State: Kansas
Volume: 304
Term: 2016-2016
Jurisdiction(s): Kansas
Source: https://static.case.law/kan/304.pdf

No. 108,929

In the Matter of Scorr C. STOCKWELL, Petitioner.
(877 P.3d 413)
ee

On March 1, 2013, this court suspended the petitioner, Scott C.
Stockwell, from the practice of law in Kansas for a period of 1 year.
See In re Stockwell, 296 Kan. 860, 295 P.3d 572 (2013). The court
further ordered that the petitioner undergo a hearing, pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 219 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 403), prior to
consideration of a petition for reinstatement.

On March 3, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for reinstatement.
On July 2, 2014, petitioner filed an amended petition for reinstate-
ment. On July 21, 2014, the court referred the amended petition
to the Disciplinary Administrator for investigation and hearing. On
January 14, 2016, a hearing panel of the Kansas Board for Disci-
pline of Attorneys conducted a hearing to consider the petitioner's
petition for reinstatement.

On March 16, 2016, the hearing panel filed its report setting out
the circumstances leading to the petitioner's suspension, a sum-
mary of the evidence presented, and its findings and recommenda-
tions. The panel unanimously recommended that the petitioner's
petition for reinstatement of his license to practice law in Kansas
be granted, subject to practice supervision as detailed in the pe-
titioner’s plan of supervision and as amended in the final hearing
report.

The court, after carefully considering the record, accepts the
findings and recommendations of the hearing panel and grants the
petitioner’s petition for reinstatement of his license to practice law
in Kansas, subject to practice supervision as detailed in the peti-
tioner’s plan of supervision and as amended in the final hearing
report.

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that the petitioner be reinstated
to the practice of law in Kansas conditioned upon his compliance

ea
with the annual continuing legal education requirements and
upon his payment of all fees required by the Clerk of the Appel-
late Courts and the Kansas Continuing Legal Education Commis-
sion and subject to his plan of supervision as amended in the final
hearing report. Upon proof provided to the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts that the petitioner has complied with the annual continu-
ing legal education requirements and has paid the fees required
by the Clerk of the Appellate Courts and the Kansas Continuing
Legal Education Commission, the Clerk is directed to enter the
petitioner’s name upon the roster of attorneys engaged in the prac-
tice of law in Kansas.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that this order be published in the
official Kansas Reports and that the costs herein be assessed to the
petitioner.

Effective this 28th day of March, 2016.

No. 110,415

GTP: )
meee

Opinion filed April 1,
20.

Shanon S. Crane, of Hutchinson, argued the cause and was on the brief for
appellant.

Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Luoxerr, J.: A jury convicted Charles Logsdon on seven counts
stemming from the death of Jennifer Heckel: intentional first-
degree murder, felony murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree
murder, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated bur-
glary, criminal possession of a firearm, and aggravated intimidation
of a witness. The district court imposed a life sentence with a mini-
mum term of 50 years (hard 50 life sentence) for the intentional
first-degree murder conviction. Logsdon now appeals, asking us to
reverse his convictions and vacate his hard 50 life sentence.

For reasons we will more fully explain, we uphold Logsdon’s
convictions because his arguments on appeal are ultimately non-
meritorious. First, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State and deferring to the jury’s credibility conclusions—as
we must do on appeal—there is sufficient evidence supporting his
convictions. Second, the district court did not err in denying Logs-
don’s motions for a mistrial (which were based on the admission of
certain hearsay evidence). The court took effective remedial action
to prevent the jury from considering some hearsay. And the re-
maining hearsay was either not objected to or was admissible under
at least one hearsay exception. None of the hearsay statements vio-
lated Logsdon’s constitutional right to confront witnesses. Third,
we reject Logsdon’s argument regarding a jury instruction on aid-

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ing and abetting liability because, even assuming the instruction
was erroneous, he invited any error by requesting it.

Although we affirm Logsdon’s convictions, we must vacate Logs-
don’s hard 50 life sentence and remand for resentencing. As the
State concedes, Logsdon’s hard 50 life sentence was improperly
imposed in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __, 183 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed.
2d 314 (2013), and our application of that decision in State v. Soto,
299 Kan. 102, Syl. § 9, 322 P.3d 334 (2014), and State v. Warren,
302 Kan. 601, 622-23, 356 P.3d 396 (2015).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HIsTORY

Logsdon’s lengthy trial involved numerous witnesses and thou-
sands of pages of transcript. We offer a condensed version of the
facts, as they were established at trial, but still must discuss the
evidence in some detail because of Logsdon’s sufficiency of the evi-

dence challenge.

A. The crime and initial investigation

Trial testimony established that Heckel was shot in her home
around 7:00 p.m. on June 14, 2011. Her 5-year old son, T.H., was
home at the time and ran to his neighbors for help. Emergency
responders found Heckel slumped on the floor in her kitchen and,
after lifesaving measures were attempted, declared her dead at the
scene.

At trial, T.H. testified he was sitting in his playroom watching
television. During a commercial, he went to the window and saw
someone come up to the house. He heard someone else in the
house with his mother and heard several loud bangs, but he did not
see anything because he stayed in his playroom until he heard the
kitchen screen door shut. Although T.-H. could not recall any ad-
ditional details at trial, law enforcement officers testified that right
after the shooting 'T.H. had told them he saw a red car pull into the
driveway with possibly two people in it and he saw a man run out
of the house.

A total of four shots were fired inside the Heckel home: one
shot went through a food container in the kitchen, through a win-

—
dow, and outside (and was never recovered); one grazed Heckel’s
side and was found imbedded in a kitchen wall; one was found
under her body and probably caused her chest wound; and one
was fired at the back of Heckel’s head and found near her neck.
Heckel’s wounds were caused by medium-caliber bullets. Expert
witnesses opined that the shots were probably fired from relatively
close range, but no one was able to conclusively determine their
sequence.

Neither the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) nor the
Hutchinson Police Department found any relevant fingerprint,
DNA, or trace evidence. Of note, investigators found two cigarette
butts outside the house, but the cigarettes yielded no DNA match
to any suspect. Nor did investigators initially discover any evidence
of motive. Further, as members of the Hutchinson Police Depart-
ment testified at trial, every person of interest among Heckel’s fam-
ily, friends, and acquaintances had an alibi. As a result, the police
began to investigate whether someone other than Heckel was the
intended target.

To this end, police began canvassing the streets and questioning
people known to be involved in home invasions, daytime burglar-
ies, and drugs. The first break in the case came on June 30, 2011,
when Detective Dean Harcrow interviewed Billy Craig. According
to Detective Harcrow’s trial testimony, Craig told him he had heard
“someone had been shot in the head.” This same statement was
also introduced through the testimony of Lieutenant Martin Rob-
ertson, who was not present during the exchange but recounted
what Craig had told Detective Harcrow. This particular statement
was important to the investigation. As both Lieutenant Robertson
and Detective Harcrow explained, Craig’s comment told them they
were on the right track because that particular detail of the shoot-
ing had not been released to the public.

Logsdon timely made a hearsay objection to both witnesses’ tes-
timony about Craig’s statements. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60460 (A
statement constitutes hearsay evidence if it “is made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing [and is] offered to prove
the truth of the matter stated . . . . ), Hearsay evidence is generally
inadmissible unless a specific exception applies or the evidence is

sc ss
otherwise excluded from this general definition. As relevant to the
rulings, the State argued Craig’s statements were excluded from
the definition of hearsay because the State planned to have Craig,
who was in custody, testify. The State pointed to K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
60-460(a), which allows admission of “[a] statement previously
made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for
crossexamination with respect to the statement and its subject mat-
ter.” The district court overruled Logsdon’s objection.

Later in the trial, however, Craig refused to testify, leading the
district court to admonish the jury to “disregard the testimony re-
garding the statements of Billy Craig that were specifically made
during the testimony of . . . Detective Dean Harcrow, regarding
a meeting on June 30 with Billy Craig only.” The instruction did
not mention Lieutenant Robertson’s testimony about Craig's state-
ment.

After Craig revealed information that would only have been
known by someone involved in the crime or an investigator, police
began interviewing people with whom Craig was associated. Even-
tually law enforcement concluded that warring groups of drug us-
ers, who often robbed each other and did not report the robberies
to the police, were linked to Heckel’s death.

B. Testimony from witnesses associated with Craig or Logsdon

Most of the evidence admitted at trial against Logsdon came
from various members of Craig's circle. There were credibility con-
cerns. Many, if not most, of these witnesses received some sort of
benefit in exchange for their testimony against Logsdon. Almost
all of them had unrelated criminal cases pending or were in jail on
unrelated criminal charges. Several admitted they were reluctant
to testify, and some witnesses were held in contempt of court be-
fore eventually agreeing to take the stand. A handful of the other
witnesses called to testify against Logsdon were alleged, by other
witnesses, to have somehow been involved in Heckel’s death. In-
deed, at the time of Logsdon’s trial, Craig was charged with the
first-degree murder of Heckel and conspiracy to commit first-de-
gree murder. See generally State v. Craig, No. 110,466, 2014 WL
2871305 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 300 Kan.
1105 (2014).

ae

Logsdon called these witnesses’ credibility into question at trial.
We will discuss these credibility issues more thoroughly later in our
opinion, but we mention them here because they provide context
for understanding the State’s case against Logsdon.

1. Conspiracy to rob Kayla Rodriguez

Once investigators began to focus on Craig’s circle of friends,
they learned of a conspiracy to rob someone other than Heckel—
Kayla Rodriguez, a woman involved in the drug trade who sold
drugs to Craig and others.

Several witnesses testified at trial regarding Logsdon’s involve-
ment in a couple of different plans to rob Rodriguez. Kara Kylie
Branton admitted at trial that 3 to 4 weeks before Heckel’s death,
she, Craig, and Logsdon were involved in the original plan. Branton
testified she became afraid when Logsdon proposed using guns,
and she sent word of the plan to Rodriguez. Afterwards, according
to Branton, Logsdon called her cussing and screaming because she
had ruined the plan.

Rodriguez testified at trial that after she learned of the plan to
rob her, she was reluctant to go to Craig’s house if Logsdon was
there. When she asked Craig about the plan to rob her, Craig as-
sured her that as long as he was around nothing bad would happen
to her. Logsdon lodged a hearsay objection, which was overruled.

There was also evidence of a second plan to rob Rodriguez. Ac-
cording to law enforcement testimony, Leonard Hill told the KBI
that he too was involved with a planned grab-and-go robbery of Ro-
driguez—and this plan was between himself, Logsdon, and Craig.

Other testimony described a plan without mention of Hill’s in-
volvement, suggesting there was at least a third plan, and it is this
plan the State believed led to Heckel’s death. The State introduced
evidence of this last plan through a variety of witnesses, including
one who had been incarcerated with yet another woman in Craig’s
circle, Kylie Hartman. Hartman told her fellow prisoner that the
final plan involved herself, Logsdon, Craig, and two others—Matt
Barnes and Jason Casanova.

In addition to evidence about Logsdon being involved in plans
to rob Rodriguez, other evidence implicated Logsdon in efforts

sc as

to obtain a gun. One witness testified at trial that sometime prior
to Heckel’s murder (the timeline is not clear from testimony, but
the evidence suggests it was in the spring of 2011), Logsdon asked
him if he knew where he could get a gun. A second witness testi-
fied that before Heckel’s murder on June 14, 2011, Logsdon and
Branton came to his house and Branton asked about purchasing a
firearm, as she and Logsdon needed it for a robbery they were try-
ing to commit against someone named “Kayla” or “Kayley’—which
would fit with evidence of a plan to rob Kayla Rodriguez. This sec-
ond witness then denied Branton gave him any specific reason for
needing a gun, but he stated Branton tried to sell him a gun after
Heckel’s murder. He never saw the gun but thought it might have
been a .22 caliber rifle.

2. Heckel’s murder

Trial testimony was in conflict as to why anyone—whether it be
Logsdon, Craig, Branton, Hartman, Hill, Barnes, or Casanova—
wanted to rob Rodriguez. A few witnesses suggested it was because
she owed money to Craig or a Wichita drug cartel. Rodriguez, how-
ever, stated it was Craig who owed her money. Another witness
floated a theory involving Social Security fraud. Logsdon told KBI
agents that the plan was part of a paid hit. Of relevance to Logs-
don’s appeal, Hartman testified at trial, over Logsdon’s hearsay ob-
jection, that she had heard Craig mention Rodriguez’ debt a few
times, and Craig would occasionally rant and rave about it, like he
did about a lot of things.

Regardless of the motive for the robbery, several witnesses tes-
tified they had heard Heckel’s shooting was a mistake. Logsdon
also told KBI agents after his arrest that Craig had told him the
wrong person was killed. At least two theories about such a mistake
emerged at trial.

First, investigators considered whether Heckel’s death was a
case of mistaken identity. A law enforcement officer testified Heck-
el “could have been mistaken for Rodriguez” but only if a person
did not know either woman. This theory was somewhat under-
mined at trial, as Rodriguez and others testified Logsdon, Hart-
man, and Craig knew what Rodriguez looked like; Hartman even

—_ i

had a Christmas card photograph of Rodriguez. Logsdon initially
denied knowing Rodriguez, but he later told police he had seen her
at Craig’s house.

Second, some evidence suggested the shooter knew who to look
for but went to the wrong house. At least one witness briefly men-
tioned having heard that Heckel and Rodriguez had similar house
numbers but lived on different streets. Other witnesses mentioned
this theory in a little more detail. For example, a witness who had
been incarcerated alongside Hartman testified that Hartman told
her she, Craig, Logsdon, Barnes, and Casanova met one evening
to talk about going over to Rodriguez’ house. This witness testi-
fied Hartman had said Craig then drove the men to the house and
Logsdon and Barnes committed the actual murder. Hartman also
told the witness she was not involved in the murder and was “freak-
ing out” when she learned the men had gone to the wrong house
and shot the wrong woman. Yet another witness testified Hartman
told her Logsdon shot Heckel and they had “got the wrong house.”
Logsdon stated in a letter from jail, however, that Craig both new
what Rodriguez looked like and where she lived.

3. After Heckel’s death

After Heckel’s murder, Branton—who was, as we mentioned
above, involved in the first plan to rob Rodriguez—testified Logs-
don left town. Logsdon called Branton and asked her what she was
hearing about the shooting. He specifically asked whether Craig
was “telling stuff about him.” According to Branton, Craig also
made a comment along the lines of “everyone was turning bitch
on him.” When she asked Logsdon if he was involved in Heckel’s
murder, Logsdon told Branton he “stayed up eight days too many
and that he shot her.”

Hartman testified that she too left the state after Heckel’s mur-
der to care for her injured child. She spoke with police via phone in
July 2011. In her testimony, she admitted that after speaking with
the police she called Casanova and told him to remove any bullets
that might be around her house; she explained this had nothing
to do with Heckel’s murder but was because she was a convicted
felon. Casanova testified he remembered Hartman calling to do a

ss a

clean sweep of her house, but he told the jury he thought he was
just cleaning the house because it was a mess. Casanova implied
at trial that he found a gun outside Hartman’s house. When the
State asked if he threw it away, he said he was going to “plead the
Fifth.” Despite Casanova’s cleaning, the police recovered bullets
from Hartman’s house.

Hartman acknowledged hearing from someone on the street that
Casanova had made a smart aleck remark about getting “rid of that
handgun that killed that girl.” But Hartman denied hearing this
statement directly. She explained that all she knew about Heckel’s
death she had learned on the street—and those stories changed a
lot; she had heard probably 50 theories about the murder. Hartman
repeatedly denied having anything to do with Heckel’s murder.

Yet another witness offered testimony about conversations she
had with Hartman and Branton. According to this witness, Hart-
man once made a comment—knowing she was a suspect in the
case—that she got her hair cut so that it looked less like a “murder-
ess’ haircut.” This witness also testified that Hartman did not think
Craig would give her up to the police and that Craig was protect-
ing her. This witness further stated that Branton called her several
days after Heckel’s death to say Logsdon had left the state and had
told her he had shot and killed Heckel. According to this witness,
Branton gave no other specifics about Heckel’s death other than
that Logsdon was scared.

A different witness testified Hill came to her house about a week
after Heckel’s murder and let slip that Logsdon shot Heckel in the
face—information she passed on to the police. Hill, who also testi-
fied, denied making this statement. Another witness testified he
told the police both Logsdon and Hill paid him a visit the day after
Heckel’s murder and Hill was acting “real crazy” and said Logsdon
shot Heckel in the back of the head.

Another witness, David Crothers, testified that the day after the
murder he ran into Craig; he later told Detective Bryan Rodri-
guez about what he had heard. Crothers testified Craig said, “[I]
fhe had anything to do with it he’d make sure that everybody was
killed.” Detective Rodriguez corroborated that Crothers had told
him about Craig’s statements involving Heckel. Detective Rodri-

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guez further testified that Crothers told him Craig said he knew
who shot Heckel and it was Logsdon. The district court initially
overruled Logsdon’s hearsay objections to Crothers’ and Detective
Rodriguez’ testimony on the grounds that Craig would be avail-
able as a witness. But when Craig refused to testify and the dis-
trict court admonished the jury to disregard some testimony about
Craig’s statements, the district court specifically directed the jury
to disregard the testimony of both these witnesses.

As for Logsdon, he left Hutchinson for Nebraska approximately
2 weeks after Heckel's death. He told people, however, including
Detective Harcrow in a July 11, 2011, telephone conversation ini-
tiated by Logsdon, that he was in Texas. A police officer testified
Logsdon was arrested without incident on August 5, 2011. Police
recovered several firearms from a locked gun cabinet in a bedroom
in the Nebraska house. The gun cabinet was not in Logsdon’s bed-
room and the homeowner, not Logsdon, unlocked the cabinet for
the police. Investigators focused on two firearms—a Smith and
Wesson .357 handgun and a Colt .38 revolver with the serial num-
ber removed.

Through later testing and comparison to the bullets found in
Heckel’s house, KBI investigators were able to exclude the Smith
and Wesson .357 handgun. They were unable to exclude the Colt
-38 revolver. A KBI forensic examiner testified this meant it was
equally likely that the Colt .38 revolver fired the bullets as that it
did not. The parties stipulated Logsdon was a felon and was pro-
hibited from possessing a firearm.

C. Logsdon’s statements to police

Logsdon’s own statements to the police were also admitted at trial
through various law enforcement officers. One statement came in
when Detective Harcrow testified about the July 11 phone conver-
sation Logsdon had initiated. During this call, Logsdon mentioned
several people who might have been involved in the crime, includ-
ing Craig, Branton, Barnes, and Casanova. He also mentioned ru-
mors he had heard about a conspiracy to rob Rodriguez.

On August 6, 2011, the day after Logsdon was arrested in Ne-
braska, he began his interview with officers by stating he did not

| ss

know anything about the Heckel case. Nevertheless, Logsdon told
the officers certain things that had not been released to the media.
For example, Logsdon threw out the idea, unprompted, that a red
car might have been involved; he later told police that Craig drove
to the Heckels’ house in a red Cadillac. When a KBI officer said
Craig did not own a red Cadillac on the day of the murder, Logs-
don disagreed. Further investigation revealed that Craig indeed
had owned two red cars. One was a red or maroon Cadillac that he
owned for only a week. And during that week, a witness testified he
had repeatedly asked Craig if Craig would sell the Cadillac. Craig
refused. But a few days after Heckel’s murder, Craig said he was
willing to sell.

Logsdon also suggested someone went to the wrong house, and
he listed several people as possible suspects—including Craig,
Hartman, Branton, Barnes, and Casanova. The police were not
yet investigating some of these people. Logsdon denied knowing
Barnes but then kept giving little bits of information about him
(and later stating that he had heard Barnes was “the trigger man”);
Logsdon also, in later interviews, said he had never been with Casa-
nova in his life, which differed from his statements in earlier inter-
views. Finally, Logsdon told police Heckel was shot in the head—a
detail that had still not been publically released—and Logsdon also
said he knew for a fact that Craig knew who shot Heckel. Originally
Logsdon claimed only to have heard of Craig's involvement; in later
interviews Logsdon asserted Craig told him he was the driver and
once said Craig had gone inside the Heckels’ house.

Logsdon mentioned firearms several times in his postarrest in-
terviews with police. He varyingly stated: Craig was supposed to
give him a rifle but never did, he actually was in possession of a rifle
and tried to trade it for a pistol or other handgun, Craig gave him a
rifle, and either Branton or Hartman gave him a rifle.

Of note, Logsdon always adamantly denied shooting Heckel.
But during one interview, when a KBI agent suggested Heckel was
killed because someone panicked, Logsdon responded that he did
not panic. Logsdon also told the agent he had provided 85 percent
of the truth, and, when asked for the rest of it, said the remaining
15 percent would incriminate him.

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D. Logsdon’s statements to other inmates

The State also called witnesses who were housed with Logsdon
in jail. The trial transcript does not always make clear when the
various alleged exchanges between Logsdon and these witnesses
actually took place. But the evidence suggests some of Logsdon’s
alleged statements to these inmates may have been made after he
had access to the charging documents, other preliminary filings,
and evidence—as opposed to these statements coming from per-
sonal knowledge alone.

One witness testified that Logsdon denied killing Heckel but
then went on to explain how the crime supposedly happened—
Heckel was shot “execution style,” two people were involved, and
a child was present. Another witness testified he and Logsdon dis-
cussed the case and Logsdon asked him legal questions; according
to this witness, Logsdon wanted to know how long it took to get
results from DNA testing but was not concerned about any DNA
evidence specific to him. At some point this witness and Logsdon
were involved in a jailhouse fight where, at least according to the
witness’ subsequent interview with the police, Logsdon said, “'m
going to kill you like I killed that bitch.” However, the witness testi-
fied at trial he was untruthful with the police and Logsdon never
actually made this statement.

The State also presented a video from the jail depicting a con-
versation between Logsdon and two inmates. One of these inmates
testified at trial that Logsdon asked him about various legal issues
involving DNA evidence from cigarette butts and discussed dif-
ferent aspects of Heckel’s case. According to this inmate, Logs-
don demonstrated how Heckel was shot by getting down on his
knees and “put[ting] his hands behind execution style and kind of
point[ing] somewhere to the back.” This inmate testified Logsdon
said a handgun was used in the crime but explained he and Logs-
don “didn’t touch a lot on the gun issue” because Logsdon “was
assured that the gun used wasn’t going to be found so he wasn’t
worried about it.” This inmate further testified that Logsdon told
him Heckel was murdered by mistake and the plan was to rob
someone—“Kylie” or “Kaylee”—who was supposed to have drugs
and guns.

A second inmate in the jailhouse video testified that Logsdon
discussed a cigarette butt with him but changed his story several
times—sometimes Logsdon said he left a cigarette behind. Accord-
ing to this second inmate, Logsdon was particularly concerned he
might have left a cigarette butt inside the house by Heckel’s body.
This second inmate testified Logsdon told him that after the mur-
der Craig learned the wrong woman had been shot; he further tes-
tified that Logsdon gave him the names of Craig, Hartman, Casa-
nova, and Barnes and said Craig was the driver, Hartman knocked
on the door, and a total of three people went inside the Heckels’
house.

A third inmate testified at trial that he had conversations with
Logsdon while they were in jail together. The inmate stated that
Logsdon claimed he had never seen Heckel or been to her house.
Yet, when Logsdon later saw a picture of Heckel on television, he
said she was not that nice or good-looking, she was overweight, and
her house was messy. According to this inmate, Logsdon explained
they entered the Heckel home by going through the garage. Logs-
don also mentioned something about a gun that was torn apart.
Although not entirely clear, it appears this particular conversation
occurred during a recess of Logsdon’s preliminary hearing. During
the preliminary hearing, a video of the inside of Heckel’s home
was shown. Thus, Logsdon’s descriptions of Heckel and her home
might have been based on evidence he saw during the hearing. A
KBI agent testified this inmate also told him Logsdon had said he
was worried his DNA might be found’on a cigarette butt at the
scene.

A fourth inmate testified Logsdon was upset about facing a rob-
bery charge because nothing was missing from Heckel’s home.
Specifically, this inmate testified Logsdon had said, “[Whhen I shot
that bitch her purse was sitting right there.” Indeed, several wit-
nesses testified Heckel’s purse was found not far from her body.

E. Other evidence

Not all the evidence at trial came from the testimony of witness-
es associated with either Craig or Logsdon. Police uncovered text
messages between Craig and Logsdon on July 1, 2011, a couple of

—_ ie

weeks after Heckel’s murder and right after Logsdon left Hutchin-
son for Nebraska. Logsdon sent one message to Craig reading, “[T]
hey questioned you about a murder? You better talk 2 me” (Logs-
don would later tell investigators he did not know what this conver-
sation was about). Police testimony established there had been no
murders in Hutchinson for months before Heckel’s, there were no
other murders in Hutchinson between hers and July 1, and Heck-
el’s murder was the only pending murder investigation with the
Hutchinson Police Department at that time.

Logsdon also sent several messages to one of his cousins. One,
sent hours after Heckel’s death, stated, “I’m goin to prison any-
how.” Another, sent on the evening of June 14, 2011, read, “That’s
how I pay my bills you punk hoe I’m a end up hurtin one of shot
one your hoes with this new piece . . . . A law enforcement officer
explained there had been no other shootings in Hutchinson that
day or that week that could have been the subject of the message.
A few minutes later, Logsdon sent another message that read, “I
ain’t readin your bullshit you drunk coke head bitch ah kill one of
you clowns real talk bitch you fuck with Billy I’m steelin something
from you every time you do it watch ya ain’t got no love.”

Also, Logsdon mentioned the Heckel murder in several letters
from jail. In one, he denied having anything to do with Heckel’s
death and wondered why Craig was speaking out against him. He
identified Craig as the driver, Barnes as the shooter, and Hartman
and Casanova as the ones who “tore up the gun” afterwards. In an-
other letter, Logsdon again denied involvement and wondered why
Craig was lying; he asked the recipient to tell Craig to stop lying or
else he would go to the police with his own information. He later
did just that: Logsdon wrote to a detective and, while again denying
any role in Heckel’s murder, stated he wanted to help and would do
so if the police could get him out of jail. Specifically, Logsdon wrote
that he could help put Craig away and wanted a deal.

F. Billy Craig’s refusal to testify and Logsdon’s motion for mistrial

As is apparent from these facts, Craig’s initial statement about
having heard someone was shot in the head turned out to be criti-
cal to the investigation because that information, unreleased to the

i

public, led to investigators questioning those associated with Craig.
Several of these individuals testified at trial about statements Craig
made regarding Rodriguez or the Heckel murder. Again, Logsdon
objected to this testimony as hearsay, but the district court over-
ruled the objections because the State planned to call Craig as a
witness, making him available for cross-examination. As previous-
ly noted, under Kansas law, the other witnesses’ testimony about
Craig’s previous out-of-court statements would be admissible un-
der a hearsay exception if Craig testified. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
60-460(a).

Toward the end of trial, however, when the State attempted to
call Craig to the stand, the State’s plan hit a snag. The State had
charged Craig with offenses arising from Heckel’s murder, and his
attorney notified the district court that he expected Craig to assert
his right under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution to not incriminate himself. In light of his refusal to testify,
the State provided Craig with derivative testimonial use immunity
for his testimony, at which point Craig’s attorney advised Craig
(despite acknowledging caselaw to the contrary) that the federal
government might still prosecute him. The district court informed
Craig he could be held in contempt for refusing to testify despite
his immunity. Still, Craig refused to testify—he went so far as to
explain why a contempt sentence would not make much difference
to him or his sentence. :

The district court granted Craigs attorney extra time to speak
with Craig. The State supported the extra time because of the
potential impact on the trial if Craig continued to refuse to tes-
tify—for example, the jury would need to be instructed to disre-
gard what it had already heard regarding Craig’s prior, out-of-court
statements. The district court let Craig think about his situation
overnight and, the next day, informed him that in light of his im-
munity he did not have a Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to
testify. Craig refused to testify, and the district court held Craig in
criminal contempt.

Logsdon then moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the
admission of Craig’s out-of-court statements through other wit-
nesses, when Craig himself did not testify, violated Logsdon’s Sixth

—_
Amendment confrontation rights. The State insisted it believed in
good faith that Craig would testify and that a mistrial was not called
for, especially since a limiting instruction could cure any prejudice.
The district court denied Logsdon’s motion for a mistrial and set
the parties to the task of crafting an appropriate admonition for the
jury. The court then instructed the jury to disregard all testimony of
Crothers and Detective Rodriguez regarding statements Craig had
made and to disregard the testimony of Detective Harcrow regard-
ing Craig’s June 30 statement. The instruction did not detail what
the June 30 statement was, but the transcript reveals that Craig
told Detective Harcrow he had heard about Heckel being shot in
the head.

G. Verdict, posttrial motions, and sentence

After deliberating over 3 days, the jury found Logsdon guilty
of all counts against him: first-degree murder, felony murder,
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit
aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, criminal possession of a
firearm, and aggravated intimidation of a witness.

Logsdon again moved for a mistrial, and he also moved for judg-
ment of acquittal and a new trial. As relevant on appeal, he ar-
gued that several witnesses were permitted to testify about Craig's
out-of-court statements even though Craig himself never testified.
Without Craig’s testimony or other witnesses’ testimony about
what Craig had said to them, there was insufficient evidence of
Logsdon’s guilt, according to him. Additionally, he argued the testi-
mony violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. Further,
Logsdon disputed whether the State honestly had a good faith be-
lief that Craig would testify.

The district court held a hearing on Logsdon’s posttrial motions
and eventually denied them. It ruled the State had a good faith
basis for believing Craig would testify, and it also held that the cu-
rative instruction issued to the jury adequately dealt with testimony
about Craig’s out-of-court statements. Also, the court concluded a
reasonable factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Logsdon was guilty even excluding the evidence subject to the lim-
iting instruction.

sc eS

Logsdon elected not to participate at the sentencing stage. At
the State’s request, the district court imposed a hard 50 life sen-
tence, pursuant to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6620.

ANALYSIS

Our review is limited to the issues raised by Logsdon, which we
have reordered for purposes of our analysis, as follows: (1) Does
sufficient evidence support Logsdon’s convictions? (2) Did the
district court abuse its discretion in denying Logsdon’s motion for
mistrial, which asserted Logsdon had been prejudiced by the er-
roneous introduction of out-of-court statements by Craig? (3) Did
the district court err in instructing the jury on an aiding and abet-
ting theory? and (4) Must Logsdon’s hard 50 life sentence be va-
cated because it is based on judicial factfinding? We discuss each of
these issues in turn below.

Issug 1: Sufficient evidence supports Logsdon’s convictions.

First, we consider Logsdon’s argument that no rational factfinder
could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We note
that Logsdon’s sufficiency argument is a general one. He does not
pinpoint which elements of which crimes he believes the evidence
does not support; instead he points to various evidentiary issues
which, he contends, show that no reasonable jury could have found
him guilty of any of his convictions.

A criminal defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence amounts to a posttrial claim that the State failed to meet its
burden of proving each essential element of one or more charges
against the defendant. An appellate court reviews a sufficiency of
the evidence challenge “by looking at all the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution and determining whether a ra-
tional factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 374-75, 277 P.3d
1091 (2012). In arguing the State cannot meet this standard, Logs-
don focuses on discrete evidence. We will first examine the specific
evidence discussed by Logsdon and then refocus the analysis on
the ultimate standard of looking at all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State.

—_ ie

Logsdon first questions the value of the testimony of T.-H.—
Heckel’s 5-year-old son. In particular, Logsdon argues statements
by T.H. about seeing a red car during the crime were not credible,
considering his age and his initial inconsistent statements about
what he saw. Logsdon seems to be arguing that if T.H.’s statements
about seeing a red car were taken out of the mix, he would not have
been tied to the crime and no reasonable jury would have convict-
ed him. In essence, Logsdon asks us to reweigh T-H.’s testimony.
But that is not our role.
Rather, an appellate court “do[es] not reweigh the evidence or
evaluate the credibility of witnesses,” as these functions are left to
the jury. State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 859, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); see
also State v. Van Winkle, 254 Kan. 214, 225, 864 P.2d 729 (1993)
(“On appellate review . . . all questions of credibility are resolved in
favor of the State.”). The jury was in the best position to evaluate
T.H.’s credibility, especially since Logsdon was able to point out
T.H.’s inconsistent statements during cross-examination. See State
v, Peoples, 227 Kan. 127, 135, 605 P.2d 135 (1980) (pointing out
the defendant had “an opportunity in closing argument to impress
the jury with the circumstantial nature of most of the evidence”).
In addition, T.H.’s testimony was not the only circumstantial evi-
dence linking Logsdon to the murder through a red car: Logsdon
himself, in his postarrest police interviews, indicated that a red car,
driven by Craig, was involved. In fact, when an investigator told
him Craig did not own a red Cadillac on the day of the murder,
Logsdon’s protest led to further investigation that confirmed Logs-
lon’s statement—Craig owned two red or maroon cars at the time,
and after the murder he quickly attempted to sell the red Cadillac
despite recently expressing a reluctance to part with it. Thus, any
issue with T.H.’s testimony does not undermine the evidence about
ared car and, more importantly, the sufficiency of the evidence for
any of Logsdon’s convictions.

Logsdon next argues all the evidence of his involvement in a con-
spiracy to rob Rodriguez consisted of testimony about what some-
one told someone else, i.¢., hearsay evidence. He contends that,
due to witness credibility issues, this evidence was insufficient to
show his guilt. We recognize much of this testimony was called into

|
some question on cross-examination and most of the State’s wit-
nesses had potential credibility issues: almost all were involved in
other criminal cases, several had prior crimes of dishonesty, many
hoped to receive some sort of benefit in exchange for their testi-
mony, some were evasive on the stand, and a few were extremely
reluctant to testify at all. But Logsdon was able to highlight and
address these issues during cross-examination. Despite Logsdon’s
efforts, the jury believed at least some of these witnesses. Again,
we will not supplant the jury’s conclusions with our own credibility
determinations. See Hall, 292 Kan. at 859, The credibility issues
Logsdon raises do not show that no reasonable jury would have
convicted him. .

Logsdon’s next argument relating to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence involves his text messages which were presented to the jury,
most notably one reading, “I’m a end up hurtin one of shot one
your hoes with this new piece.” He contends we can only speculate
about what this and the other text messages meant, as at most they
tended to show he said he might shoot someone in the future. We
disagree.

Granted, Logsdon’s text messages are not definitive evidence of
his guilt and are certainly subject to interpretation. Regardless, a
rational jury could have concluded that Logsdon’s messages were
meant to convey he had already shot someone and, since there
were no other shootings in Hutchinson that week, that this some-
one was Heckel. The jury also did not consider each message in
isolation. In addition to the one referring to shooting a “hoe,” there
were others reading, “I’m goin to prison anyhow,” and “ah kill one
of you clowns real talk bitch you fuck with Billy I’m steelin some-
thing from you every time you do it.” The jury considered these
messages in the context of Logsdon’s conflicting statements during
his interviews with the police, other inmates’ testimony about his
behavior and statements while in jail, and many witnesses’ testi-
mony about his involvement in the Rodriguez conspiracy. Again,
we will not reweigh the evidence. Considering all the evidence in
the case, we conclude a reasonable jury could infer some evidence
of Logsdon’s guilt from the messages.

Logsdon also addresses the firearms evidence in the case. This

— ni
argument relates to most of the charges brought against Logsdon
but, in particular, to his charge of being a felon in possession of a
firearm. The parties stipulated Logsdon was a felon and prohibited
from possessing a firearm at the time of the murder, and there is
no dispute that two relevant firearms were found in the Nebraska
home where Logsdon was arrested. We acknowledge these fire-
arms were locked away in someone else’s room and testimony es-
tablished the key was not even in Logsdon’s possession. Logsdon
highlights these facts in an apparent attempt to call into question
his “possession” of these firearms in Nebraska.

Logsdon fails to recognize, however, that the State did not
charge him for possessing a firearm in Nebraska. Instead, the State
charged him for possessing a firearm on the day of Heckel’s death.
Nevertheless, the firearms seized at the time of his arrest are a part
of the relevant evidence of his possession on the day of the mur-
der because one of the firearms recovered in Nebraska—the Colt
.88—could not be excluded as the murder weapon. This meant,
according to the State’s expert witness, there was a fifty-fifty chance
that the Colt .38 was used to shoot Heckel. Thus, some circumstan-
tial evidence supported a finding that Logsdon wielded the .38,
which police found in Nebraska, on the day of Heckel’s murder.

Had this been the only evidence regarding firearms presented
to the jury, we would have strong reservations about whether it
was sufficient to support his criminal possession of a firearm con-
viction. But Logsdon told police investigators that Craig gave him
a rifle and he tried to trade it for a pistol; a fellow inmate testified
Logsdon said he traded a rifle for a revolver; and another inmate
testified he and Logsdon had some discussion about one gun be-
ing traded for another. This last inmate also testified Logsdon was
sure the gun used in the murder would not be found. Yet another
witness testified Logsdon was looking to procure a gun prior to
Heckel’s death. Also, Logsdon’s text message sent hours after the
shooting referred to a shooting with “this new piece.” Further, as
we will discuss next in more detail, there is sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Logsdon shot Heckel.
Accordingly, a rational factfinder could have found Logsdon guilty
of criminal possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

|

This brings us to our overarching consideration of all the evi-
dence against Logsdon and his final argument that all the evidence
against him was circumstantial. Logsdon’s argument initially rests
on shaky ground because “[a] conviction of even the gravest offense
may be sustained by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Graham,
247 Kan. 388, 398, 799 P.2d 1003 (1990); see State v. Scott, 271
Kan. 103, 107, 21 P.3d 516 (2001) (as long as there is substantial
evidence, we will not disturb a guilty verdict “even though the evi-
dence is entirely circumstantial” [emphasis added]). Circumstan-
tial evidence, in order to be sufficient, “need not rise to that degree
of certainty which will exclude any and every other reasonable con-
clusion.” Casey v. Phillips Pipeline Co., 199 Kan. 538,551,431 P.2d -
518 (1967). Instead, circumstantial evidence “affords a basis for a
reasonable inference by the jury” regarding a fact at issue. 199 Kan.
at 550 (explaining circumstantial evidence “tends to prove a fact in
issue by proving other events or circumstances which, according to
the common experience of mankind, are usually or always attended
by the fact in issue”). Further, Logsdon took full advantage of his
opportunity to impress upon the jury the circumstantial nature of
the evidence. See Peoples, 227 Kan. at 135 (noting defendant's op-
portunity to discuss weaknesses in State’s case).

More specifically, as we look to the evidence in this case, the
State presented sufficient evidence supporting Logsdon’s convic-
tions, despite its largely circumstantial and hearsay nature or the
questions of witnesses’ credibility. Many witnesses implicated
Logsdon in the Rodriguez conspiracy. Several of the State’s wit-
nesses testified about what Logsdon himself said. See K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 60-460(g) (excepting party admissions from the general rule
prohibiting hearsay). For example, Branton testified she and Logs-
don conspired to rob Rodriguez and that it was Logsdon’s idea to
involve guns; she also testified Logsdon called her after he left the
state, asked about Heckel’s murder and what Craig was saying, and
said he had “stayed up eight days too many and . . . shot her.” Hill
testified that he told police Logsdon asked him to participate in a
robbery. Two inmates testified Logsdon showed them how Heckel
was shot. Another inmate testified Logsdon said Heckel did not
look nice in person and was a messy housekeeper. And yet another

_ i

inmate testified Logsdon was indignant about being charged with
robbery because “when I shot that bitch her purse was sitting right
there.”

Furthermore, Logsdon sent the text messages and made some
key statements to the police. Logsdon himself brought up a con-
spiracy to rob Rodriguez when he called Detective Harcrow from
Nebraska and gave the names of several other people who might
be involved—some of whom then testified against him at trial. In
his postarrest interviews, he brought up several details of the crime
unknown to the public, including the color of the car, the fact Craig
owned a red Cadillac on the day of the murder, and the idea that
the shooter went to the wrong house. He also informed a KBI agent
that he had given 85 percent of the truth but would not divulge the
remaining 15 percent because it would incriminate him. The jurors
heard portions of these interviews and could judge for themselves
Logsdon’s demeanor.

In addition to witness testimony, the jury examined hundreds of
exhibits—including audio and DVD tapes of police interviews with
Logsdon. And the jury heard the forensic evidence about the gun
found in the house where Logsdon was arrested.

As the State points out in summarizing the evidence, even after
excluding the hearsay evidence mentioned in the limiting instruc-
tion: nine witnesses testified Logsdon provided unknown details of
Heckel’s murder, six witnesses testified they were told by someone
other than Craig that Logsdon killed Heckel, two witnesses testi-
fied Logsdon confessed to the murder, Logsdon sent incriminating
text messages shortly after Heckel’s murder, Logsdon fled to Ne-
braska upon learning investigators might be looking for him, a gun
that could not be eliminated as the murder weapon was found at
the house where Logsdon was arrested, and the State introduced a
video of Logsdon recreating the murder for other inmates.

We do not find, as the State argues, that the evidence against
Logsdon was overwhelming. There are troubling aspects about the
evidence and the trial. Nevertheless, we must view all the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and we conclude a
rational factfinder could have found Logsdon guilty of all charges
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Frye, 294 Kan. at 374-75; Scott,
271 Kan. at 107; Casey, 199 Kan. at 550-51.

i

IssuE 2: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Logsdon’s two motions for a mistrial.

Logsdon also argues the district court should have declared a
mistrial due to the erroneous admission of witness testimony about
Craig's out-of-court statements. Craig’s refusal to testify is at the
root of Logsdon’s argument because it upset the district court’s
professed basis for admitting testimony about Craig’s out-of-court
statements. Logsdon makes two separate but related arguments
about the denial of his motions for mistrial: (1) an evidentiary ar-
gument that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and (2) a con-
stitutional argument that the witness testimony violated his Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.

2.1. Standard of Review

A district court may order a mistrial if there is “[p]rejudicial con-
duct, in or outside the courtroom, [that] makes it impossible to pro-
ceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or the
prosecution.” K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c). In making this determination,
the district court must engage in a two-step process: (1) it must
determine if there is a “fundamental failure” in the proceeding; if
so, (2) the district court must determine “whether it is possible to
continue the trial without an ‘injustice.’” State v. Ward, 292 Kan.
541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).

In Ward, we explained that whether a fundamental error re-
sulted in an injustice depends on whether the error affected sub-
stantial rights—meaning whether it affected the outcome of the
proceedings. See 292 Kan. at 565. On appeal, we review the district
court’s ruling at each step for an abuse of discretion. In general, a
district court abuses its discretion by issuing an order that is (1)
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or
(3) based on an error of fact. 292 Kan, at 551.

2.2. Scope of Issue: Preservation and Waiver

Several preliminary considerations potentially limit the eviden-
tiary issues requiring full analysis on appeal.
First, although Logsdon broadly claims the district court erred
in admitting any testimony regarding statements made by Billy

—_ i

Craig to others, the State argues we cannot consider many of these
instances. Two prudential considerations are implicated. Specifi-
cally, Logsdon failed to preserve some instances with a timely trial
objection, and, in two different ways, he waived his argument as to
others by failing to follow our appellate rules.

As to Logsdon’s failure to make a timely trial objection, K.S.A.
60-404 provides that a verdict will not be set aside “by reason of
the erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of re-
cord objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as
to make clear the specific ground of objection.” In other words,
“evidentiary errors shall not be reviewed on appeal unless a party
has lodged a timely and specific objection to the alleged error at
trial.” State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 204 P.3d 585 (2009). This
court has consistently refused to “review an evidentiary issue with-
out a timely and specific objection even if the issue involves a fun-
damental right.” State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 488-89, 231 P.3d
558 (2010) (requiring defendants to raise contemporaneous Con-
frontation Clause objections); see also State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan.
1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015) (“Without a contemporaneous
objection, [defendant's] claim is being asserted for the first time on
appeal and is subject to the general rule that alleged constitutional
violations cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

Applying 60-404 means that not all testimony regarding Craig's
statements are preserved for appeal. According to the State’s count,
it asked questions about Craig’s statements “[a]t least a dozen
times” over the 3-week trial, but “Logsdon made contemporane-
ous objections [only] seven times.” We have not verified the State’s
count but do know Logsdon did not object to all of the testimony
he discusses in his brief. For example, Logsdon complains on ap-
peal about Hartman’s testimony that Craig denied killing “that girl”
and then started crying. But Logsdon elicited this testimony him-
self on cross-examination and obviously did not object. As a result,
he cannot now claim it was admitted in error. See K.S.A. 60-404.

Second, Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2015 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 41), requires an appellate brief to include “a pinpoint
reference to the location in the record on appeal where the issue
was raised and ruled on. If the issue was not raised below, there

| eC

must be an explanation why the issue is properly before the court.”
In State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1085, 319 P3d 528 (2014),
we warned litigants that Rule 6.02(a)(5) means what it says and
is ignored at a litigant’s own peril. Then, in State v. Godfrey, 301
Kan. 1041, 1044, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015), we held: “We are now suf-
ficiently post-Williams that litigants have no excuse for noncompli-
ance with Rule 6.02(a)(5).” Yet, Logsdon’s appellate brief contains
a very limited number of pincites to specific trial objections. Gon-
sequently, he has failed to preserve any statement about which he
complains that is not accompanied by a timely trial objection and a
pincite in his brief.

Third, a failure to adequately brief an issue results in abandon-
ment or waiver. See State v. Rojas~Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 543,
285 P.3d 361 (2012). In at least one instance, Logsdon cites a trial
objection in his brief to a questions asked of Lieutenant Robert-
son but does not mention the witness by name or explain why his
answer made any difference in the proceedings. Thus, we specifi-
cally hold Logsdon has waived any argument regarding Lieutenant
Robertson’s testimony about what Craig told Detective Harcrow.

As a result of the application of these various rules, we find Logs-
don failed to preserve or has abandoned an evidentiary or consti-
tutional objection to any witness testimony beyond the following
six specific instances. Each of these instances were the subject of
a timely trial objection and have been argued by Logsdon with a
supporting citation to the record:

1. David Crother’s testimony that the day after Heckel’s urder
Craig told him Logsdon shot Heckel;

2. Detective Rodriguez’ testimony that Crothers told him about
Craig’s statement that Logsdon shot Heckel;

3. Detective Harcrow’s testimony that, on June 30, Craig told
him he had heard someone was shot in the head;

4, Leonard Hill’s testimony that Craig told him about a plan to
do a grab-and-go robbery of Kayla Rodriguez;

5. Kayla Rodriguez’ testimony that Craig told her she knew he
would not let anything happen to her; and

6. Kylie Hartman’s testimony that she had heard Craig ranting
and raving about Rodriguez owing him money.

According to the State, an additional consideration curtails the
need for a full discussion of the merits of Logsdon’s argument as to
these statements. Specifically, the State argues Logsdon invited any
error by not including all of these statements in a limiting instruc-
tion in which the district court told the jury to disregard some of
Craig’s statements.

2.3, Scope of Issue: Limiting Instruction and Invited Error

Some additional facts help explain the State’s argument. As we
mentioned above, Logsdon moved for a mistrial as soon as Craig
refused to testify. The district court denied the motion and instead
asked the parties to draft a limiting instruction to reduce the im-
pact of the erroneously admitted testimony on the verdict. They
did so. The State presented a proposed instruction, and Logsdon
agreed with the State that they had “finally narrowed it down” to
a specific list of witnesses—Crothers, Detective Rodriguez, and
Detective Harcrow. Logsdon’s attommey specifically agreed he had
no other names to add to the list. Nevertheless, he objected to the
proposed instruction “to be consistent.”

Ultimately, the district court informed the jury that during trial
the parties believed Craig would be a witness but, when called, he
refused to testify. The instruction stated Craig was unavailable as a
witness and the jury was instructed to
“disregard the testimony regarding the statements of Billy Craig that were specifi-
cally made during the testimony of the following witnesses:

1. David Crothers

2. Detective Bryan Rodriguez

3. Detective Dean Harcrow, regarding a meeting on June 30 with Billy Craig

only
This instruction applies only to the witnesses named and not to the other state-
ments you may have heard regarding Billy Craig in this trial.”

Despite this instruction and his participation in its drafting,
Logsdon filed a posttrial motion for mistrial in which he argued
Craig’s out-of-court statements were so prejudicial that the error

|

could not be cured by the limiting instruction. The district court
denied his motion.

The State argues Logsdon should not be allowed to claim error
arising from any statement other than those mentioned in the lim-
iting instruction because he helped draft the limiting instruction
and failed to include the testimony. The State also points out that
Logsdon’s attorney explicitly told the court “that was the list that I
had.”

If that were the end of the issue before the district court, then
we would agree with the State’s argument. But that was not the
end. Logsdon’s attorney continued by objecting to the instruction,
and the objection precludes application of the invited error doc-
trine. The invited error doctrine applies only when the party fails
to object and invites the error, unless the error is structural. See’
State v. Verser, 299 Kan. 776, 784, 326 P.3d 1046 (2014) (holding
that, if a party has not merely failed to object to a jury instruction
but has instead invited error, we will not review the party’s argu-
ment regarding that issue on appeal unless the error is structural);
see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3) (“No party may assign as
error the giving or failure to give an instruction . . . unless the party
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict stating
distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of
the objection unless the instruction or the failure to give an instruc-
tion is clearly erroneous.”); State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 511,
286 P.3d 195 (2012); State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 163, 283 P.3d
202 (2012).

We therefore conclude that the limiting instruction does not
preclude Logsdon’s ability to raise his present arguments as to the
six witnesses and statements listed above. Yet, our consideration
of the instruction does not end here because the State presents
a second argument as to the three witnesses listed in the limiting
instruction—Crothers, Detective Rodriguez, and Detective Har-
crow. Specifically, the State argues the district court correctly de-
termined the instruction cured any prejudice caused by the admis-
sion of Craig’s out-of-court statements into evidence. Essentially,
the State argues harmless error, which we will return to after a
discussion of whether there was error.

Po

TT

— ie

2.4, Hearsay Not Admissible Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-460(a)

We turn first to Logsdon’s arguments about hearsay. At trial, the
State argued these six statements were not hearsay because Craig
would be present and available for cross-examination. As we have
previously noted, Kansas law allows the admission of an out-of-
court statement if the person who made the statement—that is,
the declarant—actually testifies during the trial. See K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 60-460(a). The district court, relying on this exception to the
hearsay rule, permitted witnesses to testify about what Craig told
them out of court.

Clearly, 60-460(a) did not apply once Craig refused to testify.
But it also did not apply even at the time the statements were in-
troduced into evidence: Craig had not yet been given immunity,
and our prior cases hold 60-460(a) cannot be used to admit an out-
of-court statement if the declarant is still protected by his or her
privilege against self-incrimination. See State v. King, 221 Kan. 69,
71-72, 557 P.2d 1262 (1976) (defense sought to admit recording of
conversation between witness and defendant; we held defendant
was not, at that point, “available” for cross-examination because
she was still protected by her Fifth Amendment privilege; when
defendant later took the stand, court did not abuse discretion in
refusing to admit the self-serving tape because defendant's in-court
testimony was best evidence); State v. Oliphant, 210 Kan. 451, 453,
502 P.2d 626 (1972) (witnesses who had claimed privilege against
self-incrimination in previous proceedings were not available for
cross-examination and 60-460[a] did not apply); see also State v.
Fisher, 222, Kan. 76, 78, 563 P.2d 1012 (1977) (emphasizing that
judges should use restraint in allowing admission of evidence un-
der 60-460[a] and quoting S. Gard, Kansas Code of Civil Procedure
465 [1963] for proposition that the exception “could be subject to
abuse” if judges allow reliance on its use when “better evidence is
available and no good purpose is served by receiving” the out-of-
court statement).

Here, Craig had been charged with crimes arising from the
murder of Heckel, his Fifth Amendment privilege still applied,
and he was not available for cross-examination when his various
out-of-court statements were admitted. There is thus no question

that 60-404(a) did not permit Hill, Rodriguez, Hartman, Crothers,
Detective Harcrow, or Detective Rodriguez to testify about what
Craig told them. Consequently, this testimony was inadmissible
hearsay—unless another hearsay exception applied.

2.5. The Coconspirator Hearsay Exception Applies

The State argued to the district court, after Craig refused to
testify, that Craig’s statements were admissible under K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 60-460(i)(2) as statements of a coconspirator. The district
court did not rule on this alternative basis for admission and in-
stead gave the limiting instruction. On appeal, the State once again
argues this alternative ground; it also argues it had a good faith
reason for believing Craig would agree to testify. Briefly, as to this
second argument, good faith does not make evidence admissible.
But the State makes a valid argument regarding coconspirators’
statements because K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60460(i)(2) permits
“[als against a party, a statement which would be admissible if made by the declar-
ant at the hearing if. .. the party and the declarant were participating in a plan
to commit a crime or a civil wrong and the statement was relevant to the plan or
its subject matter and was made while the plan was in existence and before its
complete execution or other termination .... K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60460(i)(2).

In order for this so-called “coconspirator exception” to apply:

“(1) the person testifying must be a third party; (2) the out-of-court statement
.. -thust have been made by one of the coconspirators; (3) the statement of the
coconspirator must have been made while the conspiracy was in progress; and (4)
the statement must be relevant to the plan or its subject matter.” State v. Betan-
court, 301 Kan. 282, 298, 342 P.3d 916 (2015).

As we noted above, the district court never ruled on this excep-
tion but instead decided to instruct the jury to disregard at least
some evidence. Under some circumstances, this might preclude
our consideration of this alternative exception. But here, Logsdon’s
statements that the limiting instruction covered all the witnesses on
his list would have reasonably led the district court and the State
to believe no further rulings were necessary. And while Logsdon
objected to the instruction, he did not state a specific objection that
would alert the district judge or the State to the necessity for ad-
ditional findings. Nor does he argue the State should be prohibited

—_

from making the argument on appeal. Under these unique circum-
stances, we will consider the State’s argument that the coconspira-
tor exception would apply; we also note Logsdon does not attempt
to refute this argument.

Furthermore, the record allows us to apply the exception be-
cause Craig was charged as a coconspirator, and ample evidence
supports his involvement, including the testimony of Logsdon
and other coconspirators. Also, the content of Craig’s statements
to Kayla Rodriguez, Hartman, and Hill reflect that the statements
were about the conspiracy while it was ongoing. See Betancourt,
301 Kan. at 298. The district court thus did not err in admitting this
testimony—although it was hearsay, it qualified for an exception
and was admissible. See State v. May, 293 Kan. 858, 870, 269 P.3d
1260 (2012) (appellate court can affirm even if reasoning differs
from district court).

Moreover, to the extent Logsdon argues any testimony of these
three witnesses regarding Craig’s statements was so prejudicial
that the district court erred in allowing them into evidence, we
disagree. First, Logsdon fails to cite a legal basis for arguing that
prejudice precludes the admission of a coconspirator’s statements.
Second, we find no basis to conclude the district court abused its
discretion in this regard because the statements were not unduly
prejudicial. See State v. Lowrance, 298 Kan. 274, 291, 312 P.3d 328
(2013) (Even if evidence is relevant, a trial court has discretion to
exclude it where the court finds its probative value is outweighed
by its potential for producing undue prejudice. See K.S.A. 60-445.
An appellate court reviews any such determination for an abuse of
discretion.). A review of the evidence explains our conclusion.

With regard to Craig’s statements to Kayla Rodriguez, Logsdon
asserts this testimony tied him to the plan to rob Rodriguez and
supported the State’s theory of mistaken identity. But Rodriguez’
testimony about Craig’s statement did not implicate Logsdon. Plus,
there was plenty of other, unobjected-to evidence tying Logsdon to
the conspiracy involving Rodriguez, and there was also quite a bit
of other evidence suggesting nobody ever intended to kill Heckel,
including Logsdon’s own statements to police.

As for Hartman’s alleged hearsay testimony, the State correctly

eS

points out that Logsdon only objected when she said that Craig
ranted and raved about Rodriguez’ debt. Any error in admitting
that statement was harmless in light of Logsdon’s own statements
to police about a debt “the girl” owed Craig and multiple, con-
flicting statements about who owed whom and how much—all of
which was presented at trial.

Then, regarding Hill’s testimony that Craig said the murder was
not Logsdon’s plan and the robbery was supposed to be a nonvio-
lent grab-and-go, the same sort of testimony was admitted through
other witnesses who were involved in the planning of the robbery—
such as Branton’s testimony that the original plan was nonviolent
and involved counterfeit money.

Accordingly, we hold the district court did not err in overruling
Logsdon’s hearsay objections relating to these three witnesses.

This leaves Crothers’ testimony that Craig told him Logsdon was
the shooter, Detective Rodriguez’ testimony that Crothers’ repeat-
ed what Logsdon had told him, and Detective Harcrow’s testimony
that Craig had told him of the rumor that the victim had been shot
in the head. The State concedes Detective Rodriguez’ testimony
was inadmissible, and this concession carries over to Crothers’ tes-
timony, which Detective Rodriguez was essentially repeating. In
light of this concession, we will, without analysis, assume error.
However, as to the final claim of hearsay error, the State argues
Detective Harcrow’s testimony was not hearsay because the state-
ment was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted—that
is, it was not admitted to prove Heckel had been shot in the head.
Rather, the argument goes, it was admitted to explain why detec-
tives began to investigate Craig and his associates.

Had the detective simply said that Craig provided informa-
tion that had not yet been made public, the State’s point would
have persuaded us. But the State wanted the jury to understand
the truth of the statement—that Heckel had indeed been shot in
the head and Craig knew it. The detail of Craig’s statement and its
truth made it more believable that Craig (and, in tum, his associ-
ates) were tied to the crime. Although the State proved the nature
of Heckel’s injuries in other ways, it still presented this testimony
for the truth of the matter it asserted. The State does not argue this
testimony falls under any hearsay exception.

36

This means we either assume or find that the district court erred
in overruling Logsdon’s hearsay objection to Detective Harcrow’s,
Detective Rodriguez’, and Crothers’ statements about comments
made by Craig. Before discussing whether these errors resulted in
an injustice, we will discuss Logsdon’s claim that these errors were
also a violation of his constitutional right to confront witnesses.

2.6. Confrontation Clause

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees that “[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” See
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d
923 (1965) (applying the Confrontation Clause to state prosecu-
tions). This right is violated if an unavailable declarant’s testimo-
nial statements are brought into evidence against a person without
a prior opportunity to cross-examine that declarant; whether the
statements are “testimonial” is the threshold question. Crawford
. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d
177 (2004); State v. Bennington, 293 Kan. 503, 508, 264 P.3d 440
(2011). Neither party claims Craig was previously available for
cross-examination. Thus, if Craig made testimonial out-of-court
statements to a witness who then testified about those statements,
a fundamental error occurred.

We have established four factors to be considered in determin-

ing when evidence is testimonial:
“(1) Would an objective witness reasonably believe such a statement would later
be available for use in the prosecution of a crime? (2) Was the statement made
to a law enforcement officer or to another government official? (3) Was proof of
facts potentially relevant to a later prosecution of a crime the primary purpose of
the interview when viewed from an objective totality of the circumstances, includ-
ing circumstances of whether (a) the declarant was speaking about events as they
were actually happening, instead of describing past events; (b) the statement was
made while the declarant was in immediate danger, ie., during an ongoing emer-
gency; (c) the statement was made in order to resolve an emergency or simply to
Tearn what had happened in the past; and (d) the interview was part of a govern-
ment investigation?; and (4) was the level of formality of the statement sufficient
to make it inherently testimonial; ¢.g., was the statement made in response to
questions, was the statement recorded, was the déclarant removed from third par-
ties, or was the interview conducted in a formal setting such as in a governmental
building?” State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, Syl. ¢ 15, 173 P.3d 612 (2007).

a

See also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (leaving “for another day any

effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial,
though stating the term at least covers, inter alia, statements made
during police interrogations”).

None of those four factors apply to Craig’s statements to his own
friends or acquaintances, including four of the six statements sub-
ject to our review—that is, those of Kayla Rodriguez, Hartman,
Hill, and Crothers. See Brown, 285 Kan. 261, Syl. § 15. An ob-
jective witness would not have reasonably believed the statements
would later be available for use in the prosecution of a crime; the
statements were not made to a government official; the primary
purposes of the conversations were not for proof to be used in pros-
ecuting a crime; and the statements occurred in informal conversa-
tions between friends and acquaintances. See, ¢.g., Crawford, 541
USS. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to govern-
ment officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a
casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”); Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 51 (explaining that an “off-hand, overheard remark” might be ex-
cluded under hearsay rules but “bears little resemblance to the . . .
abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted); Bennington, 293 Kan.
at 510, 513 (stating, in the context of domestic violence, that a de-
clarant’s statements to friends and neighbors would be excluded at
trial, if at all, by hearsay rules alone, not because they were testi-
monial); Brown, 285 Kan. at 288 (recognizing “indications that the
court intended to exclude private or casual conversations from the
definition of testimonial statements”).

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
among those statements “that by their nature [are] not testimo-
nial [are] for example, business records or statements in further-
ance of a conspiracy.” (Emphasis added.) Crawford, 541 U.S. at
56; see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 83, 91 S. Ct. 210, 27 L.
Ed. 2d 213 (1970) (“We cannot say that the [coconspirator] evi-
dentiary rule applied by Georgia violates the [Sixth Amendment to
the United States] Constitution merely because it does not exactly
coincide with the hearsay exception applicable in the decidedly dif-
ferent context of a federal prosecution for the substantive offense
of conspiracy”); Betancourt, 301 Kan. at 300. In this case, Craig’s

statements to Hill and Hartman clearly furthered the alleged con-
spiracy to rob Kayla Rodriguez and, arguably, so did his statement
to Rodriguez.

Thus, although Kayla Rodriguez, Hartman, Hill, and Crothers
(and Detective Rodriguez by repeating Crothers’ statements) of-
fered hearsay evidence at trial, their testimony did not implicate
the Confrontation Clause given that all statements arose in the con-
text of informal conversations among friends and acquaintances.

This leaves a possible Confrontation Clause violation in the tes-
timony of Detective Harcrow (about Craig’s statement he heard
someone had been shot in the head).

The State fails to address why this statement by Craig was not
testimonial and why the detective’s testimony about these state-
ments did not violate the Confrontation Clause—in fact, the State
makes no mention of the Confrontation Clause during its discus-
sion of this testimony. At most, the State relies on its argument
the statement was not hearsay and that it acted in good faith. Yet,
the Sixth Amendment prohibits testimonial statements without
prior opportunity for cross-examination, even if those statements
would be admissible under hearsay rules, and there is no good faith
exception to Confrontation Clause requirements. See Crawford,
541 U.S. at 55 (holding a prior opportunity to cross-examine was a
necessary, not merely sufficient, condition for admitting testimo-
nial statements at the time the Confrontation Clause was created);
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (ruling the Sixth Amendment's protec-
tions should not be left to “the vagaries of the rules of evidence”).
Because Logsdon makes at least a colorable argument that state-
ments to a detective are testimonial and, considering the State’s
silence on the matter, we assume, again without analysis, there was
a Confrontation Clause error in the admission of Detective Har-
crow’s testimony about Craig’s statement. See Brown, 285 Kan. 261
Syl. ¥ 15.

2.7. Impact on Logsdon’s substantial rights

Assuming that error occurred in denying Logsdon’s hearsay
objection to the testimony of Crothers, Detective Rodriguez, and
Detective Harcrow regarding Craig’s statements and that Detec-

tive Harcrow’s statement also violated Logsdon’s right to confront a
witness, we must next consider whether the district court erred in
concluding the trial could proceed without an injustice. In making
this assessment, a district court must determine whether the error
“affect[ed] the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record.”
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011).

In Ward, we explained that in considering a motion for mistrial:
“[tlhe degree of certainty by which the court must be persuaded that the error did
not affect the outcome will vary depending on whether the fundamental failure
infringes upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. If it does not,
the trial court should apply K.S.A. 60-261 and determine if there is a reasonable
probability that the error will or did affect the outcome of the trial in light of the
entire record. If the fundamental failure does infringe upon a right guaranteed
by the United States Constitution, the trial court should apply the constitutional
harmless error analysis defined in Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct.
824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), in which case the error
may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error proves be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the
outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.¢., proves there is no reasonable
possibility that the error affected the verdict. . . . An appellate court reviewing
the second step for an injustice will review the entire record and use the same
analysis, applying K S.A. 60-261 and K.$.A. 60-2105 or else Chapman, depending
on the nature of the right allegedly affected. (Emphasis added.) Ward, 292 Kan.
at 569-70.

We also instructed the district courts to consider “whether any
damage caused by the error can be or was removed or mitigated by
admonition, instruction, or other curative action.” 292 Kan. at 569-
70. Generally, we presume juries follow the court’s instructions.
See State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 560, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014).

Here, the district judge instructed the jury to disregard the
testimony of Crothers and Detective Rodriguez relating to any
of Craig’s statements and to disregard the testimony of Detective
Harcrow regarding Craig's June 30 statement. On appeal, Logs-
don fails to present any reason to suspect this particular jury im-
properly considered the listed statements despite being instructed
not to do so. And our own review of the record leaves us with no
reason to suspect the jury disregarded the instruction. The instruc-
tion removed any damage caused by admitting the error. Moreover,
Crothers’ statements (repeated by Detective Rodriguez) were es-

_ ee

sentially cumulative of other evidence about the crime and Logs-
don’s involvement. And while Craig’s statement to Detective Har-
crow was particularly incriminating as to Craig, it did not in any
way incriminate Logsdon.

In light of these considerations we are persuaded the State has
met its burden under both K.S.A. 60-261 and the constitutional
harmless error standard. See Ward, 292 Kan. at 565; see also State
v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1111, 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (“[W]here
both the constitutional and nonconstitutional error clearly arise
from the very same acts and omissions, we will logically begin with
our harmlessness analysis of the constitutional error. This is be-
cause if we conclude the constitutional error is not harmless and
reverse the convictions, there is no point in analyzing whether the
State met the lower standard for harmlessness under K.S.A. 60-
261.”).

Accordingly, we hold the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying Logsdon’s motions for mistrial to the extent the
motions were based on a violation of the Sixth Amendment.

IssuE 3: The district court did not err in instructing the jury on
aiding and abetting liability.

Logsdon next argues the district court’s use of an aiding and
abetting instruction misled the jury about what was needed to re-
turn a guilty verdict for first-degree murder. According to Logs-
don, the State’s theory of the case was that Craig drove Logsdon
to Heckel’s house and then Logsdon shot her—in other words, the
State never pursued an aiding and abetting theory and so an aid-
ing and abetting instruction should not have been issued. Further,
Logsdon contends, the aiding and abetting instruction impermis-
sibly allowed the jury to find Logsdon guilty of premeditated and
felony murder based solely on discussions Logsdon may have had
with Craig about a mere plan to rob Kayla Rodriguez.

Here, both parties requested the jury be instructed on aiding
and abetting liability. Logsdon specifically requested a jury instruc-
tion stating that a person who intentionally aids another in com-
mitting a crime is criminally responsible for that crime regardless

|

of the extent of his participation. The State requested a similar in-
struction, and the district court provided the pattern instruction on
aiding and abetting.

When examining jury instruction issues, we follow a three-step
process:
“(1) determining whether the appellate court can or should review the issue,
ie. whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the
issue for appeal; (2) considering the merits of the claim to determine whether
error occurred below; and (3) assessing whether the error requires reversal, i.¢.,
whether the error can be deemed harmless.’” State v. BolzeSann, 302 Kan. 198,
209, 352 P.3d 511 (2015) (quoting State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 510, 286 P.3d
195 [2012]).

The “first and third step are interrelated in that whether a party
has preserved a jury instruction issue will affect [the court’s] revers-
ibility inquiry at the third step.” BolzeSann, 302 Kan, at 209; see
also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 223414(3) (“No party may assign as error
the giving or failure to given an instruction . . . unless the party
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict stating
distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds
of the objection unless the instruction or the failure to given an
instruction is clearly erroneous.”).

Our analysis ends at the first step—if a party has not merely
failed to object to a jury instruction but has instead invited error,
we will not review the party’s argument regarding that issue on ap-
peal unless the error is structural. See State v. Verser, 299 Kan.
776, 784, 326 P.3d 1046 (2014); State v. Hargrove, 48 Kan. App. 2d
522, 531, 203 P.3d 787 (2013).

We decline to review Logsdon’s argument regarding the aid-
ing and abetting jury instruction because he specifically requested
the instruction—thereby inviting any error that occurred. State v.
Devine, 291 Kan. 738, 742, 246 P.3d 692 (2001) (explaining a party
may not invite error and then complain of the error on appeal).
Logsdon does not raise any constitutional argument regarding this
instruction, nor does he explain why his explicit request for the
aiding and abetting instruction does not preclude our review. See
Hargrove, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 531-33.

— ie
IssuE 4: Logsdon’s hard 50 sentence was imposed in violation of
the Constitution.

Although we affirm Logsdon’s convictions, we must, as he urges,
vacate his hard 50 life sentence. Logsdon was sentenced pursuant
to K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-6620, which imposed a mandatory 50-year
sentence, without the possibility of parole, for a defendant convict-
ed of premeditated first-degree murder if the district court con-
cluded that certain statutory aggravating circumstances were pres-
ent and were not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances. We
have previously held this hard 50 sentencing scheme was unconsti-
tutional under the Sixth Amendment because the factual findings
necessary to impose the enhanced minimum sentence were made
by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
__, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160-63, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013); State v.
Warren, 302 Kan. 601, 621-24, 356 P.3d 396 (2015); State v. Soto,
299 Kan. 102, 103-04, 322 P.3d 334 (2014).

The State concedes Logsdon’s hard 50 life sentence must be va-
cated and he should be resentenced, which leaves us only to decide
how resentencing should be accomplished. We decline the State’s
suggestion (which was unaccompanied by any citation to legal au-
thority) to order the preparation of a nunc pro tunc or amended
journal entry of sentencing because, in our view, Logsdon’s sen-
tence accurately reflects the judgment rendered at the time. See
State v. Mebane, 278 Kan. 131, 136, 91 P.3d 1175 (2004) (explain-
ing nunc pro tunc orders are appropriate to correct clerical errors
arising from oversight or omission); State v. Lyon, 207 Kan. 378,
380, 485 P.2d 332 (1971). We acknowledge” the State’s assertion
that it does not wish to pursue a hard 50 life sentence on remand,
but we are not inclined to choose which sentence would be appro-
priate in its place. Instead, we simply remand for resentencing so
as to permit the parties to present their sentencing arguments to
the district court.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm Logsdon’s con-
victions but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

No, 111,518

StaTE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. NIcHOLas L. DUPREE,
Appellant.
(871 B3d 862)

Kristen Patty, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attomey, argued the cause, and Mare Ben-
nett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the
brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LUCKERT, J.: On the evening of December 14, 2011, in Wichita,
a group of four men carried out a burglary of a home, stealing tele-

|

visions among other things. In the process, one of the men mur-
dered Markez Phillips, a young man who was in the residence. The
four men were eventually identified as Reginald Dupree, Daniel
Dupree, Malek Brown, and Francis Dupree.

The instant defendant, Nicholas Dupree, was also quickly linked
to the crime. The State’s theory at trial was that he was a fifth mem-
ber of the group and, as stated by one witness, the “mastermind.” A
jury accepted the State’s theory and convicted Dupree of multiple
crimes, including felony murder.

Dupree raises five challenges in this direct appeal, none of
which requires the reversal of his convictions. His statutory speedy
trial claim is foreclosed by our recent decision in State v. Brownlee,
302 Kan. 491, 354 P.3d 525 (2015), Dupree’s Batson challenge is
unpersuasive, and he failed to adequately preserve his appellate
challenge to the voluntariness of an admission made during a cus-
todial interview. Additionally, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting autopsy and crime scene photos.
Finally, we find no cumulative error in this case. We, therefore, af-
firm Dupree’s convictions and sentences.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Just before Phillips was murdered, he was watching a movie
with his girlfriend Regina Stuart while Stuart cared for her infant
nephew at her mother’s house. The couple heard a knock, and Phil-
lips got up from the couch to answer the door. Stuart heard him
ask who it was before two men tried to push the door open. She
watched from the living room as Phillips began to fight the men.
Then she heard what sounded like a firecracker and saw Phillips
fall to the ground. He never got up.

Two men she had never seen before walked towards her. One
pointed a black handgun at her and asked for her cell phone, which
she gave him. As she pleaded for her life, they asked her where the
safe was; her family did not have a safe. The men then walked Stu-
art at gunpoint to her mother’s room, which the men ravaged, again
demanding to know the location of a safe. After the men searched
the house in vain for the safe, all the while threatening to kill Stu-
art, Stuart told them to take the televisions.

a
The men then forced Stuart to lie down on the living room floor
next to her nephew. One of the men made a phone call for a truck
so they could load the televisions. Shortly thereafter, another man
came into the house and said, “You weren’t supposed to kill no-
body.” Stuart recognized the man as Daniel Dupree, whom she
had met through her sister. Stuart’s sister had recently ended a re-
lationship with a man related to Daniel—Nicholas Dupree. The
men removed three televisions from the home while Phillips lay
bleeding on the floor.
Later that night, Phillips died in the hospital as a result of the .45
caliber gunshot wound to his head.
Nicholas Dupree’s name came up quickly in the investigation.
Stuart initially suspected Dupree’s involvement for two reasons.
First, he had been repeatedly harassing her sister since their break-
up. Apparently, Dupree believed the infant child was his, and he
had been angry since Stuart's sister told him the child was not. Sec-
ond, none of the other men Stuart saw that night had ever been to
her house. Yet, they seemed to know how to best gain access and
where to look for things. Dupree, unlike the men in the house on
that December evening, had been in the house numerous times.

Stuart also looked at photo arrays, and she quickly identified
Daniel. She was also able to identify Malek Brown as the man who
shot Phillips and Reginald Dupree as the man who accompanied
Brown into the house.

In the hours of the night following the crime, Stuart's sister re-
ceived multiple restricted calls to her cell phone and two unre-
stricted calls that displayed as coming from Dupree. She answered
one of the restricted calls and recognized Dupree’s voice. He told
her: “Just like that slob nigga just got done, you and your boyfriend
about to get done.” He also texted her twice, saying, “I hope your
kids aren’t at home,” and, “Where are you at?” Stuart’s family told
the case detective about the threats. Dupree would later admit to
investigators, and also testify at trial, that he made those statements.

After Dupree’s arrest, detectives interviewed him. He denied
any involvement in the burglary and murder, but he did admit to
calling Stuart’s sister multiple times that night and threatening her.

Detectives also spoke with Marjorielle Evans, Daniel's girlfriend.

| eC

After some hesitation, she told detectives what she knew, and she
testified accordingly at trial. Evans lived with her kids, her mom,
Daniel, Nicholas Dupree, and her brother and sister. Her room
was downstairs, as was Dupree’s. The day before the crime, she
overheard Dupree talking to Brown about committing a burglary
at the Stuart house. When Brown asked what was in the house, Du-
pree listed televisions and an Xbox. Evans provided investigators
with the names of the five men involved in the crime, and all were
eventually taken into custody.

Investigators also discovered that after hearing about Phillips’
murder, Evans got into a conversation with Stuart on Facebook
about the crime. Evans wrote that Dupree showed the others
where to go and told them to get the televisions. She said Phillips
was in the wrong place at the wrong time. She said Dupree “was
the mastermind of this whole thing,” and she hoped they would
catch Brown, who “had no reason to kill [Phillips].”

‘The jury also viewed video captured by a security camera located
on a school district maintenance shed near the Stuart home. The
images showed an SUV pulling up a short distance from the Stuart
home and three men exiting. Reginald and Brown proceeded to the
house; the other—Francis—walked up the street. The SUV, driven
by Daniel, left the house, but it soon returned. Police officers lo-
cated an SUV that belonged to Brown’s girlfriend and matched the
one on the video. Brown's girlfriend testified Brown had used her
SUV the night of the murder. She also testified Evans told her, the
day after Phillips’ murder, that Brown had shot someone.

Notably, the jury heard that one shell casing found on the scene
of the crime and one shell casing found in the backseat of the SUV
were both fired from the same Hi-Point .45 caliber handgun, A
bullet fragment taken from Phillips’ head was also fired from that
same gun.

Dupree testified at trial in his defense. He told jurors he knew
nothing about the crime and had nothing to do with it. According to
Dupree, he first learned about Phillips’ murder when his half-sister
called and told him. (She denied doing so.) Dupree said he felt bad
Phillips was murdered because Phillips was his friend—and indeed
they had lived together for a few months. While he admitted that

_ i

he threatened Stuart’s sister and called Phillips a “slob nigga” (he
could not explain why he would refer to his friend in such a deroga-
tory way), he said he made the threat (1) because Stuart’s sister’s
boyfriend threatened him first and (2) because he was angry that
he was not allowed to see the child he thought was his son. Nev-
ertheless, for reasons Dupree could not explain, none of the calls
about which he testified showed up in his phone records.

After trial, the jury found Dupree guilty on all charged counts:
first-degree felony murder, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, ag-
gravated robbery, two counts of aggravated endangering a child,
aggravated assault, and criminal threat. The district court later sen-
tenced Dupree to life plus 142 months, and it denied his motion
for a departure. Dupree timely filed a direct appeal to this court,
which has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3). Ad-
ditional facts will be provided as relevant to the analysis of Du-
pree’s appellate arguments.

ANALYSIS

IssuE 1: Dupree’s convictions are not reversible under the speedy
trial statute.

A defendant can assert a speedy trial claim in two ways—one
statutory and one constitutional. See, ¢.g., State v. Smallwood, 264
Kan. 69, 74-76, 955 P.2d 1209 (1998) (analyzing a statutory speedy
trial challenge differently than a constitutional challenge). Here,
Dupree only presents a statutory challenge under K.S.A. 22-3402
and because he did not allege a constitutional speedy trial viola-
tion, he has abandoned the constitutional argument. See State v.
Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1083-84, 319 P.3d 528 (2014) (issues not
argued or briefed are abandoned).

Dupree’s statutory argument presents a question of law subject
to unlimited review. State v. Vaughn, 288 Kan. 140, 143, 200 P.3d
446 (2009) (“[T]he computation of days to be assessed against the
so-called speedy trial clock—requires some level of statutory inter-
pretation and thus is reviewed de novo.”); State v. Adams, 283 Kan.
365, 368, 153 P.3d 512 (2007) (same).

We begin with the statutory language upon which Dupree bases
his claim. Under K.S.A. 22-3402(1):

a=

“If any person charged with a crime and held in jail solely by reason thereof shall
not be brought to trial within 90 days after such person’s arraignment on the
charge, such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability to be
tried for the crime charged, unless the delay shall happen as a result of the appli-
cation or fault of the defendant... .” (Emphasis added.)

The State bears the responsibility to ensure a defendant is af-
forded a speedy trial in compliance with K.S.A. 22-3402; a de-
fendant does not need to take any affirmative action to ensure a
speedy trial. Adams, 283 Kan. at 369, Arraignment triggers the
State’s obligation to bring a defendant to trial within the statutory
limits. State v. Sievers, 299 Kan. 305, 307, 323 P.3d 170 (2014). Du-
pree’s arraignment occurred on February 6, 2012. So the State had
90 days from that date to bring Dupree to trial. The original date
for Dupree’s trial was April 2, 2012, which amounted to a period of
56 days chargeable to the State. From that point, except a period of
14 days, all continuance requests came from the defense.

Under the plain language of this statute, a continuance result-
ing from a defense request stays the statutory speedy trial calcula-
tions. Vaughn, 288 Kan. at 151. Dupree does not dispute that his
defense attorney requested continuances, and, generally, “defense
counsel's actions are attributable to the defendant.” State v. Bloom,
273 Kan. 291, 310, 44 P.3d 305 (2002).

One exception to this general rule is relevant in Dupree’s case:
We have recognized for speedy trial purposes that an attorney can-
not continue a case over a defendant's objection. See State v. Hines,
269 Kan. 698, 704, 7 P.3d 1237 (2000); see also Vaughn, 288 Kan. at
144 (defense counsel's actions attributable to defendant “unless the
defendant timely voices” disagreement); State v. Arrocha, 30 Kan.
App. 2d 120, 126, 39 P.3d 101, rev. denied 273 Kan. 1037 (2002)
(Essentially, Hines created “a unique exception [to the rule attribut-
ing defense counsel's actions to defendant] for circumstances when
defense counsel and the defendant openly disagree about setting a
trial date beyond the statutory time limit.”). Dupree claims he was
not consulted about the continuances and never acquiesced to any
continuance.

In addition, we recently confirmed a defendant must have an
opportunity to be present to express disagreement with a continu-

—
ance because a defendant's disagreement matters in the statutory
speedy trial analysis. See State v. Brownlee, 302 Kan. 491, 508, 354
P.3d 525 (2015) (agreeing that a defendant should be present at
a hearing on a defense motion to continue); see also K.S.A. 2014
Supp. 22-3208(7) (stating defendani’s right to be present at a mo-
tion hearing); State v. Taylor, No. 104,455, 2011 WL 3795481, at
°4 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (discussing Hines and
Arrocha and recognizing that “[a] criminal defendant must be af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to object to a continuance affect-
ing his or her speedy trial rights”). Accordingly, Dupree’s claim, if
true, could indicate his right to a speedy trial was violated because
he never personally waived his statutory right.

Even if defense counsel did not consult with Dupree, Dupree
may not be entitled to relief under the majority holding in Brown-
lee, which interpreted and applied 2012 amendments to K.S.A 22-
3402. As of July 1, 2012:

“If a defendant, or defendant's attorney in consultation with the defendant,
requests a delay and such delay is granted, the delay shall be charged to the defen-
dant regardless of the reasons for making the request, unless there is prosecutorial
misconduct related to such delay. If a delay is initially attributed to the defendant,
but is subsequently charged to the state for any reason, such delay shall not be
considered against the state under subsection[] (a) . . . and shall not be used as a
ground for dismissing a case or for reversing a conviction unless not considering
such delay would result in a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial
or there is prosecutorial misconduct related to such delay.” (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3402(g).

In Brownlee, the members of this court disagreed about wheth-
er the first sentence of subsection (g) sets up a precondition for ap-
plication of the second sentence. The dissenters concluded the first
sentence defines and limits the circumstances under which the sec-
ond sentence can operate. 302 Kan. at 526 (Luckert, J., dissenting;
Johnson, J., joining). Under that view, Dupree would be entitled to
relief because he did not request, and his attorney did not consult
with him before requesting, the delays at issue.

That view did not prevail, however, and a majority of this court
held the two sentences in subsection (g) are not “contingent upon
each other.” Rather, “[t]he second sentence is much broader in its
application. It involves situations where ‘a delay is initially attrib-

i

uted to the defendant[ ] but is subsequently charged to the state
for any reason ....’ (Emphases added.) K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-
3402(g).” 302 Kan. at 510. That holding, if it retroactively applies
to Dupree’s case, controls—because Dupree does not dispute the
State’s assertion that the language of the second sentence of sub-
section (g) means he is not entitled to dismissal. Indeed, the sen-
tence fits: The district court initially attributed the delays to Du-
pree and, even if further investigation into Dupree’s claim resulted
in those delays being charged to the State, the second sentence of
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3402(g) leaves us with no grounds to reverse
Dupree’s convictions and dismiss the case against him. “Under sub-
section (g), the legislature, which created the statutory right [to
speedy trial], has decided to eliminate the remedy for its violation
in certain circumstances.” Brownlee, 302 Kan. at 511.

The question remains, however, whether the newly amended
version of K.S.A. 22-3402 applies to this case. At Dupree’s Febru-
ary 6, 2012, arraignment, K.S.A. 22-3402 did not contain subsection
(g). Subsection (g) first appeared in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3402,
which became effective July 1, 2012. We recently held in Brownlee
that “K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3402(g) is a procedural provision, and
it can be retroactively applied to [a defendant's] case.” 302 Kan. at
509-10.

In an attempt to distinguish his case from Brownlee, Dupree
argued in a letter of additional authority that, unlike Brownlee, the
time limit for his statutory speedy trial right had expired prior to
the effective date of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3402(g). In Brownlee,
the 90-day time limit expired on December 11, 2012—after the
July 1, 2012, date on which subsection (g) became effective. Here,
the State’s 90 days expired on May 6, 2012—before the July 1,
2012, effective date. As discussed below, that distinction does not
matter because Dupree did not have a vested right to dismissal of
charges as of May 6, 2012. .

Essentially, Dupree contends that the expiration of the statu-
tory speedy trial time limit provided him with a “vested” right to
dismissal, meaning he was entitled to dismissal and subsection (g)
and Brownlee’s interpretation of it could not retroactively apply
to his case. Certainly, “[elven where the legislative intent is clear,

—

courts must still consider whether retrospective application of leg-
islation will affect vested or substantive rights.” (Emphasis added.)
Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 276 Kan. 218, 220-21, 73 P.3d
753 (2003).

A vested right is one “so fixed that it is not dependent on any fu-
ture act, contingency or decision to make it more secure.” Board of
Greenwood County Comm’rs. v. Nadel, 228 Kan. 469, 474, 618 P.2d
778 (1980). Initially, we do not view Dupree’s speedy trial claim as
fitting the definition of a vested right because a defendant ordinar-
ily can only obtain relief under the speedy trial statute by (1) assert-
ing the claim at the district court level and winning or (2) losing the
claim at the district court level, appealing, and then persuading a
future appellate court to reverse the district court's findings of fact.
See State v. Crawford, 46 Kan. App. 2d 401, 408-09, 262 P.3d 1070
(2011) (recognizing that a speedy trial claim is waived if not raised
before the district court). But see State v. Adams, 283 Kan. 365,
368, 153 P.3d 512 (2007) (court sua sponte raised speedy trial issue
on appeal under the unusual circumstances of the case). In other
words, dismissal of Dupree’s case depended on both his own future
acts and other contingencies.

Although Dupree’s claim does not seem to fit the general defini-
tion of a vested right, and even though there are no similar excep-
tional circumstances in this case, we do not reject his argument out
of hand in light of Adams. Also, further consideration seems war-
ranted since we have recognized that the concept of vested rights
is inherently difficult to define and apply. See Owen Lumber, 276
Kan. at 221 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 257 Kan.
360, 364-65, 892 P.2d 497 [1995], and discussing the difficulty in
defining a “vested right” and applying the concept). Likewise, in
Owen Lumber, we set out three factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a statute deals with a vested right:

““(1) the nature of the rights at stake (¢.g., procedural, substantive, remedial), (2)
how the rights were affected (e.g., were the rights partially or completely abol-
ished by the legislation; was any substitute remedy provided), and (3) the nature
and strength of the public interest furthered by the legislation.’” 276 Kan. at 222,

Typically, the concept of vested rights has been discussed by this
court in the context of civil cases, such as Owen Lumber, which in-

|

volved legislation that sought to retroactively eradicate a mechanics
lien. 276 Kan. at 227-28. Although less frequently, at least some
discussion of vested rights has appeared in criminal cases. See, ¢.g.,
State v. Hunt, 198 Kan. 222, 226-27, 424 P.2d 571 (1967); State v.
Montgomery, 34 Kan. App. 2d 511, 515-16, 120 P3d 1151 (2005);
see also State v. McDaniels, 237 Kan. 767, 770, 703 P.2d 789 (1985)
(“‘The right to an appeal is neither a vested nor constitutional right,
but is strictly statutory in nature. It may be limited by the legisla-
ture to any class or classes of cases, or in any manner, or it may be
withdrawn completely.’”).

One case from the Court of Appeals, In re Care ¢> Treatment of
Hunt, 32 Kan. App. 2d 344, 82 P.3d 861 (2004), presented an issue
similar to Dupree’s, although it arose as a civil matter in the context
of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In re Hunt involved
individuals committed to the SVPA treatment program who argued
they were entitled to discharge because their trials did not begin
within 60 days of a probable cause hearing, as required by statute.
Prior caselaw had labeled the 60-day statutory limit as jurisdiction-
al; but in response to that caselaw, the legislature amended a statute
to make clear that the 60-day period was not jurisdictional and that
violation of the 60-day period should not result in discharge. Like
here, the question becomes whether the amendment retroactively
applied. The In re Hunt court applied the Owen Lumber factors to
determine whether the legislature sought to retroactively remove
an individual's vested right to discharge. 32 Kan. App. 2d at 362.

On the first Owen Lumber factor—the nature of the rights at
stake (procedural, substantive, or remedial), In re Hunt cited prec-
edent from this court noting that the 60-day limit was similar to
a statute of limitations or criminal speedy trial provision. 32 Kan.
App. 2d at 363 (citing In re Care & Treatment of Searcy, 274 Kan.
180, 142, 49 P.3d 1 [2002] [“The mandatory language of K.S.A.
2001 Supp. 59-29a06 is analogous to the statutory right to speedy
trial in criminal cases”]). Because a statute of limitations can be
waived, lost, or extended by statute, it does not typically create a
vested right. In re Hunt, 32 Kan. App. 2d at 363-64. But see State v.
Noah, 246 Kan. 291, 294-95, 788 P.2d 257 (1990) (noting procedur-
al nature of statute of limitations but once expired the limitations

—  _

cutoff provides a vested and complete defense; holding legislature
cannot amend a criminal statute to lengthen the period after it has
expired). That is in contrast to a statute of repose, which is substan-

tive because it “abolis!
time even though the
Harding v. K.C. Wall

hes the cause of action after the passage of
cause of action may not have yet accrued.”
Products, Inc., 250 Kan. 655, 668, 831 P.2d

958 (1992); see also Owen Lumber, 276 Kan. at 223 (noting dis-
tinction between statute of limitations and statute of repose); In re

Hunt, 32 Kan. App. 2

at 364 (same).

The In re Hunt court found this first factor to be in equipoise. It

noted that prior cases
which was more like a
recognized, however,
extended, much like
Kan. App. 2d at 364.
Here, in contrast, t]

had treated the 60-day limit as jurisdictional,
substantive statute of repose. The court also
that the 60-day limit could be waived and
e more procedural statute of limitations. 32

he speedy trial statute weighs heavily on the

procedural side. Indeed, rather than establishing a new substantive

right, the speedy trial

statute is merely a procedure that works to

protect an existing substantive right: “The purpose of K.S.A. 22-
3402 is to implement the accused's constitutional right to a speedy
trial. It is the State’s obligation to insure that an accused is pro-
vided a speedy trial.” State v. Green, 252 Kan. 548, 550, 847 P.2d
1208 (1993). The speedy trial statute is not a “substantive criminal
law, which either defines a crime or involves the length or type
of punishment.” State v. Sutherland, 248 Kan. 96, 106, 804 P.2d
970 (1991). Rather, the speedy trial statute is procedural because it
“provides or regulates the steps by which one who violates a crimi-
nal statute is punished.” State v. Hutchison, 228 Kan. 2.79, 287, 615
P.2d 138 (1980); see Easterwood v. State, 273 Kan. 361, 372, 44
P.3d 1209 (2002).

The speedy trial statute puts an obligation on the State to bring a
person to trial within 90 days; it regulates how the State goes about
punishing a person for violating a criminal statute. Because the leg-
islature enacted the speedy trial statute as a procedural mechanism
to protect a substantive constitutional right, the statutory speedy
trial time limit has long been subject to a number of exceptions: It
can be extended as a result of a defendant's delay, for a defendant’s

|

incompetence, because of the unavailability of material evidence,
because of a crowded court docket, or as a result of actions on ap-
peal. See K.S.A. 22-3402(2), (5). Thus, we conclude the first factor
weighs in favor of retroactive application of a nonvested right. See
State v. Williams, 291 Kan. 554, 557, 244 P.3d 667 (2010) (pro-
cedural rule typically operates retroactively unless it prejudicially
affects the substantive rights of a party), overruled in part on other
grounds State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 357 P.3d 251 (2015).

As to the second Owen Lumber factor—how the right was affect-
ed— the In re Hunt court noted that a person facing commitment
had a complete defense prior to the SVPA statute amendments.
There, retroactively applying the statute completely abolished the
defense without providing any substitute remedy. 32 Kan. App. 2d
at 364; see also Noah, 246 Kan. at 294-95 (criminal statute of limi-
tations, once expired, cannot be retroactively lengthened because
it abolishes a complete defense). Here, for two reasons, the 2012
amendments to the speedy trial statute do not affect the right as
severely as the In re Hunt statute.

First, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3402(g) only removes the remedy
for a statutory speedy trial violation and does so in only some cir-
cumstances, stating: “If a delay is initially attributed to the de-
fendant, but is subsequently charged to the state for any reason,
such delay . . . shall not be used as a ground for dismissing a case
or for reversing a conviction.” Granted, removal of the remedy in
those limited circumstances undercuts the statutory right, but “the
general rule is that there are no vested rights in a particular rem-
edy or method of procedure.” Owen Lumber, 276 Kan. at 222; see
also McDaniels, 237 Kan. at 770 (right to appeal is neither vested
nor constitutional). Second, the statute does not affect the statu-
tory remedy in circumstances not covered by subsection (g) and
preserves a remedy even under subsection (g) for a constitutional
speedy trial violation, which we have said is the ultimate objective
of the statute, or if there has been prosecutorial misconduct. K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 22-3402(g) (no dismissal or reversal of conviction on
appeal “unless not considering such delay would result in a viola-
tion of the constitutional right to a speedy trial or there is prosecu-

_
torial misconduct related to such delay”). Unlike in In re Hunt, the
statutory speedy trial defense is not completely abolished.

The third Owen Lumber factor—the nature and strength of the
public interest furthered by the legislation—weighed heavily in fa-
vor of retroactivity in In re Hunt. “The public has an enormous in-
terest in seeing that persons who qualify as sexually violent preda-
tors are removed from society and treated in appropriate facilities.”
Ultimately, the In re Hunt court found that the factors (particularly
the public’s interest) tipped the scale towards retroactive applica-
tion, meaning the SVPA committees did not have a vested right to
discharge. 32 Kan. App. 2d at 364-65.

Here, too, we find the third factor weighs heavily in favor of
finding a nonvested right. The legislature restricted the defendant's
remedy only under limited circumstances: when an initial deci-
sion attributing a delay to the defendant is reversed and charged
to the State. Whether this reversal occurs at the district court or
appellate level, it likely happens due to some factual or legal error.
Notwithstanding the speedy trial statute as it was worded before
the amendments at issue, in other contexts, only rarely does such a
judicial error result in the outright dismissal of a case.

Rather, the Kansas Legislature has generally directed that “[a]
t every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all er-
rors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-261; see K.S.A. 60-2105 (criminal conviction
typically will be reversed only when an error “hals] prejudicially
affected the substantial rights of the party complaining”); State v.
Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132
S. Ct. 1594 (2012) (est under 60-261 is whether “there is a reason-
able probability that the error did or will affect the outcome of the
trial in light of the entire record”). Thus, the previous language of
the speedy trial statute created an extraordinary remedy for judicial
error somewhat at odds with general legislative policy. Subsection
(g) merely limits the reach of that extraordinary remedy. Indeed,
subsection (g) specifically preserves the remedy for a constitutional
speedy trial violation, i.e., when substantial rights are prejudiced.

Properly attributing the delay leads to a correct application of
the speedy trial statute and does not affect any party's substantial

i

rights. See 2014 Supp. K.S.A. 60-261. The current statute still
serves its fundamental purpose of expeditiously resolving criminal
matters because the State still has an obligation to bring a defen-
dant to trial within the time frames of statutory speedy trial. To be
sure, if the district court correctly attributes delays and the State
fails to bring a defendant to trial within the statutory limits, the
district court must dismiss the case. The amendment furthers the
social interest of seeing that those accused of crimes are both pros-
ecuted and given a fair trial by limiting the extraordinary remedy
of dismissal and making it inapplicable to judicial errors that would
otherwise not affect substantial rights. See, e.g., K.S.A. 2014 Supp.
60-261. In other words, the third factor suggests Dupree did not
have a vested right.

Thus, the speedy trial statute does not create a vested right;
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3402(g) is procedural and retroactively ap-
plies to Dupree’s case. Because we cannot grant Dupree any re-
lief for his alleged statutory speedy trial claim, we do not decide
whether the district court was wrong to attribute the delays against
Dupree given that Dupree does not suggest his constitutional
rights were violated or that the delays resulted from prosecuto-
rial misconduct. See K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3402(g); Brownlee, 302
Kan. at 511.

IssuE 2: The district court properly overruled Dupree’s Batson
challenge.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution “applies to the State’s privilege to
strike prospective jurors through peremptory challenges.” State v.
Kettler, 299 Kan. 448, 461, 325 P.3d 1075 (2014). We use a three-
step analysis in recognition of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106
S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), when considering a challenge
that the State exercised its peremptory strikes based on purposeful
racial discrimination. See Kettler, 299 Kan. at 461; State v. Hood,
242 Kan. 115, 122-23, 744 P.2d 816 (1987). A distinct standard of
review governs each step of the analysis:

“First, the party challenging the strike must make a prima facie showing that
the other party exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Appellate
courts utilize plenary or unlimited review over this step. [Citation omitted.]

“Second, if a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the party
exercising the strike to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the prospective
juror. This reason must be facially valid, but it does not need to be persuasive or
plausible. The reason offered will be deemed race-neutral unless a discriminatory
intent is inherent in the explanation. The opponent of the strike continues to bear
the burden of persuasion. [Citation omitted.]

“Third, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has carried
the burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This step hinges on credibility
determinations. ‘[U]sually there is limited evidence on the issue, and the best
evidence is often the demeanor of the party exercising the challenge. As such, it
falls within the trial court’s province to decide, and that decision is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard.’ [Citations omitted.]” Kettler, 299 Kan. at 461-62.

A district court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that
is based on an error of law or fact; or when it makes a decision that
is otherwise arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. State v. Wilson,
301 Kan. 403, 405, 343 P.3d 102 (2015).

The parties here do not contest that there was a prima facie
showing that the State exercised a peremptory challenge on the
basis of race. Rather, they focus on whether the district court (1)
erred in finding that the State had articulated a race-neutral reason
for striking two African Americans, D.W. and K.B., and (2) abused
its discretion in concluding that Dupree had not established pur-
poseful discrimination. Neither argument is persuasive.

Turning first to D.W., the State claimed it struck her because her
answers about felony murder were troubling. During voir dire, the
prosecutor spoke about the concept of felony murder, explaining
a person can be guilty of murder even without pulling the trig-
ger. D.W. said she would have a problem finding someone guilty
of murder if he or she were not the person directly responsible for
the murder. But she said she understood that she would have to
follow the law, and she conceded she would not break her oath as
a juror. However, she also told the prosecutor to “[t]ake somebody
else” because she could not “morally and conscientiously” convict
someone for felony murder. The next day, the defense attempted
to rehabilitate D.W. Again, D.W. expressed her disapproval of the
concept of felony murder. But she did reiterate that she would fol-
low the law, even if she did not want to, and would not break her
oath.

|

The State carries a relatively low burden to provide a race-neu-
tral reason for a strike—the justification must be facially valid, but
it need not necessarily be plausible or persuasive. Kettler, 299 Kan.
at 462. Here, our review of the record reveals that the State’s rea-
son was more than facially valid; it was plausible and persuasive.
D.W. told the prosecutor she could not morally convict someone
of felony murder. She later told the defense, reluctantly and some-
what to the contrary, that she would follow the law regarding felony
murder even if she did not agree with it. Regardless of which of
these competing principles D.W. would ultimately follow, we agree
that D.W.s hesitation provided the State with a race-neutral reason
to strike her from the jury panel. Moreover, the State also struck
two other jurors, who were not African American, for the same
reason. See Angelo, 287 Kan. at 274 (a court can consider whether
State struck white potential jurors for the same reason as an Afri-
can American). Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse
its discretion in finding no purposeful discrimination as to D.W.

Turning to K.B., the prosecutor remembered him from a prior
case—K.B.’s girlfriend had been a witness. Additionally, K.B. re-
vealed he was a self-employed co-owner of a barbershop. When
the defense asked if missing work for a week to serve on a jury
would hurt him financially, K.B. replied, “It will be a challenge, but
Tl get through it.” Later, the State used a peremptory strike on
K.B., resulting in Dupree’s Batson challenge.

The State responded with several race-neutral reasons. First, it
noted that after the conclusion of voir dire, K.B. had contacted the
court assistant and disclosed that he thought he graduated with Du-
pree or at least had a class with him—something K.B. did not men-
tion during voir dire. Second, the prosecutor remembered K.B.
from the prior case because K.B. and his girlfriend were evasive
as witnesses. Third, the prosecutor noted that as a self-employed
person it would be hard, financially, for K.B. to serve on a jury trial
that was likely to span a week.

Concerned about K.B.’s post-voir dire disclosure that he might
know Dupree, the court called K.B. into chambers. K.B. told the
court that it had just occurred to him the previous night that he
might know Dupree. He claimed his knowledge of Dupree would

not make him biased. Before leaving chambers, K.B. added that he
also knew two Wichita police officers. K.B. did not explain why he
waited to disclose this information. Indeed, the panel of potential
jurors during voir dire answered questions about both their knowl-
edge of Dupree and their relationships with police officers.

In response to the State’s reasons for its strike, Dupree said he
did not remember K.B. from school, and the defense argued K.B.
had been forthcoming. Nonetheless, the court found K.B. to be
less than forthcoming in his answers to voir dire questions. The
court also found the State’s reasons were race-neutral and that Du-
pree had not shown purposeful discrimination.
This left two African Americans on the panel—the defense
struck one, and the other was selected as the alternate juror. Al-
though not determinative, the court can consider that other mem-
bers of the same race as the defendant were not struck. Angelo, 287
Kan. at 274.
On appeal, Dupree primarily argues that the district court
abused its discretion as to K.B. by providing its own reason to strike
K.B. rather than by accepting the State’s proffered race-neutral
reasons. We are not persuaded by Dupree’s argument because it is
premised on an unfair reading of the record.

A district court resolves a Batson challenge by ultimately de-
termining if the attorney exercising the peremptory strike did so
for legitimate or discriminatory ends. Likewise, the decision rests
eavily on an assessment of the credibility and demeanor of the
challenging attorney. Appellate courts give significant deference
to those sorts of credibility findings. Angelo, 287 Kan. at 272; see
State v. Brooks, 297 Kan. 945, 951, 305 P.3d 634 (2013) (“appel-
late court[s] will not determine the credibility of witnesses”). Here,
one of the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons was that he knew K.B.
and believed him to be evasive and less than forthcoming. Notably,
this court has affirmed peremptory strikes based on lesser reasons
like body language and a prosecutor's intuition. Angelo, 287 Kan.
at 274-75.

In this case, it so happened that the district court did not have
to rely solely on the prosecutor's subjective beliefs about K.B.’s na-
ture. The district court was able to judge whether K.B. had been

i

forthcoming during voir dire when he came forward with directly
relevant information after voir dire had ended. Contrary to Du-
pree’s claim, the district court did not generate its own reason when
it expressed its concern over K.B.’s inexplicably delayed disclosure
of information. More accurately, the court provided a bit of expla-
nation why, under the circumstances, it found one of the State’s
race-neutral reasons appropriate.

Furthermore, the case Dupree cites, Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d
1083 (9th Cir. 2004), to support his argument is distinguishable.
There, the defense raised a Batson challenge but, before the de-
fense could finish explaining the reasons for its challenge, the dis-
trict court interrupted with speculation about why the prosecutor
exercised peremptory strikes. The court never gave the prosecutor
a chance to explain its strikes, which clearly contravened the steps
of the Batson analysis. See also State v. Knighten, 51 Kan. App. 2d
417, 424, 427, 347 P.3d 1200 (2015) (district court told parties it

“‘not asking for a race, gender or any kind of neutral explana-
tion at this point,” resolving the matter with “its own notes and
experiences . . . without first requiring the State to produce race-
neutral reasons”). Indeed, the crux of a Batson analysis is whether
the State’s actual reason for a strike is discriminatory, So it is error
to fail to provide the State with an opportunity to explain its reason
even if the court can come up with a good reason why the State
might have justified the strike. Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1089-90. This
simply did not happen here.

Here, the record is clear that the district court’found a prima
facie case, asked for and considered the State’s reasons for the
strikes, and in light of those reasons ultimately concluded that Du-
pree failed to prove purposeful discrimination. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in overruling Dupree’s Batson chal-
lenges.

IssuE 3: Dupree failed to preserve an issue regarding the volun-
tariness of his statements during a postarrest custodial
interview.

Next, Dupree argues the district court should have suppressed a
statement he made during a custodial interview after Dupree was

ie

first arrested. He specifically focuses on his admission to making
the following statement to Stuart’s sister over the phone: “Just like
that slob nigga about got done, you and your boyfriend going to get
done.”
After a pretrial hearing, the district court concluded this admis-
sion was admissible. On appeal, Dupree argues his admission was
involuntary, and thus inadmissible, for two reasons. First, he claims
the interviewing officer deceived him into admitting that he made
the above statement to Stuart’s sister. Second, he argues his admis-
sion was involuntary under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124
S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2004), and that the State failed to
prove otherwise. We conclude Dupree failed to preserve these ar-
guments for our review because he did not lodge a timely objection
to the evidence regarding his admission before the district court.
Generally, to preserve an evidentiary issue for appellate review,
the complaining party must have lodged a timely and specific ob-
jection at trial. K.S.A. 60-404; State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 488,
231 P.3d 558 (2010). Even when the district court rules on the ad-
missibility of evidence pretrial, a party must still make an objection
at trial before the admission of the evidence because the unfolding
of a case may require a reevaluation of the reasons for the initial
ruling. State v. Richard, 300 Kan. 715, 720-21, 333 P.3d 179 (2014).
Here, Dupree did not object at any point during the testimony
of the interviewing detective who told the jury that Dupree admit-
ted to having made the phone call (1) because he was angry and
(2) with the understanding that his statement could be taken as a
threat. Instead, in a recess following the testimony, Dupree’s coun-
sel asserted he had “two continuing ongoing objections to these
statements . . . based on the previous motions we argued.”
Now, on appeal, Dupree claims the district court granted him
a continuing objection during the pretrial ruling on admissibility.
However, the record reflects that Dupree’s counsel never request-
ed a continuing objection during the pretrial hearing. The colloquy
following the ruling on voluntariness proceeded as follows:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I presume that the Court’s going to give me
leave to object at the time when these statements are coming out and state

something to the matter of for the reasons previously argued or something
like that?

i
“THE COURT: 1 will allow you to make your record to—to the extent that we

don’t go back and start arguing what we've already argued here this morning.
“(DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Sure. Understood.” (Emphasis added.)

Despite defense counsel's request to make a contemporane-
ous record during trial when the statements were admitted into
evidence, counsel did not contemporaneously object during the
lengthy direct examination in which the statements came into
evidence. He objected only during a recess after the jury already
heard the evidence.

The State is correct that Dupree never lodged a timely objec-
tion, which leaves his argument about voluntariness unpreserved
for appeal. See Richard, 300 Kan. at 720-21.

IssuE 4: The district court did not abuse its discretion by admit-
ting photographs.

Dupree next argues the trial court erred in admitting certain
photographic exhibits on the basis that the photographs were
gruesome, duplicative, and meant to ignite the jury’s sympathies.
Specifically, Dupree challenges the admission of three groups of
photos on appeal: emergency room photos, autopsy photos, and
crime scene photos. We find no error in the admission of the pho-
tographic evidence.

At the outset, Dupree concedes that photographs of the extent,
nature, and number of wounds are usually relevant in murder tri-
als. State v. Hickles, 261 Kan. 74, 85, 929 P.2d 141 (1996) (citing
State v. McCorgary, 224 Kan. 677, 681, 585 P.2d 1024 [1978]). °
Nevertheless, he argues the district court abused its discretion in
admitting the photos in this case. We find no merit in his various
arguments.

Dupree first challenges the relevancy of photographs of Phillips’
emergency room treatment. The test for relevancy is whether the
evidence has “any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.”
K.S.A. 60-401 (b); State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 348, 323 P.3d 853
(2014). This definition requires the evidence to be material and
probative. Evidence is material when the fact it supports is in dis-
pute or in issue in the case. Review for materiality is de novo. 299

—

Kan. at 348. Evidence is probative if it has any tendency to prove
any material fact. State v. Lowrance, 298 Kan, 274, 289, 312 P.3d
328 (2013). Appellate courts review the district court’s assessment
of the evidence’s probative value under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard. State v. Huddleston, 298 Kan. 941, 960, 318 P.3d 140 (2014).

As to materiality, photographs showing the jury the manner of
death are material in a murder trial. See State v. Backus, 295 Kan.
1003, 1013, 287 P.3d 894 (2012). Here, the photographs are proba-
tive of this material fact in that they show the manner of Phillips’
death—a gunshot to his head, and the unfortunately unsuccessful
attempt to save his life. Moreover, it was Dupree who, through
cross-examination, suggeste that not enough was done to save
Phillips’ life. When a defendant discusses an area of evidence that
would otherwise be forbidden the State can respond by present-
ing evidence in that formerly forbidden area. See State v. Everett,
296 Kan. 1039, 1044, 297 P.3d 292 (2013). So even if the emer-
gency room photographs were for some reason initially irrelevant,
the State here properly presented the photographs to the jury as a
rebuttal to Dupree’s suggestion that no one tried to save Phillips.

Based on our de novo review of the record, we hold that the
emergency room photographs were material and that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the probative nature
of the photographs. See Bowen, 299 Kan. at 348.

Dupree next challenges the autopsy photographs. At its core,
Dupree’s argument attacks the relevance and the cumulative na-
ture of the photographs.

As to relevance, “photographs which serve to illustrate the na-
ture and extent of the wounds inflicted are admissible when they
corroborate the testimony of witnesses or are relevant to the testi-
mony of a pathologist as to the cause of death.” State v. Verge, 272
Kan. 501, 515, 34 P.3d 449 (2001). In Dupree’s trial, the coroner
testified about the gunshot wound to Phillips’ head and concluded
that it was the cause of his death, The district court correctly deter-
mined the photographs were relevant.

In arguing about the cumulative nature of the autopsy pho-
tographs, Dupree suggests one photograph rather than four was
sufficient, noting that the coroner did not even need to reference

———
some of the photographs. As we explained in Hickles, 261 Kan. at
88: “Cumulative evidence is evidence of the same kind to the same
point, and whether it is cumulative is to be determined from its
kind and character, rather than its effect.” A district court may in
the exercise of discretion refuse to admit cumulative evidence. 261
Kan. at 88; see also State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1156, 280
P.3d 85 (2012) (on appeal, abuse of discretion standard applies to
cumulative error complaint).

Here, each of the photographs corroborated the coroner's testi-
mony by showing Phillips’ body at different angles and distances.
As we said in State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 1158, 280 P.3d 85
(2012), the photographs depicted the “injuries in a way that [the
coroner's] mere words could not. In this way, they had additional
relevance. In addition, they were not repetitious of each other, be-
cause each was taken from a different angle.”

Finally, Dupree challenges the crime scene photos and again
argues the photos were cumulative. However, the detective testi-
fied that she tried to get a panoramic view of the kitchen where
Phillips was shot “the hard way” with single camera shots. Further,
the photos served to corroborate Stuart’s and the detectives’ testi-
mony about the circumstances of Phillips’ murder. Verge, 272 Kan.
at 515.

Rarely has this court found an abuse of discretion in the ad-
mission of photographic evidence in a murder trial; here too, we
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the photos.

IssuE 5: The cumulative effect of errors in Dupree’s case does not
require reversal of his convictions.

Dupree argues this court must reverse his convictions because
multiple trial errors, considered together, resulted in an unfair
trial. Cumulative trial errors can require the reversal of a convic-
tion if the totality of the circumstances substantially prejudiced the
defendant and resulted in an unfair trial. State v. Burns, 295 Kan.
951, 960, 287 P.3d 261 (2012), overruled in part on other grounds
State v. King, 297 Kan. 955, 305 P.3d 641 (2013). If there is no er-
ror or only a single error, however, there is no error to accumulate

—
and no basis to reverse a conviction. See State v. Haberlein, 296
Kan. 195, 212, 290 P.3d 640 (2012). We do not find any errors in
Dupree’s case, however. At most, we assume a possible violation
of the speedy trial statute, although we conclude Dupree does not

have a right to a remedy. Because there is only one assumed error,
there are no errors to accumulate.

Affirmed.

67

No. 114,830

In the Matter of Davin BEN MANDELBAUM, Respondent. -
(373 P.3d 710)

Opinion filed April 8, 2016 =!

Michael R. Serra, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and
Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with him on the formal com-
plaint for the petitioner.

N. Trey Pettlon III, of Law Office of Pettlon & Ginie, of Olathe, argued the
cause, and David Ben Mandelbaum, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by
the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent,
David Ben Mandelbaum, of Leawood, an attorney admitted to the
practice of law in Kansas in 1987.

On April 8, 2015, the office of the Disciplinary Administr:
tor filed a formal complaint against the respondent alleging viola-
tions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). The
respondent filed an answer and probation plan on May 15, 2015,
and an affidavit of compliance with probation plan on February 29,
2016. A hearing was held on the complaint before a panel of the
Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on June 2, 2015, where
the respondent was personally present and was represented by
counsel. The hearing panel determined that respondent violated
KRPC 1.8(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 530) (conflict of interest);
1.8(e) (providing financial assistance to client); 1.15(a) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 556) (safekeeping property); 1.15(d) (preserving cli-
ent funds); and 8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in
conduct involving misrepresentation).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with its recommen-
dation to this court:

°

“Findings of Fact

“Representation of GF.

“8. The respondent represented G.F. for a number of years. In 2010, C.F.
hired the respondent to represent her in a divorce action. The case settled. As a
result of the settlement, the respondent received $25,000 on behalf of G.F. The
respondent deposited the settlement proceeds into his trust account. G.F. re-
quested that the respondent retain those funds on her behalf in case those funds
were needed to pay a judgment in an unrelated civil action.

“9. G.F. and the respondent entered into an oral agreement allowing the
respondent to borrow against the $25,000 held in trust. The respondent did not
advise G.F, to seek the advice of outside counsel. Between May 2011, and August
2011, the respondent borrowed nearly $10,000 of G.F’s money held in trust. From
time to time, the respondent provided G.F. with disbursements of her settlement
proceeds. On August 25, 2011, the respondent provided G.F. with the remaining
amount held in trust, including the amount he had borrowed.

“Representation of C.H.

“10. C.H. retained the respondent to represent her in a worker’s compen-
sation case, The respondent and C.H. entered into a contingent fee agreement
which provided that the respondent would receive a 25% fee of any settlement
funds.

“ll. Prior to the settlement, the respondent advanced $300 to C.H. for living
expenses. At the time the respondent advanced funds to C.H. for living expenses,
the respondent held no funds on C.H.’s behalf.

“12. Eventually, the case settled and the respondent deposited the settle-
ment proceeds of $74,777.91 into his attorney trust account.

“Representation of L.D.

“13, L.D. retained the respondent to represent her in two cases: a traffic case
and the personal injury case. The respondent and L.D. entered into a contingency
fee agreement for the personal injury case which provided that the respondent
would receive a 30% fee of any settlement funds.

“14. Prior to the settlement, the respondent advanced L.D. $186.50 so she
could pay a municipal court fine in Jackson County Missouri. On November 24,
2011, the respondent advanced L.D. $300 for living expenses. At the time the re-
spondent advanced funds to L.D., the respondent held no funds on behalf of L.D.

“15. The respondent was able to settle the case. On February 14, 2012, the
respondent received the settlement proceeds. That same day the respondent de-
posited the proceeds into his attorney trust account and distributed L.D.’s share
to her in the amount of $5,728.01.

“Representation of J. W.

“16. _J.W. retained the respondent to represent him in a worker's compen-
sation case. The respondent and J.W. entered into a contingent fee agreement
which provided that the respondent would receive a 25% fee from any settlement
proceeds in addition to reimbursement for case expenses.

“17. The case settled. On August 15, 2011, the respondent deposited a set-
tlement check on behalf of J.W. into his attorney trust account in the amount
of $91,400.62. The respondent paid J.W. a total of $40,144.56. The remaining
$51,256.06 of the settlement proceeds, which included the respondent’s fee, were
Jeft in the respondent’s trust account with other clients’ funds.

“Representation of R.M. and D.M.

“18. R.M.and D.M. retained the respondent to set up and administer a char-
itable remainder trust and a charitable lead trust with funds that R.M. and D.M.
received upon winning the lottery. For the respondent’s attorney fee, R.M. and
D.M. agreed to pay the respondent three quarters of one percent of the charitable
remainder trust balance annually.

“19. On December 22, 2011, the respondent deposited a check in the
amount of $11,706.15 into his attomey trust account. The check represented the
respondent's fees earned for administering the trust that year. At the time the
respondent deposited the check into his attorney trust account, the fees had been
earned. The respondent did not transfer the earned fees to his operating account.

“Representation of J.L.C.

“20. The respondent represented J.L.C. in a variety of matters over a 20-
year period. In September 2011, J.L.C. asked the respondent to assist him with
purchasing a motorcycle for a friend. The respondent agreed to do so and charged
J.L.C. a $200 attorney fee. J.L.C. provided the respondent with $6,260 in cash,
The respondent deposited the cash into his trust account. That same day, the
respondent wrote a check drawn on his attorney trust account in the amount of
$11,259 for the motorcycle. At the time the respondent wrote the trust account
check to pay for the motorcycle, the respondent did not hold sufficient funds on
J.L.G.’s behalf to cover the cost of the motorcycle. Within 10 days, J.L.C. paid the
respondent the difference.

“Tax Problems

“21, The respondent failed to pay his federal and Kansas income taxes. As a
result, the respondent had a significant tax debt owing both to the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) and the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR).

“22, In June 2012, the IRS and the KDR levied and removed all funds from
the respondent’s operating account. After the IRS and the KDR levied funds con-
tained in his operating account, the respondent intentionally maintained personal
funds in his trust account to prevent those funds from being taken by the IRS or
KDR.

“23. Commerce Bank closed the respondent's trust account. The respondent
was unaware the account had been closed. After the account had been closed, the
respondent continued to write checks drawn on his trust account. Three checks
were returned.

“24, Commerce Bank notified the Missouri Office of Disciplinary Counsel
(ODC) that three checks drawn on the respondent's trust account after the ac-
count had been closed were returned. Thereafter, ODC performed an audit of the
respondent's trust account covering the time period from August 1, 2011, through
July 31, 2012.

“25. The Missouri disciplinary authorities initiated disciplinary proceedings.
In Missouri, the respondent stipulated to violating the Missouri Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. Specifically, the respondent stipulated that he violated Rule
1.8(e), 1.15(b), 1.15(c), and 1.15(d). Thereafter, the Missouri Supreme Court in-
definitely suspended the respondent's license to practice law in Missouri. The
court, however, stayed the imposition of the suspension and placed the respon-
dent on probation.

“Conclusions of Law

“26. Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a mat-
ter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.8, KRPC 1.15, and KRPC 8.4, as
detailed below:

“KRPC 1.8(a)

“27. ‘Lawyers are prohibited from entering into business transactions with
clients, unless:

“(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the in-
terest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can
be reasonably understood by the client; and
the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and
is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of indepen-
dent legal counsel on the transaction; and

“(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the
client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's
role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is repre-
senting the client in the transaction.’

@)

KRPC 1.8(a). In this case, the respondent borrowed nearly $10,000 from the
money held in trust on behalf of G.F. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes
that the respondent violated KRPC 1.8(a).
“KRPC 1.8(e)
“28. Lawyers may not provide financial assistance to a client in connection
with representation, with limited exceptions:

CC

‘(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repay-
ment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and

‘(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and ex-
penses of litigation on behalf of the client.’

KRPC 1.8(e).

‘The respondent advanced funds to C.H., L.D., and J.L.C. without

satisfying the exceptions in KRPC 1.8(e). As such, the hearing panel concludes
that he violated KRPC 1.8(e).

“KRPC 1.15(a) and (d)
“29, Lawyers must properly safeguard their clients’ property. KRPC 1.15
specifically provides that:
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in

le)

a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation sepa-
rate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a
separate account maintained in the state of Kansas, Other prop-
erty shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded.
Complete records of such account funds and other property
shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period
of five years after termination of the representation.

Preserving identity of funds and property of a client.

All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including ad-
vances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more
identifiable accounts maintained in the State of Kansas with a
federal or state chartered or licensed financial institution and
insured by an agency of the federal or state government, and
no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited
therein except as follows:

(i) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be
deposited therein.

(i) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently
or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited
therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm
may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer
or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which
event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the
dispute is finally resolved.’

In this case, the respondent failed to properly safeguard his client’s property when
he commingled his funds with his client’s funds. Thus, the hearing panel con-
cludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) and (d).

— i @ @# °»8z|

“KREC 8.4(c)

“30. ‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.’ KRPC 8.4(c). The re-
spondent engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when he intentionally
maintained funds belonging to him in his attorney trust account in an attempt to
avoid tax levies. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated
KRPC 8.4(c).

“American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

“31. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel con-
sidered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ‘Standards’). Pursuant to Standard 3, the
factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the po-
tential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

“32. Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to refrain
from engaging in conflicts of interest and to safeguard client property. The re-
spondent also violated his duty to the legal profession and to the public to main-
tain his personal integrity.

“33. Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duties.

“34. Injury. As a result of the respondent’s misconduct, the respondent
caused potential injury to his clients. The hearing panel notes that while the po-
tential for injury to his clients was great, there was no evidence of conversion of
client property.

“35. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to
be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in
this case, found the following aggravating factors:

“36. Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously dis-
ciplined on two occasions. In 2001, the disciplinary administrator informally ad-
monished the respondent for having violated KRPC 1.3 (diligence) and KRPC 1.4
(communication). In 2008, the disciplinary administrator informally admonished
the respondent for having violated KRPC 1.7 (conflict of interest) and KRPC 1.8
(conflict of interest).

“37. Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent borrowed funds held in
trust on behalf of G.F. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's moti-
vation regarding that misconduct was motivated by selfishness. Additionally, the
respondent placed earned fees in his attorney trust account in an attempt to avoid
tax levies. The hearing panel concludes that such misconduct was motivated by
dishonesty and selfishness. However, the respondent also advanced fees to his cli-
ents to provide financial assistance. The hearing panel finds that misconduct was
not motivated by dishonesty or selfishness.

“38. A Pattern of Misconduct. Within this case, the respondent engaged in
a pattern of misconduct. The respondent repeatedly advanced money to clients
when he did not hold funds in trust on behalf of the clients. Additionally, the re-
spondent repeatedly commingled his funds with those of his client in his attorney
trust account, Also, the respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct, in that the
2008 discipline involved a conflict of interest. This case likewise involved a conflict
of interest.

“39. Multiple Offenses. Tlie respondent violated KRPC 1.8, KRPC 1.15, and
KRPC 8.4. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent commit-
ted multiple offenses.

“40. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1987. At
the time of the misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for approxi-
mately 25 years.

“41, Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
mitigating circumstances:

“42, Timely Good Faith Effort to Make Restitution or to Rectify Consequenc-
es of Misconduct. While the respondent borrowed the funds held in trust on
behalf of G.F., he timely repaid the funds borrowed.

“43, The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment
of the Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary pro-
cess, Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to the viola-
tions.

“44. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and
General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive
member of the bar of the Metropolitan Kansas City area. The respondent also
enjoys the respect of his peers and generally possesses a good character and repu-
tation as evidenced by several letters received by the hearing panel.

“45. Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The respondent has expe-
rienced other sanctions for his misconduct. The Missouri Supreme Court placed
the respondent on supervised probation for the instant misconduct.

“46. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

“4,12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should
know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes in-
jury or potential injury to a client.

‘4,32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of
interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that
conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

— 4

“7.2. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages
in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes
injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.’

“Recommendation

“47, The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's li-
cense to practice law be suspended for a period of 1 year, that the imposition of
the suspension be suspended, and that the respondent be placed on supervised
probation for a period of 2 years. The respondent recommended that his plan of
probation be adopted.

“48. The hearing panel has carefully considered what action needs to be
taken to correct the deficiencies in the respondent's practice and to ensure that
the misconduct does not recur. Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the Standards listed above, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent
should be allowed to continue to practice law, subject to supervision. However,
the hearing panel also concludes that additional and different terms and condi-
tions need to be added to the respondent's plan of probation. Accordingly, the
hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for an indefinite period of time. The hearing panel further

. recommends that the Court suspend the imposition of the indefinite suspension,

and place the respondent on supervised probation for a period of 2 years, subject
to the following terms and conditions:

‘1. Inventory of Cases and Clients. The respondent shall maintain an
inventory of all open cases and clients. The respondent shall update the
inventory on a daily basis. The inventory shall include the client’s name,
the client’s contact information, the client's goal, the tasks that remain to be
completed, all pending deadlines, and the forum (if any) in which the mat-
ter is pending.

2. Practice Supervision. Within 30 days of receipt of this report, the
respondent shall propose a new practice supervisor, to be approved by the
disciplinary administrator. The new proposed practice supervisor should be
an attorney who does not office share with the respondent. The respondent
shall provide the practice supervisor with an updated copy of the inventory
of cases and clients on a monthly basis. The respondent shall allow the
practice supervisor full access to his client files, calendar, and trust account
records. The respondent shall comply with all requests made by the prac-
tice supervisor. The practice supervisor shall prepare a quarterly report to
the Disciplinary Administrator regarding the respondent's status on proba-
tion. The practice supervisor will be acting as an officer and an agent of
the court while supervising the probation and monitoring the respondent's
legal practice. As supervising attorney, the practice supervisor shall be af-
forded all immunities granted by Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 223 during the course of
his or her supervising activities.

‘3. Taxes. The respondent shall develop a reasonable plan to repay all
outstanding taxes, interest, and penalties. The respondent shall pay all out-
standing Kansas taxes, interest, and penalties in full prior to being released
from probation.

“4. Continuing Legal Education. During each year of probation, the re-
spondent shall complete a CLE regarding conflicts of interest. Additionally,
during each year of probation, the respondent shall complete 5 hours of
ethics CLE.

‘5. Office Procedures. Prior to appearing before the Kansas Supreme
Court, the respondent shall provide the practice supervisor and the Disci-
plinary Administrator with written office procedures designed to monitor
the status, deadlines, and court appearances of all matters in which he has.
undertaken representation. The respondent shall modify that procedure if
directed to do so by the practice supervisor or the Disciplinary Administra-
tor. The respondent shall follow the written office procedures.

‘6, Audits. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this report, the practice
supervisor shall conduct an initial audit of the respondent’ files and trust
account to insure compliance with KRPC 1.8 and KRPC 1.15. Thereafter,
every 6 months, the practice supervisor shall conduct additional audits. If
the practice supervisor discovers any violations of the Kansas Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, the practice supervisor shall include such information in
his report. The practice supervisor shall provide the Disciplinary Adminis-
trator and the respondent with a copy of each audit report. The respondent
shall follow all recommendations and correct all deficiencies noted in the
practice supervisor's periodic audit reports.

“7. Continued Cooperation. The respondent shall continue to cooperate
with the Disciplinary Administrator. If the Disciplinary Administrator re-
quests any additional information, the respondent shall timely provide such
information.

‘8. Professional Liability Insurance. The respondent shall continue to
maintain professional liability insurance in the amounts set by Missouri in
the order of probation.

‘9. Additional Violations. The respondent shall not violate the terms of
his probation or the provisions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Con-
duct. In the event that the respondent violates any of the terms of probation
or any of the provisions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct at any
time during the probationary period, the respondent shall immediately re-
port such violation to the practice supervisor and the Disciplinary Adminis-
trator. The Disciplinary Administrator shall take immediate action directing
the respondent to show cause why the probation should not be revoked.’

' Eo Di

“49. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified
by the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator.”

Discussion

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence,
the findings of the disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the par-
ties and determines whether violations of KRPC exist and, if they
do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292
Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). Clear and convincing evidence is
“evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that “the truth of
the facts asserted is highly probable.”’” In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498,
505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725,
188 P.3d 1 [2008)).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint,
to which he filed an answer. Respondent was also given adequate
notice of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this
court. He filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing
report. With no exceptions before us, the panel's findings of fact are
deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2015 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 369). Furthermore, the evidence before the hearing pan-
el establishes the charged misconduct in violation of KRPC 1.8(a)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Amnot. 530) (conflict of interest); 1.8(e) (provid-
ing financial assistance to client); 1.15(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
556) (safekeeping property); 1.15(d) (preserving client funds); and
8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct involv-
ing misrepresentation) by clear and convincing evidence and sup-
ports the panel’s conclusions of law. We therefore adopt the panel's
findings and conclusions.

The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline
for respondent’s violations. At the panel hearing, at which the re-
spondent appeared, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator
recommended that the respondent's license to practice law be sus-
pended for a period of 1 year, that the imposition of the suspension
be suspended, and that the respondent be placed on supervised
probation for a period of 2 years. The respondent recommended

| tele

that his plan of probation be adopted. The hearing panel recom-
mended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for an indefinite period of time and that the imposition of the
indefinite suspension be suspended and the respondent placed on
supervised probation for a period of 2 years, subject to the terms
and conditions set out in the final hearing report.

At the hearing before this court, the Disciplinary Administra-
tor and respondent agreed with the recommendation of the hear-
ing panel. But they further agreed any terms and conditions in his
plan more severe or restrictive than those contained in the hearing
panel's report should control.

We hold that respondent is to be suspended from the practice of
law in the state of Kansas for an indefinite period of time and that
the imposition of the indefinite suspension be suspended and the
respondent placed on supervised probation for a period of no less
than 2 years, subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Inventory of Cases and Clients. The respondent shall
maintain an inventory of all open cases and clients. The re-
spondent shall update the inventory on a daily basis. The
inventory shall include the client’s name, the client’s contact
information, the client’s goal, the tasks that remain to be com-
pleted, all pending deadlines, and the forum (if any) in which
the matter is pending.

2. Practice Supervision. The respondent shall continue
with his current practice supervisor, providing him with an up-
dated copy of the inventory of cases and clients on a monthly
basis. The respondent shall allow the practice supervisor full
access to his client files, calendar, and trust account records.
The respondent shall also comply with all requests made by
the practice supervisor. The practice supervisor further shall
prepare a quarterly report to the Disciplinary Administrator
regarding the respondent’s status on probation. The practice
supervisor shall continue to act as an officer and an agent of
the court while supervising the probation and monitoring
the respondent's legal practice. As supervising attorney, the
practice supervisor shall be afforded all immunities granted

— i 4

by Kansas Supreme Court Rule 223 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
420) during the course of his or her supervising activities.

3. Taxes. The respondent shall develop a reasonable plan
to repay all outstanding taxes, interest, and penalties. The re-
spondent shall pay all outstanding Kansas taxes, interest, and
penalties in full prior to being released from probation.

4. Continuing Legal Education. During each year of pro-
bation, the respondent shall complete a continuing legal edu-
cation session regarding conflicts of interest. Additionally,
during each year of probation, the respondent shall complete
5 hours of ethics continuing legal education.

5. Office Procedures. The respondent has stated he has
provided the practice supervisor and the Disciplinary Admin-
istrator with written office procedures designed to monitor
the status, deadlines, and court appearances of all matters
in which he has undertaken representation. The respondent
shall modify those procedures if directed to do so by the prac-
tice supervisor or the Disciplinary Administrator. The respon-
dent shall follow the written office procedures. ©

6. Audits. Respondent has stated his trust account has
been audited to insure compliance with KRPC 1.8 and KRPC
1.15. The practice supervisor shall conduct additional audits
of respondent’s trust account every 6 months. If the practice
supervisor discovers any violations of the Kansas Rules of
Professional Conduct, the practice supervisor shall include
such information in his report. The practice supervisor shall
provide the Disciplinary Administrator and the respondent
with a copy of each audit report. The respondent shall follow
all recommendations and correct all deficiencies noted in the
practice supervisor's periodic audit reports.

7. Continued Cooperation. The respondent shall continue
to cooperate with the Disciplinary Administrator. If the Dis-
ciplinary Administrator requests any additional information,
the respondent shall timely provide such information.

EC

8. Professional Liability Insurance. The respondent shall
continue to maintain professional liability insurance in the
amounts set by Missouri in the order of probation.

9. Additional Violations. The respondent shall not violate
the terms of his probation or the provisions of the Kansas
Rules of Professional Conduct. In the event that the respon-
dent violates any of the terms of probation or any of the provi-
sions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct at any time
during the probationary period, the respondent shall immedi-
ately report such violation to the practice supervisor and the
Disciplinary Administrator. The Disciplinary Administrator
shall take immediate action directing the respondent to show
cause why the probation should not be revoked.

A minority of the court would impose a more severe discipline.
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that David Ben Mandelbaum be
and is hereby disciplined by suspension for an indefinite period of
time in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(5) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 293).

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the imposition of the above sus-
pension be stayed and that David Ben Mandelbaum be placed on
supervised probation, subject to those terms and conditions set
forth above for a period of no less than 2 years from the effective
date of this order.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that, prior to the termination of pro-
bation, respondent undergo a reinstatement hearing pursuant to
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 219 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 403),
at which respondent shall establish compliance with the require-
ments set out above.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings
be assessed to the respondent and that this opinion be published in
the official Kansas Reports.

No. 110,656

Byron T. WrecHMaN, Appellee, v. MARK HUDDLESTON,
Appellant.
(370 B3d 1194)

Stanford J. Smith, Jr., of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, L.L.P, of
Wichita, argued the cause, and Teresa L. Adams, of the same firm, was with him
on the briefs for appellant.

Ron D. Beal, of Lenexa, argued the cause, and Robert D. Wiechman, Jr., of
Wichita, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Brigs, J.: This is an interlocutory appeal challenging a district
court’s decision to set aside a dismissal order in a personal injury
lawsuit more than 4 years after that order was entered and the case
was closed. The threshold question is whether a common-law ex-
ception to our statutory jurisdictional requirements remains valid,
giving us the ability to decide this question. See Brown v. Fitz-
patrick, 224 Kan. 636, 585 P.2d 987 (1978). The Court of Appeals
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, determining Brown was

| tke ae

no longer viable in light of more recent caselaw from this court.
Wiechman v. Huddleston, No. 110,656, 2014 WL 4996205, at "5
(Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion).

We agree with the panel and overrule Brown to the extent it
endorsed a judicially created appeal right in a civil case outside of
those created by statute. See Board of Sedgwick County Comm’rs
v. City of Park City, 293 Kan. 107, 111, 260 P.3d 387 (2011) (hold-
ing in a civil case that appellate courts have no authority to fashion
equitable exceptions to statutory limitations on appellate jurisdic-
tion). This appeal must be dismissed because it was not brought in
accordance with the statute governing interlocutory appeals. See
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-2102(c); see also Supreme Court Rule 4.01
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 29).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This litigation began in September 2007, when Byron Wiech-
man sued Mark Huddleston for negligence after sustaining inju-
ries in a September 2005 car accident. Huddleston’s insurer paid
Wiechman’s insurer $7,135.15 for reimbursement of Personal In-
jury Protection (PIP) benefits. In March 2008, Huddleston’s in-
surer, through its third party administrator, Claims Professionals
Inc., sent a letter stating “today wherein we agreed to extend out
insured’s policy limit of $25,000 to you on behalf of your client.”
The letter also indicated a release for all claims against Huddleston
was enclosed, and “[u]pon receipt of the properly executed release,
we will issue payment in the amount of $25,000 and consider this
matter resolved.”

In August 2008, Wiechman’s attorney accepted the $25,000 of-
fer and returned the completed release of claims form. In Septem-
ber, Wiechman’s attorney notified the district court the case had
settled, Nothing additional occurred in the case file until the court
dismissed the litigation for lack of prosecution in December 2008.

More than 4 years later, Wiechman filed a motion to set aside
the dismissal order. He alleged that although he had accepted the
settlement offer, he never received payment. He also filed a sepa-
rate contract lawsuit alleging breach of the settlement agreement.
These disputes were not consolidated and have been on separate
tracks through the judicial system.

— i 4

On the motion to reinstate the original negligence action, the
parties disputed whether the district court had jurisdiction to set
aside the 2008 dismissal order. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(b), which
is the applicable statute, gives district courts discretion to relieve a
party from a final judgment for the following reasons:

“(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;

“(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under subsection (b) of K.S.A.
60-259, and amendments thereto;

“(8) fraud, whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation
or misconduct by an opposing party;

“(4) the judgment is void;

“(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or

“(6) any other reason that justifies relief.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260(b).

Different time limitations apply depending on the reason in-
voked. A motion under subsection (b) must be made within a rea-
sonable time, but for reasons under paragraphs (b)(1), (2), and (3)
a movant must bring the motion no more than 1 year after the entry
of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding. See K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 60-260(c).

At the motion hate Huddleston argued Wiechman’s claim
fit within paragraph (b)(1) or (3), so he asserted the motion was
untimely because it was not filed within 1 year of dismissal. But
Wiechman argued the motion was governed by paragraph (b)(6),
which was not subject to the 1-year limitations period. When asked
by the court why the effort to reopen the lawsuit was not filed soon-
er, counsel acknowledged: “I probably should have filed it earlier
but, you know, I thought we could get something worked out.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted
Wiechman’s motion to set aside the dismissal. But in doing so, it
did not address K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-260 or whether the 4-year
delay in bringing the motion was reasonable. Instead, the court
focused on what it saw as the insurer’s unfairness in not paying the
settlement.

Later, at a hearing on a motion to reconsider, the district court
reaffirmed its decision to set aside the 4-year-old dismissal order.

——— SC

Ruling from the bench, the district court suggested it was unneces-

sary to analyze the motion under the requirements of K.S.A. 2015 |

Supp. 60-260(b) because the dismissal order was administrative in |

nature, apparently because it was based on a lack of prosecution. |
|

The district court held Wiechman had established “good cause”
for setting aside the dismissal because he reasonably relied on the
insurer’s documents and phone conversations when his attorney
told the court the case had settled. The district court again did not
discuss whether the 4-year delay was reasonable.

Huddleston filed this interlocutory appeal, arguing the district
court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal order because
Wiechman’s motion was untimely under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-
260(c). Huddleston did not seek certification for his interlocutory
appeal under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-2102(c) and Supreme Court
Rule 4.01 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 29). Instead, he argued a com-
mon-law jurisdictional exception permitted an appeal from an or-
der setting aside a final judgment, citing Brown.

In dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of
Appeals acknowledged the jurisdictional exception recognized in
Brown would arguably apply but questioned whether Brown was
still good law. Wiechman, 2014 WL 4996205, at *4. Citing our rea-
soning in Park City, the panel held that judicially created excep-
tions conferring appellate jurisdiction absent statutory authority
were no longer valid. Wiechman, 2014 WL 4996205, at *5.

Huddleston petitioned for this court's review, which was grant-
ed. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b). Jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 60-
2101(b) (review of Court of Appeals decisions).

MOOTNESS

At the outset, we must consider a suggestion made for the first
time during oral argument by Wiechman’s counsel that this appeal
has become moot because he prevailed in the separate breach of
contract lawsuit after the district court reinstated the negligence |
action. In essence, Wiechman’s counsel represented that since his |
client’s breach of contract claim had been resolved, his client no
longer had any interest in this appeal’s outcome, although it was
additionally noted that issues remained outstanding over prejudg-

— i 4

ment interest and whether a fraud claim could be asserted against
Huddleston’s insurer. In rebuttal, Huddleston’s attorney disagreed
the appeal was moot and noted Wiechman had not dismissed the
underlying negligence action that launched this interlocutory ap-
peal. We agree with Huddleston.

An appeal will not be dismissed for mootness unless it is clearly
and convincingly shown the actual controversy has ended, the only
judgment that could be entered would be ineffectual for any pur-
pose, and it would not impact any of the parties’ rights. McAlister
v. City of Fairway, 289 Kan. 391, 400, 212 P.3d 184 (2009); State
ex rel. Slusher v. City of Leavenworth, 285 Kan. 438, 454, 172 P.3d
1154 (2007). The record on appeal in this case provides no such
showing.

In fact, just a week prior to oral arguments, Wiechman filed
pleadings urging us to affirm the Court of Appeals ruling. In ad-
dition, the representations made at oral arguments by Wiechman’s
counsel are inconsistent with the showing required for us to deter-
mine the case is moot. Accordingly, we hold the case is not moot.

THE LACK OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Huddleston argues the panel erred when it dismissed this appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. He admits K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-2012(a)
generally governs appeals to the Court of Appeals as a matter of
right and further concedes his appeal is not authorized by that stat-
ute because the order in controversy is not a final decision. See
Kaelter v. Sokol, 301 Kan. 247, 249-50, 340 P.3d 1210 (2015) (“A
‘final decision’ generally disposes of the entire merits of a case and
leaves no further questions or possibilities for future directions or
actions by the lower court.”). Instead, Huddleston argues this ap-
peal is authorized by the Brown jurisdictional exception, and the
panel erred when it overruled Brown. In contrast, Wiechman ac-
cepts the panel’s view and argues Brown is no longer good law in
light of more recent caselaw.

Standard of Review

An appellate court exercises unlimited review over jurisdictional
issues and has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative.

SC

When the record discloses a lack of jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the appeal. Kaelter, 301 Kan. 247, Syl. { 1. But we also
must consider whether this court’s 1978 Brown decision has lost
its precedential value, so we need to consider the doctrine of stare
decisis because this court generally follows an established point of
law in subsequent cases “unless clearly convinced it was originally
erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions
and that more good than harm will come by departing from prec-
edent.” Miller v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 636, 653, 289 P.3d 1098 (2012).

The Brown exception is no longer valid.

Huddleston agrees there is no appellate jurisdiction without
application of Brown, so it is necessary to consider that case’s ra-
tionale and holding. The litigation began when the plaintiff sued
K.N. Fitzgerald for payment on a promissory note, and the claim
was dismissed for lack of prosecution. More than 2 years after the
dismissal, the claim was reinstated under a prior version of K.S.A.
60-260(b)(6).

Fitzgerald filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the rein-
statement, and Brown opposed the appeal, arguing the appellate
court lacked jurisdiction because the order reinstating the case
was not a final order under K.S.A. 60-2102(a)(4). The Brown court
held there was a “jurisdictional exception” applying to orders under
K.S.A. 60-260(b) when “an order granting relief under authority of
K.S.A. 60-260 is challenged on jurisdictional grounds.” 224 Kan. at
639.

The Brown court principally relied on federal caselaw adopting
an identical exception for orders entered under the analogous fed-
eral rule, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b). The court reasoned that since
K.S.A. 60-260(b) was fashioned after the federal rule: “in the in-
terest of consistency with the federal case law this court feels the
‘jurisdictional exception’ should be extended in Kansas to orders
under K.S.A. 60-260(b).” 224 Kan. at 639. The court noted Kansas
recognized a similar exception for orders granting a new trial under
K.S.A. 60-259(a) based on federal caselaw interpreting Fed R. Civ.
Proc. 59(d). The court then observed that the exception had been
criticized as unwise because it leads to many interlocutory appeals,

— 4

citing 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil
§ 2871, p. 260 (1969). But in the end, the court concluded consis-
tency with the federal caselaw trumped those concerns. 224 Kan.
at 638-39.

In Huddleston’s appeal, the panel recognized Brown’s applica-
tion but held Brown was no longer valid given our more recent
Park City decision. Wiechman, 2014 WL 4996205, at *4-5. In Park
City, the district court granted a municipality additional time to file
a motion seeking postjudgment relief from a summary judgment
order—even though the district court lacked statutory authority to
grant that extension. The delay rendered Park City’s notice of ap-
peal untimely under the applicable statute. Park City attempted to
avoid a jurisdictional bar by invoking the doctrine of unique cir-
cumstances, which was another judicially created exception per-
mitting an untimely appeal when the appellant reasonably relied
on some judicial action that purportedly extended the time period
for bringing the appeal. 293 Kan. at 108-09.

The Park City court recognized that Kansas courts had been
following the United States Supreme Court's lead when it adopted
the unique circumstances doctrine, but this court further noted
that the United States Supreme Court had overruled that doctrine
after concluding Congress had exercised its constitutional authority
to limit the appellate courts’ jurisdiction and that appellate courts
could not create equitable exceptions to those legitimate statutory
requirements. 293 Kan. at 117 (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S.
205, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 168 L. Ed. 2d 96 [2007]).

The Park City court followed suit and overruled the doctrine in
Kansas based on the same reasoning, stating:

“Consequently, we reject Park City’s argument that the unique circumstances
doctrine saves its appeal. As stated in Bowles, ‘Because this Court has no authority
to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the “unique
circumstances” doctrine is illegitimate.’” 293 Kan. at 120 (quoting Bowles, 551
USS. at 214).

The rationale from Park City answers the jurisdictional question
raised by Huddleston. We have often reiterated as a “longstanding
rule” that appellate jurisdiction in civil cases is defined by statute,
and the right to appeal is neither vested nor a constitutional right.

——

293 Kan. at 111 (collecting cases); see also Kaelter, 301 Kan. at
249 (“‘Kansas appellate courts may exercise jurisdiction only under
circumstances allowed by statute.’”); Williams v. Lawton, 288 Kan.
768, 778, 207 P.3d 1027 (2009) (same). But the Brown exception is
inconsistent with that principle because the appeal statute, K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 60-2102, does not grant Huddleston a right to appeal
the district court’s order reinstating Wiechman’s claim. And this
court’s rationale in Park City is easily applied to the Brown juris-
dictional exception at issue here. As the panel held:

“The jurisdiction exception for nonfinal orders found in Brown is directly anal-
ogous to the ‘unique circumstances’ exception reexamined in Park City. Both are
court-made equitable exceptions to the jurisdictional requirements created by the
legislature. Because the jurisdiction exception created in Brown circumvents the
applicable statute—here, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-2102—it is also illegitimate under
the rationale of Park City.” Wiechman, 2014 WL 4996205, at °5.

In addition, we note that since its 1978 adoption, the Brown
exception has been rarely invoked. We are aware of only two sub-
sequent cases applying the exception to establish appellate jurisdic-
tion. See Chowning, Inc. v. Dupree, 6 Kan. App. 2d 140, 626 P.2d
1240 (1981) (order to set aside dismissal for lack of prosecution
appealable under the “jurisdictional exception”); In re Marriage
of Ariaz, No. 105,224, 2012 WL 98490 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpub-
lished opinion) (applying “jurisdictional exception” to allow appeal
from K.S.A. 60-260 order challenging district court’s jurisdiction
to enter it). Based on this, overruling Brown has limited impact on
the court's caselaw.

We note further that the exception’s wisdom continues to be
questioned by legal commentators and some courts. See 11 Wright
and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2871, p.
591 (2012) (characterizing it as an “unwise doctrine, since it mul-
tiplies interlocutory appeals and requires the appellate courts to
pass on the claim of lack of power”). This criticism led the New
Mexico Court of Appeals to decline adopting the exception in Baca
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 121 N.M. 734, 918 P.2d 13
(1996) (adopting the exception would “create an anomaly under
New Mexico law”). On the other hand, the federal courts continue
to apply this exception, which provides some authority for main-

ie

taining it in Kansas. See Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Moberly, 241
8.W.3d 329 (Ky. 2007) (adopting the jurisdictional exception be-
cause the federal practice “remains viable” after 120 years); Baca,
121 N.M. at 736 (noting most federal courts of appeals have held
there is a right to appeal from a trial court order setting aside a
judgment, usually pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59 or 60).

In our view, Brown focuses the analysis on the wrong question
by allowing consistency with federal caselaw to trump a Kansas
statute. If an appellate court lacks authority to adopt a jurisdic-
tional exception, the wisdom of that exception is inconsequential.
We conclude the best path is to abandon Brown and adhere to our
jurisprudence that limits appellate jurisdiction in civil cases to that
provided by statute.

Finally, one clarification to our holding in Park City is required
because that case dealt with a civil proceeding challenging a land
annexation order. Its holding that the right to appeal is entirely
statutory was based exclusively on civil cases that had adopted that
same principle. See Park City, 293 Kan. at 111 (citing Flores Rent-
als v. Flores, 283 Kan. 476, 480-81, 153 P.3d 523 [2007]; Bruch
v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 282 Kan. 764, 773-74, 148 P.3d 538
[2006]; Jones v. Continental Can Co., 260 Kan. 547, 550, 920
P.2d 939 [1996]; Little Balkans Foundation, Inc. v. Kansas Racing
Comm'n, 247 Kan. 180, 188, 795 P.2d 368 [1990]; Tobin Constr.
Co. v. Kemp, 239 Kan. 430, 437, 721 P.2d 278 [1986]). Accordingly,
Park City’s application should be viewed as limited to appeals in
civil cases.

We affirm the panel and dismiss Huddleston’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.

STEGALL, J., not participating.

Amy L. Harta, District Judge, assigned

. |

89

No. 112,982

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. WILLIAM ANDREW SHANK,
Appellant.
(369 P3d 322)

Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for ap-
pellant.

Amanda G. Voth, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney gen-
eral, were on the brief for appellee.

— 4

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nuss, C.J.: After accepting William Shank’s guilty pleas, the
district court ultimately sentenced him to life with a mandatory
minimum of 25 years for first-degree murder, 59 months for ag-
gravated arson, and 32 months for aggravated burglary. It ordered
all sentences to run consecutively and imposed $108,427.65 in res-
titution.

Shank argues the district court abused its discretion in ordering
his sentences to run consecutively instead of concurrently and in
imposing a restitution plan that is “unworkable.” Because there was
no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts AND PROCEDURAL HisTORY

The State charged William Shank with first-degree murder for
the premeditated killing of Teri Morris; aggravated arson for set-
ting afire the residence where she was killed; and aggravated bur-
glary for entering the residence with the intent to kill her. Shank
pled guilty to all counts.

At Shank’s plea hearing, the State proffered the evidence it
would have presented at trial. In 2012, Shank and Morris lived
together in Garden City. Morris later moved to Colby where she
eventually gave birth to their daughter, A.J.S. Later that year, Mor-
ris and A.J.S. moved into Russell Rodenbeck’s house in Colby.

Early one morning in February 2013, Morris was sleeping in her
bed while A.J.S. slept in her crib. While responding to a report of a
fire at the house later that morning, firefighters found Morris’ dead
body in the living room. An autopsy revealed she was stabbed and
slashed 27 times—and suffered blunt force trauma to her head and
thermal burns to her naked body. The soot in her mouth and nose
indicated she was alive when the fire was set.

Several hours later Shank was found with A.J.S. about 100 miles
from Colby. He had cuts on his body, Morris’ blood and DNA on
his shirt, and Morris’ blood on his right ear. Police found gloves
covered with Morris’ and Shank’s blood in a trash bag at Shank’s
home as well as Morris’ blood on the steering wheel of Shank’s
vehicle and on a lighter inside. Shank’s partial DNA was also found
on the door knob of Rodenbeck’s house. His computer revealed

——

internet searches explaining how to pick a lock and break into a
residence.

At the sentencing hearing, the State requested Shank serve sen-
tences for each count consecutively while Shank requested them to
run concurrently. Defense counsel did not object to the proposed
plan for restitution of damages. When asked for Shank’s position
on the State’s request for reimbursing the state general fund for
expenditures made by the Board of Indigent Defense Services
(BIDS), counsel responded Shank had no resources or ability to
reimburse.

The court sentenced Shank to consecutive terms of life with
a mandatory minimum of 25 years for first-degree murder, 59
months for aggravated arson, and 32 months for aggravated bur-
glary. The court also assessed $108,427.65 in restitution, primarily
as compensation for Rodenbeck’s fire-damaged house.

Jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3),

(4) (maximum sentence of life imprisonment imposed for an off-
grid crime). .
More facts will be added as necessary to the analysis.

ANALYSIS

Issue 1: The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering
Shank to serve consecutive sentences.

Shank argues the district court erred in imposing consecutive
sentences. The State responds that this decision was well within
the court's discretion.

Standard of review

KS.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6819(b) provides that, absent certain cir-
cumstances, “[t]he sentencing judge shall otherwise have discre-
tion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences in multiple
conviction cases.” This statute does not list specific factors for con-
sideration but states the judge “may consider the need to impose
an overall sentence that is proportionate to the harm and culpa-
bility” associated with the crimes. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6819(b);
State v. Wilson, 301 Kan. 403, 405, 343 B.3d 102 (2015).

— 4

This court’s abuse of discretion standard is well established:

“judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unrea-
sonable, ie., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the
trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, ie., if the discretion is guided by an
erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.¢., if substantial
competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite
conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based. [Citation omitted.]’ State
v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S, Ct. 1594
(2012).” State v. Wilson, 301 Kan. at 405.

By simply claiming the district court “needlessly” lengthened
Shank’s sentence and imposed an “unduly” lengthy sentence,
Shank essentially argues no reasonable person would have taken
the court's view. The State counters that reasonable persons would
agree with the court, e.g., that the crimes were “excessively brutal”
and consecutive sentences appropriate.

Discussion

At the sentencing hearing, the State requested Shank serve time
for each crime consecutively “due to the egregiousness of each
act.” In support, it pointed to the vulnerability of the victim at the
time of the aggravated burglary—i.e., Morris was sleeping naked
alone in her house with her child. The State also noted the brutal,
cruel, and premeditated nature of the murder and further empha-
sized that Shank set the fire to hide the crime while Morris was still
alive. Shank requested concurrent sentences because he was only
25 years old and had entered into the plea to take responsibility for
the crime. He did not make any personal statements at the hearing.

In the court's evaluation, it stated that it weighed the statements
of counsel, the statements of the victim’s family and those made
on behalf of Shank, and the presentence investigation report. It
also considered the case record which revealed Shank broke into
the residence where Morris and her daughter were sleeping. He
stabbed Morris 27 times and inflicted blunt force trauma to her
body. One of those stab wounds punctured her lung and caused her
to suffocate on her own blood. After setting the house on fire while
Morris was still alive, Shank left with A.J.S. From this information,
the court characterized the crime as excessively brutal.

| asec “=taEaee

In applying our test, we are unable to conclude that no reason-
able person would take this view. See Wilson, 301 Kan. at 406 (cit-
ing Ward, 292 Kan, at 550). So the court did not abuse its discre-
tion when it concluded consecutive sentences were proportionate
to the harm and culpability associated with Shank’s convictions.
See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6819(b).

Issux 2: The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering
Shank to pay restitution.

Shank argues the district court erred in imposing restitution.
The State counters Shank did not preserve the issue for appeal
because he failed to object to the amount of restitution at the sen-
tencing hearing. In the alternative, it contends the court did not
abuse its discretion by ordering restitution.

Standard of review
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1) provides that the sentencing

court “shall order the defendant to pay restitution, which shall
include, but not be limited to, damage or loss caused by the de-
fendant’s crime, unless the court finds compelling circumstances
which would render a plan of restitution unworkable.” An appellate
court’s consideration of a restitution plan can involve three stan-
dards of review:

“Questions concerning the ‘amount of restitution and the manner in which it is
made to the aggrieved party’ are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
[Citation omitted.] A district court’s factual findings relating to the causal link be-
tween the crime committed and the victim’s loss will be affirmed if those findings
are supported by substantial competent evidence. Finally, appellate courts have
unlimited review over legal questions involving the interpretation of the underly-
ing statutes.” State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 354-55, 204 P.3d 585 (2009) (citing State
v. Dexter, 276 Kan. 909, 912-13, 80 P.3d 1125 [2003}).

Shank argues the restitution order is unworkable because he
cannot pay the restitution as ordered. Accordingly, abuse of dis-
cretion is the proper standard. See State v. Goeller, 276 Kan. 578,
581, 77 P.3d 1272 (2003) (setting of amount of restitution is within
district judge’s discretion), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018, 350 P.3d 1054 (2015).

— 4

Discussion

Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1), restitution is the rule
anda finding that restitution is unworkable is the exception. State v.
Alcala, 301 Kan. 832, 840, 348 P.3d 570 (2015). When challenging
the workability of a restitution order, the defendant carries the bur-
den to come forward with evidence of “compelling circumstances”
that render the restitution plan unworkable. 301 Kan. at 840.

In King, 288 Kan. at 356, the defendant did not raise at the dis-

trict court level the issue of unworkability of the restitution plan “at
all.” We held:
“Not only would this lack of objection fail to preserve the issue for appellate review
in the normal case, but it also fails to meet his burden of proving unworkability.
‘Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the restitution
in this case.” (Emphasis added.) 288 Kan. at 356.

In the instant case, Shank’s attorney explicitly stated at the sen-
tencing hearing he and his client did not object to the restitution
“as listed”:

“So Your Honor, we are here today. We have had an opportunity to review
the restitution. The majority of the restitution, obviously, as the court knows is
for—to reimburse the insurance company for the payment to the house. We have
no specific way to challenge that. We've been given an opportunity to review the
restitution claims made by the different individuals, and we do not object to those,
Your Honor,

“So with that, we would ask the Court to make a determination to sentence Bill
Shank concurrently with respect to all three of the crimes.

“We agree with the 604 days, as far as the time served, and again, [we] do not
have any objection to the restitution as listed, Your Honor.” (Emphasis added.)

As with the defendant in King, Shank’s overall failure to object
to the proposed restitution obviously includes a failure to raise any
specific argument about the restitution plan’s unworkability. 288
Kan. at 356. And as in King, this would represent not only a failure
to preserve the issue for our review in the normal case but also
constitute a failure to meet his burden of proving unworkability.

Shank contends, however, that defense counsel’s statement
about a current lack of assets was the equivalent of objecting to the
imposition of the restitution plan as unworkable. But as revealed
by the following colloquy between defense counsel and the court,

—— CC

this statement related exclusively to the issue of BIDS reimburse-
ment, which occurred immediately after counsel declared, “[A]nd
again, [we] do not have any objection to the restitution as listed,
Your Honor.”

“The court: Mr. Fairbanks, if | might ask you [for] your position, or Mr. Shank’s
position, in regard to the imposition of an order requiring him to reimburse the
state general fund for all expenditures made by the Board of Indigent Defense
Services to provide your services in the matter.

“Defense counsel: Well, Your Honor, Mr. Shank has no resources. There were
no resources available initially, Your Honor. I don’t think he has any ability at this
time to reimburse them for those services. I think that’s the, my understanding,
the major factor of that to look at, Your Honor.

“Df and when he was ever granted parole, he has restitution to make, he has no
assets, Your Honor. None. The only asset he had was his car, and obviously that has
been currently still, I think, in control of the State. So that would be the position
we'd take, Your Honor.” (Emphasis added.)

Like the King court, we conclude that here “the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the restitution.” 288
Kan. at 356. Simply put, the responsibility for challenging the
workability of a restitution plan lies with the defendant, not the
court. 288 Kan. at 356-57 (rejecting argument the district court
has independent obligation to make findings on record regarding
plan’s workability, and contrasting language in restitution statute
with language in BIDS reimbursement statute, K.S.A. 22-4513, at
issue in State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 132 P.3d 934 [2006]).
And the defendant—not the court—carries the burden to come
forward with evidence of compelling circumstances that render the
restitution plan unworkable. Alcala, 301 Kan. at 840. Despite these
burdens, Shank did not challenge the restitution plan, much less
provide any compelling circumstances to support such a challenge.

Even giving Shank the benefit of any possible doubt about his
counsel's statements at sentencing, i.e., that in addition to having
no current assets, he will not have the ability to pay restitution in
the future, these statements do not support an abuse of judicial
discretion. Our decision in Alcala, 301 Kan. 832, is instructive.

In Alcala, the defendant argued his restitution plan was un-
workable in part because of his limited earning potential during
his lengthy incarceration: life imprisonment without parole for 25

— 4

years, We noted, however, that restitution is typically not due dur-
ing incarceration so “imprisonment alone is not sufficient to render
restitution unworkable.” 301 Kan. at 840. We concluded that, be-
cause Alcala had failed to present evidence of his inability to pay
restitution after his possible parole, he had failed to meet his bur-
den to show the restitution plan was unworkable. 301 Kan. at 840
(citing State v. Alderson, 299 Kan. 148, 151, 322 P.3d 364 [2014]).

As in Alcala, Shank failed to present evidence of his inability to
pay restitution in the future. Accordingly, he could not establish
this as a basis to demonstrate the restitution plan is unworkable.
So the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitu-
tion. See Alcala, 301 Kan. at 840.

For these reasons, the decision of the district court is affirmed.

| ce as

No. 113,579

" In the Matter of Joan M. Hawxins, Respondent.
(373 P3d 718) :

ST
- Opinion filed April 15, 2016. J

Kimberly L. Knoll, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause and
was on the brief for the petitioner.

Holly M. Perkins, of Joseph, Hollander & Craft LLC, of Topeka, argued the
cause, and Stephen M. Joseph, of the same firm, of Wichita, was with her on the
brief for the respondent; Joan M. Hawkins, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by
the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent,
Joan M. Hawkins, of Lawrence, an attorney admitted to the prac-
tice of law in Kansas in 1999. .

On June 11, 2014, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator
filed a formal complaint against the respondent alleging violations
of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). After filing a
motion for extension of deadlines and/or stay to obtain counsel and
a motion to continue, which were granted, the respondent filed an
answer on August 8, 2014. A prehearing conference was held on
October 2, 2014, and a hearing was held on the complaint before a
panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on October
9 and 10 and November 20, 2014, where the respondent was per-
sonally present and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel
determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d) (2015 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 572) (termination of representation); 3.2 (2015 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 595) (expediting litigation); 3.3(a)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 601) (candor toward tribunal); 3.4(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. An-
not. 609) (failure to comply with discovery request); 8.1(b) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 661) (knowingly failing to respond to a lawful
demand for information from a disciplinary authority); 8.4(c) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct involving misrepre-
sentation); and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice).

— 4

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with its reeommen-
dation to this court:

“Findings of Fact

“DALI619

“22. In 2011, the respondent represented B.S. in a post-divorce matter be-
fore the District Court of Jefferson County, Kansas. On November 14, 2011, the
respondent filed a motion to modify parenting time and child support. Julia Butler
represented A.S., B.S.’s former wife.

“23. On January 10, 2012, the court held a hearing on the motion. Follow-
ing the hearing, the court ordered the parties to participate in mediation in an
attempt to reach a parenting plan. On March 20, 2012, the parties filed an agreed
journal entry for parenting plan and a joint parenting plan.

“24.. On March 26, 2012, Ms. Butler sent the respondent an electronic mail
message and attached the agreed journal entry regarding the parenting plan. Ms.
Butler reminded the respondent that they still needed to figure out child support
and that if they could not agree, the matter should be set for hearing.

“25. On March 30, 2012, Ms. Butler sent an electronic mail message to the
respondent, attached a completed child support worksheet and alternatively pro-
vided two possible hearing dates in the event they were unable to come to an
agreement about child support.

“96. On April 5, 2018, Ms, Butler again wrote to the respondent. Ms, Butler
indicated that she had not heard back from the respondent and asked whether the
hearing dates would work.

“97. On April 9, 2012, Ms. Butler wrote to the respondent again, asking
whether the hearing dates worked for the respondent. On April 9, 2012, the re-
spondent responded to Ms. Butler, indicating that her day had not gone according
to plan but that she would contact Ms. Butler the following day.

“28. On April 10, 2012, the respondent indicated that either of the two hear-
ing times would work. Ms. Butler called the court, but, unfortunately, during the
intervening 11 days, the court had scheduled other matters during the possible
hearing times.

“99. On April 16, 2012, Ms. Butler informed the respondent that those two
dates were no longer available and queried whether May 9, 2012, at 3:30 p.m.
would work for the respondent and her client. The respondent did not respond to
Ms. Butler's April 16, 2012, email message.

“30. On April 20, 2012, Ms. Butler again asked whether May 9, 2012, at 3:30
p.m. would work for the child support hearing.

“31. On April 24, 2012, Ms. Butler again wrote to the respondent and in-
formed the respondent that because the respondent had not replied to the April
16, 2012, and April 20, 2012, email messages, Ms. Butler had scheduled the hear-
ing for May 9, 2012, at 3:30 p.m.

“32. On April 27, 2012, the respondent wrote to Ms. Butler and indicated
that her client was not available for a hearing on May 4th or May 5th. However, by
this time, Ms. Butler had already told the respondent that the court no longer had
those dates available and that the hearing was scheduled for May 9, 2012.

“33. On May 1, 2012, the respondent wrote to Ms. Butler twice. In one email
message, the respondent informed Ms. Butler that Ms. Butler’s email message
from April 16, 2012, had ended up in her junk mail. The respondent did not
mention Ms. Butler's email messages from April 20, 2012, or April 24, 2012. In
the other email message, the respondent made an offer to settle the child support
matter.

“34, Also on May 1, 2012, the respondent wrote to her client to see if he
would be available for a hearing on May 9, 2012, at 3:30 p.m. The respondent's
client informed the respondent that he was available for a hearing on May 9, 2012.

“35. On May 7, 2012, the respondent's client wrote to the respondent and
asked for confirmation that the hearing had been scheduled for May 9, 2012, at
3:30 p.m. before he asked for permission to take a day off from work. That same
day, the respondent wrote to her client and indicated that she had not previously
received a notice of the hearing. (However, Ms. Butler sent the notice of hearing
via electronic mail message on April 24, 2012.) On May 7, 2012, the respondent
also wrote to Ms. Butler and asked her about the status of scheduling A.S. and
B.S.’s motion hearing.

“36. On May 9, 2012, at 10:34 a.m., the respondent called the Jefferson
County clerk’s office and spoke with Michelle Olberding. The respondent told Ms.
Olberding that neither she nor her client would be appearing at the hearing in the
afternoon, as Ms. Butler had 30 days to provide certain financial information and
that she had not received proper notice of the hearing. Further, the respondent
informed Ms. Olberding that she would contact Ms. Butler about the respondent's
request for a continuance. Ms. Olberding both immediately spoke with the chief
clerk and made a note to the file, detailing the conversation.

“37. Sometime that day, Ms. Butler ran into the respondent on the corner of
8th and Vermont in Lawrence and confirmed that they had-a-learing scheduled
for that afternoon at 3:30 p.m. Ms. Butler acknowledged that the respondent had
an outstanding offer to settle the child support issue. Ms, Butler agreed to contact
her client to determine whether her client was willing to accept the settlement
offer. The respondent did not mention that she was interested in continuing the
hearing.

“38 On May 9, 2012, at 12:36 p.m., the respondent filed a ‘motion for con-
tinuance and order for production’ with the Jefferson County District Court by
facsimile.

“39. On May 9, 2012, at 12:57 p.m., Ms. Butler wrote to the respondent and
informed her that her client was unwilling to settle the child support issue as the
respondent proposed.

“40. At 2:23 p.m., just over an hour before the hearing'was scheduled to
begin in Jefferson County District Court, the respondent sentiMs. Butler a copy

of the ‘motion for continuance and order for production’ which she had filed by
facsimile approximately two hours earlier. Ms. Butler did not see the motion in
her electronic mail inbox until later.

“41. At approximately 3:20 p.m., the clerk entered the courtroom where Ms.
Butler and her client were waiting for the hearing to begin. Ms. Butler informed
the clerk that they were not ready to proceed as the respondent and her client had
not yet arrived. The clerk informed Ms. Butler that the respondent had called and
informed the clerk's office that neither she nor her client would be coming to the
hearing because she did not have proper notice of the hearing.

“42, Judge Nafziger entered the courtroom and informed Ms. Butler that the
respondent filed a motion to continue shortly before the scheduled hearing time.
Ms. Butler informed the judge that she had not received a motion to continue
the hearing, that she had seen the respondent earlier in the day, and that the re-
spondent did not mention that she was not coming to the hearing that day. At that
time, Ms. Butler checked her electronic mail inbox on her mobile telephone and
found that the respondent had forwarded a motion to continue by electronic mail
message.

“43, The court considered and denied the respondent's motion to continue,
as it was filed late and was not agreed to.

“44, After the court concluded the hearing, at 3:35 p.m., the respondent ar-
rived at the Jefferson County Courthouse. Delpha M. Forshee, Deputy Clerk
directed the respondent to Judge Nafziger’s courtroom. However, the court had
already completed the hearing.

“45. The respondent did not attempt to reach Ms. Butler by telephone on
May 9, 2012, until 3:41 p.m., after the respondent left the Jefferson County Dis-
trict Court.

“46. On May 15, 2012, Ms. Butler forwarded a proposed journal entry to the
respondent and to the court.

“47, On May 23, 2012, the respondent filed a motion to set aside judgment.
The respondent based her motion on an allegation that the hearing was scheduled
for 3:00 p.m. when it was actually scheduled for 3:30 p.m. The hearing was not
scheduled for 3:00' p.m. It was scheduled for 3:30 p.m. Additionally, on June 1,
2012, the respondent filed objections to Ms. Butler’s proposed journal entry.

“48, On June 21, 2012, the court held a hearing on the respondent's motion
to set aside judgment and motion for rehearing. During the proceedings, the re-
spondent denied stating to the clerk that neither she nor her client were going to
be appearing at the May 9, 2012, hearing. Specifically, the respondent stated:

‘JUDGE NAFZIGER: I was advised that you had called the clerk’s of-
fice and told them you were not going to appear and that you had told
your client not to appear, and that you had not had sufficient notice for the
hearing, or something. And so, therefore, the presumption was you weren't
going to appear.

‘MS. HAWKINS: Well, actually I did not know [sic] notify the Court
of that and, in fact, I'd had a discussion with opposing counsel during the
course of the day and shortly before the hearing.

101

‘MS. HAWKINS: but regardless, I did not, I did not notify the Court
and say I would not be here. I did notify the Court and say are there some
alternate dates that we could select from if we agree to continue this. And I
communicated those dates to Ms. Butler. She said I am not going to agree
to continue it. I at no time did I say that I was not going to appear on the
matter. I merely said I was filing a motion to continue, That I was filing a
motion to compel and that I did request some alternate dates but at no
point did I tell anyone that I was not going to be here on that day—

“MS. HAWKINS: I, furthermore, do want to point out for the record
that notice was insufficient. This Court is very clear on the fact that I do
not accept email service in any of my cases and it’s explicitly stated on all
of my pleadings. The only communication I have ever received in this case
from—

“MS. BUTLER: Judge, um, I did, and I had tried to, um, get in contact
with Ms. Hawkins numerous times to get a hearing date set and did not
receive any response from her. So, finally I contacted the clerks office, got
the hearing date of May 9th at 3:30 and from the beginning of this case I
have scanned all pleadings and emailed them to Ms, Hawkins to make sure
that there is no miscommunication on the dates or times that these matters
are supposed to be heard. I did provide her at the initial filing of this action,
copies of my client's tax returns from 2009 and 2010 and a copy of her D,
DRA, and I did it all via, um, email. And, Ms. Hawkins has sent me, um, a
pleading via email, as well. So, I don’t think there’s any problem, with, um,
her stated receipt of various documents. She did include in her motion,
um a copy of the email that I sent her with the dates and the time and that
notice of hearing was attached. Judge, when I arrived on May 9th with my
client, um, I was sitting in the courtroom, and I don’t know the young lady’s
name that, that sits here, but she came in and said that we were ready to go,
and I said, Ms. Hawkins isn’t here yet. And I had told her that I did see Ms.
Hawkins earlier that day and it was my understanding that she was coming.

‘JUDGE NAFZIGER: —Okay—

‘MS, BUTLER: ~ I did not know that she was not going to be here. And
I did state that to her and I did state that, uh, Your Honor, when you came
out onto the bench. So it should be on the record.

‘JUDGE NAFZIGER: I guess the information that I had that she wasn’t
coming came from the clerk’s office, because she called.’

“49. Ms. Olberding was in the courtroom and heard the respondent's state-
ments. Following the hearing, Ms. Olberding made a memorandum regarding
what transpired in the courtroom. Ms. Olberding’s statement includes the follow-

‘,.. [The respondent] said that she did call the Court on May 9 but claims

that she did not tell the Clerk that she nor her client was [sic] not appearing,
which is what she told me on the phone. She told the Judge that his Court
has miscommunications and didn’t understand why that was said to him.
He asked her that if she didn’t tell her client not to show up, why wasn’t
he here that day? She said that she told him he wasn’t needed. The Judge
said isn’t that the same as telling him not to come? She then hesitated and
said yes it was.

‘Tt was an insult and upsetting to sit there and listen to her lies. I would
never make anything up and I even notated it in Full Court and informed
the Clerk of the conversation afterward on May 9 because the whole con-
versation in general was odd.’

“50. On June 26, 2012, Connie Milner, Clerk of the District Court of Jef
ferson County, Kansas, memorialized her conversations with Ms. Olberding re-
garding the respondent’s May 9, 2012, statements. Ms. Milner’s memorandum
provides:

“I want to respond to the veracity of Michelle Olberding, a deputy clerk

in my office, that on the morning of May 9, 2012, she spoke with Joan

Hawkins on the phone. After she hung up she immediately turned around

and told me that Ms. Hawkins had stated that neither she nor her client

would be attending the hearing set for 3:30 that afternoon as she hadn’t
received proper notice and was still waiting on financial information. I told

Michelle to make a note of the conversation in the case which she did.’

“51. Inher initial response to the disciplinary complaint and in her testimony
during the formal complaint, the respondent denied stating to Ms. Olberding that
neither she nor her client would be appearing at the hearing, as follows:

“My mind was reeling at that point because (1) the hearing was sched-
uled at 3:30 p.m. (2) I did not recall telling anyone that I did not intend to
attend the hearing; and (3) I appeared.

‘Rather than believe someone called pretending to be me and told the
court I would not be there, the only conclusion I can draw is that there was
an error in communication. Regardless of what actually happened I am
confident that I did not provide false or inaccurate information to the court
or its personnel. My appearance is proof of my intent.’

And, during questioning by Ms. Knoll, the respondent testified as follows:

‘Q. Okay. Had you called the Clerks Office prior to 3:30 on May 9th?

‘A. Yes.

‘Q. And what was the purpose of that call?

‘A. Um, Ihad called earlier in the day to say if we greed [sic] to continue
this what would be some possible future dates.

‘Q. And did you have any other discussion?

‘A. meansthat was the gist of the call.

‘Q. Did you tell them that you were not planning on attending?

103

‘A. No.
‘Q. Did you tell them that your client was not planning on being there?
“A. No, at that point I didn’t know.”

“52. Ms. Olberding also testified at the hearing on the formal complaint. Ms.
Olberding clearly testified that the respondent stated that she was not going to
appear at the hearing that day because she had not received proper notice of the
hearing.

“53. During the hearing, the hearing panel had the opportunity to observe
the testimony and demeanor of all-of the witnesses. Based upon their personal ob-
servations of the witnesses, the hearing panel finds that Ms. Olberding’s testimony
was credible with supporting corroboration on her actions and character from the
chief clerk, Connie Milner. Likewise, the hearing panel finds that the respondent's
testimony to lack credibility on this issue.

“DA11637

“54, On approximately September 29, 2010, M.S. retained the respondent to
represent her in a child in need of care action. In April 2012, M.S. informed the
respondent that she wished to retain new counsel.

“55. On April 30, 2012, the case manager in M.S.’s case made written rec-
ommendations. M.S. had ten days to file written objections to the case manager's
written recommendations.

“56. On May 2, 2012, M.S. left a hand-written note addressed to the respon-
dent at the respondent's office, requesting the return of her file. That same day,
on May 2, 2012, the respondent acknowledged that she received M.S.’s request
for the return of her file. Knowing of the deadline to file objections to the case
manager's recommendations, the respondent told M.S. that her file would not be
ready to be picked up until May 10, 2012. The respondent offered to continue the
representation until M.S. picked up her file.

“57. On May 2, 2012, or May 3, 2012, Amy Durkin entered her appearance
on behalf of M.S. On May 8, 2012, the respondent acknowledged that she had
received Ms. Durkin’s entry of appearance.

“58. On May 10, 2012, pursuant to the respondent's instructions, M.S. picked
up her file from the respondent's office. The respondent required M.S. to sign a
receipt when she picked up the file. The receipt provided as follows:

“This is to certify that on this date I have received the original documents
and exhibits I submitted, along with pleadings, exhibits, and correspon-
dence from the law office of J. Hawk Law Ltd.

‘I understand there are certain items to which I cannot directly receive,
and those items to-wit: psychological evaluation, police reports, will be for-
warded directly to my attorney, Amy Durkin.

‘Thave had the opportunity to review the items returned and it does contain
those items listed above, less those items that I cannot directly receive.’

The respondent also signed the receipt. Despite the respondent's statement in

the receipt, the respondent never forwarded the psychological report or police
reports to Ms, Durkin and the respondent still had these in her possession on the
date of the hearing, over two and one-half years later.

“59. Ms. Durkin testified that had she timely received the psychological eval-
uation and police reports, she may have filed objections to the case manager's re-
port, as M.S. was not satisfied with the recommendations. However, she did know
for certain that she would have filed written objections because to date, she has
never received the reports from the respondent. (Ms. Durkin also testified that
because she did not file objections to the case manager's report and that because
M.S.’s former husband is no longer having contact with the children, obtaining the
psychological report and police reports is no longer necessary for the representa-
tion of her client.)

“60. After retrieving her file from the respondent, on several occasions, M.S.
requested an accounting of the advanced fee paid to the respondent and a refund
of uneamed fees. Despite what can be found in Disciplinary Administrator's Ex-
hibits 45 and 46, M.S. only received three itemized bills from the respondent.
Eventually, on July 9, 2012, the respondent returned $691.17 to M.S. ‘Then, on
August 13, 2012, the respondent returned an additional $215.00 to M.S. as un-
earned fees.

“61. On July 24, 2012, M.S. filed a complaint against the respondent with the
disciplinary administrator's office. Leslie Miller, an attorney practicing in Law-
rence and a member of the Douglas County Ethics and Grievance Committee was
appointed to investigate M.S.’s complaint against the respondent.

“62. During the investigation, Ms. Miller scheduled an interview of the
respondent. Ms. Miller directed the respondent to bring her file regarding her
representation of M.S. to the scheduled interview. The respondent did not bring
any documents with her to the scheduled interview. When Ms. Miller asked the
respondent for her file, the respondent stated that she had provided the original
file to M.S. and did not maintain a copy of the file. Later, however, the respondent
acknowledged that she did have some electronic mail messages regarding M.S.
‘The respondent did provide Ms. Miller with a couple of electronic mail messages.
Ms. Miller’s impression was that the respondent did not provide all that she had
regarding M.S. Additionally, clearly, the respondent also had billing records per-
taining to M.S. that she failed to provide to Ms. Miller at the time of the interview.

“63. At some point, Ms. Miller requested that the respondent provide trust
account records, Ms. Miller provided the respondent with a deadline to provide
the records. The deadline came and went and the respondent did not provide the
requested records. Later, rather than provide trust account records, the respon-
dent provided Ms. Miller with billing records and a ‘funds transaction listing.’
Ms. Miller clarified that she was seeking trust account records from the bank.
Eventually, counsel for the respondent provided Ms. Miller with the trust account
records from the bank.

“DA11730

“64, On August 24, 2012, B.G. filed an action in divorce from his then wife,
J.G. Suzanne Valdez and Branden Smith represented R.G.

105

“G5. Thereafter, on September 21, 2012, the respondent entered her appear-
ance on behalf of J.G. That same day, the respondent filed a parenting plan which
purported to outline the wishes of J.G. as they related to custody and parenting
time of the couple’s four children. In the parenting plan, the respondent sought
sole legal custody for J.G., the respondent asserted that R.G. should be allowed
limited supervised visitation, and the respondent asserted that custody and par-
enting time disputes be submitted to a mediator experienced with domestic vio-
lence issues. J.G. advised R.G. thereafter that she did not intend to pursue sole
legal custody, did not think that his visits needed to be supervised, and did not
authorize the respondent to include those statements in the parenting plan.

“66. After the respondent submitted the parenting plan, on September 26,
2012, counsel for R.G. wrote to the respondent and demanded that the respon-
dent withdraw the parenting plan because it contained false and defamatory state-
ments about R.G.

“67. On October 1, 2012, counsel for R.G. filed a motion to strike the parent-
ing plan. That same day, the respondent filed a motion to withdraw the temporary
parenting plan, a motion to vacate or modify the ex parte orders, and a new par
enting plan.

“68. On October 2, 2012, the court conducted a hearing regarding the tem-
porary orders and parenting plan. Thereafter, counsel attempted to negotiate the
language of the journal entry. Counsel were unable to reach agreements as to
language to include on all matters.

“69. On October 9, 2012, the respondent forwarded a temporary parenting
plan and a temporary order to the court for consideration. Ms. Valdez did not
sign the temporary parenting plan nor did she sign the temporary order. The re-
spondent's cover letter which accompanied the temporary parenting plan and the
temporary order provided as follows:

‘I submit the enclosed Temporary Orders and Temporary Parenting
Plan following the hearing on October 2, 2012.

“Ms. Valdez and I have exchanged the documents and I submit them
with those revisions we have approved, along with our email correspon-
dence reflecting the same.

“There is presently some slight confusion over whether or not your order
included any adjustments on the child support worksheet so Ms. Valdez
is scheduling a time for us to review the recording. As indicated in the
temporary order we will submit a separate order with the child support
worksheet, or if we cannot reach a consensus [sic] will submit the order
pursuant to Rule 170.

“Because R.G. is arriving for his first visit this evening we believe we
can best promote harmony between the parties if we have these orders ap-
proved and filed prior to his arrival.’

“Based upon the respondent's statement that Ms. Valdez approved the lan-
guage contained in the temporary parenting plan and temporary order, Judge

— |

Sally Pokorny entered the two orders. However, Ms. Valdez had not approved
the revisions to the temporary parenting plan and the temporary order. Further,
additional items in the respondent's cover letter were also false. Ms. Valdez was
not scheduling a time for counsel to review the recording of the October 2, 2012,
hearing. And, Ms. Valdez did not ‘believe’ it was necessary to have the orders
approved and filed prior the R.G.’s arrival to promote harmony. On the tempo-
rary parenting plan and the temporary order which was signed by the respondent
and the court, the words ‘see email approval’ appear where Ms. Valdez’ signature
should have been.

“70. On February 4, 2013, the court held a pretrial conference in anticipa-
tion of trial scheduled for May 9, 2013. At that time, the court ordered the respon-
dent to provide Ms. Valdez with a copy of the respondent's expert witness report
by February 25, 2013. The respondent failed to do so.

“7\[a]. ‘On February 15, 2013, Ms. Valdez took J.G. deposition. During the
deposition, Ms. Valdez asked J.G. a question about what J.G. would like to have to
settle the divorce case. The respondent instructed J.G. to not answer that question
posed by Ms. Valdez.

“TI{b]. On April 1, 2013, the court held a hearing on Ms. Valdez’ motion to
compel. At that time, the court ordered the respondent to provide a copy of the
respondent's expert witness report by April 15, 2013. The respondent failed to do
so.

“72. The respondent finally provided the expert witness report on April 17,
2013. At the time the respondent provided Ms. Valdez with a copy of the expert
witness’ report, the respondent also provided a copy of the report to the court, in
violation of K.S.A. 60-226.

“73, Ms. Valdez contacted the respondent by electronic mail and requested
that the respondent withdraw the report from the court, until the court ordered it
to be filed with the court. The respondent did not withdraw the report.

“74, On April 25, 2013, Ms. Valdez filed a motion to strike J.G.’s expert wit-
ness report, to disallow certain testimony, and for sanctions.

“75. On April 29, 2013, the court ordered the respondent to produce all
documents requested in R.G.’s second request for production of documents. Ad-
ditionally, the respondent was to forward a ‘succinct’ settlement proposal to Ms.
Valdez or Mr. Smith within 24 hours. The respondent failed to comply with the
court's order.

“76. On May 3, 2013, Mr. Smith filed a motion for emergency relief and for
sanctions against J.G. and the respondent. In the motion, Mr. Smith alleged that
the respondent J.G. was deliberately disobeying the court’s order to produce cer-
tain documents. The court denied Mr. Smith’s motion.

“TT. On May 6, 2013, Mr. Smith filed a motion for an order to appear and
show cause. Along with the motion, Mr. Smith provided an affidavit which de-
tailed that the respondent violated the court’s April 29, 2013, order. On May 7,
2013, the court issued an order to the respondent to appear and show cause. On
May 23, 2013, the respondent appeared on the order to show cause. During the

hearing, the court instructed Mr. Smith to provide an affidavit detailing his at-
torney fees if he intended to pursue them. On July 10, 2013, Mr. Smith filed an
affidavit of attorney's fee.

“78. On August 14, 2013, the court entered a memorandum decision regard-
ing attomey fees. The memorandum decision included the following:

“Pending in this divorce case is the request for attorney fees by Bran-
den Smith, who represented [R.G.]. [R.G.]’s primary attorney was Suzanne
Valdez but Mr. Smith also appeared in court. This case was filed August 4,
2012, [sic] and was set for trial on May 9, 2013. Ms. Hawkins represented
fie

“A final pre-trial conference was held on April 29, 2013. Although the
case was just shy of 9 months old, all requested discovery had not been
produced. Previous motions to compel had been filed by both parties. A
motion to compel [J.G.] to comply had been filed and was heard on April
1, 2013.

“One issue at the pre-trial conference concerned the then-recent de-
position of [].G.]. Ms. Hawkins had canceled the first deposition. Then
when the deposition occurred, Ms. Hawkins directed [J.G.] not to answer
questions regarding her position and objectives with regard to debis, as-
sets, and the intended outcome of this case. At the pretrial conference,
[R.G.]’s counsel stated that the deposition was long (almost 8 hours) but
nevertheless unproductive in that [R.G.] apparently still did not know what
[J.G.] was seeking in a settlement or resolution of the case. [].G.]'s attorney
Ms. Hawkins stated that she had directed [J.G.] not to answer deposition
questions because settlement discussions are not admissible in court. Ms.
Hawkins admitted that she erred in instructing her client not to answer
these questions. As far as this Court could discern, it appeared that Ms.
Hawkins and her client either did not know what they wanted from this
litigation or were not in agreement on that subject. At the time, the Court
ordered Ms. Hawkins to provide a settlement statement to.[R.G.]'s lawyer
within 24 hours. .

‘[R.G.] also expressed objection to the fact that [].G.]’s counsel had filed
and faxed the expert report to court chambers, when K.S.A. 60-205(d)
states that only a certificate of service need be filed for expert disclosures.
[R.G.] was concerned that [J.G.] was attempting to bias the Court by sup-
plying premature information, some of which was arguably inadmissible.

“As part of discovery, [R.G.] requested adoption documents in [J.G.}s
possession. Allegations of domestic violence first surfaced in these divorce
proceedings. These essentially undocumented allegations resulted in a
military investigation of [R.G.]. The couple had adopted two children, ages
XX and XX at the time of filing. Since adoption proceedings typically entail
written applications, home studies, and in-depth interviews with prospec-
tive parents, such adoption files were recent and relevant, could be discov-
ered, and could be potentially important.

“Ms. Hawlins stated that she had not received all the financial docu-
ments requested (for the past 10 years), and the Court ordered that the law
[sic] three years of financial documents at issue be produced. At the pre-
trial conference, the Court ordered [J.G.] to produce the adoption records
for the parties’ children and to provide a settlement offer to [R.G.] within
24 hours, and ordered [R.G.] to produce the additional financial records.
At no time did Ms. Hawkins object to producing these documents or claim
a privilege.

“The parties agreed to exchange documents at 4:30 p.m. on May 1,
2013. Shortly before 4:30 p.m., Ms. Hawkins emailed that she would not
allow Mr. Smith to remove the adoption documents from her office and
apparently refused to copy the documents. On May 2, 2013, Ms. Hawkins
emailed and said she would produce some documents later that day. On
May 3, 2013, Ms. Hawkins delivered the adoption document, which deliv-
ery contained 64 pages of typed information, plus 45 blank pages scattered
throughout the document. Upon review, Mr. Smith declared that docu-
ments were missing from the adoption files and the files were incomplete.
Mr. Smith then filed an ex parte motion for emergency relief and sanctions,
which the court denied. In that motion, he requested attorney fees, as well
as seeking [sic] strike [].G.]’s defense of fault in the marriage.

‘Upon the court’s refusal to grant an ex parte hearing for emergency
relief, Mr. Smith then filed an affidavit and Motion for an Order to Appear
and Show Cause why she should not be found in indirect contempt, which
repeated many of the foregoing issues. The contempt matter was heard in
May 23, 2013. In the meantime, the parties announced a settlement agree-
ment in court on May 9, 2013. The agreement was detailed, but the par-
ties had difficulty in drafting a journal entry based upon the settlement
agreement they had reached. At the contempt hearing, many requests were
moot, because the parties had settled the matter. The Court took the issue
of attorney fees under advisement. On July 10, 2013, Mr. Smith filed an
affidavit and bill further detailing the time he had claimed in previous mo-
tions related to discovery issues and motions regarding the same, at a rate
of $175/hx. :

‘The Court will grant attorney fees in this case, pursuant to K.S.A. [2013
Supp.] 60-237(b)(2)(C). That provision states that if a party or a party's of-
ficer fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, “the court must
order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure,
unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.” The [].G.] and her attorney did not offer a
substantial justification for this delay,

“This Court does not expect to hear so many last-minute discovery mo-
tions in a given case and hear that a lawyer instructed her client not to
answer repeated valid questions at a deposition or hear that a lawyer agreed

in court to produce a document and was ordered to produce the document
but ultimately sent 45 blank pages in a document without lodging any for-
mal objection to producing it. The Court has reviewed Mr. Smith’s affidavit
requesting 15.6 billable hours for $2,730.00. The court attributes 9 hours to
the failure of Ms. Hawkins to turn over discovery and awards attomey fees
to Mr. Smith of $1,575.00, (9 hours @ $175/hr.), to be paid by Ms. Hawkins.
The Court assesses the fees against Ms. Hawkins, the attomey, because
[J.G.] provided the documents to her attorney, who did not turn them over.
Ms. Hawkins is directed to pay these fees in 60 days.’

“79, On August 23, 2013, the respondent appealed the court’s order.

“80. In the divorce decree, the court awarded marital property located in
Alabama to R.G. The court ordered J.G. to execute a quit claim deed in favor of
RG. J.G. executed the quit claim deed and provided it to the respondent. Dur-
ing the pendency of the appeal, the respondent refused to turn over the quit
claim deed to opposing counsel until a journal entry and other court orders were
agreed to. In the spring 2014, after the disciplinary administrator's office became
involved, the respondent finally turned over the quit claim deed.

“81. On November 18, 2013, Ms. Valdez filed a motion for an involuntary
dismissal of the appeal. Thereafter, on December 9, 2013, the Kansas Court
of Appeals granted Ms. Valdez’ motion and dismissed the appeal. However, on
December 27, 2013, the respondent filed a motion to reinstate the appeal. Ms.
Valdez did not respond to the respondent's motion and the court reinstated the
appeal.

“82. To date, the respondent has not paid the sanction of attorney fees or-
dered by the district court as the issue remains pending on appeal before the
Kansas Court of Appeals.

“DA11918

“83. Following a court hearing on October 12, 2012, G.P. met with the re-
spondent seeking representation in a protection from abuse: case filed by T.S.
Additionally, G.P. sought to retain the respondent to seek to obtain grandparent
visitation rights. On October 15, 2012, the respondent ran a conflict check. The
respondent's check did not reveal a conflict. G.P. paid the respondent $1,100 for
the representation.

“84, On October 29, 2012, the respondent wrote to G.P. detailing the terms
of the representation. On October 31, 2012, the respondent entered her appear-
ance on behalf of G.P. At that time, a hearing was scheduled for November 13,
2012, in the protection from abuse case.

“85. At some point, G.P. told the respondent she needed 10 to 14 days ad-
vance notice to arrange for transportation to and from scheduled hearings. G.P.
did not tell the respondent that she could not attend court hearings because she
did not have transportation. She simply told the respondent t that she needed ad-
vanced notice to make necessary arrangements.

“86. The respondent and Bethany Roberts, opposing counsel, agreed to con-

tinue the hearing. The respondent prepared and signed an agreed order. The re-
spondent forwarded the order to Ms. Roberts who also signed the order. Later,
the court entered the order and continued the hearing to January 3, 2013. How-
ever, the respondent failed to inform G.P. that the case had been continued and on
November 13, 2012, G.P. traveled from Eudora, Kansas, to the Shawnee County
District Court for the hearing.

“87. On December 29, 2012, the respondent sent an electronic mail message
to Ms. Roberts. In the message, the respondent stated:

“My client informs me that she has difficulty with transportation. Wonder-

ing if you would be agreeable to reschedule if she cannot be there on the

8rd.

‘I am meeting with her Monday about your proposed agreed order. Hon-

estly don’t think she is going to agree but will see.’

At no time, did G.P. tell the respondent that she could not attend the hearing on
January 3, 2013, because of a lack of transportation.

“88. On December 31, 2012, the respondent and G.P. spoke by telephone.
The respondent informed G.P. that she was going to visit with Ms. Roberts about
the hearing and would be in touch. The respondent did not call G.P. prior to the
hearing. . .

“89. Because the respondent informed her that G.P. was unable to attend the
hearing because of transportation problems, Ms. Roberts agreed to continue the
hearing scheduled for January 3, 2013.

“90. On January 3, 2013, G.P. repeatedly called the Shawnee County District
Court to ask whether the hearing remained scheduled to be heard that day. G.P.
was repeatedly told that the hearing was proceeding that day, as an order continu-
ing it had not been entered. On January 3, 2013, the court called G.P’s case. Ms.
Roberts informed the court, based upon the respondent's statements, that G.P.
was unable to attend the hearing due to transportation problems and that Ms.
Roberts had agreed to present the respondent’s agreed order to continue the case
on the respondent’s behalf. At that time, G.P. stood up in the courtroom and an-
nounced her presence. The court continued the hearing to February 5, 2012.

“91. On January 16, 2013, T.S, informed Ms. Roberts that the respondent
had previously represented her. Thereafter, Ms. Roberts informed the- respondent
of the conflict. At that time, the respondent did not inform G.P. of the conflict.

“92. On February 3, 2013, Ms. Roberts informed the respondent that T.S.
declined to waive the conflict. On February 5, 2012, the date of the next sched-
uled hearing, the respondent filed a motion to withdraw from the representation
due to the conflict of interest. G.P. first learned of the conflict on February 5,
2013, when the respondent sought to withdraw from the representation.

“Conclusions of Law

“93. Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter
of law that in DATI619, the respondent violated KRPC 3.2, KRPC 3.3, KRPC
8.4(c), and KRPC 8.4(d); in DA11687, the respondent violated KRPC 1:16(d) and

M1

KRPC 8.1(b); in DA11730, the respondent violated KRPC 3.2, KRPC 3.3, KRPC
3.4, KRPC 8.4(c), and KRPC 8.4(d); and in DA11918, the respondent violated
KRPC 3.3, as detailed below. [Footnote: In addition, Ms. Knoll alleged that the
respondent also violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.9, KRPC 1.15,
and KRPC 3.1. The hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that clear and
convincing evidence was not presented to establish that the respondent violated
KRPC 1.3, KRPC 14, KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.9, KRPC 1.15, and KRPC 3.1. Ac-
cordingly, the hearing panel dismisses the allegations that the respondent violated
KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.9, KRPC 1.15, and KRPC 3.1.]

“KRPC 1.16

“94, KRPC 1.16 requires lawyers to take certain steps to protect clients after
the representation has been terminated. Specifically, KRPC 1.16(d) provides as
follows:

‘Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled
and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The
lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by
other law.”

The respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d) in connection with her termination of
representation of M.S. In that case, the respondent failed to timely provide the
psychological report and police reports to Ms, Durkin in DA11637. Further, the
respondent delayed in providing the file to M.S. when M.S. had only 10 days to
determine whether to file written objections to the case manager's written recom-
mendations. Finally, the respondent failed to timely refund unearned fees to M.S.
As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d)
in connection to the respondent's termination of representation of M.S.

“KRPC 3.2

“95. An attorney violates KRPC 3.2 if she fails to make reasonable efforts to
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of his client. The respondent failed
to expedite litigation in two cases.

“96. First, the respondent engaged in a number of activities that resulted in
unnecessary delay in considering the issues pending in B.S.’s case. The respon-
dent failed to timely respond to requests from opposing counsel to negotiate a
settlement or schedule a hearing, which caused delay. Further, by informing the
court’s clerk that neither she nor her client would not be appearing in court at the
May 9, 2012, scheduled hearing caused the court to review unnecessary motions
and hold unnecessary hearings and caused an unnecessary delay in resolving the
pending issues between B.S. and AS,

“97. Second, in her representation of J.G., the respondent failed to expedite
the litigation consistent with the interests of her client. The respondent filed a

temporary parenting plan which did not reflect the interests or the position of
J.G. After filing the initial temporary parenting plan, the respondent had to file a
motion [sic] withdraw that plan which delayed consideration of a parenting plan
which did accurately reflect the interests and position of her client. Further, the
respondent violated KRPC 3.2 when she withheld the quit claim deed in an at-
tempt to remove the sanctions that the court entered against her personally.

“98. The respondent's obstructionist approach to the practice of law in B.S.’
case and J.G.’s case caused unnecessary delay. Accordingly, the hearing panel con-
cludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.2, by failing to expedite litigation.

“KRPC 3.3

“99. ‘A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law
to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously
made to the tribunal by the lawyer.’ KRPC 3.3(a)(1). In this case, the respondent
violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1) in three separate cases.

“100. First, the respondent repeatedly made false statements of material fact
in the B.S. case. The respondent made false statements in pleadings filed with
the court and on the record in B.S.’s case when she denied informing the court
clerk that neither she nor her client would be attending the hearing as she had
not received proper service. The respondent’s statements were false, material, and
made to the court. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent made
false statements of material facts to a tribunal in B.S.’s case, in violation of KRPC
3.3(a)(1).

“101. Second, the respondent made false statements of material fact in her
representation of J.G. In that case, when the respondent informed the court that
Ms. Valdez approved the temporary parenting plan and the temporary order when
she had not. Ms. Loveland additionally testified that during her investigation the
respondent admitted that there was not an agreement on everything. Thus, the
respondent made false statements of material fact, in violation of KRPC 3.3(a)(1).

“102, Finally, in G.P’s case, respondent informed Ms. Roberts that G.P. could
not attend the hearing because G.P. did not have transportation to the hearing.
‘That statement was false and the respondent knew the statement was false, as G.P.
told the respondent that she needed 10 to 14 days’ notice to make transportation
arrangement. At the time the respondent informed Ms. Roberts that G.P. could
not attend the hearing due to transportation difficulties, the respondent reason-
ably should have expected that Ms. Roberts would explain the reason for the con-
tinuance to the judge. At no time, did the respondent inform the court (or Ms.
Roberts, for that matter) that the statement that G.P. could not attend the hearing
due to transportation difficulties was false.

“103. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondént repeat-
edly made false statements to tribunals and, in addition, caused false statements
to be made to a tribunal, in violation of KRPC 3.3(a)(1).

“KRPC 3.4
“104. ‘A lawyer shall not . . . in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery

request or fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request by an opposing party.’ During J.G.’s deposition, the respondent
improperly directed J.G. to refuse to answer questions regarding what J.G. sought
during the divorce proceeding. The information sought by opposing counsel was
proper discovery — it was sought in an attempt to resolve the pending divorce pro-
ceeding. Further, the respondent failed to comply with the court’s order regarding
the discovery of the adoption records. By instructing her client to refuse to answer
deposition questions and by failing to comply with the court’s order regarding the
adoption records, the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(d) in her representation of
jc.

“KRPC 8.1

“105. Lawyers must cooperate in disciplinary investigations. KRPC 8.1(b)
provides the requirements in this regard. ‘[A] lawyer in connection with a. . .
disciplinary matter, shall not: . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand
for information from [a] .. . disciplinary authority . . ’ KRPC 8.1(b). The respon-
dent knew that she was required to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation
and provide the documents and records as directed by the attorney investigator.
‘The respondent failed to provide her file and trust account records as directed by
Ms. Miller during the investigation of M.S.’s complaint. Because the respondent
Imowingly failed to cooperate in the investigation, the hearing panel concludes
that the respondent violated KRPC 8.1(b).

“KRPC 8.4(c)

“106. ‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.’ KRPC 8.4(c). The re-
spondent engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty in two cases: B.S.’s case and

.G.’s case.
} “107. First, the respondent engaged in dishonest conduct in her representa-
tion of B.S. when she falsely stated in pleadings and in open court that she did not
tell the court clerk that neither she nor her client would be appearing at a hear-
ing on May 9, 2012, because she had not received proper service. Further, the
respondent engaged in dishonest conduct when she made the same statement in
her initial response to the complaint filed regarding her representation of B.S.

“108. Also, the respondent engaged in dishonest conduct in her representa-
tion of J.G. when she falsely informed Judge Pokorny that Ms. Valdez had ap-
proved the temporary parenting plan and the temporary orders in electronic mail
messages.

“109. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated
KRPC 8.4(c) in her representation of B.S. and J.C.

“KRPC 8.4(d)

“110. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice. KRPC 8.4(d). In two cases, B.S.’s
case and J.G.’s case, the respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice.

“111. The respondent engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice when she attempted to impugn Ms. Olberding’s reputation by
stating that Ms. Olberding miscommunicated what the respondent stated on the
telephone. Further, the respondent engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice when she told her client that his appearance was not nec-
essary. Had the respondent refrained from telling the clerk that neither she nor
her client would be appearing and had the respondent refrained from telling her
client that his appearance was not necessary, the district court could have resolved
the outstanding issues remaining in B.S. and A.S.’s case. As it was, the court could
not proceed based solely on the respondent's misconduct.

“112. Likewise, the respondent engaged in conduct which was prejudicial to
the administration of justice when she refused to turn over the quit claim deed
executed by J.C. to opposing counsel which would allow R.G. to sell the Alabama
property. Further, the respondent engaged in conduct which was prejudicial to
the administration of justice when she directed her client to refuse to answer
questions in the deposition regarding what J.G. wanted in the divorce proceeding
by way of settlement. Finally, the respondent engaged in the conduct which was
prejudicial to the administration of justice when she failed to comply with the
court’s order regarding discovery relating to the adoption records.

“113. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent repeatedly
violated KRPC 8.4(d) in her representation of B.S. and J.C.

“American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

“114. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel con-
sidered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ‘Standards’). Pursuant to Standard 3, the
factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the po-
tential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

“115. Duty Violated. The respondent violated her duty to her client to prop-
erly terminate representation. The respondent violated her duty to the public to
maintain her personal integrity. Finally, the respondent violated her duty to the
legal system to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of her client.

“116. Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated her duties.

“117. Injury. As a result of the respondent’s misconduct, the respondent
caused actual injury to her clients, the legal profession, and the legal system.

a. Ms. Butler testified directly regarding the injury suffered both by

her client and by the legal system. According to Ms. Butler, her client, B.S.,

incurred additional legal fees as a result of the respondent's misconduct

and, additionally, B.S. unnecessarily missed a school session to appear in
court, when the respondent had informed the clerk’s office that she would
not be appearing. Ms. Butler also testified that the legal system was injured

115

by the respondent when the respondent used an impertinent tone with the

court and attacked both Ms. Butler and Ms. Olberding.

b. The respondent's misconduct in DA11730 resulted in injury to the
legal system and to the parties. Specifically, the respondent's actions frus-
trated the forward action of the case, increased confusion between the par-
ties, and frustrated the court.

“Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

“118. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
aggravating factors present:

“119. Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously disci-
plined on one occasion. On June 1, 2012, the respondent entered into the attorney
diversion program, under Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 203(d), for violations of KRPC 1.3 and
KRPC 1.4. Whether the respondent successfully completed the terms and condi-
tions of the diversion agreement is disputed by the parties. However, it is not nec-
essary for the hearing panel to resolve that issue, as the respondent's participation
in the attomey diversion program was offered only as a matter of aggravation.

“120. A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of mis-
conduct. A common theme that runs throughout the four cases presently before
the hearing panel is obstruction. In the hearing panel’s estimation, it appears that
the respondent repeatedly engaged in subterfuge in order to either increase her
billable fees to her client or to cause unnecessary and unreasonable delay in han-
dling pending matters. Regardless of the respondent's motivation, the pattern of
obstructing justice causes the hearing panel serious concern.

“121. Multiple’ Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations
in four cases. The respondent violated KRPC 1.16, KRPC 3.2, KRPC 3.3, KRPC
3.4, KRPC 8.1, KRPC 8.4(c), and KRPC 8.4(d). Accordingly, the hearing panel
concludes that the respondent committed multiple offenses.

“122, Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceédling by Intentionally
Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary’ Process. The respon-
dent failed to comply with Ms. Miller’s requests in investigating M.S.’s complaint.
The respondent’ failure to cooperate is an aggravating factor in this case.

“123. Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct. The respondent
has refused to acknowledge that her conduct violated the Kansas Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. The respondent's refusal to acknowledge any wrongdoing or
accept responsibility for her actions further aggravates an already serious case of
attorney misconduct.

“124. Indifference to Making Restitution. To date, the respondent has not paid
the sanction ordered by the district court.in J.G.’s divorce case. However, the
respondent appealed the order to pay Mr. Smith’s attoriey fees and the appeal
remains pending. Also, in DA11637, the respondent has not returned materials
from the client's file as requested more than 2% years ago.

“125. In addition to the factors listed above, the hearing panel also notes that
the record was void of any ‘good character’ evidence. Rather, seven attorneys in
her legal community testified and all seven testified to problems or negative ex-
periences in working with the respondent. Specifically, both Ms. Butler and Ms.
Durkin testified that because of past difficulties, they employ different methods
of correspondence with the respondent than they do with other attorneys. Specifi-
cally, Ms. Butler and Ms. Durkin both testified that all correspondence with the
respondent is done in writing to preserve a record of communication.

“126. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found no mitigating
circumstances present.

“127. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

‘5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

“(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that serious ad-
versely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.

‘5.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly en-
gages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness
to practice law.

‘6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false
statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that
material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no re-
medial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the
legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect
on the legal proceeding.

‘6.22 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court
order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a
party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceed-
ing,

‘7.2. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engag-
es in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional, and
causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal
system.

“Recommendation
“128.[a] The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be

indefinitely suspended from the practice of law or disbarred. On the other hand,
the respondent recoihmended that she be allowed to continue to practice law.

117

“129.[a] The hearing panel considered that there were four separate cases
with rule violations, in addition to past discipline. The hearing panel considered
that the respondent's violations injured her clients, opposing parties, attorneys,
judges, courthouse staff, and, in general, the legal profession.

“128.[b] The standards which are applicable in this case provide for a wide
range of appropriate discipline—from reprimand to disbarment. While the hear-
ing panel is certain that reprimand is not a sufficient discipline to recommend giv-
en the serious nature of the misconduct, the hearing panel is also likewise certain
that disbarment is not warranted. The respondent engaged in serious misconduct.
And, serious misconduct calls for serious discipline. In this case, the hearing panel
unanimously recommends that the respondent be suspended from the practice
of law. The hearing panel is divided, however, as to the length of the suspension.

“129.[b] Based upon the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, aggravating
factors, and the lack of mitigating factors, a majority of the hearing panel recom-
mends that the respondent be suspended for a period of 18 months.

“130. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified
by the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator.”

The panel's presiding officer dissented from the recommended
suspension period of 18 months, believing that a suspension period
of 1 year was more appropriate.

The respondent filed exceptions to the final hearing report, ar-
guing that the Disciplinary Administrator's office failed to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that she violated any rule. Con-
sequently, she also argued that the recommended discipline of 18
months’ suspension was unwarranted. She raised these issues in
her subsequent brief. They will each be addressed in turn.

DISCUSSION

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence,
the findings of the disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the par-
ties and determines whether violations of KRPC exist and, if they
do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292
Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); Supreme Court Rule 211(f)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). Clear and convincing evidence is
“‘evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that “the truth of
the facts asserted is highly probable.”’” In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498,
505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725,
188 P.3d 1 [2008]). This court does not reweigh the evidence or as-

sess the credibility of witnesses. In re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 190,
159 P.3d 1011 (2007). “Rather, this court examines any disputed
findings of fact and determines whether clear and convincing evi-
dence supports the panel's findings. [Citation omitted.] If so, the
findings will stand.” In re Trester, 285 Kan. 404, 408-09, 172 P.3d
31 (2007).

Hawkins was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to
which she filed an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing be-
fore the panel and the hearing before this court.

A. KRPC 1.16(d)

Hawkins argues that the panel erred in concluding that her con-
duct in winding up her representation of M.S. in DA11637 consti-
tuted a violation of KRPC 1.16(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 573).
The rule states:

“Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable no-
tice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance
payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to
the client to the extent permitted by other law.”

The panel concluded that Hawkins violated KRPC 1.16(d) by
(1) failing to provide the psychological evaluation and police report
to Amy Durkin, M.S.’s subsequent attorney; (2) taking 8 days to
provide M.S. with the file when she only had 10 days to file ob-
jections to the case manager's recommendations; and (3) failing to
timely refund uneamed legal fees to M.S.

1. The Case File, the Psychological Evaluation, and the Police
Report

Hawkins claims that her delay in providing the case file to M.S.
and her failure to provide Durkin with the psychological evalua-
tion and the police report (contained within the case file) can be
explained by the fact that M.S. only made one request for her file—
on May 2, 2012—and that prior to picking up her file on May 10,
2012, she informed Hawkins that she would not be filing an ob-
jection to the case manager's recommendations, apparently indi-

cating to Hawkins that a quick transfer of the case file, including
the evaluation and police report, was not essential to protecting
M.S.’s interests. Hawkins further claims that she called Durkin on
May 9, 2012, regarding the evaluation and report but that Durkin
never returned her call. Hawkins also points out that Durkin testi-
fied before the panel that the evaluation and report were no longer
needed because she never filed objections to the case manager's
recommendations and that M.S.’s former husband was no longer
having contact with their children.

The record shows that on April 30, 2012, the case manager in
M.S.’s case mailed and emailed her written recommendations to
the parties and to the judge presiding over the case. It appears that
the recommendations were entered into the district court's filing
system on May 3, 2012. And the recommendations were not ap-
proved by the judge until May 21, 2012.

On Wednesday, May 2, 2012, M.S. left a hand-written note at
Hawkins’ office, requesting her case file “as soon as possible.” The
note did not mention anything about M.S. wishing to terminate
Hawkins as her attorney. That same day at 3:08 p.m., Hawkins
wrote M.S. an email, acknowledging that she had received M.S.’s
request and informing her that the file would be ready for her to
pick up on May 10, 2012. In the email, Hawkins also stated:

“In the meantime do you want me to follow through on any of the matters we
discussed?

“1. Communicating to Trina [the case manager] a mea culpa
“2, Speaking with the Guardian ad Litem to see if she will agree with
the objection re continuing case management
“3. Preparing the objection
“4, Any other matters
“Please advise.” (Emphasis added.)

Hawkins sent the same email later that day at 9:54 p.m.

Though Durkin testified that she entered her appearance as
M.S.’s attorney on May 2 or 3, records from the Douglas County
District Court indicate that she entered her appearance on May 4.

At 11:46 a.m. on Monday, May 7, Hawkins sent another email to
M.S., stating: “I did not receive a response so I assume you do not
wish for me to take any further action and will assume my repre-

sentation has been terminated, unless I hear otherwise from you.”
Later that day at 2 p.m., Hawkins forwarded to M.S. the email she
had sent her twice on May 2. At the top of the email, Hawkins not-
ed that the message had “been previously sent three times,” that “at
least one of them was returned,” and that she was looking forward
to M.S.’s response.

At 6:58 p.m. on May 7, M.S. finally responded to Hawkins’
emails, informing her that she would be at Hawkins’ office on
May 10 to pick up the case file. In the email, M.S. specifically told
Hawkins that there was “[nJo need to prepare an objection.” M.S.
apologized for “the slow reply,” noting that she had “been in KC
today, and not home.”

At 2:12 p.m. on May 8, Hawkins sent an email to Durkin, noting
that she had received Durkin’s entry of appearance. Hawkins also
wrote: “Do you want to pick up the file so I can answer your ques-
tions or do you prefer I give it to [M.S.]?” Five minutes later, Dur-
kin replied to the email, stating: “It is fine if you give it to [M.S.].
I don’t think that I have any questions right now.” Phone records
indicate that Hawkins placed a 2-minute call to Durkin’s office in
Eudora on May 9.

On May 10, 2012, M.S. picked up the file from Hawkins’ office.
Hawkins required M.S. to sign a receipt when she picked up the
file. The receipt stated:

“This is to certify that on this date I have received the original documents and
exhibits I submitted along with pleadings, exhibits, and correspondence from the
Jaw office of J. Hawk Law Ltd.

“I understand there are certain items to which I cannot directly receive, and those
items to-wit: psychological evaluation, police reports, will be forwarded directly to
my attorney, Amy Durkin.

“Ihave had the opportunity to review the items returned and it does contain those
items listed above, less those items that I cannot directly receive.”

Ultimately, Hawkins admitted in her testimony before the panel
that she never forwarded the psychological evaluation or the police
report to Durkin and that both documents were still in her posses-
sion. Durkin testified that though M.S. was not completely satisfied
with the case manager’s recommendations, objections were never
filed due to the short timeframe for doing so. Durkin also testified

that she did not become aware of the existence of the psychological
evaluation or the police report until she spoke with the Disciplinary
Administrator's office regarding M.S.’s complaint. Durkin stated
that had she timely received the psychological evaluation (presum-
ably a document she has never reviewed), she may have filed ob-
jections to the case manager's recommendations. At the time of
her testimony before the hearing panel (October 9, 2014), Durkin
noted that having the documents now within her file was unimport-
ant to her current representation of M.S., considering that M.S.
had sole legal custody of the children and that her ex-husband was
no longer having contact with the children.

Though the parties agree that M.S. had 10 days to file objections
to the recommendations, neither party explains when the time pe-
riod began to run or whether only business days or all days were
counted for purposes of determining the 10-day period. Thus, it is
unclear when the exact deadline was for M.S. to file her objections.
Consequently, this makes it difficult to judge whether Hawkins’
transfer of the case file to M.S. on May 10, 2012, was reasonable
under the circumstances. Regardless, the evidence above indicates
that when Hawkins received M.S.’s written request for her case file
on May 2, Hawkins responded via email that same day, informing
MLS. that she could pick up her case file on May 10 and asking her
whether she wanted Hawkins, among other things, to prepare the
objections to the case manager’s recommendations. If Hawkins, as
her May 2 email indicates, was acting under the assumption that
she would be preparing the objections for M.S., then it certainly
cannot be said that she acted unreasonably by setting May 10 as
the date for M.S. to pick up her case file. Furthermore, when M.S.
finally responded to Hawkins’ numerous emails on May 7, M.S.
expressed no concern with picking up her case file on May 10 and
told Hawkins that there was no need to prepare objections. Under
these facts, it cannot be said that Hawkins failed to “take steps to
the extent reasonably practicable to protect” M.S.’s interests. See
KRPC 1.16(d).

Though Hawkins’ transfer of the case file to M.S. on May 10
does not appear to constitute a violation of KRPC 1.16(d), the
same cannot be said of Hawkins’ failure to forward the psycho-

logical evaluation or the police report to Durkin. Though hindsight
shows that M.S. was not harmed by Hawkins’ failure to forward the
documents to Durkin, it does not change the fact that under KRPC
1.16(d), Hawkins had a duty to timely forward the documents to
Durkin. Hawkins could not provide the hearing panel with a valid
reason for why she still retained the documents. Accordingly, we
find sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the hearing panel's
conclusion that Hawkins violated KRPC 1.16(d) by failing to for-
ward the documents to Durkin.

2. Returning Unearned Legal Fees to M.S.

In Hawkins’ answer to the complaint, she admitted that M.S.,
at the time she terminated Hawkins as her attorney, requested a
refund of the unearned fees she had advanced to Hawkins. The
record shows that between June 11 and July 9, 2012, M.S. called
Hawkins’ office numerous times requesting an accounting and
a refund of any unearned fees. In her answer to the complaint,
Hawkins admitted that on July 9, 2012, she sent M.S. a checkin the
amount of $691.17. On August 13, 2012, Hawkins sent M.S. a bill-
ing statement, a letter, and a check for $215. This amount included
1 hour of time ($185) that was withheld from the first refund plus
acredit of $30.

In an apparent attempt to explain the delay in refunding the
uneamed fees to M.S., Hawkins states that “when M.S. requested
her refund, Hawkins informed M.S. she was providing a full ac-
counting” and that “[alfter the full accounting, Ms. Hawkins did
return all of her unearned fees to M.S.” Regardless of whether this
is true, it does not change the fact that it took Hawkins 3 months af-
ter her representation of M.S. had ended to refund M.S. all of her
money. Hawkins does not explain in her brief why a “full account-
ing” would take so long. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence in
the record to sustain the hearing panel's conclusion that Hawkins
violated KRPC 1.16(d) by failing to timely refund unearned legal
fees to M.S.

B. KRPC 3.2

KRPC 3.2 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 595) states: “A lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the

interests of the client.” Hawkins argues that the panel erred in con-
cluding that she violated KRPC 3.2 by taking an “obstructionist
approach to the practice of law” in B.S.’s case (DA11619) and J.G.’s
case (DA11730) which “caused unnecessary delay.”

1. Hawkins’ Representation of B.S.

The panel found that in B.S.’s case, the respondent caused delay
by failing to timely respond to requests from Julia Butler, her op-
posing counsel, to negotiate a settlement or schedule a hearing,
and by informing Michelle Olberding, the deputy court clerk, that
neither she nor her client would be appearing at the May 9, 2012,
hearing, which in turn “caused the court to review unnecessary
motions and hold unnecessary hearings and caused an unnecessary
delay in resolving the pending issues between B.S. and A.S.”

With regard to the finding that Hawkins failed to timely respond
to Butler, Hawkins simply states that the “Panel's Report does not
support such a finding.” She then proceeds to give a recitation of
the evidence without any explanation of why it does not establish
her tardiness in responding to opposing counsel’s emails. Despite
reciting this evidence, Hawkins also states that “the complaint file
in DAI1619, alone, does not rise to the level of clear and convinc-
ing evidence,” apparently suggesting that the complaint Butler
filed with the Disciplinary Administrator was the only evidence
presented at the hearing to show that Hawkins was tardy with her
responses. The problem with Hawkins’ argument is that Butler
testified before the hearing panel regarding the trouble she ha
communicating with Hawkins. Copies of the entails at issue were
also introduced into evidence at trial verifying the panel's findings.

Hawkins, curiously, argues that because there was conflicting
evidence (i.e., her testimony versus the testimony of Olberding,
the deputy clerk of the Jefferson County District Court), the panel
could not have found by clear and convincing evidence that she
informed Olberding on the morning of May 9, 2012, that neither
she nor her client would be attending the hearing scheduled later
that day. Simply stated, the panel made a credibility determination,
finding the deputy clerk more credible than Hawkins. On appeal,
this court does not reweigh the evidence or assess'the credibility o!

“ EE i

witnesses. In re Comfort, 284 Kan. at 190. The panel had sufficient
evidence before it to find that it was highly probable that Hawkins
told the deputy clerk that neither she nor her client would be ap-
pearing for the May 9 hearing.

2. Hawkins’ Representation of J.G.

The hearing panel concluded that Hawkins, by filing a tempo-
rary parenting plan which did not reflect the interests or the posi-
tion of J.G., failed to expedite litigation consistent with the interests
of her client. The panel noted that after filing the initial temporary
parenting plan, Hawkins had to file a motion to withdraw that plan
which delayed consideration of a parenting plan which did accu-
rately reflect the interests and position of J.G. The panel also con-
cluded that Hawkins violated KRPC 3.2 when she refused to turn
over the quitclaim deed to R.G. in an attempt to remove the sanc-
tions that the court entered against her personally.

Hawkins attacks the panel's findings regarding the temporary
parenting plan by arguing that the findings were taken solely from
the original complaint that Suzanne Valdez (opposing counsel in
the underlying matter) filed against her. Hawkins then proceeds
to argue that the temporary parenting plan “accurately reflected
J.G.’s wishes and concerns” and that Hawkins and J.G. decided to
withdraw “the plan for strategic reasons because R.G. threatened
and harassed J.G. after the proposed plan was filed.”

Though Hawkins is correct that the hearing panel based its fac-
tual findings re¥arding the temporary parenting plan on informa-
tion contained ‘within Valdez’ complaint, she fails to acknowledge
that Valdez’ testimony (via deposition) was presented as evidence
to the hearing panel and was consistent with the allegations Valdez
made within her complaint. She also fails to acknowledge that at-
tached to the complaint was documentary evidence (¢.g., portions
of an email from J.G. to R.G.) indicating that the initial parenting
plan did not reflect J.G.’s wishes. Though Hawkins testified before
the hearing panel that the parenting plan did accurately reflect the
matters that she had discussed with J.G., Hawkins was unable to
confirm that J.G. had reviewed the parenting plan before Hawkins
had filed it with the court. Notably, the record indicates Hawkins

mailed the parenting plan to J.G. on the same day she filed it with
the court. Despite Hawkins’ testimony to the contrary, the panel
had evidence before it showing that it was highly probable that
the parenting plan Hawkins filed did not reflect the wishes of her
client.
With regard to the quitclaim deed, the hearing panel found that
the district court, within its divorce decree,
“awarded marital property located in Alabama to R.G. The court ordered J.G. to
- execute a quit claim deed in favor of R.G. J.G. executed the quit claim deed and
provided it to the respondent. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent
refused to turn over the quit claim deed to opposing counsel until a journal entry
and other court orders were agreed to. In the spring, 2014, after the disciplinary
administrator's office became involved, the respondent finally turned over the quit
claim deed.”

Based on this finding, the panel concluded that Hawkins violated
KRPC 3.2 when she withheld the quitclaim deed in an attempt to
remove the sanctions that the court entered against her personally.

As can be discerned from the hearing panel findings in DA11730,
the divorce case between J.G. and R.G. was, to put it mildly, a con-
tentious affair. Highly summarized, the record indicates that the
parties eventually entered mediation, reached what they thought
was an agreement on how to settle the case, but then could not
agree on the exact language needed to memorialize their agree-
ment. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 170(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. An-
not. 264), the parties submitted their competing drafts of their
agreement to the district court so it could settle the matter, result-
ing in the district court filing the divorce decree mentioned above
on July 24, 2013. Though the divorce decree awarded a home lo-
cated in Alabama to R.G., there is no specific order within it com-
manding J.G. to execute a quitclaim deed in R.G.’s favor. Valdez
indicated that R.G. wanted the quitclaim deed so he could sell the
home.

In addition to the divorce decree, the district court filed a mem-
orandum decision on August 14, 2013, ordering Hawkins to pay
$1,575 in attorney fees in connection with her supposed failure to
comply with a court order to make available to R.G.’s attorneys
adoption records of the couple’s children. 6

On August 22, 2013, Hawkins filed a notice of appeal, chal-
lenging (1) the divorce decree on the basis that it did not reflect
the entirety of the parties’ agreement and (2) the order for her to
pay attorney fees. On September 10, 2013, Valdez filed a notice
of cross-appeal, challenging “certain judgments entered herein on
July 24, 2013; and all previous rulings on all issues decided therein
to the Kansas Court of Appeals.”

While this appeal was pending, the parties returned to media-
tion to work out their remaining differences. It must be pointed out -
that the issues addressed in mediation were solely those involving
R.G. and J.G.; mediation did not address the attorney fee sanction
personally levied against Hawkins. Highly summarized, in October
2013, Valdez and Hawkins exchanged numerous emails indicating
that R.G. and J.G. had reached a settlement. The attorneys dis-
cussed how to memorialize and file the settlement with the district
court and what actions each party needed to take in order to imple-
ment their agreement (e.g, J.G. executing a quitclaim deed and
elivering it to R.G.). The attorneys also discussed what impact the
ettlement should have on the appeal pending before the Court
Appeals. Valdez believed that the settlement should result in a
oluntary dismissal of the entire appeal. Hawkins disagreed, noting
at though R.G. and J.G.’s settlement may have rendered as moot
my appellate issues concerning the divorce decree, the attorney
‘ee sanction was stil] at issue. Thus, Hawkins refused to dismiss the

eal.
Ome email in, particular, an email Hawkins wrote to Valdez on
October 17, 2013, detailed Hawkins’ understanding of the tasks
i
a

mon

2 mp

at needed to be completed by both sides in order to implement
e parties’ agreement. The email also demonstrates Hawkins’ un-
derstanding of what impact the parties’ settlement should have on
the pending appeal. Because the Disciplinary Administrator relies
solely on this email to argue that Hawkins attempted to coerce
Valdez into abandoning the attorney fee sanction in exchange for
Hawkins agreeing to deliver the quitclaim deed to Valdez’ client,
the email is quoted in its entirety:

“Suzanne,
“T, like you, am pleased that Susan Kraus was able to work with the parties to

resolve the majority of the outstanding issues in mediation. I have reviewed the
memorandums of understanding with my client and she expresses a desire that
once these MOUs are filed that there are no loose ends. The loose ends pres-
ently are: (1) The Military Retired Pay Court Order, (2) the agreed Parenting Plan
signed by the parties, (3) assurance there will be no modification of maintenance
award, (4) quit claim deed, (5) LES statements.

“I am seeking your cooperation to get all of these matters wrapped up and the
necessary paperwork on file with District Court and the Court of Appeals by
Thursday of next week.

“I propose the journal entry incorporating the Memorandum of Understanding
regarding the Supplement to Property Settlement Agreement also incorporate
by reference the agreed parenting plan (I have the original signed by both par-
ties), Military Retired Pay Court Order, and a second Supplement to Property
Settlement Agreement that incorporates the financial awards contained in the
Decree of Divorce and Journal Entry of Final Settlement into the parties mutual
agreement. That eliminates the possibility of either party revisiting the property
settlement terms and would make the appeal addressing those issues moot with or
without a dismissal.

“The journal entry should contain a space for both of our signatures as well as
the judge so that once ordered [sic] becomes incorporated into the Decree of
Divorce].] Before the journal entry is filed in District Court along with the afore-
mentioned documents, your client needs to forward the LES statements he prom-
ised during mediation. I can approve the remainder of the paperwork once that
has been received.

“Upon filing I will provide a signed quitclaim deed for the real estate.

“RE: Voluntary dismissal of Appeal
I received a phone call from the Court of Appeals regarding the fax they received
from Branden [Valdez’ co-counsel]. They are not filing the Voluntary Dismissal
as it is improperly filed. Both parties are represented by counsel, therefore any
dismissal must be signed by their attorneys of record.

“I am willing to sign a stipulated joint dismissal if you file a document in District
Court that the attorney fees judgment will not be pursued. Absent there being an
agreement not to pursue the attorney fees judgment I intend to proceed with that
appeal.

“If you intend to enforce the award of attorney fees I am still amenable to dismiss-
ing all but the attorneys fees judgment upon the filing of the journal entry and
accompanying documents referenced above; however, it cannot be done through a
voluntary dismissal. If the appellate case is dismissed as to the issues contained in
the Decree of Divorce and Journal Entry of Final Settlement then everything is
dismissed. There is no such thing as a partial dismissal on the issues.

“If the proposal for district court is acceptable to you I will prépare the proposed

paperwork for your consideration. Once I know whether or not you intend to pur-
sue collection of attorneys fees I can prepare paperwork to be filed in the Court
of Appeals.

“If you prefer to draft the paperwork please let me Inow so there is not duplica-
tion of efforts.

“If any of this requires further discussion please feel free to give me a call.

“Joan.” (Emphasis added.)

The above email indicates that Hawkins made delivery of the
quitclaim deed to R.G. contingent upon Valdez and R.G. complet-
ing certain tasks which Hawkins believed were essential to imple-
menting the agreement the parties had reached in mediation. This
may be an example of a lawyer playing hardball on behalf of a cli-
ent, but it is certainly not unethical behavior. What would consti-
tute unethical behavior is if Hawkins made delivery of the quit-
claim deed to R.G. contingent upon Valdez agreeing not to pursue
enforcement of the attorney fee sanction levied specifically against
Hawkins. Such an action could certainly be construed as failing to
expedite litigation. See KRPC 3.2. But nowhere in Hawkins’ Octo-
ber 17 email or in her subsequent emails to Valdez does she make
such a suggestion.

What Valdez wanted is for Hawkins to agree to dismiss the entire
appeal pending before the Court of Appeals. But if Hawkins did
that, she would have abandoned her right to challenge the attorney
fees levied against her. Clearly, that is why Hawkins suggested to
Valdez that if she agreed not to enforce the attorney fee sanction,
Hawkins would agree to dismiss the appeal. Such an agreement
would have rendered as moot the only issue that Hawkins could
have properly appealed at that point in time, i.e., the attorney fee
sanction. But because Valdez did not agree to Hawkins’ suggestion,
Hawkins proceeded with her appeal. Though the parties eventually
reached a settlement, causing the issues related to the underlying
divorce to be dismissed from the appeal on February 21, 2014, the
Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction over whether the attorney
fee sanction was appropriate. Notably, the Court of Appeals ulti-
mately reversed the district court’s order for Hawkins to pay attor-
ney fees. See In re Marriage of Gerleman, No. 110,461, 2015 WL
1513967 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion).

129

Though the record indicates that Hawkins did not mail the quit-
aim deed to Valdez until April 3, 2014, the hearing panel did not
ind that this delay constituted a violation of KRPC 3.2. Instead,
he hearing panel found a rule violation based on Hawkins alleg-
-dly withholding the quitclaim deed in an attempt to have the sanc-
ions against her removed. But as shown above, the record does not
support this finding. The panel's conclusion that Hawkins violated
KRPC 3.2 by withholding the quitclaim deed is not supported by
clear and convincing evidence.

C. KRPC 3.3(a)(1)

KRPC 3.3(a)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 601) states: “A lawyer
shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a
tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.” The hearing panel
concluded that Hawkins violated this rule in three separate cases:
(1) In DA11619, the panel found that Hawkins made false state-
ments when she denied telling Olberding, the deputy clerk, that
neither she nor her client would be attending a May 9, 2012, hear-
ing; (2) in DA11730, the panel found that Hawkins submitted a
temporary parenting plan and temporary order to the district court
which she falsely represented as being approved by opposing coun-
sel; and (3) in DA11918, the panel found that Hawkins made a false
statement about her client, G.P., being unable to attend a January
3, 2018, hearing.

1. Statement to Olberding Regarding Attendance at Hearing

Oo fhe

Hawkins argues that because her testimony and Olberding’s
testimony sharply conflicted regarding what was said during their
hone conversation on the morning of May 9, the panel was pre-
vented from finding that Hawkins told Olberding that neither she
nor he client would be attending the hearing scheduled for later
that day. In support of this argument, Hawkins cites In re Carson,
252 Kan. 399, 406, 845 P.2d 47 (1993), where this court stated that
“although the report of the disciplinary board ‘is advisory only, it will be given the
same dignity as a special verdict by a jury, or the findings of a trial court, and will
be adopted where amply sustained by the evidence, or where it is not against the

clear weight of the evidence, or where the evidence consisted of sharply conflicting
testimony.’ [Citation omitted.]” (Emphasis added.)

The problem with Hawkins’ reliance on this statement is that

it is no longer the standard applied by this court to review factual
findings made by a hearing panel in attorney disciplinary cases. As
this court stated in In re Barker, 299 Kan. 158, 165, 321 P.3d 767
(2014):
“This court does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.
[Citation omitted.] ‘Rather, this court examines any disputed findings of fact and
determines whether clear and convincing evidence supports the panel’s findings.
[Citation omitted.] If so, the findings will stand.’ [Citation omitted.]”

See also In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 (2008) (clear
and convincing evidence is evidence that causes the factfinder to
believe that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable); In re
Lober, 276 Kan. 633, 637, 78 P.3d 442 (2003) (“When the panel's
findings relate to matters about which there was conflicting tes-
timony, this court recognizes that the panel, as the trier of fact,
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their
demeanor. Therefore, we do not reweigh the evidence or pass on
credibility of witnesses.”).

The panel found that Olberding’s testimony regarding the May 9
phone conversation—specifically, her claim that Hawkins told her
that neither she nor her client would be appearing at the hearing
later that day—was more credible than Hawkins’ testimony deny-
ing the statement. Based on the evidence showing that Olberd-
ing, after getting off the phone with Hawkins, memorialized her
conversation with Hawkins and immediately told the clerk about
the conversation, it is highly probable that her recollection of the
conversation was accurate. Thus, clear’ and convincing evidence
supports the panel's finding that Hawkins lied to the district court
when she denied telling Olberding that she and her client would
not be attending the May 9 hearing.

2. Hawkins’ Representation that Opposing Counsel Approved
Temporary Order

Hawkins argues that she provided evidence to the panel that she
had conferred throughout the day with Valdez, opposing counsel in

131

the underlying matter, before submitting the temporary parenting
plan and temporary order to the court. Hawkins states that when
she submitted the plan and order to the court for approval, she
“believed the parties had agreed to certain issues, while reserving
other issues that the parties were not in agreement on.” Notably,
Hawkins does not go into detail about what matters the parties had
agreed to and whether those matters were consistent with what she
filed with the court. Regardless, at Valdez’ deposition, she testified
that she approved the parenting plan but did not approve the tem-
porary order prior to Hawkins submitting it to the court. The panel
had before it clear and convincing evidence that Hawkins falsely
represented in her filing to the district court that the temporary
order had been approved by Valdez.

3. Hawkins’ Statement Regarding G.P’s Ability to Attend a
Hearing

Hawkins argues that evidence before the panel did not establish
that she told Bethany Roberts, opposing counsel, that a January
3, 2013, hearing needed to be continued because Hawkins’ client,
G.P,, did not have transportation to the hearing.

The record shows that G.P. informed Hawkins that she would
have difficulty securing transportation to Topeka to attend sched-
uled hearings. As a result, G.P. asked Hawkins to give her at least
10 days’ notice of any scheduled hearing so she could make neces-
sary arrangements to attend a hearing. G.P’s testimony indicates
that she had notice well in advance of a hearing scheduled for Janu-
ary 3. She also testified that she never told Hawkins that she could
not attend the January 3 hearing. In fact, G.P. was in the courtroom
when the district court continued the January 3 hearing until Feb-
ruary 5, 2013.

On December 29, 2012, Hawkins emailed opposing counsel the
following message:

“My client informs me that she has difficulty with transportation, Wondering if
you would be agreeable to reschedule if she cannot be there on the 3rd.

“I am meeting with her Monday about your proposed agreed order. Honestly
don’t think she is going to agree but will see.” (Emphasis added.)

Roberts testified before the panel regarding the continuance of
the January 3 hearing, stating:

“The January docket Ms. Hawkins and I had been negotiating
agreed orders, dismissals, what the orders would look like, that sort
of thing, and then the January docket we had done an agreed order
to continue because we thought we had an agreement worked out.
So, yes, we had signed an agreed order and I appeared and pre-
sented that to the Court.

“Q. [By Deputy Disciplinary Administrator] Was there also any sugges-
tion that the client [C.P] could not appear at the January 3rd?

“A. Yeah. And I recall—I don’t remember if that was December or—it
was the January day, yes. The November one where she [Hawkins]
was newly appointed, January her client did appear in the Novem-
ber date as well. The January one Joan had said, hey, my client's
having transportation problems, this was via e-mail, you know, can
we continue it, Um, and it was fine. I was familiar with her client by
that point to know that her having transportation problems didn’t
surprise me. Um, and so, yeah, we—that was—she had told me that
and I appeared at the hearing with the agreed order to continue.

“Q. And did [G.P] also appear at the [January 3] hearing?

“A. She was. She was there. Um, I approached and said, Your Honor,
T'm here on this case, we have an agreed order to continue, the re-
spondent doesn’t have transportation, and presented the agreed or-
der to the judge.” (Emphasis added.)

Roberts stated that after she informed the court that the matter
had to be continued due to G.P.’s supposed inability to attend the
hearing that day, she realized that G.P. was sitting in the courtroom.

Contained within the record is the “Agreed Order for Continu-
ance” that Hawkins prepared and sent to Roberts. Both attorneys
signed the order, and it was submitted to the court on January 3.
The order states that “the parties stipulate there is good cause to
continue the evidentiary hearing in this matter in hopes of resolv-
ing this matter without court intervention.” (Emphasis added.)

Based on the evidence contained in the record, it appears that
Hawkins never informed Roberts that thié-January 3 hearing had to
be continued due to G.P’s inability to attend the hearing. Hawkins’
email to Roberts—the only communication with Hawkins that
Roberts testified about—simply asked whether Roberts would be
willing to continue the January 3 hearing if G.P. could not attend
the hearing due to transportation issues. Based on Roberts’ testi-

133

mony and the proposed order that Hawkins prepared, it appears
that the ultimate basis for the hearing’s continuance was the par-
ties’ belief that they were close to settling the issue between them
and that they needed more time to do so. Thus, if Roberts told
the court on January 3 that the hearing had to be continued due
to G.P’s inability to attend, then such a statement appears to be a
misstatement of what Hawkins actually communicated to Roberts
via email and, consequently, should not be attributed to Hawkins.
We conclude that clear and convincing evidence does not sup-
port the hearing panel's finding that Hawkins lied to Roberts about
the basis for the continuance which, in turn, caused Roberts to
convey this lie to the district court. The panel’s conclusion that
Hawkins violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1) in this regard is not supported by
clear and convincing evidence.

D. KRPC 3.4(d)

Next, Hawkins argues that the panel erred in concluding that she
violated KRPC 3.4(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 609) in DA11730
by: (1) instructing J.G. during her deposition not to answer Valdez’
questions about what J.G. would like to have in order to settle her
divorce case; and (2) failing to comply with the district court’s order
for her to turn over adoption records to R.G.’s attorneys.

KRPC 3.4(d) states: “A lawyer shall not . . . in pretrial procedure,
make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make a reasonably dili-
gent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an
opposing party.”

Hawkins concedes that she instructed J.G. not to answer Val-
dez’ questions. But she contends that her action was proper be-
cause J.G. had already provided the requested information in her
Domestic Relations Pretrial Questionnaire, which Valdez had re-
ceived prior to taking J.G.’s deposition.

Hawkins’ reason for directing her client not to answer Valdez’
questions is not valid considering that K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-230(c)
(2) states:

“An objection at the time of the examination, whether to evidence, to a party's
conduct, to the officer’s qualifications, to the manner of taking the deposition or
to any other aspect of the deposition, must be noted on the record, but the ex-

amination still proceeds; the testimony is taken subject to any objection. An objec-
tion must be stated concisely in a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner.
A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve
a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court or to present a motion [for
expenses] under subsection (d)(3).” (Emphasis added.)

Hawkins’ instruction to J.G. not to answer Valdez’ questions re-
garding settlement of the divorce case does not fall under any of
the valid reasons outlined above for directing a deponent not to
answer a question. At the most, Hawkins should have lodged an
objection but still directed her client to answer Valdez’ questions.
We find that the hearing panel properly concluded that Hawkins
violated KRPC 3.4(d) by improperly directing J.G. not to answer
Valdez’ questions regarding settlement of the case.

With regard to Hawkins’ supposed failure to comply with the
district court’s order to turn over adoption records to R.G.’s attor-
neys, the Court of Appeals concluded in In re Marriage of Ger-
leman, 2015 WL 1513967, at *5, that there was no evidence before
it to suggest that Hawkins failed to comply with a specific court
order regarding production of adoption records. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order that Hawkins
pay attorney fees to R.G.’s attorneys. 2015 WL 1513967, at *7-8.
It should be noted that the hearing panel’s report and the Court
of Appeals’ opinion were issued on the same day, March 27, 2015.

The Disciplinary Administrator concedes that this opinion is
controlling and that the hearing panel’s conclusion that Hawkins
violated KRPC 3.4(d) by disobeying a court order to produce the
adoption records should be rejected. We agree.

E. KRPC 8.1(b)

Next, Hawkins argues that the panel's conclusion that she violat-
ed KRPC 8.1(b) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 661) by failing to provide
her case file and trust account records to:Leslie Miller (the attorney
assigned to investigate M.S.’s complaint of Hawkins in DA11637)
was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. KRPC 8.1(b)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 661) states in pertinent part: “[A] lawyer
in connection with . . . a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly
fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from . . . [a] dis-
ciplinary authority...”

Miller testified that she asked Hawkins to bring M.S.’s case file
with her to their scheduled interview on October 11, 2012, but
that Hawkins failed to do so. According to Hawkins, she gave the
original case file to M.S. and did not retain a copy. Miller said that
Hawkins explained this to her, but during the interview, acknowl-
edged that she had kept some correspondence she had with M.S.
through email and that these emails were on her computer system.
Miller said that Hawkins eventually provided some of the emails to
her. Notably, in Hawkins’ Answer to the Formal Complaint, filed
on August 8, 2014, she admitted that the “investigator asked for
proof of the communications” between Hawkins and M.S, and
that she “was unable to provide documentation of calls or emails.”
Hawkins noted in her answer that she was “continuing the search
for documentation.”

Miller also asked Hawkins to bring “bank records” to the inter-
view and then subsequently clarified to Hawkins that she wanted
trust account records due to an allegation in M.S.’s complaint re-
garding fees. Hawkins brought a document which she created en-
titled “Funds Transaction Listing.” Miller said that she eventually
received the trust account records from Hawkins after the original
deadline for producing them had passed.

When asked whether she thought Hawkins was honest with her
during her investigation, Miller stated:

“I don’t know, I felt frustrated by the process because I felt that there were
perhaps more documents that were available that weren't provided to me. And I
felt as to the trust account records she challenged that quite a bit and I didn’t feel
like it was an unreasonable request since this was definitely a concern by the client
or the complainant about fees. And then the documents that I requested are not
what I received. So whether that’s dishonesty, I felt, um, that I didn’t necessarily
get all the information that I wanted or requested that was relevant to my investi-
gation and not in a timely manner.”

Hawkins seems to suggest in her brief that though she may not
have provided the requested information in a timely fashion, she
ultimately complied with the request. Thus, the panel could not
have found that she violated KRPC 8.1(b). Hawkins’ argument
is without merit. We have concluded that the failure to providé a
timely response to an initial disciplinary complaint can constitute a
violation of KRPC 8.1(b). See In re Barker, 302 Kan. 156, 159-60,

162-63, 351 P.3d 1256 (2015). We likewise conclude that Hawkins’
failure to timely provide Miller with information she had requested
constitutes a violation KRPC 8.1(b).

F. KRPC 8c)

KRPC 8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) states that “Lilt is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct in-
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” The panel
concluded that Hawkins violated this rule in two instances: (1) in
DAI1619, by denying in pleadings and before the district court
that she told Olberding that neither she nor her client would be
appearing at a May 9, 2012, hearing; and (2) in DA11730, when she
represented that the temporary orders she had filed with the court
had been approved by opposing counsel.

Hawkins argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the
above factual findings and, thus, the panel’s conclusion that she vio-
lated KRPC 8,4(c) should be rejected. But, as already noted above,
clear and convincing evidence supports each finding. Hawkins also
argues that panel could not rely on these findings to conclude that
she violated KRPC 8.4(c) because the panel relied on the findings
to conclude that she had violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer shall
not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal).
Hawkins’ argument is without merit because we have concluded in
prior attorney disciplinary cases that the same conduct can support
violations of both KRPC 3.3(a)(1) and KRPC 8.4(c). See, ¢.g., In
re Shriver, 294 Kan. 617, 619, 622, 278 P.3d 964 (2012). We find
that the panel properly concluded that Hawkins’ conduct violated
KRPC 8.4(c).

G. KRPC 8.4(d)

KRPC 8.4(d) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice.” The hearing panel concluded that Hawkins vio-
lated this rule in DA11619 by: (1) attempting to impugn Olberd-
ing’s reputation by stating that Olberding miscommunicated what
she, Hawkins, had said on the telephone; and (2) telling B.S. that
his presence at the May 9, 2012, hearing was not necessary, thereby

preventing the court from resolving the issues remaining in B.S.
and A.S.’s case. The panel also concluded that Hawkins violated
KRPC 8.4(d) in DA11730 by: (1) refusing to turn over the quit-
claim deed to opposing counsel which would have allowed R.G. to
sell the property; (2) directing J.G. not to answer deposition ques-
tions regarding settlement of the divorce case; and (3) failing to
comply with the court’s order regarding discovery of the adoption.
records.

1. Hawkins’ actions in DA11619

Hawkins takes exception to the panel’s finding that she engaged
in conduct that was prejudicial to administration of justice by ques-
tioning in district court the accuracy of Olberding’s memory of
their May 9, 2012, phone conversation. As noted above, Hawkins’
and Olberding’s testimonies regarding their phone conversation
conflicted with each other. Olberding claimed that Hawkins told
her that neither she nor her client would be appearing at the hear-
ing scheduled for later that day, Hawkins claimed she merely told
Olberding that she was filing a motion for a continuance and asked
Olberding for possible dates to schedule the hearing. The district
court and, subsequently, the hearing panel found Olberding more
credible. There is evidence in the record to support this credibility
determination. We conclude that the Hawkins engaged in conduct
that was prejudicial to administration of justice when she told the
district court that Olberding had miscommunicated what was said
during their phone conversation. See In re Tarantino, 286 Kan.
254, 258, 182 P.3d 1241 (2008) (concluding that attorney’s misrep-
resentation that he would seek to set aside his Missouri default dis-
barment was a violation of KRPC 8.4[d]); In re Hansen, 179 Ariz.
229, 231-33, 877 P.2d 802 (1994) (censuring lawyer under Rules
3.3[a][1], 8.4[a], 8.4[c], and 8.4[d] for lying to court about reason
for witness’ absence).

Hawkins also contends that the hearing panel erred in conclud-
ing that she violated KRPC 8.4(d) by telling her client it was not
necessary to attend the May 9 hearing. The panel concluded that
this action was prejudicial to the administration of justice because
it prevented the district court from resolving the outstanding is-

sues remaining in B.S. and A.S.’s casé. Hawkins makes the curious
argument that because the parties could not agree to the amount
of child support that B.S. should pay to A.S., the panel could not
have surmised that the district court would have resolved the issue
had B.S. attended the May 9 hearing. Hawkins fails to appreciate
the fact that the whole purpose of the hearing was to resolve the
child support issue which the court, despite the absences of B.S.
and Hawkins, determined in A.S.’s favor.

Though the record indicates that the district court resolved the
child support issue at the hearing (negating the hearing panel’s
finding that Hawkins’ and B.S.’s absences prevented resolution of
the matter) we conclude that Hawkins’ actions in connection with
the. May 9 hearing were still prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Her actions caused the district court to rule on the child
support issue without the benefit of hearing testimony from B.S. or
arguments from Hawkins. Accordingly, we conclude that Hawkins’
actions in this regard violated KRPC 8.4(d).

2. Hawkins’ actions in DA11730

We have already concluded that the record does not show that
Hawkins violated (1) KRPC 3.2—by allegedly withholding a quit-
claim deed ‘in an effort to have opposing counsel forgo enforce-
ment of an attorney fee award; or (2) KRPC 3.4(d)—by allegedly
failing to comply with a court order regarding discovery of adoption
records. Because the record does not establish that Hawkins com-
mitted either act, we do not agree with the panel’s conclusion that
Hawkins, based on these alleged actions, violated KRPC 8.4(d).

In contrast, our above analysis shows that Hawkins violated
KRPC 3.4(d) by improperly directly J.G. not to answer questions
posed to her at a deposition. We agree with the hearing panel that
this conduct also violates KRPC 8.4(d) because it was prejudicial to
the administration of justice.

In summary, we find that clear and convincing evidence sup-
ports the hearing panel's conclusions that Hawkins violated

¢ ~ KRPC 1.16(d) by (1) failing to forward the psychological
evaluation and police report to M.S.’s subsequent attorney
and (2) failing to timely refund unearned fees to M.S.

139

*  KRPC 3.2 by (1) failing to timely respond to requests from
Butler to schedule a hearing to resolve the child support
issue between B.S. and A.S.; (2) informing Olberding that
neither she nor B.S. would be attending the May 9, 2012,
hearing; and (3) filing an initial temporary parenting plan
that did not reflect the interests or the position of J.G.

¢  KRPC 3.3(a)(1) by (1) falsely claiming that she did not tell
Olberding that neither she nor B.S. would be attending
the May 9 hearing; and (2) filing a temporary order which
she falsely claimed was approved by Valdez, her opposing
counsel.

*  KRPC 3.4(d) by improperly directing J.G. not to answers
questions posed to her at a deposition.

¢  KRPC 8.1(b) by failing to timely provide Miller, the attor-
ney assigned to investigate DA11637, with the case file and
trust account records related to Hawkins’ representation of
MS.

*  KRPC 8.4(c) by (1) falsely claiming in pleadings and in
open court that she did not tell the deputy clerk that nei-
ther she nor her client would be appearing at the May 9
hearing; and (2) by filing a temporary order which she
falsely claimed was approved by Valdez.

*  KRPC8.4(d) by (1) causing the district court to rule on the
child support issue between B.S. and A.S. without hearing
testimony from B.S. or arguments from Hawkins; and (2)
improperly directing J.G. not to answer questions posed to
her at a deposition.

APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE

Before the hearing panel, Hawkins argued that no discipline was
warranted because she did not violate any rule. The Disciplinary
Administrator recommended that Hawkins be indefinitely sus-
pended from the practice of law or disbarred. A majority of the
hearing panel recommended that Hawkins be suspended for 18

months; one member thought a suspension of 1 year was more ap-
propriate.

This court is not bound by the recommendations of the Disci-
plinary Administrator or the hearing panel. In re Mintz, 298 Kan.
897, 911-12, 317 P.3d 756 (2014). The court bases its disciplinary
decision on the facts and circumstances of the violations and the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances present. In re Johan-
ning, 292 Kan. 477, 490, 254 P.3d 545 (2011). And although not
mandated by our rules, this court and disciplinary panels “[h]istori-
cally” turn to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
to guide the discipline discussion. See ABA Compendium of Pro-
fessional Responsibility Rules and Standards (2012); see also In re
Woodring, 289 Kan. 173, 180, 186, 210 P.3d 120 (2009) (discussing
and applying ABA Standards); In re Rumsey, 276 Kan. 65, 78-79,
71 P.3d 1150 (2003) (citing and discussing ABA Standards).

Under the ABA Standards, four factors are considered in assess-
ing punishment: (1) the ethical duty violated by the lawyer; (2) the
lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury resulting
from the misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances. See Rumsey, 276 Kan. at 78 (listing the four
components of the ABA Standards’ framework); ABA Standard §
3.0.

A. Ethical Duty

The hearing panel concluded that Hawkins violated her duty to
MSS., a client, by failing to properly terminate representation. The
panel also concluded that Hawkins violated “her duty to the pub-
lic to maintain her personal integrity” and “her duty to the legal
system to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of her
client.”

As indicated above, Hawkins violated her duty to a client by fail-
ing to (1) forward documents to M.S.’s-subsequent attorney and
(2) timely refund uneamed legal fees to M.S. Hawkins violated her
duty to the public to maintain her personal-integrity by (1) denying
that she called Olberding and told her that neither she nor B.S.
would be attending the May 9 hearing; and (2) filing a temporary
order which she falsely claimed was approved by opposing counsel.

Hawkins violated her duty to the legal system to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of her clients by (1) failing to timely
respond to requests from Butler to schedule a hearing to resolve
the child support issue between B.S. and A.S.; (2) causing the dis-
trict court to rule on the child support issue without hearing tes-
timony from B.S. or arguments from Hawkins; (3) filing an initial
temporary parenting plan that did not reflect the interests or the
position of J.G.; and (4) improperly directing J.G. not to answer
questions posed to her at a deposition.

B. Mental State

The panel found the Hawkins “knowingly violated her duties.”
The ABA Standards identify three mental states: “intent,” the high-
est culpable mental state; “knowledge,” the intermediate culpable
mental state; and “negligence,” the least culpable mental state.
Under the ABA Standards, a lawyer acts intentionally when acting
with the “conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particu-
lar result,” while a lawyer acts with knowledge when acting “with
conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of
his or her conduct both without the conscious objective or purpose
to accomplish a particular result.” Finally, a lawyer acts negligently
when failing “to be aware . . . that a result will follow... .” See ABA
Standards, 462; In re Kline, 298 Kan. at 216.

Because Hawkins denied any wrongdoing, there is no direct evi-
dence regarding her mental state when she committed the numer-
ous rule violations noted above. But, it can be inferred from the
actions constituting the rule violations that Hawkins, at the very
least, acted with a conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of her conduct.

C. Injury Resulting from the Misconduct

The panel concluded that Hawkins’ conduct resulted in actual
injury to her clients, the legal profession, and the legal system. In
support of this conclusion, the panel cited Butler's testimony re-
garding the additional legal fees her client incurred as a result of
Hawkins’ attempt to set aside the court's decision resulting from
the May 9, 2012, hearing. The panel, relying on Butler's testimo-

ny regarding Hawkins’ conduct at a June 21, 2012, hearing to set
aside the district court’s decision, also found that Hawkins “used
an impertinent tone with the court and attacked both Ms. Butler
and Ms. Olberding.” Finally, the panel concluded that Hawkins’
actions during her representation of J.G. “resulted in injury to the
legal system and to the parties. Specifically, the respondent's ac-
tions frustrated the forward action of the case, increased confusion
between the parties, and frustrated the court.” As noted above,
clear and convincing evidence shows that Hawkins (1) filed an ini-
tial temporary parenting plan that did not reflect the interests or
the position of J.G; and (2) improperly directed J.G. not to answer
questions posed to her at a deposition. We agree with the hearing
panel’s conclusion that Hawkins caused injury to her clients, the
legal profession, and the legal system.

D. Aggravated and Mitigating Circumstances

This court's rules require that a disciplinary panel explain “[m]
itigating or aggravating circumstances which affect the nature or
degree of discipline.” Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2015 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 350). The panel must consider the evidence presented
as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine the
weight to be assigned to each in arriving at an appropriate disci-
pline. In re Walsh, 286 Kan. 235, 248, 182 P.3d 1218 (2008). On
appeal, this court determines whether it agrees with the panel's
findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See
In re Kline, 298 Kan. 96, 221, 311 P.3d 321 (2013).

The hearing panel found that the following aggravating circum-
stances were present: (1) Prior Disciplinary Offenses; (2) A Pattern
of Misconduct; (3) Multiple Offenses; (4) Bad Faith Obstruction
of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally Failing to Comply
with Rule or Orders of the Disciplinary Process; (5) Refusal to Ac-
knowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct; and (6) Indifference to
Making Restitution. The panel also noted that the “record was void
of any ‘good character evidence,’” and that
“seven attomeys in [Hawkins’] legal community testified and all seven testified to

problems or negative experiences in working with the respondent. Specifically,
both Ms. Butler and Ms. Durkin testified that because of past difficulties, they

employ different methods of correspondence with the respondent than they do
with other attorneys. Specifically, Ms. Butler and Ms. Durkin both testified that
all correspondence with [Hawkins] is done in writing to preserve a record of com-
munication.”

Because Hawkins claimed that her actions did not violate a sin-
gle rule, she did not present any mitigating evidence to the panel.
Consequently, the hearing panel found that no mitigating circum-
stances existed.

Now on appeal, Hawkins challenges four of the aggravating cir-
cumstances found by the panel. First, with regard to the Pattern of
Misconduct conclusion, the panel found that in its “estimation, it
appears that the respondent repeatedly engaged in subterfuge in
order to either increase her billable fees to her client or to cause
unnecessary and unreasonable delay in handling pending matters.”
Hawkins argues that this statement “has little to no evidence sup-
porting it, as it is not the focus of the Panel’s Report or findings of
fact.” Though Hawkins is correct that the panel did not find that
she overbilled clients, the record certainly shows that her actions
caused unnecessary delay in resolving pending matters and estab-
lishes, as the panel found, a “pattern of obstructing justice.”

Hawhkins also contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support the panel’s finding that she committed multiple offenses
or that she failed to comply with requests during the investigation
into her conduct. But as we have already determined, clear and
convincing evidence shows that Hawkins committed numerous
rule violations in three separate cases. Moreover, Hawkins failed to
timely comply with Leslie Miller’s requests for her to produce the
client file and trust account records in connection with her repre-
sentation of M.S. :

Finally, Hawkins argues the panel's finding that she was indif-
ferent to making restitution should be reversed because the basis
of that finding—the attorney fee sanction levied against her—was
reversed by the Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of Gerleman,
No. 110,461, 2015 WL 1513967 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished
opinion). The Disciplinary Administrator concedes that any of the
panel's findings contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision should
be abandoned. As a result, we do not consider Hawkins’ supposed

“ i i

indifference to making restitution as a factor in determining the
appropriate level of discipline.

At oral arguments in this case, Hawkins gave an unsympathetic
acknowledgment of wrongdoing, stating that she was sorry for any
conduct that the court found to be in violation of the KRPC. When
asked what she thought would be an appropriate level of punish-
ment should this court find that her actions violated the KRPC,
Hawkins suggested a term of probation similar to that imposed in
In re Rumsey, 301 Kan. 438, 343 P.3d 93 (2015). In Rumsey, we de-
cided sua sponte to place the respondent on a 3-year term of proba-
tion, believing that form of punishment would ensure the respon-
dent’s long-term compliance with the KRPC. 301 Kan. at 448. The
conduct at issue in Rumsey was the respondent's act of calling op-
posing counsel, during the middle of a criminal trial, a derogatory
term and submitting an affidavit to the Disciplinary Administrator
which falsely claimed that it was signed before a notary public. 301
Kan. at 440-441. The severity of this conduct was lessened by sev-
eral mitigating factors, including (1) the respondent's contempora-
neous apology to opposing counsel; (2) evidence showing that the
respondent was suffering from health problems during trial; (3) the
hearing panel's finding that the affidavit was not offered to mislead
or deceive the Disciplinary Administrator or the hearing panel; (4)
the respondent's cooperation during the disciplinary hearing and
his full acknowledgment of wrongdoing; and (5) several witnesses,
including two district court judges, who testified to respondent's
excellence as a criminal defense attorney. 301 Kan. at 443-45.

In contrast, the conduct at issue here, conduct constituting nu-
merous rule violations, arose from three separate disciplinary com-
plaints. Hawkins’ actions included delay in returning unearned le-
gal fees to a former client, filing false pleadings in district court,
improperly calling into question the veracity of a court employee,
and engaging in behavior that unreasonably delayed the resolu-
tion of two legal matters. Additionally, seven attorneys testified
about problems or negative experiences they had in working with
Hawkins.

Though we have not accepted some of the hearing panel's find-
ings, a majority of this court concludes that the hearing panel’s rec-

— CC

ommended discipline of 18 months’ suspension is warranted given
the nature and volume of Hawkins’ conduct, the duties she vio-
lated, and the aggravating circumstances present coupled with the
lack of any mitigating evidence. A minority of the court, however,

would impose a shorter term of suspension.
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that Joan M. Hawkins
ed from the practice of law in the state of Kansas for a

1 suspend-
period of 18

months, effective on the filing of this opinion, in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293).

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that Hawkins shall comply with Su-
preme Court Rule 218 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 401), and in the
event respondent seeks reinstatement, she shall comply with Su-

preme Court Rule 219 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 403).
Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these

roceedings

be assessed to the respondent and that this opinion be published in

the official Kansas Reports.

146

No, 114,543

In the Matter of JoHN W. ToursTon, Respondent.
(871 P3d 879)
ee

BEE ot 15, 1
| |

Kimberly L. Knoll, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and
Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal com-
plaint for the petitioner.

John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the
cause, and John W. Thurston, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by
the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent,
John W. Thurston, of Manhattan, an attorney admitted to the prac-
tice of law in Kansas in 2001.

On February 25, 2015, the office of the Disciplinary Administra-
tor filed a formal complaint against the respondent, alleging viola-
tions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). The
respondent filed an answer on March 17, 2015. On April 7, 2015,
respondent entered into a joint stipulation of facts. Because there
was no stipulation to the existence of KRPC violations, a hearing
was held on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for
Discipline of Attorneys on April 9, 2015, where the respondent was
personally present and was represented by counsel. The hearing
panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 556) (safekeeping property); and 1.16(d) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 572) (termination of representation).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with its reeommen-
dation to this court:

“Findings of Fact

“10. C.B. retained the respondent to represent him in a criminal case in Ri-
ley County District Court. C.B. faced a seven-count complaint which consisted of
seven felony sexual offenses, involving three children.

“11. On October 17, 2013, C.B. and the respondent signed a fee agreement
that provided, in part:

‘FEES AND EXPENSES: You have agreed to pay the Firm for its legal

services and expenses as follows:

$30,000.00 Feé. The sum of $20,000.00 shall be paid on Octo-
ber 17, 2013. The remaining sum of $10,000.00 shall be paid in
monthly payments with the remaining balance to be paid in full
on or before April 17, 2014.

If the matter goes to a jury trial an additional fee will be as-
sessed. Said fee shall be determined at a later date and shall be
due and owing 30 days prior to the date set for jury trial.

‘These fees do not include any work to be done at the Appellate
level or the Kansas Supreme Court.

These fees do not include any out of pocket expenses paid or
incurred by the firm on your behalf. Such expenses include, but
are not limited to: fees charged for discovery such as video copy
fees and photocopy fees, filing fees for Municipal Appeals, fees
for transcripts. Also not included are any fines, court costs, or
other fees due to the court.

“TERMINATION BY CLIENT:. You may terminate this agreement at any
time, but you must give the Firm written notice of the termination. If you
terminate this agreement, you are still obligated to pay the fees and ex-
penses accrued to the time of termination. Said fees shall be calculated at
the rate of $250-per hour?

“12. C.B. paid the respondent $23,100.00. The respondent did not deposit
the funds into his trust account.

“13, On December 19, 2013, the court conducted the preliminary hearing.
At the preliminary hearing, the © respondent engaged in limited cross-examination,
of the witnesses.

“14. CB. was bound over for trial on all 7 counts. Thereafter, on January
6, 2014, the court arraigned C.B. and scheduled the matter for trial on April 28,

2014.

“15. On January 27, 2014, the respondent sent C.B. an electronic mail mes-
sage. The electronic mail message provided: -*
‘Your case progressed faster than I expected. An unfortunate byproduct is
that we have to talk about the fee for a jury trial sooner than I expected. As
you recall our fee agreement calls for a two-stage fee, the first part carrying
‘us up to the point of jury trial. Given that the trial has been set for five days
my fee will be $25,000. In addition we will need to have money set aside for
investigator and expert witness fees. My estimate is that we will need an ad-
ditional $10,000 set aside for those fees. Unfortunately due to the timeline

imposed on us by the judge we will need to have those fees paid immedi-
ately. The witness/investigator fees will be placed in our trust account. I
wish there was a different way to handle this, but unfortunately we all have
to recognize that there is a business aspect to every criminal case. We must
handle this fee issue now, because if I need to withdraw from your case it
needs to happen soon as to not disrupt the court’s schedule.’

G.B. did not pay the additional fees.

“16. On January 31, 2014, the respondent filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel. The respondent provided the following three reasons for the motion to
withdraw:

“1) Unforeseen circumstances have developed in this case that prevent
counsel from effectively representing the accused.

‘2) This is not due to any action or inaction on behalf of the accused, but
rather due to circumstances beyond his control.

“3) Should there be any change in the dates currently scheduled for the
trial in this matter, any such delay will be attributed to the defendant for
purposes of speedy trial calculations.’

On February 10, 2014, the court granted the respondent’s motion to withdraw and
appointed substitute counsel.

“17. After withdrawing from representation of C.B., the respondent failed to
provide C.B. with an accounting of the advance fee paid. Because the respondent
failed to keep complete time records, it was difficult to determine the amount
of the unearned fees. In fact, some of the respondent's time was tracked only by
notations made on the respondent's calendar.

“18. At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent testified that he
worked between 70 and 80 hours on C.B.’s case.

‘Q. How many hours can you justify in this particular case?

‘A. Ifwe're going off of just what [was] on the calendar-and I'll be hon-

est, I haven’t added those up. I mean, I’ve tried to go back as best
as I could after talking to Mr. Ambrosio about it to determine what
other time I did, what other time I spent on this case. My estimate is
that I spent between 70 and 80 hours in total on the case. But, again,
that’s—its very artful because I didn’t track it.’

Based upon that testimony, the hearing panel concludes the respondent worked
70 hours on C.B.’s case, thus, earning $17,500.00. The respondent owes C.B.
$5,650 in unearned fees.

“19. Subsequent counsel filed a motion for a new preliminary hearing, al-
loging that the respondent was ineffective in his representation of C.B. On April
11, 2014, the court granted the motion for a new preliminary hearing, concluding
that there was ‘no apparent tactical or strategic advantage to be gained from such
abbreviated cross-examination of the witnesses.’

149

“Conclusions of Law

“20, Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter
of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15 and KRPC 1.16, as detailed below.
[Footnote: The deputy disciplinary administrator also alleged that the respondent
violated KRPC 1.5. The hearing panel, however, concludes that insufficient evi-
dence was presented to establish a violation of KRPC 1.5.]

“KRPC 1.15

“21. Lawyers must properly safeguard the property of their clients and third
persons. Properly safeguarding the property of others necessarily requires lawyers
to deposit unearned fees into an attorney trust account. KRPC 1.15(a).

“22. A lawyer may charge a flat fee to a client for a specific task to be under-
taken. When the flat fee is paid to the lawyer, it must be deposited into the lawyer's
trust account and the fee cannot be withdrawn until it is earned. Since a flat fee
is not earned until completion of the task, the entire flat fee must remain in the
Jawyer’s trust account until that task is completed unless the lawyer and client oth-
erwise agree to partial withdrawals based upon the amount earned for completion
of specified subtasks. KRPC 1.15(a).

“23. The respondent failed to deposit the flat fee received from C.B. into
his trust account. Because the respondent failed to deposit unearned fees into his
trust account, the hearing panel concludes the respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a).

“KRPC 1.16

“24. KRPC 1.16 requires lawyers to take certain steps to protect clients after
the representation has been terminated. Specifically, KRPC 1.16(d) provides the
requirement in this regard:

“Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent

reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reason-

able notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,

surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and re-

funding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer

may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other

law”

“25, Upon termination, a lawyer needs to be in a position to accurately deter-
mine the fees earned to date. That requires lawyers to keep time records reflect-
ing actual time spent in the representation. In this case, the respondent failed to
keep adequate time records which would indicate the amount of unearned fees.
Relying on notations on the respondent's calendar and on the respondent's recol-
ection is unacceptable. However, for purposes of this case, itis the only available
information.

“26. Based upon the respondent's testimony, the hearing panel concludes
that the respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d) when he failed to return unearned
fees to C.B.

“American Bar Association

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

“27, In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel con-
sidered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ‘Standards’). Pursuant to Standard 3, the
factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the po-
tential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

“28. Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to safe-
guard property.

“29. Mental State. The respondent negligently violated his duty.

“30. Injury. As a result of the respondent’s misconduct, the respondent
caused actual injury to his client.

“Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

“31. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
aggravating factors present:

“32. Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously dis-
ciplined on two occasions. On October 29, 2009, the respondent entered into
a diversion agreement with the disciplinary administrator's office, case number
DA10632. In that case, the respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.1. On
June 14, 2013, the respondent entered into a second diversion agreement with
the disciplinary administrator's office, case number DA11706. In that case, the
respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 8.4(g).

“33. A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of mis-
conduct. Throughout the period of representation, the respondent failed to keep
reasonable time records on this and other matters.

“34, Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 2001. At
the time of the misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for approxi-
mately 13 years.

“35. Indifference to Making Restitution. The respondent failed to return the
unearned fees to C.B.

“36. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may jus-
tify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
mitigating circumstances present:

“37. Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent’s misconduct
does not appear to have been motivated by dishonesty or selfishness.

“38. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Pull and Pree Acknowledgment
of the Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary pro-

cess, Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to the viola-
tions.

“39. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and
General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive
member of the bar of Manhattan, Kansas. The respondent also enjoys the respect
of his peers and generally possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced
by several letters received by the hearing panel.

“40. Remoteness of Prior Offenses. The two previous cases, which resulted in
participation in the attorney diversion program, appear to be remote in character
to the misconduct in this case.

“41, In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

“4.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in

dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury toa
client.

‘7.3. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently en- _
gages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional,
and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the
legal system.’

“Recommendation

“42, The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be
censured and that the censure be published in the Kansas Reports. The respon-
dent recommended that the hearing panel informally admonish the respondent
for the violations.

“43, Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the
respondent be censured and that the censure be published in the Kansas Reports,
In addition, the hearing panel recommends that conditions be attached to the
respondent's published censure. First, the hearing panel directs the respondent to
permit the auditor employed by the disciplinary administrator's office to conduct
a trust account audit within 90 days of the date of this report. Second, the hearing
panel directs the respondent to submit written policies regarding time records
and fee agreements which are in compliance with the Kansas Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct to the disciplinary administrator's office for approval within 30
days of the date of this report. Finally, the hearing panel directs the respondent
to pay his client $5,650 within 30 days of the date of this report.

“44, Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified
by the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator.”

Discussion

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence,
the findings of the disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the

parties and determines whether violations of KRPC exist and, if
they do, the discipline to be imposed. Attorney misconduct must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292
Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). Clear and convincing evidence is
“‘evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that “the truth of
the facts asserted is highly probable.”’” In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498,
505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725,
188 P.3d 1 [2008]).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint,
to which he filed an answer. Respondent also was given adequate
notice of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this
court. He filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing
report.

Avith no exceptions before us, the panel’s findings of fact are
deemed admitted, Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2015 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 369). Furthermore, the evidence before the hearing pan-
el established the charged misconduct in violation of KRPC 1.15(a)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 556) (safekeeping property); and 1.16(d)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 572) (termination of representation) by
clear and convincing evidence and supports the panel's conclusions
of law. We therefore adopt the panel's findings and conclusions.

The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline
for respondent's violations. At the panel hearing, at which the re-
spondent appeared, the Disciplinary Administrator representative
recommended published censure. The respondent requested in-
formal admonition. The Hearing Panel ultimately recommended .
published censure, but it also “recommend|ed] certain conditions
be attached to the respondent's published censure.” Despite the
permissive, nonbinding tone established by the panel's use of the
word “recommend,” it then directed the respondent to perform
certain tasks within specified time limits:

“First, the hearing panel directs the respondent to permit the auditor employed
by the disciplinary administrator's office to conduct a trust account audit within 90
days of the date of this report. Second, the hearing panel directs the respondent
to submit written policies regarding time records and fee agreements which are
in compliance with the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct to the disciplinary
administrator's office for approval within 30 days of the date of this report. Finally,

153

the hearing panel directs the respondent to pay his client $5,650 within 30 days of
the date of this report.”

These directions were not permissive or nonbinding. Rather,
they conveyed clearly nonnegotiable requirements of behavior,
and the deadlines for that behavior to occur were likely to ripen
long before respondent's case reached its oral argument date be-
fore this court. This is, in fact, exactly what occurred. The panel’s
Final Hearing Report bears a date of September 16, 2015, while
this court heard oral argument on March 1, 2016—well after the
longest of the panel's specified time limits—90 days—expired.

Although neither respondent nor his counsel contested the pan-
el’s “conditions” or the power of the panel to impose or enforce
them, by the time the parties reached oral argument before this
court, there was evident lack of unanimity on whether respondent
had complied to the greatest extent possible. In particular, the rep-
resentative of the Disciplinary Administrator challenged the na-
ture and completeness of documents respondent had supplied to
facilitate the required audit. As a result of what she viewed as less-
than-enthusiastic embrace of the panel’s directions, she sought a
sanction more severe than the published censure she had sought at
the panel hearing, i.¢., a 60-day suspension with a requirement of a
reinstatement hearing,

Respondent's counsel resisted this effort to raise the stakes in
this case and implored us to provide definitive guidance, particu-
larly for the criminal defense bar, on how to account for flat fees and
other advanced fees within ethical boundaries. Although prompted
to do so by questions from several members of the court, respon-
dent’s counsel did not take issue with the panel's power or author-
ity to order his client to fulfill certain requirements pending oral
argument before this court; nor did he challenge the appropriate-
ness of the Disciplinary Administrator’s office seeking more serious
sanctions at oral argument because of perceived deficiencies in re-
spondents’ compliance with interim panel orders. Also in response
to questions from the bench, the representative of the Disciplinary
Administrator stated that she had relied on her interpretation of
several earlier disciplinary cases for the proposition that a hearing
panel was empowered to suggest or require a course of action to be

followed by a respondent between the panel hearing and Supreme
Court oral argument and that this court would consider the respon-
dent's resulting behavior in deciding discipline. She also appeared
to favor more extensive ethical guidance from this court for lawyers
who accepted flat or other advanced fees.

We decline counsels’ invitation to issue what we believe would be
an advisory opinion on ethical accounting for flat fees and other ad-
vanced fees, Having adopted the panel's findings and conclusions,
we have already done what is necessary on that subject in this case.
We must, however, address the question of whether a disciplinary
hearing panel may issue mandatory directives to respondents—di-
rectives to be ignored or treated casually at their peril. Certain of
our prior cases may have been less than clear on this point, and on
whether the court will look favorably upon the Disciplinary Admin-
istrator’s recommendation of a more severe sanction as a result of
what it regards as noncompliance with such directives. See In re
Barker, 299 Kan. 158, 172-74, 321 P.3d 767 (2014) (court adopts
panel’s recommendation of 6-month suspension; agrees with cer-
tain of panel's suggested conditions, rejects another because of
post-hearing developments); In re Lee, 287 Kan. 676, 682-83, 198
P.3d 140 (2008) (panel agrees with joint recommendation of pub-
lished censure but attaches conditions; Disciplinary Administrator
notes compliance with conditions at oral argument; court adopts
panel’s recommendation with suggested conditions); In re Dock-
ing, 282 Kan. 715, 147 P.3d 139 (2006) (panel’s recommendation
for 90-day suspension followed after respondent at least partially
complied with interim restitution recommendation of panel). It is
time for a course clarification, if not correction.

Simply put, our current Kansas Supreme Court Rules do not
permit a disciplinary hearing panel to impose discipline or to re-
quire or enforce any conditions attached it—not between a panel
hearing and oral argument to this court or at any other time. See
Supreme Court Rule 211(f). The rules plainly endow hearing pan-
els with the power to recommend sanctions for KRPC violations;
imposition of discipline is left to this court alone, which is free to
reject recommendations from the panel or from the Disciplinary
Administrator. See Supreme Court Rule 212(f). If members of the

panel or the Disciplinary Administrator believe that a respondent
has engaged in additional behavior meriting discipline in the pe-
riod between issuance of the panel’s Final Hearing Report and oral
argument before this court, then any responsive action must safe-
guard the respondent's right to due process. For example, the Dis-
ciplinary Administrator's office could file a motion to remand the
current case to the panel for further factfinding on the questioned
behavior or it could file an entirely new Formal Complaint. If such
a procedure is not followed, then we are likely to end up with pre-
cisely the kind of situation we face here: an oral argument in which
counsel cannot agree on the new, potentially critical facts. Such a
dispute is not one an appellate court can reliably resolve. We also
note a further complicating factor in this particular controversy:
Both sides appear to have overread at least one of the panel’s condi-
tions/directives. The second demands production of policies on fee
agreements, not the agreements themselves.

All of this being said, we do not mean to discourage respondents
from taking corrective or rehabilitative actions between their dis-
ciplinary hearings and their oral arguments in the Supreme Court.
Indeed, such actions may appropriately be considered by us when
we decide discipline, because they may be indicative of a respon-
dent's acceptance of responsibility and/or remorse. We have previ-
ously remarked that respondents should keep us and the Disci-
plinary Administrator’s office informed of any such actions by way
of affidavit submitted before oral argument. See In re Peloquin,
301 Kan. 1, 9-12, 338 P.3d 568 (2014) (Disciplinary Administrator
seeks indefinite suspension because of respondent's failure to com-
ply with panel's interim recommendations; panel had rejected un-
workable probation plan, urged 3-month suspension; court’states
“respondent would have been well served to have filed an affidavit”
confirming psychological evaluation after panel hearing); see also
In re Freed, 294 Kan. 655, 661-62, 279 P.3d 118 (2012) (panel rec-
ommends public censure ‘plus conditions, including psychological
evaluation of respondent; respondent's late confirmation of evalu-
ation, submission of revised, suggested probation plan underscore
misconduct leading to complaint, counsel suspension over pub-
lished censure). And we note that such a procedure is required in

a case in which a probation plan with mandatory terms and condi-
tions is in place. See Kansas Supreme Court Rule 211(g)(5). This is
not a probation case; respondent has not sought probation, and the
Disciplinary Administrator has not suggested it. We do not elect to
impose it sua sponte here. See In re Florez, 298 Kan. 811, 819, 316
P.3d 755 (2014). The bottom line is that a lack of compulsion of
corrective or rehabilitative actions does not necessarily equate to a
lack of influence on our decision making.

We also hasten to add that there is one type of situation in which
the court will certainly consider post-disciplinary hearing mis-
behavior by a respondent without additional factfinding in a re-
manded or new disciplinary proceeding. That situation arises when
a respondent has been provided notice of the oral argument set-
ting for his or her case and nevertheless fails to appear. In such a
case, the violation of KRPC has occurred before the eyes of the
court, see Kansas Supreme Court Rule 212(d), (e)(5) (respondent
shall appear before the court), and no further factfinding below is
necessary to preserve the respondent's right to due process. The
court may impose discipline more severe than that recommended
by the panel or Disciplinary Administrator as a result of the new
violation, with or without a recommendation to do so. See In re
Barker, 302 Kan. 156, 163, 351 P.3d 1256 (2015) (citing In re Batt,
296 Kan. 395, [405], 294 P.3d 241 [2013]) (“When a respondent
fails to appear before this court when facing recommendations of
indefinite suspension, a sanction greater than that recommended
by the Disciplinary Administrator or panel, even up to disbarment,
may be warranted, Certainly, the lack of an appearance at the hear-
ing before this court qualifies as an additional aggravator of these
circumstances under consideration.”).

In this case, for all of the reasons just reviewed, we are not will-
ing to impose discipline more severe than published censure. The
hearing panel was not empowered to require respondent to engage
in specific behaviors between issuance of the Final Hearing Report
and oral argument before this court; and the more severe recom-
mendation from the Disciplinary Administrator's office that arose
out of the parties’ interpretation of the panel's requirements and
disagreement over the respondent’s compliance is rejected.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that John W. Thurston be and is
hereby disciplined by published censure in accordance with Su-
preme Court Rule 203(a)(3) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293).

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings
be assessed to the respondent and that this opinion be published in
the official Kansas Reports.

No. 105,148

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. LEONARD D. CHARLES, SR.,
Appellant.
(372 P.3d 1109)

Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the
cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco
Foulston, former district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with
him on the brief for appellee.

Per Curiam: This is the direct appeal of defendant Leonard D.
Charles, Sr., from his jury convictions and sentence for reckless ag-
gravated battery, felony criminal damage to property, and criminal
threat based on a series of incidents that occurred on Christmas
2009, The district judge sentenced Charles to 34 months’ impris-
onment and required him to register as a violent offender under
the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA).

On appeal to our Court of Appeals, Charles raised six issues
challenging his convictions and the registration requirement. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. Charles raises the same six issues on
petition for review to this court. For the reasons detailed in the
discussion section below, we affirm his convictions and vacate his
registration requirement.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Late in the evening on Christmas 2009, Charles drove his 1995
Nissan Pathfinder 4x4 SUV into a Family Video parking lot in
Wichita. Charles was on his way to Kansas City to see his mother
because he had heard from his brother that she was scheduled to
have open heart surgery soon. Charles would eventually testify that
he had become lost and had mistaken the Family Video for a gas
station.

Autumn McDowell had just finished returning a video at the
store when her car became stuck in snow near the parking lot exit.
As Charles pulled into the parking lot, he saw McDowell in her
vehicle. McDowell and Charles would later provide different ac-
counts of the nature of their subsequent interaction.

According to McDowell, when Charles pulled up, he asked if
she needed assistance. McDowell told him that she was going to try
to rock her car back and forth to free it. During this brief conver-
sation, a driver in a car that had been behind McDowell began to
honk, seemingly unaware that McDowell’s car was stuck. Charles
got out of his SUV, approached the third vehicle, and started yell-
ing at the driver. The third vehicle then left. Charles reentered
his SUV and positioned it behind McDowell’s car. At that point,
McDowell was able to rock her car free, and she drove out of the
parking lot. When McDowell looked into her rearview mirror, she
saw that Charles was following her in his SUV. McDowell sped up
to 60 miles per hour “to get away from him,” before she turned into
a residential neighborhood.

Once in the neighborhood, McDowell drove evasively, “going
from street to street, in and out, just trying to lose [him].” At one
point, McDowell tumed off her headlights to avoid Charles’ detec-
tion, but she quickly turned them back on because she could not
see. Minutes after the pursuit began, Charles rear-ended McDow-
ell’s car, sending both vehicles over a curb. McDowell was “really
scared,” “felt threatened,” and “was in a panic ‘cause I didn’t know
what he wanted with me, why he was following me.” After the colli-
sion, McDowell believed Charles’ SUV was stuck on the curb. She
then drove home and called 911. McDowell suffered whiplash in
the collision, and her car sustained nearly $4,000 in damage.

According to Charles, he entered the Family Video parking lot,
saw McDowell in her car, lowered his window, and asked her if
she could give him directions. McDowell agreed to do so. Charles
then got out of his SUV and showed her a piece of paper that had
written directions on it. McDowell apparently told Charles how
he could return to his route and get to Kansas City. At that point,
McDowell told Charles that her car was stuck, and he agreed to
help her by pushing her car with his SUV. Charles also said that the
two talked about exchanging phone numbers and that McDowell
directed him to follow her to her parents’ house in a nearby neigh-
borhood.

Charles pulled up behind McDowell and used his SUV to push
her car free of the snow. He then stepped out of his SUV to in-

161

spect it for damage and watched as McDowell “mashed the gas”
and sped away. Charles got back into his vehicle and drove in the
direction he saw McDowell drive away, and he eventually followed
her into a residential neighborhood.

Charles said that he did not see McDowell’s car when he en-
tered the neighborhood. He did, however, see a car with its lights
off, which appeared to be parking. Figuring the parking car con-
tained McDowell, Charles sped up to see better. When his SUV's
headlights illuminated the parking car’s interior, he saw McDowell,
“and she had this surprised look on her face like, [‘JOh, my God,
he found me.|’]”

According to Charles, McDowell then turned her headlights
back on and “sped off again.” Charles followed. As the pursuit con-
tinued, Charles began to question whether McDowell did in fact
want him to follow her. “The wheels start[ed] clicking,” he said,
and, “I began to think like is she—is she running?”

Nevertheless, Charles said he wanted to make contact with Mc-
Dowell to determine whether she did not want him to follow her.
Shortly thereafter, McDowell’s vehicle began “fishtailing and slid-
ing”; Charles slammed on his brakes, causing his SUV to skid be-
fore colliding with McDowell’s vehicle. Charles characterized the
accident as unavoidable.

After the collision, Charles returned to Family Video, where Ra-
chel Northrup and Kailey Westemeir were working inside. Both
Northrup and Westemeir testified at Charles’ trial.

When Charles entered Family Video, Northrup was helping
customers from behind the counter while Westemeir checked in-
ventory at the back of the store. Northrup did not see Charles enter
the store, but she noticed him when he approached the counter.
Charles was “pacing and raising his voice” and generally looked
frustrated and upset. Charles continued to get louder, saying there
was something wrong with his SUV. He then said that, if he could
not get to Kansas City to see his mother before she died, he was
going to come back to the store and kill someone.

Charles then came behind the counter and approached Northrup
face-to-face, making similar statements about killing someone if he
was unable to get to Kansas City before his mother died. At some

point, Charles “took a big swipe” and knocked over a computer
monitor that had been attached to the counter. He also knocked
over a gift card display and a cup of pens and pencils that were on
the counter, and he knocked several videos off the store’s shelves.

Westemeir heard the commotion in the front of the store and
came toward the counter from the back. Charles approached her
and began yelling about “some girl who messed up his car.” West-
emeir eventually called 911. While she was on the phone with the
911 operator, Charles told her that if he could not get to Kansas
City to see his dying mother, “he was gonna come back and kill us.”

When police arrived at Family Video, they arrested Charles.

As a result of all of these events, the State charged Charles with
three counts: intentional aggravated battery, alleging Charles “un-
lawfully and intentionally cause[d] bodily harm to another person . .
with a deadly weapon, to-wit: 1995 Nissan Pathfinder”; criminal
damage of McDowell's car; and criminal threat toward Westemeir,

At trial, in addition to giving an intentional aggravated battery
instruction telling the jury it could convict if Charles caused bodily
harm to McDowell with his SUV, the district judge informed the
jury of the circumstances under which it could convict Charles of
reckless aggravated battery as a lesser included offense. Charles
did not object to the giving of the lesser included offense instruc-
tion, which read:

“If you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of aggravated battery intentional,
you should then consider the lesser included offense of aggravated battery reck-
less.

“To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:

“1. That the defendant recklessly caused bodily harm to another person

with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a car, or in any manner whereby great bodily

harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted; and

“2. That this act occurred on or about the 25th day of December, 2009, in

Sedgwick County, Kansas.” (Emphasis added.)

During the first portion of the State’s closing argument, the pros-
ecutor prefaced many of his statements with the phrase “I think” or
similar, personalized wording:

* Discussing Charles’ statement that he was going to kill

someone, “I don’t believe that there’s anything that you can

consider the word ‘kill’ to mean other than to inflict physi-
cal harm to another person. I think that’s the only way you
can look at what those words mean.”

Discussing certain elements of criminal threat, “I think
you're not gonna have a problem. .. . I don’t think you have
to worry yourselves with the rest of the elements. I think
the defendant himself told you, I committed this crime.”

Discussing aggravated battery, “I think the evidence shows
you beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ‘the defendant inten-
tionally caused bodily harm to another person with a deadly
weapon, to wit: acar.’...I think the car is a deadly weapon
in this—in this case.”
Discussing the bodily harm element of aggravated bat-
tery, “[Bodily harm] doesn’t have to be great, only bodily. I
would say her neck and her back are her body. I think that’s
evident. She suffered harm.”

Discussing McDowell’s reaction to Charles following her,
“I don’t think she was overreacting. I think she had every
right to be scared from the minute she left Family Video.”

Discussing Charles’ testimony that McDowell provided
him directions, “I don’t think so. I think what happened
is—is he’s and that’s what the evidence shows is that he
continued to pursue her ‘cause he’s gonna hook up with
her.”

Discussing Charles’ testimony about second-guessing
whether McDowell wanted him to follow her, “Yeah, ladies
and gentlemen, I think that was pretty clear from her testi-
mony. She had absolutely no want or will for him.”

Discussing whether ‘Charles’ vehicle could be a deadly
weapon, “His Nissan Pathfinder SUV, given the fact he
thought he himself miay have killed her, I’d say that that’s a
deadly weapon.”

Wrapping up, “I don’t think there’s really anything else to
explain to you. I think that his evidence he showed you

yesterday told you everything you needed to know about
what he was trying to do.”

During the rebuttal portion of the State’s closing argument, the
prosecutor again employed at least one personalized expression.
Discussing a defense contention that the roads were snow-covered
and slippery, he said: “Now, defendant would lead you to believe
that the pieces to the vehicles just coincidentally landed on the only
two dry pieces of the road. I doubt it.”

The jury found Charles guilty of the lesser included offense of
reckless aggravated battery, criminal damage to property, and crim-
inal threat. In addition to receiving a 34-month prison sentence,
Charles was ordered to register as a violent offender because the
district judge found that he used a deadly weapon in the commis-
sion of a felony.

Charles asserts on appeal that (1) the lesser included offense in-
struction for reckless aggravated battery was impermissibly broader
than the greater offense charged; (2) the reckless aggravated battery
instruction allowed for a conviction under alternative means, and
the State failed to prove each means beyond a reasonable doubt;
(3) the district judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruc-
tion on statements Charles made to Northrup; (4) the prosecutor
committed misconduct by injecting his personal opinion of the evi-
dence into the proceedings; (5) cumulative error denied Charles
a fair trial; and (6) the district judge erred by requiring Charles to
register under the Kansas Offender Registration Act.

Discussion
Breadth of Lesser Included Instruction

Charles’ first claim on appeal centers on the lesser included
reckless aggravated battery instruction,.which permitted convic-
tion if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles reck-
lessly caused bodily harm to McDowell with his SUV or “in any
manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be
inflicted.” The charging document had accused Charles only of the
greater offense of intentionally causing bodily harm to McDowell

with his SUV, and the jury instruction on the greater charge mir-
rored the more limited language.

Because Charles did not object at trial to the giving of the reck-
less aggravated battery instruction as worded to include the “in any
manner” language, we look to K.S.A. 22-3414(3)’s clear error stan-
dard and to our caselaw to supply the template for our review of
this issue.

When analyzing jury instruction issues, we follow a three-step

process:
“(1) determining whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, i.e.,
whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue
for appeal; (2) considering the merits of the claim to determine whether error oc-
curred below; and (3) assessing whether the error requires reversal, i., whether
the error can be deemed harmless.” State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 510, 286 P.3d
195 (2012).

“Our first and third step are interrelated in that whether a party
has preserved a jury instruction issue will affect our reversibility
inquiry at the third step.” State v. Bolze-Sann, 302 Kan. 198, 209,
352 P.3d 511 (2015).

At the second step of determining whether there was any er-
ror at all, we consider whether the subject instruction was legally
and factually appropriate. See State v. Barber, 302 Kan. 367, 377,
353 P.3d 1108 (2015). A reviewing court “‘should use an unlimited
review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropri-
ate.’” State v. Brownlee, 302 Kan. 491, 511, 354 P.3d 525 (2015)
(quoting State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. { 1, 283 P.3d 202
[2012}). When analyzing whether the instruction is factually appro-
priate, “the court should determine whether there was sufficient
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or
the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction.”
Brownlee, 302 Kan. at 511 (quoting Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl.
q). :

If the reviewing court determines that the district judge erred in
giving or failing to give a challenged instruction, it then moves to
reversibility, which in this case is whether the challenged instruc-
tion was clearly erroneous. To determine if an instruction is clearly
erroneous, “the court assesses whether it is firmly convinced that

the jury would have reached a different verdict had the instruction
error not occurred. The party claiming a clearly erroneous instruc-
tion maintains the burden to establish the degree of prejudice nec-
essary for reversal.” Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. 45.

“‘A jury instruction on the elements of a crime that is broader
than the complaint charging the crime is erroneous.’” State v. Mc-
Clelland, 301 Kan. 815, 828, 347 P.3d 211 (2015) (quoting State v.
Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, Syl. { 4, 217 P.3d 15 [2009] [wording of
complaint binding on State in pursuing its theory of case before
a jury]); see State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 210, 290 P.3d 640
(3013) (State bound by complaint’s ’s “version of offense,” “theory”
of case at trial), “An overbroad instruction is erroneous because
the charging instrument sets out the specific offense alleged to in-
form the defendant of the nature of the accusation, to permit the
development of a defense to meet that accusation, and to protect
against conviction based on facts not contemplated in the accusa-
tion.” State v. Hart, 297 Kan. 494, 508, 301 P.3d 1279 (2013) (citing
Trautloff, 289 Kan. at 802-03); see also United States v. Miller, 471
U.S. 130, 144, 105 S. Ct. 1811, 85 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1985) (additions to
State’s indictment theory by way of jury instruction impermissible
under modern criminal law).

In Hart, we concluded that a jury instruction on the elements
of indecent liberties with a child was overbroad because the com-
plaint alleged defendant Randy Dean Hart committed the subject
crimes with an intent to satisfy his own sexual desires, while the
elements instruction provided that the State could get a conviction
if the crimes were committed with an intent to arouse or satisfy the
sexual desires of the victim, the defendant, or both. See 297 Kan.
at 501. Accordingly, the instruction was neither legally nor factually
appropriate and thus was erroneous. See 297 Kan. at 508. In this
case, the Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion about the
lesser included instruction. See State v. Charles, No. 105,148, 2012
WL 2325877, at *3 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion). And
we agree on this point.

We acknowledge that this case differs from Hart because the
elements instruction under examination for impermissible over-
breadth in that case defined the charged crime. Here we are con-

167

cerned with the elements instruction for a lesser included crime.
But this is a distinction without a legally significant difference. The
element that made the aggravated battery lesser here—that is, a
severity level 8 rather than a severity level 7—was the lesser sci-
enter or mens rea of recklessness instead of intentional conduct. A
Kansas criminal defendant is always on notice that the State may
seek or the district judge be otherwise compelled to give a less-
er included instruction involving the same conduct or actus reus
described in the complaint but driven by a less culpable or more
expansive mental state easier for the State to prove. See State v.
Ramirez, 299 Kan. 224, 227-28, 328 P.3d 1075 (2014) (conviction
of defendant on charge not contained in complaint clear violation
of due process; exception allowed when district judge gives less-
er included instruction, instruction on lesser degree of offense);
K.S.A. 22-3414 (statute requires district judge to instruct on crime
charged, any lesser included crime when “there is some evidence
which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included
crime”). Charles does not challenge the giving of the reckless ag-
gravated battery instruction because of its more expansive reckless-
ness mental state. He challenges it only because of the increased
breadth of the actus reus, when compared with the actus reus spec-
ified in the charged offense.

Courts in several of our sister states have recognized that a lesser
included offense instruction may not be a vehicle for broadening
the State’s theory of the case. See Andrews v. State, 679 So. 2d
859, 859 (Fla. Dist. App. 1996) (defendant convicted of aggravated
battery, lesser included offense of charged attempted first-degree
murder; information alleged defendant stabbed victim with knife;
lesser included offense instruction allowed conviction for use of
leadly weapon or for causing great bodily harm; great bodily harm
theory unsupported by charging document); People v. Adams, 202
Mich. App. 385, 392, 509 N.W.2d 530 (1993) (notice to defendant
inadequate when State attempts to add lesser included offense in-
struction on crime dissimilar to charged offense); People v. Russell,
147 A.D.2d 280, 283, 543 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1989) (“so-called lesser in-
cluded offense” represented “seismic shift” in prosecution's theory;
defendant denied due process).

168

The Texas Court of Appeals’ opinion in Castillo v. State, 7
S.W.3d 253 (Tex. App. 1999), is particularly illustrative of the prob-
lem here.

In Castillo, the State charged defendant Julian Antonio Castillo
with “intentionally and knowingly caus|ing] serious bodily injury to
[a child victim] by then and there striking the child with a deadly
weapon, to wit: the defendant’s hands or by striking the child’s
head against a deadly weapon, to wit: a wall or a floor.” 7 S.W.3d at
255. At the conclusion of the guilt stage of trial, the defense sought
a jury instruction on the lesser included offenses of recklessly caus-
ing injury to a child. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could
find Castillo guilty of the lesser included offense if it determined
that he “recklessly engage[d] in conduct that caused serious bodily
injury to [child victim] by then and there shaking or striking the
[victim] with a deadly weapon, to wit: the defendant’s hands, or
by striking the child’s head with a deadly weapon, to wit: a wall
or floor.” 7 $.W.3d at 257. The jury convicted Castillo of recklessly
causing injury to the child.

The appellate court reversed Castillo’s conviction because the
lesser included offense instruction “submitted the theory of ‘shak-
ing’ in the disjunctive as an additional manner and means of injur-
ing the child to those means alleged in the indictment.” 7 $.W.3d
at 257. Although the State had not been required to “plead the
precise way in which [Castillo] caused serious bodily injury to the
child, . . . [by including a more specific description, the State un-
dertook the burden of proving the specific allegations to obtain a
conviction. [Citation omitted.]” 7 S.W.3d at 255.

We are confronted with exactly the same situation. The State
was not required to be as specific as it was in its aggravated battery
charge against Charles. It need not have alleged that Charles com-
mitted severity level 7 intentional aggravated battery only by caus-
ing bodily harm to McDowell by using his SUV as a deadly weapon.
But, having chosen that path, it assumed the burden of proving
the elements of exactly it or its lesser included reckless version be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The district judge erred by expanding the
lesser included instruction so that Charles could be convicted if the
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he inflicted bodily harm

169

on McDowell “in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfig-
urement or death can be inflicted.” The lesser included offense
instruction was neither factually nor legally appropriate.

Having determined that there was instruction error, we must
next determine whether it was “clear” and therefore reversible,
standing alone. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); Hart, 297 Kan. at 508 (cit-
ing State v. Trujillo, 296 Kan, 625, 630-31, 294 P.3d 281 [2013] [in
order for overbroad instruction to qualify as “clearly” erroneous,
court must be firmly convinced that jury would have reached dif-
ferent verdict had instruction error not occurred]).

In his petition for review, Charles asked this court to “grant re-
view and clarify that where, as here, an instruction is overbroad and
allows a jury to convict a defendant based on uncharged conduct,
an appellate court should reverse so long as there [] is a ‘possibility’
that [jury reliance on the uncharged theory] cannot be ruled out.”
Although language to this effect may appear in Trautloff, see 289
Kan. at 802, it is not the correct governing standard under Trujillo
or here. Again, because Charles failed to object to the wording of
the reckless aggravated battery instruction, he must demonstrate
that the error on the overbroad instruction was clear under K.S.A.
22-3414(3).

Evidently because neither the Court of Appeals brief nor the
petition for review filed by Charles fully explained why Charles de-
served reversal on this instructional error standing alone, his coun-
sel attempted to flesh out his position at oral argument before this
court. We understood counsel to assert that the definition of “dead-
ly weapon” as an “instrument which, from the manner in which it
is used, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury,” see PIK Crim. 4th 54.310; State v. Colbert, 244 Kan. 422,
426, 769 P.2d 1168 (1989), makes it logically inconsistent with the
concept of recklessness. Further, if Charles’ conviction on severity
level 8 aggravated battery would have been legally impermissible
because of this logical inconsistency, then the jury must have relied
upon the overbroad and impermissible “in any manner” theory. If
so, counsel argued, then any standard of reversibility has been met.

In Hart, we discussed our earlier decisions in Trautloff and State
v. Wade, 284 Kan. 527, 161 P.3d 704 (2007):

“In Trautloff, decided before our recent clarification of the clearly erroneous
standard in Trujillo, we reversed one of the defendant's convictions for sexual
exploitation of a child because of overbreadth of a jury instruction on the crime’s
elements. The State had charged Melvin Trautloff with ‘displaying’ an offending
photograph or video of a child, but the instruction allowed the jury to convict
‘Trautloff of ‘displaying, procuring or producing’ such a photograph or video. At
‘Trautloff’s trial, the evidence of ‘procuring’ or ‘producing’ was direct and over-
whelming, while the evidence of ‘displaying’ was minimal and circumstantial. We
concluded that, under those circumstances, Trautloff’s substantial rights had been
prejudiced by the instruction. Trautloff, 289 Kan. at 802-03.

“Likewise, in State v. Wade, 284 Kan. 527, 161 P.3d 704 (2007), the State
charged Morgan Wade with aggravated burglary without alleging the intended
felony upon which the charge was predicated. It cured this defect by advising the
court and defense that it intended to rely upon first-degree premeditated murder
as the underlying felony. At trial, however, after the defendant had testified, the
jury was instructed that the underlying felony could be premeditated murder or
aggravated assault. On appeal, this court concluded that the broader jury instruc-
tion prejudiced Wade because the State had proceeded in its case-in-chief only
on the theory that Wade intended to commit premeditated murder; the alternate
theory that he lacked premeditated intent to kill and meant only to frighten sux-
faced only after he had essentially admitted during his testimony that he commit-
ted an aggravated assault. Wade, 284 Kan, at 537.” Hart, 297 Kan. at 508-09.

We distinguished Trautloff and Wade from the situation before

us in Hart. In Hart, we detected no reversibly prejudicial lack of
notice to the defense about the accusation to be defended. In that
aggravated indecent liberties case,
“{t]here was no evidence presented by either side that would suggest Hart’s con-
duct was responsive to the victims’ desires. Hart was not lured into presenting a
defense that sealed a conviction on an alternate State theory that the girls had ini-
tiated or provoked the sexual contact. Rather, he generally denied that any sexual
contact took place, and his testimony merely suggested motives for the victims or
his ex-wife to fabricate the allegations against him. This was not, as in Wade's case,
‘trial by ambush,’ Wade, 284 Kan. at 541, and the error in the instruction does not
qualify as clearly erroneous or require reversal.” Hart, 297 Kan. 509-10.

In this case, we disagree with the underlying premise of defense
counsel's reversibility argument. This court’s use of the word “cal-
culated” in the definition of “deadly weapon” does not mean a jury
in an aggravated battery case involving an allegation of use of a
deadly weapon must answer a subjective question: Did the de-
fendant actually believe that he or she was using an instrument

in a way that made that instrument deadly? Rather, the jury must
answer an objective question: Would a reasonable person in de-
fendant’s circumstances have believed that? Put another way, was
it likely the instrument would be deadly, when used in the way and
at the time and place it was used by defendant? See State v. Whit-
tington, 260 Kan. 873, 878, 926 P.2d 237 (1996).

In our view, these objective questions are logically consistent,
not inconsistent, with the concept of recklessness as the required
mens rea for severity level 8 aggravated battery. Reckless conduct
is “conduct done under circumstances that show a realization of
the imminence of danger to the person of another and a conscious
and unjustifiable disregard of that danger.” See K.S.A. 21-3201(c).
Again, an objective standard is employed. If a defendant engages
in behavior that is a gross deviation from the standard of care a
reasonable person would employ in like circumstances, then the
necessary disregard is demonstrated. See PIK Crim. 4th 52.010.

We conclude that this case is closer to Hart than to Trautloff
and Wade. Charles was not misled by the original narrow charge
into a failure to challenge the State’s case or into commitment to a
losing defense strategy. His counsel's argument that the jury must
have relied on the impermissible, overbroad theory of the lesser
included offense is unconvincing, given the objective nature of the
definitions of deadly weapon and recklessness. Charles has not met
his burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to reversal of his ag-
gravated battery conviction on this issue, standing alone. The error
does not qualify as clear. See Williams, 295 Kan. 506, Syl. (5.

Sufficiency of the Evidence on Asserted Alternative Means

Charles argues that reckless aggravated battery is an alterna-
tive means crime and that the State failed to prove either alleged
means.

“Issues of statutory interpretation and construction, including is-
sues of whether a statute creates alternative means, raise questions
of law reviewable de novo on appeal.” State v. Brown, 295 Kan.
181, Syl. 6, 284 P3d 977 (2012).

In State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 253-54, 295 P.3d 1020 (2013),
we held that K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(2)(B) (“recklessly causing bodily

harm to another person with a deadly weapon, or in any manner
whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflict-
ed”), does not outline an alternative means crime. We therefore re-
ject Charles’ argument insofar as it relies on classifying aggravated
battery as an alternative means crime.

That being said, we must still address Charles’ assertion that
the State failed to prove either of the alleged alternatives. This is
equivalent to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the conviction.

“When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, this
court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine
whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Suate v. Frye, 204 Kan, 364, 374-75, 277 P3d 1091 (2012). An ap-
pellate court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass
on the credibility of witnesses. State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. § 8, 245 P.3d
1030 (2011).” State v. McBroom, 299 Kan, 731, 754, 325 P.3d 1174 (2014).

In this case, testimony established that Charles followed Mc-
Dowell closely while traveling at high speeds through a residential
neighborhood. Charles admitted that the wintry road conditions
were far from ideal, and it is undisputed that the collision between
his SUV and McDowell’s car caused thousands of dollars in prop-
erty damage and injured McDowell. From the manner in which
Charles was driving his vehicle, a reasonable jury could have found
either that the SUV qualified as a deadly weapon or that Charles’ use
of it was likely to produce death or serious injury. See Whittington,
260 Kan. at 878-79 (automobile may be used as deadly weapon);
State v. Bailey, 223 Kan. 178, 184, 573 P.2d 590 (1977) (automo-
bile constituted deadly weapon); State v. Bradford, 27 Kan. App.
2d 597, 600, 3 P.3d 104 (2000) (automobile used in deadly manner
“could very well have been a deadly weapon” supporting conviction
for reckless aggravated battery). There was sufficient evidence to
support Charles’ conviction for reckless aggravated battery.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Charles next contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the
prosecutor's repeated statements of personal opinion on the quality
and quantity of the State’s evidence. Appellate review of a prosecu-

173

torial misconduct claim based on improper comments requires a
two-step analysis.

“First, an appellate court decides whether the comments at issue were outside the
wide latitude a prosecutor is allowed, ¢.g., when discussing evidence. If so, there
was misconduct. Second, if misconduct is found, an appellate court determines
whether the improper comments prejudiced the jury against the defendant and
denied the defendant a fair trial.” State v. Lewis, 299 Kan. 828, 848, 326 P.3d 387
(2014) (citing State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, 1012, 306 P3d 244 [2013]).

“Appellate courts consider three factors in analyzing the second step: (1)
whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct
showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the evidence was of such
a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little
weight in the minds of jurors. But none of these factors individually controls; and
before the third factor can override the first two, an appellate court must be able
to say the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 87 S, Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), have been met. State v. Mc-
Cullough, 293 Kan. 970, 990-91, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012).

“When both constitutional and nonconstitutional errors clearly arise from the
same acts and omissions, an appellate court begins with a harmlessness analysis of
the constitutional error. If the constitutional error is reversible, an appellate court
need not analyze whether the lower standard for harmlessness under K.S.A. 60-
261 also has been met. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, Syl. § 16. Under both standards,
the party benefiting from the error bears the burden to demonstrate harmless-
ness. State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1110, 299 P.3d 292 (2013).” Lewis, 299 Kan.
at 848-49,

Charles identifies more than a dozen of the prosecutor's closing
argument comments, most of which include the phrase “I think” or
its equivalent or their substantive opposites.

We are troubled by these comments, because, in short, the
prosecutor’s personal views are irrelevant to the task before the
jury. And, in some circumstances, such views can be a legally sig-
nificant distraction outside the wide latitude permitted prosecutors
when discussing the evidence during closing argument. See State
v. Brown, 300 Kan. 542, 560, 331 P.3d 781 (2014) (wide latitude
does not extend to prosecutor's personal opinion). For example, we
have had little hesitation in labeling prosecutors’ statements about
their personal views on witness credibility misconduct. See State
v. Armstrong, 299 Kan. 405, 429, 324 P.3d 1052 (2014). Similarly,
a prosecutor should not express personal opinions on the ultimate
guilt or innocence of the defendant. State v. Mireles, 297 Kan. 339,

368, 301 P.3d 677 (2013). The reason for prohibiting such com-
ments is that they constitute a form of unsworn, unchecked tes-
timony, not commentary on the evidence of the case. Armstrong,
299 Kan. at 429; Mireles, 297 Kan. at 368. “Nevertheless, a pros-
ecutor has “‘freedom . . . to craft an argument that includes reason-
able inferences based on the evidence’” and “‘when a case turns
on which version of two conflicting stories is true, [to argue] certain
testimony is not believable. [Citations omitted.]”’” Armstrong, 299
Kan. at 427. A prosecutor may also argue that the evidence dem-
onstrates a defendant's guilt. Mireles, 297 Kan. at 368. In so do-
ing, a prosecutor must “say something akin to ‘the evidence shows
defendant's guilt’ in order to make a statement merely directional
and not an expression of the prosecutor's personal opinion.” State
v. Peppers, 294 Kan. 377, 400, 276 P.3d 148 (2012); see State v.
Mann, 274 Kan. 670, 688-89, 56 P.3d 212 (2002) (distinguishing
between permissible comment that séts up “prosecutor's upcoming
summation” and impermissible “prosecutorial vouching”).

We recognize that the Court of Appeals has ruled that the phrase
“I think” makes a prosecutor's closing argument susceptible to a
misconduct challenge. See State v. Haugland, No. 105,218, 2012
WL 1450440, at *2 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (use of
“T think” in extemporaneous comments made them susceptible to
defendant’s argument that prosecutor stated personal opinion on
credibility); see also State v. Syers, No. 107,051, 2013 WL 1234192,
at *7 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutors use of
“I think” improper, inserted personal opinion of defendant’s guilt);
but see State v. Rivera, 42 Kan. App. 2d 1005, 1021-22, 219 P.3d
1231 (2009) (terms “I believe,” “I think” often figure of speech,
not expression of personal knowledge), rev. denied 290 Kan. 1102
(2010). This court has recently emphasized the use or lack of use
of the phrase “I think.” See State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 935,
329 P.3d 400 (2014) (no prosecutorial misconduct, noting absence
of phrase “I think” when prosecutor discussed witness credibility);
State v. Hart, 297 Kan. 494, 501, 301 P.3d 1279 (2013) (emphasiz-
ing use of “I think,” “I believe” in analysis of prosecutorial miscon-
duct on discussion of witness credibility). Ultimately, howéver, we
must view the phase “I think” not in isolation but in context. See

State v. Duong, 292 Kan. 824, 831, 257 P.3d 309 (2011); see also
State v. De La Torre, 300 Kan. 591, 612, 331 P.3d 815 (2014) (state-
ment occupying “middle ground” between impermissible opinion
and permissible directional statement not improper in context of
argument that followed).

Here, at oral argument, the State encouraged us to view the pros-
ecutor’s use of “I think” as a rhetorical device. This characterization
is inapt and does an injustice to true rhetoric. Rather, on repeated
reading in context, we are convinced that the “I thinks” littering
the transcript in this case are mere verbal tics—transitions and
time fillers akin to “um” or “uh.” As such, we hold that they were
not outside the wide latitude given the prosecutor. But, in the fu-
ture, prosecutors are on notice that any temptation to say “I think”
should be rebuffed and replaced with “the evidence shows” or “I
submit” or a similar, less potentially subjectively loaded phrase. See
State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 316, 130 P.3d 1179 (2006) (phrase
“IAve submit” used to advance idea for jury’s consideration rather
than expressing a personal opinion).

Because we ultimately conclude that there is no error on this
issue, we need not reach the question of whether any error was
harmless.

Need for Limiting Instruction

Charles argues that Northrup’s testimony about comments he
made to her moments before he made comments to Westemeir
constituted “prior bad act evidence” that required a limiting in-
struction under K.S.A. 60-455 to guide the jury's consideration of
the testimony. The district judge did not give such an instruction.

The Court of Appeals panel regarded this issue as unpreserved
because admission of the evidence was not contested at trial. We
have recently rejected this view. See State v. Breeden, 297 Kan.
567, 583, 304 P.3d 660 (2013). The clearly erroneous standard ap-
plies. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3).

“K.S.A. 60-455 does not prohibit the admission of evidence re-
garding other crimes and civil wrongs if the evidence relates to
acts committed as part of the events surrounding the crimes or
civil wrongs at issue in the trial.” State v. King, 297 Kan. 955, Syl.

4 1, 305 P.3d 641 (2013). Northrup’s testimony was limited to state-
ments Charles made during his short time inside the video store.
The statements were not made on a separate occasion and were not
subject to K.S.A. 60-455, See King, 297 Kan. at 963-64. A limiting
instruction was not legally or factually appropriate, and there was
no error in failing to give one. See State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509,
553, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014).

Cumulative Error

Charles argues that cumulative error requires reversal of his
convictions. We judge the application of the doctrine by review-
ing the entire record and engaging in an unlimited review. State v.
Cruz, 297 Kan. 1048, 1074, 307 P.3d 199 (2013).

“In a cumulative error analysis, an appellate court aggregates all errors and,
even though those exrors would individually be considered harmless, analyzes
whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively
they cannot be determined to be harmless. [Citation omitted.] In other words, was
the defendant's right to a fair trial violated because the combined errors affected
the outcome of the trial?” State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 205, 262 P.3d 314 (2011).

We have identified only one error, the overbroad elements in-
struction on reckless aggravated battery. With no other error iden-
tified, cumulative error analysis is not applicable. See State v. Bow-
en, 299 Kan. 339, 359, 323 P.3d 853 (2014); State v. Frierson, 298
Kan. 1005, 1020, 319 P.3d 515 (2014).

Registration Requirement

In this case, the district judge determined that Charles’ commis-
sion of aggravated battery employing a deadly weapon demanded
his registration as a violent offender under the Kansas Offender
Registration Act, K.S.A. 22-4901 et seg. Charles challenges the
constitutionality of the Act, specifically its requirement for judicial
factfinding, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct.
2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). The constitutionality of a statute
presents a question of law over which this court has unlimited re-
view. State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 121, 322 P.3d 334 (2014).

We have not previously considered this precise issue, but its
general contours are straightforward. If KORA registration does

177

not constitute punishment for purposes of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, then Apprendi does not apply. If
it does constitute punishment under that clause, then Apprendi
applies and the Sixth Amendment demands that all factfinding in
support of a registration requirement must be done by a jury, not
a judge. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151,
2161, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

In Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016), a ma-
jority of this court, as of the time of the argument in this case,
holds that retroactive application of KORA, as amended in 2011,
to a sex offender who committed his or her sex crime before the
amendment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution. This is so because that majority regards the overall
KORA statutory scheme, effective as of July 1, 2011, as punitive in
effect as it relates to sex offenders. See Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan.
at 317-28 (applying “intent-effects” test from Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84, 92, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 [2003]).

The Doe v. Thompson decision informs the Apprendi analysis
here. See Terry & Furlong, Sex Offender Registration and Com-
munity Notification: A “Megan’s Law” Sourcebook, Part I, sec. 2.1
(2nd ed, 2008-2009) (noting many courts have held that if a par-
ticular sanction constitutes punishment under one constitutional
basis, it constitutes punishment under other constitutional bases
as well).

Charles committed his crime on December 25, 2009. He was
sentenced on September 10, 2010. Neither the record before us
nor the briefs of the parties make it crystal clear whether the ver-
sion of KORA applied at Charles’ sentencing was the 2009 version
in effect at the time he committed his crime or an amended 2010
version that took effect on July 1, 2010. However, it is clear that
Charles has not challenged his KORA registration requirement
on an ex post facto basis; rather he attacks it only because judicial
rather than jury factfinding supported its imposition. These cir-
cumstances persuade us that we should focus on the 2009 version
of KORA in this case. :

Charles’ issue statement and argument in both his brief to the

Court of Appeals and his petition for review to this court appears
to further narrow his KORA challenge. The issue statement reads
in pertinent part: “Because the public disclosure requirements of
KORA are punishment, the finding triggering such registration re-
quirements should be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Emphasis added.) The argument section of his brief does not fo-
cus on the public disclosure requirements mentioned in the issue
statement; instead it mentions only the reporting fee requirement
and the harshness of the Level 5 offense severity rating for viola-
tion of KORA.

Our Doe v. Thompson decision observes that the 2011 KORA
provision for public dissemination of sex offender registrants’ in-
formation contributes to the entire statutory scheme’s punitive
effect or nature. 304 Kan. at 317, 318-19, 328. The 2009 KORA
public dissemination provision is nearly identical to that in the
2011 version, compare K.S.A. 22-4909(a) with K.S.A. 2011 Supp.
22-4909(a), although the 2011 KORA amendment did broaden the
universe of registrants’ information subject to public dissemination.

Likewise, the $20-per-report fee and the felony status of a
KORA violation under the 2011 version contributed to the Doe v.
Thompson holding that the statutory scheme was punitive in effect
or nature as it relates to sex offenders. 304 Kan. at 319-20, 328.
Again, both the reporting fees and the felony status for violation
are similar in the 2009 version of KORA. Compare K.S.A. 22-4907
with K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4907.

In sum, although this. case can be distinguished from Doe v.
Thompson in certain ways, Doe v. Thompson’s overall conclusion
that sex offender registration under the 2011 version of KORA is
punitive should be extended to the 2009 version applied to a violent
offender such as Charles as well, particularly when we focus on the
three provisions upon which Charles concentrates: those on public
dissemination, reporting fees, and felony penalty for violation. We
therefore hold that the registration requirement qualifies as pun-
ishment under the Due Process Clause, and that its imposition on
Charles required a jury finding of his use of a deadly weapon under
Apprendi. Lacking such a finding here, we must vacate the regis-
tration requirement imposed at his sentencing.

All of this being said, we further acknowledge that today’s deci-
sion by a new majority in State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 Kan. 192,
377 P.3d 1127 (2016), argued a year after Doe v. Thompson, may
influence whether the KORA holding of this case is available to
be relied upon by violent offenders whose appeals have yet to be
decided. In Petersen-Beard, the majority arrives at a conclusion op-
posite from that arrived at in Doe v. Thompson, holding that appli-
cation of KORA to sex offenders does not qualify as punishment.
304 Kan. at 211.

CONCLUSION

Based on our analysis of each of defendant's appellate challenges
above, we affirm his convictions and vacate the sentencing require-
ment that he register as a violent offender under KORA.

" MICHAEL J. Matong, Senior Judge, assigned
aoe

Jouwson, J., concurring: I concur in the result reached by the
majority. I take exception to the majority’s holding that the pros-
ecutor committed no error during closing argument, but I would
find that the erroneous statements of personal opinion were harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, I cannot be as charitable as the majority in characterizing
all of the prosecutor’s improper statements as merely “verbal tics.”
For instance, when discussing the critically important question of
whether defendant's Nissan Pathfinder SUV could prove the dead-
ly weapon element of aggravated battery, the prosecutor declared:
“Yd say that that’s a deadly weapon.” No transition or time filler
there. A juror would be hard-pressed to view that statement as any-
thing other than the prosecutoi’s personal opinion as to what the
evidence proved. The prosecutor’s frequent use of “I think” and “I
don’t think” would do nothing to dissuade the jury that the pros-
ecutor was proffering personal opinions.

But more importantly, I write separately to express my view that
it is error, i.¢., outside the wide latitude given to prosecutors, to use
words during closing argument that are commonly understood to
state a personal opinion. If the prosecutor did not intend to state
a personal opinion, then that inadvertence would indicate a lack
of ill will under the second step of the analysis and could negate
reversal. But a prosecutor should not be permitted to extend the
bounds of proper argument through inadvertence or idiosyncratic
speech patterns. Consequently, I would find that the prosecutor
erred, albeit harmlessly.

LUCKERT, J., AND MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, join in
the foregoing concurring opinion.

181
No. 105,982
Stare OF Kansas, Appellee, v. JosEPH M. BusERr, Appellant.
(371 P.3d 886)

Opinion filed April 22, 2016.

Meryl Caroer-Allmond, of Kansas Capital Appellate Defender Office, argued
the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Mark J. Noah, county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney
general, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JoxNson, J.: Joseph M. Buser seeks review of the Court of Ap-
peals’ holding that the 2011 amendments to the Kansas Offender
Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq., can be applied
retroactively to his 2009 conviction without violating the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution (hereafter Ex Post
Facto Clause). Because KORA’ statutory scheme after the 2011
amendments is so punitive in effect as to negate the implied legis-
lative intent to deem it civil, we hold that the Ex Post Facto Clause
precludes the retroactive application of the amended statutory
scheme to any sex offender who committed the qualifying offense
prior to July 1, 2011. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals
and hold that the time period in which Buser is required to register
is 10 years from his release from prison, pursuant to the provisions
of K.S.A. 22-4906(a).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

In February 2009, when he was 21 years old, Buser began dat-
ing a 15-year-old girl. The couple began having sex 2 months later,
and the following month, in May 2009, the girl’s mother reported
the couple’s sexual relationship to the police. The police investiga-
tion led to charges being filed against Buser, including one count
of indecent liberties with a child and six counts of aggravated in-
decent liberties with a child. Ultimately, Buser pled no contest to
one count of indecent liberties with a child. In connection with his
plea, Buser was advised of the KORA requirement to register as a
sex offender.

The district court accepted Buser's plea and sentenced him to 52
months’ imprisonment and lifetime post-release supervision. The
district court also ordered Buser to register as an offender under
KORA for his lifetime because the court found that this was Buser’s
second conviction, apparently based upon a prior juvenile adjudi-
cation.

In Buser’s direct appeal to the Court of Appeals, he argued that
the district court erred in counting his prior juvenile adjudication

as a first conviction for purposes of KORA because K.S.A. 22-4906
refers to “convictions,” not “adjudications.” The State agreed that
Buser’s juvenile adjudication could not count as a prior convic-
tion to enhance the time period of registration. But the State con-
tended that under the subsequently enacted 2011 amendments to
KORA, Buser'’s registration term as a first-time offender had been
increased to 25 years. Buser’s reply briéf argued that he should only
be subject to the 10-year registration term in effect when he com-
mitted his crime, because retroactively imposing a longer registra-
tion term based upon the 2011 amendments to KORA violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause.

The Court of Appeals found that the State was correct in conced-
ing that the district court erred in imposing a lifetime registration
term. State v. Buser, No. 105,982, 2013 WL 1149655, at °6 (Kan.
App. 2013) (unpublished opinion). But the panel also found that
the 2011 amended registration term of 25 years could be applied
retroactively to Buser. 2013 WL 1149655, at *9. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for “cor-
rection of the duration of time Buser must register under KORA.”
2013 WL 1149655, at °10.

Buser petitioned this court for review on the sole issue of wheth-
er the Court of Appeals violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when it
held that Buser was required to register under KORA for 25 years
instead of 10 years. This court granted Buser’s petition for review,
together with two other cases with related issues: Doe v. Thomp-
son, 304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 350 (2016), and State v. Redmond, 304
Kan. 283, 371 P.3d 900 (2016).

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF KORA 2011 AMENDMENTS

The 2011 version of KORA’ statutory scheme purported to ap-
ply to any person who was convicted of any sexually violent crime
on or after April 14, 1994. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4902(b) (defining
“sex offender”). Indecent liberties with a child is statutorily desig-
nated as a “sexually violent crime.” K.S.A, 2011 Supp. 22-4902(c)
(2). Accordingly, Buser’s 2009 conviction for a sexually violent
crime made him subject to the additional and enhanced provisions

of the 2011 statutory scheme, including the increased time period
for a first-time offender.

But legislative acts must comport with our federal and state con-
stitutions, and Article I, § 10, of the United States Constitution
provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall. . . pass any. . . ex

post facto Law.” One category of ex post facto laws is “‘“any statute
. .. which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime,
after its commission.”’” State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 277, 323 P.3d
829 (2014) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 169-70, 46 S. Ct.
68, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 [1925]). Yet, “[t]he constitutional prohibition
on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes.” State v. Myers,
260 Kan. 669, 677, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996). Consequently, the ques-
tion of whether the 2011 version of KORA can be constitution-
ally applied retroactively to Buser will be resolved by determining
whether the amended statutory scheme is punitive.

Standard of Review

“When the application of a statute is challenged on constitu-
tional grounds, this court exercises an unlimited, de novo standard
of review. State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 676, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996).”
State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 768, 187 P.3d 1283 (2008).

Analysis

In upholding the constitutionality of retroactively applying the
2011 KORA provisions, the Court of Appeals relied in part on this
court's decision in Myers, as the panel determined it had been
modified by the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent hold-
ings in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d
164 (2003). On review, Buser acknowledges the hurdles that those
cases present, but he argues that his case is factually distinguish-
able in that the 2011 version of KORA is far more punitive in na-
ture than the statutes reviewed in Myers and Smith. We agree.

State v. Myers

Myers considered whether a previous registration act, the Kan-
sas Sex Offender Registration Act (KSORA), could be applied to
a person who had committed the qualifying offense prior to the

1994 effective date of KSORA. See L. 1994, ch. 107, secs. 1-7. My-
ers claimed that the retroactive application of KSORA’s reporting
and disclosure requirements violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The State conceded that KSORA was being retroactively applied
to Myers but argued that the intent and purpose of KSORA was
regulatory, rather than punitive, and the Ex Post Facto Clause did
not apply.

The Myers court agreed with part of the State’s argument, find-
ing that while KSORA contained no express statement of legisla-
tive intent or purpose, “the legislative history suggests a nonpuni-
tive purpose—public safety.” 260 Kan. at 681. But Myers’ analysis
did not end with legislative intent. Rather, the Myers court recog-
nized that it had to make the additional determination of “whether
the ‘statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as
to negate that [legislative] intention.’ United States v. Ward, 448
US. 242, 248-49, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).” 260
Kan. at 681.

Ultimately, Myers opined that KSORA’s registration require-
ments were remedial and could apply retroactively to Myers. In
contrast, the court held that “KSORA’ disclosure provision must
be considered punishment.” 260 Kan. at 699. While holding that
the legislative aim was not to punish and retribution was not an
intended purpose of the legislation, Myers reasoned “that the re-
percussions, despite how they may be justified, are great enough
under the facts of this case to be considered punishment.” 260 Kan.
at 699. Further, Myers opined that the unrestricted public access
to the registry was excessive and went beyond what was necessary
to promote public safety. 260 Kan. at 699. Consequently, Myers
declared that “[tlo avoid the ex post facto characterization, public
access [to registration information] should be limited to those with
aneed to know the information for public safety purposes” and that
those authorized to access the information should only use it for
public safety purposes. 260 Kan. at 700.

The Court of Appeals opined that it was duty-bound to follow
Myers’ holding that the registration requirements of KORAS pre-
decessor did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, but that it was
also duty-bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s hold-

ings in Smith. Without explicitly stating as much, the panel sug-
gested that Myers’ ruling on this State’s disclosure provisions had
been overruled by Smith, Buser, 2013 WL 1149655, at *8-9.

Smith v. Doe

Smith considered an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to the Alas-
ka Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA). Although it was the first
time the high court had considered the precise issue, the Supreme
Court applied its well-established framework of (1) determining
whether the legislature’s intention was to enact a “a regulatory
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive” and, if so, (2) “examin[ing]
whether the statutory scheme is “‘so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem it “civil.”’” 538
USS. at 92 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117
S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 [1997]). This framework is often
referred to as the “intent-effects” test. See, ¢.g., Moore v. Avoyelles
Correctional Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 2001). Although
Myers did not label its analysis, it used the same framework.

On the intent component, Smith held that the Alaska Legisla-

ture’s intent “was to create a civil, nonpunitive regime.” 538 U.S.
at 96. For the effects part of the test, the Court utilized the factors
identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69,
83S. Ct. 544, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963), but noted that “[b]ecause the
Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to apply in various consti-
tutional contexts, . . . they are ‘neither exhaustive nor dispositive,’
[citations omitted], but are ‘useful guideposts.’” 538.U.S. at 97.
The Court explained:
“The factors most relevant to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation,
the regulatory scheme: [1] has been regarded in our history and traditions as a
punishment; [2] imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (3] promotes the
traditional aims of punishment; [4] has a rational connection to a nonpunitive
purpose; or [5] is excessive with respect to this purpose.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.

Smith summarily dismissed the remaining two Mendoza-Mar-
tinez factors—whether the regulation comes into play only on a
finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime”—by declaring those factors carried “little weight.”
538 U.S. at 105.

Under the first factor—whether the regulatory scheme has been
regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment—Smith not-
ed that sex offender registration and notification statutes “‘are of
fairly recent origin,’ [citation omitted] which suggests that the stat-
ute was not meant as a punitive measure, or, at least, that it did not
involve a traditional means of punishing.” 538 U.S. at 97 (quoting
Doe Iv, Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 989 [9th Cir. 2001]). The Court reject-
ed the argument that the notification provisions resembled sham-
ing punishments of the colonial period by asserting that shaming,
humiliation, and banishment punishments of old involved more
than the dissemination of accurate information, which is all that
ASORA did. The Smith Court was not swayed by the fact that Alas-
ka posted the registration information on the Internet because, in
the Court's view, a member of the public visiting the state’s website
was analogous to that person visiting the official criminal records
archive. 538 U.S. at 99.

Under the second factor, Smith found that ASORA had not im-
osed an affirmative disability or restraint on Doe because he was
ot physically restrained in any manner. 538 U.S. at 100. Moreover,
e Court rejected the notion that the reporting provisions were
kin to probation or parole, partially because the subsequent re-
porting did not have to be made in person.

Under the third factor—whether the regulatory scheme pro-
motes the traditional aims of punishment—the Court described
those aims as retribution and deterrence. The Court appeared to
concede that ASORA might deter future crimes, but it opined that
if the mere presence of deterrent purpose renders a government
program “criminal,” it “‘would severely undermine the Govern-
ment's ability to engage in effective regulation.’” Smith, 538 U.S. at
02 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105, 118 S. Ct.
488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 [1997]). It then held that the act's registra-
tion obligations were not retributive based upon the differing dura-
tion of reporting for different categories of offenders because these
measures were “reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and
this is consistent with the regulatory objective.” 538 U.S. at 102.

Smith declared the fourth factor—the rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose—to be the most significant factor. The Court

eet

summarily rejected the respondent’s argument that ASORA was
not “‘narrowly drawn to accomplish the stated purpose,’” reason-
ing that a “statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a
close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.”
538 U.S. at 103.

When assessing the fifth factor—whether the regulatory scheme
is excessive with respect to its purpose—Smith opined that it need
not determine “whether the legislature has made the best choice
possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy. The question
is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of
the nonpunitive objective.” 538 U.S. at 105. The Court concluded
that ASORA’s application to all convicted sex offenders, without
any individualized assessment of the offender's dangerousness, did
not render the act punitive. Finding that the risk of recidivism by
sex offenders was ‘frightening and high,’” the Court held that “[i]
n the context of the regulatory scheme the State can dispense with
individual predictions of future dangerousness and allow the public
to assess the risk on the basis of accurate, nonprivate information
about the registrants’ convictions without violating the prohibitions
of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” 538 U.S. at 103-04.

Relying on empirical research on child molesters, the Court also
held that the duration of ASORA’s reporting requirements was not
excessive because “‘most reoffenses do not occur within the first
several years after release,’ but may occur ‘as late as 20 years fol-
lowing release.’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 104 (quoting National Institute
of Justice, R. Prentky, R. Knight, & A. Lee, U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Child Sexual Molestation: Research Issues 14 [1997]).

Finally, the Court held that the widespread dissemination of the
registration information was not excessive, instead finding that the
“notification system is a passive one: An individual must seek ac-
cess to the information.” 538 U.S. at 105. The Court also deter-
mined that making the registry information available throughout
the state was not excessive in light of population mobility, citing to
a study indicating that 38% of recidivist sex offenses took place in
different jurisdictions than where the previous offense was com-
mitted. 538 U.S. at 105.

Having determined that the respondents had failed to show

“that the effects of the law negate Alaska’s intention to establish a
civil regulatory scheme,” the Smith majority declared that the act
was nonpunitive and that its retroactive application did not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause. 538 U.S. at 105-06.

Statutory Differences

In his petition for review, Buser asserts that the enhanced re-
quirements of KORA, after the 2011 amendments, render that
statutory scheme much more punitive than the schemes involved
in either Myers or Smith. Consequently, Buser contends that work-
ing the current statutory scheme through the Mendoza-Martinez
factors would yield a different result.

We engaged in that endeavor in Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291,
373 P.3d 750 (2016). There, we listed the significant differences be-
tween the 2011 KORA and the ASORA reviewed in Smith. Those
differences included the following: KORA applies to a broader
group of offenders; KORA requires frequent in-person reporting
regardless of whether registration information has changed since
the last reporting, KORA requires a longer registration period for
some first-time offenders; KORA requires additional registration
information; KORA requires changed information to be reported
in person within 3 days; KORA requires additional information to
be disseminated to the public; KORA imposes potentially costly
registration fees; KORA requires advance notice for travel outside
the United States, KORA requires annual driver's license renewal
and offenders subject to KORA must have a distinguishing num-
ber on their licenses; parents subject to KORA must disclose that
status in any proceeding determining child custody, residency, and
parenting time; and KORA imposes severe, person felony sanctions
for violating any KORA provision. Thompson, 304 Kan. at 317-20.

Reviewing KORA, as amended in 2011, in light of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors, we first determined that the statutory scheme re-
sembled traditional forms of punishment by being akin to public
shaming and by replicating the circumstance of being on probation
or parole. Thompson, 304 Kan. at 321-22. The latter circumstance
also imposed an affirmative disability or restraint on the offender,
as did the difficulties in obtaining employment and housing caused

by KORA. Moreover, the financial obligations were punitive in ef-
fect, when viewed from an offender's perspective. 304 Kan. at 323-
24, Next, we determined that the current KORA had a deterrent
effect and was retributive in character, before opining that KORA
was not rationally connected to the nonpunitive purpose of public
safety. In other words, the statutory scheme is excessive in relation
to its regulatory purpose. 304 Kan, at 327-28. Consequently, we
determined that the 2011 version of KORA is punitive in effect and
that the amended statutory scheme cannot be applied retroactively
to any sex offender who committed the qualifying crime prior to
July 1, 2011. 304 Kan. at 328.

Given that Buser committed his crime in 2009, he cannot be
subjected to the subsequently enacted 25-year registration period
in the 2011 version of KORA without violating the Ex Post Facto
Clause. The Court of Appeals decision to the contrary is reversed.
Buser will be subject to the KORA provisions that were in effect
in 2009.

Reversed.
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned

goa

Bigs, J., dissenting: I dissent from the majority's decision in
this case for the reasons more fully stated in my dissent in Doe
v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016). As explained
there, I believe the majority asks and answers the wrong ques-
tion. Whether the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) as
amended in 2011 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution is entirely a federal question. We should apply
the abundant federal caselaw where possible to inform the analysis.
The majority’s approach disregards that caselaw.

As explained in my Thompson dissent, the applicable federal

191

caselaw considers similar burdens under other offender registra-
tion schemes. It compels me to conclude that the 2011 KORA
amendments do not violate the United States Constitution’s Ex
Post Facto Clause and the United States Supreme Court would so
hold. I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision for the reasons
T explain in Thompson.

Nuss, C.J., and LuckErr, J., join in the foregoing dissent.

No. 108,061

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. HENRY PETERSEN-BEARD,
Appellant.
(877 Pad 1127)

Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and
was on the brief for appellant.

Christina M. Trocheck, first assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and
Ellen Mitchell, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with
her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

STEGALL, J.: Henry Petersen-Beard challenges his sentence to
lifetime postrelease registration as a sex offender pursuant to the
Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq.,
as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of § 9 of the Kan-
sas Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Because we find that lifetime registration as a sex
offender pursuant to KORA is not punishment for either Eighth

Amendment or § 9 purposes, we reject Petersen-Beard’s argument
that it is unconstitutionally cruel and/or unusual and affirm his sen-
tence. In so doing, we overrule the contrary holdings of State v.
Redmond, 304 Kan. 283, 371 P.3d 900 (2016), State v. Buser, 304
Kan. 181, 371 P.3d 886 (2016), and Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan.
291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petersen-Beard pled guilty to and was convicted of one count
of rape for having sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old girl when
he was 19 years old. Prior to sentencing, he filed motions asking
the district court to depart from the presumptive guidelines sen-
tence and to declare KORAS requirement of lifetime registration
unconstitutional under § 9 of the Kansas Bill of Rights and the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district
court granted Petersen-Beard’s motion for a downward durational
departure but denied his request to find KORA’ lifetime registra-
tion requirements unconstitutional. As such, the district court sen-
tenced Petersen-Beard to 78 months’ imprisonment with lifetime
postrelease supervision and lifetime registration as a sex offend-
er—the lowest sentence permitted by law.

Petersen-Beard appealed the district court’s ruling to the
Court of Appeals but did not prevail. State v. Petersen-Beard, No.
108,061, 2013 WL 4046444 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opin-
ion). Petersen-Beard now brings his appeal to this court reprising
the arguments he made below that the requirement in Kansas law
of lifetime registration as a sex offender is unconstitutional. We
granted Petersen-Beard’s petition for review pursuant to K.S.A.
20-3018(b), exercise jurisdiction pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101(b),
and affirm.

ANALYSIS
Standard of Review

This appeal requires us to decide whether KORA’s mandatory
lifetime sex offender registration as set forth in K.S.A. 22-4901
et seq., runs afoul of either the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against “cruel and unusual punishments” or § 9’s prohibition against
“cruel or unusual punishment.” The constitutionality of a statute is
a question of law over which this court exercises plenary review.
State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 906, 281 P.3d 153 (2012). “We
presume statutes are constitutional and must resolve all doubts in
favor of a statute’s validity.” State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 121, 322
P.3d 334 (2014). “It is not the duty of this court to criticize the legis-
lature or to substitute its view on economic or social policy; it is the
duty of this court to safeguard the constitution.” State ex rel. Six v.
Kansas Lottery, 286 Kan. 557, 562, 186 P.3d 183 (2008).

Typically, challenges arising under either the Eighth Amend-
ment or § 9, or both, attack criminal sanctions against persons con-
victed of crimes as being cruel and/or unusual. Such is the case with
Petersen-Beard’s argument here. However, as the State points out,
there remains a threshold question as to whether the challenged
sanction is punishment at all for purposes of either the Eighth
Amendment or § 9, or is rather a civil and nonpunitive sanction.
Here, the State claims that KORA‘s requirement of lifetime sex of-
fender registration in Petersen-Beard’s case is not punishment at
all-and is therefore not subject to our normal cruel and unusual
analysis. For the reasons set forth below, we agree.

KORA’ lifetime sex offender registration requirements are not pun-
ishment for purposes of applying the United States Constitution.

In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S, Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d
164 (2003), the United States Supreme Court set out the following
framework for analyzing whether a legislature’s statutory scheme
is punitive:

“We must ‘ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish “civil”
proceedings.” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). If the intention of
the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the
intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must
further examine whether the statutory scheme is ““so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem it “civil.”” Ibid. (quoting United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1980)). Because we ‘ordinarily defer to the
legislature’s stated intent,’ Hendricks, supra, at 361, ‘“only the clearest proof” will
suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a
civil remedy into a criminal penalty,’ Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100

(1997) (quoting Ward, supra, at 249, [100 S. Ct. at 2641]; see also Hendricks,
supra, at 361; United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996); United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S, 354, 365 (1984).”

This framework is often referred to as the “intent-effects” test.
Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir.
2001). In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court reasoned that a “con-
clusion that the legislature intended to punish” would resolve the
question of the punitive nature of the statutory scheme “without
further inquiry into its effects.” 538 U.S. at 92-93. Applying the in-
tent-effects test to KORAs lifetime registration provisions, we have
held today in Thompson that our legislature intended those provi-
sions of KORA to be a nonpunitive and civil regulatory scheme
rather than punishment. See Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. at 309-17,
(citing State v. Myers, 260 Kan, 669, 923 P.3d 1024 [1996] [life-
time postrelease registration under Kansas Sex Offender Registra-
tion Act was nonpunitive in nature], cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118
[1997]). We agree and do not disturb that aspect of Thompson or
its companion cases. See State v. Redmond, 304 Kan. at 287; State
v. Buser, 304 Kan. at 185.

Because the legislature did not intend for KORAs lifetime sex
offender registration scheme to be punishment, we must next turn
to the effect of those provisions to determine whether, by “‘“the
clearest proof,”’” those effects “‘override legislative intent and
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a crimi-
nal penalty.’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. The Supreme Court in Smith
utilized the seven factors identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Mar-
tinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963),
to decide whether the effects of the legislative enactment negated
and overrode the legislature’s intent to establish a civil regulatory
scheme. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. The Mendoza-Martinez factors are:
“Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it ap-
plies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally

be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned . . . .” Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.

While in Smith, the Mendoza-Martinez factors were applied
to determine whether a lifetime registration scheme was punish-
ment for ex post facto purposes rather than for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment, there exists no analytical distinction between
or among the different constitutional contexts in which the ques-
tion of punishment versus a civil regulatory scheme can arise. “The
common inquiry across the Court’s Eighth Amendment, ex post
facto, and double jeopardy jurisprudence is determining whether
the government’s sanction is punitive in nature and intended to
serve as punishment.” Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 264 0.5 (1st
Cir. 2015) (citing Mendoza-Martinez); see also United States v. Un-
der Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 263-64 (4th Cir. 2013) (using Mendoza-
Martinez factors to determine federal Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2012),
is nonpunitive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment); Myrie
v. Commissioner, N.J. Dept. of Corrections, 267 F.8d 251, 262
(3d Cir. 2001) (applying Mendoza-Martinez factors to an Eighth
Amendment “Excessive Fines” Clause challenge); Cutshall v. Sun-
dquist, 193 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 1999) (using Mendoza-Martinez
factors to determine Tennessee’s Sex Offender Registration and
Monitoring Act was nonpunitive under the Eighth Amendment);
Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, 74 F.3d 633, 651-52 (Sth Cir. 1996)
(Dennis, J., concurring) (using Mendoza-Martinez factors to evalu-
ate whether a pretrial detainee was punished under the Eighth
Amendment); People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 388, 581 N.E.2d
687 (1991) (court would have used Mendoza-Martinez factors to
evaluate Eighth Amendment claim if conclusive evidence of leg-
islative intent was unavailable); In re Justin B., 405 S.C. 391, 404,
747 S.E.2d 774 (2018) (using Mendoza-Martinez to evaluate sex
offender registration under the Eighth Amendment).

Given this, if KORA’: lifetime sex offender registration require-
ment is punishment for either ex post facto or double jeopardy pur-
poses, it must necessarily also be punishment for Eighth Amend-
ment purposes. The reverse would likewise be true. Thus, while
the question of whether KORA is punishment arises here in the
context of the Eighth Amendment, we must necessarily address

our decisions, issued today, in Redmond, Buser, and Thompson. In
Redmond, Buser, and Thompson, we held that the identical statu-
tory provisions we consider here are, in fact, punishment for ex
post facto purposes. Redmond, 304 Kan. at 289-90; Buser, 304 Kan.
at 189-90; Thompson, 304 Kan. at 328.

If we were to follow those holdings, we would conclude that
KORAs lifetime sex offender registration requirement is punish-
ment for Eighth Amendment purposes and we would proceed with
a cruel and unusual analysis pursuant to established precedent.
However, this court is persuaded that the holding of Thompson,
Buser, and Redmond that KORA constitutes punishment is incor-
rect. We are instead convinced by the dissent in Thompson that a
faithful application of federal precedents requires us to find that
the provisions of KORA at issue here are not punitive for purposes
of applying our federal Constitution. We therefore overrule the
contrary holdings of Thompson, Buser, and Redmond.

Because we are persuaded by the Thompson dissent on this
question, we take the unusual step of quoting liberally from that
opinion and adopting its reasoning in toto:

“Federal appellate courts have unanimously held retroactive application of the
federal offender registration requirements found in SORNA does not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause. United States v. Brunner, 726 F.3d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 2013);
United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Felts, 674
F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011); United States
v. WB.H., 664 F.3d 848, 860 (11th Cir, 2011); United States v. Shenandoah, 595
F.3d 151 (3d Cir), cert. denied 560 U.S. 974 (2010), abrogated én other grounds
by Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 132 S. Ct. 975, 181 L. Ed. 2d 935
(2012); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied
559 U.S. 974 (2010); Young, 585 F.3d at 206 (noting that Young made no “effort
to prove that the effect of SORNA is so punitive as to make it not a civil scheme,
and any attempt to do so would have been futile”); United States v. May, 535 F.3d
912, 919-20 (8th Cir, 2008), cert. denied 556 U.S. 1258 (2009), abrogated on other
grounds by Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012); United States v. Hinkley, 550 F.3d
926, 937-38 (LOth Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds v. United
States, 565 U.S. 432, 132 S. Ct. 975, 181 L. Ed. 2d 935 (2012); see also United
States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying Mendoza-Mar-
tinez factors to hold SORNA was not cruel and unusual punishment as applied
to a juvenile); United States v. Stacey, 570 Fed. Appx. 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2014)
(holding ex post facto challenge to conviction for failing to register under SORNA

foreclosed by Shenandoah); United States v. Sampsell, 541 Fed. Appx. 258, 260
(4th Cir, 2013) (holding ex post facto challenge to SORNA foreclosed by Gould).

“In addition, federal circuit courts have upheld state sex offender registration
Jaws against federal ex post facto challenges, even when those state laws contained
provisions more expansive in scope and impact than either SORNA or the Alaska
provisions addressed in Smith. See Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1242-43 (9th
Cir. 2014) (upholding California requirement that offenders register in-person
every 90 days); American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046,
1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding Nevada law expanding category of individu-
als who must register, increasing time period offenders were subject to registra-
tion, adding in-person registration requirements, and expanding law enforcement
obligations to notify specified entities that an offender resided nearby); Doe v.
Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding Tennessee law requiring,
among other things, extended lifetime registration and satellite-based monitoring
with wearable GPS device); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2004)
(upholding California law containing several provisions different from the Alaska
statute analyzed in Smith).

“The majority disingenuously characterizes this unanimous body of caselaw as
just the decisions of ‘a number of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal,’ which it then
discounts by noting the obvious, i.., there are differences between the federal
SORNA and our state’s KORA. 304 Kan. at 327-28. And while it is true that none
of the statutory schemes upheld by other courts are identical to KORA, there is
substantial overlap, and so the rationale from those decisions should apply with
equal force here. I would not so quickly disdain this federal caselaw because it
compellingly answers the real question presented: Are there convincing reasons
to believe the United States Supreme Court would view KORA differently than
it viewed the Alaska law in 2003 when it decided Smith? See Litmon, 768 F.3d at
1243 (‘[T]here is no reason to believe that the addition of [the 90-day, in-person
registration] requirement would have changed the outcome [in Smith].’). If the
answer to that question is no, then this court must affirm.

“[Given that'the legislature did not intend KORA to be punishment], we must
decide whether KORA is ‘“so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the
State’s] intention” to deem [KORA] “civil.”’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. This is where
I depart from the majority's analysis.

“For this second step, we should follow the federal factors laid out in Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644
(1963). See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. Those factors consider the degree to which the
regulatory scheme imposes a sanction that: (1) has historically been regarded as
punishment; (2) constitutes an affirmative disability or restraint; (3) promotes the
traditional aims of punishment; (4) is rationally connected to a nonpunitive pur-
pose; (5) is excessive in relation to the identified nonpunitive purpose; (6) contains
a sanction requiring a finding of scienter; and (7) applies the sanction to behavior
that is already a crime. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. In Smith, the Court
focused on the first five as more relevant in evaluating Alaska’s registration and

notification law, concluding the remaining two were of ‘little weight.’ 538 U.S. at
105. I will do the same.

“HIsTORICAL ForM OF PUNISHMENT

“The majority holds that the 2011 KORA ‘crosses the line drawn by Smith’ by
too closely resembling the shaming punishments from the colonial period, 304
Kan. at 321. KORA does this, according to the majority, by posting the registrant’s
information on the Internet, ‘branding’ a registrant's driver's license with the let-
ters ‘RO,’ and requiring quarterly registration in each location where an offender
works, lives, or attends school. Let’s take each of these in turn.

“Posting offender information on the Intervet

“As summarized below, there is overwhelming federal authority holding that
Internet posting of registrant information is not analogous to historical forms of
punishment. The analysis used to reach that conclusion applies in equal force to
KORA, regardless of other differences the statutory schemes may have. The ma-
jority overreaches by rejecting this caselaw and adopting a contrary view.

“In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that Alaska’s offender regis-
tration act could apply retroactively and ‘[t]he fact that Alaska posts the informa-
tion on the Internet does not alter our conclusion.’ 538 U.S. at 99. The Court held
the posting requirement was not akin to historical punishments despite recogniz-
ing that it subjects the offender to public shame or humiliation because most of
the information related to an already public criminal record and dissemination of
it furthers a legitimate governmental objective. 538 U.S. at 99. The Smith Court
explained:

‘[The stigma of Alaska’s Megan’s Law results not from public display for

ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information

about a criminal record, most of which is already public. Our system does
not treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a legiti-
mate governmental objective as punishment. On the contrary, our criminal
law tradition insists on public indictment, public trial, and public imposi-
tion of sentence. Transparency is essential to maintaining public respect
for the criminal justice system, ensuring its integrity, and protecting the
rights of the accused. The publicity may cause adverse consequences for
the convicted defendant, running from mild personal embarrassment to
social ostracism. In contrast to the colonial shaming punishments, however,
the State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma an integral
part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.’ 538 U.S. at 98-99.

“The Smith Court then added:

‘The fact that Alaska posts the information on the Internet does not alter
our conclusion. It must be acknowledged that notice of a criminal convic-
tion subjects the offender to public shame, the humiliation increasing in
proportion to the extent of the publicity. And the geographic reach of the

Internet is greater than anything which could have been designed in co-
Jonial times. These facts do not render Internet notification punitive. The
purpose and the principal effect of notification are to inform the public for
its own safety, not to humiliate the offender. Widespread public access is
necessary for the efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant humiliation is
but a collateral consequence of a valid regulation.’ 538 U.S. at 99.

In so holding, the Court's analysis recognizes the obvious—posting information on
the Internet makes it far more accessible and subjects the offender to increased
shame and humiliation. Nevertheless, the Court held that Internet posting did not
make Alaska’s statutory scheme punitive.

“The majority characterizes the Smith Court’s 2003 analysis of the Internet as
‘antiquated,’ and then concludes: ‘Any suggestion that disseminating sex offender
registration [information] on an Internet website reaches no more members of
the public and is no more burdensome to the offender than maintaining an ar-
chived criminal record simply ignores the reality of today’s world.’ 304 Kan, at 322.

“But as seen from its holding, Smith did not base its conclusion on some old-
fashioned, dial-up modem/floppy disk notion of the World Wide Web; nor did it
consider accessing offender information on the Internet nothing more than a walk
to the courthouse to thumb through publicly available paper files. Smith’s ratio-
nale withstands the more recent development of a mobile, smartphone Internet.
Indeed, these developments can be viewed as furthering the nonpunitive, public
safety ends supporting offender registration because, as Smith acknowledged,
‘{wlidespread public access is necessary for the efficacy of the scheme.’ Smith, 538
U.S. at 99. The majority simply disagrees with the Court’s conclusion but needs
a rationale for considering the question further. This becomes overwhelmingly
evident when the authority from more recent courts applying Smith is acknowl-
edged.

“Consider first the federal notification statute, SORNA. Similar to KORA, the
federal law requires that offender information including the offenders’ names,
physical descriptions, photographs, criminal offenses, and criminal histories be
made publicly available on the Internet. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16914, 16918-16920
(2012). Under SORNA, the states and enumerated territories, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Puerto Rico, must each maintain websites for this purpose.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(10); 16918(a) (2012). The federal government, in turn,
must maintain a website containing ‘relevant information for each sex offender
and other person listed on a jurisdiction's Internet site,’ 42 U.S.C. § 16920. Each
of these websites must make the information obtainable ‘by a single query for
any given zip code or geographic radius set by the user’ 42 U.S.C. §§ 16918(a),
16920(b). And among SORNAS others mandates, an appropriate official must af-
firmatively distribute notice of an individual's sex offender status to “each school
and public housing agency’ in the area where that sex offender resides. 42 U.S.C.
§ 16921(b)(2) (2012). In short, SORNA goes further than the Alaska scheme at
issue in Smith and further than KORA as to affirmative notification of statutorily
specified groups.

“Nevertheless, all federal circuits addressing whether SORNA’ publication
requirements are punitive have followed Smith and held they are not, despite
candidly recognizing they can result in greatly increased public shame. See, ¢.g.,
Parks, 698 F.3d at 5-6 (noting the disadvantages from the publicity attendant to
SORNAS Internet requirements ‘are obvious’ and refusing to invalidate SORNA
due to ‘wide dissemination’ of offender's information, citing Smith); Hinckley, 550
F.3d at 937-38 (‘SORNA, just as the Smith scheme, merely provides for the “dis-
semination of accurate information about a criminal record, most of which is al-
ready public”); see also United States v. Talada, 631 F. Supp. 2d 797, 808 (S.D. W.
‘Va. 2009) (citing Smith and upholding SORNA as a valid regulatory program even
though it requires widespread Internet dissemination of offenders’ information, a
community notification program, and in-person reporting).

“Also persuasive is the Ninth Circuit's 2012 decision upholding retroactive ap-
plication of a Nevada statute that, among other things, not only required Internet
publication of registration information, but also active notification to specified
groups over and above what was required by SORNA, such as youth and religious
organizations. Masto, 670 F.3d at 1051. In rejecting any notion that these features
were akin to historical forms of punishment, the Ninth Circuit held:

“Active dissemination of an individual's sex offender status does not alter

the [Smith] Court’s core reasoning that “stigma . . . results not from public

display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate
information about a criminal record, most of which is already public.” [Cita-
tion omitted.] Though “humiliation increas[es] in proportion to the extent

of the publicity,” the “purpose and the principal effect of notification are to

inform the public for its own safety.” [Citation omitted.]’ 670 F.3d at 1056.

“There is also recent state court authority, relying heavily on Smith, that holds
posting registered offenders’ information on the Internet is not akin to traditional
shaming punishments. See Kammerer v. State, 322 P.3d 827, 834-36 (Wyo. 2014)
(‘Although dissemination of information relating to a registrant's status as a sex of-
fender may have negative consequences for the registrant, information regarding
the offense is made public at the time of trial, and its publication under WSORA
is merely a necessary consequence of the Act’s intent to protect the public from
harm.’); State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, {] 38, 985 A.2d 4 (2009) (Internet post-
ing of sex offender information is not punitive in purpose or effect, citing Smith;
Maine and federal Ex Post Facto Clauses are coextensive); see also Doe Iv. Wil-
liams, 2013 ME 24, { 35, 61 A.3d 718 (2013) (following Letalien).

“I would follow this abundant caselaw and hold that KORA’s Internet posting
of information is not akin to historical shaming punishments. And in reaching that
conclusion, I would further note the majority’s discussion of the sharing functions
available on the Johnson County Sherriff’s website is irrelevant to the statute’s
constitutionality because KORA does not require this capability; and, just as im-
portantly, the majority cites no authority that would find a federal ex post facto
violation because of a nonstatutorily mandated software feature added by a local
law enforcement agency.

“Regardless, given the overwhelming weight and substance of the caselaw re-
jecting federal ex post facto challenges based on widespread Internet dissemina-
tion of offender registration information, as well as the federal courts’ more recent
validations of Smith, I would not consider Smith’s rationale to be ‘antiquated’ or
subject to easy dismissal, and I would not weigh this against the statute’s constitu-
tionality. The majority errs in this regard.

“ Branding’ a registrant’s driver's license

“Next, the majority declares that KORA ‘mimics [the] shaming of old by
branding the driver's license of a registrant with the designation, “RO.”’ 304 Kan.
at 321. The majority is referring to K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-243, which provides that
an offender's driver's license ‘shall be assigned a distinguishing number by the
division [of motor vehicles] which will readily indicate to law enforcement officers
that such person is a registered offender. The division shall develop a numbering
system to implement the provisions of this subsection.’ This requirement, while
not technically contained in KORA, differentiates Kansas laws from SORNA, al-
though the statute only requires a distinguishing number and the ‘RO’ practice is
just a decision by a state agency that is not specifically dictated by the statute. See
KS.A, 8-243(d).

“The majority draws support for its view from a divided decision in Starkey v.
Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, 305 P.3d 1004 (2013), which consid-
ered the Oklahoma Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. See Okla. Const., art. 2,
§ 15. But I do not find Starkey persuasive for several reasons.

“First, although the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied the intent-effects test,
that court's majority suggests they applied a lower standard as to when the effects
of a measure are punitive under the OKMahoma Ex Post Facto Clause by noting
that the United States Constitution simply establishes a floor for constitutional
rights in Oklahoma, 2013 OK 43, § 45 (‘How we apply the “intent-effects” test
is not governed by how the federal courts have independently applied the same
test under the United States Constitution as long as our interpretation is at least
as protective as the federal interpretation.’). Second, Oklahoma’s offender regis-
try law imposed harsher restraints on offenders because of residency boundaries
(minimum distance from schools, playgrounds, etc.) and a requirement that Okla-
homa driver's licenses and identification cards spell out the term ‘Sex Offender.’
In contrast, KORA contains no residency exclusions and Kansas simply uses as
a matter of state agency practice an abbreviation (RO), which applies equally to
non-sex-offenders. Finally, the Starkey court relied upon the totality of the Okla-
homa law’s harsher circumstances when determining they weighed in favor of
punishment. 2013 OK 43, { 61 (‘{W]e are not making a determination of the con-
stitutionality of any of these individual registration requirements but for purposes
of analyzing the second Mendoza-Martinez factor we find the totality of these
requirements weigh in favor of punishment.’).

“Offering a different analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s unanimous deci-
sion in Smith o. State, 84 So. 3d 487 (La. 2012), reached the opposite conclusion

regarding its driver’s license labeling and is more on point. In so holding, the
Louisiana court acknowledged that including the words ‘sex offender’ printed in
orange color on an offender's driver's license ‘may be remotely similar to historical
forms of punishment, such as public humiliation, [but] the immediate need for
public protection was a corollary of, rather than an addendum to, the punishment
for sex offenders.’ Smith, 84 So. 3d at 496 n.7-8, 498. The court then concluded
that the requirement of a notation on an offender's driver's license ‘may be harsh,
may impact a sex offender's life in a long-lived and intense manner, and also be
quite burdensome to the sex offender, [but] we do not find them to constitute an
infringement of the principles of ex post facto.’ 84 So. 3d at 499.

“Admittedly, the Louisiana court did not articulate whether it was relying on
the federal or state constitution for its holding, but this does not appear to make
a difference because that court had previously held Louisiana’s Ex Post Facto
Clause offers the same protections because it was patterned after the United
States Constitution. See State ex rel. Olvieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735 (La. 2001).
For this reason, I find the Louisiana decision more persuasive than the Odahoma
decision,

“Quarterly Registration

“Next, the majority labels KORA’ quarterly, in-person registration require-
ments for each location where the offender works, lives, or attends school as ‘a
traditional means of punishment’ by likening the requirement to probation or pa-
role. 304 Kan. at 322. It does so without citation to any authority or explanation as
to how quarterly reporting mandates offend federal ex post facto caselaw. Again,
a review of the unanimous federal caselaw upholding SORNA is persuasive and
leads to a contrary conclusion.

“SORNAS in-person reporting requirements differentiate between types of sex
offenses in determining the frequency of in-person reporting. There must be in-
person verification ‘not less frequently than’ once a year for Tier I sex offenders,
twice a year for Tier II sex offenders, and four times per year for Tier III sex of-
fenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16916 (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (defining Tiers I, I, and
Ii). In Parks, the First Circuit recently noted SORNA’s in-person requirement
was ‘surely burdensome for those subject to it,’ but nevertheless concluded this
was not punitive, noting:

‘To appear in person to update a registration is doubtless more inconve-
nient than doing so by telephone, mail or web entry; but it serves the reme-
dial purpose of establishing that the individual is in the vicinity and not in
some other jurisdiction where he may not have registered, confirms identity
by fingerprints and records the individual's current appearance. Further,
the inconvenience is surely minor compared to the disadvantages of the
underlying scheme in its consequences for renting housing, obtaining work
and the like—consequences that were part of the package that Smith itself
upheld.’ 698 F.3d at 6.

See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1281-82 (2d Cir, 1997); see also Doe v. Cuomo,

755 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2014) (approving triennial, in-person reporting as being
reasonably related to the nonpunitive, prospective goals of protecting the public
and facilitating law enforcement efforts).

“Admittedly, KORA‘ reporting requirements are more burdensome than those
in SORNA because under KORA, all sex offenders are subject to in-person regis-
tration four times per year, and drug and violent offenders must report in person
a minimum of three times per year. K.S.A, 2011 Supp. 22-4905(b), KORA further
requires an offender to report registration changes in person ‘to the . . . agency or
agencies where last registered.’ (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(a),
(g). In addition, the definition of ‘reside’ in KORA is broader than the definition
in SORNA. Compare K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4902(j) (definition of ‘reside’) with
SORNAS 42 U.S.C. § 16911. Therefore, it is obvious KORA imposes a greater
registration burden on the offender than SORNA. But the question is whether
the federal courts would view these changes as tipping the balance. I think not.

“Consider again as an example Matso in which the Ninth Circuit rejected a
federal ex post facto challenge to a Nevada law that essentially mirrored SORNA’s
registration requirements, but also expanded the category of individuals required
to register, added to-the frequency offenders were subject to registration, and
required in-person registration. Matso, 670 F.3d at 1051; see also Litmon, 768
F.3d at 1242-43 (holding California’s 90-day, in-person lifetime registration re-
quirement does not violate federal ex post facto principles); Hatton, 356 F.3d at
965 (no evidence California’s registration requirement has an objective to shame,
ridicule, or stigmatize sex offenders). These decisions strongly point in a direction
that indicates KORAS reporting requirements do not offend federal ex post facto
principles.

“Additionally, the majority's analogy to probation is not persuasive. While pro-
bation/parole may have ‘reporting’ in common in the abstract, this is only one
aspect of many conditions attached to these punishments. For example, proba-
tioners are subject to searches of their persons and property simply on reasonable
suspicion of a probation violation or criminal activity and are subject to random
drug tests. They'may also be required to avoid ‘injurious or vicious habits’ and
‘persons or places of disreputable or harmful character’; permit state agents to
visit their homes; remain in Kansas unless given permission to leave; work ‘faith-
fully at suitable employment’; perform community service; go on house arrest;
and even serve time in a county jail. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6607(b), (c).

“In sum, I do not believe the federal courts, more specifically the United States
Supreme Court, would hold that this historical-form-of-punishment factor weighs
toward an ex post facto violation.

“AFFIRMATIVE DISABILITY OR RESTRAINT

“The majority focuses next on what it characterizes as the ‘more common re-
straint on an offender's freedom of movement’ under KORA, which is the quar-
terly registration requirement in each applicable jurisdiction and the required $20
registration fee, as well as the KORA’ broader definition of the word ‘resides.’

304 Kan, at 323. The majority notes the registration costs, depending on circum-
stances, could be $80 to $240 annually.

“But the majority fails to explain how the federal courts would hold that these
components of KORA would weigh this factor against the Kansas law. For ex-
ample, no evidence was presented establishing that the KORA registration costs
were a fine instead of a fee. See Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir.
2014) (‘The burden of proving that it is a fine is on the plaintiffs... ).

“In Mueller, the Seventh Circuit recently upheld Wisconsin’s annual $100
registration fee against a sex offender who moved out-of-state but was still re-
quired to register in Wisconsin. In doing so, the court noted first that plaintiff had
done nothing to get over the first hurdle by presenting evidence regarding the
fee versus the registration programs cost. 740 F.3d at 1134 (‘[T]hey cannot get to
first base without evidence that it is grossly disproportionate to the annual cost of
keeping track of a sex offender registrant—and they have presented no evidence
of that either. They haven't even tried.’). Similarly, Doe has done nothing as to this
evidentiary hurdle, yet the majority strikes this factor against KORA even though
the burden is on the challenger and the statute is presumed constitutional.

“Second, the Seventh Circuit noted the nonpunitive purpose of collecting fees
and where the responsibility lies for having to provide a registry, stating:

‘The state provides a service to the law-abiding public by maintaining a

sex offender registry, but there would be no service and hence no expense

were there no sex offenders. As they are responsible for the expense, there

is nothing punitive about requiring them to defray it.’ 740 F.3d at 1135.

“If it is the potential for a total annual cost of $240 that offends the majority,
what is the legal basis for that? The majority leaves this unexplained.

“Next, the majority holds that housing and employment problems result from
the registry, which ties back to the widespread dissemination of information on the
Internet discussed above, which Smith and the other federal courts have plainly
rejected. But the majority believes KORA suffers an additional evidentiary blow
because of direct evidence that Doe actually lost a job and housing opportunities
because of the Internet registry. I disagree this tips the balance when the caselaw
is considered.

“As noted earlier, my review of federal caselaw from Smith on down shows
the courts have fully understood that actual consequences result from offender
registration and have not dismissed these consequences simply as conjecture. See,
e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 99; Parks, 698 F.3d at 6 (‘The prospective disadvantages
to Parks from such publicity are obvious.’). Indeed, several courts have approved
state laws that imposed actual residential living restrictions on offenders, which
are literally off-limits zones disabling offenders from living in close proximity to
schools, playgrounds, etc. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (Lowa’s
2,000-foot buffer zone regulatory, not punitive); Salter v. State, 971 So. 24.31 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2007) (approving 2,000-foot buffer zone); People v. Leroy, 357 Ill. App.
3d 530, 828 N.E.2d 769 (2005) (approving 500-foot buffer zone); State v. Seering,

701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005) (upholding 2,000-foot buffer zone); see also Doe v.
Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1004 (6th Cir. 2007)(‘The [Tennessee] Act’s registration,
reporting, and surveillance components are not of a type that we have traditionally
considered as a punishment, and the district court correctly found that they do not
constitute an affirmative disability or restraint in light of the legislature's intent.’);
Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 186 N.C. App. 134, 650 S.E.2d 618 (2007) (uphold-
ing ban on entering public park); Doe v. Baker, No. Civ. A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006
WL 905368 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (upholding 1,000-foot buffer
zone). Clearly, such exclusions cause lost opportunities for housing and employ-
ment for offenders, yet these prohibitions were upheld as nonpunitive.

“J am not persuaded the federal courts would find KORA to impose require-
ments traditionally considered to be affirmative disabilities or restraints to the
point of weighing this factor against constitutionality.

“TRADITIONAL AIMS OF PUNISHMENT

“The third Mendoza-Martinez factor is whether the ‘regulatory scheme . . .
promotes the traditional aims of punishment.’ Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. The Court
has described those aims as retribution and deterrence. See, ¢.g., Mendoza-Mar-
tinez, 372 U.S. at 168.

“The majority’s analysis of this factor is muddled and difficult to unpack. It is
unclear to me whether the majority is relying on the articles attached to Doe's
summary judgment motion or its own intuition. As best as I can tell, the majority
ultimately ignores the attachments and simply holds that KORA promotes tradi-
tional aims of punishment because the legislature increased the reporting term
from 10 to 25 years. 304 Kan, at 325. But this conclusion is at odds with the federal
caselaw.

“But the fact that KORA has a deterrent effect is not conclusive. The Smith
Court found that ‘[aJny number of government programs might deter crime with-
out imposing punishment’ and “‘[t]o hold that the mere presence of a deterrent
purpose renders such sanctions ‘criminal’ . . . would severely undermine the Gov-
ernment’ ability to engage in effective regulation.” [Citations omitted.]’ 538 U.S.
at 102. The Court also rejected the lower court's finding that Alaska’s registration
obligations were retributive based upon the length of reporting differing between
individuals convicted of nonaggravated offenses and those ‘convicted of aggra-
vated or multiple offenses.’ 538 U.S. at 102. The Court found the ‘categories . . .
and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement are reasonably related
to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory objective.
(Emphasis added.) 538 U.S. at 102.

“The Smith Court's analysis is equally applicable to KORA, though not wholly
dispositive because the Court was addressing a 15-year registration requirement
and KORA has a 25-year requirement. But SORNA imposes a 25-year registration
requirement on Tier II offenders and a lifetime requirement on Tier II offend-
ers, 42 U.S.C. § 16915 (2012), and the federal courts addressing this issue have
upheld SORNA based on Smith.

“The Eleventh Circuit addressed this registration requirement in W.B.H. and
held that SORNA is no different than the Alaska act at issue in Smith. 664 F.3d
at 858-59. The W.B.H. court reasoned that SORNA is ‘reasonably related to the
danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders.’ 664 F.3d at 858. And the court ex-
plained that while SORNA ‘allows the public and law enforcement to determine
the general whereabouts of convicted sex offenders, .. . it does not directly restrict
their mobility, their employment, or how they spend their time.’ 664 F.3d at 858.
So, the court found that any deterrent effect or purpose of SORNA does not
justify a finding that the act’s purpose is punitive. 664 F.3d at 858; see also Under
Seal, 709 F.3d at 265 (quoting from Smith to find that SORNA does not promote
traditional aims of punishment).

“I would find under Smith and the cases interpreting SORNA that the tradi-
tional aims of punishment factor weighs in favor of KORA being fairly character-
ized as nonpunitive.

“RATIONAL CONNECTION TO NONPUNITIVE PURPOSE

“In Smith, the Court identified this as ‘a “most significant” factor in our deter-
mination that the statute’s effects are not punitive,’ 538 U.S. at 102 (citing United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 [1996]).
The Smith Court did not elaborate on what is meant by ‘rational connection to
a nonpuntive purpose’ before analyzing the Alaska act under the standard. One
commentator has noted that the standard is ‘deferential to the state purpose
(much like rational basis review under substantive due process analysis).’ Hobson,
Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep Convicted Sex Offenders Away
from Children?, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 961, 984 (2006). In State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766,
774, 187 P.3d 1283 (2008), this court determined that ‘the registration act was
intended to promote public safety and to protect the public from sex offenders,
who constitute a class of criminals that is likely to reoffend.’

“The majority concludes that arguably under the current version of KORA,
‘public safety has become a pretext.’ 304 Kan, at 326. The majority finds fault with
KORA because it does not distinguish between types of offenders and contains
no mechanism for relieving a ‘fully rehabilitated’ offender from its notification
burdens. But the Ninth Circuit and others have rejected similar arguments. In
Matso, the court held:

“Plaintiffs argue Smith overstated the risk of sex-offender recidivism.

They note that Smith cited several studies on sex offender recidivism. See

id. at 104. Plaintiffs then rely on an expert declaration critiquing the meth-

odology of the recidivism studies in Smith. The district court did not make

any factual finding regarding the risk of sex offender recidivism. Even had it
adopted the declaration’s conclusions as its own, a recalibrated assessment

of recidivism risk would not refute the legitimate public safety interest in

monitoring sex-offender presence in the community.’ 670 F.3d at 1057.

See also Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1006 (Tennessee Legislature ‘could rationally con-
clude that sex offenders present an unusually high risk of recidivism, and that

stringent registration, reporting, and electronic surveillance requirements can re-
duce that risk and thereby protect the public’ and concluding that ‘[w]here there
is such a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, it is not for the courts to
second-guess the state legislature's policy decision’), In addition, the Second Cir-
cuit recently held the New York Legislature’s ‘decision to eliminate the possibility
of relief from registration for twenty years’ for level one offenders did not render
the registration provisions punitive. Cuomo, 755 F.3d at 112.

“The majority fails to cite any authority for its analysis of this factor; and the
proposition that offender registration schemes are rationally related to the nonpu-
nitive purpose of public safety finds overwhelming approval in the federal caselaw.
Even Myers, 260 Kan. at 681, appears to assume offender registration is rationally
connected to public safety, and the Alaska state case that held post-Smith changes
to the Alaska act were an ex post facto violation admits registration, at least as to
sex offenders, advances a nonpunitive public safety purpose. See Doe v. State, 189
P.3d 999, 1015-16 (Alaska 2008).

“T do not see how the majority can say no public safety purpose is rationally
furthered by having sex, drug, and violent offenders register. I would follow the
referenced precedent and hold that KORA has a rational connection to a nonpu-
nitive purpose, so this factor does not weight towards punishment.

“EXCESSIVE IN RELATION TO REGULATORY PURPOSE

“In Smith, the Court clarified that ‘[t]he excessiveness inquiry of our ex post
facto jurisprudence is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has
made the best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy. The
question is whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the
nonpunitive objective.’ 538 U.S. at 105. The Smith Court further noted that ex
post facto jurisprudence does not preclude a state from making reasonable cat-
egorical judgments that certain crimes should have particular regulatory conse-
quence.

“Instead of independently analyzing this factor, the majority merely harkens
back to the ground it already plowed, concluding: ‘Our discussion of the other
factors has touched upon the excessive nature of KORA.’ 304 Kan. at 327. The
majority then specifically cites the fact that the 2011 KORA amendments required
more information from the offenders and that the penalty for noncompliance has
increased. 304 Kan. at 327. I would hold that neither of these requirements is
excessive given KORAS public safety purpose based on the authority cited above.

“CONCLUSION

“Although the 2011 KORA offender registration scheme imposes a number
of burdens on sex offenders, I believe the applicable federal caselaw considering
similar burdens under other offender registration schemes compels us to con-
clude that the 2011 KORA amendments do not violate the United States Con-
stitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to sex offenders and that the United
States Supreme Court would so hold.” Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. at 328-46,
(Biles, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

CC

Because we conclude the registration requirements Petersen-
Beard complains of are not punishment, his claim that those re-
quirements violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment cannot survive.

KORA’ lifetime sex offender registration requirements are not pun-
ishment for purposes of applying the Kansas Constitution.

Having held that KORAS lifetime sex offender registration re-
quirements are not punishment for purposes of applying our fed-
eral Constitution, we must next consider whether those same re-
quirements might still be punishment for purposes of applying the
Kansas Constitution. We conclude they are not.

Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides that
“[alll persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capi-
tal offenses, where proof is evident or the presumption great. Ex-
cessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.”

“This court . . . can construe [its] state constitutional provisions
independent of federal interpretation of corresponding provisions.”
State v. Schultz, 252 Kan. 819, 824, 850 P.2d 818 (1993). While we
have the freedom to extend greater protection to Kansas citizens
under the Kansas Constitution than exists under comparable pro-
visions of the federal Constitution, we generally have not done so.
See State v. Spain, 269 Kan. 54, 59, 4 P.3d 621 (2000); Murphy v.
Nelson, 260 Kan. 589, 597, 921 P.2d 1225 (1996); State v. Morris,
255 Kan. 964, 981, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994); Schultz, 252 Kan. at 826. .

However, we have shown a willingness to evaluate § 9 under
a separate analytical framework. See State v. Mossman, 294 Kan.
901, 924, 281 P.3d 153 (2012) (explaining how proportionality anal-
ysis can differ between the two clauses). In this instance, however,
we find no textual or historical evidence that the drafters of § 9
intended the meaning of “punishment” to differ from the same
word's meaning as used in the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

The origins of the Eighth Amendment and similar state prohi-
bitions (“punishments clauses”), such as § 9 of the Kansas Bill of
Rights, are in the 1689 English Bill of Rights. See, ¢.g., Harmelin

v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836
(1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 n.10, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77
L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983); 3 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States § 1896 (1833). By 1791, five state constitutions
prohibited “cruel or unusual punishments.” See Del. Declaration
of Rights, sec. 16 (1776); Md. Declaration of Rights, art. 22 (1776);
Mass. Declaration of Rights, art. XXVI (1780); N.C. Declaration
of Rights, sec. 10 (1776); N.H. Bill of Rights, art. 33 (1784). Two
others prohibited “cruel” punishments. See Pa. Const., art. IX, sec.
13 (1790); S.C. Const., art. IX, sec. 4 (1790). The Eighth Amend-
ment most closely followed the Virginia Declaration of Rights,
which prohibited “cruel and unusual” punishment. Va. Declaration
of Rights, sec. 9 (1776).

The Kansas Bill of Rights, adopted as part of the Wyandotte Con-
stitutional Convention of 1859, was modeled after the Ohio Bill of
Rights, although there were “a few transpositions and changes in
phraseology.” Perdue, The Sources of the Constitutions of Kansas,
reprinted in 7 Kansas Historical Collections 130-151 (1902). Ohio
had created a new constitution in 1851 and its punishments clause
read: “All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
for capital offences where the proof is evident, or the presumption
great. Excessive bail shall not be required; nor excessive fines im-
posed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Ohio Const.,
art. I, § 9 (1851). Our § 9 tracks Ohio’s § 9, but for one key distine-
tion: “or” vs. “and.” While this textual difference may support a
divergent application of § 9 in some cases, it is immaterial to our
decision today.

The record regarding the adoption of the Kansas Bill of Rights—
and § 9 in particular—is scarce. We can find no textual or historical
reason to depart from our general practice of giving an identical
interpretation to identical language appearing in both the Kansas
Constitution and our federal Constitution. There is no evidence
that the word “punishment” meant anything different to the draft-
ers of the Kansas Constitution than it did to the framers of the Bill
of Rights. Therefore, we conclude the term punishment has the
same meaning in § 9 as it does in the Eighth Amendment. Because
we have held that KORAS sex offender registration requirements

do not qualify as punishment as that word is used in the Eighth
Amendment, we likewise conclude that those requirements are not
punishment as that word is used in § 9.

Affirmed.

aoe

JouNsoN, J., dissenting: I dissent from the majority's decision
in this case and from the majority’s declaration that it is overrul-
ing the decisions in State v. Redmond, 304 Kan. 283, 371 P.3d 900
(2016), State v. Buser, 304 Kan. 181, 371 P.3d 886 (2016), and Doe
v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016), which I will here-
after collectively refer to as “Ex Post Facto cases.”

The majority does not explain the unusual circumstance where-
by the opinions in the September 2014 Ex Post Facto cases are
being filed on the same day as the opinion in this September 2015
case that purports to overrule their holdings. I firmly believe that
some explanation is warranted in the interests of clarity and trans-
parency. Moreover, I want to assure that the defendants in the Ex
Post Facto cases obtain the relief to which they are entitled.

The “overruled” Ex Post Facto cases dealt with the question
of whether article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution—the
Ex Post Facto Clause—prohibited the retroactive application of
the 2011 amendments to the Kansas Offender Registration Act
(KORA), K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq. An initial consideration was wheth-
er KORA was even subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. The three
cases were set together and heard on this court’s docket on Sep-
tember 11, 2014.

At that time, and for some 3 months thereafter, a position on this
court was open due to the appointment of our colleague, Nancy
Moritz, to the United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. Con-
sequently, the Chief Justice utilized his constitutional and/or statu-
tory authority to assign a senior district court judge as the seventh
member of this court to hear and decide cases coming before the
court during the vacancy period, which included the September
2014 docket. See K.S.A. 20-2616(b) (“A retired justice or judge so
designated and assigned to perform judicial service or duties shall

have the power and authority to hear and determine all matters
covered by the assignment.”); see also Kan. Const. art. 3, § 6(f)
(“The supreme court may assign a district court judge to serve tem-
porarily on the supreme court.”). Notably, our constitution does
not restrict or limit the power and authority of a temporarily as-
signed justice nor does it restrict or limit the precedential effect of
the decisions issued by a supreme court that includes a justice that
is temporarily assigned. Indeed, the Chief Justice often announces
at oral argument that a temporarily assigned jurist will be fully par-
ticipating in the decision of the court.

As evidenced by the opinions that are now being publicly filed,
a majority of the constitutionally constituted court hearing the Ex
Post Facto cases voted to hold that KORA% statutory scheme, after
the 2011 amendments, was so punitive in effect as to negate any
implied legislative intent to deem it civil, so that it was subject to
the Ex Post Facto Clause’s prohibition on retroactive application.
The decision specifically left intact all provisions of the 2011 itera-
tion of KORA for any person who committed a qualifying offense
after July 1, 2011, the effective date of the 2011 amendments. In
other words, the majority opinion in the Ex Post Facto cases did
not hold KORA unconstitutional, but rather it held that the ret-
roactive application of KORA’s amendments was unconstitutional.
The prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment in our
federal and state constitutions were neither raised as issues nor dis-
cussed by this court in the Ex Post Facto cases.

By August 2015, the opinion in Thompson, the lead Ex Post Fac-
to case, was ready to be filed with the Clerk of the Appellate Court.
By that time, the vacancy on this court had been filled and this
case had been set on a docket to be heard by the newly constituted
court the following month, September 16, 2015, é.¢., a year after
the arguments in Thompson. Thereupon, notwithstanding that the
outcome for the Ex Post Facto litigants would be unaffected by any
subsequent ruling in another case, a majority of the Ex Post Facto
court ordered that the opinions in those cases were to be held in
abeyance pending the newly constituted court’s hearing and resolu-
tion of Petersen-Beard’s cruel and unusual punishment case.

Then, after a majority of the court in this case determined that

it could overrule the holdings in the Ex Post Facto cases for all
future litigants—as disclosed in the majority opinion above—a ma-
jority of the Ex Post Facto court ordered that the release of the
Ex Post Facto cases was to be further delayed until this Petersen-
Beard opinion was ready to be filed. The apparent rationale for the
delay was to make the holding in the Ex Post Facto cases applicable
solely to the parties in those cases.

To be clear, this Petersen-Beard opinion does not change the
result for the Ex Post Facto defendants, i.e., John Doe in Doe v.
Thompson, 304 Kan. at 291; Joseph M. Buser in State v. Buser, 304
Kan. 181; and Promise Delon Redmond in State v. Redmond, 304
Kan at 283. Likewise, Leonard D. Charles, in State v. Charles, 304
Kan. 158, 372 P.3d 1109 (2016), whose case was heard on the same
docket as the Ex Post Facto cases, will be governed by the holding
in his case. Plainly stated, all of those litigants won on appeal, and
the KORA amendments cannot be applied to them. But they had
to wait for many months—unnecessarily in my view—to reap the
benefits of their respective wins. I find that to be a denial of justice.

Tuming to the merits of this case, I begin by clarifying what is
before us to be decided. The issue presented here was whether
the KORA provision requiring Petersen-Beard to register as a sex
offender for the rest of his life was unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual punish-
ment under { 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. The Ex
Post Facto Clause of article I, § 10 of the United States Consti-
tution was not in play here. Moreover, the issue is not limited to
retroactivity, but rather Petersen-Beard seeks to nullify KORA’s
lifetime registration provision for all offenders, both past and fu-
ture. In other words, the issue in this case is not the same issue
presented in the cases it purports to overrule, notwithstanding the
possibility that the analyses might overlap in some respects.

Further, the question of whether KORA is subject to the cruel
and unusual constraint of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution was not presented to or decided in the Ex Post
Facto cases. Consequently, the majority's assertion that its determi-
nation that KORA is not punitive for Eighth Amendment purposes

requires the reversal of the prior Ex Post Facto cases is dictum.
See Law v. Law Company Building Assocs., 295 Kan. 551, 564,
289 P.3d 1066 (2012) (nobody bound by dictum, not even the court
that issued it). If this case is to provide authority for the proposition
that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to KORA because the
act is nonpunitive for both Eighth Amendment and Ex Post Facto
purposes, then a subsequent case that presents that precise issue
can make that determination. Accordingly, the litigants of that sub-
sequent case could challenge the applicability of the federal circuit
courts of appeal cases addressing the constitutionality of the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. §
16901 et seq. (2012), upon which the majority in this case relies to
conflate the two types of cases.
Likewise, the Thompson dissent, adopted as the majority's ratio-
nale, presents string cites to federal circuit courts of appeal deci-
sions that analyze the constitutionality of SORNA or other states’
registration acts in light of those federal circuit courts’ mandatory
authority from the United States Supreme Court. While perhaps
interesting, those citations are only tangentially connected to the
issue before this court. Our task, as the Kansas Supreme Court,
is to rule on the constitutionality of the Kansas registration act.
A federal court's determination that a federal act is constitutional
might be used as an analog to inform a state court’s decision on its
own laws, but state courts are not bound by any lower federal court
decision, even on matters of federal constitutional law. As stated by
a member of the United States Supreme Court:
“The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither
federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state
court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court's interpre-
tation. In our federal system, a state trial court’s interpretation of federal law is no
less authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in whose circuit the trial
court is located.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376, 113 S. Ct. 838, 122 L.
Ed. 2d 180 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).

Ordinarily, any analysis of a Kansas legislative act would not
begin with a consideration of merely persuasive federal authority
when there are decisions of this court on point. If there is direct
authority in this State, it is binding on the lower State courts and is

215

entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of stare decisis in this court.
In Thompson, the majority opinion began its analysis by discuss-
ing the direct authority of State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 699, 923
P.2d 1024 (1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997), which held
that the disclosure provisions of a prior registration law—the Kan-
sas Sex Offender Registration Act (KSORA)—were punitive in
effect, precluding their retroactive application under the Ex Post
Facto Clause. The State in Thompson had argued that Myers was
overruled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Smith
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103-04, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164
(2003). But that was not accurate, because Smith did not review
the Myers decision and did not even consider the Kansas regis-
tration act. Rather, the Smith court held that the Alaska Sex Of-
fender Registration Act (ASORA) was nonpunitive and not subject
to the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, Smith is important only
as a guide as to how the United States Supreme Court might view
KORA for federal constitutional purposes; it is not direct, manda-
tory authority that KORA is nonpunitive.

The Thompson dissent obliquely recognized that Smith was
not directly binding in that Ex Post Facto case when it stated that
“the real question presented” was: “Are there convincing reasons
to believe the United States Supreme Court would view KORA
differently than it viewed the Alaska law in 2003 when it decided
Smith?” Thompson, 304 Kan. at 332. (Biles, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Of course, the majority's recitation of that
issue statement presents an incomplete picture in Peterson-Beard’s
case because of the State constitutional provision in play here. The
United States Supreme Court does not have authority to interpret
§ 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. It is this court’s view
of KORA that will decide that issue, even if this court chooses to
adopt a rationale consistent with the Smith majority. The majority
must own that decision; it cannot hide behind federal decisions.

Setting aside for a moment the State constitutional question,
the answer to the question posed by the Thompson dissent is yes,
there are convincing reasons to believe that the United States Su-
preme Court, in 2016, would view the current version of KORA
differently than it viewed ASORA in 2003, when it decided Smith.

The majority in Thompson attempted to explain those reasons, and
Iwill reiterate some of them here, albeit I do not intend to clip and
paste the entire majority opinion into this dissent. In addition, I will
present some points that were not explicitly made in Thompson.

March 5, 2016, marked 13 years since Smith was decided, and
there are new justices now. Five of the justices involved in the
Smith decision, i.e., 55.56% of the Court, are no longer on the
Court. Three of the five justices (60%) joining the majority opin-
ion in Smith, upon which the Thompson dissent heavily relies, are
no longer on the Court. Surely, the majority here, especially the
Thompson dissenters, can appreciate the impact of a change in
Court composition.

And not only are the new justices different, but they are young-
er, which might well make them more attuned to the digital age.
For instance, the youngest member of the current court was about
21 years old when IBM introduced the PC (personal computer)
in 1981, as compared to Chief Justice Rehnquist—a member of
the Smith majority—who was approaching 60 years old when the
personal computer revolution began to go mainstream. The Smith
majority, authored by Justice Kennedy, who was 67 years old at the
time, described Alaska’s posting of registration information on the
Internet as a passive system, akin to physically visiting “an official
archive of criminal records,” 538 U.S. at 99.

Tn contrast, in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 8. Ct. 2473,
2491, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014), a majority of the 2013 Term Su-
preme Court noted that ordinary citizens with smartphones can
easily access vast amounts of data and that “a cell phone [can be]
used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen.” 573
US. at , 134 S. Ct. at 2491. That data includes push notifica-
tions of sex offender registries and indiscriminate sharing of social
media. Certainly, if nothing else, a majority of the Court must now
recognize that ubiquitous tweeting and other social media have
changed the landscape of information sharing. Pointedly, Twit-
ter did not exist until 3 years after Smith was decided. In short, I
believe a majority of the current Supreme Court would be more
attuned to the repercussions of Internet dissemination of a sex of-
fender registry.

In this State, Myers displayed a great deal of prescience. It held
that despite how one might try to justify the disclosure provisions of
KSORA, the repercussions visited upon Myers were “great enough
. .. to be considered punishment. The unrestricted public access
given to the sex offender registry is excessive and goes beyond that
necessary to promote public safety.” 260 Kan. at 699. Myers fret-
ted that “[t]he print or broadcast media could make it a practice of
publishing the list [of sex offenders] as often as they chose.” 260
Kan. at 697. Not only has that circumstance come to pass, but the
unnecessary digital distribution of the sex offender registry has
gone far beyond that imagined by the Myers court. In other words,
the punitive effect on offenders is even greater now.

The explanation that the repercussions to which Myers referred
arise from the fact that the offender was convicted in a public pro-
ceeding and the records of that conviction are public information
is nonsensical. The whole purpose of the registry is to provide easy
access to information that most people would not know. It is the
wide dissemination of the information that causes the punitive ef-
fect. Moreover, the public record of conviction does not provide
the wealth of current information about the offender that he or she
must provide for the sex offender registry and keep updated. Pub-
lic shaming is much more effective if the public knows where the
offender lives, works, and/or attends school, as well as the make,
model, and license number of the vehicle he or she drives.

Likewise, the attempted rationale that an Internet-based regis-
try is merely the dissemination of accurate information is unper-
suasive. An example of traditional public shaming referred to in
Myers came from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter (Ran-
dom House 1950) (1850), in which Hester Prynne’s punishment
for adultery required her to wear a scarlet “A” upon her dress. One
could describe the information being conveyed by that scarlet let-
ter as “accurate information.” Yet, Hawthome described its puni-
tive effect as follows: “There can be no outrage . . . against our
common nature,—whatever be the delinquencies of the individu-
al,—no outrage more flagrant than to forbid the culprit to hide his
face for shame; as it was the essence of this punishment to do.’”
Artway v. Attorney General of State of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1265

(3d Cir. 1996) (quoting The Scarlet Letter, 63-64). Further, one has
to challenge the accuracy of the disseminated information when
it does not differentiate between the extremely low-risk offenders
and the extremely dangerous high-risk offenders. Ultimately, how-
ever, the point is that, despite the spin the majority would put on
it, today’s dissemination of sex offender registry information does
resemble traditional forms of punishment.

In Thompson, we set forth KORA’ onerous requirements and
differentiated them from both Smith’s ASORA and the dissent’s
SORNA. It is unfathomable to me that any rational person could
say with a straight face that being forced to comply with those Dra-
conian terms and conditions of registration for the rest of one’s life,
under penalty of going to prison for a new felony, is not an affirma-
tive disability or restraint on the offender. The majority quibbles
over whether the required monetary payments due each quarterly
reporting date is a fine or fee. But Smith described the intent-ef-
fects test as being in two parts, whereby the second step examines
the “punitive .. . purpose or effect.” 538 U.S. at 92. I submit that a
substantial fee, even if its intent is to cover the government's cost of
the registry, can have a punitive effect on the offender who might
be living hand-to-mouth because of problems getting and main-
taining employment.

Moreover, although the majority compares individual provisions
of KORA to corresponding provisions in SORNA, in the Thompson
majority we cautioned that
“it is important to keep in mind that it is the entire ‘statutory scheme’ that must
be examined for its punitive effect. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (effects analysis
requires the appellate court to ‘examine . . . the statutory scheme’ [emphasis add-
ed}); Myers, 260 Kan. at 681 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 948-
49, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742 [1980]) (‘ask whether the “statutory scheme
was so punitive either in purpose or effect” [emphasis added]). For instance, a
particular registration requirement may not have the same punitive effect in a
statutory scheme that permits a reduction in registration time for proven rehabili-
tation, as it does in a statutory scheme that precludes any individualized modifica-
tions.” Thompson, 304 Kan, at 320,

That distinction is particularly compelling when considering that
SORNA allows an offender the opportunity to reduce his or her
registration time, whereas under KORA there is no opportunity for

relief from lifetime registration even for a completely rehabilitated
offender. The punitive effect of being required to register in per-
son quarterly might be mitigated if the requirement could be ter-
minated when it was no longer necessary, rather than mandatorily
continuing for a lifetime.

Perhaps the most compelling reason for the current Supreme
Court to view KORA differently than the Smith Court viewed
ASORA involves the last two factors discussed by the majority:
whether the statutory scheme is rationally connected to a nonpu-
nitive purpose; and whether the statutory scheme is excessive in
relation to the identified nonpunitive purpose.

Smith analyzed ASORA against the nonpunitive purpose of

public safety. The Court opined that a registration act need not be
“‘narrowly drawn to accomplish the stated purpose,” so long as
“the Act’s nonpunitive purpose is [not] a ‘sham or mere pretext.’
Hendricks, 521 U.S., at 371 (KENNEDY, J., concurring).” Smith,
538 U.S. at 103. Smith then determined that “Alaska could con-
clude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of sub-
stantial risk of recidivism.” 538 U.S. at 103. The Smith majority
then supported that ruling as follows:
“The risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and high.’ McKune
v, Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34[, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47] (2002), see also id., at
33 (‘When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than
any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault’ (citing
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders 27
(1997); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners
Released in 1983, p. 6 (1997))).” 538 U.S. at 103.

The Court then determined that “[t]he duration of the reporting
requirements is not excessive,” because research on child molest-
ers had shown that most of them do not reoffend within the first
several years after release, but rather a reoffense may occur “‘
late as 20 years following release,’ National Institute of Justice, R.
Prentky, R. Knight, & A. Lee, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Child Sexual
Molestation: Research Issues 14 (1997).” 538 U.S. at 104. But a
recent investigation into the source of Smith’s seemingly compel-
ling statistics calls into question their bona fides.

In “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court's Crucial Mis-
take About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 Const. Comment. 495 (2015),

the authors Ira and Tara Ellman point out that Justice Kennedy,
the author of the Smith majority, was also the author of a four-
person plurality decision in McKune, which is Smith’s cited source
for the “frightening and high” statistic. In McKune, Justice Ken-
nedy wrote that the recidivism rate of untreated sex offenders “‘has
been estimated to be as high as 80%,’” which he later referred to as
“a frightening and high risk of recidivism.’” 30 Const. Comment.
at 495-96 (quoting McKune, 536 U.S. at 33-34). The source of the
80% statement—apparently taken from a reference in an amicus
brief filed by the Solicitor General—was cited as the U.S. Dept.
of Justice, Nat. Institute of Corrections, A Practitioner's Guide to
Treating the Incarcerated Male Sex Offender, xiii (1988). Although
that Practitioner’s Guide was published by the Justice Department,
its “Preface notes that its contents present the views ‘of the authors
and do[es] not necessarily represent the official position or policies
of the U.S. Department of Justice.” 30 Const. Comment. at 498
n.11. The Practitioner’s Guide cited a 1986 article in Psychology
Today as the source of its claim. That mass-marketed magazine ar-
ticle—designed for a lay audience—contained the following bare
assertion, without attribution or supporting reference: “‘Most un-
treated sex offenders released from prison go on to commit more
offenses—indeed, as many as 80% do.’” 30 Const. Comment. at
498 (quoting Freeman-Longo & Wall, Changing a Lifetime of Sex-
ual Crime, Psychology Today, March 1986, at 64). The author of
the magazine article was a counselor who was touting his prison
counseling program for sex offenders and whose “unsupported as-
sertion about the recidivism rate for untreated sex offenders was
offered to contrast with [the counselor's] equally unsupported as-
sertion about the lower recidivism rate for those who complete [the
counselor's] program.” 30 Const. Comment. at 498.

The article did not stop at challenging the factual support for
McKune’s “frightening and high” finding, It cited to studies utiliz-
ing accepted methodologies to support the proposition that the
purported 80% risk of reoffending was way off base, both as a
stand-alone statistic for sex offenders and as a comparison to other
offenders. “One recent study found that about 3% of felons with
no known history of sex offenses commit one within 4.5 years of

SC

their release,” whereas “[a]lbout 97.5% of the low-risk offenders
were offense-free after five years.” 30 Const. Comment. at 502-04.
In other words, the risk of recidivism within 5 years of release from
prison for a low-risk sex offender (about 2.5%) is virtually identical
to that of a released prisoner who was not convicted of a sex offense
(about 3.0%).

Further, the sample group of the study Smith used to declare
that reoffenses do not occur within the first several years of release,
but rather “may occur ‘as late as 20 years following release,” 538
US. at 104, consisted of “rapists and child molesters released from
the Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous Per-
sons, established in 1959 ‘for the purpose of evaluating and treating
individuals convicted of repetitive and/or aggressive sexual offens-
es.’” 30 Const. Comment. at 503 n.29 (citing Prentky, Lee, Knight,
& Cerce, Recidivism Rates Among Child Molesters and Rapists: A
Methodological Analysis, 21 L. & Hum. Behav. 635, 637 [1997}).
While the public might assume that everyone on the sex registry is
a forcible rapist or molester of young children, that is simply not
the reality, as evidenced by the facts of this case. But even for the
offenders initially assessed as high-risk, the likelihood of reoffend-
ing decreases over time. “Those who haven’t re-offended after fif-
teen years are not high-risk for doing so, regardless of their offense
or their initial risk assessment.” 30 Const. Comment. at 503.

The article recognized that human nature is such that, when
faced with an immeasurable fear and strongly held belief, a person
will tend to ignore or discount quantifiable facts. “Fhe label ‘sex
offender’ triggers fear, and disgust as well. Both responses breed
beliefs that do not yield easily to facts.” 30 Const. Comment. at
508. Yet, I must cling to the belief that the persons who have been
privileged to serve on our nation’s highest Court will yield to the
facts and give a closer look at whether our statutory scheme is ra-
tionally connected to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety and
whether its terms and conditions are excessive in relation to that
public safety purpose. If they do, I submit that an objective analy-
sis will disclose that, in the current version of KORA, public safety
has crossed over the line and is now a “sham or mere pretext” for
imposing additional punishment on the offender.

222

The Thompson majority pointed out that KORA does not dif-
ferentiate between the young immature adult whose indiscretion
with a consenting and encouraging teenager has led to a qualifying
conviction and the middle-aged confirmed and incorrigible rap-
ist and pedophile. We said that mixing in low-or-no-risk offend-
ers with the high-risk offenders created an overinclusive system
where “[t]oo much [was] too little.” Thompson, 304 Kan. at 326.
In other words, “[i]f the registry’s main purpose is to let us monitor
and warn people about those who committed violent, coercive, or
exploitative contact sex offenses, we dilute its potential usefulness
when we fill it up with people who never did any of those things.”
30 Const. Comment. at 504.

We also pointed out in the Thompson majority that KORA’ stat-
utory scheme was also too underinclusive to be rationally related
to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety. Thompson, 304 Kan.
at 326. For the registry to provide effective public safety, it should
notify the public of all persons known to have committed acts con-
sidered to be sex offenses. Yet, only persons convicted of a qualify-
ing crime are required to register.

It is not uncommon for a prosecutor to entice a plea agreement
from a defendant charged with a registration-qualifying sex offense
by offering to amend the charge to a crime that will not require
the defendant to register. Certainly, that circumstance dilutes the
State’s argument that nullifying KORA in any respect will leave
the young children of this State defenseless—the State effects the
same result through a plea agreement. But more importantly for
our purposes, one would think that, if the legislature’s true intend-
ed purpose for the registry was public safety, it would have prohib-
ited prosecutors and courts from circumventing the public’s safety
through a plea bargain. The legislature has demonstrated that it
knows how to do that for driving under the influence (DUI): “No
plea bargaining agreement shall be entered into nor shall any judge
approve a plea bargaining agreement entered into for the purpose
of permitting a person charged with [DUI] ..... to avoid the manda-
tory penalties established by this section . . . .” K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
8-1567(m). - *.

Likewise, the registry would not include a person who has com-

223

mitted a qualifying sex offense but who avoided being convicted
of the crime on some legal basis. For instance, an acquittal could
follow the court’s suppression of illegally obtained evidence. While
the exclusionary rule will entice proper police conduct in the fu-
ture, the exclusion of the sex offender from the registry does not
further its purpose of public safety. In another area deemed to be
a civil regulatory statutory scheme, the Sexually Violent Predator
Act, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 59-2901 et seq., the legislature made a
provision for the civil commitment of a qualifying person, even
where that person was deemed incompetent to stand trial in his or
her criminal case. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 59-29a07(g). No similar pro-
cedure is in place under KORA, further rendering its public safety
purpose suspect.

Given the foregoing, together with the other points made in the
Thompson majority, I have every confidence that the United States
Supreme Court would find that the current “statutory scheme [of
KORA] ‘“is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the
State’s] intention” to deem it “civil.”’” See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
Accordingly, even under the issue framed by the Thompson dissent
and adopted by the majority here, Petersen-Beard should prevail.
But even though that was the end of the analysis in Thompson,
we have more to discuss in this case. The Kansas Constitution was
not involved in Redmond, Buser, or Thompson, because our state
constitution does not contain an ex post facto provision. It is in-
volved here, however, because, in addition to the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, our own
constitution—in § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights—
prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment.” The majority recognizes
that this court can independently interpret our own State constitu-
tion in a manner that extends greater protection to our Kansas citi-
zens than the United States Supreme Court has provided under its
interpretation of the United States Constitution. Then, it dismisses
that proposition with the superficial rationale that “we generally
have not done so” and “[w]e can find no . . . reason to depart from
our general practice.” 304 Kan. at 209-11.

I will not prolong this dissent with a discussion of the historical
development of this court’s practice of simply adopting federal con-

— 4

stitutional interpretation for similar State constitutional provisions,
or my opposition to such a practice. Suffice it to say that it has not
always been that way. See Monnat & Nichols, The Loneliness of
the Kansas Constitution, 34 J. Kan. Ass’n Just. 10, 11 (September
2010) (“In its early opinions, the Kansas Supreme Court routinely
interpreted the Kansas constitution as an independent document
with force of its own.”).

More importantly, even if we adopt the federal analytical model,
we need not apply it to Kansas’ statute in the same manner as the
United States Supreme Court applied it to Alaska’s statute. Indeed,
after Smith, the Alaska Supreme Court considered the same stat-
ute in the same case with the same defendants, utilizing the same
intent-effects test and Mendoza-Martinex factors to determine the
same ex post facto issue, albeit under the Alaska state constitution.
The state court found that its statute, ASORA, violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the Alaska state constitution, concluding:

“Because ASORA compels (under threat of conviction) intrusive affirmative
conduct, because this conduct is equivalent to that required by criminal judg-
ments, because ASORA makes the disclosed information public and requires its
broad dissemination without limitation, because ASORA applies only to those
convicted of crime, and because ASORA neither meaningfully distinguishes be-
tween classes of sex offenses on the basis of risk nor gives offenders any opportu-
nity to demonstrate their lack of risk, ASORAS effects are punitive. We therefore
conclude that the statute violates Alaska’s ex post facto clause.” Doe v. State, 189
P.3d 999, 1019 (Alaska 2008).

In the Thompson majority, we found it interesting that the Alas-
ka court had cited with approval to Myers, even after the Smith
decision. See Doe, 189 P.3d at 1017. We also noted that other states
have found their sex offender registration statutes constrained by
their state constitutions. See, ¢.g., Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d
3871, 377-78 (Ind. 2009); Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety and Cor-
rectional Services, 430 Md. 535, 547-48, 62 A.3d 123 (2013); State
v. Williams, 129 Ohio St. 3d 344, 347-49, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (2011);
Starkey v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, [{ 76-79,
305 P.3d 1004 (2013).

In short, even if we were not convinced that the United States
Supreme Court would find KORA punitive, we can and should still
find that it is so punitive in effect as to negate any pretended civil

225

regulatory purpose under our State constitution. The citizens of
this State are entitled to have their own Supreme Court interpret
their own constitution in a logical, rational manner that is consis-
tent with actual, not made-up, facts. Consequently, I would find
that this matter should proceed to a determination of the cruel or
unusual analysis.

ane

BEIER and ROSEN, JJ., join Justice Johnson's dissent as to the re-
sult. See Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016); State
v. Buser, 304 Kan. 181, 373 P.3d 886 (2016); State v. Redmond, 304
Kan. 283, 371 P.3d 900 (2016); see also State v. Charles, 304 Kan.
158, 372 P.3d 1109 (2016) (following Doe, Buser, Redmond; impo-
sition of registration requirement for violent offender qualifies as
punishment, entitling defendant to relief under Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 [2000]).

bo

26

No. 109,123

SvaTE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. ANTHONY C. HANKINS,
Appellant.
(372 P.3d 1124)

‘Opinion filed April 22, 2016

Catherine A. Zigtema, of Law Office of Kate Zigtema LC, of Lenexa, argued
the cause, and Sarah Morrison Rapelye, of The Law Office of Stacey J. Lett & As-
sociates, LLC, of Leawood, was with her on the briefs for appellant.

Steven J. Obermeier, senior deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and
Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were
with him on the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Jounson, J.: Anthony C. Hankins seeks review of the Court of
Appeals decision to affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to
correct an illegal sentence. The motion claimed that the sentencing

court used an incorrect criminal history score by including an OKa-
homa deferred judgment as a prior conviction. The Court of Ap-
peals majority held that the invited error doctrine barred Hankins’
challenge to his criminal history score. In dicta, the majority also
opined that Hankins would lose on the merits. State v. Hankins, 49
Kan. App. 2d 971, 978, 319 P.3d 571 (2014). A concurring judge
disagreed with the majority’s holding on invited error but reluc-
tantly agreed with the result on the merits because of prior Kansas
Supreme Court dicta. We reverse both the Court of Appeals and
the district court, remanding the matter for resentencing with the
proper criminal history score.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

In this case, Hankins pled guilty to multiple felony charges. His
presentence investigation report (PSI) listed two prior misdemean-
or convictions and one prior nonperson felony conviction. The
felony was based on a possession of a firearm on school property
charge in Oklahoma. That adult nonperson felony raised Hankins’
criminal history score to a “G.” Hankins filed a motion for disposi-
tional departure.

At the May 19, 2011, sentencing hearing, in response to the dis-
trict court’s inquiry as to whether the parties “had a chance to look”
at the PSI, Hankins’ counsel responded, “We have.” The court then
recited that Hankins’ presumptive sentencing ranges were between
68 and 77 months’ imprisonment for the primary offense and 11 to
13 months for each of the three nonbase convictions. After that
recitation, the district court inquired if “[a]nyone disagree[d] or
ha{d] anything to add to those findings.” Defense counsel respond-
ed, “Judge, we do not disagree, and Defense has nothing to add
with regards to those findings.” Defense counsel also denied know-
ing of any reason that sentencing could not proceed.

During the district court’s consideration of Hankins’ departure
motion, defense counsel asked the court to consider that “[t]here
was an issue about that conviction in Oklahoma, whether it had
actually been dismissed or if it was part of a diversion or some ju-
venile issues. He didn’t want to challenge that either, Judge, and
decided, I’ve been dealing with this, I want to go forward today.”

The district court denied Hankins’ departure motion and imposed
a controlling sentence of 68 months’ imprisonment.

Hankins filed a notice of appeal in June 2011 but subsequently
voluntarily dismissed his appeal. On June 25, 2012, Hankins filed
a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, and on October 16,
2012, his counsel filed a supplemental motion. Both motions as-
serted that Hankins’ criminal history score should not have includ-
ed the Oklahoma nonperson felony because Hankins received a
deferred judgment for the Oklahoma crime, which did not consti-
tute a conviction for criminal history scoring purposes.

The State responded that under Kansas law, the Oklahoma de-
ferred judgment constitutes a conviction and, therefore, it was
properly utilized in determining Hankins’ criminal history. The dis-
trict court held a hearing on the motion, at which the State asserted
the additional claim that Hankins had waived his criminal history
score challenge at sentencing by stipulating to the score reflected
in the PSI.

The district court granted the defense request to submit addi-
tional written information on the Oklahoma proceeding, and the
court subsequently issued a written ruling denying the motion to
correct an illegal sentence. The district court first found that the
defense attorney's comments during the sentencing hearing waived
Hankins’ right to challenge his criminal history score. The district
court inferred that the defense intentionally chose not to challenge
the Oklahoma conviction as a matter of strategy, so that it could ar-
gue the forbearance of a challenge as another reason for the court
to grant a departure. The court acknowledged that while a party
may not stipulate to an incorrect application of the Jaw, Hankins
was not challenging how the prior conviction-was scored—rather,
he was challenging the factual existence of the conviction.

Additionally, the district court ruled that even assuming Hankins
could challenge his criminal history score, he had failed to prove
his score was incorrectly calculated. Specifically, the district court
determined that under Oklahoma's deferred judgment procedure,
the defendant must plead guilty or nolo contendere to the charges
and the court must accept the plea, thereby establishing that the
defendant committed the Oklahoma offense. The court found that

CC

fact not only distinguishes the Oklahoma procedure from a Kansas
diversion, but it also sufficiently establishes the defendant's guilt to
be considered a conviction under the rationale of State v. Macias,
30 Kan. App. 2d 79, 83, 39 P.3d 85, rev. denied 273 Kan. 1038
(2002).

After the district court ruled on the illegal sentence motion,
Hankins filed a pro se amended supplemental motion of final re-
sponse to correct an illegal sentence. The record does not indicate
that the district court provided any additional ruling on that mo-
tion. Three days after that final pro se motion, Hankins’ counsel
filed a timely notice of appeal.

A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's de-
nial of Hankins’ motion, albeit the panel members were not unani-
mous on the rationale for doing so. State v. Hankins, 49 Kan. App.
2d 971, 319 P.3d 571 (2014). The majority applied the invited error
doctrine to find that Hankins’ criminal history score challenge was
barred and further offered its opinion that Hankins’ deferred judg-
ment in Oklahoma established his guilt sufficiently to make it a
conviction for Kansas sentencing purposes. 49 Kan. App. 2d at 977-
78. Judge Atcheson concurred in the result on the merits because
he felt constrained to do so by Kansas Supreme Court precedent,
but he rejected the majority's application of the invited error doc-
trine. 49 Kan. App. 2d at 985-86, 992-93 (Atcheson, J., concurring).

This court granted Hankins’ petition for review. We begin with
the panel majority's principal holding that the invited error doc-
trine precludes appellate review. After rejecting that invited error
holding, we consider the merits and determine that a successfully
completed Oklahoma deferred judgment is not to be counted as a
conviction when calculating a Kansas criminal history score.

INVITED ERROR PRECLUDING REVIEW OF AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE

On appeal, Hankins proffers multiple reasons why the Court of
Appeals majority erred by using the invited error rule to bar his
illegal sentence claim. One argument adopts Judge Atcheson’s po-
sition that the 2009 amendment to K.S.A. 21-4715(c}: “effectively
negates the invited error doctrine with respect to a defendant's

criminal history and, thus, allows a defendant to challenge a legal
mistake in his or her criminal history even after admitting to the
mistaken history at sentencing.” 49 Kan. App. 2d at 993 (Atcheson,
J., concurring). Another argument asserts that the invited error doc-
trine is subject to exceptions, such as where the defendant does not
personally agree with his or her criminal history score or when the
stipulation involves an incorrect application of the law, and those
exceptions apply in this case. A final argument attempts to make a
due process claim, presumably based upon Judge Atcheson’s ob-
servation that “Hankins probably has a constitutional argument of
sufficient gravity to override any purported bar based on invited
error.” 49 Kan. App. 2d at 997 (Atcheson, J., concurring). We begin
with the due process argument.

Standard of Review

Whether the doctrine of invited error applies presents a ques-
tion of law, and appellate courts generally exercise unlimited re-
view over questions of law. State v. Ruiz, 51 Kan. App. 2d 212, 223,
343 P.3d 544 (2015).

Analysis

Hankins’ constitutional argument is unavailing. He has litigated
this matter as a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A.
22-3504; he previously voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal. This
court has “‘repeatedly held that K.S.A. 22-3504(1) has very limited
applicability”” Makthepharak v. State, 298 Kan. 573, 581, 314 P.3d
876 (2013) (quoting State v. Edwards, 281 Kan. 1334, 1336, 135
P.3d 1251 [2006]). The three types of illegal sentences that can be
corrected any time through a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion are “[1] a sen-
tence imposed by a court without jurisdiction, [2] a sentence which
does not conform to the statutory provision, either in character or
the term of the punishment authorized, or [3] a sentence which
is ambiguous with regard to the time and manner in which it is to
be served.” State v. LaBelle, 290 Kan. 529, Syl. ¢ 1, 231 P.3d 1065
(2010). A claim that a procedural bar to the appellate review of a
sentence violates due process does not fit within the limited defini-
tion of an illegal sentence for K.S.A. 22-3504 purposes. Accord-

ingly, Hankins’ claim of a due process violation cannot be remedied
in this proceeding.

In his concurrence below, Judge Atcheson recognized that a due
process challenge is not properly presented in a motion to correct
an illegal sentence, but he suggested that a pro se motion to correct
an illegal sentence might be liberally construed as asserting a claim
under K.S.A. 60-1501 or 60-1507. Hankins, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 998-
99. But Hankins’ motion specifically cites to and applies the rules
governing a motion to correct an illegal sentence. It was filed un-
der the criminal case number and was prosecuted to conclusion in
the criminal action. Accordingly, treating the motion as a separate
Chapter 60 motion would require us to rewrite the motion and its
procedural history, rather than simply applying a liberal construc-
tion to its content. Cf. State v. Gilbert, 299 Kan. 797, 798, 326 P.3d
1060 (2014) (“Liberal rules of construction cannot transform the
reality of a pleading’s content or the arguments being advanced,
even when a litigant is pro se.”). In short, Hankins’ constitutional
argument is not properly before this court in this action.

Hankins’ statutory argument on review emanates from Judge
Atcheson’s concurrence. But Hankins did not raise that issue in
the Court of Appeals. Moreover, we need not resolve the panel's
conflicting interpretations of the 2009 amendment to K.S.A. 21-
4715(c) to determine we can review Hankins’ claim of an illegal
sentence.

Our recent precedent favors Hankins’ position. In State v. Dick-
ey, 301 Kan. 1018, 1032, 350 P.3d 1054 (2015), we declared that
“a stipulation or lack of an objection regarding how those convic-
tions [listed in the criminal history] should be classified or counted
as a matter of law for the purpose of determining the defendant's
criminal history score will not prevent a subsequent challenge un-
der K.S.A. 22-3504(1) of his or her prior convictions.” That deci-
sion relied in part on State v. Weber, 297 Kan. 805, 304 P.3d 1262
(2013). Weber rejected the State’s argument that a defense stipula-
tion was a procedural bar to an illegal sentence challenge, stating
that “‘Kansas law is clear that a defendant can’t agree to an illegal
sentence. State v. Jones, 293 Kan. 757, 757-58, 268 P.3d 491 (2012);
State v. Duncan, 291 Kan. 467, 470-71, 243 P.3d 338 (2010).’ State

— |

v. Burton, No. 105,656, 2012 WL 2148179, at *1 (Kan. App. 2012)
(unpublished opinion).” 297 Kan. at 815.

The Court of Appeals majority attempted to skirt that precedent
by characterizing Hankins’ stipulation as being a factual one, be-
cause he was “challenging the very inclusion of this item [in the
PSI], not its classification.” Hankins, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 976. The
majority's reasoning was based in part on its declaration that a “PSI
does not list cases. It lists only convictions.” 49 Kan. App. 2d at 976.
But of course not all convictions are part of the criminal history
calculation either.

Nevertheless, the stipulation of Hankins’ attorney upon which

the panel majority apparently relied was directed at a legal finding,
not a factual one. After ascertaining that the parties had been pro-
vided an opportunity to look at the PSI, the district court recited
the number of months’ imprisonment within the presumptive grid-
box for the base crime and the same information for the remaining
nonbase crimes, before inquiring whether anyone disagreed with,
or had anything to add to, the court’s findings. The court did not
ask if anyone disagreed with the existence of the convictions used
to calculate the presumptive sentence; it asked if there was any
disagreement with the computed presumptive sentence.
The computation of the presumptive term of imprisonment ap-
plicable to Hankins was a legal determination, i.e., Hankins’ attor-
ney stipulated to the district court’s legal findings. We do not per-
mit parties to stipulate “‘as to the legal conclusions from admitted
facts.’” Urban Renewal Agency v. Reed, 211 Kan. 705, 712, 508
P.2d 1227 (1973) (quoting 50 Am. Jur, Stipulations § 5). The dis-
trict court’s finding that the defense was stipulating to the criminal
history score as part of a departure strategy does not affect the
result. An illegal sentence is to be corrected, even where it is to
the offender’s disadvantage. See State v. McCarley, 287 Kan. 167,
175, 195 P.3d 230 (2008) (“The fact that the new, and proper, sen-
tence is more severe than the original, improper one is of no con-
sequence.”). In short, Hankins’ illegal sentence challenge is subject
to our review.

233

WHETHER AN OKLAHOMA DEFERRED JUDGMENT IS A
CONVICTION FOR CRIMINAL HisTORY SCORING IN KANSAS

Standard of Review

Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law subject to
unlimited review. State v. Kelly, 298 Kan 965, 975, 318 P.3d 987
(2014).

Analysis

Under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), “the
sentencing guidelines for criminal defendants are generally based
upon two factors: the crime severity ranking of the current crime of
conviction and the criminal history classification of the defendant.”
State v. Neal, 292 Kan. 625, 630-31, 258 P.3d 365 (2011) (citing
K.S.A. 21-4703[]]; K.S.A. 21-4704[c]). All prior adult felony con-
victions are used to obtain an offender’s criminal history classifica-
tion, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-4710(d)(2), including an offender's out-
of-state convictions and juvenile adjudications, K.S.A. 21-4711(e).
The question presented here is whether Hankins’ Oklahoma de-
ferred judgment is to be classified as an out-of-state felony convic-
tion for criminal history classification purposes under the KSGA.

The underlying facts of the Oklahoma proceeding are not in dis-
pute. On January 30, 1999, Hankins committed the crime of pos-
session of a firearm on school property to which he pled guilty and
received a deferred judgment with conditions pursuant to Okla.
Stat. tit. 22, § 991c (1998 Supp.). Hankins successfully completed
the procedure, resulting in his discharge without a court judgment
of guilt and with a court order to expunge his guilty plea and to
dismiss his case with prejudice. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991c(C)
(1998 Supp.).

Although at times the parties refer to Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991c
(1998 Supp.) as a deferred sentencing statute, the statute does
more than defer sentencing; it defers the entry of judgment. The
statute requires a guilty verdict or the offender's plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, but the court does not enter a judgment of guilt.
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991c(A) (1998 Supp.). Instead, the court im-
poses conditions on the deferred judgment, akin to the conditions

— i 4

of a diversion agreement in this state. If the court finds that the
offender has met all of the conditions of the deferred judgment,
including the payment of all monetary assessments, “the defendant
shall be discharged without a court judgment of guilt, and the court
shall order the verdict or plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere
to be expunged from the record and the charge shall be dismissed
with prejudice to any further action.” Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 991¢(C)
(1998 Supp.). The provisions of subsection (C) applicable to the
successful completion of the deferred judgment “shall be retroac-
tive.” Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 991e(D) (1998 Supp.).

Generally, OKahoma courts do not consider a deferred judg-
ment to be a conviction if the court does not pronounce judgment
and sentence, i.., unless the offender violates the court-imposed
conditions. See Belle v. State, 1973 OK CR 438, 516 P.2d 551, 552
(Ola. Crim. 1973); see also Starkey v. Oklahoma Dep't of Corr.,
2013 OK 43, ¥ 9, 305 P.3d 1004, 1011 n.11 (Okla. 2013) (“[I]f a
defendant completes the conditions of the deferred judgment and
the court so finds, there will be no conviction.”); United States v.
Hutchinson, 438 Fed. Appx. 681, 684, 2011 WL 3873811 (10th Cir.
2011) (“Oklahoma law is . . . clear that a deferred sentence under
§ 991c does not operate as a conviction.”). But the panel majority
pointed to the definition of conviction utilized by the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals in Gonseth v. State, 1994 OK CR 9,
871 P.2d 51 (Okla. Crim. 1994), where that court struggled to har-
monize the right to appeal and the deferred judgment statutes in
conformity with the Oklahoma constitution, by considering the
guilty plea as sufficient to qualify as an appealable conviction. The
Court of Appeals Hankins concurrence discussed Gonseth while
discounting the majority’s declaration that OKahoma courts had
treated that state’s deferred judgment proceedings as convictions,
stating in a footnote:

“There are several problems with that approach. First, of course, Kansas law gov-
erns what is and is not a conviction for purposes of establishing a defendant's
criminal history. Second, in Gonseth v. State, 871 P.2d 51, 54 (Okla. Crim. App.
1994), which the majority cites, the court suggested that a defendant pleading
guilty under a deferred sentencing and being ordered to fulfill certain conditions
could then appeal. The court reasoned the process, at that point, could be treated
as a ‘conviction’ upon a guilty plea within the meaning of the statute authoriz~

ing criminal appeals. But the holding is plainly limited to the statute governing
appeals. And technically, the court recognized the appeal to be from a denial of
the defendant’s motion to withdraw the plea rather than from a conviction. 871
P2d at 54. More importantly, however, the Oklahoma appellate courts have rec-
ognized that a defendant successfully completing the deferred sentencing process
cannot be treated as having been convicted of the underlying offense. Platt v.
State, 2008 OK CR 20, { 13, 188 P.3d 196 (Construing the comparable deferred
sentencing process for drug offenders, the court finds that after the charges have
been dismissed, the defendants’ guilty pleas ‘would not constitute prior “convic-
tions” impairing the right to possess firearms under Oklahoma law.). (Emphasis
added.) The circumstances considered in Platt match Hankins’ situation; those in
Gonseth do not.” State v, Hankins, 49 Kan. App. 2d 971, 990, 319 P.3d 571 (2014)
(Atcheson, J., concurring).

Turning to Kansas law, the Hankins panel majority attempts to
establish that Kansas law follows the “not widely used” definition
of conviction applied by Oklahoma in Gonseth. 49 Kan. App. 2d
at 981. It points to State v. Holmes, 222 Kan, 212, 563 P.2d 480
(1977), where the court found that a conviction occurs before sen-
tencing. But Holmes did not say that a defendant's plea was suffi-
cient to establish the conviction. The opinion cited to the definition
in K.S.A. 21-3110(4), to-wit: “‘“Conviction” includes a judgment
of guilt entered upon a plea of guilty.” (Emphasis added.) 222 Kan.
at 213. It then held that a defendant stands convicted “once the
statutory procedure has been complied with and the plea of guilty
or nolo contendere has been accepted and a finding of guilty en-
tered thereon.” (Emphasis added.) 222 Kan. at 214. In other words,
the court has to adjudge the defendant guilty before the statutory
definition of “conviction” has been met.

The statutory definition of “conviction” remains unchanged in
our current criminal code. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5111 recites that
“[tJhe following definitions shall apply when the words and phras-
es defined are used in this code, except when a particular context
clearly requires a different meaning.” Then, subsection (d) pro-
vides: “‘Conviction’ includes a judgment of guilt entered upon a
plea of guilty.”

The requirement for a judgment of guilt to trigger a “convic-
tion” in Kansas is a critical point in our analysis because the Okla-
homa deferred judgment statute specifically directs.that an entry
of judgment will not be entered for an offender who successfully

— 4

completes a deferred judgment. The initial conditions are to be
imposed “without entering a judgment of guilt.” Okda. Stat. tit. 22,
§ 991c(A) (1998 Supp.). Then, upon successfully completing the
deferred judgment, “the defendant shall be discharged without a
court judgment of guilt.” Okda. Stat. tit. 22, § 991e(C) (1998 Supp.).
The State’s argument that the journal entry in Hankins’ case in-
dicates that the district court adjudged Hankins guilty is simply
unavailing. Such an action would have been statutorily prohibited,
and we will not ascribe such unlawful conduct to the Oklahoma
tribunal.

Finally, we must address the precedent which constrained Judge
Atcheson from a plain language application of our statutory defini-
tion of “conviction.” In State v. Macias, 30 Kan. App. 2d 79, 83,
39 P.3d 85, rev. denied 273 Kan. 1038 (2002), a panel of the Court
of Appeals held that the defendant’s prior Texas cases which fol-
lowed a “deferred adjudication” procedure would be counted in his
criminal history. The defense had argued that the Texas deferred
adjudication was akin to Kansas’ diversion proceedings, so that the
Texas crimes should be treated the same as Kansas diversions, i.e.,
not counted as prior convictions in calculating criminal history.

Macias focused on the critical distinction that Kansas’ diversion
is instituted before a plea is entered, whereas the Texas procedure
could only be employed “after the defendant enters a guilty or nolo
contendere plea, or proceeds to a trial where guilt is demonstrat-
ed.” 30 Kan. App. 2d at 81-82. The panel opined that establishing
a defendant's factual guilt in the foreign state was sufficient to in-
clude the prior crime in the Kansas criminal history calculation be-
cause that would further the criminal history purpose of addressing
“a defendant's refusal to renounce criminal behavior.” 30 Kan. App.
2d at 83. The defense apparently did not argue that the Kansas
definition of “conviction” requires a “judgment of guilt,” not simply
a factual basis for a guilty plea.

Shortly after Macias, this court had an opportunity to consider
Missouri's suspended imposition of sentence procedure in a differ-
ent context. In State v. Pollard, 273 Kan. 706, 44 P.3d 1261 (2002),
the question was whether the defendant had a prior conviction
that would make it unlawful for him to possess a firearm. Pollard

claimed his underlying Missouri offense could not serve as the
predicate felony under the unlawful possession of a firearm statute
in this state, K.S.A. 21-4204(a)(3), because the Missouri suspended
imposition of sentence did not count as a conviction under Mis-
souri law.

Pollard rejected defendant's argument, holding that Kansas law
applies in determining whether a defendant had the equivalent of
a prior conviction at the time he possessed the firearm. 273 Kan. at
712-13. Although the opinion considered “[t]hree lines of reason-
ing” to answer that question in the affirmative, its first reason—ad-
dressing the Kansas statutory definition of “conviction”—is most
germane here. The court recited the definition from K.S.A. 21-
3110(4) and related Holmes’ holding that the adjudication of guilt,
not the imposition of sentence, constitutes a “conviction.” 273 Kan.
at 712. Pollard then declared that “the journal entry clearly indi-
cates that the Missouri court found [Pollard] guilty and entered a
judgment of guilt against him.” (Emphasis added.) 273 Kan. at 712.
The quoted language from the Missouri document stated that the
Missouri court had “‘adjudged that [Pollard] having been found
guilty upon a plea of guilty entered on 7/14/99, . . . is guilty of said
offense(s).’” 273 Kan. at 713. There is nothing in the opinion to
suggest that the statutes governing the Missouri suspended impo-
sition of sentence procedure precludes the court from entering a
judgment of guilt at the commencement of the proceedings.

Pollard’s first line of reasoning actually supports the notion that
a judgment of guilt must have been entered in a foreign jurisdic-
tion for that crime to be considered a conviction under Kansas law.
What clouds the issue is Pollard’s third line of reasoning, in which it
discusses, inter alia, the Macias rationale for scoring the Texas de-
ferred adjudication in defendant’s Kansas criminal history. As the
Hankins Court of Appeals’ concurrence indicated, Pollard's discus-
sion of Macias was dicta, which binds nobody. 49 Kan. App. 2d at
991 (Atcheson, J., concurring); see Law v. Law Company Building
Assocs., 295 Kan. 551, 564, 289 P.3d 1066 (2012) (nobody bound
by dictum). Moreover, the analog is superfluous at best, given that
ifthe Texas deferred adjudication had included a judgment of guilt,
like the Missouri suspended imposition of sentence, it would have

— |

met the definition of “conviction” relied upon by Pollard’s first line
of reasoning.

Likewise, Pollard specifically restricted its holding to the circum-
stance where the Kansas crime was committed during the 2-year
probationary period for the Missouri felony, declaring: “Our deci-
sion is limited to those facts and does not decide if the result would
be the same if the Kansas offense had occurred after the expiration
of the 2-year period.” 273 Kan. at 714. Here, of course, Hankins’
probationary period had expired and we are presented with the
case that Pollard did not decide.

Finally, we briefly address a new argument by the State, claim-
ing that Hankins’ sentence cannot be considered illegal because his
sentencing grid block without counting the Oklahoma felony would
have a presumptive range of 61, 66, or 71 months. The argument is
that, because Hankins’ 68 months mitigated sentence in the incor-
rect box does not exceed the 71 months aggravated sentence in the
correct grid box, his sentence is within the presumptive range and,
therefore, is legal.

But the KSGA defines “presumptive sentence” as “the sentence
provided in a grid block for an offender classified in that grid block
by the combined effect of the crime severity ranking of the current
crime of conviction and the offender’s criminal history.” (Emphasis
added.) K.S.A. 21-4703(q). The judge did not select the 68-month
sentence from within the grid block for which Hankins was classi-
fied, negating its status as a presumptive sentence, i.e., a sentence
that conforms to the statutory provision. Moreover, a sentencing
judge is to select the middle number in the grid block in the usual
case and “reserve the upper and lower limits for aggravating and
mitigating factors insufficient to warrant a departure.” K.S.A. 2010
Supp. 21-4704(e)(1). Consequently, the fact that the mitigated
sentence imposed from the incorrect grid block is less than the
potential aggravated sentence from the correct grid block does not
legalize an otherwise illegal sentence. ;

In conclusion, we hold that under Kansas law, the entry of a
judgment of guilt by the foreign court is necessary to meet this
State’s definition of a conviction. Under the Oklahoma deferred
judgment procedure, a judgment of guilt was never lawfully en-

tered upon Hankins’ plea of guilty, and, therefore, he did not have
a conviction for purposes of calculating a criminal history score in
this State. Hankins’ sentence is vacated, and the matter is remand-
ed for resentencing with the proper criminal history classification.

Reversed and remanded.

eae

STEGALL, J., dissenting: I would affirm the lower court's ap-
plication of the invited error doctrine in this case. “The general
rule regarding review of an illegal sentence is that ‘[a] defendant
who invites error by stipulating to his or her criminal history can-
not request a correction of sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 after
pronouncement of sentence.’” State v. Vandervort, 276 Kan. 164,
175-76, 72. P.3d 925 (2003) (quoting State v. McBride, 23 Kan. App.
2d 302, Syl. § 3, 930 P.2d 618 [1996]). The Vandervort rule arose in
part out of the statutory mandate that a defendant notify the court
if he or she objects to the inclusion of any conviction on the de-
fendant'’s presentence investigation report (PSI). See K.S.A. 2010
Supp. 21-4715(c) (“Upon receipt of the criminal history worksheet
prepared for the court, the offender shall immediately notify the
district attorney and the court with written notice of any error in
the proposed criminal history worksheet.”) (recodified at K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 21-6814[c}). .

We have recently clarified and modified the Vandervort rule.
See State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018, 350 P.3d 1054 (2015). There,
drawing on two earlier cases (State v. Neal, 292 Kan. 625, 258
P.3d 365 [2011], and State v. Weber, 297 Kan. 805, 304 P.3d 1262
[2013]), which had given rise to some confusion, we explained that
while a defendant can make factual stipulations to the existence of
convictions as listed on the PSI—and such stipulations will give rise
to the application of invited error if the defendant subsequently
makes a collateral attack on the sentence as illegal on the grounds
that the PSI was wrong—a defendant cannot make stipulations as
to the legal effect of such convictions vis-a-vis the proper criminal
history score the defendant should have received. We stated this
holding as follows:

— 4

“It appears that the legal reasoning of Neal and Weber is more sensible than
the line of cases holding that a defendant waives a subsequent challenge to the
classification of prior convictions or to his or her criminal history score if he or she
stipulated or failed to object to the classification or score at sentencing. As Weber
indicates, a defendant's stipulation or failure to object at sentencing will prevent
the defendant from later challenging the existence of convictions listed in his or
her criminal history. But a stipulation or lack of an objection regarding how those
convictions should be classified or counted as a matter of law for the purpose of
determining the defendant's criminal history score will not prevent a subsequent
challenge under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) of his or her prior convictions.” (Emphasis
added.) Dickey, 301 Kan. at 1032.

Thus, applying the newly modified Vandervort/Dickey rule, the

proper question in Hankins’ case is whether he stipulated to the
existence of the conviction he now challenges when it was listed on
his PSIP Clearly, he did. That stipulation was factual, as the Court
of Appeals properly held. Just as importantly, the district court
found that Hankins’ factual stipulation was strategically and inten-
tionally made.
“[Hankins] did stipulate to the factual existence of his prior conviction. He at-
tempts to avoid that difficulty by arguing on appeal that he ‘does not challenge the
existence of the Oklahoma case listed on his presentence investigation report but
challenges the classification of the Oklahoma case as a conviction for the purpose
of criminal history score.’ However, the PSI does not list cases. It lists only convic-
tions. Hankins is challenging the very inclusion of this item, not its classification.

“There is no need for any additional analysis of the [invited error] doctrine
here, The facts in this case drive the decision on invited error, The district court
found that Hankins chose to forgo a challenge to the Oklahoma item on his crimi-
nal history as part of his dispositional departure strategy.” State v. Hankins, 49
Kan, App. 2d 971, 975-77, 319 P:3d 571 (2014), rev. granted 301 Kan, 1049 (2015).

The record in this case bears out the Court of Appeals’ recitation
of the facts, and the majority opinion doés not question its accu-
racy. Instead, the majority chooses to expand the Dickey exception
to the Vandervort rule to include challenges to the existence of
convictions listed on a PSI in addition to challenges to the legal
effect of those convictions on the resulting criminal history score.
In my view, this result swallows up the statutory scheme requiring
a defendant to put the State and the court on notice if a defendant

| ake

objects to the “existence of convictions listed in his or her criminal
history.” Dickey, 301 Kan. at 1032.

After today, a defendant will be in the position to take advantage
of a stipulation to prior convictions during the sentencing phase and
then, in a subsequent case, collaterally attack his or her sentence
as illegal because the conviction factually admitted to is alleged to
not constitute a “true conviction” as a matter of law. This opens up
an entire world of legal arguments about possible legal infirmities
in prior convictions which can now be raised for the first time in a
collateral attack long after the defendant’s direct appeal rights have
expired. This is directly contrary to the statutory scheme which is
intended to flush such arguments into the open before sentenc-
ing in the district court. The aim of the statutory scheme is to get
sentences right the first time. Our decision undermines that aim.

In sum, I would not extend the Dickey exception to encompass
failures to object to the existence of a conviction as noted on a de-
fendant’s PSI. The alternative theories for relief advanced in Judge
Atcheson’s concurring opinion were not argued by Hankins before
the Court of Appeals and were asserted for the first time in Han-
kins’ petition for review. As such, I would not consider them. See
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¢ 10, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (“Ina
case that is before the Kansas Supreme Court on a granted petition
for review, an issue cannot be raised for the first time before the
Supreme Court. Any issue that was not presented to the Kansas
Court of Appeals is deemed abandoned.”), cert. denied 132 S. Ct.
1594 (2012).

For these reasons, I dissent.

LUCKERT, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.

No. 109,706

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. MaTTHEW T. FIsHER, Appellant.
(373 P3d 781)

inion fle

Samuel Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and
was on the briefs for appellant.

Jonathon L. Noble, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Mare
Goodman, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him
on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BEIER, J.: Defendant Matthew T. Fisher appeals his jury trial
convictions of attempted second-degree murder and criminal dam-
age to property, which arose out of a fight with a roommate.

Fisher raises seven issues on appeal: (1) whether the prosecutor
xan afoul of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240,
49 L. Ed. 91 (1976), during his cross-examination of Fisher; (2)
whether the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing ar-
gument; (3) whether the district court judge should have instruct-
ed the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary
manslaughter; (4) whether the district judge erred by telling the

— #8 ~~]

jury at the beginning of the trial that a mistrial attributable to jury
misconduct would be a burden on the parties and taxpayers; (5)
whether the criminal damage conviction was supported by suffi-
cient evidence; (6) whether cumulative error deprived Fisher of a
fair trial; and (7) whether the district judge erred in determining
Fisher's criminal history score.

As detailed below, we ultimately reject Fisher's arguments and
affirm his convictions and sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the time of the crimes, Fisher lived with his friend Tim Worth-
en and Tim’s ex-wife, Angelique Worthen (Angel). Tim was the sole
owner of the house the three shared. Fisher and Tim spent the day
drinking, first at Tim’s house and then at bars. After Tim left to pick
Angel up from work, Fisher headed home on foot. On the way, he
encountered police officers twice, the second time right outside of
the house.

As a result of the second police encounter, Fisher became bel-
ligerent. He kicked a door open inside the house, damaging the
door. Then, while back outside the house, Fisher hit Tim, who then
went inside next-door neighbor Corby Stevens’ house. Eventually,
Fisher and Angel ended up in a physical fight that left Angel with
life-threatening injuries. Although Stevens’ windows were open,
both she and Tim denied hearing the fight between Fisher and
Angel. Fisher left the scene in Tim’s car, but he wrecked the car
within a few blocks of the house.

Responding officers and emergency medical technicians would
eventually testify that Fisher kept mentioning Tim’s address. They
also observed that he was covered in an amount of blood inconsis-
tent with the seriousness of his own injuries. A medical technician
would testify that Fisher’s wounds appeared to be defensive. Fisher
was acting paranoid, refused an IV, and referred to an “assassin.”
Based on Fisher’s behavior and his repeated references to Tim’s ad-
dress, officers requested a welfare check at the house. Meanwhile,
Fisher was transported to the hospital.

When officers arrived at the house, they found Angel lying in a
large pool of blood. Her injuries were so extensive that one officer

—— SC

initially thought she was dead, and one of the medical technicians
would eventually testify that he could not immediately tell whether
the victim was a man or a woman. But Angel was able to tell the
police that “Matt” had hurt her.

Soon after Fisher arrived at the hospital, he told officers that
Angel had attacked him and that he had defended himself. He also
expressed concern for Tim’s safety and said that he feared Angel
and Stevens had kidnapped him. He claimed to have left the house
to go to the hospital for help. After receiving Miranda warnings,
Fisher also admitted to telling Angel he would kil] her if she did not
reveal Tim’s whereabouts.

The next morning, Fisher spoke to a different officer, telling her
that he had hit Angel because she would not reveal Tim’s location.
He did not mention self-defense.

The State charged Fisher with attempted murder in the sec-
ond degree or, in the alternative, aggravated battery. He also was
charged with criminal damage to property because of the door he
kicked open inside the house.

At trial, after empaneling the jury, the district judge told jurors

about the rules and restrictions governing their service. The judge
then stated:
“Any juror who violates these restrictions, as I've explained to you, jeopardizes the
fairness of these proceedings and a mistrial could result which would require the
entire process to start over. As you can imagine, a mistrial is a tremendous expense
and inconvenience to the parties, the Court, and the taxpayers.”

At trial, Angel testified that she could not remember much of
what happened on the night of the crimes. Tim testified that he
had heard Stevens yell out her window that she would not let Tim
leave her house.

During direct examination, Fisher said he could not “really re-
member” talking to police at different times. Fisher testified that
Angel had said she received training in hand-to-hand combat while
in the Navy. Fisher also testified that Angel started the fight with
him by jumping on his back. He asserted that he acted in self-de-
fense when he struck her, pushed her, and stepped on her chest
after she had fallen to the ground. Defense counsel asked Fisher

’ DE i

if he “ever [got] the opportunity to explain the details of what hap-
pened in context.” Fisher responded:

“Thad. .. . [S]everal officers had asked me what had happened. ... And I was of
the frame of mind that, you know, they're not going to believe you because the
first officer that asked me that, I remember asking, he replied like he didn’t be-
lieve me so, you know, it is kind of hard to believe.”

During cross-examination, the prosecutor and Fisher engaged
in the following exchange:
“PROSECUTOR: When you were aware that maybe you didn’t quite tell the po-
lice exactly what happened, did you ever contact police and tell them you needed
to talk to give a more definitive statement about what happened ... . that night?
“FISHER: No.
“PROSECUTOR: Never said a word about these things until today?
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your honor, in light of the legal proceedings, I believe
that encroaches his Constitutional rights, we would object.
“PROSECUTOR: I made—tI now the case law, Judge, there's absolutely no ref-
erence made to his status. It was only an inquiry as to whether he elected—
“DISTRICT JUDGE: Overruled, you can ask the question about making contact
or not making contact.”

During the jury instructions conference, the district judge said
he would instruct the jury on attempted second-degree murder,
aggravated battery by knowingly causing great bodily harm, and
reckless aggravated battery. The judge also intended to give a self-
defense instruction. The district judge did not instruct on attempt-
ed voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, and Fisher
did not object to that omission.

The criminal damage instruction required the State to prove:

“1. [Angel] had an interest in property described as a door;

2. [Fisher] knowingly damaged, destroyed, defaced or substantially impaired
the use of property by means other than by fire or explosive;

8, [Fisher] did so without consent of [Angel].”

During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury,

“And I suggest to you when you look at that evidence what you can see by your
common knowledge and experience is that it didn’t start [alongside] of that car,
and, one, if you believe it’s self-defense, it doesn’t apply because it’s excessive. He

——

had her loosened. He had her away from him. And then he beats the living hell
out of her and kills her—about kills her.”

The prosecutor then suggested what had happened on the night
of the crimes, focusing on photographs of the scene, the extent of
Angel's injuries, and Fisher’s testimony that he had hit Angel seven
or eight times. He continued:

“The testimony was quite clear. She’s lying there motionless. You heard the tape of
her trying to say who did it in the hospital.

“You can’t even tell it's a woman anymore, but he wants you to believe it’s
self-defense. Whatever triggered it, whatever caused him to decide enough was
enough with that woman, he took advantage of that and he beat her and beat her
with the intent to kill her. . . [T]here is no way in this world the State will assert to
you anything but that he intentionally attempted to kill Angel.”

In his closing, Fisher’s counsel argued that Angel had started
the fight in an attempt to keep Tim’s whereabouts hidden from
Fisher. He pointed out that Angel had induced Fisher to believe
she had hand-to-hand combat training. He said that Fisher was
merely concemed for Tim and his own welfare and that the situa-
tion got “bad in a hurry.” Fisher caused Angel's injuries but had no
intent to kill her, only to repel a perceived attack. Fisher’s counsel
also pointed out that Angel did not own the interior door that had
been damaged.

In the rebuttal portion of his closing, the prosecutor stated:
“The State put every bit of evidence it had and most of that came from that man,
himself, whether it was in the hospital or his assertion today that it was self-de-
fense. How self-serving, How self-serving.

<.., Well, let’s take his theory, it was with an elbows, of course they weren't on
his hands. He beat the living heck out of her with his elbow. Pick one. Pick self-
defense. His super attack from behind that was going to result in his belief, in
imminent death or great bodily harm? Bull . . Take his version. His self-defense
isn’t allowed at that point. And one way or the other, that blood’s still where it was
and all over everywhere and she’s still laying there dying, I, in my entire life, .. .
never can you say, well, it wasn’t an attempted murder because she didn’t die.
State will continue to assert self-defense isn’t worth the response. He intention-
ally, for whatever reason, whatever it was that triggered in his mind over his bro,
Tim, intentionally was going to kill Angel []. Ee meant to do it.”

The prosecutor also said, “[Fisher] wasn’t really saying he was

— 4

going to die. He wanted whoever it was off of . . . him and then he
kept beating her. When he realized who it was, he didn’t stop.”
After the jury returned its guilty verdicts, Fisher was sentenced
to a prison term of 247 months. On the criminal damage convic-
tion, the district judge noted that “the evidence was not substantial
. .. that the property claimed to be damaged . . . was actually owned
by [Angel].”
The Court of Appeals rejected Fisher's appellate challenges,
State v. Fisher, No. 109,706, 2014 WL 3731928 (Kan. App. 2015)
(unpublished opinion), and we granted his petition for review.

Doye VIOLATION

Fisher first argues that the State’s introduction of evidence about
his post-Miranda silence violated Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-
19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 91 (1976).

Review of whether a defendant's constitutional rights, as pro-

tected by Doyle, were violated “involves a question of law that is
reviewed de novo.” State v. Reed, 300 Kan. 494, 509, 332 P.3d 172
(2014). If we rule that there was Doyle error, we must determine
whether the error was harmless by examining it in the context of
the record as a whole, see State v. Hernandez, 284 Kan. 74, 95, 159
P.3d 950 (2007) (each case must be scrutinized in the light of trial
record as whole; incidents not viewed in isolation), and by con-
sidering how the district judge dealt with the error when it arose.
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569-70, 256 P.3d 801 (2011).
“[T]he error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the er-
ror proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the exror complained of will not or did
not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is
no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.” 292 Kan. 541,
Syl. 16.

It is generally impermissible for the State to impeach a defen-
dant with the defendant's post-Miranda silence. Doyle, 426 U.S. at
619; see also State v. Hernandez, 284 Kan. 74, Syl. J 3, 159 P.3d
950 (2007) (applying Doyle). A prosecutor may not “imply[] that
the defendant had a post-Miranda, pretrial obligation to reveal to
the police or prosecutor the substance of the defendant’s trial tes-
timony.” State v. Kemble, 291 Kan. 109, 122, 238 P.3d 251 (2010).

| ow a

The same protections apply to the defendant who had “some dis-
cussion with the police” but “remain[ed] silent as to matters later
asserted at trial,” regardless of whether the defendant expressly in-
voked his or her right to remain silent. State v. Clark, 223 Kan. 83,
89, 574 P.2d 174 (1977).

But the protections of Doyle have limits. A defendant's silence
before given Miranda warnings and his or her statements after giv-
en the warnings are fair game. See Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 82 (no
Doyle violation when prosecutor refers to defendant’s pre-Miranda
silence); see also State v. Drayton, 285 Kan. 689, 707-08, 175 P.3d
861 (2008) (no Doyle violation when prosecutor impeaches defen-
dant’s trial testimony through use of a prior inconsistent statement
made after Miranda warnings given). When considering whether
a line of questioning violates Doyle, “[t]he determinative question
.. .is whether the discussion centered on what was not said during
the interview (the defendant’s right to remain silent) or what was
said but now called into question (impeachment by way of prior
inconsistent statements.)” Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 91. And a pros-
ecutor may impeach the defendant on his or her post-arrest silence
in exceptional circumstances, such as when a defendant opens the
door by suggesting he or she fully cooperated with an investigation
by sharing all that was known. State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 192-93,
262 P.3d 314 (2014).

In addition, a Doyle violation does not make reversal of a con-
viction automatic. We have upheld convictions when, for example,
evidence of a defendant’s guilt was overwhelming or such evidence
combined with other factors. See, ¢.g., Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 95
(evidence of guilt overwhelming). When we have reversed a con-
viction based on a Doyle violation, the factfinder’s assessment of
the defendant's credibility has tended to be a central issue at trial.
See State v. Santos-Vega, 299 Kan. 11, 321 P.3d 1 (2014) (district
judge gave no admonition or curative instruction; verdict depen-
dent on whether jury believed victim or defendant); see also Tully,
293 Kan. at 194 (district judge took no remedial action; verdict
hinged on defendant’s credibility); State v. Kemble, 291 Kan. at
124-25 (outcome dependent on evaluation of defendant’s cred-
ibility; prosecutor's improper reference to defendant’s silence ad-
dressed theory of defense).

’ Eo i

Turning to this case, Fisher claims the prosecutor violated Doyle
when he asked Fisher if he “ever contact[ed] police and [told] them
{he] needed to talk to give a more definitive statement about what
happened . . . that night,” and followed with, “Never said a word
about these things until today?”

Fisher had never expressly invoked his right to remain silent,
and he had provided post-Miranda statements to at least three of-
ficers while in the hospital, but neither obligated him to volunteer
his exculpatory story, and the prosecutor committed a Doyle viola-
tion by suggesting otherwise to the jury. Clark, 223 Kan. at 89; see
Drayton, 285 Kan. at 707-08. The prosecutor's remarks cannot be
fairly categorized as proper comment on Fisher's pre-Miranda si-
lence or on inconsistencies between post-Miranda statements and
Fisher's trial testimony. See Kemble, 291 Kan. at 122-23 (statement
that defendant never said drunkenness affected memory “until to-
day” impermissibly implied defendant had post-Miranda, pretrial
duty to reveal his testimony). If the prosecutor intended to im-
peach by pointing out inconsistencies among Fisher's statements,
the prosecutor needed to focus on what Fisher did say during po-
lice interviews, such as his admission that he hit Angel because
she would not tell him where Tim was, instead of focusing on what
Fisher did not say. See Hernandez, 284 Kan. at 91.

Our analysis does not end, however, with a ruling that there was
error, We must determine whether the error was harmless.

“Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have
emphasized the importance of respecting the protections of Doyle
because ‘every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous.’” San-
tos-Vega, 299 Kan. at 26 (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617). Here, it
was undisputed that Fisher was the one who caused Angel's severe
injuries. But his guilt depended on whether the jury believed his
most sympathetic version of events—that Angel had instigated the
attack on him and that he was acting in self-defense.

In such a case, a prosecutor can flirt with disaster by alluding to
a defendant’s post-Miranda silence. In this particular case, disas-
ter was avoided because the prosecutor also thoroughly impeached
Fisher’s credibility by emphasizing the inconsistent content of the
communications when Fisher was not silent. Any further negative

251

impact on Fisher's credibility arising from the prosecutor's two ref-
erences to Fisher's selective silence would have been strictly mar-
ginal, not enough to have had reasonable possibility of contributing
to the verdict. See Santos-Vega, 299 Kan. at 27. Fisher is not en-
titled to reversal of his convictions on the basis of the Doyle error
alone.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Fisher next claims the prosecutor committed misconduct on
several occasions during both phases of his closing argument.

We review such claims even when a contemporaneous objection
was not made at trial. State v. Anderson, 294 Kan. 450, 461, 276
P.3d 200 (2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 529 (2012). Our analysis
has two steps. First, the court determines whether the prosecu-
tor’s comments were outside the wide latitude that the prosecu-
tor is allowed in discussing the evidence. If the comments were
improper and constituted misconduct, the appellate court must
determine whether the comments prejudiced the jury against the
defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Roeder,
300 Kan. 901, 932-33, 336 P.3d 831 (2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct.
2316 (2015). In the second step, we consider three factors: (1)
whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant, (2) whether the
misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's part, and (3) wheth-
er the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that
the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of
jurors. State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 540, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014).
None of these factors is individually controlling. Before the third
factor can ever override the first two factors, we must be able to say
that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967),
have been met. Williams, 299 Kan. at 540-41. As a practical matter,
however, if the constitutional harmless error test is met, the statu-
tory test also will be met. See State v. Lowrance, 298 Kan. 274, 282,
312 P.3d 328 (2013) (when State meets constitutional harmlessness
test it necessarily also meets lower statutory harmlessness test as
well). Under the constitutional test, the party benefitting from the
error must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record,
ie., there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to
the verdict. 299 Kan. at 541.

During closing argument, the prosecutor must confine his or her
remarks to matters in evidence. State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 249, 331
P.3d 544 (2014). And the prosecutor’s comments must “accurately
reflect the evidence, accurately state the law, and . . . not [be] in-
tended to inflame the jury’s passions or prejudices or divert the
jury from its duty to decide the case based on the evidence and
controlling law.” 300 Kan. at 249. The prosecutor has “‘consider-
able latitude in discussing the evidence and drawing reasonable
inferences from that evidence.’” State v. Tahah, 302 Kan. 783, 788,
358 P.3d 819 (2015).

Fisher first focuses on what he argues was an expression of the

prosecutor's opinion on Fisher's guilt:
“You can’t even tell it’s a woman anymore, but he wants you to believe it’s self-de-
fense. Whatever triggered it, whatever caused him to decide enough was enough
with that woman, he took advantage of that and he beat her and beat her with the
intent to kill her.”

And, in rebuttal, the prosecutor said:

“State will continue to assert self-defense isn’t worth the response. He intention-
ally, for whatever reason, whatever it was that triggered in his mind over his bro,
Tim, intentionally was going to kill Angel Worthen. He meant to do it.”

A prosecutor may not express a personal opinion about the de-
fendant’s guilt because “‘such expressions of personal opinion are
a form of unisworn, unchecked testimony, not commentary on the
evidence of the case. [Citation omitted.]’” State v. Mireles, 297
Kan. 339, 368, 301 P.3d 677 (2013). But a prosecutor may com-
ment on the weakness of a defense or make a directional statement
encouraging the jury to examine evidence of guilt. See State v. Pep-
pers, 294 Kan. 377, 399-400, 276 P.3d 148 (2012); State v. Duong,
292 Kan, 824, 833, 257 P.3d 309 (2011) (pointing out weaknesses
of defense theory not misconduct). “[A]n affirmative statement .. .
not couched in terms such as ‘it is alleged’ or ‘the State intends to
prove’ . . . stated as a fact . . . [is] the equivalent of a personal ex-
pression of guilt.” State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 212, 284 P.3d 977
(2012).

Te asc aoaiaee

On the first of these two challenged statements, just before the
prosecutor remarked on Fisher's intent to kill Angel, he had di-
rected the jury to evidence supporting the State’s version of events.
The prosecutor had referred to Fisher's size, the first responder’s
initial impression that Angel was dead, and the amount of blood at
the scene. The prosecutor then suggested how the fight may have
occurred and concluded: “Whatever triggered it, whatever caused
him to decide enough was enough . . . he beat her and beat her with
the intent” to kill her. The prosecutor then said that there was “no
way in this world the State will assert to you anything but that he
intentionally attempted to kill Angel.” When we consider this first
challenged statement in context, we conclude that it was part of a
permissible summary of part of the evidence contradicting Fisher's
claim of self-defense and was not error.

Turning to the challenged statement from rebuttal closing, the
prosecutor again argued, “He intentionally, for whatever reason,
whatever it was that triggered in his mind over his bro, Tim, in-
tentionally was going to kill Angel Worthen. He meant to do it.”
The State suggests that these comments were proper comment on
the incredibility of Fisher’s claim of self-defense. Again, when the
remarks are considered in context, we see no error. State v. Chan-
thaseng, 293 Kan. 140, 148, 261 P.3d 889 (2011) (the context in
which prosecutor makes a statement is “all-important”).

Fisher next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by accusing him of lying. A prosecutor is also forbidden from ac-
cusing a defendant of lying. See State v. Brown, 300 . 542, 560,
331 P.3d 781 (2014). And
“{tUhe prohibition extends not only to using the word ‘ie’ but also to its “deriva-
tive.’ See State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 62, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005) (prosecutor called
defendant's testimony a ‘fabrication,’ ‘yarn,’ ‘final yarn,’ the yarn spun here,’ and
four-part yarn’); see also [State v.] Akins, 298 Kan. [592,] 607, 315 P.3d 868 [2014]
(prosecutor asked did the jury ‘buy’ defendant's story and said his testimony was
‘not credible’).” Brown, 300 Kan. at 560.

During rebuttal closing, the prosecutor said:

“The State put [on] every bit of evidence it had and most of that came from that
man, himself, whether it was in the hospital or his assertion today’ that somehow it
was self-defense. How self-serving. How self-serving.

“... Well, let’s take his theory, it was with an elbow, of course they weren't on
his hands. He beat the living heck out of her with his elbow. Pick one. Pick self-
defense. His super attack from behind that was going to result, in his belief, in
imminent death or great bodily harm? Bull.”

Although the prosecutor's use of “self-serving” to describe Fish-
er’s testimony qualified was proper comment on inconsistencies in
Fisher's testimony, the prosecutor's truncated slang exclamation of
“bull” was beyond the wide latitude allowed him in discussing the
evidence. There is no mistaking the meaning of the expression; it
is the equivalent of calling Fisher a liar. And “a prosecutor's time
during closing arguments is better spent discussing the evidentiary
strengths of the case at hand, rather than devising different ways to
euphemistically accuse a criminal defendant of lying on the witness
stand.” Brown, 300 Kan. at 561.

Fisher also alleges misconduct in the form of remarks designed
to inflame the passions of the jury. During the opening portion of
the State’s closing, the prosecutor said: “[I}f you believe it’s self-de-
fense, it doesn’t apply because it’s excessive. He had her loosened.
He had her away from him. And then he beats the living hell out of
her and kills her—about kills her.” This colloquialism resurfaced in
somewhat milder form during rebuttal closing: “He beat the living
heck out of her.”

A prosecutor may not encourage the jury to decide a case based
on a personal interest instead of neutrality or distract the jury from
its duty to make decisions based on the evidence and the control-
ling law. See State v. Corbett, 281 Kan. 294, 313, 130 P3d 1179
(2006). But a:prosecutor may use “‘picturesque speech’ as long as
he or she does not refer to facts not disclosed by the evidence.”
State v. Crawford, 300 Kan. 740, 748-49, 334 P.3d 311 (2014).

The prosecutor's use of “living hell” and “living heck” certainly
made for “vivid descriptions” in his review of the evidence. See
State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 723, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011), over
ruled on other grounds in State v. Astorga, 299 Kan. 395, 324 P.3d
1046 (2014). And Fisher believes they crossed the line to repugnant
and unprofessional. We disagree. There was no dispute that Fisher
beat Angel almost to death; indeed, she suffered life-threatening
injuries and was unrecognizable as a woman, or even alive, when

CC

discovered. Although a prosecutor probably would be well advised
to avoid expressions during arguments that could offend a juror’s
moral or religious sensibility, we do not think this prosecutor was
trying to distract the jury from deciding the case based on the evi-
dence. Instead, he was emphasizing the severity of the beating and
the likelihood that it went far beyond the violence that would have
been necessary to effectively repel an attack. See Carr, 300 Kan.
at 249 (“The wide latitude permitted a prosecutor in discussing the
evidence during closing argument in a criminal case includes at
least limited room for rhetoric and persuasion, even for eloquence
and modest spectacle.”).

Having held that there was one instance of prosecutorial mis-
conduct during closing, we move to the question of harmlessness.

First, we consider whether the misconduct was gross and fla-
grant. “Comments generally amount to gross and flagrant miscon-
duct when they were repeated, emphasized, calculated, or in viola-
tion of well-established laws.” State v. Barber, 302 Kan. 367, 380,
353 P.3d 1108 (2015). The prosecutor's use of the word “bull” to
describe Fisher’s story at trial violated our longstanding rule against
a prosecutor's personal commentary on witness credibility, and this
is fairly described as gross and flagrant. See Brown, 300 Kan. at
561.

Next, “[iJn analyzing ill will, this court considers whether the
comments were ‘deliberate or in apparent indifference to a court’s
ruling.” Barber, 302 Kan. at 380. There was no specific court rul-
ing in this case that the prosecutor violated, and we do.not perceive
that the one-time, one-word remark was the product of ill will.

The third factor we consider in determining whether the pros-
ecutor’s remark was reversible error, standing alone, is whether the
evidence against Fisher was so direct and overwhelming that the
misconduct would have had little weight in the minds of jurors.
State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 540, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014). We are
convinced that the prosecutor’s momentary lapse had negligible, if
any impact, on Fisher's jury.

Considering our three harmlessness criteria under the more
demanding federal constitutional standard, the State has demon-
strated beyond a reasonable doubt that the single error did not af-

— 4

fect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record; there is no
reasonable possibility that the brief, umrepeated error contributed
to the verdict. See Williams, 299 Kan. at 541.

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTION

Fisher’s next argument on this appeal focuses on the district
judge’s instruction at the start of trial that their misconduct could
result in a mistrial, which would be “a tremendous expense and
inconvenience to the parties, the Court, and the taxpayers.” Fisher,
whose counsel did not object below, urges this court to hold that
this language was clear error necessitating reversal.

This precise issue was considered in our recent Tahah opinion.
302 Kan. at 792-95.

In that case, the district judge used nearly identical language
at the opening of a trial to warn jurors about the consequences of
their misbehavior. 302 Kan. at 792. The defendant challenged the
instruction on appeal, suggesting that it violated the rule of States
v. Salts, 288 Kan. 263, 266-67, 200 P.3d 464 (2009), in which this
court held that an Allen instruction given at the beginning of delib-
erations that said “‘another trial would be a burden on both sides’”
was misleading and inaccurate.

In Tahah, we declined to extend the Salts holding. We distin-
guished a preliminary jury instruction given in the context of ex-
plaining the danger of juror misconduct from a true Allen instruc-
tion, which is impermissible because it could coerce jurors into a
“unanimous verdict by unduly influencing [them] to compromise
their views on the evidence simply to avoid a hung jury.” Tahah,
302 Kan, at 794-95. We held that the preliminary instruction given
in Tahah was not error. 302 Kan. at 795. That holding is controlling
here, and Fisher's challenge to the preliminary instruction fails.

LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION

Fisher also challenges the district judge’s failure to give a lesser
included offense instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter
based on a theory of imperfect self-defense.

Our analysis of jury instruction challenges follows this pattern:
“*(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from

257

both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of
review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine wheth-
er the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine
whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and
(4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine whether
the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State
v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S$, Ct. 1504 (2012).’”
State v. Woods, 301 Kan. 852, 876, 348 P.3d 583 (2015).

When, as here, the failure to give a lesser included offense instruc-
tion is challenged on appeal, the court applies the same analytical
framework. State v. Armstrong, 299 Kan. 405, 432, 324 P.3d 1052
(2014).

According to the record before us, Fisher did not seek an instruc-
tion on attempted voluntary manslaughter or object to its omission.
His silence on this issue at the time of trial does not deprive us of
jurisdiction to consider it. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3); State
v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 97, 298 P.3d 333 (2013) (“[F]ailure to
object to an instruction does not prevent appellate review.”). But,
as further discussed below, it means he would face a higher burden
in persuading us that any error merits reversal. See State v. Wil-
liams, 295 Kan. 506, 511-12, 286 P.3d 195 (2012) (noting exception
to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414[3]; the preservation requirement al-
lows appellate court to consider clear error).

Turning to whether an attempted voluntary manslaughter in-
struction would have been legally appropriate, voluntary man-
slaughter is a lesser included offense of second-degree murder.
Therefore, an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction would
have been legally appropriate in this prosecution for attempted
second-degree murder. See State v. Salary, 301 Kan. 586, 599, 343
P3d 1165 (2015).

The question of whether the instruction would have been fac-
tually appropriate is more difficult. See State v. Molina, 299 Kan.
651, 661, 325 P.3d1142 (2014) (failure to instruct on lesser includ-
ed crime erroneous only if instruction would have been factually
appropriate). “‘[W]here there is some evidence which would rea-
sonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime .. . , the
judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any lesser

included crime.’” Armstrong, 299 Kan. at 432 (quoting K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 22-3414[3]); see also State v. Story, 300 Kan. 702, 710, 334
P.3d 297 (2014) (evidence must reasonably justify conviction of
lesser included crime). If, after a review of all the evidence viewed
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we are convinced
that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty of
the lesser crime, failure to give the instruction is error. Armstrong,
299 Kan. at 433.

Voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense is
“knowingly killing a human being committed . . . upon an unrea-
sonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justified
use of deadly force under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5222.” K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 21-5404(a)(2). Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5222(a), “[a]
person is justified in the use of force against another when and to
the extent it appears to such person and such person reasonably
believes that such use of force is necessary to defend such person .
. against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” The imper-
fection in “imperfect self-defense” is objective unreasonableness of
the defendant's subjective belief in the necessity of violence.

This means that, in order to determine that an attempted volun-
tary manslaughter instruction was factually appropriate, we must
detect record evidence to support the existence of Fisher's sub-
jective, honest belief that force was necessary to defend himself
against Angel, as well as evidence demonstrating that Fisher's be-
lief was objectively unreasonable. See State v. Qualls, 297 Kan. 61,
70-71, 298 P.3d 311 (2013); State v. Gonzalez, 282 Kan. 73, 110,
145 P.3d 18 (2006). This court does not speculate about hypotheti-
cal scenarios. Story, 300 Kan. at 710 (quoting State v. Wade, 295
Kan. 916, 925, 287 P.3d 237 [2012]).

This case is relatively unusual. A typical stumbling block for a
defendant who desires an instruction on voluntary manslaughter
based on imperfect self-defense is a lack of evidence of a subjec-
tive belief in the necessity of self-defense. See Gonzalez, 282 Kan.
at 111-12 (listing cases); see also State v. Moore, 287 Kan. 121, 194
P3d 121 (2008) (voluntary manslaughter instruction not appropri-
ate in shooting death of police officer; defendant knew individuals
at door were law enforcement officers, understood why they were

| tke a

there); State v. White, 284 Kan. 333, 161 P.3d 208 (2007) (no en-
titlement to voluntary manslaughter instruction when no evidence
defendant believed grandson in imminent danger). Here, we have
ample evidence of Fisher's subjective belief. He testified that An-
gel initiated the attack and that he thought she was going to kill
him. He thought Stevens and Angel had harmed Tim and were try-
ing to prevent him from helping Tim. He testified that Angel had
told him in the past that she had received training in hand-to-hand
combat while in the Navy, and Tim confirmed that Angel had said
she could handle herself in a fight.
The greater potential stumbling block in this case is the paucity
of evidence that Fisher’s subjective belief was objectively unrea-
sonable and yet not delusional. See State v. Ordway, 261 Kan. 776,
790, 934 P.2d 94 (1997) (honest but unreasonable belief cannot be
product of psychosis). No one saw or heard the beginning of the
fight between Fisher and Angel; and Angel’s memory of the event
was so impaired that she could not contest Fisher's version. Tim did
testify that he heard Stevens yell out the window that she would
not let him go, which generally supports Fisher's expressed fear for
Tim’s safety. And one of the first responders testified about Fisher
having defensive wounds, which tends to support Fisher's story
that Angel, with her military combat training, was on offense at
some point in their fight. This evidence reads “reasonable” rather
than “unreasonable.”
Still, Fisher’s version of events also contained elements of the
bizarre, including the possibility of government conspiracy and
one or more marauding assassins. And Fisher was undoubtedly
extremely intoxicated. After being stopped by police twice on his
walk home, he fought with Tim on arrival, then promptly forgot he
had seen him at all, developing an alternate theory that Tim had
been kidnapped and was being confined and concealed against his
will by Stevens and Angel:
Even viewing the whole of the evidence in the light most fa-
vorable to the prosecutor, we conclude that a rational factfinder
could have found Fisher guilty of attempted voluntary manslaugh-
ter based on imperfect self-defense. See Armstrong, 299 Kan. at
433, Although this is a close case, under current Kansas caselaw,
the instruction was factually appropriate.

Having determined the omitted attempted voluntary man-
slaughter instruction was legally and factually appropriate, we hold
there was error under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3). However, be-
cause Fisher lodged no timely objection to the omission of the in-
struction, he is entitled to reversal only if we hold the omission was
clearly erroneous. We consider the entire record de novo, includ-
ing procedural safeguards and the total amount of inculpatory evi-
dence. State v. Briseno, 299 Kan. 877, 886, 326 P.3d 1074 (2014);
Armstrong, 299 Kan. at 433. We reverse only if firmly convinced
that the jury’s verdict would have been different had the district
judge given the missing instruction, and Fisher bears the burden of
demonstrating that this case meets that demanding standard. See
State v. Littlejohn, 298 Kan. 632, 646, 316 P.3d 136 (2014).

Fisher does not carry his burden here. Under appropriate facts a
jury may consider intentional second-degree murder and voluntary
manslaughter based on a theory of imperfect self-defense simul-
taneously. See State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 326, 160 P.3d 457
(2007). And, had the jury been properly instructed here, there is
a theoretical possibility it could have rendered a different verdict
because imperfect self-defense fit some of the admitted evidence.
But, a mere theoretical possibility is inadequate under the clear
error standard. The whole of the evidence includes Fisher's admis-
sion to hitting Angel and threatening to kill her if she did not reveal
Tim’s whereabouts. In view of this statement, Fisher cannot show
the verdict would have been different if the jury was instructed on
attempted voluntary manslaughter.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL DAMAGE

Fisher also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence support-
ing his conviction for criminal damage to property. When the suffi-
ciency of the evidence is challenged in a.criminal case, an appellate
court reviews all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State. A conviction will be upheld if the court is convinced that a
rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt based on that evidence. Williams, 299 Kan. 509,
525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014). To the extent Fisher's argument re-
quires us to interpret the language of the criminal damage statute,

BT
a

we examine that question of law de novo. State v. Eddy, 299 Kan.
29, 32, 321 P.3d 12 (2014).

K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5813(a)(1) defines criminal damage to
property as, by means other than fire or explosives, knowingly
causing damage to property “in which another has an interest.”
Fisher specifically argues that insufficient evidence was presented
to establish that Angel had “an interest” in the door he damaged.
He asks this court to interpret “an interest” as used in the statute
to refer to a “property interest,” because otherwise an owner of a
home could be guilty of criminal damage for kicking in his or her
own door as long as another person also had “an interest” in the
door. The State suggests that Angel had a leasehold interest in the
property.

Black’s Law Dictionary 828 (8th ed. 2004) defines “interest” as
“a legal share in something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim
to or right in property.” A “legal interest” is defined as “[a]n interest
recognized by law.” Black's Law Dictionary 829 (8th ed. 2004). A
“leasehold interest” is “[a] lessor’s or lessee’s interest under a lease
contract.” Black’s Law Dictionary 910 (8th ed. 2004).

The Court of Appeals has addressed what constitutes “an inter-
est” in property in this context, holding that a pastor who served as
an administrator and caretaker for a church had “an interest” in it,
that a joint owner could be criminally liable for damage to it, and
that both an individual renting a townhome and the entity owning
it had “an interest” in it. In re D.A., 40 Kan. App. 2d 878, 882-83,
197 P.3d 849 (2008) (pastor); see State v. Wilson, 47 Kan. App. 2d
1,45, 275 P.3d 51 (2008) (joint owner); see also State v. McGowan,
No. 107,147, 2012 WL 3136771 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished
opinion) (individual renting, entity owning).

We have not directly addressed this statute, but recently in State
v. Bollinger, 302 Kan. 309, 313, 352 P.3d 1003 (2015), we consid-
ered what constitutes “an interest” under our arson statute. The
primary distinction between the criminal damage to property pro-
vision and the arson provision is the means by which property is
damaged. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5812, the arson statute, forbids an
individual from knowingly by means of fire or explosives damaging
a dwelling “in which another person has any interest.” (Emphasis
added.)

We held that when the interest is not contested, the State “is not
required to establish exactly what the nature of the ‘any interest’
is, be it a fee simple, a rental, or a tenancy, in order to satisfy the
statutory requirement. [Citation omitted.]” 302 Kan. at 314, But
when “the interest is contested at trial, it may be incumbent upon
the State to establish the nature” of the interest. State v. Boone, 277
Kan. 208, 215, 83 P.3d 195 (2004), abrogated on other grounds as
recognized in State v. De La Torre, 300 Kan. 591, 601, 331 P.3d 815
(2014). In Bollinger, the wife had an interest “derived both from
the legal rights inherent in a marital relationship and the special
circumstances of this case,” including a court order granting her
exclusive possession of the house. 302 Kan. at 315.

Other jurisdictions also have considered what type of interest
another person must have in property in order to sustain a de-
fendant’s conviction for conduct similar to Fisher’s and have de-
termined that either a possessory or a proprietary interest in the
property is sufficient. See State v. Brushwood, 171 $.W.3d 143, 147
(Mo. App. 2005); People v. Kheyfets, 174 Misc. 2d 516, 518, 665
N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. 1997).

In this case, the only evidence. was that Angel lived at the home
containing the damaged door. There was no evidence of a lease or
of her payment of rent. Nevertheless, we hold that Angel had “an
interest” in Tim’s home as one ofits residents. The legislature could
have been more specific had it wanted to limit the reach of K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 21-5813(a)(1). See Com. v. One 1988 Suzuki Samurai,
139 Pa. Commw. 68, 73, 589 A.2d 770 (1991) (possession, exercise
of dominion, control over property elements in determining own-
ership); see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5801 (defining theft as tak-
ing property from “owner”). Until it says differently, we will include
a residential interest such as Angel's among the group covered by
“an interest” in the statute.

CUMULATIVE ERROR

Fisher’s final appellate challenge to his convictions alleges cu-
mulative error.

“Cumulative error, considered collectively, may be so great as to require

reversal of a defendant's conviction. The test is whether the totality of the

circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied him or

her a fair trial. No prejudicial error may be found under the cumulative ex-
ror doctrine if the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming. State v.
Dixon, 289 Kan. 46, 71, 209 P.3d 675 (2009).’ State v. Hart, 297 Kan. 494,
513-14, 301 P.3d 1279 (2013).

“In a cumulative error analysis, an appellate court aggregates all errors and,
even though those errors would individually be considered harmless, analyzes
whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively
they cannot be determined to be harmless.’ State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 205, 262
P3d 314 (2011).

“In making the assessment of whether the cumulative errors are harm-
less error, an appellate court examines the errors in the context of the re-
cord as a whole considering how the district court dealt with the errors as
they arose (including the efficacy, or lack of efficacy, of any remedial ef-
forts); the nature and number of errors committed and their interrelation-
ship, if any; and the strength of the evidence.’ 293 Kan. at 205-06,

“The test is whether the totality of the circumstances substantially prejudiced
the defendant and denied him or her a fair trial.”’ State v. Magallanez, 290 Kan.
906, 926, 235 P.3d 460 (2010).” State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132, 167-68, 340
P.3d 485 (2014).

We have identified three errors: the Doyle violation, the pros-
ecutor’s reference to Fisher's testimony as “bull,” and the failure
to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary
manslaughter. None was reversible standing alone.

Given the evidence against Fisher, particularly including his ad-
mission on the night he beat Angel, the permissible impeachment
of his more exculpatory trial testimony, and the severity of Angel’s
injuries, even when the three errors are considered together un-
der the cumulative error doctrine, they do not necessitate reversal.
Fisher was not entitled to a perfect trial, and he received a fair one.
See State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 286-87, 323 P.3d 829 (2014).

CLASSIFICATION OF PREGUIDELINES CONVICTIONS

Fisher argues his sentence was illegal because of the way in
which the district judge classified his prior convictions. Whether a
sentence is illegal within the meaning of K.S.A. 22-3504 is a ques-
tion of law over which the appellate court has unlimited review.
State v. Taylor, 299 Kan. 5, 8, 319 P.3d 1256 (2014). Appellate
courts “unquestionably may entertain” a defendant's claim on an
illegal sentence for the first time on appeal because,

“Kansas courts have ‘specific statutory jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence at
any time,’ State v. Scherzer, 254 Kan. 926, 930, 869 P.2d 729 (1994) (citing K.S.A.
22.3504; see also State v. Rogers, 297 Kan. 83, 93, 298 P.3d 325 (2013) (‘This court
may correct an illegal sentence sua sponte.’).” State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 975-76,
318 P.3d 987 (2014).

After Fisher had filed his brief before the Court of Appeals, this
court issued its opinion in State v. Murdock, 299 Kan. 312, 323
P.3d 846 (2014), modified by Supreme Court order September 19,
2014, which supported Fisher's claim. Kansas Supreme Court Rule
6.09(b) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 54) allows a party to notify the
court by letter of additional authority “that has come to the party’s
attention after the party’s last brief was filed.” But generally “an
appellate court will not consider new issues raised for the first time
in a party’s Rule 6.09(b) letter,” Littlejohn, 298 Kan. at 659 (let-
ter raised previously unraised argument, not new argument based
on new authority). And the Court of Appeals declined to consider
Fisher's challenge to the legality of his sentence. Because Kansas
courts are empowered to consider a motion to correct an illegal
sentence for the first time on appeal, the panel should have con-
sidered the merits of Fisher's issue. See Kelly, 298 Kan. at 975-76.

All of this being said, this court has since overruled Murdock in
State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 589, 357 P.3d 251 (2015), and Fisher's
illegal sentence claim therefore fails.

SENTENCING BASED ON CRIMINAL HisTORY

Fisher also challenges his sentence under the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, arguing
that the district judge could not use his prior convictions to en-
hance his sentence without ensuring that the existence of those
convictions was proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Fisher
relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct.
2348, 147 L. Ed, 2d 435 (2000). Fisher recognizes that this court
conclusively rejected this argument in State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44,
45-48, 41 P.3d 781 (2002), and includes the issue only to preserve it
for federal review. No further discussion of the issue is warranted.

COC

CONCLUSION

Defendant Matthew T. Fisher has not persuaded this court that
his convictions of attempted second-degree murder and criminal
damage to property were infected by reversible error. Nor was his
sentence illegal. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

eon

ROSEN, J., concurring: I agree with the majority's well-reasoned
conclusions affirming Fisher's conviction and sentence. However, I
disagree with the majority opinion which finds the prosecutor's use
of the expression “bull” was the equivalent of calling Fisher a liar
While the use of that word can certainly be equated to the char-
acterization ascribed by the majority, as used here, the prosecutor
was simply attempting to discredit Fisher's theory of self-defense.
In this context, characterizing evidence as “bull” in my mind is
synonymous with using words such as “hogwash” or “nonsense” or
“ridiculous,” terms which merely point to inconsistency in or un-
believability of a person’s position. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 271
Conn. 218, 267-68, 856 A.2d 917 (2004), where the prosecutor in
closing argument summarized the defendant’s theory and then re-
marked, “Bull.” On appeal, the court found that the prosecutor's
comment related to inferences that the jurors might draw from the,
evidence and were not a critique of the credibility of the defendant
or other witnesses. See also People v. Charles, 58 Mich. App. 371,
388, 227 N.W.2d 348 (1975) (prosecutor's closing argument refer-
ence to defendant's “cock-and-bull” story not improper); State v.
Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 513-14 (Mo. 1995) (prosecutor's charac-
terization of defendant’s theory as “cock-and-bull” story acceptable
comment on believability of defense position). As a result, I would
find the use of the term “bull” as used here was not beyond the
wide latitude allowed in discussing the evidence resulting in error
in this case.

Talso disagree with the majority concluding that the record re-
quires the district court judge to instruct the jury on attempted
voluntary manslaughter. As the majority points out, voluntary man-
slaughter based on imperfect self-defense is “knowingly killing a
human being committed . . . upon an unreasonable but honest

— 8 =~—es

belief that circumstances existed that justified use of deadly force
under K.S.A. 21-5222.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5404(a)(2). Under
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5222(a), “[a] person is justified in the use of
force against another when and to the extent it appears to such per-
son and such person reasonably believes that such use of force is
necessary to defend such person . . . against such other's imminent
use of unlawful force.”

K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3) provides “where there is some ev-
idence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser
included crime . . . the judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime
charged and any such lesser included crime.” Here, Fisher did not
seek an instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter or object
to its omission, and only sparse evidence based on the testimony,
read from a cold record, of a delusional intoxicated defendant is
offered to support it. It bears repeating that the test set forth in
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3) is not a theoretical one. Instead, it
requires the trial judge, who has heard, seen, and evaluated all of
the evidence in the case, to determine whether there is “some evi-
dence which would reasonably justify a conviction” of the lesser
included crime. State v. Haberlein, 296 Kan. 195, 214, 290 P.3d 640
(2012) (Rosen, concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied
134 S. Ct. 148 (2013). What does not bear repeating is any further
explanation of my position as it relates to the inclusion of lesser in-
cluded offenses when little or no actual evidence exists to support
the unrequested or requested instruction. I would simply find on
this record and consistent with my dissenting opinions in State v.
Qualls, 297 Kan. 61, 73, 298 P.3d 311 (2013); Haberlein, 296 Kan.
at 214; State v. Tahah, 293 Kan. 267, 280-81, 262 P.3d 1045 (2011);
and State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 628-29, 186 P.3d 755 (2008); that
the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.

STEGALL, J., joins the foregoing concurring opinion.
vee
BILES, J., concurring: I concur with the majority except as to

the preliminary instruction holding. As explained in State v. Tahah,
302 Kan. 783, 797, 358 P.3d 819 (2015) (Johnson, J. concurring),

I believe giving that instruction was error. Given that, I would ad-
ditionally hold this error was harmless under the applicable stan-
dard both individually and cumulatively with the other errors de-
termined by the majority.

eae

JoxNson, J., dissenting in part: I agree with the majority's iden-
tification of three trial errors, i.¢., “the Doyle violation, the pros-
ecutor’s reference to Fisher’s testimony as ‘bull,’ and the failure
to instruct on the lesser included offense instruction of attempted
voluntary manslaughter.” Slip op. at 28. But I take exception to
part of the majority's analysis on the question of whether the volun-
tary manslaughter lesser included offense instruction was factually
appropriate, and I find an additional error in giving the pretrial
instruction directing the jury to consider matters unrelated to de-
fendant's guilt. Further, I would find that the State did not pres-
ent substantial competent evidence to support the conviction for
criminal damage to property, as the State charged that crime in
Fisher's case.

Beginning with the factual propriety of the voluntary man-
slaughter instruction, I would not apply the product-of-psychosis
exception from State v. Ordway, 261 Kan. 776, 934 P2d 94 (1997),
instead of our more recent—and arguably more logically consis-
tent—test enunciated in State v. Roeder, 300 Kan. 901, 336 P.3d
831 (2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 2316 (2015). As we pointed out
in Roeder, the Ordway court first found that the elements of the
imperfect self-defense manslaughter statute involved in that case
were purely subjective, but then it introduced an objective excep-
tion when it declared that “‘the “unreasonable but honest belief”
necessary to support the “imperfect right to self-defense man-
slaughter” cannot be based upon a psychotic delusion.’ 261 Kan.
at 790.” Roeder, 300 Kan, at 923. We queried “whether Ordway
intended for the constraint on subjectivity to apply to others whose
belief may have been the product of aberrant mental processes,
e.g., brainwashed cult members or religiously indoctrinated terror-
ists.” 300 Kan. at 923.

Nevertheless, we rejected Ordway’s purported purely subjec-

tive interpretation of the imperfect self-defense statutory provi-
sions, opining that

“the purely subjective interpretation does not comport with the statutory language
of K.S.A, 21-3403(b). If the legislature had intended to allow a defendant to make
up his or her own version of the law based upon the defendant's declaration of an
honest belief, the statute could have simply defined the crime as an intentional
Killing of a human being committed upon an unreasonable but honest belief that
circumstances existed that justified deadly force. But the statute adds something;
it requires that the honest belief has to be ‘that cireumstances existed that justified
deadly force under K.S.A. 21-3211, 21-3212 or 21-3213 and amendments thereto.
(Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-3403(b).

“The statutory reference to the perfect defense statutes has to mean something
because we do not interpret statutes in such a manner as to render portions super-
fluous or meaningless. See State v. Van Hoet, 277 Kan. 815, 826-27, 89 P.3d 606
(2004) (‘The court should avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that part of it
becomes surplusage.’). The logical interpretation is that the circumstances which
the defendant honestly believed to exist must have been such as would have sup-
ported a claim of perfect self-defense or defense-of-others, if true. Accord People
v. Enraca, 53 Cal, 4th 735, 761, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 269 P.3d 543 (To make the
observation in In re Christian S. [, 7 Cal. 4th 768, 773 n.1, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 872
P.2d 574 (1994),] more general, not every unreasonable belief will support a claim
of imperfect self-defense but only one that, if reasonable, would support a claim
of perfect self-defense.”), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 225 (2012).” 300 Kan. at 923-24.

Applying that Roeder test here, a lesser included instruction
based upon imperfect self-defense was factually appropriate. If
Fisher's belief—that Angel possessed military hand-to-hand com-
bat skills with which she could kill him when she initiated a physical
attack upon him—had been true, that subjective belief would have
reasonably supported a claim of perfect self-defense. But I agree
with the majority that Fisher has not carried his burden to show
reversal is required under the clearly erroneous standard.

With respect to the preliminary instruction telling the jury that
“‘a mistrial is a tremendous expense and inconvenience to the par-
ties, the Court, and the taxpayers,” I still firmly believe that “the
attempted coercive instruction directs the jurors to consider mat-
ters that are beyond the scope of their role in the criminal justice
system and the instruction statement is not true in all respects.”
State v. Tahah, 302 Kan. 783, 797, 358 P.3d 819 (2015) (Johnson, J.,
concurring). Moreover, even the PIK committee has contradicted
the notion that the jury should be concerned with the money that

269

might be spent in disposing with the case after the trial, to-wit:
“Your only concern in this case is determining if the defendant is
guilty or not guilty. The disposition of the case is a matter for deter-
mination by the Court.” PIK Crim. 4th 50.080.

Which is it, then? Does the jury concern itself only with the guilt
of the defendant and leave the posttrial disposition of the case for
the court to deal with? Or, does the jury concern itself with the tre-
mendous expense and inconvenience to the parties, the Court, and
the taxpayers if there is a mistrial? If the latter, does the jury also
worry about the tremendous expense and inconvenience caused
by a hung jury mistrial that would follow a failure to reach a unani-
mous verdict? If not, how would a jury intuit that it is only a bad
thing to use the taxpayers’ money in the event of a misconduct
mistrial but acceptable for “‘the entire trial process to start over”
when they cannot agree on a verdict? Tahah, 302 Kan. at 798. The
point is that the pretrial instruction injects a risk of misdirecting
the jury, and that risk is unnecessary to accomplish the purpose of
dissuading juror misconduct. I would declare it to be error.

Finally, the principal reason I am writing separately is to chal-
lenge the majority’s declaration that “[a] resident of a house has, as
amatter of law, ‘an interest’ . . . in an interior door of that house suf-
ficient to support another's prosecution for criminal damage to that
door.” 304 Kan. 242, Syl. { 5. The majority's interpretation of the
criminal damage statute to support that proposition suffers from
the construction flaw of isolating a word or phrase, rather than con-
struing the whole provision. See State v. Gonzales, 255 Kan. 243,
249, 874 P.2d 612 (1994) (quoting Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195,
Syl. { 4, 580 P.2d 867 [1978]) (“‘In order to ascertain the legislative
intent, courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated
part or parts of an act but are required to consider and construe
together all parts thereof in pari materia.’”); cf. Samantar v. You-
suf, 560 U.S. 305, 319, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1047 (2010)
(“In sum, ‘[w]e do not . . . construe statutory phrases in isolation;
we read statutes as a whole.’ United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822,
828, 104 S. Ct. 2769, 81 L. Ed. 2d 680 [1984].”).

The majority bases its holding on its interpretation of the iso-
lated phrase: “property in which another has an interest.” But the

whole statutory provision upon which Fisher’s prosecution was
based, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5813(a)(1), says more, to-wit:

“(a) Criminal damage to property is by means other than by fire or explosive:

(1) Knowingly damaging, destroying, defacing or substantially impairing the
use of any property in which another has an interest without the consent of such
other person.” (Emphasis added.)

Consequently, under the plain language of the statute, the State’s
evidence that the defendant knowingly damaged property in which
another has an interest is insufficient to establish the statutory
crime of criminal damage to property, under K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-5813(a)(1). The State must also prove that “such other person”
did not consent to the act.

For example, a homeowner's roofing contractor, hired to re-
place shingles on the homeowner's house, could not be convicted
of criminal damage to property, even though the State could eas-
ily prove that the contractor knowingly damaged “any property in
which another has an interest” when the contractor ripped off the
homeowner’s old shingles. Of course, the contractor's actions do
not constitute the crime of criminal damage to property because
the absence of consent is an essential element of the crime, and the
homeowner's consent to the damaging act as part of the replace-
ment contract negates that element.

As I understand the majority's statutory construction, a non-
owner resident/guest in a house has a legally sufficient interest in
and to any part of that house, so as to qualify as the victim of a
criminal damage to property prosecution under K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-5813(a)(1). But reading the statute as a whole, as we must, re-
veals that the majority's construction of the statute also fails to com-
ply with the “fundamental . . . rule of statutory interpretation that
courts are to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” State v. Frier-
son, 298 Kan. 1005, 1013, 319 P.3d 515 (2014).

As K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5813(a)(1) is written—“property in
which another has an interest without the consent of such other
person”—the same person whose property interest the State is al-
leging has been damaged must be the same person whose consent
to the damaging act the State must refute. (Emphasis added.) Logi-
cally, then, to be a victim of criminal damage to property one must

have an interest in that property sufficient to be able to consent
to someone “[k]nowingly damaging, destroying, defacing or sub-
stantially impairing the use of [that] property.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
5813(a)(1). Otherwise, the absence of consent portion of the stat-
ute is meaningless. See Frierson, 298 Kan. at 1013 (“court pre-
sumes the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaning-
less legislation”).

The resulting absurdity of the majority's statutory interpretation
can be seen in my roofing contractor example above. Under the
majority's holding that a resident of a house has, as a matter of
law, a sufficient interest in a part of the house to support another's
prosecution for criminal damage to property, the State could pros-
ecute the roofing contractor by identifying a foreign exchange stu-
dent living in the homeowner's house as the victim of the crime.
Notwithstanding the homeowner's consenting for the contractor to
damage the roof as a prelude to replacement, the roofer was “with-
out the consent of such other person,” which would have been the
foreign exchange student in this example.

To avoid that absurdity in this case, I would have required the
State to show that Tim, as the sole owner of house, had invested
Angel with a sufficient interest in the interior door so that she could
have consented to Fisher damaging that door. Otherwise, she did
not have a sufficient interest in the property to be the victim of
criminal damage to property under the language of K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 21-5813(a)(1). Such a determination would be a question of
fact, not a matter of law, as the majority asserts. Here, there was
no evidence presented to establish that Angel’s interest in the door
complied with the requirements of K.S.A, 2015 Supp. 21-5813(a)(1),
and I would reverse that conviction.

No. 109,995

Stave OF Kansas, Appellant, v. DONTAE M. PATTERSON,
Appellee.
(371 B3d 893)

Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Matt J. Malo-
ney, assistant district attorney, Mare Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, were on the brief for appellant.

Richard Ney, of Ney, Adams & Shaneyfelt, of Wichita, argued the cause and
was on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

STEGALL, J.: The Wichita Police Department received informa-
tion that a resident of 2720 N. Erie in Wichita, Dontae Patterson,
was selling narcotics. The police obtained and executed a search
warrant that described the place to be searched as “[t]he premises
of 2720 N. Erie, Wichita, Sedgwick County, Kansas.” The warrant
authorized a search for various items at the premises related to
the sale of marijuana including any marijuana, drug paraphernalia,

currency, records of sales, evidence of occupancy or ownership of
the residence, firearms connected with the sale of marijuana, scan-
ners or radios used in the sale, and indicia of gang affiliation or
membership including clothing. The supporting affidavit identified
Patterson’s minor son, D.M.P,, as also residing at that location. The
affidavit indicated that D.M.P. had a juvenile criminal record and
was flagged as a member of a criminal street gang in the Wichita
Police Department’s database.

During the search of the house, officers found various amounts
of marijuana, a white chunl-like residue that field-tested positive
for cocaine, a digital scale, $10,020 in cash, a bag of marijuana seeds,
and a Glock firearm. Officers also searched a Mercedes parked in
the driveway and found a glass container with white crusty residue,
a box of sandwich bags, a digital scale with powdery residue, and a
Taurus handgun. At the time the warrant was executed, Patterson
was inside the house and D.M.P. was sitting in the driver's seat of
the Mercedes. Following the search, Patterson was arrested and
sharged with various crimes including distribution of marijuana,
‘elon in possession of a firearm, possession of cocaine, and posses-
ion of drug paraphernalia.
Patterson filed numerous motions to suppress the evidence ob-
tained during the search, including a motion to suppress the evi-
dence found in the Mercedes. At the suppression hearing, Wichita
Police Officer John Groh testified that as he and other officers ap-
proached the home to execute the warrant, he saw a white Mer-
cedes backed into the driveway and a juvenile male sitting behind
the steering wheel. Groh testified the juvenile was D.M.P. Groh
described the Mercedes as backed up to “within a few feet” of the
house. The car was parked, engine not running, and facing the
street. Following safety protocol, Groh and other officers ordered
D.M.P. out of the car. Officers then secured the home and its oc-
cupants and conducted a concurrent search of both the vehicle and
the residence.

The district court granted Patterson’s motion to suppress the
evidence found in the Mercedes on the grounds that it was not
within the scope of the search warrant and the evidence would not
have inevitably been discovered. The State took a timely interlocu-

ae

tory appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
decision. State v. Patterson, 49 Kan. App. 2d 1001, 319 P.3d 588
(2014). The panel held that the search warrant for the “premises”
authorized the search of any vehicles within the curtilage of the
home, and the Mercedes was within the curtilage. 49 Kan. App. 2d
at 1007-10. We granted Patterson’s petition for review.

ANALYSIS

This appeal presents only one question: Was the search of the
Mercedes authorized by (or within the scope of) the search war-
rant? Patterson argues the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded
the Mercedes was within the curtilage of the residence described
in the search warrant—and that it was therefore outside the scope
of searches authorized by the warrant. The State, unsurprisingly,
argues that the Court of Appeals panel correctly found that the
Mercedes was located within the curtilage and was therefore in-
cluded within the scope of the warrant’s authorized search of the
premises.

Our standard of review in cases such as this is well established:

“An appellate court generally reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to
suppress using a bifurcated standard. The trial court’s findings are first reviewed
to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence.
Appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the wit-
nesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion regarding
the suppression of evidence is then reviewed de novo. If the material facts in a
trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence are not in dispute, the ques-
tion of whether to suppress is a question of law over which an appellate court has
unlimited review. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Martinez, 296 Kan. 482, 485, 293
P.3d 718 (2013).

“On a motion to suppress evidence, the State bears the burden
of proving to the district court the lawfulness of the search and
seizure by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Porting, 281
Kan. 320, 324, 130 P.3d 1173 (2006). Here, material facts are not
in dispute, and we exercise plenary review. See Martinez, 296 Kan.
at 485.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution re-
quires that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

275

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” “The scope
of Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is identical
to that of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.” State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332, 334, 806 P.2d 986 (1991); see
also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-2502(a) (Statute authorizes the issuance
of search warrants “which particularly describes a person, place or
means of conveyance to be searched and things to be seized.”).

“To satisfy the specificity requirement of the constitutions the
search warrant must describe the premises to be searched with suf-
ficient particularity to permit the executing officer to locate the
same from the face of the warrant. [Citations omitted.]” LeFort,
248 Kan. at 334-35; see also Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U.S.
498, 503, 45 8. Ct. 414, 69 L. Ed. 757 (1925) (“Tt is enough if the
description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.”). “The
purpose of this requirement is to prevent general searches and to
prevent the seizure of an item at the discretion of the officer. [Cita-
tions omitted.]” LeFort, 248 Kan. at 337. “If the scope of the search
exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or
the character of the relevant exception from the warrant require-
ment, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more.”
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L.
Ed. 2d 112 (1990).

“[W]arrants and their supporting affidavits are interpreted in a
common sense, rather than a hypertechnical, fashion. To do other-
wise would tend to discourage police officers from submitting their
evidence to a judicial officer before acting.” LeFort, 248 Kan. at
335-36; see K.S.A. 22-2511 (“No search warrant shall be quashed or
evidence suppressed because of technical irregularities not affect-
ing the substantial rights of the accused.”); see also United States
v. Young, 263 Fed. Appx. 710, 713 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished
opinion) (“The scope of a warrant is determined using ‘a standard
of practical accuracy rather than technical precision.””).

Here, the warrant accurately and particularly described the
place to be searched as “[t]he premises of 2720 N. Erie, Wichita,
Sedgwick County, Kansas.” The only question presented is wheth-
er, as a matter of law, this description was broad enough to include

the search of the Mercedes parked in the driveway. As a general
matter, “the term ‘premises’ as used in [a] warrant include[s] all
property necessarily a part of and appearing so inseparable as to
be considered a portion thereof.” State v. McClelland, 215 Kan.
81, 84, 523 P.2d 357 (1974) (citing State v. Caldwell, 20 Ariz. App.
331, 334, 512 P.2d 863 [1973] [“A search of premises, however, may
include all property necessarily a part of the premises and so in-
separable as to constitute a portion thereof.”]). The term premises,
therefore, describes a single unit of ownership—é.e., the whole of
the property.

In State v. Basurto, 15 Kan. App. 2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, aff'd 249
Kan. 584, 821 P.2d 327 (1991), a Court of Appeals case this court
adopted and affirmed, the court was confronted with a warrant that
did not include the term “premises” or a like description of the
entire unit of ownership. The Basurto panel concluded that even
in the absence of a broader description of a unit of ownership, the
description of a residence included its curtilage. See 15 Kan. App.
2d at 266-71. Basurto reasoned that “[w]hile the use of the term
‘premises’ in a search warrant may be desired to avoid arguments
such as the one with which we now deal, it is not required in every
instance. The law is clearly established that a search warrant which
describes a specific residence authorizes a search of the ‘curtilage’
of that residence.” 15 Kan. App. 2d at 271.

“At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the
intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and
the privacies of life,’ . . . and therefore has been considered part
of home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984)
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29
L. Ed. 746 [1886]). Courts have defined curtilage “by reference to
the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may
expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain
private.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. The Court has referenced four
factors for resolving whether a particular area is curtilage:

“[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, [2] whether the

area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the
uses to which the area is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the

277

area from observation by people passing by. [Citation omitted.]” United States o.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1987).

The Court clarified, however, that those factors are not a process
to be “mechanically applied” but “are useful analytical tools only to
the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally rel-
evant consideration—whether the area in question is so intimately
tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's
‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” 480 U.S. at 301.

Therefore, when considering the scope of a warrant describing
a residence only (i.¢., a warrant lacking any broadening language
such as “premises” that would clearly include the entire “proper-
ty” on which the home is situated) it is reasonable for courts to
conclude, as did Basurto, that the scope of such a warrant is co-
terminous with the “umbrella” of the home’s Fourth Amendment
protection. So while the legal definitions and doctrines of curtilage
began as a shield with which individuals could protect themselves
against warrantless searches, numerous jurisdictions including our
own have reasonably used the concept of curtilage as a sword with
which the State can expand the scope of a warrant that only spe-
cifically describes a home to be searched. See, ¢.g., United States
v. Cannon, 264 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A search warrant
for a residence may include all other buildings and other objects
within the curtilage of that residence, even if not specifically refer-
enced in the search warrant.”); United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d
272, 275 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a search warrant specifying only the
residence permits the search of ‘closets, chests, drawers, and con-
tainers’ therein where the object searched for might be found, so
should it permit the search of similar receptacles located in the
outdoor extension of the residence, i.e., the curtilage, such as the
container in this case. To hold otherwise would be an exercise in
pure form over substance.”); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 428
Mass. 871, 873, 705 N.E.2d 1110 (1999) (scope of warrant describ-
ing residence extends to automobiles located within the curtilage);
State v. Woodrome, 407 S.W.3d 702, 708 (Mo. App. 2013) (“[I]fa
dwelling is subject to search, as by a warrant, then the curtilage
may also be searched pursuant to the warrant, even if it is not spe-
cifically mentioned in the warrant”); State v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325,

330-31, 299 N.W.2d 421 (1980) (A search warrant which directs
that a search be made of a specific dwelling house also authorizes
the search of outbuildings included within the curtilage, although
not described specifically.).

Without disturbing the Basurto rule today, we note explicitly
what Basurto implicitly acknowledged—using the doctrine of cur-
tilage to define the outer scope of a search warrant is less than
ideal. Defining curtilage, particularly according to the Dunn fac-
tors, is a complex legal exercise and risks “hypertechnical” warrant
interpretations which, at a minimum, will interfere with the abil-
ity of law enforcement officers to clearly understand the extent of
the warrant. Using the concept of curtilage in such a cross-over
fashion likewise risks unintended consequences in future, yet-to-
be-contemplated cases and factual scenarios. See, ¢.g., Dunn, 480
US. at 313-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that in narrowing
the definition of curtilage, “the Court also narrows the scope of
searches permissible under a warrant authorizing a search of build-
ing premises”).

Fortunately, in Patterson’s case, the issuing magistrate included
terms—specifically the term “premises”—in the warrant itself set-
ting the outer boundary of the warrant'’s scope at the totality of
the unit of property ownership. Applying this kind of “property-
rights baseline” to Fourth Amendment issues has the clear virtue
of keeping “easy cases easy.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. _, 133
S. Ct. 1409, 1417, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013). As such, we conclude
that an analysis of the extent of the curtilage of the home—and
whether the Mercedes was within the curtilage—is unnecessary
in this case because the Mercedes was, without any doubt, on the
premises described in the warrant. See State v. Sprague, 303 Kan.
418, 435, 362 P.3d 828 (2015) (citing McClelland and holding that
a warrant using the term “home” in conjunction with a description
of “areas outside the home” was sufficient to describe the entire
premises and included outbuildings on the property); see also State
v. Ogden, 210 Kan. 510, 518-19, 502 P.2d 654 (1972) (trashcan in
a yard “was properly considered as a part of the ‘premises’ to be
searched”).

Our conclusion that the Mercedes was physically located within
the area described by the warrant does not entirely resolve Pat-
terson’s appeal. Presumptively, all containers within the scope of
a search warrant can themselves be searched without a separate
search warrant specific to that container:

“A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which
the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that
separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. Thus,
a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also pro-
vides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weap-
on might be found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for marihuana would
also authorize the opening of packages found inside. A warrant to search a vehicle
would support a search of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object
of the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its
limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and
containers, in the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered
seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the
interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.” United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L, Ed. 2d 572 (1982).

The State suggests, with significant support, that a vehicle physi-
cally located within the scope of a warrant is simply another one of
the many containers that could hold the evidence being sought. See,
e.g., United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir. 1976)
(“We think that the reference to ‘on the premises known as 3027
Napoleon Avenue’ was sufficient to embrace the vehicle parked in
the driveway on those premises.”); Massey v. Commonwealth, 305
S.W.2d 755, 756 (Ky. 1957) (“it is not more necessary to describe
a car on the premises than it would be to describe any other item
of personal property in which the liquor might be stored”); Com-
monwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. 137, 144-46, 934 N.E.2d 810
(2010) (search warrant encompassed driveway where defendant
parked his vehicle and police were authorized to search); see also
2 LaFave, Search & Seizure, A Treastise on the Fourth Amend-
ment § 4.10(c) Vehicles on or near described premises, pp. 953-58
(5th ed. 2012) (collecting numerous sources allowing searches of
vehicles on the premises).

In response, Patterson cites authority for the proposition that
when containers are mobile and accompanied by reasonable in-

280

dications of innocent ownership, the general rule will not apply.
Patterson points out that the Court has noted “a person’s mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activ-
ity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search
that person.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S. Ct. 338,
62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979). Following this reasoning, the warrant at
issue in Ybarra to search the Aurora Tap Tavern and its bartender
for cocaine did not authorize the search of every customer in the
tavern. 444 U.S. at 91; see also State v. Vandiver, 257 Kan. 53, 63,
891 P.2d 350 (1995) (“For a warrant to authorize a search of all
persons on the premises where the warrant is being executed, the
affidavit must contain facts sufficient for the issuing magistrate to
believe that the premises are confined to ongoing illegal activity
and that every person within the orbit of the search possesses the
items sought by the warrant.”).

Similarly, Patterson suggests, a vehicle is a mobile container
that may have arrived innocently on the premises and may have
no connection with the criminal activity giving rise to the underly-
ing probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant. Pat-
terson’s position is, again, not ‘without support in our caselaw. In
State v. Coker, No. 89,851, 2003 WL 22697577 (Kan. App. 2003)
(unpublished opinion), the defendant had arrived at the residence
described in the search warrant just prior to the search in order to
give a resident a ride. The court concluded that a visitor, and the
visitor's automobile (to which probable cause of illegal activity was
never extended), was not within the scope of the search warrant.
2003 WL 22697577, at *3-4,

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed this issue in
some detail. In United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459, 1461
(Oth Cir. 1990), the court articulated the rule that a vehicle locat-
ed within the physical scope of the warrant is “generally include[d]
...if the objects of the search might be located therein.” Gottschalk
went on, however, to articulate an exception to this general rule:
“[T]he better rule in these circumstances is to define the scope of the warrant to
include those automobiles either actually owned or under the control and domin-
ion of the premises owner or, alternatively, those vehicles which appear, based
on objectively reasonable indicia present at the time of the search, to be so con-

trolled. Thus where the officers act reasonably in assuming that the automobile is
under the control of the premises owner, it is included in the warrant.” 915 F.2d
at 1461.

We are convinced that the Gottschalk test is correct, and we
adopt it. The Court of Appeals panel below likewise applied the
Gottschalk test and concluded that objectively reasonable indicia
present at the time of the search indicated the Mercedes was con-
trolled by Patterson. Patterson, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 1009-10. The
panel emphasized that “[t]he position of the car in the driveway,
the mamner in which it was parked, and its nearness to the house
all suggested that the car belonged to a resident of the household
and not a visitor.” 49 Kan. App. 2d at 1009. Further,

“the only individuals on the property were Patterson, Patterson's son, the young
adult male named in the application for the warrant, and a juvenile under driving
age. As all the individuals in the household of driving age appeared in the applica-
tion and were understood by officers as living at the residence, it was reasonable
to conclude that the Mercedes belonged to the owner or occupier of the prem-

ises—namely, Patterson or another person named in the warrant.” 49 Kan, App.
2d at 1009-10.

Patterson suggests these facts are irrelevant because there was

no evidence Patterson was the owner of the residence. The Tenth
Circuit recently confronted this same argument and clarified the
Gottschalk rule:
“While Gottschalk rejects a broad authority to search any vehicle located within
the curtilage of a premises to be searched—it would, for example, prevent of-
ficers from searching a guest’s vehicle that was incidentally present within the
curtilage at the time of the search, see [915 F.2d] at 1460-61—its holding and ra-
tionale are sufficiently broad to encompass vehicles actually or apparently owned
or controlled by long-term residents who exercise possessory ownership of the
premises.” United States v. Hohn, 606 Fed. Appx. 902, 909 (10th Cir. 2015) (un-
published opinion).

The affidavit affixed and incorporated into the search warrant
stated that Patterson lived at the residence. The panel’s summation
of the objectively reasonable indicia concerning the Mercedes is
supported by the record. The panel correctly noted the location
of the vehicle is itself indicative of a close relationship between
whoever drove the vehicle and the residence. Further, Patterson’s
son, a juvenile who was named in the warrant, was sitting in the

— 4

front seat of the Mercedes when the officers arrived on the scene.
Given these factors—which were reasonably apparent to the of-
ficers at the time of the search—we conclude that the search of
the Mercedes was authorized by the warrant and the incriminating
evidence located therein was lawfully discovered.

The decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of
the district court is affirmed, and the judgment of the district court
is reversed.

No. 110,280

StaTE OF Kansas, Appellant, v. PROMISE DELON REDMOND,
Appellee.
(871 B3d 900)

Opinion

Brett Watson, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jodi Litfin, as-
sistant district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, were on the brief for appellant.

Jeffrey G. Dazey, of Northeast Kansas Conflict Office, argued the cause and.
was on the brief for appellee.

— 4

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Jounson, J.: The State of Kansas appeals the district court’s
dismissal of criminal charges against Promise Delon Redmond for
failing to register as a sex offender, as required by the Kansas Of
fender Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq. The dis-
trict court determined that Redmond had completed his registra-
tion requirements at the time of the alleged crimes because the
2011 amendments to KORA could not be retroactively applied to
Redmond without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution.

Pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c), we transferred the case from
the Court of Appeals and decide it the same day as two related
cases, Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016), and
State v. Buser, 304 Kan. 181, 371 P.3d 886 (2016). Consistent with
our holdings in those companion cases, we determine that KORA’s
statutory scheme after the 2011 amendments was so punitive in
effect as to negate the implied legislative intent to deem it civil, so
that the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes its application to any sex
offender who committed the qualifying crime prior to July 1, 2011.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

On December 13, 2001, Redmond pled no contest to one count
of indecent solicitation of a child 14 to 15 years old, then a severity
level 7, person felony. See K.S.A. 21-3510 (Furse 1995). Redmond
was sentenced to a term of 13 months’ imprisonment, but the dis-
trict court suspended his sentence and placed Redmond on proba-
tion for 24 months. The district court also found that Redmond was
required to register as a sex offender.

Under the 2001 version of KORA, Redmond was required to
register for 10 years “from the date of conviction.” K.S.A. 2001
Supp. 22-4906(a)-(b). Accordingly, prior to the 2011 amendments,
Redmond’s registration term would have expired on December 13,
2011. Under the 2011 amendments, Redmond’s crime of convic-
tion requires registration for 25 years, which would make his term
of registration expire in 2026. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4906(b)(1)(B).

Sl

On November 6, 2012, the State charged Redmond with three
counts of violating KORA. Each count alleged Redmond failed to
report in person: the first failure to report on or about September
1, 2012; the second failure to report on or about March 1, 2012;
and the third failure to report on or about June 1, 2012. All three
dates were outside the original 10-year registration period.

Redmond filed three motions to dismiss, two of which raised
procedural due process issues that are not involved in this appeal.
The motion to dismiss at issue here raised the question of whether
the charges against Redmond violated the constitutional prohibi-
tion against ex post facto laws. The State responded to the motions,
Redmond filed a notice of additional authority, and then the par-
ties requested leave to submit the motion on their briefs. There-
after, the district court granted Redmond’s motion to dismiss on
ex post facto grounds and declared the other motions to be moot.
The State timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, and this court
transferred the appeal.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF KORA 2011 AMENDMENTS

The 2011 version of KORA’ statutory scheme stated that it ap-
plied to any person who was convicted of any sexually violent crime
on or after April 14, 1994. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4902(b) (de-
fining “sex offender”). Indecent solicitation of a child is statutorily
designated as a “sexually violent crime.” K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-
4902(c)(6). Accordingly, Redmond’s 2001 conviction purportedly
made him subject to the additional and enhanced provisions of the
2011 statutory scheme, including the increased time period from
10 years to 25 years for first-time offenders.

But legislative acts must comport with our federal and state con-
stitutions, and Article I, § 10, of the United States Constitution
provides, in relevant part, that “[n]Jo State shall .. . pass any . . . ex
post facto Law.” One category of ex post facto laws is “‘“any statute
. .. which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime,
after its commission.”’” State v. Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 277, 323 P.3d
829 (2014) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S. Ct.
68, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 [1925]). Yet, “[t]he constitutional prohibition
on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes.” State v. Myers,

’ Eo i

260 Kan. 669, 677, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996). So the question becomes
whether KORA is punitive.

The district court determined that the amended statutory
scheme was “uniquely punitive” for Redmond and that the sub-
sequently added burdens placed upon Redmond for a previously
committed crime violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Standard of Review

The district court relied on constitutional grounds to find that
the 2011 version of KORA could not be applied to Redmond.
“When the application of a statute is challenged on constitutional
grounds, this court exercises an unlimited, de novo standard of re-
view. State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 676, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996).”
State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 768, 187 P.3d 1283 (2008).

Analysis

In reaching its decision, the district court applied the analytical
framework from this court’s prior decision in Myers and the United
States Supreme Court's prior decision in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S.
84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003). That framework is
referred to as an “intent-effects” test. See, e.g., Moore v. Avoyelles
Correctional Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 2001).

Under the intent-effects test, a court must first determine legis-
lative intent. “If the intention of the legislature was to impose pun-
ishment, that ends the inquiry.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. The statute
is penal and cannot be applied retroactively.

But if the legislature’s intention was to enact “a regulatory
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive,” the court must then “exam-
ine whether the statutory scheme is “‘so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem it “civil.”’”
Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
361, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 [1997]). For the effects
part of the test, the court utilizes the factors identified in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 544, 9 L. Ed.
2d 644 (1963) (Mendoza-Martinez factors), as “useful guideposts.”
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.

In determining legislative intent, the district court first noted

that KORA does not contain an expressed statement of purpose.
The district court then looked to Myers, which had held that the
legislative history of the 1994 Kansas Sex Offender Registration Act
(KSORA) suggested that the act served the nonpunitive purpose of
public safety. 260 Kan. at 681. The district court then determined
that the Kansas Legislature also “likely meant” to enact KORA as a
“civil, regulatory scheme,” and proceeded to the “effects” portion
of the test. In Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. at 316-17, we observed
that we had not been pointed to any subsequent legislative history
for KORA that would contradict Myers’ determination of the non-
punitive legislative intent for KSORA. In like fashion, we affirm the
listrict court's holding below that the legislative intent of KORA
was nonpunitive.

For the “effects” analysis, the district court was guided by the
Mendoza-Martinez factors, which it recited from Myers, as follows:
“‘[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2]
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, [3] whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the be-
havior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” Myers, 260 Kan. at 681.

With respect to the first factor, the district court opined that
the in-person reporting requirements and the registration fees as-
sessed subjected KORA registrants to an affirmative disability or
restraint. The court pointed out that a person who lives, works, and
attends school in different counties would have to report in person
12 times a year, which resembled parole or probation. The court
found the reporting requirements imposed upon an offender’s
time and served as a physical restraint. Further, the court noted
that the registration fees were a substantial cost to the registrant,
adding up to between $2,000 and $6,000 over the course of the
unalterable 25-year registration period. Moreover, that cost would
be particularly burdensome if the offender suffered employment
difficulties because of the notification provisions of KORA. The
district court also pointed to other states which had found similar

= ssi

statutory schemes to work an affirmative disability or restraint on
the offender.

With respect to the historical nature of the punishment, the dis-
trict court found persuasive the analogy to the colonial punishment
of shaming made by the Indiana court in Gonzales v. State, 980
N.E.2d 312, 318-19 (Ind. 2013). The district court also noted that
Myers had quoted from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Let-
ter, indicating the historical aspect of treating public notification as
punishment.

For the rest of the factors, the district court did not make a de-
tailed recitation on the record, referring on occasion to the defen-
dant’s arguments. With respect to excessiveness, the district court
appeared to find that the added requirements were particularly ex-
cessive and punitive when applied to Redmond.

What the district court did not clarify is that we are applying
a federal constitutional provision, so that Kansas state courts are
duty-bound to follow the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court when interpreting the United States Constitution. See, e.g.,
Trinkle v. Hand, 184 Kan. 577, 579, 337 P.2d 665, cert. denied 361
U.S. 846 (1959) (Under Article VI of the United States Constitu-
tion, “the interpretation placed on the Constitution and laws of the
United States by the decisions of the supreme court of the United
States is controlling upon state courts and must be followed.”).

Smith considered an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to the Alas-
ka Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA), utilizing the intent-
effects test. The Court found the intent of the Alaska Legislature
was to enact a civil and nonpunitive law. Then, applying five of the
Mendoza-Martinez factors, Smith determined that the offenders
had failed to show “that the effects of the law negate Alaska’s inten-
tion to establish a civil regulatory scheme,” so that the act was non-
punitive and its retroactive application did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 538 U.S. at 105-06. Accordingly, for us to find KORA
punitive, we must find it factually distinct from ASORA.

In Thompson, which is filed this same date, we listed the sig-
nificant differences between the 2011 KORA and the ASORA re-
viewed in Smith, some of which were mentioned by the district
court. Those differences included the following: KORA applies

CC

to a broader group of offenders; KORA requires frequent in-per-
son reporting regardless of whether registration information has
changed since the last reporting; KORA requires a longer registra-
tion period for some first-time offenders; KORA requires addition-
al registration information; KORA requires changed information
to be reported in person within 3 days; KORA requires additional
information to be disseminated to the public; KORA imposes po-
tentially costly registration fees; KORA requires advance notice for
travel outside the United States; KORA requires annual driver's
license renewal and offenders subject to KORA must have a distin-
guishing number on their licenses; parents subject to KORA must
disclose that status in any proceeding determining child custody,
residency, and parenting time; and KORA imposes severe, person
felony sanctions for violating any KORA provision. Thompson, 304
Kan. at 317-20.

Then, we reviewed the factually distinct KORA, as amended
in 2011, in light of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, in the manner
employed by Smith, albeit with a different end result. We first de-
termined that the statutory scheme resembled traditional forms
of punishment by being akin to public shaming and by replicating
the circumstance of being on probation or parole. Thompson, 304
Kan. at 322. The latter circumstance also imposed an affirmative
disability or restraint on the offender, as did the difficulties in ob-
taining employment and housing caused by KORA. Moreover, the
financial obligations were punitive in effect, when viewed from an
offender's perspective. 304 Kan. at 324, Next, we determined that
the current KORA had a deterrent effect and was retributive in
character, before opining that KORA was not rationally connected
to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety. In other words, the
statutory scheme is excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose.
304 Kan. at 327-28. Consequently, we determined that the 2011
version of KORA is punitive in effect and that the amended statu-
tory scheme cannot be applied retroactively to any sex offender
who committed the qualifying crime prior to July 1, 2011. 304 Kan.
at 328.

Applying Thompson’s holding to the facts before us, we find that
Redmond’s 10-year registration period could not be retroactively
increased to 25 years; that Redmond had completed his registra-

tion requirements under the law in effect when he committed his
crime by the dates of his alleged failure to report; and that, without
a statutory duty to report, Redmond could not be prosecuted for
failing to report. Consequently, the district court’s dismissal of the
charges against Redmond is affirmed.

Affirmed.

MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned

aes

Bigs, J., dissenting: I dissent from the majority's decision in
this case for the reasons more fully stated in my dissent in Doe
v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016). As explained
there, I believe the majority asks and answers the wrong ques-
tion. Whether the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) as
amended in 2011 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution is entirely a federal question. We should apply
the abundant federal caselaw where possible to inform the analysis.
The majority's approach disregards that caselaw.

As explained in my Thompson dissent, the applicable federal
caselaw considers similar burdens under other offender registra-
tion schemes. It compels me to conclude that the 2011 KORA
amendments do not violate the federal Ex Post Facto Clause and
the United States Supreme Court would so hold. Accordingly, I
must dissent.

Nuss, C.J.;and Luckert, J., join in the foregoing dissent.

291

No. 110,318

Joun Dog, Appellee, v. Kink THompsoNn, DIRECTOR OF THE
Kansas BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and FRANK DENNING,
Jounson County, Kansas, SHERIFF, Appellants.

(373 P.3d 750)

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filed Ap: m

Christopher M. Grunewald, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and
Ward E. Loyd, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general,
were with him on the briefs for appellant Kirk Thompson, and Kirk T. Ridgway,
of Ferree, Bunn, Rundberg, Radom & Ridgway, Chartered, of Overland Park, was
with him on the briefs for appellant Frank Denning.

Christopher M. Joseph, of Joseph Hollander & Craft, LLC, of Topeka, argued
the cause, and Carrie E. Parker, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for
appellee.

James R. Shetlar, of Overland Park, was on the brief for amicus curiae The
National Center for Victims of Crime.

Jessica R. Kunen, of Lawrence, was on the brief for amicus curiae American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Kansas.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JoxNson, J.: Plaintiff, proceeding under the pseudonym John
Doe, filed a declaratory judgment action against agents of the
State, claiming that retroactive application of the 2011 amend-
ments to the Kansas Offender Registration Act, K.S.A. 22-4901 et
seq. (KORA), violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 10 of
the United States Constitution (hereafter, Ex Post Facto Clause).
The district court granted summary judgment in Doe’s favor, find-
ing that while-the legislature intended KORA to be a civil statu-
tory scheme, the act was punitive in effect pursuant to the factors
identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69,
83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963) (Mendoza-Martinez factors).
Consequently, the district court concluded that, because KORA‘s
retroactive application assigned a new punitive measure to a crime
already consummated, it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.

The State appealed the district court’s judgment, arguing that
the district court erred by (1) refusing to strike inadmissible evi-
dence submitted in support of Doe’s motion for summary judg-
ment; (2) taking judicial notice of certain journal articles; and (3)
concluding that the KORA amendments violated the Ex Post Facto

Clause. In addition, the State complains about the district court’s
order granting Doe leave to proceed with a pseudonym. We affirm
the district court’s result.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

In 2003, after being charged with inappropriately touching or
fondling a 14- or 15-year-old child, Doe pled guilty to and was con-
victed of one count of indecent liberties with a minor, in violation
of K.S.A. 21-3503(a)(1) (Furse 1995). In April 2003, he received
a controlling prison term of 32 months, but the prison portion of
his sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for 36
months. It appears that probation was Doe’s presumptive sentence.
Doe successfully completed his probation in April 2006.

At the time of his conviction, KORA required Doe to register
with both the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) and the John-
son County Sheriff's Office for a period of 10 years from the date
of his conviction, given that he was not incarcerated. K.S.A. 2002
Supp. 22-4906(a). Doe submitted his initial registration forms fol-
lowing his April 2003 sentencing and thereafter complied with the
KORA registration and reporting requirements.

Information from the registration form, such as the offender’s
name, age, address, gender, race, and photograph, is available for
public access on the Johnson County Sheriff's website, which al-
lows the public to search for offenders by name or geographical
location. In addition, the website contains a “share and bookmark”
feature that allows users to share registry information via email and
other Internet information sharing resources.

The KBI’s website provides even more information for public
access, including such additional information as the offender's
hair and eye color, the dates of offense and conviction, the county
of conviction, and the age of the victim. It also allows the pub-
lic to search for an offender by name and geographical location.
The public can also learn if a phone number, email, or Facebook
identity belongs to an offender. Finally, the KBI website provides a
community notification system that allows an individual to be noti-
fied by email when a registered offender registers a home, work,

294

or school address that is near an address of interest to the notified
individual.

Before Doe was scheduled to complete his reporting require-
ments, on June 15, 2011, the KBI sent a letter to all registered
offenders, including Doe, detailing recent legislative amendments
to KORA that were to become effective on July 1, 2011. The let-
ter advised Doe that the amendments were retroactive and would
apply to all offenders regardless of when their underlying offenses
occurred. Particularly germane to Doe was the notification that his
period of registration had been extended from 10 years to 25 years
after conviction, i.e., Doe’s KORA completion date was changed
from the year 2013 to the year 2028. :

In response, Doe filed a petition for declaratory judgment
against KBI director Kirk Thompson and Johnson County Sheriff
Frank Denning (hereafter collectively referred to as “the State”).
Doe sought a judicial determination that the retroactive applica-
tion of the 2011 KORA amendments, particularly the extension of
the registration period, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by ef-
fecting an after-the-fact increase in punishment for a previously
committed crime. Doe sought, and was granted, leave to proceed
with his lawsuit using a pseudonym in order to protect his identity,
his family members’ identities, and the identity of the victim in the
underlying criminal case.

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. To his mo-
tion, Doe attached affidavits and journal articles. The affidavits
described how the registration requirements had adversely im-
pacted Doe and his family. The journal articles provided general
discussions of the difficulties that sex offenders encounter due to
the registration requirements, together with social science find-
ings regarding the impact that registration laws have on recidivism.
The State filed a motion to strike specific portions of the affida-
vits, claiming that they were “replete with testimony unsupported
by specific material facts or personal knowledge or both; inadmis-
sible hearsay testimony”; and contained lay opinion testimony that
lacked proper foundation. In addition, the State contended that
Doe’s motion for summary judgment “inappropriately attempts to
use general law journal articles and other publications in lieu of
testimony to establish certain facts.”

295

The district court denied the defendants’ motion to strike and
granted Doe’s motion for summary judgment. As will be discussed
in more detail below, the district court found that the 2011 amend-
ments to KORA imposed additional burdens upon KORA regis-
trants so as to render the act punitive in effect. Specifically, the
district court concluded that “KORA‘s current provisions subject
Mr. Doe to punishment under any definition,” and, therefore, the
retroactive application of those punitive provisions to a previously
committed crime violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district
court entered judgment requiring defendants to immediately ter-
minate Doe’s additional 15-year registration requirement and de-
lete all KORA information that was being publicly displayed.

The State filed a timely appeal, invoking this court's jurisdiction
pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101(b), which provides that “[aln appeal
from a final judgment of a district court in any civil action in which
a statute of this state or of the United States has been held uncon-
stitutional shall be taken directly to the supreme court.”

DENIAL OF STATE’S MOTION TO STRIKE MATERIAL FROM
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The State argues that the district court erred in failing to strike
certain evidence that Doe submitted in support of his motion for
summary judgment. Specifically, the State complains about: (1)
testimony contained in the affidavits that was not based on personal
knowledge; (2) inadmissible hearsay evidence contained within the
affidavits; and (3) purported “legislative facts” contained in journal
articles, which forms the basis of the second issue discussed below.
The State contends that the error was unfairly prejudicial because
several of the objectionable affidavit statements “were recited by
the district court as uncontroverted material facts.” Doe claims that
the State’s argument is a “straw man,” because the statements were
not relied upon by the district court in deciding the summary judg-
ment motion.

Standard of Review

‘The State challenges the legal basis upon which the district court
considered the affidavits and journal articles in conjunction with

296

Doe’s summary judgment motion. We exercise de novo review over
a challenge to the legal adequacy of the district court’s decision to
admit or exclude evidence. See State v. Holman, 295 Kan. 116, Syl.
{ 6, 284 P.3d 251 (2012).

To the extent that we are called upon to interpret our judicial
notice statute, K.S.A. 60-409, we conduct a de novo review. See
Jeanes v. Bank of America, 296 Kan. 870, 873, 295 P.3d 1045 (2013)
(statutory interpretation a legal question subject to de novo review).

Analysis

We begin with the State’s challenges to the affidavits of John
Doe and his wife, Jane Doe. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-256(e)(1), the
statutory provision governing motions for summary judgment, con-
tains a specific provision addressing affidavits or declarations that
are submitted in support of, or opposition to, a summary judgment
motion, to-wit:

“A supporting or opposing affidavit or declaration must be made on personal
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the
affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. If a paper or part
of a paper is referred to in an affidavit or declaration, a swom or certified copy
must be attached to or served with the affidavit or declaration. The court may
permit an affidavit or declaration to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories or additional affidavits or declarations.”

Affidavits submitted in support of, or in opposition to, a summa-
ry judgment motion must set forth evidence in a form that would
be admissible at trial. Estate of Belden v. Brown County, 46 Kan.
App. 2d 247, 285-86, 261 P.3d 943 (2011). Moreover, Kansas Su-
preme Court Rule 141(d) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 258) provides
that a “party may object that the material cited to support or dis-
pute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible
in evidence.”

Although the State’s motion to strike objected to 33 of the 44
paragraphs contained in Doe’s affidavit and 15 of the 19 paragraphs
contained in Jane Doe’s affidavit, the State’s brief in this appeal
narrowed the focus of their objections to 12 paragraphs in Doe's
affidavit and 6 paragraphs in Jane Doe's affidavit. The challenged
paragraphs deal generally with how the registration has impacted

297

the Does’ children, Doe’s employment and housing, Doe’s access
to school activities, and Doe’s access to a hospital visitation.

With respect to the Does’ children, the affidavits stated that
other parents had instructed their children not to associate with
the Doe family; that the Doe children had been teased at school
and had come home crying because their classmates had called
Doe a “bad man,” a “pervert,” or a “pedophile”; that the children
were only repeating what they heard their parents say; and that the
parents knew nothing about Doe except what could be reviewed
on the offender registry. The State complains that the Does were
not personally present to hear what the other children had said or
what they had heard from their parents, and that the Does could
not personally know whether the other children’s parents had ac-
cessed the registry or had obtained their knowledge from some
other source.

The State’s assertion that the affiants lacked personal knowledge
has some merit with respect to the speculation about what the
schoolmates’ parents told them or that the parents obtained their
knowledge of Doe by accessing the registry. But the Does observed
first-hand the trauma their children had experienced and personal-
ly heard the children explain that the source of that mental anguish
was teasing and name-calling by their schoolmates. To the extent
the State is arguing hearsay, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-460(1) recog-
nizes an exception for statements of physical or mental condition,
including the declarant'’s existing state of mind or emotion, when
the mental condition is in issue or is relevant to prove or explain the
acts or conduct of the declarant. See State v. Hobson, 234 Kan. 133,
154, 671 P.2d 1365 (1983). The Doe children’s statements about
what their schoolmates said and did was certainly relevant to ex-
plain why they came home from school crying.

With respect to his employment, Doe's affidavit stated that he
had continued to work for a corporation throughout his prosecu-
tion and even after his conviction, but that he “was terminated once
[his] presence on the Offender Registry was brought to the atten-
tion of [his] employer.” Doe asserted that someone had told his
manager that he was listed as a sex offender, whereupon the man-
ager terminated Doe and had him escorted from the building. Doe

related that the manager had said that other employees working
for the company had felony convictions, but that Doe’s listing on
the registry would expose the company to public relations liabilities
and issues related to employees’ concerns for workplace safety.

Doe also testified about his attempts to find employment com-
mensurate with his education, skills, and abilities. He said prospec-
tive employers always rejected him as soon as he disclosed his reg-
istration status. Some even told him to come back when he was “off
the list.”

The State’s brief makes the somewhat confusing argument that
Doe had “provided no basis to testify to the truth about [his] for-
mer manager's thoughts about Doe’s registration status,” for exam-
ple, that there were corporate concerns about liabilities or that a
coworker had found Doe on the registry and told the former man-
ager. But, of course, Doe’s basis for testifying about what his former
manager said was that the manager was saying those things directly
to Doe, while firing him. Moreover, whether the manager was be-
ing totally truthful in all that he said to Doe is not really the point.
Rather, what is germane is that the manager told Doe that he was
fired because his name was on the registry.

Again, although not argued by the parties, it appears that the
manager's statement can be admitted under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-
460(1) to explain the manager's state-of-mind, i.¢., the reason he
undertook the action at issue, even if it cannot be used to prove
that Doe was actually listed on the registry or that there was actu-
ally a corporate concern about liabilities. See Monroe v. Board of
Ed. of Town of Wolcott, Connecticut, 65 F.R.D. 641, 649 (D. Conn.
1975) (school principal's affidavit recitation based on what he heard
the school board say were reasons for expelling a student fit hearsay
exception for declarations of present existing motive or reason for
action).

Perhaps Doe might have obtained an affidavit directly from the
manager and avoided the State’s hearsay challenge. But we re-
cently opined that “[a] statement contemporaneously describing a
declarant’s belief or intention is inherently more trustworthy than
a statement made after the fact, when incentives to embellish or
fabricate may have arisen.” State v. Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 131, 262

P.3d 285 (2011). Moreover, even if the manager's statement of the
reason for firing Doe was not admissible, it would be reasonable to
infer that the reason was the registry, given the timing and abrupt-
ness of the termination.

With respect to housing, Doe’s affidavit described his attempts
to rent a place to live. Even though his rental applications reflected
prior military service, an excellent credit history, and sufficient in-
come to support the monthly rent, landlords repeatedly refused to
rent to Doe. The landlords related to Doe that they had no prob-
lem with the registration per se but that the map on the website
showing where sex offenders live was a problem because it would
cause current tenants to leave and potential tenants to avoid the
area.

In its brief, the State makes no separate argument as to why this
statement should be struck, other than to refer back to its compre-
hensive presentation to the district court, which included tables
specifying specific objections to each paragraph. But Doe could
certainly testify that, after he began disclosing that he was listed
on the sex offender registry, he was repeatedly denied housing.
Then it would be a reasonable inference to draw that a website
map showing the location of registered sex offenders would be an
impediment to a registrant obtaining an apartment.

The only other affidavit paragraph that drew a specific argument
from the State on appeal concerned Doe being denied admittance
to visit neighbors at a hospital. The affidavit related that at the en-
trance, a security guard swiped Doe’s driver's license but then ad-
vised him that the hospital could not accommodate his visit and
that he had to leave. The affidavit added the declaration: “I was
only barred from entering because I was listed on the Offender
Registry, not because of my crime.” The State argues that “Doe's
testimony about the truth of whether a hospital barred his entry
solely because of his registration status and not his crime is not
founded on personal knowledge of the hospital's policies or instruc-
tions to its guards.”

The State’s concern about whether the guard’s actions were
based upon hospital policy or instructions misses the point. As will
be discussed later, Doe’s status as a registrant was identified on his

driver's license. Doe could certainly testify that he attempted to
enter the hospital, but when he presented his sex offender driver's
license, he was denied admittance. The district court could con-
sider that testimony and infer that admittance was denied based
upon the registry identification on the swiped license.
Nevertheless, to the extent the affidavits contain inadmissible
evidence, a remand to the district court is unnecessary. The princi-
pal issue before us is whether the district court’s summary grant of
plaintiff's declaratory judgment was erroneous, as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we will conduct a de novo review and can disregard
any information that was improperly contained within the affida-
vits.
Judicial Notice of Journal Articles

The State next complains that the district court twice erred in its’
handling of the 16 journal articles attached as appendices to Doe’s
motion for summary judgment. First, it contends that the district
court was wrong in ruling that the Kansas judicial notice statute
does not apply to “legislative facts.” Then, the district court com-
pounded the error by actually taking judicial notice of the journal
articles to support its determination that KORA violates ex post
facto.

While Doe did not cite to the articles in his statement of un-
controverted facts, he used them to supply the factual premise for
some of his legal arguments. For example, Doe referenced the
journal articles to support his arguments that offender registra-
tion and notification requirements create adverse collateral con-
sequences for registered sex offenders, ¢.g., that registered sex
offenders face employment difficulties, challenges to obtain hous-
ing, and social stigmatization. He cited to other journal articles in
support of the argument that such difficulties can increase a sex
offender's recidivism rate; that the offense-based tier system of
determining registration lengths was not reasonably related to the
danger of recidivism; and that “[c]ontemporary studies overwhelm-
ingly indicate that registration and notification laws do not reduce
sex crime recidivism rates.”

Standard of Review

The resolution of this issue will depend on the applicability of
our judicial notice statute, K.S.A. 60-409. That presents a question
of law subject to de novo review. Jeanes, 296 Kan. at 873.

Analysis

The State’s motion to strike the journal articles asserted that Doe
was inappropriately using the law journal articles and other publi-
cations as a substitute for the competent and admissible testimony
needed to establish the material facts upon which his arguments
relied. The State also argued that Doe’s legal argument impermis-
sibly relied on contentions of fact not contained in his statement of
uncontroverted facts, in violation of Kansas Supreme Court Rule
141(a)(1). In response, Doe argued that the journal articles were
not offered to prove adjudicative facts, but instead were relevant
to establish legislative facts, to which the rules of evidence do not
apply.

In denying the State’s motion to strike, the district court con-
cluded that the journal articles containing results of social science
research studies were admissible as legislative facts. Accordingly,

the district court opined that “[b
facts, the judicial notice statutes
take judicial notice of the studies

lecause the studies are legislative
do not apply, and the Court may
when ruling on the parties’ sum-

mary judgment motions.” In its memorandum decision and order,
the district court placed some reliance upon the social science re-
search contained within certain journal articles. ‘

On appeal, the State argues that Kansas’ judicial notice statute,
unlike federal law, makes no distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts, and that judicial notice of the social science evi-
lence relied upon by the district court was not statutorily autho-
rized. In addition, the State contends that the journal articles did
not contain legislative facts; that the articles did not support the
definitive conclusions reached by the district court; and that Doe
was required to have an expert witness to authenticate, explain,
validate, or adopt the conclusions upon which the district court
relied. Doe counters that the journal articles do constitute legisla-
tive facts to which K.S.A. 60-409 is inapplicable and that both the

302

United States Supreme Court and the Kansas Supreme Court have
been taking judicial notice of legislative facts for years without any
regard to evidentiary rules, such as evidence admissibility. Never-
theless, Doe suggests that we can hold that the 2011 amendments

to KORA are punitive, in vi
without relying on the legisla’

Doe’s argument that appel
islative facts” to support a hol

iolation of the Ex Post Facto Clause,
itive facts at issue here.

late courts have selectively used “leg-
ding is not entirely without merit. For

instance, in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155

L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003), which
United States Supreme Cou

high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their

dangerousness as a class.” T]

recidivism posed by sex offenders as “ ‘frightening and high.’” 538
US. at 103 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34, 122 S. Ct.
2017, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47 [2002)]). It gives one pause to think that the

“legislative facts” frequently

tion laws might not be completely accurate, if Doe’s journal articles

are to be believed. Neverthe!

judicial notice statute applied to Doe’s appended journal articles,

and we find that it does.
K.S.A. 60-409 specifically

be judicially noticed. For example, the statute provides that judi-
cial notice shall be taken of common law, constitutions, and public

will be discussed in detail below, the
rt refers to “grave concerns over the

he high Court even labels the risk of

used to justify sex offender registra-

less, the question here is whether our

lists the type of facts that must or may

statutes, as well as “specific

knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot reason-

ably be the subject of disput
statute provides that judicial

are so generally known or of such common notoriety within the

territorial jurisdiction of the
the subject of dispute,” and “

acts and propositions of generalized

‘e.” K.S.A. 60-409(a). In addition, the
notice may be taken of “such facts as

court that they cannot reasonably be
specific facts and propositions of gen-

eralized knowledge which are capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable
accuracy.” K.S.A. 60-409(b)(3) and (4).

A major impediment to Doe’s argument is the statutory lan-
guage. Unlike the federal rule of evidence, K.S.A. 60-409 does
not explicitly limit its application to “adjudicative facts.” Cf. Fed.

303

R. Evid. 201(a) (“This rule governs judicial notice of an adjudica-
tive fact only, not a legislative fact.”). Ordinarily, “[w]hen a statute
is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not specu-
late about the legislative intent behind that clear language, and it
should refrain from reading something into the statute that is not
readily found in its words.” Bussman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America,
298 Kan. 700, 725, 317 P.3d 70 (2014).

Perhaps more importantly, our statute appears to govern the
types of facts which would fall within the category of “legislative
facts.” For example, K.S.A. 60-409(a) specifically provides that ju-
dicial notice shall be taken of laws, constitutions, and statutes. In
contrast, the language of Fed. R. Evid. 201 does not mention stat-
utes, laws, or regulations because the federal provision expressly
excludes legislative facts, and “[s]tatutes are considered legislative
facts” of which the authority of courts to take judicial notice is “un-
questionable.” United States v. Williams, 442. F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th
Cir, 2006). Additionally, K.S.A. 60-409(a) provides that judicial no-
tice shall be taken of “specific facts and propositions of generalized
knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot reasonably
be the subject of dispute.” (Emphasis added.) This, too, appears to
be encompassed by the definition of “legislative facts.” See United
States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir. 1976) (defining legisla-
tive facts as “established truths, facts or pronouncements that do
not change from case to case but apply universally”).

Accordingly, even if the district court was correct in determining
that the information in the journal articles constituted legislative
facts, it nevertheless erred in finding that K.S.A. 60-409 did not
apply. If a Kansas court is to take judicial notice of a fact—either
adjudicative or legislative—it must do so in conformity with our
judicial notice statutes.

Here, it appears that if the journal articles reporting social sci-
ence findings fall within any statutory category it would be the pro-
vision for “specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge
which are capable of immediate and accurate determination by re-
sort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.” K.S.A.
60-409(b)(4); see also K.S.A. 60-410 (provisions relating to deter-
mination as to propriety of taking judicial notice). But the district

304

court found K.S.A. 60-409(b) inapplicable, and, consequently, it
did not consider whether the articles upon which it relied were
“sources of indisputable accuracy.”

The State contends that the articles are not indisputably accu-
rate because the subjects of recidivism and the measure of the ben-
efits of public notification laws generally are not closed subjects.
Instead, the State argues, the submitted articles are simply “recent
scholarship on a debated subject.” We agree. While it does appear
that there is an evolution of knowledge and opinion taking place
with respect to sex offender recidivism and the effects of public no-
tification laws, the articles appended by Doe to his summary judg-
ment motion could not be deemed to be the definitive final word
on the topic, i.e., were not sources of indisputable accuracy.

But, again, we need not remand to the district court. We can
simply conduct our de novo review without reference to the ap-
pended articles.

USE OF A PSEUDONYM

Before proceeding to the principal issue before us, we pause
briefly to address the State’s complaint that the district court should
not have permitted Doe to proceed under a pseudonym.

Standard of Review

Both parties agree that an abuse of discretion standard of review

applies when considering a district court's decision to allow an ac-
tion to proceed anonymously. See Unwitting Victim v. C.S., 273
Kan. 937, 944, 47 P.3d 392 (2002). Our familiar abuse of discretion
standard is stated as follows:
“Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unrea-
sonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the
trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.¢., if the discretion is guided by an
erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.¢., if substantial
competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite
conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.’ State v. Ward, 292 Kan.
541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S, Ct. 1594 (2012).” State v. Nel-
son, 296 Kan. 692, 694, 294 P.3d 323 (2013).

tS:

Analysis

This court has expressly held that “[a]lthough anonymous or
pseudonymous litigation is an atypical procedure, where an impor-
tant privacy interest outweighs the public interest in the identity
of the plaintiff, the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed anony-
mously.” Unwitting Victim, 273 Kan. at 944. The Unwitting Victim
court balanced the plaintiff's claimed right to privacy against the
public interest militating against pseudonymity, utilizing nine fac-
tors: (1) The extent to which the identity of the litigant has been
kept confidential; (2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared
or sought to be avoided and the substantiality of these bases; (3)
the magnitude of public interest in maintaining the confidentiality
of the litigant’s identity; (4) whether, because of the purely legal
nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically
weak public interest in knowing the litigant’s identities; (5) the un-
desirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and
attributable to his or her refusal to pursue the case at the price
of being publicly identified; (6) whether the party seeking to sue
pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives; (7) the universal
level of public interest in access to the identities of the litigants; (8)
whether the litigant is a public figure; and (9) whether opposition
to the pseudonym is illegitimately motivated. 273 Kan. at 947-48.

As the State acknowledges, the district court utilized the nine
factors to conduct a balancing test, comparing the public’s interests
versus Doe’s privacy rights. In other words, the district court used
the correct legal standard.

The State does not point us to any place in the district court’s
careful consideration of the factors where the judge was arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable. We have carefully reviewed the court's
rulings on each of the factors and cannot discern anything that was
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. The State has failed to estab-
lish that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted
by the trial court. To the contrary, the State has offered no rational
explanation as to why the public's safety would be better protected
by disclosing the identity of an individual challenging KORA on
purely legal grounds as essentially a class representative. Rather,
its complaint appears to be simply that the court did not assess the

evidence in a manner that would yield the State’s desired result.
This was not a case of an abuse of discretion, but rather the exercise
of learned discretion.

Finally, the State’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
are unavailing. The district court had evidence to support its find-
ings. We decline the State’s implicit invitation to reweigh that evi-
dence.

In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
permitted Doe to proceed pseudonymously.

Ex Post Facro CLAusE VIOLATION

The State’s substantive issue is whether the 2011 amendments to
KORA can be retroactively applied to Doe without violating the Ex
Post Facto Clause. The State contends that, even though Doe com-
mitted his crime before the 2011 amendments, the Ex Post Facto
Clause is simply inapplicable because the amended KORA is still
a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive. Our resolution
will hinge on whether the 2011 amendments rendered the KORA
statutory scheme so punitive in effect as to negate any implied in-
tent to make it “civil.” See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (citing Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed, 2d 501
[1997]). We find that they do.

But before proceeding, we pause to clarify what we are not de-
ciding today. We are not saying that the 2011 version of KORA is
unconstitutional as applied to any sex offender who commits a cov-
ered crime on or after its July 1, 2011, effective date. Although we
are finding that the KORA statutory scheme is now penal in nature,
the legislature is permitted to impose penal sanctions on future
violators. We are saying that the legislature cannot add today’s new
sanction to a punishment imposed yesterday. The only sex offenders
affected by this decision are those that have been complying with
the Kansas registration requirements in effect when they commit-
ted their offenses. And this decision does not relieve any registrant
from completing the registration requirements in effect when he
or she committed the applicable offense. Further, this opinion will
have no effect on any offender's obligations under federal law.

Likewise, as emphasized in State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 700,

307

923 P.2d 1024 (1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997), “we are
not balancing the rights of . . . sex offenders against the rights of . . .
their victims.” Rather, our duty is to resolve “a claim of constitu-
tional infringement arising from retroactive legislation.” 260 Kan.
at 700. The Constitution does not exclude sex offenders from its
protections.

Standard of Review

“When the application of a statute is challenged on constitution-
al grounds, this court exercises an unlimited, de novo standard of
review. State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 676, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996).”
State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 768, 187 P.3d 1283 (2008).

Analysis
Ex Post Facto Clause

The constitutional protection in issue here is found in Article 1,
§ 10, which simply states, in relevant part, that “[n]o State shall .
. . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.” “We have ’held that a law is ex
post facto if two critical elements are present: (1) The law is ret-
rospective, and (2) the law disadvantages the offender affected by
it.” State v. Gleason, 299 Kan. 1127, 1159-60, 329 P.3d 1102 (2014)
(citing State v. Jaben, 294 Kan. 607, 612, 277 P.3d 417 [2012]; State
v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 770, 187 P.3d 1283 [2008]).

Recently, this court clarified that “retroactively applied legisla-
tion that simply ‘alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage’
does not, in and of itself, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The
disadvantage, to be unconstitutional under the Clause, must fall
within one of the categories recognized in Beazell [v. Ohio, 269
U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S. Ct. 68, 70 L. Ed. 216 (1925)].” State v.
Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 277, 323 P.3d 829 (2014). The Beazell category
that is applicable here is “‘“[a]ny statute . . . which makes more
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission.”’”
Todd, 299 Kan. at 277 (quoting Beazell,'269 U.S. at 169-70); see
also Gleason, 299 Kan. at 1159-60. Doe claims, and the district
court found, that the 2011 amendments to KORA made the pun-
ishment for Doe’s 2001-2002 crimes more burdensoine.

But “[t]he constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies

only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by
them.” Myers, 260 Kan. at 677. The State contends that KORA is
not punishment for the sex offender's crime, but rather a civil regu-
latory scheme enacted for the purpose of public safety.

State v. Myers

Kansas first considered whether a sex offender registration law
ran afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause in Myers, which was filed
in 1996. Myers related the relatively brief history of Kansas’ law,
beginning in 1993 with the Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act
(HSORA), which required repeat offenders to register for 10 years.
Registration consisted of a statement in writing that included the
offender's name, date of birth, social security number, fingerprints,
and a photograph, as well as information on the offense(s) com-
mitted and the dates/location of conviction(s). K.S.A. 1993 Supp.
22-4907. But HSORA, specifically K.S.A 1993 Supp. 22-4909, said
that the registration information “shall not be open to inspection
by the public” or subject to the Kansas Open Records Act, and that

- the data could only be obtained by a law enforcement officer or
other person specifically authorized by law.

The following year, the act was amended and renamed the Kan-
sas Sex Offender Registration Act (KSORA) because it included
first-time offenders, who were subject to the 10-year registration
term. Second or subsequent offenses resulted in lifetime registra-
tion. KSORA also allowed for public inspection of registration in-
formation at the sheriff's office and specifically made the registra-
tion information subject to the Open Records Act. L. 1994, ch. 107,
secs. 1-7.

Myers had committed his offense prior to the effective date of
KSORA. Consequently, Myers claimed that the retroactive appli-
cation of KSORAs reporting and disclosure requirements violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause. The State conceded that KSORA was
being retroactively applied to Myers but argued that the intent and
purpose of KSORA was regulatory, rather than punitive. The My-
ers court agreed with the State, holding that while KSORA con-
tained no expréss statement of legislative intent or purpose, “the

309

legislative history suggests a nonpunitive purpose—public safety.”
260 Kan. at 681.

But Myers recognized that its analysis did not end with its “pub-

lic safety” conclusion. Rather, it had to determine “whether the
‘statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate that intention.’ United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-
49, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).” 260 Kan. at 681.
Ultimately, Myers determined that the registration component of
KSORA was remedial but that the public disclosure provisions of
the act were too punitive in effect to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny. Specifically, the Myers court held:
“For Myers, KSORA% disclosure provision must be considered punishment. We
hold that the legislative aim in the disclosure provision was not to punish and that
retribution was not an intended purpose. However, we reason that the repercus-
sions, despite how they may be justified, are great enough under the facts of this
case to be considered punishment. The unrestricted public access given to the sex
offender registry is excessive and goes beyond that necessary to promote public
safety.” 260 Kan. at 699.

Enroute to that holding, Myers found that the practical effect
of KSORA’s unrestricted dissemination of registration information
“could make it impossible for the offender to find housing or em-
ployment” and that “[uJnrestricted public access to the registered
information leaves open the possibility that the registered offender
will be subjected to public stigma and ostracism.” 260 Kan. at 696.
Then, the court opined that “[t]o avoid the ex post facto charac-
terization, public access [to registration information] should be
limited to those with a need to know the information for public
safety purposes” and that those authorized to access the informa-
tion should only use it for public safety purposes. 260 Kan. at 700.

The State urges us to accept Myers’ holding as being equally ap-
plicable to the registration component of KORA, but to find that
Myers’ holding on the public disclosure component was effectively
overruled by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.

Smith v. Doe

In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that retroac-
tive application of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASO-

310

RA) did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 538 U.S. at 105-
06. Smith was the first time the Court had considered this type of
claim; however, the Court applied its well-established framework
of (1) determining whether the legislature’s intention was to enact
a “a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive” and, if so, (2)
“examin[ing] whether the statutory scheme is “‘so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem it
“civil.”’” 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361). This
framework is often referred to as the “intent-effects” test. See, ¢.g.,
Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th
Cir. 2001).

Under the intent portion of the test, “[w]hether a statutory
scheme is civil or criminal ‘s first of all a question of statutory con-
struction.’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
361). If the legislature intended to punish, the ex post facto viola-
tion is established and no inquiry into the effects of the act is re-
quired. 538 U.S. at 92-93.

The first inquiry under intent is whether “‘the legislature, in es-
tablishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label or the other.” Smith, 538 U.S.
at 93 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 8. Ct.
488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 [1997]). The Court relied upon the Alaska
Legislature’s express statutory finding that “‘sex offenders pose a
high risk of reoffending’ and identified ‘protecting the public from
sex offenders’ as the ‘primary governmental interest’ of the law.”
Smith, 538 U.S. at 93 (quoting 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 41, § 1).
Citing to its earlier decision in Hendricks, the Court reiterated that
“an imposition of restrictive measures on sex offenders adjudged
to be dangerous is ‘a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objec-
tive and has been historically so regarded.’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 93
(quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363).

Smith held that the stated nonpunitive intent of the ASORA
was not altered by the Alaska Constitution’s inclusion of protecting
public safety as a purpose for the criminal justice system, by the
legislature’s partial codification of the ASORA in the criminal pro-
cedure code, or by the requirement for courts accepting criminal
pleas and entering criminal judgments to inform defendants of the

ASORA requirements. 538 U.S. at 93-96. The Court noted that its
conclusion was “strengthened by the fact that, aside from the duty
to register, the statute itself mandates no procedures[,]” but “[i]
nstead . . . vests the authority to promulgate implementing regula-
tions with the Alaska Department of Public Safety, . . . an agency
charged with the enforcement of both criminal and civil regulatory
laws.” 538 U.S. at 96. Therefore, the Court held that the Alaska
Legislature’s intent “was to create a civil, nonpunitive regime.” 538
US. at 96.

After concluding that the intent of the Alaska Legislature was

nonpunitive, the Court turned to the effects of the ASORA. 538
US. at 97. The Court held that “[b]ecause we ‘ordinarily defer to
the legislature’s stated intent,’ [citation omitted] “‘only the clear-
est proof” will suffice to override legislative intent and transform
what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal pen-
alty.’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100).
The Court utilized the factors identified in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 544, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644
(1963), but noted that “[b]ecause the Mendoza-Martinez factors
are designed to apply in various constitutional contexts . . . they
are ‘neither exhaustive nor dispositive,’ [citations omitted] but are
‘useful guideposts.’ [Citation omitted.]” 538 U.S. at 97. The Court
explained:
“The factors most relevant to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation,
the regulatory scheme: [1] has been regarded in our history and traditions as a
punishment; [2] imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; [3] promotes the
traditional aims of punishment; [4] has a rational connection to a nonpunitive
purpose; or [5] is excessive with respect to this purpose.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.

Smith summarily dismissed the remaining two Mendoza-Mar-
tinez factors—*whether the regulation comes into play only on a
finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime”—by declaring those factors carried “little weight.”
538 U.S. at 105.

Under the first factor, whether the “regulatory scheme . . . has
been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment,” the
Court reasoned that “[a] historical survey can be useful because a
State that decides to punish an individual is likely to select a means

deemed punitive in our tradition, so that the public will recognize
it as such.” 538 U.S, at 97. The Court noted that sex offender regis-
tration and notification statutes “‘are of fairly recent origin,’ which
suggests that the statute was not meant as a punitive measure, or,
at least, that it did not involve a traditional means of punishing.”
538 U.S. at 97 (quoting Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 989 [9th Cir.

The Smith Court rejected the respondents’ argument that ASO-
RA, and particularly its notification provisions, “resemble shaming
punishments of the colonial period.” 538 U.S. at 97-98. The Court
recognized that “[s]ome colonial punishments indeed were meant
to inflict public disgrace”; however, unlike the ASORA, the colonial
punishments had a corporal element, involved direct confrontation
between the public and the offender, or expelled the offender from
the community. 538 U.S. at 97-98. The Court held that the stigma
from the ASORA “result[ed] not from public display for ridicule
and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information
about a criminal record, most of which is already public.” 538 U.S.
at 98. The Court was not swayed by the fact that Alaska posted reg-
istration information on the Internet, concluding that a member of
the public visiting the State’s website was analogous to the person
visiting the official criminal records archive. 538 U.S. at 99.

In analyzing the second factor, whether “the regulatory scheme
. . . imposes an affirmative disability or restraint,” the Court con-
sidered “how the effects of the Act are felt by those subject to it.
If the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its effects are
unlikely to be punitive.” 538 U.S. at 97, 99-100. The Court noted
that unlike prison, “the paradigmatic affirmative disability or re-
straint,” the act did not impose physical restraint. 538 U.S. at 100.
Further, the Court held the act less burdensome than occupational
disbarment, which is nonpunitive. 538 U.S. at 100. Additionally,
the Court rejected sex offenders’ employment and housing diffi-
culties as conjecture unsupported by evidence. 538 U.S. at 100.
The Court recognized the potential “lasting and painful impact on
the convicted sex offender”; however, the court held “these conse-
quences flow not from the Act's registration and dissemination pro-

visions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of public
record.” 538 U.S. at 101.

The Court also noted that the Ninth Circuit, which had held
ASORA constituted punishment, incorrectly believed that ASORA
required sex offenders to update registration in person. 538 U.S. at
101. Additionally, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that registration was “parallel to probation or supervised release
in terms of the restraint imposed” because while the “argument
has some force,” unlike registration, “[p]robation and supervised
release entail a series of mandatory conditions and allow the su-
pervising officer to seek the revocation of probation or release in
case of infraction.” 538 U.S. at 101. Although noting that offenders
“must inform the authorities after they change their facial features
(such as growing a beard), borrow a car, or seek psychiatric treat-
ment, they are not required to seek permission to do so.” 538 U.S.
at 101. The Court reasoned that although a sex offender may be
prosecuted for a registration violation, such prosecution is separate
from the individual's original offense. 538 U.S. at 102.

The third factor involves whether the “regulatory scheme . . .
promotes the traditional aims of punishment.” Smith, 538 U.S. at
97. The Supreme Court has described those aims as retribution
and deterrence. See, ¢.g., Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. The
Court held that although the ASORA might deter future crimes
“(alny number of governmental programs might deter crime with-
out imposing punishment” and “‘[t]o hold that the mere presence
of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions “criminal” .. . would
severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective
regulation.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 102 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at
105). The Court held that the act’s registration obligations were not
retributive based upon the differing duration of reporting for dif-
ferent categories of offenders because these measures were “rea-
sonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent
with the regulatory objective.” 538 U.S. at 102.

The Court found that the fourth factor, a rational connection to
a nonpunitive purpose, was the most significant factor in its “de-
termination that the statute’s effects are not punitive.” 538 U.S. at
102. In Smith, the respondents agreed that ASORA’s nonpunitive

purpose of alerting “‘the public to the risk of sex offenders in their
communit[y]’” was “valid, and rational.” 538 U.S. at 103 (quoting
Otte, 259 F.3d at 991), However, the Court summarily rejected the
respondent’s argument that ASORA was not “‘narrowly drawn to
accomplish the stated purpose,’” reasoning that a “statute is not
deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with
the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.” 538 U.S. at 103.

When assessing the fifth factor, whether the regulatory scheme
is excessive with respect to its purpose, the Court opined it need
not determine “whether the legislature has made the best choice
possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy. The question is
whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the
nonpunitive objective.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 105. The Court conclud-
ed that ASORA’ application to all convicted sex offenders, without
any individualized assessment of the offender's dangerousness, did
not render the act punitive. Finding that the risk of recidivism by
sex offenders was “frightening and high,’” the Court held that “[i]
n the context of the regulatory scheme the State can dispense with
individual predictions of future dangerousness and allow the public
to assess the risk on the basis of accurate, nonprivate information
about the registrants’ convictions without violating the prohibitions
of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” 538 U.S. at 103-04.

Relying on empirical research on child molesters, the Court also
held that the duration of ASORA’s reporting requirements was not
excessive because “‘most reoffenses do not occur within the first
several years after release,’ but may occur ‘as late as 20 years fol-
lowing release.’” 538 U.S. at 104 (quoting National Institute of Jus-
tice, R. Prentky, R. Knight, & A. Lee, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Child
Sexual Molestation: Research Issues 14 [1997]).

Finally, the Court held that the widespread dissemination of the
registration information was not excessive, instead finding that the
“notification system is a passive one: An individual must seek ac-
cess to the information.” 538 U.S. at 105. The Court also deter-
mined that making the registry information available throughout
the state was not excessive in light of population mobility, citing to
a study indicating that 38% of recidivist sex offenses took place in

315

different jurisdictions than where the previous offense was com-
mitted. 538 U.S. at 105.

Having determined that the respondents had failed to show
“that the effects of the law negate Alaska’s intention to establish a
civil regulatory scheme,” the Smith majority declared that the act
was nonpunitive and that its retroactive application did not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause. 538 U.S. at 105-06.

In stark contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court would later use the
same intent-effects test that the Smith Court utilized but would
find that ASORA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska
state constitution, concluding:

“Because ASORA compels (under threat of conviction) intrusive affirmative
conduct, because this conduct is equivalent to that required by criminal judg-
ments, because ASORA makes the disclosed information public and requires its
broad dissemination without limitation, because ASORA applies only to those
convicted of crime, and because ASORA neither meaningfully distinguishes be-
tween classes of sex offenses on the basis of risk nor gives offenders any opportu-
nity to demonstrate their lack of risk, ASORA’ effects are punitive. We therefore
conclude that the statute violates Alaska’s ex post facto clause.” Doe v. State, 189
P.3d 999, 1019 (Alaska 2008).

Interestingly, the Alaska court cited with approval to Myers.
Doe, 189 P.3d at 1017. Other states have likewise relied on their
state constitutions to prohibit retroactive application of sex offend-
er registration statutes. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377-
78 (Ind. 2009); Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Ser-
vices, 430 Md. 535, 547-48, 62 A.3d 123 (2013); State v. Williams,
129 Ohio St. 3d 344, 347-49, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (2011); Starkey v.
Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, | 76-79, 305 P.3d
1004 (2013). But, Kansas does not have a specific Ex Post Facto
Clause in our state constitution. Todd, 299 Kan. at 276.

And this court is bound by the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the United States Constitution, albeit we are not
bound by any lower federal court. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
US. 364, 376, 113 S. Ct. 838, 122 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1993) (Thomas,
J.. concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause demands that state law
yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other
principle of federal law requires that a state court’s interpretation
of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s interpretation. In

316

our federal system, a state trial court's interpretation of federal law
is no less authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in
whose circuit the trial court is located.”). Accordingly, our inquiry
becomes whether KORA, as amended in 2011, is sufficiently dis-
tinct from ASORA reviewed in Smith that it mandates a different
result under the federal Constitution.

Application of Intent-Effects Test to KORA, as Amended in 2011

In the initial step of the intent-effects test, the statutory provi-
sions are construed to determine whether the legislature intended
to enact a punitive provision. If so, retroactive application of the
provisions is always prohibited; no further inquiry is needed. Smith
found ASORA nonpunitive, first pointing to express statutory lan-
guage, stating that the objective of the law was to protect the public
from sex offenders and that the release of certain information to the
public assists in protecting the public safety. 538 U.S. at 93. Smith
also noted that Alaska’s statutory scheme placed the notification
provisions in the health, safety, and housing code, albeit the reg-
istration provisions were codified in the criminal procedure code.
Moreover, the Alaska statute mandated no procedures but rather
it vested the Alaska Department of Public Safety with authority to
promulgate implementing regulations, leading the Smith Court to
infer that “the legislature envisioned the Act’s implementation to
be civil and administrative.” 538 U.S. at 96.

KORA, in contrast, is wholly contained within our criminal pro-
cedure code, mandates the manner of implementation, and impos-
es serious criminal sanctions for noncompliance. As State v. Myers,
260 Kan. 669, 678, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996), pointed out, Kansas’ act
“contains no express statement of legislative intent or purpose.”
Curiously, our sex offender act has been amended numerous times
since Myers noted the absence of a legislative expression of intent
or purpose while finding the notification provisions punitive in ef-
fect. See L. 1997, ch. 181, secs. 7-14; L. 1999, ch. 164, secs. 29-34,
36; L. 2000, ch. 150, sec. 2; L. 2001, ch. 208, secs. 10-16; L. 2002,
ch. 163, sec. 6; L. 2002, ch. 55, secs. 1-4; L. 2003, ch. 123, secs.
3-9; L. 2005, ch. 202, secs, 1-2; L. 2006, ch. 212, sec. 20; L. 2006,
ch. 214, sec. 2, 6-10; L. 2007, ch. 181, secs. 1-7; L. 2008, ch. 57,

sec. 1; L. 2008, ch. 74, sec. 1; L. 2009, ch. 32, sec. 44; L. 2010, ch.
66, sec. 1; L. 2010, ch. 74, sec. 11; L. 2010, ch. 135, sees. 35-37; L.
2010, ch. 147, sec. 8; L. 2010, ch. 155, sec. 10; L. 2011, ch. 95, secs.
1-11; L. 2012, ch. 149, secs. 1-10; L. 2013, ch. 127, secs. 1-8; and
L. 2014, ch. 117, secs, 2-3. Nevertheless, the legislature has yet to
definitively express the intent or purpose of the act.

Notwithstanding that KORA is more fully clothed in criminality
than was Smith’s ASORA, we need not ruminate on how the high
court would judge the Kansas Legislature’s intent or purpose. We
have our own precedent; Myers found a nonpunitive purpose of
public safety in the legislative history of KSORA. Doe points us
to no subsequent legislative history that would lead us to overturn
Myers’ holding on the intent portion of the analysis. Accordingly,
we proceed to consider how the factual distinctions between the
statute under examination in Smith and that under examination to-
day affect the “effects” portion of the test.

‘We begin with a list of the most significant differences between
the 2011 version of KORA and the version of ASORA reviewed in
Smith:

¢ KORA applies to a broader group of offenders. The 2011
KORA applies to sex offenders, violent offenders, and drug
offenders (with no personal use exception). K.S.A. 2011
Supp. 22-4902, ASORA only applied to sex offenders and
child kidnappers. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010 (2000).

¢ KORA requires frequent in-person reporting regardless of
registration changes. KORA requires in-person quarterly
reporting for sex offenders in each location where the of-
fender resides, maintains employment, or attends school.
KS.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(b). Additionally, transient of-
fenders must register in person in the location where the
offender is physically present every 30 days. K.S.A. 2011
Supp. 22-4905(e). ASORA did not require in-person report-
ing after initial registration. Alaska required annual written
verification for nonaggravated sex offenses and quarterly
written verification for aggravated offenses. “Alaska Stat. §
12.63.010(d) (2000).

¢ KORA often requires longer registration terms. For the ma-
jority of first-time sex offenses, KORA requires 25 years or
lifetime registration. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4906. For first-
time nonaggravated sex offenses, the ASORA required 15-
year registration. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020 (2000).

¢ KORA requires additional registration information. In addi-
tion to the registration information offenders were required
to provide under ASORA, KORA registration requires: alias
dates or places of birth; temporary lodging information; tele-
phone numbers; social security number; occupation; name
of ‘any anticipated employer and anticipated place of em-
ployment; photocopies of current driver's licenses and iden-
tification cards; aircraft and watercraft license plates and
registration information; information concerning where mo-
tor vehicles, aircraft, and watercraft are habitually parked or
otherwise kept; professional licenses, designations, and cer-
tifications; preconviction mental health treatment; schools
attended or expected to be attended; travel and immigra-
tion documents; name and telephone number of probation,
parole, or community corrections officer; email addresses;
all online identities used on the Intemet; any information
relating to membership in online social networks; DNA ex-
emplars; and the sex and date of birth of each victim. Com-
pare K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4907 with Alaska Stat. § 12.63.10
(2000).,

¢ KORA requires in-person registration updates. KORA ad-
ditionally requires in-person registration updates within
3 days of any information change. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-
4905(g). ASORA required a written update for a change of
residence. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(c) (2000).

¢ KORA requires additional information dissemination to the
public. In addition to the information made available to the
public under ASORA, KORA disseminates: any other of-
fenses for which the offender has been convicted or adjudi-
cated; temporary lodging information; address of any place
where the offender will be a student; and professional li-

censes, designations, and certifications the offender holds.
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4909(b)(3), (5), (8), and (10); Alaska
Stat. § 18.65.087 (2000).

KORA imposes costly registration fees. KORA requires that
offenders remit a $20 fee, four times per year, in each loca-
tion where an offender resides, maintains employment, or
attends school. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(k). ASORA al-
lowed the department of public safety to adopt fees for reg-
istration and required that fees be based upon actual costs
and be set at a level not to discourage registration. Alaska
Stat. § 18.65.087(d)(3) (2000).

KORA requires provision of notice for travel outside the
United States. Under KORA, an offender must give 21 days’
notice of international travel except in emergency situations.
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(0). No restriction on travel was
included in ASORA.

KORA requires annual driver's license and identification
card renewal and the Motor Vehicle Drivers’ License Act
requires a distinguishing number on the KORA registrant’s
driver's licenses. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(1); K.S.A. 2014
Supp. 8-243(d). ASORA did not contain similar require-
ments.

Kansas considers whether a parent is subject to KORA or is
residing with a person subject to KORA in determining child
custody, residency, and parenting time. K.S.A. 2011 Supp.
23-3203(h), (j). Alaska’s domestic relations code did not re-
quire consideration of registered offender status. See Alaska
Stat. §§ 25.20.090 (2000); 25.24.150 (2000).

KORA imposes burdensome penalties for violations. Under
the 2011 KORA, a first conviction is a severity level 6 per-
son felony, a second conviction is a severity level 5 person
felony, a third conviction is a severity level 3 person felony,
and a violation continuing for more than 180 days is a sever-
ity level 3 person felony. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4903. Under
ASORA, the penalty for a first-time failure to register was a

class A misdemeanor. Alaska Stat. § 11.56.840 (2000). The
penalty for a second time failure to register or failure to reg-
ister with the intent to escape detection or identification and
to facilitate the person’s commission of a sex offense or child
kidnapping was a class C felony, the lowest severity level fel-
ony in Alaska. Alaska Stat. § 11.56.835 (2000); Alaska Stat. §
11.81.250 (2000).

The district court found these differences significant, opining
that, since Smith, the requirements in Kansas had become “in-
creasingly severe.” Further, the district court noted that the advent
of the widespread use of social media had significantly changed
the landscape for dissemination of offender information. The court
then individually discussed four of the Mendoza-Martinez factors.

Following the Smith format, we will likewise individually dis-
cuss the guideline factors from Mendoza-Martinez, although it is
important to keep in mind that it is the entire “statutory scheme”
that must be examined for its punitive effect. See Smith, 538 U.S.
at 92 (effects analysis requires the appellate court to “examine . . .
the statutory scheme” [emphasis added]); Myers, 260 Kan. at 681
(quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S. Ct.
2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742 [1980]) (“ask whether the ‘statutory scheme
was so punitive either in purpose or effect’” [emphasis added]).
For instance, a particular registration requirement may not have
the same punitive effect in a statutory scheme that permits a re-
duction in registration time for proven rehabilitation, as it does in
astatutory scheme that precludes any individualized modifications.

The first factor considered by Smith was whether the regula-
tory scheme has been regarded in our history and traditions as a
punishment. 538 U.S. at 97. Again, the Smith Court rejected the
argument that ASORA’s notification provisions “resemble shaming
punishments of the colonial period,” finding that such early pun-
ishments as shaming, humiliation, and banishment involved more
than the dissemination of information. 538 U.S. at 97. Then, not-
withstanding that the focus was supposed to be upon the “effects”
of the law, rather than the legislative intent, Smith rationalized that
Alaska did not “make the publicity and the resulting stigma an in-

tegral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.” 538 U.S. at
99. Nevertheless, the 2011 KORA crosses the line drawn by Smith.

Myers cited to Artway v. Attorney General of State of N-J.,
81 F.3d 1235, 1265 (3d Cir. 1996), for a quotation from Nathan-
iel Hawthome, The Scarlet Letter, 63-64 (Random House 1950)
(1850), which, referring to the portion of Hester Prynne’s punish-
ment for adultery that required her to wear a scarlet “A” upon her
dress, stated: ““There can be no outrage . . . against our common
nature,—whatever be the delinquencies of the individual,—no
outrage more flagrant than to forbid the culprit to hide his face
for shame; as it was the essence of this punishment to do.’” KORA
mimics that shaming of old by branding the driver’s license of a reg-
istrant with the designation, “RO.” See K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-243(d).
While a driver's license is not worn upon a person's chest, it is re-
quired to be displayed for a variety of reasons unrelated to KORA’s
public safety purpose, ¢.g., to obtain medical treatment, to obtain a
checking account balance from a bank teller, to vote in Kansas, etc.
See also Starkey v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, {
59, 305 P.3d 1004 (2013) (“driver's license is frequently necessary in
face-to-face encounters when cashing a check, using a credit card,
applying for credit, obtaining a job, entering some public buildings,
and in air travel . . . subject[ing] an offender to unnecessary public
humiliation and shame . . . not unlike a ‘scarlet letter.’”). Conse-
quently, in the words of Smith, the statutory scheme “[holds] the
person up before his fellow citizens for face-to-face shaming,” 538
U.S. at 98. In the words of the district court, “the notation on the
[driver’s} license is a visible badge of past criminality in line with
traditional punishment.”

Likewise, Smith’s description of Alaska’s posting of registration
information on the Internet as a passive system, akin to physically
visiting “an official archive of criminal records,” 538 U.S. at 99, is
antiquated in today’s world of pushed notifications to listservs and
indiscriminate social media sharing. The Supreme Court has re-
cently recognized the vast amount of data that is currently available
to most citizens on their smartphones and that “a cell phone [can
be] used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen.”
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491, 189 L. Ed.

—_ ii

2d 430 (2014). Indeed, Myers’ fear that “[t]he print or broadcast
media could make it a practice of publishing the list [of sex offend-
ers] as often as they chose,” 260 Kan. at 697, has come to pass.
Websites contain pop-up ads offering to locate sex offenders for
the viewer. Indeed, one would not be surprised to find that an ap-
plication (app) for a mobile device had been developed that would
provide instant access to the location of all sex offenders in a given
location. And, as the district court noted, members of the public
may now post public comments about an offender after using the
Johnson County “share and bookmark” feature that posts registry
information on social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Myspace. In contrast, Smith’s analysis of ASORA specifically noted
the absence of the ability of the public to comment. 538 U.S. at
99. The district court therefore concluded that “citizens can use
the county-sponsored website to create a virtual forum for pub-
lic shaming, which closely resembles traditional punishment.” We
agree.

Any suggestion that disseminating sex offender registration on
an Internet website reaches no more members of the public and is
no more burdensome to the offender than maintaining an archived
criminal record simply ignores the reality of today’s world. More-
over, the argument that the additional widespread dissemination
enhances the effectiveness of the registration system simply misses
the point; the focus of this part of the intent-effects test is to as-
sess whether there is a penal effect on the offender. For example,
placing the offender in a locked stockade on the courthouse square
would more effectively achieve the purpose of public safety, but, of
course, the effect of that method could not be labeled nonpunish-
ment.

On the registration side of the statutory scheme, KORA utilizes
a traditional means of punishment when it requires quarterly reg-
istration in person in each location where the offender works, lives,
or attends school. Reporting in person.to a State agent, up to 12
times a year, to update the agent on the offender's personal, em-
ployment, and educational status replicates what we most often see
when the criminal sanction of probation or parole is imposed.

The next Mendoza-Martinez factor—whether the statutory

scheme subjects the offender to an affirmative disability or re-
straint—involves an inquiry into “how the effects of the Act are
felt by those subject to it.” 538 U.S. at 99-100. Smith noted that
ASORA imposed no physical restraint on offenders, and, although
registrants had to inform the authorities of certain changes, such as
a job or residence, the offenders were not required to obtain prior
permission for the change. Of course, in Kansas, KORA requires
21 days’ prior notification for international travel.

But the more common restraint on an offender's freedom of
movement under KORA is more indirect. The offender must reg-
ister in person quarterly in each applicable jurisdiction and remit
$20 to each jurisdiction each time, at the risk of committing a new
felony under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4903. As the district court not-
ed, that will result in the offender paying from $80 to $240 a year.
Further, KORAS definition of “reside” is extremely broad. K.S.A.
2011 Supp. 22-4902(j) provides that “[i]t shall be presumed that an
offender resides at any and all locations where the offender:stays,
sleeps or maintains the offender’s person for seven or more con-
secutive days or parts of days, or for seven or more non-consecutive
days in a period of 30 consecutive days.” Under those rules, an of-
fender could inadvertently acquire a new registration residence by
taking a week’s vacation out-of-county, or by having a sales route
where the offender stays in an out-of-county motel for 2 nights
a week, i.e., 8 nonconsecutive days in a period of 30 consecutive
days. As the district court opined, “in-person, quarterly reporting
restricts offenders’ time and freedom” and is akin to the punitive
measure of probation or parole, as we have discussed above.

‘The district court also found that KORA registration and noti-
fication created housing and occupational barriers for an offend-
er. Smith rejected as “conjecture” the argument that registration
under ASORA had created employment or housing problems in
that case, declaring that “these consequences flow not from the
Act's registration and dissemtination provisions, but from the fact of
conviction, already a matter of public record.” 538 U.S. at 100-01.
But here, the State’s argument that Doe’s employment and hous-
ing barriers were constructed by his conviction, rather than by his
registration, is not supported by the evidence.

Granted, the district court relied on social science research
gleaned from the journal articles for such information as the per-
vasiveness of employment difficulties associated with registration.
But the district court also had direct testimony in this case from
Doe himself, stating that he retained his job through the time of
his prosecution and conviction, only to be fired after his registra-
tion became public. Moreover, Doe’s listing on the registry was the
reason given for both his job termination and his inability to get a
better job. Likewise, the published map showing the residential
location of sex offenders was the reason given by prospective land-
lords for refusing to rent to Doe.

To say Doe’s housing and employment problems flowed from
the public record of his conviction, rather than from the notifica-
tion provisions of KORA, defies logic and common sense. First,
one would have to question how many members of the general
public are proficient at accessing and interpreting archived court
records. Next, those records would not identify the offender’s place
of employment, so that a public relations reaction to the corporate
employer would be.a remote possibility, whereas the offender is
tied to the employer in the registry. Likewise, the criminal defen-
dant’s address at the time of conviction, even if contained within
the public portion of the court records, would not necessarily be
the same as when the record was accessed. Moreover, although
a defendant on probation must notify the defendant’s probation
officer of a change of address, that information is not open to the
public. Certainly, potential landlords would have no concern that
other tenants would ascertain the offender's current address from
the prior court record. That information would have to come from
KORA. a

Blaming the public record of conviction, rather than KORA
registration and dissemination, for housing and employment dif-
ficulties also defies our precedent. Myers looked at the practical
effect of unrestricted dissemination of registration information and
concluded that it “could make it impossible for the offender to find
housing or employment.” 260 Kan. at 696. Certainly, the ensuing
increase in the number of people with access to the Internet since
Myers, along with the increased ease with which information can

|

be shared and commented upon, only serves to corroborate that
case’s prescient holding.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that
KORAs statutory scheme works an affirmative disability or re-
straint on the offender.

The next factor is whether the statutory scheme promotes the
traditional aims of punishment: deterrence and retribution. Smith
acknowledged the deterrent effect of the law but summarily con-
sidered that to be a necessary component of effective government
regulation. Smith then rejected the lower court’s conclusion that
ASORA was retributive for basing the length of the reporting re-
quirement on the extent of wrongdoing, rather than the risk posed
by the offender. It concluded, without further explanation, that the
broad categories and length of required reporting were “reasonably
related to the danger of recidivism” and, thus, consistent with the
regulatory objective. 538 U.S. at 102. But of: Com. v. Baker, 295
S.W.3d 437, 444 (Ky. 2009) (“When a restriction is imposed equally
upon all offenders, with no consideration given to how dangerous
any particular registrant may be to public safety, that restriction
begins to look far more like retribution for past offenses than a
regulation intended to prevent future ones.”).

If the 10-year length of reporting was reasonably related to the
danger of recidivism in 2003, when Doe was convicted and the
year after Smith was decided, one has to wonder what happened
in 2011 to make the reasonable relationship two and a half times
greater. The State has provided nothing to support the reasonable-
ness of the 25-year reporting term. Even Smith’s “legislative fact”
in support of ASORA‘s length of reporting was that sex offenders
may reoffend “‘as late as 20 years following release.’” 538 U.S. at
104, KORA’s new reporting term is 25% longer than Smith’s out-
side limit. Moreover, Doe’s “legislative fact” from current social sci-
ence indicates that the risk of recidivism actually decreases as the
offender ages. Even if we do not take judicial notice of that “legis-
lative fact,” we can conclude that there is no evidentiary or logical
support for the increase in reporting term. Such arbitrariness is
inherently retributive.

The next factor—which Smith labeled “a ‘[m]ost significant’

factor”—is the act’s rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose.
Smith found ASORA rationally connected to the nonpunitive pur-
pose of public safety, even though the act was not “‘narrowly drawn
to accomplish the stated purpose.” 538 U.S. at 102-03. Smith
would apparently require the imprecision to render the nonpuni-
tive purpose a “‘sham or mere pretext.’” 538 U.S. at 103 (quoting
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371).

Arguably, under the current KORA, public safety has become a
pretext. Without differentiating between the 18-year-old immature,
marginally intelligent, sexually naive person who succumbs to the
seduction of a mature-acting, sexually informed 15-year-old child
and the 30-year-old confirmed pedophile that rapes preschoolers
and is not amenable to rehabilitation, KORA fails to effectively no-
tify the public of the danger of recidivism. Too much is too little.
Moreover, that flaw is accentuated by KORA’ prohibition in K.S.A.
2011 Supp. 22-4908: “No person required to register as an offend-
er pursuant to the Kansas offender registration act shall be granted
an order relieving the offender of further registration under the
act.” Even fully rehabilitated offenders will be on the registry for
a quarter-century. In the words of the district court, “[w]ithout a
mechanism for challenging long registration periods, offenders
who are compliant with the registration requirements and have a
low risk of recidivism suffer consequences that outweigh the mini-
mal increases in public safety created by registration.” Cf Gonzalez
v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 320-21 (Ind. 2013) (finding that Indiana’s
registration law was excessive in relation to its articulated purpose
because the act contained no mechanism for determining whether
offender had been rehabilitated or no longer presented a risk to the
public thereby alleviating the need for registration).

On the flip side, the registry could be underinclusive because
only convicted sex offenders must register. One who has engaged
in the same conduct as Doe might well avoid being subjected to
the rigors of registration by pleading to a non-sex offense, by being
acquitted because of a suppressed confession, or by having a con-
viction overturned on appeal because of an illegal search or some
other reason, other than insufficient evidence. One can envision
that a prosecutor might use offender registration as a plea bargain-

ing chip to leverage a guilty plea to a charge that the prosecutor
has amended from a KORA offense to a non-KORA offense, which
would effectively nullify the public safety purpose of KORA. Again,
the point is that the statutory scheme is not closely connected to
the nonpunitive purpose of public safety.

The final factor is whether the statutory scheme is excessive in
relation to its regulatory purpose. Our discussion of the other fac-
tors has touched upon the excessive nature of KORA, at least as
amended in 2011. For instance, the information a registrant is re-
quired to provide has increased dramatically from that required in
the Myers era, to include such items as the registration number of
owned watercraft.

And the penalty for noncompliance with the stringent and com-
plicated registration rules has been elevated to a level 6 person
felony, as opposed to being a misdemeanor under the act reviewed
in Smith. Granted, the countering argument is that the increased
penalty is for committing a new crime. But the sex or other offense
is a necessary predicate to any conviction for failing to comply with
KORA, because only those who have been convicted of a qualify-
ing offense are subject to the registration requirements. Moreover,
when the penalty for failing to comply with registration exceeds the
penalty for the crime triggering the registration requirement, the
statutory scheme loses its civil regulatory blush.

Smith relied heavily on its “legislative facts” to justify ASORA’s
excessive provisions, which may or may not remain valid. But what
we do know is that Siith’s reliance on the notification system be-
ing “passive,” 538 U.S. at 105, does not translate to today’s system
under KORA. For instance, the KBI will provide active notifica-
tion under certain circumstances, and, as the district court cor-
rectly noted, “the current internet notification schemes are more
aggressive than they were when Smith was decided, offenders are
at a greater risk of suffering ostracism and even vigilante acts by
members of the community.” Again, Myers got it right with respect
to the effects of unlimited public dissemination of registration in-
formation.

In finding that the current KORA% statutory scheme is so puni-
tive in effect as to negate the implied legislative intent to deem it

—_

civil, we are not unaware of the fact that a number of federal Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal have found the federal act, the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et
seq. (2012), nonpunitive and appropriately applied retroactively.
Those cases are not persuasive because of the differences between
SORNA and KORA. For instance, SORNA differentiates between
classes of offenders, whereas KORA is a one-size-fits-all scheme;
KORA is not restricted to just sex offenders, whereas SORNA is;
KORA has no mechanism for obtaining an early release from the
registration requirement, whereas SORNA allows for a reduction
in registration time for a clean record; KORA requires a special,
annually renewed driver’s license and child custody notification not
found in SORNA; KORA requires more registration information
than SORNA; KORA imposes a fee, whereas SORNA does not;
and KORA has a broader definition of “resides” than SORNA. See
42, U.S.C. §§ 16911, 16914-16 (2012). In other words, looking at
the statutory scheme as a whole, the effects of KORA are consider-
ably more punitive than those of SORNA.

In short, we affirm the district court. KORA as amended in 2011
is punitive in effect, and the amended statutory scheme cannot be
applied retroactively to any person who committed the qualifying
sex offense crime prior to July 1, 2011.

MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned]

woe

BILEs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with
the majority that our legislature intended for the Kansas Offender
Registration Act (KORA) and its 2011 amendments to be a civil
regulatory scheme for public safety that was nonpunitive. I also
agree the proper retroactivity test boils down to whether the 2011
amendments that prompt the present controversy render KORA
so punitive as applied to sex offenders as to negate that intent.
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d

329

164 (2003) (applying intent-effects test for federal Ex Post Facto
Clause purposes). Our state constitution does not contain a simi-
lar provision or suggest a different analytical process. See State v.
Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 276, 323 P.3d 829 (2014) (no Ex Post Facto
Clause in Kansas Constitution).

But this just means we are being asked to answer a federal ques-
tion, which logically suggests adhering to the federal law on this
subject. My colleagues in the majority too easily disregard the
substantial federal caselaw that yields a contrary result from the
one reached today. This caselaw uniformly concludes that the fed-
eral Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42
U.S.C. § 16901 et seq. (2012), as well as offender registration laws
from other states, are nonpunitive and may be applied retroactively
without violating the federal Ex Post Facto Clause. This authority
sets the path we must follow.

Standard of review

Our standard of review is well known when considering a chal-
lenge to a statute’s constitutionality; yet its recitation in the ma-
jority opinion tellingly ignores critical components, namely: we
always presume legislative enactments are constitutional and we
resolve all doubts in favor of a statute’s validity. State v. Cheeks, 298
Kan. 1, 4, 310 P.3d 346 (2013); Board of Miami County Comm’rs v.
Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy, Inc., 292 Kan, 285, 315, 255 P.3d
1186 (2011). This presumption of constitutionality emanates from
the critical doctrine of separation of powers, which recognizes that
courts are concerned only with the legislative power to enact stat-
utes—not with the wisdom behind them. Miller v. Johnson, 295
Kan. 636, 646, 289 P.3d 1098 (2012).

We do not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is clear be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the statute infringes on constitution-
ally protected rights. State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 285, 331 P3d 544
(2014) (quoting State v. Brown, 280 Kan. 898, 899, 127 P.3d 257
{2006]). And as the United States Supreme Court noted in Smith,
“‘only the clearest proof’” of punitive effect is sufficient to override
the legislature’s intent to create a civil regulation. Smith, 538 U.S.
at 91 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 8. Ct.

488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 [1997]); see also United States v. Young, 585
F.3d 199, 2005 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[Y]oung must present the ‘clearest
proof’ that either the purpose or the effect of [SORNA] is in fact so
punitive as to negate its civil intent. This he cannot do.”).

The majority's analysis deviates from these principles by framing
the question as an examination into whether differences between
KORA and the Alaska statute the United States Supreme Court
upheld in Smith “mandates a different result.” 304 Kan. at 316.
But viewing the controversy in this way ignores the presumption
of constitutionality, resourcefully casts off the numerous decisions
cited below that have upheld various registration requirements
against federal retroactivity challenges, and renders meaningless
the “clearest proof” standard stated in Smith. The majority's stated
reason for this approach is that federal circuit court opinions are
not binding on state supreme courts, so the majority will not con-
sider whether their holdings may inform our thinking. This smacks
of simply being a means to a predetermined end.

Discussion

The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits state and federal governments from retroactively imposing
additional punishment for a criminal offense. U.S. Const. art. I, §§
9-10. As noted, Kansas does not have a comparable constitutional
dictate. See Todd, 299 Kan. at 276.

Federal appellate courts have unanimously held retroactive ap-
plication of the federal offender registration requirements found in
SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. United States v.
Brunner, 726 F.3d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Parks,
698 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d
599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039,
1045 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773
(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 860 (11th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied 560 U.S. 974 (2010), abrogated on other grounds by
Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 975, 181 L.
Ed. 2d 935 (2012); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied 559 U.S. 974 (2010); Young, 585 F.3d at

206 (noting that Young made no “effort to prove that the effect
of SORNA is so punitive as to make it not a civil scheme, and any
attempt to do so would have been futile”); United States v. May,
535 F.3d 912, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 556 U.S. 1258
(2009), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds, 132 S. Ct. 975;
United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 937-38 (10th Cir. 2008),
abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds, 132 S, Ct. 975 (2012); see
also United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2013)
(applying Mendoza-Martinez factors to hold SORNA was not cruel
and unusual punishment as applied to a juvenile); United States
v. Stacey, 570 Fed. Appx. 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding ex post
facto challenge to conviction for failing to register under SORNA
foreclosed by Shenandoah); United States v. Sampsell, 541 Fed.
Appx. 258, 260 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding ex post facto challenge to
SORNA foreclosed by Gould).

In addition, federal circuit courts have upheld state sex of
fender registration laws against federal ex post facto challenges,
even when those state laws contained provisions more expansive
in scope and impact than either SORNA or the Alaska provisions
addressed in Smith. See Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1242-43
(9th Cir. 2014) (upholding California requirement that offenders
register in-person every 90 days); American Civil Liberties Union
of Nevada v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012) (up-
holding Nevada law expanding category of individuals who must
register, increasing time period offenders were subject to regis-
tration, adding in-person registration requirements, and expand-
ing law enforcement obligations to notify specified entities that
an offender resided nearby); Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000
(6th Cir. 2007) (upholding Tennessee law requiring, among other
things, extended lifetime registration and satellite-based monitor-
ing with wearable GPS device); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 F.3d 955,
967 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding California law containing several
provisions different from the Alaska statute analyzed in Smith).

The majority disingenuously characterizes this unanimous body
of caselaw as just the decisions of “a number of Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal,” which it then discounts by noting the obvious,
i.e., there are differences between the federal SORNA and our

state’s KORA. 304 Kan. at 327-28. And while it is true that none
of the statutory schemes upheld by other courts are identical to
KORA, there is substantial overlap, and so the rationale from those
decisions should apply with equal force here. I would not so quick-
ly disdain this federal caselaw because it compellingly answers the
real question presented: Are there convincing reasons to believe
the United States Supreme Court would view KORA differently
than it viewed the Alaska law in 2003 when it decided Smith? See
Litmon, 768 F.3d at 1243 (“[T]here is no reason to believe that the
addition of [the 90-day, in-person registration] requirement would
have changed the outcome [in Smith].”). If the answer to that ques-
tion is no, then this court must affirm.

To answer the question presented, we apply the two-step test
from Smith to determine whether the 2011 KORA amendments
constitute an additional form of punishment when applied to of-
fenders required to comply with them because of convictions that
occurred before the amendments were enacted. See Smith, 538
U.S. at 92. And as noted, the majority correctly concludes in the
first step that the Kansas Legislature intended for its 2011 amend-
ments to preserve KORA% status as a civil regulatory scheme. 304
Kan. at 317. After that, we move to the second step, where we must
decide whether those 2011 amendments are “‘“so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem
[KORA] “civil.”’” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. This is where I depart
from the majority's analysis.

For this second step, we should follow the federal factors laid out
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct.
554, 9-L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963). See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. Those fac-
tors consider the degree to which the regulatory scheme imposes
a sanction that: (1) has historically been regarded as punishment;
(2) constitutes an affirmative disability or restraint; (3) promotes
the traditional aims of punishment; (4) is rationally connected to
a nonpunitive purpose; (5) is excessive ‘in relation to the identified
nonpunitive purpose; (6) contains a sanction requiring a finding of
scienter; and (7) applies the sanction to behavior that is already a
crime. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. In Smith, the Court
focused on the first five as more relevant in evaluating Alaska’s reg-

istration and notification law, concluding the remaining two were
of “little weight.” 538 U.S. at 105. I will do the same.

HisTORICAL FORM OF PUNISHMENT

The majority holds that the 2011 KORA “crosses the line drawn
by Smith” by too closely resembling the shaming punishments
from the colonial period. 304 Kan. at 321. KORA does this, accord-
ing to the majority, by posting the registrant’s information on the
Internet, “branding” a registrant’s driver's license with the letters
“RO,” and requiring quarterly registration in each location where
an offender works, lives, or attends school. Let’s take each of these
in turn.

Posting offender information on the Internet

As summarized below, there is overwhelming federal author-
ity holding that Internet posting of registrant information is not
analogous to historical forms of punishment. The analysis used to
reach that conclusion applies in equal force to KORA, regardless
of other differences the statutory schemes may have. The majority
overreaches by rejecting this caselaw and adopting a contrary view.

In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that Alaska’s
offender registration act could apply retroactively and “[t]he fact
that Alaska posts the information on the Internet does not alter our
conclusion.” 538 U.S. at 99. The Court held the posting require-
ment was not akin to historical punishments despite recognizing
that it subjects the offender to public shame or humiliation be-
cause most of the information related to an already public criminal
record and dissemination of it furthers a legitimate governmental
objective. 538 U.S. at 99. The Smith Court explained:

“(T]he stigma of Alaska’s Megan’s Law results not from public display for ridicule
and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal
record, most of which is already public. Our system does not treat dissemination
of truthful information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as
punishment. On the contrary, our criminal law tradition insists on public indict-
ment, public trial, and public imposition of sentence. Transparency is essential to
maintaining public respect for the criminal justice system, ensuring its integrity,
and protecting the rights of the accused. The publicity may cause adverse conse-
quences for the convicted defendant, running from mild personal embarrassment

to social ostracism. In contrast to the colonial shaming punishments, however, the
State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part of the
objective of the regulatory scheme.” 538 U.S. at 98-99.

The Smith Court then added:

“The fact that Alaska posts the information on the Internet does not alter our
conclusion. It must be aclnowledged that notice of a criminal conviction subjects
the offender to public shame, the humiliation increasing in proportion to the ex-
tent of the publicity. And the geographic reach of the Internet is greater than any-
thing which could have been designed in colonial times. These facts do not render
Internet notification punitive. The purpose and the principal effect of notification
are to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate the offender. Wide-
spread public access is necessary for the efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant
humiliation is but a collateral consequence of a valid regulation.” 538 U.S. at 99.

In so holding, the Court’s analysis recognizes the obvious—post-
ing information on the Internet makes it far more accessible and
subjects the offender to increased shame and humiliation. Never-
theless, the Court held that Internet posting did not make Alaska’s
statutory scheme punitive.

The majority characterizes the Smith Court’s 2003 analysis of
the Internet as “antiquated,” and then concludes: “Any sugges-
tion that disseminating sex offender registration [information] on
an Internet website reaches no more members of the public and is
no more burdensome to the offender than maintaining an archived
criminal record simply ignores the reality of today’s world.” 304
Kan. at 321-22.

But as seen from its holding, Smith did not base its conclusion
on some old-fashioned, dial-up modem/floppy disk notion of the
World Wide Web; nor did it consider accessing offender informa-
tion on the Internet nothing more than a walk to the courthouse
to thumb through publicly available paper files. Smith’s rationale
withstands the more recent development of a mobile, smartphone
Internet. Indeed, these developments can be viewed as furthering
the nonpunitive, public safety ends supporting offender registra-
tion because, as Smith acknowledged, “[w]idespread public ac-
cess is necessary for the efficacy of the scheme.” Smith, 538 U.S.
at 99. The majority simply disagrees with the Court’s conclusion
but needs a rationale for considering the question further. This

becomes overwhelmingly evident when the authority from more
recent courts applying Smith is acknowledged.

Consider first the federal notification statute, SORNA. Similar
to KORA, the federal law requires that offender information in-
cluding the offenders’ names, physical descriptions, photographs,
criminal offenses, and criminal histories be made publicly available
on the Internet. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16914, 16918-16920 (2012). Un-
der SORNA, the states and enumerated territories, including the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, must each maintain websites
for this purpose. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(10); 16918(a) (2012). The
federal government, in turn, must maintain a website containing
“relevant information for each sex offender and other person listed
on a jurisdiction’s Internet site.” 42 U.S.C. § 16920. Each of these
websites must make the information obtainable “by a single query
for any given zip code or geographic radius set by the user.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 16918(a), 16920(b). And among SORNA’s others man-
dates, an appropriate official must affirmatively distribute notice of
an individual's sex offender status to “each school and public hous-
ing agency” in the area where that sex offender resides. 42 U.S.C. §
16921(b)(2) (2012). In short, SORNA goes further than the Alaska
scheme at issue in Smith and further than KORA as to affirmative
notification of statutorily specified groups.

Nevertheless, all federal circuits addressing whether SORNA’s
publication requirements are punitive have followed Smith and
held they are not, despite candidly recognizing they can result in
greatly increased public shame. See, ¢.g., Parks, 698 F.3d at 5-6
(noting the disadvantages from the publicity attendant to SORNA’s
Internet requirements “are obvious” and refusing to invalidate
SORNA due to “wide dissemination” of offender's information,
citing Smith); Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 937-38 (“SORNA, just as the
Smith scheme, merely provides for the ‘dissemination of accurate
information about a criminal record, most of which is already pub-
lic’”); see also United States v. Talada, 631 F. Supp. 2d 797, 808
(S.D. W. Va. 2009) (citing Smith and upholding SORNA as a valid
regulatory program even though it requires widespread Internet
dissemination of offenders’ information, a community notification
program, and in-person reporting).

—

Also persuasive is the Ninth Circuit’s 2012 decision uphold-

ing retroactive application of a Nevada statute that, among other
things, not only required Internet publication of registration in-
formation, but also active notification to specified groups over and
above what was required by SORNA, such as youth and religious
organizations. Masto, 670 F.3d at 1051. In rejecting any notion that
these features were akin to historical forms of punishment, the
Ninth Circuit held:
“Active dissemination of an individual's sex offender status does not alter the
[Smith] Courts core reasoning that ‘stigma... results not from public display for
ridicule and shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about
a criminal record, most of which is already public.’ [Citation omitted.] Though
‘humiliation increas[es] in proportion to the extent of the publicity,’ the ‘purpose
and the principal effect of notification are to inform the public for its own safety.”
[Citation omitted.]” 670 F.3d at 1056.

There is also recent state court authority, relying heavily on
Smith, that holds posting registered offenders’ information on the
Internet is not akin to traditional shaming punishments. See Kam-
merer v. State, 322 P.3d 827, 834-36 (Wyo. 2014) (“Although dis-
semination of information relating to a registrant’s status as a sex
offender may have negative consequences for the registrant, infor-
mation regarding the offense is made public at the time of trial, and
its publication under WSORA is merely a necessary consequence
of the Act’s intent to protect the public from harm.”); State v. Let-
alien, 2009 ME 130, { 38, 985 A.2d 4 (2009) (Internet posting of
sex offender information is not punitive in purpose or effect, citing
Smith; Maine and federal Ex Post Facto Clauses are coextensive);
see also Doe I v. Williams, 2013 ME 24, J 35, 61 A.3d 718 (2013)
(following Letalien).

I would follow this abundant caselaw and hold that KORA’s In-
ternet posting of information is not akin to historical shaming pun-
ishments. And in reaching that conclusion, I would further note
the majority’s discussion of the sharing functions available on the
Johnson County Sherriff’s website is irrelevant to the statute’s con-
stitutionality because KORA does not require this capability; and,
just as importantly, the majority cites no authority that would find a
federal ex post facto violation because of a nonstatutorily mandated
software feature added by a local law enforcement agency.

337

Regardless, given the overwhelming weight and substance of the
caselaw rejecting federal ex post facto challenges based on wide-
spread Internet dissemination of offender registration information,
as well as the federal courts’ more recent validations of Smith, I
would not consider Smith’s rationale to be “antiquated” or subject
to easy dismissal, and I would not weigh this against the statute’s
constitutionality. The majority errs in this regard.

“Branding” a registrant’s driver's license

Next, the majority declares that KORA “mimics [the] shaming
of old by branding the driver's license of a registrant with the desig-
nation, “RO.” 304 Kan. at 321. The majority is referring to K.S.A.
2011 Supp. 8-243, which provides that an offender's driver's license
“shall be assigned a distinguishing number by the division [of mo-
tor vehicles] which will readily indicate to law enforcement officers
that such person is a registered offender. The division shall develop
a numbering system to implement the provisions of this subsec-
tion.” This requirement, while not technically contained in KORA,
differentiates Kansas laws from SORNA, although the statute only
requires a distinguishing number and the “RO” practice is just a
decision by a state agency that is not specifically dictated by the
statute. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-243(d).

The majority draws support for its view from a divided decision
in Starkey v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, 305
P.3d 1004 (2013), which considered the Oklahoma Constitution’s
Ex Post Facto Clause. See Okla. Const., art. 2, § 15. But I do not
find Starkey persuasive for several reasons.

First, although the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied the in-
tent-effects test, that court’s majority suggests they applied a lower
standard as to when the effects of a measure are punitive under the
Oklahoma Ex Post Facto Clause by noting that the United States
Constitution simply establishes a floor for constitutional rights in
Oklahoma. 2013 OK 43, § 45 (“How we apply the ‘intent-effects’
test is not governed by how the federal courts have independently
applied the same test under the United States Constitution as long
as our interpretation is at least as protective as the federal inter-
pretation.”). Second, Olahoma’s offender registry law imposed

harsher restraints on offenders because of residency boundaries
(minimum distance from schools, playgrounds, etc.) and a require-
ment that Oklahoma driver's licenses and identification cards spell
out the term “Sex Offender.” In contrast, KORA contains no resi-
dency exclusions and Kansas simply uses as a matter of state agen-
cy practice an abbreviation (RO), which applies equally to non-
sex-offenders. Finally, the Starkey court relied upon the totality
of the Oklahoma law’ harsher circumstances when determining
they weighed in favor of punishment. 2013 OK 43, § 61 (“[W]e are
not making a determination of the constitutionality of any of these
individual registration requirements but for purposes of analyzing
the second Mendoza-Martinez factor we find the totality of these
requirements weigh in favor of punishment.”).

Offering a different analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
unanimous decision in Smith v. State, 84 So. 3d 487 (La. 2012),
reached the opposite conclusion regarding its driver's license la-
beling and is more on point. In so holding, the Louisiana court
acknowledged that including the words “sex offender” printed in
orange color on an offender's driver's license “may be remotely
similar to historical forms of punishment, such as public humilia-
tion, [but] the immediate need for public protection was a corollary
of, rather than an addendum to, the punishment for sex offend-
ers.” Smith, 84 So. 3d at 496 n.7-8, 498. The.court then concluded
that the requirement of a notation on an offender's driver’s license
“may be harsh, may impact a sex offender's life in a long-lived and
intense manner, and also be quite burdensome to the sex offender,
[but] we do not find them to constitute an infringement of the prin-
ciples of ex post facto.” 84 So. 3d at 499.

Admittedly, the Louisiana court did not articulate whether it was
relying on the federal or state constitution for its holding, but this
does not appear to make a difference because that court had previ-
ously held Louisiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause offers the same protec-
tions because it was patterned after the United States Constitution.
See State ex rel. Olvieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735 (La. 2001). For
this reason, I find the Louisiana decision more persuasive than the
Oldahoma decision.

339

Quarterly registration

Next, the majority labels KORA’ quarterly, in-person registra-
tion requirements for each location where the offender works,
lives, or attends school as “a traditional means of punishment” by
likening the requirement to probation or parole. 304 Kan. at 322.
It does so without citation to any authority or explanation as to how
quarterly reporting mandates offend federal ex post facto caselaw.
Again, a review of the unanimous federal caselaw upholding SOR-
NA is persuasive and leads to a contrary conclusion.

SORNA’ in-person reporting requirements differentiate be-
tween types of sex offenses in determining the frequency of in-
person reporting. There must be in-person verification “not less
frequently than” once a year for Tier I sex offenders, twice a year
for Tier II sex offenders, and four times per year for Tier III sex
offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16916 (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (defin-
ing Tiers I, II, and III). In Parks, the First Circuit recently noted
SORNA’ in-person requirement was “surely burdensome for those
subject to it,” but nevertheless concluded this was not punitive,
noting:

“To appear in person to update a registration is doubtless more inconvenient
than doing so by telephone, mail or web entry; but it serves the remedial purpose
of establishing that the individual is in the vicinity and not in some other juris-
diction where he may not have registered, confirms identity by fingerprints and
records the individual's current appearance. Further, the inconvenience is surely
minor compared to the disadvantages of the underlying scheme in its consequenc-
es for renting housing, obtaining work and the like—-consequences that were part
of the package that Smith itself upheld.” 698 F.3d at 6.

See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1281-82 (2d Cir. 1997); see also
Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2014) (approving trien-
nial, in-person reporting as being reasonably related to the nonpu-
nitive, prospective goals of protecting the public and facilitating
law enforcement efforts).

Admittedly, KORA’s reporting requirements are more burden-
some than those in SORNA because under KORA, all sex offend-
ers are subject to in-person registration four times per year, and
drug and violent offenders must report in person a minimum of
three times per year. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(b). KORA fur-

—  _.

ther requires an offender to report registration changes in person
“to the . . . agency or agencies where last registered.” (Emphasis
added.) K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4905(a), (g). In addition, the defini-
tion of “reside” in KORA is broader than the definition in SORNA.
Compare K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4902(j) (definition of “reside”) with
SORNAs 42 U.S.C. § 16911. Therefore, it is obvious KORA im-
poses a greater registration burden on the offender than SORNA.
But the question is whether the federal courts would view these
changes as tipping the balance. I think not.

Consider again as an example Matso in which the Ninth Ci
cuit rejected a federal ex post facto challenge to a Nevada law that
essentially mirrored SORNA’ registration requirements, but also
expanded the category of individuals required to register, added to
the frequency offenders were subject to registration, and required
in-person registration. Matso, 670 F.3d at 1051; see also Litmon,
768 F.3d at 1242-43 (holding California’s 90-day, in-person lifetime
registration requirement does not violate federal ex post facto prin-
ciples); Hatton, 356 F.3d at 965 (no evidence California’s registra-
tion requirement has an objective to shame, ridicule, or stigmatize
sex offenders). These decisions strongly point in a direction that
indicates KORA’s reporting requirements do not offend federal ex
post facto principles.

Additionally, the majority’s analogy to probation is not persua-
sive. While probation/parole may have “reporting” in common in
the abstract, this is only one aspect of many conditions attached
to these punishments. For example, probationers are subject to
searches of their persons and property simply on reasonable suspi-
cion of a probation violation or criminal activity and are subject to
random drug tests. They may also be required to avoid “injurious
or vicious habits” and “persons or places of disreputable or harm-
ful character”; permit state agents to visit their homes; remain in
Kansas unless given permission to leave; work “faithfully at suitable
employment’; perform community service; go on house arrest; and
even serve time in a county jail. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6607(b), (c).

In sum, I do not believe the federal courts, more specifically the
United States Supreme Court, would hold that this historical-form-
of-punishment factor weighs toward an ex post facto violation.

341

AFFIRMATIVE DisaBILITY OR RESTRAINT

The majority focuses next on what it characterizes as the “more
common restraint on an offender's freedom of movement” under
KORA, which is the quarterly registration requirement in each ap-
plicable jurisdiction and the required $20 registration fee, as well
as the KORA% broader definition of the word “resides.” 304 Kan.
at 323, The majority notes the registration costs, depending on cir-
cumstances, could be $80 to $240 annually.

But the majority fails to explain how the federal courts would
hold that these components of KORA would weigh this factor
against the Kansas law. For example, no evidence was presented
establishing that the KORA registration costs were a fine instead of
afee. See Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“The burden of proving that it is a fine is on the plaintiffs .. . .”).

In Mueller, the Seventh Circuit recently upheld Wisconsin's an-
nual $100 registration fee against a sex offender who moved out-
of-state but was still required to register in Wisconsin. In doing so,
the court noted first that plaintiff had done nothing to get over the
first hurdle by presenting evidence regarding the fee versus the
registration program’s cost. 740 F.3d at 1134 (“[T]hey cannot get
to first base without evidence that it is grossly disproportionate to
the annual cost of keeping track of a sex offender registrant—and
they have presented no evidence of that either. They haven’t even
tried.”). Similarly, Doe has done nothing as to this evidentiary hu
dle, yet the majority strikes this factor against KORA even though
the burden is on the challenger and the statute is presumed con-
stitutional.

Second, the Seventh Circuit noted the nonpunitive purpose of

collecting fees and where the responsibility lies for having to pro-
vide a registry, stating:
“The state provides a service to the law-abiding public by maintaining a sex of-
fender registry, but there would be no service and hence no expense were there
no sex offenders. As they are responsible for the expense, there is nothing punitive
about requiring them to defray it.” 740 F.3d at 1135.

If it is the potential for a total annual cost of $240 that offends
the majority, what is the legal basis for that? The majority leaves
this unexplained.

342

Next, the majority holds that housing and employment prob-
lems result from the registry, which ties back to the widespread dis-
semination of information on the Internet discussed above, which
Smith and the other federal courts have plainly rejected. But the
majority believes KORA suffers an additional evidentiary blow be-
cause of direct evidence that Doe actually lost a job and housing
opportunities because of the Internet registry. I disagree this tips
the balance when the caselaw is considered.

As noted earlier, my review of federal caselaw from Smith on
down shows the courts have fully understood that actual conse-
quences result from offender registration and have not dismissed
these consequences simply as conjecture. See, ¢.g., Smith, 538 U.S.
at 99; Parks, 698 F.3d at 6 (“The prospective disadvantages to Parks
from such publicity are obvious.”). Indeed, several courts have ap-
proved state laws that imposed actual residential living restrictions
on offenders, which are literally off-limits zones disabling offend-
ers from living in close proximity to schools, playgrounds, etc. See
Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (Lowa’s 2,000-foot buf-
fer zone regulatory, not punitive); Salter v. State, 971 So. 2d 31
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (approving 2,000-foot buffer zone); People
v. Leroy, 357 Ill. App. 3d 530, 828 N.E.2d 769 (2005) (approv-
ing 500-foot buffer zone); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa
2005) (upholding 2,000-foot buffer zone); see also Doe v. Brede-
sen, 507 F.3d 998, 1004 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The [Tennessee] Act’s
registration, reporting, and surveillance components are not of a
type that we have traditionally considered as a punishment, and
the district court correctly found that they do not constitute an af-
firmative disability or restraint in light of the legislature’s intent.”);
Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 186 N.C. App. 134, 650 $.E.2d 618
(2007) (upholding ban on entering public park); Doe v. Baker, No.
Civ. A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (unpub-
lished opinion) (upholding 1,000-foot buffer zone). Clearly, such
exclusions cause lost opportunities for housing and employment
for offenders, yet these prohibitions were upheld as nonpunitive.

I am not persuaded the federal courts would find KORA to im-
pose requirements traditionally considered to be affirmative dis-
abilities or restraints to the point of weighing this factor against
constitutionality.

i

‘TRADITIONAL AIMS OF PUNISHMENT

The third Mendoza-Martinez factor is whether the “regulatory
scheme . . . promotes the traditional aims of punishment.” Smith,
538 U.S. at 97. The Court has described those aims as retribution
and deterrence. See, ¢.g., Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.

The majority's analysis of this factor is muddled and difficult to
unpack. It is unclear to me whether the majority is relying on the
articles attached to Doe’s summary judgment motion or its own
intuition. As best as I can tell, the majority ultimately ignores the
attachments and simply holds that KORA promotes traditional
aims of punishment because the legislature increased the report-
ing term from 10 to 25 years. 304 Kan. at 325. But this conclusion
is at odds with the federal caselaw.

But the fact that KORA has a deterrent effect is not conclusive.
The Smith Court found that “[alny number of government pro-
grams might deter crime without imposing punishment” and “‘[t]
o hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such
sanctions “criminal” . . . would severely undermine the Govern-
ment’s ability to engage in effective regulation.’ [Citations omit-
ted.]” 538 U.S. at 102. The Court also rejected the lower court’s
finding that Alaska’s registration obligations were retributive based
upon the length of reporting differing between individuals convict-
ed of nonaggravated offenses and those “convicted of aggravated
or multiple offenses.” 538 U.S. at 102. The Court found the “cat-
egories . . . and the corresponding length of the reporting require-
ment are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this
is consistent with the regulatory objective.” (Emphasis added.) 538
US. at 102.

The Smith Court’s analysis is equally applicable to KORA,
though not wholly dispositive because the Court was addressing a
15-year registration requirement and KORA has a 25-year require-
ment. But SORNA imposes a 25-year registration requirement on
Tier IT offenders and a lifetime requirement on Tier III offenders,
42 U.S.C. § 16915 (2012), and the federal courts addressing this
issue have upheld SORNA based on Smith.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed this registration requirement in
W.B.H. and held that SORNA is no different than the Alaska act at

— J

issue in Smith. 664 F.3d at 858-59. The W.B.H. court reasoned that
SORNA is “reasonably related to the danger of recidivism posed by
sex offenders.” 664 F.3d at 858. And the court explained that while
SORNA “allows the public and law enforcement to determine the
general whereabouts of convicted sex offenders, . . . it does not di-
rectly restrict their mobility, their employment, or how they spend
their time.” 664 F.3d at 858. So, the court found that any deterrent
effect or purpose of SORNA does not justify a finding that the act’s
purpose is punitive. 664 F.3d at 858; see also Under Seal, 709 F.3d
at 265 (quoting from Smith to find that SORNA does not promote
traditional aims of punishment).

I would find under Smith and the cases interpreting SORNA
that the traditional aims of punishment factor weighs in favor of
KORA being fairly characterized as nonpunitive.

RATIONAL CONNECTION TO NONPUNITIVE PURPOSE

In Smith, the Court identified this as “a ‘most significant’ factor
in our determination that the statute's effects are not punitive.” 538
U.S. at 102 (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116
S. Ct. 2135, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 [1996]). The Smith Court did not
elaborate on what is meant by “rational connection to a nonpun-
tive purpose” before analyzing the Alaska act under the standard.
One commentator has noted that the standard is “deferential to
the state purpose (much like rational basis review under substan-
tive due process analysis).” Hobson, Banishing Acts: How Far May
States Go to Keep Convicted Sex Offenders Away from Children?,
40 Ga. L. Rev. 961, 984 (2006). In State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 774,
187 P.3d 1283 (2008), this court determined that “the registration
act was intended to promote public safety and to protect the public
from sex offenders, who constitute a class of criminals that is likely
to reoffend.”

The majority concludes that arguably under the current version
of KORA, “public safety has become a pretext.” 304 Kan. at 326.
The majority finds fault with KORA because it does not distinguish
between types of offenders and contains no mechanism for reliev-
ing a “fully rehabilitated” offender from its notification burdens.
But the Ninth Circuit and others have rejected similar arguments.
In Matso, the court held:

“Plaintiffs argue Smith overstated the risk of sex-offender recidivism. They
note that Smith cited several studies on sex offender recidivism. See id. at 104,
Plaintiffs then rely on an expert declaration critiquing the methodology of the
recidivism studies in Smith. The district court did not make any factual finding
regarding the risk of sex offender recidivism. Even had it adopted the declaration’s
conclusions as its own, a recalibrated assessment of recidivism risk would not re-
fute the legitimate public safety interest in monitoring sex-offender presence in
the community.” 670 F.3d at 1057.

See also Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1006 (Tennessee Legislature “could
rationally conclude that sex offenders present an unusually high
risk of recidivism, and that stringent registration, reporting, and
electronic surveillance requirements can reduce that risk and
thereby protect the public” and concluding that “[wJhere there is
such a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, it is not for
the courts to second-guess the state legislature’s policy decision”).
In addition, the Second Circuit recently held the New York Legis-
lature’s “decision to eliminate the possibility of relief from registra-
tion for twenty years” for level one offenders did not render the
registration provisions punitive. Cuomo, 755 F.3d at 112.

The majority fails to cite any authority for its analysis of this fac-
tor; and the proposition that offender registration schemes are ra-
tionally related to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety finds
overwhelming approval in the federal caselaw. Even Myers, 260
Kan. at 681, appears to assume offender registration is rationally
connected to public safety, and the Alaska state case that held post-
Smith changes to the Alaska act were an ex post facto violation ad-
mits registration, at least as to sex offenders, advances a nonpuni-
tive public safety purpose. See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1015-16
(Alaska 2008).

I do not see how the majority can say no public safety purpose is
rationally furthered by having sex, drug, and violent offenders reg-
ister. I would follow the referenced precedent and hold that KORA
has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, so this factor
does not weight towards punishment.

EXCESSIVE IN RELATION TO REGULATORY PURPOSE

In Smith, the Court clarified that “[t]he excessiveness inquiry of
our ex post facto jurisprudence is not an exercise in determining

whether the legislature has made the best choice possible to ad-
dress the problem it seeks to remedy. The question is whether the
regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive
objective.” 538 U.S. at 105. The Smith Court further noted that
ex post facto jurisprudence does not preclude a state from making
reasonable categorical judgments that certain crimes should have
particular regulatory consequence.

Instead of independently analyzing this factor, the majority
merely harkens back to the ground it already plowed, concluding:
“Our discussion of the other factors has touched upon the excessive
nature of KORA.” 304 Kan. at 327. The majority then specifically
cites the fact that the 2011 KORA amendments required more in-
formation from the offenders and that the penalty for noncompli-
ance has increased. 304 Kan. at 327. I would hold that neither of
these requirements is excessive given KORA’s public safety pur-
pose based on the authority cited above.

CONCLUSION

Although the 2011 KORA offender registration scheme impos-
es a number of burdens on sex offenders, I believe the applicable
federal caselaw considering similar burdens under other offender
registration schemes compels us to conclude that the 2011 KORA
amendments do not violate the United States Constitution’s Ex
Post Facto Clause as applied to sex offenders and that the United
States Supreme Court would so hold.

Nuss, C.J., and Luckert, J., join in the foregoing concurring
and dissenting opinion.

Est

No. 110,468

STATE OF Kansas, Appell JorDAN A. MULLEN, Appellant.
‘1 P.3d 905)

Joanna Labistida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and
was on the brief for appellant.

Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and, Stephen
M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him
on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSEN, J.: Jordan Mullen filed a motion to suppress evidence
resulting from a search of a house where he was staying in Shaw-
nee, Kansas. The search was conducted pursuant to an anticipatory
search warrant which purported to give law enforcement authority
to search the house once a suspicious package—addressed to the
house in Shawnee and likely containing illegal drugs—was success-
fully delivered to a resident of the house. The district court denied
Mullen’s motion to suppress, concluding that the search warrant
was supported by probable cause and that the event triggering the
warrant’s execution occurred when Mullen, under the surveillance
of law enforcement, retrieved the package from the front porch
and brought it inside the home. The Court of Appeals agreed and
affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the search warrant
and its execution. See State v. Mullen, 51 Kan. App. 2d 514, 348
P.3d 619 (2015). This court granted Mullen’s petition for review
challenging the Court of Appeals decision. We affirm.

pT

349

FACTS

On November 8, 2011, Steve Hahne, a detective with the special
investigations unit of the Shawnee Police Department, prepared
an affidavit in support of a search warrant for a home located in
Shawnee, Kansas. Within the affidavit, Hahne stated the following
pertinent facts:

“J, 11/08/2011, the Affiant was contacted by Detective Shaun Miller of the
Shawnee Police Department's Special Investigations Unit. Detective
Miller was contacted on the telephone by United States Postal Inspec-
tor Justin Lewis. Postal Inspector Lewis reported while he was check-
ing mail on today’s date at the Kansas City, Missouri processing and dis-
tribution center located at 1700 Cleveland Ave., he saw a box addressed
to a name that was un-readable at 5807 Meadowsweet Lane, Shawnee,
Kansas. Inspector Lewis checks mail randomly in order to intercept
contraband being delivered via United States Postal Service. The box
weighs 5 lbs. 12.6 ounces. The package originated from a U.S. Post Of-
fice located in Oakland, California. The return address on the package
is also from Oakland, California. The Affiant knows through his training
and experience that California is a source state of high grade marijuana
as well as other illicit substances.

“2, A computer check revealed 5807 Meadowsweet Shawnee; Johnson
County, Kansas is occupied by a David B. Grooms, w/m, 01/04/1967
anda Jacob R. Grooms, w/m, 06/05/1993.

“3. The parcel from the sort was placed with other unrelated parcels.
Kansas City Missouri Police Officer Canine Handler Antonio Garcia
directed K-9 Franz to the packages. Upon K-9 Franz coming into con-
tact with the parcel, K-9 Franz sat alerting to the odor of narcotics in
or about the parcel. The parcel was then taken into the custody of The
Kansas City, Missouri Police Department, until.a search warrant could
be obtained.

“4, K-9 Franz is a 7 year old German shepherd and is trained and certi-
fied to alert to the odors of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, and
heroin. K-9 Franz has assisted in the seizure of 4,641.4 pounds of mari-
juana, 75.8 pounds of cocaine, 13 pounds of Methamphetamine, 23.3
pounds of Heroin, and $1,845,686.00 in U.S. currency.

“5, The Affiant knows that U.S. Postal Service Inspector Justin Lewis will
attempt to deliver the package to a resident of 5807 Meadowsweet
Lane, Shawnee, Johnson County, Kansas. Based on the successful con-
trolled delivery to a resident, the Affiant is requesting permission to
execute this warrant at 5807 Meadowsweet Lane, Shawnee, Johnson

’ Ee

County, Kansas, Should the delivery not be made, this warrant will not
be executed.” (Emphasis added.)

Based on these facts, a district court judge signed a search war-
rant for 5807 Meadowsweet Lane, authorizing law enforcement to
search the home for evidence of illegal drugs.

That same day, Hahne, along with other members of the spe-
cial investigations unit, set up a surveillance of the home. At ap-
proximately 1 p.m., Inspector Lewis, dressed as a mail carrier and
driving a postal vehicle, arrived at the residence with the package.
Lewis knocked on the front door and announced, “Post Office,” but
no one answered. After waiting about a minute, Lewis set the pack-
age down by the front door (the package’s sender did not require a
signature for delivery) and left in the postal vehicle. At 1:06 p.m.,
an individual, later identified as Mullen, came out of the house
through the front door, retrieved the package, and went back in-
side.

At 1:17 p.m., law enforcement entered the home and found only
Mullen inside the house. The package, still unopened, was lying on
the kitchen countertop. Law enforcement opened the package and
discovered marijuana inside (the Johnson County Crime lab later
confirmed that the package contained 896.1 grams of marijuana).
After being apprised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), Mullen told
Hahne that he had recently begun staying at the house and had
agreed to be there that day so he could bring the package inside
the house once it arrived in the mail. Mullen was then supposed to
watch over the package until one of three people (Alex Firth, Noah
Schrader, or Jacob Grooms) arrived at the house to retrieve it. Mul-
len admitted to knowing that the package contained marijuana.

Mullen was ultimately charged with possession of marijuana
with the intent to distribute. Mullen filed a motion to suppress the
marijuana as well as his statements to the police, arguing that the
triggering event within the anticipatory search warrant (i.¢., “the
successful controlled delivery to a resident” of the home) required
Lewis to hand deliver the package to a resident of the home. Mul-
len contended that because Lewis simply left the package on the
front porch, a controlled delivery never occurred and, consequent-

351

ly, law enforcement acted in violation of the search warrant when
they entered the home after Mullen retrieved the package.

The State argued that a controlled delivery did occur because,
once the postal inspector left the package on the front porch, the
package remained under the constant surveillance of law enforce-
ment until Mullen eventually brought the package inside the home.
Thus, according to the State, law enforcement acted properly in ex-
ecuting the search warrant.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Hahne
stated that the warrant’s triggering event required that the pack-
age, while under the surveillance of law enforcement, be delivered
to the home and that the package be taken inside the home by a
resident. Though he had agreed with defense counsel’s statement
at Mullen’s preliminary hearing that a “controlled delivery” would
require handing the package to a resident of the home, Hahne in-
dicated at the suppression hearing that a controlled delivery was
accomplished in this case when Mullen, under the law enforce-
ment surveillance, retrieved the package from the front porch and
brought it inside the home.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court reserved rul-
ing on whether a controlled delivery occurred and asked for sup-
plemental briefing on whether probable cause to search a home for

legal drugs is established merely because a resident of the home

ings a package—mailed to the residence and likely containing
legal drugs—into the home. At a subsequent hearing, the district
court ruled that the search warrant was supported by probable
cause and that law enforcement effected a controlled delivery of
the package, reasoning that Mullen’s retrieval of the package from
the front porch while under police surveillance was sufficient to
trigger execution of the search warrant.

Later, Mullen agreed to a bench trial on stipulated facts while
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress. The district found Mullen guilty, imposed an underly-
ing prison sentence of 22 months and placed him on probation for
18 months.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Mullen’s arguments
concerning the lack of probable cause supporting the search war-

or

rant or that a controlled delivery never occurred. The Court of
Appeals, however, found that the record failed to show that the
district court advised Mullen of his right to a jury trial before he
waived that right by signing the stipulation of facts. As a result,
the Court of Appeals reversed Mullen’s conviction and remanded
the case for further proceedings. Mullen, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 526.
Mullen filed a petition with this court seeking review of the Court
of Appeals decision affirming the denial of his motion to suppress.
The State filed a cross-petition seeking review of the Court of Ap-
peals decision concluding that Mullen’s jury trial waiver was in-
valid. This court granted Mullen’s petition for review but denied
the State’s cross-petition.

ANALYSIS
Probable Cause for the Search Warrant

Mullen argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. He con-
tends that without evidence showing that occupants of a particular
home are involved in drug activity, the mere fact that an occupant
brings a package—addressed to the residence and likely containing
illegal drugs—inside the home does not provide probable cause to
search the home for illegal drugs.

Before the Court of Appeals, the State argued that Mullen
should not be allowed to raise this argument on appeal because
he failed to raise it before the district court. The State pointed out
that Mullen’s sole argument in favor of suppression was that the
event triggering the warrant’s execution, i.¢., a controlled delivery
of the package to a resident, never occurred. The Court of Ap-
peals rejected the State’s contention and addressed the merits of
Mullen’s probable cause argument, noting that the district court, in
lenying Mullen’s suppression motion, addressed whether probable
cause supported the anticipatory search warrant. Mullen, 51 Kan.
App. 2d at 519-20, We conclude that the Court of Appeals properly
addressed the issue; likewise, we reach the merits of the issue. See
Huffmier v. Hamilton, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1163, 1167, 57 P.3d 819
(2002), rev. denied 275 Kan. 964 (2003) (when trial court chooses

CC

to address issue not raised by the parties, appellate court may ad-
dress issue as well).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees the right to be free from “unreasonable searches and sei-
zures” and that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation.” Section 15 of the Kansas Con-
stitution Bill of Rights provides the same protections. State v. Dan-
iel, 291 Kan. 490, 498, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010), cert. denied 563 U.S.
945 (2011). When evidence is illegally obtained, its suppression
may be warranted under the exclusionary rule, which is a judicially
created rule that safeguards against unconstitutional searches and
seizures by suppressing illegally seized evidence as a deterrent to
future violations. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104
S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984); Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496.

A judge deciding whether an affidavit supplies probable cause
for a search warrant considers the totality of the circumstances pre-
sented and makes “a practical, common-sense decision whether a
crime has been or is being committed and whether there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.” State v. Hicks, 282 Kan. 599, 613-14, 147 P.3d
1076 (2006). In Hicks, this court discussed an appellate court's role
when reviewing a lower court’s probable cause determination:

“When an affidavit in support of an application for search warrant is chal-
lenged, the task of the reviewing court is to ensure that the issuing magistrate
had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. This standard is
inherently deferential. It does not demand that the reviewing court determine
whether, as a matter of law, probable cause existed; rather, the standard translates
to whether the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate’s determi-
nation that there is a fair probability that evidence will be found in the place to be
searched. Because the reviewing court is able to evaluate the necessarily undis-
puted content of an affidavit as well as the issuing magistrate, the reviewing court
may perform its own evaluation of the affidavit’s sufficiency under this deferential
standard.” 282 Kan. 599, Syl. { 2.

In United State v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 164 L.
Ed, 2d 195 (2006), the United States Supreme Court upheld the
validity of anticipatory search warrants under the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Court stated:

“An anticipatory warrant is ‘a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable
cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will
be located at a specified place.’ [Citation omitted.] Most anticipatory warrants
subject their execution to some condition precedent other than the mere passage
of time—a so-called ‘triggering condition.’ . . . If the government were to execute
an anticipatory warrant before the triggering condition occurred, there would be
no reason to believe the item described in the warrant could be found at the
searched location; by definition, the triggering condition which establishes prob-
able cause has not yet been satisfied when the warrant is issued.” 547 U.S. at 94.

The Grubbs Court then concluded:

“[FJor a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth Amend-
ment’s requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be
satisfied. It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs ‘there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place,’ [citation omitted] but also that there is probable cause to believe the trig-
gering condition will occur. The supporting affidavit must provide the magistrate
with sufficient information to evaluate both aspects of the probable-cause deter-
mination. [Citation omitted.]” 547 U.S. at 96-97.

See also United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir.
1998) (“As with all warrants, probable cause to support an anticipa-
tory warrant ‘does not exist unless a sufficient nexus between the
[contraband] and the place to be searched exists.’ [Citation omit-
ted.]”).

In Grubbs, officers from the Postal Inspection Service arranged
a controlled delivery of a videotape containing child pornography
to the defendant’s residence. The defendant had ordered the vid-
eotape from a website operated by an undercover postal inspector.
The affidavit made out in support of the search warrant for the
defendant’s home stated:
“Execution of this search warrant will not occur unless and until the parcel
has been received by a person(s) and has been physically taken into the resi-
dence. . . . At that time, and not before, this search warrant will be executed by
me and other United States Postal inspectors, with appropriate assistance from
other law enforcement officers in accordance with this warrant’s command,’” 547
US. at 92. a .

In concluding that the search warrant was supported by prob-
able cause, the Court stated:

“[TJhe occurrence of the triggering condition—successful delivery of the video-
tape to [the defendant's] residence—would plainly establish probable cause for

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the search. In addition, the affidavit established probable cause to believe the trig-
gering condition would be satisfied. Although it is possible that [the defendant]
could have refused delivery of the videotape he had ordered, that was unlikely.
‘The Magistrate therefore ‘had a “substantial basis for . .. conclud[ing]” that prob-
able cause existed.’ [Citations omitted.]” 547 U.S. at 97.

Mullen argues that Grubbs stands for the proposition that in
order for an anticipatory search warrant of a home to be supported
by probable cause, there must be evidence indicating that an oc-
cupant of the home anticipates receiving a package in the mail con-
taining contraband. In support of this contention, Mullen points
to a single sentence in Grubbs’ statement of facts which states that
the defendant “purchased a videotape containing child pornogra-
phy from a Web site operated by an undercover postal inspector.”
547 U.S. at 92.

Mullen places too much significance on this sentence. Nowhere
in Grubbs’ legal analysis did the Court point to or rely on evidence
showing the defendant’s knowledge or intention of receiving child
pornography through the mail as contributing to the probable
cause necessary to issue an anticipatory search warrant of the de-
fendant’s residence. Instead, the Court focused solely on whether
the affidavit made in support of the search warrant established a
fair probability (é.¢., probable cause) that contraband or evidence
of a crime would be found inside the defendant’s home once the
triggering event occurred and whether there was a fair probability
that the triggering event would occur. Because execution of the
search warrant was contingent upon the government delivering the
package—addressed to the defendant’s home and containing child
pornography—to the defendant’s residence, the Court concluded
that both prongs of the probable cause determination were satis-
fied. 547 U.S. at 94-97.

An argument similar to the one Mullen raises here was addressed
and rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 1997). There, the court
concluded that an anticipatory search warrant of a residence was
supported by probable cause when the affidavit made in support
of the warrant merely alleged that a parcel containing contraband
was mailed to the residence and that the warrant would not be ex-

ecuted until the parcel was delivered “to a responsible adult at the
residence . . . who willingly ‘accept[s] delivery’ and signs a receipt
therefor.” 112 F.3d at 1083. In reaching this holding, the Hugo-
boom court rejected the defendant's argument that the search war-
rant lacked probable cause because there was no evidence—be-
sides the parcel being mailed to the residence—of drug activities
taking place at the location. 112 F.3d at 1086.

The Tenth Circuit later fleshed out Hugoboom’s holding in Row-
land. There, the court stated:

“As recognized in Hugoboom, when the warrant application indicates there will
be a government-controlled delivery of contraband to the place to be searched,
probable cause for a search is established and an anticipatory warrant may be is-
sued, provided the warrant’s execution is conditioned on the contraband’s delivery
to, or receipt at, the designated place. [Citations omitted.] In this context, the
Hugoboom court indicated that when the warrant affidavit refers to a controlled
delivery of contraband to the place designated for search, the nexus requirement
of probable cause is satisfied and the affidavit need not provide additional inde-
pendent evidence linking the place to be searched to criminal activity.” (Emphasis
added.) Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1202-03.

See also United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir.
1996) (“Several circuits agree that in order for an anticipatory war-
rant to satisfy the probable cause standard it must demonstrate that
contraband is on a ‘sure course’ to the destination to be searched.”).
Similarly, in United States v. Lawson, 999 F.2d 985 (6th Cir.
1993), the Sixth Circuit concluded that a controlled delivery of a
package—amailed to the defendant's residence and containing 6
ounces of cocaine—provided probable cause to issue an anticipa-
tory search warrant of the residence. Notably, the court rejected
the argument that additional evidence connecting the residence
with drug activity was needed in order to guard against an occupant
being “set up” by unknowingly receiving contraband in the mail.
The court reasoned “that one does not send six ounces of cocaine
through the mail to a specific address on a whim.” 999 F.2d at 988.
See also United States v. Washington, 852 F.2d 803, 804 (4th Cir.
1988) (rejecting defendant’s argument that delivery of package ad-
dressed to his residence and containing 154 grams of heroin did
not provide probable cause for an anticipatory search warrant of
his home; though neither the defendant nor his roommates were

| tw a

named on the package as the intended recipient, court reasoned
that “[i]t is common knowledge that fictitious names are frequently
used in illicit drug trafficking.”).

The following facts can be gleaned from the affidavit at issue
here:

* The package had been flagged as suspicious by a postal inspector at the
Kansas City, Missouri, processing and distribution center;

* The package had been mailed from a known narcotics source state;

* The package was addressed to an illegible name at a house located on
Meadowsweet Lane in Shawnee;

© The package weighed 5 lbs. 12.6 oz;

* AK-9 unit trained and certified to alert to the odors of marijuana, cocaine,
methamphetamine, and heroin alerted on the package; and

* A-search of the house on Meadowsweet Lane would not occur until a con-
trolled delivery of the package to a resident of the house was accomplished.

These facts establish a fair probability that the package—ad-
dressed to the residence on Meadowsweet Lane—contained illegal
drugs and, thus, constituted evidence of an illegal drug trafficking
scheme. Cf. State v. Barker, 252 Kan. 949, 959-60, 850 P.2d 885
(1993) (A K-9 alert may supply probable cause necessary to search
a vehicle as long as there is some evidence that K-9’s behavior reli-
ably indicates the likely presence of a controlled substance.). Fur-
ther, the search warrant’s triggering event—the controlled delivery
of the package to a resident of the house—would establish a fair
probability that, upon execution of the search warrant, contraband
or evidence of a crime would be found inside the house. Addi-
tionally, the affidavit established probable cause to believe that the
triggering event—a controlled delivery to a resident of the house,
effected by a postal inspector—would be satisfied. Thus, we con-
clude that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the district
court judge’s determination that probable cause supported a search
warrant of the home.

The Controlled Delivery

Mullen argues that the search warrant was not validly executed

because the triggering event—a successful controlled delivery to
a resident of the home—did not occur. Mullen contends that in
order to accomplish a controlled delivery, Inspector Lewis was re-
quired to hand deliver the package to a resident of the home.

Whether the undisputed facts of this case establish that a con-
trolled delivery was accomplished appears to raise a question of law
subject to unlimited review. See State v. James, 301 Kan. 898, 908,
349 P.3d 457 (2015) (“When the material facts are not in dispute,
as here, we will exercise plenary review of the district court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress evidence.”). Relevant to this inquiry are
the guiding principles stated in Hicks for determining whether an
affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant:

“When an affidavit in support of an application for search warrantiis challenged,
the task of the reviewing court is to ensure that the issuing magistrate had a sub-
stantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. This standard is inherently
deferential. It does not demand that the reviewing court determine whether, as a
matter of law, probable cause existed; rather, the standard translates to whether
the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate’s determination that
there is a fair probability that evidence will be found in the place to be searched.
Because the reviewing court is able to evaluate the necessarily undisputed content
of an affidavit as well as the issuing magistrate, the reviewing court may perform
its own evaluation of the affidavit’s sufficiency under this deferential standard.”
(Emphasis added.) 282 Kan. 599, Syl. 2.

To support his argument that a controlled delivery requires a
hand-to-hand delivery, Mullen points to two Kansas cases: State
v. Duhon, 33 Kan. App. 2d 859, 861, 109 P.3d 1282 (2005), and
State v. Windes, 13 Kan. App. 2d 577, 578-79, 776 P.2d 477 (1989).
While both cases describe, within their respective statement of
facts, a controlled delivery occurring when a package was directly
handed to each defendant, the State correctly responds that “nei-
ther case addressed whether a hand-to-hand delivery was the only
method through which a controlled delivery could be completed.”

In determining how a controlled delivery is accomplished, the
Court of Appeals panel in this case looked to the United States
Supreme Court’s discussion of the subject in Ilinois v. Andreas,
463 U.S. 765, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (1983). There,
the Court stated:

“The lawful discovery by common carriers or customs officers of contraband in
transit presents law enforcement authorities with an opportunity to identify and
prosecute the person or persons responsible for the movement of the contraband.
To accomplish this, the police, rather than simply seizing the contraband and de-
stroying it, make a so-called controlled delivery of the container to its consignee,
allowing the container to continue its journey to the destination contemplated by
the parties. The person dealing in the contraband can then be identified upon tak-
ing possession of and asserting dominion over the container.

“The typical pattern of a controlled delivery was well described by one court:
“Controlled deliveries of contraband apparently serve a useful function in
Jaw enforcement. They most ordinarily occur when a carrier, usually an
airline, unexpectedly discovers what seems to be contraband while inspect-
ing luggage to learn the identity of its owner, or when the contraband falls
out of a broken or damaged piece of luggage, or when the carrier exercises
its inspection privilege because some suspicious circumstance has caused
it concern that it may unwittingly be transporting contraband. Frequently,
after such a discovery, law enforcement agents restore the contraband to
its container, then close or reseal the container, and authorize the carrier
to deliver the container to its owner. When the owner appears to take de-
livery he is arrested and the container with the contraband is seized and
then searched a second time for the contraband known to be there.’ United
States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S.
843 (1980).” Andreas, 463 U.S. at 769-70.

At issue in Andreas was whether police needed to secure a
search warrant to reopen a container—addressed to the defendant
and, based on a lawful search, known to contain marijuana—that
undercover law enforcement officers had delivered to the defen-
dant’s apartment. Officers later seized the container when they ar-
rested the defendant upon seeing him leave his apartment with the
container 30 to 45 minutes after the delivery. The container was
taken to the police station and reopened without police first obtain-
ing a search warrant. 463 U.S. at 767-68.

An Illinois appellate court affirmed the district court's suppres-
sion of the marijuana found inside the container. The court rea-
soned that the officers had failed to effect a “‘controlled delivery”
of the container which, in the court’s view, required the officers to
maintain “‘dominion and control’ over the container at all times.”
463 U.S. at 768. Because the container was out of the officers’
sight for 30 to 45 minutes while inside the defendant's apartment,

— 4

the officers could not be “‘absolutely sure’” that its contents had
remained unchanged. Thus, the police were required to obtain a
search warrant in order to reopen the container at the police sta-
tion. 463 U.S. at 768.

The Supreme Court rejected the notion that police had to ob-
tain a warrant in order to reopen the container. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court reasoned that

“the rigors and contingencies inescapable in an investigation into illicit drug traffic
often makes ‘perfect’ controlled deliveries and the ‘absolute certainty’ demanded
by the Ilinois court impossible to attain. Conducting such a surveillance unde-
tected is likely to render it virtually impossible for police so perfectly to time their
movements as to avoid detection and also be able to arrest the owner and reseize
the container the instant he takes possession. Not infrequently, police may lose
sight of the container they are trailing, as is the risk in the pursuit of a car or ves-
sel.” Andreas, 463 U.S. at 772.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that while Andreas did not
directly answer the question of what constitutes a controlled deliv-
ery, the case indicated

“that what makes [a] delivery a controlled delivery is that it was performed under
the control and supervision of law enforcement officers. This interpretation is sup-
ported by numerous cases discussing a controlled delivery where hand-to-hand
contact was not required. For example, in State v. Bierer, 49 Kan, App. 2d 403,
405-06, 308 P.3d 10, rev. denied 298 Kan. 1204 (2013), a postal inspector con-
tacted the police about a suspicious package he believed contained drugs. After a
K-9 unit alerted to the package for narcotics, a controlled delivery of the package
was arranged. The postal inspector knocked on the door of the house; however,
when no one responded, he left the package at the front door: Later, Bierer ar-
rived and took the package from the front door and placed it in his vehicle. The
panel referred to this as a controlled delivery. Bierer, 49 Kan. App. 2d at 413; see
Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1204 (delivery to a post office box was a controlled delivery);
United States v. Fadipe, 43 F.3d 993, 994 (5th Cir, 1995) (delivery to the mail box
at an apartment complex was a controlled delivery).

“The dominant feature in the cases discussing controlled deliveries is that the
delivery is supervised by police officers, meaning police exercise control over
when and how the delivery occurs. Delivery of a controlled substance is defined
in K.S.A, 2011 Supp. 65-4101(g) as ‘the actual, constructive or attempted transfer
from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an
agency relationship.’ This appears to be what occurred in this case.” Mullen, 51
Kan. App. 2d at 522-23.

The panel's reasoning that a “controlled delivery” does not re-
quire law enforcement to employ a specific method of conveyance
(e.g., handing the package to a resident versus leaving the package
on the porch or in the mailbox for a resident to pick up) is sound.
The cases cited by the panel, along with the standard applicable
for reviewing a search warrant, see Hicks, 282 Kan. 599, Syl. 2,
indicate that as long as the means employed to deliver contraband
to the site of an anticipatory search warrant was (1) performed un-
der the control and supervision of law enforcement officers and
(2) establishes a fair probability that the contraband will be found
within the site upon execution of the warrant, then the delivery will
be considered a “controlled delivery.”

Here, the affidavit indicated that Inspector Lewis would per-
form a controlled delivery of the package to a resident of the Mead-
owsweet Lane house. Lewis, while under the surveillance of Shaw-
nee police officers, approached the house to deliver the package.
He knocked on the door and yelled, “Post Office,” but no one an-
swered the door. After waiting a minute, Lewis left the package at
the front door of the house as the package sender had authorized.
While the package was under police surveillance, Mullen, a pre-
sumptive resident of the home, opened the front door, picked up
the package, and took it inside the home.

These facts establish that a controlled delivery of the package
to a resident of the home was accomplished. The method used to
deliver the contraband (i.e., leaving the package at the front door
and a resident, in turn, retrieving it) was performed under the con-
trol and supervision of law enforcement officers. Here, the method
used to deliver the contraband established a fair probability that
the contraband would be found inside the house. We conclude that
the event triggering execution of the search warrant, i.¢., a con-
trolled delivery of the package to a resident of the home, occurred
in this case and that the police acted appropriately when they en-
tered the home pursuant to the search warrant.

The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the district court's rul-
ing denying Mullen’s motion to suppress.

362,

No. 110,610

RON KEISWETTER, Administrator of the Estate of Helen Keiswet-
ter, Deceased; and RON KEISWETTER, Individually and on Be-
half of the Heirs-at-law of Helen Keiswetter, Deceased, Appel-
lants, v. STATE OF Kansas, Appellee.

(873 P3d 803)

Opinion filed April 22, 2016.

Dustin L. Van Dyk, of Palmer, Leatherman, White & Girard, LLP, of Topeka,
argued the cause, and LJ. Leatherman, of the same firm, was with him on the
briefs for appellants.

363

John Wesley Smith, assistant attorney general, argued the cause and was on the
briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nuss, C.J.: This is an action for personal injury and wrongful
death brought against the State by Ron Keiswetter, individually
and on behalf of the estate and heirs-at-law of his mother Helen
Keiswetter. She died from her injuries after a minimum-security
inmate escaped from the State’s custody, entered her home, and
ultimately forced her into a closet.

The Norton County District Court granted summary judgment
to the State on a number of grounds, and a panel of the Court of
Appeals affirmed. We affirm the summary judgment because the
State is immune from liability under the police protection excep-
tion of the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq. (KTCA).

FAcTs AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Christopher Zorn was part of a Norton Correctional Facility
community work crew mowing grass at a Norton church when he
escaped from custody. About 25 minutes before the crew supervi-
sor discovered Zorn was missing, an investigator from the prison
arrived to question the inmates about a pack of cigarettes that had
been stolen from another site where the crew had recently worked.
Zom ran from the church before he could be interviewed. The
proper authorities were notified, and a large-scale search ensued.

Zorn later admitted he had hidden in a shed until about 9 that
night. He then entered Helen Keiswetter’s house to find keys for
stealing her car. He said that he injured her when he shoved her
into a closet. More specifically, he admitted he had grabbed her by
the arms and waist and that he had kicked her, causing her to fall
and hit her head.

Helen Keiswetter’s daughter and grandson found her barricaded
in the closet the next morning. She was transported first to the local
hospital and then to Wesley Medical Center in Wichita. She died
8 months later.

Her son, Ron Keiswetter, then sued the State for her personal

injuries and wrongful death. He claimed it was negligent by “(a)
failing to continue Mr. Zorn’s medication to control his bipolar dis-
order; (b) putting Mr. Zorn . . . on work release out in the com-
munity in spite of his dangerous propensities; (c) negligently con-
ducting a criminal investigation of Mr. Zorn while he was on work
release in the community instead of while he was in the security of
the Norton Correctional Facility; and (d) failing to take reasonable
care in preventing Mr. Zorn, who was in [the Kansas Department
of Corrections’] custody and control, from escaping and causing
harm to Ms. Keiswetter.” He later voluntarily dismissed all but the
fourth claim.

The State filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it owed

no duty to Helen Keiswetter to protect her from Zorn’s attack, and,
even if it did, it was immune from liability under two exceptions of
the KTCA. After a hearing the district court granted summary judg-
ment. It found that the public duty doctrine precluded Keiswetter’s
claim because any duty owed his mother was owed to the public at
large and not specifically to her. The court additionally found that
no special duty was owed to Keiswetter and that the State was im-
mune from liability under the police protection exception of the
KTCA, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-6104(n).
A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Like the district court,
the panel concluded Keiswetter’s claim failed because of the pub-
lic duty doctrine, the lack of a special duty owed to Keiswetter,
and the police protection exception of the KTCA. Additionally,
the panel held Keiswetter had presented insufficient evidence of
the State’s negligence to survive summary judgment. Keiswetter v.
State, No. 110,610, 2014 WL 3732021 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpub-
lished opinion). .

Keiswetter filed a petition for review with this court under K.S.A.
20-3018, challenging each of the panel's holdings and particularly
asking us to consider whether the public duty doctrine is still viable
under Kansas law. We granted the petition, obtaining jurisdiction
under K.S.A. 60-2101(b).

ANALYSIS

Issuz: The State is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law because it is immune from liability under the KTCA’ police
protection exception.

The parties’ arguments primarily concern whether we should
abolish the public duty doctrine. Under that doctrine, a plaintiff
suing a governmental entity in negligence cannot establish the duty
requirement of its claim when the duty is a public one, i.¢., owed to
the public at large and not to any particular individual. See Shirley
v. Glass, 297 Kan. 888, 894, 308 P.3d 1 (2013) (negligence claim re-
quires a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, breach of that
duty, causation between the breach and the injury, and damages
suffered by plaintiff). In short, the doctrine bars a governmental
entity's liability unless the plaintiff can show a special relationship
that gives rise to a specific duty owed to him or her. See Roe v.
Dept. of SRS, 278 Kan. 584, 593, 102 P.3d 396 (2004); Robertson v.
City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 358, 363, 644 P.2d 458 (1982).

Despite the parties’ focus on this doctrine, however, the ulti-
mate issue before us is whether the district court properly granted
summary judgment to the State. As discussed below, we conclude
such judgment was proper because the State is entitled to immuni-
ty under the KTCA%s police protection exception. See K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 75-6104(n). So we need not also address the other grounds
the lower courts found to reject Keiswetter’s claim.

Standard of review

Our summary judgment standard is well-known:

“Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all
facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor
of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for sum-
mary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish
a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts
subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On ap-
peal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable minds could differ as
to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied.

[Citations omitted]. Shamberg, Johnson &- Bergman, Chid. v. Oliver, 289 Ken.
801, 900, 220 P.3d 333 (2009)"* Fawcett v. Oil Producers, Inc. of Kansas, 302 Kan.
350, 358-59, 352 P.3d 1032 (2015).

When the material facts are uncontroverted, we exercise un-
limited review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.
See Soto v. City of Bonner Springs, 291 Kan. 73, 78, 238 P.3d 278
(2010). And whether an exception of the KTCA applies to grant
immunity to a governmental entity is a question of law, also subject
to unlimited review. See 291 Kan. at 78.

Discussion

Liability is the rule, and immunity is the exception for govern-
mental entities sued under the KTCA. See 291 Kan. at 78. The
general rule of liability is established by K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-
6103(a) which provides:

“Subject to the limitations of this act, each governmental entity shall be liable
for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any of its em-
ployees while acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances
where the governmental entity, ifa private person, would be liable under the laws
of this state.”

K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-6104 lists several exceptions to liability, in-
cluding the police protection exception. Under this exception, “[a]
governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the
employee’s employment shall not be liable for damages resulting
from . . . failure to provide, or the method of providing, police or
fire protection[.]” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-6104(n). Such exceptions
to governmental liability, like the general allowance of liability it-
self, are matters of public policy left to the legislature. See Barrett
v. U.S. D. No. 259, 272, Kan. 250, 260, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001).

In interpreting the KTCA, K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 75-6101 et seq. we

have held: .
“(The analytical matrix established by the legislature in enacting the KTCA dic-
tates that a governmental entity can be found liable for the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any of its employees while acting within the scope of their em-
ployment only if (1) a private person could be liable under the same circumstances
and (2) no statutory exception to liability applies.’” (Emphasis added.) Soto, 291
Kan. at 78 (quoting Adams v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm’rs, 289 Kan. 377,
585, 214 P.3d 1173 [2009]).

As in Soto, for the sake of a straightforward review we will as-
sume, but not decide, that a duty—here, to Keiswetter—exist-
ed. See 291 Kan. at 78; of. Jarboe v. Board of Sedgwick County
Comm’rs, 262 Kan. 615, 623, 938 P.2d 1293 (1997) (decision to
grant summary judgment on basis of immunity is not an acknowl-
edgment “any duty existed on the part of defendants to protect
[victim] from [escaped juvenile’s] criminal actions”). So we need
only determine whether the State’s claimed statutory exception to
lability, i.e., the police protection exception, applies. If the excep-
tion applies, it disposes of this case.

Moreover, because an exception to liability, i.¢., an immunity, is
supposed to free the defendant from the burdens of litigation, it
typically makes sense to examine immunity as the threshold ques-
tion. As we have stated about the related issue of qualified immu-
nity:

“*“Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other bur-
dens of litigation.’ [Citation omitted.] The privilege is ‘an immunity from suit rath-
er than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’ [Citation omitted.] As a result,
‘we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at

the earliest possible stage in litigation.’ [Citation omitted.]”’” State v. Jones, 298
Kan. 324, 332, 311 P.3d 1125 (2013).

Consistent with this view, this court has supported a district
court’s refusal to allow depositions and affirmed its dismissal of a
negligence action against a defendant because of the plaintiff's fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This failure
was due, among other things, to the defendant’s immunity from
liability provided by the police protection exception in the KTCA.
Beck v. Kansas Adult Authority, 241 Kan. 13, 23-24, 735 P.2d 222
(1987). Accord Robertson, 231 Kan. at 362-63 (affirming dismissal
of negligence action for failure to state a claim based upon discre-
tionary function exception in KTCA).

The Beck court generally explained the advantages of address-
ing dispositive issues early, i.¢., by a motion to dismiss instead of a
motion for summary judgment—even though both can avoid the
burdens of trial:

“The important distinction between the handling of a motion to dismiss on the
one hand and a motion for summary judgment on the other is that in the former

the trial court is limited to a review of the pleadings, while in the latter, the trial
court takes into consideration all of the facts disclosed during the discovery pro-
cess—affidavits, depositions, admissions, and answers to interrogatories. Thus, a
party opposing a motion for summary judgment may point to or provide deposi-
tions, affidavits, or other documents to demonstrate that there are genuine issues
of material fact, necessitating a trial.” (Emphasis added.) 241 Kan. at 26.

Given our assumption that a duty to Keiswetter exists, our im-
munity analysis proceeds by acknowledging that the State has the
burden to establish it is immune from liability under the police
protection exception. See Soto, 291 Kan. at 78. If the State can-
not meet this burden, then the general rule of liability set forth in
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-6103(a) applies. Jarboe, 262 Kan. at 624.

The Court of Appeals panel in the instant case relied upon
Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 675 P.2d 57 (1984), to hold the State
was entitled to immunity under the police protection exception.
There, the plaintiff claimed the State was negligent in (1) failing to
confine seven armed and dangerous inmates who escaped from a
correctional facility and (2) failing to warn the public and local law
enforcement of the escape. The Cansler court determined the fail-
ure to warn did not constitute a failure to provide police protection,
and, therefore, the State was not immune from liability under the
police protection exception. 234 Kan. at 572. But, as the Keiswetter
panel noted, Cansler suggests that without the duty-to-warn claim,
the State would have been immune from liability under that excep-
tion. See Keiswetter, 2014 WL 3732021, at °6 (“Absent the failure
to warn of the escape after it occurred, Cansler indicates that the
State would have been immune.”).

In discussing the State’s duty to confine the dangerous inmates
before their escape, the Cansler court acknowledged that “police
protection” was implicated:

“There is no question that penal officials and employees have the powers of
law enforcement officers when such powers are necessary for the performance
of their duties. When moving prisoners from one penal institution to another,
or to and from court, penal officers would have and exercise the same powers as
would, for example, a deputy sheriff. The operation of a penal institution is car-
ried on pursuant to the police power of the state, and the institution itself provides
police protection for all Kansas residents by keeping apart from the rest of the
population those convicted felony offenders whose actions have been and perhaps
promise to be dangerous and inimical to society. . ..

“.., While the seven inmates were within the walls of the penitentiary, the
State’s duty could be classified as custodial and as providing police protection for
the benefit of all Kansans.” (Emphasis added.) 234 Kan. at 571-72.

See also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-2202(m) (defining “law enforcement
officer” as a person who has a “duty to maintain or assert custody
or supervision over persons accused or convicted of crime”); K.S.A.
‘'75-5247a (prison officials “acting within the scope of their duties
as employees of the department of corrections, shall possess such
powers and duties of a law enforcement officer as are necessary for
the performance of such duties”). So we conclude per these state-
ments from Cansler that under certain circumstances, the KTCA’s
police protection exception can apply to correctional facilities and
their supervisory personnel.

Generally, whether an exception under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-
6104 applies depends on the specific allegations raised by the plain-
tiff. See Thomas v. Board of Shawnee County Comm’rs, 293 Kan.
208, 235, 262 P.3d 336 (2011) (discretionary function exception
under K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 75-6104[e] does not apply when plaintiff
alleges government defendant negligently performed a ministe-
rial act); Cansler, 234 Kan. at 568 (enforcement of a law exception
under K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6104{c] applies when plaintiff's sole
claim is that government defendant enforced or failed to enforce a
law). And exceptions are not to be liberally construed. See Jackson
». City of Kansas City, 235 Kan. 278, 286, 680 P.2d 877 (1984) (or-
dinarily a strict or narrow interpretation must be applied to statu-
tory exceptions), overruled on other grounds by Simmons v. Porter,
298 Kan. 299, 312 P.3d 345 (2013); see also Robertson, 231 Kan. at
363 (ordinarily a strict or narrow interpretation is applied to statu-
tory exceptions, but statutes must be construed in their entirety
with a view of giving effect to the legislative intent).

Here, Keiswetter claims only that the State failed to take rea-
sonable care in preventing Zorn from escaping from custody and
attacking Helen Keiswetter, i.¢., that the State breached an indi-
vidual duty to her to confine Zorn. Relying on Cansler, the State
responds that because the duty to keep an inmate confined is a
duty of “providing police protection for the benefit of all Kansans,”
any breach of that duty is immunized by the police protection ex-

ception. See Cansler, 234 Kan. at 572. Keiswetter counters with a
1992 opinion of a Court of Appeals panel to contend that the police
protection exception does not apply when a government defendant
breaches a specific duty owed to an individual rather than the pub-
lic at large. See Washington v. State, 17 Kan. App. 2d 518, 525-26,
839 P.2d 555 (1992). As discussed below, we agree with the State
and conclude the police protection exception exempts the State
from liability in this case.

We start with Washington. Inmate Washington of the Lansing
Correctional Facility had been in a fight with an inmate named
Vaughn. Both were later placed in the Adjustment and Treatment
Unit where, while separated, Vaughn repeatedly threatened Wash-
ington. Both were released from the unit and placed in general
population the same day in cells four cells apart. Vaughn then at-
tacked and injured Washington who sued to recover for his injuries.

The Washington Court of Appeals panel rejected the argument

that the State was immunized because of the police protection ex-
ception with the following discussion:
“The State argues the administration of a correctional facility is a police function
exempt from liability pursuant to this provision. As a general rule, this is correct.
In Cansler, 234 Kan, at 571, the court concluded that ‘t]he operation of a penal
institution is carried on pursuant to the police power of the state.”

“Although the language of 75-6104(n) suggests immunity for failure to provide
adequate police protection is absolute, the police protection exemption will not
provide governmental immunity in all instances where the State fails to provide
adequate protection. Where a government employee (1) possesses the power of
a law enforcement officer and (2) breaches a specific duty owed to an individual
rather than the public at large, 75-6104(n) will not protect the State from lia-
bility. Robertson v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 358, 363, 644 P.2d 458 (1982). If
upon remand it is concluded that prison officials breached a specific duty owed
to Washington as an individual pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320,
the police protection exemption would not provide the State with immunity from
liability.” (Emphasis added.) 17 Kan. App. 2d at 525-26.

We reject Washington's blanket statement that the police pro-
tection exception never applies to a breach of “a specific duty owed
to an individual rather than the public at large”—a rejection which
eliminates our need to determine whether special duties existed
here. 17 Kan. App. 2d at 526. In support of our conclusion we first
observe that the sole authority cited by the Washington panel for

371

this particular statement is Robertson v. City of Topeka. But this
court’s decision in Robertson is not supportive. We simply noted
that “[a]bsent some special relationship with or specific duty owed
an individual, liability will not lie for damages”—a statement with
which we agree. 231 Kan. at 363. The Washington panel goes far-
ther, however, to conclude there can never be immunity under the
police protection exception when law enforcement breaches this
special duty. Second, we note this view by the Washington panel
contravenes Cansler’s indication 8 years earlier that the police pro-
tection exception would have applied absent the duty to warn. And
it is important to recognize that the Cansler plaintiff and Keiswet-
ter both claimed, among other things, the State breached a special
duty to confine those respective inmates under Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 319 (1964).

We turn now to Keiswetter’s implicit contention during oral ar-
guments that rejecting this Washington panel conclusion would
violate the general rule that exceptions to liability under the KTCA
must be narrowly construed. See Robertson, 231 Kan. at 363. We
acknowledge this court previously rejected an overbroad construc-
tion of the police protection exception in Jackson v. City of Kansas
City, 235 Kan. 278. The Jackson decision was a personal injury ac-
tion under the KTCA involving a collision between two Kansas City
fire trucks responding to the same fire.

The City argued the police protection exception granted “ab-
solute” immunity in any suit under the KTCA where the plaintiff
alleged a governmental entity failed to provide or negligently pro-
vided fire protection through its methods. Specifically, “(T]he City
asserts that under subsection (m) [now subsection (n)] the sole fact
the incident herein occurred while two city fire trucks were re-
sponding to a fire alarm operates as a complete bar to claimants’
actions.” 235 Kan. at 290. In holding the exception should not be
construed quite so broadly, the Jackson court stated:

“We believe [the police protection exception] is aimed at such basic matters
as the type and number of fire trucks and police cars considered necessary for the
operation of the respective departments; how mariy personnel might be required;
how many and where police patrol cars are to operate; the placement and supply
of fire hydrants; and the selection of equipment options. Accordingly, a city is im-
munized from such claims as a burglary could have been prevented if additional

police cars had been on patrol, or a house could have been saved if more or better
{fire equipment had been purchased. We do not believe subsection (m) is so broad
as to immunize a city on every aspect of negligent police and fire department
operations. Should firemen negligently go to the wrong house and chop a hole
in the roof thereof, we do not believe the city has immunity therefor on the basis
the negligent act was a part of the method of fire protection.” (Emphasis added.)
235 Kan. at 292.

Three years later we approvingly quoted this full Jackson lan-
guage as we again examined the police protection exception in
Beck, 241 Kan. 13. There, after a man entered the University of
Kansas Medical Center’s emergency department and killed two
people with a shotgun, the plaintiffs brought personal injury and
wrongful death actions against the Kansas Adult Authority, Board
of Regents, and Medical Center. Following our confirmation that
the university police officers had the same rights, protections, and
immunities afforded to other law enforcement officers, we deter-
mined that “[T]he negligent acts complained of consist only of the
failure to provide more adequate police protection, and the failure
to warn.” (Emphasis added.) 241 Kan. at 22. We relied on the plain
language of the police protection exception and Jackson’s rationale
to hold that “[t]he determination of how to provide police protec-
tion is immunized. The Medical Center is not liable because of the
methods it adopted for police protection.” (Emphasis added.) 241
Kan, at 24,

We conclude Keiswetter’s claim that the State failed to take rea-
sonable care in preventing Zorn from escaping from custody and
attacking Helen Keiswetter falls under the police protection excep-
tion to liability under the KTCA because it invokes the State’s “fail-
ure to provide, or the method of providing, police . . . protection.”
See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-6104(n). As mentioned, this court has
held: “[A] city is immunized from such claims as a burglary could
have been prevented if additional police cars had been on patrol,
or a house could have been saved if more or better fire equipment
had been purchased” and a university medical center is immunized
“because of the methods it adopted for police protection.” (Em-
phasis added.) See Jackson, 235 Kan. at 292; Beck, 241 Kan. at 24;
see also Cansler, 234 Kan. at 571-72. So the State likewise is immu-
nized from Keiswetter’s claim that the attack on his mother could

have been prevented if corrections personnel had more closely
supervised Zorn, ¢.g., with additional personnel, to prevent his es-
cape. As we have stated previously: “‘[TJhe legislature is better
equipped to resolve the difficult policy questions inherent in the
field of governmental immunity. As judges our desire to achieve
what may seem fair to us as individuals cannot overcome the laws
enacted by our duly elected legislators.’” Barrett, 272 Kan. at 260
(quoting Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2, 9,547 P.2d
1015 [1976]).
Because the State has demonstrated it is entitled to immunity un-
der the KTCA’s police protection exception, we do not consider the
lower courts’ additional grounds for rejecting Keiswetter’s claim for
relief, i.., the public duty doctrine, the lack of a special duty owed
to Helen Keiswetter, or the failure to present sufficient evidence
of negligence to survive summary judgment. See Barrett, 272 Kan.
at 264 (after holding KTCA’s recreational use exception provided
immunity, no need to consider KTCA’ discretionary function ex-
ception); Nichols v. U.S.D. No. 400, 246 Kan. 93, 98, 785 P.2d 986
(1990) (after holding KTCA‘s recreational use exception provided
immunity, no need to discuss discretionary function exception or
Land and Water Recreational Areas Act defenses); Beck, 241 Kan.
at 24 (after holding KTCA’s police protection exception provided
immunity, no need to reach the discretionary function exception).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district
court is affirmed. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Bar Docket No. 20619

In the Matter of Ricuann R. Frirz, Respondent.
(871 P.3d 348)
eee!

Ina letter signed March 28, 2016, addressed to the Clerk of the
Appellate Courts, respondent Richard R. Fritz, an attorney admit-
ted to practice law in Kansas, voluntarily surrendered his license to
practice law in Kansas, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 217 (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 390). The respondent was also licensed in Mis-
souri. On March 25, 2014, the Missouri Supreme Court issued an
order disbarring the respondent.

At the time the respondent surrendered his license, a formal
hearing was pending regarding a docketed disciplinary complaint.
The complaint alleged that the respondent violated Kansas Rules
of Professional Conduct 8.1 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 661) (bar
admission and disciplinary matters); 8.3 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
670) (reporting professional misconduct); 8.4 (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 672) (misconduct); and Supreme Court Rule 207 (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 328) (duties of the bar and judiciary). Addition-
ally, another complaint was docketed for investigation alleging that
the respondent violated Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 641) (unauthorized practice of law).

This court, having examined the files of the office of the Disci-
plinary Administrator, finds that the surrender of the respondent’s
license should be accepted and that the respondent should be dis-
barred.

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that Richard R. Fritz be and he is
hereby disbarred from the practice of law in Kansas, and his license
and privilege to practice law are hereby revoked.

ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Appellate Courts
strike the name of Richard R. Fritz from the roll of attorneys li-
censed to practice law in Kansas.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall be published in
the Kansas Reports, that the costs herein shall be assessed to the
respondent, and that the respondent forthwith shall comply with
Supreme Court Rule 218 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 401).

Dated this 22nd day of April, 2016.

Bar Docket No. 9169

In the Matter of Jonn F. THompson, Respondent.
(B71 P3d 348)

In a letter signed April 16, 2016, addressed to the Clerk of the
Appellate Courts, respondent John F. Thompson, of Leavenworth,
an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of Kansas, volun-
tarily surrendered his license to practice law in Kansas, pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 217 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 390).

At the time the respondent surrendered his license, two com-
plaints had been docketed by the office of the Disciplinary Admin-
istrator for investigation. One complaint alleged that the respon-
dent violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 1.1
2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 442) (competence), and the other com-
plaint alleged that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15 (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 556) (safekeeping property) and KRPC 8.4 (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (misconduct).

This court, having examined the files of the office of the Dis-
ciplinary Administrator, finds that surrender of the respondent's
license should be accepted and that the respondent should be dis-
barred.

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that John F. Thompson be and is
hereby disbarred from the practice of law in Kansas and his license
and privilege to practice law are hereby revoked.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Appellate Courts
strike the name of John F. Thompson from the roll of attorneys li-
censed to practice law in Kansas.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall be published in
the Kansas Reports, that the costs herein shall be assessed to the
respondent, and that the respondent forthwith shall comply with
Supreme Court Rule 218 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 401).

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2016.

No. 110,311

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. REGINALD O. DUPREE,
Appellant.
(873 P3d 811)

a 2:
filed Apri

Michael P. Whalen, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, argued the
cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Mait J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Mare Ben-
nett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the
brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Lucxerr, J.: Reginald Dupree appeals his convictions for felony
murder, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, two
counts of aggravated endangering a child, and aggravated assault.
On appeal, Dupree raises a total of eight arguments, which can be
generally categorized as follows: two charging information issues, a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge, three jury instruction issues,
a witness sequestration issue, and a cumulative error argument.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Dupree’s convictions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the evening of December 14, 2011, two intruders pushed
their way into a Wichita home (the “Locust Street home”). The
homeowner's 19-year-old daughter, Regina Stuart, was home at
the time with her boyfriend, Markez Phillips, and her 5month-old
nephew. Someone Inocked on the side door, and when Phillips
went to answer there was a struggle. As Phillips tried to close the
door on the intruders, one of them shot him in the face. Two men
then entered and forced Stuart to accompany them while they
went throughout the house looking for valuables; the two men, plus
another intruder, ultimately left with several televisions.

Investigators soon linked five men to the crime. The State

‘ charged Dupree with seven criminal counts: first-degree felony
murder, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, two
counts of aggravated endangering a child, and aggravated assault.
At trial, Dupree did not deny that he was involved in the crimes
and was one of the two initial intruders; nor, in asserting his argu-
ments on appeal, does he deny his involvement. Instead, he took
the stand in his own defense and explained he was an unwilling or
unaware participant and never intended to rob or shoot anybody.

Given Dupree’s admission to being present when the crimes oc-
curred, we need not discuss many of the evidentiary details heard
by the jury in this lengthy trial. Instead, we will confine ourselves to
the essential facts necessary to understanding his issues on appeal.

Many of these essential facts stem from Stuart's testimony. Al-
though she did not know the two men who first entered her home,
she later identified them as Dupree and Malek Brown. She told the
juzy the men entered the room where she had been watching tele-
vision; she described them as rounding the corner into the room
at the exact same time. One man, Brown, held a black handgun.
Stuart testified both men asked her for her cell phone, wallet, and
money. She told them she only had her phone, which she gave to
them. Brown then put the gun to the back of her head, and both
men forced her to move room to room while asking her about the
location of a safe. She repeatedly told Dupree and Brown there
was no safe, but both said she was lying and threatened to kill her.
Eventually she told the men to just take the televisions. She heard
Brown make a phone call and ask someone to pull up and help him
load the televisions.

After Brown made the phone call, Dupree told her to sit in a
chair, but Brown made her lie face-down on the floor next to her
nephew. At this point a third person, whom Stuart recognized as
Daniel Dupree, entered the house. Daniel seemed shocked to see
Phillips on the ground and asked Dupree what they were doing.
Daniel told the men they needed to leave and were not supposed
to have killed anybody. The men then took televisions out of the
house.

Stuart testified it did not seem Brown forced Dupree to do any-
thing, and she never heard Dupree say anything to this effect. She
never saw Brown point a gun at Dupree or tell him to take valu-
ables from the house. Although Brown had the gun the entire time
and did most of the talking, Dupree pushed her through the house
and also threatened to kill her. The men separated at one point
when Dupree was getting the living room television and Brown was
in the back of the house; Stuart testified Dupree could have left at
this point because he was not in danger from Brown. He did not do
so, and it did not appear to Stuart that he wanted to.

381

The State presented other evidence implicating Dupree and the
other men in the crimes. Stuart’s grandmother, along with another
of Stuart's nephews, encountered the men as they were leaving the
Locust Street home, and one of the men pointed a gun at them.
Others testified about their observations of and conversations with
Dupree and his companions both before and after the crimes. In
general, these witnesses did not observe anything indicating Du-
pree was ill on the day of the shooting or suggesting he had been
coerced to participate. In addition, video from a nearby security
camera corroborated the testimony of Stuart, her grandmother,
and Dupree about the incident: a Jeep drove up to the Locust
Street home, two occupants got out and moved toward the home,
and the Jeep returned after a few minutes and backed up the drive-
way so the men could load the televisions.

The defense presented only one witness: Dupree. Dupree testi-
fied that the day of the shooting he felt like he was coming down
with something—his nose was running, he had an itchy throat and
the chills, and he was tired. As the day went on, he felt worse and
worse. During the afternoon or evening, Dupree asked for a ride to
get some medicine. Dupree, Francis Dupree, and Daniel Dupree
all got into a Jeep driven by Brown. Dupree testified that Brown
seemed upset, possibly intoxicated or high, and did not seem like
himself. Brown announced he had to pick something up first and
pulled into a neighborhood. Brown circled the block a few times
before pulling in front of a house. He asked the passengers to help
him get some stuff. But when they all got out, Brown said, “I don’t
think this is the house.” So the men all got back in the vehicle and
left.

According to Dupree’s testimony, after driving around for a bit
longer, Brown decided the house they went to was the right one
after all. He drove back to the house and parked, at which time
Dupree told Brown he felt poorly and his body was aching. Brown
replied, “Come with me.” They walked up to the house, and Brown
knocked at the side door. Dupree then said, “I forgot my phone in
the car. I'll be right back.” He turned to walk away. As soon as he
did, he heard the door open. Brown said something, and the man
inside the house replied, “I said I was going to beat your ass if I

see you again.” Before Dupree got halfway down the driveway he
heard a pop.

Dupree testified he was scared and jogged back to the door-
way to see what had happened. He saw Phillips on the ground and
Brown with a gun in his hand. He asked Brown what he was doing,
but Brown did not reply and just waved the gun at him. Brown’s at-
torney asked whether Brown pointed the gun at him, and Dupree
replied, “You can say that.” Dupree hesitated at the threshold, but
Brown waved the gun again and said, “Come on.” When Dupree
entered the Locust Street home he saw Stuart standing in the living
room. Brown took her phone and then asked about a safe and some
money. Brown pointed the gun at Stuart’s back and made her lead
him around the house. Dupree stayed close because he did not
know what was going on.

Dupree testified that after Brown called for help loading the
televisions, Brown told Dupree to stop standing around and help.
Dupree complied because he was shocked and did not want any-
thing else to go wrong. On his way out, he saw Daniel enter the
house and heard him tell Brown he was not supposed to have shot
anybody. As they were driving away, Daniel kept yelling at Brown
for shooting someone.

On cross-examination, Dupree explained he did not leave after
hearing a gunshot and seeing Phillips on the ground because he
was afraid for his life. Although Brown did not threaten him, he
waved his gun at him. Dupree denied ever speaking to Stuart at
any time while in the Locust Street house and also denied push-
ing her around. According to Dupree, only Brown ordered Stuart
around and forced her through the house. Dupree also admitted
he had his phone and could have called the police but did not. And
on redirect, Dupree stated he did not intend to rob anybody or see
anybody shot.

The jury found Dupree guilty on all seven counts. After deny-
ing Dupree’s posttrial motions for a new trial and judgment of ac-
quittal, the district court sentenced him to a total sentence of life
imprisonment, with 20 years’ minimum, plus 122 months. Dupree
now appeals from his convictions. We have jurisdiction over his
appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 223601(b)(3) (permitting a

383

direct appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court in any case where a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment has been imposed).

ANALYSIS

Dupree raises eight arguments on appeal, and, as we briefly
mentioned above, they can be categorized as arguments relating
to deficiencies in the charging information, sufficiency of the evi-
dence, the jury instructions, witness sequestration, and cumulative
error. We will address his claims in that order.

Issue 1: The State's failure to charge Dupree specifically with
“aiding and abetting” aggravated assault and aggravated
child endangerment offenses did not deprive the district
court of jurisdiction over these offenses.

Dupree contends the State’s failure to charge him specifically
with aiding and abetting aggravated assault and aggravated child
endangerment rendered the charging information insufficient,
such that it never conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the dis-
trict court. He argues there was no evidence he committed these
offenses as a principal, and thus the State’s failure to charge him
specifically as an aider and abettor requires these convictions be
reversed. He acknowledges he failed to raise this argument before
the district court, and he also acknowledges our precedent is con-
trary to his claim.

In making his argument, Dupree relies on past cases in which
we have stated that, “if a complaint fails to include an essential ele-
ment of a crime charged, it is ‘fatally defective, and the trial court
lacks jurisdiction to convict the defendant of the alleged offense.’”
State v. Gonzales, 289 Kan. 351, 366, 212 P.3d 215 (2009) (quot-
ing State v. Moody, 282. Kan. 181, 197, 144 P.3d 612 [2006]). He
also notes that issues involving subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, and we review de novo whether a charging in-
formation conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the courts. State
v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 532, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014). Although
these arguments accurately reflect our past caselaw, parties in oth-
er pending cases have raised questions recently about whether a
defective complaint is truly jurisdictional. See, ¢.g., State v. Dunn,

No. 106,586, 2012 WL 3290004 (Kan. App. 2012), rev. granted 298
Kan. 1205 (2013). But the State has not raised those arguments
here. Further, we need not resolve the question because, even un-
der the cases Dupree cites, he fails to establish a charging defect
that would entitle him to relief.

Turning to the specifics of Dupree’s argument, he asserts that
aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime with a separate, ad-
ditional element of proof beyond the elements of aggravated child
endangerment and aggravated assault—namely, the specific intent
to aid and abet. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5210. According to his
theory, that means the charging information must allege that the
defendant aided and abetted the commission of a crime. Absent
that specific allegation, he argues, the information was fatally de-
fective.

Three aiding and abetting liability statutes that have been in ef-
fect in Kansas at one point or another put Dupree’s argument in
context. Prior to July 1969, the Kansas aiding and abetting statute
read: “Any person who counsels, aids, or abets in the commission
of any offense may be charged, tried and convicted in the same
manner as if he were a principal.” (Emphasis added.) G.S. 1949,
621016. This older statute expressly permitted the State to charge
a defendant as a principal even if the defendant was only an aider
and abettor.

From July 1969 to July 2011 (several months before the De-
cember 2011 events at issue in this case), Kansas utilized K.S.A.
21-3205(1), which read: “A person is criminally responsible for
a crime committed by another if such person intentionally aids,
abets, advises, hires, counsels or procures the other to commit the
crime.” Dupree stresses that K.S.A. 213205 did not retain the “may
be charged . . . in the same manner” language of the prior statute.
He argues this indicated the legislature intended a change that can
only be read as the imposition of a pleading requirement. But this
court implicitly rejected that in 1976, when comparing 213205 with
its predecessor and concluding “there is very little, if any, difference
in the meaning of the language used in the two sections.” State v.
Motor, 220 Kan. 99, 102, 551 P.2d 783 (1976). Moreover, we have
“consistently held that the State is not required to charge aiding

and abetting in the charging document in order to pursue a theory
of accomplice liability at trial.” Williams, 299 Kan. at 533; see e.g.,
State v. Betancourt, 299 Kan. 131, 140, 322 P.3d 353 (2014).

Williams, which was published after Dupree filed his appellate
brief, represents one of our more recent affirmations of this long-
standing rule. The Williams defendant, like Dupree, had argued
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over certain
offenses because the State failed to separately charge aiding and
abetting. See 299 Kan. at 53233. Also like Dupree, the Williams
defendant contended aiding and abetting required different ele-
ments of proof than the elements of committing the underlying
crime as a principal. 299 Kan. at 533. We rejected these arguments
and cited with approval previous precedent that “‘aiding and abet-
ting is not a separate crime in Kansas. Instead, it extends criminal
liability to a person other than the principal actor.” 299 Kan. at 533
(quoting State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1038, 270 P.3d 1183
[2012]).

Nevertheless, Williams only addressed K.S.A. 21-3205, which
was the statute in effect at the time of the crime and trial in that
case. 299 Kan. at 533. We did note, however, that 21-3205 had
been repealed and replaced with a new aiding and abetting liability
statute, K.S.A, 2010 Supp. 21-5210. L. 2010, ch. 136; sec. 30; see
Williams, 299 Kan. at 533. Williams declined to address this new-
est statute.

Now, because K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5210(a) was the statute in
place at the time of Dupree’s crime and trial we must determine
the pleading requirements under its terms. It provides: “A person
is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if such
person, acting with the mental culpability required for the commis-
sion thereof, advises, hires, counsels or procures the other to the
commit the crime or intentionally aids the other in committing the
conduct constituting the crime.”

The difference between our present statute and the earlier stat-
ute discussed in Williams comes down largely to formatting; in oth-
er words, we see no meaningful difference supporting a departure
from Williams. Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5210 the State is not

386

required to use the words “aiding and abetting” in the charging
document in order to pursue a theory of accomplice liability at trial.

Dupree’s charging information thus did not fail to allege an es-
sential element of the crimes of aggravated child endangerment
and aggravated assault. See Gonzales, 289 Kan. at 366.

IssuE 2: The State’s oral amendment to the felony-murder charge
did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction or other-
wise constitute reversible error:

Dupree’s second jurisdictional argument relates to the State’s
oral amendment, at the close of evidence, to the felony-murder
charge. The State’s motion, which was made after the district court
had denied Dupree’s motion for acquittal, requested permission
to change the underlying felony from aggravated robbery to ag-
gravated burglary.

Dupree’s counsel responded by saying, “I suppose for the re-
cord, I would [object].” He argued that he approached the case
with the idea that “agg[ravated] robbery was the underlying felo-
ny.” The State contended there was no prejudice to Dupree, since
during the preliminary hearing the district court approved both
the aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary charges and thus
both had to be proved all along. Dupree had no response, and the
district court permitted the State’s amendment. It also specifically
found that Dupree was “not prejudiced whatsoever” by the amend-
ment because he was aware of the aggravated burglary charge and.
had the opportunity to meet that charge.

Now, on appeal, Dupree urges us to conclude the State’s amend-
ment was not sufficiently specific. Additionally, while he recognizes
the State need not always formally file an amended complaint, he
contends its failure to do so in this case prejudiced his defense and
constituted reversible error.

In general, the State bears the burden of filing a written com-
plaint setting forth the essential facts constituting the crime charged.
See K.S.A. 22-3201(b). The State may, with the district court's
leave, amend an information “at any time before verdict . . . if no
additional or different crime is charged and if substantial rights
of the defendant are not prejudiced.” K.S.A. 22-3201(e). This

amendment may be oral, but “the prosecution has the duty to
memorialize the amendment by filing an amended complaint.”
State v. Switzer, 244 Kan. 449, 456, 769 P.2d 645 (1989); see also
State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 768 P.2d 268 (1989) (recognizing me-
morialization may occur in a journal entry). The State’s failure to
comport with this duty “does not deprive a trial court of subject
matter jurisdiction over the defendant,” though such a failure may
nonetheless constitute reversible error. State v. Davis, 283 Kan.
767, 769, 156 P.3d 665 (2007); see Switzer, 244 Kan. at 457 (“[T]he
issue,” when the State fails to amend the complaint in writing, “is
whether the omission invalidates the verdict.”).

To determine whether a failure to memorialize an oral amend-
ment requires us to reverse a conviction, we examine (1) whether
the amendment was appropriate—meaning no additional or dif
ferent crime was charged and the substance of the amendment
was not prejudicial, and (2) whether the failure to memorialize the
amendment was prejudicial to the defendant. See Davis, 283 Kan.
at 769 (explaining the court’s use of the word “appropriate”); Swit-
zer, 244 Kan. ‘at 456-57 (discussing the additional consideration
of whether prejudice results from the failure to memorialize the
amendment and stating that failure to memorialize an amendment
is not per se prejudicial and does not by itself constitute reversible
error); see also Nunn, 244 Kan. at 224 (holding that an oral amend-
ment is effective even without later memorialization, so long as the
defendant is not prejudiced).

Applying these concepts in this case, we first conclude the infor-
mation did not charge a new or different crime. Second, changing
the underlying felony did not prejudice Dupree. The State’s oral
amendment only affected the felony-murder count by changing
the underlying felony. And this change came as no surprise be-
cause Dupree had been charged with both underlying felonies, had
defended against each, and his defense did not revolve around the
nature of the underlying’ felony. In light of these circumstances,
Dupree has failed to corivince us that swapping the underlying
felony for the felony-murder charge impaired his ability to defend
himself or impaired his right to a fair trial. See K.S.A. 22-3201(e);

Nunn, 244 Kan. at 22526 (explaining that changing noncritical fac-
tors of an offense is not prejudicial).

So far we have considered the amendment itself. We must now
consider whether the fact that the State did not follow up its oral
amendment with a written amendment constitutes reversible er-
ror—that is, whether amendment only by oral motion prejudiced
Dupree. See Davis, 283 Kan. at 769; Switzer, 244 Kan. at 456;
Nunn, 244 Kan. at 224. We conclude it did not.

Dupree had notice of the amendment made on the record. See
Switzer, 244 Kan. at 457. Further, substituting one underlying fel-
ony for another did not require any additional rewording of the
charge, and Dupree does not claim the original charge for felony
murder was not sufficiently specific. His arguments essentially boil
down to a claim the State should have read the amended charge
aloud from beginning to end, instead of just asking to swap out
“aggravated robbery” for “aggravated burglary.” Yet the effect of
the State’s amendment is clear and caused no confusion. Also, he
was not, contrary to his argument, “left to guess” about how the
jury instructions would be affected. Dupree participated in the jury
charge conference and was able to see exactly how the amended
charge played out. He had ample opportunity to object to any prej-
udice. We conclude the failure to memorialize the amendment did
not cause prejudice.

Accordingly, we hold the State’s oral amendment to the felony-
murder charge, even though not memorialized, did not deprive the
district court of jurisdiction or otherwise constitute reversible er-
ror.

IssuE 3: Sufficient evidence supports Dupree’s felony-murder con-
viction.

Dupree claims insufficient evidence supported his felony-mur-
der conviction. He points out that while the amended information
charged him with felony murder based_on a killing that happened
“while in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from”
aggravated burglary, the jury instructions only asked the jury to
consider whether Phillips was killed while Dupree “was commit-
ting” aggravated burglary. He contends aggravated burglary is not

“committed” until a perpetrator actually enters a building. Thus,
Dupree argues the evidence was sufficient to establish only an “at-
tempt to commit” aggravated burglary at the time of the murder
because the evidence only established, at most, that he and Brown
were trying to get into the Locust Street house (by pushing on
the door or shooting through the door from the outside). In other
words, according to Dupree, because the jury instructions theory
only encompassed a completed burglary and not an attempted bur-
glary there was insufficient evidence supporting his felony-murder
conviction as charged.

Given that Dupree raises this issue as a sufficiency of the evi-
dence claim, our standard of review is to “look{] at all the evidence
ina light most favorable to the prosecution and determin[e] wheth-
er a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 374-75, 277
P.3d 1091 (2012). We “do not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses,” as this function is best left to the jury.
State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 859, 257 P.3d 272 (2011). Applying this
standard, we reject Dupree’s sufficiency challenge.

The felony-murder instruction required the jury to consider
whether “[tJhe ldlling was done while defendant was committing
aggravated burglary.” Granted, this was narrower than the charg-
ing information, as amended, which stated that Dupree and others
killed Phillips “while in the commission of, attempt to commit, or
flight from” aggravated burglary, language that mimicked the felo-
ny-murder statute. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 215402(a)(2) (defining
felony murder as “the killing of a human being committed . . . in
the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inher-
ently dangerous felony.”).

Despite this deviation and the focus on whether the killing oc-
curred while Dupree “was committing” aggravated burglary, we
have previously explained: ““The question for the jury is whether
the death is within the res gestae of the crime, regardless of the
actual sequence of events.” State v. Beach, 275 Kan. 603, 610, 67
P.3d 121 (2003) (quoting State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, 189-90,
14 P.3d 409 [2000]). And, with respect to felony murder, the res
gestae includes “those acts done before, during, or after the hap-

pening of the principal occurrence when those acts are so closely
connected with the principal occurrence as to form, in reality, a
part of the occurrence.” State v. Jackson, 280 Kan. 541, 545, 124
P.3d 460 (2005).

Here, to determine whether Dupree “was committing” aggra-
vated burglary when Phillips was shot, the jury could consider the
moments immediately preceding the shooting, the moment of the
shooting, and the moments immediately after the shooting, all of
which fell within the res gestae of the felony murder in this case.
Thus, it does not matter whether Phillips was shot during the
scuffle to enter the home (which Dupree argues would only be
an “attempt” to commit aggravated burglary) or once Dupree and
Brown were over the threshold (which Dupree agrees would be a
“committed” aggravated burglary) because the instruction permit-
ted the jury to consider all these moments together as it deter-
mined whether a killing occurred while Dupree “was committing”
aggravated burglary. Phillips’ death occurred within the res gestae
of felony murder, and the jury instruction reflected the facts of the
case and did not run afoul of our precedent. See Jackson, 280 Kan.
at 545; Beach, 275 Kan. at 610.

In fact, Dupree acknowledges that his attempt to distinguish be-
tween attempting to commit and committing a completed underly-
ing felony is contrary to our precedent regarding res gestae. But he
nonetheless urges us to set this precedent aside as inconsistent with
legislative intent. He argues the three options in the felony-murder
statute—a killing that occurred in the commission of, attempt to
commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous felony—eliminate
the res gestae concept and segment the nature of the State’s proof.

Dupree is nominally correct because K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
5402(a) does set forth various circumstances in which the crime
can occur. As we have stated:

“The felony-murder statute has two primary elements—killing and simultane-
ously engaging in an inherently dangerous felony. The second element can be es-
tablished through proof that the killing occurred while the defendant was commit-
ting, attempting to commit, or fleeing from an inherently dangerous felony. These
are simply factual circumstances in which a material element may be proven.”
State v. Cheffen, 297 Kan. 689, 702, 303 P.3d 1261 (2013).

In some felony-murder cases, there will be clear evidence that
the death occurred after completion of the crime. See State v.
Kunellis, 276 Kan. 461, 473, 78 P.3d '776 (2003). But at other times
detailed sequences of events are unavailable, perhaps making it un-
clear when exactly the death occurred or the precise moment when
actions crossed the line from attempt to completion. Still the evi-
dence is sufficient so long as the acts happened so closely as to be
part of the same occurrence—in other words, within the res gestae
of felony murder. See, e.g., Jackson, 280 Kan. at 546 (affirming a
juzy’s conclusion that a murder occurred “during” a drug transac-
tion when the transaction “had not been completed but was still in
process”); State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 938, 40 P.3d 139 (2001)
(describing the three statutory phrases as “temporal requirements
delineating when a killing may occur and still be part of the under-
lying felony”), overruled in part on other grounds State v. Marsh,
278 Kan. 520, 102 P.3d 445 (2004) . Nothing Dupree points to con-
vinces us the language of the statute requires that the State must
prove whether the killing specifically occurred once the intruders
had crossed the threshold, as opposed to while they were commit-
ting the act of forcing their way into the home. Dupree fails to per-
suade us that the language of the felony-murder statute requires us
to overrule our prior cases.

Here, the struggle at the door, the shot, and the entry happened
so close together that they were all part of the same occurrence
and within the res gestae. The evidence sufficiently supported the
jury's finding that Phillips was killed while the men were commit-
ting aggravated burglary. Accordingly, we need not reach the par-
ties’ other arguments, and we hold there was sufficient evidence to
support Dupree’s felony-murder conviction.

IssuE 4: The jury instructions do not require reversal.

We tum now to Dupree’s three jury instruction arguments. We
begin by discussing the steps of analysis that we apply when analyz-
ing a claim of error arising from jury instructions. These steps are:

“(1) determining whether the appellate court can or should review the issue,
ie., whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the

issue for appeal; (2) considering the merits of the claim to determine whether
error occurred below; and (3) assessing whether the error requires reversal, i.c.,
whether the error can be deemed harmless.” State v. BolzeSann, 302 Kan. 198,
209, 352 P.3d 511 (2015) (quoting State v. Williams, 295 Kan. 506, 510, 286 P.3d
195 [2012]).

Applying these steps to each of Dupree’s three jury instruction
issues, the parties focus on the second step, at which we determine
whether there was any error at all by “‘consider[ing] whether the
subject instruction was legally and factually appropriate, employ-
ing an unlimited review of the entire record.’” State v. Herbel, 296
Kan. 1101, 1121, 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (quoting Williams, 295 Kan.
506, Syl. { 4); see also State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 16063,
283 P.3d 202 (2012) (setting forth a fourstep standard of review,
in which this second step is split into two separate inquiries—was
the instruction factually appropriate and was the instruction legally
appropriate). We, too, will focus on the merits step and examine
whether the instructions were factually and legally appropriate.

4.1. The jury instructions did not result in an erroneous felony-
murder conviction based on principal liability as opposed
to aiding and abetting liability.

Turing to the specifics of Dupree’s first jury instruction issue,
Dupree claims his felony-murder conviction must be reversed be-
cause the jury was not properly instructed about aiding and abetting
liability. He believes the jury instructions precluded consideration
of aiding and abetting liability for the felony-murder charge—
meaning the jury could only have convicted him of felony murder
as a principal. He further contends no evidence established he was
the one who fired the gun and shot Phillips, and he also seems to
imply the jury could not consider that he aided and abetted the ag-
gravated burglary to the extent the commission of that crime was
an element of felony murder, as charged. Therefore, he argues, the
jury could not find him guilty of felony murder.

The aiding and abetting instruction at issue was given after both
the State and Dupree proposed using PIK Crim. 4th 52.140, the
pattern jury instruction explaining accomplice liability based on
the theory of aiding and abetting. The district court proposed a

slight modification, beginning the instruction with the words “[a]s
to Counts 2 to 7.” As Dupree points out, this alteration effectively
informed the jury that the instruction did not apply to the felony-
murder count, which was Count 1.

Before turning to the merits of Dupree’s arguments, we first
briefly address his contention that we must rule in his favor be-
cause the State “invited error” by requesting the use of the pattern
jury instruction on aiding and abetting, PIK Crim. 4th 52.140, and
defending the district court’s addition of the phrase limiting the
instruction to Counts 2 through 7. But invited error is not a path
to relief for the party making a claim of error in an appeal. Typi-
cally, unless the error is structural, invited error works to preclude
appellate review of a claim of error if the party making the claim
invited the error. See State v. Verser, 299 Kan. 776, 784, 326 P.3d
1046 (2014); see also State v. Hargrove, 48 Kan. App. 2d 522, 531.
293 P.3d 787 (2013). Because Dupree is making the claim of error,
not the State, the invited error doctrine is inapplicable.

Turning to Dupree’s principal argument, we conclude it also lacks
merit. Dupree argues the jury could not find him guilty of aiding
and abetting felony murder if it followed the court’s instructions.
But he premises his argument on a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of felony murder. If someone dies in the course of an
inherently dangerous felony, such as aggravated burglary, “all the
participants . .. [are] equally guilty of the felony murder, regardless
of who fired the fatal shot.” State v. Thomas, 239 Kan. 457, 462, 720
P2d 1059 (1986). In short, all participants in a felony murder are
principals. See State v. Littlejohn, 260 Kan. 821, 822, 925 P.2d 839
(1996); Thomas, 239 Kan. at 462.

If the evidence shows someone other than the defendant did
the shooting, a district court may choose to issue a felony-murder
instruction like the one given in this case, which requires the State
to prove “the defendant, or another, killed [the victim].” See PIK
Crim. 4th 54.120 & Notes on Use. Choosing to add “or another”
so that the instruction more closely matches a particular factual
scenario does not require the court to then also issue an aiding and
abetting instruction specific to felony-murder. Indeed, this would
be at odds with the nature of felony murder.

As to intent and participation in the underlying felony, it is
enough that the instructions as a whole informed the jury about
the nature of the defendant’s liability for the underlying felony—in
this case, Dupree’s liability for the aggravated burglary. See State
v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 47, 58, 127 P.3d 1016 (2006) (“[W]hen a homi-
cide occurs during the commission of a felony, the ‘“felony is the
statutory equivalent to the deliberation and premeditation essen-
tial to murder in the first degree.”’” [quoting State v. Altum, 262
Kan. 733, 738, 941 P.2d 1348 [1997]). The district court instructed
the jury on the elements of felony murder, as charged, which re-
quired the State to prove Phillips was killed in the commission of
aggravated burglary. The instruction referred the jury to a separate
instruction defining the elements of aggravated burglary. Specifi-
cally, to prove aggravated burglary, as charged, the State had to
prove Dupree entered the Locust Street home without authority,
he did so with the intent to commit aggravated robbery, and he did
so while another person was in the house. In turn, the district court
instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated robbery. The dis-
trict court's instructions allowed the jury to consider whether Du-
pree aided and abetted the aggravated burglary.

While Dupree essentially reads the felony-murder instruction
in isolation, the jury had to—and this court in reviewing his claim
of error must also—consider the instructions as a whole. See State
v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 570, 357 P.3d 251 (2015), cert. denied 136
S. Ct. 865 (2016) (directing that “instructions are to be considered
together as a whole, without isolating any one instruction”). When
read together, the jury instructions informed the jury that the aid-
ing and abetting instruction applied to both the crimes of aggravat-
ed burglary and aggravated robbery—in other words, that it could
convict Dupree of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery
based on aiding and abetting liability. If Dupree aided and abet-
ted an aggravated burglary, and in the course of that aggravated
burglary Brown shot Phillips, then Dupree may be convicted as a
principal for felony murder. This theory is accurately reflected in
the jury instructions as a whole.

We also note that the jury could well have concluded Dupree
was guilty of the underlying felony of aggravated burglary as a prin-

cipal. See State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 633, 88 P.3d 218 (2004).
Contrary to Dupree’s assertion, there was more than sufficient evi-
dence to support this theory: Stuart testified Dupree immediately
stepped into the house after the shooting; asked her for money and
her cell phone; pushed her through the house looking for a safe;
threatened to kill her; and carried a television out of the house.
Dupree admitted to taking a television and also admitted to accom-
panying Stuart and Brown throughout the house. While he denied
threatening Stuart, pushing her, or acting of his own accord, the
jury was free to disbelieve the parts of his story that did not cor
relate with Stuart's account. This evidence would permit a rational
factfinder to conclude Dupree did not merely aid and abet an ag-
gravated burglary but instead was an active and willing principal.
We will not reweigh a jury’s credibility determination. See Hall,
292 Kan. at 859.
Dupree also argues the problems with the jury instructions are
illustrated by misstatements in the State’s closing argument relat-
ing to his culpability for the acts of another. At issue is a portion
of the argument where the prosecutor stated, “In for a penny, in
for a pound.” The State then recited the text of the court's aid-
ing and abetting instruction and told the jury, “Now, don’t get con-
fused about the language here where it says as to Counts 2 through
7, when you're looking at Count 1, the felony murder. It’s already
built in. Go to . . . the felony murder [charge].” The State contin-
ued by noting Dupree had admitted that Brown killed Phillips and
that the killing happened “while [Dupree] was committing an ag-
gravated burglary. They're pushing their way into the house. . . .
Theyre trying to get in.” The State asserted it did not have to show
Dupree intended to kill Phillips or that he knew Phillips would die;
all it had to show was that the men were committing an inherently
dangerous felony, Dupree was involved in it, and a person died.
This argument, rather than pointing out a problem with the in-
structions, illustrates how the instructions, when read as a whole,
correctly reflected Kansas law and fully explained the theory of ac-
complice liability relevant to the facts of Dupree’s case. Liability
for felony murder does not distinguish between principals and aid-
ers and abettors, and the felony-murder instruction explained this

through the use of the phrase “the defendant or another.” The State
also accurately informed the jury that the foreseeability portion of
the aiding and abetting instruction—that a person is responsible
not only for the crime he intentionally aided and abetted but also
for reasonably foreseeable crimes and consequences that might
happen during the course of the intended crime—was built into
the felony-murder instruction. The instructions referred the jury to
the instruction for aggravated burglary, which in tum referred the
jury to the instruction for aggravated robbery. And they informed
the jury that Dupree had to intend to commit—or aid and abet the
commission of—these crimes. The prosecutor's arguments did not
tell the jury to ignore these requirements or direct them away from
considering any element of the underlying crimes.

We therefore reject Dupree’s first jury instruction argument.
The instructions regarding felony murder, aggravated robbery, and
aiding and abetting properly and fairly stated the law as applied to
the facts of his case. Because we find no error, we need not discuss
the other steps of the jury instruction analysis. See Williams, 295
Kan. at 518.

4.2, The district court did not commit reversible error by de-
clining to instruct the jury on Dupree’s requested compul-
sion defense.

In Dupree’s next claim of jury instruction error, he contends the
evidence at trial, taken in the light most favorable to him, supported
a compulsion defense. He argues there was evidence that Brown
pointed a gun at him and directed him into and around the Locust
Street home. Accordingly, he contends, the district court erred as a
matter of law in rejecting his request for such an instruction.

The compulsion defense is defined in K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-5206(a), which provides:

“A [defendant] is not guilty of a crime other than murder or voluntary man-
slaughter by reason of conduct which [he or-she] performs under the compul-
sion or threat of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if [the
defendant] reasonably believes that death or great bodily harm will be inflicted
upon [him or her] or upon [his or her family] if [he or she] does not perform such.
conduct.”

The compulsion defense “is not available to a person who inten-
tionally or recklessly places such person’s self in a situation in which
such person will be subjected to compulsion or threat.” K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 21-5206(b).

As to the first part of the statute making the defense unavailable
to defendants accused of “murder or voluntary manslaughter,” this
court has explained this phrase means murders resulting from an
intentional killing. See State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 641, 740 P.2d
559 (1987) (“The rationale is that, when confronted by a choice be-
tween two evils of equal magnitude, the individual ought to sacri-
fice his own life rather than escape by the murder of an innocent.”).
But a defendant may raise a compulsion defense if he or she is
charged with a killing “done by another during the commission of
some lesser felony,” so long as compulsion is an available defense
for that underlying felony. Hunter, 241 Kan. at 641-42.

Hence, the compulsion was legally available to Dupree as a de-
fense to the felony-murder charge. Even so, the district court had
to determine whether the evidence supported the instruction—
that is, whether the instruction was factually appropriate. See Her-
bel, 296 Kan. at 1121. Generally, a criminal defendant is entitled to
instructions on the law applicable to his or her theory of defense
if there is sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to find for
the defendant on that theory. State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 176, 184, 322
P.3d 367 (2014). If the defendant requested an instruction at trial,
as Dupree did, the court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant, 299 Kan. at 184, and can find the evi-
dence sufficient even if a defendant’s testimony was all that sup-
ported the defense. State v. Anderson, 287 Kan. 325, 334, 197 P.3d
409 (2008).

In making this assessment, the district court had to consider the
limited nature of the compulsion defense. State v. Dunn, 243 Kan.
414, 42.1, 758 P.2d 718 (1988). Specifically, a compulsion defense is
only available if “the coercion or duress [was] present, imminent,
and impending, and of such a nature to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if the act [was] not
done.” 243 Kan. at 421; see also State v. Matson, 260 Kan. 366, 385,
921 P.2d 790 (1996) (“A threat of future injury is not enough.”). The

coercion or compulsion must also be continuous, and a defendant
cannot invoke the defense if there was a reasonable opportunity to
avoid committing the crime without undue exposure to death or
great bodily harm. Dunn, 243 Kan. at 421; see State v. Baker, 287
Kan. 345, 362, 197 P.3d 421 (2008).

Considering these requirements, a district court must evaluate
whether a rational juror could conclude that the defendant reason-
ably believed he or she was in danger of death or great bodily harm,
see K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5206, and whether coercion induced a
well-grounded fear, see Dunn, 243 Kan. at 421. “[Mlerely ‘slight’
evidence of these objective standards of reasonableness would ap-
pear to be insufficient to justify a rational factfinder finding for the
defendant, and therefore insufficient to warrant the giving of a
compulsion instruction.” Anderson, 287 Kan. at 334.

Here, the district court determined there was not enough ev-
idence to permit a rational jury to believe Dupree’s compulsion
lefense, See Anderson, 287 Kan. at 334, Thus, it denied Dupree’s
request for such an instruction.
Dupree argues the district court erred in making this ruling be-
cause four portions of his trial testimony supported a compulsion
lefense instruction: (1) Dupree’s testimony he was walking away
from the Locust Street home when, after hearing a pop, Brown
waved a gun at Dupree and indicated he should follow inside; (2)
Dupree’s testimony that when he hesitated at the threshold, Brown
again waved the gun and told him to come on; (3) his testimony
that he stayed close to Brown inside the house because he did not
know what was going on and felt his life was in danger; and (4) his
testimony that he helped steal the televisions because Brown told
him to stop standing around and help and because he did not want
anything else to go wrong.

While Dupree’s testimony represents some slight evidence of
luress, his testimony is not sufficient to entitle him to a compulsion
defense instruction. See Anderson, 287 Kan. at 334. In fact, Du-
pree’s own testimony on crossexamination negated his compulsion
lefense. Dupree admitted that he could have fled the scene after
the shooting, and, though he explained he did not flee because he
was shocked and scared for his life, he also admitted that Brown

aa

did not verbally threaten him. Dupree also acknowledged Brown
was not in the same part of the house or threatening him when he
took the television from the living room and went outside. Again,
a compulsion defense is only available when coercion was continu-
ous and there was no reasonable opportunity for the defendant
to escape the scene without committing the charged crimes. See
Dunn, 243 Kan. at 421.

Thus, even Dupree’s own testimony, considered in the light most
favorable to him, does not provide evidence sufficient to support his
request for an instruction regarding the compulsion defense. See
Anderson, 287 Kan, at 334. The district court’s assessment that the
instruction was not warranted is further bolstered by the testimony
of Stuart and other witnesses who had been around Dupree an
his accomplices before and after the events at the Locust Street
house. Considering all this evidence, a rational jury could not find
that Dupree reasonably believed he was in danger of death, that
this fear was wellgrounded, or that the compulsion was continuous
and left Dupree with no reasonable opportunity to escape the com-
pulsion or avoid the act. See Anderson, 287 Kan. at 334. Accord
ingly, we hold the district court did not err in concluding Dupree’s
requested instruction on compulsion was not factually warranted.

4.3. The district court did not err in failing to give a lesser in-
cluded offense instruction for the felony-murder charge.

Dupree’s third and final jury instruction argument is that the
district court committed reversible error in rejecting his request
to instruct the jury about lesser included offenses for felony mur-
der—specifically, the lesser included offenses of second-degree in-
tentional murder and voluntary manslaughter. He urges us to con-
clude the jury could well have convicted him of a lesser included
offense, and he points to evidence he believes shows the victim,
Phillips, was the aggressor prior to the shooting.

At the time of Dupree’s trial, Kansas law held that lesser includ-
ed offense instructions must be given, even in felony-murder cases,
when there was some evidence that would reasonably justify a con-
viction of a lesser included crime. State v. Berry, 292 Kan. 493, 254

P.3d 1276 (2011), superseded by statute as recognized in State v.
Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 273-74, 323 P.3d 829 (2014).

However, after our opinion in Berry the legislature eliminated
all lesser included offenses of felony murder. See K.S.A. 2013
Supp. 21-5109; L. 2012, ch. 157, sec. 2; see Todd, 299 Kan. at 274.
Although K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5109 was effective July 1, 2013—
after Dupree’s trial—the legislature expressly provided that the
statute is a procedural rule meant to apply retroactively to any case
currently pending. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5402(d), (e), L. 2013,
ch. 96, sec. 2; see Todd, 299 Kan. at 274-75. We have since held
that this last prescription was within the legislature’s powers and
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Todd, 299 Kan. at 276-78.

With this recent legislative history in mind, we readily agree with
the State that Dupree’s argument lacks merit. The legislature has
made clear that (1) felony murder has no lesser included offenses
and (2) this rule applies retroactively to all cases pending, which
would include Dupree’s case. See Todd, 299 Kan. at 276-78. Du-
pree’s requested lesser included offense instructions were legally
inappropriate. Likewise, the district court did not err in refusing to
issue such instructions. See State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1121,
299 P.3d 292 (2013).

Issux 5: The district court’s order permitting the case detective to
sit at or near counsel table during trial, and its decision to
exempt the case detective from a sequestration order, did
not prejudice Dupree and do not require reversal.

Dupree argues the district court abused its discretion in allow-
ing the case detective to sit with the State’s attorneys at or near
the prosecution’s table and also abused its discretion by permitting
the case detective to remain in the courtroom despite the general
sequestration order. He asserts the case detective’s presence and
testimony unfairly bolstered the State’s case and amounted to a
constitutional error requiring reversal of his convictions.

Prior to trial Dupree had moved for an order of sequestration
and specifically requested the order cover the case detective—
meaning she, like all other witnesses, would not be permitted to
hear any other person's testimony. Dupree’s motion also stated that

i

even though it might not be per se abuse of the district court's dis-
cretion to allow a case detective to sit at counsel table during trial,
it nonetheless opened the door to possible prejudice.

The State responded by noting it was the general practice in
Sedgwick County to permit detectives to remain in the courtroom
despite a sequestration order. But on Dupree’s second point, the
State agreed—it assured the district court it would not place the
case detective at counsel table. Instead, she would sit behind coun-
sel but still assist the State.

The district court entered a sequestration order but exempted
the case detective from its order. It also specifically ruled the case
detective would be permitted to sit near the prosecutor. In the
course of its ruling the district court stated it had “always been
[its] practice over the years to allow the case detective to sit at the
table or in close proximity to the prosecutor,” and it “[had not]
been made aware of a case that stands for the proposition that it
is definitely prejudicial and [should not] be allowed.” The State
again confirmed it was not intending to have the case detective sit
at counsel table and explained there was not enough room at the
counsel table anyway. Instead, the State explained, it would prob-
ably have the case detective sit in front of the barrister bar but
behind the counsel table.

With these facts in mind, we will separately consider the two as-
pects of Dupree’s argument: (1) whether the district court erred in
allowing the case detective to sit with counsel and (2) whether the
district court erred in exempting her from the sequestration order.

As to the first aspect, in State v. Sampson, 297 Kan. 288, 292,
301 P.3d 276 (2013), which was filed after the trial in this case, we
acknowledged that our previous caselaw allowed a district court
some discretion to allow a testifying law enforcement officer to sit
at the prosecution table. See State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329,
342-43, 184 P.3d 274 (2008), abrogated by Sampson, 297 Kan. 288.
But we abrogated this rule in Sampson and held that permitting a
case detective to sit at counsel table carried a significant likelihood
the detective’s credibility would be improperly bolstered. Samp-
son, 297 Kan. at 295-96. Accordingly, post-Sampson, “a trial court
has no discretion to permit a testifying law enforcement officer to

sit at the prosecution table, regardless of the practical benefits of
that practice to the prosecution.” 297 Kan. at 297.

That post-Sampson holding does not apply to this case, which
preceded the filing of Sampson. Nevertheless, the reasoning of
Sampson supports Dupree’s arguments as to why the district court
abused its discretion in permitting the case detective to sit nearby
and assist the prosecutor. Indeed, in Sampson, 297 Kan. at 296-97,
we identified the harm as the significant likelihood a detective’s
credibility would be improperly bolstered by permitting an officer
to be so visually associated with the State’s lawyers. This danger
exists even if the case detective sits behind the counsel table but in
front of the barrister bar, as apparently happened here.

We also specifically stated in Sampson that the “practical ben-
efits” of having a case detective handy are simply not more impor-
tant than the need to avoid improper credibility vouching by the
State. 297 Kan. at 297. And we are thus troubled by the State’s
explanation, to the district court, that the case detective would as-
sist the State in gathering documents and answering questions the
prosecutors might have about the case. This type of conduct un-
questionably adds an imprimatur of credibility to the case detec-
tive’s testimony that will in many cases be inappropriate. See 297
Kan. at 296 (noting that the case detective in that case “acted as
a legal assistant, rose four times from the table to testify, and re-
tured four times to the table”). It is well established the State may
not assert to the jury a certain witness is or is not truthful. Work-
ing with and openly relying upon a case detective throughout trial
communicates trust and veracity. See State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47,
64, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005) (“[A] prosecutor should not comment on
the credibility of his or her own witnesses.”).

The State counters, however, that before Sampson the practice
was still allowed and nothing suggests this case differs in kind from
those past cases. This may be valid. Regardless, even assuming an
abuse of discretion here, the assumed error was harmless. Dupree
asserts, without analysis, that we must apply the constitutional
harmless error standard. Under this standard,

“the error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not

affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.¢., proves there is no
reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.” State v. Ward, 292 Kan.
541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012) (citing Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 708, reh. denied 386
U.S. 987 [1967]).

Assuming this standard controls, we conclude the State has met
its burden in light of the overwhelming evidence against Dupree
and the fact that the case detective’s testimony had little, if any-
thing, to do with Dupree’s defense. The bulk of the case detective’s
testimony consisted of a summary of the police investigation, direct
evidence of her own interactions with Stuart, and a narration of
the video from the security camera located near the Locust Street
house. Some of her testimony was helpful to the defense, such as
her statements that no DNA or fingerprint evidence was found and
her statement that Dupree was not hiding and was peaceably ar-
rested. And, unlike in some cases, Dupree did not attack the cred-
ibility of the case detective because the case detective’s testimony
was not the disputed evidence in the trial.

Stuart was the main witness against Dupree, and she told the
jury about his personal involvement and his culpability for the
crimes. Other witnesses, too, implicated him in the crimes. Even
Dupree’s testimony tracked Stuart's version of events, only differ-
ing on the matter of his intent—i.e., he claimed he was an unwill-
ing actor. Like Stuart, Dupree subjected himself to the jury's cred-
ibility evaluation by testifying, and the jury apparently rejected his
testimony about being sick and not acting of his own free will—a
theory rebuffed by several fact witnesses and his own answers on
cross-examination. The case detective’s testimony had little bear-
ing on that point. Hence, we do not believe there is any reasonable
possibility the result would have changed if the case detective had
not been sitting near the prosecutor's table.

For the same reasons, even if we assume the district court
abused its decision when it exempted the case detective from the
sequestration order, considering the record as a whole, we cannot
conclude the case detective’s presence prejudiced Dupree. Du-
pree points to no indication in the record of prejudice and makes
no suggestion, for example, that the case detective tailored her tes-

— ie
timony to buttress or to rebut another witness’ testimony. See State
v. Heath, 264 Kan. 557, 589, 957 P.2d 449 (1998) (recognizing that
even if district court abuses its discretion in denying a request to
sequester witnesses, the error is not reversible absent evidence of
prejudice).

We conclude the district court’s orders regarding the sequestra-

tion and seating of the case detective do not require us to reverse
Dupree’s convictions.

Issuz 6: The cumulative error doctrine does not require reversal
of Dupree’s convictions.

In his final argument, Dupree argues all of the alleged errors
discussed above, when considered together, deprived him of a fair
trial.

“Cumulative trial errors, when considered collectively, may re-
quire reversal of the defendant’s conviction when the totality of
circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied
the defendant a fair trial.” State v. Waller, 299 Kan. 707, 72728,
328 P.3d 1111 (2014). We will not find cumulative error “when the
record fails to support the errors raised on appeal.” State v. Cofield,
288 Kan. 367, 387, 203 P.3d 1261 (2009). A single error will not
constitute cumulative error. State v. Foster, 290 Kan. 696, 726, 233
P.3d 265 (2010).

As we have explained above, each of Dupree’s claims fails indi-
vidually; at most, we have assumed error in the orders regarding
the case detective but have determined that this assumed error did
not prejudice Dupree. There are no other errors to accumulate,
and the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. See Foster, 290
Kan. at 726,

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm each of Dupree’s convic-
tions and sentences.

Affirmed.

i

No. 112,469

Tracy ULLERY, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Jamie
Ullery, and KristoPHER ULLERY, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v.
DARREN OTHICK, WINDSOR PLACE AT-HOME Care, L.L.C.,
HEALTH MANAGEMENT OF Kansas, INC., JOANN J. O'BRIEN,
Defendants/Appellees, ALICE BEATTY, Defendant/Cross-claim-
ant/Appellee, and MONTE CoFFMAN, Defendant/Appellee.

MEGHAN OTHICK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JoANN J. O'BRIEN, et al.,
Defendants.

(372 P3d 1135)
Li

Linus L. Baker, of Stilwell, argued the cause and was on the brief for appel-
lants.

Samuel A. Green, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., of Topeka, ar-
gued the cause, and James P. Nordstrom, of the same firm, was with him on the
brief for appellee Alice Beatty, and Tyler C. Hibler, of Sanders, Warren, and Rus-
sell, L.L.P., of Overland Park, argued the cause for appellee Joann O’Brien.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BEIER, J.: This wrongful death case, arising out of a car accident
that killed Jamie Ullery, calls upon this court to determine whether
the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal taken
mid-case after the district judge certified that there was “no just
reason for delay” under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-254(b).

We hold that Prime Lending II v. Trolley’s Real Estate Holdings,
48 Kan. App. 2d 847, 304 P.3d 683 (2013), does not apply and that
the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction. We therefore remand to the
Court of Appeals for consideration of the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of defendants Alice Beatty and Windsor Place
At-Home Care, L.L.C.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Tracy Ullery, as the administrator of Jamie Ullery’s
estate, and Kristopher Ullery, Jamie’s sole heir, filed the underly-
ing lawsuit against Darren Othick, Windsor Place At-Home Care,
Health Management of Kansas, Joann O’Brien, Alice Beatty, and
Monte Coffman after a January 2012 car accident that caused Ja-
mie’s death.

On February 10, 2014, the district judge issued a Memorandum
Decision addressing various motions for partial and full summa-
ry judgment. At the conclusion of the decision, the district judge
wrote:

“This memorandum decision constitutes a journal entry and judgment is en-
tered in accordance with the findings and statements made above. This memoran-
dum is dated and effective this 10th day of February, 2014.”

On April 16, 2014, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify Journal
Entry as Final Judgment, seeking the district judge’s certification
of the February 10 Memorandum Decision “as a final judgment
under K.S.A. 60-254(b).” The district judge granted the motion in
a Journal Entry filed stamped July 29, 2014. The order read:

“NOW on this the 27th day of May, 2014, comes on for hearing before the
Court plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to K.S.A, 60-254(b) to certify the February 10,
2014[,] journal entry as final judgment.

“The Court being well and fully advised in the premises, and after reviewing ”
the briefs of counsel and hearing arguments of counsel, finds that the motion
should be sustained.

“IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the Court's memorandum decision heretofore entered February
10, 2014[,] is hereby modified as follows:

407

“There is no just reason for delay. The following judgments are deemed final
pursuant to K.S.A. 60-254(b):

“1) The Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant Beatty
against plaintiffs on the plaintiffs’ claims against her of negligence and wrongful
death;

“2) The Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant Wind-
sor Place At-Home Care, L.L.C. against plaintiffs on the plaintiffs’ claims against
ity

“3) The Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant Wind-
sor Place At-Home Care, L.L.C. as to Alice Beatty's claims against it; and

“4) The Court’s judgment in favor of plaintiffs on defendant O’Brien’s mo-
tion for partial summary judgment on the issue of conscious pain and suffering
experienced by Jamie Ullery.

“5) The Court’s judgment in favor of defendant O’Brien and against plain-
tiffs on O’Brien’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of pre-impact
emotional distress.”

Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal of the adverse rulings on
August 27, 2014, i.e., within 30 days of the July 29 filing of the
court’s Journal Entry. The notice included the following language:

“Notice is hereby given that all plaintiffs, each and every one, in the above
named case, hereby appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals from the final judg-
ment entered July 29, 2014, and all other prior judgments, orders, and rulings
entered in this action. This notice is intended to include, as broadly as possible, all
of the judgments, orders, and rulings, and to also include (but not to the exclusion
of others) all of the interlocutory and preliminary rulings, orders, and judgments
in case No. 2012cv406, including but not to the exclusion of others, the February
10, 2014[,] Memorandum decision filed of record February 13, 2014, which was
modified on July 29, 2014.”

In October 2014, before briefs in the appeal were filed, the
Court of Appeals issued an order to show cause on why the appeal
should not be dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction.

“Appellants are challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
certain claims. The district court apparently entered its initial judgment on Febru-
ary 10, 2014, At some time after that, Appellants apparently asked for permission
to have their action severed from other Defendants through application of K.S.A.
2013 Supp. 60-254(b). That request was granted by the district court in a journal
entry that was filed on July 29, 2014. Appellants’ notice of appeal was timely filed
on August 27, 2014,

“However, neither Appellants nor the district court seem to acknowledge this
court’s prior holding in Prime Lending II v. Trolley’s Real Estate Holdings, 48
Kan. App. 2d 847, 304 P.3d 683 (2013). In that case, the panel ruled that because

a district court failed to make the express statutory determination required by
K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-254(b) at the time the initial journal entry was filed, it had
no discretion to retroactively make that decision a final judgment. 48 Kan. App.
2d at 855. Unlike the Prime Lending case, there is no question that in this appeal,
the notice of appeal was timely filed. However, if the district court lacked the au-
thority to retroactively certify the judgment as immediately appealable, this court
questions whether it may assume jurisdiction over a non-final action. See K.S.A.
2013 Supp. 60-2102(a)(4).

“If the district court has entered a final judgment subsequent to the docketing
of this appeal, Appellants must include a certified, file[d]-stamped copy of that
journal entry when responding to this order.”

After receiving the parties’ responses to the order to show cause,

the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on October 30, 2014. Its
dismissal order included the following:
“Appellants’ response seems to focus on the claim that this court’s prior decision
in Prime Lending IL v. Trolley’s Real Estate Holdings, 48 Kan. App. 2d 847, 304
Pd 683 (2013)[,] was erroneous and should not be followed. In so arguing, Ap-
pellants point to the language of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-254(b), specifically the line
which allows the district court to “revise[] at any time” any order or decision which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties.

“In In re Marriage of Brown, 295 Kan. 966, 975, 291 P.3d 55 (2012), a case
cited by Appellants in their response, the Kansas Supreme Court clarified that
the revision contemplated by K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-254(b) is a revision to the
substance of an interlocutory order. The Brown case involved alterations to inter-
locutory child support orders and is wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case.

“This court’s prior holding in Prime Lending is clear. Unless and until the
Kansas Supreme Court clarifies the reach of K.$.A. 2013 Supp. 60-254(b), Prime
Lending will remain in effect in this court. Under that decision, this appeal is

We granted the plaintiffs’ petition for review. Defendants
O’Brien and Beatty have filed supplemental briefs arguing that the
Court of Appeals properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal.

Discussion

Resolution of the issue before us requires interpretation of
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-254.

“Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have
unlimited review. [Citations omitted.]

“The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the
legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. State v. Arnett, 290 Kan.
41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010). . . . [J]udicial interpretation must be reasonable and
sensible to effectuate the legislative design and the true intent of the law. State v.
Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 495, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014). In State v. Urban, 291 Kan. 214,
216, 239 P.3d 837 (2010), we stated:

“An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through

the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary mean-

ings. [Citation omitted.] When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an ap-
pellate court does not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and
will not read into the statute something not readily found in it. Where there

is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to statutory construction. Only

if the statute’s language or text is unclear or ambiguous does the court use

canons of construction or legislative history or other background consider-

ations to construe the legislature’s intent. [Citation omitted.]’” State v. Keel,

302 Kan. 560, 571-72, 357 P.3d 251 (2015).

At issue is whether a district judge can make the determination
that “there is no just reason for delay” of an appeal from a judg-
ment on “one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” at a
time other than contemporaneously with entry of the judgment.
See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-254(b) (court “may direct entry of a final
judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties
only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason
for delay”).

This court has previously addressed the process for entering a
final judgment on fewer than all claims or against fewer than all
parties. In City of Salina v. Star B, Inc., 241 Kan. 692, 739 P.2d
933 (1987), we considered “‘whether entry of a partial summary
judgment “pursuant to K.S.A. 60-254(b)” satisfied the require-
ments for certification in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-254(b).’” 241 Kan.
at 693 (quoting City of Salina v. Star B, Inc., 11 Kan. App. 2d
639, 640, 731 P.2d 1290 [1987]). The journal entry at issue in that
case “contain[ed] no express determination by the trial court ‘that
there is no just reason for delay’ and there [was] no ‘express direc-
tion for the entry of judgment.’” 241 Kan. at 693 (quoting K.S.A.
60-254[b]). This court agreed with an earlier statement from the
Court of Appeals:

“Faced with the clear requirements of K.S.A. 60-254(b) and the strong policy
against piecemeal appeals, we will not assume that the court made an express

determination that there was no just reason for delay merely because it entered
judgment “pursuant to K.$.A. 60-254(b).’” 241 Kan. at 696 (quoting City of Sa-
lina, 11 Kan. App. 2d at 646-47).

We then held:

“A trial court, intending to enter a final judgment on less than all claims or
against less than all parties, must make an express determination that there is no
just reason for delay and must expressly direct the entry of judgment. These must
appear affirmatively in the record, preferably by use of the statutory language.”
241 Kan, at 696.

Although the Court of Appeals had previously held that a “‘state-

ment of the reasons for the decision to certify’” could provide an
alternative route to appeal, this court rejected that ruling:
“We have not, in Kansas, required a trial court to state its reasons in making such
certification, and such a statement of reasons, while it might be helpful to an ap-
pellate court, is not an alternative to the express requirements of the statute that
the trial court must make an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and expressly direct the entry of judgment. The language of the statute is
clear, and must be followed.” 241 Kan. at 696-97.

In this case, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal grew from the hold-
ing of Prime Lending. Prime Lending involved an August 24, 2011,
summary judgment in a foreclosure action granted to Prime Lend-
ing II, LLC. Prime Lending, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 847-49. The dis-
trict judge later entered an order directing the county sheriff to
conduct a judicial sale of the property. On May 24, 2012, Prime
Lending moved to certify the August 24, 2011, summary judgment
decision as final under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-254(b). The district
judge granted this motion on June 19, 2012, saying:

“This Court’s August 24, 2011, Memorandum Decision did not specify that
judgment was final as to Trolley’s and Blue Moose, and that there was no just rea-
son to delay foreclosing on the property. Nevertheless, considering that this mat-
ter had been pending for two years at the time of judgment, and at least one party
still remains subject to bankruptcy court, this Court's Memorandum Decision was
clearly issued with the purpose of allowing foreclosure to proceed immediately.
‘Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion and certifies the August 24, 2011,
Memorandum Decision as a final judgment pursuant to K.S.A. 60-254.’” 48 Kan.
App. 2d at 849-50,

The Prime Lending panel first addressed whether either the
August 24, 2011, memorandum decision or the subsequent cor-

All

responding journal entry was a final judgment under K.S.A. 2012
Supp. 60-254(b). Because neither document “contained the ex-
press determination that there [was] no just reason for the delay
and an express direction for entry of judgment,” neither document
constituted a final judgment. 48 Kan. App. 2d at 851-52. The panel
also noted that “[a] partial adjudication of an action absent a K.S.A.
2012 Supp. 60-254(b) certification remains interlocutory and ‘may
be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating
all the claims and all the parties rights and liabilities.’” 48 Kan.
App. 2d at 852 (quoting K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-254[b]).

The panel then asked: “What effect, if any, does the trial court’s

June 19, 2012, memorandum decision and journal entry, which ret-
roactively certified the trial court’s August 24, 2011, memorandum
decision as a final judgment under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-254(b),
have on [the Court of Appeals’] jurisdiction?” (Emphasis added.)
48 Kan. App. 2d at 853-54. Its initial observation in response told
the ultimate tale: Even if the June 19, 2012, memorandum deci-
sion properly retroactively certified the August 24, 2011, decision
as a final judgment, Trolley’s would have needed to file its appeal
within the 30 days following August 24, 2011. 48 Kan. App. 2d at
854. It did not do so. This meant that, even if the June 19, 2012,
certification was deemed effective, the appeal still would be un-
timely and could not be saved from dismissal. 48 Kan. App. 2d at
854.
“Because the trial court failed to make the proper express determination required
by K'S.A. 2012 Supp. 60-254(b) when it issued its August 24, 2011, memorandum,
decision or its August 31, 2011, journal entry of judgment of foreclosure, it had
no discretion to retroactively make those decisions final judgments. See State ex
rel. Board of Healing Arts v. Beyrle, 262 Kan, 507, 510, 941 P.2d 371 (1997) (The
judgment lacked the determination required by K.S.A. 60-254(b), ‘and it is not
possible to now amend the order so to include the required findings within the
order,’); see also Razook v. Kemp, 236 Kan. 156, 158-59, 690 P.2d 376 (1984),”
(Emphasis added.) Prime Lending, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 855.

The Prime Lending panel held that a retroactive certification of
an earlier order was improper. 48 Kan. App. 2d at 855. It expressly
acknowledged that it was not addressing a situation in which the
trial court included a certification on finality in the earlier proceed-

ing instead of ordering retroactive certification in a later journal
entry. 48 Kan. App. 2d at 855-56.

Since the filing of the petition for review in this case, a differ-
ent panel of the Court of Appeals has factually distinguished Prime
Lending and avoided applying its holding to require dismissal of
an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In that case, Deaver v. Board
of Lyon County Comm'rs, No. 110,547, 2015 WL 715909, at *5
(2015) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 302 Kan. ___ (Sept. 14,
20185), the judge did not “retroactively declare [a] summary judg-
ment order was final as of the date it was first entered,” the situ-
ation in Prime Lending. Instead, the district judge “declared the
summary judgment order final as of . . . the [date the district judge]
ruled on the . . . motion [to certify].” 2015 WL 715909, at *5.

Tuming to the facts of this case, a recap of the critical dates is
useful here:

¢ February 10, 2014—The district judge issues a Memoran-
dum Decision granting summary judgment to certain de-
fendants.

¢ April 16, 2014—The plaintiffs file their Motion to Certify
Journal Entry as Final Judgment.

* May 27, 2014—A hearing on the Motion to Certify Journal
Entry as Final Judgment is held.

© July 29, 2014—The district judge issues his Journal Entry
Certifying Final Judgment, including “no just reason for de-
lay” language from K.S.A. 60-254(b), as required by City of
Salina, 241 Kan. at 696.

* August 27, 2014—The plaintiffs file their notice of appeal of
the “final judgment entered July 29, 2014.”

Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-2103, the 30-day period for filing
a notice of appeal generally begins to run on the date of the entry
of judgment under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-258. K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
60-258 provides:

“Entry of judgments is subject to subsection (b) of K.S.A. 60-254, and amend-
ments thereto. No judgment is effective unless and until a journal entry or judg-
ment form is signed by the judge and filed with the clerk.”

KS.A. 2015 Supp. 60-254(a) defines a judgment as a “final de-

termination of the parties’ rights in an action.” Subsection (b) of
that statute governs a judgment, such as the one before us here,
on multiple claims or involving multiple parties. In order to make
a judgment as to fewer than all parties or claims final, “the court
[must] expressly determine[] that there is no just reason for delay.”
Without such an express determination,
“any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end
the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before
the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and
liabilities.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-254(b).

In this case, the original February 10 order arguably was “desig-
nated” final by the judge. But that designation alone did not make
it a judgment subject to appeal within the meaning of K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 60-254. To be such a judgment, it had to be a final deter-
mination of all of the rights and liabilities of all of the parties or, if
something less, had to be subject to an express determination that
there was no just reason for delay of an appeal. The February 10
order satisfied neither condition. It thus did “not end the action”
and could “be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”
See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-254.

The district judge’s July 29 Journal Entry explicitly “modified”
the February 10 order, as permitted by K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-
254(b). And even the Court of Appeals panel appears to have ac-
knowledged that it was the July 29 Journal Entry that started the
30-day notice of appeal clock; it stated that there was no question
the appeal had been timely filed. This statement was consistent
with K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-258, which made the judgment effective
upon a journal entry or judgment form being signed by the district
judge and filed with the clerk. The July 29 journal entry marked the
first time the district judge made the statutorily required, express
determination that there was no just reason for delay of appeal. See
Deaver, 2015 WL 715909, at *5 (later K.S.A. 60-254(b) certifica-
tion distinct from retroactive certification). This express determi-
nation made the July 29 journal entry a final, appealable judgment

within the meaning K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-254(b), effective on its
filing with the clerk. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-258.

The Court of Appeals otherwise misread Prime Lending to stand
for the proposition that the “no just reason for delay” certification
must be made contemporaneously with the district court's order
adjudicating fewer than all of the claims in a lawsuit. In fact, Prime
Lending explicitly left that question open. See 48 Kan. App. 2d at
855-56 (“[H]ad the trial court certified the current proceedings,
we express no determination whether this would have resolved the
jurisdiction problem.”).

In brief summary, our interpretation of the plain language of the
interlocking applicable statutes persuades us that a certification of
“no-just reason for delay” may be made after summary judgment
is granted to fewer than all parties or on fewer than all claims. The
filing date of the district court order or journal entry memorializing
that certification starts the 30-day appeal clock, and a timely notice
of appeal endows the appellate court with jurisdiction to determine
the merits. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-254(b) explicitly allows revision
of nonfinal judgments, and K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-258 prevents any
judgment from becoming effective until it is memorialized in a
journal entry and filed with the clerk. For these reasons, the dis-
trict judge’s certification of his original decision as an appealable
judgment was successful here, and the Court of Appeals’ dismissal
of the plaintiffs’ appeal was incorrect.

Two final points merit mention.

O’Brien advances one additional, potentially significant prece-
dent to limit the district judge’s authority, citing State ex rel. Board
of Healing Arts v. Beyrle, 262 Kan. 507, 510, 941 P.2d 371 (1997).
Beyrle does not support the result O’Brien seeks. To the extent it
disapproved of a noncontemporaneous K.S.A. 60-254(b) certifica-
tion, its statement to that effect was dicta. In that case “[n]Jo at-
tempt was made to satisfy the requirements of K.S.A. 60-254(b).”
262 Kan. at 510. And the primary avenue for invoking appellate
jurisdiction in Beyrle was former K.S.A. 60-2102(b) (Furse 1994),
which allowed an interlocutory appeal when “‘such order involves
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and . . . an immediate appeal from the

order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion.’” Beyrle, 262 Kan. at 508.

For her part, Beatty attempts to argue that the district judge
“improperly certified as final the interlocutory judgment entered
in this case because plaintiffs’ claim against Beatty is not separable
from the remaining claims.” The substance of this argument ap-
pears to be that the district judge abused his discretion in ruling
as he did on July 29, 2014. This is not the issue before this court
on the plaintiffs’ petition for review. We deal in this opinion only
with the judge’s legal authority, not with the adequacy of his per-
formance under that authority. The petition listed only one issue:
“Whether a prior interlocutory order may later be certified as final
pursuant to K.S.A. 60-254(b).” Beatty was free to file a response
to the plaintiffs’ petition or a cross-petition. She did neither. Any
alleged abuse of discretion by the district judge is not before us on
the plaintiffs’ limited petition for review.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals’ order dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal

for lack of jurisdiction is vacated, and this case is remanded to the

Court of Appeals for consideration of the merits of the plaintiffs’
appeal.

No, 113,562

Stare oF Kansas, Appellant, v. AMONEO D. LEE, Appellee.
(872 P.3d 415)

De
a
ion filed April 29, 2016.

Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Mare
Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on
the brief for appellant.

Richard Ney, of Ney & Adams, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the
brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

RosEn, J.: The State of Kansas appeals from an order by the
district court that granted Amoneo D. Lee’s motion to correct an il-
legal sentence. Lee was convicted by a jury for a 1995 murder, and
the judge imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole
for 40 years. The conviction was affirmed by this court in State v.
Lee, 266 Kan. 804, 977 P.2d 263 (1999). The validity of the sentenc-
ing procedure was not raised in the direct appeal.

In 2008, Lee filed a motion “for correction of sentence pursu-
ant to K.S.A. 22-3504(1),” alleging, inter alia, that the sentencing
court denied him “his due process rights of allowing the jury to
participate in the sentencing proceeding that was not waived by
the defendant.” The district court summarily denied the motion.
This court affirmed the judgment of the district court, relying on
the then-current understanding of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
US. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000): Because
the sentencing court did not enhance Lee’s maximum sentence but
only his sentence relating to parole eligibility, the sentence did not
violate his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. State v. Lee, No.
101,638, 2011 WL 433533 (Kan. 2011) (unpublished opinion).

On August 11, 2014, Lee filed through counsel a second motion

Al7

to correct an illegal sentence, based on Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S.__, 183 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), and State
v, Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 322 P.3d 334 (2014). Following a hearing,
the district court granted Lee’s motion. It is this motion and order
that is the subject of the current appeal.

Whether a sentence is illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504 is a question
of law subject to de novo review. State v. Mitchell, 284 Kan. 374,
376, 162 P.3d 18 (2007).

At sentencing, the district court judge considered Lee’s three
prior convictions of aggravated battery, as well as convictions of car-
tying concealed weapons, burglaries, and thefts. He also took into
account the nature of the crime at hand and concluded: “Clearly
the aggravating factors in this case, the prior conviction, the sever-
ity of it, those findings I’ve already made, clearly outweigh beyond
a reasonable doubt any mitigating factor that exists in this case.”
Based on this finding, the judge sentenced Lee to a life term with-
out eligibility for parole for a minimum of 40 years. These determi-
nations were made exclusively by the sentencing judge.

In granting Lee’s motion to correct the sentence, the Sedgwick
County District Court agreed with him that the sentencing proce-
dure violated Alleyne. The district court then held that retroactivity
was not a relevant inquiry, because it would be unfair to punish a
defendant who was the victim of bad timing. The court then or-
dered that Lee be brought back into court for resentencing.

Under K.S.A. 22-3504(1), a defendant may file a motion to cor-
rect an illegal sentence at any time. An illegal sentence is a sen-
tence imposed by a court without jurisdiction; a sentence that does
not conform to the statutory provision, either in the character or
the term of the punishment authorized, or a sentence that is am-
biguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be
served. Mitchell, 284 Kan. at 376. A sentence is illegal only if it fits
within these categories. State v. Gayden, 281 Kan. 290, 293, 130
P.3d 108 (2006). A claim that a term of punishment was later de-
clared unconstitutional does not satisfy the requirements for find-
ing a sentence illegal. 281 Kan. at 292.

This court addressed that issue squarely in State v. Moncla, 301
Kan. 549, 553-54, 343 P.3d 1161 (2015), holding:

“Moncla also argues that his sentence is illegal because a judge rather than a
jury determined the existence and weight of the aggravating factor that led to the
hard 40. He cites Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162-63,
186 L. Ed, 2d 314 (2013), which held that, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact
that increased a sentence must be found by a jury rather than a judge. ‘Because
the definition of an illegal sentence does not include a claim that the sentence
violates a constitutional provision, a defendant may not file a motion to correct an
illegal sentence based on constitutional challenges to his or her sentence.’ State v.
Mitchell, 284 Kan. 374, 377, 162 P.3d 18 (2007); see Verge v. State, 50 Kan. App.
2d 591, 598-99, 335 P.3d 679 (2014) (motion to correct illegal sentence based on
Alleyne improper constitutional challenge to sentence).”

See also State v. Warrior, 303 Kan. 1008, Syl., 368 P.3d 1111
(2016) (motion to correct illegal sentence inappropriate vehicle for
challenges under Alleyne); State v. Noyce, 301 Kan. 408, 409-10,
343 P.3d 105 (2015) (Alleyne constitutional issues not proper basis
for motion to correct illegal sentence); State v. Petrano, 289 Kan.
805, 217 P.3d 23 (2009) (failure of sentencing court to carry out
statutorily mandated balancing of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors did not render sentence illegal).

Lee seeks to frame his main argument as being something other
than a constitutional challenge. As artfully crafted as his arguments
are, they all seek application of later caselaw to the statute that was
in effect at the time that he was sentenced. Lee was sentenced un-
der a statute that did not, at the time, conflict with any higher court
decision on the jury-determination question.

The statute, K.S.A. 22-3504, was not void at the time, because
no court had held it to be void. Apprendi was not issued until June
2000, and Lee’s conviction, sentence, and appeal had become final
by that time. The 1997 statute was not vacated as having no ef-
fect. See, e.g., Whisler v. State, 272 Kan. 864, 877-79, 36 P.3d 290
(2001) (Apprendi represented procedural, not substantive change
and was not a “watershed rule” of criminal procedure implicating
fundamental fairness of trial; could not be applied in collateral at-
tacks on sentences). Whether the timing of subsequent decisions
gives the appearance of “unfairness,” as the district court ruled, is
irrelevant: Lee’s claim is inappropriate because a motion to correct
an illegal sentence cannot be used to attack the constitutionality of
a sentencing statute.

The decision of the district court granting the motion to correct
an illegal sentence is reversed, and the order that Lee be resen-
tenced is vacated.

No. 112,316

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. EBONY NGUYEN, Appellant.
(372 P.3d 1142)

een
Opinion
filed May 20, 201
Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and
was on the brief for appellant.
Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Mark

Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attomey general, were with him on
the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nuss, C.J.: Ebony R. Nguyen appeals the district court’s denial
of her motion, for a downward durational departure of her life sen-
tence for felony murder. Because the district court had no discre-
tion to depart, we reject Nguyen’s arguments and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts are undisputed. Nguyen unwittingly received coun-
terfeit money from Jordan Turner in exchange for her marijuana.
Upon discovering the deception and with the assistance of three
others, Nguyen retaliated by luring Turner to a secluded location
where he was shot and killed. With kidnapping serving as the un-
derlying felony, Nguyen pled no contest to one count of felony
murder under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5402(a)(2).

Before Nguyen was sentenced, she filed a motion for durational
departure from a life sentence and sought a sanction of between
147 to 165 months in prison. At the hearing on the motion the
district court stated it had no discretion to depart from the life sen-
tence but, if so, it would not have granted departure:

“Well, I'll say for the record that in my opinion, the Court doesn’t have discretion.
This is an off-grid offense, and it calls for a life sentence.

“Now, on appeal, if the appellate court were to disagree with that, my position,
for purposes of the record, is that I would be unable to find substantial and com-
pelling reasons to depart. Miss Nguyen was the driving force behind the shooting
in this case, and under those circumstances, it would be wholly inappropriate for
the Court to depart, so if the Court did have the discretion to consider the motion
to depart, the Court would deny the motion.”

Accordingly, the court denied Nguyen’s motion and imposed a
life sentence with parole eligibility after 20 years. See K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 22-3717. Nguyen timely appealed her sentence.

Our jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3601(b)
(3), (4) (maximum sentence of life imprisonment imposed for an
off-grid crime).

More facts will be added as necessary to the analysis.

ANALYSIS

Issue: The district court did not err in concluding that K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 21-6806(c) does not authorize a district court to depart from
alife sentence for felony murder.

Nguyen argues that because K.S.A. 2015 Supp: 21-6806(c)
is silent on durational departures for off-grid crimes, sentencing
courts have discretion to grant them—at least for felony murder.
She specifically contends this court implicitly acknowledged such
discretion to depart from a life sentence for felony murder in State
v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 88 P.3d 218 (2004). The State basically
counters that the statute’s language reveals the intent of the legisla-
‘ture is to prohibit durational departures from sentences for off-grid
crimes like felony murder.

Nguyen further argues that once we have agreed the district
court had departure discretion, several factors warrant the court's
exercise of that discretion to reduce her sentence: her lack of crim-

i

inal history, her limited role in the murder, and her age and lack of
maturity. But because we reject Nguyen’s first argument, we do not
reach her second one.

Standard of review

Whether the district court has discretion to grant a durational de-
parture from a felony-murder life sentence requires interpretation
of the revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 21-6801 et seq., a question of law subject to unlimited
review. State v. Luarks, 302 Kan. 972, 976, 360 P.3d 418 (2015)
(citing State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 571, 357 P.3d 251 [2015)).

In exercising our unlimited review, we acknowledge that “‘[t]he
fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that
the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascer-
tained.’” Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 301 Kan. 916, 918, 349
P.3d 469 (2015). A statute’s language is our paramount consider-
ation because “‘“the best and only safe rule for ascertaining the
intention of the makers of any written law is to abide by the lan-
guage they have used.”*” State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906, 327
P.3d 425 (2014) (quoting Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1143,
319 P.3d 1196 [2014] [quoting Wright v. Noell, 16 Kan. 601, 607,
1876 WL 1081 (1876)]). “When statutory language is plain and un-
ambiguous, there is no need to resort to statutory construction. An
appellate court merely interprets the language as it appears; it is
not free to speculate and cannot read into the statute language not
readily found there.” State ex rel. Schmidt v. City of Wichita, 303
Kan. 650, 659, 367 P.3d 282 (2016).

When legislative intent cannot be derived from the plain lan-
guage of the statute, this court may look to legislative history or
employ other methods of statutory construction. State v. Holt, 298
Kan. 469, 474, 313 P.3d 826 (2013).

Discussion

We start our analysis by acknowledging that K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-6806(c) establishes the sentencing for certain off-grid crimes,
including felony murder under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5402(a)(2).
The sentencing statute provides:

|

“Violations of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5401, 21-5402, 21-5421, 21-5422 and 21-
5901, and amendments thereto, are off-grid crimes for the purpose of sentencing.
Except as otherwise provided by K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6617, 21-6618, 21-6619,
21-6622, 21-6624, 21-6625, 21-6628, and 21-6629, and amendments thereto,
the sentence shall be imprisonment for life and shall not be subject to statutory
provisions for suspended sentence, community service or probation.” (Emphasis
added.) K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6806(c).

We next note that the exceptions listed in K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-6806(c)—K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6617, 21-6618, 21-6619, 21-
6622, 21-6624, 21-6625, 21-6628 and 2.1-6629—do not provide any
exceptions to a life sentence for felony murder. These statutes pri-
marily provide a sentencing scheme for capital murder.

Nguyen argues this court essentially interpreted this language in
a predecessor statute—K.S.A. 21-4706(c)—to answer this depar-
ture question in State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624. There, the district
court denied the defendant’s request for a durational departure
on his conviction of felony murder and sentenced him to life im-
prisonment with no possibility of parole for 20 years. We held that
the defendant was not entitled to a reduced sentence despite the
lighter sentences his codefendants received as part of their plea
bargains in which they pled guilty to less serious offenses. 277 Kan.
at 656. Nguyen argues that by reviewing the issue of departure
from a life sentence in Gleason, this court implicitly acknowledged
the district court had discretion to consider a departure.

But Nguyen’s reliance on Gleason is misplaced. The issue before
this court concerned whether the district court was required to
compare defendant’s sentence to the lesser sentences of his code-
fendants, not whether the sentencing statute allowed for durational
departure. 277 Kan. at 656. So, we reject Nguyen’s argument that
in Gleason we implicitly acknowledged a district court’s discretion
to depart from a life sentence for felony murder.

Moreover, since Gleason we twice have expressly stated that
the life sentence for felony murder is mandatory. Four years af-
ter Gleason we stated: “[T]he district court imposed a mandatory
life sentence for the felony murder” and declared: “The sentence
imposed for [the defendant’s] felony murder, a mandatory life sen-
tence, conforms to the statutory provisions.” (Emphasis added.)
State v. Heath, 285 Kan. 1018, 1019, 179 P.3d 403 (2008). In Heath

i

we cited the previous, substantially similar felony-murder sentenc-
ing statute in effect at the time, K.S.A. 21-4706(c), which provided
in relevant part: “Violations of K.S.A. 21-3401 [(b) is felony mur-

der] . . . are off-grid crimes for the purpose of sentencing. . . . [T]he
sentence shall be imprisonment for life and shall not be subject to
statutory provisions for suspended sentence, community service or
probation.” (Emphasis added.)

Six years after Heath we similarly pronounced in State v. Brown,
300 Kan. 542, 562-63, 331 P.3d 781 (2014):

“A person convicted of felony murder is subject to a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment. See K.S.A, 21-4706(c). A person serving a life sentence for a

felony murder committed after July 1, 1999, becomes parole eligible after 20 years
of confinement. K.S.A. 22-3717(b)(2).” (Emphasis added.)

These declarations are consistent with the plain language of
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6806(c)—and its predecessor K.S.A. 21-
4706(c)—which provides that a sentence for felony murder “shall
be imprisonment for life.” (Emphasis added.) See also State v.
Brown, 303 Kan. 995, 1006, 368 P.3d 1101 (2016) (describing
KS.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6806[c] as an example of “mandatory life
sentences assigned by the legislature for off-grid crimes”).

Despite the foregoing, in none of these decisions did we ex-
pressly analyze this particular statutory phrase—"the sentence
shall be imprisonment for life’--with the language that immedi-
ately follows it: “and shall not be subject to statutory provisions
for suspended sentence, community service or probation.” K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 21-6806(c). Not surprisingly, Nguyen and the State dif-
fer on the meaning and possible significance of this language and
whether it introduces ambiguity into the statute.

Nguyen argues that by listing “suspended sentence, community
service or probation” the legislature merely prohibited them and
any similar unlisted dispositional departures but did not prohibit
the durational departure she requested. The State responds this
language shows that the intent of the legislature was to disallow
any departures.

To assist our analysis, we observe that after Nguyen committed
her crime in March 2013, the legislature added language to anoth-
er statute to specifically govern felony-murder sentences. Although

i

the amendment to the statute applies to felony murders committed
after July 1, 2014, it is of guidance in determining the legislative in-
tent in K.S.A. 21-6806(c). Cf. Brown, 303 Kan. at 1006 (court does
not interpret statutes in isolation but considers provisions of an act
in pari materia with view to reconciling, bringing provisions into
workable harmony) (citing State v. Hobbs, 301 Kan. 203, 210-11,
340 P.3d 1179 [2015)]).

The amendment to that statute, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6620,
provides in relevant part:
“[A] defendant convicted of murder in the first degree as described in subsection
(a)(2) [felony murder] of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5402, and amendments thereto,
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life and shall not be eligible for probation
or suspension, modification or reduction of sentence. In addition, the defendant
shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving 25 years’ imprisonment, and such
25 years’ imprisonment shall not be reduced by the application of good time cred-
its. No other sentence shall be permitted.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-6620(b)(1).

When, as here, language has been added to an existing statute,
the issue often becomes whether the new language is meant to
constitute substantive legislative changes or simply to codify prior
caselaw, e.g, to clarify. See Stueckemann v. City of Basehor, 301
Kan. 718, 745, 348 P.3d 526 (2015) (distinguishing substantive leg-
islative changes from mere codification of prior caselaw); see also
Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass’n, 293 Kan. 446, 458,
264 P.3d 102 (2011) (“When an original statute is ambiguous, the
legislative purpose may be to clarify the statute’s ambiguities, not to
change the law.”); Estate of Soupene v. Lignitz, 265 Kan. 217, 222,
960 P.2d 205 (1998) (amendment which in effect construes and
clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as the legislative declara-
tion of the meaning of the original act).

Faced with our decisions in Heath in 2008 and Brown in 2014,
the legislature could have chosen to change this caselaw. In other
words, it could have chosen to make substantive changes in K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 21-6806 and clearly establish that the life sentence
for felony murder was not mandatory—i.e., durational departures
were permitted. But the legislature did not do so. See Hall v. Dil-
lon Companies, Inc., 286 Kan. 777, 785, 189 P.3d 508 (2008) (when

legislature does not modify statute to avoid a standing judicial con-
struction of that statute, the legislature is presumed to agree with
that judicial construction). Instead, it chose to address the subject
of felony-murder sentences in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6620, and the
statute’s amended language certainly cannot be said to override
Heath and Brown. The amendment provides that defendant “shall
not be eligible for . . . modification or reduction of sentence” and
“the defendant shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving 25
years’ imprisonment, and such 25 years’ imprisonment shall not be
reduced by the application of good time credits. No other sentence
shall be permitted,” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6620(b)(1).

Indeed, the legislature chose the opposite approach to substan-
tive change. By including disqualifying language far beyond the
concepts of probation and suspension in 21-6620, the legislature
essentially only codified the caselaw. We therefore conclude that
these additions are merely meant to clarify the legislative intent:
the mandatory sentence for felony murder is life imprisonment.

The State makes additional arguments that we conclude support
the holding that a life sentence is mandatory for felony murder, i.e.,
no departures are permitted. The State first notes that the general
sentencing statute for on-grid crimes, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6815,
contains language specifically authorizing departures, Subsection
(a) provides in relevant part: “[T]he sentencing judge shall impose
the presumptive sentence provided by the sentencing guidelines
unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose
a@ departure sentence.” (Emphasis added.) Subsections (c)(1) and
(2) then provide the nonexclusive lists of mitigating and aggravat-
ing factors which may be considered by the judge in determining
whether substantial and compelling reasons for a departure exist.

The State next observes that while mandatory life sentences for
some types of off-grid crimes can nevertheless be eligible for de-
parture, their empowering statutes are explicit in their departure
authorization. It points to the statute controlling Jessica’s Law sen-
tencing, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6627, which provides for a manda-
tory minimum of imprisonment for certain offenders. Jessica’s Law,
like K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6806(c), generally prohibits departures

427

for its off-grid crimes. And it specifically includes language echoing
that of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6620(b)(1):

“When a person is sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) or (b), such person
shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of not less
than 25 years, 40 years or be sentenced as determined in subsection (a)(2) or
subsection (b)(2), whichever is applicable, and shall not be eligible for probation
or suspension, modification or reduction of sentence. In addition, a person sen-
tenced pursuant to this section shall not be eligible for parole prior to serving such
mandatory term of imprisonment, and such imprisonment shall not be reduced
by the application of good time credits.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-6627(c).

But unlike K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6806(c), after establishing a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment (not less than 25
years), Jessica’s Law goes on to expressly authorize, and provide
a procedure for, departing from this mandatory sentence: “[T]he
sentencing judge shall impose the mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment provided by subsection (a), unless the judge finds
substantial and compelling reasons, following a review of mitigat-
ing circumstances, to impose a departure.” (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6627(d)(1); see also State v. Spencer, 291
Kan. 796, 803, 248 P.3d 256 (2011).

Building on the State’s argument, we also doubt that the leg-
islature intended for the crimes it identified in the first sentence
of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6806(c)—21-5401 (capital murder); 21-
5402 (first-degree murder); 21-5421 (terrorism); 21-5422 (illegal
use of weapons of mass destruction); and 21-5901 (treason) —to be
eligible for a durational departure from a life sentence. Our skepti-
cism is particularly valid when the legislature has failed to provide
any guidance to the sentencing court on when and how to depart
from these most serious crimes. Compare K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
6627(d)(1) (Jessica’s Law sentencing statute provides guidance on
how and when to depart) and 21-6815 (general departure statute
for presumptive sentences provides guidance on how and when to
depart). These two statutes further demonstrate that had the legis-
lature intended to allow departures from a mandatory life sentence
for felony murder, it clearly knew how to enact such provisions. Ac-
cordingly, we hold that by failing to provide an exception for felony
murder, the legislature intended to prevent departures from the

—_

mandatory life sentence. See State v. Looney, 299 Kan. at 906 (The
most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of
the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.).

As a result, we hold that K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6806(c) does not
give district courts discretion to depart from a life sentence for fel-
ony murder. Given this holding, we need not consider the merits of
Nguyen’s motion for downward durational departure.

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

429

No. 108,807

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. GREGORY STUART Rosa,
Appellant.
(871 P3d 915)

Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was
on the brief for appellant.

Adam Y, Zentner, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek
Schmidt, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

STEGALL, J.: Gregory Rosa challenges his conviction for pos-
session of methamphetamine on three grounds: (1) the evidence
was insufficient; (2) evidence of his prior drug use was improperly
admitted; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct. We find no reversible
error and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 27, 2011, law enforcement officers executed a

search warrant for a methamphetamine laboratory in Rosa’s home
in Leavenworth County, Kansas. The house had four long-term
residents. Rosa and Maureen Evans were in a relationship at the
time and lived together in the upstairs master bedroom where they
were found during the raid. Randall Smith lived in a bedroom on
the main floor. Smith was found hiding behind a water heater in the
asement. Joshua Sigler also lived in the house but was not present
during the raid. Brian Brice and O’rian Heckman were also in the
house in a separate bedroom during the raid. Neither lived at the
house, but both would sometimes “crash there.” Rosa owned the
home and paid the utilities. Smith, Sigler, and Evans did not lease
their rooms or otherwise pay rent.
The raid occurred following an investigation into the suspi-
cious behavior of Evans, Smith, Brice, Heckman, and Sigler, who
ad purchased Sudafed, a known drug precursor, multiple times
roughout that month. Video from a Walmart on Januaty 13,
011, showed Heckman purchasing Sudafed while accompanied
y Brice and Smith and then getting into a car owned by Rosa,
though Rosa was not present. Video from the 14th showed Evans
purchasing Sudafed. Slightly over an hour later, the video showed
Brice purchasing Sudafed. On the 15th, video showed Sigler pur-
chasing Sudafed, and then Heckman purchased Sudafed again ap-
proximately 15 minutes later.
At another store, a Walgreens, a log of pseudoephedrine pur-
chases showed that on January 11, 2011, Sigler purchased Sudafed
‘ollowed by Brice purchasing Sudafed 4 minutes later. The log
showed Sigler purchasing more Sudafed on the 16th, Heckman
purchasing on the 17th, and Brice purchasing on the 26th. Police
had stopped Sigler’s vehicle earlier that January in relation to a rob-
ery at a pharmacy and found several stolen bottles of tincture of
iodine, another substance known to be used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Smith, Brice, and Heckman were in Sigler’s
vehicle during the stop.

During the raid, police officers found evidence of an active red
“P”—also called “red phosphorous” or “red and black’—metham-

rp

phetamine laboratory in Smith’s bedroom. There, officers discov-
ered methamphetamine in a “sludge” inside a coffee pot. Testi-
mony established Smith was cooking red “P” methamphetamine in
that coffee pot the morning of the raid. Various containers of liquid
containing methamphetamine were also found in Smith’s closet,
inside a green bag, and hidden inside the lining of a coat found
in the room. Methamphetamine residue was found on a glass pie
plate under Smith’s bed. Much of the testimony of investigating of-
ficers was spent detailing the many items related to manufacturing
methamphetamine found in Smith’s bedroom. Officers also found
a small plastic bag containing crystal “ice” methamphetamine resi-
due hidden in a sunglasses case inside a dresser in a storage room
used by Evans for her clothing, jewelry, and other personal items.

Officers did not find methamphetamine in the common areas of
the home or the master bedroom.

At trial, the State presented evidence of Rosa’s prior drug use
and general acquaintance with methamphetamine. Brice testified
that Rosa used methamphetamine in front of him. Sigler testified
that Rosa had been present at the house while he used metham-
phetamine and that he saw Rosa using drugs. Heckman testified
that she had used drugs at Rosa’s house with Rosa, Smith, Brice,
Evans, and Sigler. Evans testified that she was aware of drug use at
the house prior to Smith moving in. Additionally, during trial, the
State asked Evans, “How did you get your meth?” and she replied,
“From Greg [Rosa].” The State then repeated this, asking, “You got
your meth from [Rosa]?” Evans replied, “Yes.” :

Smith’s testimony made it clear that he had operated a meth-
amphetamine lab that produced red “P” methamphetamine in his
bedroom. Brice testified that he and Heckman were also present in
the room while Smith cooked the methamphetamine. Brice him-
self had been present when Smith cooked 10 to 15 times. Accord-
ing to Brice, Smith was in the process of cooking the methamphet-
amine the morning the raid occurred.

Evans testified Rosa directed her to drive the others to the store
while he was at work because he suspected “they were up to no
good.” When asked whether Rosa did not want to be associated
with the others, Evans replied, “Yes. That's why he wanted the er-

rand running done while he was at work or not at all is what he
said.”

Evans further testified that Rosa had been in Smith’s room, al-
though she could not say what occurred in the room. Evans said
there were times when Rosa would go with Smith into Smith’s
room and the door would be closed and locked. Evans also testified
that she and Rosa had previously cleaned Smith’s room. Evans said
they discovered “[p]araphernalia and needles” as well as red marks
and burn marks on the carpet while cleaning. Evans testified that
Rosa had to replace the carpet because of the damage.

Additionally, there was testimony that Rosa smelled the cook in
Smith’s bedroom. Brice testified that once on Rosa’s day off, when
Smith was cooking methamphetamine, Rosa commented that he
smelled something coming through the door of Smith’s bedroom.
Finally, Sigler testified that he told Rosa to kick Smith out because
he was making methamphetamine. He told Rosa to get rid of Smith
“[flive to ten” times, and he testified, “[Rosa] has been told on
many occasions to get rid of [Smith] because of what he was doing.”

The State prosecuted Rosa on the theory that he possessed the
methamphetamine found in his house. The State intended to prove
its case by demonstrating that Rosa owned and exercised general
control over all areas in the house and that he knew methamphet-
amine was in the house. Rosa defended against the charge of pos-
session primarily by attempting to establish, through witnesses and
arguments of counsel, that he did not know the other residents
of the house were cooking and keeping methamphetamine in his
house. In other words, Rosa did not deny he owned the premises
or that the drugs were found on his premises, he only denied his
knowledge of and intent to possess those drugs.

ANALYSIS
The evidence was sufficient.

Our standard of review on sufficiency challenges is well known
and often stated: “When the sufficiency of the evidence is chal-
lenged in a criminal case, this court reviews the evidence in a light
most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational fact-
finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reason-

| ow cae

able doubt.” State v. McClelland, 301 Kan. 815, 820, 347 P.3d 211
(2015).

As illustrated by the jury instructions, the charge Rosa was ulti-
mately convicted of required the State to prove:

“1. That the defendant intentionally possessed methamphetamine; and

“2, That this act occurred on or about the 27th day of January 2011, in Leav-
enworth County, Kansas.”

See K.S.A. 2010 Supp 21-36a06(a). Kansas law defines possession
as “having joint or exclusive control over an item with knowledge
of and intent to have such control or knowingly keeping some item
in a place where the person has some measure of access and right
of control.” K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-36a01(q).

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we
have no difficulty concluding that the evidence was sufficient to
prove that Rosa owned the premises, exercised lawful and factual
control over all areas of the house, and knew there was metham-
phetamine present in the house—most significantly, in Smith’s
bedroom cook operation. Rosa was in and out of Smith’s bedroom
contemporaneously with the cook operation; he saw the cook; he
smelled the cook; and he was told repeatedly about the cook by
other guests and residents of the home. The question presented
by this case is whether these facts, once sufficiently proven as they
have been here, are legally sufficient to support the charge of pos-
session.

“‘A conviction of even the gravest offense can be based en-
tirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences fairly deduc-
ible therefrom. If an inference is a reasonable one, the jury has
the right to make the inference.” McClelland, 301 Kan. at 820
(quoting State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. { 9, 245 P.3d 1030
[2011]). Thus, we must decide whether the State presented suf-
ficient circumstantial evidence to prove that Rosa had “joint or ex-
clusive control over an item with knowledge of and intent to have
such control.” See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-36a01(q). To the extent
we must interpret and apply the statutory definition of possession,
our review is unlimited. State v. Eddy, 299 Kan. 29, 32, 321 P.3d 12
(2014).

— 4

Normally, when a person is the sole occupant of a room or resi-
dence there is a logical inference of their dominion and control
over the objects in that room or residence. See State v. Walker,
217 Kan. 186, 189-90, 535 P.2d 924 (1975). Although we allow the
State to prove knowledge and intent by circumstantial evidence,
when a defendant is in nonexclusive possession of the premises on
which illegal drugs are found, the mere presence of or access to
the drugs, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate possession
absent other incriminating circumstances. State v. Anthony, 242
Kan. 493, 502, 749 P.2d 37 (1988).

When a vehicle or home is not exclusively occupied, we have
previously looked at factors such as the “defendant's previous par-
ticipation in the sale of drugs, use of narcotics, proximity to the area
where drugs are found, and the fact the drugs were found in plain.
view.” State v. Bockert, 257 Kan. 488, 494, 893 P.2d 832 (1995). We
have noted, “[w]hile no one of these circumstances, by itself, may
be sufficient to support a conviction, taken together they provide
a sufficient inference of knowing possession to support a verdict.”
257 Kan. at 494. We have also considered a defendant's incrimi-
nating statements and suspicious behavior. See State v. Boggs, 287
Kan. 298, 317, 197 P.3d 441 (2008).

In State v, Beaver, 41 Kan. App. 2d 124, 129, 200 P.3d 490
(2009), our Court of Appeals synthesized our caselaw on what in-
criminating circumstances could be sufficient to establish a defen-
dant’s possession of drugs when he is in nonexclusive possession of
the premises. Beaver was charged with felony possession of meth-
amphetamine with intent to sell. While executing a search warrant,
police found Beaver along with the drugs inside a house that did
not belong to Beaver. The panel ruled that Beaver’s mere pres-
ence in the house and proximity to the drugs found in the kitchen
were insufficient to support the charge. 41 Kan. App. 2d at 132. In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted that (1) Beaver was not
a resident of the home where the drugs were found; (2) there was
no evidence showing his belongings were found in close proximity
with the seized items; (3) there was no evidence the he had ever
participated in the sale of drugs; (4) and there was no evidence

that the defendant exhibited suspicious or otherwise incriminating
behavior. 41 Kan. App. 2d at 131-32.

Rosa's case presents a far different scenario. Rosa stipulated that
he owned the home and paid the utilities. The other long-term
residents did not pay rent. Rosa’s status as owner creates an infer-
ence of a right to control the areas of the house, Additionally, there
was ample evidence that Rosa in fact exercised actual control over
all areas of the house including the room Smith used as a bedroom
and a methamphetamine laboratory. Moreover, there is abundant
evidence that Rosa had prior knowledge concerning methamphet-
amine from his own prior use and proximity to its use by others
and that he knew what was going on inside Smith’s room. These
facts are sufficient circumstantial evidence—and create reasonable
inferences—from which a rational factfinder could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Rosa had “joint . . . control over [metham-
phetamine] with knowledge of and intent to have such control.”
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-36a01(q).

The district court did not err in admitting evidence of Rosa’s prior
drug use.

Rosa next claims his conviction should be reversed because the
district court erred by admitting evidence of Rosa’s prior drug use
in violation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455. At the time of trial, K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 60-455 read:

“(a) Subject to K.S.A. 60-447, and amendments thereto, evidence that a person
committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove
such person’s disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an infer-
ence that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified
occasion. .

“(b) Subject to K.S.A. 60-445 and 60-448, and amendments thereto, such evi-
dence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
mistake or accident.”

The State contended, and the district court below agreed, that Ro-
sa’s knowledge about methamphetamine was a disputed material

fact in this case to which Rosa’s prior use of methamphetamine
would be relevant and thus admissible pursuant to K.S.A. 2014

’ DE a

Supp. 60-455(b). When reviewing evidentiary determinations such
as this one, we

“must decide whether the evidence is relevant or has ‘any tendency in reason to
prove a material fact.’ K.S.A. 60-401(b); State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 505, 186 P.3d
713 (2008). Relevant evidence must be material and probative. Material evidence
is evidence that “has a legitimate and effective bearing on the decision of the case
and is in dispute.’” State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 14, 169 P.3d 1069 (2007). This
court reviews de novo whether evidence is material. Reid, 286 Kan. at 505. Proba-
tive evidence is evidence that furnishes, establishes, or contributes toward proof.
State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1009, 236 P.3d 481 (2010). This court reviews
the probative element of relevancy under an abuse of discretion standard. [The
defendant] bears the burden of proving the court’s discretion is abused. See Reid,
286 Kan. at 507, 512. Finally, this court must determine whether the evidence’s
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. 286 Kan. at 503. This step is also
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 286 Kan. at 512.” State v. Preston, 294 Kan.
27, 32-33, 272 P.3d 1275 (2012).

In Boggs, we held that in indirect possession cases such as this
one, “when a defendant does not assert that his or her actions were
innocent but rather presents some other defense, there is no rea-
son to admit evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs to prove in-
tent.” 287 Kan. at 314. We have since clarified that in Boggs
“{iJhis court then drew what amounts to a bright-line rule that intent is not dis-
puted if a defendant claims he or she is innocent and did not possess the drugs.
The Boggs court held that the defendant's admission of prior drug use was not
admissible when the defendant denied ever having possessed the drugs. 287 Kan.
at 315-16. We explained that under those circumstances, the only purpose for ad-
mitting Boggs’ statement about prior use was to improperly establish his alleged
propensity for using marijuana.” Preston, 294 Kan. at 34.

We concluded in Preston: “In summary, this court has adopted
a rule that distinguishes between cases in which the defendant ac-
knowledges but attempts to provide an innocent explanation for
his or her actions and those in which the defendant disputes the
allegations outright.” 294 Kan. at 35. In other words, Boggs and
Preston establish the rule that a defendant’s prior acquaintance
with drugs is irrelevant to any disputed material fact—and thus
inadmissible—when a defendant claims that the State’s allegations
concerning the presence of drugs is factually untrue—i.e., the de-
fendant “disptites the allegations outright.”

The corollary to this rule, however, occurs when the defendant

| ake

does not dispute the factual basis of the State’s allegations—i.e., the
defendant does not dispute that what turned out to be drugs were
found under the defendant's control—but the defendant instead
“attempts to provide an innocent explanation” for the presence
of the drugs. Possible “innocent explanations” would include the
claims that the defendant either was unaware of the presence of
the drugs or was under the mistaken belief that the drugs were not
illegal drugs but were some other lawful substance. In such cases,
evidence of prior drug use by the defendant is relevant and proba-
tive to prove a disputed material fact—viz., the truth or falsity of
the defendant's “innocent explanation.”

Rosa’s case fits squarely in the latter category. Rosa did not dis-
pute the presence of methamphetamine in his house. Instead, he
attempted to persuade the jury of an innocent explanation that
boiled down to Rosa’s claim that he did not know Smith or Evans
were keeping or making methamphetamine in the house. Rosa’s
primary witness called for his defense, Smith, testified—under
questioning by Rosa’s counsel—that Rosa did not know about his
lab, he never told Rosa about the lab, and he never heard anyone
in his bedroom having a conservation with Rosa about the lab. It
is clear to us that Rosa’s knowledge of the methamphetamine in
Smith’s room was a material fact in dispute. The district court prop-
erly admitted the evidence of Rosa’s prior acquaintance with meth-
amphetamine pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b) as “rele-
vant to prove some other material fact including . . . knowledge.”

The Court of Appeals did not err when finding the prosecutorial
error harmless.

Finally, Rosa argues the State committed reversible misconduct
when the prosecutor argued, “I’m not asking you to find him guilty
of possessing the methamphetamine just because he harbored a
meth lab in his home bringing it into a neighborhood of families
with children living in this neighborhood.” The Court of Appeals
found that the statement was the error but that error was harm-
less. The State did not cross-petition for review from the finding
of error; thus, the only issue properly before us is whether the er-
ror found by the Court of Appeals was harmless. See K.S.A. 2015

— 4

Supp. 60-2103(h) (to obtain appellate review of adverse rulings,
appellee must file notice of cross-appeal); State v. Crawford, 300
Kan. 740, 750, 334 P.3d 311 (2014). We find that it was.

Our unique harmlessness analysis in the context of prosecutorial

misconduct claims considers three factors bearing on the ultimate
prejudice to the defendant of the error:
“(1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant, (2) whether it was motivated
by prosecutorial ill will, and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and
overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in
the minds of jurors. No one factor is controlling.” Crawford, 300 Kan. at 745.

At trial, during closing arguments, the prosecutor said to the
jury:

“[Rosa] had every right to have control over the house, and he had every right to
have control over what was going on in the house. And that means that he had
control over what was in the house.

“Given he had even known about the meth, all of the different items that were
found surrounding the meth lab, the reasonable conclusion is that he knew about
the methamphetamine and it was within his control.

“And what I suggest to you is I'm not asking you to find [Rosa] guilty of pos-
sessing the methamphetamine just because he harbored a meth lab in his home
bringing it into a neighborhood of families with children living in this neighbor-
hood. 'm not asking you to do that. ’'m asking you to find Mr. Rosa guilty because
the evidence shows that he possessed methamphetamine in his house. That he
had control over it. He knew about it, and you should find him guilty for having
that type of item in his control and for allowing it to continue.” (Emphasis added.)

“In assessing whether gross and flagrant conduct has occurred,
appellate courts should look to whether the prosecutor ‘“repeated
or emphasized the misconduct.”’” State v. Chanthaseng, 203 Kan.
140, 148, 261 P.3d 889 (2011) (quoting State v. Simmons, 292 Kan.
406, 418, 254 P.3d 97 [2011]). This was the only mention by the
State of Rosa bringing methamphetamine into a neighborhood of
families and children. And it does not appear to us that the remarks
were emphasized. We find no evidence the comment was gross or
flagrant.

Neither do we see any indication of ill will. The statement was
not emphasized; it was not made in defiance of court rulings; and
the prosecutor exhibited no other behavior suggesting ill will. See
State v. Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 945-46, 287 P.3d 245 (2012); see

——

also State v. Miller, 284 Kan. 682, 719, 163 P.3d 267 (2007) (quot-
ing State v. McHenry, 276 Kan. 513, 525, 78 P.3d 403 [2003]) (not-
ing “‘a prosecutor's indifference to a court's rulings, mocking of a
defendant, or repeated acts of misconduct are evidence of ill will
and the lack of such conduct shows that there was no ill will’”).
Finally we consider “whether the evidence was of such a direct
and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have
had little weight in the minds of jurors.” State v. Akins, 298 Kan.
592, 599, 315 P.3d 868 (2014).
“Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court
must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (error not
ground for new trial unless justice requires otherwise) and Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967) (conclusion beyond rea-
sonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the
results of the trial), have been met.” Simmons, 292 Kan. 406, Syl. { 2.

In analyzing both constitutional and nonconstitutional error an ap-
pellate court need only address the higher standard of constitution-
al error. Akins, 298 Kan. 592, Syl. {| 3. The constitutional standard
for harmless error provides:

“(The error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the exror
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not
affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.¢., where there is no
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.” State . Ward,
292 Kan. 541, Syl. § 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).

In addition to the lack of any gross or flagrant conduct or ill will,
we are convinced the State has met the Chapman standard because
there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict. See
State v. Killings, 301 Kan. 214, 239, 340 P.3d 1186 (2015) (citing
State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 431, 264 P.3d 81 [2011]; State v.
Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 918, 269 P.3d 1268 [2012] [finding prosecu-
tor’s misstatement did not affect the outcome of the trial in light
of the entire record]). This was a case about indirect possession.
The drugs were found inside Rosa’s house. The facts at issue dealt
with Rosa's knowledge of their existence. Several witnesses, in-
cluding Rose’s live-in girlfriend and his housemates, testified about
his prior drug use and knowledge of the drug activities in his resi-
dence. The prosecutor did not misstate the law or argue facts not

in evidence. The prosecutor’s statement simply does not rise to the
level of misconduct requiring reversal. This one, isolated, improper
statement during closing arguments would have had little weight in
the minds of the jurors.

Affirmed.

No. 110,712

StaTE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. TYRONE WALKER, Appellant.
3d 1147)

a ©:
filed May 27, |

Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the
cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Mare Ben-
nett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the
brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

STEGALL, J.: A jury convicted Tyrone Walker of first-degree
premeditated murder for the killing of Janis Sanders. We affirm
Walker's conviction and sentence and hold: (1) any error by the
district court in failing to provide a lesser included instruction was
harmless; (2) the State did not err during closing argument; (3)
while the district court should have suppressed Walker's statements
from the interrogation after he invoked his right to remain silent,
the error was harmless; (4) cumulative error did not deny Walker a
fair trial; and (5) Walker’s hard 50 sentence is not unconstitutional.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 4, 2011, Janis Sanders’ body was discovered in the over-
grown grass behind a vacant home near the intersection of Wash-
ington and Lincoln streets in Wichita, Kansas. Sanders’ body was
unclothed and had visible ligature wounds on the neck. Nearby,
law enforcement officers found a string later identified as a shoe-
lace and a kitchen Imife stuck into the ground. Forensic analysis
would later indicate that the shoelace was consistent with Sanders’
neck wounds. Sanders’ clothing—torn and stained with blood—
along with her personal effects were then discovered in a nearby
dumpster.

The investigation eventually led investigators to Charles Wil-
liams. Williams explained that he had been driving through the
intersection of Washington and. Lincoln the night before when a
passenger in his car, Tyrone Walker, spotted Janis Sanders and de-

Te osc a=teoee—eae

manded that Williams stop the car. Walker got out of the car and
approached Sanders as Williams drove away. Another passenger
in the car, Suzana Hernandez, provided corroborating statements.

At trial, the jury also heard from a detective about an interview
he and his partner conducted with Thomas Wilson, an inmate who
had been at the Sedgwick County jail with Walker after Sanders’
killing. Wilson told detectives that Walker had shared with Wilson
the story of Sanders’ killing, detailing the events as follows. Walker
was in possession of some crack cocaine while he was riding in Wil-
liams’ car. Walker spotted Sanders and decided to leave Williams
and join Sanders because they had previously smoked crack co-
caine together and Sanders owed him a favor. After Walker and
Sanders met on the street, Sanders took them to a nearby empty
house where they could smoke. During this time, Walker repeat-
edly propositioned Sanders for sex, but she rebuffed him. This an-
gered Walker. He eventually pinned Sanders to the ground and
told Wilson that he thought about using the kitchen knife he had
with him, but because he did not want to “get blood all over him-
self” or leave fingerprints, he decided to strangle Sanders with a
shoelace instead. Walker told Wilson that he had been concerned
that Sanders had scratched him during the fighting.

Additionally, the State presented DNA evidence from three dif-
ferent DNA samples: (1) scrapings under Sanders’ fingernails; (2)
DNA traces on the shoelace; and (3) the handle of the kitchen knife.
Walker could not be excluded from any of the three crime scene
DNA samples. Other forensic experts testified thatthe autopsy re-
vealed bruises on Sanders’ face, indicating she was beaten with “at
least seven or eight distinctive, separate blows.” There were at least
five ligature marks on Sanders’ neck consistent with repositioning,
which can occur during strangulation when the victim attempts to
loosen the ligature and causes the assailant to tighten the ligature in
a new position. Visible scratch marks on Sanders’ neck were char-
acteristic of a victim scratching at her own neck in an attempt to
move or release the ligature. The State’s expert opined that Sand-
ers could have remained conscious for 50 to 60 seconds of struggle
or possibly longer depending on the time betwee repositioning.
The expert testified that once consciousness is lost it takes approxi-

mately 2 more minutes of pressure for irreversible brain damage
to begin and approximately 3 to 4 minutes of constant pressure
before death.

The jury also heard about a prior strangulation homicide com-
mitted by Walker. Walker stipulated that he was initially charged
with murder in the first degree of Tamara Baker and eventually
pled guilty to second-degree murder. Evidence was introduced
to establish similarity between the crimes. Baker went missing on
Halloween day in 1989, and her body was discovered in the spring
of 1990 in a wooded area. The autopsy indicated Baker had been
killed by manual strangulation. Baker's body was discovered virtu-
ally unclothed. Walker eventually confessed to investigators that
he strangled Baker with his hands and then left her body in the
wooded area. Walker claimed he became angry after the two had
been kissing in his car and Baker told him that he needed to give
her money or she would tell his wife what they were doing.

Walker now appeals his conviction and sentence.

ANALYSIS

The district court's failure to give the lesser included instruction
was not clear error.

Walker's first claim on appeal is that the district court committed
clear error by failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included crime
of second-degree intentional murder. With Walker's agreement,
the district court instructed the jury only on the charge of first-
degree premeditated murder. The State initially argues Walker in-
vited this error, preventing appellate review.

“The doctrine of invited error precludes a party from asking a
district court to rule a given way and thereafter challenging the
court’s ruling on appeal.” State v. Soto, 301 Kan. 969, 983, 349 P.3d
1256 (2015). If the defendant invites error in the jury instructions,
the court need not determine whether the jury instruction is clearly
erroneous. State v. Jones, 295 Kan. 804, 812, 286 P.3d 562 (2012).
However, “[a] party must do more than simply fail to object to a
district court’s proposed jury instruction to risk application of the
invited error doctrine as a bar to appellate review of that instruc-
tion.” State v. Dern, 303 Kan. 384, Syl. { 4, 362 P.3d 566 (2015).

| ats Ea

At the instructions conferenée, the district court discussed with
the parties its duty to instruct on lesser included crimes and opined
that a second-degree murder instruction was inappropriate because
the testimony on the length of time required to kill by strangulation
showed premeditation. The district court then noted that Walker’s
counsel had not requested any lesser included instructions, and
Walker's counsel confirmed that was still the case.

Under similar facts, we have regularly declined to apply the in-
vited error rule. For example, we did not hold there was invited
error in Soto, where the State, defense, and district court agreed
there was no evidence to support lesser included instructions for
the first-degree murder charge. 301 Kan. at 983-84. We noted:
“[D]efense counsel made no affirmative request to omit a second-
degree murder instruction nor did defense counsel decline an offer
by the court to give the instruction.” 301 Kan. at 984. The opinion
concluded: “Defense counsel acquiesced to the trial judge’s ruling
rather than requested the instruction not be given. Under these
facts, we decline to apply the invited error rule.” 301 Kan. at 984.
As in Soto, so too here. Walker merely acquiesced to the district
court's ruling; he did not invite it.

Our standard of review of alleged jury instruction errors is well-
established:

“When reviewing the failure to give a lesser included instruction, (1) first, the
appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdic-
tion and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2)
next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whither the instruc-
tion was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determitie whether there
was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the
requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the
district court erred, the appellate court must determine whether the error was
harmless.’ State v. Soto, 301 Kan. 969, Syl. J 9, 349 P:3d 1256 (2015).

“When a defendant challenges the district court’ failure to give a lesser in-
cluded offense instruction for the first time on appeal, the reviewing court applies
the clearly erroneous standard provided in K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3414(3), requir-
ing that the defendant demonstrate ‘that the failure was clearly erroneous, i.e., the
defendant must firmly convince the appellate court that the giving of the instruc-
tion would have made a difference in the verdict.’ Soto, 301 Kan. 969, Syl. § 10.”
State v. Cooper, 303 Kan. 764, 769-70, 366 P.3d 232 (2016).

The State concedes that second-degree intentional murder is a

—_— 4

lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder and is
correct to do so. See, ¢.g., Soto, 301 Kan. at 985 (intentional sec-
ond-degree murder is a lesser included offense of premeditated
first-degree murder). However, the parties dispute the appropri-
ateness of the instruction in this case. We find it unnecessary to
address this factual dispute because, even assuming the instruction
was factually appropriate, we conclude there is no reasonable pos-
sibility the error affected the verdict. See Cooper, 303 Kan. at 771
(assuming the instruction was factually appropriate and proceeding
directly to clear error analysis).

‘To establish clear error, “the defendant must firmly convince the
appellate court that the giving of the instruction would have made
a difference in the verdict.” Soto, 301 Kan. 969, Syl. ¢ 10. Our
analysis of the question in this case turns on the State’s evidence of
premeditation. “Premeditation means to have thought the matter
over beforehand and does not necessarily mean an act is planned,
contrived, or schemed beforehand; rather, premeditation indicates
a time of reflection or deliberation.” 301 Kan. at 988-89. Circum-
stances giving rise to the inference of premeditation include:

“**(1) the nature of the weapon used; (2) lack of provocation; (3) the defendant's
conduct before and after the killing; (4) threats and declarations of the defendant
before and during the occurrence; and (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the
deceased was felled and rendered helpless. [Citation omitted.]”’” 301 Kan. at 989
(quoting State v. Kettler, 299 Kan. 448, 467, 325 P3d 1075 [2014]).

At trial, the State presented significant evidence supporting
premeditation: In sum, the State’s evidence showed Walker killed
Sanders after’she refused his repeated propositions for sex. Walker
said he decided to stranglé Sanders, despite having a kitchen knife,
to avoid getting blood on himself. He used a ligature to avoid leav-
ing fingerprints. These statements reflect a calculating, planning
state of mind indicative of deliberation.

Walker strangled Sanders to death with a ligature, a process
which, according to expert testimony in this case, can take 3 to 4
minutes. We have noted many times that death by strangulation
presents strong evidence of premeditation. See State v. Lloyd, 299
Kan. 620, 634, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014); State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39,
64-65, 144 P.3d 647 (2006); State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 395, 403, 109

447

P.3d 1158 (2005); see also State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 111, 21
P.3d 516 (2001) (when finding premeditation jury could conclude
defendant's state of mind changed during the violent episode, in-
cluding at any time during the strangulation); State v. Brown, 234
Kan. 969, 972-73, 676 P.2d 757 (1984) (evidence of premeditation
sufficient when severely beaten victim was killed by strangulation).
In view of the truly overwhelming evidence of premeditation here,
much of it from the defendant's story as reported by Wilson, Walk-
er has failed to firmly convince us that the lesser included instruc-
tion would have made a difference in the verdict.

The State did not err during closing argument.

Walker next claims the State erred in closing argument by tell-
ing the jury that Sanders’ body (as well as a prior victim’s body)
were “left like trash without dignity.” Notably, Walker's brief limits
its argument to these statements, and we deem any other allega-
tions of prosecutorial misconduct abandoned. See State v. Bowen,
299 Kan. 339, 355, 323 P.3d 853 (2014) (arguments not adequately
briefed deemed abandoned).

Specifically, Walker argues the challenged statements inflamed
the passions of the jury or explained the evidence in a repugnant
manner. See State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 723, 245 P.3d 1030
(2011) (Prosecutor's particularly repugnant statements, despite be--
ing useful in explaining the case, were erroneous and demonstrat-
ed ill will, lack of good faith, and were gross and flagrant.); State v.
Baker, 281 Kan. 997, 1016, 135 P.3d 1098 (2006) (“Prosecutors are
not allowed to make statements that inflame the passions or preju-
dices of the jury or distract the jury from its duty to make decisions
based on the evidence and the controlling law.”). We disagree.
The prosecutor's comment was made in direct response to the
defense attack on Sanders’ character. During closing argument,
Walker's counsel chose to accuse the victim of “chas[ing] the rock
by selling herself for the rock.” In rebuttal, the State responded:

“The law protects us all. We mentioned—we want to mention that she was
chasing the rock. We want to mention that she was a hooker, to now attack her
character that she’s dead. I submit to you, you saw her at 5:15 or whatever it was
that day. Someone had got her a QuikTrip. Someone had paid for that. She’s bare-
foot, seemingly happy, and now we find her without any of this, without the things,

— 4

her papers, that tell who she is. She was left without her bag that she carried over
her shoulder. She was—her clothes were ripped from her body and taken from
her body, so that she was left like trash, just like Tamara Baker, just like Tamara
Baker, left like trash without dignity.” (Emphasis added.)

The first step in reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct
is to determine whether the statement or statements were outside
the wide latitude that a prosecutor is allowed in discussing the evi-
dence. State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 856, 281 P.3d 1112 (2012).
Walker relies heavily on McCaslin, 291 Kan: at 722-23, in which we
disapproved of two comments by the prosecutor in closing argu-
ment:

“First, evidence showed that A.D.’s body was set ablaze after she was doused with
citronella oil. When explaining why there was no citronella oil on McCaslin, the
prosecutor argued to the jury:

“You've all maybe lit a barbecue. Did you get barbecue lighting fluid on you when
you are lighting a barbecue? No, it goes on the charcoal, and Angela Duran was
his charcoal and he was through.’

“Second, when explaining to the jury why there was no soot on McCaslin’s cloth-
ing, the prosecutor remarked:

“We're not saying he hung around and cooked s’mores. We're saying he lit the
fire and left. The fire was burning. You would not have soot, you would not have
ash, you wouldn’t have smoke at the time.’”

We found the prosecutor’s statements, “while picturesque,” to
be “particularly repugnant.” 291 Kan. at 723. We further conclud-
ed: “[T]hese remarks not only constituted prosecutorial miscon-
duct but also demonstrated ill will, lack of good faith, and were
gross and flagrant.” 291 Kan. at 723.

The prosecutor's statements here are not akin to the “repugnant”
imagery we condemned in McCaslin. To the contrary, they came
in direct response to Walker's blame-shifting, attack-the-victim ar-
gument that specifically disparaged Sanders’ character. Moreover,
the State used imagery directly connected to the evidence—é.e.,
Sanders’ clothes and belongings were literally discovered in the
trash and her naked body was disposed of in long grass behind a
vacant house. We find these statements, in this context, to be well
within the wide latitude afforded prosecutors when discussing the
evidence.

The district court erred by failing to suppress the evidence obtained
after Walker invoked his right to remain silent; however, the error
was harmless.

Walker next argues the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress the statements Walker gave to Wichita detec-
tives. Walker claims both that he unequivocally invoked his right
to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution which was violated by the continued interview and
that his statements to detectives were rendered involuntary due to
his alcohol consumption and sleep deprivation.

We first address Walker's claim of voluntariness or lack thereof.
“When challenged, the prosecution must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the voluntariness of a defendant’s inculpa-
tory statement to a law enforcement officer.” State v. Gibson, 299
Kan. 207, 214, 322 P.3d 389 (2014). In determining voluntariness
trial courts look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the statement by considering six nonexclusive factors: “(1) the ac-
cused’s mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the inter-
view; (3) the accused’s ability to communicate on request with the
outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (5)
the officer's fairness in conducting the interview; and (6) the ac-
cused’s fluency with the English language.” 299 Kan. at 214. Walker
claims his mental condition was impaired due to alcohol and sleep
deprivation. The district court disagreed, and we find substantial
competent evidence supports the district court’s findings. See State
v. Betancourt, 301 Kan. 282, 290, 342 P.3d 916 (2015).

The only evidence presented at trial of Walker's actual state-
ments to law enforcement officers from the interview was pre-
sented through the testimony of interrogating officer Detective
Timothy Relph. But at the suppression hearing, both Walker and
Detective Relph testified concerning Walker's mental state during
the interrogation. Detective Relph testified he conducted the in-
terview with Walker at approximately 3:19 in the morning on June
18, 2011. Detective Relph testified Walker was picked up around
11:45 p.m. and held in custody until the interview. The video of the
interrogation shows Walker was alone in the room, possibly sleep-
ing, for at least 2 hours and 40 minutes prior to the interview.

— 4

Once the interview began, Walker told Detective Relph he had
12 or 13 32-ounce cans of beer during the day before he was picked
up. Detective Relph testified that Walker did not show signs of in-
toxication. Detective Relph acknowledged he was surprised when
Walker mentioned drinking that many beers because “I certainly
didn’t smell it,” and Walker did not exhibit signs of someone con-
suming that much beer. When asked if Walker displayed slurred
speech, Detective Relph replied, “No. I mean, he was tired, 3:00
o'clock in the morning, but certainly didn’t have any trouble recall-
ing his relatives or anything like that.” Detective Relph testified
that Walker gave appropriate answers to questions and appeared
to understand what was going on. While Detective Relph acknowl-
edged that both he and Walker were sleepy, he did not observe
signs of sleep deprivation.

Walker testified that he had approximately a dozen 32-ounce
beers while playing cards with friends from about 1 p.m. until he
was arrested at 11:45 p.m. When asked if he was under the influ-
ence of alcohol, Walker said, “It’s kind of hard to say, because police
make you nervous, so I don’t know.” When asked if he was inebri-
ated, Walker replied, “I knew I was—I don’t want to say drunk,
but I knew I was—I guess that’s the words you want to say, yeah.
Counsel then asked, “You was what?” to which Walker replied,
“Buzzed, high, whatever you want. I don’t know how you say it.”
Walker replied, “[n]Jo,” when asked if he felt sober. Following tes-
timony, the district court stated it would watch the interview video
before ruling. .

The district court denied Walker’s motion to suppress, find-
ing his statement was knowingly and voluntarily given. The court
found that “it’s quite apparent that [Walker] was in control of his
faculties.” Based on both his observations of the interview video
and the testimony at the suppression hearing, the district judge
found, under the totality of the circumstances, that Walker made
“a knowing, intelligent, freely voluntary waiver of his rights.” No-
tably, the court found “there is just absolutely no indication that
[Walker] was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of
the interview.”

“The fact that an accused had been drinking or using drugs does

—— SC

not per se establish involuntariness of the accused's confession. All
circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement must be
examined to determine if the intoxication prevented the accused
from voluntarily making a statement.” State v. Gilliland, 294 Kan.
519, Syl. { 5, 276 P.3d 165 (2012).

“To make this assessment, in past cases we have noted a variety of factors that
provide substantial competent evidence regarding a trial court’s determination
that drug or alcohol use did or did not prevent an accused from making a volun-
tary statement. These factors have included such things as whether there were
manifestations of intoxication, the opinions of those who interacted with the ac-
cused about whether the accused seemed intoxicated, the trial court's indepen-
dent evaluation based on observing or hearing the accused in a video or audio
recording of the statement, the accused's familiarity with the police’s interview
procedures, and the accused's familiarity with the Miranda rights. Courts have
noted markers such as whether an accused's answers were precise, normal, ra-
tional, or responsive; whether the accused was coherent and wide awake; and
whether there was a detectable odor, swaying, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech,
or other physical signs of intoxication. If the trial court has relied on some of
these factors in ruling a statement was voluntary, an appellate court examines only
whether there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s find-
ings; an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or independently reach our
own determination of voluntariness.” 294 Kan. at 529-30,

Applying this analysis, substantial competent evidence supports
the district court’s conclusion here. Detective Relph testified Walk-
er showed no signs of intoxication. Detective Relph even found
Walker's claim regarding how much he had to drink surprising giv-
en the absence of alcohol odor and the lack of signs of intoxication.
Walker, for his own part, testified inconsistently, saying first, “It’s
kind of hard to say,” whether he was under the influence but also
that he was not sober.

Substantial competent evidence supports the court’s decision as
both the testifying officer and video of the interview show Walker
was not impaired by intoxication or sleep deprivation. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in denying Walker's motion to suppress
on the grounds of involuntariness.

Walker’s claim that the district court should have suppressed his
statements because officers violated his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent is more compelling. As a preliminary matter, both the
State and Walker concede that the interview was custodial. Walker

also does not challenge the facts that he was properly advised of
his rights and that he initially agreed to talk to detectives. Walker
argues, and the district court considered, three possible points dur-
ing the interrogation when Walker may have invoked his right to
end the interview.

The first alleged invocation occurred approximately 30 minutes
into the interview. Detective Relph was pressing Walker on a point
when Walker said, “Man, you know what, I’m done, I’m through
talking, man, ‘cause you gonna keep trying to talk to me and act, I
mean, just ask me what you need to ask me them questions.” A sec-
ond detective, Detective Dan Harty, then rephrased the question,
and the interview continued normally.

The second alleged invocation occurred approximately 14 min-
utes after the first. Detective Relph first told Walker that Williams
and Hernandez had seen Walker exit the car and approach Sand-
ers. The following exchange then occurred:

“Walker: Well if that’s what you think, then that’s... .

“Relph: That’s what I think.

“Harty: How about...

“Walker: How about we're done because he’s just accused me of lying.

“Relph: Accused you of what? I didn’t accuse you of lying. I told you what
they said.

“Walker: Okay, well.

“Harty: Can I talk to you about something else?

“Walker: Sure.”

The interview then continued. The final alleged invocation oc-
curred approximately 8 minutes later. At that point, Detective
Relph began asking pointed questions—i.e., whether Walker killed
Sanders. Walker denied that he did. The following exchange then
occurred:

“Relph: You're the last person that I know that saw [Sanders] alive. Okay. The
last woman you ever saw alive in 1989 is dead. Okay. I’m not so foolish to not have
done my homework.

“Walker: Did they tell you I was in prison for murder?

“Relph: Yeah.

“Walker: Okay, now I’m telling you this conversation is over ‘cause you just
accusedme,

“Relph: Yeah, I did, I think you're involved with it, [Statements overlap with
Walker's]

CC

“Walker: Okay, well, I'm done. I’m done. Now, I'm done. [Overlapping Relph’s
prior statement]

“Relph: Okay.

{Ten second pause in conversation occurs]

“Relph: “I asked you if you did it, that's diff. -- far different from accusing you.

{Ten second pause]

“Walker: [Directed at Relph’s notes] You put down that little statement that
you made just before you did that too.

“Relph: I did, because I've done my homework.

“Walker: No.

“Relph: That you were the last person that saw her. What statement do you
want me to write down?

“Walker: No. None.

“Relph: That you were the last person that saw that girl in 1989? You want me
to write that down too?

“Walker: [Directed at Harty] Sir .

“Relph: No wait, you want me to....

“Walker: [Directed at Harty] Can you take me to a cell now? I'll talk to you, I'll
talk to the investigators, alright.

“Relph: You're gonna go to jail. You're gonna go to jail, don’t worry about it.

“Harty: I understand you're getting pissed off, I mean, but the thing is is that

“Walker: No, the way he does what he does. I know the good cop, bad cop,
whatever, however [inaudible], it doesn’t really matter like that, it’s not, no no, ’'m
not playing no game either, what I’m saying is, there’s a difference in how, we treat
you at the job you do. And I understand that, you know, but, it’s also... .

“Relph: Is there a nice way to ask you that that you wouldn’t have reacted that
way?”

The interrogation continued for some time after this exchange,
going approximately another hour and 40 minutes, including a
40-minute break.

“When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court deter-
mines whether the factual underpinnings of the district judge’s decision are sup-
ported by substantial competent evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion to be
drawn from those facts raises a question of law requiring application of a de novo
standard. An appellate court does not weigh evidence to find facts.” State v. Ran-
som, 289 Kan. 378, Syl. { 1, 212 P.3d 203 (2009).

When the material facts underlying a trial court’s decision on a
motion to suppress are not in dispute, the question of suppression
is a matter of law over which we exercise unlimited review. State v.
Stevenson, 299 Kan. 53, 57, 321 P.3d 754 (2014).

We have recently discussed at length the legal rules and ana-
lytical path governing Walker’s claim. In State v. Aguirre, 301 Kan.
950, 954-58, 349 P.3d 1245 (2015), we said:

“The rules governing an accused's constitutional rights during a custodial inter-
rogation are well established: “The Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution guarantees the right against self-incrimination, including the right to have a
lawyer present during custodial interrogation and the right to remain silent.’ State
v. Walker, 276 Kan. 939, 944, 80 P.3d 1132 (2003) (citing Mirandal v. Arizona],
384 U.S. [436,] 479[, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)]). Moreover, in Kan-
sas, ‘[nJo person shall be a witness against himself [or herself].’ Kan. Const. Bill of
Rights, § 10. ‘[A] suspect's invocation of his or her right to remain silent must be
scrupulously honored and cuts off further interrogation elicited by express ques-
tioning or its functional equivalent.’ State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 69-70, 183 P.3d
801 (2008) ) (citing State v. Carty, 231 Kan. 282, 286, 644 P2d 407 [1982]).

The an ‘gument is founded upon a long- standing rule of law: Ifa suspect in-
vokes the right to remain silent during questioning, that interrogation must cease.
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100, 96 S. Ct. 321, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1975)
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74). Thereafter, ‘the admissibility of state-
ments obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends
under Miranda on whether his “right to cut off questioning” was “scrupulously
honored.”’ Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.

“More recently, law enforcement's duty to scrupulously honor a suspect's deci-
sion to invoke his or her Miranda rights has been conditioned upon the suspect's
ability to communicate that decision without any ambiguity or equivocation. See
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381-82, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 176 L. Ed. 2d
1098 (2010) (suppression only required for denial of unambiguous invocation of
Miranda rights; objective inquiry). This court has said that we test the clarity of
a Miranda rights invocation by determining whether a reasonable police officer
under the circumstances would understand the suspect’s statement as an assertion
of a Miranda vight. State v. Cline, 295 Kan. 104, 113, 283 P3d 194 (2012).

“[O]ne potential common coloring fact is that the suspect continued to answer
questions after the alleged rights invocation, as occurred here. The trial court in
this case stated that it was partially influenced by [defendant's] responses to the
detectives’ post-invocation questions in which he said he was still willing to talk to
them. But the United States Supreme Court has held ‘that, under the clear logical
force of settled precedent, an accused's postrequest responses to further inter-
rogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial
request itself.’ Smith o. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100, 105 S. Ct. 490, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488
(1984). In other words, if the interrogators simply ignore the suspect's invocation
of rights and continue to ask questions, the suspect’s compliance with the further
questioning does not invalidate or render equivocal the prior invocation of rights.”

The Aguirre court then reiterated that courts must “assess what
a reasonable law enforcement officer under the circumstances
would have understood [the defendant’s] statement to mean at the
time it was made.” 301 Kan. at 958, We concluded that the defen-
dant’s statement, ““This is—I guess where I, I’m going to take my
rights and I want to turn in David to his family and I'll be back here.
I mean, I would like to keep helping you guys I just want to—,’” was
a facially unambiguous invocation of his rights. 301 Kan. at 960.
But see 301 Kan. at 967-68 (Biles, J., dissenting) (“Given [defen-
dant’s] internally inconsistent statement about ‘tak{ing] my rights’
and wanting to ‘keep helping’ the officers, the officers quite rea-
sonably followed up to determine whether [defendant's] concerns
had to do with David or whether he intended to invoke the right to
remain silent.”).

Applying this analytical framework, we find that Walker's first
and second alleged invocations were not unambiguous invocations
of Walker's right to remain silent. In the first instance Walker said
in one sentence, “I’m through talking, man, . . . just ask me what
you need to ask me.” By the basic language of the statement, Walk-
er invited further questioning and did not unambiguously invoke
his right to remain silent.

The second alleged invocation occurred when Walker told de-
tectives, “Hlow about we’re done because he’s just accused me of
lying.” Walker correctly points out that there are many instances of
other courts interpreting some form of “I’m done” as unequivocally
invoking the defendant’s rights. See, ¢.g., Munson v. State, 123 P.3d
1042, 1046 (Alaska 2005) (“‘Well, I'm done talkin’ then,’” invoked
right to silence); Deviney v. State, 112 So. 3d.57, 78 (Fla. 2013) (de-
fendant’s six “T’ statements, along with attempts to leave,

'm done’
invoked right); Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 242-43, 765 S.E.2d 896
(2014) (“I’m done. I have no more to say. I’m done. Let's ride,”
invoked right); State v. Rogers, 277 Neb. 37, 69, 760 N.W.2d 35
(2009) (“‘No, I'm not. I'm done. I won't,” along with “‘I'm not
talking no more,” invoked right); State v. Kramer, No. C5-00-
1195, 2001 WL 604955, at *7-8 (Minn. App. 2001) (unpublished
opinion) (statements such as, “(1) ‘I gave you my statement’ and

that he wanted to go home, (2) ‘I don’t want to talk,’ and (3) ‘I’m
done talking,” unambiguously invoked the right to remain silent).
Here, however, Walker's comment was quickly followed by De-
tective Harty asking, “Can I talk to you about something else?”
We have previously said: “[W]here a suspect makes a statement
which may be ambiguous as to whether he or she is asserting a
right to remain silent, the interrogator may, but is not required
to, ask questions to clarify or may continue questioning without
clarifying.” State v. Scott, 286 Kan, 54, 69-70, 183 P.3d 801 (2008).
Detective Harty’s question, immediately following Walker's state-
ment, was in this case an attempt to ascertain whether Walker was
ending the interview. Even though appellate courts look only to
the statement made, not postrequest responses, interviewing offi-
cers have also been told they may ask clarifying questions regarding
ambiguous invocations. Here, Detective Harty asked for clarifica-
tion, and Walker said they could talk about something else. Given
this context, a reasonable law enforcement officer would not have
understood Walker's statements to be an invocation of his right to
end the interview.

We do find, however, that Walker unequivocally invoked his
right to remain silent during the third exchange. Walker’s state-
ments, “Okay, now I’m telling you this conversation is over ‘cause
you just accused me,” and, “Okay, well, I’m done. I’m done. Now,
Tm done,” demonstrate a clear and unambiguous invocation of the
right to remain silent and an attempt to end the interview which
is far more explicit than the previous two exchanges. A reasonable
officer would view those statements as an invocation of Walker's
rights. Furthermore, Walker’s subsequent statements reinforce
his efforts to end the interview. After Detective Relph’s statement
breaking the silence, and another pause, Walker directed Detec-
tive Relph to write down his “little statement” to note it happened.
Finally, Walker turned to Detective Harty and asked, “Can you take
me to a cell now?” Collectively, Walker's statements would have
made. it clear to reasonable law enforcement officers that Walker
was invoking his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amend-
ment and that they were obligated, at that point, to “scrupulously
honor” Walker's request. In this respect, the district court erred in

denying Walker’s motion to suppress. As such, any evidence of any
of Walker’s statements during the post-invocation portion of the
interview was inadmissible.

A thorough review of the record reveals that the only evidence
admitted at trial from the interview after what we have now de-
termined to be Walker's invocation of his right to remain silent (in
other words, the only evidence admitted erroneously in violation of
Walker's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination) was
Detective Relph’s testimony that Walker admitted to being in Wil-
liams’ car that night but that he denied getting out of the car. It
was error to allow these statements into evidence. However, at that
point in the trial, other witnesses had already testified that Walker
was a passenger in Williams’ car, and Williams had already testified
that when he had later asked Walker about getting out of the car
the night of Sanders’ death, Walker had outright denied getting out
of the car. Thus, evidence that Walker was a passenger in Williams’
car and evidence that Walker had denied getting out of Williams’
car had already been permissibly presented to the jury.

Given this, the State argues that any error in the admission of
Walker’s statements was harmless. We agree. When a defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated, the State must “carry the
burden of proving ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com-
plained of . . . did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of
the entire record, i.¢., proves there is no reasonable possibility that
the error affected the verdict.’” Aguirre, 301 Kan. at 962 (quoting
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 [2011], cert. denied
182 S. Ct. 1594 [2012]). Given the limited evidence erroneously
introduced and the fact that the evidence had already been prop-
erly presented to the jury through other witnesses, the State has
met its burden.

Cumulative error did not deny Walker a fair trial.

Walker next contends that cumulative error denied him a fair tri-
al and requires reversal. The test for cumulative error is “‘whether
the totality of circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant
and denied the defendant a fair trial. No prejudicial error may be
found upon this cumulative effect rule, however, if the evidence is

overwhelming against the defendant.’” State v. Edwards, 291 Kan.
532, 553, 243 P.3d 683 (2010) (quoting State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan.
1132, Syl. J 12, 221 P.3d 1105 [2009]). Here, we have assumed that
failing to instruct the jury on second-degree murder was error and
we have determined that it was error to admit evidence obtained in
violation of Walker's Fifth Amendment rights. We found both the
assumed error and the actual error to be harmless. As described
above, the State’s evidence of Walker's guilt was overwhelming.
Further, the errors were unrelated to each other and were unre-
lated to the ultimate question of guilt. There is no reasonable prob-
ability that, even assuming error on the jury instruction question,
cumulative errors affected the verdict or denied Walker a fair trial.

Walker's hard 50 sentence does not violate Alleyne because the sen-
tence relied only on the fact of a prior conviction.

Finally, Walker argues the trial court violated Alleyne v. United
States, 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2160-63, 186 L. Ed.
2d 314 (2013), by imposing a hard 50 sentence based solely on the
finding of the aggravating circumstance that the “defendant was
previously convicted of a felony in which the defendant inflicted
great bodily harm, disfigurement, dismemberment or death on an-
other.” K.S.A. 21-4636(a). At trial Walker stipulated to his prior
conviction for second-degree murder.

Following Walker’s conviction, the State filed notice of its in-
tent to pursue a hard 50 sentence for Walker. Prior to the sentenc-
ing, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Alleyne,
calling the hard 50 sentencing system into doubt. The State filed
a bench brief arguing Alleyne was inapplicable when a hard 50
sentence was based on the aggravating circumstance described in
K.S.A. 21-4636(a), that “[t]he defendant was previously convicted
of a felony in which the defendant inflicted great bodily harm, dis-
figurement, dismemberment or death on another,” because prior
convictions are excluded under Alleyne and Apprendi. The district
court agreed and imposed a hard 50 sentence relying on Walker's
stipulated-to prior conviction of second-degree murder to support
the aggravating circumstance described in K.S.A, 21-4636(a).

Following Alleyne, we have held the hard 50 sentencing scheme

| twee

in effect at the time of Walker’s crime violated the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution because it “permitted a
judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of
one or more aggravating factors necessary to impose an increased
mandatory minimum sentence, rather than requiring a jury to find
the existence of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Astorga, 299 Kan. 395, 397-98, 324 P.3d 1046 (2014).

Citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118
S. Ct. 1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1998), however, the Alleyne Court
made it clear that the Constitution does not require that the fact
of a prior conviction be determined by a jury. See Alleyne, 133 S.
Ct. at 2160 n.1 (In Almendarez-Torres, “we recognized a narrow
exception to this general rule for the fact of a prior conviction.”).
Walker now argues the Almendarez-Torres exception does not ap-
ply here because the aggravating circumstance contained in K.S.A.
21-4636(a) requires a finding of an additional “fact”—that the prior
felony conviction involved the infliction of “great bodily harm, dis-
figurement, dismemberment or death on another.”

“Jnterpretation of a statute is a question of law over which ap-
pellate courts have unlimited review.” State v. Morrison, 302 Kan.
804, 813, 359 P.3d 60 (2015). At trial, Walker stipulated to his prior
conviction for second-degree murder. Walker asks us to charac-
terize as a further “factfinding” the determination that this prior
felony involved the infliction of death on another. But we need not
parse the statutory language that finely here, as we can comfortably
conclude—as a matter of law, not factfinding—that a conviction for
second-degree murder involved the infliction of death on anoth-
er. Therefore, the trial court did not engage in any unconstitutional
factfinding on its way to using the aggravating factor of a prior con-
viction to impose a hard 50 sentence on Walker.

Affirmed.

No. 111,639

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. ANSON R. BERNHARDT,
Appellant.
(372 P3d 1161)

Opinion filed May 27, 201

Michelle A, Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and
was on the brief for appellant.

Te ats eae

Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Mare
Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmide, attorney general, were with her on
the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BEIER, J.: Defendant Anson R. Bernhardt appeals his convic-
tion for premeditated first-degree murder.

Bernhardt raises three instructional issues, arguing the district
judge erred by (1) adding language to a pattern jury instruction
defining premeditation; (2) giving two separate jury instructions
on intentional second-degree murder and reckless second-degree
murder instead of a single instruction covering both theories; and
(3) failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter. He also claims
the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him a fair trial. Ber-
nhardt further contends the district judge erred by applying the
2013 amendments to Kansas’ hard 50 sentencing scheme retroac-
tively, and he challenges the aggravating circumstances ultimately
relied upon to support imposition of his hard 50 sentence.

We hold that there was no error and affirm Bernhardt’s convic-
tion and sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We review the evidence in the record before us at greater length
than we otherwise might because of the nature of the challenges
Bernhardt advances on appeal.

On the afternoon of September 29, 2012, Bernhardt picked up
his live-in girlfriend Amber Kostner from work. About 7 that eve-
ning, the two went to a party, picking up their friend Josie Breeden
on the way. Bernhardt left the party about 10:30 to take Breeden
home, then returned to the party for a short time. When he and
Kostner left, she was not ready to go home; so they went to a bar
and stayed there for 15 to 20 minutes.

The next morning, Officer Keith Luongo responded to a report
that there was a body in a ditch across the road from Campus High
School in Haysville. The body would later be identified as Kost-
ner'’s.

The Sedgwick County Sheriff's Department took Bernhardt into
custody for questioning, and he spoke to a detective in a taped in-

terview that would later be introduced at trial. In the interview,
Bernhardt initially said that he had not seen Kostner since she left
the bar they had gone to after the party. He claimed that Kostner
walked out of the bar during an argument. But, as Bernhardt ex-
plained the events in more detail, he contradicted his earlier state-
ment. He then said that he and Kostner had gone home together
from the bar and that she had later left.

While he and Kostner were en route home, Bernhardt said Kost-
ner was saying things like: “For God sake Anson I’m a grown ass
woman” and “I wanna have another drink, I'll have another drink.”
Bernhardt said that, once the couple arrived home, he told Kostner
they could not keep arguing because his mother would kick them
out of the house. It was at that point that Kostner told Bernhardt to
“fuck off” and left. Bernhardt said it was not unusual for Kostner to
leave after they had a fight.

Bernhardt then told the detective that he became worried the
next morning when he woke up and Kostner had not returned. Ber-
nhardt called several of Kostner’s friends and relatives, as well as
hospitals and the jail, but no one had seen or heard from her. Ber-
nhardt also recounted what he had done the rest of the day, which
included spending time on the Internet playing games, helping a
friend work on a car, and then spending the afternoon at Breeden’s
house. That evening, Bernhardt went to a couple of bars: He was at
the second bar when officers asked him to come in for questioning.

Investigators then had Bernhardt repeat his story, asking for
additional details at various points. One of the investigators asked
Bernhardt why Kostner’s car might have been by Campus High
School. Bernhardt initially denied knowing why the car would have
been there, but the investigators’ repeated requests that he explain
led eventually to his confession:

“Investigator: What happened?

“Bernhardt: I beat the crap out of her and dumped her body.

“Investigator: Well you say you beat the crap out of her. How?

“Bernhardt: I—was kicking her.

“Investigator: Where at?

“Bernhardt: Everywhere. . . . I pretty much kicked her everywhere. And I
threw her in the backseat and I drove her to 55th and Meridian and dumped her
off.”

463

Bernhardt then elaborated, beginning with events in the car af-
ter he and Kostner left the bar: “She was yelling at me, she reached
over and smacked me and I was driving and—I pulled over and
pulled her over to—out of the driver's side by her hair and then she
hit the ground and I started kicking her.” He also told the officers
that Kostner “screamed for a second when I pulled her hair. Pulled
her out of the car. And then she—she wasn’t really saying anything
after that.”
Bernhardt said that after he finished kicking Kostner he put her
in the backseat and started driving; but, before he reached his ul-
timate destination, he stopped and put her in the trunk because of
“[t]he sound of her breathing.” He said that “[iJt was—it wasn’t like
smooth breathing. It was kinda garbled, like—probably blood or
something.” He “didn’t wanna hear her.”

When Bemhardt reached 55th and Meridian, “[he] pulled over
. [a]nd [he] pulled her out of the trunk and [he] kinda threw her
but she kinda rolled a little bit.” Then he left. Bernhardt told the
officers that Kostner “was still breathing when [he] threw her on
the side of the road,” and he did not know she had died until the
interview. When asked why he would leave Kostner on the side of
the road if she was still breathing, Bernhardt said he “was probably
scared or something.” When asked if he left Kostner by the side
of the road because he thought she was going to die, Bernhardt
answered: “Maybe. I don’t know.”

Bernhardt said initially that he did not know how many times
he kicked Kostner. But, when pressed, he said: “20? 30? I don’t
know.” He also said that he “ “probably” kicked Kostner in the head,

“[p]retty much from her waist up.”

When asked if he had considered calling an ambulance for Kost-
ner or otherwise getting her help, Bernhardt said: “I thought about
it later and I thought about going and getting her and taking her to
the hospital, taking her to the emergency room.” When asked why
he had not done so, Bernhardt said he did not know.

Bernhardt’s statements led to the charge of first-degree premed-
itated murder.

At trial, the State’s primary evidence against Bernhardt was the
video of his interview. The State also put on several witnesses who

corroborated many of the details Bernhardt had given about what
he and Kostner had been doing the night of her murder and what
he did the next morning. Dr. Scott Kipper, Sedgwick County’s dep-
uty coroner and medical examiner, testified about the results of
Kostner’s autopsy. In his opinion, Kostner had suffered at least six
distinct blows to the front of her head, and “[tJhe cause of death
was multiple blunt force injuries, and the manner was homicide.”
Kipper also opined that it was possible that Kostner would have
survived, had she received “immediate medical attention.”

After both the State and defense rested, the district court judge
and counsel discussed jury instructions. The State requested ad-
ditions to the Pattern Instructions for Kansas (PIK) language on
premeditation, arguing it was necessary for the jury to understand
that Bernhardt did not have to have thought about killing Kostner
before their physical altercation began.

The unadomed PIK language read:

“Premeditation’ means to have thought over the matter beforehand, in other
words, to have formed the design or intent to kill before the act. Although there
is no specific time period required for premeditation, the concept of premedita-
tion requires more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life.”

The State requested that the district judge add the following
three paragraphs:

“Premeditation does not have to be present before a fight, quarrel, or struggle
begins. Premeditation is the time of reflection or deliberation. Premeditation does
not necessarily mean that an act is planned, contrived, or schemed beforehand.

“Premeditation can be inferred from other circumstances including: (1) the
nature of the weapon used, (2) the lack of provocation, (3) the defendant’s conduct
before and after the killing, (4) threats and declarations of the defendant before
and during the occurrence, or (5) dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was
felled and rendered helpless.

“Premeditation can occur during the middle of a violent episode, struggle, or

fight.”
Bernhardt’s lawyer objected to these paragraphs, arguing they
were “outside of what PIK 4 calls for, and I don’t believe it’s appro-
priate.” The judge acknowledged a preference for using PIK lan-
guage alone but granted the State’s request because the additional
language accurately stated the law. He further observed that, based
on the facts of the case, “there is more than a slight possibility of

confusion by the jury about when premeditation can or cannot oc-
cur and what evidence can be used to prove premeditation.”

After the district judge granted the State’s request, Bernhardt
asked for a different, additional paragraph. That brief paragraph
was inserted between the PIK language and the three paragraphs
that had been sought by the State; it read: “Premeditation is the
process of thinking about a proposed killing before engaging in
homicidal conduct.” The State did not object to this further addi-
tion to the instruction.

The discussion then turned to which lesser included offenses
instructions should be given. The State requested an intentional
second-degree murder instruction but opposed a reckless second-
degree murder instruction. The district judge concluded that the
jury should be instructed on both theories. The prosecutor then ad-
vocated for putting the reckless second-degree murder description
in an instruction separate from that for intentional second-degree
murder, saying: “The law is clear that the jury should first consider
second-degree intentional and if they cannot reach a unanimous
decision then consider second-degree reckless.” Bernhardt’s law-
yer opposed separating the theories into two instructions, because
he believed that was the PIK design. The judge ultimately agreed
with the State and gave two separate instructions.

The judge discussed Bernhardt’s request for a voluntary man-
slaughter instruction. Bernhardt argued that “there [was] some
factual basis to support a heat of passion, intense emotional excite-
ment” because Bernhardt “was struck by [Kostner] and he just—he
stopped the car and he pulled her out and he reacted.” The district
judge denied the request for the voluntary manslaughter instruc-
tion, noting “the provocation, whether it be a sudden quarrel or
some other form of provocation, must be sufficient to cause an or-
dinary man to lose control of his actions and reason.”

Thus, after the first-degree murder instruction, which included
the language on premeditation, the jury was given the following
general lesser included offense instruction:

“The offense of murder in the first degree with which defendant is charged
includes the lesser offenses of murder in the second degree (intentionally) and
murder in the second degree (recklessly).

466

“You may find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, murder in
the second degree (intentionally), murder in the second degree (recklessly) or not
guilty.

“When there is a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more offenses defen-
dant is guilty, he may be convicted of the lesser offense only.”

The separate instructions for intentional second-degree murder
and reckless second-degree murder followed. On one page, the in-
struction read:

“If you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree,
you should then consider the lesser included offense of murder in the second
degree (intentionally).

“To establish this change, each of the following claims must be proved:

“1. The defendant intentionally killed Amber Lynn Kostner.

“2, This act occurred on or about the 30th day of September, 2012, in Sedg-
wick County, Kansas.

“The State must prove that the defendant committed this crime of murder
in the second degree intentionally. A defendant acts intentionally when it is the
defendant's desire or conscious objective to do the act complained about by the
State.”

The next page read:

“If you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of murder in the second de-
gree (intentionally), you should then consider the lesser included offense of mur-
der in the second degree (recklessly).

“To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:

“1. The defendant killed Amber Lynn Kostner unintentionally but recldessly
under circumstances that show extreme indifference to the value of human life.

“2, This act occurred on or about the 30th day of September, 2012, in Sedg-
wick County, Kansas.

“The State must prove that the defendant committed this crime of murder
in the second degree recklessly. A defendant acts recklessly when the defendant
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result of the de-
fendant's actions will follow. This act by the defendant disregarding the risk must
be a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would use in
the same situation.”

The verdict form gave the jury four options—guilty of first-de-
gree murder, guilty of intentional second-degree murder, guilty of
reckless second-degree murder, and not guilty—in that order. The
jury took the first option.

Approximately a month before Bernhardt was convicted on July

11, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 8. Ct. 2151, 186 L.
Ed. 2d 314 (2013). In that opinion, the Court held that facts relied
upon to increase a mandatory minimum sentence constitute ele-
ments of an offense that must be proved to a jury beyond a reason-
able doubt to avoid a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
juxy trial. Under Kansas law in effect at the time Kostner was mur-
dered, the usual mandatory minimum sentence for premeditate:
first-degree murder was life without the possibility of parole for 25
years, i.¢., a hard 25. The hard 25 could be increased to a hard 50 i
the sentencing judge found the existence of one or more aggravat-
ing factors by a preponderance of the evidence.

On September 6, 2013, before Bernhardt’s sentencing hearing,
the legislature amended K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620 to alter the
procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence and bring it in line with
the holding of Alleyne. The amended statute requires a jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating circum-
stance exists and that any aggravating circumstances are not out-
weighed by any mitigating circumstances, before a hard 50 can be
imposed.

The district judge in this case ruled that the amended statute
could be applied to Bernhardt without violating the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United States Constitution. Bernhardt then waived
his right to have a jury make any findings of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances and instead tried the issue to the judge.

At the bench trial on the appropriateness of a hard 50, the State
relied on the evidence from trial to establish the aggravating cir-
cumstances. Bernhardt testified on his own behalf about his alco-
holism. Bernhardt’s mother also testified, telling the judge about
Bernhardt’s alcohol problem and his problems with his ex-wife.
She said Bernhardt’s ex-wife caused him to “tr[y] to slice his wrist”
and that, shortly before Kostner’s death, he “looked like . . . he
was having a nervous breakdown” after talking to his ex-wife. After
the defense presented additional ‘evidence of mitigating circum-
stances, the district judge listed the aggravating factors the State
had alleged:

“(1) [T)he defendant committed the crime in order to avoid or prevent a lawful ar-

rest or prosecution; . . . (2). . . the defendant committed the crime in an especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel manner; and . . . (3) . . . the victim was killed while
engaging in, or because of the victim’s performance or prospective performance
of, the victim’s duties as a witness in a criminal proceeding,”

The defense argued that three mitigating circumstances were
present:
“[U]nder K.S.A. 21-6625, subparagraph (a), number (1) ‘The defendant has no
significant history of prior criminal activity’; number (2), “The crime was commit-
ted while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbances’; and number (6) ‘The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to
the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.”

Before ruling, the district judge made some general comments
about the evidence:

“The only specific comments the Court will make with regard to evidence is,
there is the evidence that he kicked her in the head until she was unconscious.
He kicked her after she was unconscious. He transferred her to the trunk because
of the noise that she was making. He drove ten to 15 minutes to leave her in a
ditch while she was still alive and then he drove ten to 15 minutes back home.
And according to the transcript, he thought about taking her to the hospital but
he didn’t.”

After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the
district judge then found
“beyond a reasonable doubt that the following aggravating circumstances have
been established by the evidence and are not outweighed by mitigating circum-
stances found to exist:

“Number (1), that the defendant committed the crime in order to avoid or
prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution; number (2), that the defendant committed
the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. Those are the only
aggravating circumstances the Court is finding,

“The defendant shall be sentenced accordingly.”

Bernhardt’s counsel asked the district judge to “note” a “con-
temporaneous objection to the Court's finding,” which the district
judge agreed to do. The prosecutor then asked if the district judge
needed to state on the record whether he had found that any miti-
gating circumstances existed. The district judge declined to do so.

At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the State again made a re-
quest about putting findings on mitigating circumstances on the

record, and the district judge noted that Bernhardt had a criminal
history of “more than one page, but the majority of it are driving of-
fenses, or similar-type offenses; misdemeanors.” The judge there-
fore concluded that Bernhardt did not have a significant criminal
history. The district judge rejected mitigators on the crime being
“committed while the defendant was under the influence of ex-
treme mental or emotional distress” and on “[t]he capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct
or to conform the defendant’s conduct to the requirements of the
law” being substantially impaired. The district judge then imposed
a hard 50 for Bernhardt’s murder of Kostner.

PREMEDITATION INSTRUCTION

Bernhardt first takes aim on appeal at the premeditation jury
instruction. His counsel fully preserved this issue for our review
by objecting in district court. See State v. Brownlee, 302 Kan. 491,
512, 354 P.3d 525 (2015); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3).

For jury instruction issues such as this, we employ a multistep

analysis:
“(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from
both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of
review; (2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine wheth-
er the instruction was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine
whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
defendant or the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction; and
(4) finally, if the district court erred, the appellate court must determine whether
the error was harmless, utilizing the test and degree of certainty set forth in State
v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).’”
State v. Woods, 301 Kan. 852, 876, 348 P.3d 583 (2015).

As we apply this framework, we also consider “the instructions
as a whole without isolating any one instruction” and we review
“the instruction to see whether it properly and fairly stated the law
as applied to the facts of the case and could not have reasonably
misled the jury.” State v. Horton, 300 Kan. 477, 491, 331 P.3d 752
(2014) (citing State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1059, 221 P.3d 525
[2009]).

Although not entirely clear from Bernhardt’s brief, it appears
that he specifically questions whether the instruction as given was
legally appropriate.

Bernhardt first contends that PIK language helps to ensure due
process through uniformity and that the PIK instruction fully and
clearly conveyed the law on premeditation. This argument is un-
dercut by Bernhardt’s own request that the district judge add to
the PIK language, although we acknowledge that his counsel may
have been trying to fashion a silk purse out of a sow’s ear after the
judge had agreed to add the three paragraphs sought by the State.

“Failure to use the exact language of a PIK instruction is not
fatal and does not automatically require reversal. Prejudice must
still be shown.” State v. Mitchell, 269 Kan. 349, Syl. 4 5, 7 P3d
1135 (2000).

“The use of PIK instructions is not mandatory but is strongly recommended.
The pattern instructions have been developed by a knowledgeable committee to
bring accuracy, clarity, and uniformity to jury instructions. They should be the
starting point in the preparation of any set of jury instructions. If the particular
facts in a given case require modification of the applicable pattem instruction or
the addition of some instruction not included in PIK, the district court should not
hesitate to make such modification or addition. However, absent such need, PIK
instructions and recommendations should be followed.” State v. Dixon, 289 Kan.
46, Syl. ¢ 10, 209 P.3d 675 (2009).

In this case, where Bernhardt admitted that he and Kostner had
been arguing before he pulled her out of the car and started kick-
ing her, the judge believed there was a possibility of jury confusion
on when premeditation can or cannot occur and on the type of
evidence that may be relied upon to demonstrate it. We see no er-
ror on the basis of the district judge’s deviation from PIK to include
that language iri this case.

Bemhardt also has argued that the additions improperly focused
on how quickly premeditation can form. He relies on our decision
in State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 144 P.3d 647 (2006), and two Ari-
zona cases, State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 65 P.3d 420 (2003),
and State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 778 P.2d 1185 (1989), for the
general proposition that premeditation cannot be formed in an in-
stant. This is true, and it is error to tell a jury the opposite.

In Gunby, the prosecutor made several “troubling” statements
during closing:

“(1) [P]vemeditation can occur after the chain of events,’ (2) ‘[A]t some point after
he started hitting and strangling her . .. [the defendant] made the conscious deci-

sion, “I want to kill you” . . . [and] that’s when he premeditate[d],’ (3) A defendant
‘cannot intentionally strangle somebody to death without there being premedita-
tion,’ and (4) It is ‘impossible to intentionally strangle somebody to death without
knowing, thinking and wanting that person to die [and] that is all that is required
for premeditation . . . that is the premeditation.” 282 Kan. at 64.

We noted that “these remarks defined premeditation somewhere
between the level of forethought outlined in the PIK instruction
we have endorsed . . . and the ‘instantaneous’ timing we have disap-
proved.” 282 Kan. at 64. After comparing the statements in Gunby
to the facts in two other cases in which we had affirmed jury find-
ings of premeditation in strangulation cases, the court held that it
regarded “the prosecutor's statements in this case as barely outside
the broad latitude permitted him in discussing the evidence in this
case” and said that “whatever error they may have injected into
the trial was harmless.” 282 Kan. at 65; see also State v. Scott, 271
Kan. 103, 108, 21 P.3d 516 (2001) (continued application of pres-
sure over a period of time sufficient for a jury to find victim’s death
premeditated); State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 395, 402, 109 P.3d 1158
(2005) (affirming Scott’s holding that jury can find defendant's state
of mind changed from intent to premeditation at any time during
violent episode that causes victim’s death).

In Guerra, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that “a jury may
be misled by an instruction placing undue emphasis on the rapid-
ity with which premeditation can occur.” 161 Ariz, at 204, But the
Guerra court ultimately approved of a jury instruction stating:

“Premeditation means that the defendant's intention or knowledge existed be-
fore the killing long enough to permit reflection.

“The time for reflection need not be prolonged and there need be no appre-
ciable space of time between the intention to kill unlawfully and the act of killing.

“Tt may be as instantaneous as the successive thoughts of the human mind,
however it must be longer than the time required to form the intent or knowledge
that such conduct will cause death.

“An act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion.” (Emphasis added.) 161 Ariz. at 293-94.

The court concluded that the instruction before it, read as a whole,
properly instructed the jury on premeditation. 161 Ariz. at 294.

In Thompson, the Arizona Supreme Court reiterated its concern
about undue emphasis on the passage of time in a premeditation

jury instruction. 204 Ariz. at 476. But the issues actually decided
by the court were whether a moment of reflection was necessary
‘or premeditation to occur and whether the State was required to
prove such reflection through direct evidence. 204 Ariz. at 478.
Thompson plows no new analytical ground for Bernhardt.

We conclude that the prosecutor's statements in Gunby and
instructions in the Arizona cases were substantively—and signifi-
cantly—different from the three paragraphs on premeditation at
issue here. The Gunby prosecutor said that strangulation was not
possible without premeditation. Bernhardt’s jury instruction did
not make such a categorical statement or direct the jury to find
remeditation because of his continuous infliction of blows. In-
stead, the instruction stated premeditation “does not have to be
resent before a fight, quarrel, or struggle” and is not necessar-
ily “planned, contrived or schemed beforehand.” Again, these are
correct statements of Kansas law. See Scott, 271 Kan. at 108, 111.
Bernhardt’s instruction also did not focus explicitly on how quickly
premeditation can form, the flaw in the Arizona cases. Cf. State v.
Moncla, 262 Kan. 58, Syl. { 6, 936 P.2d 727 (1997) (jury instruction
“that premeditation may arise in an instant” inappropriate because
diminishes importance of the element of premeditation).

We are persuaded that the three challenged paragraphs did not
communicate that premeditation could be instantaneous, only that
it could form during or after an initial altercation. This means that,
read as a whole, the premeditation instruction “properly and fairly
stated the law as applied to the facts of the case.” Horton, 300 Kan.
at 491. The instruction correctly informed the jury that Bernhardt
did not have to premeditate Kostner’s murder before pulling her
out of the car and beginning to kick her.

The district judge did not err in modifying the PIK instruction as
requested by the State. Accordingly, we need not reach the ques-
tion of whether any error was harmless.

INTENTIONAL SECOND-DEGREE MURDER AND RECKLESS
SECOND-DEGREE MURDER INSTRUCTIONS

Bernhardt next complains that the district judge erred in giv-
ing separate lesser included offense instructions for intentional
second-degree murder and reckless second-degree murder.

This court reviews lesser included offense instructions using the
same general framework outlined in the previous section. More
specifically, when considering the legal appropriateness of a lesser
included offense, “an appellate court asks whether the lesser crime
is ‘legally an included offense of the charged crime.’” Armstrong,
299 Kan, at 432,

Bernhardt preserved this issue for appellate review. After the
district judge in this case decided to instruct on both intentional
and reckless second-degree murder, his discussion with counsel
turned to whether separate instructions should be given for each
theory. Bemhardt argued that both second-degree murder theo-
ries should be given in the same instruction, separated by “or.”
The State argued that because reckless second-degree murder is
a lesser included offense of intentional second-degree murder, the
court should give two separate instructions. The State ultimately

revailed.

Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5109(b), a lesser included crime is:
“(1) A lesser degree of the same crime, except that there are no lesser degrees
of murder in the first degree under subsection (a)(2) [felony murder] of K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 21-5402, and amendments thereto;
“(2) a crime where all elements of the lesser crime are identical to some of the
elements of the crime charged;

“(3) an attempt to commit the crime charged; or
“(4) an attempt to commit a crime defined under paragraph (1) or (2).”

We have recognized five degrees of homicide, in descending or-
der: capital murder, first-degree murder, second-degree murder,
voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. State v.
Cheever, 295 Kan, 229, 258-59, 284 P.3d 1007 (2012) (adding capi-
tal murder to homicide hierarchy), vacated on other grounds and
remanded 571 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 596, 187 L. Ed. 2d 519 (2013).
Based on this hierarchy, intentional and reckless second-degree
murder are both lesser included offenses of first-degree murder
under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-5109(b)(1). See State v. Killings, 301
Kan. 214, 222, 225, 340 P.3d 1186 (2015). It was therefore legally
appropriate to instruct the jury on both theories of second-degree
murder.

Bernhardt argues that, although it was legally appropriate to
give a second-degree murder instruction, it was not appropriate
to divide intentional and reckless into separate instructions. Doing
so meant that the jury would not consider reckless second-degree
murder unless it could not agree on intentional second-degree
murder, which incorrectly treated reckless as a lesser included of-
fense of intentional. The State counters that Bernhardt seeks “a
departure from the long-standing rule that homicide offenses are
to be considered in order of severity.”

Strictly speaking, Bernhardt is correct that reckless second-de-
gree murder is not a lesser included offense of intentional second-
degree murder. Because they have different mens rea require-
ments, reckless second-degree murder does not qualify as a lesser
offense under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5109(b)(2) (all elements of
lesser crime identical to some elements of greater). But intentional
second-degree murder and reckless second-degree murder are as-
signed different severity levels, see K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5403(b)
(intentional severity level 1, person felony; reckless severity level
2, person felony), with reckless designated the less serious crime.
And, as the State correctly notes, we have clearly stated that “in
the interests of promoting an orderly method of considering the
possible verdicts, ‘a trial court should instruct on lesser included
offenses in the order of severity beginning with the offense with
the most severe penalty.’ [State v.] Trujillo, 225 Kan. [320,] 324,
[590 P.2d 1027 (1979)].” State v. Adams, 292 Kan. 60, 77, 253 P.3d
5 (2011).

Moreover, contrary to Bernhardt’s insistence before the district
judge, PIK’s second-degree murder section does not clearly call for
a district judge to use a single instruction for both intentional and
reckless second-degree murder. PIK Crim. 4th 54.140 provides in
relevant part:

“To establish this charge [of second-degree murder], each of the following
claims must be proved:

“1, The defendant intentionally ldlled insert name of victim.

“OR

“1. The defendant killed insert name of victim unintentionally but recklessly
under circumstances that show extreme indifference to the value of human life.

“2, This act occurred on or about the __ day of. > ,in.

County, Kansas.”

475

Because both the intentional and reckless theories are labeled
with the number “1,” PIK conveys that each theory is meant to
be considered separately. Whether that separate consideration is
prompted by a single instruction on one page or two successive
instructions on two pages matters not, as long as the reckless crime,
the one with the lesser severity rating, comes second.

We conclude the district judge did not err by giving separate
instructions on intentional and reckless second-degree murder. We
need not engage in a harmlessness analysis.

VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION

In his third and final jury instruction issue, Bernhardt argues the
district judge erred by failing to instruct on voluntary manslaugh-
ter. The four-step framework applied in the previous sections also
applies here. See Brownlee, 302 Kan. at 511.

Bernhardt asked for and was denied a voluntary manslaughter
instruction, so the issue is fully preserved for our review. Voluntary
manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first-degree premedi-
tated murder and therefore was legally appropriate. See Brownlee,
302 Kan. at 512.

The next step in the analysis is whether a voluntary manslaugh-
ter instruction was factually appropriate.

“In order to require the instruction, there must have been evidence that would
reasonably justify a conviction of the lesser included crime. [State v. Story,] 300 .
Kan. [702,] 710[, 334 P.3d 297 (2014)]. This court does not speculate about hypo-
thetical scenarios. 300 Kan. at 710 (quoting [State v.] Wade, 295 Kan. [916,] 925,
[287 P3d 237 (2012)]).

“The key elements of voluntary manslaughter under K.S.A. 21-3403 are an
intentional killing and legally sufficient provocation. [Citation omitted.] When re-
viewing whether provocation was legally sufficient, an objective test is used. [Ci-
tation omitted.] “Heat of passion” has been defined as “any intense or vehement
emotional excitement of the kind prompting violent and aggressive action, such as
rage, anger, hatred, furious resentment, fright, or terror,” based “on impulse with-
out reflection.” [Citation omitted.] The provocation ‘“must be sufficient to cause
an ordinary man to lose control of his actions and his reason.”’ [Citations omitted.]

“{T]n order to reduce a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaugh-
ter, there must be an adequate provocation that deprives a reasonable per-
son of self-control and causes that person to act out of passion rather than

reason. Mere words or gestures, however offensive, do not constitute le-

gally sufficient provocation for a finding of voluntary manslaughter.’ [State

v.] Hayes, 299 Kan. [861,] 864-66[, 327 P.3d 414 (2014)].

“A sudden quarrel can be one form of heat of passion. State v. Johnson, 290
Kan, 1038, 1048, 236 P.3d 517 (2010). ‘[A]n unforeseen angry altercation, dispute,
taunt, or accusation could fall within th[e] definition [of heat of passion] as suf-
ficient provocation’ 290 Kan. at 1048. ‘“The hallmark of heat of passion is taking
action upon impulse without reflection.”’ State v. Hilt, 299 Kan, 176, 194, 323
P.3d 367 (2014) (quoting Wade, 295 Kan. at 925).” Brownlee, 302 Kan. at 512-13.

Bernhardt argues that Kostner’s slapping him during their argu-
ment was objectively sufficient provocation to warrant a voluntary
manslaughter instruction.

In State v. Johnson, 290 Kan. 1038, 236 P.3d 517 (2010), this
court provided definitions for “heat of passion,” “sudden,” and
“quarrel.”

“Heat of passion’ is defined as:

‘Rage, terror, or furious hatred suddenly aroused by some immediate
provocation, usually another person’s words or actions. At common law, the
heat of passion could serve as a mitigating circumstance that would reduce
a murder charge to manslaughter. Also termed sudden heat of passion; sud-
den heat; sudden passion; hot blood; sudden heat and passion; furor brevis.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 791 (9th ed.).

“Sudden’ is commonly defined as: ‘1. Happening without warming; un-
foreseen. 2. Characterized by hastiness; abrupt; rash. 3. Characterized by
rapidity; quick; swift.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 1286 (1969).

“‘Quarrel’ is defined as: ‘An altercation or angry dispute; an exchange
of recriminations, taunts, threats, or accusations between two persons.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1363 (9th ed.); ‘An angry dispute; an altercation.’
‘The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1069 (1969).”
290 Kan. at 1047-48.

The evidence in this case—even from Bernhardt’s own mouth—
showed that he and Kostner began arguing while they were at the
bar, and the argument continued during their car ride home. Dur-
ing that ride, Kostner slapped Bernhardt, and, at that point, he
stopped, pulled her out of the car, and kicked her repeatedly. He
then threw Kostner into the backseat of the car and began driving.
After hearing Kostner’s “garbled” breathing, Bernhardt stopped
the car again, put Kostner in the trunk, and continued driving until

ATT

he stopped a third time and abandoned Kostner in a roadside ditch.
He believed Kostner was still alive at the time.

This evidence makes Bernhardt’ position on this issue problem-

atic for several reasons. The initial argument between Bernhardt
and Kostner was insufficient to qualify as provocation supporting
a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Cf. State v. Hayes, 299 Kan.
861, Syl. { 4, 327 P.3d 414 (2014) (“Mere words or gestures, how-
ever offensive, do not constitute legally sufficient provocation for a
finding of voluntary manslaughter.”) In addition, according to Ber-
nhardt’s statement, this type of argument was not unusual for the
two, which tends to negate the “sudden” aspect of sudden quarrel;
the argument did not happen “without warning” and was foresee-
able. Although Kostner did slap Bernhardt, the slap occurred dur-
ing their ongoing argument and “mere evidence of an altercation
between parties does not alone support finding sufficient provo-
cation.” See State v. Northcutt, 290 Kan. 224, 234, 224 P.3d 564
(2010). As the State notes in its brief, Bernhardt “did not indicate
that he somehow snapped, experienced a break from reality, felt
insulted, denigrated, or suffered a personal affront.” See Brownlee,
302 Kan. at 513. Even if the slap were an objectively reasonable
cause for Bernhardt to act impulsively, his later, coldly callous be-
havior was not impulsive. After kicking her repeatedly, he placed
her first in the backseat and then, when what he imagined to be
blood in her airway made a sound that disturbed him, in the trunk.
Rather than take her to hospital, which he considered, he dumped
her on the side of a road where he left her to die.’ Had Bernhardt
stopped short of even this final step, Kostner might have survived
his brutality.
On these facts, a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not fac-
tually appropriate. It was not error for the district judge to refuse
Bernhardt’s request for one. Again, we need not decide whether
any error was harmless.

CUMULATIVE ERROR

Bernhardt asserts the cumulative effect of the district judge’s
trial errors warrants reversal of his conviction. Because we have not
identified any trial errors, the cumulative error doctrine does not
apply. See State v. Reed, 302 Kan. 390, 404, 352 P.3d 1043 (2015).

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE AMENDED HARD 50
STATUTE

We have previously declined to address the retroactive appli-
cation of the amended hard 50 statute because the issue has not
een ripe. See, e.g., State v. Roeder, 300 Kan. 901, Syl. J 13, 336
P3d 831 (2014) (issue not ripe until prosecutor chooses to pursue
hard 50 on remand). The issue is ripe in this case, but the circum-
stances are different from those in cases in which we have vacated
the sentences of defendants who were sentenced under the previ-
ous statute. See, ¢.g., 300 Kan. at 940. Here, Bernhardt committed
his crime before the legislature amended the statute but was sen-
tenced after the amendments’ effective date. Holding application
of the amended statute to Bernhardt would not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the district judge employed the statute to arrive at
Bernhardt’s sentence. Bernhardt now relies on the clause in his ap-
pellate challenge.

This court reviews questions of both statutory and constitutional
law de novo. State v. Garcia, 285 Kan. 1, 7, 169 P.3d 1069 (2007).

As mentioned above, the United States Supreme Court decided
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ____, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158, 186
L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), in June 2013, holding that facts used to in-
crease a mandatory minimum sentence are elements of the offense
that must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable
doubt to avoid a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial. The Kansas statutory scheme in place at that time permit-
ted the sentencing judge in a first-degree murder case to find by
a preponderance of the evidence one or more aggravating factors
necessary to increase the mandatory minimum hard 25 sentence to
a hard 50. In the wake of Alleyne, we held this statutory procedure
violated the Sixth Amendment. See State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102,
119, 322 P.3d 334 (2014).

In response to Alleyne but before our decision in Soto, in Sep-
tember 2013, the legislature amended the hard 50 statute. The
amended statute originally stated that “[t]he provisions of this sub-
section shall apply only to the crime of murder in the first degree
based upon tlie finding of premeditated murder committed prior
to the effective date of this act.” K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620(c). The

479

statute was subsequently amended to insert the effective date and
change the subsection lettering. See K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6620(e)
(“The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to the crime of
murder in the first degree based upon the finding of premeditated
murder committed prior to September 6, 2013.”).
In general,

“a statute operates only prospectively unless there is clear language indicating
the legislature intended otherwise. State v. Martin, 270 Kan. 603, 608-09, 17 P.3d
344 (2001); State v. Sisk, 266 Kan. 41, 44, 966 P2d 671 (1998). An exception to
this rule has been employed when the statutory change is merely procedural or
remedial in nature and does not prejudicially affect the substantive rights of the
parties. Martin, 270 Kan, at 608-09; State v. Ford, 262 Kan. 206, 208, 936 P.2d 255
(1997).’ Wells, 297 Kan. [741,] 761[, 305 P.3d 568 (2013)].” State v. Waller, 299
Kan, 707, 718, 328 P.3d 1111 (2014).

Here, the amended statute explicitly provided that the new pro-
cedure should be considered procedural and applied retroactively:

“The amendments to subsection (e) by chapter 1 of the 2013 Session Laws of
Kansas (Special Session):

“(1) Establish a procedural rule for sentencing proceedings, and as such

shall be construed and applied retroactively to all crimes committed prior

to the effective date of this act, except as provided further in this subsec-

tion.” K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6620(1).

“Article I, § 10, of the United States Constitution states simply
that ‘[nJo State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto [Ilaw.’” State v.
Todd, 299 Kan. 263, 276, 323 P.3d 829, cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 460
(2014). There is no comparable provision in the Kansas Constitu-
tion. 299 Kan. at 276. .

Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, we have
interpreted
“the prohibition on ex post facto laws to require two elements to be present: ‘(1)
The law must be retrospective, applying to events occurring before its enactment,
and (2) it must alter the definition of criminal conduct or increase the penalty
by which a crime is punishable.’ Anderson v. Bruce, 274 Kan. 37, 43, 50 P3d 1
(2002).” State v. Prine, 297 Kan. 460, 469-70, 303 P.3d 662 (2013).

We have further stated:

“Although we have sometimes described the requirement of alteration in defini-
tion or increase in punishment in shorthand as mere ‘“disadvantage”’ to a crimi-
nal defendant, see State v. Chamberlain, 280 Kan. 241, 247, 120 P.3d 319 (2005)

— ~—es

(quoting Stansbury ». Hannigan, 265 Kan, 404, 412, 960 P.2d 227, cert. denied
525 U.S. 1060 [1998]), we have emphasized that the crucial ‘question in evaluat-
ing an ex post facto claim is whether the [new] law changes the legal consequences
of acts completed before its effective date.’ Prine, 297 Kan. at 470 (citing Weaver
[v. Graham], 450 U.S. [24,] 31[, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981)]; State v.
Armbrust, 274 Kan. 1089, 1093, 59 P.3d 1000 [2002]).” Todd, 299 Kan. at 278.

A merely procedural law does not “change[] the legal conse-
quences of acts completed before its effective date” and therefore
does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied retroac-
tively. See 209 Kan. at 278 (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S.
37, 49-50, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30 [1990]); see also Dob-
bert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2d
344 (1977) (“Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a
defendant, a procedural change is not ex post facto.”). However,
the legislature cannot simply declare a statutory amendment “pro-
cedural,” thereby insulating later application of the changed law
from ex post facto scrutiny. See Todd, 299 Kan. at 275 (citing Col-
lins, 497 U.S. at 46).

Bernhardt argues that because the previous hard 50 statute was
unconstitutional, the newly-amended statute “cannot be applied
retroactively because it aggravates the crime of premeditated mur-
der and it creates a greater punishment than the law allowed at the
time of the commission of the crime.” In his view, there was no
hard 50 in effect when he committed his crime. Thus the amended
statute, in essence, created a new, harsher punishment that cannot
be applied to his long-ago-completed crime.

Bernhardt’s argument ignores that it was not the hard 50 sen-
tence, or the aggravating and mitigating factors used to determine
its application, that the district judge held—and this court would
later hold—unconstitutional; rather, it was the procedure for im-
posing the hard 50. The United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the procedural nature of these types of statutes in Alleyne
itself, when it said that the “force of stare decisis is at its nadir
in cases concerning procedural rules that implicate fundamental
constitutional protections.” (Emphasis added.) Alleyne, 133 S. Ct.
2151 0.5.

We also note that the United States Supreme Court has reject-
ed an argument similar to Bernhardt’s in Dobbert, 432 U.S. 282.

When defendant Ernest John Dobbert, Jr., committed the acts that
led to his convictions for first- and second-degree murder, Flori-
da’s death penalty statutes required a person convicted of a capital
crime to be sentenced to death unless a majority of the jury recom-
mended mercy. Before Dobbert’s sentencing, the statutory scheme
was ruled unconstitutional under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), and the state legis-
lature amended the statutory procedure for imposing a death sen-
tence. Dobbert was then sentenced under the amended statutory
scheme. Based on the previous ruling on constitutionality, Dobbert
challenged his death sentence under the Ex Post Facto Clause, ax-
guing that there was no valid death penalty in effect at the time he
committed the murders. The Supreme Court determined that this
“highly technical” and “sophistic” argument

“mocks the substance of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Whether or not the old statute
would in the future, withstand constitutional attack, it clearly indicated Florida’s
view of the severity of murder and of the degree of punishment which the leg-
islature wished to impose upon murderers. The statute was intended to provide
maximum deterrence, and its existence on the statute books provided fair warn-
ing as to the degree of culpability which the State ascribed to the act of murder.”
Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 297.

Likewise, Bernhardt had fair warning at the time he murdered
Kostner that he could be sentenced to a hard 50 term if he was
ultimately convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. And,
because the new statute did not alter the definition of criminal
conduct or increase the penalty by which a crime is punishable, it
cannot be said that “‘the [new] law changes the legal consequences
of acts completed before its effective date.’” Todd, 299 Kan. at 278
(quoting Prine, 297 Kan. at 470).

The district judge correctly determined that the amendments to
KS.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620 could be applied to Bernhardt without
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Bernhardt’ final argument on appeal is that the district judge
erred in his findings on the existence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances,

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a hard 50 aggravating circumstance, this court “consider[s]
whether, after review of all the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found the exis-
tence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. DeAnda, 299 Kan. 594, 603, 324 P.3d 1115 (2014). When
a district judge has declined to find a mitigating circumstance, “the
standard of review is whether, after a review of all the evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, a rational fact-
finder could have found by a preponderance of the evidence the
existence of the mitigating circumstance.” State v. Livingston, 272
Kan. 853, 858, 35 P.3d 918 (2001).

The district judge found two aggravating circumstances: First,
Bernhardt committed the crime in order to avoid or prevent a law-
ful arrest or prosecution, and second, Bernhardt committed the
crime in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. See
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6624(e), (f). The judge also found one miti-
gating circumstance: Bernhardt did not have any significant crimi-
nal history. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6625(a)(1).

Bernhardt challenges the district judge’s finding that the crime
was committed “to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecu-
tion.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6624(e). He also challenges the district
judge’s failure to find two mitigating circumstances: “The crime
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbances,” and “[t]he capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct
or to conform the defendant’s conduct to the requirements of law
was substantially impaired.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6625(a)(2), (6).

Even if we were to assume the district judge committed all of
these alleged errors in his findings, there was still abundant evi-
dence to allow a rational factfinder to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Bernhardt murdered Kostner, “in an especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel manner” and that-the existence of this aggra-
vating circumstance was not outweighed by any of the mitigating
circumstances at issue here. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6620(e)(5);
21-6624(f). Bernhardt’s heinous, atrocious, and cruel actions, pre-
viously detailed, need not be described again. And he does not con-

tend that the presence of the additional mitigating factors would
have outweighed the aggravator.

Regardless of whether there was error in findings on one aggra-
vator and two mitigators, there is no reasonable possibility such an
error affected the outcome of the sentencing phase of Bernhardt’s
trial. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 565, 256 P.3d 801 (2011),
cert, denied 132 8. Ct. 1594 (2012).

CONCLUSION

We have carefully examined each of defendant's claims on ap-
peal and determined that they do not merit reversal of his convic-
tion or vacation of his sentence. The judgment of the district court
is affirmed.

eee

JOHNSON, J., dissenting: I disagree with the majority on two of
the instruction issues. First, the district court’s additions to the Pat-
tern Instructions of Kansas (PIK) defining “premeditation” were
contradictory and misleading. Second, an instruction on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter was factually appro-
priate in this case and it was error for the trial court to refuse the
defendant’s request to give it. Moreover, I would not find the errors
to be harmless, especially under the appellant’s cumulative error
claim.

Premeditation

My premeditation complaint in this case will principally focus
on the language employed to define the term for the jury. But that
does not mean that I have abandoned my previously expressed
view of this court’s temporal treatment of premeditation, to-wit:

“First, notwithstanding its majority view status in this State, I continue to reject
the notion that a person can premeditate a murder while committing the mur-
der. In my view, concurrent premeditation is an oxymoronic concept that obliter-
ates the distinguishing feature of first-degree premeditated murder. See State v.
Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1074-75, 221 P.3d 885 (2009) (Johnson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (premeditation contemplates that the matter be
thought over before commencement of homicidal conduct); State v. Warledo, 286
Kan. 927, 956, 190 P.3d 937 (2008) (Johnson, J., concurring) (premeditation re-

quires having thought the matter over beforehand; ‘beforehand’ must mean prior
to commencing the death-causing act).” State v. Marks, 297 Kan, 131, 151, 298
P.3d 1102 (2013) (Johnson, J., dissenting).

Here, the homicidal act entailed Bernhardt pulling Kostner
from the car and onto the ground, kicking her from the waist to her
head some 20 to 30 times, inflicting 6 distinct blows to the front of
her head, and causing her death from multiple blunt force inju-
ries, The majority's stated iteration of premeditation in this case is
that it can “form during or after an initial altercation.” (Emphasis
added.) 304 Kan. at 472. In other words, the majority would permit

“the State to prove the premeditation element of the first-degree

murder charge by proving either that: (1) Bernhardt thought about
killing Kostner while he was kicking her; or (2) Bernhardt thought
about killing Kostner after he had delivered the last kick. I submit
that the notion that premeditation encompasses both concurrent-
meditation (thinking about it while doing it) and post-meditation
(thinking about it after it is done) does not comport with Black's
Law Dictionary’s definition of premeditation, which retains the
temporal integrity of the term, to-wit: “Conscious consideration
and planning that precedes an act (such as committing a crime); the
pondering of an action before carrying it out.” (Emphasis added.)
Black’s Law Dictionary 1371 (10th ed. 2014).

Nevertheless, the district court’s modified instruction was so
contradictory and misleading that a lay juror could not have clearly
understood premeditation to mean either what the majority says
it means or what I discern it should mean. To recap, the modi-
fied instruction stated as follows, with the first paragraph being the
standard PIK instruction:

“Premeditation’ means to have thought over the matter beforehand, in other
words, to have formed the design or intent to kill before the act. Although there
is no specific time period required for premeditation, the concept of premedita-
tion requires more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life.

“Premeditation is the process of thinking dbbut a proposed killing before en-
gaging in homicidal conduct.

“Premeditation does not have to be present before a fight, quarrel, or struggle
begins. Premeditation is the time of reflection or deliberation. Premeditation does
not necessarily mean that an act is planned, contrived, or schemed beforehand.

“Premeditation can be inferred from other circumstances including: (1) the

485

nature of the weapon used, (2) the lack of provocation, (3) the defendant's conduct
before and after the killing, (4) threats and declarations of the defendant before
and during the occurrence, or (5) dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was
felled and rendered helpless.

“Premeditation can occur during the middle of a violent episode, struggle, or
fight.”

Certainly, the last sentence suggested to the jury that Bernhardt’s
premeditation could have occurred during the middle of the vio-
lent episode, which, according to Bernhardt’s estimate, would have
been somewhere around the 10th to 15th kick. But the PIK por-
tion of the instruction clarified that to be a premeditated murder,
the killer must “have formed the design or intent to kill before the
act.” (Emphasis added.) Then, the second paragraph defined the
“act” referred to in the first paragraph as being the “homicidal con-
duct” and required the jury to find that Bernhardt had engaged in
“the process of thinking about a proposed killing before engaging in
homicidal conduct.” (Emphasis added.)

Because the coroner told the jury that the cause of death was
multiple blunt force injuries, a rational juror would have under-
stood that the “homicidal conduct” referred to in the instructions
meant the multiple kicks Bernhardt inflicted upon Kostner. Con-
sequently, the first part of the instruction told that rational juror
that Bernhardt had to form the intent to kill Kostner before he
started kicking her. But the last sentence of the instruction con-
tradicted that directive by telling the rational juror that Bernhardt
could have formed the intent to kill Kostner in the middle of the
homicidal conduct of kicking her. To that rational juror, then, the
first and last parts of the instruction present an irreconcilable con-
tradiction.

Similarly, the instruction’s third paragraph might make sense to a
nonlinear thinking juror, but for others, it would be mind-spinning,
unintelligible gibberish. The paragraph begins by telling the jury
that the defendant did not have to premeditate the killing before
beginning a fight, quarrel, or struggle. Then, it explains that the
defendant had to have time to reflect or deliberate on the killing.
Perhaps those professing to be astute at multi-tasking would not
be confused by the concept of taking time for reflection or delib-

’ DE

eration while one is engaged in a fight, quarrel, or struggle. But
even the multi-taskers would be scratching their heads about the
notion that, after the defendant engaged in the “time of reflection
or deliberation” on the killing, that does not necessarily mean that
the killing was “planned, contrived, or schemed beforehand.” How
does one reflect or deliberate about killing the victim without plan-
ning, contriving, or scheming to kill the victim? If the defendant
was not planning, contriving, or scheming to kill the victim, he or
she was not premeditating the murder.

In my view, this is an example of what happens when various
case quotes are taken out of context and thrown together as a jury
instruction. The result is that the instruction fails the majority's
test, which requires that the instruction “could not have reasonably
misled the jury.” 304 Kan. at 469 (citing State v. Horton, 300 Kan.
ATT, 491, 331 P.3d 752 [2014]). Moreover, that misdirection denied
Bernhardt a fair trial. See Marks, 297 Kan. at 156 (Johnson, J., dis-
senting) (fair trial requires jury be properly led to understand the
concept of premeditation).

Before moving on to the next issue, I pause to observe that there
seems to be nothing in the modified instruction which would have
informed the jury that Bernhardt could have formed his intent to
kill Kostner after the homicidal act of kicking was completed, as
the majority suggests. The instruction paragraph referencing de-
fendant’s conduct after the killing simply informs the jury that what
a killer does afterward might imply that the killer had thought the
matter over before the killing. To the extent the majority suggests
that letting the victim die without rendering aid, after inflicting the
mortal wound, is tantamount to premeditating the killing, I do not
understand that to be the law. Even under this court's interpreta-
tion of premeditation as being possible up to a nanosecond before
an instantaneous killing, premeditation should no longer be a pos-
sibility after the point in time when the killing would be deemed
instantaneous.

Voluntary Manslaughter

As I understand the majority’s rationale for finding that a volun-
tary manslaughter instruction was not factually appropriate, it first

487

determined that there was not a sudden quarrel because Bernhardt
and Kostner started a verbal argument at the bar that continued
on the ride home; an argument using mere words or gestures is in-
sufficient provocation to support voluntary manslaughter; and the
two often argued in that manner, making it foreseeable rather than
sudden. Then, when “Kostner did slap Bernhardt,” it merely evi-
denced that there was “an altercation between [the] parties,” which
was insufficient provocation standing alone. 304 Kan, at 477. I have
a different view of both the facts and the legal principles.

The majority’s characterization of Kostner’s verbal attack as an
oft-occurring, normal “argument” and calling her physical attack
on Bernhardt a “slap” casts those facts in a light most favorable to
the State. We have clearly stated that the opposite should be true.
See State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 162, 283 P.3d 202 (2012) (“Of
course, where the defendant has requested the lesser included of-
fense instruction, the evidence should be viewed in the light most
favorable to the defendant.”), At trial, Bernhardt described a more
provocative scenario: “She was yelling at me, she reached over and
smacked me and I was driving and—I pulled over and pulled her
over to—out of the driver's side by her hair and then she hit the
ground and I started kicking her.”

In addition, the majority conveniently ignores Bernhardt’s im-
mediate reaction to being yelled at and smacked while driving his
vehicle, preferring instead to talk about his calculated—“not im-
pulsive”—actions after the violent episode had ended. 304 Kan. at
ATT. His first reaction to being yelled at and smacked was to pull
over his vehicle, grab his assailant by the hair, pull her past the
steering wheel and out the driver's door onto the ground, where he
commenced to kick her repeatedly “[p]retty much from her waist
up,” apparently in such a rage that he could not recall how many
times he kicked her or whether he actually kicked her in the head.
His response to being pressed on the number of times he kicked
Kostner was: “20? 30? I don’t know.” One would certainly expect
a person, who had coldly and callously formed the design or intent
to kill a person by kicking them to death, to be more deliberate
and calculating in the quality and placement of his kicks. Flailing
wildly at the victim’s body innumerable times, without regard for

— 4

or memory of the location on the victim’s body where the kicks
landed, strikes me as a particularly incredible design for a premedi-
tated killer to form.

From a legal standpoint, one could read the majority opinion as
suggesting that it was necessary for Bernhardt to show there was
a sudden quarrel to justify the voluntary manslaughter instruction.
But, as we have previously clarified, a sudden quarrel is but “‘“one
form of provocation for ‘heat of passion’ and is not separate and
apart from ‘heat of passion.’”’ State v. Johnson, 290 Kan. 1038,
1047, 236 P.3d 517 (2010) (quoting State v. Coop, 223 Kan. 302,
307, 573 P.2d 1017 [1978]).” State v. Story, 300 Kan. 702, 711, 334
P.3d 297 (2014). We have defined heat of passion “to include ‘“‘any
intense or vehement emotional excitement of the kind prompting
violent and aggressive action.’” [Citations omitted.) State v. Wade,
295 Kan. 916, 925, 287-P.3d 237 (2012); see State v. Story, 300 Kan.
702, 711, 334 P.3d 297 (2014) (discussing definition of ‘heat of pas-
sion’); State v. Coop, 223 Kan. 302, Syl. ¥ 1, 573 P.2d 1017 (1978)
(heat of passion ‘““includes an emotional state of mind character-
ized by anger, rage, hatred, furious resentment, or terror”’).” State
v. Brownlee, 302 Kan, 491, 530, 354 P.3d 525 (2015) (Luckert, J.,
dissenting).

The majority was apparently impressed with the State’s argu-
ment that Bernhardt did not specifically testify “‘that he somehow
snapped, experienced a break from reality, felt insulted, denigrated,
or suffered a personal affront.’” 304 Kan. at 477. But in a manner,
Bernhardt’s testimony indicated those very things. He snapped and
immediately pulled to the side of the road, rather than continu-
ing to their residence. He had a sufficient break from reality that
he couldn’t remember exactly what happened—how many kicks
he delivered or whether any landed on Kostner’s head. He was in
such an emotional state of mind that he kicked Kostner—his girl-
friend—many, many times, continuing even after she stopped say-
ing anything. If those facts are not indicative of anger, rage, hatred,
and/or furious resentment, I am unsure what would qualify.

In my view, “[t]he crime of premeditated murder should be re-
served for killings that are calmly planned or designed prior to the
commencement of the murderous act, i.e., murder in cold blood,

rather than applied to crimes of passion, regardless of the amount
of time that may be consumed by the killer's rage.” Marks, 297 Kan.
at 153 (Johnson, J., dissenting). In the legislature’s view, a lesser
included offense instruction is required “where there is some evi-
dence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser
included crime.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3414(3). Here, there was
evidence to reasonably justify a conviction for a heat of passion
killing that was as credible, or more so, than the evidence of pre-
meditation. Consequently, under our criminal justice system, the
jury—not the judge—should have been permitted to decide which
crime Bernhardt committed.

As the majority notes, Bernhardt asserted a claim that the cumu-
lative effect of trial errors denied him a fair trial. 1 agree with that
contention. The judge erred by giving the jury a misleading and
contradictory instruction on premeditation and by refusing to give
the requested instruction on heat-of-passion voluntary manslaugh-
ter as a lesser included offense. Given my inability to reasonably
predict what the jury might have done with appropriate instruc-
tions on the law, I cannot say that the State has proved the instruc-
tion errors to be harmless. I would reverse and remand for a new
trial with proper instructions.

nae

LucxeEnrr, J., dissenting: I join Justice Johnson’s conclusions that
(1) the district court’s modified premeditation instruction was so
contradictory and misleading that a lay juror could not have clearly
understood premeditation; (2) an instruction on the lesser included
offense of voluntary manslaughter was factually appropriate in this
case, and it was error for the trial court to refuse the defendant's re-
quest to give it; and (3) cumulative error requires reversal of Anson
R. Bernhardt’s conviction for premeditated first-degree murder.

No. 113,267

Luxe GANNON, BY HIS NEXT FRIENDS AND GUARDIANS, ef a.,
Appellees, v. STATE OF Kansas, Appellant.
(372 P.3d 1181)

Stephen R. Mcallister, solicitor general, argued the cause, and Jeffrey A.
Chanay, chief deputy attorney general, M.J. Willoughby, assistant attorney gen-
eral, Dwight R. Carswell, assistant solicitor general, Bryan C. Clark, assistant so-
licitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief
for appellant State of Kansas; Arthur 8. Chalmers, Gaye B. Tibbets, Jerry D.
Hawkins, and Rachel E. Lomas, of Hite, Fanning & Honeyman, LLP, of Wichita,
were with him on the brief for appellant State of Kansas.

Alan L. Rupe, of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, of Wichita, argued
the cause, and Jessica L. Skladzien and Mark A. Kanaga, of the same firm, and

John S. Robb, of Somers, Robb & Robb, of Newton, were with him on the brief
for appellees.

Per Curiam: This case requires us to determine whether the
State has met its burden to show that recent legislation brings the
State’s K-12 public school funding system into compliance with Ar-
ticle 6 of the Kansas Constitution. We hold it has not.

On February 11, 2016, we affirmed the holding of the three-
judge district court panel that found changes made to the State’s
K-12 funding system through enactment of the Classroom Learn-
ing Assuring Student Success Act of 2015 (CLASS) violated the
equity component of Article 6, § 6(b) of the Kansas Constitution.
Gannon v. State, 303 Kan. 682, 746, 368 P.3d 1024 (2016) (Gannon
II). Specifically, we determined the operation of capital outlay state
aid and local option budget (LOB) supplemental general state aid,
as formulated under CLASS, still allowed inequitable distribution
of funding among school districts that we had held unconstitutional
in Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014) (Gannon
1). 303 Kan. at 729-33.

After affirming the panel's decision, we stayed our mandate “to
give the legislature a second, and substantial, opportunity to craft
a constitutionally suitable solution and minimize the threat of dis-
ruptions in funding for education.” Gannon IT, 303 Kan. at 741. In
April 2016, lawmakers responded by passing Senate Substitute for
House Bill No. 2655 (H.B. 2655). See L. 2016, ch. 45.

H.B. 2655 restores the prior formula for capital outlay state aid
we identified as a permissible cure for the inequities found in that
funding mechanism. Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 710-11. But the new
law, for the first time, also applies the same capital outlay aid for-
mula to LOB supplemental general state aid. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec.
3. As conceded by the State, application of the capital outlay aid
formula to LOB funding results in significant reductions in overall
supplemental general state aid to the vast majority of school dis-
tricts. .

Because of this result, the new law includes a “hold harmless”
provision creating a new “equalization aid” entitlement for the
2016-17 school year. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 1(a). Specifically, the law
authorizes such equalization aid—to those districts receiving re-

duced funding under the new bill—in an amount equal to their
loss. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 5. The new law also moves from the State
Finance Council to the Kansas State Board of Education (State
Board) an “extraordinary need fund” of approximately $15 million
and permits the State Board’s disbursement of those funds to fur-
ther decrease disparity among the districts. L. 2016, ch. 45, secs.
1(e), 9.
We ordered both parties to brief whether the legislative action—
H.B. 2655—remedied the inequities that Gannon II affirmed to
exist in CLASS. Additionally, the parties were directed to discuss
the proper judicial remedy if we ruled the new law failed to comply
with our Gannon IT decision.
In this remedial stage, the State asserts: (1) H.B. 2655 cures the
inequities found in the capital outlay state aid by restoring and fully
funding the capital outlay aid formula we previously held constitu-
tional; (2) H.B. 2655 cures the inequities found in the LOB fund-
ing by applying the same capital outlay aid formula to supplemental
general state aid, It additionally argues any remaining inequities in
the LOB funding system are cured through operation of the hold
harmless provision and extraordinary need fund; and (3) If H.B.
2655 fails to cure the inequities we found in CLASS, the proper
remedy is severing the offending provisions and allowing the re-
mainder of CLASS to operate throughout the 2016-17 school year.
Plaintiffs do not contest the State’s first argument. They do,
however, assert that H.B. 2655 worsens, rather than cures, the in-
equities in LOB funding affirmed to exist in Gannon II. They fur-
ther argue that we should not sever any offending provisions but
hold the entirety of H.B. 2655 unconstitutional, lift our stay of the
panel’s extensive remedial orders, and grant them attomey fees.
After careful consideration of the legislative record and argu-
ments from both sides, we hold the following:
1. H.B. 2655 cures the capital outlay inequities affirmed to exist in Gannon II.
2, HB. 2655, which includes the hold harmless and extraordinary need provi-
sions, fails to cure the LOB inequities affirmed to exist in Gannon II.
8. The unconstitutional LOB funding mechanism is not severable from
CLASS, the general statutory scheme for K-12 public school finance, thus
making CLASS unconstitutional.

4, The panel's remedial orders remain stayed, and jurisdiction of this case is
retained by this court.
5. The plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees.

Each of these holdings will be explained below.
Facts

The procedural and factual history of this case was extensively
outlined in both Gannon I and Gannon IT. See Gannon I, 298 Kan.
at 1112-18; Gannon IT, 303 Kan. at 686-98. Accordingly, we limit
this section only to those facts necessary to our holding.

The School District Finance and Quality Performance Act
(SDFQPA), K.S.A. 72-6405 et seq., was the comprehensive statu-
tory plan for K-12 public school finance in Kansas at the outset of
the underlying lawsuit filed in 2010. See Gannon IT, 303 Kan. at
686. The basic source of funding within the SDFQPA was pro-
vided by the State through “general state aid” entitlements funded
by a required 20-mill levy for each district. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-
6431. Each district’s general state aid was calculated by multiplying
a dollar amount known as “base state aid per pupil” (BSAPP) by
the district's population of enrolled students. K.S.A. 2014 Supp.
72-6410. Full-time enrollment was weighted by factors recognized
to increase the cost of education per pupil, e.g., number of special
needs students. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-6407; K-S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-
6410.

In addition to this basic payment, the legislature allowed dis-
tricts “local effort” revenue-raising authority to fund capital out-
lay expenditures and an LOB. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-8801; K.S.A.
2014 Supp. 72-6433. In general, both were funded through op-
tional additional mill levies on property in the district. See Gannon
II, 303 Kan. at 687-88. The legislature capped the additional levies
for capital outlay expenses at 8 mills per district, while the rev-
enues produced by the additional LOB mill levy could not exceed
an amount equal to a set percentage—currently 33%, historically
as low as 25%—of a district’s general state aid. K.S.A. 2014 Supp.
72-8801; K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-6433. Districts could use capital
outlay funds only for limited purposes, ¢.g., improvements such as
building construction and maintenance, equipment purchases, and

other authorized investments. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-8804. On the
other hand, LOB funds had few restrictions and districts could use
them to supplement their general state aid. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-
6433.

Because of the dissimilarities among the overall property values
of the 286 school districts, these local revenue-raising programs
created inequities in the amount of funds districts could generate
and the tax effort required to do so. A district with high property
value, for example, implementing the maximum 8-mill levy, gener-
ated more capital outlay funds than a property-poor district doing
the same. Similarly, a property-wealthy district fully funding a 15%
LOB could do so with less tax effort, i.¢., a lower mill levy, than
a district with lower property values. See Gannon I, 298 Kan. at
1175-88. /

To remove these disparities, the legislature implemented pro-
grams through SDFQPA intended to equalize property-poor dis-
tricts’ local revenue-raising authority. The State Board calculated
an assessed valuation per pupil (AVPP) for each district in the
State by dividing the total assessed property value of a district by
its schools’ enrollment population. The State Board ranked all the
districts by their AVPP—from low to high. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-
8814; K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-6434. This AVPP schedule was then
utilized in two distinct formulas to calculate what was commonly
called “equalization aid” for the capital outlay and LOB funding.
See Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1180, 1185.

For capital outlay, a “state aid percentage factor” for each dis-
trict was established at 25%. This factor increased 1% for every
$1,000 a district fell below the median AVPP with a cap of 100%,
and decreased 1% for every $1,000 it rose above the median. The
resulting percentage factor was then multiplied by the district’s to-
tal capital outlay mill levy revenue, and the product was provided
to the district as capital outlay state aid. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-8814;
Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1176.

For the LOB, the State Board multiplied the amount of a dis-
trict’s LOB-generated revenue by a ratio—obtained from dividing
the district's AVPP by the one located at the 81.2 percentile of the
AVPP schedule and then subtracting the quotient from 1. The re-

sulting product was provided to the district as supplemental gen-
eral state aid. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-6434; Gannon II, 303 Kan. at
720.

In 2010, the State began withholding capital outlay state aid.
See 298 Kan. at 1177. In addition, supplemental general state aid
was reduced from the amount required by its formula, which re-
sulted in prorated payments. See 298 Kan. at 1183. Districts not
qualifying for aid, or eligible only for a nominal amount, were unaf-
fected by these reductions and were able to keep generating their
same level of local revenue without added tax effort, i.e., without
increased mill levies. See 298 Kan. at 1181, 1187-88.

In 2010 plaintiffs sued the State in Shawnee County District
court, alleging K-12 public school funding in Kansas was uncon-
stitutionally inadequate. The plaintiffs additionally claimed the
system was unconstitutionally inequitable because reduction or
elimination of state aid under the capital outlay and LOB funding
mechanisms disproportionately affected the local revenue-raising
ability of districts with a low AVPP, while districts with a higher
AVPP saw little or no change in such ability. After a 16-day bench
trial, the three-judge panel agreed with the plaintiffs and held the
changes to the school finance system violated Article 6, § 6(b) of
the Kansas Constitution. See Kan. Const., art. 6, § 6(b) (“The leg-
islature shall make suitable provision for finance of the educational
interests of the state.”).

On appeal, we confirmed Article 6, § 6(b) contains adequacy and
equity components and outlined standards for both. Gannon I, 298
Kan. 1107. For adequacy, we adopted the seven-prong standard
initially formulated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989), 298
Kan. at 1170, and later essentially codified in K.S.A. 2013 Supp.
72-1127(c). See 298 Kan. at 1165-67. For equity, we determined
“[s]chool districts must have reasonably equal access to substan-
tially similar educational opportunity through similar tax effort.”
298 Kan. at 1174.

We affirmed the panel’s ruling that found elimination of the
capital outlay state aid and proration of supplemental general state
aid created unfaix, wealth-based—and unconstitutional—dispari-

497

ties among the districts. The case was remanded for the panel to
reconsider the adequacy portion of its ruling under Rose, while the
equity portion was returned for remedial action. 298 Kan. at 1111.

As guidance to the panel, we specified the State could cure the
equity issue by fully funding the existing formulas for capital out-
lay state aid and supplemental general state aid. If the State chose
to cure the issue with less than full funding, or by adopting other
equalization techniques, the panel was instructed to evaluate the
curative action under the test set out in our opinion. 298 Kan. at
1198-99.

After the case returned to the panel, the 2015 legislature ulti-
mately repealed the SDFQPA and replaced it with a new com-
prehensive public school funding system known as CLASS. K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 72-6463 et seq. The new law made substantial changes
to the formulas used to calculate both capital outlay state aid and
supplemental general state aid. Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 685.
For capital outlay state aid, the initial percentage factor began
at 75% and decreased 1% for every $1,000 a district rose above the
State Board’s lowest calculated AVPP. After application of this new
formula, all eligible districts’ capital outlay state aid was reduced,
and 28 districts lost eligibility altogether. See 303 Kan. at 712-15.
For supplemental general state aid, the legislature directed the
State Board to organize aid-qualifying districts on its AVPP sched-
ule into five equal quintiles from low AVPP to high. In other words,
each quintile represented a 20% AVPP span. The SDFQPA formu-
la for determining supplemental general state aid was then utilized.
If the school district fell in the lowest quintile, it would receive
97%—not 100%—of the calculated aid. If it was in the second low-
est quintile it would receive 95%, continuing to the third lowest
receiving 92%, the fourth lowest receiving 82%, and the highest
receiving 72%. In simplest terms, the legislature reduced the LOB
aid (supplemental general state aid) of the poorest 20% of school
districts by 3%, the next 20% by 5%, and so on until the wealthiest
aid-receiving districts were reduced by 28%. See L. 2015, ch. 4,
sec. 38; 303 Kan. at 721.

CLASS also disbursed base funding for school years 2015-16
and 2016-17 through a new “block grant” formula. The funding

matched the amount equal to a district’s total general state aid plus
the capital outlay state aid and supplemental general state aid it
previously received in school year 2014-15. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 72-
6465. Essentially, the equalizing funds of the capital outlay and
LOB funding systems were frozen at 2014-15 levels as calculated
under the new formulas and then rolled into a 2-year block grant
payment to the districts for school years 2015-16 and 2016-17. See
303 Kan. at 694,

The panel held that the changes made by CLASS continued to
allow unconstitutional funding inequities to exist among the dis-
tricts. Specifically, the reduced LOB supplemental general state
aid required the less-property-wealthy districts to increase their
local mill levies to cover the loss of such aid. In comparison, the
wealthier non-aid-qualifying districts experienced no change in
their local levy to stay at the same revenue level. Similarly, the
negative effects of the new capital outlay state aid formula were
limited to aid-qualifying districts, while non-aid-qualifying districts
remained unharmed. In addition to these holdings on equity, the
panel also held CLASS unconstitutionally inadequate. See Gannon
II, 303 Kan. at 696.

On appeal in Gannon IT, we bifurcated the equity and adequacy
portions of the panel’s rulings and first examined equity. 303 Kan. at
689. We held the State failed to cure the inequities affirmed to exist
in Gannon I for both capital outlay and LOB funding, 303 Kan. at
720, 726. Specifically, we found the reduction in aid for both pro-
grams negatively affected the property-poor districts, while leaving
property-rich districts unscathed. See 303 Kan. at 719, 726. In ad-
dition, because CLASS froze aid payments at 2014-15 levels but
continued to allow districts to increase their capital outlay levies
and LOB budgets, districts without a need for aid continued to
have greater ability to raise additional local revenue than their less
property-wealthy counterparts. See 303 Kan. at 729-32. We agreed
with the panel that these changes worsened rather than cured K-12
funding inequities affirmed to exist in Gannon I. See 303 Kan. at
718-33.

Instead of remanding the case to the panel for it to begin imple-
menting its broad remedial orders, we stayed the issuance of our

499

mandate and retained jurisdiction over the appeal to give the leg-
islature time to respond to our decision and enact a cure for the
inequities found to exist in CLASS. 303 Kan. at 746. We advised
the State that “[o]ne obvious way [it] could comply with Article
6 would be to revive the relevant portions of the previous school
funding system and fully fund them within the current block grant
system.” 303 Kan. at 743. We further counseled that if the State
chose a different route, “any other funding system it enacts must
be demonstrated to be capable of meeting the equity requirements
of Article 6.” 303 Kan. at 743.

We cautioned:

“In short, if by the close of fiscal year 2016, ending June 30, the State is un-
able to satisfactorily demonstrate to this court that the legislature has complied
with the will of the people as expressed in Article 6 of their constitution through
additional remedial legislation or otherwise, then a lifting of the stay of today’s
mandate will mean no constitutionally valid school finance system exists through
which funds for fiscal year 2017 can lawfully be raised, distributed, or spent.

“Without a constitutionally equitable school finance system, the schools in
Kansas will be unable to operate beyond June 30.” 303 Kan. at 743-44.

The legislature passed H.B. 2655 in April 2016 in response to
our decision and the bill was signed by the governor. Among other
things, it makes major changes to the aid-programs at issue in Gan-
non II. Those changes and their effects are discussed i in detail be-
low.

ANALYSIS

Issue 1: H.B. 2655 does not comply with the equity requirement
of Article 6.

In response to our decision in Gannon II, the State filed a “No-
tice of Legislative Cure” on April 7, 2016. Submitted with this no-
tice was the legislative record, including documents and informa-
tion made available to lawmakers during their deliberative process.
In a similar situation 10 years ago, we recognized the submitted
documents had “not been subjected to the fact-finding processes
of litigation through which the parties were permitted to examine
[their] validity and accuracy.” Montoy v. State, 282 Kan. 9, 21, 138

500

P.3d 755 (2006) (Montoy IV). But we considered such information
as “part of the legislative history” and used it in determining leg-
islative intent, relevant to whether the cure complied with Article
6, 282 Kan. at 21-22; see Montoy v. State, 279 Kan. 817, 825, 112
P.3d 923 (2005) (Montoy III) (“[T]his court’s retained jurisdiction
allows a review to determine if there has been compliance with our
opinion.”); see also Gannon IT, 303 Kan. at 743 (“[T]he State would
help its case by showing its work in how it determined that any...
proposed solution complies with Gannon I.”). We will consider the
submitted documents for these purposes.

Burden of Proof

“‘[A]. party asserting compliance with a court decision ordering
remedial action bears the burden of establishing that compliance
...2” Gannon IT, 303 Kan. at 709 (quoting Montoy III, 279 Kan.
at 826). Although untested legislation normally enjoys a presump-
tion of constitutionality, the presumption no longer applies when
the legislative action is in response to a court order. 303 Kan. at
708-09, Accordingly, “[t]he State has the express burden to show
compliance.” 303 Kan. at 709.

Discussion
Equity Standard

In Gannon I we clarified the equity standard of Article 6, § 6(b)
by stating: “School districts must have reasonably equal access to
substantially similar educational opportunity through similar tax
effort.” 298 Kan. at 1175. We have never required precise stan-
dards for equity compliance or applied a zero tolerance test. But
we have “rejected legislation that increased or exacerbated inequi-
ties among districts . . . .” Gannon v. State, 303 Kan. 682, 709, 368
P.3d 1024 (2016) (Gannon II); see Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107,
1110, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014) (Gannon I).

In our analysis, we do not dictate to the legislature how it should
constitutionally fund K-12 public school education; we only review
its efforts to ensure they do not run afoul of the Kansas Constitu-
tion. See Gannon IT, 303 Kan. at 734-35 (“We . . . reaffirm[] the
legislature’s power and duty to create a school funding system. . . .

[W]e have also consistently affirmed our own power and duty to
review legislative enactments for constitutional compliance . . . .”).

Our review of legislation includes an acknowledgment that a
system of school finance allowing local revenue-raising authority,
such as assessing LOB mill levies on property within a school dis-
trict, will almost certainly create wealth-based disparities among
the districts. This reality, as confirmed in the numerous school
finance cases litigated in our courts, has been the result of poli-
cy decisions made by the legislature. See Gannon I, 298 Kan. at
1173-74 (“‘legislat{ure’s] increase in the LOB cap exacerbates the
wealth-based disparities between districts’”) (quoting Montoy III,
279 Kan. at 840).

Indeed, in recent years the legislature has shifted its empha-
sis from funding BSAPP with the 20-mill levy on all districts—as
mandated by K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-6431—to a greater reliance
on district-elective LOB’s. The LOB cap held steady at 25% from
1992 until 2005-06, but from then until CLASS’ passage in 2015,
the LOB cap increased to 33%. Since 2005-06, BSAPP has effec-
tively been reduced from $4,257 to $3,838. See, ¢.g., K.S.A. 2005
Supp. 72-6410; K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-6410; see also Gannon II,
303 Kan. at 691-92, 720, 731-33 (BSAPP decreased as the LOB cap
increased). As Mark Tallman, Associate Executive Director for the
Kansas Association of School Boards, described to the 2016 legisla-
ture, “[O]ne of the challenges we see is that the more local funding
you allow, the greater your challenge is to equalize it because there
is such a range of local sources.”

Accordingly, if local funding is to continue, this disparate effect
has to be limited so it complies with Article 6. See Gannon I, 298
Kan. at 1174 (quoting Montoy III, 279 Kan. at 840). In sum, the
State may not allow children to receive disparate levels of educa-
tional opportunity on the basis of wealth, especially the property
wealth of the district where they happen to live. See Gannon I, 298
Kan, at 1174 (“Education in Kansas is not restricted to that upper
stratum of society able to afford it.”).

With these principles in mind we address the State’s arguments.

H.B. 2655 cures the capital outlay inequities affirmed to exist in
Gannon II.

Section four of H.B. 2655 revives and fully implements the prior
SDFQPA capital outlay state aid formula which we essentially had
held constitutional for that purpose in Gannon I: “If... the leg-
islature fully funds the capital outlay provision as contemplated in
K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72-8814, the panel need not take any additional
action on this issue.” 298 Kan. at 1198; see Gannon II, 303 Kan. at
743. Specifically, the new law, L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 4, again uses a
25% factor that increases 1% with every $1,000 below the median a
school district falls on the State Board AVPP schedule and decreas-
es 1% for every $1,000 rising above the median with a cap of 100%.

Capital outlay state aid is also removed from the general state
aid block grant. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 7(b). This removal allows aid to
be calculated by the total mill levy actually set by a school district,
instead of being frozen at the levy level imposed before the enact-
ment of CLASS. See L. 2016, ch. 45, secs. 4, 7. As was demonstrat-
ed by the record and confirmed by the State in oral arguments, this
change allows aid-qualifying districts that raise their mill levies to
receive corresponding additional capital outlay state aid.

The aid is funded by the legislature appropriating $50.7 million
to the “capital outlay state aid fund.” L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 1(b). The
legislative record reflects this amount was estimated by the State
Board—subject to later adjustments—as sufficient for full funding
of capital outlay aid for school year 2016-17.

The State Board is tasked with calculating the total aid required
for all districts and certifying that amount in the form of a demand
transfer against the state general fund. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 4(c). A
backup for this capital outlay aid is created in section 1(b) that al-
Jows an increase in the amount appropriated equal to the $15.1 mil-
lion set aside for the extraordinary need fund. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec.
1(b), (e). In other words, if the State Board discovers the amount
of capital outlay state aid needed is more than the $50.7 million
appropriated, it may create additional demand transfers shiftin,
funds from extraordinary need to capital outlay state aid. L. 2016,
ch. 45, sec. 1(e).

According to data compiled by the Kansas Legislative Research

Department (KLRD) and supplied to lawmakers, reverting from
CLASS to the previous SDFQPA formula increases capital outlay
state aid in the 2016-17 school year by approximately $23.5 million
statewide. The overwhelming majority of aid-qualifying districts
will see substantial increases in such aid for the upcoming year,
and the restored SDFQPA formula significantly decreases disparity
between aid-qualifying and non-aid-qualifying districts.

Based on our review of the language of the legislative materials
submitted for consideration, the State has met its burden to estab-
lish that it successfully responded to our constitutional equity con-
cerns in capital outlay aid. By reviving and fully funding the prior
formula we had approved in Gannon I—and confirmed in Gannon
II—H1.B. 2655 complies with our Gannon II decision in this area.
See Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 709 (State has express burden to show
compliance during the remedy stage).

H.B. 2655 fails to cure the LOB inequities affirmed to exist in
Gannon II.

In Gannon II, we considered the changes made to the LOB aid
formula by CLASS and determined they increased and exacerbated
inequity between the poorer and wealthier districts. Specifically, we
affirmed the panel’s conclusion that implementation of the quintile
formula for calculating supplemental general state aid reduced the
abilities of aid-qualifying districts to fund their LOB while leaving
wealthier districts’ mill levy capabilities unscathed. Accordingly, we
determined the distribution of LOB aid under CLASS was ineq-
uitable and required the State to respond with a cure. 303 Kan. at
730-33, 741. We held out reversion to the pre-CLASS aid formula
from the SDF QPA as a way the legislature could fix the inequitable
distribution. 303 Kan. at 743.

But instead of reverting to the formula as it existed prior to
CLASS, the legislature adopted the SDFQPA capital outlay state
aid formula and applied it to LOB supplemental general state aid.
L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 3. The State readily admits using that formula
to calculate supplemental general state aid significantly reduces
not only the overall LOB aid—compared to the amounts calcu-
lated under both the LOB aid formulas in the SDFQPA and in

— |

CLASS—but also the number of school districts qualifying for it.
But it points to the new “hold harmless” fund as well as to CLASS’
1-year-old “extraordinary need” fund and argues these provisions
sufficiently mitigate any increase in disparity among the districts.

Based on our review of the legislative record and consideration
of the parties’ arguments, we hold the State has failed to meet its
burden on this issue. Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 709. Simply put, use
of the former capital outlay aid formula for the LOB funding sys-
tem increases and exacerbates the disparity among districts. As
more fully explained below, the legislature's use of the hold harm-
Jess provision and extraordinary need fund in H.B. 2655 admittedly
mitigates this increase in inequity. But at most they bring aid-qual-
ifying districts back up to LOB distribution levels found inequi-
table in Gannon II. In addition, the new law does not require hold
harmless funds to replace lost supplemental general state aid in a
district’s LOB fund. Rather, hold harmless money is deposited into
a district's general fund. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 5(c). This action obvi-
ously leaves aid-qualifying districts with a financial gap between
the total funds that would have been generated through their LOB
and the depleted funds actually in their LOB account. Aid-qualify-
ing districts will now have the option of filling this gap—up to their
authorized LOB percentage levels—through new mill levies that
are not equalized by the State.

These activities will likely result in wealthier aid-qualifying dis-
tricts raising additional local revenue with less tax effort than poor-
er aid-qualifying districts. The overall result of the new LOB fund-
ing mechanism under H.B. 2655 is therefore an exacerbation of
inequity among the districts and a failure to satisfactorily respond
to our Gannon II decision.

After the legislature applied the SDFQPA capital outlay state
aid formula to LOB supplemental general state aid, it appropri-
ated $367.5 million. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 1(a). The Kansas State
Department of Education (KSDE) estimated this was the amount
needed to fully fund the projected supplemental general state
aid for school year 2016-17 under the capital outlay formula. But
if the demands on the LOB aid fund exceed the appropriations,
the State Board may transfer monies from the extraordinary need

505

fund's $15.1 million until its exhaustion—just as its monies can be
transferred to the capital outlay aid fund should it be exhausted. L.
2016, ch. 45, sec. 1(e). And like the capital outlay state aid system,
supplemental general state aid is now independent of the block
grant. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 7(b).

Applying the capital outlay aid formula to supplemental general
state aid decreases the overall aid going to qualifying districts—not
only per the calculations under the SDFQPA’s LOB formula but
also under the CLASS “quintile” system held unconstitutional in
Gannon ITI. Specifically, the KSDE data in the legislative record
shows that the amount of supplemental general state aid for 2016-
17 reduces the aid provided in the 2015-16 school year under
CLASS by $82,908,792.

Under both prior formulas—SDFQPA and CLASS—the point
to which districts were equalized on the State Board schedule was
set at the 81.2 percentile. Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 720-21. Under
the capital outlay aid formula, however, the equalization point be-
comes significantly lower and set to the median AVPP on the State
Board's AVPP schedule. This application has the effect of substan-
tially decreasing the number of aid-qualifying school districts and
reducing the amount of equalization aid to those that remain eligi-
ble. According to State Board data in the legislative record, for the
2016-17 school year 197 districts will experience reduced supple-
mental general state aid and 35 districts will lose aid altogether. As
specific examples, plaintiff Wichita School District will experience
more than $6 million in decreased supplemental general state aid,
and plaintiff Kansas City, Kansas School District will incur a loss
of more than $2.5 million. While the property-poor districts suf-
fer this loss, the wealthier districts with no need for supplemental
general state aid experience no change in their ability to fund their
LOB.

Nevertheless, the State argues that because we have previously
found the prior capital outlay formula constitutionally permissible
under Article 6 when applied to capital outlay state aid, we should
also find it constitutionally permissible when applied to LOB sup-
plemental general state aid. While this argument is superficially
attractive, a deeper and comprehensive review discloses it fails to

account for fundamental differences between the programs—dif-
ferences the State’s counsel acknowledged during oral arguments
and that we have previously found relevant in considering equity
compliance. See Montoy IV, 282 Kan. at 17.

By law, school districts may only use capital outlay funds for
capital improvements such as building costs, equipment purchases,
and other authorized investments. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-8804. And
the amount of money raised by a district for these limited purposes
is further restricted to what the district can generate within the
legislatively prescribed 8-mill cap. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-8801.

LOB funds, however, differ in both magnitude and flexibility.
The revenues generated by a district's maximum LOB, i.e., 33%
of its state financial aid entitlement, are significantly greater than
what an 8-mill capital outlay levy can generate. Moreover, LOB
funds may supplement general state aid by being used for a dis-
trict’s basic educational expenses. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-6433.

For example, during the 2014-15 school year, the Wichita School
District had a 30% LOB (below the 33% cap) generating a total of
$111 million through its additional local effort mill levy, of which
$59 million was supplemental general state aid. The district also
had an 8-mill capital outlay levy generating a total of $28 million, of
which $7.6 million was capital outlay state aid. Wichita’s $111 mil-
lion in LOB-generated funds were available for general use. But
the $28 million in funds raised by its maximum 8-mill levy were
restricted to the narrow class of expenses authorized under the
capital outlay program. See K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-6433; K.S.A. 72-
8804. In sum, LOB enhances a district's ability to perform its basic
function, while capital outlay, although necessary, is indirect and
generates considerably smaller revenue.

This phenomenon was confirmed by several witnesses testifying
before the legislature during consideration of the legislative cure,
including Deputy Commissioner Dale Dennis of the KSDE:
“[S]ometimes we have a tendency to want to compare capital outlay with LOB,
but capital outlay there is a difference. You have a cap. You can’t go more than
eight mills. So, if there’s—it’s equalization, why, it’s got to be within that eight
mills, where the LOB about the average tax rate there is in the 19, 20 mill range.
So, it’s much larger and the dollars involved are much greater . . . .” (Emphasis
added.)

Mark Tallman indicated the same:

“The local option budget and capital outlay are, as you’ve heard, . . . local choices.
Now, many districts would say no one is operating without I think at least 20 per-
cent LOB or more. They would argue that a lot of local option budget really . . .
isn’t an option any more. There are districts that have no capital outlay. ... Iwould
say LOB is different because we've really, we believe, folded LOB into general
operations. We don't—I don’t think any district would really say the local option
budget is now just used for extras. And, so, in that sense, what we—what we really
have is every district has to levy 20 mills [required under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 72-
6431], and, then, every district has to levy some other mill rate to fund that 25 to
30 percent of their budget.” (Emphasis added.)

As we previously observed, beginning in the 2005-06 school year,
the legislature has steadily increased the LOB cap. And beginning
in the 2009-10 school year, it has overall decreased the BSAPP
from its 2005-06 levels. See, ¢.g., K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 72-6410; Gan-
non II, 303 Kan, at 691-92, 720, 731-33. As a result of these legisla-
tive decisions to become increasingly dependent on local revenues
for funding schools, districts now are required to rely more heavily
on their LOB funds to perform their basic functions. Indeed, the
legislative record reveals that LOB funds now pay for nearly one-
fourth of the districts’ basic operating expenses.

We must conclude that applying the former capital outlay for-
mula—to calculate supplemental general state aid—creates intol-
erable, and simply unfair, wealth-based disparities among the dis-
tricts. While these disparities are acceptable when computing aid
in the smaller and less flexible capital outlay arena, the degree of
inequity among the districts is too great when considering that the
LOB has developed into such a major source of basic, and versatile,
educational funding.

Hold Harmless Provision

Because of the reduction of LOB aid (supplemental general
state aid) under H.B. 2655 for the 2016-17 school year, the-major-
ity of districts will experience lower total funding amounts than
the total amounts promised in the 2-year block grant of CLASS.
To make up this loss, H.B. 2655 contains a “hold harmless” provi-
sion ensuring the changes do not result in a funding decrease from
2016-17 CLASS distributions. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 6. This mere

restoration of funds is accomplished by a new payment to districts
curiously labeled “school district equalization state aid.” L. 2016,
ch, 45, sec. 1(a).

The general trend among the districts for 2016-17 under the
new law, with some exceptions, is for them to receive an increase in
capital outlay state aid (based on reimplementation of the former
formula) but a bigger decrease in supplemental general state aid
after application of the former capital outlay state formula to the
LOB funding mechanism. School districts experiencing a net re-
duction in overall funding based on these two changes are entitled
to receive the hold harmless payment in an amount equal to their
loss. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 5. Jason Long, the revisor who drafted the
bill, explained this provision while answering questions during a
legislative committee hearing on March 22, 2016:

“Rep. Kleeb: . .. Iwanted to, Jason, have you go into Section 4 just a little bit and
talk about this hold harmless aspect. In particular, so, we are holding districts that
have this change due to this formula, we're holding them even with the financing,
is that my understanding?

“Mx. Long: Yes. To the extent that because of the change in how the supplemental
general state aid is being calculated under this bill, to the extent that their total
supplemental general state aid and capital outlay state aid amount is less next year
[2016-17] than what they received through the block grant this year [2015-16],
Section 4 makes up that difference and provides that difference to the school
district so that they would receive the same amount as they received this year
[2015-16].” (Emphasis added.)

As an example of how the new payment would work, the KSDE
showed that under the new law the Neodesha School District
would receive an increase of $46,331 in capital outlay state aid but
a $250,286 decrease in supplemental general state aid. The net loss
of $203,955 would be covered by a hold harmless payment in that
amount.

Consequently, the new hold harmless provision ensures aid-
qualifying districts are brought back to their previously calculated
2016-17 school year CLASS distribution amounts. Lost funds un-
der the newly substituted formula are simply repaid by hold harm-
less monies.

Despite there being no real change in the distribution of aid
from 2015-16, the State points to a projected decrease in mill rate

SC

disparity among districts for the upcoming year as proof of com-
pliance with our Gannon II decision. To support this conclusion,
it primarily relies on two 1-page charts compiled by the Kansas
Legislative Research Department and provided to lawmakers dur-
ing their consideration of H.B. 2655. The charts divide the districts
into five groups based upon AVPP wealth and show the difference
in mills required in each to generate a 25% LOB. In the 2014-15
school year, the mill disparity between the poorest and the wealthi-
est 20% after implementation of CLASS and its “quintile” LOB
formula was 4.225. In the 2015-16 school year, the second year of
applying the same formula, the disparity increased to 5.456. But
for 2016-17, under H.B. 2655 the disparity is projected to decrease
to 3.148,

The State failed in its brief, however, to demonstrate that this
reduction in mill levy disparity was anything more than a result
of normal fluctuations in the AVPP of districts. Such fluctuations
are well known to the State and, in Gannon IT, it cited the fluctua-
tions as a basis for its inability to properly fund LOB supplemental
general state aid. See 303 Kan. at 723-26. And, during recent oral
arguments, the State admitted it was unable to demonstrate that
the operation of H.B. 2655 is what would cause the projected re-
duction in mill rate disparity.

The legislative record also leads us to reject the State’s argu-
ment. As mentioned, after the enactment and implementation of
CLASS, the disparity between the poorest and the wealthiest 20%
of districts setting a 25% LOB was 4.225 mills in 2014-15. And in
the second year of CLASS, which froze funding distributions for all
districts at prior levels, the disparity actually increased 1.231 mills
to 5.456 in 2015-16.

As the plaintiffs point out, this mill increase was accompanied
by a $16,684 increase in the difference between the wealthiest and
poorest districts’ groups’ AVPP. But this difference in AVPP was
reduced in the upcoming school year—2016-17—by $30,301, and
the accompanying mill rate disparity decreased by 2.308 mills to
3.148. So they argue the decrease is more coincidence than any-
thing else.

Eddie Penner, the staff member of Kansas Legislative Research

Department who provided the information the State is relying on
for its argument, confirmed the plaintiffs’ observations that the mill
levy differences can be caused by normal fluctuations in AVPP—
and not changes in the amount of state aid:
“[T]he cost between [years 20]14-15 and [20]15-16, the difference there or even
that increase because, as you recall, the amount of supplemental general state aid
for those two years was the exact same based upon the block grant. And so that
disparity is a result of—that increase in disparity from 14-15 to 15-16, is essen-
tially a result of the weighted assess evaluation and enrollment in schools [AVPP]
have changed and nothing else. Because it isn’t the result at all of the amount of
state aid that was provided to those districts.” (Emphasis added.)

Penner continued:

“So it just so happened that between 14-15 and 15-16, the wealthiest 20 percent of
school districts in the state got, relatively speaking, a little wealthier and the poor
est 20 percent of school districts in the state got, relatively speaking, a little poorer
than they were the prior year and that caused that disparity to extend.”

Moreover, the charts merely reflect averages which hide great-

er disparities contained inside. We observe that even within the
five different groups of districts, data in the record from Mr.
Penner shows that large mill disparities exist. For example, within
the wealthiest district group, generating a “Non-State Portion of
25% Adopted LOB” for the Burlington School District (AVPP of
$484,593) requires a 2014-15 mill levy of 4.359. And for the Brew-
ster School District (AVPP $131,824), the same “Non-State Portion
of 25% Adopted LOB” requires a mill levy for that identical time
period of 21.802.
The same problem exists within the poorest district group. Gen-
erating a “Non-State Portion of 25% Adopted LOB” for the Val-
ley Heights School District (AVPP of $46,243) requires a 2014-15
mill levy of 22.204. And for the Eudora School District, (AVPP
36,281), the same “Non-State Portion of 25% Adopted LOB” re-
quires a mill levy for that identical time period of 14.101.

Based on the State’s oral arguments and the record before us,
the State has not persuaded us that the two single-page charts’
decrease in mill levy disparity is attributable to anything enacted
in H.B. 2655. Gannon v. State, 303 Kan. 682, 709, 368 P.3d 1024

511

(2016) (Gannon IT) (State has express burden to show compliance
during the remedy stage.).

In Gannon II we held the distribution of LOB funds under
CLASS was unconstitutionally inequitable. 303 Kan. at 729. And
the State admits that application of the SDFQPA capital outlay
formula to supplemental general state aid drives LOB funding to
aid-qualifying districts even further below those unconstitutional
distribution amounts. The hold harmless provision, at most, merely
returns those districts to CLASS 2016-17 distribution amounts. Ac-
cordingly, the hold harmless provision is not sufficient to cure the
increased disparity created by using the former capital outlay for-
mula to calculate supplemental general state aid.

Moreover, while the hold harmless provision for 2016-17 at most
does give back what the new LOB formula takes away for that year,
it replaces it in a way that actually increases disparity among aid-
qualifying districts’ ability to access additional LOB revenue. For
aid-qualifying districts, supplemental general state aid makes up a
significant portion of the district's LOB funds, so with the decrease
in such aid under H.B. 2655, all aid-qualifying districts will experi-
ence some gap between the total funds that would have been real-
ized through their LOB and the monies actually received to fund it.

While the hold harmless provision is meant to make up for this
loss, the bill’s terms dictate that the money not go into a district’s
LOB fund. Rather, it is deposited into a district’s general fund. L.
2016, ch. 45, sec. 5(3)(c). This action maintains the gap between
the total funds that would have been generated by the LOB—up
to the district’s authorized percentage level—and the money actu-
ally received in the LOB account. So a choice is created for aid-
qualifying districts: They either can fill the gap with the hold harm-
less money or leave the hold harmless money in their general fund
and fill the gap by raising even more—but not equalized—revenue
through increased LOB mill levies until their cap is reached.

This choice was explained to legislators by Deputy Commis-
sioner Dale Dennis as he answered their questions during their
consideration of the bill:

“Rep. Hutton: [T]he last time we had this discussion it was apparent that the bulk
of what was going back to some school districts was going to be really retuming

to taxpayers as property tax reduction. How does this approach jive up with—will
this result in all this going still to property tax reductions or will this actually result
in more money to the school districts?

“Mr. Dennis: No, it will not—this, the effect of this will not reduce property tax
overall. The expenditures will stay about the same. . . . Now, the reason why I say
property tax could go up, if the LOB goes—they’re losing—they lose state aid
in their LOB, they make that up in the hold harmless clause. The hold harmless
money or equalization money goes to the general fund and that can go to...
the general fund to be spent in classrooms. Now, the board's question then is the
money they lost in the state aid, do they want to raise the mill levy or cut the bud-
get. (Emphasis added.)

“[Rep.] Ryckman: And what money would they lose in state aid?

“Mr. Dennis: The money they would lose in LOB state aid would be . . . made
up in hold harmless, but the board would have some option. The hold harmless
money goes to the general fund and the LOB state aid loss is felt in the LOB fund,
Now, there’s a way you can do this. The school district could choose to take the
hold harmless money and indirectly put it in the LOB and not raise the mill levy,
but you’re more likely to see a little increase in mill levy because the LOB state aid
is going down as such. They got the same amount of money, but local boards will
decide that and, Representative Hutton, they'll be all over the place. Some will
choose to raise the mill levy . ... Local decision there.” (Emphasis added.)

In short, wealthier aid-qualifying districts that imposed addi-
tional mill levies to fill this gap will require less tax effort than poor-
er aid-qualifying districts, and those districts choosing to increase
local levies will receive no additional corresponding supplemental
general state aid for their effort—a combination that exacerbates
existing inequities, if not creating additional ones. Cf. Gannon I,
298 Kan. at 1188 (raising LOB cap two percentage points without
corresponding increase in supplemental general state aid exacer-
bated wealth-based disparities among districts because any addi-
tional funds would have to come entirely from each district’s prop-
erty tax base) (citing Montoy IIT, 279 Kan. at 834). These inequities
may affect many of the 232 aid-qualifying districts—out of 286 to-
tal districts in the state—that lost some LOB aid under H.B. 2655.

So while the hold harmless provision creates the same distri-
bution of funding seen under CLASS, we conclude its application
actually allows increases in the inequity from the previous 2016-17
CLASS LOB funding distribution.

The State next points to the political necessity of the hold harm-

513

less provision and its benefit in ensuring district budget certainty
in the 2016-17 school year as reasons we should accept H.B. 2655.
Neither of these purposes have a bearing on Article 6 equity com-
pliance in this context. See generally Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1135-
37.

Budget certainty for schools is an admirable goal. But CLASS it-
self was in part constructed with the objective of multi-year budget
certainty for districts, and we still found the magnitude of the in-
equities in its provisions ran afoul of Article 6. See Gannon IT, 303
Kan. at 732-33, An unconstitutional school funding system is not
rendered constitutional merely because a district treated inequita-
bly can budget with some certitude for its inequitable treatment.

The political necessities of the legislature are similarly irrelevant
to our review. The constitution of the people of Kansas does not
change its requirements based on legislators’ support, or nonsup-
port, of proposed legislation. See 303 Kan. at 735 (citing Atkinson
v. Woodmansee, 68 Kan. 71, 75, 74 P. 640 [1903]). Rather, the Kan-
sas Constitution “is the supreme and paramount law, receiving its
force from the express will of the people.” 303 Kan. at 735 (quoting
Moore v. Shanahan, 207 Kan. 645, 651, 486 P.2d 506 [1971]). Just
as the legislature has the power and duty to create a school funding
system that complies with Article 6, it is this court’s power and duty
to determine whether an act of the legislature is invalid under that
constitution, i.¢., if the legislature has met its duty. See Gannon II,
303 Kan. at 734-35. A law’s political expediency or level of support
will not shield it from such review.

After considering all of the arguments, we conclude the State
has failed to meet its burden on this issue in the remedial phase of
this case. Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 709. Specifically, the hold harm-
less provision fails to sufficiently mitigate the increased inequities
created by applying the capital outlay aid formula to the LOB fund-
ing system. At best, H.B. 2655 does no more than take away funds
from the districts, then give the funds back, simply to restore the
same level of inequity we ruled unconstitutional in Gannon IT, 303
Kan. at 720. Additionally, it worsens disparity in accessing LOB
funds among aid-qualifying districts.

The Extraordinary Need Fund

In 2015 the legislature passed CLASS, which created a fund for
“extraordinary need state aid” and placed it under the control of
the State Finance Council. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 72-6476, The fund’s
purpose was to allow those districts experiencing extraordinary
increases in enrollment, extraordinary decreases in their assessed
valuation, and “any other unforeseen acts or circumstances which
substantially impact the . . . general fund budget for the current
school year” to apply to the Council for increased aid. K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 72-6476(b). The aid was apparently created, in part, to at-
tempt to cure inequities created when CLASS’ block grants essen-
tially froze all districts’ funding at 2014-15 levels for 2015-16 and
2016-17, regardless of increased enrollments or drops in AVPP. See
Gannon IT, 303 Kan. at 694.

The three-judge panel described the positioning of the fund
with the Council as “oddly placed.” It continued: “The Kansas
State Board of Education, at least in the first instance, has the con-
stitutional duty of the oversight of USDs” and complained that “the
needs evaluation procedure includes no part for that Board.”

H.B. 2655 responds to this concern by moving the fund un-
der the supervision of the State Board. In addition to the prior
grounds for fund disbursement, the new law also allows the State
Board to consider “whether the applicant school district has rea-
sonably equal access to substantially similar educational opportu-
nity through similar tax effort.” L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 9(b)(4). The
State argues this provision also mitigates any shortcomings in the
application of the capital outlay aid formula to the LOB funding
mechanism. Specifically, it points out the State Board can reduce
any continuing disparity by distributing extraordinary need funds
to aid-qualifying districts.

We begin by observing that H.B. 2655 reduces the extraordinary
need fund balance from $17.5 to $15.1 million. L. 2016, ch. 45,
sec. 1(d). And while maintaining its original purpose, i.e., providing
relief for districts experiencing extraordinary increases in enroll-
ment, extraordinary reductions in AVPP, and any other unexpected
circumstances increasing the cost of performing their basic func-
tions (L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 9), the new law also expands the grounds

for the fund’s use by making it a backup for both the capital outlay
and LOB aid provisions. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 1(¢). The State argues
that although the reduced fund balance is now also subject to even
more bases for demands, it can sufficiently reduce the disparities in
LOB funding we recognized in Gannon II.

As noted earlier, through operation of the hold harmless pro-

vision, H.B. 2655 provides districts with the same distribution of
funding for 2016-17 as they received under CLASS for 2015-16;
few exceptions are found in the data provided by the State. Be-
cause in Gannon II we held this distribution to be unconstitutional-
ly inequitable, almost all aid-qualifying districts would have a valid
demand on the extraordinary need fund for more monies under the
law’s new language. L. 2016, ch. 45, sec. 9(b) (“[T]he state board
shall consider . . . whether the applicant school district has rea-
sonably equal access to substantially similar education opportunity
through similar tax effort.”). See Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1175.
We are simply not convinced by the State that these inequities
can be cured even when exhausting the extraordinary need fund,
particularly when monetary demands can already be made against
it based upon districts’ extraordinary increases in enrollment and
decreases in AVPP. Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 709, We acknowledge
that the State has provided this court with 700 pages of documents,
in response to our suggestion in Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 743 (“[T]he
State would help its case by showing its work in how it determined
that any . . . proposed solution complies with Gannon I.”). But this
advice includes more than just providing documents. It requires
the State to show justification for legislative decisions, i.c., dem-
onstrating to this court why the result of H.B. 2655 is equitable.
See, ¢.g., U.S.D. No. 229 v. State, Case No. 92 CV 1099 (Shawnee
County District Court, December 16, 1993) (unpublished opin-
ion) (based on historical data presented by parties as justification
for legislative action, as well as information from other states and
statistical analysis commonly applicable to school finance issues,
court concluded the LOB [including supplemental state aid] did
not violate equal protection).

We hold the extraordinary need fund is an insufficient remedy
for the residual inequities in the LOB funding mechanism. See

Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 696 (extraordinary need fund found insuf-
ficient by panel to cure CLASS inequities).

Summary

In its present form, the SDFQPA capital outlay formula satisfies
the equity provisions of Article 6 when applied to capital outlay
and when fully funded. See Gannon IT, 303 Kan. at 743. But the
application of the SDFQPA capital outlay state aid formula to LOB
supplemental general state aid not only fails to cure, but also wors-
ens the inequities affirmed to exist in Gannon II. In short, dispari-
ties among the districts remain inequitable and unconstitutional.

Applying this same formula to two distinct programs reveals
substantial differences. The LOB funding is much larger and pro-
vides a substantial amount of resources covering basic educational
expenses akin to the purposes of BSAPP. The magnitude of dispar-
ity that can be tolerated in that system is therefore lower than what
can be accepted in the more indirect and more restrictive capital
outlay system. For as Mr. Tallman described to the legislature on
March 21, 2016, “[W]hat we really have is every district has to levy
20 mills [required under K.S.A. 72-6431], and, then, every district
has to levy some other mill rate to fund that 25 to 30 percent of
their budget.” (Emphasis added.)

While the hold harmless provision does somewhat mitigate the
decrease in supplemental general state aid, it does so in a way that
at best only brings districts to the same distribution held inequita-
ble under Gannon IJ—while actually increasing disparity between.
the aid-qualifying districts. As described, the eventual decrease in
supplemental general state aid allows aid-qualifying districts the
option of accepting the hold harmless money and then backfilling
the gap in their LOB, an easier task for wealthier districts because
less mill levy increase is required than for poorer districts. More-
over, those districts will not be entitled to additional state aid for
their new taxing effort because such- equalization aid essentially
was already included in the hold harmless monies. So the net ef-
fect of the hold harmless provision is to worsen the LOB disparity
in CLASS that we held unconstitutional in Gannon II.

The State has not shown that the hold harmless provision and

the diluted extraordinary need provision will cure the increased
disparities going forward. The State has the burden of proof in this
remedial phase and, after review of H.B. 2655 and the legislative
record, we hold it has not carried its burden. Gannon II, 303 Kan.
at 709.

We take no issue with the stated goals of budget certainty and
recognize the political realities of the legislative branch. But we
must review lawmakers’ efforts for conformity with the Kansas
Constitution, which demands that school districts have reason-
ably equal access to substantially similar educational opportunity
through similar tax effort. Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1175. We con-
clude the LOB funding mechanism under H.B. 2655 is an “unsuc-
cessful attempt|] to equitably, i.c., fairly, allocate resources among
the school districts.” Gannon IT, 303 Kan. at 744.

Issue 2: Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees.

Plaintiffs have requested attorney fees at every stage of this case.
The panel denied their initial request, and we affirmed that deci-
sion in Gannon I. 298 Kan. at 1195-96. In Gannon II, the plaintiffs
renewed their request on appeal. We denied the request in part
because it was not raised with the panel on remand, and, insofar as
the request was for appellate attorney fees, it was procedurally in-
sufficient because no motion was filed under Supreme Court Rule
7.07(b) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 72). Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 733.

Nothing has changed since our February 11 opinion in this mat-
ter. The plaintiffs note they have a request for attorney fees pend-
ing in the panel which they filed shortly after the panel’s decision
we reviewed in Gannon II. Because the renewed motion for attor-
ney fees for the litigation phase of this case has not been ruled on, it
is not before us on appeal. See K.S.A. 60-2101; see also Snodgrass
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 246 Kan. 371, 377-78, 789 P.2d
211 (1990) (decisions on attorney fees are not part of the merits
and may be adjudicated separately). Additionally, the plaintiffs
have not filed a motion for appellate attorney fees in this court. For
the above reasons, we deny the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees
on present showing.

Constitutionality and Severability

We have declared the supplemental general state aid provision
of H.B. 2655 to be unconstitutional. The hold harmless and ex-
traordinary need provisions do not cure the infirmities. Invalidat-
ing a provision because it is unconstitutional is not “rewriting” the
statute. Rather, itis merely enforcing the constitution. See National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.__, 132 S.
Ct. 2566, 2607, 183 L. Ed. 2d 450 (2012). See also Central Branch
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.ER. Co., 28 Kan. 453, 460-61
(1882) (court is exercising its constitutional duty when it ascertains
that one part of legislation conflicts with the constitution and must
fail).

The question then becomes: What effect does our holding have
on the remaining provisions of H.B. 2655 and CLASS? See Sedlak
v. Dick, 256 Kan. 779, 803, 887 P.2d 1119 (1995) (“Since we have
held the above provisions of K.S.A. 44-555b to be unconstitutional,
we must determine what effect our holding has on the remaining
provisions of the statute and the Act.”).

e State urges us to sever any unconstitutional provision and
let the remainder of CLASS stand. It points out that while CLASS
contained a nonseverability clause—K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 72-6481 (a)
—section 12 of H.B. 2655 specifically repeals that clause. And sec-
tion 2(c)(3) of this new law replaces it with a severability clause:
“[T]he provisions of this act should be considered as severable.”
The plaintiffs respond that the LOB funding mechanism, in-
cluding the hold harmless and extraordinary need provisions, is
not severable from CLASS, so the entire Act is unconstitutional.
They also ask us to lift our stay of the panel’s extensive remedial
orders, which included, in part, reinstating certain provisions of the
SDFQPA and mandating some additional funding. See Gannon II,
303 Kan. at 697-98.

To begin our severance analysis, we acknowledge the caution
provided from several justices of the United States Supreme Court:

“An automatic or too cursory severance of statutory provisions risks ‘rewrit[ing]
a statute and giv[ing] it an effect altogether different from that sought by the
measure viewed as a whole.’ Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S.
330, 362, 55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. Ed. 1468 (1935). The Judiciary, if it orders uncriti-

4

519

cal severance, then assumes the legislative function; for it imposes on the Nation,
by the Court's decree, its own new statutory regime, consisting of policies, risks,
and duties that Congress did not enact. That can be a more extreme exercise of the
judicial power than striking the whole statute and allowing Congress to address
the conditions that pertained when the statute was considered at the outset.” (Em-
phasis added.) National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
at 2668 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

To avoid an automatic or too cursory severance, we apply our
nearly 60-year-old two-part Kansas test that was recently confirmed
as follows:

“Whether the court may sever an unconstitutional provision from a statute
and leave the remainder in force and effect depends on the intent of the legis-
lature. If from examination of a statute it can be said that [1] the act would have
been passed without the objectionable portion and [2] if the statute would operate
effectively to carry out the intention of the legislature with such portion stricken,
the remainder of the valid law will stand. Whether the legislature had provided for
a severability clause is of no importance. This court will assume severability if the
unconstitutional part can be severed without doing violence to legislative intent.’”
(Emphasis added.) Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 293 Kan. 446,
463, 264 P.3d 102 (2011) (quoting Felten Truck Line v, State Board of Tax Appeals,
183 Kan. 287, 300, 327 P.2d 836 ([1958]).

Our test has some resemblance to the two-part approach utilized
by the United States Supreme Court—both parts of which also
must be satisfied in order to sever. “The standard for determining
the severability of an unconstitutional provision is well established:
““[1] Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have en-
acted those provisions which are within its power, independently of
that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped [2] if what is left
is fully operative as a law.”’” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S.
678, 684, 107 S. Ct. 1476, 94 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1987). But the statu-
tory remainder also must “function in a manner consistent with the
intent of Congress.” 480 U.S. at 685. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at
2608, 2676 (The remainder will “still function in a way ‘consistent
with Congress’ basic objectives in enacting the statute.’”).

The severability clause

Brennan quoted Felten to state that “‘[w]hether the legislature
had provided for a severability clause is of no importance.” (Em-
phasis added.) 293 Kan. at 463. But this statement requires some

explanation, given the earlier Brennan-Felten quotation: ““Wheth-
er the court may sever an unconstitutional provision from a stat-
ute and leave the remainder in force and effect depends on the
intent of the legislature.’” (Emphasis added.) 293 Kan. at 463. As
explained below, the statement regarding the severability clause
should more accurately provide: “At the later stage of the analysis,
‘whether the legislature had provided for a severability clause is of
no importance.”

Certainly, the presence of a severability clause is direct evidence
of legislative intent—which Brennan indicates is our touchstone.
State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 913, 179 P.3d 366
(2008). As the State admitted at oral argument, however, the clause’s
presence is not dispositive of the severability issue; it simply cre-
ates a presumption of severability. See State v. Next Door Cinema
Corp., 225 Kan, 112, 118-119, 587 P.2d 326 (1978) (The effect of a
severability clause “is to create . . . presumption of separability.”).
See Alaska Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 686 (“[S]uch a clause cre-
ates a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the
statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally
offensive provision.”). In other words, for determining legislative
intent, the severability clause “is an aid merely; not an inexorable
command.” Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290, 44 S. Ct.
323, 68 L. Ed. 686 (1924).

Accordingly, despite the presence of a severability clause, at
least as early as 1947 this court has declared an entire act void—
ie., been unable to sever the unconstitutional provision from its
companions. State ex rel. v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 322, 182 P.2d 865
(1947); see Sedlak v. Dick, 256 Kan. at 803-04; Thompson v. KFB
Ins. Co., 252 Kan. 1010, 1023, 850 P.2d 773 (1993); Boyer v. Fer-
guson, 192 Kan, 607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964). The United States Su-
preme Court has made similar holdings. See, ¢.g., Sloan v. Lemon,
413 U.S. 825, 834, 93 S. Ct. 2982, 37 L. Ed. 2d 939 (1973); Wil-
liams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 278 U.S. 235, 245, 49 S.
Ct. 115, 73 L. Ed. 287 (1929), overruled in part on other grounds
by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 61 S. Ct. 862, 85 L. Ed. 1305
(1941); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70, 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed.
822 (1922).

With this background, we continue our severability analysis. We
observe that the supplemental general state aid provisions were
designed by the legislature to specifically address inequities it ac-
knowledged existed in the system—in particular, those created by
the LOB funding device. See Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1185 (legis-
lative creation and distribution of supplemental general state aid
“would be meaningless if inequalities were not inherent within the
LOB funding scheme”).

The severance of the unconstitutional provisions designed to
cure these inequities obviously leaves those inequities still in place.
See Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1185 (“And as with the withholding of
capital outlay equalization payments, once the general supplemen-
tal state aid was reduced, it logically follows that the inequity that
equalization aid was designed to cure remains present. The State
points to nothing in the record demonstrating that the inequity was
eliminated or lessened on its own or by other means.”); see also
Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 717 (quoting Gannon I, 289 Kan. at 1179)
(“‘Once payments have stopped, it logically follows that the ineq-
uity the equalization aid was originally designed to cure remains
present.’”).

It just as logically follows that if the statutory attempts to cure,
eg., the hold harmless and extraordinary need fund, are insuffi-
cient to eliminate the unconstitutionality, then the deletion of these
and all other cures necessarily maintains the state of unconstitu-
tionality. And so we hold. Accordingly, we cannot accept the State’s
request that we simply sever the unconstitutional LOB aid (supple-
mental general state aid) provision and leave the remainder of H.B.
2655 intact.

Simply put, severance actually worsens the inequitable situ-
ation. To put this exacerbation in financial perspective, a KSDE
spreadsheet shows that severance of this aid provision would mean
a loss of approximately $367 million for the 2016-17 school year to
those 197 school districts which are scheduled to receive such aid.
According to Deputy Education Commissioner Dennis, all of the
State’s educational funds for districts in. school year 2016-17 total
“a little over $4 [billion].” So taken as a whole, the loss represents a
9% funding reduction to aid-qualifying districts.

3

This holding brings us to the State’s alternative argument: sev-
er additional provisions as necessary and save the remainder of
CLASS. The next logical step for severance after the supplemental
general state aid provision is the inequity-producing LOB provi-
sion itself. After all, why not sever the provision that has created
the inequity and consequently created the need for the supple-
mental general state aid?

The principal problem with this severance alternative requested
by the State is that according to KSDE spreadsheets, the LOB “lo-
cal effort” funding mechanism generates approximately $693 mil-
lion per year for those school districts with LOB’s. Combining this
loss with the supplemental general state aid loss of $367 million per
year means slightly more than $1 billion per year—roughly 25%
of all the educational funds for districts from the State—would be

‘one.
6 At oral arguments the State acknowledged the magnitude of this
funding loss. But its counsel nevertheless contended that loss of
$1 billion through severance is better than the loss of the $4 bil-
lion that would result if severance were not allowed and the en-
tire funding act (CLASS) were held unconstitutional. He argued
that this severance at least would allow the school districts to op-
erate from July 1 until some unknown point during school year
2016-17 when the remaining $3 billion was exhausted. By then,
he reasoned, the legislature would supply a constitutional financial
fix allowing schools to continue unimpeded operation through the
balance of the school year.

We again acknowledge that “[a]n automatic or too cursory sever-
ance of statutory provisions risks ‘rewrit[ing] a statute and giv[ing]
it an effect altogether different from that sought by the measure
viewed as a whole.’” National Federation of Independent Business
v, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2669 (Scalia, J., dissenting). So analysis of
this part of the State’s severance argument requires careful applica-
tion of our test for severance.

As we specifically apply the two factors expressed in Brennan,
we first ask whether the legislature would have passed CLASS
without the unconstitutional LOB and supplemental general state
aid provisions—which supply approximately $1 billion or 25% of all

CC

state funds for K-12 public school education. We are not persuaded
for several reasons.

First, as of the 2016 legislative session, the State already had
been in continuous litigation since 2010 over its alleged violation of
the adequacy provisions of Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution. See
Gannon I, 298 Kan. at 1115 (Gannon suit filed November 2010).

Second, on June 26, 2015, the three-judge panel ruled the
State’s then-current funding was constitutionally inadequate and
ordered remedies—including the State’s payment of amounts that,
when calculated, would be millions of dollars. As of the 2016 leg-
islative session this panel holding had not been ruled upon by this
court—per our order of June 30, 2015, which stayed the panel's
order pending our decision on equity. Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 698.

Third, in Gannon II we cautioned the legislature that any fund-
ing system it enacted in response to our decision “must be demon-
strated to be capable of meeting the equity requirements of Article
6—while not running afoul of the adequacy requirement.” Gannon
II, 303 Kan. at 743.

Fourth, the legislature’s inclusion of the hold harmless provision
demonstrates that many of its members apparently were concerned
about any amount of reduced funding to school districts caused by
HB. 2655. Indeed, nine of the senators voting “yes” indicated that
the hold harmless concept represented a significant part of their
decision-making process. According to Senator Denning:

“Madam President: I vote yes on Sen Sub for H.B. 2655 because of the evidence
presented. . . . Moreover, it includes a ‘hold harmless’ provision that means no
school district loses funds. All the school districts that testified . . . acknowledged
that the hold harmless provision is necessary in light of the legislature's obliga-
tion to respond to the Court's remedial order while the school districts’ budgeting
processes are occurring. The Department of Education witnesses confirmed this
view, too.” (Emphasis added.)

Denning’s “Explanation of Vote” was concurred with by Senate
President Wagle, and Senators Arpke, Fitzgerald, Lynn, Master-
son, Melcher, Smith, and Wolf.

And as a former Speaker of the House explained to legislators,
the hold harmless provision also guards against a claim of constitu-
tionally inadequate funding:

ne

— 4

“No district losing funds, that’s the hold harmless provision. . . . No one is going
to lose under this. The Court did have one phrase in its opinion that suggested
that you ought to, even though this in the equity phase, you should not lose sight
of adequacy, And—with hold harmless, you guard against a claim that, well, you
have taken money from me that I was expecting that I already had in my budget
and so I'm no longer adequate. Hold harmless provisions take care of that.” (Em-
phasis added.)

Finally, we take judicial notice of the recent budget bill the leg-
islature submitted to the governor in May 2016. While authorizing
allotments (reductions) to state government funds appropriated by
the legislature, the bill essentially exempted K-12 school funding
reduction from allotment authority for FY 2017. 2016 House Sub-
stitute for Senate Bill No. 249, section 45 provides:

“The provisions of section 98(a)(2) of 2016 House Substitute for Senate Bill No.
161 [allowing reduction through allotments] shall not apply to any item of appro-
priation which provides funding to any state agency for school districts educating
students in kindergarten or any of the grades one through 12.” (Emphasis added.)

We therefore deem it quite unlikely the legislature would have
passed legislation intentionally cutting the K-12 public school edu-
cation budget—which the panel found was already underfunded,
i.e., inadequate—by another $1 billion, or 25%. See State ex rel.
v. Wyandotte County Comm’rs, 140 Kan. 744, 754, 39 P.2d 286
(1934) (court “convinced that the legislature would not have given
its sanction to this enactment” without the unconstitutional provi-
sion so statute as a whole cannot stand); see also Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Com’n of State of Okl., 286 U.S. 210, 234, 52
S. Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed. 1062 (1932) (after application of severability
clause, remaining provisions stand “[uJnless it is evident” legisla-
ture would not have enacted just those provisions).

Nonseverability here is appropriate not only because of a failure
of the first part of Brennan’s test-but also because of an even more
evident failure of the second. That part provides: “‘[I]f the statute
would operate effectively to carry out the intention of the legisla-
ture with such portion stricken, the remainder of the valid law will
stand. .. . This court will assume severability if the unconstitutional
part can be severed without doing violence to legislative intent.’”
293 Kan. at 463. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (the remainder

CC

will “still function in a way ‘consistent with Congress’ basic objec-
tives in enacting the statute.’”); Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685
(the remainder also must “function j in a manner consistent with the
intent of Congress”).

We begin this analysis of the second part of the Brennan test
by examining the express “‘intention of the legislature’” in pass-
ing H.B. 2655. 293 Kan. at 463. According to its preamble, “[t]he
legislature is committed to avoiding any disruption to public educa-
tion and desires to meet its obligation.” And section 2(b) provides:
“The legislature has been advised that funding disruptions and
uncertainty are counter-productive to public education and that
the funding certainty of the classroom learning assuring student
success act [CLASS] is critical to the effective operation of school
districts . . . .” (Emphasis added.) H.B. 2655, sec. 2(b).

Similarly, section 6(b) states: “The legislature hereby declares
that the intent of this act is to . . . provide more flexibility and in-
creased local control for school district boards of education and
administrators in order to (1) Enhance predictability and certainty
in school district funding sources and amounts . . . (3) maximize
opportunities for more funds to go to the classroom.” (Emphasis
added.)

Finally, section 6(c) provides: “The legislature further declares
that the guiding principles for the development of subsequent leg-
islation for the finance of elementary and secondary public educa-
tion should consist of . . . (1) Ensuring that students’ educational
needs are funded; (2) providing more funding to classroom instruc-
tion.” (Emphasis added.)

These express legislative statements repeatedly make clear that
with the LOB and supplemental general state aid provisions sev-
ered, CLASS cannot operate effectively to carry out the intention
of the legislature. Among other things, severance and the immedi-
ate loss of $1 billion of school funding would seriously undermine
the legislature's “desire[] to meet its obligation” under Article 6
of the constitution. And this loss of 25% of all educational funds
until such time as the legislature might restore them contradicts
the legislative intent to (1) “avoid[] any disruption to public edu-
cation”; to (2) “enhance predictability and [provide] certainty” in

planning school district budgets; and to (3) “maximize opportuni-
ties for more funds to go to the classroom.”

The legislature’s intent has been expressed not only in H.B.
2655's language and legislative history, but also in the State’s brief.
“When simply reverting to all of the old formulas failed to gain
support, the [2016] Legislature considered other approaches, all
with the predominant goal in mind of creating a constitutionally
equitable system of school fiance.” (Emphasis added.)

These points lead us to conclude that severance of these two
provisions would do “‘violence to legislative intent.’” Brennan, 293
Kan. at 463. The school district reorganization case of Hines, 163
Kan. 300, is of particular guidance. There, the plaintiff claimed the
legislature had unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to
local committees which would reorganize school districts through-
out the state. The court began its analysis with several important
observations similar to ours in the instant case.

“Before giving consideration to the specific questions presented, some general
observations should be made. ‘The court is cognizant of the complicated conse-
quences which rest upon the result of the litigation. The court realizes that prob-
ably nothing is more essential to the welfare of the state than the continued main-
tenance of adequate schools... . The court... . [understands] the complex problems
which have confronted the legislature in its efforts to enact satisfactory legislation
controlling the controversial questions which arise upon consideration of school
reorganizations. As a consequence this case presents an instance wherein the rule
relative to the duty of a court to hold that statutes are valid, whenever it is reason-
ably possible to do so, has profound significance.” (Emphasis added.) 163 Kan. at
30l.

With these observations in mind, the court nevertheless found

several statutory provisions unconstitutional. And despite the pres-
ence of a severability clause, the court held that these unconstitu-
tional provisions could not be severed, and it declared all provi-
sions void. 163 Kan. at 321-22. In support the Hines court cited
State v. Smiley, 65 Kan. 240, 247, 69 P. 199 (1902):
“[I]f the void and valid parts of the statute are so connected with each other in
the general scheme of the act that they cannot be separated without violence to the
evident intent of the legislature, the whole must fil. These rules are of everyday
enforcement in the courts.” (Emphasis added.)

As Smiley expressed, severance is rejected when the provisions

are connected in the general scheme of the act, i.¢., when sever-
ance would change its scope. See State ex rel., v. Consumers Ware-
house Market, 185 Kan. 363, 372, 343 P.2d 234 (1959) (“The invalid
portion of the statute is not a separate and independent provision
of the Act, but rather is such an integral and inseparable part of the
whole scheme and purpose of the law that it may not be severed
therefrom and thus leave the remainder in full force and effect.
In other words, to eliminate the objectionable exemption would
change the scope of the Act.”).

As the concept of nonseverability of unconstitutional provisions
has been considered by Kansas courts for more than 100 years, ob-
viously its cousin—the threshold concept of statutory invalidity—
has been as well. See Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 743-44. There we
observed that an unconstitutional act is invalid because “‘“it is not
alaw . .. itis, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed.”*” 303 Kan. at 744 (quoting Wyandotte Co. v.
KC., ES. & M. Rid. Co., 5 Kan. App. 43, 44, 47 P. 326 [1896]). And
as we cautioned there, without a constitutionally equitable school
finance system, the schools in Kansas will be unable to operate.

As we explained in more detail in Gannon II, the inability of
Kansas schools to operate would not be because this court woul
have ordered them closed. Rather, it would be because this court
would have performed its sworn duty to the people of Kansas un-
der their constitution to review the legislature’s enactments and to
ensure the legislature’s compliance with its own duty under Article
6, See Gannon II, 303 Kan. 682, Syl. { 9. Simply put, the state leg-
islature’s unconstitutional enactment is void; it has not performed
its duty. Gannon II, 303 Kan. at 743-44; see Auditor of State v. A.T.
& S.E Railroad Co., 6 Kan. 500, 506, 1870 WL 507(1870) (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. [1 Cranch] 137 [1803]) (“It is em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.’”).

We acknowledge the legislature’s intent, as recently expressed in
its preamble to H.B. 2655: “The legislature is committed to avoid-
ing any disruption to public education and desires to meet its obli-
gation.” So, we continue to stay the issuance of our mandate—and
the stay of the panel’s broad remedial orders—until June 30, 2016.

— 4

This will give the legislature yet another opportunity to treat Kan-
sas students fairly and “to craft a constitutionally suitable solution
and minimize the threat of disruptions in funding for education.”
303 Kan. at 741.

BEIER and STEGALL, JJ., not participating.

MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, and Davip L. Srurzman,
District Judge, assigned

nee

Jounson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part: I agree with

the majority's determination that the legislature’s latest changes to
the local option budget supplemental general state aid program
(hereafter referred to as LOB) did not cure the inequities which
this court confirmed were unconstitutional in March of 2014 and
reaffirmed as unconstitutional in February 2016.
But I continue to believe that this court should join with the
district court panel to affirmatively remedy the unconstitutionality,
rather than continuing to merely offer the functional equivalent of
declaratory judgments. See Gannon v. State, 303 Kan. 682, 746,
368 P.3d 1024 (2016) (Johnson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (opining that this court should lift the stay on the district
court’s remedial orders). If this court had not issued a stay on the
listrict court's remedial orders on June 30, 2015, the public edu-
cational system in Kansas would have avoided yet another year of
unconstitutional inequity. In my view, maintaining the integrity of
our state constitution and providing equitable educational oppor-
tunities for our children are too important for this court to be con-
strained by any concern that the legislature will be offended that
we told it how to do its job. After all, this court has its own job to
do, as well.

Specifically, I would lift the stay on those district court remedial
orders that require the legislature to fully fund the LOB as it ex-

529

isted before the institution of this lawsuit. Although the majority
leaves open the possibility of lifting the stay on the district court's
remedial orders on July 1, 2016, I would do it now. The legislature
has had more than enough opportunities to resolve this unconstitu-
tionality on its own terms.

I acknowledge the State’s complaint that such an order would
violate the separation of powers by encroaching upon the legisla-
tive branch’s constitutional authority to appropriate money, pursu-
ant to Article 2 of the Kansas Constitution. But the legislature has
repeatedly failed or refused to exercise its Article 2 constitutional
authority to fulfill its Article 6 constitutional responsibility with re-
spect to the educational interests of this state. By allowing the leg-
islature to close the schools and shut off all monies to all the public
schools through the simple tack of taking no action to fix the uncon-
stitutional inequities, this court would be enabling the legislature's
dereliction of constitutional duty. Moreover, I fear that some might
view the closure of all public schools as a victory.

As a practical matter, a remedial order to fully fund the original
LOB program, i.e., requiring the legislature to use the “safe har-
bor” this court proffered 2 years ago, would be far less draconian
than the State’s suggestion that we sever the entire LOB program,
thereby denying the schools approximately $1 billion, or about 25%
of the total educational budget. And, after all, as the State’s attor-
ney repeatedly asserted at oral arguments: “It’s only for 1 year.”

No. 110,452
In the Matter of Kevin E. DELLETT, Respondent.
(377 P34 418)
el

On March 28, 2014, this court placed the respondent, Kevin E.
Dellett, on probation for a period of 2 years with specific condi-
tions. In re Dellett, 299 Kan. 69, 324 P.3d 1033 (2014).

The Disciplinary Administrator filed a report verifying that the
respondent has fully complied with all conditions imposed on him
by this court and recommending that the respondent be discharged
from probation.

This court, having reviewed the files and the recommendation of

the office of the Disciplinary Administrator, finds that the respon-
dent should be discharged from probation.

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondent is hereby dis-
charged from probation and from any further obligation in this
matter and that this proceeding is closed.

ir Is FurTHER ORDERED that this order be published in the
Kansas Reports and that the costs herein be assessed to the re-
spondent.

Effective this 31st day of May, 2016.

III
| atc ake

No. 114,829

In the Matter of RicHarD HarTBRINK, Respondent.
(875 B3d 296)

ee
SE (00 e003, 2016
=

Kimberly L. Knoll, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and
Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal com-
plaint for the petitioner.

John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the
cause, and Richard Haitbrink, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an attorney discipline proceeding against
Richard Haitbrink, of Shawnee Mission, Kansas. Respondent was
admitted to the practice of law in the State of Kansas on June 30,
1966. In March 1968, the Missouri Supreme Court admitted re-
spondent to the practice of law in the State of Missouri.

On June 21, 2015, the Disciplinary Administrator's office filed a
formal complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). Respondent timely
filed an answer on September 9, 2015, after the granting of a joint
motion to continue the date the answer was due.

A panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys held a
hearing on October 22, 2015, at which the respondent appeared
personally and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel de-
termined that respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 482) (communication); 1.8(h)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
530) (making an agreement limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client
for malpractice); 1.15(a) (2015 Kan, Ct. R. Annot. 556) (safekeep-
ing property); 1.16(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 572) (termination
of representation); 2.1 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 588) (exercise of
independent professional judgment); 8.3(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. An-
not. 670) (reporting professional misconduct); and Supreme Court
Rule 207(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 328) (failure to report action).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and disciplinary recommenda-

tion. Respondent took no exceptions to the hearing panel’s report.
We quote the report's pertinent parts below.

“Findings of Fact

“N.M.

“9. The respondent associated himself with Daniel E. Ryder, LLC to mod-
ify or renegotiate residential home loans. N.M. hired Daniel E. Ryder, LLC to
renegotiate her residential home loan. N.M. paid Daniel E. Ryder, LLC $2,500.
Daniel E. Ryder, LLC assigned N.M.’s file to the respondent. The respondent
failed to provide the services. N.M. requested a partial refund. She did not receive
arefund.

“10. N.M. filed a complaint with the disciplinary administrator's office. The
respondent agreed to participate in the attorney diversion program. On February
21, 2012, the respondent entered into an attorney diversion agreement, stipulat-
ing that he violated KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.8(h)(1), KRPC 1.15(a), KRPC 1.15(c),
KRPC 1.16, and KRPC 2.1.

“LL. On February 25, 2013, Ms. Knoll dismissed the complaint filed by N.M.,
following the respondent’s completion of the attorney diversion agreement.

“State of Washington

“12, Beginning in August 2009, and continuing until February 2010, the
respondent represented approximately 15 residents of the State of Washington,
including N.M., in an effort to negotiate (with mortgage companies) delinquent
mortgages, mortgages in foreclosure, or mortgages which exceeded the value of
the property.

“13. _N.M. filed a complaint with the Department of Financial Institutions
(DF) of the State of Washington. Thereafter, the respondent received a letter
from the DFT alleging that the respondent might be acting as a mortgage broker
or loan originator which would require a license.

“14. The respondent provided a written response to the letter. The respon-
dent informed DFT that he had ceased the activity, but that he had been acting
on a good faith belief that he was representing them as an attorney licensed to
practice law and not acting as a mortgage broker or loan originator. Additionally,
the respondent agreed that he would not resume the practice. Finally, on his own,
the respondent provided the DFI with a complete list of clients’ names, previously
unknown to the DFT.

“15. The DFI charged the respondent with violating the Mortgage Broker
Practices Act in Washington for acting as a mortgage broker and loan origina-
tor without being licensed. The respondent made application for an adjudicative
hearing. However, because of health and financial issues, the respondent was un-
able to secure legal representation in the State of Washington.

533

“16. Thereafter, the respondent entered into a settlement agreement with
the DFI. The respondent agreed to make restitution to the 15 clients and pay for
the costs of investigation.

“17. On April 23, 2013, the respondent paid for the costs of the investiga-
tion. The respondent continues to pay restitution to the 15 clients in the State of
Washington.

“PY. and MLV.

“18. In July 2009, PV. and M.V. hired the respondent to assist them with
modifying mortgages on five properties. P.V. and M.V. paid the respondent $11,575
for the representation. Five separate contracts for loan modifications were drawn
up. The contracts were identical with the exception of the property address and
the fee amounts. The contracts included the following terms:

“This Agreement is entered into by and between Richard F. Haitbrink,
Attomey at Law (“the FIRM”) and [P-V. and M.V.], (co-borrower) the CLI-
ENT, (whether one or more parties).

‘CLIENT hereby retains the FIRM to represent CLIENT in a MORT-
GAGE CONTRACT MODIFICATION/RENEGOTIATION of: [proper-
ty type and address] and Client empowers the FIRM to take or cause to be
taken all steps necessary to represent CLIENT properly.

“The FIRM may designate non-attorneys and other assistants to prepare
papers or perform any other work on the CLIENT’ case under the supervi-
sion of the FIRM. The FIRM may associate with any other counsel, lawyers
or law firms outside the FIRM to handle any portion of CLIENT’ case
at the FIRM’ discretion and at the FIRM’s expense. CLIENT grants the
FIRM the authority to do this.

‘CLIENT understands this fee is a prepayment of immediate compen-
sation to the FIRM. This fee is fully eared by the FIRM upon the signing
of this Agreement by the FIRM’s assuming professional responsibility of
CLIENT regarding this specific matter and agreeing to handle CLIENT
case, subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Kansas
Supreme Court.

“The FIRM makes no promises, warranties, representations or guaran-
tees, whether express or implied, as to the result of its efforts, as to the
outcome of this matter, and CLIENT acknowledges that no guarantee as to
specific results has been givén or communicated to CLIENT by the FIRM
except for the following: The FIRM understands that a modification offer
from a Lender may not be satisfactory to all parties (Borrower/Attorney)
and in those cases the FIRM will renegotiate with the Lender on the CLI-
ENT’s behalf. If the FIRM cannot facilitate in improvement in the CLI-
ENT position with their lender a refund will be issued of all monies paid

excluding $495.00 which will be retained by the FIRM for any work done
to that point, upon CLIENT request within 30 days.

“CLIENT understands that all original agreements, promissory notes,
mortgages, guarantees and the like between CLIENT and CLIENT’s
lender(s) are in full force and effect until modification, forbearance or
any other alternative payment plan is agreed to by both CLIENT and
CLIENT’ lender(s), and the agreement representing such modification,
forbearance or other alternative payment plan is set forth in writing and
executed by both CLIENT and CLIENT’s lender(s). CLIENT agrees to
hold harmless the FIRM in this regard, and the FIRM will not be liable
to CLIENT for loss, injury, damage or claims resulting from the FIRM’s
performance, services or representation of CLIENT in the loan modifica-
tion process, CLIENT expressly releases and holds harmless the FIRM,
and any attorneys, employees, officers, directors, members, agents and the
like, from any claim, suit, action or demand arising out of or in relation to
this Agreement.’

It does not appear that the respondent signed the contracts.

“19. BV. and M.V. were not eligible for loan modifications. P.V. and M.V. re-
quested a refund pursuant to the refund clause of the contracts. The respondent
did not refund the $9,100 as promised in the contracts.

“20. PV. and M.V. contacted the Kansas Bar Association’s Fee Dispute Com-
mittee. On March 20, 2012, the Fee Dispute Committee conducted a mediation.
The respondent admitted that he owed PV. and M.V. the fee. Following the medi-
ation, the parties entered into a memorandum of understanding and preliminary
settlement. The agreement provided as follows:

“1. Richard Haitbrink agrees that he owes [P.V. and M.V,] the sum of $9,100
pursuant to the subject contracts between the parties. Said contracts
are attached. Both parties agree that a breach of the contracts occurred
which gave rise to these damages.

‘2. Richard Haitbrink agrees he shall pay to [PV. and M.V/] the sum of
$1,500 which shall represent prejudgment interest as of March 1, 2012.

“3. Richard Haitbrink agrees he shall pay to [P.V. and M.V.] post-judgment
interest in the amount of 12% per annum.

‘4, Richard Haitbrink agrees he shall pay to [PV. and M.¥.] agree to pay
[sic] the parties’ reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $1,200, at
the rate of $30 per month which shall be due and payable at the same
rate as the amounts which are payable pursuant to paragraph 5.

‘5. Richard Haitbrink shall pay towards these sums the sum of $300 per
month, commencing on April 10, 2012, and each month thereafter on
the 10th day of each month in an equivalent amount for a total period
of 12 months. At the end of the 12 months the entire balance owed shall
become due and payable.

‘6. Richard Haitbrink or his counsel shall prepare a promissory note which
memorializes the instant agreement and shall provide such promissory
note to [PV and M.V.]’s attorney, Justin Holstin, on or before March 10,
2012.

“7. All payments shall be made directly to [P-V. and M.V.]’s attorney or as
directed by them.

‘8, The terms of this agreement are not considered to be confidential and
may be admitted into evidence in any legal proceeding to enforce the
terms of this agreement.’

On March 20, 2012, the respondent signed a promissory note, agreeing to pay
$330 per month for one year and agreeing to pay the balance due at the end of
the year.

“21. The respondent paid as agreed for a period of time. The respondent
then stopped paying as agreed. At the time of the hearing, the respondent had
paid PV, and M.V. and their attorney, approximately $12,000.

“22, On May 28, 2013, PV. and M.V. filed a complaint with the disciplinary
administrator's office against the respondent. On May 29, 2013, Ms. Knoll wrote
to the respondent, directing the respondent to provide a written response to the
complaint within 20 days. The respondent failed to file a written response to the
complaint within 20 days.

“23. On July 10, 2013, P-V. and M.V, filed a limited action suit against the re-
spondent in the Shawnee County District Court, case number 2013-LM-011215.
The respondent did not answer the petition and default judgment was entered
against the respondent in the amount of $10,782, plus interest.

“94, Finally, on August 23, 2013, the respondent forwarded a written re-
sponse to the complaint.

“Conclusions of Law

“25. Based upon the findings of fact and the respondent's admissions in his
answer, the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent vio-
lated KRPC 1.4(a), KRPC 1.8(h)(1), KRPC 1.15(a), KRPC 1.16(d), KRPC 2.1,
KRPC 8.3(a), and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(c), as detailed below.

“KRPC 1.4(a)

“26. KRPC 1.4(a) provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably in-
formed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable re-
quests for information.’ In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a) when
he failed to properly communicate with PV. and M.V. Accordingly, the hearing
panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a).

“KRPC 1.8(h)(1)

“27. A lawyer shall not ‘make an agreement prospectively limiting the law-
yer’s liability toa client for malpractice unless the client is independently repre~
sented in making the agreement.” KRPC 1.8(h)(1). In this case, the five attorney

536

fee agreements included identical provisions that the client would hold the firm
and any attorneys harmless from any claim, suit, action or demand arising out of or
in relation to the agreement. The ‘hold harmless’ provision is in violation of KRPC
1.8(h)(1). Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC
1.8(h)(1).

“KRPC 1.15(a)

“28. Lawyers must properly safeguard the client’s possessions. KRPC 1.15(a)
requires lawyers to deposit unearned fees into an attorney trust account. Specifi-
cally KRPC 1.15(a) provides:

‘{a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in

a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from

the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account main-

tained in the state of Kansas. Other property shall be identified as such
and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds

and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a

period of five years after termination of the representation.’

Despite the language in the agreement to the contrary, the fees paid by PV. and
M.V. were not earned when paid. The fees were not earned until the respondent
completed work justifying the payment of fees. Thus, under KRPC 1.15(a), the
fees were required to be deposited into the respondent's trust account. The hear-
ing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) by failing to de-
posit the fees into the respondent's trust account.

“KRPC 1.16(d)

“29, KRPC 1.16 requires lawyers to take certain steps to protect clients after
the representation has been terminated. Specifically, KRPC 1.16(d) provides the
requirement in this regard:

“Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reason-
able notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and re-
funding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer
may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other
law?

The respondent violated KRPC 1.16(d) when he failed to refund the fees accord-
ing to the fee agreement. Therefore, the hearing panel concludes that the respon-
dent violated KRPC 1.16(d).
“KRPC 2.1
“30, Lawyers must exercise independent professional judgment. KRPC 2.1.
In this case, the respondent became associated with a non-attorney, Mr. Ryder.
The respondent's association with Mx. Ryder interfered with the respondent's

exercise of independent professional judgment. Accordingly, the hearing panel
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 2.1,

“KRPC 8.3(a) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(c)

“31. Lawyers must report professional misconduct. KRPC 8.3(a) and Kan.
Sup. Ct. R. 207(c) provide the requirements in this regard. Specifically, KRPC
8.3(a) provides, ‘[a] lawyer having knowledge of any action, inaction, or conduct -
which in his or her opinion constitutes misconduct of an attorney under these
rules shall inform the appropriate professional authority.’ Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(c)
provides:

‘(c) It shall be the further duty of each member of the bar of this state

to report to the Disciplinary Administrator any action, inaction, or conduct

which in his or her opinion constitutes misconduct of an attorney under

these rules,”

In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 8.3(a) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(c)
when he failed to inform the disciplinary administrator's office of the actions taken
by the DFT. As a result, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated
KRPC 8.3(a) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(c).

“American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

“32. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel con-
sidered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ‘Standards’). Pursuant to Standard 3, the
factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the po-
tential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

“33. Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to properly
safeguard client property. Additionally, the respondent violated his duty to the
legal profession.

“34. Mental State. The respondent negligently violated his duties.

“35. Injury. As a result of the respondent’s misconduct, the respondent
caused potential injury. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent caused
potential injury and not actual injury because the respondent has paid PV. and
M.V. more than $9,100 to date and because the record is unclear whether the
clients in Washington were injured or if they received the services for which they
were paid, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent was not authorized to
provide those services.

“36, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to
be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in
this case, found no aggravating factors present.

“37. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-

ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in- this case, found the following

mitigating circumstances present:

‘a. Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent's misconduct
does not appear to have been motivated by dishonesty or selfishness.

‘b. Timely Good Faith Effort to Make Restitution or to Rectify Conse-
quences of the Misconduct. To date, the respondent has paid PV. and
MLV. more than they paid the respondent in attorney fees. Further,
the respondent has agreed to continue to pay PV. and M.V. additional
amounts for interest. The respondent has paid DFT for the costs of the
investigation. The respondent continues to pay his clients in Washing-
ton for the attorney fees they paid him.

‘c. Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. During the
relevant time period, the respondent had significant medical problems.
It is clear that the respondent's medical conditions contributed to cir-
cumstances which led to the difficulties in this case.

‘d. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Ac-
knowledgment of the Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated
with the disciplinary process. Additionally, the respondent admitted the
facts and the rule violations.

‘e. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Char-
acter and General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an
active and productive member of the bar of Shawnee Mission, Kansas.
‘The respondent also enjoys the respect of his peers and generally pos-
sesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by several letters
received by the hearing panel.

‘£. Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The respondent has experi-
enced other sanctions for his conduct. The respondent agreed to pay to
PV, and M.V. more than what he received. Additionally, the respondent
paid the costs of the investigation in the State of Washington. Finally,
the respondent agreed to pay restitution to the clients in the State of
Washington.’

6

“38. Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed genu-
ine remorse for having engaged in the misconduct.
“39. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel thoroughly ex-
amined and considered the following Standards:

‘4.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in
dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a
client.

‘4.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in
determining whether the representation of a client may be materially

539

affected by the lawyer’s own interests, or whether the representation
will adversely affect another client, and causes injury or potential
injury to a client.

‘7.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently en-
gages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional,
and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the
legal system.’

“Recommendation

“40. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law. Counsel for the respondent recommended
that the respondent be censured and that the censure be published in the Kansas
Reports.

“41. The hearing panel is troubled by the respondent's failure to inform the
disciplinary administrator's office of the action taken in Washington in light of the
fact that the respondent was on diversion for related circumstances. However,
the hearing panel concludes that because the respondent acted negligently and
not intentionally he should be allowed to continue to practice law. Continuing
to practice law will afford the respondent the opportunity to refund the attorney
fees, However, the hearing panel believes that conditions should be attached to
the respondent's authorization to continue to practice law, as follows:

‘a, The respondent shall make timely payments to PV. and MV.

‘b. The respondent shall make timely payments pursuant to the settlement

agreement with the DF] in Washington.

‘e. The respondent shall properly use his attorney trust account.

‘d. The respondent shall not violate the Kansas Rules of Professional Con-

duct.

‘e. The respondent shall obtain and maintain professional liability insur-

ance,”

“42, Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards
listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent
be censured, The hearing panel further recommends that the censure be pub-
lished in the Kansas Reports. Moreover, the hearing panel recommends that the
respondent be ordered to comply with the conditions set forth above. Finally, the
hearing panel recommends that should the respondent fail to comply with the
conditions set forth above, the disciplinary administrator requests that an order to.
show cause [be] issued for the respondent [to] show why his license should not be
suspended for failing to comply with the conditions.

“43. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified
by the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator.”

DISCUSSION

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence,
the hearing panel’s findings, and the parties’ arguments to deter-
mine whether KRPC violations exist and, if they do, what discipline
should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945,
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 350), Clear and convincing evidence is “‘evidence
that causes the factfinder to believe that “the truth of the facts as-
serted is highly probable.”’” In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204
P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d
1 [2008]).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint,
to which he filed an answer. Respondent filed no exceptions to
the final hearing report. As such, the panel's findings of fact are
deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c) and (d) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 369).

The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and
convincing evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.4(a)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 482) (communication); 1.8(h)(1) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 532) (making an agreement limiting the lawyer's
liability to a client for malpractice); 1.15(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. An-
not. 556) (safekeeping of property); 1.16(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. An-
not. 572) (termination of representation); 2.1 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. An-
not. 588) (exercise of independent professional judgment); 8.3(a)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 670) (reporting professional misconduct);
and Supreme Court Rule 207(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 328)
(duties of the bar and judiciary). We adopt the panel's findings and
conclusions.

The only remaining issue is determining the appropriate dis-
cipline for respondent’s violations. At the panel hearing, the Dis-
ciplinary Administrator's office recommended respondent be
suspended from the practice of law. Respondent recommended
published censure. The hearing panel recommended published
censure with the conditions noted above.

Prior to the hearing before this court, respondent submitted an
affidavit stating he had paid in full P.V. and M.V. and remained in

Te asc (tea

compliance with his settlement agreement with the DFI in Wash-
ington. The Disciplinary Administrator’s office does not dispute
those representations. And at oral argument, the Disciplinary Ad-
ministrator’s office changed its position regarding the appropriate
discipline and agreed with the panel’s recommendation, including
the conditions.

The hearing panel’s recommendations are advisory only and do
not prevent us from imposing greater or lesser sanctions. Supreme
Court Rule 212(f) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 369); see In re Kline,
298 Kan. 96, 212-13, 311 P.3d 321 (2013). After careful consid-
eration, the court holds that respondent should be disciplined by
published censure without the conditions set out by the panel. Un-
der the circumstances, and in light of the activities detailed in the
affidavit and counsels’ representations during oral argument, the
interests of the public and the profession are met by the discipline
of published censure.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

Iv Is THEREFORE ORDERED that Richard Haitbrink be and is
hereby disciplined by published censure in accordance with Su-
preme Court Rule 203(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293) (types of
discipline).

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings

be assessed to the respondent and that this opinion be published in
the official Kansas Reports.

Lawron R. Nuss, Chief Justice, not participating.
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned

No. 108,963

Berry A. Born, as Trustee of the Jon H. Born, JR. REVOCABLE
Trust, and The JoHN H. Born, JR. REVOCABLE TRUST, Ap-
pellants/Cross-Appellees, v. SHARON L. BORN, Appellee/Cross-
Appellant, and Topp J. BORN AND JANEL M. Born, Co-Trust-
ees of the Topp J. BoRN REVOCABLE Trust, Intervenors/
Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

(374 B.3d 624)

James A. Walker, of Triplett, Woolf & Garretson, LLC, of Wichita, argued the
cause, and Shane A. Rosson, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for ap-
pellants/cross-appellees.

Todd E. Shadid, of Klenda Austerman LLC, of Wichita, argued the cause and
was on the brief for appellee/cross-appellant Sharon L. Born.

‘ Ee a

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Jounson, J.: Betty Born (Betty), in her capacity as a trustee
of the inter vivos, revocable trust created with her late husband,
John H. Born, Jr. (John), hereafter referred to as “the Born Trust,”
brought this injunctive and declaratory judgment action against
Sharon Born (Sharon). Sharon held two installment promissory
notes upon which the Born Trust assets had been pledged as secu-
rity when John died. When Betty attempted to make payments on
the notes, Sharon took the position that the notes were in default
because of John’s death; that, pursuant to the notes’ acceleration
clauses, the entire remaining balances were immediately due and
payable; and that Sharon’s only remedy under the security agree-
ments was to accept all of the Born Trust’s pledged assets in full
satisfaction of the note balances. This action challenged Sharon’s
right to unilaterally effect an acceptance-of-collateral remedy.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sha-
ron, finding that the Born Trust had failed to properly object to
Sharon’s acceptance of the collateral in full satisfaction of the notes
and that the Born Trust had failed to properly redeem the collat-
eral after being notified that Sharon had accepted it. The district
court therefore ordered the Born Trust to turn over the collateral
to Sharon.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. The panel
found that, although the Born Trust did properly object to Sharon’s
proposed acceptance of collateral, the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) required that the trust also redeem the collateral. The panel
determined that the Born Trust had not effectively attempted to
redeem the collateral, so that the district court’s result could be af-
firmed. Born v. Born, No. 108,963, 2014 WL 1096602, at “14 (Kan.
App. 2014) (unpublished opinion).

This court granted the Born Trust's petition for review of the
Court of Appeals’ decision. Finding that the Born Trust had the
right under the promissory notes to pay the accelerated balances
due thereon to prevent Sharon’s acceptance of the pledged assets
under the security agreement, we reverse both the Court of Ap-
peals and the district court. The matter is remanded to the district
court to calculate the amount due on the notes at the time they

CC

were accelerated, and upon payment of that amount, to order the
release of Sharon’s lien on the Born Trust assets.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

The promissory notes and security agreements at issue in this
case were executed in connection with the sale of a business inter-
est; the persons involved in the sale and this lawsuit are related
by blood or marriage. At the time of the sale, John owned a suc-
cessful stone mason company. His cousin, Sharon, owned all but
nine shares of H.J. Born Stone, Inc. (Born Stone, Inc.), a family
corporation that had owned and operated a stone and quarry busi-
ness since 1949. Sharon’s son, Todd Born (Todd), held the other
nine shares of Born Stone, Inc., stock and was employed by the
corporation.

In September 2010, the cousins reached an agreement for John
to purchase a majority interest in the stone and quarry business,
which would then be operated jointly by John and Todd. The trans-
action was structured to include both an asset purchase and a stock
purchase.

First, the Born Trust and Todd formed a separate company, TJ
Leasing, LLC (TJ Leasing), to be used to purchase certain equip-
ment, vehicles, and real estate from Born Stone, Inc. The Bom
Trust's membership interest in TJ Leasing was 51%; Todd owned
49%. Although Todd later transferred his interest in TJ Leasing to
the Todd J. Born Revocable Trust, we will refer to his interest as
individually owned to avoid further confusion.

TJ Leasing paid Born Stone, Inc., for the purchased assets by
executing a “Purchase Price Note” for the full purchase price of
$825,877, together with annual interest to be calculated each year
pursuant to a formula. By the terms of the note, TJ Leasing, as
“Borrower,” was to pay H.J. Born Stone, Inc., as “Lender,” annual
payments of $50,000, until the note was paid in full. The payments
were due each September 30, beginning in 2011. Although the
Court of Appeals’ opinion referred to this instrument as “Note 1,”
we will refer to it more descriptively as the “TJ Leasing note.” As
collateral for the TJ Leasing note, Todd and the Born Trust execut-
ed a Pledge Agreement, granting Born Stone, Inc., a security inter-

est in and to all of their ownership interests in TJ Leasing. We will
refer to this instrument as the “TJ Leasing security agreement.”

The day before the September 30, 2010, effective date of the TJ
Leasing note, Sharon resigned as an officer and director of Born
Stone, Inc. Then, on the same date as the asset sale to TJ] Leas-
ing, Born Stone, Inc., used the sale proceeds, along with other
remaining corporate assets, to fund the repurchase of 144 shares
of Sharon’s Born Stone, Inc., stock, pursuant to a Stock Redemp-
tion Agreement. The corporation partially paid for the stock re-
demption by giving Sharon a written assignment of its interests
and rights in and to the TJ Leasing note and TJ Leasing security
interest. In other words, Sharon became the holder of those in-
struments, assuming the rights and obligations of Born Stone, Inc.
After the stock redemption on September 30, 2010, Born Stone,
Inc., had 194 shares outstanding; Sharon owned 185 shares and
Todd owned 9 shares.
The following day, October 1, 2010, the Born Trust obtained
one-half of the outstanding shares of Born Stone, Inc., by pur-
chasing 97 shares from Sharon. The Born Trust paid for the stock
purchase by executing an installment promissory note (“Stock Pur-
chase Note”) in the principal amount of $708,300, together with
interest, payable to Sharon in annual payments of $50,000, due on
September 30 of each year, beginning in 2011. To secure those pay-
ments, the Born Trust, by written agreement hereafter referred to
as “stock security agreement,” pledged its Born Stone, Inc., stock
as collateral. That same day, Sharon gifted her remaining 88 shares
of Born Stone stock to Todd, which resulted in Todd and John both
holding 97 shares of Born Stone stock.

Unusual events ensued. Shortly after the sales transactions,
John was diagnosed with terminal cancer. He informed Sharon of
his diagnosis and kept her apprised of his medical condition. In
April 2011, Sharon requested and received a lump sum payment of
$375,000 from TJ Leasing so that she could pay her income taxes.
That voluntary lump sum payment within the first 6 months of the
TJ Leasing note reduced its principal amount by approximately
45%. In June 2011, Todd sold 1.94 shares of his Born Stone, Inc.,
stock to the Born Trust for $14,166, which made the Born Trust’s

interest in Born Stone, Inc., 51% and left Todd with 49% own-
ership, the same proportional ownership as it held in T] Leasing.
Then, on September 8, 2011, approximately 3 weeks before the
first annual payments were due on the two notes, John died.

On or about September 19, 2011, Betty contacted Sharon in an
attempt to make the annual payment on both notes, but Sharon
avoided the attempt, claiming she was busy. Instead, 2 days later,
on September 21 (9 days before the due date of the first annual in-
stallment), Sharon’s attorney hand-delivered two letters to Betty in
her capacity as trustee of the Born Trust. One letter addressed the
September 30, 2010, TJ Leasing note and security agreement; the
other referenced the October 1, 2010, documents. In both letters,
Sharon made the following declaration and notification, with the
addition of parenthetically describing the collateral for each note:

“As a result of the death of John H. Born, Jr, I, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the
Note, declared the entire balance of the Note in default and immediately due and
payable. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Pledge Agreement, this letter is notice to
the John H. Born, Jr. Revocable Trust, as restated and amended wa/d December
15, 2005, that I have accepted the Collateral listed in the Pledge Agreement.”

Additionally, in the T] Leasing note and security agreement
letter, Sharon made the following declaration: “As a result, all of
the membership interest in TJ Leasing, LLC, held by the John H.
Born, Jr. Revocable Trust, as restated and amended u/a/d Decem-
ber 15, 2005, is forfeited, ceased to exist and terminated.” Sharon
then directed Betty to “immediately surrender the trust’s original
Unit Membership Certificate of T] Leasing, LLC,'to my attorney,
Todd E. Shadid,” at his Wichita office address.

Sharon sent a similar letter to her son, Todd, instructing him to
surrender his original Unit Membership Certificate of T] Leasing
to her. Todd complied with his mother’s demand, forfeiting his 49%
interest in TJ Leasing to her.

The letter to Betty declaring a default under the Stock Purchase
Note and security agreement, included the additional declaration:
“As a result, all of interest [sic] of the trust as stockholder in HJ.
Bron [sic] Stone, Inc. is forfeited, ceased to exist and terminated.”
That letter demanded that Betty “immediately surrender the trust’s
original Stock Certificate(s) for H.J. Born Stone, Inc., to my attor-
ney, Todd E. Shadid,” at his Wichita office address.

— 4

The day after Sharon’s attorney hand-delivered the above-de-
scribed letters to Betty, the Born Trust’s attorney contacted Sha-
ron’s attorney to arrange payment of the entire remaining balances
on the notes. Sharon’s attorney responded with the statement that
Sharon would refuse to accept payment. Further, he confirmed
that Todd had surrendered his interest in TJ Leasing to Sharon,
albeit Sharon apparently did not credit the T] Leasing note with
any value for the relinquished collateral.

The next day, September 23, 2011, the Born Trust's attorney
followed up with a letter to Sharon’s attorney confirming that the
Born Trust had agreed to pay Sharon the total amounts then due
under both accelerated notes but stating that “you and your cli-
ent are taking the absurd position that once your client declares a
default under the Promissory Notes, our clients have no rights to
immediately make payments to remedy the defaults.” The letter
further alleged that Sharon failed to act in good faith when: (1)
she refused to meet with Betty on or about September 19, 2011,
to accept payment in full on the notes; (2) she declared default on
the notes 2 days later; and (3) she refused to accept full payment
on the notes on September 22, 2011. The letter advised that pur-
suant to K.S.A. (2011 Supp.) 84-9-625, the Born Trust was filing a
lawsuit seeking an injunction to prevent Sharon from taking pos-
session and ownership of the collateral and a declaratory judgment
requiring Sharon to accept payment in full from the Born Trust in
satisfaction of the promissory notes.

That same day, September 23, 2011, the Born Trust filed the law-
suit against Sharon, alleging that by declaring default and demand-
ing immediate surrender of the collateral, Sharon had breached
the terms of the notes and security agreements and had violated
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, specifically K.S.A.
2011 Supp. 84-9-607(c), K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 84-9-625, and K.S.A.
2011 Supp. 84-1-304. The Born Trust asked the court to enter an
order restraining Sharon from: (1) any further violation of the law,
(2) undertaking any collection efforts against the Born Trust, (3)
taking any ownership interest of the Stock Certificates and Unit
Membership: Certificates, (4) exercising any authority or control
over Born Stone, Inc., or TJ Leasing, (5) exercising any stockholder

rights in Born Stone, Inc., or member rights in TJ Leasing, and (6)
entering into any contracts on behalf of Born Stone, Inc., or T]
Leasing or acting as an agent of either company.

On September 26, 2011, Sharon’s attorney e-mailed a letter to
the Born Trust’s attorney, arguing that an intent to tender payment
did not constitute an actual tender of payment, which was required
even if Sharon would reject any such tender. The letter alleged
that Betty had not offered to meet with Sharon on September 19
to pay all amounts owed under the notes, but rather the purpose of
the meeting was to pay the $50,000 annual installments that were
coming due under the notes. The attorney's letter further alleged
that Betty had informed Sharon that Betty could not pay the full
amount due on the notes until sometime in the future after she
received the proceeds from John’s life insurance policy. Finally, the
attorney opined that pursuant to the clear and unambiguous terms
of the notes and security agreements, Sharon was not required to
accept any payments from the Born Trust.

On September 27, 2011, the district court entered a temporary
restraining order mandating that the operation and management
structure of Born Stone and TJ Leasing maintain their status quo;
prohibiting the sale, transfer, or encumbrance of company assets;
and prohibiting the sale, transfer, or encumbrance of Born Stone
Stock or TJ Leasing membership interests.

On September 28, 2011, the Born Trust caused a certified check
in the amount of $964,144.87 to be hand-delivered to Sharon’s
counsel, along with a letter stating: “This check should satisfy all
amounts due under the contracts.” Although not explained at the
time, the amount tendered was calculated as the total amount of
principal and interest due and owing under both notes as of Sep-
tember 29, 2011, after taking into account the April 8, 2011, pay-
ment of $375,000 on the TJ Leasing note and deducting 49% of the
remaining principal balance of the TJ Leasing note to reflect Todd's
transfer to Sharon of his 49% ownership interest in TJ Leasing.

On September 30, 2011, Sharon’s attorney returned the check,
stating: “I am in receipt of your client’s actual tender of payment,
and as stated before, it is rejected.” The letter continued to set
forth Sharon’s position; namely, that she did not need to declare a

550

default, that John’s death constituted an automatic default, that she
only needed to declare that the notes’ balances were accelerated,
and that her only remedy in the event of the default was to accept
the collateral.
Todd’s Trust filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit on Octo-
ber 11, 2011, and the motion was subsequently granted.
On October 31, 2011, Sharon filed a second amended answer
and counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that (1) imme-
liately upon the death of John, Sharon properly and rightfully
leclared due the entire amounts owed under the notes; (2) upon
John’s death, Sharon had the right to vote all of the membership
interest in T] Leasing and 97 shares of Born Stone; (3) Sharon
properly notified the Born Trust of her acceptance of the collateral
under the security agreements; (4) Sharon is the lawful owner of
all membership interest in T] Leasing and the 97 shares of Born
Stone stock; and (5) the Born Trust has no further liability under
the notes and security agreements. In the alternative, Sharon re-
quested that if the notes and security agreements could not be en-
forced as written, the agreements should be reformed to carry out
the parties’ intent, or the agreements should be rescinded and the
parties retumed to their original position.
A restraining order was filed on November 15, 2011, wherein
the parties agreed that the operations and management structure
of Born Stone and TJ Leasing would maintain their status quo and
no other substantive actions would be taken by either company
without written agreement by the lawsuit’s parties or court order.
The Born Trust also filed a motion for leave to amend its peti-
tion, which was subsequently granted. The amended petition add-
ed a count for declaratory judgment asking the court to find: (1)
that the Born Trust was entitled to a reasonable amount of time to
pay the balance of each note before Sharon could accept the col-
lateral; (2) that Todd’s surrender of his membership interest in TJ
Leasing, and Sharon’s acceptance of the same, satisfied 49% of the
balance of the T] Leasing note; (3) that the Born Trust’s tender of
the total amount due under both notes was reasonable and timely;
(4) that Sharén’s purported acceptance of the collateral was inef-
fective; (5) that the Born Trust remains the owner of 98.94 shares

fal

| ake ate

of Born Stone stock; and (6) that Sharon’s remedy is acceptance of
the amount previously tendered for each note as payment in full.

The Born Trust and Sharon subsequently filed competing mo-
tions for summary judgment, with Todd’s Trust joining Sharon’s
motion. The district court granted summary judgment to Sharon,
finding that the Born Trust had not formally objected to Sharon’s
notice of acceptance of the collateral and that the Born Trust had
not tendered payment in fulfillment of all its obligations under the
notes. The district court therefore directed the Born Trust to turn
over its 97 shares of Born Stone stock and all of its membership
interest in T] Leasing to Sharon.

The Born Trust filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
district court denied. But the district court did clarify that John’s
death did not trigger an option for Born Stone or its stockhold-
ers to purchase the 1.94 shares of Born Stone stock that had been
previously purchased from Todd. As such, the district court held
that the 1.94 shares of Born Stone stock properly passed to John’s
heirs. The Born Trust appealed the district court's initial ruling, and
Sharon cross-appealed the district court’s ruling with regard to the
1.94 shares of Born Stone stock.

Court of Appeals Decision

To the Court of Appeals, the Born Trust raised five issues, assert-
ing that (1) for multiple reasons, the district court erred in hold-
ing that Sharon had properly accepted the collateral under K.S.A.
2013 Supp. 84-9-620(a); (2) the written agreements clearly pro-
vided that the Born Trust had a reasonable amount of time to pay
the balance of the notes after John’s death and before Sharon's ac-
ceptance of the collateral; (3) Sharon waived or relinquished her
right to demand prompt payment of the notes; (4) Sharon’s accep-
tance of 49% of the collateral under the TJ Leasing security agree-
ment should have reduced the amount required to be tendered by
the Born Trust; and (5) the district court erred in holding that the
Born Trust’s tender did not redeem the collateral secured by the T]
Leasing security agreement.

In response, Sharon argued that her acceptance of the collateral
was in conformance with K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620; that the dis-

552

trict court correctly held that Sharon’s acceptance of the collateral
was effective unless the Born Trust timely objected and timely re-
deemed the collateral; and that the district court correctly held that
the Born Trust failed to timely object and redeem the collateral.
Finally, Sharon argued that the district court erred in holding that
the Born Trust’s transfer of the 1.94 shares of Born Stone stock was
a permitted transfer.

In affirming the district court, the Court of Appeals first held
that the parties’ agreements were subject to the UCC, which con-
tains specific provisions relating to a secured party’s options upon
default. Born, 2014 WL 1096602, at *6. Critical to its ultimate
holding, the panel then found that the terms of the sales limited
Sharon’s remedy upon default to accepting the secured collateral
and that the UCC regulates the manner in which a secured party
may accept collateral..2014 WL 1096602, at *7. The Court of Ap-
peals correctly noted that the acceptance of collateral procedure
may not be waived. 2014 WL 1096602, at *7.

The Court of Appeals then found that Sharon’s September 21,
2011, letters constituted valid proposals to accept the collateral
pursuant to K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620, 2014 WL 1096602, at *9.
Citing to K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-102(a)(66), the provision defin-
ing “proposal,” the Court of Appeals determined that Sharon’s pro-
posal need only to manifest her intent to accept the collateral in full
satisfaction of the Born Trust’s obligations, and Sharon’s September
21, 2011, letters clearly manifested that intent. 2014 WL 1096602,
at °8. The Court of Appeals further reasoned that the UCC did not
require the secured party to notify the debtor of its right to object
or notify the debtor of the amount due under the debt instrument.
2014 WL 1096602, at *9.

Contrary to the district court's finding, the Court of Appeals held
that the Born Trust did, in fact, object to Sharon’s acceptance of
the collateral. 2014 WL 1096602, at *10. The panel reasoned that
because Sharon’s only remedy under the agreements was to accept
the collateral, an event of default
“could result in one of only two outcomes: (1) Sharon could accept the collat-

eral in satisfaction of the Born Trust’s obligations on the Notes or (2) the Born
‘Trust could object and redeem the collateral under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-623.

553

Therefore, the district court correctly determined that in order to prevent Sharon
from accepting the collateral, the Born Trust had to both timely object to Sharon’s
proposal and redeem the collateral.” 2014 WL 1096602, at *10.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the Born Trust failed to
redeem the collateral because it did not make a “full tender of the
entire obligation due under the Notes.” 2014 WL 1096602, at *11.

In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals rejected the Born
Trust’s argument that Sharon’s refusal to accept payment constitut-
ed a waiver of its obligation to tender because the payment would
have been futile. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the
debtor’s right to redeem is absolute and cannot be waived, “regard-
less of Sharon’s position, the Born Trust could have redeemed the
collateral if it had actually tendered payment of the outstanding
balance of the Notes in full.” 2014 WL 1096602, at *12. In addi-
tion, the Court of Appeals found that Sharon did not, in fact, waive
the Born Trust’s obligation to tender; but instead, Sharon’s counsel
repeatedly advised the Born Trust’s counsel that actual tender was
necessary. Finally, the Court of Appeals rationalized that the Born
Trust’s attempt to tender the partial amount due, as well as its re-
peated statements that it intended to tender the total amount due,
established “that the Born Trust was aware of its obligation under
K-S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-623(b).” 2014 WL 1096602, at *12.

The Court of Appeals also rejected the Born Trust’s argument
that partial tender was sufficient, finding that the plain language of
the TJ Leasing security agreement and the provisions of the UCC
did not permit partial payment or partial surrender under the facts
of this case. 2014 WL 1096602, at *13. Similarly, the panel rejected
the Born Trust’s argument that the partial tender completely satis-
fied the obligations secured by the Stock Purchase Note because
the evidence indicated that the parties intended that all of the
agreements were part of one transaction and that when making its
tender, the Born Trust expressly stated that the check should satisfy
all amounts due under the contracts. 2014 WL 1096602, at *14.
The Court of Appeals concluded that under the terms of the par-
ties’ agreements, Sharon’s sole remedy was to accept the collateral,
that Sharon did not waive her right to payment under the notes,
and the Born Trust did not follow the steps to properly redeem the

ne

— 4

collateral because it did not tender fulfillment of all obligations se-
cured by the collateral. As such, the Court of Appeals held that the
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Sha-
ron. 2014 WL 1096602, at *14. We granted the Born Trust’s timely
filed petition for review pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(b), obtaining
jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-2101(b).

In its petition for review, the Born Trust divides its challenge
to the Court of Appeals’ decision into a number of issues, some of
which overlap and some of which are alternative arguments. We
take the liberty of consolidating and rearranging the issues for our
discussion.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The district court decided this case on defendant’s summary
judgment motion, which is only appropriate if the pleadings, depo-
sitions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. The district court must resolve all facts and infer-
ences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor
of the party against whom the ruling is sought. On appeal, the same
rules apply; summary judgment must be denied if reasonable minds
could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.
Stanley Bank v. Parish, 298 Kan. 755, 759, 317 P.3d 750 (2014).

En route to its ultimate decision, the Court of Appeals interpret-
ed the parties’ agreements, and the panel interpreted and applied
statutory provisions. The interpretation of statutes and written con-
tracts is a question of law over which this court exercises unlimited
review, unaffected by the lower courts’ interpretations or rulings.
See Prairie Land Elec. Co-op v. Kansas Elec. Power Co-op, 299
Kan. 360, 366, 323 P.3d 1270 (2014) (appellate court exercises un-
limited review over interpretation and legal effect of written instru-
ments; not bound by lower court's interpretation); Cady v. Schroll,
298 Kan. 731, 734, 317 P.3d 90 (2014) (statutory interpretation le-
gal question subject to unlimited review).

CC

VALIDITY OF THE CREDITOR’S STRICT FORECLOSURE

The Born Trust’s first three issues on review posed the follow-
ing questions: (1) Whether Sharon’s acceptance of the collateral
in satisfaction of the notes under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620 was
proper, given that the Bom Trust did not consent to that proce-
dure but rather objected thereto; (2) whether the Born Trust was
required to both object to the acceptance of collateral and redeem
the collateral in order to prevent Sharon from accepting the collat-
eral in satisfaction of the notes under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620;
and (3) whether Sharon’s sole remedy under the notes and security
agreements was to accept the collateral in full satisfaction of the
indebtedness.

Those issues were intertwined by the Court of Appeals when
it determined that Kansas’ version of the Uniform Commercial
Code, K.S.A. 84-9-101 et seq., applied to the transactions involved
in this case; that Sharon’s sole default remedy under the written
agreements was to accept the collateral in full satisfaction of the re-
maining indebtedness; and that, in such a case, K.S.A. 2013 Supp.
84-9-620 had to be interpreted to require the Born Trust to both
object to the acceptance of collateral and to redeem the collateral
by tendering “fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collater-
al.” Born, 2014 WL 1096602, at *14. Accordingly, we will consider
those three questions together.

The Court of Appeals’ holding that the UCC applies to the par-
ties’ transactions in this case has not been challenged on review,
and that holding is supported by K.S.A. 2013 Supp:'84-9-109(a)(1),
which states that Article 9 applies to “[a] transaction, regardless
of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or
fixtures by contract.” Here, the sale transactions created security
interests in personal property (corporate stock and LLC member-
ship units) by the two contracts which were labeled “Pledge Agree-
ment.” See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-1-201(b)(35) (defining “security
interest”). In addition, the parties specifically provided in the se-
curity agreements that “all words in this Agreement shall have the
meaning given to them in the Uniform Commercial Code.”

The applicability of the UCC is important here because, as the
panel acknowledged, Article 9 provides a secured party with sev-

556

eral remedy options. Born, 2014 WL 1096602, at *6-7. Those UCC
remedies are cumulative and may be used simultaneously. K.S.A.
2013 Supp. 84-9-601(c), Comment 5. Moreover, K.S.A. 2013 Supp.
84-9-601(a) indicates that the statutory remedies on default are in
addition to “those [remedies] provided by agreement of the par-
ties,” so long as the agreement does not contravene the nonwaiver
provisions of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-602. Nevertheless, the Court
of Appeals determined that only one remedy could apply in this
case, declaring:

“In the present case, the terms of the parties’ agreements specifically limited
Sharon to a single remedy—accepting the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt.
‘The UCC regulates the manner in which a secured party may accept collateral.
See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620(A). This procedure cannot be waived. K.S.A.
2013 Supp. 84-9-602(10).” 2014 WL 1096602, at 7.

The sole remedy identified by the panel—acceptance of collat-
eral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation—is set forth in
KS.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620. As it relates to the facts of this case,
that statute provides that a secured party may accept collateral in
full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures “only if” the
debtor consents to the acceptance or the secured party does not
receive an authenticated objection to the proposal within 20 days
of giving the debtor notice of the proposal. K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-
9-620(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), and (d).

The remedy described in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620 is also
known as a strict foreclosure, which is defined as “a procedure by
which the secured party acquires the debtor’s interest in the collat-
eral without the need for a sale or other disposition under Section
9-610.” K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620, Comment 2. “Strict foreclo-
sure eliminates the need for the secured party to dispose of the col-
lateral,” and “[wJhere the collateral is accepted in full satisfaction
of the debt, the secured party effectively waives its right to a defi-
ciency and the debtor waives its right to any surplus.” 11 Anderson
on the Uniform Commercial Code § 9-620:3 (3d ed. 2007).

“The acceptance or retention of collateral is a permissive, not
mandatory remedy. Moreover, a debtor cannot force a secured
creditor to accept the property in satisfaction of the debt.” 68A Am.
Jur. 2d, Secured Transactions § 577. On the other hand, “[b]ecause

—— SC

the debtor loses any right that he [or she] may otherwise have to
the amount by which the value of the collateral exceeds the debt
(‘the surplus’), the debtor must consent to the secured party’s deci-
sion to strictly foreclose upon the collateral.” (Emphasis added.) 11
Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 9-620:8. Arguably,
that consent must occur at the time the secured party proposes
strict foreclosure, rather than at the time the contract is executed.
See, ¢.g., In re CBGB Holdings, LLC, 439 B.R. 551, 555 (Bank.
S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] debtor cannot consent to strict foreclosure in
anticipation of a future default at the time it enters into the transac-
tion that creates the debt and security interest.”). Because both the
note balance and the value of collateral can change dramatically
over the term of a note, i.¢., the existence of surplus or deficit col-
lateral value is a constantly moving target, a “Inowing” consent to
strict foreclosure can only be made at the time the secured party
proposes the strict foreclosure.

The changing effect of strict foreclosure on a debtor's surplus is
poignantly illustrated by the TJ Leasing transaction. The promis-
sory note was initially made for the full purchase price of $825,877,
plus interest, payable at $50,000 per year. At that rate of repay-
ment, it would take 16.5 years to pay just the principal. But within
the first year of the installment note, the debtor paid off nearly half
of the indebtedness, only to have the secured party strictly fore-
close on the collateral securing the debt, taking any surplus of the
collateral’s value over the remaining debt that the payment of 45%
of the purchase price had generated. To be colloquial, Sharon got
to have her cake and eat 45% of it too on the TJ Leasing transac-
tion, at the expense of John’s heirs.

Accordingly, the panel’s determination that the Born Trust did
not consent to the strict foreclosure, but rather timely notified Sha-
ron that it objected to the strict foreclosure proposal should have
ended the inquiry with a ruling in favor of the Born Trust. The
statute’s use of “only if” clearly establishes mandatory conditions
precedent to a creditor’s permissive use of strict foreclosure. Under
our facts, those conditions precedent to strict foreclosure would be
either that the debtor consented or that the debtor failed to object

after notice. Sharon could not establish either condition; the Born
Trust did not consent and it did object.

But the Court of Appeals read into the statute an additional con-
dition that a debtor must establish in order to prevent a secured
party from forcing a strict foreclosure. Under the panel’s interpre-
tation, a debtor's objection to the strict foreclosure proposal under
K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620 must be accompanied with a redemp-
tion of the collateral under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-623. But that
does not comport with a plain language construction, under any
reasonable interpretation of the common meaning of the common
words employed in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620. See In re Tax Ap-
peal of Burch, 296 Kan. 713, 722, 294 P.3d 1155 (2013) (when stat-
ute plain and unambiguous, appellate court cannot read something
into statute that is not there).

Further, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of K.S.A. 2013
Supp. 84-9-620 is inconsistent with other provisions of the UCC.
For instance, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-623(c)(3) provides that re-
demption may occur “at any time before a secured party: . . . has
accepted collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation
it secures under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-622, and amendments
thereto.” The K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-622 referred to in that re-
demption provision deals with the effect of an acceptance of col-
lateral, and its corresponding Comment explains: “The acceptance
to which it refers is an effective acceptance. If a purported accep-
tance is ineffective under Section 9-620, ¢.g., because the secured
party receives a timely objection from a person entitled to notifica-
tion, then neither this subsection nor subsection (b) applies.” (Em-
phasis added.) K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-622, Comment 2. Pointedly,
the comment does not say that to avoid the effects of an acceptance
the debtor must also redeem the collateral.

The only way to statutorily square the Court of Appeals’ result
would be to infer that it found that the Born Trust’s ineffectual
redemption of collateral under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-623 acted
as a waiver or a variance of the rules by which a debtor prevents
strict foreclosure with a notification of objection under K.S.A. 2013
Supp. 84-9-620. But that pathway runs counter to the proscrip-
tion against waiver or variance in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-602. The

Court of Appeals opinion mentions that statute in passing but fails
to acknowledge that it does not apply to Sharon’s rights. To the
contrary, the statute begins with the following limiting language,
to-wit: “[T]o the extent that they give rights to a debtor or obligor
and impose duties on a secured party, the debtor or obligor may
not waive or vary the rules stated in the following listed sections.”
K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-602. In other words, the nonwaiver stat-
ute only proscribed a waiver or variance of a statutory rule by TJ
Leasing or the Born Trust (as debtor and obligor, respectively); the
statute did not prevent a waiver or variance of a statutory rule by
Sharon, as the secured party. Moreover, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-
602 only prevented a waiver or variance of a statutory rule that gave
TJ Leasing or the Born Trust a right or that imposed a duty on Sha-
ron; rules giving rights to Sharon or imposing duties on TJ Leasing
or the Born Trust were unaffected by K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-602.

K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620, dealing with the acceptance of col-
lateral in satisfaction of the obligation, i.e., strict foreclosure, is one
of the sections listed in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-602 as containing
debtor’s rights and/or secured party's duties that cannot be waived
or varied. Yet, the panel did that very thing; it varied the statutory
rules of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620 by taking away the right of a
debtor/obligor to prevent strict foreclosure by the sole and only act
of effectively objecting to the secured party's proposal. Put another
way, the panel’s additions to K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-620 not only
violated canons of statutory construction but also ran counter to
the specific nonvariance provisions of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-602.

Apparently, the Court of Appeals felt compelled to augment the
statute governing strict foreclosure because it opined that the cir-
cumstance into which Sharon had placed herself by written agree-
ments left her with no remedy when the Born Trust exercised its
statutory right to object to strict foreclosure. Again, the parties’
agreements could waive or vary Sharon’s rights without violating
K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-602. Therefore, court intervention to re-
store any right or remedy that Sharon might have contracted away
was not statutorily warranted or appropriate.

Moreover, as will be discussed below, the panel's initial prem-
ise—that the parties’ agreements only permitted Sharon to strictly

560

foreclose on the collateral upon default—was faulty and doomed
its analysis from the outset. Nevertheless, even if the parties’ writ-
ten agreements had created an untenable circumstance for the se-
cured party that the court could or should rectify, the fix should
have been aimed at the provisions of the agreements causing the
problem, rather than revising the applicable statutory provisions.

There is statutory support for fixing the agreements. For in-
stance, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 84-9-603(a) indicates that where the par-
ties are permitted to determine by agreement the standards mea-
suring the fulfillment of rights and duties, those standards cannot
be “manifestly unreasonable.” Cf K.S.A. 84-2-302(1) (court may
limit application of unconscionable clause of sales contract to avoid
any unconscionable result). Likewise, there is contractual support
for fixing any invalid provisions in the agreements. The parties’ se-
curity agreements contained a severability provision stating that “if
any one or more such paragraphs shall be adjudged or declared il-
legal, invalid or unenforceable, this Agreement shall be interpreted
and shall remain in full force and effect as though such paragraph
or paragraphs had never been contained in this Agreement.” In
short, a determination that a provision of the parties’ agreements
is manifestly unreasonable or unconscionable does not provide the
justification for a court to revamp a statute that had nothing to do
with creating the perceived problem.

Turning to the question of whether the agreements limited Sha-
ron’s default option to strict foreclosure, we first observe that the
Court of Appeals focused entirely on Sharon’s rights under the
default paragraph of the security agreements. After substituting
Sharon’s name for that of her assignor, Born Stone, Inc., the de-
fault and remedies paragraph in the T] Leasing security agreement
provided:

“Whenever an Event of Default exists as set forth in the Note beyond any ap-
plicable cure period, or in the event Members fail to comply with the provisions
of Paragraph 6, [Sharon] shall accept the Collateral by giving notice of such fact to
Members in which case [Sharon] shall forthwith take possession of the Collateral
and all interest of Members therein shall be forfeited and shall cease and termi-
nate, and neither [Sharon] nor Members shall have an [sic] further liability to the
other under this Agreement.”

We pause to note that the parties and the panel did not ac-
knowledge that, in connection with the asset purchase transaction,
the borrower on the promissory note is TJ Leasing, but the assets
pledged to secure that note are individually owned by the Born
‘Trust and Todd. The record does not reflect whether the T] Leas-
ing members personally guaranteed the full amount of the corpo-
rate debt or whether they simply pledged their individual assets to
secure the debt only to the extent of the value of those pledged as-
sets, Nevertheless, the failure to differentiate between the debtor
and the other obligors on the T] Leasing note will not affect our
resolution of this appeal.

In the stock purchase transaction, where the borrower on the
note was also the owner of the assets pledged as security, the se-
curity agreement contained essentially the same default provision,
to-wit:

“Whenever an Event of Default exists as set forth in the Note beyond any ap-
plicable cure period, or in the event Stockholder fails to comply with provisions
of Paragraph 6, [Sharon] shall accept the Collateral by giving notice of such fact
to Stockholder in which case [Sharon] shall forthwith take possession of the Col-
lateral and all interest of Stockholder therein shall be forfeited and shall cease
and terminate, and neither [Sharon] nor Stockholder shall have an [sic] further
liability to the other under this Agreement.”

The panel apparently read the phrase, “shall accept the Collat-
eral,” as meaning that “the parties’ agreements specifically limited
Sharon to a single remedy—accepting the collateral in full satisfac-
tion of the debt.” But, of course, the phrase does not specifically
state that acceptance of collateral is Sharon’s exclusive remedy.
Moreover, reading the phrase in context would refute that such a
reading should be implied. Within the same sentence, the phrase
is immediately followed by the words, “by giving notice of such
fact to Stockholder,” which could indicate that the word “shall” was
intended to mandate the manner in which Sharon could accept the
collateral. To paraphrase, the sentence could mean: “To use the
acceptance of collateral remedy, Sharon shall give notice of such
fact to Stockholder.” Nevertheless, the security agreement certain-
ly does not mandate that the remedies provided under the UCC,

562

which are in addition to those provided by the agreement, are not
applicable to this transaction.

More importantly, however, the paragraph begins by referring to
the provisions of the promissory note, specifically mentioning the
events constituting a default set forth in the note and any applica-
ble cure period. That reference acknowledges that the promissory
note contains certain rights and duties as between the lender and
borrower, separate and apart from the security agreement. Indeed,
the note and the security agreement perform separate functions.
The note governs the manner and method of the repayment of the
debt, whereas the security agreement governs the disposition of
the collateral pledged to assure the performance of the debtor un-
der the note. See 8A Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 9-102:42 (“The purpose of a security interest is that ‘the collateral
serves to assure repayment of the debt in case of default.’”).

Here, as previously indicated, the note enumerates the events
which would place the borrower in default, one of which was “the
death of either John H. Born, Jr. or Todd Born.” The next para-
graph of the note, entitled “Acceleration of Purchase Price Note
upon Event of Default,” states:

“Upon the occurrence of an Event of Default, Lender may, at its option and in
its sole discretion, declare the entire balance of this Purchase Price Note, includ-
ing all interest, costs, expenses, charges, disbursements and fees payable by Bor-
rower hereunder, to be immediately due and payable, and upon such declaration
all sums outstanding and unpaid under this Purchase Price Note shall become and
be in default, matured and immediately due and payable, without presentment,
demand, protest or any notice of any kind to Borrower or any other person.”

That provision of the notes gave Sharon the option to accelerate
the notes and demand payment of the remaining balances. There is
nothing that would have precluded Sharon from accepting Betty's
proffer of the $50,000 annual payments on each note, rather than
declaring an acceleration. But in either event, paragraph l.c. of
the note directs the borrower as follows: “All payments due under
[the] Purchase Price Note shall be made to Lender [at her address]
in lawful money of the United States.” The notes contemplated
cash payments.

Clearly, then, upon John’s death, the promissory notes gave Sha-

—— CC

ron remedies other than strict foreclosure of the collateral, e.g.,
she could continue to accept annual payments under the install-
ment notes or she could declare an acceleration of the notes and
receive monetary payments of the full amount of their remaining
balances. Nothing in the provisions of the notes would suggest that
the lender was limited to receiving the “immediately due and pay-
able” accelerated note balances in the form of forfeited collateral.
To the contrary, the intended endgame on a promissory note is nor-
mally the full payment of the debt, rather than a foreclosure on the
securing collateral.
Moreover, the remedies available to a lender under a promis-
sory note are not lost simply by taking a security interest in the
debtor’s collateral. A secured party, i.¢., a person who has loaned
money and secured collateral to assure repayment, “may also, at
its option, ignore that security and satisfy its judgment from other
property in the hands of the judgment debtor.” Kennedy v. Bank of
Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881, 884 (Utah 1979). See also Gillenwater v.
Mid-American Bank & Tr. Co., 19 Kan. App. 2d 420, Syl. ¢ 3, 870
P.2d 700 (1994) (holding that creditor was not required to foreclose
on a mortgage securing a note, but instead creditor could first sue
debtors on the note). In other words, Sharon always had the option
to forego a pursuit of her interest in the collateral under the secu-
rity agreements and simply assert her right to repayment under the
notes. :

In this case, Sharon attempted to take both routes; she declared
the accelerated notes “immediately due and payable,” while at the
same time proposing to accept the collateral in full satisfaction of
the debts. When the Born Trust, as obligor on the TJ Leasing note
and debtor on the Stock Purchase note, objected to Sharon’s strict
foreclosure proposal, that remedy was precluded by statute. But
Sharon’s right to accept payment of the amounts due under the
notes was still very much alive and well.

Likewise, both notes gave the borrower the right to prepay any
amount of indebtedness at any time; nothing in either note pur-
ports to extinguish the borrower's right to pay the notes with money
when the lender declares an acceleration. That result should not
change simply by labeling the tender of payment due on the note

as a cure for a default. To the contrary, even the security agree-
ments contemplate the possibility that an Event of Default can be
cured, e.g., by payment in full, before the collateral remedies are
invoked. The default/remedies paragraph in both security agree-
ments specifically states that its provisions apply “[w]henever an
Event of Default exists . . . beyond any applicable cure period.”
Certainly, that language is inconsistent with Sharon’s argument that
the parties intended strict foreclosure to be automatically and im-
mediately triggered when John died, without any opportunity to
cure the default with full payment.

In summary, when Sharon invoked her Event of Default option
to accelerate the notes, declaring the remaining balances to be im-
mediately due and payable, the Born Trust, as obligor under one
note and debtor under the other, had the right to cure the declared
default by paying the accelerated balances on the notes “in lawful
money of the United States.” Sharon was not prohibited by law or
by agreement from accepting the tender of a monetary payment
on the accelerated debt. She was, however, prohibited by law from
strictly foreclosing on the collateral without the consent and over
the objection of the Born Trust.

The Born Trust made a concerted effort to exercise its right to
pay the accelerated notes in full. First, the day following Sharon’s
notice of acceleration, the trust’s attorney contacted Sharon’s at-
torney to proffer and arrange for payment in full on the remaining
balances. On Sharon’s behalf, her attorney rejected the proffer, tak-
ing the position that she did not have to accept note payments be-
cause she was strictly foreclosing on the collateral. Notwithstand-
ing Sharon’s blanket refusal to accept any monetary payments, the
Born Trust followed its proffer by tendering a $964,144.87 certified
check to Sharon’s counsel, indicating that it was intended to “satisfy
all amounts due under the contracts.” Sharon’s attorney rejected
the payment and returned the certified check, again asserting that
strict foreclosure was the only remedy.

The Court of Appeals found that the tender of payment was an
ineffectual redemption of collateral because it was for an amount
less than the total remaining balance on the two notes. It supported
that conclusion by stating that the parties later agreed that the bal-

—— SC

ances on the notes totaled $1,193,036.74. 2014 WL 1096602, at
*4. But the panel does not indicate whether that figure takes into
account the value of surrendered collateral. Certainly, TJ Leasing,
as the borrower on the asset purchase note, was entitled to a credit
against the TJ Leasing note for the value of the collateral its mem-
ber transferred to the lender, in the same manner as it received
credit for the gratuitous $375,000 prepayment on the note to help
Sharon out of her tax problem.

But the district court did not make any factual findings on the
value of Todd’s membership units that were surrendered to Sha-
ron, except to observe that the value of a minority stock holding is
sometimes discounted. That observation is suspect for more than
one reason. First, if the outstanding balance of the TJ Leasing note
is disputed because the amount of credit for surrendered collateral
is in dispute, summary judgment would not have been proper.

Next, even if the value of Todd’s membership units was dis-
counted, it was worth something, and that something should have
been credited against the debt. The panel's holding that a partial
acceptance of collateral was not permitted is belied by Sharon’s ac-
tions in accepting the partial strict foreclosure in lieu of payment.
If the Born Trust has to pay the entire balance on the T] Leasing
note, without reduction for Todd’s surrendered collateral, does the
trust seek contribution from Todd or Sharon?

Finally, if the minority discount to which the district court re-
ferred is from the current book value of the TJ Leasing member-
ship units, the discounted value of 49% of the units might well ex-
ceed the value of 49% of the remaining balance on the TJ Leasing
note (which the Born Trust claimed). That result could easily ob-
tain if the company’s profits in its first year of operation increased
the book value of its units or if the book value remained the same
but the note balance was drastically reduced by the large prepay-
ment, or both.

But more importantly, Sharon did not reject the Born Trust’s
tender of payment because she disputed the amount tendered. She
wrongfully rejected the tender in order to force a strict foreclo-
sure, which was not permitted by law or required by agreement.
Accordingly, the Born Trust’s good faith tender of the amount it

believed to be due on the notes, in the absence of any claim at the
time by Sharon that the tender was insufficient, established the
Born Trust's right to cure the Event of Default by paying the notes
and triggered the date on which to establish the indebtedness. Cf.
K.S.A. 84-3-603(c) (“If tender of payment of an amount due on an
instrument is made to a person entitled to enforce the instrument,
the obligation of the obligor to pay interest after the due date on
the amount tendered is discharged.”). Sharon’s later claim that the
amount tendered was not enough simply served to establish the
existence of a material disputed fact that the district court should
have resolved.

Consequently, the holdings of the Court of Appeals are reversed.
The matter is remanded to the district court for further proceed-
ings to determine, as of September 28, 2011, the amount due from
the Born Trust on the stock purchase note and the amount due
from TJ] Leasing on the asset purchase note, giving appropriate
credit for the value of Todd’s transferred membership units to the
lender. Upon payment of those amounts, Sharon’s liens against the
pledged collateral shall be terminated and released.

Reversed and remanded.

No. 109,367

Caro. EINSEL, Appellant, v. RODNEY EINSEL, individually; NAN-
cy E. Haas; CHARLENE EINSEL; RODNEY EINSEL, as Execu-
tor of the Estate of Anna Louise Einsel; et al., Appellees.

(374 B3d 612)

Opinion filed June 10, 2016.

— 4

Carol M. Park, of Glassman, Bird, Schwartz & Park, L.L.P,, of Hays, argued
the cause, and John T. Bird, of the same firm, was with her on the briefs for ap-
pellant.

Charles H. Herd, of Coldwater, argued the cause and was on the briefs for
appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Per Curiam: The heart of the dispute in this appeal, which arises

in the context of a partition action, raises a question of the correct
interpretation of a journal entry of judgment in a prior divorce pro-
ceeding. More specifically, the parties disagree about the effect of
language in the journal entry granting the wife a percentage of the
husband's remainder interest in an inheritance, which consisted
mostly of land and mineral interests. The district court determined
the decree granted the wife a money judgment. On appeal from
that decision, the Court of Appeals reviewed the judgment de novo
and held the divorce decree granted the wife an interest in prop-
erty. Einsel v. Einsel, No. 109,367, 2014 WL 1795993, at *2 (Kan.
App. 2014) (unpublished opinion).
On petition for review the husband argues the Court of Appeals
erred in applying a de novo standard of review and in interpreting
the divorce decree as granting the wife an interest in real property.
We disagree with his arguments, and, as we explain below, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals’ ruling, although we issue slightly differ-
ent remand instructions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Preliminary partition proceeding

In January 2010, Carol Einsel filed a petition for partition in
Comanche County District Court against her ex-husband, Rodney
Einsel. Although Carol initially named several other members of
the Einsel family as defendants, these parties were peripheral (and
some were dismissed). Due to the shared surnames, we will refer
to the parties by their first names in order to avoid confusion. All
parties agree the dispute is really only between Carol and Rodney,
and we will limit our recitation of the facts accordingly.

The ownership interests at stake in this case involved the Einsel

569

family ranch—specifically, interests in 12 tracts of land in Coman-

che County (the surface rights), a total of 14 oil and gas wells in Co-

manche and Kiowa Counties (the mineral interests), and 3 tracts of
land with mineral interests in Kiowa County. Carol alleged she had

an ownership interest in certain surface and mineral interests that -
had previously been enjoyed only by Rodney and his family. Her

petition did not differentiate between the surface rights and miner-

al interests and instead asserted these rights were all owned in the

following percentages: each of Rodney's two sisters, an undivided

one-third; Rodney, an undivided 60% of one-third; and Carol, an

undivided 40% of one-third. She requested an order specifying

the parties’ interests and directing partition pursuant to K.S.A. 60-

1003; she later moved for payment of oil and gas proceeds from the

14 wells and the mineral interests in Kiowa County.

In his answer, Rodney explained that Carol's claim derived from
a 1994 journal entry of divorce (the “divorce decree”) in their ear-
lier divorce proceedings, which had been filed and heard in Ellis
County District Court. The judge presiding over the divorce had
awarded Carol 40% of Rodney's remainder interest in the inheri-
tance he received during the marriage. Rodney disputed whether
he actually received any interest in his inheritance during his mar-
riage to Carol; regardless, he also argued that the divorce decree
did not award Carol an interest in real property. According to
Rodney, partition was inappropriate because Carol’s interest was
limited to the value of Rodney's remainder interest on the date of
the divorce decree. In response to Carol's motion for payment of
oil and gas proceeds, Rodney explained he and his sisters actually
owned a one-sixth interest in the Einsel real estate and mineral
interests, not a one-third interest as Carol claimed.

The partition court denied as premature Carol's motion for pay-
ment of oil and gas proceeds, and it then scheduled a hearing and
ordered briefing between the parties regarding Carol’s ownership
rights, if any, in the Einsel ranch and associated mineral interests.
Essentially, the parties’ disagreement at this point hinged on the
nature of Carol's award in the divorce proceedings. Accordingly, we
turn to the documents the parties submitted to the partition court
regarding the divorce decree.

570

B. Documents submitted to the partition court in advance of the
hearing

According to exhibits submitted by the parties, Carol and Rod-
ney were married in May 1966. Rodney's father, Victor Einsel, died
testate in April 1992; his will was admitted to probate in June 1992.

Carol and Rodney experienced marital difficulties, and in De-
cember 1992 (approximately 8 months after Victor’s death), Carol
petitioned for separate maintenance.

Victor Einsel’s estate

In January 1993, the probate court entered a journal entry of
final settlement on Victor's estate (the “probate order”). This pro-
bate order is relevant to the instant case because it defined what
Victor owned at the time of his death and informed what Rodney
could receive from Victor in inheritance. The probate order re-
counted that at the time of his death Victor owned an undivided
one-half interest in the Einsel ranch in Comanche County (the
surface rights) and also owned fractional interests in 14 oil and gas
wells in Comanche and Kiowa Counties (the mineral interests).
Victor also possessed a one-sixth or one-half interest in certain sev-
ered mineral interests in Comanche and Kiowa counties (the sev-
ered mineral interests). Victor held other property as a joint tenant
in common with his wife, Anna Lou Einsel, and the probate court
ruled that Victor's interest in this other property terminated upon
his death, and full ownership devolved to Anna Lou as the surviv-
ing joint tenant.

The divorce proceedings

In June 1993, Rodney answered Carol's petition for separate
maintenance and counterclaimed for divorce in Ellis County Dis-
trict Court. In a hearing before the divorce court, Carol explained
she was unemployed and had been unable to find work, was pre-
viously hospitalized due to emotional turmoil and had significant
medical bills, had no means of support since Rodney stopped de-
positing money in their joint account, did not have reliable trans-
portation, and was in need of funds.

In an October 1993 hearing, the divorce court asked the parties

if there would be substantial arguments about the value of any as-
sets. Carol responded that there was only one such issue—“[t]he
value of remainder interests in [Victor's] estate, a sizable amount of
land in the estate.” Rodney agreed there was an immediate issue as
to “what the nature of his interest in that land is, if any.”

Prior to its final ruling, the divorce court received a valuation
of Rodney's interest. According to tlie valuations, the Einsel ranch
was valued at $892,680, and the royalty interests in Comanche and
Kiowa Counties were worth $73,224, for a grand total of $965,904.
Rodney owned a one-third remainder interest in one-half of this
property (i.e., the half owned by Victor at the time of his death),
valued at $160,984. Using actuarial tables, Rodney's net remainder
interest value as of January 1994 was $68,802.95.

The divorce court made its ruling in the divorce case in January
1994, The transcript of the final hearing shows the divorce court re-
alized “there just isn’t a lot of cash to go around” between Rodney
and Carol. It recognized Carol was in “necessitate circumstances”
and would likely remain that way despite her best efforts. Consid-
ering numerous factors, including employability and earning ca-
pacity, the divorce court awarded Carol $400 per month in alimony
for 6 years.

The divorce court then turned to the “last remaining major is-
sue,” Rodney's “remainder interest in the property in [Comanche]
County and the royalty interest in [Comanche] County and Kiowa
County.” It noted the parties had stipulated that the, present value
of the property was $68,802.95. The divorce court, acknowledged
Rodney's argument that because he only received an interest in
the property upon Victor's death, right around when he and Carol
separated, Carol should receive none of it; it also noted Carol's po-
sition that she should receive all of it.

Ultimately, the divorce court concluded:

“[T]he fair thing to do here—even considering that this was obtained as a result of
inheritance, rather than the ‘efforts of the parties’ is to allow [Carol] to have the
following: I am going to give her forty percent of this remainder interest on the
condition that [Rodney] has not paid her $22,500.00 within six months of todays
date. That shall bear no interest. As I calculate it, 40% based upon this appraisal
is $27,000.00 some dollars(‘] worth, therefore, [Rodney] can—if he feels that it is
worth what the appraisal has listed it at—essentially can buy it back for less than
the appraisal.”

The divorce court issued a corresponding journal entry of di-
vorce, in which it awarded Carol, inter alia:
“{Florty percent (40%) of the remainder interest of the inheritance received by
[Rodney] during the marriage, on the condition that [Rodney] may opt to pay
[Carol] the sum of $22,500.00 within six (6) months of the date of hearing, in
which case [Rodney] shall receive all of the remainder interest.”

Rodney appealed, and in 1995 the Court of Appeals affirmed
the divorce court’s award to Carol—though it remanded for further
findings of fact as to Rodney's income. In re Marriage of Einsel, No.
71,367, unpublished opinion filed May 12, 1995.

Anna Lou Einsel’s estate

The parties also submitted documents to the partition court
showing that Rodney's mother, Anna Lou, died in October 2008,
many years after the conclusion of the divorce proceedings. Her
will was admitted to probate; her estate included her own undivid-
ed half interest in the Einsel ranch real estate, her undivided half
interest in producing mineral rights in Comanche County, and her
undivided whole interest in other tracts of land which she acquired
as the surviving joint tenant to the land she and Victor owned.

C. Arguments before the partition court

Before the partition court, the parties primarily argued about
the nature of Carol’s award—was it an interest in a money judg-
ment, as Rodney urged, or was it an interest in real property, as
argued by Carol.

In Rodney's view, the divorce decree did not grant (or was in-
capable of granting) Carol an interest in Victor’s estate at all—but,
even assuming it did, her claim was limited to 40% of the value of
Rodney's remainder interest. Rodney reasoned that if the divorce
court intended to give Carol 40% outright it would not have set the
buyback value of the property at issue at $22,500.

For her part, Carol argued the divorce decree gave her an inter-
est in the Einsel ranch itself—an interest in real property. She, like
Rodney, focused on the $22,500 buyback provision—but, in her
view, this valuation did not indicate her award was a money judg-
ment but instead merely allowed Rodney to choose how to allocate

573

his risk. Namely, he could pay the $22,500 lump sum and reclaim
his whole interest in real property but risk predeceasing his mother
and never experiencing the benefit of his remainder interest (i.¢.,
his interest would never become possessory). Or, he could not pay
the lump sum and risk the property being worth more than $22,500
when Carol decided to foreclose on the interest.

Carol explained that now she had decided to foreclose on the
interest: Anna Lou had passed away and Rodney's remainder in-
terest had become a possessory interest—an interest in fee sim-
ple—and was subject to partition. She requested partition of the
Einsel ranch as follows: Carol, 6.66%; Rodney, 10%; each of Rod-
ney’s two sisters, 16.66%; and Anna Lou's estate/trust, 50%. Carol
acknowledged some of the severed mineral interests identified as
part of Victor's estate had expired or were sold during Anna Lou's
life tenancy; but, she noted, Victor's will required Anna Lou to use
proceeds from such sales to invest and reinvest in real and personal
property to be distributed to the remaindermen. Accordingly, she
requested partition of the 14 wells as follows: Carol, 13.33%; Rod-
ney, 20%; and each of Rodney's two sisters, 33.33%.

D. Partition court’s decision

After receiving the parties’ submitted documents and briefs, the
partition court held a hearing in November 2012 expressly to re-
solve the issue of the proper interpretation of the Ellis County Dis-
trict Court’s 1994 divorce decree. The partition court first agree
with Carol that the divorce decree clearly meant to.award her some
interest in Rodney’s share of Victor’s estate.

Looking at the submitted documents, the partition court paid
particular attention to the valuations of Rodney's remainder inter-
est that were provided to the divorce court. The partition court
explained that $68,802.95 present interest value as of January 1994
established the value of Rodney’s reminder interest that he re-
ceived during the marriage—and the divorce decree gave Carol
“40 percent of this figure,” which would be $27,521.18. The parti-
tion court thus concluded that the divorce decree gave Carol an
interest in a money judgment in the amount of $27,521.18.

In the partition court’s view, the buyback provision supporte

574

this interpretation: the buyback provision gave Rodney “an op-
portunity to purchase the full remainder interest back at a discount
rate of $22,500, or just write out a $5,000 [approximate] discount
if he did so within six months.” Basically, the partition court ex-
plained, the divorce court was attempting to persuade Rodney to
“pay a discounted lump sum to [Carol] so she would have a sub-
stantial sum of money to assist her with her immediate financial
needs.”

Accordingly, the partition court found that Carol’s interest in
Rodney's inheritance was $27,521.18; it granted her a judgment in
this amount. It then declared Rodney owned 16.66% of the family
ranch, each of his two sisters also owned 16.66%, and Anna Lou's
estate/trust owned 50%. As for the mineral rights, Rodney owned
33.33% and each of his two sisters owned 33.33%.

At this point in the proceedings Carol pointed out that if the
divorce decree was interpreted as providing her only a money judg-
ment, the divorce court had not made any provision for interest as
would have been required under Kansas law. The partition court
reviewed the divorce decree and ruled Carol would not be awarded
any interest stemming from Rodney’s failure to pay her $22,500
within 6 months of the divorce court’s order.

E. Court of Appeals decision

Carol appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued the parti-
tion court erred in interpreting the nature of her award under the
divorce decree. She reasoned the transcript of the divorce court's
ruling clearly evidenced its intent to give her an interest in real
property, even if this intent was not clear from the divorce decree
alone.

In response, Rodney agreed the divorce decree, considered
on its own, was insufficient to convey an interest in real proper-
ty regarding the Einsel ranch. However, in his view, the divorce
decree allowed Carol to receive $22,500 if Rodney paid within 6
months, and, if not, 40% of $68,802.95 (the present value of Rod-
ney’s remainder interest)—which, according to Rodney, bore the
“hallmarks ofa secured transaction.” Rodney contended the terms
and structure of the award supported the partition court’s inter-

575

pretation of the divorce decree, but, in any event, the balance of
equities also supported the partition court's decision. The partition
court knew the whole history of Victor's estate and Carol and Rod-
ney’s divorce. It also knew that a decision to partition the Einsel
ranch would affect Rodney's family, and it was within the court’s
equitable powers to determine Carol had no fee simple interest in
the property. Rodney also urged the Court of Appeals to consider
the equitable mortgage doctrine and view Carol’s award as a lien
against Rodney's property subject to discharge once Rodney paid
her what he owed.

Although the Court of Appeals did not specifically address Rod-
ney’s equitable mortgage argument, which he based on Fuqua v.
Hanson, 222, Kan. 653, 567 P.2d 862 (1977), or his brief contention
that Carol’s award was a secured transaction, it implicitly rejected
these theories by ruling that the divorce decree awarded Carol an
interest in real property, not an interest in a money judgment. Ein-
sel, 2014 WL 1795993, at *1-2. The panel ruled the divorce court
“intended to award Carol an interest in real property, conditioned
on Rodney’s failure to pay her a lump sum of cash within 6 months
of the order.” Einsel, 2014 WL 1795993, at *2. In so doing, the
Court of Appeals disagreed with both parties’ positions that the
court needed to look beyond the journal entry of divorce—the
written journal entry was the controlling document and there was

“no indication . . . that [the judge in the divorce proceeding] in-
tended the award to be a monetary judgment.” Einsel, 2014 WL
1795993, at *2.

Under the Court of Appeals’ interpretation, the journal entry of
divorce gave Rodney “two alternatives from which to choose”: ei-
ther he could pay a lump sum of $22,500 right away and then wait
for Anna Lou to die before he could enjoy the benefit of that pay-
ment; or he could choose not to pay the lump sum and risk Carol’s
40% share being worth more than $22,500 when his remainder in-
terest became possessory upon Anna Lou's death. Finsel, 2014 WL
1795993, at *2. The Court of Appeals acknowledged it was clear
the divorce court's order “was designed to benefit Carol no mat-
ter which option Rodney chose”—if Rodney paid $22,500 immedi-
ately or within 6 months, then Carol's immediate need for money

would be satisfied; and if Rodney did not pay the $22,500 Carol
would presumably have a larger benefit in the future, satisfying the
equities of the situation involving the parties’ different earning ca-
pacities. Zinsel, 2014 WL 1795993, at *2. Since Rodney elected not
to pay, the condition in the award was met and Carol was left with
40% of his remainder interest in real property—not a money judg-
ment. 2014 WL 1795993, at °2. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
“[rJeversed and remanded with directions to grant Carol's request
for partition as set forth in her petition.” 2014 WL 1795993, at °3.

We granted Rodney's petition for review of the Court of Appeals’
decision and have jurisdiction pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (“The
supreme court shall have jurisdiction to correct, modify, vacate or
reverse any act, order or judgment of a district court or court of ap-
peals in order to assure that any such act, order or judgment is just,
legal and free of abuse.”).

ANALYSIS

Rodney’s petition for review raised five issues, which we have
condensed into three: (1) What is the proper standard of review?
(2) What did the divorce court award to Carol? and (3) What are
the proper instructions on remand?

Before we resolve the parties’ arguments, a brief overview of
partition in Kansas helps place the parties’ arguments in perspec-
tive. “Partition” refers to dividing up an estate or interest in real
property into separate, distinct portions so that owners may own
their pieces separately. See generally K.S.A. 60-1003. Parceling out
an estate in this way may be desirable for any number of reasons—
perhaps the owners wish to terminate their relationship or avoid
the discord that so often comes with shared possession.

Once an owner/petitioner requests partition and the remaining
owners/defendants answer, the district court shall make an order
“specifying the interest of the respective parties and directing par-
tition.” K.S.A. 60-1003(c)(1). An order “directing partition” does
not automatically carve up an estate: instead, it merely marks the
start of the actual partition process. See K.S.A. 60-1003(c)(1).

After directing partition the district court shall appoint three
commissioners; it is these commissioners, not the court, who par-

577

titions the property among the parties according to their respec-
tive interests. K.S.A. 60-1003(c)(2) (also setting forth procedures if
partition is impracticable or manifestly injurious). Once the com-
missioners prepare their report for the court, any party may file
exceptions. K.S.A. 60-1003(c)(3). After a hearing, the judge may
approve, disapprove, or modify the commissioners’ report as jus-
tice and equity might require. K.S.A. 60-1003(c)(3).

The district court’s powers in partition proceedings are broad—
once it obtains jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter
in the case, a district court has “full power to make any order not
inconsistent with the provisions of this article that may be neces-
sary to make a just and equitable partition between the parties,
and to secure their respective interests, or may refuse partition if
the same would result in extraordinary hardship or oppression.”
K.S.A. 60-1003(d); see Peterson v. Peterson, 173 Kan. 636, 641,
251 P.2d 221 (1952) (asserting that a district court acting pursuant
to this statute “has plenary power to determine the right, title and
interest of the parties to the action”). Although a district court act-
ing pursuant to its partition powers may not create new ownership
interests, it may determine whether a particular party actually has
an ownership interest. See Jones v. Anderson, 171 Kan. 430, 435,
233 P.2d 483 (1951) (“A partition action is particularly designed
and suited to settle any and all rights of cotenants in and to the
property involved. The district court in such a proceeding has full
and complete power to adjudicate every legal and equitable right
of the parties to the litigation.”).

A district court possesses wide discretion in partition proceed-
ings because such proceedings require use of the court's equita-
ble powers, meaning its powers to make a fair and just division
of property based on the circumstances of a particular case. See
Home-Stake Production Co. v. Tri-State Pipe Co., 197 Kan. 163,
167, 169-70, 415 P.2d 377 (1966); Peterson, 173 Kan. at 641 (not-
ing that district courts involved in partition proceedings have “the
same powers as were exercised by chancery courts under equity
practice”); see also Johnson v. Burns, 160 Kan. 104, 111, 159 P.2d
812 (1945) (“Ordinarily where there is as wide a discretion reposed
in a trial court as is reposed in it in partition actions we are reluc-
tant to interpose our judgment for that of the trial court.”).

With this brief overview, we turn to the issues at hand.

I. Di THE Court OF APPEALS ERR IN REVIEWING THE
PARTITION COURT'S DECISION DE NOVO INSTEAD OF
REVIEWING FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION?

Rodney first argues a partition court wields plenary power and,
as a result, the Court of Appeals should have applied an abuse of
discretion standard of review rather than unlimited or de novo re-
view. Carol, in her brief to the Court of Appeals, had advocated for
de novo review.

Despite our repeated references to a district court’s broad pow-

ers in partition proceedings, our caselaw does not suggest, as Rod-
ney would have us conclude, that a district court's plenary powers
are absolute and entirely beyond appellate review. See Peterson,
173 Kan. at 641 (concluding, despite the district court’s plenary
partition powers, that the district court had made a reversible error
of law); see also Johnson, 160 Kan. at 111 (explaining the court is
“ordinarily” reluctant to supplant the partition court’s judgment be-
cause it possesses a wide “discretion”). Instead, an appellate court
reviews a district court’s exercise of powers in a partition proceed-
ing under an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Miller v.
Miller, 222 Kan. 317, 320, 564 P.2d 524 (1977), abrogated in part
on other grounds by Walnut Valley State Bank v. Stovall, 223 Kan.
459, 574 P.2d 1382 (1978); Sheets v. Simms, 36 Kan. App. 2d 361,
362, 364, 138 P.3d 1249 (2006) (reviewing a partition decision for
abuse of discretion).
“Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unrea-
sonable, i.¢., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the
trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an
erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.¢., if substantial
competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite
conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.” State v. Ward, 292 Kan.
541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).

The issue upon which this case turns is whether the journal en-
try of judgment in the Einsels’ divorce proceeding granted Carol
a money judgment rather than an ownership interest in property.

The interpretation of a journal entry, like the interpretation of all
written instruments, presents a question of law over which an ap-
pellate court exercises de novo, or unlimited, review. See Steele v.
Guardianship & Conservatorship of Crist, 251 Kan. 712, 719, 840
P2d 1107 (1992) (construing a journal entry). Abuse of discretion
review necessarily “‘includes review to determine that the discre-
tion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions,” in cases where
the question is whether the district court abused its discretion by
making an error of law. Likewise, “‘[l]ittle turns . .. on whether we
label [appellate] review of this particular question abuse of discre-
tion or de novo.’” State v. White, 279 Kan. 326, 332, 109 P.3d 1199
(2005) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S. Ct.
2035, 185 L. Ed. 2d 392 [1996]).

This is precisely the situation here: The district court’s inter-
pretation of the Einsels’ divorce decree is a legal conclusion sub-
ject to de novo review by an appellate court. If the district court
relied on an erroneous interpretation of that written instrument
it would constitute an abuse of its discretion. Thus, the Court of
Appeals applied the correct, de novo standard of review to the dis-
trict court's legal conclusion. While the better practice might have
been for the Court of Appeals to have started by recognizing the
overarching abuse of discretion standard of review in partition pro-
ceedings, here there was no practical difference in jumping to de
novo review of the partition court’s interpretation of the journal
entry of divorce. Any mistake of law on this point would qualify as
an abuse of discretion. See White, 279 Kan. at 332; Einsel, 2014
WL 1795993, at *2.

Rodney's contention that Carol’s claim was adjudicated on the
facts and that the partition court fashioned an equitable ruling af-
ter considering these facts thus somewhat misses the point: such
conclusions would ordinarily be left in place out of deference to a
partition court’s wide discretion, see Johnson, 160 Kan, at 111. But
in Carol’s case these conclusions were in large part based on the
partition court's interpretation of a journal entry of divorce—a legal
question, see White, 279 Kan. at 332.

Accordingly, we hold the Court of Appeals applied the correct
standard of review when reviewing the partition court’s order.

Il. Dip THE CourT OF APPEALS ERR IN IDENTIFYING THE
NATURE OF CAROL EINSEL’S INTEREST AS ONE IN REAL
PROPERTY, AS OPPOSED TO A MONEY JUDGMENT?

We now arrive at the heart of the case: what, exactly, did the
divorce decree give to Carol? Rodney argues it was a monetary
judgment, and he gives a plethora of reasons why the balance of
equities supported the partition court's decision, including: (1) the
divorce case was filed only 6 months after Victor Einsel died; (2)
Rodney did not receive the land interest from Victor's estate until
after the divorce was filed; (3) Carol did not contribute money or
labor to the land at issue and had no family ties to the property; (4)
Rodney’s property interest was subject to his mother’s life estate;
(5) neither Carol nor Rodney had any significant assets as of the
divorce; (6) Carol had immediate financial needs after the divorce;
(7) Rodney did not have the ability to exercise the buyback provi-
sion in the journal entry of divorce and pay $22,500 to Carol within
6 months; (8) Rodney’s mother was able to pay that $22,500 to Car-
ol; and @) Rodney's sisters’ undivided interests in the family ranch
could be lost in partition. Under Rodney’s interpretation, the whole
point of the divorce award was to provide for Carol’s immediate
needs, not to provide Carol with either a short-term lump payment
or a long-term investment benefit.

Rodney further asserts that the unacknowledged “elephant in
the room” is that Rodney’s mother, Anna Lou, was supposed to be
the one to pay Carol's $22,500 cash award—she had the resoure-
es, while Rodney did not, and the divorce court assumed that by
collateralizing payment of the cash award with an interest in the
Einsel family ranch, Anna Lou would pay out of fear that other-
wise her family’s future interests would be lost. Rodney argues this
unacknowledged strategy is disturbing and, on its own, justifies an.
equitable intervention.

Rodney also renews his argument that the divorce court did not
award Carol a fixed share of the land but rather employed a condi-
tional transfer of a property interest to collateralize payment of a
cash award—in other words, the divorce court set up Carol’s award
as a secured transaction.

581

As we mentioned above, the interpretation of a written instru-
ment is a matter of law over which we exercise de novo review.
Steele, 251 Kan. at 719; Godfrey v. Chandley, 248 Kan. 975, 977,
811 P2d 1248 (1991) (permitting an appellate court to construe
an instrument and determine its legal effect). The primary rule in
interpreting written instruments is to ascertain the intent of the
parties, and thus, in interpreting an order the primary rule is to
ascertain the intent of the court. See, ¢.g., Liggatt v. Employers
Mut. Casualty Co., 273 Kan. 915, 921, 46 P.3d 1120 (2002). “As
a general rule, if the language of a written instrument is clear and
can be carried out as written,” the intent of the maker is made clear
and “there is no room for rules of construction.” See Godfrey, 248
Kan. at 977.

If the maker’s intent is not clear, meaning we apply the rules of

construction , we have explained:
“In placing a construction on a written instrument, reasonable rather than unrea-
sonable interpretations are favored by the law. Results which vitiate the purpose
or reduce the terms of the contract to an absurdity should be avoided. The mean-
ing of a contract should always be ascertained by a consideration of all pertinent
provisions and never be determined by critical analysis of a single or isolated pro-
vision.” Arnold v. S.J.L. of Kansas Corp., 249 Kan. 746, 749, 822 P.2d 64 (1991)
(quoting Garvey Center, Inc. v. Food Specialties, Inc., 214 Kan, 224, Syl. ¥ 3, 519
P.2d 646 [1974]).

Here, the Court of Appeals deemed the plain meaning of the
divorce decree’s language sufficient to discern the divorce court's
intent. Einsel, 2014 WL 1795993, at *2; see Godfrey, 248 Kan. at
977. We agree. .

The award to Carol in the divorce decree consists of three clauses:

Clause 1: “forty percent (40%) of the remainder interest of the inheritance

received by [Rodney] during the marriage,”

Clause 2: “on the condition that [Rodney] may opt to pay [Carol] the sum of

$22,500.00 within six (6) months of the date of hearing,”

Clause 3: “in which case [Rodney] shall receive all of the remainder interest.”

Significantly, the wording of the divorce decree’s first clause does
not award Carol 40% of the value of Rodney's remainder interest
but rather 40% of Rodney's remainder interest itself: “forty per-
cent (40%) of the remainder interest of the inheritance received by

582,

[Rodney] during the marriage.” See Godfrey, 248 Kan. at 977-78
(endorsing a four-corners approach to interpretation of a written
instrument). Rodney's interest, inherited from Victor, was a re-
mainder interest in real property—both the partition court and the
Court of Appeals acknowledge this, and Rodney does not seriously
contest it at this point.

In addition, all three clauses in the divorce decree, read togeth-
er, clearly show the divorce court meant to give Carol an interest
in real property. See Arnold, 249 Kan. at 749 (considering all per-
tinent provisions of a written instrument). Reading the first clause
to provide Carol with only a money judgment is inconsistent with
the remaining language and produces an unreasonable result. See
McHenry v. Smith, 154 Kan. 528, 530-31, 119 P.2d 493 (1941)
(‘[C]onstruction should be given to a judgment as will give force
and effect to every word of it, if possible, and make it as a whole
consistent, effective and reasonable.”). Namely, if Rodney exer-
cised his rights under the second clause’s buyback provision, he
would then, under the third clause, “receive all of the remainder
interest”—but if Rodney was to “receive” anything at all after giv-
ing Carol $22,500, he would be receiving Carol's remainder inter-
est in real property. To see the award as giving Carol a money judg-
ment would be unreasonable—there would be nothing for Rodney
to “receive” after paying Carol the $22,500.

Even if we were to look beyond the journal entry of divorce, the
parties’ statements before the divorce court and the divorce court’s
statements during the final hearing support our interpretation. In
the October 1993 hearing, for example, Carol stated there was only
one big issue—“[t]he value of remainder interests in [Victor's] es-
tate, a sizable amount of land in the estate.” (Emphases added.)
Rodney agreed there was an issue about “what the nature of his
interest in that land” would be. (Emphasis added.) The divorce
court, for its part, described Rodney’s “remainder interest in the
property .. . and the royalty interest” as the last major issue in the
divorce; the divorce court also rejected Rodney's argument he had
no present interest in the Einsel ranch or the 14 wells because
it “underst[ood] exactly what a remainder interest is.” (Emphasis
added.) :

583

We are not persuaded to the contrary by the partition court’s
justification for finding a money judgment. The partition court did
not discuss the plain language of the divorce decree but instead
focused on the fact that the divorce court had been presented with
evidence about the value of Rodney’s interest. But the divorce de-
cree itself did not mention this present value of Rodney’s interest
or what 40% of this value would be, and so the partition court’s
interpretation that Carol was awarded 40% of the value of Rodney's
remainder interest seems tenuous. Additionally, we note the di-
vorce decree proposed no timeline for Rodney to pay this supposed
monetary judgment of 40% of the value of Rodney’s remainder in-
terest once 6 months had elapsed, did not provide for any inter-
est on the sum, and did not even state when this supposed money
judgment would be due. And, of course, if the divorce court meant
to provide Carol with money, it could simply have ordered Rodney
to pay Carol $22,500 or some other sum immediately or within a
set time frame.

We are also unmoved by the equitable factors urged by Rod-
ney. As we stated in our introduction to partition proceedings, the
partition court’s powers are not entirely unbounded. Equity comes
into play when determining whether and to what extent partition is
possible or just, but a district court cannot, in the name of equity,
disregard legal ownership under an instrument of law like a journal
entry of divorce. See, ¢.g., K.S.A. 60-1003; Miller, 222, Kan. at 320
(“The trial courts necessarily exercise wide judicial discretion in
partition actions, but that discretion is exercisable primarily in the
area of making a fair and just division between the parties.”).

Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ decision re-
versing the partition court’s order. The divorce decree gave Carol
an interest in real property, with the stipulation that Rodney could
buy this interest back within 6 months for $22,500. He failed to do
so, meaning Carol’s interest in real property stands.

By virtue of reaching this conclusion, we need not spend much
ink rejecting Rodney's hasty reference that the divorce decree set
up Carol’s award as a secured transaction. He has pointed to no
evidence supporting this theory, and there is no indication either
the divorce court or the partition court viewed the divorce decree

in this light. We also reject his theory that the divorce decree set up
a lien or a mortgage in line with the equitable mortgage doctrine:
the divorce decree made no mention of such conveyances and, as
we have already explained, the divorce decree did not set forth a
judgment amount or make any provision for interest. In short, we
affirm our holding that the divorce decree gave Carol an interest
in real property.
III. SHOULD THE COURT OF APPEALS’ REMAND INSTRUCTIONS
STAND?

Rodney raises two concerns with the Court of Appeals’ remand
instructions: First, they would impermissibly curtail the partition
process; and second, the remand instructions force the district
court to give Carol a higher percent interest in the Einsel estate
than the divorce court initially awarded.

An appellate court’s decision, including remand instructions,
forms a part of its mandate to the lower court, which “shall be con-
trolling in the conduct of any further proceedings necessary in the
district court.” K.S.A. 60-2106(c). Subject to some limited excep-
tions, a district court must carry the mandate into execution and
““cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execu-
tion; nor give any other or future relief; nor review it upon any
matter decided on appeal, for error apparent; not intermeddle with
it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.’” State v.
Collier, 263 Kan. 629, 636, 952 P.2d 1326 (1998) (quoting Sibbald
v. United States, 37 U.S. [12 Pet.] 488, 492, 9 L. Ed. 1167 [1838]);
see also Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. Partnership, 262 F.3d 1128,
1133 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing certain well-established excep-
tions to the mandate rule, permitting the district court to depart
from the mandate rule if blatant error would result in serious in-
justice).

Thus, what exactly the Court of Appeals ordered in its remand
instructions can become an important issue of dispute between the
parties. Whether a district court complied with a Court of Appeals
mandate, and the proper interpretation of a mandate, are questions
of law over which we exercise de novo review. State v. Guder, 293
Kan. 763, 765, 267 P.3d 751 (2012); see United States v. Shipp, 644

| tw sae

F.3d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Collier, 263 Kan. at 636
(explaining the mandate rule is really a subspecies of the law of the
case doctrine).

Here, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the parti-
tion court’s decision “with directions to grant Carol’s request for
partition as set forth in her petition.” Einsel, 2014 WL 1795993,
at *3. Rodney fears that upon receiving the Court of Appeals’ in-
structions the district court would immediately issue a final order
of partition, thus denying him an opportunity to show how parti-
tion would result in hardship. These fears are misplaced. As set
forth in our partition statutes, an order directing partition marks
the beginning of partition proceedings—following the Court of Ap-
peals’ instructions, the district court would direct partition, appoint
commissioners, hear objections to the commissioners’ report, and
lirect further proceedings if need be. See K.S.A. 60-1003(c)-(d).
The parties would still be able to influence the partition court and
resolve any grievances, and the partition court would still be able
to exercise its considerable powers as a court of equity. We simply
do not see a reasonable risk that the district court would misun-
lerstand the Court of Appeals’ instructions and jump straight to a
final order of partition. To the extent ambiguity might have existed,
we clarify that the district court should follow statutory partition
procedures on remand.
We are sensitive, however, to Rodney's second point, which is
that the Court of Appeals’ remand instructions might prompt the
district court to make an error regarding Carol's ownership rights.
Even though the Court of Appeals correctly determined the nature
of Carol's interest as one in real property, the extent of that interest
is a separate matter.

We recall the divorce decree gave Carol “forty percent (40%)
of the remainder interest of the inheritance received by [Rodney]
during the marriage.” It seems to us that Carol has claimed differ-
ent percentages in the Einsel estate at different times during the
proceedings.

For example, Carol’s petition stated that Rodney owned 60% of
one-third of the total surface rights and mineral interests and that
she owned 40% of one-third. Thus, Carol’s petition for partition

586

appeared to seek 40% of a one-third interest in all of the surface
rights associated with the Einsel ranch, even though the divorce
decree entitled her to only 40% of a one-third interest in Rodney's
remainder interest at the time of his father’s death, which was the
remainder interest he inherited during his marriage to Carol. Yet
at other times, such as in her brief to the district court, she claimed
40% of a one-third interest in half of the total surface rights. We
see similar issues with her requests for her share in the mineral
interests and severed mineral interests.

We think there is some question as to whether Carol's petition
for partition requested 40% of what Rodney inherited during the
marriage as a result of his father’s death or instead requested 40%
of Rodney’s current surface rights, mineral interests, and severed
mineral interests now that his mother has also passed. There is thus
a real risk that the Court of Appeals’ instructions to grant Carol’s
“request for partition as set forth in her petition” would result in
the district court ascribing to Carol a higher percentage of owner-
ship in the whole than she is entitled to. 2014 WL 1795993, at *3.

Accordingly, although we approve the Court of Appeals’ con-
clusion regarding the nature of Carol’s award—an interest in real
property—we leave it to the district court to consider, in the first
instance, whether Carol's petition for partition accurately describes
the extent of Rodney's property received through inheritance and,
correspondingly, her ownership in that property. See K.S.A. 60-
1003(c) (stating the partition court's first duty is to specify the inter-
est of the parties and direct partition).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district
court is affirmed. The judgment of the district court is reversed
and remanded with instructions.

STEGALL, J., not participating.
RENE S. YOUNG, District Judge, assigned]

No. 109,783

In the Matter of the Equalization Appeal of WAGNER, KRIsTIN
Lea for the Year 2012 in Johnson County, Kansas.
(372 P3d 1226)

Kristin Wagner, appellant, was on the briefs pro se.

Kathryn D. Myers, assistant county counselor, was on the brief for appellee
Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County.

The opinion of the court was delivered by “

Rosen, J.: Kristin Lea Wagner, a Johnson County resident, ap-
peals the Court of Appeals’ decision in In re Equalization Appeal
of Wagner, No. 109,783, 2014 WL 1096896 (Kan. App. 2014) (un-
published opinion) (Wagner II), affirming the Court of Tax Ap-
peals’ $494,200 valuation of her home for the 2012 tax year. No-
tably, in determining the 2012 valuation, COTA adopted the final
valuation it assigned to the home for the 2011 tax year.

We conclude that COTA ignored evidence in the record estab-
lishing that Wagner’s home suffered a 2.94% decrease in value be-
tween 2011 and 2012. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Ap-

Pd

588

peals’ decision and remand the case to COTA with directions that
Wagner's home be valued at $479,600 for the 2012 tax year.

FACTS

To fully understand Wagner's current tax appeal, an overview
of the facts from her 2011 appeal—tIn re Equalization Appeal of
Wagner, No. 107,472, 2012 WL 3290147 (Kan. App. 2012) (un-
published opinion) (Wagner I )—is necessary.

In 2011, Wagner received a Notice of Value from the County
showing that, based on comparable properties and a quality rating
of 4.33 good+, the appraised value of her property was $569,000.
Wagner appealed, complaining that the appraised value was higher
than that of 2006 despite no improvements to the property and
a “substantial downturn” in the real estate market during the in-
terim. After an informal equalization appeal, the County did not
change the appraised value, leading Wagner to file a protest form
with COTA. Ultimately, COTA determined that the appraised val-
ue for tax year 2011 should be reduced to $553,600. Wagner dis-
agreed with COTA’ determination and appealed. Wagner I, 2012
WL 3290147, at *1-3,

On appeal before the Court of Appeals, Wagner raised two argu-
ments: (1) COTA improperly assumed that the 4.33 good+ quality
rating was correct and placed the burden of proving its invalidity on
Wagner; and (2) COTA’ underlying factual findings concerning the
aptness of the quality rating were not based on evidence that was
substantial when viewed in the light of the record as a whole. The
Wagner I court agreed with Wagner's arguments, concluding that
COTA had improperly shifted the burden of proof on the quality
rating issue and that COTA’s underlying factual findings concerning
the quality rating were not based on evidence that was substantial
when viewed in the light of the record as a whole. Accordingly, the
court reversed COTA’s decision and remanded with directions that
COTA establish the appraised value of Wagner's property for 2011
based on a 4.00 good quality rating. Wagner I, 2012 WL 3290147,
at °7, The Wagner I decision became final in September 2012.

While the 2011 appeal was pending, the County, utilizing a
sales-comparison approach and, once more, a construction qual-

589

ity rating of 4.33 good+, appraised Wagner's property for the 2012
tax year at $537,300—a 2.94% decrease from the value assessed in
2011 ($553,600) prior to Wagner's successful appeal to the Court
of Appeals. Wagner challenged the 2012 appraisal, arguing before
the Small Claims and Expedited Hearings Division of COTA that
the property’s fair market value had fallen to $490,000. The hearing
officer found in favor of the County, and Wagner appealed.

COTA conducted a hearing on October 11, 2012—after the
Wagner I opinion had become final. At the hearing, Traci Weaver,
a Johnson County appraiser, appeared for the County and Wagner
appeared pro se. In describing Wagner's home, Weaver stated that
the property is a “conventional style home” located in the Belle
Meade Farms subdivision of Shawnee, Kansas. The home has five
bedrooms, five full and one-half baths, and a walk-out basement.
Weaver stated that the home had a “[t]otal living area above grade”
of 3,551 square feet along with a “lower level finish of approximate-
ly 2,000 square feet.” In discussing an aerial view of the property,
Weaver stated that Wagner’s “home has a lot of pitch—pitches in
the roof, some angles and design features that are a little bit better
than what would be normal or typical for this area . . . .” Weaver
also noted that the “home has certain amenities that a typical home
in this area would have, such as decks and patios, and . . . a pool.”

Weaver acknowledged that the 4.33 good+ quality rating utilized

in the appraisal was at issue. But, Weaver stated that in preparation
for the hearing,
“the County did go out and view the subject property and the’comparables as well
as other homes within the neighborhood to determine if. . . the quality rating for
the property is accurate; and at this time we do deem that, based on the informa-
tion that we have and views of the property, that quality is stated accurately.”

Weaver testified that the County relied heavily on the sales com-
parison approach in determining the appraised value for Wagner's
property. She discussed the three comparable properties utilized in
the 2012 appraisal, two of which were located in the same subdivi-
sion. Weaver stated:

“All these homes are similar conventional style homes either built in the late 1990s
or early 2000s. County has made adjustments for those market driving factors such
as differences in total living area, lower level finish and condition of these homes.

590

“These properties sold with prices ranging from $420,000, which is Comp 2
[located outside the subdivision]; Comp 1 selling for $625,000, and Comp 3 sell-
ing for $737,000. After these adjustments have been made, we have an indicated
market value of $545,000. However, the County chose to go with the model pre-
dictor [ie., Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) Estimate of Value] of $537,300
for this valuation,”

Notably, out of the four approaches the County used to appraise

the value of Wagner's home, the MRA estimate of value resulted in
the lowest value. Within the appraisal report the County submitted
to COTA, “MRA Value” was defined as .
“a statistical valuation approach. It is an estimate of value based on regression
models developed for delineated market areas, usually a neighborhood or group
of neighborhood{s] referred to as a model area. Multiple regression analysis al-
lows for defining the relationship between property characteristics and sale pric-
es. Property characteristics contributing to value are identified and the summed
contributory value of each, as defined in the model, become the value from this
approach.”

See also In re Equalization Appeal of Voth, No. 94-8411-EQ, 1995
WL 865905, at *1 (Kan. Bd. Tax App. 1995) (“MRA stands for Mul-
tiple Regression Analysis, which is a statistical technique for esti-
mating unknown data on the basis of known and available data. In
mass appraisal, the unknown data is the fair market value and the
known data consists of sales prices and property characteristics of
comparable properties. The objective of the MRA is to model the
relationship between property characteristics and value so that an
estimate of fair market value can be estimated from the compara-
ble sales. The actual calculation of the MRA is extremely difficult.
. . . Because of the complex mathematics involved, a computer is
used to make the calculations.”).

Based on the information the County had regarding Wagner's
home, Weaver recommended that the 2012 appraised value of the
home remain at $537,300.

After Wagner questioned Weaver about the properties she used
as comparables, Wagner directed COTA’ attention to Taxpayer Ex-
hibit No. 3, which was a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Wagner I
decision. In referring to the Wagner I decision, Wagner stated the
following:

“So in that case, I'd like to reference Taxpayer Exhibit No. 3. I Inow that I

heard Ms. Weaver at the beginning state that she would only like to talk about
2012. However, this document from 2011, I believe is very important to the value
of 2012.

“It was my understanding that a copy of this was provided to the County as
well as [COTA] but in it my understanding was that it was directed that the quality
value of my home in 2011 be returned to a value of 4 instead of a value of 4.3. . ..

“So again, I'm asking that 2011 be recalculated with a value of 4. Since nothing
has changed since 2011, I believe it’s imperative that my value for 2012 also be
calculated with a quality of 4.” (Emphasis added.)

The COTA judge responded that he was unsure whether the

Wagner I case had become final but told Wagner she was free to
argue that “the 2011 should roll over to 2012.” Counsel for COTA
noted that because the Court of Appeals reversed COTA’s deci-
sion in Wagner I, there was more action that needed to be taken
to determine the final 2011 appraisal value for Wagner’s home.
Based on this comment, Wagner suggested that the hearing be
continued until the 2011 tax appeal was finally resolved because
she believed that “the 2011 amount is going to have some impact
on 2012.” In response, one of the COTA judges sitting on the panel
stated, “Well, let’s go ahead and finish the testimony, and then that’s
a decision that the Court will have to make.” Wagner concluded by
stating:
“I have simply one document that I sent during the exchange of evidence, and
that would be Taxpayer [Exhibit] No. 4. I believe it’s pretty straightforward, but
essentially, assuming that the quality value on my home for 2011 is good as op-
posed to good plus, I would like to see 2011 recalculated and then based upon that
value consider 2012.”

Taxpayer Exhibit No. 4 was a letter that Wagner wrote to the
Johnson County Appraiser prior to the hearing before COTA, de-
tailing her legal arguments regarding the 2012 appraisal of her
home. Wagner wrote:

“For 2012, Johnson County established the appraised value of my property at
an amount 2.94% lower than the 2011 appraised value.

“In determining the 2011 value, Johnson County used a Construction Qual-
ity parameter setting of Good+ (4.33). I appealed the county’s use of the Good+
(4.33) setting; the COTA denied my appeal and affirmed the county’s value.

“Inits opinion filed August 10, 2012 (case number 107,472), the Kansas Court
of Appeals reversed the COTA’s decision regarding the appraised value of my
property for 2011 and directed the COTA to establish the 2011 appraised value

Ps

based on a Quality parameter setting of Good (4.00), rather than Good+ (4.33).
“Johnson County has not yet provided me with the corrected appraised value
for 2011. Assuming that the corrected value for 2011 is fair and acceptable, I
request that the 2012 appraised value of my property be set at a value 2.94%
lower than the corrected 2011 appraised value. I also request that the Construc-
tion Quality of my property for 2012 be set at Good (4.00).” (Emphasis added.)

After asking for and receiving no final comments, one of the
COTA judges sitting on the panel stated that the hearing was now
closed and that the panel would take the information the parties
had provided under advisement and issue a decision within the
statutory time period.

With regard to the 2011 tax appeal, upon remand, COTA re-
viewed supplemental valuation evidence provided by the County
applying a 4.00 good quality rating to Wagner's home. Based on this
evidence showing a market value for Wagner's home of $494,200,
COTA issued a final decision on December 13, 2012, adopting this
value as the appraised value for Wagner's home for the 2011 tax
year.

On January 4, 2013, COTA sent a letter to Weaver, the Johnson
County appraiser, regarding the 2012 appraisal of Wagner’s home.
The letter stated:

“The Court held a hearing in this matter on October 11, 2012. The Court re-
quests a tax year 2012 sales approach be compiled via the county's mass appraisal
system utilizing the physical characteristics and amenities as originally indicated
with the exception that the construction quality factor be changed to good.

“Please submit this additional evidence to the Court within two (2) weeks of
the date of this letter. Please also send a copy of your submission to the applicant,
Ms. Wagner, and include a notation in your submission to the Court indicating
that you have done so.

“The Court will also allow the applicant ten (10) days to present any reply that
she may have to the county's submission.” (Emphasis added.)

Kathryn D, Myers, a Johnson County assistant county counselor,
responded to the letter on January 9, 2013. Myers stated:
“The County is in receipt of a letter dated January 4, 2012[,] asking Ms. Weaver
of the appraiser's office to provide additional information related to an evidentiary
hearing that was held and the record closed on October 11, 2012. The Court does
not cite to any legal authority that allows it to request additional information from
a party litigant once the evidentiary record is closed. As the County is not com-
pelled by an order, it declines to provide additional information.”

593

With regard to the 2012 valuation of Wagner’s home, Myers
stated that it was the County's position that “K.S.A. 79-1460 applies
to the 2012 tax year and that the Court is mandated to maintain the
final value determined by the 2011 appeal to the 2012 tax year.”
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 79-1460 stated in pertinent part:

“(a) The county appraiser shall notify each taxpayer in the county annually
on or before March 1 for real property and May 1 for personal property, by mail
directed to the taxpayer's last known address, of the classification and appraised
valuation of the taxpayer's property, except that, the valuation for all real property
shall not be increased unless . . . (2) for the taxable year next following the taxable
year that the valuation for real property has been reduced due to a final determi-
nation made pursuant to the valuation appeals process, documented substantial
and compelling reasons exist therefor and are provided by the county appraiser.
‘When the valuation for real property has been reduced due to a final determina-
tion made pursuant to the valuation appeals process for the prior year, and the
county appraiser has already certified the appraisal rolls for the current year to the
county clerk pursuant to K.S.A. 79-1466, and amendments thereto, the county ap-
praiser may amend the appraisal rolls and certify the changes to the county clerk
to implement the provisions of this subsection and reduce the valuation of the real
property to the prior year’s final determination, except that such changes shall not
be made after October 31 of the current year.” (Emphasis added.)

On January 19, 2013, Wagner sent a letter to COTA noting the
County's refusal to provide the information COTA had requested
and stating her belief that the Wagner I decision dictated that the
County apply a 4.00 good quality rating instead of a 4.33 good+
rating to the 2012 appraisal of her home. Wagner's evidence pre-
sented at the hearing showed that in 2012, the County, using a
quality rating of 4.33 good+, appraised her home at $537,300—a
2.94% decrease from the value assessed in 2011 ($553,600) using
the same 4.33 good+ quality rating. Based on this evidence, Wag-
ner argued that the 2012 value of her home should be $479,600—
2.94% lower than the corrected value assessed for 2011 ($494,200).
Wagner argued that contrary to the County’s assertion, K.S.A. 2012
Supp. 79-1460 did not mandate that the final 2011 valuation be
maintained as the valuation for 2012 because she was seeking a
valuation for 2012 that was less than the 2011 valuation. Wagner
noted that there was no language within the statute that prevented
a valuation that was lower than the previous year’s valuation.

COTA did not respond to Wagner's letter and did not order

594

the County to provide the additional information that COTA had
requested. Instead, COTA issued an order on March 8, 2013, es-
tablishing the value of Wagner's property for the 2012 tax year at
$494,200, i.¢., the same amount as the property’s 2011 final ap-
praised value. In reaching its decision, COTA stated:

“In light of the findings of the Kansas Court of Appeals in Wagner [I], we
find that a construction quality rating of good is appropriate for the valuation of
the subject property for the 2012 tax year. The Court finds the subject property's
final 2011 appraised value of $494,200 was determined based on this corrected
construction quality rating and pursuant to this Court's examination of pertinent
market data. The Court finds no substantial credible evidence to support the Tax-
payer's assertion that the subject neighborhood has experienced a 2.94% decrease
in overall market value from 2011 to 2012. Given the record evidence, the Court
concludes that the subject property's final 2011 appraised value of $494,200 is the
best indicator of the subject property's value for the 2019, tax year.” (Emphasis
added.)

Notably, in maintaining the 2011 value for the 2012 tax year,
COTA did not rely on K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 79-1460 but concluded
that the final appraisal for the 2011 tax year constituted the best
evidence of the home’s value for 2012.

Wagner filed a subsequent letter asking for reconsideration,
pointing out that her argument for a 2.94% reduction in value was
not based on a supposed decrease in value of homes in her neigh-
borhood, but on the decrease in value the County assigned to her
home in 2011 and 2012 using a 4.33 good+ quality rating. Wagner
specifically asked COTA to require that the County produce a 2012
appraisal using a 4.00 good quality rating. In the alternative, Wag-
ner asked COTA to set the 2012 value of her home at $479,600—
again, a decrease of 2.94% from the final 2011 value assigned to her
home. When COTA denied Wagner's petition for reconsideration,
Wagner filed a timely petition for judicial review.

Before the Court of Appeals, Wagner raised two arguments.
First, she argued that COTA misconstrued the basis for her ar-
gument that her home’s 2012 value should be reduced by 2.94%.
Wagner argued that COTA mistakenly believed that her argument
for a reduction was based on a supposed decrease in value of her
home’s neighborhood rather than a specific decrease in value to the
home itself. Because of this mistaken belief, Wagner contended

oT

595

that COTA ignored evidence supporting her argument (i.e., the
County’s 2011 and 2012 appraisals of her home showing a 2.94%
reduction in value). Second, Wagner argued that COTA relieved
the County of its statutory burden to prove the value of her home
by failing to require that the County produce a 2012 appraisal o:
her home using a 4.00 good quality rating. Wagner believed that
such an appraisal was required under the holding of Wagner I and,
moreover, factually appropriate, given that she had made no im-
provements to her home between 2011 and 2012.

In response, the County argued that because the valuation o:
Wagner’s home in 2011 had been reduced as a result of the valu-
ation appeals process, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 79-1460(a)(2) dictated
that the 2011 valuation be carried over to 2012 unless substantial
and compelling reasons existed to justify increasing the valuation
for 2012. The County pointed out that after the hearing before
COTA, it took the position that no substantial and compelling rea-
sons justified increasing the home’s valuation for 2012. The County
contended that Wagner had the burden to prove that her home’s
2012 valuation should be less than the final valuation for 2011 an
that she failed to do so. As a result, the County argued that COTA,
despite not relying on K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 79-1460 for its decision,
properly applied the 2011 valuation to the assessment of Wagner's
home for 2012.

The County also responded to Wagner's argument contending
that it had a legal obligation to produce a 2012 appraisal of her
home using a 4.00 good quality rating. The County. noted the ab-
sence of a provision within the Kansas Administrative Procedure
Act (KAPA), K.S.A. 77-501 et seq., authorizing a hearing officer or
a hearing panel to compel a party to create and/or offer evidence
that it did not offer voluntarily at an. evidentiary hearing that has
been closed. .

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed COTA’s decision, con-
cluding that COTA properly used the 2011 valuation to determine
the home's value for the 2012 tax year. In reaching this holding,
the court determined that unless substantial and compelling rea-
sons existed for doing so, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 79-1460 prevented
the County from increasing a taxpayer's property value during the

tax year following a successful tax appeal. But the court also noted
that the statute did not prevent a valuation from being lower than
the final valuation obtained for the prior tax year. Accordingly, the
court concluded that because the County conceded that substantial
and compelling reasons did not exist for increasing the valuation in
2012, the valuation of the home for 2012 was capped at $494,200,
i.e., the final value for 2011. Wagner II, 2014 WL 1096896, at *5-6.

With regard to whether the valuation for 2012 should be less
than the 2011 valuation, the court construed Wagner's argument
for a 2.94% reduction as being based on either a decrease in the
value of neighboring properties (now COTA construed Wagner's
argument) or on the difference in value the County assigned to her
home in 2011 and 2012 using a 4.33 good+ quality rating. Citing
In re Equalization Appeal of Whittaker, No. 109,155, 2013 WL
4566422 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion), in support, the
court concluded that Wagner could not “rely on the changes in
appraised values of neighboring properties to show that she was
entitled to a reduction in value of 2.94% for the 2012 tax year.”
Wagner IT, 2014 WL 1096896, at *6. The court also rejected Wag-
ner’s argument that a reduction in value was justified based on the
difference between the 2011 and 2012 appraisals. The court stated:
“The problem with Wagner's argument is that she bases it on the County's use of
the 4.33 good+ quality rating. But the Wagner I court reversed and remanded
with directions that COTA establish the appraised value of Wagner's property for
the 2011 tax year based on a 4.00 good quality rating. Upon remand, COTA valued
Wagner's property at $494,200 using the 4.00 good quality rating. In Wagner's
2012 tax dispute, COTA again appraised Wagner's property at $494,200 using the
4.00 good quality rating.

“Because COTA used a 4.00 good quality rating to appraise Wagner's property
in 2011 and 2012, Wagner has failed to meet her appellate burden to show that
she is entitled to a 2.94% reduction in the appraised value of her property. Sim-
ply because Wagner's appraised property value decreased by 2.94% under a 4.3
good+ quality rating, used by the County, it does not necessarily follow that Wag-
ner’s appraised property value would have decreased by the same amount under
the 4.00 good quality rating used by COTA.

“If we understand Wagner's argument correctly, it turns on a false analogy.
Wagner's point, we take it, was that because the County used a 4.33 good+ quality
rating to establish the 2012 appraised value of her property of $537,300, which
was a 2.94% decreased from the County’s 2011 appraised [sic] of Wagner's prop-
erty of $553,600, using the same 4.33 good + quality rating, therefore, COTA’s

2012 ad valorem valuation of $494,200, using the 4.00 good quality rating, should
be further reduced by 2.94%. Wagner’s argument is weak because it relies on the
difference in valuation that one may obtain between using a 4.00 good quality
rating versus a 4.33 good+ quality rating, Because these two quality ratings are dis-
similar, Wagner's argument is not supported by substantial competent evidence.
Consequently, GOTA properly denied Wagner's request to reduce the appraised
value of her property by 2.94%.” Wagner II, 2014 WL 1096896, at °7.

Based on this reasoning, the Court of Appeals affirmed COTA de-
cision. Wagner II, 2014 WL 1096896, at *8. We granted Wagner's
petition for review.

ANALYSIS
4.00 Good Quality Rating

Decisions of COTA are subject to review under the Kansas Ju-
dicial Review Act (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. K.S.A. 2012 Supp.
74-2426(c). On appeal, Wagner has the burden of proving the in-
validity of COTA’s actions and decision because she is the party
asserting invalidity. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(a)(1).

KS.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c) sets out eight standards under
which an appellate court shall grant relief. Wagner correctly notes
that her argument that COTA erroneously relieved the County of
its burden to prove the value of her home for 2012 using a 4.00
good quality rating falls under subsection (c)(4) of the statute. See
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(4) (relief shall be granted if “the agen-
cy has erroneously interpreted or applied the law”).

Wagner asserts that based on the Court of Appeals’ decision in
Wagner I (remanding with orders that a 4.00 good quality rating be
used for the 2011 appraisal) and the fact that she made no improve-
ments to her home between 2011 and 2012, the County was legally
required to use a 4.00 good quality rating to appraise her home in
2012. Because the County had the burden of proof before COTA,
see K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 79-1609, Wagner contends that COTA re-
lieved the County of its burden when it failed to order that the
County produce a 2012 appraisal of her property using a 4.00 good
quality rating.

Though Wagner is correct that the County bore the burden of
proof at the hearing before COTA to establish the validity of its

appraisal of her home for 2012, she is mistaken that the Coun-
ty had the duty to present an appraisal of her home using a 4.00
good quality rating. Wagner assumes that the Court of Appeals’
decision in Wagner I regarding her home’s 2011 appraisal dictates
that a 4.00 good quality rating must be applied to any subsequent
appraisals of her home until she “changes the construction qual-
ity of her property, and the [County] properly substantiates and
documents a different CQ/G rating for her property.” The problem
with this argument is that Wagner I only involved the appraisal of
Wagner's home for the 2011 tax year and merely concluded that
the County, for that tax year, had failed to sufficiently prove that
a 4.33 good+ quality rating was properly applied to the appraisal
of the home. Based on this holding, the Wagner I court reversed
and remanded with directions that “COTA establish the appraised
value of the subject property for tax year 2011 based on a 4.00 qual-
ity rating.” (Emphasis added.) Wagner I, 2012 WL 3290147, at *7.
As long as the county meets its burden, Wagner I did not foreclose
the possibility of a 4.33 good+ quality rating being applied to future
appraisals of Wagner’s home. Further, when different tax years are
involved in matters of taxation, principles of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel do not apply because taxes are levied annually. In
re Tax Appeal of Fleet, 293 Kan. 768, 780-81, 272 P.3d 583 (2012);
Inve Equalization Appeal of Prieb Properties, 47 Kan. App. 2d 122,
127, 275 P.3d 56 (2012). Accordingly, we reject Wagner's assertion
that the County was precluded from producing an appraisal of her
property using.a 4.33 good+ quality rating, if the county can meet
that burden.

Reduction in Value

Next, Wagner argues that COTA improperly rejected her argu-
ment that her home’s 2012 valuation should be 2.94% less than the
value assigned to it for 2011 tax year. Wagner relies on K.S.A. 2012
Supp. 77-621(c)(7) and (c)(8) to support her claim for relief.

K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(8) requires an appellate court to
grant relief if COTA’s action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary,
or capricious. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(c)(7) allows an appellate
court to grant relief if the agency action is based on a determination

of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by evi-
dence that is substantial when viewed in the light of the record as a
whole. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(d) defines “in light of the record
as a whole” to include the evidence both supporting and detract-
ing from an agency's finding. Courts must now determine whether
the evidence supporting the agency’s factual findings is substantial
when considered in light of all the evidence. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-
621(d); Redd v. Kansas Truck Center, 291 Kan. 176, 182-83, 239
P.3d 66 (2010). “Substantial competent evidence possesses both
relevance and substance and provides a substantial basis of fact
from which the issues can be reasonably determined.” Frick Farm
Properties v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 289 Kan. 690, 709, 216
P.3d 170 (2009). Furthermore, in reviewing the evidence in light of
the record as a whole, an appellate court “shall not reweigh the evi-
dence or engage in de novo review.” K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 77-621(d).

Ultimately, COTA decided that “[iJn light of the findings of the
Kansas Court of Appeals in Wagner [I],” a 4.00 good construction
quality rating should be used to appraise Wagner's home for 2012.
COTA then concluded that because the final 2011 appraisal of
Wagner's home employed a 4.00 good quality rating, the resulting
valuation of $494,200 should be adopted as the home’s value for
the 2012 tax year. Moreover, COTA rejected Wagner's argument
that the 2012 value should be less than the 2011 value because,
according to COTA, there was no substantial credible evidence to
support Wagner's assertion “that the subject neighborhood had ex-
perienced a 2.94% decrease in overall market vale from 2011 to
2012.” (Emphasis added.)

Initially, it must be noted that COTA’s reasoning for adopting
the home’s 2011 value as its value for 2012 is incorrect. As can
be gleaned from its order, COTA misconstrued Wagner I as com-
manding that a 4.00 good quality rating be maintained for 2012.
But as indicated above, Wagner I only involved the 2011 appraisal
and merely concluded that the County, for that tax year, had failed
to sufficiently prove that a 4.33 good+ quality rating was appropri-
ate for Wagner's home. As mentioned above, Wagner I certainly
did not foreclose the possibility of the County proving a 4.33 good+
quality rating applies to future appraisals of Wagner's home.

Instead of relying on Wagner I as justification for maintain-
ing a 4.00 good quality rating for 2012 and, in turn, carrying the
2011 valuation over to 2012, COTA should have taken note of the
County’s post-hearing letter advising it of the applicability of K.S.A.
2012 Supp. 79-1460 to the current appeal. Again, the statute (its
constitutionality is not at issue in this appeal) stated that when “the
valuation for real property has been reduced due to a final determi-
nation made pursuant to the valuation appeals process,” the valua-
tion of the property for the next taxable year will not be increased
unless the county appraiser provides “documented substantial and
compelling reasons” for increasing the valuation. See K.S.A. 2012
Supp. 79-1460(a)(2); In re Appeal of Tallgrass Prairie Holdings,
50 Kan. App. 2d 635, 645-46, 333 P.3d 899 (2014) (reaching same
conclusion). The Court of Appeals correctly noted that nothing
in the language of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 79-1460 prevented a valu-
ation from being lower than the prior year’s valuation. Thus, be-
cause the County, in its post-hearing letter to COTA, essentially
conceded that substantial and compelling reasons did not exist for
increasing the valuation in 2012, the valuation for 2012 was capped
at $494,200, i.¢., the final value for 2011. Wagner II, 2014 WL
1096896, at °5-7.

The Court of Appeals went astray by excusing COTA’s misun-
derstanding of Wagner's argument for a 2012 valuation that was
2.94% less than the final valuation determined for 2011. In its or
der, COTA misconstrued Wagner's argument as being based on
an alleged 2.94% decrease in overall market value of her home’s
neighborhood. Based on this misunderstanding, COTA improperly
rejected Wagner's argument for a reduction in value, finding no
substantial credible evidence to support her claim. But as indicated
above, the record clearly shows that the basis for Wagner’s argu-
ment was the fact that the County’s 2012 appraisal of her home, us-
ing a quality rating of 4.33 good+, valued her home at $537,300—a
2.94% decrease from the 2011 valuation of $553,600, resulting
from an appraisal using the same 4.33 good+ quality rating.

Though the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the 2011 and
2012 appraisals indicated that Wagner’s home suffered a decrease
in value, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because these apprais-

als utilized a 4.33 good+ quality rating, they were not probative as
to whether COTA’s 2012 valuation of $494,200—based on a 2011
valuation employing a 4.00 good quality rating—should be reduced
by 2.94%. The Court of Appeals reasoned that “[s]imply because
Wagner's appraised property value decreased by 2.94% under a
4.33 good+ quality rating, used by the County, it does not neces-
sarily follow that Wagner's appraised property value would have
decreased by the same amount under the 4.00 good quality rating
used by COTA.” Wagner II, 2014 WL 1096896, at °7. Concluding
that Wagner's argument was “weak because it relies on the differ-
ence in valuation that one may obtain between using a 4.00 good
quality rating versus a 4.33 good+ quality rating,” the Court of Ap-
peals held that COTA properly denied Wagner's request for a 2012
valuation that was 2.94% less than the final 2011 valuation. Wagner
II, 2014 WL 1096896, at *7.

The Court of Appeals’ reasoning for rejecting Wagner's argu-
ment for a reduction in value appears to be based on false prem-
ise. The court assumed that COTA’s 2012 valuation of Wagner's
home resulted from a 2012 appraisal utilizing a 4.00 good quality
rating. Wagner II, 2014 WL 1096896, at *7 (“In Wagner's 2012
tax dispute, COTA again appraised Wagner’s property at $494,200
using the 4.00 good quality rating.”). But the record shows that
COTA’ 2012 valuation resulted from COTA merely adopting the
2011 valuation for 2012. Granted, the 2011 valuation resulted from
an appraisal utilizing a 4.00 good quality rating, but this valuation
applied to the 2011 tax year. It was never updated for the 2012
tax year to reflect market changes, nor was there a new appraisal
conducted for the 2012 tax year which applied a 4.00 good quality
rating. Consequently, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning for rejecting
the 2011 and 2012 appraisals as evidence of a reduction in value
was incorrect.

Because the County has conceded that substantial and com-
pelling reasons do not exist for increasing the valuation of Wag-
ner’s home for 2012 above its final 2011 value, K.S.A. 2012 Supp.
79-1460 dictates that the home's valuation for the 2012 tax year
must be capped at $494,200. As evidenced by the 2011 and 2012
appraisals—uncontested evidence which the County produced—

Wagner’s home suffered a 2.94% decrease in value between 2011
and 2012. We agree with Wagner that her home’s 2012 valuation
should reflect this reduction. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of
Appeals’ decision and remand the case to COTA with instructions
that Wagner's home be valued at $479,600 for the 2012 tax year.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
JoHNsoN, J., concurs in the result.

603

No. 112,973

Water District No. 1 of JouNson County, Kansas, Appel-
lee, v. PRAIRIE CENTER DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., et al., Defen-
dants, and D.P, BonaM and WanpaA BonHaM, Individually,
and as TRUSTEES OF THE D.P, AND WANDA BONHAM Trust,
Appellants.

(375 P3d 304)

Opin-

ion filed June 10, 2016.

Lance Y. Kinzer, of Schlagel Kinzer, LLC, of Olathe, argued the cause and was
on the briefs for appellant.

Paul G. Schepers, of Orrick & Exskine, LLP, of Overland Park, argued the
cause, and Timothy P. Orrick, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for ap-
pellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Lucxert, J.: Water District No. 1 of Johnson County, Kansas,
(referred to by the parties as WaterOne) filed an eminent domain
petition in the district court seeking to condemn 10 tracts of land
“[s}ubject to existing easements of record.” Prairie Center Devel-
opment, L.L.C., owned each of the tracts in fee simple. After the
district court’ granted the petition, D.P. and Wanda Bonham and
the D.P. and Wanda Bonham Trust (hereinafter the Bonhams)—
who were not parties to the condemnation proceeding—filed both
an appeal of the condemnation award and a motion to void the dis-
trict court’s order. The Bonhams owned an easement in one of the
10 condemned tracts, and they argued that WaterOne necessar-
ily took their easement without complying with the Eminent Do-
main Procedure Act (EDPA) as to their easement. See K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 26-501 et seq. After hearing arguments, the district court
denied the Bonhams’ motion to void, concluding that WaterOne
did not condemn the Bonhams’ easement. We affirm the district
court's decision.

605

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

‘WaterOne’s plan was to install “a water pump station, a reser-
voir and system of transmission and distribution mains in Johnson
County, Kansas.” To complete this project, WaterOne exercised its
eminent domain power to condemn permanent water main ease-
ments and temporary construction easements in the 10 tracts of
land on and around which the project was to be constructed. Prai-
rie Center Development, L.L.C., was the owner of the 10 tracts.
In February 2014, WaterOne filed an eminent domain petition in
the district court against Prairie Center Development and “any un-
known persons claiming an interest in or in possession of the prop-
erty described herein.”

About a month later, the district court approved WaterOne’s pe-

tition and appointed appraisers to conduct a valuation of the land.
Thereafter, the appraisers determined just compensation for the
condemned lands, and the district court ordered WaterOne to pay
the awards. The record does not reflect that WaterOne or Prairie
Center Development filed an appeal.
Instead, the Bonhams, who were not parties to the proceedings,
filed both an appeal of the award and a motion to void the con-
demnation. Specifically, the Bonhams argued the condemnation
relating to one of the tracts—Tract 16A—was void for noncompli-
ance with the EDPA. The Bonhams possessed their own easement
in Tract 16A and argued that WaterOne failed to name them in
the condemnation petition or send them the proper statutory no-
tice. In response, WaterOne argued it did not have to name the
Bonhams or give them notice under the EDPA because it did not
intend to take or interfere with their easement. After considering
the motion in a hearing, the district court denied the Bonhams’
motion to void. The Bonhams timely appealed to this court, which
has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-504 (“Appeals to the
supreme court may be taken from any final order under the provi-
sions of [the EDPA].”).

ANALYSIS

In Kansas, the EDPA provides the only avenue through which
the government can exercise its eminent domain power. See K.S.A.

606

2015 Supp. 26-501 et seq.; Concerned Citizens, United, Inc. v.
Kansas Power & Light Co., 215 Kan. 218, 227, 231, 523 P.2d 755
(1974). Importantly, “‘[a] statute which confers the right to exer-
cise the power of eminent domain is to be strictly construed in
light of the objectives and the purposes sought to be attained by
its enactment.” Miller v. Bartle, 283 Kan. 108, 113, 150 P.3d 1282
(2007) (quoting Nat'l Compressed Steel Corp. v. Unified Gov't of
Wyandotte County/Kansas City, 272 Kan. 1239, Syl. 4 5, 38 P.3d
723 [2002]).

The Bonhams allege WaterOne failed to comply with the EDPA.
As relevant to this appeal, we conduct unlimited review over mat-
ters of jurisdiction, the interpretation of statutes, and the interpre-
tation of written instruments. Cady v. Schroll, 298 Kan. 731, 734,
317 P.3d 90 (2014); Frazier v. Goudschaal, 296 Kan. 730, 743, 295
P.3d 542 (2013); Liggatt v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 273 Kan.
915, 917, 46 P.3d 1120 (2002); City of Wichita v. Meyer, 262 Kan.
534, 539, 939 P.2d 926 (1997). A brief overview of a proceeding
under the EDPA puts the Bonhams’ claims in context and clarifies
the objectives and purposes of the EDPA.

1. This action is governed by the nature of condemnation pro-
ceedings.

Eminent domain—the power to take private lands for public
use—is essential and inherently governmental. See K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 26-501(c)(2); Concerned Citizens, 215 Kan. at 226-27; 26
Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 4. But however essential, the gov-
ernment cannot exercise its inherent power to take land for free:
The government must justly pay for the land it takes. K.S.A. 26-
513(a) (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.”).

In Kansas, provisions of the EDPA control the proceedings to
the extent the provisions address an issue. In an appeal from an
eminent domain award, the code of civil procedure applies. K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 26-508(a) (an eminent domain appeal “shall be tried as
any other civil action”); Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 301 Kan.
916, 920, 349 P.3d 469 (2015).

Eminent domain proceedings begin when an entity seeking

| eC

to condemn land files a petition in the district court. K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 26-501(b). Under the EDPA, the entity’s petition must in-
clude:

“(1) the authority for and the purpose of the taking; (2) a description of each lot,
parcel or tract of land and the nature of the interest to be taken; (3) insofar as
their interests are to be taken (a) the name of any owner and all lienholders of
record, and (b) the name of any party in possession. . . . No defect in form which
does not impair substantial rights of the parties shall invalidate any proceeding.”
KS.A. 26-502.

In addition, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-503 requires that notice be given
to “each interested party as named in K.S.A. 26-502,” that is, “any
owner,” “lienholders of record,” and “any party in possession.”

Once the petition is filed, the judge must determine from the
petition itself (1) whether the entity “has the power of eminent
domain” and (2) whether “the taking is necessary to the [entity’s]
lawful corporate purposes.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-504. When the
judge makes those findings in favor of the government entity, ap-
praisers are appointed to conduct a valuation of the land the entity
seeks to take. K.S.A, 2015 Supp. 26-504; K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-505.
Ultimately, those appraisers file a report on the amount of com-
pensation that is just. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-506. Then, to proceed
with the taking, the entity must pay that amount within 30 days of
the appraiser's report. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-507; Miller, 283 Kan.
at 113. This court has characterized these proceedings as an “in-
quest”—an investigation into exactly how much the government
owes. Indeed, the proceedings are narrow and not “‘a forum for
litigation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain nor
the extent thereof.’” Miller, 283 Kan. at 113-14.

Here, WaterOne filed its eminent domain petition in the district
court. As to the extent of its taking, WaterOne sought to condemn
temporary construction easements and permanent water main
easements in 10 tracts of land owned by Prairie Center Develop-
ment in fee simple. The district court appointed appraisers, the
appraisers filed reports, and from those reports Prairie Center De-
velopment received compensation. There is nothing in this appeal
suggesting that WaterOne did not fully comply with the EDPA as
to the owners of the land—Prairie Center Development.

=r

The EDPA does provide that if any party is not satisfied with the
amount awarded in the appraiser's report the party can appeal to
the district court for a trial de novo. But even the trial de novo is
narrow: “The only issue to be determined . . . shall be the compen-
sation required by K.S.A. 26-513.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-508(a).
In short, EDPA proceedings are intended to be quickly resolved,
only concerning (1) the authority to take and (2) just compensation
for the taking. Litigation of collateral issues is relegated to other
civil actions. Miller, 283 Kan. at 114; State Highway Commission
v. Bullard, 208 Kan. 558, 561-62, 493 P.2d 196 (1972). From the
record here, it does not appear that Prairie Center Development
or WaterOne filed an appeal under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-508 to
challenge the amount of compensation awarded.

What makes this case unique is that the Bonhams—who were
never parties to WaterOne’s action—filed an appeal. WaterOne
had taken a permanent water main easement in Tract 16A, which
is a tract of land on which the Bonhams held their own easement.
And the Bonhams’ easement had become a private roadway known
as Stonecrest Road.

Soon after filing the appeal, the Bonhams also filed a motion
to void the proceedings for statutory defects. Essentially, the Bon-
hams claimed WaterOne could not possibly take the permanent
water main easement and use it to install a pipeline in Tract 16A
without interfering with Stonecrest Road—the Bonhams’ ease-
ment. So the Bonhams argued WaterOne did not comply with the
EDPAs petition requirements because WaterOne took the Bon-
hams’ interest without listing the Bonhams as parties in the pe-
tition. See K.S.A, 2015 Supp. 26-503. Additionally, under K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 26-503, the Bonhams argued WaterOne failed to send
them the requisite notice of the condemnation proceedings. The
Bonhams also argued the district court made two errors that are
reflected in the journal entry: The district court read K.S.A. 26-502
and 26-503 as applying only to fee holders, not easement holders,
and it considered parol evidence.

In response, before both the district court and this court, Wa-
terOne has consistently argued that it did not include the Bonhams
in the action because it never sought to acquire the Bonhams’

609

easement—notably, the plain language in WaterOne’s petition
condemned an easement in Tract 16A “[slubject to existing ease-
ments”; in other words, subject to the Bonhams’ easement. Like-
wise, WaterOne argues the district court wholly lacked the jurisdic-
tion to hear the Bonhams’ claims.

Before we address the Bonhams’ arguments, we address Wa-
terOne’s threshold question of whether the district court had juris-
diction to consider the Bonhams’ claims.

2. The district court had jurisdiction to consider the Bonhams’
narrow claim that WaterOne’s petition was statutorily defec-
tive.

Essentially, WaterOne presents a question of subject matter ju-
risdiction, which is an issue that can be raised at any time. Shipe
v. Public Wholesale Water Supply Dist. No. 25, 289 Kan. 160, 166,
210 P.3d 105 (2009). Thus, despite the Bonhams’ argument that
this argument should not be considered because WaterOne did not
cross-appeal, we can consider WaterOne’s argument.

WaterOne’s argument arises, in large part, because the district
court heard the Bonhams’ claim even though the Bonhams were
not originally parties to the condemnation proceedings. As a practi-
cal matter, the district court had to determine whether WaterOne
took the Bonhams’ property interest in order to determine whether
WaterOne’s petition was statutorily defective for failing to name
the Bonhams. Despite their nonparty status, we agree with the
district court that it could determine the narrow issue of whether
WaterOne’s petition contained a statutory defect.

“There is no provision in the [EDPA] precluding a landowner
from raising statutory defect arguments in the condemnation pro-
ceeding.” City of Wichita, 262 Kan. at 542. The Bonhams relied ex-
clusively on City of Wichita for the authority to file a motion to void
the proceedings. And the case does support the Bonhams’ ability,
as a procedural matter, to file their motion in this case.

In City of Wichita, the city initiated condemnation proceedings
on multiple tracts for the purpose of constructing an ice rink. 262
Kan. at 535. Although the city sought to condemn Tracts 47 and
48, which R.E.M. Properties (REM) owned, the city did not list

REM or mention the tracts in its petition. The public hearing no-
tice, however, did list REM and its two tracts, and the appraisers
determined the value of the two tracts at $29,000. Despite its non-
party status, REM filed an appeal and argued a statutory defect
(a day later the city amended the petition to include REM and the
two tracts). 262 Kan. at 536-37. Because REM was not a party to
the initial petition, the city argued the district court did not have
jurisdiction over REM’s claims. 262 Kan. at 539-40.
__ Rejecting the city’s jurisdictional argument, this court concluded
that although the EDPA limits an appeal to the issue of compensa-
tion, “raising statutory defects that render the condemnation pro-
ceeding void before trial of the appeal [or after the appeal] is not
foreclosed.” 262 Kan. at 542. This court in City of Wichita reasoned
that even though REM was not initially a party to the proceedings,
as a landowner with rights at stake, it should not have to risk fore-
going an appeal of an award by filing a separate action to challenge
the validity of the petition. 262 Kan. at 542; 6 Nichols on Eminent
Domain § 26A.03[3] (3d ed. 2008) (“[A] description of property to
be taken that does not meet the strict pleading requirements of this
allegation will render the entire condemnation proceeding void.”).
Thus, under City of Wichita, the district court in this case had
jurisdiction over the proceedings to narrowly consider the merit of
the Bonhams’ statutory-defect argument. See also Dotson v. State
Highway Commission, 198 Kan. 671, 675-76, 426 P.2d 138 (1967)
(permitting unnamed owner to join in appeal: “[A]ny appeal by a
landowner, lienholder or interested party brings to the district court
for determination in a single action the sufficiency of the award for
all interests in the tract or parcel of land under condemnation.”).
Alternatively, the code of civil procedure gives the district court
discretion to permit intervention if the Bonhams presented “a claim
. .. that share[d] with the main action a common question of law
or fact.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-224(b)(1)(B). WaterOne notes that
the Bonhams characterized their motion specifically as a motion
to void under City of Wichita rather than a motion to intervene.
But implicit in the motion to void was an intervention question—
whether the Bonhams had an ownership interest sufficient to give
them a place in this action. And typically intervention is subject to

liberal construction in favor of intervention. Smith v. Russell, 274
Kan. 1076, 1083, 58 P.3d 698 (2002). In this procedurally unique
case, we do not find that the district court wholly lacked jurisdic-
tion to narrowly consider the Bonhams’ claims.

Because the district court had jurisdiction to consider the Bon-
hams’ statutory-defect claim, the next question is whether the dis-
trict court correctly resolved the motion against the Bonhams. We
conclude that it did.

3. The district court was correct that WaterOne’s petition con-
tained no statutory defects.

Certainly, WaterOne’s petition did not name the Bonhams or
describe their ownership interest in the easement over Tract 16A.
If WaterOne intended to condemn the Bonham’s interest—either
permanently or temporarily—it needed to include them as a party
and describe their interest. However, in seeking both a permanent
water main easement and a temporary water main easement, Wa-
terOne pleaded that its interests would be “‘[s]ubject to existing
easements of record.’”

This fact—i.e., that WaterOne was not seeking and has never
sought to take the Bonhams’ easement—makes this case factually
distinguishable from City of Wichita. Notably, in City of Wichita,
there was no question the city sought to take Tracts 47 and 48 from
REM. So the city’s petition was void for two reasons: (1) It failed
to list Tracts 47 and 48, and (2) the city failed to send REM the
requisite statutory notice. 262 Kan. at 544-46 (“If the petition fails
to list the property to be condemned, it is impossible-for the judge
to make any of the findings to allow condemnation to go forward
as to that property.”); see also K.S.A. 26-502 (petition must contain
description of property); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-503 (condemning
authority must send notice to interested parties). Here, WaterOne
has consistently maintained that it is not seeking to take the Bon-
hams’ easement, and the plain language of the condemnation peti-
tion is consistent with that position. Had the petition not contained
the phrase “‘[s]ubject to existing easements of record,” the Bon-
hams would have made a valid point.

Nevertheless, the phrase was included, and the language in the

petition and the corresponding appraiser’s report determined the
extent of the property rights taken. City of Mission Hills v. Sexton,
284 Kan, 414, 431, 160 P.3d 812 (2007). Thus, WaterOne’s peti-
tion did not condemn the Bonhams’ interest and WaterOne did
not obtain the right to interfere with the Bonhams’ interest. (The
appraisers’ report does not appear in the record on appeal). Wa-
terOne, as the government entity condemning the land, had the
exclusive right to determine what lands it needed to take. Murray
vo: Kansas Dept. of Transportation, 239 Kan. 25, 27, 716 P.2d 540
(1986); Concerned Citizens, 215 Kan. at 228; 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Emi-
nent Domain § 38 (“The selection of the amount of land necessary
for a condemnation is a legislative question to be determined by
the condemnor.”).

Apparently, WaterOne determined that it needed an easement
in Tract 16A but did not need the Bonhams’ easement. Generally,
“no more property of a private individual, and no greater interest
therein, can be condemned and set apart for public use than is
absolutely necessary.” 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 39. Even
in this appeal, WaterOne claims that “no . . . taking or damage will
result [in the Bonhams’ easement] from the exercise of rights ac-
quired.” If in WaterOne’s estimation it did not believe it needed
the Bonhams’ easement, it would have been difficult for WaterOne
to justify using eminent domain to take it. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-
504 (petition must show that taking the land is necessary). Indeed,
a condemning body “has no authority to appropriate private prop-
erty for only:a contemplated or speculative use in the future.” 26
Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 40 (“[I]f the condemning body is
uncertain when the future use will occur, the future use becomes
unreasonable, speculative, and remote as a matter of law and de-
feats the taking.”).

The Bonhams recognize that the petition condemns an interest
in Tract 16A “subject to any existing easements.” However, they ar-
gue that other language in the petition gives WaterOne the right to
ignore the Bonhams’ easement: “What WaterOne’s Petition seems
to give with one hand through the ‘Subject to any existing ease-
ments of record... .’ language, it takes away with the other.” This
argument fails to persuade us.

613

When interpreting a written document, the intent of the par-
ties controls and is best evinced by the document’s unambiguous
language. A document's meaning should be gleaned from the doc-
ument as a whole rather than “the critical analysis of a single or
isolated provision.” See Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
265 Kan. 317, 324, 961 P.2d 1213 (1998). Eschewing this interpre-
tive canon, the Bonhams claim WaterOne can “pretty well do as it
pleases” on the Bonhams’ easement, pointing to the long and gen-
eral list of actions WaterOne’s petition says it can take on the prop-
erty it condemns—e.g., “may temporarily excavate or cut through
any road.”

Contrary to this assertion, WaterOne’s interest is expressly lim-
ited by the language that indicated any right it sought in Tract 16A
was subject to the Bonhams’ easement. Regardless of what Wa-
terOne’s petition would have given it the right to do if WaterOne
had condemned the Bonhams’ interest (if the petition had includ-
ed the Bonhams’ easement) or its rights on property interests it
did condemn, WaterOne did not condemn the Bonhams’ easement
and has no legal right to interfere with it. The Bonhams’ assertion
before the district court that WaterOne would at some point ob-
struct Stonecrest Road does not mean that WaterOne condemned
the easement. See 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 240 (“Fu-
ture apprehended damages . . . claimed to be due because of an-
ticipated . . . operation of the public project, may not be included
in the condemnation award since the law furnishes a remedy in
the future for recovery of those damages if and when they occur.”).
The district court did not err in concluding, from the petition, that
WaterOne did not take the Bonhams’ easement.

The core of the Bonhams’ appeal is their claim that WaterOne
cannot realistically hope to construct a water line without inter-
fering with Stonecrest Road. That contention might have seemed
like a fair possibility when the district court considered the par-
ties’ arguments; it might even prove (or by the time it reached this
court have proven) true. If so, WaterOne will have exceeded its
legal authority; because of such possibilities, we urge condemn-
ing authorities to be scrupulously fair in the exercise of eminent

614

domain, always cognizant of the responsibility that comes with a
power so great.

Nevertheless, we are constrained in an eminent domain pro-
ceeding by the language the condemning authority uses, its con-
demnation plans, and the limits of the EDPA. “‘A condemnation
proceeding instituted under K.S.A. 26-501 et seq., . . . does not
provide a forum for litigation over the right to exercise eminent
domain or to determine the extent of said right. ... The right . . . to
determine other issues such as the necessity and extent of the tak-
ing can only be litigated in an individual civil action.’” (Emphasis
added.) Miller, 283 Kan. at 114. We reiterate, the express language
in WaterOne’s petition—which controls in the very narrow pro-
ceedings at issue here—did not condemn the Bonhams’ easement.

In fact, WaterOne’s discretionary decision to take an interest in
Tract 16A and leave the Bonhams with their easement is only sub-
ject to judicial review upon a showing of fraud, bad faith, or abuse
of discretion. Murray, 239 Kan. 27; Concerned Citizens, 215 Kan.
at 228, First, WaterOne correctly notes that the Bonhams do not
argue fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion in this appeal. Second,
even had the Bonhams made those assertions in this case, those
assertions are only proper in an action outside the narrow condem-
nation proceedings. Murray, 239 Kan. at 27; Concerned Citizens,
215 Kan. at 225-26, 228.

Under the weight of the authority, the Bonhams cannot prove a
statutory defect based on their assertion that WaterOne will nec-
essarily, at some point, interfere with their easement. 6 Nichols
on Eminent Domain § 26A.03[1] (It is not “necessary to describe
property that will be damaged if the proposed improvement is con-
structed”; the condemnor does not intend to damage land it does
not take, so those damages are speculative.); see also Concerned
Citizens, 215 Kan. at 237-39 (condemning authority does not need
to show it could fully accomplish its plan prior to taking land); Wel-
don . State, 495 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (Owners
of easement did not need to be named because it was “obvious that
the rights of those owning the dominant tenements of the right of
way across Lot B are not obstructed in any way by the condemna-
tion of a small, noncontiguous, portion of Lot B. As such, there has

been no taking of the dominant tenement or the easement.”); In re
Appeal of Heim, 151 Pa. Cmwlth. 438, 444, 617 A.2d 74 (1992) (No
error in failing to name easement owners because “the easements
of the additional lot owners will continue to exist over the opened
road, just as they existed over the unopened road. The additional
lot owners therefore do not have a’property interest which has been
taken, injured or destroyed.”). Consequently, the district court cor-
rectly resolved the narrow issue before it. WaterOne’s petition was
not statutorily defective on its face for omitting the Bonhams and
their easement because WaterOne never sought to take—and did
not take—the Bonhams’ easement.

Notwithstanding WaterOne’s intentions, the Bonhams are not,
as we have alluded, left without a remedy just because their claims
were improper in this case: Should WaterOne interfere with the
Bonhams’ easement (or if it has done so), the Bonhams could file
a separate action for inverse condemnation. 6 Nichols on Eminent
Domain § 26A.03[1]. Indeed, “[i]nverse condemnation is an action
initiated by the landowner and is available when private property
has been taken for public use without formal condemnation pro-
ceedings and where it appears there is no intention or willingness
of the taker to bring the action.” City of Wichita v. Meyer, 262 Kan.
534, 548, 939 P.2d 926 (1997). It seems WaterOne has no inten-
tion to file a formal condemnation proceeding as to the Bonhams’
easement. So if WaterOne does take or damage the easement, the
Bonhams have viable legal options, which they recognized in the
hearing before the district court.

Accordingly, we hold WaterOne’s petition was valid on its face.
We next address the Bonhams’ challenges to the district court’s
journal entry denying their motion to void the condemnation.

4. The Bonhams fail to establish an error in the journal entry.

As to their attack on the journal entry in this case, the Bonhams
first claim the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding
that easement holders are not entitled to notice under the EDPA.
Second, the Bonhams assert that the district court improperly re-
lied on parol evidence to conclude that WaterOne did not take
their easement. We find no error in the journal entry.

616

4.1. An entity must comply with the EDPA when taking an
easement.

The Bonhams assert that the district court made a mistake of
law in concluding that only fee owners of property, lienholders,
and parties in possession are entitled to statutory notice under the
EDPA. We reject this claim because we disagree with the Bon-
hams’ characterization of the district court’s legal conclusion.

Citing Kansas Gas ¢ Electric Co. v. Will Investments, Inc., 261
Kan. 125, 132, 928 P.2d 73 (1996), the Bonhams argue this court
has recognized easement holders as parties entitled to compensa-
tion under the EDPA. See 261 Kan. 125, Syl. { 6 (“Under the facts
of this case, the trial court correctly found the owner of a retained
easement taken by a condemnor was entitled to the entire amount
of the appraiser’s award.”). They fault the district court’s conclusion
that “WaterOne complied with the Eminent Domain Procedure
Act, ... since the [Bonhams] were not the fee holder, lienhold-
ers, or parties in possession of” the condemned tract. Indeed, this
statement strayed from the statutory language and substituted “fee
holder” for the term “owner” in K.S.A. 26-502, and, arguably this
change could be read as a failure to account for an easement hold-
er's interest.

Nevertheless, as we have noted, WaterOne has consistently ar-
gued it did not include the Bonhams in the action because it never
sought to acquire the Bonhams’ easement; WaterOne asserts its
position was never that those with a preexisting easement would
not be entitled to be named in a petition and given notice. Wa-
terOne, for its part, concedes that the EDPA covers the taking of
easements. See also 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain § 209 (“The
owner of an easement is entitled to compensation when the ease-
ment is taken in eminent domain.”). This means, according to Wa-
terOne, any misstatement by the district court (assuming there was
one) was irrelevant to its ultimate conclusion, which was that Wa-
terOne did not take the Bonhams’ property interest. The Bonhams
also concede that “being the owner of an easement interest does
not entitle one to be named and noticed up if the taking at issue
does not interfere with the enjoyment of the easement in ques-
tion.”

Reading the district court’s faulted statement regarding fee
holders in context, it becomes clear this statement was not the ba-
sis for the district court’s decision and, in fact, the district court did
not conclude that easement holders are never entitled to statutory
notice under the EDPA. Rather, the court found that the Bonhams
were not entitled to notice because their “easement rights under
the plain language of WaterOne’s condemnation petition [were]
not designated to be taken.” As we previously concluded, because
WaterOne took Prairie Center Development's property subject to
any existing easements, WaterOne did not take the Bonhams’ ease-
ment, or any existing easement, and only had to name Prairie Cen-
ter Development, who happened to be the fee holder. Nothing in
the record suggests that the district court did not understand that
easements could be taken or that it believed the EDPA notice re-
quirements did not apply to easements. We do not find the record
to support the Bonhams’ argument on this point.

4.2. The district court did not erroneously rely on parol evi-
dence.

The Bonhams argue the district court concluded there was no
taking only by erroneously relying on WaterOne’s project design
plan, which was parol evidence outside WaterOne’s condemna-
tion petition. The district court’s findings of fact did mention Wa-
terOne’s project plan. The court found, among other things, that the
“project design plans and contract specifications provide that the
contractor is ‘to construct 12 foot wide temporary access road for
neighborhood ingress/egress that is to be accessible at all times.’”
We recognize the petition was not the source of that information.

Again, the petition and appraiser's report define the extent of
the land condemned, and parol evidence is not admissible to limit
the extent of a taking. See City of Mission Hills, 284 Kan. at 431
(“‘parol evidence will not be admitted for the purpose of establish-
ing a lesser interest based on the condemnor’s intended use’”). But
WaterOne did not condemn the Bonhams’ easement through its
petition and then use the project plan to exclude the Bonhams’
easement from the condemnation. WaterOne never intended to
take the Bonhams’ easement, and it explicitly drafted its petition so
as not to take the easement.

: Granted, the district court did mention parol evidence in its
journal entry. But it was the Bonhams who first referenced parol
evidence in their motion to void by arguing that “[a]s part of the
construction project it will be necessary to dig up Stonecrest Road
in order to put the pipeline underground.” Nowhere does the peti-
tion say WaterOne will dig up Stonecrest Road; the petition makes
no mention of Stonecrest Road.

Generally, a party cannot invite error and then complain of the
error on appeal. Thoroughbred Assocs. v. Kansas City Royalty Co.,
297 Kan. 1193, 1203-04, 308 P.3d 1238 (2013). The Bonhams at-
tempted to support their motion to void by arguing that WaterOne
would have to dig up Stonecrest Road to complete its project. We
find a point WaterOne made before the district court compelling:
Just as WaterOne cannot use its plans to show how it will avoid
interfering with the Bonhams’ easement, the Bonhams cannot go
outside of the petition’s language to argue WaterOne will inter-
fere with their easement. The Bonhams invited the district court
to hear parol evidence about the project plan in their attempt to
prove WaterOne would need their easement. The petition itself
simply did not condemn the Bonhams’ easement.

Furthermore, even if the district court’s discussion of parol evi-
dence was uninvited error, the error was harmless here because it
did not affect the Bonhams’ substantial rights. See City of Mission
Hills, 284 Kan. at 434 (Harmless error under K.S.A. 60-261 applies
to the admission of evidence in an eminent domain proceeding. );
see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-261 (“[N]o error in admitting or ex-
cluding evidence. . . is ground for . . . disturbing a judgment or
order [unless the error affects a] party's substantial rights.”). Again,
despite mentioning parol evidence, the district court relied only on
the language of the petition to conclude that the Bonhams’ “ease-
ment rights . . . are not designated to be taken.” So its discussion of
the construction plan did not lead to its ruling.

If WaterOne does dig up Stonecrest Road at some point in the
future (or, as argued during oral arguments before this court, has
already interfered with the Bonhams’ property interest), then the
Bonhams would have had a claim in a separate action for inverse
condemnation. See City of Wichita, 262 Kan. at 548.

619

Finding no error in the district court’s decision in this case, we
affirm.

Affirmed.

eae

STEGALL, J., concurring: I am compelled to concur with today’s
decision because I agree with our conclusion that “WaterOne’s pe-
tition did not condemn the Bonhams’ interest and WaterOne did
not obtain the right to interfere with the Bonhams’ interest.” 304
Kan. at 612. And because WaterOne’s petition was drafted, on its
face, so as not to condemn the Bonhams’ easement, the Bonhams’
were not statutorily entitled to receive notice of the condemnation
proceedings.

At oral argument, the Bonhams’ counsel made it clear that his
clients were aware of the alternative remedies available to them
for the alleged interference with and trespass against their prop-
erty interest. We discuss some of those alternative remedies above.
Counsel further plausibly represented—and we have no reason to
doubt—that the Bonhams’ reasons for bringing this action (as op-
posed to an after-the-fact claim for damages) is because they are
chiefly concerned with vindicating their perceived right to have re-
ceived notice of the condemnation proceedings at the outset.

Without question, notice is a fundamental component and policy
objective of the Kansas Eminent Domain Procedure Act (EDPA).
See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26-503. However, the reality our decision
today manifests without articulating—a state of affairs deserving
explicit acknowledgment—is that the EDPA grants condemning
authorities carte blanche to consciously limit the scope of the re-
quired notice through drafting gamesmanship. If complete and
widespread notice is indeed a fundamental policy objective of the
legislature, as it appears to be, this case simply illustrates that the
statutory language chosen by the legislature fails to implement that
policy in an airtight manner.

In response to this failure of statutory language, my colleagues
muster the hope that government actors will “be scrupulously fair
in the exercise of eminent domain, always cognizant of the respon-
sibility that comes with a power so great.” 304 Kan. at 613-14. lam

not so sanguine. Instead, I am mindful that in the past, when con-
sidering the potential for abusive practices in eminent domain pro-
ceedings, we have noted that it is difficult to “conceive of a policy
of government afflicted with greater potentials for abuse of a pri-
vate citizen.” Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan.
698, 711, 594 P.2d 671 (1979) (summarizing with approval Board
of Com’rs of State Inst. v. Tallahassee B. & T. Co., 108 So. 2d 74
(Fla. App. 1958}).

Left unchecked by flood walls erected either by the people’s
representatives or by the people’s constitution, the power of the
state will flow like an encroaching ocean into and through every
available chink and crevice. The statutory requirement of prior no-
tice is one such flood wall against the “abuse of a private citizen”
in eminent domain proceedings. But in its absence, as today’s case
aptly demonstrates, condemning authorities are more likely to take
advantage of this crack in the law—the better to effect expansive
exercise of power—than they are to be “scrupulously fair” and
“cognizant of the responsibility that comes with a power so great.”
304 Kan. at 613-14.

Unfortunately for the Bonhams, their claim is a statutory claim
and the failure of the statute to effectively guarantee to them and
others like them the right to receive notice can only be remedied
in the legislature.

No. 114,542

In the Matter of BENJAMIN N. Casa, Respondent.
(872 P3d 1219)

Opinion filed June 10, 2016.

Deborah L. Hughes, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and
Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal com-
plaint for the petitioner.

John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the
cause, and Benjamin N. Casad, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by
the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent,
Benjamin N. Casad, of Prairie Village, an attorney admitted to the
practice of law in Kansas in 1992.

On June 23, 2015, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator
filed a formal complaint against the respondent alleging violations
of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). The respon-
dent filed an answer on July 8, 2015. A hearing was held on the
complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of At-
torneys on September 1, 2015, where the respondent was person-
ally present and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel
determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 442) (competence); 1.3 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 461) (dili-
gence); 1.4(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 482) (communication); and
8.4(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with its recommen-
dation to this court:

“Findings of Fact

“8, In January 2013, the Leavenworth County District Court appointed the
respondent to represent R.B., an elderly man, ina criminal appeal following R.B.’s
conviction for forgery, a severity level 8 felony; conspiracy to commit forgery, a
severity level 10 felony; and theft, a class A misdemeanor. The court sentenced

R.B. to a 10-month prison sentence for the forgery conviction, a 6-month prison
sentence for the conspiracy conviction, to run concurrently to the forgery sen-
tence, and a 12-month jail sentence for the theft charge. The court granted R.B.’s
request for probation and placed R.B. on probation for a period of 12 months.

“9. On May 21, 2013, the respondent timely filed a brief on behalf of B.B.
However, the respondent failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) by
adequately citing to the record on appeal.

“10. Inthe brief, the respondent argued that R.B.’s statutory right to a speedy
trial had been violated. On August 30, 2013, the state timely filed its brief. In its
brief, the state conceded that R.B.’s statutory speedy trial rights were violated
regarding the forgery and theft convictions. Thus, the state agreed that those two
convictions should be reversed.

“Ll. On September 4, 2013, the Court of Appeals notified the respondent
that he failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) by adequately citing
to the record on appeal. The court ordered the respondent to submit a corrected
brief on or before September 16, 2013. The respondent failed to submit a cor-
rected brief. On October 10, 2013, the court issued an order dismissing R.B.’s
appeal ‘for failure to resubmit an amended brief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
6,02.’ On November 13, 2013, the clerk of the appellate courts issued the mandate
dismissing R.B.’s appeal.

“12. The respondent did not have contact with R.B. at any time during the
appeal. The respondent did not provide R.B. with a copy of the brief he filed on
R.Bvs behalf. The respondent did not provide R.B. with a copy of the court's order
directing him to resubmit an amended brief. The respondent did not provide R.B.
with a copy of the order dismissing R.B’s appeal. The respondent never notified
R.B. that his appeal had been dismissed,

“13, In December 2013, Greg Robinson, R.B.’s trial counsel, learned that
R.B.’s appeal had been dismissed. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact
the respondent by phone and electronic mail message, Mr. Robinson spoke to the
respondent. The respondent told Mr. Robinson that he was considering filing a
motion to recall the mandate. At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Robinson
believed that the respondent was going to file something to remedy the dismissal.

“14. Mr. Robinson contacted the court and learned that the respondent had
not taken any action to remedy the dismissal.

“15, On March 5, 2014, Mr. Robinson filed a motion in district court request-
ing that the district court order the respondent to file a motion to recall the man-
date or appoint new appellate counsel. On March 10, 2014, the respondent filed a
motion to recall the mandate in the Court of Appeals.

“16. On June 16, 2014, the respondent self-reported his conduct to the disci-
plinary administrator's office.

“17. On September 26, 2014, the respondent attempted to file an amended
brief. The clerk of the appellate courts refused to accept and file the brief.

“18. On October 23, 2014, the Court of Appeals summarily denied the re-
spondent's motion to recall the mandate.

“19. On November 17, 2014, the respondent attempted to file a motion for
an extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the mo-
tion to recall the mandate. The time period for filing a motion for rehearing or
modification had already expired. The respondent explained that he had several
other matters that required attention and did not have sufficient time to complete
the motion for reconsideration or file for extension of time before the deadline
passed. The clerk of the appellate courts refused to accept the motion for filing.

“20. If R.B’s appeal had not been dismissed, R.B’s convictions of forgery
and theft would have likely been reversed and his sentences on those convictions
vacated as the state conceded the speedy trial violations regarding those convic-
tions.

“21. At some point, R.B. was found in violation of his probation for failure to
pay restitution. R.B. remains on probation as he is on a fixed income and has been
unable to satisfy the restitution obligation.

“22. Had R.B.’s convictions for forgery and theft been reversed as a result of
a successful appeal, his criminal history classification would have been lowered.
Thus, should R.B. later be convicted of or pleaded guilty to another offense, he
may now be subject to a harsher sentence than he would have been had the appeal
been successful.

“Conclusions of Law

“93, Based upon the respondent's stipulation and the above findings of fact,
the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC
1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 8.4(d), as detailed below.

“KRPC 1.1

“24. ‘Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC
L.L. ‘Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.’ The respondent
failed to exercise the requisite preparation by failing to prepare and file a brief
which comported with the Supreme Court Rules. Accordingly, the hearing panel
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1 by filing a brief which failed to
adequately cite to the record on appeal in violation of Supreme Court Rule 6.02.

“KRPC 1.3

“25. Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in rep-
resenting their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and
promptly represent R.B., by failing to timely submit a corrected brief to the Court
of Appeals, citing to the record on appeal. Because the respondent failed to act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, the hearing
panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3.

“KRPC 14

“26, KRPC 1.4(a) provides that ‘{a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably in-
formed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable re-

— i 4

quests for information.’ The respondent did not have contact with R.B. at any time
during the appeal. The respondent did not provide R.B. with a copy of the brief
he filed on B.B.’s behalf, The respondent did not provide R.B. with a copy of the
court's order directing him to resubmit an amended brief. The respondent did not
provide R.B. with a copy of the order dismissing R.B.’s appeal. The respondent
never notified R.B. that his appeal had been dismissed. Accordingly, the hearing
panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a).

“KRPC 8.4(d)

“27. ‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to. . . engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” KRPC 8,4(d). The respondent
engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he
failed to file a brief that comported with the Supreme Court Rules. As a result of
the respondent's misconduct, R.B. lost his opportunity for a direct appeal of his
convictions. The injury is particularly grave in this case as the state has conceded
that two of the three counts should have been dismissed due to speedy trial viola-
tions. Further, the respondent failed to comply with an order of the Court of Ap-
peals. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC
8.4(d).

“American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

“28. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel con-
sidered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ‘Standards’), Pursuant to Standard 3, the
factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the po-
tential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

“29. Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to provide
competent and diligent representation and adequate communication. Further,
the respondent violated his duty to the profession to comply with court orders
which resulted in prejudice to the administration of justice.

“30. Mental State. The respondent knowingly did not respond to the Court
of Appeals’ order and did not communicate with his client regarding the case. The
respondent negligently violated his duties to comply with Supreme Court rules
regarding citation to the record on appeal.

“31, Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent
caused actual serious injury to his client.

“Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

“32. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
commendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
aggravating factors present:

“33, Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations.

625

‘The respondent violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 8.4(d). Ac-
cordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed multiple
offenses.

“34. Vulnerability of Victim. B.B. is an elderly, indigent criminal defendant.
R.B. was vulnerable to the respondent’s misconduct.

“35. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1992.
The respondent began practicing law in 1996, At the time of the misconduct, the
respondent has been practicing law for approximately 17 years.

“36. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
mitigating circumstances present:

“37. Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not previ-
ously been disciplined.

“38, Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent's misconduct
does not appear to have been motivated by dishonesty or selfishness.

“39, Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, The respondent suffers
from depression, anxiety, and alcoholism. The respondent has not consumed al-
cohol for 9 years. Based upon the testimony presented, it is clear that the respon-
dent's depression and anxiety contributed to his misconduct.

“40. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment
of the Transgressions. The respondent self-reported the misconduct. Thereafter,
the respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. Additionally, the
respondent admitted the facts and the rule violations.

“41. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Includ-
ing Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character
and General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and produc-
tive member of the bar of Leavenworth, Kansas. The respondent also enjoys the
respect of his peers and generally possesses a good character and reputation as
evidenced by the testimony of Mr. Robinson and David Graham and by several
letters received by the hearing panel. Respondent's Exhibits A, B, C, E, G, and H.

“4, Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed genu-
ine remorse for having engaged in the misconduct.

“43, In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

‘4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when: .. . (b) a lawyer engages
in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

“443 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and
does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and
causes injury or potential injury to a client.”

‘6.22, Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court
order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a
party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceed-
ing.

‘6.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails
to comply with a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential
injury to a client or other party, or causes interference or potential .
interference with a legal proceeding.”

“Recommendation

“44. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be
censured and that the censure be published in the Kansas Reports. The disciplin-
ary administrator further recommended that the respondent be ordered to com-
ply with terms of the KALAP monitoring agreement. The respondent also recom-
mended that he be censured and that the censure be published in the Kansas
Reports. The respondent recommended that the KALAP agreement be extended
to 3 years’ duration (instead of the existing -year agreement).

“45, The respondent’ failure to comply with the Court of Appeals’ order—
and the impact of that conduct—is troubling to the hearing panel. However, the
respondent presented compelling mitigating evidence—including evidence that
he has not had any other complaints filed against him since his admission in 1992.
Thus, the hearing panel concurs with the recommendations of the parties and
recommends to the Supreme Court that the respondent be censured and that the
censure be published in the Kansas Reports. The hearing panel also recommends
that the Kansas Supreme Court should order the respondent that he must com-
ply with the KALAP agreement and is persuaded by counsel’s recommendation
that the KALAP agreement should be extended to a total of 3 years. Further, the
hearing panel directs the respondent to complete a full physical examination with
a physician within 30 days of the date of this report. Finally, should a request be
made to the respondent to execute any additional releases to allow the members
of the disciplinary administrator's office to discuss the respondent's treatment with
treatment providers, the respondent shall execute an appropriate release within
30 days of the date of the request. Should the respondent fail to comply with any
portion of the KALAP agreement during the next 3 years or fail to comply with
any other direction of the Kansas Supreme Court or of this hearing panel, the
hearing panel recommends that the Kansas Supreme Court enter at the request
of the disciplinary administrator an order to show cause why this case should not
be reopened and other discipline imposed.

“46. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified
by the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator.”

Discussion

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence,
the findings of the disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the par-

ties and determines whether violations of KRPC exist and, if they
do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292
Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). Clear and convincing evidence is
“‘evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that “the truth of
the facts asserted is highly probable.”’” In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498,
505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725,
188 P.3d 1 [2008}).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint,
to which he filed an answer. Respondent was also given adequate
notice of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this
court. He filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing
report. With no exceptions before us, the panel's findings of fact
are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 369). Furthermore, the evidence before the hearing
panel clearly and convincingly establishes that the charged miscon-
duct was in violation of KRPC 1.1 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 442)
(competence); 1.3 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 461) (diligence); 1.4(a)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 482) (communication); and 8.4(d) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice) and supports the panel’s conclusions of law.
We therefore adopt the panel’s findings and conclusions.

The remaining issue before this court is the appropriate dis-
cipline for respondent's violations. As noted above, the hearing
panel recommended a published censure but supplemented that
suggested sanction by recommending placement of conditions on
the respondent for 3 years. To reiterate, those recommended con-
ditions were that the respondent comply with the KALAP agree-
ment and that the duration of the agreement be extended to a total
of 3 years; that respondent complete a full physical examination
with a physician within 30 days of the date of the final panel re-
port; and that, within 30 days of a request from the Disciplinary
Administrator's office, respondent execute appropriate releases to
his treatment providers. Finally, the hearing panel recommended
that, should the respondent fail to comply with any portion of the
KALAP agreement during the next 3 years or fail to comply with

ee
=

any other direction of the Kansas Supreme Court or of the hearing
panel, then, at the request of the Disciplinary Administrator, this
court should issue an order to show cause why this case should not
be reopened and other discipline imposed.

At the hearing before this court, both the Disciplinary Admin-
istrator and the respondent requested that this court follow the
panel's recommendation of published censure with supplemental
post-reprimand conditions. Naturally, we give due regard to the
recommendations of the panel and the parties, but we are not
bound by such recommendations. See In re Mintz, 298 Kan. 897,
911-12, 317 P.3d 756 (2014); Supreme Court Rule 212(f) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 371) (“The recommendation of the panel or
the Disciplinary Administrator as to sanctions to be imposed shall
be advisory only and shall not prevent the Court from imposing
sanctions greater or lesser than those recommended by the panel
or the Disciplinary Administrator.”). Instead, this court endeavors
to fashion a disciplinary sanction in each case that is appropriately
penal for the past violations given the particular facts and circum-
stances—both aggravating and mitigating—but with the additional
goal of ordering such corrective measures as will protect the public
against future transgressions.

Here, as the panel observed, the respondent engaged in both
intentional and negligent behavior, which implicated both suspen-
sion and reprimand as generally appropriate sanctions under the
American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanc-
| tions. The mitigating circumstances in this case would ordinarily
i counsel that we accept the recommendation of the lesser penalty
of reprimand. But the panel’s determination that years-long sup-
plemental conditions would also be advisable for the respondent’s
professional rehabilitation convinces us that it is more appropriate
to underpin those conditions with a suspension.

Accordingly, we suspend the respondent from the practice of law
in the state of Kansas for a period of 60 days but stay the imposition
of that suspension upon certain conditions. First, the respondent
shall comply with the terms of his current agreement with KALAP,
including any extension period that KALAP may deem necessary
for respondent's professional rehabilitation. Next, respondent shall

obtain a full and complete physical examination by a physician and
shall follow through with all of the doctor's recommendations. Fur-
ther, the respondent shall forthwith comply with any request from
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator to provide releases to
medical care providers to enable that office to obtain reports and
discuss respondent's treatment regimen and progress. Finally, upon
completion of all of the conditions, the respondent shall make satis-
factory proof to the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator, upon
which that office shall terminate the suspension, as if it were for a
definite term. See Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 403). A minority of the court would tie the conditions of the
stay to the period of time respondent is working with KALAP.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that Benjamin N. Casad be and is
hereby suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) and (5) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 293), for a period of 60 days, but imposition of that
discipline shall be stayed upon the terms and conditions outlined
above.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 219(c), respondent shall be eligible for reinstatement without
a hearing, in the same manner as if this suspension were for a defi-
nite period of time.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings
be assessed to the respondent and that this opinion be published in
the official Kansas Reports.

No. 114,583

In the Matter of STEPHEN M. Stark, Respondent.
(375 P3d 956)

Opinion filed June 10, 2016.

Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and was on
the formal complaint for the petitioner.

David M. Rapp, of Hinkle Law Firm, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause, and
Stephen M. Stark, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by
the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent,
Stephen M. Stark, of Wichita, an attorney admitted to the practice
of law in Kansas in 1984.

On February 3, 2015, the office of the Disciplinary Administra-
tor filed a formal complaint against the respondent alleging viola-
tions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). The
respondent filed an answer on March 9, 2015. The parties entered
into a written stipulation on April 20, 2015. A hearing was held on
the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline
of Attorneys on April 21, 2015, where the respondent was person-
ally present and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel
determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.3 (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 461) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 482) (com-
munication); and 8.4(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with its recommen-
dation to this court:

“Bindings of Fact

“8. On February 20, 2009, Robert D. Myers, city attomey for the City of
Newton, Kansas, negotiated an option to purchase 120 acres of real estate owned
by the Claassen family at a price of $7,500.00 per acre, on behalf of the city. The
Claassens requested assurance that they would receive at least as favorable a price

631

as other property owners who sold their property to the city. Therefore, the city
agreed to include a ‘Most Favored Nation’ (MFN) clause in the Claassen option
agreement. The MFN clause would assure the Claassens would receive the best
price per acre paid by the city for other property. The Claassen option expired on
August 31, 2010.

“9. On July 29, 2009, the city purchased a separate tract for the industrial
park at $8,000.00 per acre. On January 8, 2010, the city acquired another option to
purchase property in connection with the industrial park at a price of $10,000.00

er acre.

Peo. On February 18, 2010, the city exercised its option to purchase the
Claassen property, but only offered to pay the Claassens $8,000.00 per acre. The
Claassens believed they were entitled to $10,000.00 per acre. The city and the
Claassens agreed to close on the purchase of the Claassen property at a price of
$8,000.00 per acre. However, the city and the Claassens entered into a Reserva-
tion of Rights Agreement under which the Claassens reserved the right to claim
a higher price pursuant to the MFN clause. The Reservation of Rights provision
contained additional post-closing obligations not set forth above, such as the par-
ties’ obligation to negotiate in good faith to attempt to resolve any dispute over the
claim for additional compensation.

“11, In December 2010, the Claassens filed a lawsuit against the city claim-
ing $240,000.00 in damages ($2,000.00 per acre for 120 acres).

“12, The city initially engaged the respondent in 2010, to review the Claas-
sen option contract and provide advice regarding the interpretation of the MFN
clause. When the Claassens sued the city over the price of the property, the re-
spondent was retained to handle the litigation on behalf of the city. The respon-
dent was to communicate with the city through Mr. Myers. Mr. Myers would
normally have served as co-counsel in the litigation, but it was anticipated that he
would be a material witness in the litigation due to his involvement in negotiating
the option with the Claassens. Mr. Myers was involved in the strategic planning
for the litigation. It was agreed that the appropriate strategy was to move for sum-
mary judgment as soon as possible. Alternative arguments would be advanced
regarding the MFN clause in the Claassen option: (1) there was no ambiguity re~
garding the option terms, so no extrinsic evidence would be necessary to construe
it; (2) and, the city’s limitations under the Kansas Cash Basis Law and Budget Law
rendered the option void.

“13. From that time until the first part of 2012, the parties were involved in
discovery and various other preliminary matters, During that time, the city also re-
tained the respondent to negotiate with Claassens’ counsel to get the transaction
closed with the Reservation of Rights Agreement. The respondent successfully
handled that portion of the representation.

[14. Not used.]

“15. On June 5, 2012, Mr. Myers sent the respondent an e-mail asking for a
status report regarding the case and asking what needed to be done with respect
to the filing of a motion for summary judgment, In July of 2012, the respondent

— 8 =~—ee

obtained approval from Mr. Myers to have a summer law clerk perform some
research on the case.

“16. On July 11, 2012, the plaintiff’ attorney, Lee Thompson, deposed Mr.
Myers.

“17, On September 28, 2012, the respondent’s firm issued a billing invoice
for time worked in July and August of 2012. That billing included an entry by the
respondent on August 20, 2012, with the description ‘review for scheduling.’ No
billing memos or invoices were provided to the city after the invoice dated Sep-
tember 28, 2012.

“18. A scheduling conference was held in September, 2012. The respondent
failed to inform Mr. Myers of the scheduling conference held in September, 2012.

“19. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed a motion for summary judg-
ment on behalf of the city. The motion asserted that the Claassens’ claim was
barred by the Cash Basis Law and Budget Law. The memorandum in support of
the motion for summary judgment did not present any argument that the MFN
clause was unambiguous. The motion also did not address the secondary issues in
the lawsuit related to the Claassens’ personal property. The respondent failed to
discuss the motion with Mr. Myers. Further, the respondent failed to inform Mr.
Myers that a motion had been filed. Finally, the respondent failed to provide Mr.
Myers with a copy of the motion.

“20. The Cash Basis Law and Budget Law arguments were based on the the-
ory that the city had not appropriated the money that would have been necessary
to pay the higher purchase price demanded by the Claassens. In the motion for
summary judgment, the respondent represented that the argument would be sup-
ported by an affidavit from Mr. Myers. Specifically, the memorandum in support
of the motion referred to an affidavit of Mr. Myers and the affidavit was listed as
an exhibit to the memorandum. However, the affidavit was not attached. Although
the respondent prepared a draft of an affidavit for Mr. Myers to sign, it was never
presented to Mr. Myers for review and execution. While the respondent had not
submitted the affidavit to Mr. Myers for review and execution, he believed, based
on past communications with Mr. Myers and Mr. Myers’ involvement as the city’s
30(b)(6) deposition witness, that Mr. Myers had personal knowledge of the facts,
law, and concepts set forth in the draft affidavit. The respondent also believed that
Mr. Myers would be willing to sign the affidavit as drafted.

“21. On November 28, 2012, Mr. Thompson sent the respondent an e-mail
requesting the missing affidavit, noting: ‘I would assume that we got it; but could
you e-mail or fax me a copy?” Mr. Thompson also requested a 5-day extension of
time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. On November 29, 2012,
the respondent agreed to the 5-day extension and told Mr. Thompson that the
absence of the affidavit was an ‘oversight.’ On December 4, 2012, Mr. Thompson.
again e-mailed the respondent asking for a copy of the Myers affidavit. The re-
spondent responded the next day, saying: ‘I will check w/Myers, but I’m buried
today.”

633

“22, On December 7, 2012, Mr. Thompson filed a response to the respon-
dent’s motion for summary judgment.

“23. On December 17, 2012, a hearing was held on the city’s motion for sum-
mary judgment. The court asked the respondent about the missing affidavit, to
which the respondent replied:

‘Tve not obtained exhibit 9, the Myers’ [sic] affidavit, yet. Since counsel’s
brief indicated that whatever the facts attested to by Mr. Myers—prepared
to argue around those, I went ahead and proceeded forward, but I'll shore
that up and provide that.”

Later in that hearing, the court again raised the issue of the affidavit and it said:

‘Tt sounds like this isn’t a big deal, the affidavit from Mr. Myers, exhibit 9,
but just out of an abundance of caution, Mr. Stark, why don’t you, if you
could—and I’m assuming you can. If you could, get that in our court file
and then also to Mr, Thompson, say before the end of the day tomorrow. I
am assuming it’s in your materials.”
As part of this discussion about the affidavit, Mr. Thompson raised a concern about
obtaining some assurance that the affidavit actually existed at the time of hearing:

‘I'm just a little bothered. I, of course, want counsel to represent to the
Court or show that that was done prior to today’s argument. I mean—and
Y’'m not questioning Mr. Stark, He and I know each other, but I haven’t
seen it or anything else, and I think to protect my client, we need that
representation that it was available and was part of what should have been
submitted.”

‘The court acknowledged Mr. Thompson's concem, saying, “Mr. Stark if you could
let us know along the les of what Mr. Thompson suggests, what the availability
was of that exhibit.’ The respondent did not respond on the record regarding the
status of the affidavit. No further discussion was had regarding the affidavit at the
hearing.

a ‘The respondent failed to communicate with Mr. Myers from July, 2012,
until December 19, 2012, when the respondent phoned Mr. Myers. Mr. Myers
was unavailable, but responded by an e-mail inviting the respondent to provide
him information regarding the law clerk’ research and inquiring about the sum-
mary judgment motion. The respondent did not reply to Mr. Myers’ December
19, 2012, e-mail. He did attempt to reach Mr. Myers by phone on two occasions,
but Mr. Myers was out of the office at those times.

“25. On December 20, 2012, Mr. Thompson filed a supplemental memo-
randum in opposition to the respondent’s motion for summary judgment. The
respondent failed to provide Mr. Myers with a copy of the supplemental memo-
randum in opposition to the respondent's motion for summary judgment.

“26. The court held a pretrial conference on January 4, 2013, On January 11,
2013, a pretrial conference order was entered setting the case for a 3-day jury trial
beginning February 20, 2013. The respondent failed to inform Mr. Myers that a

— 4

pretrial conference had been held, that a pretrial order had been entered, or that
the court scheduled the case for jury trial beginning February 20, 2013.

“27. On January 14, 2013, Judge Joe Dickinson sent the parties a letter deny-
ing the city’s motion for summary judgment. Regarding the affidavit, Judge Dick-
inson wrote:

“At the hearing it was brought to my attention that exhibit 9 was never filed
by the defense, although it was referenced in the Memorandum in Support
of the Motion for Summary Judgment (see page 6). I checked again today
and the Court has never received exhibit 9, apparently an Affidavit of Rob-
ert Myers. I’ve seen, as did claimant’s counsel, that this was inadvertent and
would be supplied by the defendant, and accordingly, I allowed additional
time to supply the document. In any event, setting that issue aside, I find
that the city’s motion for summary judgment should be denied...”

The respondent did not advise Judge Dickinson that the affidavit had never been
signed. The respondent failed to inform Mr. Myers that the court sent the parties
aletter denying the city’s motion for summary judgment. The respondent failed to
provide a copy of Judge Dickinson’s letter to Mr. Myers.

“28, In the journal entry and order denying motion for summary judgment,
the court noted the following regarding the affidavit:

“The factual basis for the city’s argument was set out in paragraphs 27
through 33 of its Memorandum, citing the Affidavit of Robert Myers, City
Attorney for Newton. However, the reference to the affidavit was not at-
tached to the Memorandum. Even though the issue was raised in Plaintiffs’
response at oral argument and by way of a Supplemental Memorandum, no
affidavit was filed of record.”

The respondent failed to provide Mr. Myers with a copy of the journal entry and
the order denying motion for summary judgment.

“29. Through January and early February of 2013, the respondent and Mr.
Thompson exchanged various communications regarding possible mediators for
the case, On February 13, 2013, they agreed the trial date should be rescheduled
to May 8, 2013, and May 9, 2013, to allow additional time for mediation. From
February 21, 2013, through April 5, 2013, Mr. Thompson contacted the respon-
dent at least six times to address potential mediators and waiver of a jury trial. The
respondent did not respond to Mr. Thompson. On March 13, 2013, a legal secre-
tary from the respondent’s firm, Linda Hansen, sent an e-mail to the respondent
stating:

‘Lee Thompson is getting desperate. He left a voicemail message for me

saying he had been trying to contact you by e-mail and phone to schedule

mediation and wondered if I could help him. Will you call him?”

“30. On April 5, 2013, Mr. Thompson sent a letter to the respondent stating
the following:

‘I have written, called and e-mailed on numerous occasions trying to get
your input on acceptable dates to conduct a mediation in the captioned
case. I agreed to your suggestion of Mert Buckley as a mediator and identi-
fied numerous dates I would be available. . . .

‘Given the absence of a response to possible mediation, my clients have
reviewed the case with me and a [sic] willing to make an offer of settlement
at this time...’

Mr. Thompson’s April 5, 2013, letter further outlines a settlement proposal in
which the Claassens would accept a lower cash amount ($200,000.00) in exchange
for favorable leasing terms related to other farmland owned by the city. The re-
spondent failed to communicate the settlement offer to Mr. Myers.

“31, In early May 2013, Mr. Myers was contacted by telephone by the re-
spondent and three other attorneys in his firm. At that time, the respondent, for
the first time, informed Mr. Myers that the case was scheduled for trial on May
8, 2013, and May 9, 2013. The respondent and the other attorney also informed
Mr. Myers of other matters that had already transpired without his knowledge,
including: entry of a scheduling order; filing of a motion for summary judgment;
argument upon the motion of summary judgment; ruling (against the city) on the
motion for summary judgment; and entry of a pretrial order closing discovery and
identifying the issues and witnesses in the case.

“32, ‘Thereafter, Mr. Myers retained other counsel to represent the city in the
pending litigation. Following the engagement of substitute counsel for the city,
a motion was filed supported by an affidavit from the respondent to re-open the
pretrial proceeding and continue the trial.

“33. As a result of the respondent's conduct, the trial was continued from
May 2013, to August 2013, the court amended the pretrial conference order, and
the court re-opened discovery.

“34. On May 2, 2013, the respondent self-reported his misconduct to the
disciplinary administrator. On May 10, 2013, Mr. Myers filed a complaint against
the respondent for the same conduct.

“Conclusions of Law

“35. Based upon the respondent's stipulation and the above findings of fact,
the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC
13, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 8.4(d) as detailed below.

“KRPC 13

“36. Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in rep-
resenting their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and
promptly represent the City of Newton, Kansas. Because the respondent failed to
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, the hear-
ing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3.

“KRPC 14

“37. KRPC 1.4(a) provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably in-
formed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable re-
quests for information.’ In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a) when
he failed to inform Mr. Myers of the many events occurring in the litigation. Ac-
cordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a).

“KRPC 8.4(d)

“38, ‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to. . . engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.’ KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent
stipulated that he engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of
justice by:

a. _ failing to present the affidavit to Mr. Myers for consideration and signa-
ture;

b. making reference in the memorandum to an affidavit that had not been
reviewed or signed by Mr. Myers;

c. filing a motion for summary judgment and memorandum without at-
taching a signed affidavit; and

d. failing to advise opposing counsel or the court that the affidavit had not
been presented to Mr. Myers for consideration or signature.

The respondent's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. As such,
the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d).

“American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

“39. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel con-
sidered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ‘Standards’), Pursuant to Standard 3, the
factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the po-
tential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

“40. Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to provide
diligent representation and adequate communication. The respondent violated
his duty to the legal profession to refrain from conduct which is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.

“41, Mental State. The respondent negligently and knowingly violated his
duties.

“42. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent
caused potential injury to his client, the City of Newton, Kansas.

“43. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to
be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in
this case, found the following aggravating factors present:

a. Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously disci-
plined on one occasion. On February 20, 2003, the respondent entered

into a diversion agreement. In the diversion agreement, the respondent
stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.3 and KRPC 1.4.

b. A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in a pattern of mis-
conduct by neglecting this matter for an extended period of time and
by repeatedly failing to inform Mr. Myers regarding the status of the
litigation.

c. Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations.
The respondent violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 8.4(d). Ac-
cordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed
multiple offenses.

d. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in

1984. At the time of the misconduct, the respondent has been practic-
ing law for more than 25 years.

“44, Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
mitigating circumstances present:

a. Personal or Emotional Problems if Such Misfortunes Have Contributed
to Violation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent has

suffered from chronic depression and anxiety throughout the majority of his adult
life. He has sought treatment for this condition and is currently working with a
treatment professional to control his depression. It is clear that the respondent's
depression contributed to the misconduct.

b. ‘The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her Co-
is ing the Hearing and His or Her F1 wledgment of

res . The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process.
Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to-the violations. Fi-
nally, the respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC
8.4(d). The respondent's cooperation is a significant mitigating factor.

c haracter and Reputation it includin,

Friends and Lawyers it Character and

General fepataton of Fhe Attomey. The respondent is an active and productive
member of the bar of Wichita, Kansas. The respondent also enjoys the respect of
his peers and generally possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by
several letters received by the hearing panel.

d. Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed genuine
remorse for having engaged in the misconduct.

e. Remoteness of Prior Offenses. The respondent’s participation in the at-
torney diversion program in 2003 is remote in time but not in’character to the
misconduct in this case.

“45, In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

“4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and
causes injury or potential injury to a client; or

(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or
wy gag Pi gt jury
potential injury to a client.”

“Recommendation

“46. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of 2 years. The disciplinary admin-
istrator further recommended that the imposition of the suspension be suspended
and that the respondent be placed on probation subject to the terms and condi-
tions detailed in the respondent’s proposed probation plan. Finally, the disciplin-
ary administrator recommended that the respondent continue in treatment, that
the respondent execute appropriate releases, and that the treatment provider pro-
vide quarterly written reports regarding the respondent's progress in treatment.

“47. The respondent recommended that he be suspended for a period of 90
days and that he be granted probation from that suspension subject to the terms
and conditions detailed in his proposed probation plan.

“48, In order for the hearing panel to consider recommending that the re-
spondent be placed on probation, the respondent must first comply with Kan.
Sup. Ct. R. 211(g)(1) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g)(2), Additionally, the hearing
panel must then consider, based upon the factors detailed in Kan. Sup. Ct. R.
211(g)(3), whether to recommend to the Court that the respondent be placed on
probation.

‘(g) Requirements of Probation

(1) Ifthe Respondent intends to request that the Respondent be placed
on probation for violating the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct or the
Kansas Supreme Court Rules, the Respondent shall provide each member
of the Hearing Panel and the Disciplinary Administrator with a workable,
substantial, and detailed plan of probation at least fourteen days prior to
the hearing on the Formal Complaint. The plan of probation must contain
adequate safeguards that will protect the public and ensure the Respon-
dent's full compliance with the disciplinary rules and orders of the Supreme
Court.

(2) If the Respondent provides each member of the Hearing Panel and
the Disciplinary Administrator with a plan of probation, the Respondent
shall immediately and prior to the hearing on the Formal Complaint put
the plan of probation into effect by complying with each of the terms and
conditions of the probation plan.

—— SC

(3) The Hearing Panel shall not recommend that the Respondent be
placed on probation unless:

(i) _ the Respondent develops a workable, substantial, and detailed
plan of probation and provides a copy of the proposed plan of
probation to the Disciplinary Administrator and each member
of the Hearing Panel at least fourteen days prior to the hearing
on the Formal Complaint;

(ii) the Respondent puts the proposed plan of probation into effect
prior to the hearing on the Formal Complaint by complying
with each of the terms and conditions of the probation plan;

ii) the misconduct can be corrected by probation; and

(iv) placing the Respondent on probation is in the best interests of
the legal profession and the citizens of the State of Kansas.’

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g). The respondent provided each member of the hearing
panel and the disciplinary administrator with a workable, substantial, and detailed
plan of probation at least fourteen days prior to the hearing on the formal com-
plaint. The respondent's plan contains adequate safeguards that will protect the
public and ensure the Respondent's full compliance with the disciplinary rules
and orders of the Supreme Court. The respondent put the plan of probation into
effect by complying with each of the terms and conditions of the probation plan.
The respondent's misconduct can be corrected by probation. Finally, placing the
respondent on probation is in the best interests of the legal profession and the
citizens of the State of Kansas.

“49. The hearing panel has carefully considered the facts of this case. The
respondent's depression is profound and the mitigation factors are significant. As
aresult of the persuasive factors in mitigation, the hearing panel unanimously rec-
ommends that the respondent be suspended for a period of 2 years. The hearing
panel further recommends that the respondent be granted probation, subject to
the following terms and conditions: .

a. Term of Probation. The respondent will remain on probation for a period
of 2 years.

b. Practice Supervision. Charles E. Cole, Jr. will serve as the respondent's
practice supervisor. The respondent will allow the practice supervisor full and
complete access to his files, calendar, and trust account records. The respondent
will comply with all requests made by the practice supervisor. The respondent
will meet with the practice supervisor on a monthly basis throughout the period
of probation. The practice supervisor will provide a report to the respondent and
the disciplinary administrator's office every quarter throughout the period of pro-
bation, detailing the respondent's compliance with each term and condition of
probation. The practice supervisor will be acting as an officer and agent of the
Kansas Supreme Court while supervising the respondent on probation. The prac-

tice supervisor will be afforded all immunities granted by Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 223
during the course of his supervising activities.

c. Inventory. Within 30 days of the date of this report, the respondent will pro-
vide the practice supervisor with an inventory of cases and clients. The inventory
will include all deadlines and scheduled activity. Each month, the respondent will
provide the practice supervisor with an updated inventory.

d. Limitation on Practice. The respondent will not accept any new clients or
new matters for existing clients unless an additional member of his law firm is add-
ed as the responsible party for the new matter. The respondent agrees to engage
the assistance of an additional member of his law firm on all currently existing and
newly initiated litigation matters. The respondent will not serve as first-chair on
any litigation matters.

e. Communication. The respondent will review every open file to determine
whether he has adequately communicated with each client. For every case where
no activity has taken place for 30 days or more, the respondent will make written
contact with the client providing a status report.

£. Billing. The respondent will ensure that monthly billing statements are sent
to each client unless a written agreement with the client provides otherwise.

g. Audits. Within 30 days of the date of this report, the practice supervisor
will conduct an initial audit of the respondent’ files. Thereafter, every 6 months,
the practice supervisor will conduct additional audits. At the conclusion of proba-
tion, the practice supervisor will conduct a final audit. If the practice supervisor
discovers any violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, the practice
supervisor will include such information in his report. The practice supervisor
will provide the disciplinary administrator and the respondent with a copy of each
audit report. The respondent will follow all recommendations and correct all defi-
ciencies noted in the practice supervisor's periodic audit reports.

h. Psychological Treatment. The respondent will continue his treatment for
depression and anxiety throughout the period of supervised probation, unless the
treatment provider determines that continued treatment is no longer necessary.
The treatment provider will notify the practice supervisor and the disciplinary
administrator in the event that the respondent discontinues treatment against the
recommendation of the treatment provider during the probationary period. The
respondent will provide the treatment provider with appropriate releases of infor-
mation to allow the treatment provider to provide such information to the practice
supervisor and the disciplinary administrator.

i. Continued Cooperation. The respondent will continue to cooperate with the
disciplinary administrator. If the disciplinary administrator requests any additional
information, the respondent will timely provide such information.

j. Additional Violations. The respondent will not violate the terms of his pro-
bation or the provisions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. In the event
that the respondent violates any of the terms of probation or any of the provisions
of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct at any time during the probation-

641

ary period, the respondent will immediately report such violation to the practice
supervisor and the disciplinary administrator. The disciplinary administrator will
take immediate action pursuant to Kan, Sup. Ct. R. 211(g).

“50. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified
by the office of the disciplinary administrator.”

Discussion

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence,
the findings of the disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the par-
ties and determines whether violations of KRPC exist and, if they
do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292
Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f)
(2015 Kan. Ct, R. Annot. 350). Clear and convincing evidence is
“‘evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that “the truth of
the facts asserted is highly probable.”’” In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498,
505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725,
188 P.3d 1 [2008}).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint,
to which he filed an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing
before the panel and the hearing before this court. The respondent
did not file exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report.
As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court
Rule 212(c) and (d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 369).

The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and
convincing evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.3
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 461) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 482) (communication); and 8.4(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
672) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice), and it supports the panel's conclusions of law. We adopt the
panel's conclusions.

The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline
for respondent’s violations. As noted, the panel recommended a
2-year suspension from the practice of law in the state of Kansas
but that the suspension be stayed to allow respondent to be placed
on probation under the terms and conditions set forth in its final
hearing report. At oral arguments before this court, the Disciplin-

— «|

ary Administrator recommended the panel's proposed sanction of
a 2-year suspension, stayed to allow respondent to be placed on a
2-year probation upon the panel's proposed terms and conditions,
but with the added condition that respondent make a reasonable
effort to pay restitution for the additional legal fees his misconduct
cost his aggrieved client. Respondent’s counsel argued for a shorter
term for the underlying suspension but agreed to the 2-year proba-
tion,

We are not bound by the recommendations of either the Dis-
ciplinary Administrator or the hearing panel. See In re Mintz, 298
Kan. 897, 911-12, 317 P.3d 756 (2014). We fashion a disciplinary
sanction in each case presented to us based upon its particular facts
and circumstances, including the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances of the violations. 298 Kan. at 912. In this case, however,
a majority of the court finds the sanction recommended by the Dis-
ciplinary Administrator at the hearing before this court to be ap-
propriate; a minority of the court would impose a shorter term for
the underlying suspension.

Specifically, we hold that the respondent is suspended from the
practice of law in the state of Kansas for a period of 2 years but
that suspension is stayed and the respondent is placed on proba-
tion for a period of 2 years from and after the filing of this opinion,
on the terms and conditions set forth in the hearing panel’s final
hearing report, as outlined above, with the additional condition
that respondent make a reasonable effort to pay restitution for the
additional legal fees his misconduct cost his aggrieved client. The
termination of probation, whether probation was successful or not,
shall be governed by the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 211(g)
(2015 Kan, Ct. R. Annot. 350). A minority of the court would im-
pose a different condition of probation regarding a more certain
restitution to the aggrieved client.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that Stephen M. Stark be and is
hereby suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas,
in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) and (5) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293), for a 2-year period, but imposition of that

SC

discipline shall be stayed and respondent placed on probation for
a 2-year period from the date this opinion is filed, upon the terms
and conditions outlined above.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the termination of respondent's
probation, whether probation was successful or not, shall be ef-
fected pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 211(g).

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings
be assessed to the respondent and that this opinion be published in
the official Kansas Reports.

BEIER, J., not participating.

644

No. 114,836

In the Matter of Kerry DALE Hotyoak, Respondent.
(872 P3d 1205)

Opinion fled June 10, 2016,

|

Kate B. Baird, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and AL
exander M. Walozak, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, and Stanton A. Hazlett,
Disciplinary Administrator, were on the formal complaint for the petitioner.

Kerry Dale Holyoak, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed
by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against the respon-
dent, Kerry Dale Holyoak, of Leawood, an attorney admitted to
the practice of law in Kansas in 1989.

On March 23, 2015, the office of the Disciplinary Administra-
tor filed a formal complaint against the respondent alleging viola-
tions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). The
respondent filed an answer on April 9, 2015. A hearing was held
on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline
of Attorneys on July 1, 2015, where the respondent was present
and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel determined
that respondent violated KRPC 5.4(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
639) (professional independence of a lawyer); 7.1(a) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 653) (communications concerning a lawyer's ser-
vices); 8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct
involving misrepresentation); and 8.4(g) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
672) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to
practice law).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with its recommen-
dation to this court:

“Bindings of Fact

“8. Wilson County Holdings, LLC (WCH), a subsidiary of Stranded Oil
Resources Corporation based in Austin, Texas, developed a project to revitalize
an oil field located in Fredonia, Kansas. To carry out the project, they sought to

purchase mineral rights within the City of Fredonia from individual lot owners,
based on the size of each lot.

“9, On Jamuary 30, 2013, Donald Missey, Project Manager for WCH, sent
the respondent and his wife an offer to purchase the mineral rights associated
with his residential property and commercial property. The total mineral purchase
price for the respondent's two properties totaled $938.52.

“10. On February 1, 2013, the respondent and his wife, Kerry I. Holyoak,
sent Mr, Missey a letter rejecting WCH’s offer. The respondent and his wife made
a counter offer. The offer to lease their mineral rights for an annual payment of
$34,450 plus 689% of revenues in excess of $5,000,000 annually. In addition, the
respondent's letter provided:

“To date we have chosen not to share our research, data or any information re-
lated to this offer with anyone. We recognize the sensitivity of such a proposal and
would agree to sign a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement. This counter-
proposal is valid until 5:00 PM on Friday, February 15, 2013.”

“11, On February 12, 2013, Mr. Missey responded to the respondent's offer.
Mr. Missey told the respondent that he had passed their offer on to their man-
agement team for evaluation. It appears that WCH did not accept or reject the
respondent's counter offer during the time allotted.

“12, On April 29, 2013, the respondent and his wife wrote to Mr. Missey
again. In that correspondence, they clearly stated they were only willing to con-
sider leasing their mineral rights. They made a new offer. According to their April
29, 2018, letter, they were willing to accept a lease signing bonus of $35,156.25
plus annual royalties of 3/16 for their relative portion of the pooled units [(gross
revenue x .1875) x .05]. In addition to making an additional offer, the respondent
and his wife posed a number of detailed questions regarding the project to Mr.
Missey at that time.

“13, On May 17, 2013, Mr, Missey wrote to the respondent and his wife and
rejected their latest offer. Through Mr. Missey, WCH made another proposal to
the respondent and his wife.

“14. On June 3, 2013, the respondent and his wife made a verbal presenta-
tion to the mayor and commissioners of Fredonia at the regularly scheduled City
Council meeting. They expressed their concerns about the mineral rights of the
residents of Fredonia, Kansas, related to the project being conducted by WCH.

“15. On August 5, 2013, the respondent and his wife wrote to the Fredo-
nia, Kansas, City Manager and Mr. Missey. The respondent provided a proposed
franchise agreement. According to the respondent, he and his wife ‘discussed this
proposed franchise agreement with numerous citizens’ who were ‘willing to sign
a petition or vote in a special election.’ Also according to the respondent, the pro-
posed franchise agreement sought to accomplish the following:

‘1. Pool the mineral rights of the residents of the entire city [sic] of Fredo-

nia, Kansas;

“2. Authorize a lease of said mineral rights to Wilson County Holdings,

p

646

LLC for the purpose of horizontally drilling under the city [sic] for the
exploration and production of oil and gas minerals;

‘8, Require Wilson County Holdings, LLC to compensate each landowner
their proportionate share of a 3/16 royalty on production of all gas and
oil gross revenues;

‘4, Require Wilson County Holdings, LLC to properly survey the entire
city [sic] of Fredonia in order to accurately determine the square foot-
age allocation of each parcel owner, in an effort to illustrate an accurate
representation of the mineral owner's percentage of the overall pool, for
future compensation purposes;

‘5. Establish procedures for responding to emergencies;

“6. Require specific performance from Wilson County Holdings, LLC
whenever there is an incident of damage reported that has been caused
by their drilling and exploration activities;

“7, Revert ownership of mineral rights that have been sold to Wilson
County Holdings during the period January 2011 to date, to the original
surface owner, and treat payments made for said sales, as advances on
future royalties.”

“16. On May 16, 2014, the respondent and his wife wrote to WCH. In thé
letter, the respondent and his wife indicated that they had reconsidered their po-
sition and would agree to sell the mineral rights associated with their residential
property to WCH. However, they indicated their interest in selling the mineral
rights was contingent upon WCH purchasing their home at a price of $250,000
plus moving expenses. The respondent and his wife indicated that they were only
interested in leasing the mineral rights associated with their commercial property.

“17. On May 29, 2014, Bill Metzler met with the respondent and his wife at
their residence. The respondent and his wife told Mr. Metzler that if WCH would
pay them $1.9 million, they would agree not to pursue any legal action against
WCH due to its underground drilling project. To memorialize that agreement, the
respondent and his wife presented Mx. Metzler with a ‘Covenant Not to Sue’ and.
“Purchase Contract.’

“18. Also during that meeting, the respondent and his wife made oral state-
ments and representations concerning the transactions proposed. Mr. Metzler
memorialized the respondent's statement in the form of an affidavit, which pro-
vided as follows:

‘a. Kerry Dale Holyoak is legal counsel to 50 local landowner clients who

have engaged him “to bring the company fown” and “stop the project”;

‘b. The Holyoaks prefer to enroll their children in private school and re-
locate Kerry Dale Holyoaks’ [sic] law practice in Kansas City but need
WCH's help [sic] finance that move;

‘c. In exchange for payment of $1.9 million the Holyoaks would agree to
leave the town “quickly and quietly”;

647

‘d. The $1.9 million dollar [sic] payment to KWADCO, a Bahamas Corpo-
ration, via an offshore wire to an unidentified account at the Royal Bank
of Canada;

“e. The landowners opposed to WCH will not do anything if the Holyoaks
“don’t take the lead for them”; and

‘f. The Holyoaks will only sign the covenant not to'sue if WCH purchases
Kerry Dale Holyoak’s law practice in addition to the Holyoaks’ mineral
rights and house, and if WCH refuses, then the Holyoaks will commute
from Kansas City to ensure its allies “stand and fight” against WCH.’

‘The respondent later explained that he was not attempting to sell his law practice.
Rather, he agreed to sell his property and in order to value the property, he took
into account the value of his law practice.

“19. The ‘Covenant Not to Sue’ prepared by the respondent and given to Mr.
Metzler provides as follows:

‘COVENANT NOT TO SUE
“THIS Agreement made and entered this ____day of
2014, by and between Kerry Dale Holyoak and Kerry Irene Holyoak,
a married couple (hereinafter referred to as PLAINTIFFS), located at
530 N. 10th Street, Fredonia, KS 66736 and Wilson County Holdings,
and Stranded Oil (hereinafter referred to as DEFENDANTS), located
at 1135 N 15th St., Fredonia, KS 66736.
‘In exchange for the complete compliance of all terms of the PURCHASE
CONTRACT for the sale of all real estate owned by the PLAINTIFFS
within Wilson County, Kansas, plus the cost of professional movers, and
additional consideration in the amount of $___ (___mil-
lions) paid to (KWADCO, a Bahamas Corporation) the chosen entity to
receive compensation for and on behalf of Kerry Dale Holyoak and Kerry
Irene Holyoak, by Wilson County Holdings. (Funds to be paid by wire
transfer to the Royal Bank of Canada, Account No,___.)

“WITNESSETH:

‘1. PLAINTIFFS, have a cause of action against DEFENDANTS for
fraud and misrepresentation with regard to the manner in which DEFEN-
DANTS coerced mirieral purchases and mineral leases from the residents
within the city limits of Fredonia, Kansas.

‘2, PLAINTIFFS understand that should they initiate a lawsuit against
DEFENDANTS for their claims it would cause no less than fifty addi-
tional plaintiffs to come forward and file similar lawsuits for similar claims.
The potential number of plaintiffs could escalate to as many as have sold
or leased their mineral rights to DEFENDANTS under false pretenses,
thereby constituting grounds for a class action lawsuit.

‘3. PLAINTIFFS agree not to initiate or participate in any lawsuit or
action against DEFENDANTS as counsel, co-counsel, local counsel, wit-

ness, plaintiff, party, or otherwise, with regard to any and all of the business
activities of DEFENDANTS, within the region of Wilson County, Kansas.
‘4, PLAINTIFFS further agree not to participate in any legal action
against DEFENDANTS at any point in the future, as pertaining to the
operations of DEFENDANTS in Wilson County, Kansas.
‘5. PLAINTIFFS agree not to provide any legal advice to anyone seek-
ing information about DEFENDANTS and/or their business operations.

‘NON-DISCLOSURE AND CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

“Il. PLAINTIFFS agree to permanently dispose of any and all docu-
mentation, records, recordings, witness statements, personal contact infor-
mation for potential litigants, research and all other forms of discovery as
it pertains to evidence which could be used against DEFENDANTS in a
lawsuit of any nature.

‘2. PLAINTIFFS agree to relocate their family and business a distance
of not less than 75 miles away from Fredonia, Kansas.

‘3. PLAINTIFFS agree not to return to Fredonia, Kansas, except to
engage in contacts or business unrelated to potential litigation against DE-
FENDANTS.

‘4, DEFENDANTS agree to assist PLAINTIFFS with their move by
covering the cost of a professional moving company to assist the parties in
moving their personal belongings from their home, their office building and
their storage unit and relocating them to a new home more than 75 miles
away.

‘5. PLAINTIFFS and DEFENDANTS agree not to disclose any of the
terms of this agreement. If either party discusses the terms of this agree-
ment, the offending party will bear the burden of the cost of any litigation
including reimbursement of attorney fees and expenses for the non-offend-
ing party.

‘6. Time is of the essence in this agreement. If DEFENDANTS fail to
complete and comply with the terms of this agreement by the day of
________, 2014, then neither party shall be bound by the terms of
this agreement and PLAINTIFFS will be free to engage in litigation against
DEFENDANTS regarding the extraction of minerals from the city [sic] of
Fredonia or from any other location and may do so'as parties, witnesses,
egal counsel and/or support staff or in any other manner for any entity or
entities engaged in litigation against DEFENDANTS or any discussion of
or exposure of the actions of DEFENDANTS.

‘7. Bill Metzler, as agent for DEFENDANTS has complete authority
to enter into this agreement on behalf of DEFENDANTS and bind the
DEFENDANTS to all terms thereof.

‘8. This covenant does not indicate the guilt or innocence of either par-

ty.
‘This document is the only covenant between PLAINTIFFS and DEFEN-
DANTS regarding litigation against DEFENDANTS, and any statements

or provisions made by either party that are not contained in this document
are neither valid nor binding”

“20. The ‘Purchase Contract’ prepared by the respondent provided as fol-

lows:

‘PURCHASE CONTRACT
‘THIS CONTRACT made and entered into this _____ day of
_______, 2014, by and between KERRY DALE HOLYOAK and
KERRY IRENE HOLYOAK, a married couple, of Wilson County, Kansas,
(hereinafter called “Sellers”), and as agent for
WILSON COUNTY HOLDINGS/STRANDED OIL, a corporate entity of
(hereinafter called “Purchaser”)

“WITNESSETH:

“1. Sellers agree to sell and convey to Purchaser and Purchaser agrees to
buy and to pay for the following described real property subject to compli-
ance with the following terms and conditions as set forth herein:

Lots Eleven (11) and Twelve (12), Block Six (6), Hamilton’s Addi-

tion to the City of Fredonia (commonly known as the residence

located at 530 N. 10th Street, Fredonia, Kansas 66736)

Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot One (1), Block Fifteen

(15), City of Fredonia, thence North 60.36 feet, thence East 34.3

feet, thence South 23.06 fect, thence West 8.7 feet, thence South

7.6 feet, thence West 5 feet; thence South 29.7 feet, thence West

20.6 feet to the point of beginning. (commonly known as the office

building located at 521 Madison Street, Fredonia, Kansas 66736)

‘2. Sellers are the owners of said real property and are not engaged in
and have not previously engaged in any litigation which may impact their
ownership or control of said property. Sellers have not entered into any oth-
er agreements which may impact their ownership or control of said prop-
erty and have not incurred expenses against and have not suffered any liens
to be held against the real property. In the event that any of the conditions
set forth in this paragraph have been broken, this transaction shall become
void and the purchase funds shall be immediately refunded to Purchaser.

‘3. Purchaser shall pay to Sellers the purchase price of $.
to be made in one earnest money payment of $10,000.00 plus a lump sum
payment of $______payable to Sellers as the price of the real property
and mineral rights plus $. for the Sellers’ moving expenses by a
commercial moving company.

“4, Sellers shall have thirty (30) days to remove all unattached items of
personal property and vacate the residence and the office building and de-
liver all keys to Purchaser.

‘5. Sellers agree to deliver and Purchaser agrees to accept the property
in its present condition with all attachments and Sellers agree to provide a
Warrant [sic] Deed to Purchaser.

650

‘6. All taxes and assessments against the property prior to the date of
this agreement and for prior years shall be paid by Sellers. Purchaser shall
be responsible for all taxes and assessments coming due from the date of
this agreement forward.

“7. The sale of said real property shall also include the transfer of all
Sellers’ mineral rights. Sellers are the owners of said mineral rights and are
not engaged in and have not previously engaged in any litigation which may
impact their ownership or control of said mineral rights. Sellers have not
entered into any other agreements which may impact their ownership or
control of said mineral rights, have not incurred expenses against and have
not suffered any liens to be held against said mineral rights. In the event
that any of the conditions set forth in this paragraph have been broken, this
transaction shall become void and the purchase funds shall be immediately
refunded to Purchaser.

8. , as agent for Purchaser has com-
plete authority to enter into this agreement on behalf of Purchaser and bind
Purchaser to all terms thereof.’

“21, On June 4, 2014, Mr. Metzler sent an email to the respondent. At that
time, Mr. Metzler informed the respondent that their May, 2014, proposal. was
under review. .

“22, The next day, June 5, 2014, the respondent and his wife replied to Mr.
Metzler’s email message. The respondent and his wife, as a courtesy, informed Mr.
Metzler that it was their intention to file a written protest to WCH’s petition to
the KCC requesting an Order Granting Exception from Casing and Completion
Requirements. The respondent and his wife also informed Mr. Metzler that they
planned to appear at the hearing set for June 16, 2014, and provide testimony and
evidence in support of their concerns. The respondent and his wife set a deadline
of June 6, 2014.

“23. On June 6, 2014, Jonathan Rosen, outside compliance counsel for WCH
wrote to the respondent and his wife regarding serious concerns about the May,
2014, offer. Mr. Rosen stated:

‘We have serious concerns about your proposed and uninvited scheme to

receive an exorbitant offshore wire to a nominee account in exchange for

a series of tainted inducements, including the honest services of a licensed

attorney and an illicit competitive advantage.’

Mr. Rosen included in his correspondence the oral statements made by the re-
spondent as recorded by Mr. Metzler in his affidavit.
“24. Mr. Rosen also stated:
‘I specifically note that these representations and assertions are memorial-
ized and/or corroborated by the proposed covenant not to sue and purchase
contract, which you gave to WCH in support of the “offer” on May 29, 2014.
“We have reviewed these facts and, as a former federal and state prosecu-
tor, I believe your scheme implicates significant ethical and legal concerns.

“First, we have concerns that your proposal betrays Mr. Holyoak’s ethical
and fiduciary obligations as a licensed attorney.

“Second, you rely on an illicit competitive advantage in an attempt to co-
erce payment from WCH. Wholly independent of Mr. Holyoak’s status as
a licensed fiduciary, you purport to be civic leaders who exert influence
over a significant number of local landowners. You condition your uninvited
promise to abandon these followers and, in your opinion, facilitate the suc-
cess of WCH's project, only if WCH purchases your business location in ad-
dition to your mineral rights and home. Your bad faith implicates state and
federal criminal law. See, e.g., K.S.A. 21-6501 (defining extortion, in part,
as an act which causes “the competition of the person from whom the pay-
ment is demanded, solicited or received to be diminished oi eliminated.”).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud).

“Third, your scheme structures an offshore transaction to a Bahamas shell
corporation in an apparent effort to conceal your beneficial interest in any
ill-gotten gains. Despite your ready access to local banks, your covenant not
to sue requires an offshore wire to a nominee account maintained by a Ba-
hamas corporation, KWADCO. WCH has absolutely no information on the
offshore account, the nominee corporation or your compliance with crimi-
nal laws requiring that you disclose to the Infernal Revenue Service your
financial interest or signature authority over such offshore accounts. More-
over, you demanded this specific manner of payment in full knowledge that
WCHs prior offer, dated January 30, 2013, specifically identified that pay-
ment would be made via a domestic bank draft payable to you individually.

‘Fourth, the desperation conveyed with the “offer” is further evidence of
bad faith. As reflected by your inability to marshal any support for your
bogus claims against WCH and purported plan at the Fredonia City Com-
mission in June 2013, Mr. Holyoak’s public masquerade as a citizen attor-
ney general has failed. This is further demonstrated by WCH¥s past and
continuing success in partnering with landowners to support the project.
While WCH does not begrudge any prospective seller’s good faith effort
to maximize his or her self-interest, we strenuously object to using illicit
means to achieve your personal ambition.

“Further, yesterday we received additional evidence of your attempt to co-
erce the elicit [sic] payment in the form of your June 5, 2014 e-mail to
Mr. Bill Metzler of WCH concerning the Kansas Corporation Commission
(“KCC”), In that e-mail, you make the further offer to “forego filing the
objection or intervening in any KCC proceedings now or in the future” if
WCH pays you the $1.9 million demanded prior to the expiration of the
protest period for WCH's applications for exceptions to the KCC. This is
further evidence of your continuing practice of bad faith with respect to
the project.

‘As a good corporate actor in a highly regulated marketplace, WCH has
zero tolerance for unethical and illegal conduct. Over the past 18 months,
WCH has engaged in a fully transparent process to successfully purchase
mineral rights from a substantial number of landowners. WCH remains in-
terested in acquiring such rights at a fair market value, but WCH has never
and will never condone or participate in any instance of fraud, extortion or
other such matters.

‘Please provide your response directly to me concerning the serious items
no later than June20, [sic] 2014 so that we may continue our review of these
issues along with considerations of duties or obligations to disclose all rele-
vant facts to appropriate enforcement, regulatory and licensing authorities.’

“25, Ina letter also dated June 6, 2014, the respondent and his wife respond-

ed to Mr. Rosen’s letter. The Holyoaks’ letter provides:

“We are in receipt of your letter dated June 6, 2014, wherein you have
grossly mischaracterized and misunderstood not only our “offer” but also
our intentions. We accept your letter as WCH's refusal of our offer to settle.

‘It is my understanding that MORRIS, LAING, EVANS, BROCK &
KENNEDY, CHARTERED of Wichita, Kansas is counsel of record for
WCH in the KCC administrative proceedings. As a matter of courtesy, we
are including a copy of our protest to the KCC.

‘You have characterized our request for an “exorbitant offshore wire”
as though it is some sort of extortion. To be clear, our interests are tied
up in real estate and business interests within and around the city [sic] of
Fredonia, Kansas. Our offer is fair and can in no way be construed as ex-
tortion or illicit or illegal. There is nothing illegal about receiving funds in
an offshore account. It is called asset protection. [Footnote: Neither in his
correspondence nor during his testimony at the hearing on this matter did
the respondent satisfactorily explain what he meant by “asset protection.”]
Your assumptions about our relationship with the IRS are also baseless. We
are honest tax payers. Our “offer” was not tied to some arbitrary or fanciful
number, These numbers directly relate to the value of our lives in Fredonia,
Kansas and are based upon the following:

1. We have 107-year old Victorian home we value at $250,000 which
we have continued to renovate and improve.

2, We have an office building we value at $90,000 which we have also
continued to renovate and improve.

3. We have a small town law practice which generates around $330,000
per year in gross revenues. We did a simple “business valuation” of 5
times gross revenue to arrive at the figure of $1,650,000.

‘We do not agree with the practices of Wilson County Holdings. We have
tried to invite their cooperation in protecting the financial and environmen-
tal interests of this community as members of the community and NOT

as legal counsel for anyone. However, representatives of WCH have regu-
larly refused to grant leases to small property owners and have offered to
purchase mineral rights for a one-time payment of 4 cents per square foot
ox, in the alternative, that the property owners receive nothing. This does
not constitute an “arm’s-length” transaction, is not a meeting of the minds,
severely lacks any semblance of good faith negotiation and is nothing more
than an “it’s my [sic] or the highway” negotiation. This seems especially
unfair since WCH has been aware of the potential value of oil production
to the land owners from the outset. Only recently have they granted any
leases to a few local small property owners without whom they could not
even run horizontal casings.

‘At no time have I, Kerry D. Holyoak, announced that I am legal coun-
sel for anyone in any proceeding regarding WCH. My wife and I are con-
cemed citizens who do not agree with the WCH project based upon their
xefusal to deal fairly with small property owners and their initial promises
not to engage in fracking. Our home and our business are directly affected
by the drilling and oil production activities of WCH and we have a right to
state our concerns and be treated fairly.

‘We view our offer as being no different than the farmers who were
fairly compensated with millions of dollars to sell their acreage and miner-
als. Owners of large tracts of land have also been fairly compensated for the
value of their minerals by being granted a 3/16 lease. Owners of small tracts
of land within the city, such as ours, have been denied any lease by WCH
but are instead offered 4 cents per square foot to sell all mineral rights
in perpetuity. Therefore, we and other small property owners are being
denied fair value for the pooled minerals under our own land and this is in
violation of our correlative rights and forms part of the basis for our protest,
a copy of which is included for your review.

‘Our business is not a farm, but it is a business with value nonetheless.
‘We do not wish to live in a town facing potential ruin by the environmental
effects of the WCH project. These environmental concerns are not imagi-
nary but are evident by the WCH request for an exception to the industry
standard of cementing wall casings and another exception to allow them to
flare gas taken during petroleum extraction. Based on these concerns, we
requested that they consider purchasing ALL of our interests and not just
our real estate and mineral rights.

“We did tie this to a request to a Covenant Not to Sue and Confidentiality
[sic] Agreement. We did not do this in any attempt to extort the company.
They have the right to proceed with their project and we have the right to
protest their actions. In fact, we have the right as citizens to seek redress in
administrative and judicial venues whether we first make an offer to settle
or not. We believe that certain other residents and citizens of the City of
Fredonia may also have valid causes of action for fraud and conversion
against Wilson County Holdings. We do not represent them as counsel but

654

we have met with them in the past as friends, neighbors, and fellow citizens
and we are willing to help other counsel and further actions against WCH
should they want to take action. In the event that we reach a resolution with
WCH, I would be surprised if other citizens choose to take action.

‘I find it amazing that you choose to use your status to threaten me with
potential state and/or criminal prosecution in an effort to gain an advantage
for your client in a civil matter and then you choose to characterize my mo-
tives as unethical.

‘I also find it amazing that you consider it a violation of the federal tax
code for someone to use an offshore bank account in order to minimize tax
liability.

‘L also find it amazing that you appear to characterize WCH as some
sort of victim of what you characterize as our “scheme” and fail to see the
deceitful manner in which they have dealt with some citizens in order to
obtain mineral rights for much less than fair value and deny others any
recompense at all. :

“You have chosen to call me names and threaten my wife and I and our
livelihood. You characterize our attempt to present a franchise agreement
to the City of Fredonia and: WCH as that of a failed “public masquerade
as a citizen attorney general”. We did that on our own time and expense as
citizens in [sic] attempt for all of the small landowners to be treated fairly.
The city [sic] was not interested in such an agreement as they had already
received a lease from WCH. The only response by WCH Representative
Don Missey was “that's interesting.” We can see now how that effort would
be repugnant to WCH in their efforts to purchase small land owner's min-
eral rights for a pittance and not share with the small landowners the real
financial benefits of pumping the oil from underneath their properties.

‘Nevertheless we are also mediators and we saw an opportunity.to re-
solve our complaints without litigation. It is a completely normal practice to
make such types of agreements in business as we have proposed.

‘Based upon your rather demeaning and caustic letter, it appears that
WCH is not as interested in reaching any kind of resolution with us as they
are in using your position as a former federal prosecutor to intimidate and
frighten us from exercising our rights as private citizens and from attempt-
ing to negotiate a settlement.

‘It was and continues to be our good faith intention to offer WCH an op-
portunity to avoid litigation and resolve this and future matters.

‘Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office.’

“26. On July 8, 2014, Jonathan A. Schlatter and Douglas $. Laird filed a com-
plaint against the respondent.

“27. The respondent's law practice was established as a limited liability com-
pany with the Kansas Secretary of State’s office. As of June 6, 2014, the respon-
dent listed his wife, Kerry I. Holyoak, as an owner of his law firm. The respon-
dent's wife is not an attorney. The respondent has since corrected this problem.

“98, ‘The respondent has a website which advertises his legal services. As
of June 12, 2014, the respondent's website also featured his wife’s services as a
mediator. It was unclear from a review of the respondent's website whether the
respondent's wife was also an attorney practicing law in the respondent's firm. The
respondent has since removed references to his wife from his website.

“Conclusions of Law

“29. In the formal complaint, Mr. Walczak included specific rules which he
alleged the respondent violated. In deliberating this matter, in addition to the
rules alleged in the formal complaint, the hearing panel considered whether the
respondent violated two additional rules: KRPC 5.3(b) and KRPC 8.4(g).

“30. It is appropriate to consider violations not specifically included in the
formal complaint under certain circumstances. The law in this regard was thor-
oughily examined in State v. Caenen, 235 Kan, 451, 681 P.2d 639 (1984), as follows:

“Supreme Court Rule 211(b) (232 Kan. clxvi), requires the formal com-
plaint in a disciplinary proceeding to be sufficiently clear and specific to
inform the respondent of the alleged misconduct.

“The seminal decision regarding the applicability of the due process
clause to lawyer disciplinary proceedings is found in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S.
544, 88 S. Ct. 1229, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117, reh. denied 301 U.S. 961, 88 S. Ct.
1833, 20 L. Ed, 2d 874 (1968). There the United States Supreme Court
held that a lawyer charged with misconduct in lawyer disciplinary proceed-
ings is entitled to procedural due process, and that due process includes
fair notice of the charges sufficient to inform and provide a meaningful
opportunity for explanation and defense.

‘Decisions subsequent to Ruffalo have refined the concept of due process
as it applies to lawyer disciplinary hearings, and suggest that the notice to be
provided be more in the nature of that provided in civil cases. The weight
of authority appears to be that, unlike due process provided in criminal
actions, there are no stringent or technical requirements in setting forth
allegations or descriptions of alleged offenses. . . . Due process requires
only that the charges must be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the
attomey of the misconduct charged, but the state is not required to plead
specific rules, since it is the factual allegations against which the attorney
must defend. .. . However, if specific rules are pled, the state is thereafter
limited to such specific offenses. . . .

“Subsequent to the Ruffalo decision, the due process requirements in
lawyer disciplinary proceedings have been given exhaustive treatment
by this court. In State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 538 P.2d 966 (1975), 87
A.L.R.3d 337, the court summarized prior Kansas and federal precedent
on the question, including Ruffalo, and held in accordance with established
precedent that the state need not set forth in its complaint the specific
disciplinary rules allegedly violated . . . , nor is it required to plead specific
allegations of misconduct. ... What is required was simaply stated therein:

“We must conclude that where the facts in connection with the
charge are clearly set out in the complaint a respondent is put on
notice as to what ethical violations may arise therefrom. . . .

“It is not incumbent on the board to notify the respondent of
charges of specific acts of misconduct as long as proper notice is
given of the basic factual situation out of which the charges might
result.’”

235 Kan. at 458-59 (some citations omitted). Thus, only when the formal com-
plaint alleges facts that would support findings of violations of additional rules, will
considering additional violations be allowed. The hearing panel will address the
above-stated law with respect to KRPC 5.3(b) and KRPC 8.4(g) separately below.

“KRPC 5.3(b)

“31. KRPC5.3(b) provides:
“With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer:
‘(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the non-
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s
conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer...
In this case, the evidence presented at the hearing on this matter clearly estab-
lished that the respondent failed to supervise a nonlawyer, his wife, as required by
KRPC 5.3(b). The formal complaint, however, is void of sufficient facts to put the
respondent on notice that he may have violated KRPC 5.3(b). As such, the hear-
ing panel is unable to conclude, based upon Caenen, that the respondent violated
KRPC 5.3(b).

“KRPC 5.4(d)

“32, KRPC 5.4(d) provides that:
“A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation
or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary repre-
sentative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the
lawyer for a reasonable time during administration...”

The respondent formed his law practice as a limited liability company. The re-
spondent’s wife, a nonlawyer, was registered as an owner of the company with
the Kansas Secretary of State. The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC
5.4 in this regard. As such, based upon the respondent's stipulation and the facts
presented, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 5.4.
(It is worth repeating, the respondent has resolved this issue.)

657

“KRPC 7.1(a)

“33, ‘Lawyers must not make false or misleading statements about their ser-
vices. ‘A communication is false or misleading if it... contains a material misrep-
resentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement consid-
ered as a whole not materially misleading’ KRPC 7.1. The respondent stipulated
that he violated KRPC 7.1 by including references to his wife and the mediation
services that she provides on his law firm’s website. On the website, the respon-
dent omitted facts which were necessary to make the website considered as a
whole not materially misleading. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the
respondent violated KRPC 7.1.

“KRPC 8.4(c)

“34. ‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.’ KRPC 8.4(c). The re-
spondent misrepresented information when he communicated with Mr. Missey
and Mr. Metzler and when he drafted the covenant not to sue. Specifically, the
respondent claimed that he represented 50 other landowners when he did not. As
such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c).

“KRPC 8.4(g)

“35. ‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in any other con-
duct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.’ KRPC 8.4(g).
With regard to KRPC 8.4(g), the disciplinary administrator included sufficient
facts in the formal complaint to warrant consideration of such a violation. Thus,
under Caenen, the hearing panel concludes that it is proper to consider a violation
of KRPC 8.4(g).

“36. The respondent engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law. First, the respondent drafted the covenant not to sue. In that cov-
enant, the respondent included the following provision:

‘L. PLAINTIFFS agree to permanently dispose of any and all docu-
mentation, records, recordings, witness statements, personal contact infor-
mation for potential litigants, research and all other forms of discovery as
it pertains to evidence which could be used against DEFENDANTS in a
lawsuit of any nature.”

‘The respondent's offer to destroy evidence is conduct which adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law.

“37. Second, the respondent offered to settle his claims by having WCH wire
transfer $1.9 million dollars to an offshore account in the Bahamas. The respon-
dent stated that he wished to have the money transferred to the offshore account
as a form of ‘asset protection.’ The respondent, however, denied that he was at-
tempting to avoid paying taxes on the money. The respondent was unable to offer
any legitimate explanation for ‘asset protection.’ Based on all the evidence, it is
reasonable for the hearing panel to conclude that the respondent was attempting
to avoid paying taxes on the money he hoped to get from WCH.

658

“38. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC
8.4(g).
“American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

“39. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel con-
sidered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ‘Standards’). Pursuant to Standard 3, the
factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the po-
tential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

“40, Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to the public to main-
tain his personal integrity. The respondent also violated his duty to the legal pro-
fession.

“41. Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duties.

“42. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent
caused actual injury to the legal profession.

“43. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to
be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in
this case, found the following aggravating factors present:

“44. Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously disci-
plined on one occasion. In 1993, the disciplinary administrator informally admon-
ished the respondent for violating the rules requiring diligent representation and
adequate communication.

“45, Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent’s misconduct was moti-
vated by dishonesty and selfishness. The respondent sought to use unlawful means
to obtain $1.9 million. Accordingly, the hearing panel-concludes that the respon-
dent's misconduct was motivated by dishonesty and selfishness.

“46. Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations.
The respondent violated KRPC 5.4(d), KRPC 7.1(a), KRPC 8.4(c), and KRPC
8.4(g). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed
multiple offenses.

“47. Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct. The respondent
stipulated that he violated KRPC 5.4(d) (relating to the ownership of his law of-
fice) and KRPC 7.1(a) (relating to his website). The respondent, however, refused
to admit that he engaged in any misconduct relating to his dealings with WCH.
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent refused to acknowl-
edge the wrongful nature of his conduct.

“48. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1989. At
the time of the misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for more than
20 years.

“49. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may

justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
mitigating circumstance present:

“50. Remoteness of Prior Offenses. The discipline imposed in 1993 is remote
in character and in time to the misconduct in this case.

“51. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

‘5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice.

‘5.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages
in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Stan-
dard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice.

‘5.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages
in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrep-
resentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice
law.

“7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages
in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes
injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”

“Recommendation

“52, ‘The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be
suspended for a period of 6 months. Counsel for the respondent recommended
that the respondent be permitted to continue to practice and that he be censured
by the Kansas Supreme Court.

“53. The respondent engaged in serious misconduct which involved mis-
representations. Based upon the seriousness of the misconduct, a suspension is
warranted. Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the
respondent be suspended for a period of 6 months.

“54. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified
by the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator.”

DiIscUussION

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence,
the findings of the disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the par-
ties and determines whether violations of KRPC exist and, if they

660

do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292
Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). Clear and convincing evidence is
“‘evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that “the truth of
the facts asserted is highly probable.”’” In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498,
505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725,
188 P.3d 1 [2008}).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint,
to which he filed an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing
before the panel and the hearing before this court. The respondent
did not file exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing reports.
As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court
Rule 212(c) and (d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 369).

The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear
and convincing evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC
5.4(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 639) (professional independence
of a lawyer); 7.1(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 653) (communica-
tions concerning a lawyer’s services); 8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. An-
not. 672) (engaging in conduct involving misrepresentation); and
8.4(g) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct adverse-
ly reflecting on lawyer's fitness to practice law), and it supports the
panel's conclusions of law. We adopt the panel’s conclusions.

The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline
for respondent's violations. At the hearing before the panel, the of-
fice of the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that respon-
dent be suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas
‘or a period of 6 months. Respondent recommended he be disci-
plined by public censure. The hearing panel agreed with the of-
fice of the Disciplinary Administrator in recommending a 6-month
suspension.

At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent ap-
eared, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator recommend-
ed that respondent be suspended from the practice of law in the
state of Kansas for a period of 6 months. Respondent stated that
6 was not opposed to a 6-month suspension. This court is not
ound by the recommendations of the Disciplinary Administra-

tor or the hearing panel. In re Mintz, 298 Kan. 897, 911-12, 317
P.3d 756 (2014). The hearing panel’s recommendations are advi-
sory only and do not prevent us from imposing greater or lesser
sanctions. Supreme Court Rule 212(f) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
369); see In re Kline 298 Kan. 96, 212-13, 311 P.3d 321 (2013).
After careful consideration, the court holds that a greater sanction
is appropriate under the circumstances. The uncontested findings
demonstrate respondent committed multiple acts of professional
misconduct, the most troubling being: (1) He engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. KRPC
8.4(c). Here, the respondent misrepresented information when
he communicated with Donald Missey and Bill Metzler and in
his proposed covenant not to sue. Specifically, the respondent
claimed that he represented 50 other landowners when he did
not. (2) He engaged in multiple acts of conduct that adversely
reflect on his fitness to practice law. KRPC 8.4(g). First, the re-
spondent drafted the covenant not to sue. In that covenant, the
respondent included a provision to permanently dispose of any
and all documentation, records, recordings, witness statements,
personal contact information for potential litigants, research,
and all other forms of discovery as it pertains to evidence which
could be used by his clients and others against defendants in
a lawsuit of any nature. The respondent’s offer to destroy evi-
dence is conduct which adversely reflects on his fitness to prac-
tice law. Second, the respondent offered to settle his claims by
having WCH wire transfer $1.9 million dollars to an offshore ac-
count. The respondent stated that he wished to have the money
transferred to the offshore account as a form of “asset protec-
tion.” The respondent, however, denied that he was attempting
to avoid paying taxes on the money. The respondent was unable
to offer any legitimate explanation for “asset protection.” Based
on all the evidence, it was reasonable for the hearing panel to
conclude that the respondent was attempting to avoid paying
taxes on the money he hoped to get from WCH.

The respondent refuses to acknowledge the wrongful nature of
his conduct, particularly as it pertains to the covenant not to sue.

We rarely see such behavior unaccompanied by any misgivings that
reflects so poorly on our profession. We find his conduct, which
ultimately evolved into a scheme of bribery and extortion, to be of
such a serious magnitude and unconscionable nature that an in-
definite period of suspension is warranted. If not fully accepting
and appreciating that falsely claiming to the representation of over
50 litigants and offering to destroy all evidence that could be used
on their and others’ behalf in exchange for wiring $1.9 million to
an offshore account is wrongful, nothing short of the action we are
taking today will adequately protect the public.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that Kerry Dale Holyoak be indefi-
nitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 293), as of the date of this order.

Iv Is FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall comply with
Supreme Court Rule 218 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 401), and in
the event respondent seeks reinstatement, he shall comply with
Supreme Court Rule 219 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 403).

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings
be assessed to the respondent and that this opinion be published in
the official Kansas Reports.

No. 107,684

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. KENNETH J. Taroya, Appellant.
(72 3d 1247)

Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and
was on the brief for appellant.

Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco

Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on
the brief for appellee.

—

The opinion of the court was delivered by

STEGALL, J.: Kenneth. J. Tafoya was convicted by a jury in 2008
of one count of driving under the influence (DUI). Tafoya had
three prior DUI convictions, all occurring in the 1990s. When Ta-
foya was sentenced in 2008, Kansas DUI sentencing statutes pro-
vided for a lifetime lookback period for purposes of classifying the
current conviction as a second conviction, third conviction, etc. See
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8-1567(0)(3). Including his three prior convic-
tions from the 1990s, Tafoya’s 2008 conviction was properly classi-
fied as a fourth DUI, and Tafoya was sentenced accordingly to 180
days in jail, 12 months’ postrelease supervision, and a mandatory
$2,500 fine.

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the district
court had erred by imposing a mandatory fine without making the
necessary factual findings concerning Tafoya’s financial condition.
State v. Tafoya, No. 100,784, 2010 WL 5185473, at °9 (Kan. App.
2010) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 293 Kan. 1113 (2011)
(Tafoya 1). Specifically, the panel upheld Tafoya’s conviction and
sentencing for a fourth DUI but found that the district court erred
by failing to consider community service under K.S.A. 2006 Supp.
8-1567(j) in lieu of a direct payment of the fine. 2010 WL 5185473,
at *9. Announcing its holding on this point, the panel ordered that
“Tafoya’s fine must be vacated and the case must be remanded for
reconsideration of the method of payment of the fine.” 2010 WL
5185473, at *9. However, when summarizing the outcome of the
appeal in the final sentence of the opinion, the Court of Appeals
wrote: “Affirmed in part; sentence vacated and remanded for re-
sentencing.” 2010 WL 5185473, at *10.

After the Court of Appeals decision in Tafoya I, but before the
district court held the remand hearing as instructed by the panel,
the legislature amended the DUI lookback provisions, effective
July 1, 2011, to encompass only convictions occurring “on or after
July 1, 2001.” K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1567(j)(3). Thus, at the time of
the remand hearing in February 2012, Tafoya sought the benefit of
the new, more limited lookback period which would have resulted
in a resentencing for a first DUI, rather than a fourth DUI. The
district court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to resentence Tafoya

because the panel's mandate was limited to “reconsideration of the
method of payment of the fine.” The district court simply allowed
Tafoya to perform community service in lieu of a direct payment of
his mandatory DUI fine.

Tafoya again appealed and argued for a retroactive application
of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1567(j)(3) to his 2008 conviction. State v.
Tafoya, No. 107,684, 2013 WL 1457946 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpub-
lished opinion) (Tafoya I). Another panel of the Court of Appeals
had recently decided State v. Reese, ruling that the 2011 lookback
period was not applicable to crimes committed prior to its effective
date. 48 Kan. App. 2d 87, 283 P.3d 233 (2012), rev’d 300 Kan. 650,
333 P.3d 149 (2014). Relying on the Court of Appeals’ holding in
Reese, the Tafoya II panel ruled that because Tafoya’s conviction
occurred in 2008, he was not entitled to the 2011 lookback period.
2013 WL 1457946, at °2-3.

Soon after, however, while Tafoya’s petition for review of Tafoya
II was pending, we considered the decision of the Court of Appeals
in Reese and reversed. State v. Reese, 300 Kan. 650, 333 P.3d 149
(2014). There, we held that the question was not properly one of
retroactive application. Rather, because the classification of a DUI
conviction as a first conviction, second conviction, etc. was to occur
“at the time of sentencing,” the 2011 lookback period applied “to
all persons who are sentenced for DUI on or after the July 1, 2011,
effective date of the amended statute.” 300 Kan. 650, Syl. In light
of our decision in Reese, we granted a number of pending petitions
for review affected by the Reese holding—including Tafoya’s peti-
tion for review of the decision in Tafoya IJ—and then summarily
vacated the decisions of the Court of Appeals and remanded the
cases to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Reese.

The question on remand—and the question now before us in
Tafoya’s third trip to this court—was a simple one: When was Ta-
foya sentenced? If he was sentenced in 2008, the lifetime lookback
provision was properly applied. If he was sentenced following the
remand hearing in 2012, however, pursuant to Reese he would be
entitled to the benefits of the 2011 lookback period. In Tafoya’s
case, the sentencing difference is significant. The Court of Ap-
peals again affirmed Tafoya’s sentence for a fourth DUI conviction,

_ Ei
finding that Tafoya was actually sentenced in 2008 and that the
2012 remand hearing was limited to the question of the method of
payment of the mandatory fine. As such, the panel reasoned that
Tafoya was neither sentenced nor resentenced in 2012. State v.
Tafoya, No. 107,684, 2014 WL 7152142, at *2 (Kan. App. 2014)
(unpublished opinion) (Tafoya III).

Tafoya appeals and we now affirm, thus ending his long sojourn
through our appellate courts.

ANALYSIS

Whether a district court has complied with the mandate of an

appellate court is a question of law over which we exercise plenary
review. State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 765, 267 P.3d 751 (2012).
Generally referred to as the “mandate rule,” K.S.A. 60-2106(c) pro-
vides:
“When . ..a decision of an appellate court becomes final, such court shall prompt-
ly cause to be transmitted to the clerk of the district court its mandate containing
such directions as are appropriate under the decision. A copy of the opinion of
the court shall accompany and be a part of the mandate. . . . Such mandate and
opinion, without further order of the judge, shall thereupon be a part of the judg-
ment of the court if it is determinative of the action, or shall be controlling in the
conduct of any further proceedings necessary in the district court.”

“Tf our decision and mandate is fully determinative of the is-
sues presented in the proceedings below, they become a part of
the judgment in the case without further order of the trial court.”
Provance v. Shawnee Mission U.S.D. No. 512, 235 Kan. 927, 933,
683 P.2d 902 (1984) (construing K.S.A. 60-2106). Furthermore,
“where our decision and mandate [of the appellate court] does not
fully determine the issues pending before the trial court . . . direc-
tions are necessary or appropriate to control the conduct of further
proceedings to resolve any remaining issues.” 235 Kan. at 933.

A sentence is effective when pronounced from the bench. State
v. Mason, 204 Kan. 675, 677, 279 P.3d 707 (2012); State v. Jackson,
262 Kan. 119, 140, 936 P.2d 761 (1997). A sentence is the judgment
of the court that formally declares to the accused the legal conse-
quences of his or her conviction. State v. Van Winkle, 256 Kan. 890,
895, 889 P.2d 749 (1995). The final judgment in a criminal case is

oO

667

the sentence. 256 Kan. at 895. Once sentence is pronounced and
judgment entered, the district court loses jurisdiction over a crimi-
nal case except to correct arithmetic or clerical errors. State v. Hall,
298 Kan. 978, 983, 319 P.3d 506 (2014).

Likewise, a district court has no authority to modify unchal-
lenged sentences following a remand by an appellate court except
when modification is needed to correct arithmetic or clerical errors.
See Guder, 293 Kan. at 766-67. The only other exception occurs
when a sentence is determined to be illegal within the meaning of
KS.A. 22-3504, which may happen at any time. State v. Harp, 283
Kan. 740, 743, 156 P.3d 1268 (2007). Thus, on remand from a high-
er court, absent narrow exceptions, a district court’s jurisdiction to
resentence or otherwise deviate from an already pronounced sen-
tence is limited to the express instructions contained in the higher
court’s mandate.

Simply put, the outcome of this case depends entirely on the
mandate issued by the Tafoya I panel of the Court of Appeals to
the lower court. Ordinarily, determining the controlling content of
an appellate court’s mandate ought not be difficult. In this case
though, as has become clearer in light of the peculiar subsequent
series of events and legal holdings, the Tafoya I panel gave what
amounted to two different, contradictory explanations of its man-
date. On the one hand, it instructed: “Tafoya’s fine must be vacated
and the case must be remanded for reconsideration of the meth-
od of payment of the fine”; and on the other hand, it announced:
“[Tafoya’s] sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.” 2010
WL 5185473, at *9-10. Which is it?

If the Tafoya I mandate vacated Tafoya’s 2008 sentence and re-
manded for resentencing, he should have had the benefit of the
2011 lookback period and been resentenced accordingly. If, how-
ever, the Tafoya I mandate did not vacate Tafoya’s 2008 sentence
and remanded to the district court only for the limited purpose of
properly considering and determining the method of the payment
of the mandatory fine, then the district court was correct that it
was not vested with jurisdiction to resentence Tafoya, and his 2008
sentence cannot be disturbed or otherwise rendered illegal by the
2011 changes to the lookback period.

Given that Tafoya I remanded this case pursuant to our holding
in State v. Copes, 290 Kan. 209, 224 P.3d 571 (2010), we find it use-
ful to look to Copes to determine the substantive effect of a Copes
remand. In Copes, we held:

“Where the amount of fine is discretionary, this court has required the district
court to ‘state on the record that he or she has taken into account the financial
resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of the fine
will impose.’ State v. McGlothlin, 242, Kan. 437, 441, 747 P.2d 1335 (1988). We
see no reason to require a different procedure when the method of payment is
discretionary. In doing so, we recognize there are considerations other than ability
to pay that are relevant to the determination of whether the public service option
will be ordered. Nevertheless, the existence of other factors influencing a court's
discretion does not diminish a statutory requirement that a specific factor be con-
sidered. In addition, the method of payment may be equally relevant to a district
court's decision in situations where a monetary fine imposes little or no burden on
a defendant; in such a case, the court might determine the commitment of time to
community service is a more appropriate penalty. Consequently, applying K.S.A.
21-4607(3) we hold that a district court must take into account the defendant's
financial resources and the burden of the fine when considering the method of
payment of a fine for a fourth or subsequent DUI offense, i.¢., whether the defen-
dant must pay a monetary fine or provide community service under K.S.A. 2009
Supp. 8-1567(j).” 290 Kan, at 222-23.

Notably, we did not declare Copes’ original sentence illegal pur-
suant to K.S.A. 22-3504, and we did not use the term “resentenc-
ing” when discussing the remand. We ordered “[t]he district court's
decision [] reversed and remanded for consideration of Copes’ fi-
nancial resources with respect . . . to the method of payment of
her DUI fine.” Copes, 290 Kan. at 223. Several panels of the Court
of Appeals have since followed suit. See, ¢.g., State v. Adame, 45
Kan. App. 2d 1124, 1130, 257 P.3d 1266 (2011) (In light of Copes,
$2,500 DUI fine was “remanded and the court [was] directed to
consider the alternative method of payment under K.S.A. 2008
Supp. 8-1567[j].”); State v. Wells, No. 105,204, 2012 WL 718929,
at *2 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (DUI fine vacated
and matter remanded in light of Copes); State v. Kent, No. 105,118,
2012 WL 308536, at *1 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion)
(“[F]ine is vacated, and the case is remanded for the district court
to make findings pursuant to Copes concerning the manner and
method of paying the fine.”); State v. Shaw, No. 102,206, 2011 WL

426105, at °3 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (“The case
is remanded for reconsideration of the fine in a mamner consistent
with Copes.”); State v. Suter, No. 103,164, 2011 WL 2039739, at
*14 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (“[F]ine must be va-
cated and the case must be remanded for reconsideration of the
method of payment of the fine in light of Copes.”), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds 296 Kan. 137, 290 P.3d 620 (2012);
of. State v. Taylor, No. 104,091, 2011 WL 1878139, at *1 (Kan.
App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (“revers[ing] and vacat[ing] the
$1,500 fine . . . and remand[ing] for resentencing with the district
court to consider Taylor’s financial resources” [emphasis added]);
State v. Torres, No. 103,058, 2011 WL 867602, at *2 (Kan. App.
2011) (unpublished opinion) (“fine vacated, and case remanded for
resentencing in accordance with Copes” [emphasis added)).

The case Copes built upon, State v. McGlothlin, 242 Kan. 487,
747 P.2d 1335 (1988), is even more instructive. There, we held that
“where the defendant is convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor and is sentenced
to imprisonment . . . and a fine is to be imposed, the judge must make specific
findings . . . before imposing a fine. The judge must also state on the record that
he or she has taken into account the financial resources of the defendant and the
nature of the burden that payment of the fine will impose.” 242 Kan. at 441.

Following this holding, our mandate read: “(T]he fines imposed
. ..are vacated and that portion of the judgment is reversed; oth-
erwise, the judgment of the trial court, including the sentences im-
posed in this case, is affirmed.” 242 Kan. at 441.

Considering these authorities, we conclude that a sentence is
not rendered illegal simply because the district court judge fails
to consider (or fails to state on the record that he or she has con-
sidered) the financial resources of the defendant when determin-
ing either the discretionary amount of a fine or the discretionary
method of payment. Moreover, a remand from an appellate court
to a district court pursuant to these authorities to correct this error
is, in substance, not a remand for resentencing. As such, the Tafoya
I panel was substantively correct when it limited its mandate to va-
cating the fine and instructing the district court to reconsider “the
method of payment of the fine.”

Having determined the substantive legal effect of the Tafoya I

670

remand pursuant to Copes and McGlothlin, we are left to decide
the impact on this case, if any, of the panel's contradictory state-
ment that it was remanding Tafoya’s case to the district court with
his “sentence vacated” for “resentencing.” We conclude that the
substance of the Court of Appeals ruling controls over the form
its ruling takes. “‘“The law of this state is realistic. Substance pre-
vails over form.”’” State v. Fewell, 286 Kan. 370, 389, 184 P.3d 903
(2008) (quoting Murray v. Modoc State Bank, 181 Kan. 642, 647,
313 P.2d 304 [1957]). Tafoya was never resentenced, and his claim
to the benefit of the 2011 lookback period necessarily must fail.

Affirmed.

671

No, 110,095

WILLIAM May, Appellee, v. SAM CLINE, Appellant.
(372 P.3d 1242)

Jon D. Graves, of Kansas Department of Corrections, argued the cause and
was on the briefs for appellant,

Shawn P. Lautz, of Lautz Law, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the
brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

STEGALL, J.: William May was an inmate at the Larned Correc-
tional Facility when he was involved in an altercation with another
inmate, Jason Dale. May was ultimately disciplined for violating
K.A.R. 44-12-8301, the regulatory prohibition on fighting. After ex-
hausting his administrative remedies, May sought relief through
this K.S.A. 60-1501 petition filed against Sam Cline, the warden of
the Hutchinson Correctional Facility where May is currently incar-

672

cerated, May alleged his due process rights were violated because
the finding by the hearing officer that May violated K.A.R. 44-12-
301 was not supported by any evidence. The district court agreed
with May, but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the district
court. We granted May’s petition for review, and we reverse the
Court of Appeals and affirm the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

K.A.R. 44-12-301 states:

“Fighting or other activity which constitutes violence, or which is likely to lead
to violence, is prohibited unless such activity is in self-defense. Violation of this
rule shall be a class I offense.”

The facts as established during the hearing are not in dispute,
though the legal significance of those facts is contested by the par-
ties as a matter of law. After the altercation between May and Dale
had already begun, correctional officer Tracy Guesnier arrived on
the scene. Guesnier’s disciplinary report states:

“On 11-9-2012 I COI Guesnier Tracy was escorting inmates from west unit to
LSH main cafeteria . .. .Inoticed two inmates wrestling and throwing punches at
each other . . . . I yelled several times to break it up, but neither inmate separated
and punches were still being thrown. Both inmates wrestled off the sidewalk to
the west. Again I was telling both inmates to stop and that I would use the pepper
spray. Inmate continued wrestling where from my advantage Dale was the ag-
gressor and his face was towards me I then used two 1 second burst and inmates
were not separating I then used another 1 second spray. Demands were still given
to separate and finally Dale said I am done. Both inmates were handcuffed and
escorted to central unit. Inmates were Jason Dale #100165, William May #96951.”

At the disciplinary hearing, Guesnier testified his report was ac-
curate and truthful. Guesnier said that he could not tell who was
fighting at first and that Dale “seemed to be the aggressor.” Even
after several loud commands to break it up and the use of pepper
spray, the fight did not stop until Dale said “‘I’m done.’” Guesnier
was asked whether he could tell if May was defending himself and
responded, “‘No, the fight was already going when I noticed it I
have no idea who started it.’”

May testified that he was attacked by Dale, and he did not know
why. The hearing officer's report describes May as stating that he
was “just trying to hold on until help arrived but every time [May]

would let up Dale would come back at him.” The hearing offi-
cer concluded that “with no evidence to prove self-defense” May
would “be looked upon as being involved in a fight.”

Upon this evidence, the hearing officer concluded:

“Based on the preponderance of this evidence it is believed to be more true than
not that inmate May was involved in violence and that he was involved in a physi-
cal altercation with inmate Dale. That there is no evidence available to show that
inmate May was simply defending himself. Therefore a finding of guilty was ren-
dered.”

The Reno County District Court conducted a hearing on May's
K.S.A. 60-1501 petition and ultimately issued an order reversing
the hearing panel's findings as follows:

“[T]he hearing officer could and should have recognized that the respondent had
the right of self-defense unless the preponderance of evidence showed that the
other inmate was not the aggressor. The government had the burden of proof.
Likewise, as to whether the petitioner failed to stop fighting when ordered to do
so, the government had the burden of proof to show that the respondent unrea-
sonably continued to fight when he could have complied with the order without
reasonable belief that he would receive further blows from the other inmate. The
hearing officer made no attempt to evaluate the reasonableness of the petitioner's
stated belief that he was the victim of an aggression by the other inmate and enti-
tled to use self-defense. The hearing officer made no attempt to evaluate whether
the petitioner unreasonably failed to stop fighting when he could have done so
safely. Therefore, the hearing officer could not have reasonably found the peti-
tioner guilty. The conviction is therefore reversed.”

Cline appealed this ruling, and the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding:

“Tt is clear from the record that there was some evidence to support the hear-
ing officer's finding that May was involved in a fight. As was the case in Miller
[v. McKunel, 38 Kan. App. 2d [810,] 816, [174 P.3d 891 (2006),] the question of
self-defense was an issue before the hearing officer because May asserted that
he acted in self-defense at the hearing. But, by the decision of guilty of fighting
being reached by the hearing officer, it is clear the existence of this defense was
resolved against May. Contrary to the findings by the district court, there was no
evidence regarding who started the fight. KDOC was not obligated to disprove
self-defense, and the hearing officer as the factfinder in a prison disciplinary pro-
ceeding resolved this issue.” (Emphasis added.) May v. Cline, No. 110,095, 2014
‘WL 1708027, at °3 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion).

We granted May’s petition for review, and we now reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court's
ruling.

ANALYSIS

Disciplinary decisions concerning inmates in the custody of the
State are goenaly not subject to judicial review. K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
77-603(c)(2) (exempting discipline of persons in the custody of the
Secretary of Corrections from the Kansas Judicial Review Act). To
obtain relief, an inmate must demonstrate a constitutional viola-
tion. Here, the lower courts properly construed May’s claim as aris-
ing under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution given that he claims a lack of
evidence to support the alleged violation. “The requirements of
due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by
the prison disciplinary board .. . .” Sammons v. Simmons, 267 Kan.
155, Syl. { 3, 976 P.2d 505 (1999). Moreover,

“[t]his standard is met if there was some evidence from which the conclusion of
the administrative tribunal could be deduced. Ascertaining whether this standard
is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assess-
ment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the rele-
vant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Sammons, 267 Kan. 155, Syl. 3.

The United States Supreme Court has also discussed the ap-
plicable standard:

“The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes
any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board. Instead, due pro-
cess in this context requires only that there be some evidence to support the find-
ings made in the disciplinary hearing. Although the evidence in this case might be
characterized as meager, and there was no direct evidence identifying any one of
three inmates as the assailant, the record is not so devoid of evidence that the find-
ings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Su-
perintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985).

Thus, due process is satisfied in the context of an inmate dis-
ciplinary proceeding if there is any evidence in the record, even
evidence which could be characterized as meager, that could sup-
port the conclusion of the disciplinary authority. Due process does
not require that the evidence preclude other possible outcomes or

conclusions, only that the evidence provides some support for the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority such that the deci-
sion is not arbitrary.

In this case, the outcome turns on what, specifically and as a
matter of law, had to be shown to support a finding that May violat-
ed K.A.R. 44-12-301. The parties agree, as do we, that the question
comes down to which party bears the burden to prove or disprove
May’s claim of self-defense. The Court of Appeals panel ruled that
“KDOC was not obligated to disprove self-defense.” May, 2014 WL
1708027, at *3. This is consistent with the holding of prior panels of
the Court of Appeals. See, ¢.g., Miller v. McKune, 38 Kan. App. 2d
810, 816, 174 P.3d 891 (2006) (“The question of self-defense was
an issue before the hearing officer. But, by the decision of guilty
of fighting being reached, it is clear the existence of this defense
was resolved against Miller. The prosecution was not obligated to
disprove self-defense.”). The Court of Appeals reasoned from this
premise to the logical conclusion that the “some evidence” stan-
dard had been met in May’s case given the undisputed fact that
May and Dale were fighting. May, however, continues to challenge
the premise itself.

The interpretation of a regulation is a question of law. See Mur-
phy v. Nelson, 260 Kan. 589, 594, 921 P.2d 1225 (1996). Cline asks
us to show deference to the agency interpretation of K.A.R. 44-
12-301; however, we have recently resoundingly rejected the doc-
trine of deference to an agency on questions of law. Douglas v.
Ad Astra Information Systems, 296 Kan. 552, 559, 293 P.3d 723
(2013) (doctrine of operative construction has “been abandoned,
abrogated, disallowed, disapproved, ousted, overruled, and perma-
nently relegated to the history books”); Coleman v. Swift-Eckrich,
281 Kan. 381, 383, 130 P.3d 111 (2006) (recognizing that the doc-
trine of operative construction applied to agency interpretations of
both statutes and regulations). We therefore owe no deference to
an agency's interpretation of its own regulations and exercise un-
limited review over such questions.

At common law, self-defense was always an affirmative defense.
“[T]he common-law rule was that affirmative defenses, including
self-defense, were matters for the defendant to prove.” Martin v.

676

Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235, 107 S. Ct. 1098, 94 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987).
The burden of proof rule arises directly out of the nature of affir-
mative defenses—.e., affirmative defenses (or the lack thereof) are
neither elements of the alleged offense nor do they negate any ele-
ment of the offense. Rather, affirmative defenses provide a legally
recognized justification for the action such that the actor cannot be
held criminally or civilly liable. See, ¢.g., United States v. Corrigan,
548 F.2d 879, 883 (10th Cir. 1977) (“An affirmative defense admits
the defendant committed the acts charged, but seeks to establish a
justification or excuse.”).

The law of self-defense pertaining to criminal acts in Kansas
has been modified such that a burden-shifting scheme is now em-
ployed. A defendant claiming self-defense must first meet the bur-
den to come forward with some competent evidence in support of
the claim, and thereafter, “the state has the burden of disproving
the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
5108(c).

But in this case, these rules must give way to the plain language
of the regulation we are considering. Here, K.A.R. 44-12-301
clearly and unambiguously makes the absence of self-defense an
element of the offense itself. See, ¢.g., State v. Messer, 278 Kan.
161, 164, 91 P.3d 1191 (2004) (quoting State v. Sweat, 30 Kan. App.
2d 756, 760, 48 P.3d 8 [2002]) (“‘[A]I] crimes are statutory and the
elements necessary to constitute a crime must be gathered wholly
from the statute.’”). The presence of the language “unless such
activity is in self-defense” establishes a burden on the disciplin-
ary authority to prove the “activity” was not “in self-defense.” See
KAR. 44-12-301; State v. Longoria, 301 Kan. 489, 518, 343 P.3d
1128 (2015) (State has the burden of proving all elements of the
crime charged).

When we evaluate the evidence in the record before us in light
of a proper understanding of the regulation May was alleged to
have violated, we have no difficulty concluding that there was no
evidence whatsoever presented to the hearing officer that May did
not act in self-defense. The quantum of evidence to support a dis-
ciplinary action is slight, but even so, the record here discloses nary
a scintilla of evidence on which a reasonable hearing officer could

677

conclude that May was not acting in self-defense. This is hardly
surprising given that neither the disciplinary authorities nor the
hearing officer believed the regulation demanded such evidence.
Nevertheless, the regulation at issue was promulgated by the De-
partment of Corrections and the Department must abide by its
language.

May was not accorded due process when he was found to have
violated K.A.R. 44-12-301 despite a complete failure of proof of
one of the elements of the offense. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the district court is af-
firmed.

Q

78

No. 110,977

James LEE JAMERSON, Appellant, v. JAMES HEIMGARTNER,
WaRDEN, EL DorADO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Appellee.
(372 P3d 1236)

S|
| |

Nancy Ogle, of Ogle Law Office, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause and was
on the briefs for appellant.

James Lee Jamerson, appellant, filed a brief pro se.
Michael J. Smith, of Kansas Department of Corrections, of El Dorado, argued
the cause and was on the briefs for appellee.

Stephen Douglas Bonney, of ACLU Foundation of Kansas, of Kansas City,
Missouri, was on the brief for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Kansas.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSEN, J.: James L. Jamerson appeals from the denial by the
district court of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he
challenged the basis for his confinement in administrative segrega-
tion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district
court. In granting review, this court directed the parties to brief
an issue not explicitly argued to the Court of Appeals relating to
the constitutionality of Jamerson’s confinement: the duration of his
administrative segregation.

Jamerson is serving a sentence of 288 months following his plea
of no contest to charges of second-degree intentional murder, ag-
gravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, all
leading from events occurring in Shawnee County in January 2001.
His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Ja-
merson, No. 89,382, 2003 WL 22345443 (Kan. App.) (unpublished
opinion), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2003).

In June 2010, in response to threats of gang violence and possi-
ble involvement in contraband trafficking, Jamerson was placed in
administrative segregation at Lansing Correctional Facility. More
than 3 years later, on August 8, 2013, he filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus under K.S.A. 60-1501. He alleged that he had
been placed in administrative custody based on false reports and
for other unlawful reasons and that his continued administrative
custody, already lasting over 1000 days, therefore violated his con-
stitutional right to due process. Without conducting a hearing, the
district court dismissed the petition for three reasons: he failed to
seek timely administrative relief, placement in administrative seg-
regation does not implicate constitutional rights, and classification
and placement issues are best left to penal authorities.

The Court of Appeals rejected the conclusion that Jamerson had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies properly but agreed
with the district court that continued incarceration in segregated
custody, without at least a prima facie showing of unusually harsh
conditions, does not infringe on a protected liberty interest. Jam-
erson v. Heimgartner, No. 110,977, 2014 WL 2871439 (Kan. App.
2014) (unpublished opinion).

Jamerson filed a pro se petition for review along with his at-
torney’s separate petition for review. This court granted the pro se
petition in part. The court informed the parties that the sole issue
that the court would consider is the question of whether the dura-
tion of administrative segregation alone implicates an inmate’s due
process liberty interest, an issue not explicitly argued in either the
district court or the Court of Appeals. The parties were directed to
provide supplemental briefing limited to this issue.

It is acknowledged by both parties that Jamerson is no longer
placed in administrative segregation, having successfully com-
pleted a behavior modification program. Although a decision on
the question presented to the parties will not have an immediate
impact on his cause of action, which sought release from such seg-
regated placement, the issue is one of statewide interest and of a
nature that demands a decision, and the circumstances generat-
ing the issue will likely arise repeatedly. We therefore elect to set
out certain contours for evaluating claims of constitutional liberty
interests in the context of extended administrative segregation.
See State v. Hollister, 300 Kan. 458, 458-59, 329 P.3d 1220 (2014)
(setting out conditions for addressing issues not currently affecting
rights of parties).

Segregation, or solitary confinement, generally consists of re-
stricting contact among prisoners, between prisoners and prison
staff, and between prisoners and visitors for extended periods of
time. Disciplinary segregation is instituted for punitive reasons and
restricts an inmate’s privileges and rights in order to maintain dis-
cipline in correctional facilities. The purpose of disciplinary seg-
regation is punishment, and placement in disciplinary segregation
requires compliance with correctional regulations. Amos v. Nelson,
260 Kan. 652, 656, 923 P.2d 1014 (1996). Unlike disciplinary de-

681

tention, administrative segregation is nonpunitive. Amos, 260 Kan.
at 657. Administrative segregation is used as a method for physi-
cally segregating from the general population those prisoners who,
for certain reasons, cannot be placed in the general prison popula-
tion. Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995).

A curious result of the distinction is that punitive segregation
is generally of a short duration, while administrative segregation
may extend for periods of years, or even decades. A correctional
classification that is so harsh that it is used as punishment on some
inmates may thus be imposed for longer periods of time on inmates
who have not been designated for punitive treatment. Although
courts may seek to distinguish between the rights involved in the
two different motivations for segregating prisoners, the label used
may encourage a “standardless discretion” that may violate due
process. See McClary v. Kelly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 195, 199 (W.D.N.Y.
1998).

Courts give penal authorities great deference in the manage-
ment and operation of the prison system. See Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d
935 (1974); Schuyler v. Roberts, 285 Kan. 677, 681, 175 P.3d 259
(2008); Foster v. Maynard, 222 Kan. 506, 509, 565 P.2d 285 (1977);
Chambers v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 205 F.3d 1237, 1242
(10th Cir, 2000).

Nevertheless, although they are confined to prison, inmates re-
tain certain constitutionally protected liberty interests whose de-
privation implicates the right to due process. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at
557; Schuyler, 285 Kan. at 681; Chambers, 205 F.3d at 1242. To be
sure, incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected
liberty interests. See Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1011 (10th
Cir. 2012). A protected liberty interest may, however, arise when
prison authorities impose a restraint on a prisoner's already quite-
limited freedom and the restraint is atypical and a significant hard-
ship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L.
Ed. 2d 418 (1995).

Here, the district court denied the petition for relief in part be-

CY

682

cause classification and placement issues do not raise constitutional
issues. While this conclusion is in a broad sense correct, it pro-
vides an incomplete understanding of an inmate’s liberty interests
with respect to segregated confinement. As a constitutional ques-
tion distinct from procedural due process and separate from cruel
and unusual punishment, courts have given credence to claims that
confinement in segregated custody may encroach on protected lib-
erty interests.

In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L.
Ed, 2d 675 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a prisoner has no
constitutional right to remain free of discretionary administrative
segregation, because “the transfer of an inmate to less amenable
and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well with-
in the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison
sentence.” The Court determined that the Due Process Clause,
standing alone, did not confer a liberty interest in avoiding admin-
istrative segregation; there was no constitutional liberty interest in
freedom from state action taken “within the sentence imposed.”
459 U.S. at 468. The Court recognized that prisoners retain only
“the most basic liberty interests” and determined that remaining in
the general population was not one of those basic interests, explain-
ing that, because “inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving
[administrative segregation] at some point in their incarceration,”
the Due Process Clause alone does not create a liberty interest. 459
U.S. at 468-69,

Subsequently, in Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, the Supreme Court
held that a mere change in the level of an inmate’s security clas-
sification within a prison does not constitute such a deprivation of
a liberty interest that it will support a legal challenge by a prisoner.
The Court went on to hold that disciplinary segregation was not an
atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary incidents
of prison life because such discipline is similar to conditions ex-
perienced by inmates in administrative segregation and protective
custody. 515 U.S. at 485-86.
| Kansas court decisions have been consistent with these de-
cisions. In Murphy v. Nelson, 260 Kan. 589, 602, 921 P.2d 225
(1996), the court relied on Sandin to conclude that the adminis-

683

trative regulations in effect at the time in Kansas governing cor-
rectional segregation did not, as a matter of law, create conditions
during administrative segregation leading to a significant and atypi-
cal hardship on a prisoner beyond what was contemplated in the
realm of conditions of the original sentence. The court held that no
liberty interest existed in transfers to administrative segregation.

In Amos, 260 Kan. at 665-66, this court continued to follow the

tule that administrative segregation does not place atypical and sig-
nificant hardships on inmates:
“Inmates [in segregation] must be provided all prescribed medications, clothing
that is not degrading, and access to basic personal items unless there is a clear
and present danger that inmates will destroy such items or use them to injure
themselves or others. Inmates confined to segregation also receive the same meals
as the general prison population except in certain circumstances involving their
behavior or for religious or medical reasons. Inmates in segregation have access to
reading materials, hair care services, telephone privileges, and linen and clothing
on the same basis as inmates in the general population, as well as personal legal
materials, legal reference materials, the opportunity to shower and shave three
times per week, the same communication privileges as inmates in the general
population, visitation. . . , and exercise periods outside their cells a minimum
of 1 hour per day, 5 days per week. Inmates in disciplinary segregation have ad-
ditional restrictions relating to television privileges, reading materials, canteen
privileges, telephone privileges, and tobacco privileges. Unlike inmates confined
to disciplinary segregation, those in administrative segregation have access to the
commissary, social and counseling services, religious guidance, recreation, edu-
cational services, telephone privileges, reading materials, legal services, and per-
sonal property.”

The Amos court concluded that the petitioner “has no protected
liberty interest in avoiding placement in administrative segrega-
tion.” 260 Kan. at 666.

Then, in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224, 125 S. Ct. 2384,
162 L. Ed. 2d 174 (2005), the United States Supreme Court re-
ferred to three factors in determining whether an institutional as-
signment infringes on a protected liberty interest: the harshness of
the conditions, such as deprivation of human contact and environ-
mental and sensory stimuli; the duration of the confinement; and
disqualification for parole consideration. The Court thus clarified
that duration is a factor to be considered in assessing the hardship
that segregated custody places on an inmate.

Consistent with Wilkinson, courts have begun to recognize that
an inmate may proffer a lengthy term of segregation as evidence of
hardship.

In Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2006), the court
considered placement of the petitioner in administrative segre-
gation for 750 days while other inmates remained in segregation
for the most serious offenses for only 180 days.The court held:
“Where, as here, the prisoner is subjected to a lengthy period of
segregation, the duration of that confinement may itself be atypical
and significant.” (Emphasis added.) 465 F.3d at 1225, The circuit
reversed the district court's summary dismissal and remanded the
case for evidentiary analysis.

In Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693 (7th Cir.
2009), the court held that the question of whether 240 days in disci-
plinary segregation was a type of atypical, significant hardship that
would implicate a protected liberty interest could not be decided at
the pleadings stage. The court noted that it was “clear that a term
of segregation as lengthy as [the petitioner’s] requires scrutiny of
the actual conditions of segregation.” 559 F.3d at 698. The court
accordingly remanded the case to the district court for further fact-
finding. 559 F.3d at 699.

In Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 2008), the
Sixth Circuit considered a plaintiff in a § 1983 action who had been
assigned to administrative segregation for a period of approximate-
ly 3 years. The court determined that the duration of such restric-
tive confinement was a key factor in evaluating a claim that the
confinement constituted an atypical and significant hardship: “In
deciding whether changes to an inmate’s conditions of confinement
implicate a congnizable liberty interest, both Sandin and [Wilkin-
son] considered the nature of the more-restrictive confinement
and its duration in relation to prison norms and to the terms of the
individual's sentence.” 524 F.3d at 792.

In Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 774 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 2014), the
plaintiff was confined for nearly 39 years in “closed-cell restriction”
following the murder of a corrections officer. The circuit compared
decisions from other courts and determined that duration in segre-
gated confinement does not necessarily give rise to a liberty interest

in ranges from 12 months to 15 months and up to 2% years. Eight
years in administrative custody, on the other hand, constituted an

“atypical” confinement or an “‘atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 774
F.3d at 855. The court considered the fact that the restrictions on
the petitioner's freedom were less severe than the restrictions on
other inmates who had been placed in solitary confinement: the
petitioner was allowed some contact visits, telephone privileges,
peer counseling, and correspondence course. The court reasoned:
“Were the duration of [the petitioners] solitary confinement less lengthy, such dis-
tinctions might become material. Here, however, we consider the 23-hour-a-day
in cell isolation, limited physical exercise, and limited human contact, together
with the extraordinary length of time that [the petitioner] has been held in such
conditions. Viewed collectively, there can be no doubt that these conditions are
sufficiently severe to give rise to a liberty interest under Sandin.” 774 F.3d at
855-56.

The court acknowledged that the initial security classification in
administrative segregation does not implicate a liberty interest, but
such an interest may arise when the classification is attended by
extraordinary circumstances, and indefinite placement in highly re-
strictive conditions implicates a liberty interest, “even if that place-
ment is the result of [a constitutionally sound] initial classification.”
TTA F.3d at 858.

We conclude that the duration of segregated placement is a fac-
tor that courts must consider in determining whether an inmate
has met the Sandin standards for demonstrating a liberty interest
infraction. In extreme cases, courts may deem duration the domi-
nant factor. While it may be difficult to ascertain at what point du-
ration becomes extreme, drawing such a conclusion in a particular
case requires specific inquiry and fact-finding by a district court
to determine the specific conditions of the administrative segre-
gation. Relevant questions include the frequency of visitation, ac-
cess to exercise or work programs, the degree of supervision, and
how those conditions compare with the conditions of inmates in
the general prison population. We remind tribunals that isolation
from human contact may constitute an especially harsh condition
of incarceration, as was pointed out by Justice Kennedy in his con-

_

curring opinion in Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2187,
2209-10, 192 L. Ed. 2d 323 (2015).

In cases where such relevant factors were not developed be-

low, the usual remedy would be to remand for factual findings and
corrected application of the law to those findings. Such a remedy
would be particularly important in the present case, because the
record simply does not contain a factual basis for evaluating wheth-
er the conditions of Jamerson’s placement were “atypical” and con-
stituted a “significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” In the present case, however, the remedy of remand
is not available because Jamerson is no longer in administrative
segregation.
We nevertheless issue this opinion to provide guidance to courts
as they encounter liberty interest claims in the future. We note that
an opinion that is not essential to the decision constitutes judicial
dictum. City of Wichita v. Molitor, 301 Kan. 251, 264, 341 P.3d
1275 (2015) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 549 [10th ed. 2014]);
Law v. Law Company Building Assocs., 295 Kan. 551, 564, 289
P.3d 1066 (2012). Judicial dictum is an expression of opinion on a
question directly involved in a particular case, argued by counsel,
and deliberately ruled on by the court, although not necessary to
a decision. While not binding as a decision, judicial dictum is en-
titled to greater weight than obiter dictum and should not be lightly
disregarded. Crescent Ring Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 102
NJ.L. 85, 89, 132 A. 106 (1926); see also United States v. Bell, 524
F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975) (judicial dictum is considered opinion
that, while not binding on appellate courts, may provide guidance
to lower courts and must be given considerable weight); see also
D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 334 (D.
Conn. 2011) (judicial dictum designed to guide lower courts).

Jamerson’s request for relief is now moot, and the courts are
without jurisdiction to grant him the relief that he requests.

eC

No. 113,302

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. DEAARION Potts, Appellant.
(874 P3d 639)

pO

ion filed June 24, 2011

Samuel Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and
was on the briefs for appellant.

Johnathan M. Grube, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Shawn
M. Boyd, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Der-
ek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

RosEN, J.: On the night of October 20, 2012, 15-year-old Deaar-
ion Potts drove three acquaintances around Kansas City, Kansas, in
a car that Potts stole earlier that day. During the excursion, Potts
drove up behind a car and his three passengers proceeded to fire
weapons at the vehicle, killing Ramon Bradley, one of the car’s four
occupants. As a result, Potts was charged with felony murder, crim-
inal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and burglary.
After the district court authorized Potts to stand trial as an adult,
a jury found him guilty of all three crimes. The district court im-
posed a controlling sentence of life without the possibility of parole
for 20 years.

On appeal, Potts raises several arguments. First, he argues that
because it was possible Bradley sustained his fatal gunshot wound
during the initial moments of the shooting—when Potts claims he
was not intending to aid his companions with the shooting—the
State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of either felony
murder or criminal discharge of a firearm. Potts also argues that in
order for the State to have convicted him of burglary, it had to pres-
ent evidence that he intended to steal something from within the
car he broke into and stole. Because his conviction for burglary was
based on his act of breaking into the car that he stole, he contends
that his conviction must be reversed. Additionally, Potts argues that
(1) his statements to police should have been suppressed because
they were involuntary; (2) the district court’s jury instruction on
aiding and abetting was erroneous; (3) cumulative error deprived
him of a fair trial; (4) the district court unconstitutionally enhanced
his sentence by making factual findings that authorized the State
to prosecute him as an adult; and (5) the district court incorrectly

689

noted within the journal entry of judgment that Potts was subject
to lifetime postrelease supervision for all his convictions.

We reject his arguments and affirm his convictions and sen-
tence. However, we conclude that while the district court properly
sentenced Potts to lifetime parole for felony murder, the journal
entry of judgment indicates that lifetime postrelease supervision
was also imposed as a result of his convictions for burglary and
criminal discharge of a firearm when only a maximum of 36 months
is allowed. The State concedes the issue. Accordingly, we vacate
only that portion of his sentence and remand for resentencing.

Facts

During the late evening hours of October 20, 2012, Tracy Jordan
and Eddie London drove Jordan’s black Pontiac Grand Am to a
community center located near Tenth Street and Washington Bou-
levard in Kansas City, Kansas, to pick up Jordan’s brother, Charles
Shelby, and his friend, Bradley, from a function that was ending.
After picking them up, the group traveled eastbound on Washing-
ton Boulevard with the plan of going to the Power & Light District
in downtown Kansas City, Missouri. Jordan drove; London sat in
the front passenger seat; and Shelby and Bradley rode in the back-
seat.

Once the two eastbound lanes of Washington Boulevard pass
Fourth Street, the lanes slowly curve south and eventually split,
with the left lane exiting onto eastbound 170 (taking travelers
into Missouri). The right lane proceeds south and then makes a
sharp curve to the east. At this point, the lane is called Minnesota
Avenue; it travels a short distance east until meeting with Third
Street. Proceeding directly east through the intersection of Third
and Minnesota would cause a person to travel the wrong way on
Fairfax Trafficway.

As the group traveled around the first curve on Washington
Boulevard, preparing to take the exit for eastbound I-70, some-
one started firing multiple gunshots at them. Moments later, the
rear window shattered. Jordan noticed that the gunfire was coming
from a red car directly behind them. Jordan continued driving in
the right lane, eventually going around the sharp curve and com-

ing to the intersection of Third and Minnesota. He drove through
the intersection, going the wrong way up Fairfax Trafficway. At
that point, the red car stopped its pursuit and tumed left on Third
Street.

Sometime during the shooting, but after the rear window had
been shot out, Shelby heard Bradley say, “I’m hit.”

Due to the damage the car sustained, Jordan’s Grand Am even-
tually came to a stop on Fairfax Trafficway. Shelby estimated that
more than a minute had passed from the time he heard the first
shot to the time the car stopped on Fairfax; London estimated
2 minutes had passed. Jordan got out of the car and waived down
a truck driver, asking him to call the police. Police eventually re-
sponded to the scene and discovered that Bradley had died as a
result of a single gunshot wound.

Police did not find any weapons or bullet casings inside -the
Grand Am. Police noted that the car had sustained several bullet
holes, indicating that it was fired upon from behind.

During the investigation of the shooting, police scavenged the
area on eastbound Washington Boulevard where the initial shots
occurred and discovered bullet casings beginning just after the exit
sign for Minnesota Avenue/Fairfax District. The sign noted that
the exit—where traffic lines begin denoting separation of the two
eastbound lanes—was /-mile away. In this general area, police
discovered a total of 31 shell casings—nineteen 7.62x39 mm cas-
ings and twelve 9 mm casings. Near the intersection of Third and
Minnesota—where the red car ended its pursuit—police found 20
shell casings—fourteen 7.62x39 mm casings and six 9 mm casings.

Police eventually found a red Dodge Intrepid parked in the
middle of an alley near 25th and Garfield. The interior of the car
was partially burnt. Someone had attempted to set the car on fire
by igniting a gas can and placing it behind the front passenger seat.
Police noted that the outer plate of the ignition switch was missing,
indicating that someone had used a screwdriver to start the car.
There were no weapons found inside, and there was no evidence
that the car had sustained any gunshot damage. But police did find
two 9 mm shell casings inside the car.

In all, police recovered 53 shell casings—thirty-three 7.62x39

691

mm casings and twenty 9 mm casings. Law enforcement deter-
mined that all 33 of the 7.62x39 mm casings were fired from the
same gun. Of the twenty 9 mm casings recovered, 13 were fired
from one gun, and seven were fired from another. In other words,
three firearms were involved in the shooting—one firing 7.62x39
mam bullets and two firing 9 mm bullets.

A forensic scientist from the KBI testified that the most com-
mon firearm designed for 7.62x39 mm ammunition is an AK-47
rifle. In comparison, 9 mm ammunition is typically used in hand-
guns. The scientist also estimated that an AK-47 without a shoulder
stock is at least 26 inches long and that a shoulder stock generally
adds another 8 to 10 inches in length. The scientist said that a9 mm
handgun is typically around 10 inches in length.

During Bradley's autopsy, a forensic pathologist recovered the
fatal bullet. The forensic scientist examined the bullet. Though he
could not determine its exact caliber, the scientist stated that based
on its characteristics, the bullet was “consistent with a rifle caliber
rather than a handgun caliber.”

A couple of days. after the shooting, police learned that 16-year-
old D’Andre Hill may have been involved in the shooting. On
October 24, 2012, Hill, accompanied by his mother, spoke with
police about the shooting. Hill told police that he and Deandre
Harris (age 17) were at the Chelsea Apartment complex off Sev-
enth Street when Potts (age 15) and Bobby Hale, Jr., (age 18 or 19)
picked them up in a red car. As Potts drove, Hale sat in the front
passenger seat, and Hill and Harris sat in the back seat.

According to Hill, as they traveled eastbound on Washington
Boulevard, he heard Hale say, “There they go:” Then, Hill heard
a “boom” and. realized that Hale was firing a rifle at a black car in
front of them. Hill and Harris, who were armed with handguns,
joined in and started firing their weapons at the car while Potts
drove. As Potts followed the car down the Third Street exit, he
drove into a curb or guardrail, but kept following the black car. Hill
said that Potts stopped following the car once it drove through the
intersection at Third and Minnesota and proceeded the wrong way
on Fairfax Traffieway: Potts then turned left onto Third Street and
drove away. :

Hill said that no one discussed the shooting prior to it occurring.
On October 26, Potts, accompanied by his grandfather, came to
the police station. After being advised of and waiving his Miranda
rights, Potts spoke with two detectives. He told them that on the
day of the shooting, he was walking by himself when he got tired
and decided to steal a red Dodge Intrepid. He drove the car to an
apartment complex off Seventh Street where he picked up Hale,
Hill, and Harris. Hale sat in the front seat, Hill and Harris sat in the
back seat. Potts told detectives that he was driving east on Wash-
ington Boulevard when he heard a “boom.” He looked over and
saw that Hale had fired, in Potts’ words, a “big gun” out the front
passenger-side window at a car traveling in front of them. As Hale
fired his weapon at the car, Potts said that he sped up and followed
the car until it went down the wrong way of a one-way street. After-
wards, Potts drove his companions back to the apartment complex
and dropped them off. He then parked the car and walked to his
grandmother's house.
Potts told detectives that he did not realize anyone in the car
was armed prior to the shooting.
After charging Potts in juvenile court with felony murder and
criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, the State
filed a motion seeking authorization to prosecute Potts as an adult
pursuant to K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2347. After conducting an evi-
dentiary hearing, the district court granted the State’s motion. The
State filed an amended information charging Potts with the addi-
tional crimes of vehicular burglary and theft.

At Potts’ jury trial, Hill testified for the State. Other than a few
additional details, Hill's account of the shooting was similar to the
account he gave to detectives. Hill. again said that he and Harris
were picked up at the apartment complex by Potts who was driving
ared Dodge Intrepid. Hale sat in the front seat. Hill said that they
left the apartment complex to buy cigars.

Hill indicated that somewhere around the area of Fifth and
Washington, he heard Hale say, “There they go.” Then he heard
gunshots, looked up, and saw Hale firing an assault rifle out the
front passenger-side window at a car. Hill said that he thought they
were getting shot at, so he began shooting at the car with his hand-

693

gun. Hill said that when they started shooting at the car, it was a
couple of car lengths away.

Hill said that he and Harris were both armed with 9 mm hand-
guns while Hale was armed with an assault rifle. Hill described
Hale’s gun as being long, estimating that it was 2 feet in length. Hill
claimed that he did not know Harris and Hale were armed until the
shooting occurred. Hill said that prior to the shooting, they had not
discussed looking for a particular vehicle.

Hill said that as they were going around a curve, they hit a curb.
Initially, Hill said that everyone stopped firing their weapons at this
point. But later on cross-examination, Hill said that the shooting
stopped once Potts tumed left onto a street, presumably Third
Street. Hill said that after the shooting, Potts drove them back to
the Chelsea apartments where everyone got out of the car and left.
Hill and Harris returned later and drove the car to an alley, set fire
to it, and left. Hill said that after throwing his gun into a sewer, he
xetumed to the apartment complex.

At the end of the State’s case-in-chief, the district court granted
Potts’ motion for a directed verdict on the theft count due to the
State failing to put on any evidence to establish the car's owner.

Potts presented the testimony of Dwight Alexander, an attor-
ney who, at the request of defense counsel, timed how long it took
to drive the portion of Washington Boulevard where the shooting
took place. Alexander testified that the speed limit in that area is
30 miles per hour. Alexander said that going the speed limit, it took
him 16.47 seconds to travel from the ¥/s-mile exit sign for Minne-
sota Avenue/Fairfax District to the start of the exit for Minnesota
Avyenue/Fairfax District. From the exit sign to the stop sign at the
intersection of Third Street and Minnesota Avenue, it took 39.27
seconds to travel that distance going the speed limit. Alexander
noted that he had to slow down in order to negotiate the shape
curve leading onto Minnesota Avenue.

The jury found Potts guilty of felony murder, criminal discharge
of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and burglary. More facts will be
stated as they become pertinent to issues discussed below.

FELONY MURDER AND CRIMINAL DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM.

Potts argues that his convictions for felony murder and criminal
discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle should be reversed
because, according to him, the evidence was inconclusive as to
whether he intended to aid his companions (particularly Hale)
when they initially fired their weapons at the Grand Am. Potts con-
tends that Hale, his front-seat passenger, started shooting at the
Grand Am without any warning and that the bullet which killed
Bradley was fired from Hale’s gun. Potts claims that because it is
possible Hale fired the fatal shot before he, Potts, acted in a man-
ner which aided Hale and the others with the shooting (i.e., speed-
ing up in order to stay close to the Grand Am), the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of either criminal discharge of a firearm
or felony murder.

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a crimi-
nal case, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the
State to determine whether a rational factfinder could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Frye, 294
Kan. 364, 374-75, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012). An appellate court does
not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on
the credibility of witnesses. State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl.
{ 8, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011). This court has also recognized that there
is no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in
terms of probative value. State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 105, 62 P.3d
220 (2003). “A conviction of even the gravest offense can be based
entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences fairly de-
ducible therefrom. If an inference is a reasonable one, the jury has
the right to make the inference.” McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. § 9.

Felony murder is the killing of a human being committed “in
the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently
dangerous felony.” K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5402(a)(2). Criminal dis-
charge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle is considered an inher-
ently dangerous felony for purposes of applying the felony-murder
rule, See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5402(c)(1)(O).

The district court instructed the jury that in order to convict
Potts of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, it
had to find that Potts or another for whose conduct Potts was crimi-

695

nally responsible: (1) discharged a firearm at the Grand Am; (2)
did so recklessly and without authority; (3) the Grand Am was oc-
cupied by a person, regardless of whether this was known by Potts
or his companions at the time of the shooting; and (4) the shoot-
ing caused great bodily harm to Bradley. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp.
21-6308(a)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(B). In order to hold Potts criminally
responsible for the conduct of his companions, the jury was in-
structed:

“A person is criminally responsible for a crime if the person, either before or
during its commission, and with the mental culpability required to commit the
crime intentionally aids another to commit the crime. All participants in a crime
are equally responsible without regard to the extent of their participation. Mere
association with the principles who actually commit the crime or mere presence
in the vicinity of the crime is insufficient to establish guilt as an aider and abettor.”

We have repeatedly stated that if someone dies during the course
of an inherently dangerous felony, such as criminal discharge of
firearm at an occupied vehicle, “all the participants . . . [are] equally
guilty of the felony murder, regardless of who fired the fatal shot.”
State v. Thomas, 239 Kan. 457, 462, 720 P.2d 1059 (1986). All par-
ticipants in a felony murder are principals. See State v. Littlejohn,
260 Kan. 821, 822, 925 P.2d 839 (1996); Thomas, 239 Kan. at 462.

Potts’ sufficiency argument fails to account for direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence that the jury could have relied on to conclude
that he intended to aid his companions with the shooting at its
very beginning. The jury was presented with evidence establishing
that Potts stole a car prior to the shooting and that Hale—armed
with an assault rifle that was at least 2 feet in length—got into the
car and sat in the front passenger seat as Potts drove. After pick-
ing up Hill and Harris at the apartment complex, Potts drove the
car east on Washington Boulevard. Hill’s testimony indicated that
somewhere around Fifth Street and Washington Boulevard, Hale
said, “There they go,” and then he started firing his weapon at the
Grand Am. Hill and Harris soon joined in by firing their handguns
at the car. Police discovered 31 shell casings (nineteen 7.62x39 mm
casings and twelve 9 mm casings) on eastbound Washington Street
beginning just past the ¥/s-mile exit sign for Minnesota Avenue/

Fairfax District, which is past the intersection of Fourth Street and
Washington Boulevard.

Based on this evidence, the jury could have inferred that Potts
stole the car for the purpose of acquiring transportation in order
to commit the shooting. The fact that Hale got into the car and sat
next to Potts while armed with an assault rifle (a weapon not easily
concealed) supports this inference. Hale’s statement of “There they
go” indicates a prearranged plan to commit the shooting because
the statement implies Potts would know that Hale was referring to
the occupants of the Grand Am. Finally, instead of simply stopping
the car or pulling over, Potts reacted to the initial shots by speeding
up and following the Grand Am for a considerable distance, which
included driving past an exit for I-70 and pursuing the car around
asharp curve leading onto Minnesota Avenue, thereby allowing his
companions (based on the evidence collected near the intersec-
tion of Third and Minnesota) to fire their weapons 20 more times
at the car. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence to
show that Potts, before and during the incident, intended to aid his
companions with firing their weapons at the Grand Am. Because
Ramon Bradley died as a result of the shooting, the evidence was
also sufficient for the jury to find Potts guilty of felony murder and
criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle.

VEHICULAR BURGLARY

Potts was convicted of burglary in violation of K.S.A. 2012 Supp.
21-5807(a)(3) based on his act of illegally entering and stealing the
Dodge Intrepid that was used in the shooting. Potts contends that
his conviction must be reversed because, according to him, an un-
authorized entry into a vehicle with the intent to steal that very
same vehicle is not criminalized by the burglary statute. Rather,
the statute criminalizes the unauthorized entry into a vehicle with
the intent to steal property located within the vehicle. Accordingly,
Potts argues that because there was no evidence presented at trial
that he entered the Dodge Intrepid with the intent to steal any-
thing from within the vehicle, his conviction for vehicular burglary
must be reversed.

Again, when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a
criminal case, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to

697

the State to determine whether a rational factfinder could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Frye, 294
Kan. at 374-75. An appellate court does not reweigh evidence, re-
solve conflicts in the evidence, or pass on the credibility of wit-
nesses. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. ¢ 8. To the extent that Potts’
argument requires interpretation of the burglary statute, this court
exercises unlimited review. See State v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 685,
317 P.3d 54 (2014).

K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5807(a)(3) states in pertinent part that
burglary is entering into vehicle without authority with intent to
commit a theft “therein.” Theft is defined in pertinent part as ob-
taining or exerting unauthorized control over property with the in-
tent to permanently deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the
property. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5801(a)(1). As the language of the
burglary statute indicates, proof that the defendant completed a
theft is not required for a conviction. Instead, the evidence must
show that the defendant illegally entered the vehicle with the in-
tent to commit a theft therein. See State v. Rush, 18 Kan. App. 2d
694, 701, 859 P.2d 387 (1993), rev’d on other grounds 255 Kan.
672, 877 P.2d 386 (1994). *

Potts argues that the legislature’s use of the word “therein” (a
word meaning “in or into that place or thing,” see the Merriam
Webster Dictionary [Online ed. 2016]) shows that the legislature
intended to proscribe the act of entering a vehicle without author-
ity for the purpose of stealing something from within the vehicle
rather than entering the vehicle with the intent to steal the vehicle.

As Potts acknowledges, the Court of Appeals rejected this argu-
ment in State v. Jones, 29 Kan. App. 2d 936, 34 P.3d 82 (2001), rev.
denied 273 Kan. 1038 (2002), but he argues that the court’s reason-
ing for doing so ignored the language of K.S.A. 21-3715(c), the
predecessor to K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5807(a)(3). K.S.A. 21-3715(c)
defined burglary as “knowingly and without authority entering into
or remaining within any... motor vehicle . . . with intent to commit
a felony, theft or sexual battery therein.” Like Potts, the defendant
in Jones argued that by including “therein” within the statutory def-
inition of vehicular burglary, the legislature distinguished an intent
to commit a theft within the vehicle (i.¢., stealing an item located

inside the vehicle) from the intent to commit a theft of the vehicle.
Accordingly, the defendant argued that he could not be convicted
of burglary based on his act of entering a vehicle with the intent to
steal it.

The Jones court construed the defendant's argument as essen-
tially contending that “because the entry of the vehicle was a neces-
sary part of the theft of the vehicle,” the two crimes merged togeth-
er, preventing his prosecution for both crimes. 29 Kan. App. 2d at
937. Rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that burglary and
theft are separate crimes with distinct elements. “[TJhe fact that
one necessarily precedes the other does not demonstrate a merger
of the offenses any more than a burglary of a house, although nec-
essary to the completion of some offense inside the house, merges
with that offense upon its completion.” Jones, 29 Kan. App. 2d at
939.

Admittedly, the Jones court failed to precisely address the defen-
dant’s argument regarding the impact of the word “therein” upon
the mens rea element of vehicular burglary. But the court did touch
upon the fact that burglary and theft are separate crimes and that
if a person unlawfully enters a vehicle with the intent to commit
a theft, he or she is guilty of burglary, regardless of the property
the person intended to steal after entering the vehicle. There is
nothing in the statutory language of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5807(a)
(3) or K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5801(a)(1) that restricts the scope of
the burglary statute to situations in which the defendant steals or
intends to steal something from the interior of a vehicle, as op-
posed to attempting to steal or actually stealing the vehicle itself.
Simply stated, a person who illegally enters a car for the purpose
of completing a theft—be it hotwiring a car or removing a car ste-
reo—necessarily intends to commit a theft inside the vehicle (i.e.,
therein) and may be properly convicted of vehicular burglary un-
der K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5807(a)(3).

Courts from other jurisdictions with similar vehicular burglary
statutes have reached the same conclusion. In Illinois, where ve-
hicular burglary is defined as a knowing entry without authority
into “a motor vehicle . . . or any part thereof, with intent to commit
therein a felony or theft,” see 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/19-1(a)

699

(2014), the courts have rejected the same argument Potts makes in
this case—that entry into a vehicle with the intent to steal the ve-
hicle itself (as opposed to something “therein”) does not constitute
a burglary. See People v. Buckner, 203 Ill. App. 3d 525, 535, 561
N.E.2d 335 (1990) (noting that if the court adopted defendant's
construction of vehicular burglary statute, “a person who entered a
car to steal something from within would be punished for burglary
but a person breaking in to steal the car itself would be guilty of
theft only”); People v. Mullinex, 125 Ill. App. 3d 87, 89-91, 465
N.E.2d 135 (1984); People v. Sansone, 94 Ill. App. 3d 271, 273-
74, 418 N.E.2d 862 (1981). In Florida, where vehicular burglary
is defined as an entry into “a structure or a conveyance with the
intent to commit an offense therein,” see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 810.02
(2007), the courts have also rejected the argument that the stat-
ute ought not to apply when the only intent is to steal the vehicle
itself. See, ¢.g., State v. Stephens, 601 So.2d 1195, 1196-97 (Fla.
1992) (The court noted that “therein” is synonymous with “in that
place” and that use of the word “therein” within vehicular burglary
statute “places no requirement that the crime must be one that
can be completed solely within the fixed limits of that particular
place, only that the crime is intended to be committed there. This
obviously can include an intent to commit car theft, because such a
crime can be committed ‘in that place.’”). Accord State v. Griffin,
116 N.M. 689, 694, 866 P.2d 1156 (1993) (construing New Mexico’s
vehicular burglary statute and concluding that “[b]reaking into a
car with the intent to steal the car qualifies as an intent to commit
a theft ‘therein’”).

Potts does not dispute that the evidence presented at trial es-
tablished he did not have permission to take the Dodge Intrepid.
He simply argues that his act of illegally entering the car with the
intent to steal the car is insufficient to sustain his conviction for
vehicular burglary. Based on our construction of K.S.A. 2012 Supp.
21-5807(a)(3), we reject Potts’ argument and affirm his conviction
for vehicular burglary.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Next, Potts argues that the district court erred in failing to sup-

press his statements to police because his statements were invol-
untarily made. Potts acknowledges that he failed to object at trial
when Detective Angela Garrison testified about Potts’ statements
to police. But he argues that notwithstanding the lack of a contem-
poraneous objection, this court should address the merits of this
evidentiary issue in order to serve the ends of justice or to prevent
the denial of fundamental rights. He also argues that judicial econ-
omy would be promoted by addressing the issue now rather than
forcing him to file a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion based on ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to object at trial.

We reject Potts’ invitation to address this issue. In State v. Hous-

ton, 289 Kan. 252, 270, 213 P.3d 728 (2009), we stated:
“{Wle hold that when a pretrial motion to suppress has been denied, the evi-
dence must also be objected to at the time it is offered during the trial in order
to preserve the issue for appeal. This holding is also consistent with the language
in KS.A. 60-404—objection to the evidence must be ‘timely interposed’——and
consistent with this court's longstanding characterization of the statutory language
as requiring a ‘contemporaneous’ objection. Among other advantages, this hold-
ing allows a court to rule on the evidence before trial, but after hearing how the
evidence unfolds during trial, allows the court to be prepared—after timely trial
objection—to reconsider its original ruling.”

Further, it should be noted that Potts’ statements to police
played a central role in his defense against the charges of felony
murder and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle.
Defense counsel performed an extensive cross-examination of De-
tective Garrison regarding Potts’ statements to police. During this
cross-examination, defense counsel was able to highlight for the
jury Potts’ statements indicating that he was not aware his com-
panions were armed prior to the shooting; that the shooting was
spontaneous, brief, and surprised him, and that as soon as he could,
he stopped following the Grand Am by turning onto Third Street.
Defense counsel used these statements in her closing argument to
contend that Potts should not be found guilty of either criminal dis-
charge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle or felony murder because
he never intended to aid his friends with shooting at the Grand Am.
Accordingly, defense counsel's failure to raise a contemporaneous
objection during Garrison’s testimony concerning Potts’ statements
may have been a strategic decision that will prove to be unchal-

lengeable in a later K.S.A. 60-1507 motion raising ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. See Rowland v. State, 289 Kan. 1076, 1083-84,
219 P.3d 1212 (2009) (If counsel has made a strategic decision after
making a thorough investigation of the law and the facts relevant to
the realistically available options, then counsel's decision is virtu-
ally unchallengeable.). Consequently, Potts’ judicial economy argu-
ment for why this court should address his unpreserved evidentiary
issue on direct appeal is not persuasive.

We decline to address Potts’ argument regarding the admission
of his statements into evidence because he failed to preserve the
issue for appellate review.

JURY INSTRUCTION ON AIDING AND ABETTING

Next, Potts argues that the district court's jury instruction on aid-
ing and abetting was erroneous because it failed to clearly convey
that Potts, in order to be found guilty of criminal discharge of a
firearm at an occupied vehicle, needed to act intentionally in aid-
ing Hale with shooting at the Grand Am. To remedy this, Potts
contends that the statutory definition of intentional conduct should
have accompanied the instruction on aiding and abetting culpabil-
ity. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5202(h) (“A person acts ‘intention-
ally, or ‘with intent,’ with respect to the nature of such person’s
conduct or to a result of such person’s conduct when it is such
person’s conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.”).

Potts concedes that he did not request the instruction or object
to the district court’s jury instruction on aiding and abetting. Ac-
cordingly, review of this issue is controlled by K.S.A. 22-3414(3)
and the stairstep analytical process set out in State v. Herbel, 296
Kan. 1101, Syl. {{ 7-8, 299 P.3d 292 (2013), and State v. Williams,
295 Kan. 506, 511, 286 P.3d 195 (2012). As Williams articulated,
K.S.A. 22-3413(3) creates a procedural hurdle when a party fails
to object because the statute establishes a preservation rule for in-
struction claims on appeal. It provides, in part, that no party may
assign as error a district court’s giving or failure to give a particular
jury instruction, including a lesser included crime instruction, un-
less the giving or failure to give the instruction is clearly erroneous.

If it is clearly erroneous, appellate review is not predicated upon an
objection in the district court. Williams, 295 Kan. at 512-13.

To establish that the giving or failure to give an instruction was
clearly erroneous, the reviewing court must determine whether
there was any error at all. This requires demonstrating that giving
the proposed instruction would have been both legally and factu-
ally appropriate, employing an unlimited review of the entire re-
cord. Williams, 295 Kan. at 515-16. And if error is found on that
basis, then the court moves to a reversibility inquiry in which it
assesses whether it is firmly convinced the jury would have reached
a different verdict had the instruction been given. The defendant
maintains the burden to establish the degree of prejudice neces-
sary for reversal. 295 Kan. at 516.

The district court gave the following instruction (based on PIK
Crim. 4th 52.140) regarding aiding and abetting culpability:

“A person is criminally responsible for a crime if the person, either before or
during its commission, and with the mental culpability required to commit the
crime intentionally aids another to commit the crime. All participants in a crime
are equally responsible without regard to the extent of their participation. Mere
association with the principles who actually commit the crime or mere presence
in the vicinity of the crime is insufficient to establish guilt as an aider and abettor.”

The language of the instruction conforms with K.S.A. 2012
Supp. 21-5210(a) (“A person is criminally responsible for a crime
committed by another if such person, acting with the mental culpa-
bility required for the commission thereof, advises, hires, counsels
or procures the other to commit the crime or intentionally aids the
other in committing the conduct constituting the crime.”).

In State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 311 P.3d 399 (2013), this court
reviewed an aiding and abetting instruction based on PIK Crim. 3d
54.05—the predecessor to PIK Crim. 4th 52.140. The instruction
stated:

“‘A person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids an-
other to commit a crime with the intent to promote or assist in its commission is
criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of the
Defendant's participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime.” 28
Kan. at 258. . .

The district court denied the defendant’s request in Llamas to
add the following language to the instruction:
“‘[Mlere association with the principals who actually commit the crime or mere
presence in the vicinity of the crime is insufficient to establish guilt as an aider
or abetter. To be guilty of aiding and abetting in the commission of the crime the
defendant must willfully associate himself with the unlawful venture and willfully
participate in it as he would something he wishes to bring about.’” 298 Kan. at
258.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court erred in
refusing to give the additional language because the jury was left
without direction regarding his defense (similar to Potts’ defense)
that he was merely present at the crime scene and did not assist
an acquaintance with firing a gun at an occupied vehicle that re-
sulted in a death. This court acknowledged that though the “mere
association or presence” language was a correct statement of law,
several of its prior decisions had concluded that the language of
PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 “‘clearly informs the jury that intentional acts
by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and
abetting.’” 298 Kan. at 260. See, ¢.g., State v. Edwards, 291 Kan.
532, 552, 243 P.3d 683 (2010) ([“This court has repeatedly held that
juries are presumed to intuit from the word ‘intentionally in the
patterned instruction that proof of mere association or presence
would be insufficient to convict.”). Consequently, the court con-
cluded that though “[t]he better practice would be to include the
mere association or presence language when a defense is based on
the theory that a defendant was merely present and did not actively
aid and abet a crime,” the district court did not err by failing to do
so. Llamas, 298 Kan. 261-62; see also State v. Littlejohn, 298 Kan.
632, 650-51, 316 P.3d 136 (2014) (reaching same conclusion).

The instruction at issue in this case gave a more extensive de-
scription of criminal liability based on aiding and abetting than the
instruction at issue in Llamas. The first two sentences of the aiding
and abetting instruction given in this case are substantially similar
to the instruction at issue in Llamas—an instruction that the court
determined “‘clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a de-
fendant are necessary to sustain a conviction for aiding and abet-
ting.” 298 Kan. at 260. The requirement that the defendant act

’ DE i

intentionally in order to find him or her criminally responsible for
a crime committed by another is reinforced by the last sentence of
the instruction at issue here: “Mere association with the principals
who actually commit the crime or mere presence in the vicinity of
the crime is insufficient to establish guilt as an aider or abettor.”
The instruction as a whole clearly conveyed to the jury that a
defendant, in order to be found guilty for a crime committed by
another, must have intentionally aided in the commission of the
crime. We conclude that it was not legally necessary for the district
court to add the definition of intentional conduct sua sponte to the
instruction it gave the jury on aiding and abetting liability. Based
on the caselaw cited above, doing so would have been redundant.

CUMULATIVE ERROR

Potts next argues that cumulative error cost him a fair trial. Cu-
mulative error, considered collectively, may be so great as to re-
quire reversal of a defendant’s conviction. The test is whether the
totality of the circumstances substantially prejudiced the defen-
dant and denied him or her a fair trial. No prejudicial error may be
found under the cumulative error doctrine if the evidence against
the defendant is overwhelming. State v. Cosby, 285 Kan. 230, Syl.
{ 9, 169 P.3d 1128 (2007). Moreover, this doctrine does not apply
if no error or only one error supports reversal. See State v. Dixon,
289 Kan. 46, 71, 209 P.3d 675 (2009).

Based on the above analysis, none of the trial issues raised on
appeal constitute error. Therefore, the court should not apply the
cumulative error doctrine here

PROSECUTION AS AN ADULT

Potts also argues that when the district court made factual find-
ings supporting its decision to authorize adult prosecution, it in-
creased his potential punishment in violation of Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).
Potts acknowledges that he failed to raise this issue before the dis-
trict court, but he notes that this court has addressed Apprendi is-
sues for the first time on appeal. See, ¢.g., State v. Gould, 271 Kan.
304, 404-05, 23 P.3d 801 (2001); of. State v. Perez, 292 Kan. 785, 261

705

P.3d 532 (2012) (refusing to address adult-certification Apprendi
argument because defendant failed to comply with Supreme Court
Rule 6.02 [2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 41] by not explaining why issue
should be considered for the first time on appeal). Whether the
district court violated Apprendi by making factual findings autho-
rizing Potts to stand trial as an adult raises a question of law subject
to unlimited review. See State v. Tyler, 286 Kan. 1087, 191 P.3d
306 (2008).

Here, the district court, not a jury, found that the State could
prosecute Potts as an adult under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38-2347. Potts
contends that if he had been prosecuted as a juvenile, he would
have faced approximately 8 years in a juvenile correctional facil-
ity, compared to the controlling hard-20 life sentence he received
as the result of being tried as an adult. Because the district court’s
approval of adult prosecution increased the maximum punishment
Potts faced, and the determination was not tried before a jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Potts claims his rights under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution—as interpreted by Apprendi and its progeny—were vio-
lated.

Potts concedes that this court has rejected this argument in sev-
eral cases. See Tyler, 286 Kan. at 1096; State v. Mays, 277 Kan.
359, 367-68, 85 P.3d 1208 (2004); State v. Kunellis, 276 Kan. 461,
465, 78 P.3d 776 (2003); State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, 47 P.3d 783,
cert. denied 537 U.S. 980 (2002). In Jones, we held that while Ap-
prendi applies to the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding
after guilt has been determined, the case does not apply to an ini-
tial adult certification hearing because such a hearing addresses a
“jurisdictional matter” meant to determine which court (juvenile or
adult) will resolve the case. Thus Apprendi’s requirement of a jury
determination is not required for a juvenile to be tried as an adult.
273 Kan. at 774-78.

This court affirmed Jones’ reasoning in Tyler. Tyler argued that
his Apprendi rights were violated when the district court made the
factual findings necessary to allow his prosecution as an adult rath-
er than as a juvenile. The Tyler court rejected this argument, rea-
soning that Apprendi forbids only the imposition of a sentence that

exceeds the statutory maximum permitted by the facts required
by the jury’s finding of guilt. In other words, Apprendi still applies
after the certification procedure sends a juvenile to adult court.
Tyler, 286 Kan. at 1095-96.

Notably, “[t]he vast majority of courts have held that a judge’s
decision whether a juvenile should be prosecuted as an adult is
a pre-adjudicatory question of jurisdiction and therefore does not
implicate the Apprendi case line.” Jenny E. Carroll, Rethinking
the Constitutional Criminal Procedure of Juvenile Transfer Hear-
ings: Apprendi, Adult Punishment, and Adult Process, 61 Hast-
ings L.J. 175, 201 (2009). See, e.g., United States v. Miguel, 338
F.3d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Apprendi does not require that
a jury find the facts that allow the transfer to district court. The
transfer proceeding establishes the district court’s jurisdiction over
a defendant.”); United States v. Juvenile, 228 F.3d 987, 990 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that the transfer of a juvenile to an adult court
“merely establishes a ‘basis for district court jurisdiction’”); State
v. Kalmakoff, 122 P3d 294, 297 n.29 (Alaska App. 2005) (finding
that the weight of authority indicates that transfer proceedings are
mere determinations of the court's jurisdiction and therefore Ap-
prendi protections do not apply); State v. Rodriguez, 205 Ariz. 392,
401, 71 P.3d 919 (Ariz. App. 2003) (holding that the state juvenile-
transfer statute in question is not a sentence-enhancement scheme
because “it does not subject [a] juvenile to enhanced punishment,
it subjects [a] juvenile to the adult criminal justice system”); People
v, Beltran, 327 Ill. App. 3d 685, 690-91, 765 N.E.2d 1071 (2002)
(holding that transfer establishes jurisdiction and therefore is “dis-
positional, not adjudicatory”); Caldwell v. Com., 133 $.W.3d 445,
452-53 (Ky. 2004) (adopting the argument that juvenile transfer is
merely jurisdictional); State v. Lopez, 196 S.W.3d 872, 875-76 (Tex.
App. 2006) (holding that a decision allowing “prosecution of a juve-
nile as an adult” only “involves the determination of which system
will be appropriate for a juvenile offender”).

Potts claims that Tyler was wrongly decided because the court
focused on the jurisdictional nature of authorizing the State to
prosecute a juvenile as an adult rather than the effect adult cer-
tification has on a juvenile, i.¢., subjecting him or her to the pos-

sibility of increased punishment. However, Potts’ argument fails
to acknowledge that the adult certification procedure takes place
before a juvenile has been found guilty of committing any crime. In
Apprendi, the Supreme Court held: “Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. But the
Court cautioned that “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a great-
er punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”
(Emphasis added.) 530 U.S. at 494. Since Apprendi, the Court has
never indicated or hinted that Apprendi would apply to a factual
determination made at a pretrial proceeding. Cf Hurst v. Flori-
da, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621-22, 193 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2016)
(concluding that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the
Sixth Amendment because judicial fact finding exposes defendant
to greater punishment [death] than the punishment authorized by
juxy’s guilty verdict [life sentence]); Alleyne v. United States, 570
U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013) (conclud-
ing that defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated when
a judge made factual finding that increased defendant’s mandatory
minimum sentence resulting from jury’s guilty verdict).

Based on the above, we affirm our holding in Tyler and conclude
that Potts’ Sixth Amendment rights were not violated when the dis-
trict court made factual findings authorizing the State to prosecute
Potts as an adult.

POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION

Finally, Potts argues that the district court erred by noting with-
in the journal entry of judgment that Potts was subjected to life-
time postrelease supervision for all of his convictions. He argues
that this court should order the preparation of a nunc pro tunc or
amended journal entry of judgment to reflect that he is subject to
lifetime parole for the felony-murder conviction and 36 months of
postrelease supervision for the criminal discharge of a firearm and
burglary convictions. The State concedes this issue.

A criminal sentence is effective when pronounced from the

bench at the sentencing hearing; it does not derive its effectiveness
from the journal entry. Therefore, a journal entry that imposes a
sentence that varies from the sentence pronounced from the bench
is erroneous and must be corrected to reflect the actual sentence
imposed. State v. Mason, 294 Kan. 675, 677, 279 P.3d 707 (2012);
see also State v. Mebane, 278 Kan. 131, 136, 91 P.3d 1175 (2004)
(explaining nunc pro tunc orders are appropriate to correct clerical
errors arising from oversight or omission). A journal entry of judg-
ment may be corrected “at any time” by a nunc pro tunc order. See
K.S.A. 22-3504(2); Mason, 294 Kan. at 677.

Under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3717(b)(2), a person convicted
of felony murder is “eligible for parole after serving 20 years of
confinement without deduction of any good time credits.” Under
subsection (d)(1)(A), a person convicted of a nondrug severity
level 3 crime (such as criminal discharge of a firearm resulting in
great bodily harm, see K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-6308[b][1][B]) “must
serve 36 months, plus the amount of good time and program credit
earned and retained . . . on postrelease supervision.” In addition,
subsection (d)(1)(F) of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3717 states:

“In cases where sentences for crimes from more than one severity level have
been imposed, the offender shall serve the longest period of postrelease supervi-
sion as provided by this section available for any crime upon which sentence was
imposed irrespective of the severity level of the crime. Supervision periods will

not aggregate.”

Thus the controlling term of postrelease supervision applicable
to Potts’ criminal discharge of a weapon and burglary convictions
is 36 months. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5807(c)(1)(C) (vehicular
burglary is a nondrug severity level 9 crime).

At sentencing, the district court judge stated that for the felony-
murder conviction, he was sentencing Potts to “a term of life with-
out eligibility for parole until you have served twenty years.”
But shortly after announcing this sentence, the judge stated
that “[plost-release will be life.” With regard to the criminal dis-
charge of a firearm conviction, the district judge indicated that
he was imposing lifetime parole. For the burglary conviction, the
judge did not announce a term of postrelease supervision. The sub-

709

sequently filed journal entry of judgment indicates that the judge
imposed lifetime postrelease supervision for all three convictions.
It appears that the journal entry of judgment reflects, in part, the
sentence that the district court pronounced from the bench at sen-
tencing; thus it cannot be corrected by a nunc pro tunc order. State
v. Vanwey, 262 Kan. 524, Syl. { 2, 941 P.2d 365 (1997) (“A nunc
pro tunc order under K.S.A. 22-3504[2] may only be used to cor
rect actual clerical errors or errors arising from oversight or omis-
sion.”). Instead of issuing a nunc pro tunc order, the appropriate
remedy is to vacate the lifetime postrelease supervision period that
the district court imposed and remand the case for resentencing
with instructions that the district court impose lifetime parole for
the felony-murder conviction and 36 months of postrelease super-
vision for the criminal discharge of a firearm and burglary convic-
tions. See K.S.A. 22-3504(1) (an illegal sentence can be corrected
at any time); State v. LaBelle, 290 Kan. 529, Syl. § 1, 231 P.3d 1065
(2010) (“An illegal sentence is a sentence . . . which does not con-
form to the statutory provision, either in character or the term of
the punishment authorized .. . .”).

CONCLUSION

We affirm Potts’ convictions and the accompanying prison sen-
tences. But we vacate the lifetime postrelease supervision term
that the district court imposed and remand with directions that the
district court impose lifetime parole for the felony-murder con-
viction and 36 months of postrelease supervision for the criminal
discharge of a firearm and burglary convictions.

No. 109,397

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. ERIN KRisTENA DARROW,
Appellant.
(374 P.3d 673)

Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for
appellant.

Steven J. Obermeier, senior deputy district attorney, Betsey L. Lasister, legal
intern, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general,
were on the briefs for appellee.

71

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JouNsoN, J.: Erin Darrow petitions this court for review of thé
Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Darrow, No. 109,397, 2014
WL 1887629 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion), affirming
her driving under the influence (DUI) conviction, third offense.
The district court found Darrow guilty on stipulated facts. Darrow
argues the stipulated facts were insufficient to prove she operated
or attempted to operate a vehicle. We disagree, finding that the
stipulated facts presented to us by the parties, together with the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the State, are sufficient to support the
conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

Darrow was convicted of DUI, third offense, and refusing a pre-
liminary breath test (PBT) after a bench trial on stipulated facts.
But this particular case presents an unusual circumstance with re-
spect to the stipulated facts.

Apparently, the presiding judge made inquiries beyond the writ-
ten stipulation of facts presented at the bench trial, as evidenced by
a stipulation on appeal. But, unfortunately, the record of the bench
trial could not be transcribed because of an electronic recording
malfunction and any discussion of the facts beyond the written stip-
ulation in the record was lost. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
granted defense counsel’s motion to stay briefing in order to pre-
pare and file an agreed statement as to the substance of the bench
trial hearing. The parties then signed and filed a stipulation of facts
for appeal. The written stipulation of facts submitted at the bench
trial and the written stipulation of facts submitted in lieu of the trial
transcript for appellate purposes are overlapping, but not identical.
The propriety of this course of action was not challenged in the
petition for review, and the parties’ briefs cite to both sets of stipu-
lated facts. Therefore, we will consider both factual stipulations.

The parties stipulated that on December 4, 2010, after a night of
drinking, one of Darrow’s friends commenced to drive Darrow and
another person home. En route, Darrow was acting “a little bellig-
erent,” so the driver parked the car at the end of a dead-end street

with the front of the vehicle against a chain-link fence. The driver
and other passenger left, leaving Darrow alone in the vehicle. At
some point after being abandoned by her friends, Darrow moved
to the driver's seat, where she was later discovered asleep with the
car running.

The next morning at 7:47 a.m., Officer S. Parker was dispatche
to Darrow’s location on report of an accident. When Parker ap-
proached the car, it was running, as evidenced by exhaust coming
from the car’s mufflers. Parker spoke with the reporting party, who
explained that when she approached the car, she saw the sole oc-
cupant, later identified as Darrow, “passed out” behind the wheel.
Parker made contact with Darrow, who remained asleep behin
the wheel. Parker was able to wake Darrow and asked her to turn
off the car. Darrow “started to reach down and fumble[] with the
gear shift, but the car stayed in park.”

Darrow opened the door and got out of the car. Parker noted
Darrow smelled of alcohol, her speech was slurred, and her balance
was unsteady. After Darrow failed field sobriety tests and exhibited
other clues of impairment, Parker placed her under arrest. At the
police station, Darrow refused to take a breath test. Based on his
training and experience, Parker determined Darrow was operating
a motor vehicle while she was under the influence of alcohol to a
degree that rendered her incapable of safely driving.

In the stipulation of facts, the parties narrowed the issues before
the district court. The State conceded that Darrow did not drive
to the location where the police officer found her. In turn, Darrow
conceded that if the district court determined she was operating or
attempting to operate her vehicle, she was under the influence of
alcohol to a degree that rendered her incapable of safely operating
the vehicle. The parties also stipulated that Darrow had two prior
DUI convictions. And finally, the parties agreed that the ultimate
issue should be: “Is fumbling with [the] gear shift while [the] vehi-
cle is running, operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle?”

The district court found Darrow guilty of DUI and refusing a
PBT. Darrow timely appealed from the district court’s judgment,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her DUI
conviction. The Court of Appeals held that under the totality of the

713

evidence presented in the stipulated facts, Darrow was guilty of
_ DUI when she fumbled with the car's gear shift. 2014 WL 1887629,
at *4,
DEFINITION OF ATTEMPT TO OPERATE

Before determining whether the State presented sufficient evi-
dence to prove that the defendant violated a criminal statute, one
xoust know the specific acts that are proscribed by the statutorily
defined crime. Here, the Court of Appeals panel identified the rel-
evant part of the applicable statute, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8-1567(a)
(3), to be: “No person shall operate or attempt to operate any ve-
hicle within this state while: . . . under the influence of alcohol
to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving a
vehicle.” 2014 WL 1887629, at *2. The panel then determined that
the proscribed act of attempting to operate a vehicle was satisfied
if the defendant had “actual physical control” of the vehicle. 2014
WL 1887629, at *3. We disagree.

Standard of Review

Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which an ap-
pellate court has unlimited review. State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 571,
357 P.3d 251 (2015).

Analysis

The Court of Appeals correctly recited that in State v. Kendall,
274 Kan. 1003, 1009, 58 P.3d 660 (2002), this court held that the
terms “drive” and “operate” are synonymous. But then the panel
took a wrong turn by importing a portion of the definition of “drive”
from the Uniform Commercial Driver’s License Act (UCDLA).
That unrelated act defines “drive” as “to drive, operate or be in
physical control of a motor vehicle . . ..” K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8-2,128.
Darrow, 2014 WL 1887629, at *2. The panel then proceeded to
decide the case on the basis of “whether Darrow was in ‘actual
physical control’ of the vehicle when she fumbled with the gear
shift.” 2014 WL 1887629, at *3.

Pointedly, however, the panel failed to acknowledge that Kendall
rejected the State’s attempt to use the K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-2,128())

definition of “drive” to define “operate or attempt to operate” in
the DUI statute. After opining that the definitions in the Commer-
cial Driver's License Act apply only to that act, Kendall specifically
and unequivocally stated: “K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-2,128 makes no
difference here.” 274 Kan. at 1009.

Instead, Kendall adhered to the holding in State v. Fish, 228
Kan. 204, 612 P.2d 180 (1980), that said “‘operate’ as used in [the
DUI] statute should be construed to mean ‘drive,’ thus requiring
some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the defendant
drove the automobile while intoxicated in order for the defendant
to be convicted [of DUI].’” Kendall, 274 Kan. at 1009 (quoting
Fish, 228 Kan. at 210).

Kendall went on to say that the legislature’s post-Fish amend-
ment to K.S.A. 8-1567, prohibiting the operation or attempt to
operate under the influence, was designed to encompass “those
who merely tried but failed” to drive the vehicle. 274 Kan. at 1009.
Therefore, “[m]ovement of the vehicle is not required in order
to convict a defendant of DUI under the theory that defendant
attempted to operate the vehicle.” 274 Kan. at 1009-10. We re-
inforced that notion in State v. Ahrens, 296 Kan. 151, 160, 290
P.3d 629 (2012): “[R]ather than requiring the State to prove that a
defendant actually drove a vehicle while under the influence, the
legislature employed the phrase ‘operate or attempt to operate’
in order to encompass a broader set of factual circumstances that
could establish the driving element.”

Importantly, however, Kendall declared that “nothing in Fish or
other pertinent Kansas law says that the definition of ‘driving’ does
not require movement of the vehicle.” 274 Kan. at 1010. In other
words, to “operate” means to “drive”; “driving” requires movement
of the vehicle; therefore, “operating” requires movement of the ve-
hicle, and an “attempt to operate” means to attempt to move the
vehicle. Taking actual physical control of the vehicle is insufficient
to attempt to operate that vehicle without an attempt to make it
move. Accordingly, that part of the panel's decision holding that
taking actual physical control of a vehicle satisfies the operate or
attempt to operate element of DUI is overruled.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The evidentiary question, then, is whether the State presented
sufficient evidence through the stipulations of facts to prove that
Darrow attempted to move the vehicle.

Standard of Review

The State argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied
a de novo standard of review to Darrow’s sufficiency of the evi-
dence claim. The ordinary standard of review for sufficiency of the
evidence issues is “whether, after reviewing all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is con-
vinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Ward, 292 Kan, 541,
581, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), rev. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). But as
Darrow argues and the Court of Appeals recognized, when a case
is decided on stipulated facts, an appellate court can conduct a de
novo review. Darrow, 2014 WL 1887629, at *1. See State v. Dull,
298 Kan. 832, 840, 317 P.3d 104 (2014) (citing State v. McCam-
mon, 45 Kan. App. 2d 482, 488, 250 P.3d 838, rev. denied 292 Kan.
968 [2011]). Nevertheless, even when an appellate court states it
is exercising de novo review of stipulated facts, the facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the State when testing their
sufficiency. See McCammon, 45 Kan. App. 2d at 489-90 (reviewing
the stipulated facts and holding the “evidence, viewed in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, was legally sufficient”). Cf Siru-
ta v. Siruta, 301 Kan. 757, 761, 348 P.3d 549 (2015) (“We review
the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment.”). :

Evidence that may be considered

In the district court, the parties argued for the narrow factual
consideration of whether simply fumbling with the gear shift while
the vehicle is running, standing alone, would be sufficient evidence
of an attempt to operate the vehicle. On appeal, the State contends
that the court must view Darrows actions in their entirety. The
Court of Appeals implicitly agreed by considering the totality of

the evidence presented in the stipulated facts. Darrow, 2014 WL
1887629, at *4.

We agree that all of the facts and circumstances, including the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, must be con-
sidered. See State v. McBroom, 299 Kan. 731, 754, 325 P.3d 1174
(2014) (quoting State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. { 9, 245 P.3d
1010 [2011]) (conviction can be based entirely on circumstantial

evidence “‘and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom’”). The
parties cannot cherry-pick the facts they want tested for sufficiency,
but rather, an appellate court must review “all the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution.” (Emphasis added.) State
v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014). We cannot
ignore the circumstantial evidence presented in the stipulations
because, if such evidence provides a basis from which the fact-
finder may reasonably infer the existence of the fact in issue, that
evidence can support a guilty verdict. See State v. Brooks, 298 Kan.
672, 689, 317 P3d 54 (2014). We often recite that a conviction of
even the gravest offense can be based entirely on circumstantial
evidence. 298 Kan. at 689. See also State v. Perkins, 296 Kan. 162,
167, 290 P.3d 636 (2012) (“[A] DUI conviction, like any conviction,
can be supported by direct or circumstantial evidence.”). In short,
the stipulated facts must include the stipulated context in which
they occurred.

Consequently, we first take a look at the stipulations. The origi-
nal trial stipulation recites as follows:

“1, On December 5, 2010, at 7:47 AM Overland Park Officer S. Parker was dis-
patched to an accident, at the dead end street of W. 110th and Gillette, Overland
Park, Johnson County, Kansas.

“2, Officer Parker located the Silver convertible, with the front of the vehicle
into a chain link fence, Officer Parker observed the vehicle to be running because
exhaust smoke was coming from the mufflers.

“3, Officer Parker made contact with the repoiting party, Patricia Eikenberry
who originally approached the vehicle and observed the sole occupant, later iden-
tified as Erin K. Darrow (defendant herein) passed out behind the wheel.

“4. Officer Park made contact with the defendant, who was still asleep behind
the wheel. Once Officer Parker was able to arouse the defendant, she started to
reach down and fumbled with the gear shift, but the car stayed in park.

“5. Upon the defendant opening her door, Officer Parker detected an odor of
alcohol coming from defendant, her speech was slurred and balance was unsteady.

“6. Officer Parker had the defendant perform Standardized Field Sobriety
‘Tests (SFSTs) which after performed indicated impairment.

“7, After failing the SFSTs and exhibiting other clues of impairment, the de-
fendant was placed under arrest.

“8. At the station, the defendant was read the Implied Consent Advisory
(DC70) and asked to submit to a breath test. The defendant refused a breath test.

“9, Officer Parker determined based on his training and experience that De-
fendant was operating a motor vehicle while she was under the influence of alco-
hol to a degree that rendered her incapable of driving safely.

“10. The State will concede the defendant did not drive to the location where
[she] and her vehicle were initially found by Patricia Eikenberry.

“11. The Defendant will concede that if determined by this court she was op-
erating or attempting to operate her vehicle as observed by Patricia Eikenberry
or Officer Parker, she was indeed under the influence of alcohol to a degree that
rendered her incapable of safely driving a vehicle.

“Records confirm Defendant has the following prior convictions:

1) A DUI that occurred in Merriam, Kansas on 12/6/01 and resulted in a di-

version on 8/21/03.
2) A DUI that occurred in Overland Park, Kansas on 5/10/01 and resulted in
a conviction on 3/26/03.”

The agreed upon stipulation of facts for appeal recites as follows:
“L. On November 27, 2012, Judge Bornholdt found Ms. Erin Darrow guilty of
DUI based on the stipulation of facts presented by the State and Defense.
“2, The stipulation of facts presented were agreed upon by Defense Attorney
Edward Pitluck and Assistant District Attorney Josh Brunkhorst.
“3. The stipulated facts presented to the Judge described the following events:
a. Ms. Darrow was found asleep in her car by nearby homeowner; the
car was on but in park,
b. The car was parked against a chain link fence; the car was actually
touching the fence.
A police office was called and knocked on Ms. Darrow’s window.
|. The officer asked if she was alright and asked her to turn off the car.
Ms. Darrow, in a daze, fumbled with the gear shift and eventually
was able to open the car and get out.
Earlier that night Ms. Darrow was drinking with some friends.
g- One of these friends was driving Ms. Darrow and another friend
home that night after drinking.
h. Ms. Darrow was acting a little belligerent so the driver parked the
car just as it was found by the police officer and left with the friend,
leaving Ms. Darrow alone in the car.

ae

2

»

i, Ms. Darrow switched to the driver's seat and fell asleep with the car
on.

“4, The Judge had asked for clarification after reading the facts and both the
State and Defense agreed that the only issue was whether that brief moment of
fumbling with the gear shift amounted to a DUL.

“5. The Judge then found that there was evidence to support the charge and
found her guilty.”

Are the facts, circumstances, and inferences sufficient?

The original stipulation includes the circumstances that Darrow
was observed passed out behind the wheel, i.e., in the driver's seat
of the vehicle; that the vehicle engine was running; and that upon
waking Darrow reached down and fumbled with the gear shift
lever, but the transmission remained in park. The appeal stipula-
tion tells us a bit more. Upon awakening Darrow, the police officer
asked Darrow to turn off the car engine. Darrow was in a daze
when she fumbled with the gear shift lever. The parties also stipu-
lated that, after being abandoned by her friends, Darrow switched
to the driver's seat and fell asleep with the engine running. Point-
edly, we do not know whether Darrow started the engine or it was
left running by her “friends” when they jumped ship.

Darrow argues that the stipulated facts do not prove attempted
operation, i.¢., do not prove that she tried to move the car. Rather,
she claims that those facts are consistent with her suggestion that
she was simply sleeping in a running car and moved to the driver's
seat to smoke a cigarette because the passenger side window was
broken. One might also view Darrow’s fumbling with the gear shift
lever upon being awakened as a dazed person’s attempt to comply
with the officer's command to turn off the engine, rather than an
attempt to get the vehicle moving.

But we do not view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the defendant's theory of what might have happened—the State
gets that advantage after a factfinder cotivicts the defendant. From
that vantage point, the State can point to the following facts: the
vehicle’s engine was running, i.e., the vehicle was ready to move
upon the engagement of the transmission; Darrow had previously
moved into the driver's seat, i.e., she had intentionally placed her-

719

self in a position to manipulate the controls necessary to move the
vehicle and may have been the one to start the engine; and, upon
being awakened, Darrow reached down and fumbled with the gear
shift lever, i.¢., she made an overt act toward engaging the trans-
mission, which was arguably the last act needed to legally “drive”
the vehicle.

The State calls our attention to the facts found sufficient in Ken-
dall. There, the police found Kendall’s truck in the middle of a
residential street, with the engine running, lights on, and trans-
mission in neutral. Kendall was slumped over the steering wheel,
wearing his seat belt, with his foot on the brake, but apparently
asleep. When he awoke, he told the officers that he had not been
driving and claimed that someone else had driven the vehicle to
the location where he was discovered. This court found sufficient
evidence to support an attempt to operate.

Other cases have looked at similar scenarios. For instance, in
State v. Sprague, No. 105,827, 2012 WL 3822625 (Kan. App.
2012) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 297 Kan. 1255 (2013),
a police officer found a sleeping Sprague slumped over the steer-
ing wheel in the driver's seat of a truck parked on the side of the
street. The truck’s engine was running, and the radio was playing
loudly. Sprague testified that his cousin had driven him home from
a local bar and he “passed out” in the passenger seat on the way
home. He could not recall how he ended up in the driver's seat with
the engine running. In arguing the State failed to prove operation,
Sprague conceded the facts proved an attempt to operate a vehicle,
and the panel noted: “After all, [the vehicle] was found with him
in the driver's seat and the engine running.” 2012 WL 3822625,
at °7. See also State v. Adame, 45 Kan. App. 2d 1124, 1129, 257
P.3d 1266 (holding sufficient evidence supported attempt to oper-
ate by showing Adame sat on the driver's side of vehicle with key in
ignition trying to start vehicle), rev. denied 293 Kan. 1108 (2011);
State v. Stottlemire, No. 105,284, 2011 WL 4357860, at *3 (Kan.
App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (holding sufficient evidence
supported attempt to operate because the deputy saw Stottlemire
in driver’s seat of parked SUV with key in the ignition and motor
running and Stottlemire admitted she placed the key in the ignition

and started the vehicle); cf. 1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving
Cases § 1.02(1)(c) (2016) (“The fact that the engine is running is
almost always sufficient to constitute operation, even in a case in
which the defendant is found sleeping or passed out while sitting
behind the wheel of the vehicle.”).

Certainly, as the Court of Appeals opined, the facts here present
a close case. But we are not afforded the luxury of deciding this
case on the basis of the inferences we would have found most per-
suasive as a factfinder. As with direct evidence, it is not the func-
tion of this court to reweigh the circumstantial evidence supporting
Darrow’s conviction versus the circumstantial evidence supportin;
a not-guilty verdict. See State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 107, 21 P.3d
516 (2001) (“The probative values of direct and circumstantial
evidence are intrinsically similar, and there is no logically sound
reason for drawing a distinction as to the weight to be assigned
to each.”). Instead, our function is to determine if the direct and
circumstantial evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
State, could have reasonably supported a rational factfinder’s guilty
verdict. Here, we are compelled to sustain the integrity of the fact-
finder’s determination and hold the evidence was legally sufficient
to support the verdict.

Affirmed.
BEIER, J., not participating.

MicHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned[f

No. 110,149

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. RALPH E. Corey, Appellant.
(374 B3d 654)

a

Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and
Lydia Krebs, of the same office, was on the brief for appellant.

Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and James
T. Ward, deputy county attorney, Josh Smith, deputy county attorney, Stephen
A. Hunting, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the
briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Burs, J.: Ralph Corey challenges his convictions for aggravated
kidnapping, attempted rape, criminal threat, and two counts of ag-
gravated sexual battery. He raises two additional sentencing issues.
The convictions stem from a February 2000 sexual assault in Ottawa
that had no suspect until January 2011 when DNA profiles pointed
toward Corey, who by then was incarcerated in an Arizona federal
correctional facility. His first trial ended in a postconviction mistrial
due to jury misconduct. A second trial resulted in his convictions.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Corey, No. 110,149, 2014
WL 6490503 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion).

As this case reaches our court on petition for review, we must
decide: (1) whether reversal is required because jurors learned
during their deliberations that Corey had been tried previously for
the crimes; (2) whether the prosecutor argued facts outside the evi-
dence and misstated the law of attempt, and if so whether revers-
ible error occurred; (3) whether three other undisputed trial court
errors require reversal; and (4) whether cumulative error requires
reversal. We must also decide whether the district court erred by
relying on Corey's criminal history to increase the sentence for his
primary crime of conviction without that criminal history having
been proven to a jury. And, finally, Corey has filed a motion for
summary disposition arguing his aggravated kidnapping sentence
is illegal based on State v. Murdock, 209 Kan. 312, 319, 323 P.3d
846 (2014), overruled by State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 357 P.3d 251
(2015). As explained below, we affirm Corey’s convictions and sen-
tences and deny the motion.

We hold that the jury misconduct was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt based upon our review of the entire record. We further
hold all trial errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt—
both individually and cumulatively. As to the criminal history claim,

we have repeatedly rejected it since State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44,
41 P.3d 781 (2002), and will not revisit that holding in this appeal.
See, ¢.g., State v. Foster, 290 Kan. 696, 699, 233 P.3d 265 (2010).
Finally, we deny Corey’s motion because his illegal sentence argu-
ment was resolved by Keel, which overruled Murdock.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2000, 16-year-old L.H. was abducted as she left
work, An assailant ran up as she was getting into her car, hit her,
and pushed his way inside. He put L.H. in the back seat, pulled a
stocking cap over her head to cover her eyes, threatened to kill her
if she called out, and then drove to a nearby parking lot. The as-
sailant got into the back seat with L.H., lifted her bra, and fondled
her breasts.

As he began to pull down her pants, she resisted. The attacker
removed or partially removed his pants and rubbed his genitals
against her stomach. He asked how old she was, and she told him.
She later testified the assailant “responded like he was shocked”
and stopped. He told her he would take her back, to be quiet, and
that he would not hurt her if she did as she was told. He then fon-
dled her breasts and masturbated before driving to another loca-
tion. There, he fondled her breasts again, but stopped and said he
knew who she was, where she worked, and that he would come
back and hurt her if she told anyone what happened. When he left,
L.H. notified the police, describing her assailant as a male of me-
dium build with dark hair and a mustache.

Investigators found the stocking cap and a pair of gloves in the
back of L.H.’s car. Partial DNA profiles were obtained from the cap
and one glove, and a full profile was taken from the other glove.
Each profile was consistent with the same individual, but not the
victim. A partial male DNA profile was also developed from a swab
of L.H.’s stomach. Latent fingerprints inside the car did not match
either L.H. or Corey.

The full profile from the glove was entered into the FBI's Com-
bined DNA Index System, but it was not until 2011 when authori-
ties matched it to Corey, who was by then in federal custody. He

denied involvement with the crime and said he had never been to
Kansas.

The State charged Corey with aggravated kidnapping, attempt-
ed rape, criminal threat, and two counts of aggravated sexual bat-
tery. He was tried and convicted, but the district court granted an
unopposed motion for new trial after it was learned a juror had
used a cell phone during deliberations to access information about
the case and shared it with the jury.

Our focus is on the second trial, where the attention was on the
attacker’s identity. L.H. described him as a white male with dark
hair and a mustache, who was approximately 58” tall with a me-
dium build. She said his voice was strong and gruff, and had a flat,
Midwestern accent. She testified he wore dark blue jeans, a dark
top, and a long-sleeved jacket. She admitted only glimpsing the as-
sailant’s face and could not identify him from photo lineups or in
the courtroom.

Tammy Smith, who was waiting for L.H. in the parking lot where
the abduction occurred, testified she had parked her car so that she
could see her friend walk out. She noticed a white male wearing a
heavy black coat and black stocking cap move quickly behind her
car. He was about 6’ tall or a little shorter, had a mustache, and dark
eyebrows. She said he got close enough to her driver's door that she
could have touched him if the window had been open. The man
left abruptly after she put her car in gear. She did not see L.H. walk
out, but later observed a car similar to L.H.’s leaving the parking
lot, driven by someone who appeared to be the same man who ap-
proached her car. Smith identified that man as Corey.

Shortly after the attack, L.H. and Smith independently cooper-
ated with a sketch artist who produced composite drawings of the
man based on their descriptions. They agreed at trial those sketch-
es accurately reflected their recollections. The drawings were ad-
mitted into evidence, as were photographs of Corey taken in 2002
and 2011.

The State also presented evidence about Corey's employment
at the time of the attack as an over-the-road truck driver for com-
panies based in Iowa and Arizona. Records showed Corey bought
fuel in Waterloo, Iowa, the day before the attack and in Hewitt,

Texas, the day after. The State showed these cities were close to
Interstate 35, which passes through Ottawa.

At trial, the State’s experts testified Corey could not be excluded
as a contributor to the DNA profiles from the swab of L.H.’s stom-
ach, the stocking cap, and the gloves. The estimated probability of
randomly selecting an unrelated male from the general population
with the partial DNA profile from the stomach swab was approxi-
mately 1 in 9. But the partial profile from the left glove had an esti-
mated frequency in Caucasians unrelated to Corey of 1 in 7 billion,
while the partial profile from the cap had an estimated frequency
of 1 in 12 trillion, and the full profile from the right glove had an
estimated frequency of 1 in 62 trillion.

The expert who testified about the hat and gloves admitted that
the presence of Corey’s DNA on the clothes left by the attacker did
not prove Corey was the person who used the items the night of
the attack. Corey testified in his own defense, denying any involve-
ment.

Corey admitted it was possible he travelled Interstate 35 be-
tween Waterloo and Hewitt as a trucker, but would consider it a
normal route travelling north, rather than south. He said most of
his runs from Waterloo headed east, typically driving to St. Louis,
then Oklahoma City and Dallas. He agreed his equipment includ-
ed gloves, boots, and stocking caps and that the gloves in evidence
were commonly used in the trucking industry. He said the hat and
gloves were consistent with what he would have used around the
time of the attack, but did not specifically remember owning them.
He explained that hats and gloves are frequently left at places such
as rest areas and truck stops and commonly transferred from one
driver to another. He estimated he had gone through 50 to 75 pairs
of gloves in 20 years.

The defense attacked the State’s evidence on various fronts. Co-
rey argued he was not the attacker because he had a strong east-
coast accent, rather than a Midwestern one, as L.H. had described.
He also noted he had tattoos on his forearms at the time of the as-
sault and L.H. did not notice any tattoos on her attacker. And while
she testified the attacker was wearing a coat, she also admitted on
cross-examination that she had previously said the assailant wore a

727

we

ort-sleeved t-shirt and his arms could be seen. On redirect, she
said she had never stated that she had seen the attacker's bare arms.
Corey also challenged Smith’s in-court identification by pointing
out that Smith had initially told police the man in the parking lot
only got within about 12 feet of her, which was contrary to her tes-
timony. Corey’s counsel suggested Smith had told another officer
that the closest the man got was 30 feet away.

As to the DNA evidence, the defense presented Dean Stetler,
a University of Kansas molecular biosciences professor, who testi-
fied about shortcomings in the State’s DNA analysis. He explained
that the results linking Corey to the hat and gloves were unreliable
ecause of sloppy lab work, as evidenced by the State’s inability to
locument exactly what was done during the sampling and inac-
curate dates shown in the evidence submitted to him. Along this
ine, Corey elicited admissions from the KBI employee who did
initial DNA testing on the hat and gloves that her work habits had
een questioned by her supervisor, who had characterized her ad-
ministrative documentation as inadequate and sloppy. At trial, that
employee admitted her supervisor had alleged she falsified dates
during her employment and proposed to demote her before she
resigned.
Stetler further testified there was a possibility the DNA profile
rom the stomach swab was inaccurate because of cross-contami-
nation with a positive control profile used in the analysis. He said
the partial profile from the swab was consistent with the positive
control and that it might have come from that, rather than the
swab. Stetler noted the positive control matched the profile from
the swab better than Corey's DNA because the partial profile did
not exhibit one of two alleles found in Corey’s DNA.

Finally, Stetler observed that the DNA evidence did not prove
Corey was present at the attack and it was possible Corey had only
been in earlier contact with the items. He said it was also possible
the attacker did not leave any DNA on the mouth area of the stock-
ing cap—the area from which that particular profile was devel-
oped—if he wore the cap as a beanie. He said if kept dry, a person’s
DNA can remain forever.

The jury convicted Corey. He was sentenced to imprisonment

— eae

for 272 months for the aggravated kidnapping, 59 months for at-
tempted rape, 32 months for each aggravated sexual battery convic-
tion, and 6 months for criminal threat, with all sentences running
consecutively, for a controlling sentence of 401 months of impris-
onment. He timely appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
State v. Corey, No. 110,149, 2014 WL 6490503 (Kan. App. 2014)
(unpublished opinion).

Corey timely petitioned for review, which we granted. Jurisdic-
tion is proper. K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (review of court of appeals deci-
sion); K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (procedure for obtaining review).

Juror Misconpucr

Corey claims the district court erred when it denied his motion
for mistrial made when it was discovered the jury discussed his

first trial. The Court of Ay
failure in the proceedings
gated any harm. Corey, N
Corey argues the panel ay

peals agreed there was a fundamental
but held that curative instructions miti-
o. 110,149, 2014 WL 6490503, at *8-9.
pplied the wrong test and should have

reversed his convictions. To correctly resolve the arguments, we

must understand what hay
for appellate review.

Additional Facts

During deliberations, t]
that this was a retrial. The

ppened, as well as the proper standard

he court bailiff heard a juror comment
ailiff alerted the trial judge, who asked

the jurors to stop deliberating until he could talk to the parties.

While in chambers, the bail
had reported that another

the bailiff should know. Thi

liberations. The bailiff said

liff told the judge and parties that a juror
juror said this was a retrial and thought
juror also asked how that affected de-
most of the jurors were present when

the retrial comment was discussed. The judge and parties agreed

to break for the weekend
reconvened.
When the trial resumed

alternative, an instruction t

and decide what to do when the trial

, Corey requested a mistrial or, in the
‘o explain that: each jury is sovereign,

both parties submitted evi

lence not submitted to the last jury, and

that the jury is not permitted to consider any prior proceeding to

729

determine whether the State met its burden of proof. The State op-
posed a mistrial, arguing knowledge of a prior proceeding was in-
sufficient to strike a prospective juror for cause during voir dire, so
‘the question at this stage should be whether the jury could set aside
knowledge of a retrial and base its decision on the evidence. The
State agreed a curative instruction could be given. In response, Co-
rey acknowledged it was unclear whether the jury knew the previ-
ous trial resulted in a conviction, but he also recognized the extent
of the jurys knowledge could not be discovered without further
“poisoning the well.” He said his requested curative instruction as-
sumed the worst.

The district court agreed that not knowing if the jury was aware
of the prior conviction was problematic, but it was also hesitant to
delve further into that with the jurors. The court forecast that as
soon as there were questions about what the jury heard and how
that information may be affecting their thinking, the first thing the
jury would talk about when deliberations resumed would be the
retrial.

Ultimately, the court denied the mistrial, finding there was an in-

sufficient showing of actual or substantial prejudice. But it agreed
to give a curative instruction and assembled the jury. The court ex-
plained it was giving two additional instructions based on concerns
that arose before the weekend break. First, it instructed that it was
the court’s duty to explain the law pertinent to the case and that the
jury's duty was to consider and follow those instructions and decide
the case by applying them to the facts as found by the jury. Second,
and based on a modification of PIK Crim.3d 51.04, the court told
the jury:
“Tn your fact findings you should consider and weigh everything admitted into
evidence. This includes testimony of witnesses, admissions or stipulations of the
parties, and any admitted exhibits. You must disregard any testimony or exhibit
which I did not admit into evidence. The jury is not to consider any prior proceed-
ings for purposes of determining whether the State has met its burden of proof in
this case.” (Emphasis added.)

On appeal, Corey argued the district court erred in giving the
additional instructions rather than declaring a mistrial. In reject-
ing this, the panel acknowledged the district court’s analytical path
was flawed but determined reversal was not warranted because

‘we agree with the district court that the curative instruction miti-
gated any harm caused by the jury misconduct.” Corey, 2014 WL
6490503, at *8-9. On review to this court, Corey notes the panel
applied an incomplete analysis.

‘We agree the panel incorrectly considered the issues presented
but hold nonetheless that the jury misconduct was harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt based on our review of the entire record.
We start with the applicable test in its full form.

Standard of Review

A trial court may declare a mistrial if prejudicial conduct, inside
or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed without
injustice to either the defendant or the prosecution. See K.S.A. 22-
3423(1)(c). This sets out a two-step process for the trial court’s con-
sideration. First, it must determine if the proceeding suffered some
fundamental failure. If so, the second step is to assess whether the
trial can continue without an injustice, i.¢., whether the prejudi-
cial conduct’s damaging effect can be removed or mitigated by an
admonition, jury instruction, or other action. If not, the trial court
must determine whether the degree of prejudice results in an in-
justice. If so, the court declares a mistrial. State v. Harris, 297 Kan.
1076, 1086-87, 306 P.3d 282 (2013); see State v. Ward, 292 Kan.
541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).

An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a motion
for mistrial for abuse of discretion. Harris, 297 Kan. at 1087. The
appellate court’s inquiry is separated into two parts: (1) Did the
district court abuse its discretion when deciding if there was a fun-
damental failure in the proceeding? and (2) Did the district court
abuse its discretion when deciding whether the conduct caused
prejudice that could not be cured or mitigated through jury ad-
monition or instruction or other means, resulting in an injustice?
Ward, 292 Kan. at 551. Judicial discretion is abused when judicial
action is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.., if no reason-
able person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court;
(2) based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an
erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) based on an error of fact, i.e., if
substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding

731

on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discre-
tion is based. 202 Kan. at 550.

The fundamental failure analysis varies with the nature of the
alleged deficiency, i.¢., whether it is based on a witness’ actions, a
bystander's actions, prosecutorial error, or an evidentiary error. 292
Kan. at 551.

When determining if a fundamental failure made it impossible
to proceed without injustice, a court must assess whether the fail-
ure affects a party's substantial rights—in other words, whether it
will or did affect the trial’s outcome. 292 Kan. at 565, 569. “The
degree of certainty by which the court must be persuaded that the
error did not affect the outcome of the trial will vary depending
on whether the error implicates a right guaranteed by the United
States Constitution.” 292 Kan. at 565. If it does not, the court will
use the statutory harmless error standard of K.S.A. 60-261 and
KS.A. 60-2105. If it does, the court will use the constitutional
harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87
S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967). 292
Kan. at 569; see State v. Santos-Vega, 299 Kan. 11, 23-24, 321 P.3d
1 (2014).

“An appellate court reviewing the second step for an injustice
will review the entire record and use the same analysis ... .” Ward,
292 Kan. at 570. Put differently, the appellate court's review is a
harmlessness inquiry, even though abuse of discretion has been ar-
ticulated as the nominal standard of review. See Santos-Vega, 299
Kan. at 26-27 (reviewing denial of mistrial motion, assessing district
court’s decision on injustice prong by analyzing whether error was
harmless to degree of certainty applicable to constitutional errors).

The level of certainty in the trial’s outcome required under
the nonconstitutional and constitutional harmless error tests are
distinct. See State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1110, 299 P.3d 292
(2013). For nonconstitutional error, the [trial] court applies K.S.A.
60-261 and determines “‘if there is a reasonable probability the er-
ror did or will affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire
record.’” 296 Kan. at 1110 (quoting Ward, 292 Kan. 542, Syl. 6).
But for constitutional error, the court applies the test articulated
in Chapman, under which an error may be declared harmless only

when it is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt the error will
not or did not affect the trial’s outcome in light of the entire record,
i.e., when there is no reasonable possibility the error contributed to
the verdict. 296 Kan. at 1109-10. Under either test, the party ben-
efitting from the error bears the burden of demonstrating harm-
lessness. 296 Kan. at 1110; State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 983,
270 P.3d 1142 (2012) (nonconstitutional error); Ward, 292 Kan. at
568-69 (constitutional error).

Discussion

In Corey’s case, the district court did not make an explicit find-
ing that the juror’s comment about a retrial constituted a funda-
mental failure, but the Court of Appeals did. The panel noted juror
misconduct ordinarily occurs when a jury considers matter outside
the evidence and the issues in the case and that the information
about a retrial in Corey’s case was a matter completely outside the
evidence. Corey, 2014 WL 6490503, at *8, citing State v. Leaper,
291 Kan. 89, 238 P.3d 266 (2010). See Saucedo v. Winger, 252 Kan.
718, 724, 850 P.2d 908 (1993); State v. Fenton, 228 Kan. 658, 664,
620 P.2d 813 (1980). Implicit in the panel's decision is a determi-
nation that the district court abused its discretion by not explicitly
finding a fundamental failure in the proceedings.

The State has not disputed the panel’s conclusions up to this
point in the analysis, and we agree there was a fundamental failure
in the proceedings based on the undisputed facts and the caselaw
noted. The problem lies with what follows because the panel did
not consider what harmless error standard was applicable given
the nature of the fundamental failure. Instead, it simply stated:
“[W]e agree with the district court that the curative instruction
mitigated any harm caused by the jury misconduct.” Corey, 2014
WL 6490503, at *9.

Jury misconduct under these circumstances must be viewed
under the Chapman constitutional harmless error standard. “In
the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessar-
ily implies at the very least that the ‘evidence developed’ against
a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public court-
room where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right

CC

of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.” Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73, 85 S. Ct. 546, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424
(1965) (reversing conviction when sheriff's deputies in charge of
jury while it was sequestered also testified against defendant at
the trial, in part because nothing in record showed what deputies
discussed with the jurors after their testimony). “Jury exposure to
facts not admitted during trial violates the sixth amendment right
to trial by jury by permitting evidence to reach the jury which has
not been subjected to confrontation or cross-examination and to
which counsel has not had the opportunity to object or request
a curative instruction.” Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 983 (5th
Cir. 1986); see Gamache v. California, 562 U.S. 1083, 1084, 131 S.
Ct. 591, 178 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2010) (denying certiorari) (suggesting
Chapman applied when deliberating jury given access to videotape
not admitted at trial); United States v. Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 937 (9th
Cir. 2001) (applying harmless error standard to jury's discussion of
extrinsic evidence during deliberations when defendant framed is-
sue as violation of his Confrontation Clause rights).

Corey argues there was a reasonable possibility the jury miscon-
duct affected its verdict, noting that a jury’s awareness of a defen-
dant’s prior conviction for the same crime has been determined to
be highly prejudicial. He relies on two Nevada cases: Winiarz v.
State, 107 Nev. 812, 820 P.2d 1317 (1991), and Hut v. State, 103
Nev. 321, 738 P.2d 892 (1987). But in both, the juries learned the
previous proceedings resulted in convictions, while the record in
Corey's case does not disclose if the jury learned of the conviction
in the first trial.

The Winiarz court plainly draws this distinction and cites an
Arizona case, State v. Hansen, 156 Ariz. 291, 295-96, 751 P.2d 951
(1988), in which a juror remarked during deliberations that the
trial was the defendant's second with the first ending in a mistrial,
although the juror did not know the previous verdict. The Arizona
Supreme Court agreed a new trial was unwarranted because the
discussion about the prior trial was short and the jury did not know
the previous verdict. The court held: “Such a brief and inconse-
quential conversation was hardly prejudicial to [the defendant].”
156 Ariz. at 295. See also Williams v. State, 494 A.2d 1237, 1242

(Del. 1985) (prosecutor inadvertently referenced defendant's prior
trials, but this was not prejudicial because knowledge of that fact
does not lead to conclusion that they ended in convictions).

At trial, Corey endorsed the district court’s decision not to probe
further into the jury’s knowledge about the previous trial and there
is no evidence Corey attempted to ascertain that information after
the second trial. Just as importantly, Corey alternatively recom-
mended giving curative instructions, which Corey’s counsel said
assumed the worst possibility, i.., actual jury knowledge about the
prior trial’s outcome. The trial court gave those instructions, and
appellate courts presume juries follow the instructions given. State
v. Kettler, 299 Kan. 448, 478, 325 P.3d 1075 (2014).

Finally, the evidence was overwhelming. The only issue was
whether Corey was the person who committed the crimes. In that
regard, the State presented: (1) strong DNA evidence linking Co-
rey to the stocking cap and gloves found in the back of the victim’s
vehicle; (2) weaker DNA evidence associating Corey to the DNA
sample taken from the victim’s stomach; (3) eyewitness testimony
identifying Corey at the scene; (4) additional eyewitness testimony
consistent with Corey being the attacker; and (5) Corey’s fuel re-
cords demonstrating his opportunity to commit the crimes.

We hold based on our review of the entire record that the jury
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,
neither the district court’s failure to determine whether the mis-
conduct was a fundamental failure in the proceeding, nor the pan-
el’s failure to apply the appropriate legal standard when analyzing
the injustice prong entitles Corey to a new trial. See State v. Wy-
coff, 303 Kan. 885, 886, 367 P.3d 1258 (2016) (appellate court can
affirm district court if it was right for the wrong reason).

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Corey next argues reversible prosecutorial misconduct occurred
during closing arguments when the prosecutor said: (1) Corey's
DNA was found on the victim’s body; and (2) the reason the assail-
ant stopped the attack did not matter in deciding the attempted
rape charge. The panel held that the prosecutor did not misstate
the evidence or the law. Corey, 2014 WL 6490503, at *25.

| eC

Standard of Review

Appellate review of a prosecutorial error claim based on im-
proper comments requires a two-step analysis. First, an appellate
court decides wliether the comments at issue were outside the wide
latitude a prosecutor is allowed, ¢.g., when discussing evidence.
so, there was error. Second, if error is found, an appellate court
determines whether the improper comments prejudiced the jury
against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v.
Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, 1012, 306 P.3d 244 (2013).

Appellate courts consider three factors in analyzing the secon
step: (1) whether the error was gross and flagrant; (2) whether the
error showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the
evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the
misconduct would likely have had little weight in the jurors’ minds.
But none of these factors individually controls; and before the third
factor can override the first two, an appellate court must be able to
say the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-261 an
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, have been met. McCullough, 293 Kan.
at 990-91.

When both constitutional and nonconstitutional errors clearly
arise from the same acts and omissions, an appellate court begins
with a harmlessness analysis of the constitutional error. If the con-
stitutional error is reversible, an appellate court need not analyze
whether the lower standard for harmlessness under K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 60-26] also has been met. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, Syl. 16.
Under both standards, the party benefiting from the error bears
the burden to demonstrate harmlessness. Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1110.

References to DNA on the Victim’s Body

The prosecutor referred to the DNA found on L.H.’s body in
several statements during the main and rebuttal portion of closing
arguments: (1) “From the belly swabs comes the DNA of this de-
fendant. The defendant, he cannot be excluded.” (2) “Now remem-
ber when the belly swab was compared to the defendant it was 1
in 9 individuals.” (3) “His DNA shows up on her belly. His DNA
shows up on the gloves. His DNA shows up on the hat. And in ad-
dition, one of the eyewitnesses from that night pointed to him and

said that’s the guy.” (4) “Ladies and Gentlemen, this case you've
got more than circumstantial evidence. You've got actual scientific
evidence that places his DNA on items left at the scene and his
DNA on her body.”

The panel held it was a reasonable inference to draw from the
evidence that the DNA recovered from the victim’s stomach was
Corey’s. The panel found persuasive State v. Young, No. 106,451,
2013 WL 1339873 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion), which
held it was fair comment to argue that DNA belonged to defen-
dant when evidence showed probable frequency of profile among
individuals of defendant’s race of 1 in 9,280 and because the victim
identified the defendant as the perpetrator, the defendant was driv-
ing the same car as the perpetrator, and the defendant lived out-
of-state but was near the crime scene on the day it was committed.
Corey, 2014 WL 6490503, at °23-24.

The problem is that the statistical match between Corey's DNA
and the DNA recovered from L.H.’s stomach was not as conclusive
as the prosecutor represented, most particularly in the statement:
“You've got actual scientific evidence that places his DNA on items
left at the scene and his DNA on her body.” The partial DNA pro-
file from the stomach swab was consistent with Corey DNA pro-
file, but the estimated probability of randomly selecting an unre-
lated male from the general population with the same partial DNA
profile was 1 in 9. We cannot conclude from this that the “actual
scientific evidence” placed Corey’s DNA on the victim’s body. Such
comment was error.

But this error was not gross and flagrant or the product of ill
will. The circumstances do not suggest the prosecutor deliberately
set out to misstate the evidence. See Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1016.
Though the rule against stating facts outside the evidence is long-
standing, there was a significant amount of evidence from which to
infer the DNA belonged to Corey. Cf. 297 Kan. at 1014 (gross and
flagrant misconduct when prosecutor said defendant's friend did
not help defendant install a water heater, when the friend actually
testified he did).

Moreover, while the prosecutor said more than once that the
stomach swab contained Corey’s DNA, the prosecutor also remind-

737

ed the jury the DNA profile could be found in 1 in 9 individuals.
Additionally, it does not appear the jury was unduly swayed by this
because it asked a question during deliberations about the DNA
analysis from the belly swab and the appropriate witness testimony
was read back. Finally, the remaining evidence against Corey was
overwhelming, i.e., his DNA found on clothing left behind by the
attacker, the eyewitness descriptions, and his opportunity to com-
mit the crimes as demonstrated by his fuel logs.

The Law of Attempted Rape

Corey next argues the prosecutor misstated the law of attempt
by arguing the jury could not acquit based on the assailant’s volun-
tary abandonment of the attempted rape. The panel rejected this
claim, citing State v. Morfitt, 25 Kan. App. 2d 8, 956 P.2d 719 (de-
nying voluntary abandonment as a defense to the charge of attempt
to commit a crime when defendant committed an overt act toward
the perpetration of the crime), rev. denied 265 Kan. 888 (1998).

The prosecutor told the jury:

“Ladies and Gentlemen, for the purposes of the attempted rape charge, it
doesn’t matter why he stopped. From a legal standpoint, the fact is when he tried
to unbutton her pants and actually did undo her pants and tried to pull them down
and was clearly trying to have sex with her, he has done more than just mere prep-
aration in attempting to rape somebody. He is in the act of trying to rape them and
from a legal standpoint it does not matter as to why he stopped.

“For whatever reason, when she told him her age he stopped. It doesn’t matter
why. It’s enough that he did all the things that he did and clearly his intent was
obvious based upon all the kissing and fondling, when it was done to the victim,

Under the attempt statute in effect at the time of the crimes:
“An attempt is any overt act toward the perpetration of a crime
done by a person who intends to commit such crime but fails in the
perpetration thereof or is prevented or intercepted in executing
such crime.” K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-3301(a). Relying on dictionary
definitions of the terms “fail,” “prevent,” and “intercept,” Corey ar-
gues the statute can be reasonably interpreted to require a defen-
dant'’s failure to complete the intended crime must be due to some
reason other than voluntary abandonment. Therefore, he argues,
the rule of lenity requires the court to construe the statute in his
favor.

But controlling precedent forecloses Corey's argument. In State
v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1007, 236 P.3d 481 (2010), the court
held the attempt statute offered alternatives to the prosecution in
establishing attempted rape, explaining that the State could pro-
luce evidence the defendant was “prevented or intercepted” in ex-
ecuting the crime, or demonstrate there was a failure to perpetrate
the crime. The court held the victim’s testimony that Martinez
stopped touching her genitals was “sufficient to justify the jury’s
verdict” and that the State was not required to prove “someone or
something prevented” the defendant from completing the crime.
290 Kan. at 1007. And it noted it had previously described “proof
of this element in the context of attempted rape as simply showing
the defendant ‘failed to penetrate the [victim's] sexual organ .
290 Kan. at 1007.
Martinez demonstrates that the reason the intended crime did
not occur is irrelevant because the fact that the completed crime
did not occur is sufficient in itself. Therefore, Corey's argument
that the crime must fail to occur for some reason other than the
defendant’s voluntary abandonment is without merit. As a result,
his claim that the prosecutor misstated the law fails.

THREE ADDITIONAL TRIAL ERRORS

Next, Corey challenges the panel’s determination that three ad-
ditional trial errors were harmless. They are: (1) The district court
judge’s ex parte communication with the jury; (2) the record's fail-
ure to reflect that Corey was present during critical stages of the
trial, specifically a discussion about a jury question and a testimony
readback; and (3) instructions given concerning the costs of a mis-
trial due to juror misconduct. We consider these individually and
hold each is harmless. We will address the cumulative issue sepa-
rately.

Judge’s Ex Parte Communication

During the discussion between the court and the parties about
the jury's discovery of the first trial, the judge disclosed on the re-
cord and with Corey and counsel present:

739

“So I went back there and uh, when I went back there they were talking again,
and I just asked them to stop until I had a chance to talk with counsel. I told them
to take a break, not to deliberate any further, just relax for a little bit until I had a
chance to talk with you all which they were happy with.

“And ub, I did ask who the foreman was and uh, it appeared that the lady that
the rest of them had selected wasn't happy being foreman, Primarily she thought
she was going to have to read the verdicts out loud in court. I do not have them
do that. I do that. So she was okay with going ahead and being the foreman at that
point, but it’s [B.R.], who is the actual jury foreman. She’s the lady on the back
row, second one in. Anyway, that’s what’s going on. So I don’t know if counsel have
any comments or any thoughts on how to proceed?

“I did not ask any more questions about this comment about a retrial or any-
thing of that nature.”

Corey’s counsel then asked for time to speak with Corey, and the

judge replied, “If you want to talk about that, five or ten minutes.
Yl tell the jury we're talking about it and relax for another ten min-
utes.” It does not appear Corey objected to the judge returning to
the jury room. After the recess, the judge advised the parties:
“J told the jurors that counsel were in here and discussing the matter. I didn’t tell
them what I told you all. The juror foreman told that they wanted to know how
long they could deliberate. One of them did. It wasn’t the juror foreman but the
jury foreman butted in and said what she means is can we come back a different
day. We're completely exhausted. We want to come back another day if we're too
tired to continue today.

“T told them jury deliberations can continue as long as you all want. I don’t have
a rule cutting you off at a certain time. That if that ends up being the case so be
it, but I told them I was still talking to counsel and would be back in a minute and
that’s when I came back in here.”

The panel held the district court violated Corey's right to be
present at all critical stages of his trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by
entering the jury room and talking with jurors outside his presence.
Corey, 2014 WL 6490503, at *15. The State does not dispute this
determination, and “‘[i]t is well settled that a conference between a
trial judge and a juror is a critical stage of the trial at which a crimi-
nal defendant has a constitutional right to be present.’” State v.
Killings, 301 Kan, 214, 241, 340 P.3d 1186 (2015) (quoting State v.
Mann, 274 Kan. 670, 682, 56 P.3d 212 [2002]); State v. McGinnes,
266 Kan. 121, 127, 967 P.2d 763 (1998).

When a defendant's right to be present is violated, an appel-
late court determines whether the error requires reversal by apply-
ing the constitutional harmless error standard. State v. Verser, 299
Kan. 776, 789, 326 P.3d 1046 (2014). In doing so, the court utilizes
four factors:

(1) the overall strength of the prosecution's case; (2) whether an objection was
lodged; (3) whether the ex parte communication concerned a critical aspect of
the trial or rather involved an innocuous and insignificant matter, and the manner
in which it was conveyed to the jury; and (4) the ability of a posttrial remedy to
mitigate the constitutional error.” 299 Kan. at 789-90 (quoting Herbel, 296 Kan.
at 1111).

The panel held the ex parte communications were harmless be-
cause (1) the State’s case was strong, particularly in light of the
DNA evidence; (2) Corey did not object to them; (3) the conver-
sations were not about a critical aspect of the trial; and (4) Corey
did not pursue any posttrial remedies to mitigate the error. Corey,
2014 WL 6490503, at °15-17.

The only challenge Corey mounts to the panel's analysis is that
the evidence was not overwhelming. Specifically, he relies on his
expert testimony calling the DNA evidence into question, varia-
tions in the eyewitness accounts over the years, and the testimony
about Corey's tattoos and accent contradicting the victim’s testi-
mony.

Our review of the four Verser factors leads us to agree with the
panel's conclusion that this error was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. As discussed, the prosecution’s case against Corey was
strong and Corey overstates the strength of his challenges to the
State’s case. The defense DNA expert did not attack the State’s
experts’ conclusions about the evidence from the hat and gloves
because they were arrived at through flawed methodology, Instead,
he testified the conclusions were unreliable because of alleged
shoddy recordkeeping. And as to the stomach swabs, the defense
expert merely suggested cross-contamination was a possibility for
the results. The testimony about the tattoos is of little import given
the victim’s equivocation on whether she even saw the attacker's
arms. In addition, the contemporaneous police sketches and fuel
records point to Corey as the guilty party as well.

TAL

Second, Corey did not object to the ex parte communications
when the district court alerted the parties they had occurred.
Third, the judge’s communications did not concern a substantive
aspect of the trial. He simply told the jury to stop deliberating and
informed the foreperson that he, not the foreperson, would read
the verdict in the courtroom. “Reversal is unwarranted when the
information communicated outside the defendant's presence is so
vanilla.” 299 Kan. at 790. Fourth, Corey did not raise the error in
his motion for new trial.

Based on the entire record, we conclude the ex parte communi-
cation by the judge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Corey’s Absence from the Jury Question Discussion and Readback

This issue arises because after deliberations resumed following
the weekend break, the jury submitted a question, asking: “On the
3 belly swabs, does the Y[-]STR DNA test prove that the defen-
dant has the same DNA as 1 in 9 male individuals in the world?
[O]r does that mean 1 in 9 within the defendant(’]s lineage” The
parties agreed the most prudent response was to read back the tes-
timony of the witness who discussed the stomach swab DNA com-
parison. The court agreed and arranged the readback.

The record is silent whether Corey was present for this discus-
sion or the actual readback, so Corey argued for the first time on
appeal that the district court violated his right to be present at all
critical stages of his trial. In response, the State conducted an ex
parte hearing with the district court while the case was on appeal to
secure a district court determination that the trial transcript was in-
accurate when it failed to show Corey’s presence during the cham-
ber’s conference and the subsequent readback.

The panel noted the ex parte hearing by the district court while
the case was on appeal was “problematic” because Corey and his
counsel were not present-and the district court was without juris-
diction while the case was‘on appeal. It determined it must decide
the appeal based only on the original trial transcript. Corey, 2014
WL 6490503, at *11. The panel then held it would presume the
defendant’s constitutional right to be present at all critical stages
of the trial was violated based on the original transcripts failure to

confirm Corey’s attendance at the proceedings in question and de-
termined the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2014 WL
6490503, at *12-13. The State did not cross-petition for review, and
we see no reason to question the panel’s determinations. See Rule
8.03(h)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 78) (review includes all issues
properly before Court of Appeals that petition or cross-petition al-
lege were erroneously decided); see also Killings, 301 Kan. at 241
(right to be present at conference between judge and jury); State
v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1107-08, 299 P.3d 292 (2013) (court will
presume defendant not present when record does not affirmatively
reflect presence).

Corey’s only argument is with the conclusion that the error was
harmless, based on the panel’s determination that the evidence
of guilt was overwhelming. Based on the Verser factors, we agree
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The readback
added nothing new to the evidence, the entire testimony was read,
and there is no allegation the readback was inaccurate. In addition,
the evidence was overwhelming, Corey's counsel did not raise any
objection during the chamber’s conference or the readback based
on the lack of Corey's presence, and Corey did not pursue any post-
trial remedies. So while we acknowledge the jury's question and
the readback were both substantive and critical to the State’s case
because it went to the strength of the only DNA evidence directly
placing Corey at the scene at the time of the crimes, we hold the
discussion of the jury question and readback of testimony outside
Corey’s presence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jury INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT CONSEQUENCES OF A MISTRIAL

Corey next argues his convictions must be reversed because the
district court twice told the jury that a mistrial would result in ex-
pense and inconvenience to the court, the parties, and the taxpay-
ers. The first occurred just after the jury was selected. The trial
court gave a preliminary instruction stating in part:

“You must not engage in any activity, or be exposed to any information, that
might unfairly affect the outcome of this case. Any juror who violates these in-
structions I’ve explained to you jeopardizes the fairness of these proceedings, and
a mistrial could result that would require the entire trial process to start over. As

you can imagine, a mistrial is a tremendous expense and inconvenience to the par-
ties, the Court and the taxpayers.”

The second came when the district court released the jury for
the weekend after learning about the misconduct. It told the jury it
had already given an instruction that, to ensure a fair verdict, it was
necessary the jurors not be exposed to outside information about
the case, law, or issues in the case, especially during deliberations.
The court stressed this admonishment still applied and warned
them not to try to get information from any other source before
resuming deliberations. The court further explained:

“The reason it’s so important, Number One [sic], it's important because this
trial is important to both of the parties. The State’s concerned that they have a
fair trial. Mr. Corey is concerned that he gets a fair trial in this particular case.
And any information or any discussions or the things I’ve already mentioned can
jeopardize that.

“It’s also important to the Court, because if there is any of this type of activity it
could result in a mistrial which means we would have to try this thing again. There
would be 12 more of you selected and another cost associated with that for a week
long jury trial. So it’s important—I can’t just stress it enough.” (Emphasis added.)

Corey did not object to the preliminary instruction or the ad-
monishment, but for the first time on appeal claims they were er-
ror and require reversal of his convictions. The panel agreed both
instructions were error, relying on State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 263, 200
P.3d 464 (2009), but held the errors did not require reversal. On
review, the State does not contest those holdings.

Standard of Review

When reviewing jury instructions for error, an appellate court
first considers reviewability from jurisdiction and preservation
viewpoints, which it does de novo. Next, the court exercises unlim-
ited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appro-
priate. Then, it considers whether the evidence taken in the light
most favorable to the defendant supports the instruction. And, fi-
nally, if there was error, the court determines whether it was harm-
less, using the test and degree of certainty set out in State v. Ward,
292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011). State v. Moyer, 302 Kan. 892,
914-15, 360 P.3d 384 (2015).

744,

If, as here, the appellant failed to properly object to the instruc-
tion, the standard on appeal is whether the instruction was clearly
erroneous. 302 Kan. at 915. To find clear error, the court must be
firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict
absent the instructional error. See State v. Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan.
TAT, 753, 357 P.3d 877 (2015).

Discussion

This case’s procedural posture creates an unusual circumstance
because after the panel issued its decision, a majority of this court
held a similar preliminary instruction given at the beginning of trial
did not constitute error. See State v. Tahah, 302 Kan. 783, 795, 358
P.3d 819 (2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 1218 (2016). But absent a
properly raised challenge to the panel’s error determination, we are
confined to reviewing the panel's holding that the verdict would not
have been different absent the preliminary instruction and admon-
ishment. See Corey, 2014 WL 6490503, at *21; Rule 8.03(h)(1).

Like the panel, we are not firmly convinced there is a real pos-
sibility the jury would have reached a different verdict absent the
preliminary instruction and admonishment. We need look no fur-
ther than Tahah to conclude the preliminary instruction did not
influence the jury's verdict:

“An Allen instruction risks coercing a unanimous verdict by unduly influencing
jurors to compromise their views on the evidence simply to avoid a hung jury... .

“The preliminary jury instruction here, however, is not an Allen instruction. Its
character and purpose are entirely different. The instruction occurred at the start
of trial, before the presentation of evidence, and warned jurors of the dangers
of a mistrial resulting from their own misconduct. As such, its coercive effect (to
prevent juror misconduct) is entirely proper and justified.” 302 Kan. at 794-95.

We need not decide, but question in light of the majority view
in Tahah whether the admonishment was error. But assuming it
was, we are faced with Corey's argument that the admonishment
might have caused a compromise verdict because it could infer the
consequences of a mistrial from juror misconduct might also be the
consequences of a hung jury. We are not firmly convinced this is
what happened because “[nJothing in the record demonstrates the
jury was near deadlock, deadlocked, pressured to reach a verdict,

745

or concerned about the implications of another trial.” State v. War-
rior, 294 Kan. 484, 515, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012) (affirming conviction
despite Salts error because there was substantial evidence of guilt
and defendant did not explain why instruction made difference in
deliberations); see Salts, 288 Kan. 263 (jury would not have reached
different verdict despite erroneous instruction that jury's failure to
reach decision would leave charges undecided, State would decide
whether to resubmit to different jury, and another trial would be
burden on both sides).

There is evidence of some disharmony in the jury room before
the weekend break, but the record does not disclose the source.
Before deliberations resumed, the district court instructed the jury
to base its decision on the instructions and evidence admitted at
trial. In turn, that evidence pointed strongly to Corey's guilt: his
DNA on items at the scene, eyewitness descriptions consistent with
his appearance, DNA consistent with his on the victim, and his
presence along Interstate 35 as an over-the-road trucker in cities
north and south of Ottawa in the days before and after the crime.

Even assuming error, the preliminary instruction and admonish-
ment were not clearly erroneous.

CUMULATIVE ERROR

Corey next argues cumulative error denied him a fair trial. We
have identified or presumed the following errors: (1) Juror mis-
conduct from discussion about the first trial during the second trial;
(2) prosecutorial error in stating Corey’s DNA was found on the
victim; (3) the district court’s ex parte conversation with the jury;
(4) Corey’s presumed absence during the discussion about a jury
question and readback of testimony; and (5) the preliminary jury
instruction and admonishment warning about the burdens of hav-
ing to restart the trial after a mistrial caused by juror misconduct.
“The test for cumulative error is ‘““whether the totality of circumstances substan-
tially prejudiced the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. No prejudi-
cial error may be found upon this cumulative effect rule, however, if the evidence
is overwhelming against the defendant.” State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 553,
243 P.3d 683 (2010) (quoting State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, Syl. ¢ 12, 221 P.3d
1105 [2009]).” State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 585, 604, 363 P.3d 1101 (2015).

ie

When applying this test, if any of the errors being cumulated are

constitutional in nature, their cumulative effect must be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. In assessing the totality of the circum-
stances,
“an appellate court examines the errors in the context of the record as a whole,
considering how the district court dealt with the errors as they arose (including
the efficacy, or lack of efficacy, of any remedial efforts); the nature and number
of errors committed and their interrelationship, if any; and the strength of the
evidence.” State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 205-06, 262 P.3d 314 (2011) (citing Ward,
292 Kan. at 569-70, 578).

The panel reviewed these factors and held cumulative error
did not require reversal. But the panel did not consider the jury
misconduct in its analysis. Doing so in our analysis, we reach the
same result because the errors do not overtake the strength of the
evidence against Corey. There was no reversible cumulative error.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY DisPosiTION

‘The final issue arises on a motion for summary disposition Corey
filed while his petition for review was pending in this court. He ar-
gues the district court erred calculating the criminal history score
used to determine his aggravated kidnapping sentence because it
scored a pre-1993 out-of-state felony conviction as a person felony.
He relies on State v. Murdock, 299 Kan. 312, 319, 323 P.3d 846
(2014), overruled by State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560 (2015), which held
pre-1993 out-of-state felony convictions must be scored as nonper-
son felonies.

We will assume without deciding that Corey’s motion was a
proper procedural vehicle to raise this issue. Compare K.S.A. 22-
3504(1) (“The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”),
with Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.041(b) (“During the pendency
of an appeal, a party may move for summary disposition, citing
a controlling appellate decision that is dispositive of the appeal.”
[Emphasis added.]) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 67).

We must deny Corey's motion because we have since held “the
classification of a prior conviction . . . as a person or nonperson
offense for criminal history purposes is determined based on the
classification in effect for the comparable Kansas offense at the

747

time the current crime of conviction was committed.” Keel, 302
Kan. at 590. Corey does not argue the district court erred in ascer-
taining the comparable Kansas offense when scoring the pre-1993
conviction.

Affirmed.

No. 113,116

StaTE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. KoHLER Z. JEFFRIES, Appellant.
(375 P3d 316)

Opinion
filed July 1,
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defénder Office, was on the brief
for appellant. . :
Steven J. Obermeier, senior deputy district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by

JOHNSON, J.: In 1987, prior to the enactment of the Kansas Sen-
tencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), Kohler Z. Jeffries pled no con-
test to felony murder and one count of aggravated robbery, pled
guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery, and was convicted of
felony murder and multiple counts of aggravated robbery, receiv-
ing a controlling prison term of life without possibility of parole for
30 years. This appeal is from the district court's summary denial of
Jeffries’ 2014 motion to correct an illegal sentence, That motion

749

claimed that our decision in State v. Murdock, 299 Kan. 312, 319,
323 P.3d 846 (2014), overruled by State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 357
P.3d 251 (2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 865 (2016), mandates that
Jeffries’ sentence should be converted to a guidelines sentence un-
der the 1993 version of the KSGA. Finding that Murdock is neither
controlling nor analogous, we affirm the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

In 1986, Jeffries and Brian Bailey committed a series of armed
robberies of gasoline stations and a liquor store. During one of the
robberies, a clerk was shot and killed. Neither codefendant admit-
ted to being the shooter, but they were both charged with felony
murder, in addition to the robberies. Jeffries ultimately pled guilty
to three counts of aggravated robbery and pled nolo contendere to
one count of aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder.
He received a life sentence for the murder and 15-to-life sentences
for the robberies, some of which were to be served concurrently
and some to be served consecutively. As a result, Jeffries would not
be parole-eligible for 30 years.

The 1993 KSGA provided that it could be retroactively applied
to some existing indeterminate sentences for less severe crimes, al-
lowing those sentences to be converted to determinate guidelines
sentences. With regard to that provision, the Kansas Department
of Corrections (DOC) issued a “Notification of Findings” to Jef-
fries, which indicated that because at least one of his crimes was
a severity level 3 (any of the aggravated robbery convictions), he
was not eligible for retroactive application of the KSGA. K.S.A. 21-
4724(c)(1) (Furse 1995) (KSGA not retroactively applied to sen-
tences which, had they been committed on or after July 1, 1993,
would constitute a severity level 1, 2, 3, or 4 nondrug crime). Jef-
fries did not appeal this finding. K.S.A. 21-4724(c)(4) (Furse 1995)
(providing process to appeal eligibility for retroactive application
of KSGA).

Many years later, prompted by this court’s decision in Murdock,
Jeffries filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The motion
asserted that Murdock stands for the proposition that, because

there were no severity level 3 felonies before the enactment of the
KSGA, his prior aggravated robbery convictions could not be clas-
sified as severity level 3 felonies to deny the retroactive application
of the KSGA.

The Johnson County District Court summarily denied the mo-
tion, finding that Murdock only applied to the classification of out-
of-state convictions and Jeffries was challenging the classification
of his in-state aggravated robbery conviction. Jeffries appealed di-
rectly to this court. Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 22-3601(b)(2); State v. Pennington, 288 Kan. 599, 599,
205 P.3d 741 (2009) (jurisdiction over appeal of motion to correct
illegal sentence lies with court that had jurisdiction over original
appeal).

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF KSGA

This is Jeffries’ fourth attempt at attacking his sentence. See
Jeffries v. Kansas Prisoner Review Bd., No. 111,458, 2015 WL
2342777 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion); Jeffries v. Roberts,
No. 97,600, 2007 WL 2377303 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion),
rev. denied 285 Kan. 1174 (2007); Jeffries v. State, No. 94,419, 2006
WL 2043031 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 282
Kan. 790 (2006). This challenge is founded upon the 1993 KSGA
provision addressing the applicability of that act to crimes com-
mitted prior to July 1, 1903, K.S.A. 21-4724 (Furse 1995), as inter-
preted in light of Murdock. But Murdock is not directly applicable,
both because it specifically limited its holding to the classification
of out-of-state convictions and because it has been overruled by
Keel. Likewise, Murdock does not provide an analytical framework
for Jeffries’ argument because the retroactive application provision
of K.S.A. 21-4724 (Furse 1995), does not contain the same ambigu-
ity as addressed in Murdock.

Standard of Review

This court reviews de novo a district court’s summary denial of
a motion to correct an illegal sentence..State v. Trotter, 296 Kan.
898, 901, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013). Like the district court, this court

must determine whether the defendant’s motion, records, and files
conclusively show defendant is not entitled to relief. State v. Jones,
292 Kan. 910, 913, 257 P.3d 268 (2011). Whether a sentence is il-
legal under K.S.A. 22-3504 is a question of law subject to de novo
review. Makthepharak v. State, 298 Kan. 578, 578, 314 P.3d 876
(2013). Likewise, statutory interpretation is a question of law over
which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Eddy, 299
Kan. 29, 32, 321 P.3d 12 (2014).

Analysis

We take the liberty of beginning with the topical and textual ob-
stacles to Jeffries’ attempted use of the Murdock rationale to force
a late conversion of his pre-KSGA indeterminate sentence under
K.S.A. 21-4724 (Furse 1995). Both the issue presented and the
statute interpreted in Murdock were too distinct from Jeffries’ is-
sue to make the Murdock decision persuasive, even if that holding
had not been overruled in Keel.

Murdock involved an interpretation and application of K.S.A.
21-4711(e), which governed the criminal history classification of
out-of-state prior convictions as being for either a person or non-
person crime. Murdock pled guilty to committing robberies in
Kansas in 2008, and the sentencing court had to classify two prior
Illinois robbery convictions—one in 1984 and one in 1990—as ei-
ther person or nonperson felonies to calculate Murdock’s criminal
history score.

K.S.A. 21-4711(e)’s ambiguous directive was: “In designating
a crime as person or nonperson comparable offenses shall be re-
ferred to. If the state of Kansas does not have a comparable of-
fense, the out-of-state conviction shall be classified as a nonper-
son crime.” Murdock pointed out that the statute did not indicate
the timeframe for referring to comparable Kansas offenses. For
instance, the statute did not clarify whether the sentencing court
should refer to comparable Kansas offenses in effect at the time of
the 1984 Illinois robbery, or the comparable offenses in effect at
the time of the 2008 offenses being prosecuted. See 299 Kan. at
315-16. Based on the precedent from State v. Williams, 291 Kan.
554, Syl. § 4, 244 P.3d 667 (2010), Murdock determined that the

statute should be construed to make the comparison to the Kansas
offense in effect at the time the prior, out-of-state crime was com-
mitted. 299 Kan. at 317. Then, because Kansas had no designated
person offenses when the Illinois robberies were committed, those
prior robberies were scored as nonperson felonies. 299 Kan, at 319.

In this scenario, however, we are not faced with a statutory am-
biguity. Jeffries was convicted of and sentenced for the crimes of
first-degree murder and aggravated robbery prior to the enactment
of the KSGA. He does not challenge the legality of his original sen-
tence. Rather, he contends the later-enacted KSGA should have
been retroactively applied to him to convert his indeterminate sen-
tence to a guidelines sentence, suggesting that the failure to do so
transformed his legal sentence into an illegal one.

But “[e]xtending retroactive conversion to some offenders by the
1993 legislature was an act of grace,” and Jeffries was not automati-
cally entitled to conversion. State v. Roseborough, 263 Kan. 378,
386, 951 P.2d 532 (1997). To the contrary, K.S.A. 21-4793 (Furse
1995) made it crystal clear that the retroactive application of the
KSGA was the exception rather than the rule when it declared:
“Except as provided in K.S.A. 21-4724, the provisions of this act
creating a presumptive sentencing guidelines system have no ap-
plication to crimes committed prior to July 1, 1993.” Consequently,
Jeffries was ineligible for conversion unless he could fit within the
exception of K.S.A. 21-4724 (Furse 1995).

K.S.A. 21-4724(a) (Furse 1995) confirmed that it was the statute
containing the provisions under which the KSGA sentencing grids
“shall be applied for crimes committed before July 1, 1993.” Sub-
section (b) generally provided that the modification of sentences
imposed prior to July 1, 1993, was available for persons who would
have been “classified in a presumptive nonimprisonment grid block
on either sentencing grid . . . if sentenced pursuant to the [KSGA].”
KS.A. 21-4724(b) (Furse 1995). For the nondrug offense grid,
the modifiable grid blocks listed were 5-H, 5-I, or 6-G. K.S.A. 21-
472A(b)(1) (Furse 1995). In other words, only sentences for crimes
that would have been classified as severity level 5 or 6 if the person
had been sentenced under the KSGA were eligible for conversion.
If Jeffries had been “sentenced pursuant to the [KSGA],” the crime

753

of aggravated robbery would have been classified as a severity level
3 offense. See K.S.A. 21-3427 (Furse 1995) (“Aggravated robbery
is a severity level 3, person felony.”).

Subsection (c)(1) corroborates Jeffries’ ineligibility for conver-
sion. While directing the DOC to prepare a sentencing guidelines
report on imprisoned inmates with pre-July 1, 1993, sentences, the
provision specifically excepts reporting for “those who have convic-
tions for crimes which, if committed on or after July 1, 1993, would
constitute a severity level 1, 2, 3 or 4 felony on the sentencing
guidelines grid for nondrug crimes.” K.S.A. 21-4724(c)(1) (Furse
1995). The obvious reason for relieving DOC of the responsibil-
ity to report on those more severe crimes is that they are never
eligible for conversion. And again, there is no temporal ambiguity.
The statute clearly directs that a person’s pre-July 1, 1993, criminal
acts are compared to the law in effect on July 1, 1993, to determine
conversion eligibility.

Even Murdock acknowledged that the issue presented here is
not analogous to the one it decided, because K.S.A. 21-4724 is not
ambiguous. In dictum, Murdock specifically cited to the language
of K.S.A. 21-4724(c)(1)—“‘as if the [prior] crime[s] were commit-
ted on or after July 1, 1993’”—as a means by which the legislature
could resolve the ambiguities Murdock found to exist in K.S.A. 21-
A711 (e). 299 Kan. at 319.

In short, Jeffries’ 1987 indeterminate sentence for felony mur-
der and multiple counts of aggravated robbery was ineligible for
conversion to a guidelines sentence under the provisions of K.S.A.
21-4724 (Furse 1995) on July 1, 1993; his sentence remains ineli-
gible for retroactive application of the KSGA today; and, therefore,
Jeffries’ 1987 sentence is not illegal. The district court reached the
correct result. See State v. Overman, 301 Kan. 704, 712, 348 P3d
516 (2015) (district court’s correct result will be upheld on appeal).

Affirmed.

Bar Docket No. 22161

In the Matter of DANIEL J. ARKELL, Respondent.
(377 B3d 414)

In a letter signed June 30, 2016, addressed to the Clerk of the
Appellate Courts, respondent Daniel J. Arkell, an attorney admit-
ted to practice law in Kansas, voluntarily surrendered his license to
practice law in Kansas, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 217 (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 390).

At the time the respondent surrendered his license, five com-
plaints had been docketed by the office of the Disciplinary Admin-
istrator for investigation. The complaints alleged that the respon-
dent violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 442) (competence); 1.7 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
519) (conflicts of interest); 3.3 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 601) (can-
dor to the tribunal); 4.4 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 632) (transaction
with persons other than clients); and 8.4(b), (c), (d), and (g) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (misconduct).

This court, having examined the files of the office of the Disci-
plinary Administrator, finds that the surrender of the respondent’s
license should be accepted and that the respondent should be dis-
barred.

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that Daniel J. Arkell be and he is
hereby disbarred from the practice of law in Kansas and his license
and privilege to practice law are hereby revoked.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Appellate
Courts strike the name of Daniel J. Arkell from the roll of attorneys
licensed to practice law in Kansas.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall be published in
the Kansas Reports, that the costs herein shall be assessed to the
respondent, and that the respondent forthwith shall comply with
Supreme Court Rule 218 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 401).

Dated this 7th day of July, 2016.

No. 111,398

STATE OF Kansas, Appellant, v. SPENCER Girts, LLC, Appellee.
(874 P3d 680)

Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen
M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him
on the briefs for appellant.

Tricia A. Bath, of Bath & Edmonds, PA, of Overland Park, argued the cause,
and Thomas J. Bath, Jr., and Mitch E. Biebighauser, of the same firm, were with
her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Lucxerr, J.: Kansas’ speedy trial statute, K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
22-3402(b), provides in relevant part: “If any person charged with
a crime and held to answer on an appearance bond shall not be
brought to trial within 180 days after arraignment on the charge,
such person shall be entitled to be discharged from further liability
to be tried for the crime charged.” (Emphasis added.) Despite the
express limitation of this provision to cases in which a defendant

757

has been “held to answer on an appearance bond,” the defendant
in this case, who was not on bond, relied on this statute in seeking
dismissal of all charges when a trial did not occur within 180 days
after arraignment. The district court granted the dismissal, and the
State appealed. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, affirmed
the dismissal based on this court’s decision in City of Elkhart v.
Bollacker, 243 Kan. 543, 546, 757 P.2d 311 (1988), which held the
legislature intended for 22-3402(2)—now 22-3402(b)— to apply
even when a defendant had not been held on an appearance bond.
State v. Spencer Gifts, 51 Kan. App. 2d 437, 348 P.3d 611 (2015).
The concurrence argued that Bollacker had been decided incor-
rectly and should be overruled.

On our review of the Court of Appeals decision, the State argues
we should overrule Bollacker, apply the unambiguous appearance
bond limitation of 22-3402(b), and reverse the district court and
Court of Appeals. We agree with the State that K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
22-3402(b) unambiguously limits its application to cases in which
a defendant has posted an appearance bond, and we further agree
that Bollacker should be overruled. We do so because the Bollacker
court, in extending 22-3402(b) to defendants who are not held on
an appearance bond, had to add words to the unambiguous lan-
guage of 22-3402(b)—and thereby violated our rules of statutory
interpretation, which do not allow courts to rewrite unambiguous
statutes. We, therefore, cannot agree with the reasoning in Bol-
lacker and, after weighing the various considerations relevant to
a determination of whether we should overrule precedent, con-
clude Bollacker should be overruled. Nevertheless, we affirm the
application of Bollacker in this case because it formed the law that
controlled the defendant's motion to dismiss, and we do not apply
today’s change in the law to eradicate a vested right to a speedy trial
defense.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties do not dispute the facts of this case. Beginning in
May 2009, two investigators with the Johnson County District At-
torney’s Office began a year-long investigation into Spencer Gifts,
LLC, which is a retail business in Oak Park Mall generally open

to the public. Over the course of about 30 different visits, the in-
vestigators noted that Spencer Gifts displayed various items of a
potentially obscene nature: for example, sex toys, lewd clothing,
posters of nude women, and wind-up toys simulating sexual acts.
Often these adult-oriented displays were in the vicinity of other
items geared more toward youth, such as Teenage Mutant Ninja
Turtle merchandise, Sesame Street clothing, and Twilight movie
posters. During their visits, the investigators observed numerous
minor customers enter the store.

On May 16, 2010, the investigators executed a search warrant
and seized various retail items as evidence. And on October 6,
2010, the State charged Spencer Gifts with 10 counts of promot-
ing obscenity harmful to minors. That same day, the district court
issued a summons ordering Spencer Gifts to appear. Important to
the case now before us, throughout the proceedings Spencer Gifts
was never subject to an appearance bond.

Years later, Spencer Gifts filed a motion to dismiss alleging a stat-
utory speedy trial violation. The district court held a hearing and
ultimately denied the motion by concluding that statutory speedy
trial did not apply both because Spencer Gifts was a business entity
and because it was never on bond. The speedy trial issue arose
again, however, during a subsequent pretrial conference before a
different judge. After arguments, the then-presiding district judge
concluded Spencer Gifts was statutorily entitled to a speedy trial
under Bollacker and its progeny and the State had failed to honor
that right. As a result, the district judge dismissed the State’s case.

The State appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in a split decision, with the
majority relying on precedent from this court. Spencer Gifts, 51
Kan. App. 2d at 444. The concurring judge agreed binding prec-
edent from this court dictated the outcome of the case. But the
concurring opinion noted contradictions in this court’s treatment of
statutory speedy trial and read the plain language of the speedy trial
statute to contradict the precedent upon which the majority relied.
51 Kan. App. 2d at 444-50 (Malone, C.J., concurring). We granted
the State’s petition for review. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3602(e).

The State presents four alternative contentions in arguing the
district court erred in dismissing the case for a statutory speedy
trial violation under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b): (1) The statute
did not apply to Spencer Gifts because it had not been held on
an appearance bond; (2) any contrary holding in Bollacker should
be overturned; (3) Spencer Gifts did not have speedy trial rights
because it is a corporation; and (4) dismissal is not required under
the provisions of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(g) (“If a delay is ini-
tially attributed to the defendant, but is subsequently charged to
the state for any reason, such delay . . . shall not be used as a ground
for dismissing a case.”). We address each argument in turn.

1. The plain language of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) does
not apply to a defendant not held to answer on an appear-
ance bond.

As evident from our previous discussion, tension exists between
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) and Bollacker. The statute, by its
plain terms, limits its application to situations where a defendant
has been “charged with a crime and held to answer on an appear-
ance bond.” Yet the statute’s reach was extended in Bollacker, 243
Kan. 543.

In that case, Lanning Bollacker became a criminal defendant
when the City of Elkhart charged him with unlawful discharge of
a firearm and served him with a complaint and a notice to appear.
Bollacker appeared, and he was tried and convicted in municipal
court. Bollacker appealed his conviction to the district court and,
while on appeal, was never subject to an appearance bond. Despite
the fact that Bollacker did not meet the bond requirement, the
district court dismissed the charges because the trial did not occur
within the time required by K.S.A. 22-3402(2) (Ensley 1981).

The City of Elkhart then appealed the dismissal to this court, ar-
guing the speedy trial statute did not apply because Bollacker was
never held to answer on an appearance bond. Although acknowl-
edging the statutory language about an appearance bond, this
court found the lack of an appearance bond insignificant, mostly
for general policy reasons: “[T]he legislature intended that persons

charged with crime should be granted a prompt and speedy trial”
in order to “prevent the oppression of a citizen by holding criminal
prosecutions suspended over him for an indefinite time and to pre-
vent delays in the administration of justice.” 243 Kan. at 545; State
v. Pendergrass, 215 Kan. 806, 807, 528 P.2d 1190 (1974) (“The
purpose of [statutory speedy trial] is to implement and define the
constitutional guaranty of speedy trial.”). In addition, the Bollacker
court noted a defendant served with a notice to appear is under the
threat of arrest for failing to appear, just like a defendant held on
an appearance bond. Ultimately, the court held 22-3402 applicable
“whether bond is required or whether the accused is simply served
with a notice to appear and is thus required to appear without post-
ing bond.” 243 Kan. at 546,

Bollacker thus supports Spencer Gifts’ position in this case. In
dismissing the case against Spencer Gifts, the district court noted
a more recent appellate decision that relied on Bollacker: State v.
Palmquist, No. 103,914, 2011 WL 767861 (Kan. App.) (unpub-
lished opinion), rev. denied 292. Kan. 968 (2011). In Palmquist, a
notice to appear secured the defendant’s appearance in one case
and a summons was issued in another—the defendant was never
subject to an appearance bond. Nevertheless, the district court dis-
missed the case. On appeal, the majority relied on Bollacker and
concluded that statutory speedy trial under K.S.A. 22-3402 applied
and the district court had correctly dismissed the case. 2011 WL
767861, at °7.

The dissent in Palmquist, however, would have held that
“[aJbsent [the defendant] being held to answer on an appearance
bond, the plain language of K.S.A. 22-3402(2) simply does not ap-
ply.” 2011 WL 767861, at *9 (Buser, J., dissenting). Although the
dissent recognized Bollacker as precedent, it noted this court had
recently emphasized “the duty of courts to follow plain and un-
ambiguous statutory language.” 2011 WL 767861, at “7 (Buser, J.,
dissenting). And that emphasis, in the dissent’s view, was an indica-
tion this court would interpret 22-3402(b) differently than it had
in Bollacker. See State v. Ottinger, 46 Kan. App. 2d 647, 655, 264
P.3d 1027 (2011), rev. denied 294 Kan. 946 (2012) (Court of Ap-

761

peals must follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent unless there is
indication the Supreme Court is departing from a prior position).

In this appeal from the dismissal of the charges against Spencer
Gifts, the Court of Appeals majority held that Bollacker rendered
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) applicable despite the fact that
Spencer Gifts was never held to answer on an appearance bond.
Spencer Gifts, 51 Kan. App. 2d at 444, The concurring opinion rec-
ognized Bollacker as controlling precedent, but it agreed with the
dissent in Palmquist that the plain language of K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
22-3402(b) simply does not confer any statutory speedy trial right
to a person who was never held to answer on an appearance bond.
51 Kan. App. 2d at 446-47 (Malone, C.J., concurring). We must
now decide whether the analysis in Bollacker remains sound.

2. Bollacker is at odds with our rules of statutory interpreta-
tion and is overruled but applies to this case because rights
under it had vested.

As the concurring opinion in this case and the dissent in
Palmquist recognized, if we momentarily set aside Bollacker and
apply the plain language of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b), the
State has a strong argument that the statute only applies when a
person is “held to answer on an appearance bond.” Typically, when
we conduct our de novo review of statutes, we begin with the most
fundamental rule of statutory construction: The intent of the leg-
islature governs. State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1079, 319 P.3d
528 (2014). Reliance on the plain and unambiguous language of a
statute is “the best and only safe rule for determining the intent of
the creators of a written law. ... The plain language selected by the
legislature, when it does not conflict with constitutional mandates,
trumps both judicial decisions and the policies advocated by par-
ties.” (Emphasis added.) Merryfield v. Sullivan, 301 Kan. 397, 399,
343 P.3d 515 (2015); see Taylor v. Kobach, 300 Kan. 731, 735, 334
P.3d 306 (2014) (“We have often expressed that the best and only
safe rule for ascertaining the intention of the makers of any written
law is to abide by the language they have used.”); Vontress v. State,
299 Kan. 607, 611, 325 P3d 1114 (2014); Gannon v. State, 298
Kan. 1107, 1143, 319 P.3d 1196 (2014) (citing Wright v. Noell, 16
Kan. 601, 607, 1876 WL 1081 [1876]).

By our reading of the plain language, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-
3402(b) only applies when a person is “charged with a crime and
held to answer on an appearance bond” and not when the court
had merely issued a notice to appear. Statutorily, an appearance
bond is a distinct thing—it is not identical to a summons. Indeed,
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-2202(b) defines an appearance bond as “an
agreement, with or without security, entered into by a person in
custody by which the person is bound to comply with the condi-
tions specified in the agreement.” A summons, on the other hand,
is “a written order issued by a magistrate directing that a person
appear before a designated court at a stated time and place and
answer to a charge pending against the person.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
22-2202(s); see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-2202(0) (defining notice
to appear as “a written request, issued by a law enforcement officer,
that a person appear before a designated court at a stated time and
place”).

Spencer Gifts is correct that an appearance bond and a sum-
mons have similar functions—both order a person to appear. But
a shared purpose does not make those two distinct things inter-
changeable. Even assuming some linguistic ambiguity, which would
permit us to move past K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402’s plain language,
we would construe the legislature’s specific mention of an appear-
ance bond to mean that the legislature intended to exclude a sum-
mons from the statute. See State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 495, 325
P.3d 1095 (2014) (courts resort to statutory construction only when
the statute is ambiguous); Cole v. Mayans, 276 Kan. 866, 878, 80
P.3d 384 (2003) (the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of
another), We simply cannot apply K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b)
to a case like this one, which involves a summons, without reading
language into the statute that is not there. As an appellate court, we
“«“merely interpret[] the language as it appears; [we are] not free
to speculate and cannot read into the statute language not read-
ily found there.”’” State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 469, 474, 313 P.3d 826
(2013); State v. Paul, 285 Kan. 658, 661, 175 P.3d 840 (2008) (court
should not read statute to “add language that is not found in it”).

In Bollacker, this court took solace in a policy-driven conclusion
with reliance on an entirely separate criminal statute defining the

763

crime of failure to appear. See 243 Kan. at 545. At the time, the
legislature essentially defined failure to appear as “willfully incur-
ring a forfeiture of an appearance bond.” K.S.A. 21-3813(1) (En-
sley 1981); see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5915(a). But subsection
(2) of the failure-to-appear statute explicitly included a summons
into subsection (1)’s definition of an appearance bond: “Any person
who is released upon his or her own recognizance, without surety,
or who fails to appear in response to a summons or traffic citation,
shall be deemed a person released on bond for appearance with-
in the meaning of subjection (1) of this section.” (Emphasis add-
ed.) K.S.A. 21-3813(2) (Ensley 1981); see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
215915(e). The Bollacker court found this to be evidence that the
legislature implicitly intended similar interchangeability of appear-
ance bonds and summonses in the context of statutory speedy trial.
243 Kan. at 545.

To the contrary, the failure-to-appear statute was—and re-
mains—evidence that the legislature knows how to draft a statute
that makes appearance bonds and summonses interchangeable. It
did not do that in K.S.A. 22-3402. Thus, the crime of failure to ap-
pear (now K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5915) exists as evidence the leg-
islature, in adopting K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b), did not intend
to grant rights to defendants who had not posted an appearance
bond. See State v. Boyer, 289 Kan. 108, 116, 209 P.3d 705 (2009)
(finding it significant that the legislature had distinguished juvenile
adjudications from adult convictions in other statutes, so a general
reference to “convictions” in another statute did not encompass
juvenile adjudications).

Moreover, in the context of statutory speedy trial, the Bollacker
court’s deviation from plain language seems to be an outlier; Kan-
sas appellate courts have regularly interpreted K.S.A. 22-3402 by
its plain language. Most notably, almost 10 years after Bollacker
this court issued an opinion somewhat at odds with Bollacker: State
v. Mathenia, 262 Kan. 890, 942 P.2d 624 (1997). There, the prin-
cipal issue related to whether the speedy trial provision at issue in
this case—22-3402(b)—even applied under the facts of the case.

Willard Parnell Mathenia had committed a crime while incarcer-
ated and, thus, when charges related to that crime were brought,

he was not held in custody solely because of those charges. The
State, therefore, argued K.S.A. 22-3402(1) (Furse 1995), which
provided for a 90-day speedy trial for those in custody solely on
the current charge, was inapplicable. Mathenia acknowledged he
was not being held in custody solely because of the current charges
against him but argued the provision then found at 22-3402(2)—
now 22-3402(b)—should automatically apply and require the State
to bring him to trial within 180 days. And at the time, language in
prior cases from this court had suggested as much. See State v.
Noriega, 261 Kan. 440, 459, 932 P.2d 940 (1997) (“Because Norie-
ga was not solely being held in jail for the crime charged, he was
not entitled to be brought to trial within 90 days after his arraign-
ment. He was entitled to be brought to trial within 180 days after
his arraignment.”), disapproved of by Mathenia, 262 Kan. at 900;
State v. Abel, 261 Kan. 331, 335, 932 P.2d 952 (1997) (“A person
being held in jail not solely for the crime charged is not entitled to
be brought to trial within 90 days after the person’s arraignment
but is entitled to be brought to trial within 180 days after the per-
son’s arraignment.”), disapproved of by Mathenia, 262 Kan. at 900.

This court in Mathenia, however, explicitly rejected any sugges-
tion that the 180day period applied anytime the 90-day period did
not, saying: “K.S.A. 22-3402(2) refers only to defendants ‘charged
with a crime and held to answer on an appearance bond.’ [Citations
omitted.] Mathenia was not held on an appearance bond; there-
fore, K.S.A. 22-3402(2) does not apply.” 262 Kan. at 900. Thus,
in Mathenia, this court relied on the plain language of K.S.A. 22-
3402(2) (Furse 1995) to disapprove of precedent and conclude that
Mathenia was not entitled to a trial within 180 days.

In fact, plain language has been the guidepost in a number of
other speedy trial cases. See, ¢.g., State v. Hill, 257 Kan. 774, 777-
78, 895 P.2d 1238 (1995) (holding speedy trial statute did not ap-
ply because the defendant did not meet a plain condition of the
statute—the requirement that the defendant be held solely by rea-
son of the charged crime); State v. Blizzard, 43 Kan. App. 2d 418,
422-23, 295 P.3d 773 (2010) (refusing to apply speedy trial statute
because the defendant was not held on an appearance bond); State
v. Strong, 8 Kan. App. 2d 589, 593, 663 P.2d 668 (1983) (refusing

765

to apply speedy trial statute because defendant was “neither in cus-
tody ‘solely by reason’ of the instant charges, nor at liberty subject
to an appearance bond”).

We recognize, as did this court in City of Elkhart v. Bollacker,
243 Kan. 543, 757 P.2d 311 (1988), that it would be a reasonable
policy for the legislature to intend that statutory speedy trial ap-
plies broadly to any circumstances where a defendant is ordered
to appear. And Spencer Gifts argues that not applying the speedy
trial statute to a defendant summoned to court would be an absurd
result. But simply because the legislature could reasonably have
granted summoned defendants statutory speedy trial rights does
not mean excluding them is absurd. The legislature may have had
a variety of policy reasons for choosing the language it enacted and
for creating distinct statutory protections for those who incurred
the additional burden of executing—and often paying for—an ap-
pearance bond. Such “questions of public policy are for legislative
and not judicial determination, and where the legislature does so
declare, and there is no constitutional impediment, the question of
the wisdom, justice, or expediency of the legislation is for that body
and not for the courts.” State, ex rel., v. Kansas Turnpike Authority,
176 Kan. 683, 695, 273 P.2d 198 (1954); see In re Property Valua-
tion Appeals of Various Applicants, 298 Kan. 439, 447, 313 P.3d 789
(2013), cert. denied sub nom. Missouri Gas Energy v. Kansas Div. of
Prop. Valuation, 135 S. Ct. 51 (2014); Samsel v. Wheeler Transport
Services, Inc., 246 Kan. 336, 348-49, 789 P.2d 541 (1990); Harris v.
Shanahan, 192 Kan. 183, 206, 387 P.2d 771 (1963).

Relying on yet another canon of statutory construction, Spencer
Gifts argues the legislature’s choice not to amend or modify K.S.A.
22-3402 after Bollacker’s judicial construction amounts to tacit ap-
proval of the interpretation. See State v. Quested, 302 Kan. 262,
279, 352 P.3d 553 (2015) (legislative acquiescence can be, but is
not always, indicative of legislative intent); Cady v. Schroll, 298
Kan. 731, 737, 317 P.3d 90 (2014). But “[m]ore important [than
legislative acquiescence] is the application of the doctrine of statu-
tory interpretation that directs us to consider the plain language of
the statutes.” Hall v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 286 Kan. 777, 787,
189 P.3d 508 (2008). And Spencer Gifts’ legislative-acquiescence

argument is far from compelling here because the legislature has
not modified or amended the relevant portions of statutory speedy
trial even though Kansas appellate courts have construed it differ-
ently in different cases. Compare Bollacker, 243 Kan. at 546 (180-
day limit applied even if not held to answer on appearance bond),
with Mathenia, 262 Kan. at 900 (“K.S.A. 22-3402[2] refers only to
defendants ‘charged with a crime and held to answer on an ap-
pearance bond. [Citations omitted.] Mathenia was not held on an
appearance bond; therefore, K.S.A. 22-3402[2] does not apply.”).
Moreover, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) is clear; it expressly
mentions an appearance bond but does not mention a summons.
Because Spencer Gifts was not held on an appearance bond, the
statutory 180-day limit of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) did not
apply. See Mathenia, 262 Kan. at 900.
Finding that the plain language of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b)
does not apply to Spencer gifts’ circumstances, we turn to our next
question: Should we overrule Bollacker?
Certainly, we do not lightly disapprove of precedent. The doc-
trine of stare decisis “instructs that points of law established by a
court are generally followed by the same court and courts of lower
rank in later cases in which the same legal issue is raised.” Hoesli
». Triplett, Inc., 303 Kan. 358, 362-63, 361 P.3d 504 (2015). Such
adherence to precedent promotes the systemic stability of our legal
system. Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 277 Kan. 706, 715, 89 P.3d 573
(2004). That said, stare decisis is not an inexorable command, and
we avoid continuing an incorrect interpretation of the law. Hoesli,
303 Kan. at 363; O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.,
294 Kan. 318, 343, 277 P.3d 1062 (2012). An appellate court should
adhere’ to stare decisis “‘unless clearly convinced that the rule was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing con-
ditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from
precedent,’” Crist, 277 Kan. at 715 (quoting Samsel v. Wheeler
Transport Services, Inc., 246 Kan, 336, 356, 789 P.2d 541 [1990}).
From a policy perspective, we are not so much convinced that
the rule in Bollacker was unsound or erroneous; nevertheless, we
are convinced that the policy issue was not an appropriate basis
for an appellate court’s decision. A court's obligation is to follow

767

the intent that the legislature expresses through statutory language.
And our only safe analytical path to achieve that end is to follow the
plain language the legislature has chosen. Merryfield, 301 Kan. at
399.

So, then, does more good than harm come from overruling Bol-
lacker? We believe that it does. We are cognizant of the fact that
Spencer Gifts, and those in Spencer Gifts’ position, could have
placed some reliance on statutory speedy trial under Bollacker.
But what this case turns on is bigger than both the facts presented
here and the legal issue the case contains. Certainly, adherence to
the Bollacker precedent would ensure stability on this particular
issue, i.e., whether statutory speedy trial applies to a defendant not
held to answer on an appearance bond. But the stability gained on
that one issue is at the expense of the stability of our legal system:
litigants, courts, and the legislature must be able to rely on the fact
that statutory language drives the law in Kansas, And here, K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) by its language does not apply to a defen-
dant never held on an appearance bond.

Moreover, interpreting K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) by its
plain language does not eradicate speedy trial. Defendants not held
to answer on an appearance bond may still have a constitutional
right to speedy trial. See State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 43, 54, 371 P.3d
862 (2016) (explaining that “the speedy trial statute is merely a pro-
cedure that works to protect an existing substantive [constitutional]
right”).

Accordingly, we overrule City of Elkhart v. Bollacker, 243 Kan.
543, 757 P.2d 311 (1988), and conclude that K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-
3402(b) only applies to a “person charged with a crime and held
to answer on an appearance bond.” Spencer Gifts did not fit that
category. Still, Bollacker was good law when the district court dis-
missed the case against Spencer Gifts and the Court of Appeals
affirmed—there was no error in the lower courts. Hierarchically
lower courts are required to follow our precedent absent indication
that we are departing from our precedent. See Snider v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 297 Kan. 157, 168, 298 P.3d 1120 (2013).
And because we have changed the law on this point in detriment to

Spencer Gifts, we find that the rule we express in this decision does
not apply so as to reinstate the State’s case against Spencer Gifts.

As a general rule, “when an appellate court decision changes
the law, that change acts prospectively and applies only to all cases,
state or federal, that are pending on direct review or not yet final
on the date of the appellate court decision.” State v. Mitchell, 297
Kan. 118, Syl. § 3, 298 P.3d 349 (2013). And Spencer Gifts’ case is
not only currently pending, but statutory speedy trial is a proce-
dural rule, and procedural rules typically apply retroactively. These
general rules, typically applied when a defendant appeals and seeks
the benefit of a change in the law, would suggest that the change in
the law we espouse today would apply to Spencer Gifts.

But here the State has appealed and seeks a change in the law
that would potentially obliterate Spencer Gifts’ statutory speedy
trial defense. In such a circumstance, the general rules just cited
are tempered by the proposition that changes in the law cannot
apply so as to affect a vested or substantive right. “A vested right is
one ‘so fixed that it is not dependent on any future act, contingency
or decision to make it more secure.’” Dupree, 304 Kan. at 52 (quot-
ing Board of Greenwood County Comm’rs v. Nadel, 228 Kan. 469,
474, 618 P.2d 778 [1980]).

In Dupree, we held that the mere running of the statutory time
period for speedy trial did not establish a vested right because time
alone was not determinative. To secure dismissal under statutory
speedy trial the parties would have to argue before a court whether
various periods of time would count against the State or the defen-
dant or whether various waivers would apply. Dupree, 304 Kan. at
52-56. Counting days, in and of itself, still left dismissal too contin-

ent.

We face a different situation here, however: Spencer Gifts has
argued statutory speedy trial, and Spencer Gifts obtained dismissal
of the case in the district court under the then controlling law of
Bollacker. While Mathenia contained language seemingly at odds
with Bollacker, it did not expressly change or overrule Bollacker’s
holding. We only now change that prior precedent. But such a
change cannot resurrect the charges against Spencer Gifts, which
lawfully utilized a complete defense against those charges. Unlike

769

in Dupree, Spencer Gifts’ right to dismissal for a statutory speedy
trial violation was no longer contingent—it had vested with the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of the case.

The statutory speedy trial issue, as illustrated by this case, is not
unlike a statute of limitations. A statute of limitations is a proce-
dural rule, which means changes typically apply retroactively. And
the procedural nature of the rule means that when the legislature
extends a statute of limitations period, the new time period applies
to all cases that have yet to be time barred by the prior statutory pe-
riod. However, cases that were time barred by the original period
remain time barred—an extension to a statute of limitations cannot
resurrect expired charges by eradicating the vested and complete
defense the prior law afforded. See State v. Noah, 246 Kan. 291,
292-95, 788 P.2d 257 (1990); see also Lujan v. Regents of Universi-
ty of California, 69 F.3d 1511, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1995) (statutes of
limitations have mixed procedural and substantive aspects); Tonge
v. Werholiz, 279 Kan. 481, 488-89, 109 P.3d 1140 (2005) (holding,
as to Department of Corrections regulations, that “once an inmate
accrues a vested defense to the enforcement of disciplinary restitu-
tion, that defense cannot be taken away”).

This case calls for a similar conclusion. Spencer Gifts’ right to
dismissal for a statutory speedy trial violation vested when, under
the weight of valid precedent from this court, it obtained dismissal
in the district court. There was nothing left for Spencer Gifts to do
to secure its right. See Dupree, 304 Kan. at 52 (a vested right is one
that depends on no future act, contingency, or decision).

Applying Bollacker, neither party disputes that Spencer Gifts
did not meet a plain condition of the speedy trial statute. Spencer
Gifts was not held to answer on an appearance bond. So by its plai
language K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) did not apply. Our deci-
sion today to overrule Bollacker by relying on the plain language of
KS.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) cannot resurrect the appropriately
dismissed charges against Spencer Gifts because doing so would
eradicate a complete defense. See Dupree, 304 Kan. at 55 (qualify-
ing for a complete and total defense signifies the vesting of a right);
Noah, 246 Kan. at 292-95 (extending statute of limitations period
cannot resurrect expired charges).

3. The State’s alternative argument that a corporation is not
entitled to speedy trial protection is waived.

The State offers, as an alternative to the argument we have dis-
cussed above, an argument that K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b) and
Bollacker should not apply to Spencer Gifts because it does not
make sense for a corporation, who could not be jailed, to have a
speedy trial right. To support this claim, the State notes that busi-
ness entities are not entitled to all the same constitutional rights
afforded to natural persons. Further, the State points out that the
United States Supreme Court has not definitively decided the con-
stitutional speedy trial rights of corporate entities.

Still, the State has cited no on-point authority to support its
argument that a business entity is not entitled to rights under a
speedy trial statute. The failure to support a point with pertinent
authority is akin to abandonment and constitutes waiver of an argu-
ment. See State v. Tague, 296 Kan. 993, 1001, 298 P.3d 273 (2013).
Moreover, the weight of authority, even as to constitutional rights,
actually stands against the State’s position. See, ¢.g., United States
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 734, 737-41 (9th Cir.
1989) (applying statutory and constitutional speedy trial to corpo-
rate defendant); United States v. Rivera Const. Co., 863 F.2d 293,
295-97 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying statutory speedy trial to corporate
defendant); United States v. Litton Systems, Inc., 722 F.2d 264,
265-66 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying constitutional speedy trial to cor-
poration); United States v. New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600
F.2d 368, 372-77 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying statutory speedy trial to
corporate defendant); United States v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844, 847-
50 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying constitutional speedy trial to corporate
defendant); People v. Slender Wrap, 36 Colo. App. 11, 15-19, 536
P.2d 850 (1975) (applying statutory and constitutional speedy trial
to corporate defendant even though corporation could not be ar-
rested); People v. Crawford Distributing Co., 78 Ill. 2d 70, 78-81,
397 N.E.2d 1362 (1979) (considering statutory speedy trial for cor-
porate defendant); State v. Empak, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex.
App. 1994) (“Corporations have a speedy trial right under federal
and Texas constitutions.”). ;

Even acknowledging the State’s point that a corporation’s con-

771

stitutional speedy trial rights remain unsettled, we struggle to see
how uncertainty about constitutional rights have relevance to the
statutory issue before us. A limited liability company, like Spencer
Gifts, is statutorily defined as a “Person” under K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
17-7663(1). And “any person charged with a crime and held to an-
swer on an appearance bond” has a right to a trial 180 days after
arraignment. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b).
Regardless of whether an LLC could assert a constitutional speedy
tial right, which was never Spencer Gifts’ claim here, the State has
not presented us with any reason why an LLC—statutorily defined
as a person—would not have a statutory speedy trial right if indeed
it was held to answer on an appearance bond. As before, we deem
this point abandoned. Tague, 296 Kan. at 1001 (failure to show a
point is sound in the face of contrary authority is akin to abandon-
ment). This means, at least under the arguments as presented to
us, Spencer Gifts could rely on Bollacker for relief under K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 22-3402(b).

4. KS.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(g) does not prevent Spencer
Gifts from obtaining relief.

There is little merit to the State’s next alternative argument,
which is that K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(g), as interpreted in State
v. Brownlee, 302 Kan. 491, 354 P.3d 525 (2015), removes Spencer
Gifts’ remedy of dismissal. In Brownlee, a majority of this court
held that the legislature removed the remedy of dismissal for a stat-
utory speedy trial violation when a delay is initially charged—in-
correctly—to a defendant but subsequently corrected and charged
to the State. 302 Kan. at 510-11; see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-
3402(g) (“If a delay is initially attributed to the defendant, but is
subsequently charged to the state for any reason, such delay. . .
shall not be used as a ground for dismissing a case.”). But see
Brownlee, 302 Kan. at 524-28 (Luckert, J., dissenting).

In this case, the first district judge held that Spencer Gifts did
not have a speedy trial right under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3402(b).
Subsequently, another district judge disagreed and dismissed the
case because the State failed to bring Spencer Gifts to trial within
180 days. There may have been judicial disagreement, but there
was never a dispute about the attribution of delays or whether cer-

tain days were chargeable against the State. Unlike Brownlee, the
issue here was whether statutory speedy trial applied at all—the
latter district judge did not subsequently charge the State with de-
lays initially attributed to Spencer Gifts. Likewise, the plain lan-
guage of K.S.A, 2015 Supp. 22-3402(g), which foreclosed relief
in Brownlee, did not apply here to foreclose dismissal of the case
against Spencer Gifts.

CONCLUSION

We overrule City of Elkhart v. Bollacker, 243 Kan. 543, 757 P.2d
311 (1988), and hold that a defendant not held to answer on an
appearance bond has no statutory speedy trial right under K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 22-3402(b). However, we affirm the dismissal of the
charges against Spencer Gifts because its right to dismissal for a
statutory speedy trial violation had vested under the prior binding
law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court
is affirmed. The decision of the district court to dismiss the charg-
es against Spencer Gifts for a violation of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-
3402(b) is affirmed.

Nos. 106,586
106,587

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. JEROLD MICHAEL DuNN,
Appellant.
(375 P3d 332)

x
q

Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on
the briefs for appellant.

Stephen P. Jones, deputy county attorney, argued the cause, and Hillary McK-
inney, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on
the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BEIER, J.: Defendant Jerold Michael Dunn appeals his convic-
tions on one count of forgery and one count of stalking. For the
first time on appeal, he urges us to abandon the analytical struc-
ture erected by State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 760-61, 764-65, 793
P.2d 737 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Ferguson v.
State, 276 Kan. 428, 78 P.3d 40 (2003), and argues that the charg-
ing document's failure to allege all of the elements of the crime
of forgery deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Dunn
also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on his stalking con-
viction.

On the way to resolution of these issues, we revisit and realign
the Kansas approach to charging document sufficiency. We con-
clude that charging documents do not bestow or confer subject
matter jurisdiction on state courts, and thus they need not allege
every element of a crime in order to invoke a district court’s sub-
ject matter jutisdiction or sustain an appellate court's jurisdiction.
However, omission of certain information from a charging docu-

715

ment may give a criminal defendant a successful claim for relief
that will take various forms at various stages of a prosecution before
the district court and on appeal.

Ultimately, under the revised pattern of analysis we describe to-
day, we affirm both of Dunn’s convictions.

INTRODUCTION

Each criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial. But there are
few, if any, perfect trials. This is inevitable because trials are human
endeavors.

The essential task of an appellate court when reviewing criminal
cases is discerning which proceedings are so imperfect that they are
unfair. Certainly, there are singular, critical aspects of a prosecution
that cannot be done wrong or done without. Error affecting other
aspects can be disregarded as long as the appellate court possesses
a specified level of confidence that the error made no difference.

This court has been vexed for many years by difficulties in dis-
tinguishing one from the other when it comes to error in charging
documents in criminal cases. Are such errors potentially fatal to
subject matter jurisdiction? If so, how do we tell when they are so
imperfect that jurisdiction is implicated? Even if charging docu-
ments are not jurisdictional instruments, how do we tell when they
are so imperfect that they have failed to fulfill their function of
informing the defendant about the crime alleged so that he or she
can challenge the State’s case?

We have state constitutional provisions that shed some light on
this subject. We have statutes designed to tell us what must be in
a complaint, information, or indictment—the three charging docu-
ments conventionally employed in Kansas. And we have dozens
and dozens of cases that have wrestled with the nature and content
of charging documents, cases nearly as old as the state and as fresh
as today’s blog post. These cases are listable and describable, but
not all are amenable to seamless or even sensible synthesis, the
lawyer’s stock in trade.

One case, in particular, has been the bane of the criminal de-
fense lawyers’ existence for more than 25 years: State v. Hall, 246
Kan. 728, 793 P.2d 737 (1990). Today defendant Dunn urges us to

776

reject Hall, at least to the degree that it made it more difficult for
defendants to mount a successful jurisdictional challenge based on
charging document error raised for the first time on appeal. Dunn
argues that this part of Hall has never made sense. Subject matter
jurisdiction exists or it does not, and all parties and the court are
independently charged with ensuring that it does exist before dis-
posing of any other issue in a case. Dunn insists that the timing of
raising the question matters not one whit.

After comprehensive study, we have determined that it has been
too easy to point out this flaw in Hall and apparently almost im-
possible for this court and those who come before it to appreciate
its other, substantial virtues. Today we review what led this court
to Hall and to a recent partial retreat from it, examining historic
Kansas constitutional, statutory, and caselaw developments. We at-
tempt to preserve what was good in Hall and say goodbye to its
logical and legal infirmities.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

During a break in their on-again-off-again relationship, defen-
dant Dunn and Tracy Shaw, who had obtained a protection order
against Dunn, encountered one another at a bank in Parsons. Shaw
visited the bank daily as part of her job as a courier. According to
bank employees, Dunn had been wandering around outside the
bank before Shaw’s arrival, and he eventually entered the bank,
inquired about opening a checking account, and then appeared to
leave. Shaw arrived some time later. While she was inside, Dunn
reappeared and approached the bank’s glass front doors. When
Dunn waved at Shaw, a bank employee heard Shaw say, “That's
harassment,” and Shaw appeared to be “nervous and afraid, scared,
upset.” The employee offered Shaw the use of a telephone to call
police, but Shaw declined.

Once it appeared that Dunn had again departed, Shaw left the
bank to go to her car. As she was walking toward it, Dunn reap-
peared and positioned himself between Shaw and her car door.
From inside the bank, the employee saw Dunn get “right into
[Shaws] face, and . . . point] his finger.” The employee said that
Dunn “looked real mad” at Shaw.

Shaw would eventually testify that she was afraid and felt unsafe
during this encounter with Dunn at the bank. Shaw also testified
on direct examination about statements Dunn made to her at the
time of the confrontation near her car; but she said she could not
remember those statements during cross-examination. As a result
of Shaw’s memory lapse, the district judge struck her earlier direct
examination testimony about Dunn’s statements.

A month after the bank encounter, Dunn and Shaw reunited,
and Shaw sought to have the protection order lifted.

A few weeks later, Dunn went to a smoke shop to buy cigarettes.
Dunn presented the cashier with a prewritten check drawn on
Shaw’s bank account. The cashier told Dunn that the signature on
the check was in the wrong place; it appeared on the check’s memo
line rather than on its signature line. Dunn then signed “Tracy Al-
ford,” the other name by which Shaw is known, on the check’s sig-
nature line. According to Shaw, she never authorized Dunn to use
her check for this smoke shop transaction.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The State charged Dunn with various offenses in four separate
cases. In Case 09 CR 333, the multiple charges were for forgery
and theft. Count 8 in the eventual Amended Complaint/Informa-
tion stated:

“That on or about the 27th day of July, 2009, in Labette County, Kansas, Jerold
M. Dunn, then and there being present did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
issue[] or deliver{] a check (#1050) which he/she knew had been made, altered
or endorsed so that it appeared to have been made, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3710
and against the peace and dignity of the State of Kansas. (Forgery-Passing) Sever-
ity level 8 Non-person Felony, (7-23 months).”

In Case 09 CR 210, the State charged Dunn with one count of
stalking, based on his behavior at and outside the bank.

All four cases were consolidated and tried to the bench. Dunn
was convicted on Count 8 of forgery in Case 09 CR 333, on the
stalking count in Case 09 CR 210, and on two counts of violation of
the protection order that were part of Case Nos. 09 CR 203 and 09
CR 398. The protection order counts are not at issue in this appeal.

Dunn appealed only his forgery and stalking convictions to the

Court of Appeals. On the forgery conviction, he argued for the first
time on appeal that Count 8 lacked multiple elements required
by the statute defining the crime, K.S.A. 21-3710. He argued that
the count “lack{ed] any language alleging the essential element
of an ‘intent-to defraud.’” He also argued that the count failed to
specify any of the listed statutory means of committing the act of
forgery and failed to allege that Dunn lacked authority to use the
check as he had. These charging document defects prejudiced the
preparation of Dunn’s defense “because he could not reasonably
be expected to defend himself against charges of a noncrime,”
impaired his ability to plead any conviction in a subsequent pros-
ecution “because there was no way to know what act of his could
reasonably have been considered criminal under the statute,” and
limited his substantial rights to a fair trial “because he was never
fully informed as to what charge he should be defending himself
against.” In short, Dunn asserted, the complaint did not “‘by any
reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defen-
dant [was] convicted.’”

The State characterized each of the defendant's challenges to
Count 8 as “technical” and asserted that any omissions could not
undermine a post-Hall presumption of the charging document's
validity. It urged the Court of Appeals to rule that the count was
not “‘so defective that it does not, by any reasonable construction,
charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted,’” because
Dunn and his series of three different defense lawyers were able to
mount a “credible” defense to the forgery count, including cross-
examination of the smoke shop personnel who accepted the check
and Dunn's own direct testimony about Shaw’s authorization of his
use of the check.

A panel of our Court of Appeals affirmed both of Dunn’s con-
victions. See State v. Dunn, Nos. 106,586 and 106,587, 2012 WL
3290004 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion). On the forgery
conviction, the panel stated that the question was whether the
charging document was sufficient to confer subject matter juris-
diction, and it therefore applied an unlimited standard of review.
Observing that Count 8's omission of an allegation of intent to de-
fraud was undisputed by the State, the panel filled in the blanks by

7719

means of Count 4 of the Amended Complaint/Information, a count
on which Dunn had not been bound over after preliminary hear-
ing. Count 4 alleged that Dunn unlawfully, feloniously, and know-
ingly made, altered, or endorsed the same check that was at issue in
Count 8 with intent to defraud. 2012 WL 3290004, at *3. The panel
also concluded that Dunn’s attempt to prove that Shaw authorized
his use of the check demonstrated that he was not prejudiced in his
defense of Count 8 nor impaired in his ability to plead, and that he
was not prevented from realizing his right to a fair trial.

This court granted Dunn’s petition for review. In that petition,
Dunn did not argue that the Court of Appeals panel incorrectly
applied the post-Hall analysis of his defective complaint challenge
raised for the first time on appeal. Rather, he quoted language from
our decision in State v. Portillo, 294 Kan. 242, 274 P.3d 640 (2012).
In that decision, the court expressed skepticism about the sound-
ness of the Hall differentiation between defective complaint claims
raised initially in the district court and those raised for the first time
in the appellate court:

“Tt gives one pause to look closely at how the Hall rule works, During the jury
trial, the charging document would be jurisdictionally and fatally defective if it
omitted an essential element and the trial court would not have jurisdiction to
enter any resulting conviction. However, if the defendant later failéd to file a mo-
tion for arrest of judgment, the charging document and resulting conviction would
somehow acquire retroactive validity. That notion appears to run counter to the
rule that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created by waiver, estoppel, or con-
sent. See [State v.] Ellmaker, 289 Kan. [1132,] 1151, [221 P.3d 1105 (2009), cert.
denied 560 U.S. 966 (2010)]. Likewise, the constraint on raising the jurisdictional
issue for the first time on appeal is inconsistent with our holdings that allow a
challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction to be raised at any time.
See State v. Sales, 290 Kan. 130, 135, 224 P.3d 546 (2010). Moreover, we recently
declared that appellate courts have ‘no authority to create equitable exceptions to
jurisdictional requirements.’ Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs 0. City of Park
City, 293 Kan. 107, Syl. J 3, 260 P.3d 387 (2011).” Portillo, 294 Kan, at 255.
Dunn argued that the pre-Hall standard for evaluating defective
complaints should be applied here and that its application would
result in a ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction over Count 8.

After initial oral argument, we requested additional briefs and
argument on the following topics:

780

1. The history of and modern support or lack of support for
the Kansas rule that the charging document in a criminal
case either succeeds in conferring or fails to confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the court.

2. The standard that has been applied and that should be
applied to determine whether a charging document in a
Kansas criminal case is sufficient, deficient, or fatally de-
ficient—including whether the charging document must
contain all material elements of the crime in order to avoid
deficiency or fatal deficiency.

3. The historical, current, and appropriate future role of Kan-
sas statutory law and of state and federal constitutional law,
including Fifth Amendment due process and Sixth Amend-
ment notice principles, in determining whether a charging
document in a Kansas criminal case is sufficient, deficient,
or fatally deficient.

4, The controlling facts, holding, reasoning, and preceden-
tial value of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 629, 122 S. Ct. 1781,
152 L. Ed. 2d 860 (2002), and cases dealing with the valid-
ity of charging documents that have been decided since
Cotton in lower federal courts and in other state appellate
courts.

5. The correct remedy for a deficient or fatally deficient
charging’ document, when the flaw is identified by a crimi-
nal defendant for the first time pretrial, during trial, after
trial, on direct appeal, or in a collateral attack on the defen-
dant’s conviction or sentence.

6. The advisability of applying a more strict or less strict dis-
trict court preservation requirement or standard of review
to an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of a Kansas
charging document, see Hall, 246 Kan. 728, depending
upon the timing of a criminal defendant's first assertion of
such a claim or the procedural vehicle chosen to advance it.

In response to this court’s order, Dunn argued that a sufficient

731

charging document is required to endow a district court with sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over a criminal case as well as to adequately
charge a crime. Dunn asserted that a charging document's lack of
an allegation on any element of the crime makes it not only defi-
cient but also fatally so. Although a Fifth Amendment due process
claim or a Sixth Amendment notice claim can be waived and may
be subjected to a harmless error review on appeal, a subject mat-
ter jurisdiction problem can never be waived and must always be
considered by the court. This is true, Dunn argued, even if the
question arises on an appellate court’s own initiative, and the appli-
cable standard of review should not vary from one case to the next,
depending on when or through which procedural mechanism the
issue has surfaced.

With regard to Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, Dunn recognized the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court’s holding that, under federal law, defects
in a charging document no longer necessarily deprive a court of
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a case. Further, the Court
subjected a charging document error raised for the first time on
appeal to the “plain error” test of Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 52(b). 53 U.S. at 631. Dunn also acknowledged that federal
courts following Cotton include the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.
See United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1173 (LOth Cir. 2002);
United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 2014).
And courts in several of our sister states have decided likewise.
See, e.g,, State v. Ortiz, 162 N.H. 585, 589-90, 35 A.3d 599 (2011).
Nevertheless, Dunn argued, neither this court nor, any state court
is bound to do so. See State v. Apollonio, 130 Hawaii 353, 357-59,
311 P.3d 676 (2013) (applying Hawaii caselaw); State v. Johnson,
219 W. Va. 697, 700-02, 639 S.E.2d 789 (2006) (applying West Vir-
ginia law). Dunn also observed that, despite Cotton and the cases
that have followed it, certain flaws in federal charging documents
are still regarded as serious enough to deprive the court of subject
matter jurisdiction. See United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 713-
16 (11th Cir. 2002) (indictment that fails to charge federal crime
insufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction despite defen-
dant’s guilty plea).

On this case specifically, Dunn argued that K.S.A, 22-3201(b)

“782

permitted the State to incorporate allegations from another count
or counts in its charging document into Count 8, the count on
which Dunn was convicted, but the State did not seek to do so
here. Thus, in Dunn’s view, the Court of Appeals panel erred when
it looked to Count 4, a count on which Dunn had not even been
bound over, to fill in fatal omissions in Count 8.

On the question of remedy, Dunn urged this court to overrule
Hall as an aberration that erroneously excused subject matter ju-
tisdictional defects in charging documents. Although he acknowl-
edged that the appropriate procedural vehicle for seeking relief on
a claim that a charging document was fatally defective may vary
from one stage of a prosecution to another, he argued that all such
vehicles are directed at preventing or vacating a void judgment.
If the claim has merit, such prevention or vacation is inevitably
necessary.

The State’s response to this court’s order agreed with Dunn that
asufficient charging document is necessary to give the court subject
matter jurisdiction over a prosecution. It equated adequate notice
to a defendant of the State’s allegations of each of a charged crime’s
elements to “sufficiency” for subject matter jurisdiction purposes.
In essence, once a defendant is made aware of the allegations that
need to be defended, the State argued, it has met any obligation it
bore to create or invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.
The State divided our previous cases on charging document suffi-
ciency into three groups: (1) those in which a missing element was
not essential and the defendant was not misled or disadvantaged
by an omission; (2) those in which a missing element was supplied
through incorporation of other information in the charging docu-
ment, which meant the charging document was deficient but not
fatally so; and (3) those, as in Portillo, 294 Kan. at 257, and State v.
Minor, 197 Kan. 296, 299, 416 P.2d 724 (1966), in which a missing
element was so important that the defendant had been convicted
of a crime not charged or had been sentenced for a crime he or
she could not be expected to defend against, which meant that the
charging documents qualified as fatally deficient and that subject
matter jurisdiction was lacking.

On Cotton, the State’s response described the facts and holding

783

of the case without additional discussion of its applicability to this
case or of any subsequent cases following it.

The State supported continuation of Hall’s differentiation be-
tween the standard of review applicable when a defective com-
plaint claim is made for the first time in the district court and that
applicable when it is made for the first time on appeal. The State
argued that Hall struck a reasonable and appropriate balance be-
tween the rights of the accused and the justice and efficiency re-
quired by K.S.A. 22-2103, which states that Kansas’ criminal pro-
cedure statutes are “intended to provide for the just determination
of every criminal proceeding” and are to be construed “to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration[,] and the elimi-
nation of unjustifiable expense and delay.” In the State’s view, once
a defendant has demonstrated that he or she is informed enough
by a charging document to mount a defense, judicial review of the
document's language should be forgiving.

Dunn filed a reply to the State, in which he noted:

“It appears generally from the State’s supplemental brief that the State has
failed to recognize that the ability of a charging document to confer subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is a different matter than the ability of the charging document
to adequately inform the accused of the nature and cause of the action against
him. While a charging document that does not allege all of the essential elements
of the crime might be sufficient to adequately inform the accused of the nature
and cause of the action against him—particularly if the accused does not com-
plain about the constitutional sufficiency of the charging document at the time of
trial—that same charging document would be fatally defective because it failed
to confer jurisdiction on the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction upon a
finding of guilt.”

Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, we turn to our analysis.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT’S
FORGERY COUNT

Dunn’s initial, and dominant, appellate issue challenges the suf-
ficiency of Count 8 of the complaint to endow the district court
with subject matter jurisdiction over his prosecution for forgery.
He relies on Kansas caselaw repeatedly declaring that a Kansas
charging document is a jurisdictional instrument and beseeches us
to overrule Hall, 246 Kan. 728, which introduced a kinder, gentler-

— i 4

to-the-State appellate review of subject matter jurisdiction chal-
lenges to charging documents raised for the first time on appeal.

The question of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is one
of law subject to unlimited review on appeal. Kingsley v. Kansas
Dept. of Revenue, 288 Kani. 390, Syl. { 2, 204 P.3d 562 (2009).

“Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear
and decide a particular type of action.” State v. Matzke, 236 Kan.
833, 835, 696 P.2d 396 (1985); see Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630 (subject
matter jurisdiction refers to “‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate the case’”). The existence of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived, and its nonexistence may be chal-
lenged at any time. See, ¢.g., Trotter v. State, 288 Kan. 112, Syl.
{| 4, 200 P.3d 1236 (2009). A conviction obtained in a court without
subject matter jurisdiction is void. See State v. Elliott, 281 Kan.
583, Syl. { 3, 133 P.3d 1253 (2006).

All of the six topics on which we sought additional briefing and
argument from the parties were related to this issue. We address
them in the order listed with the exception of the fourth on Cotton
and its progeny. We address Cotton first because of its relevance
to our identification of the law controlling various aspects of this
decision.

United States v. Cotton

In Cotton, the United States Supreme Court considered a chal-
lenge to an indictment that failed to allege the quantity of cocaine
and cocaine base that defendants had allegedly conspired to dis-
tribute and possess with intent to distribute. 535 U.S. at 627-28.
Under the applicable federal law, a conviction for a drug offense
involving a detectable quantity of cocaine or cocaine base carried a
maximum imprisonment term of 20 years. For convictions involv-
ing 50 grams or more of cocaine base, the maximum sentence in-
creased to life imprisonment. After the jury convicted defendants,
the federal district court judge found, based on trial testimony, that
defendants were responsible for at least 500 grams of cocaine base
and imposed enhanced sentences. The defendants did not object
in district court to the fact that their sentences were based on a
quantity not alleged in the indictment.

On appeal, the defendants argued that their sentences were in-
valid under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348,
147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), because the issue of drug quantity was
neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted to the jury. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed for plain error
based on the defendants’ failure to object before the district court.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals vacated defendants’ sentences
“on the ground that ‘because an indictment setting forth all the es-
sential elements of an offense is both mandatory and jurisdictional,
. a court is without jurisdiction to . . . impose a sentence for an
offense not charged in the indictment.” Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629.
The Court of Appeals relied on Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7S. Ct.
781, 30 L. Ed. 849 (1887), which had concluded that, because of a
defective indictment, “‘the jurisdiction of the offence [was] gone,
and the court [had] no right to proceed any further in the progress
of the case for want of an indictment.” Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629
(quoting Bain, 121 U.S. at 13).

The Supreme Court rejected “the Court of Appeals’ conclu-
sion that the omission from the indictment was a ‘jurisdictional’
defect.” 535 U.S. at 629. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that post-
Bain cases soon departed from Bain’s idea that defects in an indict-
ment deprived a court of jurisdiction. See Lamar v. United States,
240 U.S. 60, 36 S. Ct. 255, 60 L. Ed. 526 (1916) (failure of indict-
ment to charge a crime not jurisdictional defect, “goes only to the
merits of the case”). He explained that the “‘expansive notion’” of
jurisdiction typical of the Bain-era cases was a “product of an era
in which the Court's authority to review criminal convictions was
greatly circumscribed.” 535 U.S. at 629 (early authority to afford
habeas relief limited to criminal cases in which convicting court
lacked jurisdiction). The modern understanding of jurisdiction in-
stead referred to “‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.’” 535 U.S. at 630 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens
for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L.
Ed 2d 210 [1998]). The Court then applied the federal plain er-
ror test to the defendants’ forfeited claim. Because the evidence
that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was
“‘overwhelming’ and ‘essentially uncontroverted,’” the Court held

that defendants’ rights were not substantially affected, reversing
the Court of Appeals. 535 U.S. at 633-34.

Since Cotton, as Dunn has recognized, both the Tenth and Elev-
enth Circuits have applied its general rule that the absence of an
element of the crime in a charging document does not doom sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. But the Eleventh Circuit has nevertheless
identified one situation in which an indictment that failed to charge
a federal crime was fatal to a prosecution.

In the Tenth Circuit’s Avery, 295 F.3d at 1164, defendant Jona-
than Avery was indicted by a federal grand jury on eight counts,
which included charges that Avery possessed cocaine base with an
intent to distribute and knowingly possessed specific firearms in
relation to a drug trafficking crime. Avery argued on appeal that
his convictions tied to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime must be reversed because of deficiencies in
the indictment, including deficiencies that deprived the trial court
of jurisdiction. 295 F.3d at 1164. The panel rejected Avery's argu-
ment, relying on United States v. Prentiss, 256.F.3d 971, 981 (10th
Cir. 2001) (en banc), in which the court had stated: “‘An indict-
ment’s failure to allege an element of a crime is not jurisdictional in
the sense that it affects a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, i.¢., a
court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case.’” Av-
ery, 295 F.3d at 1173. The panel then noted that the United States
Supreme Court had endorsed this position in Cotton. In the panel's
view, Prentiss and Cotton “foreclosed squarely” Avery's challenge.
Avery, 295 F.3d at 1173.

In the Eleventh Circuit, the panel in Brown, 752 F.3d at 1345,
applied the holding of Cotton to reject defendant Danielle Brown’s
argument that her indictment was defective because it did not ex-
pressly allege the mens rea element of the charged offense. Brown
had pleaded guilty to “knowingly receiving 481 counterfeit United
States Postal Money Orders from a foreign country with the in-
tent to pass and publish these same counterfeit money orders as
true.” 752 F.3d at 1345. The panel discussed a series of pre-Cotton
Eleventh Circuit cases holding that omission of an element of a
crime from an indictment did not deprive a court of jurisdiction.
Brown, 752 F.3d at 1349-50. The panel then noted that the United

States Supreme Court had confirmed the Eleventh Circuit's posi-
tion when it addressed the questions presented in those cases in
Cotton. Brown, 752 F.3d at 1350. The panel acknowledged the
distinction between an indictment that fails to allege an element
of a crime and one that fails to constitute a crime. “[T]here is no
jurisdictional defect when the ‘indictment faills] to allege an ele-
ment of the charged offense,’ but there is one when the indictment
affirmatively alleges conduct that does not constitute a crime at all
because that conduct falls outside the sweep of the charging stat-
ute.” 752 F.3d at 1352 (quoting Peter, 310 F.3d at 714).

As pointed out by Dunn, the earlier Peter panel of the Eleventh
Circuit had persisted in regarding a defective complaint as a subject
matter jurisdiction rather than a statutory problem. Peter arose on
coram nobis because defendant Michael J. Peter did not challenge
the sufficiency of the charging document to support the court's ju-
risdiction until after he had entered a guilty plea and served his
sentence. The alleged flaw was that the conduct charged and ad-
mitted to was not proscribed by the federal statute invoked, the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1961 et seq. The panel distinguished the recently decided Cotton:

“Unlike the error asserted here, there was no claim in Cotton that the indict-
ment consisted only of specific conduct that, as a mattér of law, was outside the
sweep of the charging statute. Rather, the conviction reviewed in Cotton had been
obtained on an indictment that unquestionably described the offense of conspir-
ing to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The indictment
omission went only to the legality of the defendants’ sentences. Furthermore, the
prosecution's evidence had been ‘overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted’
on the very point of fact which the indictment had erroneously failed to allege.
[Citation omitted.] Hence the Supreme Court did not address whether the insuf-
ficiency of an indictment assumes a jurisdictional dimension when the only facts
it alleges, and on which a subsequent guilty plea is based, describe conduct that is
not proscribed by the charging statute.” Peter, 310 F.3d at 714.

Ultimately, the panel decided “it is clear under these circumstanc-
es that the Government's proof of the alleged conduct, no matter
how overwhelming, would have brought it no closer to showing
the crime charged than would have no proof at all,” and “Peter's
innocence of the charged offense appears from the very allegations
made in the superseding information, not from the omission of an

allegation requisite to liability.” 310 F.3d at 715. Based on this, the
district court, although broadly endowed with original and exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United
States, was without jurisdiction to accept Peter's plea. Peter, 310
F.3d at 715.

These federal cases are instructive ini this case on at least three
points.

First, they demonstrate that any Kansas rule that a charging
document including every element of a crime is essential to the ex-
istence of subject matter jurisdiction lias no current basis in federal
law. Since Cotton overruled Bain, if the rule exists at all, it must be
supported by state law—in our case, the Kansas Constitution, Kan-
sas statute, or Kansas common law. Both Hawaii and West Virginia
courts have grasped and agreed on this source-of-law lesson from
Cotton. See Apollonio, 130 Hawaii at 355-59 (applying Hawaii law);
Johnson, 219 W. Va, at 700 (applying West Virginia law).

Second, Cotton's evaluation of whether there was federal plain
error requiring reversal reminds us that, to the extent a defective
complaint issue before our court is dependent on an alleged im-
pairment of constitutional due process or notice under the federal
Bill of Rights, federal law informs the standard of review for error
and for harmlessness. These inquiries are distinct from state law
inquiries about charging document error and its effect or lack of
effect on the district or appellate court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Conflation of these analyses and their governing law is to be
avoided. .

And third, based on Peter, we recognized that there may be
cases in which the conduct alleged in a charging document, even
ifa defendant has admitted to engaging in it, does not constitute a
violation of the criminal statute invoked.

Historical Support for Hall’s Jurisdictional Instrument Rule

The first issue on which we sought the parties’ additional input
was “[t]he history of and modern support or lack of support for the
Kansas rule that the charging document in a criminal case either
succeeds in conferring or fails to confer subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the court.” The responses we received were something less

than robust. In essence, Dunn asserted that the rule exists and the
State capitulated. Our research has revealed that the stability of
the Kansas jurisdictional instrument rule, though often recited, is
highly questionable.

The rule originated in 1966 with a pronouncement in Minor,
197 Kan. 296, although Hall would neither cite Minor nor acknow!-
edge its paternity. We discuss Minor itself more fully below, but,
before doing so, turn to an examination of state constitutional law,
statutory law, and caselaw leading up to its pivotal link between
charging documents and subject matter jurisdiction.

To begin with, at the time Minor was decided, Article 3, Section
1, of the Kansas Constitution had vested “judicial power of this
state” in the “supreme court, district court, probate courts, justices
of the peace, and such other courts, inferior to the supreme court,
as may be provided by law.” Since 1972, the passage has located
the judicial power of the state “exclusively in one court of justice,”
divided into the Supreme Court, “district courts, and such other
courts as are provided by law.” Another section, now found at Ar-
ticle 3, Section 6(b), has always provided that the “district courts
shall have such jurisdiction in their respective districts as may be
provided by law.”

As our predecessors recognized in Hall, several statutes also
have governed. They continue, when given appropriate attention,
to reinforce the constitution’s language and clarify the true source
of district court subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases.
K.S.A. 20-301 or a predecessor provision has provided since 1868
that there “shall be in each county” a district court that “shall have
general original jurisdiction” on all matters, “both civil and crimi-
nal,” unless otherwise provided by law. See G.S. 1868, ch. 28, art.
1, sec. 1. In addition, since 1868, Kansas statutes have provided
that “[t]he district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction”
in all felony cases. See G.S, 1868, ch. 31, art. 10, sec. 308. K.S.A.
22-2601 now provides that, except as provided in K.S.A. 12-4104
dealing with the jurisdiction of municipal courts, “the district court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to try all cases of felony and other
criminal cases arising under the statutes of the state of Kansas.” See
also Chelf v. State, 46 Kan. App. 2d 522, 529, 263 P.3d 852 (2011)

790

(subject matter jurisdiction vested by statute, constitution) (citing
Kingsley, 288 Kan. at 395).

Meanwhile, Kansas statutes have historically provided and still
provide for several different mechanisms to commence or insti-
tute a criminal prosecution. See G.S. 1868, ch. 82, art. 5, sec. 36
(complaint); G.S. 1868, ch. 82, art. 6, sec. 66 (indictment, informa-
tion). Since 1976, K.S.A. 22-3201 (a) has provided that generally
prosecutions in district court “shall be upon complaint, indictment
or information.” See also K.S.A. 22-2301(1) (“[ulnless otherwise
provided by law, a prosecution shall be commenced by filing a com-
plaint with a magistrate”). K.S.A. 22-2202 defines a complaint as a
“written statement under oath of the essential facts constituting a
crime.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-3011 has set out the process
leading to indictment, and K.S.A. 22-2303(1) has set out the pro-
cess for initiating prosecution by filing an information. In addition
to the usual mechanisms of complaint, indictment, or information,
“in extreme cases, upon affidavits filed . . . of a commission of a
crime,” K.S.A. 22-2301(2) has permitted a district judge to order a
county attorney to institute criminal proceedings.

Since 1970, K.S.A. 22-3201 has set forth the required contents
for charging documents and has noted ways in which the charging
document may be amended by the court or the State or be aug-
mented after a defense motion for a bill of particulars:

“(b) The complaint, information or indictment shall be a plain and concise
written statement of the essential facts constituting the crime charged, which
complaint information or indictment, drawn in the language of the statute, shall
be deemed sufficient. The precise time of the commission of an offense need not
be stated in the indictment or information; but it is sufficient if shown to have
been within the statute of limitations, except where the time is an indispensable
ingredient in the offense. An indictment shall be signed by the presiding juror of
the grand jury. An information shall be signed by the county attorney, the attorney
general or any legally appointed assistant or deputy of either. A complaint shall be
signed by some person with Inowledge of the facts. Allegations made in one count
may be incorporated by reference in another count. The complaint, information
or indictment shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the
statute, rule and regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is al-
Jeged to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission shall {not be] ground
for dismissal of the complaint, information or indictment or for reversal of a con-
viction if the error or omission did not prejudice the defendant.

“(c) When relevant, the complaint, information or indictment shall also allege
facts sufficient to constitute a crime or specific crime subcategory in the crime
seriousness scale.

“(d) The court may strike surplusage from the complaint, information or in-
dictment.

“(e) The court may permit a complaint or information to be amended at any
time before verdict or finding if no additional or different crime is charged and if
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.

“(f) When a complaint, information or indictment charges a crime but fails to
specify the particulars of the crime sufficiently to enable the defendant to prepare
a defense the court may, on written motion of the defendant, require the pros-
ecuting attorney to furnish the defendant with a bill of particulars. At the trial the
state’s evidence shall be confined to the particulars of the bill.” (Emphasis added.)

This statute’s focus on inclusion of facts constituting a crime in
Kansas is reminiscent of its earliest antecedent. Chapter 82, Article
8, Section 103 of the General Statutes of Kansas 1868, effective
1868, provided that an indictment or information “must contain:
... [a] statement of the facts constituting the offense, in plain and
concise language, without repetition.” (Emphasis added.) Section
104 of the same Article stated that the indictment or information
must be “direct and certain, as it regards the party and the offense
charged.” Section 109 stated that the indictment would be suffi-
cient if it included, among other things, a statement that “the of-
fense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, or is tri-
able therein,” which appears to be a reference to territorial rather
than subject matter jurisdiction. These concepts endured through
several changes in statutory numbering during the 102 years be-
tween 1868 and 1970. See G.S. 1949, 62-1004; G.S. 1949, 62-1005;
G.S. 1949, 62-1010.

We also note that the possibility of different forms of cure under
Subsections (d), (e), and (f) of K.S.A. 22-3201 indicate that a court
is not automatically deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by a
defect in a charging document. In addition, Subsection (b) allows
a prosecution to be continued in spite of an error or omission in
the required citation to the provision of law alleged to be violated,
unless a defendant has suffered prejudice. This also indicates at a
minimum that not all errors in complaints, indictments, or infor-
mations are fatal to subject matter jurisdiction.

Again, these possibilities of at least limited district court cure for

Pe

a charging document that is in some manner deficient have deep
roots in Kansas law. See G.S. 1868, ch. 82, art. 6, sec. 72 (“An in-
formation may be amended in matter of substance or form at any
time before the defendant pleads, without leave. The information
may be amended on the trial as to all matters of form, at the discre-
tion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the defendant.”). In addition, Chapter 82, Article 8,
Section 110 provided that no indictment or information could be
quashed or set aside

“for any of the following defects: First, For a mistake in the name of the court or
county in the title thereof. Second, For the want of an allegation of the time or
place of any material fact, when the venue and time have once been stated in the
indictment or information. Third, That dates and numbers are represented by fig-
ures. Fourth, For an omission of any of the following allegations, viz: “With force
and arms,’ ‘Contrary to the form of the statute,’ or, ‘Against the peace and dignity
of the state of Kansas.’ Fifth, For an omission to allege that the grand jurors were
impaneled, sworn or charged. Sixth, For any surplusage or repugnant allegation,
when there is sufficient matter alleged to indicate the crime and person charged;
nor Seventh, For any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the
prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.”

An indictment or information could be quashed under this early
enactment when “it appear[ed] upon its face” that the facts stated
did not “constitute a public offense.” G.S. 1868, ch. 82, art. 11, sec.
225.

Since 1970, K.S.A. 22-3208 has discussed at least some of the
ways in which a defendant should challenge an error in the com-
mencement of a prosecution. It takes pains to provide that a chal-
lenge to a charging document for failure to show jurisdiction in the
court or to charge a crime need not be raised prior to plea or trial.

“(8) Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecu-
tion or in the complaint, information or indictment other than that it fails to show
jurisdiction in the court or to charge a crime may be raised only by motion before
trial. The motion shall include all such defenses and objections then available to
the defendant. Failure to present any such defense or objection as herein pro-
vided constitutes a waiver thereof, but he court for cause shown may grant relief
from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction or the failure of the complaint, information
or indictment to charge a crime shall be noticed by the court at any time during
the pendency of the proceeding.

“(4) ... A plea of guilty or a consent to trial upon a complaint, information or

indictment shall constitute a waiver of defenses and objections based upon the in-
stitution of the prosecution or defects in the complaint, information or indictment
other than it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge a crime.”

A different subsection of the same statute further suggests that
neither a defect in a complaint, indictment, or information nor an-
other type of defect in the institution of a prosecution necessarily
deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction, because the de-
fendant may be held in custody or on an appearance bond contin-
ued up to 1 day after relief is granted on a motion challenging the
defect. See K.S.A. 22-3208(6).

Once a district court judgment has been entered and before a

direct appeal, Kansas statutes also have provided since 1868 that
a defendant may file a motion for arrest of judgment if the com-
plaint, indictment, or information “does not charge a crime or if
the court was without jurisdiction of the crime charged.” K.S.A.
22-3502. At the time of Dunn’s trial and now, the time limit for
such a motion has been 14 days after verdict or finding of guilt or
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, unless the court extends the
deadline. This availability of a last-ditch district court procedural
mechanism for challenging the sufficiency of a charging document
or the absence of jurisdiction, whose availability was limited to 10
lays in 1990 when Hall as decided, eventually proved particularly
important to this court.
Like the constitutional and statutory provisions with which we
have become reacquainted above, caselaw predating Minor did not
invariably support its characterization of charging documents as
the instruments conferring or bestowing subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the courts. And it did not make all errors in them fatal to
that jurisdiction.

Under Kansas common law, certain components of a charging
locument and certain procedures concerning it have been re-
quired, but courts have aimed from the beginning to leave strict
“technical certainty” behind. See Wessels v. Territory, McCahon
100, 1 Kan. (Dassler’s ed.) 525, 1860 WL 3387 (1860) (citing Acts
of 1859, Section 95 at 197) (good indictment names defendant,
shows offense committed within territorial jurisdiction of court,
sets forth offense in plain language; “the offense charged is stated

with such a degree of certainty that the court may pronounce judg-
ment upon conviction”).

In the first few decades of statehood, for example, the court
ruled that it was necessary for a charging document to originate
with the proper authority. See Jackson v. State, 4 Kan. 150 (1867).
It also must demonstrate that the court possessed territorial juris-
diction. See Territory v. Freeman, McCahon 56, 1 Kan. (Dassler’s
ed.) 491, 1858 WL 4421 (1858); see also State v. Hoffman, 171 Kan.
116, 117, 119, 229 P.2d 768 (1951) (embezzlement defendant suc-
cessfully moved to quash amended information; defendant had ab-
sconded to California, had there refused victim’s demand for mon-
ey’s return; no allegation defendant gained possession of money in
Reno County, Kansas). And it must allege facts that constituted a
Kansas offense. See State v. Pittman, 10 Kan. 593, 597-98 (1873)
(information charged defendant with selling liquor without license
from county, failed to allege defendant lacked license from city; no
crime charged); see also State v. Pitzer, 23 Kan. 250, 252 (1880)
(indictment failed to allege lack of license for all permissible means
of selling liquor; want of one means does not negate existence of
others; grant of motion to quash affirmed for indictment’s lack of
“essential element”). But a mere technical error with no ill effect
on the substantial rights of the defendant could be disregarded.
See State v. Carey, 56 Kan. 84, 87-88, 42 P. 371 (1895) (failure to
affix seal immaterial, not prejudicial).

State v. Hinkle, 27 Kan, 308 (1882), is illustrative of 19th-centu-
ry analysis of charging documents. In that case, the court reversed
the defendant’s conviction because the complaint that launched
the prosecution failed to show territorial jurisdiction; it did not al-
lege that the crime occurred in Brown County. Before reaching
that issue, however, the court addressed the defendant’s argument
that the proceeding was wholly invalid because the complaint had
not been verified except through the filing of an amended version.
The defendant essentially asserted a lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion: “[T]here was at the commencement of the trial in the district
court no verified complaint on file, and... therefore there was no
valid proceeding pending against defendant, nothing which could
be amended, and. : . the court had no power to permit the filing of

795

a new and verified complaint.” 27 Kan. at 310. The court rejected
this argument, holding: “There was a prosecution pending against
the defendant, a complaint filed whether defective or not; and if
defective, the court had the power to permit the filing of a new and
perfect complaint at any stage of the proceedings. (Comp. Laws
1879, ch. 83, § 22.)” 27 Kan. at 310.

Another early case, State v. Brown, 21 Kan. 38 (1878), demon-
strated the necessity of stating facts that constitute a Kansas crime.
In Brown, the court reversed defendant's first-degree murder con-
viction because the indictment failed to allege either explicitly or
implicitly that the defendant killed the victim with premeditation.
Brown, 21 Kan. at 49-51; see also State v. Frazier, 53 Kan. 87, 91-
92, 36 P. 58 (1894) (reversing attempted rape conviction and re-
manding case for further proceedings because of information’s fail-
ure to allege specific overt act; essential element of offense should
be set forth in charge “so that the court may see whether or not
the law has been violated, and so the accused may know to what
he must make answer”). The court noted that the indictment may
have been sufficient to charge second-degree murder, but not first-
degree murder, and it reversed and remanded for retrial. Brown,
21 Kan. at 48, 50-52, 54. It is important to note that the court did
not dismiss the case entirely because of an absence of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, and it did not hold that the defendant stood con-
victed of the lesser offense of second-degree murder. It also did not
discuss why either of these remedies was not appropriate. It simply
allowed the parties to start over, each fully infon med about exactly
what was at stake.

In other cases involving alleged omissions from charging docu-
ments, the court rejected arguments that a prosecution was flawed
from its initiation. In State v. McGaffin, 36 Kan. 315, 318-20, 13 P.
560 (1887), the information charging murder failed to include the
words “malice aforethought” or “with intent to kill’ but the court
decided other language succeeded in conveying the same mean-
ing. See also State v. Hillis, 145 Kan. 456, 458, 65 P.2d 251 (1937)
(information’s use of the words “unlawfully,” “steal” connote crimi-
nal intent, follow language of statute; judgment in favor of defense
reversed, cause remanded with instructions to overrule motion to

quash information); State v. Goodrich, 136 Kan. 277, 278-79, 15
P2d 434 (1932) (no error in refusal to grant motion to quash in-
formation in worthless check prosecution; defendant's challenge
on basis of missing elements of crime baseless); State v. Morris,
124 Kan. 505, 507-08, 260 P. 629 (1927) (omission of “intent to
defraud” from charging document in forgery prosecution not fatal
to defendant’s conviction; missing element of offense mere “tech-
nical averment”); State v. Moore, 110 Kan. 732, 733, 205 P. 644
(1922) (motion to quash information charging attempted rape cor-
rectly overruled; information set out acts done by defendant in at-
tempt charged); State v. Johnson, 92 Kan. 441, 443-46, 140 P. 839
(1914) (information contained every element of offense of first-de-
gree murder, including deliberation inferred from other explicitly
stated elements; Brown distinguished); State v. Calhoun, 75 Kan.
259, 262, 88 P. 1079 (1907) (every essential element of forgery by
fraudulent passing of forged instrument included in charging docu-
ment despite inclusion of language describing other statutorily de-
fined method of committing forgery; conviction affirmed); State v.
Learned, 73 Kan. 328, 333, 85 P. 293 (1906) (information charging
incest sufficient even though it did not follow language of statute
exactly; “It has been so frequently decided by this court that it is
not requisite that the exact language of the statute be used, but that
other language of like import may be employed, that the citation of
the cases is unnecessary.”); State v. Jessup, 42 Kan. 422, 424, 22 P.
627 (1889) (charge including reference to burning barn to defraud
insurer adequate to convey essential element barn insured at time
of fire).

We also note that other cases from as early as the Brown-Mc-
Gaffin era held that differing appellate standards of review would
be applied to charging document challenges, depending on the
nature or timing of the objection raised. See State v. Decker, 52
Kan. 193, 194-95, 34 P. 780 (1893) (challenge to missing element
of crime in charging document allowed when raised in motion for
new trial, despite no motion to quash or motion to arrest judgment;
conviction for removing building from mortgaged property without
permission of assignee reversed); Jessup, 42 Kan. at 423-24 (fail-
ure to file motion to quash, motion to arrest judgment could end

797

case; motion for new trial construed as motion to arrest judgment
to reach merits of information’s sufficiency); City of Kingman v.
Berry, 40 Kan. 625, 627, 20 P. 527 (1889) (“[dlefects in a criminal
pleading which might be held bad in a motion to quash, if one was
made, are not always sufficient, after a verdict of guilty, to arrest
a judgment”; conviction on complaint failing to allege obstruction
of street, sidewalk upheld; “unlawfully kept and maintained” bar-
rels of oil adequate equivalent); State v. Segermond, 40 Kan. 107,
108, 112, 19 P. 370 (1888) (objection to information lodged after
verdict “must be considered in a different light here than as if such
bjections had been properly made at the trial”; “if on examination
it can be seen that the information was sufficiently explicit, first,
to enable the court to say that, admitting the facts, it had jurisdic-
tion; second, to apprise the defendant of the nature of the offense
charged, so as to give him an opportunity to make his defense; and
third, to make the judgment certain and available as a bar to any
subsequent prosecution for the same offense” then no remedy due;
legation that defendant took “twenty-five dollars in money” not
specific enough to provide sufficient notice under Kansas Constitu-
tion Bill of Rights; robbery conviction reversed); State v. Henry, 24
Kan. 457, 459 (1880) (“[T]he defendant, after taking his chances
of an acquittal upon the merits of the action, cannot then object to
the information, because it has not stated the offense in as definite
terms as it might have done.”). These cases indicated that a perfect
charging document was not indispensable to the existence of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. mee

The earliest Kansas appellate case we have found that explicitly
separated the concept of subject matter jurisdiction from the con-
cept of charging document sufficiency is the original Court of Ap-
peals’ decision in State v. Hook, 4 Kan. App. 451, 46 P. 44 (1896),
overruled on other grounds Learned, 73 Kan. at 331. In Hook, the
defendant was charged with adultery, and he challenged the in-
formation on several grounds, including lack of jurisdiction and a
failure to state facts sufficient to constitute an offense. The court
made quick work of the jurisdictional challenge, stating without
any further elaboration or citation that the district court had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the crime charged. 4 Kan. ‘App. at 454. It

°

also observed that the court had acquired personal jurisdiction over
the defendant when he gave a recognizance for his appearance at
the court term. 4 Kan. App. at 454-55. Still, the information was
defective and fatally so, because it did not charge a public offense.
4 Kan. App. at 456-58. The relief granted by the court was reversal
of the adultery conviction and remand to the district court “with
directions to set the judgment of conviction aside and to sustain the
motion to quash the information.” 4 Kan. App. at 458.

Other early cases filling the decades leading to Minor in 1966
demonstrate that this court, over time, has attempted to explain the
relationship between subject matter jurisdiction on the one hand
and the language of the charging document on the other hand in an
imprecise assortment of ways.

In James v. Amrine, 157 Kan. 397, 140 P.2d 362 (1943), the court
considered the sufficiency of an information collaterally attacked in
a habeas proceeding. The defendant claimed that the information
erroneously alleged the date of the crime, placing it 6 months after
his trial, which rendered his conviction and sentence void because
the district court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction. This
court took pains to say that the habeas action was not based upon a
denial of due process. Instead, and in contrast to the language of an
earlier opinion, State v. Keester, 134 Kan. 64, 4 P.2d 679 (1931), it
described the issue before it as whether the information “was suf-
ficient to give the court jurisdiction to enter upon inquiry and make
a decision.” (Emphasis added.) James, 157 Kan. at 399. The court
held that the obvious clerical error “did not render the information
void or vitiate the subsequent proceedings,” noting that it would
have been subject to correction by amendment had it been noticed
earlier than 18 years after judgment was entered. 157 Kan. at 400.
Three years later, in State v. Hazen, 160 Kan. 733, 165 P.2d 234
(1946), this court focused on whether an information conformed
to the statutory definition of the crime of assault. The defendant
had challenged the information, including filing a motion to quash
and a motion to arrest judgment in the district court and making
an issue of it on direct appeal. This court noted that the common
law absolutist requirement that an information “conform strictly
to established formality and charge an offense with technical

———

accuracy and nicety of language” had been superseded by more
relaxed statutory standards, including that the information state
“‘the facts constituting the offense, in plain and concise language,
without repetition.’” (Emphasis added.) 160 Kan. at 736-37 (quot-
ing G.S. 1935, 62-1004). It also specifically quoted statutory lan-
guage prohibiting quashing an information “‘[flor any surplusage
or repugnant allegation, when there is sufficient matter alleged to
indicate the crime and person charged’” or “‘{flor any other de-
fects or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the
substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.’” 160 Kan. at
737 (quoting G.S. 1935, 62-1011).

“Since the enactment of the sections of the statute just quoted this court has
definitely committed itself to the general doctrine that in charging statutory of-
fenses, except in those cases in which the statute simply designates and does not
describe or name the constituent elements of the offense, informations are suf-
ficient if they charge an offense in the language of the statute. Even the statutory
words need not be strictly pursued but others conveying the same meaning may
be used.” 160 Kan, at 737.

Under this rubric, the information in Hazen stated a public offense.
The charge was made “substantially in the words of the statute”
and did not prejudice the defendant because it “fairly informed”
him of the offense charged. The fact that it included additional
information about the “means and manner of the assault” did not
defeat it. Nor did its failure to include an affirmative allegation that
the defendant “intended or attempted to do [a specific person]
bodily, physical, or corporal injury” make it insufficient. Hazen, 160
Kan. at 738-39, .

In summary, applying the greatest degree of synthesis we can
muster, interpreting caselaw leading to Minor in 1966 indicated
that charging documents merely needed to show that a criminal
case had been filed in the correct court, that the court's exercise
of territorial jurisdiction would be appropriate, and that the facts
alleged would constitute a crime under Kansas statutes. Not all er-
rors or omissions would inevitably be fatal to the entire prosecu-
tion. Some were subject to correction or could be waived by the
defendant or disregarded by the court.

Minor, 197 Kan. 296, shifted the Kansas common law on the suf-
ficiency of charging documents in at least two consequential ways.

First, the decision categorically stated what some among earlier
cases may merely have been read to suggest: Charging documents
must state every statutory element of the crime alleged in order to
be deemed sufficient. Second, it made such sufficiency an explicit
precondition to the existence of district court subject matter juris-
diction. See Minor, 197 Kan. at 299; see also State v. Rasch, 243
Kan. 495, 498, 758 P.2d 214 (1988) (discussing the effect of Mi-
nor). These two shifts removed any possibility that many charging
document errors or omissions could be deemed harmless, nonfatal
defects, because any conviction obtained in a proceeding before a
court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void. The jurisdictional
nature of the error also meant that a charging document problem
could be raised by a defendant at any time, without any negative
impact on his or her remedy attributable to the choice of proce-
dural vehicle or delay in employing it. See Minor, 197 Kan. at 299
(information failing to allege essential element of crime cannot be
cured).

In Minor, the defendant had been convicted of manslaughter
in the first degree. The wording of the charging document did not
match that of the statute violated, failing to allege that the killing
would have been a murder at the common law. In the court’s view,
“[alt best, the information charges manslaughter in the fourth de-
gree” but, even then, it could not “be commended as a model of
draftsman’s art.” 197 Kan. at 298. The court cited no law beyond
one Ohio case—in which the court itself had described the indict-
ment defect.as a failure to charge any offense—to support its hold-
ing that a charging document including all essential elements of an
alleged crime was required to endow the district court with subject
matter jurisdiction. It stated simply: “In a criminal action pending
in the district court, the information or indictment is the jurisdic-
tional instrument upon which the accused stands trial.” 197 Kan.
at 299 (citing State v. Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St. 490, 494, 110 N.E.2d
416 [1953]). The court’s election to raise the problem it perceived
in the information sua sponte further emphasized the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction character of its ruling. Minor, 197 Kan. at 300-01.

Several cases decided after Minor and before Hall reflexively
adhered to the new analytical pattern of Minor. See, e.g., State

801

v. Wilson, 240 Kan. 606, 607, 731 P.2d 306 (1987) (first-degree
murder charge in information fatally defective for failure to allege
that killing of victim was done maliciously, deliberately, and with
premeditation); State v. Jackson, 239 Kan, 463, 467, 721 P.2d 232
(1986) (indecent liberties charge in complaint fatally defective for
failure to allege victim not married to accused, victim less than 16
years old); State v. Slansky, 239 Kan. 450, 452-53, 720 P.2d 1054
(1986) (conviction for aggravated assault void; complaint lacked al-
legation defendant had apparent ability to do bodily harm); State
v. Howell & Taylor, 226 Kan. 511, 512-14, 601 P.2d 1141 (1979)
(aggravated robbery conviction void because of complaint’s failure
to allege taking was by force, threat of great bodily harm; if a charg-
ing document “fatally defective,” then, even if all of its allegations
proved, defendant still not guilty of statutory crime; “evidence in-
troduced at trial to show commission of the crime sought to have
been charged and the jury instructions thereon have no bearing
on” issue of complaint’s sufficiency); State v. Giddings, 216 Kan.
14, 19-20, 531 P2d 445 (1975) (second count of forgery cannot
support subject matter jurisdiction over that crime, given omission
of essential element of intent to defraud; void conviction must be
set aside); State v. Baker, 197 Kan. 660, 662-64, 421 P.2d 16 (1966)
(conviction of second-degree burglary void, set aside because of
information’s failure to allege burglary occurred “in the night-
time,” an essential element of the offense; jury verdict on sufficient
evidence of nighttime occurrence and after instruction including
missing element do not cure fatal information error).

Other cases decided in this period were somewhat more reflec-
tive than reflexive. Although they took no direct issue with Minor’s
link between charging document sufficiency and the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction, they treated sufficiency as a more
elastic concept. Viewed in retrospect and taken together, it is ap-
parent to us that these cases foreshadowed the Hall decision; see
State v. Wade, 244 Kan. 136, 140-42, 766 P.2d 811 (1989) (distin-
guishing Jackson, 239 Kan. 463; (information’s omission of statu-
tory element of aggravated criminal sodomy—victim not married
to defendant—excused when information included victim’s age
of 5; common-sense construction, legal impossibility of marriage

eliminate need for allegation); State v. Micheaux, 242 Kan. 192,
194-203, 747 P.2d 784 (1987) (discussing history of charging docu-
ment sufficiency in Kansas; most common rule allows words com-
municating same meaning as those in criminal statute to be used
in charging document; “[w]hile an information may be insufficient
if it fails to allege an essential element of the offense, nevertheless,
an information should be read in its entirety, construed according
to common sense, and interpreted to include facts which are nec-
essarily implied”; welfare fraud conviction upheld); State v. Bird,
238 Kan. 160, 166-68, 708 P.2d 946 (1985) (information not fatally
defective despite no allegations that defendant’s conduct in solicit-
ing murder “felonious,” certain manner or means to be used to aid
and abet, named person to be aided; defendant could have moved
to quash information, sought bill of particulars; defendant not mis-
led, disadvantaged; because information charged crime, per stat-
ute, other objections to institution of prosecution waived); State
v. Maxwell, 234 Kan, 393, 397-99, 672 P.2d 590 (1983) (omission
of element cured by other information given to defense); State v.
Lucas, 221 Kan. 88, 89-90, 557 P.2d 1296 (1978) (emphasizing stat-
utory governance of charging document contents, need for basic
clarity under modern rationale for pleading in criminal cases; ag-
gxavated robbery charge in information sufficient despite lack of al-
legation of criminal intent; “feloniously” implies missing element);
State v. Lora, 213 Kan. 184, 187-88, 515 P.2d 1086 (1973) (failure
to charge crime underlying aggravated burglary not fatal to case).

And at least one case allowed an oral motion to cure a defect in
a charging document that had omitted an essential element of the
crime charged, a fix inconsistent with the idea that the charging
document must bestow subject matter jurisdiction on the district
court from the commencement of the prosecution. See Rasch, 243
Kan. at 496-501 (defendant charged with aggravated robbery; com-
plaint failed to allege “taking was by force or threat of harm,” an
essential element of aggravated robbery; before trial, prosecutor
orally moved to amend with no objection from defendant, journal
entry filed ordering complaint amended; held, oral amendment
cured jurisdictional defect).

This brings us to 1990's Hall, 246 Kan. at 753-65, the precedent

CC

Dunn urges us to abandon here. It is evident that the Hall court
attempted to stem what it believed to be a tide of appellate chal-
lenges to convictions for deficiencies in charging documents. Hall,
246 Kan. at 753 (referencing increase in convictions rendered void
for failure to allege all essential elements of charged crime).

Defendant Gary Lee Hall challenged his theft conviction under
Count II on the ground that the charging document had omitted
an essential element of the crime, i.¢., the adverb “permanently”
when stating the nature of his intention to deprive the owner of his
cattle. Count II also did not incorporate Count III by reference;
Count ITT had included the word “permanently” in its description
of Hall's intent to steal a truck and trailer hauling the Count II
cattle. See K.S.A. 22-3201(b) (allowing incorporation of language
from different count). Hall had not raised the defective complaint
issue in the district court, among other things, failing to file a post-
conviction motion for arrest of judgment.

The court recognized its prior holdings that “an information
which omits one or more of the essential elements of the crime
it attempts to charge is jurisdictionally and fatally defective and a
conviction on that offense must be reversed.” 246 Kan. at 747 (cit-
ing Wilson, 240 Kan. at 607). Under this rule, Hall’s conviction on
Count II could not stand. But the court was frankly reluctant to
reach this result, remarking on prior “mistaken judicial blending of
the concepts of ‘jurisdiction’” and saying:

“We note: (1) the jury was instructed properly as to all of the elements of
theft in Counts II and IIT; (2) the information in Counts II and III cited the theft
statute . . . ; (3) no bill of particulars was requested by Hall . . . ; (4) no motion for
arrest of judgment was filed . .. ; (5) Hall was represented by experienced retained
counsel; and (6) no argument has been advanced by Hall that the omission of ‘per-
manently’ in Count II of the information prejudiced him in any way or in any way
interfered with the preparation of his defense. We have reversed Count II based
upon precedent.” 246 Kan. at 758.

The court specifically acknowledged a criminal defendant's right
to notice of the charges against him or her under Section 10 of
the Bill of Rights in the Kansas Constitution and the United States
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment. 246 Kan. at 753. Borrowing from
Professor Charles Wright’s treatise focused on federal law, the

804

court emphasized that the “fundamental purpose” of a charging
document is “to inform the defendant of the charge so that the de-
fendant may prepare a defense.” 246 Kan. at 754 (citing 1 Wright,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Crim. 2d § 125 at 365). Focusing
on the notice purpose of charging documents, the court continued:
“The test for sufficiency ought to be whether it is fair to require the defendant
to defend on the basis of the charge as stated in the particular indictment or in-
formation. The stated requirement that every ingredient or essential element of
the offense should be alleged must be read in the light of the fairness test just
mentioned. The information is sufficient, even if an essential averment is faulty
in form, if by a fair construction it may be found within the text. All parts of the
pleading must be looked to in determining its sufficiency.” 246 Kan. at 754.

The court also cited and discussed potentially pertinent Kansas
statutes, including K.S.A. 20-301 (each Kansas county shall have
district court of record with original jurisdiction of all civil, crimi-
nal matters, unless otherwise provided by law); K.S.A. 22-2601
(district court holds exclusive jurisdiction to try all felony, other
criminal cases); K.S.A. 22-2103 (criminal code intended to provide
just determination of every criminal proceeding); K.S.A. 22-2202
(subsections define complaint, information, indictment); K.S.A.
22-3201 (charging document requirements; right to file written
motion for bill of particulars to enable preparation of defense; pos-
sibility of amending charging document); K.S.A. 22-3502 (arrest
of judgment on motion); and K.S.A. 22-3503 (arrest of judgment
without motion).

Hall focused on the historical antecedents for statutes allowing
arrest of judgment, observing that the permissible grounds for mo-
tions for arrest of judgment included “‘[flirst, that the grand jury
who found the indictment had no legal authority to inquire into the
offense charged, by reason of it not being within the jurisdiction of
the court; second, that the facts stated do not constitute a public
offense.’” 246 Kan. at 755 (quoting G.S. 1949, 62-1605).

The Hall court also recognized that not all prior cases had treat-
ed every charging document defect as automatically prejudicial,
and thus reversible, error. 246 Kan. at 760 (discussing Maxwell,
234 Kan. at 397-99, and Lora, 213 Kan. at 187-88, both of which
involved failure to charge intended crime underlying aggravated

burglary; problem cured by other information supplied to defense;
convictions affirmed).

In particular, the court recognized the import of the State’s
statutorily authorized ability to amend a deficient charging docu-
ment, stating that amendment cases “have not presented insoluble
jurisdictional problems. Jurisdiction does not descend on the pro-
ceedings at the moment the amendment is granted or . .. months
or years later when [a] nunc pro tunc order is signed by the trial
court after a ruling on appeal.” 246 Kan. at 759-60 (relying upon
Rasch, 243 Kan. at 501, allowing journal entry memorializing ear-
lier oral amendment to be filed pretrial; State v. Nunn, 244 Kan.
207, 224, 768 P.2d 268 [1989], extending Rasch holding to cover
journal entry filed after trial; State v. Switzer, 244 Kan. 449, 456-
57, 769 P.2d 645 [1989], allowing oral amendment to be validated
by post-appeal nunc pro tunc order).

In short, according to the Hall court, at least some defects in
charging documents could and should be addressed in district
court. The court decided to fashion a prospective rule, one under
which an appellate court would treat omission of an element of a
crime from a charging document as fatal to subject matter juris-
diction only when it was brought to the attention of the presiding
district judge before, during, or soon after trial. If, instead, the is-
sue did not surface until the case was on direct appeal or later, the
court would treat the error as something far less lethal to the State’s
case. See 246 Kan. at 747, 758.

“Common sense will be a better guide than arbitrary and artificial rules. The
sufficiency of an information should be determined on the basis of practical rather
than technical considerations when addressed for the first time on appeal. [Cita-
tions omitted.]

“The proper procedure for a defendant who contends either that the informa-
tion does not charge a crime or that the court was without jurisdiction of the crime
charged is to utilize the statutory remedy extended by the legislature for these two
specific situations—a K.S.A. 22-3502 motion for arrest of judgment. This remedy,
available for 10 days after disposition at the trial court level, is of benefit to a de-
fendant. It is preferable to raise either or both of these claims in the trial court
rather than waiting to raise the issues for the first time on appeal. If the motion is
denied by the trial court, the denial may be appealed, if appropriate, to the Court
of Appeals or to this court.” 246 Kan. at 754, 760.

Going forward from Hall’s decision date, those defendants who
timely filed a motion for arrest of judgment or otherwise raised
a defective complaint issue in the district court would have their
defective charging document challenges reviewed on appeal un-
der the “rationale of [the court’s] pre-Hall'cases.” 246 Kan. at 764.
Although not crystal clear, it appears from the opinion that such a
standard would uphold a conviction under the charging document

unless the document was “‘so defective that it does not, by any rea-
sonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant is
convicted.’” 246 Kan. at 763 (quoting United States v. Watkins, 709
F.2d 475, 478 [7th Cir. 1983]). If, on the other hand, a defendant
raised the challenge for the first time on appeal, the appellate court
would
“look to whether the claimed defect in the information ha{d]: (a) prejudiced the
defendant in the preparation of his or her defense; (b) impaired in any way defen-
dant’s ability to plead the conviction in any subsequent prosecution; or (c) limited
in any way defendant's substantial rights to a fair trial under the guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution
Bill of Rights, § 10. If a defendant is able to establish a claim under either (a), (b),
ot (c), the defective information claim, raised for the first time on appeal, will be
allowed.” 246 Kan. at 765.

It is this prospective rule attacked by Dunn in this case. He
makes the dual and interconnected points that Hall did not ex-
plicitly overrule Minor or descendant cases holding that charging
documents are jurisdictional instruments, and, if such holdings are
still good law, Hall’s bifurcated review standard is illogical. Simply
put, mere improvements in procedure and timeliness cannot cure
a lack of indispensable-at-any-procedural-stage subject matter ju-
risdiction. See State v. Brown, 299 Kan. 1021, 1030, 327 P.3d 1002
(2014) (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent,
waiver, estoppel); see also Ryser v. State, 295 Kan. 452, 456, 284
P.3d 337 (2012) (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
failing to object or raise jurisdiction on appeal).

Although Dunn is persuasive on this point, this criticism of Hall
does not end the matter. Our careful study of that decision and its
background persuades us that our 1990 predecessors may have ne-
glected to pinpoint Minor as the place where Kansas charging doc-

CC

ument law took a wrong turn, but they had sound instincts. They
may have said that there had been a “mistaken judicial blending
of the concepts of ‘jurisdiction,’” 246 Kan. at 758, when what they
really sensed was a “mistaken judicial blending” of the concepts
of subject matter jurisdiction, constitutional and statutory charging
document sufficiency, and adequate due process and notice protec-
tion for defendants; but they deserve appreciation for their effort to
tease apart these sources of concern and the need for distinct pat-
terns of analysis. See State v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31, 34-35 (Mo.
1992) (blending of concepts confuses issues to be determined).

Unfortunately, this court has since failed to seize upon the op-
portunity presented by a more nuanced reading of the Hall de-
cision. Rather, we have routinely paid lip service to its weakest
features—insistence on robotic recitation of essential statutory
elements rather than allegations of fact that would support those
elements in charging documents to deem them sufficient as well
as rigid application of the procedural rule making some jurisdic-
tional challenges more equal than others, see State v. Carr, 300
Kan. 1, 185, 331 P.3d 544 (2014), rev’d and remanded on other
grounds 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 633, 193 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2016);
State v. Tapia, 295 Kan. 978, 986, 287 P.3d 879 (2012) (noting de-
fendant did not question Hall decision)—while neglecting to fully
appreciate or articulate its strongest feature. See State v. Inkelaar,
293 Kan. 414, 433-34, 264 P.3d 81 (2011) (complaint failing to in-
clude element fatally defective; trial court lacks jurisdiction to con-
vict); State v. Gonzales, 289 Kan. 351, Syl. { 8, 212 P.3d 215 (2009)
(“Generally, if a complaint fails to include an essential element of
a crime charged, it is fatally defective, and the district court lacks
jurisdiction to convict the defendant of the alleged offense.”); State
v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, Syl. § 2, 183 P.3d 801 (2008) (information
omitting one or more essential elements of crime “fatally defec-
tive”; conviction on such information must be reversed); see also
State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 532, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014) (ques-
tion of whether complaint “conferred” subject matter jurisdiction
subject to unlimited review); State v. McElroy, 281 Kan. 256, 261,
130 P.3d 100 (2009) (discussing sufficiency of charging document
“to confer jurisdiction”).

808

We also have perpetuated the Minor sufficiency and jurisdic-
tional instrument rules in cases supposedly suitable for application
of the more forgiving post-Hall review standard. See, e.g., State
v. Brown, 299 Kan. 1021, Syl. { 2, 1028-29, 327 P.3d 1002 (2014)
(“complaint or information is the jurisdictional instrument in a
criminal prosecution”; charging document would be sufficient to
invest district court with jurisdiction “over a charged crime if it al-
leges all of the elements of the offense, if it sufficiently apprises the
defendant of the facts against which he or she must defend, and if it
is specific enough to safeguard the defendant against a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense”; information charging felony
murder, aggravated burglary drawn in language of statutes defin-
ing crimes, notifying defendant of what he was accused of doing
adequate; no need to name victim of aggravated assault supporting
aggravated burglary, which in turn supported felony murder).

In State v. Rome, 269 Kan. 47, 5 P.3d 515 (2000), the court con-
sidered a charging document supporting a plea to a Class A felony
drug conviction for sale of cocaine, which was based on the defen-
dant having two prior state court drug convictions. Years later, after
the defendant successfully challenged one of the prior state court
convictions and it was replaced with a federal court drug convic-
tion, the defendant challenged the original complaint for failing to
set out the two prior convictions as elements of the felony offense.
The court recited that Hall had changed the “standards of appellate
review for claims that a complaint or information was defective,
when raised for the first time on appeal,” Rome, 269 Kan. at 52,
but it did not articulate the standard to be applied to a post-Hall
case. Rather, it reinforced the rule from the unnamed Minor both
explicitly—“a complaint or information which omits an essential
element of a crime is fatally defective for lack of jurisdiction” —and
implicitly, holding that the Rome complaint passed muster because
failure to include particulars of the defendant's prior crimes in the
complaint did not constitute omission of elements of the crime;
thus the complaint was not “jurisdictionally defective.” Rome, 269
Kan. at 52; see also State v. Moody, 282 Kan. 181, 192-94, 197,
144 P.3d 612 (2006) (challenge to sentence as fourth-time driving
under the influence offender on basis of complaint alleging defen-

809

dant had “two or more” prior offenses; court holds complaint ju-
risdictionally sound; proof of prior conviction not element of DUI
offense).

All of this being said, a few cracks in Minor’s and Hall’s armor
have gradually begun to surface.

In Carmichael v. State, 255 Kan. 10, 19, 872 P.2d 240 (1994), we
reversed a Court of Appeals panel opinion holding that jurisdiction
was lacking on a complaint charging defendant Floyd Carmichael
with rape rather than aggravated incest when the victim was Car-
michael’s daughter. We held that the proper remedy was vacation
of Carmichael’s sentences and remand to the district court for re-
sentencing on the correct crime, rather than declaring the convic-
tions void. See Carmichael, 255 Kan. at 19 (recognizing State v.
Williams, 250 Kan. 730, 829 P.2d 892 [1992], implicitly overruled
State v. Moore, 242. Kan. 1, 7, 748 P.2d 833 [1987]; Moore had al-
lowed two convictions—one for rape, one for aggravated incest—
based on same act). Indeed, the view that a failure to include an es-
sential element in the charging document is a jurisdictional defect
had quickly become the minority view in state and federal jurisdic-
tions. See 5 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Crim. Proc. §§ 19.2(e),
19.3(b) (4th ed. 2015); see also Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536,
539 (Ala. 2006) (validity of indictment is irrelevant to whether trial
court had jurisdiction over subject matter of case); Ortiz, 162 N.H.
at 589 (defective indictment does not deprive trial court of power
to adjudicate case); Parker v. State, 1996 OK CR 19, 917 P.2d 980,
985 (rejecting prior precedent that defective information failed
to confer jurisdiction upon trial court; defects in information gov-
erned by Due Process Clause); State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 101-
03, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005) (noting modern jurisprudence separates
concepts of subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court and the
sufficiency of the indictment). But see Johnson, 219 W. Va. at 702
(because state rule of criminal procedure allows defendant to ob-
ject to sufficiency of indictment based on failure to state an offense
at any time during criminal proceeding, indictment jurisdictional).

Some of our post-Hall cases in Kansas also have recognized
degrees of charging document inadequacy leading to different re-
sults. Allegations of certain elements of certain crimes have been

810

regarded as expendable, when proof of the missing element was
considered overwhelming. The flagship of this fleet is State v. Rey-
na, 290 Kan. 666, 234 P.3d 761 (2010). In that case, a jury convicted
defendant Israel Reyna of four counts of aggravated indecent liber-
ties with a child. Under Jessica’s Law, when an offender is 18 years
old or older and he or she commits aggravated indecent liberties
with a child, the offense is an off-grid crime. On appeal, Reyna
argued that the State had failed to allege or present evidence of
his age at the time of the offenses. According to Reyna, the State’s
failure to allege his age in the complaint deprived the district court
of jurisdiction to subject him to off-grid sentencing and sentence
him to life in prison. We ultimately rejected Reyna’s argument and
held that “the failure to allege Reyna’s age in the complaint is not
grounds to invalidate his convictions of the off-grid offense.” 290
Kan. at 678. We bolstered our conclusion with the facts that the
charging document did include Reyna’s year of birth in its caption
and did state at the bottom of the page that the charges were for
off-grid crimes. 290 Kan. at 678; see also State v. Holman, 295 Kan.
116, 151, 284 P.3d 251 (2012) (charging document omitted defen-
dant’s age; any deficiency did not invalidate defendant's conviction
or sentence); State v. Portillo, 294 Kan. 242, 252, 274 P.3d 640
(2012) (listing cases rejecting defendant's argument of deficient
charging document based on omission of defendant's age); State v.
Sellers, 292 Kan. 346, 362, 253 P.3d 20 (2011) (State excused from
charging element of Jessica’s Law defendant's age when evidence
in trial record leaves no doubt omission made no practical differ-
ence in verdict); State v. Colston, 290 Kan. 952, 973-76, 235 P.3d
1234 (2010) (citing Reyna; failure to instruct jury on defendant's
age as element of crime in Jessica’s Law case harmless when evi-
dence of age‘overwhelming).

And, finally, as emphasized by defendant Dunn, in 2012's Por-
tillo, the unanimous court was openly critical of Hall’s procedural
rule, which granted “retroactive validity” to charging documents
and the prosecutions they launched, if the defendant failed to chal-
lenge sufficiency before appeal. Portillo, 204 Kan. at 255.

Today the cracks in Minor’s and Hall’s armor widen irreparably
to fractures. We now recognize Minor’s declaration of Kansas’ ju-

risdictional instrument rule as an unjustified departure from Kan-
sas constitutional and statutory provisions and from our prior case-
law. We therefore overrule it. Charging documents do not bestow
or confer subject matter jurisdiction on state courts to adjudicate
criminal cases; the Kansas Constitution does. Charging documents
need only show that a case has been filed in the correct court, ¢.g.,
the district court rather than municipal court; show that the court
has territorial jurisdiction over the crime alleged; and allege facts
that, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, would constitute a Kan-
sas crime committed by the defendant. This holding places us se-
curely in the majority of modern courts, a fact that reinforces our
conviction that today’s revised view of Kansas’ true law is sound.

Without Minor’s jurisdictional instrument rule as bedrock, we
must also reject the rulings of Hall built upon it. There is now
no reason for Hall's differentiation between treatment of charg-
ing document errors and other types of errors. They are not ju-
risdictional flaws fatal to the State’s case when pointed out first to
the district court and miraculously without significant effect when
pointed out first to an appellate court. We return to these points
and their implications more fully below.

Standard for Charging Document Sufficiency

The second topic on which we sought additional briefing and ar-
gument was the appropriate standard for charging document suffi-
ciency. Having now rejected Minor’s jurisdictional instrument rule
and Hall’s statements dependent upon it, we are compelled to con-
sider Minor’s second striking overstatement when compared with
the weight of prior law—its categorical declaration that a charging
document must include all essential elements of the charged of-
fense to avoid insufficiency. This too we overrule.

The plain language of K.S.A. 22-3201(b) is relatively clear: A
charging document shall state “essential facts” constituting the
crime charged, and the document “shall be deemed sufficient” if
it is “drawn in the language of the statute.” The statute’s emphasis
on “facts” rather than “elements” is repeated in other related stat-
utes and legally significant. A Kansas charging document should
be regarded as sufficient now, as it was before Minor, when it has

alleged facts that would establish the defendant’s commission of
a crime recognized in Kansas. See State v. Hazen, 160 Kan. 733,
736-39, 165 P.2d 234 (1946) (charging document sufficient despite
failure to include affirmative allegation that defendant intended
a specific person bodily injury); James, 157 Kan. at 400 (charging
document sufficient despite erroneously alleging crime took place
6 months after defendant's trial); Keester, 134 Kan. at 71 (charging
document merely discloses jurisdiction; not necessary for charging
document to state both counties in which crime took place). Be-
cause all crimes are statutorily defined, this is a statute-informed
inquiry. The legislature's definition of the crime charged must be
compared to the State’s factual allegations of the defendant’s in-
tention and action. If those factual allegations, proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, would justify a verdict of guilty, then the charg-
ing document is statutorily sufficient. If the charging document is
instead statutorily insufficient, then the State has failed to properly
invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and an appro-
priate remedy must be fashioned. The problem is not a substantive
absence of jurisdiction; it is a procedural failure to demonstrate its
existence. The availability of a remedy is key. Statutory infirmity
does not inevitably fail to bestow subject matter jurisdiction or de-
prive the court of jurisdiction or destroy jurisdiction. See K.S.A.
22-3502 (arrest of judgment available if charging document does
not charge crime or court without jurisdiction).

This rule hearkens back to State v. Morris, 124 Kan. 505, 260 P.
629 (1927), in which the court congratulated itself on its modern
approach. It said:

“A good form book is a valuable adjunct to the office equipment of a prosecut-
ing attorney, and he would do well to consult it before drawing an information in
an important criminal case; but the day is past in this jurisdiction, we trust, when
criminals can hope to go unwhipped of justice because of the want of a technical
recital in a criminal information which neither misled nor prejudiced them in the
preparation or management of their defense.” Morris, 124 Kan. at 508.

The Morris court relied upon the fact that the defendants fully
understood they were on trial for the fraudulent making of a check
to the prejudice of the rightful owner of the check, of the bank on
which the check was drawn, and of the filling station owner expect-

813

ing to be paid by means of the check. See Morris, 124 Kan. at 508.
In other words, there was no constitutional problem arising from
the charging document’s omission of an element of the crime.

The Reyna line of Jessica’s Law cases challenging, for the first
time on appeal, a charging document’s omission of the defendant’s
age of 18 or over at the time of the crime provides a contempo-
rary illustration of how today’s rule should relieve analytical ten-
sion arising from Minor and Hall. See Reyna, 290 Kan. at 677-78;
see also State v. Holman, 295 Kan. 116, 151, 284 P.3d 116 (2012).
We have recognized in such cases that the charging document did
not include an allegation of the defendant’s age, an element of the
crime, but ultimately ruled that the omission did not prejudice the
defendant's rights as long as the evidence presented to the fact-
finder on that subject was overwhelming or undisputed. See, ¢.g.,
Sellers, 292 Kan. at 362. Under the rule we announce today, as-
suming a defendant succeeds in persuading us to reach the merits
of the claim despite a lack of preservation in the district court, we
would be more likely to hold that there is no charging document
sufficiency problem in the first place. A complaint, indictment, or
information that names a defendant or otherwise identifies him or
her inherently includes his or her age on the date of the alleged
offense. No question of adequate notice to the defendant of his or
her own age on the given date is logically possible, and the charg-
ing document will have served its purpose of providing notice and a
fair opportunity to defend. In other words, there would be no error
and we would not reach the prejudice or harmlessness question.

We now turn to the third topic on which we sought additional
briefing and argument from the parties.

The Role of Constitutional Due Process and Notice Provisions

Our discussion thus far has established that the Kansas Consti-
tution dictates the existence of subject matter jurisdiction as long
as the charging document shows that the case has been brought in
the correct court in the proper county. In addition, we look to Kan-
sas statutes to determine whether the charging document includes
facts that would constitute a crime under Kansas law; it must do so
to be statutorily sufficient.

The third topic on which we sought additional guidance from
the parties had to do with any additional or distinct role that fed-
eral or state constitutional due process and notice principles play in
determining charging document sufficiency.

Every criminal defendant has a right under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to due process before he or she can be deprived
of life, liberty, or property. In addition, we have long recognized
that a criminal defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment
to notice of the charge or charges pursued by the State. See, ¢.g.,
State v. Loudermilk, 221 Kan. 157, 158-59, 557 P.2d 1229 (1976);
see also State v. Rasch, 243 Kan. 495, 497, 758 P.2d 214 (1988)
(one goal of adequate charging document to inform defendant of
alleged offense, in part to enable double jeopardy claim). And Sec-
tion 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights contains its own
requirement that a criminal defendant be informed of the charges
against him or her. Depending on the form a defendant's challenge
to a charging document takes, these constitutional provisions may
apply and may require relief from a conviction or sentence because
the document led to prejudicial due process or notice error. See
State v. Wade, 284 Kan. 527, 537, 161 P.3d 704 (2007) (instruction
on elements of aggravated burglary erroneous because it added ul-
terior felony on which defendant had no notice before evidentiary
portion of trial concluded; error prejudiced defendant, required
reversal of conviction). But even prejudicial deficiencies in due
process or notice do not render the outcome of a prosecution void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

One illustrative case is State v. Seeger, 65 Kan. 711, 711, 70 P.
599 (1902). In that case, the defendants were convicted of keeping
a nuisance after being charged with maintaining

“‘a place where intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, sold, bartered or given
away in violation of law, or where persons are permitted to resort for the purpose
of drinking intoxicating liquors as a beverage, or where intoxicating liquors are
kept for the purpose of sale, barter or delivery in violation of law, or a place where
intoxicating liquors, bottles, glasses, kegs, pumps, bars and other property are kept
and used in maintaining such place.””

This court ruled that the district judge erred by refusing to quash
the complaint because, although it was drawn in the language of

815

the statute, its repeated use of the disjunctive “or” failed to in-
form the defendants of the nature of the offense. “The defendant
is entitled to be informed just what is charged against him, and a
complaint that he did one thing, or another, or still another, lacks
certainty.” Seeger, 65 Kan. at 712; see also State v. Kamen, 166 Kan.
664, 666, 203 P.2d 176 (1949) (notice requirement established law
in this jurisdiction). The case was reversed and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings in district court. It was not dismissed outright.
Seeger, 65 Kan. at 712.

With the completion of this section’s discussion, we have iden-
tified three possible types of charging document insufficiency a
criminal defendant may challenge. First, either a district or appel-
late court may be asked to decide whether the document shows
that the Kansas constitutional minimums of correct court and cor-
rect territory are met. Second, a court may be asked to evaluate
whether the document alleges facts about the intent and action
on the part of the defendant that, if proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, would constitute violation of a Kansas criminal statute. And,
third, a court may be asked to determine whether the charging
document meets federal and state constitutional standards for due
process and notice, such that the defendant has an opportunity to
meet and answer the State’s evidence and prevent double jeopardy.
These types of charging document error may be raised at various
points in a prosecution, and attendant circumstances may dictate
various forms of relief. We discuss procedure and remedy in the
next section.

Procedure and Remedy

Our questions about procedure and remedy for defective charg-
ing documents formed the foundation of the fifth topic on which
we sought further input from the parties. Of the possible sources of
charging document insufficiency identified today—tfailure to show
the case is brought in the right court in the right territory, as the
Kansas Constitution requires; failure to state facts that would con-
stitute a crime under a Kansas statute; failure to ensure observance
of the defendant's federal and state constitutional rights to due pro-
cess and notice of the charges—none of these pleading defects pre-

vents or destroys the existence of subject matter jurisdiction over
criminal cases in our district and appellate courts. Rather, the first
qualifies as state constitutional error, the second as statutory error,
and the third as federal and state constitutional error.

Now that a defective complaint will no longer be regarded as a
telltale marker for the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, the
question of appropriate remedy has become more complicated. Its
answer, at a minimum, will depend on the nature of the defect
alleged by the defendant and the timing of and circumstances sur-
rounding the court’s awareness of it. Although we cannot foresee
every situation that may arise in a future case, a few general obser-
vations can be made today.

As long as an error of the first type is merely a failure to recite or
a mistake in recitation and not the actuality of a filing in the wrong
court or wrong territory, which does implicate subject matter juris-
diction, see City of Junction City v. Cadoret, 263 Kan. 164, Syl. | 5,
946 P.2d 1356 (1997) (municipalities do not have jurisdiction over
crimes designated a felony by state statute), then it is most likely
to be amenable to remedy or cure by amendment before verdict
under K.S.A. 22-3201(e). An amendment to fill in the omission or
to correct a fact obvious to both sides will neither charge a new
crime nor impair defendant's “substantial rights,” including federal
and state constitutional rights to due process and notice. Given the
nonprejudicial nature of such an error, we also expect that it would
not support a successful motion to arrest judgment after trial nor
reversal on appeal.

The second type of error, failure to state facts constituting a
Kansas crime—although under Kansas law, a statutory rather than
a constitutional problem—has the potential for more serious rami-
fications if not corrected as early as possible in the prosecution.
As mentioned in a previous section of this opinion, although the
court’s constitutionally endowed subject matter jurisdiction is nei-
ther prevented nor destroyed by this error, a charging document's
failure to describe a Kansas crime impairs invocation of that ju-
risdiction and carries the risk that due process and notice for the
defendant are similarly infirm. The longer the error is able to fes-
ter uncorrected, the greater the potential harm to the defendant’s

rights and the higher the likelihood a motion for bill of particulars
under K.S.A. 22-3201(f) or a K.S.A. 22-3201(e) amendment will be
unworkable and the district judge will neéd to order a mistrial or
arrest of judgment or the appellate court a reversal and remand in
response to the defendant’s complaint. If the State is forced to con-
cede on appeal, as it was at final oral argument in this case, that the
language of its charging document failed to state facts constituting
a Kansas crime, it will be limited to arguing lack of preservation of
the issue, which is discussed in the next section, or harmlessness
under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105.

The third type of error, a charging document sufficiency prob-
lem based on federal or state constitutional due process or notice
rovisions, like the second type of error, becomes more difficult
to remedy the longer it goes unaddressed. A failure to cure the
problem early will circumscribe the visible universe of solutions.
See Wade, 284 Kan. at 537. Certainly, if the defendant's challenge
grows out of the Fifth and Fourteenth or the Sixth Amendments,
the court will be guided by the test for harmlessness applicable to
‘ederal constitutional error. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 22-24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). This standard can
pose a significant burden to the State. See State v. Bolze-Sann, 302
Kan. 198, 216, 352 P.3d 511 (2015). We assume without deciding
today that a similarly stringent test will also be applied to evalu-
ate the prejudicial effect of a charging document error implicating
state constitutional due process or notice rights.

Issue Preservation for Appeal and Standard of Review

The last topic on which we sought additional briefing and argu-
ment from the parties dealt with preservation of issues for appeal
and the applicable standard of review.

We address preservation first.

Ordinarily a party that wants to pursue an issue on appeal must
have preserved that issue in the court below. See State v. Godfrey,
301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015). But preservation is a
prudential consideration, not an invariable rule. See State v. Bea-
man, 295 Kan. 853, 857, 286 P.3d 876 (2012).

In the case of challenges to alleged defects in institution of crim-

818

inal proceedings, as with evidentiary rulings under K.S.A. 60-404,
the legislature has provided specific guidance on implied waiver of
arguments by the defense. We thus begin our discussion with that
guidance.

K.S.A. 22-3208(3) forbids “[d]efenses and objections based on
defects in the institution” of a prosecution or in the charging docu-
ment “other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to
charge a crime” to be raised other than by pretrial motion. Fail-
ure to follow this provision constitutes waiver, “but the court for
cause shown may grant relief from the waiver.” K.S.A. 22-3208(3).
The next subsection of the statute also makes a plea of guilty or a
consent to trial on a charging document a waiver “of defenses and
objections based upon the institution” of a prosecution or defects
in the charging document “other than it fails to show jurisdiction in
the court or to charge a crime.” K.S.A. 22-3208(4).

In short, the legislature has expressly excepted the first two types
of charging document insufficiency addressed in this opinion from
its implied waiver rule. If a charging document fails to show juris-
diction (as required by the Kansas Constitution) or fails to state a
Kansas crime under the statutes the legislature has used to define
them, those defects need not be raised in pretrial motion. The third
type of charging document error discussed in this opinion, because
it involves federal and state constitutional rights to due process and
notice, may also escape the implied waiver rule because the rule
is subject to suspension by a judge for “cause shown.” K.S.A, 22-
3208(3). If a defendant can demonstrate that a charging document
was so bare bones that he or she was unable to appreciate an in-
fringement of due process or notice rights until evidence began to
come in at trial or later, then it is not hard to imagine that a judge
of the district court or a majority of judges on an appeals panel will
excuse a late challenge to a charging document for “cause shown.”
We therefore do not regard the statute as much of an impediment
to a defendant seeking to raise a charging document challenge for
the first time on appeal.

That being said, now that we have established that such chal-
lenges do not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, we also see no
reason that they must be treated especially favorably when it comes

819

to preservation. Our usual rules apply to charging document chal-
lenges by criminal defendants. They should be raised in the district
court in the first instance. If they are not, defendants will be tasked
with demonstrating on appeal that an exception to the usual pres-
ervation rule should be applied. See Godfrey, 301 Kan. at 1043
(three recognized exceptions: [1] newly asserted claim involves
only question of law arising on proved or admitted facts, determi-
native of case; [2] consideration of claim necessary to serve ends of
justice, prevent denial of fundamental rights; [3] district court right
for wrong reason).

Turning to the applicable appellate standard of review, it is no
doubt evident to any experienced appellate advocate from all that
we have said so far in this opinion that the standard for evaluating
assertions of charging document error in future cases will be de
novo. The sources of law governing the three types of charging
document challenges we have addressed are the Kansas Constitu-
tion, statutory definitions of Kansas crimes, and federal and state
constitutional provisions. We apply a de novo standard to both con-
stitutional and statutory interpretation. See In re Care & Treatment
of Miller, 289 Kan. 218, 230, 210 P.3d 625 (2009). We also apply de
novo review to written instruments; and ‘charging documents are
writings. See State v. Tims, 302 Kan. 536, 546, 355 P.3d 660 (2015).

Application of Today's Ruling to Dunn

Dunn has advanced two challenges to Count 8 for forgery in
Case 09 CR 333. His “main horse,” as his counsel described it in
oral argument, is that the count failed to include essential elements
of the Kansas crime of forgery and thus the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to convict him. His fallback argument
has been that Count 8 failed to provide him adequate due process
and notice to enable his defense.

There is no dispute that Dunn did not preserve the defective
complaint issue by raising it in the district court. It is this lack of
preservation that led Dunn to challenge Hall’s rule that he would
be held to a more difficult appellate standard of review on what he
and Hall still regarded as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
We have now broken this nonsensical link. A charging document's

failure to include an element of a crime under the defining Kansas
statute does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction
to convict; it does not even necessarily meet the statute-defined
threshold for failure to charge a crime because the facts alleged,
rather than the legal elements regurgitated, determine whether
the charge is sufficient under the statute defining the crime.

The particular subsection of the forgery statute intended to
support Count 8 apparently is K.S.A. 21-3710(a)(2). It provides:
“Forgery is knowingly and with intent to defraud . . . issuing or
delivering such written instrument knowing it to have been thus
made, altered or endorsed.” The “such written instrument” and
“thus made” language in subsection (2) evidently refer back to sub-
section (1) of the statute which defines forgery as:

“Making, altering or endorsing any written instrument in such manner that it
purports to have been made, altered or endorsed by another person, either real or
fictitious, and if a real person without the authority of such person; or altering any
written instrument in such manner that it purports to have been made at another
time or with different provisions without the authority of the maker thereof, or
making, altering or endorsing any written instrument in such manner that it pux-
ports to have been made, altered or endorsed with the authority of one who did
not give such authority.” K.S.A. 21-3710(a)(1).

To say that this language from the forgery statute is not a model

of clarity is an obvious understatement. But, even with the diffi-
culty of following it acknowledged, the language from Count 8 still
goes it one better on the gibberish meter. That language, again, for
ease of reader reference, stated:
“That on or about the 27th day of July, 2009, in Labette County, Kansas, Jerold
M. Dunn, then and there being present did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
issue[] or deliver[] a check (#1050) which he/she knew had been made, altered
or endorsed so that it appeared to have been made, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3710
and against the peace and dignity of the State of Kansas. (Forgery-Passing) Sever-
ity level 8 Non-person Felony, (7-23 months).”

At a minimum, this count fails to allege the fact that Dunn in-
tended to defraud Shaw or the Smoke Shop when he passed check
#1050, and the State made no effort to augment the language of
Count 8 by incorporating by reference Count 4, which dealt with
the same check. K.S.A. 22-3201(b) explicitly permitted such incor
poration, and the Court of Appeals erred when it treated the de-

821

fective Count 8 as though the State had taken that simple step to
preserve the viability of its prosecution. Compounding that error
perhaps is the fact that Dunn was never bound over on Count 4.

Under these circumstances, we hold that the State failed to
charge forgery in Count 8, a statutory error subject to a harmless-
ness inquiry under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105.
Under those statutes, we examine whether the defect affected
Dunn’s substantial rights.

We conclude that Dunn’s substantial rights were not affected
by the charging document error because he and his trial counsel
clearly understood exactly what the State sought to prove on Count
8. Indeed, his defense was that he was authorized by Shaw to use
check #1050 for his purchases and that he did not intend to defraud
her or the Smoke Shop in the transaction. The jury did not accept
his version of events, but that does not mean we are confronted
with reversible error.

Dunn’s backup argument—that he also was deprived of con-
stitutionally guaranteed due process and notice by the defective
Count 8—also fails to compel reversal of his conviction. Even if we
were to hold that Count 8 also was so poorly drafted that it failed
to provide Dunn with enough information to defend, it is plain that
he and his lawyer had the necessary information in spite of the de-
fect. He is not entitled to reversal under the federal constitutional
harmlessness standard of Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, which applies
to federal due process and notice claims. To the extent Dunn relies
on the Kansas Constitution for his due process and notice claims,
we also can safely say any alleged error was harmless.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT STALKING
CONVICTION

The appellate standard of review on sufficiency of evidence is
often stated and well known:

“When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the
standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a ratio-
nal factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v, Stafford, 296 Kan. 25, 53, 290 P.3d 562 (2012); see State v. Frye, 294 Kan.
364, 374, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012) ({C]onvictions arising from bench trials and those

arising from jury trials are reviewed by this court utilizing the same standards
on appeal.’). In making a sufficiency determination, the appellate court does not
reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make determinations regarding
witness credibility. Stafford, 296 Kan. at 53.” State v. Kendall, 300 Kan. 515, 523,
331 P.3d 763 (2014).

Under K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 21-3438(a)(3), the State was required
to prove that Dunn intentionally or recklessly violated a protection
from abuse order during his encounter with Shaw at the bank, that
his conduct “would cause a reasonable person to fear for such per-
son’s safety, . . . and [that] the targeted person [was] actually placed
in such fear.”

Dunn argues that there was no evidence Shaw had any particu-
larized fear for her safety. He also contends that there was no evi-
dence to support a conclusion that a reasonable person would fear
for his or her safety based on Dunn’s actions.

This challenge has no merit.

The evidence in this case included testimony about Dunn’s ap-
pearance at the bank shortly before Shaw made what was a rou-
tine work stop there. The bank teller described Shaw, after seeing
Dunn, as “real nervous and afraid, scared, upset.” The tel ler also
heard Shaw describe Dunn’s appearance at the bank as “harass-
ment.” Additional evidence showed that Dunn approached Shaw
as she left the bank and, with a “real mad” look, “got right into
her face.” He positioned himself between Shaw’s car and its door,
which prevented her from leaving. The teller heard Shaw tell Dunn
to leave her alone and further testified that she was concerned for
Shaw’s safety. Shaw testified that she was afraid on the day of her
confrontation with Dunn at the bank.

Dunn argues that all of this evidence must be viewed in light of
the fact that Dunn and Shaw later reconciled. According to him,
the reconciliation presents “real questions about whether [Shaw]
had any genuine fear of [Dunn].”

Our first observation is that, as a matter of logic and legal import,
a later reconciliation does not magically remake a couple’s violent
or threatening history. Moreover, Dunn’s challenge essentially asks
this court to make a credibility redetermination, something an ap-
pellate court does not do. State v. Sitlington, 291 Kan. 458,

823

Syl. { 7, 241 P.3d 1003 (2010) (“The determination of credibility
of the victim is solely within the province of the factfinder, and the
factfinder’s determination is not to be set aside unless the witness’
testimony is so incredible and improbable as to defy belief.”).

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, we affirm the forgery and
stalking convictions of defendant Jerold Michael Dunn. Although
the State’s Count 8 was deficient, the error was not reversible; and
defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his stalking conviction is without merit.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed, although for reasons other than
those cited by the panel on the forgery count.

nae

Jounson, J., dissenting in part: I dissent from that portion of the
majority opinion that holds that a district court—part of the judicial
branch of our government—has the authority (jurisdiction) to con-
vict a person of a crime when the prosecutor—part of the executive
branch of our government—has failed to charge that person with
any crime under Kansas law. The executive branch is charged with
enforcing the laws, including choosing the crime to be charged un-
der the circumstances.

I agree with the majority’ determination that the complaint,
which alleged that Dunn issued or delivered a check “which he[]
knew had been made . . . so that it appeared to have been made,”
obviously did not state facts that constitute a Kansas crime. I fre-
quently make checks that appear to be made. Consequently, “the
State . . . failed to properly invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court.” 304 Kan. at 812. I would not effect such an invocation,
ie., perform the prosecutor's enforcement-of-the-laws function,
under the guise of a judicial determination of harmlessness.

No. 108,915

StaTE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. JEFFREY L. PRIBBLE, Appellant.
(375 P3d 966)

Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and
Lydia Krebs, of the same office, was on the brief for appellant.

Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett,
district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief
for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JouNsoN, J.: Jeffrey L. Pribble seeks review of the Court of Ap-
peals decision to affirm his convictions on numerous drug offenses
and his 42 months’ imprisonment sentence. The Court of Appeals
affirmed Pribble’s convictions after rejecting Pribble’s claims that
(1) the charges for possession of marijuana with no drug tax stamp
and possession of methamphetamine with no drug tax stamp con-
stituted only one crime, rendering the two convictions multiplici-
tous; (2) the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct during
his closing argument; and (3) the district court violated Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435
(2000), by using his prior convictions to enhance his sentence un-
der the sentencing guidelines without requiring the State to prove
the existence of those prior convictions to a jury beyond a reason-
able doubt. This court granted Pribble’s petition for review. Find-
ing that the drug tax stamp statute contemplates only one unit of
prosecution under these facts, we reverse one of those convictions
and remand for resentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

While executing a search warrant at Pribble’s house, law en-
forcement officers discovered and seized drug-buy money, over

800 grams of marijuana, more than 14 grams of methamphet-
amine, and various items of drug paraphernalia. None of the drugs
bore the requisite drug tax stamps. As a result, Pribble was charged
with possessing marijuana, methamphetamine, paraphernalia,
and drug-sale proceeds. Of particular interest here, the State also
charged Pribble with two taxation offenses under K.S.A. 79-5208,
to-wit: one count of possession of marijuana with no drug tax stamp
and one count of possession of methamphetamine with no drug tax
stamp.

Pribble testified that none of the seized drugs or paraphernalia
belonged to him and offered explanations for the incriminating cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, the jury convicted Pribble as charged.
This appeal ensued.

MULTIPLICITY

Pribble first challenges the Court of Appeals determinations that
“Pribble’s convictions of possession of marijuana with no drug tax
stamp and possession of methamphetamine with no drug tax stamp
do not arise from the same conduct and, by statutory definition,
constitute two separate offenses.” State v. Pribble, No. 108,915,
2014 WL 1193337, at °4 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion).
Those determinations led the panel to “conclude that the convic-
tions are not multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.” 2014 WL
1193337, at °4,

Pribble’s challenge to the panel's holding is founded on our defi-
nition of multiplicity as being “the charging of a single offense in
several counts of a complaint or information.” State v. Thompson,
287 Kan. 238, 244, 200 P.3d 22 (2008); State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan.
453, 475, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). We have noted that “[t]he principal
danger of multiplicity is that it creates the potential for multiple
punishments for a single offense, which is prohibited by the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.”
Thompson, 287 Kan. at 244.

Standard of Review

AK-S.A. 79-5208 violation occurs when a drug dealer distributes
or possesses marijuana or controlled substances without having af-
fixed the appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia of having paid
the tax imposed on the dealer’s drugs. Whether the State charged
a single drug tax stamp offense in two counts of the complaint or
information presents a question of law subject to unlimited review.
See Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 462.

Analysis

The Court of Appeals loosely applied Schoonover's two-compo-

nent test for determining whether convictions are multiplicitous.
Under that rubric, a court first looks at whether the convictions
arose from the same conduct, considering such factors as:
“(1) whether the acts occur at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occur at
the same location; (3) whether there is a causal relationship between the acts, in
particular whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether there is a fresh
impulse motivating some of the conduct.” 281 Kan. 453, Syl. { 16.

If the same-conduct prong is met, the second component of the
test focuses on whether the applicable statutory provisions define
“two offenses or only one.” 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¥ 15.

The panel first determined that Pribble’s possession of two
different drugs constituted two separate acts that would support
two convictions, notwithstanding the acknowledged fact that “the
charged acts occurred at the same time and location.” Pribble, 2014
WL 1193337, at *3. In addition to the conceded applicability of the
first two Schoonover factors (same time and same location), the
remaining two factors favor a determination that the convictions
arose from the same conduct. The fact that all of the drugs found
at Pribble’s house—at the same time and in the same place—were
devoid of any affixed drug tax stamp does not support the notion
that there was any intervening event between the alleged criminal
acts. Likewise, the reasonable inference to be drawn from these
circumstances is that the same impulse—to avoid detection and
evade taxes—was the likely motivation for failing to pay the tax and
affix the tax stamps to both drugs. In short, both drug tax stamp

convictions arose from the same conduct, i.., a drug dealer's “dis-
tributing or possessing marijuana or controlled substances without
affixing the appropriate stamps, labels or other indicia.” K.S.A. 79-
5208.

Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ determination that
Pribble’s convictions did not meet the first multiplicity require-
ment of separate conduct, it chose to proceed to the second step.
Because Pribble’s two convictions were based on violations of the
same statute, K.S.A. 79-5208, the panel applied Schoonover’s unit
of prosecution test to determine whether the legislature intended
two offenses or only one. Pribble, 2014 WL 1193337, at *4. Under
this test, a court looks at “the statutory definition of the crime” to
determine “what the legislature intended as the allowable unit of
prosecution,” and then allows only one conviction for each identi-
fied unit of prosecution. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 497-98.

The panel focused on portions of K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 79-5201 (c),
which is a subsection of the definitions provision of the act address-
ing the taxation of marijuana and controlled substances, K.S.A. 79-
5201 et seq. That particular definition states as follows:

“(c) ‘dealer’ means any person who, in violation of Kansas law, manufactures,
produces, ships, transports or imports into Kansas or in any manner acquires or
possesses more than 28 grams of marijuana, or more than one gram of any con-
trolled substance, or 10 or more dosage units of any controlled substance which is
not sold by weight.” K.S.A, 2010 Supp. 79-5201(c).

The panel opined that, because that definitional statute “re-
quires the State to prove a defendant possessed different amounts
of marijuana versus a controlled substance such as methamphet-
amine, . . . the legislature clearly intended that possession of each
drug without the requisite tax stamp would constitute a separate
violation of the statute.” Pribble, 2014 WL 1193337, at °4. We dis-
cern that the panel read too much into the legislature’s definition of
a drug “dealer,” especially when the act is viewed as a whole.

Globally, the statutory provisions in play here are part of an act
dealing with taxation, rather than being part of this state’s criminal
code. The topic of Chapter 79 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated
is designated as “Taxation,” while Article 52 of this taxation chap-
ter deals with “Marijuana and Controlled Substances.” As noted,

829

K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 79-5201 contains definitions applicable to the
taxation of marijuana and controlled substances, specifically defin-
ing “marijuana,” “controlled substance,” “dealer,” and “domestic
marijuana plant.”

The next statute, K.S.A. 79-5202, imposes the tax, sets the rates
of taxation, and describes the measure to be used to calculate the
tax. Significantly, the provision states that “[t]here is hereby im-
posed @ tax upon marijuana, domestic marijuana plants and con-
trolled substances . . . at the following rates,” thereafter stating
different rates of taxation for marijuana, wet domestic marijuana
plants, dry domestic marijuana plants, controlled substances sold
by weight, and controlled substances not sold by weight. (Empha-
sis added.) K.S.A. 79-5202(a)(1)-(5). That language suggests that
the legislature was imposing but one tax on the drugs but calculat-
ing the amount of that tax by applying differing rates of taxation.

Continuing in that same vein, K.S.A. 79-5204(a) provides: “No
dealer may possess any marijuana, domestic marijuana plant or
controlled substance upon which a tax is imposed pursuant to
K.S.A. 79-5202, and amendments thereto, unless the tax has been.
paid as evidenced by an official stamp or other indicia.” (Emphasis
added.) Subsection (c) also uses the singular form of tax, to-wit:

“When a dealer purchases, acquires, transports, or imports into this state
marijuana, domestic marijuana plants or controlled substances on which a tax is
imposed by K.S.A. 79-5202, and amendments thereto, and if the indicia evidenc-
ing the payment of the tax have not already been affixed, the dealer shall have
them permanently affixed on the marijuana, domestic marijuana plant or con-

trolled substance immediately after receiving the substance.” (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 79-5204(c). “

Granted, in subsection (d) of that provision, the legislature used
the plural form, stating that “[t]axes imposed upon marijuana, do-
mestic marijuana plants or controlled substances by this act are
due and payable immediately upon acquisition or possession in this
state by a dealer.” K.S.A. 79-5204(d). But in the very next statute,
the legislature again speaks as if there is but a single tax being as-
sessed:

“At such time as the director of taxation shall determine that a dealer has not
paid the tax as provided by K.S.A. 79-5204, and amendments thereto, the director

830

may immediately assess a tax based on personal knowledge or information avail-
able to the director of taxation; mail to the taxpayer at the taxpayer's last known
address or serve in person, a written notice of the amount of tax, penalties and
interest; and demand its immediate payment.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2010
Supp. 79-5205(a).

Perhaps most importantly, the specific provision imposing a tax
penalty and creating criminal liability does not indicate that a tax
liability generated by possessing more than one type of drug at the
same time and same place creates multiple offenses for the same
conduct of failing to affix the requisite drug tax stamps. That statute
states:

“Any dealer violating this act is subject to a penalty of 100% of the tax in addi-
tion to the tax imposed by K.S.A. 79-5202 and amendments thereto. In addition
to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or possessing marijuana or con-
trolled substances without affixing the appropriate stamps, labels or other indicia
is guilty of a severity level 10 felony.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 79-5208.

The statute can reasonably be read to mean that K.S.A. 79-5202
imposes a single tax, notwithstanding the differing rates that might
be applied to calculate the total tax on the various taxable drugs in
the dealer’s possession. Moreover, as Pribble argues, the statute
provides that the failure to affix “the appropriate stamps” (plural)
makes the dealer “guilty of a .. . felony” (singular), suggesting one
unit of prosecution even where both marijuana stamps and con-
trolled substances stamps are “appropriate.” Of course, another
explanation for referring to the plural, “stamps,” might be the pos-
sibility that multiple stamps could be required on a single drug. See
K.S.A. 79-5204(b) (“The director shall issue the stamps, labels or
other indicia in denominations in multiples of $10.”). But such an
explanation does not parallel K.S.A. 79-5204(a), which proscribes
the possession of drugs by a dealer “unless the tax has been paid as
evidenced by an official stamp or other indicia.” (Emphasis added.)
In other words, the statute describing the prohibited possession of
untaxed drugs does not contemplate more than one stamp being
necessary to evidence the payment of the requisite tax.

Viewing all of the statutory provisions together suggests that the
legislature intended to impose a tax on the marijuana or controlled
substances possessed by drug dealers and to make it a crime for

Te ats se a

those drug dealers to fail to evidence the payment of that drug tax
with the appropriate stamps. Consequently, the clear purpose of
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 79-5201(c)’s definition of “dealer” is to differen-
tiate between drug dealers and personal-use possessors of drugs,
and, thereby, clarify who is a taxpayer under the act that can be
subject to the criminal sanction of K.S.A. 79-5208. In that regard,
the legislature’ designation of more grams to be considered a mar-
ijuana dealer than that required to be a methamphetamine dealer
has a basis in fact unrelated to establishing a unit of prosecution.
Accordingly, we reject the proposition that K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 79-
5201(c) clearly indicates a legislative intent to make the posses-
sion of two separate drugs two separate units of prosecution under
K.S.A. 79-5208.

Therefore, under the facts presented in this record, we hold that
Pribble’s possession of both marijuana and methamphetamine, at
the same time and the same location, without the appropriate drug
tax stamps affixed, without any proof that the drugs were acquired
at different times, constituted a single crime that should not have
been charged in two counts. One count is reversed, and the matter
is remanded for resentencing with one conviction for possessing
drugs without a drug tax stamp.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Next, Pribble contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the
prosecutor's closing argument. He claims the prosecutor misstated
the law, impermissibly commented on witnesses’ credibility, and
shifted the burden of proof to the defense. Pribble’s complaints are
not devoid of merit.

Standard of Review/Analytical Framework

Pribble did not object at trial to the prosecutor’s comments, but
the same standard of review applies to a claim of prosecutorial er-
ror during closing argument regardless of whether the defendant
raised a contemporaneous objection. See State v. Miller, 293 Kan.
535, 550, 264 P.3d 461 (2011) (noting the special preservation
rule). Appellate review of a prosecutor's closing argument requires
a two-step analysis. First, an appellate court decides whether the

— 4

comments were outside the wide latitude that a prosecutor is al-
lowed in discussing the evidence. Second, if misconduct or error
is found, an appellate court must determine whether the improper
comments prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied
the defendant a fair trial. State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 856, 281
P.3d 1112 (2012).

Prosecutors enjoy wide latitude in crafting closing arguments.
See State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 114, 21 P.3d 516 (citing State v.
Miller, 268 Kan. 517, Syl. { 4, 997 P.2d 90 [2000]), cert. denied 534
USS. 1047 (2001). This latitude allows a prosecutor to argue reason-
able inferences that may be drawn from the admitted evidence, but
it does not extend so far as to permit arguing facts that are not in
evidence. State v. Tahah, 293 Kan. 267, 277, 262 P.3d 1045 (2011).
Likewise, “[p]rosecutors are not allowed to make statements that
inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury or distract the jury
from its duty to make decisions based on the evidence and the con-
trolling law.” State v. Baker, 281 Kan. 997, 1016, 135 P.3d 1098
(2006). In short, a prosecutor's arguments must remain consistent
with the evidence.

Analysis

We will take each challenge in order, starting with the allegation
that the prosecutor misstated the law applicable to possession of
the illegal drugs. The prosecutor started on track, arguing as fol-
lows:

“So what is possession? As the Judge told you, it means having joint or exclu-
sive control over an item with knowledge of and the intent to have that control or

Imowingly keeping an item in some place where you have access or some measure
of control over it.”

But the prosecutor stumbled in trying to fashion a scenario that
adequately explained the legal principles involved. The prosecu-
tor’s exemplar was as follows:

“If I was to walk into your home and find a remote control on a couch, well,
maybe Alex Martinez was over there and dropped off the remote control or maybe
there was some big party, but it’s still yours. And this marijuana is in his suitcase.
There is a tag for it. It’s in his bedroom. It’s in his toilet. It is in his freezer. It is
everywhere.” (Emphasis added.)

—— SC

The district court’s jury instruction, which was proper, told the
jurors that the defendant’s control over the item had to be “with
knowledge of and the intent to have such control or knowingly
keeping some item in a place where the person has some measure
of access and right of control.” To the contrary, the prosecutor's
hypothetical implied that possession does not require intent when
it stated that a third-person’s deposit of an item in the defendant’s
house without the defendant’s knowledge means that the defen-
dant possessed the deposited item. But as a matter of law, Pribble
would not “possess” an item that was dropped in his house with-
out his knowledge. Therefore, the prosecutor's hypothetical about
Martinez’ remote control erroneously misstated the law for the
jury. See State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 406, 133 P.3d 14 (2006)
(“Misstating the law is not within the wide latitude given to pros-
ecutors in closing arguments.”).

Our finding that the prosecutor exceeded the boundaries of fair
argument sends us to the second step of determining whether the
error requires reversal. In recent years, this court has looked at
three factors in analyzing reversibility in prosecutorial misconduct
cases, to-wit: (1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant;
(2) whether the misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's part;
and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelm-
ing nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight
in the minds of jurors. State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 914, 269 P.3d
1268 (2012).

Tn applying the factors, we often declare that none of them is in-
dividually controlling. See Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, Syl. { 3. To aid
in the determination of the first factor—whether the misconduct
was gross and flagrant—we have considered whether the error was
repeated, was emphasized, was in violation of a long-standing rule,
was in violation of a clear and unequivocal rule, or was in viola-
tion of a rule designed to protect a constitutional right. 294 Kan.
850, Syl. 4 6. In analyzing whether a prosecutor’s misconduct was
motivated by ill will, we have considered whether the misconduct
was deliberate, repeated, or in apparent indifference to a court's
ruling. 204 Kan, 850, Syl. { 7. Perhaps most importantly, we must
consider the prosecutor's challenged comments “in the context in

' DE

which they were made, not in isolation.” State v. Brown, 300 Kan.
542, 560, 331 P.3d 781 (2014).

The prohibition against misstating the law is certainly a long-
standing, clear, and unequivocal rule. Here, the prosecutor cor-
rectly stated the law for the jury but then inartfully tried to explain
the law with an inaccurate hypothetical. In context, however, the
prosecutor immediately followed the misstatement by pointing out
that marijuana was everywhere in Pribble’s house—in a suitcase
with a tag on it, in his bedroom, in his toilet, and in his freezer. The
obvious implication of the prosecutor's observation was that the
ubiquitous presence of marijuana in a person’s house belies the no-
tion that the homeowner was unaware of its presence, which would
be a statement well within the boundaries of fair argument. In oth-
er words, the prosecutor’s erroneous hypothetical had no possibil-
ity of changing the result and does not require reversal. See State
v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 431, 264 P3d 81 (2011) (State bears
burden to establish no reasonable possibility the error affected the
verdict).

Pribble’s next challenge involves the conflicts between Pribble’s
testimony and the testimony of the law enforcement officers who
searched the house. After telling the jurors that they had “to de-
termine the weight and credibility to be given the testimony of
each witness”; that they should use their “common knowledge and
experience” in reviewing “any matter about which a witness has
testified”; and that numerous claims made by Pribble during his
testimony were simply implausible, the prosecutor made the fol-
lowing statement: .

“Who is credible? Mr. Pribble says I don’t want anything to do with marijuana,
it’s illegal. Well, that’s why he’s sitting in that chaix, ladies and gentlemen. He says
I don’t approve of the culture. I don’t like Bob Marley. I don’t like Rastafarian. I
don’t like anything to do with that. I don’t support marijuana. I don’t believe that's
credible. And 1 don’t believe you, ladies and gentlemen, should believe that’s cred-
ible either.

“I don’t think those things add up, because we know that the officers didn’t
make him put that shirt on. We know the officers didn’t tell him it had smallpox.
They didn’t say, hey, put this on, let’s go out and get a picture.” (Emphasis added.)

The significance of the referenced shirt was that it contained a

835

message promoting marijuana use. Later, during the prosecutor's
rebuttal argument, he stated:

“Do not go down these rabbit holes, do not chase these red herrings. Ladies
and gentlemen, the State has met its burden. It’s beyond a reasonable doubt, a

reasonable doubt. I can’t disprove things that don’t happen, and the defense can’t
either.” (Emphasis added.)

It is improper for a prosecutor to offer his or her personal opin-
ion as to the credibility of a witness, including the defendant. See
State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 59-64, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005); State
v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 121-23, 61 P.3d 701 (2003); State v. Pabst,
268 Kan. 501, 506-07, 996 P.2d 321 (2000). The reason is because
“‘such comments are “unsworn, unchecked testimony, not com-
mentary on the evidence of the case.”’” State v. Peppers, 294 Kan.
377, 396, 276 P.3d 148 (2012) (quoting State v. Duong, 292 Kan.
824, 830, 257 P.3d 309 [2011]). A prosecutor, however, “may ex-
plain the legitimate factors which a jury may consider in assessing
witness credibility and may argue why the factors present in the
current case should lead to a compelling inference of truthfulness.”
State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, Syl. { 5, 186 P.3d 755 (2008); see, e.g.,
State v. Huerta-Alvarez, 291 Kan. 247, 262, 243 P.3d 326 (2010)
(finding that prosecutor's remarks in closing regarding victim’s
credibility “were generally in the nature of reviewing what [the vic-
tim] said, asking the jury to assess the credibility of her statements,
and querying the jury why she would not have made up a more
convenient story if in fact she had fabricated the story at all”).
Often, the propriety of a prosecutor’s point in closing argument
will hinge upon how the statement is phrased. For instance, the
statement, “The evidence contradicts the defendant's statement,”
is acceptable, whereas, “I don’t believe the defendant's statement
is credible,” crosses the line. Here, the prosecutor stepped outside
the wide latitude allowed when he gave the jury his personal opin-
ion: “I don’t believe that’s credible. And I don’t believe you, ladies
and gentlemen, should believe that’s credible either.” Likewise, the
prosecutor should not have offered his opinion that “I don’t think
those things add up.” The other portions of the argument asked
the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and fell
within the wide latitude afforded to prosecutors notwithstanding

the colorful language employed. See State v. Albright, 283 Kan.
418, 429-30, 153 P.3d 497 (2007) (noting that court has approved a
variety of colorful analogies—such as “smoke and mirrors’—used
by prosecutors during closing arguments to describe the defen-
dant’s theory of the case).

Turning to the second step on the prosecutor's erroneous state-
ments of personal belief, we note that the prosecutor sent a mixed
message, rather than just the wrong message. Before proffering his
personal opinion, the prosecutor specifically told the jurors that it
was their duty to determine the weight and credibility to be given
to the testimony of each witness. Moreover, one would not expect
the jurors to have been surprised to learn that the prosecutor did
not believe the defendant's exculpatory statements, given that the
prosecutor was continuing to seek defendant's conviction.

Under the third factor, the evidence of Pribble’s guilt was cir-
cumstantial in nature but substantial in quantity. The jurors heard
testimony from law enforcement officers regarding the marijuana,
packaging materials, labels, bongs, blow torches, methamphet-
amine, and a possible grow room found in Pribble’s home. They
saw photographs meticulously documenting the search as well as
the large quantity of evidence seized. Accordingly, when viewed
as a whole, the prosecutor's use of “I believe” and “I think” did not
affect the verdict.

Pribble’s final challenge to the State’s closing argument involves
the prosecutor's remarks early in his rebuttal to defense counsel's
arguments, The defense had pointed out that law enforcement of-
ficers did not collect any fingerprint or DNA evidence during the
search of Pribble’s house and that the jury did not hear from nu-
merous witnesses who could have corroborated Pribble’s claim of
being out of town for several weeks prior to the house search. The
prosecutor responded with the following remarks:

“[Defense counsel] tells you that the officers cut corners. They didn’t get fin-
gerprints. They didn’t get fingerprints. They didn’t collect semen off the toilet.
They didn’t collect fingerprints out of the house. They didn’t do black light tests.
They didn’t get the DNA off the cans. He's right.

“And he says that beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest burden in the land.
Absolutely can’t be any more. It’s also the same thing that we've been doing since

837

about 1789 before we did DNA, black lights, fingerprints, et cetera, et cetera. And
we've been getting convictions ever since.

“He says that it’s hard to prove something that didn’t happen. How do you
disprove something? That's true. It’s really hard, How do you prove a negative?

“He says the State didn’t prove anything. Well, ladies and gentlemen, the de-
Jense has the exact same ability to subpoena witnesses. And if he was at Fall River,
his sister could have told us. His nephew could have told us there was a big party.
Terry Moore could have come in and said none of this stuff was there when I left
the house. Alex Martinez could have come in and said, yeah, I was at the house.
And guess who we heard from. No one. Because how do I disprove something that
didn’t happen? How do I disprove that he wasn't in Fall River, he was at his house
hours before the search warrant was executed, days before? Because Detective
Olsen told you, yeah, I saw the pickup. I didn’t have a camera with me that day.
We did this multiple times. Olsen is not hiding anything. He told you exactly what
he could remember, what he saw, what he documented.

“It is my burden to prove this case, and the State has done that.” (Emphasis
added.)

Pribble complains that the prosecutor's statements about the

defense’s ability to call witnesses shifted the burden of proof to
the defense. “Kansas courts deem it ‘improper for the prosecutor
to attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defendant or to mis-
state the legal standard of the burden of proof. [Citations omit-
ted.] But we grant prosecutors considerable latitude to address
the weaknesses of the defense.” Duong, 292 Kan. at 832 (quoting
State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13, 18, 237 P.3d 1229 [2010]); see State v.
McKinney, 272 Kan. 331, 346, 33 P.3d 234 (2001) (where jury has
been properly instructed that prosecution has burden of proof, a
prosecutor may argue inferences based on the balance or lack of
evidence), overruled on other grounds by State v. Davis, 283 Kan.
569, 158 P.3d 317 (2007). In Peppers, this court stated:
“When a prosecutor’s comment ‘constitute[s] only a general question about the
absence of evidence to rebut the State’s witnesses . . . and not an impermissible
remark about the defendant's failure to testify or an attempt to shift the burden
of proof to the defense,’ the comment is within the wide latitude afforded to the
prosecution.” 294 Kan. at 397-98.

Particularly germane here is our precedent that a prosecutor
does not shift the burden of proof by pointing out the absence of
evidence to support the defense argument that there are holes in
the State’s case. See, ¢.g., State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 939,

838

329 P.3d 400 (2014) (“[I]f a defendant asks the jury to draw an in-
ference that the State’s evidence is not credible because the State
did not call a witness to corroborate other evidence, we have held
that the State can refute the inference by informing the jury that
the defense has the power to subpoena witnesses, including those
who would be favorable to the defense.”); Duong, 292 Kan, at 832-
33 (holding prosecutor’s arguments questioning defendant's failure
to present evidence of misidentification did not improperly shift
burden of proof because prosecutor did not call upon defense to
disprove crime’s occurrence but rather pointed out that evidence
supporting defense theory was thin).

Accordingly, the prosecutor did not improperly shift the burden
of proof when he commented about Pribble’s failure to call alibi
witnesses who could have corroborated his theory of the case, i.e.,
that he was out of town when the drugs came into his house. More-
over, Pribble testified at trial, so there was nothing about the state-
ment that infringed on his right to remain silent. Furthermore,
the prosecutor's comment was a fair rebuttal to defense counsel’s
argument that the State failed to collect certain evidence inside
Pribble’s home or call Moore and Martinez as alibi witnesses. In
short, we find no error in this portion of the prosecutor's closing
argument.

JUDICIAL FINDING OF CRIMINAL HISTORY

For his final issue, Pribble makes the familiar, but futile, argu-
ment that the district court violated his rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, pursu-
ant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348,
147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), when it imposed an increased sentence
based upon his prior convictions without requiring the State to
prove the existence of the convictions to a jury beyond a reason-
able doubt.

Pribble concedes that his argument was rejected in State v. Ivo-
ry, 273 Kan. 44, 46-48, 41 P.3d 781 (2002). This court has repeat-
edly confirmed Ivory’s holding. See, e.g., State v. Castleberry, 301
Kan. 170, 191, 339 P.3d 795 (2014). Pribble advances no reason for
this court to revisit Ivory and, thus, we decline to do so. Pribble’s

839

sentence under the guidelines, determined in part by his prior con-
victions, was not unconstitutional.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with direc-
tions.

STEGALL, J., not participating.
MIcHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned]

RK

ROSEN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pait: I agree with
the majority's conclusion that the prosecutor’s comments during
closing argument did not constitute reversible error. I also agree
with the majority that the district court’s use of Pribble’s prior con-
victions to determine his sentence under the sentencing guidelines
did not violate his constitutional rights as described in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435
(2000). But I disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that Pribble’s
convictions for possession of marijuana with no drug tax stamp and
possession of methamphetamine with no drug tax stamp are mul-
tiplicitous.

The Kansas Drug Stamp Act is a means by which our legisla-
ture has attempted to hold accountable those who perpetuate and
benefit financially from illegal drug trafficking. This accountability
includes a distinction recognizing different levels of taxation based
on a drug's detrimental societal impact, unwittingly capturing the
essence of the “The Pusher,” a song made famous years ago by the
musical group Steppenwolf. A dealer of marijuana—‘A man with
the love grass in his hand” is taxed separately and at a significantly
lower rate than a pusher—“a monster . . . he’s not a natural man,”
who “don’t care if you live . . . or if you die,” that being a person
who deals in addictive controlled substances. That person is taxed
at a rate over 5,000% greater for possessing/selling a controlled
substance compared to a possessor/seller of a similar quantity of
marijuana. Even comparing the minimum amounts allowable for

prosecution, 28 grams for possessing marijuana versus I gram for
possessing a controlled substance, the tax on a controlled substance
is more than double the taxed amount for marijuana.

While I have always questioned the constitutional limitations
of such measures, drug stamp laws have withstood constitutional
challenges, including the 5th Amendment's right against self-in-
crimination and its prohibition against double jeopardy. State v.
Jenson, 259 Kan. 781, Syl. ¥ 2, 915 P2d 109 (1996); see, e.g., State
v. Gulledge, 257 Kan, 915, Syl. { 3, 896 P.2d 378 (1995); State v.
Durrant, 244 Kan. 522, 523, Syl. ¢ 13, 769 P.2d 1174, cert. denied
492. U.S. 923 (1989). My reading of the Kansas Drug Tax Act in-
dicates that the legislature clearly allowed for a person in Pribble’s
situation—a person possessing more than 28 grams of marijuana
and more than 1 gram of methamphetamine without affixing ap-
propriate drug tax stamps to either drug—to be convicted of two
violations of K.S.A. 79-5208.

In State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¢ 15, 133 P.3d 48
(2006), we stated that two components must be met in order for
convictions to be considered multiplicitous: “(1) Do the convic-
tions arise from the same conduct? and (2) By statutory definition
are there two offenses or only one?” I agree with my colleagues
that Pribble’s drug-tax-stamp convictions arise from the same con-
duct. But I disagree with their construction of K.S.A. 79-5208.

Because Pribble’s convictions arose from a single statute, we
apply the unit of prosecution test. Under this test, a court looks
at “the statutory definition of the crime” to determine “what the
legislature intended as the allowable unit of prosecution. There
can be only one conviction for each allowable unit of prosecution.”
Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 497-98.

K.S.A. 79-5208 states:

“Any dealer violating [the Kansas Drug Tax Act] is subject to a penalty of 100%
of the tax in addition to the tax imposed by K.S.A. 79-5202 and amendments
thereto. In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or possessing
marijuana or controlled substances without affixing the appropriate stamps, labels
or other indicia is guilty of a severity level 10 felony.” (Emphasis added.)

The term “dealer” is defined as

“any person who, in violation of Kansas law, manufactures, produces, ships, trans-

841

ports or imports into Kansas or in any manner acquires or possesses more than
28 grams of marijuana, or more than one gram of any controlled substance, or 10
or more dosage units of any controlled substance which is not sold by weight.”
(Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 79-5201(c).

“Controlled substance” is defined as

“any drug or substance, whether real or counterfeit, as defined by K.S.A. 2010
Supp. 2136a01, and amendments thereto, which is held, possessed, transported,
transferred, sold or offered to be sold in violation of the laws of Kansas. Such term
shall not include marijuana.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 79-5201(b).

Methamphetamine is considered a controlled substance under
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-36a01 (a). See K.S.A. 65-4107(d).

As we noted in State v. Gulledge, 257 Kan. 915, 918, 896 P.2d
378 (1995), “K.S.A. 79-5208 establishes criminal and civil penal-
ties. A dealer violating the Act is subject to a civil penalty of 100
percent of the tax in addition to payment of the tax itself.” (Em-
phasis added.) K.S.A. 79-5202(a)(1) imposes a tax of $3.50 for each
gram of marijuana a dealer possesses. Subsection (a)(4) imposes a
tax of $200 for each gram of methamphetamine a dealer possesses.
K.S.A. 79-5202(a)(4). The taxes owed under the act “are due and
payable immediately upon acquisition or possession [of the drug or
drugs at issue] in this state by a dealer.” K.S.A. 79-5204(d). Consis-
tent with the civil nature of the taxes and penalties imposed under
K.S.A. 79-5202 and K.S.A. 79-5208, the Department of Revenue,
not a county or district attorney, is responsible for collecting any
money owed under the Kansas Drug Tax Act. See K.S.A. 2010
Supp. 79-5205.

If a dealer pays the taxes on the marijuana or controlled sub-
stances in his or her possession, the dealer receives “stamps, la-
bels or other indicia” from the Department of Revenue, indicating
that the dealer paid the taxes imposed under K.S.A. 79-5202. See
K.S.A. 79-5204(a) and (b). K.S.A. 79-5204(b) states that “[t]he di-
rector [of taxation] shall issue the stamps, labels or other indicia in
denominations in multiples of $10.” Upon acquiring the stamps, a
dealer is required to affix the appropriate number of stamps to the
marijuana or controlled substances in his or her possession. See
K.S.A. 79-5204(c).

Returning to the language of K.S.A. 79-5208, the criminal act

— |

that the statute proscribes is a dealer’s failure to affix “the appropri-
ate stamps, labels or other indicia” to marijuana or controlled sub-
stances, such as methamphetamine, in his or her possession. When
the definition of a dealer is taken into consideration (i.¢., a person
possessing more than 28 grams of marijuana or more than 1 gram
of any controlled substance) along with the definition of controlled
substance (a term which includes methamphetamine but specifi-
cally excludes marijuana), it is clear that possession of more than
28 grams of marijuana without affixing the appropriate number of
stamps constitutes one unit of prosecution and possession of more
than 1 gram of controlled substances without affixing the appropri-
ate number to stamps constitutes another unit of prosecution. In
other words, possession of more than 28 grams of marijuana and
possession of more than 1 gram of methamphetamine without af-
fixing the appropriate number of stamps to either drug constitutes
two violations of K.S.A. 79-5208.

Pribble’s only argument on appeal for concluding otherwise is
that the legislature, by using the plural terms “stamps, labels or
other indicia” rather than singular terms “stamp, label, and indi-
cium” within K.S.A, 79-5208 “expressed its intent that the failure
to obtain and affix any number of stamps, labels, or other indicia
constitutes only one violation of the statute. That statute explicitly
states as much; such an individual is guilty of ‘a severity level 10
felony,’ i.¢., one severity level ten felony.”

Pribble is partially correct. The language of K.S.A. 79-5208 does
indicate that a dealer’s failure to affix any number of “stamps, la-
bels, or indicia” to a single drug, regardless of its quantity, results
in only one violation of the statute. Therefore, regardless of wheth-
er a dealer possesses 29 or 200 grams of marijuana, if the dealer
fails to affix the appropriate number of stamps to the marijuana
in his or her possession, the dealer has committed only one viola-
tion of K.S.A. 79-5208. But as indicated above, if that same dealer
also possesses more than 1 gram of a controlled substance (such
as methamphetamine) without affixing the appropriate number of
stamps to the substance, that dealer can be charged and convicted
of two violations of K.S.A. 79-5208.

In this case, while executing a search warrant, law enforcement

843

officers found more than 800 grams of marijuana and more than
14 grams of methamphetamine inside Pribble’s home—more than
enough to qualify Pribble as a “dealer” of both drugs under K.S.A.
2010 Supp. 79-5201(c). Because he failed to affix tax stamps to
either drug, the language of K.S.A. 79-5208 allows for him to be
charged, convicted, and sentenced for two violations of the statute,
a level 10 felony. Fortunately for Pribble, Steppenwolf’s offgrid
sentence of—"I’d cut him if he stands, and I’d shoot him if he’d
run. Yes ’'d kill him with my Bible and my razor and my gun”—was
not embraced by our legislature when considering the appropriate
sanction for violation of this law. Accordingly, I would affirm the
Court of Appeals’ determination that Pribble’s tax stamp convic-
tions are not multiplicitous and let stand his two convictions for
violating K.S.A. 79-5208.

No. 114,863

In the Matter of LyLE Louris Ono, Respondent.
(375 B3d 320)

Opinion filed July 15, 2016. Jas

Kimberly L. Knoll, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and
Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal com-
plaint for the petitioner.

Thomas A. Hamill, of Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer, L.L.P, of
Overland Park, argued the cause, and Lyle Louis Odo, respondent, argued the
cause pro se.

|

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by
the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent,
Lyle Louis Odo, of Platte City, Missouri, an attorney admitted to
the practice of law in Kansas in 2007. Respondent was admitted to
the practice of law in Missouri in 1975.

On August 10, 2015, the office of the Disciplinary Administra
tor filed a formal complaint against the respondent alleging viola-
tions of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). The
respondent filed an answer on September 2, 2015. A hearing was
held on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Dis-
cipline of Attorneys on November 4, 2015, where the respondent
was present and was represented by counsel. The hearing panel
determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.7(a)(2) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 519) (conflict of interest); 1.8(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 530) (conflict of interest); 1.8(e) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
530) (providing financial assistance to client); 1.9(a) (2015 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 539) (duties to former clients); 1.15(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 556) (preserving client funds); and 8.4(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with its recommen-
dation to this court:

CC

“Findings of Fact

On June 24, 2011, C.M. and L.F. filed a complaint against the respon-
dent with the disciplinary administrator's office. C.M. and LF. also filed a com-
plaint with the Missouri Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

“9. In August 2013, a Missouri disciplinary hearing panel conducted a hear-
ing, In December 2013, the disciplinary hearing panel issued its written decision.
The hearing panel made the following findings of fact:

“10. On November 6, 2009, [C.M.] was a passenger in a vehicle driven by
[L.F], which was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by an employee of
Alan Cummings. The accident occurred in Atchison County, Kansas.

‘11. As aresult of the accident, [C.M.] sustained a fractured hip and was life-
flighted to a hospital where he was hospitalized for six days.

“12. On December 2, 2009, [L.F.] and [C.M.] both executed a written attor-
ney-client agreement with Respondent for legal representation of them regarding
their respective injury claims arising out of the motor vehicle accident.

‘13. Respondent's law firm is located in Missouri. [C.M.] and [L.F.] met with
Respondent several times at Respondent’s Missouri law office. Since there was no
lawsuit filed by Respondent with respect to the personal injury claim, virtually all
work performed by Respondent relative to that claim occurred in Missouri. Other
legal work performed by Respondent for [C.M.] involved legal proceedings be-
fore a Missouri tribunal, e.g. Circuit Court of Platte County, Missouri or the City
of Tracy, Missouri Municipal Court.

'{5. [L.FI's personal injury claim was settled by Respondent on January 14,
2011.

‘16. [C.M.] terminated Respondent's services in the personal injury claim on
May 10, 2011, and retained Roger D. Fincher.

“V7. [C.M1]s personal injury claim was settled in late 2011.

‘Findings of Fact Relating to Count I:
Prohibited Transactions [Rule 4-1.8(a)]

‘18. Beginning about February 2010, [C.M.] was unable to work and was
experiencing financial distress, He investigated the possibility of obtaining loans
as an advance against his anticipated personal injury settlement, and inquired of
Respondent as to this possibility.

“19. Respondent advised [C.M.] that he could arrange for him to receive
loans on better terms than the sources he had investigated.

‘20. Respondent recommended [C.M.] borrow funds from Kristen Nicole
Properties, Inc. (KNP).

1, KNP is a closed corporation which Respondent incorporated in 1994.
He is President and registered agent of the corporation, and the only officer, em-
ployee, or representative it has ever had. KNP has the same address, telephone
number, and email address as Respondent's law office.

846

“22. At the time of its incorporation Respondent was the sole owner of KNP,
but in 2005 Respondent transferred all the shares of KNP to his daughter, Kristen
Nicole Odo, who is now the sole shareholder and beneficiary.

‘23. Atall times in question Respondent was the registered agent of KNP, as
well as its sole director and officer, and was the only person through whom [C.M.]
or anyone else deals with KNP.

24. Respondent testified that the primary purpose of KNP is to invest in and
manage real estate properties.

‘25. Respondent testified that no one receives any salaries, dividends, or in-
come from KNP. The sole benefit of its economic activities is the appreciation of
its value. Respondent testified that he transferred ownership of KNP to Kristen
Nicole Odo as an estate planning action, so that she would benefit from the wealth
it created upon his death or cessation of business. However, Respondent is still the
only person who operates or represents KNP.

‘26. Although Respondent is not the technical owner of KNP, he still derives
benefit from profits earned by the company, as according to his own testimony
such profits enhance the value of his estate, and thus Respondent has an owner-
ship, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest in transactions with KNP for
purposes of Rule 4-1.8(a).

‘27. The acts of KNP in loaning money to Respondent's client are the acts
of Respondent himself since Respondent was the only officer, director and agent
of the lender and controlled the checking account used to consummate the loans
and personally signed each loan check. Respondent controlled each aspect of the
transactions without the independent assistance of any other person. Respon-
dent's daughter Kristen Nicole Odo had no Inowledge of the loan transactions
between KNP and [C.M.].

‘28, During the period from February 2010 to May 2011, Respondent ar-
ranged sixteen separate loan transactions between [C.M.] and KNP. [L.F'] signed
twelve of the loan documents as a guarantor or co-signer.

‘29. Respondent served as counsel for KNP in the loan transactions, and also
had an active client-attorney relationship with [C.M.] and [L.F.] at all times during
the loan transactions. Respondent testified that he went through the loan docu-
ments with [C.M.] and [L.F.], answered their questions, and generally advised
them as their attorney as to the loan transactions.

‘30. Respondent did not advise [C.M.] and/or [L.F.] in writing of the desir-
ability of seeking independent legal counsel on the transaction, as required by
Rule 4-1.8(a)(1).

‘31. Respondent did not fully disclose and transmit the transaction and
terms on to the [sic] [C.M.] and [L.F.] in writing in a manner that can be reason-
ably understood by the client, as required by Rule 4-1.8(a)(2).

‘32. [C.M.] and [L.F] did not give informed consent, in a writing signed by
them, to the essential terms of the transaction and Respondent's role in the trans-
action, including whether Respondent was representing them in the transaction,
as required by Rule 4-1.8(a)(3).

847

‘33. These business transactions were secured loan transactions, document-
ed in each case by a “Note, Disclosure and Security Agreement” (Exhibit 4) jointly
executed by [C.M.] as the borrower and [L.F.] as guarantor or co-signer. Under
these loan agreements, Kristen Nicole Properties, Inc. (“KNB”) was identified as
the lender.

‘34, Each of the sixteen loan agreements contained the following provision:
“To secure the obligations of this Loan Agreement, I give you a security interest in
the Property described below. Sufficient portion of the proceeds of an injury claim
against Alan Cummings which occurred November 6, 2009 to satisfy this note.”

‘35. Each of the sixteen loan transactions was secured by a lien on the pro-
ceeds of [C.M.]'s personal injury settlement, in the matter in which Respondent
represented [C.M.].

‘36. Respondent, representing KNP, charged [C.M.] a transaction fee of $75
for each loan transaction, amounting to $1,200 for the sixteen transactions.

‘37. The interest rate for the loans was 180% for the first month, and 38.8%
per annum, a rate the Panel finds excessive, burdensome, and possibly illegal.
[Footnote: The hearing panel in the instant case concurs with the Missouri disci-
plinary hearing panel that in addition to the rule violations, the hearing panel also
concludes that the interest rate charged by the respondent is excessive and bur-
densome. Further, if the transaction had occurred in Kansas, it would be illegal.
See K.S.A. 16-207]

88. Respondent advised and required [L.F] to co-sign for the loans al-
though she acquired no interest in the loan proceeds, which were not terms fair
and reasonable to [L.F.].

‘Findings of Fact Relating to Count II:
Financial Assistance to a Client [Rule 4-1-8(e)]

“39. From Respondent's own funds, during the course of the representation,
Respondent paid various bills for medical treatment received by [C.M.]. Respon-
dent twice paid $500 each for [C.M.]’s epidural treatments to relieve his pain. Re-
spondent admits that such payments were for actual medical treatment received
by [CM].

“40. Respondent also paid $4,079 for an MRI on [C.M.]s behalf. Respon-
dent’s amended answer characterizes this payment as a payment of “medical eval-
uation” rather than for “medical treatment,” but in his testimony Respondent did
indeed admit that the $4,079 payment was “diagnostic” for his client's “medical
treatment,” and also included pharmaceutical analgesic.

‘41, On these occasions Respondent advanced payments for medical treat-
ments to his client.

“42, Respondent has expressed his regret for this violation of the Rule, and
testified that his motivation was compassion for his client who was in pain and un-
able to pay medical expenses.

— #8§=§= lh

‘Findings of Fact Relating to Count III: Representation of a Client
Involving a Concurrent Conflict of Interest [Rule 4-1.7(a)(2)]

“43, During the relevant period at issue, Respondent simultaneously served
as the lawyer for [C.M.] and [L. he lawyer for KNP; the sole officer and direc-
tor of KNP; and a father who desired to leave an inheritance to his daughter and
the namesake of KNP.

“44, Respondent's own actions often failed to distinguish between his differ-
ent roles. In March 2011, Respondent sent to [C.M.] on law firm letterhead (Ex-
hibit 10) an accounting of the loan balances with accrued interest while in April
2011, Respondent send [sic] the copies of the loan documents on KNP letterhead
(Exhibit 3) as president of KNP.

‘45. Respondent simultaneously represented KNP as creditor and [L.F.] and
[C.M.] as borrowers in connection with the administration of the loans.

‘46. There was a significant risk that Respondent's representation of [C.M.]
and [L.F.] would be materially limited by Respondent's personal interests as their
creditor through his absolute control of the finances of KNP. Likewise, there was
a significant risk that Respondent's representation of KNP would be materially
limited by Respondent's responsibilities to [C.M.] and [L.F].

‘47. _[C.M.] testified that he became concemed that Respondent's interest in
loaning him money was deterring Respondent from filing a lawsuit on his behalf
or proceeding with settlement of the matter.

“48. Respondent simultaneously represented KNP as creditor and [L.F.] and
[C.M.] as borrowers in connection with the administration of the loans.

“49. There was a significant risk that Respondent's representation of [C.M.]
and [L.F.] would be materially limited by the Respondent's personal interests and
divided loyalty as their creditor through his pecuniary interest in and representa-
tion of KNP.

‘50. While Respondent did not delay handling [C.M.]’s case for an amount
of time that violated Rule 4-1.3 regarding diligence, the regular pattern of broker-
ing loans from KNP to [C.M.] compromised Respondent's full loyalties were [sic]
with his client.

“Findings of Fact Relating to Count IV:
Disclosure of Client Information [Rule 4-1.6(a)]

‘Sl. On May 20, 2011 Respondent filed a civil lawsuit in the Circuit Court of
Platte County, Missouri against [C.M.]. The case was captioned as Lyle Odo P.C.
v. [C.M.], Case No. LIAECV01722 (the “Odo v. [C.M.] Lawsuit”).

‘52, The Petition in the Odo v. [C.M.] Lawsuit was prepared, signed and
filed by Respondent. Respondent did not seek to file the Petition under seal.

‘53. Respondent attached as exhibits to the petition documents regarding
his representation of [C.M.] and [L.F.], including detailed activity logs showing
everything he did on their behalf.

‘54. [C.M.] appeared by counsel in the action, and did not file a motion to
seal the documents.

‘Findings of Fact Relating to Count V:
Representation Adverse to a Former Client [Rule 4-1.9(a)]
(Febbo Matter)

'55. _ [C.M.Js injury claim was settled in the latter half of 2011. In connection
with the settlement, [C.M.], through his new counsel, filed an action to apportion
the settlement proceeds between disputed liens and [C.M.]s share of recovery.
The action was filed in the District Court of Atchison County, Kansas on October
24, 2011, captioned as [C.M.] v. Cummings et al., Case No. 2011CV123.

‘56. Respondent appeared in the Atchison County case, adversely to [C.M.],
on his own behalf, relating to his attomey fees and expenses, and also on behalf of
two clients who asserted claims against [C.M.]—KNP Properties, and Dr. Theresa
Febbo.

‘BT. During the course of his representation on the personal injury claim,
Respondent referred [C.M.] to Dr. Theresa Febbo, a chiropractor, for treatment
of pain.

"58. Dr. Febbo treated [C.M.] for pain, and also provided a chiropractic re-
port for use in the personal injury case.

‘59. In February 2012, Respondent contacted Attorney Hudnall and advised
him that Dr. Febbo was a “long time client” who needed to file a collection case,
which Respondent could not do because of a conflict.

“60. Respondent prepared the lawsuit petition on behalf of Dr. Febbo
against [C.M.]. Respondent's legal assistant notarized Dr. Febbo’s signature on
the lawsuit petition. Respondent paid the filing fee for the lawsuit and arranged to
have it filed at the Courthouse.

‘61. Febbo v. [C.M.] was docketed as No. 124E-CU00155 in the Circuit
Court for Platte County, Missouri.

“62. William Hudnall was counsel of record for Dr. Febbo in Febbo v. [C.M.].
However, Respondent appeared on behalf of Dr. Febbo on two occasions:

a. On February 16, 2012, Respondent appeared in place of Mr. Hudnall at

a hearing on the matter.

b. On April 5, 2012, Respondent appeared in place of Mr. Hudnall at a

hearing on the matter.

‘63. Mr. Hudnall kept Respondent informed about the progress of the Feb-
bo case, although he testified Respondent told him he had a conflict.

‘64, The subject matter of Febbo v. [C.M.] was substantially related to the
subject matter of the personal injury claim in which Respondent represented
[C.M1], as the injuries for which Febbo was to treat [C.M.] arose out of the same
accident as the personal injury claim, and Febbo was expected to supply a report
for use in the personal injury claim.

“65. For the same reasons, the subject matter of the Febbo claim in [C.M.]
©. Cummings was substantially related to the subject matter of the personal injury
claim in which Respondent treated [C.M.].

‘Findings of Fact Relating to Count IV:
Representation Adverse to a Former Client [Rule 4-1.9(a)]
(KNP Matter)

‘66. As previously found, [C.M.] terminated Respondent's services in the
personal injury matter on May 10, 2011.

‘67. On June 1, 2011, Respondent, on his law firm letterhead, wrote a letter
to [C.M.] which stated:

Enclosed you will please find a document entitled “Inrevocable Instructions

To Deduct Payment From Settlement Proceeds” for your notarized sig-

nature together with a self-addressed stamped envelope for you to return

same within ten (10) days from the date of this letter.

Notes #1, #2 and #3 are due and payment must be made unless you comply

with this request.

If 1 did not receive the above document as requested, my client will initiate

all steps necessary to protect its interests in collection same [sic].

“68. The letter also included a Federal debt collection notice.

‘69. In the letter of June 1, 2011, Respondent clearly represented the inter-
ests of KNP, who he referred to as “my client,” adversely to the interests of [C.M.].

“70. The subject matter of the letter of June 1, 2011, collection of some of
the loans Respondent had brokered between KNP and [C.M.], was substantially
related to the subject matter of Respondent's representation of [C.M.] in both the
Joan transactions and the personal injury claim.

“71. Respondent represented KNP as its legal counsel of record against
C.M.] in the Atchison County, Kansas proceeding captioned as [C.M.] v. Cum-
mings to enforce KNP’s purported security interest under the loan documents
upon [C.M.]’ settlement proceeds.

“72. As previously found, on May 20, 2011 Respondent filed the “Odo v.
(C.M_] Lawsuit” against [C.M.] in Platte County.

‘73. On June 27, 2011, Respondent filed a First Amended Petition in Odo
v. [C.M.], in which he added claims on behalf of KNP to the lawsuit, adversely to
“74, Respondent continued to represent KNP in the matter, and filed plead-
ings and motions on behalf of KNP until KNP’s claims were dismissed by the
court.
“75, The subject matter of the claims asserted in Odo v. [C.M.] by KNP
was substantially related to the subject matter of Respondent's representation of
‘C.M.] in both the loan transactions and the personal injury claim.

‘Findings of Fact as to Count VII: Conduct Prejudicial
to the Administration of Justice [Rule 4-8.4 (d)]

"76. {C.M.] fired Respondent by letter dated May 10, 2011, which Respon-
dent likely received in the mail the next day.

‘T7. Onor about May 13, 2011, a member of Respondent's office staff, under

851

his direct supervision, sent an email to Tammy Glick, the guardian ad litem of
[C.M Js children in his custody case, requesting the name of a drug testing agency
which had done a drug test on [C.M.].

“78. The email stated that the staff person needed to refer someone to the
agency. Respondent admitted in his testimony that he knew [C.M.] had under-
gone a drug test, but could not remember the name of the agency. He caused his
staff person to contact Glick in hopes of obtaining the result of the drug test.

‘79. The testing agency refused to supply Respondent's office with the re-
sults of the drug test without a release from [C.M.].

80. Respondent admitted in his testimony that he knew [C.M.] might file a
malpractice claim and/or disciplinary complaint against him, and he wanted the
drug test results for evidence to defend himself.

‘81. Informant argued that Respondent violated Rule 4-8.4(d) in a variety of
other ways, including:

a. Filing the Odo v. [C.M.] lawsuit against [C.M.] and revealing informa-

tion relating to the representation through attachment of exhibits contain-

ing client information;

b. Making a demand for payment of notes to KNP, although the notes had

not yet matured;

c. Attending a debtor examination held by Dr. Febbo’s counsel (although

he did not attend as counsel in the case); and

d. Generally attempting to annoy, harass and intimidate [C.M.] in retalia~
tion for [C.M.]s termination of the attorney-client relationship and [C.M.]s
initiation of a bar complaint.’

“10, Based upon the hearing panel’s decision, on September 30, 2014, the
Missouri Supreme Court issued an order suspending the respondent's license to
practice law indefinitely for having violated the Missouri Rules of Professional
Conduct. Specifically, the Court concluded that the respondent violated Rules
1.7(a)(2), 1.8(a)(1), 1.8(a)(2), 1.8(a)(3), 1.8(e), 1.9(a), and 8.4(d).

“11. In its order, the court permitted the respondent to file a petition for
reinstatement after a period of 1 year. At the time of the hearing on the instant
formal complaint, the respondent had not yet filed a petition for reinstatement
in the State of Missouri. The respondent, however, planned to file a petition for
reinstatement a week or two later.

“Conclusions of Law

“12, Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a mat-
ter of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.7, KRPC 1.8, KRPC 1.9, KRPC
1.15(d), and KRPC 8.4, as detailed below: .

“KRPC 1.7

“13, The rules do not permit lawyers to represent clients with conflicting
interests without taking certain steps. KRPC 1.7 provides the requirements in this
regard, as follows:

852

‘(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent
a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A
concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

(2) there is a substantial risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to an-
other client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest
of the lawyer.

‘(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest
under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to pro-
vide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writ-
ing.

The respondent's representation of both KNP and C.M. and L.F. in the loan trans-
actions presented a substantial risk that his representation of C.M. and L.F. would
be materially limited by his responsibilities to KNP or by his personal interest.
Neither C.M. nor L.F. gave written informed consent. Thus, the hearing panel
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.7(a)(2).

“KRPC 18

“14. Generally, lawyers may not enter into business transactions with clients.
See KRPC 1.8(a). In order to enter into a business transaction with a client or
otherwise acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client, the attorney must establish that:

“(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and trans-
mitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably
understood by the client; and

‘(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is
given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
Tegal counsel on the transaction; and

‘(8) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client,
to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the
transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client
in the transaction.’

The respondent charged C.M. extraordinary interest rates and included burden-
some terms in the loan transactions. Additionally, the respondent failed to inform
C.M. in writing of the desirability of seeking independent legal counsel. Finally,

CC

the respondent did not seek and obtain written informed consent from C.M. Ac-
cordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.8(a).
“15, Attoreys may not advance funds to clients.
“(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connec-
tion with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:

(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the re-
payment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter;
and

(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and
expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.’

In this case, on multiple occasions, the respondent paid medical bills on behalf
of C.M. which were not for purposes of the litigation. As such, the hearing panel
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.8(e). The hearing panel notes,
however, that the respondent's motive for extending financial assistance to C.M.
was to assist his client. The respondent's motive in this regard mitigates the mis-
conduct.

“KRPC 1.9

“16. In addition to duties owed to current clients, lawyers also owe duties to
former clients. See KRPC 1.9. Specifically, KRPC 1.9(a) prohibits lawyers from
representing a current client [in] the same or a substantially related matter in
which a current client’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client without first obtaining written informed consent from the former
client.

“17. The respondent represented Dr. Febbo in an action against C.M. which
was based on services performed by Dr. Febbo on referral from the respondent
for treatment and evaluation related to C.M.’s personal injury case. Dr. Febbo’s
claims were the same or substantially related to the subject matter of the respon-
dent's representation of C.M. Therefore, the hearing panel concludes that the
respondent violated KRPC 1.9(a).

“[KRPC 1.15(d)]

“18. Lawyers must not commingle client funds with funds belonging to the
lawyer or the lawyer's firm. KRPC 1.15(d). The respondent produced his trust ac-
count records and admitted to commingling clients’ funds with his funds, by using
this trust account as an operating account. As such, the hearing panel concludes
that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15(d).

“KRPC 8.4(d)

“19. ‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.’ KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent
engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he
repeatedly engaged in conduct which amounted to conflicts of interest with his
clients. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC
8.4(d).

“American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

“20. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel con-
sidered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ‘Standards’). Pursuant to Standard 3, the
factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the po-
tential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

“21. Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to refrain
from engaging in conflicts of interest.

“22. Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duty.

“23. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent
caused actual injury to C.M.

“24. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to
be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in
this case, found the following aggravating factors present: [Footnote: While the
hearing panel is unable to find by clear and convincing evidence that the respon-
dent was motivated by dishonesty and/or selfishness, the hearing panel is troubled
by the respondent's motivation. The respondent attempted to obtain the results of
a drug test of a client, in an unrelated matter, to use against his client. The hearing
panel cannot fathom a good motivation for making such an attempt. Additionally,
the respondent attended a hearing in Febbo v. C.M., when he knew he had a
conflict and had no legitimate reason for attending. The hearing panel is seriously
troubled by the respondent's conduct.]

“25, Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The respondent has been previously dis-
ciplined on one occasion in the State of Missouri; in 2006, the respondent was
informally admonished.

“26. “Multiple Offenses. The respondent violated KRPC 1.7, KRPC 18,
KRPC 1.9, KRPC 1.15(d), and KRPC 8.4. Accordingly, the hearing panel con-
cludes that the respondent committed multiple offenses.

“27. Vulnerability of Victim. Because C.M. and L.F. were experiencing fi-
nancial difficulties when they sought the assistance from the respondent, C.M.
and L.F. were vulnerable to the respondent's misconduct.

“28, Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 2007. The
Missouri Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of law in 1975.
At the time of the misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for more
than 35 years.

“29. Indifference to Making Restitution. To date, the respondent has not
made restitution to his clients. Currently, a claim is pending before the Missouri
Client Protection Fund to reimburse his clients for their loss.

“30. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-

ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
mitigating circumstances present:

“31. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment
of the Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary pro-
cess, Additionally, the respondent admitted the facts that gave rise to the viola-
tions. Finally, the respondent admitted that he violated the Kansas Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.

“32, Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including
Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and
General Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent presented four letters from
friends and neighbors who spoke favorably of him.

“33, Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The respondent has experi-
enced other sanctions for his conduct. The respondent's license to practice law in
the State of Missouri was suspended indefinitely. The Missouri Supreme Court’s
order provided that the respondent would be permitted to apply for reinstatement
after 1 year.

“34, Remoteness of Prior Offenses. The discipline imposed in 2006 is remote
in character and in time to the misconduct in this case.

“35. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

“4.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a con-
flict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible
effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

‘4.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in
determining whether the representation of a client may be materially
affected by the lawyer's own interests, or whether the representation
will adversely affect another client, and causes injury or potential
injury to a client.’

“Recommendation

“36. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be
suspended for a period of 1 year. The respondent recommended that the hear-
ing panel immediately suspend the respondent from the practice of law. (It is
worth noting here that the hearing panel is without the ability to effectuate the
respondent's request. The hearing panel is charged with making findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendations as to discipline to be imposed.) The
respondent further recommended that he be reinstated to the practice of law
in Kansas at the time Missouri Supreme Court reinstates the respondent to the
practice in Missouri.

“37. In considering the appropriate discipline, the hearing panel has consid-
ered many factors. During the proceedings in Missouri, the respondent did not
express remorse or regret or take responsibility for a majority of the misconduct.
‘The Missouri disciplinary hearing panel commented as follows:

— 4

‘22. For the most part, Respondent did not show remorse or express regret
for his conduct. He continued to defend the loan transactions on the tech-
nical ground that he had no interest in KNP because he had transferred an
ownership interest to his daughter, and continued to assert there was no
substantial relationship between the Febbo and KNP representation and
his representation of [C.M.]. He did express regret for having advanced

medical costs to [C.M.].’

In the intervening time period, the respondent has come to understand the wrong-
ful nature of his conduct. However, the respondent continued to fail to demon-
strate remorse for C.M. and L.F. at the hearing on the formal complaint in Kansas.

“38. It is important for the hearing panel to note that the clients in this case
are Kansas residents and the personal injury cases arose as a result of an accident
which occurred in Kansas. Had the respondent filed litigation on behalf of L.F.
and C.M., he would have filed it in Kansas. Because the misconduct related to
Kansas clients and in representation in a Kansas matter, this is not simply a recip-
rocal discipline case. The respondent harmed Kansas clients. The hearing panel
must consider what discipline is appropriate to recommend, independent of the
discipline imposed in Missouri.

“39. Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the
respondent be suspended for an indefinite period of time. Prior to reinstatement,
the hearing panel recommends that the respondent be required to establish that
he has made restitution to C.M. and L.F. Additionally, the hearing panel recom-
mends that the respondent be required to establish that he fully cooperated with
the Missouri Client Protection Fund Commission and repaid the commission or
his clients as directed. In the event the Kansas Client Protection Fund also initi-
ates an investigation and prosecution, the hearing panel further recommends that
the respondent be required to establish that he fully cooperated with the Kansas
Client Protection Fund Commission and repaid the commission or his clients as
directed. Finally, the respondent should establish that he provided C.M. and L.F.
with a sincere apology for the misconduct and the harm it caused. If the respon-
dent makes full restitution and forwards a sincere apology to C.M. and L.F,, the
hearing panel recommends that the respondent be allowed to apply for reinstate-
ment after a period of 1 year suspension.

“40. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified
by the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator.”

Discussion

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence,
the findings of the disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the par-
ties and determines whether violations of KRPC exist and, if they
do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292

—— SC

Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). Clear and convincing evidence is
“‘evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that “the truth of
the facts asserted is highly probable.”’” In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498,
505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725,
188 P.3d 1 [2008]).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint,
to which he filed an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing
before the panel and the hearing before this court. The respondent
did not file exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report.
As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court
Rule 212(c) and (d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 369).

The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and
convincing evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.7(a)
(2) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 519) (conflict of interest); 1.8(a) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 530) (conflict of interest); 1.8(e) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 530) (providing financial assistance to client); 1.9(a)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 539) (duties to former clients); 1.15(d)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 556) (preserving client funds); and 8.4(d)

_ (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice), and it supports the panel’s conclu-
sions of law. We adopt the panel's conclusions.

The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline
for respondent's violations. At the hearing before the panel, the of-
fice of the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that respon-
dent be suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas
for a period of 1 year. Respondent recommended the hearing panel
immediately suspend him and that he be reinstated to the practice
of law in Kansas at the time the Missouri Supreme Court reinstates
him to the practice of law in Missouri. The hearing panel recom-
mended suspension for an indefinite period of time no less than 1
year. Further, the hearing panel recommended that prior to rein-
statement, respondent must establish that he has made restitution
to C.M. and L.F;; that he has fully cooperated with the Missouri
Bar Client Security Fund Committee; that, in the event the Kansas
Client Protection Fund Commission initiates an investigation and
prosecution, he establish he fully cooperated with the Kansas Cli-

ent Protection Fund Commission and repaid the commission or
his clients as directed; and that he provided C.M. and L.F. with a
sincere apology for the misconduct and harm it caused.

After the panel hearing, on December 30, 2015, respondent filed
with the Disciplinary Administrator's office a second answer which
included an executed mutual total release and settlement agree-
ment between C.M., L.F., and respondent dated February 22,
2012, which arose out of lawsuits filed in Platte County Missouri,
Lyle L. Odo, P.C. v. [C.M.], No. LLAE-CV01722, and in Atchison
County, Kansas, [C.M.] v. Alan Cummings, et al., No. 2011 CV
123. The purpose of the release and settlement agreement was to
“fully settle and compromise any and all claims, demands, liens or
causes of action any one party to this Agreement may have against
any other party or combination of parties to this Agreement.” Af-
ter reviewing the agreement, the Missouri Bar Board of Governors
concluded that C.M.’s claim for compensation from the Missouri
Bar Client Security Fund Committee “did not qualify for compen-
sation under the rules which govern the Fund.”

At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent ap-
peared, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law in the state
of Kansas for a period of 1 year with respondent being automati-
cally reinstated at the end of that.year. Respondent requested that
he be suspended in Kansas until such time as he is reinstated in
Missouri.

We hold that respondent is to be suspended from the practice
of law in the state of Kansas for a period of 1 year effective as of
the date of the filing of this opinion. Before reinstatement is al-
lowed, respondent shall comply with Kansas Supreme Court Rule
218 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 401) and Rule 219 (2015 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 403), including a required appearance before a hearing
panel for a reinstatement hearing.

In its final hearing report, the panel recommended that respon-
dent make full restitution to C.M. and L.F. However, the panel did
not acknowledge the mutual total release and settlement agree-
ment dated February 22, 2012. The court holds that when future
hearing panels make a recommendation of restitution, the panel

859

must make a supportive factual finding and include such finding in
its final hearing report.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

Ir Is THEREFORE ORDERED that Lyle Louis Odo be and is
hereby disciplined by suspension from the practice of law in the
state of Kansas for a period of 1 year, in accordance with Supreme
Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293), as of the date
of this order.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall comply with
Supreme Court Rule 218 and Rule 219 before reinstatement is al-
lowed.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings
be assessed to the respondent and that this opinion be published in
the official Kansas Reports.

No. 112,955

StaTE oF Kansas, Appellee, v. MITCHELL C. NORTHERN,
Appellant.
(375 B3d 363)

aaa ©:

file OEE
Samuel Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and
was on the brief for appellant.
Sheryl L. Lidtke, chief deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Kris-
tiane N. Bryant, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney,
and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSEN, J.: Mitchell C. Norther appeals from the denial of his
motion for leave to take an out-of-time appeal from his life sen-
tence for first-degree premeditated murder.

Northern pled guilty to first-degree murder, and the district
court imposed a hard 25 sentence from the bench on October 28,
2011, in conformity with the plea agreement. Richard Carney was
Northern’s attorney during the proceedings. At the sentencing
hearing, the State requested that the court “leave open” the mat-
ter of restitution until information from the victim’s family became
available. After pronouncing the terms of incarceration, the court
stated, “I will leave the issue of restitution open for a matter of 30
days.” The court then informed Northern that he had 14 days in
which to file a notice of appeal. No notice of appeal was filed at
that time.

On November 30, 2011, the district court entered a restitution
order in the amount of $1,977.98 to be paid to the parent of the
victim. Again, no notice of appeal was filed at the time.

Years later, on May 19, 2014, Northern filed a pro se motion
seeking leave from the district court to file his appeal out of time.
In his motion, he proffered that he had been informed of his right
to appeal by the court, that he asked his attorney to take an appeal
from the sentence, and that his attorney failed to file a timely ap-
eal. Northern and Carney both testified at a hearing on the mo-
tion.
Northern testified that, when the judge told him he had 14 days
in which to appeal, he told his attorney that he “would like for that
to happen” and that he “wanted the appeal to go.” He further testi-
fied that his attorney responded that “it wouldn’t do any good.” On
cross-examination, Northern said that he was “fairly sure” that he
asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal and that he was “most
of the way sure” that he made the request, but that he “could be
mistaken.” Northern did not inquire of Carney whether he actually
filed the notice of appeal. Finally, in May 2014, Northern deter-
mined that no appeal had ever been filed in his case.

Carney testified that he did not recall Northern asking him to
file an appeal and that no conversation took place regarding an ap-
peal. Carney further testified that he had explained to Northern
during discussions about the plea agreement that he would be stat-
utorily precluded from an appeal unless the sentence was illegal or
otherwise incorrect.

The district court engaged in the following evaluation of the
credibility of the two witnesses:

“The court finds clearly that he was notified of his right to appeal, he admits
that candidly. He also admits candidly that he’s not positive what phraseology he
had with Mr. Carney. I do not find that he has met the basis of the exceptions
under Ortiz and subsequent cases. And based on that, the court denies his right
to file appeal out of time.”

In its subsequent journal entry, the district court made the fol-
lowing findings on which it based the denial of Northern’s motion:

“1. The defendant was notified of his right to appeal. *
“2, The defendant did not recall a specific conversation with his attor-

ney, Rick Carney, during which he requested that Carney file an ap-
peal on his behalf. In addition, Carney testified that the defendant
did not request that Carney file an appeal.

“3. None of the exceptions under State v. Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733 (1982)

apply.”

Northern initially argues that, although his prison term was pro-
nounced in open court, the subsequent restitution order was issued
only through a written order. He contends that his sentence never
became final for purposes of appeals because restitution was never
pronounced from the bench in open court and his appeal from the
sentence is therefore not out of time.

Because the interpretation of statutes and the determination of
jurisdiction, including when the time to file a notice of appeal starts
to run, involve questions of law, we exercise unlimited review over
this matter. See State v. Hall, 298 Kan. 978, 982-83, 310 P3d 506
(2014).

A defendant’s sentence becomes final and appealable when the
district court pronounces the sentence from the bench. Hall, 298
Kan. at 983. A district court may exercise its discretion to continue
a sentencing hearing. State v. Beaman, 295 Kan. 853, 863, 286 P.3d
876 (2012). Restitution is part of a criminal defendant's sentence.
Hall, 298 Kan. at 983. It is not the incarceration phase of sentenc-
ing alone that triggers the beginning of the statutory time to file a
notice of appeal; the restitution phase of sentencing must also be
completed before a defendant files a notice of appeal. State v. Mc-
Daniel, 292 Kan. 443, 448, 254 P.3d 534 (2011). A defendant may
not take an appeal until judgment is final. Hall, 298 Kan. at 986.

Because restitution is part of a criminal defendant's sentence,
the amount may only be set by a sentencing judge when the de-
fendant is present in open court. Until the applicable restitution
amount is decided, the sentencing process is not complete. Hall,
298 Kan. at 986. The Hall court emphasized that “any completion
of sentencing must take place in the defendant's presence in open
court.” 298 Kan. at 987. “As is the case with other critical stages
of criminal proceedings, a defendant may waive his or her right to
be present at a continued sentencing hearing, but a district judge
would be well advised to see that a defendant’s waiver appears on
the record.” 298 Kan. at 987-88.

CC

Northern argues that he was not present in open court when
the judge announced the amount of restitution; he did not waive
his right to be present at all stages of sentencing; the order of res-
titution therefore did not complete the sentencing procedure; sen-
tencing has never been completed; and his time to file a notice of
appeal therefore has never begun to run.

The State directs the court’s attention to State v. Frierson, 298
Kan. 1005, 319 P.3d 515 (2014). In Frierson, the district court im-
posed restitution at the same hearing during which it announced
defendant’s prison term. The district court then modified the resti-
tution order via a written order that was signed by both attorneys.
The defendant challenged the modification, asserting that the
district court was without jurisdiction to increase the restitution
amount.

This court affirmed the modified restitution order on several
grounds: at the sentencing hearing, the judge announced that he
was holding jurisdiction open in order to obtain complete cost as-
sessments; the written restitution order was signed by the defen-
dant’s attorney; and the defendant did not argue on appeal that
his right to be present at sentencing was violated, so the issue was
not considered by this court. 298 Kan. at 1021-22. We held that
“because the judge explicitly held open jurisdiction, and because
the parties agreed on a 30-day extension, and because the order
was signed by defense counsel and entered within the planned
time frame, we are satisfied that the spirit, if not the letter, of the
procedure” set out in Hall was satisfied. 208 Kan, at-1021. Noting
widespread uncertainty about the interplay of restitution orders
and appellate timelines, we limited strict adherence to the Hall
requirements to cases in which sentencing occurred after the man-
date in Frierson. 298 Kan. at 1021.

This court then relied on Frierson in State v. Moncla, 301 Kan.
549, 555, 343 P.3d 1161 (2015), where we rejected the appellant's
argument that his case was still open because restitution had been
set by a written journal entry and was never pronounced in his
presence in open court. We held that “[t]he finality of Moncla’s
sentence . . . occurred no later than the filing of the journal en-
try memorializing the restitution amount.” (Emphasis added.) 301

864.

Kan. at 555. As in Frierson, we were satisfied that the “spirit, if not
the letter” of proper procedure was followed. 301 Kan. at 554.

The facts of the present case closely resemble those of Frier
son and Monela. Northern was sentenced prior to the decision in
Frierson, and we have declined to apply the strict requirements
derived from Hall retroactively to pre-Frierson sentences. We find
no manifest injustice ensuing from Northern’s inability to obtain
appellate jurisdiction, and we are not persuaded of a need to alter
our holdings in Frierson and Moncla.

Northern advances a second argument that the district court
erred when it denied his motion to file an untimely appeal.

A timely notice of appeal is required under most circumstances
in order for an appellate court to obtain jurisdiction over an appeal.
State v. Patton, 287 Kan. 200, 206, 195 P.3d 753 (2008). In State v.
Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733, 735-36, 640 P.2d 1255 (1982), this court set
out three narrow exceptions to this jurisdictional requirement. A
listrict court may allow a late appeal if a criminal defendant was:
(1) not informed of his or her right to appeal; (2) not furnished
an attorney to perfect an appeal; or (3) furnished an attorney who
failed to perfect an appeal. If a defendant meets the exceptional
circumstances set out in Ortiz, he or she must be allowed to file an
appeal out of time. State v. Phinney, 280 Kan. 394, 405, 122 P.3d
356 (2005).

Northern contends that the first and third Ortiz exceptions ap-
ply to him, because the district court misadvised him during the
sentencing process about the time for taking his direct appeal and
because his attorney failed to comply with his express wish that he
file a timely notice of appeal.

Northern concedes that he did not argue these points to the dis-
trict court, and for that reason the proof required of either him
or the State by the Patton test was never proffered. He advocates
remanding the case for additional development of the record and
for additional findings by the district court. We decline to exercise
that option under the facts of this case.

An appellate court may consider a new argument on appeal only
if the newly asserted theory involves a pure question of law arising
on proved or admitted facts and that is finally determinative of the

———

case or if consideration of the new theory is necessary to serve the
ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights. State v.
Poulton, 286 Kan. 1, 5, 179 P.3d 1145 (2008).

Northern’s argument regarding the first Ortiz exception does
not involve a purely legal question. He, therefore, would have
to show that consideration of his argument is necessary to serve
the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights. He
makes no proffer of any injustice that he has suffered as a result of
receiving the statutory minimum sentence based on his voluntary
plea to murder.

Northern contends that the failure by trial counsel to follow
K.A.R. 105-3-9, which requires appointed counsel to file a notice
of appeal unless the defendant signs a waiver of the right to appeal,
would be better evidence of whether the third Ortiz exception ap-
plies. In Phinney, however, this court held that trial counsel's direct
testimony that he had fully advised his client of his appeal rights
was sufficient to take the place of K.A.R. 105-3-9 evidence. 280
Kan. at 405. Even though a signed waiver would have simplified
the factual findings in the present case, the district court heard
evidence and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and deter-
mined that Northern did not ask his attorney for an appeal. That
determination is supported by the record.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

State v. Cheever, No. 99,988 on pages 866-906 was modified by the Supreme
Court on July 20, 2017, in response to defendant's motion for rehearing or modi-
fication filed August 12, 2016. The original opinion without the modification will
not be published in the bound volumes of the Kansas Reports.

See modified opinion on remand, State v. Cheever, No. 99,988 filed July 20,
2017, in 306 Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017).

907

No, 115,982

BRADLEY E. AMBROSIER, CHIEF JUDGE, Kansas 26TH JuDI-
ciaL District; LinpA P. GiLMoRE, DisTRICT JUDGE; AND
CLINTON B, PETERSON, DisTRICT JUDGE, Petitioners, v. SAM
BROWNBACK, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, Respon-
dent.

(375 B3d 1007)
Le

SE © inion filed July 29, 2016.
Pedro L. Irigonegaray and Elizabeth R. Herbert, of Irigonegaray & Associates,
of Topeka, were on the petition for petitioners.

Brant M. Laue, of the office of the Governor, was on the response for respon-
dent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BEIER, J.: This original mandamus action brought by the chief
judge and two district court judges of the 26th Judicial District of
Kansas against Governor Sam Brownback asks this court to compel
the governor to appoint an interim district magistrate judge imme-
diately under the authority of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25-312a.

We hold that a 90-day time limit set out in the statute is direc-
tory rather than mandatory under our precedent. This means that
the timing of the governor's appointment is discretionary rather
than ministerial. Mandamus cannot be invoked to compel a discre-
tionary act. The governor may therefore, consistent with his stated
intention, wait for the result of the primary election on August 2,
2016, before he appoints the magistrate judge sought by petition-
ers,

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

District Magistrate Judge Tommy B. Webb was one of five mag-
istrates in the 26th Judicial District until his retirement on Febru-

ary 19, 2016. The governor received statutorily required notice of
Judge Webb’s planned departure from the bench on February 5,
2016. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25-312a (clerk to provide notice of
vacancy).

The governor informed Chief Judge Bradley E. Ambrosier that
day that the governor was accepting applications to fill the vacancy
and that an interim magistrate judge would be appointed within
the 90-day period prescribed in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25-312a.

After receiving applications, the governor wrote a letter to the
applicants dated May 25, 2016, i.e., after expiration of the 90 days.
The letter stated:

“This is to inform you that I have decided not to make an appointment to the
position at this time. Instead, I will defer to the voters of Haskell County, who will

have the opportunity to vote on the position in the August 2nd primary election.
“The filing deadline to participate in the election for this position is June 1.”

Counsel for petitioners contacted the governor's office on June
13, 2016, and the governor’s office confirmed the governor's inten-
tion to “revisit” the vacancy after the primary election.

Chief Judge Ambrosier, District Judge Linda P. Gilmore, and
District Judge Clinton B. Peterson filed this petition for writ of
mandamus on June 15, 2016. At the time, four Republican candi-
dates had filed for election to the vacant magistrate judge position.
Those candidates will be on the ballot in the primary election on
August 2.

The petition specifically seeks a writ requiring the governor
to “immediately appoint an interim district magistrate judge for
Haskell County.” Petitioners allege the governor “has failed, and
in fact refused, to appoint a successor district magistrate judge, in
violation of [his] duty” under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25-312a, which
states that “[alny appointment made by the governor . . . shall be
made within 90 days following receipt of notice from the clerk of
the supreme court.” The petitioners also seek reimbursement of
their reasonable attorney fees.

This court ordered the governor to respond to the petition,
which he did on July 11, 2016. The governor advances four argu-
ments on the merits: (1) the 90-day time limit is directory rather
than mandatory; (2) his general appointment duty is discretionary

909

rather than ministerial; (3) the relief sought by petitioners would
violate the separation of powers; and (4) dismissal is appropriate
under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.

DISCUSSION

Because, as detailed below, we decide this case in the gover
nor’s favor on the basis of his first argument, we need not reach,
and express no opinion on the validity of, his remaining arguments.
Petitioners’ request for attorney fees is rendered moot, and we will
not address it.

Before turning to the merits of the governor's first argument, we
observe that the parties do not appear to contest the advisability
of this court’s exercise of discretionary concurrent jurisdiction in
this case or the petitioners’ standing to bring this action. Given this
lack of controversy, we touch upon these two preliminary consider-
ations only briefly. See Peterson v. Ferrell, 302 Kan. 99, 102-03, 349
P.3d 1269 (2015) (subject matter jurisdiction, including component
of standing, may be raised at any time, on court’s own initiative).

Article 3, § 3 of the Kansas Constitution grants original jurisdic-
tion in proceedings in mandamus to the Supreme Court. This juris-
diction is discretionary and concurrent; the writ also may be sought
in lower courts. See State v. Becker, 264 Kan. 804, 807, 958 P.2d
627 (1998); see also K.S.A. 60-801 e¢ seq.; Manhattan Buildings,
Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan. 20, 26, 643 P.2d 87 (1982). To support an
original action in this court, a petitioner is required to state “the
reason why the action is brought in the appellate court instead of in
the district court.” Kansas Supreme Court Rule 9.01(b) (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 88); see Mobil Oil Corporation v. McHenry, 200 Kan.
211, 242, 436 P2d 982 (1968). Petitioners have done so here. They
assert that the delay inherent in beginning this litigation in district
court and the statewide importance of the petition’s subject mat-
ter justify its filing in the Supreme Court rather than in Shawnee
County District Court.

Both of petitioners’ points are well taken. We have previously
considered judicial economy, the need for speedy adjudication of
an issue, and avoidance of needless appeals when evaluating wheth-
er to exercise discretionary, concurrent jurisdiction over an original
action. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representa-

tives, 236 Kan. 45, 53, 687 P.2d 622 (1984) (“Without question, if
this court declines to exercise jurisdiction in this action, it will be
faced with the identical issue in a subsequent appeal from an action
before the district court.”); see also Long v. Board of Wyandotte
County Comm’rs, 254 Kan. 207, 212, 864 P.2d 724 (1993) (“It is
only where an issue of law affects public officials, presents an issue
of great public importance and significant state interest, and re-
quires a speedy adjudication that mandamus is an appropriate and
proper means to decide the issue.”); State, ex rel., v. State High-
way Comm., 132 Kan. 327, 334-35, 295 P, 986 (1931) (“The use of
mandamus to secure a speedy adjudication of questions of law for
the guidance of state officers and official boards in the discharge
of their duties is common in this state.”). In addition, this case wil
define a legislatively imposed duty of the governor, a constitutional
officer and the leader of the executive branch of state government.
The governor's timely performance of the duty at issue, as peti-
tioners emphasize, affects the function, fairness, and efficiency o
the coequal judicial branch in its service to Kansas citizens. This
case thus presents an important public question of statewide im-
portance appropriate for this court's attention in the first instance.
See State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. 559, 568, 836 P.2d
1169 (1992) (interpretation of governor's constitutional authority
appropriate for original action filed in Supreme Court); see also
Manhattan Bldgs., 231 Kan. 20, Syl. | 4 (mandamus “proper rem-
edy where the essential purpose of the proceeding is to obtain an
authoritative interpretation of the law for the guidance of public
officials in their administration of the public business”).

Tuming to standing, this court has allowed original actions in
mandamus when the petitioner demonstrates a need “‘to secure
a speedy adjudication of questions of law for the guidance of state
officers and official boards in the discharge of their duties.’” Kansas
Bar Ass’n v. Judges of the Third Judicial Dist., 270 Kan. 489, 498,
14 P.3d 1154 (2000). And the court has determined such guidance
questions when the action was brought by state or political actors
other than the attorney general on behalf of the State. See Board
of Sedgwick County Comm’rs v. Noone, 235 Kan. 777, 779-80, 682
P.2d 1303 (1984) (action in mandamus against district court judge

91

brought by board of county commissioners to secure remittance of
fines appropriate vehicle for the guidance of public officials); see
also Wilson v. Sebelius, 276 Kan. 87, 88, 90-91, 72 P.3d 553 (2003)
(action in mandamus against governor brought by Democratic
Party of Shawnee County challenging constitutionality of statutory
scheme decided in original action). The petitioners have standing
to bring this action.

The governor's first argument requires us to perform statutory
interpretation or construction, which raises a question of law. State
v, Jolly, 301 Kan. 313, 320, 342 P.3d 935 (2015). We routinely recite
that our initial task is statutory interpretation, as long as the lan-
guage used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous. See State
v. Urban, 291 Kan. 214, 216, 239 P.3d 837 (2010). If the language
is less than clear or is ambiguous, we move to statutory construc-
tion and use the canons of construction and legislative history and
other background considerations to divine the legislature’s intent.
See 291 Kan. at 216.

The statute at issue in this case, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25-312a,
reads in pertinent part: “Any appointment made by the governor
... shall be made within 90 days following receipt of notice from
the clerk of the supreme court.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioners ar-
gue that the word “shall” creates a mandatory duty on the part of
the governor to appoint within the prescribed 90-day period. The
governor argues that the word “shall” is merely directory in con-
nection with the time limit. Our decision between mandatory and
directory will tell the tale because a merely directory provision is
the mark of a discretionary duty, and it is well established that man-
damus cannot be invoked to compel a public official to perform a
discretionary duty. See Gaslight Villa, Inc. v. City of Lansing, 213
Kan. 862, 872-73, 518 P.2d 410 (1974) (“This remedy may not be
invoked to control discretion, or to enforce a right that is in sub-
stantial dispute.”) (citing Curless v. Board of County Commission-
ers, 197 Kan. 580, 419 P.2d 876 [1966]); see also Kansas Bar Ass’n,
270 Kan. at 491 (“‘Mandamus may not be invoked to control dis-
cretion.’”); Arney v. Director, Kansas State Penitentiary, 234 Kan.
257, 260, 671 P.2d 559 (1983) (“It is well established that manda-
mus will not lie for the performance of an act involving discretion

912

on the part of a public official.”) (citing Topeka Bldg. é+ Construc-
tion Trades Council v. Leahy, 187 Kan. 112, 353 P.2d 641 [1960]);
Martin, Governor, v. Ingham, 38 Kan. 641, 651, 17 P. 162, 168
(1888) (governor subject to mandamus only to compel ministerial
acts, not discretionary acts; “ministerial act is one which a public of-
ficer or agent is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the
propriety or impropriety of the act to be performed”).

We have previously recognized that the legislature’s use of the
word “shall” can have different meanings in different provisions.
Because the word’s meaning is not plain, statutory construction
rather than statutory interpretation is necessary.

Our 2009 decision in State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, 914-21,
219 P.38d 481 (2009), extensively reviewed the relevant historical
caselaw on the issue and distilled a four-factor test to be used to
determine whether a “shall” in a statute should be understood as
directory or mandatory. Courts should consider “(1) legislative
context and history; (2) substantive effect on a party's rights versus
merely form or procedural effect; (3) the existence or nonexistence
of consequences for noncompliance; and (4) the subject matter
of the statutory provisions, ¢.g., elections or notice on charges for
driving under the influence.” 289 Kan. at 921.

The first Raschke factor, legislative context and history, cuts con-
vincingly in favor of the governor in this case.

The 90-day time limit was added to the statute by way of a 2014
set of amendments, the only amendments since 1987. See L. 2014,
ch. 82, sec. 25. Earlier language had provided for a 60-day time
limit, but it began to run at the time the vacancy occurred rather
than at the time the appellate clerk provided notice to the gover-
nor. The 2014 amendments added 30 days and started the clock at
the notice. They also provided that the clerk had up to 120 days
after a vacancy occurred to provide the notice in the first place. See
L. 2014, ch. 82, sec. 25. In other words, the legislature decided to
substantially lengthen the potential time a judicial position such as
the one before us today could remain open. Even if the statutory
time limits are met, a vacancy can go unfilled for the 4 months

913

until the clerk’s notice plus the 3 months of the governor's pro-
cess. This total of 7 months contrasts dramatically with the total of
2 months post-vacancy that the statute contemplated before the
2014 amendments. In short, the legislative context indicates less,
rather than more, urgency.

The governor's response makes another cogent point about leg-
islative context and history by comparing K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25-
312a to a different statute covering other judicial appointments. To
understand this comparison, the following basic pieces of informa-
tion are helpful.

The judicial position at issue in this case is subject to partisan
election. About half of the district judges and district magistrate
judges in Kansas’ 31 judicial districts obtain their seats by such a
selection method. The other half arrive at the bench through a
nonpartisan district nominating commission process. In the non-
partisan districts, for district magistrate judge positions, the com-
mission vets the applicants and makes the appointment, see K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 20-2914; for district judge positions, the commission
vets the applicants and submits the names of nominees to the gov-
ernor, and the governor then makes the appointment from among
the nominees, see K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 20-2909; K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
20-2911. While K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25-312a addresses the filling of
a vacancy on the bench that arises between elections for a district
judge or district magistrate judge seat subject to partisan election,
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 20-2911 speaks to filling district judge vacancies
that arise anytime in those judicial districts that use the nonpartisan
nominating commission process.

The governor’s comparison of the two statutes accurately ob-
serves that both contain time limits for the governor's action on
appointments. But only K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 20-2911 contains a pro-
vision designed to control in a situation like that giving rise to this
case—when the governor fails or refuses to appoint within the time
limit. If such a situation occurs on a district judge vacancy in a non-
partisan nominating commission district, then the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court steps in and makes the appointment. K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 20-2911 (a).

The legislature’s creation of the backup plan for gubernatorial

appointments in the nonpartisan nominating commission districts
demonstrates that it knows how to make sure it has such a plan if
it is considered necessary. The fact that it did not put a backup in
place for partisan election districts is persuasive evidence that it
did not believe one to be necessary for interim appointments such
as the one before us today. Reasonable minds may differ on the
wisdom of this policy choice, but the choice is not this court’s to
make or reform.

On the second Raschke factor, it does not appear that K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 25-312a’s 90-day time limit is meant to confer a specific
legal right on any one party. This factor tips the scale toward con-
struction of the word “shall” as directory rather than mandatory.
See Raschke, 289 Kan. at 916 (quoting, inter alia, City of Hutchin-
son v. Ryan, 154 Kan. 751, Syl. ¢ 1, 121 P.2d 179 [1942] [where
strict compliance with provision essential to preservation of rights
of parties affected, to validity of proceeding, provision mandatory;
where provision fixes mode of proceeding, time within which of-
ficial act to be done, provision directory; where provision merely
intended to secure order, system, dispatch of public business, pro-
vision directory]).

On the third factor—whether the statute contemplates conse-
quences for noncompliance with the 90-day time limit—again, the
factor cuts in favor of the governor’s characterization of the word
“shall” as directory only. Even petitioners’ prayer for relief implicit-
ly acknowledges that at least the most serious consequence of tardi-
ness, i.¢., invalidation of any eventual appointment, is not intended
by the legis lature. They seek an immediate appointment, meaning
they do not believe that the governor's reluctance to appoint on
time should deprive him of the power to appoint at all. Indeed, the
legislature appears to have provided for no adverse consequences
‘or failure to meet the 90-day time limit. See Raschke, 289 Kan. at
917-18 (citing and discussing, inter alia, Hooper v. McNaughton,
113 Kan. 405, 407, 214 P. 613 [1923] [distinction between direc-
tory, mandatory lies in consequence of nonobservance; act done
in disobedience of mandatory provision void; directory provision
should be obeyed, but act done in disobedience may still be valid)]).
The fourth Raschke factor focuses on subject matter of the stat-

ute at issue. It recognized that statutes dealing with elections and
DUI notices tended to be held to be mandatory while statutes
“governing order and timing of procedures are more likely to be
determined to be directory only.” Raschke, 289 Kan. at 918-20 (col-
lecting numerous cases). The subject matter before us here deals
explicitly with timing of the governor's appointment, not with his
substantive power. This factor also favors the governor's argument
that the “shall” in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25-312a is directory rather
than mandatory.

Considering all of the four Raschke factors, we hold that the
word “shall” in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25-312a should be interpreted as
directory. Although the governor should appoint an interim district
magistrate judge in a partisan election district within the 90-day
time limit set out in the statute, we construe the statute to permit
him to do so later.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons discussed above, the petition for writ of
mandamus is denied.

BILEs, J., and STEGALL, J., not participating.
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned]
Davin L. STUTZMAN, Senior Judge, assigned

916
No. 110,061
STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. SHELBERT L. SmrrH, Appellant.
(877 P3d 414)

Opinion.
filed August
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and
was on the brief for appellant.

Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Mare Bennett,
district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief
for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Jounson, J.: Shelbert Smith appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion to file a direct appeal out of time. He argues that he

917

should be allowed an untimely appeal because his appointed trial
counsel failed to file the appeal that Smith requested, Because this
case is presented to us without adequate factual findings, we re-
mand to the district court to make the requisite findings pursuant
to the framework described in this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

Smith was convicted as an adult in 1993, after pleading nolo
contendere to first-degree felony murder, aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm by a minor. At the
time, Smith was 16 years old. The district court sentenced Smith
to life sentences for the murder and aggravated kidnapping convic-
tions, 10 years to life for the aggravated robbery conviction, and 30
days in jail for the firearms conviction, all to run consecutively.

Smith asserts that he told his appointed counsel, Max Opper-
man, immediately after sentencing that he wanted to file an appeal
but that his attorney had advised him to wait until the district court
ruled on a motion to modify his sentence before appealing. Under
a procedure available at the time, commonly called the 120-day
callback, a court could modify a sentence within 120 days of sen-
tencing in certain circumstances. See K.S.A, 21-4603(d)(1) [then
K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4603(4)(a)]. In other words, a successful sen-
tence modification on a callback motion might change the neces-
sity for or character of an appeal of the original sentence.

Smith’s attorney did file a modification motion. But after the dis-
trict court overruled the motion on March 3, 1994, counsel never
filed a direct appeal of Smith’s sentence.

Nearly 2 decades later, on May 1, 2013, Smith filed a pro se
notice of appeal, a motion for an out-of-time appeal, and a motion
for appointed counsel. Subsequently, his appointed counsel filed a
docketing statement. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3). This
court ordered Smith to show cause why the untimely appeal should
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and Smith responded that
he should be allowed to appeal out of time under one of the excep-
tions in State v. Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733, 640 P.2d 1255 (1982). This
court remanded to the district court to rule on Smith’s motion for
an. out-of-time appeal, which would include an Ortiz hearing if
necessary.

918

At the district court hearing, the only evidence presented was
Smith’s testimony that, immediately after he was sentenced, he
told Opperman that he wanted to appeal, but that Opperman had
told Smith to wait for the result of the 120-day callback proce-
dure. Smith said he never heard from Opperman after the 120-
day callback period ended, despite persistent attempts to contact
him. Smith said he called Opperman’s office, two to three times
per day, for most of 1994 but was unable to reach him. Smith said
his mother also attempted to contact Opperman and was likewise
unsuccessful. Smith said he eventually gave up because he “was
in limbo” and did not know what to do, until 19 years later when
he found someone at the Hutchinson Correctional Facility who
helped Smith with his appeal.

Opperman died in 2009. Therefore, the State was unable to
present trial counsel's testimony. The State presented no other evi-
dence but argued that based on the Kansas Court of Appeals deci-
sion in State v. Cole, No, 105,745, 2012 WL, 1649886 (Kan. App.
2012) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 296 Kan. 1131 (2013),
Smith had waived his right to bring an untimely appeal by waiting
so long.

The district court denied Smith’s motion. The district court did
not make any findings of fact as to whether Smith had told Opper-
man to file an appeal, other than to say, “Well, we have the state-
ment of the defendant somewhat to that effect.” Rather, the district
court relied on the Cole decision to find that the passage of time
was a bar to Smith’s appeal, stating:

“But the thing that the Court cannot get over is the fact that the defendant
waited all these years and said absolutely nothing, did absolutely nothing.

“In light of the decision of the Court [of Appeals] in State. versus Cole, the
[Kansas] Supreme Court would not be receptive. This Court cannot be receptive.”

Smith timely appealed the district court’s ruling.
THE PASSAGE OF TIME AS A WAIVER OF AN ORTIZ EXCEPTION

Smith argues that he should be allowed to bring his direct appeal
out of time, pursuant to Ortiz, because his attorney did not file an
appeal despite Smith’s direction to do so, and Smith would have
timely taken an appeal but for his counsel's nonperformance. The .

State argues that the lapse of time between sentencing and Smith’s
notice of appeal precludes review because, by letting the matter
rest, Smith waived his right to an appeal.

Standard of Review

This court exercises unlimited review over the issue of appel-
late jurisdiction. State v. Scoville, 286 Kan. 800, 803, 188 P.3d 959
(2008). The factual findings underlying a trial court’s ruling in an
Ortiz hearing are reviewed for substantial competent evidence,
while the legal determinations are reviewed de novo. State v. Gill,
287 Kan. 289, 293, 196 P.3d 369 (2008).

Analysis

Appellate courts in Kansas have declined to find a constitutional
right to appeal and generally exercise jurisdiction only where an
appeal conforms to the applicable statutes. 287 Kan. at 293-94.
Crimes committed before July: 1, 1993, were required to be ap-
pealed within “10 days after the expiration of the district court’s
power to modify the sentence.” K.S.A. 22-3608(a). For sentences
imposed under K.S.A. 21-4603(d)(1), the district court could mod-
ify the sentence within 120 days (the 120-day callback). Effectively,
then, Smith had 130 days from the date of sentencing in which to
appeal his sentence.

There is no question that Smith’s appeal was filed past the statu-
tory deadline and that the general rule would result in its dismissal.
See Albright v. State, 292 Kan. 193, 197, 251 P.3d 52 (2011). But
Ortiz created judicial exceptions to the general rule barring un-
timely appeals. Under those exceptions, an untimely appeal may
be allowed when: (1) the defendant was not informed of his or her
right to appeal; (2) the defendant was not furnished an attomey to
pursue the appeal; or (3) the defendant was furnished an attorney
who failed to perfect the appeal. State v. Patton, 287 Kan. 200, 206,
195 P.3d 753 (2008) (citing Ortiz, 230 Kan. at 735-36). In Patton,
this court developed rules for each of the Ortiz exceptions. 287
Kan. at 219-24. In so doing, Patton emphasized that the general
rule barring untimely appeals was still exactly that—the general
rule, and that the Ortiz exceptions were “narrowly defined” and

— 4

reserved for “truly exceptional circumstances.” Patton, 287 Kan.
at 217.

Patton recognized the second and third Ortiz exceptions are
rooted in the concepts of fundamental fairness and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Patton, 287 Kan. at 218-19. Effec-
tiveness of counsel is generally analyzed by the two-prong analysis
of performance and prejudice set forth in Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
Patton, 287 Kan. at 224. A defendant must first establish that coun-
sel’s performance was deficient, and second, that counsel's perfor-
mance prejudiced the defense. 287 Kan. at 224. But the Patton
court held that under the third Ortiz exception, when counsel's de-
ficient performance results in the forfeiture of a proceeding, e.g.,
the right to an appeal process, the Strickland analysis is modified
by Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 145 L. Ed.
2d 985 (2000): /

“Under Flores-Ortega, if appointed or retained counsel has failed to file or
perfect a direct appeal by a criminal defendant, we will presume the existence of
prejudice. This is not, however, the same as a finding of prejudice per se, requir
ing application of the third Ortiz exception. The defendant must still demonstrate
that, but for counsel's failure, he or she would have taken a timely direct appeal.
The defendant need not show, as he or she would have had to show if we were
using the Strickland standard as our benchmark, that such a timely direct appeal
would have been successful. [Citation omitted.]” Patton, 287 Kan. at 225.

Here, Smith asserts that he falls under the third Ortiz exception
because he told his attorney he wanted to appeal immediately after
sentencing and because he unsuccessfully attempted to contact his
attorney about proceeding with an appeal on numerous occasions
during the year following the expiration of the 120-day callback
period, but that his attorney failed to file the requested appeal.
Had his attorney filed an appeal, Smith claims that he would have
pursued it.

In response, the State argued, and the district court agreed, that
Smith had waived his right to appeal because he “let the matter
rest” by waiting so many years to attempt to proceed with the ap-
peal pro se. The district court relied on Cole, where a panel of the
Court of Appeals said whether the defendant “let the matter rest”

was a threshold requirement a defendant must overcome in order
to assert an Ortiz exception, and a failure to timely assert an Ortiz
exception could be considered a waiver of that right. Cole, 2012
WL 1649886, at *2. In effect, Cole said that a defendant may not
make an untimely request to be allowed to make an untimely ap-
eal.

P Cole’s threshold requirement that a defendant must establish
that he or she had not “let the matter rest” as a condition precedent
to establishing an Ortiz exception was apparently crafted from the
following language in Ortiz:

“‘A defendant properly informed of his appellate rights may not “let the matter
rest,” Worts v. Dutton, 395 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir, 1968), and then claim that he
did not waive his right to appeal.’” Ortiz, 230 Kan. at 736 (quoting Norris v. Wain-
wright, 588 F.2d 130, 137 [5th Cir. 1979]).

The quoted Fifth Circuit opinion, Norris v. Wainwright, 588
F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1979), involved a different factual scenario.
There, the defendant had been properly informed of his appellate
rights, but he did not direct his attorney to file an appeal. In other
words, the defendant made no contemporaneous attempt to invoke
the right to appeal which he had been told that he had. Here, the
actions that Smith alleges that he took during the year after he was
properly informed of his appellate rights do not comport with the
Norris notion of letting the matter rest. Smith’s immediate direc-
tive to his attorney to appeal the sentence imposed is the antithesis
of waiving his right to appeal; rather, it was an invocation of his
right to appeal contemporaneous with being advised of that right.
Perhaps a more accurate description of the district court’s holding ,
in this case would be that Smith’s suspension of his efforts to en-
force his right to appeal for 19 years constituted an abandonment
of his right to appeal, as a matter of law.

But requiring a defendant to establish the timeliness of his or
her attempt to invoke the third Ortiz exception adds a step to the
proper analysis set forth in Patton, to-wit: (1) Whether the defen-
dant told his or her counsel to appeal, but the attorney failed to
file or perfect the appeal; and, (2) if so, the defendant will enjoy a
presumption of prejudice but must show that he or she would have
timely appealed, but for counsel's failure. Patton, 287 Kan. at 225.

Patton discussed the “let the matter rest” concept, but as a factor
in the Flores-Ortega two-prong performance and prejudice analy-
sis. Patton, 287 Kan. at 225. The court found that Patton had not
“Jet the matter rest,” based on evidence in the record that showed
Patton desired to pursue an appeal and had been attempting to do
so, but for his counsel's nonperformance. 287 Kan. at 225. In other

words, as in Patton, Smith’s dilatory cond
the credibility of his claim that he told his
claim that he would have proceeded with
had not failed him. But the lapse of tim
his attorney to appeal and Smith’s attemy
exception to file an out-of-time appeal, s
threshold bar to the untimely appeal as

uct might be relevant to
attorney to appeal or his
an appeal if his attorney
e between Smith telling
pt to use the third Ortiz

tanding alone, was not a

a matter of law. But of.

Gill, 287 Kan. at 296-97 (found 8-year delay while attempting to
effect appeal warranted denial of out-of-time appeal, but declined
to “suggest[] any bright-line temporal rules”).

Because the district court found the appeal time-barred, it did
not conduct a Patton analysis. Thus, the district court did not make
the requisite factual findings that would support the claimed third
Ortiz exception. Moreover, the cold record before us only con-
tains Smith’s testimony. Whether this evidence is sufficient to meet
Smith’s burden relies in part on its credibility. A witness’ credibil-
ity is a determination for the district court to make. See State v.
Wilkerson, 278 Kan. 147, 156, 91 P.3d 1181 (2004) (“It is not this
court’s function to weigh witness credibility.”); Barger v. United
States, 204 F.3d 1180, 1182 (8th Cir. 2000) (“A bare assertion by

. the petitioner that she made a request [for counsel to file appeal]
is not by itself sufficient to support a grant of relief, if evidence
that the fact-finder finds to be more credible indicates the contrary
proposition.”).

Accordingly, we are compelled to send this back to the district
court once again for the express purpose of determining whether
Smith’s testimony is credible, i.e., whether he told his attorney to
appeal, whether the attorney did not file an appeal, and whether
Smith would have appealed if his attorney had not failed to per-
form. If Smith’s testimony is credible, he has established deficient
performance under Flores-Ortega. See Albright, 292 Kan, at 211.

A lawyer who disregards specific instructions to file a notice of ap-
peal has acted in a professionally unreasonable manner, and the
defendant is entitled to a new appeal without a showing that the
appeal would have been successful. 292 Kan. at 209-10 (quoting
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477). In that event, Smith will be per-
mitted to appeal out of time.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

No. 111,375

StaTE oF Kansas, Appellee, v. LUTHER JOHNSON, Appellant.
70)

926

Opinion

|

Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and
Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of the same office, was on the brief for appellant.

Sheryl L. Lidtke, chief deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome
A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her
on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nuss, C.].: Luther Johnson appeals his convictions on one count
of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated burglary related
to the shooting death of Derrick Hill. Johnson contends the district
court erroneously: (1) failed to instruct the jury on the offenses of
voluntary manslaughter, unintentional second-degree murder, and
reckless involuntary manslaughter; (2) excluded testimony that the
shooting happened in a high crime area; (3) denied Johnson’s re-
quest for a trial continuance; (4) denied Johnson’s motion for anew
trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) made a com-
bination of rulings warranting a new trial; and (6) used Johnson's
previous convictions for sentencing purposes without their being
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

We conclude Johnson’s arguments are without merit. Accord-
ingly, we affirm his convictions.

Facts AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For 10 years Luther Johnson and Cerrina Nicole Griffin had an
on-again, off-again relationship. At the time of Derrick Hill’s fatal
shooting, they had been “off” for at least 30 days. During this time,
Griffin and her daughter stayed with Griffin’s cousin Victoria Free-
man and Freeman’s infant son at Rosedale Ridge Apartments in
Kansas City, Kansas. Because Betty Grace Kebert and her daugh-
ter also lived there, Freeman slept in one bedroom, Kebert in the
other, and Griffin slept in the living room on an air mattress.

During the evening of August 20, 2010, several individuals, in-
cluding Hill, visited Freeman’s apartment to play cards and smoke
marijuana. Later, Kebert and Demetrius Grant went to Kebert’s
bedroom while Griffin, Hill, and Freeman continued playing cards
and watching television in the living room.

Shorily after midnight, Freeman locked her apartment’s front
door and the sliding glass door leading to the balcony before retir-
ing to her bedroom. Griffin and Hill continued watching television
until they both fell asleep on the air mattress with their heads near
the balcony door.

The State’s physical evidence and witnesses, including Griffin,
showed that sometime around 3 a.m., Johnson climbed onto the
apartment's balcony from outside and blew out the sliding glass
door with a shot from a .45 caliber pistol. He then stepped into the
apartment, called Griffin’s name, and began arguing with her near
the air mattress. Griffin and Hill did not have a sexual relation-
ship, and she tried explaining to Johnson she was not having sex
with Hill. During this argument with Griffin from just inside the
shot-out balcony door, Johnson shot Hill in the left temple, and
his pistol ejected a .45 caliber shell casing onto the blankets by the
nearby couch. Griffin then fled to Kebert’s bedroom with Johnson.
in pursuit. There, Johnson grabbed her arm and dragged her out of
the apartment. When she resisted he told her if she did not come
along he would “kill [her], too.”

Grant testified he was asleep in Kebert’s bed and awoke to the
sound of a gunshot. According to Grant, a black male came into the
bedroom, grabbed Griffin—whose name Grant did not know at the
time—and the two left the apartment.

In Kebert’s statement to police at the scene after the shooting,
she too said Griffin and Johnson came into her bedroom, where he
grabbed Griffin’s arm and took her out of the apartment. Kebert
further told police Johnson had his arm around Griffin’s neck and
a gun in his hand when she heard Griffin ask, “Luther, why'd you
shoot him?’—but at trial, she denied these observations. Kebert
testified she made these earlier comments to the police “to try to
get my friend [Griffin] back to her daughter quicker.”

Apartment resident Freeman likewise testified at trial somewhat
differently from her statements at the scene. According to her ear-
lier statements, after being awakened by Kebert, she called 911
and told the dispatcher that her cousin’s boyfriend, Johnson, had
shot out her balcony window and then shot Hill. Freeman told po-
lice that she was asleep in her bedroom when she awoke to a loud

noise. She too said she had seen Griffin and Johnson fighting and
she heard Johnson say, “‘I shot him.’” But at trial Freeman testi-
fied that her 911 calls and statements to police were simply based
on what Kebert had told her once Kebert woke her up after the
shooting.

Several other witnesses in neighboring apartments, including
Lakisha Davis, LaShonda Barnes, and Gwendolyn Randle, testified
to waking to gunshots and hearing a man yelling outside the apart-
ment as well as a woman screaming. Davis and Randle testified that
they ran to the front of their apartment and witnessed a black male
saying to a woman, “Come on, before I kill you, too.”

Griffin testified Johnson put her into the back seat of a green
Mazda, told her to lie down, and drove off. As they drove away
Johnson said what had happened was stupid and Griffin was at fault
for Hill’s death. According to Griffin’s recorded police statement,
testified to by Detective Michael Vega, Johnson admitted he had
killed Hill and would not have had to if Griffin had not been a “ho”
that night.
For the defense, Keyanhna Johnson testified she and Luther
Johnson were at his mother’s house watching a movie when Griffin
repeatedly called. Luther then asked Keyanhna if he could bor-
row her car and jumper cables to give Griffin a jumpstart, but she
refused. They went to bed around 2:30 or 3 a.m., and Johnson was
gone when she awoke at 6 a.m.

Johnson testified that while he was watching the movie with
Keyanhna, Griffin called asking him to pick up her mother and
brother from Children’s Mercy hospital because her car would not
start. He initially refused but relented after Griffin called multiple
times. According to Johnson, at one point Griffin told him she was
staying at Freeman's, some people had entered the apartment, and
one of them had a gun. He then picked up Griffin's mother and
brother from the hospital around 2 a.m., dropped them off, and
eventually drove to Freeman’s apartment because he was worried
about Griffin.

According to Johnson, while he was there Griffin told him an
angry man named Mike had come by earlier because Hill had pur-

930

chased some weed from Mike with counterfeit money. Griffin told
him that Mike, who had “act{ed] like he was clutching on a gun,”
eventually left. Johnson testified that while he later was outside try-
ing to start Griffin’s car he heard gunshots and ducked around a car.
Approximately 2 minutes later, he went into the apartment build-
ing to get Griffin. According to Johnson, Griffin and Kebert were
screaming and acting hysterical, so he told Griffin they needed to

0.
Johnson further testified he took Griffin to his sister's house and
went to sleep. Later that night Griffin woke him up to tell him his
face was on TV, and he was wanted for questioning. Johnson then
called Kimberlee Carson who picked up Johnson and Griffin and
let them stay at her house. Police ultimately arrested Johnson there
several days later.

At trial, defense counsel requested a jury instruction on vol-
untary manslaughter, arguing the evidence established a heat of
passion killing. The district court refused to issue the instruction,
ruling that the evidence suggested the events preceding the shots
demonstrated an argument or conversation exclusively between
Griffin and Johnson, not Hill. The court later instructed the jury
on premeditated first-degree murder, intentional second-degree
murder, and aggravated burglary.

Ultimately, a jury convicted Johnson of premeditated first-de-
gree murder under K.S.A. 21-3401(a) and aggravated burglary un-
der K.S.A. 21-3716, Johnson later filed several motions including
a motion for new trial, a pro se supplemental motion for new trial,
a second supplemental motion for new trial, and accompanying
memoranda in support.

The court denied the motions for new trial and sentenced John-
son to a hard 25 life sentence for the first-degree murder convic-
tion to run concurrent with the 57 months’ imprisonment for the
aggravated burglary conviction. Johnson timely appeals.

Jurisdiction is proper under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3),
(4) (maximum sentence of life imprisonment imposed for an off-
grid crime [first-degree murder]).

More facts will be added as necessary to the analysis.

“931

ANALYSIS

Issue 1: The district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury
on voluntary manslaughter, unintentional second-degree murder,
and reckless involuntary manslaughter.

Johnson argues that the jury could have returned a conviction
for voluntary manslaughter, unintentional second-degree murder,
or reckless involuntary manslaughter had the district court given
instructions on these offenses, The State generally responds that
those instructions are not appropriate under the facts of this case.

Standard of review

To analyze jury instruction issues on appeal, this court follows a
stair-step framework:

“or jury instruction issues, the progression of analysis and corresponding
standards of review on appeal are: (1) First, the appellate court should consider
the reviewability of the issue from both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints,
exercising an unlimited standard of review; (2) next, the court should use an un-
limited review to determine whether the instruction was legally appropriate; (3)
then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that would
have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the ap-
pellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test
and degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801
(2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1504 (2012).’” State v. Salary, 301 Kan. 586, 592,
343 P.3d 1165 (2015) (quoting State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. {| 1, 283 P.3d
202 [2012]).

Johnson requested an instruction for voluntary manslaughter.
So we look to see if denying the instruction was district court er-
ror and, if so, whether the error is harmless. Salary, 301 Kan. at
592, But Johnson did not request an instruction on either uninten-
tional second-degree murder or reckless involuntary manslaughter.
Consequently, we look to see if this lack of such jury instructions
met the higher standard of being “clearly erroneous.” K.S.A. 22-
3414(3); State v. Briseno, 299 Kan. 877, 882, 326 P.3d 1074 (2014).

As with the requested instruction, for these two unrequested
instructions we must first determine whether there was any error
at all—i.e., whether each instruction was legally and factually ap-

propriate, employing an unlimited review of the entire record. See
Briseno, 299 Kan. at 882-83 (quoting State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101,
1121, 299 P.3d 292 [2013]). If no error, the analysis ends. But if er-
ror is found, then we must determine if it is clear error, i.e., wheth-
er we are “‘“firmly convinced that the jury would have reached
a different verdict had the instruction error not occurred.”’” 299
Kan. at 883 (quoting Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1121). Here, the burden
to meet this standard is on Johnson. See 299 Kan. at 883 (quoting
Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1121).

Discussion
Voluntary manslaughter

The first step to determine whether the district court erred by
refusing to give the voluntary manslaughter instruction Johnson re-
quested is to ask if the instruction was legally appropriate. Salary,
301 Kan. at 592. It was, because voluntary manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of both first- and second-degree murder—for
which instructions were given. See K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(a); State v.
Wade, 295 Kan. 916, 924, 287 P.3d 237 (2012).

Next, we examine whether the instruction was factually appro-
priate. Voluntary manslaughter is defined as an “intentional killing
of a human being committed . . . [u]pon a sudden quarrel or in the
heat of passion.” K.S.A. 21-3403(a). Kansas considers sudden quar-
rel as one form of heat of passion. State v. Johnson, 290 Kan. 1038,
1048, 236 P.3d 517 (2010). Heat of passion is defined as “‘any in-
tense or vehement emotional excitement of the kind prompting vi-
olent and aggressive action, such as rage, anger, hatred, furious re-
sentment, fright, or terror,’ based ‘on impulse without reflection.’”
State v. Hayes, 299 Kan. 861, 864, 327 P.3d 414 (2014) (quoting
State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. 791, 796, 696 P.2d 381 [1985]).

The key elements of voluntary manslaughter are an intentional
killing and legally sufficient provocation. Hayes, 299 Kan. at 864.
When reviewing whether provocation was legally sufficient, an ob-
jective test is used: “[T]here must be an adequate provocation that
deprives a reasonable person of self-control and causes that person
to act out of passion rather than reason.” 299 Kan. 861, Syl. { 4.

At trial, Johnson argued the evidence established a heat of pas-

sion killing. The State responded that no evidence had been pre-
sented of any provocation of Johnson by the victim, Derrick Hill.
The district court refused the instruction on voluntary manslaugh-
ter:

“And what we have in that regard is an unlawful entry, a—two individuals being
held at gunpoint, that there was an argument—and I don’t know if ‘argument’ is
the right term. There was a—at least from the testimony of Cerrina [Griffin], she
was emotional and apparently she came to the conclusion that given the circum-
stances of her being in the same room with the deceased that apparently in her
mind she thought this would infuriate Luther [defendant], so she immediately
began talking to him.

“And as I recall her testimony, it then, and perhaps understandably so, given
the nature of the situation, she couldn’t be real specific about what happened, as I
recall, and counsel mentioned this. Her mouth was moving, Luther's [defendant's]
mouth was moving. I even think she said Derek’s [Hill's] mouth was moving; we
have no idea what Derek may have said or may not have said.

“But as I interpret the evidence, what was going on prior to the shot or shots
being fired was pretty much exclusively between Cerrina Nicole [Griffin] and the
defendant, with the deceased being in a position of just basically standing there.
There is no testimony—Cerrina was the only source we have that he came at the
defendant, that he said anything in particular to the defendant which could cause
him to act in a certain way, that he rushed at him, threatened him, that he did any-
thing. He was just basically standing there and at some point in time, then,—and
this is what Cerrina Nicole says—the defendant shot him.

“And applying an objective standard to those facts, or to at least Cerrina Ni-
cole’s ability to remember what had happened at that time, based upon the appli-
cable case law, I’m going to find that instruction on voluntary manslaughter would
not be appropriate in this case.”

At the later hearing on Johnson’s motion for a new trial, the
court again explained why the voluntary manslaughter instruction
was inappropriate: .

“What happened here is that Mr. Johnson climbed up on a balcony of a place
where he did not live, he was armed, shot out a window, entered the living room
area, there was a significant pause, and then he shot a young man, who as the State
points out, did nothing, Just got up, and then got shot. Now I suppose, Mr. Dent,
[defense counsel] one might consider a heat of passion type thing if say you went
to your own home and went to your own bedroom and walked in on your girl
friend, or whoever, and saw something going on, and you didn’t have a gun on you,
but you were so inflamed by that, there might be a gun or weapon handy, and you
just grab it and spontaneously react to the situation. And that wasn’t the case here.

“Mr. Johnson went to someplace he didn’t belong to begin with. He was con-
victed of aggravated burglary for shooting out the window and entering, and then

rather cold bloodily and with deliberation, shot the victim in the head. . . . I just
don’t know what to say about that, other than there is no evidence.”

Johnson again argues that Griffin’s testimony establishes an in-
tense, emotional argument occurred that potentially resulted in
Hill's death. The State counters sufficient provocation by the vic-
tim must exist but no evidence existed of any heated argument be-
tween Johnson and Hill.

For this analytical step—whether the voluntary manslaughter
instruction was factually appropriate—we must determine whether
there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
the defendant as the requesting party, that would have supported
the instruction. Salary, 301 Kan. at 592. In general, the district
court mist instruct the jury on the law for a lesser included offense
“where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a
conviction of” it. K.S.A, 22-3414(3); State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 176,
194, 322 P.3d 367 (2014).

Johnson relies upon other jurisdictions where some courts found
heat of passion and voluntary manslaughter in situations he argues
are factually similar to the present case. While he first cites the
concurring opinion in United States v. Martinez, 988 F.2d 685 (7th
Cir. 1993), that case involved a fight between several inmates at

. a federal correctional institution. Thus, our analysis is not aided
by the concurrence’s one-sentence discussion of “heat of passion”
involving a cuckolded husband finding his wife and her lover in
flagrante delicto. 988 F.2d at 705 (Cudahy, J., concurring).

Johnson next cites State v. Rainey, 154 N.C. App. 282, 574
S.E.2d 25 (2002), where the defendant shot a man having a rela-
tionship with the defendant’s sister. The defendant requested an
instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter. The North Caro-

- lina appellate court described the “typical” voluntary manslaughter
situation as “homicide committed in the moments after discovering
a spouse in the act of infidelity.” 154 N.C. App. at 287. Accordingly,
the dissimilar facts in Rainey do not provide helpful guidance.

Johnson also cites People v. McCarthy, 132 Ill. 2d 331, 547
N.E.2d 459 (1989), where the defendant found his girlfriend and
a man lying in bed and shot both of them, killing the female. The
Illinois Supreme Court listed several circumstances constituting

sufficient provocation, including adultery with defendant's spouse.
But the defendant and his girlfriend had never married and had
broken up before the shooting. As a result, the court declined to
determine whether adultery-based voluntary manslaughter should
be extended beyond a marital relationship. 132 Ill. 2d at 341-42.

By contrast, our decision in Wade, 295 Kan. 916, provides more
valuable guidance. Wade was convicted of the premeditated first-
degree murder of his child’s mother who called Wade to say that
he could not see his son. Wade brought a handgun to the residence
where she was staying, climbed through a window, and shot her.
We held that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not factu-
ally appropriate because there was no evidence of sudden quarrel
where Wade “orchestrated the encounter which is the antithesis of
an unforeseen event.” 295 Kan. at 925.

In Wade we concluded the defendant's behavior leading up
to the shooting—arming himself with a handgun before leaving
home—implied he planned to use it in some manner during his
encounter with the victim. His behavior simply did not support his
contention that the murder was performed without reflection. We
further noted that while Wade's anger with the victim may have
provided a motive, the anger did not provide sufficient provocation
for the shooting to be in the heat of passion. 295 Kan. at 926 (“A
slow burn is not heat of passion.”).

Similarly, Johnson’s orchestration of the encounter does not sug-
gest that his actions were merely taken “‘on impulse without reflec-
tion.’” Hayes, 299 Kan. at 864. The evidence instead demonstrates
Johnson armed himself with a loaded .45 caliber handgun, drove to
the apartment where he knew Griffin—his former girlfriend—was
staying, climbed up the balcony, and shot out the sliding glass door
of the apartment. Although Johnson saw Griffin sleeping on an air
mattress with Hill, no physical act was occurring.

Johnson paused after taking his glass-shattering shot—stepping
into the apartment and talking with Griffin while she tried to con-
vince him nothing was going on between Hill and her. Hill said
nothing. Johnson then shot Hill in the left temple—per the tes-
timony and photographs of the scene, from a distance less than
the length of the air mattress. While Johnson blamed Griffin for

936

making him do it and his jealousy may have provided a motive for
killing Hill, under these circumstances it did not provide sufficient
provocation for the shooting to be in the heat of passion.
Accordingly, a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not factu-
ally appropriate here. So the district court did not err in refusing
to give it.
Unintentional second-degree murder and reckless involuntary
manslaughter

Unlike the voluntary manslaughter instruction, Johnson did not
request an instruction for unintentional second-degree murder
or reckless involuntary manslaughter. As noted, we review these
particular instruction challenges for clear error. Briseno, 299 Kan.
at 882, We begin by acknowledging these instructions are legal-
ly appropriate because unintentional second-degree murder and
reckless involuntary manslaughter are lesser included offenses of
first-degree murder—for which instructions were given. State v.
Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 135, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005).

Again, we must next determine whether the instructions were
factually appropriate. Salary, 301 Kan. at 592. Under K.S.A. 21-
3402(b), unintentional second-degree murder is “the killing of a
human being committed . . . unintentionally but recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of hu-
man life.” Per K.S.A. 21-3404(a), involuntary manslaughter is “the
unintentional killing of a human being committed . . . [rlecklessly.”
And, “[rJeckless conduct is conduct done under circumstances that
show a realization of the imminence of danger to the person of an-
other and a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of that danger.”
K.S.A. 21-3201(c). We have held reckless involuntary manslaugh-
ter differs from reckless second-degree murder only in the degree
of recklessness required to prove culpability. Engelhardt, 280 Kan.
at 135,

Johnson argues the Kansas legislature effectively has stated that
proof a person acted intentionally also establishes he or she acted
recklessly under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5202(c) which provides:

“Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged constitutes proof
of the culpability charged. If recklessness suffices to establish an element, that

element also is established if a person acts knowingly or intentionally. If acting
lnowingly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a
person acts intentionally.”

But neither Johnson nor the State addresses K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-5103(d), involving the scope and application of the Kansas
Criminal Code, which provides:

“This code has no application to crimes committed prior to July 1, 2011. A
crime is committed prior to the effective date of the code if any of the essential
elements of the crime as then defined occurred before that date. Prosecutions for
prior crimes shall be governed, prosecuted and punished under the laws existing
at the time such crimes were committed.” (Emphasis added.)

Because the fatal shooting of Hill was performed on August 21,
2010, Johnson’s arguments based upon K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5202
necessarily fail.

We now resume our review for factual propriety of the two in-
structions. We observe that “second-degree reckless murder is a
killing of a human that is not purposeful, willful, or knowing but
which results from an act performed with knowledge that the vic-
tim is in imminent danger, although death is not foreseen.” (Em-
phasis added.) State v. Killings, 301 Kan. 214, 225-26, 340 P.3d 1186
(2015). And an instruction for reckless involuntary manslaughter is
appropriate when the act resulting in death was intentional, but the
defendant did not intend to kill the victim. State v. McCullough,
293 Kan. 970, 978-79, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012).

In Killings, this court held that a requested, but rejected, sec-
ond-degree reckless murder instruction was factually inappropri-
ate where the evidence established Killings went to the apartment
to exact revenge, pointed a gun at the victim, taunted him, and
shot at him multiple times, hitting him once. We reasoned the only
inference that could be gleaned from this evidence was that Kill-
ings intended to kill the victim. 301 Kan. at 227. We contrasted
two cases: State v. Cordray, 277 Kan. 43, 56, 82 P.3d 503 (2004)
(evidence sufficient to support jury verdict of unintentional but
reckless second-degree murder where the defendant fired a gun
in the general direction of a vehicle at night, striking an occupant);
State v. Jones, 27 Kan. App. 2d 910, 915, 8 P.3d 1282 (2000) (held
jury could have found evidence supporting recklessness where wit-

nesses testified defendant shot gun randomly over crowd of people
with eyes closed). See also State v. Mitchell, 23 Kan. App. 2d 413,
416-17, 422, 932 P.2d 1012 (1997) (Defendant claimed victim had
pulled a gun on him and he was afraid for his life, so he pulled out
his own gun, closed his eyes, and began shooting. Reversed and
remanded for instruction on involuntary manslaughter.), cited in
State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 252, 275, 213 P.3d 728 (2009).

Here, like Killings, the only inference that can be gleaned from
the trial evidence was that Johnson intended to kill Hill. We recog-
nize Johnson testified he was in the parking lot during the shooting.
But as mentioned in the analysis of the voluntary manslaughter is-
sue, the State’s evidence demonstrated that he took a loaded hand-
gun and drove to the apartment where he knew his ex-girlfriend,
Griffin, was staying; climbed up the balcony; shot out the glass
door; and entered. After some discussion with Griffin, he shot Hill
in the left temple with a .45 caliber handgun—according to the tes-
timony and photographs, from a distance less than the length of the
air mattress. See Houston, 289 Kan. at 275-76 (among other things,
evidence showed defendant shot victim in face with 12-gauge shot-
gun from within 15 feet; court rejected involuntary manslaughter
instruction after concluding no rational jury could have found de-
fendant did not intend to kill victim). Shortly after the shooting
Johnson told Griffin if she did not come with him he would kill her
too and she was at fault for Hill’s death. In short, no reasonable jury
would conclude he acted recklessly. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3) (judge
shall instruct the jury “where there is some evidence which would
reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime”).

As a result, jury instructions for both unintentional second-
degree murder and involuntary manslayghter were not factually
appropriate. So the district court’s failure to so instruct certainly
could not be clearly erroneous as required for unrequested instruc-
tions. See State v. Cooper, 303 Kan. 764; 769, 366 P.3d 232 (2016).

Issue 2: The district court did not err’ by’ excluding evidence that
the shooting occurred in a high crime area and that someone had
threatened Johnson and Griffin and vandalized Griffin’s car.

Johnson argues the district court denied him his right to a full

939

and complete defense by excluding evidence that (1) Rosedale
Ridge Apartments, where the shooting took place, was a “high
crime” area, and (2) someone had threatened Johnson and Griffin
and vandalized Griffin’s car. Both categories of evidence allegedly
support a theory that someone besides Johnson fatally shot Hill.
The State responds there was no basis to legally admit any evidence
about the high crime area.

Standard of review

A claim that defendant was denied a constitutional right to pres-
enta full and complete defense under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution is a question of law subject to
de novo review. State v. Maestas, 298 Kan. 765, 780, 316 P.3d 724
(2014). But the fundamental right to a fair trial is “subject to statu-
tory rules and caselaw interpreting the rules of evidence and proce-
dure.” 298 Kan. at 781 (citing State v. Wells, 289 Kan. 1219, 1235,
221 P.3d 561 [2009}}).

When this court considers a challenge to exclusion of evidence,
we first consider relevance, which is established by
“‘a material or logical connection between the asserted facts and the inference
or result they are intended to establish. [Citation omitted.] Relevant evidence, as
defined in K.S.A. 60-401(b), is “evidence having any tendency in reason to prove
any material fact.” In State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 505, 186 P.3d 713 (2008), we
explained that this definition of “relevance” contains both a materiality element
and a probative element. There, we held that an appellate court reviews a district
court's determination of materiality de novo and the assessment of probative value
under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Burnett, 300
Kan. 419, 427, 329 P.3d 1169 (2014) (quoting State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 857,
295 P.3d 1020 [2013)).

See State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, 303, 173 P.3d 612 (2007).

In considering evidence that a third party is responsible for com-
mitting a crime, we have stated:

“Whether a third party was responsible for the crime a defendant is charged
with is clearly a material fact rélated to determining the defendant's guilt or in-
nocence. We have previously stated that ‘[w]hile evidence of the motive of a third
party to commit the crime, standing alone, is not relevant, such evidence may be
relevant if there is other evidence connecting the third party to the crime.’ State v.
Brown, 285 Kan. 261, Syl. 26, 173 P.3d 612 (2007). In other words, without ad-

940

ditional evidence showing that a third party could have committed the crime (e.g,
presence at the crime scene, the opportunity and means to commit the crime),
evidence merely suggesting that someone other than the defendant had a motive to
commit the crime has little probative value and can be properly excluded at trial.
“A district court judge must evaluate the totality of facts and circumstances in a
given case to determine whether the defense’s proffered evidence effectively con-
nects the third party to the crime charged.’ 285 Kan. 261, Syl. ¢ 27. Because the
district court’s determination of this question contemplates whether the proffered
evidence is probative to establishing a third party’s involvement in the charged
crime, the district court’s decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” (Empha-
sis added.) Burnett, 300 Kan. at 431-32.

Discussion

At the outset, we observe that evidence of Griffin’s vandalized
car and threats to Johnson and Griffin was admitted at trial. As a
result, Johnson’s arguments about their erroneous exclusion have
no merit. His counsel expressly cross-examined Griffin about the
vandalism to her car and threats made to Johnson:

“Q. Okay. And at some time did he break down and say he was scared? There
were threats?
“A. Imean, he said he was scared.
“Q. Did anybody make any mention of somebody tearing up your car?
‘A. Yeah, we heard it from someone.
0 Who did you hear it from?
“A. Quite a few people.
“Q. But you said you weren’t in contact with people, so who are the quite a few
people you heard it from?
“A. don’t now, you would have to ask him. He was the one getting the informa-
tion.
“Q. So he was in contact with people, but you weren't.
“A. That’s correct.
“Q. Okay. So he found out from Victoria or Vicky or whoever that your car had
been damaged?
“A. I don’t know who he found out from.” (Emphasis added.)

Additionally, Johnson himself testified during direct examination
that he was receiving threats and that one of the residents of the
apartment had called him to say someone “was messing [Griffin's]
car up.” And during the State’s rebuttal, a detective testified that
while obtaining a statement, Johnson told him, “‘I hear I’m getting
threats that people are going to kill me.’”

As for Johnson’s arguments the court erred by excluding evidence

that the fatal shooting occurred in a “high crime” area, he claims
such evidence was relevant to prove the material fact of identity.
Specifically, his defense was premised on his not being in the apart-
ment when Hill was shot; thus someone else pulled the trigger. The
State responds that admitting evidence that “other people” might
have killed the victim, standing alone, is not relevant.

On the first day of trial, defense counsel.asked Officer Jared
Shearer if he would “describe Rosedale Ridge as a high crime
area?” The court sustained the State’s objection on relevance
grounds. Defense counsel then argued there was no physical evi-
dence against Johnson so the theory was “if not him, then who?”
He reasoned evidence that this was a high crime area, where one
other “shots fired” police call happened that day and six or seven
“shots fired” calls happened that month, would thus be relevant.

The State countered it had direct evidence that Johnson was
the only one in the apartment with a gun; that he admitted telling
Griffin he shot Hill and it was her fault; and that it had consider-
able circumstantial evidence. The State therefore argued evidence
that some other person might have fired the shots was “irrelevant,
speculative, and we believe misleading to the jury.” The district
court confirmed its exclusionary ruling but said it was willing to
revisit the issue if the parties were able to provide caselaw before
the other detectives testified.

On the second day of trial, defense counsel acknowledged that
he could not find any caselaw directly on point but submitted:
“certainly think the fact that this particular apartment complex in the month of
August alone had seven shots-fired calls, three of them in this apartment building;
two shootings not including—two shootings total; five armed disturbances; one
armed robbery; five attempts to locate wanted persons; two suspicious persons;
and four suspicious crowd calls there in the building—or there in the complex.
‘There was a separate shots-fired call from this particular building in that complex
this same day.

“And so, I believe that—that it does at least show that there are other people
on the grounds out there who'are clearly armed, who have firearms that there is
certainly the opportunity to commit this crime. I believe it is more than just me
standing up here trying to argue blankly that somebody else could have done it
that there is at least a record that there are other people at that complex who are
armed and causing problems. And I think it is more than just tangential. . . . I
clearly think that it is a natural or logical connection here to say we believe some

other dude did it and that there certainly is evidence that there are other people
out there armed and causing problems.” (Emphasis added.)

The State responded there was no evidence that anyone besides
Johnson was “out to get Derek Hill;” that this “high-crime area”
evidence would allow the jury to consider evidence that had no
relevance; and the defense based on third party evidence requires
specific information to implicate another person.

The district court once again agreed with the State:

“I believe you're correct. Well, you know, statistically I guess Wyandotte County
and probably Sedgwick County are considered the high-crime counties in the
state, and so just because something happens in Wyandotte County or Sedgwick
County, you can’t in every criminal trial say, well, this happened in a high-crime
county. And then you further go down into areas, well, just because a crime hap-
pened in an area where crimes happen does not necessarily have any connection
to that crime, we'd be hearing this evidence in nearly every criminal case that we
have. Uthink it is kind of fact-driven.

“Let’s say the facts in this case were that the victim was standing by the window,
a bullet came from somewhere, went through the window, and then hit him. In
other words, it could be argued factually that this was some random shot that was
fired, There’s lots of shots fired in that area that could be a factual possibility. Well,
then maybe I think you could talk about there’s lots of gunfire in this area, and it
could have happened that way as opposed to some evidence of an individual.

“But what you have here is a shell casing on the balcony, a shell casing inside
the apartment, so it’s not—it’s a factual scenario where a person was standing
right there and firing the shots. And so given the way the crime apparently was
committed, I don’t see that the fact that it occurred in what one may, quote/un-
quote, consider a ‘high crime aréa’ would be relevant, so your request is once again
denied.” (Emphasis added.)

At the hearing on Johnson’s motion for new trial, defense coun-
sel again argued Johnson was not allowed to completely present his
defense that someone else had committed the crimes. The district
court yet again rejected this argument that relied upon third party
evidence: ,

“As far as the allowing the evidence of gunshots in the area and other crimes
that may have gone on near this period of time; T just didn’t see at the time how
that would be relevant and probative of anything in terms of a defense. Basi-
cally, all the—all that would show is that this particular homicide occurred in what
might be referred to as a high crime area. And if every time you have a trial,
whether it’s a robbery or a burglary or happens to be homicide, you don’t bring in
evidence that well, you know, two days ago, there were shots fired down the street.

I mean its not probative of anything, other than you know, that’s just kind of what
the area is like. And you would have to have more than that, I think, to somehow
tie it into this specific incident. And it just wasn’t there. It was just speculative not
probative.” (Emphasis added.)

On appeal, the State contends the facts of the instant case are
similar to those in State v. Knox, 301 Kan. 671, 347 P.3d 656 (2015).
There, Knox argued evidence of guns and drugs found in the home
near the murder scene was relevant to show someone else, such as
a rival drug dealer, could have committed the murder. Knox rea-
soned most people know that drug houses are inherently danger-
ous, and someone inside could have shot the victim. We rejected
the argument, stating:

“Yet, evidence of a third party's motive, on its own, will be excluded for rel-
evance where nothing else connects the third party to the crime. See State v.
Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 197-203, 331 P.3d 544 (2014). ‘And nothing in this case connects
a third party to the crime. The simple presence of guns and drugs in a house that
Morris never had a chance to enter does not lead to-an inference that someone
else was involved in Morris’ murder. Witnesses saw two or three men walk to-
wards Morris’ Mustang, shoot Morris, and then leave in vehicles. No evidence
suggested the involvement of anyone other than Knox and his companions; noth-
ing implicated anyone who entered or exited the house. Nor was there any sugges-
tion that Morris’ murder had anything to do with the drugs and guns found in the
house. Theoretically, a house with drugs and guns can be a dangerous place, but
that alone has no tendency to show that an unidentified and unseen person from
the house or an unidentified rival drug dealer killed Morris.” (Emphasis added.)
301 Kan. at 689.

We held that because the presence of guns and drugs was not ma-
terial and probative to whether Knox murdered the victim, the dis-
trict court did not err in excluding the evidence and Knox's right
to present his defense therefore was not violated. 301 Kan. at 690.

Our decision in Burnett, 300 Kan. 419, also provides valuable
guidance. Burnett was convicted, among other things, of felony
murder for firing a gun into the residence of a man with whom he
had a dispute. Burnett argued the district court erred in exclud-
ing evidence that other shootings previously had occurred at tlie
home—which he offered to raise the possibility that someone else
may have shot at the residence. We upheld the district court's ex-
clusion, stating:

944

“In this case, Burnett proffered evidence establishing that Ramsey’s house was
the target of shootings before and after July 7 and suggested that because the
house had been the target of other shootings—which he claimed were drug re-
Jated—it was possible that someone else was responsible for the July 7 shooting.
Though the evidence tends to show that the house attracted criminal activity, it
fails to identify or show that someone other than Burnett was responsible for the
July 7 shooting. Without evidence connecting the prior or subsequent shootings
to the July 7 shooting (e.g, the same gun was used in all the shootings), the evi-
dence of prior or subsequent shootings has little probative value to establishing
the material fact that someone other than Burnett committed the July 7 shooting.”
(Emphasis added.) 300 Kan. at 433.

Without a connection between the shooting and high general
criminal activity, evidence of the latter has scant probative value
for establishing that someone other than Johnson shot Hill. More-
over, Johnson was already able to present evidence that a third
party named “Mike”—an otherwise unidentified and reputed drug
dealer—may have shot Hill because Hill paid Mike for drugs with
counterfeit money.

Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding the high crime area evidence. See Burnett, 300 Kan.
431-32 (district court’s decision on whether proffered evidence is
probative to establishing a third party’s involvement in the charged
crime is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Johnson’s right to
present his defense therefore was not violated.

Issue 3: The district court did not err in denying Johnsons request
for atrial continuance.

Johnson argues the district court abused its discretion by de-
nying a request for continuance by his retained counsel, William
Dunn, who entered an appearance 6 days before trial. He claims
(1) the continuance would not have inconvenienced the witnesses,
court, counsel, or parties; (2) legitimate reasons existed for the de-
lay; and (3) denial of the continuance prejudiced him by denying
him effective assistance of counsel. Unsurprisingly, the State re-
sponds the court did not arbitrarily deny Johnson’s request.

Standard of review

K.S.A. Supp. 22-3401 provides that “[clontinuances may be
granted to either party for good cause shown.” We review the

SS

denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. State v. Robinson,
303 Kan. 11, 90, 363 P.3d 875 (2015) (citing Burnett, 300 Kan. at
436).

We often have stated that judicial discretion can be abused in
three general ways: where judicial action is arbitrary or based on an
error of law or fact. State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 505, 277 P.3d
1111 (2012). The party asserting abuse of judicial discretion has the
burden to prove it on appeal. State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132,
161, 340 P.3d 485 (2014). Additionally, where a defendant claims
the denial of continuance interfered with his or her ability to pres-
ent a defense, we review the question de novo. Robinson, 303 Kan.
at 90; State v. Lewis, 299 Kan. 828, 846, 326 P.3d 387 (2014).

Discussion

“An essential element of the Sixth Amendment's protection of

the right to counsel is that a defendant must be afforded a reason-
able opportunity to secure counsel of his or her choosing.” State v.
Anthony, 257 Kan. 1003, 1018, 898 P.2d 1109 (1995) (citing Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 [1932]).
Although “an accused must be provided a fair opportunity to obtain
counsel of his or her choice, this right cannot be manipulated to
impede the efficient administration of justice.” 257 Kan. at 1019
(citing State v. Bentley, 218 Kan. 694, 695, 545 P.2d 183 [1976]).
The United States Supreme Court has explained some of the ten-
sion in this area:
“Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not
the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors
at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances
except for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad discretion must be granted
trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘in-
sistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates
the right to the assistance of counsel. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 5891, 84 S.
Ct. 841, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921] (1964).” (Emphasis added.) Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S.
1, 11-12, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 75 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1983), quoted in Robinson, 303 Kan.
at 85.

As this court stated in Anthony: “‘When a criminal defendant's
constitutional right to secure counsel of his choice conflicts with
the trial judge’s discretionary power to deny continuances, the re-

—_ ie

viewing court must balance several factors in determining whether
the trial court’s conduct was “fair and reasonable.”’” 257 Kan. at
1019 (quoting United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1322 [9th Cir.
1987]). These factors are: “(1) [W]hether a continuance would
inconvenience witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties; (2)
whether other continuances have been granted; (3) whether legiti-
mate reasons exist for the delay; (4) whether the delay is the fault
of the defendant; and (5) whether denial of a continuance would
prejudice the defendant.” Robinson, 303 Kan. at 90 (quoting An-
thony, 257 Kan. at 1019).

We begin our analysis with a review of events. On August 23,
2010, Johnson was charged with the crimes arising out of the Hill
shooting. Steven Alexander was appointed as his counsel. In No-
vember 2010, Johnson's request for new counsel was granted and
Patricia Kalb was appointed as his second counsel. Following his
February 28, 2011, preliminary hearing, Johnson was bound over
for trial, which was set for May 9, 2011.

On April 15, 2011, over the State’s objection, Johnson was grant-
ed a continuance and trial was reset for August 22, 2011. John-
son then filed another motion for continuance asserting his family
was hiring private counsel to defend him. After an August 4, 2011,
hearing, the court ruled that Johnson presented no evidence of an
attorney being hired.

Five days later on August 9, 2011, Johnson filed a pro se motion
for change of counsel, and a hearing was held August 12, 2011. The
court noted that although Johnson’s actual complaints about his at-
torney were not significant, Johnson clearly had lost confidence in
Kalb. It granted his request for new counsel and again continued
the trial.

On August 15, 2011, Michael Nichols was appointed as John-
son’s third counsel, and the court later set trial for a third date:
January 23, 2012. On January 3, 2012, three weeks before trial,
Johnson filed a pro se motion to replace Nichols as counsel, and
Nichols filed a motion to continue the jury trial.

On January 20, 2012, the court denied Johnson’s motion for new
counsel but granted the motion for continuance. At the February
23, 2012, status conference, the court set trial for a fourth date:
April 16, 2012.

947

Five days before trial, on April 11, 2012, William Dunn entered
an appearance as Johnson’s retained counsel—his fourth counsel
overall. Dunn also moved the court to continue the jury trial—now
set for April 16—to a fifth date. At a hearing the next day, Dunn
explained that he would not be prepared to try a murder case 4
days later. Dunn told the court if it did not grant the continuance,
he planned to withdraw and allow Nichols to proceed as counsel.

At that hearing, the State asked the court to deny the motion
because of the number of continuances previously granted to John-
son; the multiple attorneys already appointed to represent him; the
inconvenience to witnesses, jurors, counsel, and the court; and the
defense’s failure to demonstrate any legitimate reason for delay.
The district court agreed with the State and, after applying the fac-
tors identified in Anthony, denied the motion:

“Mr. Johnson has had since August the 23rd of 2010, for either himself or as
Mr. Dunn tells us here today, his retainer is coming from family and friends for his
family and friends to put retainer money together and hire some other counsel.
Quite franldy, I don’t even know if Mr. Dumn is in fact Mr. Johnson’s counsel of
choice. ...

“But that doesn’t matter how that went because it’s absolutely clear to me
based on the record in this case that all of Mr. Johnson’s actions in this case in get-
ting, one, two, three, prior trial settings continued is to delay a resolution of this
case to manipulate basically to put it in the vernacular to gain [game] the system.
Tm trying to get a lawyer to work for me, and put off, as I stated, a resolution in
this case.

“And Ms. Lidtke [prosecutor] has stated, she has subpoenas issued. She has
people personally served. Mr. Nichols [defense attorney] has been diligently been
working on this case for the last six months, we've had several hearings where I've
heard several motions that Mr. Nichols has filed. He has subpoenas out. Like I
said, been working for six months, knows the case, knows what's in the State’s file
and I have no doubt in my mind has been pursuing whatever defenses are avail-
able to his client... . Subpoenas have been issued. Both counsel, I’m sure, have
talked to and interviewed their witnesses. This is the second time this case has
been set in front of this division of the Court. Based upon the Court’s schedule of
things coming up, I don’t know when in the world we could get to this again in a
reasonable timeframe. Jurors, as Ms. Lidtke has pointed out, have already been
called in. All of that applies to that factor. Whether other continuances have been
granted, we've already talked about that extensively. Whether legitimate reasons
exist for the delay and I'm not aware of any legitimate reason, other than the fact
that the defendant, once again, wants to once again to have a new attorney. And in
my view, that is done for the purposes of delay.

. .. Whether the delay is the fault of the defendant that’s clear in this case. The
continuance at his request. All previous delays were attributable to the defendant.
Whether the denial of the continuance would prejudice the defendant, I do not
see any way that this delay would prejudice the defendant. For the past year and
a half, he has had two highly competent counsel working on this case and I don’t
see the changing counsel at this stage of the game would in any way prejudice him,
That would only cause other difficulties, therefore based on that record of facts
and law, I find that the request for a continuance should be and is hereby denied.”
(Emphasis added.)

Dunn then asked for permission to withdraw, which was grant-
ed. Later, Johnson again raised his continuance argument when
seeking a new trial. An evidentiary hearing on the motion for new
trial was held, and Johnson was represented by his fourth appoint-
ed counsel, Paul Dent. Both Dunn and Nichols testified, and the
court affirmed both its earlier decision and underlying rationale.

Dunn’s requesting a continuance so he could remain as Johnson's
newly-retained counsel was the functional equivalent of requesting
a continuance so he then could be retained as new counsel. See
Anthony, 257 Kan. at 1019 (counsel would not enter an appearance
in case without first securing a continuance). So the test applied in
Anthony applies here.

Under the first Anthony factor—i.e., whether a continuance
would inconvenience witnesses, the court, counsel, or the par-
ties—Johnson argues no specific evidence shows such an inconve-
nience. The State responds that another continuance would have
inconvenienced everyone including the 22 witnesses ready to tes-
tify for the State—particularly those already subpoenaed—and the
60 jurors who had been summoned for the April 2012 trial. At the
continuance hearing, the State argued this was “not an easy case to
try because we don’t have cooperation from a lot of witnesses, so
we have gone through a lot of steps to secure personal attendance,
some of the primary material witnesses in this case.” Additionally,
the court pointed out that the witnesses had been interviewed by
both attorneys and it would be difficult to schedule a new trial date
in a reasonable timeframe. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor
of the State.

The second factor—i.e., whether other continuances have been

949

granted—also weighs in favor of the State. Johnson had already
requested and received three continuances of his scheduled trial
settings—April 15, 2011, August 12, 2011, and January 20, 2012—
and the State objected to two of them. In short, the court rejected
Johnson’s fourth request, i.¢., for a fifth trial setting.

Under the third factor—é.e., whether legitimate reasons exist for
the delay— Johnson argues Dunn needed time to prepare to effec-
tively represent Johnson. He contends he was required to choose
between two of his Sixth Amendment rights: to retain private coun-
sel and to receive effective assistance of counsel. Nichols was the
third attorney appointed to represent Johnson, however, and was
prepared to go to trial. The court noted that the only possible le-
gitimate reason for the delay was that Johnson wanted yet another
new attorney—but merely for the purposes of creating a delay. Ac-
cordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the State.

As for the fourth factor—i.e., whether the delay is the fault of the
defendant—Johnson argues attributing the delay to him amounts
to punishing him for his financial circumstances. The State re-
sponds that he had had a reasonable time to hire an attorney of his
choice. It points out Johnson was charged in August 2010 and had
been granted three continuances and been appointed three attor-
neys before Dunn’s motion for continuance in April 2012. As early
as August 2011, Johnson expressed his desire to hire retained coun-
sel. However, after a hearing, the district court found no evidence
that an attorney was being hired at that time. It took Johnson 8 ad-
ditional months to obtain retained counsel. The delay was properly
attributed to Johnson. So this factor weighs in favor of the State.

Under the final factor—i.e., whether denial of a continuance
would prejudice the defendant—Jobnson argues the continu-
ance denial made Dunn withdraw and left him with Nichols who
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The State responds no
substantial rights were prejudiced by denial of Johnson’s fourth re-
quest for continuance and resetting to a fifth trial date. Indeed,
Dunn was not told he could not participate in the trial, but he nev-
ertheless chose to withdraw. Additionally, as analyzed below, John-
son has not demonstrated that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel at trial.

When we balance these Anthony factors, they easily support
denial of a continuance. This denial is bolstered by Anthony it-
self. There, 18 days before trial, Anthony retained counsel who
promptly sought a continuance though the case had been pending
for 6 months. Counsel explained the funds were not available to
retain him until shortly before trial, and he would need at least 2
months to prepare for trial. Anthony had already been granted one
continuance, and speedy trial rights would have demanded that
Anthony's case be severed from his codefendants. After listing the
factors from Kelm, 827 F.2d at 1322 n.2, the Anthony court found
no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance where (1) the
only reason for the continuance was to allow new counsel to enter
his appearance and (2) the district court made no attempt to re-
strain him from entering the case. 257 Kan. at 1019-20. Similarly,
in the instant case Dunn was not barred by the district court from
representing Johnson at trial.

Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by denying Johnson’s fourth motion for a trial continuance.

Issue 4: The district court did not err in denying Johnson's motion
for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

Johnson argues the district court abused its discretion by de-
nying his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of
counsel. Johnson claims his counsel was ineffective for: (1) spend-
ing a significant amount of time encouraging him to accept a plea
agreement, i.¢., apparently making him unprepared for trial; and
(2) mishandling evidence calling into question Griffin’s credibility.
The State denies counsel was ineffective. .

Standard of review

We use a well-known standard for reviewing alleged perfor-
mance errors by counsel: They present mixed questions of fact and
law. State v. Cheatham, 296 Kan. 417, 430, 292 P.3d 318 (2013).
Consequently, appellate courts review the underlying factual find-
ings for support by substantial competent evidence and the legal
conclusions based on those facts de novo. State v. Burnett, 300
Kan. 419, 452, 329 P.3d 1169 (2014).

951

“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must establish (1)
that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, which requires a show-
ing that counsel made errors so serious that his or her performance was less than
that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
(2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a
showing that counsel's errors were so severe as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial. Cheatham, 296 Kan. at 431.

“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance in a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel is highly deferential and requires consideration of all the evidence be-
fore the judge or jury. The reviewing court must strongly presume that counsel's
conduct fell within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance. Harris
v, State, 288 Kan, 414, 416, 204 P.3d 557 (2009). To establish prejudice, the defen-
dant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient perfor-
mance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Cheatham, 296 Kan. at 431.” Burnett, 300 Kan. at 452.

The district court denied Johnson’s request on both the perfor-
mance and prejudice prongs of his claim.

Discussion

At the outset, we observe that Johnson fails to provide any argu-
ment in his brief to support his claim that defense counsel Nichols
spent a significant amount of time before trial encouraging him to
accept a plea agreement. Accordingly, it is deemed abandoned. See
State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 355, 323 P.3d 853 (2014) (when a
litigant fails to adequately brief an issue it is deemed abandoned).

As for Johnson’s argument concerning the alleged mishandling
of evidence of Griffin’s credibility, we acknowledge that a counsel's
failure to impeach the credibility of a witness whose testimony is vi-
tal to the State’s case can prejudice the defendant and constitute in-
effective assistance. State v. Brooks, 297 Kan. 945, 952-54, 305 P.3d
634 (2013). But we also acknowledge that “[t]he decisions on what
witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination,
. ..and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive
province of the lawyer after consultation with his or her client.”
Bledsoe v. State, 283 Kan. 81, 92, 150 P.3d 868 (2007). “‘Strategic
choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant
to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.’” State v. Betan-
court, 301 Kan. 282, 311, 342 P.3d 916 (2015) (quoting Rowland v.

State, 289 Kan. 1076, 1083, 219 P.3d 1212 [2009]). And defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating that trial counsel's alleged defi-
ciencies were not the result of strategy. State v. Gleason, 277 Kan.
624, 644, 88 P.3d 218 (2004) (citing Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan.
428, 446, 78 P.3d 40 [2003]).

Johnson specifically asserts his counsel’s failure to introduce jail-

house recordings of his recent telephone conversations with Grif-
fin—where she stated the police only wanted to hear one version
of the events of August 21, 2010, i.¢., an untruthful version harm-
ul to Johnson—constitutes ineffective assistance. He contends the
State’s case hinged largely on Griffin as the only eyewitness, and
Nichols’ failure to introduce evidence “that directly dealt with Grif-
fin’s credibility is a deficient trial strategy.”
The State responds that the jury clearly knew Griffin's trial tes-
timony was inconsistent with her statements to police, her pre-
liminary hearing testimony, and her conversations with Johnson.
Among other things, it also points out that Nichols cross-examined
Griffin extensively about her phone calls with Johnson. The State
argues the phone calls could be interpreted as Johnson trying to
influence her testimony and Nichols’ opinion that the calls would
be harmful was a reasonable, strategic decision.

Review of the record demonstrates that only a brief exchange

from the recorded conversation on April 15, 2012, was quoted in
Johnson’s second supplemental motion for new trial:
“Luther: Were they trying to force you to say what they want you to say? Cerrina:
Yeah, pretty much. And I’m muthafuckin’ scared (unintelligible) if I could told
“em, I would of told ‘em a long muthafuckin’ time ago. (unintelligible) They just
want to hear what they want to hear, they don’t want to hear the truth. They want
me to tell ‘em what they want me to tell ‘em.” (Emphasis added.)

Neither the recorded conversations nor the entire transcripts are
in the record on appeal. See State v. Cervantes-Puentes, 297 Kan.
560, Syl. { 3, 303 P.3d 258 (2013) (party alleging a trial error has
the burden of designating a record that affirmatively shows preju-
dicial error). Johnson’s failure to provide the entire transcript or
recording on appeal clearly hinders this court’s analysis. See Glea-
son, 277 Kan. at 647 (on ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

953

letters introduced into evidence were not part of record on appeal,
and only portions of those letters were read into the record, two of
which are quoted in the opinion).

With this in mind, we observe that at the hearing on Johnson's

motion for new trial he testified about this conversation and Nich-
ols’ decision not to place its recording into evidence:
“[A]fter she [Griffin] said what she said, that I started going off, and he [Nichols]
didn’t want to present it to the jury, because it would make me look like a monster.
And I said, no, you should play it because they playing with my life. So whatever
I say afterwards, shouldn’t have nothing to do with you playing this tape. Because
anybody going to get mad if somebody is sitting there telling them that somebody
is forcing them to play with their life.”

Nichols indeed explained at the same hearing that he reviewed
all of the telephone conversations and concluded they would do
more harm than good to the defense. He testified there were other
instances during the conversations where it appeared Johnson was
trying to get individuals to say certain things, and Nichols did not
want that to come out at trial.

“Q: So the bottom line is you felt like it hurt him more than it would have helped
him?

“A: I did, because [Griffin] never would come out and say that he didn’t do this,
or that she had lied on the stand. It was just a point where she said that ‘Ev-
erybody wants me to say what they want that me to say.’ And he said, ‘What is
the truth, that I didn’t do this.’ And she simply hung up. He asked her, ‘Why
did you do that today.’ And she said, ‘I had to.’ I mean there was no clear
admission that she had lied or that she had been influenced or anything like
that. But on the other hand, there were other instances that it would appear
that Luther was trying to get other people [to] say certain things, and I did
not want that to come out in trial.” (Emphasis added.)

Nichols actually cross-examined Griffin about these conversa-
tions and highlighted her statements:

“Q. You said you have talked to Luther on the phone since this happened; is that
correct?

“A. Yes.

“Q. Have you talked to him as recently as Sunday?

“A. I'm not sure if it was Sunday, but it was here recently.

“Q. Okay. Did you ever tell him that the prosecutor didn’t want to hear the truth?

“A. I said nobody wants to hear the truth. Everybody wants me to say what they
want to hear and that’s what everybody want to hear.” (Emphasis added.)

954.

Further, during Nichols’ direct examination of Johnson, his cli-
ent’s testimony suggested Griffin was being forced to testify like the
prosecutor wanted:

“Q. Okay. And what has she told you about this case?

“A. That they told her they was going to charge her as accomplice if she didn’t tell
him what they—what she wanted to hear.

“Q. Okay. And when was the last time you talked to Cerrina about this case?

“A. Last night.

“Q. Okay. You call her or did she call you?

“A. No. I called her. I mean, well, she called my sister first, and my sister told me
what she told her—and she called my sister and told her that she had to say
what she said or they were going to charge her.

“MS. LIDTKE: Objection. Hearsay.

“THE COURT: Sustained. The jury will disregard the answer.”

Nichols’ decision not to introduce the telephone recordings
containing information potentially harmful to Johnson—while
still addressing Griffin’s credibility through other means—was a
sound strategic decision. We agree with the district court it thus
was not constitutionally deficient performance. See Boldridge v.
State, 289 Kan. 618, 637-39, 215 P.3d 585 (2009) (decision by coun-
sel for murder defendant to exclude evidence of domestic abuse
against her did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness; such evidence can be a double-edged sword). Even if we as-
sumed Nichols’ failure to introduce these recordings was deficient
performance, we also agree with the district court that Johnson is
unable to demonstrate constitutional prejudice, i.¢., a reasonable
probability exists the trial outcome would have been different. This
conclusion is based on (1) the fact the substance of the recorded
conversation was presented to the jury through other means and
(2) the great amount of evidence of Johnson’s guilt presented at
trial. See Burnett, 300 Kan. at 452.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in de-
nying the motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Issue 5: Because there are no errors, cumulative error did not pre-
vent Johnson from receiving a fair trial.

Johnson argues the cumulative effect of the errors he raised

955

above, even if independently harmless, deprived him of a fair trial.
But as the State argues, and our analysis confirms, no errors were
committed.

Standard of review

When considering the cumulative effect of errors, the reviewing
court has unlimited review. State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 1039, 1050,
329 P.3d 420 (2014).

Discussion

The test for cumulative error is “‘“‘whether the totality of cir-
cumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied the
defendant a fair trial. No prejudicial error may be found under
this cumulative effect rule, however, if the evidence is overwhelm-
ing against the defendant.’”’” Williams, 299 Kan. at 1050 (quoting
State v. Cruz, 297 Kan. 1048, 1073-74, 307 P.3d 199 [2013]).

Having rejected each Johnson claim of individual error, we nec-
essarily also reject his claim of cumulative error. See Williams, 299
Kan. at 1051 (“[T]here were no errors to accumulate, and {defen-
dant’s] claim of cumulative error must fail.”).

Issue 6: Johnson’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under
Apprendi v. New Jersey were not violated when his sentence was
increased based 6n prior criminal history.

Johnson argues the State failed to inchide his prior convictions
in the complaint or prove those convictions to a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477,
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). The State notes we have
previously rejected such claims. State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 45-48,
41 P.3d 781 (2002). ,

Standard of review

This court exercises unlimited review over the interpretation of
sentencing statutes and over constitutional questions generally. See
State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 494, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014); State v.
Hilt, 299 Kan. 176, 202, 322 P.3d 367 (2014).

956

Discussion

Johnson agrees with the State that this court has previously re-
jected his argument. See, ¢.g., Ivory, 273 Kan. at 45-48; see also
State v. Fisher, 304 Kan. 242, 264, 373 P.3d 781 (2016); State v.
Barber, 302 Kan. 367, 386, 353 P.3d 1108 (2015). Johnson merely
wishes to preserve this issue for federal review, and he offers no
new argument to persuade this court to overrule this precedent.
See Barber, 302 Kan. at 386.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court is affirmed.

No. 108,305
STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. MICHAEL STATEN, Appellant.

7

Michael P. Whalen, of Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, argued
the cause, and Rebecca L. Kurz, of The Kurz Law Office, LLC, of Mission, was on
the brief for appellant.

Jennifer 8. Tatum, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A.
Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on
the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Rosen, J.: Michael Staten was convicted by a jury of one count
of aggravated battery. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convic-
tion, and we granted review.

FACTS

Staten and Yvonne Williamson shared an apartment in Wyan-
dotte County. In the early morning of July 22, 2011, the two en-
gaged in an altercation that left Williamson severely injured. Wit-
nesses disagreed on the circumstances leading up to the altercation,
resulting in two distinct narratives, which, we set out below.

Williamson and other witnesses recalled the following sequence of
the events.

Williamson testified that on July 21, she got off work around
9 p.m. and went home to cook dinner. Staten was already home,
and they got into an argument. Williamson decided to leave and
walk to a nearby liquor store in order to keep the argument from
escalating. Upon returning home with her purchase, the argument

959

became more heated, and she again left, this time to visit a friend,
where she talked, watched television, drank some brandy, smoked
some marijuana, and consumed some cocaine.

Early the next morning, around 1:30 a.m., she returned to her
apartment, feeling anxious and anticipating a continued argument
with Staten. When she arrived, Staten was angry and had been
drinking. He told her to get her belongings and leave. She packed
her clothes, and he threw them out onto the back porch. While she
was putting her clothes in her car, he attempted to lock her out of
the house. He came outside about 20 minutes later and persuaded
her to return to the apartment.

Once inside, they began to argue again. Staten grabbed her keys,
and she called him a “bitch.” He hit her in the face with the keys,
and then he pulled her into the bathroom, where he began beating
her so hard that she started to bleed profusely. When he grabbed
her by the hair, she bit him in an attempt to make him release her,
and he put his arm around her neck in a chokehold. He informed
her that he was going to kill her and then turn himself in to authori-
ties in the morning. He finally released her when he got up to get
something, and she ran outside and shouted for help.

Staten followed her outside and started swinging a stick at her.
The stick had a nail protruding from one end. As she was trying to
protect herself from the blows, one of her knuckles was broken. Af-
ter he had hit her several times with the stick and his fist, she fell to
the ground. He continued to hit her and kick her and told her that
he would kill her, that she did not deserve to live, and that nobody
would want her when he was through with her. She lay still until an
ambulance arrived.

She was hospitalized for 4 days. In addition to receiving scars
and bruises, she suffered a puncture wound near her lung, and she
eventually received surgery for an injury to one eye. She denied
having threatened or attacked Staten and testified that she bit him
only after he grabbed her hair.

A neighbor, Emmanuel Rivera, testified that he was awakened
by his dog barking and looked out his apartment window to see
Staten “beating the crap out of a woman.” He reported that Staten
was hitting the woman so hard with a stick that the stick broke and

960

art of it flew away some distance. He saw Staten continue to hit
her with the broken stick, then kick her, and then drag her around
on the ground. In Rivera's opinion, it appeared that Staten was hit-
ting and kicking the woman so hard that he was trying to kill her.
Rivera shouted to him that he should stop or Rivera would call the
police. Staten hit the woman a few more times and then threw the
stick into a neighbor's yard. Rivera never saw the woman attack or
attempt to hit Staten; she lacked the strength to do that, and she
was unable to defend herself. While the woman screamed for help,
Staten called her a “whore” and told her he was going to kill her.
When emergency vehicles approached, Rivera saw Staten go back
inside.
Edward Miller, a neighbor and acquaintance of Staten and Wil-
liamson, spent the evening of July 22 hanging out with Staten and
a third man outside the apartment. They listened to music and
waited for Williamson to return home. Around midnight, the three
parted company and went into their respective apartments. Later,
Miller's fiancée woke him and told him he needed to go get Staten.
Going outside, Miller heard a lot of yelling and saw Williamson ly-
ing in the middle of the parking lot. She was bloody but speaking
in a normal voice. Staten was shouting that “she deserved it.” Mill-
er pulled Staten away from Williamson and tried to stay between
them. Staten went back inside his apartment, and Miller stayed
outside until the police and ambulance arrived.
Miller's fiancée, Nicole Vaughn, also witnessed some of the
events. After hearing some noise in the parking lot, she looked out
her apartment window and saw Staten with his hand raised as if he
was preparing to strike Williamson. She woke Miller up, ran down-
stairs, and called the police. Williamson was seated or lying “help-
less” on the ground, and Staten was standing over her. Vaughn saw
no aggressive behavior on Williamson’s part. Instead, she watched
Staten kick Williamson and hit her several times, either with his
fist or with a stick with a sharp object on the end. She also heard
Staten say, “[T]his bitch deserves to die.” After Staten returned to
his apartment, Vaughn walked over to Williamson, who was unrec-
ognizable because there was so much blood and because her hair
was matted to her head and her face was so swollen.

Staten testified to a different version of the events and subsequent
altercation.

On the evening of July 21, Staten saw another man escorting
Williamson home across the parking lot. When she arrived back in
the apartment, Staten and Williamson had a tense encounter, and
Williamson then left for several hours.

She returned to the apartment around 1:15 in the morning.
When she arrived, Staten was in the living room. She grabbed a
beer out of the refrigerator and walked into the bedroom. Staten
followed her, intending to ask about the earlier situation, but she
was on the telephone and he decided to wait. He told her they
could discuss the matter later in the morning, and she agreed, so
he returned to the front room to get ready for bed. He got in bed
around 1:25, while Williamson stayed up and played a computer
game.

Around 3 am., Williamson walked toward the kitchen and
kicked the futon mattress on which Staten was sleeping. Returning
from the kitchen, she told him that he did not have to worry about
her staying because she was leaving. He went into the bedroom
and saw that she had packed her clothes. He told her that packing
her clothes meant she was ready to leave, so he took two bags of
clothing and set them on the back porch, along with some of her
other belongings. When she went to see where he had put her be-
longings, he locked her out of the bedroom, hoping that some time
alone would defuse her antagonism.

When Staten heard Williamson putting things in her car, he
locked her out of the apartment because he was concerned that
she was agitated and confrontational. Then he went outside to talk
with her after she had calmed down. After they talked for about 20
minutes, he went around to the front to smoke a cigar while she
went back inside. He saw her take his keys and start to drop them
in her purse, at which time he grabbed the key chain and snatched
the keys out of her purse.

Williamson ran toward him, called him a “bitch,” and grabbed
his keys. Staten warned her that he would call the police, where-
upon Williamson grabbed his right hand and bit him on the right
ring finger. As she bit down, he grabbed her in a headlock in an

— 4

attempt to make her release his finger. After she finally let go, he
got up and went into the living room to get his cell phone to call the
police. While he was trying to unplug his phone from its charger,
Williamson ran up and hit him with a stick that they had been using
to hang laundry. She hit him on the head and in the face and chased
him out of the apartment.

They both tripped over a bicycle railing, and he wrestled the
stick away from her and hit her. She ran back toward him, so he hit
her again in order to protect himself. Williamson said she was going
to kill him, and he thought he was going to die. It was only after he
had struck her several times that she became subdued enough to
cease her attack, and he returned to the apartment.

The verdict and sentence

A jury found Staten guilty of one count of aggravated battery,
and he was sentenced to a standard term of 154 months and or-
dered to pay $27,000 in restitution. He took a timely appeal to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction. State v. Staten,
No. 108,305, 2015 WL 423644 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished
opinion). This court granted review with respect to all issues.

ANALYSIS
Jury instruction on burden of proof for self-defense

Staten first complains that the jury instructions failed to inform
the jury properly what the burden of proof was and who bore it. He
asserted a self-defense theory at trial. He contends that the district
court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
did not act in self-defense. While the district court gave a general
burden of proof instruction, it did not instruct specifically how the
reasonable-doubt standard should apply to the selfdefense instruc-
tion. Staten maintains that, despite his failure to object, this omis-
sion constituted reversible error.

When a party fails to object to or request a jury instruction, ap-
pellate review is limited to a determination of whether the instruc-
tion was clearly erroneous. Review under this standard consists of

963

two steps: first the appellate court determines whether the instruc-
tion as given was erroneous, that is to say, not legally and factually
appropriate, after an unlimited review of the record; and second,
if there was error, the appellate court will reverse only if it is firmly
convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict had
the instruction error not occurred. The party asserting a clearly
erroneous instruction maintains the burden of establishing the de-
gree of prejudice necessary to require reversal. State v. Knox, 301
Kan. 671, 680, 347 P.3d 656 (2015).

Staten argues that, in order to find him guilty, the jury had to be
instructed that the State bore the duty of proving beyond a reason-
able doubt that he did not act in self-defense.

Instruction No. 5 informed the jury of what the State was re-
quired to prove:

“The defendant is charged with the crime of aggravated battery. The defen-
dant pleads not guilty.

“To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:

“1, That the defendant intentionally caused great bodily harm to another per-
son; to wit: Yvonne Williamson; and.

“9, That this act occurred on or about the 22nd day of July, 2011, in Wyandotte
County, Kansas.”

Instruction No. 7, explaining the theory of self-defense, read:

“Defendant claims his use of force was permitted as self-defense.

“Defendant is permitted to use force against another person when and to the
extent that it appears to him and he reasonably believes such physical force is
necessary to defend himself against the other person’s imminent use of unlawful
force. Reasonable belief requires both a belief by defendant and the existence of
facts that would persuade a reasonable person to that belief.”

Instruction No. 9, relating to the State’s burden of proof, read:

“The State has the burden to prove the defendant is guilty. The defendant is
not required to prove he is not guilty. You must presume that he is not guilty un-
less you are convinced from the evidence that he is guilty.

“The test you must use in determining whether the defendant is guilty or not
guilty is this: If you have a reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims
required to be proved by the State, you must find the defendant not guilty. If you
have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the claims required to be proved
by the State, you should find the defendant guilty.”

964

Neither PIK Crim. 4th 51.050 (2013 Supp.) nor its substantially
similar predecessor, PIK Crim. 3d 52.08 (2008 Supp.), was given.
PIK Crim, 4th 51.050 (2013 Supp.) would have informed the jury:

“The defendant raises describe the defense claimed as a defense. Evidence in
support of this defense should be considered by you in determining whether the
State has met its burden of proving that the defendant is guilty. The State’s burden
of proof does not shift to the defendant.”

Staten did not propose this instruction to the court and did not
object to its omission.

Self-defense has been recognized in Kansas as a defense against
charges of battery for well over a century. In The State v. Newland,
27 Kan. 764 (1882), the court upheld the propriety of a jury instruc-
tion directing the jury that if the defendant “‘acted throughout only
in a self-defense which was necessary, or apparently necessary, to
avoid personal injury, then he should be acquitted.’” 27 Kan. at
768-69. The court determined that the remaining instructions ad-
equately informed the jury of matters such as the presumption of
innocence and questions of reasonable doubt. 27 Kan. at 767.

This court first considered the failure to instruct the jury under
PIK Crim. 2d 52.08 in the absence of an objection in State v. Os-
bey, 238 Kan. 280, 285-86, 710 P.2d 676 (1985). There, the court
held there was no error because the jury was instructed on defense
of a person, reasonable doubt, the burden of proof, the definitions
of the various legal terms relating to criminal intent, and the fact
that the State’s burden to prove such intent never shifts to the de-
fendant. “Error cannot be predicated on the refusal to give specific
instructions where those which were given cover and include the
substance of those refused.” 238 Kan. at 286.

Next, in State v. Crabtree, 248 Kan. 33, 805 P.2d 1 (1991), the
court applied a clear-error standard in analyzing whether the omis-
sion constituted reversible error. 248 Kan. at 39-40. The court
considered the instructions given as a whole, concluding that the
general burden of proof instruction sufficed to make it clear to the
jury that the defense relates to the State’s burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. 248 Kan. at 39-40. The court then added that
the evidence supporting the defense was vanishingly weak and that
consideration of the evidence, combined with the accuracy of the

965

instructions as a whole, did not lead to reversible error. 248 Kan.
at 40-41.

Then, in State v. Sperry, 267 Kan. 287, 978 P.2d 933 (1999), this
court was again confronted with a self-defense instruction given
without the clarifying 52.08 PIK instruction. The court applied a
standard of clear error because the defendant failed to object to
the omission of the 52.08 instruction on burden of proof. 267 Kan.
at 294. The court deemed the Crabtree language relating to the
wealmess of the defendant’s evidence to be dicta and not essential
to determining reversibility. Relying on Crabtree, the court con-
cluded that the instructions as a whole sufficed to cover the subject
of the burden of proof when a self-defense instruction is given. 267
Kan. at 294-95.

In State v. Cooperwood, 282 Kan. 572, 581-82, 147 pad 125
(2006), this court subsequently reaffirmed Crabtree, holding that
the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury with PIK Crim. 3d 52.08
was not clearly erroneous.

These cases were all decided under a statutory scheme that did
not explicitly refer to the burden of proof when the defendant as-
serts an affirmative defense. K.S.A. 21-3109 simply explained the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, as well as setting out rules for lesser included
offenses.

In 2010, the Kansas Legislature repealed 21-3109 and created
KS.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5108(c), which read, in relevant part:

“(c) A defendant is entitled to an instruction on every affirmative defense that
is supported by competent evidence. Competent evidence is that which could
allow a rational fact finder to reasonably conclude that the defense applies. Once
the defendant satisfies the burden of producing such evidence, the state has the
burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” L. 2010, ch, 136,
§8.

This amendment codified the caselaw requirement that, once a
defendant properly asserts a self-defense affirmative defense, the
State must disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Kansas Criminal Code Recodification Commission’s Final Report,
Appendix A, Section 21-31-301, Comment (2010). The amend-
ment did not alter the law in Kansas concerning the State’s burden

of proof, and it did not create a new element that the State must
prove when charging a crime. Statutory self-defense is a rebuttable
defense to certain crimes, as it was before the amendment. See,
e.g., State v. Henderson, 284 Kan. 267, 276, 160 P.3d 776 (2007)
(discussing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
158 L. Ed. 2d 177 [2004]); State v. Shore, No. 97,833, 2007 WL
4578005, at *1-4 (Kan. App. 2007) (unpublished opinion), rev. de-
nied 286 Kan. 1185 (2008).

The cases prior to the statutory amendinent read the instructions
as a whole and concluded that everything necessary for the jury to
consider the burden of proof was contained within the instructions.
We see no reason to change course from that line of cases.

Other jurisdictions have applied reasoning similar to our case
analysis. Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281, 285-86 (6th Cir. 1989) (in-
struction stating that burden of proving guilt is upon prosecution
throughout entire trial and that burden at no time shifts to defen-
dant sufficed to inform jury that State bore burden of establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt in light of defendant's self-defense
theory); United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1010-11 (7th Cir.
1978) (instructions informed jury of prosecution’s burden of proof
and evidence against self-defense claim so overwhelming that it
was “very unlikely that the burden of proof omission had any ef-
fect on the jury’s determination of this case”; therefore, no plain
error). See, e.g., Moore v. State, 275 Ind. 39, 42-43, 414 N.E.2
558 (1981) (jury correctly instructed ’on State’s burden to prove
all elements of crime beyond reasonable doubt; additional instruc-
tion dealing only with the burden of proof as to self-defense was
unnecessary); Woods v. State, 162 Ind. App. 316, 326, 319 N.E.2d
688 (1974) (instructions, taken as whole, sufficiently informed jury
of State’s burden of proof, even though instruction on self-defense
did not explicitly address State’s burden of proof beyond reasonable
doubt); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 714, 415 A.2d 830 (1980) (in
death-penalty appeal, court rejected claim that trial court’s failure
to instruct the jury clearly that burden was on State to prove he did
not act in self-defense constituted plain error, but separate instruc-
tion informed juxy that burden of proof remained “with the State
throughout the trial”; this instruction sufficed to ensure jury woul

967

assign proper burden of proof to self-defense claim); State v. Cook-
sey, 499 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Mo. 1973) (when instructions as whole
covered presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt of guilt, and
State’s burden to prove guilty beyond reasonable doubt, court not
required to give combined self-defense and burden-of-proof in-
struction); State v. Syed Tagi Shah, 134 Wis. 2d 246, 256-58, 397
N.W.2d 492 (1986) (reasonable jurors would interpret instructions
as whole and would apply to self-defense instruction other instruc-
tions governing presumption of innocence and State’s burden of
proof).

The failure to give the PIK instruction was error, but it was not
clear error. Instructions are clearly erroneous only when the re-
viewing court is firmly convinced that there is a real possibility that
the jury would have reached a different verdict in the absence of
the error. State v. Richardson, 290 Kan. 176, 178, 224 P.3d 553
(2010). In light of the generally correct nature of the instructions
as a whole as well as the nature of the evidence supporting Staten’s
claim of self-defense, we find no basis in the instructions to reverse
Staten’s conviction.

Prosecutorial misconduct

Staten next argues that, during closing argument, the prosecu-
tor engaged in misconduct that was of such a magnitude that it
requires reversal.

The prosecution opened its cross-examination of Staten with the
following exchange:

“Q: Would you agree with me that what she suffered was great bodily harm as a
result of this incident?

“A; And me defending myself, yes, ma’am.

“Q: So you acknowledge that she suffered great bodily harm?

“A: In defense of myself, yes.”

During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:

“All of these elements that I have to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt are
true. He said yes, it happened in Wyandotte County, and yes, I caused great bodily
harm to her. He gives you that, so he is guilty of aggravated battery as we stand
here.”

Staten did not object to the prosecutor's questions during cross-

=
examination. He is therefore precluded from arguing on appeal
that there was error in introducing that evidence to the jury. See
K.S.A. 60-404; State v. Sprague, 303 Kan. 418, 432-33, 362 P.3d
828 (2015).

He contends, however, that the prosecutor engaged in miscon-
duct during the closing argument by referring to the testimony ob-
tained by the cross-examination questions. He directs the court's
attention to State v. Crum, 286 Kan. 145, 184 P.3d 222 (2008).

In Crum, the prosecution on cross-examination elicited testimo-
ny from the defendant suggesting that the defendant agreed that
the murder in question was intentional and had been premeditated,
although the defendant denied being the perpetrator. Then, during
closing argument, the prosecution argued to the jury that it did not
have to prove premeditation because the defendant had conceded
that the murder method “‘sounds like a plan.’” 286 Kan. at 154.
We noted that the issue of premeditation was not undisputed
and the prosecutor's statement that he did not have to argue why
the facts established the element of premeditation exceeded the
wide latitude afforded to prosecutors in discussing the evidence.
The court then perceived the argument as “so fundamentally er-
roneous as to be gross and flagrant.” 286 Kan. at 154. Furthermore,
the combination of eliciting improper lay opinion testimony and
then characterizing the equivocal responses as a stipulation to an
element of the crime connoted ill will or “such misunderstanding
of basic legal principles as to be tantamount to ill will.” 286 Kan.
at 154-55.

The court nevertheless determined the evidence of guilt in the
case to be “overwhelming.” In addition, the prosecutor included
proper argument on how other facts supported premeditation, and
the question of premeditation was not a close call for the jury. The
critical issue for the jury was the identity of the perpetrator. The
court concluded the error was harmless. 286 Kan. at 155.

The testimony in the present case differed from that in Crum
in two important respects. First, the relevant facts before us now
were undisputed. It was not contested that Staten struck William-
son and that she experienced great bodily injury as a result. These

facts were not the fulcrum on which the success of Staten’s defense
rested. Staten’s own testimony on direct examination conceded that
narrative. Staten argued instead that his actions and Williamson's
injuries were provoked by her attack on him, and he did not waiver
from that theory on cross-examination. The prosecutor focused her
closing argument on Staten’s theory of self-defense. She acknowl-
edged the presumption of innocence that attaches to a defendant,
while also referring to evidence casting doubt on the elements of
self-defense. Furthermore, in Crum, the elicited testimony went
to the defendant's opinion regarding the perpetrator’s thoughts and
intent. Here, the elicited testimony was not speculative but was
explicit—the defendant struck the victim, causing her serious inju-
ries, but the actions were motivated by a legally justifiable intent.

The prosecutor nevertheless erroneously stated that “he’s ac-
lnowledged he’s guilty of this crime . . . .” The prosecutor thus
mischaracterized Staten’s testimony and referred to facts not in
evidence. Staten did not acknowledge that he was guilty; instead,
he testified that he was not guilty because he acted in self-defense.
The comments were therefore outside the wide latitude allowed a
prosecutor in discussing evidence. See Sprague, 303 Kan. at 427.

We nevertheless do not find the comments to rise to the level of
reversible misconduct. The prosecution maintained a focus on the
pivotal question of self-defense and did not show evidence of ill
will or flagrant disregard for the rules governing arguments. More-
over, the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature
that the error carried little weight. See Sprague, 303 Kan. at 427.
In light of the entire record, there is no reasonable possibility that
the error affected the verdict, and reversal is not appropriate. See
State v. Rosa, 304 Kan. 429, 439, 371 P.3d 915 (2016).

Request for new counsel

Staten next argues that the trial court abused its discretion both
in the manner in which it inquired about an alleged conflict of in-
terest as well as in denying his request for new counsel. Before
the trial commenced, Staten asked the court to provide him with
new counsel, alleging a conflict with his appointed counsel and a
breakdown of communication. On appeal, he contends that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion when it denied the motion.

970

A district court's refusal to appoint new counsel is reviewed un-
der an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Sappington, 285 Kan.
176, 196, 169 P.3d 1107 (2007). A court abuses judicial discretion
if its action is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on
an error of law; or (3) based on an error of fact. State v. Wells, 297
Kan. 741, 753-54, 305 P.3d 568 (2013). If the district court has a
reasonable basis to conclude that counsel could provide “ ‘effective
aid in the fair presentation of a defense,’” then it cannot be found
to be an abuse of discretion. Sappington, 285 Kan. at 196. The
defendant bears the burden of proving the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for new counsel. 285 Kan. at 196.

We recently provided an extensive framework for analyzing the
denials of requests for new counsel in State v. Pfannenstiel, 302
Kan. 747, 758-60, 357 B.3d 877 (2015).

The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution contains a correlative right to representation
that is unimpaired by conflicts of interest or divided loyalties. Con-
flicts of interest and divided loyalties can take many forms, and
whether an actual conflict exists is evaluated on the specific facts of
each case. In general, a conflict exists when an attorney is placed
in a situation conducive to divided loyalties and can include situ-
ations in which the caliber of an attorney’s services may be sub-
stantially diluted. In order to obtain substitute counsel because of
alleged lack of performance by current counsel, a defendant must
show justifiable dissatisfaction with his or her appointed counsel.
302 Kan. at 758-60.

The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a defendant the right
to select which attorney will represent the defendant. A defendant
seeking substitute counsel must show “ ‘justifiable dissatisfaction’”
with current counsel, which may be demonstrated by showing a
conflict of interest, an irreconcilable disagreement, or a complete
breakdown in communication between counsel and the defendant.
302 Kan. at 759-60.

Staten presented the district court with an articulated statement
of attorney dissatisfaction, which triggered a duty on the part of the
court to inquire into potential conflicts of interest.

This duty of inquiry may result in three types of errors, each of

971

which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 302 Kan. at 760. The
first type of error occurs when a district court becomes aware of a
potential conflict of interest but fails to conduct an inquiry. Such a
failure constitutes an error of law, that is, a failure to follow the law
and fulfill a legal duty. The second type of error occurs when a dis-
trict court conducts an inquiry but fails to do so in an appropriate
manner. An appropriate inquiry requires fully investigating both
the basis for the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel and the
facts necessary for determining whether the dissatisfaction justifies
appointing new counsel. The third type of error may occur when
a district court conducts an appropriate inquiry but fails to make a
decision that is reasonable in light of the facts that come to the fore.
302 Kan. at 761-62.

The morning of the trial, Staten’s counsel, Craig Lubow, in-
formed the court that Staten was submitting a motion for new
counsel. Lubow explained that Staten had at some earlier time filed
a disciplinary complaint against him, but the Disciplinary Admin-
istrator had dismissed it. The court then asked Staten for the basis
of his request. He replied with a series of complaints relating to the
validity of the arrest warrant, allegedly inconsistent statements by
one of the investigating detectives, failure to file motions regarding
those issues, and failure to communicate.

After hearing the argument, the trial court denied Staten’s mo-
tion, holding that he had failed to articulate justifiable dissatisfac-
tion. The court noted that the motions that Staten had filed with
respect to the arrest warrant and the detective were without merit.

The pro se motions to which Staten referred consisted of a mo-
tion to compel discovery, seeking transcripts of various recordings
and hearings for the purpose of helping him prepare a defense;
a motion to quash the arrest warrant, asserting that the arresting
detective used inconsistent statements of facts to support the issu-
ance of the warrant; and a motion for judgment of acquittal, based
on the allegations contained in the motion to quash. These motions
appear to have little bearing on the success of Staten’s defense, and
they were denied in any event. The failure of the attorney to file
the motions on Staten’s behalf did not dihite his ability to provide
effective representation.

972

The major point remaining in Staten’s request for new coun-
sel was the asserted breakdown of communication. Staten repre-
sented to the court that his attorney did not speak with him for
several months and only got in touch with him a couple of times
in the week before the trial. Staten did not, however, explain how
this limited communication worked adversely to the presentation
of his defense. ““The focus of the justifiable dissatisfaction inquiry
is the adequacy of counsel in the adversarial process, not the ac-
cused’s relationship with his attorney.” Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan. at
761-62 (quoting United States v. Baisden, 713 F.3d 450, 454 [8th
Cir. 2013]).

The statements made at the pretrial hearing showed that Stat-
en’s disciplinary complaint had been dismissed. It is unclear who
dismissed it—Staten, voluntarily, or the Disciplinary Administra-
tor, perhaps as a frivolous complaint. It is also unclear what the
basis of the complaint was, although the record suggests that the
complaint raised questions of communication.

In State v. Bryant, 285 Kan. 970, 992-93, 179 P.3d 1122 (2008),

we considered whether filing a disciplinary complaint in itself cre-
ates a conflict such that an attorney should be disqualified from
further representation of the client filing the complaint. We held
that the filing does not necessarily require a district court to replace
counsel:
“During the May 18 inquiry, although discussion was sparse on the nature of the
disciplinary complaint itself, the court leaned that the Disciplinary Administrator
had said there was nothing to investigate. Moreover, after discussion with Bryant
and McBratney on the nature of Bryant's overall concerns, the court stated that it
did not see any conflict requiring her removal. During the November 18 inquiry,
although similarly limited on the nature of the second disciplinary complaint itself,
the record reveals that the court gave Bryant opportunities to be heard. Several
times Judge Burdette asked Bryant to ‘give me something specific.’ And... there
is nothing in the record indicating what McBratney’s responses to the complaints
were, much less any indication that they ‘would be contrary’ to any position she
needed for defending Bryant.” 285 Kan. at 992-93.

A court is not required to engage in a detailed examination of
every nuance of a defendant's claim of inadequacy of defense and
contlict of interest. A single, open-ended question by the trial court
may suffice if it provides the defendant with the opportunity to

explain a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable disagreement, or an
inability to communicate with counsel. Wells, 207 Kan. at 755-56.

The district court allowed Staten to make two statements about
his dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel. While articulating
displeasure with Lubow, Staten did not proffer any specific manner
in which Lubow would be unable to present his theory of defense
or why some other theory might have been preferable. The court’s
inquiry sufficed to explore whether Staten’s right to counsel was in
jeopardy, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in deter-
mining that replacing Lubow was not necessary to protect Staten’s
right to a fair trial.

Cumulative error

Finally, Staten argues that the cumulative effect of various trial
errors was so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. When a party
argues that the cumulative impact of alleged errors is so great that
they result in an unfair trial, this court aggregates all errors and,
even if those errors individually would be considered harmless,
analyzes whether their cumulative effect is so great that they col-
lectively cannot be determined to be harmless. State v. King, 297
Kan. 955, 986, 305 P.3d 641 (2013). While we acknowledge that er-
ror occurred in the jury instructions and in the prosecutor's closing
argument, the cumulative effect was not so great as to have been
prejudicial to Staten’s defense or to require a new trial.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is affirmed, and the judgment
of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed.

eo

74,

No. 112,824

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. JAVIER R1zo, Appellant.
(377 3d 419)

August
Sarah Ellen Johnson, of Capital Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause
and was on the brief for appellant.

Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett,
district attomey, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief
for appellee. os

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Jounson, J.: Javier Rizo appeals his convictions for first-degree
felony murder, three counts of aggravated battery, fleeing or at-
tempting to elude a law enforcement officer, and battery. He ar-
gues the district court erred by: (1) failing to obtain a knowing and
voluntary trial waiver from him before allowing his case to proceed
as a bench trial on stipulations, and (2) denying his motion for a
departure sentence. We reject both arguments, affirm the jury trial
waiver and the life sentence for felony murder, and dismiss the
sentence departure claim.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

In the early morning hours of October 27, 2013, Rizo and his

girlfriend, Danielle Martinez, had an argument at a club in the Old
Town district of Wichita, Kansas. At approximately 1:15 a.m., Rizo
took Martinez’ minivan keys, prompting Martinez to tell Rizo he
could not drive her vehicle because he was drunk. Rizo responded
by grabbing Martinez around the neck and pushing her, causing
security personnel to remove Rizo from the club.
At approximately 2 a.m., two uniformed police officers in the
Old Town district learned of a parking lot disturbance. A witness
pointed the officers to Martinez’ minivan. The officers walked
toward the minivan, but it exited the parking lot. Rizo was driv-
ing the minivan, and he had three passengers with him, includ-
ing his brother, Tony Losey. The officers pursued the minivan in
their marked patrol car. Rizo led the officers on a high speed chase
within the city limits, during which he committed multiple traf-
fic violations, including exceeding the posted speed limits, at one
point accelerating to an estimated 80 to 90 miles per hour.

Rizo eventually crashed into a Suzuki automobile at an intersec-
tion. Rizo and Losey fled the collision scene. The two remaining
minivan passengers and the driver and passenger of the Suzuki,
Maria and Sergio Martinez, sustained injuries requiring hospital-
ization. Maria died at the hospital at 2:56 a.m.

The Wichita Police Department attempted to locate Rizo for

several weeks following these events. According to Rizo’s family,
Rizo left Kansas shortly after the collision. On January 5, 2014, law
enforcement found Rizo at a residence in Wichita, Kansas, and
took him into custody.
Rizo was later interviewed by Detective Paul Kimble. After be-
ing read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.
Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966), Rizo
explained that during the events in question, he was drunk and
most of the night was a blur. When Rizo saw the police lights, he
did not want to get his brother in trouble because the brother was
on probation, so Rizo kept driving. He said he did not see the Su-
zuli coming and did not remember the crash. After the crash, he
took off running and did not check on anyone’s wellbeing because
he was scared. He further explained that there was a warrant out
for his arrest and that he had just gotten out of jail.

The State charged Rizo with second-degree murder or, in the al-
ternative, first-degree felony murder for the death of Maria Marti-
nez; three counts of aggravated battery for the others injured in the
collision; fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer;
and battery of his girlfriend. The district court granted Rizo’s mo-
tion to suppress his pre-Miranda statements and denied his motion
to suppress his post-Miranda statements after a Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 84S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964), hearing. At
the preliminary hearing, the State presented DNA evidence plac-
ing Rizo in the driver's seat of the minivan. ;

When the parties could not reach a plea agreement, Rizo’s
counsel informed the State that Rizo wanted to waive his right to
a jury trial. In exchange for Rizo waiving this right and proceeding
on stipulated facts, the State agreed to dismiss another pending
criminal case against Rizo for felony fleeing and eluding, Sedgwick
County Case No. 13 CR 2514, which the State alleged Rizo com-
mitted a few weeks before the events leading to this case. If con-
victed in 13 CR 2514, Rizo’s criminal history score would increase
from a “D” to a “B,” which would increase the potential sentences
for the guidelines offenses in this case.

Before the district court, the parties discussed their negotiations.

Rizo’s counsel asserted that he would never let his client waive his
right to a jury trial unless the client was receiving a deal in exchange
for the stipulated facts and that, in this case, Rizo did not want to
put the victim’s family through a trial. After hearing from both par-
ties, the district court had a colloquy with Rizo about his decision
to waive his right to a jury trial. At one point, the district court
asked the State and defense counsel if there was anything else the
court needed to cover. Defense counsel informed the court, “No,
sir. He understands his rights, we have talked about it, this is what
he wants to do, and it’s beneficial to him.” The State asked the court
to clarify that the only right Rizo was waiving at that time was his
right to a jury trial before 12 citizens of the community. The court
then ensured that Rizo understood he was waiving his right to a
jury trial and wished to proceed “either with a bench trial or a trial
to me [the judge] on stipulated facts.”

Later that same day, the parties returned to the district court
and presented the court with a document entitled “Agreement to
Proceed to Trial on Stipulated Facts” (the stipulated facts agree-
ment) and a document entitled “Stipulation by the Parties” (the ad-
ditional stipulations). The stipulated facts agreement provided that
Rizo had previously made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
jury trial right; it informed the court of Rizo’s choices not to testify
in his own defense and to waive confrontation of the State’s wit-
nesses and evidence; it withdrew Rizo’s objection to the admission
of his post-Miranda statements; and it explained that Rizo agreed
to allow the court to accept as true the facts set forth in the ex-
hibits and stipulations agreed upon by the parties. The agreement
also clarified that if Rizo was convicted of any charges, both parties
were free to argue for any lawful sentence.

Pursuant to the stipulated facts agreement, the district court for-
mally dismissed the charges in 13 CR 2514. At the State’s request,
the district court held an on-the-record colloquy with Rizo regard-
ing his decision to proceed as set forth in the stipulated facts agree-
ment. The district court confirmed with Rizo that he had signed
the stipulated facts agreement and additional stipulations after
having ample time to consult with his counsel and obtain answers
to any questions he had. Rizo said it was his decision alone to sign
both documents.

The district court found Rizo guilty as charged on each count.
The district court denied Rizo’s motion for new trial or judgment
of acquittal, where Rizo argued insufficient evidence supported the
district court's verdict.

At sentencing, the district court denied Rizo’s motion for depar-
ture. The court dismissed the second-degree murder conviction
and sentenced Rizo to life in prison for first-degree felony mur-
der, 55 months for the primary count of aggravated battery, and
34 months for one of the additional counts of aggravated battery,
to run consecutive to the life sentence. The court also imposed 31
months for the remaining count of aggravated battery, 7 months
for fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, and
6 months for battery to run concurrently. Therefore, Rizo’s con-
trolling sentence was life imprisonment with 89 months’ imprison-
ment to run consecutive to the life sentence.

Rizo filed a timely appeal, over which this court has jurisdiction
under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3601(b) (off-grid crime; maximum
sentence of life imprisonment imposed).

TRIAL RIGHTS WAIVER

Rizo argues the district court did not obtain a knowing and vol-
untary trial waiver from him. He asserts that when he waived his
right to a jury trial, the district court failed to fully inform him of
all the rights he was waiving because, at that time, the parties had
not determined whether the trial would proceed as a bench trial
with evidence presented or a bench trial on stipulated facts. Before
considering the merits of Rizo’s claim, there is a threshold question
concerning preservation.

Issue Preservation

The State argues that this court should not consider Rizo’s claim
for the first time on appeal. In general, issues not raised before the
trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See, ¢.g.,
State v. Shadden, 290 Kan. 803, 813, 235 P.3d 436 (2010). However,
there are three recognized exceptions allowing an appellate court
to consider a constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal,
including when consideration of the issue is necessary to serve the

979

ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights. State
v. Anderson, 294 Kan. 450, 464-65, 276 P.3d 200 (2012).

Because preservation is a prudential rule, rather than a jurisdic-
tional bar, we have discretion to apply an exception to the general
tule. State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 369, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012). In
Frye, we rejected a bright-line rule that a jury trial waiver issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, reasoning “whether
the court has advised a defendant of his or her right to a jury trial

. should be one of the last to be denied the opportunity for ex-
ceptional treatment.” 204 Kan. at 370. Frye held the Court of Ap-
peals did not err in applying an exception to the preservation rule
where the district court made no effort to ascertain the validity of
a handwritten jury trial waiver and did not advise the defendant of
his right to a jury trial. 294 Kan. at 371.

In State v. Beaman, 295 Kan. 853, 856-62, 286 P.3d 876 (2012),
we likewise addressed a jury trial waiver issue for the first time on
appeal where defendant claimed he was confused during the dis-
trict court’s discussion about waiver, which the defendant argued
implicated the district court’s affirmative duty to ensure he fully
understood his right to a jury trial. Rizo’s claim is analogous to the
issue we reviewed in Beaman. He claims the district court's jury
trial waiver colloquy was inadequate to inform him of other trial
rights he would waive if he proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated
facts as opposed to a bench trial where evidence was presented.
While we ultimately disagree with his arguments, we will consider
the issue even though it is raised for the first time on appeal.

Standard of Review

“Whether a defendant waived the right to a jury trial is a factual question,
subject to analysis under a substantial competent evidence standard of review.
But when the facts of the district court’s determination to accept a jury trial waiver
are not disputed, the question whether the defendant voluntarily and knowingly
waived the jury trial right is slog inquiry subject to unlimited appellate review.”
Beaman, 205 Kan. at 858. .

Analysis

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
§§ 5 and 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights guarantee

a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial. See also K.S.A. 22-
3403(1) (“The defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the con-
sent of the court, may submit the trial of any felony to the court.
All other trials of felony cases shall be by jury.”); State v. Irving,
216 Kan. 588, 589, 533 P.2d 1225 (1975) (“The right of a criminal
defendant to be tried by a jury of his peers, rather than by the court
alone, is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice.’”) (quot-
ing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 491 [1968]). Although “[a] criminal defendant may waive
the fundamental right to a jury trial if the court and State agree
to the waiver,” such waivers are “strictly construed to ensure the
defendant has every opportunity to receive a fair and impartial trial
by jury.” Beaman, 295 Kan. at 858 (citing Irving, 216 Kan. at 589).

Therefore, the district court cannot accept a jury trial waiver
“‘unless the defendant, after being advised by the court of his right
to trial by jury, personally waives his right to trial by jury, either in
writing or in open court for the record.’” Irving, 216 Kan. at 589-90
(quoting American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice,
Trial by Jury, Section 1.2[b], p. 7). “The test for determining the
waiver’s validity is whether it was voluntarily made by a defendant
who knew and understood what he or she was doing. Whether that
test is satisfied depends upon the particular facts and circumstanc-
es in each case.” Beaman, 295 Kan. at 858.

Here, Rizo does not dispute that he waived his right to a jury tri-
al in open court. Further, he acknowledges that the district court’s
colloquy with him “arguably adequately constituted a waiver of []
Rizo’s right to trial by jury by informing him he was waiving the
right to have 12 people make a unanimous decision[.]” We agree
with that concession. The district court held a lengthy colloquy with
Rizo, where the court advised Rizo that he was waiving his right to
a jury trial, The following excerpt illustrates how the district court
advised Rizo of the right he was waiving:

“THE COURT: All right. And when you have—when you have a jury, the jury
is 12 people. And what happens with your situation is you go through a possible
panel by questioning them, trying to find their impartiality, trying to find their
neutrality on a case like this, and certain jurors are dismissed and you end up with
12.

“And you have a right to present your case to those 12 people. And those 12

people have to unanimously decide that you're guilty. If they don’t have unanim-
ity, if it is not unanimous, then they don’t come back with a guilty verdict on you.
‘That's in particular what you're giving up. Do you understand that. [sic]

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

“THE COURT: And is it still your desire to waive that trial to a jury and then
proceed either with a bench trial or a trial to me on stipulated facts?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”

Furthermore, in the stipulated facts agreement, Rizo acknowl-
edged his waiver:

“L. Defendant, having previously knowingly, intelligently, freely, and vohun-
tarily waived his right to a jury trial on all charges in the Information filed in this
case, now agrees to proceed to bench trial by stipulated facts.”

Rizo does not cite any autl
explain other trial rights to ad

ority requiring the district court to
efendant in order to obtain a know-

ing and voluntary jury trial waiver. Further, our caselaw has up-

held jury trial waivers even wl
the particulars surrounding t!

Lewis, 301 Kan. 349, 377-78, 344 P.3d 928 (2015) (holding jury trial

waiver valid although district
his attorney’s ability to make cl
476 U.S. 79, 88-89, 106 S. Ct.
man, 295 Kan. at 859, 862 (ho

en the district court fails to explain
e right to a jury trial. See State v.

court did not inform defendant of
hallenges under Batson v. Kentucky,
1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 [1986]); Bea-
ding jury trial waiver valid although

the district court did not explain that a 12-person jury would need
to unanimously agree on guilt); State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328,
340-41, 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (holding jury trial waiver valid although
district court did not inform defendant of right to unanimous ver-
dict); see also State v. Savage, No. 112,882, 2015 WL 8590269,
at *5-7 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion) (holding jury trial
waiver valid despite defendant’s argument that district court faile:
to clearly distinguish between jury trial, bench trial, and the use
of stipulated facts). Certainly, then, we are satisfied that under the
facts and circumstances in this case, Rizo’s jury trial waiver was
knowing and voluntary.

Rizo, however, argues that the jury trial waiver colloquy was in-
adequate to inform him of the other trial rights he would waive if
he proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts as opposed to a
bench trial where evidence was presented. Rizo argues the district

court failed to advise him that by proceeding on stipulated facts, he
waived the right to cross-examine witnesses, compel the appear-
ance of favorable witnesses, appeal adverse evidentiary rulings, and
appeal an alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.

Rizo’s first, and most glaring, hurdle is that his argument does
not comport with the evidence in the record. Before the case pro-
ceeded on stipulated facts, the State and the defense presented the
district court with the stipulated facts agreement, signed by Rizo,
which specifically provided:

“2, As part of this agreement, defendant informs the Court of his choice not
to testify in his own defense, to waive confrontation of the State’s witnesses and
evidence, and to allow the Court to accept as true the facts set forth in the follow-
ing exhibits an stipulations]

“Defendant specifically withdraws any objection to the Court’s admission
and consideration of his post-Miranda statements[.]”

At the State’s request, the district court held a colloquy with Rizo

about the stipulated facts agreement and additional stipulations.
Pointedly, Rizo’s brief fails to acknowledge or discuss this colloquy.
At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that we should con-
sider the district court's verbal exchange with Rizo, in addition to
the submitted written documents, when determining the adequacy
f the district court’s actions. But counsel nevertheless maintains
hat the district coutt’s actions were insufficient to ensure Rizo un-
lerstood the rights he was waiving. We disagree.
Before allowing the trial to proceed under the stipulated facts
agreement, the district court judge came off the bench and talked
with Rizo. The judge confirmed that Rizo had, in fact, signed both
the stipulated facts agreement arid the additional stipulations; that
Rizo had ample time to consult with his counsel and obtain answers
to any questions he had; and that it was Rizo’s own decision to sign
both documents. Rizo cites no authority to support his claim that
his rights were insufficiently protected by the district court, and we
find that argument to be unsupported and unpersuasive.

This court’s holding in White v. State, 222 Kan. 709, 568 P.2d
112 (1977), undermines Rizo’s theory. The White court clarified
that a bench trial on stipulated facts is not the same as a guilty

Qahe

983

plea and does not require the district court to employ the K.S.A.
22-3210 procedure for accepting a guilty plea. 222 Kan. at 712-
13. “We know of no case or statute holding that a trial court must
interrogate and advise a defendant, who is represented by coun-
sel, before accepting and approving stipulations as to the evidence,
and we are not prepared to initiate such a requirement.” 222 Kan.
at 713. Here, the district court did, in fact, interrogate and advise
Rizo, i.e., the trial judge went above and beyond what was required
by law. Moreover, this court has confirmed “‘that the accused may
waive his right to cross examination and confrontation and that the
waiver of this right may be accomplished by the accused’s counsel
as a matter of trial tactics or strategy.’” State v. Kinnell, 197 Kan.
456, 461, 419 P.2d 870 (1966) (quoting Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d
282, 286 [9th Cir. 1965]); see also State v. Laturner, 289 Kan. 727,
739, 218 P.3d 23 (2009) (“[T]he right of confrontation ‘falls into
the class of rights that defense counsel can waive through strategic
decisions, such as choosing whether and how to conduct cross-ex-
amination or by stipulating to the admission of evidence. [Citation
omitted.|’”) (quoting Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662,
669 [Colo. 2007]).

In sum, we hold that the district court in this case obtained a
knowing and voluntary jury trial waiver from Rizo and that it did
not err in allowing his case to proceed under the stipulated facts
agreement.

MOTION FOR DEPARTURE SENTENCE

Rizo argues that no reasonable person could agree with the dis-
trict court’s denial of his request for a departure. As the person
alleging an abuse of discretion, Rizo bears the burden of showing
such an abuse. See State v. Heywood, 245 Kan. 615, 621, 783 P.2d
890 (1989). .

In his brief, Rizo argued for a departure from his felony-mur-
der life sentence. But at oral argument, Rizo’s counsel conceded
that no legal authority allowed the district court to depart from his
life sentence. This concession is in line with our recent decision
in State v. Nguyen, 304 Kan. 420, Syl. J 2, 372 P.3d 1142 (2016),
where we held that “K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6806(c) does not give

district courts discretion to depart from a'life sentence for felony
murder.” Therefore, the district court’s refusal to depart from the
life sentence for felony murder is affirmed.

Because of that legal deficiency, counsel attempted to pivot and
to transform Rizo’s claim into a challenge to the district court’s re-
fusal to depart from the on-grid sentences. But that tack runs head-
on into a jurisdictional barrier.

Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which we
have unlimited review. State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, 1147, 221
P.3d 1105 (2009).

The revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A.
2015 Supp. 21-6801 et seq., defines a defendant's right to appeal
from his or her sentence. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6820(c)(1) provides
that “the appellate court shall not review: (1) Any sentence that is
within the presumptive sentence for the crime.” The KSGA defines
“presumptive sentence’” as “the sentence provided in a grid block
for an offender classified in that grid block by the combined ef-
fect of the crime severity ranking of the offender’s current crime of
conviction and the offender's criminal history.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-6803(q). Consequently, with respect to Rizo’s sentences that are
lerived from the KSGA grid there is no appellate jurisdiction.

We do note that on one of the counts Rizo was sentenced to
the aggravated number in the applicable grid block. State v. Ross,
295 Kan. 1126, 1135-36, 289 P.3d 76 (2012), found that this court
lacked jurisdiction to consider a similar scenario. There, we stated
that “‘[ujnder K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1), an appellate court is without
jurisdiction to consider a challenge to a presumptive sentence, even
if that sentence is to the highest term in a presumptive grid block.’”
295 Kan. at 1135 (quoting State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, Syl. { 6,
190 P.3d 207 [2008]); see also State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831, 835,
247 P.3d 1043 (2011) (“Merely moving for a departure sentence
does not grant the right of appeal to a defendant, if the result of the
motion is a presumptive sentence.”). Although Ross additionally
held that this court has jurisdiction to consider whether the district
court abused its discretion in running his felony-murder sentence
consecutive to his grid sentence, 295 Kan. at 1136-38, Rizo does
not make that argument; therefore, it is deemed waived and aban-

985

doned. See Cooke v. Gillespie, 285 Kan. 748, 758, 176 P.3d 144
(2008) (“an issue not briefed is deemed waived or abandoned”).

In short, this court has no jurisdiction to consider Rizo’s depar-
ture issue and that claim must be dismissed.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

986

No. 108,550

STATE OF Kansas, Appellee, v. GREGORY VINCENT KEENAN,
Appellant.
(877 B3d 439)

Courtney T. Henderson, of Billam & Henderson, LLC, of Olathe, argued the
cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen
M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him
on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BEIER, J.: Defendant Gregory Vincent Keenan challenges the
denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained when officers
entered his home without a search warrant.

The district court judge denied Keenan’s motion based on what
he described as the existence of reasonable suspicion to conduct
an investigation of drunk driving and exigent circumstances. The

987

Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that probable cause
to arrest Keenan for violation of a protection from abuse order
(PFA) and for drunk driving existed before the officers entered the
house and that exigent circumstances—the possible loss, destruc-
tion, or concealment of evidence and the doctrine of hot pursuit—
supported the warrantless entry. State v. Keenan, 50 Kan. App. 2d
358, 365, 371-73, 325 P.3d 1192 (2014).

We also affirm the district judge’s decision, although our reason-
ing for doing so differs somewhat from that of the district judge
and the Court of Appeals panel. We agree with the Court of Ap-
.peals that, based on the undisputed facts before the district court
at the time of the suppression hearing, the officers had probable
cause to arrest Keenan for driving under the influence before they
entered his home. In addition, even if the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution should have prevented the officers
from following Keenan into his home to effect the arrest, any evi-
dence gathered and admitted at trial as a result of the entry was
superfluous; it would not have affected the ultimate outcome in
Keenan’s case. See ‘State v. Thomas, 302 Kan. 440, 451, 353 P3d
1134 (2015) (court need not determine whether un-Mirandized
statements could be used in search warrant affidavit when affidavit
already contained evidence sufficient to support finding of prob-
able cause). In other words, even if there was error, an issue we do
not decide today, the error was not reversible.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 23, 2010, Julie Hynes agreed to babysit her
4-year-old grandson overnight. About 11 p.m., Keenan, the boy’s
father, unexpectedly came into Hynes’ residence. He was acting
“bizarre,” according to Hynes—speaking nonsensically, slurring his
speech, stumbling, and swaying. He also smelled of alcohol. He
picked up the sleeping boy and stumbled while carrying him out
to his vehicle. It was sleeting outside, and Hynes was concerned
about the weather. She thought Keenan was returning the boy to
her daughter's residence a couple of blocks:away; but Keenan said
he was going home to Lenexa. When Keenan drove away, Hynes
called Platte County, Missouri, law enforcement and was subse-
quently connected with the Lenexa Police Department.

Lenexa Police Officer Betsy MadI was dispatched to Keenan's
residence, based on a call that he was driving while intoxicated with
his 4-year-old son in the car. Dispatch also advised her that a com-
plaint had been made earlier that day about Keenan’s alleged viola-
tion of a PFA order. Madl parked in front of Keenan’s home and
observed a vehicle matching the description she had been given
drive up the road and pull into Keenan’s driveway. Madl did not
observe any signs of driver impairment while watching the vehicle.
Keenan then got out of the vehicle and retrieved his son. Mad ap-
proached and asked if she could speak with Keenan. Keenan asked
if he could take his son inside. Mad] smelled a strong odor of al-
cohol on Keenan, and she saw him stumble while carrying the boy
toward the home.

Officer Jason Hinkle arrived at Keenan’s home and observed
Mad speaking with Keenan. Hinkle heard Keenan ask if he could
go inside to put his son down, and the officers allowed him to do so.
Hinkle asked for permission to follow Keenan into the house, but
Keenan said, “No.” The officers followed Keenan inside anyway.

At a later preliminary hearing, Hinkle would provide two rea-
sons for entering the home despite Keenan’s refusal of permission.
First, Hinkle believed that exigent circumstances existed because
Keenan could destroy or manipulate the evidence, i.c., the amount
of alcohol in his body. Second, while en route to the residence,
Hinkle had been told that Keenan had violated a protection order
involving another party. Hinkle had read about three-quarters of a
report on that issue before arriving at Keenan’s residence, and he
believed there to be probable cause to arrest Keenan for violation
of the order.

The officers followed Keenan down a hallway inside the home
and observed him stumble again on his way to a bedroom where
he lay his son down. Keenan was speaking on his phone, and he
ignored multiple requests from the officers to hang up. The officers
observed that Keenan had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes, and
they smelled an overwhelming odor of alcohol. Keenan stumbled
several more times and had difficulty communicating. He refused
to perform field sobriety tests, and he was placed under arrest for
DUI.

989

Hinkle offered Keenan an opportunity to make arrangements
for his son, and Keenan went into the kitchen to plug in his cell
phone. Hinkle told Keenan to stay out of the kitchen because a
12-inch butcher knife was on the counter. Keenan told them to
stop being paranoid and continued on. Hinkle grabbed Keenan by
the collar, and Keenan stated: “‘I’'m fucking Jersey, baby. I’ve taken
care of more cops than you'll know.’” Keenan was then handcuffed.
He refused to take a breath test. A subsequent search of his ve-
hicle revealed a half-empty bottle of whiskey, a bottle cap, and full
bottles of beer. Later that evening, officers learned that the PFA
order was no longer valid.

Keenan was charged with felony DUI as a three-time offender,
refusing a preliminary breath test, and transporting an open con-
tainer. He was bound over after the preliminary hearing, in which
Hynes and the officers testified. He pleaded not guilty to all three
charges.

Keenan then filed his motion to suppress. The motion is not in
the record on appeal. The State’s written response and oral argu-
ment at the hearing on the motion asserted that exigent circum-
stances justified the officers’ entry into Keenan’s home and that
officers needed to ensure as part of their DUI investigation that
Keenan did not drink alcohol once inside. The State also argued
that Miranda warnings were unnecessary because the officers’
juestions were part of an investigatory interrogation and that the
officers had probable cause to arrest Keenan for DUI because of
their observations of his impairment. The defense argued that,
even if Hinkle believed he had probable cause to arrest Keenan for
a violation of the PFA order, a warrant would be necessary to make
such an arrest in a residence, absent exigent circumstances. The
defense attempted to discount the significance of the officers’ reli-
ance on their DUI investigation, saying that the officers had “ab-
solutely zero instances with any kind of DUI issues until they got
in the house.” The State-disagreed, pointing to MadI’s testimony
about odor and stumbling before Keenan went inside.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district judge
ruled that a recording of the arrest would need to be redacted to
eliminate statements obtained from Keenan in violation of his Mi-
randa rights. He also ruled:

“Considering the evidence having been presented and your arguments, it is
my finding that the police under exigent circumstances had the duty to enter the
home and conduct a DUI investigation, certainly a reasonable suspicion to do so.
Upon entering the home, more facts were made known which ultimately led to
Mr. Keenan’s arrest for DUI.

“But as to the first part of the argument that the police should not have entered
the residence without a search warrant, I overrule that point. I think the police
acted appropriately in entering the home at the time that they did.” (Emphasis
added.)

At a subsequent hearing concerning the planned redaction of
the recording, defense counsel said that the district judge previous-
ly had made “it clear there was probable cause to go in the house
without [a] search warrant.” The district judge corrected defense
counsel, saying: “Exigent circumstances.”

When Keenan's case came to trial, defense counsel objected
to the admission of the recording of the officers’ encounter with
Keenan and of the alcohol bottles found in Keenan’s vehicle. Coun-
sel asserted that the bottles were found in an unlawful search of
Keenan’s vehicle incident to his arrest; that the search of the house
was illegal; and that any testimony arising from the unlawful police
conduct should be inadmissible. The district judge adhered to the
pretrial rulings and admitted the exhibits.

Keenan was ultimately convicted of felony DUI and transport-
ing an open container. He also was fined for refusing the prelimi-
nary breath test.

When Keenan challenged the district judge’s suppression ruling
before the Court of Appeals, the panel first ruled that, based on all
of the evidence available to the officers, they had more than the
mere reasonable suspicion upon which the district judge had relied
to rule in the State’s favor. The panel held that the officers had
probable cause to arrest Keenan, both for violating a PFA and for
driving under the influence before they’ entered Keenan’s home.
Keenan, 50 Kan. App. 2d at 364-66.

The panel next addressed whether either exigent circumstances,
specifically, such as the potential for loss, destruction, or conceal-
ment of evidence or the doctrine of hot pursuit justified the of-
ficers’ warrantless entry into Keenan’s home. It determined that a

991

violation of a PFA and a DUI were not minor, nonjailable offenses;
and thus Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 782 (1984), did not preclude a warrantless entry. 50 Kan.
App. 2d at 368.

The panel next rejected Keenan’s argument that law enforce-
ment’s mere speculation that Keenan would drink additional alco-
hol, coupled with a lack of a particularized finding of exigent cir-
cumstances by the district judge, doomed the State’s reliance on
State v. Dugan, 47 Kan. App. 2d 582, 588-89, 276 P.3d 819 (2012)
(probable cause must be coupled with particularized, exigent cir-
cumstances to allow warrantless entry of a private residence). 50
Kan. App. 2d at 368-69, The panel listed five factors set out in Du-
gan for evaluation of whether exigent circumstances exist:

“‘(1) The time needed to secure a search warrant; (2) the reasonableness of the
officers’ belief the evidence may be immediately lost; (3) potential danger to the
officers guarding the site while awaiting a warrant; (4) whether those persons with
possession of the evidence are aware of the officers’ presence; and (5) the ease
with which the evidence might be destroyed or hidden.’” 50 Kan. App. 2d at 369
(quoting Dugan, 47 Kan. App. 2d at 605 [citing United States v. Moses, 540 F:3d
263, 270 [4th Cir. 2008]; United States v. Vega, 22.1 F.3d 789, 800 [5th Cir. 2000).

In the panel's view, the situation at the threshold of Keenan’s home
met four of the five factors, all but the third focused on danger to
the officers guarding the site while a warrant is obtained. 50 Kan.
App. 2d at 369,

The panel then noted that Kansas had little authority on wheth-
er the potential for increase or dissipation of alcohol in a suspect's
blood constituted exigent circumstances. It also observed that cases
from other jurisdictions are split. See 50 Kan. App. 2d at 370 (citing
and discussing People v. Thompson, 38 Cal. 4th 811, 825, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 750, 135 P.3d 3 [2006] [dissipation may constitute exigent
circumstance under particular facts]; People v. Wehmas, 246 P.3d
642, 644 [Colo. 2010] [dissipation insufficient to show exigency];
State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 772 [Iowa 2001] [compromise of
blood-alcohol evidence establishes exigency]; City of Kirksville v.
Guffey, 740 S.W.2d 227, 228-29 [Mo. App. 1987], cert. denied 485
U.S. 1035 [1988] [permissible for officer to block closing garage
door to apprehend DUI suspect in home; need to prevent altera-

992

tion of blood-alcohol evidence justified entry into suspect’s home]);
State v. Larson, 266 Wis. 2d 236, 251, 668 N.W.2d 338 [Wis. App.
2003] [loss of blood-alcohol evidence not exigency]. In this relative
legal vacuum, the panel concluded that the totality of the circum-
stances in this case demonstrated a potential for loss of evidence
that was serious enough to qualify as an exigent circumstance jus-
tifying the officers’ entry into Keenan’s home. 50 Kan. App. 2d at
371.

The panel also sided with the prosecution on the applicability of

the doctrine of hot pursuit:
“The officers’ contact with Keenan reflects their control of the stop. Although the
officers had not arrested Keenan, by Keenan asking permission to enter his own
house, Keenan submitted to the officers’ authority and control of his movement
and recognized he was restricted by their presence,

“... [Thhe officers had two choices—keep Keenan out of his house or allow
him to enter the house to put his child to bed. They chose to protect the child's
welfare but kept Keenan under their control by following him into the house.
Keenan was using his need to put his son to bed as a reason to keep moving to-
ward the house and avoid the officers. The fact Keenan was trying to retreat into
his house, particularly in light of his request to put his young son to bed, does not
protect him from an arrest that was ‘set in motion in a public place.’ See [United
States v.] Santana, 427 U.S. [38,] 43, [96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976)].

“Keenan first encountered Madl outside his house, and while the pursuit may
not have been the equivalent of an action movie, the United States Supreme
Court has still deemed the short trip from the doorway of a house to the interior
to qualify as hot pursuit. 427 U.S. at 42-43.” 50 Kan. App. 2d at 372-73.

In its ultimate conclusion, the panel cautioned that its decision
was narrowly limited to the facts of this case. It said it was “not
establishing a bright-line rule to approve the warrantless entry into
the house of a driver suspected of being under the influence of
alcohol.” 50 Kan. App. 2d at 373.

PRESERVATION

The State argued before the Court of Appeals and again before
us at oral argument that Keenan has an issue preservation problem
on his challenge to the denial of suppression. The State did not
cross-petition for review on the preservation issue, even though
the Court of Appeals rejected its argument that Keenan’s late trial
objection was insufficient. 50 Kan. App. 2d at 363.

993

Supreme Court Rule 8.03(h)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 81)
states that “issues before the Supreme Court include all issues
properly before the Court of Appeals which the petition for review
or cross-petition allege were decided erroneously by the Court of
Appeals.” Because the State did not cross-petition to challenge the
Court of Appeals’ preservation ruling in favor of Keenan, we will
not consider whether the panel erred on this point.

SUPPRESSION

“When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to sup-
press, we bifurcate our analysis, first assessing whether the factual
findings below are supported by substantial competent evidence
and then applying a de novo standard to the ultimate legal conclu-
sion to be drawn from those facts.” State v. Aguirre, 301 Kan. 950,
954-55, 349 P.3d 1245 (2015). The defendant carries the burden of
establishing the facts necessary to support his or her suppression
motion in the district court. State v. Estrada-Vital, 302 Kan. 549,
557, 356 P.3d 1058 (2015). However, the State bears the burden of
proving the lawfulness of a search and seizure. State v. Thompson,
284 Kan. 763, 772, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007).

“When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first
among equals. It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law
that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are pre-
sumptively unreasonable.” State v. Talkington, 301 Kan. 453, Syl.
15, 345 P.3d 258 (2015). “Except in carefully circumscribed situ-
ations, law enforcement officers, then, violate the Fourth Amend-
ment if they enter a dwelling without either a search warrant for
the premises or an arrest warrant for a resident they reasonably
believe will be found there.” Dugan, 47 Kan. App. 2d at 588 (citing
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 748-49).

“Kansas recognizes various exceptions permitting warrantless
entries or searches: consent; search incident to lawful arrest; stop
and frisk; probable cause to search accompanied by exigent cir-
cumstances, of which hot pursuit is one example; emergency aid;
inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of
closely regulated businesses.” State v. Neighbors, 299 Kan. 234,
239, 328 P.3d 1081 (2014). And the United States Supreme Court

=
has recognized that entry into a house without a warrant can pass
muster under the Fourth Amendment when an officer possesses
probable cause of criminal activity and exigent circumstances exist.
See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S, 551, 559, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L.
Ed. 2d 1068 (2004).

We first address the panel's determination that there was prob-
able cause to arrest Keenan by the time he entered his home. This
determination does not require a rigid application of factors. Sloop
v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 296 Kan. 13, 20, 290 P.3d 555 (2012).
Rather, it looks to the totality of the circumstances, as viewed
through the lens of an objectively reasonable police officer. State v.
Ramirez, 278 Kan. 402, 407, 100 P.3d 94 (2004).

The probable cause necessary to justify a warrantless arrest is
“‘a reasonable ground for belief of guilt; and this means less than evidence which
would justify condemnation of conviction; probable cause exists where the facts
and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer making the arrest or
search, and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense
has been or is being committed. [Citation omitted.” State o. Fewell, 286 Kan.
370, 377, 184 P.3d 903 (2008) (quoting State v. Hays, 221 Kan. 126, Syl. 1, 557
P2d 1275 [1976]).

The record supports Keenan’s contention that the district court
judge erred in applying the wrong legal standard—evaluating the
facts for the existence of reasonable suspicion rather than the more
demanding probable cause. Reasonable suspicion is a much lower
standard than probable cause and may be established with less reli-
able information. State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 735, 952 P.2d
1276 (1998). However, we agree with the Court of Appeals panel
that probable cause to arrest nevertheless existed. Keenan, 50 Kan.
App. 2d at 365-66; see Sloop, 296 Kan. at 22 (Supreme Court may
decide probable cause question on undisputed facts in DUI case
despite failure to analyze in district court).

Although Madl saw Keenan commit no traffic infractions, she
and Hinkle responded to Keenan’s home based on Hynes’ tele-
phone tip reporting that Keenan was driving home drunk and had
his son with him. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-14, 84
S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964) (use of informants can be

an acceptable method of establishing probable cause). “[P]robable

cause can be based solely on information from a reliable, credible
informant.” United States v. Long, 774 F.3d 653, 660 (10th Cir.
2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 2068 (2015). Probable cause for a
warrantless law enforcement action may rely upon information re-
ceived through an informant, rather than upon an officer's direct
observation, “‘“so long as the informant's statement is reasonabl
corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge.”
[United States v. Mathis,] 357 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2004
(quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 80 S. Ct. 725,
L. Ed. 2d 697 [1960]).” Long, 774 F.3d at 659.

All of the particulars of Hynes’ tip were corroborated by the offi-
cers’ personal, direct observations. Keenan was driving the vehicle
described; he arrived at his home when expected; his son was with
him; Keenan smelled of alcohol; and he stumbled while carrying
his son. See State v. Slater, 267 Kan. 694, 703, 986 P.2d 1038 (1999)
(“An officer may corroborate the tip by observing illegal activity or
by finding the person and vehicle and the location as substantially
described by the informant.”). These observations combined with
the detailed tip from identified informant Hynes supplied sub-
stantial competent evidence to support probable cause to arrest
Keenan for DUI.

Ordinarily, we would next turn to the question of the existence
of exigent circumstances, the question on which the parties have
concentrated their efforts during the proceedings on petition for
review. Indeed, when Keenan’s petition for review was granted,
this court anticipated that this case would provide an opportunity
to fill in the blanks the Court of Appeals noted in Kansas law on
the exigencies that may arise because of the changeable nature of
blood-alcohol evidence in DUI prosecutions. But, on closer exami-
nation, we have determined that this case cannot bear the weight
intended for it.

Even if we were to conclude that Keenan was correct and there
were no exigent circumstances to justify the officers’ entry into
his home, meaning all evidence obtained as a result of that entry
should have been suppressed, the district judge’s error would be
examined on appeal for harmlessness. See State v. James, 301 Kan.

AS

898, 910, 349 P.3d 457 (2015) (where case turns on Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, constitutional error may be declared harmless when
party benefitting from error demonstrates beyond a reasonable
doubt that error did not affect outcome of trial in light of the entire
record). After reviewing the entire record here, we are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the additional, largely cumulative
evidence obtained as a result of the officers’ entry into Keenan's
home and later search of his vehicle did not affect the outcome of
his trial. Before the entry, the officers were acting on a highly reli-
able tip from a known informant who personally observed Keenan
display multiple signs of intoxication and yet place his son in his
vehicle to drive him to his home. The officers corroborated every
aspect of this tip with their own observations. They had probable
cause to arrest and could have arrested Keenan for DUI without a
warrant at this point. Instead, they behaved in a calm and humane
way, allowing Keenan to put his young son inside and out of the
sleet late at night. They then appropriately effected the arrest they
could have made moments before on the other side of the home’s
exterior door.

Under these circumstances, we need not reach the issue we an-
ticipated, and we do not decide whether the officers’ entry into
Keenan’s home was permissible because of the exigent circum-
stances of the loss, concealment, or destruction of evidence or the
doctrine of hot pursuit. We simply hold that, even if the entry was
illegal, any error by the district judge was harmless. See State v.
Thomas, 302 Kan. 440, 453, 353 P.3d 1134 (2015) (if lawfully ob-
tained information sufficient, standing alone, to support requisite
probable cause to issue warrant, inclusion of unlawfully obtained
information will not invalidate warrant).

CONCLUSION

Although the reasoning of this court differs, as discussed above,
we affirm the judgment of the district court and the decision of the
Court of Appeals panel.

JOHNSON, J., concurring: I agree with the majority's determina-
tion that the law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest

Keenan before he entered the house. But I would not go directly
to a harmlessness holding under these facts.

As the majority points out, if the officers’ warrantless entry into
Keenan's home was unlawful, his rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution were violated. In that
event, the district court’s refusal to suppress the evidence obtained
during the unlawful search and seizure was a constitutional error.
Constitutional errors “may be declared harmless where the party
benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of
the trial in light of the entire record, i.¢., proves there is no reason-
able possibility that the error affected the verdict.” State v. Ward,
292 Kan, 541, 569, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct.
1594 (2012).

Here, the State benefitted from the admission of any illegally
obtained evidence. Therefore, the State must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the erroneously admitted evidence had no rea-
sonable possibility of affecting the jury's guilty verdict on the DUI
charge. In my view, the State has not cleared that hurdle.

As the majority describes the events, after the law enforcement
officers entered the house, they observed Keenan stumble again on
his way to lay his son down in a bedroom; they experienced Keen-
an’s failure to obey their multiple requests to hang up the tele-
phone; and they observed Keenan’s slurred speech, bloodshot eyes,
and overwhelming odor of alcohol. The officers further testified
that Keenan stumbled several more times, had difficulty communi-
cating, refused to perform field sobriety tests, refused the officers’
order to stay out of the kitchen where a butcher knife lay on the
counter, made a veiled threat that he had taken care of cops before,
and refused to take a breath alcohol test. A subsequent search of
Keenan's vehicle produced a half-empty bottle of whiskey, a bottle
cap, and a number of full bottles of beer.

Given that there was no evidence of the alcohol concentration
in Keenan’s breath or blood, the State had to prove to the jury
that Keenan was “under the influence of alcohol to a degree that
render|ed] [him] incapable of safely driving a vehicle.” K.S.A. 2010
Supp. 8-1567(a)(3). Testimony relating the officers’ post-entry

998

observations about Keenan’s physical appearance, lack of coor-
dination, communication difficulties, and combative attitude was
designed to advance the State’s argument that Keenan was func-
tioning at a high degree of intoxication. Moreover, common sense
would suggest to most jurors that the presence of an open bottle of
whiskey and multiple bottles of beer in a vehicle enhances the pos-
sibility that the operator was under the influence. Consequently,
the State has not convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt that the
above-described post-entry evidence had no reasonable possibility
of affecting the jury’s verdict that Keenan was driving under the
influence.
But with respect to the officers’ entry into the house after ac-
quiring probable cause of driving under the influence, I would find
that their need to protect the welfare of the child in this unique
situation provided the requisite exigent circumstances, i.e., there
was no constitutional error. The child’s grandmother had alerted
law enforcement that she was concerned for the safety of the child
because of Keenan’s intoxication. The officers observed evidence of
that intoxication and consequent danger to the child when Keenan
stumbled while carrying the child from the vehicle. Moreover, get-
ting the child inside, away from the inclement weather, contributed
to the exigency of the circumstances. In short, whether one labels
the situation as an exigent circumstance, hot pursuit, or emergency
aid, the officers were permitted to enter the house to assure the
safety and well-being of the child, before taking Keenan into cus-
tody. Accordingly, I would affirm the lower courts.

No. 114,636

In the Matter of KENTON M. Hatt, Respondent.
(377 P3d 1149)

ee
eee Opinion filed September 2, 2016.
Deborah L, Hughes, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and
Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the brief for the
petitioner.
John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Arnbrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the

cause and was on the brief for respondent, and Kenton M. Hall, respondent, ar-
gued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is a contested original proceeding in discipline
filed by the office of the Disciplinary Administrator against respon-
dent, Kenton M. Hall, of Kansas City, Missouri, an attorney admit-
ted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1988. Pursuant to Kansas
Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350), the
Disciplinary Administrator filed a Notice of Appeal and Exceptions
to the Hearing Panel Report regarding its dismissal of two claims
brought against respondent—purported violations of Supreme
Court Rule 218(c)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 401) and Kansas
Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 5.5(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 641). The Disciplinary Administrator also argues that the
panel assigned respondent the wrong mental state and considered
an inappropriate mitigating circumstance. The dismissal of claims
and the other errors resulted in a too lenient recommendation of
published censure.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 30, 2015, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator
filed a formal complaint against respondent alleging violations of
the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). Respondent
filed an answer on July 13, 2015. The parties entered into a writ-
ten stipulation on September 9, 2015. A hearing was held on the
complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of
Attorneys on September 10, 2015, where respondent was person-

1000

ally present and represented by counsel. The hearing panel deter-
mined that respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R.
Annot. 601) (candor toward tribunal); 8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. An-
not. 672) (engaging in conduct involving misrepresentation); 8.4(d)
(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice);
and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 208 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
342) (registration of attorneys).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with its reeommen-
dation to this court:

“Findings of Fact

. The Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of
law in the State of Kansas on October 5, 1988. Initially, the respondent practiced
Jaw in Kansas with Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs,

“9. The Missouri Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice
of law in the State of Missouri in April 1989, The respondent accepted a position
with the Missouri public defender’s office. Since that time, the respondent has
been actively engaged in the practice of law in Missouri,

“10. In 1990, the respondent changed the status of his law license in Kansas
to inactive. On August 14, 1996, the respondent called the clerk of the appel-
late courts to find out what would happen if he did not pay the inactive fee. He
was informed that his license would be suspended. The respondent did not pay
the inactive fee in 1996. As a result, on November 5, 1996, the Kansas Supreme
Court suspended the respondent's license to practice in Kansas. The respondent's
license to practice law in Kansas has remained suspended since 1996.

“11, In 2003, the respondent resigned {rom the Missouri public defender’s
office.

“12. In May 2003, the respondent called the clerk of the appellate courts to
learn what steps he would have to take to have his license reinstated. The clerk's
office sent the respondent the forms necessary to seek reinstatement and the in-
structions for doing so. The respondent failed to complete the steps necessary to
have his license reinstated.

“13. In May 2009, the respondent again called the clerk of the appellate
courts to learn what steps he would have to take to have his license reinstated.
Again, the clerk's office sent the respondent the forms and instructions for apply-
ing for reinstatement. Again, the respondent failed to complete the steps neces-
sary to have his license reinstated.

“14, On June 8, 2012, the respondent submitted a verified application to ap-
pear pro hac vice on behalf of the defendant in State v. H.R.I., Johnson County
District Court, case number 12DV0289].

‘a. Paragraph 4 of the application required the respondent to list all

——

“[b]ars to which the applicant is admitted, the dates of admission, and the
applicable attorney registration number(s)[.]” The respondent did not list
his Kansas bar admission.

‘b. Paragraph 5 of the application required the respondent to state
whether he was a member in good standing with each bar. The respondent
answered, “I swear and affirm that I am a member in good standing of each
bar referenced in paragraph 4.” The respondent's license to practice law in
Kansas was not in good standing.

‘c. Paragraph 6 of the application required the respondent to state
whether he had “been the subject of prior public discipline, including but
not limited to suspension, or disbarment, in any jurisdiction[.]” The respon-
dent stated, “I have not been the subject of prior public discipline by any
jurisdiction.” The respondent’s license had been suspended, albeit an ad-
ministrative suspension.’

“15. On June 13, 2012, the respondent was admitted pro hac vice for the pur-
pose of representing the defendant in State v. H.B.I. in Johnson County District
Court. The respondent’s local counsel was Stephen Patton.

“16. The respondent represented H.R.I. in that case from March 8, 2012,
to December 27, 2012. The case went to a jury trial. The defendant was found
not guilty of the two felony charges against him and was found guilty of a lesser-
included misdemeanor and a separately charged misdemeanor.

“17. On May 2, 2013, the respondent submitted a verified application to ap-
pear pro hac vice on behalf of the defendant in State v. S.L.S., Wyandotte County
District Court, case number 2013-CV000070.

“18. Just as with the verified application the respondent submitted in the
Johnson County District Court case, the respondent did not disclose his Kansas
bar admission, did not disclose that his license was not in good standing in Kansas,
and did not disclose that his Kansas license was suspended.

“19. ‘The court granted the respondent's application and the respondent was
admitted pro hac vice for the purposes of representing S.L.S. in Wyandotte Coun-
ty District Court. The respondent’s local counsel was Ruth B. Sanders.

“20. In early July 2013, the respondent consulted with a prospective client,
B.R., concerning representing B.R. in a shoplifting case pending in Overland Park
Municipal Court. B.R. gave the respondent a check in the amount of $450.00,
dated July 8, 2013. On July 11, 2013, the check was returned due to insufficient
funds in the account to pay the check. When the respondent notified B.R. that
the check had bounced, B.R. told the respondent he had appeared pro se, had
entered into a diversion, and no longer needed an attorney.

“21, On August 1, 2013, Ms. Sanders filed a complaint with the disciplinary
administrator based upon her belief that the respondent's license to practice law
was inactive and that the respondent planned to appear on behalf of B.R. in the
Overland Park Municipal Court.

“22. On August 6, 2013, Ms. Sanders was allowed to withdraw as counsel
in State o. $.L.S, On August 14, 2013, the respondent filed a motion for leave to
withdraw in State v. S.L.S. In that motion, the respondent stated:

“ ii

“2. Counsel sought admission pro hac vice on the basis of his active Mis-
souri Bar License. Counsel believed, in good faith, that seeking admission

in this court on a pro hac vice basis with local counsel was permissible.

However, counsel has been advised that, because his Kansas Bar License

was actually suspended in 1996 for failure to pay dues when counsel was

an employee of the Missouri State Public Defender System, he may not be

allowed to practice in the State of Kansas on any basis, including pro hac

vice with local counsel. Counsel had previously believed, in error, that his

Kansas Bar license was merely, “inactive.”

“23. The court allowed the respondent to withdraw as counsel for S.L.S. Ms.
Sanders and the respondent refunded the full attorney’s fee that had been paid on
S.L.S.’s behalf.

“24, The respondent remains licensed to practice law in Missouri and is an
active member of the federal bars in the Western District of Missouri and the
District of Kansas, The respondent has an active private practice in the area of
criminal defense in Kansas City, Missouri.

“Conclusions of Law

“25. Based upon the respondent's stipulations and the above findings of fact,
the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated KRPC
3.3(a)(1), KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 8.4(d), and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208, as detailed below.
[Footnote: The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 3.3(a), KRPC 8.4(c),
KRPC 8.4(d), Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 218. In addition, the
disciplinary administrator also alleged that the respondent violated KRPC 5.5(a).
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent did not engage in the unauthor-
ized practice of law in the State of Kansas. Thus, the hearing panel concludes
that the respondent did not violate KRPC 5.5(a). Further, because the portion of
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 218 which the disciplinary administrator was relying on, (c)(1),
is directly tied to KRPC 5:5, the hearing panel rejects the stipulation that the re-
spondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 218. Accordingly, the hearing panel dismisses
the allegations that the respondent violated KRPC 5.5 and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 218.]

“KRPC 3.3(a)(1)

“26. KRPC 3.3(a)(1) provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a
false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.’ The respondent made false
statements of material fact to the court twice when he failed to disclose in the
verified applications for admission pro hac vice that he had been admitted to the
practice of law in Kansas and that his license was suspended. Because the respon-
dent provided false information to the Court, the hearing panel concludes that the
respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1).

“KRPC 8.4(c)

“27. ‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.’ KRPC 8.4(c). The re-
spondent engaged in conduct that involved a misrepresentation when he failed to

1003

disclose in the verified applications for admission pro hac vice that he had been
admitted to the Kansas bar and that his license to practice was suspended. As
such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c).

“KRPC 8.4(d)

“28, ‘Tt is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.’ KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent
engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he
obtained admission pro hac vice improperly as the respondent was not eligible for
admission pro hac vice. Nonetheless, the respondent was admitted in two district
courts and represented criminal defendants. As such, the hearing panel concludes
that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d).

“Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208

“29. ‘All attorneys . . . admitted to the practice of law before the Supreme
Court of the State of Kansas shall annually, on or before the first day of July, regis-
ter with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts’ and ‘shall pay an annual fee.’ Kan. Sup.
Ct. R. 208. Additionally, ‘[a]ttorneys may register as: active; inactive; retired; or
disabled due to mental or physical disabilities. Only attorneys registered as active
may practice law in Kansas.’

“30. In this case, the respondent failed to register with the clerk of the ap-
pellate courts for years. Additionally, the respondent failed to pay the annual fee
for years. Finally, the respondent obtained admission pro hac vice improperly.
Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated Kan. Sup.
Ct. R. 208.

“American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

“31. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel con-
sidered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter ‘Standards’). Pursuant to Standard 3, the
factors to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the po-
tential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

“32. Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to the legal profession
to understand and abide by the licensing and professional practice rules of the
Kansas Supreme Court.

“33. Mental State. The respondent negligently violated his duty.

“34. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent
caused actual injury to the administration of justice.

“35. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to
be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in
this case, found the following aggravating factors present:

1004

‘a. A Pattern of Misconduct. For 16 years, the respondent failed to pay
the annual registration fees to maintain his license to practice law. As such,
the hearing panel concludes that the respondent has engaged in a pattern
of misconduct.

‘b. Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule viola-
tions. The respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a), KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 8.4(d),
and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the
respondent committed multiple offenses.

‘c. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in

1988 and the Missouri Supreme Court admitted the respondent to practice
law in the State of Missouri in 1989. At the time of the most serious mis-
conduct, the respondent had been practicing law for more than 20 years.”

“36. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its rec-
ommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following
mitigating circumstances present:

‘a. Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not
previously been disciplined.
‘b. Timely Good. Faith Effort to Make Restitution or to Rectify Con-

. The respondent immediately withdrew from
his representation of S.L.S. Additionally, the respondent immediately re-
funded the entire fee paid on behalf of S.L.S. Further, the respondent also
called the disciplinary administrator to report his conduct immediately af-
ter realizing his pro hac vice application misrepresentations.

‘c. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or

Her Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Ac-
. The respondent fully cooperated

Jmowledgment of the Transgressions.
with the disciplinary process. Additionally, the respondent admitted the
facts that gave rise to the violations. Finally, the respondent stipulated that
he violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1), KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 8.4(d), and Kan. Sup. Ct.
R. 208.
cluding Any Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of thi
Character and General Reputation of the Attorney, The respondent is an
active and productive member of the bar of Kansas City, Missouri. The re-
spondent also enjoys the respect of his peers and generally possesses a good
character and reputation as evidenced by the testimony of his peers as well
as evidenced by several letters received by the hearing panel. Further, the
respondent has given back to the profession by providing pro bono repre-
sentation on many occasions.

‘e. Remorse. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed
genuine remorse, embarrassment, and shame for the misconduct.

‘{. Additional Consideration. An additional factor considered by the

hearing panel relates to a change in Supreme Court Rule 217. At the time
the respondent took inactive status, the rule did not allow for the surrender
of license—the respondent had to choose between registering as an active
attomey or an inactive attorney. Each status carried with it annual registra-
tion requirements. However, since that time, the rule has changed and at-
torneys have an additional option to consider.
(c) Voluntary Surrender of License When Attorney is Not Under Inves-
tigation for Misconduct and Investigation is Not Anticipated.
(1) Voluntary Surrender. If an attorney voluntarily surrenders the

attorney's license to practice law when the attorney is not un-
der investigation for attorney misconduct and an investigation
is not anticipated, the attorney's name is stricken from the roll
of attorneys. The attorney must be in good standing at the time
of surrender.”

Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 217. Thus, if this rule had existed at the time the respon-

dent took inactive status, the respondent would have had a third option.

The hearing panel considers this to mitigate the respondent’s misconduct.’

“37. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

5.13

6.12

6.13

73

Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law.

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that
false statements or documents are being submitted to the court
or that material information is improperly being withheld, and
takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury
to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or po-
tentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent
either in determining whether statements or documents are
false or in taking remedial action when material information is
being withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party
to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially ad-
verse effect on the legal proceeding.

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a pro-
fessional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the
public, or the legal system.

Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a pro-
fessional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the
public, or the legal system.’

1006

“Recommendation

“38. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent's
license be suspended for a period of 60 days. The disciplinary administrator
also noted what the respondent would have to do to have the administrative
suspension lifted.

“39. The respondent recommended that the respondent be censured
and that the censure be published in the Kansas Reports.

“40, The hearing panel is persuaded by the significant mitigating factors
presented in this case. Clearly, the respondent is a well respected member
of the Kansas City, Missouri, criminal defense bar. Because of the signifi-
cant mitigating evidence, the hearing panel recommends that the respon-
dent be censured and the censure be published in the Kansas Reports.

“41. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certi-
fied by the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator.”

DISCUSSION

The Disciplinary Administrator’s office appeals the panel's dis-
missal of two claims brought against respondent—purported viola-
tions of Supreme Court Rule 218(c)(1) and KRPC 5.5(a)—pursu-
ant to Kansas Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
350). The Disciplinary Administrator also argues that the panel as-
signed respondent the wrong mental state and considered an inap-
propriate mitigating circumstance.

Standard of review

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence,
the findings of the disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the par-
ties and determines whether violations of KRPC exist and, if they
do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292
Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). Clear and convincing evidence is
“‘evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that “the truth of
the facts asserted is highly probable.”’” In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498,
505, 204 P.3d 610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725,
188 P.3d 1 [2008)).

The Disciplinary Administrator appeals the dismissal of the al-
leged Supreme Court Rule 218(c)(1) and KRPC 5.5(a) violations as
matters of law. But neither he nor respondent has taken exceptions
to the panel's findings of fact. Thus, we admit those findings as un-

1007

disputed under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 212(c) and (d) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 369).

Issue: The hearing panel erred in concluding that respondent did
not violate Kansas Supreme Court Rule 218(c)(1) and KRPC 5.5(a).

The Disciplinary Administrator argues that the facts show re-
spondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of Jaw in violation
of Supreme Court Rule 218(c)(1) and KRPC 5.5(a). Respondent
counters that during the time he represented clients in Kansas, he
had been admitted pro hac vice and, thus, he was not engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law. He contends that, although the
two pro hac vice admissions by court order were obtained in viola-
tion of the rules, the violations do not invalidate the pro hac vice
orders.

Analysis

In a footnote to the final hearing report, the panel concluded
that respondent did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law
under Supreme Court Rule 218(c)(1) and KRPC 5.5(a). We hold
the panel erred for two reasons: (1) Respondent stipulated to vio-
lating Kansas Supreme Court Rule 218; and, (2) respondent’s un-
disputed conduct violated the plain language of Kansas Supreme
Court Rule 218(c)(1) and KRPC 5.5(a).

Kansas Supreme Court Rule 218(c)(1) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
401) states: “It is the unauthorized practice of law and a violation of
KRPC5.5 for: (1) a suspended . . . attorney to practice law after the
Supreme Court enters an order suspending . . . the attorney.” And
KRPC 5.5(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 641) provides: “A lawyer
shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation
of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing
so.”

The parties entered into stipulations filed with the panel, includ-
ing that respondent's conduct violated Supreme Court Rule 218. In
other words, he admitted violating Rule 218(c)(1) and, by neces-
sity, KRPC 5.5(a).

More important than respondent's stipulation, clear and con-
vincing evidence shows that his conduct violates the plain language

1008

of the two rules—é.e., practicing law while on a suspended license
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. In 1990, respondent
went on inactive status in Kansas and then, in 1996, failed to pay
the inactive fee. Due to his failure to pay the fee, this court ordered
an administrative suspension of his license. In 2003 and 2009, re-
spondent called the office of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts to
learn what steps he could take to reinstate his license. But he failed
to complete the necessary steps. Respondent's administrative sus-
pension qualifies as a suspension for Rule 218(c)(1) purposes. See
In re Thompson, 301 Kan. 428, 433, 343 P.3d 108 (2015) (an ad-
ministrative suspension was sufficient to constitute a violation of
Kansas Supreme Court Rule 218 for failure to notify clients, oppos-
ing counsel, and the courts of a suspension).

Respondent claims that despite his administrative suspension,
he did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law because he
was authorized through his pro hac vice admissions. In 2012, re-
spondent submitted two applications to appear pro hac vice on be-

alf of two separate clients. On both applications, he failed to list
his Kansas bar admittance, inform the court his license to practice
aw in Kansas was not in good standing, or inform the court his
license in Kansas was on administrative suspension. Subsequently,
respondent was admitted pro hac vice in both cases.

The panel merely found respondent's pro hac vice admission in-
valid; “Respondent obtained admission pro hac vice improperly as
the respondent was not eligible for admission pro hac vice.” The
Disciplinary Administrator correctly points out that, under Kansas
Supreme Court Rule 116 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 222), only out-
of-state attorneys who are not admitted to practice in Kansas are
eligible for pro hac vice admission. That rule states: “An attorney
not admitted to practice law in Kansas may be admitted on motion
to practice law in a Kansas court or administrative tribunal—for a
particular case only[.|” In the instant case, respondent was admit-
ted to practice law in Kansas and therefore could not be admitted
pro hac vice.

Additionally, at oral argument the Disciplinary Administrator
referred to Supreme Court Rule 208(e), which states, in pertinent
part:

1009

“It shall be the duty of each member of the judiciary of this state to prohibit any
attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law from appearing or
practicing in any court, and it shall be the duty of each member of the bar and
judiciary to report to the Disciplinary Administrator any attempt by an attorney
to practice law after his or her suspension. The practice of law after suspension
constitutes a violation of Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5.” (Emphasis
added.) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 343).

The Disciplinary Administrator points out that under this rule all
courts have a duty to prohibit a suspended lawyer from practicing
law in Kansas. Therefore, his office argues, the district court cer-
tainly would have no authority to grant respondent's pro hac vice
admissions to practice law while on suspension.

We agree with the Disciplinary Administrator. Respondent's
administrative suspension simply does not allow his pro hac vice
admission while a member of the Kansas bar. See In re Swisher,
285 Kan. 1084, 1092, 179 P.3d 412 (2008) (noting a suspended at-
torney remains a member of the Kansas bar, subject to the provi-
sions of rules of professional conduct). Per these authorities, the
district court orders granting him pro hac vice admission were void
ab initio. They therefore could not empower him to practice law in
Kansas.

Accordingly, we conclude respondent engaged in the unauthor-
ized practice of law in violation of Supreme Court Rule 218(c)(1)
and KRPC 5.5(a). The panel erred in concluding otherwise.

Issues OF DISCIPLINE

At the panel hearing, the Disciplinary Administrator's office rec-
ommended that respondent's license to practice law be suspended
for a period of 60 days. Respondent and the panel recommended
published censure. At oral arguments before this court, the Dis-
ciplinary Administrator again recommended that respondent's li-
cense to practice law be suspended for a period of 60 days. And
respondent reiterated his recommendation for published censure.

The panel’s recommendation is advisory and does not prevent
this court from imposing a greater or lesser punishment. In re Har-
rington, 296 Kan. 380, 387, 293 P.3d 686 (2013) (citing Supreme
Court Rule 212{f]). In determining the appropriate sanction, this
court considers the facts and circumstances of the case as well as

1010

aggravating and mitigating factors. 296 Kan. at 387 (citing In re
Swanson, 288 Kan. 185, 214-15, 200 P.3d 1205 [2009]; Supreme
Court Rule 211[f]).

Although not required or mandated by our rules, “this court and
disciplinary panels ‘historically’ turn to the ABA Standards for Im-
posing Lawyer Sanctions to guide the discipline discussion.” In re
Hawkins, 304 Kan. 97, 140, 373 P.3d 718 (2016). The ABA Stan-
dards provide four factors to consider in assessing punishment: (1)
the ethical duty violated by the lawyer; (2) the lawyer’s mental state;
(3) the actual or potential injury resulting from the misconduct;
and (4) the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
304 Kan. at 140 (citing ABA Standard 3.0).

The Disciplinary Administrator argues that the hearing panel
erred in its assessment of the appropriate sanction for two reasons
related to the ABA factors: (1) it wrongly concluded respondent
negligently, rather than knowingly, violated the rules; and, (2) it
wrongly concluded recent amendments to Supreme Court Rule
217 (Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 390) constituted a mitigating factor. Re-
spondent generally refutes the Disciplinary Administrator's argu-
ments and asserts that the panel properly considered the amend-
ment to Supreme Court Rule 217 as a mitigating factor and the
evidence supports he acted negligently rather than knowingly.

The hearing panel erred in concluding respondent negligently
violated the KRPC and Kansas Supreme Court Rules.

The Disciplinary Administrator contends that respondent's vio-
lation of the KRPC and Supreme Court Rules arose from knowing,
not negligent, conduct as the panel concluded. Respondent con-
cedes that certain violations—KRPC 3.3(a)(1), KRPC 8.4(c), and
Supreme Court Rule 208—involve knowing acts. But, he argues,
the panel determined his mental state was a misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of the rules, i.¢., negligence-based, not a know-
ing act of excluding his Kansas status from his pro hac vice applica-
tions.

ABA Standards identify three mental states: “intent,” the high-
est culpable mental state; “knowledge,” the intermediate culpable
mental state; and “negligence,” the least culpable mental state.

———

Hawkins, 304 Kan. at 140. A lawyer acts with knowledge when act-
ing “with conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circum-
stances of his or her conduct both without the conscious objective
or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” A lawyer acts negli-
gently when failing “to be aware . . . that a result will follow... ..”
304 Kan. at 141; see also ABA Compendium of Professional Re-
sponsibility Rules and Standards, at 462 (2012).

The panel concluded that respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1),
which states that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false state-
ment of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .” (Emphasis added.) (2015
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 601). The panel also concluded respondent vio-
lated KRPC 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
representation.”) and KRPC 8.4(d) (“It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to .. . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice.”) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672). Finally,
the panel concluded that respondent violated Supreme Court Rule
208—attorneys admitted in Kansas must pay an annual fee and
register, and only attorneys registered as active may practice law in
Kansas. (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 342). And additionally, we have
concluded that respondent violated Supreme Court Rule 218(c)
(1) and KRPC 5.5(a). Again, Rule 218(c)(1) states that “[i]t is the
unauthorized practice of law and a violation of KRPC 5.5 for .. .
a suspended . . . attorney to practice law after the Supreme Court
enters an order suspending” that attorney. (2015 Kan. Ct. R. An-
not. 401-02). Finally, KRPC 5.5(a) provides: “A Jawyer shall not
practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the
legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.”
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 641).

At least one of respondent's violations —KRPC 3.3(a)(1)—clear-
ly establishes “knowingly” as the culpable mental state for making a
false statement to a tribunal. See In re Kline, 298 Kan. 96, 125-26,
311 P.3d 321 (2013) (violation of KRPC 3.3{a][1] requires actual
knowledge of falsity). He concedes two others—KRPC 8.4(c) and
Supreme Court Rule 208—also involved knowing acts on his part.

Respondent's violations and the record both reveal he acted with
knowledge. But respondent argues he was acting negligently when

1012

he applied for pro hac vice status. He contends at the time of his
application he believed he was not suspended in Kansas, but sim-
ply on inactive status. This argument fails for two reasons.

First, the record indicates that respondent had actual knowledge
of his suspension. Twice he received letters from this court specifi-
cally informing him of his suspension and the procedure for rein-
stating his license. And twice he called the court’s clerk to inquire
how to reactivate his license. Even with this knowledge, he still
submitted two pro hac vice admissions where he failed to include
his Kansas suspension, as required by the application.

Second, the argument that he negligently believed he was inac-
tive in Kansas does not explain his failure to include his Kansas bar
admission on the verified application for pro hac vice admission.
The application required respondent to list all “[b]ars to which the
applicant is admitted, the dates of admission, and the applicable
attorney registration number(s).” Even if respondent had acted un-
der the belief he was simply on inactive status, he was still a lawyer
admitted to the Kansas bar and listed as such with the Office of
Attorney Registration.

Respondent also argues that the panel’s conclusion that he acted
with a negligent mental state was associated with his “duty to the
legal profession to understand and abide by the licensing and pro-
fessional practice rules of the Kansas Supreme Court.” In other
words, he negligently failed to understand the rules. But the factual
basis for the majority of respondent's violations was the knowingly
made false statements to a tribunal. As the Disciplinary Adminis-
trator correctly notes, respondent could not knowingly make a false
statement negligently under KRPC 3.3(a)(1). The circumstances
surrounding respondent's pro hac vice applications and admis-
sions establish a level of culpability beyond mere negligence. We
conclude that respondent acted with a knowing mental state and
therefore knowingly violated his duty.

The hearing panel did not err in considering Kansas Supreme
Court Rule 217 as a mitigating factor.

The Disciplinary Administrator also argues that the panel erred
in considering an amendment to Supreme Court Rule 217(c)(1)

1013

as a mitigating factor. Prior to the enactment of the amendment,
the rule allowed attorneys involved in a disciplinary investigation
to voluntarily surrender their license to practice law. In 2012, Su-
preme Court Rule 217 was amended to give even attorneys in good
standing the option to voluntarily surrender their license:

“{f an attomey voluntarily surrenders the attomey's license to practice law when
the attorney is not under investigation for attorney misconduct and an investiga-
tion is not anticipated, the attorney's name is stricken from the roll of attorneys.
The attorney must be in good standing at the time of the surrender.” (2015 Kan.
Ct. R. Annot. 390).

Utilizing this change in the rule, the panel concluded:
“An additional factor considered by the hearing panel relates to a change in Su-
preme Court Rule 217. At the time the respondent took inactive status, the rule
did not allow for the surrender of license—the respondent had to choose between
registering as an active attorney or an inactive attorney. Each status carried with it
annual registration requirements. However, since that time, the rule has changed
and attorneys have an additional option to consider.

“Thus, if this rule had existed at the time the respondent took inactive status, the
respondent would have had a third option. The hearing panel considers this to
mitigate the respondent’s misconduct.”

As the panel correctly concluded, the amended provision was
not in effect at the time respondent’s license was suspended and
respondent did not have the option to voluntarily surrender his li-
cense. Rather, this court suspended his license after he failed to
pay the inactive attorney's fee.

The Disciplinary Administrator argues that because neither
party presented evidence related to Supreme Court Rule 217, the
panel should not have considered it as a mitigating factor. Respon-
dent replies that, although the issue was not addressed at the hear-
ing, there was no rule prohibiting the panel from considering the
rule as a mitigating circumstance.

Unlike the standard for proving attorney misconduct, the panel
does not need clear and convincing evidence to consider aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors. See In re Walsh, 286 Kan. 235, 248,
182 P.3d 1218 (2008). In Walsh, the respondent argued the panel
erred in considering a letter presented as compelléd due to terms
of a settlement, rather than voluntary, because there was no clear

— #4

and convincing evidence to conclude the letter was compelled. We
stated:

“The Respondent is correct that ‘[alny attorney misconduct must be established
by substantial, clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.’ [Citation omitted.]
However, the Respondent cites no authority for his position that each aggravat-
ing and mitigating factor must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Rather, the panel must consider the evidence presented with respect to aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances and determine how much weight to assign to
each in arriving at an appropriate discipline.” (Emphasis added.) 286 Kan. at 248.

While the panel is not required to support aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances with clear and convincing evidence, some
evidence of those circumstances still must be presented for weigh-
ing. See Hawkins, 304 Kan. at 141 (“The panel must consider the
evidence presented as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and determine the weight to be assigned to each in arriving at an
appropriate discipline.”); see also In re Barker, 299 Kan. 158, 167,
321 P.3d 767 (2014) (same); Harrington, 296 Kan. at 387 (same).
Additionally, the formal complaint provides that “all evidence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances shall be presented at the
hearing.”

In the instant case, the record supports the panel's finding that,
had the option been available, respondent may have voluntarily
surrendered his license. Respondent testified that he went inactive
and was ultimately suspended because of monetary concerns and
he did not want to pay the fee in Kansas when he did not practice
here. But the reason for respondent’s administrative suspension—
i.e., his financial reasons for failing to pay the attorney registra-
tion fee—is not at issue in this disciplinary action. Rather, at issue
is respondent's candor toward the tribunal when applying for pro
hac vice admission and his unauthorized practice of law after that
admission was granted on misleading facts. So, it is unclear why
respondent's potential surrender of a legal license would mitigate
those violations.

Regardless, in assigning discipline the panel considered five oth-
er mitigating circumstances and did not assign weight to its con-
sideration of each. In addition to considering Supreme Court Rule
217, the panel also found: absence of prior discipline, timely good
faith effort to rectify consequences of misconduct, full coopera-

1015

tion with disciplinary process, previous good character and repu-
tation in the community, and remorse. As for aggravating factors,
the panel found: a pattern of misconduct for 16 years, multiple
offenses—violations of KRPC 3.3(a), KRPC 8.4(c), KRPC 8.4(d),
and Rule 208—and substantial experience in the practice of law.
Accordingly, the panel may have given very little weight to Rule
217 as a mitigating factor when weighing it against the totality of
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances presented to it.

We conclude the panel did not err in considering Supreme
Court Rule 217 as a mitigating circumstance because some evi-
dence of respondent’s wish to voluntarily suspend his license was
presented. However, we also conclude that the reasoning behind
respondent’s administrative suspension from the practice of law
does not mitigate his current rule violations—i.e., candor toward
the tribunal and the unauthorized practice of law. Thus, we assign
little weight to the current availability of a voluntary surrendering
of a law license under Supreme Court Rule 217.

Appropriate Discipline

Given our conclusions that respondent additionally violated Rule
218(c)(1) and KRPC 5.5(a), that he acted with a knowing mental
state, and that the panel properly considered evidence of mitigat-
ing circumstances, the only remaining issue before us is to deter-
mine the appropriate discipline for respondent's violations. The
ABA Standards provide guidance for appropriate sanctions. See In
re Mintz, 298 Kan. 897, 912, 317 P.3d 756 (2014) (ABA Standards
are guidelines to assist the court and disciplinary panels). For viola-
tions of duties owed to the legal system—e.g., misrepresentation—
and violations of other duties owed as a professional—e.g., the un-
authorized practice of lav—the ABA recommends:

“6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false
statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that
material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no re-
medial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the
legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect
on the legal proceeding.

“6.92, Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that he or
she is violating a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential

1016

injury to a client or party, or causes interference or potential interfer-
ence with a legal proceeding.
“7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engag-
es in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and
causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal
system.”
Considering both the panel's findings and our legal conclusions,
a majority of the court holds that respondent is to be suspended
from the practice of law in the state of Kansas for a period of 60
days. A minority of this court would impose a greater sanction. Ad-
ditionally, respondent must comply with Supreme Court Rule 218.
The costs of the proceedings shall be assessed to respondent.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

Iv Is THEREFORE ORDERED that Kenton M. Hall be and is
hereby suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kan-
sas for 60 days in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2)
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293), effective on the filing of this deci-

sion.

Iv Is FURTHER ORDERED that respondent comply with Su-
preme Court Rule 218.

Ir Is FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings
be assessed to respondent and that this opinion be published in the
official Kansas Reports.

Adams v. State
Allen v. Bruffett.
Amos v. Heimgartner
Anderson v. State
Andrews v. State

03/31/2016
04/21/2016
03/31/2016
04/21/2016
03/31/2016
07/22/2016
04/21/2016
07/22/2016
08/31/2016
07/22/2016

City of Shawnee v. Clarl
Clark v. Roberts.
Dixon v. State..

Drach v. State 04/21/2016
Dudley v. Heimgartner 03/31/2016
Gant v. State. 07/07/2016

06/21/2016
04/11/2016
08/30/2016
06/21/2016
03/31/2016
03/31/2016

Grammar v. State
Hodes & Nauser, MDs v. Schmidt ..
Humphrey v. Roberts
Hunt v. State,

+ 06/21/2016
113,569
113,786
In re Guardianship & Conservator-

04/07/2016

ship of Raney... 110,841 Denied. 07/22/2016
In re Guardianship of Levot 111,463 Denied. 04/21/2016
Ine JW. 113,161 Denied. 03/31/2016
Inte L.S.M.A. 114,038. Denied. . 07/07/2016
Inre ML. 112,769 Denied. . 08/31/2016
Inre MMM. 113,875 Denied. . 07/07/2016
Ine Marriage of Hodges 113,884 Denied. . 04/21/2016
Iserhardt v, State 111,269 Denied . . 07/29/2016
Jones v. Jones 112,520 Granted . 08/30/2016
Kling v. Cline 113,519 Denied. . 03/31/2016
Lopez-Martinez v, State 112,100 Denied. . 03/31/2016
Lowe v, State 112,017 Denied. . 03/31/2016
Manco v. Stati 112,194 Denied. . 08/31/2016
McElhaney v. Thom: 111,590 Granted. . 06/21/2016
McIntyre v. State. 111,580 Granted 03/31/2016
Morton County Hospital v. Howell ... 112,768 Denied... . 06/21/2016

(1017)

Unpublished
Unpublished.
Unpublished
Unpublished
‘Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
52 Kan. App. 2d 274
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
51 Kan. App. 2d 733,
Unpublished
Unpublished

51 Kan, App. 2d

1103

1018 ee

Moundridge Telephone Co. v. Kansas

Corporation Comm’n 114,064 Denied. 04/21/2016
Perez v. State 112,328 Denied... 07/07/2016
Rice v. State 110,589 Denied .. 04/21/2016
Sanders v, State.. 109,972 Denied . 03/28/2016
Sellers v. State. 112,099 Denied . 07/22/2016
Sharp v. Kansas Dept. for Children

& Families .. 110,504 i + 08/30/2016
Sharp v. Kansas Dept. for Children

& Families . 04/21/2016
Sperry v. McKune. 08/04/2016
State v. Adams i 03/28/2016
State v. Alvarez i 04/21/2016

i 06/21/2016
State v. Armstea i 04/21/2016
State v. Arnold i 06/21/2016
06/21/2016
State v. Atlas. 03/28/2016
State v. Austin 03/31/2016
State v. Ballou 08/30/2016
State v. Bannot 06/21/2016
State v. Beltra 03/31/2016
State v. Bet 06/21/2016
State v. Biet 07/15/2016
State v. Bledso
06/21/2016
State v. Bliss... 06/21/2016
State v. Borden-Vas: 112,088 06/21/2016
111,781 03/28/2016
111,771 03/28/2016
112,203 03/31/2016
State v. Bryan. 112,079 07/07/2016
State v. Burton 111,713 07/22/2016
State v. Cameron 113,061 07/15/2016
State v. Campbell 112,159 07/07/2016
State v. Carpenter 112,301 03/31/2016
State v. Carter. 109,966 04/21/2016
State v. Cash 107,007 06/21/2016
State v. Cole. 112,080 03/31/2016
112,934 07/07/2016
111,725 03/28/2016

State v. Croan

» L11,154

State v. Crowley.......

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished.
Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
51 Kan. App. 876
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished.
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished

1019

State v. Crudo
State v, Currie.
State v. Daniel
State v. Daniels.

112,805
111,542
107,963
112,164
112,165
111,844
112,443
108,453
111,930
111,931
108,801
112,158
108,916
111,478
112,626
111,593
143
110,276
111,699
111,601
110,901
113,594
109,259
111,964
111,790
110,823
112,754
111,890
111,866
110,982
110,605
112,120
111,622
109,690
110,729
111,270
113,992
111,991

State v. Davis
State v. Dean..
State v. Deshazer
State v. Dickson

State v. Donaldson.
State v. Dwigans
State v. Edwards
State v. Eisenhour.
State v. Enloe.
State v, Ervin
State v. Evans.
State v. Finch

State v. Hankins.
State v. Harbert
State v. Hardy

State v. Hunter
State v. Iserhardt ..

State v. Jimenez
State v. Johnson . 109,406
and 16
other
cases
. 112,745
111,028
112,081
111,519

State v. Kangas......

111,659 |

04/21/2016
- 03/28/2016
- 06/21/2016

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

. 03/28/2016
03/28/2016
07/07/2016
. 06/21/2016

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

03/31/2016
. 06/21/2016
. 03/31/2016
- 06/21/2016
- 06/21/2016
. 07/27/2016
- 06/21/2016
08/30/2016
. 06/21/2016
- 03/28/2016
. 03/28/2016
04/21/2016

Unpublished.
Unpublished
51 Kan. App. 2d 790
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
51 Kan. App. 2d 168
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
51 Kan. App. 2d 296
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

Denied .
Denied ..
Denied ..
Denied .
Denied .

Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished

07/07/2016
03/31/2016
03/28/2016
03/31/2016
07/15/2016

State v. Kebert
State v. Kennedy.
State v. Kern

State v. Kilbourn
State v. Kindsvater.
State v. King.

03/28/2016
06/21/2016
03/31/2016
03/31/2016
State v. Kreiter, 07/22/2016
State v. Lacy. 06/21/2016
State v. Laicer. 03/31/2016
State v. Langdon 07/15/2016
State v. Leshore .. 07/22/2016
State v. Lilley. 03/31/2016
State v. Logan 07/07/2016
State v. Long 04/21/2016
State v. Maberry 04/21/2016
State v. Macke: 03/28/2016
State v. Maitho 06/21/2016
State v. Martinez. 03/28/2016
State v. Martinez. 07/22/2016
State v. McClellan .. 04/21/2016
State v. McCoy. 04/21/2016
State v. McIntyre 03/28/2016
State v. Miles.
State v. Miller . Denied
State v. Montgomery . Granted in p:
vacated in
part;
remanded to
Ct. of Ap] 04/21/2016
State v. Moore.. 09,553 Denied 04/21/2016
State v. Moore. 10,706 Denied 06/21/2016
State v, Morales 13,730 Denied 06/21/2016
State v. Mpofu 11,393 Denied 03/28/2016
State v. Munoz 11,681 Denied 03/28/2016
State v. Muns 12,926 Denied 07/07/2016
State v. Murdoch 12,089 Denied 03/31/2016
State v. Naughton i 06/21/2016
State v. Naughton 07/07/2016

State v. Nur.
State v. Obregon...
State v. Olds
State v, Osoric

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
52 Kan. App. 2d 179
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

1021

Denied . . 04/21/2016

Denied . . 06/21/2016

Denied . 03/28/2016

State v. Parry. Granted. . 06/21/2016

State v. Paulson. Denied 04/21/2016

State v. Perciado Granted . 06/21/2016

State v. Peters Denied . 07/22/2016

State v. Peterson Denied .. 03/28/2016

State v. Porter Denied . 03/28/2016

State v. Potter Denied 03/31/2016

State v. Pouncil Denied . 03/28/2016

State v. Price. Denied 07/15/2016

State v. Price . Denied . . 03/31/2016

State v. Ramirez. Denied . . 04/21/2016
State v. Ramsey.

Denied . 07/22/2016

State v. Rathbun... Denied .. 06/21/2016

State v. Recinos-Gonzalez. 111,921 Denied .. . 03/28/2016

State v. Reed... 111,663 Denied .. . 03/28/2016

State v. Reed. 110,766 Denied. . 04/21/2016

State v. Reed. 108,823 Denied . . 03/28/2016

State v, Reese. 110,021 Granted . 06/21/2016

State v. Reinhar 112,879 Denied . 04/21/2016

State v. Reyna ... 112,350 Denied. . 07/07/2016

State v. Richardson. 107,786 Granted. . 06/21/2016

State v. Rincon... 112,183 Denied - 08/31/2016

110,921 Denied . 03/28/2016

111,857 Denied . 06/21/2016

110,040 Granted . 06/21/2016

110,243 Granted. . 06/21/2016

109,624 Denied . 04/21/2016

112,932 Denied . 07/22/2016

State v, Saldana... 111,429 Denied . 03/28/2016

State v. Sanders. 111,738 Denied . 06/21/2016

State v. Sasser . 04/21/2016

State v. Schewe . 04/21/2016

State v. Scuderi..
. 06/21/2016
. 06/21/2016
. 06/21/2016
. 07/07/2016
- 07/22/2016
. 03/31/2016
. 08/31/2016
. 06/21/2016
. 06/21/2016
. 07/22/2016

State v. Seaman..
State v. Sellers.
State v. Shaff
State v. Sherman.
State v. Shirley.
State v. Shives

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
51 Kan. App. 2d 928
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
50 Kan. App. 2d 922

Unpublished
Unpublished
‘Unpublished
Unpublished
51 Kan. App. 2d 107
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
50 Kan. App. 2d 448
Unpublished
Unpublished

State v. Smith. 111,755 Denied... 04/21/2016
State v. Smith 109,165 Granted in part;
vacated in
parts
remanded to
Ct. of App. ... 04/14/2016
State v. Soloman 111,596 Denied .. 06/21/2016
State v. Spohn 111,630 Denied... 03/28/2016
State v. Stanley 112,828 Denied. 08/31/2016
State v. Steven: 03/31/2016
State v. Stevenson. 06/21/2016
State v. Stevenson. 03/28/2016
State v. Stewart. 08/31/2016
State v. Stone ..
07/15/2016
State v, Suellentrop 04/21/2016
State v. Tague..
++ 07/15/2016
State v. Tanner... LLL
111,947
111,948 03/31/2016
07/22/2016
07/07/2016
06/21/2016
State v. Thompson. 08/28/2016
State v. Tice. 07/22/2016
State v. Toliver
08/31/2016
State v. Tummons 04/21/2016
State v. Unrau 09/01/2016
State v. Vap . 06/21/2016
State v. Villa 06/21/2016
State v. Villalobos. 08/31/2016
07/07/2016
06/21/2016
06/21/2016
03/28/2016
06/21/2016
06/21/2016
06/21/2016
08/31/2016
03/31/2016
06/21/2016
07/22/2016
07/15/2016
06/21/2016

Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished

Unpublished.
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished

Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
47 Kan. App. 2d 703
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
Unpublished
51 Kan, App. 2d 971
Unpublished

1023

State v. Woodson 111,692 Denied 03/28/2016 Unpublished
State v. Zimbelman. . i 03/28/2016 Unpublished
State v. Zurita-Cruz y i 06/21/2016 Unpublished
Strong v. State. i 03/31/2016 Unpublished
Unified Government of WYCO/KCK

v. Nai] i .». 03/31/2016
Wagner Interior Supply of Wichita,

Ine. v. Dynamic Drywall, Inc. ,037 Granted.
Waldrup v. State Denied
‘Walling v. Kansas Prisoner Review

Bd.

Unpublished

06/21/2016 Unpublished
03/28/2016 Unpublished

Denied
Walling v. Spradlin; Denied
Wilson v. State Denied

07/15/2016 Unpublished
07/15/2016 Unpublished
06/21/2016 Unpublished