguished by numbers or
otherwise that each can be voted upon separately.” Mont. Const. art XIX, § 9 (1889).

The 1969 Legislature appointed a Constitutional Revision Committee, which
contemplated how a new constitution might be amended by initiative. The basic purpose
of the Committee was to make “a fundamental yet flexible document” for constitutional
amendments. Committee Report, at 354. The Committee recognized the importance of
constitutional initiatives, recognizing a “further guarantee that the people will retain a
firm hold on the power of constituting government.” Committee Report, at 358. The
Committee stated that constitutional amendments were “an inherent right in a body
politic whose Constitution is to be the embodiment of the will of the people.” Committee
Report, at 363. The purpose of allowing popular initiatives was to avoid “cumbersome
procedural detail,” which had been a “burden to often-popular Constitutional change,”
and to preclude the Supreme Court from voiding proposed amendments because of a
“slight procedural irregularity.” Mont. Const. Conv. Proc. Vol. I, 362 (1972)

suggested in footnote #2. The question is, does the initiative
substantively constitute more than one amendment? Such an approach
would not invalidate an initiative merely because it contained text that
changed or revised more than one article of the Constitution, as long
as those revisions were part of one complete, substantive amendment.
Further, this straight-forward, constitutionally-based approach would
avoid the flawed formulaic approach of assessing the text and the effect
separately.
{76 Most importantly, so holding would affirm the promise of Article
IL, Section 2, of the Montana Constitution, whether the courts think it
good policy or not:
The people have the exclusive right of governing themselves as a
free, sovereign, and independent state. They may alter or abolish
the constitution and form of government whenever they deem it
necessary.
77 I dissent.
JUSTICE BAKER joins in the dissenting Opinion of JUSTICE
RICE.

Appendix A
Constitutional Initiative 116

(1) To preserve and protect a crime victim’s right to justice, to ensure
a crime victim has a meaningful role in criminal and juvenile justice
systems, and to ensure that a crime victim’s rights and interests are
respected and protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than the
protections afforded to a criminal defendant and a delinquent youth,
a crime victim has the following rights, beginning at the time of
victimization:

(a) to due process and to be treated with fairness and respect for

the victim’s dignity;

(b) to be free from intimidation, harassment, and abuse;

(c) to be reasonably protected from the accused and any person

acting on the accused’s behalf;

(d) to have the victim’s safety and welfare considered when setting

bail and making release decisions;

(e) to prevent the disclosure of information that could be used to

locate or harass the victim or that contains confidential or

privileged information about the victim;

(f) to privacy, including the right to refuse an interview,

deposition, or other discovery request and to set reasonable

conditions on the conduct of any interaction to which the victim

consents;

216

(g) to receive reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of and to be
present at all proceedings involving the criminal conduct, plea,
sentencing, adjudication, disposition, release, or escape of the
defendant or youth accused of delinquency and any proceeding
implicating the rights of the victim;

(h) to be promptly notified of any release or escape of the accused;
(i) to be heard in any proceeding involving the release, plea,
sentencing, disposition, adjudication, or parole of the defendant or
youth accused of delinquency and any proceeding implicating the
rights of the victim;

(j) to confer with the prosecuting attorney;

(k) to provide information regarding the impact the offender’s
conduct had on the victim for inclusion in the presentence or
predisposition investigation report and to have the information
considered in any sentencing or disposition recommendations
submitted to the court;

(1) to receive a copy of any presentence report and any other report.
or record relevant to the exercise of a right of the victim, except
for those portions made confidential by law;

(m) to the prompt return of the victim’s property when no longer
needed as evidence in the case;

(n) to full and timely restitution. All money and property collected
from a person who has been ordered to make restitution must be
applied first to the restitution owed to the victim before paying
any amounts owed to the government.

(0) to proceedings free from unreasonable delay and to a prompt
and final conclusion of the case and any related postjudgment.
proceedings;

(p) to be informed of the conviction, sentence, adjudication, place
and time of incarceration, or other disposition of the offender,
including any scheduled release date, actual release date, or
escape;

(q) to be informed of clemency and expungement procedures; to
provide information to the Governor, the court, any clemency
board, or any other authority and to have that information
considered before a decision is made; and to be notified of any
decision before the release of the offender; and

(r) to be informed of the above rights and to be informed that the
victim may seek the advice and assistance of an attorney with
respect to the above rights. This information must be made
available to the general public and provided to all crime victims
on what is referred to as a Marsy’s card.

(2) A victim, the victim’s attorney, the victim’s legal representative, or
the prosecuting attorney at the request of the victim may assert and
seek enforcement of the rights enumerated in this section and any
other right afforded to the victim by law in any trial or appellate court
or any other authority with jurisdiction over the case as a matter of
right. The court or other authority shall act promptly on the request,
affording a remedy by due course of law for the violation of any right.
The reasons for any decision regarding disposition of a victim’s right
must be clearly stated on the record.
(3) This section may not be construed to deny or disparage other rights
possessed by victims. This section applies to criminal and youth court
proceedings, is self-executing, and requires no further action by the
Legislature.
(4) As used in this section, the following definitions apply:
(a) “Crime” means an act defined as a felony, misdemeanor, or
delinquency under state law.
(b) “Victim” means a person who suffers direct. or threated
physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the
commission or attempted commission of a crime.
(i) The term includes:
(A) aspouse, parent, grandparent, child, sibling, grandchild, or
guardian of the victim;
(B) a person with a relationship to the victim that is
substantially similar to a relationship described in subsection
(4)(b)G)(A); and
(C) a representative of a victim who is a minor or who is
deceased, incompetent or incapacitated.
(ii) The term does not include the accused or a person who the
court. believes would not act in the best interests of a minor or of
a victim who is deceased, incompetent or incapacitated.
Mont. Const. art IT, § 36 (2017), https://perma.cc/VQ76-WRAJ.

DEANNA H. McATEE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
WHITEFISH CREDIT UNION; and
MORRISON AND FRAMPTON, PLLP,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 17-0037.
Submitted on Briefs August 23, 2017.
Decided November 7, 2017.

2017 MT 268.

389 Mont. 218.

405 P.3d 70.

For Appellant: Mark M. Kovacich, Ben A. Snipes, Kovacich
Snipes, P.C., Great Falls; Michael J. McKeon, Jr., McKeon Law,
PLLC, Butte.

For Appellee Whitefish Credit Union: Scott D. Hagel, Crowley
Fleck PLLP, Kalispell.
For Appellee Morrison & Frampton, PLLP: Brian J. Smith,
Tessa A. Keller, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula.
JUSTICE WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 This appeal comes from the District Court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss finding McAtee’s amended complaint constituted improper
serial litigation.
{2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:
Did the District Court err in granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss McAtee’s amended complaint when it found that the action
constituted improper serial litigation pursuant to § 3-1-502, MCA?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{3 McAtee is the owner of The Mortgage Source (TMS), a mortgage
company that brokered loans under a line of credit with Whitefish
Credit Union (WCU). McAtee brokered a construction loan, which the
borrowers defaulted on in 2008. McAtee was included on the loan as a
personal guarantor, and TMS held a trust indenture on the property
and assigned its interest in the trust indenture to WCU. The
assignment. was not recorded. Subsequently, WCU, through its
attorneys, Morrison and Frampton, PLLP (M&F), filed suit against
TMS to foreclose on the defaulted loan. WCU alleged that when the
borrowers defaulted, the construction was unfinished; McAtee then
borrowed money from a friend to finish it, and put his interest as first
priority secured mortgage. WCU alleged McAtee pledged WCU’s
collateral rather than TMS’s collateral as security for the mortgage to
the new lender, leaving WCU with an unsecured loan. WCU alleged
fraud in the foreclosure by McAtee. These allegations led to criminal
fraud charges against McAtee. The District Court determined that the
new lender was a bona fide purchaser for value, so WCU no longer had
asecured interest. Ultimately, both the criminal and civil fraud claims
were dismissed. WCU alleges it dismissed all of its claims against
McAtee when she went through bankruptcy.

q4 InSeptember 2014, prior to the resolution of these claims, McAtee
filed a motion for leave to amend her answer in the WCU foreclosure
case to add M&F as a party to the action and to assert claims for
malicious prosecution and abuse of process. In December 2014, the
District Court denied McAtee’s motion to amend her answer in the
WCU complaint, reasoning the parties had been litigating for over
three years, sufficient time for McAtee to “clarify and solidify” her

allegations.

{5 McAtee filed the instant case, as a separate action against WCU
and M&F, for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. On January
80, 2015, McAtee amended this complaint. On March 5, 2015, WCU
and M&F filed a M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; the
defendants included considerable materials from the underlying
foreclosure case and requested the judge to convert the motions to
motions for summary judgment if necessary. On December 20, 2016,
the District Court granted the M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
the McAtee complaint with prejudice, concluding that “the filing of this
cause of action constitutes improper serial litigation of a claim,” that
the suit is based upon the same facts and transactions as those alleged
in the foreclosure litigation, and that it is therefore impermissible
under § 3-1-502, MCA. McAtee appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
{6 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss
pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Western Sec. Bank v. Eide Bailly
LLP, 2010 MT 291, {] 18, 359 Mont. 34, 249 P.3d 35.

DISCUSSION

{7 Did the District Court err in granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss McAtee’s amended complaint when it found that the action
constituted improper serial litigation pursuant to § 3-1-502, MCA?
{8 McAtee argues the District Court incorrectly dismissed her
complaint when it found her action constituted improper serial
litigation. WCU agrees that the District Court’s dismissal of McAtee’s
complaint based on § 3-1-502, MCA, is legally incorrect. However, it
asserts the District Court reached the correct result and urges this
Court to uphold the dismissal. The District Court dismissed McAtee’s
complaint because she was first “denied the opportunity to add a
defendant and two causes of action [to the underlying foreclosure
litigation], so she filed this action.” The District Court found her
pleadings to be impermissible, concluding that § 3-1-502, MCA, barred
her complaint, citing In re Stewart, 163 Mont. 432, 517 P.2d 879 (1974).
q9 Section 3-1-502(1), MCA states:

If an application for an order, made to a judge of a court in which

the action or proceeding is pending, is refused in whole or in part.

or is granted conditionally, no subsequent application for the same

order shall be made to any other judge, except of a higher court.
Pursuant to the statute, when a judge denies a request for an order a

party may not seek “the same order” from another judge. In Stewart,
an incapacitated person, Gavin, filed a petition for restoration to
capacity, which the district court denied. Stewart, 163 Mont. at 433,
517 P.2d at 879. After a new judge was appointed to the case, Gavin’s
counsel filed another petition for restoration to capacity. Thenewjudge
ordered Gavin to restored capacity. Based on an application for writ of
supervisory control, this Court determined the petitions were the same
and the second petition should have been denied. Stewart, 163 Mont.
at 433-34, 517 P.2d at 880.

10 HM Unlike Stewart, McAtee did not attempt to obtain different
results by seeking the same order from another judge. McAtee filed a
motion to amend and commenced a separate proceeding through the
filing of a new complaint. Section 3-1-502, MCA, “forbids only a
subsequent application for the same order to any other judge.” Marvel
Brute Steel Bldg. v. Bass, 189 Mont. 480, 483, 616 P.2d 380, 382 (1980).
McAtee has not asked any judge for “the same order” to allow the
amended pleading. McAtee has instead filed this separate action
asserting her malicious prosecution claims, which accrued after WCU
filed its action. Section 3-1-502, MCA, does not bar McAtee’s original
complaint.

11 WCU agrees § 3-1-502, MCA, does not bar McAtee’s complaint but
urges this Court to uphold the dismissal on other grounds. Although
the District Court did not address any of the arguments advanced by
the parties, its order granting the motions to dismiss cannot be
affirmed on other grounds. The District Court did not convert the
M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions into motions for summary judgment,
never gave McAtee notice that it would do so, and McAtee was never
afforded the opportunity for a hearing. See Meagher v. Butte-Silver
Bow City-County, 2007 MT 129, {11 16-17, 337 Mont. 339, 160 P.3d 552;
Cole v. Flathead County, 236 Mont. 412, 418-19, 771 P.2d 97.
Therefore, despite WCU and M&F’s extensive factual arguments, their
M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions had the effect of “admitting all well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint.” Reidelbach v. Burlington N. and
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2002 MT 289, {| 14, 312 Mont. 498, 60 P.3d 418.
McAtee’s complaint properly alleges every element of her claims under
Montana law. We will not consider in the first instance the merits of
WCU’s and M&F’s substantive grounds for judgment in their favor.

CONCLUSION
12 [Ml The District Court incorrectly dismissed McAtee’s petition
based on § 3-1-502, MCA. McAtee’s original complaint is not improper

serial litigation and therefore is not barred. We decline to address the
alternative grounds proffered by WCU and M&F to uphold the District
Court’s decision.
113 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion.

JUSTICES McKINNON, BAKER, SHEA and RICE concur.

MARK DUNDAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

WINTER SPORTS, INC.,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 17-0062.
Submitted on Briefs October 4, 2017.
Decided November 7, 2017.
2017 MT 269.

389 Mont. 223.

For Appellant: Gary Crowe, Attorney at Law, Kalispell.
For Appellee: Mikel L. Moore, Christopher C. DiLorenzo,
Moore, Cockrell, Goicoechea & Johnson, P.C., Kalispell.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Mark Dundas appeals from the District Court’s January 20, 2017
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. We
affirm.
{2 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court properly
granted summary judgment dismissing Dundas’ claims for wrongful
discharge under the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment
Act (WDEA), Title 39, chapter 2, part 9, MCA.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
q3 Defendant Winter Sports, Inc. (WSI) operates the Whitefish
Mountain Resort in Montana.’ Its primary operation is a winter ski
resort, but it also has limited operations in other seasons. The majority
of WSI’s employees are seasonal and work less than a full year. WSI
has approximately 100 year-round employees, but that number
increases to approximately 525 in the winter season. The winter
seasonal employees work a season that varies with the snowfall, and
they may be off work as long as seven months between the end of one
winter season and the beginning of the next.
q4 Dundas was a winter seasonal employee at WSI during each of the
winter seasons from 2003 to 2014. WSI hired Dundas for the 2014-2015
winter season for a new position of Snow Safety Coordinator. Dundas’
job was set to begin approximately November 19, 2014, and to end
April 12, 2015, depending upon the weather. He also applied for the
positions of Ski Patrol Manager and Assistant Ski Patrol Manager but
was not hired for either position.
{5 According to WSI managers, Dundas was angry because he did not
get hired for either of the Ski Patrol positions. Dundas sent an email
to Chester Powell, Director of Mountain Operations, that was critical
of the hiring process and that stated he had a “very low opinion” of
Powell and of Dan Graves, CEO of the WSI operation. The WSI
managers also determined that Dundas expressed his anger to other
employees “in a manner that WSI management found insubordinate
and inappropriate.” The WSI Ski Patrol Manager David Stephens
counseled Dundas that his negative attitude and his profane
statements to others about his job and his superiors were
inappropriate. WSI terminated Dundas on March 1, 2015, because of
his inappropriate behavior.

\ The facts are based upon the “undisputed facts” found by the District Court as
part of the consideration of the motion for summary judgment.

{6 Dundas sued WSI for damages for wrongful discharge under the
Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, Title 39, chapter
2, part 9, MCA. Dundas alleged that WSI lacked good cause to
terminate his employment (§ 39-2-904(1)(b), MCA); that WSI failed to
follow its written personnel policies (§ 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA); and that
WSI terminated him for refusing to violate public policy or for
reporting violations of public policy (§ 39-2-904(1)(a), MCA). WSI
moved for summary judgment on all the claims. The District Court
held a hearing on January 18, 2017, and subsequently entered the
order granting WSI’s motion, concluding that Dundas did not have a
wrongful discharge claim because he was a probationary employee who
could be terminated for any reason as provided in § 39-2-904(2)(a),
MCA. Dundas appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
{7 This Court reviews a district court’s decision on summary
judgment to determine whether it is correct, using the same criteria
under M. R. Civ. P. 56. Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortgage, 2013 MT 354,
4] 9, 373 Mont. 1, 313 P.3d 839.

DISCUSSION

q8 ‘Issue: Whether the District Court properly granted summary
judgment dismissing Dundas’ claims for wrongful discharge under the
Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA), Title 39,
chapter 2, part 9, MCA.

q9 With few exceptions, the WDEA is the exclusive remedy under
Montana law for an employee to recover damages for wrongful
discharge. Section 39-2-902, MCA; Kuszmaul v. Sterling Life Ins. Co.,
2012 MT 154, {| 22, 365 Mont. 390, 282 P.3d 665. The WDEA preempts
all common-law remedies for discharge claims. Section 39-2-913, MCA;
Blehm v. St. John’s Lutheran Hospital, 2010 MT 258, {| 19, 358 Mont.
300, 246 P.3d 1024. One of the purposes of the WDEA is to protect
employees from wrongful discharge “after the end of their probationary
period.” Blehm, {| 11. The existence of a probationary period of
employment is an “integral part” of the WDEA, and an employer may
establish a specific employment probationary period. Section 39-2-
904(2)(b), MCA; Blehm, 1 15. During probationary employment either
the employer or employee may terminate the relationship at will “for
any reason or for no reason.” Section 39-2-904(2), MCA.

{10 A crucial issue in the proceedings below was whether Dundas was
a probationary employee when he was terminated. The District Court

determined that he was a probationary employee and therefore that he
could be terminated for any reason or for no reason as provided in § 39-
2-904(2), MCA.
11 During the time that Dundas was associated with WSI, the
Employee Handbook provided for categories of employees, including
“seasonal employees” who are “hired to work for a period of less than
12 months.” The Handbook provided that:
Seasonal employees are hired to work for a pre-determined period
of less than 12 months. At the end of the temporary period,
employment is terminated. If a seasonal employee wishes to be
considered for employment following termination, they may
reapply but, if hired, they are considered a new employee for all
purposes.
(Emphasis added.) The Handbook also provides that the probationary
employment period is the “first 6 months of employment.”
412 Dundas argues that the Employee Handbook should be construed
so that his six-month probationary employment period ended years
ago, during his first or second terms of seasonal employment. He
argues that he was in “continuous employment” at WSI from 2003
until he was expressly terminated in March 2015. This argument,
however, is contrary to the express provisions of the Employee
Handbook relating to the “temporary period” of seasonal employment.
As provided in the Employee Handbook, beginning in 2003 Dundas was
separately hired for each new winter season that he worked, and at the
end of each of those winter seasons his employment was terminated.
The District Court found that Dundas acknowledged that he was
“rehired” by WSI at the beginning of each new winter season, in
accordance with the Employee Handbook. This is consistent with both
the Employee Handbook and the WDEA, which provides that a
particular employment “is terminated by the expiration of its
appointed term.” Section 39-2-501(1), MCA. Each seasonal term of
employment at WSI was terminated at the end of the winter season.
113 The record is clear as to WSI's policy on seasonal employees and
as to the probationary period. Dundas argues that a seasonal employee
could never be off probation because of the limited period of work.
However, it is undisputed that seasonal work schedules varied with the
weather and could therefore extend to six or more months if snow
conditions warranted. In any event, we agree with the District Court
that there is no reason to construe the plain language of the Employee
Handbook in any way other than as it is written and that, viewing the
document as a whole, the Employee Handbook is not ambiguous in this
regard. A seasonal re-hire is clearly “a new employee for all purposes,”

including for the purposes of the probationary period. As noted above,
an employer may define the period of probationary employment, and
WSI has done so. As provided in the Employee Handbook, the
probationary employment period is the “first 6 months of employment.”
14 When Dundas was re-hired for the 2014-2015 winter season he
was a new employee “for all purposes,” and began a six-month
probationary period. He was still on probation when WSI terminated
his employment four months later.

15 Dundas contends that he was entitled to imposition of progressive
discipline before being terminated. However, as the District Court
found, the fact that he was a probationary employee precludes such an
argument because he could be fired for any reason or for no reason, as
specifically provided in the WDEA. Section 39-2-904(2), MCA.

16 Finally, Dundas contends that he was terminated for refusing to
violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy. He
contends that the District Court should have further considered this
issue and should have allowed him to prove that he was terminated for
refusing to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public
policy.

17 [Hl The WDEA provides that one of the categories of “wrongful”
discharge is a discharge “in retaliation for the employee’s refusal to
violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy.”
Section 39-2-904(1)(a), MCA. This is in effect a protection for “whistle
blowers.” Krebs v. Ryan Oldsmobile, 255 Mont. 291, 296, 843 P.2d 312,
315-16 (1992). The WDEA defines “public policy” as “a policy in effect
at the time of the discharge concerning the public health, safety, or
welfare established by constitutional provision, statute, or
administrative rule.” Section 39-2-903(7), MCA. The District. Court
considered this issue in the summary judgment proceeding and
determined the Dundas failed to establish any constitutional provision,
statute or administrative rule that WSI violated or that he reported.
The District Court properly granted summary judgment to WSI on this
issue because Dundas failed to produce “any evidence” to support his
contention.

CONCLUSION
18 The District Court properly granted summary judgment to WSI
on Dundas’ claims for wrongful discharge. Affirmed.
JUSTICES McKINNON, BAKER, SANDEFURand RICE concur.

DANA ROLAN, on her own behalf and
on behalf of the class she represents,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
NEW WEST HEALTH SERVICES,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 17-0009.
Submitted on Briefs August 2, 2017.
Decided November 7, 2017.
2017 MT 270.

389 Mont. 228.

405 P.3d 65.

EE
EE

For Appellants: Erik B. Thueson, Thueson Law Office, Helena.

For Appellee: Robert C. Lukes, Emma L. Mediak, Garlington,
Lohn & Robinson PLLP, Missoula.

JUSTICE WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Dana Rolan and the class she represents appeal from the order of
the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, granting
New West Health Service’s (New West) motion for summary judgment.
Finding the issue stated below dispositive we decline to address the
additional issues raised by the parties. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
{2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

Whether the District Court abused its discretion by granting New

West leave to amend its answer to assert ERISA preemption.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q3 Dana Rolan (Rolan) was injured in a vehicular collision on
November 16, 2007, and sustained serious injury, resulting in medical
expenses totaling approximately $120,000. Rolan carried health
insurance through New West. The tortfeasor who caused the accident
carried liability insurance through Unitrin Services Group (Unitrin).
Unitrin accepted legal responsibility and paid approximately $100,000
of Rolan’s medical bills.

q4 On January 26, 2010, Rolan filed a complaint against New West
alleging individual and class claims for breach of contract, violation of
made-whole rights, and unfair claims settlement practices under §§ 33-
18-201, MCA, et seq. Rolan sought compensatory and punitive
damages. During a deposition, New West’s representative affirmatively
stated that Rolan’s plan was “not a properly constituted ERISA plan.”
Relying on such representation, Rolan proceeded with her claims and
class claims based solely on state law.

{5 Rolan sought to certify a class under M. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) for
declaratory and injunctive relief arising from the claims for breach of
contract and violation of made-whole rights. Rolan’s class certification
was based on the systematic practices by New West to avoid paying
medical bills for an insured when a liability carrier was available to
pay medical bills as part of tort damages. On April 25, 2012, the
District Court granted class certification. Maintaining that Rolan’s

claims were based solely on state law claims, New West proceeded to
appeal to this Court Rolan’s class certification. We upheld the class
certification in Rolan v. New West Health Servs., 2013 MT 220, 371
Mont. 228, 307 P.3d 291.

q6 On October 24, 2013, New West moved to amend its answer
alleging the policy was an Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) policy and that all state law claims were preempted by federal
law. Rolan opposed New West’s motion to amend. The District Court
allowed New West to amend its answer to include the affirmative
defense of ERISA preemption. The District Court reasoned, “[ilf federal
law does in fact preempt state law resolution of this case, the ends of
justice would not be served by denying the motion to amend.” The
District Court granted Rolan attorney fees for time spent addressing
New West’s abandoned defenses. Following the District Court’s order
allowing New West to amend, New West moved for summary
judgment.

q7 + OnMay 6, 2015, the District Court granted New West’s motion for
summary judgment holding that Rolan’s policy was subject to ERISA
and thus her original state law claims were preempted. However, the
District Court allowed Rolan to amend her complaint to include ERISA
claims. On June 1, 2015, Rolan amended her complaint to include both
state law and ERISA claims. New West then removed the case to
federal court.

q8 On February 29, 2016, the federal court remanded the case back
to state court. The federal court determined that New West’s removal
was untimely. Judge Lovell cited several causes for the delay in
removal; one cause was: “New West’s inexplicable confusion over
whether its own plan was or was not an ERISA plan.” Nevertheless,
the federal court concluded that the state court had concurrent
jurisdiction over Rolan’s ERISA 502(a)(1) claims and therefore Rolan
may proceed with her ERISA claims in state court.

{9 Following remand, Rolan filed a motion requesting the District
Court to resolve all matters regarding ERISA preemption. New West
moved for summary judgment asserting ERISA preemption requires
dismissal of Rolan’s state law and ERISA claims. On December 7,
2016, the District Court granted New West’s motion for summary
judgment and denied Rolan’s motion. The District Court again
dismissed Rolan’s argument that New West waived the affirmative
defense of ERISA preemption. Further, the District Court determined
that complete preemption under § 502 of ERISA was proper and thus
barred any state law claims asserted by Rolan.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

110 We review the district court's decision to amend for an abuse of
discretion. Lindey’s v. Professional Consultants, 244 Mont. 238, 242,
797 P.2d 920, 923 (1990). “A district. court abuses its discretion when
it acts arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or
in excess of the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.”
Kershaw v. Mont. Dept. of Transp., 2011 MT 170, 4] 11, 361 Mont. 215,
257 P.3d 358 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION
{11 Whether the District Court abused its discretion by granting New
West leave to amend its answer to assert ERISA preemption.
12 Rolan argues on appeal that the District Court abused its
discretion in granting New West’s motion to amend its answer.
Specifically, Rolan maintains that ERISA preemption is an affirmative
defense and should have been pled in the answer.
413 New West counters that the District Court did not err by allowing
leave to amend because leave should be freely given “when justice so
requires.” M. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). New West contends that there was no
evidence of bad faith, intentional delay, or dilatory motive by New
West; therefore, leave to amend was proper.
q14 Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides that “[iln
responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any
avoidance or affirmative defense.” The rationale for requiring these
defenses be affirmatively pled are the underlying principles of fairness
and notice. Weaver v. State, 2013 MT 247, | 35, 371 Mont. 476, 310
P.3d 495. We have previously held that ERISA preemption is an
affirmative defense and thus is waivable if not timely raised pursuant
to M. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Winslow v. Mont. Rail Link, Inc., 2005 MT 217,
1 37-38, 328 Mont. 260, 121 P.3d 506; Rimrock Chrysler, Inc., v. DOJ,
2016 MT 165, ] 29, 384 Mont. 76, 375 P.3d 392 (citing Wolf v. Reliance
Std. Life Ins., 71 F.3d 444, 449 (1st Cir. 1995)). However, Rule 8(c) is
not absolute; a district court may allow a defendant to amend its
answer to include an affirmative defense pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 15.
Keller v. Dooling, 248 Mont. 535, 542, 813 P.2d 487, 441 (1991).
{15 Montana Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides “a party may
amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or
court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” However, “this does not mean that a court must
automatically grant a motion to amend.” Kershaw, {| 25. We have
articulated circumstances justifying a court’s denial of a motion to

amend. Such situations include when the denial is “for an apparent
reason such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of
the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by allowance
of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.” Bitterroot Intl Sys.
v. Western Star Trucks, Inc., 2007 MT 48, {| 50, 336 Mont. 145, 153
P.3d 627 (quoting Lindey’s, 244 Mont. 238, 242, 797 P.2d 920, 923).
16 In determining whether an amendment would cause undue
prejudice, a court should balance the prejudice suffered by the opposing
party “against the sufficiency of the moving party’s justification of the
delay.” Farmers Coop. Ass’n v. Amsden, LLC, 2007 MT 286, {| 14, 339
Mont. 445, 171 P.38d 690. We previously have concluded undue
prejudice exists when the opposing party already had expended
“substantial effort and expense” in the course of the dispute that
“would be wasted” if the moving party were allowed to proceed on a
new legal theory. Eagle Ridge Ranch v. Park County, 283 Mont. 62, 68-
69, 938 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1997).
17 Initially, the District. Court failed to conduct an inquiry into
whether Rolan and the class she represents would be prejudiced. The
District Court failed to determine if undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by allowance of the amendment, or futility of the amendment
existed. The District. Court’s reasoning was as follows:
“(t]he Court is sensitive to Rolan’s arguments regarding the
effects of allowing amendment at this stage. However, the briefing
before the Court does not directly address the question of whether
ERISA in fact preempts federal law. If federal law does in fact
preempt state law resolution of this case, the ends of justice would
not be served by denying the motion to amend.”
Clearly, the District Court allowed amendment purely because the
defense would apply.
118 We have upheld a District. Court’s denial to amend to include an
affirmative defense, even if such defense could apply. See, e.g.,
Bitterroot, | 54; Cullen v. Western Mortgage & Warranty Title Co., 47
Mont. 518, 580, 184 P. 302, 307 (1913); Meadow Lake Estates
Homeowners Ass’n v. Shoemaker, 2008 MT 41, {1 30-31, 341 Mont.
345, 178 P.3d 81; Peuse v. Malkuch, 275 Mont. 221, 228, 911 P.2d 1153,
1157 (1996). If we allowed amending an answer any time an
affirmative defense applied it would effectively eliminate M. R. Civ. P.
8(c). A district court should freely allow a party to amend its pleadings;

however, leave to amend should not be automatically given. Thus, the
District Court should have inquired as to whether Rolan would suffer
prejudice from the amendment.

119 We have upheld a district court’s denial of motion for leave to
amend if extraordinary circumstances are present. In Peuse, we
recognized that a party’s prolonged delay in adopting a new legal
theory is prejudicial to the opposing party, particularly when a party
waits until after the opposing party files a motion for summary
judgment. Peuse, 275 Mont. at 228, 911 P.2d at 1157. In affirming the
district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion, we noted the two-year
delay and explained that if the district. court were to have granted the
defendants’ motion, the plaintiff would have been “prejudiced since his
[summary judgment] motion was based on the original pleadings which
remained unchanged for almost two years.” Peuse, 275 Mont. at 227,
911 P.2d at 1157. Further, we noted that new counsel does not excuse
an inopportune request for amendment when those defenses were
available to original counsel. Peuse, 275 Mont. at 227,911 P.2d at 1156.
We concluded that “[Ilitigants should be allowed to change legal
theories after a motion for summary judgment has been filed only in
extraordinary cases.” Peuse, 275 Mont. at 228, 911 P.2d at 1157.

{20 We later affirmed Peuse in Bitterroot Int'l Sys. v. Western Star
Trucks, Inc., 1-52-54. We recognized that a district. court should
balance the alleged prejudice to the opposing party against the
rationale of the party seeking leave to amend. We noted that Western
Star’s oversight justification in seeking leave to amend did not
outweigh Bitterroot’s prejudice against the amendment which would
have occurred after a five-year delay, the close of discovery, and within
three months of trial. Bitterroot, {| 51-53. Further, Western Star
attempted to minimize its oversight by stating that Bitterroot should
have known such a defense was likely. We were unpersuaded, stating,
“Western’s counsel fails to explain adequately, however, how such an
obvious defense escaped its attention for nearly five years.” Bitterroot,
| 53. In concluding the district court properly denied Western Star’s
motion to amend, we determined that allowing Western Star to amend
under these circumstances “would render Rule 8(c)’s purpose of
providing adequate notice of affirmative defenses to the plaintiff a
nullity.” Bitterroot, 1 54.

121 MM There are no extraordinary circumstances in this case that
would warrant granting New West’s motion to amend. Rolan and the
class argued that they would be substantially prejudiced by allowing
New West to amend its answer to include the affirmative defense of

ERISA preemption. Rolan and the class cite to three specific reasons
prejudice would occur: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the parties have
conducted extensive discovery, and (3) the case has already been
appealed to the Montana Supreme Court for class certification based
on state law claims. Conversely, New West has not offered any
reasonable justification for the delay. New West has not sufficiently
explained why it failed to assert ERISA preemption in its original
answer, why its own representative in a deposition substantiated that
ERISA did not apply, or why it proceeded based upon state law claims
for nearly three and a half years. The facts of this case are akin to
Peuse and Bitterroot, in which we affirmed the district courts’ denial of
leave to amend. Nevertheless, the District Court determined that New
West should be able to amend its pleading.

122 [J Although length of delay and stage of the proceedings are
crucial factors, alone they may not warrant denying the amendment.
However, had the District Court conducted a proper inquiry into undue
prejudice, we conclude the class certification would have been the
dispositive issue. Rolan and the class were certified as a class based
only on state law claims. Allowing New West to amend to include
ERISA preemption would effectively destroy the class. As a class, they
shared a common question of law or fact. Specifically, Rolan and her
class alleged New West had systematically violated their state law
made-whole rights. New West’s amendment could de-certify the class,
forcing Rolan and the class to either seek re-certification based on
ERISA claims or proceed alone, ten years after Rolan’s injury and more
than seven years after she filed suit. The District Court failed to
consider the effect of the amendment on the class. We conclude that
Rolan and the class she represents would be unduly prejudiced by
allowing New West to amend.

23 Rolan and the class she represents already had expended
substantial effort and expense, including an appeal to this Court in the
course of the dispute, that was wasted when New West was allowed to
proceed on a new legal theory. Therefore, Rolan’s showing of undue
prejudice to her and the class combined with the New West’s failure to
reasonably justify the delay should have led the District Court to deny
leave to amend.

124 Hl Thus, we conclude the District Court. exceeded the bounds of
reason resulting in substantial injustice to Rolan. We recognize that
district courts should freely grant leave to amend; however, based on
the District Court’s inadequate inquiry and the extraordinary
circumstances of this case, we conclude that the District Court abused
its discretion by granting New West leave to amend.

125 Reversed and remanded.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SHEA, BAKER,
SANDEFUR and RICE concur.

JUSTICE McKINNON, dissenting.
26 I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that the District Court.
“exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice to
Rolan” when it allowed New West leave to amend its answer to assert
federal preemption. Opinion, { 24. We have repeatedly held that leave
to amend should be freely granted when justice requires unless the
moving party is guilty of undue delay, bad faith, or a dilatory motive.
Aldrich & Co. v. Ellis, 2002 MT 177, | 27, 311 Mont. 1, 52 P.3d 388.
There was no evidence of intentional delay, bad faith, or a dilatory
motive on the part of New West. Further, the District. Court took
efforts to alleviate any prejudice to Rolan as a result of the
amendment. Here, the District Court concluded that the “ends of
justice would not be served by denying the motion to amend.” The
District Court recognized that the application of state subrogation
statutes and doctrine to federal ERISA benefit plans was incorrect as
a matter of law. The court appreciated that applying the wrong law to
the parties’ disputes would not advance proper resolution of their
underlying claims nor further the ends of justice. Clearly, the District
Court believed those considerations deserved more weight in the
analysis and that New West’s leave to amend should prevail over
Rolan’s objection.
27 The District Court was in a very difficult position, as clearly
factors weighed in favor of both granting and denying leave to amend.
I do not think it as clear and one-sided as the Court opines and, under
the present circumstances, the rule of deference to the trial court
should prevail. Accordingly, I dissent from the Court’s decision finding
the District Court abused its discretion by granting New West leave to
amend. I would address the merits of the controversy.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

TALAN HARRINGTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0672.
Submitted on Briefs August 16, 2017.
Decided November 7, 2017.
Rehearing Denied December 5, 2017.
2017 MT 273.

389 Mont. 236.

405 P.3d 1248.

| |
For Appellant: Colin M. Stephens, Smith & Stephens, P.C.,
Missoula.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Madison L. Mattioli, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Joshua
Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls.

JUSTICE WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
qi Talan Harrington (Harrington) appeals from an order of the
Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denying Harrington’s
pretrial motions to dismiss charges relating to his arrest for sexual
abuse of children. We affirm.
q2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

Issue One: Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that

Harrington knowingly possessed child pornography.

Issue Two: Whether the statutory definition of possession, § 45-2-

101(59), MCA, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to

Harrington.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{3 In 2012, Agent Albert Kinsey of the Department of Homeland
Security utilized Child Protective System software to identify
individuals in Montana engaged in file sharing of child pornography.
Based on Agent Kinsey’s investigation, four different Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses in Montana were identified to be associated with child
pornography images. Each IP address had files with descriptions and
titles indicative of files containing child pornography. One of the IP
addresses showed the use of keyword searches commonly associated
with child pornography. All four of the IP addresses were assigned to
Erin Nielsen in Great Falls, Montana.

q4 Agent Kinsey contacted Great Falls Police Department Detective
Jesse Slaughter and provided him with this information. Detective
Slaughter obtained a search warrant for Nielsen’s home. When officers
executed the warrant, Nielsen denied ever looking at child
pornography but told officers she had previously been in a relationship

with Harrington. Nielsen disclosed Harrington had lived with her until
2012. Further, Nielsen told Detective Slaughter her Wi-Fi signal is
password protected; however, Harrington likely knew the password
because he had placed a key logger device on her computer.

{5 Agent Kinsey and Detective Slaughter went to Harrington’s home.
They informed Harrington that they had just executed a search
warrant at Nielsen’s home regarding a child pornography
investigation. Harrington admitted to using Frostwire' to download
two child pornography videos containing children aged seven and eight.
Based upon Harrington’s own admission, law enforcement asked
Harrington to come down to the Great Falls Police Department for an
interview. Harrington complied. Detective Slaughter seized a Sony
laptop that was in plain view.

q6 Harrington consented to search of the Sony laptop, waived his
Miranda rights, and agreed to answer questions. Harrington again
admitted to downloading the two pornographic files with seven- and
eight-year-old children. Harrington said he had recently uninstalled
and deleted Frostwire because his computer had been infected with a
Trojan horse virus. Harrington told Agent Kinsey that when he used
Frostwire he always individually selected his downloads and never did
mass downloads. During the interview, Agent Kinsey and Detective
Slaughter noted Harrington’s aptitude for computers.

{7 Special Agent Brent Johnsrud of the Department of Homeland
Security conducted a forensic examination of the laptop. Agent
Johnsrud used EnCase, a computer software program, to locate image
files in the allocated space on Harrington’s laptop and did not locate
any suspected child pornography image files. Then Agent Johnsrud
used EnCase to locate files in the unallocated space® on Harrington’s
laptop. Agent Johnsrud located twenty-four suspected child
pornography image files. Agent Johnsrud immediately recognized two
of the child pornographic images because he had encountered them in
past forensic examinations.

q8 Agent Johnsrud recovered the twenty-four image files depicting

'Frostwire is a peer-to-peer network. Frostwire users can send and/or receive files
directly to or from other users who are utilizing file sharing software programs.

* A hard drive consists of allocated space and unallocated space. Allocated space
is space on a hard drive that a user can readily access. When a file in allocated space is
deleted, it is moved to unallocated space on a hard drive . Unallocated space is not
readily accessible by a user. However, the items in unallocated space remain on the hard
drive and can be accessed until they are overwritten by other data.

child pornography. Agent Johnsrud explained during examination that
those files were most likely cache files created by the laptop as a
normal function of the operating system. When a video is played, the
operating system creates a thumbnail, an indirect cache image that
displays the first frame of the video. Thus, the files were the result of
child pornography videos being played on the laptop. In addition, the
cache image could have been saved to the hard drive if a user partially
downloaded a video. The images found on Harrington’s laptop most
likely derived from incomplete videos being downloaded and viewed
using the Frostwire software. Additionally, Agent Johnsrud discovered
link files’ containing names indicative of child pornography associated
with Frostwire and the user account titled “Talon.* The user
downloading the file from Frostwire would have seen the name of the
video file when it was selected.

q9 Agent Johnsrud concluded through his investigation that the
video files had been deleted after having been opened and/or viewed.
Further, Agent Johnsrud concluded based on the link files, that the
video files were opened and/or viewed between October 21, 2012, and
January 7, 2013.

{110 Based on the information discovered by Agents Kinsey and
Johnsrud, the State charged Harrington with twenty-four counts of
sexual abuse of children. On September 10, 2015, Harrington filed his
first motion to dismiss based on insufficient evidence to prove the
requisite mens rea. On October 5, 2015, Harrington filed his second
motion to dismiss arguing that the statutory definition of possession
is unconstitutionally vague as it applies to Harrington’s case. On
December 29, 2015, the District Court held a hearing on both motions.
Subsequently, the District Court issued a Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order denying both motions. On June 1, 2016, Harrington
pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse of children pursuant to a
plea agreement. Harrington reserved the right to appeal the District
Court’s denial of the two motions. Harrington timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
{11 We conduct a de novo review of the record for sufficient evidence.
State v. Bekemans, 2013 MT 11, 1 18, 368 Mont. 235, 293 P.3d 843. We

® A link file is created when a file or program is opened. Link files are then
typically stored in the recent folder associated with the user account that was used to
access the file.

“Tt is undisputed that Harrington used the user name “Talon” on his laptop.

review the record for sufficient evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution. State v. Gunderson, 2010 MT 166, 158, 357 Mont. 142,
237 P.3d 74. There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Finley, 2011 MT 89, 7 18,
360 Mont. 173, 252 P.3d 199.

12 This Court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal
case de novo. State v. Dugan, 2013 MT 38, 1 13, 369 Mont. 39, 303 P.38d
755. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. A party challenging
a statute’s constitutionality must establish, “beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the statute is unconstitutional, and any doubt must be
resolved in favor of the statute.” State v. Michaud, 2008 MT 88, {| 15,
342 Mont. 244, 180 P.3d 636. The constitutionality of a statute is a
question of law, which we review for correctness. State v. Knudson,
2007 MT 324, {] 12, 340 Mont. 167, 174 P.3d 469.

DISCUSSION

13 Issue One: Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that
Harrington knowingly possessed child pornography.

q14 The District Court determined that there was sufficient evidence
to establish Harrington acted knowingly when he possessed child
pornography. Harrington argues he could not possess dominion and
control over the images because they were stored in unallocated space
which could only be accessed using sophisticated forensic software. The
State counters that although the images were found in unallocated
space, Harrington’s own admissions and conduct would allow a rational
jury to find that Harrington knowingly possessed child pornography.
{15 Section 45-5-625(1)(e), MCA, provides: “A person commits the
offense of sexual abuse of children if the person ... knowingly possesses
any visual or print medium, including a medium by use of electronic
communications in which a child is engaged in sexual conduct, actual
or simulated.” Visual medium means, in part, “any disk, diskette, or
other physical media that allows an image to be displayed on a
computer or other video screen and any image transmitted to a
computer or other video screen by telephone line, cable, satellite
transmission, or other method.” Section 45-5-625(5)(d)(ii), MCA.

{116 A person commits the offense of sexual abuse of children by,
among other things, “knowingly” possessing photographs of a child
engaged in actual or simulated sexual activity. In other words,
possession of such photographs alone renders one in violation of § 45-5-
625(1)(e), MCA. Therefore, the correct “knowingly” definition under
§ 45-5-625(1)(e), MCA, is “a person acts knowingly with respect to

conduct ... when the person is aware of the person’s own conduct ....”
State v. Hovey, 2011 MT 3, {| 20, 359 Mont. 100, 248 P.3d 308 (quoting
§ 45-2-101(35), MCA).

117 Possession is defined as “the knowing control of anything for a
sufficient time to be able to terminate control.” Section 45-2-101(59),
MCA. Possession can be actual or constructive. State v. Meader, 184
Mont. 32, 42, 601 P.2d 386, 392 (1979) (internal citations omitted).
Actual possession means that the contraband is in the personal custody
of the person, whereas constructive possession means that the person
charged with possession has dominion and control over the prohibited
contraband. Meader, 184 Mont. at 42, 601 P.2d at 392. The Ninth
Circuit has reasoned, and we agree, that in an electronic context, a
person can possess or receive child pornography without downloading
it if he or she seeks it out and exercises dominion and control over it.
United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir. 2006).

18 Harrington relies principally on United States v. Kuchinski, 469
F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911 (9th
Cir. 2011), to support his argument that he did not knowingly possess
child pornography because the images found were in unallocated space.
However, these cases are factually distinguishable from Harrington’s
case because in Kuchinski and Flyer the United States failed to present
any evidence to show knowing possession of the child pornography files
by the defendants.

19 In Kuchinski, the defendant was not held responsible for the
thousands of images of child pornography found within his cache.
Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 862-63. Kuchinski admitted to downloading 110
images of child pornography, but at sentencing he was held
accountable for thousands of images found in the cache. ® Kuchinshi,
469 F.3d at 861-62. The Court noted that the thousands of images
found within the cache could have been automatically downloaded
when the 110 images were downloaded and viewed by Kuchinski.
Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 862-63. Therefore, the Court concluded it was
improper to consider the thousands of additional images found in the
cache because there was no evidence he downloaded the additional
images, clicked on the images, enlarged them, or viewed them.
Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 863.

{20 In Flyer, the defendant’s possession of child pornography
conviction was overturned. Flyer, 633 F.3d at 919. The Court

° For purposes of sentencing, the number of child pornographic images could
increase a defendant’s offense level.

established that the mere presence of child pornographic images in
“unallocated space” on a computer hard drive, by itself, is not sufficient
to prove knowing possession of child pornography. Flyer, 633 F.3d at
919. Further, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “deletion of an image
alone does not support a conviction for knowing possession of child
pornography ....” Flyer, 633 F.3d at 920.

21 Ml Harrington argues that based on Kuchinski and Flyer this case
must result in a dismissal of his charges. However, in Kuchinski the
defendant never admitted to seeking out, downloading, or viewing the
images in question. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 862. Thus, Kuchinski held
that images in the cache alone do not suffice to support a finding of
knowing possession. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d at 863. Similarly, Flyer made
no admission that he had viewed the charged images on or near the
time alleged in the indictment. Flyer, 633 F.3d at 919. Consequently,
Flyer held that images found in unallocated space without any other
supporting evidence of possession do not suffice to support a finding of
knowing possession. Flyer, 633 F.3d at 911. Therefore, based on
Kuchinski and Flyer, the State must have evidence that the child
pornographic files on Harrington’s laptop were not the product of an
automatic or accidental download which were then deleted.

22 Here, the State had evidence, other than the mere presence of the
images in the unallocated space, to support that Harrington knowingly
possessed the images. Harrington admitted to using Frostwire to
intentionally seek out and download two pornographic videos
containing children. Further, he admitted that he never mass
downloaded from Frostwire, and therefore would individually pick out
and download files from Frostwire. Harrington’s laptop showed
evidence that confirmed Harrington’s admission. The forensic analysis
conducted on the laptop not only discovered cache files in the hard
drive but link files that could be directly traced back to the user name
“Talon.” The link files had names indicative of child pornography and
would have been visible to Harrington before opening them. The link
file evidence shows that the videos associated with the user “Talon”
had been viewed on the laptop. Taken together, these circumstances
demonstrate more than sufficient evidence to support knowing
possession of child pornography because there was more than just
cache images or deleted images.

23 Harrington attempts to distinguish Romm; however, the case is
more akin to Harrington’s case than Kuchinski and Flyer. In Romm,
the defendant’s conviction for possessing child pornography was
upheld. Romm, 455 F.3d at 1001. Romm admitted to seeking out child
pornography. Romm, 455 F.3d at 1000. By Romm’s own admission he

a “s

would view the images for a few minutes, then he would delete the
images. Romm, 455 F.3d at 1000. While those images were displayed
on his screen they were simultaneously stored to his cache. Romm, 455
F.3d at 1000-01. The Court. concluded based on the above-mentioned
evidence a reasonable jury could conclude that Romm knowingly
possessed child pornography. Romm, 455 F.3d at 1001.

124 I Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we agree with the District Court that there is sufficient
evidence that a rational jury could have found Harrington guilty of
sexual abuse of children because he knowingly possessed child
pornography.

25 Issue Two: Whether the statutory definition of possession, § 45-2-
101(59), MCA, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Harrington.
{26 The District Court determined that the statutory definition of
possession, § 45-2-101(59), MCA, was not vague as applied to
Harrington. Harrington argues the statutory definition of possession
criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct, such as deleting unwanted or
illegal computer files. Therefore, Harrington asserts that he could not
have understood what conduct would subject him to prosecution. The
State counters that as applied to Harrington the statutory definition
of possession is not unconstitutionally vague because Harrington
sought out and downloaded child pornography, a clear violation of the
statute.

27 We presume that all statutes are constitutional. State v. Dixon,
2000 MT 82, {| 14, 299 Mont. 165, 998 P.2d 544. A vagueness challenge
to a statute may be maintained under two different theories: (1)
because the statute is so vague that it is rendered void on its face; or
(2) because it is vague as applied in a particular situation. State v.
Watters, 2009 MT 163, {| 24, 350 Mont. 465, 208 P.3d 408. “It is a basic
principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Dugan, {| 66 (internal citations
omitted).

428 For vague-as-applied challenges, a court must determine (1)
whether the statute in question provides a person with “actual notice”
and (2) whether it provides “minimal guidelines” to law enforcement.
Dugan, | 67 (citing Watters, | 32). To determine whether the
challenged statute provides “actual notice,” courts examine the statute
in light of the defendant’s conduct to determine if the defendant
reasonably could have understood that the statute prohibited such
conduct. Watters, {| 32. Therefore, the issue is whether Harrington
could have reasonably understood that the statute proscribed his
conduct—seeking out and downloading child pornography.

129 Tl Section 45-2-101(59), MCA, which Harrington challenges as
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, defines possession as “the
knowing control of anything for a sufficient time to be able to terminate
control.” First, we determine if the statute would provide actual notice
to Harrington of what conductis proscribed. The statute clearly applies
to Harrington’s conduct. Harrington pleaded guilty to the possession
of child pornography. Harrington admitted to seeking out, and
downloading child pornography. Then Harrington deleted the files,
resulting in the images being stored in the unallocated space of his
laptop’s hard drive. Knowingly downloading child pornography with
the intent to view and then deleting it would fall within a reasonable
understanding of “possession.” A reasonable person of average
intelligence would have clearly understood that entering search terms
associated with child pornography into Frostwire and then
downloading child pornography files would fall within the scope of
possession of child pornography.

130 [I Second, we determine whether the Legislature established
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement regarding Harrington’s
conduct. Here, Harrington contends that the definition of possession
regarding computer images could include otherwise innocent conduct.
Harrington admitted to searching child pornography and then
downloaded two specific files with children seven and eight years old.
Clearly, Harrington knowingly controlled the files of child pornography
on his laptop sufficiently to delete them. Harrington’s arguments that
aprosecutor could bring charges against a defendant who involuntarily
downloaded child pornography and then immediately disposed of it do
not apply to Harrington’s conduct. Harrington knowingly sought out
multiple child pornography files to download; this is clearly not a case
of involuntary download. We conclude that § 45-2-101(59), MCA, is not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Harrington’s conduct.

CONCLUSION

131 We conclude that the District Court did not err when it
determined that the State presented sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that Harrington knowingly possessed child
pornography. Further, we conclude that Montana’s statutory definition
of possession under § 45-2-101(59), MCA, is not unconstitutionally
vague as applied to Harrington’s conduct. Therefore, the District Court
properly denied Harrington’s motions to dismiss.

q32 Affirmed.

JUSTICES SHEA, BAKER, SANDEFUR and RICE concur.

a «

JOHN P. STOKES and PAMELA J. STOKES,
Petitioners and Appellants,
v.

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY OF
MONTANA, INC., a Montana Corporation; and
US BANK TRUST, N.A., as Trustee for
LSF8 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST,
Respondents and Appellees.

No. DA 17-0161.

Submitted on Briefs September 13, 2017.
Decided November 7, 2017.
Rehearing Denied December 12, 2017.
2017 MT 275,

389 Mont. 245.

406 P.3d 439.

For Appellants: John Patrick Stokes, Pamela Jeanne
Stokes, self-represented; Bigfork.

For Appellees: Michael J. Lilly, Berg, Lilly & Tollefsen P.C.;
Bozeman; Danielle A.R. Coffman, Crowley Fleck PLLP; Kalispell.

OPINION AND ORDER
JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion and Order of the Court.

{11 While the appeal in this matter was pending, Appellees First
American Title Company and U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. (Appellees) filed
a joint motion requesting an order declaring Appellant John P. Stokes
(Stokes) to be a vexatious litigant and requiring either anything he
files be pre-approved by the district court or, alternatively, certified by
a licensed Montana lawyer in good standing as meritorious under
MR. Civ. P. 11.
2 In the appeal, John and Pamela Stokes (Mr. and Mrs. Stokes)
challenged an order that had been entered by the Twentieth Judicial
District Court, Lake County, Honorable James Manley presiding,
which dismissed their lawsuit against the Appellees. We affirmed the
District Court’s dismissal order in a memorandum opinion, issued in
conjunction herewith. Stokes v. First American Title Co., 2017 MT
274N, DA 17-0161. Mr. and Mrs. Stokes were initially represented by
counsel, who withdrew early in the case.
q3 Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution guarantees
every person access to the courts of Montana: “Courts of justice shall
be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury
of person, property, or character ... Right and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial, or delay.” However, the right to
access Montana’s legal system is not absolute, and may be limited with
the showing of a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
Peterson v. Great Falls Sch. Dist. No. 1 & A, 237 Mont. 376, 380,
773 P.2d 316, 318 (1989) (collecting cases).
q4 The Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that litigants can be
sanctioned for frivolous or vexatious litigation conduct:
The supreme court may, on a motion to dismiss, a request
included in a brief, or sua sponte, award sanctions to the
prevailing party in an appeal, cross-appeal, or a motion or petition
for relief determined to be frivolous, vexatious, filed for purposes
of harassment or delay, or taken without substantial or
reasonable grounds. Sanctions may include costs, attorney fees, or
such other monetary or non-monetary penalty as the supreme
court deems proper under the circumstances.
M.R. App. P. 19(5). We have previously cited Rule 19 in the imposition
of pre-filing orders for vexatious litigants. See, e.g., Hartsoe v. Tucker,
2013 MT 256, {1 14-18, 371 Mont. 539, 309 P.3d 39. Montana does not.
have a statute specifically authorizing the imposition of restrictions
upon vexatious litigants, but our common law includes such

authority.’ Motta v. Granite Cty. Comm’rs, 2013 MT 172, 1] 19-23,
370 Mont. 469, 304 P.8d 720. In Motta, we cited a five-factor test
utilized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal to determine whether a
pre-filing order is justified: (1) the litigant’s history of litigation and, in
particular, whether it has entailed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative
lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in pursuing the litigation; e.g.,
whether the litigant has an objective good faith expectation of
prevailing; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4)
whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or
has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel;
and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect. the
courts and other parties. Motta, {| 20 (citing Molski v. Evergreen
Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007))2

{5 Under the first factor, Stokes’ history of litigation in the district
courts is significant and has entailed vexatious, harassing, or
duplicative lawsuits. Stokes has been before this Court ten times.’ In

1 Section 37-61-421, MCA, does provide that “[a]n attorney or party to any court
proceeding who, in the determination of the court, multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorney fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”

? In Motta, we adopted a similar four-factor test to review the entry of a pre-filing
order by a trial court, which considered: (1) whether the litigant was given notice and a
chance to be heard before the order was entered; (2) whether the trial court has compiled
an adequate record for review; (3) whether the trial court has made substantive findings
about the frivolous or harassing nature of the plaintiff's litigation; and (4) whether the
vexatious litigant order is narrowly tailored to closely fit the specific vice encountered.
Motta, {20 (citing Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057-58). We utilized that test and considered the
findings entered by the District Court. Mozéa, | 21. However, because we are here not
reviewing the entry ofa pre-filing order in the trial court, but instead undertaking initial
consideration of the matter based upon the motion made in this Court, we will utilize the
five-factor test.

° We are here only addressing John Stokes’ status as a vexatious litigant, and not
Pamela Stokes. Although Pamela has been involved as a co-party in much of John
Stokes’ litigation, her status was not raised as part of the motion and we do not consider
it here.

* See Ameo Bldg. Sys. v. Stokes, No. 98-635, 2000 MT 66N, 2000 Mont. LEXIS 463;
Stokes v. State, 2005 MT 42, 26 Mont. 138, 107 P.3d 494; Anderson v. Stokes, 2007 MT
166, 338 Mont. 118, 163 P.3d 1273; Stokes v. State, 2007 MT 169, 338 Mont. 165,
162 P.3d 865; State v. Stokes, No. DA 06-0629, 2007 MT 318N, 2007 Mont. LEXIS 568;
State v. Skyline Broadcasters, Inc., 2009 MT 193, 351 Mont. 127, 211 P.3d 189; Stokes
v. Duncan, 2015 MT 92, 378 Mont. 433, 346 P.3d 553; Stokes v, State, No. OP 06-0647,

several of these cases, Stokes was represented by counsel, and there
was no assertion that the appeals had been taken unreasonably.
However, Stokes’ pro se appeals have repeatedly been found to be
insufficiently presented, including a failure to provide a sufficient
record or a failure to raise cognizable arguments, and have usually
been affirmed in a memorandum opinion based upon the failure to
meet the appellant’s burden. In this matter, we conclude that Mr. and
Mrs. Stokes’ appeal was taken without substantial or reasonable
grounds. As noted in our memorandum opinion, their briefing lacked
citations to the record, citations to authority, and cognizable legal
argument.
q6 Further, the briefing asserted numerous serious and unsupported
accusations against party opponents, judges, and officials. With no
citation to the record, Mr. and Mrs. Stokes alleged fraud, fabrication,
collusion, harassment, and intimidation by their bankruptcy trustees;
bias and prejudice by Judge Manley; and that Appellees were a “scam
enterprise and laundering front for the Drug Cartel ....” The brief also
stated that John Stokes personally removed a majority of the judges in
Flathead County and implied a threat to initiate a federal suit against
Judge Manley in California. We find such serious and wholly
unsupported statements to be harassing and vexatious.
{7 Appellees also attached complaints in four other suits brought by
Stokes pro se, one which was entitled “COMPLAINT FOR
EMBEZLEMENT [sic], EXTORTION AND DAMAGES.” They include
outlandish allegations of a harassing and abusive nature. Appellees
quote from district court orders expressing frustration with Stokes’
litigation tactics:
Stokes’ brief is a litany of confused “facts,” in which he attempts
to intertwine at least three separate lawsuits ... Stokes wholly
fails to respond to the Plaintiffs’ argument that Stokes has pled no
actual cause of action ... Once again, Stokes mixes motions, relies
on outdated case law and in general impermissibly attempts to re-
litigate matters ... Stokes seeks to add the individual attorneys
and the law firm as third party defendants. He alleges that the
individuals and the law firm have prepared false affidavits, have
withheld documents in a separate lawsuit, and have a financial
interest in continuing the litigation ... Once again, the Court is
faced with superfluous pleadings, which have no basis in fact or

Or. (Mont., Oct. 25, 2006); Stokes v. Anderson, No. OP 06-0756, Or. (Mont., Nov. 29,
2006); and the memorandum opinion in the underlying case here.

Jaw and which consume limited Court resources.
Gardner v. Stokes, No. DV 07-0729(B) (Mont. 11th Judicial Dist. July
17, 2008). A different district court judge stated, “Stokes has filed an
incomprehensible motion, accompanied by an equally convoluted
brief ...” and concluded it was “yet another example of [Stokes’] blatant
disregard of legal procedures and rules.” Anderson v. Stokes, No. DV
01-023C (Mont. 11th Judicial Dist. April 28, 2008).
{8 Stokes didnot file a response to the motion seeking his declaration
as a vexatious litigant, but argued in his appellate reply brief that, by
citing his filings in other cases, Appellees have offered inadmissible
evidence in support of their motion. However, this Court may take
judicial notice of other court proceedings, and we do so here.
M. R. Evid. 202. While it would be preferable for a pre-filing order to
be entered by a trial court upon fact-finding, we cannot ignore
vexatious actions, particularly those that occur in this Court. We
conclude the first factor of the Motta test is satisfied.
q9 Under the second factor, we find Stokes does not have an objective
good faith expectation of prevailing in the foreclosure matter that was
the subject of his appeal. His pro se motions and briefs were
procedurally unrecognizable and lacking in proper legal arguments.
One federal judge commented: “Stokes is not an attorney, and while he
zealously argues his positions, the record of his unsuccessful results in
litigation is uniform and speaks for itself.” In re Stokes, No. 09-60265-
11, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3030, at *52 (U.S. Bankr. D. Mont. Sep. 21,
2009).
{10 The third factor, whether Mr. Stokes is represented by counsel, is
an important consideration here and affects the breadth of the remedy
ordered. The vexatious behavior exhibited by Stokes has occurred
prevalently while he was acting pro se, exemplified by the present
appeal, wherein his counsel withdrew and Stokes thereafter filed a
number of harassing pleadings while representing himself. Similarly,
in Motta, we concluded that the pre-filing order at issue, which
restricted Motta’s pro se filings, was narrowly tailored and
appropriately entered. Motta, {| 17, 22.
{11 Under the fourth factor, it is clear from the actions described
above that Stokes has caused needless expense to other parties and
posed an unnecessary burden on the courts. In the litigation at issue
in this appeal, Stokes filed an action to prolong the foreclosure process,
and then later argued the court lacked jurisdiction to address the very
action he initiated, an effort that merely caused confusion and turmoil.
12 Finally, we conclude that sanctions other than a pre-filing order
would be inadequate. Stokes has previously litigated over significant

debt and initiated bankruptcy proceedings. A financial sanction of costs
or fees would appear to give a litigant with Stokes’ history little pause
in pursuing further vexatious behavior in the courts. Indeed, district
courts have imposed such fees on Stokes in the past, with little or no
discernible impact. In his appellate briefing here, Stokes has already
threatened future litigation against the same parties and the presiding
judge. Further, given the broad range of litigation Stokes has brought.
in multiple judicial districts, we see no way to effectively narrow the
pre-filing order to a particular type of claim.
13 [I We conclude the applicable Motta test is satisfied and that the
necessity of a pre-filing order has been established when Stokes is
litigating pro se. Consistent with the Montana Constitution, an order
has a direct relationship to the state interest of protecting other parties
from the unnecessary expense of litigating against Stokes and
protecting the courts from the unnecessary expenditure of judicial
resources. Therefore,
qi4 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the joint motion to declare John
P. Stokes a vexatious litigant is GRANTED IN PART. Before Stokes
can file any pleading pro se ina Montana district court or the Montana
Supreme Court, he is required to obtain pre-filing approval from the
court in which he seeks to file. The court may prohibit any such filing
upon a determination that the claims asserted are harassing, frivolous,
or legally not cognizable. This pre-filing requirement also applies to
pro se filings by Stokes in cases where his counsel, if any, has
withdrawn from representation of Stokes. Although this order does not
apply to Pamela Stokes, courts should not permit John Stokes to
engage in vexatious litigation tactics under her name.
115 The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide copies of this Order
to counsel of record, all Montana district courts, and to John P. Stokes
and Pamela J. Stokes, personally.

DATED this 7th day of November, 2017.

JUSTICES SHEA, SANDEFUR, McKINNON and BAKER concur.

MONTE R. DAVIS, JR. and
WILHELMINE S. DAVIS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
DOUGLAS L. WESTPHAL and
KATHY L. WILSON,
Defendants, Appellees, and
Cross-Appellants.

No. DA 17-0003.
Submitted on Briefs June 21, 2017.
Decided November 8, 2017.
2017 MT 276.

389 Mont. 251
405 P.3d 73.

—

For Appellant: Randall A. Snyder, Snyder Law Office; Bigfork.

For Appellee: Evan F. Danno, Danno Law Firm, P.C.; Kalispell.

JUSTICE SANDEFUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1 Plaintiffs Monte R. and Wilhelmine S. Davis (Davises) appeal
from an order of the Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court,
Flathead County, denying the portion of their motion for partial
summary judgment seeking an order compelling Defendants Douglas
L. Westphal and Kathy L. Wilson (Westphals) to immediately remove
trespassing encroachments on Davises’ property and to restore the
property to its prior condition subject to Davises’ right to do so at
Westphals’ expense if they fail to timely act. Westphals cross-appeal
the District Court’s underlying grant of summary judgment declaring
their shop building and underground septic system to be trespassing
encroachments on Davises’ property. We affirm and remand for further
proceedings.

ISSUE
2 The restated issue is:
Did the District Court erroneously deny summary judgment for
immediate removal of Westphals’ trespassing encroachments and
restoration of Davises’ land?

BACKGROUND

3 The parties are owners of adjoining tracts of rural property along
Five Deer Lane in Flathead County near Bigfork, Montana. The
Westphals own a 10.01-acre tract to the west known as Five Deer
Lakes Lot 1. The Davises own an 8.562 tract to the east known as Five
Deer Lakes Lot 2. Without verification or inquiry, the Westphals
mistakenly assumed that.a line of pink survey flags running across the
ground from a corner survey marker delineated the boundary line
between Lots 1 and 2. Asa result, Westphals cut down several trees on
Davises’ property in 2013. In 2014-15, Westphals built a 40’x60’ shop
building, and installed an accompanying septic system drain field, near
their property line, both which mistakenly encroached on Davises’
property.

q4 In September 2015, while visiting their undeveloped land from
California, Davises first noticed the Westphals’ progressing
improvements and suspected that they encroached on Davises’ land. By
that time, the septic system drain field and concrete foundation for the

shop were in place and Westphals were in the process of erecting the
metal shop building on the foundation. After retaining a licensed
surveyor and confirming that the shop building and drain field
encroached across the property line onto their lot, Davises notified
Westphals of the encroachments and requested that they remove them
immediately. Westphals did not immediately respond. After they
finished enclosing the shop in advance of the oncoming winter,
Westphals responded, by correspondence dated November 13, 2015,
wherein they acknowledged the encroachments, admitted fault for
their mistake, apologized, and stated their desire to resolve the
problem amicably.

q5 Six months later, with no agreement or abatement effort
underway or imminent, the Davises filed a district court complaint on
June 10, 2016, asserting four unspecified causes of action seeking: (1)
“an order of ejectment, deconstruction and removal of’ the
“encroachments, and reasonable restoration of [the] property;”
(2) compensatory damages, trebled by statute, for the wrongfully felled
trees; (3) relocation of the non-encroaching portions of the shop and
septic system in compliance with county zoning setback requirements;
and (4) punitive damages. The complaint separately prayed for
judgment declaring the encroachments as trespasses, “ejecting” the
encroachments, “ordering [their] immediate deconstruction and
removal,” ordering restoration of the property, “enjoining [Westphals]
from constructing any improvements on their own property in violation
of ... zoning ... setback requirements;” and for compensatory and
punitive damages “proximately caused by [Westphals’] conduct.” The
District Court issued a temporary restraining order on Davises’
accompanying ex parte motion and set a hearing on their motion for a
preliminary injunction for June 22, 2016. At the hearing, upon notice
that the parties had reached an informal agreement for Westphals to
remove the encroachments and restore the property in return for the
Davises dropping their request for a preliminary injunction, the
District Court denied the motion for preliminary injunction as moot.

{6 OnSeptember 12, 2016, with abatement of the encroachments still
not underway or imminent, Davises moved for summary judgment for:
(1) declaratory judgment declaring the encroachments as trespasses on
their property; (2) an order “ejecting” the encroachments and “ordering
[their] immediate ... removal” with restoration of the property; (3) “a
permanent injunction” enjoining “any further trespass” and enjoining
Westphals from “constructing any improvements on their own property
in violation of’ county “zoning regulations or setback requirements.”
For the first time and without reference to mandatory injunctive relief,

Davises characterized their claims as claims for declaratory judgment
of trespass, common law “ejectment,” and prohibitive injunctive relief.
Westphals opposed the motion on the asserted ground that no legal
trespass had occurred because they had not intentionally encroached
on Davises’ property. Westphals requested an additional year to
remove the encroachments and restore the property in the face of the
upcoming winter. Westphals filed a supporting affidavit describing the
difficulty and cost. of removing the encroachments and restoring the
property. The affidavit described the Westphals’ financial limitations
and asserted that Davises’ need for immediate abatement was not
urgent because they lived in California, only occasionally visited the
land, and had no immediate plans to build on the undeveloped
property.
{7 On October 24, 2016, the District Court granted Davises’
summary judgment on the briefs without a hearing’ declaring that the
Westphal encroachments and tree-felling constituted civil trespasses.
However, the court denied Davises’ requests for “immediate ejection ...
and removal of all encroaching improvements,” site restoration, and a
permanent injunction enjoining any further intrusion on Davises’
property or noncompliance with county zoning setback requirements.
The court reasoned that:
(1) the authority cited by Davises did not “order ejection, adopt the
remedy of ejection, or otherwise establish standards for an
ejection claim;”
(2) § 27-1-318, MCA, “generally provides for money damages for
wrongful occupation of real property;”
(3) though “ejection is a possible remedy” under § 27-8-3138, MCA
(declaratory judgment supplemental relief provision), and
Goodover v. Lindey’s, 246 Mont. 80, 802 P.2d 1258 (1980)
(affirming discretionary grant of supplemental mandatory
injunction for removal of encroachments to afford complete relief
to declaratory judgment of trespass), Davises presented
“insufficient information to determine whether coercive
supplemental relief, i.e., ejection, deconstruction, and restoration,”
is necessary “as a matter of law” to remedy the trespasses “in
addition to money damages” (emphasis in original); and
(4) Davises “offered no factual basis or legal argument that [the
requested prohibitive] injunctive relief is necessary at this point

‘Neither party requested a hearing, thus waiving a hearing pursuant to M.R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(2A).

in time.”

The court noted further that Westphals “informally agreed to remove
the encroaching structures in exchange for dismissal of the action,” a
result the court observed to be “the most expeditious way to resolve the
dispute.” The court thus encouraged the parties “to negotiate a date
certain for removal of the structures.”

{8 Davises subsequently moved the District Court pursuant to M. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(a) to “correct” its summary judgment ruling by
granting their request for an order compelling immediate removal of
the encroachments and site restoration on the asserted ground that the
failure to grant such relief was irreconcilably inconsistent with its
declaration of trespass and erroneously failed to provide complete
relief. The District Court denied the motion on the stated ground that
its denial of mandatory injunctive relief was not a final judgment and
that Davises “failed to raise any new evidence” or show that the denial
was erroneous as a matter of law. Davises appeal the court’s denial of
their request for an order compelling immediate removal of the
encroachments and site restoration.” Westphals cross-appeal the
court’s underlying declaratory judgment of trespass.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

q9 Wereview summary judgment rulings de novo for conformance to
M. R. Civ. P. 56. Dick Anderson Constr., Inc. v. Monroe Prop. Co., 2011
MT 138, { 16, 361 Mont. 30, 255 P.3d 1257. Summary judgment is
proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3). The questions of whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists or whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law are
conclusions of law subject to de novo review for correctness. Ereth v.
Cascade County, 2003 MT 328, {| 11, 318 Mont. 355, 81 P.3d 463.

{10 The grant or denial of injunctive relief is a matter within the
broad discretion of the district court based on applicable findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Shammel v. Canyon Resources Corp., 2003 MT
372, 7 11, 319 Mont. 132, 82 P.8d 912; Walker v. Warner, 228 Mont.
162, 166, 740 P.2d 1147, 1149-50 (1987). The standard of review of a
grant or denial of injunctive relief is whether the court manifestly

® Davises do not challenge the District Court’s denial of their request for
prohibitive injunctive relief enjoining Westphals from any farther trespass and from
relocating or constructing improvements on their own property except in compliance with
applicable zoning restrictions

abused its discretion. Shammel, 12. A manifest abuse of discretion
is an “obvious, evident, or unmistakable” abuse of discretion.
Shammel, 12. The standard of review of lower court findings of fact
and conclusions of law is whether the findings of fact are clearly
erroneous and whether the conclusions of law are correct. We review
district court rulings on motions for post-judgment relief under M. R.
Ciy. P. 59 and 60 for an abuse of discretion. Folsom v. Montana Pub.
Employees Ass'n, 2017 MT 204, {] 18, 388 Mont. 307, 400 P.3d 706.

DISCUSSION

11 At issue on Davises’ appeal and Westphals’ cross-appeal are
summary judgment rulings that are also the predicate for Davises’
related appeal of the court’s subsequent denial of their Motion to
Correct summary judgment rulings. Orders granting or denying
summary judgment are generally interlocutory orders not subject to
immediate appeal. Trombley v. Mann, 2001 MT 154, {J 6-10, 306
Mont. 80, 30 P.3d 355; M. R. App. P. 6(5)(b). In this case, the District
Court has not entered a “final judgment,” as defined by M. R. App. P.
A(1)(a), or certified its interlocutory summary judgment rulings as
suitable for immediate appeal pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and M.
R. App. P. 6(6). However, “provided that the order is the court’s final
decision on the referenced matter,” orders granting or denying
injunctive relief are immediately appealable. M. R. App. P. 6(3)(e). Rule
6(3)(e) thus allows immediate appeal of an order granting or denying
a preliminary injunction. Montana Cannabis Indus. Ass'n v. State,
2012 MT 201, {] 13, 366 Mont. 224, 286 P.3d 1161. Because Davises’
appeal irreconcilably conflates relief available at law on a common law
ejectment claim with preliminary and final injunctive relief available
as supplemental relief on a common law ejectment claim or on a
statutory declaratory judgment, we accept their appeal on the above-
restated issue pursuant to M. R. App. P. 6(3)(e) and § 3-2-204(5), MCA
(mandatory review of all questions of fact and questions of law
implicated on record in equity cases). However, we decline Westphals’
cross-appeal without prejudice as a premature appeal of an uncertified
interlocutory ruling.

12 Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). A genuine issue of material fact is
an issue of inconsistent fact, material to the elements of a claim or
defense at issue, and not amenable to judgment as a matter of law.
Mountain West Bank, N.A. v. Mine & Mill Hydraulics, Inc., 2003 MT
35, 1 28, 314 Mont. 248, 64 P.3d 1048; see also § 25-7-103, MCA

(exclusive domain of finder of fact); Weinberg v. Farmers State Bank,
231 Mont. 10, 27, 752 P.2d 719, 730 (1988) (exclusive domain of finder
of fact to resolve questions of fact upon which reasonable people may
differ). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of
showing a complete absence of any genuine issue of material fact on
the Rule 56 record’ and that the party is thus entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Weber v. Interbel Tel. Coop., Inc., 2003 MT 320, 15,
318 Mont. 295, 80 P.3d 88; accord, Ereth, ] 11. The burden then shifts
to the opposing party to show either the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact or that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the facts of record not subject to genuine material
dispute. Osterman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2003 MT 327, {| 17, 318
Mont. 342, 80 P.3d 435 (citing Bruner v. Yellowstone Cnty., 272 Mont.
261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903 (1995)); Ereth, 11. While the court must
view the Rule 56 factual record in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences against summary
judgment, Weber, 5, the court has “no duty to anticipate or speculate”
regarding contrary material facts. Gamble Robinson Co. v. Carousel
Properties, 212 Mont. 305, 312, 688 P.2d 282, 287 (1984).

13 Did the District Court erroneously deny summary judgment for
immediate removal of Westphals’ trespassing encroachments and
restoration of Davises’ land?

14 Davises assert on appeal that the District Court erroneously
refused to order Westphals to remove the subject encroachments and
restore the property within 60 days of judgment with the proviso that
Davises could remove the drain field and shop building at Westphals’
expense if they failed to timely comply. Apart from their base request
for a declaratory judgment of trespass, the Davises sought summary
judgment “ejecting” the encroachments, “ordering [their] immediate ...
removal” and restoration of the property, and permanently enjoining
“any further trespass” or violation of applicable zoning setback
requirements. Without reference to mandatory injunctive relief in the
District Court and in contrast to their request for prohibitive injunctive
relief, Davises sought an order compelling removal of the
encroachments and restoration of the property as forms of relief
available on the common law claim of ejectment. On appeal, Davises
now assert. that, in addition to common law ejectment, they are also
entitled to mandatory injunctive relief compelling Westphals to remove

° The summary judgment record includes “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits.” M. R. Civ. P, 56(0X3).

the encroachments and restore the property. Davises’ conflation of the
torts of common law trespass and ejectment, declaratory judgment of
trespass, and supplemental preliminary and permanent equitable
relief requires that we sort out these causes of action and remedies as
a prelude to addressing their assertion of error.

{115 Modern common law trespass is an intentional tort claim for
damages caused by an unauthorized entry or holdover upon real
property of another. Tags Realty, LLC v. Runkle, 2015 MT 166, {] 15,
3879 Mont. 416, 352 P.3d 616; Tally Bissell Neighbors, Inc. v. Eyrie
Shotgun Ranch, LLC, 2010 MT 63, 138, 355 Mont. 387, 228 P.3d 1134;
Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 187 P.2d 718,715 (Cal. App. 1948). The
essential elements of a modern common law trespass claim are: (1) an
intentional entry or holdover (2) by the defendant or a thing;
(3) without consent or legal right. Branstetter v. Beaumont Supper
Club, Inc., 224 Mont. 20, 24, 727 P.2d 933, 935 (1986); Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 158 and 163 (1965). Because the legal harm is the
interference with another’s right to exclusive possession of property, an
unauthorized tangible presence on the property of another constitutes
a trespass regardless of whether the intrusion caused any other harm.
Tally, {| 37-38 (distinguishing “tangible” invasion of property by
person or thing from an “intangible” invasion, e.g., invasion of sound,
light, odor, gas, or electromagnetic field, requiring proof of actual harm
beyond mere infringement of right); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 163 cmt. d. A civil trespass encompasses both the initial
unauthorized entry upon the property of another and the subsequent
failure to cease or abate the intrusion. Branstetter, 224 Mont. at 24,
727 P.2d at 935; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 158 and 163.

116 [J While civil trespass is an intentional tort, Miller v. Nat?
Broadcasting Co. , 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (Cal. App. 1986), intentional
trespass does not require proof of specific intent, i.e., that the
tortfeasor intended to enter or remain upon property owned or
controlled by another. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 163 emt. b, ¢
and 164 cmt. a. The intent element of civil trespass only requires proof
that the tortfeasor intentionally entered or remained, or caused a third
party or thing to enter or remain, upon the property of another
regardless of the tortfeasor’s knowledge, lack of knowledge, or good
faith mistake as to actual property ownership or right. Luoma v.
Donohoe, 179 Mont. 359, 365, 588 P.2d 523, 526 (1978); Miller, 232 Cal.
Rptr. at 677; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 163, cmt. b, ¢ and 164
emt. a; W. Page Keeton and William Prosser, Prosser & Keeton on the
Law of Torts § 13, 67-68 and 73-75 (5th ed. 1984) (“interest of the
landowner is protected at the expense of those who make innocent

mistakes”).*

17 Hf Though related tort claims of common origin for enforcement
of an owner’s right to exclusive possession of real property, common
law trespass and common law ejectment are technically distinct causes
of actions providing distinct remedies. Tally, | 38; Slater, 137 P.2d at
715; 28A C.J.S. Ejectment § 1 (2008). In contrast to a common law
trespass claim for damages anda modern statutory claim for judgment
declaring a trespass as a predicate for supplemental legal or equitable
relief, common law “ejectment” is an independent cause of action of
ancient origin and greatly evolved purpose and scope. Sofer v. Beech,
409 A.2d 337, 339-43 (Pa. 1979); Dice v. Reese , 21 A.2d 89, 92 (Pa.
1941); Caperton v. Schmidt, 26 Cal. 479, 496-512 (Cal. 1864);
Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. 481, 441-43 (1832); Black’s Law
Dictionary 630 (10" ed. 2014).° In modern form, common law ejectment
is an action at law brought against a trespasser in possession of all or
a portion of real property for immediate possession of the property
based on proof of superior title and the right to immediate possession.
Sofer, 409 A.2d at 339-40; Heroux v. Katt, 68 A.2d 25, 26-28 (R.I. 1949)
(recognizing ejectment as action at law to remedy encroaching
improvements); Slater, 187 P.2d at 715; Butler v. Frontier Telephone
Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 488-92 (N.Y. 1906) (recognizing ejectment as an
action at law to remedy vertical encroachment by overhanging wires);
Agar v. Winslow, 56 P. 422, 423 (Cal. 1899); 25 Am. Jur. 2d Ejectment
§ 19 (2014); 28A C.J.S. Ejectment §§ 1-3 and 5-6; accord, Kootenai Corp.
v. Dayton, 184 Mont. 19, 24, 601 P.2d 47, 49-50 (1979) (distinguishing
common law ejectment from statutory forcible detainer action); Miner
v. Cook, 87 Mont. 500, 502-03, 288 P. 1016, 1017 (1930); Baker v. Butte
Water Co., 40 Mont. 588, 585; 107 P. 819, 820(1910); Billings v.

* See also, Olsen v. Milner , 2012 MT 88, {| 35-40, 364 Mont. 523, 276 P.8d 935
(applying Restatement (Second) of Torts § 165 (1979) reckless/negligent trespass theory
to boundary line encroachment); but see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 165 emt. b, ¢ Gn
contrast to intentional trespass under §§ 158-64, reckless/negligent trespass theory
narrowly pertains to unintentional entry upon land distinguished from intentional entry
upon land under mistaken belief of ownership or right and further requires proof ofharm
beyond mere interference with owner right to exclusive possession).

° Ejectment was originally an action at law in trespass against a landlord to restore
a wrongfully ousted tenant to possession of a leasehold for the remainder of the term.
Sofer, 409 A.2d at 339-43; Dice, 21 A.2d at 92; Caperton, 26 Cal. at 496-512; Cincinnati,
31 U.S. at 441-43; Black's Law Dictionary 630 (10th ed. 2014).

Sanderson, 8 Mont. 201, 204, 19 P. 307, 307-08 (Mont. Terr. 1888).°
18 Long predating modern declaratory judgment Acts,” the primary
relief available on an ejectment claim is a judgment declaring that the
plaintiff has the right to immediate possession of the property. 25 Am.
Jur. 2d Ejectment §§ 1 and 44; 28A C.J.S. Ejectment §§ 1-2 and 6. A
successful plaintiff may also recover damages in ejectment
as compensation for the loss of use of the property during the duration
of the trespass, § 27-1-318, MCA (reasonable rental value as general
measure of damages for wrongful occupation of land); Pritchard
Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Coop. Oil & Supply Co., 121 Mont. 1, 7, 190
P.2d 55, 58-59 (1948) (mesne profits)* Equitable defenses were not
available to counter ejectment claims at common law. 25 Am. Jur. 2d
Ejectment § 20. However, with the modern merger of law and equity,
see M. R. Civ. P. 1-2, equitable defenses, and even affirmative relief,
may be available, as equitable, to counter or ameliorate a common law
ejectment claim. Pritchard, 121 Mont. at 15-16; 190 P.2d at 62-63 (good
faith trespasser who placed permanent improvements on land may
counterclaim in equity for damages setoff to “recoup the value of the
improvements” to the extent they “enhanced the value of the land”
regardless of limitations of § 70-28-110, MCA (right to damages setoff
for improvements made by good faith withholding of land under color
of title)): 25 Am. Jur. 2d Ejectment § 20.

{19 Due to its limited nature as a mere declaration of right to
possession, a judgment of ejectment is not self-executing. Page v.
Luhring, 178 S.E.2d 527, 529 (Va. 1971). The remedy available at law
to effect. a judgment of ejectment is execution under a special writ

° Early Montana ejectment cases reference historical common law requirements
for proof that the plaintiff actually entered upon and possessed the land and that the
defendant unlawfully ousted the plaintiff from possession and remained in unlawful
possession. See, e.g., Miner, 87 Mont. at 502-03, 288 P. at 1017; Baker, 40 Mont. at 585,
107 P. at 820; Billings, 8 Mont. at 204, 19 P. at 307-08; compare Sofer, 409 A.2d at 339-
40 (abandoning rigid common law requirements for proof of complete ouster from the
property and actual entry or possession by defendant).

7 Declaratory judgments are a modern statutory remedy unknown at common law
or in equity, 26 C..S. Declaratory Judgments § 2 (2011).

* Depending on the facts and relief sought, restoration damages may also be
available as an alternative measure of compensatory damages at law to remedy damage
to real property. See Lampi v. Speed, 2011 MT 231, 1] 22-24, 31, and 37-39, 362 Mont.
122, 261 P.3d 1000; Sunburst School Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, 1] 32-38
and 43-45, 338 Mont 259, 165 P.3d 1079.

known at common law as a writ of possession or ejectment,
commanding the sheriff or levying officer to deliver possession of the
property to the plaintiff by removing the defendant and personalty
from the property. Sections 25-13-201, -301(1)(d), and -307, MCA;
Page, 178 S.E.2d at 529; Dodd v. Simon, 113 Mont. 536, 541-42, 129
P.2d 224, 228 (1942); Long v. Neville, 291 Cal. 131, 135-36 (Cal. 1865);
9 Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Ejectment §§ 70-71 (2017); 25 Am. Jur. 2d
Ejectment § 48; 28A C.J.S. Ejectment §§ 6 and 216; see also, Fuller v.
Gibbs, 122 Mont. 177, 183, 199 P.2d 851, 854 (1948); Baker, 40 Mont.
at 585-86; 107 P. at 820-21. Though ejectment technically lies to
remedy a real property encroachment, a writ of possession
commanding the sheriff to remove the defendant and personalty will
generally not abate a substantial physical encroachment affixed to
land. While a writ of possession could conceivably command a sheriff
or levying officer to enter onto real property and affirmatively remove
a trespassing encroachment, see Heroux, 68 A.2d at 27-28, and Butler,
186 N.Y. at 492-93, our general execution statutes govern writs of
possession under Montana law. Dodd, 113 Mont. at 542, 129 P.2d at
228. Davises did not raise the question of whether §§ 25-13-201, -
801(1)(d), and -307, MCA, would permit issuance of such an
extraordinary writ of execution before the District Court and the issue
is not properly before us at this time.

20 Independent of common law trespass and ejectment claims, a
modern declaratory judgment action is also available to determine the
“rights, status, and other legal relations” of the parties on any matter
in dispute. Sections 27-8-201 and -301, MCA. Statutory declaratory
judgment claims merely supplement other claims and remedies
independently available at law or in equity. See M. R. Civ. P. 57; 26
C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments §§ 1-2 (2011). Prohibitive and
mandatory injunctive relief are forms of supplemental relief available
where “necessary or proper’ to effect or enforce a declaratory judgment.
Section 27-8-313, MCA; Lindey’s, 246 Mont. at. 82-83, 802 P.2d at 1260.
As an alternative or supplemental remedy to preexisting common law
trespass and ejectment claims, a party may seek redress of a
trespassing real property encroachment by seeking a declaratory
judgment of trespass, supplemental damages as otherwise provided by
law, and supplemental injunctive relief for abatement of the
encroachment as otherwise authorized in equity. See Lindey’s, 246
Mont. at 82-83, 802 P.2d at 1260.

21 Here, Davises obtained summary judgment declaring that
Westphals’ tree-felling and encroaching building and drain field
constituted civil trespasses. As far as it goes, that declaratory

judgment was the substantive equivalent. of a judgment of ejectment
declaring Davises’ right to exclusive possession of their property to the
exclusion of the subject encroachments. Thus, Davises successfully
obtained an interlocutory judgment, prevailing on their alternatively
pled declaratory judgment and common law ejection claims. Except for
as yet undetermined damages not at issue on appeal, and in contrast
to any supplemental injunctive relief otherwise appropriate in equity,
no other relief at law is currently available to Davises on their common
law ejectment claim prior to final judgment.

122 [To the extent that Davises assert that the District Court erred
by failing to further order ejectment. of the subject. encroachments,
their “immediate removal,” and restoration of the property, they seek
forms of relief that are either premature or beyond the scope of relief
available on a common law ejectment claim. The parties and the
District Court have yet to consider whether a writ of possession
executed by a sheriff or levying officer is available or adequate under
§§ 25-13-201, -301(1)(d), and -307, MCA, to abate the subject
encroachments and restore possession of the property to Davises. Even
if so, a writ of execution enforcing a judgment of possession still may
not issue until the judgment is final. See M. R. Civ. P. 58 and 70(d);
§§ 25-13-101, -201, and -307, MCA. Davises do not assert that the
District Court erred by failing to enter final judgment. Except as
supplemental equitable relief, an order compelling a trespasser to
remove an encroachment and to restore the property to its prior
condition is not a cognizable form of relief available at law on a
common law ejectment claim. We hold that the District Court did not
err in declining to grant relief at law other than a declaration of
trespass on Davises’ common law ejectment claim.

123 As to injunctive relief, it is unclear whether Davises assert that
the District Court erred by failing to grant injunctive relief pursuant
to § 27-8-313, MCA (relief supplemental to declaratory judgment), or
as equitable relief supplemental to their common law ejectment claim.
More significantly, it is further unclear from their briefing whether
Davises assert that the court erroneously denied preliminary
injunctive relief, permanent injunctive relief, or both. Regardless of
whether requested pursuant to § 27-8-313, MCA, or as supplemental
equitable relief necessary to afford complete relief on a common law
claim, temporary and permanent injunctive relief are equitable
remedies governed by general principles of equity codified in Montana
in Title 27, ch. 19, MCA. Talley v. Flathead Valley Comm. College, 259
Mont. 479, 491, 857 P.2d 701, 708 (1993); State ex rel. Stewart v.
District Ct., 77 Mont. 361, 369, 251 P. 137, 139 (1926); see also, M. R.

Civ. P. 65. Contrary to Davises’ assertion, injunctive relief is an
extraordinary remedy not available as a matter of right. Paradise
Rainbows v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 148 Mont. 412, 420, 421 P.2d 717,
721 (1966). The grant or denial of permanent or preliminary injunctive
relief is highly discretionary and critically dependent on the particular
facts, circumstances, and equities of each case. Shammel, | 12;
Citizens for Balanced Use v. Maurier, 2013 MT 166, {I 11 and 28, 370
Mont. 410, 303 P.3d 794; Knudson v. McDunn, 271 Mont. 61, 65, 894
P.2d 295, 297-98 (1995); Montana Tavern Ass'n v. State, 224 Mont. 258,
265, 729 P.2d 1310, 13815 (1986). Where necessary to afford complete
relief, injunctive relief may be available either as an alternative or
supplemental remedy to those ordinarily available by statute or at
common law. City of Whitefish v. Troy Town Pump, 2001 MT 58, {| 35,
304 Mont. 346, 21 P.3d 1026 (court sitting in equity “empowered to
grant all relief necessary to the entire adjustment of the subject
matter”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 951 cmt. a (under modern
merger of law and equity all forms of legal and equitable relief are
available to provide complete relief as necessary on a case basis). Thus,
where appropriate on balance of the equities, injunctive relief is
available as a supplemental remedy to afford complete relief on a
common law ejectment claim. See Jeppeson v. Montana Dept. of State
Lands, 205 Mont. 282, 287, 667 P.2d 428, 431-32 (1983); Blinn v.
Hutterische Soc’y of Wolf Creek, 58 Mont. 542, 553, 194 P. 140, 142
(1920); King v. Mullins, 27 Mont. 364, 368, 71 P. 155, 156 (1903);
Heinze v. Kleinschmidt, 25 Mont. 89, 105, 63 P. 927, 933 (1901);
Williams v. Long, 61 P. 1087, 1088 (Cal. 1900); Natoma Water &
Mining Co. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal. 544, 552 (Cal. 1860).

24 [District courts have broad discretion to grant preliminary
injunctive relief on any of the five grounds enumerated in § 27-19-201,
MCA. Sandrock v. DeTienne, 2010 MT 237, 1 16, 358 Mont. 175, 243
P.3d 1123; Sweet Grass Farms, Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2000
MT 147, { 27, 300 Mont. 66, 2 P.3d 825. On evidence or competent
affidavit? considered upon hearing, a court may issue a preliminary
injunction at any time before final judgment. Section 27-19-303, MCA.
In considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction on any of the
grounds enumerated in § 27-19-201, MCA, the court must exercise its
discretion only in furtherance of the limited purpose of preliminary

° In this context, an affidavit is competent only if “verified” and “the material
allegations ... setting forth the grounds for the [preliminary injunction] are made
positively and not upon information and belief.” Section 27-19-303(2), MCA.

injunctions to preserve the status quo and minimize the harm to all
parties pending final resolution on the merits. Porter v. K & S
Partnership, 192 Mont. 175, 183, 627 P.2d 836, 840 (1981). The “status
quo” is generally “the last actual, peaceable, [un]contested condition”
preceding the controversy at issue. Porter, 192 Mont. at 181, 627 P.2d
at 839. “If a preliminary injunction will not accomplish [its limited]
purposes, then it should not issue.” Porter, 192 Mont. at 183, 627 P.2d
at 840. Thus, even on proof of any grounds enumerated in § 27-19-201,
MCA, a preliminary injunction should not issue absent an
accompanying prima facie showing, or showing that it is at least
uncertain, that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury prior to
final resolution on the merits. Porter, 192 Mont. at 181, 627 P.2d at.
839; Rea Bros. Sheep Co. v. Rudi, 46 Mont. 149, 160, 127 P. 85, 87
(1912).

25 [Bl Jnter alia, Davises assert that, upon granting summary
judgment declaring the encroachments as trespasses, the District.
Court erred by failing to go further and issue a preliminary injunction
for their removal pursuant to § 27-19-201(3), MCA (preliminary
enjoinder of wrongful conduct “tending to render judgment
ineffectual”). However, preliminary injunctions may not issue except
upon evidence or affidavit considered at a duly noticed hearing. Section
27-19-3038, MCA. Davises abandoned their initial motion for a
preliminary injunction by stipulation long before they moved for
summary judgment, did not clearly articulate a renewed request for a
preliminary injunction in their summary judgment motion, and in any
event failed to request a preliminary injunction hearing on or incident
to their motion for summary judgment. Moreover, though they
requested that the court “order ejectment” of the encroachments,
compel Westphals to remove the encroachments, provide for “forcible”
removal ifnecessary, and conditionally authorize them to remove them
if Westphals failed to act, nowhere in Davises’ conflated summary
judgment motion and briefing was any reference to § 27-19-201(3),
MCA, much less a factual showing that the failure to grant a
preliminary mandatory injunction would render ineffectual any
subsequent final judgment that might include, as appropriate, final
injunctive relief. We will not hold a district court in error for failing to
address an issue that parties did not timely raise. McDunn v. Arnold,
2013 MT 138, {| 14, 370 Mont. 270, 303 P.3d 1279. We hold that the
District Court did not err in declining to issue a preliminary injunction
for removal of the subject. encroachments upon granting summary
judgment declaring them as trespasses.

26 Permanent injunctive relief, also known as final injunctive relief,

see § 27-19-102, MCA, is available only where necessary to prevent
irreparable injury in the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate
statutory or common law remedy. Ducham v. Tuma, 265 Mont. 436,
442, 877 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1994), overruled on other grounds by
Shammel, {| 12 (clarifying standard of review of grant or denial of
injunctions); Jeffries Coal Co. v. Industrial Acc. Bd. , 126 Mont. 411,
413, 252 P.2d 1046, 1047 (1952); Santa Rita Oil & Gas Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 112 Mont. 359, 366-67, 116 P.2d 1012, 1016 (1941);
Bullard v. Zimmerman, 82 Mont. 434, 446-48, 268 P. 512, 517-18
(1928); accord, § 27-19-102, MCA. Irreparable injury is a harm or
wrong: (1) not fully or effectively remedied by compensatory damages;
(2) in regard to which adequate, non-speculative compensation is
difficult to determine; or (3) of a recurring or continuous nature such
that full and effective redress would otherwise require a multiplicity
of successive actions at law. Wind v. Herbert, 8 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (Cal.
App. 1960); see also, § 27-19-102, MCA. A statutory or common law
remedy may be inadequate to fully or effectively remedy a harm or
wrong either due to the nature of the cause of action or the form of
relief ordinarily available thereon. Bullard, 82 Mont. at 446-48, 268 P.
at 517-18.

27 Hl Injunctive relief is generally not available to remedy a trespass
where an action at law for damages or ejectment will provide complete
relief. Jeppeson, 205 Mont. at 287, 667 P.2d at 431-32; King, 27 Mont.
at 368, 71 P. at 156; Musselshell Cattle Co. v. Woolfolk, 34 Mont. 126,
132-33, 85 P. 874, 875-76 (1906). However, compensatory damages are
generally inadequate to fully remedy a continuous or recurring
encroachment on real property. Ducham, 265 Mont. at 443, 877 P.2d
at 1006; Allman v. Stuart, 158 Mont. 402, 409-12, 492 P.2d 909, 913-14
(1972); Gibbons v. Huntsinger, 105 Mont. 562, 574-76, 74 P.2d 443,
449-50 (1937); Musselshell Cattle Co., 34 Mont. at 132-33, 85 P. at 875-
76; Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Ass’n v. McMullin, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 658,
675 (Cal. App. 2016); Hoffman v. Bob Law, Inc., 888 N.W.2d 569,
{1 10-11 (S.D. 2016); Amkco, Ltd., Co. v. Welborn, 180 N.M. 155, 1] 10-
11 (N.M. 2001); Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d
584, 588 (Cal. 1984); Arnold v. Melani, 437 P.2d 908, 911 (Wash. 1968);
see also, Jeppeson, 205 Mont. at 287, 667 P.2d at 431-32; King, 27
Mont. at 368, 71 P. at 156.

28 Accordingly, Davises cite Ducham and Olsen v. Milner, 2012 MT
88, 364 Mont. 523, 276 P.3d 934, for the proposition that it is reversible
error for a court to refuse to grant a mandatory injunction compelling
removal of a continuous or recurring encroachment upon determining
the encroachment as a trespass. In Olsen, upon determining that the

defendant knowingly built a shop building partially on his neighbor’s
property, the district court issued a mandatory injunction compelling
the defendant to remove the trespassing encroachment within 60 days
subject to the plaintiff's right to remove it at the defendant’s expense
if he failed to timely do so. Olsen, {| 15. However, the narrow issues on
appeal in Olsen were whether res judicata barred the plaintiffs
trespass claim and whether the court correctly determined that the
encroachment was a trespass, not whether the court properly granted
mandatory injunctive relief. Olsen, {| 18-38. In Ducham, the district
court denied a request for permanent injunctive relief based on a
determination that the defendant’s recurring discharge of water across
the plaintiffs property did not constitute a trespass. Ducham, 265
Mont. at 438, 877 P.2d at 1004. On appeal, we held only that the court
erroneously concluded that the water discharges were not a recurring
trespass and that the plaintiff was thus entitled to a permanent
injunction enjoining any further discharges across his property.
Ducham, 265 Mont. at 440-48, 877 P.2d at 1005-07. Apart from the
threshold issue of trespass, the equities of permanent injunctive relief
were not otherwise at issue on appeal. Ducham, 265 Mont. at 440-43,
877 P.2d at 1005-07. Neither Ducham nor Olsen support Davises’
assertion that a plaintiff is entitled to a mandatory injunction
compelling abatement of a trespassing encroachment as a matter of
right in every case.

129 [I To the contrary, regardless of a determination of a trespass,
the grant or denial of mandatory injunctive relief remains highly
discretionary dependent on the unique facts and circumstances of each
case. Tally, {| 48 (flexible rules of equity require consideration of
“exigencies” of each “particular case”). Though legal title must
generally prevail if the equities are equally balanced or balance against
the trespasser, Bonding Co. v. State Sav. Bank, 47 Mont. 332, 339, 133
P. 367, 368-69 (1913), the court must carefully weigh and balance the
equities in each case when exercising its broad discretion to grant or
deny injunctive relief. Four Rivers Seed Co. v. Circle K Farms, 2000
MT 360, 7 12, 303 Mont. 342, 16 P.3d 342.” Thus, though often

To that end, other jurisdictions recognize an equitable “relative hardship”
doctrine to assess whether, regardless of a legal trespass, equity may yet preclude
issuance of mandatory injunctive relief in favor of pecuniary damages at law in certain
limited circumstances, thereby effecting an equitable easement in favor of an
unintentional, non-negligent trespasser. See, e.g., Minnwest Bank v. RTB, LLC, 873
N.W.2d 135, 145-46 (Minn. App. 2015); Nellie Gail Ranch, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 675-78;
Graham v. Jules Inv., Inc., 356 P.3d 986, |] 32-41 (Colo. App. 2014); Warsaw, 676 P.2d

appropriate on a balance of the equities in particular cases, mandatory
injunctive relief is not available to remedy a trespassing real property
encroachment as a matter of right in every case.

30 Here, unlike in Ducham and Olsen, the District Court has yet to
grant or deny permanent injunctive relief upon entry of final judgment
following full consideration of the equities. The court’s grant of
summary judgment declaring the subject encroachments as trespasses
was merely an interlocutory order. Trombley, {| 7. Permanent
injunctions are available only upon entry of a final judgment. Compare
§ 27-19-102, MCA (final injunctions), with §§ 27-19-201 and -303, MCA
(preliminary injunctions). In its summary judgment order, the District
Court did not make a final determination precluding mandatory
injunctive relief upon further proceedings prior to entry of final
judgment. The court merely concluded that Davises presented
“insufficient information” in support of their motion for summary
judgment “to determine whether coercive supplemental relief” is
“necessary or appropriate” in addition to money damages “at this point
in time.” In narrowly concluding that Davises “have provided no
evidence upon which” to conclude, “as a matter of law that money
damages” will be “insufficient to remedy the harm,” the District Court
merely concluded that Davises failed to satisfy their initial burden
under M. R. Civ. P. 56 of showing a complete absence of any genuine
issue of fact material to their requested equitable relief.

131 [ The parties fully submitted Davises’ summary judgment
motion to the court on their briefs. In support of the motion, Davises
submitted only a one-page map prepared by a surveyor showing the
boundary line encroachments, a copy of Westphals’ November 13, 2015
letter accepting responsibility and apologizing for the encroachments,
and the affidavit of Plaintiff Monte R. Davis regarding the nature,

at 588 (Cal.); Wojahn v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298, 307 (Minn. 1980); Arnold, 437 P.2d
at 914-15 (Wash.); Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 137 A.2d 667 (Md. App. 1958);
Christensen v. Tucker, 250 P.2d 660, 665-67 (Cal. App. 1952); Amkco, Ltd., Co., Y{] 12-17
(N.M)); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 595 (Colo. 1951); Hoffman, J 12-21
(S.D.); Owenson v. Bradley, 197 N.W. 885, 887-89 (N.D. 1924); see also, Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 941 emt. ¢, d (1979). We have yet to consider the application and
merits of the equitable doctrine of relative hardships under Montana law and state no
view on it here. See Penland v. Derby, 220 Mont. 257, 260, 714 P.2d 158, 160 (1986)
(declining to consider equitable easement theory first raised on appeal); compare
Allman, 158 Mont. at 409-11, 492 P.2d at 913-14 (reversing order in equity compelling
joint sale and division of proceeds to separate owners of building and land severed by
separate foreclosure sales in favor of mandatory injunction compelling purchaser with
notice to remove the resulting trespass).

discovery, and continued existence of the encroachments. Though
sufficient for the court to adjudicate the existence of continuing or
recurring trespasses as a matter of law, this limited evidentiary record
was insufficient to show a complete absence of any genuine issue of fact
material as to whether the balance of the equities warranted the
extraordinary remedy of a mandatory injunction compelling removal
of the encroachments. This deficiency was particularly manifest when
juxtaposed against the affidavit of Defendant Kathy L. Wilson and, as
noted by the District Court, Westphals’ stated willingness to remove
the encroachments upon determination or negotiation of a reasonable
deadline for removal. The summary judgment record was devoid of any
evidence sufficient for the District. Court to assess the urgency of
removal and restoration, the burden and cost of removal and
restoration, Westphals’ means and ability to effect removal and
restoration on the timeline requested, or any other relevant equitable
consideration. Under these circumstances, we hold that, at this stage
of the proceeding, the District Court’s interlocutory denial of
preliminary or final mandatory injunctive relief was neither
irreconcilable with its summary judgment declaring a trespass nor a
manifest abuse of discretion.

32 Davises failed to make any additional factual showing warranting
injunctive relief in their subsequent M. R. Civ. P. Rule 59(e) or 60
Motion to Correct. Even if they had, Rule 59 and 60 motions may not
serve as a vehicle to raise matters that the party reasonably could and
should have earlier raised. Lee v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2001 MT 59,
{ 76, 304 Mont. 356, 22 P.3d 631 (construing M. R. Civ. P. 59(e));
Orcutt v. Orcutt, 2011 MT 107, {| 11, 360 Mont. 353, 253 P.3d 884
(construing M. R. Civ. P. 60). We hold that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Davises’ subsequent motion to correct
its prior summary judgment ruling.

CONCLUSION
33 We hold that the District did not err at this stage in the
proceedings in: (1) declining to grant other relief at law on Davises’
common law ejectment claim; (2) declining to grant preliminary or final
injunctive relief compelling immediate removal of the encroachments
and restoration of the property; or (3) denying Davises’ Motion to
Correct those rulings. We hereby affirm the District Court’s
interlocutory rulings and remand for further proceedings in the
ordinary course.
JUSTICES WHEAT, McKINNON, BAKER and RICE concur.

FLATHEAD JOINT BOARD OF CONTROL
and JERRY LASKODY, BOONE COLE,
TIM ORR, TED HEIN, BRUCE WHITE,
SHANE ORIEN, WAYNE BLEVINS and

GENE POSIVIO, all members of the
Flathead Joint Board of Control,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Defendant, Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
and
CONFEDERATED SALISH AND
KOOTENAI TRIBES,
Intervenor, Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 16-0516

Submitted on Briefs September 6, 2017
Decided November 8, 2017.

2017 MT 277.
389 Mont. 270.
405 P.3d 88.

For Appellants: Bruce A. Fredrickson, Kristin L. Omvig,
Rocky Mountain Law Partners, P.C., Kalispell.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Dale
Schowengerdt, Solicitor General, J. Stuart Segrest, Matthew T.
Cochenour, Melissa Schlichting, Assistant Attorneys General,
Helena.

For Intervenor: John B. Carter, Daniel J. Decker, Rhonda R.
Swaney, Attorneys at Law, Pablo.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.

ql The Flathead Joint Board of Control (the Board) challenges the
constitutionality of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Water
Compact (the Compact) entered between the Tribes, the State of
Montana and the United States, and codified at § 85-20-1901, MCA.
The District Court held that one provision was unconstitutional, but
that it was severable from the remainder of the Compact. The Board
appeals.
2 We restate the issue on appeal as whether Article II, Section 18
of the Montana Constitution required the Legislature to approve the
Compact or its administrative provisions by a two-thirds vote of each
house because they granted new immunities to the State.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
q3 After many years of negotiation, representatives of the State of
Montana, through the Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission,
provided for in § 85-2-702, MCA, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai

Tribes (CSK), and the United States agreed to the terms of the
Compact as a means of settling water rights disputes involving the
Tribes. In 2015 the Montana Legislature approved the Compact, and
its lengthy provisions are codified at § 85-20-1901, MCA. The
Legislature concurrently enacted separate administrative and
management provisions, codified at § 85-20-1902, MCA. While the
State of Montana has approved the Compact, it will not be effective
until after it is also approved by the CSK Tribal Council and by
Congress.
4 The parties agreed in the Compact that the water right claims of
the CSK Tribes should be settled through agreement rather than
litigation. The Compact seeks to “secure to all residents of the
Reservation the quiet. enjoyment of the use of waters of the
Reservation” and to provide a “unitary administration system” for
appropriation of water and administration of water rights. Art. I, § 85-
20-1901, MCA.
q5 The plaintiff Board oversees the operations of the Flathead,
Mission and Jocko Valley Irrigation Districts. The Districts are local
governmental entities provided for by Montana law, with locally
elected officials. They generally have the authority and responsibility
to represent landowners in the various districts as to water and
irrigation matters.
{6 The Board challenged a specific section of the Compact and a
specific section of the administrative provisions. The first, Article
IV.1.8 of § 85-20-1901, MCA, of the Compact provides:
The Tribes and the State hereby waive their respective
immunities from suit, including any defense the State shall have
under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, in order to permit the resolution of disputes under the
Compact by the Board, and the appeal or judicial enforcement of
Board decisions as provided herein, except that such waivers of
sovereign immunity by the Tribes or the State shall not extend to
any action for money damages, costs or attorneys’ fees. The
parties recognize that only Congress can waive the immunity of
the United States and that the participation of the United States
in the proceedings of the Board shall be governed by Federal law,
including 43 U.S.C. § 666.
The second section challenged by the Board is Section 1-2-111 of § 85-
20-1902, MCA, of the administrative and management statute:
Members of the Board, the Engineer, and Designee, and Water
Commissioner appointed pursuant to Section 3-1-114 of this
Ordinance, and any Staff shall be immune from suit for damages

arising from the lawful discharge of an official duty associated
with the carrying out of powers and duties set forth in the
Compact or this Ordinance relating to the authorization,
administration, or enforcement of water rights on the Reservation.
The Board contends that these provisions create new sovereign
immunities from suit for the State of Montana, and that Article II,
Section 18 of the Montana Constitution therefore requires that they be
enacted by a two-thirds majority of each house of the Legislature. The
parties agree that neither the Compact nor the management provisions
passed either house by a two-thirds majority vote.
{7 The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The
District Court found that the case was justiciable and appropriate for
judicial resolution. As to the merits, the District Court found that the
challenged section of the Compact did not contravene Article II, Section
18 of the Montana Constitution because it did not enact any new
immunities from suit. To the contrary, that section waived immunities
from suit and so could become effective without a two-thirds majority
vote of each house of the Legislature. As to the challenged section of
the administrative provisions, the District Court found that it provided
“new immunity to the State and its agents” and therefore was covered
by Article II, Section 18 of the Montana Constitution. Since the
provision did not pass by a two-thirds majority of each house, the
District Court struck it as unconstitutional, but held that it could be
severed from the remaining provisions of the enactment.
8 The Board appeals and the State cross-appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

9 All legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, and
the challenging party bears the “heavy burden” to prove “beyond a
reasonable doubt” that the challenged statute is unconstitutional.
Molnar v. Fox, 2013 MT 132, 1 49, 370 Mont. 238, 301 P.3d 824. Courts
should strive whenever possible to avoid interpreting a statute in a
way that causes it to be unconstitutional. Molnar, { 38.

10 This Court reviews a district court’s decision on summary
judgment to determine whether it is correct, using the same criteria
under M. R. Civ. P. 56. Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortgage, 2013 MT 354,
9, 373 Mont. 1, 313 P.3d 839.

DISCUSSION
11 Issue: Whether Article II, Section 18 of the Montana Constitution
required the Legislature to approve the Compact or its administrative
provisions by a two-thirds vote of each house because they granted new

immunities to the State.
12 As a preliminary matter, the State contends that this case is not
justiciable because the Compact has not yet been approved by the CSK
Tribes or by Congress and so is not yet in effect. The District Court
determined that the legal issues were justiciable, noting that the State
has approved the Compact, and has appropriated money to begin
implementing it. We agree that because the Montana Legislature has
appropriated money for the purpose of implementing the Compact, and
its preliminary provisions are being implemented, we are not called
upon to issue an advisory opinion here. The issues of Tribal water
rights are important both in the Flathead region and statewide, and
the issues presented here are purely legal and constitutional. See
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Stults , 2002 MT 280, 1 19,
312 Mont. 420, 59 P.3d 1093. Determining the State constitutional
challenge now will also resolve any cloud over the deliberations of
Congress and the CSK Tribes in considering the Compact. A decision
here applies to an existing controversy; the issue can be determined by
judicial decision; and the dispute is one of “overriding public moment.”
Lee v. State, 195 Mont. 1, 6, 635 P.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1981). Therefore,
we proceed to consider the merits of the legal issues raised by the
Board.
13 In 1972 the State of Montana waived its sovereign immunity from
suit with adoption of Article II, Section 18 of the Constitution.
Silverstone v. Park County, 2007 MT 261, {| 12, 339 Mont. 299, 170
P.3d 950. Despite that waiver, the State remains immune from suit for
money damages in federal courts because of the Eleventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Brown v. Montana, 442 F. Supp. 2d
982, 988 (D. Mont. 2006). A state may waive sovereign immunity from
suit in its own courts without waiving its Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Montana v. Peretti, 661 F.2d 756, 757 (9th Cir. 1981).
q14 The Montana Constitution provides:
The state, counties, cities, towns and all other local governmental
entities shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or
property, except as may be specifically provided by law by a 2/3
vote of each house of the legislature.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 18. This provision restrains the Legislature in
asserting sovereign immunity from suit, but it “does not in any way
prohibit the legislature from waiving sovereign immunity in any case.”
Byorth v. District Court, 175 Mont. 63, 66, 572 P.2d 201, 203 (1977)
(emphasis in original).
15 Hf The District Court determined that the Compact provision
providing for a “waiver of immunity” in Article IV.I.8 of § 85-20-1901,

MCA, did not violate the provisions of Article II, Section 18 of the
Montana Constitution. The District Court determined that this
provision was a waiver of immunity, not a grant of new immunity. The
District Court determined that the two-thirds legislative approval
requirement of Article II, Section 18 of the Montana Constitution
applies only to the imposition of new immunities from suit and
therefore does not apply to new waivers of immunity. We agree with
the District Court’s construction of the plain language of the
Constitution and the Compact. Article IV.1.8 of § 85-20-1901, MCA, of
the Compact on its face did not create any new immunity from suit and
so could be enacted by less than a two-thirds majority of each house.

{116 The disputed immunity provision in the administrative and
management statute is Section 1-2-111 of § 85-20-1902, MCA (quoted
above). The administrative statute creates a Water Management Board
consisting of two members appointed by the Governor, two appointed
by the CSK Tribal Council, and a fifth selected by those appointees.
The Board is responsible for appointing an Engineer and any Water
Commissioners. Sec. 1-2-110, 3-1-114, § 85-20-1902, MCA. The District
Court determined that it clearly “creates a new sovereign immunity for
the state, and for its agents or employees.”

17 It is established that “immunities separate and distinct from
sovereign immunity remained unaffected by the language of Article II,
Section 18.” Silverstone v. Park County, 2007 MT 261, 18, 339 Mont.
299, 170 P.8d 950. Individuals who are judges, prosecutors, and
members of quasi-judicial bodies, for example, have immunities from
suit for actions taken in their designated positions. Silverstone, {| 13;
§ 2-9-112, MCA (providing for judicial immunity.) Article II, Section 18
on its face plainly applies only to new sovereign immunities enacted for
the benefit. of the “state, counties, cities, towns and all other local
governmental entities.” The immunity provision of the administrative
and management ordinance, Section 1-2-111 of § 85-20-1902, MCA,
does not establish or alter any immunity as to the “state, counties,
cities, towns [or] other local governmental entities.” To the contrary,
the new immunities provided there specifically apply only to
designated individuals—“Members of the Board, the Engineer, and
Designee, and Water Commissioners appointed pursuant to Section 3-
1-114 of this Ordinance, and any Staff.” We decline to consider any
extrinsic materials to determine legislative intent here because it is
clear on the face of the statute. Swanson v. Consumer Direct, 2017 MT
57, 116, 387 Mont. 37, 391 P.3d 79. State governmental entities listed
in Article II, Section 18 of the Montana Constitution are not covered by

this immunity provision in the management ordinance.’

118 Montana law in other contexts recognizes immunities from suit as
to individual public employees, apart from immunities for the
governmental entities themselves. Section 2-9-305(2), MCA, provides
that a State employee is immune from suit if the governmental entity
employer acknowledges or is bound by a judicial determination that
the employee was acting in the course and scope of employment. Also,
for example, see § 2-9-112(2), MCA, granting immunity from suit for
damages to a “member, officer, or agent of the judiciary”; § 7-33-
2208(2), MCA, granting a chief or deputy of a rural fire district
immunity from suit resulting from certain firefighting activities; and
§ 41-2-203, MCA, immunizing from suit persons who report child
abuse, in certain situations.

19 [I The District Court reached an incorrect conclusion of law by
construing the disputed provision of the administrative statutes as
providing a new immunity from suit for the State of Montana. The
provision on its face does not provide any new immunity to the State
of Montana or to any other governmental entity. Therefore, Article II,
Section 18 of the Montana Constitution does not apply, and the District
Court’s decision to the contrary is reversed.

CONCLUSION

120 Hl The disputed provisions of the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Water Compact are consistent with Article II, Section 18 of
the Montana Constitution. The District Court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.

JUSTICES McKINNON, BAKER, WHEAT, SHEA and
SANDEFUR concur.

JUSTICE McKINNON, concurring.
21 I agree with the Court’s resolution of the disputed provisions of
the Compact. I write separately only to address the State’s contention
raised in its cross-appeal that the Board does not have standing
because the Board’s claims are hypothetical and seek an advisory
opinion by this Court.
22 The judicial power of the courts is limited to justiciable
controversies. Reichert v. State, 2012 MT 111, 53, 365 Mont. 92, 278
P.3d 455. This limitation is premised upon both constitutional
requirements and policy or prudential considerations. Plan Helena,

‘We need not consider whether the Board itselfis a State, Tribal or Federal entity
because the only immunity provided is to “members” of the Board.

Inc. v. Helena Reg'l Airport Auth. Bd., 2010 MT 26, {| 6, 355 Mont. 142,
226 P.3d 567. The constitutional component derives from Article VII,
Section 4, of the Montana Constitution which confers original
jurisdiction on district courts in “all civil matters and cases at law and
in equity.” Mont. Const. art. VII, § 4(1). This language has been
interpreted as embodying the same limitations as those imposed on
federal courts by the “case or controversy” provision of Article III,
Section 2, of the United States Constitution. Olson v. Dep’t of Revenue,
223 Mont. 464, 469-70, 726 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1986). Thus, federal
precedent interpreting Article III requirements for justiciability are
persuasive authority for interpreting justiciability requirements of
Article VII, Section 4(1), of the Montana Constitution. Plan Helena,
q6.

23 In federal jurisprudence, “the irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing has three elements: injury in fact (a concrete harm that is
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical), causation (a fairly
traceable connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of), and redressability (a likelihood that the requested relief will
redress the alleged injury).” Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 2011
MT 91, {| 32, 360 Mont. 207, 255 P.3d 80 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992); Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016-17
(1998)). Regarding the first element, injury in fact, we have explained
that a plaintiff must have suffered “a past, present, or threatened
injury to a property or civil right, and that the injury would be
alleviated by successfully maintaining the action.” Schoof v. Nesbit,
2014 MT 6, {1 15, 373 Mont. 226, 316 P.3d 831; accord Chipman v. Nw.
Healthcare Corp., 2012 MT 242, {| 26-27, 366 Mont. 450, 288 P.3d 193.
As to the requirement of present or threatened injury, “[olther courts
have held and we agree, that potential economic injury is sufficient to
establish standing.” Mont. Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 199
Mont. 434, 443, 649 P.2d 1283, 1288 (1982). In Rosebud County v.
Department of Revenue, 257 Mont. 306, 849 P.2d 177 (1993), a county’s
substantial interest in the protection of its tax base and its potential
for economic harm in the valuation of heavy equipment was sufficient
to give the county standing to challenge administrative rules. Also, in
Missoula City-County Air Pollution Control Board v. Board of
Environmental Review, 282 Mont. 255, 937 P.2d 463 (1997), this Court
held that a local air pollution control board established a threatened
injury when it faced potential economic harm from the additional
expenses necessary to monitor, collect, and analyze data and to develop
a regulatory response pursuant to an administrative rule regulating

air pollution that applied within its jurisdiction.

24 This case is unique in that the dispute arises out of a provision in
an agreement negotiated among the United States, the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSK), and the State of Montana. The
Compact represents a negotiated compromise among the parties, in
lieu of adjudicating the water claims of the CSK and its members in
protracted, expensive, and uncertain litigation. See In re Crow Water
Compact, 2015 MT 217, {| 6, 380 Mont. 168, 354 P.3d 1217. The
Flathead Joint Board of Control is the joint board of operations for the
Flathead Irrigation District, Mission Irrigation District, and Jocko
Valley Irrigation District, which are elected local government bodies
under Montana law. The Board is responsible for representing
irrigators within its districts and overseeing irrigation operations.
Other Appellants are Board members, property owners, and individual
irrigators. Appellants allege that the Compact operates to immunize
the State from any responsibility for money damages. Specifically,
Appellants allege that the Compact creates a new administrative
hierarchy with defined and unitary enforcement authority to
administer and manage water of the several irrigation districts.
Appellants maintain that the Compact’s immunity provisions will
prohibit administrative bodies from awarding money damages and that
the Compact operates to eliminate a party’s right to obtain money
damages in any forum. Appellants allege an injury in fact on the basis
of a threatened economic harm—the inability to be compensated for
injuries as a result of an unconstitutional immunization
provision—which they argue is imminent because the Montana
Legislature approved the Compact and it became law. Appellants
argue that, although the Compact has not been ratified by Congress,
planning, design, and implementation of adaptive management
programs has already begun to occur prior to the Compact’s effective
date.

{25 I would conclude that Appellants have alleged a threatened
economic injury and that the threatened injury is imminent.
Appellants’ rights under the Compact have been conclusively
established by the Montana Legislature, absent review by this Court.
While the Compact requires approval by other parties to become
effective, as it relates to the Board, irrigators, and property owners, the
Compact has been adopted in Montana and is currently being
implemented by the Compact Implementation Technical Team (CITT).
The Compact is no longer imminent in Montana, but has become
Montana law, § 85-20-1901, MCA. The delay in ratification by the
remaining parties does not disfranchise Appellants of standing when

they seek a determination of their rights under a Montana law they
assert is unconstitutional. Appellants’ injuries and challenges are
distinguishable from those of the taxpayers we concluded did not have
standing in Mitchell v. Glacier County, No. DA 16-0716, 2017 MT 258,
389 Mont. 122, 406 P.3d 427, 2017 Mont. LEXIS 649 (Oct. 25, 2017). In
Mitchell, taxpayers alleged errors in the county’s budgeting and
accounting of revenues and a failure of the county to comply with the
Single Audit Act. We held that although there were deficit balances in
particular funds, the county’s total government funds were more than
adequate to meet the county’s needs and taxpayers could not show that
an increase in taxes was actual or imminent. Mitchell, ] 37. As
taxpayers were unable to demonstrate an injury in fact and had not
raised a constitutional challenge to the Single Audit Act, we found they
lacked standing. Mitchell, | 43.

26 Here, Appellants challenge the constitutionality of a recently
enacted statute that would eliminate their rights to obtain money
damages in any forum. Appellants are either water users of the district
or are responsible for representing water users and overseeing
irrigation operations. The Compact has become Montana law and is
being implemented by the CITT. The Appellants, in my view, have
demonstrated a threatened injury in fact and satisfied the first
requirement for constitutional standing. The remaining elements for
constitutional standing—causation and redressability—are also
established. If Appellants were to successfully challenge the immunity
provisions, those provisions would be declared unconstitutional.

27 The constitutional requirements of standing have been described
as “absolute,” while the prudential limitations have been described as
“malleable.” Schoof, | 15. Having found that Appellants meet the
constitutional minimum requirements for standing, there remains the
prudential limitation of standing to consider. These are discretionary
limits on the exercise of judicial power that “cannot be defined by hard
and fast rules.” Air Pollution Control Bd., 282 Mont. at 260, 937 P.2d
at 466. For example, a litigant may only assert her own constitutional
rights or immunities, Jones v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 2007 MT 82, | 48, 337
Mont. 1, 155 P.3d 1247, and the alleged injury should be
distinguishable from the injury to the public generally, though not
exclusive to the plaintiff, Bd. of Trs. v. Cut Bank Pioneer Press, 2007
MT 115, 9] 15, 337 Mont. 229, 160 P.3d 482, superseded by statute, 20
US.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A), as recognized in Krakauer v. State, 2016 MT
230, 4] 22, 384 Mont. 527, 381 P.8d 524. Prudential limitations of
standing generally involve a weighing of the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court.

consideration. Reichert, | 56. The principal consideration under the
fitness inquiry is whether there is a factually adequate record upon
which to base effective review. Reichert, 56; Havre Daily News, LLC
v. City of Havre, 2006 MT 215, {] 20, 333 Mont. 331, 142 P.3d 864.
Finally, there is the countervailing factor weighing against these
prudential restrictions of whether the question is important to the
public. Air Pollution Control Bd., 282 Mont. at 260, 937 P.2d at 466.
{28 None of the prudential limitations to standing exist in these
proceedings. The Appellants have existing water rights and
management, responsibilities which are clearly affected by the
Compact, rights that are distinguishable from the public generally.
Moreover, the inquiry here requires the Court to examine the terms of
the Compact in relation to the requirements of Article II, Section 18,
of the Montana Constitution. It is a question which is nearly entirely
one of law and not dependent upon additional facts to aid the Court’s
inquiry. See Havre Daily News, {| 20. The record is factually adequate
to enable this Court to make the necessary legal determinations.
129 Weighing heavily in favor of finding standing is the significance
to the litigants of having the constitutionality of the Compact’s
immunity provisions conclusively determined. This is the
“countervailing factor weighing against ... prudential restrictions,”
Heffernan, 1 33, and I fully agree with the Court in its recognition that
“(dletermining the State constitutional challenge now will also resolve
any cloud over the deliberations of Congress and the CSK Tribes in
considering the Compact.” Opinion, {| 12. In my view, deferring a
determination of the challenged provisions until ratification of the
Compact by Congress, the CSK, and the Montana Water Court would
consume valuable resources with no corresponding benefit. were we to
conclude after the parties’ ratification that the immunity provisions of
the Compact were unconstitutional. Clearly, the circumstances here,
which require ratification of a negotiated agreement by federal, state,
and tribal governments, and approval of the Montana Water Court, are
unique. The complexities of ratification by the various government
entities necessitate a delay in the effective date of the Compact,
although Appellants’ rights have been conclusively determined by the
Montana Legislature. Under these unique circumstances, I would find
Appellants have alleged an imminent, threatened injury under
Montana law and constitutional requirements for standing have been
met; further, prudential considerations of standing favor this Court
substantively addressing the merits of this appeal.
130 I otherwise concur in the Court’s decision.

JUSTICE BAKER joins in the concurring Opinion of JUSTICE

McKINNON.

JUSTICE RICE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
q81 I concur with the Court’s determination that this matter is
justiciable.
1382 Regarding Article IV.1.8 of the Compact, the District Court held
that the provision was a waiver of immunity, and not a grant of
immunity subject to a “2/3 vote of each house of the legislature.” Mont.
Const. Art. II, sec. 18. The Court states its agreement here “with the
District Court’s construction of the plain language of the Constitution
and the Compact,” Opinion, {| 15, and I likewise concur. As the District
Court explained, this provision constitutes “a limited waiver of [the
state’s] sovereign immunity, under the Eleventh Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, which prohibits the state [from] being sued in a
federal court.” The District Court stated that the waiver of immunity
would permit “certain kinds of suits,” which would include, under the
language of the Compact, actions for “the resolution of disputes under
the Compact by the Board, and the appeal or judicial enforcement of
Board decisions as provided herein.” The provision clarifies that this
waiver “shall not extend to any action for money damages, costs or
attorneys’ fees.” Thus, the effect of the provision is to permit actions
against the state in federal court (a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity), not to prohibit actions against the state (a grant of
immunity).'
433 Unlike the Court, I also agree with the District Court’s analysis
of the Administrative Statute, § 85-20-1902, subsection 1-2-111, MCA.
That provision, entitled “Immunity from Suit,” provides that “Members
of the Board, the Engineer, any Designee, any Water Commissioner ...
and any Staff shall be immune from suit for damages” arising out of
the discharge of their respective duties. While I acknowledge that
members of state boards enjoy common law quasi-judicial immunity for
actions taken pursuant to their adjudicatory duties, see Rahrer v.
Board of Psychologists, 2000 MT 9, {[{] 12-20, 298 Mont. 28, 993 P.2d
680, the Administrative Statute goes beyond the boundaries of our
common law quasi-judicial immunity and grants immunity to agents
and employees of the state, as well as immunity to board members that

' The District Court also suggested that “an obvious problem” with this federal
court remedy “is that federal courts do not appear to even have subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain such cases under current laws .... The limited ‘remedy’ outlined
in the Compact thus appears to be illusory. It may never exist as postulated.” This
possibly implicated issue of due process of law and related constitutional concerns about
the water right process are not before us in this case

is more broadly stated than our common law quasi-judicial immunity.
See Rahrer, {| 16-17. The Court distinguishes this grant of immunity
from the immunities enacted for the benefit of “state, counties, cities,
towns and all other local government entities” under Article II, Section
18, but I do not believe this to be a persuasive distinction.
Governments act through their agents. “Every government entity is
subject to liability for its torts and those of its employees acting within
the scope of their employment or duties whether arising out of a
governmental or proprietary function. ...” Section 2-9-102, MCA. As
noted by the District Court, this conclusion appears to be bolstered by
the legislative history of the Compact’s passage. Thus, this provision
required passage by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature and,
lacking such, is invalid.

434 Section 1-1-113(1) of the Administrative Statute provides that its
provisions “are severable, and a finding of invalidity of one or more
provisions hereof shall not affect the validity of the remaining
provisions.” Pursuant thereto, I would affirm the District Court's
invalidation and severance of the provision, and dissent from that
portion of the Court’s opinion.

JAMES C. QUIGLEY and LINDA M.S. QUIGLEY,
Claimants, Objectors and Appellants,
RICHARD L. BECK,

Claimant, Counter-Objector and Appellee,
AVISTA CORPORATION,

Objector.

No. DA 16-0629.
Submitted on Briefs September 6, 2017.
Decided November 14, 2017.
2017 MT 278.
389 Mont. 283.
405 P.3d 627.

For Appellants: Ryan K. Mattick, Moore, O’Connell & Refling,
PC, Bozeman.
For Appellee: John E. Bloomquist, Bloomquist Law Firm, P.C.,

Helena.
JUSTICE BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 James C. Quigley and Linda M.S. Quigley (Quigley) and Richard
L. Beck assert conflicting claims of ownership over four water rights
for irrigation from Nevada Creek. After presiding over a trial and
conducting a site inspection, the Water Master issued a report dividing
the four rights between Quigley and Beck based on a ratio of the
irrigated acres owned by each party. Quigley filed objections with the
Water Court. The Water Court largely adopted the Water Master’s
report. Quigley appeals the Water Court’s order. We affirm.
2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Whether the Water Court erred in its interpretation of the 1909
Geary v. Raymond decree;
2. Whether the Water Court erred in applying the clear error
standard to the Water Master’s findings of fact.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

{3 Quigley and Beck own adjoining ranches, which John W. Blair
once owned as a single property known as Finn Ranch. Finn Ranch,
situated in the Blackfoot River Basin, included lands in sections 27, 28,
38, and 34 of Township 12 North, Range 9 West. The lands in sections
27 and 28 now belong to Beck, and the lands in sections 33 and 34 now
belong to Quigley.

{4 In 1909, when Blair still owned Finn Ranch, the Montana Third
Judicial District Court in Powell County issued a decree in the case
Geary v. Raymond (the “Geary decree”), declaring the water rights of
users of Nevada Creek and its tributaries. Among the rights that the
district court decreed to Blair were four water rights for irrigation from
Nevada Creek. In 1912, Finn Ranch was split and sold. It has
remained in separate ownership to the present day. No deed transfer
for the properties in the ensuing years has reserved specific water
rights as appurtenances to the land.

{5 Quigley’s predecessor timely filed water rights claims, including
four Nevada Creek claims' based on the water rights decreed to Blair
in the Geary decree. Beck’s predecessor also filed four water right
claims” for Nevada Creek based on water rights decreed to Blair in the
Geary decree. During its review of claims in preparation for the

‘Claim Nos. 76F 108071-00, 76F 108075-00, 76F 108076-00, and 76F 108077-00.

° Claim Nos. 76F 117732-00, 76 F 120974-00, 76F 120975-00 and 76F 120976-00.

Blackfoot River Basin Temporary Preliminary Decree, the Montana
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) noted
that the eight claims were based on the same four water rights and
that each party was claiming the entirety of each of the four rights. As
a result, the rights claimed exceeded the total appropriations and the
DNRC attached a “decree exceeded” issue remark to the eight claims
from Quigley and Beck.

{6 Quigley filed objections against the Beck claims, and Beck filed
counterobjections against the Quigley claims. The claims and
objections were consolidated and assigned to a Water Master for
adjudication. After discovery, the Water Master presided over a
two-day trial and conducted a site visit. In his report, the Master
concluded that both Quigley and Beck were successors to a portion of
Blair’s four Nevada Creek water rights. The Master proportionally
split the flow rates of each decreed right between Quigley and Beck
based on the historic number of acres irrigated on each property, using
the formula provided in Spaeth v. Emmett, 142 Mont. 231, 383 P.2d
812 (1963). Under this formula, Beck received 70 percent of the decreed
rights and Quigley received 30 percent.

7 Quigley filed objections to the Master’s report with the Water
Court. After briefing and a hearing, the Water Court largely adopted
the Master’s report.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

8 When acase involves a Water Master’s report, “[t]he Water Court
reviews the Master’s findings of fact for clear error and the Master's
conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct.” Skelton
Ranch, Ine. v. Pondera Cnty. Canal & Reservoir Co., 2014 MT 167,
25, 375 Mont. 327, 328 P.3d 644. This Court then reviews “the Water
Court’s order de novo, to determine whether it correctly applied the
clear error standard of review to the Master's findings of fact and
whether its conclusions of law were correct.” Skelton Ranch, Inc., 26.
9 Interpretation of a judgment or decree is a question of law, which
this Court reviews to determine whether it is correct. Granite Cnty. Bd.
of Comm'rs v. McDonald, 2016 MT 281, {| 5, 385 Mont. 262, 383 P.3d
740.

10 Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if (1) substantial evidence
does not support the findings of fact; (2) the fact-finder
misapprehended the effect of the evidence; or (3) a review of the record
leaves the court with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.” Marks v. 71 Ranch, LP, 2014 MT 250, {| 12,
376 Mont. 340, 334 P.3d 373; Skelton Ranch, Inc., || 27.

DISCUSSION
11 1. Whether the Water Court erred in its interpretation of the 1909
Geary v. Raymond decree.
12 Quigley contends that the Water Master and Water Court
incorrectly interpreted the Geary decree as decreeing water rights for
irrigation to all of Finn Ranch. Quigley argues that the water rights
could be appurtenant only to the specific lands where Blair put the
water to beneficial use. He thus contends that in order to apply
established appurtenance law to the Geary decree, the decree must be
interpreted to have incorporated Blair’s answer and amended answer,
which described more fully where Blair put his water rights to use.
113 The Water Master determined that the Geary decree did not
attach the decreed water rights to specific parcels; rather, the water
rights “were made appurtenant to all of [Blair's] land as listed in his
answer to the complaint.” The Water Master reasoned that the district
court was specific in listing the priority dates and flow rates, and it
could have been equally specific in listing the places of use had it
intended such a meaning. The Water Master concluded that it would
be “an exercise in speculation” to match the flow rates and priority
dates listed in the decree with particular parcels mentioned in the
pleadings.
q14 The Water Court affirmed the Water Master's interpretation.
First, it reasoned that the decree did not incorporate Blair’s pleadings,
because the claim dates and flow rates alleged in the pleadings were
rejected. Second, the references to Blair’s pleadings in the decree were
general, and the decree made similar references to other parties’
pleadings, some of which were less specific than Blair’s pleadings.
Further, the decree specified the point of diversion and ditch for one of
the four rights. The Water Court reasoned that the decree would have
specified a point of diversion and ditch for each right if that was the
court’s intention, and that the Master properly rejected attempts to
add such new findings to the decree a century later.
15 Interpretation of a prior court decree is an issue of law. Granite
Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 119. We review a trial court’s interpretation of
such a decree to determine whether it is correct. Granite Cnty. Bd. of
Comms, 4 19. We interpret judgments “to have a reasonable
intendment; where a judgment is susceptible of two interpretations the
one will be adopted which renders it the more reasonably effective and
conclusive and which makes the judgment harmonize with the facts
and law of the case.” Granite Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 19 (quoting Gans
& Klein Inv. Co. v. Sanford, 91 Mont. 512, 522, 8 P.2d 808, 811 (1932)).
The court may “refer to the record in the original case” if a decree is

ambiguous. Harland v. Anderson Ranch Co., 2004 MT 132, { 23,
321 Mont. 338, 92 P.3d 1160. The court should interpret the decree to
be consistent with the established and applicable law. See Granite
Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, [| 21-22.

16 For a water right to be appurtenant to land it must be used for
a beneficial purpose on that land. See Section 70-15-105, MCA (“A
thing is deemed to be incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by
right used with the land for its benefit.”); Castillo v. Kunnemann, 197
Mont. 190, 196, 642 P.2d 1019, 1024 (1982) (quoting Lensing v. Day &
Hansen Sec. Co., 67 Mont. 382, 384, 215 P. 999, 1000 (1923)) (“[A]
water right acquired by appropriation, and used for a beneficial and
necessary purpose in connection with a given tract of land, is an
appurtenance.”). A beneficial use includes “the use of water for the
benefit of the appropriator” for agricultural or other uses.
Section 85-2-102(4)(a), MCA.

{117 Quigley puts great weight on the Geary decree’s language that
Blair’s appropriations were “for the purpose of irrigating the lands
belonging to them and described in the answer of the said John W.
Blair.” Quigley argues that the phrase “described in the answer”
incorporates the parts of Blair’s answer where he described which
parcels he irrigated with which claimed water rights. However, this
exact language is used throughout the decree to introduce each
declaration of irrigation rights. It is not modified to indicate whether
aparticular party’s pleadings are specific or more generalized. Read in
the broader context of the entire decree, it can hardly be understood to
give Blair’s pleadings heightened importance. The Water Court held,
and Beck does not dispute, that Blair’s pleadings properly are
considered in interpreting the decree and as evidence of historic water
use. But the language in the decree on which Quigley relies does not
mandate the interpretation of the decree that Quigley proposes.

q18 As both the Water Master and Water Court observed, the decree
rejected the appropriation dates and flow rates that Blair alleged in his
answer. Quigley argues that this is not a rejection of Blair's
contentions on where the water was used. We disagree. The Geary
court did take the divisions in Blair’s pleadings into account in the
decree. Blair filed a single answer for claims from his two separate
properties, Finn Ranch and Brazil Ranch. The district court, however,
divided his appropriations into two separate groups, one for each of the
two ranches. The court had two separate findings of fact—identified as
numerals XIX and XXVI—and two separate conclusions of
law—identified as numbers 24 and 31—separating Blair's
appropriations between the Finn Ranch and the Brazil Ranch. The

decree properly divided the appropriations between the ranches to
account for where the appropriations were being put to beneficial use.
Such a division was in harmony with the law of appurtenance. See
MacLay v. Missoula Irrigation Dist., 90 Mont. 344, 353, 3 P.2d 286, 290
(1921) (citations omitted) (“A water right, legally acquired, is in the
nature of an easement in gross, which, according to circumstances,
may or may not be an easement annexed or attached to certain lands
as an appurtenance thereto. When a water right is acquired by
appropriation and used for a beneficial and necessary purpose in
connection with a given tract of land, it is an appurtenance thereto
and, as such, passes with the conveyance of the land, unless expressly
reserved from the grant.”) The appropriations for Blair’s lands in
Brazil Ranch were not, and under the law of appurtenance could not.
be, appurtenant to Blair’s lands in Finn Ranch and vice versa. The
lands in the two ranches were not in the same “given tract of land.”
MacLay, 90 Mont. at 353, 3 P.2d at 290. The law of appurtenance
required this much division; it did not require more.

q19 A review of Blair’s pleadings and the decree shows that the
district court declared the water rights appurtenant to the irrigated
lands of each separate ranch. But the decree put few restrictions on
where Blair could use the water appropriated to Finn Ranch for
beneficial purposes within Finn Ranch itself. For instance, only one of
the four rights from the decree at issue in this case specified a
ditch—the Blair-Keiley Ditch—connected to the right. Further, in the
general language of the judgment, the Geary decree stated that the
appropriators had “uninterrupted use, enjoyment and possession of the
number of inches of the waters of said Nevada creek and its tributaries
according to their respective priorities, and that they make a
reasonable use of the waters allotted to them.” Because the Geary
decree itself did not specify parcels within Finn Ranch where the water
right could be used, the rights were appurtenant to all of the irrigated
Jands in Finn Ranch.

20 We conclude that the Water Master and Water Court correctly
interpreted the Geary decree in the context of the facts of the case and
the applicable law. Blair’s answer, amended answer, and pleadings do
not control the place of use of the rights decreed to Blair. Therefore, the
Geary decree itself does not prevent the Nevada Creek water rights
from being made appurtenant to Beck’s lands.

21 2. Whether the Water Court erred in applying the clear error
standard to the Water Master’s findings of fact.

22 Quigley argues that, aside from the Geary decree’s declarations,
there is insufficient evidence to support the Water Master’s finding

that all four of the Nevada Creek water rights were appurtenant to all
of Beck’s irrigated land. Quigley contends that the Water Court
misapplied clear error analysis in upholding the Water Master's
findings. Quigley first argues that Beck did not present sufficient
evidence to support a finding that all four water rights were
appurtenant to Beck’s property. Second, Quigley argues that the Water
Master misapprehended the effect of the evidence. Quigley points to
evidence he presented before the Water Master that supports his
position that Blair used one of the four water rights solely on what is
now Quigley property, two of the water rights almost exclusively on
what is now Quigley property, and only one of the water rights on what
is now Quigley and Beck property. Quigley argues finally that even if
the Water Master did not misapprehend the effect of the evidence, the
Court should be left with a firm conviction that the Water Master
committed a mistake because application of the Spaeth formula to
these four rights leaves the Quigley property with less water than the
property has used historically.

123 The Water Court reviewed all of the evidence in the record and
determined that the Water Master's findings were not in clear error.
The Water Court specifically reviewed the evidence presented by
Quigley to which the Water Master had assigned little weight and
determined that (1) there was substantial evidence to support the
Master’s findings; (2) the Master did not misapprehend the evidence;
and (3) the evidence as a whole did not suggest a mistake was made.
24 The Water Court may not simply substitute its judgment for the
Water Master’s when reviewing the Master’s factual findings. In re
Eldorado Coop Canal Co., 2016 MT 94, {| 28, 383 Mont. 205, 369 P.3d
1034 (2016). As a reviewing court, the Water Court must review the
Water Master’s factual findings for clear error. Eldorado, {| 28. The
Water Court may replace the Water Master’s findings for one of only
three reasons. First, the Water Court may correct the Water Master's
findings if the findings were not supported by substantial evidence,
which “need not amount to a preponderance of the evidence, but it
must be more than a scintilla.” Skelton Ranch, Inc., | 27. Second, the
Water Court may determine that a finding is clearly erroneous if the
Water Master misapprehended the effect of the evidence. Skelton
Ranch, Inc., J 27. Finally, the Water Court may hold a finding clearly
erroneous if, upon review of all of the evidence, it “is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Skelton Ranch, Inc., {| 27 (quoting Heavirland v. State, 2013 MT 313,
116, 372 Mont. 300, 311 P.3d 813). “Although conflicts may exist in the
evidence presented, it is the duty of the trial judge to resolve such

conflicts. Due regard is to be given the trial court’s ability to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.” Interstate Prod. Credit Ass’n v. DeSaye,
250 Mont. 320, 324, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287 (1991).

{25 Quigley argues that Beck failed to present substantial evidence
that each of the four water rights is appurtenant to Beck’s land. In
Castillo v. Kunnemann, we held that existence of a decree declaring a
water right appurtenant to the property before its division into smaller
parcels, along with testimony that the smaller parcel was traditionally
irrigated from the ditch to which the water right was assigned, were
enough to establish appurtenance of the water right to the smaller
parcel. Castillo, 197 Mont. at 195-96, 642 P.2d at 1023-24. In this case,
there is no dispute that both Quigley’s and Beck’s lands made up the
Finn Ranch previously owned by Blair and to which the Geary decree
applies. As we discussed above, the Geary decree did not separate the
water rights from Nevada Creek for use on specific parcels within Finn
Ranch, except for a notation that one of the rights was to be
appropriated through the Blair-Keiley Ditch. In addition to the decree,
Beck presented witness testimony, along with other evidence, that
Nevada Creek traditionally had been used to irrigate his parcels. This
is substantial evidence that the Nevada Creek water rights were
appurtenant to Beck’s lands.

{26 Quigley’s arguments amount to disagreement over the weight that
the Water Master accorded to Quigley’s evidence. But a conflict in
evidence does not prove misapprehension of the effect of that evidence.
The Water Master considered all of the evidence to which Quigley
points on appeal: the pleadings and testimony from the Geary decree;
the 1919 affidavit in contempt against a prior owner of Quigley’s land;
the 1959 Water Resources Survey (WRS) Field Notes and WRS Map;
Water Commissioner Records; and the witness testimony. The Water
Master justified the weight it gave to each of these pieces of evidence,
disregarding only the 1919 affidavit. In its review, the Water Court
reviewed all of the evidence again, including the 1919 affidavit, and
determined that the Water Master had not misapprehended the effect
of the evidence. The Water Court correctly analyzed whether the
evidence had been misapprehended.

{27 Without conclusive evidence to establish appurtenance of any
given right to a specific parcel of land, the Water Master applied the
formula established in Spaeth to assign the claimed rights between the
parties. Under the Spaeth formula, when an owner divides a tract of
land, “the appurtenant water right is divided in respective amounts to
each tract measured in proportion as the number of acres irrigated
with the water right on the land conveyed bears to the total number of

acres irrigated by the water.” Spaeth, 142 Mont. at 237, 383 P.2d at
815. Successors in interest cannot enlarge a water right beyond that
which was conveyed. MacLay, 90 Mont. at 353, 3 P.2d at 290.

{28 Quigley’s last argument is that this Court should be left with a
firm conviction that the Water Court made a mistake in determining
that the four water rights are appurtenant to both properties, because
under the Spaeth formula he will be apportioned less water than has
been used historically on his property. Quigley points to evidence of the
historical use of Nevada Creek water on his and Beck’s lands. He also
asserts that evidence in the record demonstrates that his land needs
more water than Beck’s land due to soil composition.

129 [The Water Master was called upon to resolve the DNRC issue
remark that the claims exceeded the total decreed appropriation. The
DNRC noted that the flow rate decreed to Blair for these four Nevada
Creek water rights had been exceeded in the Quigley and Beck claims.
It is a necessary outcome that at least one party will be apportioned
less water than it previously claimed when the Water Court
adjudicates a “decree exceeded” issue remark. We are not left with a
firm conviction that the Water Master committed a mistake in
resolving the issue remark when it apportioned the parties less water
than they originally claimed. Quigley can receive only as much of the
water right to which he was entitled. Further, the Water Court
concluded that Quigley failed to prove by sufficient evidence that the
Spaeth formula should be adjusted to allocate flow rates differently
based upon any assertion of duty of water issues, such as soil
differences. Although witness testimony before the Water Master
referenced the different composition of the soils, Quigley provided no
further evidence to the Water Master that quantified the different
water requirements of the soils or demonstrated how the Spaeth
formula should be adjusted to account for these differences. The Water
Master did not clearly err in its factual findings and properly applied
the formula from Spaeth to divide the water right given the evidence
before it.

430 The Water Court correctly applied the clear error analysis to the
Water Master’s findings of fact.

CONCLUSION
131 The Water Court’s order is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT, SANDEFUR
and RICE concur.

KELLY G. WATSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation; BURLINGTON NORTHERN
AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY;
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, and DOES A-Z,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 17-0229.
Submitted on Briefs October 18, 2017
Decided November 14, 2017.
2017 MT 279.

389 Mont. 292.

405 P.3d 634.

For Appellant: Allan M. McGarvey, John F. Lacey, McGarvey,
Heberling, Sullivan, & Lacey, PC, Kalispell.
For Appellees: Chad M. Knight, Knight Nicastro, LLC, Boulder,
Colorado.
JUSTICE SHEA delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1 Plaintiff Kelly G. Watson (“Watson”) appeals the January 25, 2017
Order by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, granting
Defendant Burlington Northern and Sante Fe Railway Company’s
(“BNSF”) motion for summary judgment on Watson’s asbestos-related
disease claim, brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(“FELA”). The dispositive issue in this matter is as follows:
Whether the Bankruptcy Court’s Order enjoining claims against
W.R. Grace and other “Affiliated Entities,” including BNSF, tolled
the statute of limitations on Watson’s claim.
2 We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3 Watson was a long-term employee of BNSF in Lincoln County.
During his BNSF employment, he was exposed to vermiculite dust.
The vermiculite mined in Libby and the dust produced by it contains
amphibole asbestos. BNSF transported vermiculite for W.R. Grace &
Company and its predecessors from Libby to various locations.

4 In July 2000, following widespread news reports on the hazards
posed by vermiculite dust from the W.R. Grace mine in Libby, Watson
sought a health screening offered by the Libby Community
Environmental Health Program. Watson’s initial test results for lung
disease were negative.

5 On April 2, 2001, W.R. Grace filed a voluntary petition for relief
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. The Bankruptcy Court.
immediately entered a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against
actions being pursued against Nondebtor Affiliates and certain third
parties arising from W.R. Grace’s mining operations and exposure to
vermiculite dust. The TRO defined “Actions” as “pending actions and
actions that have not been filed or are not pending as of the date of
entry of this Order ....” It also ordered “that the prosecution and/or
commencement of all Actions are temporarily restrained pending a
resolution of [W.R. Grace]’s pending motions for a preliminary

injunction ....” On April 12, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court extended the
TRO, again defining “Actions” as “pending actions and actions that
have not been filed or are not pending as of the date of entry of this
Order[,]” and ordered that the “Order Granting Temporary Restraining
Order entered on April 2, 2001 temporarily restraining the prosecution
and/or commencement of all Actions pending a resolution of plaintiff's
pending motions for a preliminary injunction is hereby extended
through and including April 24, 2001 ....” On April 18, 2001, the
Bankruptcy Court entered a preliminary injunction pending a May 3,
2001 hearing.
q6 On May 3, 2001, the Bankruptcy Court entered a Preliminary
Injunction, which ordered “that the prosecution of all Actions are
stayed and enjoined pending a final judgment in this adversary
proceeding or further order of this Court ....” The Injunction again
defined “Actions” as “any case filed or pending,” but omitted the
previously used language, “and actions that have not been filed or are
not pending.”
q7 On January 22, 2002, the Bankruptcy Court modified the May 3,
2001 Order. The January 22, 2002 Order “reinstate[d] the bar against
the commencement of new Actions against Affiliated Entities.” The
January 22, 2002 Order also restored the language that had been
omitted from the May 3, 2001 Order, so that the definition of “Actions”
again included “actions that have not been filed or are not pending....”
The Order stayed and enjoined the prosecution of “all Actions as
defined above.”
q8 On March 26, 2007, W.R. Grace moved to expand the Bankruptcy
Court’s Injunction to include actions against BNSF related to W.R.
Grace’s Libby mining operations. On June 6, 2007, the Bankruptcy
Court entered a temporary order staying cases against BNSF while it
considered expanding the Injunction.
{9 Meanwhile, Watson underwent a second health screening in
October 2007. On October 22, 2007, a physician advised Watson he had
asbestos-related disease associated with his exposure while working for
BNSF.
q10 On April 11, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order
expanding the Injunction to include BNSF as a Nondebtor Affiliate.
The Order reads, in pertinent part:
The matter before the Court is the Debtors’ Motion to Expand the
Preliminary Injunction to Include Actions Against [BNSF] (the
“Expansion Motion”), which seeks to expand the relief granted by
the preliminary injunction (the “Injunction”) to specifically include
actions against [BNSF] for exposure of some kind to the Debtors’
former vermiculite mining operations in Libby, Montana (the

“Montana Actions”).

The preliminary injunction at issue in this proceeding was issued
on May 8, 2001, barring the prosecution of currently pending
actions against various affiliated entities and third parties whose
purported liability was solely derivative of W.R. Grace. After May
8, 2001, the preliminary injunction was extended. On January 22,
2002, the court entered an order modifying the preliminary
injunction to include certain additional affiliates and to reinstate
the bar against the commencement of new actions against affiliates
arising from alleged exposure to asbestos whether indirectly or
directly cause[d] by W.R. Grace.

AND NOW, this 11th day of April, 2008, for the reasons expressed
in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, it is ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the objections are overruled
and the Debtors’ Motion to Expand the Preliminary Injunction to
Include Actions Against [BNSF], which seeks to expand the relief
granted by the preliminary injunction to specifically include
actions against BNSF for exposure of some kind to the Debtors’
former vermiculite mining operations in Libby, Montana (the
“Montana Actions”), is GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the
Injunction, as defined in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, is
hereby expanded to include BNSF as a Nondebtor Affiliate and
that the Montana Actions and all other similar actions that have
been or may be brought against BNSF that arise from alleged
exposure to vermiculite ore from the Debtors’ Libby mining
operations are and shall be stayed until further order of the Court.
(Emphasis added.)
q11 On August 5, 2010, Watson and two other plaintiffs filed suit
against the State of Montana, three wood products companies,
Montana Light and Power Co., and Robinson Insulation Co., as well as
fictitious defendants, Does A-Z. Watson’s complaint contains no
allegations against BNSF; neither Watson’s employment nor BNSF is
referenced in the pleading.
12 On February 3, 2014, under the Bankruptcy Court’s Order, W.R.
Grace’s reorganization plan became effective and the automatic stays
and injunctions, including actions against BNSF, terminated.
{13 On November 28, 2014, Watson moved to amend his complaint to
remove settled claims against the State, dismiss claims against the
wood products defendants and Montana Light and Power Co., and add
claims against BNSF. On December 2, 2014, Watson filed his First

Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. He alleged that he
was exposed to vermiculite dust during his employment with BNSF,
which transported vermiculite for the W.R. Grace & Company and its
predecessors from Libby to various locations.

q14 On January 25, 2017, the District Court granted BNSF’s motion
for summary judgment. The District Court held the statute of
limitations barred Watson’s claim because Watson’s claim accrued on
October 22, 2007, and he should have filed his FELA claims by October
22, 2010. The District Court concluded that “[wJhile the bankruptcy
court's injunction stayed pending cases against BNSF, nothing in the
injunction prohibited a plaintiff from suing,” and “[t]here is nothing in
the original bankruptcy court injunction, BNSF expanded injunction,
or associated briefing referenced by the parties that. precludes filing
new cases to preserve the statute of limitations.” The District Court
also concluded that “there is nothing in the plain language of the
bankruptcy court’s original injunction or expanded BNSF injunction
that enjoins the ‘commencement of an action’ to trigger § 27-2-406,
MCA.”

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

{115 We review de novo a district court’s grant or denial of summary
judgment, applying the same criteria of M. R. Civ. P. 56 as a district.
court. Anderson v. BNSF Railway, 2015 MT 240, {| 15, 380 Mont. 319,
354 P.3d 1248. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving
party demonstrates both the absence of any genuine issues of material
fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, {| 15.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must
present substantial evidence essential to one or more elements of the
case to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, {] 15. We
review a question of law to determine if the district court’s legal
conclusions are correct. Anderson, {| 15 (citing Harris v. State, 2013 MT
16, { 11, 368 Mont. 276, 294 P.3d 382).

DISCUSSION
(16 Whether the Bankruptcy Court’s Order enjoining claims against
W.R. Grace and other “Affiliated Entities,” including BNSF, tolled the
statute of limitations on Watson’s claim.
17 No action may be maintained under the FELA unless commenced

' Section 27-2-406, MCA, tolls a limitations period “[wJhen the commencement of
an action is stayed by injunction or other order of the court or judge or statutory
prohibition.”

within three years from the day the cause of action accrued. 45 U.S.C.
$56. Section 27-2-406, MCA, provides: “When the commencement of an
action is stayed by injunction or other order of the court or judge or
statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or
prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action.”

118 Watson argues the period of limitations for his action against
BNSF shouldbe deemed tolled because the commencement of an action
against BNSF was enjoined by the Bankruptcy Court’s Injunction and
§ 27-2-406, MCA, applies. Watson asserts the District Court
erroneously concluded that the Bankruptcy Court Injunction did not
bar the “commencement” of a new action, such as Watson’s, because:
(a) the Injunction was modified on January 22, 2002, to “reinstate the
bar against the commencement of actions”; (b) the Injunction was
expanded to bar not only certain “Montana Actions” but “all other
similar actions that have been or may be filed” against. BNSF; (c) the
purpose of expanding the Injunction to include BNSF was to prevent
the tender of defense to Debtor W.R. Grace that would be triggered by
the filing of a complaint against BNSF; and (d) the Bankruptcy Court
and the parties, including BNSF, repeatedly acknowledged the
Injunction as a bar against the “commencement” of actions.

419 BNSF argues the latest date on which Watson’s claim accrued
was October 22, 2007, but because Watson did not file until December
2014, the District Court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.
BNSF maintains the Bankruptcy Court’s Injunction merely stayed the
prosecution and litigation involving claims against BNSF arising out
of W.R. Grace’s mining operations in Libby, and did not bar the
commencement or filing of new claims against BNSF or toll the
limitations period. BNSF contends the District Court appropriately
determined that nothing in the plain language of the Injunction barred
the commencement of new cases against BNSF while the Injunction
was in place. We disagree.

20 The District Court’s Order failed to acknowledge the Bankruptcy
Court’s January 22, 2002 Order that modified the May 3, 2001
Injunction for the express purpose of “reinstat[ing] the bar against the
commencement of new actions against Affiliated Entities.”
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court’s April 11, 2008 Order that.
expanded the Injunction to include actions against BNSF specifically
noted that the original Injunction was modified by the January 22,
2002 Order “to reinstate the bar against the commencement of new
actions against affiliates arising from alleged exposure to asbestos
whether indirectly or directly cause by W.R. Grace.” The April 11, 2008
Order concluded:

It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the
Injunction, as defined in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, is
hereby expanded to include BNSF as a Nondebtor Affiliate and
that the Montana Actions and all other similar actions that have
been or may be brought against BNSF that arise from alleged
exposure to vermiculite ore from the Debtors’ Libby mining
operations are and shall be stayed until further order of the Court.
(Emphasis added.)
21 Hl Watson’s claim accrued in October 2007. While his claim was
still well within the FELA’s three-year statute of limitations, the
Bankruptcy Court issued its April 22, 2008 Order expanding the
Injunction to include BNSF as a Nondebtor Affiliate. This Injunction,
as modified by the Bankruptcy Court’s January 22, 2002 Order,
“barl[red] ... the commencement of new actions against affiliates.”
Effective upon the issuance of the Bankruptcy Court’s April 22, 2008
Order, therefore, Watson was barred from commencing his asbestos-
related disease action against BNSF. The Bankruptcy Court’s
Injunction was lifted on February 3, 2014, at which time Watson’s
statute of limitations resumed running. Watson amended his
Complaint to include BNSF on November 28, 2014. Approximately six
months passed between October 22, 2007, when Watson’s claim against
BNSF accrued, to April 11, 2008, when the Bankruptcy Court’s
Injunction was expanded to include BNSF. Approximately ten months
passed between February 3, 2014, when the Bankruptcy Court’s
Injunction was lifted, until November 28, 2014, when Watson amended.
his Complaint to include BNSF. After excluding the time that Watson
was enjoined from commencing an action against BNSF, he amended
his Complaint to include a claim against BNSF approximately sixteen
months after his claim accrued. This was well within the FELA’s three-
year statute of limitations.

CONCLUSION

22 [Hl The District Court erred in its conclusion that the Bankruptcy
Court’s Injunction did not bar the commencement. of new actions
against BNSF. We reverse the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment to BNSF and remand to the District. Court for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SANDEFUR, BAKER
and RICE concur.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

GARY HANSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0194.
Submitted on Briefs October 25, 2017
Decided November 14, 2017.
2017 MT 280.

389 Mont. 299.

405 P.3d 625.

299

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, Chad R.

Vanisko, Assistant Appellate Defender; Helena.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,

Ryan Ward Aikin, Assistant Attorney General; Helena; Joshua A.

Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Carey Ann Haight, Deputy
County Attorney; Great Falls.
JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1 Appellant Gary Hansen appeals from the imposition of sentence
following his plea of no contest’ to sexual assault, in the Eighth
Judicial District Court, Cascade County. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings, addressing the following issue:
Did the District Court err by accepting Defendant’s no contest plea
to the charge of sexual assault, and imposing a sentence based
upon that plea?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{2 The State originally charged Hansen with four counts of felony
incest, in violation of § 45-5-507(5), MCA, based on allegations that
Hansen had sexually abused his eight-year-old granddaughter. That
offense carried a mandatory prison sentence of 100 years with no
parole eligibility for the first 25 years, subject to exceptions.
Section 45-5-507(5)(a)(i), MCA (2013). The State also charged Hansen
with one count of obstructing a peace officer, a misdemeanor, after
Hansen tried to evade officers during the investigation.

q3 Hansen entered into a plea agreement with the State, wherein he
agreed to enter a no contest plea to an amended charge of sexual
assault under § 45-5-502(3), MCA (sexual assault of a victim under the
age of 16 by an offender at least 3 years older than the victim). This
offense carried a minimum sentence of four years, with exceptions, and
a maximum of life or 100 years. Section 45-5-502(3), MCA. The State
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend to the
District Court that Hansen be sentenced to 50 years in Montana State
Prison (MSP) with 25 years suspended. The agreement allowed Hansen
to make any sentencing recommendation he believed to be appropriate.
{4 The District Court conducted a change of plea hearing, finding
that a proper basis existed for entry of the no contest plea after
explaining in detail to Hansen the difference between a guilty plea and
ano contest plea. The District Court found that Hansen was making
a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea. Before accepting the plea,
the District Court informed Hansen that it was not bound by the

‘Regarding plea nomenclature, “no contest” and “nolo contendere” are
interchangeable. See Black's Law Dictionary 1209 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed., West
2014).

sentencing recommendations in the plea and advised him of the
maximum possible penalty, life or 100 years in prison.

{5 Atsentencing, the State recommended a sentence of 50 years with
25 years suspended, consistent with the plea agreement, and Hansen’s
counsel requested a 20-year sentence, with 10 years suspended. The
District Court sentenced Hansen to 60 years in MSP with no time
suspended. Hansen appeals, challenging the validity of his plea and
sentence, and raising a claim of ineffective assistance against his trial
counsel for negotiating a plea agreement premised upon an illegal plea.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
{6 We review whether a District Court had statutory authority to
impose a sentence de novo. State v. Ring, 2014 MT 49, | 15, 374 Mont.
109, 321 P.3d 800 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

7 Did the District Court err by accepting Defendant’s no contest plea
to the charge of sexual assault, and imposing a sentence based upon
that plea?

{8 [Hi Imposing a unique restriction upon the entry of a criminal
plea, the Legislature has provided that a “court may not accept a plea
of nolo contendere in a case involving a sexual offense,” with exceptions
not at issue here. Section 46-12-204(4), MCA. “Sexual offense” is
defined to include sexual assault under § 45-5-502(3), MCA.
Section 46-23-502(9)(a), MCA. Consequently, there is an express
statutory prohibition upon entry of a no contest plea to a charge of
sexual assault. Further, we have held that a plea agreement provision
that violates a statute can render the agreement “void and
unenforceable.” State v. Cleveland, 2014 MT 305, { 22, 377 Mont. 97,
838 P.3d 606 (citing § 28-2-701, MCA; § 28-2-604, MCA).

{9 We discussed a similar plea in Hardin v. State, 2006 MT 272,
334 Mont. 204, 146 P.3d 746, involving a defendant’s no contest plea to
the charge of sexual intercourse without consent. In a postconviction
proceeding, Hardin claimed the district court lacked jurisdiction to
accept his plea and impose sentence, due to the statutory prohibition
upon no contest pleas in sex offense cases. Hardin, {| 14. Framing this
as a jurisdictional issue, Hardin argued that it could be raised at any
time, including within a postconviction proceeding. Hardin, 14. We
rejected Hardin’s argument, holding that his claim was “more
accurately characterized as a claim that his sentence was illegal as
exceeding statutory authority,” and because “Hardin did not challenge

the legality of his sentence on direct appeal,” the claim was
procedurally barred. Hardin, {| 15-16 (citations omitted). While
Hardin did not raise the issue on direct appeal from his criminal
conviction, Hansen does so.
10 EB“A district court’s authority to impose a sentence is defined and
constrained by statute.” State v. Ruiz, 2005 MT 117, {| 12, 327 Mont.
109, 112 P.38d 1001 (citations omitted). “A sentence not based on
statutory authority is an illegal sentence.” Ruiz, | 12 (citations
omitted). Here, entry of the no contest plea to sexual assault was an
explicit violation of § 46-12-204(4), MCA. We conclude that Hansen’s
sentence, imposed upon his no contest plea, is illegal for exceeding a
district court’s statutory authority. See Hardin, 1 15.
11 The State acknowledges that the District Court erred in accepting
Hansen’s no contest plea, but argues we should affirm the conviction
and sentence because Hansen did not. object to the sentence before the
District Court, thereby failing to preserve the issue. Hansen responds
that we should undertake Lenihan review’ or, alternatively, conclude
that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for permitting him
to enter an invalid plea.
12 The Lenihan rule provides a sentence not objected to in the
district court that is “illegal or exceeds statutory mandates,” Lenihan,
184 Mont. at 343, 602 P.2d at 1000, and not merely an “objectionable”
statutory violation, State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, 1 13, 335 Mont. 344,
151 P.3d 892 (citations omitted), may be reviewed on appeal. We have
explained that, where a district court, “if provided the opportunity to
consider the error now asserted on appeal, could nevertheless have
imposed the same sentence, the illegality requirement of the Lenihan
exception has not been met.” State v. Bull, 2017 MT 247, {| 11, 389
Mont. 56, 403 P.3d 670 (citations omitted). Here, if provided the
opportunity to consider the error of Hansen’s invalid no contest plea,
it is clear that the District Court could not have imposed a valid
sentence upon Hansen.
13 Therefore, we void the plea agreement and vacate the sentence
imposed herein. We remand the matter to the District Court to allow
Hansen to enter a legal plea to the original charges, enter a new plea
agreement, or to proceed to trial.
q14 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES BAKER, MCKINNON
and SHEA concur.

? State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 602 P.2d 997 (1979).

CITY OF MISSOULA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

JUSTIN WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0674.
Submitted on Briefs August 9, 2017.
Decided November 17, 2017.
2017 MT 282.

389 Mont. 303.

406 P.3d 8.

For Appellant: Martin W. Judnich, Vincent J. Pavlish,
Judnich Law Office, Missoula.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Ryan W. Aikin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Jim Nugent,
Missoula City Attorney, Doug Schaller, Deputy City Attorney,
Missoula.

JUSTICE McKINNON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

{1 Justin Williams (Williams) appeals from an order entered by the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, affirming the

Municipal Court of the City of Missoula’s denial of his motion to
suppress blood evidence in a DUI proceeding against him. We affirm.
{2 Williams presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the District Court erred in affirming a telephonic
search warrant issued pursuant to § 61-8-402(5), MCA, to draw
Williams's blood.
2. Whether the District Court erred in failing to consider the merits
of Williams’s contention that he did not receive the implied consent
advisory prior to his blood draw.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q3 On January 24, 2016, at 2:48 a.m., Missoula Police Deputy Jenna
Volinkaty (Volinkaty) observed Williams speeding in a rental truck,
lose control of the vehicle, collide with a utility pole and tree, and
attempt to leave the scene. Using a radar device before the collision,
Volinkaty measured Williams traveling between 50 and 55 miles per
hour and another officer measured him traveling at 70 miles per hour
and accelerating. The speed limit in the area is 30 miles per hour.
Volinkaty smelled alcohol on Williams’s breath, saw that his eyes were
glassy, watery, and bloodshot, his clothing was soiled, that he could not
maintain his balance, and heard Williams slur his words. Volinkaty
arrested Williams for suspected DUI. Williams admitted he had
consumed alcohol, but refused to take an Intoxilyzer breath test.
Volinkaty learned that in 2008, Williams was convicted of an alcohol-
related driving offense under Arizona Revised Statute § 28-1381.

{4 + Volinkaty contacted Judge Marie Anderson to obtain a telephonic
search warrant to draw Williams’s blood. In her affidavit, Volinkaty
described seeing Williams speeding, travelling 50-55 miles per hour,
losing control, and crashing into a utility pole at 2:48 a.m.; Williams
being taken into custody after he attempted to flee; observing
symptoms of his impairment including watery, bloodshot eyes, slurred
speech, staggering movements, soiled clothing, and mood swings.
Volinkaty also notified Judge Anderson that “the suspect has a prior
conviction for DUI or substantially similar offense on 11/20/2008 in
Arizona.” Judge Anderson authorized the issuance of the search
warrant and Volinkaty executed it by having Williams’s blood drawn.
Williams had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.197.

5 The City of Missoula (the City) charged Williams with aggravated
DUI pursuant to § 61-8-465, MCA; reckless driving pursuant to § 61-8-
301, MCA; and refusing to submit to a blood or breath test pursuant to
§ 10.56.020 of the Missoula Municipal Code. Williams filed a motion to
suppress the blood draw evidence arguing it was obtained pursuant to

asearch warrant that relied on a previous conviction from Arizona that
“does not qualify as a ‘similar’ offense under Section 61-8-402(5).” The
Municipal Court denied Williams’s motion to suppress “conclud[ing]
that the Arizona DUI conviction could be considered a ‘similar’ offense
for purposes of seeking a telephonic search warrant.” In its order, the
Municipal Court recognized, however, that under State v. McNally,
2002 MT 160, 310 Mont. 396, 50 P.3d 1080, the Arizona conviction
could not be used to enhance Williams’s DUI sentence to a felony.
Reserving his right to appeal the adverse determination on his motion
to suppress, Williams pleaded no contest to aggravated DUI. The City
dismissed the remaining two charges. The Municipal Court sentenced
Williams to six months in jail with all but five days suspended and
imposed a fine of $1,000.

{6 Williams appealed the Municipal Court’s order denying his motion
to suppress to Montana’s Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula
County, and made an additional argument that “Officer Volinkaty
failed to include in her Affidavit of Probable Cause that she had read
to [Williams] the Implied Consent Advisory and therefore information
about his refusal is called into question.” The District Court affirmed
the Municipal Court’s order denying Williams’s motion to suppress on
the same grounds as the Municipal Court, concluding that the Arizona
statute is “similar” to Montana’s DUI statute “for the purposes of being
able to seek a telephonic search warrant under the auspices of Mont.
Code Ann. §61-8-402(5).” The District Court declined to address
Williams’s additional argument “[blecause this issue was not
previously raised and the municipal court had no opportunity to rule
on the issue ....”

{7 Williams appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
q8 On appeal from a municipal court, the district court functions as
an intermediate appellate court. Sections 3-5-303, 3-6-110, MCA; City
of Bozeman v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40, {] 10, 369 Mont. 81, 296 P.3d 461.
When a district court acts as an intermediate appellate court, “[t]he
appeal is confined to review of the record and questions of law, subject
to the supreme court’s rulemaking and supervisory authority.” Section
8-6-110(1), MCA. Our review of the case is as if the appeal was
originally filed in this Court and we examine the record independently
of the district court’s decision. Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, {] 26,
334 Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643. This Court reviews a ruling on a motion
to suppress evidence to determine whether the court’s findings of fact
are clearly erroneous and whether the court’s interpretation and

application of the law are correct. State v. Marcial, 2013 MT 242, J 10,
371 Mont. 348, 308 P.3d 69. Although we will review the municipal
court record as if the appeal was originally filed in this Court, our
disposition pertains to the order of the district court from which the
appeal is taken.

DISCUSSION

q9 1. Whether the District Court erred in affirming a telephonic search
warrant issued pursuant to § 61-8-402(5), MCA, to draw Williams’s
blood.

10 Williams challenges the legality of the search warrant application
that allowed his blood to be drawn. Williams contends on appeal that,
under McNally, Arizona and Montana’s DUI statutes are not “similar”
and, without similarity, there was insufficient evidence to authorize a
blood draw under § 61-8-402(5), MCA. Therefore, Williams concludes,
“the search warrant was illegal and the blood draw results should have
been suppressed.”

{11 The City responds that McNally is distinguishable because it
addressed “similarity” for sentencing purposes only, not for obtaining
search warrants pursuant to § 61-8-402(5), MCA. The City also
contends, based upon the statutory history of § 61-8-402(5), MCA, that
Arizona and Montana’s DUI statutes are similar. The City concludes
that construing Arizona and Montana’s DUI statutes as not similar
would frustrate the Legislature’s intent when it authorized the
drawing of a person’s blood pursuant to the provisions of § 61-8-402(5),
MCA.

112 While we ultimately conclude that McNally is not dispositive of
the issue before us, some discussion of McNally and its progeny are
necessary to understand the legal inquiry required in assessing the
similarity of another state’s statutes with ours and whether such an
inquiry is appropriate in deciding if a search warrant should issue. The
statute at issue in McNally was a sentencing enhancement statute,
§ 61-8-734(1)(a), MCA, which elevates a DUI offense to a felony if the
offender has three or more prior convictions under certain Montana
laws or “a similar statute or regulation in another state.” McNally,
{| 11 (quoting § 61-8-734(1)(a), MCA). McNally was charged with a
fourth or subsequent DUI after having previously received four Driving
While Ability Impaired (DWAD) convictions in Colorado. McNally, 13.
Because Colorado law provides a DWAI offense and Montana’s law
does not, McNally argued on appeal that his prior convictions for
DWAI “did not constitute previous convictions under a similar statute

for the purposes of enhancing Count I to Felony DUI under § 61-8-734,
MCA,” and he could, therefore, “be sentenced only for a first offense
DUI, a misdemeanor.” McNally, {| 3.
13 This Court conducted a careful review and comparison of the
statutory scheme pertaining to alcohol-related offenses for both
Colorado and Montana, which required consideration of the elements
and degree of impairment for each state’s respective offenses. We
agreed with McNally, differentiating between Colorado’s scheme of
alcohol-related driving offenses, which provided for three offenses,
DUI, DUI per se, and DWAI, and Montana’s, which only provided for
two, DUI and DUI per se. McNally, {1 7-10. Reasoning that the
standard of impairment contained in Colorado’s DWAI statute, which
required impairment only to the “slightest degree,” was lower than the
standard of impairment in Montana’s DUI statute requiring the
driver’s ability be “diminished,” we determined “McNally’s prior
convictions in Colorado do not constitute ‘conviction[s] for a violation
of a similar statute ... in another state,’ as required under § 61-8-
734(1)(a),MCA....” McNally, 11118, 22 (quoting § 61-8-734(1)(a), MCA).
“(We conclude[d] it was error to enhance McNally’s DUI conviction to
a felony based on his convictions under Colorado’s DWAI statute.”
McNally, {| 23. In sum, McNally held that Colorado’s DWAI statute is
not “similar” to Montana’s DUI statute within the meaning of § 61-8-
734(1)(a), MCA.
14 The Montana Legislature has also utilized the language, “similar
statute,” relative to requirements for obtaining blood or breath tests
where probable cause exists to suspect impaired driving. We begin with
Montana’s statutory presumption of implied consent that “[a] person
who operates or is in actual physical control of a vehicle upon ways of
this state open to the public is considered to have given consent to a
test or tests of the person’s blood or breath for the purpose of
determining any measured amount or detected presence of alcohol or
drugs in the person’s body.” Section 61-8-402(1), MCA. However, if an
arrested person refuses to supply a BAC sample, the “refused test or
tests may not be given.” Section 61-8-402(4), MCA. Section 61-8-402(5),
MCA, carves out an exception to this rule:
If the arrested person has refused to provide a breath, blood, or
urine sample under 61-8-409 or this section in a prior
investigation in this state or under a substantially similar statute
in another jurisdiction or the arrested person has a prior
conviction or pending offense for a violation of 45-5-104 [negligent
homicide], 45-5-106 [vehicular homicide while under the
influence], 45-5-205 [negligent vehicular assault], 61-8-401 [DUI],

61-8-406 [DUI per se], or 61-8-411 [operating a vehicle under the
influence of THC] or a similar statute in another jurisdiction, the
officer may apply for a search warrant to be issued pursuant to
46-5-224 to collect a sample of the person’s blood for testing.
115 The Legislature added § 61-8-402(5), MCA, in 2011. Prior to its
inclusion, the statute “did not permit law enforcement to apply for a
search warrant in DUI cases if an arrested person refused to submit to
BAC testing.” State v. Giacomini, 2014 MT 93, {| 10, 374 Mont. 412,
327 P.3d 1054. If an arrested person refused to submit to a blood or
breath test “the refused test or tests [could] not be given ....” Section
61-8-402(4), MCA (2009). A blood sample could only be taken pursuant
to asearch warrant if probable cause existed that an offense other than
the underlying DUI had occurred. Giacomini, {| 10 (citing Collins v.
Dep't of Justice, Div. of Highway Patrol, 232 Mont. 73, 78, 755 P.2d
1373, 1876 (1988)). The statutory framework was revised in 2011 by
the Legislature’s passage of Senate Bill 42, which authorized law
enforcement to apply for a search warrant for a blood draw where an
arrested person refused to submit to BAC testing and had a prior
conviction for any of the listed driving, alcohol-related driving, or drug-
related driving offenses “or a similar statute in another jurisdiction.”
The amended bill was explained by a proponent:
The question is: What do you do with these people who have
figured out the game? That is—“If I refuse, they don’t have the
evidence.” And you notice that the committee amended the bill for
the repeat offenders just for that reason. Because there was a
general idea that we shouldn’t do it for the first refusal. And what
we got here is a bill to try to compel the person that fits the profile
of the repeater to give evidence .... When you tell them “You either
give us a breath test or we go to the judge and get a warrant [for
your blood,]” they’re going to give you a breath test and that is the
object of the exercise.'
116 This Court addressed a challenge to § 61-8-402(5), MCA, in
Giacomini. Giacomini refused to submit to a breath test requested
during a traffic stop. Giacomini, {| 4. Because Giacomini had refused
to provide a BAC test in the past, law enforcement applied for and
received a warrant to draw his blood pursuant to § 61-8-402(5), MCA.
Giacomini, 1 5. On appeal, Giacomini argued that “his prior refusal of

“Authorize Warrants to Obtain Blood or Breath Test in DUI Cases, Second Reading
of Senate Bill 42, 62nd Leg., at 1:24:30-1:25:23 (2011) (statement of Sen. Larry Jent),
available at https:/fperma.ce/D3BN-XH3X.

a breath test [was] insufficient to establish probable cause to support
a search warrant to draw his blood.” Giacomini, {] 12. In response, we
noted that “[t]he revisions made to § 61-8-402, MCA, by Senate Bill 42
merely removed the statutory prohibition on seeking a search warrant
for a blood draw ....” Giacomini, | 13. We explained that an arrested
person’s prior refusal does not by itself establish the necessary
probable cause for a warrant, “but merely permits police to apply for
a warrant” under § 61-8-402(5), MCA. Giacomini, J 18. Aside from his
prior refusal, there was a substantial basis to support the judge’s
determination that probable cause existed in Giacomini’s case,
including that he had driven the wrong way down a one-way street;
had watery, bloodshot eyes; smelled like alcohol; swayed and
staggered; and performed poorly on standard field sobriety tests.
Giacomini, {| 13. Section 61-8-402(5), MCA, does not supply probable
cause, but allows a mechanism to gather evidence against those who
have either refused a test in the past or been charged with or convicted
of various, but specifically enumerated offenses.

17 Here, Williams contends McNally is not limited to sentencing and
asserts that “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between the
sentencing enhancement. statute [§ 61-8-734(1), MCA,] and the
telephonic search warrant application statute [§ 61-8-402(5), MCA]....”
Pointing out that both Arizona and Colorado’s DWAI statutes include
a threshold level of impairment described as to the “slightest degree,”
Williams argues that Arizona and Colorado’s DWAI statutes are the
same and, based on our holding in McNally, neither is similar to
Montana’s DUI statute, which requires a driver’s ability to be
“diminished.” Williams urges us to expand McNally and hold that
because Montana’s DUI statute is not similar to Colorado’s DWAI
statute, within the meaning of § 61-8-734(1), MCA, Montana’s DUI
statute is also not similar to Arizona’s DWAI statute, within the
meaning of § 61-8-402(5), MCA. While it is true that both statutes
require convictions for “similar” offenses in order to justify either an
enhanced sentence or the taking of a person’s blood, significant to
resolving the underlying issue are well-established principles for
reviewing the sufficiency of a search warrant application, which
remain distinguishable from review of predicate convictions for
purposes of sentencing and other aspects of the criminal trial. Hence,
when reviewing the issuance of a search warrant pursuant to § 61-8-
402(5), MCA, it is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether
Arizona and Montana have “similar” DUI statutes as we did in
McNally. Such an inquiry, which is entirely a question of law, is
beyond review of the “facts” set forth within the four corners of the

application and otherwise necessary for a determination of probable
cause.
118 Probable cause is required for a judge to issue a search warrant.
A judge shall issue a search warrant to a person upon application
... made under oath or affirmation, that:
(1) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that.
an offense has been committed;
(2) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that.
evidence, contraband, or persons connected with the offense may
be found;
(3) particularly describes the place, object, or persons to be
searched; and
(A) particularly describes who or what is to be seized.
Section 46-5-221, MCA. This Court follows the “totality of the
circumstances” test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 218, 103 S.
Ct. 2317 (1983). State v. Reesman, 2000 MT 248, | 24, 301 Mont. 408,
10 P.3d 83; overruled on other grounds by State v. Barnaby, 2006 MT
203, 4] 42, 333 Mont. 220, 142 P.3d 809. Under this test, to determine
if a search warrant should be issued, the judge evaluates the facts
asserted within the four corners of the warrant application and makes
a practical, common sense determination whether there is a fair
probability that incriminating items will be found in the place to which
entry is sought.” Reesman, {| 24 (citations omitted).
{119 Williams does not dispute that he was convicted under Arizona
Revised Statute § 28-1381 or argue that there were insufficient facts
to demonstrate probable cause he was driving while impaired. Nor does
Williams dispute the validity of Volinkaty’s observations. Williams’s
entire argument is based upon Volinkaty’s inclusion in the affidavit of
his prior Arizona conviction, which he maintains is not similar to any
statute in Montana. Williams thus presents a challenge to the validity

? Notwithstanding the limitation on the issuing judge to the “four corners” of the
application, search warrants must be supported by probable cause—a different standard
from preponderance of the evidence applicable to whether a conviction is valid for
purposes of sentencing enhancement. Sate v. Maine, 2011 MT 90, | 13, 360 Mont. 182,
255 P.3d 64; State v. Krebs, 2016 MT 288, {] 12, 385 Mont. 328, 384 P.3d 98. Probable
cause, the standard upon which a search warrant may issue, is lower than a
preponderance of the evidence, the standard required to establish the existence of prior
convictions. Furthermore, probable cause is a less onerous standard than determining
whether a prior conviction from a different state was pursuant to a “similar statute” for
sentencing enhancement purposes. This Court will review a district court’s
determinations of similarity to determine if its conclusions of law were correct as a
matter of law. Our review under such circumstances is plenary. McNally, | 5.

of Volinkaty’s affidavit. We adopted the Franks procedure for
challenging the validity of a warrant affidavit in State v. Sykes, 194
Mont. 14, 20, 663 P.2d 691, 695 (1983); overruled on other grounds by
State v. Long, 216 Mont. 65, 69, 700 P.2d 153, 156 (1985). “[A] warrant
affidavit must set forth particular facts and circumstances underlying
the existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make
an independent evaluation of the matter.” Franks v. Delaware, 438
US. 154, 165, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2681 (1978). “There is, of course, a
presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the
search warrant.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684. A “judge
or magistrate is required to evaluate only the facts asserted within the
four corners of a search warrant application. If inaccurate or
misleading information is included in that application, it must be
excised from the application regardless of whether that information
was included mistakenly, negligently, or intentionally.” State v.
Worrall, 1999 MT 55 {| 33, 293 Mont. 439, 976 P.2d 968 (citation
omitted); overruled on other grounds by State v. Kasparek, 2016 MT
163, | 12, 384 Mont. 56, 375 P.3d 372. “This Court’s only function is to
ensure that the issuing judicial officer had a substantial basis to
determine that probable cause existed” and we pay great deference to
a magistrate’s determination. State v. Estes, 2017 MT 226, {| 24, 388
Mont. 491, 403 P.3d 1249 (citation omitted). “When the issuance of a
search warrant is based in part on illegal information, the reviewing
court shall excise the illegally obtained information from the
application for search warrant and review the remaining information
de novo to determine whether probable cause supported the issuance
of a search warrant.” Estes, | 24 (citation omitted). Significantly,
§ 61-8-402(5), MCA, does not alter how search warrants are to be
issued and reviewed.

{20 Our review, and that of the issuing judge, is constrained to the
facts within the four corners of the affidavit and we decline to conduct.
a legal inquiry into the similarity of Montana’s statutes with those of
Arizona. At a minimum, such an inquiry would require consideration
of information not within the application and beyond the requirements
for establishing probable cause. See Reesman, {] 24; § 46-5-221, MCA.
Williams’s contention is based on a conclusion of law reached after
conducting a legal analysis of the alcohol-related statutory schemes in
Arizona, Colorado, and Montana, as wellas specific statutory elements.
The determination of whether two statutes are “similar” is not
informed by facts contained within the affidavit which were observed
by the officer in the commission of the alcohol-related offense and any

inquiry of statutory similarity for purposes of § 61-8-402(5), MCA,
which is beyond the affiant’s averment that they are similar, is outside
the four corners of the affidavit and unnecessary. Here, Volinkaty
represented under oath that Williams had a prior conviction “for a DUI
or substantially similar offense on 11/20/2008 in Arizona.” Neither
Volinkaty nor Judge Anderson is compelled to conduct an exhaustive
legal analysis into “similarity” of the statutes in order to meet the
requirements of § 61-8-402(5), MCA, for issuance of a search warrant.
121 Finally, we would be remiss if we failed to note that conducting
such an analysis would place an impractical or impossible burden on
police officers and issuing judges prior to applying for or issuing a
search warrant. Such a requirement would be time consuming and
DUI investigations are time-sensitive by nature because the evidence
of the offense metabolizes out of the driver's bloodstream simply by the
passage of time. We are also confident that if the Legislature is
dissatisfied with our interpretation made here, it will exercise its
authority and determine otherwise.

22 Hi We conclude that conducting a “similarity” analysis of Arizona
and Montana DUI statutes—a question purely of law—would go
beyond the four corners of the affidavit. In the absence of inaccurate,
misleading, or illegally obtained information, it was unnecessary to
excise from the affidavit Volinkaty’s representations that Williams had
a prior conviction in Arizona for DUI. The District Court did not err in
denying Williams’s motion to suppress.

23 2. Whether the District Court erred in failing to consider the merits
of Williams’s contention that he did not receive the implied consent
advisory prior to his blood draw.

124 Williams argues generally that the warrant requirements were
not met and that the City failed to demonstrate that they were met.
Williams more specifically argues that Volinkaty failed to read the
implied consent advisory. This failure, Williams argues, is fatal to the
search warrant application’s validity. Williams also faults the District
Court for failing to address this argument. The City responds that
Williams failed to raise this issue in the Municipal Court and that
issues raised for the first time on appeal are not addressed.

25 Those who operate a motor vehicle in the state of Montana have
impliedly consented to submit to a blood or breath test for the purpose
of determining the presence or amount of alcohol or drugs in their
body. Section 61-8-402(1), MCA. “[D]ue process requires that the
arresting officer inform the accused of his or her right to obtain an
independent blood test, regardless of whether the accused consents to
the test designated by the officer.” State v. Strand, 286 Mont. 122, 126,

951 P.2d 552, 554 (1997); overruled on other grounds by State v.
Minkoff, 2002 MT 29, 7 14, 308 Mont. 248, 42 P.3d 223. This advisory,
derived from principles of fairness and due process, is called the
implied consent advisory.

26 “The rule is well established that this Court will not address an
issue raised for the first time on appeal. The reason for the rule is that
it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule on
an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider.” State v.
Gomez, 2007 MT 111, 21, 337 Mont. 219, 158 P.3d 442 (quotation and
citations omitted). When the district court acted as an intermediate
appellate court, we review the case as if the appeal was originally filed
in this Court, examining the record independently of the district court’s
decision. Stanley, ] 26.

27 Our review of the record reveals the only issue raised in the
Municipal Court was whether “the blood evidence obtained pursuant
to the search warrant should be suppressed because [Williams’s]
previous conviction from Arizona does not qualify as a ‘similar’ offense
under Section 61-8-402(5).” It is clear from the briefing in the
Municipal Court, that the parties agreed that the implied consent
advisory had been given. Both parties referred to Volinkaty providing
an implied consent advisory to Williams prior to his refusing to provide
a BAC sample. We conclude that whether Volinkaty supplied the
implied consent advisory was not at issue in the Municipal Court and
the District Court correctly declined to address the matter. For the
same reason, we also decline to address Williams’s contention that the
search warrant is invalid because Volinkaty failed to give him the
implied consent advisory.

CONCLUSION

28 The decision of the District Court affirming the Municipal Court’s
denial of Williams’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SHEA and BAKER
concur.

JUSTICE SANDEFUR, specially concurring.
29 I concur that the City’s application for a DUI search warrant
stated sufficient probable cause to believe that Williams was driving
under the influence of alcohol in violation of § 61-8-401, MCA, and that.
he waived his assertion of error regarding the implied consent advisory
requirement by failing to raise it in Municipal Court. Thus, I concur
that the Municipal Court did not err in denying Williams’ motion to
suppress the blood alcohol content (BAC) evidence obtained by the
Missoula Police pursuant to a post-refusal DUI search warrant.

However, I disagree that the validity of the Municipal Court’s search
warrant depends on compliance with § 61-8-402(5), MCA, and that the
warrant application complied with the similarity requirement of § 61-
8-402(5), MCA. Rather than attempt to shoehorn the warrant into § 61-
8-402(5), MCA, I instead would affirm on the alternative basis that,
regardless of whether Williams’ prior Arizona DUI conviction occurred
under a legal standard of liability similar to §§ 61-8-401 and -406,
MCA, the Municipal Court lawfully issued the search warrant on
probable cause of DUI as independently authorized by § 46-5-221, MCA
(general authorization for issuance of search warrants on probable
cause of criminal activity).

30 Standing impassably in the path of affirming the Municipal
Court’s search warrant under § 61-8-402(5), MCA, is the express
statutory requirement that Williams must have had a prior Arizona
DUI conviction under a legal standard of liability “similar” to
§§ 61-8-401 and -406, MCA (Montana DUI and DUI per se). See § 61-8-
402(5), MCA. Unlike the Colorado statutes at issue in McNally, which
had three different classes of DUI offenses,' Montana and Arizona have
only two base DUI offenses—DUI andDUI per se. See
§§ 61-8-401(1)(a), (3), and -406(1)(a), MCA; Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-1381(A)(1) and (2). While Arizona and Montana similarly define
DUI per se, see § 61-8-406(1)(a), MCA (driving or being in actual
physical control of anoncommercial vehicle with BAC of 0.08 or more),
and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1381(A)(2) (driving or being in actual physical
control of a vehicle with an “alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more”),
Arizona defines alcohol-based DUI more broadly than § 61-8-401(1)(a)
and (3), MCA (driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle
when person’s “ability to safely operate a vehicle has been diminished”
by alcohol intake). Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1381(A)(1) (driving or
being “in actual physical control of a vehicle ... [wJhile under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor ... if the person is impaired to the
slightest degree”). See also State v. Miller, 245 P.3d 454, | 7 (Ariz. App.
2011) (construing Arizona DUI definition). The Arizona “impaired to
the slightest degree” standard requires proof of a lesser degree of
impairment than § 61-8-401, MCA (diminished “ability to safely
operate a vehicle”). A person who commits the offense of DUI under
Arizona law does not necessarily commit the offense of DUI under
§ 61-8-401, MCA. Consequently, the State inaccurately represented in

' See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301(1)(a), (D), (g)(DUI, DUI per se, and “driving while
ability impaired” to the “slightest degree”).

the search warrant application that Williams had a prior DUI
conviction under a standard of criminal liability “similar” to §§ 61-8-
401 and -406, MCA.

31 As recognized by the Court, the mechanism for judicial review of
the sufficiency of a search warrant application is our constitutionally-
mandated Worrall standard of review requiring excise of inaccurate or
misleading factual statements set forth in the original search warrant
application and then reassessment of whether what remains is
sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant.
Worrall, {| 32-33 (adopting Montana constitutional standard more
stringent than federal Franks standard). If what remains in original
application is not sufficient to establish the necessary probable cause,
the reviewing court must void the warrant and suppress the fruits of
the search. Worrall, 1] 32-33.

132 If, as the Court implies, the validity of the Municipal Court's
search warrant depends on § 61-8-402(5), MCA, I would extend and
similarly apply our Worrall standard not only to the constitutionally-
required probable cause review of search warrant applications but also
to review of the accuracy of the statutorily-required assertion in a
search warrant application under § 61-8-402(5), MCA, that the suspect
had a prior DUI conviction under a standard of criminal liability
similar to §§ 61-8-401 and -406, MCA. Under Worrall, lower court
findings of fact would continue to be subject to a clearly erroneous
standard of review, but the related question arising under § 61-8-
402(5), MCA, of whether a statute from another jurisdiction imposes
a standard of criminal liability “similar” to §§ 61-8-401 and -406, MCA,
would be a pure question of law necessarily subject to de novo review
for correctness. Here, straightforward application of our Worrall
standard would result in the unavoidable conclusion that the search
warrant application inaccurately represented that Williams hada prior
Arizona DUI conviction under a standard of legal liability similar to
§§ 61-8-401 and -406, MCA. The required excision of that inaccurate
information would then require invalidation of the warrant and
suppression of the resulting BAC evidence due to non-compliance with
the express similarity requirement of § 61-8-402(5), MCA.

33 The Court’s analysis avoids application of our Worrall standard,
and with it any meaningful review of the State’s compliance with § 61-
8-402(5), MCA. The Court correctly begins with the proposition that
judicial review of the sufficiency of a search warrant application is
limited to review of the information within the four corners of the
application. But the analysis goes awry when it asserts that
application of our Worrall standard to the similarity requirement of

§ 61-8-402(5), MCA, would improperly call for a conclusion of law
dependent on extrinsic legal analysis beyond the four corners of the
search warrant application. The Court’s reasoning overlooks the fact
that Worrall allows, if not necessarily requires, consideration of
extrinsic information as a basis to assess the truth and accuracy of the
information set forth within the four corners of the application.
Regardless of whether the predicate information involves a matter of
fact. or matter of law, the critical focus of our Worrall standard of
review is whether the predicate information alleged by the State as the
legal justification for issuance of a search warrant is true and accurate.
The purported “impractical or impossible” time-consuming “burden on
police officers and issuing judges,” of verifying the accuracy of a sworn
representation in a search warrant application, has no bearing
whatsoever on the critical question of whether the court issued the
warrant based on accurate information required by law.
34 Neither the obvious public policy importance of effective DUI
investigation and prosecution, nor the practical inconvenience of
requiring law enforcement to comply with a legal requirement imposed
by the Legislature, have any proper place in the construction of the
clear and unambiguous similarity requirement of § 61-8-402(5), MCA.
If, as the Court implies, the validity of DUI-related search warrants
necessarily depends on compliance with § 61-8-402(5), MCA, the sky
will not fall and cripple DUI investigations if the State has to provide
accurate information to comply with the statutory similarity
requirement. Montana law enforcement officers have, or should have,
24/7 legal support from state and local prosecutors as needed. As
Montana’s chief law enforcement. officer, the Attorney General
certainly has the resources and expertise to support law enforcement
and local prosecutors by surveying and publishing the various
comparative standards of DUI-related liability in other jurisdictions.
Finally, any law enforcement problem caused by compliance with § 61-
8-402(5), MCA, is the sole responsibility of the Legislature, not this
Court. Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the Court’s stated
rationale for upholding the validity of the search warrant in this case.
185 Proper resolution of this case merely requires recognition of the
independent availability of unrestricted DUI-related search warrants
under § 46-5-221, MCA. Prior to 2011, Montana law did not specifically
provide for DUI-related search warrants. The two primary legal means
available to law enforcement to obtain DUI-related BAC evidence were:
(1) voluntary consent of the person to the implied consent request
of a law enforcement officer for a preliminary breath test in the
field on reasonable suspicion of a DUI-related offense, § 61-8-

409(4), MCA, and/or a more precise breath or blood test following
the person’s arrest on probable cause of a DUI-related offense,
§ 61-8-402(4), MCA; and
(2) involuntary seizure and scientific analysis (search) of a
person’s blood upon a search warrant issued pursuant to § 46-5-
221, MCA, on probable cause of criminal activity, whether DUI or
non-DUI-related, and the presence of particularly described
related evidence or contraband at or in a particularly described
location.
As to the latter, unrestricted search warrants have always been
available to law enforcement “on probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed” and that “evidence ... connected with the
offense may be found.” Section 46-5-221, MCA (emphasis added).? As
defined by §§ 61-8-401 and -406, MCA, DUI and DUI per se are
“offenses” as referenced in § 46-5-221, MCA. See § 46-1-202(15), MCA
(definition of “offense”). Even before the 2011 Legislature expressly
clarified the matter in § 46-5-224(1), MCA (specifically including
detectable BAC in preexisting authorization for seizure of “evidence”
by warrant), measurable BAC has always been “evidence connected
with” DUlI-related offenses for purposes of § 46-5-221, MCA. See
§§ 26-1-101(2), 46-5-224(1), and 61-8-404(1)(a), MCA. Fifty years ago,
the 1967 Legislature broadly crafted § 46-5-224, MCA, to “set out as
expansively as possible the items which may be seized under a search
warrant.” State v. Quigg, 155 Mont. 119, 129, 467 P.2d 692, 697-98
(1970) (quoting Criminal Law Commission Comments) (emphasis
added); 1967 Mont. Laws 372.
36 In various forms since original enactment in 1971, Montana’s
primary implied consent statute has allowed DUI suspects to refuse to
submit to warrantless implied consent BAC tests subject only to
temporary loss of driving privileges upon refusal. See § 61-8-402(4),
MCA. From 1971 through 1995, § 61-8-402, MCA® provided that, if an
arrested person “refuses ... to submit” to a warrantless implied consent
test, “none shall be given.” Section 61-8-402(3), MCA (1995); 1971

The statute setting forth probable cause grounds for search warrants was enacted
as part of the Montana Code of Criminal Procedure, and codified as § 95-704, R.C.M.
1947 (1967 Mont. Laws 372), and renumbered as § 46-5-202, MCA. In 1991, the search
warrant statute was amended and renumbered to become § 46-5-221, MCA. 1991 Mont.
Laws 3030. Telephonic search warrants were similarly available well before 2011. See
§§ 46-5-202(3)-(5), MCA (1985) and 46-5-222, MCA (1991).

* Formerly numbered § 32-2142.1, R.C.M. 1947.

Mont. Laws 640. From 1997 to date, § 61-8-402, MCA, has similarly
provided that, if a person “refuses ... to submit” to a warrantless
implied consent test, “ the refused test ... may not be given.” Section
61-8-402(4), MCA; 1997 Mont. Laws 492." This clear and unequivocally
plain limiting language in Montana’s implied consent statutes has
always applied only to the warrantless post-refusal BAC tests
authorized by the statutes. The plain language of Montana’s implied
consent statutes has never barred or otherwise limited
warrant-authorized seizures and searches of DUlI-related blood
samples under the independent authority of § 46-5-221, MCA.

437 Nonetheless, despite clear and unequivocal statutory language to
the contrary, widespread misconception has long existed that the
limiting language of §§ 61-8-402(4) and -409(4), MCA, not only barred
warrantless post-refusal DUI-related seizures of BAC evidence but
also warrant-authorized DUI-related seizures.® The long-standing
misconception stems from a too cursory and undiscerning analysis of
our decision in Collins v. Montana Dept. of Justice, 232 Mont. 73, 755
P.2d 1373 (1988). In the anomalous context of a civil assault and
battery action against an investigating Montana Highway Patrol
officer and the State, we considered whether the limiting language
§ 61-8-402(3), MCA (1983), barred post-refusal, warrant-authorized
blood seizures as the lynchpin for determining whether the officer and
the State had qualified immunity from the plaintiffs civil assault and
battery claims. Collins, 232 Mont. at 77-78, 755 P.2d at 1375-76.
Whether the limiting language in § 61-8-402(3), MCA (1983), barred
post-refusal, warrant-authorized, DUI-related seizure of BAC evidence
was not squarely at issue. Rather, based on the State’s concession, we
assumed, without analysis, that § 61-8-402(3), MCA (1983), barred
post-refusal DUI-related search warrants. Based on that uncontested
assumption, we merely held that the district court erroneously denied
qualified immunity to the officer and State because the limiting
language in the implied consent statute in any event did not bar
warrant-authorized post-refusal blood seizures based on non-DUI-

* Montana’s supplemental implied consent statute authorizing warrantless
preliminary alcohol screening tests (PAST) has always similarly provided that, “if a
person refiuses to submit to a test under this section, a test will not be given.” Section 61-
8-409, MCA; see 1995 Mont. Laws 2081.

° See Hearing on S.B. 42, before the Mont. Sen. Jud. Comm., 62nd Leg. Reg. Sess.
00:43: :23:14 (Jan. 20, 2011) and Hearing on S.B. 42 before the Mont. House Jud.
Comm., 62nd Leg. Reg. Sess. 00:58:22-01:25:59 (March 17, 2011).

related offenses. Collins, 232 Mont. at 77-78, 755 P.2d at 1375-76.° In
2014, we perpetuated the misconception by cursorily stating, without
analysis, that the limiting language in the pre-2011 implied consent
statute “did not permit law enforcement to apply for a search warrant
in DUI cases if an arrested person refused to submit to BAC testing.”
Giacomini, 1] 10-11 (citing Collins, 232 Mont. at 78, 755 P.2d at 1376).
38 However, upon our first opportunity to squarely construe the
meaning of the limiting language in § 61-8-402(4), MCA, we clarified
that our contrary statement in Giacomini was mere dicta and held that
the still-present limiting language in § 61-8-402(4), MCA, applies only
to warrantless post-refusal BAC tests, not DUI-related blood draws
independently authorized by search warrant. State v. Minett, 2014 MT
225, {I 12-17, 376 Mont. 260, 332 P.3d 235. Though the case did not
involve a search warrant issued after an implied consent refusal,
Minett remains important here because our plain meaning construction
of the limiting language of § 61-8-402(4), MCA, did not depend on the
presence or absence of an implied consent refusal. See Minett, 1] 12-17.
Minett merely recognized what should have been obvious all along—the
limiting language of § 61-8-402(4), MCA, expressly applies only to
warrantless post-refusal DUI-related seizures of BAC evidence.
Consequently, contrary to the longstanding misconception and our now
superseded dicta in Giacomini, DUI-related search warrants have
always been, and remain, available to law enforcement under the
general authority of § 46-5-221, MCA, without any requirement for a
prior DUI conviction or implied consent refusal. The only question is
whether, in enacting Senate Bill 42, the 2011 Legislature in any way
limited the preexisting availability of DUI-related search warrants
under the independent authority of § 46-5-221, MCA.

139 In a well-intentioned effort. to enhance effective enforcement of
Montana’s DUI laws by closing a misperceived loophole protecting
DUL-related offenders, the 2011 Legislature revised Montana’s implied
consent statutes to expressly make post-refusal search warrants

® Aside from Collins’ manifestly limited scope and further undermining it as
authority aiding in the construction of § 61-8-402, MCA, our reasoning was suspect given
that the non-DUI-related “offense” upon which we distinguished application of the
implied consent statute was not an “offense” for purposes of the qualified immunity/scope
of employment matter at issue. The non-DUL-related “offense” was merely a suspected
violation of an alcohol restriction imposed as a condition of the DUI suspect’s preexisting
probation and, thus, beyond the scope of officer’s duty to investigate and enforce absent
prior authorization of the suspect’s probation officer. See § 46-1-202(15) and (17), MCA
(definitions of an “offense” and “peace officer”).

available to law enforcement to obtain otherwise unavailable BAC
evidence against repeat DUI offenders. Section 61-8-402(5), MCA; 2011
Mont. Laws 1164. The new provision defined a repeat DUI offender as
a person who has a prior DUI-related conviction or implied consent
refusal under Montana law “or a similar statute in another
jurisdiction.” Section § 61-8-402(5), MCA. Given the Legislature’s
narrow focus on repeat. offenders and the widespread misconception
that Montana’s existing implied consent statutes barred law
enforcement from obtaining post-refusal DUI-related search warrants,
it is not surprising that nothing in the express language, title, or
legislative history of Senate Bill 42 evinces any legislative intent to
affirmatively limit the preexisting availability of DUI-related search
warrants under § 46-5-221, MCA. The new warrant exception, § 61-8-
402(5), MCA, and accompanying amendments to §§ 61-8-402(4) and
-409(4), MCA, make sense only under the then-prevailing
misconception that the preexisting implied consent statutes barred
both warrantless and warrant-authorized post-refusal seizures of BAC
evidence. Regardless of the Legislature’s clear intent to limit the
availability of the new warrant authorization,’ legislation enacted to
partially plug a perceived loophole in DUI enforcement cannot logically
be construed as legislative intent to affirmatively limit an
independently available, preexisting search warrant authorization the
Legislature did not believe existed. Though certainly creating
unnecessary ambiguity between statutes, the 2011 revisions to
§ 61-8-402, MCA, simply did not supersede, limit, or otherwise affect,

7 Under the misconception that DUl-related search warrants were not then
available under existing law, and consistent with the express limiting language in the
proposed new section, § 61-8-402(5), MCA, the sponsor of SB 42, Sen. Jim Shockley,
explained to the House Judiciary Committee that the new warrant authorization would
be available only upon a second or subsequent DUI offense or implied consent refusal,
to wit:

[Right now, the way that the statutes are written, you cannot get a warrant
from a court to draw blood from a suspect who the officer believes is impaired
by alcohol or drugs... What this does provide is a constitutional way for law
enforcement to conduct a search to gather evidence against a person believed
to have committed a crime.... [But] there’s a mulligan. I don’t golf, but I
understand that if you golf and you mess up the first shot ... it doesn’t count.
And that’s what this is, a mulligan. This bill does not apply, you can’t get a
warrant, unless the person has refused to cooperate with law enforcement
before, refused to either blow or give blood, or has a ... previous DUI, or is
awaiting trial on DUI. In other words, this is the second mistake.

Hearing on S.B. 42, House Jud. Comm., 62nd. Leg. Reg. Sess. 00:58:58-1:00:37
(March 17, 2011).

the preexisting availability of DUI-related search warrants under
§ 46-5-221, MCA. Thus, unrestricted DUI-related search warrants
remain available to law enforcement under § 46-5-221, MCA,
unaffected by the limiting language in § 61-8-402(5), MCA.

40 In the continuing absence of any statutory provision handcuffing
law enforcement by clearly and unequivocally limiting the long-
standing independent availability of unrestricted DUI-related search
warrants under § 46-5-221, MCA, I would hold that, regardless of the
inaccurate statement in the warrant application that Williams had a
prior out-of-state DUI conviction under a statute similar to §§ 61-8-401
or -406, MCA, the Missoula Police lawfully seized his blood pursuant
to a post-refusal search warrant properly issued by the Municipal
Court in accordance with the independent authority of § 46-5-221,
MCA. I would further respectfully suggest that the Legislature review
and clean up this mess at its earliest convenience.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

JAMIE MICHELLE KOON,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0357.
Submitted on Briefs September 27, 2017.
Decided November 20, 2017.
2017 MT 283.
389 Mont. 322.
405 P.8d 1254.

po

ee er rel

For Appellant: Chad M. Wright, Chief Appellate Defender,
James Reavis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Mardell Ployhar, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Leo
Gallagher, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Lisa Leckie, Deputy
County Attorney, Helena.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Jamie Michelle Koon appeals from the District Court’s Order on
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss dated April 9, 2015. We affirm and
remand for correction of the sentence.

2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Koon’s

motion to dismiss the petition to revoke her suspended sentence on

the ground that there had been a four-year delay in executing the
arrest warrant.

Issue Two: Whether the District Court’s written judgment should

be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q3 On February 21, 2007, Koon pleaded guilty to felony issuing a bad
check in violation of §§ 45-6-316 and 45-2-101, MCA. The District
Court in Lewis and Clark County sentenced her to four years in prison
with all but thirty days suspended. That sentence was to run
consecutively to a sentence Koon was then serving in Colorado, and
was subject to conditions including supervision by the Montana
Department of Corrections and payment of restitution. She was
extradited to Colorado.

q4 On April 13, 2009, the State filed a petition to revoke Koon’s
suspended sentence. A supporting affidavit from a probation officer
stated that Koon had discharged her Colorado sentence on October 16,
2008, but had not communicated with her supervising probation officer
in Montana. Koon’s whereabouts were unknown to Montana
authorities, and on April 14, 2009, the District Court issued a
“Montana only” warrant for her arrest.’

{5 Koon was convicted of another offense in Colorado in 2009 and

1A “Montana only” warrant is a case management tool that allows prosecutors and
law enforcement administrators to limit the geographical area where a warrant should
be served. It provides notice that extradition from another state will not be sought.

spent the next four years dealing with her new sentence there, being
paroled and revoked several times. In June 2009 Koon wrote a letter
to the Clerk of the District Court in Lewis and Clark County asking to
be returned to Montana to serve her 2007 sentence. Nothing occurred
as a result of that letter, and Koon discharged her Colorado sentences
on April 12, 2013.

q6 Koon returned to Montana at some point and on November 11,
2013, was stopped for a traffic violation in Fort Benton. She was
arrested on the April 2009 “Montana only” warrant. On November 14,
2013, Koon appeared on the April 2009 petition to revoke her Montana
2007 suspended sentence. She was released on her own recognizance
and ordered to report to her probation officer.

{7 Koon moved to dismiss the petition to revoke the 2007 suspended
sentence, contending that the State failed to bring her to court without
unnecessary delay in violation of her right to due process.

{8 The District Court denied Koon’s motion to dismiss, holding that
the requirement of § 46-18-203(4), MCA, that an arrested offender
must be brought before a judge “without unnecessary delay” applies to
the offender’s initial appearance after arrest, citing State v.
Edmundson, 2014 MT 12, 373 Mont. 338, 317 P.3d 169. The District
Court determined that Koon’s appearance in court within three days
of her November 2013 arrest satisfied the statute. The District Court
further concluded that there is no statutory requirement that an arrest
warrant be served without unnecessary delay on an offender who is
incarcerated in another state.

{9 Koon also argued that issuing a “Montana only” arrest warrant
while she was incarcerated in Colorado violated her due process rights.
She contended that after she served her Colorado sentence she could
no longer ask the Montana court to set her sentence in this State to
run concurrently with her sentence in Colorado. In addition, she
alleged that she had a “failing memory,” making it difficult for her to
recall past events. The District Court applied State v. West, 2008 MT
338, 346 Mont. 244, 194 P.3d 683 to determine whether there was a
violation of due process. As provided in West, the District Court
examined the “totality of the circumstances.”

{10 The court considered the four-year time between the 2009 arrest
warrant and Koon’s arrest in 2013; the fact that her location was
unknown when the warrant was issued; and the fact that Koon was
subsequently arrested and incarcerated in Colorado under a sentence
that was not discharged until 2013.

11 The District Court determined that the extradition statutes do not
impose a duty on a state to seek the return of a prisoner from another

state for purposes of a revocation proceeding. The District Court
determined that Koon had “no right to demand a hearing or extradition
to Montana” and that her 2009 letter to the Clerk of the Court
“triggered no requirement” that she be extradited. The court
determined that even if Koon had been returned to Montana during
her period of incarceration or supervision in Colorado, she had no right
to receive a concurrent sentence to whatever sentence she was serving
in Colorado. In addition, her original 2007 Montana sentence was
specifically consecutive to her Colorado sentences, materially
decreasing the likelihood that she would have received a concurrent
sentence in any event. In light of all these factors, the District Court
determined that Koon had not suffered a deprivation of due process.
12 The District Court ultimately held a hearing upon the petition to
revoke Koon’s 2007 suspended sentence and determined that she had
violated the terms of the sentence. The District Court nevertheless
sentenced her to the same term of three years, and suspended the
entire term.

113 Koon appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
14 This Court exercises plenary review of issues of constitutional law.
West, {| 138. This Court reviews a district court’s imposition of a
criminal sentence for legality only. State v. Kroll, 2004 MT 203, {| 12,
322 Mont. 294, 95 P.38d 717. This Court reviews a district court’s
interpretation of a statute as an issue of law, to determine whether the
interpretation is correct. West, {| 13.

DISCUSSION

15 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in dismissing Koon’s
motion to dismiss the petition to revoke her suspended sentence on the
ground that there had been a four-year delay in executing the arrest
warrant.

{16 In 2008 this Court established that “execution of a probation
violation warrant without unreasonable delay is one of the due process
protections afforded defendants,” based upon the due process
guarantee of Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution. West,
{| 27. The concept of due process does not have a static definition, but
generally expresses a requirement of fundamental fairness. State v.
Graves, 2015 MT 262, {| 21, 381 Mont. 37, 355 P.38d 769; Edmundson,
4/17. A probation revocation proceeding is civil, and the offender is not
entitled to the full range of constitutional protections available to a

person first charged with a crime. Edmundson, | 16. Probation
revocation deprives an individual not of absolute liberty, but only of the
“conditional liberty” that depends upon adherence to established parole
restrictions. West, {] 36. A charged defendant’s rights to a speedy trial
do not apply in the context of a probation revocation. Edmundson, 116.
117 Assessing the due process implications of a particular revocation
proceeding requires a flexible approach that provides the procedural
protections that the particular case demands. West, {| 32. Due process
is “ultimately measured by the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding,” Edmundson, {| 17, and requires “an appraisal of the
totality of the facts in a given case.” West, {] 32. The reviewing court
should consider the delay in serving the warrant; the State’s diligence;
the reasons for the delay; the conduct of the probationer; whether the
State knows the location of the probationer; and any actual prejudice
that resulted. This list is not exclusive. West, {| 34.

118 The Dissent opines that “any straight-up application of the West
factors to the undisputed facts of this case does not bode well for the
State.” Dissent, {] 35. However, the West opinion clearly emphasizes
the “flexible” nature of the due process analysis in revocation
proceedings, appraising the “totality of facts in a given case.” West,
{| 32. Quoting the United States Supreme Court, “That which may, in
one setting constitute a denial of fundamental fairness ... may, in other
circumstances and in light of other considerations fall short of such
denial.” West, | 32 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
850, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1719 (1998)).

19 It is established that the time between issuance and execution of
an arrest warrant for a probation violation is but one factor for
consideration and is “not alone dispositive.” West, {] 34. In West, for
example, this Court held that a twenty-six-month delay in executing
a probation violation warrant, during which the defendant was in State
custody, did not amount to a “per se due process violation.” West, 1 33.
The District Court in this case properly applied West, considering the
totality of the circumstances, to determine that Koon suffered no
violation of due process. The District Court considered the four-year
lapse between issuance and execution of the warrant; the fact that
Koon was serving a sentence for offenses in Colorado for most of that.
time; and that securing Koon’s presence for executing the warrant
would require initiation of an extradition proceeding.

120 [I The conduct of the probationer is also an important factor in
the resolution of this case. Koon notes that while in custody in
Colorado she wrote a letter to the Clerk of the Court in Lewis and

Clark County expressing a desire to return to Montana to deal with the
revocation warrant. However, it is difficult to determine how she was
prejudiced upon review of these facts. When she finally discharged her
Colorado sentence and returned to Montana in 2013, she did not seek
a resolution of her situation. While obviously aware that the warrant
had been issued, she did not notify her probation officer that she had
returned as the conditions of her prior sentence required. Thus, her
presence in Montana and the outstanding warrant for her arrest came
to light only after she was stopped for a traffic offense. Koon’s conduct
indicates a desire to evade service of the warrant and an intent to
avoid the requirements of her probation. West, {| 34.

121 HH While Koon argues that she was prejudiced by not being able
to argue that her Montana-revoked probation should be served
concurrently with her Colorado sentence, her original Montana
sentence was specifically imposed as consecutive to the Colorado
sentence. Koon has not demonstrated any likelihood that she would
have received a concurrent sentence upon revocation in Montana, and
she had no statutory entitlement to a concurrent sentence. Section 46-
18-401, MCA. We also decline to ascribe any material prejudice to
Koon’s unsupported suggestion that she could forget the facts of past
events.

22 We affirm the District Court’s decision to deny Koon’s motion to
dismiss the revocation petition.

23 Issue Two: Whether the District Court’s written judgment should
be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence.

24 Koon contends that during sentencing the District. Court stated
that. probation supervision fees would be waived because of her
inability to pay. The State concedes that the final written disposition
failed to reflect the waiver of supervision fees and should be corrected.
The written disposition must conform to the pronouncement of the
sentence in open court. Kroll, q 15.

25 Therefore, we remand to the District Court so that the final
disposition of Koon’s sentence may be amended to waive supervision
fees.

CONCLUSION
26 The District Court is affirmed. This matter is remanded for
correction of the final disposition to reflect that Koon is not required to
pay supervision fees for probation.
JUSTICES BAKER, WHEAT, SHEA and McKINNON concur.
JUSTICE McKINNON, concurring.
27 These proceedings are controlled by our decision in West. In my

opinion, however, West fails to adequately account for the obligations
and responsibilities of a probationer; particularly, the requirement
fundamental to conditional release that a probationer report to his or
her probation officer. Probation is a “conditional privilege previously
granted by the State as a matter of grace.” State v. Maynard, 2010 MT
115, J 28, 356 Mont. 333, 233 P.3d 331, quoting State v. Haagenson,
2010 MT 95, { 17, 356 Mont. 177, 232 P.3d 367.

28 In West, the record established the defendant had been
incarcerated and under State supervision during the entire period of
time the arrest warrant remained outstanding. West, {] 7. Likely as a
consequence, the Court’s enumeration of “factors” to be considered in
assessing “unreasonable delay” focused on the State’s reasons for not
bringing a probationer to court when the probationer was being held
under state authority and unable to report. West, {| 34-35. Implicit to
the West analysis was the fact that West was unable to comply with
conditions of probation due to his incarceration in another Montana
detention facility, thus implicating due process and fairness
considerations and a demand that the State justify its actions.
Arguably, West was not conditionally released when he was
incarcerated during the time the warrant remained outstanding.

29 In contrast, when a probationer is released, even intermittently,
and does not report and abide by the rules of probation, the State’s
issuance of a probation-violation warrant should not shift the inquiry
away from the probationer’s underlying obligation to report. To place
the burden on the State to justify its failure to execute the arrest
warrant not only distorts the fundamental nature and purpose of
probation, but also relieves the probationer of her obligation to report.
In my opinion, a straightforward application of the West factors, as the
Dissent urges, fails to account for the circumstances present.
here—where there were intermittent periods while Koon was on parole
and after she had completed her Colorado sentence when she could
have addressed her reporting obligations, but nonetheless chose to
disregard those obligations.

30 Although this Court stated in West that the prohibition against
unreasonable delay “contemplates a case-by-case analysis, not hard-
and-fast rules” the Court set forth “several factors,” precisely six, which
“must [be] consider[ed] in making a determination of reasonableness.”
West, 1] 33-34 (quotation omitted and emphasis added). Focusing on
the State’s actions, the West factors are: (1) the length of delay between
the State’s issuance and execution of the warrant; (2) the State’s
diligence in attempting to serve the warrant; (3) the reasons for the

State’s delay in executing the warrant; (4) the conduct of the
probationer in frustrating the State’s actions to execute the warrant; (5)
whether the State knew of the probationer’s whereabouts; and (6) any
prejudice to the probationer caused by the State’s delay in executing the
warrant. West, | 34. In my opinion, West is inadequate to address the
present circumstances. Here, the focus should not be on the State’s
actions where Koon had opportunities to report, was required by her
conditions of probation to report, and failed to report. West falls short
in its analysis by focusing the inquiry on the State’s actions, giving
little regard to the underlying nature of a revocation proceeding and
the fundamental requirement of the probationer’s obligation to report.
31 Pursuant to West, the risk of having a revocation proceeding
dismissed for failing to timely execute an arrest warrant falls entirely
on the State regardless of whether the probationer, who in the first
instance has the obligation to report, was able to report. Here, Koon
failed to report when she discharged her Colorado sentence in April
2013 and thereafter relocated to Montana. Koon, on numerous
occasions, failed to keep her probation officer informed of her
whereabouts. Koon was also released on parole intermittently and
failed to report. The inquiry pursuant to West remains focused only on
the State’s actions, without due consideration of the probationary
context of the proceedings and the probationer’s obligation to report.
The failure of a probationer to report when able to do so nowhere
informs the West inquiry or is otherwise set forth as a factor to be
considered.

32 It is well-established that a probationer has a due process
guarantee protected by Article II, Section 17 of the Montana
Constitution, which ensures that the execution of a probation-violation
warrant occurs without unreasonable delay. West, {I{] 26-27. Despite
its acknowledgment that due process is a “flexible” concept, West, 133,
I am concerned that West has distorted the nature of a revocation
proceeding and the State’s obligations. In the context of a probationer
who had the ability to report but chose not to do so, West’s six-factor
test is inadequate to address the question of whether there has been
“unreasonable delay” in executing a warrant. While the West factors
may inform the inquiry when a probationer is incarcerated for the
entire period the warrant remains outstanding, West fails to
adequately articulate considerations which pertain to the underlying
nature of a revocation proceeding and which also consider the
probationer’s obligation to report.

433 I would revisit West and its underlying analysis. I otherwise

concur in the result reached by the Court.

JUSTICE SANDEFUR, dissenting.
434 I dissent. In 2008, for better or worse, in the manifest absence of
any recognized uniform criteria for objective assessment of the
demands of constitutional due process in the face of the State’s lack of
diligence in the execution of arrest warrants issued on probation
violations, this Court extended and built on the United States Supreme
Court’s traditional four-factor Sixth Amendment speedy trial test from
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972) (the
length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant’s actual desire for
speedy trial, and resulting prejudice to defendant), to craft a new, six-
factor Montana Constitutional due process analog for assessing
unreasonable State delay in executing on probation violation warrants.
State v. West , 2008 MT 338, {I{] 22-36, 346 Mont. 244, 194 P.3d 683
(adopting a six-factor totality of the circumstances balancing test:
length of delay, State diligence in attempting to arrest defendant,
whether defendant impeded arrest, whether defendant’s whereabouts
were known or readily ascertainable to State, reasons for State delay,
and degree of resulting prejudice to defendant). The Court jumped onto
this slippery slope despite its express recognition that the fundamental
right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by the United States and Montana
Constitutions, does not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
435 Any straight up application of the West factors to the undisputed
facts of this case does not. bode well for the State. Three of them—the
length of the delay, the State’s diligence in executing on the warrant,
and whether the defendant’s whereabouts were known or reasonably
ascertainable—all weigh heavily against the State. Two of
them—resulting prejudice and defendant impedance of State
efforts—weigh moderately against the State. Only one of them—the
reason for the State delay—weighs moderately in the State’s favor.
436 Four years and seven months—1,672 days—passed before the
State arrested the defendant. The State, not the issuing court,
unilaterally deemed the warrant a “Montana only” warrant. At all
times pertinent, the State was well aware, or reasonably should have
been on any diligent effort, of the defendant’s whereabouts. When it
filed its probation revocation petition and obtained an arrest warrant,
the State was aware that the defendant was then in Colorado under
the preeminent supervision of the State of Colorado as the State
expressly based its revocation petition on the defendant’s failure to
timely report to her Colorado probation officer. A week later, the State
became aware that the defendant was in the custody of the State of
Colorado where she thereafter remained in continuous Colorado

custody or supervision until April 2013.

487 When the State wants to treat a Montana case as a serious
matter, it does not put a Montana arrest warrant into the national or
interstate criminal justice information databases and then declare the
warrant to other jurisdictions as “Montana only.” This practice merely
subjects the defendant and other jurisdictions to a costly, burdensome,
and recurring catch-and-release exercise. Rather, it puts an
unrestricted Montana warrant into the criminal justice information
system and, upon notification of an arrest of a Montana fugitive in
another jurisdiction, immediately places an interstate detainer on the
fugitive forcing the other state to “hold” the defendant for extradition
back to Montana upon the conclusion of proceedings in that state. The
State did neither here. Why? Because it did not view the case as
important enough to pay for the cost of transporting the defendant
back to Montana.

438 Compounding matters for purposes of the West analysis, Koon, by
formal Montana court filing while in Colorado custody in June 2009,
affirmatively requested that Montana place an interstate detainer on
her for the purpose of facilitating her extradition back to Montana to
promptly resolve this matter upon conclusion of her Colorado
incarceration. Despite awareness of the request, Montana prosecutorial
and probation officials simply ignored Koon’s request and allowed the
“Montana only” warrant to continue to pend without further action or
attention. Three years later, while still on probation in Colorado, Koon
called the Montana prosecutor’s office, expressed her desire to return
to Montana, and requested information and assistance from Montana
officials in getting Colorado and Montana to approve an interstate
transfer that would allow Montana officials to supervise the balance of
her Colorado probation in Montana in conjunction with her concurrent
Montana probation, thereby allowing Koon to voluntarily return to
Montana at no cost to the State to resolve this matter. In a classically
ridiculous, bureaucratic Catch-22, which neither the State nor the
Court make any attempt to defend, Colorado refused to approve an
interstate transfer due to the pendency of the Montana warrant, a
warrant that was neither important enough for Montana to extradite
on or to quash to allow the defendant to return at her expense to
resolve this matter. Why? Because the State did not have to and did
not care enough about the case to do so. After fully discharging her
Colorado probation, Koon returned to Montana, enrolled her children
in high school in Great Falls, obtained gainful employment, and was
working two jobs at the same time to make ends meet when she was
stopped for a traffic offense and arrested and jailed on the almost five-

year-old Montana warrant.

39 As to the West prejudice factor, Koon made no showing that she
suffered any prejudice to the evidentiary merits of her case as a result
of the almost five-year delay. However, it is undisputed that the State
arrested and jailed her on an almost five-year-old warrant issued not
on any new criminal conduct but, rather, issued merely on a by then
long-resolved failure to timely report to her Colorado probation officer.
Given its manifest disregard for this case until Koon literally fell into
the State’s net after almost five years, it is disingenuous at best for the
State to now assert that it had any compelling law enforcement
interest in this case sufficient to offset the inherently prejudicial
nature of Koon’s arrest, incarceration, related loss of employment, and
family disruption. While Koon is at least partially responsible for this
prejudice due to her failure to surrender to authorities on her return
to Montana, the primary focus of the West test is on the reasonableness
and effect of the State’s efforts to arrest a probation violator. Even on
balance with Koon’s failure to surrender herself after returning to
Montana, the State’s utter disregard for this case significantly
undercuts any assertion that its usually compelling interest in law
enforcement justifies the inherent prejudicial nature of Koon’s arrest,
incarceration, associated loss of employment, and family disruption in
a case the State could not care less about. Under these extraordinary
circumstances, the West prejudice factor weighs moderately against
the State.

140 West next focuses on whether and to what extent, if any, the
defendant impeded the State’s efforts to arrest her. Again, while Koon
is certainly responsible for failing to surrender to authorities on
returning to Montana, any assertion that she impeded the State’s non-
existent efforts to arrest her is ridiculous. The inconvenient fact is that
the State made absolutely no effort to arrest Koon before she
fortuitously fell into its hands on an unrelated traffic stop. Even
liberally construed in the State’s favor, the West warrant-impedance
factor at best balances evenly between the State and the defendant.
41 The only West factor that even remotely weighs in favor of the
State is the reason for the delay. The State’s only justification for its
utter disregard for Koon’s fundamental liberty interest, and
concomitant due process right to be free from infringement thereof
except pursuant to a fundamentally fair process of law, is the
approximate $1,800 cost of extraditing her back to Montana from
Colorado. Though a valid reason as far as it goes, it is highly doubtful
that a single member of Montana’s judicial, prosecutorial, law
enforcement, gubernatorial, or legislative communities would, if at all

candid, find an $1,800 savings to be a compelling justification for the
arrest and jailing of any one of them or a family member under similar
circumstances. While not particularly compelling under the totality of
the circumstances, the West reason-for-delay factor must nonetheless
still weigh moderately in favor of the State. Regardless of the fact that
due process is flexible and that no single factor is dispositive, the West
criteria clearly balance out against the State, thus necessitating a
finding of unreasonable delay in arresting Koon under the totality of
the circumstances.
42 The State does not challenge on appeal the continued validity of
the West test. The Court’s opinion is conspicuously void of any
particularized consideration and careful balancing of all of the West
factors. The Court instead narrowly focuses on the District. Court’s
obviously correct—but not due-process-dispositive—conclusions of law
that fugitives have no right to be extradited, the State has no duty to
extradite fugitives, and that the defendant had no right to a concurrent
dispositional sentence on her revocation even if promptly arrested.
Merely noting that due process is flexible, recognizing that no single
West factor is dispositive, and then focusing solely on considerations
favorable to the State is hardly the type of careful balancing demanded
by West and other balancing tests adopted by this Court. If we are of
the view that our adoption of the West test was either improvident
from the outset or has not proven out on experience, then we should
straight up say so and discard it. If not, we should require the same
particularized elemental consideration and careful balancing under the
totality of the circumstances that West demands and then let the chips
fall where they may regardless of whether we like the result in a
particular case. I dissent.

JUSTICE RICE joins in the dissenting Opinion of JUSTICE
SANDEFUR.

ZINVEST, LLC, a Montana
limited liability company,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

GUNNERSFIELD ENTERPRISES, INC.,
a California corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0769.
Submitted on Briefs August 23, 2017.
Decided November 21, 2017.
2017 MT 284.

389 Mont. 334,

405 P.3d 1270.

For Appellant: Mark L. Evans, Axilon Law Group, PLLC,
Bozeman; Elizabeth L. Griffing, Axilon Law Group, PLLC, Helena.
For Appellee: W. Scott Green, Daniel Larry Snedigar, Patten,
Peterman, Bekkedahl & Green, PLLC, Billings.
JUSTICE BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 In 2008, Gunnersfield Enterprises, Inc. purchased five
condominium units and an adjoining vacant lot. The deed was properly
recorded and a Realty Transfer Certificate was submitted to the
Department of Revenue, which did not correctly update its ownership
records for the vacant lot. Gunnersfield received notice of and paid the
tax assessments for the five condominium units each year, but the
Gallatin County Treasurer continued to send the tax bills for the
vacant lot to the previous owner. When the taxes went unpaid, the
Treasurer sold the lot for delinquent taxes. Zinvest, LLC acquired the
County’s interest. Gunnersfield now appeals the District Court’s
determination to quiet title to Zinvest. We reverse and remand,
concluding that the Department of Revenue’s defective property tax
assessment voided the tax lien sale.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

{2 In June 2008, Gunnersfield purchased five commercial
condominium units, known as Units 1 through 5, and an adjacent
fenced lot, known as Lot 6A, from Prospero, LLC in a single
transaction. A single Warranty Deed conveying all of the property to
Gunnersfield was recorded that same month in the records of the
Gallatin County Clerk and Recorder. The Department of Revenue
(Department) received both a copy of the deed and the Realty Transfer
Certificate in 2008. While the Department correctly updated its
ownership records for Units 1 through 5, it did not update the
ownership record for Lot 6A.

q3 Gunnersfield paid all property tax notices it received from the
Gallatin County Treasurer (County) for the property. The notices it
received, however, were for the five condominium units only. From
2009 through 2012, the County continued to send tax bills for Lot 6A

to Prospero, the former owner. Beginning in the second half of 2009
and continuing in the subsequent years, the taxes for Lot 6A went
unpaid. In July 2010, the County offered a property tax lien for sale
against Lot 6A for the 2009 delinquent taxes. At that time there was
no purchaser and the County was listed as the purchaser of the lien.
q4 In 2012, Zinvest, LLC became interested in the property and took
action to acquire the tax lien from the County. Zinvest sent the
statutorily required notice of pending assignment of the tax lien to
Prospero, which the U.S. Postal Service returned undelivered. Zinvest
did not send notice to Gunnersfield. Upon Zinvest’s payment. of the
delinquent taxes, interest, and fees, the County assigned its tax lien
interest in the property to Zinvest on October 9, 2012.

q5 Zinvest then began the process to acquire a tax deed on the
property. During this process, Zinvest obtained a Litigation Guarantee
from Stewart Title, which revealed that the title to Lot 6A had vested
in Gunnersfield in 2008. Zinvest sent a notice that a tax deed may
issue to Prospero, to Gunnersfield, and to the County. Gunnersfield
admits that it received this notice. In an affidavit from Jon Chaney, the
President and majority shareholder of Gunnersfield, Gunnersfield
attested that it inquired with the County about what property was at
issue in the notice. The County office staff informed Gunnersfield that
the notice pertained to the property located at 153 Shepherd Trail, the
street. address for the condominium building. Lot 6A has no street
address. Gunnersfield maintains that it assumed the notice must
relate to condominium Units 6 and 7, which it believed Prospero still
owned, because Gunnersfield had never been notified, and was
unaware, of any delinquent taxes on its own properties. In September
2013, when the period for redemption expired, the County issued a tax
deed to Zinvest.

{6 Zinvest filed a quiet title action for the property in the District
Court in October 2013. During this litigation, Zinvest’s attorney sent
aletter to Gunnersfield requesting that it sign a Disclaimer of Interest.
Gunnersfield signed and returned the Disclaimer of Interest, again
believing that the proceedings related to Units 6 and 7, and not to Lot
6A. The District Court granted final judgment and quieted title to
Zinvest in May 2014.

{7 + Realizing its error in February 2015, Gunnersfield filed a motion
for relief from judgment with the District Court. The court granted the
motion and struck Gunnersfield’s prior Disclaimer of Interest from the
record, reasoning that it was “not unreasonable” for Gunnersfield to
assume that the proceedings did not pertain to its property and that
“negligence in this instance [was] excusable.” Following additional

briefing and argument, the District Court denied Gunnersfield’s
motions for summary judgment and granted Zinvest’s motion. It issued
a final judgment on December 2, 2016, quieting title to Zinvest.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

q8 This Court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of summary
judgment de novo. RN & DB, LLC v. Stewart, 2015 MT 327, q 13,
3881 Mont. 429, 362 P.3d 61. Like the district court, we apply the
criteria of M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) to determine whether there is a
“genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether “the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see also
RN & DB, LLC, 4) 13. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we
review for correctness the district court’s conclusion that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. RN & DB, LLC, 113.
{9 Wereview de novoa district court’s interpretation and application
of a statute. Dick Irwin Inc. v. State, 2013 MT 272, 9] 18, 372 Mont. 58,
310 P.3d 524.

DISCUSSION
{10 Whether the defective property tax assessment voided the tax lien
sale.
11 It is undisputed that Gunnersfield properly recorded its deed to
Lot 6A and that the Department received the Realty Transfer
Certificate, which showed correctly the conveyance of Lot 6A from
Prospero to Gunnersfield. It is also undisputed that the Department
continued to assess Lot 6A to Prospero, rather than to Gunnersfield;
that Gunnersfield did not receive any notices of taxes due on Lot 6A;
and that Gunnersfield paid all taxes due on the notices it did receive
for Units 1 through 5. Gunnersfield argues that, under these facts, the
Department’s tax assessments on Lot 6A were invalid.
412 Among its arguments before the District Court, Gunnersfield
contended that errors in the tax assessment of the property invalidated
the assessment and therefore rendered void the tax deed to Zinvest.
The District. Court disagreed and held that, even though the wrong
party was assessed, the tax assessment was valid under § 15-8-201(4),
MCA. The District Court reasoned further that the language in the
misnomer statute protecting tax lien sales, § 15-17-325, MCA,
supported this understanding. It quoted two cases from this Court in
support—Cobban v. Hinds, 23 Mont. 338, 349, 59 P. 1, 2 (1899), and
Meyer v. Chessman, 1382 Mont. 187, 192, 315 P.2d 512, 514 (1957).
13 On appeal, Zinvest argues that the District Court decided the case
correctly and that the tax assessments were procedurally proper. In

support, it argues that the language of §§ 15-8-201(4) and 15-17-325,
MCA, as well as some of our prior case law, indicates that taxation is
an in rem proceeding, not an in personam proceeding. Zinvest thus
contends that a valid assessment does not require that the actual
owner of the property be assessed, as long as some individual person
or entity is assessed for the parcel of property at issue. Finally, Zinvest
argues that it is the responsibility of taxpayers to exercise diligence
and ensure their property taxes are paid.

14 Title 15 of the Montana Code Annotated encompasses the statutes
governing taxation in the state of Montana. It prescribes a detailed
process both for the assessment and taxation of property and for the
sale of property for unpaid taxes. The process involves multiple steps
and multiple levels of government. The Department of Revenue is
tasked with valuing all of the taxable property in the state and with
maintaining the database of ownership and property value
information. See §§ 15-7-101, -304, 15-8-101, -201, MCA. Based on
information from the Department, each taxing jurisdiction calculates
its own mill levy and submits it to the Department. See §§ 15-10-201,
-202, MCA. The Department computes the taxes, fees, and assessments
to be levied and provides this information to each county’s clerk and
recorder and treasurer. Section 15-10-305, MCA. The county treasurer
in turn produces and mails the property tax bills, collects the property
taxes, and distributes the monies to the taxing jurisdictions. Sections
15-16-101, -104, MCA. Failure to pay taxes can result in the county
treasurer taking actions under Title 15, chapter 17, MCA, to sell a tax
lien on the delinquent property, and, if the taxes remain unpaid, to
issue a tax deed under Title 15, chapter 18, MCA, which creates anew
title extinguishing the interests of the original owner. Collier v.
Kincheloe, 2008 MT 100, {| 15, 342 Mont. 314, 180 P.3d 1157.

115 Property taxes are one of the primary and most stable means
available to support local government budgets. 5-39 Richard R. Powell,
Powell on Real Property, § 39.02[1], 39-7 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
2017). Failure to pay taxes is a serious breach of an individual's social
obligations, and tax liens are a powerful tool to ensure payment.
Powell, supra, § 39.04, 39-37. But the tax lien statutes mandate many
procedures that must be strictly followed when a county takes action
to sell a tax lien or issue a tax deed “because a property owner's
fundamental interests are at stake in tax deed proceedings.” Isern v.
Summerfield, 1998 MT 45, {| 10, 287 Mont. 461, 956 P.2d 28. In fact,
“(t]he purpose behind the tax lien sales statutes is to protect property
owners and their rights to due process.” Zinvest, LLC v. Hudgins,
2014 MT 201, {| 20, 376 Mont. 72, 330 P.3d 1135.

116 The interests of the property owner also find protection in the tax
assessment statutes requiring that property taxes be assessed in the
owner’s name. See 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation § 630
(2017). Among the protections that the tax assessment statutes provide
is to alert property owners to tax assessments levied against them and
their property. Such notice gives property owners the opportunity to
dispute the government's valuation of their land, see § 15-7-102(3), (6),
MCA; see also RN & DB, LLC, { 36, and helps to prevent any
unwarranted property forfeitures through a tax lien sale. The latter
purpose is evidenced in the fact that a valid assessment is a
foundational requirement for a county treasurer to have jurisdiction to
sell a tax lien for delinquent taxes. See Martin v. Glacier Cnty.,
102 Mont. 213, 219, 56 P.2d 742, 744 (1936); see also Powell, supra,
§ 39.04[4], 39-48 (“All steps required of the public authority for a
properly levied tax assessment to arise are jurisdictional prerequisites
for a valid tax sale.”).

17 Although the entire process described above is often referred to as
“taxation,” there are distinct stages. “Assessment [is] the process by
which persons subject to taxation [are] listed, their property described,
and its value ascertained and stated. Taxation consist[s] in
determining the rate of the levy and imposing it.” Vail v. Custer Cnty.,
132 Mont. 205, 214, 315 P.2d 993, 998 (1957) (quoting Hilger v. Moore,
56 Mont. 146, 165, 182 P. 477, 480 (1919)) (emphasis omitted). Under
current law, assessment is entirely the responsibility of the
Department. Collection and enforcement are the responsibility of
county treasurers. Gunnersfield argues that the errors of the
Department make the tax assessment invalid.!

418 The Department must assess property taxes to “the person by
whom it was owned or claimed or in whose possession or control it was
at midnight of the preceding January 1.” Section 15-8-201(2)(a), MCA.
Even if the owner is absent or unknown, “the department shall make
an estimate of the value of the property.” Section 15-8-501(1), MCA.
But the statute elaborates that “[i]f the name of the absent owner is
known to the department, the property must be assessed in the owner’s
name.” Section 15-8-501(2), MCA. Further, when property is sold and
ownership changes, the Department is statutorily obligated upon
receipt of a Realty Transfer Certificate to update ownership records
used for the assessment and taxation of real property.

' Gunnersfield also challenges other steps in the process, but we find it
unnecessary to entertain these arguments.

Section 15-7-304, MCA.

4419 The language of these provisions indicates that the Legislature
intended to make these protections mandatory: “the department shall
assess property to ... the person by whom it was owned,” “the property
must be assessed in the owner’s name,” and “[t]he department is not
required to change any ownership records ... unless the department has
received a transfer certificate.” Sections 15-8-201(2), -501, 15-7-304(2),
MCA (emphasis added). Indeed, in prior cases interpreting almost. the
exact same language in predecessor statutes of §§ 15-8-201(2) and -501,
MCA, this Court determined that the language is mandatory in
relation to both personal property and real property. See Birney v.
Warren, 28 Mont. 64, 67-68, 72 P. 293, 294 (1903) (“[TJhe provisions ...
are mandatory, and... require the assessor to assess personal property
in the name of the real owner.”); Vail, 1832 Mont. at 214, 315 P.2d at
998 (quoting 3 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation
§ 1096, 2216-17 (4th ed. 1924)) (“‘An assessment should ordinarily be
made to the owner of record, and statutes so provide in many states ...
Such statutes are mandatory so that an assessment to one not the
owner makes the assessment void.’ ”).

20 Since those cases were decided our tax laws have been amended.
The Department was created in 1973, removing the responsibility for
tax assessments from county officers. Along with updating §§ 15-8-
201(2) and -501, MCA, to apply to the Department rather than to
county assessors, the Legislature added other responsibilities to the
Department, including § 15-7-304(2), MCA, which requires the
Department to update its ownership records upon receipt of a Realty
Transfer Certificate. 1975 Mont. Laws ch. 528, § 4, as amended 1993
Mont. Laws (Nov. 1993 Sp. Sess.) ch. 27, § 44. These changes
emphasize the importance the Legislature placed on the Department
assessing taxes to the owner of the property.

21 Zinvest relies, as did the District Court, on §§ 15-17-325 and 15-8-
201(4), MCA, to overcome the mandatory language of these statutes.
Section 15-17-325, MCA, provides: “When a tax lien sale certificate is
acquired, as provided [by the tax lien statutes] and the taxes were
properly assessed on the property of a particular person, no misnomer
of ownership or other mistake relating to ownership affects the sale or
renders it void or voidable.” In plain language, this statute makes clear
that it offers no curative effects unless the “taxes were properly
assessed.” Section 15-17-325, MCA. The statute cannot save an
otherwise invalid tax assessment. Only the curative provision in the
assessment statute, § 15-8-201(4), MCA, could do so.

22 Zinvest argues that the District Court properly relied on Cobban,

23 Mont. at 348-49, 59 P. at 2, in applying § 15-17-325, MCA. Cobban
upheld a tax assessment on the basis of the language in the
predecessor statutes of §§ 15-8-201(4), -308, and 15-17-325, MCA. The
predecessor to § 15-17-325, MCA, originally was passed in 1891. The
language of the statute remained largely unchanged until 1987 when
the modern tax lien statutes were enacted. 1987 Mont. Laws ch. 587,
§ 13. The original language in force at the time of Cobban stated:
“When land is sold for taxes correctly imposed as the property of a
particular person, no misnomer of the owner, or supposed owner, or
other mistake relating to the ownership thereof affects the sale or
renders it void or voidable.” See 1891 Mont. Laws 118. The modern
statute differs in two important ways. First, the Legislature removed
the language “When land is sold for taxes” and replaced it with “When
a tax lien sale certificate is acquired.” This change means the modern
statute now applies to both real and personal property sold at a tax
sale. This highlights the important distinction we draw between § 15-
17-325, MCA—which now applies to both real and personal
property—and § 15-8-201(4), MCA—which applies to real property
only. Second, the Legislature broke down the qualifier that taxes be
“correctly imposed” into two separate predicates: (1) the county must
have followed the statutory tax lien procedures; and (2) the
Department must have “properly assessed” the taxes. The Legislature’s
change in language indicates that the modern statute, § 15-17-325,
MCA, does not apply unless the tax assessment was proper.

23 We next turn to the other misnomer statute, § 15-8-201(4), MCA.
That provision states that “[a] mistake in the name of the owner or
supposed owner of real property does not invalidate the assessment.”
The provision is specific to a mistake in the name of the owner rather
than to a mistake in the identity of the owner. The statute says
nothing about assessing the property to the wrong person or entity
entirely.

24 The Dissent puts much weight on the inclusion of “supposed
owner” in § 15-8-201(4), MCA, in arguing that the statute excuses an
assessment made to the wrong person. It cannot bear this weight.
“Supposed” carries connotations of belief that something is probable or
certain. The first definition of “supposed” in Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary is “believed to be or accepted as such.” See
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2298 (Philip Babcock
Gove ed., 1971). The modern statutes provide a process to inform the
Department of ownership changes. Gunnersfield followed this process.
The Department did not “believe” Prospero was the owner, it simply
had failed to update its records. There is no basis for a “supposed

owner” when the process outlined in § 15-7-304, MCA, is followed and
the Department is informed of the actual owner. A “supposed owner”
may exist if, for example, ownership changes and the new owner fails
to record his or her interest. in the property and to file a Realty
Transfer Certificate with the Department. But these are not the facts
of this case.

125 [Hf Our role in interpreting statutes “is simply to ascertain and
declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to
insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted.”
Section 1-2-101, MCA. Section 15-8-201(4), MCA, does not include a
mistake in ownership and we decline to insert it. Because the
provisions requiring the owner to be named are mandatory, and
§ 15-8-201(4), MCA, provides no cure for a defect in the identity of the
owner, a tax assessment to a person or entity other than the owner,
where the owner is known to the Department through properly
recorded transfer records, is not a valid assessment.

26 Comparing the language of §§ 15-8-201(4) and 15-17-325, MCA,
further supports this conclusion. Section 15-17-3825, MCA, states “no
misnomer of ownership or other mistake relating to ownership affects
the sale or renders it void or voidable.” This language differs from the
“mistake in the name” language of § 15-8-201(4), MCA. Unlike the
phrasing in § 15-17-325, MCA, the phrasing in § 15-8-201(4), MCA,
does not include language about mistakes relating to ownership. The
language that appears in these modern provisions was first adopted
into Montana law in the same act of legislation in 1891. See 1891 Mont.
Laws 73, 78, 118. Because the enacting Legislature did not use
identical language in the two provisions, it is proper for us to assume
that a different statutory meaning was intended and that “mistake in
the name” therefore does not include “misnomer of ownership or other
mistake relating to ownership.” See Gregg v. Whitefish City Council,
2004 MT 262, {] 38, 323 Mont. 109, 99 P.3d 151 (“Different language is
to be given different construction.”); In re Kesl’s Estate, 117 Mont. 377,
386, 161 P.2d 641, 646 (1945) (citations and internal quotations
omitted) (“It is a settled rule of statutory construction that, where
different language is used in the same connection in different parts of
a statute, it is presumed the legislature intended a different meaning
and effect.”).

27 The Dissent relies on Birney v. Warren to demonstrate that the
statutes treat a mistake relating to the ownership of personal property
differently from a mistake relating to the ownership of real
property—that is, that such a mistake during the tax assessment voids
a personal property tax sale, but not. a real property tax sale. Dissent,

a «

{| 49. Birney voided a tax sale of personal property because the
property was assessed to the wrong entity. Birney, 28 Mont. at 67, 72
P. at 294. The Birney Court’s holding rested on two grounds: (1) the
language of the predecessor statutes to §§ 15-8-201(2) and -501, MCA,
which applies to both real and personal property, was “imperative” and
thus mandatory; and (2) the predecessor statute to § 15-17-8325, MCA,
which excused mistakes relating to ownership, did not apply to
personal property. Birney, 28 Mont. at 67-68, 72 P. at 294. Tellingly,
the Birney court did not rely on the predecessor to § 15-8-201(4), MCA,
to distinguish a mistake relating to ownership of real property, but
relied only on the predecessor to § 15-17-325, MCA. Further, as
discussed above, after the 1987 amendments to § 15-17-325, MCA, that.
statute now applies both to real property and to personal property sold
at. a tax sale and requires “properly assessed” taxes. Section 15-17-3825,
MCA, is no longer a basis for a distinction between a mistake in the
ownership of real property as opposed to a mistake in the ownership of
personal property. And as we discussed above, § 15-8-201(4), MCA,
does not cure a failure to name the record owner at all.

28 Zinvest next argues that the tax assessment process and the
subsequent tax lien sale are in rem proceedings that require only that
an individual or entity be assessed, not that the actual owner be
assessed. Zinvest cites three cases in support: Meyer, 132 Mont. at 192,
815 P.2d at 514; Sutter v. Scudder, 110 Mont. 390, 394, 103 P.2d 303,
805 (1940); and Cobban, 23 Mont. at 349, 59 P. at 2.

29 Zinvest’s argument that proceedings are in rem, rather than in
personam, conflates the tax assessment with tax enforcement.
Assessment is the responsibility of the Department. Responsibility for
enforcement lies with the counties. The error in the present case
occurred in the tax assessment itself. None of our prior cases have held
that the assessment itself is in rem. Vail, 182 Mont. at 213, 315 P.2d
at 998 (“The tax sale is the proceeding in rem.”); Meyer, 182 Mont. at
192, 315 P.2d at 514 (“[T]he tax sale is a proceeding in rem against the
property itself.”); Sutter, 110 Mont. at 394, 103 P.2d at. 305 (“We hold
that proceedings for the enforcement of a tax obligation when
proceedings are against the property ... are in rem.”).

30 Further, Zinvest’s argument. that the proceedings are in rem,
rather than in personam, is a distinction without a difference in this
case. Characterization of the assessment as in rem or in personam does
not change the statutory requirements that property be assessed to the
owner. See §§ 15-8-201(2), -501, 15-7-304(2), MCA. Developments in in
rem jurisprudence over the last forty years also support this position.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected the traditional

justifications for distinguishing between in rem and in personam
proceedings. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212, 97S. Ct. 2569, 2584
(1977) (requiring assertions of in rem jurisdiction to meet the same
requirements as assertions of in personam jurisdiction); Mennonite
Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 796 n.3, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2710
n.3 (1983) (holding that a mortgagee with a legally protected property
interest is entitled by due process to notice of a tax sale and quoting
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 206, 97 S. Ct. at 2580, “An adverse judgment in
rem directly affects the property owner by divesting him of his rights
in the property before the court.”). Our approach to interpreting the
requirements of §§ 15-8-201(2), -501, and 15-7-304(2), MCA, does not
hinge on whether the proceeding is in rem or in personam. Even if we
were to hold that the tax assessment is an in rem proceeding, this
would not change our interpretation of the statutory requirements that
property must be assessed in the name of a known owner.

131 A closer look at the case law Zinvest cites convinces us that this
conclusion is correct. First, Meyer and Sutter are distinguishable. In
Meyer, the parties challenged the lack of notice before the county
issued the tax deed. Meyer, 132 Mont. at 191, 315 P.2d at 514. The case
did not raise or address any alleged errors during the tax assessment.
In Sutter, tax assessment notices were sent to the record owner of the
property, who had passed away. Sutter, 110 Mont. at 392, 103 P.2d
at 304. His heirs had neither gone through probate in Montana nor
taken any steps to record their interest in the property. Sutter,
110 Mont. at 392, 103 P.2d at 304. The heirs challenged the tax sale
because they, as the current owners, had not received actual notice of
the tax assessments. Sutter, 110 Mont. at 398, 103 P.2d at 305. We
upheld the tax assessment as proper, however, because the record
owner, i.e., the “supposed owner”, was assessed and tax notices were
sent to the last known address. Sutter, 110 Mont. at 395, 103 P.2d
at 306. We held that the heirs should have taken steps to properly
record their interest and also that it was “incumbent upon a property
owner to take notice of the known fact that all property is taxed
annually, and unless the taxes are paid that the property will be sold
at tax sale.” Sutter, 110 Mont. at 395, 103 P.2d at 305.

132 Sutter counsels a different result under the facts of the present
case. Gunnersfield properly recorded its interest anda Realty Transfer
Certificate was sent to the Department to notify it to update its
records. But the Department failed to assess the owner of record,
Gunnersfield. Further, Gunnersfield paid the annual taxes on the
portion of the property for which it was assessed and therefore did not
have notice that it was not paying any annual taxes that were due.

a

133 The final case on which both Zinvest and the District Court relied
is Cobban v. Hinds. The language in Cobban suggests that the correct
listing of the owner is a mere formality and listing the lands to the
wrong person during the tax assessment was not grounds for voiding
a tax sale. Cobban, 23 Mont. at 349, 59 P. at 2. Cobban is not
controlling for several reasons. First, as we discussed above, Cobban
rested its holding on three statutes, including the predecessor to § 15-
17-3825, MCA. The current language of § 15-17-325, MCA, undermines
Cobban’s holding relying on that statute. Further, the tax assessment
statutes also have been amended and now include § 15-7-304, MCA,
which obligates the Department to update ownership records when it
is notified of real property transfers. More, the plain language of the
assessment statutes imposes a requirement on the Department to
assess land in the name of the owner.

34 Second, our subsequent case law also has undermined the
decision. In Musselshell County v. Morris Development Company , 92
Mont. 201, 203, 11 P.2d 774, 775 (1932), Roundup Coal Mining
Company quitclaimed only the surface rights to Morris Development
Company and “reserveld] to itself all coal and other minerals
underlying the surface.” Musselshell County, 92 Mont. at 203, 11 P.2d
at 775. Thus, Roundup Coal Mining Company retained a fee simple
interest in the minerals in the ground.” The county assessed Morris
Development for the mining claim but this Court held that Roundup
Coal Mining was the proper party to tax. Musselshell Cnty., 92 Mont.
at 209-10, 11 P.2d at 777. This Court explained that “separate estates
or interests should be separately assessed to the respective owners”
and declined to decide whether the assessment against Morris
Development would be valid for all purposes against Roundup Coal
Mining. Musselshell Cnty., 92 Mont. at 210, 11 P.2d at 777. Despite
citing Cobban and Cullen v. Western Mortgage & Warranty Title

? The Dissent challenges the applicability of Musselshell County because not all
mining interests are taxed as real property. Dissent, | 46. As we explained in Rist v
Toole County, 117 Mont. 426, 434, 159 P.2d 340, 343 (1945), “the concept of royalty is
very different from that of the fee-simple title to minerals in place in the ground.” This
Court clarified in Ris? that royalty interests are taxed as personal property, but fee-
simple title to minerals in the ground is taxed as real property. Rist, 117 Mont. at 442,
159 P.2d at 347. In Musselshell County, Roundup Coal Mining Company retained a fee
simple interest in the minerals underlying the surface and thus the tax assessment at
issue in that case was for real property taxes, not for personal property taxes as the
Dissent states.

Company, 47 Mont. 518, 134 P. 302 (1913)? the Musselshell County
Court ordered that steps be taken to change the assessment to the
Roundup Coal Mining Company, “[t]o obviate any question regarding
the validity of the assessment,” suggesting that even after Cobban the
effect of mistaken identity of the owner on the validity of a tax
assessment remained an open question. Musselshell Cnty., 92 Mont. at
211, 11 P.2d at 778.

435 Further, Cobban directly conflicts with the later decided case of
Vail.‘ Both cases dealt with the propriety of the assessment of several
parcels of land together without any separation of the assessment
between landowners who owned individual parcels. Vail, 132 Mont.
at 208, 315 P.2d at 995; Cobban, 23 Mont. at 348, 59 P. at 2. But the
two cases arrived at opposite conclusions. The Cobban Court upheld
the tax sale, ruling that the single assessment of multiple properties
with various owners was proper. Cobban, 23 Mont. at 348, 59 P. at 2.
In Vail, however, this Court reaffirmed that taxes are levied upon
persons—not upon property—and invalidated the tax lien on the
property. Vail, 132 Mont. at 213, 315 P.2d at 998. We held that an
assessment made en bloc to an entire development, rather than to the
individual landowners within the development, was void. Vail,
132 Mont. at 213, 315 P.2d at 998. To the extent that Cobban conflicts
with Vail, it implicitly was overruled. We decline to rely on any
language in Cobban taken out of context, especially when our decision
in Vail and amendments to the statutes already have undermined the
foundation of Cobban and bring its continued validity into question.
436 Finally, Zinvest argues that voiding the tax lien sale “would
effectively absolve the property owner from any level of diligence in the
assessment process.” Zinvest is correct that “it is incumbent upon a
property owner to take notice of the known fact that all property is
taxed annually, and unless the taxes are paid that the property will be
sold at tax sale.” Sutter, 110 Mont. at 395, 103 P.2d at 306. But “[mlore

° Upon review of our case law, we find few cases that have actually relied on
Cobban to uphold challenged assessments. To the extent that Cullen relies on Cobban
and the predecessor to § 15-17-325, MCA, its continued validity on this point also is
called into question by our decision today.

* The Dissent correctly points out that Vail involved special assessments rather
than property taxes. Dissent, ] 46. However, in Vail, this Court analyzed the special
assessments in the same manner as property taxes and even relied on the predecessor
to $ 15-8-201, MCA, the general tax assessment statute, in its analysis. Vail, 132 Mont.
at 214, 315 P.2d at 998. We disagree that Vail is distinguishable in a meaningful way.

importantly, a party’s ability to take steps to safeguard its interests
does not relieve the State of its constitutional [due process] obligation.”
Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 799, 103 S. Ct. at 2712. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that Gunnersfield had reason to
know that the Department was not assessing the taxes for Lot 6A to
Gunnersfield. During the time in question, the County taxed Units 1
through 5 together. It was reasonable for Gunnersfield to believe—and
the record lacks any evidence that Gunnersfield believed
otherwise—that its tax bill included Lot 6A, which was purchased in
the same transaction and was conveyed to Gunnersfield in the same
deed. In fact, when it received the notice from Zinvest that a tax deed
may issue, Gunnersfield did inquire with the County. This inquiry only
buttressed Gunnersfield’s belief that the notice did not pertain to its
properties, because it had paid all tax notices it had received and was
unaware of any delinquent taxes on its properties.

137 Tl We conclude that the tax assessment on Lot 6A was invalid.
Because the tax assessment was void, the subsequent tax lien sale and
issuance of a tax deed also must be voided. We require strict
compliance with “every essential and material step required by the tax
deed statute.” Moran v. Robbin, 261 Mont. 478, 482-83, 863 P.2d 395,
398 (1993). In order for a county treasurer to have the jurisdiction to
sell real property for delinquent taxes, “there must be (1) a valid
assessment; (2) a valid levy; and (3) nonpayment of the tax so duly
levied and assessed.” Martin, 102 Mont. at 219, 56 P.2d at 744. The
County lacked jurisdiction to hold the tax lien sale on the property
because there was no valid assessment. The subsequent tax deed
issued to Zinvest is void and its quiet title action must fail.

138 This does not mean that Gunnersfield is relieved from its tax
obligations for Lot 6A. Under § 15-8-601, MCA, the Department may
assess property for prior erroneous assessments within ten years of the
calendar year in which the original assessment was or should have
been made, “provided that the property is under the ownership or
control of the same person who owned or controlled it at the time it ...
was erroneously assessed.” The taxes for Lot 6A were erroneously
assessed starting in 2009, and the ten-year limitation has not yet run.

CONCLUSION
139 We reverse the District Court’s December 15, 2015 and October
22, 2016 orders denying summary judgment to Gunnersfield, as well
as the judgment quieting title in Zinvest. We remand for entry of
judgment quieting title in Gunnersfield.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT, SHEA,

SANDEFUR and RICE concur.
JUSTICE McKINNON, dissenting.

40 First and foremost, it is undisputed that Gunnersfield received
actual notice of the tax sale proceedings when it was identified as a
potentially interested party in the title report required by § 15-18-
212(4), MCA. Zinvest filed and mailed a notice to Gunnersfield that a
tax deed may be issued, dated June 17, 2013. Zinvest secured a tax
deed, filed a quiet title action, and received a Disclaimer of Interest in
Lot 6A from Gunnersfield. It was not until Zinvest listed the property
for sale, eight months later, that Gunnersfield realized its mistake.
This Court’s decision, therefore, overturns a tax deed sale in which the
taxpayer admits to receiving notice of a tax lien, but then failed to
investigate; failed to act; and, ultimately, failed to timely discharge the
tax lien. “The law helps the vigilant before those who sleep on their
rights,” § 1-3-218, MCA, and Montana’s statutory taxation scheme is
premised upon notice, process, and the near universal recognition that
every property is liable to a tax. While “[t]he purpose behind the tax
lien sales statutes is to protect property owners and their rights to due
process,” Zinvest, LLC, {| 20, the process is abused when the statutes
are strictly complied with but an exception is nonetheless made to
enforcement. Zinvest and the County Treasurer complied with all
statutory requirements for Zinvest’s purchase of Lot 6A by tax sale.
Thus, where there has been strict adherence to the statutory scheme,
as here, any concerns of due process and notice to the taxpayer
regarding the necessity for discharging an admittedly owing lien are
unwarranted. Taxation and the sale of property for unpaid taxes could
never be effectively administered if we were to assess the merits of
each property owner’s individual inquiries regarding whether he or she
owed taxes. “All proceedings in the nature of assessing property for
purposes of taxation and in levying and collecting taxes thereon are in
invitum and must be stricti juris.” Perham v. Putnam, 82 Mont. 349,
358, 267 P. 305, 309 (1928). Tax sales must be conducted in compliance
with the taxation statutes or they are void. Conversely, “no
presumption can be raised to supply defects in the proceedings for the
sale[]” if there was strict statutory compliance. Perham, 82 Mont. at
358, 267 P. at 309.

441 I am also concerned with the Court’s analysis regarding
identification of the owner for purposes of assessment. The Court
misconstrues § 15-8-201(4), MCA, by omitting any consideration of
“supposed owner” and compounds the error by concluding that the
property was not “properly assessed” for purposes of § 15-17-325, MCA,
a statute generally providing that a sale is not to be voided by a

misnomer of ownership. The Court’s analysis is flawed through its
failure to grasp a long-recognized statutory distinction, and one
similarly recognized in our case law, between assessments of taxes on
real property and assessments of taxes on personal property. Failure
to appreciate this distinction leads to our unprecedented action of
“implicitly” overruling, and in some instances expressly overruling,
nearly a century of jurisprudence relying on and correctly interpreting
this distinction. Opinion, {/] 33-35, 34 n.3. In my opinion, this Court’s
decision to jettison over a century of precedent is both hasty and ill-
advised.
42 Montana has long recognized a distinction between the
assessment of property and taxation of property. In Hilger, 56 Mont. at
165-66, 182 P. at 480, we said:
When our Constitution was prepared and ratified, the term
“assessment” and the term “taxation” each had a definite, well-
understood meaning. Assessment was the process by which
persons subject to taxation were listed, their property described,
and its value ascertained and stated. Taxation consisted in
determining the rate of the levy and imposing it.... This has been
the history of our revenue legislation from the time Montana was
organized as a territory, and the framers of our Constitution
understood these words and used them accordingly.
Although the Court acknowledges this distinction by stating that
“assessment is entirely the responsibility of the Department” and
“{clollection and enforcement are the responsibility of County
Treasurers,” Opinion, {| 17, the Court ultimately fails to appreciate the
significance of the distinction when it invalidates a tax sale (taxation)
based upon its conclusion that the Department erred by incorrectly
identifying the owner of real property (assessment). The Court first
errs in concluding that the real property was not properly assessed
pursuant to § 15-8-201(4), MCA. The Court next errs by assigning the
purported error of the assessment to the County Treasurer’s tax sale.
43 To begin, the Department, pursuant to § 15-8-201(2)(a), MCA, is
required to assess property to “the person by whom it was owned or
claimed ....” However, with respect to real property, “[a] mistake in the
name of the owner or supposed owner of real property does not
invalidate the assessment.” Section 15-8-201(4), MCA (emphasis
supplied). Section 15-8-201(4), MCA, is the first misnomer statute
applicable to these proceedings and addresses identification of the
owner for the purpose of assessment. The Court’s first mistake is that
it interprets § 15-8-201(4), MCA, as being “specific [only] to a mistake
in the name of the owner rather than to a mistake in the identity of the

owner,” and concludes that “[t]he statute says nothing about assessing
the property to the wrong person or entity entirely.” Opinion, {] 23. To
the contrary, while such an interpretation perhaps is consistent with
assessments for personal property, the statute specifically provides for
other considerations when identifying the owner for purposes of
assessing real property. The Court simply does not address the
remaining language of § 15-8-201(4), MCA, “supposed owner,” which
is likely that subsection’s most significant distinction from § 15-8-
201(2)(a), MCA, and the other misnomer statute under consideration,
§ 15-17-325, MCA. Significantly, the distinction amounts to this: a
mistake in the “supposed owner” of the real property will not invalidate
the assessment on real property, while the same is not true for
personal property. Clearly, “supposed” means that the property was
assessed in one other than the owner. The “supposed” owner is
“(plresumed to be [the] true or real [owner] without conclusive
evidence”; the “intended” owner; or the “firmly believed” or “expected”
owner. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
1751 (Joseph P. Pickett ed., 5th ed. 2011). See also Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary, supra, at 2298, defining “supposed” as
“believed to be or accepted as such”; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 1184 (Frederick C. Mish ed., 10th ed. 1997), defining
“supposed” as “held as an opinion,” “mistakenly believed,” or
“considered probable or certain.” A “supposed owner,” therefore, based
on these common usage definitions, would include a person other than
the actual owner.

44 In Cobban, as the District Court recognized, an action by the
treasurer to sell real estate for taxes due was not invalidated because
the assessment was in the name of one other than the owner. Cobban,
23 Mont. at 350, 59 P. at 3. Moreover, our decision in Cullen was
informed by Cobban when we rejected the argument that an
assessment was void because it failed to name all the owners of the
property. We determined the question “settled” by statute and “twice
announced by this [Clourt” that “when land is sold as the property of
a particular person for taxes which have been correctly imposed upon
the land, no misnomer or other mistake relating to ownership thereof
affects the sale or renders it void, or voidable [citing Cobban and
Birney], such mistake being in the nature of an irregularity or
informality only.” Cullen, 47 Mont. at 524-25, 134 P. at 305. Although
we recite § 1-2-101, MCA, and our role in interpreting statutes,
Opinion, {| 25, we fail to address the most relevant and significant
distinction between § 15-8-201(2)(a) and -201(4), MCA; that is, we
ignore, by failing to give it any effect, the plain language of the statute

which provides that a mistake in the name of the “supposed owner” of
real property will not invalidate the assessment. Here, the “supposed
owner,” Prospero, was a mistake and, as the mistake relates to real
property, it will not serve to invalidate the assessment. Had the
assessment related to personal property, the same would not have been
true.

45 The second misnomer statute at issue here is § 15-17-325, MCA.
In contrast to the real property distinction of § 15-8-201(4), MCA, § 15-
17-3825, MCA, applies to the sale of all property, both personal and real
property. Section 15-17-325, MCA, provides that once taxes are
“properly assessed on the property of a particular person, no misnomer
of ownership or other mistake relating to ownership affects the tax lien
or renders it void or voidable.” Thus, if the assessment is for property
other than real property, it must be assessed to the person by whom it
is owned, § 15-8-201(2)(a), MCA. See Birney, 28 Mont. at 68, 72 P. at
294; Vail, 1382 Mont. at 214, 315 P.2d at 998. Therefore, misnomers of
ownership or other mistakes relating to ownership as set forth in
§ 15-17-325, MCA, do not raise concerns of due process or notice as the
underlying requirement for the property to be assessed to the person
by whom it is owned, § 15-8-201(2)(a), MCA, has been satisfied.
Conversely, if personal property is not assessed to the owner, then the
property has not been “properly assessed” and the provisions of the
misnomer statute contained in § 15-17-325, MCA, are not implicated.
Importantly, and of critical significance to these proceedings, § 15-8-
201(4), MCA, also works in conjunction with § 15-17-325, MCA,
applying the misnomer provision that a mistake in the name of a
supposed of real property does not render the property “[im]properly
assessed.” The Court’s attempt to find authority for its conclusions by
referring to the “modern statutes” is unpersuasive, Opinion, {I 22, 24.
The statutes, applied together consistently, have always required
personal property to be assessed in the name of the owner, but the
assessment of real property in the name of the supposed owner,
through operation of § 15-8-201(4), MCA, nonetheless remains valid.
This Court has, for over a century, recognized these statutory
distinctions.

46 In Vail the dispute was whether Vail held title in fee or clouded by

® Section 15-8-501, MCA, to which the Court refers, Opinion, | 18, is not relevant
to these proceedings as the owner was neither absent nor unknown. Again, the misnomer
provisions of § 15-8-201(4), MCA, pertaining to “supposed owner” directs that a mistake
in the name of the real property owner, as here, will not invalidate the assessment.

a lien of special assessments for water charges. Vail, 182 Mont. at 207,
815 P.2d at 994. Vail did not concern a tax on real property; Vail had
earlier acquired the property by tax deed and argued that the water
district. was late in collecting its special assessment fees. The Court
found that the special assessment must be made to the individual
owners and relied on the predecessor to § 15-8-201(2)(a), MCA, that to
be a valid assessment it “must assess such property to the persons by
whom it was owned.” Vail, 132 Mont. at 214, 315 P.2d at 998. The
Court explained that “the charges made by irrigation districts are
special assessments not taxes, although they are administered and
collected in the same general manner as taxes. It is elementary that
this requires assessment to individual owners by individual
ownership.” Vail, 132 Mont. at 214, 315 P.2d at 998 (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Musselshell County, relied on extensively by the Court,
the assessment related to a mining claim. We recognized that the
added taxable interest of the mining claim to the real estate “should be
separately assessed” from the real property. Musselshell County, 92
Mont. at 210, 11 P.2d at 777. Rather than deciding whether the
misnomer statute pertaining to real property also applied to the
separate personal property interest of the mining claim, the Court
simply modified the judgment to reflect an assessment against the
owner of the mining claim. Musselshell County, 92 Mont. at 210-11, 11
P.2d at 777-78. This was also consistent with our subsequent.
explanation in Rist that “the originator of the royalty is still the owner
of the real property to which it relates, and that the assignee’s interest
is only in the ‘produce or profit’ therefrom,—namely, in the personal
property which the owner is to receive for the granted privilege of
producing minerals from his land.” Rist, 117 Mont. at 432, 159 P.2d at
342-43 (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, Musselshell County does not
establish that, like personal property, real property must be assessed
in the name of the actual owner. The Court in Musselshell County
avoided the issue by simply modifying the judgment to reflect that the
assessment will run against the true owner of the mining claim, as
should an assessment for a personal property interest. This was
consistent with the requirement to assess personal property in the
name of the actual owner pursuant to § 15-8-201(2)(a), MCA, and does
not provide guidance regarding the relationship of the two misnomer
statutes at issue here.

47 Inthese proceedings, as in Cobban, both misnomer statutes, §§ 15-
8-201(4) and 15-17-325, MCA, must be applied consistently together,
without confusing the provisions of § 15-8-201(2)(a), MCA. Pursuant to
§ 15-8-201(4), MCA, which allows an assessment against a “supposed.

owner,” the proceedings are against the property itself and are, as the
District Court found, in rem. If the proceeding is pursuant to
§ 15-8-201(2)(a), MCA, it is against personal property, or in personam,
and must identify the owner of the property. Our jurisprudence has
expressly recognized such a distinction. In Cobban, we stated:
[I]t is plain that the listing of land in the name of a person other
than the owner is but an irregularity or informality which, of
itself, does not avoid the assessment nor render the tax illegal or
unauthorized. The name of the owner of the real property is, for
all purposes of taxation except perhaps the imposition of a
personal liability, comparatively unimportant.... The listing of
lands to the wrong person affords no ground for restraining the
collection, by sale of the property itself, of the taxes due thereon.
Cobban, 23 Mont. at 349, 59 P. at 2-3 (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, in Meyer we held that “[t]he reason for the statute and the
cases holding likewise is that the tax sale is a proceeding in rem
against the property itself and not in personam.” Meyer, 132 Mont. at
192, 315 P.2d at 514. Further, in Sutter we explained:

Under our statutes property must be assessed in the name of
the owner if known, but if unknown it must be assessed to
unknown owners. (Sec. 2009, supra.) A mistake in the name of the
owner or supposed owner does not affect the validity of the
assessment. (Sec. 2002, Rev. Codes; County of Musselshell v.
Morris Development Co., 92 Mont. 201, 11 P.2d 774.) This points
to the conclusion that in some respects at least the procedure for
taxation of real property and enforcing collection of taxes isin rem
and not in personam, and this court has so indicated in State ex
rel. Freebourn v. Yellowstone County, 108 Mont. 21, 88 P.2d 6, as
well as in Averill Machinery Co. v. Freebury Bros., 59 Mont. 594,
198 P. 130. Defendants assert that the Averill Case recognizes the
proceedings as in rem only when the property is actually assessed
to an unknown owner. We do not so interpret that case. They also
rely upon the cases of Hilger v. Moore, 56 Mont. 146, 182 P. 477,
State ex rel. Tillman v. District Court, 101 Mont. 176, 53 P.2d 107,
103 A.L.R. 376, Ford Motor Co. v. Linnane, 102 Mont. 325,57 P.2d
803, and Christofferson v. Chouteau County, 105 Mont. 577, 74
P.2d 427, as sustaining the view that tax proceedings in Montana
are in personam. The opinions in those cases use language
pointing to that conclusion. Those cases state that “taxes are
levied against the person, not the property”; they do not treat of
the precise question here under consideration. While taxes may be
levied against the person, there is no continuing personal

obligation on the part of the owner, but the obligation is
terminated when the tax lien is foreclosed. (Calkins v. Smith, 106
Mont. 453, 78 P.2d 74.)

We hold that proceedings for the enforcement of a tax
obligation when proceedings are against the property, as here,
rather than by suit under section 2253, Revised Codes, are in rem.
If that were not so, it is doubtful whether taxes could ever be
collected against a non-resident owner of property in this state.
Proceedings to effect collection of taxes on real property by
foreclosure of the tax lien are in rem and not in personam.

Sutter, 110 Mont. at 393-94, 103 P.2d at 305.

48 The two misnomer statutes under scrutiny here have existed in
our law since 1887. Section 46, an act to provide for the levy of taxes
and assessment of property, provided: “When any lands or town lots
are offered for sale for any taxes, it shall not be necessary to sell the
same as the property of any person or persons; and no sale of any land
or town lot for taxes shall be invalid on account of its having been
charged on the assessment roll in any other name than that of the
rightful owner or charged as unknown ....” In 1891, and thereafter in
1895, similar statutes were enacted making it “plain that the listing of
land in the name of a person other than the owner is but an
irregularity or informality which, of itself, does not avoid the
assessment nor render the tax illegal or unauthorized.” Cobban, 23
Mont. at 349, 59 P. at 2. This Court recognized, as early as 1899, “[t]he
name of the owner of the real property is, for all purposes of taxation
except perhaps the imposition of a personal liability, comparatively
unimportant.” Cobban, 23 Mont. at 349, 59 P. at 2. We drew from the
authority of numerous other states in support of such an
interpretation: Landregan v. Peppin, 24 P. 859 (Cal. 1890); Haight v.
Mayor of N.Y., 1 N.E. 883 (N.Y. 1885); Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark. 331
(Ark. 1854); Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 346 (Ill. 1880); State v.
Matthews, 40 N.J.L. 268 (N.J. 1878); Bradley v. Bouchard, 48 N.W. 208
(Mich. 1891); Hill v. Graham, 40 N.W. 779 (Mich. 1888); Stilz v. City
of Indianapolis, 81 Ind. 582 (Ind. 1882); Schrodt v. Deputy, 88 Ind. 90
(Ind. 1882); and Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 Watts & Serg. 166 (Pa. 1841).
Accordingly, it was quite clear that “the listing of lands to the wrong
person affords no ground for restraining the collection, by sale of the
property itself, of the taxes due thereon....” Cobban, 23 Mont. at 349,
59 P. at 3. We explained that the tax statutes “prohibit courts and
judges from enjoining the collection of any tax, and from restraining
the sale of the property for nonpayment of any tax, except in those
instances where the tax is illegal, or not authorized by law, or where

the property is exempt from taxation ....” Cobban, 23 Mont. at 349-50,
59 P. at 3.

49 Four years later, in 1903, this Court considered the effect on an
assessment of a mistake in the name of the owner of personal property
and whether it differed from a mistake in the name of the owner of real
property. Birney, 28 Mont. at 64, 72 P. at 293. The Court: first
examined the statute pertaining to assessment of land, which provided:
“(when land is sold for taxes correctly imposed as the property of a
particular person, no misnomer of the owner, or supposed owner, or
other mistake relating to the ownership thereof, affects the sale, or
renders it void or voidable.” Birney, 28 Mont. at 67, 72 P. at 294. Next,
the Court applied the rule of interpretation “Expressio unis est
exclusion alterius,”* reasoning that. a mistake in the name of the owner
of real property does not invalidate the tax, but that an assessment of
personal property to a named person other than the owner is
absolutely void. Birney, 28 Mont. at 67, 72 P. at 294. While I do not
disagree with the Court’s final evaluation of Birney, that mistakes
relating to ownership of personal property are not excused, Opinion,
{| 27; the significance of Birney for purposes of this proceeding is that
the Court reasoned that because the misnomer statute at issue related
specifically to real property, the same could not apply to mistakes in
the owner of personal property. A mistake in the owner of personal
property, accordingly, would invalidate an assessment. Birney simply
provides additional support for the long-recognized distinction between
mistakes in owners of real and personal property and the
corresponding effect on the validity of the assessment.

450 In my opinion, the foregoing historical precedent accumulated over
the course of a century demonstrates the Court’s error in applying
principles of taxation for personal property to the taxation of real
property. I dissent from the Court’s decision to depart from this well-
reasoned precedent and our failure to recognize a distinction between
taxation of real property and that of personal property. I dissent also
for the simple reason that Gunnersfield received actual notice that he
had failed to pay taxes owing on his real property.

° Expressio unis est exclusion alterius is a “canon of construction holding that to
express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.”
Black's Law Dictionary 602 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999).

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

BARTON HOWARD,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 15-0629.
Submitted on Briefs September 20, 2017.
Decided November 21, 2017.
2017 MT 285.
389 Mont. 356.
405 P.3d 1263.

For Appellant: Chad M. Wright, Chief Appellate Defender;
Helena.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General; Helena; Bernard
Cassidy, Lincoln County Attorney; Libby.

JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

#1 Barton Howard (Howard) appeals from the judgment entered by
the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, convicting him
of Criminal Endangerment under § 45-5-207, MCA. We affirm,
addressing the following issues:

1. Is Howard’s claim of judicial bias reviewable for plain error?

2. Is Howard’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel reviewable

on direct appeal?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{2 On March 31, 2014, at around 11:45 p.m., Debbie Wiherski called
911 to report her 72-year-old husband, Jerome Wiherski (Wiherski),
had been attacked at their home. Lincoln County Sheriff's officers
responded to the residence and observed Wiherski had suffered
substantial injuries, including a swollen eye, broken nose, head
injuries, and a swollen right abdomen. Wiherski told officers that
someone had knocked on his door and, when he opened it, pulled him
onto the porch and beat him, then kicked him while he was on the
ground. The officers established that. Howard was the potential
attacker, and drove to his residence. They interviewed Howard without
giving him a Miranda' warning. Howard admitted attacking Wiherski
in retaliation for Wiherski’s alleged attempt to sexually assault
Howard’s partner. Howard confirmed that Wiherski was on the ground
during the attack and did not fight back. This conversation was
captured on an officer’s pocket recorder.

q3 The State charged Howard with aggravated assault, and the
Honorable James B. Wheelis presided over the case. On May 5, 2014,
Noel Larivee from the Office of the State Public Defender (OPD)
appeared as Howard’s counsel at the arraignment. At the omnibus
hearing, Larivee raised the affirmative defense of justifiable use of
force. On June 30, Scott Hilderman, private counsel, filed a notice of
substitution of counsel as Howard's new counsel of record. Hilderman
filed a motion to suppress, arguing Howard’s statements to police were
not voluntary and his Miranda rights had been violated. Hilderman
subsequently moved to vacate the hearing on the motion and instead

} Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

requested a change of plea hearing. However, at the change of plea
hearing on January 5, 2015, Howard changed his mind and decided not
to change his plea to the charge. Thus, the matter was put back on the
trial calendar.

q4 OnJanuary 15, Hilderman filed an unopposed motion to withdraw
as counsel, to which Howard had consented. The District Court granted
the motion to withdraw, and on January 26 conducted a hearing to
discuss Howard’s representation. The District Court asked, “Mr.
Howard, as far as I recall, you are now representing yourself, correct?”
Howard replied, “Yes, Sir.” The District Court offered only a brief
admonition about some of the dangers of self-representation, following
which Howard decided he wanted representation by a public defender.”
He thereafter filed a motion for appointment of counsel. However, at
a March 2 status conference, Howard changed his mind, stating he
only wanted standby counsel. The District Court told Howard that he
either had to represent himself or be represented by an attorney from
the OPD. Howard chose to represent himself, which the District Court
permitted following a warning to Howard about the dangers of self-
representation based upon Faretta.

{5 Howard filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, claiming difficulty
getting his case files from prior counsel, although he did not explicitly
claim ineffective assistance of counsel. The State filed for issuance of
Gillham’ protective orders to allow Hilderman and Larivee to advise
the Court what discovery information they had provided to Howard.
Over Howard's objection, the District Court issued the Gillham orders
and heard testimony from Larivee, who testified he provided Howard
all the discovery materials in his possession as well as copies of
correspondences between him and Howard. During the hearing,
Larivee directly questioned Howard to confirm that Larivee provided
all the discovery documents to Howard, during which Howard
confirmed that Larivee’s testimony was correct. and stated that he was
more concerned with Hilderman’s representation than Larivee’s

2 As part of his judicial bias argument, Howard cites the District Court's failure to
fully advise him at this appearance about the dangers of self-representation, pursuant
to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1974) (requiring a defendant “should be made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”)
(citation omitted). However, Howard thereafter elected to be represented by counsel and
not represent himself, and thus the advisory issue was satisfactorily resolved. It is not
raised as an independent issue on appeal.

*In re Gillham, 216 Mont. 279, 704 P.2d 1019 (1985).

representation.

q6 Representing himself, Howard filed a motion to suppress his
statement to law enforcement given at his residence, wherein he
reasserted the Miranda claim and added an allegation that the State
had tampered with the audio recording. Howard included a report from
Primeau Forensics, which opined that, although the recording of
Howard’s statement might have been part of a longer recording
session, it could not determine whether there had been interruptions
in recording, and that an examination of the original recording may
provide additional information. The court held a suppression hearing
on the motion and appointed counsel to represent Howard for purposes
of the hearing. Attorney Charles Sprinkle appeared as counsel.’ The
court thereafter denied the motion, finding Howard’s statement to
police was admissible because he was not in custody for Miranda
purposes when he admitted to assaulting Wiherski. The court also
found the recording had not been edited and concluded sufficient
foundation supported its admission.

{7 Howard also filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the Information
failed to establish probable cause he committed aggravated assault.
The court denied the motion, concluding there was probable cause that
Howard committed the offense.

q8 On March 19, OPD notified the court that Timothy Baldwin would
thereafter represent Howard. Baldwin submitted several pleadings and
motions that were opposed by the State, and for which the District
Court. conducted a hearing attended by Baldwin but not by Howard.
The District Court ruled it would exclude Howard’s audio recording
expert because the expert could not verify that the recording had been
altered in any way. Baldwin’s motion to preclude the testimony of
physician assistant Joseph Chopyak concerning the nature of
Wiherski’s injuries, because he was not qualified to offer an opinion,
was denied by the District Court, which found that the “scope of
Chopyak’s licensure in his medical practice does not limit his capacity
to testify as an expert on the scope, extent, nature, course, and
duration” of Wiherski’s injuries. Baldwin filed an amended witness list,
naming Howard’s father, Robert. Howard, with the explanation that
Robert would testify “regarding the time of day that the defendant was
with him on the date of the alleged assault,” an apparent alibi defense.
The State moved to exclude alibi evidence because the defense was not
raised at the omnibus hearing. Baldwin did not object to the State’s

* OPD was then determining Howard's eligibility for public defender services
pursuant to his pending application.

motion, but stated that Howard was requesting that he pursue the
issue. Baldwin then made the following statement during the hearing:
COURT: ... [Oln the State’s motion about precluding the
Defendant from raising an alibi defense and calling Robert.
Howard, any argument about that?
BALDWIN: Your Honor, I need to put something on the record so
the Court can make a ruling based on what I am presenting. I
don’t object to the State’s motion with regard to an alibi. Without.
revealing client/attorney confidential information, I need to put.
the Court on notice that there is a potential that Mr. Howard will
want to testify at the trial regarding an alibi. I am not going to
ask the questions regarding an alibi, and so if Mr. Howard insists
on testifying in that regard, I would have to ask the Court that he
be able to testify in a narrative fashion. Because, I again, I’m not
going to ask those kinds of questions, nor am I going to be arguing
that defense theme at trial. But I think that as a matter of record
the Court probably has to make a ruling as to if he does intend to
do that what the Court will instruct either him or the jury on that.
issue.
COURT: I don’t know if I would let him be called as a witness
based on the information that you have offered that’s been offered.
And I understand that you have a duty to your client to proceed,
but on the other hand, my rulings at this stage would be that an
alibi is too late. So if he intends, makes it known that he intends
to testify regarding alibi, then I would keep him off the stand.
BALDWIN: Okay.
COURT: If there are other issues he might want to testify about,
I don’t know what they would be but that would be different.
q9 On May 19, Baldwin requested a hearing because Howard wanted
to represent himself and have Baldwin assigned as standby counsel.
On May 21, the court held a hearing. Howard was late and the District
Court began the proceeding in his absence. Howard ultimately
appeared and confirmed that he wanted to represent himself. The
District Court explained that if, on the day of trial, Howard wanted to
represent himself, standby counsel would not be permitted. The
District Court provided Faretta warnings about the rights Howard was
waiving by proceeding pro se, reminded him of Baldwin’s limited role,
and confirmed Howard's decision to represent himself was knowing
and voluntary.
q10 On May 26, the jury trial began. During the pretrial conference,
the State moved to exclude Robert Howard’s testimony because it was
unable to arrange an interview with Robert. The court granted the
request. Howard then notified the court he wanted Baldwin’s legal

representation, explaining that his self-representation was premised
upon atrial strategy involving calling Robert to testify, which had now
been denied. Baldwin was called to again represent Howard.

{11 Before the conclusion of voir dire, the parties reached a plea
agreement that called for the State to amend the charge to felony
criminal endangerment and Howard to enter a no contest plea, and
preserved Howard’s right to challenge the court’s pretrial rulings on
appeal. Following a plea colloquy, the court accepted Howard’s no
contest plea and set sentencing for August 3.

q12 On June 1, Baldwin requested a hearing to address Howard's
latest request to represent himself and to withdraw his plea. On June
8, the court held a hearing and Howard explained that he had changed
his mind about these matters since the hearing was set: he now wanted
Baldwin to continue as his attorney, and his plea to remain.

{13 On June 12, Baldwin filed a motion addressing the following
matters: a renewed request by Howard to withdraw his plea;
appointment of new counsel; and a possible Gillham order. Baldwin
explained that he could not “in good faith” represent Howard regarding
his change of plea, and suggested that new counsel be appointed.
Baldwin sought a Gillham order permitting him to testify in the event.
Howard asserted ineffective assistance of counsel against him as a
basis for withdrawal of the plea. At a hearing on June 22, Howard
asserted his plea should be withdrawn because he did not understand
he would be found guilty upon a no contest plea. The District Court
denied Howard’s motion to withdraw his plea, reasoning that he
voluntarily, knowingly, and willingly entered his plea. The District
Court ordered Howard to appear at sentencing. Baldwin remained as
counsel.

14 Prior to sentencing, Howard filed two pro se motions seeking to
represent himself and a pro se motion asking to withdraw his guilty
plea. At the August 10 hearing in aggravation and mitigation of
sentence, Howard retracted his request to proceed pro se, stating it was
merely a strategy to get pro se documents into court. Howard then
asked the court to reconsider his request to withdraw his plea, but had
no additional evidence to offer, so the court denied the request.

q15 At sentencing, Baldwin advocated for a deferred sentence for
Howard by emphasizing what he thought were mitigating
circumstances, including that Wiherski had “made a pass” on Howard's
partner. Baldwin contended that witnesses had “exaggerated”
Howard’s conduct in the case. In response, the District Court stated,
“You do have to recall that I saw Mr. Wiherski ... a few days [after the
assault].” Baldwin replied, “Right, Your Honor, and I recognize that.
But I think that—and those injuries I think were fairly, you know,

exact.” Baldwin noted that the initial injuries were not as serious as
later developments that involved Wiherski seeking medical care for
bleeding in the brain. The court agreed, stating that he would “not
consider Mr. Chopyak’s testimony about the later consequences of the
injuries to Mr. Wiherski” in sentencing Howard. The District Court
imposed a ten-year sentence to the Department of Corrections, with
five years suspended.

16 At no time during the proceedings did Howard state a claim of
judicial bias against the District Court. Howard appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

17 When a defendant raises the plain error doctrine to request our
review of issues that the defendant did not raise before the district
court, our review is discretionary. State v. Stutzman, 2017 MT 169,
18, 388 Mont. 133, 398 P.3d 265 (citation omitted).

18 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that are reviewed on
direct appeal present mixed questions of law and fact, which we review
de novo. State v. Nuessle, 2016 MT 335, 1 9, 386 Mont. 18, 385 P.3d 952
(citations omitted).

DISCUSSION
19 1. Is Howard’s claim of judicial bias reviewable on appeal for plain
error?
20 Howard raises no claims of substantive legal error on appeal,
despite the detailed account of his trial proceedings set forth in his
briefing. Instead, he asserts judicial bias, in that “the presiding judge
created an atmosphere of hostility against Howard as he was trying to
test the State’s case and present a defense.” Howard’s argument is
based upon the District Court’s comments, rulings, and his perception
that he was treated adversely.
21 His appellate theory notwithstanding, the record requires Howard
to acknowledge, in understatement, that he “demanded more from the
criminal justice system than the average defendant.” More accurately,
Howard was a difficult litigant who abused the judicial system, wasted
judicial resources, imposed unreasonable burdens upon lawyers and
personnel, and mocked the core judicial purpose of seeking truth. It
should not be surprising that his appeal is an attempt to shift all
attention away from his own actions and place blame elsewhere.
122 Howard argues we should exercise plain error review of his claim
of judicial bias, which he bases upon the District Court’s: (1) granting
of one of Howard’s motions to represent himself without sufficiently
advising him of the dangers of self-representation under Faretta; (2)
granting the State’s motion for issuance of Gillham orders; (3)

subjecting Howard to requirements, when he was representing himself,
that went beyond those imposed on other litigants, such as requiring
him to turn over his expert report before it was established the expert
would be called to testify; (4) denying Howard’s motions to withdraw
his no contest plea; and (5) during sentencing, referring to having seen
Wiherski’s injuries while presiding over the protection proceeding.
Howard asks that his conviction be vacated and a new trial ordered.
23 Howard did not object or claim judicial bias or impropriety before
the District Court, so he did not preserve the issue for appeal. “A claim
for disqualification of a judge must be brought within a reasonable
time after the moving party learns the facts forming the basis for a
claim that the judge should be disqualified... Ifit is not brought within
a reasonable time, the claim is waived.” State v. Strang, 2017 MT 217,
{ 18, 388 Mont. 428, 401 P.3d 690 (citations omitted). Generally, this
court does not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. “We
invoke plain error review sparingly, on a case-by-case basis, according
to narrow circumstances, and by considering the totality of the
circumstances.” Nuessle, {| 12. Obtaining plain error review of an
unpreserved issue requires the appellant to: “(1) demonstrate the
claimed error implicates a fundamental right and (2) firmly convince
this Court that failure to review would result in a manifest miscarriage
of justice, leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of
the trial proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial
process.” State v. Williams, 2015 MT 247, {| 16, 380 Mont. 445, 358
P.3d 127 (citing State v. Carnes, 2015 MT 101, 118, 378 Mont. 482, 346
P.3d 1120). “When the circumstances of a case do not warrant
application of the plain error doctrine, we need not address the merits
of the alleged error.” Stutzman, {| 23.

24 Hj Howard's assertions of judicial bias are largely based upon the
District Court’s rulings. However, “judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994) (citation
omitted); see also § 3-1-805(1)(b), MCA (an affidavit of disqualification
is deemed not to have been made in good faith if it is based solely on
rulings in the case).

425 Further, we question whether District Court made any Faretta
error. At the January 26, 2015 hearing, Howard ultimately decided not
to represent himself, so Faretta warnings may not have been required.
See State v. Insua, 2004 MT 14, 4] 19, 319 Mont. 254, 84 P.3d 11 (“Liln
applying the Faretta standard, we have repeatedly held that a trial
court is not required to advise a defendant specifically of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation as long as the court makes
inquiry of the defendant to the extent it deems necessary to ensure

that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.”).? While we have cautioned about the use of Gillham
proceedings outside of the postconviction context, State v. Cheetham,
2016 MT 151, {| 29, 384 Mont. 1, 373 P.3d 45, State v. Aguado, 2017
MT 54, {| 25, 387 Mont. 1, 390 P.3d 628, we have not adopted an
absolute bar to its use in trial proceedings. The considerable demands
Howard placed upon his attorneys, his claims of ineffectiveness, and
his repeated dismissals of his counsel may have put the conduct of the
attorneys at issue. Regarding its comments about Wiherski’s injuries,
the District Court subsequently dialogued with counsel about the issue
and agreed to limit consideration of the injuries for purposes of
sentencing to Chopyak’s observations.

126 [i Howard’s assertion of bias is largely premised upon judicial
rulings or upon a record that does not convince us that his claim
implicates a fundamental right, or that failure to review the claim
would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the
question of the fundamental fairness of the trial proceedings, or
compromise the integrity of the judicial process. Williams, {| 16.
Therefore, we decline to undertake consideration of the merits of the
bias allegation pursuant to the plain error doctrine.

27 2. Is Howard’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel reviewable
on direct appeal?

28 Howard argues that his appointed counsel presented testimony,
evidence, and confidential information in violation of his interests, thus
violating their duty of loyalty, citing to Baldwin’s statement in open

®° We note that even if Faretta warnings were required when Howard subsequently
decided to represent himself, the court’s Faret¢a warnings, although brief, explained the
hazards of self-representation and were likely sufficient. Further, Howard’s multiple pro
se filings and active participation in his own defense, at times with and without the aid
of counsel, are strong evidence of his knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of
counsel, See United States v. Hantzis, 625 F.3d 575 (9th Cir. 2010). In Hantzis, the
defendant hired, or was appointed, four different attorneys and, while he was
represented, filed multiple pro se documents. Hantzis later began representing himself
pro se, and the district court conducted a brief colloquy that explained the hazards of
self-representation. The next day, Hantzis changed his mind and stated he wanted his
original attorney to continue representing him. Soon thereafter, he filed another motion
to proceed pro se. Hantzis, 625 F.3d at 577-79. The appellate court found the colloquy
adequate and Hantzis’ waiver of counsel to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
because he filed multiple pro se documents and “actively and personally participated in
his own defense from the outset of the case, sometimes with, and sometimes without, the
aid of counsel.” Hanizis, 625 F.3d at 580. Howard does not claim that he was denied the
right to counsel based on an involuntary waiver, but instead alleges generally that an
inadequate Faretta warning is evidence of bias.

court about his alibi defense. The State argues that the record is not
sufficiently developed to determine whether counsel has been
ineffective.
29 The right to counsel in a criminal proceeding is protected by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Article II, Section 24
of the Montana Constitution. State v. Stratton, 2017 MT 112, ] 9, 387
Mont. 384, 394 P.3d 192. Before reaching the merits of an ineffective
assistance claim on direct appeal, this Court must determine whether
the allegations are properly before it. State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243,
| 14, 323 Mont. 6, 97 P.38d 1095. We review claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal if the claims are based solely on
the record. State v. Clary, 2012 MT 26, {| 12, 364 Mont. 53, 270 P.3d 88.
Consequently, “[I]f the record does not demonstrate ‘why’ counsel did
or did not take an action which is the basis of the claim, the claim is
more suitable for a petition for postconviction relief where a record can
be more fully developed.” Cheetham, {] 14 (citations omitted).
430 Howard argues Larivee improperly made statements about
discovery related to the defense investigator and improperly directly
questioned Howard during a Gillham proceeding. The record is
unclear why Larivee made any statements beyond specifying all the
discovery materials he provided to Howard. Howard also argues his
counsel Sprinkle was “unprepared” and “could not have developed any
loyalty towards [Howard] given such a limited appointment.” The
record does not establish Sprinkle was unprepared nor does it address
his loyalty to Howard, and we note that Sprinkle was apparently
appointed only for the limited purpose of the suppression hearing.
Finally, Howard argues his counsel Baldwin improperly informed the
court “Mr. Howard” was going to commit perjury by providing
information on a potential alibi defense. The State argues that, taken
in context, the statement is referring to Robert Howard, the
Defendant’s father, and not Howard. Because the substance of the
exchange is not clear from the record, the record is insufficient to allow
review on direct appeal.
131 Ml Howard’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not
factually established in the record before us. Therefore, we cannot
address them on direct appeal. Howard may pursue these claims in a
petition for postconviction relief.
q32 Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT, McKINNON
and SANDEFUR concur.

HOLLY LABAIR and ROBERT LABAIR,
Individually and on behalf of DAWSON R.
LABAIR, deceased minor child,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

STEVE CAREY, Esq. and CAREY
LAW FIRM, and JANE DOES 1-4,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 17-0058.
Submitted on Briefs September 20, 2017.
Decided November 21, 2017.
2017 MT 286.
389 Mont. 366.
405 P.3d 1284

| |

For Appellant: Tina L. Morin, Morin Law Firm, PLLC, Butte.

For Appellees: Mikel L. Moore , Katherine A. Matic, Moore,
Cockrell, Goicoechea & Johnson, P.C., Kalispell.

JUSTICE BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Holly and Robert Labair sued Steve Carey and the Carey Law
Firm (collectively Carey) for legal malpractice. Following this Court’s
reversal and remand of a summary judgment order, Judge Edward P.
McLean assumed jurisdiction in the case. Judge McLean retired after
the trial, and Chief Justice Mike McGrath issued an order calling him
to active service to preside over the case. Following Judge McLean’s
entry of final judgment, the Labairs appealed. This Court reversed and
remanded for a new trial. Approximately two months after remittitur
issued, the Labairs moved to substitute Judge McLean. Judge McLean
denied the Labairs’ motion as untimely. The Labairs appeal. We
affirm. We consider the Labairs’ arguments that:

1. The time never started running on their deadline for

substitution because the Clerk of District Court did not give

statutorily-required notice of Judge McLean’s assumption of

jurisdiction; and

2. Judge McLean lost jurisdiction after appeal from the final

judgment, and the case reverted to his replacement once the

appeal was decided.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2 The case is before this Court for the third time on appeal. We
detailed the factual background in the previous two appeals, Labair v.
Carey, 2012 MT 312, 367 Mont. 453, 291 P.3d 1160 (Labair I), and
Labair v. Carey, 2016 MT 272, 385 Mont. 233, 383 P.3d 226 (Labair II).
We restate here only the procedural facts relevant to this appeal.
3 The Labairs hired Carey to pursue a potential medical malpractice
claim against their obstetrician, Dr. Thomas Baumgartner, after the
death of their newborn son. Carey failed to file the medical malpractice
claim before the statute of limitations expired. The Labairs then filed
a legal malpractice claim against Carey.
[4 The District Court, Judge John Larson presiding, granted
summary judgment to Carey in November 2011. The Labairs appealed.
We reversed in Labair I and remanded for trial. Labair I, {| 40.
5 After remittitur issued in Labair I, the Labairs timely filed a
motion for substitution of district court judge under § 3-1-804(12),
MCA. Judge Larson called in Judge McLean, who accepted jurisdiction.

Judge McLean presided over a jury trial in March 2015. The jury
entered a special verdict in favor of Carey. Judge McLean retired
effective April 30, 2015, and Judge Leslie Halligan assumed
jurisdiction over the case.

q6 OnJune 1, 2015, Chief Justice McGrath entered an Order calling
Judge McLean back into active service to assume judicial authority of
this case and several others. The Order authorized Judge McLean “to
proceed with any and all necessary hearings, opinions and orders,
including final resolution of said matters.” It stated further: “A copy of
this Order shall be filed with the District Court Clerk of Missoula
County with a request that copies be sent to counsel of record.” The
District Court Clerk filed the Order as directed but apparently failed
to send a copy to counsel for either party.

{7 The District Court held a telephonic status conference with the
parties the same day that Chief Justice McGrath entered his Order. A
minute entry from that status conference states that “the Court
advised counsel that Chief Justice McGrath has asked Judge McLean
to hear argument on the costs issue as the Court conducted trial in the
above cause.” The District Court sent a copy of the minute entry to
counsel for both parties. The Labairs claim on appeal that “[t]his was
the only notice counsel received regarding Judge McLean’s assumption
of jurisdiction.”

q8 On September 22, 2015, Judge McLean held a hearing on Carey’s
motion for sanctions and on the reasonableness of costs, at which
counsel for both parties appeared and presented argument. Judge
McLean also entered a final judgment that same day in accordance
with the jury’s special verdict.

q9 The Labairs appealed Judge McLean’s final judgment. We
reversed in Labair II, reasoning that the Labairs were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the issue of their entitlement to
damages. Labair II, | 27. We remanded for a new trial to determine
the amount of the Labairs’ damages. Labair II, | 27. We decided
Labair II on October 25, 2016, and remittitur was filed with the
District Court on November 21, 2016.

{10 Fifty-seven days later, on January 17, 2017, the Labairs filed a
motion for substitution of Judge McLean. They stated in their motion:
“Plaintiffs have received no notice from the Court who has been
assigned but were verbally informed by clerks within the Clerk’s Office
that they thought Judge McLean was assigned to the case. Plaintiffs
have received no notice of this assignment.” Judge McLean denied the
Labairs’ motion as untimely. He concluded that he “was assigned to the
matter by the Chief Justice on June 1, 2015,” and that “he remains in

jurisdiction.” The Labairs appeal the denial of their motion for
substitution.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
11 A district court’s determination whether to substitute a judge is
a question of law that we review for correctness. Mines Mgmt. v. Fus,
2014 MT 256, 415, 376 Mont. 375, 334 P.3d 929.

DISCUSSION

12 The Labairs argue that the District Court did not provide them
with proper notice of Judge McLean’s assumption of jurisdiction, in
violation both of § 3-1-804(7), MCA, and of their constitutional right to
due process, and that Judge McLean therefore should have granted
their motion for substitution. They contend further that Judge
McLean’s jurisdiction expired when he issued his September 2015
Final Judgment, which in their view constituted “final resolution” of
the case under the terms of Chief Justice McGrath’s Order. They claim
that Judge McLean’s subsequent order denying their motion for
substitution is void because he lacked jurisdiction over the case.
13 This Court’s rule governing judicial substitution, codified in § 3-1-
804(12), MCA, provides:

When a judgment or order is reversed or modified on appeal and

the cause is remanded to the district court for a new trial, ... each

adverse party is entitled to one motion for substitution of district.

judge. The motion must be filed, with the required filing fee,

within 20 calendar days after the remittitur from the supreme

court has been filed with the district court. There is no other right.

of substitution in cases remanded by the supreme court.
This Court’s decision in Labair II reversed and remanded the case for
anew trial. Labair II, | 27. Remittitur was filed with the District.
Court on November 21, 2016. Under the terms of § 3-1-804(12), MCA,
the Labairs had twenty days thereafter to file a motion for
substitution. They did not file their motion until January 17,
2017—fifty-seven days after remittitur. On its face, the Labairs’ motion
for substitution was untimely.
414 The Labairs contend nonetheless that their motion for
substitution should have been granted because they were not afforded
proper notice of Judge McLean’s assumption of jurisdiction over the
case. They claim that the District Court’s failure to serve notice
violated the terms of Chief Justice McGrath’s Order and of
§ 3-1-804(7), MCA, which provides:

When a new district judge has accepted jurisdiction, the clerk of

court shall provide a copy of the assumption of jurisdiction to the
first. district judge to whom the case was assigned and to each
attorney or party of record. A certificate of service must be
attached to the assumption of jurisdiction form in the court file.
We have held that “when retired district judges are called in to
‘exercise[] the powers of a district judge on a temporary basis, they are
‘judges presiding in district courts’ as contemplated by the introductory
clause of § 3-1-804, MCA.” Cushman v. Mont. Twentieth Judicial Dist.
Court, 2015 MT 311, 118, 381 Mont. 324, 360 P.3d 492 (internal citation
omitted). The Chief Justice’s “specific assignments of retired judges”
are “within the intended scope of the right to substitution under
§ 3-1-804, MCA.” Cushman, 1 8.
15 We have addressed district court violations of the rule’s notice
requirement in two orders on petitions for writ of supervisory control.
In Torres v. Eleventh Judicial District Court, No. OP 14-0489,
376 Mont. 549, 347 P.3d 265 (table) (Aug. 19, 2014), we granted
supervisory control due in part to the district court’s noncompliance
with § 3-1-804(7), MCA. The original district court judge in that case
retired and was replaced by Judge Ulbricht. Torres at 1. The district
court clerk never sent notice of Judge Ulbricht’s assumption of
jurisdiction to Torres. Torres at 1-2. Torres was unaware of the new
presiding judge until he filed a motion on an unrelated matter. Torres
at 2. As soon as Torres became aware of Judge Ulbricht’s involvement
in the case, he filed a motion for substitution of district court judge,
which the district court denied as untimely. Torres at 2. We reversed,
reasoning that Torres had filed his motion for substitution promptly
after learning of Judge Ulbricht’s role in the case. Torres at 2-3.
q16 By contrast, in Smith v. Fourth Judicial District Court, No. OP
13-0702, 373 Mont. 440, 318 P.3d 172 (table) (Oct. 29, 2013), we denied
a petition for writ of supervisory control despite the district court’s
failure to comply with the requirements of § 3-1-804(7), MCA. In that
case, the district court did not serve notice on Smith of Judge John
Larson’s acceptance of jurisdiction. Smith at 2. Smith did not argue
that he did not have notice of Judge Larson’s assumption of
jurisdiction; he contended only that the district court’s failure to
comply with the requirements of § 3-1-804(7), MCA, should have voided
Judge Larson’s subsequent actions in the case. Smith at 1-2. We noted
that Smith was aware of Judge Larson’s jurisdiction, and that he had
“filed briefs and appeared at the hearing before Judge Larson on his
motions to suppress.” Smith at 2. We therefore concluded that Smith
had not “identified any way in which he [had] been prejudiced by the

procedural irregularity.” Smith at 2.

17 The District Court in the present case failed to comply with either
§ 3-1-804(7), MCA, or Chief Justice McGrath’s Order by not serving on
the Labairs’ counsel notice of Judge McLean’s assumption of
jurisdiction when the Order was issued on June 1, 2015. But as in
Smith, and unlike in Torres, this “procedural irregularity” did not
prejudice the Labairs because the Labairs had actual notice of Judge
McLean’s involvement in the case. Smith at 2.

q18 Judge McLean resumed judicial authority in the case on June 1,
2015. The District Court had not conducted any activity between Judge
McLean’s retirement and the June 1, 2015 Order. On the same day as
Chief Justice McGrath’s Order, counsel for both parties participated in
a telephonic hearing in which the court informed them that Chief
Justice McGrath had asked Judge McLean to “hear argument on the
costs issue” in the case. The District Court Clerk filed a copy of Chief
Justice McGrath’s Order in the case record. The Labairs’ counsel was
present at a September 22, 2015 hearing on Carey’s motions for
sanctions and on the reasonableness of costs, over which Judge
McLean presided. Judge McLean issued final judgment that same day,
a copy of which was sent to the Labairs’ counsel. The Case Register
Report identified Judge McLean as the presiding judge from the time
of his assumption of jurisdiction to present, including after the
November 2016 remittitur of Labair II.

19 Hf The Labairs could not reasonably have concluded, based on
these facts, that anyone other than Judge McLean presided over their
case. The court record at all relevant times clearly identified Judge
McLean as the presiding judge, and no other judge participated in any
hearing or entered any rulings. The purpose of the notice rule in
§ 3-1-804(7), MCA, is to ensure that parties are informed when a new
judge assumes jurisdiction. Here, the District Court’s failure to comply
with § 3-1-804(7), MCA, did not prejudice the Labairs, because the
Labairs had actual notice when Judge McLean assumed jurisdiction in
the case. Absent prejudice, we will not disturb the District Court's
denial of the Labairs’ motion for substitution. See M. R. Civ. P. 61 (“At
every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and
defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”).

120 HI The Labairs argue that the Clerk’s failure to give written
notice of the June 1, 2015 Order also violated their due process rights.
“We have said that the hallmarks of due process are notice and
opportunity to be heard.” In re B.W.S., 2016 MT 340, {| 12, 386 Mont.
33, 386 P.3d 595 (citing Kulstad v. Maniaci, 2010 MT 248, { 41,

358 Mont. 230, 244 P.3d 722). “Notice must be reasonably calculated
to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely
affect their legally protected interests.” Steab v. Luna, 2010 MT
125, {| 22, 356 Mont. 372, 233 P.38d 351 (citation and internal
quotations omitted). As discussed above, the Labairs had actual notice
of Judge McLean’s assumption of jurisdiction over their case. The
court's failure to serve official notice on them under § 3-1-804(7), MCA,
did not “adversely affect their legally protected interests” where they
had actual knowledge of the judge presiding in their case. Steab, J 22.
Their claim of a due process violation fails.

21 Finally, the Labairs argue that Judge McLean’s denial of their
motion for substitution is of no effect because his jurisdiction over the
case had expired before he issued that ruling. But Judge McLean did
not automatically lose jurisdiction in this case when the Labairs
appealed from the final judgment. Although jurisdiction over a case
passes from a district court to this Court when a party files a notice of
appeal, see, e.g., Powers Mfg. Co. v. Leon Jacobs Enters. , 216 Mont. 407,
411, 701 P.2d 1377, 1380 (1985), jurisdiction vests again in the district
court upon reversal and remand, Zavarelli v. Might, 239 Mont. 120,
122, 779 P.2d 489, 491 (1989) (“We determine that a district court, on
reversal and remittitur from this Court ‘for further proceedings,’ is
reinvested with full jurisdiction of the cause.”). And a district court
does not lose jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters after the appeal
is taken. See Powder River Cnty. v. State, 2002 MT 259, {| 27,
312 Mont. 198, 60 P.3d 357 (citing Powers Mfg. Co., 216 Mont. at 411-
12, 701 P.2d at 1380). The presiding judge does not change when notice
of appeal is filed. After our reversal and remand in Labair II,
jurisdiction over the case automatically returned to the District Court,
with Judge McLean presiding. See Zavarelli, 239 Mont. at 122,
779 P.2d at 491.

22 The Labairs assert that, under the terms of Chief Justice
McGrath’s June 1, 2015 Order, Judge McLean’s jurisdiction expired
when he issued final judgment. Article VII, Section 6(3), of the
Montana Constitution and § 19-5-103, MCA, allow the Chief Justice of
the Montana Supreme Court to “confer jurisdiction and authority to
retired judges as district court judges.” Capital One, NA v. Guthrie,
2017 MT 75, 1 17, 387 Mont. 147, 392 P.3d 158. “The authority the
Chief Justice can confer is comprehensive, up to and including all
duties of the sitting district court judge.” Capital One, NA, J 17 (citing
§ 19-5-103, MCA). Chief Justice McGrath’s Order called in Judge
McLean to “proceed with any and all necessary hearings, opinions and

orders, including final resolution of said matters.” (Emphasis added).
23 In the Labairs’ view, “final resolution” of the case occurred when
Judge McLean issued final judgment. To support their argument, they
cite legal authority—including Kline v. Murray, 79 Mont. 530, 257 P.
465 (1927), and M. R. Civ. P. 54(a)—for the proposition that a
judgment may be considered final prior to an appeal to the Supreme
Court.

24 Although Judge McLean issued final judgment, it was not final
resolution of the case. The controversy between the Labairs and
Carey—the litigation over Carey’s liability for legal malpractice—is
ongoing. In Labair II, we remanded for a new trial, limited to damages
resulting from Carey’s negligence. Labair II, | 27. “Final resolution” of
this case will not occur until either settlement between the parties or
a new trial and the exhaustion of any appeals. Judge McLean’s final
judgment did not resolve the controversy between the parties and
therefore did not constitute “final resolution” of the case. Under the
terms of Chief Justice McGrath’s Order, Judge McLean retained
jurisdiction at the time of his January 2017 denial of the Labairs’
motion for substitution.

CONCLUSION

25 The Labairs had actual notice of Judge McLean’s assumption of
jurisdiction, Judge McLean retained jurisdiction after our reversal and
remand in Labair II, and the Labairs filed their motion for substitution
after the twenty-day deadline under § 3-1-804(12), MCA. The District
Court correctly denied the Labairs’ motion, and its denial of their
motion is affirmed. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SHEA, SANDEFUR
and RICE concur.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
ROBERT LYSLE ROSE,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0627.
Submitted on Briefs September 6, 2017
Decided November 28, 2017.
2017 MT 289.
389 Mont. 374.
406 P.3d 443.

For Appellant: Anthony R. Gallagher, Federal Defender,
David F. Ness, Assistant Federal Defender, Great Falls.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Tammy K Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; William E.
Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton.

JUSTICE McKINNON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

{11 Robert Lysle Rose (Rose) appeals from an order entered by the
Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County. The District
Court’s order was issued on remand from the United States District
Court for the District of Montana (Federal District Court) after Rose
applied for a writ of habeas corpus. The Federal District Court
concluded Rose’s trial counsel was ineffective and the proper remedy
was to require the State to reoffer Rose an originally un-communicated
and favorable plea proposal. The District Court rejected the reoffered
plea and left the conviction undisturbed. We affirm.

{2 We find the following issues dispositive:

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in rejecting the

reoffered plea agreement?

2. Did the District Court err in failing to allow Rose to withdraw
his guilty plea?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q3 OnJune 6, 2003, following the conclusion of a four-day trial, ajury
convicted Rose of aggravated kidnapping, assault with a weapon, and
assault on a peace officer. Rose’s convictions stem from a January 2002
incident wherein Rose, high on methamphetamine, kidnapped his co-
worker in Kalispell and forced him, at knifepoint, to drive Rose south
for several hours towards Stevensville. The co-worker attempted to flee
by jumping out of the vehicle, but Rose attacked him, stabbing him in
the chest, neck, and throat. Both Rose and the victim were injured in
the ensuing struggle and were taken to the hospital. The victim
suffered near fatal injuries. At the Ravalli County Detention Center
following his arrest, Rose sprayed detention staff with pepper spray
that was inadvertently left in the vehicle transporting him and which
Rose had concealed in his underpants.

{4 On August 10, 2003, the District Court sentenced Rose to four
consecutive periods of commitment in the Montana State Prison: a 50-

year term with 20-years suspended for the aggravated kidnapping
charge; a 20-year term for the assault with a weapon charge; a 10-year
term for the assault on a peace officer charge; and an additional 20-
year persistent felony offender (PFO) term.' The total term was 100-
years, with 20-years suspended.

{5 Since 2003, Rose has engaged in more than a decade of litigation
involving his convictions in both state and federal courts. This is Rose’s
fourth appeal before this Court. In State v. Rose, 2009 MT 4, 348 Mont.
291, 202 P.3d 749 (Rose I), we affirmed Rose’s convictions. In Rose v.
State, No. DA 11-0419, 2012 MT 55N, 2012 Mont. LEXIS 59, we
affirmed the court’s grant of summary judgment to the State following
Rose’s petition for a declaration that the actions of the Montana
Department of Corrections violated state open meeting and public
participation laws.

q6 In Rose v. State, 2013 MT 161, 370 Mont. 398, 304 P.3d 387 (Rose
IIT), we considered Rose’s contention that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel (IAC) when his attorney, Kelli Sather (Sather)
failed to communicate a plea offer which Sather believed was illegal.
Ravalli County Attorney George Corn (Corn) sent Sather a letter on
May 21, 2003, setting forth a proposed plea which contemplated
dismissing the aggravated kidnapping charge and the assault on a
peace officer charge if Rose entered into a non-binding plea agreement,
under § 46-12-211(1)(c), MCA, to felony assault with a weapon and
misdemeanor assault (Plea Offer). Corn would recommend consecutive
sentences for the two offenses and would agree to a “consecutive”
sentence for the PFO designation of 10-years with 5 suspended. Sather
correctly recognized that the Plea Offer’s separate sentence for Rose’s
designation as a PFO was proscribed by statute. Sather made a
counteroffer in light of what she believed was an illegal plea offer
without conveying the Plea Offer to Rose. Rose argued that Sather’s
failure to convey the Plea Offer to him was deficient pursuant to Lafler
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 1382 S. Ct. 1876 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye,
566 U.S. 134, 132 S. Ct. 1899 (2012). We affirmed the denial of Rose’s
petition for postconviction relief without addressing whether Sather’s
conduct was deficient because we concluded that the Plea Offer was
unlawful and could not have been imposed by the District Court. We

' At the time the District Court imposed its sentence, this Court had not decided
State v. Gunderson, which held that “sentences imposed on an offender’s status as a
[PFO] replace the sentence for the underlying felony.” Gunderson, 2010 MT 166, 9 54,
357 Mont. 142, 237 P.3d 74.

explained that Rose could not demonstrate prejudice because the
remedy for IAC arising out of a rejected plea is “to order the State to
reoffer the plea agreement.”

{7 On July 24, 2018, Rose applied for a writ of habeas corpus in
Federal District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), arguing that
our decision in Rose IJ was contrary to clearly established precedent of
the United States Supreme Court and that Rose IJ was an
unreasonable application of federal law. In Findings and
Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch (Judge
Lynch), dated January 6, 2016, the Federal District Court considered
only two of Rose’s claims to have merit. Relevant here, one of those
claims was Rose’s IAC claim pertaining to Sather’s failure to
communicate the Plea Offer. Additional discovery was authorized by
the Federal District Court.

{8 The depositions of Rose, Sather, and Corn were taken in June
2015 and provide some insight into the plea negotiations that occurred
prior to Rose’s trial 12 years earlier. Corn testified in his deposition
that he made Rose two plea offers—an initial offer and the May 21,
2003 Plea Offer. In making the initial offer, Corn recollected meeting
with Rose and his then-counsel Larry Mansch in-person at the jail.
Corn could not recall the specific terms of his initial offer but, after
their in-person conversation, Corn testified he “had the impression that
[Rose] had accepted whatever it was that I had offered him.” Rose, in
his deposition, remembered that Corn’s initial offer included the State
reducing the aggravated kidnapping charge to kidnapping and
recommending a 40-year maximum sentence and Rose pleading guilty
to kidnapping, assault with a weapon, and assault on a peace officer.
Corn testified Rose gave him the impression he would accept the initial
plea after taking some time to consider it and consulting with his
family. However, at a hearing held one week later, Rose told the
District Court there had been insufficient time to consider the offer or
discuss it with the various people he wanted to. Rose neither accepted
nor rejected the initial offer stating, “I’m not totally turning down
anything that Mr. Corn has offered.” In his deposition, Rose testified
that because he had not turned the offer down, he “always kept that in
mind that that plea bargain would be there, that I could accept.” After
Rose failed to accept Corn’s initial offer, Corn testified he “felt [he] had
gotten worked” by Rose.

q9 Sather testified in her deposition that when she began
representing Rose, she recalled believing that accepting a plea offer
was in Rose’s best interest, “[blut he was very against it. I mean, he
was very focused on witnesses, discovery, what happened, and going to

trial.” Sather admitted Rose was “difficult” to work with and she
“couldn’t keep him focused on the things that [she] was trying to find
out and trying to talk to him about the case.” Sather testified that she
received the Plea Offer on May 21, 2003. Sather remembered
researching the PFO statute because of a term included in it and, as a
result of her research, “thought that [the Plea Offer] was illegal.”
Sather met with Corn the following day, May 22, and made a
counteroffer, but could not recall the terms of her counteroffer. Sather
testified: “I just remember [Corn] being angry and pulling the plea
offer, saying we [the State] won't agree to it. I mean, I said I made a
counteroffer. I’m assuming I offered something similar.” Sather could
not. recall whether she discussed the Plea Offer with Rose prior to
meeting with Corn.
{10 Corn remembered things differently. Corn testified that he
recalled sending Sather the Plea Offer after first consulting with the
victim. Corn testified that on May 22, 2003, Sather “came in and
offered a much lesser sentence.” Corn testified he remembered
thinking “we’re at the end of any negotiations. I’ve done what I could
do for resolving the case without trial, but I’m not going any lower at
this point, so I withdrew the offer.” Corn did not recall a discussion
about the Plea Offer containing an illegal provision or becoming angry
with Sather. Corn admitted he was “mistrustful of Robert Rose’s
sincerity at that point. I think at that point, too, I had gotten Judge
Davis’s judgment, ... he was the judge in [Rose’s 1995 felony]
Beaverhead County case. And the reasons for his sentence, he talked
about [Rose] being manipulative of court and counsel ....” Corn testified
that the Plea Offer was a late effort to avoid the trial scheduled for
June. When asked in his deposition whether he thought the Plea Offer
was reasonable, Corn testified that it was “less than I thought that
[Rose] should have, but it would have resolved the case and the victim
would not have had to go through the trial.” Corn testified, “[t]he
victim was really cut horribly in this case” and was still having
problems at the time Rose was sentenced. Corn continued:
So this was [an offer] that would have spared [the victim] a trial.
Do I think it was reasonable? No, I don’t think it was harsh
enough for [Rose] for what he had done, especially with his past
history. But it would have resolved the case. And that is one of the
considerations that I had as a prosecutor when you have a victim
of a violent crime, start to get things behind him.
Corn admitted in his deposition that instead of being withdrawn, “If
[the Plea Offer] was illegal, yeah, it would have been void.” Finally,
Corn testified that at sentencing the District Court imposed a sentence

on Rose that was greater than what he ended up recommending and
greater than what the presentence investigation recommended.
11 In its Findings and Recommendation dated May 5, 2016, Judge
Lynch disagreed with our holding in Rose II, concluding that Sather’s
failure to communicate the Plea Offer to Rose was not excused by the
offer’s illegality. Judge Lynch determined that the Plea Offer exposed
Rose to potentially 30-years with 5 suspended, which was favorable to
both the actual sentence imposed’ and the maximum sentence of 220-
years to which Rose was exposed’ without a plea. In an order dated
June 23, 2016, Federal District Judge Donald W. Molloy (Judge Molloy)
adopted Judge Lynch’s May 5, 2016 Findings and Recommendation in
full and granted Rose’s petition relating to his IAC claim. In its order,
the Federal District Court directed:
On or before June 30, 2016, the State is required to reoffer the
equivalent terms of the plea agreement proposed on May 21, 2003.
The state trial court can then exercise discretion in deciding
whether to vacate the conviction from trial and accept the plea or
leave the conviction undisturbed. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.
1376, 1389 (2012) (providing instruction for exercising such
discretion). If the State does not meet the deadline for reoffering
the plea agreement, Rose shall be immediately released from
custody. See Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“the constitutional infirmity would justify Nunes’ release, but if
the state puts him in the same position he would have been in had
he received effective counsel, that would cure the constitutional
error”).
12 The State complied, reoffering Rose an equivalent plea, and Rose
and his defense counsel signed the agreement on July 13, 2016. The
reoffered plea agreement provided that Rose would plead either guilty
or no contest to assault with a weapon, a felony in violation of § 45-5-
213, MCA, and assault, a misdemeanor in violation of § 45-5-201(1)(a),

2 The sentence imposed by the District Court following the jury trial was for a total
term of 100-years, with 20-years suspended.

* Tfeonvicted on all counts at trial and if all terms ran consecutively, Rose faced a
maximum sentence of life or 100-years for aggravated kidnapping, § 45-5-303(2), MCA
(2001); 10-years for assault on a peace officer, § 45-5-210(2)(a), MCA (2001); and 20-year
for assault with a weapon, § 45-5-213(2)(a), MCA (2001). With a PFO designation, the
maximum sentence on either the second or third count would be raised to 100-years,
§ 46-18-502(2), MCA (2001). Accordingly, the maximum available sentence would be
220-years without a plea agreement.

MCA. In exchange, the State would dismiss the aggravated kidnapping
felony charge and the assault on a peace officer felony charge. At
sentencing, the State would recommend the District Court designate
Rose as a PFO and require him to serve two consecutive periods of
commitment for a total term of 30-years with 5 suspended.’
q13 On August 11, 2016, the District Court held a change of plea
hearing on the reoffered plea agreement. Rose, present with counsel,
made a statement of apology to the District Court and several people
involved in his trial for his behavior at trial. Rose acknowledged that
at the time of the trial he had been selfish, would not accept others’
advice, and perceived himself as a victim. Rose also read a letter of
apology to the victim, who was not present, accepting responsibility for
attacking him. In an order dated August 24, 2016, the District Court
stated it viewed Rose’s “expressed change of attitude and statement of
apology” ina positive light; however, based on Lafler, the District
Court rejected the reoffered plea agreement and left Rose’s conviction
undisturbed because Rose was unwilling to accept responsibility for his
actions at the time the Plea Offer was made. The District Court
explained:
Lafler contemplates restoration, as much as possible, of the
defendant and the prosecution to the positions they occupied prior
to the date the plea offer was initially made. Significantly, Lafler
states that a defendant’s earlier expressed willingness or
unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions is a relevant.
consideration. Here, all parties are well aware of Defendant’s
failure to accept any responsibility for his actions back in 2003.
Upon consideration of the United States Supreme Court’s
discussion and directive in Lafler, and mindful of the Defendant’s
complete unwillingness to accept any responsibility for his actions
at the time the Plea Agreement was initially offered:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plea Agreement is
REJECTED. Defendant's conviction stands undisturbed.
(Emphasis in original and citations omitted).
14 Rose appeals.

“ Although the State’s recommendation was 10 years less than the Plea Offer, this
was the term of the original offer calculated by Judge Lynch and adopted by Judge
Malloy in the federal habeas corpus proceeding.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

415 The United States Supreme Court, in Lafler, recognized that
when the prosecution is required to reoffer a plea proposal, the trial
court should then “exercise its discretion in deciding whether to vacate
the conviction from trial and accept the plea or leave the conviction
undisturbed.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171, 132 S. Ct. at 1389. We review a
district court’s exercise of discretion for an abuse of that discretion.
Therefore, a district court’s decision to reject a reoffered plea
agreement is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Lafler, 566 U.S.
at 171, 182 S. Ct. at 1889. A court abuses its discretion if it acts
arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of
reason. Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, {| 65, 336 Mont. 225, 154 P.3d
561 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

16 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in rejecting the
reoffered plea agreement?

17 Preliminarily, we recognize that where a state court has denied
relief on the merits, a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief
only if the state court’s denial of his claims “resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States,” or if the state court’s denial was “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary
to [the Supreme Court’s] clearly established precedent ifthe state court
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [its] cases”
or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and
nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519-20
(2000) (O’Connor, J. concurring). Rose applied for a writ of habeas
corpus in Federal District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
arguing that our decision in Rose IJ was contrary to clearly established
precedent of the United States Supreme Court and that Rose IJ was an
unreasonable application of federal law. The Federal District Court
agreed with Rose. Our decision concerns only whether the District
Court abused its discretion in rejecting the reoffered plea agreement
and leaving Rose’s convictions and sentence undisturbed.

118 Rose argues that the Federal District Court concluded Rose had
demonstrated he would have accepted the Plea Offer, which precluded

the District Court from rejecting the reoffered plea agreement. The
State argues Lafler and the Federal District Court’s order gave the
District Court discretion to conclude Rose would not have accepted the
Plea Offer, which it properly exercised. We conclude the express terms
of the remand order which state “[t]he state trial court can then
exercise discretion in deciding whether to vacate the conviction from
trial and accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed,” allowed
the District Court certain discretion in accepting or rejecting the
reoffered plea, provided the District Court’s discretion was exercised
in accordance with Lafler.

{19 “Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right
that extends to the plea-bargaining process.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162,
132 S. Ct. at 1384 (citations omitted). “If a plea bargain has been
offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in
considering whether to accept it.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 168, 132 S. Ct. at
1887. “[A]ls a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on
terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Frye, 566
US. at 145, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. A successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim requires “[flirst, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient,” and “[s]econd, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Where the
ineffective advice led not to an offer’s acceptance but to its rejection,
the prejudice is in having to stand trial. In these circumstances, a
defendant must show that but for the ineffective assistance of counsel
there is “a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been
presented to the court (i.e. , that the defendant would have accepted the
plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of
intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its
terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s
terms” would have been less severe than under the actual sentence
imposed. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164, 132 S. Ct. at 1385.

20 At issue in Lafler was “how to apply Strickland’s prejudice test
where ineffective assistance results in a rejection of the plea offer and
the defendant is convicted at the ensuing trial.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163,
182 S. Ct. at 1884. When counsel performs deficiently at the plea
bargaining stage, Lafler recognized a defendant could suffer one of two
forms of prejudice. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170, 132 U.S. at 1389. One form
occurs where a defendant. would have received a lesser sentence on a
charge or charges under a plea proposal, but instead is convicted at
trial of the same charge or charges, and receives a greater sentence.

Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171, 132 S. Ct. at 1389. The remedy for this type of
prejudice is to resentence the defendant. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171, 132
S. Ct. at 1389 (“If the showing is made, the court may exercise
discretion in determining whether the defendant should receive the
term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence
he received at trial, or something in between.”). The other form of
prejudice, relevant here, occurs where the offer was for a guilty plea to
acount or counts less serious than the ones for which a defendant was
convicted after trial. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171, 182 S. Ct. at 1389. The
Court in Lafler determined the latter type of prejudice requires a
different remedy:
In these circumstances, the proper exercise of discretion to remedy
the constitutional injury may be to require the prosecution to
reoffer the plea proposal. Once this has occurred, the [trial] judge
can then exercise discretion in deciding whether to vacate the
conviction from trial and accept the plea or leave the conviction
undisturbed.
Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
(21 In Lafler, the United States Supreme Court declined to set a
bright-line rule for trial judges to follow in deciding whether to accept
a reoffered plea, reasoning that factors would develop over time.
Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171, 1382S. Ct. at 1389. Lafler did suggest two
considerations a trial court should weigh in making its decision
whether to accept a reoffered plea. First, a trial court should consider
the “defendant’s earlier expressed willingness, or unwillingness, to
accept responsibility for his or her actions.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171, 132
S. Ct. at 1889. Second, a trial court should consider “any information
concerning the crime that was discovered after the plea offer was
made.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171-72, 1328. Ct. at 1389. Lafler recognized
“(t]he time continuum makes it difficult to restore the defendant and
the prosecution to the precise positions they occupied prior to the
rejection of the plea offer, but that baseline can be consulted in finding
a remedy that does not require the prosecution to incur the expense of
conducting a new trial.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 172, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
22 Atissue in Missouri v. Frye, a companion case to Lafler decided on
the same day, was “whether defense counsel has the duty to
communicate the terms of a formal offer to accept a plea on terms and
conditions that may result in a lesser sentence, a conviction on lesser
charges, or both.” Frye, 566 U.S. at 145, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. In holding
that defense counsel has a duty to communicate favorable plea offers,
Frye instructs that for a defendant “[t]o show prejudice from ineffective
assistance of counsel where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected

because of counsel’s deficient performance, defendants must
demonstrate a reasonable probability they would have accepted the
earlier plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of
counsel.” Frye, 566 U.S. at 147, 1382S. Ct. at 1409. Additionally, under
Lafler, a defendant must show “that the court would have accepted”
the offer’s terms, “and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under
the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment
and sentence that in fact were imposed.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164, 132
S. Ct. at 1385.

23 Here, the District Court, at the change of plea hearing and in its
order rejecting the reoffered plea, expressed “sincere doubts” that Rose
would have “accepted the Plea Agreement back in 2003, when [Rose]
was fully entrenched in his denial that he had done anything wrong
and was blaming his unfortunate legal situation on the victim, the
prosecution, and his defense attorneys.” (Emphasis in original.) The
District Court commented: “Now, we'll never know for sure, obviously.
But Mr. Rose’s whole approach to this case was to deny responsibility,
to blame the victim and to do everything humanly possible to frustrate
the judicial process to resolve the issue of his guilt or innocence.” Citing
Lafler, the District Court reasoned that Rose’s earlier expressed
unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions was a relevant
consideration: “Lafler contemplates restoration, as much as possible,
of the defendant and the prosecution to the positions they occupied
prior to the date the plea offer was initially made. ... Here, all parties
are well aware of [Rose’s] failure to accept any responsibility for his
actions back in 2003.”

24 When the State is required to reoffer a plea proposal pursuant to
Lafler, the trial court is allowed to exercise its discretion between two
options: the trial court may either vacate the defendant’s conviction
and accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed. Lafler, 566
US. at 171, 132 S. Ct. at 1389. One consideration a trial court may
make is whether the defendant was, at the time the plea offer was
originally made, willing to accept responsibility for the crime. Lafler,
566 U.S. at 171, 1382 S. Ct. at 1389. Rose argues the Federal District
Court already concluded he would have accepted the Plea Offer when
it was originally made and the District Court was constrained by that
conclusion. We disagree. Lafler and the Federal District. Court invited
the District Court to exercise its discretion between either vacating
Rose’s conviction and accepting the reoffered plea or leaving his
conviction undisturbed. Lafler instructs consideration of the
defendant's willingness to accept responsibility at the time the plea
offer was first made. The District Court was familiar with Rose and his

behavior at the time the Plea Offer was first made and concluded Rose
would not have accepted it because he was unwilling to accept
responsibility at the time it was first made.

125 Tl Ample evidence in the record supports the District Court’s
conclusion that Rose would not have accepted the Plea Offer. Sather’s
testimony indicated Rose was “against” pleading and instead was
intent and very focused on trial, certain witnesses, and various
defenses, including that Rose lacked the requisite mental state, had
been involuntarily intoxicated, or was acting in self-defense. Corn’s
testimony indicated he made an initial plea offer with favorable terms
and Rose never accepted it. In fact, Rose always considered the initial
plea offer available to him, but never attempted to accept it. In Rose’s
testimony at the change of plea hearing, held on August 11, 2016, Rose
admitted he was unwilling to accept responsibility for his actions prior
to his 2008 trial. In his testimony, Rose prefaced his apologies by
admitting that at trial he saw himself “as a victim” and that his
situation “was everybody else’s fault. It wasn’t [his] fault.” Rose
admitted it had taken him some time in prison to accept responsibility
and “get out of that victim mind-frame.”

126 [Ml Based upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude the
District Court abused its discretion by considering Rose’s
unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions and rejecting the
reoffered plea. Instead, the District Court was explicitly instructed by
the Federal District Court to “exercise discretion” and use Lafler as a
guide. Lafler clearly directs trial courts to consider a defendant's
earlier expressed unwillingness to accept responsibility when
determining whether to “accept the plea or leave the conviction
undisturbed.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 171, 132 S. Ct. at 1389. Considering
the District Court’s sincere doubts Rose would have accepted the Plea
Offer, other evidence in the record, and Rose’s admission that at the
time of his trial, he felt he was the victim, we conclude the District
Court did not act arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or
outside the bounds of reason and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting the State’s reoffered plea agreement.

27 2. Did the District Court err in failing to allow Rose to withdraw
his guilty plea?

28 Rose signed a Guilty Plea and Waiver of Rights on July 28, 2016.
Rose argues he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
once the District Court rejected the reoffered plea agreement. The
State responds by arguing that this Court should not consider Rose’s
argument because he is raising it for the first time on appeal. Further,
the State argues the Federal District Court correctly concluded

allowing Rose to withdraw his plea would contravene the remedy
outlined in Lafler. We agree with the State.

29 Rose relies on § 46-12-211(4), MCA, “If the court rejects a plea
agreement ... the court shall ... afford the defendant the opportunity to
withdraw the plea ....” Rose raised this issue in the Federal District
Court. The Federal District Court found § 46-12-211(4), MCA,
“inapplicable” to Rose’s reoffered plea explaining, “Lafler plainly
provides that when inadequate assistance of counsel causes
nonacceptance of a plea offer and further proceedings led to a less
favorable outcome, the conviction is to be left undisturbed if the trial
court decides to reject the reofferleld plea agreement.” “[A] remedy
must ‘neutralize the taint’ of a constitutional violation, while at the
same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander
the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal
prosecution.” Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89 (citations
omitted). According to the Federal District Court, allowing Rose to
withdraw his guilty plea if the District Court rejected it “would allow
[Rose] to proceed [to] trial when he already received a jury trial free of
constitutional error and according to Lafler the proper remedy should
‘not require the prosecution to incur the expense of conducting a new
trial” ” Section 46-12-211(4), MCA, contemplates plea agreement
procedure occurring prior to trial and we agree with the Federal
District Court, the statute is inapplicable to a rejected plea agreement
reoffered after the defendant receives a full and fair trial.

130 Hl We agree with the Federal District Court. Allowing Rose to
withdraw his guilty plea is not required and contrary to Lafler. The
District Court did not err by not allowing Rose to withdraw his guilty
plea after it rejected the reoffered plea agreement.

CONCLUSION

31 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the
reoffered plea agreement and leaving the convictions and sentence
undisturbed. The District Court also did not err by failing to allow Rose
to withdraw his plea after it was rejected.
q32 Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT, SHEA and
RICE concur.

YVONNE WILSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
RODNEY D. BRANDT, M.D., and FLATHEAD
VALLEY ORTHOPEDIC CENTER, P.C.,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 17-0075.
Submitted on Briefs October 4, 2017.
Decided November 28, 2017.
2017 MT 290.

389 Mont. 387.

406 P.3d 452.

For Appellant: James G. Hunt, Hunt Law Firm, Helena.

For Appellees: Sean Goicoechea, Chris Di Lorenzo, Moore,
Cockrell, Goicoechea & Johnson, P.C., Kalispell.

JUSTICE BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Dr. Rodney D. Brandt performed surgery to repair Yvonne
Wilson’s torn ACL in February 2008. She began to experience new and
excruciating knee pain shortly after surgery. On November 5, 2012,
Wilson filed a claim with the District Court asserting that Dr. Brandt
negligently performed surgery on her knee. The District Court granted
summary judgment to Dr. Brandt, holding that Wilson’s claim was
filed after the three-year statute of limitations had run. Wilson
appeals, arguing the District Court erred in concluding as a matter of
law that her claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. We reverse.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

{2 On October 30, 2007, Wilson twisted her left knee while removing
a pool cover at work. An MRI showed a medial meniscus tear of her left
knee. Dr. Brandt, an orthopedic surgeon at Flathead Valley Orthopedic
Center, P.C. (FVOC), performed a medial meniscus resection on
December 13, 2007, to repair the tear. During surgery, Dr. Brandt
discovered that Wilson’s ACL was partially torn, but did not repair the
tear, noting that the chance of needing additional surgery was less
than 50 percent. Wilson’s symptoms of knee instability and buckling
continued, however, and Dr. Brandt performed ACL reconstruction
surgery on February 4, 2008. The ACL reconstruction procedure
involved drilling a hole through the tibia bone, known as a “tibial
tunnel.”

{3 In follow-up appointments from March through May 2008, Dr.
Brandt noted that Wilson was “doing absolutely fabulous,” “extremely
well,” and was “approaching maximum medical improvement.” His
notes after the May 2008 appointment indicate that Wilson was having
“some pes anserinus pain.” The pes anserinus refers to the area where
three tendons insert into the tibia bone located at the inner part of the
knee. Dr. Brandt gave her a local injection of cortisone to help ease the
pain.

{4 Contrary to Dr. Brandt’s impressions, Wilson testified that in the
weeks following surgery, she experienced new and excruciating pain at
the site of the tibial tunnel, as well as popping and cracking and
continued knee buckling. She testified that during this time she “didn’t
know’ if the “pain ... was related to the hole that had been drilled in
[her] knee,” and that she did not ask why she was having the new pain

because she had had “two different types of surgeries, one was more
aggressive than the other, like the ACL is more aggressive than the
meniscus. And so [she] thought it all joined together.” During her
deposition, in response to the question whether she thought there was
something new wrong, she said she was “concerned” and that she
“knew there was something wrong” with her knee during this time. In
July 2008, Dr. Brandt performed a third knee surgery on Wilson after
she fell and reinjured her left knee meniscus.

q5 Dr. Brandt’s notes from a September 2008 appointment state that
Wilson was “starting to have some nerve type pain.” The notes go on
to say that he told Wilson that she would “get better and the nerve
pain will burn out.” At Wilson’s appointment on October 8, 2008, Dr.
Brandt noted that Wilson “continueld] to struggle” and that “I have
discussed with the patient that I am really not certain what is going
on” and that she was “not within the bell curve of normalcy” for
recovery after an ACL surgery. He ordered an MRI to rule out “internal
derangement.” In his notes reviewing the October 2008 MRI, Dr.
Brandt stated that he “continue[d] to diagnose this as complex regional
pain syndrome’—also known as reflex sympathetic dystrophy
(RSD)—that “will eventually burn out.” Wilson testified that sometime
during this period Dr. Brandt told her that RSD developed because “he
did too many surgeries in a short period of time.”

{6 Over the next several months, Wilson met with Ann Ingraham, a
nurse practitioner at FVOC, and continued to report knee pain to her.
On January 13, 2009, Ingraham ordered another MRI to investigate
the pain. Upon review of the MRI, Dr. Brandt noted that. Wilson
continued to report a “significant amount of nerve pain,” but he saw
“no interval change” since the last MRI. He believed additional surgical
intervention would be inappropriate based on what he saw in the MRI.
Wilson, meanwhile, continued to report pain to her healthcare
providers. After another MRI on June 25, 2009, Dr. Brandt repeated
his recommendation that further surgical intervention would be
inappropriate. In September 2009, Wilson’s workers’ compensation
insurance stopped authorizing further treatment from FVOC
providers. She was referred from FVOC to Montana Center for
Wellness & Pain Management on November 3, 2009, to manage her
pain.

{7 InJune 2010, providers at the Montana Center referred Wilson to
Dr. James Blasingame, an orthopedic surgeon with Northwest
Orthopedics and Sports Medicine, for a second opinion about her
continuing knee pain. Dr. Blasingame wrote in his notes from her
initial appointment that he did not think Wilson had RSD and ordered

another MRI. At the July 26, 2010 appointment to discuss the results
of the MRI, Dr. Blasingame noted “a somewhat unusual tibial tunnel”
and a possible need for surgical intervention. After gathering other
opinions, Dr. Blasingame met with Wilson again on September 10,
2010, and recommended surgical intervention to bone graft the tibial
tunnel. He noted he was “unclear as to the exact reason for her knee
discomfort. Certainly, the patient’s study is quite abnormal with the
course of the graft and the subchondral support being compromised by
the graft.” On December 7, 2010, he noted: “The thought of bone
grafting [the tibial tunnel] was an effort to decrease her pain,
obviously, but the pain may well be multifactorial as fully outlined in
the chart.”

{8 The Montana State Fund sent Wilson to get another opinion from
Dr. Michael J. Schutte on January 25, 2011. Upon review of her MRI
and medical records, Dr. Schutte noted an “anterior impingement of
ACL graft tissue related to aberrant tunnel placement” and suggested
atwo-stage surgical intervention. Wilson attested in an affidavit: “I did
not know that Dr. Brandt messed up my surgery until I met with Dr.
Schutte.” Dr. Blasingame agreed with Dr. Schutte’s recommendation
for a two-stage procedure and performed the first stage of the surgical
intervention in April 2011.

q9 On May 7, 2012, Wilson filed her complaint with the Montana
Medical Legal Panel (MMLP), claiming that Dr. Brandt negligently
performed surgery on her knee on February 4, 2008, by drilling a tibial
tunnel in the wrong location. The MMLP issued its decision on August
21, 2012, and Wilson filed her complaint with the District. Court on
November 5, 2012. Dr. Brandt moved for summary judgment, arguing
that Wilson’s claims were barred by the three-year statute of
limitations contained in § 27-2-205, MCA.

{10 The District Court reviewed the evidence submitted and held that
Wilson discovered the fact that she was injured and tied that injury to
Dr. Brandt's ACL surgery within two months of the February 2008
surgery.’ The District Court held that the injury was not self-
concealing, citing Wilson’s testimony that she experienced new pain in
the place where she knew Dr. Brandt had drilled a hole in her bone, as

' The statute of limitations is tolled from the filing of an application with the
MMLP until 30 days after the panel renders its decision. Section 27-6-702, MCA.
Wilson’s statute of limitations was tolled from May 7, 2012, to August 21, 2012, plus 30
days. Taking this tolled period into account, the applicable three-year statute of
limitations for Wilson’s complaint filed on November 5, 2012, bars recovery for any
injury discovered before June 20, 2009.

well as other new symptoms, shortly after her ACL surgery. The court
emphasized further that Wilson said she “knew there was something
wrong.” The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Dr.
Brandt.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

11 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Dvorak v. Mont. State Fund , 2013 MT 210, {| 15, 371 Mont. 175, 305
P.3d 873. We apply the criteria of M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) to determine
whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether
“the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” M. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3); see also Dvorak, {] 15. In evaluating a motion for summary
judgment, we review the record independently and afford no deference
to the district court’s decision. Siebken v. Voderberg, 2012 MT 291,
{| 20, 367 Mont. 344, 291 P.3d 572. We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment. Siebken, | 20.

DISCUSSION

12 Wilson argues that the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment because the date on which she discovered or reasonably
should have discovered her injury involves disputed issues of material
fact. She argues that the District Court ignored facts that demonstrate
genuine issues for trial, such as Dr. Brandt’s diagnosis of RSD to
explain her pain. She argues that under Lorang v. Fortis Ins. Co., 2008
MT 252, {] 136, 345 Mont. 12, 192 P.3d 186, “questions of fact may be
determined as a matter of law on summary judgment if ‘reasonable
minds could reach but one conclusion’ on the issue.” (quoting Seeley v.
Davis, 284 Mont. 517, 523, 946 P.2d 119, 122 (1997)). Wilson maintains
that reasonable minds could reach different. conclusions about when
she discovered or reasonably should have discovered her injury.

13 Dr. Brandt counters that the statute of limitations begins to run
when a plaintiff discovers or through reasonable diligence should
discover (1) her injury, and (2) that the injury “may have been caused”
by the defendant medical provider. Wisher v. Higgs, 257 Mont. 132,
144, 849 P.2d 152, 159 (1993), overruled on other grounds by Blackburn
v. Blue Mt. Women’s Clinic, 286 Mont. 60, 75, 951 P.2d 1, 10 (1997). He
argues that the disputed facts that Wilson raises are irrelevant to this
determination, because her testimony and the testimony from two of
her friends establish that within a few months of her ACL surgery
Wilson discovered (1) her injury, and (2) that it may have been caused

by Dr. Brandt’s actions—more than three years before she filed her
claim with the District Court.

14 Since 1971, the limitations period for medical malpractice has
been governed by its own statute, separate from the general statute of
limitations for other torts. 1971 Mont. Laws ch. 328, § 1. In adopting
§ 27-2-205, MCA, the Legislature codified language from this Court’s
discovery doctrine case law. Compare 1971 Mont. Laws ch. 328, § 1
(tolling the statute of limitations until “the plaintiff discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
injury”); with Johnson v. St. Patrick’s Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 132, 417
P.2d 469, 478 (1966) (holding that, when a surgeon negligently leaves
a foreign object in a patient’s body, the statute of limitations is tolled
“antil the patient learns of, or in exercise of reasonable care and
diligence should have learned of the presence of such foreign object in
his body”). Section 27-2-205, MCA (2007)—the statute in effect at the
time of Wilson’s ACL reconstruction surgery in 2008—provides, in
relevant part, that actions for medical malpractice “must ... be
commenced within 3 years after the date of injury or within 3 years
after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever occurs last.” (Emphasis
added.)

415 Our jurisprudence around the medical malpractice statute of
limitations borrows both from prior case law and from the general tort
statute of limitations. Section 27-2-205, MCA, codified a specific
version of the discovery doctrine for medical malpractice cases. Some
of our prior decisions applying § 27-2-205, MCA, rely on cases that are
not governed by § 27-2-205, MCA, to interpret the statute. The parties
repeat this framework of analysis in their briefing on appeal,
discussing at length whether Wilson’s injury was “concealed or self-
concealing.” But when the Legislature amended the general statute of
limitations for torts, it adopted different language for the discovery
doctrine applicable to torts other than medical malpractice. See 1987
Mont. Laws ch. 441, § 1; § 27-2-102(3), MCA. By adopting different
statutes, the Legislature has made clear that, for purposes of tolling
the statute of limitations, medical malpractice is treated differently
from other torts. See § 27-2-102(4), MCA (“Subsection (3) [prescribing
the discovery doctrine exceptions to the general tort statute of
limitations] does not apply to actions involving the limitations

? In 2015, the Legislature amended § 27-2-205, MCA, from 3 years to 2 years. See
2015 Mont. Laws ch. 368, § 21

contained in 27-2-205 [the medical malpractice statute of
limitations].”); Gregg v. Whitefish City Council, 2004 MT 262, {| 38, 323
Mont. 109, 99 P.3d 151 (“Different language is to be given different
construction.”). Here, we apply to the facts of this case the language of
§ 27-2-205, MCA, in the context of the Legislature’s adoption of
somewhat different language when it later codified the discovery
doctrine in § 27-2-102(3), MCA, for all other torts.

{116 Before the enactment of § 27-2-205, MCA, this Court had adopted
the discovery doctrine in medical malpractice cases. Johnson, 148
Mont. at 132, 417 P.2d at 473. Under this doctrine, the statute of
limitations was tolled “until the patient learns of, or in exercise of
reasonable care and diligence should have learned of,” his or her
injury. Johnson, 148 Mont. at 132, 417 P.2d at 473. Making this
determination required “look[ing] carefully at the facts of each case
presented, for the problems presented in each is how and when the
patient discovered the negligence.” Johnson, 148 Mont. at 128, 417
P.2d at 470. The doctrine was based on equitable considerations of
“giving full scope to the statute of limitations on the one hand and
according a reasonable measure of justice to the plaintiff on the other.”
Grey v. Silver Bow Cnty., 149 Mont. 213, 217, 425 P.2d 819, 821 (1967)
(quoting Owens v. White, 342 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1965)). In
summing up the development of the discovery doctrine in our early
case law, we explained in Bennett v. Dow Chem. Co. that the discovery
doctrine allowed the statute of limitations to be tolled until a plaintiff
discovered that his injury “may have been caused” by the defendant,
but not “beyond discovery of the cause of an injury.” Bennett, 220 Mont.
117, 121, 713 P.2d 992, 995 (1986).

{17 Between the 1971 enactment of § 27-2-205, MCA, and the 1987
amendment of § 27-2-102, MCA, this Court continued to use and
develop the discovery doctrine outside the medical malpractice context.
See, e.g., Bennett, 220 Mont. at 121-22, 713 P.2d at 995 (discussing
application of the discovery doctrine to negligence and products
liability claims). During this time, we clarified limitations on use of the
discovery doctrine, applying the doctrine only if the injury was self-
concealing by its nature or if the defendant concealed the facts of the
injury from the injured party. See Monroe v. Harper, 164 Mont. 23, 27,
518 P.2d 788, 790 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Blackburn, 286
Mont. at 75, 951 P.2d at 10. In 1987, the Legislature incorporated
these developments into the general statute of limitations for torts.
1987 Mont. Laws ch. 441, § 1. In enacting these amendments, the
Legislature also changed the requirement from discovery of the
“injury” to discovery of “the facts constituting the claim,” after hearing

testimony that this was a better reflection of this Court’s discovery
doctrine case law. Senate Judiciary Committee Report, January 29,
1987, p. 8. Section 27-2-205, MCA, however, has not been amended to
reflect these developments. Despite this, this Court has relied on cases
outside medical malpractice without distinction or clarification when
called on to interpret the medical malpractice statute of limitations in
§ 27-2-205, MCA. See, e.g., Wisher, 257 Mont. at 140, 849 P.2d at 156-
57.

18 Although it is not improper for us to look to these developments
in the law to aid our interpretation of the statute, we must do so with
the role of the judge in mind. When interpreting a statute, it is our role
“simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance
contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what
has been inserted.” Section 1-2-101, MCA. The plain language of § 27-
2-205, MCA, does not call for a separate determination that an injury
be “self-concealing” or that the defendant took “action which prevents
the injured party from discovering the injury or its cause” in order to
toll the statute of limitations. The express exclusion of medical
malpractice from the general discovery statute, § 27-2-102(4), MCA,
reinforces this. The terms of § 27-2-205, MCA, instead allow the tolling
of medical malpractice claims until the time that a plaintiff “discovers
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury.”

{19 We have interpreted the statute of limitation provision contained
in § 27-2-205, MCA, on three occasions: Major v. N. Valley Hosp., 233
Mont 25, 759 P.2d 153 (1988), overruled on other grounds by
Blackburn, 286 Mont. at 75, 951 P.2d at 10; Wisher, 257 Mont. at 132,
849 P.2d at 152; and Runstrom v. Allen, 2008 MT 281, 345 Mont. 314,
191 P.3d 410. In these cases, we have held that the statute of
limitations begins to run when a plaintiff discovers or through
reasonable diligence should have discovered both (1) the injury; and (2)
that the injury “may have been caused” by the defendant medical
provider. Wisher, 257 Mont. at 144, 849 P.2d at 159; Major, 233 Mont.
at 30, 759 P.2d at 156. But the statute of limitations is not tolled until
a plaintiff discovers her legal right to bring an action for known
injuries. Wisher, 257 Mont. at 140, 849 P.2d at 157; Major, 233 P.2d at
30, 759 P.2d at 156-57. Nor is the statute tolled until a plaintiff learns
the facts out of which a known cause of action arose.” Wisher, 257
Mont. at 140, 849 P.2d at 157.

{20 In Major, the plaintiffs daughter suffered from a form of lupus,
which included episodes of throat swelling and breathing difficulty.
Major, 233 Mont. at 26-27, 759 P.2d at 154. On the day of her

daughter’s death in March 1982, the plaintiff called the hospital to
inform the staff that her daughter’s throat was closing and that she
and her daughter were en route from Kalispell to the hospital in
Whitefish. Major, 233 Mont. at 26, 759 P.2d at 154. Upon their arrival,
the hospital staff had not yet called the doctor. Major, 233 Mont. at 27,
759 P.2d at 154. The plaintiff's daughter died in the hospital several
hours later. Major, 233 Mont. at 27, 759 P.2d at 154. The plaintiff
consulted with an attorney shortly thereafter, who advised her she
should acquire her daughter’s medical records. Major, 233 Mont. at 27,
759 P.2d at 154. The plaintiff was unable to acquire the records until
October 1984. Major, 233 Mont. at 27, 759 P.2d at 154. She filed her
complaint in April 1985, more than three years after her daughter's
death. Major, 233 Mont. at 27, 759 P.2d at 154. The district court
granted summary judgment on the statute of limitations, and we
affirmed. The plaintiff argued on appeal that the statute of limitations
should have been tolled until she received the medical records and
could thus discover the facts that provided “a causal connection
between her daughter’s death and the acts, errors, or omissions of her
daughter’s health care provider.” Major, 233 Mont. at 30, 759 P.2d
at 156. After reviewing the record, we rejected her argument and held
that the plaintiff's testimony demonstrated that on the day of her
daughter’s death, the plaintiff thought her daughter’s treatment was
inadequate. Major, 233 Mont. at 30, 759 P.2d at 156. We held that
under the circumstances, her lack of knowledge of the facts contained
in the medical record did not prevent her from discovering the injury
at issue in the case. Major, 233 Mont. at 30, 759 P.2d at 157.

21 In Wisher, the plaintiff underwent left facial nerve decompression
surgery to treat Bell’s palsy. Wisher, 257 Mont. at 135, 849 P.2d at 153-
54. Immediately after surgery she began to have new symptoms of
pain, nausea, dizziness, loss of equilibrium, vomiting, and buzzing in
her left ear. Wisher, 257 Mont. at 135, 849 P.2d at 154. Her surgeon
attributed these symptoms to the side effects of anesthesia and a
condition called post-operative labyrinthitis. Wisher, 257 Mont. at 135,
849 P.2d at 154. The plaintiffs initial symptoms seemed to improve for
about two years, but she continued to have problems both related and
unrelated to the surgery over the ensuing years. Wisher, 257 Mont. at
148, 849 P.2d at 159. Several years and multiple diagnoses later,
another doctor discovered that the surgeon had perforated the
plaintiffs inner ear during the nerve decompression surgery. Wisher,
257 Mont. at 137-38, 849 P.2d at 155. We held that there was no
evidence that the plaintiff knew or suspected that she suffered from an
injury as a result of her surgery or that she could have discovered this

through the use of due diligence. Wisher, 257 Mont. at 143-44, 849 P.2d
at 159. We relied on Johnson and Grey, the cases in which we first
enunciated the doctrine of discovery. We distinguished Major, holding
that in Major the wrongful act “was easily identifiable and the injury
simultaneous and obvious.” Wisher, 257 Mont. at 140, 849 P.2d at 157.
We held that substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict that
the statute of limitations had run. Wisher, 257 Mont. at 144, 849 P.2d
at 159.

122 In Runstrom, the plaintiffs sixteen-year-old son broke his femur
in an all-terrain vehicle accident and died the next day in the hospital.
Runstrom, { 7. The day of his son’s death, the plaintiff requested an
autopsy and confronted the doctor because, “[in tloday’s time, you
know, people don’t usually die from a broken leg.” Runstrom, {| 7, 33.
Within weeks, he obtained his son’s autopsy report and medical records
and consulted with an attorney, but no suit was filed at that time.
Runstrom, {| 7. Four years later, the local paper ran an article
reporting on administrative proceedings regarding the doctor.
Runstrom, {| 8. Although his son was not named in the article, the
plaintiff believed that his son was one of the unnamed patients
discussed in the article. Runstrom, {| 8. Several months after the
newspaper article was published, the plaintiff filed a malpractice suit
against the doctor. Runstrom, { 9. The plaintiff argued that he did not
discover his son’s injury until he read the newspaper article.
Runstrom, {| 34. We rejected this argument because the newspaper
article contained no new information. Runstrom, | 37. The autopsy
report and medical records in his possession since shortly after his
son’s death contained all of the information upon which the plaintiff
later based his medical malpractice suit. Runstrom, {] 37.

23 Some of these opinions borrowed language from the non-medical
malpractice context to interpret the language of § 27-2-205, MCA. But
despite those references to terms used in the general tort statute, we
conclude that both § 27-2-205, MCA, and our jurisprudence since its
enactment accord with our prior medical malpractice case law applying
the discovery doctrine when the “patient does not know of his own
condition ... until some time later when he learns of, or in the exercise
of reasonable care and diligence he should have learned of it.” Grey,
149 Mont. at 216, 425 P.2d at 820. As we noted in Johnson, this may
require “lookling] carefully at the facts of each case presented.”
Johnson, 148 Mont. at 128, 417 P.2d at 470. Summary judgment is
proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact. See M. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(3). When reasonable minds can reach more than one
conclusion on the accrual of a plaintiff's claim, a jury may consider the

nature of the injury and other surrounding circumstances in resolving
the factual dispute over discovery.”

24 Our de novo review of the record reveals the following material
facts:

{25 Drilling a hole in Wilson’s bone was part of the ACL repair. Wilson
was informed of this and consented to it. Wilson testified in her
deposition that she had new pain after the ACL surgery. Wilson knew
that Dr. Brandt drilled a hole in her knee and that she had pain—a
common occurrence after a surgery. She “didn’t know” if the “pain ...
was related to the hole that had been drilled in [her] knee,” in the
months after surgery. She stated she did not ask why she was having
the new pain because she had had “two different types of surgeries, one
was more aggressive than the other, like the ACL is more aggressive
than the meniscus. And so [she] thought it all joined together.” When
asked whether she thought there was something new wrong, she said
she was “concerned” and that she “knew there was something wrong”
with her knee during this time. She testified that Dr. Brandt
attributed her pain to RSD. Dr. Brandt’s records confirm his
impression of RSD and his belief that more surgery was not needed. In
Wilson’s submitted affidavit, she attested that she did not know Dr.
Brandt “messed up” until meeting with Dr. Schutte. Even striking any
possible hearsay statements from the affidavit, Wilson’s claim of her
own personal knowledge and impression after her meeting with Dr.
Schutte are consistent with her deposition testimony.’

26 Tammy Munroe, a friend of Wilson, testified in a deposition that
she knew about only two of Wilson’s six knee surgeries. She testified
that a month or two after the ACL surgery Wilson told her that the
“ACL just wasn’t working, and it hurt her a lot.” Munroe said that
after the second surgery, when discussing her pain, Wilson “didn’t tell
me different, but she described it different[ly]” from her pain before the

° The second sentence of § 27-2-205, MCA, allows tolling “for any period during
which there has been a failure to disclose any act, error, or omission upon which an
action is based,” We held in a prior case that this sentence applies exclusively to toll the
five-year statute of repose and does not apply to the statute of limitations. Blackburn,
286 Mont. at 75, 951 P.2d at 10. This language is thus inapplicable in the current case.

* Dr. Brandt argues that to the extent Wilson relies on her affidavit to argue that
she was not aware of her injury until meeting with Dr. Schutte, the affidavit is contrary
to her sworn deposition testimony. We disagree. She testified during her deposition that
she experienced “new” and “excruciating” pain after her surgery. She did not testify that
she recognized that she had been injured or that she believed any new injury may have
been caused by Dr. Brandt’s actions.

ACL surgery.

27 Another of Wilson’s friends, Shannon Penney, testified in a
deposition on November 10, 2016, about Wilson’s knee pain and
surgeries. Penney testified that within six months to a year after the
ACL surgery, Wilson told Penney that “[s]he knew there just wasn’t
something right with her knee after that surgery, and she'd go to
doctors, and then they'd send her to physical therapy. And she would
constantly say, you know, There’s something wrong. And she’d show
me like her knee was indented really weird, just it looked deformed,
and it would ache.” When asked when Wilson first thought about
hiring an attorney, Penney stated “It’s—was it four years ago? Five
years ago?” When asked how soon after Dr. Brandt’s second surgery
Wilson considered hiring an attorney, Penney answered that Wilson
was in a lot of pain right after surgery, but “I guess I couldn’t give you
an exact time frame, because I don’t know.”

128 Wilson’s medical records show that Wilson continued to report
pain to her medical providers, including Dr. Brandt, after the surgery.
They show that Dr. Brandt diagnosed Wilson with RSD and concluded
that it explained the pain she was having. It was not until Wilson’s
June 2010 appointment with Dr. Blasingame that Wilson’s pain was
attributed to something besides RSD or nerve pain that would burn
out.

29 Upon review of the full record, we conclude that the material facts
are not undisputed that, before June 20, 2009, Wilson both recognized
that she was injured and that her injuries may have been caused by
Dr. Brandt or, alternatively, that through reasonable diligence she
should have discovered her injury and its cause. Rather, there is more
than one permissible inference that could be made based on Wilson’s
testimony and medical records. From the evidence, we conclude that
the finder of fact reasonably could infer that Wilson discovered her
injury and that Dr. Brandt’s surgery may have been the cause of that
injury soon after the ACL surgery. As in Major, it could be inferred
that Wilson’s lack of knowledge of the facts connecting her pain to the
aberrant tibial tunnel did not prevent her or should not have prevented
her from discovering the injury at issue because she knew that her
pain was new and excruciating. But drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of Wilson as the non-moving party, as required in considering
a summary judgment motion, we conclude that the finder of fact
alternatively could infer that she knew only that she was having pain
from her surgeries, but not that the surgeries had injured her or that
any new injury may have been caused by Dr. Brandt’s actions. As in
Wisher, it could be inferred that Wilson did not and could not discover

her injury because pain can be expected after surgery and her
symptoms were attributed to another cause.

130 [J Thus, more than one inference could be drawn from this
evidence about whether Wilson discovered or should have discovered
her injury and whether it may have been connected to Dr. Brandt’s
actions during this time. Objective evidence supports both inferences.
Weighing this evidence and determining when Wilson discovered or
reasonably should have discovered her injury is an issue for the jury to
decide. See Nelson v. Nelson, 2002 MT 151, {| 24, 310 Mont. 329, 50
P.3d 139 (“The rule in Montana, and in the majority of jurisdictions, is
that when there is conflicting evidence as to when a cause of action
accrued, the question of whether an action is barred by the statute of
limitations is for the jury to decide.”). Based on our review of the
record, we conclude that there are questions of material fact about
when Wilson was aware of—or should have been aware of—sufficient
facts to believe she was injured by Dr. Brandt’s alleged actions during
surgery.

31 HM Just as in Siebken, “[wle reverse the decision of the District
Court not because we conclude [Wilson] did file a timely action, but
because we conclude the matter should not have been decided on
summary judgment.” Siebken, {| 20. Wilson is entitled to have a jury
decide when she discovered or through reasonable diligence should
have discovered her injury and that it may have been caused by Dr.
Brandt.

CONCLUSION
(32 The District Court’s order granting summary judgment is reversed
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES McKINNON,
SANDEFUR and SHEA concur.

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
DANIEL E. ORR,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.

MELINDA J. ORR,
Respondent and Appellee.

No. DA 17-0095.
Submitted on Briefs October 11, 2017.
Decided November 28, 2017.
Rehearing Denied December 28, 2017.
2017 MT 291.

389 Mont. 400.

Le |

For Appellant: Jamie J. McKittrick, Thomas H. Stanton,
Wells & McKittrick, P.C.; Missoula.

For Appellee: Raymond P. Tipp, Tipp Coburn Schandelson, P.C.;
Missoula.

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1 Daniel E. Orr (Daniel) appeals the order denying his motion to
modify maintenance, entered in the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula
County. We affirm, and address the following issue:

Did the District Court err when it determined that maintenance,

incorporated into the decree from the marital property settlement

agreement, was not modifiable by the court?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q2 Daniel and Melinda Orr, n/k/a Melinda Koffler, (Melinda) were
married in 1985 and have three adult children. Daniel filed a petition
for dissolution of marriage in July 2013. Both parties were represented
by counsel and engaged in lengthy negotiations that ultimately
resulted in a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (the
Agreement) on May 16, 2014, in which the parties consented to entry
of a Decree of Legal Separation. The District Court entered a Final
Decree of Legal Separation the same day, incorporating the Agreement
and, although the record before us does not include the transcript of
the hearing, the Decree states the District Court found the Agreement
was reasonable, equitable, and not unconscionable.
q3 The Agreement divided assets and debts between the parties.
Section 11 addressed maintenance, and section 13 distributed property,
including the couple’s business, Iron Orr Welding, Inc. (the business).'
The Agreement provided that if the matter remained a legal
separation, Melinda was entitled to 30% monthly distributions from
the business, but would receive no maintenance. However, if the
matter was converted into a marriage dissolution, then Melinda would
relinquish her interest in the business and Daniel would pay Melinda
$3,000 per month in maintenance for a period of three and one-half
years. Section 21 stated as follows, including a provision regarding
modification:

21. ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement contains the entire

agreement of the parties. There are no representations,

‘Daniel's motion to modify maintenance attributed the $170,841 in adjusted gross
income on the parties’ 2013 federal income tax return to their welding business.

warranties, covenants, or any other undertakings of any sort of
nature other than those expressly set forth or discussed herein.
Time is of the essence of the terms and condition of this
Agreement. This Agreement may not be amended or modified
except by an agreement in writing, duly subscribed and
acknowledged with the same formality that has been employed in
the execution of this Agreement.
(Underline and bold in original, emphasis added.)
q4 On November 19, 2014, on Daniel’s motion, the District Court
converted the Decree of Legal Separation to a Decree of Dissolution of
Marriage, triggering Melinda’s relinquishment of her interest in the
business and Daniel’s obligation to pay her $3,000 monthly
maintenance payments, beginning December 2014. At that time,
Daniel was operating the business in the Bakken oil fields in North
Dakota, and he made maintenance payments to Melinda for six
months, totaling $18,000. However, when the oil market declined,
Daniel was unable to find work in North Dakota, and he moved back
to Montana. He then began employment in a non-welding position,
earning about $3,000 per month in take-home pay.
q5 Citing a change in circumstances, Daniel moved the court to
modify the maintenance provision in the Agreement in March 2016,
asking that he be completely relieved of any maintenance obligation.
The matter was assigned to a Standing Master, who conducted a
hearing. Melinda testified that she agreed to relinquish her share in
the business, which she had helped to build, only because of the
maintenance provision. She testified she was paying off significant
debts assigned to her under the Agreement, and without the
maintenance money, she would have to file for bankruptcy. For his
part, Daniel testified that “I had to make this deal in order for
[Melinda] to sign the divorce and [I] kept telling everybody that the oil
field was not going to last.” Daniel testified he had almost no assets
and no retirement savings, and he was living in a fifth-wheel trailer for
which he was making payments. Daniel also testified his welding
business was now in poor financial condition, and believed he was
earning more in his non-welding job than he would earn if he returned
to welding.
{6 The Standing Master reduced the maintenance, citing her
equitable powers, ordering Daniel to pay $500 a month for 24 months.
The Standing Master also ordered Daniel to sell a broken-down race
car he owned for a minimum of $4,000, and pay Melinda the proceeds.
These provisions would have relieved Daniel of approximately $96,000
he still owed to Melinda in maintenance under the Agreement.

{7 Melinda objected, requesting review of the Standing Master’s
decision by the District Court. The District Court first reasoned that
the Agreement is a contract, which must, under § 28-3-401, MCA, be
construed according to its “clear and explicit language,” and concluded
“(while the [non-modification] provision is in fact one sentence out of
a larger paragraph, it is still quite ‘clear and explicit’ that the
[Agreement] cannot be modified absent a written agreement of the
parties.” The District Court also reasoned that § 40-4-201(6), MCA, and
Montana case law, precludes a District Court from modifying
maintenance when an agreement prohibits modification. Daniel
appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
q8 The construction and interpretation of a written agreement are
questions of law that we review for correctness. Moore v. Goran, LLC,
2017 MT 208, {| 7, 388 Mont. 340, 400 P.3d 729 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

(9 Did the District Court err when it determined that maintenance,
incorporated into the decree from the marital property settlement
agreement, was not modifiable by the court?
{10 We affirm the District Court’s holding, but on an alternate basis.
Regarding modification of maintenance, Daniel argues the District
Court erred as a matter of law because the non-modification language
in the clause titled “Entire Agreement” does not preclude judicial
modification of maintenance. Referencing various authorities, Daniel
offers that the purpose of an “entire agreement” or “merger” clause is
to “avoid litigation over the questions of whether there were oral
representations made outside the written agreement ....” (quoting
17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 378 (2008)). Daniel thus argues that non-
modification language contained in a merger clause is merely intended
to prevent extrinsic evidence from being used to modify the terms of
the Agreement, and does not operate to foreclose judicial modification
of maintenance on the ground of changed circumstances. Melinda
responds that the District Court correctly applied the law, and that the
plain language of the Agreement prevents modification, regardless of
where the language was placed in the Agreement, a principle
consistently upheld by this Court.
qj11 The Legislature has addressed judicial modification of
maintenance provisions. Section 40-4-208, MCA, provides:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in 40-4-201(6), a decree may be

modified by a court as to maintenance or support only as to

installments accruing subsequent to actual notice to the parties
of the motion for modification.

(2) (b) [W]henever the decree proposed for modification contains
provisions relating to maintenance or support, modification
under subsection (1) may only be made:
(@) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and
continuing as to make the terms unconscionable. ...
(Emphasis added.) However, this provision cross-references
§ 40-4-201(6), MCA, which provides an exception allowing decrees of
dissolution to preclude or limit future modification upon the parties’
agreement:
[E]xcept for terms concerning the support, parenting, or parental
contact with the children, the decree may expressly preclude or
limit modification of terms set forth in the decree if provided for in
the separation agreement. Otherwise, terms of a separation
agreement set forth in the decree are automatically modified by
modification of the decree.
(Emphasis added.) Consequently, we have held that “where a
separation agreement expressly precludes modification or limitation of
maintenance, a District Court is barred from later modifying the terms
of the agreement.” In re Marriage of Bolstad, 203 Mont. 131, 135,
660 P.2d 95, 97 (1983); see also Rowen v. Rowen, 199 Mont. 315, 320,
649 P.2d 1259, 1262 (1982) (when a separation agreement does not
expressly limit modification, the district court has the power to modify
maintenance); In re Marriage of Johnson, 252 Mont. 258, 261-62,
828 P.2d 388, 391 (1992) Gudicial modification of maintenance
precluded by language in the agreement that specifically prevented a
court from modifying the agreement); In re Marriage of Pearson,
1998 MT 236, 7 34, 291 Mont. 101, 965 P.2d 268 (general non-
modification clause sufficient to preclude the court from modifying
maintenance).
12 Bolstad cited approvingly In re Marriage of Thompson, 640 P.2d
279 (Colo. App. 1982). Thompson reasoned that when parties negotiate
an agreement, one side may agree to pay greater maintenance in
return for a larger share of property, and thus they should be free to
preclude modification of maintenance, explaining:
Indeed, the waiver of the right to seek modification in and of itself
could well be the consideration for a concession in the amount or
duration of maintenance, or in the property received by a party.
Thus, to permit reconsideration of the amount of maintenance
contracted for, without also reopening the property division, would

be inequitable.

Thompson, 640 P.2d at 280. This Court has likewise held that when
maintenance is accepted in exchange for relinquishing rights in other
property, the maintenance obligation is not subject to modification for
changed circumstances, and is instead viewed as part of the total
property disposition:
[I]f support provisions have been made an inseverable part of the
Agreement between husband and wife to divide their property,
and the court in the [dissolution] action approves the agreement,
the provisions of such agreement cannot thereafter be modified
without the consent of both of the contracting parties.
In re Marriage of Robertson, 237 Mont. 406, 410, 773 P.2d 1213, 1216
(1989) (citing Washington v. Washington, 162 Mont. 349, 356,512 P.2d
1300, 1304 (1973)). In Robertson, the husband sought modification of
the maintenance he agreed to pay in a marital property settlement
agreement, arguing it was unconscionable. Robertson, 237 Mont.
at 409, 773 P.2d at 1215. Under the terms of the Robertson agreement,
the wife had relinquished claims against the husband’s retirement,
savings, and profit-sharing accounts, accepting maintenance in lieu of
her share of that property. Robertson, 237 Mont. at 410, 773 P.2d
at, 1216. We thus held that the wife’s maintenance was an inseverable
part of the property settlement arrangements, and that the
maintenance obligation was undertaken by the husband in exchange
for the wife’s forbearance of certain property in the marital estate.
Robertson, 237 Mont. at 410, 773 P.2d at 1216.
13 I We conclude that such is the case here. The Agreement
provided that Melinda would receive distributions from the business
while the parties were legally separated, and would receive no
maintenance. However, upon dissolution, Melinda would relinquish her
interest in the business and would receive maintenance payments.
Consistent with the Agreement, Melinda’s uncontested testimony
confirmed that she agreed to give up her interest in the business only
because she was assured she would receive maintenance payments.
While denominated as maintenance, these payments were, in effect, a
structured purchase of Melinda’s share of the business. As Melinda
argues, “Dan received extra property in the marital settlement
Agreement in exchange for his non-modifiable promise to pay
maintenance to Melinda for 3 % years.” The record and our holding in
Robertson establish that the maintenance provision is an inseverable
part of the property distribution provided in the Agreement, and
cannot be separately modified by a court upon Daniel’s motion.
114 [ll Daniel also argues that it would be unconscionable for him to

fulfil the maintenance provision, given his change in circumstances.
We acknowledge that the present situation makes this a harsh result
for Daniel, but under the Agreement, he assumed both the risk of
business failure as well as the possibility of business success if the oil
economy continued to boom. Upon dissolution, Melinda gave up the
chance at business success in exchange for certain maintenance
payments. Further, the parties’ decision to place the risk of business
failure and the possibility of business success on Daniel, who would be
acting as the sole owner and sole employee of the business, and
responsible for its operation, was not unreasonable. Therefore, we
conclude that enforcement of the parties’ agreement is not
unconscionable.
q15 Affirmed.”

JUSTICES SHEA, McKINNON, BAKER and SANDEFUR concur.

° Having affirmed on these grounds, we need not reach the issue of whether the
non-modification language of the subject Agreement is merely part of an integration
clause, or if it prechades all judicial modification of the Agreement.

JENNIFER TEETER,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Stock Insurance Company,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 17-0241.
Submitted on Briefs October 25, 2017.
Decided November 28, 2017.
2017 MT 292.

389 Mont. 407.

406 P.3d 464,

ae

For Appellant: James D. Johnson, Williams Law Firm, P.C.,
Missoula, Montana

For Appellee: Jeffrey B. Hays, Hays & Hayes, P.L.LP.,
Hamilton, Montana

JUSTICE WHEAT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Mid-Century Insurance Company (Mid-Century) appeals the
Opinion and Order of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli
County, granting Jennifer Teeter’s (Teeter) motion for summary
judgment. We reverse and remand.
2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

Whether the District Court erred in granting Teeter’s motion for

summary judgment under §$§ 33-18-201(6) and (13), MCA,

concluding that no disputed issues of material fact existed

regarding causation and damages.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
q8 This case arises from a motor vehicle accident in Missoula,
Montana, on May 30, 2014. Derek Colberg (Colberg) rear-ended
Plaintiff Teeter’s vehicle on Brooks Street. Mid-Century insured
Colberg. The officer who arrived at the scene concluded Colberg was
responsible for the crash and cited him for careless driving.
q4 Later that day, Teeter sought medical treatment for possible
injuries from the crash. The treating physician diagnosed Teeter with
whiplash and a right shoulder strain. Following her diagnosis, Teeter
saw several health care professionals to treat her physical and
psychological injuries including a chiropractor, neurologist, physical
therapist, counselor, and masseuse.
q5 Immediately after the accident Teeter retained counsel demanding
advance payment of medical costs from Mid-Century. Mid-Century
determined its insured Colberg was responsible for the accident and
made several advance payments to Teeter for her medical expenses
and lost wages. Mid-Century paid in advance $53,347.97 from May 30,
2014, until December 2014. In November 2014, Mid-Century sought
Teeter’s past medical records and asked Teeter to undergo an
independent medical examination (IME) to determine if the ongoing
medical expenses were related to the accident. Teeter refused both
requests. In December, Mid-Century had Dr. Lennard Wilson conduct
arecords review of Teeter’s post-accident medical records. Mid-Century
discontinued Teeter’s advance payments based on Dr. Wilson’s opinion
that Teeter’s ongoing expenses were no longer causally related to the
accident.

q6 On February 17, 2015, Teeter filed a declaratory action against
Mid-Century seeking payment of medical expenses and lost wages
incurred after December 16, 2014. During discovery, Mid-Century
obtained two IMEs of Teeter. The first IME was with forensic
psychiatrist Dr. William Stratford on March 15 and 16, 2016. Dr.
Stratford concluded that Teeter’s symptoms were almost entirely a
psychological issue. The second IME was with board-certified
orthopedist Dr. Emily Heid on March 22, 2016. Dr. Heid determined
that there was no physiological basis for Teeter’s pain complaints.
{7 On June 23, 2016, Teeter filed her motion for summary judgment
arguing that there is no dispute of material facts that. Colberg’s
liability is reasonably clear and that Teeter’s medical expenses and lost
wages were causally related to the accident. The following day, Mid-
Century filed its own motion for summary judgment.’ Mid-Century
argued that the opinions of Dr. Wilson, Dr. Heid, and Dr. Stratford
(collectively, the Doctors) provided objective evidence establishing a
reasonable debate regarding whether Teeter’s ongoing medical
expenses and wage losses were causally related to the accident.
Further, Mid-Century maintained that a declaratory action was
inappropriate since there was a clear dispute of fact that should be
resolved by a jury in a tort action.

q8 On August 23,2016, the District Court held oral arguments on the
cross-motions for summary judgment. On December 30, 2016, the
District Court issued its sixty-nine-page Opinion and Order. The
District Court determined the following: (1) a declaratory action was
appropriate to resolve narrow issues of fact regarding medical
causation and damages; (2) Teeter’s sworn statement combined with
her treating providers’ affidavits made a prima facie showing that it is
reasonably clear that her medical expenses and wage losses are
causally related to the accident; (3) the opinions of the Doctors did not
create a disputed issue of material fact. as to medical causation and
damages; and (4) the Doctors lacked foundation.

q9 Following the District Court's Opinion and Order, Teeter
petitioned for supplemental relief seeking fees and costs. Mid-Century
objected to the petition. On March 23, 2017, the District Court granted
Teeter’s petition and ordered Mid-Century to pay Teeter’s unpaid
medical expenses, lost wages, medically related mileage, attorney fees

Additionally, Mid-Century filed a motion in limine which was granted in part and
denied in part by the District Court’s December 30, 2016 Opinion and Order. However,
Mid-Century does not appeal the District Court’s ruling on its motion in limine

and costs. Mid-Century appeals the District Court’s order granting
Teeter summary judgment and the award of fees and costs.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{10 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same criteria of M. R. Civ. P. 56 as the district court.
Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 2013 MT 354, 1 9, 373
Mont. 1, 313 P.3d 839. We review a district court’s conclusions of law
to determine whether they are correct and its findings of fact. to
determine whether they are clearly erroneous. Pilgeram, {] 9. Under
Rule 56(c), summary judgment will be granted if the moving party can
show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled toa judgment as a matter of law. Roe v. City of
Missoula, 2009 MT 417, { 14, 354 Mont. 1, 221 P.3d 1200.

DISCUSSION
{11 Whether the District Court erred in granting Teeter’s motion for
summary judgment under §§ 33-18-201(6) and (13), MCA, concluding
that no disputed issues of material fact existed regarding causation and
damages.
412 Mid-Century argues the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment to Teeter because it was not reasonably clear that the
medical expenses and wage losses were causally related to the
accident. Further, Mid-Century maintains that the issues of fact as to
causation and damages should be resolved by a jury in a tort action.
Lastly, Mid-Century argues that the District Court erroneously
disregarded the opinions of the Doctors.
13 Teeter counters that the District Court properly granted summary
judgment because there was no issue of material fact as to causation
and damages. Further, Teeter counters that the declaratory action is
the appropriate method to resolve this case. Finally, Teeter contends
the District Court properly disregarded the opinions of Mid-Century’s
Doctors because they provided unsworn testimony and lacked
foundation.
14 The Montana Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides the
following:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or
other writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by statute, municipal ordinance,
contract or franchise may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute,
ordinances, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of

rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
Section 27-8-202, MCA. Thus, a declaratory action is appropriate to
“afford relief from uncertainty with respect to rights, status and other
legal relations.” Tarlton v. Kaufman, 2008 MT 462, { 33, 348 Mont.
178, 199 P.3d 263. “A declaratory proceeding is primarily intended to
determine the meaning of law or a contract and to adjudicate the rights
of the parties therein, but not to determine controversial issues of fact
such as the existence or denial of procedural due process.” Tarlton,
{33 (internal citations omitted).
q15 In Ridley v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., the plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment that §§ 33-18-201(6) and (13), MCA, required an
insurer to pay medical expenses as they were incurred when the
tortfeasor’s liability was reasonably clear. 286 Mont. 325, 332-33, 951
P.2d 987, 991 (1997). We held that under the statutes an insurer is
required to pay an injured third party’s medical expenses when
liability is reasonably clear for the expense that is submitted. Ridley,
286 Mont. at 334, 951 P.2d at 992. However, “even though liability for
the accident may be reasonably clear, an insurer may still dispute a
medical expense if it is not reasonably clear that the expense is
causally related to the accident in question.” Ridley, 286 Mont. at 334,
951 P.2d at 992. Therefore, Ridley is a two-part test: (1) whether
liability is reasonably clear and (2) whether it is reasonably clear that
a medical expense is causally related to the accident.
416 We later clarified our “reasonably clear” legal standard in
Peterson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2010 MT 187, 357 Mont.
293, 238 P.3d 904. We adopted the following standard: liability is
reasonably clear “when a reasonable person, with knowledge of the
relevant facts and law, would conclude, for good reason, that the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff.” Peterson, | 39. Further, we
concluded that if liability was reasonably clear it “would leave little
room for objectively reasonable debate.” Peterson, 1 39. Essentially, the
reasonably clear standard of Ridley is comparable to the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard. Peterson, 37. Even though in Peterson
we only addressed whether liability is reasonably clear, the reasonably
clear standard applies to the causal relationship of a medical expense
and the accident as set forth in Ridley. Therefore, if there is an
objectively reasonable debate about whether a medical expense is
causally related to the accident then a Ridley declaratory action would
be inappropriate because a controversial issue of fact. exists.
117 Our Ridley cases demonstrate that a Ridley declaratory claim is
an inappropriate method to resolve disputed issues of material fact.
Our decision in Giambra v. Travelers Indem. Co., is instructive. 2003

MT 289, 318 Mont. 73, 78 P.3d 880. In Giambra, the plaintiffs filed a
declaratory action under Ridley arguing that liability was reasonably
clear and that Travelers was obligated to advance pay medical
expenses. Giambra, {| 12. The district court disagreed. The district
court determined that there was a conflict in the evidence as to
negligence and therefore liability was not reasonably clear. Giambra,
{| 14. Thus, the district court granted Travelers’ motion for summary
judgment dismissing the declaratory action. We affirmed, holding that
summary judgment was appropriate because there was a clear issue
of material fact that should be resolved in a negligence action and that
Travelers had no obligation under Ridley. Giambra, {I 15-16.
Therefore, Giambra would have to pursue reimbursement through a
negligence suit against Travelers’ insured tortfeasor. Subsequently,
Giambra brought a negligence action against the tortfeasor to resolve
the disputed issues of material fact, evidenced by our decision in
Giambra v. Kelsey, 2007 MT 158, 338 Mont. 19, 162 P.3d 134.

18 Similarly, in Safeco Ins. Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, we held that disputed facts should be left to a jury. 2000 MT
153, 300 Mont. 123, 2 P.3d 834. In Safeco, the plaintiff brought a
declaratory action? seeking advance payment of medical expenses.
Safeco, | 5. Safeco’s insured admitted liability and the district court
concluded there were no disputed material facts concerning causation.
Safeco, | 9. Therefore, the declaratory action was proper to establish
plaintiffs right under Ridley that Safeco must as a matter of law pay
the undisputed medical expenses. Safeco, {] 20. Then, the district court
determined the only matter reserved for trial would be damages since
Safeco reasonably disputed a portion of the medical expenses. Safeco,
| 24. We upheld the district court’s ruling. Safeco, | 34. Thus, we
conclude that based on the purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act
and our Ridley cases, a Ridley declaratory claim is an inappropriate
method to adjudicate disputed issues of material fact as to causation.
419 Next, we turn to whether a disputed issue of material fact exists
in this case. The District Court concluded that there was no disputed
issue of material fact regarding causation or damages. The District
Court came to this conclusion because it rejected Mid-Century’s
Doctors’ affidavits for two reasons: (1) Mid-Century’s affidavits of the
Doctors were unsworn affidavits, and (2) the Doctors lacked
foundation. We conclude the District Court erred in disregarding the
Doctors’ affidavits and opinions.

2 The plaintiff also brought claims against Safeco’s insured for negligence.

20 [ll First, the District Court determined that the affidavits of the
Doctors did not comply with M. R. Civ. P. 56. However, each of the
Doctors’ affidavits properly stated that they were made based on
personal knowledge, the affiants were competent to testify, and
represented the attached doctors’ reports were true and correct. Thus,
the Doctors’ affidavits do comply with M. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Second, the
District Court determined that the Doctors’ opinions lacked foundation
to opine about Teeter’s pre-accident conditions because they relied on
post-accident records. However, the Doctors relied on Teeter’s medical
history that. documented her pre-accident counseling history, which
was later corroborated in Teeter’s deposition. Further, the appropriate
method to challenge foundation for the Doctors’ opinions is on
cross-examination at trial because whether the expert reliably applied
the reliable field to the facts is a question of fact for a jury to decide.
Beehler v. E. Radiological Assocs. P.C., 2012 MT 260, {| 35, 367 Mont.
21, 289 P.3d 131. Therefore, the Doctors’ affidavits and opinions should
have been considered in determining whether a disputed issue of
material fact existed regarding causation and damages.

]21 Having determined the District Court erroneously disregarded the
Doctors’ affidavits, we now balance the evidence presented by both
parties to determine whether a disputed issue of material fact exists
regarding whether Teeter’s remaining damages are causally related to
the accident. Teeter presented the following evidence to support that
her treatments were causally related to the accident: her own sworn
affidavit and the affidavits of her treating physicians. In their
affidavits, Teeter’s treating physicians maintained that all of Teeter’s
treatments were reasonable and necessary to treat her injuries from
the accident.

122 Mid-Century countered by presenting evidence of the Doctors’
opinions that disputed the ongoing medical expenses and wage losses
were causally related to the accident. Specifically, Dr. Wilson and Dr.
Heid opined that Teeter’s ongoing treatments were excessive for the
normal standard of care for her injuries. Dr. Heid asserts there is no
physiological basis for Teeter’s pain complaints and diagnosed her with
chronic pain syndrome. Further, Dr. Stratford opined that Teeter’s
pain complaints stem from a psychological condition rather than from
injuries suffered in the accident. Lastly, Dr. Wilson and Dr. Heid
dispute that Teeter’s wage losses are reasonable because there is no
objective evidence that Teeter has any physical or vocational
restrictions from the accident. Fundamentally, Mid-Century’s experts
set forth a disputed issue of material fact regarding causation and
damages.

123 Tl We conclude after balancing Teeter’s affidavits against the
Doctors’ affidavits there remains a clear disputed issue of material fact
regarding causation and damages. Thus, it is not reasonably clear that
Teeter’s ongoing medical expenses are causally related to the accident
because there is a reasonable debate. Therefore, we conclude that the
District Court erred in granting Teeter summary judgment on her
Ridley declaratory action.

CONCLUSION

24 We conclude that the District Court erred in granting Teeter’s
motion for summary judgment. A declaratory action is an
inappropriate method to resolve disputed issues of material fact. Here,
there is a clear dispute of material fact regarding causation because it
is not reasonably clear if Teeter’s remaining expenses are causally
related to the accident. Further, the District Court’s order granting
fees and costs to Teeter is reversed because granting summary
judgment to Teeter was in error. We reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
25 Reversed and remanded.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES BAKER, McKINNON,
SANDEFUR and RICE concur.

BRIDGER DEL SOL, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Vv.
VINCENTVIEW, LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 17-0186.
Submitted on Briefs October 4, 2017.
Decided November 28, 2017.
2017 MT 293.

389 Mont. 415.

406 P.3d 460.

For Appellant: Aaron Brann, Karl Knuchel, Karl Knuchel,
P.C., Livingston.
For Appellee: Lilia N. Tyrell, Kasting, Kauffman & Mersen,
P.C., Bozeman.
JUSTICE McKINNON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 VincentView, LLC, (VincentView) appeals from findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order entered by the Eighteenth Judicial
District Court, Gallatin County, granting judgment in favor of Bridger
del Sol, Inc. (BDS) and awarding BDS attorney fees. We affirm.
{2 VincentView presents the following issues for review:
1. Did the District Court err in finding Vincent View anticipatorily
breached the lease?
2. Did the District Court err in finding BDS did not breach the
lease?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q3 VincentView owns property located at 17 South Tracy Avenue,
Bozeman, Montana. BDS is in the business of owning and operating a
restaurant called Taco del Sol, a “casual, young, fun Mexican
restaurant.” VincentView and BDS entered into a commercial lease
agreement on December 1, 2012. VincentView agreed to lease
commercial premises to BDS for the purpose of operating Taco del Sol
for an initial five-year year term with two three-year options to extend.
Term 6 of the lease required BDS to have Taco del Sol “open and
operating at least five (5) days per week,” but prohibited BDS from
doing “anything or permit[ing] anything to be done ... tending to create
a nuisance or to disturb any other tenant or occupant of any part of the
building.” Three residential apartments are located above the leased
premises. Term 27 allowed VincentView to discretionarily adopt
“reasonable rules” and add them to the lease. Term 31 provided BDS
with the quiet enjoyment of the premises.

44 Anticipating a lease term of five or more years, BDS made
substantial permanent renovations to both the residential and
commercial space before occupying the premises. These renovations
included: upgrading the electrical system for the entire building;
upgrading the plumbing; installing a new ventilation system;
refinishing existing hardwood flooring and replacing carpeting with

new flooring; refinishing the ceilings, adding fire retardation systems,
and “sound channels;” installing an air conditioning unit; and
refinishing and repainting the walls with a product designed to
mitigate sound and odor.

{5 BDS opened Taco del Sol in the leased premises in March 2013.
After Taco del Sol opened, upstairs tenants came in the restaurant and
complained about noise from music playing in the restaurant and odors
from cooking. BDS attempted to address the upstairs tenants’ concerns
by reducing the music’s volume and playing it only during business
hours and offered to reroute the ventilation system through the roof
instead of at street-level. On April 10, 2013, VincentView sent BDS a
letter alerting BDS it was exercising its right to adopt reasonable rules
and implementing two new rules to address the upstairs tenants’
concerns. The first rule prohibited BDS from playing music and
required BDS to keep felt attached to the legs of its chairs. The second
rule required BDS pay for and install a new ventilation system that
would eliminate all odors. BDS continued to play music. BDS kept felt
on its chair legs. BDS purchased equipment to reroute the existing
ventilation system, but VincentView prevented its installation.

{6 OnSeptember 11,2013, VincentView sent BDS a Notice of Default
indicating BDS was breaching the lease by failing to abide by the
added rules—playing music and not replacing the ventilation system.
The Notice of Default indicated BDS had thirty days to comply and if
BDS failed to comply VincentView would cancel the lease and retake
possession of the premises. On October 21, 2013, BDS initiated a
declaratory action in Montana’s Eighteenth Judicial District. Court,
Gallatin County. In its complaint, BDS asked the District Court to
declare it was not breaching the lease and also claimed VincentView
anticipatorily breached the lease causing BDS damages. VincentView
filed counterclaims. On April 30, 2015, BDS supplied VincentView
notice it planned to terminate the lease on July 31, 2015. BDS vacated
the premises and relocated Taco del Sol.

{7 On December 30, 2016, the District Court issued findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order. The District Court concluded BDS did
not breach the lease and that VincentView anticipatorily breached the
lease when it gave BDS Notice of Default by violating the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and by interfering with BDS’s
right to quiet use and enjoyment of the leased premises. The District
Court awarded BDS damages of $88,567.25 and its reasonable attorney
fees of $43,409.25. VincentView appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

q8 Whether a party materially breached a contract is a question of
fact. Eschenbacher v. Anderson, 2001 MT 206, {| 22, 306 Mont. 321, 34
P.3d 87 (citation omitted). “We review a district court’s findings of fact
to determine whether they are clearly erroneous.” Eschenbacher, {| 22
(citation omitted). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not
supported by substantial evidence, ifthe district court misapprehended
the effect of the evidence, or, if after reviewing the record, this Court
is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Eschenbacher, {| 22 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

q9 1. Did the District Court err in finding Vincent View anticipatorily
breached the lease?

110 [ VincentView argues requiring BDS to stop playing music and
eliminate cooking odors neither breached its duty of good faith and fair
dealing nor interfered with BDS’s quiet use and enjoyment of the
leased premises. Further, VincentView argues it did not anticipatorily
breach the lease. Every contract contains an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Story v. Bozeman, 242 Mont. 436, 450, 791 P.2d
767, 775 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Arrowhead Sch. Dist.
No. 75 v. Klyap, 2003 MT 294, 1 54, 318 Mont. 103, 79 P.3d 250. The
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade. Story, 242 Mont. at 450, 791 P.2d at 775 (quotation
omitted). Here, VincentView agreed to allow BDS to operate a
restaurant in the leased premises for the lease term to operate a
“casual, young, fun Mexican restaurant.” Later, VincentView adopted
new rules prohibiting BDS from playing music or emanating cooking
odors. Restaurants commonly play music and must cook. Thus,
VincentView’s new rules were not reasonable or fair to BDS.

11 A breach of the “covenant for quiet enjoyment can be such an act
or omission on the part of the landlord which permanently interferes
with the tenant’s beneficial enjoyment of the premises so as to justify
the tenant’s abandonment before the lease has expired.” Sewell v.
Hukill, 188 Mont. 242, 246-47, 356 P.2d 39, 41 (1960) (citations
omitted). VincentView provided BDS notice it would retake possession
of the premises if BDS did not comply with the additional rules. To
BDS, this notice created a “constant threat of eviction” forcing BDS to
relocate Taco del Sol prior to the expiration of the lease term.
VincentView providing the Notice of Default permanently interfered
with BDS’s beneficial enjoyment of the premises and caused BDS to

relocate Taco del Sol.

12 “An anticipatory breach of a contract is a repudiation of the
promisor’s contractual duty before the time fixed for performance has
arrived.” Chamberlin v. Puckett Constr., 277 Mont. 198, 202, 921 P.2d
1237, 1239 (1996) (citation omitted). “[A] demand for performance of a
term not contained in the parties’ contract, accompanied by an
unequivocal statement that the demanding party will not perform
unless the additional term is met, constitutes anticipatory breach of
the contract excusing performance by the other party.” Chamberlin,
277 Mont. at 203, 921 P.2d at 1240. The District. Court concluded
VincentView breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing because
requiring BDS to eliminate all noise and all odor was impossible to
accomplish and, therefore, dishonest. The District Court concluded
VincentView interfered with BDS’s quiet use and enjoyment by
prohibiting BDS from playing music and emanating odors. Under
Chamberlin, the District Court concluded, VincentView breached the
lease by implementing these prohibitions and providing BDS a Notice
of Default. We agree.

13 [EM VincentView’s Notice of Default contained an unequivocal
statement VincentView planned to retake the premises prior to the end
of the lease term if BDS failed to cease playing music and cooking, two
terms VincentView added and BDS argued could not be complied with
while continuing to operate its restaurant. Therefore, VincentView
anticipatorily breached the lease prior to its expiration when it sent the
Notice of Default in September 2013. The District Court’s findings are
not clearly erroneous.

14 2. Did the District Court err in finding BDS did not breach the
lease?

15 VincentView argues BDS breached Term 6 and the added lease
terms by disturbing the upstairs tenants with noise from music and
chairs and odors from cooking. VincentView argues the District Court
erred in concluding BDS had not breached the lease. However,
substantial evidence in the record supports the District Court’s
conclusion. The upstairs tenants complained of noise and odors. To
alleviate their complaints, the upstairs tenants suggested BDS not
play music outside of business hours, reduce the music’s volume, and
mitigate noise from furniture movement. In response, BDS complied
with their suggestions by playing music during business hours only,
reducing the music's volume, and keeping felt on its chair legs.
Additionally, BDS purchased equipment to reroute the ventilation
system through the roof instead of at street-level to minimize any odors
emanating from its kitchen. However, VincentView prevented BDS

from rerouting the ventilation system. BDS took steps to eliminate any
disturbance it caused the upstairs tenants and BDS’s failure to address
the upstairs tenants’ concerns is attributable to VincentView.
Accordingly, the District Court’s finding that “BDS has not defaulted
on the Lease” is supported by substantial evidence in the record and
not clearly erroneous.

CONCLUSION
16 The District Court found Vincent View anticipatorily breached the
lease and BDS did not breach the lease. These findings are supported
by substantial evidence in the record and are not clearly erroneous.
q17 Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SHEA, BAKER and
RICE concur.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Vv.
JASON TERRONEZ,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 16-0611.
Submitted on Briefs October 4, 2017.
Decided December 6, 2017.
2017 MT 296.

389 Mont. 421.

406 P.3d 947.

P|

For Appellant: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Tammy K Plubell, Assistant Attorney General; Helena; Thomas P.
Meissner, Fergus County Attorney, Jean A. Adams, Deputy Fergus
County Attorney; Lewistown.

For Appellee: Michael J. Sherwood, Michael J. Sherwood, P.C.;
Missoula.

JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.
11 The State of Montana appeals from the order entered by the Tenth
Judicial District Court, Fergus County, granting Defendant Jason
Terronez’ (Terronez) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm,
addressing the following issues:

1. Is the State authorized to appeal the District Court’s order

granting Terronez’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

2. Did the District Court err by determining that good cause existed

to permit Terronez to withdraw his guilty plea?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q2 David and Sunnshine Welton are both dentists and owned
Montana Family Dentistry in Lewistown, Montana. They have two
children: a girl, L.W. and a boy, M.W. Dana and Jason Terronez are
nurses and worked at Central Montana Medical Center in Lewistown.
They have four children: three girls and one boy. Dana and Terronez
were patients at the Weltons’ dental clinic and the families became
close friends—sharing meals, weekend gatherings, and holidays.

q3 Sunnshine was sexually abused as a child, which made her
apprehensive about letting her children participate in sleepovers with
other families. She described herself as a “paranoid” mom who is
hypersensitive about sexual abuse issues. As a precaution, Sunnshine
educated her children about “good touch” and “bad touch” and initiated
such conversations with them every six months. However, she trusted
Terronez and Dana, and had permitted her daughter, five-year-old
L.W., to sleep over at the Terronez household prior to the incident in
question. On March 7, 2015, she again allowed L.W. to sleep over at
the Terronez residence. L.W. watched a movie with Terronez and his
three girls, including Terronez’ oldest daughter, nine-year-old A.T.
Dana was in and out of the living room while the others watched the
movie, during which Terronez was seated next to L.W. After the movie,
Dana asked L.W. if she wanted to go home, and L.W. said she wanted
to stay at the Terronez household.

{4 On March 8, L.W. was sitting on the toilet and told Sunnshine it
hurt when she peed. L.W. also reported that, while bathing, her vagina

hurt. On March 10, L.W. again complained that her vagina hurt, and
Sunnshine washed it. On March 11, L.W. told Sunnshine that, during
the movie at Terronez’ house, Terronez had put his hand into her
pajamas and touched her vagina. Sunnshine informed David, and then
immediately reported this to the Lewistown Police Department. The
same day, Sunnshine took L.W. to her physician, Dr. Bolstad, for a
sexual abuse examination. Because more than 72 hours had lapsed
since the reported contact, Dr. Bolstad did not collect biological
evidence. The examination revealed L.W.’s external genitalia was
normal, but internally there were four discrete areas of injury. Dr.
Bolstad diagnosed the injuries as sexual abuse based on the areas of
injury and what L.W. reported.

q5 Officer Jenness interviewed A.T., who had also been in the room
watching the movie at the Terronez residence. A.T. initially stated
that, during the movie, she was sitting next to Terronez, but later
admitted she lied to prevent Terronez from getting into trouble.
However, none of Terronez’ daughters or Dana reported they had seen
Terronez do what L.W. had reported. At defense counsel’s request,
Officer Jenness also interviewed Sunnshine’s brother-in-law, Jeremy
Baxter, as a possible suspect. Baxter had watched L.W. and M.W. a
week prior to the sleepover. Sunnshine had commented that Baxter
looked like a pedophile, but later said her comment was meant as a
joke. This inquiry by police did not yield any evidence implicating
Baxter. Other males in L.W.’s life at the time were her brother, seven-
year-old M.W., and her father, David.

q6 OnMarch 12, the State charged Terronez with one count of sexual
intercourse without consent via digital penetration. On March 16,
Honorable Jon A. Oldenburg, District Judge, recused himself from the
case after David confronted him at a local restaurant, and Honorable
Randal I. Spaulding assumed jurisdiction of the case. Terronez was
initially represented by attorney Craig Buehler, but on April 6, a notice
of substitution of counsel was filed indicating that Jeffry Foster had
assumed representation of Terronez. Foster filed a motion for change
of venue, arguing a reasonable apprehension existed that Terronez
could not receive a fair trial in Fergus County because of: (1) the small
size of the Fergus County jury pool; (2) the heinous nature of the crime;
(3) both families’ relationships and standing in the community; (4)
statements about the case made by the Weltons to others in person and
on social media; and (5) concerns expressed by court staff and law
enforcement about Terronez’ safety. The District Court denied the
motion, but stated the matter would be reconsidered if concerns arose
during voir dire. Foster also filed a motion for production of all of

L.W.’s medical records by the State. After an in-camera review, the
court denied the motion, reasoning the records were “devoid of any
evidence that can fairly be characterized as exculpatory or useful as
impeachment evidence.”

{7 On September 21, 2015, the trial began and the parties selected
a jury over the next two days. That morning, the court held a final
pretrial conference in-chambers with Terronez, Foster, Deputy County
Attorney Jean Adams, Deputy County Attorney Monte Boettger, and
Officer Jenness. Foster reported he had received a “tongue lashing”
from Sunnshine and recommended that the Weltons be excluded from
trial. The court indicated it had “personally observed some facial
expressions and hand gestures and things during the course of
testimony” from the Weltons that. caused “considerable concern about
potential mistrial.” The court ordered the Weltons be excluded from
trial until they testify, upon which it would re-evaluate the situation.
On September 22, the court had a conference in-chambers with the
same parties. Adams reported that Sunnshine may have had a
purposeful encounter with a prospective juror in the women’s restroom.
Foster moved to extend the Weltons’ exclusion from the courthouse for
the entirety of the trial. After interviewing a witness to the incident,
the court granted the request, basing its decision mainly on David's
earlier confrontation with Judge Oldenburg and Sunnshine’s encounter
with potential jurors.’ Foster renewed his motion for a change of
venue, but the court denied the motion, stating instead it would
admonish the jurors not to talk about the case.

q8 On September 23, the court held another conference with the
same parties in-chambers. Officer Jenness brought to the court’s
attention a report that David, while viewing the proceeding remotely,
had stated that if the jury found Terronez not guilty, he would “take
care of it himself.” The parties discussed increased protection for
Terronez. On Friday, September 25, at another in-chambers conference
with the same parties, Officer Jenness reported to the court that,
sometime during the previous evening, a large chunk of concrete had
been thrown through the windshield of Foster’s vehicle while it was
parked outside the Terronez household. Foster renewed his motion for
change of venue and also moved for a mistrial, stating the culmination
of issues had “infect[ed] [the] proceeding.” The court denied the motion,
but again sternly admonished the jurors. Foster expressed his concern,

1 The District Court permitted the State to make arrangements for the Weltons to
view the trial proceedings remotely.

stating he had not “had a lot of time to process” what had occurred and
he “just [didn’t] know what to do or how to handle” the incident. Foster
also expressed his concern for the Terronez children, who were also
witnesses, and the rest of Terronez’ family. He advised the court he
wasn’t prepared to proceed. The court expressed sympathy, noting that
it had “not had anything quite as extraordinary as this happen,” and
adjourned the trial until the following Monday.

{9 Several witnesses testified at trial. L.W. stated that Terronez had
used his hand to touch her privates and that his hand was outside her
vagina, but in response to a leading question, affirmed his hand had
been inside her vagina. Dr. Bolstad testified regarding L.W.’s injuries,
stating her diagnosis was partially based on what. L.W. reported to
have occurred and that she could not state with medical certainty that
L.W. sustained her injuries on March 7, or rule out infection or self-
touch as explanations. Dr. Bolstad explained that, when L.W. was two
or three years old, she had a skin condition called mollescum
contagiosum, an infection of small vesicles on her back thighs and
buttocks. However, at a January 9, 2015, check-up, two months before
the incident, L.W.’s skin was clear. Dr. Bolstad further established that
L.W. never had vaginal complaints or urinary tract symptoms.
Although Foster had originally planned to call A.T. as a witness and
stated his intent to do so in his opening statement, he ultimately
decided against doing so and negotiated a stipulation with the State to
avoid calling A.T.

{10 On Monday, September 28, the court held a conference in-
chambers with Terronez, Foster, Adams, County Attorney Thomas
Meissner (substituting for Boettger), Undersheriff Vaughn, Officer
Jenness, and Sheriff Troy Eades. The purpose of the conference was for
law enforcement to provide an update on security measures and
concerns. Eades commented on the concrete block thrown through
Foster’s windshield, indicating in his years securing “several trials in
this county,” he had not seen anything like this and noted that tensions
were “relatively high.” He suggested Terronez and Foster wear
bulletproof vests, and advised the parties they would be required to
submit to a metal-detector wand inspection prior to entering the
courtroom. Sheriff Eades also updated the court on security measures
at the Terronez household. The court cautioned everyone to be
“vigilant,” and to pay attention to “the people that are coming and
going.” That evening, although Foster had checked into the Yogo Hotel
and rented a new vehicle to avoid detection from the Weltons, the
Weltons encountered Foster in the hotel’s restaurant.

{11 On September 29, the court held a conference in-chambers with

Terronez, Foster, Meissner, Adams, and Officer Jenness. The court
inquired if any plea offers had been relayed to the defense and Adams
stated that the State offered a general plea offer, which specified that
Terronez would plead guilty to the lesser included offense of felony
sexual assault instead of sexual intercourse without consent. Foster
stated he had not communicated the offer to Terronez because he
wanted the agreement in writing first. The court urged the parties to
discuss the matter. During a court recess, Terronez met with Foster
and family members to discuss the possible plea agreement. Terronez
was worried that he could not win the case, but his family members
told him if he had not committed the offense, he should not plead
guilty. Terronez ultimately decided to accept the plea agreement.
12 During another court recess that afternoon, the parties requested
an impromptu meeting with the court, and the court met in-chambers
with the same individuals. Foster stated the parties had reached a plea
agreement, which stipulated that Terronez would plead guilty to felony
sexual assault, and the parties would jointly recommend a sentence of
25 years in prison with a parole restriction for the first 13 years.
Adams indicated she wanted to wrap up the agreement quickly
because the next day was “18 hours from now” and that she wanted to
schedule the change-of-plea hearing for later in the evening because “of
the nature of how this case has gone” and because there were “high
tensions on all sides.” Adams pointed to the benefit of a late-night
change-of-plea hearing, indicating that Terronez would have some time
to see his children after school was out and their family would be able
to have dinner together, and it would give Adams and Meissner time
to draft the plea agreement. The court agreed to the evening change-of-
plea hearing, and the parties agreed that Terronez would go home then
return to the courthouse at 7:15 p.m. to meet with Foster and review
the acknowledgement of waiver of rights and plea agreement, with a
change-of-plea hearing to follow at 8:00 p.m. The parties and law
enforcement then discussed plans to secure the building that evening.
The court re-convened the trial to dismiss the jury for the rest of the
day, with the intention of bringing the jury back at nine o’clock the
next morning to inform them an agreement had been reached.

13 Prior to the change of plea hearing, Deputies and Lewistown
Police officers cleared the courthouse and were posted in plainclothes
and in uniform throughout the building. During the hearing, the court
informed Terronez of the rights he was giving up and Terronez
confirmed verbally and in writing that he was giving a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent plea. Terronez apologized to L.W. in
accordance with the plea agreement and the proceeding concluded.

Foster drove back to the Yogo Hotel with a police escort. Tragically, in
the early hours of the next morning, Foster committed suicide in his
hotel room.

q14 On October 16, Attorney Michael Sherwood filed a notice of
appearance stating he was now representing Terronez. On February
10, 2016, Terronez, through Sherwood, moved to withdraw his guilty
plea and rescind the plea agreement. The parties briefed the issue and
attached witness affidavits. On May 20, Sherwood requested an
evidentiary hearing be set “if the prosecution contests any facts set
forth in the various affidavits submitted by Terronez[,]” but deferred
to the court as to whether such a hearing was necessary.

{15 On September 28, without a hearing, the District Court granted
Terronez’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that Terronez
had established “good cause” under § 46-16-105(2), MCA, to withdraw
his plea. The court based its decision primarily on its conclusion that
Foster had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, reasoning that
his trial performance was “deficient or fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness” under the first prong of the Strickland test, citing
the deficiencies as: (1) telling the jury during the opening statement
they would hear testimony from A.T., a critical defense witness, but
later stipulating to her not testifying; (2) not interviewing several
critical prosecution witnesses; (3) failing to subpoena the victim’s
medical records and instead relying on the prosecution’s representation
that all the victim’s records had been provided to the court; (4) filing a
motion to exclude the results of the DNA testing on L.W.’s pajama
bottoms in spite of a report indicating the presence of alleles of at least
two unknown male subjects, thus casting doubt on Terronez’ guilt; and
(5) not requesting DNA testing of other males with the means and
opportunity to assault L.W. The court concluded that prejudice to
Terronez was “properly presumed,” or, alternatively, Foster was clearly
deficient under the first prong of Strickland, and there was a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the Defendant
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on continuing
with trial” under the second prong of Strickland.

16 Although the District Court primarily based its decision on
ineffective assistance of counsel, it also based its decision on a
“pervasive air of fear” surrounding the trial that. had impacted the
proceedings and Foster’s performance, highlighting the incident of the
concrete block thrown though Foster’s windshield, as well as several
alleged incidents of the Weltons’ threats, stalking, and confrontations.
The court observed that these events “objectively appeared to have a
serious deleterious effect on [Foster],” who appeared “disheveled” and

“overly anxious” (sweating profusely, running his fingers through his
hair stammering, pacing, repeating himself, etc.). This behavior was,
from the court’s perspective, “very uncharacteristic of counsel,” andled
the court to have “serious doubts about his effectiveness at trial and up
to and including the Defendant’s guilty plea.” Similarly, the court
noted Foster was uncharacteristically deficient in cross-examination,
and did not mitigate the harmful effects of witness testimony. The
court also noted that Foster appeared indecisive on strategy decisions,
and described his demeanor after the concrete block incident and
before the plea agreement was reached:
[Clounsel appeared visibly distraught and fearful for himself as
well as the Defendant and the Defendant’s family. His behavior
became somewhat erratic. For example, the defense had made it.
known early on that they would be presenting a full defense
including evidence of the Defendant’s good character and would be
calling numerous character witnesses in that regard. The defense
also notified the Court and counsel that it would be calling the
Defendant’s wife and children to testify regarding the alleged
assault. Then, suddenly and rather unexpectedly and in the midst.
of trial, former counsel flatly told the Court and counsel that the
defense was abandoning its good character defense and would not.
be calling the Terronez children to testify. A short while later,
counsel returned from lunch and promptly announced once again
that the defense would be presenting a full defense including
evidence of the Defendant’s good character. Mere moments later,
the parties notified the Court that they had reached a plea
agreement.
17 Based on ineffective assistance and the threatening atmosphere
surrounding the proceedings, the court concluded that “good cause”
was established for allowing Terronez to withdraw his plea. The State
appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

18 The ultimate question of whether a plea is voluntarily made is a
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Prindle, 2013 MT 173, {] 16,
370 Mont. 478, 304 P.3d 712 (citing State v. Brinson, 2009 MT 200, 113,
851 Mont. 136, 210 P.38d 164). Consequently, we review a district
court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea de novo. Prindle,
| 16. We review a district court’s underlying factual findings for clear
error. State v. Warclub, 2005 MT 149, I] 22-24, 327 Mont. 352, 114
P.3d 254. We review for correctness the district court’s interpretation
of the law and its application of the law to the facts. Warclub, {| 23.

19 We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for a
clear abuse of discretion. State v. Schulke, 2005 MT 77, 10, 326 Mont.
890, 109 P.3d 744. A court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily
without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the
bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. State v. Passmore,
2010 MT 34, 751, 355 Mont. 187, 225 P.3d 1229 (citing State v.
Derbyshire, 2009 MT 27, 1 19, 349 Mont. 114, 201 P.3d 811).

DISCUSSION

{20 1. Is the State authorized to appeal the District Court’s order
granting Terronez’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea?
121 As a threshold matter, we address Terronez’ contention that the
State’s appeal is barred. Terronez argues the State does not have
statutory authority to appeal the District Court’s order allowing him
to withdraw his guilty plea because none of the enumerated orders
listed in § 46-20-103, MCA, from which the State is authorized to
appeal, apply here. The State responds § 46-20-103(2)(c), MCA, permits
its appeal because the substantive effect of the District Court’s order
allowing Terronez to withdraw his plea is the granting of a new trial.
Section 46-20-103(2), MCA, provides, in pertinent part:

The state may appeal from any court order or judgment the

substantive effect. of which results in:

(c) granting a new triall.]

122 HI Not all plea withdrawals have the substantive effect of
granting a new trial, but the circumstances here bring the matter
within the language of the statute. At the time Terronez entered his
guilty plea, the trial was in its second week. A jury had been selected,
and the State had called most of its witnesses and was nearing the end
of its case-in-chief. Terronez had the opportunity to preview virtually
the entirety of the State’s case. Therefore, the substantive effect of the
District Court’s order allowing Terronez to withdraw his guilty plea
entered at this point was to grant Terronez a new trial. The State is
thus authorized to appeal under § 46-20-103(2)(c), MCA.
(23 2. Did the District Court err by determining that good cause existed
to permit Terronez to withdraw his guilty plea?
24 The State argues that a hearing should have been conducted and
the District Court’s “good cause” determination was in error because
it was premised upon hearsay and the failure to “test. the [witness]
affidavits through the adversarial process.” Terronez answers that the
District Court relied on undisputed facts, and only needed to determine
the underlying law. Terronez also argues the State should have
requested an evidentiary hearing if it thought one was needed.

125 [Hl While an evidentiary hearing would ordinarily be necessary
and may well have been the prudent course in this case, given that the
State was arguably contesting some of Terronez’ factual contentions,
we conclude the District Court did not clearly abuse its discretion in
failing to conduct a hearing under these circumstances. Schulke, 1 10.
We first note that the State did not request a hearing, even after
Sherwood asked that a hearing be held “if the prosecution contests any
facts set forth in the various affidavits submitted by Terronez.” More
importantly, the District Court did not rely solely on the witness
affidavits, but also relied on its own observations and its assessment.
of a “pervasive air of fear” surrounding the proceedings and impacting
Foster. Further complicating the matter was the impossibility of
obtaining from Foster his account of what occurred and the reasoning
for his actions during trial, given his untimely death. Both parties had
the opportunity to present witness affidavits and did so, providing
sworn assertions about the proceedings. A hearing on a request to
withdraw a plea is not expressly mandated as a matter of law. Section
46-16-105(2), MCA. We thus conclude the District Court did not act
arbitrarily or erroneously by not holding a hearing on the motion.
{26 The State next disputes the District Court’s determination that
good cause existed for Terronez’ plea withdrawal because of Foster's
ineffective assistance of counsel, offering refutations for the District
Court’s five apparent examples of ineffectiveness. Terronez responds
that his plea was involuntarily entered and the court correctly
concluded that both prongs of Strickland were satisfied, based on
evidence of Foster’s deficiencies and the resulting prejudice to
Terronez.
27 A defendant may withdraw his guilty plea within one year of final
judgment for “good cause.” Section 46-16-105(2), MCA; State v. Wise,
2009 MT 32, {| 9, 349 Mont. 187, 203 P.3d 741. Good cause “includes
the involuntariness of the plea, but it may include other criteria.”
Warclub, 116 (citation omitted). A plea must be voluntary because the
defendant is waiving his constitutional rights to not incriminate
himself and to a trial by jury. Prindle, 17 (citing Brady v. U.S., 397
US. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468-69 (1970)). We have adopted the
Brady standard to determine if a plea was voluntarily made:
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct.
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must.
stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled
or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by

their nature improper to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).

Warclub, {| 18 (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 755, 90S. Ct. at 1472). The
burden is on the defendant to show the plea was involuntary. See State
v. Robinson, 2009 MT 170, {1 17-18, 350 Mont. 493, 208 P.3d 851. “If
any doubt exists on the basis of the evidence presented regarding
whether a guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently made, the doubt
must be resolved in favor of the defendant.” State v. Hendrickson, 2014
MT 132, 1 14, 375 Mont. 136, 325 P.3d 694 (citation omitted).

28 Ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute good cause to
withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Valdez-Mendoza, 2011 MT 214, {| 14,
861 Mont. 503, 260 P.3d 151. “Where a defendant is represented by
counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of
counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.” Prindle, ] 17 (citing State v. McFarlane, 2008 MT 18,
111, 341 Mont. 166, 176 P.3d 1057). We apply the Strickland test for
ineffective assistance of counsel to evaluate whether counsel's
ineffectiveness impacted the voluntariness of the defendant’s plea. See
Hendrickson, | 16; McFarlane, {| 11; Strickland v. Washington, 446
USS. 668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984). Under Strickland, “the
defendant must show (1) that his counsel’s advice fell outside the range
of competence demanded of a criminal attorney and (2) but for
counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have entered a guilty
plea.” McFarlane, | 11. We consider “whether counsel’s conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness considering prevailing
professional norms, and in the context of all circumstances.” McGarvey
v. State, 2014 MT 189, {| 25, 375 Mont. 495, 329 P.3d 576. We do not
rely on “rigid categorization of counsel’s performance as
strategic/tactical or ignorant/neglectful” because it is “not an adequate
measure of that performance.” Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, 19,
343 Mont. 90, 183 P.3d 861. The question is not merely whether
counsel’s conduct flowed from strategic decisions and trial tactics, but
rather, whether it was based on “reasonable” or “sound” professional
judgment. Whitlow, {| 19; See e.g. Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S.
500, 505, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104
S. Ct. at 2065. Counsel’s conduct is strongly presumed to be within
professional norms, and a defendant must “identify the acts or
omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of
reasonable professional judgment.” Whitlow, | 16 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066).

{29 The District Court determined Foster’s performance was deficient
because he failed to: (1) call A.T. as a witness after declaring he would

do so in his opening statement; (2) interview State witnesses; (3) obtain
L.W.’s medical records; (4) argue for admittance of potentially
exculpatory DNA evidence; and (5) seek DNA samples with other
males with whom L.W. may have had contact. The State counters by
offering potentially valid reasons for Foster’s actions, including that:
(1) Terronez and Dana wanted to prevent A.T. from testifying, even
during trial; (2) Foster had his defense investigator interview the
State’s witnesses to be able to call his investigator to impeach the
witnesses if necessary; (3) Foster actually did move for the State to
produce all of L.W.’s medical records and the court denied production
of such records as not relevant after an in-camera review; (4) the
inconclusive lab result identifying two unknown males’ alleles on an
article of L.W.’s clothing was offered by the State as evidence that DNA
evidence is reliable; however, Foster objected to it having no probative
value—as it would not be surprising if L.W.’s father or brother’s touch
DNA was on L.W.’s articles of clothing; and (5) even if Foster were to
pursue DNA testing of L.W.’s brother and father, any DNA evidence
would not be relevant because the charges against Terronez were
based on digital penetration.

30 Although we recognize the difficult position of the District Court
in evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel without having Foster's
explanation of his actions, the State has offered persuasive and
plausible explanations for Foster’s conduct, particularly in view of the
fact that “[clounsel’s conduct is strongly presumed to be within
professional norms.” Whitlow, {] 16. We cannot conclude on this record
that Foster failed to exercise reasoned professional judgment. that
prejudiced Terronez. However, we affirm the District Court’s finding
that good cause existed for withdrawal of Terronez’ plea on alternative
grounds discussed in the District Court’s order, based on the extreme
events that occurred during the proceeding.

31 The District Court, referencing Sherwood’s affidavit, summarized
the facts supporting its determination that there existed a “pervasive
air of fear” in the proceeding, including, but not limited to: (1) David’s
confrontation with Judge Oldenburg; (2) David’s threat of suicide, and
discharge of a weapon; (3) David tailgating Terronez; (4) Dana asking
for a protective order against the Weltons; (5) Foster stating he feared
for his safety to a mental health counselor; (6) Foster’s attempt to avoid
the Weltons by checking into a hotel and switching vehicles, only to
encounter the Weltons at that hotel; (7) the Weltons’ attempt to video
record Terronez’ arrest; and (8) Officers being posted inside and outside
the courtroom and conducting meetings on safety measures. These
occurrences were in addition to the events reported during the trial,

including the concrete block thrown through Foster’s windshield. The
District Court observed the stressful impact of these events upon
Foster.

32 “An involuntary plea can justify withdrawal, but it is not the only
basis for establishing good cause.” State v. Ferris, 2010 MT 252, {] 8,
358 Mont. 244, 244 P.3d 782; Accord State v. Andrews, 2010 MT 154,
111, 857 Mont. 52, 236 P.38d574; Wise, 1 9; McFarlane, 11; Warclub,
1 16; State v. Lone Elk, 2005 MT 56, 119, 326 Mont. 214, 108 P.3d 500,
overruled on other grounds by Brinson, | 9. We analyze “numerous
case-specific considerations” to ascertain whether good cause is shown
to withdraw a guilty plea. Robinson, {| 11; Accord Lone Elk, || 23; Wise,
4116; see State v. Nance, 120 Mont. 152, 164, 184 P.2d 554, 560 (1947)
(quoting State v. McAllister, 96 Mont. 348, 353, 30 P.2d 821, 823
(1934)) (noting that “each case of necessity must depend upon its own
facts and circumstances, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down
that will fit every case”); see also Commission Comments to § 46-16-
105, MCA (quoting Nance, 120 Mont. at 164, 184 P.2d at 560). This
Court considers such factors as: an inadequate colloquy, newly
discovered evidence, intervening circumstances, or any other reason for
withdrawing a guilty plea that did not exist when the defendant
pleaded guilty. Robinson, | 11. We also evaluate “... the benefits
obtained from the plea bargain, the withdrawal’s timeliness, and other
considerations that may affect the credibility of the claims presented.”
McFarlane, | 17; (citing State v. Muhammad, 2005 MT 234, {[] 14, 24,
328 Mont. 397, 121 P.3d 521).

133 [Hl We conclude that the District Court did not err in allowing
Terronez to withdraw his guilty plea. Sufficient evidence exists within
the record to support the mixed fact and law determination of “good
cause” for withdrawal based on case-specific circumstances present
here, including extensive intimidating, threatening, and inappropriate
behaviors, acts of violence, the District Court’s own observations of the
impact of these events upon the participants, and its description of a
pervasive air of fear during the trial. See McFarlane, | 17; Robinson,
{ 11 (we consider “numerous case-specific considerations” in
determining whether good cause exists for withdrawal.).

434 The District Court made the factual determination that Foster
was personally impacted and his performance was affected by the
threatening behaviors from the outset of this case. These findings were
not clearly erroneous. Through Foster, Terronez was impacted and his
plea was at least partially induced by these events. “If any doubt exists
on the basis of the evidence presented regarding whether a guilty plea
was voluntarily and intelligently made, the doubt must be resolved in

favor of the defendant.” Hendrickson, 1 14. The record here establishes
doubt concerning the voluntariness of Terronez’ plea.
q35 Affirmed.

JUSTICES McKINNON, BAKER, SHEA and SANDEFUR concur.

ALTO JAKE HOLDINGS, LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
KEVIN DONHAM and SHALEY CLEMM,
Defendants and Appellants.

No. DA 17-0204.
Submitted on Briefs September 20, 2017.
Decided December 5, 2017.
2017 MT 297.
389 Mont. 435.
406 P.3d 937.

For Appellant: Brian J. Miller, Morrison Sherwood Wilson &
Deola, PLLP; Helena.

For Appellee: Paul A. Sandry, Mary Kate Moss, Johnson, Berg
& Saxby, PLLP; Kalispell.

JUSTICE SANDEFUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
#1 Kevin Donham and Shaley Clemm (Tenants) appeal the judgment.
of the Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County,
dismissing their appeal of an underlying judgment of the Flathead
County Justice Court for failure to timely file an appellate brief
pursuant to Rule 14 of the Uniform Municipal Court Rules of Appeal
to District Court (U. M. C. R. App.). We restate the narrow issues on
appeal as:

1.Did the District Court erroneously dismiss Tenants’ appeal for

failure to timely file an appellate brief before ruling on their justice

court motion to proceed in forma pauperis for purposes of § 25-33-

201, MCA?

2. Did the Justice Court erroneously enter a money judgment in

excess of its $12,000 jurisdictional limit?
{2 We affirm on Issue 1 but reverse and remand on Issue 2 for entry
of judgment in favor of Alto Jake Holdings, LLC (Landlord), in
conformance with the jurisdictional limit for justice court money
judgments.

BACKGROUND

{3 Tenants successively rented two mobile homes on adjoining
properties, 1188 and 1190 Patrick Creek Road, in Kalispell, Montana,
from Alto Jake Holdings, LLC. Tenants assert that they executed a
written, one-year lease agreement calling for them to rent the upper
trailer (1188) during November and December 2015, and then to rent
the lower trailer (1190) from January 2016 through October 2016.
James Sichting and his daughter, Amber Altig, were partners and the
principals in Alto Jake Holdings, LLC.

q4 On September 7, 2016, Landlord filed a statutory unlawful
detainer action! in the Flathead County Justice Court for repossession
of both trailers, $450 in back rent, compensation for property damage,
costs, and attorney fees. On October 3, 2016, Tenants filed a pro se
answer generally denying all complaint allegations and
counterclaiming for $4,800 in restitution for previously paid rent, costs,
and attorney fees. In support of their counterclaim, Tenants alleged
that Landlord materially breached the lease agreement by allowing the
lower mobile home to become uninhabitable due to freeze-broken pipes,
a defective water filtration system, and non-functional sewage system.
Tenants further alleged that the upper trailer had a “red tagged”
electrical meter while they were living there prior to moving to the
lower trailer. Tenants alleged that Landlord failed to restore water and
sewer service to the lower trailer despite timely written and verbal
notice of the problems.

{5 Atbench trial on October 17, 2016, Landlord presented testimony
through Sichting, Altig, and hired handyman Brad Hoag. Sichting
recalled the general terms of the parties’ one-year lease agreement, but
also testified that, due to memory loss, he could not clearly recall all
related details and circumstances pertaining to the specific terms of
the agreement. During the late fall and winter of 2015-16, Altig lived
out-of-state and was not personally involved with the subject rental
until she returned to Montana in April 2016. While Altig denied that
Tenants had a one-year lease and contrarily asserted that they merely
rented on an informal month-to-month basis, the Justice Court.
admitted a copy of the parties’ executed lease agreement into evidence
without objection. Altig testified that she first became aware of the
water and sewer system problems in early April 2016. She asserted
that the mobile home water system froze up only after Tenants
unplugged the heat tape and space heater in the pump house. She also
asserted that. the trailers did not have a functioning water-filtration
system only because Tenants removed or disconnected the system.
q6 Handyman Hoag testified that Sichting hired him to make repairs
on the upper trailer in early 2016 after Tenants had moved to the lower
trailer in January. Hoag testified that he was able to restore water to
the upper trailer but explained that the lack of filtration caused all
faucets in both trailers to plug up with sand and pebbles. Hoag said
that he discovered the main sewer pipe for the lower trailer had
become disconnected and that other pipes in the sewage system were

1 See §§ 70-27-108 through -212, MCA.

broken, causing an unsanitary mess. Hoag testified that the lower
trailer was not worth fixing due to the degree of sewage contamination.
Hoag estimated that Sichting hired him to work on the two trailers
approximately six times during the winter of 2016. Over objection, the
Justice Court admitted a list of damages presented by Altig as Exhibit
M, which estimated the total cost of repairs to the trailers at $20,583.
Under questioning from the court, Tenants acknowledged that they
received Landlord’s notice to vacate the lower trailer in August 2016
and subsequently moved out in September 2016. Before adjourning due
to time constraints on the court docket, the Justice Court declared the
rental agreement terminated due to Tenants’ failure to pay rent and
decreed that Landlord was entitled to immediate possession of the
property.

{7 On November 18, 2016, the matter came on for continuation of
bench trial to address the merits of Landlord’s damages claim and
Tenants’ counterclaims. Tenants did not appear. On Landlord’s motion,
the court dismissed Tenants’ counterclaims with prejudice. Amber
Altig again testified that Tenants caused extraordinary damage to both
trailers by causing breakage of sewer piping in the lower trailer, which
then allowed raw sewage to run downhill to a small pond on the
property. She estimated $4,000 as the cost of tearing down and hauling
away the contaminated lower trailer and an additional $8,000 to
$9,000 as the cost of digging out and restoring the contaminated pond.
Based on those estimates and the other figures in her previously
admitted Exhibit M, including the cost of repairing the upper trailer,
Altig estimated the “rough total” of Landlord’s damages to be $20,583.
At the close of trial, the Justice Court issued judgment against Tenants
and awarded the Landlord damages, attorney fees, and costs in the
amount of $21,950.

q8 Just hours after the trial adjourned, Tenants moved to set aside
the judgment on the asserted ground that they did not receive notice
of the continued trial date. On December 6, 2016, on hearing on
Tenants’ motion, the Justice Court vacated its November 18th
judgment on the ground that Tenants had properly updated their
address of record and did not receive notice at their new address.

q9 On December 7, 2016, the Justice Court issued an order, served
by mail, resetting the continuation of bench trial for December 19,
2016. Four days before trial, on December 15, 2016, Tenants moved to
continue the trial on the asserted grounds that: (1) they had
insufficient time to prepare for trial because they did not receive notice
of the December 19th trial until December 13th; (2) a Helena attorney
had agreed to represent them but needed time to review the case; and

(3) Tenant Clemm was scheduled by her new employer to begin a 7-
week training at the Teletech call center in Kalispell on December 19th
and would forfeit her new job if she missed the first day of training.
Landlord filed a response opposing the motion and the court took no
action prior to the bench trial.
{10 On December 19, 2016, the matter came on again for continuation
of bench trial. Tenants both appeared. The Justice Court questioned
Tenants about the status of the attorney who had purportedly agreed
to represent them. Finding their explanation unsatisfactory, the court
denied the motion to continue on the grounds that the attorney had yet
to file a notice of appearance and that further delay would prejudice
Landlord.” Upon denial of the motion, Tenants lamented that they
were unsure how to proceed due to lack of sufficient time to prepare.
Tenant Clemm asked the court, “Okay, so can I just let you go with
whatever you granted them last time? ... I am not prepared to
represent myself or [Tenant. Donham].” The court characterized
Clemm’s question as a motion to vacate the continuation of bench trial
and inquired of Donham whether he agreed to have the court re-impose
the prior judgment. Donham agreed. The Justice Court thus stated:
Upon the defendant’s motion to vacate this trial and re-impose the
judgment that was awarded to the plaintiff after the hearing on
November 18th, there being no objection to it, and I find good
cause for it based on the record that was made at the hearing of
November 18th, the defendants’ motion is granted.
The Justice Court then adjourned proceedings and re-issued its
November 18th judgment, re-dated December 19, 2016, and again
awarded Landlord damages, attorney fees, and costs in the total
amount of $21,950.
q11 On January 18, 2017, Tenants timely filed a joint notice of appeal
in the Justice Court, together with a motion and application to proceed
in forma pauperis. By letter dated January 26, 2017, the Clerk of
District Court notified the parties that the court received the Justice
Court record and that the Uniform Municipal Rules of Appeal to
District Court*® (U. M. C. R. App.) governed the procedure on appeal.
The Clerk’s notice included copies of U. M. C. R. App. 12-14 and
specifically referred the parties to the “deadlines set. forth in” the

° The Justice Court made no findings as to the nature of the prejudice.

* Enacted by Sup. Ct. Ord. Mar. 19, 1998, eff. April 1, 1998, pursuant to Mont.
Const. art. VIT, § 2(3).

attached rules. The notice warned: “No separate briefing schedule will
be issued by the court.” Tenants did not subsequently file an appellate
brief or request an extension of their briefing deadline.

q12 Almost one month later, on February 23, 2017, attorney Brian J.
Miller filed a notice of appearance on Tenants’ behalf in the District
Court. On March 6, 2017, without reference to the previously expired
briefing deadline, Tenants filed a cursory motion asking the District
Court to set a briefing schedule. Later that same day, Landlord filed a
motion for summary dismissal of the appeal pursuant to U. M. C. R.
App. 14(c). The motion asserted that the briefing deadline specified by
U. M. C. R. App. 14(a) had expired and Tenants had yet to file an
appellate brief. Two days later, on March 8, 2017, the District Court
summarily dismissed Tenants’ appeal pursuant to U. M. C. R. App.
14(c) on the ground that, even giving them “the benefit of the doubt” by
“adding an additional three days for mailing,” Tenants’ briefing
deadline expired on February 13, 2017, without filing.

13 By motion filed March 20, 2017, Tenants moved the District Court
to vacate its prior order of dismissal and set a new briefing schedule on
the asserted grounds that: (1) the court prematurely ruled on
Landlord’s motion to dismiss prior to expiration of Tenants’ response
deadline under Uniform District Court Rule 2; (2) Tenants did not.
receive the court’s January 26, 2017, notice of briefing deadlines until
February 18, 2017, because the court incorrectly mailed the notice to
Tenants’ old address at 189 Kelly Road in Kalispell; and (3) Tenants
requested the justice court “transcripts” on February 22, 2017, but did
not receive them until March 7, 2017. By response filed April 3, 2017,
Landlord objected on the ground that, contrary to Tenant Donham’s
affidavit assertion, the Justice Court record indicated 189 Kelly Road
as Donham’s last address with no record indication of any other
current address or request for change of address. Three days later, on
April 6, 2017, Tenants filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
14 The district court functions as an intermediate appellate court
upon an appeal from a justice court of record and the scope of district
court review is “confined to review of the record and questions of law.”
Sections 3-5-3083 and 3-10-115(1), MCA. On appeal to this Court, we
review the justice court record independently of the district court as if
appealed directly to this Court. Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, 1] 25-
26, 334 Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643. Thus, we review court findings of fact
for clear error, conclusions of law de novo, discretionary rulings for an
abuse of discretion, and mixed questions of law and fact de novo. We

review a district court’s dismissal of a lower court appeal for failure to
timely prosecute the appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v. Frazier,
2005 MT 99, {| 8, 326 Mont. 524, 111 P.3d 215; § 25-33-305, MCA; U.
M.C.R. App. 14(c).

DISCUSSION

15 1. Did the District Court erroneously dismiss Tenants’ appeal for
failure to timely file an appellate brief before ruling on their justice
court motion to proceed in forma pauperis for purposes of § 25-33-201,
MCA?

116 Based on the assertion that § 25-33-201, MCA, first required the
District Court to take notice of and rule on their still-pending justice
court motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Tenants assert that the
District Court was without jurisdiction to proceed with briefing on
appeal under U. M. C. R. App. 14.* Tenants do not raise on appeal any
of the asserted grounds for relief raised in their March 20, 2017 motion
to set aside the district court’s order of dismissal.° Tenants’ reliance on
§ 25-33-201, MCA, as the threshold jurisdictional lynchpin for their
assertion of error necessarily requires analysis of the pertinent
provisions of Title 25, chapter 33, MCA, and the Uniform Municipal
Rules of Appeal to District Court governing appeals from justice courts
of record.

17 The Flathead County Justice Court is a justice court of record, as
defined by § 3-10-101(5), MCA. In contrast to appeal by trial de novo,
the exclusive manner of appeal from a justice court of record is appeal
on the record. Sections 3-10-115, 25-33-101, and -301(3), MCA.° The U.

“In dismissing the appeal for failure to timely file an appellate brief, the District
Court also concluded sua sponte that Tenants failed to perfect their appeal by either
filing a sufficient undertaking or moving for an in forma pauperis waiver, as required by
§ 25-33-201(1) and (4), MCA. While that conclusion is not consistent with this Opinion
as an alternative or supplemental ground for dismissal on this record, we need only
address the court’s primary ruling within the narrow framework of the jurisdictional
issue raised on appeal.

® Though framed as a generic motion to vacate without reference to any underlying
authority for post-judgment relief, Tenants’ motion to set aside was, in essence, a motion
to vacate the prior judgment pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) (relief from judgment
based on mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect).

° Prior to the relatively recent advent of lower courts of record in 1991 and 2003,
the exclusive manner of appeal from justice courts to district courts was by trial de novo
rather than appeal on the record. Sections 25-38-101 and -301, MCA; see also Mont.

M. C. R. App. and §§ 25-33-101 through -306, MCA, as applicable to
justice courts of record, govern the procedure on appeal from justice
courts of record. Frazier, ]] 8; §§ 3-10-115(4) and 25-33-101, MCA.
Regardless of whether a justice court is a court of record, a party
seeking to appeal an adverse judgment in a civil case must first file a
notice of appeal in justice court within 30 days of entry of the
judgment. U. M. C. R. App. 4, 5(a)(1); §§ 25-33-101 through -103, MCA.
When the judgment is a money judgment, the appeal “is not effectual
for any purpose unless” the appellant also files “an undertaking” with
two or more sureties, in a sum equal to twice the amount of the
judgment, including costs. U. M. C. R. App. 5(a)(2), 6(a)(1) and (4);
§§ 25-33-201(1) and (4), MCA.” At the time of filing the notice of appeal,
the appellant must pay a justice court filing fee for the notice of appeal
and undertaking, verification of sureties, and transmittal of the justice
record to district court. Section 25-31-112(5), MCA. However, a person
unable to pay the filing fee or cost of the undertaking may file a motion
in justice court to proceed in forma pauperis. U. M. C. R. App. 6(a)(1)
and (4), 11(a); §§ 25-10-404(1), 25-31-1138, and 25-33-201(1), (5), MCA.
A motion to proceed in forma pauperis is a request for waiver of filing
fees, the undertaking requirement, and costs on appeal in the form of
an affidavit stating that the appellant has a non-frivolous appeal and
is unable to afford those costs. U. M. C. R. App. 11(a); § 25-10-404(1),
MCA.

18 If the justice of the peace is available and grants the waiver
request upon timely presentation of a notice of appeal, the justice court
must file the notice of appeal and the appeal must proceed as if the
appellant had paid the justice court filing fee and filed the required
undertaking. U. M. C. R. App. 6(a)(1), 11(a); § 25-10-404(1) and (2),
MCA; see also §§ 25-31-113 and 25-33-201(1), MCA. If the justice of the
peace is not available to rule on the waiver, the justice court must
likewise file the notice of appeal and, “subject to subsequent approval”
of the waiver request by the district court, the appeal must proceed as

Const. art. VII, § 4(2) (district courts “shall hear appeals from inferior courts as trials
anew unless as otherwise provided by law”); 1889 Mont. Const. art. 8, § 11 (district
courts “have appellate jurisdiction in such cases arising in justices and inferior courts
.. as may be prescribed by law”); § 3-5-303, MCA (district courts have “appellate
jurisdiction in cases arising in justices’ courts and other courts of limited jurisdiction ...
as may be prescribed by law and consistent with the constitution”)

7 The appellant may alternatively deposit money in lieu of filing a security. U. M.
©.R. App. 8(b); § 25-33-205, MCA.

a  «°

if the appellant had paid the justice court filing fee and filed the
required undertaking. Section 25-10-404(2), MCA; see also U.M.C. R.
App. 6(a)(1) and (4); §§ 25-31-1138, and 25-33-201(1), (5), MCA-* If the
justice of the peace denies the waiver request on an appeal from a
justice court of record, the appellant must either pay the justice court.
filing fee and file the required undertaking or refile the waiver motion
in district court within 10 days of the denial. U. M. C. R. App. 112

19 Given the particular and limited jurisdiction of justice courts and
the limited appellate jurisdiction of district courts, we have long held
that strict compliance with the statutory notice of appeal and
undertaking requirements are necessary to vest the district court with
appellate jurisdiction in each case. Berry v. Seman, 245 Mont. 335, 337,
801 P.2d 589, 590 (1990); Adams v. Crismore, 211 Mont. 245, 248-49,
683 P.2d 497, 499 (1984); State ex rel. Gregory v. District Court, 86
Mont. 396, 398, 284 P. 537, 5387-38 (1930); Jenkins v. Carroll, 42 Mont.
302, 313, 112 P. 1064, 1069 (1910) (citing McCauley v. Jones, 35 Mont.
82, 88 P. 572 (1907)); and State ex rel. Hall v. District Court, 34 Mont.
112, 85 P. 872 (1906)). Based on this jurisdictional threshold, record
and non-record justice courts have no duty to transmit the record on
appeal to district court unless and until the appellant perfects the
appeal by timely complying with the notice of appeal and undertaking
requirements of U. M. C. R. App. 4, 5(a)(1), 6(a)(1); §$ 25-33-101
through -103, and -201(1), MCA. U. M. C. R. App. 10(a) and (¢); § 25-33-
104, MCA. Consequently, jurisdiction over an appeal generally does not
vest in the district court until the justice court transmits the justice
court record upon perfection of the appeal in justice court. See U. M. C.
R. App. 10(c), (h), and 14(a); § 25-33-104, MCA; Berry, 245 Mont. at

* In contrast to $ 25-10-404(2), MCA (expressly addressing effect of the non-
availability of a justice of the peace to timely rule ona motion to proceed in forma
pauperis), the U. M. C.R. App. include no similar express provision addressing the effect.
ofno ruling by the justice court. See U. M. C. R. App. 11 (addressing effect of grant or
denial without reference to effect of non-ruling).

° No similar post-denial right to refile the fee waiver request in the district court
is expressly available on appeal from a non-record justice court. See $§ 25-10-404(2), 25-
31-113, and 25-33-201(1), MCA; but see § 25-83-201(4), MCA (“[w]hen the appealing
party is determined by the court to be indigent, the district court shall waive the
undertaking requirements”).

337, 801 P.2d at 590.° The dispositive issue here is whether, and to
what extent, the timely filing of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
satisfies the undertaking requirements of U. M. C. R. App. 6 and § 25-
33-201, MCA, sufficient to vest the district court with jurisdiction over
an appeal.

{20 In that regard, Tenants timely filed a notice of appeal, and
accompanying motion to proceed in forma pauperis, in justice court in
accordance with U. M. C. R. App. 4, 5(a)(1), and 6(a)(1); §§ 25-10-
404(1), 25-31-1183, 25-33-101 through -103, -201(1), (5), MCA. The
justice court timely transmitted the record to the district court “subject.
to subsequent approval” of the fee waiver request. U. M. C. R. App.
6(a)(1) and (4), 10(a) and (c); §§ 25-10-404(2), 25-31-1138, and 25-33-
201(1), (4), MCA. Thus, subject to subsequent approval of Tenants’ fee
waiver request pursuant to § 25-10-404(2), MCA, the district court
acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on January 24, 2017, on receipt
and filing of the justice court record. U. M. C. R. App. 10(c) and (h);
§ 25-33-104, MCA; Berry, 245 Mont. at 337, 801 P.2d at 590.

21 The clerk of district court “shall notify the parties in writing” of
the filing date of the justice record. U. M. C. R. App. 10(c). The clerk
may serve the notice by mail or personal service. U. M. C. R. App.
12(c). “Service by mail is complete on mailing.” U. M. C. R. App. 12(c).
Unless otherwise ordered by the district court, “the appellant shall
serve and file a brief within 15 days after the date on which the record
is filed.” U. M. C. R. App. 14(a). If the clerk serves notice of filing of the
justice court record to the parties by mail, the filing deadline for the
appellant’s brief is 18 days after the date of filing of the justice court
record in district court. U. M. C. R. App. 14(a), 20(c).

22 Here, the District Court received and filed the justice record on
appeal on January 24, 2017. By correspondence mailed two days later
to the parties’ respective addresses of record in the justice court record,
the Clerk of District Court notified the parties in writing of the court’s
receipt of the justice court record and that the U. M. C. R. App.
governed the procedure on appeal. The notice included copies of U. M.
C. R. App. 12-14 (requirements for filing, service, and form of briefs

" Ifa justice court fails to timely transmit the record on perfection of the appeal,
district courts may compel the justice court to transmit the record. Section 25-33-104,
MCA. Perfection of the appeal in justice court also requires the justice court to stay any
pending execution on the judgment and allows the adverse party to timely “except to the
sufficiency of the sureties,” thereby requiring the appellants to file an affidavit verifying
their ability satisfy the bond subject to the approval of the justice or district court. U. M.
©.R. App. 7 and 8(a); §§ 25-33-203 and -204, MCA.

a

and briefing deadlines) and referred the parties to the “deadlines set
forth in” the attached rules. The notice clearly and unequivocally
warned that: “No separate briefing schedule will be issued by the
court.” The clerk’s notice of the filing date of the record and the parties’
briefing deadlines was clear, unequivocal, and complete on mailing.
(23 “If [the] appellant fails to file a brief within the time provided” by
Rule 14(a) or as otherwise extended by the court, “the appeal shall be
deemed without merit and subject to summary dismissal by the district
court.” U. M. C. R. App. 14(c). Absent an abuse of discretion, “we will
not reverse a district court for insisting that the parties ... timely
comply” with the briefing deadlines specified by U. M. C. R. App. 14(a).
Frazier, | 9. Despite due notice of the filing deadline mailed to their
last address of record, Tenants’ neither filed a brief nor requested a
time extension upon a showing of good cause. Well after expiration of
the briefing deadline, when Tenants appeared through new counsel on
February 23, 2017, Tenants again failed to file a brief or seek a time
extension. Even when counsel subsequently filed a motion requesting
a briefing schedule on March 6, 2017, the motion made no reference to
the expired briefing deadline, much less an asserted showing of good
cause for a belated time extension. Though Tenants subsequently
attempted to assert good cause for not complying with their briefing
deadline in their March 20, 2017 motion to set aside the court’s order
of dismissal, Tenants do not appeal on any of those grounds here.’
Under these circumstances, Tenants have failed to show that the
District Court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing the
appeal pursuant U. M. C. R. App. 14(c).

24 In reliance on Dime Ins. Agency v. Johnson & ISC Distributors,
279 Mont. 121, 926 P.2d 733 (1996), Tenants assert that, regardless of
an otherwise valid basis for dismissal pursuant to U. M. C. R. App.
14(c), the district court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal, and
thus the U. M. C. R. App. 14(a) briefing deadline could not begin to
run, until the court ruled on Tenants’ previously filed fee waiver
request. In Dime Ins., we considered whether an appellant’s failure to
file an undertaking within 30 days of the date of the justice court
judgment prevented the district court from acquiring jurisdiction to
proceed to on appeal. Dime Ins., 279 Mont. at 123-24, 926 P.2d at 734-
35. While recognizing the long-settled rule that the district court does

1 A premature ruling prior to expiration of a party's response time under Uniform
District Court Rule 2 is a non-jurisdictional procedural defect subject to waiver. See
Stanley, {4 37-38

not acquire jurisdiction over an appeal unless and until the appellant
has complied with the statutory notice of appeal and undertaking
requirements, we held only that, read to together in context,
§§ 25-33-1038, -201, and -207, MCA, allowed the appellant to file the
required undertaking at any time prior to the hearing on a motion to
dismiss filed by the appellee in district court. Dime Ins., 279 Mont. at
126-27, 926 P.2d at 736-37.” Unlike here, Dime Ins. did not consider
the effect of the continued pendency of a justice court motion to proceed
in forma pauperis on the district court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over
an appeal. Thus, Dime is distinguishable and of no consequence here.
25 [ll Nonetheless, we again recognize and reaffirm the longstanding
general rule that the district court does not acquire jurisdiction to
proceed with an appeal unless and until an appellant timely complies
with the statutory requirements for filing a notice of appeal and an
undertaking on appeal. However, the undertaking requirement is
expressly subject to an indigency-based waiver. U. M. C. R. App. 6(a)(1)
and (4); § 25-33-201(1), (5), MCA. Moreover, if the justice court is
unable to timely rule ona motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the
appeal must proceed as if the appellant had timely paid required fees
and filed the required undertaking “subject to subsequent approval” of
the appellant’s fee waiver request by the district court. See § 25-10-
404(1), (2), MCA; see also U. M. C. R. App. 6(a)(4); § 25-33-201(5), MCA.
126 [MM In accordance with § 25-10-404(1) and (2), MCA, and in the
current absence of a more specific statutory or rule provision to the
contrary, a district court’s failure to rule sua sponte on a pending
waiver request previously filed in justice court does not preclude
acquisition or retention of district court jurisdiction to proceed with
briefing on appeal upon transmittal of the justice court record. Rather,
pursuant to § 25-10-404(1) and (2), MCA, the district court acquires
jurisdiction on transmittal of the justice court record and may proceed.
on appeal subject to subsequent ruling on the pending waiver request
prior to entry of final judgment on appeal. Upon acquisition of
jurisdiction on filing of the justice court record, the district court may
rule on the pending indigency waiver request: (1) on motion of the
adverse party pursuant to § 25-33-207, MCA; (2) on the appellant’s
renewed motion or request for ruling pursuant U. M. C. R. App. 6(a)(4)

® But see Goldsmith v. Lane, 226 Mont. 341, 343, 735 P.2d 306, 308 (1987)
(question of the sufficiency or insufficiency of an undertaking cannot arise until the
appellant actually files an undertaking), overruled by Dime Ins., 279 Mont. at 124-26,
926 P.2d at 735-36.

and 11(b) and § 25-10-404(1) and (2), MCA; or (3) sua sponte. Here,
pursuant to U. M. C. R. App. 6(a)(1) and (4) and §§ 25-10-404(1), (2)
and 25-33-201(1), (4), MCA, the district court acquired jurisdiction over
the appeal on filing of the justice court record subject to subsequent
approval of the pending waiver request prior to entry of final judgment
on appeal. Landlord, the only party with standing to contest Tenants’
request for waiver of the undertaking requirement, did not object to the
request prior to entry of final judgment on appeal. Thus, regardless of
the continued pendency of Tenants’ justice court motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, the District Court had jurisdiction to proceed with
briefing on appeal pursuant to U. M. C. R. App. 14. We hold that the
District Court did not err, due to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing
Tenants’ appeal pursuant to U. M. C. R. App. 14(c) prior to ruling on
their previously filed motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

27 2. Did the Justice Court erroneously enter a money judgment in
excess of its $12,000 jurisdictional limit?

{28 Tenants did not object here or below that the amount of the
Justice Court judgment exceeded the jurisdictional limit for justice
courts. However, subject matter jurisdiction is the threshold power and
authority of a court to hear and determine a claim or issue. Ballas v.
Missoula City Bd. of Adjustment, 2007 MT 299, 1] 15-16, 340 Mont. 56,
172 P.3d 1232 (distinguishing subject matter jurisdiction from
standing); Stanley, | 30. Montana courts acquire jurisdiction only as
conferred by the Montana Constitution or statutes enacted in
conformance with the Constitution. Stanley, 52. While the failure to
timely object generally waives non-jurisdictional procedural defects,
“lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and may be
raised at any stage of a judicial proceeding by a party or sua sponte” by
the trial or appellate court. Stanley, I] 31-32 (courts cannot acquire
subject matter jurisdiction by consent of the parties and trial and
appellate courts have an independent duty “to determine whether
subject-matter jurisdiction exists” swa sponte); Sage v. Gamble, 279
Mont. 459, 463, 929 P.2d 822, 824 (1996) (lack of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived); O'Donnell v. Ryans, Inc., 227 Mont. 48,
49, 736 P.2d 965, 966 (1987). Accordingly, we review sua sponte on
appeal in this matter whether the amount of the Justice Court
judgment exceeded the jurisdictional limit for justice court money
damages awards.

29 HBAs courts of limited jurisdiction strictly prescribed by statute,
justice courts have no jurisdiction in civil actions to award money
damages in excess of $12,000, exclusive of courts costs and attorney
fees. Section 3-10-301, MCA. The jurisdictional limits specified by § 3-

10-301, MCA, are express limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of
justice courts. Here, based on the evidence of the “rough total” of
damages claimed by the Landlord, the Justice Court awarded $20,524
to Alto Jake Holdings, LLC, exclusive of costs and attorney fees.
Adding in claimed costs and statutory attorney fees in the amount of
$1,426, the Justice Court issued judgment against Tenants in the total
amount of $21,950. The $20,524 compensatory damages award
exceeded the Justice Court’s $12,000 jurisdictional limit by $8,524.
Thus, regardless of Tenants’ lack of objection below or on appeal to this
Court, the Justice Court erred by awarding a money judgment $8,524
in excess of its $12,000 jurisdictional limit.

CONCLUSION

30 We hold that the District Court did not err, due to lack of
jurisdiction, in dismissing Tenants’ appeal pursuant to U. M. C. R.
App. 14(c) prior to ruling on their previously filed motion to proceed in
forma pauperis. However, we hold that the Justice Court erred by
awarding a money judgment $8,524 in excess of the court’s $12,000
jurisdictional limit. Therefore, we hereby reverse and remand for entry
of a corrected judgment against Tenants in the total amount of
$13,426, constituting $12,000 in compensatory damages and $1,426 in
costs and attorney fees.

31 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

JUSTICES SHEA, WHEAT, McKINNON and RICE concur.

ERIC HORN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

ST. PETER’S HOSPITAL,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 16-0730.
Submitted on Briefs October 18, 2017
Decided December 5, 2017.

2017 MT 298.

389 Mont. 449.

406 P.3d 932.

For Appellant: L. Randall Bishop, Bishop, Heenan & Davies,
Billings; Eric Rasmusson, Bulman Law Associates, PLLC, Missoula;
Neel Hammond, Hammond Law, PLLC, Missoula.

For Appellee: David M. McLean, Ryan C. Willmore, McLean
& Associates, PLLC, Missoula.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.
{1 Eric Horn appeals from the District Court’s post-jury-trial orders
overturning the verdict in Horn’s favor, and granting judgment to St.
Peter’s Hospital (Hospital). We affirm.

2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

Whether the District Court erred in granting a judgment as a

matter of law in favor of St. Peter’s Hospital following a jury

verdict in favor of Eric Horn.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q3 Horn was injured in April 2011 when he fell from a roof, fracturing
his heels and a vertebra. His injuries required several surgeries, a
seventeen-day stay in the Hospital, and a subsequent period of
immobilization. Prior to surgery, Hospital orthopedic surgeon Dr.
Jeffrey Martin ordered that. a retrievable blood clot filter be placed in
Horn’s inferior vena cava (IVC), a large vein leading to the heart. The
purpose of installing the filter was to trap blood clots that might arise
from the period of physical inactivity during Horn’s recuperation after
surgery. A radiologist employed by Great Divide Radiology implanted
an Optease brand filter.

q4 = Dr. Martin was the primary physician responsible for Horn’s care
from April 28, 2011, to August 16, 2011. In early August 2011, after the
filter had been in place about 120 days and Horn had regained some
mobility, Dr. Martin ordered that it be removed. On August 16, 2011,
Dr. Jeffrey Georgia attempted to remove the filter, but discovered that.
it was embedded in the wall of Horn’s IVC and could not be retrieved.
{5 After the failed filter retrieval, Horn returned to the Hospital's
emergency room several times with severe abdominal, pelvic and groin
pains. He was treated for a bladder or kidney infection, but in August
2011 returned to the ER with a swollen right leg. Horn was
transported to St. Patrick Hospital in Missoula on August 29 and
remained there through September 2, 2011. Doctors there treated Horn
for a blood clot and hematoma, and inserted a stent in his left iliac
vein.

{6 Thedoctors at St. Patrick Hospital determined that removal of the

blood clot filter was too complicated for them to attempt and referred
Horn to the Oregon Health Sciences University in Portland. Doctors
there unsuccessfully attempted to remove the embedded filter. In the
process of doing so, the tip of a catheter broke off in the vein and could
not be retrieved.

{7 The OHSU referred Horn to Stanford University where doctors
used a unique laser procedure to remove the blood clot filter. The
Stanford doctors were unable to remove the fragment of catheter
because it was embedded in the wall of Horn’s IVC.

{8 In September 2013 Horn sued St. Peter’s Hospital seeking to
recover damages for medical negligence. The case went to jury trial on
August 29, 2016. Horn presented his case, including the testimony of
treating doctors as well as two expert medical witnesses. When Horn
rested, the Hospital moved for judgment as a matter of law under
M. R. Civ. P. 50(a), contending that Horn had failed to prove that the
Hospital departed from the applicable standard of care. The District
Court denied the motion and the case proceeded, lasting a total of four
days.

q9 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Horn, awarding damages
for medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, and mental and
emotional distress. On September 14, 2016, the District Court entered
judgment in Horn’s favor for $492,268.39.

{10 The Hospital then renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of
law and joined it with motions under M. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60 for anew
trial and for relief from the judgment. On November 18, 2016, the
District Court reversed its prior order and granted the Hospital’s Rule
50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, dismissing Horn’s
complaint.

{11 The District Court’s order reviewed the testimony from the trial,
noting that the only express reference to standard of care from Horn’s
expert, Dr. Alzheimer, came during cross-examination when he was
asked whether the standard of care would vary depending upon where
the medical professional practiced. The District Court concluded that
Dr. Alzheimer “provided no opinion” regarding the applicable standard
of care, or whether it was breached.

12 The District Court noted that Horn’s other expert, Chris Bilyeu,
testified about the practices and procedures followed by the hospital
where he works in Sheridan, Wyoming. The District Court determined
that Bilyeu did not establish that these practices and procedures
constituted the standard of care “for all hospitals,” and did not
establish that they should have been followed by the Hospital in this
case. The District Court determined that upon review, Bilyeu provided

no opinion on the standard of care, and no opinion that the Hospital
departed from the standard of care to Horn’s injury.

13 The District Court also noted Horn’s reliance upon the testimony
of treating physician Dr. Martin, but again determined that Martin did
not testify as to any standard of care or that there was a breach of the
standard of care. The District Court further determined that the only
expert to testify about a standard of care was the Hospital’s expert, Dr.
Moriarty. He testified that the decision to use the IVC filter was within
“acceptable medical practice” and met the applicable standard of care.
The District Court noted that Moriarty’s testimony was “unrefuted.”
14 The District Court rejected Horn’s argument that the record
showed negligence by the Hospital and that “multiple experts either
inferred or admitted that the evidence indicated a deviation from what
was safe and prudent aftercare.” The District Court concluded that
these arguments were unavailing because “inference, implication, and
jury purview is not what Montana law requires. Expert testimony as
to the standard of care must be presented at trial.”

115 Horn appeals, seeking reversal of the District Court’s order and
reinstatement of the verdict and judgment in his favor.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

16 A district court may only grant judgment as a matter of law under
M. R. Civ. P. 50 when “there is a complete absence of any evidence
which would justify submitting an issue to a jury.” Schumacher v.
Stephens, 1998 MT 58, {] 14, 288 Mont. 115, 956 P.2d 76. All evidence
and all legitimate inferences that might be drawn from it “must be
considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.” Schumacher, {| 14. This Court reviews the district court.
decision using those same principles to determine whether the district
court’s decision was correct. Schumacher, | 14. Determination of a
Rule 50 motion is an issue of law, and this Court provides “full review
... Without special deference to the views of the trial court.” Johnson v.
Costco Wholesale, 2007 MT 43, {] 18, 336 Mont. 105, 152 P.38d 727.
{117 Courts should “exercise the greatest self-restraint in interfering
with the constitutionally mandated process of a jury decision.”
Johnson, {| 13.

DISCUSSION
18 Issue: Whether the District Court erred in granting a judgment as
a matter of law in favor of St. Peter’s Hospital following a jury verdict
in favor of Eric Horn.
{119 Horn’s claim was that the Hospital was negligent in providing

care to him. Horn claimed that the Hospital failed to implement
procedures to assess the risks of inserting various types of blood clot
filters; failed to implement procedures for tracking filters after
insertion into a patient; and waited too long to attempt retrieval of his
filter. Horn contended that these failures resulted in the filter staying
inside his body until retrieval was extremely difficult, requiring
successive referrals to high-level medical facilities before the filter
could be removed.
{20 The District Court considered the Hospital’s motion under M. R.
Civ. P. 50, which provides in part:
(1) If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury
trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that
issue, the court may:
(A) resolve the issue against the party; and
(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the
party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be
maintained or defeated only with a favorable ruling on that issue.
M. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). The District Court applied the well-settled
governing principle that judgment as a matter of law is
properly granted only when there is a complete absence of any
evidence which would justify submitting an issue to a jury and all
such evidence and any legitimate inferences that might be drawn
from the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion.
Johnson, J 13. The District Court also applied the principle that in
cases of alleged medical negligence, the plaintiff (Horn) has the burden
to establish the standard of care; that the standard was breached; and
that he suffered damage. Labair v. Carey, 2012 MT 312, {] 29, 367
Mont. 453, 291 P.3d 1160. Expert testimony is required to establish
these issues when they are beyond the common experience of the jury
and the testimony will assist the jury in understanding the facts.
Labair, | 29. These same principles apply when the case involves
alleged medical negligence by a hospital. Dalton v. Kalispell Regional
Hosp., 256 Mont. 243, 246-47, 846 P.2d 960, 962 (1993).
121 Horn does not dispute that these principles govern his claim
against the Hospital. Horn contends that he proved that the Hospital
“did not use reasonable care” in treating him, and that “multiple
experts either inferred or admitted” that there was a “deviation from
what was safe and prudent aftercare.” He contended that the
treatment he received was “slipshod and negligently coordinated.”
However, after review of the evidence that Horn presented at trial, the

District Court determined that neither of his two medical experts
“established the requisite standard of care.”

22 Horn’s expert, Dr. Alzheimer, did not identify any medical
standard of care that would have been applicable to Horn’s situation,
either as to the Hospital as an organization or as to individual doctors.
During Dr. Alzheimer’s testimony, Horn’s attorney read passages from
medical articles and from the manufacturer’s package insert for the
IVC filter itself, asking him whether he “agreed” with the text. In
particular, Dr. Alzheimer “agree[d]” with the “advice and assessment”
in the literature that “[t]he success of retrieval attempts has been
shown to decrease with prolonged dwell times, ... highlightling] the
importance of frequent follow-up for reassessment of risk and
consideration of filter retrieval.” The fact that Dr. Alzheimer “agreed”
with what was read to him by the attorney is essentially irrelevant
without further testimony that it was part of the established standard
of medical care applicable to Horn’s situation. On cross-examination,
Dr. Alzheimer also “agreed” that he was not aware of any filter that
had been retrieved at the manufacturer’s recommended twenty-three
days, that the literature also had reported successful retrieval after a
dwell time as long as 3,006 days, and that “these filters vary from
patient to patient.”

23 Similarly, Horn’s other medical expert Chris Bilyeu failed to
provide any testimony as to the standard of care for the defendant
hospital. Bilyeu, the medical imaging manager at Sheridan, Wyoming’s
eighty-eight-bed hospital, testified that “in [his] department” the
company representative is brought in “for the first couple filter
placements to make sure we know—understand how to use them.” In
terms of filter retrieval, Bilyeu stated, “Ultimately, ... it’s the
collaboration between the ordering physician and the radiologist to
determine that the filter can come out. We simply just provide an
avenue to make sure they understand when the retrieval time is
coming up.” As the District Court noted, Bilyeu “provided testimony of
what occurs at the hospital he works at.” However, he “did not testify
this was the standard of care for all hospitals, or opine this is the
standard SPH should have utilized.” On cross-examination, Bilyeu
acknowledged that he was aware of only one case in which his hospital
attempted retrieval of an Optease filter within the manufacturer's
recommended twenty-three days, and his hospital “had to send it out”
after an unsuccessful removal attempt. Again, Horn’s second expert
failed to provide any description of the standard of care applicable to
this case. We have recognized that a medical provider’s “individual
practice, when not based on national standards, lacks relevance to a

medical malpractice case.” Norris v. Fritz, 2012 MT 27, | 44, 364 Mont.
63, 270 P.3d 79. See also Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Gratton, 169
Mont. 185, 190, 545 P.2d 670, 673 (1976).

24 Horn also relies upon two documents from the manufacturer of the
Optease filter. One appears to be information for patients as to the
purpose, design and placement of the filter. It states, in part, that the
filter “may be placed permanently as an implantable device or
temporarily as a retrievable device” depending upon the doctor’s
recommendation. The other was an insert into the packaging for the
filter itself. It states, in part, that a “21 patient study and a 40 patient
retrospective chart review suggest” that the filter “can be safely
retrieved (mean of 11.1 days, range 5-14 days and mean of 16.4 days,
range 3-48 days).” The same section of the document then states that
the “Optease filter can be safely retrieved up to 23 days.”

{25 While Horn argues that such manufacturer information may
contain the standard of medical care, standing alone it does not do so.
The issue is that there was no medical expert testimony stating that
the manufacturer’s information was the standard of care. There was
no description of a standard of care that a jury could comprehend. A
doctor witness’s statement that he agreed with this information in no
way helps the jury to understand it, and does not in any way establish
the medical standard of care that should be followed by all hospitals for
blood clot filter cases.

26 Hl A manufacturer's recommendation or package insert can be
relevant evidence to be considered by the jury, but it is not a substitute
for the required expert evidence that describes the standard of care.
See Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 114 (Ky.
2008) (concluding that, although information about a drug in the
package insert and the Physicians’ Desk Reference “is relevant and
useful information regarding the prescribing physician’s standard of
care, it is not the sole determinant of the standard of care”);
Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 16-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(observing that such materials are “intended to comply with the FDA’s
regulations, to provide advertising and promotional material, and to
limit the manufacturer’s liability’ and cannot, by themselves, be
considered prima facie evidence of the prescribing physician’s standard
of care); Morlino v. Medical Center of Ocean County, 684 A.2d 944, 949
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996) (holding that package inserts and parallel
Physicians’ Desk Reference information “may be considered by the jury
along with expert testimony to determine the appropriate standard of
care”); Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 188, 151 (Haw. 1995) (holding that a
manufacturer’s insert, in and of itself, may not establish the relevant

standard of care in a medical negligence action, but may be considered
by the fact finder “along with expert testimony” to define the standard
of care).

27 Tl Horn attempts to downplay this fundamental failure at trial
by dismissing it as only a quibbling over the absence of “magic words.”
As noted above, Montana law has long required the presentation of
expert testimony to establish the standard of care in a medical
negligence case. Labair, {| 29. The issue here is the total failure to
establish for the jury the medical standard of care applicable to this
case. Without proof of this fundamental element of the medical
negligence case, the jury was essentially left on its own to determine
what the standard of care might be. The issue is not the absence of
magic words, but rather trial counsel’s failure to meet the clear and
established requirements for maintaining a medical negligence case.
Without presentation of a standard of care against which the jury can
evaluate the medical care Horn received, this case becomes a simple
negligence action governed by a “reasonable person” standard. This is
contrary to Montana law.

128 The necessity of proving the first and essential leg of a medical
negligence claim was at the forefront throughout this case. The District
Court specifically referred to its prior order, which had stated that the
“parties agree Horn bears the burden of establishing the standard of
care” and that expert testimony is ordinarily required to establish the
standard of care. For whatever reason, that was not done when the
case went to trial. Unfortunately, Horn must bear the burden of that
failure.

29 [I The District Court determined that because of the failure to
present evidence of the first and essential part of a medical negligence
claim, the jury did not have a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to
return a verdict against the Hospital for medical negligence. As
discussed above, this is the threshold for granting a judgment as a
matter of law under M. R. Civ. P. 50. The District Court applied the
well-settled governing principle that judgment as a matter of law is
warranted when there is a complete absence of evidence that would
justify submitting an issue to a jury. Johnson, {| 13. With Horn’s
complete failure to prove the applicable standard of care, as the
District Court eventually recognized, the case should not have been
presented to the jury.

30 We agree with the District Court’s evaluation of the evidence in
this case. Even under the very high standard for granting a Rule 50(b)
motion, it is clear that Horn’s representatives at trial utterly failed to
present evidence on the fundamental requirements of a medical

negligence case—the applicable medical standard of care; a breach of
the standard of care; and damage resulting from that breach.
Unfortunately for Horn, this departure from the requirements for a
prima facie claim of medical negligence make it impossible to uphold
the jury verdict in this case.

CONCLUSION
31 We affirm the District Court’s order granting judgment to the
Hospital.
JUSTICES McKINNON, WHEAT, SANDEFUR, BAKER, SHEA
and RICE concur.

FLORENCE J. LARSON and.
DWIGHT W. LARSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.

DOUG E. LARSON,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 16-0309.
Submitted on Briefs September 13, 2017.
Decided December 5, 2017.
2017 MT 299.
389 Mont. 458.

406 P.3d 925.

For Appellant: Kirk D. Evenson, Marra, Evenson & Bell, P.C.,
Great Falls.

For Appellee: W. Scott Green, Daniel L. Snedigar, Patten,
Peterman, Bekkedahl & Green, P.L.L.C., Billings.

JUSTICE SHEA delivered the Opinion of the Court.
qi Plaintiffs Dwight W. Larson (“Dwight”) and Florence J. Larson
(“Florence”), through her Conservator Joyce Wuertz (“Wuertz”), appeal
the December 29, 2015 Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment by the by the Ninth Judicial District Court, Toole County.
We address the following issues:

Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in finding no undue

influence by Doug over Florence.

Issue Two: Whether the gift of stock certificates was actually a

contract for which Doug furnished no consideration.

Issue Three: Whether the District Court erred in finding Florence

made a valid gift of D & D Land Co. stock certificates to Doug.
q2 We affirm.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3 This case concerns whether Florence, mother of Dwight and Doug
Larson (“Doug”), properly and without undue influence, gifted her
shares in the family farm corporation, to Doug.

{4 In 1964, Florence and Edward Larson (“Ed”) began farming in
Toole County. In 1973, Ed and Florence formed D & D Land Company
(“D & D”) as the operating entity for the family farm. Originally, Ed
held 31,200 shares, Florence held 8,800 shares, and D & D retained
10,000 shares. In 1984, Ed and Florence executed their wills, providing
the surviving spouse would own 51% “of the total voting rights of D &
D Land Company” with the remaining balance going to sons, Dwight.
and Doug, in equal shares. At that time, Ed held 20,005 shares and
Florence held 19,995 shares. Since 1987, D & D has employed Doug as
the full-time farm manager. Dwight lives in Billings, where he is a
teacher. In 1999, Ed gifted 10 shares to Doug, leaving Ed with 19,995
shares and Florence with 19,995 shares.

{5 Ed passed away on March 16, 2006. Florence served as the
Personal Representative of Ed’s estate and hired attorney Gary
Bjelland (“Bjelland”) to probate the estate. Florence continued to keep

the books for the farm’s operations while Doug took over the primary
operations of the farm. Over the next two years, Florence met with
Bjelland and Denise Frigge (“Frigge”)—Florence’s long-time friend and
an accountant with the firm of Brown, Fitchner and Associates in
Conrad—to discuss her husband’s estate and her own estate. Dwight
attended some of these meetings. Doug attended all of these meetings.
{6 During a December 2007 meeting, Frigge explained that Florence
would need D & D assets out of her name for five years if Florence
wanted to avoid D & D assets being depleted to pay for her future
nursing care. Florence expressed her desire that D & D remain a viable
family farm, which she believed would not be possible if the property
was divided equally between Dwight and Doug upon her death.
Florence also expressed her strong desire to stay on the farmstead she
built with her husband and to assist in D & D operations for as long as
possible.

{7 In early 2008, after Florence expressed interest in giving her
shares to Doug, Dwight began calling Florence. Dwight taped at least
four long calls, and testified that he called his mother more than the
calls he taped. Dwight would keep Florence on the phone for an hour
at a time and repeatedly tell her that she should not change her will
and should leave things as “Dad left them.” Dwight complained that he
would not get his fair share if she changed her will and that Doug had
enough land. On March 12, 2008, after Dwight called and woke
Florence up, she told him she could not split the farm fifty-fifty
“because it won’t be enough to run the farm.”

q8 On February 20, 2008, Dwight drove Florence to Bjelland’s law
offices for a meeting, and she arrived visibly upset. During the
meeting, Florence told Dwight in front of Doug and Bjelland that she
thought Doug should receive a greater share of the farm “because he’s
farming himself and has to make a living on it.” Bjelland carefully
explained any decision was Florence’s to make and that she could enter
into an agreement to stay on the farm and have her living expenses
provided by D & D. In accordance with Ed’s will, Ed’s D & D shares
were distributed at the meeting: Florence received 405 shares, Doug
received 9,795 shares, and Dwight received 9,795 shares. As a result,
Florence held 20,400 shares (51%), Doug held 9,805 shares (24.52%),
and Dwight held 9,795 shares (24.49%).

q9 On March 19, 2008, Florence and Doug again met with Bjelland
to discuss Florence’s estate planning concerns, including her desire to
avoid D & D assets being used to pay for her future nursing care.
Florence took copious notes during the meeting. On or about March 27,
2008, Bjelland received a call from Florence and Doug in which
Florence stated she decided to “gift substantially all of her stock,

except for ten shares, to Doug.” Bjelland prepared the stock certificates
for the transfer, and sent the blank stock certificates to Florence.
Around March 29, 2008, Florence received the blank certificates with
Bjelland’s instructions that noted “{ulpon signing these, then the
certificates comprising of your 20,004 shares should be cancelled or
voided out.” Florence and Doug discussed the transfer once more before
she signed the stock certificates on April 1, 2008. Florence then
directed Doug to mail the signed certificated back to Bjelland. Bjelland
testified that he received the signed stock certificates Nos. 12 and 13
and made a note to cancel the old stock certificates Nos. 6 and 9, which
he ultimately failed to do.

{10 On April 3, 2008, Bjelland drafted an Agreement that allowed
Florence to remain president of D & D for as long as she desired and
was capable. The Agreement required Doug to vote his shares to retain
Florence as president, and provided that D & D would pay her
expenses as long as she resided on the farmstead. On April 4, 2008,
Florence met with Frigge to discuss the Agreement and its terms.
Florence and Doug signed the Agreement, and Frigge notarized and
saved a copy of it.

11 Around April 4, 2008, after learning that Florence transferred her
shares to Doug, Dwight drove to the farm and, without telling any
other family member, took Florence back to Billings. Florence has not
returned to the farmstead since that time. On April 16, 2008, Dwight
filed a petition for guardianship and conservatorship of Florence in
Yellowstone County. As part of the guardianship proceedings, Florence
signed an affidavit stating that she did not understand what she
signed when she transferred the D & D shares. Florence is now under
a Guardianship and Conservatorship in Yellowstone County, with
Dwight as guardian and Wuertz as conservator.

12 In early May 2008, Dwight began taking Florence to several
doctors in Billings. Dr. Patricia Coon, Florence’s treating physician
since 2008, is a geriatrician that specializes in dementia, long-term
care management, and senior assessments. Dr. Coon referred Florence
to the Senior Assessment Clinic at the Billings Clinic for additional
testing regarding memory loss and anxiety. At trial, Dr. Coon opined,
based primarily on medical history that Dwight provided for Florence
and test results from the Senior Assessment Clinic, that Florence
suffered from significant cognitive deficiencies and that Florence would
need help with complex decision making. Dr. William Bredehoft is a
psychologist that evaluated patients for the Senior Assessment Clinic.
He testified by deposition regarding Florence’s performance on
neurological tests in 2008 and 2012, and opined that Florence suffered
from a progressive cognitive decline. Dr. Bredehoft also testified he had

no way of knowing when Florence’s progressive dementia began, but
that she had a mild impairment in May 2008 and a significant
impairment in 2012 based on his two evaluations of her. Dr. Debra
Sheppard is a neuropsychologist who also performed evaluations for
the Senior Assessment Clinic. In her deposition, Dr. Sheppard testified
that she diagnosed Florence with dementia and anxiety.

{113 In November 2008, Florence executed a Power of Attorney to
Dwight, and he used it to open joint bank accounts. On March 21, 2011,
Florence entered a contract with Dwight to loan him $35,000 to
purchase a 1968 GTO convertible. Shortly thereafter, Florence forgave
the balance of the loan.

q14 In June 2009, Dwight filed suit against Doug, alleging undue
influence, and requesting, among other things, a judgment directing
that all transferred D & D shares be deemed void and requiring Doug
to compensate Florence for her emotional distress. In November 2014,
following a three-day bench trial, the District Court entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. The District
Court found no evidence that Florence was unduly influenced by Doug
or incompetent from March 29 through March 31, 2008, or on April 4,
2008, the times during which she decided to gift her shares to Doug
and signed the Agreement to stay on the farm. Dwight failed to
convince the Court that Florence’s gift was invalid because none of the
medical experts could definitively say that Florence lacked the mental
capacity to make a gift at the time she signed the stock certificates.
Bjelland and Frigge testified they had no concerns regarding Florence’s
capacity to understand what she was doing at the time she discussed
transferring the corporate stock, when she transferred the stock, or
when she entered the Agreement to remain on the farm as president
of D&D.

115 The District Court determined that Doug did not, at any time,
exercise undue influence over Florence to convince her to gift her D &
D shares to him. However, the District Court concluded that Dwight
attempted to exercise undue influence over Florence through late
night, high pressure phone calls, which Dwight recorded, in a clear
effort to pressure his mother into splitting her D & D shares equally
between Dwight and Doug. The District Court noted that Dwight never
questioned whether Florence was competent to execute the Power of
Attorney, to open joint bank accounts, to loan him $35,000 for a car, or
to forgive his car loan. The District Court also concluded that the gift
of stock from Florence to Doug was complete when Florence delivered
the shares of stock to Doug. Once Doug accepted the stock, the gift
became irrevocable, and the fact that “void” was not on prior issued
stock certificates did not invalidate the gift.

{16 Dwight and Wuertz, as conservator for Florence, now appeal the
District Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

117 We review the findings of a district court sitting without a jury to
determine if the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous. M. R.
Civ. P.52(a); Byrum v. Andren, 2007 MT 107, { 14, 337 Mont. 167, 159,
P.3d 1062. We view evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party when determining whether substantial credible
evidence supports the district court’s findings. Byrum, 9 14 (citing Ray
v. Nansel, 2002 MT 191, 19, 311 Mont. 135, 53 P.3d 870). We review
a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether those
conclusions are correct. Byrum, {| 14 (citing In re Estate of Harms, 2006
MT 320, {1 12, 335 Mont. 66, 149 P.3d 557).

DISCUSSION
18 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in finding no undue
influence by Doug over Florence.
19 Undue influence consists of:
(1) the use by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another
person or who holds a real or apparent. authority over the other
person of the confidence or authority for the purpose of obtaining
an unfair advantage over the other person;
(2) taking an unfair advantage of another person’s weakness of
mind; or
(8) taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another
person’s necessities or distress.
Section 28-2-407, MCA.
20 We employ the same criteria when determining whether undue
influence was exercised on a donor making a gift as we employ in
deciding whether undue influence was exercised on a testator making
a will. In re Estate of Harmon, 2011 MT 84A, { 20, 360 Mont. 150, 253
P.3d 821. To determine whether the statutory requirements for undue
influence have been met, a court may consider:
(1) any confidential relationship between the person alleged to be
exercising undue influence and the donor; (2) the physical
condition of the donor as it may affect his or her ability to
withstand influence; (3) the mental condition of the donor as it.
may affect his or her ability to withstand influence; (4) the
unnaturalness of the disposition as it relates to showing an
unbalanced mind or a mind easily susceptible to influence; and (5)
the demands and importunities as they may affect the donor,
taking into account the time, place and _ surrounding

circumstances.
Harmon, { 20 (citing In re Estate of Harms, 2006 MT 320, ¥ 21, 335
Mont. 66, 149 P.3d 557); see also In re Estate of Bradshaw , 2001 MT
92, 7] 138-16, 305 Mont. 178, 24 P.38d 211. These criteria are
nonexclusive considerations available to guide courts in the application
of statutory requirements, and may or may not be present in any given
undue influence case. Harmon, {| 20.
21 Courts consider whether, at the time the document was executed,
the grantor or donor was mentally incompetent or undue influence was
exerted. In re Murphy’s Estate, 43 Mont. 353, 360, 116 P. 1004 (1911).
“If the testator was of sound mind at the time he executed his will, it
is immaterial what the condition of his mind was either before or after
that time.” Murphy’s Estate, 43 Mont. at 360, 116 P. at 1004. The
presumption is that the donor was competent and of sound mind, and
undue influence or incompetence must be proven like any other fact.
Blackmer v. Blackmer, 165 Mont. 69, 74, 525 P.2d 559, 562 (1974); In
re Estate of Bodin, 144 Mont. 555, 559, 398 P.2d 616, 618-19 (1965).
The burden of proof in showing substantial evidence falls upon the
shoulders of the party claiming undue influence. Blackmer, 165 Mont.
at 74-75, 525 P.2d at 562. “Mere suspicion” is not enough to satisfy the
party’s burden to prove undue influence. Harmon, {] 22. Evidence of
“specific acts” are an essential element of an undue influence claim.
Harmon, 1 21. Evidence of a donor’s mental state and kinship with the
done is not evidence of specific acts. In re Estate of Mead, 2014 MT 264,
{1 31-82, 376 Mont. 386, 336 P.3d 362; Murphy’s Estate, 43 Mont. at
360, 116 P. at 1004.
22 Dwight maintains Doug exerted undue influence over Florence to
gift her shares in D & D to Doug, and that the District Court failed to
give credence to the medical experts’ testimony, constituting reversible
error. Dwight contends that the medical evidence established Florence
lacked the requisite metal capacity to understand the transaction and
suffered from dementia at the time of the gift. Dwight cites numerous
tests Florence’s doctor and medical experts used to diagnose Florence
with cognitive decline from 2008 to 2012. Dwight also cites Dr. Coon’s
testimony that Florence should have had legal representation at the
time she signed the documents.
23 Doug counters that the District Court weighed the medical
evidence and correctly found no evidence that Doug pressed any
demand or importunities upon Florence in late March or early April.
Doug contends that “[IJawful influence, such as that arising from
legitimate family and social relations, must be allowed to produce its
natural results, even in influencing last wills.” See Hale v. Smith, 73
Mont. 481, 488, 237 P. 214, 216 (1925). Furthermore, Doug contends

the District Court findings that “evidence bearing on [Florence’s]
mental state and kinship with Doug is not evidence of ‘specific acts’ ”
of undue influence are not clearly erroneous.

24 [I The District Court weighed the evidence and found that Doug
did not exert undue influence on Florence when she gifted her D & D
shares to him. Both Doug and Dwight had relationships that could be
considered confidential with their mother. See Harmon, {| 20 (citing
Harms, { 21). The District Court articulated that the testimony of
various witnesses, including Florence’s own taped words, illuminated
her reasons to transfer her shares to Doug. Florence told Bjelland and
Frigge about her concerns: she did not want the farm assets used to
pay her nursing home care; she wanted to keep the family farm as a
viable unit; and she wanted Doug to have more land because he was
the one farming and had worked hard every day. Both Bjelland and
Frigge testified they were convinced that Florence knew all the issues
and was fully competent in March 2008 and on April 4, 2008. The
District Court found that Florence’s gift of shares to Doug was not
unnatural and held it was not. a result of undue influence on Doug’s
part. Harms, {| 32. We agree.

125 [I Dwight failed to meet his burden to establish Doug exerted
undue influence over Florence. The evidence Dwight presented was
“mere suspicion” of undue influence and he failed to show specific acts
of undue influence to satisfy his burden. Harmon, 1] 21-22. We will not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on issues related to
the weight of evidence, and we hold that these findings are not clearly
erroneous. See Albert v. Hastetter, 2002 MT 123, | 30, 310 Mont. 82,
48 P.3d 749.

26 Issue Two: Whether the gift of stock certificates was actually a
contract for which Doug furnished no consideration.

{27 Dwight argues that Doug failed to prove a gift inter vivos because
the Agreement converted the “alleged” gift into an unenforceable
contract. Dwight contends the Agreement, allowing Florence to remain
president of D & D and stay on the farm while D & D paid her living
expenses, established that Florence gave Doug the D & D shares as
consideration for the Agreement. Because a “gift” must be given
“voluntarily and without consideration,” see § 70-3-101, MCA, Dwight
argues that the Agreement converted the “alleged” gift into an
unenforceable contract since Doug lacked authority to enter into the
Agreement without the consent of the D & D Board of Directors, who
at the time were Doug, Florence, and Dwight. Dwight also argues Doug
failed to perform on the Agreement.

{28 Doug argues that Dwight failed to properly raise his unenforceable
contract argument before the District Court, and cannot raise this

argument for the first time on appeal. See Becker v. Rosebud Operating
Servs., 2008 MT 285, 117, 345 Mont. 368, 191 P.3d 435.
The general rule in Montana is that this Court will not address
either an issue raised for the first time on appeal or a party’s
change in legal theory. The basis for the general rule is that “it is
fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule
correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to
consider.”
Becker, 117 (quoting Unified Indus., Inc. v. Easley, 1998 MT 145, 715,
289 Mont. 255, 961 P.2d 100) (internal citations omitted).
{29 Dwight asserts the unenforceable contract argument is merely an
additional argument to support the legal theory of an invalid gift,
which should be reviewed on appeal. See Wicklund v. Sundheim, 2016
MT 67, {| 26, 383 Mont. 1, 367 P.3d 403. Yet Dwight frames the issue
on appealas an assertion that this alleged “gift” was, in fact, a contract
that lacked consideration. Dwight’s argument on appeal goes well
beyond the scope of the legal theory he presented to the District
Court—that the gift was invalid—and presents an entirely different
issue—that this was in fact a contract for which Doug furnished no
consideration. This theory was not presented to the District Court.
Accordingly, we decline to address it on appeal. Easley, {| 16-18.
30 Issue Three: Whether the District Court erred in finding Florence
made a valid gift of D & D Land Co. stock certificates to Doug.
131 EBA gift is a transfer of personal property made voluntarily and
without consideration.” Section 70-3-101, MCA. A gift inter vivos
requires (1) donative intent, (2) delivery, and (3) acceptance. Valley
Victory Church v. Sandon, 2005 MT 72, {| 14, 326 Mont. 340, 109 P.38d
273 (citing Albinger v. Harris, 2002 MT 118, {| 31, 210 Mont. 27,
48 P.3d 711). The only revocable gift recognized by Montana law is a
gift in view of death. Sections 70-3-103, -201, MCA. Otherwise, a gift
made without condition becomes irrevocable upon acceptance. Section
70-3-103, MCA; Albinger, 31.
32 “Delivery, which manifests the intent of the giver, must turn over
dominion and control of the property to the recipient.” Albinger, {| 31.
When the essential elements of donative intent, voluntary delivery,
and acceptance are demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, the
gift is complete. Albinger, | 31. The court will not void the transfer
when the giver experiences a change of heart. Albinger, {| 31 (citing
Gross v. Gross, 239 Mont. 480, 781 P.2d 284 (1989) (holding a father
was barred from revoking a gift of real property transferred to his
son)).
33 Dwight argues that D & D Bylaws required, and Florence failed,

to cancel the old certificates Nos. 6 and 9 by signing them, and the lack
of a signature on the old certificates invalidates any alleged gift. Doug
asserts that if there were deficiencies in the actual process of
transferring stock, they were a result of Dwight removing Florence to
Billings after the gift.

134 Here, the District Court found the three essential elements of a
gift inter vivos. See Valley Victory Church, {| 14. First, extensive
testimony by Bjelland, Frigge, Doug, and Florence illustrated
Florence’s donative intent and her reasons to gift her D & D shares to
Doug. Albinger, {| 31. Second, Florence voluntary delivered her D & D
shares to Doug when she signed the stock certificates and physically
gave the stock certificates to Doug, who sent them to Bjelland.
Albinger, 31. Third, the gift was complete and irrevocable once Doug
accepted the stock certificates. Section 70-3-103, MCA; Albinger, 1 31.
135 [I We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the fact
“void” was not written on previously issued stock certificates Nos. 6
and 9 did not invalidate the completed gift of shares. The record
supports the District Court’s findings of Florence’s donative intent, her
delivery of the certificates to Doug, and Doug’s acceptance of the
certificates. Thus, the essential elements of an irrevocable gift inter
vivos were satisfied. The fact. that “void” was not written on the
previously issued stock certificates, per the D & D Bylaws, is an
insufficient basis “to elevate what are essentially just a private
corporation’s internally created rules to the same status as a statute
passed or a code adopted by this State’s Legislature.” Harwood v.
Glacier Elec. Coop., 285 Mont. 481, 490, 949 P.2d 651, 656 (1997).

CONCLUSION

{36 The District Court weighed the testimony and evidence presented,
setting out detailed findings of fact regarding Florence’s capacity and
reasons to gift her D & D shares to Doug. The District Court’s findings
of fact were not clearly erroneous. The District Court’s conclusions of
law were correct, regarding Florence’s irrevocable gift inter vivos to
Doug. We affirm.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES WHEAT, SANDEFUR
and RICE concur.

MATTHEW J. TEDESCO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

HOME SAVINGS BANCORP, INC., d/b/a
HOME SAVINGS OF AMERICA,
and DIRK S. ADAMS,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. DA 17-0157.
Submitted on Briefs October 11, 2017
Decided December 12, 2017.
2017 MT 304.

389 Mont. 468.

407 P.3d 289.

For Appellant: Thomas A. Marra, Antonia P. Marra, Marra,
Evenson & Bell, P.

., Great Falls.
For Appellees:

Lewistown.

JUSTICE BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Craig R. Buehler, Buehler Law Office,

{1 Matthew Tedesco began working in March 2008 for Home Savings
of America (HSOA), a federally chartered savings and loan association.
After a few months on the job, Tedesco signed an employment
agreement containing a provision that required the parties to submit
any disputes to binding arbitration. HSOA terminated Tedesco’s
employment in 2011. Tedesco sued HSOA, its CEO and Board Chair
Dirk Adams, and Home Savings Bancorp (HSBC), which owned all of
HSOA’s stock. Tedesco alleged wrongful discharge, breach of contract,
and fraud. The District Court ordered the parties to proceed to binding
arbitration. The Arbitrator issued an award in favor of Adams and
HSBC,’ and the District Court confirmed the award. Tedesco appeals
both the order compelling arbitration and the order confirming the
award. We affirm both orders.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
q2 Tedesco worked as a regional manager for First National
Mortgage Sources until 2008. In that position, he oversaw lending
branches and created a lending platform to secure mortgages for First
National Bank. When First. National Bank decided to shed First
National Mortgage Sources, it granted Tedesco permission to move his
branches and lending platform to another institution.
{3 Tedesco contacted Adams, and the two negotiated an agreement
under which HSOA—a Minnesota corporation—would employ Tedesco
to move his branches and lending platform to HSOA. Tedesco signed
HSOA’s Employee Handbook Acknowledgment and an Alternative
Dispute Resolution Agreement on February 22, 2008. The Alternative
Dispute Resolution Agreement stated that Tedesco agreed to arbitrate
any disputes arising from his employment with HSOA. Tedesco began
his work with HSOA in March 2008.
q4 Shortly after Tedesco signed the Handbook Acknowledgment and
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement, Adams asked Tedesco
to prepare an employment agreement. Tedesco prepared a proposed
agreement with the assistance of counsel and presented it to Adams in
April 2008. Adams rejected Tedesco’s proposed agreement.
{5 In July 2008, Adams presented Tedesco with a “Retail Regional
Manager Terms of Employment” (Employment Agreement). The
Employment Agreement contained this “Enforcement” provision: “Any

" After Tedesco filed suit, HSOA was dissolved and placed into receivership with
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It was not a party to the arbitration
and is not a party to this action on appeal. Tedesco maintains, however, that HSOA was
the “alter ego” of Adams and HSBC.

and all disputes arising under or related to the Agreement shall be
resolved by binding arbitration under the auspices of, and according to
the rules promulgated by, the American Arbitration Association —
Commercial Mediation Rules.” The Employment Agreement also stated
that Tedesco’s employment was “terminable at the will of either party.”
Tedesco signed the Employment Agreement on July 30, 2008. Tedesco
later testified that he would have faced immediate termination had he
not signed the agreement. He claimed also that, by July 2008, he
already had moved his branches and lending platform to HSOA and
relocated his family.

{6 HSOA terminated Tedesco’s employment on June 1, 2011. Tedesco
filed a complaint in August 2011 against Adams and “Home Savings
Bancorp, Inc., d/b/a Home Savings of America.” He asserted wrongful
discharge under the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act (WDEA), breach of contract, fraud, constructive fraud, and fraud
in the inducement.

{7 When Tedesco refused to submit to arbitration, HSBC and Adams
filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay the action, or to
dismiss the complaint under M. R. Civ. P. 12. The District Court issued
an order in February 2015 compelling arbitration through the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and staying the proceedings
pending the outcome of the arbitration. The court found that, although
the February 2008 Handbook Acknowledgment and Alternative
Dispute Resolution Agreement did not constitute valid contracts, the
July 2008 Employment Agreement’s arbitration provision was binding
on the parties.

q8 Atarbitration, the parties submitted evidence and participated in
an evidentiary hearing, at which Tedesco and Adams testified. In
August 2016, the Arbitrator granted summary judgment to Adams and
HSBC on Tedesco’s wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and fraud
claims.

q9 Tedesco filed an application with the District Court in October
2016 to vacate, correct, or modify the Arbitrator’s award. The court
denied Tedesco’s application. It reasoned that its role was not to
“review the merits of the controversy,” and it referenced the
Arbitrator’s “broad authority and powers to determine all issues.” The
District Court then entered judgment confirming the Arbitrator’s
award. Tedesco appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
10 This Court reviews de novo a district court’s order on a motion to
compel arbitration. Global Client Solutions, LLC v. Ossello, 2016 MT
50, 1 19, 382 Mont. 345, 367 P.3d 361.

11 A district court’s review of an arbitration award is strictly limited
by Montana’s Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA). Paulson v. Flathead
Conservation Dist., 2004 MT 136, {| 24, 321 Mont. 364, 91 P.38d 569;
Geissler v. Sanem, 285 Mont. 411, 415, 949 P.2d 234, 237 (1997). We
review district court decisions on arbitration awards like any other
district court decision, accepting findings of fact that are not clearly
erroneous but deciding questions of law de novo. City of Livingston v.
Mont. Pub. Emps. Ass’n ex rel. Tubaugh, 2014 MT 314, 11, 377 Mont.
184, 339 P.3d 41. We review a district court’s ultimate decision to
confirm an arbitration award for an abuse of discretion. Colstrip
Energy Ltd. P’ship v. Nw. Corp., 2011 MT 99, {| 18, 360 Mont. 298,
253 P.3d 870.

12 The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted
arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or
exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.
Colstrip Energy Ltd. P’ship, 1 18. In reviewing whether the District
Court abused its discretion in confirming the arbitration award, we
apply the law that a court cannot review the merits of the controversy,
but may only confirm, vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award
pursuant to §§ 27-5-311, -312, and -318, MCA. Roberts v. Lame Deer
Pub. Sch. Dist. #6, 2013 MT 358, {| 7, 373 Mont. 49, 314 P.3d 647.

DISCUSSION
13 “The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs contracts that involve
interstate commerce.” Kelker v. Geneva-Roth Ventures, Inc., 2013 MT
62, {| 11, 369 Mont. 254, 303 P.3d 777. The FAA preempts state laws
that “prohibit outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim.”
Kelker, J 15 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,
341, 1318. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011)). “However, when a state law does not
conflict with the FAA so as to frustrate the objectives of Congress, it is
not necessarily preempted.” Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp. , 1998
MT 326, {] 23, 292 Mont. 229, 971 P.2d 1240. The FAA preempts a
state law “to the extent that it stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress” in enacting the FAA. Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am.,
Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 432 (9th Cir. 2015). The Employment Agreement
between Tedesco and HSOA involved interstate commerce: HSOA was
a Minnesota corporation, Tedesco was a Montana resident, and
Tedesco’s work with HSOA involved doing business across state lines.
The FAA therefore applies to the Employment Agreement’s arbitration
clause. See Kelker, {| 11. Montana’s UAA also applies to the extent that
it does not conflict with the FAA’s objectives. See Sakkab, 803 F.3d at

432.
14 1. Whether the District Court erred in compelling arbitration.
115 Tedesco argues that the District Court erred in ordering the
parties to proceed to arbitration. He contends that the Employment
Agreement generally and the arbitration clause specifically were
invalid. In his view, because there was no valid agreement between the
parties to arbitrate their disputes, the District Court should have
denied Adams’s and HSBC’s motion to compel arbitration. Adams and
HSBC challenge Tedesco’s appeal of the District Court’s order
compelling arbitration as untimely.

A. Timeliness of Tedesco’s Appeal of the Order Compelling

Arbitration.
16 The District Court issued its order compelling arbitration on
February 26, 2015, and it simultaneously stayed the proceedings.
Adams and HSBC argue that the order was “final and appealable” and
therefore that Tedesco had thirty days to appeal it. Because Tedesco
did not appeal the order compelling arbitration until March 2017—over
two years later—Adams and HSBC urge the Court not to hear his
appeal.
117 The Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that notice of
appeal in civil cases “shall be filed with the clerk of the supreme court
within 30 days from the date of entry of the judgment or order from
which the appeal is taken.” M. R. App. P. 4(5)(a)(i). The Rules allow a
party to appeal from a “final judgment in an action” or from specified
“final orders” in civil cases. M. R. App. P. 6(1), (3). The list of orders
from which appeal may be taken does not include orders compelling
arbitration. See M. R. App. P. 6(3).
q18 Montana’s UAA also specifies certain rulings from which a party
may appeal, including: “an order denying an application to compel
arbitration”; “an order granting an application to stay arbitration”; “an
order confirming or denying confirmation of an award”; “an order
modifying or correcting an award”; “an order vacating an award
without directing a rehearing”; or “a judgment entered pursuant to the
provisions of’ the UAA. Section 27-5-324(1), MCA. The list does not
include orders compelling arbitration. See § 27-5-324(1), MCA. The
FAA states that “an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory
order ... compelling arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(3) (emphasis added).
19 Adams and HSBC cite our decisions in Iwen v. U. S. W. Direct,
1999 MT 68, 293 Mont. 512,977 P.2d 989, and Larsen v. Opie, 237
Mont. 108, 771 P.2d 977 (1989), for the proposition that interlocutory
orders compelling arbitration are immediately appealable under the
FAA. In Iwen, the district court granted U.S. West Direct’s motion to
compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings. In holding that this

Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we explained, “We have
recently addressed the issue of the appealability of orders to arbitrate
within the context of the Federal Arbitration Act and concluded that
an order compelling arbitration is final and appealable.” Iwen, |] 18
(citing Larsen, 237 Mont. at 110, 771 P.2d at 979).

{20 In Larsen, the district court granted Opie’s motion to compel
arbitration. Larsen, 237 Mont. at 109, 771 P.2d at 978. We held that
the court’s order compelling arbitration was “final” and “appealable,”
reasoning that it constituted “a final determination of the District
Court.” Larsen, 237 Mont. at 110, 771 P.2d at 979.

21 This Court decided Larsen in 1989 and Iwen in 1999. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held recently that the FAA “bars appeals of
interlocutory orders compelling arbitration and staying judicial
proceedings.” Johnson v. Consumerinfo.com, Inc., 745 F.3d 1019, 1021
(9th Cir. 2014) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)); accord MediVas, LLC v.
Marubeni Corp., 741 F.3d 4, 7 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “an order
compelling arbitration may be appealed if the district court dismisses
all the underlying claims, but may not be appealed if the court stays
the action pending arbitration”). This authority makes clear that an
interlocutory order compelling arbitration, when combined with a stay
of the proceedings pending arbitration, is not final and appealable
under the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(3); Johnson, 745 F.3d at 1021;
MediVas, LLC, 741 F.3d at 7.

22 We consistently decline to entertain appeals of orders that are not
final orders in the case or that do not meet one of the specific
exceptions listed in Rule 6(3). See Johnson v. Booth, 2008 MT
155, 111 30-31, 343 Mont. 268, 184 P.3d 289 (holding that the district
court's order on discovery sanctions was not a “final judgment” and
therefore was not reviewable on appeal). And the UAA does not provide
for the appeal of interlocutory orders compelling arbitration, although
it does authorize appeal from an order denying a motion to compel.
Section 27-5-324(1), MCA. Neither the applicable statutes nor the
Rules of Appellate Procedure authorize immediate appeal from an
order compelling arbitration where the case is not dismissed by that
order. To the extent that our decisions in Iwen and Larsen state the
contrary, we modify those decisions and hold that interlocutory orders
compelling arbitration and staying further proceedings are not
immediately appealable. See Iwen, 4 18; Larsen, 237 Mont. at 110, 771
P.2d at 979.

23 We conclude that the District Court’s interlocutory order
compelling arbitration and staying further proceedings was not final
and appealable. The thirty-day time bar of M. R. App. P. 4(5)(a)(i)
therefore did not apply to that order. Tedesco’s appeal of the order is

timely.
B. Whether the Parties Had a Valid Agreement to
Arbitrate.
124 Tedesco asserts a number of errors in the District Court’s decision
to compel arbitration. He contends that the Employment Agreement
was invalid because it was a contract of adhesion presented to him on
a “take it or leave it” basis and because its “at will” termination
provision violated public policy and the WDEA. He claims also that the
arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable because he
did not receive a copy of the arbitration rules that the clause referenced
and because there was no “meeting of the minds” on the clause’s
essential terms. Finally, he argues that the arbitration clause did not
cover his breach of contract and fraud claims and that the District
Court should have allowed those claims to proceed in court.
25 Tedesco attacks the validity of the Employment Agreement as a
whole and of the arbitration clause specifically. “[U]nder the FAA,
when a party challenges the validity of a contract as a whole, an
arbitrator should resolve that dispute in the first instance.” Kelker,
| 12 (citing Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20, 183 S.
Ct. 500, 503 (2012)); accord Martz v. Beneficial Mont., Inc., 2006 MT
94, 7 17, 332 Mont. 93, 135 P.3d 790 (“(Alrbitration, not court, is the
proper forum for challenges to contracts as a whole where those
contracts contain arbitration provisions.”). The District Court did not
err in allowing the Arbitrator to decide the validity of the Employment
Agreement.
26 “When a party challenges the validity of the arbitration clause in
a contract, however, a court may resolve that dispute in the first
instance.” Kelker, | 12. The FAA provides:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at.
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9U.S.C. § 2. Montana’s UAA similarly provides, “A written agreement
to submit to arbitration any controversy arising between the parties
after the agreement is made is valid and enforceable except upon
grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.”
Section 27-5-114(2), MCA.
{27 Both federal and Montana law apply a “presumption of
arbitrability” to arbitration agreements, under which doubts are
“resolved in favor of arbitration.” Ossello, | 21; Kalispell Educ. Ass’n
v. Bd. of Trs., 2011 MT 154, 118, 361 Mont. 115, 255 P.3d 199 (citing

Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 301, 1380S.
Ct. 2847, 2858 (2010)). “The initial inquiry when any court is asked to
compel arbitration is whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate.”
Ossello, | 23; accord Kortum-Managhan v. Herbergers NBGL, 2009 MT
79, 4] 15, 349 Mont. 475, 204 P.3d 693. “[I]n deciding whether the
parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a
court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims.”
Kalispell Educ. Ass’n, {20 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
28 “An enforceable agreement to arbitrate must [ ] have the same
elements as any contract: namely, identifiable parties with the capacity
to contract; the consent of the parties; a lawful object; and
consideration. The consent of the parties requires that there be mutual
assent or a meeting of the minds on all essential terms to form a
binding contract.” Ossello, ] 23 (internal citation and quotations
omitted).

29 Tedesco contends that there was no “meeting of the minds” as to
the essential terms of the arbitration clause because the District Court
altered the title of the applicable arbitration rules from the AAA’s
“Commercial Mediation Rules” to the AAA’s “Commercial Arbitration
Rules.” As the District. Court noted, however, the AAA’s manual to
which the arbitration clause refers is entitled, “Commercial Arbitration
Rules and Mediation Procedures” and contains the AAA’s rules for both
arbitration and mediation. The District Court’s revision of what it
noted was a “simple misstatement of the official title of the manual in
the Employment Agreement” did not alter any of the “essential terms”
of the arbitration clause. See Ossello, {| 23. It did not change the fact
that there was a “meeting of the minds” on the parties’ agreement to
resolve their disputes by binding arbitration under the auspices of the
AAA. See Ossello, | 23. The arbitration clause thus satisfies the
element of having the “consent of the parties.” See Ossello, | 23.
Tedesco does not allege that the clause failed to meet the other
elements of an enforceable agreement: identifiable parties, a lawful
object, or consideration. See Ossello, {| 23.

30 Tedesco argues that the arbitration clause was unconscionable
and unenforceable in part because the Employment
Agreement—including the arbitration clause—was presented to him
on a “take it or leave it” basis and he had no meaningful opportunity
to decline or negotiate the terms. He argues that the clause was
unconscionable also because he did not receive a copy of the arbitration
rules to which the clause referred.

31 The test for whether a contract provision—such as an arbitration
clause—is unconscionable “involves a two-step inquiry: whether the
contract qualifies as a contract of adhesion, and whether the contract

unreasonably favored the drafter.” Kelker, 1 19. “Contracts of adhesion
arise when a party possessing superior bargaining power presents a
standardized form of agreement to a party whose choice remains either
to accept or reject the contract without the opportunity to negotiate its
terms.” Kortum-Managhan, { 23 (citation and internal quotations
omitted). “Disparity in bargaining power is an essential element of a
contract of adhesion.” Day v. CTA, Inc., 2014 MT 119, J 10, 375 Mont.
79, 324 P.3d 1205.

32 Even if an arbitration clause is part of a contract of adhesion,
however, “that alone does not make the arbitration clause
unenforceable.” Graziano v. Stock Farm Homeowners Ass’n, 2011 MT
194, q 20, 361 Mont. 332, 258 P.3d 999. The party challenging the
clause must show that the clause was unreasonably favorable to the
drafter, meaning that it “either (1) was not within [the non-drafting
party’s] reasonable expectations, or (2) was within his reasonable
expectations, but when considered in context, is unduly oppressive,
unconscionable, or against public policy.” Graziano, {| 20; see Kelker,
q19.

33 “(IIn determining whether a contractual provision proves
unconscionable for being outside a party’s reasonable expectations,”
courts consider the following factors, among others: “whether a
disparity existed in the bargaining power of the contracting parties”;
“whether a difference in business experience and sophistication of the
parties existed”; whether the party agreeing to the provision “was
represented by counsel at the time the agreement was executed”;
“whether economic, social or practical duress compelled a party to
execute the contract”; and whether the clause was “ambiguous or
misleading.” Kelker, {| 21 (citing Kortum-Managhan, {| 27).

434 In Iwen, we held that an arbitration clause that permitted the
drafter to sue over any disputes arising out of an advertising contract
but that required the non-drafting party to arbitrate all disputes was
unconscionable. Iwen, | 34. We noted that the drafter “pointedly
protected itself by preserving its constitutional right of access to the
judicial system while at the same time completely removed that right”
from the other party. Iwen, {] 31. We concluded, “[D]isparities in the
rights of the contracting parties must not be so one-sided and
unreasonably favorable to the drafter, as they are in this case, that the
agreement becomes unconscionable and oppressive.” Iwen, {] 32.

85 We followed Iwen in Ossello and held that the arbitration clause
at issue was unconscionable because it unfairly favored the
drafter—Global Client Solutions—and lacked mutuality. We pointed
out that, under the terms of the arbitration agreement, “Ossello is
obligated to arbitrate all controversies arising from the breach of the

[agreement], but if Ossello breaches the agreement, Global has the
right to sue her in a court of law and to recover damages plus court
costs, collection fees, and attorney fees.” Ossello, | 37. We therefore
concluded that “the obligation to arbitrate is one-sided” and “not
mutual.” Ossello, | 37.

36 We cannot conclude here that the Employment Agreement’s
arbitration clause was “so one-sided and unreasonably favorable to the
drafter” as to be “unconscionable” and unenforceable. Iwen, {| 32.
Unlike in Iwen and Ossello, the Employment Agreement bound both
Tedesco and HSOA equally to arbitrate any disputes that arose from
Tedesco’s employment. The terms of the clause were not skewed in
HSOA’s favor.

187 Tedesco contends that he had less bargaining power than HSOA
and that he had no meaningful choice but to accept the terms of the
Employment Agreement as proposed by Adams. The record shows,
however, that Tedesco had the opportunity to draft an employment
agreement in March 2008, well before he signed HSOA’s Employment
Agreement. Indeed, he retained counsel to help him draft an
agreement. Although Tedesco testified that he faced immediate
termination if he did not sign the Employment Agreement as it was
written, he did not present other evidence to support his assertion.
Further, Tedesco signed a copy of HSOA’s Alternative Dispute
Resolution Agreement on February 22, 2008, which put him on
notice—before his employment with HSOA began—that HSOA had a
policy of arbitrating disputes. The record does not prove Tedesco’s
contention that he had no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the
Employment Agreement.

438 As the District Court observed, Tedesco was an experienced
businessman with valuable products to offer HSOA—access to his
branches and lending platform. Unlike a typical consumer transaction,
it is not clear that HSOA had “superior bargaining power” over
Tedesco, given Tedesco’s business expertise and sophistication, his
employment of counsel, and his opportunity to propose an employment
agreement. Kortum-Managhan, {| 23. Because there is no clear error
in the District. Court’s finding that the parties had relatively equal
bargaining power, the court properly concluded that the Employment
Agreement was not a “contract of adhesion.” See Kortum-Managhan,
q 23.

39 Tedesco’s awareness of HSOA’s arbitration policy, his opportunity
to prepare an employment agreement with the assistance of counsel,
and the fact that the Employment Agreement obligated both parties
equally to arbitrate supports a conclusion that the Employment
Agreement was “within [Tedesco’s] reasonable expectations” and that

it was not “unduly oppressive, unconscionable, or against public
policy.” Graziano, {| 20. Because the Employment Agreement was not
a “contract of adhesion” and did not unreasonably favor HSOA, Tedesco
has not shown that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and
unenforceable. See Kelker, J 19.

40 Further, we are unpersuaded—in light of the above-referenced
circumstances surrounding the Employment Agreement—that HSOA’s
failure to provide Tedesco with a copy of the applicable arbitration
rules renders the entire clause unconscionable. Tedesco cites two
federal district court cases from California to support his argument:
Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1243 (C.D. Cal.
2016), and Capili v. Finish Line, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 3d 1000 (N.D. Cal.
2015). These cases highlight California’s differentiation between
procedural and substantive unconscionability, a distinction that
Montana does not recognize and Tedesco has not explained. Tedesco
cites no Montana authority to support his contention that HSOA’s
failure to supply the rules, without more, requires a determination that
the arbitration clause was unenforceable. The record supports the
District Court’s ruling that the parties entered into a valid agreement.
to arbitrate.

41 I Finally, Tedesco argues that the District Court erred in
referring his breach of contract and fraud claims to the Arbitrator. He
asserts that these claims fall outside the purview of the arbitration
clause. The arbitration clause states, “Any and all disputes arising
under or related to the [Employment] Agreement shall be resolved by
binding arbitration.” (Emphasis added). Tedesco’s breach of contract
claim is based upon Adams’s and HSBC’s alleged breach of the terms
of the Employment Agreement and their unlawful termination of his
employment. His fraud, constructive fraud, and fraud in the
inducement claims rely on Adams’s and HSBC’s alleged
misrepresentations in convincing Tedesco to move his branches and
lending platform to HSOA, for which the Employment Agreement
provided Tedesco would be compensated. These claims “aris[e] under
or [are] related to” Tedesco’s Employment Agreement with HSOA.
Applying the “presumption of arbitrability,” we conclude that these
claims fall under the purview of the arbitration clause and that the
District Court properly referred them to arbitration. See Kalispell
Educ. Ass’n, { 18; Ossello, | 21.

42 2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in confirming
the arbitration award.

43 The UAA limits judicial review of an arbitration award.
Paulson, {| 24; Geissler, 285 Mont. at 415, 949 P.2d at 237. Pertinent
to Tedesco’s claims, § 27-5-312(1)(b), MCA, provides: “Upon the

application of a party, the district court shall vacate an award
if ... there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct
prejudicing the rights of any party.” The UAA “does not authorize
judicial review of arbitration awards on the merits of the controversy.”
Paulson, | 24 (citation and internal quotations omitted). District courts
review arbitration awards “for a manifest disregard of the law
pursuant to § 27-5-312(1)(b), MCA.” Geissler, 285 Mont. at 416,
949 P.2d at 238. “To conclude that an arbitrator ruled in manifest
disregard of the law requires more than simply a misapplication of the
law by the arbitrator.” Geissler, 285 Mont. at 417, 949 P.2d at 238. “For
reversal under this standard, an arbitrator must have been aware of
a clearly governing principle of Montana law, but blatantly refused to
follow it.” Paulson, {| 24 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
44 Tedesco argues that the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law
by: determining that arbitration was not precluded by the WDEA;
unilaterally altering the applicable arbitration rules to the AAA’s
“Employment Arbitration Rules”; permitting Adams and HSBC to
commit discovery violations; and granting summary judgment to
Adams and HSBC. Tedesco asserts that, because the arbitrator clearly
disregarded the law, the District Court abused its discretion in
confirming the arbitration award.
445 Adams and HSBC respond in part that, because the arbitration
clause was governed by the FAA, Tedesco was required to file his
motion to vacate the arbitration award in federal district court rather
than in state court. They assert that the District Court therefore
lacked jurisdiction to hear Tedesco’s motion.

A. State Court Jurisdiction.
{46 The FAA provides that, under certain circumstances, “the United
States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
the arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (emphasis added). The statute
provides also that. a party seeking confirmation of an arbitration award
“may” make an application for confirmation to the federal district
court. 9 U.S.C. § 9. The FAA does not state explicitly that federal
district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over applications to
vacate, confirm, or alter arbitration awards. See generally, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16.
47 Adams and HSBC rely in part on our decision in Bank of America,
N.A. v. Dahlquist, 2007 MT 32, 336 Mont. 50, 152 P.3d 718. We stated,
“(I]t is questionable whether a state district court has venue, under the
FAA, to consider a motion to confirm,” given that “[flederal case law is
unclear as to whether § 9 [of the FAA] is permissive or restrictive

concerning venue in state courts.” Dahlquist, | 11 (emphasis in
original). We did not decide whether the district court could entertain
the claim under the FAA, because we held that “the District Court.
correctly denied Dahlquist’s motion to confirm on other grounds.”
Dahlquist, 4] 11. Because we did not reach the jurisdictional issue,
Dahlquist does not provide guidance here. Adams and HSBC also cite
briefly to Dahlquist’s companion case, Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v.
Dahlquist, 2007 MT 42, 336 Mont. 100, 152 P.3d 693. That case does
not discuss the jurisdiction of Montana state courts to hear motions
arising under the FAA.
48 In the absence of clear language in the FAA or any other legal
authority depriving state courts of jurisdiction over applications to
vacate arbitration awards under the FAA, we conclude that the FAA
did not bar Tedesco from filing his application in state court. See
Harrington v. Energy W. Inc., 2015 MT 233, {] 24, 380 Mont. 298,
356 P.3d 441 (“Article VII, section 4 of the Montana Constitution
provides district courts with subject-matter jurisdiction in all civil
matters, without limitation.”).

B. Whether the Arbitrator Manifestly Disregarded the

Law.
449 In granting summary judgment to Adams and HSBC, the
Arbitrator first rejected Tedesco’s claims of wrongful discharge under
the WDEA and of breach of contract. The Arbitrator reasoned that the
WDEA did not apply because Tedesco had failed to establish that
either Adams or HSBC—rather than HSOA—was Tedesco’s “employer”
for purposes of the law. The Arbitrator reasoned that, “[iJn the absence
of some statutory indication that the Montana legislature intended
liability under the WDEA to extend beyond the traditional definition
of employer, [Tedesco] failled] to sustain a claim for violations of the
WDEA’ against Adams or HSBC. The Arbitrator cited our holding in
Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet, 248 Mont. 276, 287, 811 P.2d 537,543
(1991), for the proposition that “[a]ll remedies provided by the Act run
against the employer. The Act does not envision lawsuits against
corporate employees, officers or shareholders.”
450 As to the breach of contract claim, the Arbitrator concluded that
neither Adams nor HSBC was a party to the Employment Agreement
and therefore that Tedesco’s claims against them failed. The Arbitrator
noted that “contract actions [ | require privity for enforcement and
claims of breach.” (Citing Degnan v. Exec. Homes, 215 Mont. 162, 168,
696 P.2d 431, 435 (1985); State ex rel. Buttrey Foods v. Dist. Court of
the Third Jud. Dist., 148 Mont. 350, 353, 420 P.2d 845, 847 (1996).
51 The Arbitrator found that the Employment Agreement was

between Tedesco and HSOA and that Tedesco had not demonstrated
privity with Adams and HSBC. As to Tedesco’s attempt to “pierce the
corporate veil” and hold Adams and HSBC legally accountable for
HSOA’s actions, the Arbitrator noted that, under state and federal case
law, Tedesco had the burden to show that HSOA was the “alter ego” of
Adams or HSBC and that Adams or HSBC used HSOA as a
“subterfuge” to commit bad acts. The Arbitrator concluded that
Tedesco had presented “scant” evidence that Adams or HSBC had used
HSOA as a “subterfuge.”

52 Bearing in mind the limited scope of a court’s review in arbitration
cases, see Geissler, 285 Mont. at 415, 949 P.2d at 237, we conclude that.
Tedesco has not shown manifest disregard of the law. We do not review
the Arbitrator’s resolution of disputed facts, including the nature of
Tedesco’s relationships to Adams and HSBC, the identity of Tedesco’s
employer, or whether Tedesco met his evidentiary burden on his
claims. The Arbitrator clearly was aware of the relevant governing
principles of Montana law: namely, that the WDEA provides a remedy
against an “employer,” see, e.g., § 39-2-905, MCA, and that breach of
contract actions require privity between the parties, see State ex rel.
Buttrey Foods , 148 Mont. at 353, 420 P.2d at 847. Whether the
Arbitrator correctly applied the law is not the issue. Geissler,
285 Mont. at 417, 949 P.2d at 238. Tedesco has not established that the
Arbitrator “blatantly refused to follow” the governing principles of law.
Paulson, { 24.

53 The Arbitrator also rejected Tedesco’s fraud claims, concluding
that they were barred by the statute of limitations. Tedesco had
asserted that Adams made false statements during the employment
negotiations about HSOA’s capacity to handle Tedesco’s lending
platform and branches and about HSOA’s financial soundness. The
Arbitrator recognized that Montana law grants a party two years tofile
a claim of fraud, commencing from “the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Section 27-2-203, MCA. The
Arbitrator determined that Tedesco discovered HSOA’s fraudulent.
actions in 2008, more than two years before he filed suit in August
2011. Again, the factual findings underpinning this conclusion are
beyond the scope of our review. The Arbitrator did not manifestly
disregard the law pertaining to Tedesco’s fraud claims.

454 Tedesco argues further that the Arbitrator disregarded the law by
unilaterally determining that the AAA’s “Employment Arbitration
Rules” would apply to the proceedings, rather than the “Commercial
Mediation Rules,” as stated in the arbitration clause, or the
“Commercial Arbitration Rules,” as the District Court had determined.
Indeed, the Arbitrator stated in a September 2015 scheduling order,

‘This Arbitration shall be governed by the AAA Employment
Arbitration Rules.” The Arbitrator reasoned in a subsequent order, “In
designating the AAA [ ], the Parties submitted to the AAA’s
administrative determination that, regardless of the choice referenced,
the dispute arose in the employment context and the Employment
Arbitration Rules apply.”

55 The Arbitrator relied on the AAA’s Employment Arbitration Rules
for the proposition that “when an arbitration is filed arising in the
employment. context, the AAA makes an initial administration
determination as to whether the dispute arises from an employer plan
or an individually-negotiated employment agreement or contract.” The
Arbitrator determined that the dispute before it arose from an
“individually-negotiated employment agreement.” Under the
Employment Arbitration Rules, that determination required the
parties—including Tedesco—to pay equal portions of the arbitration.
(56 “Once it is determined ... that the parties are obligated to submit
the subject. matter of the dispute to arbitration, procedural questions
which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should
be left to the arbitrator.” Mont. Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. City of Bozeman,
2015 MT 69, {| 8, 378 Mont. 337, 343 P.3d 1233 (quoting John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84S. Ct. 909, 918 (1964)).
We held in Montana Public Employees’ Association, for instance, that
“an arbitration agreement’s time limits and conditions precedent to
arbitration are procedures that bear on arbitrability. Whether a
dispute remains arbitrable despite the failure to follow these
procedures is a classic question of procedural arbitrability that is for
an arbitrator and not for a court to decide.” Mont. Pub. Emps. Ass'n ,
{| 10 (emphasis in original).

157 As we have discussed, the parties agreed to submit their dispute
to arbitration through the AAA. The Arbitrator determined which set
of rules was most applicable to the case at hand and then found that
the Employment Agreement was “individually-negotiated” rather than
part of an “employer plan.” These “procedural questions” were within
the Arbitrator’s authority and are outside the scope of our review.
Mont. Pub. Emps. Ass'n, { 8. The Arbitrator’s determination of which
of the AAA rules would apply did not present a question for the court
concerning “manifest disregard of the law.” Geissler, 285 Mont. at 416,
949 P.2d at 238. The Arbitrator’s subsequent factual determination
that the Employment Agreement was “individually-negotiated” goes to
the “merits of the controversy” and was beyond the scope of judicial
review. Paulson, {| 24.

458 Finally, Tedesco argues that the Arbitrator disregarded the law
by permitting Adams and HSBC to commit discovery violations during

arbitration. Adams and HSBC responded to Tedesco’s interrogatories
and requests for production in February 2016, in compliance with the
Arbitrator’s order to do so. As Tedesco points out, however, the
responses to most of the inquiries consisted of either objections to the
questions or statements that neither Adams nor HSBC possessed the
information requested. Adams also submitted to a deposition in
February 2016. The transcript of that deposition shows that Adams
provided answers to many of the questions, but also that he declined
to answer many others. Tedesco contends that Adams’s and HSBC’s
actions amounted to discovery violations.

59 These contentions, too, raise “procedural questions” that arose
during arbitration and fell under the purview of the Arbitrator. See
Mont. Pub. Emps. Ass’n, | 8. Further, “Montana gives arbitrators
broad authority and powers to determine allissues.” City of Livingston,
| 14. Management of the discovery process during arbitration is left to
the determination of the Arbitrator. The record does not show that
Adams and HSBC so clearly abused the discovery process that the
Arbitrator’s failure to take punitive action against them constituted a
“manifest disregard of the law.” Geissler, 285 Mont. at 416, 949 P.2d at
238.

{60 Tedesco similarly argues that the District Court committed
reversible error by failing to enforce discovery rules against Adams and
HSBC. He alleges that Adams and HSBC repeatedly refused to
respond to his interrogatories and requests for production, in violation
of the District Court’s discovery orders. Tedesco maintains that when
Adams and HSBC eventually responded to Tedesco’s discovery
requests, they objected to most of Tedesco’s inquiries and refused to
provide substantive documents, thereby rendering their discovery
responses meaningless and not in good faith.

61 “Generally, it is up to the trial court to decide the proper sanction
for discovery abuse. We defer to the trial court because it is in the best
position to know whether the party in question has disregarded the
other’s rights, and is in the best. position to determine which sanction
is most appropriate.” Harrell v. Farmers Educ. Coop. Union, 2013 MT
367, 1 61, 373 Mont. 92, 314 P.3d 920. The Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure provide that a district court “may” order sanctions for a

® Tedesco argues that the District Court’s actions during discovery bear on the
validity of the court’s order compelling arbitration. But his discovery assertions go to the
merits of the dispute and not to the validity of the arbitration clause. As such, we
address them here, rather than in our discussion of the court’s order compelling
arbitration.

party’s failure to respond to interrogatories or requests for inspection,
M. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)Gi), or for a party’s failure to obey a discovery
order, M. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). “We review a District Court’s rulings
on discovery matters for an abuse of discretion.” Draggin’ Y Cattle Co.
v. Addink, 2013 MT 319, 1 17, 372 Mont. 334, 312 P.3d 451.

62 The District Court acknowledged on multiple occasions during the
proceedings that Adams and HSBC were inadequately participating in
the discovery process. In a January 2012 order denying Adams’s and
HSBC’s motion to stay discovery, the court noted the defendants’
“extensive delay in responding to discovery.” Then, in an August 2014
order denying Tedesco’s motion for default judgment due to Adams’s
and HSBC’s alleged discovery violations, the court acknowledged that
Adams and HSBC had not “followed the procedures and deadlines as
set out in Rule 37 [of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure].” The court
explained in that order, however, that Tedesco had not “alleged or
shown the requisite prejudice, other than delay of his day in Court,
that would dictate this Court to use its discretionary powers to enter
a default judgment.”

463 Adams and HSBC argued—and they maintain on appeal—that
their failure to comply fully with Tedesco’s discovery requests was
justified because those requests should have been directed at HSOA,
which was in receivership with the FDIC. Adams and HSBC contend
that the FDIC possessed the documents relating to Tedesco’s
employment with HSOA that Tedesco requested. Adams and HSBC
moved for a protective order against Tedesco’s discovery requests,
which the court denied in July 2014. Shortly after the court denied the
protective order, Adams and HSBC responded to Tedesco’s
interrogatories and requests for production. Tedesco maintains that
the responses were inadequate.

64 The record provides support for Tedesco’s contention that Adams
and HSBC did not fully comply with discovery rules. Yet the record
also shows instances of Adams’s and HSBC’s compliance and suggests
that their failures to fully comply with the discovery process were
based on their belief that they did not possess the information that
Tedesco requested. The District Court was in the “best position” to
determine whether Adams and HSBC had disregarded Tedesco’s rights
and “to decide the proper sanction” for any discovery abuses. Harrell,
{| 61. Tedesco alleged discovery violations under M. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A)—for Adams’s and HSBC's failure to obey the District
Court’s discovery orders—and M. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(ii)—for their
failure to answer interrogatories or respond to requests for production.
Under each of these rules, the District Court “may” order sanctions;
the rules do not require the District Court to do so. It was within the

court’s discretion to decide whether and how to sanction Adams and
HSBC. See Harrell, | 61. We determine that the court did not abuse
that discretion. See Draggin’ Y Cattle Co., 17.

165 [Ml In addressing Tedesco’s claims against Adams and HSBC, in
determining which of the AAA’s rules applied to the case at hand, and
in managing the discovery process, the Arbitrator did not manifestly
disregard the law. The District. Court did not abuse its discretion in
confirming the arbitration award.

CONCLUSION
66 The District Court’s order compelling arbitration and its judgment
confirming the arbitration award are affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SANDEFUR, SHEA
and RICE concur.

BRENDA M. ASH, INDIVIDUALLY and as
Trustee of the Brenda M. Ash Revocable Trust,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JOHN B. MERLETTE, Individually and as
Trustee of the John B. Merlette, Sr. Living Trust;
GLADYS A. MERLETTE, Individually and as
Trustee of the Gladys A. Merlette Living Trust,
Defendants and Appellants.

No. DA 17-0160.
Submitted on Briefs August 2, 2017.
Decided December 12, 2017.
2017 MT 305.

389 Mont. 486.

407 P.3d 304.

For Appellant: Paul A. Sandry, Johnson, Berg, & Saxby, PLLP;
Kalispell.

For Appellees: Renee L. Coppock, Crowley Fleck PLLP;
Billings; Richard W. Casey, Ashley A. Di Lorenzo, Crowley Fleck
PLLP; Kalispell.

JUSTICE SANDEFUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

{1 John B. Merlette and Gladys A. Merlette (Merlette) appeal an
order of the Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court granting
summary judgment declaring that Brenda M. Ash (Ash) owns certain
disputed land between the high- and low-water marks of a small lake
located in Flathead County, Montana. We affirm and address the
following issue on appeal:

Did the District Court correctly conclude that Ash owns the land
bordering her property between the high- and low-water marks of
Parker Lake?

BACKGROUND
q2 In 1986, Larry and Serena Streeter (Streeters) acquired
approximately 43 acres of property surrounding a small lake in
Flathead County known as Parker Lake No. 1.' In 1991, Streeters
subdivided the property by internal boundary line relocation into an
approximately 5.66 acre tract (Parcel A) and a 37.17 acre remainder
(Tract 1).? Both tracts included lake frontage on Parker Lake. In 1992,
Streeters sold the 37.17 acre remainder to John Bradshaw (Merlette

‘See Tract 1 and Parcel A, COS 10120, filed March 1991, Flathead County real
property records.

2 Certificate of Survey 10404, filed December 5, 1991, Flathead County real
property records.

Property)® but retained the previously created 5.66 acre tract (Ash
Property) for themselves. In 2000, Brenda Ash (formerly Olson) jointly
acquired the Ash Property with her then-husband via a mesne
conveyance originating from Streeters.*

q3 As created and particularly described by Streeters’ 1991 COS
10404, the 5.66 acre Ash Property included approximately 577 feet. of
frontage on Parker Lake. COS 10404 described the Ash Property
boundary along Parker Lake by a particularized metes and bounds plot
running from a referenced starting point on the high-water mark and
then “on and along” the high-water mark three specified courses
marked by pin locations. Streeters’ subsequent 1992 deed to Bradshaw
conveyed the Merlette Property by reference to COS 10120 but
expressly excluded the retained Ash Property from the conveyance by
reference to COS 10404, which cut the Ash Property out of COS 10120
prior to the Bradshaw conveyance. The 1992 Bradshaw deed expressly
excluded the Ash Property by reference to COS 10404 and a redundant
metes and bounds description lifted verbatim therefrom. The 2000
Olson-Ash deed (Ash deed) described the Ash Property by reference to
COS 10404 and a redundant metes and bounds plot running from a
referenced point on the high-water mark “on and along” the high-water
mark three specified courses, “577 feet more or less.””

q4 In 2002, construction workers retained by Merlette excavated fill
from Parker Lake to level a site for a new residence on the Merlette
Property. Ash complained to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that.
Merlette’s fill excavation violated § 404 of the federal Clean Water Act.
prohibiting unpermitted dredging in streams, lakes, and wetlands
subject to the Act.® After a site visit, the Corps issued correspondence,
dated January 21, 2003, declaring Parker Lake as a non-navigable

° Inter alia, the 1992 Bradshaw deed inchaded language expressly reserving “unto”
Streeters “lifetime fishing and boating rights and privileges” to Parker Lake, “including
access to exercise said boating rights and privileges.”

“Tn 2001, Merlette sold .66 acres of the original 37.17-acre tract to Olson-Ash to
resolve a mistaken septic system drain field encroachment. COS 14886, Flathead County
real property records.

® Special Warranty Deed from Pan American Bank, FSB, to Barry L. Olson and
Brenda M. Olson, Doc. No. 200006-16450, recorded in the official real property records
of the Flathead County Clerk and Recorder on March 6, 2000.

° 33 U.S.C. § 1334,

intrastate body of water beyond the Corps’ jurisdiction pursuant to
Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 121
S. Ct. 675 (2001) (federal jurisdiction limited to waters susceptible to
interstate commerce and immediately adjacent wetlands).

{5 Later in 2002, Ash placed a boat dock on the Parker Lake
shoreline in front of her home. Merlette objected, asserting that he
owned all of the land below the high-water mark around the entire
lake. He accused Ash of trespass and insisted that she remove the dock
immediately. Ash eventually acquiesced and removed the dock. In
2015, Ash again installed a dock on the lake in advance of listing her
property for sale. Merlette again protested on the asserted ground that
he owned all of the land below the high-water mark around the lake.
The dispute escalated when Merlette pounded metal fence posts along
the high-water mark bordering Ash’s property and Ash removed and
stacked them on Merlette’s driveway.

q6 After the parties exchanged correspondence through counsel, Ash
filed suit on November 12, 2015, asserting claims for declaratory
judgment and in tort based on alleged trespass and nuisance. Ash
further sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction enjoining Merlette from interfering with her lake access
pending final judgment. Merlette counterclaimed in trespass, asserting
ownership of all land between the high- and low-water marks on the
lake. On November 24, 2015, the District Court granted Ash’s request
for a temporary restraining order and, following hearing on December
1, 2015, issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Merlette from
interfering with Ash’s lake access. On December 28, 2016, Ash filed an
amended complaint adding counts of intentional interference with her
contractual relationship with her realtors and slander of title based on
Merlette’s alleged misrepresentations to third parties regarding his
asserted ownership of all lake frontage on Parker Lake.

{7 In January 2016, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. On the ground that extrinsic evidence was not necessary or
proper to construe the clear and unambiguous language in Ash’s deed,
the District Court denied Merlette’s M. R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion to stay
summary judgment and for further discovery. On November 7, 2016,
the District Court granted summary judgment that Ash owned the
land between the high- and low-water marks of Parker Lake bordering
Ash’s property. On February 22, 2017, the District Court certified its
summary judgment order for immediate appeal pursuant to M. R. Civ.
P. 54(b). We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
q8 Wereview summary judgment rulings de novo for conformance to
M. R. Civ. P. 56. Dick Anderson Constr., Inc. v. Monroe Prop. Co., 2011
MT 138, {1 16, 361 Mont. 30, 255 P.3d 1257. Summary judgment is
proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3). Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists or whether a
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law are conclusions of law
subject to de novo review for correctness. Ereth v. Cascade County,
2003 MT 328, {| 11, 318 Mont. 355, 81 P.3d 463.

DISCUSSION

{9 Did the District Court correctly conclude that Ash owns the land
bordering her property between the high- and low-water marks of
Parker Lake?

10 As matters of federal and federally-derived state sovereignty over
beds and banks of navigable waters, conveyances of land bordering
navigable waters, as defined by federal law, cannot convey title below
the high-water mark unless otherwise authorized by state law. See
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 589-91, 182 S. Ct. 1215,
1227-28 (2012) (riparian ownership acquired by western states on
admission under federal “equal footing” doctrine); Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 551, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1251 (1981) (ownership of
land between the high-water marks of navigable waters generally
adhered to the states upon statehood subject only to any retained
federal easement and federal constitutional authority to regulate
interstate commerce); United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 597, 61 S. Ct. 772, 775 (1941) (federal
authority to regulate interstate commerce between high-water marks
of navigable waters); § 70-1-202(1), MCA (state owns “all land below”
water of navigable lakes and streams). Subject to Montana’s limited
public trust easement over state waters for fishing and recreational use
between the high-water marks, see Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3;
§§ 23-2-302(1), 70-1-202(1), and 87-2-305, MCA; Galt v. State, 225
Mont. 142, 147-48, 731 P.2d 912, 915-16 (1987), parties other than the
state may acquire title to the midline of non-navigable waters and to
the low-water mark of navigable waters. Section 70-16-201, MCA.’
Thus, unless the source instrument of conveyance clearly and
unequivocally provides otherwise, conveyances of land bordering on

7 See also § 23-2-301(9), MCA (definition of “ordinary high-water mark”).

non-navigable waters convey title to the underlying land to the midline
of the water body, while conveyances of land bordering on navigable
waters convey title to the low-water mark. Section 70-16-201, MCA.
Since Montana’s public trust easement is not at issue here and a
conveyance of land bordering on a water body conveys at least to the
low-water mark unless otherwise provided by the conveyance, we need
only address whether the District Court correctly construed the
pertinent instruments of conveyance without consideration of whether
Parker Lake is navigable or non-navigable.

11 Other than by operation of law, transfers of real property may
occur only by written conveyance expressing the grantor’s intent to
convey particularly described property to another. Sections 70-1-501,
70-2-101, and -102, MCA. Except as otherwise provided by law, the
language of an instrument of conveyance determines the nature and
extent of title conveyed. Anderson v. Stokes, 2007 MT 166, {| 32, 338
Mont. 118, 163 P.3d 1273. Conveyance of real property by reference to
acertificate of survey, as defined by §§ 76-3-103(1), -302(1), -401, -402,
MCA, incorporates the referenced certificate of survey, including all
notes, certifications, lines, descriptions, land marks, and depictions
therein, into the deed as if set forth on the face of the deed. John
Alexander Ethen Trust Agreement v. River Res. Outfitters, LLC, 2011
MT 148, 127, 361 Mont. 57, 256 P.3d 913; see also § 70-20-201(6), MCA
(construction and effect of deed reference to map); Blazer v. Wall, 2008
MT 145, 7] 31-36, 343 Mont. 173, 183 P.38d 84; Halverson v. Turner,
268 Mont. 168, 172-74, 885 P.2d 1285, 1288-89 (1994); Bache v. Owens,
267 Mont. 279, 283-86, 883 P.2d 817, 820-22 (1994). The construction
of an instrument of conveyance, including the question of whether its
terms are vague or ambiguous, is a question of law. Mularoni v. Bing,
2001 MT 215, {1 32, 306 Mont. 405, 34 P.3d 497.

12 Here, the parties agree with the District Court that the Ash
Property lake frontage descriptions in COS 10404 and the Ash deed are
consistent, clear, and unambiguous.’ They simply disagree about their
meaning. Ash agrees with the District Court that she owns the

® However, references and depictions in certificates of survey are sufficient to
create a new property interest only to the extent that they adequately describe the
interest and clearly manifest the grantor’s intent to do so. Blazer, {] 38-40.

° As a secondary fallback position in the event this Court might conclude that the
instruments of conveyance of the Ash Property are ambiguous, Merlette alternatively
asserts that certain extrinsic evidence precludes judgment as a matter of law and
supports factual argument in his favor at trial.

disputed land between the high- and low-water marks of Parker Lake
bordering her property based on the presumption of § 70-16-201, MCA,
and the meander line methodology for describing riparian borders.
Merlette contrarily asserts that the specific metes and bounds
description of the Parker Lake boundary line in the source COS 10404
and the resulting Ash deed expressly limit the property to the high-
water mark.

13 To the extent lawful and reasonably ascertainable, courts must
construe instruments of conveyance to give full effect to the intent of
the grantor at the time of the conveyance. Anderson, {| 33. If the
language of an instrument of conveyance is clear and unambiguous,
the court must construe the instrument based on its express language
and incorporated references without resort to extrinsic evidence.
Section 70-20-202(1), MCA; Anderson, {| 33; Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 209
Mont. 177, 180, 679 P.2d 787, 789 (1984). Extrinsic evidence is a
relevant construction aid only if the language of the instrument of
conveyance is vague or ambiguous. Anderson, {| 33. The language of a
conveyance is ambiguous only if susceptible to two or more conflicting
meanings, both of which are objectively reasonable. Mary J. Baker
Revocable Trust v. Cenex Harvest States, Co-ops., Inc. , 2007 MT 159,
{ 20, 338 Mont. 41, 164 P.3d 851. Mere disagreement about the
meaning of particular terms or provisions does not render otherwise
clear and unambiguous language ambiguous. Heggem v. Capitol
Indem. Corp., 2007 MT 74, | 30, 336 Mont. 429, 154 P.3d 1189.

14 In construing instruments of conveyance, the court may not rely
on isolated words or provisions. Anderson, | 36 (citing Rumph v. Dale
Edwards, Inc., 183 Mont. 359, 368-69, 600 P.2d 163, 168-69 (1979)).
The court must construe an instrument of conveyance in its entirety,
giving effect to all within its four corners, and narrowly construing and
subordinating any term or provision repugnant to the manifest general
intent or purpose of the instrument. Anderson, {] 36. The court must
liberally construe express reservations in grants of real property in
favor of the grantor. Section 70-1-516, MCA. Except as otherwise
expressly provided or necessarily implied from the language of the
instrument, a conveyance of real property transfers to the grantee all
title and interest then held by the grantor. Section 70-1-519, MCA.
15 Essential to this case is the well-settled methodology for surveying
and describing riparian boundaries. Congressional acts from 1785 into
the early 1800s required official government surveys to subdivide all
territories acquired by the United States north of the Ohio River and
west of the Mississippi River (except Texas) into six-mile square

townships, composed of 36 square-mile sections containing 640 acres
each. Yellowstone River, LLC v. Meriwether Land Fund I, LLC, 2011
MT 263, {| 6, 362 Mont. 273, 264 P.3d 1065 (citing Joyce Palomar,
Patton and Palomar on Land Titles vol. 1, § 116 (3d ed. 2003) and
Curtis M. Brown, Walter G. Robillard, & Donald A. Wilson, Evidence
and Procedures for Boundary Location 179-200 (2d ed. 1981)). See also
Curtis M. Brown, Walter G. Robillard & Donald A. Wilson, Brown’s
Boundary Control and Legal Principles (Brown’s) § 6 (6th ed. 2009)
(discussing the development of the Public Land Survey (PLS)
system). Where a true section or quarter-section corner would
otherwise be located in “a water course,” the PLS system required
official government surveyors to run the converging straight section
lines from the other “established corners ... to the [edge of the] water
course,” thereby establishing “fractional townships” with the water
course “designated as the external boundary of the fractional
township.” Schurmeir v. St. Paul & P. RR. Co., 10 Minn. 82, 99-100
(Minn. 1865) (emphasis original) (citing 2 Stat. 313, 314 (1805)
(construing Land Act of February 11, 1805, in re mode of surveying
US. public lands). The PLS system thus required “an accurate survey
of the meanderings of a water course” serving as external boundary of
fractional townships by reference to a “meander line,” i.e., a “line
showing the place of the water course and its sinuosities, courses, and
distances.” Schurmeir, 10 Minn. at 100. Accord Alan C. Morganfield &
Charles Carpenter, The Ins and Outs (and Zigs and Zags) of Legal
Descriptions, 102A Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Spec. Inst. 11, 49-51 (1998).
Though originally applicable by federal statute only to lands surveyed
and conveyed by the federal government, the PLS system meander line
methodology became a generally accepted professional standard and
practice for surveying and describing public and private lands bounded
by water bodies. See Brown’s § 1.2.

16 [Consistent with this generally accepted standard and practice,
a federal and state common law rule soon developed that, unless the
language of a conveyance clearly and unequivocally manifests a more
limited intent to fix a riparian boundary to the precise course specified

' Due to rough terrain, bad weather, antiquated instruments, and occasional error,
purported 640-acre sections often vary by a few inches to several hundred feet from a
precise square mile. David E. Wolley and Lisa D. Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects
of Lost Chain of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 Hastings Bus. L. J. 365, 366-69 (2012).

in a property description, a riparian boundary" specified or depicted
in an instrument of conveyance, or incorporated survey or plat map, is
merely a meander line, i.e., a@ mere approximation of the ever-
fluctuating and meandering edge of a water body intended as the
actual boundary line of the property. Andersen v. Monforton
(Monforton), 2005 MT 310, 1] 22-24, 329 Mont. 460, 125 P.3d 614;
North Shore v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 302-03 (N.D. 1995);
Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 413, 11 S. Ct. 819, 821-22 (1891)
(government land patents identifying lots conveyed by reference to the
official government survey plat “have the legal effect of a declaration
that they extend to and are bounded by the lake or stream” with all
regular “legal consequences of such a boundary in the matter of
riparian rights and title to land under water” (internal punctuation
omitted)); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380, 11 S. Ct. 808, 811
(1891) (“meander lines are intended for the purpose of bounding and
abutting the lands granted upon the waters whose margins are thus
meandered” to the effect “that the waters themselves constitute the
real boundary”); St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. 272,
286-87 (1868) (“[mleander-lines are run in surveying fractional
portions of the public lands bordering upon navigable rivers, not as
boundaries of the tract, but for the purpose of defining the sinuosities
of the banks of the stream, and as the means of ascertaining the
quantity of the land in the fraction subject to sale, and which is to be
paid for by the purchaser”). Except as otherwise clearly provided in the
language of conveyance, a meander line merely approximates “the
border-line of the stream” and signifies that the water course is the
actual boundary rather than “the meander line ... run on the land.” St.
Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 74 U.S. at 287. Accord Faucett v. Dewey Lumber
Co., 82 Mont. 250, 257-58, 266 P. 646, 648 (1928) (citing Hardin and
St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.); North Shore, 530 N.W.2d at 302-03.
Consequently, unless otherwise unequivocally provided on the face of
the instrument, an instrument of conveyance describing a riparian
boundary by reference to a particularized metes and bounds
description, i.e., a meander line, conveys title at least to the low-water
mark of the body of water rather than the line precisely described by

1 “Riparian” means “relating to, or located on the bank of a river or stream (or
occasionally another body of water, such as a lake).” Black's Law Dictionary 1524 (Bryan
A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014). A “riparian owner’ is an owner of land “along, bordering
upon, bounded by, fronting upon,” or “abutting or adjacent and contiguous to” a non-tidal
body of water. Black's Law Dictionary 1192 (5th ed. 1979).

metes and bounds. Monforton, || 22 (synthesizing meander line
methodology with § 70-16-201, MCA); Faucett, 82 Mont. at 257, 266 P.
at 648.

117 In Monforton, a residential developer acquired and subdivided a
large ranch property bordering on the Jefferson River in Madison
County. Monforton, {| 7-8. The source 1971 warranty deed to the
developer, as well as the subsequent subdivision plat in reference to
which the developer conveyed subdivision lots to third parties,
described the property boundary along the Jefferson River by reference
to a point on the bank of the river and then “meandering the right
bank” along a series of specified courses that corresponded to the high-
water mark. Monforton, {| 10, 13. Years later, a subsequent owner,
who acquired the undeveloped remainder of the original ranch property
from the developer, sued river lot owners for declaratory judgment that
the river boundary specified in the developer's source warranty deed,
as carried forward in the subsequent subdivision plat and resulting lot
deeds, specifically established the high-water mark as the actual
boundary of the subdivision lots contrary to the presumption of § 70-
16-201, MCA. Monforton, 1 9-14. The plaintiff thus asserted that.
owners of subdivision river lots had no river access because he owned
the 11.4-acre strip between the high- and low-water marks along the
subdivision boundary.

18 After recognizing the long-settled meander line methodology for
describing riparian boundaries and the common law presumption
codified in § 70-16-201, MCA,” we rejected the plaintiff's assertion that
the meander line methodology applies only to the official federal
government land surveys from which it arose. Monforton, {[] 18-24.
Based on the presumption of § 70-16-201, MCA, the nature and
purpose of meander lines, and an express reference to the described
boundary as “meandering” along the river, we held that the specific
metes and bounds description of the riparian boundary, which included
references to monumental and non-monumental marks, was
insufficient alone to “indicate an intent contrary to” the “low-water
line” presumption of § 70-16-201, MCA. Monforton, 1 26-29. We so
held notwithstanding that the metes and bounds description
referenced and ran along the high-water mark, the existence of
contrary extrinsic evidence, and that the river lot owners had not paid
taxes on the adjoining property between the high- and low-water

© See Faucett, 82 Mont. at 259, 266 P. at 648 (noting that § 70-16-201, MCA, is a
mere codification of the common law rule).

marks. Monforton, 1 26-29.

19 Similarly here, the parties do not dispute that their source
common grantor (Streeters) owned at least to the low-water mark of
Parker Lake.” The parties affirmatively agree that the Ash Property
lake frontage descriptions in COS 10404 and the Ash deed are
consistent, clear, and unambiguous. Mere disagreement about the
meaning of the otherwise clear and unambiguous metes and bounds
descriptions in COS 10404 and the Ash deed is insufficient to render
those instruments ambiguous. Heggem, { 30.

120 Hl While the descriptions in COS 10404 and the Ash deed do not
use any form of the term “meander” to describe the property boundary
along Parker Lake, express reference or use of the term “meander” in
an instrument of conveyance is not talismanic. By nature, water bodies
meander and their boundaries are meandering. See, e.g., Faucett, 82
Mont. at 257-58, 266 P. at 648; St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 74 U.S. at.
286-87; Brown’s 463 (defining “high-water mark”). With or without
express reference to the term “meander,” a metes and bounds
description that plots a varying course, using specific measured
distances running from precisely referenced points, to plot an
otherwise non-uniform edge of a water body is an approximate
meander line unless otherwise clearly provided in the instrument of
conveyance. Monforton, |] 20-21.

21 Unlike other particularized metes and bounds descriptions
intended to establish stationary boundary lines on the ground, the
purpose ofa particularized metes and bounds description along a water
body is to provide a reasonably precise approximation of an
ever-varying course along the non-stationary and non-uniform edge of
the water body. Monforton, {I 20-24. The particularized
approximation permits a reasonably precise description of the location
and quantity of land bought or sold with the understanding that the
actual boundary and quantity of the land varies with the fluctuating,
meandering water line of the lake or stream. Monforton, {| 20-24. In
turn, the meander line methodology of approximating riparian
boundaries is consistent with the default rule of § 70-16-201, MCA,
that the party who owns property to the high-water mark of a
navigable or non-navigable body of water also owns the adjoining
property between the high- and low-water marks unless the source
instrument of conveyance provides otherwise. Monforton, {| 25. Due to

18 See § 70-16-201, MCA (riparian owners generally own at least to the low-water
mark depending on navigability).

the inherent difficulty in describing a naturally meandering water body
by uniform measurements, a conveyance of riparian property by
reference to a specific metes and bounds description along the high-
water mark is insufficient alone to overcome the presumption of § 70-
16-201, MCA, that the grantee takes at least to the low-water mark.
Monforton, 1] 26-29." See also § 70-1-519, MCA (conveyance of real
property conveys all title held by the grantor in the subject property
unless otherwise clearly provided by the instrument of conveyance).

122 [MM As in Monforton, the metes and bounds descriptions of the
Parker Lake frontage in COS 10404 and the resulting Ash deed are
unquestionably meander line descriptions, i.e., particularized metes
and bounds plots approximately corresponding to the otherwise
non-uniform edge of a meandering water body. Aside from express
references to specific metes and bounds courses along the high-water
mark, nothing in COS 10404 or the resulting Ash deed indicate any
intent of the parties’ common grantors (Streeters) to strip themselves,
or successors, of the grantors’ preexisting ownership of the land
between the high- and low-water marks of Parker Lake along the Ash
Property.’® Thus, in accordance with the presumption of §§ 70-1-519

“ Tn other words, if a grantor actually intends to limit a riparian boundary to the
high-water mark, or other described line, the grantor must expressly reserve or except
the land below the high-water mark, or other described line, from the description of the
subject tract by expressly declaring, in the subject deed and source COS or subdivision
plat, that the described riparian boundary along the high-water mark, or other described
upland line, is the actual boundary line rather than an approximate meander line. North
Shore, 530 N.W_2d at 302-03. Any such reservation or exception that effects a “division
of land,” as defined by § 76-3-103(4), MCA, is of course subject to applicable provisions
of the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act. See Title 76, chapter 3, MCA.

1% Despite his concession that the language of the subject instruments of
conveyance are clear and unambiguous, Merlette suggests in a secondary fallback
argument that Streeters’ reservation of“lifetime fishing and boating privileges, including
access to exercise said rights,” in their 1992 conveyance of the Merlette property to
Bradshaw evinces Streeters’ awareness that they did not retain any ownership interest
around Parker Lake below the high-water mark. Streeters’ rationale for including the
reservation of a personal right vis-a-vis Bradshaw is indeed subject to speculation
without resort to extrinsic evidence. However, in addition to being consistent with their
independent retention of previously acquired appurtenant lakefront access during their
continued term of ownership of the Ash Property (Parcel A), the subsequent reservation
of a personal right in the Bradshaw deed is insufficient as a matter of law to create
ambiguity on the face of the prior source COS from which the Ash Property derived and
from which the Merlette Property did not.

and 70-16-201, MCA, Streeters retained ownership of the land between
the high- and low-water marks along the Ash Property in COS 10404,
which then carried forward to Ash under a successive conveyance
referencing COS 10404 without limitation. Merlette never acquired
title to the land between the high- and low-water marks along the Ash
Property because the source description of the property in COS 10404
was insufficient to separate the adjoining land below the high-water
mark and the subsequent deed from Streeters to Bradshaw expressly
excluded the Ash Property from the conveyance of the Merlette
Property. Bradshaw simply never owned the disputed land below the
high-water mark to convey to Merlette even if he had intended to do
so.'® Despite express reference to the high-water mark, the specific
metes and bounds description of the riparian boundary of the Ash
Property in COS 10404, as carried forward and repeated in substance
in the Ash deed, was a meander line establishing the riparian
boundary of the Ash Property at least to the low-water mark of Parker
Lake pursuant to § 70-16-201, MCA. We hold that the District Court
correctly granted summary judgment declaring that the Ash Property
includes, and thus Ash owns, the disputed land between the high- and
low-water marks of Parker Lake.

CONCLUSION

123 The specific metes and bounds description of the riparian
boundary of the Ash Property in COS 10404, as carried forward and
repeated in substance in the Ash deed, was a meander line description
establishing the riparian boundary of the Ash Property at least to the
low-water mark of Parker Lake. We hold that the District Court
correctly granted summary judgment declaring that Ash owns the
disputed land between the high- and low-water marks.
24 Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SHEA, WHEAT and
RICE concur.

'8 Merlette has made no such showing or assertion.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

DAVID GARY BURTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 15-0593.

Submitted on Briefs September 6, 2017.
Decided December 12, 2017.
2017 MT 306.

389 Mont. 499.

407 P.3d 280.

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, James
Reavis, Assistant Appellate Defender; Helena.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General; Helena; Leo
Gallagher, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Melissa Broch,
Deputy County Attorney; Helena.

JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

{1 David Burton appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss charges
under § 46-11-504(1), MCA, by the Montana First Judicial District
Court, Lewis and Clark County. We affirm, and address the following
issues:

1. Can a defendant appeal the denial of a motion for dismissal

under § 46-11-504(1), MCA, prior to the entry of a final judgment?

2. Did the District Court err by denying Burton’s motion under

§ 46-11-504(L), MCA, to dismiss the charges of deceptive practices,

burglary, and felony theft, given his federal conviction for

possession of stolen firearms?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2 The Lewis and Clark County Sheriffs Office and Helena Police
Department connected Burton to a series of crimes that started in 2010
and culminated in December of 2011. Prosecutors alleged the following
crimes were committed by Burton: On September 7, 2010, a Ruger .380
caliber pistol was stolen from Timothy Kosena’s vehicle in the Helena

Valley. On November 28, 2010, the Helena Valley home occupied by
the McClain family was broken into and several items of value, along
with personal documents, were taken. On February 5, 2011, owners
reported that Jack and Jill Sports Memorabilia in downtown Helena
was broken into, with merchandise and a cash register stolen. On
October 5, 2011, a laptop computer and several tools were reported
stolen from Glen Knudson’s vehicle as it was parked in Helena or the
Helena Valley. On November 16, 2011, the Helfert home in the Helena
Valley was broken into and several items of value, including a Ruger
45 Colt revolver and a Llama pistol, were missing. On December 7,
2011, it was reported that jewelry was missing from the Mihelish home
in the Helena Valley. On December 8, 2011, in the middle the night,
J.L., a 13-year-old girl, was abducted from her bedroom in the Helena
Valley while her mother slept. She was driven to a remote area where
she was sexually assaulted and then released on foot. The next day,
December 9, 2011, the Corbally home in the Helena Valley was broken
into and several valuables, including a Springfield 9 millimeter pistol,
a Springfield .40 caliber pistol, a Ruger .45 caliber pistol, a Ruger 12
gauge shotgun, and a Rock River AR rifle, were stolen. On December
15, 2011, it was reported that Capital Jewelry and Loan was broken
into and a Center Arms Galil rifle was stolen. The same day, the Davis
home in the Helena Valley was broken into and several valuables,
including a Ruger 9 millimeter pistol, were taken. Again the same day,
the Roncalli home in the Helena Valley was broken into and several
valuables and a credit card were missing. On December 17, 2011, it
was reported that King Lewy’s Auto Plaza in Helena was broken into,
and it appeared that a van had been stolen and later returned. The
credit card taken from the Roncalli home was used to fuel the stolen
van. Later that night, Bowser’s Casino in Helena was robbed at
gunpoint. The same van was used as a get-away vehicle.

q8 The Roncalli credit card was used at several other businesses, and
using security camera footage, police were able to identify Burton and
arrest him. Burton was first charged in January 2012, and as he was
connected to additional crimes, charges were added. In July 2012, the
state filed an amended information, stating 13 counts: (1) felony
deceptive practices, common scheme (Roncalli); (2) burglary (Roncalli);
(3) misdemeanor theft (Roncalli); (4) burglary (King Lewy’s); (5)
robbery (Bowser’s); (6) felony theft (Bowser’s); (7) burglary (Corbally);
(8) felony theft (Corbally); (9) burglary (J.L); (10) aggravated
kidnapping (J.L.); (11) sexual intercourse without consent (J.L.); (12)
felony theft (Davis, Capital Jewelry and Loan, Mihelish, Helfert,
Knudson, Jack and Jill, McClain, Kosena); and (13) alternatively to

count twelve, felony theft for possession of the stolen property.

q4 In December 2012, federal prosecutors obtained an indictment
against Burton for four federal charges: (1) felon in possession of
firearms; (2) possession of stolen firearms; (3) robbery affecting
commerce; and (4) utilization of a firearm during a crime of violence.
The federal indictment identified five guns as the basis for the charges:
a Ruger .380 caliber pistol, a Ruger .45 caliber revolver, a Ruger 9
millimeter pistol, a Rock River rifle, and a Galil rifle. The State’s
affidavit identified a Ruger .380 as being stolen from Kosena, a Ruger
.45 caliber revolver from Helfert, a Ruger 9 millimeter from Davis, a
Rock River rife from Corbally, and a Galil from Capital Jewelry.'

{5 Shortly thereafter, the State, in consideration of § 46-11-504(1),
MCA, filed a second amended information “to remove from the [first.
amended] information [] transactions that are the subject of the federal
indictment.” The State removed counts four, five, and six (the burglary
of King Lewy’s, and the robbery and theft of Bowser’s Casino). The
state also removed the firearms from the list of property stolen from
the Corballys and reduced count eight from felony theft to
misdemeanor theft. Further, the State amended alternative counts
twelve and thirteen to remove the victims from whom only firearms
were stolen, and also removed all firearms from the lists of property
stolen from other victims.” Thus, the second amended information
stated charges of: (1) felony deceptive practices, common scheme
(Roncalli); (2) burglary (Roncalli); (3) misdemeanor theft (Roncalli);
(4) burglary (Corbally); (5) misdemeanor theft (Corbally); (6) burglary
(J.L.); (7) aggravated kidnapping (J.L.); (8) sexual intercourse without
consent (J.L.); (9) felony theft (Davis, Mihelish, Knudson, Jack and Jill,
and McClain); and (10) alternatively to count nine, felony theft.

{6 Burton filed a motion to dismiss under § 46-11-504(1), MCA,
which the District Court denied. The District Court granted Burton’s
motion to sever the aggravated kidnapping, sexual intercourse without
consent, and burglary charge related to J.L. In October of 2014, a jury
found Burton guilty of aggravated kidnapping and sexual intercourse

‘The record reflects that both Helfert and Corbally had Ruger .45 caliber
handguns stolen. The State identified Helfert’s gun asa revolver, andthe federal charges
involving a Ruger .45 caliber handgun described it as a revolver, so we assume the
federal charge involved Helfert’s handgun. However, it is possible that Corbally’s Ruger
45 caliber handgun was also a revolver, and that the federal charge referenced that
handgun. This question does not impact our resolution of the issues raised here

2 The State apparently also removed the Helfert theft from the charges, even
though several valuables were taken that were not firearms.

without consent, but not guilty of burglary.
{7 Subsequently, Burton pled guilty to federal count two, possession
of stolen firearms. The other federal charges were dismissed. At the
plea hearing, federal prosecutors made an offer of proof demonstrating
their intention to prove that Burton possessed the five stolen firearms
listed in the indictment, explaining the elements of the offense: Burton
knowingly possessed stolen firearms, he knew or had reasonable cause
to believe they were stolen, and the firearms were transported between
one state and another before they were stolen. The charge did not
include the assertion that Burton had himself stolen the firearms.
q8 In March of 2015, Burton’s second trial was held on the remaining
State charges. The jury found him guilty of the remaining counts,
except for burglary (Roncalli) and the alternative theft charge. At trial,
the State attempted to offer evidence of the stolen firearms. The
District Court denied admission of the evidence, and gave the following
jury instruction, without objection from Burton:
Ladies and gentlemen I want to make a statement to you before
we get started. At the end of the day there was an exhibit that.
was being offered when we broke. I have refused that exhibit.
You need to be aware of something. The charges in this
case—there are no charges that Mr. Burton stole firearms. So I
am going to read you an instruction.
The defendant is not being tried for theft of firearms. He may not
be convicted for any other offense other than those charged in this
case. For the jury to convict the defendant of any other offenses
than that or those charged in the case may result in unjust double
punishment of the defendant.
So if we hear some testimony or some reference to firearms, there
will be an instruction telling you what to use that for. But if not,
you are not to consider it.
After that, no other mention of firearms was made by the parties.
Further, the Davis theft was removed from the instructions and verdict
form. This action meant that none of the victims from whom firearms
had been stolen remained in the count nine theft charges.
q9 In May 2015, Burton was sentenced in federal court to ten years
in prison, to run consecutively to his sentence for crimes related to J.L.,
and concurrent to all other state counts. Based on the outcome of the
federal prosecution, Burton moved to dismiss all the state felony
charges on statutory multiple prosecution grounds. The District Court
denied Burton’s motion, noting the State’s removal of all charges
covered by the federal prosecution, Burton’s motion in limine to
prohibit the introduction of evidence concerning the federally charged

conduct, and the District Court’s refusal to admit firearms evidence
offered by the State at trial. Burton immediately filed this appeal, on
statutory grounds, challenging only counts (1) felony deceptive
practices (Roncalli); (4) burglary (Corbally); and (9) felony theft
(Mihelish, Knudson, Jack and Jill, and McClain). Consequently,
Burton has not yet been sentenced for the state charges in this
proceeding.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
110 We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a defendant's
motion to dismiss a charge under Montana’s statutory protection
against double jeopardy, § 46-11-504, MCA, for correctness. State v.
Cline, 2013 MT 188, 1 6, 371 Mont. 18, 305 P.3d 55 (citing State v.
Neufeld, 2009 MT 235, | 10, 351 Mont. 389, 212 P.3d 1063).

DISCUSSION

qi i. Can a defendant appeal the denial of a motion under
§ 46-11-504(1), MCA, prior to the entry of a final judgment?
112 The State moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground there is no
final judgment from which to appeal. We permitted the appeal to
proceed, based on precedent that has permitted interim appeals in
double jeopardy cases. State v. Burton, No. DA 15-0598, Or. (Mont. Oct.
13, 2015). The State asks us to reconsider this order, given that the
Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide for interim
appeals, and that this is a challenge under statute, as opposed to
constitutional double jeopardy.
113 Because we have already denied the State’s motion to dismiss, and
ordered this appeal to proceed, we will address the merits pursuant to
the law of the case doctrine. “[W]here a decision has been rendered by
the Supreme Court on a particular issue between the same parties in
the same case, whether that decision is right or wrong, such decision
is binding on the parties and the courts ....” State v. Van Dyken, 242
Mont. 415, 425, 791 P.2d 1350, 1356 (1990). The doctrine promotes
judicial economy and finality of judgments. In re Estate of Snyder, 2009
MT 291, 1 6, 352 Mont. 264, 217 P.3d 1027.
q14 However, we also accept the State’s invitation to revisit the issue
of interim double jeopardy appeals, taken before a final judgment is
entered, to clarify the process of review prospectively.

a. Appeals of constitutional double jeopardy issues.
q15 Both the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II,
Section 25 of the Montana Constitution, protect individuals from being

twice placed in jeopardy. The United States Supreme Court has held
that the Fifth Amendment protects not only against double
punishment, but against being tried twice for the same offense. Abney
v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-61, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 2041 (1977). The
Abney Court concluded that a double jeopardy challenge must be
reviewable before a defendant’s exposure to a second trial. Abney, 431
US. at 662, 97 S. Ct. at 2041. This holding was inconsistent with
Montana statute, which provided that criminal cases may be appealed
“by the defendant only from a final judgment of conviction and orders
after judgment which affect the substantial rights of the defendant.”
Section 46-20-104, MCA; see also M. R. App. P. 6(2). Consequently,
citing Abney, this Court held that a defendant could raise a
constitutional double jeopardy challenge, prior to a second trial, by way
of a writ of supervisory control, overruling prior contrary holdings.
Keating v. Sherlock, 278 Mont. 218, 224-25, 924 P.2d 1297, 1300-01
(1996). This approach ensured, consistent with the Montana Rules of
Appellate Procedure, that defendants could have a denial of a double
jeopardy challenge reviewed by this Court prior to a second trial.
16 Since Keating, we have occasionally strayed from this procedure,
and entertained interim appeals raising double jeopardy challenges
prior to entry of a final judgment. See, e.g., State v. Violette, 2015 MT
67, 378 Mont. 320, 343 P.3d 574. In State v. Barron, 2008 MT 69, 11 8,
342 Mont. 100, 179 P.3d 519, we explicitly created a broadly-stated
“interim appeal” for all constitutional double jeopardy issues. (“We
conclude that where the challenge before us is one made on double
jeopardy grounds, we will accept an interim appeal for the sole purpose
of considering the merits of the defendant’s double jeopardy claims.”);
see also State v. Duncan, 2012 MT 241, 366 Mont. 443, 291 P.3d 106.
117 However, interim appeals are not authorized by the Montana
Rules of Appellate Procedure and are, in retrospect, ill-founded. Such
appeals are governed, as they must be, by the usual appellate rules,
which do not separately contemplate interim appeals, and are
necessarily time-consuming and significantly disruptive of atrial court
proceeding. In contrast, under the rules, this court can exercise
supervisory control over a trial court that is proceeding under a
mistake of law with relative promptness and efficiency, and thereby
reduce the delay and disruption associated with a mid-proceeding
double jeopardy challenge.

118 [Hl For these reasons, and because the constitutional necessity for
pre-trial review under Abney can be fulfilled by our supervisory control
authority, we overrule our prior jurisprudence recognizing a common

law interim appeal for double jeopardy issues. The interim appeal
created by Barron sanctions delay and piecemeal litigation without a
basis in the statutes or rules. We return to Keating, and hold that
constitutional double jeopardy rulings by a district court may be
challenged prior to a final judgment only by way of a petition for writ
of supervisory control, as authorized by M. R. App. P. 14(3).

119 We have likewise permitted appeals to this Court, following
appeal to the district court, of double jeopardy rulings entered by
courts of limited jurisdiction, without a final judgment. See City of
Helena v. Whittinghill, 2009 MT 343, 353 Mont. 131, 219 P.3d 1244.
Appeals of a double jeopardy issue from a court of limited jurisdiction
to a district court are permitted as a “narrow exception[]” to the
general rules governing de novo appeals to the district court,
Whittinghill, 1] 12-18, as district courts have no jurisdiction to issue
a writ of supervisory control over a limited jurisdiction court. State ex
rel. Ward v. Schmall, 190 Mont 1, 3, 617 P.2d 140, 141 (1980) (“Absent
a constitutional provision or statute bestowing upon the District
Courts the authority to grant writs of supervisory control over Justice
of the Peace Courts, we are obligated to infer that District Courts do
not have such powerl,]” and overruling cases). However, as with
appeals from double jeopardy rulings originating in the district courts,
there is no authority for interim appeals to this Court from non-final
orders originating in a court of limited jurisdiction following appeal to
the district court. Thus, consistent with our ruling above, pre-judgment
double jeopardy rulings entered by a court of limited jurisdiction can,
following appeal to the district court, be brought to this Court only by
way of a petition for a writ of supervisory control. See, e.g., Huertas v.
Billings Mun. Ct., 2017 MT 261, 389 Mont. 158, 404 P.3d 709.

b. Appeals of “statutory double jeopardy” issues.

{20 Apart from federal and state double jeopardy constitutional
jurisprudence, Montana has enacted statutory protections against.
multiple prosecutions in certain instances. Sections 46-11-5083 to -505,
MCA. Although the statutes do not employ terminology associated with
constitutional double jeopardy jurisprudence, they are commonly
referred to as “statutory double jeopardy” provisions. State v. Glass,
2017 MT 128, {| 9, 387 Mont. 471, 395 P.3d 469; Cline, | 8.* Our cases
have utilized double jeopardy terms and concepts in application of the
statute, and at times our constitutional and statutory analyses have

° We have also used the term “multiple prosecutions” statute. State v. Maki, 2008
MT 379, 1 15, 347 Mont. 24, 196 P.3d 1281; Lacey v. State, 2017 MT 18, 27, 386 Mont.
204, 389 P.3d 233.

intertwined. See, e.g., State v. Cech, 2007 MT 184, {| 10, 338 Mont. 330,
167 P.3d 389. We have stated that these statutes generally provide
criminal defendants “greater protection against double jeopardy than
the United States Constitution.” Cline, {| 8 (citations omitted). For our
purposes here, we simply note that there are also important
distinctions between the statutes and constitutional double jeopardy
jurisprudence, for example, in their treatment of the attachment of
jeopardy. Compare § 46-11-504(2), MCA (statutory protection premised
upon an “acquittal, final order, or judgment” that terminated a former
prosecution), with State v. Cates, 2009 MT 94, {] 30, 350 Mont. 38, 204
P.3d 1224 (citations omitted) (attachment of constitutional jeopardy
occurs when the jury is impaneled).
21 The State urges that an interim appeal of an order denying relief
under the multiple prosecution statutes should be prohibited because
they are not premised upon the constitutional considerations at issue
in Abney:
Unlike these very unique and specific constitutional double
jeopardy cases, claims of statutory violations like Burton’s are
different and should be treated differently. Claims under [§ 46-11-
504(1), MCA] have been reviewed and considered by this Court
almost exclusively on direct appeal from final judgment—and no
such cases have been considered under the very narrow Barron or
Schillinger ‘interim appeal’ exception.’
122 [ The State’s argument is well taken. As with constitutional
double jeopardy claims, there is no basis in rule or statute for an
interim appeal of claims under the multiple prosecution statutes and,
more, an interim appeal for violation of statute is not constitutionally
compelled. However, a petition for a writ of supervisory control
pursuant to M. R. App. P. 14(3) is available for a defendant to assert
apre-trial challenge that a second prosecution will violate the statutes.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Booth v. Mont. Twenty-First Judicial Dist., 1998
MT 344, 292 Mont. 371, 972 P.2d 325 (considering both the statute and
constitutional double jeopardy); State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Mont.
Fourth Judicial Dist., 168 Mont. 289, 541 P.2d 1215 (1975).
23 2. Did the District Court err by denying Burton’s motion under
§ 46-11-504(1), MCA, to dismiss the charges of deceptive practices,
burglary, and felony theft, given his federal conviction for possession of
stolen firearms?
24 Burton asserts a violation of § 46-11-504(1), MCA, which provides:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the jurisdiction of any

* City of Three Forks v. Schillinger, 2007 MT 331, 340 Mont. 211, 173 P.3d 681

state or federal court, a prosecution in any jurisdiction is a bar to
a subsequent prosecution in this state if:
(1) the first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction
and the subsequent prosecution is based on an offense arising out.
of the same transaction ... .
125 We apply a three-part test to determine if the statute has been
violated:
1. The defendant’s conduct must constitute an equivalent offense
within the jurisdiction of the court where the first. prosecution
occurred and within the jurisdiction of the court where the
subsequent prosecution is pursued;
2. The first prosecution must result in an acquittal or a conviction;
and
3. The subsequent prosecution must be based on an offense arising
out of the same transaction.*
Cline, 1 9 (citations omitted); Neufeld, | 11 (citations omitted); State
v Gazda, 2003 MT 350, 1 12, 318 Mont. 516, 82 P.3d 20; Cech, 1 13
(citation omitted); Heddings v. State, 2011 MT 228, ] 22, 362 Mont. 90,
265 P.3d 600 (citations omitted); State v. Fox, 2012 MT 172, J 19, 366
Mont. 10, 285 P.3d 454 (citations omitted). If any one of the three
factors is not satisfied, there is no statutory violation. Cech, J 13
(citations omitted).
26 We can state the test in application to this case as follows:
1. Burton’s conduct must constitute an equivalent offense in the
federal and Montana jurisdictions;
2. The federal prosecution must have resulted in an acquittal or
a conviction; and
3. The State’s prosecution must be based on an offense arising out.
of the same transaction.
Burton challenges three of his state convictions, each of which we
compare to the federal offense in application of the statute.
a. Count 4, burglary of the Corbally residence.
27 We resolve this claim under the first prong of the test, which
requires that Burton’s conduct constitute an equivalent offense in the
federal and Montana jurisdictions. For the first prong to be met, it is
not necessary that a defendant be charged with identical offenses in
both jurisdictions, only that his conduct constitute an equivalent

® “Conduct” is defined by statute as “an act or series of acts and the accompanying
mental state.” Section 45-2-101(15), MCA. “Offense” is defined twice, as “a crime for
which a sentence of death or of imprisonment or a fine is authorized[,]” § 45-2-101(49),
MCA, and as “a violation of any penal statute of this state or any ordinance of its
political subdivisions[,)” § 46-1-202(15), MCA.

offense in both jurisdictions. Cech, | 18; Cline, ] 11. If a jurisdiction
could have brought a charge for the conduct, but declined to do so, the
first. prong would nonetheless be met. Cech, {| 18. However, if a
defendant’s conduct does not constitute an offense in the first
jurisdiction, but does in the second, the statute does not prohibit.
prosecution. Gazda, {| 15.
28 In Cline, Cline stole firearms and other, non-firearm merchandise
from his employer. Cline, ] 4. Cline was convicted in federal court of
possession of stolen firearms, and was charged by the State of Montana
with theft by common scheme. Cline, I] 4-5. After Cline filed a motion
to dismiss for violation of the multiple prosecution statute, the state
amended its complaint to charge Cline with only theft of the non-
firearm items. Cline, | 5. We held the first prong was not satisfied
because “Cline’s theft of non-firearm items, in contrast, did not form
the basis of his conviction for theft of firearms. Cline never has been
punished, or put in jeopardy, for his theft of the non-firearm items.”
Cline, 1 19.
29 Similarly, regarding the Corbally burglary charge, Burton broke
into the household and stole firearms and other valuables, including
commemorative coins. He was convicted of possessing the stolen
firearms in federal court. The State brought charges for the burglary
and theft of the non-firearms, over which, as in Gazda, the federal
court did not have jurisdiction. Burton argues that the first prong is
met because the firearms were taken at the same time as the other
valuables. While this might be an effective argument under the third
prong, our precedent makes clear that the theft of the firearms is not
equivalent to theft of the other valuables. Cline, | 12.
80 Further, the state relied on conduct that was distinct from the
conduct considered by the federal court. The federal court considered
that Burton possessed stolen firearms, but did not consider that
Burton broke into a home and stole other valuables, which provided
the basis for the state charge. Thus, Burton’s conduct does not
constitute an equivalent offense under the first prong, and we need not
consider the other prongs.

6b. Count 1, felony deceptive practices for the use of

Roncalli’s credit card.
31 We resolve this claim under the third prong, because the State’s
prosecution was not based on an offense arising out of the same
transaction.
82 “Same transaction” means:

conduct consisting of a series of acts or omissions that are

motivated by:

(a) a purpose to accomplish a criminal objective and that are

necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of that objective; or

(b) a common purpose or plan that results in the repeated

commission of the same offense or effect upon the same person or

the property of the same person.
Section 46-1-202(23), MCA; see also Neufeld, {] 20 (citations omitted)
(“Offenses arise from the same transaction when a defendant's
underlying conduct which gives rise to each prosecution is motivated
by a purpose to accomplish the same criminal objective.”).
33 In Neufeld, we held that, where the two subject. charging
documents referenced the same time, the same conduct, and the same
victim, the charges involved the same transaction. Neufeld, 19. In
contrast, in Heddings, we held that because the state and federal
charges “involved different victims, different offenses and different
time periods|,]” they did not constitute the same transaction.
Heddings, {| 27. Similarly, in Fox, we held that because two separate
victims were victimized at different times, it was not the same
transaction. Fox, {| 26. Fox molested two siblings. Fox, 1] 7-9. He was
convicted in federal court of possession of nude photographs of one of
the sisters, but the State was not barred from pursuing charges based
on his molestation of the other sister. Fox, {] 26.
34 Burton argues that using the credit card was incidental to the
federal charges because he used the credit. card to fuel the vehicles
used when he robbed Bowser’s Casino and burglarized the Davis house,
stealing a firearm. However, this connection is too attenuated to even
be considered “necessary or incidental” to the federal charge of
possession of stolen firearms. Burton also argues the charges involved
the same transaction because they were part of a common purpose or
plan. However, the crimes involved very different conduct committed
against different victims. Separate crimes do not have a common
purpose or objective merely because they occurred temporally within
a defendant’s crime spree. A more “necessary or incidental” purpose is
required under the statute. Otherwise, all crimes committed around
the same time would constitute the same transaction.
85 Burton’s case is similar to Fox. Like Fox, Burton victimized
different individuals. As charged, Burton burglarized Roncalli and
subsequently used her credit card. Burton stole no firearms from
Roncalli, and thus none of the federal charges were based on the crimes
that victimized Roncalli. Therefore, the state was not barred from
prosecuting Burton for his use of Roncalli’s credit. card. The state
charge did not involve any conduct in relation to the theft or possession

of firearms.

ec. Count 9, felony theft from McClain, Jack and Jill Sports

Memorabilia, Knudson, and Mihelish.
36 We likewise here conclude that the State’s prosecution was not
based on an offense arising out of the same transaction, and therefore
the third prong was not satisfied.
137 [fl Burton argues that all the thefts were motivated by a purpose
to accomplish the same criminal objective as the federal firearm
charges, and thus constitute the same transaction. However, the state
charges involved non-firearm property and occurred at different
locations, upon different victims, and at different times, over a period
of 13 months. The record demonstrates no particular connection
between the firearm crimes committed against Kosena, Helfert, Davis,
Corbally, and Capital Jewelry and Loan, with the thefts from McClain,
Jack and Jill, Knudson, and Mihelish, except that they were part of
Burton’s lengthy crime spree. They did not involve “the repeated
commission of the same offense or effect upon the same person or the
property of the same person.” Section 46-1-202(23)(b), MCA.
38 Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES BAKER, McKINNON
and SHEA concur.

DERRICK EARL STEILMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
REGINALD MICHAEL, Director, Montana
Department of Corrections,
TIMOTHY CHARLES FOX,
Montana Attorney General,
Respondents.

No. DA 16-0328.
Submitted on Briefs May 17, 2017,
Decided December 13, 2017.
2017 MT 310.

389 Mont, 512.

407 P.3d 313.

For Petitioner: Colin M. Stephens (argued), Nick K. Brooke
(argued), Smith & Stephens, P.C., Missoula.

For Respondents: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Jonathan M. Krauss (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Helena;
Colleen Ambrose, Chief Legal Counsel, Montana Department of
Corrections, Helena.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUSTICE SHEA delivered the Opinion and Order of the Court.
{1 Derrick Earl Steilman petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.
Relying on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 1382S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and
Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 1386S. Ct. 718 (2016), Steilman
argues that his sentence of 110 years imprisonment, without the
possibility of parole, for deliberate homicide with the use of a weapon,
violates his Eighth Amendment rights because Steilman committed the
offense when he was seventeen years old and the sentencing court
failed to consider the special circumstances of his youth.
2 We address the following issues:

Issue One: Whether Miller and Montgomery apply to Montana’s

discretionary sentencing scheme.

Issue Two: Whether Steilman’s sentence qualifies as a de facto life

sentence to which Miller and Montgomery apply.
q3 We hold that Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary
sentences in Montana. Regarding the applicability to de facto life
sentences in Montana, the dispositive issue in this case is whether the
unique circumstances of Steilman’s Montana sentence, when viewed
in light of his eligibility for day-for-day good time credit and the
concurrent sentence he is presently serving in Washington, qualifies
as a de facto life sentence to which Miller’s substantive rule applies.
We conclude that Steilman’s sentence does not qualify as a de facto life
sentence, and therefore we do not reach the merits of whether the
District Court properly considered the special circumstances of
Steilman’s youth in this case as required by Miller. We deny Steilman’s

petition.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
q4 On the night of September 17-18, 1996, Steilman and his
accomplice, Steven Francis, made a pact to kill someone as a show of
trust before pursuing a criminal enterprise together that included a
planned bank robbery. Steilman and Francis randomly crossed paths
with Paul Bischke. Steilman and Francis demanded Bischke’s money,
then struck him at least four times in the head, face, and arms with a
crow bar, killing him. At the time he committed this murder, Steilman
was 17 years and 323 days old, six weeks before his eighteenth
birthday.
{5 Steilman then moved to Tacoma, Washington, where nearly two
years later, on or about September 10, 1998, he killed Jack Davis by
beating Davis with a baseball bat. Within a week, Steilman and his
then-girlfriend Colleen Wood were arrested in Butte in connection with
the Washington homicide. Wood reported that Steilman took her to
Davis’s apartment to show her Davis’s body. Another former girlfriend
of Steilman’s told law enforcement that he admitted to killing someone
and acted “as if it was nothing,” but she waited to contact law
enforcement because Steilman threatened to kill her. The presentence
investigation report provided Steilman dropped out of school before the
tenth grade in large part due to drug and alcohol abuse, which started
when he was thirteen. The report also provided that Steilman
surrounded himself with “friends and acquaintances [who] were almost
all using drugs and alcohol and living a criminal lifestyle to support
their addictions.”
{6 On October 5, 1998, the State charged Steilman with deliberate
homicide. The prosecution commenced in Youth Court because
Steilman was under eighteen when he committed the first murder. The
State moved to transfer Steilman’s case to District Court. The Youth
Court found: Steilman was seventeen years old when he committed the
offense; probable cause existed; the delinquent act constituted
deliberate homicide; the gravity of the offense and protection of the
community required treatment beyond that afforded by juvenile
facilities; the offense was committed in an aggressive and violent
manner; and § 41-5-206(3) (1995), MCA, required transfer to the
District Court.
{7 Following the transfer to District Court, Steilman was returned
to Washington for prosecution of Davis’s murder. He pled guilty to first
degree murder and was sentenced to 260 months of incarceration plus
24 months for the use of a weapon, totaling 23 years, 8 months. As an

inmate of the State of Washington, Steilman was returned on a
detainer order to be prosecuted in Montana for Bischke’s murder.

q8 On October 1, 1999, Steilman pled guilty to deliberate homicide.
On October 15, 1999, the District Court sentenced Steilman to the
Montana State Prison for 100 years for deliberate homicide and 10
years for the use of a weapon, to run consecutively. The District Court
reasoned that “the gravity and random nature of the
murder ... [,Steilman’s] commission of another homicide, the
punishment permitted by law and the possibility, or lack thereof, of
rehabilitation” justified the 110-year sentence. The District Court also
ordered Steilman ineligible for parole, remarking the “commission of
asenseless, brutal, random homicide demonstrates that [Steilman] is
not a suitable candidate for parole or other supervised release.”

{9 Steilman’s Montana sentence is eligible for day-for-day good time
allowance, which, contingent upon his behavior in prison, could make
him eligible for release in 55 years. Section 53-30-105, MCA (1995); see
Wilcock v. State, No. OP 11-0442, 362 Mont. 544, 272 P.3d 125 (table)
(Sept. 18, 2011). Also, the District Court ordered Steilman’s 110-year
prison term to run concurrent with his 23 years, 8 months Washington
sentence. Under Washington law, Steilman is required to serve at least
two-thirds of his sentence before he would be eligible for community
release.

DISCUSSION
{110 Section 46-22-101, MCA, provides “every person imprisoned or
otherwise restrained of liberty within this state may prosecute a writ
of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of imprisonment or restraint
and, if illegal, to be delivered from the imprisonment or restraint.”
Article II, Section 19 of the Montana Constitution guarantees the writ
of habeas corpus shall never be suspended. The writ of habeas corpus
is available to challenge the legality of the sentence; however, it is not
available to attack the validity of the conviction or sentence of a person
who has been adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record and has
exhausted the remedy of appeal. Sections 46-21-101(1), -22-101(2),
MCA; Rudolph v. Day, 273 Mont. 309, 311, 902 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1995).
The exception for filing habeas petitions to challenge a facially invalid
sentence is generally limited to invalidity that “stems from a rule
created after time limits for directly appealing or petitioning for
postconviction relief have expired.” Beach v. State, 2015 MT 118, 1 6,
379 Mont. 74, 348 P.3d 629 (citing Lott v. State, 2006 MT 279, {| 22, 334
Mont. 270, 150 P.3d 337). A petitioner who successfully challenges a
sentence by way of habeas corpus, but not the underlying conviction,

is not entitled to be released, but only to be resentenced. Lott, {| 23. If
the illegal portion of a sentence “affects the entire sentence” and we are
unable to discern what the district court would have done if it had
properly applied the law, we remand for resentencing. State v. Heath,
2005 MT 280, {| 7, 329 Mont. 226, 123 P.2d 228.

11 Issue One: Whether Miller and Montgomery apply to Montana’s
discretionary sentencing scheme.

12 The State argues that Steilman’s sentence is not facially invalid
and habeas relief is not available because the sentencing court had the
constitutional authority to impose the sentence. The State contends
that Miller’s rules only apply to sentencing schemes mandating life
without parole for juvenile offenders, and that the “mandatory
sentencing rule has no application in Montana.” See Beach, | 36. The
State further contends that Miller merely requires the sentencing
court to follow a certain process before imposing a life without parole
sentence on a juvenile, and does not “foreclose a sentencer’s ability to
make that judgment in homicide cases.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 480, 1328.
Ct. at 2469. According to the State, under Miller a sentencing court
retains the constitutional authority to sentence a juvenile to life
without parole; therefore, as a matter of law, such a sentence cannot
be facially invalid under Lott. See Beach, {| 38; Lott, {| 22. We disagree,
and are satisfied that Steilman sufficiently calls into question the
facial validity of his sentence because Montgomery announced that
Miller applies retroactively and effectively overruled our holding in
Beach. Montgomery, ___ U.S. at ___, 186 S. Ct. at 734.

413 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article II, Section 22 of the Montana Constitution provide: “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” The U.S. Supreme Court dictates that
courts must interpret the Eighth Amendment “according to its text, by
considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for
its purpose and function in the constitutional design” and refer to “‘the
evolving standards of decency that. mark the progress of a maturing
society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to
be cruel and unusual.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61, 125 S.
Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101, 78
S. Ct. 590, 598 (1958) (plurality opinion)). The Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “flows from the
basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to the offense.’ ” Roper, 543 U.S. at 560, 125S. Ct. at
1190 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 311, 122 S. Ct. 2242

(2002)). “While in practice the concept of proportionality does not affect
most sentences, proportionality bears on the harshest types of
punishments when an Eighth Amendment challenge is raised.” Beach,
{ 8 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 8. Ct. 1179 (2003))
(internal citations omitted).
14 Through a series of decisions over the last dozen years, the U.S.
Supreme Court has made clear that “children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing” under the Eighth
Amendment. See Montgomery, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. at 732-733
(holding that Miller's procedural requirements to consider
characteristics of youth when sentencing juvenile offenders provides a
substantive rule that applies retroactively); Miller, 567 U.S. at 470-71,
132 S. Ct. at 2463-64 (holding the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life without the possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 1380S. Ct.
2011, 2026 (2010) (holding the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids
sentences of life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
offenses); Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (holding capital
punishment unconstitutional for juvenile offenders).
15 The U.S. Supreme Court identified three primary differences
between adult and juvenile offenders:
First, children have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility,” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and
heedless risk-taking. Second, children “are more vulnerable to
negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their
family and peers; they have limited “control over their own
environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from
horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child’s character
is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and
his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievable depravity.”
Montgomery,__ U.S. at___, 186 S. Ct. at 733 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S.
at 471, 132 S. Ct. at 2464) (alterations, citations, and some internal
quotation marks omitted). “These differences render suspect any
conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.” Roper, 543
USS. at 570, 125 S. Ct. at 1195. The Court admitted the difficulty, even
for expert psychologists, “to differentiate between the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”
Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, 125 S. Ct. at 1197. The Court acknowledged the
inherent “differences [that] result from children’s ‘diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform, ” and that “ ‘the

distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications’
for imposing life without parole on juvenile offenders.” Montgomery,
__US. __, 186 S. Ct. at 733 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 461, 132 S.
Ct. at 2465). The Court reiterated that “youth matters in determining
the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the
possibility of parole.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 473, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. In so
doing, Miller barred life without parole for all but the rarest juvenile
offenders whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. Montgomery,
__US. at ___, 1386S. Ct. at 734.
16 The Miller Court outlined five factors of mandatory sentencing
schemes that “prevent the sentencer from considering youth and from
assessing whether the laws harshest term of imprisonment
proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” Miller, 567 U.S. at
461-62, 132 S. Ct. at 2458.
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile [1] precludes
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences. [2] It prevents taking into
account the family and home environment that surrounds
him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no
matter how brutal or dysfunctional. [3] It neglects the
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him. [4] Indeed, it ignores that he
might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not
for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his
inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a
plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. And
[5] finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility
of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. Even though the Miller
Court did not categorically bar sentences of life without parole for
juveniles convicted of a homicide offense, the Court required
sentencing judges “take into account how children are different, and
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to
a lifetime in prison.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 480, 182 S. Ct. at 2469.
17 Hl Steilman argues that the aspect that is cruel and unusual for
juvenile offenders is the sentence of life without parole itself, not.
whether the scheme under which the sentence is imposed is
mandatory. We agree. Discussing its rationale for treating juvenile
offenders differently from adult offenders, the U.S. Supreme Court

explained that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for
all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable
corruption.’” Montgomery, __ U.S. at ___, 186 S. Ct. at 726 (quoting
Miller, 567 U.S. at 480, 132 S. Ct. at 2469). The Court further noted,
“Miller ... did more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile
offender’s youth before imposing life without parole; it established that
the penological justifications for life without parole collapse in light of
‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’” Montgomery, ___ U.S. at___, 186
S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at. 472, 132 S. Ct. at 2465). In
the same vein, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals appropriately
reasoned: “The relevance to sentencing of ‘children are different’ also
cannot in logic depend on whether the legislature has made the life
sentence discretionary or mandatory; even discretionary life sentences
must be guided by consideration of age-relevant factors.” McKinley v.
Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 2016). We conclude that Miller’s
substantive rule requires Montana’s sentencing judges to adequately
consider the mitigating characteristics of youth set forth in the Miller
factors when sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the
possibility of parole, irrespective of whether the life sentence was
discretionary.

18 Issue Two: Whether Steilman’s sentence qualifies as a de facto life
sentence to which Miller applies.

{19 The State argues that because Montana law provides a distinction
between sentences of life imprisonment, term-of-years, and death, a
term-of-years sentence cannot become a de facto life sentence and
equate to a de jure life imprisonment under Montana law. See § 45-5-
102(2), MCA. The State contends Steilman’s term of 110 years as a
sentence is not the same as a life imprisonment sentence, and Miller
only applies to life imprisonment. The State further contends no
standard exists to determine how long a term-of-years must be before
it becomes the equivalent of life imprisonment, and any term-of-years
could be equivalent to life without parole if the offender dies while
incarcerated. We disagree.

{20 The same principles that make Miller applicable to Montana’s
discretionary scheme similarly apply to a term-of-years sentence that
is the practical equivalent of life without parole. A strict application of
the State’s argument would mean that a sentence that inarguably
would not allow for the offender to ever be released could not be
considered a life sentence so long as the sentence is expressed in years.
Logically, the requirement to consider how “children are different”
cannot be limited to de jure life sentences when a lengthy sentence

denominated in a number of years will effectively result in the juvenile
offender’s imprisonment for life. See McKinley, 809 F.3d at 911; State
v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197 (N.J. 2017); People v. Nieto, 52 N.E.3d 442 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2016); Kelly v. Brown, 851 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2017); State v.
Ramos, 387 P.3d 650 (Wash. 2017); State v. Cardeilhac, 876 N.W.2d
876 (Neb. 2016); People v. Cervantes, 9 Cal. App. 5th 569 (Cal. Ct. App.
2017); Hayden v. Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d 1000 (E.D.N.C. 2015).

21 In Graham, upon which the Miller Court relied heavily, the Court
reasoned that sentencing a juvenile non-homicide offender to life
without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s rule against
disproportionate sentences because it denies the juvenile offender a
chance to demonstrate growth and maturity. Graham, 560 U.S. at 73,
130 S. Ct. at. 2029. The Graham Court did not focus on the precise
sentence meted out, nor did it require the state to “guarantee the
offender eventual release, but if [the state] imposes a sentence of life
it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain
release before the end of that term.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 82, 1830S. Ct.
at 2034. Consonantly, the Montgomery Court dictated that children,
who are constitutionally different from adults in their level of
culpability, must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not
reflect irreparable corruption, and if redeemable, their hope of release
must be restored. Montgomery, __ U.S. at ___, 186 S. Ct. at 736-37. As
such, the rule in Montgomery “draws ‘a line between children whose
crimes reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose
crimes reflect irreparable corruption’ and allows for the possibility ‘that
life without parole could be a proportionate sentence only for the latter
kind of juvenile offender.” Tatum v. Arizona, ___ U.S. __, __, 1878S.
Ct. 11, 12 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Montgomery, __
US. at ___, 1386S. Ct. at 734). Montgomery and Graham illustrate the
U.S. Supreme Court’s inexorable evolution recognizing that all but the
rarest juvenile offenders be given an opportunity for redemption and
a hope of release, which a sentence of life without parole cannot
provide. As it pertains to the specific sentence imposed on Steilman,
however, our analysis cannot end here.

22 The dispositive question remaining is whether the sentence
imposed on Steilman does, in fact, constitute a de facto life sentence
that triggers the Eighth Amendment protections set forth in
Montgomery and Miller. We begin with the practical application of
Steilman’s sentence. As the State points out, because Steilman is
eligible for day-for-day good time credit, his 110-year sentence allows
for his release after serving only 55 years, contingent upon his behavior

in prison. Section 53-30-105, MCA (1995) (repealed 1997). Let us
assume, for the sake of argument, that a sentence imposed upon a
twenty-one year old man, which allows for the possibility of release in
55 years, constitutes a de facto life sentence. We nevertheless cannot
ignore the reality that Steilman’s Montana sentence was imposed to
run concurrent with the Washington sentence he was already serving
for the murder he committed as an adult in Washington, thus giving
Steilman credit towards his Montana sentence for time served on a
wholly unrelated murder in Washington.

23 The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment “flows from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment
for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.’” Roper,
543 U.S. at 560, 125 S. Ct. at 1190. After factoring in both the day-for-
day good time credit to which Steilman is eligible, and the credit he
gets towards his Montana sentence while serving his concurrent
sentence in Washington, Steilman could potentially serve as little as
31.33 years exclusively attributed towards Bischke’s murder. Had the
Montana District Court imposed a sentence that allowed for the
possibility of Steilman’s release after serving as little as 31.33 years,
but ordered the sentence to run consecutive to his Washington
sentence, Steilman would be hard pressed to argue that such a
sentence was disproportionate to the horrific crime he committed. In
that circumstance, such a sentence would simply reflect a
proportionate sentence independently imposed for a crime
independently committed. And yet this is precisely the practical effect
of the sentence Steilman actually received. Steilman was not entitled
to aconcurrent sentence in this case. Nevertheless, the District Court,
in its discretion, elected to run his Montana sentence concurrent with
his Washington sentence, inuring considerably to Steilman’s benefit.
If we were to ignore the practical effect of Steilman’s sentence, we
would be allowing him to reap that benefit while disregarding it for
purposes of assessing the proportionality of his Montana sentence.
Determining whether a sentence is cruel and unusual does not require
us to ignore reality.

CONCLUSION
124 [ll The combination of the good-time credit to which Steilman is
eligible and the amount of his sentence that will be discharged while
serving a sentence on a wholly unrelated crime leads us to conclude
that Steilman’s sentence does not trigger Eighth Amendment
protections under Montgomery, Miller, and Graham. Therefore, we do
not reach the question of whether the District. Court failed to

adequately consider Steilman’s youth under Miller and Montgomery
when sentencing him.

ORDER

25 The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

DATED this 13th day of December, 2017.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES BAKER and RICE
concur.

JUSTICE WHEAT, dissenting.
q26 I concur with the Court’s determination that Miller and
Montgomery apply to Montana’s discretionary sentencing scheme and
that a lengthy term-of-years sentence could invoke Miller if the
sentence is the practical equivalent of life without parole. However, I
respectfully dissent from the majority's decision that Steilman’s
sentence does not qualify as a life sentence without parole sufficient to
implicate Miller. In my opinion, Steilman’s sentence invokes Miller;
therefore, I would grant Steilman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
and vacate the parole restriction.
27 The underlying principles of the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012),
and Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. ___, 186 S. Ct. 718 (2016), are
that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes
of sentencing” and “have diminished culpability and greater prospects
for reform.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 1382S. Ct. at 2464. The “imposition
of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed
as though they were not children.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 474, 132 S. Ct.
at 2466. Montgomery echoed the same concerns: “In light of what this
Court has said in Roper, Graham, and Miller about how children are
constitutionally different from adults in their level of culpability, ...
prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their
crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their
hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.”
Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 736-37. Although the
majority reiterates many of these principles, it nevertheless rejects
their application where a seventeen-year-old was sentenced to the
practical equivalent of life without parole. Consequently, Steilman was
never and will never be given an opportunity to show that his crime did
not reflect. irreparable corruption. Such result is contrary to the
principles set forth in Miller and Montgomery.
428 The majority erred in concluding that a seventeen-year-old
sentenced to 110 years without the possibility of parole, with a

conditional minimum sentence of 55 years, is outside the scope of
Miller. Miller’s command that a sentencing judge “take into account
how children are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,” applies with equal
strength to a sentence that is the practical equivalent of life without
parole. Miller, 567 U.S. at 480, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Therefore, states
have held that lengthy term-of-years sentences imposed on juveniles,
similar to Steilman’s sentence in this case, are sufficient to trigger the
protections of Miller under the United States and state Constitutions.
See Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 317 Conn. 52, 115 A.3d 1031, 1044
(Conn. 2015), cert. denied, Semple v. Casiano,__ U.S. __, 186 S. Ct.
1364 (2016) (50-year sentence without possibility of parole is subject to
Miller); Iowa v. Null, 8836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (lowa 2013) (minimum
sentence of 52.5 years imprisonment invokes Miller); New Jersey v.
Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 452, 152 A.3d 197, 215 (N.J. 2017) (110-year
sentence with 55 years of parole ineligibility implicates Miller); Bear
Cloud v. Wyoming, 2014 WY 113, 334 P.3d 132, 141-42 (Wyo. 2014)
(holding that an aggregate sentence of more than 45 years was de facto
life without parole and was barred by Miller).

29 Here, Steilman’s sentence should trigger Miller and Montgomery
protections. The District Court sentenced Steilman to the maximum
number of years pursuant to § 45-5-201, MCA (1995), and § 46-18-221,
MCA (1995), which is the practical equivalent of life without parole.
Thus, Steilman’s multiple term-of-years sentence, in all likelihood, will
keep him in jail for the majority of his life without the possibility of
release until he is well into his seventies.

430 Additionally, the majority incorrectly focuses on the fact. that
Steilman’s sentence is subject to day-to-day credits to conclude that his
sentence does not implicate Miller. Opinion, | 22. However, a
conditional release based on day-to-day credits is not determined by a
district court, but rather is determined by the Montana Department of
Corrections. This Court should consider the actual sentence imposed
on Steilman, not a sentence that is subjectively determined by an
entity other than the District Court. And despite the majority’s
conclusion, there is no guarantee that Steilman will be released after
55 years. Therefore, although Steilman’s sentence may be subject to
day-to-day credit, it should not negate the fact that the sentencing
judge sentenced Steilman to the practical equivalent of life without.
parole: 110 years without the possibility of parole. Thus, I would
conclude that Steilman’s sentence would constitute a de facto life
sentence and habeas corpus relief is appropriate.

31 Because Steilman’s sentence is subject to Miller and Montgomery,
I would strike the parole restriction. The United States Supreme Court
emphasized that by giving Miller retroactive effect “[a] State may
remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to
be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”
Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 186 S. Ct. at 736. Such remedy is
appropriate here. It would allow Steilman to be considered for parole,
which “ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient
immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve
a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”
Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 736. Further, allowing
Steilman parole eligibility would permit the parole board to evaluate
whether Steilman “demonstrate[s] the truth of Miller’s central
intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable
of change.” Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 186 S. Ct. at 736. Thus,
striking the parole restriction would provide Steilman with the
meaningful opportunity for release that Miller and Montgomery
mandate of juvenile homicide offenders, provided he does not reflect
irreparable corruption.
32 Accordingly, I would amend Steilman’s sentence by striking the
parole restriction because his sentence of 110 years without the
possibility of parole implicates Miller. Then, the parole board could
properly consider Steilman’s “youth and attendant characteristics” at
the time of his crime and his development and behavior during
incarceration. Conversely, Steilman could be re-sentenced or given a
Miller hearing to ensure that his sentence does not upset the concerns
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court regarding the
culpability of juvenile offenders and these offenders’ potential for
growth and maturity.
33 For these reasons, I dissent from the Court’s denial of Steilman’s
petition.

JUSTICE SANDEFER joins in the Dissent of JUSTICE WHEAT.

JUSTICE MCKINNON, dissenting.
434 In Beach, this Court considered the U.S. Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in Miller, that “a sentencer follow a certain
process —considering an offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Miller, 567
US. at 483, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (emphasis added). The Court was asked
to decide whether Miller applied to a state collateral proceeding thus
requiring Beach to be resentenced. I specially concurred in Beach,
concluding Montana’s individualized and discretionary sentencing

scheme already required a sentencing court. to consider a defendant’s
individual needs, characteristics, family environment, and prospects
for rehabilitation—including age. In my opinion, it was significant that
Miller had been decided within the context of a mandatory statutory
sentencing scheme, which did not allow for imposition of a sentence
less than life without parole for first degree murder, regardless of the
age of the offender at the time the crime was committed. I also
concluded that pursuant to Montana’s habeas corpus statute, § 46-22-
101(2), MCA, and our holding in Lott, Beach was precluded from
attacking his facially valid conviction.

35 Following this Court’s decision in Beach, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Montgomery. In my opinion, Montgomery does not simply
decide whether a “certain process” required by Miller is to be applied
retroactively, Montgomery actually rewrites and expands the
pronouncements made in Miller. In Montgomery, the Court stated that
Miller “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for a
class of defendants because of their status—that is, juvenile offenders
whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” Montgomery,
__ US. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). The Montgomery Court described its holding in Miller as
barring sentences of life without parole “for all but the rarest of
juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent
incorrigibility.” Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 186 S. Ct. at. 734. The
Montgomery Court explained, “[t]he only difference between Roper and
Graham, on the one hand, and Miller, on the other, is that Miller drew
a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and
those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.”
Montgomery, __ U.S. at___, 186 S. Ct. at 734. The Montgomery Court
held that “Miller, then, did more than require a sentencer to consider
a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without parole; it
established that the penological justifications for life without parole
collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’ ” Montgomery,
__US. at __, 186 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 132
S. Ct. at 2465).

436 The difficulty presented in the instant proceedings is that the
attributions of the Montgomery Court to its Miller decision do not
appear in Miller. In fact, Miller stated: “Our decision does not
categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime-as,
for example, we did in Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only
that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender's
youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular

penalty.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 483, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (emphasis added).
Throughout Miller, the constitutional error focused on the mandatory
nature of the sentence imposed. Thus, Miller held that mandatory life
without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violated the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.” Miller,
567 U.S. at 465, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. “Before Miller, every juvenile
convicted of a homicide in Alabama was sentenced to life without
possibility of parole.” Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 186 S. Ct. at 734
(emphasis added). As Miller required that a sentencing court consider
a youth offender’s age, but did not expressly bar life without parole for
all juveniles, Miller’s application appeared limited when a statutory
sentencing scheme allowed discretion to impose a sentence less than
life without parole. In the wake of Miller, there has been considerable
question across the country about whether it set forth a substantive or
procedural rule, whether it applied to discretionary sentencing
schemes, and whether its pronouncements were to be applied
retroactively. Courts across the country reached different conclusions
as to what Miller meant and required.

37 Whether characterized as a clarification or a rewrite of Miller,
Montgomery now establishes that “(elven if a court considers a child’s
age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence
still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects
‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity.’” Montgomery, __ U.S. at__,
136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).
“A hearing where ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ are
considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those
juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who
may not” and, therefore, give effect to “Miller’s substantive holding
that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose
crimes reflect transient immaturity.” Montgomery, __ U.S. at___, 1386
S. Ct. at 735 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S. Ct. at 2460)
(emphasis added). Thus, Montgomery held that Miller rendered life
without parole an “unconstitutional penalty for ... the vast majority of
Juvenile offenders” because most of their crimes reflect the transient.
immaturity of youth. Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 182 S. Ct. at 735
(citations omitted and emphasis added). Montgomery concluded that
Miller had “announced a [new] substantive rule of constitutional law”
that had retroactive application. Montgomery, US. at ___, 1386S.
Ct. at 734.

{38 Following Montgomery, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued orders
vacating and remanding five Arizona state sentences of life without

parole for crimes the offenders committed before they turned eighteen.
See Tatum,__U.S.__, 187 S. Ct. 11. Pursuant to Miller, Arizona has
expressly considered the offender’s youth as a mitigating factor, but
still imposed life without parole based on the nature of the offense and
the offender. Significantly, the sentences followed the Arizona
Legislature’s enactment of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-716 in 2014, which
provided discretion to the sentencing court to allow the possibility of
release for a juvenile sentenced to life imprisonment, after serving a
minimum number of calendar years. See Arizona v. Vera, 334 P.3d 754,
756-58 (Arizona 2014). Based on Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-716, the
sentences deemed unconstitutional in Tatum were imposed pursuant
to a discretionary sentencing scheme. Although the U.S. Supreme
Court in Tatum did not address the case on its merits, the orders are
consistent with Montgomery’s holding that unless a juvenile is a
member of the exceptional and uncommon class of offenders whose
crimes reflect irreparable corruption, a sentence of life without parole
is unconstitutionally disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.
{39 Montgomery is also significant in that it mandated, “for the first
time,” that “[wlhere state collateral review proceedings permit
prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States
cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional
right that determines the outcome of that challenge.” Montgomery, __
US. at ___, 186 S. Ct. at 731-32. The Montgomery Court determined
that, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
state collateral review courts must give retroactive effect to new
substantive rules of constitutional law. Montgomery, ___ U.S. at___,
186 S. Ct. at. 731. Accordingly, a state’s “collateral review procedures
are open to claims that a decision of [the U.S. Supreme Court] has
rendered certain sentences illegal, as a substantive matter, under the
Eighth Amendment.” Montgomery, US. at ___, 186 S. Ct. at. 732
(citation omitted).

440 This Court is bound by Montgomery and its “clarification” of
Miller. Miller identifies inherent problems when a sentencing court
lacks discretion in mandatory sentencing schemes; sets forth factors
highlighting the differences between youth and adults (this Court
refers to five factors which must be considered, Opinion, {I 16-17); and
enunciates a requirement that the age of the juvenile offender be
adequately considered. Montgomery, however, sets forth a new
substantive constitutional rule more sweeping than this Court
recognizes; Montgomery categorically declares that the imposition of
life without parole upon a juvenile offender is unconstitutional, carving

out only a small exception for those rare occasions when irreparable
corruption has been demonstrated. That the unconstitutional sentence
may have been imposed pursuant to a discretionary sentencing scheme
is, therefore, of no consequence. Montgomery and Miller stand on equal
footing with Roper and Graham in establishing that children are
constitutionally different from adults in their level of culpability and
in the way they may be constitutionally sentenced. However,
Montgomery requires that evidence of “irreparable corruption” or
“permanent incorrigibility’ be demonstrated, not just that the
sentencing court considered and addressed various factors of youth.
Montgomery, ___ U.S. at ___, 186 S. Ct. at 734. Montana’s trial courts,
as well as Montana’s Legislature, should be so advised. “We leave to
the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.”
Montgomery,__ U.S. at ___, 186 S. Ct. at 735 (citation and alterations
omitted). “That Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement
does not leave States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects
transient immaturity to life without parole.” Montgomery, ___ U.S. at
___, 186 S. Ct. at 735.

41 Finally, courts tasked with resentencing must decide—in many
cases decades after the sentence imposed became final—whether, at
the time of commission of the offense, the offender fit within the class
of juveniles who were irreparably corrupt. Montgomery has suggested
an answer to this problem as well. “A State may remedy a Miller
violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for
parole, rather than by resentencing them. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §6-
10-301(c) (2013) (juvenile homicide offenders eligible for parole after 25
years).” Montgomery, __ U.S. at___, 186 S. Ct. at 736. In my view, the
no parole designation in Montgomery was the sentencing aspect most
troubling for the U.S. Supreme Court because parole ineligibility
“condemned [the youthful offender] to die in prison.” Montgomery, __
US. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 736. “Allowing those offenders to be
considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected
only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be
forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.” Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 186 S. Ct. at 736. The
Court in Montgomery was suggesting a legislative solution for states
with mandatory sentencing schemes, in light of its concern that
“(gliving Miller retroactive effect... not require States to relitigate
sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender
received mandatory life without parole.” Montgomery, ___ U.S. at ___,

136 S. Ct. at 736 (emphasis added).

42 Based upon Montgomery, the suggested remedy to states with
mandatory sentencing schemes of allowing for parole, together with the
prohibition of parole ineligibility in all but the rarest cases, I would
conclude that any distinction between Steilman’s sentence for a term
of 110 years, without possibility of parole, and life imprisonment,
without possibility of parole, is a distinction without a difference.
Further, to conclude, as the Court does, that the availability of good
time credit is a distinguishing aspect for purposes of sentencing a
youth, is likewise inconsistent with the principles set forth in
Montgomery. Opinion, I] 22-23. Montgomery never acknowledged the
availability of good time credit as restoring “hope [to the offender] for
some years of life outside prison walls ...,” Montgomery, __ U.S. at__,
137 S. Ct. at 736, although doubtless the opportunity to accumulate
good time credit was available to every offender whose sentence Tatum
vacated. In a similar vein, this Court attempts to distinguish
Steilman’s sentence on the basis that it was imposed concurrently to
his Washington sentence. Opinion, {[{] 22-23. However, imposing a
concurrent sentence does nothing to reduce the length of Steilman’s
Montana sentence, which remains 110 years regardless of its
concurrent nature. More important, however, is Steilman’s parole
ineligibility for 110 years, which was the most troublesome aspect for
the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller and Montgomery. At the time the
sentence was imposed, Steilman was left with no hope of time outside
prison. Accordingly, to distinguish Steilman’s sentence on either basis
fails to recognize the U.S. Supreme Court’s direction that youth are
constitutionally different from adults. A sentencer is required to
consider “how children are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”
Montgomery,__U.S. at___, 1386S. Ct. at 733 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S.
at 480, 182 S. Ct. at 2469) (emphasis added).

43 Lastly, I would be remiss if I failed to comment on the hardship to
avictim’s family in having to revisit the tragic circumstances of a loved
one’s death. Principles of finality of judgments are deeply rooted in this
country’s jurisprudence and should be honored. Deference to the
judgment of the sentencing judge, who is the judicial officer most.
attuned to the circumstances of the case, is equally well entrenched
and should similarly be honored. I am, nonetheless, bound by U.S.
Supreme Court precedent and obligated to apply it when the
circumstances of the case dictate. Here, I can reach but one
conclusion—that Montgomery holds a sentence for a youth offender of
110 years without parole is unconstitutionally disproportionate when

there is no finding supported by evidence that the youth is irreparably
corrupted. The circumstances could support a conclusion that Steilman
was irreparably corrupted when he committed the homicide. Steilman
was six weeks shy of his eighteenth birthday, had committed another
homicide in Washington, and was living an adult lifestyle. The murder
was brutal, savage, and senseless. Thus, Steilman hardly appears
entitled to “Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even
heinous crimes are capable of change.” Montgomery, __ U.S. at ___,
136 S. Ct. at 736. That determination, however, must be made by the
trial court.

44 I would grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis
that Montgomery and Miller established a new substantive rule that
is applicable in state collateral proceedings. In contrast to Justices
Wheat and Sandefur, however, I would remand for resentencing so
that the District Court is free to impose the original sentence, provided
the Miller and Montgomery requirements are met. I do not agree that
this Court should merely strike Steilman’s parole restriction as
suggested by the Montgomery Court; particular circumstances of a case
and the reasons for imposing a sentence should be considered and
determined by the trial court, with this Court subsequently reviewing
those decisions and record. Based on statements from the victim’s
family and other documents in the record, it is clear that parole
ineligibility was a significant factor in Steilman’s sentence. It may be,
however, that the victim’s family, following discussion with the
prosecutor, would prefer to ask the District Court to reimpose his
original sentence, none of which we can assess by merely striking the
parole restriction. Accordingly, I would remand these proceedings to
the District Court for resentencing consistent with Miller and
Montgomery.

45 While I agree with much of the analysis set forth by the Court in
Issue One, it is my belief that the Court fails to adequately recognize
the impact of Montgomery and the findings and conclusions which
must be made by the sentencing court. I dissent from the Court’s
decision in Issue Two, that a term of 110 years without parole is
different from a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Such a
conclusion ignores the primary concern in Montgomery—that a youth
offender not be “condemned to die in prison” without an “opportunity
to show [his or her] crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and,
if it did not, [his or her] hope for some years of life outside prison walls
must be restored.” Montgomery, US. at __, 1878. Ct. at 736-37.
{46 I dissent.

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

LEE COCHRAN AKERS,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 16-0382.
Submitted on Briefs October 25, 2017
Decided December 19, 2017.
2017 MT 311.

389 Mont. 531.

408 P.3d 142.

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, James
Reavis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General,
Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Bruce E.
Becker, Park County Attorney, Kathleen Carrick, Deputy County
Attorney, Livingston.

JUSTICE McKINNON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

{1 Lee Cochran Akers (Akers) appeals from an order of the Sixth
Judicial District Court, Park County, on appeal from the Park County

Justice Court (Justice Court). The District Court’s order denied Akers’s
motion to dismiss, affirmed the Justice Court’s judgment, and
remanded the case to the Justice Court to enforce its judgment. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
q2 Akers presents three issues on appeal. First, Akers argues the
Justice Court erred by not instructing the jury that the State carried
the burden of proving Akers’s actions were not a justifiable use of force.
Second, Akers argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request such an instruction. Third, Akers argues he was denied the
right of confrontation when the State presented its witnesses through
Skype testimony. We conclude that the Justice Court erred by not
instructing the jury that the State carried the burden of proving
Akers’s actions were not a justifiable use of force and reverse.
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address Akers’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. Further, because these proceedings are being
remanded, we decline to issue an advisory opinion addressing the
propriety of the State’s use of Skype testimony. We restate the
dispositive issue as follows:

Whether this Court should exercise plain error review to reverse

Akers’s conviction because the jury was not instructed on the

burden of proof for justifiable use of force.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

q3 Akers travelled from Tennessee to Montana with four friends,
Terri Gilley (Gilley), Myron Tipton (Tipton), Terri McFarland, and
Scott Marcha, to attend a music concert. While in Montana, the group
also visited Yellowstone National Park and stayed in a cabin in Park
County. Gilley and Akers had several arguments during the trip and
on September 1, 2015, a physical altercation ensued. As a result, Gilley
left the cabin and contacted local police. Park County Sheriffs Deputy
Pete Adams (Adams) met with Gilley and observed a scratch on her
cheek and several bruises on both of her arms. Adams subsequently
arrested Akers and cited him with misdemeanor assault.

q4 The facts surrounding the physical altercation are disputed.
According to Gilley, in response to something Akers said, Gilley threw
a cup containing ice and soda at Akers’s head. After throwing the cup
at Akers, Gilley attempted to run away, but Akers grabbed Gilley,
shoved her, and hit her several times. Akers presents a different
version of the incident. Akers maintains that, without provocation,
Gilley threw the cup and contents at his head and then approached
him. Akers then grabbed Gilley’s wrists to prevent her from scratching

or hitting him. Holding onto her wrists, Akers attempted to back Gilley
out of the cabin’s front door, but Gilley fell to the floor and she, again,
tried to scratch him from her position on the floor. Akers believes it
was at this point that Gilley scratched herself in the face.

{5 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to allow testimony of
witnesses at trial through Skype, a software application and video
conferencing platform, which allows for real-time audio and video
telecommunication. The State cited the burden of travel as its cause for
filing the motion. On December 22, 2015, the Justice Court granted the
State’s motion in a single-sentence order.

q6 The Justice Court held a jury trial on January 29, 2016. At trial,
Akers relied on the defense of justifiable use of force. Akers presented
witnesses who testified to a version of the incident largely consistent
with his own. The State presented witnesses who testified to a version
of the incident largely consistent with Gilley’s. Gilley testified through
Skype from Tennessee. The State presented an additional rebuttal
witness, Sheldon Ziro, who also testified through Skype from
Tennessee. Akers’s witnesses all testified personally in court. The jury
convicted Akers of assault and the Justice Court sentenced him to pay
a fine of $300, court costs of $85, and jury costs of $806.52. The Justice
Court stayed enforcement of its judgment pending Akers’s appeal to
the District Court.

{7 On appeal, Akers filed a motion to dismiss and raised two
arguments. First, Akers argued Article VII, Section 4, of the Montana
Constitution, entitled him to a trial de novo in the District Court.
because the Justice Court judge was not an attorney. Second, Akers
argued the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution; Article II, Section 24, of the Montana
Constitution; M. R. Evid. 611(e); and § 46-16-201, MCA, entitled him
to confront the witnesses against him in person, not through Skype.
The District Court denied Akers’s motion to dismiss, affirmed the
Justice Court’s judgment, and remanded the case to the Justice Court
to enforce its judgment.

q8 Akers appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
{9 When district courts function as intermediate appellate courts for
appeals from lower courts of record, this Court reviews the appeal de
novo as though it were originally filed in this Court. Section 3-5-303,
MCA; Bozeman v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40, { 10, 369 Mont. 81, 296 P.3d
461 (citation omitted).
{10 Generally, an appellate court does not address issues raised for

the first time on appeal. State v. Favel, 2015 MT 336, {| 18, 381 Mont.
472, 362 P.3d 1126. Plain error review is an exception to this general
rule where we may consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.
Favel, 1 13; State v. Finley, 276 Mont. 126, 137, 915 P.2d 208, 215
(1996), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39,
21, 304 Mont. 215, 19 P.3d 817. “[Clourts invoke plain error review
to correct error not objected to at trial but that affects the fairness,
integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Finley, 276
Mont. at 134, 915 P.2d at 213. To reverse a decision for plain error, the
appellant must: (1) demonstrate that the claimed error implicates a
fundamental right; and (2) firmly convince this Court that a failure to
review the claimed error would result in a manifest miscarriage of
justice, leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the
trial or proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process.
Favel, {23 (quotations omitted) (citing State v. Daniels, 2011 MT 278,
{| 32, 362 Mont. 426, 265 P.3d 623).

DISCUSSION

11 As a preliminary matter, Akers satisfied his burden of producing
evidence sufficient to place his affirmative defense of justifiable use of
force at issue. See Daniels, {| 15. Akers gave notice to the State of his
intention to raise justifiable use of force in advance of trial. Akers and
Tipton testified that Gilley struck Akers in the head with a cup and
that Gilley moved forward to scratch at Akers with her nails. Akers
then sought to defend himself by restraining Gilley to prevent Gilley
from scratching him. Akers, accordingly, offered evidence of his
affirmative defense of justifiable use of force and properly placed the
defense at issue.

12 Section 46-16-131, MCA, provides that “when the defendant has
offered evidence of justifiable use of force, the state has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions were
not justified.” “Courts may not disregard the plain language of a
statute.” State v. Cooksey, 2012 MT 226, {] 32, 366 Mont. 346, 286 P.3d
1174 (citation omitted). However, neither Akers nor the State
requested or submitted a proposed jury instruction, which properly
instructed the jury on the burden of proof pursuant to § 46-16-131,
MCA; nor did the Justice Court sua sponte instruct. the jury on the
State’s burden. The only issues Akers presented to the District Court
on appeal were that. a non-lawyer judge presided over the Justice Court
trial and that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated by
the State’s presentation of Skype testimony. Generally, “a reviewing
court can consider only those issues that are properly preserved for its

review.” In re Transfer Territory from Poplar Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
9 to Froid Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 65, 2015 MT 278, {| 18, 381 Mont.
145, 364 P.3d 1222 (citing In re T.E., 2002 MT 195, 20, 311 Mont.
148, 54 P.3d 38. “In order to preserve a claim or objection for appeal,
an appellant must first raise that specific claim or objection in the
[lower court].” In re T.E., | 20. “The basis for the general rule is that.
it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule
correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider.”
Unified Indus., Inc. v. Easley, 1998 MT 145, {| 15, 289 Mont. 255, 961
P.2d 100 (quotations and citation omitted). The parties agree that the
failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof for
justifiable use of force was not raised in the Justice Court or District.
Court and, therefore, was not preserved.

113 Despite Akers’s failure to preserve this issue at the Justice Court
and failure to raise the issue at the District Court, this Court may, as
Akers recommends, exercise plain error review. “(T]he plain error
doctrine is to be employed sparingly, on a case-by-case basis”
considering the “totality of circumstances of each case.” State v.
Lindberg, 2008 MT 389, 1 34, 347 Mont. 76, 196 P.3d 1252 (quotations
and citation omitted). When a “criminal defendant’s fundamental
rights are invoked, we may choose to review a claim under the common
law plain error doctrine where failing to review the claimed error may
result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the
question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may
compromise the integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Taylor, 2010
MT 94, { 12, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79 (citation omitted). For this
Court to reverse under plain error, Akers must first demonstrate that
the claimed error implicates a fundamental right. Favel, {| 23. Akers
argues his “fundamental right to be protected from conviction except
upon presentation of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact that
Montana requires to constitute a crime, including the absence of
justification” was implicated by the Justice Court’s failure to instruct.
the jury on the State’s burden of proof.

14 The interests of a criminal defendant “are of such magnitude that
historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they
have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly
as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.” Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99S. Ct. 1804, 1808 (1979) (footnote omitted).
“This is accomplished by requiring under the Due Process Clause that
the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24, 99 S. Ct. at 1808 (citing In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 370, 90S. Ct. 1068, 1076 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
The formula “beyond a reasonable doubt” is accepted in common law
jurisdictions “as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution
must convince the trier of all essential elements of guilt,” and its
universal acceptance reflects “a profound judgment about the way in
which law should be enforced and justice administered.” In re Winship,
397 U.S. at 361-62, 90S. Ct. at 1071 (quotations and citations omitted);
In re J.S., 2017 MT 214, J 23, 388 Mont. 397, 401 P.3d 197.

415 Consonant with these principles, Montana requires that the “jury
is to be instructed by the court on all proper occasions ... [and] that in
criminal cases guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Section 26-1-403, MCA. We have explained, in the context. of the
affirmative defense of justifiable use of force, that the State carries the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s
actions were not justified, in addition to proving each element of the
crime of assault beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Erickson, 2014 MT
304, | 25, 377 Mont. 84, 338 P.3d 598 (“In 2009, ... the Legislature
enacted legislation [§ 46-16-131, MCA] designed to shift the burden to
the State to prove the absence of justification in self-defense claims.”
(citation omitted)). “[W]hile the district court’s discretion is broad, it is
ultimately restricted by the overriding principle that jury instructions
must fully and fairly instruct the jury regarding the applicable law.”
State v. Archambault, 2007 MT 26, {| 25, 336 Mont. 6, 152 P.3d 698
(citation omitted).

{16 In light of the foregoing principles, we conclude that failure to
instruct the jury of the State’s burden of proof implicated Akers’s
fundamental right to a fair trial. Addington, 441 US. at 423-24, 99S.
Ct. at 1808; In re J.S., J 23. At trial, Akers argued that his actions
constituted self-defense, not assault. Section 46-16-131, MCA, places
the burden on the State of proving Akers’s actions towards Gilley were
not justified. The State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that Akers’s actions were not justified, in addition to proving
each element of the crime with which Akers was charged. We therefore
agree with Akers that the jury made its determination without being
fully and fairly instructed of the applicable law, which was an error
that implicated his fundamental rights.

117 HH Having determined Akers has satisfied the first element to
establish plain error, we turn to the second. This Court will review and
reverse a decision for plain error if we are convinced that a failure to
do so will result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled
the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or

compromise the integrity of the judicial process. Favel, {] 238. While
Akers’s claimed error potentially implicates each of the listed criteria,
we are convinced that, at a minimum, allowing his conviction to stand
will leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding. The failure to properly instruct on the State’s burden of
proof implicates whether the State met its burden of proof in
establishing Akers’s guilt. As we have recognized, an accused is
“protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as
possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.” Addington, 441 U.S.
at 423, 99 S. Ct. at 1808 (footnote omitted). Where a jury has not been
properly instructed on the highest measure of proof—beyond a
reasonable doubt—and who carries that burden, we cannot be assure
of the fairness or have confidence in its determination of guilt. This is
particularly true given that the error occurred within the context of a
defense wherein the burden is normally shouldered by the accused. We
conclude that the Justice Court’s failure to instruct the jury that the
State bore the burden of proving Akers’s actions were not. justifiec
beyond a reasonable doubt denied Akers a fair trial and will leave
unsettled the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.
q18 Lastly, we address several arguments made by the
State—specifically, that this Court may not consider Akers’s claime«
jury instruction error because Akers failed to raise it at the District.
Court or first-level appellate court. The State contends that in
Missoula v. Asbury, 265 Mont. 14, 873 P.2d 936 (1994), this Court hel
issues not raised at the first-level appellate court cannot be properly
raised before this Court. The State concludes that allowing Akers to
present his jury instruction argument to this Court after failing to
preserve it in the Justice Court and failing to raise it in the District
Court would allow Akers to add a new legal theory “on his third bite at
the apple.” We disagree.

q19 Although procedurally similar, the State’s reliance on Asbury is
misplaced. In Asbury, the appellants were several people arrested for
blocking patients’ access to a clinic that provided abortions. Asbury,
265 Mont. at 16, 873 P.2d at 937. A Municipal Court jury convicted the
appellants of trespass, criminal contempt, and disorderly conduct.
Asbury, 265 Mont. at 16, 873 P.2d at 937. At trial, the appellants
raised an international laws or treaty defense. Asbury, 265 Mont. at
19-20, 873 P.2d at 939. The appellants appealed to the district court,
but did not present the international laws or treaty defense issue.
Asbury, 265 Mont. at 19-20, 873 P.2d at 939. The district court.
affirmed the convictions and appellants then appealed to this Court,

raising their international laws or treaty defense again. Asbury, 265
Mont. at 19-20, 873 P.2d at 939. In declining to address the issue, we
stated “based on the Appellants’ failure to raise the treaty issue at the
first appellate level in the District Court, we conclude that the issue is
not properly before us.” Asbury, 265 Mont. at 20, 873 P.2d at 939. In
Asbury, we held that the appellants failed to preserve the issue for our
review because they abandoned the argument by not raising it at the
district court level. Asbury, 265 Mont. at 20, 873 P.2d at 939 (“Here, of
course, the ‘treaty’ issue was presented to the trial court which, in this
instance, was the Municipal Court. However, the treaty issue was not
presented to the first-level appellate court—here, the District Court.”
(emphasis in original)).

{20 In contrast, Akers has not previously raised, before any other
court, the error we address here. The principle underlying plain error
review is “to correct error not objected to at trial but that affects the
fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Finley, 276 Mont. at 134, 915 P.2d at 213. The plain error doctrine “is
a doctrine that a reviewing court invokes in order to rectify a trial
court ruling that, although either not properly preserved or never
raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal of the trial
court’s judgment, for reasons of policy.” 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review
§ 716 (2014). This Court’s power to conduct plain error review “is
inherent in the appellate process itself.” Finley, 276 Mont. at. 184, 915
P.2d at 213 (“Appellate courts have the inherent duty to interpret the
constitution and to protect individual rights set forth in the
constitution and necessarily have the correlative authority to invoke
the plain error doctrine in order to carry out those duties.” (citation
omitted)). Ifthe error is preserved, we apply a harmless error standard
of review and the State has the burden of demonstrating the error was
harmless. Conversely, if a defendant fails to properly preserve his or
her issue for appeal, we apply the plain error standard of review and
the defendant has the burden of proof. In Asbury, the Court did not
consider plain error review; thus, the claimed error must have been
preserved at the first-level appellate court in order for this Court to
consider the issue. However, where a reversal is warranted following
application of plain error review, this Court may exercise its discretion
to rectify a trial court judgment that, as here, leaves unsettled the
question of the fundamental fairness of the trial.

CONCLUSION
121 We exercise plain error review to reverse Akers’s conviction. We

remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
722 Reversed and remanded.

CHIEF JUSTICE McGRATH, JUSTICES SHEA, SANDEFUR
and RICE concur.

540

SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA

Marriage of Harr
2017 MT 167N

State v. Nelson
2017 MT 168N

Hershberger v.
Marquart
2017 MT 171N

Adoption of L.R.B. &
D.W.B.
2017 MT 172N

Matter of K.A.P. &
AR.P., YINC
2017 MT 173N

Parenting of R.W.W.
2017 MT 174N

Matter of O.R. &
J.R., YINC
2017 MT 175N

Devlin v, 20" Jud.
District Court.

DA 16-0696
Affd in part
rev. in part,
remanded

DA 15-0657
Affirmed

DA 16-0742
Affirmed

DA 17-0085
Reversed &
Remanded

DA 16-0765
Affirmed

DA 16-0717
Affirmed
DA 16-0608
Affirmed

OP 17-0372
Denied

07/05/17

07/05/17

07/1/17

07/1/17

07/11/17

07/11/17

07/11/17

07/1/17

Dist. 11 (Flathead)

Dist. 11 (Flathead)

Dist. 10 (Fergus)

Dist. 5 (Madison)

Dist. 11 (Flathead)

Dist. 18 (Gallatin)

Dist. 5 (Beaverhead)

Original Proceeding
Supervisory Control

EE 541

Reber v. Kowalski

Lenoir vy. 4"* Jud.
District Court

Marriage of Axelberg
2017 MT 178N

State v. Springer
2017 MT 179N

JBL. v. 13" Jud.
District Court

Burchill v. Gallatin
County

Ford v. Michael, et al
2017 MT 183N

Denenny v. O'Fallon

Gee v. State

Drake v. State

Cline v. Kralich
2017 MT 187N

Zinvest v. Missoula
County, et al.
2017 MT 188N

Zlahn v. 13° Jud.
District Court

Payne v. Fletcher

Eva v. O'Fallon

OP 17-0373
Denied

OP 17-0375
Denied

DA 16-0412
Affirmed

DA 16-0044
Affirmed

OP 17-0381
Denied

OP 17-0389
Denied

DA 17-0119
Affirmed

OP 17-0406
Denied

OP 17-0404
Denied

OP 17-0411
Denied

DA 16-0216
Affd in part
Rev. in part

DA 16-0678
Affirmed

OP 17-0424
Denied

OP 17-0422
Denied

OP 17-0418
Denied

07/1/17

07/11/17

07/18/17

07/18/17

07/18/17

07/18/17

07/25/17

07/25/17

07/25/17

07/25/17

08/01/17

08/01/17

08/01/17

08/01/17

08/01/17

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding
Supervisory Control

Dist. 11 (Flathead)

Dist. 13
(Yellowstone)

Original Proceeding
Supervisory Control

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Dist. 3 (Powell)

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Dist. 12 (Chouteau)

Dist. 4 (Missoula)

Original Proceeding
Mandamus

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

542

Kent v. State
2017 MT 193N

Jenkins v. U.S.
Bank, et al.
2017 MT 194N

Hilton v. State
2017 MT 195N

Warner y. 11" Jud.

District Court

Wilson v. Fletcher

Hall v. Michael

State v. Kokot
2017 MT 198N

State v. Brunell
2017 MT 199N

State v. Farr III
2017 MT 200N

Hark v. Quirk
Cattle Co.
2017 MT 201N

Matter of M.R.C.,
YINC

2017 MT 202N
Reber v. Kowalski
Amtrust Ins. v.
wcc

Kelly, et al. v. 11"
Jud. District Ct.

DA 17-0325
Affirmed

DA 16-0732
Affirmed

DA 16-0352
Affirmed

OP 17-0429
Denied

OP 17-0431
Denied

OP 17-0277
Denied

DA 15-0723
Affd in part
Rey. in part

DA 14-0630
Affirmed

DA 15-0536
Affirmed

DA 16-0740
Affirmed

DA 17-0081
Affirmed

OP 17-0451
Denied

OP 17-0457
Denied

OP 17-0407
Denied

08/08/17

08/08/17

08/08/17

08/08/17

08/08/17

08/08/17

08/15/17

08/15/17

08/15/17

08/15/17

08/15/17

08/15/17

08/15/17

08/15/17

Dist. 1 (Lewis and
Clark)

Dist. 4 (Missoula)

Dist. 17 (Phillips)
Original Proceeding
Supervisory Control

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Dist. 18 (Gallatin)

Dist. 3 (Deer Lodge)

Dist. 8 (Cascade)

Water Court

Dist. 8 (Cascade)

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding
Supervisory Control

Original Proceeding
Supervisory Control

EE 543

Anderson v. Fletcher
Cox v. DOR
McGrail v. 18"

Jud. District Ct.

State v. Shepherd
2017 MT 205N

HSBC Bank v.
Nickerson
2017 MT 206N

State v. Kapps
2017 MT 207N

Bank of America

vy. Braun

2017 MT 209N
Braaton v. Fletcher
Burkhart v. 3% Jud.
District Court

Nelson v. Fletcher

Shaffer v. State
2017 MT 213N

Hussar, II v. Hughes
State v. Benjamin
2017 MT 219N

Marriage of Barlow
2017 NT 220N

OP 17-0450
Denied

OP 17-0453
Denied

OP 17-0360
Denied

DA 17-0068
Affirmed

DA 15-0332
Affirmed

DA 16-0513
Affirmed

DA 17-0050
Affirmed

OP 17-0462
Denied

OP 17-0330
Denied

OP 17-0276
Granted in
part and
Remanded

DA 16-0584
Affirmed

OP 17-0499
Denied

DA 15-0501
Affirmed

DA 17-0107
Affirmed

08/15/17

08/15/17

08/15/17

08/22/17

08/22/17

08/22/17

08/22/17

08/22/17

08/22/17

08/22/17

08/29/17

08/29/17

09/05/17

09/05/17

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding
Mandamus

Original Proceeding
Supervisory Control

Dist. 12 (Hill)

Dist. 1 (Lewis and
Clark)

Dist. 16 (Fallon)

Dist. 18 (Gallatin)

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Dist. 22 (Carbon)
Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Dist. 9 (Glacier)

Dist. 6 (Park)

544

Smaage v. State
2017 MT 221N

Puckett v. Fender

Matter of AM.M.
2017 MT 227N

State v. Doney
2017 MT 228N

Reber v. Vukovich

Marriage of
Patterson
2017 MT 231N

Belanus v. Sherlock
et al.
2017 MT 232N

State v. Henry
2017 NT 233N

Matter of I.L.!
YINC
2017 MT 234N

Gillin v. Butte-Silver
Bow Detention Ctr.

Victor Federation of
Teachers v. 21" Jud.
District Court

ACLU of Montana v.
AG & SOS

Whalen v. State
2017 MT 239N

DA 16-0750
Affirmed

OP 17-0509
Denied

DA 16-0729
Affirmed

DA 15-0206
Affirmed

OP 17-0519
Denied

DA 17-0112
Affirmed

DA 16-0543
Affirmed

DA 16-0462
Affirmed

DA 16-0621
Affirmed

OP 17-0539
Denied

OP 17-0515
Denied

OP 17-0449
Language
Change

DA 16-0540
Affirmed

09/05/17

09/05/17

09/12/17

09/12/17

09/12/17

09/19/17

09/19/17

09/19/17

09/19/17

09/19/17

09/19/17

09/19/17

09/26/17

Dist. 1 (Lewis and
Clark)

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Dist. 20 (Lake)
Dist. 13
(Yellowstone)

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Dist. 4 (Missoula)

Dist. 1 (Lewis and
Clark)

Dist. 4 (Missoula)

Dist. 8 (Cascade)

Original Proceeding
Habeas Corpus

Original Proceeding

Supervisory Control

Original Proceeding
Ballot Language

Dist. 13
(Yellowstone)

EE 545

Kangrga v. Gjorev, DA 16-0648 09/26/17 _ Dist 4 (Missoula)
etal. Affirmed
2017 MT 240N