State: Ohio
Volume: 20
Term: 0-0
Jurisdiction(s): Ohio
Source: https://static.case.law/ohio/20.pdf

REPORTS

CASES

ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE

Supreme Court, of Ohio

IN BANK

PRINTED BY AUTHORITY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

By WILLIAM LAWRENCE

ATTORNEY AT LAW

VOLUME XX

CINCINNATI
ROBERT CLARKE & CO
1873

ie fans &, LEE7

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO IN BANK

Cxosep its labors under the Constitution of 1802, and adjourned
without day, on January 16,1852. The following Judges com-
posed the Court at its last session :

Hoy. PETER HITCHCOCK, Onmr Jupex.
Hon. RUFUS P. SPALDING,
Jupezs.

Hon. WILLIAM B. CALDWELL,
Hon. RUFUS P. RANNEY, .

This Court has from its commencement been composed of
Judges distinguished for learning, talents, and integrity. Its do-
cisions, on the Circuit and in Bank, now comprise twenty volumes
of Reports—a fund of judicial learning, characterized by profound
research and luminous exposition, not only invaluable to the pro-
fession in Ohio, but which will leave its impress upon the science
of Law, wherever that science is known and understood,

CHIEF JUSTICH HITCHCOCK.

Puzrer Hircncock was born October 19, 1781, at Cheshire, Con-
necticut; graduated at Yale College, in September, 1801; was ad-
mitted to the bar of his native State in March, 1803; removed to.
Burton, Geauga county, Ohio, in June, 1806, where he has con-
tinued to reside ever since, engaged in the practice of his profes-
sion, except when officially employed; was elected to the Ohio
House of Representatives in 1810, and served one term; was
elected to the Senate of Ohio in 1812, where he served two
years; again elected in 1815, and during the session of 1815-16
Git)

iv EDITORIAL NOTICES.

presided over that body as Speaker; was elected in 1816 a Repre-
sentative in Congress, in which capacity he served two years;
again elected a member of the Ohio Senate in 1833, and’ during
the session of 1834-35 a second time presided over that body as
Speaker; and finally was clectod, in 1850, a member of the Con-
vention which framed the New Constitution of Ohio, while he was
yet Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of the State.

In all these various offices he acted a prominent and distin.
guished part, alike honorable to himself and to his country, with
the history of which he is so identified, that his services will be
appreciated and his fame remembered, as long as that history
shall endure.

Such are the services of Purmn Hrroucock asa Statesman. Asa
Jurist, his services have been still more pre-eminent. For twenty-
eight years he has been a Judge of the Supreme Court—the
Jongest period of service rendered by any Judge in Ohio. His
terms of service were as follows’:

He was commissioned as a Judge of the Supreme Court, Feb-
ruary 5, 1819, in place of Hon. Erman A. Brown, resigned, and
served seven years.

He was again commissioned as Judge of the Supreme Court,
February 1, 1826, to take effect February 5, 1826, the date of the
expiration of his first term, and served seven years.

He was again commissioned as Judge of the Supreme Court,
March 7, 1835, in place of Hon. Jon C. Wriaur, resigned, and
served seven years.

He was again commissioned as Judge of the Suprome Court,
February 16, 1845, and served until the second Monday (9) of
February, 1852, when his term ceased by operation of the New
Constitution, only a few days before the expiration of the full
term for which he was elected by the General Assembly.

He was Chief Judge six years—during 1831, 1832, 1833, and
1849, 1850, 1851, and until his term ceased.

‘The degree of LL. D. has been deservedly conferred upon Judge

EDITORIAL NOTICES.

Hirowcocx, by the Marietta College and the Western Reserve
College.

Distinguished for his profound learning, his vast and varied
attainments, his unsullied integrity, his long, laborious, and useful
services to the public, and for his extensive experience as a Judge,
in which capacity he was Master of the Law; with the confidence
of the Bar and the people, Perzr Hiroxcoox retires from the high
office of Chief Judge, at the age of seventy years, enjoying in an
eminent degree, “ Mens Sana in Oorpore Sano.”

Rurvus P. Sparpine was commissioned as Judge of the Supreme
Court, February 24, 1849, to take effect March 5, 1849.

Wiuisam B. Canpwen, was commissioned as Judge of the
Supreme Court, February 24, 1849, to take effect March 7, 1849.

Rurus P. Rannuy was elected as Judge of the Supreme Court,
his term to commence March 17, 1851; and received his commis-
sion March 24, 1851, in place of Judge Avury, resigned.

[MEMORANDUM.—In this volume of Reports, the Crimuvan
Casus are placed first, the Orvin Cases ar Law next, and the
Ouancrry Casus last. So far as practicable, the different cases
decided upon any one subject have also been placed together.

This order of arrangement can be attended with no disadvan-
tages, and may possibly be found of occasional service in facili-
tating the examination of questions discussed and decided in tho
volume. *

A few Norzs have been appended to some of the cases, either
as confirming the decisions made, or containing references to
analogous principles, or decisions upon the same subject.

The InpEx contains occasional references to points argued by
counsel, and questions made in the cases, though not decided.
This may sometimes be found useful in the investigation of the
same or similar questions hereafter. It was the’ intention of the
reporter to have inserted a Tastm or Contxnrs, but the late day
at which the concluding sheets of the volume were received has
prevented.

Errors, typographical and others, will doubtless be found; but
it is believed they are generally such as the Profession will readily
correct.

THE REPORTER]

Buureroyvarnn, April, 1852.

TABLE OF CASES:

CRIMINAL—OIVIL—CHANOERY.

I. CRIMINAL CASES.

Bucklin v. The State of Ohio.....
Hall v. The State of Ohio...
Hart y. The State of Ohio.
Jones v. The State of Ohio.

18

7
49
384

Il. CIVIL CASES AT LAW.

A.

Adm’r of Black—MeDonald
Adm’r of Lee—MoGovney v..
Adm’r of McGuire v. Canal-boat

Kentucky...
Adm’r of Moore—Turner
Ash v. Marlow...

B.

Bank of Manhattan—Meyers eb
Beckel, Phillips, & Co. v. Knox
Mutual Ins. Co...
Black v. Webb........+. 304
Black's Adm'r—MeDonald v..... 185
Blake's Lessee v. Davis et al..... 231
Boat,Canal, Montgomery v. Kent
Boat, Ganal, Kentucky—Mo-
Guire’s Adm'r Vo...
Borchelt and Wiseman— Kugler
+ 361

62
332
19

174

54

62

Bradley—Spafford v.......
Brown y. Timmany..

Rose v. The State of Ohio... 81
Shafher v, The State of Ohio... 1
Wilson v. The State of Ohio....., 26
Brown & Oo. v. WebBeeeessseseree 889
Brown & Reed—Washington Ins.

00, Vesessesseessereseeeeen wre 199
Burch and Stansbury Reynolds

Wee sessseese B44

0.

Canal-boat Kentucky—Me-

Guire’s Adm’r v...... sn 62
Canal-boat Montgomery v. Kent

Ob Als essesesesessueseeee . 54
Carpenter, State, for use of, v.

Sloane et al... ve 897
Choteau et al. v. Raitt... 182

Chrisman, Adm'rof Moore—Tur-
ner v
Cincinnati Mut. Ins. Go. v. May, 211

D.

Davis et al.—Lesseo of Blakev.. 231
Dempsey & Co.—Hambleton v... 168

E

Erwin & Co., Hunte?i—Meyers
& Waterson V.vececesseneeres 881

vu TABLE OF OCASES—OIVIL.
F. . Lessee of Jennings v. Wood. 261

Ficld—Hunter v. veces 340 Little Miami RR. Co. v. Stevens 415
Fish Lyon yn oq | LOWY. Fish.sstessssseenesseeeeens 100
Fogle—Hildebrand ¥. MT M.
Bulton-—Mad River and L, EB, * gyg | Mad River and Lake Brie R. R.

0+ Vesees Co. v. Fulton. . 818
Finemen’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. May... 211 | yoo aan amet

G.

310
+» 105

Gard and wife—Negley
Graham—Hoarper v.

A.

Hambleton v. Dempsey & G
Haxper v. Graham..
Hildebrand v. Fogle.
Hunter y. Field...
Hunter Erwin & Co.—Myers &

‘Waterson ves.

IJ.

Insurance Co., Cincinnati Mut.,
v. May...

. Insurance Co., Firemen’s Mut.,
vy. May... vee OIL

Ins, Co., Knox Mutu; Philips,
Beckel & Co. v..
Ins. Co., Washington Mutual, v.
Reed & Brown...

168
105
147
340

381

199

Jennings’ Lessee v. Wood... 261
K.
Kent.et al—Canal-boat Mont-

gomery v. we 54
Kentucky,

Guire's Adm’y + 62
King v. Wicks....... 87
Knox Mutual Insurance Co—

Phillips, Beckel & Co. Vivswvese 174

Kugler v. Wiseman & Borchelt.. 361
L
Lee's Adm’s, State, for use of—

McGovney v. . 93
Leslie—Wilson ¥... 161
Lessee of Ward y. Racer 250
Lessee of Blake v. Davis eb al... 231

May—Cincinnati Mut Ins. Co. v. 211
May—Firemen’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. 211
Mason—Morgan et al. Vi... 401
Manhattan Bank—Myers et al.v. 283
McDonald v. Adm’r of Black...... 185
McGovney v. The State, for use
of Lee's Adm’,
McGuire's Adm'r v. Canal-boat
Kentucky . 62
McGibbon & Stewart—Samms v. 69
Montgomery,Canal-boat, v. Kent
etal... .
Moore's Adm'r—Turner v.
Morgan et al. v. Mason
Mutual Ins, Co., Washington, v.
Reed & Brown,
Mut. Ins. Co., Cincinnati, v.
Mut. Ins. Co,, Firemen’s, v. May.. 211
Mut. Ins. Co., Knos, v. Phillips,
Beckel & Co. :
Myers et al. vy. Manhattan Bank. 2
Myers é& Waterson v. Hunter

93

Exwin & Covsssensesssseerseesse 881
N

Negley v. Gard and. wife... 310
0.

Ohio, for use of Carpenter and

¥. Sloane et al. 327
Ohio, for use of Lee's Adm’
MoeGovney etal. Varies 98
PB
Phillips, Beckel & Co. vy. Knox
‘Mutual Insurance Co... 174

R.
Racer—Lessee of Ward V.....0++6

TABLE OF CASES—CHANCERY.

Bb

- Railroad Co.,
Fulton..
Railroad Co.,
Stevens. .
Raitt—Choteau ‘et al.
Reed and Brown—Wash. Mut.
Ins. Co. v.

MR &LE,y

Little Miami, v.

Roynoldsv.
8.
Samms v. Stewart & McKibben. 69
Sheriff of Stark county—Brown
& C0. Vevessesevees sess 389
Sloane et al.—State, for use of
Carpenter and wife. 327

Spafford v. Bradle; 4
Stansbury & Burch—Reynolds v. 344
State, for use of Lee's Adm'r—
McGovney v....
State, for use of Carpenter and
wife, v. Sloane et al. eves BOT
Stevens—Little Miami Railroad

93

Stewart & McKibben—Samms v. 69
Stansbury and Burch—Reynolds

T.

Timmany—Brown V....
‘Treasurer of Lawrence County—
Dempsey & Co. v.
Turner v. Chrisman,
Moore...sssssssesetesssees

w.

‘Ward's Lessee v. Racer.
Washington Mutual Ins.

Reed & Brown...
Waterson & Meyers v. Hunter

Erwin & Co..
Webb—Brown & Co.
Webb—Black
Wicks—King v
Wilson y. Lesli .
Wiseman & Borchelt—Kugler v. 361
Wood—Lessee of Jennings ¥..... 261

81

Il. CHANCERY CASES.

A.

Adm'r of Bollmeyer v. Medina
Co. Ins. Co,
Adm'r de bonis non o}
Filler et al..ceceeseseeeen

529

de bonis non,
Adm’r of Wood—Wood v.
B.

Blizzard, Adm’r de bonis non, v.
Filler, Adm't.
Bollmeyer’s Adm'r v. Medina
Mut. Ins. Co..

See Appendix A,

Cc.

Camp et al.—Follett Veessesesee 546
Canal and Manut’g Oo. of Zanes:
ville v. City of Zanesville... 483
Carey et al. v. Commissioners
‘Wyandot Oo.
Camneal et al.—Irwin's
w 7
City of Zanesville—Zan esville
Canal and Manuf'g Co. Vossen
Clary’s Adm’r de bonis non v.
Karns’ Adm’r..
Collins et al. v. Hope ef
Cotterell v. Long et al.

See Appendix B

x

TABLE OF OASES—CHANCERY.

Comm'rs of Wyandot Co.—Carey

etal. v.*, we - 624
Comm'rs of Crawford Oo. et al.—
Griffith et al. v... - 609

Connery and wife ob al—Me-
Guffey v
Crawford Co. Comm'rs et
Griffith etal. vi"...

KF
Fassett v. Traber et . 540
Fillor, Adm’r of Karns—Bliz-
zayd’s Adm'r v.... - 479
Finley and wife et al—McGuf-

474,

foy¥ 414
Follett v. Reese et al. 546
G
Glass v. Greathouse...
Greathouse—Glass v..

Griffith et al. v. 0. & IR. R. Co.

ccm

Heirs of Irwin v. Longworth et
ale seseetee 581
Hope et al.—Collins et al. v....- 492

L
Ins. Co., Medina Mutual—Palm,

Adm’r, v... . 529
Inwin’s Heirs. Longworth etal} 581

K.
Karns’ Adm’r—Clary’s Adm’r v. 479
Ketchum y. Stout...
L

Long et al—Cotterell v
Longworth et al—Irwin’s Heirs
Vafeees vee BBL

*See Appendix A.

M.
MoGuffey v. Finley and wife etal. 474
McIntire’s Trustee v. The City

of Zamesvill .- 488
Medina Mutual Ins, Co.—Palm,
AGI’, Vessssunsnsesserseecesssessere 529
N.
Neil, Camp & Reese—Follet v... 546
Niswanger—Gwynne Veuve 556
0.

0. & LR, R. Co. et al—Griffith
etal. 7%...

Palm, Adm’r,y. Medina Mut. Ins.
Co.

529

R.

Railroad Co., 0.& I. et al.
fith eb al. v.%......00.
Reese et al.—Follett v..

8
Stout—Ketchum vo...esevee
Ro

Traber ot al—Fassett vo...
w.
Warden, Adm'r of Wood, v.
Wo0d.ersereee
Whiteman, Longworth et al,
Inwin's Heirs v.. sesso BBL
Wood—Wood's Adm'r V.sssee 518
Wyandot Co. Comm’rs—Carey
Z.

Zanesville Canal and Manuf’g Co.
v. City of Zanesville...

624

See Appendix B.

CASES

ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE

Supreme Court of Ohio,

IN BANK.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

PRESENT:
Hon. PETER HITCHCOCK, Carer Jusrioz.
Hon. RUFUS P. SPAULDING,
Hoy. WILLIAM B. CALDWELL, \ Jupens.
Hon. RUFUS P. RANNEY,
JOSEPH McCORMICK, Arrorney-Gunzrat.
WILLIAM LAWRENCE, Reporrer.

Joun H. Saaraer v. Tas Srarz or Ouro.

‘Mazriages in this state, contracted by male persons under the age of eighteen
and female persons under fourteen, are invalid, unless confirmed by co-
habitation after arriving at those ages respectively.

Such marriage, not thus confirmed, does not subject © party to punishment
for bigamy for contracting a subsequent marriage, while the frst husband
or wife is living.

s
Hrror to the common pleas of Warren county.
At the July term, 1850, of the court of common pleas of Warren
vou, xx—1

2,3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Shafher », The State of Ohio.

county, the plaintiff in error was indicted for the crime of big-
amy.

Te was charged with having married one Elizabeth Emerick,
2] *on March 9, 1848, and while she was still living, on March
15, 1850, with baving again marricd one Amanda Fitz. To this
indictment he pleaded not guilty, and on trial at the October term
of the court, for the same year, he was found guilty, and, a motion
for a new trial having been overruled, was sentenced to three
years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary. At his instance a bill
of exceptions was signed and sealed by the judges, and made part
of the record, upon which all the questions presented in this case
arise. By that it appears that “after the prosecution bad given
evidence of the two marriages, as charged in the indictment, the
defendant on his part gave evidence tending to prove that he was
‘but sixtcen years of age on May 26th following the first marriage,
which took place with the consent of his father, and that ho was
eighteen years of age in May following the second marriage; and
that at the time he arrived at that age he was living and cohabit-
ing with his second wife, and within eight or ten miles of the
residence of the first one.” His counsel then requested the court
to instruct the jury “ that if they were satisfied that he was under
the age of eighteen years at the time of the first marriage, such
marriage would be void; or, if not void ab initio, but merely
voidable, that it would become absolutely void unless affirmed by
cohabitation after arriving at that ago.” This instruction the
court refused to give, but did charge the jury that “if ho was
married under the age of eighteen, and lived with his wife until
near that age, he could not marry again without disaffirming that
marriage, and that to do so on arriving at the age of eighteen, or
within a reasonable time after, he must notify the first wife, by
act or declarations, of such disaffirmance, that tho contract was at
an ond, and that he would no longer be bound by it; and thatsuch
disaffirmance must be before another marriage; and further, that
the mero fact that he had left the first wife, and, without her
knowledge, married another, with whom he lived and cohab-
ited, would not amount to a disaffirmance of the first contract.”
8] Exception was taken to the refusal to charge as requested,
and to the charge as given.

Errors assigned: that the court refused to charge as requested,
and that the charge as given was improper.
2

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Shafher o, The State of Ohio.

W. H. Batpwiy, for the plaintiff in error.
J. MoCormicx, attorney-general, for the state.
The cause was submitted without argument.

Rannzy, J. The main question arising in this case is, was the
action of the court of common pleas erroneous? It is one of con-
siderable importance and some difficulty. We have not been
favored with an argument on cither side, and are obliged to decide
from the best lights that a limited examination of the books can
give us, .

The actupon which this indictment is predicated (Swan’s Stat. 230,
sec. 7) provides, ‘That if any married porson, having a husband
or wife living, shall marry any other person,” every such person,
on conviction, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more
than seven nor less than one year. The first indispensable step
to be taken by the prosecution is, to establish the fact that the
person prosecuted is a “married person,” and has “a husband or
wife living.” To do this, a valid marriage in fact must be shown.
The law will not presume it as it will in civil cases. Arch. Crim.
Pl. 476.

The question arising upon this record may be thus stated: Can
a male person under the age of eighteen, or a fomale person under
the age of fourteen years, contract a valid marriage in this state?
To answer this question, we must first resort to our own statute
laws. The first section of the “act regulating marriages” (Swan’s
Stat. 582), passed January 6, 1824, provides, “ That male persons of
the age of eighteen years, and female persons of the age of fourteen.
years, not nearer of kin than first cousins, and not having a hus-
band or wife living, *may be joined in marriage.” The last [4
part of the section provides, that between these ages and the ages
of twonty-one and eighteen, respectively, the consent of the parents
or guardians shall first be obtained. Although the marriage rela-
tion has its foundation in nature, and is indispensable to the moral
improvement and happiness of mankind, a great variety is found
to exist in the municipal regulations of civilized states as to the
ago ut which it may be lawfully entered into. Nature has fixed
no precise period, and each state must for itself, by fixed and rea-
sonable rules, regulate the matter with regard to its own peculiar
circumstances. The common law, as is well known, borrowed
trom the Roman law, fixed the age at fourteen in males and twelve

3

5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
Shafher v. The State of Ohio.

in females. The code Napoleon fixed it at eighteen in males and

fifteen in females. In some of the states of this Union the common-

Jaw rule prevails, and in others the matter is regulated by statute.

In Massachusetts and Illinois it is fixed ai seventeen in males and

fourteen in females ; but marriages contracted below that age are’
rendered valid if followed by voluntary cohabitation. Michigan

and Indiana follow the provisions of our own law. This diversity

of regulation is not in all cases accidental. Nature herself in many

cases demands such variation, An age that would be right and

proper in Spain and Italy would not be adapted to Norway and

Sweden. A state of society and a system of policy that makes

marriage in many cases a convenient means of controlling estates,

and confining property in particular channels, as in Great Britain,

is best subserved by allowing marriages at a period of life when

parental influence and authority is not likely to be overcome by

the strong current of affection and independence incident to ma-
turer years. But such a regulation would be poorly adapted to a
state of society like our own, where no such policy is to be pro-
moted, where fidelity to the marriage vow has all the sanctity of
a religious sentiment, and where all experience has shown that
the blessings of the marriage relation can only be realized when

entered into with the utmost freedom of choice, and between per-

sons of matured judgment and discretion.

5] *Although our statute differs from the common law in fixing
the age at which this contract can be made, still, as it is entirely

silent as to the effect of an attempt to enter into it before the
period presented, we must resort to the exposition of the common

Jaw upon that point; and judicial determinations and the opin-
ions of jurists under that system are strictly applicable. Black-
stone, in his Commentaries (vol. 1, p. 433), has treated this subject
with his usual clearness and force. In discussing the question as
to how marriages may be contracted, and after remarking that
the law regards them in no other light than as a civil contract,

and that all persons willing and able to contract may enter into

them, he proceeds to say that, “In goneral all persons are able to

contract themselves in marriage, unless they labor under some

particular disabilities and incapacities.” These disabilities are

of two sorts, canonical and civil. In relation to the first, he says,

“These in our land only make the marriage voidable, and not

pso facto void, until sentence of nullity be obtained.” In relation

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Shafher v. The State of Ohio.

to the last, he remarks, “ These civil disabilities make the contract
void ab initio, and not merely voidable; not that they dissolve a
contract already formed, but they render the parties incapable of
forming any contract at all; they do not put asunder those who
are joined together, but they previously hinder the junction. And
if any persons, under these legal incapacities, come together, it is
a meretricious and not a matrimonial union.”

He then enumerates three legal disabilities that make the con-
tract void. The first is prior marriage, He then proceeds to say,
“The next legal disability is want of age. This is sufficient to
avoid all other contracts, on account of the imbecility of judgment
in the parties contracting ; @ fortiori, therefore, it ought to avoid
this the most important contract of any. Therefore, if a boy
under fourteen, or a girl under twelve years of age, marries, this
marriage is only inchoate and imperfect, and when either of them
comes to the age of consent aforesaid, they may disagree and
declare the marriage void without any divorce or sentence in the
‘spiritual court. *Although,” he continues to say, “ifat the [6
age of consent they agree to continue together, they need not be
married again.”

Chancellor Kent (2 Com. 78) states substantially the same. He
says, “No persons are capable of binding themselves in marriage
until they have arrived at the age of consent. Marriage before
that age is voidable at the election of either party, on arriving at
the age of consent, if either of the parties be under that age when
the contract is made.”

Judge Reeve (Domestic Rel. 200), in speaking of such contracts,
says, “Such a contract, I apprehend, is void, upon the principle
that it is a contract against sound policy and contra bonos mores.”
Wharton, in his treatise on Criminal Law, 555, says, “If a boy
under fourteen, or a girl under twelve, contract matrimony, it is
void, unless both husband and wife consent to confirm the mar-
riage after the minor arrives at the age of consent.” See also
Poynter on Marriage and Divorce, 154; Arch. Crim. Plead. 477;
Co. Lit. 79; Rex v. Gordon, Eng. Crown Cases, 48.

We think these authorities very conclusively show that the
contract of marriage when entered into by a person under the age
fixed by law, is void, as well for the want of capacity in the infant
to make it, as being opposed to sound policy and the positive re-

quirements of the land. And while it is possible that an occasional
5

7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Shafher v. The State of Ohio.

ease may arise, in which precocious villainy may escape morited
punishment, we should remember, on the other hand, that it might
as often happen that a different holding would place inexperi-
enced and thoughtless youth irretrievably in the power of cunning,
erafty, and interested persons of maturer years. For our law
furnishes no method of obtaining a judicial sentence for annulling
such a marriage; unless the parties have the means of escape in
their own hands, none exist. To admit the right, and deny the
power to make it available, would amount to little less than
absurdity. The court below refused to charge that such a mar-
riage would be void until confirmed by cohabitation after arriving
at the age of consent. In this we think they erred. They did
7) charge that unless *he dissented from the contract on arriving
at such age, and gave the wife notice of the fact, he could not
avoid it. We think acts of assent after age must be shown to bind
him. They did charge that the fact that he had left the first wifo,
and married another, with whom be was cohabiting at the time
of arriving at the age of consent, would not amount to such dis-
sent, while we hold that if such express dissent were required,
such acts would be sufficient.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded fora new
trial.

1. In Oo. Lit. 79, b, it is said: “The time of agreement or disagreement
whon thoy marrie infra annos nubiles, is for the woman at twelve or after, and
for the man at fourteene or after, and there need no new marriage if they so
agree; but disagree they can not before the said ages, and then they may dis~
agreo and marrie againe to others without any divorce; and if they once
after give consent, they can never disagree after.” R. 0. Gordon, R. & R. 48.

2. Byidence of two marriages, the former of which is void, will not sustain
an indictment for bigamy. 3 West. Law J. 134; 5 West. Law J. 376.

On an indictment for bigamy, the admissionsof the defendant as to @ prior
marriage may be given in evidence to prove the fact of such marriage.
‘Wolverton ». Ohio, 16 Ohio, 173.

‘The common law age of consent is changed by our statute to the age of
eighteen in males and fourteen in females, Stat. 582.

6

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 8

Hall v. The State of Ohio.

Rosert Hatt v. Taz Stare or Onto.

Penal statutes are to be construed strictly, and can not be extended, by im-
plication, to cases not falling within their terms.

Such statutes of a local character, referring to persons, places, or things, unless
otherwise expressed, are to be confined to such persons, places, or things
as existed at the time of their passage.

The act of February 9, 1846, “to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors in
the vicinity of certain manufacturing establishments, in the counties of
Scioto, Lawrence, and Jackson,” is to be confined to such manufacturing
establishments as existed at the time of its passage.

Error to the court of common pleas of Lawrence county.

At the April term, a. D. 1848, of the court of common pleas of
Lawrence county, an indictment was found against *plaintiff [8
in error, which charged “that Robert Hall, late of said county, on
March 10, a. D. 1848, at the county aforesaid, did vend and sell
certain spirituous liquors, to wit, one quart of whisky, to one
Andrew J. Razor at the grocery store of said Robert Hall, then
and there situate, within the distance of three miles of a foundry
belonging to Peebles, Wood & Co., then and there an iron foundry,
then and there used for the manufacture of iron-castings within
the county of Lawrence aforesaid, and not located within the
town of Portsmouth, contrary to the form of the statute,” ete.

The indictment was upon a local act of the general assembly,
passed February 9, 1846, entitled “an act to prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquors in the vicinity of certain manufacturing
establishments in the counties of Scioto, Lawrence, and Jack-
son.” 44 Ohio L. L. 64. At the October term, 1848, Hall was
tried and convicted. A bill of exceptions was taken, which
shows that on the trial, “The state called as a witness Andrew J.
Razor, who testified that in March, 1848, he purchased of James
H. Berkley, at a grocery store known by the name of ‘Hall’s
grocery,’ in Lawrence county, a quantity of whisky ; that Borkley
was keoping said grocery; that he had seen Hall present when
Berkley was selling liquor, but whother Hall knew of it could not
say; that witness had never purchased whisky of Hall or in his
presence; that there were measures in the grocery for measuring
liquids, in which witness had seen molasses, vinegar, liquor, and

7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hall v. The State of Ohio.

other liquids measured ; that said grocery was within three miles
of the iron foundry of Peebles, Wood & Co.

, Rodgers, witness for state, testified that said foundry was in
operation only from February, 1848; that said grocery was. a
regular place of business before tho foundry was built, and had
been continuously kept, from before the erection of the foundry.

“ Frampton, witness for state, testified that Hall told witness,
that he (Hall) owned said grocery, but had never seen Hall
participate in the management of it.

“ Dempsey, witness for state, testified, had heard Hall say he
9] *had employed said Berkley as his clerk to attend to said
grocery. The state then rested the case.”

The defendant, in the court below, offered no evidence, but
asked the court to instruct the jury, among other things, “ that, if
the grocery mentioned in the indictment was an established place
of business at the time when said foundry was built, and has been
continued as such since, the selling adjudged in the indictment
was not an unlawful selling,” which instruction the court re-
fused. This was all the evidence given on trial. Motion for a
new trial and in arrest of judgment in due form overruled.

The error assigned and chiefly relied upon is the refusal of the
court to charge the jury as requested.

Josepx W. Wurzuer, for plaintiff:

The conviction is erroneous, because:

1. The act of February 9, 1846, under which this conviction has
been had, is opposed to the laws of Congress to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several states, in so far as it
relates to the sale of imported liquors when sold in the original
cask or vessel in which they were imported. The presumption of
Jaw upon the evidence in this case is that the sale complained of
was 2 lawful one.

2, That the act of February 9, 1846, does not extend to the place
where the alleged sale took place.

38. That tho act of February 9, 1846, is a private or local act,
and should therefore have been specially set forth in the indict-
ment, and proved to the jury.

4, That the court erred in not charging as requested.

‘We will consider these ‘points in the order in which they are
stated.

First. The constitutionality of the act of February 9; 1846, so

8

Po

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 10, 11

Hall v. The State of Ohio.

far as regards the sale of imported liquors, when sold in the origi-
nal cask or vessel in which they were imported.

The extent of the power conferred upon the general government
2*by virtue of that clause of the constitution which declares [10
that Congross shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states, has recently been so fully
and ably discussed in the celebrated license cases reported in 5
Howard’s U: 8. Rep., that any attempt to further elucidate the sub-
ject by argument would be futile. We shall, therefore, merely
point out to the court wherein we think the. principles settled in
these cases are applicable to the present.

As we understand these decisions, the following principles are
clearly laid down by the court:
| 1, “That the laws of Congress regulating foreign commerce au-
thorize the importation of spirits, distilled liquors and brandy, in
casks or vessels not containing less than a certain quantity speci-
fied in the laws upon the subject.”

2. That any state law which prevents or ‘obstructs the importa-
tion or sale of these articles in the original cask or vessel in which
they were imported, is void.

3. That the states may, asa mere matter of police regulation,
impose a license upon, and, to a certain extent, regulate the traffic
in these articles,

4, But that no state law which attempts to prohibit the importa-
tion or the sale of these articles in the original quantity imported,
can be supported as a police regulation. Ch. J. Taney, p. 557;
McLean, J., p. 592; Catron, J., p. 601.

If am right, then, beyond all controversy, the law under which

this prosecution originated is void, in so far as it regards the sale
of imported liquors when made in the original quantity and vessel
in which they were imported, becanse this law prohibits entirely,
in the greater part of three entire counties of the state, the sale of
any spirituous liquors in any quantity.
The logal operation of this law, then, must be restricted to the
prohibition of the sale of domestic liquors, or of the sale of im-
ported liquors when made in less quantity than by law is author-
ized to be imported at one time in any one vessel.

The next question is, does the record in the present caso
*show a state of circumstances which entitles the defendant to [IL
take advantage of the illegality of the law in this particular?

9

12 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hall v. The State of Ohio.

The indictment undoubtedly charges Hall with having made an
illegal sale, because the laws of Congress do not authorize the im-
portation and sale of spirituous liquors in so small a quantity as
one quart; but the averment of quantity in the indictment is im-
material, and may be supported by proof of a sale of any quantity
which may not be legally sold.

The proof is that the defendant sold “a quantity of whisky.”

* How much, or whether imported or of domestic manufacture, does
not appear. Here, then, is proof of a sale which might be lawful
or unlawful, as the character and quantity of the article sold might
vary. What, then, is the presumption of law upon this state of
facts? Undoubtedly, that the article sold was of the character
and in the quantity which would make the sale legal; for every
act which might be lawful is presumed to be so until its illegality
is clearly established.

The burden of showing the circumstances or facts relied upon as
a justification, never rests upon the defendant, except where the
defense is under a license, or under a subsequent law or subse-
quent clause of the same law declaring the offense. 1 Greenl. Ey.
90, 91.

But in this case our defense is under the constitution and laws
of the United States, which can never be said to form exceptions to
the laws of a state. They establish the general rule, and the state
Jaw forms the exception.

Where there is a traffic in an article which is lawful under the
constitution and laws of the United States, and which a state can
not interdict, and also a traffic in the samo article which a state
may legally prohibit, wo think a state, by illegally attempting to
prohibit the entire traffic, can not render that traffic which they
could not legally prohibit, prima facie illegal, so as to throw upon
those engaged in the lawful traffic, the burden of being at all
times prepared (in a state court) to show, affirmatively, the le-
gality of their trade. Such a power might be so exercised as to
effectually prohibit tho traffic altogether. ,

12] *If the legislature of Ohio, in enacting this law, had not
attempted, by prohibiting the entire traffic, to transcend their con-
stitutional powers, the burden of the whole proof would have
rested upon the state, as it should. And can it be said that by
this attempt to exceed their powers, they can cast upon the defend-
ant the burden of showing his innocence?

10

bo

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 13

Hall v. The State of Obio.

Second. The second objection upon which we rely for a reversal
of this judgment is, that the act of February 9, 1846, under which
the prosecution originated, does not extend to the place where the
alleged sale took place.

The foundry was put in operation in the month of February,
1848.

The law in question was passed February 9, 1846, when, and
for more than two years afterward, the foundry mentioned in the
indictment was not in existence.

We claim that this law can not be construed to extend to this
foundry.

This statute must be strictly construed, because:

1. It is highly penal; “and penal statutes are never to be ex-
tended by implication.” Andrews v. United States, 2 Story, 202.

2. It is in restraint of trade; and “statutes which impose re-
strictions on trade or common occupations must be construed
strictly.” Sewall v. Jones, 9 Pick. 402.

8, This- statute was enacted for the benefit of a particular class
of persons—certain iron manufacturors—as opposed to the natural
right of the citizen ; and “statutes made in favor of corporations
and individuals, in derogation of common right, should be strictly
construed.” Sprague v. Burdsell, 2 Cow. 419.

At the time of the passage of this law, and for two years after-
ward, it did not extend to the place where this sale took place,
and nothing in the law itself, or which can be drawn from it by
fair legal construction, will authorize this court to say that the
legislature, at the time of its passage, intended that the law should
apply to this particular place, or contemplated *its exten- [13
sion to any other manufactories than those in existence at the
time.

It is a well-settled principle that statutes referring to or affect-
ing persons, placeg, and things, are limited in their application to
persons, places, and things as they existed at the time the statute
was passed. Kendall, Postmaster-General, v. United States, 12
Pet. 294; United States v. Paul, 6 Ib. 141; Mobile v. Eslave, 16
Ib. 243; Mobile v. Hallet, 16 Ib. 261. .

Again, we claim that this act can not be extended to manu-
factories erected since its passage, because such a construction
would render the act itself, so far, unconstitutional.

The legislative power of this state is vested exclusively in the
li

14 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hall v. The State,of Ohio.

general assembly of the state, and it is not in their power to dele-
gate to any man, or other body of men, any portion of that power.

And any enactment of the general assembly, intended to operate.
asa law of the state, to which the assent of any man or other
body of men is rendered necessary to its, validity as a law, is an
attempted delegation of the power of legislation.

This principle is fully and clearly sustained in the case of
Parker v. Tho Commonwealth, 6 Barr, 515, 516; and recently in
the case of Barto v. Himrod et al.,in Tompkins county, New
York Supreme Court, in which Hon. Wm. H. Shankland, of the
Supreme Court, declared the late free-school law of that state
unconstitutional, because “the tenth and fourteenth sections of
the act expressly referred the question, whether the act became a
jaw or not, to the peoplo at the polls. The power to extend an
existing law to a place where it did not extend, is as much a legis-
lative power as the power to make the original law.

If the operation of this law was made to depend upon an ex-

pression of the will of the people, it would be unconstitutional:
But if such a law would be unconstitutional, much more would a
Jaw be unconstitutional which makes its application to a locality
depend upon the mere act and will of a private individual or
manufacturing company, exercised for mercenary motives.
14] *Before the erection of the foundry described in the indict-
ment, the defendant was engaged at his usual place of doing busi-
ness, in a traffic in spirituous liquors. This traffic was, under the
then existing laws, a lawful business. But without any change
in the law of the land, by the erection of the foundry of Peebles,
;Wood & Co., and immediately upon its going into operation, the
defendant’s business must be abandoned, or he punished as a
‘criminal for exercising it.

The authorities would go very far in warranting the court in
declaring such a law void, even where the law itself was clear and
positive.

“Statutes passed against the plain and obvious principles of
common right and common reason, are null and void, so far as
they are calculated to operate against these principles.” 4 Bac,
Abr. 635, pl. 12; Ham v. Claws, 1 Bay. 93; Morrison v. Backs-

. dalo, Harper, 101.
But where the law itself is not clear and positive in its terms,

12

. DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 16

Hall v. The State of Ohio.

the courts ought not, by construction, to give it an effect so mani-
fostly unjust and unreasonable. 1 Black. Com. 91.

8. M. Brownine, prosecuting attorney, and J. McCormior, at-
torney-general, for the state, submitted the case without argument.

Ranney, J. The plaintiff in error was indicted under the act
of February 9, 1846, “ To prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors,
in the vicinity of certain manufacturing establishments, in the
counties of Scioto, Lawrence, and Jackson.” On trial, he was
found guilty of having sold, on March, 10, 1848, one quart
of whisky, to one Andrew J. Razor, at his grocory store,
within three miles of a foundry owned by Pecbles, Wood & Co.,
in the county of Lawrence. We do not propose to notice but one
of the errors assigned by the plaintiff. It appears by the bill of
exceptions, that it was proved to the jury on the trial, that the
foundry was erected in the month of February, 1848; that the
grocery, at which the liquor was sold, was a regular place of
business before the foundry was built, and *had been con- [15
tinuously kept, from before the building of the foundry until
after the sale of the liquor charged in the indictment. On this
state of facts, the plaintiff in error requested the court to charge
the jury, “that if the grocery mentioned in the indictment was
an established place of business at the time when said foundry
was built, and has been continued as such since, the selling alleged
in the indictment was not an unlawful selling.” This instruction
the court refused to give, and in this we think they erred. The
act upon which the indictment is founded, subjects to a fine of
from ten to one hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the county
jail from ten to thirty days, or both, any person who shall “sell,
or expose to sale, any spirituous or intoxicating liquors, at any
place within a distance of three miles of any irdn-furnace, forge,
-or foundry, used for the manufacturing of pig-iron, bar-iron,
blooms, or iron-castings, within the counties of Scioto, Lawrence,
and Jackson, in this state, except such furnace, forge, or foundry
be located in the town of Portsmouth.” Several considerations
connected with the policy of this law are not easily understood.
Tf right in itself, why should its blessings have been confined to
three counties? If necessary for the manufacturing interests,
why confine it to those of iron alone? And upon what principle
do the people of the town of Portsmouth obtain a dispensation to

. 13

16 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hall v. The State of Ohio.

do acts that are made highly criminal when committed by those
not fortunate enough to live within ber corporate limits? But it
is a law, and although we may not be able to see far enough to
fathom its wisdom, we are bound to give it a fair construction and
enforce its provisions. It is a highly penal law, punishing the
sale of spirituous liquors, in any quantity, when, by the general
law of the state, a quantity above a quart could be freely sold,
and inflicting imprisonment upon the offender, in addition to a
large fine, which it is believed no general law has ever done. It
has long been settled that all such laws must be strictly con-
strued. They can not be extended by implication to casos not
strictly within their terms. Andrew v. United States, 2 Story,
202.

16] *The plaintiff in error, at the time this law passed, and for
two years afterward, was engaged, so far as we know, in a lawful
commerce. His place of business did not stand upon interdicted
ground. He was not within a marine league of one of the favored
establishments.

He was outside of the territorial limits covered by the law; it
did not extend to him or over him; and the question is, could
Peebles, Wood & Co., two years after its passage, carry it there,
extend it over him, and break up his business? We think not.
Tho statute prohibits the sale of spirituous or intoxicating liquors,
within three miles of any iron-furnace, forge, or foundry within
the countics named. There is no intimation in the act that it is
to extend to establishments erected after its passage.

A well-scttled rule of construction here comes in to our aid,
which is, that “a statute referring to, or affecting persons, places,
or things, is limited in its operations, to persons, places, or things
as they existed at the time the statute was passed.” I shall refer
put to one case in illustration of this rule, and if I do not mis-
judge, it is identical in principle with the present.

It is the case of the United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141. The
prisoner was indicted in the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Southern District of New York, in October, 1830, and charged
with breaking, with an intention to steal, into a store situated at
‘West Point, in the State of New York, and within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The indictment was
founded upon section 3 of the act of Congress, entitled “an act
hore effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes

14 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. ly

Hall v. The State of Ohio.

against the United States, and for other purposes,” passed March
8, 1825. This section provides that “if any offense shall be com-
mitted in any of the places aforesaid [forts, dock-yards, etc.,
ceded by a state to the United States], the punishment of which
offense is not specially provided for by any law of the United
States, such offense shall, upon a conviction in any court of the
United States having cognizance thereof, be liable to, and receive
the same punishment as the laws of the state, in which such fort,
*etc., is situated, provide for the like offense, when committed [17
within the body of any county of such state.” The offense charged
in the indictment was not burglary by the laws of New York, in
1825, but was made so in 1829. The question was whether this
section was to be limited to the laws of the several states, in force
at the time of its enactment, and upon this question the circuit court
divided. The Supreme Court held that it was; that although the
charge against the defendant was made burglary in 1829, a year
before he had broken into the store, the prosecution was confined
to the laws of the State of New York in force at the time the act
of Congress was passed. The law of Congress refers to the “laws
of the state in which such fort, etc., is situated.” This statute
refers to “any iron-furnace, forge, or foundry within the counties
of Scioto, Lawrence, and Jackson.” It would be quite as unwar-
_ rantable to extend this statute to all furnaces, forges, and foundries
that might be afterward erected, as it would the act of Congress
to laws of the states afterward- passed. We therofore give this
extraordinary law a local habitation, by holding that it extended
for three miles around every furnace, forge, and foundry in the
counties of Scioto, Lawrence, and Jackson, existing at the time of
its passage, always exempting the town of Portsmouth; and that it
is not migratory in its habits or capacities—that it only punishes
those who go within its reach, and does not go after them. It is
only when Mahomet goes to the mountain, and not when the
mountain comes to Mahomet, that its penalties can be invoked.
The judgment is reversed.
15

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Bucklin v. The State of Ohio.

18] *OnarLzus Buoxiin v. Tas Srarz or Ouro.

‘Where a witness is called for the purpose of impeaching the cbaracter for
truth and veracity of a witness called on the other side, such impeaching
witness can only speak of the general reputation of the witness sought to
be impeached, in the community, and can not give his own opinion of
his character. (1)

Error to the court of common pleas of Henry county.

At the May term, 1849, of said court, Bucklin, now plaintiff in
error, was indicted for retailing spirituous liquors by less quantity
than a quart without license; and at the April term, 1850, he was
tried and convicted on said indictment, and fined.

During the trial a bill of exceptions was taken, which shows
that the state introduced as a witness, Reuben Lamphier, who
gave evidence tending to prove the defendant on trial guilty.
“The defendant then called J. M. Veris, as a witness on the part
of defendant, who testified that he was acquainted with the pros-
ecuting witness, Reuben Lamphier, and that he had the means of
knowing his character for truth and veracity. Defendant then asked
said witness ‘what the character of said Lamphier was for truth
and veracity; to which question the state, by the prosecuting
attorney, objected, and said objection was sustained by the court,
The court decided that the question should be as to the general
reputation of the said witness, Reuben Lamphier, for truth and
veracity, which question was then asked by the defendant’s at-
torney, in accordance with said decision of the court.” ~

The errors assigned are :

1. That the court erred in refusing to permit the defendant’s
attorney to ask the witnesses as to the character of said Lamphier
for truth and veracity.

19] 2. *The courterred in deciding that the proper question to be
asked was, as to what was the reputation of Lamphier for truth
and veracity.

Spm & Murray, for plaintiff:

This case is reserved for the purpose of settling a question of

(1) Upon this question the cases of Wilson v. Runyan, Wright's 8. C. 651,
and Secly o. Blair, Wright, 683, are overruled.
16 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 20

Bucklin v. The State of Ohio.

practice, and presents the question: Whether the testimony of a
witness on the stand will be permitted to be impeached by tes-
timony of his general bad character for truth and veracity, or
whether a party seeking to impeach the testimony of a witness is
restricted in his inquiries as to the reputation of the witness for
truth and veracity.

Did the court of common pleas decide correctly in refusing to
allow us to prove the genoral bad character of this witness for
truth and veracity, for the purpose of impeaching his testimony ?
We claim that they did not. The proper distinction between gon-
eral character and reputation is this: that in the first case the
witness testifics from his own personal knowledge of tho character
of thé witness sought to be impeached, as he may have become
acquainted with it in his general habits and conduct. On the
other hand, the witness who testifies from reputation alone, testifies
from the mere rumor and scandal of community—neighborhood
talk—without any reference to the truth or falsity of those reports.

The question having never before been thought worthy of consid-
eration in bank, we are compelled to look to the decisions of tho
court on the circuit, and to the reason of the rule in tho case of
Jane Wilson v. Runyan, decided in Wright, 651. The court, per
Wright J., say: “It has been repeatedly decided by this court
that tho proper questions to ask on such examinations are:

“1, Have you the means of knowing the general character of
the witness for truth ?

“Te the answer be in the negative, you can ask no further;
*but if the answer be affirmative, you may ask one orthe [20
other of the following questions:

“2. From your knowledge of his character, would you believe
him under oath; or,

«Ts his character for truth as good as that of men in general ?”

These are precisely the questions sought to be asked in this case.

The court further say: “It is the character, the conduct, and the
habits of the witness which it is sought to learn, not his reputation
alone, or what the world says of him. His character may bo well
known to the witness as infamous, such as to render him unworthy
of belief; and yet the knowledge of it may not have gone abroad
so as to affect his reputation. Suppose I have raised a child, and
know him to be a thief and a liar, unworthy of belief on oath, but _
the knowledge of his character has not gone abroad. It is obvious

VoL, Xx—2 Ww

21 . SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Bucklin v. The State of Ohio.

that it is my knowledgo which discredits the witness, and which
should go to the jury. A good reputation may be offered to sus-
tain the character as one means of refuting the impeaching evi-
dence, for without a good character it must be supposed difficult
to acquire a reputation for one.” Seely v. Blair, Ib. 683.

Establish the rule as claimed by the court, and what is the result?
You pay a premium on hypocrisy. No matter how criminal, how
abandoned, how vicious a man may be—if

“he was a man
‘Who stole the livery of heaven,
To serve the devil in”—

if he had skill and cunning sufficient. to secure for himself a rep-
utation in community at variance with his true character and
practice—he is safe, he may testify with impunity; and the man
who does know him, who has detected his private character, has
beheld him stripped of the guise that covers him, he is prohibited
from making that character known, and is compelled to admit the
21] general reputation of the man to be *good, and in effect, to
confirm and strengthen his testimony, even when conscious that
the character of the man is such as ought to cause a jury to look
upon his testimony with suspicion, if not to roject it altogether.
Phillips. on Ev, 212; Rex v. Clark, 2 Stark.; Boyd v. Lewis, 13
Johns, 504. Seealso Jackson v. Osborn, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 555;
see also Manson v. Hartsink, 4 Esp. N. P. ©. 102; Hume v.
Scott, 8 Marsh. 261; Noel v. Dickey, 3 Bibb, 268; McNally’s Ev.
221; King v. Rockwood, 4 State Trials, 461, and cases cited;
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 14 Mass. 387; 2 Hayw. 300; 3 Dev.
(N. GC.) 209; Stato v. O'Neal, 4 Iredell, 88; Blue v. Kirby, 4
Monroe, 195; People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569.

J. McCormiox, attorney-general, for defendant:

Ido not find the form of question ruled out by the court, st sus
tained by any of the clementary writers. They invariably carry
the question to general character or general reputation, as contra-
distinguished from specific character or reputation within the
private knowledge of the individual testifying, and declare the
latter inadmissible.

Tt is truco that in some English cases, impeaching witnesses, on
examinations in chief, have been permitted to give their opinions,

18

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. . 22

Bucklin v. The State of Ohio.

formed from their own Knowledge of the habits and conduct of
the witness impeached, and also their knowledge of particular
circumstances and transactions, which were discreditable to the
witness; but so far as my examination extends, these wore cases
growing out of political transactions, in which the conviction of
the defendant had becomo necessary to the government; and in
which the ordinary and well-recognized rules of law were sot
aside,

Apart from cases of this sort, I know of none which go so far
as the cases cited by the plaintiff in error from Wright’s Reports,
nor do I think the rulings in those cases, or the reasons thereof,
maintained by the principles of justice or sound philosophy.

*The words “character and reputation,” and the terms “gen- [22 .
‘eral character and general reputation,” have been used by judges
and elementary writers indiscriminately, and as having and con-
veying the same meaning. 1 Greenl. Ev. 540; 1 Stark. Hy. 211,.
n. 1; 2 Phil. 431, 432; 4 Phil. 750-760,

Catpwett, J. The plaintiff in error was indicted for selling
liquor without a license, tried and convicted. On the trial a bill
of exceptions was taken to tho ruling of the court, on which a
single question is presented, After the state had rested, the de-
fondant called J. M. Veris as a witness, who testified that he was
acquainted with the prosceutitg witness, Reuben Lamphicr, and
that he had the means of knowing his character for truth and
veracity. Defendant then asked said witness what the character
of said Lamphier was for truth and veracity, to which question
the prosecuting attorney objected, and the objection was sustained
by the court. The court decided that the quostion should be as
to the general reputation of the said witness, Reuben Lamphier,
for truth and veracity, which question was then asked by defendant.
It is contended that the court erred in overruling the question as
above stated.

In 1 Phillips’ Evidence, 291, the rule is laid down thus:
“The party against whom a witness is called may disprove the
facts stated by him, or may examine other witnesses as to his
general character.”

The author then quotes the language of Chief Justice Buller:
“That to impeach the credit of a witness, you can only examine
as to his general character, and not to particular facts. And the

19

23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Bucklin v. The State of Ohio.

reason given is, that every man is supposed to be capable of sup-
porting his general character ; but is not to be supposed capable
of supporting his character as to particular facts.” It is stated
that the regular mode of inquiring into general charactor, is to
inquire of the witness whether he has the means of knowing tho
former witness’ general character; and if so, what it is. In the
case of Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 Serg. & Rawle, 337, Justice Gibson
says: “The witness is to give, not his own judgment of the matter,
23] but the aggregate result *of at least a majority of the voices
he has heard; or, in other words, he must state what the common
report is among those who havo the best opportunity of judg-
ing of the habits and integrity of the person whose character
is under consideration.” The judge further remarks: “The
reputation of the neighborbood is the only thing that is compo-
tent.”

In 1 Starkie’s Evidence, 147, in a note, the rule is laid
down as follows: “A witness called to impeach or support the
general character (reputation) of another, is not to speak of his
private opinion, or of particular facts in his own knowledge; but
he must speak of the common reputation among his neighbors
and acquaintances. The only proper questions to be put to him,
are, whether he knows the general character (reputation) of the
witness intended to be impeached in point of truth, among his
neighbors, and what that character (reputation) is—whether good
or bad?”

In 1 Greenleaf’s Evidence, 539, the author says: “But in im-
peaching the credit of a witness, the examination must be con-
fined to his general reputation, and not be permitted as to
particular facts. The regular mode of examining into the general
reputation, is to inquire of the witness whether he knows the
general reputation of the porson in question among his neighbors;
and what that reputation is.”

There is one thing to be observed in reference to tho terms
character and reputation: that, although differing widely in signi-
fication, when strictly used, yet when-used in this connection,
both by authors and courts, they are generally used as synony+
mous terms; the term general character being used to signify
what would perhaps be more definitely expressed by general repu-
tation. The term “character,” when more strictly applied, refers
to the inherent qualities of the person, rather than to any opinion

20

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 24, 25

Bueklin ». The State of Ohio.

that may be formed or expressed of him by others. The term “rep-
utation” applies to the opinion which others may have formed
and expressed of his character; so that, as has been remarked-in
some of the books, when treating on this subject, a man’s char-
acter may really be good, when *his reputation is bad, and, [24
on the other hand, his reputation may be good, when his character
is bad. But, as we have before intimated, the terms, when used
in connection with this subject, are generally used in contradic-
tion to this distinction ; the term “general character” being used in
Jogal signification, as it is frequently used in common parlance, to
express the opinion that has generally obtained of a person’s
character—the estimate community generally has formed of it.
When you ask.a witness, then, in this sense of the term, what a
man’s general character is for truth and veracity, he is called on
to answer as to what opinion is generally entertained and ex-
pressed of him, by those acquainted with him. When, on the
other hand, you ask a witnéss what is the character of a person
for truth and veracity, without the qualifying term, you ask him
to state what is his own opinion of the character of the party,
vather than the general opinion of community. The current of
authorities is very strongly in favor of the rule, that it is the
general opinion of the party’s character, and not the individual
opinion of the witness called for the purpose of impeaching, that
is competent to be given in evidence. The reason given in most
of the books for the rule, that you can not impeach the character
of a witness by the proof of specific facts, is, that whilst every
man, in contemplation of law, is supposed to be always ready to
defend his general character, he is not presumed to be ready,
without notice, to defend bis character against specific charges.
The same objection would exist to permitting an impeaching
witness to give his individual opinion of the character of the wit-
ness that he may be called on to impeach. A person can no more
be presumed to be able, without notice, to disprove the opinion
which individuals may have formed of his character, than he
could be to disprove specific facts.

As to the charge of general bad reputation, if untrue, every
person in the neighborhood can give specific evidence rebutting
it. If not able to state affirmatively, that the person is well
spoken of in the neighborhood, the witness can state that he

knows of no such general bad reputation ; which goes *directly [26
21

26 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Wilson v. The State of Ohio.

to rebut the allegation of its existence. In the case now before us,
the question was not put as to the genoral character or reputation
of the witness sought to be impeached; and in this we think it
was objectionable, and that the court did not err in ruling it out.

Tho case of Wilson v. Runyan, Wright, 653, and also Seoly v.
Blair, Ib. 683, are relied on by plaintiff in error. In both those
cases the reasoning is predicated on the theory that the impeaching
witness may state the character of the person sought to be im-
peached from his own knowledge, without reference to the reputa- _
tion such person may have acquired in community. We think,
however, these cases are contrary to the current of authority,

Another question was suggested in argument, which does not
arise in this case, but which-is certainly one of some importance ;
and that is, whether the question should be limited to general
character for truth and veracity, or whether it should not be per-
mitted to general character without such limitations. There are
some very strong reasons in favor of the latter rule; but as that
question does not now present itself for our decision, we do not
feel authorized to go into a discussion of it.

The judgment of the common pleas is affirmed.

26] *Davip Wizson v. Tax Srare or Onto. .

“Where distinct offenses are charged in separate counts of an indictment, the
jury must cither return a general verdict, or else respond to each charge
in their finding.

“Where the defendant was charged in one count with an assault with intent to
commit murder, and in another count with shooting with intent to kill,
which are distinct offenses under the Ohio statute, and the jury returned

+ guilty of “an assault with intent to Kill and murder George Lewis, in
manner and form as alleged, ote,” but said nothing as to the charge of
shooting, etc., the finding is insufficient. (1)

(2) On an indictnent containing two counts substantially alile, a verdict
of acquittal upon one, and of guilty upon the other, does not necessarily present
such a case of repugnancy as to roquire an arrest of judgment. 18 Ohio, 453,

‘Where an indictment contains two counts for the same offense, one good
and the other bad, judgment may be given on the good count, upon a general
vordict of guilty. Turk. Ohio, 7 Ohio, 240, pt. 2.

22

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

‘Wilson v. The State of Ohio.

Error to the court of common pleas of Lucas county.

In that court Wilson was tried and convicted upon an indict-
ment containing two sets of counis, upon two distinct statutory
offenses, to wit: an “assault with intent to commit a murder,”
under section 17 of the act for the ‘punishment of crimes; and a
“shooting with intent to kill,” under section 24 of the same act.
" ‘The jury returned, as their verdict, “that the defendant is guilty
of an assault with intent to kill and murder George Lewis, in
manner and form as is alleged in said indictment.”

‘Thereupon followed a sentence of imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary for four years, etc.

Before the jury was sworn at the trial term, the defondant below
moved the court to compel the prosecutor to elect upon which class
of the counts in said indictment he would undertake to convict
the defendant, but the court overruled the motion, and exception
was duly taken.

*The defendant below also moved for a new trial for insuffi- [27
ciency of evidence, and in arrest of judgment, because the indict~
ment charged the defendant with different crimes which have dif-
ferent punishments. Both of these motions were overruled, for
which reason a bill of exceptions was taken.

The overruling of all these motions, and the insufficiency of the
verdict to warrant judgment, are assigned for error.

Spink & Mornay, for plaintiff:

The finding of the jury does not pass upon all the issues sub-
mitted to them,.and is not sufficient to sustain the judgment. It
is true they have passed upon the issue presented by tho sct of
counts charging an offense under section 17 of the statute; but
upon that set of counts charging an offense under section 24 of
the statute, thoy have not passed; and it seems to us that upon this
state of facts, and in dospite of the positive prohibition of the
constitution of the state that he shall not be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense, the plaintiff in error may still be indicted and
tried for the same offense of shooting at George Lewis, with intent
to kill. We believe it to be a well-established rule of civil prac-
tice, that a jury must pass upon all the issues submitted to them,

Where an indictment contains threo separate counts, and the jury say they
find the defendant not guilty on the first, but can not agree on tho other
counts, it is not error for the court to refuse to receive the verdict and have it
recorded. Hurley v. Ohio, 6 Ohio, 399,

23

28 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Wilson v. The State of Ohio.

else their finding is bad. 4 Ohio, 108; Thornton v. Sprague,
Wright, 165; Patterson v. United States, 2 Wheat. 221. See also
French v. Thompson, 5 Vt. 54; Miller v. Tato, 1 Ld. Raym. 324;
Hadley v. Stiles, 2 Salk. 664; Garnish v. Train, 3 Pick. 124; Trip-
lett v. Micon, 1 Rand. 269.

Tho finding the prisoner guilty of an assault with intent to
murder, is not an acquittal on those counts charging the shooting
with intent to kill,—nor is it a substantial finding of any kind on
them. The reason is obvions. David Wilson may be guilty of
both offenses. If guilty, he may have beon charged in two sepa-
rate indictments, tried, convicted and punished for both offenses ;
28] and wo presume it will not for a moment be *claimed that a
trial and conviction, or acquittal, under one indictment, would be
a bar to a prosecution under the other. Hurley v. The State, 6
Ohio, 403; 6 Johns. 688; Jones, 163; Caine’s Ab, 478.

‘We claim that the court erred in refusing to compel the pros-
ecuting attorney to elect on which sct of counts he would prosecute,
while we admit that a grand jury may find as many separate in-
dictments against the same person for the same offense as they see
proper, and no objection can be taken on that account, further than
the record, in one case, would be a bar to the further prosecution
of the others; yet we claim the rule to be equally well established,
that where different offenses are charged on separate counts in the
same indictment, it is the duty of the court, on the request of the
defendant, to compel the prosecutor to elect on which set of counts
he will proceed ; that it does not rest in the discretion of the court
to gravt or refuse the motion at pleasure, but is so far a duty that
their proceedings thereon may be reviewed on error.

We claim that the indictmont in this case is defective, for the
reason that it contains counts charging different offenses of a dif-
ferent nature and degree. We suppose there can bo no dispute of
the proposition that offenses of the same nature and degree may
be charged in different counts in the same indictment; and we
suppose it to be an equally well-settled rule, that where there are
separate and distinct offenses charged, so that the record in one
ease would not be a bar to prosecution in the other, they can not
be joined, even in different counts, in thesame indictment. Barton
v. State of Ohio, 18 Ohio, 221.

We further claim that this indictment is defective for the reason
that tbe several counts are good counts, not only for assault with

24

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 29, 80

‘Wilson v. The State of Ohio.

intent to murder, but are also good counts for shooting with intent

to kill, and are therefore bad for duplicacy. .
‘Wm. H. Hann, prosecuting attorney, and J. McCormaor, attorney-

general, for the state, submitted the case without argument,

*Spautpine, J. We have once before reviewed and reversed [29
the procecdings of the Lucas common pleas upon an indictment
for this same offense. Wilson v. The State, 18 Ohio, 143.

That indictment had but four counts, while this has eight. The
merit of an indictment is not always enhanced in an exact ratio
with the number of counts.

Nothing contributes more to the strength and safety of crim-
inal pleadings than brevity.

Prolixity tends to the embarrassment of both judge and jury.

“Tt has been the constant aim of modern legislation,” said Lord
Denman, in Reg. v. O'Connell, 11 Clark & Fin. 15, “to simplify
criminal charges, nor is any object worthier of attention in
framing the code of every civilized country.”

For my own part, I do not like the practice of setting forth more
than one distinct offense in the same indictment.

But cortain it is, if the prosecutor be permitted to charge the
prisoner with divers crimes, subject to different shades of pon-
alties, all in the same indictment, the plea of not guilty, by the
accused, puts in issue the truth of all the charges, and we aro of
opinion that the finding by the jury should be equally extensive.

“The jury may acquit the defendant of a part, and find him

guilty of the residue. They may convict him upon one count of
the indictment, and acquit him of the charge contained in another,
and, in general, where from the evidence it appoars that the do-
fendant has not been guilty to the extent of the charge specified,
he may be found guilty as far as the evidence warrants, and be
acquitted as to the residue.” 1 Ohitty’s Crim. Law, 637.
” In the case at bar, the jury have found the dofendant guilty of
an “assault with intent to murder,” which is punishable by im-
prisonment in the penitentiary for a term not more than seven
years, and have said nothing in regard to the charge of “shoot-
ing with intent to kill,” which last crime may be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for twenty years.

*These are distinct and independent offenses, and if per- [80

25

31 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Wilson v. The State of Ohio.

mitted to be joincd atall in the same indictment; we think should
be responded to by the verdict.

In the case of Hurley v. The State, 6 Ohio, 404, Wood, Judge,
in pronouncing the opinion of the court, takes occasion to say,
“A verdict in either a civil or criminal case must ‘be considered
an entire thing.

“Tt must respond to the whole declaration, and to every count in
the indictment, or the court can not legally receive it as the verdict
of the jury.”

We are not prepared to take this dictum of the learned judgo
to be law without many grains of allowance. The point did not
arise in the case, and was not necessarily decided by the court.
‘We are aware, too, of the reported decisions in several of the
states recognizing the doctrine that when an indictment contains
two counts, and a verdict of guilty is found upon one, and there
is no finding as to the other, the verdict is good, and judgment
of acquittal should be entered upon the one not noticed. 4 Scam.
851; 6 Ala. 200; 7 Blackf. 186, ete.

But we think it prudent in.the case of distinct and independent
offenses, especially where they aro made so by the statute, and
are subjected to different degrees of punishment, to require the
jury, in the absence of a general verdict, to affirm or negative
each charge in their finding.

This may not be absolutely necessary to protect the accused
against a second prosecution for the offense not passed upon by
the jury; but, if there be any doubt at all upon that subject, it is
sufficient to warrant us in establishing the rulo.

That it does admit of some doubt, we may gather from pretty
high authority:

In United States v. McKeon, 1 McDean, 444, the judge says,
“On four of the counts, the jury have found the defendant guilty;
on one of them there is no finding. . . . . The suggestion is
not without some force, that finding the defendant guilty on the’
81] four counts, implies strongly that he is *not guilty of the
othor count. In this view, however, the question is not clear of
difficulty. The finding of the jury is not special as to the facts,
but it may be said to be partial, as it does not include all the
counts. And there is no precedent in such a case for amending
the verdict.

“The finding is full on the four counts, but it is admitted that

26

33 " SUPREME COURT OF OHi0.

Rose v. The State of Ohio.

prisoner was in, jail, and could not be prosent; that the indict-
ment was insufficient in law; that the court rendered judgment
on the verdict.

Tho bill of exceptions shows that upon the trial of the accused,
“after the evidence was closed upon both sides, and the prosecuting
attornoy opened the cause to the jury, by argument, the court ad-
journed for dinner, and theroupon the sheriff placed the said
Luke Rose, defendant, in jail, where he remained until after the
cause was argued on the defense and closed by the state, and the
verdict returned by the jury and received by the court, in the ab-
sence of said defendant, the prisoner, and while said prisoner was
so in jail, but during all said time the counsel of the prisoner was
present, and made no objection to said proceedings,” because of
the absence of the prisoner.

D. W. Srampauen, for plaintiff in error, cited 11 Ohio, 472; 18
Ib. 469; 16 Pick. 423 ; 5 How. (Miss.) 730.

J. McCorutor, attorney-general, submitted the case without ar-
gument.

33] *Hrrencoor, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

From the facts disclosed in the bill of exceptions, it appears
that, on the trial of this case, the accused was in court from the
commencement of the trial until the close of the opening argumont
for the prosecution, at which time the court adjourned for dinner.
Upon the adjournment of the court, the sheriff took the prisoner
into custody, and committed him to jail, where he remained during
the residue of the argument, and until after the verdict had been
returned, and the jury discharged. The counsel for the prisoner
were present during the trial of the prisoner, and when tho
verdict was returned. On account of the confinement of the ac-
cused, as before stated, and his absence from the court, he moved
for a new trial, which was overruled; and the question presented for
the consideration of this court is, whether, under the circum-
stances, the accused was entitled to a new trial.

In section 11, of article 8, of the constitution of 1802, it is
provided: “That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a
right to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy
thereof; to meet the witnesses, face to face,” etc. Now an accused
person can not enjoy these privileges, especially the last, unless
28

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 32

Rose v. The State of Ohio.

the first count, on which there is no finding, must be disposed of ;
and if this can not be done by the entry of not guilty, as above
suggested, or by a discontinuance, the verdict must be set aside.”

This opinion was pronounced on a motion for a new trial, and
the conclusion was that Judge McLean permitted the district
attorney to enter a nodle prosequi on the first count, and then pro-
ceeded to render judgment on the verdict.

It is deemed unnecessary to notice further the points made by
plaintiff in error.

The judgment of the common pleas will be reversed, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings.

Luxe Ross v. Tax Starz or Onto.

“On the trial of an indictment for a criminal offense, and at the return of the
‘verdict, it is the right of the accused to be present; and, if prevented by
imprisonment, or other improper means, he is entitled to a new trial. (1)

Error to the court of common pleas of Huron county.

At the February term, 1851, of the court of common plas
of Huron county, the plaintiff in error was indicted for en
*assault and battery upon, one Caroline Rose, with an intent [82
to commit a rape upon the person of the said Caroline. To this
indictment the accused pleaded not guilty. "The case was tried
by a jury, who returned a verdict of guilty against the plaintiff
in error, as charged in the indictment.

The plaintiff in error then moved the court for a new trial,
which motion was overruled, and judgment was announced in
pursuance of Jaw.

To the opinion of the court overruling the motion for a new
trial, the plaintiff in error excepted, and his bill of exceptions was
signed by the judges of the court, and made part of the record.

The crrors assigned are: That the court overruled the motion
for a new trial; and the court erred in proceeding with the trial,
charging the jury, and receiving the verdict of the jury, while the

(2) In criminal cases the verdict should be received in presence of the
prisoner, that he may have the jury polled. Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio, 472.
eve

35 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Johes v. The State of Ohio.

jurisdiction conferred upon it by the act of February 7, 1831, “to organize
the judicial courts,” Swan's Stat. 222; and the act of February 7, 1831,
“directing the mode of trial in criminal cases.” Swan's Stat. 724.

Error to the Supreme Court of Hamilton county.

The plaintiff in error was indicted in the court of common pleas
35] of Hamilton county, at the July term, 1849, for the *murder
of John Brasher. The indictment contained but one count, and
the charge was murder in the first degree. The plaintiff in error
elected to be tried in the Supreme Court, to which court the indict-
ment and other papers in the case were certified pursuant to the
statute.

At the May term, 1850, of the Supreme Court, the case was sub-
mitted to.a jury, and by the jury the accused was found guilty of
murder in the second degree; whereupon the then defendant, now
plaintiff in error, moved the court for a now trial, and assigned
the following reasons:

1. That the court erred in refusing to’ charge the jury that a
constable or watchman of the city of Cincinnati has no authority
to arrest a person, except on actual view or commission of an
offense, or to preserve the peace, without a warrant legally issued,
authorizing such arrest; and the judges being equally divided
in opinion as to the law in such case, refused to charge on that
point. .

2. The court erred in not directing the jury that a difference in
opinion between the judges composing the Supreme Court, upon
a principle of law nocessary to be decided in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused, created a reasonable doubt
to be construed in the prisoner’s favor.

3, Lhe court erred in permitting the prosecuting attorney to
comment upon and denounce the character of the accused as cor-
rupt, vicious, and criminal, when said accused had not put his
character at issue.

4, The court erred in permitting persons to testify as witnosses
who were entitled to a reward upon the condition that the accused
should be convicted. .

5. The verdict of the jury was not warranted by the evidence.

This motion was overruled by the court, and the prisoner was
sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary, pursuant to law.
Thereupon the then defendant excepted to the opinion of the

30

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 34.

Jones v. The State of Ohio.

present in court during his trial, so that he may be said to have a
constitutional right to be present.

Again, an accused person, when a verdict of guilty is returned
against him, has aright to have the jury-polled. This privilege
is never in this state denied in a criminal caso, although it is a
matter of discretion with the court whether it shall or shall not bo
allowed in a civil case. Of this privilege the accused person ia
deprived unless present when tho verdict is returned. We con-
ceive it to be the right of an accused person to be present during
the trial of his case, and at the return of the verdict, and we think
that when deprived of these privileges by being imprisoned in a
jail, or in any other improper manner, the verdict returned
against him should not be followed *by judgmont or sentence [34
of the court, but a new trial should be ordered if requested.

These rights may be waived by the accused person, if he think
proper, but whether they can be waived by his counsel is matter
of doubt. But, certainly, the fact that his counsel are present in
court during the trial, and at the return of the verdict, and do not
raise any objection on account of his absence, does not amount to
a waiver.

The court of common pleas erred in not granting a new trial,
for which error the judgment is reversed, and the case remanded
for a new trial.

: Jussz Jonus v. Tau Starz or Oxto.

‘The mere failure of an inferior court to instruct a jury upon a particular
point of law arising in a case is not erreonous.

To make such failure a ground of error, the court should have been requested
to instruct upon the point.

‘Tho judgment of an inferior court can not be reversed for matter not appar-
ent upon the record, and if the errors assigned have any reference to the
facts of a case, those facts should be made part of the record by bill of
exceptions. (1)

The act of March 12, 1848, to regulate the judicial courts and the practice
thereof,” 43 Obio L. 80, does not take from the Supreme Court the criminal

(1) Ona writ of error, nothing is examinable but what is set forth in the
record. 7 Ohio, 212, pt. 1.
29

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 36, 37

Jones 'v. The State of Ohio.

court in overruling his motion for a new rial, and his bill of ex-
ceptions was allowed, sealed, and made part of the record, as fol-
low:
+ Be it remembered, that on the trial of the above cause, [36

ote., there was no evidence that the said John Brasher, who was a

day-watch, had a warrant to arrest the said Jesse Jones, and there

was evidence tending to prove that said Brasher had, on the day

previous to the alleged killing, arrested, without warrant, and dis-

charged the said Jesse Jones, and, at the time of the killing, was

attempting to arrest the said Jesse Jones without any warrant»

but only upon the charge and suspicion that the said Josse had

committed a crime; that, on the facts, it was material matter of

Jaw to determine whether a constable or watchman had the right

to arrest without warrant, and the court being divided in opinion

as to the law upon that point, so told the jury, and said that they

could not charge them whether a warrant was necessary or not,

and did not charge the jury upon that point of law; and, also,

that the prosecutor commented injuriously upon the character of
the prisoner, when the same had not been put in issue, and the

prosecutor claimed it as a matter of just inference, for which, and

other reasons assigned on motion of a new trial, the court refused

to grant a new trial, and overruled the same, to which ruling and

determination the counsel for the prisoner excopts, and prays that

this bill of exceptions be signed and sealed as a true bill, and that

the same be made part of the record in this case.”

This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the sentence and,
judgmont of the Supreme Court. The errors assigned are:

I, That the court erred in not charging the jury that a warrant
issued in due form of law, by a magistrate or other officer
legally authorized, was necessary to enable an officor to effect
a legal arrest, except upon actual view of the commission of an
offonse. -

If. That the’ court erred in not charging the jury that a differ-
ence of opinion between the judges composing the Supreme Court,
upon a principle of law necessary to be decided in the determina-
tion of the guilt or innocense of the accused, was a reasonable
doubt to be construed in the prisoner’s favor.

III. Thatthe court erred in permitting the prosecutor to **com- [By
ment upon and denounce the character of the plaintiff in orror as
31

38 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Jones v. The State of Ohio.

corrupt, vicious, and criminal, when the said plaintiff had not put
his charactor in issue, .

IV. That the court erred in admitting the testimony of persons
who were entitled to a reward upon the condition that the said
plaintiff. in orror should be convicted.

V. That the verdict is unwarranted by the evidence.

VI. That the court erred in overruling the motion fora new
trial.

VII. That the judgment should have been in favor of the
plaintiff in error.

N.C. Reap and Jamus T. Worrutneron, for the plaintiff:

Mr. Worthington submitted a lengthy argument, in which he
made the following points:

1. An arrest can not be made in Ohio withouta special warrant,
showing probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, oxcept
upon actual view of the commission of an offense.

2, The authority of watchmen of the city of Cincinnati, in mat-
ters of arrest, extends only to offenses committed in their actual
view; and day watchmen of the said city have no official author-
ity in the night season. '

3. The equal division of opinion of the Supreme Court upon a
material question of law, raises a doubt which should be consid-
ered beneficially to the defendant.

4, The prosecutor can not go into any inquiry in regard to the
defendant's character, unless the same has been putin issue by
the defendant himself.

5. Persons having a pecuniary interest in the result of the trial,
and depending upon the conviction of the defendant, are not com-
potent witnesses.

6. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in criminal cases,

First. The first and principal point presented, is as to the
authority of a watchman to make an arrest without a warrant.
88] U.S. Constitution, art. 4 of amendments; Constitution of
Ohio, art. 8, sec. 5; 2 Hill, 296; 3 Burr. 1743; 1 Black. 555;
2 Hawk. P. ©., ch. 18, sec. 10; 1 Hale’s P. C. 580; 4 Black. Com,
291.

The American doctrine, then, in the first placo, is that general
warrants are iJlegal and void. 3 Cranch, 458, 453; U. 8. Consti-
tution, 4th amendment; Constitution of Ohio, art. 8, sec. 5. If
this bo the true interpretation of the constitutional provisions

32

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 39

Jones v. The State of Ohio.

upon this topic, but two other modes of effecting an arrest can be
inferred, either by special warrant, or without any warrant, but
simply virtute offcii. It is conceded that an officer can make an
arrest for an offense committed in his actual view and presence,
but beyond this he can not move a single step without a warrant
legally issued. 2 Black. Com. 293; 2 Hawk. P.O., ch. 13, sce.
8; 1 Chitty’s C. L. 17; 1 Hale’s P. 0. 587; Rawle on Constitution,
124,

In Ohio, a magistrate is authorized to cause arrests only in two
ways; either on view of a criminal offense, or on complaint made
on oath or affirmation. Swan’s Stat. 587, sec. 1; 3 Binn. 38; Con-
stitution of United States, 4th amendment ; Constitution of Ohio,
art. 8, sec. 5; 3 Story on Constitution, 748; Rawle on Constitution,
124; 3 Cranch, 448, 453; 4 Cranch, 75; 3 Wend. 350; 1 Bald. 0.
©. 571; 4 Black. Com. 292; 2 Iredell, 201.

Under what circumstances are watchmen empowered to make
arrests virtute officit?

No act can be performed virtute oficii, which the power of the
government is incompetent to authorize, and if the preceding
construction of the organic law of the land be correct, the state
government can confer no authority upon its officers beyond the
limits therein prescribed; or, in other words, no arrest can be
made by an officer virtute offcii, except on actual view. A consta-
ble (and a fortiori a watchman) has no more authority to make
an arrest than a private person has, by virtue of his office alone.
2 Hawk. P.C., ch. 13, sec. 7; 1 Chit. Orim. Law, 18. Even the
‘old common-law rule, that *a constable, when a felony has [89
actually been committed by some one, may arrest a person upon
reasonable cause of suspicion, can have but little, if any effect, in
aiding us in the determination of this question.

Has a constable any authority in any matter beyond that which
tho statute expressly confers upon him? We maintain that he
has not. Swan’s Stat. 541, sec. 25; 12 Com. Law R. 266.

Second. But the officer who attempted to make the arrest in this
case was a day-watchman of the city of Cincinnati.

The office of watchman is the creation of the city charter, and
although his authority could not extend beyond that of a consta-
dle, it does not follow that it equals it. Lot us inquire, then, what
authority the city of Cincinnati has power to confer upon watch-
men, and ‘what authority she has attempted to invest them with.

VOL. KX—3 33

40 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Jones v. The State of Ohio.

The city is authorized, by its charter, to establish a city watch,
“prescribe its duties, and define its powers, in such a manner as
will most effectually secure the inhabitants thereof from personal
violence, and their property from fire and unlawful depredation.”
32 Ohio L, 244, sec. 9.

But let us examine what action the city council have taken, and
what authority they have attempted to confer upon watchmen,
Several ordinances, at different periods, have been ordained, under
the charter, and the one in force at the time the alleged offonse
was committed, entitled “an ordinance to organize, prescribe'the
duties, define the powers, and fix the compensation of the city
night-watch,” was passed April 9,1845. Ord. City Cin., vol. 2, p. 84.
A. prior ordinance, passed May 27, 1842, entitled “an ordinance to
establish a day-watch” (and amended August 30, 1848, only in=
creasing the number of watchmen—Ord. Cin., vol. 5, p. 23), and still
in force, confers the same powers upon the day-watch, while on
duty, as ave conferred on the night-watch. Ord. City Cin., vol. 1,
p- 205. By reference to the ordinance of April, 1845, it will be found
that the fifth section thereof invests night-watchmen with tho
40] power to arrest in the night season, and *take before the
mayor, for trial, any person or persons who shall have committed,
or be in the act of committing, any criminal offense; and under a
preceding section of the same ordinance, they are invested with
the same powers, for the enforcement of the city ordinances, ete.,
as are conforred upon constables ; and they are required: in “the
night season to arrest and apprehend all persons committing, or
who shall have committed, any criminal offense,” etc. If the
ordinance referred to is intended to confer any authority in mat-
ters of arrest, beyond the fact of commission in actual view, any
such arrest becomes not only “unreasonable” and “ unwarrant-
able,” but such delegated authority is general authority to arrest,
and must operate as a general warrant, which is expressly uncon-
stitutional. 4th Amend. U.S. Const.; Ohio Const., art. 8, sec. 5;
Rawle on Const, 12£; 3 Story on Const. 748; 3 Binney, 38; 3
Cranch, 448; 4 Cranch, 75 ; 4 Black. Com. 291; 3 Burr. 1743;
1. Black. 555; 1 Hale’s P. C. 580; 2 Hawk. P. C., ch. 13, sec, 10.

In attempting to arrest Jones, Brasher acted solely in tho
capacity of a day-watchman, appointed under the ordinances of
May 27, 1842, and August 30, 1848, which conferred upon him the

34 :

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Jones v. The State of Ohio.

same powers that are conferred upon night-watchman, only while
on duty. .

The language of the ordinance of May, 1842, is, “and the per-
sons selected by the city council to act as day-watch, shall, whilst
on duty, have the same powers as are now, or may hereafter be
conferred on the night-watch ” (City Ord., vol. 1, p. 205) ; and that
of the ordinance of August 30, 1848, “ that the said day-watchmen

* shall perform the same duties, be clothed with the same powers,
be governed by the same rules and regulations, and receive the
same compensation, as the night-watchmen elected under the
ordinance to which this is an amendment. City Ord., vol. 5, p. 23.

In attempting, therefore, to arrest Jones in the night season,
Brasher acted solely as a private citizen, without any color of
Jegal authority.

*Third. The court were equally divided in opinion as to the [41
necessity of a warrant to effect a legal arrest, and on this point did
not charge the jury. .

This division of opinion of the Supreme Court of the state cer-
tainly implied a doubt of the law, the benefit of which should
have been given to the plaintiff in error. 1 Greenl. By. 97; Roscoe
Crim, Ey. 15; Wright's 8. ©. 20, 392, 617; Ohio Const., art. 8, sec. 6;
11 Ohio, 424.

The jury are the judges of the facts, both in civil and criminal
cases, but they are not the judges of the law in either. 2 Blackf.
161. The maxim, ad guestionem juris non respondent juratores, is as
old as the common law. Oo. Lit. 155, }.

In Ohio, in cases of writs of error in prosecutions, the punish-
ment whereof is capital, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary,
upon an equal division of opinion in the court in bank, the judg-

ment is reversed. 42 Ohio Stat. 53, sec, 2. This statute clearly | _

determines that where doubts of the law arise in the minds of the
court, and there is a division of opinion upon the law, the doctrine
in this state is, that the person on trial is to receive the benefit
arising from those doubts and opinions.

Fourth. The bill of exceptions also discloses the fact that the pros-
ecuting attorney was permitted to comment upon the character of
the plaintiff in error, denouncing it as vicious, corrupt, and crim-
inal, when the said plaintiff had not put his character in issue,
It is a well-settled principle that the character of a person charged
with crime can only be put in issue by himself, and unless he does

35

AQ SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Jones v. Tho State of Ohio.

so voluntarily, the prosecutor has no right whatever to refor to
that character, or introduce evidence in regard to it. MeNally’s
Ey. 324; Whart. C. L. 172; 1 Chit. 0. L. 574; Roscoe’s Crim. Ev.
89; Peake’s Ev. 9; Bull. N. P. 296; 2 Mass. 318; 14 Wend. 111;
State v. O'Neal, 7 Iredell, 250.

Fifth. Tt is also claimed that the court erred in admitting the tes-

timony of persons who were entitled to a reward, upon the express
condition that the plaintiff in error should be convicted.
42] *A reward was offered for the “arrest and conviction of
Jesse Jones,” and witnesses on the trial, who had made the arrest,
and received a part of the reward, were permitted to testify, which
wag objected to upon the ground of direct interest in the result,
but the objection was overruled. 1 Greenl. Hv. 326, 327, 386; 3
Stark. Ey. 1729; 1 Phil. Ev. 45; McNally’sEv.59; Bull. N. P. 283;
Roscoo’s Crim. Hv. 126; 1 Chit. C. L. 596.

Sixth. But one more question remains. It is the question of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in criminal cases. We claim
that it has none.

Whatever jurisdiction the Supreme Court bas in criminal or
other cases was conferred by the act passed February 7, 1831, on-
titled “an act to organize the judicial courts. Swan’s Stat., 222.
Under section 2 of this act, the Supreme Court derived its juris-
diction in criminal cases, and undor the authority thereby conferred,
solely has the court tried capital cases. This section of the act
provides “that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction

_ of all offenses, the punishment whereof is capital.” But section
9 of an act entitled “an act to regulate the judicial courts, and the
practice thereof” (43 Ohio Stat. 80), passed March 12, 1845, is as
follows: “Section 2 of an act entitled an act to organize the judicial
courts, passed February 7, 1821, except so much thereof as gives the
Supreme Court original and appellate jurisdiction in proceedings in
chancery, together with all acts and parts of acts inconsistent
herewith, are repealed.”

By the aet of March 7, 1831, entitled “an act directing the
mode of trial in criminal cases” (Swan’s Stat. 724), it is enacted,
that “when any person charged with the commission of an offense,
the punishment whereof is capital, hath been indicted and arraigned
before the court of common pleas, he or she, before pleading
thereto, shall be at liberty to declare whether he or she elect to be
tried in the Supreme Court;” and although there is no law re-

36

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 43, 44

Jones v. The State of Ohio.

pealing this provision in express *terms, yet itis claimed that [43
if jurisdiction is taken away, the right to elect ceases, ea necessi-
tate ret.

J. MoCormior, attorney-general, for the state:

I do not deem it necessary to reply to the elaborate argument
on constitutional law, presented by counsel for the plaintiff, and
correct the error into which he has fallen, in applying the prin-
ciple contained in provisions intended to guard the citizen against
the operation of general search-warrants, to the case at bar, in
which a known criminal was arrested upon the charge of having
committed a known crime, Halley v. Mix,3 Wend. 350; Wakely
v. Hart, 6 Binney, 316 ; Commonwealth v. Deacon, 8 S. & R. 49.
If an innocent person is arrested upon suspicion by a private in-
dividual, such individual is excused if a felony was in fact com-
mitted, and there was reasonable ground to suspect the person
arrested; but if no felony be committed, and a private individual
arrest without warrant, such arrest is illegal; an officer, however,
would be justified if he acted upon information from another,
which he had reason to rely on. An arrest of a felon may be
justified by any person without warrant, whether there be time to
obtain one or not, if a felony has in fact been committed by the
person arrested. 3 Wend. 350; Wrexford v. Smith, 2 Root, 171.

‘When one not generally known as an officer makes an arrest,
he must show his authority, if demanded, or he may be lawfully
resisted; but it is otherwise of a known officer. The State v.
Curtis, 1 Hayward, 471; Arnold v. Stevens, 10 Wend. 514.

The right, however, to demand of one not-generally known as
an officer, to produce his authority, is where the party submits
himself to the arrest, not where he immediately resists, and by
his own wrongful act prevents the officer from doing his duty.
Commonwealth v. Field, 13 Mass. 321. Parties thus resisting do
it at their peril. Tho rule deducible from the foregoing decisions
appears to be, that when a well-known officer arrests *a party [44
he need not produce his warrant for so doing, even if demanded
after a voluntary surrender, and certainly not when the arrest is
made by violence, either when the party attempts escape, or re-
sists the arrest by force.

It is perhaps unnecessary to notice the other questions dis-
cussed, except that raised as to the incompetency of witnesses on
the ground of interest. The interest which disqualifies must be

37

45 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Jones v, The State of Ohio.

direct and immediate, not contingent andremote. The conviction
in this case did not entitle the witness to the reward, but only to
recover the reward, provided he brought himself within the con-
ditions annexed to the offer thereof. The interest being contin-
gent and remote, only goes to affect his credibility, which is a
proper question for the jury. Irvine v. Lumberman’s Bank, 2
Watts & Serg. 190; Clark v. Robinson, 5 B. Mon, 55; Smith v.
White, 5 Dana, 376.

The statement of facts made by counsel for plaintiff in error, is
dehors the record, but did they appear on the record the results
would not be changed, or it would be in the power of any party
accused of crime, for whose conviction a reward was offered, to
defeat justice and public policy, and disqualify the witness of his
erime, by procuring to be offered and paid a private reward for
his own conviction.

Hicoucoox, C.J. Before proceeding to the consideration of the
specific errors assigned in this case, it is proper to remark that
the bill of exceptions is very defective. It discloses no, part of
the evidenco in the case, so that it is impossible to determine
upon some of the errors assigned, whether the court did or did
not err.

The first error assigned is “that the court erred in not charging
the jury that a warrant issued in due form of law, by a magis-
trate or other officer, legally authorized, was necessary to enable
an officer to effect a legal arrest, except when on actual view of
the commission of an offense.”

Whether it was the duty of the court to charge upon this point
at all, must depend upon the facts which had been disclosed
45] ‘*upon the trial; because, if there was no evidence relating
to the point, the court could not properly charge upon it.

What is stated in the bill of exceptions is as follows: “Be it
remembered, that on the trial of the above cause, there was no
evidence that the said John Brasber, who was a day-watch, had a
warrant to arrest the said Jesse Jones, and thore was evidence tend-
ing to prove that said Brasher had on the day previous to the
alleged killing, arrested without warrant, and discharged the said
Jesse Jones, and at the time of the killing was attempting to
arrest the said Jesse Jones without any warrant, but only upon
tho charge and suspicion that the said Jesse had committed a

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 46

? Jones v. The State of Ohio.

crime, and that on the facts, it was material matter of law to de-
termine whether a constable or watchman have the right to arrest
without warrant; and the court being divided in opinion as to the
law upon that point, so told the jury, and said they could not
charge them whether a warrant was necessary or not, and did not
charge the jury upon that point.” According to this part of the
bill of exceptions, it seems that the court hearing the case, was
of opinion “that on the facts,” this “was a material matter of law to
determine.” This, howover, is not sufficient. This is a question
for this.court, acting as a court of errors, to determine, and it can
not be determined but upon a disclosure of the facts in the bill.
of exceptions. .

But what, in reality, isthe error complained of? Not that the
court refused, upon request of the party, to instruct the jury upon a
particular point of law arising in the case. Not that the court
violated any principle of law, in the instructions given, but that the
court neglected, or forbore to instruct upon one point of law, which
is said to have been material in the case.

Suppose, after the testimony and arguments of counsel are closed,
the court submits the case to the jury without any instructions
whatever; would this be error, for which the judgment sub-
sequently rendered could be reversed? I apprehend not, for I
know of no rule of law which requires a court, of its *own [46
mere motion, to instruct or charge a jury at all; and perhaps
those who hold—and there are many such—tbat in criminal cases
the jury aro tho judges of the law, as well as of the facts, would
hold that it was erroneous for the court, in such cases, to give any
instructions at all. It is customary for our courts, as a general
rule, to charge or instruct juries; but I am not aware of any law
which, as a matter of course, imposes any such duty upon them.
If it would not be erroneous to neglect to give any instructions

* whatever, it certainly can not be erroneous to neglect to instruct
upon a particular point which may arise in a case. But if the
partics to a caso, or either of them, request the court to instruct
the jury upon the whole case, or upon particular points which
may be involved, it is the duty of the court to do it, and if the law
is mistaken by the court, it is error.

Tho rule of law upon the subject I suppose to be this: If the
court, in its instruction to the jury, mistakes the law of the case,

39

aT SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Jones v. The State of Ohio.

or if the court is requested to instruct upon a point of law involved
in the case, and refuses such instruction, it is error.

Now apply this principle to the case before this court. How
does it stand, so far as the first error assigned is concerned? The
. judges of the court before whom this case was tried, differed upon
a point of law, which, in their opinion, was involved in the case.
They so stated to the jury, and for this reason neglected to in-
struct upon that point. Neither the plaintiff in error nor his
counsel made any objection to this action of the court, nor re-
quested any instruction upon the particular point. Having failed
to do this, it is now too late to complain. Had the plaintiff in
error, or his counsel, requested the court to instruct the jury that
the law upon this particular point was as they now allege it to
be, and had the court refused, the foundation for a writ of error
would have been laid, and this court wonld have been called upon
to settle the law upon the subject.

Such, however, is not the state of case, and we do not feel that
it would be propor for us to undertake to settle the principal
47] *question, which has been elaborately and ably argued by
counsel. That question, in substance, is, whether a ministerial
officer, without process, has any better right to arrest a man
suspected of crime than has a private citizen, We are aware that
it is aquestion upon which there is a great contrariety of opin-
ion, and it will be soon enough for the court to decide it when a
case is presented rendering it necessary.

The second error assigned is, “that the court erred in not
charging the jury that a difference of opinion between the judges
composing the Supreme Court, upon a principle of law necessary
to be decided in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
person accused, was a reasonable doubt, to be construed in the
prisoner’s favor.”

There is the same difficulty with respect to this assignment of
error as with respect to the first. It is a mere allegation that
tho court failed so to instruct, not that there was any refusal of
the court so to instruct, when requested. There is also this ad-
ditional difficulty : the bill of exceptions does not show whether
there was or was not any such charge, nor whether any such
charged was requested. All that appears in the record is, that
this was assigned by counsel as one of the reasons why a new trial
should be granted.

40

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 48

Jones v. The State of Ohio.

The third error assigned is, “that the court permitted the prose-
eutor to comment upon, and denounce the character of, the plaint-
iff in error, as corrupt, vicious, and criminal, when said plaintiff
had not put his character in issue.”

Upon this point the bill of exceptions contains this statement:
“The prosecutor commented injuriously upon the character of
prisoner, when the same had not been put in issue; and the
prosecutor claimed it as matter of just inference.” There is
nothing to show that there was any action of the court upon this
subject at all. All that appears is, that the counsel for the
prosecution commented upon the character of the accused, and
claimed that he had a right so to do. Whether he had such right
was not a question made to the court. Possibly he may have
eon too severe in his remarks. But this is nothing *un- [48
common. Counsel frequently take great, and, in fact, unpardon-
ablo liberty in commenting upon the character of parties, and
more especially of witnesses. It does not conduce to the ends of
justice. It is a bad practice; and the members of the bar who
are addicted to it, from respect to themselves, and to the courts in
which they practice, should abandon it. But we should bo un-
willing to reverse judgment because the court in which it was
rendered had not interfered to prevent improper remarks of
counsel.

The fourth and fifth errors assigned are, “that the court erred
in admitting the testimony of porsons who were entitled to a re-
ward upon condition the said plaintiff should be convicted,” and
“that the verdict is unwarranted by tho evidence in the case.”

As to these errors, it is sufficient to say that the record does
not show that such persons wore admitted as witnesses, nor does
it show what evidence was before the court and jury. Tho bill
of exceptions is silent upon the subject.

‘The sixth crror is, that the court overruled the motion fora new
trial; and tho soventh, that the judgment was against the plaint-
iff in error, when it should have been in his favor.

Nothing appears in the record to lead this court to the conclu-
sion that a new trial should have been granted ; and, if not, it fol-
lows, of course, that the judgment is correct.

Another point is made in the argument of plaintiff's counsel,
which is not noticed in the assignment of errors. It is claimed
that by the act of March 12, 1845, “to regulate the Judicial courts

Ag SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hart v. Tho State of Obio.

and the practice thereof” (43 Ohio L. 80), all previous laws con-
ferring criminal jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court were re-
pealed, Such is not the construction which has been put upon
the statute by this court. True, the question has never been
decided by the court in bank, but it has frequently been agitated
upon the circuit; and upon the circuit the court have uniformly
exercised the same criminal jurisdiction as before the enactment
of the law of 1845. :

49] *In tho whole case we discover nothing erroneous. The
sentence and judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed.

Sean Harr v. Tae Srars or Onto.

A charge in an indictment for forgery, that the defendant had forged a prom-
issory note, described in the indictment as a note without a seal, is not
supported by evidence tending to prove that defendant had committed
forgery of «note under seal. It is error in the court to admit such ovi«
dence in proof of the charge.

Error to the court of common pleas of Morgan county.

At the October term, 1851, of said court, Hart, the plaintiff in
error, defendant below, was indicted, tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for forgery. The in-
dictment contains three counts. In tho first count it is avorred
that on April 30, 1851, Selah Hart “falsely made, forged, and
counterfeited a certain promissory note,” ete, which “is of the
purport and effect following:

«“cTon months after date, for value received, I promise to pay
Selah Hart, or order, the sum of $406, as witness my hand and
seal,

«¢ April 2, 1851. G. ARMsrRone.’”

The second count charges that Hart, having in his possession a
promissory note executed to him by George Armstrong, under the
signature of G. Armstrong, precisely in all respects like the note
set out in the first count, except that it was for the payment of
sia dollars, on April 30, 1851, “falsoly did alter the said promis-
sory note,” by inserting before the words “six dollars,” the words

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 50, 51

Hart v. The State of Ohio.

“four hundred and,” thus making a note similar to the one set out
in the first count.

*The third count is for feloniously uttering and publishing, [60
as true and genuine, a false, forged, and counterfeit note, described
as in the first count. The indictment does not aver the loss of
the forged instrument. The note,-as set out and described in all
the counts, is not set out or described as a note under seal. The
note set out, before the signature and date, contains the words “as
witness my hand and seal,” but has no seal.

During the trial the state introduced evidence tending to prove
that the note purporting to be forged, was in the possession of the
accused, and was by him destroyed; and then the state offered
secondary evidence of the contents of said note as originally ex-
ecuted, and as it subsequently appeared. This, and all the other
evidence, is contained in a bill of exceptions taken during the
trial. The acctsed, by his counsel, moved the court below for a
new trial, and in arrest of judgment, which motions were over-
ruled, and exceptions were duly taken to the action of the court
in overruling the motions.

Various errors are assigned: 1, That the court erred in refusing
to rule out the evidence of the state. 2. That the court erred in
receiving evidence of the destruction of the note without an aver-
ment in the indictment to that effect, 3, That the court erred in
receiving secondary evidence of the contents of the note, with-
out averment in the indictment of the loss of said note, or with-
out averment that it was in possession of defendant, and because
no notice was served ‘on defendant to produce the note. 4. That
the court erred in receiving, in evidence, a copy of a note not
under seal. 5. That the court erred in receiving secondary evi-
dence of the contents of the note alleged to be forged, when the
state only proved the destruction of a similar note under seal, and
no other. :

The last-named error is the one upon which the decision of this’
court is made, and the evidence upon this part of the case is suf-
ficiently stated in the opinion of the court. The other evidence,
having no bearing on the decision, is omitted. .

Panisu, Evans & Cxarx, for plaintiff in error, insisted that
*the note which was proved to have been destroyed, wasa [51
note under seal, and the note counted on was not under seal.
No evidence tending to prove forgery could be given, as there

43

52 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hart v. The State of Ohio.

was no sufficient evidence of tlie loss or destruction of the note
counted on.

. Besides, in the absence of any averment in the indictment ex.
eusing the non-production of tho original note, no evidence of its
loss could be received, and in this the court erred.

Joun EB. Hanna, for state, cited Briggs v. Taylor, 9 Wheat. 483 ;

. Bouldin and wife v. Massie, 7 Ib. 122, and note at the end of the
caso; 1 Pet. 591; 7 Ib. 99; United States v. Reybourn, 6 Ib. 364;
183 Johns. 93; 17 Ib. 294; How v. Hall, 14 Hast, 276.

R. W. P. Muss, prosecuting attorney, on the same side, cited
Wharton's Am. 0. L. 161; 3 Mass. 82; 1Ib.7, and note; 14 East
(Sprague’s case) ; 18 Johns. 90; 1 Chit. Orim. L. 566, 567, 578, 579 ;
16 Wend. 522.

Catpwett, J. On the trial of this case in the court below, evi-
donce was offered for the purpose of showing that tho note had
been destroyed by the dofendant himself, and then secondary evi-
dence of the contents of the note, by introducing what was said to
be a copy, and by other testimony. To the introduction of all
this evidence the defendant's counsel objected, but the court over-
ruled the objections and received the evidence. The state, for the
purpose of introducing the secondary evidence, to prove the con-
tents of the note alleged to have been forged, called on James CO.
Newell, who testified that in August last he saw defendant havea
note, made by George Armstrong, payable to said Selah Hart, and
that he (Selah Hart) then tore it up, and that said note was a
sealed instrument.

The state then proceeded with the secondary evidence. It was

, proved that the note had been left with the firm of Corner, Davis
52] & Sprague, by the defendant; that whilst it was in their *pos-
session, the prosecuting witness, George Armstrong, obtained it,
and took it to Henry Dawes, who took a copy of it, and handed it
back to Corner, Davis & Sprague; that Corner, one of said firm,
delivered it to John Moody, who delivered it to the defendant.
Armstrong testifies that his signature to the note was genuine, but
that the words ‘four hundred” were inserted after it was signed.
Two witnesses, Conn and Hart, testify to having seen the note be-
fore it was executed, and that it was drawn up for $406, the same
amount that it afterward contained. The copy of the note, taken
by Dawes, was given in evidence, corresponding with the note set

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 53

Hart v. The State of Ohio.

forth in the indictment, and is not under seal. In addition to
Newell, Corner testifies that his strong impression is that the noto
was under seal. Conn testifies that he saw the note before it was:
executed, and afterward saw it in the hands of Moody, and that it
hadaseal, Edwin Hart testifies positively that the note had a
seal,

On the other hand, two or three other witnesses are interrogated.
on this subject, who do not recollect of any seal—they do not
speak positively one way or the other. Armstrong says he does
not recollect whether the note had a seal or not; he says the copy
was taken for a true one, and he supposed that it was. Dawes,
who copied the note, says he does not recollect of any seal, and
thinks if there had been one that he would have copied it.

The first question which is presented, is, whether the court were
justified in permitting the copy of the note, and the parol testi-
mony in reference to the description of it, to be given in evidence.

We think the evidence was inadmissible. It is a universal rule
of evidence, that a party offering to prove any matter is bound to
produce the best evidence which the nature of the case will ad-
mit of, or give a satisfactory excuse for not presenting such evi-
dence, before he will be. permitted to introduce evidence of a
lower or secondary character; and this is especially the case in
forgery, where the production of the instrumont *itself isso [53-
necessary to determine on the truth of the charge. The ground
on which secondary evidence is said to be admissible in this case,
is, that the note has come into the possession of the defendant, and
has been by him destroyed. The note, however, which Newell

- testifies to have seen in the possession of defendant (and he is the
only witness who testifies to this branch of the case), and which
was by defendant destroyed, was a note under seal. Moody de-
livered this note to the defendant, and Conn testifies that he saw
the note in Moody’s hands, and that it was a note under seal. So-
that the note that came into the hands of defendant, and was by
him destroyed, was a note under seal. This would not lay any
ground for the introduction of secondary evidence, if a note not
under seal. They are, both in civil and criminal pleading, dis-
tinct and separate instruments ; evidence of one will in no case
support a pleading describing the other. But although this
would be the legal effect of the evidence, yet there is no doubt

but that the theory on which the state proceeded was the true
45

54 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Canal-boat Montgomery ». Kent et al.

one—in fact, that the evidence, in reality, all related to the same

paper. And the evidence on the part of the state, as well as the

evidence for the defense, proves that that paper was a note under

seal. The evidence, then, entirely fails to prove the charge in the

indictment, which is forgery of a note not under seal. We think

it a clear case of variance between the proof and the pleadings,”
and that the court erred in not ruling out the evidenee. This

view of tho case renders it unnecessary to pass on the other errors

assigned. (1)

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

64] *Canat-Boat Montcomery v. Marvin Kenr ur an

For the breach of an executory contract to carry goods upon » particular boat
or vessel, between the owner of the goods and the owner of the boat or
‘vessel, an action can not be sustained against said boat-or vessel by name
under the water-craft law of February 26, 1840. (2) ,

Error to the court of common pleas. Reserved in Cuyahoga
county. .

On November 3, a. p., 1846, by warrant of that date, the de-
fendant in error commenced an action of assumpsit against the
plaintiffs in error, in the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga
county.

(1) The decision of questions relating to the subject of forgery, ete., may be
found in the following cases: Hess 0 State, 5 Ohio, 1; Pickens v. State, 6
Ohio, 274; Simmons v. State, 7 Ohio, 116, pt. 1; Anderson ». State, 7 Ohio,
450; Birney v. State, 8 Ohio, 230; Kegg ». State, 10 Ohio, 75; 10 Ohio, 354;
Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; Ohio v. Bronson, 1 West. L. J. 222; Ohio o
Neale, 2 West. L. J. 570.

(2) LEGISLATION.

I. The “act providing for the collection of claims against steamboats’ and
othor water-crafts, and authorizing proceedings against the same by name,”
was passed and took effect February 26, 1840. 38 Ohio 34; Swan’s Stat. 209.

IL This act was amended by an act passed March 10,1843, 41 Ohio T. 51.

TIL. An act explanatory of these acts was passed February 24,1848. 48
ObioL. 76.

IV. The acts of February 26, 1840, and March 10, 1843, were amended by
an act passed March 24, 1851. 49 Ohio 1. 101,

46

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. - 55, 56

Canal-boat Montgomery v. Kent et al.

The declaration in the case contains two counts. In the first,
*jt is stated, in substance, that on August 1, 1846, the then [55
plaintiffs were millers, and manufacturing large quantities of flour,
in a flouring mill at Franklin, in the county of Portage, intending
the same, or the greater part thereof, to be transported to Cleve-
land, in Cuyahoga county, between the day aforesaid and the close
of navigation; that on that day they entered into a contract with
one J. Z. Smith, captain and owner of the canal-boat Montgomery,
by the terms of which contract the said Smith agreod, for the con-
sideration of eightcen cents per barrel, to be by them to him paid
to transport in said canal-boat, to Cleveland, all the flour which
they should make and desire to have transported, between that
date and the close of navigation for that season; that, although
the plaintiffs manufactured large quantities of flour, and desired
to have the same transported to Cleveland, in pursuance of said
contract, the said boat refused to receive the same on board, and
transport the same, otc.

*Lhe second count is like the first, except that the contract [56

‘These are the only laws ever in force in Ohio upon this subject.

DECISIONS.
In the case of Glenney v. The Steamer Globe, in the District Court of the
‘United States for the Northern District of New York, Conkling, J., held
“that a judgment in rem rendered in a court in the State of Ohio, in virtue
of the act of the general assembly of that state, entitled ‘an act providing
for the collection of claims against steamboats, etc., passed February 26,
1840, and the act explanatory thereof, passed February 24, 1848, is to be re
garded as a nullity by judicial tribunals in other states, unless the owner of
the vessel proceeded against appeared in the suit, and had an opportunity to
make a defense.

“The title, if any, acquired by the purchaser at a sale of the vessel on exe-
cution, in virtue of such 2 judgment, is subordinate to the lien in favor of a
material-man, conferred by the general maritime law of the United States,
and by the act of Congress of February 26, 1845, chap. 20.

“A judgment recovered in a proceeding under the statute of Ohio, in a
court of that state for supplies, is not a bar to a subsequent suit in rem, in ad-
miralty for the sdme supplies.”

Qurry.—Whether the provisions of the statute of Ohio are not repugnant
10 the constitution and laws of the United States? 3 Western Law Journal,
NN. 8. 41 (1851). See also, vol. 2 N. 8. (1849-50) 530,

Questions have been decided touching these laws in the following cases:
Steamboat Monarch v. Finley, 10 Ohio, 384; Canal-boat Huron v. Simmons,
11 Ohio, 458; Bennett B. Lewis v. The Schooner Cleveland. 12 Ohio, 341;
Jones & Watkins v. Steamboat Commerce, 14 Ohio, 408.
. 47

56 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Canal-boat Montgomery v. Kent et al.

is charged as having been made with the boat itself, instead of
being made with the captain and owner.

To this declaration a plea of the general issue was filed, and at
tho March term, 1850, tho case was submitted to a jury. The
jury, under the charge of the court, returned a verdict in favor of
the defendants in error, plaintiffs below, in pursuance of which
judgment was rendered.

The plaintiff in error excepted to certain rulings of the court in
the progress of the trial, and in the charge to the jury, and ten-
dered a bill of exceptions, which was allowed, signed, sealed, and
made part of the record.

Tho bill of exceptions shows that on the trial, the plaintiffs be-
low “ proved their copartnership, and submitted evidence tending
to prove the contract set out in the declaration; that it was made
by Captain J. Z. Smith, then master of the canal-boat Montgom-
ery, and also submitted evidence that said Smith was, at the date
of the contract, owner of the boat, and that said contract was
made for and on account of said boat, and that said contract was
violated by him; that he did not run his boat to the plaintiffs

[ow far this case is overruled, see Webster ». Tho Brig Andes, 18 Ohio,
187, Curwen’s Cases Overruled, 28.]

Steamboat Waverly 0. Joseph Clements, 14 Ohio, 28; Kellogg, Kenneil &
Orane v. Brennan et al., 14 Ohio, 72; Canal-boat Etna v. Treat, 15 Ohio, 585;
‘Treat v. Canal-boat Btna, 16 Ohio, 276, 421; Goodsill ». The St. Louis, 16 Ohio,
178; The Champion v. Jantzen, 16 Ohio, 91; Schooner Argyle v. Worthing-
ton, 17 Ohio, 460; Prevost ». Wilcox, 17 Ohio, 359; The Aurora Borealis .
Dobbie, 17 Ohio, 125; Julius B, Webster 0 Brig Andes, 18 Ohio, 187; Steam-
‘boat Clipper . Linus Logan, 18 Ohio, 375; 1 West. Law Journal, 394; 2 West
Law Journal, 44; Boyce v. The Steamboat Empress, 3 W est. Law Journal
114; Berry ». Griffin, 3 West. Law Journal, 129; Goodsill v. The St. Louis, 4
‘West. Law Journal, 128 (and see 16 Obio, 178); Steamboat Arkansas Mail 0
Fox, 4 West Law. Journal, 527.

[JIow ‘far an opinion intimated in this ease is overruled, see McGuire v. The
Kentucky, 6 West. Law Journal, 179; and the same case reported in this vol-
ume of reports.)

‘The Jane Louisa v. Willioms, 5 West. Law Journal, 8; 8. P., 17 Ohio, 460
See 4 West. Law Journal, 528,

‘Tho decision of Goodsifl ». The St. Louis, 4 West. Law Journal, 123, and
the same case in 16 Ohio, 178, and The Champion ». Jantzen, 16 Ohio, 91, led
to the enactment of the explanatory act of February 24, 1848, which modifies
the law as decided in those cuses. Section 2 of that act has been declared un-
constitutional. Aurora Borealis v. Dobbie, 17 Ohio, 125. See also 2 West. Law
Journal, N.S. (1849-50), 143,

‘is *

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. ST

Canal-boat Montgomery ». Kent et al.

after the 2d of October, and they were compelled to pay oxtra
prices to the amount found by the jury over and above their con=
tract price; that they paid no more than the ordinary and reason-
able pricos, and that freights could not be procured at loss prices.
Tho proof of the contract consisted entirely of the declaration of
said J. Z. Smith, made while he was the acting master of said
boat, and in possession of it, and while, as the testimony tended to
show, he was owner of said boat.”

Upon this state of facts, counsel for defendant below asked the
court to charge the jury as stated in the opinion of the court here-
after, in this case, which charge was refused, and such refusal is
assigned for error.

To roverse the aforesaid judgment, this writ of error is pre-
sented, and the following errors are assigned :

“1, That the contract to carry freight, set forth in the first
*and second counts of the said declaration, are not contracts [57
the breach of which subjects a boat to seizure, under the statute
subjecting water-crafts to seizure for debts, and the court erred in
not charging the jury as requested by defendant's counsel.

“2, The court orred in charging the jury that the declaration
of the owner of the boat might be given in evidence to charge the
boat without proving that the said owner was such at the time the
suit commenced, or without proving that the title’to the boat at
the time the suit was brought was derived from such owner by
private sale, and not by public sale, on judgment under the statute.

“3, That the judgment should have been for the defendant.”

Wizson, Wavr & Wans, for plaintiff:

The statute under which this action has been commenced is
remedial, and its provisions should be interpreted in reference to
defects and mischicfs of the law as it was.

Now, the mischiefs of the old law were, that those who intrusted
their persons or property on board of water-crafts, for conveyance,
were liable to injury by the negligence or misconduct of those
having charge and management of such crafts. Those persons
were frequently irresponsible; the injury, also, might, and usu-
ally would, occur, at places distant from the residence of the owner
of the water-crafts, or these might be irresponsible or unknown.
Injuries from these causes were of frequent occurrence ; often of
a serious character, and always annoying and highly vexatious to
all, and especially to immigrants, strangers, and those least able,

Vou, xx—4 49,

58 : SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Canal-boat Montgomery v. Kent et al.

from poverty or from that repugnance which strangers always
more or less fecl against attempting to vindicate their rights by
Jaw, under so many discouragements.

To remedy these glaring defects in our laws—defects made every
day more glaring and intolerable, from the unparalleled growth
of our internal commerce and increase of travel—this law was
enacted, by which the legislature have devised for those suffering
58] from this class of injuries, a simple, speedy, and *effectual
remedy. Contracts of the class set forth in the declaration, though
perhaps within the letter of the act, were not within the contem-
plation of the legislature, nor within tho spirit of the remedy
provided by the act.

The master of a canal-boat, as such, has no authority to make
such a contract as this to bind the owners of the boat. Itis equiva-
lent to the charter of the boat to the defendants in error for the
season.

The master of a boat may be romoved, but if the master can
make such a contract as this, he may do so for the lifetime of the
oraft. .

It is said tho master in this case was owner; but it does not fol-
low that the boat can be seized for a breach of the contract.

Besides this, the court below erred in admitting ovidence of the
declarations of the master of the boat that he was owner, and as
to the contract. Reed v. Dickey, 1 Watts, 152, 154; 2 Cow. &
Hill’s Notes, 655, 661.

‘His doclarations of ownership were not made when the contract
‘was made, nor whon he stated the terms of the contract.

Anpruws, Foor & Hort, for defendant. Foot & Hoyt submit-
ted an argument, and relied upon the act of February 26, 1840.

Trcucoox, C.J. By the bill of exceptions it appears that, on
tho trial of the case, the defendants in error introduced testimony
tonding to prove a contract with J. Z. Smith, while captain of the
Montgomery, as stated in the declaration, and that this contract
‘was on account of the boat, or for transportation in this particu-
lar boat; that the contract was violated by a refusal to transport
flour, after October 2, 1846; that the defendants in error were
under the necessity, after that time, of employing other boats to
transport their flour, and compelled to pay a greater price for
freight than under their contract with Smith they were bound to

50 :

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 59, 60

Canal-boat Montgomery ». Kent et al.

pay. Tho testimony offered to prove the contract consisted princt-
pally in the *proof of declarations made by Smith while he [59
was captain of the boat. The price actually paid for freight was
not above the ordinary rate for the season.

After the testimony was closed, counsel for plaintiff in error re-
quested the court, among other things, to charge the jury:

“J, That no recovery can be had upon the first count in the
‘declaration, because it makes no case as against the defendant.

“2. That the socond count docs not set up a contract upon
which the defendant is liable to seizure and suit under the
statute.”

To this request the court responded as follows: “Upon the first
and second points made in the request, a majority of the court are
of opinion, and so charge, that the contract set forth in each of the
counts in the declaration, are such contracts as would hold the
defendant; we, therefore, refuse to charge upon those points ag
requested by the defendant’s counsel.” .

This is assigned as error, and presents this single question,
whether an executory contract to carry freight upon a particular
boat or vessel, attaches to said boat or vessel, and is within the
statute of February 26, 1840, “providing for the collection of
claims against steamboats and other water-crafts, and authorizing
proceeding against the same by name.” This question might as
well have been presonted by demurrer, but it may be made as it
now is, by calling upon the court for special instructions to the
jury. This is a new question in this court, although it has here-
tofore been decided upon the circuit.

For tho non-performance of a contract like the one set forth in
this declaration, the defaulting -party would be liable to an action.
But if he was ready and willing, and offered to transport the
freight, I think he would not be liable in damages, for not offering
to do it in the identical boat specified in the contract. The object
of the freighter is to procure the transportation of his property,
and it can not be essential to him whether it be done in one boat
or another.

A common carrier is’ liable for all loss or damage to goods
*which he undertakes to carry, unless the loss arises from [60
inevitable accident, or from the public enemy. But this stringent
rule can not be applied to him until the goods are once in his

possession. When so in his possession the Jaw imposes this lia-
51

61 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Canal-boat Montgomery v. Kent et al.

Dility. But should a common carrier enter into a contract to
carry goods hereafter, and should he refuse to comply with that
contract, we suppose he will be liable to the same amount of dam-
ages, and no greator, than would any other individual under sim-
ilar circumstances.

The first section of the act before referred to, provides, “that
steamboats,” otc., “shall be liable for debts contracted on account
of the craft, by the master,” ete., “ for material, supplies, or labor,
in building, repairing, furnishing, or equipping the same,” etc.
A contract to furnish materials, labor, or supplies, is not within
the statute. But in order that the right may oxist, to sustain an
action against the craft, by name, as provided in the second sec-
tion, the “ material, supplies, or labor,” must have been actually
furnished.

The statute further provides, “that the craft shall be liable for
damages arising out of any contract for the transportation of
goods or persons, or for injury done to such person or property
by said craft,” ete.

Now it is said by counsel for the defendant, that here was a
contract for the transportation of goods, and therefore it is within
the letter of the statute. But the damages sustained do not,
strictly speaking, arise out of this contract. They arise from the
refusal of Smith, the other contracting party, to comply with his
contract, wheroby the defendants were under the necessity to pro-
cure other persons than Smith to transport their flour, at a higher
charge for freight. But the bill of exceptions shows that they
paid no more than the ordinary rate for that season.

It seems to have been supposed that it was necessary that the
contract for the transportation of foods, referred to in tho statute,
must be on account of the craft, and therefore efforts were made
61] to prove that this contract was on such account. *But how
it can be said that a contract to carry on a particular boat, is a
contract on account of, or upon the credit of that boat, I do not
readily perceive. But the statute does not in fact prescribe that
the “contract for the transportation of goods” shall be on accdunt
of, or upon the credit of the boat; that phraseology applies alouo
to “materials, supplies, and labor.”

It seems to tho court that an oexecutory contract, like the one
now before the court, was not in the mind of the general assom-
bly, in the enactment of this law, bat that body had an entircly

52

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 62

Canal-boat Montgomery v. Kent et al.

different contract, or class of contracts, in view. The owner of a
steamboat, or other water-craft, employed in the transportation
of goods, isa common carrier, and is bound safely to carry and
deliver the goods, and nothing will exonerate him, unless pre-
vented by inevitable accident, or the public enemy. There is an
express or implied contract between him and the person for whom
he carries, to this effect—express, if there is a bill of lading; im-
plied, if he carries without any such bill.

If the goods are received on board the boat or vessel, this con-
tract attaches, and if the goods are injured or lost, there is an
injury or damage arising out, or in consequence of the contract,
while the same is in the course of performance. The owner him~-
self would be liable, and by the act of February 26, 1840, an action
to recover for the loss might be sustained by the person injured
against the craft by name. As the “ materials, labor and supplies”
were furnished to her, so the goods to be carried were received on
board, and there is the same reason for allowing the proceedings
authorized in the statutes in the one case as the other. But
there is no reason why a remedy should be given against the
craft by name, merely because the owner has failed to comply with
his executory coritract to carry goods at some future period.

In the opinion of this court, the court of common pleas erred
in refusing to charge as requested, in the two particulars named,
and this renders it unnecessary to dook any further into the
case.

*The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the case re- [62
manded to the court of common pleas, to carry this judgment
into execution.

Spavxprna, J., did not sit in this case, having originally been -

of counsel,
53

- 63 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McGuire’s Adm’r v. Canal-boat Kentucky.

Joan McGurrn’s ApMinistrator v. CANAL-Boat Kentucky.

Money loaned to the owner or master of a steamboat, or other water-craft, for
the purpose of paying tolls, or for paying for “ materials, supplies, or la
por in the building, repairing,” etc., such craft, can not be recovered in
an action against the craft by name, undér the act of February 26, 1840.

Bexor to the court of common pleas of Miami county.

The original action was assumpsit, commencod by John McGuire
against the defendant, before a justice of the peace, in Miami
county, and appealed to the court of common pleas. During the
progress of the case McGuire died, and his administrator was, in
pursuance of tho statute, made party plaintiff.

The declaration contains the common counts in assumpsit, to
which a plea of the general issue was filed.

At the March term of the court of common pleas, a. p. 1848,
the case was submitted to the court without the instruction of a
jury. The court found the issue joined in favor of the plaintiff
below, and assessed his damages at $107, for which judgment was
vendered. .

‘The case was removed by writ of error to the Supreme Court,
the judgment reversed, and the case remanded for another trial.

At the April term, A. D. 1851, of the court of common
63] ‘*pleas, the case was again tried by the court, and the issue
found in favor of the defendant below.

The plaintiff then moved the court for a new trial, assigning for
reasons, that the findings of the court was against the evidence;
that it was against the law of the case; that it was in favor of the
defendant, whereas it should have been in favor of the plaintiff.

This motion the court overruled, and entered judgment for tho
defendant, pursuant to the aforesaid finding.

The plaintif? excepted to the opinion of the court, overruling
the motion for a new trial, and his bill of exceptions was sealed.
by the court, and made part of the record. On the trial the
plaintiff “proved the execution of a written instrument, and
gavo the same in evidence, which was in the following form:

“ CurnLicoruz, December 12, 1841.

“Borrowed of John Me Guire $100, for the use of the boat
M. B. Ross, payable on demand. Wx. MoAniister.”

54

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 64

McGuire's Adm’r ». Canal-boat Kentucky.

The plaintiff proved that the name of the boat had been
changed to the “Kentucky ;” that the maker of said instru-
ment, at the time of signing it, was master of said boat. The
plaintiff also gave in evidence the deposition of Wm. McAllister,
mado part of the bill of exceptions.

The defendant proved tbat said boat had been sold three several
times, to difforent purchasers, since the execution of said instru-
ment; that the owner in whose hands it had been attached in
this suit had purchased the boat in good faith, for a valuable con-
sideration, without notice of the claim given in evidence, before
attaching in this suit.

The deposition of McAllister, referred to in the bill of ex-
ceptions, states that he was master and part owner of the canal-
boat “ B. M. Ross ;” that he changed the name to “ Kentucky ;”
that about six years before the giving of the deposition he had
borrowed $100 from McGuire, *for the purpose of paying [64
tolls for the boat, and that he so appropriated the money, and that
he gave a note on the boat. This was all the evidence.

To reverse the aforesaid judgment, this writ of error is pre-
sented, and the errors assigned are:

1. That the finding of the court was manifestly against the
evidence in the case.

2. The general error, that the judgment was given for the de.
fendant, whereas it should have been for the plaintiff.

J. H. Harr, for plaintiff:

The plaintiff claims that a fair construction of the act of Feb-
ruary 26, 1840, brings this act within its provisions, and makes
the boat liable. In the case of the Canal-boat Huron v. Charles
‘W. Simmonds, 11 Stant. Ohio, 461, the court say: “This statute
is equitable in its objects, and will receive a liberal construction
to carry the dosign of its enactment into effect.” In Julius B.
Webster v. The Brig Andes, 18 Ohio, 202, the court say: “It is
of so highly beneficial a character as to justify a court in giving
to its construction the most liberal intendment to carry out its
objects.” Tho court say in Bennett B. Lewis v. The Schooner
Cleveland, 12 Ohio, 842, “It has been said by this court, in the

-ease of the Canal-boat Huron v. Simmons, 11 Ohio, 458, that it
was the intention of the legislature to substitute the water-craft,
in all cases of claim, at the option of the plaintiff, where the owner

or master, as such. would be liable.”
55

65 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McGuire's Adm’r v. Canal-boat, Kentucky.

The statute being equitable in its design, and receiving a liboral
construction, does not our claim come within the description of
those for which water-craft are liable under the statute? (I call
the attention of the court to the act of March 23, 1840, Swan’s
Stat. 187, sec. 73): “No boat or float shall shall bo permitted to
pass on either side of the canals, unless the master thereof shall
first have obtained a clearance therefor, for each voyage of such
65] boat or float, from the proper collector *of tolls on such ca-
nals, except,” etc. Also, sce sections 74.and 75 of the same act,
in same connection. Section 76 of the same act provides “the
fall amount of tolls chargeable on any boat, and on each and.
every article of property which shall be on board thereof, or con-
stitute any float at the time such boat or float shall depart from
the port or place in which there is a collector from whom a clear-
ance is required, or that shall be taken on board within one mile
of such port or place, shall be paid to such collector before he
shall issue a clearance for such boat or float.” Again, section 95
of the same act provides: “The master of overy boat or float shall
be liable for the payment of tolls and expenses, chargeable upon
such boat or float and its cargo, and it shall be the duty of every
collector to detain all articles on which tolls and expenses are
chargeable, and the boat or float containing them, until such tolls
and expenses shall be paid.”

In same connection, see section 104 of same act. See also sec-
tions 112-114, 131-134, and section 27.

The question then arises: Docs money paid for tolls due by the
boat come within the provisions of the statute? This question
leads to a discussion of the terms of the statute. Is it not in-
cluded in the term “supplies,” in furnishing or equipping the
boat? Let us look to the definition of “supply.” This word is
derived from the Latin word “suppleo,” which means, according
to Webster, “to fill up as any deficiency happens; to furnish what
is wanted; to afford or furnish a sufficiency.” Without a clear-
ance the boat can not leave portor proceed. Without the full pay-
ment of tolls the boat must and will be detained. She has her
cargo on, bound for a different port, and without money she can
not procced. The money, then, to pay the tolls, is a supply in
furnishing or equipping the boat for her voyage—as necessarily a
supply, a furnishisg, or equipping, as the flour and potatoes that
feed her crew, or the horges that drag her through the water ; and

* 56

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 66, 67

McGuire's Adm’r v, Canal-boat Kentucky.

for them, or the services of the crew, she would be liable; yet is
neither of these more necessary or efficient in the prosecu- ~
tion ¥of her voyage than the payment of toll. Yet weare [66
told that money loaned to the boat, and by the master and owner
applied to the payment of tolls, is not within the statute! Surely
any such construction is not within either the letter or spirit of
the statute, and is in opposition to the decisions referred to.
Furnish means to equip, to fit for an expedition, to supply, and it
is so defined.

Another question presented is, that the parties defending wore
purchasers without notice, and therefore hold the boat free of all
incumbrances. To this point we only refer the court to the case
of Jones & Watkins v. Steamboat Commerce, 14 Ohio, 413: “A
purchaser, at private sale, takes only the interest and title of the
vendor, and holds his property as his vendor held it. The one
an convey no better title than he has, and the other can acquire
by his purchase but the same. The private sale is the act of the
owner for his individual benefit, and the purchaser may secure
himself by taking indemnity against existing liabilities from the
vendor.” The same doctrine is maintained in Steamboat Waverly
v. Joseph Clements, 14 Ohio, 28. On this point nothing need be
said farther, unless it be to call the attention of the court to the
language of Judge Hitchcock, in Kellogg, Kennel & Crane v.
Brenan aud others, 14 Ohio, 90. “It may not be technically a
lien, but is something which appropriates the property as effect-
ually, if not more so, than ordinury liens.” 12 Ohio, 341.

I would refer to the case of Steamboat Arkansas Mail v. Fox,
4 West. L. Journal, 527, Hamilton county, May term, 1847. The
court held in that caso, that a duc-bill givon in the name of the
steamboat and owners, signed by the master, for money borrowed,
where it did not appear that the money was not applied to the use
of the boat, was within the statute authorizing proceedings against
the water-craft by name, and that a due-bill, so signed, was com-
petent evidence to be submitted to a jury. Whether such a due-
bill, by itself, and without other evidence, was sufficient to sustain
the action, the *court said was not necessary to be decided, [67
although it was intimated that it would be sufficient of itself.

In view of the facts, the law, and the uniform decisions'of the
court, I claim that the court below erred in refusing to grant a

. new trial, and that their judgment should therefore be reversed.

57

68 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McGuire's Adm’r v. Canal-boat Kentucky.

Suir and VALLANDIGHAM, for defendant, submitted the case
without argument.

Hiroucock, C.J. The facts of this case, as disclosed by the bill
of exceptions, so far as the same are necessary to be stated, are
simply these: McAllister, who was part owner and master of the

* canal-boat “M. B. Ross,” subsequently called the “Kentucky,”
borrowed of McGuire $100 for the purpose of paying tolls for the
boat, and so appropriated the money. The probability is, that
the note in evidence on the trial was given for this money, but
of this there is no certain proof. But admitting such to be the
case, the question arises whether the plaintiff had a legal right to
maintain the action and recover a judgment.

The solution of this question depends upon the construction of
tho act of February 26, 1840, “providing for the collection of
claims against steamboats and other water-crafts, and authorizing
proceedings against them by name” (Swan’s Stat. 209), under
which this action is brought. Tbe first section provides, that
“steamboats and other water-crafts, navigating the waters within,
or bordering upon, this state, shall be liable for debts contracted
on account thereof, by the master, owner, steward, consignee, or
other agent, for materials, supplies, or labor, in the building, re-
pairing, furnishing, or equipping the same, or due for whariage ;
and also for damages,” etc. And in such cases, by another section,
the person having the demand may proceed against the owner or |
mastor, or the craft by name. We have always been willing to
give this statute a liberal construction, for the purpose of carry-
68] ing into eflect the *intention of the law-making powor in its
enactment; but we can not, by construction, extend it to cases not
within its purview. There may possibly be other cases where
there would be as strong reasons for the application of the extraor-
dinary remedy hore allowed, but that is a matter for the con-
sidoration of the general assembly, not of this court.

The argument urged to sustain the claim in this case, is, that
tolls must be paid upon boats navigating the canal, and that with-
out the payment of such tolls no boat can have aclearance. This |
is truco; still, nothing is said in the act of 1842, under which this
suit is brought, about tolls. It does provide that for wharfage,
proceedings may be had against the craft by name. Tolls are not
within this act.

58

DECEMBER TERM, 1851, 69

McGuire’s Adm’r v. Canal-boat Kentucky.

“For materials, supplies, or labor, in the building, repairing,
or equipping” the craft, an action may be had against her by
name, if furnished on her credit. The cause of action in the case
now before us is not embraced in this clause of the act. The action
is not brought for materials, supplies, or labor. It is brought for
money loaned to pay for tolls.
But suppose this money had been loaned to pay “ for materials,
supplies, or labor, in the building, repairing, furnishing, or equip-
ping,” would the plaintiff have a right of action against the boat
by name? We think not. There is nothing in the act to meet
such a case. A promissory note might be given, the consideration
of which was “ materials, supplies, or labor,” and upon the exhibi-
tion of the note, with proof of the consideration, a plaintiff might
perhaps recover, under this statute. But there is nothing in the
act which gives any such right of action to the lender of money,
although that money may have been applied in the purchase of,

“ or in the payment for, materials, supplies, or labor. And to hold
that such lender might have an action against the craft by name,
would be to subrogato him to the rights of the material-man, the
farnisher of supplies, or the laborer. Courts of law do not possess
this power of subrogation.

‘It is said, however, that cases have been decided upon the
*cireuit, by this court, in which it has been holden that such [69
lender of money might maintain an action under the statute. Very
possibly this may be true; and, as a matter of fact, we know
that it has been differently decided upon the circuit. It was
in consequence of this contrariety of decision that this case was
brought to this court, and we are unanimous in the opinion that
this plaintiff had no right of action against the boat “ Kentucky,”
by name.

The judgment of the court of common pleas is affirmed with
costs. .

. 59

70 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Samms v. Stewart & McKibben.

Luvr Samus v. Srewarr & McKrssun.

A person whose business is not the carrying of goods, and who does not hold
himself out to the world as such, will not be regarded as a common car-
rier, although he may occasionally carry goods for hive.

“The person thus occasionally carrying will be responsible, in case of the loss
of the goods, only as an ordinary bailee for hire, and to excuse bimself
from liability, need only show that he has used ordinary care and dili-
gence. (1)

Error to the court of common pleas of Brown county.
40] *The proceeding, in that court, was an action on the case,
brought by the defendants in error, Stewart and McKibben,
against Levi Samms, to recover the value of a box of goods, de«
livered by them to him, to be carried in his wagon from Cincin-
nati to New Hope, in Brown county, which goods were stolen
from the wagon on their way. The record presents a very
meager statement of the evidence in the court below. The Dill
of excoptions contains the charge of the court to the jury, which
was reduced to writing by the judge, and in which the evidence,
with the charge of the court upon it, is presented as follows:
“According (o the uncontradicted testimony in this case, the mer-
chants of New Hope usually procure their goods from Cincinnati,
and the usual mode of carriage is by return market-wagons.
Very few goods are carried to New Hope by any other mode of
conveyance. The defendant has, according to the testimony of

(1) Questions upon the law of bailments, including the law of common
carriers, have been decided in the following cases:

Babcock v. May, 4 Ohio, 224; Jordan v. James, 5 Ohio, 88; Roland v,
Gundy, 5 Ohio, 262; Lawrence v. McGregor, 5 Ohio, 309 (and see Wright's
S.C. 198); McGregor v. Kilgore, 6 Ohio, 368; Jones v. Voorhes, 10 Ohio, 145;
Bowman v. Hilton, 11 Ohio, 303; Talmadge ». The Zanesville and Maysville
Road Oo, 11 Ohio, 197; Conwell v. Voorhes, 13 Ohio, 523; Barker v. Cory, 15
Ohio, 9; Wayne v. Steamboat Goneral Pike, 16 Ohio, 421; Johnson ». Miller,
16 Ohio, 431; Inglebright v. Hammond, 19 Ohio, 337; Monteith ». Bissoll’s
Adm’r, Wright's S. C. 410; Anderson v. Foresman, Wright's 8. 0, 598; Law-
rence v. McGregor, Wright’s 8. C. 193 (and see 5 Ohio, 309); Goodman ».
Ashton & Stewart, Wright’s 8. 0. 216; Long ». List, 1 West. Law Journal,
393; Wayne v. Steamboat Albatross, 4 West. Law Journal, 528; see also
Mad River and Lake Brie Railroad Co. v, Cockran Fulton, in this volume of
Reports.

60

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. ve

Samms v. Stewart & McKibben.

Whiting, for twelve or thirteen years; and according to the testi-
mony of Fox for nearly twenty yoars, been ongaged in carrying
marketing from New Hope and that neighborhood to Cincinnati,
and bringing goods from Cincinnati to Now Hope; and he, when
about going to Cincinnati with marketing, frequently asked the
merchants of New Hope for return loads of goods. If you find
from the testimony that the defendant has been so engaged for
several years, he should be held responsible as a common carrier,
although he was a farmer, and carrying not his principal business.”
A verdict and judgment having been rendered in the court below
against the defendant below, he now prosecutes this writ of error.
Tho principal errors relied on, and upon which the decision of
this court is made, are, that the court erred in their charge to the
jury, and in overruling motion for new trial.

Suurers & Marswaut, for plaintiff:

‘We hold that when no special contract’ is made defining the risk:
and liability of the carrier or the careand diligence to be *used, [71
the custom of the place is understood to be the law of the case.
Story on Bailments, 4 ed., sec, 543, n.5; Babcock v. May, 5 Ham.
Ohio, 334; Albatross v. Wayne, 16 Grisw. Ohio, 513.

The court erred in the charge given. Under it there was noth-
ing for-the jury to do. The court decides the case both as to the
law and the facts. This charge in the bill of exceptions is in the
handwriting of the judge who gave it, and is erroneous under tho
rule in 2 Dana, 221; Wright’s 8. C. 334; 19 Grisw. Ohio, 131.

The case was decided upon the authority of Gordon v. Hutchin-
son, 1 Watts & Serg. 285. We insist that the ruling in that case
is not law and is not applicacle to this case. It is unsupported by
any other decision. Story on Bail. 465-467, sec. 495, n. 2; Kent’s
Com. 597.

In the case from 1 Watts & Serg., the loss was by neglect, not lar-
ceny, asin this case. See alsol Hayw.14; Satterlee v. Groat, 1Wend..
272; 1 Boll’s Com., sec. 397; Brind v. Dale, 8 Carr. & Payne, 212,

Puyn, Kine & Pznn, for defendant, cited 1 Watts & Serg. 285.

Catpwett, J. The principal assignment of error and the only
one which we think it necessary to consider, presents the simple
question, whether Samms, from the facts disclosed in tho bill of
exceptions, is to be regarded as a common carrier. As to who
are to be deemed common carriers and who not, the rules of dis-

61

72 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Samms v. Stewart & McKibben.

crimination are thus Jaid down in Story on Bailments, sec. 495.
“Tt is not (as we bave seen) overy person who undertakes to
carry goods for hire, that it is deemed a common carrier. A
private person may contract with another for the carriage of his
goods, and incur no responsibility boyond that of an ordinary
pailee for hire, that is to say, the responsibility of ordinary dili-
gence. To bring a person within the description of a common
carricr, he must exercise it as a public employment; he must
22] undertake to carry goods for persons *generally; and ho
must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of
goods for hire, as a business, not as a casual occupation.” The
same doctrine is substantially laid down by Chancellor Kent.
2 Kent’s Com. 597, 598. The case ‘of Sheldon v. Robinson, 7
New Hampshire, 157, is a case bearing a very close analogy to
the one now before the court. In that case it was proved of the
defendant (who was sought to be charged as a common carrier
for a package of money that had been intrusted to him to carry
for hire), that he was a stage-driver for a company who run a line
of stages between Boston and Portsmouth; that be was constantly
in ‘the habit of carrying packages of money for hire, from one
place to the other, for all persons who chose to employ him. The
court in that case decided that the evidence did not make the
defendant a common carrier, inasmuch as it did not show that
that was his public employment, and that he undertook to carry
money and goods generally; although it did show that he had
taken all that was offered to him. The case of Hennel & Short v.
Pettijohn, 2 Harrington, 48, is a decision to the same effect. We
think it will be found in most of the cases, where the question has
arisen, that a clear distinction has been kept up between such
persons as hold themselves out to the world as engaged to carry
goods generally, and at all times, and those who may occasionally,
or in a single instance, undertake to carry for hire.

The common carrrier is regarded, in some respects, as a public
employe; he has held himself out to the world as such, and hence
he is required to carry all that may be offered to him, provided a
reasonable cempensation be tendered, and if he refuse, when he
has the convenience to carry, he will be liable to an action for
such refusal. The reason of his being held to such rigid respon-
sibility, in case the goods be lost, arises from his public char-
acter IJaving placed himself in the channels of commerce, and

62

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 78, 74.

Samms v. Stewart & McKibben.

undertaken to carry for the community generally, he necessarily
has intrusted to his care the goods of those who can have no
personal knowledge of his character, and who *have not the [73
power to make any special contract with him. And were it not
for these and similar considerations, we see no justice in holding
a person who engages to carry goods to any more rigid respon-
sibility for the loss of the goods, than any otber bailee for hire.
The general rule in reference to a bailee for hire—that he is only
answerable for the loss of the goods where he has beon wanting
in ordinary care and diligonce—is in most cases a reasonable and
just one, and is only departed from in the case of a common car-
rier, on account of the peculiar relation that he has assumed to
the community. Now we seo no reason why the law applicabl¢|
to a common carrier should be applied to a farmer who makes a
personal application to a merchant for a load of goods, on his return
trip from market. The merchant has it in his power to make
such special bargain as he chooses, 4s to what shall be the liability
of the farmer in case the goods are lost. The farmer has assumed
no character to the community entitling him to peculiar con-
fidence, and the merchant is left, as in ordinary cases, to an in-
quiry as to his character and qualifications. Nor do we suppose '
it would make any differenco how many applications of this kind
had been made by the party thus carrying, of to how many dif-
ferent persons they may have beon made—they would still remain
so many special and individual transactions.

In the case before us, as will be seen above, it is merely stated.
that the defendant, for a number of years, had been engaged in
carrying marketing from New Hope and that neighborbood, to
Cincinnati, and bringing goods from Cincinnati to New Hope,
and that when ubout going to Cincinnati with marketing, he fre-
quently asked the merchants of New Hope for return loads of
goods. The court charged the jury that if they found these facts
to oxist they should hold the defendant liable as a common carrier,
although he might be a farmer, and carrying not his regular busi-
ness. In this we think the court of common pleas erred. Thero
is nothing in this state of fucts to show that the business of tho
defendant was that of a common carrier, or that he held himself
out to the world as such. It is not stated *to whom the [74
marketing and the goods that the defendant was in the habit of
carrying belonged; we presume, however that the goods belonged

63

75 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Spafford v. Bradley.

to the merchants of New Hope and the neighborhood. This
carrying, however, was only what every farmer would like to do,
4o earn something by getting a back load. Nor do we think that
his frequently applying to the merchants of New Hope for a back
load, at all alters the case. This was mercly offering his services
to the few merchants that rosided in the village, and was not an
offer to do business for the public generally.

We have been referred lo the case of Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1
Watts & Serg. 285, on the authority of which it is said the court
of common pleas acted in making their decision, That case, wo
think, sustains the ruling of the common pleas; but we think it
opposed to the current of authorities on the subject,

The judgment of the common ploas will be reversed, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings.

Amos Sparrorp v. WiLLIAM BRADLEY.

A judgment of the Supreme Court on the cirenit, reversing the judgment of
an inforior tribunal for refusing a new trial, where it was claimed that
the finding was against the evidence, will not, as a general rule, be con-
sidered the subject of reversal here. (1)

Nor will the action of an inferior tribunal in granting a now trial in a like
case be held oxceptionable by the Supreme Court.

Brnor to the Supreme Court of Hamilton county.
7] *The plaintiff in error brought suit in the commercial court

(1) See act of March 12, 1845, 43 Ohio L. 81, “to regulate the judicial courts
and the practice theroof.”

‘Under this act where a cause is submitted to the court without a jury, the
samo right exists to except to the ruling of the inferior court in refusing, on
motion for new trial, to set aside their own finding, as though the cause had
deen submitted to a jury, and the right to prosecute a writ of error is the
same. Per Spalding, Judge.

In Markle v. Akron, 14 Ohio, 586, it was hold that “when the facts are sub-
mitted to the court, instoad of the jury, for decision, its judgment will not be re-
versed on error, though unsnstained by the weight of evidence.” And seo
Wright's S. ©. 46, 673; Roynolds ot al. ». Rogers’ Ex’r, 5 Ohio, 171. Tho
point thus decided scems to be modified by the act of March 12, 1845. In
Kopner’s Adm’r v. Snively’s Adm’r, 19 Ohio, 298, it was held that where there

64

DECEMBER TERM, 1851 _ 6

Spafford v. Bradley.

of Cincinnati, upon two promissory notes given to him by the de-
fendant, Bradley, and dated, “Detroit, November 8, 1847”—the
first in the sum of $158.67, payable in three months, and the
second for $159.12, at four months ; and both made payable at the
Commercial Bank in Cincinnati.

The defense was, that the notes were given on a transfer of
stock in “the Cincinnati and Presque Isle Mining Company of
Lake Superior,” which stock was claimed to be without value,
and, consequently, it was insisted by defendant, that there was a
total failure of consideration.

The cause came on for trial at the October term of the com-
mercial court, 1848, and was submitted to the judge, without the
intervention of a jury.

The only witness called by plaintiff was one Abel Goddard, who
testified that he was present in April, 1848, when the plaintiff
presented the notes to defendant for payment. He said the dee
fendant promised to pay the amount so soon as he could got a
certain mill in operation, which was then in process of building;
that he repeatedly afterward heard promises of a similar import.
This witness said furthor that in the years *1845 and 1846 [76.
he was acquainted with the affairs of “the Cincinnati and Presque
Isle Mining Company,” and that during said years the stock was
in good repute, and the prospects of the company flattering; but
that his information did not reach a subsequent period.

On the part of defendant, the depositions of Alvah Hand,
William O'Callahan, and Hugh O’Birne wore read to the court.

- Hand swore, in substance, that he was present at Detroit, in
the early part of November, 1847, when defendant made to plaint-

has been a motion for a new trial overruled, and a bill of exceptions taken
showing the evidence, whether the cause has been submitted to the court or
jury, under said act of March 12, 1845, such case may be reviewed on error. ,
‘A judgment will not be reversed because decided against the evidence, unless
there is a motion for new trial. 19 Ohio, 296,

‘This act is construed in Baker v. Cory, 18 Ohio, 9, and Kepner’s Adm'r ».
Snively’s Adm’x, 19 Ohio, 296. Cleveland v. Bodwell, 13 Ohio, 133, is said to
be obsolete by force of this act. Curwen’s Gases Overruled, 17. See also
Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio, 426; see also Bayless v. Belmont Bank, 15 Ohio, 606;
‘Wagers v. Dicky, 17 Ohio, 439.

As to jurisdiction of Supreme Court, see West. Law Journal, 1849-50,
p. 221.

See Pierre Chonteau, Jr., et al. v. Rait, in this volume of Reports.

Vou. xx—5 65

U7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Spafford », Bradley.

iff two notes, for an amount something over $300 ; that these notes
were given for stock in “the Cincinnati and Presque Isle Mining
Company of Lake Superior.” At the time the notes wore given,
witness supposed said stock to be of some value, but subsequent
events had satisfied him that he was mistaken—the stock was
worthless.

O'Callahan stated that he had learned from plaintiff, that de-
fendant, Bradley, had given him notes for stock in the “Cincin-
nati and Presque Isle Mining Company;” is acquainted with
tho nature of this stock, and considers it worthless, At the time
of the execution of said notes, and ever since, witness has regarded
the stock as a humbug.

O’Birne testified that on November 9, 1847, Spafford, the plaint-
iff, sold to Bradley, the defendant, 364 shares of stock in “the
Cincinnati and Presque Isle Mining Company.” From conversa-
tion between the parties, he thinks one or more notes were given
by defendant for said stock. There is no sale for said stock in
the market, and there never has been to any great amount, within
the knowledge of deponent, except between stockholders. It is the
opinion of witness that said “mining company” was a swindling
speculation of said Amos Spafford and other persons from Ohio.

No other testimony was submitted on either side except the
notes.

27] +*The plaintiff took judgment for the amount of notes and
interest.

The defendant moved for a new trial, on the ground that the
judgment was against law and evidence. The motion was over-
ruled and exceptions taken.

At the May term of the Suprome Court for Hamilton county,
A.D. 1850, this judgment was reversed, and the cause was re-
manded to the commercial court, for further proceedings.

The present writ of error is brought to the judgment of re-
versal,

B. J. Henry, for plaintiff in error:

I. Was there such error in the commercial court in refusing to
grant a new trial, as justified the interference of the Supreme

* Court?

This court, in Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio, 446, havo well re-
marked: “That the court before whom a trial is had, where
witnesses appear, and are examined; where the bearing of any

66

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. . 78

Spafford v. Bradley.

specific testimony is seen and understood, can judge with much
more propriety whether a new trial should be granted in a given
case, than can an appellate court, to which nothing is presented
but a statement of facts proved.”

II. There is not sufficient evidence that the notes were given
for the consideration alleged by defendant..

TII. But to admit that the notes were given for the considera-
tion alleged, it is not proved that there was no consideration in
Jaw, and in fact.

All the world over, the holder of the notes of a bank at the
time it stops payment, bears the loss, although the bank may have
been insolvent for months. Story’s Promissory Notes, sec. 502,
and notes; Chitty on Bills, 108, and notes; 13 Wend. 101.

A broker buys the depreciated paper of a bank, at its market
value—say seven-eighths of one per cent. on the dollar. *Can [78
he resist payment, by merely proving that twelve months after-
ward there was no sale for the paper of the bank ?

I buy stock in a morus multicaulis silk company, and give
notes; the “stock” turns out to be worthless. I can not resist
payment. See Button’s Adm’r v, Clark, 16 Ohio, 297.

A note given for a quitclaim deed for land, without fraud, in
the absence of covenants, can not be avoided by total failure of
title. 2 Caines, 188; 2 Johns. Ch. 522; 5 Johns. Oh. 29, 79; 3
Breese, 270; 3 Scam. 502; 3 N. H.522; 1 N. H. 174; 4 Johns.
421; 5 Johns. 404; 10 Mass. 197; 2 Hast, 314; 4 Blackf. 57.

Notes given on compromise are valid, without respect to the
legal rights of the parties. Douglass, 654; 5 Barn. & Ald. 117;
2 Bibb, 448. Notes given on compromise of slander suit, for
words not actionable, are valid. 2 Penn. 531.

Where parties deal with equal means of knowledge, without
warranty or fraud, caveat emptor is the rule. 2 Kent, 478,485; 1
NN. H. 174; 3 Term, 438; 8 Mass. 46.

Even false representation, without fraud, no defense. 1 Breese,
268; 2 Scam. 13, 452, 363, 444; 2 Kent, 485, 486.

The slightest benefit to the promisor, or the slightest loss to the
promisee, is sufficient consideration, Inadequacy is no defensc,
either in law or equity, without fraud. 16 Ohio, 297; Chit. Con.
31, 32, and notes; 2 Hill, 606.

The transfer of the possession, or claim of title to lands, is to
the prejudice of the seller, and a benefit to the purchaser, and

67

79 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Spafford v. Bradley.

therefore forms a good consideration. 3 Scam. 337; 6 Wend
648.

A party wishing to rescind, must be ready, prompt, and eager
to place vendor én statu quo. And where goods are sold with war-
ranty, failure to give notice of breach, raises a strong presumption
against the buyer, that the goods, at the time of sale, had not the
defect complained of, Chitty, 458, and notes. And a fortiori, if
the buyer, after five months, promise payment.

979] *Earon & Justion, for defendant in error.

No argument came to the reporter’s hands.

Srazpine, J. The record before us nowhere shows that the
decision of the Supreme Court on the circuit turned exclusively
upon tho refusal of the court below to grant a new trial.

We find, however, that this is the only mattor assigned for error
deserving of much considoration, and, in our examination of the
subjoct, will assume the proposition of plaintiff’s counsel to be
true; that no other sufficient cause of reversal was found by the
court to exist in the record.

By the act of March 12, 1845, entitled “an act to regulate the
judicial courts and the practice thereof,” it is provided that in all
cases pending in the courts of common pleas, etc., either party
shall have the right to except to the opinion of the court in all
cases of motion for a new trial, by reason of any supposed mis-
direction of the court to the jury, or by reason that the verdict
may be supposed to be against law or evidence, so that such case
may be removed by writ of error.

The right to except to the ruling of the inferior tribunal in
refusing, on motion for a new trial, to set aside their own finding,
in the absence of a jury, is also recognized in practice by this
court as within the spirit of the legislative enactment.

Since the right of appeal has been taken away from the parties
in actions at law, this court has often interposed, under the act of
1845, to reverse a judgment, for the reason that the court in which
it was rendered had unreasonably refused a new trial; the verdict
being manifestly against the evidence.

This is, in offect, a second trial upon the weight of the testimony
before a different tribunal; and the power conferred by the stat-
ute upon this court is sometimes necessarily called into exercise
40 prevent a total failure of justice.

Not so, however, where the error assigned is that the court

68

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 80, 81

Spafford v. Bradley.

below sustained the motion for a new tria], and set aside the ver~
dict or judgment. No irreparable wrong can be done in *such [80
a case, as it only compels the parties to retrace.their steps, and
submit their proofs and allegations a second time to the same
tribunal.

Hence, although by the terms of the statute the party supposing
himself aggrieved would seem entitled to his writ of error, as well
where a motion for a new trial is sustained as where it is refused,
mo case has oceurred in practice where this court has seen fit to
reverse the proceedings of a subordinate tribunal for the sole rea-
son that it has, on motion, set aside a verdict as against evidence,
and ordered a new trial.

In the case at bar, the testimony is by no means of a preponder-
ating and conclusive character. The members of this court would
probably divide in opinion, if called to try the cause upon its
merits,

A jury might, therefore, without any glaring impropriety, have
returned a verdict for either party; and if the judge of the com-
mercial court had seen proper, on reflection, to have set aside his
own finding, and to direct a new trial, this court, most undoubt-
edly, would have refused to disturb his proceedings.

What different bearing has the question before us been made to
assume?

The judge of the commercial court refused to entertain the
motion of defendant for a new trial, and entered up judgment for
plaintiff upon the notes. Two judges of the Supreme Court, sit-
ting for the county of Hamilton, deeming the evidence insufficient
to sustain the plaintiff’s claim, have set aside the judgment and
directed a new trial.

Saying nothing about the porplexity into which the parties liti-
gant would be thrown by a different course of procedure, I ask if
it can be expected that we shall treat the proceedings of the
Supreme Court for Hamilton county with less respect than that
which we are at all times ready to extend to the action of the
commercial court of Cincinnati?

We would not have interposed our authority to prevent a second
trial, if ordered by the commercial court, for the same *cause. [8
‘We will not interfere to disturb the action of the Supreme Court,
which has produced no other or different result.

The judgment is affirmed..

69

b

\

82 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Brown v. Timmany.

Cuartes Brown v, Warp Timmany.

‘Money paid on an agreement, entered into on Sunday, may be recovered back
so long as the contract remains executory.

Aliter, if the agreement has been executed.

Error to the court of common pleas of Athens county. Re-
served for decision in this court by. the Supreme Court in that
county.

The action was assumpsit, commenced originally before a justice
of the peace, by whose judgment the plaintiff recovered six dol-
lars damages, and costs of suit, on April 11, 1850.

The defendant appealed to the court of common pleas, where
the cause, after sundry continuances, was tried by a jury, at the
September term, 1851.

Under the charge of the court, the jury returned a verdict for
defendant.

The Dill of exceptions shows that the plaintiff and defendant
made an agreement, on Sunday, whereby the defendant was to
deliver to the plaintiff a yoke of oxen, in exchange for a colt of the
plaintiff and five dollars “ boot-money.” At the time of making the
agreement, the plaintiff paid to the defendant the five dollars, and
the defendant was to bring the oxen to the plaintiff’s house on
82] the next day, and take away *the colt. If he failed to do so,
he was to forfeit and pay to the plaintiff one dollar. The date of
the contract is not disclosed in the bill of exceptions.

The defendant wholly failed to fulfill said agreement. He would
neither deliver the oxen nor receive the colt. This action was
brought to recover back the money paid.

At the request of counsel for the defendant, the court instructed
the jury, that, if they should find that said agreement was made on
Sunday, and that said sum of five dollars was paid in part execution
of the contract for an exchange of property, the money paid by
plaintiff could not be recovered back under the common counts
in the declaration, although they should find that the defendant
had wholly failed to comply with the agreement on his part+
Motion for new trial overruled. .

It is insisted by plaintiff that the court mistook the law in this

70

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 83°

Brown v. Timmany.

their charge to the jury, and that the judgment should be re-
versed.

Joun WeEton, for plaintiff:

The court instructed the jury that plaintiff could not recover
back the five dollars, as the contract was made on Sunday. This
was clearly wrong.

It bas been decided by this court, that suit can not be main-
tained upon a contract made on a Sunday. This decision I do not
seek to disturb. What I maintain is, that money paid on a con-
tract made on Sunday, where the contract remains executory, can
be recovered back—putting contracts made on Sunday on the
same footing with other illegal contracts,

The common pleas fell into the error from the statements made .
in digests, that “money paid upon an illegal contract can not be
xecovered back ;” whereas the cases show that the contracts were
executed, in all cases where the court refused to allow it to be
recovered back, and that the reason assigned was, that to allow it
to be recovered back, in violation of the *contract, would be [88
to allow the party to take advantage of his own wrong.

The law of illegal contracts is :

1. That no suit upon them will be sustained ; that is, they will
not be enforced.

2. That when executed, no suit will be sustained to recover back
money paid, or damages for any other thing done in execution of
them; and, .

3. That while they remain executory, either party may recover
back money paid, either in part or whole execution of the con-
tract; that is, either party may rescind, and be restored to his
former condition, if not in default himself.

Tho reason, in the first case, is, that courts will not aid to do what |
is illegal. In the second case, the illegal thing having been already
done, the court will not aid either party to violate a contract,
although illegal. But in the third case, the court is not asked to
aid the execution of the contract, or to aid the plaintiff to violate it;
but simply to compel the party who has violated it, as well as been
guilty of making it, to restore the party who has not violated it,
to his original rights. In doing this, the court gives no sanction
to the illegal contract, or to its violation, but discountenances both.

All the cases where it is stated that money paid upon an illegal
contract can not be recovered back, are cases where the defendant

7

fo

84 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Brown v. Timmany.

has executed the contract, and is, therefore, not in fault. See 3
Torm, 266; 8 Ib. 575; 1 Hast, 96; 8 Taunt. 492.

In Loury v. Bordean, Doug. 451, where the plaintiff was allowed
to recover, the court first lay down the rule, that “ there is a clear
distinction between contracts executed and exccutory.”

In Jacques v. Golightly, premiums paid to an illegal lottery-
office keeper, who refused to pay over what had been won, were
allowed to be recovered back.

Chitty on Contracts, 637: “If the contract be executed or per-
84] formed, and both parties are in part delicto, no action lies *to
recover back money paid; but if the contract be executory, or not
performed, the plaintiff may disavow it before its completion, and
recover back money paid under it to the other party, under the
count for money had and received,”

In Greenman v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 381, the plaintiff, who had sold
defendant a cargo, to be paid for in slaves, and who had received.
part of the slaves, and defendant's note or agreement for the re-
maining slaves, was allowed to abandon the note, and recover
under the count for goods sold, the balance of the price of the cargo.

Roscoe on Evidence, 232: “Where money has been paid in
pursuance of an illegal contract, it is in certain cases recoverable
as money had and received to the use of the party paying it. It

. May be recovered in the following caso:

“When the contract remains executory, though the parties be in
pari delicto,” citing 2 B. & P. 467; 3 Taunt. 277; 4b. 290; Doug.
468, ote.

This is a suit to rescind the contract which the defendant has
rofused to fulfill. This is his act of rescission. The guit, or de~
mand of the moncy, is the plaintiff's act of rescission. This is the
strongest case of rescission for the plaintiff, But plaintiff may
rescind and recover back where defendant is not in default, as in
8 Taunton, 277, and 4 Ib. 290, where the plaintiff recovered back
money advanced on an illegal wager, having brought his suit

, bofore the bet was decided. Cowles v. Regnet et al., 14 Ohio, 55;
4 Ohio, 400; 7 Ohio, 70. (1)

Joun EB, Hanna, for defendant, insisted :

That the acts done by the parties in this case were not wrong
per se; the acts were right in themselves, but wrong because done

(1) See 6 Obio, 442; Moore ». Adams, 8 Ohio, 372; Thomas v. Oronise, 16
Ohio, 54.
72

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 85, 86

Brown v. Timmany.

at a time prohibited by law. The cases cited by plaintiff's
*counsel are all for acts wrong -in themselves, and this is the [83
distinction betweon those cases and the one at bar.

Tall the attention of the court to the authority cited from Chitty:
“But if the contract be executory and the plaintiff dissent from,
or disavow, the contract before its completion, he may, on disaf-
firmance thereof, recover back money paid under it,” ete. The
election to rescind must be taken and notificd in due time—before
that which is unlawful is done. Why is it that whore the illegal
contract is executory, the money paid may be recovered back?
Because the party before he does that which the law prohibits,
recants and notifies the other party; and the unlawful act is not
done.

Story defines an executory contract—Contracts, sec. 18. In
this case the illegal act was consummated in the making of the
contract, and there is no pretense that there was a rescission or no-
tice to the other party by the plaintiff, before the illegal act was
done. Sellers v. Dugan, 18 Ohio, 493, is conclusive. I also refer
to Chit, on Con. 657 C.4; Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 343; Drury
v. Defontain, 1 Taunt. 139; Fennell v. Ridler, 5 Barn & Ores. 406 ;
Story on Con. ch. 8, sec. 613; 11 Wheat 258; Bartle v. Coleman,
4 Pet. 284; Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 436; Lyon v. Strong, 6
Vt. 219; Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379; 2 Green}. Hy., sec.
111-199, n. 2; Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225.

The case at bar is not an executory contract, but falls under what
Strong on Contracts (sec. 19) denominates as a class “partaking
of the nature both of executed and executory contracts.”

Sparpine, J. In Sellers v. Dagan, 18 Ohio, 493, this court,
with one dissenting voice, decided that an ordinary contract, made
in the course of business, on a Sunday, is void, and that no action
can be sustained to recover damages for the breach of such a con-
tract.

The question whether money paid on the contract could be re-
covered back in the action of assumpsit, was not submitted, much
Joss determined, in that suit.

*The question is directly presented for adjudication in the [86
case at bar, and we have no hesitation in saying that the court of
common pleas erred in its instructions to the jury.

We have declared that a business contract, made on Sunday, is

73

PO

87 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Brown », Timmany.

void. Neither party will receive the aid of the court, while seek-
ing to enforce performance of the agreement, or to recover dam-
ages for its breach.

Nor would we help either party to rescind, if the agreement
was wholly executed, upon the principle applicable -to parties in
pari delicto.

‘Where, however, as in this case, money has been advanced in
part performance of a void contract, and either party sees fit to
put an end to its further fulfillment, the amount paid may recovered
back, in indebitatus assumpsit, as for money had and received.

In tho present case, the agreement had never been wholly ex-
ecuted.

The plaintiff paid to the defendant five dollars in money, and
the defendant agreed to deliver to the plaintiff on the noxt day, a
yoke of oxen, and to receive a colt in exchange. The defendant
refuses to deliver the oxen, on the ground that he entered into the
contract on a Sunday, and it is void. So far he is sustained by
the law.

But if he repudiates and refuses to execute the agreement, on
the ground that it was a business transaction on the Sabbath, and
consequently void, upon what pretense of right can he withhold
from the plaintiff the money that he advanced upon the faith of
that agreement?

He bas put an end to the execution of the contract, as he had a
Jegal right to do.

‘He now holds five dollars of the plaintiff ’s money without con-
sideration, and is, ex @quo et bono, under as great obligation to re-
fund it as if he bad accidentally found it on Sunday. The woll-
settled rule of Jaw undoubtedly is, that’ where money has been
paid in pursuance of an illegal contract that remains oxevutory, it
87] is recoverable in an action for money had and received to
the use of the party paying it. Aliter, when the agreement is
executed,

The judgment of the common pleas is reversed, with costs.

74,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 88

King v. Wicks.

Giron §. Kine v. Opep W. Wioxs, Jr.

Before a witness can be contradicted by proving statements out of court at
variance with his testimony, he must be first inquired of, upon cross-
examination, as to such statements, and the time, place, and person in-
volved in the supposed contradiction.

Error to the court of common pleas of Geauga county.

The original action was trespass before a justice of the peace,
brought by Wicks as plaintiff (now defendant in error), against
King, defendant below (now plaintiff in error). The cause was
removed to the common pleas, and tried to a jury at May term,
1851, when the plaintiff below recovered judgment.

The bill of exceptions taken at said May term shows that the
plaintiff below, on trial, called as a witness, William R. Tolls, who
gave evidence for the plaintiff material to the issue. “ After the
plaintiff had closed his testimony, and rested his case, the defend-
ant called Freeman Brown, a witness sworn for defondant, and
proposed to prove, and asked said witness what he had heard the
witness Tolls say in relation to the case, and stated to tho court
that the object of the testimony was to contradict tho said wit-
ness in what he had testified to, and to show that he (Tolls) had
made to the witness Brown, statements out of court different from
his testimony here, and that he (Tolls) had stated to witness
Brown, altogether different from what he had testified in court, and
as set forth in this bill of exceptions for the purpose of contradict-
ing and impeaching the *witness Tolls. To this inquiry the [88
plaintiff objected, on the ground that the defendant had no right
to such testimony, because the defendant had not asked the witness
Tolls on the stand, whether he had not stated to the witness Brown,
or to any one, and told him or them what the defendant sought to prove
that said Tolls had said to him, or asked the witness anything in
relation to the declarations sought to be thus proven by said
Brown. The plaintiff proposed to defendant that he might recall
the witness Tolls, and inquire of him, so as to lay the foundation
for the evidence. The court sustained said objection, and would
not permit the defendant to examine the witness, nor permit the

. 5

89 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

King v. Wicks.

witness to answer the questions; to which opinion of the court
the defendant excepted,” ete.

It docs not appear that the defendant below accepted the propo-
sition to recall tho witness Tolls, and examine him, so as to lay
the foundation for the examination of Brown.

B. Bisszxt, for plaintiff:

Had the plaintiff in error the right to impeach Tolls by proof
of statements out of court different from his evidonce in court?
I know it was held in the celebrated case of The Queen, that you
must inquire of the witness first, whether he had not made the
statements; but it was never so held up to that time, nor is that
case authority in any court that bas independence enough to en-
counter the arbitrary ruling of the court made for the occasion.

The only reason for such rule is, that the witness may leave, and
have no opportunity to explain. In answer, I say a witness has
no right to leave until the testimony is closed.

Puurrs, Rinpte & Turaswer, for defendant, cited 3 Stark.
Ey. 1753; 1 Greenl. Ev. 622, and notes, 2d ed.; 2 Phil. Ev. 432,
434, 3d ed.; Cow. & H., 4 Phil. Ev. 758; Cowen’s Notes, 390,
pt. 2, 3d ed.; Angus v. Smith, 1 Mood. & Malk. 437, 474,
89] This is the English rule, and is adopted in all *the states ex-
cept Maine—perhaps Massachusetts and Ohio. In this state the
decisions have been contradictory

Ranney, J. From the bill of exceptions taken upon the trial,
it appears that the defendant in error called a man by the name
of Tolls, as a witness, who gave evidence material to the issue.
The plaintiff in error then proposed to show, by another witness,
that Tolls had made statements out of court different from his tes-
timony in court, for the purpose of contradicting and impeaching
him. This evidence was objected to, upon the ground that the
witness Tolls had not been inquired of whether he had not made
such statements as were proposed ta bo proved to the other wit-
ness, or whether he had said anything to that witness upon the
subject. The defendant in error proposed to the plaintiff, that he
might recall the witness Tolls, and so lay the foundation for the
evidence to contradict him; but this offer was declined, and there-
upon the court sustained the objection, and ruled out the evidence.
In this it is claimed they erred.

We are aware that some diversity of practice upon this question

- 16

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 90:

King v. Wicks.

has obtained in the courts of common pleas in different parts of
this state. This case was reserved for the purpose of settling the
rule and securing uniformity upon the subject. Tho case upon
authority is exceedingly clear. The reported cases and clement~-
ary books speak an almost uniform Jangnage upon the subject.
The loading case in England was that of the Queen, reported in
2 Broderip & Bingham, 314, Lord Abbott, C. J., delivered the
unanimous opinion of the judges, holding that evidence to contra-
dict or impeach a witness, by proving that he had made different
statements out of court, could not be reccived until the witness
was first asked, upon cross-examination, whether or not he had
said or declared that which was intended to be proved. But the
counsel for the plaintiff in error is mistaken in supposing that the
doctrine rests alone or mainly upon this decision. It has been
followed in England by the cases of Angus v. Smith, 1 M. & Malk.
**473; Orowly v. Page, 7 Car. & P,'789; Regina v, Shellend, 9 Car. [90
& P.277; Regina v. Holden, 8 Car. & Payne, 606; and is the clear
and undeniable rule of the English courts at this day. It has been
almost universally acquiesced in in this country. It was adopted
in Now York in the cases of Everson v. Carpenter, 17 Wend. 419;
and Robertson v. Carr, 3 Barb. 410; in Pennsylvania, in McAteer
v. McMullen, 2 Barr. 82; in Vermont, in Downer v. Dana, 19 Vt.
338; in Maryland, in the Franklin Bank v. The Steam Naviga-
tion Co., 11 Gill & Johnson, 28; in Indiana, in Doe v. Reagan, 5
Black. 217, and Weinzorpflin v. The State, 7 Black. 186; in Illinois,
in Regnier v. Cabot, 2 Gil. 34; in Tennessee, in Story v, Saunders,
8 Humph. 663; and by Mr. Justice McLean, in the case of McKin-
ney v. Neal, 1 McLean, 540. It is believed to be the rule in every
state in the Union, where the question has been raised, except
Massachusetts and Maine. It is also the doctrine laid down in
the most approved elementary books. Mr. Greenleaf, in his work
on Evidence (vol. 1, p. 542, sec. 462), after stating that the credit
of a witness may be impeached by proof of statements out of court
. contrary to what he has testified at the trial, adds: “ Before this
can be done, it is generally held necessary, in the case of verbal
statements, first to ask him as to the time, place, and person in-
volved in the supposed contradiction. It is not enough to ask
him the general question, whether he has ever said so and go, nor
whether he has always told the same story; because it may fre-
quently happen that, uvon the general question, he may not
17

91 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

King v. Wicks.

remember whether he has so said; whereas, when his attention is
challenged to particular circumstances and occasions, he may
recollect, and explain what he has formerly said.” And this
course he regards as indispensably necessary, as a matter of jus-
tice to the witness whose testimony is sought to be impeached-
Mr. Starkie (3 Starkie’s Hv. 1753) lays down the same rule in the
most unqualified manner, and after enforcing the necessity of
adhering to it to chable the witness to give such reasons, explana-
tions, or exculpations of his conduct, if any there be, as the
91] circumstances may furnish, and thus the *whole matter be
brought before the court at once, which is the most convenient
course, says: “And it is of great importance that this opportunity
should be thus afforded, not only for the reasons already suggested,
but because such explanation, if not given in the first instance,
may be rendered impossible; for a witness who has been exam-
ined, and has no reason to suppose that his further attention is
requisite, often departs the court, and may not be found or brought
back until the trial be at an end.” The doctrine is also laid down
by Phillips (1 Phillips’ Ev. 295), and is indorsed by Mr. Justice,
Cowen, in his notes to that work (vol. 2, p. 774), and enforced by
a striking illustration of its wisdom, by an example drawn from
his own practice upon the bench. We should be very slow to
depart, unless the most careful investigation convinced us of the
necessity, from a rule thus sanctioned by the ablost elementary
writers, whose works ave placed in tho hands of every student,
and so many of the highest courts in different parts of the world.
Such investigation and scrutiny, however, only serve to convince
us of ils wisdom, and of the propriety of adhering to it. In
addition to the reasons already stated, others equally cogent could
be given. To make the truth manifest upon the issues joined
between the parties, is the object of all evidence. This testimony,
has no direct bearing upon any disputed fact, but raises a collat-
eral issue upon the credit to be given to a witness, and, with all
collateral issues, is calculated to divert the minds of the jury from
the points in controversy in tho case, Such collateral inquiry
may and often will become necessary, but it should be avoided
where it can be; and I firmly believe it may be avoided in a
majority of cases, where the inquiry is first made of the witness
himself, either by his confessing such contradictory statements, or
giving such explanations in regard to them as will convince the

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 92, 93

McGovney v. The State of Ohio.

party that nothing is to be made by pursuing the matter further

Aguin, witnesses are required, willing or unwilling, to come into
evurt and testify. They should appear there under the full confi-
dence that their feclings and reputations will be respected and
protected, so far *as is consistent with the ends of justice. The [92
witness suddenly finds himself on trial for his veracity, and his
character attempled to be impaired, not only for the purposes of
the present controversy, but unavoidably with his neighbors after-
ward. His disregard of truth is sought to be established by the
most uncertain and unsatisfactory of all evidence—mere verbal
declarations. A word imperfectly heard, forgotten, or omitted,
may change his whole meaning, and make him say what he
never thought of; or even the imperfection of his own language
may have misled the hearer. His seeming inconsistency may be
proved by very honest witnesses, while he feels conscious of being
wronged; and thus an angry and excited contest very often con-
tinues through a whole trial, ang embroils a neighborhood in
bitter strife for years afterward, which might all have been
avoided by one minute's explanation, in the first instance, from
the party implicated, in the presence of those brought to impeach
him. The opportunity for explanation at the outset not being
improved, the breach widens as the contest progresses, until it
becomes a matter of astonishment how small a matter is sufficient
to lay the foundation of a great controversy. We are satisfied
this rule impairs no substantial right of any suitor, while the cause
of justice gains much by its observance.

The judgment is affirmed.

*Lmomas MoGovnuy er au. v. Tax Scars or Onto, For tHe [93
use or WasLey Len’s ADMINISTRATOR. ,

‘The act of March 23, 1840, to provide for the settlement of the estates of de-
ceused persons, does not extend to estates in the course of settlement when
it took effect.

The bonds of executors and administrators taken in such cases, are governed

by and must be prosecuted under the laws in force when they were en-

tered into,
79

94. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McGovney v. The State of Ohio.

The undertaking of a surety can not be extended beyond the terms of the
contract into which he hes entered.

An excoutor’s bond, describing the testator as James L. Findley, can not, by
parol evidence, be made applicable to the estate of Joseph L, Findley.

Error to the court of common pleas of Adams county.

The plaintiffs in error, defendants below, were sued in the court
of common pleas of that county as the sureties of James Findley
and John Patterson, on an executor’s bond. The declaration sets
forth that one Joseph L. Findley, by his last will and testament,
appointed John Patterson and James Findley his executors, which
will was proved in the court of common pleas of that county on
August 10, 1839, when the executors namod appeared, were duly
appointed and qualified, and took upon themselves the execution
of the trust, and at the same time entered into bond with the
plaintiffs and one Ficlds Marlott as their sureties in the penal sum
of $2,000, conditioned as follows: “The condition of the above
obligation is such that if the above-bound John Patterson and
James Findley, exccutors of the last will and testament of James
L. Findley, deceased, shall faithfully perform all and every of the
duties required of them by law, as such executors, then the above
obligation to be void and of no effect; otherwise to remain in full
force and virtue in law ;” which bond was approved and accepted
by the court. Tho plaintiff then avers that “the name, James L.
Findley, in the condition of the aforesaid recited bond, was, by
clerical mistake, inserted instead of the name of Joseph L. Findley,
94] *and the namo, James L. Findley, was intended for Joseph L.
Findley, in the condition aforesaid.”

After the execution of this bond, it is charged that the executors
entered upon the discharge of their duties, received large sums of
money belonging to the estate, for which they have failed to ac-
count, and have converted to their own use, leaving the debts of
the estate unpaid; that Lee, in his lifetime, on February 7, 1848, -
recovered a judgment against Patterson, the surviving executor
(Findley being dead), before a justice of the peace, for about the
sum of $100, which remains in full force and wholly unpaid.

Patterson and Marlott were not served with process, but as to
them the sheriff returned “not found.”

The defendants below craved oyer of the writ, and demurred
specially to the declaration, and, on hearing, the court of common

80

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 95

McGovney v. The State of Ohio.

pleas overruled the demurrer, and gave judgment against the do-
fendants for the amount of the bond, with leave to take out exe-
eution for $104.14 and costs of suit; to reverse which this writ of
error is prosecuted. The questions arising upon the record aro
fully stated in the opinion of the court.

J. McCormiox, attorney-general, for plaintiff, maintained:

1. It does not appear that Lee, during his lifetime, or his admin-
istrator since his death, ever presented the claim on which the
judgment was obtained, for allowance, rejection, or reference, ac-
cording to law (Swan’s Stat. 354, scc. 90), nor does it appear that
the suit on the claim was instituted within six months after its
rejection by the executors, if by them it was rejected. See also
Stat. 373, sec. 182. The statute requires the creditor to demand
payment, and this requisition is not dispensed with, although the
claim has been reduced to judgment. The declaration does not
aver a neglect to pay upon demand, and hence I conceive the court
erred in overruling the demurrer.

2. The statute requires executors to give bond to the *state. [95
The condition is that the executor will, in accordance with law,
execute the will of his testator, and no other person. If the court
accepted a bond with any other condition than that prescribed by
law, it was a mere act of assumption, and void. The declaration
avers the execution of an illegal bond, and the subsequent,aver-
ment of the clerical error will not heal the prior averment.

Even if this were not so, a court of law can not correct the
error or mistake.

This case does not come within Fisher v. Butcher, 19 Grisw.
Ohio, 406. .

I insist that the action in the court below can not be main-
tained ; and I rely upon the authority of the State v. Medary et al.,
17 Grisw., Ohio, 565.

i. P. Evans, for defendant:

The main question presented for consideration in this case is,
“can a party in declaring on a written instrument, by averment,
correct 4 mere clerical error in such instrument?” I maintain
that he can, and refer the court to the following authorities:
Day v. Brown, 2 Ham. Ohio, 345; Carr v. Williams et al., 10 Wil-
cox’s Ohio, 305. The mistake averred in the declaration is a latent
ambiguity, and admits of parol evidence to apply the bond to its
proper subject matter. 3 Stark. Hy. 1020, 4 Amer. ed.

VoL, xx—6 7 81

96 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McGovney », The State of Ohio.

Rawney,' J. Among the varicty of reasons assigned by the
plaintiffs in error, why their demurrer to the declaration should
have been sustained, and of the errors assigned, why this judg-
ment should be reversed, two only are relied upon by their coun-
acl, in argument.

First. It is claimed that the declaration is bad, as it does not
show that the claim of Lee was ever presented to the executors,
and allowed or disallowed by them, and that the presumption
96] from the lapse of time between the accruing of the action *and
the commencement of his suit, is that the claim was barred; and
that it is not averred that payment of the judgment was de-
manded before the commencement of this suit. To sustain this
position, we are referred to sections 90 and 182 of the ‘act to
provide for the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.”
Swan’s Stat. 354, 373, By the first of these sections, a creditor
is required to commence suit within six months after his claim is
disputed or rejected by the executor or administrator, and on
failure to do so, ho is “ forever barred from maintaining any action
thereon.” By the last, it is provided that after the creditor is
entitled to the payment of his debt, and the same has been allowed
or liquidated by judgment, award, or order of distribution, he
may sue the bond of the executor or administrator, if he neglects,
“upon demand made, to pay such claim.”

This case does not require us to put a construction upon these
sections. A recurrence to the dates will plainly show that they
have nothing to do with the case. The bond in suit was entered
into on August 10, 1839. The act referred to took effect on No-
vember 1, 1840. Section 247 repeals all previous laws upon the
subject, but with the following saving clause: “ Provided, however,
the repeal of said acts shall not affect any act done, or any right,
liability, or estate, accruing or accrued, or any suit, matter or
proceeding, had, or commenced; but the same shall be deter-
mined, and remedies for the same had, and all estates in the course
of settlement by an executor or administrator, at the time this
act takes effect, shall be settled ‘under said acts.” The “ liability ”
upon this bond had then “accrued ;” the estate was in the course
of settlement, and of course’ the “remedies” upon it must be
sought under the laws then in force; and we think the plaintiff,
so far as this point is concerned, clearly within their provisions.

The second position relied upon by the plaintiff’s counsel is,

82

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 97, 98

MeGovney ». The State of Ohio.

that the bond is insufficient to secure the performance of the
*duties of the executors of Joseph Lu. Findley, James L. [97
Findley being named in the condition.

To this it is replied that the name of James was used instead of
Joseph by a mistake of the clerk; that it was intended as a bond
for the executors of Joseph, L. Findley, and that the averments of
the declaration are sufficient to apply it to his estate, and to
charge the defendants for the default of his exécutors. From the
face of the bond it does not appear that the defendants became
sureties for the executors of Joseph L. Findley. The question
arising is, can this be shown by averment and proof outside of
it? Can a bond, not appearing to have any connection with that
estate, be shown to have such connection by parol?

The defendants are sought to be charged for the default of
others. By positive law, this can only be done when the obliga-
tion exists in writing. They are mere sureties, and, as such, may
demand to be brought strictly within the terms of the obligation
before they are charged. It is true, that a contract falling within
the statute of frauds may be enforced, if plainly made out in all
its terms, from any writing of the party, or even from his cor-
respondence. But, as stated by Mr. Greenleaf (1 Greenl. Hv. 318),
“it must all be collected from the writings, verbal testimony not
being admissible to supply any defects or omissions in the written
evidence.” ,

The rule to be applied to the undertaking of sureties is very
clearly and satisfactorily settled, The Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of the United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet.
208, thus states it: “This court held, in Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat.
702, that the liability of a surety is not to be extended, by impli-
cation, beyond the terms of his contract; that his undertaking is
to receive a strict interpretation, and not to extend beyond the
fair scope of its terms, and that the whole series of authorities
proceeded on this ground.” See also Sprigg v. Bank of Mount
Pleasant, 14 Pet. 208. In Evans v. Bradley, 17 Wend, 422, the
Supreme Court of New York bold this language: “Where there is
no *uncertainty upon the face of the instrument, or where, in [98
cases of doubt, we have ascertained the true meaning of the con-
tract, the liability of a guarantor or surety can not be extended
by implication or otherwise. The case must be brought strictly
within the terms of the guaranty, or the guarantor will not be

83 :

99 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McGovney v. The State of Ohio.

liable. The cases speak a uniform language upon that subject.”
And again, in Hunt v. Smith, 17 Wend. 180, Judge Cowan says,
“the terms of the guaranty must be exactly pursued or the
guarantor is not liable at all.” This court has beon equally
explicit upon the subject. In tho case of the Bank of Steuben-
ville v. Carroll’s Adm’rs, 5 Ohio, 214, it is said that “no principle
is bettor settled at the present day, than that a surety can not be
further bound than by the terms of his undertaking.” In tho
case of The State v. Modary et al., 17 Ohio, 565, it is thus forcibly
stated: “The bond speaks for itsclf, and the Jaw is that it shall so
speak; and that the liability of sureties is limited to the exact let-
ter of tho bond. Sureties stand upon the words of the bond, and.
if the words will not make them liable nothing can. There is no
construction, no equity against sureties. If the bond can not
have effect according to its exact words, the law does not au-
thorize the court to give it effect in some other way, in order that
it may prevail.”

The principles settled in these authorities would seem to be
decisive against the validity of this bond, and to supersede the
necessity of further inquiry. But the case of Grant v. Naylor,
4 Cranch, 224, decides the very quostion now under consideration.
Tt was an action of assumpsit, brought upon a letter of guaranty,
addressed by the plaintiff in error to John and Joseph Naylor & Co.
The name of the firm for which it was intended, was John and
Jeremiah Naylor & Co., who advanced goods upon it, and the prin-
cipal having failed to pay, brought this action against the
guarantor to recover the amount. The court held that the plaint-
iff below could not be admitted to prove, by parol testimony, that
it was intended for, and was an assumpsit to John and Jeremiah
99] Naylor & Co. C.J. *Marshall, in delivering the opinion of
the court, says: “That the letter was really designed for John and
Jeremiah Naylor, can not be doubted; but the principles which
require that a promise to pay the debt of another shall be in
writing, and which will not permit a‘written contract to be ex~
plained by parol testimony, originate in a general and wise policy,
which this court can not relax so far as to except from its opera-
tion cases within the principle.”

“Already have so many cases been taken out of the statute of
frauds, which seem to be within its letter, that it may well be
doubted whother the exceptions do not let in many of the mis-

84.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 100

Lyon ». Fish.

chiefs against which the rule was intended to guard. The best
judges in England have been of opinion that this relaxiug con-
struction of the statute ought not to be extended further than it
has already been carried, and this court entiroly concurs in that
opinion. ~

«The letter itself is not a written contract between Daniel
Grant, the writer, and John and Jeremiah Naylor, the persons to
whom it was delivered. To admit parol proof, to make it such a
contract, is going further than courls have ever gone, where the
writing is itself the contract, not evidence of the contract, and,
where no pre-existing obligation bound the party to enter into
it.”

‘We are of opinion that the bond in this case can not, by parol
evidence, be made applicable to the estate of Joseph L. Findley,
and that the court of common pleas erred in overruling the de-
murrer filed to the declaration.

For this cause, the judgment of that court is reversed.

*Joun Lyon v. Levi Fis. [100

A defect in the conclusion of a plea can not be reached by general demurrer.

Where a return has been made on an execution issued by a justice of the
peace, of “no goods in the township” where the justice resides, with a
suggestion that “there are goods of the judgment debtor” in another
township of the same county, an execution issued to any constable of
either of the two townships, although not strictly in accordance with the
statute, is not therefore void. (1)

Exror to the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county. Re-
served by the Supreme Court in that county for decision here.

Lyon, the plaintiff below (and plaintiff in error), sued in tres-
pass, and complained of Fish, “constable of the township of
Brooklyn, in Cuyahoga county, for that on October 20, 1846, at
Brooklyn, in the county of Cuyahoga, etc.. the said defendant, be-
ing a constable of the township of Brooklyn, etc., and assuming to
act as such constable, without lawful authority, with force and

(1) See sections 90, 91 of the act of March 14, 1831, of justices of the peace
and coastables, defining the powers and duties in civil cases. Swan’s Stat. 522.
83

101 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lyon ». Fish.

arms, took and carried away “ the plaintiff's goods and chattels,
to wit: One two-horse lumber wagon, of the value of $80; eight
tons of ey of the value, etc. ; and the corn grown on six acres of
Jand,”

The second count charges a trespass and taking by defendant
as said constable of the same property, at the same time, at Parma,
in said county.

Defendant filed a plea of the general issue and two special pleas.

The first special plea avers that as to the wagon, the plaintiff
ought not to have his action, ete. That on October 20, 1846,
Wm. J. Case, caused an execution to be issued in his favor by
Benjamin Sawtell, a justice of the peace in Brooklyn townsbip,
101] against said Lyon for $40 debt and costs, which, *by the
judgment of said justice, Case had previously recovered against
Lyon; that the execution was on October 20, 1846, delivered to
defendant as constable of Brooklyn township, to whom it was di-
rected, and on the same day was returned ‘no goods or chattels
found whereon to levy,’ but with a suggestion indorsed thereon
‘that Lyon had goods in Parma township ;’ that on October 24,
1846, said justice issued an execution on said judgment, directed ‘to
any constable of Brooklyn or Parma townships,’ which came to
the hands of said Fish as constable, and that on the 26th October,
he levied said execution on said wagon, advertised and sold it at
Parma to Case, the judgment creditor, and made due return of the
writ; that it did not satisfy the writ; and the plea concludes :

“Whereupon he prays judgment as to so much of the cause of
action in said déclaration mentioned, as relates to said wagon, if
the said plaintiff his action aforesaid against him ought to have
or maintain,” ete. .

The second special plea is substantially the same, and after re-
citing the facts, and a sale of the property on the execution at
Parma, concludes thus :

“ Afterward, before the expiration of thirty days from the date
of said last-mentioned writ, made due return thereof with his do-
ings thercon, to the said justice, according to the precept thereof,
ete., and as to all the other matters alleged against him in said
declaration, he says he is not guilty thereof in manner and form,
as the said plaintiff hath therein alleged against him, ete.

“JosepH ADAMS,
“ Defendant's Attorney.”
86

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 102

Lyon ». Fish.

“P,S. Letit be supposed that the last special plea has a veri-
fication in the place of the, ‘etc.,’ in the fourth line from the bot-
tom, and in place of the last ‘etc.,’ that the plea concludes to the
country or any other form to accommodate the replication.

“Yours truly, J. AL”

To these two special pleas, the plaintiff filed a general de-
murrer.

There was no averment in either of the pleas, as to the residence
of any of the parties to the judgment before the justice.

*The court of common pleas overruled the demurrer, and [102
sustained the special pleas, and entered judgment “ that the said
Levi Fish go hence without day and recover of the said John
‘Lyon his costs,” ete.

The principal errors assigned are:

First. That said special pleas do not answer the whole declara-
tion.

Second, That there is no Proper form of conclusion to said
special pleas.

Third. That the court of common pleas erred in sustaining the
defendant's justification, as set up in his special plea above
pleaded.

Fourth. That the court of common pleas erred in sustaining
the second writ of exocution issued by the justice, and set out in
said defendant’s special pleas, it having a double direction; being
directed to Brooklyn and Parma townships, when, in fact, the
statute only authorizes magistrates to issue writs of execution di-
rected to one township at a time.

LLynpn & Caste, for plaintiff:

The defendant, in his special pleas, does not pretend to answer
the declaration, only as to the wagon, and is silent as to any of the

other property charged to have been taken.

In the second place, the defendant has adopted the old and long
exploded course of pleading ; in short, for aconclusion to his plea:
“Let it be supposed that the last special plea has a verification in
the place of the ‘etc,’ and that it conclude to the country or any
other form to accommodate the replication,” which form we con-
eeive is wholly insufficient for a special plea.

The third and fourth exceptions depend upon the construction of
sections 90 and 91 of Swan’s Revised Statutes, page 522. Section
90, we conceive, gives a construction to be followed by the cases

87

103, 104 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lyon ». Bish.

supposed in both sections, and that section distinctly expresses it
to be the duty of the magistrate to issue his writ of execution, to
103] any constable *of his own township, or to any constable of
theo township where the defendant resides, in the same county.
Now this does not authorize a magistrate to issue an execution
with a double direction to one or the other township, but should
be directed to one alone, nor do we conceive that an execution
with such double direction would be anything but utterly void.

Joszpn Apams, for defendant,

No argument came to the hands of the reporter.

Oatpwett, J. The declaration charges the defendant with
forcibly seizing upon, and appropriating to his own use, certain
personal property belonging to the plaintiff; viz: one wagon, eight
tons of hay, and six acres of corn standing on the ground. Tho
defendant plead the general issue, and also two special pleas, the
substance of which two special pleas is the same, namely, that so
far as the wagon, in the declaration mentioned, is concerned, that
he, defendant, levied upon it, and sold it, as a constable of Brook-
lyn township, Cuyahoga county, by virtue of an execution issued
by Benjamin Sawtell, a justice of the peace of said township,
on a judgment rendered by said justice, in favor of one William
J. Case, against Lyon, the plaintiff; that an execution had been
previously issued on ‘this judgment, and returned ‘no goods of the
judgment debtor, in Brooklyn township,’ with a suggestion that
he had personal property in Parma township ; and that thereupon.
an execution was issued to any constable of Brooklyn or Parma
townships, which execution was placed in defendant’s hands, by
virtue of which he levied upon and sold the wagon, and applied
the proceeds on the judgment. To these pleas there was a general
demurrer, The court of common pleas overruled the demurrer,
and gave judgment for the defendant, And the only question
raised in the case is as to the sufficiency of these pleas. It is
said that the special pleas do not answer the whole declaration.
This is only true of the. first plea; the second plea, after answer-
104] ing *specially as to the wagon, traverses generally tho
trespass to the other property mentioned in the declaration. The
demurrer being general to both pleas, it is sufficiont if either be
good. The next objection is that there is no proper conclusion to
tho pleas. The second special plea, in place of the verification or

88

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 105

Lyon ». Fish.

averment, has simply the term ‘etc.’ The plea is clearly defect-
ive, wanting a proper conclusion, but the defect, being merely of
form, can only be taken advantage of by special demurrer. Seo
Swan’s Stat. 687, sec. 5. Another objection urged against the
special pleas is, that the writ of execution, under which the de-
fondant justifies, is directed to any constable of Brooklyn or Parma
townships. Itis said that the justice should have confined the
process to any constable in one or other of the townships; but
that he could not give it the double direction, to any constable of
either township, and that, being so directed, it was therefore void.
‘The section of the statute making provision for a case such as the
present, provides (Swan’s Stat. 522, sec. 91): “When the con-
stable shall make return, that sufficient goods and chattels can not
‘be found in the township where the justice resides, who issued the
execution, and it shall be suggested to the justice, that the party
against whom the same issued, has goods and chattels within any
other township in the same county, it shall be lawful for the
justice to issue execution to any constable of the township in
which the justice resides, or of the township where such goods
and chattels may be found,” ete.

Now we suppose that the direction of the statute, when strictly
applied, is that the process shall be directed to tho officers of one
or the other of the townships. The defendant, however, who was
a constable of Brooklyn township, was one of the persons to whom,
in contemplation of the statute, the process might be directed.
He was embraced within its direction, it came into his hands, he
executed it, and the object of the law and the requisitions of the
process were fully complied with, and the execution, we think,
was as valid as if directed to him alone. The defect in the writ
(if such it could be *called) was merely formal, which will [105
never be allowed to render process void. We see no error, what-
ever, in the proceedings of the court of common pleas.

The judgment will therefore be affirmed.

89

106 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Harper o. Graham.

Rosert Harrur v. Issac GRawaM.

“Where a party recovered a judgment against another who was insolvent, and
the plaintiff afterward agreed to receive from him the sum of $550 on
the judgment, and the payment of $100 for attorney's fees, which sums
wore paid accordingly, and a receipt in full given for the judgment,
although both sums amounted to much less than the judgment: Hold, that
a satisfaction of such judgment would, from this state of facts, be or-
dered to be entered. (i)

OxRr10RARI to the court of common pleas of Butler county.

Isaac Graham recovered judgment against Robert Harper, at
the September term, 1844, of’ Butler common pleas, for $1,716.86,
and plaintiff’s costs, $52.99; the defendant's costs taxed at $19.91.

Harper was then residing in Arkansas. Graham procured a
certified transcript of the judgment, and forwarded it to Paschal
106] *& Ogden, attorneys at law in Arkansas, for collection. Har-
per was notoriously insolvent. Divers propositions of comprom-
ise were submitted and considered by Graham’s attorneys, on the
one part, and Harper on the other; and, finally, on March 4,
1847, it was proposed by Graham's attorneys and agreed to by
Harper, that—

Harper should pay on the judgment......uereseersseeere $500 00
The attorney’s fees of Paschal & Ogden and

Floyd $100 00
52 99
3 50

156 50

* $656 50

(1) Where, in an action of trespass against five, the plaintiff accepts a note
from two, payable at a future day, in satisfaction of the trespass, as to the
two, but not to operate as a satisfaction as to the other defendants, the cause
of action is satisfied and discharged as to all. Ellis ». Bitzer, 2 Ohio, 89.

An accord, on mutual promises to perform, is not good if there be no per-
formance before action is brought. Frost v. Johnson, 8 Ohio, 393.

Accord and satisfaction may be given in evidence under the general issue
in assumpsit. Stewart v. Saybrook Tp, Wright's 8. 0. 374.

The plea of accord, etc, with George E., agent, is not sustained by proof
of an accord with John E. Chappell v. Phillips, Wright's 8. C. 371; seo 18
Ohio, 79,

90

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 107

Harper v. Graham.

—which was to be received in full satisfaction and discharge of the
judgment. Harper paid to said attorneys $656.50 in specie, and
they delivered up to him the transcript of tho record, with the
following indorsement:

“Received of Robert Harper $656.50, in specie, in full payment
and discharge of the foregoing judgment, remaining of record in
the court of common pleas, in Butler county, Ohio, Given under
our hands, March 4, a. p. 1847, +

(Signed,) | “Pasonan & Oapzn,

«Wm. W. Frorp,
“ Attorneys for plaintiff.” -

Paschal & Ogden wrote to Graham by letter, dated March 14,
1847, stating, in substance, that they had made the best settlement
with Harper in their power, and that they leave their acts to his
(Graham’s) ratification; that Harper was preparing to go to the
Rio Grande; that they had no process for arresting debtors; that
Harper had proposed to pay $500, and that they agreed to take
$556.50—Harper paying their fees and Floyd’s fees, $100; that
they refused to give a release; that they believed none of Gra-
ham’s rights to a future action were waived; 1. Because a judg-
ment can not be released except under seal; 2. Because to
sustain a plea of payment in *money, the payment must [107
have been in full of principal, interest, and costs.

They advise the acceptance of it, and suggest to let the matter
sleep until Harper releases his property, or gets under way ; and
they add:

“But if you fear that your rights will be prejudiced, and wholly
dissent from the settlement, return to us the draft, and we will
return the money to Harper, and place everything in statu quo.
We did with this business as we should with our own; and believ-
ing your statements about him, we feol no conscientious scruples
about reserving for you a future right. Wo trust you will be sat~
isfied.”

They inclose a draft for $550, with a statement showing the
manner in which the money was appropriated, and also a copy in
substance of the receipt upon the transcript of the record, given
by them to Harper.

‘The affidavit of Graham shows that he received the check for
$550, with a full knowledge of all the facts, and appropriated the

91

108 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Harper o. Graham,

same to his own use by entering in his own handwriting, on the
execution docket, in Butler common pleas, in the said case of
Isaac Graham v. Robert Harper, “ money paid, $550.” Tho excuse
offered for not returning the check and disavowing the settlement
was, that his (Graham’s) counsel in Ohio wore of the same opin-
jon with the counsel in Arkansas, “That his acceptance of a part
of said judgment without legally authorizing any person to satisfy
the same under seal, would not preclade his further prococdings
to recover the balance.”

Prior to the compromise and payment by Harper, in March,
1847, Floyd, ono of the attorneys in Arkansas, who aided Paschal
& Ogden in the compromise, wrote to Graham, in Ohio, advising
him that it would be best to compromise with Harper, by taking
Jess than the whole amount. Graham replied by letter that he
would not take less than the amount of the judgment, interest, and
108] costs, and this instruction was communicated “to Paschal &
Ogden, but the witness, Floyd, the attorney, does not remember
whether or not Harper was informed of this.

Graham, in an affidavit filed on the motion to enter satisfaction,
states that he wrote to Paschal & Ogden that he would sooner lose
the whole debt than accept $500, but that he would accept $580,
and proper security for the residue of his claim.

In the letter of Paschal & Ogden, of March 14, 1847, before re-
ferred to, and which was offered in evidence by Harper on the
motion to enter satisfaction, there is this statement: “Through a
gentleman at Clarksville, he (Harper) proposed to pay us $500,
etc. We showed Harper and his attorney our letters, and refused
to give a release.” None of the witnesses testify that the letters
were shown.

The depositions of Turner L. Green and W. W. Floyd show
that Harper was considered entirely insolvent; that Harper
raised said money through the assistance of friends; that the set-
tlement was made in entire good faith, and intended as a complete
discharge of the judgment; that Grabam’s attorneys considered
they had made an advantageous settlement for their client. Green,
who was Harper’s attorney, swears that the attorneys for Graham,
distinctly asserted “their full and complete power to compromise
the judgment;” that Harper so understood it—otherwise he would
not have paid a dollar; that Graham’s attorneys stated that ifthe

92

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 109

Harper ». Graham.

receipt they had given was not satisfactory to Harper, they would
sign any receipt that would satisfy him.

Harper presented his transcript of the record, thus receipted,
to the clerk of the court of common pleas of Butler county, who
copied the receipt on the margin of the record of the cause. Gra-
ham afterward caused an execution to be issued upon the judg-
mont, to collect the balance of the judgment; whereupon Harper
filed in said court of common pleas, his motion to sect aside the
execution and to have satisfaction entered upon said judgment.
The cause was submitted to the *associate judges, at the [109
February term, 1851, who overruled the motion “upon the ground
that the testimony adduced did not show a good accord and satis-
faction,” to which Robert Harper excepted.

The writ of certiorari is sued out to reverse said decision.

The errors assigned, are:

1. That tho court erred in deciding that the payment by Har-
per of $500 on the judgment, $56.50 for plaintiff’s costs, and $100
for Graham’s attorneys’ fees, did not constitute a good accord and
and satisfaction.

’ 2, The court erred in deciding that the testimony did not show
sufficient grounds to authorize an entry of satisfaction on said
judgment.

3, The court erred in overruling Harper’s motion.

Tuomas Mrzurrzn, for plaintiff:

Do the facts show a valid accord and satisfaction? It appears
to have been generally held, that the payment and acceptance of
a less sum than the debt can not be insisted on as a satisfaction;
but the courts will avoid this rule whenever they can, and there
are many exceptions to the general rule. Brooks v. White, 2
Met. 285; Kellogg v. Richards, 14 Wend. 116; 5 Jobns. 269; 14
Wend. 119; Blinn v. Chester, 5 Day, 360; Brooke v. White, 2
Met. 285; 2 Greenl. Bv., sec. 48; 20 Johns. 78; 1 Amer. Com. L.
137; 5 East, 230; Reynolds v. Pinhowe, Croke Bliz. 429; 14
Wond. 117; 2 Greenl. Hy., sec. 28; 20 Johns. 76; 15 Mees. &
Welsby, 23, reversing Cumber v. Wayne, Strange, 426 ; Slofford v.
Bacon, 1 Hill, 538.

The case at bar comes within acknowledged exceptions to the
general rule. .

1. It was a benefit to Graham to receive the money without

93

110, 111 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Harper v. Graham.

suit, and to prevent a writ of error, by which the judgment
might have been reversed.
110] *2. The money was paid at a different place than that con-
templated by the parties.

3. Harper paid the attorney’s fees of Paschal & Ogden and
Floyd, $100; tho plaintiff ’s costs in the transcript, $52.99; cost of
the transcript, $3.50. Here was not only a technical, but 2 sub-
stantial consideration.

Graham was bound to pay his own cost in the transcript, if the
same could not bo made of Harper. Swan’s Stat. 405, sec. 51.
The attorney’s fees, and the cost of the transcript, Harper was not
bound to pay, and it was a substantial benefit to Graham to have
them paid by Harper.

Graham recognized the payment of his attorney’s fees and the
costs of the transcript, as a separate and independent considera-
tion ; for with a fall knowledge of all the facts, he entered upon
the execution docket of Butler county a credit of $550, the amount
of the draft, instead of $656.50, the amount actually paid.

4, Harper was insolvent—this is admitted. The money was
raised through the assistance of friends. This is a technical con-
sideration at least.

The evidence of the debt was the certified transcript; this was
not only receipted, but delivered up to Harper, which of itself
implied a release. Sce Bouvier L. Dic., tit. Release.

In relation to the authority of Paschal & Ogden to make the
settlement, there can be no question. I admit the record shows
no authority to make the compromise ; but the facts show a full
and complete ratification, and that, too, after taking the advice of
counsel. i

Ratification once made with full knowledge of all the material
circumstances, can not be recalled. Story on Agency, 291, 293;
Palmerston v. Huxford, 4 Denio, 167.

A principal can not ratify a part and repudiate the balance—
ratification of part confirms the whole. Farmers’ Loan and Trust
Co. v. Walworth, 1 Comst. 447; Story on Agency, 299, 300.

TL] +*A subsequent ratification is equivalent to an original au-
thority. Story on Agency, 293, 294.

As Graham acted with his eyes open, the court will not stop to
inquire whether he acted wisely or not, or whether he will be
gainer or loser by the decision which he made. The fact that

94

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 112

Harper v. Graham.

Graham and his attorneys secretly intended to violate a solemn
agreement, to take refuge under a legal technicality, and thus
harass an unfortunate debtor, will not make the ratification less
complete and effectual. 1 Comst, 447.

Joun R. Lewis, for defendant:

The proposition, that “the payment and acceptance of a less
sum than the debt can not be insisted on as a satisfaction, is a well-
established rule of law, announced in most of the authorities cited
for plaintiff.

The case of Reynolds v. Pinhowe, which is the only case directly
in point, cited by the counsel for the plaintiff on this branch of
the case, is, to say the least, of doubtful authority. The case is
very meagerly reported, and stands alone, unsupported by any
other authority. Though not expressly overruled, I find no in-
stance in which it has been confirmed, and indeed in the same
volume of reports (Cro. Hliz., case 74, Dixon v. Adams), the principle
is decided directly contrary to the case of Reynolds v. Pinhowe:
In that case J.S.and J. D. were obliged to Adams in £40, and
thereupon he sued J. S. in the Queen’s Bench, in which suit Dixon
became bail. Adams recovered, and upon a seire facias against
Dixon (the bail) had judgment against him, and he, without
other process, paid the condemnation, and Adams, in considera-
tione inde, assumed to Dixon to deliver unto him the principal
obligation, and a letter of attorney to sue it against J. D.; and for
non-performance hereof the action was brought, and upon non
assumpsit pleaded, and found for the plaintiff, hc had judgment;
and thereupon error brought, because it was not a sufficient con-
sideration. And so it was held by the whole court, for Dixon
had *not done any act whereto the law would not have [lI2
compelled bim. .

But leaving these cases in which the rule has been admitted to
exist, and the exceptions to it pointed out, I turn to those cases
in which the point has been presented directly to the court, and
how runs the current of authority?

In the case of Seymour v, Minturn, 17 Johns. 175, where the
question was directly raised, the court say, “The cases of Harri-
son v. Wilcox & Close, 2 Johns. 449; Fitch v. Sutton, 5 Hast, 232;
and Cumber v. Warn, 1 Strange, 426, are decided authorities to show
that the payment of a loss sum of money than the real debt, will
be no satisfaction of a larger sum without a release by deed.”
95

118 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Harper v. Graham.

And again, “ Where there is an agreement upon an adequate con-
sideration, to pay a sum certain, the promisor can not avoid that
agreement by an agreement to receive a less sum.” In tho case of.
Harrison v. Wilcox, cited above, the question was directly decided,
and the court there say, “The caso of Fitch v. Sutton, and tho au-
thorities there cited, go to show that the payment of the twenty-
“one dollars and fifty-five cents in this case, without a rclease by
deed, is no bar to the demand, and that the promise to look only to
Close is anudum pactum. Dederich v. Leman, 9 Johns. 333; Watkin-
son v. Inglosby, 5 Johns. 391; Mechanics’ Bank v. Hazard, 13 Johns.
357,

1. But it is said this case is taken out of the general rule. It
was a benefit to Graham to pay without suit. Certainly no more
benefit can accrue from payment without suit on a record, than
upon payment without suit upon a bond which has been decided not
to be a good accord and satisfaction, 9 Johns, 333; 13 Johns. 337.

2. “The money was paid at a different place,” etc.

I admit that where a less sum has been paid at a place different
from that where the defendant had, by his contract, bound him-
self to pay it, it has been held to be a good accord and satisfac-
tion; but the case is widely different from that where a debtor
113] absconds from the jurisdiction where a judgment *has been
obtained against him, and his creditor has been compelled to fol-
low him to enforce payment.

But it is said that inasmuch as that part of the money paid by
Harper was appropriated to the payment of costs and attornoy’s
fees, that this formed a substantial consideration for relinquish-
ing the balance of the judgment. The evidence of Turner L.
Green, taken by Harper, shows that the whole sum paid was con-
sidered a payment on the judgment. After testifying to the first
offer of $500, he says, “Graham’s attorneys thought the sum too
small, but finally they agreed, or rather Paschal agreed, if Harper
would pay the amount over and above $500, sufficient to pay the
cost of the suit had in the court of common pleas, Butler county,
Ohio, and attorney’s foes, to wit, fifty dollars, or some such sum,
to Paschal & Ogden, and fifty dollars to W. W. Floyd, which said
costs and fees amounted to the sum of $156.50, that they would
compromise the debt.” The import of this language clearly
is, that the $500, together with so much more as was necessary to
pay costs and fees, was to be paid by Harper on the judgment.

96

DECEMBER TERM, 1861. 14

Harper v. Graham,

But we need not be technical in the construction of language;
there is no escaping from the fact that here the payment of a less
sum in money is set up as a discharge from a judgment for
greater amount,

As to the evidence of the debt being delivered up, it is sufficient
to reply, that the record of the judgment still subsisting and in
force, is the evidence of the debt, and the delivery of a mere copy
certainly can not operate to discharge it.

But it appears further, from the evidence, that the compromise
was not only made without authority, but that Harper knew that.
it was so. In the letter of Paschal & Ogden to Graham (offered ©
in evidence by plaintiff in error), they state, ‘We showed Harper
and his attorney our letters, and refused to give a release!” Ho
therefore acted with his eyes open, and the court will not strain
the law in favor of a debtor who had once absconded, and, when
on the point of doing so again, *compromised a claim with [14
attorneys in a way which he knew was against the express direc-
tions of their client.

Ranney, J. Did the court of common pleas err in refusing to
order the execution in this case to be set aside, and satisfaction to be
entered on the judgment? It can not be denied thatthe plaintiff's
attorneys did agree to receive in full satisfaction of the judgments
the sum of $656.50; that it was paid in specie, in pursuance of the
agreement, they giving a receipt specifying that it was in fall pay-
ment and discharge of said judgment then remaining of record in
Butler county. These acts of the attorneys were fully ratified and
confirmed by the principal, the plaintiff in the judgment, and are
just as effectual as though done by him. This was done, itis true,
with the mental reservation on the part of both client and at-
torneys, that it would not effectually bar a recovery for the balance.
of the judgment: first, because the release was not under seal;
and, second, because the payment was not as large as the amount
of the judgment. But it is not pretended that any such intima-
tion was given to Harper. On the contrary, it is not denied that
he vaised the money and paid it with the full confidence that it re-
lieved him entirely from the judgment, and that the transaction
was really what it soomed. Harper was at the time residing in
the State of Arkansas, and was entirely insolvent. The question
now presented is, whether the plaintiff can, by means of this sub-

+ VOL, XX—T 7 -

115 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Harper », Graham.

terfuge, obtain the payment of a part of his debt, and for the
technical reasons above stated, in the face of his positive agree-
ment, refuse to enter satisfaction upon his judgment.

Tt was very early settled as a rule of the common law, that the
payment of less than the sum due upon a Jiquidated demand, af-
though agreed to be received in full satisfaction, could not be in-
sisted upon as such, because there was no valuable consideration
to uphold the agreement to relinquish the balance. But if the
party to whom the money was coming executed a release, undor
115] seal, for the same debt, he was *effectually barred, although
he should have received nothing upon it. The rale and the rea-
son were purely technical, and often fostered bad faith. The his-
tory of judicial decisions upon the subject has shown a constant
effort to escape from its absurdity and injustice. Hence, we find
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in the case of Kel-
Jogg v. Richards, 14 Wend. 116, holding the following language
in respect to it:

«The rule that the payment of a less sum of money, though
agreed to be received in full satisfaction of a debt exceeding that
amount, shall not be so considered in contemplation of law, is
technical, and not very well supported by reason. Courts, there-
fore, have departed from it on slight distinctions.”

Tho Supreme Court of Massachusetts; in the case of Brooks
v. White, 2 Met. 285, speak of it in no less explicit terms. They
say: :
“This rule which may obviously be urged in violation of good
faith, is not to be extended beyond its precise import; and when-
ever the technical reason for its application does not exist, the rule
itself is not to be applied. Hence judges have been disposed to
take out of its application all thoso cases where there was any new
consideration, or any collateral benefit received by the payee
which might raise a technical Jegal consideration, although it was
quite apparent that such consideration was far less than the amount
of the sum due.”

A moment’s attention to the cases taken out of the rule, will
show that there is nothing of principle left in the rule itself. One
of the earliest cases is Reynolds v. Pinhowe, Oro. Eliz. 429, where,
after judgment for £5, the plaintiff on receipt of £4, assumed to ac«
knowledge satisfaction of the judgment before a given day; and this
was held good upon the ground that it was a benefit to the plaintiff

98

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 116, 117°

Harper v. Graham.

to receive the money without suit or charge, and to prevent a writ
of error, by which the defendant might have avoided the whole
judgment. The authority of this case has been questioned, but 1
find it relied on in the very recent case of Sibner v. Tripp, 15
Mee. & *Welsb. 22, and conclude that it is regarded as [116
good law in England now.

In Pinnell’s case, 5 Co. 117, it was held that the payment of
a less sum before the debt fell duc, would discharge it, and this
reason is given: “ Peradventure parcel of the sum before the day
it fell due, would be more beneficial to him than the whole at the
day ; and the value of the satisfaction is not material.” Another case
taken out, is thus alluded to in Co. Lit., 212, 6: “If the obligor pay
@ lesser sum, either before the day, or at another place than is
limited by the condition, and the obligee receiveth it, this is a
good satisfaction.”

In Boyd v. Hitchcock, 20 Johns. 76, the debtor gave a note to’
the creditor for a less sum than was due, with security, and this
was held a valid discharge, for the reason, as the court say, “here
was a beneficial interest acquired, and a valuable consideration
received by the plaintiffs, when they agreed to accept less than
the whole demand.”

So in Kellogg v. Richards, before cited, it was held that the re-
ceipt of the note of a third person for less than the amount due,
would be a good accord and satisfaction ; and the same thing was
held in the vase of Brooks v. White, before cited.

Again, it is well settled by a great number of authorities, that
the receipt in satisfaction of any other article than money, will be
effectual, no matter how small the value as compared to the debt.
Blynn v. Chester, 5 Day, 360.

As stated by Alderson, B., in Sibner v. Tripp,'15 Mee. &
Welsb. 37: “Ifyou substitute for a sum of money a piece of paper,
or a stick of sealing wax, it is different, and the bargain may be
carried out in its full integrity. A man may give in satisfaction
of a debt of £100, a horse of the value of five pounds, but not five
pounds.” In this case it was held that the acceptance of the
negotiable security of the debtor himself, by the creditor, was in
law a satisfaction of a debt of greator amount. This decision was
made as late as 1846, and the learned judge from whom I have
quoted, ventures to intimate in respect to the whole subject, that
“the courts might very *well have held the contrary, and [17

99

118 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Harper v, Graham.

have left the matter to the agreement of the parties.” We see,
then, that the payment of a less sum than is duo, the day before
a debt falls due, will discharge it—payment at another place than
is stipulated will do so—the delivery of a collateral article
of any value will do so—the acceptance of the debtor’s note with
security, the note of a third person, or even the negotiable note
of the debtor himself, will do so; and yet the payment of as much
money in hand as is called for by such note, will have no such
effect !—although it is demonstrable that the utmost the creditor
can get from such note can not exceed the amount that he gets in
hand in the other case, without trouble, delay, or expense. It may
seem to some persons, not having a great veneration for those in-
stitutions of antiquity, for which no reason can be given, that a
rule so effectually undermined, and having neither rhyme nor
reason to support it, ought to be at once overruled and the whole
matter placed upon the footing of reason and common sense. Hs~
pecially, as the exigencies of modern commerce frequently com-
pel the most deserving men, with the aid of friends, to compromise
their debts for less than the amount due—an operation mutually
beneficial to both debtor and creditor, as the creditor gets a part,
where otherwise he would lose the whole, and the debtor is left
free to commence again with the hope of better success. These
considerations will necessarily arise whenever it becomes neces-
sary to decide the general question. In this case we aspire to
nothing higher than to follow in the footsteps of the sages of the
law, and hold this one of the cases “taken out” of the rule, This
money was payable at the clerk’s office in Butler county, or to the
plaintiff, residing in the same county. It was paid in Arkansas.
It is true it might be said that this was not so beneficial to the
plaintiff, as though it had been paid to him in Butler county. This
may be, but still it does not prevent it from being at a different.
place, which is all the rule seems to require. Again, Harper was
bound to pay the judgment, but he was not bound to pay Graham’s
118] lawyers. He did pay them $100 in *the settlement that was
made, and this separatély from the amount paid upon the judg-
ment. Graham so treated it himself, for he indorsed only $550
upon the judgment, instead of $656.50, the amount actually paid
by Harper. Harper thus discharged a debt due from Giaham to
his attorneys, and this was a “collateral benefit received by Gra~
ham, which raises a technical legal consideration” for the promise
100

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. ° 119

Ash »v. Marlow.

of Graham to discharge this judgment; although both sums paid
fall far short of the amount of the judgment, But this cireum-
stance, it is agreed in all the cases, is not atall material. Tam
aware that this is exceedingly technical and unsatisfactory reason-
ing, but its justification is found in the fact that the plaintiff seeks
to escape from his solemn engagement, by which he has obtained
money from the defendant by the aid of a technicality ; to prevent
the consummation of such a.fraud, he is met with technicalities
nearly as absurd as that upon which he insists. The reason and
common sense (and I trust I may soon say the law) of the whole
matter is this: The plaintiff had a judgment against an insolvent
man. He had a right to dispose of it to whom he pleased and for
what he pleased, as well as he had any other article of property
the owned. He did dispose of it to the defendant in the judgment,
and received his pay in full according to agreement. By this
disposition, in the absence of fraud or unfairness, he ought in
honor, justice, and law, to be bound, and we think under the cir-
cumstances of this case, in any view of it, either technical or sub-
stantial, he is bound.

It follows that the order of the court below is erroneous, and
the same is reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions
to enter satisfaction upon the judgment.

*Jauzs H. anp Jacos Asn v. Jonn Maruow. fi9

_ “A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the per-
son accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,” is a good
definition of the term “ probable cause.” .

“Probable cause” is a mixed question of law and fact. ‘The court must leave
the facts with the jury, with instructions as to what is probable cause. (1)

(1) The question of probable cause is a mixed proposition of law and
fact: whether the cireumstances alleged to show it probable or not probable
are true, and existed, is a matter of fact; but whether, supposing them true,
they amount to a probable cause, is a question of law. It therefore falls
within the legitimate province of the jury to investigate the truth of the facts
offered in evidence, and the justice of the inferences to be drawn from such
facts; whilst at the same time they receive the, law from the judge that, ac-

101

120 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Ash v. Marlow.

Proof that the examining magistrate ‘bound the accused over to court” is
not conclusive evidence of “ probable cause.”

If the defendant, in an action for malicious proseoution, would take shelter
under the “advice of counsel,” he must be prepared to show that he com-
municated to such counsel all the facts bearing upon the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused of which he had knowledge, or by reasonable dili-
gence could have ascertained.

A court has power to correct “bills of exceptions” at any time during the
trial term.

Error to the court of common pleas of Knox county.
120] *In the common pleas, Marlow, plaintiff below (now defend-
ant in error), brought an action of trespass on the case, against
James H. and Jacob Ash, for malicious prosecution. The declara-
tion avers that James H. and Jacob Ash falsely and maliciously,
and without any reasonable or probable cause, prosecuted the said

cording as they find the facts proved or not proved, and the inferences war-
ranted or not, there was reasonable and probable ground for the prosecution
or the reverse; and this rule holds, however complicated and numerous the
facts may be.” Broom’s Legal Maxims, 45, citing Johnstone v. Sutton, 1
T. BR. 644, 545, 547; Blanchford v. Dod, 2 B. & Ad. 179; Reynolds v, Ken-
nedy, 1 Wils. 232; James ». Phelps, 11 A. & E. 483; Panton v. Williams, 2
Q. B. 169, 194; Pack ». Boyes, 7 Scott, N. I, 441; Michell v, Williams, 11 M.
& W. 205; Bushell’s case, Vaugh. 147; and see Pangburn ». Bull, 1 Wend.
345; Masten ». Deyo, 2 Wend, 424; 7 West. Law Journal, 397.

To sustain 2 suit for malicious prosecution, it must have been malicious
without probable cause, and have been ended. Benjamin v. Garee, Wright's
8.0. 450; Anderson ». Buchanan, Wright's 8.C. 725. A defendant may show
the charge true, as probable cause, even though the prosecution alleged to be
malicious was unsuccessful. Ib. 725. If a justice of the peace be sued for
maliciously issuing execution, evidence must be given of his acting without
authority; it will not be presumed. Perry ». Gilleland, Wright's 8. 0. 38.

‘Where an affidavit was made charging crime, which charge was the subject
of an action for malicious prosecution, and the declaration stated the sub-
stance in general terms of the affidavit, as dated on or about 24th of May, the
affidavit date, 16th May of the same year, is competent evidence. Potts v.
Rider, 3 Ohio, 70.- Case will lie for falsely and maliciously suing out a writ
of attachment against the plaintiff's effects, to their injury, though it be ad-

mitted they were indebted to the defendant. Sperry . Warner, 9 Ohio, 103.

A creditor's false affidavit that his resident debtor absconds, is not probable
couse for issuing an attachment against his effects. Ib. 103.

Sce Murray v. Long, | Wend. 140; Gorton v. De Angelis, 6 Wend. 418;
Burlingame »v. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 142; Murray v. Long, 1 Wend, 420;
Candler v. Petit, 2 Hill, 915,

102

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 121

Ash v. Marlow.

Marlow before a justice of the peace, for having willfully and ma-
liciously burned, or caused to be burned, four sacks of wheat, the
personal goods, etc., of said James H. and Jacob Ash, and that
said justice required said Marlow to enter into recognizance in
$1000 for his appearance before the court of common pleas, to
answer said charge; that said James H. and Jacob Ash appeared
as witnesses before the grand jury, but that no indictment was
found, etc.

The plaintiff below recovered judgment for $250, and costs.,

Motion for new trial overruled.

Upon the trial in the court below, sundry bills of exceptions
were sealed, upon which the assignment of error has beon made.
The errors assigned are as follows:

1. The court erred in receiving the deposition and testimony
contained in the bill of exceptions marked “ A.”

2, The court erred in receiving the testimony in bill of excep-
tions marked “B.” .

8. The court erred in their charge to the jury contained in bill
of exceptions “C.”

4, The court erred in receiving the testimony in bill of excep-
tions “ D.”

5. The court erred in allowing the amendment to be made to
bill of exceptions “A,” and contained in bill of exceptions “BH.”

6. The verdict and judgment were against the law and the evi-
dence.

%. The judgment was given in favor of said John Marlow,
whereas it should have been given in favor of J. H. Ash and Jacob
Ash.

‘The matters shown in the bills of exceptions, so far as material,
are sufliciently stated in the opinion of the court.

*Dupano, Sarr & Sarre, and Vanox & Surru, for plaintiffs: [121

The court erred—

First. In improperly admitting evidence.

Second, In their direction to the jury on the law of the case.

‘Wo will first consider the ruling of the court upon the evidence:

Bill of Exceptions “A.” 1. The notice was not sealed up and
returned with the deposition. This the statute requires. Wright,
632, 156,

2, The notice was improper, as it was a notice to take depo-
sitions in this and two other cases. It should have been a notice

103

122 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Ash o, Marlow.

in one case. Stat. 321,sec. 1. Exceptions to the deposition need
not be filed, as proper notice must be proved before a deposition
can be read.

Bill of exceptions “D.” This shows that Marlow was per-
mitted to give parol evidence impeaching the transcript of a
justice, by him introduced, showing that the criminal prosecution
against him was commenced August 4, 1849. He proved by parol
that the prosecution was not commenced until the last of October.
This was erroneous. Douglass v. Wickison, 19 Conn. 489; Fry v.
Hoyt, 12 Conn. 491; Steinberger, Adm’r, v. Steinberger, 19 Ohio, -
106.

Bill of exceptions “H.” After the trial was through, the court
made an order on the journal explaining away bill of exceptions
“A” This the court could not do. 43 Stat. 80, sec. 3.

Bill of exceptions “0.” 1, The court were too stringent in
their definition of probable cause. The judge says: “I therefore
adopt these definitions of reasonable or probable cause as in sub-
stance identical, and as applicable to that question in this case,
and instruct you that the facts and circumstances in proof, and
relied on by the defendants in this case to show the existence of
reasonable or probable cause for prosecuting the plaintiff, must ‘be
facts and circumstances so strong in themselves as to lead and por-
122] suade an impartial, *ingenuous, and reasonable man of com-
mon capacity, to believe that the plaintiff was guilty of burning
the stacks.” Sutton v. Johnston, 1 Darn. & Hast, 308, 493; Smith
v. McDonald, 3 Esp. 7; Ulmer v. Leland, 1 Maine, 183; 2 Greenl.
By. 454, 455; 11 Ad. & El. 489; 3 Bing. N. ©. 950; 5 Watts &
Serg. 438; 4 Iredell, 389; 3 Hawks, 66.

2, The court erred in not instructing the jury that the facts
proved did or did not amount to probable cause. 1 Maine, 138,
139; 27 Maine, 266. See also 24 Pick. 84,85; 1 Durn. & Hast,
309; 2 Stark. Ev. 912; 1 Term, 545; 1 Wilson, 232; 2 Moore, 80;
2 Starkie, 167; 4 Taunton, 616; 2 Taylor, 123; 2 Browne, 42; 3
Wash. C. C. 31; 4 Ib. 82; 4 Munf. 59; 7 Iredell, 280.

8. The court erred in not directing the jury that the binding
over of the plaintiff below by the justice was conclusive evidence
of probable cause, and a complete defense, unless the integrity of
the magistrate’s proceedings were attacked. Reynolds v. Ken-
nedy, 1 Wils. 232; Hob. 226; 6 Mod. 262; Hard. 195; Whiting

104

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 123

Ash ». Marlow.

v. Peckham, 15 Mass. 243; Wiltram v. Gonan, 14 Maine, 362; 8
‘Watts, 240; 4 Munf, (Va.) 462.

4, We claim: that the court erred in their instruction as to the
advice of counsel.

After the main charge had been givon, at the request of the
plaintiff’s counsel, the judge instructed the jury as follows: “If
after the advice of counsel, and before the delivering of the war-
vant, any new material facts came to the knowledgo of the dofend-
ants, tending to lessen the probability of the plaintiff’s guilt, and
which were not communicated to the counsel for his further
opinion, then the advice previously given could be no protection
to the defendants for thus delivering the warrant, and further
prosecuting the plaintiff.” Stone v. Swift, 4 Pick. 389,

Hovey B. Curtis & Miromzun, Mer & Dunsar, and Morean,
for defendant: :

*Bill of exceptions “A.” The notice produced was identi- [123
fied by Dunbar, a witness sworn, and that will do.

It is objected that the deposition contained matter that was in-
competent.

A general objection to a deposition on the ground of incompe-
tency of the testimony contained in it, when part is competent, is
bad. Beebe v. Bull, 12 Wend. 504.

Bill of exceptions “ D.” The point made is this: The transcript
of the justice shows the issuing of the warrant “ August 4, 1849,”
and its return of service, October 30.”

The questions put to the witnesses (the Scotts), in Indiana, are
as to the statements made by the defendants below, or one of
them, while in Indiana in October, 1819, as to the commencemont
of the prosecution. And the answers show that at that date, ac-
cording to the defendant's statements, the prosecution was not
commenced, but would be as soon as they got back to Ohio.

It will be seen by proofs, that the warrant was not delivered to
the constable for execution until October 26; at which time the
defendant, who had been in Indiana, was present.

The court, in charging the jury, held that the testimony now
excepted to, was “ not sufficient to contradict” the record of the
justice. So far as counsel had claimed the ovidence for this pur-
pose, it was distinctly overruled.

The evidence was, with special instruction, permitted to remain
to the jury for other purposes claimed by the plaintiff! below.

105

124 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Ash v, Marlow.

Bill of exceptions “ 0.” (1) No exception, in fact, was taken to
the chargo of the court, until after the verdict was rendered by
tho jury ; nor until after the motion for new trial had been made,
And, although on its face the bill does not specifically show when
the exception was taken; and, although ingeniously dated
“ November term, 1850,” yet, that it was long subsequent to the
124] rendition of the verdict, is shown by the *dates in the trans-
cript of the journal entries, and the filing of the several papers,
viz: date of trial in transcript, December 23, 1850 ; date of filing
motion for new trial, December 23, 1850; date of filing bill of ex-
ceptions “ C,” January 24, 1851. It is farther shown to have been
subsequent to the verdict and motion for new trial, by the fact that
the misdirection of the judgo was not assigned as one of the causes
for now trial.

“ Exceptions to the charge of the court to the jury can not be
iakon after the verdict.” Anderson v. Hill, 12 Smede & Marshall,
679; Brutton v. Mitchell, 3 Barr, 44; Read v. McAllister, 8
‘Wond, 109.

We also object to several of these specifications, upon the ground
that no special request was made to the court, by the plaintiffs in
error, to charge the law to be as claimed, on the particular point.
It has been decided at this term, in the caso of Jones v. The State
of Ohio, that, to hold the failure of the court to charge upon par-
ticular points of law arising in the case a ground of error, the
court should have been requested to instruct upon the point. The
same doctrine is held in Law v. Merrills, 6 Wend. 268; 6 Cranch,
233; 2 Pet, 15.

We will, however, proceed to consider the several specifications
made, and see if this exception be well taken. And,

1. As to whether the court erred in their definition of probable
cause.

Wo refer to 12 Conn. 229; Willis v. Noys, 12 Pick. 324; Munn
v. Dupont, 3 Wasb. C. 0. 37; Wilmouth v. Monfort, 4 Wash. 0. C.
82; Stowe v. Crocker, 24 Pick. 86; Merriam v. Mitchell, 1 Shop.
439; Tlarle v. Hawkins, 5 Humph. 357; Paris v. Starke, 3 B.
Mon. 4; Foshay v. Ferguson, 2 Denio, 617; Rice v. Ponder, 7
Tredoll, 390.

Smith v. McDonald, 8 Espinasse, cited for plaintiffs, is com-

(1) Geauga Iron Oo. 2. Street, 19 Ohio, 300,

106

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 125, 126

Ash », Marlow.

mented on in 2 Stark. Ev. 495, note 4, and is overruled in 3 Mo.
350, Greenleaf’s Overruled Cases, 337.

2, The second objection to the charge of the court i is, that “the
court erred in not instructing the jury whether the facts *re- [125
lied on, to make out probable cause in law, do or do not amount
to probable cause.”

‘This question has been repeatedly made to the courts of England
and of the United States; and it has been invariably determined
that, although there are some cases in which a judge may bo ex-
pected to tell the jury whether or not the defendant had probable
cause, yet, when it consists partly of matter of fact, and partly
of matter of law—and especially when the facts are, in whole or
in part, deductions and inferences from circumstances, or are con-
tested—the question is, properly, and we may add necessarily,
loft to the jury, under tho general instruction of the court, upon
tho law. James v. Phelps, 11 Adol. & Hillis, 483; 39 E. Com. L,
150; McDonald v. Rooke, 2 Bing. N. C. 217; 29 Hag. C. L. 312;
Taylor v. Williams, 2B. & Adol. 845; 6 Bing. 183; Wincberger
v. Shelly, 6 Watts & Serg. 336; Francis v. Smith, 1 Penn. St. 234;
Nash v. Ord, 3 Brov. 94; Paris v. Waddell, 1 McMullen, 358;
Pomroy v, Golly, Geo. Decis. (pt. 1) 26; Dodge v. Brittain, 1
Meigs, 84.

3. The third exception to the charge of the court is, that tho
court erred in not instructing the jury, that the binding over by
the magistrate was conclusive evidence of probable cause.

The cases cited distinguish in unequivocal terms between the
judgment of a court of final jurisdiction, and a binding over by an
examining court.

In Jobnston v. Sutton, 1 Tenn. 505, 506, the ruling of the court
in Roynolds v. Kennedy, is considered, and much qualified and
weakened.

Whitney v. Peckham, 15 Mass, 243, next cited by plaintiffs, was
an action for malicious prosecution, in a case of assault and bat-
tery. The alleged prosecution was before a magistrate, who,
under tho laws of Massachusetts, had final jurisdiction to try and
determine the case. The justice found the party guilty, and as-
sessed a fine against him; but, on appeal, *he was acquitted. [126
Tt was held, that the justice “having inal jurisdiction” in the

107

127 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Ash v. Marlow.

ease, and having found the plaintiff guilty, there was conclusive
evidence of probable cause. (1)

In the case cited from 14 Maine, 362, the justice had final juris-
diction, and that fact was relied upon by the counsel in the case,
and doubtless influenced and controlled the decision of the court.

4, We come now to consider the fourth specification of error in
the charge of the court below—that the court erred as to the ad-
vice of counsel. ;

It is conceded, that to shield one’s self by advice of counsel, a
full, clear, and distinct statement of the facts, known to the pros-
ecutor, must be made.

Can it then be pretended, that, after receiving this advice and
taking out the warrant, and new material facts have come to his
Inowledge, the prosecutor will be protected against a subse-
quent delivery of the writ and arrest of the defendant, under the
shield of advice obtained before the new matter came to his
knowledge? .

Bill of exceptions “B.” It is contended by counsel for plaint-
iffs in error, that the court had no power to correct a mistake in
their record, made at the same term, if it happen to be in a bill
of exceptions.

It has been the frequent practice of the courts of this state to
correct mistakes, or misstatements, in bills of exceptions. 10
Wend. 254.

We also refer to the following authorities:

“The inferior court, at any time during the term, may supply
a defect or omission in a bill of exceptions, by statemént on the

‘yecord.” Givens v. Bradley, 3 Bibb, 195.

127] ** Ifa bill of exceptions is taken to the ruling of the judge
admitting certain evidence, yet, if no evidence is given under the
ruling, the bill ought to be given up.” Bunting v, Allen, 3 Har-
rington, 299.

Sparpine, J. The several bills of exceptions will be noticed in
their order. .

(1) On the trial of an indictment for barratry, the order of a magistrate,
requiring a person complained against by the defendant to be recognized for
his appéarance before a court of competent jurisdiction, is not conclusive evi-
deuce of probable cause for making the complaint. Commonwealth v. Davis,
11 Pick, 433,

108

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. » 128

Ash v. Marlow.

Tn bill of exceptions “A,” we find that the deposition of one
Levi Marlow, introduced by the defendant in error, was objected
to because the notice was not sealed up and returned with the
deposition.

The bill shows that the notice was found among a large quan-
tity of depositions on file in the cases that said paper referred to,
and the certificate of the magistrate showed the deposition to have
been taken under “the inelosed notice.”

The proper service and transmission of the notice was proved
by the oath of one of the attorneys.

The objection, if available in any case, was not well taken in
this instance, as the strong presumption was that the notice had
been inclosed in the deposition by the justice, and had become
detached by constant handling of the papers. .

It is objected that the notice, when produced, was found to
cover more than one suit. It certainly gave notice to the party
of an intention to take depositions in the suit then on trial, and
it is difficult to see what inconvenience could arise from taking,
on the same day, and at the same place, other depositions between
other plaintiffs and the same defendants, if there was sufficient
time to perform the whole work. If the rights of the party were
prejudiced by reason of the attempt to take too many depositions
within a short space of time, the showing of that fact would have
had weight with the court. In this case, the defendants paid no
attention to thenotice. They did not appear at all, and, of course,
had no reason to object that too much was sought to be done.

These formal objections, however, should have been noted upon
the depositions, within the rules of court, to have *entitled [128
them to any regard. They came too late, after the jury was
impaneled. :

This bill of exceptions “ A” also shows that the deposition was
permitted to go to the jury, although objected to by defendant’s
counsel as containing incompetent evidence.

By a subsequent entry upon the journal, the court corrected an .
error that had intervened here, and show that the deposition was.
not, in fact, read as evidence-in-chief, at all, and but a single par-
agraph as rebutting testimony.

In bill of exceptions “B,” it is said that plaintiff's counsel, on
cross-examination, put a question to the witness on the stand, upon
an assumption that had no existence in the testimony in chief

109

129 : SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Ash v. Marlow.

The language was this: “You have stated that John Marlow said
it must have been the Scotts that had burned the wheat, and you
have also stated that it was pretty much in the mouth of every-
body that it was the Scotts. I now ask you what reasons were
mentioned by any of the persons alluded to, for suspecting the
Scotts?”

It is objected that the witness had said nothing about any con-
versation except the one he himself had with John Marlow.

We have but a small portion of the testimony given to us in the’
pill of exceptions, but, upon the supposition that the counsel for
plaintiffs in error is correct in his statement of what the testimony
was, there could be no impropriety in allowing the question to be
put. The witness was on his cross-examination, and consequently
much latitude was allowed to the examiner. But aside from that,
he had said that Marlow threw suspicion on the Scotts. The attor-
ney of Marlow might, with propriety, inquire, what reasons were
given at the time for such suspicions.

The charge of the court is contained in bill of exceptions “0.”
The judge gives sundry definitions of the term “ probable cause,”
as laid down by distinguished jurists, and then, after directing
the jury to ascertain how far the facts are proved, says: “Apply to
them the test, the rule of law which I have laiddown toyou. Ask
129] yourselves conscientiously —‘Are the *facts and circumstances
that we have found, so strong in themselves as to warrant an im~
partial, ingenuous, and reasonable man, of common capacity, with
the caution usually exercised by such a man in the defendant's
situation, but not under tho influence of any improper motive,
to believe the plaintiff guilty of the crime charged against him?’
If they are sufficient to warrant that belief, in such a mind, that
conclusion, when deliberately arrived at by you, will terminate
your labors; and you will return to this court your verdict of not
guilty.

“If your conclusion on the facts relied on to show the existence
of reasonable or probable cause, shall be adverse to the defendants,
your deliberations will proceed.”

We have examined this whole charge with some care, and really
ean see no just cause for complaint by either party.

The judge has been somewhat diffuse in giving his views on
“probable cause,” but they do not substantially differ from the
sensible and concise definition laid down by the court in Munn v.

110

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 130

Ash v. Marlow.

Dapont, 3 Wash. C. C. 37. “What, thon, is the meaning of the
term ‘probable cause?’ We answer, a reasonable ground of sus-
picion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in them-
selves to warrant a cautious man in the beliof that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.”

We are content to adopt this last, as the definition of what in
tho law constitutes “probable cause.” There is no force in the
objection that the judge did not instruct the jury that the facts
relied on by defendants below, did, or did not amount to probable
eause. “Probable cause” is a mixed question of law and fact;
and if the facts are contested, the court must leave them to the
jury with instructions as to what is “probable cause.” It is in-
sisted, in the third place, that the judge committed an error in
refusing to instruct the jury, that the “binding over” by the
magistrate was conclusive evidence of probable cause. It is suf-
ficient to say, that it is the opinion of this court that the judge
went far enough when he said to the jury, that after an exhibition
of the affidavit, warrant, and *transeript of the justice’s [130
docket, showing that the accused was bound over to court, it was
incumbent on the plaintiff below to show affirmatively that there
was no reasonable or probable cause for the prosecution, The
notion could not be countenanced for a moment, that a “ binding
over to court” by an examining officer merely, should be taken
as conclusive evidence of probable cause. It was claimed in
behalf of defendants below, that they acted under the advice of .
counsel in prosecuting the plaintiff. It appeared that the warrant
was taken out on August 4, 1849, but the arrest was not made
under it until the 30th day of the following October. The judge
instructed the jury that “if, after the advice of counsel, and before
the delivery of the warrant, new and material facts came to the
knowledge of the defendants, tending to lesson the probability of
the plaintiff’s guilt, and which were not communicated to the
counsel for bis further opinion, then the advice previously given
could be no protection to the defendants for thus delivering the
warrant and farther prosecuting the plaintiff.”

‘This is the fourth specification of error in the charge of the
court, and we are clearly of opinion that the instruction was right.
If, under the advice of counsel, a person swoars out a warrant
against his neighbor, and, before he causes the arrest, shall ascer-
tain his innocence of the charge, it will be difficult to see by what

1

181 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Ash v. Marlow.

system of ethics he can be justified in‘depriving that neighbor of
his liberty, even though he was protected by professional advice,
in taking out the warrant.

In bill of exceptions “D,” it is said that John Marlow gave in
evidence a transcript of a justice of the peace, showing that the
criminal prosecution against him was commenced on August 4,
A. D. 1849; that he then gave parol evidence tending to show that
Jacob Ash had made declarations in Indiana, in the month of Octo-
bor, setting forth that he had not then commenced his prosecution
against Marlow, but should do so on his return to Ohio. This, it
is claimed, is impeaching a record by parol ovidence.

The objection is really too trifling to merit serious refutation,
181] *but it is very much in character with the rest of the case,
as presented by plaintiffs in error. It became important to show
that between the issuing of the warrant in August, and the arrest
of the accused persons in October, the defendants below had
become possessed of information that should have exonerated the
plaintif? below from the charge preferred against him. Tho
trahscript of the justice was not impeached. The parol testimony
was entirely consistent with the facts set forth in that document.
It only served to show that Jacob Ash treated the prosecution as
commenced at the time of the arrest, and not at the date of the
warrant.

In bill of exceptions “H,” complaint is made that the court
caused an entry to be made on the record, doing away with the
force of bill of exceptions “A.”

This matter has been already noticed. The court retains full
control over every part of its record until the close of the trial
term, and may, on any day and at any moment, cause corrections.
to be made, to comport with truth and justice, as well in bills of
exceptions as in their own journal, which is signed every morning
by the president judge. We are satisfied that the trial below,
although excossively tedious, was nevertheless fair in every par-
ticular, and that the rulings of the court were consonant to law.

‘The judgment will be affirmed, with costs.

112 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 182, 183

Choteau et al. ». Raitt.

*Prerre Cuornav, Jn, ur au. v. Tuomas G. Rairr. [182

In the prosecution of a partnership claim, as a general rule, all the partners
are necessary parties, and if one of the partners has been omitted, he is
ndt 2 competent witness for the plaintiffs, although the counsel for the
defendant thay have stipulated before the trial that the omission to make
the proper party shall not defeat the action. (1)

A notice given to produce a paper claimed to be in the possession of the party
to whom the notice is given, is not, as a general rule, a reasonable notice,
unless given before the trial of the cause in which said paper is wanted is
commenced,

Error to the Supreme Court of Huron county.

The original action in this case was commenced by the plaint-
iffs in error against the defendants, in assumpsit, in the court of
common pleas of Huron county. ,

The first count in the declaration was special, upon a contract,
of which the following is a copy:

“Article of agreement, entered into at Detroit, State of Mich-
igan, this Ocotober 26, 1844, between Thomas Raitt, of Norwalk,
State of Ohio, of one part, and P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., of New
York, by William Brewster, of Detroit, aforesaid, of the other
part: Witnesseth—

“1. That the said Raitt does hereby agree to purchase all the
fars and skins which he can obtain at safe and reasonable rates
(said rates to be regulated, from time to time, by instructions from
said Brewster), at Norwalk aforesaid, and the adjoining country,
from the present time until the close of the season for purchasing
the same next expiring, which furs and skins, so purchased by
said Raitt, shall be and remain the property of the said P. Choteau,
Jr. & Co., and be held ‘subject to the order and control of [133
the said P, Choteau, Jr. & Co., until all advances which shall be
made by P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., or the said Raitt, with interest on
same, shall be fully paid and canceled; and the said Raitt agrees

(1) After the death of an ostensible partner, » surviving dormant partner
may sue alone upon a partnership contract. Beach v. Hayward, 10 Ohio, 455,
Tho names of dormant partners, though interested, and an ostensible part-
ner, if it can be clearly proved that ho had no interest, may be omitted. 1
Swan's Prac. 41.
VoL. Xx—8 113

184 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Choteau et al. v. Raitt.

to collect the furs and skins purchased by or for him, at Norwalk
aforesaid, as fast as the same are purchased, and to keep them in
safe and proper places, until he closes his purchases of the samo
next spring, at which time be, the said Raitt, agrees to bring all
of said furs and skins to Detroit, and to deliver the same to said
Brewster, who shall pay the said Raitt the market price of De-
troit for said fursand skins. The said Raitt shall also keep the
said Brewster advised of the quantity of furs and skins which he
has on hand from time to time, and the cost of the same,

“2. The said P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., by said Brewster, agree to
advance to said Raitt funds for the purchase of furs and skins, as
above stated, in such amounts as they shall deem proper, for
which advances they shall charge interest at the rate of seven per
cent. per annum; but in-no case shall the said Raitt use any of
the funds so to be advanced him for any other purpose than pur-
chasing furs and skins, under this agreement, nor shall he make
any advances on account of the same.

“P, Caornau, Jr. & Co.
“ By William Brewster.
“Tomas G. Rarrr.”

“Signed, sealed, and delivered on the day and yoar above

written.”

It was alleged in this count of the declaration, that although the
plaintiffs advanced large sums of money to Raitt on this contract,
as by the terms of the contract they were bound to do, yet the
said Raitt did not comply, on his part, in the purchase and deliv-
ery of furs and skins at Detroit, etc. The declaration also con-
tained the common money counts.

To this declaration the defendant pleaded the general issue, and
gave notice of set-off.

At the March term, 1850, of the court of common pleas,
184] *the case was tried by a jury, and a verdict returned for the
plaintiffs; whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial, which
was overruled by the court, and judgment entered on the verdict.

In tho progress of the trial the defendant, by his counsel, ex-
cepted to the rulings of the court of common pleas in the admis-
sion of testimony, and also in the instructions given to the jary,
and tendered two bills of exceptions, which were allowed, sealed,
and made part of the record.

114

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. . “135

Choteau et al. v Raitt.

To reverse the judgment, so as aforesaid rendered, a writ of
error was sued out and prosecuted by the defendant in that case,
and the case came before the Supreme Court of Huron county for
hearing, at the August term, 1850.

Tho errors assigned were—

“1. That the court of common pleas erred i in admitting the said
Brewster as a witness, he being a partner and interosted i in said
contract, and not competent as a witness for the plaintiffs.

“2, That the court of common pleas erred in admitting to the
jury the copy of the letter, mentioned in said bill of exceptions, of
March 29, 1845.

“3, That the court of common pleas erred in the instructions
they gave to the jury, as contained in the second bill of exceptions,
in respect to the construction to be put on said contract, and the
effect of the testimony of said Brewster in respect’to said schedule
of prices.

«4, That judgment was given for the plaintiffs, whereas it
should have been given for defendant.”

In the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed for the first
two errors assigned, the court expressing no opinion upon the last
two.

This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the aforesaid judg-
ment of reversal.

The bill of exceptions is not inserted at length, because it is
belioved that enough of its contents appears in the opinion *of [185
the court to show clearly the principles upon which the case was
decided.

Janzs A. Van Dyxe and J. R. Oszory, for plaintiffs:

Was Brewster a competent witness?

I. The depositions of Dockstader and Hollister were not suf-
ficient 1o establish the interest of Brewster.

A witness may testify as to his “impression,” but this testimony
is to be weighed by the jury; and if the impression be “slight,”
or an unwarranted deduction, then it should be rejected. 1 Greenl.
Ev. 440; 10. & H. 154; 5 Pick. 244; Cutler v. Carpenter, 1 Cow.
81; Halliday v. McDougal, 20 Wend. 81; 2 Greenl. By. 456-465.

But this question of interest, though involving facts, is for
tho court—not for the jury. 1 Greenl., 4 ed., 530, sec. 425; 7
Wend. 57; 2 Smith’s Leading Cases, note to page 65; Hart v.
Hailun, 3 Rawle, 407; 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 1501. .

115

136 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Choteau et al. », Raitt.

Competency of witness is always presumed. The burden of
showing to the contrary lies on the objectors. Marsdell v. Stan-
field, 7 Barn. & Cres. 815; 4 Cow. 427, 430; Milligan’s Lessee v.
Dickson, 1 Pet. C. C. 484, note; see Starkie, (6 Amer. ed.) 121,
122, :

‘Was Brewster a competent witness as shown on his voir dire?
Sce 1 Greenl. 527, 528, secs. 422, 423; also, Cow. & Hill’s Notes,
780, 1576.

On cross-examination, he says he never was a partner of the
firm of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., the partios to said contract, and
plaintiffs in the suit; that be was interested in the subject matter
as stated with Pierre Choteau, Jr. & Co., but that, at the time of
his being sworn, he had no interest—mutual releases had passed.
Tt is interest at the time of cxamination which disqualifies. 2
Binn. 497. See 2 Wend. 527; Bayley v. Osborn, 1 Pet. C. C. 306;
1 Cow. & Hill, 266.

186] But we now proceed to show, that, in fact, Brewster was
not a necessary, or even a proper party to the suit. See Cothey
v. Fennel, 21 Eng. Com. Law. 7, 146,

Brewster was, by a contract between himself and Pierre Choteau,
Jr. & Co., placed in a relation with them which the law declares
to be a partnership. De jure, he was a partner; de facto, he was
not. Bickerton v. Bonnell, 5 M. & Sel. 383; 2 Greenl. Ev., sec.
478; Comyn on Contracts; 4 Barnw. & Cresw. 666; Collyer on
Partnership, secs. 653, 651; 2 Barr. 89; 21 Eng. Com. Law. 146.

IL. It is sufficient to give notice to produce the letter during the
trial, if there be sufficient time to comply with it, without inter-
rupting the trial, and where the paper is, or may be presumed to
be, at place of trial. 2 Cow. & Hill, 1186.

The showing; to admit the secondary evidence, was sufficient.
See 6 Cow. 90, 100,101; Thallburn v. B., 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes,
1203, 1204; Id. 1242. It does not appear that any exceptions
were taken to the rulings of the court as to this letter.

And we assume it to be the law, that, not only must objection be
interposed, but exception taken, at the time of the ruling. See
tho doctrine aud ruling on this subject, well condensed, in 2 Cow.
& Hill’s Notes, 788, 990-993. As to vagueness in bills of excep-
tions, 1 Ohio, 212; 4 Ohio, 79, 388; 1 United States Dig. 412, No.
9; An. Dig. 1847, 96, No. 54; 2 United States Dig. 167, sec. 216;

116

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Choteau et al. v. Raitt.

Clark v. Dubehn, 9 Cow. 674; Smith v. Carrington, 4 Cranch, 62; 1
United States Dig. 415, No. 92; 1 Sup. to same, 285, Nos. 188, 191,
p. 287, No. 231; Wagers v. Dilly, 17 Obio, 439; Armstrong v. Clark,
17 Ohio, 495 ; Halli v. Reed, Id. 498; Coil v. Williams, 18 Ohio, 28,

See also 7 United States Dig. 96, sec. 54; 8 United States Dig.
50, sec. 20; 9 United States Dig. 76, secs. 20, 21, 25, 28, 34; 6 How.
U.S. 279; 8 Hill, 75; 9 Wend. 262; 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 791;
McDougal v. Fleming, 4 Ham. 81; 1 United States Dig. 415, secs.
‘91, 92.

*IIL. If it was erroneous to have examined William Brew- [137
ster, the error is cured by the statute. Laws 1849-50, p. 33.

The statute “ to improve the law of evidence,” which has since
gone into effect, cured the error. This statute by its terms ap-
plies to actions pending at the time it took effect—not merely to
actions thereafter to be commenced. If it is not made expressly
applicable to such actions, the rules.of law will so apply it, as it is
a mere regulation of practice. People v. Livingston, 6 Wend. 526,
n., 530, 581; 1 Morris, 238; 8 United States Dig. 336, sec. 2; 9
Tb. 405, sec. 8; 5 United States Dig. (Supplement, vol. 1,) p. 242,
No. 555. “The court refused to reverse a judgment where a stat-
ute had been passed since its rendition, which would obviate the
error upon a new trial. Lyons v. Jackson, 1 How. (Miss.) 474.”

We have already cited cases to show that there can be no re-
versal after judgment, on account of error, if the error was imma-
terial, because the party is not prejudiced by the verdict. 1
United States Dig. 419, sec. 207; 2 Ib. 162, sec. 64; 6 Mass. 445 ;
17 Conn. 288; 17 Vt. 499; 10 Vt. 520; 11 Mass. 417; 20 Pick.
471; 4 Pick. 25; 9 Pick. 46; 24 Pick. 181; 11 Pick. 322; 3
United States Dig. 567, sec. 475; 11 Conn. 342; 4 Vt. 471; 6
Mass. 445.

IV. The act requiring notice, etc., practice act, pages, 676 and 97,
has no application to this case. Bronson v. Kensey, 3 McLean,
180; 1 Baily, 540; 2 A. H. Notes, 1182; 2 Cow. & H. Ootes, 1180;
Graham’s Prac. 524; Townshend v. Lawrence, 9 Wend. 458; 20
Wend. 682; 2 Hill, (N. Y.) 320; 3 Wash. C. C. 381.

V. If, therefore, an error has occurred, which could not have
influenced the final result, the court will not reverse the judgment
for that orror. The principle is well recognized in the adjudi-
cated cases.

Conover v. Welch, 15 Ohio, 156; Vollan v. Moses, 3 Barl. Sup.

117

138, 189 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Choteau et al. o. Raitt.

C. 31; 2 Comstock, (N. Y.) 198, 193; 7 Ham. O. 214; 3 Met. 19;
1 ‘Taunt. 12; 19 Eng. ©. L. 162 ; 4 Wond. 453; 12 Tb. 41.
138] *See ‘also Rey nolds v. Bx'rs of Hughes, 5 Hammond,
169 6 O. Cond. 104, 106); Miller v. Stone, 13 Johns. 417;
United States Dig. 186, sec. 749; 3 Scam. 427; 3 Shep. 67; 2
Shep. 275; 10 Ib. 453; 3 Ib. 67; Baily », Campbell, Scam. 47;
7 Serg. & Rawle, 219 ; 1 United States Dig. 415, sec.106; 2C. & H.
Notes, 786; 2 Pet. 625; Hamilton v. Russell, 1 United States
Cond. 318 (1 Cranch, 309); 9 Cow. 680; 1 Cranch, 132; 3 Gill &
Johns. 450; 2 Hulst, 357.
Worcezsrer & PenneweExt, for defendant:
I, Was Brewster a partner with P. Choteau, Jr. & Co? If so,
- be was not a competent witness, for he was intorested in the re-
sult. According to his own statement, “P. Choteau, Jr. & Co.
were to furnish him money for the purpose of purchasing furs
over a large extent of country, and the profits and losses of the
transactions were to be divided between himself and them.” EHow
to be divided does not appear; the presumption would be equally.
This being so, it is vain for Brewster to swear to a conclusion of
law, “that he never was a partner.” The question is, was he to
participate in the “ profits?” He says he was to do so, and in the
* losses” also. And he would remark that the contract itself, is,
in all rospects, consistent with the fact of Brewster’s partnership.
‘His copartners were to /urnish the cash capital, and he was to put
in his service as an equivalent. He does not describe himself in
the contract as “agent” even, but he does describe himself
throughout as the acting and business member of the firm—the
party through whom, and by whom, the money was to be received
and disbursed—whose duty it was to give directions and instruc-
tions—to whom the furs, when purchased, should be delivered,
» and with whom the final settlement was to be made. The con-
tract does not state who cohstitute the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. &
Co., and the words “& Co.,” may, with as much consistency, em-
brace Brewster as Sanford, or any one else of the persons ad-
mitted to be members of the firm.
139]. *Wo think it will not bo seriously urged, as it was not at
the trial below, that Brewster’s participation in the “ profits and
losses,” as to these adventures, was a mere mode agreed upon be-
tween himself and his associates, for fixing the amount of “com-
pensation” for bis services, without making him liable to third
118 :

" DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 140

Choteau et al. v. Raitt.

parties as a partner. This construction of the arrangement
would be carrying the doctrine of “compensation” to an extent
for which we think no precedent can be found in the hooks, and
which, under the circumstances, would be exceedingly dangerous,

We know of no instance in which one of several partics to a
contract, whether general partners or not, has been allowed, in
the mode pursued in this suit, to settle his interest in tho subject
matter of the suit with his co-contractors, exchange mutual re-
leases pending the suit, and then be offered and admitted as a
witness for the plaintiffs. If any precedent can be found for such
practice, or that looks toward sustaining it, in any common law
court, it has yet to come under our notice. See Story on Partner-
ship, 50-62; Id. 344, 345, and 356 in notes; Id. 54, and 57 in
notes; 2 Greonl. Hv. 393, 394; Gow on Partnerships, 16-18, and
1387-141.

The letter of March 29, 1845.—The court permitted a copy of a
letter to be read in evidence, upon notice to produce the original,
never proved to have been received, served during trial. By law,
ten days’ notice must be served. Sec. 113 of the Practice Act.

Hrroncock, C.J. The record in this case shows that the orig-
inal suit was commenced by Pierre Chotean, Jr., John B. Sarpy,
John F, A. Sanford, and Joseph A. Sire, under the name of P.
Choteau, Jr.& Co, At the trial term of the court of common
pleas, and before the trial was commenced, the counsel for the -
respective parties entered into a stipulation, which is as follows :
“In this case it is matter of stipulation, that in event it appears
that William Brewster should have “joined as plaintiff, it [140
shall’ not affect the suit or bar a recovery in the present form.
Should Brewster be offered as a witness, and received, the defend-
ant retains the right to except to any ruling admitting him.”

On the trial, the plaintiffs, to sustain the issue on their part,
among other testimony, offered in evidence the contract declared
upon in the first count of the deClaration, and rested in chief.

After the plaintiffs bad closed their testimony in chief, the de-
fendant examined several witnesses, and read sundry depositions
to sustain his defense.

To rebut the defense made, the plaintiffs offered William Brew-
ster as a witness, to whose examination the witness objected, on
account of his incompetency; and to show this incompetency,

119

141 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Choteau et al. v. Raitt.

read portions of the depositions of Nicholas Dockstader and Ben-
jamin F. Hollister. Dockstader states that he is “acquainted
with Raitt; that he is acquainted with P. Choteau, Jr., and John
F. A. Sanford, of the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., and is also
acquainted with William Brewster, of Detroit, but is not able to
say whether said Brewster is a member of said firm or not;
states that he has had dealings with said firm, and always did his
business with said Brewster, and his impression always has been
that Brewster was a member of said firm. Deponent resides in
Cleveland, and has been engaged in the fur business there for
twenty years.”

Hollister states that he “resides at Perrysburg, in Wood county,
Ohio; has been engaged in the fur business for thirty years; that
he always understood that William Brewster was a partner with
the plaintiffs.” (1)

The defendant further read, to sustain his objection, the exam-
ination of William Browster on his voir dire, when heretofore
giving a deposition in the case; on which examination, he says,
“that ho is not, and never was, a partner in the firm of P. Cho-
teau, Jr. & Co., and that he has no interest in the event of this
141] suit.” The question is then propounded to him, *“In what
relation did you stand to P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., betwoen October
26, a. D. 1844, and May 16, a. p. 1845, or in what capacity did you
act for them?” To which he replied, “The arrangement was,
that the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co. were to furnish money to
this deponent, for the purpose of purchasing furs over a large
extent of country, and the profits and loss of the transactions
were to be divided between deponent and P. Choteau, Jr. & Co.”
Tn reply to a question propounded by plaintiff’s counsel, witness
states, “Said arrangement has wholly ceased, and was closed some
time in December, 1849; that he was released and discharged by
said P. Choteau, Jr. & Co. from all liability therein, and has no
longer any interest therein.”

Upon this evidence, the counsel for defendant contended that
Brewster was a partner with plaintiffs in this transaction, and
therefore interested in the event of the suit, and not competent as
a witness. The court, howover, overruled the objection, and held
that Brewster would be competent, and might testify, provided he

to (1) Iaglebright o, Hammond, 19 Ohio, 297,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 142

Choteau et al. v. Raitt.

would execute a release to P. Choteau, Jr. & Co, The release was
executed, and he was examined as a witness. .

This decision of the court was excepted to, and it was assigned
for error in the Supreme Court, that therein the court of common
pleas erred, and such was the opinion of the Supreme Court, and
for this error, together with another which will hereafter be
noted, the judgment of the court of common pleas was reversed.

Whether the court of common pleas erred in the decision
above referred to, must depend upon the solution of two ques-
tions:

1. Whether Brewster, in making the contract with Raitt, acted
as the agent of Choteau, Jr. & Co., or, whether in this transaction,
he was partner with them. .

2. If a partner, is thore anything in the stipulation of the counsel
of the parties, as contained in the bill of exceptions, *which [142
can be so construed as to preclude the defendant from objecting
to him as a witness.

Before proceeding to the consideration of these questions it may
be proper to refer to an objection raised by counsel for plaintiff.
It is said that whether Brewster was a partner, and interested in
the case, depended. upon testimony bofore the court of common
pleas, which must be considered and acted upon by that court;
and that court having found, upon this evidence, that Brewster
was not interested, this court is concluded by that finding. Ifthe
objection is well taken, it would rarely happen that this court
would reverse a judgment because the court of common pleas had
erred in the admission of testimony. When such questions are
raised, the court, in which the trial is had, must, as a general
thing, decide that question from the evidence before it. Ifan ex-
ception is taken, the whole evidence, relative to the point, is made
part of the record, and the reviewing court is bound to look into
that evidence, and, from the whole, to determine whether tho
inferior court did, or did not, properly admit or reject the wit-
ness,

Counsel have been led into an error, as I presume, from the
action of this court in another class of cases. By our practice, an
issue in fact may as well be submitted to the court as to the jury.
This court hold, that if an issue is so submitted, no exception can
be taken to the judgment of the court, upon its own finding. In

such cases we hold that the court, in passing upon the issue, acts
. 121

143 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Choteau et al. v. Raitt.

as a jury, and an exception can no more be taken to the finding of
the one than the other. Whether the case is submitted to the
court or to the jury, the party against whom the issue is found
may move for a new trial; and if that motion is overruled, may
except to the opinion of the court in overruling, and in that way
get the whole evidence upon the record.(1) If the éase, undér such
circumstances, is removed by writ of error, the reviowing court
148] must cxamine the whole *evidence, and from that evidence
determine whether the new trial should or should not have been
granted.

We will now proceed to examine the question, whether Brew-
ster, in making the contract with Raitt, acted as the agent of P.
Choteau, Jr. & Co., or whether, in this transaction, he was a
partner with them.

By tho terms of tho contract it might be difficult to ascertain the
truc character of Brewster. It purports to have becn made by
Choteau & Co., by Brewster, with Raitt. Raitt, in purchasing furs
and skins, is to be regulated by the instructions of Brewster. The
surs and skins purchased by Raitt are to be and remain the prop-
erty of Choteau & Co. until all the advances by them made shall
be fully paid and canceled, with the interest. . The furs and skins
purchased are to be delivered by Raitt to Brewster, at Detroit,
who is to pay him therefor the market price at Detroit; and far-
ther, Raitt is to keep Brewster advised of the quantity of furs and
skins he may have on hand, from time to time. Choteau, Jr. &
Co., by Brewster, agree to advance to Raitt money with which to
purchase, and for which he is to allow them interest at the rate of
seven per cent. Throughout the whole contract Browster seems
to be the active map on the one part. Choteau, Jr. & Co. have
only to advance money through him, and through him receive the
avails of such advancement. In all this, however, thore is nothing
inconsistent with tho idca that in all this ‘business he may have
acted as the agent of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co.

To show that he was in fact a partner in this transaction, the
dcpositions of Dockstader and Hollister were read. It is true
neither of these witnesses undertake to state positively that he
‘was 4 partner, though such had been their understanding, and the
former had had dealings with the firm, and Brewster was the man
with whom ho dealt. This was competent testimony to have gone

1) See Spafford v, Bradley, in this volume of Reports.

reek

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 144, 145

Choteau et al. v. Raitt.

to a jury in a case where the question of partnership was involved,
and had a jury, with this evidence before it, found that the part-
nership existed, a court would hardly have *granted a new [144
trial, because the verdict was unsustained by proof.

But when we look into the examination of Brewster himself, it
would seem that no doubt could remain upon the subject. He
says that he was not a partner in the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. &
Co.; and this was probably true, so far as concerned their general
business. That was a firm doing business in the city of New
York ; he was operating in the fur business, at Detroit, and in the
surrounding country. He speaks of an arrangement betwoen
himself and that firm, which was in existence at the time this
contract with Raitt was entered into, by which that firm was to
farnish him money, and he was to purchase furs and skins over a
large extent of country, and the profits and loss of the entire
‘business were to be shared equally between himself and the com-
pany. Had the arrangement been that he was to share in the
profits only, this share might well have been held to be in the .
nature of wages for services performed. But when he is to share
in both profit and loss, he must be held as a partner. Aspinwall
v. Williams, 1 Ohio, 84; Austin v. Williams, 2 Ohio, 61; 13 Ohio,
300; Channel v. Fassett, 16 Ohio, 166; Johnson v. Miller, 16 Ohio,
431.

It is not denied, by plaintiff’s counsel, that in these fur trans-
actions Brewster was a partner with P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., but it
ig claimed that inasmuch as there had been a settlement Between
himself and his copartners of the whole business, he was not a
necessary party to the suit. It will be seen that this settlement
took place long after this suit was commenced. Had it been other-
wise, it would have made no difference. Partners are liable for
all demands against the firm, and by no arrangement among
themselves can any one or more of them be relieved from this
obligation, And where a suit is commenced to enforce a partner-
ship demand, it must be in the name of all who were partners at
the time the demand accrued. Such is the general rule; but there
are exceptions, as in the case of a dormant partner. This was not,
however, the situation of Brewster. On the contrary, he was the
active business man *of the firm. We are clearly of the [145
opinion that Brewster should have been a party plaintiff; that he
was interested in the event of the suit. As he was not a party to

123

146 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Choteau et al. v. Raitt.

the record, the plaintiffs would not have had judgment but for the
stipulation of counsel, heretofore referred to.

The court of common pleas seem to have supposed that when
Brewster was called to the stand, he was interested, and thereforo
incompetent, and would not permit him to testify until he had ex-
ecuted a release to P. Choteau, Jr. & Co. Such release could not
restore his competency. As a partner, he was liable to Raitt, in
the event that in the investigation of the case it should be found
there was a balance due to him. A release from Raitt was the
necessary release to render him competent as a witness.

The next inquiry is as to the force and effect of the stipulation
of counsel before referred to, and what was its true intent and
meaning. The defendant, by his counsel, agrees that if it should
appear in the trial of the case, that Brewster was a necessary
party, he would not, on that account, object to a judgment. This
is a favor which he confers upon the plaintiffs. But he expressly
reserves the right to object to Brewster as a witness should he be

. Offered. As we understand the stipulation, the defendant reserved

to himself the same right to object to Brewster that he would have
had, had Brewster been a party upon the record, as he should have
been. Brewster was an incompetent witness, and his release to
Choteau & Co. did vot change his situation. .

Tho Supreme Court did not err in holding the decision of the
court of common pleas, permitting him to testify, to be erroneous.

The second error assigned in the Supreme Court was, that the
court of common pleas erred in admitting to the jury the copy of
the letter mentioned in the bill of exceptions of March 29, 1848.

Tho facts relative to the admission of this copy, as shown
by the record, were, that during the progress of the trial, and
146] *after tho plaintiffs had closed their testimony in chief, they
gave notice to the defendant to produce the letter referred to,
which he denied having in his possession or ever having received.
‘There was no testimony that the letter ever had been in his pos-
session. Tho only evidence upon the subject, was that such a let-
tor had been deposited in the post-office of Detroit, directed to the
defendant. Upon this evidence the copy was received.

The record of the Suprome Court shows that one of the grounds
of the reversal of the judgment of the court of common pleas
was, that this notice to produce the letter was not a reasonable
notice.

124.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 147

Hildebrand v. Fogle.

In the opinion of this court, there was no error in this. It must
be an extraordinary case, where a motion to produce a paper,
given during the progress of the trial, can be held to be reasonable,
If it should be apparent that the paper was with a party in court,
present at the trial, such a notice might be said to be reasonable.
But surely where the paper is not in court, and no proof that it
was ever in the possession of the party notified, such short notice
ean not be reasonable,

As to the question whether, by proving that a letter has been
deposited in a post-office, directed to any particular person, a copy
of that letter can be given in evidence to charge the person to
whom it is directed, we do not deem it necessary to say anything
further than this: that we should hesitate long before we should
be willing to establish any such rule. In giving notice of the pro-
test of a bill or note, all that is necessary is to establish tho fact
that a letter containing the notice was deposited in a post-office in
due time, and properly directed. But the position assumed by
plaintiffs’ counsel is, that in all cases where it can be shown that a
letter was deposited in a post-office, the person to whom it is di-
rected is to be charged with knowledge of the contents of that
letter. We are not prepared to admit the correctness of this prop-
osition.

The judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed, with costs.

*Jusse Hinprpranp v. Rosert A. Foann. [47

“Where subcontract in writing, for carrying the United States mail, pro-
vides for payments to be made quarterly, in the months of May, August,
November, and February, it is competent to show, by parol evidence, from
the circumstances and situation of the contracting parties, that the con-
tract, had relation to the quarterly divisions of the years fixed in the
post-office department, and when such quarters commence and termi-
nate. .

Extrinsic parol evidence is always admissible to give effect to a written in-
strument by applying it to ifs proper subject matter, by proving the cir-
cumstances under which it was made, thereby enabling the court to put
themselves in the place of the parties, with all the information possessed.

125

148 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hildebrand v. Fogle.

by them, the better to understand the terms employed in the contract, and
to arrive at the intention of the parties. (1)

Error to the court of common pleas of Morgan county.

The action in the court of common pleas was commenced Sep-
tember 5, 1850, by Fogle against Hildebrand, in assumpsit, on the
following contract :

«TJ, Jesse Hildebrand, do agree and bind myself to pay Robert H.
Fogle $750 per annum, payable quarterly, in the months of May,
August, November, and ebruary. The same is for carrying the
148] United States mail “from Zanesville to McConnellsville, Ohio,
‘six times a week, on horse, from December Ist to April Ist in each
year, until June 30, 1852; and also to carry the mail three times
a weok in two-horse stages, from the Ist of April to the Ist of
December, in each year, until June 30, 1852. And should I be
ordered to carry the mail six times a week in two-horse stages,
from the 1st of April to the 1st of December, instead of three
times a week, then I agree to pay said Fogle $300 additional pay,
payable as above.

“Contract to commence on March 3, 1850:

“J, HinpEBranp.

“ MoCownanrsviuie, Onto, February 23, 1850.”

Tho declaration avers that the plaintift, i in pursuance of said
agreement, did, on March 3, 1850, commence and carry said mail
according to the terms of the contract, etc., and that he continued

(2) In what cases parol evidence is admissible to explain, vary, or contra-
dict written instruments, see Wilcox’s Dig. Evidence, 249, ch.6—Common Car-
riers, 141—Appendix, Hvidence, 62; Painter v. Painter ot al. 18 Ohio, 247;
Rohrer v. Morningstar et al., 18 Ohio, 579; Inglebright v. Hammond, 19 Ohio,
344; Steinbarger’s Adm’r ». Steinbarger, 19 Ohio, 106; Turney v. Yeoman,
16 Ohio, 24; Cockerell v. Insurance Co. 16 Ohio, 148; Bodkins v. Taylor, 14
Ohio, 489; Worth 0. Wilson, Wright's S. C. 162; State v. Buchanan, Wright,
233; Hunt’s Lessee », McHenry et al., Wright, 599; Hammer ». Neville,
‘Wright, 169; Wells v. Boneticld, Wright, 201 (but see Hill v. King, 4 Ohio,
135); Edwards v. Richards, Wright, 597; Lawrence v. McGregor, Wright, 193 ;
Wood v. Perry, Wright, 240; Emrio v. Gilbert, Wright, 764; Fallis ». Grif
fith, Wright, 303; Hare v. Harrington, Wright, 290; State v, Perry, Wright,
662; Swisher v. Williams, Wright, 754; Humbert ». Methodist Church,
‘Wright, 213; Kline v. Prindle, Wright, 414; Davis o. Coffield, 6 West. Law
Journal, 318; Wales v. Bates, 3 West. Law Journal, 263; Golden ». MeCon-
nell, 1 West. Law Journal, 397; Rice v. Lindsay, 1 West. Law Journal, 553;
1 Greenl. Ev., secs, 292, 295,

126

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. , 149

Hildebrand v. Fogle.

to carry said mail until September 1, 1850, and was still willing,
ete., to continue in the performance of said contract, but that do-
fendant failed to comply on his-part, and refused to pay the plaint-
iff quarterly, in the months of May, August, November, and Feb-
ruary, according to contract.

The declaration also contains the common counts. Plea, non
assumpsit. The cause was tried to a jury in the common pleas,
June term, 1851. Verdict for plaintiff Fogle, $131.12. Motion
for new trial, because the verdict was against evidence, and because
of the ruling of the court, overruled and judgment on the verdict.
Exceptions were duly taken to the ruling of the court on trial,
and for overruling motion for new trial. .

The bills of exceptions show that on the trial, “the plaintiff, for
the purpose of sustaining the issue on his part, gave in evidence
the contract set out in the declaration, and after giving evidence
tending to prove that the plaintiff commenced the performance
of the contract on his part and continued to carry the mail until
August 30, 1850, and also a letter of *defendant, made part [149
of the bill of exceptions, rested his case.”

" ‘This letter is dated Marictta, July 21, 1850, addressed by Hilde

brand to D.C. Pinkerton, postmaster at McConnellsville, and is
in reply to a letter from Pinkerton to Hildebrand. The letter
states, “Fogle is bound to carry the mail until the last day of
Tune, 1852, and if he quits or leaves his contract previous to that
time, he will forfeit all that would otherwise be due him. He
understands that as well as I do—I explained that to him when
he took the contract. For carrying the mail during March he
and I would get our pay in May. But if the post-office depart-
ment sent on the collection ordors for me to collect, we would get
our pay in April for carrying mail, in March. Well, the orders
came and I paid him all and over, for his services up to April 1st,
by orders on the postmasters. Well, then, ho and I were neither
of us entilled to any pay until August. But tho department sent
on the orders again in Jaly, and I sent him (Fogle) all the orders
above McConnellsville, and tho balance due for carrying mail up
to July Ist. I get from the department in August, when, of
course, I pay over:to him that month, all that is bis due up to
July Ist. But until I don’t pay bim in August, he has no reason
to complain. If he refuses and does not carry said mail, get any
other person as cheap as you can and I will foot the bill, I will

127

150 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
Hildebrand v. Fogle.

put on a new stage of my own, in a week or so, if he quits. I
shall take all expenses out of his wages, and he can not recover
from me one cent more than he -has received. Say this to him,
If he wants to quit and give up his contract, and will continue on
for ten or twelve days, I will take the contract off his hands, and
pay him for his labor up to that time, rather than have any more
trouble. Fogle knows that he has been paid sooner than I was
bound to pay him; he knows he was overpaid up to the Ist of
April, and has received some on the last quarter, but is not enti-
tled to it until August.”

The bill of exception shows that on trial, “The defendant then
150] gave in evidence a lotter from plaintiff to defendant, made *an
exhibit, D, and a receipt of the plaintiff acknowledging payment
for services up to June 30, 1850, exhibit E. Also, an agree-
ment signed by plaintiff, of oven date with that given in evidence
by plaintiff, which agreement signed by plaintiff is made exhibit
F. The defendant then offered in evidence, for the purpose of
explaining the terms of the above contracts as to the time and
manner of payment, depositions, which are made exhibit A. Tho
court permitted the depositions to be read to the jury, and the
defendant rested. The causo was submitted to the jury on the
charge of the court, who charged the jury, among other things,
“That the depositions read to them could not be received in evi-
dence for the purpose of explaining the contracts between tho
parties, the contract of the defendant with the post-office depart-
ment not being referred to therein; that said deposition must be
disregarded so far as related to that purpose, and so far ruled it
out, directing it in that respect to be withdrawn from the jury.”

Exutsrr D.—Letter from Fogle to Hildebrand, dated April 19, 1850.

“Sm: Tinclose the amount of money due you. The amount
due me is $59.75. I will incloso $15, and will settle the small
change when you come up.”

Exursrr E.—Reoztpr.
“McConnetisvinLE, August 30,1850. Received of J. Hildebrand
$114.70 in full, and on settlement, as a balance duo me for trans-
porting the U. S. mail betwoon Zanesville and McConnellsville, for
the quarter ending June 30, 1850.

128

“Rosner H. Foeuz.”

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. ° 151, 152

Hildebrand ». Fogle.

Exursir F.—Acremment.

“T, Robert H. Fogle, of McConnellsville, Ohio, do agree and bind
myself to carry the U.S. mail from Zanesville to McConnellsville,
six times a week each way, on horse, from the 1st of December to
April Ist, and in two-horse stages from *April 1st to Decem- [51
ber Ist, three times a week exch way; for $750 per annum, to be
paid me quarterly, in the months of May, August, November, and
Fobruary, of $187.50 for each quarter, but any amount paid mo
by said Hildebrand, through postmasters or otherwise, is to be
deducted from any of the above amounts that would necessarily
be due me; and if any finos are imposed on Hildebrand by the
post-office department for failures or injured mails at Zanesville
or avy part of said route above McConnellsville, the same to be
deducted from my pay. And ifsaid Hildebrand is ordered by the
post-office department to carry the mail six times per weck each
way in two-horse stages, from April 1st to December 1st, then I
agree and bind myself to carry said mail six times per week for
the additional sum of $300 per annum, payable as above. The
above contract to close on 30th June, 1852. LIagree to receive and
deliver at Zanesville the mail in accordance with the schedule
ordered by the post-office department. Contract to commence
March 3, 1850. First payment to be for the month of March.

“RH. Foarz.

“ MoConneLisviLiE, February 23, 1850.”

Bxursir A.—Dzposrrions.

Samucl M. Hdwards, one of the clerks of the Auditor's office for
the post-office department, deposes, June 4, 1851: “Hildebrand
is contractor for transporting the mail on route No. 2,900, from
Zanesville to Marietta, commencing March 3, 1850; ending June
30, 1852, at the annual compensation of $1,900, payable in quarter-
yearly payments, in the months of May, August, November, and ,
February, in each year. The payments undor such contract, and
all others of a similar character, never fall due before the months
named, and are seldom made before.”

Question —Please state whether, under this contract, the first
payment to be made in May is to be made for a whole quarter, or
only for the balance of the quarter ending March 31, 1850.

*Answer—The first payment under said contract, and all sim- [152 -
ilar contracts, was and is uniformly made for the fraction of the quar-

Vou. xx—9 . 129-

153 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hildebrand v. Fogle.

ter only, and in the present case the defendantreceived credit on the
books of the office for the sum of $153.06, being for service from
March 3, 1850, to the 31st of same month—twenty-nine days—at
the rate of $475 per quarter. “In all contracts with the United
States for carrying the mail, the quarters énd regularly on tho
last days of March, June, September, and December of each
year, without reference to the time at which such contracts com-
mence.”

Cranston Laurie, a clerk in the department, proves Hildebrand’s
contract. The contract of Hildebrand with the United States,
proven and in evidence with the deposition, is dated and mado
January 29, 1850, and binds him to carry the mail between Zanos-
ville and Marietta for $1,900 per year, commencing March 3, 1850,
ending June 30, 1852. Hildebrand is to be paid $1,900 a year, to-
wit: “Quarterly, in the months of May, August, November, and
February.” : :

This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse said judgment, and
the action of the court below is claimed to be erroneous.

Gopparp, Covey, and Rosrnson, for plaintiff in error :

The great question in the case in the common pleas was,
whether evidence could be received to show that the written con-
tract between Fogle and Hildebrand was to be interpreted in such
a manner as to corrrespond with the contract between the govern-
ment and Hildebrand, there being no express stipulation that it
should be.

It was the duty of the court to decide the question affirmatively
for Hildebrand, or to leave it as a question of fact for the jury.
The court did neither. .

The suit was brought September 5, 1850. Fogle had carried the
mail from March 3 to August 30, 1850, at $750 per annum, and
had earned $372.25 ; but when did Hildebrand violate any duty in
refusing to pay ?
153] *On the 31st March, Fogle had earned, as he says in his letter
of 17th April, $59.75. When was Hildebrand bound to pay it?
The contract says in May. On June 30, 1850, he earned a full
quarter’s pay, $187.50. When was Hildebrand bound to pay it?
The contract says in August; and we find, accordingly, Fogle’s
receipt dated August 30, 1850, for the balance due him for the
quarter ending June 30, 1850.

Had he continued to perform his work under his contract up to

130

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 154

Hildebrand v. Fogle.

September 30, 1850, he would have earned $187.50 more, and would
have been entitled to his pay in November following. He chose
to sue September 5th. Surely he can not recover.

It.may be inferred from the charge of the court, that in an ac-
tion upon a written contract nothing can be referred to in
evidence, to explain the intention of the parties, unless the writ-
ten contract itself refer to it in terms.

This is not law. 13 Pet. 89; Bellinger v. Kitts, 6 Barb. W
Y.) 273; Knight v. New England Worsted Co., 2 Cush. (Mass.)

+ 271.

Fogle can not recover on the common counts. There is no evi-
dence that the contract was rescinded.

Parisn & Evans, for defendant in error:

There is no ambiguity arising on the face of the agreement de-
clared on, and there can be no resort to other evidence to explain
it. But the contract was mutually rescinded, and the plaintiff was
entitled to recover on the common counts.

The deposition of Edwards proves a usage in the department to
consider and treat the last days of the months of March, Jane,
September, and December, as the end of each quarter for the year,
respectively, and that the pay for the quarters, respectively, was
not considered due until the months of May, August, November,
and February, respectively; that this usage applied to Hilde-
brand’s contract with the department, as well as all others of that
class, and that applying the usage to Hildebrand, he was only
paid in May, 1850, so much *of the quarter-ending the last [154
of March, as had expired after March 3d, making $153.06, instead
of $475, or one-fourth of the yearly payment.

The proposition was to show that the quarterly payment of the
sum of $750 was not to be made at the time specified in the con-
tract, but sixty days after. This was not explaining but altering
the contract.

This usage of the department could not affect the plaintiff be-
low, unless it was shown that he knew of it at the time he made
his subcontract. 13 Pet. 92, 96.

Rawyey, J. The action in the court below was brought by
Fogle against Hildebrand upon a written contract entered into
between the parties on February 23, 1850, for carrying the United
States mail from Zanesville to McConnellsville, from March 8, 1850,

181

155 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hildebrand v. Fogle.

until June 30, 1852." For this service Hildebrand agreed to pay
Fogle the sum of $750 per annum, “payable quarterly, in the
months of May, August, November and February,” with tho
further sum of $300, in case certain additional services were re-
quired by the post-office department of Hildebrand. By an agroo-
ment of the samo date, signed by Fogle and delivered to Hilde-
brand, the former agreed to carry the mail, as stipulated in the
other contract, in accordance with the schedule ordered by the
post-office department, and to perform the additional service for
said sum of $300, provided the same was required of Hildebrand. °
He agreed to account for all such money as should be paid him
through postmasters, and deduct it from the sums falling due to
him from time to time. If any fines were imposed on Hildebrand
by the post-office department, for failures or injured mails on that
part of the route, the same was to be deducted from the pay of
Fogle. It was agreed that the’ contract should commence on
March 3, 1850, and that the first payment should be for the month
of March. On the 19th of April following, Fogle, in a letter to
155] Hildebrand, stated the sum due him at $59.75, *which he
had received from postmasters, together with a further sum which
ho forwarded to Hildebrand. This, it will be seen, was the exact
sum due for the month of March, as mentioned in the contract.
On August 30, 1850, he receipted to Hildebrand for $114.70, which
is stated to be “in full and on settlement as a balance due me for
transporting the United States mail between Zanesvillo and Me-
Connellsville, for the quarter ending June 30, 1850.

He continued to carry the mail until August 30, 1850, and on
September 5th commenced this suit, to recover for the service com-
moncing on July Ist and ending on August 30th. The position of
Hildebrand was that the quarter did not end until September 30th,
and that the money did not become due for that quarter’s service
until the month of November. He denied, therefore, that Fogle
had complied with the contract, on his part, or in any event that
any money was due him at the commencement of the suit.

To fortify himself in this construction of the contract, he gave
jn evidence a sworn copy of his own contract with the post-office
department, by which it appeared that on January 29, 1850, he had
contracted to carry the mail from Marietta to Zanesville, the con-
tract with Fogle covering a part of the same route, for the same

» period of time as specified in the contract with Fogle, for the sum
1382

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 150

Hildebrand v. Fogle.

-of $1,900 per annum, payable quarterly, in the months of May,
August, November, and February. To this contvact was appended
the schedule of arrivals and departures referred to in the contract
with Fogle. He also proved by a deposition of a clerk in the de-
partment, that tho regular post-office quarters of the year end on
the last days of March, June, September, and December, without
any reference to the time at which contracts commence; that
under the contract with the plaintiff in error and all others of
like character, the payments never fall due until the months
named after the expiration of the quarter, and are seldom made
before; and that where a fraction of a *quarter only, inter- [156
‘venes between the commencement of a contract and the close of
the quarter, the payment is only made for such fraction, and was
so done in the present instance. The court then charged the jury
that this testimony could not be received in evidence for the pur-
pose of explaining the contract between the parties, the contract
of the defendant with the post-office department not being referred
to in the contract with Fogle; that it must be disregarded so far
as related to that purpose, and so far ruled it out and directed
it to be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury. To this
opinion the plaintiff in error excepted, and the jury having re- ©
turned a verdict for the full amount claimed, he moved for a new
trial, which being overruled, he also excepted to that, and now
seeks a reversal of the judgment for what be claims were errors in
the said rulings of the court.

Did the court err in thus rejecting the evidence offered, and in
overruling the motion for a new trial, are the questions presented
for our consideration. The reason given by the court for reject-
ing the evidence is hardly correct in point of fact. It is true that
the contract of Hildebrand with the department is not mentioned
in so many words, in his contract with Fogle, but it is also true
that there are such allusions in the latter contract as leave no
doubt whatever that Fogle did understand that such a contract
existed. It acknowledges the obligation of Hildebrand to carry
the mail in accordance with a schedule from the department as to
arrivals and departures, and his liability to be fined for failures,
etc., and his obligation to do additional service, if required; aid
all these obligations Fogle took upon himself. Whence arose all
these obligations? They could arise by law only in consequence
of a contract with the department; and it seems to be shutiing

133°

157, 158 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hildebrand ». Fogle.

our eyes to the most obvious light when we refuse to look at the
matter as the parties themselves saw it. The subject matter of
this contract was the transportation of the United States mail. It
does not attempt to give a full description of everything to which
it alludes. It employs terms with reference to the established
157] usages and regulations of the post-office *department.
Among these is the term “quarters ;” and the question is, what
does that term mean as applicable to this branch of the public
service? and can a court and jury be permitted, by evidence, to
try and find out? We think they can, without, in the least, in-
fringing upon the wise and well-settled rule, that a written in-
strument can not be varied or contradicted by parol evidence.
These parties may be fairly presumed to have understood the
matter about which they were contracting. But the same thing
can not be said of every court and jury that may be called on to in-
terpret their contract. To enable the court and jury to be as wise
as the parties, and so to arrive at and give application to the words
they have used, and thus carry out their intentions, the law per-
mits them to hear a full description, from evidence, of the subject
matter of the contract, and of the circumstances that surrounded
the parties at the time it was made; and to learn what were the
motives and inducements that led to the contract, and the object
to be attained by it; or, as expressed by the court in the case of Bel-
linger v. Kitts, 6 Barb. 273': “In expounding a written instrument,
the attendant and surrounding circumstances are competent evi-
dence for the purpose of placing the court in the same situation,
and giving it the same advantages for construing the instrument
as are possessed by the parties who oxecute it.” The same rule
is laid down by Mr. Greenleaf, in his work on Evidence (vol. 1,
sec. 286), and enforced by a great variety of illustrations. The ob-
ject or tendency of this evidence is not to contradict or vary the
terms of the instrument, but to enable the court to come to the
language employed, with an enlightened understanding of the
subject matter in reference to which it has been used.

This whole doctrine is very ably considered in the case of Brad-
Jey v. Washington, Alexandria and Georgetown Steam Packet
Company, 13 Pet. 89, and the rule carried much further than we ure
called upon to go in the ease at bar. The plaintiff in error had,
by an agreement in writing, hired a steamboat to be put on the
158] route from Washington to Potomac *Creck, until another

134,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 159

Hildebrand v. Fogle.

steamboat, then building, should be prepared, and be put on the
route.

The plaintiff in error was the contractor for carrying the United
States mail, which was carried between those points by steamboat,
except in winter, when the navigation of the river was interrupted
by ice, when the mail was carried by land. The steamboat so
hired was employed in carrying the mail, but the ice interrupted
its use for a considerable time, and the owners sued for the hire
of the boat during the time it was so interrupted.

The circuit court refused to allow parol evidence to be given to
show the purpose for which the steamboat was employed, and to
explain the meaning of the terms used in the contract, and of
other matters conducing to show the meaning of the contract.
The Supreme Court held ihat the evidence was admissible—
that extrinsic parol evidence is admissible to give effect to a writ-
ton instrument, by applying it to its proper subject matter, by
proving the circumstances under which it was made, whenever,
without the aid of such evidence, the application could not be
‘tmade in the particular case,

Mr. Justice Barbour, in delivering the opinion of the court, after
a critical review of the authorities, says: “ All the casos which wo
have cited, in which extrinsic evidence has been received, and
those which we have supposed, in which we think that it would
be admissible, proceed on one principle only, and can only be
justified upon that principle. And that is this: that tho rale
which admits extrinsic evidence, for the purpose of applying a
written contract to its proper subject matter, extends beyond the
mere designations of the thing on. which the contract operates,

“and embraces within its scope the circumstances under which the
contract concerning that thing was made, when, without the aid
of such extrinsic evidence, such application of the written con-
tract to its proper subject matter could not be made.”

And the court held, that the extrinsic circumstances, that Brad-
ley was a contractor with the government for carrying the
*mail, and that the steamboat was to be engaged in that [159
business, might be shown, although they were not alluded to in
the written contract, and whon shown would deprive the owners
of the boat of the right to recover for such time as the boat could
not be used on account of ice. In tho case under consideration, no
attempt is made to add anything to the written contract. The

135

160 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hildebrana ». Fogle.

proof is only offered to give application to the terms used in it, by
showing, from the circumstances and situation of the parties, in
what senso they used them; and we think for this purpose the
evidence was clearly admissible, and taken in connection with the
written contract, or rather the written contract thus applied by it,
has reference to the established quarters of the post-office depart-
ment, in fixing the time of payment, and not to the quarterly
divisions of the year from the date of the contract. Indeed, no
other construction can, it seems to us, reasonably be put upon the
contract, without the aid of this extrinsic evidence, when made in
connection with the written evidence that the plaintiff below has
furnished, as to his undorstanding of its true construction. The
first payment, after the contract was entered into, was to be made
in May, and it expressly provides tbat this shall be for the month
of March. Why this provision? Because the month of March
closed the regular post-office quarter. He was paid accordingly.
On the 30th of August he gives a receipt in fall for the quarter
ending the 30th of June. This was the second payment to be
made by the terms of the contract, and was made at the very time
stipulated in the contract.

‘He here confesses, under his own hand, that the term “ guar-
terly,” used in tho contract, refers to post-office quarters. The
post-office quarter did ond at that time; but a quarter from the
date of entering upon his contract, would have ended on the 3d
of June.

Again, if the time is to be computed from the commencement
of the contract, the termination of the quarters will not fall in
either of the months named in the contract, and would involve
the injustice of compelling Hildebrand to pay Fogle for his
160] *services before they were performed, while, for the same
service, he was obliged to wait upon the government until two
months after they were performed,

Thus have the parties themselves given a practical construction
to the terms of this contract, not contradictory to the language
used in it, but in strict accordance therewith, and have applied
its torms of payment to post office quarters. To show what these
quarters were, as well as to show the circumstances and situation
of the contracting parties, in respect to the subject matter of the
contract, we think the evidence offered was admissible, and
should have been permitted to go to the jury; and for rejecting

136 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 161

‘Wilson v. Leslie.

it, as well as in overruling the motion for a now trial, a majority
of this court are of opinion that the court of common pleas erred.
Upon the question raised as to the right of the plaintiff below to
recover upon the evidence given by him, attempting to establish
a mutual rescission of the contract, we express no opinion.

The plaintiff in orror having been deprived of the’ benefit of
legal evidence, which he offered, compels us ¢o reverse the judgment,
in order that he may avail himself of it upon a new trial.

CALDWELL, J., dissented.

*Marrnew Wizson, Jr. v. Benszamin F. Lusnin. {ist

A mortgage of personal property under the statute of 1846 is “absolutely
void” as to other ereditors of the mortgagor who assert their rights
against the property after its execution, and before it is deposited with
the recorder or township clerk. .

Such s mortgage is not void in toto, by reason of an omission to make the
deposit “ forthwith,” but becomes effective whenever it is deposited. And
in case of a temporary withdrawal of the paper from the recorder’s office,
the mortgagee will not be prejudiced by a levy made at the instance of an-
other croditor. .

Error to the court of common pleas of Muskingum county.

The action was replovin, brought by Wilson, the plaintiff below,
who is also plaintiff in error, against Leslie, to recover the posses-
sion of the following goods and chattels: One carriage with
leather extension top, trimmed with red plush; one carriage with
standing top; one dapple gray mare, called Sarah Thompson ; one
light gray mare, called Betsey Baker; two sorrel mares matched.”

The bill of exceptions is as follows:

“Upon the trial of this cause, in the court of common pleas, tho
plaintiff gave in evidence a mortgage of chattels from John
Clements to him, dated March 12, 1851, und deposited with the
recorder of Muskingum county (his officé being kept in the town-
ship where the mortgagor and mortgagee resided) March 20, 1851,
a copy of which mortgage, with the indorsement by the recorder, is
attached hereto, marked ‘A” The plaintiff also gave in evi-
dence the notes mentioned in the said mortgage, copies of which

137

"162 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Wilson ». Leslie.

are hereto annexed, marked ‘B;’ and gave evidence tending to
show that the debts therein mentioned were justly due to him.
fo also proved that about the hour of three Pp. mu. of April 1, 1851,
the defendant, as sheriff of said county, levied on the chattels men-
tioned in the declaration, by virtue of an oxecution then in his
hands, in favor of Kennett, McKee & Co., and against said
Clements, which, with interest and cost, amounted to the verdict
162] ‘afterward rendered herein. In the farther progress of the
cause, it was proved that on April 1, 1851, this court then being
in session, about ten o'clock 4. mu. the plaintiff, without the
knowledge or advice of the attorney hereinafter referred to, went
to the recorder’s office, which is in an upper room of the west
wing of the building in which the court sits, and asked for the
mortgage, saying that he wanted an alteration made therein;
that the recorder handed it to him, and the plaintiff took it to the
court-room to a lawyer who had before that time been his attorney
in the matter of securing his debt from Clements, and told him
that the ‘bay horso, Baldfaco,’ mentioned in the mortgage, had
some disease which he thought might injure the others, and he
had had him sold, and wished to have inserted in lieu thereof,
one bay mare, and he desired his advice whether such an altera-
tion of the instrament might lawfully be made, with the assent
of Clements, The attorney advised that it might be done, where-
upon the plaintiff went to Clements, and the instrument was
altered with the assent of the parties to it, by drawing a pen
through tho words ‘bay horse, Baldface’ and interlining in liew
thereof, the words ‘one bay mare.’ This alteration was made
before tho levy, but the mortgage was not returned to the re-
corder’s office, until four P. m. of that day and after the levy. Neither
the bay horse, ‘ Baldface, nor the bay mare, was levied upon.”

It was further proved that on Saturday, March 30, 1851, the
same attorney, having in his hands a warrant of attorney given
by Clements to the said firm of Kennett, McKee & Co., made prep-
arations by drawing all the necessary pleadings, to take judg-
ment against said Clements the following Tuesday, being the first
day of the then noxt.term of the court of common pleas for said
county, and also to file a bill in chancery against the plaintiff and
Clements, impeaching the mortgage for fraud, and praying, if
held valid, the property might be sold, and the surplus, after
satisfying Wilson’s debt applicd to the claim of Kennett, McKee

188

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 163, 164

Wilson v. Leslie.

& Oo.; that for the purpose of preparing said bill in chancery, he
went that *Saturday to the recorder’s office and copied [163
from said mortgage a list of the articles, and partially wrote his
Dill the following Tuesday morning, and on the same afternoon
he concladed to insert the entire mortgage in his bill, and after
his interview with the plaintiff in the court-house, went to the re-
corder’s office to copy said mortgage, and learned that the mortgage
had not yet boen returned; that he could as well have written his
pill in chancery without seeing said mortgage again, as with it;
that be then took his judgment, and deemed it his duty to issue
execution in favor of said Kennett, McKee & Co., which he did, and
which was levied as before set forth. It was also in evidence that the
plaintiff knew before March 30, 1851, that the said attorney had
said claim of Kennett, McKee & Co. against Clements in his hands
for collection; and it was further proved that the said attorney
intended, on Saturday, March 29, 1851, to enter up said judgment
the following Tuesday, though he did not intend levying on the
property in question, until he discovered that the mortgage had
not been returned to the recorder’s office as above stated.

It was further proved that the property mortgaged, and now in
question, was not delivered to Wilson, but remained with Clements
until the said levy was made.

The court charged the jury, “first, that the mortgage was void
because of the lapse of time between its execution and deposit
with the recorder; and, second, that the levy made while the mort-

" gage was temporarily out of the recorder’s office, would hold the
property, notwithstanding notice to the attorney, unless the jury
were satisfied that the attorney assented to its being out; and that
they were to regard these instructions as governing the case, al-
though they might be satisfied that the debts mentioned in the
mortgage were justly and fairly due from Clements to the plaint-
iff To which opinions of the court the plaintiff excepts, and
prays the court to sign and seal this his bill of exceptions, and
that it be made a part of the record, which is accordingly done.”

*The mortgage referred to reads as follows: [164

“ Know all men by these presents, that I, John Clements, for
and in consideration of the sum of $1,000, to me paid by Matthew
Wilson, Jy., have bargained and sold, and do hereby sell and con-
vey unto the said Matthew Wilson, Jr., the following described
personal property, to wit: one (1) carriage, with leather exten-

139

165, . SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Wilson v. Leslie.

sion top, trimmed with red plush; one (1) sulky; two (2) sleighs;
one (1) carriage with standing top ; one (1) brown buggy with red.
head lining; one (1) black buggy, trimmed with figured damask;
three (3) buggies in course of construction; one (1) two-horse
wagon ; one (1) buggy-pole; one (1) double-seated baggy with-
out top; two (2) pair extra shafts; one (1) dapple-gray mare
(Sarah Thompson) ; one (1) light grey mare (Betsey Baker) - one
gray horse (Gray Eagle); one (1) bay mare (Sarah McBride) ; one
(1) bay pacing mare (Sarah Bladen) ; one (1) bay horse (Col. Mor-
gan); one (1) black mare (Polly Hopkins); one (1) bay mare
(Sarah Stiner) ; one (1) sorrel mare (Fanny Morgan) ; one (1) pair
sorrel mares, matched ; one (1) bay mare; twelve (12) sets of
harness; two (2) buffalo robes; nine (9) horse-blankets; four (4) -
saddles; five (5) bridles; one (1) side-saddle.

“ Provided always, and these presents are upon this express con-
sideration, that whereas said Jobn Clements is indebted to said
Matthew Wilson, Jr., in the sum of $1,312, by three several prom-
issory notes—one for the sum of $700, dated February 1. 1849 ; one
for the sum of $300, December 1, 1846; and one for the sum of
$290, payable one day after date.

“Now, therefore, when the said John Clements shall pay said
notes and tho interest thereon, then this conveyance is to be void;
until then to remain in full force and virtue.

“Tt is understood that said Wilson does not extend the time of
payment.

165] * Witness my hand and seal, this 12th day of March, 1851.
. “Joun CLEMENTS. [SEAL]
“Attest: Wintiam Wiison.”

The notes, copies of which are made exhibits to the bill of ex-
ceptions, are described in the foregoing mortgage.

On the back of this instrument, the mortgago, is the following
indorsement:

“Entered March 20, 1851, at 104 o’clock.”

‘The cause was tried to the jury, at the July term, 1851, of the
court of common pleas for Muskingum county; and under charge
of the judge, the jury returned a verdict for defendant, and assessed
his damages at $215.56, for which judgment was entered,

The writ of error is brought to reverse this jadgment.

140

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 166
‘Wilson v. Leslie.

Gopparp & Hasrman, for plaintiff in error, cited Sanger v. East-
wood, 19 Wend. 514.

A. P. Buocxson, for defendant, cited Smith v. Acker, 23 Wend.
653; Fitch v. Humphrey, 1 Denio, 163.

Spatpina, J. The mortgage from Clements to Wilson wags
executed on March 12, 1851, and was deposited in the office of the
recorder of the county on the 20th of the same month, a period of
seven days having intervened.

The court below charged the jury that the mortgage was void,
because of this lapse of time between the oxecution and deposit of
the instrument. In this we think the court erred. Tho statute of
Ohio, of February 24, 1846, provides “that every mortgage or
conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage of goods and cbat-
tels, hereafter made, which shall not be accompanied by an imme-
diate delivery, and be followed by an actual and continued change
of possession of the things mortgaged, shall be absolutely void, as
against the creditors of the mortgagor, *and as against subse- [166
quent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage,
or a true copy thereof, shall be forthwith deposited as directed in
the succeeding section of this act.”

A fair construction of this statute will not make the instrument
inoperative as botween the parties (mortgagor and mortgagee),
although it be not forthwith deposited with the recorder. It will
not be permitted to stand in the way of an execution issued at the
instance of a judgment creditor, until after it shall have boon de-
posited in the proper office. And in certain cases, undoubtedly, an.
execution may hold the chattels mortgaged, even after the instru-
ment has been placed on file in the office; as where the delay has
been so great as to taint the transaction with fraud.

But the mere fact that the mortgagee omitted, for several days.
or several wecks, to deposit his mortgage deed with the clerk of
the township or recorder of the county, as the case might require,
would by, no means render his security void. It would not be
void as against the mortgagor, if not filed in the office at all. It
would not be void as against that class of creditors who wero
equally remiss with the mortgagee, and took no steps to fasten
upon the property for the payment of their debts. Until placed
in the proper office, a mortgage of chattels, in our state, would be
void as against other creditors of the mortgagor and subsequent

“141

167 SUPREME COURT OF OHTO.

‘Wilson v, Leslie.

purchasers and mortgagees, whose rights then attach. But when
filed with the clerk or recorder, the instrument becomes valid and
effective against all men except those whose rights have thus pre-
viously attached.

The court below charged the jury that the levy made while the
mortgage was temporarily out of the recorder’s office, would hold
the property, notwithstanding notice to the attorney, unless the
jury were satisfied that the attorney assented to its being out.
There is great and manifest error in this ruling of the court. The
facts, as disclosed by the bill of exceptions, were as follows:

The attorney who had been consulted by Wilson, in the matter
167] *of securing his debt by means of this mortgage, had in his
hands for collection a claim in favor of Kennett, McKee & Co.,
against Clements, with a warrant of attorney to confess judg-
ment,

On Tuesday, April 1, 1851, and on the first day of the term of
the court of common pleas, at about ten o’clock a. 3, Wilson took
his mortgage from the office of the recorder, where it had been
deposited since the 20th of March, to the court-room, in the same
building, for the purpose of consulting this same attorney as to the
propriety of striking out one of the horses mentioned in the in-
strument, which had become diseased, and inserting a certain bay
mare in lieu thereof. The attorney advised that it might be done,
with the assent of Clements, and while Wilson was absent procar-
ing this amendment to be made, his legal adviser “deemed it his
duty” to take judgment in favor of Kennott, McKee & Oo., and
forthwith to take out execution, and have the same levied on a por-
tion of the property which he knew was covered by the mortgage.
At four o’clock in the afternoon, the mortgage was taken back to
the office of the recorder, but “ it was too late.” The trap had been
sprung.

To designate this as sharp practice on the part of the attorney,
will be treating his conduct with sufficient delicacy. To hold that
a levy obtained through such instrumentality, should override a
bona fide mortgage, would be preposterous. The court of common
pleas ought not to sanction snch an abuse of its process.

‘The temporary withdrawal of the paper could not impair its force,
if done with intent to return it. In contemplation of law, it was
“on file in the office,” although out of the recorder’s room.

142

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 168

Hambleton v. Dempsey & Co. oe

The assent of the attorney to its withdrawal was quite immate-
rial.

The judgment of the court of common pleas is reversed, with
costs,

*JospuA HamBieron v. Josrpx W. Dempsny & Co. [168

A. special verdict is irregular and insufficient unless it find the truth of the
facts, It will not do to refer the evidence to the court and ask their
judgment upon it. (1)

If a board of equalization add to the valuation returned by the assessor, the
law will presume it to be done upon sufficient evidence, unless the con-
trary be made to appear by the party aggrieved.

‘The law gives notice that the board will meot at a time and place certain. No
special notice to the tax-payor is requisite. (2)

Hexor to the common pleas of Lawrence county.

Lhe action was assumpsit, brought by Dempsey & Co., to recover
money paid by them to Hambleton, as treasurer of Lawrence
county, upon a tax demanded by him, and denied by them to be
legal. The money was paid over to the treasurer under protest.

The bill of exceptions shows the following state of facts: The
plaintiffs below being called on by the assessor of the township, in
the spring of 1850, made their statement of taxable property in
the usual form, which was sworn to and returned by the assessor
to the county auditor. That, without any actual notice to said
plaintiffs, the county board of equalization proceeded to add to
their personal property the sum of $20,224, as follows:

‘Yo non-enumerated articles. ++ $3,000

To merchants’ stuck.......... 4,800
To manufacturers’ stock. 9,054
To moneys and credits. 3,074
To their cattle........ 296

Dota ccsesscseecsnccsteesnecesteesecesseerneesanseeceseteseessetesses $20,224

(1) See Lessee of Blake v. Lewis Davis et al. reported in this volume, as
to special verdict. ;

(2) For construction of the act for levying taxes on all property in this
state, according to its true value, passed March 2, 1846, and the amendatory
acts, see Loring et al. v. The State, 16 Ohio, 590; Wetmore v. The State, 18
Ib. 77; Cincinnati College ». The State, 19 Ib. 110. 143

196, 170 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hambleton v. Dempsey & Co.

169] *The tax was assessed on the sum thus superadded, as well
as upon the amount sworn to, and returned by the assessor. The
plaintiffs below paid these taxes to the treasurer, protesting that
they were illegal, so far as said additions were concerned, and
giving him notice that they should resort to legal measures to re-
cover back their money.

The cause was submitted to a jury at the May term, 1851, who
returned into court their verdict, as follows:

“We, the jury, find that in case the court, upon tho foregoing
statement of facts, should be of opinion that the law of the case
was with the plaintiffs, that then we find for the plaintiffs, and
that the said defendant did assume and promise, etc., and we as-
sess the damages of the said plaintiffs at $185.65. But in case
that the court, upon the foregoing statement of facts, should be of
opinion that the law of the case is with the defendant, then we,
the jury, find for the defendant; and that the said defendant did
not assume and promise, in manner and form, as the said plaint-
iffs hath above thereof alleged against him.” And thereapon the
court took the matter under advisoment to the term of September,
1851, and then declared its opinion that the said plaintiffs were
entitled to recover, and rendered’ judgment upon such special
finding of facts, in favor of said plaintiffs and against said defend~
ant below, for the sum of $185.65, and interest from the first day
of last term. To which opinion of the court rendering said judg-
ment, etc., the defendant excepted.

The foregoing “statement of facts,” referred to by the jury,
seems to have been the items of testimony, written and oral, pro-
duced on the trial of the parties respectively, but the facts are not
embodied in the verdict, and are only found in the bill of excep-
tions.

This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the judgment of the
common pleas, and errors are duly assigned.

Nieuw & Tracy, for plaintiff in error:

120] *On the trial, objections were taken to the competency
and relevancy of each item of evidence. In receiving the tax, the
defendant below performed only his official duty.

We insist that the county board of equalization, at its April
session, 1850, was authorized by law to add to the sworn state-
monts returned by the assessor. Sec. 4 of the act amendatory of”

144

”

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. - * WL

Hambleton v. Dempsey & Co.

the: general tax law, 45 Ohio L. 61, passed February 8, 1847.
Act of February 22, 1848, vol. 46 Obio L. 69; sec. 14, p. 72.

Was it necessary to give notice to the plaintiffs below of the
action of the board of equalization in order to render the action of
the board valid. We claim not. The law does not require notice.
Section 14 of the act of 1847, authorizing the county auditor, in
certain cases, to correct the return of the assessor, requires notice
to parties in interest, Notso with the county board of equaliza-
tion, when acting under section 4 of the act.

The statute of Massachusetts, in express terms, requires notice,
and in that respect differs from our statute, which provides no
notice nor any officer to give notice. 2’ Mass. 118. The uniform
practice in all the counties has been for the board to act without
notige.

Mr. Nasu, for defendant in error, made the following points:

I. He claimed that the board of equalization did not possess the
power to make these additions. Section 4 of the act of 1847, 45
Obio Stat. 61, might have designed to give such a power; but
sections 1 and 14 of the act of 1848, 46 Ohio Stut. 69, 72, modify tho
former acts, and limit the power to hearing complaints and equal-
izing valuations, The reference to section 4 of the act of 1817 is
limited to the proviso which forbids a reduction of the sum total,
Section 16 of the act of 1847 shows that the auditor is the one em-
powered to act in cases of omissions in sworn lists, and for this
purpose he is authorized to swear witnesses, and required to notify
the *party of bis intention to make the inquiry. Hore isan [171
ample remedy to mect such cases; why then apply another one
not at all adapted to obtain the ends of justice—a board, proceed-
ing, as is claimed, ex parte, and without power to compel testimony
under oath ?

II. But, admitting the board have the power, how shall this
power be oxercised? Ee parte and without notice? The power
is a quast judigial power; the board must inquire and decide upon
testimony, and their decision affects the interests of others. In
such a case, he claimed that the principles’ of eternal justice re-
quire that the party shall have notice of any inquiry and decision
which are to increase his taxes, as in this case, $180, and write
him down perjared in swearing to his list. Sach are the author-
ities : 2 Mass. 170 ; 4 [b.627; 2 Ib. 489 ; 3b. 188; 15 Johns. 537; 14
Conn. 72; 2 Hornington (N. Y.), 387; 4 N. H. 127. This last
Vou. xx—10 . 145

172 » sSUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Hambleton 0, Dempsey & Co.

case decides that the tax is void, unless it is shown on trial that
the facts justified the addition. No such evidence was offered in
this case. He claimed, however, that the inquiry under our stat-
ute should be made by the board after notice given. This would
bo less expensive than a suit at law. Hither way, this case is a
direct adjudication in favor of the decision below. Vide 8 N. H.
166; 7 Ib. 113; 2 Ib. 236; 15 Vt. 640.

TII. The tax being void, can this action be maintained against
tho collector? He claimed that the treasurer was like an agent
from whom, money paid to him for his principal, might be recov-
ered back, if the agent had not paid it over, or had been notified
not to pay it over, as was done in this case. Boston and Sandwich
Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Met. 181; Amesburg W. & C. M. Co. v,
Amesburg, 17 Mass. 461; Perry v. Dover, 12 Pick. 206; 4 Pick
361; 6 Conn. 223; 12 Pick. 7; 10 Conn, 127, This rule has been
applied to collectors. Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137. This
case is directly in point. The same is admitted to be law in Lewis
v. Tate, 10 Mo. 650,

IY. This is not a voluntary payment. The party had a
172] *right to pay under protest, and then sue to test the legality
of the tax. 4 Met. 181; 12 Pick. 7; 6 Conn. 223; 10 Ib. 227; 14
Ib. 72; 9 N. H. 524. A payment to a collector of taxes, of taxes
claimed by him in virtue of a tax duplicate, is not a voluntary
but a compulsory payment.

Spatpine, J. We have no hesitation in reversing the judgment
of the court of common pleas, and for two reasons:

1. The verdict neither finds the issue nor tho facts upon which
the court may pronounce the finding as a conclusion of law. The
statute provides that “no jury shall, in any case, be compelled to
give in-a genoral verdict, so that they find a special verdict, and
show the truth of the facts, and require the aid of the court.”

Here they have found no ono fact to be true, buf have simply
referred the court to the ovidence, and told thom if upon that evi-
dence they are of opinion the law of the case is with the plaint-
ifs, then the jury find for the plaintiffs, etc. It is the game of
“‘hido-and-go-seek ” between the court and jury. The evidence
is laid before the jury, and they are told to find the facts. The
jury lay the same evidence before the court, and tell them to find
tho facts and law together. Such practice as this we can not

146

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 173

Hambleton v. Dempsey & Co.

sanction. The parties are disposed to treat this as a special vor- .
dict. One of the best special pleaders in this or any other coun-
try, has laid down the rule governing this subject, in this wise:
“If in a special verdict, the jury find only the evidence of a mate-
rial fact, instead of the fact itself, or otherwise omit to find, upon
such a fact, either way, no judgment can be rendered upon the
finding for either party, since a matter of fact essential to the de-
termination of the cause is left unascertained by the verdict.”
Gould’s Pleading, ch. 10, sec. 62

2. We see no reason to find fault with the action of the board
of equalization, in the cases of Dempsey & Oo., and of Dempsey,
Rogers and Ellison, who compose said firm of Dempsey & Oo., of
tho date of April 23, 1850.

*By section 14 of the amendatory tax law, passed Feb- [178
ruary 8, 1847, the board has power “to add to or deduct from
the valuation of the personal property, or moneys, or credits of
any person returned by the assessor, upon such evidence as shall
be satisfactory to said board, whether said return be made upon
the oath of such person or upon the valuation of the assessor.”

By the amendatory act passed February 22, 1848, section 14,
it is provided that “the annual board of equalization, con-
stituted by section 1, shall af the same time hear complaints
and equalize the assessments of all personal property, moneys, and
credits, new entries, and new structures, returned for the current
year by the assessor, being governed by the provisions of section 4
of the amendatory tax law, passed February 8, 1847.” .

We do not hesitate to say that the power “to add to or deduct
from the valuation of tbe personal property,” is committed to the
board created by the act of 1848, as fully as to that under the act
of 1847. How otherwise could they “equalize the assessment of
all personal property ?”

It is objected that the tax-payer had no notice of the action of
the board, and that it nowhere appears affirmatively, that they
acted upon evidence of an undervaluation of the property. The
law fixes the time of meeting and the place, to wit, the second
Monday in April, annually, and at the auditor’s office. This is
notice to every citizen who has property, real or personal, re-
turned for taxation.

As to the arbitrary proceedings of the board, in adding to the

valuation put upon their personal property by the defendants in
147

174 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Philips, Beckel é& Oo. v. Knox County Mutual Insurance Oo.

error, we fecl bound to presume in favor of a proper discharge of
their duty by these officers, and as the law authorizes them to act
“upon such evidence as shall be satisfactory to them,” in the
absence of any showing to the contrary, the conclusion of law is,
that they acted upon sufficient evidence.

Tho judgment o! the common ploas will be reversed, with costs.

174] *Purures, Becker, & Oo. v. Tan Kwox Counry Morvan
Insuranon Company.

“Where a building and the land on which it stands is the property of an in-
corporated company, the stockholders of the company can not insure the
same as their individual property in a mutual insurance company. (1)

Error to the Supreme Court of Knox county.

On July 27, 1848, Horatio G. Philips, Daniel Beckel, Jonathan
D. Philips, and Samuel D. Edgar, traders in company, using the
name of Philips, Beckel & Co., commenced an action against
the “Knox County Mutual Insurance Company,” and declared
in assumpsit upon a policy of insurance, dated October 27,
A.D. 1847. To this declaration the defendant filed a plea of non
assumpsit. ‘

At the December term of the court of common pleas of Knox
county, 1849, tho issue joined was submitted to the court, and by
the court that issue was found in favor of the defendant.

Thereupon the plaintiffs moved for a new trial, on the ground
that the finding of the court was against the law and evidence in
the case. This motion was overruled, and judgment entered in
pursuance of tho finding of the court.

(1) This decision is made mainly upon e construction of the charter of the
‘Knox County Mutual Insurance Company, which gives the company a lion
on property insured, including the land on which the insured buildings stand.
By the charter, a sale of the insured property renders tho policy void, and
sootion 9 declares that if the insured have # less ostate than an unincumbered
title in foo simple, to the buildings insured and the lands covered by the same,
the policy shall be void, unless the true title of the insured and the in-
eumbrances be expressed in the policy and in the application therefor.

148

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 175, 176

Philips, Beokel & Co. v. Knox County Mutual Insurance Co.

To the decision of the court, in overruling the motion for a new
trial, the plaintiffs excepted, and their bill of exception was
allowed, sealed, and made part of tho record.

*The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. [175

The error assigned in this case when before the Supreme Court,
‘was, that the court of common pleas erred in overruling the mo-
tion for a new trial. And the error now assigned is, that the
Supreme Court erred in affirming the judgment of the court of
common pleas.

Hi. B. Curris & Mrrowett, for plaintiffs, claimed:

1. That there was, in point of fact, no misrepresentation of the
title in the application by the assured, in the present case.

1. The statement in the application for insurance is, that “the
fee of the land is held by Philips, Beckel, Edgar & Philips, leased
perpetually to Johnson & Douglas.” :

The application is by “ Philips, Beckel & Co.”

Tho naked fee was in the “Dayton Hydraulic Company,” but
the persons named in the application as holding the fee, composed.
the “ Dayton Hydraulic Company.” It is not denied by the de-
fendants but that these persons were at that time the legal owners
of the naked fee; but it is claimed that they held it not in their
individual, but in their corporate capacity. It is nowhere in tho
application so alleged. In what manner they hold it, whether in
individual or corporate capacity, is not pretended to be given,

In stating the fee as they did, tho applicants stated a conclusion
of law, in which they were mistaken, but which mistake is ap-
parent upon the face of the application itself. The application
shows that the premisos were leased perpetually to Johnson and
Douglas.

By the law, as held in this state, a perpetual lease amounts to
a transfer of the fee, Loring v. Melendy et al., 11 Ohio, 358.

In Boyd’s Lessee v. Salbert, 13 Ohio, 213, it was said that “the
question whether a lease be realty or personalty is open;” but in
ihe later case of the Northern Bank of Kentucky v. Roosa ot al.,
13 Ohio, 334, the question came fairly and *legitimately be- [176
fore the court, and is determined substantially the same as in Lor-
ing v. Melendy et al.

And under the law as declared by our courts of last resort, this’

“perpetual lease” is the same in every particular as a fee-simple

estate.
149

.

177 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Philips, Beckel & Co. v. Knox County Mutual Insurance Co.

The‘ right of mortgagees to insure, for their own protection,
mortgaged pr emises, we do not understand to be disputed. 2 Barn
& Ald. 194. And without specifying their interest to consist in
a mortgage. 4 Dall. 421; 1 Wash. C. C.409; 2 Barn & Ald. 193;
2 Marsh. 509.

When a misstatement of title has not tended to mislead the judg-
ment of the underwriters, because in no degree affecting the risk,
it does not avoid the policy. 20 Pick. 389; 8 Pick. 86; 10 Pick.
525.

2. We claim that the allegations in the policy, in ordor to be-
come matter of warranty, must bo of some fact or circumstance
relating to the risk. 1 Phil. on Ins. 348; Mackil v. Pleasants, 2
Binn. 363 ; Pawson v. Watson, Vowp. 785; Le Megurier v. Vaughn,
6 East, 387; Dobson v. Sotheby, 1 Mood. & Maik. 90; Ellis on Ins.
59 (4 Law Lib.) ; Guy Catlin v. Springfield Fire Ins. Uo., 1 Sumn.
434; Bean v. Stupart, Doug. 11; Hyde v. Bruce, 3 Doug. 213;
Marsh. 347; Phillips, 346; Ruan v, Gardner, 1 Wash. C. C. 147.

8, Having sufficiently shown that, to constitute a warranty,
the statements contained in the policy must relate to the risk, we

* will now, thirdly, inquire whether this statement of title did relate
to the risk. It has no connection with ii—no bearing upon it, 2
Camp. 610; 1 Phil. on Ins. 410 ; 13 Wend. 92; 16 Wend. 481.
2 Denio, 75, does not overrule these authorities.

4, That the mortgages from Johnson & Douglas to plaintiffs,
were not “incumbrances,” within the meaning of section 9 of
defendants’ charter; and consequently, to omit to state them could
not be “ material to defendants.”

To construe this section sensibly, we must look at the object
W77] ‘intended. It was certainly one of two things—perhaps
both: first, to give greater security to the company, by reason of
their lien for the unpaid premium note; secondly, to inform the
company how great was the pecuniary inducement of the assured
to watch and protect the insured premises.

Now, “incumbrances” upon any interest which the applicant
might have inthe premises, would be material to the defendants
to know, because they would affect both the above supposed ob-
jects. But an accretion of interest could be no incumbrance, It
would promote, not impede, both of said objects of the law.

Opun & Lows, on same side.

R. C. Hurp, for defendants.

150

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 178

Philips, Beckel & Co. v. Knox County Mutual Insurance Oo.

‘The finding, ruling and judgment of the court below, and on the
circuit, were all right, because of —

I. The breach of plaintiffs’ express warranty as.to title.

II. The misrepresentation by plaintiffs of the title and incum-
brances.

III. The provisions of ninth section of the charter of the de-
fendants.

I. The express warranty of the plaintiffs as to title and owner-
ship was broken. *

An express warranty is defined to be “ an agreement expressed.
in the policy, whereby the assured stipulates that certain facts re-
lating to the risk, are, or shall be true; or certain acts relating to
the same subject have been or shall be done.”

Tho circumstance or act warranted need not be material to the
risk, and in this respect differs from a “representation ;” and
though it is always a part of the policy, it may, “like any other
part of the express contract, be written in the margin, or contained
in progosals and documents expressly referred to in the policy, and so
made a part of it.” 1 Phillips on Insurance, 346, 347; Dennis v.
Ludlow, 2 Caine, 111; Bean v. Stupart, Doug. 11; Kenyon v.
Berthon, Dong. 12, n.

*For the defendants it is claimed that the statement in the [178
application in regard to the title and ownership of the promises
“relates to the risk.” Jenning v. Chenango County Mutual Insur-
ance Co., 2 Denio, 75; 1 Phillips on Insurance, 351.

“A warranty,” says Lord Mansfield, “must be strictly per-
formed’: nothing tantamount will do.” Rawson v. Watson, Cowp.
785; Blackhurst v. Cochell, 3 Term, 360; De Habn v. Hartley,
1 Term, 343; 2 Term, 186.

II. But if there be no express warranty, the policy is void
by reason of the misrepresentation and concealment of the
plaintiffs.

“A representation is a material fact stated, before completing the
contract, by either party to the other; and a misrepresentation is
the statement of such a fact, which turns out not to be true.

“By a material fact is meant one that shows the nature and ex-
tent of the risk, and may induce the other party to enter into the con-
tract.” 1 Phillips on Insurance, 214,

“The test of materiality is the probable influence of the state-

151

179 SUPREME: OOURT OF OHIO.

Philips, Beckel & Co. v. Knox County Mutual Insurance Co.

ment made on the mind of the underwriter.” 1 Arnold on Insur-
ance, 515, sec. 194; 1 Phillips on Insurance, 214,

Under the ninth section of the charter the fact of title and
ownership was material. 1 Arnold on Insurance, 518, 567, sec.
210.

It is said, however, that this fact ceases to be material when it
is shown that the plaintiffs were the sole stockholders in the
“Dayton Hydraulic Company.” This incorporated company is a
distinct and independent person in law.

Tho right of property was in the corporation, liable to be sold
or incumbered by them, and persons dealing with the corpora-
tion in regard to the insured property, would, of course, take it

* discharged of all equities derived simply through the individual
stockholders,

The charter says, the insurance “ company shall have a lien upon
179] the lands against the insured,” etc. Who are the *insured ?”
“Philips, Beckel, Edgar & Philips.” It is not the “Dayton Hy-
draulic Company.” Can it be pretended that the lion thus in-
tended to be given, could be onfored against the “hydraulic
company.” .

IIL. The legislature has established the Jaw for these parties.
Section 9 of the charter requires the applicant to set forth in his
application lis “true title;” and, in default thereof, declares that
the “policy shall be void.”

. Hiroscocg, C.J. The bill of exceptions in this case shows that
on the trial in the court of common pleas, the plaintiffs offered in
evidence the original policy of insurance, described in the de-
claration, and which, with part of the act of incorporation of the
defendant, is recited in the bill of exceptions. Thts policy of in-
surance is in terms similar to the ordinary policies of mutual in-
surance companies. The property insured is an oil-mill and ma-
chino shop, insured at $800, situate at Dayton, and the lot on
which situated, is particularly desctibed. The application of the
plaintifs is referred to for a more particular description, and as
part of the policy. The application so referred to, and made part
of the policy, is also made part of tho bill of exceptions. From
this it appears that the property, for the insurance of which the
application was made, was represented as the property of Philips,
Beckel & Oo., and that to the question us to “ who holds the fee
152

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 180

Philips, Beckel & Co. v. Knox County Muiual Insurance Co.

of the land on which said buildings stand, whether incumbered by
mortgage, and to what amount,” the reply was, “ Philips, Beckel,
‘Edgar and Philips, leased perpetually to Johnson & Douglas ”—
the applicants—and insured, thereby stating the fee to be in them-
selves, although subject to a perpetual loase, and no other incntm-
brances are named. It is unnecessary to insert here the sections
of the statute referred to in the bill of exceptions, as they will be
referred to horoafter. The by-laws of the company, attached to
the policy, were made part of the bill. It was admitted that the

buildings intended to be insured were destroyed by fire, on or-

about March 26, 1848, and proven that necessary preliminary
steps had been *taken to charge thé defendants, that de- [180
mand of payment, etc., had been made. The insurance was for
five years.

Defendant gave in evidence the original application before re-
ferred to, and also transcripts from the record of certain deeds,

_which are also made part of the bill. These records show, jirst,
a deed from Philips, Beckel & Co. to the “Dayton Hydraulic
Company,’ an incorporated company, for tho lands on which the
insured property was situated, bearing date June 18, 1846.

Second. A lease from the “Dayton Hydraulic Company” to
Johnson & Douglas, for the same premises, for ninety-nine years,
renewable forever. This instrument bears date July 9, 1847.

Third. Two deeds of mortgage from Johnson & Douglas, dated
the same 9th day of July, upon the same premises, to the “Dayton
Hydraulic Company :” the one to secure the payment of two
notes for two hundred dollars each—one due in one, and the other
in two years; and the other to secure the payment of two notes of
like amount, one due in three, and the other in four years.

The plaintiffs then proved that they were the sole stockholders
in the “Dayton Hydraulic Company.”

In the bill of exceptions, the reasons are assigned which induced
the court to find the issue joined in favor of the defendant, but
with this, this court has nothing todo. The simple question for
us to decide is, whether, under the circumstances disclosed in the
bill of exceptions, the plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict and
jadgment. If they were, then the court of common pleas erred
in overruling the motion for a new trial. If the plaintiff were not
entitled to a verdict and judgment, then thore is no error.

It is apparent that here was an insurance effected upon certain

153

181, 182 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Philips, Beckel & Oo. v. Knox County Mutual Insuranes Oo.

buildings as the property of the plaintiffs, and represented by the
plaintiffs, in their application, to stand upon land, the title to which
in fee simple was in the plaintiffs. A recovery is resisted by the
181] defendants, on the ground that the *property was not in the
plaintiffs, and the title to the land itself, upon which the building
was situated, was not in the plaintiffs. On the part of the de-
fendants, it is claimed that this application having been by ex-
press terms made part of the policy, the representation as to the
title is a warranty, and to be treated as such. On the cther hand,
it is claimed that it is a mero representation, and although it may
not be true in point of fact, still it can not effect the policy unless
it relates to things material to therisk. Numerous authorities are
cited by the plaintiff’s counsel, and perhaps if they are right in
the position that this is a mere representation, the authorities
cited might, in ordinary cases of insurance, establish their right
to recover.

It must be remarked, however, that in most or all the cases re-
ferred to, the suits were against individual insurers, or against
companies not mutual insurance companies, and when a case arises
either in favor of or against an incorporated company, we must
Jook into the charter or act incorporating the company, to ascer-
tain its rights, its privileges, as well as its duties, its liabilities, its
responsibility. If a fire insurance company has a lien upon the
Jand upon which the building insured stands, no matter how
small, it would seem to be material, that the true situation of the
property should be made known; and that a false representation
might with proprioty be held to avoid the policy.

As to the question whether, in this case, the representation as to
tille was a warranty, we incline to the opinion that it was. It
was made part of the policy, in express terms; but it is not, in
fact, necossary to decide this question.

The “ Knox County Mutual Insurance Company” was incor-
porated by act of the General Assembly, of March 14, 1838 (36
Ohio L. L, 288), “ for tho purpose,” as expressed in the first sec-
tion of the act, “of insuring their respective dwelling-houses,
stores, shops, and other buildings,” ete., ‘against loss or damage
by fire,” etc. The second soction provides that all persons who
182] sball insure in said company shall *become members thereof,
and shall continue to be members as ‘long as they shall continue
to be insured.

154

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 183

Philips, Beckel & Co. v. Knox County Mutual Insurance Oo.

The sixth section, which is made part of the bill of exceptions,
is as follows: “Every member of said eompany shall be, and hereby
is, bound and obliged to pay his proportion of all losses or expensos
happening or accruing in or to said company, to the amount of his
deposit note, and no further; and all buildings insured by and
with said assurance, together with the right, title, and interest of
the insured to the lands on which they stand, shall be pledged to
said company; and the said company shall have a lien thereon
against the insured, during the continuance of his, her, or their
insurance.”

By this section a lien is given to the company to secure the pay:
ment of assessments for losses, etc., not only upon the buildings
insured, but upon the land upon which such buildings may stand.
Tt is material, then, that before an insurance is made, tho company
should be truly informed as to the titles to both buildings and
land. Upon that title depends their security ; for it will not be
contended, I apprehend, that the insurance would operate as a
lien where the assured had no title. In a subsequent section it is
provided that if, after insurance, the insurance shall alienate the
property, the policy shall become void; and this, I suppose, upon
the general principle that the insured mast have an insurable in-
terest, and that, if at the time the insurance is effected, he has
such interest, but parts with it before the loss, he can not have an
action upon the policy. In order to recover upon that policy, he
must have had an interest at the time of the insurance, and at the
time of the loss,

Another section is recited in the bill of exceptions. It is the
ninth of the act, and is as follows: “The company may mako in-
surance for any time not exceeding ten years, and any policy of
insurance issued by said company, signed by the president and
countersigned by the secretary, shall be deemed valid and bind-
ing on said company in all cases where the assured has a title, in
fee simple, unincumbered, to the building “or buildings in- [183
sured, and to the lands covered by the same; but if the insured
have a less estate therein, or if the premises be incumbered, the
policy shall be void, unless the true title of the insured, and the
incumbrances of the premises, be expressed therein, and in the

* application therefor.”
Tt is contended by counsel for defendant, that it is not material

to the risk whether the insured owns the property, or whether his
155

184 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Philips, Beckel & Co. v. Knox County Mutual Insurance Co.

application is in accordance with the truth or not; and therefore
the policy can not be defended against, although a falso representa-
tion has been made. .

But such is not the law by which this company, of which these
plaintiffs were members by insuring therein, was incorporated.
That provides that the policy shall be binding, provided the in-
sured is owner in fee simple of the building insured, and the land
upon which it stands. But the same law prescribes that if tho
‘insured does not so own the building and land, “the policy shall
be void, unless the true title of the insured, and the incumbrances of
the premises, be expressed therein, and in the application.” Now
if the law, in a certain state of case, declares the policy void, how
can this court declare it otherwise?

In the application made by Philips, Beckel & Co. to the insur-
ance company, they represented themselves to be the owners, in
fee simple, of the buildings sought to be insured, and of the land
upon which those buildings were situated. If thoy were such
owners, then tho policy is binding upon the company, and the
plaintiffs should have recovered a judgment. But were they such
owners? It is scarcely pretended. Truc, they had once been the
owners; but months before this application was made they had
conveyed the property to the “Dayton Hydraulic Company.”
This company was a body corporate and politic, capable of suing
and being sued, of ‘receiving, holding, and conveying land, etc.,
created by an act of the general assembly of the state, of the date
of March 1, 1845. The fee of the land was in this company, not
in these plaintiffs. The policy, then, does not fall within the first
184] part of the *ninth section of the act incorporating the “Knox
County Mutual Insurance Company.”

Does it fall within the second clause of that section? In order
that a policy may be held good under this last part of the section,
it is necessary that the applicants, in making the application, not
having the fee in themselves, should, in their application, state
their “drue title,” and also “the incumbrances ;” otherwise the pol-
iey is void. This they did not do. In fact, they had no title or
interest, except as stockholders of an incorporated company, in
which company the title was vested. This fact was not disclosed.
to, it was concealed from, the insurance company. Besides, there
was a mortgage upon this property, not to these plaintiffs, but to

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 185

MeDonald v, Adm’r of Black.

the “Dayton Hydraulic Company.” This was an incumbrance,
‘but was not disclosed.

But it is said that these plaintiffs were the sole stockholders of
the “Dayton Hydraulic Company,” and might therefore well in-
sure the property of that company as their own individual prop-
erty. We think not. We can find no authority sustaining any
such principle, and no one is referred to. An execution upon
a judgment against Philips, Beckel & Oo. could not be levied
upon the property of the “Dayton Hydraulic Company.” Neither
could an execution upon a judgment against the “Dayton Hydraulic
Company” be levied upon the individual property of Philips,
Beckel & Co. In truth, the property of the hydraulic company is
just as distinct from the-individual property of these plaintiffs as
would be the individual property of Horatio G. Philips from that
of Daniel Beckel.

In fact, theso plaintiffs had no insurable interost in this prop-
erty whatever. The fee was in another person; not in a natural
person, but an artificial person—a corporation. If they had any
insurablo interest, it was the stock which they held in the hydrau-
lic company, and this they did not attempt to insure.

In the opinion of this court, the court of common pleas did not
err in refusing to grant a new trial, and the judgment of the
Supreme Court is affirmed, with costs.

*Dunoan MoDonarp v. Tne Apministraton or Wm. [185
BLAcK, DECEASED.

A mortgagee can not claim the benefit of a policy of insurance effected upon
the mortgaged property by the mortgagor. Each has insurable interests,
but neither can, as a general rule, take advantage of an insurance effected
by the other.

‘The rule is the same, although the policy effected by the mortgagor may con-
tain the words “for whom it may concern,” if, at the time, the mortgage
upon personal property has not become absolute at law by failure to pay
tho money.

‘The death of a party revokes a power of attorney given by him, not coupled
with an interest.

A party receiving property, part of the assets of an estate, can not, when
sued for it, set off a debt due from the estate to him.

157

186 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

‘Whether a lien attaches to a steamboat for advances made by one part-owner
upon the shares of the others, quere. But in any event, to create such
lien, it must be shown that such advances were made to discharge debts
and liabilities incurred with the consent of all the owners, and for which
they were all liable.

Ergor to the court of common pleas of Columbiana county.

The action in the court below was assumpsit, brought by Daniel
T. Lawson, as administrator of William Black, deceased, and was
commenced November 18, 1846, to recover of McDonald one-third
of the amount of money which McDonald had received of tho
Croton Insurance Company, upon a policy of insurance on the
steamboat Columbiana, owned by Black, McDonald and Diller, in
equal proportions. The policy of insurance commences thus:

“By the Croton Insurance Company: On account of Messrs.
Diller, McDonald and Black—

“ Does make insurance and cause whom it may concern to be in-
sured, lost or not lost, at and from St. Louis, Mo., to navigate the
Missouri river from September 6, 1845, at noon, to October 6, 1845,
at noon, in the sum of $2,100, of the good steamboat called the
Columbiana, ete. . . . . And in case of loss, such loss to be
paid in thirty days after proof of loss and proof of interest in the
said assured, etc. Dated September 6, 1845.”

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.
186] *Umssrazrrer, Sranron & Watnace, for plaintiff in error:

The action below was assumpsit, to recover insurance money on
one-third of the steamboat “Columbiana,” of which Black was
part owner, that had come to the hands of Duncan McDonald.

In the spring of 1845, Duncan MeDonald and William Black
became purchasers, each of the one-third of the steamboat “Colum-
biana.” Mr. McDonald advanced for Black his share of the pur-
chase money, amounting to $530—to secure which advance, Black
gave bis note and executed a mortgaye of one-sixth of the boat.

On September 6, 1845, Diller, captain of the boat, and a joint
owner, effected an insurance of $2,100 on the boat, for the benefit
and on account of “whom it may concern.”

Shortly alterward Black died. Soon afterward the boat was
Jost; aud on December 21, 1845, the insurance money was paid
over—the portion coming on Black’s interest ($485) being received
by Duncan McDonald, and claimed under his mortgage. McDonald
had paid off the debts of the boat ($461), for one-third of which

158

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

McDonald v, Adm'r of Black.

Black, as part owner, was liable. and McDonald claimed an offset

.therefor.

On the trial it was claimed :

1. That McDonald had a right to receive the insurance money,
under and by virtue of his mortgage.

2. That he had a right to set off his advances, made for and on
account of Black, on the purchase of the boat.

3. That he was also entitled to set off one-third of the payments
he had made for the boat’s debts.

All of which claims were overruled by the court.

I. To show that the court erred on the first point, the case of
Rogers v. The Howard Insurance Company, 6 Paige’s Chancery,
583, is in point. .

“Where the agents for the proprietors of a steamboat effected
an insurance upon the boat, for the benefit and on account of
whomsoever it might concern at the time of the loss, if any
*should occur: Held, that a mortgagee of the interest of one [187
who was an owner at the time of the insurance, and for whose
benefit the policy was underwritten, had a right to the mortgagor’s
portion of the insurance money to the extent of the debt secured
by the mortgage.”

II. The mortgage therefore covered, by its express provisions,
one-half of Black's interest. But McDonald had advanced the
whole purchase money, and had a clear right to set it off in any
action Black might have brought against him.

The administrator stands in the same position that Black hold;
and his suit is subject to the same set-offs that the claim would
have been subject to, if sued in Black's lifetime.

III. The money was proceeds of a boat of which McDonald and
Black were part owners. The boat was liable for its debts; and
so were the joint owners.

McDonald had paid $461 of the debts of the boat, to one-third
of which Black’s iaterest in the boat was subject.

"In receiving Black’s share of the insurance money, McDonald
was bound to account; but that account was to be taken as be-
tween part owners, and McDonald might well set off what he had
paid on account of Black, or his interest, what he had received
therefrom.

Upon this principle, all accounts between part owners are
taken,

159

188 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

In rejecting this set-off the court also erred.

Wa. K. Upuast and Ewine & Harrsnorn for defendant in
error:

Tt will not be denied by the counsel for the plaintiff in error,
that tho plaintiff below is entitled to recover, unless ho is pre-
vented by the chattel mortgage held by the plaintiff in crror, or
by the payment of debts due by the steamboat “Columbiana”
out of the insurance company.

1. As to the chattel mortgage. This mortgage was executed on
188] July 15, 1845, and given to secure a promissory *note of
the same date, calling for $530, payable to D. & D. McDonald in
ten months after date, It will be seen that this note was not
payable to Duncan McDonald, the plaintiff in error, nor was it
due and payable cither at the decease of Black, or at the time of
the loss of the boat, nor when the money in dispute was received.
The promissory note of $530 was the debt of Black, due and owing
to D. & D. McDonald ;’the mortgage or bill of sale of the boat
was merely collateral security for the debt. At the loss of tho
boat the security was gone, but the debt remained operative and
binding upon Black or his representatives. The mortgage, or
bill of sale of the boat, gave to D. & D. McDonald no claim upon
the insurance money. Tho insurance was effected by one of the
joint owners ofthe boat, for the benefit of himself and the other
joint ownors, and upon the happening of a loss the insurance
monoy became payable to the owners in proportion to their re-
spective interests.

Under this mortgage or bill of sale, D. & D. McDonald had an
insurable interest in the boat, which they might have protected
by effecting an insurance upon their own account, or for their
own benefit, 10 Obio, 223; Higginson v. Dall, 13 Mass. 96;
Locke v. N, A. Ins. Co., 18 Mass. 61; Seaman v. Loring, 1 Mason,
28 ; Russell v. Union Ins. Oo. 1 W. C. C. 409; 1 Wend. 35; Hill- -
yard on Marine Insurance, 66. “Mortgagor and mortgagee may
both insure the samo vessel.” ‘Traders’ Insurance Co. v. Robert,
9 Wend. 404. The principle and rule is the same in fire insur-
ance as in marine insurance, Carponter v. P. W. Ins. Oo., 16
Pet. 495; Strong v. Marine Insurance Co., 10 Pick. 40.

In this connection, we also refer the court to the case of
Hatcher v. Glass, decided in Portage county by the Supremo

160

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 189, 190

McDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

Court on the circuit, in 1850. Hitchcock and Caldwell, Judges,
present.

A policy of insurance is a personal contract of indemnity, not
an incident to the subject insnred; and it docs not pass *with [189
a transfer of the property. Smith’s Mercantile Laws (IL. & G.
ed.), 372; 11 Mees. & Wels. 10; 2 Pick. 249, 258; Wilson v. ILill,
3 Met. 68; 16 Wend. 397.

No one but the assured, or their legal representatives, can avail
themselves of the contract of insurance, except where the policy
has been assigned, bona Jide, with notice to the underwriter, and
with his assent, either express or implied. Comyn’s Dig. 5, tit.
Mer. 121; Carroll et al. v. Boston Marino Ins. Co., 8 Mass. 515.

And it is now doubted whether the policy can be assigned, even
with the assent of the underwriter. 2J. Duer, 51; 3 Hill, 88; 5°
Wend. 200.

But it is claimed that, by the terms of the policy, the plaintiff in
error has the right to hold the insurance in money. The policy
is “on account of Messrs. Diller, McDonald & Black,” and the
Croton Insurance Company “does make insurancé; and cause
whom it may concern to be insured.” Now, the plaintiff in error
claims, that inasmuch as he and his partner had a mortgage, or
Dill of sale, upon the boat, that he is concerned in its loss, and enti-
tled to all, or a portion, of the insurance money. .

“The phrase ‘whom it may concern,’ is a technical one, and is
understood to mean only such as. are in contemplation of the con-
tract. Under this term the policy will cover the interest intended
by the person ordering the policy, although the ‘existenco of such
interest was unknown, not only to the insurers, but to the broker
or agent effecting the policy; and these words may inure for the,
benefit of any person intended to be insured, though be gave no
authority for the purpose, if he afterward adopt it, which he may
do not only before, but after a loss takes place.” Smith’s Mercan-
tile Law, 329, n.; 1 Phillips on Ins. 152, 153, 157; 3 Kent, 251;
Buck v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 151; 8 Met. 348.

The case shows conclusively, that Daniel McDonald, agent for
tho plaintiff in error, received of the agent of the boat, the
intestate’s share of the insurance money. This monoy should
*have passed into the hands of the administrator. The [190
death of Black was a revocation of Stilwell’s authority, When
the boat was lost the joint interest of the owners, of course, ceased,
VOL, XX—I1 161

191 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

MeDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

and each had a separate interest in the insurance money, and each
could sustain a separate suit for his share. 1 Chitty, 26; 2 Caine,
166; Story on Partnership, 284, 285,

McDonald had no right either to receive Black’s share of the
insurance money, or to pay out any portion of it upon debts due
by the boat. At common law he would be treated as an executor
de son tort.

As to paymonts by McDonalds: It will not be seriously con-
tended that the debts owing by the boat to hands, for supplies,
elc., constitute a lien upon the boat, much less a lien upon the in-
surance money. Under our water-craft law, the debts on account
of the boat do not constitute a lien until seizure by process of
law.

Ranney, J. The plaintiff in error was sued in the court below
for money had and received for the use of the plaintiff below.
He pleaded the general issue, and gave notice of set-off; and the
intervention of a jary being waived, the cause was submitted to
the court, who found in favor of the plaintiff below the sum of
$612.16, for which, after overraling a motion for a now trial, thoy
entered a judgment against the plaintiff in error, to which he duly
excepted. The facts, so far as they are necessary to be stated, to
a clear understanding of the questions raised, are as follows: The
plaintiff in error, the defondant’s intestate, and one Jeremiah
Diller, were the owners, in equal proportions, of the steamboat
Columbiana. Diller was in command of the boat as captain, and
running her upon the Missouri river. On September 6, 1845, he
effected an insurance upon her for one month, for the sum of
$2,100, in the Croton Insurance Company, at St. Louis. The
policy states the insurance to be made on account of Messrs. Diller,
McDonald & Black, and that the company did cause “whom it
491] may concern to be insured, lost or not *lost,” for the period
pofore stated. On July 15, 1845, Black gave to D. & D. McDonald,
the plaintiff in error, and his brother, partners, a bill of sale, by
way of mortgage, upon one-sixth part of the boat, to secure the
payment of a note of that date, for $530, payable in ten months.
On September 16, 1845, Black gave a power of attorney to one
Charles C. Stilwell, “to control, sell, or otherwise dispose of his
interest, being one-third, in the steamboat Columbiana, now sup-
posed to be up the Missouri river.” Black was at the time sick,

162

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 192

McDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

and in a few days thereafter died. After his death, Stilwell and
the brother of the plaintiff, and on his behalf, went to St. Louis,
and the more certainly, as he states, to effect a settlement with -
Diller, they concealed from him and all others the death of Black.
‘When they arrived there they found the boat had been lost during
tho time covered by the policy, and the result was that the insur~
ance company settled and paid the amount of the insurance,
which, after deducting certain charges upon it by the agents of
the boat, was paid over; one-third to Diller, amounting to $539.12,
and the othor two-thirds to McDonald, he receiving the third be-
longing to Black's interest, by the consent of Stilwell, in payment
of the mortgage before referred to. The plaintiff in error also
proved that since he received the money he had paid debts of said
steamboat, amounting to the sum of $461.

From this state of facts, the court of common pleas were of opin-
ion that the administrator of Black was entitled to recover said
sum of $539.12, being one-third of the insurance money received,
with interest, and subject to no deduction or offset, and for this
they rondered judgment. Itis claimed they orred for three reasons:

1. That McDonald had a right to receive the insurance money
under, and by virtue of, his mortgage.

2, That be had a right to set off bis advances, made for and on
account of Black, on the purchase of the boat.

3. That he was entitled to set off one-third of the payments he
had made for the boat’s debts.

*We will notice these several positions in the order in [192
which they are stated.

The mortgage attached as a lien upon the boat; the mortgagor
afterward effected an insurance upon it, and if the policy attached
ag an incident to the thing mortgaged and insured, it would seem
to follow that without any special provision in the policy, the
mortgagee would be entitled, upon the loss of the principal thing,
to follow all the incidents that had attached to it, and subject them
for his indemnity. But it is well settled that this is not the nature
or character of a contract of insurance. It is a mere personal
indemnity against loss to the person with whom it is made, or
those falling within the scope of its provisions. As soon as the
interest of such person ceases in the property, the contract is at
an end, from the impossibility of any loss happening to him after-
ward, It is not assignable without the consent of the insurer, and

163

193 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

inasmuch as it does not attach to the property, it does not pass to
the purchaser upon the sale of it.

This doctrine is clearly sustained in Wilson v. Hill, 3 Mct. 68,
Shaw, ©. J., says: “An insurance of buildings against loss by fire,
although in popular language it may be called an insurance of the
estate, is, in effect, a contract of indemnity with an owner, or
other person having an interestin the preservation of the build-
ings, and mortgagee, tenant, or otherwise, to indemnify him
against any loss which he may sustain in case they are destroyed
or damaged by fire. If, therefore, the insured has wholly parted
with his interest before they are burned, and they are afterward
burned, the underwriter incurs no obligation to pay anybody.”

Again, in Powels v. Innis, 11 M. & W. 13, Lord Abinger, C. B.,
says: “It is a contract of indemnity only, and nobody can
recover in respect of the Joss who is not really interested. The
policy is but a chose in action, and can not pass merely by the
assignment of the ship.”

But the precise question involved in this first position of the

plaintiff in error has been settled by the highest authority.
193] *In the case of the Columbia Ins. Co, of Alexandria v. Law-
rence, 10 Pot. 612, Mr. Justice Story says: “ We know of no prin-
ciple of law or of equity, by which a mortgagee hasa right to claim
.the benefit of a policy underwritten for the mortgagor, on the
mortgaged property, in case of a loss by fire. It is not attached, or
an incident to his mortgage. It is strictly a personal contract for
the benefit of the mortgagor, to which the mortgagee has no more
title than any other ercditor.”

The same principles were affirmed in the case of Carpenter v.
The Providence Washington Insurance Co., 16 Pet. 503. In this
ease it is said: “ Policics of insurance against fire are not deemed
in this nature incident to the property insured ; but they are mere
special agreements with the persons insuring against such loss or
damage as thoy may sustain, and not the loss or damage that any
other person having an interost as grantee, or mortgagee, or cred-
itor, or otherwise, may sustain by reason of the subsequent destruc-
tion thereof by fire.” .

Other cases might be cited to the same purpose, but I deem it
unnecessary to pursue this question furthor. Is there anything
in this policy to take this case out of the genoral rule?

It is well sottled at the present day, that an insurable interest

164

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 194

4 McDonald v. Adm’r of Black,

need not amount to a right of property, or of possession. When-
ever a legal connection can be shown to exist between injury to
the thing insured, and the loss to the party insuring, it will suffice,
or as stated by Judge Story in Hancox v. The Fishing Insurance
o., 3 Sumner, 132: “ The truth is, that an insurable interest is
sui generis and peculiar in its texture and operation. It some-
times exists where there is not any present property, or jus in re,
or jus ad rem. . Inchoate rights founded on subsisting titles, unless
prohibited by the policy of the law, are insurable ; as, for example,
freight, respondentia and bottemry.” And again, by Lord Didon, in
Lucena v. Crawford, 5 Bos. & Pal, 294: “It is a right in the prop-
erty, or a right derivable out of some contract about the property,
which, in either case, may bo lost upon some contingency affect~
ing the possession or.enjoy ment of the property.” *EHence it [194
has been long settled.that both mortgagor and mortgagee have in-
surable interests—tho mortgagee to the amount of his debt, and
the mortgagor to the value of the property, since he would remain
porsonally liable for the debt upon the destruction of the mort-
gaged property. It can not be doubted that the terms of this
policy would have covered the interest of any person owning any
part of the property at the time the insurance was effected, and
who might therefore be supposed to be in contemplation of the
contract. But the policy can not be said to “concern” those .
having insurable interest even, not amounting to a legal interest
or ownership in the property, without violating the well-settled
rules upon that subject. The plaintiff in error relies upon the
case of Rogers v. The Howard Insurance Oo., 6 Paige’s Ch. 583,
as in point to sustain his position. In that case it was held
that where an insurance was effected upon a boat for the benefit,
and on account of whomsover it might concern at the time of loss,
if any should occur, that a mortgagee of the interest of one who
‘was an owner at the time of the insurance, and for whose benefit
the policy was underwritten, had a right to the mortgagor's por-
tion of the insurance money, to the extent of the debt secured by
the mortgage. A careful examination of this case develops two
important points of difference between it and the one under con-
sideration, which entirely destroy its value as an authority. In
tho first place, the policy in that case expressly provided for those
concerned in the property at the time of the loss, thereby contem-
165

195 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

MeDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

plating and authorizing a change of ownership in the property,
without affecting the validity of the policy.

Tn this case, no such liberty is given or change contemplated,
but, on the contrary, it is confined expressly to those concerned at
the time the insurance is effected. A few extracts from the
opinion of the chancellor will show the ground upon which tho
decision was placed. He says:

“The underwiters contemplated that a change of ownership of
195] the boat might take place during the continuance of *the
risk, and intended to insure whoever might be the owners from
time fo time, so that those who should be interested as such owners
at the time when any loss should occur, should have the benefit
of the policies ;” and again, he says: “ It was unquestionably com-
petent for the underwriters to agroe to insure whoover might be
the owners of the boat at the time a loss thereof should occur; so
as to protect the rights of those who might succeed to the interests
of the parties originally insured.” Having thus scttled that a fair
construction of the contract would make it inure to the benefit of
whoever might be owner at the time of tho loss, he procecds to
make out the mortgagee an owner at that time, as follows:

“The mortgage having bocome forfeited by the failure to per-
form the condition, the legal title to one-fourth of the steamboat
was in Stow (the mortgagee), as the owner thoreof, at tho time of
the loss.” The case is an authority to show that nothing short of
ownership and a legal title will answer the purpose, or come within
the operation of the claim relied upon. There can be nothing
plainer than that no such legal title or ownership existed in the
plaintiff in error, either at the time the insurance was effected, or
at the time of the loss. The mortgage was not forfeited, but had
months yet to run after cither event, and even after the money
was received. No reliance is placed upon the fact that Stilwell
consented that McDonald should receive the money upon the
mortgage. Itis very clear that upon the death of Black, all power
given to Stilwell was revoked, and his acts are consequently
entirely ineffectual to bind his administrator. We think the
position of the plaintiff in error, that he had a right to receive the
insurance money by virtue of his mortgage, can not be sustained.

His next point is, that he had aright to set off his advances
made for Black, at the time the boat was purchased, against this
money received after his death. No such question is made by the

166

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 196, 197

McDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

facts. Neither the bill of exceptions, or any paper referred to in
it, contains any such cvidence. But if it did, we do not see how
the proposition could be sustained. If*McDonald advanced [196
money for Black, Black became his debtor for the amount. If
money had come to the hands of McDonald before the death of
Black, the right of set-off might have oxisted. The moment
Black died, all his creditors had an equal right to a pro rata
dividend of his :property, upon which no liens existed; and it
would be ontirely inadmissible to hold that one ereditor could got
property into his hands belonging to the estate, and thus indirectly
by an offset obtain the full payment of his debts, while others
might receive but a part, or nothing at all. No right of offset
existed in this case at the death of Black, and none could be
acquired afterward by a seizure upon the assets of the estate. .

The next ground is, that McDonald was entilled to offset one-
third of $461, which he claimed to have paid after be received the
insurance money, on debts owing by the boat. This is claimed
upon the ground that Black’s interest in the boat was subject to
the payment of one-third of this sum, and that an accoant between
part-owners, is to be taken upon the principle of first discharging
all debts and liabilities before anything belongs to the individual
owners. In short, that there is no difference in this particular
between partners and part-owners. I will give a moment’s at-
tention to the general doctrine, and then to its application in this
case.

For reasons already given, if these debts only existed against
Black personally, no right of offset could be recognized. They
must stand upon the same ground as all his other indebtedness,
If they wero alien upon the boat, the boat being lost, it would
seem to be quite as difficult to transfor the lien from the boat to
the insurance money, as it would the lien of a mortgage, which
we have seen can not be done. But it is far from being clear that
any such lien for advances between part-owners ever exists. In
the first place, it is settled that even a majority of the owners of
aship can not incur even necessary expenses, so as to charge the
minority, without their consent; and the reason, as stated by
Judge Story (Story on Part. 591, sec. 422), is, “Phat no one part-
owner has a right to compel *another, against his will, to [197
incur any burden or expense, even although necessary for the
preservation of the common property, but it should be left to his

. 167

198 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

own froo choice. For otherwise, in case one part-owner were
poor, it might operate as a grievous evil, and compel him to sell his
share, by a sort of forced sale.” But suppose all consent; then it
is clear that all are liable in solida for the unpaid debts, and each
is bound to contribute his share of all expenditures. “But,” says
tho same author, “the’question may arise whether this is a mero
personal charge, or whether the respective part-owners have also
alien on the ship itself, for the expenditures or charge made by
thom, which lion is capable of being enforced against ‘the ship
itself, in’ cases of insolvency, death, or bankruptcy of a particular
part-owner, or any other failure on his part to discharge his own
sharo thereof.”

Upon this question, thus stated by the learned authority, the
most eminent judges in England and America have oxpressed dif-
ferent opinions. Lord Hardwick, in the case of Doddington v.
Hallot, 1 Vesor, Sen. 497, beld that part-owners making such ad-
vances’ would have such lien—while Lord Bidon, in Bx parte
Young, 2 Ves. & Beam. 242, and Ex parte Harrison, 2 Rose, 76, on
great consideration, overruled the decision of Lord Hardwick,
and maintained that there was no lien in such cases by the part-
owners upon tho shares of each other. In the last case cited, it
was held that the owners of a ship were not interested in it ag
joint tenants, but as tenants in common, and that the bankrupt’s
share passes to the creditors under the bankruptey, without
being liablo specifically, by way of lien, to the claim of the other
part-ownors, in respect Lo their disbursements and liabilities for
the ship. So, in Bx parte Gibson, 1 Mont. on Part. 102, note, it
was held that a bankrupt’s interest in the moiety of a vessel, was
his separate property, and not held by his assignees for the pur-
pose of paying the joint creditors of the ship.

The case of Ex parte Parry, 5 Ves. 575, is still more nearly in
point. Lord Loughborough there held that when one joint
198] ‘owner of a ship insured on his own account, and became
a bankrupt, while the cargo and proceeds of the voyage were
joint property, the produce of the insurance on the ship which
was lost, was separate property. The doctrine of these cases was
adopted to the fullest extent by Chancellor Kent, in the case of
Nicoll v. Mumford, 4Johns. Ch. 525. In speaking of tho decision of
Lord Hardwick, before cited, he says: “I dare not, therefore, fol-
low a case which has never had effect, and which has been so

168

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

MeDonald v. Adm’r of Black.

authoritatively exploded. The late cases which have been re-
ferred to are in point against the ullowance of any partnership
claim, or taking an account on the foot of any partnership in the
vessel. As to that, they were merely tenants in common, in like
manner as if they had owned in common a warehouse or other real
property in New York.” This caso went to the court of errors,
20 Johns. 611, where the decision of the chancellor was reversed by a
divided court. On the whole, I am not prepared to say that the
better opinion, as well as the weight of authority, may not be in
favor of the lien. I think itis. But if the rule was established,
and if we could transfer the lien from the boat to the insurance
moncy, still this case could not be brought within it. Tho only
information furnished us by the bill of exceptions apon this point
is as follows: “And further (tho defendant) proved by Daniel
McDonald, a witness examined in behalf of said defendant, that
he, tho said defendant, had, since the receipt of said insuranco
money by him, paid debts of said steamboat, amounting to the
sum of $461.” Now, all the cases agree that the rule can only
“ apply to the case of expenditures, advances, and debts, incurrod.
on account of the ship by the part-owners, merely in their char-
acter as such, as, for example, for ropairs, or for outfits for a voy-
age, or by discharging existing liens thereon.” Story on Part.
621, sec. 442.

How can we say that these debts were contracted after Black
became a part-owner of the boat, or that he was ever liable to pay
them ; or, if contracted after his interest was acquired, that he
consented to it; for without such consent we *have seen [199
that he would not be liable. Nor is there any evidence whatevor
furnished, that the debts were of a character to constitute a lien
upon the boat.

We can not presume in favor of the plaintiff upon either of these
points. The judgment must be shown to be erroneous, or we can
not interfere with it. The law binds us to make all presumption
in its favor.

We find nothing erroneous in the judgment of the court of com-
mon pleas, and it is therefore affirmed.

169

200 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Washington Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reed and Brown.

Tan Wasuineron Murvan Insurance Company v. Gzorce M,
Renp anp Winson N. Brown.

‘Injury to a flat-boat by the waves raised by a steamboat, is one of the perils
insured against in any ordinary policy of insurance, although the steam.
‘oat was an ordinary steamboat, and the swell raised by her an ordinary
one.

The insuror docs not insure against certain loss, such as must inevitably hap-
pon 1o all boats, as wear and tear, and the like; but insures against acci-
dents such as may, or are likely to happen.

‘Tho question whethor the external force that produced tho injury was great
orsmall, may be important as an item of evidence, in determining whether
the vessel was seaworthy or not; but if the force causing the injury fall
within the class of perils insured against, if the vessel be seaworthy, it
malters not whether it be great or small, the insurer will be liable.

Error to the Supreme Court of Hamilton county.

The original action was assumpsit, in the commercial court of
Cincinnati. Reed and Brown, the plaintiffs below, declared spe-
cially, on a policy of insurance effected by the defendant below,
the insurance company, on 750 barrels of whisky, to be shipped
in a No. 1 flat-boat, from Lawrenceburg, Indiana, to New Orleans.

The declaration avers that while the policy was in force, said
boat, “by a peril of the river, grounded, and became and was fast
upon abar . inthe bed . of the river, whereby, and by reason
200] *of the beating of the waves against said fiat-boat, the same
sprung a leak, whereby . . the said 750 barrels of whisky on
board said boat, the property of plaintiffs, became and were wholly
Jost.”

The declaration avers notice to defendant, demand and refusal
of payment, ete. The declaration also contained the common
counts. Plea, general issue.

On the trial in the court below, the plaintiffs gave in evidence
the policy of insurance declared on; proved that they owned the
whisky, and its delivery on board the boat June 26, 1847. The

" Dill of excoptions taken on trial then states: “Tho plaintifis also
gave in evidence the depositions of John F. Oreakbaum (and
others by name), and also the papers and documonts attached to
the said depositions, including the statement of general average
made by A. Brother.” The bill then states that “the defendant
objected to the paper marked ‘No. 1 General Average’ as not

170

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Washington Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reed and Brown.

competent evidence.” The objection was overruled, and excep-
tion taken, .

The depositions of Creakbaum (and other persons named in the
Dill) are copied in the record of this case sent up with the writ of
error.

Creakbaum’s deposition proves that the flat-boat left Lawfence-
burg for New Orleans, laden with the whisky insured, at the
proper time, covered by the policy ; that the boat and cargo were
in good condition ; that on the voyage the flat-boat met the steam-
boat John Drennan, at the foot of Longberry bar. “In going out
of the deep water on the shoal water, the John Drennan caused a
heavy swell, When we went into those shoals the boat shook
considerably, and the John Drennan came so near that I could
have jumped aboard of her. . . After we strack the swells we
struck them very fair with our bow, so as not to strain the boat;
and when the midship of tho boat came onto tho heavy swells,
the flat-boat cracked—made a noise like something breaking. I
started a man to each pump, but they found no water. Irun on,
then, some twenty minutes; tried the pumps, and found the water
flush; . . oxamined the boat; *found the water running in [201
about midship; found the water run in at the splice of tho gun-
wales. Tho flat-boat met the steamboat just after dark. Wo run
on until cleven o’clock at night, and struck ; then had eighteen
inches water on the false floor.” Finally the flat-boat was landed
at Louisville, with nearly two feet of water on the false floor. The
injury to the cargo, and loss, were proved -by the depositions.
The parties in the court below having submitted their evidence,
the jury returned a verdict for the defondant below, and judgmont
was entered. During the trial the plaintiffs excepted to the charge
of the court to the jury, and submitted a motion ‘for a new trial,
which was overruled.

The cause was removed to the Supreme Court of Hamilton
county, and the judgment was reversed for error in the charge of
the court below.

This is a writ of error to reverso the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Hamilton county.

The charge of the court below to the jury, claimed to be correct
by plaintiff in error, and erroneous by defendants in error, is stated
in the opinion of the court, with the other facts necessary to under-
stand the decision.

: 171

202 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Washington Mutual Insurance Oo. v. Reed and Brown.

The policy of insurance, as far as material to a correct under-
standing of the decision of this court, is as follows:

“Tho Washington Mutual Insurance Company of Cincinnati, by
this policy, do cause to be insured, lost or not lost, Wilson N.
Brown, in the sum of $82.50, on 750 barrels whisky, on a No. 1
flat-boat, “ Yorktown, No. 1,” from Lawrenceburg, Indiana, to
Now Orleans, in charge of Mr. Creakbaum, pilot, with the priv-
ilege of lying at Freeport, or Lafayette, thirty days (but no coasting
privilege), and twelve days at New Orleans, being for account of
whom it may concern, and in case of loss payable to Joseph Leech
& Co, . . . whereof is master for tho present voyage,
or whoever else may go for master, beginuing the adventure upon,
said property from and after the lading thereof on board said boat,
and continuing until safoly landed at the portof destination, . . .
202] ** Touching the perils which the said insurance company
are content to bear, and take upon themsclves in the premises,
they aro of the seas, rivers, fires, jettisons, onemics, pirates, and
overpowering thieves (but not other thieves). Provided, that the
insurers shall not be liable oxcept in cases of general average for
loss or damage on said property, unless it amounts to five per cent.
on the whole sum at risk, ete. . .

“ And it is agreed that the insurers shall not bo liable for dam-
age to goods by wet or dampness, or by being spotted or discolored,
moldy or rusty, unless the same be directly caused by some dis-
aster of the vessel, and proof thereof furnished.” . . . . ote,
dated July 5, 1847. -

Corrn & Mircnet, for plaintiff in error:

I. It will be perceived that the record in this case does not con~
tain one word of the testimony which was offered upon the subject
of the cause of the loss. The depositions on file are not roferred
to in such a way as to make them part of the bill of exceptions,

Whether the plaintiffs offered any, and if any, what evidence,
tending to prove the issue, does not appear. There is nothing to
show the relevancy of any instructions on the subject of swells in
tho river produced by steamboats; and it is clear that this court
will not reverse the judgments of inferior courts for errors as to
abstract questions of law.

To determine. whether a court has given erroneous instruetions,
the evidence upon the point must be set out in the bill of excep-
tions. Gale v. Pearson, 6 Miss, 253; Hamilton v. Moore, 4 Watts

172

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 203, 204

‘Washington Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reed and Brown.

& 8.570; Cawthorn v. Muldron, 8 Miss. 617; Mason v. Campbell,
2 Pike, 506; Trott v. Wost, 10 Yorg. 499; Wilkinson v. Gilmore,
2 Humpb. 140; Ib. 494; Samuel v. Withers, 9 Miss. 166; Frazer
v. Yeatman, 10 Miss. 501.

The Supremo Court will not reverse the judgment, unless the
Dill of exceptions shows that the error complained of was *ma- (203
terial, Stephens v. State, 14 Ohio, 386; Watson v. Brown, 14
Ohio, 473.

And the facts must show, affirmatively, the error complained
of. Coil v. Willis, 18 Ohio, 28; Wagers v. Dickey, 17 Ohio, 440;
Cressenger v. Lessee of Wolch, 15 Ohio, 156; 16 Ohio, 518.

And where a bill of exceptions refers to certain instraments of
writing, as being marked with certain letters of the alphabet, but
the writings themselves are not incorporated into the bill of ex-
ceptions, the court will not notice them, even though similar in-
struments are inserted in the record. Pickett v. Doe, 5 Smedes
& M. 470; Hicks v. Pearson, 19 Ohio, 446.

Il. We claim that the commercial court did not err in the
charge given. 3 Kent; 300; Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 11 Pick.
235; 2 Sumn. 202, 571; 1 Phil. on Ins. 625; Barnwell v. Church,
1 Caine, 234; 2 Johns. 127; 8 Pot. 557; 2 Johns. 128, 129.

The assured assumes tho common and ordinary perils to which

vessels aro necessarily exposed in the voyage insured; hence he
warrants to the underwriter that the vessel is every way fitted to
overcome these perils. Then comes the underwriter and says,
that being so, I will underwrite against the extraordinary perils.
- By the implied warranty of seaworthiness, “is meant that she
shall be in a fit state, as to repairs, and in all other respects, to en-
counter the ordinary perils of the voyage insured.” 1 Arn. on Ins:
652; Parke, B., in Dixon v. Sadler, 5 M. & W. 414.

It is sufficient, on a question of seaworthiness, if the vessel was
fit to perform the voyage insured as to ordinary perils; the under-
writers are bound as to extraordinary perils. Watson v. Ins. Co.
N. A., 2 Wash. ©. C. 480.

TIL. It is, perhaps, unnecessary, but we advert to one or two
other points:

1. The charge of the court upon the question of seaworthiness
was correct. 2 Greenl. on Hy. see. 500; 3 Kent, *205,n.; [204
1 Johns. Cases, 304; 2 Ib, 231, and note; 3 Mass. 485; I Arn. on
Ins. 652, 653; Park, 8 ed, 568,

173

205 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Washington Mutual Insurance Oo, v, Reed and Brown.

2. If the vessel was not seaworthy, the plaintiffs below claimed
that they should have had a verdict for the premium.

The insurance was upon the cargo “ from the time of loading,”
and the policy attached to the cargo as soon as it was on board.
A vossel may have a latent defect, yet if the cargo is put on board,
and the policy is on the cargo from the time of lading, the policy
attaches, and there shall be no return of premium, though the un-
seaworthiness defeat the action for a loss subsequent to the sailing
of tho vessel. Taylor v. Sewell, 3 Mass. 331, 343; Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Clapp, 11 Pick. 56, 64,65. Sce also 1 Phil. 448; 2 Phil.
526, 527, 538; 8 Johns. 1; 3 Cranch, 357; Cond. U. 8. 561-565.

Even if the policy did not attach, the court would not reverse
a judgment because the jury did not give tho plaintiffs a verdict
for the return of the premium where the plaintiffs did not ask for
such a verdict. Ponneman v. Tucker, 11 Mass. 66; Penson v.
Lee, 2B. & P. 330; Clark v. Mutual Ins. Oo., 2 W & M. 472, 494.

Fox & Frunou, for defendants in error:

An importan¢ question in the cause arises out of the charge of
the court, in the following words, given at the request of defend-
ant below:

“That the defendant was not liable for losses arising from the
common and ordinary perils, to which boats are necessarily exposed,
in navigating to New Orleans; and that if the jury were of opin-
ion that the loss in this case arose from an ordinary swell in the
river, produced by the passage of an ordinary steamboat by the
fiat-boat, while on her course in the river, then it was not a loss
by a peril within the policy.”

This charge can not be sustained. The substance of tho charge

is, that if the loss was occasioned by an ordinary swell of an ordi-
nary steamboat, no recovery could be had.
205] ‘*Suppose an ordinary steamboat comes so near to a flat-
boat that the swell she ordinarily creates has the effect to sink the
boat, is the owner of the flat-boat insured not entitled to recover
in such a case? If not, then the right to recover does not depend
upon the contract or policy, but depends altogether upon the
question, whether an ordinary steamboat produces an ordinary swell
only, without reference to the question whether that ordinary
swell was produced near to or at a distance from the flat-boat.

Again, the charge is erroneous on another ground. It assumes
that an insurance company is not liable for losses arising from the

174

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 206

‘Washington Mutual Insurance Co. ». Reed and Brown.

common and ordinary perils to which flat-boats are necessarily
exposed in navigating to Now Orleans, This strikes a death-blow
to all policies of insurance.

But it was claimed that because the boat was injured by the
wave of the Drennan, therefore she, the flat-boat, could not have
been seaworthy. There was no evidence offered by the defend-
ants to prove that the vessel was not seaworthy.

When a boat meets with a disaster that is apparently sufficient
to produce the injury complained of, we deny that the jury have
aright to draw the conclusion in the absence of all other testi-
mony, that the loss was occasioned by unseaworthiness, instead
of being the result of the resistance met with. 1 Marsh. on Ins,
465, a; 4 Mason, 442.

Again, the loss was occasioned by a springing of a leak, caused.
by the breaking of the gunwales. We suppose this, in analogy
to the springing of a leak at sea, even without any apparent cause,
is a peril of the river. Patrick v. Hallet & Brown, 1 Johns. 241 ;
Talcot v, Commercial Ins. Oo., 2 Johns. 127; 2 Johns. 467; 1 Binn.
600; 1Jobns. 248; 2 Sumn. 197; 2 Wash. ©. C. 480; 1 Condy’s
Marshall, 165; 1 Johns. 241; 2 Johns. 129, 467; 1 Phil. on Ins.
635, 315, 312; 4 Mason, 442; 6 Cow. 270.

It is universally admitted, that if the policy never attached,
the insured has a right to a rcturn of premium, and such ought
to have been the verdict in this case. But the judge precluded
*the verdict from being so rendered, because he charged [206
that if the boat was unseaworthy, the jury must render a verdict
for the defendant. This was clearly erroneous. 2 Bos. & Pal.
333; 2 Woodb. & Minot, 494, 495; 4 Whart. 67; 4 Mason, 442;
18 Mees. & Welsb. 392; 1 Phil. on Ins. 326; 1 Caine, 302.

CatpwELL, J. This is a writ of error to the Suprome Court of
Hamilton county. The error complained of is that the Supreme
Court erred in reversing a judgment of the commercial court of
Cincinnati, rendered in this cause, tried in that court, in which
Reed and Brown were plaintiffs, and the insurance company was
defendant. The suit was brought by Reed and Brown, on a pol-
icy of insurance, against the company, for damages to a flat-boat
load of whisky, insured at and from Lawrenceburg, Indiana, to
New Orleans, by river. The jury found a verdict for defendant
below (the insurance company) on which judgment was entered.

175

207 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Washington Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reed and Brown.

Reed and Brown prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the commercial
court, on the following ground, as stated in the record of reversal:
“Because the court below, at the request of the defendants,
charged the jury that if they wore of the opinion, that the loss
declared on by the plaintiff arose from an ordinary swell in the
river, produced by the passage of an ordinary steamboat, by the
flat-boat, while on her course in tho river, then it was not a loss
by a peril within the policy, and the plaintiff could not recover,
whereas the court ought not so to have charged.” It is said, on
the part of the plaintiff in crror, that the Supreme Court erred
in reversing the judgment of the common pleas: 1. Because the
bill of exceptions did not show that the charge of the commercial
207] court was material in the trial of the cause ; (1) *and in the
second place, if material, the charge was good law. In the first
place, thon, does the bill of exceptions show that the charge was
material upon the questions in controversy between the parties?
The bill of exceptions rofers to tho depositions of certain persons,
by namo, as being read in evidence; in terms those depositions
aro not made part of the bill of exceptions, nor does it refer to
them by letter, number, or other term of designation. The depo-
sitions, however, are made a part of the record in tho case; are
all certified up by the clerk—the evidence appears from tho
record to have been before the Supreme Court without any objec-
tion. We find, then, these depositions certified up with the re-
cord, agreeing with’ the description given of them in the bill of
exceptions, and are bound to consider them as the samo there
referred to, and as being made a part of the record; if they are
not properly made a part of the record, certified up, the plaintiffs
in error should have had the record corrected in the Suprome
Court. If, then, we take this evidence, the matoriality of the
chargo becomes clearly manifest. But the charge was asked by
the counsel for the plaintiff in error; and in the absence of testi-
mony going to show the materiality of the charge asked by them,
we would suppose that it would not be treating the opinion and
conduct of counsel with too much respect, to presume that what

(1) See Hicks v. Pierson, 19 Ohio, 426; and see Bank of Virginia o. Bank
of Chillicothe, 16 Ohio, 170; Acheson v. Sutliff, 18 Ohio, 122; and as to bills
of exceptions generally, see Wilcox’s Dig. 44, and Sup. 16, and Coil v. Willis,
18 Ohio, 28; Bascom v. Parish, 18 Ohio, 268.

176

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

‘Washington Mutual Insurance Oo. v. Reed and Brown.

they asked was material in the case, and therefore proper to be
asked, when that presumption could not injuriously affect the in-
terest of the othér party.

Besides, the charge given was directly in reference to the con-
tract of insurance; it was a definition of the legal rights and lia-
bilities of the parties under the policy of insuranco—a matter that
could scarcely fail to bo material in the matter i controversy.

We think, therefore, we are bound to consider the charge given
by the commercial court as a matter material for the consideration
of the jury. 7

This leads us to the next and main question in the case, whether
the charge of the commercial court was law. The *charge [208
has been substantially given above. It was, that the insurance
company was not liable for the losses arising from the common
and ordinary perils to which boats are necessarily exposed in navi-
gating to New Orleans, and that if tho jury were of the opinion
that the loss in this case arose from an ordinary swell in the river,
produced by-the passage of an ordinary steamboat, by the flat-boat,
while in her course in the river, then it was nota loss by a peril
within the policy, and the plaintiff could not recover. In 1 Phil-
lips on Insurance, 635, it is said: “Under perils of the sea,
which constitute a part of the risks in almost every marine policy,
are comprehended those of the winds, waves, lightning, rocks,
shoals, running foul of other vessels, and, in general, all causes of
loss and damage to the property insured arising from the elements,
and inevitable accidents, other than those of capture and deten-
tions.” In this case, it appears from the evidence that at the time
the flat-boat sprung the leak, the steamboat John Drennan was
passing her, so close that 2 person could have jumped from oné
boat to the other; that the steamboat John Drennan, in passing
out of the deep into the shoal water, made a very heavy swell ;
and that when the flat-boat struck the swell, about midship, the
boat cracked, as if something was breaking; that in a short time
the water was coming into the boat faster than it could be pumped
out, and that on examination it was found that the splicing of the
gunwales had given way, ete.

Now, injury arising from the action of the waves is one of the
perils insured against, and we do not see, in reason, the difference
between a wave raised by the wind and one raised by a steamboat.
Nor have we been able to find that any such distinction has ever

Vou. XX—12 177

209 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Washington Mutual Insurance Co. v, Reed and Brown.

been held to exist. Nor do we think that any such discrimination
as appears to be presupposed by the terms “ ordinary swells” and
“ordinary steamboats” exists. Whether the gale was a severe
one, or whether it was moderate; whether it produced heavy
swolls, or only those that were moderately so, is not important in
determining whether the insurer is liable or not; it is only neces-
209] sary, to fix his liability, *that the waves should have caused
the injury. Whether the steamboat was very large, or only ordi-
nary, whether the swell was extraordinary or not, is not the ques-
tion; but the question is, did the swell cause the damage to the
boat? We sce no more reason in making the liability of the in-
surance company depend on whether the boat was an ordinary
one, and the swell an ordinary one, or whether they were both
extraordinary, than there would be in making its liability depend
on whether the snag against which the boat run was an ordinary
or extraordinary onc. Now, if the steamboat had run against this
boat, and run her under, there is no question but such collision
would have been a peril within the policy ; and we are unable to
see any difference, in principle, between running a boat under by
directly striking her with another boat, or by running so close to
hor as to cause the waves to sink or break her, The boat causing
the injury would be equally liable in the one caso as in the other,
and so would the insurance company.

Bat it is said that the peril arising from the waves of steam-
boats is one of the ordinary perils to which flat-boats are sub-
jected, and when it is not of an extraordinary character, it is not
one of the perils insured against. The timo has been, within the
recollection of many, when danger to a flat-boat, from the waves
of a steamboat, on our waters, would have been a rare occurrence—
when it would have been an extraordinary peril; but we do not
suppose that the fact that the numbor of steamboats has so in-
creased that it has become an ordinary peril, has altered the law
of insurance.

The flat-boat, although not so highly appreciated as a means of
transportation as formerly, has lost none of her legal rights; they
must still be extended to her, if for no othor roason, for the good
she has done. Counsel for plaintiff in error have cited us toa
number of authorities, in which it is said that the insurers are not
liable for ordinary perils, but only for such as are of an extraor-
dinary kind. I have been able to find no specific definition of

178

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 210, 211

‘Washington Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reed and Brown.

what perils are to be considered ordinary and what extraordinary,
in the sense in which these terms are used in this connection,
The term “ordinary peril,” is not used as of *similar mean- [210
ing with common or frequent peril, or peril likely to be encoun-
tered; nor does it have any relation, so far as I have been able to
discover, to how great or how small the force may be that is
brought to bear, or is encountered. The term, I think, is used
rather in contradistinction to accident. The insurer does not be-
come liable for inherent defects in the thing insured; he does not
insure against wear and tear—such things as all vessels must nec-
essarily be subjected to; does not insure against certain loss, but
insures against accidents.

The question how great the force was that produced the injury,
may be an important item of evidence, going to show seaworthi-
ness or the reverse, or the like; but if the force produces the in-
jury on a seaworthy vessel, the insurer is liable, if the peril be-
long to the class insured against, although such force may have
beon ever so small. The case that gives the most color to the dis-
tinction that plaintiff's counsel have drawn between ordinary and
extraordinary perils, is the case of Hazard’s Adm’r v. The New
England Insurance Company, 8 Pet. 557. In that case the court
say, that the policy docs not cover ordinary perils, but extraor-
dinary ones, and yet we think it falls far short of sustaining their
position. In that case, the judge, on the circuit, had charged
“that if the jury should find, that in the Pacific ocean, worms or-
dinarily assail and enter the bottom of vessels, then the loss of a
vessel destroyed by worms would not be a loss within the policy.”
The Supreme Court sustained this charge. They based their de~
cisions principally on the case of Rohl v. Parr, 1 Hspinasse.
Judge McLean, however, remarks in delivering the opinion of the
court: “If worms ordinarily perforate every vessel which sails in
a certain sea, is not a risk of injury from them as common to
every vessel which sails on that sea as the ordinary wear and
decay of a vessel on other seas? The progress of the injury
may be far more rapid in the one case than in the other;
but do they not both arise from causes peculiar to the different
seas, and which affect, in the same way, all vessels that enter into
them?” This case, I think, clearly keeps up, *and is based [21L
on, the distinction between injuries that must necessarily occur,
and accidents that may or are likely to occur. If all vessels that

179

212 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May.

sail in the Pacific occan must necessarily be perforated with
worms, it could not be an accident that the particular vessel in
question was perforated by them.

We think the commercial court erred in their charge to the jury,
and that the Supreme Court decided correctly in reversing their
judgment.

The judgment of the Supremo Court will therefore be affirmed.

Otwoiwnatt Morvan Insurance Company v. Jamzs May.
Finemen’s Murvan Insurance Company v. Jamms May.

If a steamboat or other vessel be overloaded or unduly laden, she is unsea-
worthy. But whether or not unduly laden depends upon the capacity of
the boat or vessel, not upon the depth of water upon the shoals and bars
in the river upon which she is being navigated.

‘The capacity of the craft, not the capacity of the river, is to control in decid«
ing a question of this character.

If a boat or vessel insured meets with a disaster, the captain and crew are
bound diligently to labor for the recovery of the property; but the in-
sertion of a clause in the policy requiring such labor and effort, does not
impose any additional duty upon the assured. .

‘It is not proper, as a general rule, to inquire of a witness upon the stand, who
has heard the testimony in a caso, his opinion, from the knowledge he de-
tives from the testimony, as to a particular fact, which is material in the
determination of the issue in the case.

Erezor to the superior court of Cincinnati.

The original suits in theso two cases were commenced on the
same day, by James May, against the defendants in error, in the
superior court of Cincinnati. The writs bear date July 24, 1547,
returnable forthwith, to the June term of the court, which seems
to have been continued until after the date and service of tho
writs.

212] *In the first case a declaration was filed on August 27, 1847,

in assumpsit, upon a policy of insurance, bearing date February

20, 1846, by which the company caused to be insured upon the

steamboat Olive Branch, $3,000, continuing the adventure from

twelve o’clock of said 20th day of February until noon of February
180

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 218

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May.

20,1847. It was charged that the said boat was lost by the perils
insured against, on August 7, 1846.

A similar declaration was filed on the same day in the case
against the Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Company, upon a policy
bearing date December 2, 1845, whereby the sum of $3,000 was
insured upon the same boat, the risk to commence at noon on
November 28, 1845, and to continue until noon of November 28,
1846. 7

In each case it is stated that the boat was to navigate the usual
western waters, with certain exceptions stated in the respective
policies.

A plea of the general issue was filed in each case, with notice
of set-off, ete.

At the January term of the court, 1850, the cases were submitted
to separate juries, and in each case the jury returned a verdict for
the defendant in error. Upon the return of each verdict, a motion
was made for a new trial, and the reasons assigned were:

“J, That the court erred in its rulings on the trial, as to the
admission and rejection of testimony.

“2, That the court erred in its charge to the jury.

“8, That tho verdict is against the evidence.”

These motions were overruled by the court, and judgments en-
tered upon the verdicts.

‘Whereupon the plaintiffs in error excepted to the several rulings
of the court, and their bills of exception were allowed, sealed,
“and made part of the record.

These bills of exceptions, with the papers and depositions, are
extremely voluminous, and it would be usoloss to insert *them [218
at length, as it is believed that enough appears in the opinion of
the court to lead to a correct understanding of the points decided.
‘The errors assigned in each case are, in substance, that the superior
court erred in overruling testimony offered by the plaintiffs in
error; in refusing to charge the jury as requested; in the charge
actually given; and in overruling the motions for a new trial.

Corrin & Mrreuntt, for plaintiffs in error.

I. The question propounded to Ross was proper, and the court
erred in sustaining the objections. Ross was an expert in the true
sense of the term, 1 Smith’s L. 0.. 286, 287; 1 Greenl. on Hv., &
ed. 555, n. 1; Steamboat Clipper v. Logan, 18 Ohio, 394, 396.

IL. The policy in each case contains this clause:
181

214 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Oos. v. May.

“And in case of loss or misfortune, as aforesaid, it shall be the
duty of the assured, his agents or assigns, to uso every practi-
cable effort for the safeguard and recovery of the said steamboat;
and if recovered, to cause the same to be forthwith repaired; and
in caso of neglect or refusal on the part of the assured, his agents
or assigns, to adopt prompt and efficient measures for the safe-
guard and recovery thereof, then the said insurers are hereby au-
thorized to interfere and recover the said stcamboat, and cause
the same to be repaired for account of the assured ; to the charges
of which the said insurance company will contribute in propor-
tion as the sum herein insured bears to the agreed value in this
policy, but in no case whatever shall the assured have the right
to abandon, until it shall be ascertained that the recovery and re-
pairs of the said steamboat are impracticable, nor sell the wreck,
or any part thereof, without the consent of this company.”

The court charged that this clause “rondered the insured no
more and no less responsible for the negligence of the officers and
crew of the boat, in saving the boat after the disaster, than he
would have been if no such clause had been inserted.’’

214] *In this wo think the court erred.

The testimony justified the defondants in fairly raising on the
trial, to the court and jury, under the above clause in the policy,
these three questions:

1. Whether the insured, by his agent, did use overy practicable
effort for the safeguard and recovery of the vessel.

2. Whether, if he had adopted prompt and efficient measures
for that purpose, she could not have been saved with but a partial
loss; and,

3. Whotber, if he did not adopt those measures, he could re-
cover for a total loss,

The verdict in each case was for a total loss. 1 Marsh. 334;
Mitchell v. Eddic, 1 Term, 613.

2 Arnould on Insarance, 773, 1086. Upon abandonment, the
master becomes the agent of the underwriters, from the moment
of the logs, and is responsible to them. Until abandonment he is
tho agent of the assured. 1 Arnould, 197; Jumel v. Che Marine
Insurance Co., 7 Johns. 423, and note (a) and authorities there
cited, and 619; 2 Phillips, 439; Smith ». Marine Insurance Co.,
7 Met. 453.

Independent of this clause in our policies, the assured, upon

182

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. "215

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v, May.

meeting with a loss, not absolutely total, but only highly prob-
able, may, by abandonment, make it in effect total. 2 Arnould,
997, 998; Lord Hilenborough, in Wellish v. Androws, 15 East, 16;
the same learned judge, in Bainbridge v. Neilson, 10 Bast, 341;
2 Arnould, 1086, 1114, 1181 (sec. 409), 1196, 1197; 7 Johns. 519,520.

III. The policy provides that the insurers shall not be liable
for any partial loss, except in case of general average, unless
said loss amounts to five per cent. on the agreed value in the pol-
icy, exclusive of all expenses of ascertaining and proving the
same; “nor for damage or loss from, or caused by, the said steam-
boat being unduly laden during the continuance of this policy.”
It is evident that she was too deeply laden for the water.

We asked the-court in both cases to charge the jury:

*1. That, “if the Olive Branch, at the time she left St. [215
‘Louis, was loaded so as to draw more water than there was in the
river, such overloading made her unseaworthy ; and if such over-
loading contributed to her loss, the plaintiff can not recovor.

“2. That if the jury shall find she was so overloaded, she was,
in the language of the policy, unduly laden, and the plaintiff can
not recover for a loss arising therefrom.”

: Which the’ court refused to charge, but charged that, “if the
boat was laden deeper than her capacity would safely allow, then
she would be unscaworthy and unduly laden, and not otherwise.”

And the court also charged, “that if the Olive Branch was so
loaded as to draw more water than there was in the river, such
act of overloading was one of carelessness on the part of the offi-
cers and crew, and any loss consequent thereupon was within the
risks insured against (see 2 Arnould, 772, sec. 287), and covered by
the policy; but if the boat had been loaded beyond ‘her capacity,
or so as to sink her below her guards, she would thereby have
been rendered unseaworthy.”

We claim that tho court crred in refusing to charge as requested,
and in the instructions given. 1 Arnould, 679, sec. 251; Weir v.
Aberdeen, 2 B. & Ald. 320; Chase v. Hagle Insurance Co., 5 Pick.
53; Abbott, 346, 347; 1° Arnoald on Ins, 697; Perrin v. Protec-
tion Insurance Co., 11 Ohio, 147; 5 Pick. 53; Bush v. The Royal
Exchange Assurance Co., 2 B. & Ald., was decided in 1818, and
Walker v. Maitland, 5 B. & Ald. 171, in 1821; Waters v. M. L.
Insurance Co., 11 Pet. 213; Walker v. Maitland, and Bishop v.
Pentland, 2B. & ©. 219. In Walker v. Maitland, the case of Bush

. 183

216, 217 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May.

v, Royal Exchange Assurance Company is relied upon; and in’
Bishop v. Pentland the same case of Bush v. Royal Exchange
Assurance Company, and the case of Walker v. Maitland, are the
authorities cited. Not the least information-is given that any-
thing which was said in Weir v. Aberdeen conflicted with the
views expressed in the later cases.

216] *In Arnould on Insurance it is said, if the ship is so
heavily or so improperly loaded, when she sails on the voyage
insured, as to be incapable of encountering the voyage, that is
unseaworthiness; and the case of Weir v. Aberdeen is cited with
approbation. 1 Arnould, 679, and 2 Ib. 5, 1,086, and 772, 773.

Bares & Soarsorovau, for plaintiff in error:

I. The question propounded to Ross was competent, and tended
to prove the defense. Steamboat Clipper v. Logan, 18 Ohio, 375.

IL. The charge in relation to seaworthinoss of boat. 1 Phil. on
Ins. 308; 1 Arcould, 652; 11 Pick. 227; 2 Mct. 432; 1 Whart.
399; 5 Pick. 58.

ILI. The clause in policy requiring assured to use efforts for
recovery of the steamboat. 1 Arnould, 577-583, inclusive; 1 Phil.
on Ins. 346, 351; Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 8 Conn.
553; 1 Marsh. 248, 250; Park. on Ins. 318.

The assured were bound to use these efforts to entitle them to a
recovery. The question whether they wore or wore not used
should have been submitted to the jury.

Fox & Frenou, for defendant in error:

I. The court properly raled out the questions propounded to
Ross.

AI. The charge that the policy rendered the assured no more or
less responsible for the negligence of the officers in saving the boat
after the disaster, was correct. Nor did the court err in refusing
the charge asked.

The defendants contend that the boat, when she leaves port,
must, at her peril, know that there is sufficient water to enable
her to go from St. Louis to New Orleans without stopping. This
is the substance of the charge asked.

217] *The loss was not occasioned by running on a sand-bar, or
on shallow places, but by running on a ledge of logs, and then
breaking in two; and that there was water enough to navigate,
is evidencéd by the fact that she was navigated to the place of
disaster.

184

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 218

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May. .

Again, the position assumed by the defendants below, is con-
trary to another well-settled principle in insurance law. That is,
that tho insurer is always liable for any increased risks during the
voyage. 1 Phil. Ins. 630.

The counsel for plaintiffs in error are under a mistake, in sup-
posing there is any warranty in the policy that the boat shall not
be loaded deeper than the depth of water on the bars. 16 Pick.
303; 15 Wend. 582, 535; 12 Pick, 232; 5 Pick. 51.

But a warranty, if not complied with, will defeat a recovery,
although the breach of warranty did not contribute to tho loss,
and as is said, even if the subject matter of the warranty is imma-
terial to the risk. Park on Ins. 318; 1 Marsh. on Ins, 347.

But even this position is doubted in the lato English cases.
2 Barn. & Ald. 73; 5 Barn. & Ald. 171; 7 Adol. & Hillis, 40; 5
Mees. & Welsb. 405; 2 Met. 448. .

III. The next question arises under the clause providing for
what shall be done in order to preserve the vessel from loss in
case of accident met with'in the course of the voyage.

This clause in the policy, so far as the insured is concerned, was
originally inserted in policies for the benefit of the insured, so as
to enable him to use his best exertions to save tho vessel, “ with-
out prejudice to his right to abandon.” 2 Condy’s Marsh. 614,
ch. 13, sec. 5; 1 Ib. 324, ch. 8, sec. 3. The meaning of it is, that
till the insured has been “informed of what happened, no act of
the captain shall prejudice their right to abandon.” 2 Marsh:
614, 591; 1 Term, 608; 2 Marsh. on Ins. 592, ch. 18, sec. 2;
1 Term, 608; Mitchell v. Edie, 2 Marsh. ch, 13, sec. 5, p. 614; 1
Johns. 367; 7 Johns. 423. Whatever a master would have a right
to do, if the ship and cargo wore his own, the underwriter
*must answer for. 2 Phil. Ins. 268, 294; 2 Marsh. Ins.580, [218
615. Acting for the benefit of all concerned, means with a view
to that benofit, and not what the consequence of the act may prove.
2 Phil. Ins. 269; 1 Phil. Ins. 514; 3 Mass. 417.

But it is claimed, as we understand, that the insertion of the
words, “it shall be the duty of the assured, or his agents, to use
every practicable effort for the safeguard and recovery of the said
steamboat,” means not only that the master shall make use of all
ordinary efforts which skillfal men would make use of, but if any
one effort remained which others could have made use of, that
effort must have been made use of, or the insured can not recover.

. 185

Pe

219 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May.

We contend no such meaning can be attached to the clause.
Gardere v. Col. Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 519; 2 Phil. on Ins, 448; 3 Ma-
son, 82.

Tare & Maxton, for plaintiff in error, in reply:

We claim the superior court erred: 1. In exclading competent
evidence to prove the unseaworthiness of the boat. 2. In charging
that the steamboat could not be “unduly laden,” within the mean-
ing of the policy, unless she were laden too deep for hor capacity.
3. In charging that the clause in the policy, “that in case of loss
or misfortune, it should be the duty of the assured, his agents or
assigns, to use every practicable effort for the safeguard and re-
covery of the said steamboat, ete., did not affect the responsibili-
ties of the parties to the policy, in any manner.

First. Tt was claimed by the defendants below, that the Olive
Branch was unseaworthy, because she had an incompetent pilot.
Scaworthiness is a fact; and its oxistence is to be proved by evi-
dence of facts, rather than by opinions. 1 Arnould’s Ins. 653,

Wo claim, therofore, that the incompetency may be proven by
instances of bad piloting. Upon this principle those questions
were put to the .witness Ross, which called for his opinion
219] *of this, as an instance of good or bad piloting. 1 Arnould’s
Tns. 675, 678.

Secondly. 1. We claim that the court below erred in refusing
to charge that a steamboat was “ unduly laden,” within the mean-
ing of the policy, which was laden too deeply for the navigation of
tbe river at the time when she left port. The provision in the
policy is, that the company “should not be liable for damage or
Joss caused by the said steamboat being unduly laden, during the
continuance of the said policy.” The court charged the jury that
this provision had reference only to the capacity of the vessel, and
not at all to the depth of the water sho was to navigate.

2. But we claim that, independent of the clause in the policy,
to which we have last referred, a boat which starts out from a
home port, ladon too deep for the depth of the water in the river,
is not river-worthy. ‘The vessel is to be equipped and loaded in
proper manner for the navigable water in which she is to run.

Thirdly. But the error upon which we most confidently rely, is
in that portion of the charge which asserts that the clause in the
policy requiring the assured, “in case of loss or misfortune, to use
every practicable effort for the safeguard and recovery of the said

186

DECEMBER THERM, 1851. 220

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos, ». May.

steamboat,” “renders the insured no more and no less responsible
for tho negligence of the officers and crew of the boat, in saving
the boat after the disaster, than they would have been if no such
clause had been inserted.” This instruction, we insist, is crroneous,
‘We claim that this clause means precisely what it says. It is an
express warranty or condition in the policy, a compliance with
which is a condition precedent to any cause of action. It has been
settled by this court, following the Supreme Court of the United
States, and the English courts, that negligence in the management
of a ship or vessel, even of the insured himself, is no excuse for the
insurer, where there is no express provision in the policy on the
subject.

1 Arnould on Ins. 577, sec. 213, pp. 578,585; De Hahn *v. [220
Hartley, 1 Term, 345, 346; Hibbert v. Pigon, Marsh. on Ins. 395; 1
Arnould, 347.

Huironcock, 0. J. These cases are alike in substance, and were
argued and submitted by counsel as involving the same principles.
Tho policies of insurance are alike, although of different dates,
They were effected upon the same boat, and for the benefit of the
samo individual. The same testimony was offered in each case,
the same points were made, and rulod substantially alike in each
case, and in each the verdict of the jury was in favor of the insured.

There is some difference, however, in the charge of the court,
upon one particular point in the two cases, and perhaps a slight
difference in the ruling asto the testimony. Whether this difference
is such as to require of this court to decide the cases differently, is
a question to be considered: This difference is not adverted to by
counsel, if it has been even perceived by them.

The genoral facts of the cases are these: The risks upon the
“Olive Branch” were taken at the times, and for the amounts
stated in the declarations. This is apparent from tlie policies,
which aro made part of the bills of exceptions. The bills further |
show that the boat left St. Louis on a voyage to New Orleans,
about August 7, 1846, with a cargo on board; that her draft, with
the cargo on board, when she left St. Louis, was about six to six
and a half feet. At the time, the water was low in the river, and
with the cargo on board, the boat could not pass some of the bars,
and in order to get over them, the captain and crew were com-
pelled to lighten her by taking out portions of the cargo. She.

187

221 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May.

was detained at Turkey Island some three days, at’ which point a
part of the cargo, consisting of lead, was taken out, and, by so
lightening, her draft was reduced to from five and a half to six
feet. Subsequent to this, she rubbed upon somo of the bars, and
occasionally upon logs. Her progress was slow, and she did not
arrive at the place where lost until somewhere from the 15th to
221] the 17th of August; at *which time, at about eleven o'clock
at night, she was run upon a reef of stumps and logs, opposite the
mouth of thé Bordeaux chute, and was Jost. The testimony as to
the depth of water upon the bars is not very definite. The captain
-of the boat states the water was very lowin the upper Mississippi;
that below the mouth of the Ohio there was seven fect in the
lowest places, which he considers very low for that part of the
ziver. At the point where the accident happened, there was in
‘the channel a sufficient depth of water, and no particular difficulty
in the navigation ; but the boat was some distance from the proper
channel when sho was run upon the logs. She is proved to have
been staunch, sound, and seaworthy, when she left St. Louis, and
there is no evidence of any injury done to her before the accident
which occasioned her loss, It is possible, perhaps probable, that
she might have been strained and injured somewhat in rubbing’
upon bars and logs.

The evidence was offered to prove that the officers and crew
were competent, and these, so far as examined, concur in testify=
ing that, after the accident, everything was done, which, accord-
ing to their judgment, could have been done, to save the cargo
and relieve the boat, but they state it to have been their opinion,
from the time of the accident, that there was no possibility of
saving ber. Witnesses were examined, on the part of the plaintiffs
in error, to induce the belief that it was owing entirely to negli-
gence and carelessness, that the boat was not relieved from her
dangerous situation after she struck. Indeed, one witness, who
‘was & passenger on board, states it as his opinion, from what ho
saw of the conduct of the officers and crew, that the boat was in-
tentionally run upon the logs; that no efforts were made to get
her off, and that he believed the design to have been to charge
the insurers with the loss, The captain of the boat, however, and
the other officers examined, say, expressly, that they did not, at
the time of the loss, know that the boat was insured, and did not
learn that fact until some time afterward.

188 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 222, 223

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. », May.

Such are the.leading facts in the cage as set forth in the bills of
exceptions.

*The defense relied upon by the insurance companies, was [222
that the boat was unduly loaded, that she was unseaworthy, and
that the insured and his agents did not use every practicable effort
for the safety and preservation of the boat, at the time of the ac-
cident and loss.

On the trials, a witness was introduced by defendants below, by
the name of Charles Ross, who had been 4 pilot upon the river,
and who seems to have been acting as, the agent of said defendants
below to prepare said cases for trial. He was acquainted with the
river; had seen the wreck of the Olive Branch about two weeks
after the loss. He stated how pilots usually run; that the de-
scending boats are not usually very particular there, because of
the depth of the river and width of the channel; that when he
first saw the wreck, ho was not nearer than four hundred and
fifty yards from her; that boats might run within seventy-five
yards and be safe. .

The plaintiffs in error then propounded this question to the
‘witness: “State your opinion, from your knowledge of the character
of the navigation of that part of the river, whether or not a boat
descending the river, could be run to the place where the Olive
‘Branch was when you saw her, by a competent, sober pilot, if
awake, without criminal neglect or fraud.” The question was ob-

jected to, and the objoction was sustained. In this it is claimed ©

that the court erred.

It is difficult to conceive what object the party bad in view in
propounding this question. If the object was to enable the jury
to infer from the answer that there had been neglect on the part
of the pilot, such neglect could not excuse the underwriters. If
it was to enable the jury to infer that the pilot was not awake,
such fact would not excuse the underwriters.(1) Ifthe object was
to prove that fraud had been committed, this *certainly was [223
not a legitimate mode of proving the fact of fraud. If the object

(1) By a policy of insurance, the assured makes no warranty to the under
writers that the master and crew shall do their duty daring the voyage; and
their negligence or misconduct is no defense to an action on the policy, where
the loss has been immediately occasioned by the perils insured against; nor

189

224 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos, v. May.

was to induce the jury, contrary to all the evidence in the case, to
believe that the pilot was not competent, it was a singular mode
of proving incompetency.

‘The question is not based upon any hypothetical state of facts,
bet upon the defendant’s “knowledge of the navigation of that
part of the river, and from this knowledge, he was called upon to
state whether a boat could, under any possible circumstances, by
night or by day, in time of storm, when affected by the force of
wind or otherwise, be run to tho place where she was wrecked by
a competent, sober pilot, if awake, without criminal neglect or
fraud.”

The witness might have answered the question, and have an-
sswered in accordanco with the wishes of the plaintiffs in error, but -
we think he was properly precluded from doing it, and in sustain-
ing the objection the superior court did not err. The witness
stated that he had heard the testimony as to the position of the
boat on the logs, and as to that part of the river where the dis-
aster happened, and further, that he had never heard of such a
man as Hunt, who was pilot of the boat at the time of the loss,
before that loss occurred.

This question was then propounded to the witness: “On the
facts in proof in this case, as to that part of the river where, and
as to the night, and running of the Olive Branch when the ac-
cident happened, what is your opinion as to the competency of the
pilot at the wheel ?”

This question was objected to and the objection sustained.

One of the question’ involved in these cases was as to the com-
potency of the pilot. This was a question for the jury. Upon
this point there had been testimony, and the witnesses acquainted
224] with the pilots had generally, if not universally, *stated.
that they were good and competent pilots. This witness is then
called upon to give his opinion oftheir competency, not upon a
hypothetical case stated, not upon an agreed state of facts, but
from what ho had heard of the testimony in the particular case.
He must then, as a juror, ascertain the state of facts from the evi-
dence, conflicting as it was, and from the opinion which he formed

can any distinction be made in this respect between the omission by the mas-

ter and crew to do an act which ought to be done, and the doing an act which

ought not to be done, in the course of the navigation. Broom’s Legal Max-

ims, 388, citing Dixon ». Sadler, 5 M. & W.414; 11 Ohio, 147; 11 Peters, 213,
190

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 225

Ciucinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May.

of what the facts really were, draw his conclusion as to the com-
petency or incompetency of the pilots. This would be carrying
tho doctrine of permitting experts to testify and express their opin-
ions upon particular matters, upon which they are called upon to
speak, to a dangerous length. This doctrine was carried to the
utmost extent it could be, in the case of the Steamboat Clipper v.
Linus Logan, 18 Ohio, 375, with any kind of safety. But that case
was materially different from this.

Admitting that Ross, as an expert, could be permitted to express
his opinion, it must be upon a hypothetical state of facts, or in a
ease where there was no contradiction of facts relative to the sub-
ject matter upon which ho was called to speak. In the case
against the Cincinnati Mutual Insurance Company, the court seems
to have admitted that upon a hypothetical case, he might express
his opinion.

As the question was propounded, we think the court very prop-
erly sustained the objection which was taken to it.

The plaintiffs in error then propounded the following question
to the witnoss Ross: “State whether, since you have heard of
‘Hunt, you bave learned what was his reputation and character for
sobriety, or drunkenness, at the time of this occurrence; if yea,
state what that reputation and character was.”

This question was objected to, and the court would not permit
itto be answered. This is complained of as error.

It is not readily perceived how the general character or reputa-
tion of Hunt was put in issue in this case; but if it was, it should
‘bo proven by those who were acquainted with him and his rep-
utation at the time, or before the time, of the disaster, *not [225
by one who never heard of him before, but ‘might, by possibility,
have heard evil reports of him after that disaster.

In the case against the Firemen’s Insurance Company, a wit-
ness by the name of McDonald was examined, and he was called
upon, by plaintiffs in error, to state his opinion upon a particular
point, from what he had heard of the testimony in the case, sub-
stantially, as was Ross in’ the second interrogatory propounded to
him. This was not permitted by the court, and we think in this
the court ruled correctly.

These are all the points upon which it is claimed that the
superior court erred in its rulings as to the testimony. In the
opinion of this court, there was no error in those rulings.
lol

226 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May.

The testimony being closed, the counsel for plaintiffs in error
requested tho court to charge the jury, “that if the Olive
Branch was loaded so as to draw more water than there was in
the river, such overloading made her unseaworthy; and if such
overloading contributed to the loss, the plaintiff can not recover;
that if the jury shall find she was so overloaded, she was, in the
language of the policy, “unduly laden,” and the plaintiff can not
recover for a loss arising therefrom.

The court refused to charge as requested; but did charge “that
if the boat was laden deeper than her capacity would safely allow,
then she would be unseaworthy and unduly laden, not otherwise.”
At least such was the charge in the case ofthe Cincinnati Mutual
Tnsurance Company.

That the overloading a vessel renders her unseaworthy, there
can be no doubt, and being thus unscaworthy when she starts
upon her voyage, if she is lost, no matter from what cause, the
insurers are discharged, as the policy never attached. But the
question raised between the superior court and the counsel for
plaintiffs in error, is, whether the loading is to be controlled by
the capacity of the vessel or the depth of the water over which
the vessel is to float. The court’ say that the capacity of the
vessel is to control. If she is not loaded beyond her capacity, she
226] is not, in contemplation of law, unseaworthy on- *account
of her loading. Counsel seeni to admit this to be sound law
enough, so far as concerns vessels navigating the ocean, but insist
that in navigating the western waters a different rule must pre-
vail. That here we must not look so much to the capacity of the
vessel as to the depth of the water in our rivers—not the depth of
water in the rivers génerally, but the depth upon shoals and bars,
It is urged, in favor of this construction, that there is a clause in
these policios that the company shall not be liable “for damage
or loss arising from, or caused by, the said steamboat being unduly
Jaden during the continuance of the policy,” etc. 1b is said that
in using the word unduly, somothing more was meant than what
the law implied, without that provision.

Suppose we consider for a moment the consequences which
would follow from adopting the constraction which is contended for
by plaintiff's counsel. As a matter of the fact, we know that there
is a great difference in the depth of our rivers at different scasons
of the year. In times of flood the wators are deep; in times of

192

Po

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 227

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May.

drought they are very shoal. At one time a boat may bo loaded
to her full capacity, and she will be within the terms of a policy
of insurance. At another time she may not be loaded within two
or three feet of her capacity, and she will not be within the samo
policy, because there may be shoals and bars over which she can
not pass without rubbing upon the ground. A boat might be
loaded at New Orleans with a fall cargo, and start on a voyage
for St. Louis while the water in the lower Mississippi was in good
navigable order, and might be lost before she left that part of the
river, and still, if it could be shown that when she left Now
Orleans the water in the upper part of the river was so low that
she could not havo passed the shoals and bars without grounding,
the loss would not have been within the same policy. She might
have been loaded within her own capacity, but not within the
capacity of the river for the whole length of the voyage; therefore
she was unscaworthy from the commencement of the voyage, and
the policy did not attach.

*It seems to the court that this will not do, and that the [227
only sensible construction to the terms “overloading” or “un-
duly laden” is that given by the superior court—that it relates to
the capacity of the boat, not to the capacity of the river.

But it is said that the judge erred in his charge in this: that he
said, “if she was laden deeper than her capacity would allow, she
‘was unscaworthy, and not otherwise.

The language of the judge is not correctly quoted. As it was
used in the case against the Cincinnati Mutual Insurance Com-
pany, it was this: “If the jury should find that the boat was laden
deeper than’ her capacity would safely allow, then she would be
unseaworthy and unduly laden, and not otherwise.” The last words
clearly have reference to the loading of the boat.

In the case against the Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Company,
the language used in this part of the charge is different. The re-
quest to charge is the same, but the languago of the court is as
follows: “If the Olive Branch was so loaded as to draw more
water than there was in the river, such act of overloading was one
of carelessness on the part of the officers and crew, and any loss
consequent thereupon was within the risk insured against, and
covered by the policy; but if the boat had been loaded beyond
her capacity, or so as to sink her below her guards, she would
therefore have been rendered unseaworthy.”

VoL. xx—13 193

228 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutual Insurance Cos. v. May.

This language is not as clear and explicit as it might have been,
but still it is easily understood, and is consistent with the charge -
in the other case. The ideas conveyed are theso: If the boat was
loaded beyond her capacity, she was unseaworthy. Had she beon
loaded so as to sink her below her guards, she would havo beca
unduly laden, and therefore unseaworthy ; but if she was so deeply
laden as to make the navigation difficult, but still was loaded
within her capacity, it was an act of carelessness on the part of
the officers and crew, and any loss consequent thereon would have
been covered by the policy.

In such case the vessel would be seaworthy so far as the load-
ing was concerned, but tbero would have been more loading
228] *than prudence dictated ; but so long as she was seaworthy,
the insurers would be liable for any loss.

So far as this charge is concerned, we do not,in either case, dis-
cover any error.

The policies contain this clause: “And in case of loss or mis-
fortune as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the assured, their
agents or assigns, to use overy practicable effort for the safeguard
and recovery of the said steamboat, and if recovered, to cause the
same to be forthwith repaired; and in case of neglect or refusal
on the part of tho assured, their agents or their assigns, to adopt
prompt and efficient measures for the safeguard ,and recovery
thereof, the said insurers are hereby authorized to interpose and
recover said steamboat, and cause the same to be repaired for ac-
count of the assured.”

The court charged the jury, “That this clause rendered the
assured no more and no less responsible for the négligence of
the officers and crew of the boat, in saving the boat after the
disaster, than he would have been if no such clause had been in-
serted.”

In this it is claimed that the court erred.

In the opinion of the superior court, the insertion of this clause
added nothing more to the responsibility of the assured, so far as
tho negligence of the officers and crew in saving the boat after the
disaster was concerned, than would have been imposed upon him
without any such clause. The disaster has happened which was
insured against, and after this, after the insurer is liable to a par-
tial or total loss, ag the case may be, the assured or his agents are
bound by this clause to use efforts to recover and save the boat,

194

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 229

Cincinnati and Firemen’s Mutuil Insurance Cos. v. May.

and get her repaired; and if they neglect, the insurer may do it
and charge the assured with the expense. To determine whether
the opinion expressed by the court to the jury is correct, it is
necessary to ascertain what are the duties of the assured, his
agents, etc., in case of a disaster like the one which happened in
the cases under consideration.

This clause is said to be different from those inserted in the
*Atlantic policies. In these latter, the corresponding clause is, [229
“In case of any loss or misfortune, it shall be lawful for the assured,
their factors, agents, servants, etc., to sue, labor, and travel for, in
or about the defense, safeguard and recovery of the said goods or
ships, without prejudice to this insurance.”

Now, this last-recited clause added nothing to the duties of the
assured or his agent, in case of loss. It was inserted, as it seems,
so as to save to the insured a right to abandon, where he or his
agents shall, after a disaster, have made efforts to recover and save
the vessel and cargo. It was inserted for the benefit of the insured,
not of the insurers, It docs not vary or change the duties of the
party. “ Without this clause,” says Marshall, “ the insured is bound,
in justice, honor, and conscience, to use his utmost endeavors to
make tho most of what may be rescued from destruction, in order
as much as possible to lighten the burden of the insurers.” 2
Marsh. Ins. 614.

Tt is claimed, however, that the insertion of the clause which
has been referred to in the policies now before the court, imposes
an express obligation on the insured, which before was only im-
plied, and that it is to be treated as a warranty, which if not ful-
filled will avoid the policy. Such was not the opinion of the Su-
preme Court of New York as expressed in the case of Gardere v.
Columbian Insurance Company,7 Jobns. 514. In that case, the
policy contained the usual clause, with this change: after the word
“lawful,” the words “and necessary ” were inserted, so that the
reading was “it shall be lawful and necessary for the assured,” etc.
The judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, says, “ Previous
to this alteration, the construction of the above clause was well
understood ; and I can discover no substantial reason why the in-
sertion of the word “ necessary ” should so essentially alter the con-

. Straction as to create a different operation. It imposes no additional
duties on the master. He was before bound to labor diligently for
the recovery of the property, and to alleviate the burdens of the

195

230, 231 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

230] insurer. This is a well settled rule,” ete. *In the case
before us, more words are used than in the clause in tho
New York case; still, in that caso, the insertion of the word
“necessary” included, in its legal effect, all that is included,
or insisted upon as being included, in the present policies. If
go, then it follows, if the court of New York was right, and we
think it was, that no additional duties were imposed upon the
insured ‘by the insertion of this clause, and the superior court very
properly so instructed the jury.

This clause in the policy, although it imposes no additional duty
upon the insured, secures to the insurers the privilege after a dis-
aster, if the insured shall not Jabor faithfully to recover and repair
the boat or vessel, of doing it themselves and of charging the ex-
penditures to the assured. And they may do this without being
charged with having accepted an abandonment.

In the opinion of this court, the superior court did not err in
the charge to the jury.

‘The last error assigned is, that the superior court refused to
grant a new trial. If that court did not err in its rulings upon
the testimony, nor in its charge to the jury, no new trial should
have been granted on either of these accounts. And the only re
maining question is, whether the verdict was against the evidence.
We have examined the testimony as it appears in the bills of ox-
ceptions, and it seems to us that instead of its being against tho
verdict it fully sustains it, and the superior court very correctly
overruled the motion for a new trial.

The judgment of the superior court, in both cases, is affirmed
with costs.

231] *Lesszz or Jamus Buaxn v. Luwis Davis ur an.

Under the articles of association entered into between the proprietors of the
Ohio Company and the partition thereunder mado, deeds of conveyance
from the directors to the agents, and from the agents -to the several pro-
prictors, as therein provided for, may be presumed to protect the equita-
dle rights and possession of those claiming under said proprietors. (1)

Q) As to when grants, assignments, ote. will be presumed in uid of the
title of an oconpant, see Wileox’s Dig. Ev. VII, 252; Harmar o. Kelly, 14 Ohio,
502; Duke o, Thompson, 16 Ohio, 34; 2 How. U.S. 76; 2 Johns. 226.

196

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 235

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

‘Such presumption can not be made in aid of a party who is not the rightfal,
equitable owner of the land, and in the actual possession or what is
equivalent thereto.

“Where the proprietor of a share in said company died in 1793, and his share
was sold to pay debts in 1795 by his administrator, in pursuance of an
order of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, where the parties *
all resided, said partition not having been made until 1796, and the heir
not having made any claim to the property, paid taxes, or exercised any
acts of ownership over it until 1846, when she and her husband conveyed
it to the lessor of the plaintiff—conveyances having been made, and a
possession of nearly twenty years bad under the purchaser at the admin-
istrator’s sale: Held, that although said judicial proceedings could not
affect interests in lands in this state, yet such long acquiescence under
them, without claim to the land, and the want of possession by the plaint-
$8, or those under whom he claims, would prevent any such presumption
from arising in his favor as against the actual occupants of the land. (1)
authorize a judgment upon a special verdict, all the facts essential to the
right of the party in whose favor judgment is to be rendered, must be
found by the jury—finding evidence sufficient prime facie to establish
such facts, is not sufficient. (2)

‘Whatever a conveyance is to be presumed from cireumstances alleged to be
sufficient to justify it, is a question of fact for the jury, under the advice
of the court.

rT

Ss

Error to the common pleas of Athens county.

The action of the common pleas was ejectment, commenced.
*in April, 1847, against Davis and others, and was tried to a [282
jary at the November term, 1849.

The jury returned a special verdict, upon which the common
pleas, “ being of opinion that the law arising upon the fact so found

As to effect of recitals in conveyances, upon rights of purchasers, 2 Ohio,
76; 4 Ohio, 446; 10 Ohio, 466, 513; 11 Ohio, 192; 1 McLean, 486, 533; 6 Hast,
80; 4 Mass, 182; 7 Penn. 209; 6 Am. Com. L, 503, 512; and see Page on Va,
Mil. Titles 2 Johns. Ch. 210.

(1) A court in a sister state can not authorize a sale of land in Ohio.
Newell v. Ooit, 1 Ohio, 619; Wills ». Gooper, 2 Ohio, 124; Henry v. Doctor,
9 Ohio, 49; 2 Ohio, 234; 3 Ohio, 488; 9 Ohio, 180; 13 Ohio, 375.

If an owner of land knowingly permits improvements to be made by an
occupant, under an erroneous opinion of his title, without setting up a claim,
he can not afterward set up his claim. Carter v. Longworth, 4 Ohio, 384; 16
Ohio, 288.

(2) Seo Hambleton v. Dempsey & Co., reported on pp. 168-178 of this

volume.
197

233 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

by the jury is with the defendants,” rendered judgment in favor
of said defendants.

This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the judgment so
rendered.

The errors assigned are:

1. The court of common pleas erred in declaring the law, upon
the facts, as found by the jury, to be with the defendants.

2. The judgment should have been rendered for the plaintiff,
and not for the defendants.

The facts found by the jury are stated in the opinion of the
court.

No motion was made for a new trial, nor was any exception
taken Lo the action of the court below.

8. F. Vinton and C. C. Convurs, for plaintiff:

Upon the state of facts disclosed in the bill of exceptions, the
question arises: may it not be presumed that the directors of the
Ohio company, and the agent of Williams’ share, made such deeds
as the articles of association bound them to make after the land
was apportioned by lot (the directors to the agent and the agent
to their hoir), and thus carried into effect the original agreement
to convey, in execution of their respective trusts?

This presumption should be made, and is fully sustained by

authority. If the heir at law of Williams had been in the actual
possession of the land in controversy, there could be no hesitation
in presuming a conveyance to her, in execution of this trust, in
the manner provided for in the articles of association. A presump-
tion bas been defined, “an inference as to the existence of a fact
not known, arising from its connection with facts which are known.”
7 Wend. 66.
233] *Chis presumption of an unknown fact, such as a con-
veyance where there has been a long possession, is not made so
much from tho conviction that the unknown fact actually existed,
as from a desire to give effect to a principle of public policy,
which requires the repose of titles. Jackson v. McCall, 10
Johns, 381. .

Possession is not itself a conveyance, but a fact from which,
when long continued, it may be inferred that a party is holding
under a grant; but this inference is not confined to those cases
where the party in whose faver it is made has been in possession ;
it may be made from any other fact, or set of facts, equivalent to

198 :

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 234

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

possession, or equally satisfactory to the mind as the foundation
of an inference. After twenty years without demand of payment
or recognition of liability by the obligor, payment of a bond will
be presumed. So, where it is proved a mortgage debt has been
paid, a reconveyance will be presamed. 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes to
Phil Ev. 356. :

The heir at law of Williams, never having been in possession
of the land in controversy, the question is presented whether the
special verdict does not show a state of facts equivalent to posses~
sion, from which a grant to her may be presumed.

What are these facts, thus equivalent to possession? They are:

1, The directors and agents were to take the title in trust, un-
der an agreement to convey to the proprietors.

2. The articles of association contemplated the purchase of a
large district of country, which it was not in the contemplation
of the parties should bo occupied, until a partition and a title,
vested in the shareholders, individually in severalty; honce the
partition was to be made in three months after the purchase, ac-
cording to the articles. It was not expected that the shareholders
would generally emigrate to these lands.

3. The partition has been universally acquiesced in for half a
-eentury. Cow. & Hill's Notes to Phil. Ev. 364; Gittings’ Lessee
v. Hall, 1 Har. & Johns. 14; 1 Greenl. 20. This case in Green-
leaf’ is in point.

*In the case at bar the land lay in a state of nature for [234
nearly a third of a century after the partition, which was during
that time acquiesced in. The defendant’s claim is not founded on
a different and adverse right to that of plaintiff, but goes back to
the same source. It does not, therefore, imposo any obstacle to
the presumption of a grant. It may raise the inquiry whether
the grant shall be presumed to the heir, or purchaser, at the ad-
ministrator’s sale. The land lying wild for thirty years (the case
in 1 Greenleaf), shows that a grant in the meantime should be
presumed in favor of one of these parties. The administrator’s
sale being a nullity, can not lay the foundation for a presumption
of a conveyance to the purchaser, prior to the time when the
claimant went into possession, nor of a conveyance by the heir,
to the purchaser at the sale.

The defendant’s possession commenced in 1828 or 1829, nine-
teen years before suit brought. During all this time the heir
199

235 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

was a married woman—a non-resident—nearly 1,000 miles from
the land. Her silence for these nineteen years can not prejudice
her. Doe v. Campbell, 10 Johns. 476; Jackson v. Moore, 13 Ib.
516; Doe w Phillips, 9 Ib. 170; 10 Ib. 381; 2 Cow. & Hill’s
Notes to Phil. Ey. 368; Lyham v. Slade, 4 Term, 682; Bull. N. P,
110; Bowerman v. Lyburn, 7 Term 3; Jackson v. Woolsey, 11
Johns. 456; 8 Term, 122; 6 Cow. 706; 8 Wond. 426; 7 Term, 43.

This doctrine has been appliod by the Supreme Court of Obio
to the Ohio Company’s purchase. Perry v. Noland, decided in
the Supreme Court of Gallia county, 1817.

Joun Wetou, for defendants:

1. No presumption of a grant to Williams or his heir can be
raised without a possession in the party, or acts of ownership. 1
Greenl. Ev. 52; 7 Johns. 5; 10 Ib. 377; 131b.513; 4 Cow. 587 ; 6 Ib.
751; 7 Ib. 708; 7 Mass. 488; 3 Ib. 399; 6 Greenl. 145; Bicrce ef
al. v. Pierce ct al., 1 Obio, 529; Hamman v. Kelley et al, 14
285] Ohio, 503; Kinsman v. *Loomis, 11 Ib. 475; Lessee of
Starkie v. Smith, 5 Ib, 455,

2. The facts appear and rebut the presumption. Presumptions
can not contradict admitted facts, Wallace’s Lessce v. Miner, €
Ohio, 366; Lessee of Goforth v. Long, 4 Ohio, 129; Roads v,
Simms, 1 Ohio, 218; Boal v. King, 6 Ohio, 11. The special ver-.
dict finds that a deed was never made to the heir, or at least does
not find that one was made.

38. This was a question for the jury, and they have not found the
existence of the deed. The court can not add to their verdict.

When a special verdict is found, the court can not find any fact
outside of it. The jury bas found that no deed was made, The
most the court could do would be to “advise” the jury or to grant
anew trial, They wore asked to do neither. Of course there is
no error, even if the jury found wrong, and the plaintiff has no
remedy but in a new action. 1 Green|. Hv. 18, 49, 51; Lessee of
McArtbur’s Heirs v. Gallagher, 8 Ohio, 516,

4, There is better ground to presume a deed by the heir, or by
tho trustees to the grantee under the administrator, than to pre-
sume a deed to the heir, The purchaser from the administrator
has the equity, possession, and long-continued acts of ownership.

A, G. Brown, on same side:

The title of Williams at bis death was only an equity. The
legal title did not descend to his heir, The plaintiff must thon

200

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 236

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

fail. How can it be claimed the heir derived a legal title?
Whether by descent, or purchase, or directly by deed, real or
presumed ? .

It will, perhaps, be claimed that the deed of partition of Fob-
ruary 1, 1796, by the “ propriotors, original agents,” ete., having
been acquiesced in, amounts to a conveyance, although there is

no evidence that this deed was authorized, nor was it proporly
executed. But the heir can not claim by descent, because her
**fatber died before the making of a deed—not by purchase, [236
for the money had been fully paid by her fathor, for whom the
legal title was held in trust—not directly from the decds, for her
father, and not herself, is alone named as the grantee; go is the
allotment or deed. Lessoe of Thompson’s Heirs v. Gotham, 9
Ohio, 170; Kinsman’s Lessee v. Loomis & Wood, 11 Ohio, 475.

The presumption should be, that the proper conveyance was
made to defendants. Counsel are wrong in stating that there
were cight hundred and twenty-two.share-owners; there was that
number of shares, but not half so many share-owners.

Ranney, J. The questions presented in this case arise upon a
special verdict, rendered in the cours below, upon which a judg-
ment was rendered for the defendants. From the facts found by
the jury, taken in connection with several acts of Congress, the
following case substantially is made:

In the month of March, 1786, ton delegates, from several of the
counties in the commonwealth of Massachusetts, assembled in the
city of Boston, to consider of the expediency of forming a com-
pany or association to purchase lands and make a settlement in
the western country. Their deliberations resulted in a determi-
nation to form such association, and on the third of that month
they entered into written articles for that purpose, by which it
was stipulated that a fund not to exceed $1,000,000, exclusive of
one year’s interest thereon, should be raisod in continental specie
certificates; that each share in the company should consist of
$1,000, and upon each share $10, in gold and silver coin, should be
paid to such agents as the subscribers might elect.

The whole fund of certificates was to be applied to tho purchase
of lands in some one of the proposed states, northwest of the
river Ohio, or any other place adopted by Congress, not less ad-
vantageous to the company ; the one year’s interest to the purpose

201

237, 238 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

of making a settlement in the country, and assisting those who
287] would be otherwise unablo to remove there, and *the
gold and silver, to the payment of the expenses of purchasing the
Jands, and other contingent charges.

To avoid expense and to render both agents and subscribers se-
cure, the proprietors of twenty shares constituted a grand division
of the company, and appointed their own agent, who became ac-
countable to cach subscriber for the cortificates and money re-
ecived, and that the subscriber should get a just dividend of the
Jand purchased, both in quantity and quality, to be drawn by lot,
and the agent was then bound to execute to the subscriber a deed
of conveyance, similar to those he should receive from the di-
rectors. The agents being thus accountable to the subscribers,
were 10 appoint the officers of the company, consisting of five di-
rectors, a treasurer and secretary, and they were to pay over into
the bands of the treasurer all funds received by them.

Tho directors had the sole disposal of the company’s fund, and
wore required to purchaso lands for the benefit of the company as
before stated, either at public or private sale, as they deemed ex-
pediont. To secure the agents, both the treasurer and directors
were required to give bond to them jointly and severally, for the
faithful execution of their trusts; and the directors were still
farther bound, within three months from the completion of the
purchase, to divide by lof, in such manner as the agents or a ma-
jority of them should agree, among the proprietors, the land so
purchased, and thereupon to execute such deeds to the agents re-
spectively, for the proportion that fell to the division of each, as
the directors might receive from the commissioners of Congress.

No person was perm itted to hold more than five shares, and no
subscription for less than a full share could bo received. It was
further provided, that if the whole fand should not be raised by
October 17, 1786, the agent of any division might proceed in the
same manner as though the whole fund proposed had been
raised,

Subscribors to this association were procured in all the New
England States, Now York, New Jersey, and extending south
288] *as far as Virginia, to the number of eight hundred and
twenty-two shares, for which payments were made in full.

In the fall of 1786, the agents of the company purchased of the
United States, the district of country in the now State of Ohio,

202

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

known as the “Ohio Company’s Purchase,” of which the prem-
ises in question are a part. On May 10, 1792, in obedience to an
act of Congress, passed the 21st of April of the same year, the
President of the United States, by two several patents of that dato,
granted the same lands, by particular descriptions, to Rufus Put-
nam, Manassah Cutler, Robert Oliver, and Griffin Green, the di-
rectors of said company, their heirs and assigns—964,285 acres—
“in trust for the persons composing the said ( Ohio Company’s as-
sociates, according to their several rights and interests, and for
their heirs and assigns, as tenants in common.”

Jeremiah Williams was the owner of one share in the company.
In the year 1798, and before any division of the lands was made,
he died, intestate, leaving Eliza Williams, his only child and sole
heir at law. After the death of Williams, on February 1, 1796,
Rufos Putnam, Benj. Tallmadge, John Maury, and Benj. Ives
Gilman, as agents of the proprictors, executed a deed of partition
of the lands of the company, sotting apart and allotting to each
shareholder his land in severalty, by a precise and specific de-
scription, in which deed the land in question was set off and
allotted to Jeremiah Williams as a part of his share.

In making this allotment, in no case did the agents name the
heirs of any deceased shareholder, but uniformly set it off, in the ©
name of the original owner. This partition has been universally
acquiesced in by the proprietors, and they and those claiming
under them have possessed and enjoyed the property in severalty,
without objection, and that whole district of country has been
settled and grown up under it.

Hliza Williams, after the death of her father, married Samuel
Bradlee, of Boston, Massachusetts. Neither she nor her fathor
*ever took possession of this land, nor has she or her husband [239
ever been in the State of Ohio. On June 26, 1846, they conveyed
these lands to the lessor of the plaintiff.

Such is the plaintiff’s tile. These further facts found by the
jury are necessary, to understand the claim of title made by tho
defendants, On the death of Jeremiah Williams, Joseph Williams
was appointed his administrator. On February 17, 1795, ho made
application to the Supreme Judicial Court of the county of Suf-
folk, Massachusetts, for leave to sell, among other lands, one-half
of this share, to pay the debts of the estate. Leave was given,
and on August 13, 1795, he did sell and convey the whole share to

203

ne

249 . SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis ot al.

Thomas Lloyd, “attaching to said deed the original certificate
showing the payment by said Jeremiah Williams of the moneys
constituting him proprietor of said share.” In May, 1796, Lloyd
assigned all his interest to Hbenezer Belknap, under whom the de-
fendants claim one undivided half of the section described in the
declaration. Possession was taken about nineteen years before
the commencement of the suit, and has been continued to the
present time. *

The question arising upon this state of facts is, has the lessor
of the plaintiff shown such a title as will enable him to recover in
an action of ejectment? Neither he nor those under whom he
claims ever having had possession of this land, it was incumbent
upon bim to show a connected paper title from the government to
sustain the action of ejectment. He did show a regular patent
from the government to Rufus Putnam and others, in trust for the
proprietors of the Ohio Company, of whom Jeremiah Williams
was one. And he claims from the other facts and circumstances
established in the case, the court are authorized and bound to pre-
sume that a deed was made from the trustees to the agonts, and
from the agents to the several proprietors, in accordance with their

_ articles of association. And while it is claimed by his counsel
that such a presumption would be in strict accordance with well-
settled principles, its vast importance in this case is enforced from
the consideration *that the land titles of a large district of [240
country depend upon it, and it is supposed that not less than
300,000 acres of the lands of the company were allotted and set off
in the name of former shareholders, who were dead at the time
the partition was made.

‘The importance of the question is fully appreciated by us, and
although we are not aware that any diversity of practice has for
a long time obtained in this court upon the subject, as no reported
case is found, we have thought proper to consider, in the first
place, and settle the main question raised, as applicable to these
titles generally, without regard to such circumstances as are
peculiar to this title.” The inquiry will then arise whether this
case falls within the principle.

The first consideration that occurs to the mind, is that this whole
business, from the beginning to the end, was to be performed by
directors and agents, who, from the magnitude of the transaction,
might almost be considered as holding a semi-official relation to

204

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 24h

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

the proprietors. After the proprictor had paid bis money and
certificates, the whole obligation was thrown upon these directors
and agents, to secure him a title to his proportion of the land pur-
chased. The steps in ordor were for the directors first to purchase
of, and take a title from the government. This they did. Their
next duty was, within three months after the purchase, to divide
the lands by lot among the proprietors, “in such manner as the
agents, or a majority of them,” might agree upon. This they did,
but not within the time stipulated. What is called the deed of
partition can be regarded as nothing but such allotment. It is
good, so far as we can see, for that and nothing else. It evidences
the assent of the agents, in the manner provided for in the
articles; and although it is suggested that the agents joining in
the deed, did not represent a majority of the shares, the verdict
does not show that to be the fact, but the contrary. The obliga-
tion was to divide the land into as many parts as there were
shares, and it was no part of their duty to subdivide it among
heirs, to whom it might have descended. The fact, *thore- [241
fore, that a proprietor was dead, neither took from nor added to
their duties, nor could it in any way affect the validity of their
proceedings.

The next duty of the directors, after the partition, was to con-
vey to the agents, and the duty of the agents immediately arose
to convey to the proprietors. These deeds, if ever made, are not
to be found. Can they, to protect the equitable rights, and perfect
the titles of the proprietors, be presumed to have been executed?
Tt will be seon that the question arises between trustee and cestut
que trust, where the trustee had no right to retain the title, but
was under a positive obligation to convey. In such cases we
think the doctrine very clear, both upon reason and authority,
that a conveyance may be présumed.

In Bowerman »v. Lyburn, 7 Term, 3, Lord Kenyon said, “ that
as to the presumption he had directed the jury to make, he had
grounded himself upon the doctrine laid down by Lord Mansfield
in Lade v. Holford, which was not, as had been supposed, that an
ejectment might be maintained upon a mere equitable title, which
would remove ancient landmarks in the law, and create great
contusion; but that in all cases where trustees ought to convey to the
beneficial owner, he would leave it to a jury to presume, where
such a presumption might reasonably be made, that they had con-

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242 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

veyed accordingly, in order to prevent a title from being defeated
by a matter of form. And he thought this rule, as far as it went,
highly convenient and proper.”

No less explicit is the case of Hilary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 239.
This was a bill brought for a specific performance. The defend-
ant objected to the title, upon the ground that the legal estate was
outstanding in the hands of a trustee. The master of the rolls
presumed arelease. He says: “ On what ground was such a pre-
sumption to be made? On this: That what ought to have been
done should be presumed to have been done.” When the purpose
is answered for which the legal estate was conveyed, it ought to
be reconveyed. Presumptions do not always procced on a belief
242] that the thing *presumed has actually taken place. “Grants
are frequently presumed,” as Lord Mansfield says, “merely for
the purpose, and from a principle of quieting the possession.
Thore is much occasion for presuming conveyances of legal
estates, as otherwise titles must forever remain imperfect, and in
many respects, unavailable, when, from length of time, it has be-
come impossible to discover in whom the logal estate (if out-
standing) is actually vested.” On appeal to the Lord Chancellor
(Girskine), the decree was affirmed. He says: “The prosumption
in courts of law from length of time, stands upon a clear princi-
ple, built upon reason, the nature and character of man, and the
result of human expericnce. It resolves itself into this: that a
man will naturally enjoy what belongs to him. That is the whole
principle.” Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Prevost v.
Gratz, 6 Wheat. 604, says: “The doctrine in Hilary v. Waller,
on this subject, meets our approbation ;” and it is also approved
by Chancellor Kent, in Ham v. Sehuylor, 4 Johns. Ch. 7; Dutch
Church v. Mott, 8 Paige, 81.

Again, in Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 109, Mr. Justice Story
says: “There is no difference in the doctrine, whether the grant
relate to corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments. A grant of land
may as well be presumed as a grant of a fishery, or of a common,
or of a way. Presumptions of this nature are adopted from the
general infirmity of human nature, the difficulty of preserving
muniments of titlo, and the public policy of supporting long and
uninterrupted possessions ;” “and where the other circumstances
are cogent and full, there is no absolute bar against the presump-

206 :

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 243

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

tion of a grant within a peviod short of the statute of limitations.”
If further illustration from the books were needed upon this
subject, I know not where the general doctrine will be found more
perspicuously stated than in 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes to Phil. By.
368.

In speaking of presuming conveyances from trustees to cestuis
que trust, these authors say, “And here courts do not *wait [243
twenty years, or any given period, after the duty arises, but the
cestui que trust being in actual possession, and the duty of the
trustees thus partially oxecuted, by allowing such possession, tho
presumption is that they fulfilled the additional duty of making
an actual conveyance, according to the trust, The cases on this
head range from avery few years to fifty; but it is evident, from
the principle on which tho decisions go, that a very short time, in
ease ofa clear trust, would readily be adopted. The rule prevails
both at law and in equity. Law grounds its presumption on the
fact that a court of equity would compel the execution of such
trusts, and scems, in this instance, very nearly to follow the rule
in chancery—that what ought to be‘done shall be considered as
done.”

From these authorities, as well as from the reason and justice
of the doctrine itself, we feel no hesitation in saying that wherever
it may become necessary to protect the possession and equitable
rights of those holding under the shareholders in this company, in
accordance with the deed of partition or allotment, shown in this
case, all such deeds of conveyance from the directors and agents as
are necessary to clothe such equitable rights with perfect legal pro-
tection, may, and ought to be, presumed.

The next inquiry arising is, does the lessor of the plaintiff pre-
sent us a case falling within this rule? As we have already seen,
the whole doctrine rests upon the idea that titles and possessions
are to be quieted, not disturbed by it; that right and justice are
protected in its application, not injured; in short, it is only “ what
ought to be done,” that under this rule can be considered “as
done.” It is only when clear and unquestionable equitable rights
exist, that presumption can be called forth to clothe them with
legal protection.

It is also conceded by the counsel for the plaintiff in error that
actual possession in the party calling for this aid, or what is eguiv-
alent to it, must be found; but they insist that a state of facts,

. 207

244, 245 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

cquivalont to actual possession, in the heir of Williams, is shown _
244] in this case. Lot us inquire what was her *oquity, and
what are these facts thus relied upon., Jeremiah Williams was the
elear and unquestionable owner, in equity, of one cight hundred
and twenty-socond part of the whole purchase. As cvidence of
this, he held from his agent a certificate showing the fact. Ho
was never, during his life, entitled to a conveyance of any specific
land, for the reason that such conveyance could not bo made until
alter partition, which did not take place until three years after
his death, It would be absurd, therefore, to presume that any decd
was ever made to him. Upon. his death his equity descended to
his heir; subject, however, to the payment of his debts. Ilis per-
sonal representative applied for leave to sell it for that purpose;
obtained it; sold it to Lloyd ; received the pay for it; made adeed,
and with it transferred the original certificate given to Williams by
the agent. And all this took place one year before the partition
was made, and consequently before any specific land could be
conveyed to the heir. Whether the heir was at this time an in-
fant, or under coverlure, does not appear. Nearly three gonera-
tions of men passed away before we have any evidence that she
bestowed one thought upon this land, or did one act in respect to
it; and, at the end of that time, all she did was to make a deed to
the lessor of the plaintiff. During all this time conveyances were
being made in the chain of title under Loyd, and an actual pos-
session for nearly twenty years had taken place. We are now
asked, as against the actual occupants, to presume that a deed for
this land was made from the directors or agents of the company

_ to this woman, after the partition was made, upon the ground
that the judicial proceedings under which this equity was sold
wore invalid. It is undoubtedly true that those proceedings were
inoperative to affect lands held by either legal or equitable title
in Ohio. They could, so far as real estate is concerned, have no
extra territorial force; and if the heir, from this circumstance,
retained a legal advantage, we would not take it from her. But
sho has no legal advantage, but now seeks, by presumptions, to
245] get it. To get it, she must present *an honest, nota techni-
cal case, Sho can not, in honesty, take this land from the occu-
pants, while her father’s estate was relieved with the very monoy
thas paid for it, and whon she has acquiesced in the action of the
administrator for more than half a century. I know it is said

208

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 246

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

that she is a married woman; but I have yet to learn that even
married womon have a right to do wrong. We take from hor none
of her rights; we only prevent her from taking the rights of others.

I will now briefly advort to the authorities relied upon by the
plaintiff's counsel. The first is the case of Jackson v. McCall, 10
Johns. 380.

In this case the parties claiming the benefit of sae presumption,
had been in actual possession for forty-one years, and this.cireum-
stance is as strongly relied upon as in any caso to be found in the’
books. The court say: “Chis John McDonald died in possession,
and tho lessor of the plaintiff succeeded as his son and heir to the
possession of the Provoost lot, and in which he has sinco con-
tinued. We are then to conclude that the father purchased the
Provoost title at an early day; and from the fact of the order of
the council, and tho original survey by government in 1764, and
the recognition of it in the patent to McKenzie in 1765, and the
continual and undisturbed possession by the family of the lessor,
a patent to Provoost, and a deed from him to the elder McDonald,
might even have been presumed, for the sako of quioting the pos-
session. In the case of the Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 102,
Lord Mansfield held, that a grant or charter from the crown,
which ought to be by matter of record, might, under the circum-
stances, be presumed, though within time of legal memory. Tho
fact in such a case is presumed, for the purpose and from a prin-
ciple of quieting the possession, and not because the court really
think a grant has beon made.” *

The cases of Clinton’s Lessee v. Campbell, 10 Johns. 475, and
Jackson v. Moore, 13 Johns. 513, next cited, affirm the principle that
where lands are conveyed by a number of persons to a trustee, to
convoy according to a partition agreed upon *among tho [246
owners, deeds from the trustec in exccution of the trust, would be
presumed, after a lapse of many years, in favor of the persons
equitably entitled thereto—the very doctrine held by us in the
first part of this opinion.

The next caso cited is Jackson v. Woolsey, 11 Johns. 446. The
defendant claimed under a deed from commissioners appointed to
make partition, was in actual possession, and the equitable owner.
Yates, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: “The
circumstances of this case would warrant a jury to presume, that
the deed alleged to have been given by the commissioners had

VoL, Xx—14, 209

247 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

been duly executed by them, in pursuance of the order of the
court of common pleas; and if so, this court are bound to pre-
sume it. The objection stated in the argument, that the period
of possession is insufficient to authorize such a presumption, can
not prevent it. It is correct here to presume that they did their
-duty.”

The case of Farrer ot al. v. Merrill, 1 Greenl. 17, is claimed as a
very strong one for the plaintiff. In that case it was decided that
“after a lapse of more than seventy years, without any adverse
claim, the jury may presume a grant from the original proprictor
of a share in a township of land, to a person afterward constantly
acting as grantee of such share, sustaining various offices as such
in the corporation of proprictors, and paying taxes thereon ;
although such share consist of wild land and be not holden by
any open, visible possossion.” ©. J. Mellen, while he admitted
the general rule, requiring actual possession on which to found
tho presumption, and that it could never arise where there was
adverse possession, said he regarded these “circumstances as equal,
perhaps, to open possession, in favor of the presumption.”

The points of resemblance between that case and the one under
consideration, are very few indeed. In that case soventy years
had clapsed without any adverse claim—in this one fifty, with a
constant adverse claim; in that, the person claiming the presump-
247] tion had constantly acted as the grantee—in this, no *such
acts are pretended ; in that case the claimant had constantly paid
the taxes—in this, none are paid ; in that case the lands were wild
and unoceupied—in this, held adversely for many yours.

Upon a careful examination of all tho cases cited, we do not
think they help the plaintiff's caso ; and we are confident no case
can be found where a deed has been presumed in favor of a party
so thoroughly disconnocted with the land as this plaintiff and
those under whom he claims. Certain it is, that this court havo
most positively and explicitly held the contrary.

In Kinsman’s Lessee v. Loomis, 11 Ohio, 475, Judge Lane, in
delivering the opinion of the court, says: “But this presumption
will not aid the plaintiff here, It springs from possession ; it is
raised to support a possession ; it has no existence in his favor
who attacks the rights of one who holds the possession adversely
against him.”

And again: In Harmon v, Kelly, 14 Ohio, 509, Judge Birchard,

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DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 248

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

delivering the opinion of the court, after quoting and approving
this decision, says: “ When a cestui gue trust has for a long time
been in possession of lands which the trustee ought to have con-
veyed to him, the conveyance may be presumed, but the presump-
tion is not raised in his favor who attacks or holds in opposition
to the equitable right.”

This holding is in strict accordance with the well-settled rule
of evidence upon the subject; as found in the elementary books.
Tt is thus stated in 2 Cowen & Hill’s Notes to 2 Phillips’ Ev.
356: “Sometimes a deed, in the execution of a trust, is to be
presumed ; sometimes a surrender of terms, or a conveyance in
pursuance of some agreement, or in the execution of some legal
duty ; or from some other circumstances. In all these cases ad-
verse possession, or what is equivalent, makes the main ingre-
dicnt; but the time may overgo, or fall short of that required by
the statute; and various auxiliary circumstances are admissible
to support or detract from the presumption.”

The same rule is laid down by Greenleaf, vol. 1, page 53. He
says: “It is sufficient that the party who asks the aid of this
*presumption, has proved a title to the beneficial ownership, [248
and a long possession, not inconsistent therewith ; and has made
it not unreasonable to believe that the deed of conveyance, or
other act essential to the title, was duly executed. Where these
merits are wanting, the jury are not advised to make the pre-
sumption.” We are of opinion that all these merits are wanting
in this case. In the first place, the lessor of the plaintiff has
proved no “title to the beneficial ownership.” If he had a legal
advantage by which he could recover the land, it would still be
dishonest to do so, while the consideration paid for it was re-
tained. He, or those under whom he claims, have had no “ long
possession” of this land, or indeed any possession, or anything
equivalent to it. It would be difficult to imagine a case of more
entire absence of all acts or claims of ownership, than is found in
this, for more than half a century. It is “unreasonable to be-
lieve” that any deed was ever made by the agent to either Will-
jams or his daughter. He was dead long before it could have
been made, and his equity in the land was sold under the sanc-
tion of the highest judicial tribunal in the State of Massachusetts,
where the parties all resided, and the original certificate trans-

ferred to the purchaser, also before any deed could have been
“241

“249 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Blake v. Davis et al.

made to his heir. And while -theso proceedings fail in legal
efficiency to transfer the title, whon taken in connection with the
long acquiescence in them, they make it “ unreasonable” to sup-
poso that the heir ever claimed, or the agent made her a deed, cs-
pecially as bis own liability was not removed until his certificate
was taken up or satisfied.

We are therefore unanimously of opinion, that no such convey-
ances as are claimed, could rightfully be prosumed in favor of the
lessor of the plaintiff, or in aid of the title under which he claims,
This disposes of the case upon the broadest ground upon which
tho parties have placed it.

But a majority of this court are of opinion that a judgment
could not, in any event, be rendered for the plaintiff, upon the
special verdict found in tho case. There are not facts enough
249] *found by the jury to onable them to do so. Without the
deeds sought to be presumed, it is conceded the plaintiff could not
recover. The jury alone are authorized to presume them. This
is not done; but a state of facts is found, from which it is claimed
such presumptions may be raised. This is but the finding of evi-
dence by the verdict, which is clearly insufficient. Tho rule is
thus stated by Gould: “If, in a special verdict, tho jury find only
the evidence of a material sact, instead of tho fact itself, or other-
wise omit to find upon such a fact cither way, no judgment can
‘be rendered upon the findiug for either party; since ’a mattor of
fact, essential to a determination of the cause, is left unascer-
tained by the verdict,” as if in trover the jury find tho loss of the
goods, the finding by defendant, and refusal to deliver them up on
demand ; and he gives this reason: “ For the conversion, which
is the gist of the action, is neithor found nor denied by it; the de-
mand and refusal being only prima facie evidence of a conversion.”
Gould’s Pleading, 525.

That these are more presumptions of fact, and to be drawn, by
the jury, is well sottled. In Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 109, it
is said: “They may be encountered and rebutted by contrary pre-
sumptions, and can never fairly arise where all the circumstances
are perfectly consistent with the non-existenco of a grant.”

In Jackson v. Porter, 1 Paine, 8, it was held by Thompson, J.,
that “whether a deed is to be prestimed from a long possession, is
a mixed question of law and fact, and in most, if not in all cases,
to be submitted to the jury under the advice of the court. Tho

212

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 250

Lessee of Ward v. Racer.

existence of the deed is a fact for the jury, but its legal effect and,
operation is a question of law for the court.”

We sco nothing erroncous in the judgment of the court of com-
mon pleas, and it must therefore be affirmed.

*Lusszz or Nanum Warp v. Bunsasn Racur, [250 ©

A deed made in 1835, by two surviving executors of a person who died seized.
of the premises in 1804, will not prevail against ap adverse possession of
more than twenty-one years since the death of the last devises,

If the deed of the 1838 has rolation back to the “ inception of the power,” s
as to defeat the estate in the heirs of the last devisee, it will be deemed in
Jaw to give aright of action to the lessor of plaintiff at the same oatly
period.

Error to the common pleas of Washington county.

The action in the common pleas was ejectment.

Nahum Ward claimed title to the premises sought to be recov-
ered, under a deed dated December 10, 1835, made by tho two
surviving executors of Pascal N. Smith to said Nahum Ward.
He proved on the trial in the court below that Pascal N. Smith
died seized of the land in controversy, in the year 1804, having
mado a will which bears date March 20,1801. By this will the
tostator gave one-third of all his estate, real and personal, to his
wife Hestor, and directed that the residue be equally divided be-
tween his four children, Harriot, Augusta, William Tomple, and
Hester Georgiana. He directed, further, that if any of his said
ehildren should die before they arrived at the age of twenty-one
‘years, or without issue by lawful marriage, then their part or
parts should go to the survivors or survivor, their heirs and as-
signs forever. And in the event that all his said four childron
should dic before they came to be twenty-one years of age, with-
out having issue by lawful marriage, then he directed that the
whole estate, thus devised to said children, should go to his said
wife Hester, and to her heirs and assigns forever.

He made his wife Hester, and his nephews, Benjamin Strong
and John Aspinwall, the executors of his last will and testament,

218

251, 252 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Ward v. Racer.

and empowered them, “at their discretion, to make sale of any
real or personal estate that he might leave at his decease.”

251] It was proved on the trial, that all of said children named
as devisees in said will, except Hester Georgiana, died prior to the
year 1816 without issue, and under the age of twenty-one years;
and that the said Hester Georgiana died in the year 1816 without
issue, but above the age of twenty-one. Tho widow of said testator,
Hester Smith, died in the year 1823, having survived all the
children. The plaintiff also gave in evidence deeds of conveyance
to him from some of the heirs at law of the said Hester Georgiana,
dated in the year 1835 and 1836, and proved that all the interest
and estate which said widow died seized of in the premises, had
been vested in him by the deeds of trustees and devisees of said
Hester, made in 1835. The plaintiff further proved that neither
the said Pascal N. Smith, nor his executors, devisees or widow,
nor either of the grantors in said deeds to said Nahum Ward, had
ever been in the State of Obio, but, on the contrary, had at all
times resided out of said state.

The defendant proved that he and those under whom he claimed
and held possession, had been in the actual, adverse, notorious,
and continued possession of the premises in controversy, ever
since the year 1811.

The court of common pleas gave judgment for the defendant.
The plaintiff's counsel moved for a new trial, and the motion was
overruled. Exceptions were taken and this writ of error brought
to reverse the judgment.

C. B. Goppanp, for plaintiff

This suit was bronght within the time limited to non-residents
to avail themselves of their disability, under the statute of limita-
tions. It is claimed, and was so adjudged below, that the excep-
tions of the statute will not avail the plaintiff, because, notwith-
standing the power in the will, the estate was devised to certain
children, whose death interrupted the disability, and thut upon the
252] principle of the cases of Carey v. Robinson, 13 Obio, *181,
and Whitney v. Webb, 10 Ohio, 513, the statute commenced run-
ning twenty-one years before the commencement of this suit.

Without impeaching the doctrine of these cases, I have two an-,
swors to the attempt to apply them to the present case:

I. Upon the execution of the doed to Ward, his title relates to
tho inception of tho power, and divests the estate of the devisees.

214.

DECEMBER. TERM, 1851. 253

Lessee of Ward v, Racer.

IL. Tho plaintiff claiming under the executors, against whom
the statute never ran, it can not run against him, no matter what
might be its effect, if he claimed through the devisees. Hill on
Trustees, 503, 504, pt. 3, div. 1, ch. 3; Wells v. Prince, 9 Mass. 508 ;
Wallingsford v. Hearl, 15 Ib. 471; sec. 17, Act of 1831, 3 Chase,
1788.

The question whether the power could be executed after so
great a length of time, never can arise between the grantee under
the power and a stranger to the ostate.

This case has been in the Supreme Court before. The common
pleas once refused to permit the deed to be read in evidence, be-
cause executed thirty years after the death of Smith. This was
reversed by the Supreme Court, and on the last trial the deed was
received in evidence.

Cuartes R. Ruopzs, on same side, upon the first proposition
maintained in the preceding argument, cited Sug. on Powers, 331,
332; Middleton v. Crosts, 2 Atk. 661; Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 Johns.
Oh. 549. These anthoritics hold that the estates created by the
execution of a power, take effect in the same manner as if created
by the deod which raised the power. And such estates divest the
estate of the devisee, heir, or assigns. Willard v. Nason’s Adm’rs,
5 Mass. 241; Sug. on Powers, 337, sec. 338.

The extinguishment of the power is not presumed from the lapse
of time. Pickering v. Lord Stanford, 2 Vesey, Jr. 272; McDow-
ell and wife », Chambers, 3 Johns. Ch. 137; Stackpole v. Stack-
pole, 4 Dow. 209; Huett v. Fletcher, 1 *Atk. 467; 2 Phil. [253
Ey., Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 347, ch. 7,-sec. 2, Potter v. Liteomb,
7 Greenl, 303, The defendants can not impeach the execu-
tion of the power. 3 Johns. Ch, 583; 1 Ves. 106; 2 Atk. 33; 2 Ves,
466; 1 Atk. 463; 4 Bro. 136; 2 Vos. 269; 3 Atk. 235; 14 Ves. 353;
17 Ib. 152.

Smzon Nasu, for defendant:

I. The plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitation. The
cause of action accrued in 1811; the then holders of the legal title
died in 1816, and 1823; suit brought in 1846; statute began to
run as to two-thirds in 1816, and as to one-third in 1823; twenty-
one years expired in 1837 and 1844. 10 Obio, 518; 18 Ohio, 181.

II. Nor can the fact that the plaintiff claims under a deed from
the executors of P. N. Smith alter the result. The statute of

245,

254 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Ward v. Racer.

limitations operates against the person holding the legal title,
whether he hold such a, title in his own right oras a mere trustee,
If ho be barred, so are all those having equitable interests in said
lands. Were not this the case, the devisees in this will who aro
bound, could yet obtain pay for their land through a sale by the
executors, under this power ; a convenient way of getting round.
this wholesome statute. Smilic v. Bufile, 2 Barr (Pa.), 52; Williams
v. Otey, 8 Humph. 563; 7 U.S. Dig. 320, sec. 31; Ib. 352, secs.
26, 27. Vide also Dow v. Warren, 6 Mass. 326; Angell on
Limitations, 48; 2 Brod. & Bing. 217.

IIL. The lessor of plaintiff is barred, because he is not within the
saving clause of the statute. It is truc that he claims to recover,
because his grantor comes within the saving of the statute; and
such seoms to be the opinion of the court in 13 Ohio, 181.

That case was rightly decided; that was an action on a per-
sonal contract, and must therefore be governed by that portion
of the stututo which relates to such contracts. There the in-
254] testate *had never been in the state. The administrator,
came here to enforce his rights, and if the intestate was within
tho saving clause, so that he could have maintained an action, so
was his administrator. Hence-the administrator could not be
barred until he came into the state. This can only be the case,
however, when a foreign administrator is empowered to sue by
the law of the state where the debtor lives. This part of our
statute is like the English statute; in neithor is there any saving
in favor of heirs, execulors, or administrators. Strithart v.
Graeme, 8 Wilson, 145; 14 Mass. 203. The decision in 13 Ohio,
181, did not necossarily call for any comment on the opinion do-
livered in the case in 10 Ohio, 513.

But how stands the law in relation to actions for the recovery
of real estate? The English statutes have a saving in favor of
heirs, as well as in favor of the person in whom the right of action
was at the inception of the adverse possession. Our statute has
no raving in favor of heirs nor grantees. In England, a grantee
acquired no title, where the land was held by adverse possession ;
hence there, no one but the holder of tho legal title at the time
the right-of action accrued could maintain an action. Hero, how-
ever, such grantee may maintain an action at the time of the con-
voyance to him.

In 13 Ohio, 181, in argument it is assumed that where a dis-

216

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 255

Lessee of Ward v. Racer.

ability exists at the time the adverse possession begun, the limita-
tion fixed in the statute does not begin to run until that disability
is removed, or the party dies. This is not correct. ‘The true idea
is, that tho statute is a bar against all, saving those who can bring
themselves expressly within some one of its saving clauses.

By the one construction, any person can protect himself against
tho operation of the statute by proving that the person to whom the
right of action first accrued, was within the saving of the statute;
and that his death did not occur, or his disability was not removed
within twenty-one years. By the other constructidn, the statute
is a bay, unless the party suing *can show that he himself [255
is the porson named in the statnte, in whose favor a saving is made;
and as our statute has no saving except in favor of tho person sirst
entitled to sue, tbe holder of tho logal title at the time the adverse
possession originated, heirs, yrantecs and devisees, are absolutely
“barred, if such person has pormilted twenty-one years to clapse
before making such grant, or before his death. ‘To illustrate this
view of the question: The plaintiff first proves 2 logal title to the
premises, and then rests; the defendant then proves an adverse
possession for over twenty-one years, and then he rests; and in
this state of the evidence he is entitled to a verdict. To do away
with the effect of this adverse possession, the plaintiff must now
show that he comes within the saving of the statute. The statute
provides simply for saving the rights of a person, who, at the time
his cause of action accrued, was a feme covert, insano, an infant,
imprisoned, or beyond seas; and these persons have twenty-one
years given them to suo, after the removal of such disability, or
after coming into tho state. There is here no saving in favor of
his or their heirs, dovisoes, or grantees; and how can the court
then say that these parties, not named, can take advantage of a
privilege reserved to another? Tho English statute and the stat-
utes of all the old states contain a saving in favor of the heir,
giving him ten years after the death of his ancestor under disa-
Dility, to bring his suit. Our statute contains no such saving, and
is it not legislation for the court'to inscrt, by construction, such a
saving, not only in favor of heirs, but of grantees too?

Tho question in 10 Ohio, 513, was not one of “tacking” disa-
bilities, but of a construction of our statutes; whethor parties not
named, not coming within the saving clauses thereof, could be, by
construction, brought within them; whether the omission of the

217

256 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Ward v. Breer.

clause in relation to heirs should be added to the statute, in such
a way as to give them, and not only them, but grantees and
devisees, twenty-one years to bring suit after the death of his or
their ancestor, devisor, or grantor, within the saving clauses of
the statute.

256] *Such is the true construction of the statute. “It has been
shown,” says Angell, in his work on Limitations, p.518, sec. 1, “ that
unless persons are under the disabilities expressly mentioned in
the statute, they can not be exempt from its operations by judicial
construction; and so it would seem by the civil law, that prescrip-
tion runs against all persons, without exception, unless they are
included in somo exception.” his question was decided under
the statute of 32 Henry VIII. The saving clause was in favor of
the first party, and nothing was said about his heirs, as in the
statute of James. Brook, in his reading upon this statute of
Henry VIII, says (vide appendix to Angell on Limitations, 1 ed.
518, note 5, of edition 1846): “A man seized in right of his
wite, is disseized, or makes a discontin, and liveth sixty one years,
he and his wife dio, tho heir of the wifo should not have action,
claim, nor enter.” The limitation under this statute was sixty
years; sixty-one years had elapsed when husband and wifo died.
Now, if the statute did not begin to ran until the death of the
wife, then the heir of the wife was not barred; bat as tho statute
had no saving in favor of the heir, it was held that he was
barred. (1)

(1) Ma. Nash has furnished, since tho decision of this caso, the following
note, to bo added to his argument :

“T have examined Sir Robert Brook's reading upon the statute of 32 Henry
VIII, exp. 2. That statute had a saving in favor of the next heir of one who
was within the saving at the time of the passage of the statute, or the feast
of Ascension, 1546; but there is no saving in favor of the heir of any other
person dying undor disability. Keeping this view of the statute before the
mind, one will be able to understand the following rulings, extracted from the
said reading of Justice Brook : :

“Two joyntenants have cause of a writ of entry upon the ancient limita~
tion, tempore statuti, whoreas one was imprisoned tempore statuti, and after
he which was imprisoned dieth, the other shall not have action within six
months upon the ancient limitation, notwithstanding this statute,

“Because the ancient limitation was expired at Ascension, 1646, and he
which survived was not imprisoned, and he is not heir to the other, and so
fot aided.

“A man of non sane memory at the time of the statute, or an idiot, had

218

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 257

Lessee of Ward v. Racer.

*The fundamental notion of the statute is, that itruns [257
against all not coming within somo saving clause; and that the
heir, unless named in the statute, can not protect himself by
showing that his ancestor died under disability ; and that the
time of limitation has not run out since his death. Hence the
statutes of James and the old states, expressly provide that the
heir may bring his suit when his ancestor dies under a disability,
Our statute is the only one I can find in which this provision is
omitted. But Ward, in this case, is not even an heir—be is a
mere volunteer grantee—one in whose favor there is no exceptions
There is no clause in the statute which protects him from its,
operation. — .

LT hope the court will reconsider the dicta in 13 Ohio, 181.

IV. The plaintiff does not show any title to the premises. The
court will not reverse the judgment if it appears from the record
that plaintiff has no title. This title is defective.

1. Because the power in the will is a naked power to three by
name, and one having died, the survivors can not oxecute it, 1

cause of action, tempore statuti, and dyeth after Ascension, 1546, his heir shalt
never have an action,

“Because he is not aided by the statute, and the ancient limitation is ex-
pired. .

“A man which had cause of action upon the ancient limitation, had issue,
two sons, and dyeth before the statute; the eldest is possessed in France at the
time of the statute, and the youngest is within age at the time of the statute,
and after tho eldest is doraigned, and cometh backe out of France; then the
youngest which cometh at fall ago, nor the eldest, shall not have an action
with the sixe yeares upon the ancient limitation, .

“« Because the statute doth not provide for those which were beyond sea, un-
Jesse they had cause of action at the time of the statute, and a man in religion
ad not cause of action at the time of the statute, and the youngest can not
have it, because yet he is not heire.

“A feme covert, at the time of the statute, had cause of action ancestrall
‘upon the ancient limitation, and after Ascension, 1546, she and her husband
bro’t an action upon the ancient limitation, within a yeare then following, ete,
they shall not have action, notwithstanding this provision of the statute,

“Because the wife is aided within six yeares after discontinuance, but not
husband and wife after Ascension, 1646, the coverture containing, because the
ancient limitation is expized.” .

‘Those rulings show that the plaintiff in any suit is barred, unless he can
pring himself within some one of the savings of the statute; it will not an-
swer to show that some other person is within the statute.

: 219

258, 259 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Lessee of Ward v. Racer.

258] Ohio, 232 ; 2 Ib, 127; 8 Cow. 544; 4 Hill, *514; 1 Comst. 358;
18 Met. 220; 8 Humph. 563.

But it is claimed that section 14 of the act of 1881, relating to
wills, 8 Chase’s Stat. 1778, avoids this objection by retrospectively
declaring that such survivors may execute the power. This stat- |
ute does not apply to such a power as this: 1. Because it is a
naked power, not coupled with a trust; and, 2. Because itis a
-dssoretionary power. The statute says: “ Whore lands are directed
or devised to be sold.” These lands are not directed to bo sold.
The oxecutors are simply empowered to sell at their discretion.
This is not such a power as a court of equity wonld compel the
rxecution of; that is only done when the power is coupled with a
trust, the execution of which trust can not be carricd out without
the exercise of the power. 2 Story’s Hq. 321, sec. 1061; 1 Ib. 181,
169; Sugden on Powers, 392, ch. 6, sec. 3; Cole v. Wade, 16
Ves, 27.

This statute, if construed as is claimed, would be unconstitu-
tional, as divesting a vested right. By tho death of the devisees in
1816 and 1823, the title had become vested in collaterals abso-
lutely; the power having lapsed in 1823 by the death of Mrs.
Smith, one of the executors. Now, can the logislature, by law,
rovive this lapsed power, and anthorizo the surviving executors
to soll and convey, thorcby divesting the title of these collateral
heirs? 3 Blackf. 275; 3 Greenl. 291; 9 Pick. 259; 15 Ib, 435;
7 Sohns. 475; 12 Ohio; 16 Ohio, 599.

2. This power was lapsed because the persons for whose bene-

fit it was created were dead. The only use that could have been
made of this was to pay debts, and facilitate the partition of tho
real ostate. Tho debts must be presumed paid alter thirty years,
and the devisees were all dead, the last child dying in 1816, and
tho widow in 1823; the children without issue, and the widow
without ever having married again. A power can not be executed
after the person for whose use it was created is dead. 3 Day, 388;
3 Ib. 384,
259] *3. The power was lapsed because it was a discretionary
power; and such a power can be executed only by the parties
named—can never survive. Willis v. Cooper, 2 Ohio, 124; Cole
v. Wade, 16 Ves. 27; 5 Met. 462; 13 Ib, 220.

Spatpine, J. This action was instituted against the defendant
220

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 260

Lessee of Ward v. Racer.

_ in 1846. In 1811 tho adverse possession began and was unin-
terrupted m the defendant and those under whom he holds, until
the bringing of this suit. .

When this adverse possession commenced, it seems that the
owners of the land resided out of the state. A portion of them
were infants, but it seems unnecessary to dwell unon that fact, as
it will not chango the result.

In the year 1816, wo will suppose that the entire foo of the land ,
vested in Tester Smith, the widow of Pascal N. Smith, on the
death of the last child, Hester Georgiana. I say we will suppose
this, as it seems to be taken for granted by counsel on both sides,
that Hester Georgiana took no moro than a life ostato in the prem-
ises, although she lived to be more than twenty-one years of age,

At this period, 1816, the possession would not avail the defend-
ant, a8 the widow, Hestor Smith, in whom the whole title centered,
was a non-resident and protected by the exceptions to the statute
of limitations. . .

In the year 1823, however, Mrs. Smith diced, and at the instant
of her death the statute commenced running against all persons
claiming under her, and would, in the absoncé’of any other claim»
afford to the defendant ample protection, as more than twenty-ono
years had elapsed from the removal of the disability to the
commencement of the suit. Carey’s Adm. v. Robinson’s Adm’r,
13 Ohio, 181. But tho plaintiff, feeling the inconvenience of
sundry decisions of this court, that “cut up by the roots”
the doctrine of “tacking” disabilities, to avoid the statute of
limitations, has concluded to rest his claim upon tho executors’
deed of December 10, *1835. Itis thon objected thatin 1816 [260
the last limitation had fallen in, and the whole estate had become
absolute in Hester Smith and her heirs. To avoid this difficulty
the ingenuity of counsel has started the proposition that, “upon
the execution of the deed by the executors to Ward, his title relates
back to the inception of the power, and divosts the estate of the
devisees.”

Iam by no means prepared to regard this pretended execution
of power as a serious matter, under the circumstances, yet I am
content to follow in any path wherein counsel may choose to lead,

If the title of Ward, under the deed, relates back to the incep-
tion of the power, so as to defeat the estate of the dovisecs, it
relates back for another purpose equally fatal to the plaintifi’s right

+ 223

261 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Jennings ». Wood.

of recovery, with the vesting of the estate in the heirs. It relates
pack so as to give.a right of action to Nahum Ward, at the time
defendant’s possession commenced, in 1811. As he is not shown
to have been under disability, by roason of infancy or non-res-
idency, his right of action is barred by the statute,-and the ruling
of the court below was correct. The judgment will be affirmed.

261]  *Lussez or Stmzon Janninas v. Rosrrr Woop.

‘Where # purchaser of land hands his deed to the recorder, and the recorder,
by mistake, enters the name of another person as the grantor in the deed,
in place of the true grantor, the deed is not duly recorded, and will not
‘be notice to a subsequest purchaser without actual notice; but such pur-
chaser will hold the land as against the title of the former purchaser.

‘That # party can only be chargeable with constructive notice from the record,
when the record would give him actual notice.

‘That where a mortgagee purchases the mortgaged premises, and receives a
deed in fee simple, paying off o part of the consideration by the delivery
of the note, which the mortgage was given to secure, to the maker, such
mortgage is thereby paid off and extinguished, and has no effect either
in law or equity, although it may appear uncanceled on the record.

Error to the Supreme Court of Stark county.

The original action in the common pleas of Stark county was
ejectment. The declaration was filed March 26, 1849, with the
sheriff's return of service of that date.

The facts are all stated in the opinion of the court, and in the
dissenting opinion of Spalding, J.

G. W. Butpzw and J. J. Brooxs, for plaintiff:

The plaintiff was entitled to recover—

I. By his deed of June 8, 1844, he is shown to have paramount
title.

IL. Ho is shown to have paramount title by his three mortgages.

I. As to title under deed.

This is perfect, and should prevail over defendant’s deed of
April 4, 1845, recorded March 30, 1849.

But defendant asserts :

222

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 262, 263

Lessee of Jennings . Wood.

1, That the deed of plaintiff is inoperative, because not re-
corded ; or,

2. If recorded, it was so erroneous as not to give notice of
plaintiff's title.

**As to the first of these assertions, the case of Northrup’s [262
Lessee v. Brohmer, 8 Ohio, 392, is against him. “Where two deeds
are made by the grantor to different persons for thesame land, at dif-
ferent times, and neither is recorded within six months after exe-
cution, the second deed, if executed before the first is recorded,
shall prevail in the absence of all notice.” The certificate of the re-
corder indorsed on the original deed, was in evidence with tho
deed, which shows that it was recorded June 19, 1841, and this is
the only evidence on the question, except that Wood introduced
Jennings’ answer to a bill in chancery, in which Jonnings says:
“Said deed on June 19, 1844, he deposited with the recorder for
record, and that it was recorded on that day.”

The introduction of a copy of a deed, purporting to be made by
Samuel Granger, of same date, does not disprove the fact, already
proved, that Lemuel Granger also made’a deed.

As to second assertion: There is no proof that the deed was er-
roneously recorded. But if it were, it is immaterial. The only
error claimed is, that the recorder wrote the Christian name of
Granger Samuel, instead of Lemuel. The law of notice is not tech-
nical, but equitable. It is not necessary that the notice should be
beyond all cavil. The deed, as recorded, is sufficient notice.

But Jennings did all the law required, by depositing his deed
with the recorder.

Il. As to plaintiff's title under the mortgages.

The plaintiff was entitled to succeed undor his mortgages. 16
Ohio, 125.

The mortgage title was not merged in tho deed. The mortgages
conveyed the legal title, the deed the equity of redemption.
Tripp v. Vincent, 3 Barb. 613 ; Dayton v. Russell, 17 Conn. 146;
Vanderkemp v. Shelton, 11 Paige, 28; 2 Met. 26; Campbell v..
Knight, 11 Shep. (Mc.) 332. The mortgages could only be re-
leased by the parties, and that has never been done.

*W. K. Upwam, on same side: [263

‘When Wood claims that the mortgage title was merged in the.

legal title, he should therefore be estopped from contesting that the
legal title is good for all the purposes of the conveyance.
223

264. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Jennings ». Wood.

GriswoLp & Iazuerr, for defendant:

1, he plaintiff could not recover by virtue of the mortgage,
which became void by payment of the note it was given to secure.
Ejoctment would be defeated by proving failure of consideration
of note, release, or the statutory defense that the debt did not
accrue within filleen years; a fortiori, by payment.

When Jennings took a deed his title was perfect for six months,
and if he had lost it by his own neglect or that of the recorder, he
(Jennings) must bear tho loss.

The evidence shows a payment of the note secured by the mort-
gage.

II. Can ‘the plaintiff recover upon the deed of June 8, 1844?
We claim not. There has been no such record of the deed as oper-
ates as notice to a subsequent purchaser, he record is only
notice of what is in the deed. The name is the most important
part, as title is traced by it. 1 An. U. 8. Dig. 158, sec. 107;
1 Sup. to U. 8. Dig. 534, sec. 355; 2 U.S. Dig. 37, sec, 263.

It does not injure the title of a subsequent purchaser, that he
has notice of the prior conveyance, when he puts his decd on re«
cord. The notice mentioned in tho statute has reference, not to
the time of record, but to the time of purchase.

CatpweLt, J. Tho facts of this caso are substantially as follow:

On April 16, 1842, Lemuel Granger, who was then the owner of
the land of controversy, mortgaged it to Simeon Jennings, to
264] secure tho payment of a promissory *note for $273, payable
in three years from date. On Juno 8, 1844 (tho mortgage debt
(still existing), it was agreed between the parties, that Jonnings
should purchase the mortgaged promises, for the sum of $310;
that the mortgaged debt, so far as it went, should be taken in con-
sideration of the land; and that the balance should be paid in
moucy. In accordance with this agreement, Granger conveyod
the premises to Jennings, but the mortgage was not ontered satis.
fied on the record. The deed, which bears date Juno 8, 1844,
was recorded June 19,1844. The recorder made a mistake in
the record of the deed, in the name of the grantor, recording the
name as Samuel Granger, when the name in the deed, and the true
name, was Lemuel Granger.

Tn June, 1846, Jennings made a lease of the land to Granger,
224

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 265

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

who still remained in possession, for three years ; this lease Wood
surrendered to Jennings in Juno, 1847."

On April 4, 1845, Lemuel Granger conveyed this same land to
the defendant, Robert. Wood ; the deed was recorded on Novem-
ber 6, 1845; in the record of this deed, the recorder made the
same mistake that was made in the case of Jennings’ decd, record-
ing the name of the grantor as Samuel, in place of Lemuel. Gran-
ger romaincd on the premises until the summer of 1847, when he
left the country. Wood, the defendant, went into possession of the
premises a short time before Granger left, and has been in posses-
sion of them ever since. Jennings has never been in actual pos-
of the premises. There is no evidence that Wood ever had actual ,
notice of the conveyance to Jennings, or of his having any claim
on the property. Indeed it would appear that Jennings was not
free to disclose his claim.

Lorenzo Roath, who lives in the neighborhood, a witness who
was sworn on the trial, states that he had a conversation with
Jennings shortly before Granger left; that Jennings asked him if
Wood had purchased the property, and that he inquired whether
or not Wood was making improvements on it. He says Jennings
did not set up any claim to the property; he states *that [265
Wood found out Jennings’ claim as soon as any one else; but that
he (Wood) did not hear of it until after Granger had loft.

Jennings-himself states, in an answer to a bill in chancery, filed
against him in reference to the same matter, that the first con-
yersation he had with Wood, was in the spring of 1847, (when
the subject of Wood having purchased the land, was matter of
‘conversation) ; that he did not say anything to Wood about his
claim on the land, as he thought it more prudent to examine into
the facts, examine the records, ctc., than to make known his claim,
to one claiming adversely, and that therefore he refrained from
making known his claim—apparently, as it would seem to us,
acting on the presumption that Wood was not acquainted with his
claim to the property. This is unimportant, however, as there is
no evidence (as we have before remarked) going to show that
‘Wood had actual notice of Jennings’ title, and it is for the opposite
party to prove that fact.

The court of common pleas charged the jury that the record of
the deed of Simeon Jennings was no notice to Wood of the title
vou. xx—l5 225

266 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

of Jennings to the lands in controversy, such as would prevent
his (the said Wood’s) title attaching to said lands.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant; a motion was
made for a new trial, which was overruled, and judgment entered
on the verdict. It is assigned for error, that the court erred in
not granting a new trial, and also in the charge to the jury. The
error assigned to the charge of the court to the jury, presents the
principal question in this case.

Was, then, the record of Jennings’ deed such a record as to
chargo Wood with legal, or constructive notice of Jennings’ title?

If Jennings had delayed to put his deed on record for more than
six months, his title would have not have availed him against a
purchaser, who had purchased subsequent to that time, without
266] actual notice of the existence of his title. And why? *Be-
cause he had failed to put on record that notice which would en-
able every person, by the ordinary inquiry—by an examination
of the records—to ascertain its existence. The obligation rests on
the party holding the title, to give the notice. He controls the
deed ; he can put it on record or not, at his pleasure. If from any
cause he falls short of giving the legal notico, the consequences
must fall on himself. It is his own business, and he must suffer
tho consequences of its being imperfectly performed. Did Jen-
nings have notice of his title placed on record? He did not; the
deed put on record purported to be a deed from a different person.
It is only by the names of the parties conveying, that a claim of
title can be traced. Take the title in controversy as an illustra-
tion.

If a person had gone to the record to ascertain the situation of
this title; if, commencing at the source of titles, he had traced if
down from grantee to grantee, until he should have found that the
title had passed to Lemuel Granger, then all that he would have
had to do to ascertain whether the record showed any conveyance
from Lemuel Granger, would be to examine tho index, to ascertain
whether any conveyance had been made by Lemuel Granger; if
none such appeared, then the record would give notice of no such
conveyance. It would give him notice, however, that the title
was still in Lemuel Granger.

The reason that a party is chargeable with constructive notice,
is, that by an examination of the record, he will have actual

notice. The deed actually shown on record, was by a person who
226

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 267

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

had nothing to do with the title, and was, to all intents and
‘purposes, a different conveyance from the one by which Jennings
claims. But it is said that Jennings had a good deed, and that he
had done all that it was necessary for him to do; that the mistake
was that of the recorder, and that he should not suffer for the
default of the officer. It may be a hardship on Jennings—it no
doubt is; but here one of two innocent persons must suffer ; and.
whenever this is the case, the rule is, that *the misfortune [267%
must lie where it has fallen—it must rest on the person in whose
business, and under whose control it happened.

The case of Sawyer & Rogors v. Adams, 8 Vt. 172, is very much
in point in this case. In that instance, the town clerk had re-
corded a deed in a book that had ceased for a number of years to
be a book in which deeds were recorded, and failed to put the
names in the index. In that instance, as in this, the recorder
made the usual entry of the record on the back of the deed. The
court decided that the deed could not be said to be recorded, and
consequently it was no notice to subsequent purchasers. The court
say: “In such cases the purchaser may be wholly free from fault or
negligence. Hoe may deliver his deed to the proper officer, and it
may be returned to him as recorded ; but, through accident or de-
sign, it is not truly recorded. Subsequent purchasers or creditors,
having no other means of knowledgo of the contents of the deed
than by resorting to the records, can not be considered as having
notice of any other conveyance than such as appeared on record.”
‘The case of Sawyer v. Crague, 10 Vt. 555, is of a similar character.
There the deed was duly presented for record; but the clerk, by
mistake in the description of the lot, put the words “west half,”
in place of the words “east half,” in the record; the court held
that no record had been made of the deed, and that a subsequent
purchaser took the property without notice.

But it is contended that Jennings had a right to recover, by
virtue of his mortgage ; that that mortgage still remains on record
uncancelled, and that the note secured by it fell due in 1845, be-
fore the commencement of the suit; that the conveyance to Jen-
nings of the fee was merely a conveyance of the equity of redemp-
tion, and that Jennings still bad the right to set it up to protect
himself against subsequent purchasers. The payment of the mort-
gage debt, both in equity and at law, operates ag an extinguish-
ment of the mortgage.

227

268, 269 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

But it is said that the mortgage debt was not paid. It is true
268] the money was never paid; but that which the parties *treated
as its equivalent was paid. A deed in fee simple was given for tho
property. Part of the consideration was paid in money, and the
palance by Jennings delivering to Granger the note secured by
the mortgage; and this was done before the note became due.
‘When the note was thus paid off, we can not see how any vitality
could remain in the mortgage that was given solely for the pur-
pose of securing the payment of the note. The debt of Granger
had ceased to exit was, as we think, paid, and if the mortgage
‘was not entered cancelled, it should have been. Nor was there any-
thing in the sale of the property that went to vitiate it. Jennings
received a complete title for the property, and if his deed had been
duly recorded, his title would have remained perfect.

As an item of notice on the record, the mortgage merely gave
notice of its own existence; the existence of no other deed could

. be inferred from it, We think the court of common pleas ruled
correctly, both in the charge to the jury, and in overruling the
motion for a new trial.

The judgment of the Supreme Court will therefore be affirmed.

Srarpina, J., dissenting. .

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Stark county,
and the error assigned is, that the court on the circuit affirmed the
judgment of the common pleas, rendered upon the following state
of facts, as made known by the bill of exceptions:

The action was ejectment, tried at the May term of the common
pleas of Stark county, a. p,. 1851. :

The plaintiff, to sustain the issue on his part, produced his evi-
dence as follows: ~

“1, A deed from Lemuel Granger to Simeon Jennings, for the
premises in question, bearing date Juno 8, 1844, with indorsoment
thereon by the recorder of Stark county, in these words:
269] * Received June 19, 1844. Recorded same day in vol. 31,
p. 358.

“Joun Bownr,
“ Recorder for Stark Co., Ohio.”
This indorsement by the recorder was admitted in evidence
without objection.
Accompanying the deed just mentioned, were the depositions
228

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

of the two subscribing witnesses, proving its execution, ete, by
the grantor.

IL. A transcript of the records of deeds in Stark county, show-
ing what purported to be a conveyance of tho lands in contro-
versy, from Samuel Granger to Simeon Jennings, and bearing
date, June 8, 1844. Reccived and recorded June 19, 1844.

III. A lease of the premises from Simeon Jennings to Lemuel
Granger, dated June 18, 1846, for three years, at $28 a year, rent;
with due proof of its execution and acceptance by Granger, and
its subsequent cancellation on June 12, 1847.

IV. A mortgage deed from the records of the county, of Lemuel
Granger to Simeon Jennings. This deed bears date, April 16,
1842, and was recorded the same day. It conveys the premises
in dispute to Jennings, with a condition that the deed shall be
void if Granger shall pay to Jennings 8273, with the interest
within three years.

The plaintiff here rested his case.

The defendant then produced the following evidence on his
part:

I. A duly certified copy of | a deed from Lemuel Granger to
Robert Wood, of the same premises, dated April 4, 1845, and re-
corded Mayen 31, 1849.

II. The answer of Simeon Jennings to a bill in chancery, filed
against him by Robert Wood, in the common pleas of Stark

* county. In this answer Mr. Jennings gives account of the money"
advanced by him from time to timo, to Granger. He admits an
allegation in the bill to be true, that on *February 6, 1839, [270
said Lemuel Granger executed and delivered to him a mortgage
deed of the same premises, to secure the payment of a note for
$130, payable in one year from that date, with interest; which
mortgage deed was recorded in Stark county records, he thinks,
in the book and upon the page set forth in the bill.

He admits that on March 2, 1841, said Granger executed to
him a second mortgage of same premises, to secure the payment
of a note for $54. And on April 16, 1842, said Granger executed
to him a third mortgage of the same lands, to secure the payment
of a note for $273, which embraced the suount due on the two
first notes.

He says all three of said mortgage deeds were on record in
Stark county before said Robert Wood pretended to purchase said.

229

201 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

. Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

land from said Lemuel Granger, and that they were in no wise
satisfied, and that no part of the money has at any time been paid,
which they were given to secure.

He says, that on June 8, 1844, said Granger applied to him to
become the absolute purchaser of the mortgaged premises, and
that he did, on that day, purchase the premises at, and for the
price of $310; and the amount then due from said Granger be-
ing deducted from the purchase price, he paid to him (Granger)
the balance in money, and took his deed in fee simple, with the
usual covenants, which said deed he deposited, on June 19, 1844,
witb the recorder of the county, for record.

He deties that any of said mortgages, remaining of record, as
aforesaid, have been satisfied or paid in any other way than as
herein set forth.

The defendant then called Lorenzo Roath, who testified that
plaintiff Jennings was never in possession of the premises, to his
knowledge; that Granger left over two years ago, and that Wood
was in possession a short time before Granger left; that Jennings
asked him if Wood had purchased the farm, and whether he was
making any improvements. Witness told him he was. Jennings,
271] at that time, as witness heard, set up no *title to the prem-
ises. Witness did not hear that Jennings laid any claim to the
land until Granger had left.

Witness being cross-examined, says: There was no other
Granger in that neighborhood—no other man by the name of
Granger. Wood found out that Jennings laid claim to the land
8 soon as any other person, but not till Granger had gone. It is
about three years, it may be four, since Granger left.

Soon after Granger left, Jennings informed Wood that he
slaimed the land. Witness is a brother-in-law of Wood.

Defendant here rested.

The plaintiff then called Joseph J. Brooks, who testified that
Granger left the country in the summer of 1847.

He also offered in evidence a duly certified copy of a deed of
the same premises, from Samucl Granger to Robert Wood (the de-
fendant), dated April 4, 1845, and recorded in the records of Stark
county, November 6, 1845.

It was agreed on the trial, that the title to the lands in the de-
elavation mentioned, was in Lemuel Granger, before any of the
foregoing deeds and mortgages were made, and that he was the

230 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

common source of title. ‘This was the testimony, and the whole
testimony, in the case.

Among otber things, the court charged the jury, that the record
of the deed to Simeon Jennings, wherein the name of the grantor
is written by the recorder, Samuel Granger, instead of Lemuel
Granger, as in the original, was no notice to Wood of the title of
Jennings to the land in controversy ; that it would not prevent
‘Wood’s title attaching to said lands, under his deed, which was re-
corded March 30, 1849. An exception was noted to this ruling of
the court.’ The jury returned a verdict for defendant.

The plaintiff filed his motion for a new trial, for the reasons
that: 1. The verdict was against the evidence. 2. The verdict
was against the law. 3. The court erred in their charge to the
jory. :

The court overruled the motion for a new trial, and the plaint-
iff excepted.

+I maintain that the judgment of the court of common [272
pleas was erroneous, and should have been reversed by the Su-
preme Court on the circuit, for the following reasons :

1. The plaintiff in ejectment showed himself entitled to recover,
when he had introduced on the trial the original deed in foo
simple from Lemuel Granger to Simeon Jennings, bearing date
June 8, 1844, with proof of its execution, and the certificate of the
proper officer, that it had been duly recorded on the 19th day of
Juno, in the same year.

This proof, as I apprehend, rendered the plaintifi’s position im-
pregnable, as against every assault that could be made upon it in
a court of law, except through the instrumentality of a prior
grant.

It will not do to say that a transcript from the record of deods,
showing a conveyance from Samuel Granger to the plaintiff's
lessor, of the same premises, dated and recorded on the same day,
shall divest Jennings of the fee. Won constat but what this was a
differént instrument. If the defendant would prove it to be the
recorded grant under which the plaintiff claimed, the recordor
should havo been called to show its identity.

But admitting, for the argument’s sake, that which might have
beon proved, that the recorder, in transcribing the deed of Lemuel
Granger to Simeon Jennings, of June 8, 1844, had fallen into the
very natural error of writing the name of the grantor upon the

. 231

273 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

records, “Samuel,” instead of “Lemuel,” would it have vitiated
the grant? I think not—not even if a subsequent purchaser had
been misled thereby, which is hardly a supposable case.

The deed had been made by Lomuel Granger, upon sufficient
consideration, and he had delivered it to Simeon Jennings under
ajl the solemnitics of the law. The grant was dofective in no one
particular. As between the parties, nothing now remained to be
done. For the benefit of third persons, however, and to protect
them against tho possible imposition of the grantor, our legisla-
278] ture has wisely provided that **all deeds for the convey-
ance of lands shall be recorded within six months from the date
thereof’; and if such deeds shall not be so recorded within the
time prescribed, the same shall be deemed fraudulent, so far as re-
lates to any subsequent bona fide purchaser, having at the time of
making such purchase, no knowledge of the existence of such former
deed ; provided, that such deed may be recorded after the expira-
tion of the time herein prescribed, and, from the date of such
record, shall be notice to any subsequent purchaser.”

The act prescribing the duties of county recorders provides,

“that upon the presentation of any deed for record, the recorder
shall indorse thercon tho date of its presentation ;- and, if required,
shall givo to the person presenting tho same, a receipt therefor,
without fee or reward, naming in such receipt the parties to the
deed, the date thereof, and giving a brief description of the prom-
ises. And when such deed shall be recorded, the recorder shall in-
dorse thereon the time when recorded, and the number or letter, and ~
page or pages of the book in which the same is recorded.”

Now, I affirm, that under the laws of Ohio, when a grantee has
presented his deed, within six months of its date, to the recorder,
and domanded that it be placed on record, and the recorder has
returned to him the instrumont with his indorsement thereon,
showing it to have been recorded, with the time when, and the
book and page where it has been done, he has discharged his whole
duty to the public, and his muniment of title can not be shaken by
any subsequent incumbrancer.

The recording officer is undoubtedly liable in damages to any
person injured by his improper conduct. So says our statute. But
who, in the case under consideration, is the injured party? It is
difficult to tell, The true test to ascortain if any injury has, in

, fact, resulted from the slip of the recorder’s pen, is to-drive the

232

DECEMBER THERM, 1851. 274, 275

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

defendant to his action against that officer. The record was made
for his benefit, and to apprise him in due season that the land had
been conveyed. If by reason of a mistake in the recording officer,
he has *not received from the records that notice of the in- [274
cumbrance upon the land, which would have put a prudent man
on his guard when about to purchase the premises, he ought to
recover, in a suit against the recorder, any amount of moncy that
he may have lost through such want of notice. This would lead
to an investigation of the circumstances under which the second
deed was made; and as a preliminary to the establishment of a
right of recovery, the second grantee would be required to show
that he had applied at the proper office for information in regard
to the extent of the incumbrances upon the land in controversy.
He might, or he might not, be able to prove that he sought for in-
formation as to the title, before he received his deed and parted
with his money. Nothing of the kind appears in the ovidence
brought to our notice in the present case. If he did not take the
precaution to apply to the recorder for the necessary information,
surely he has not been injured by the mistake that occurred in the
record, and the officer should not be held amenable to any one.
If he did apply, and caused a search of the records to be made,
then a source of information would have come within his reach,
which I shall-notice under my second bead.

My proposition now is, that the deed, being well executed, as
between grantor and grantee, and having received the indorse-
ment of the recorder of the county, that he has placed it duly on
record within the time limited by law, can not be impeached by
evidonco tending to show a mistake in the record. The case of
Bevorly v. Ellis & Allan, decided by the court of appeals, in Vir-
ginia, in 1822, 1 Randolph, 102, strongly sustains this position.

In Janury, 1808, Carter Beverly conveyed to Poter R. Boverly .
five hundred acres of ]and in Culpeper county, by deed of bargain
and sale. This deed was left with the clerk of the county to be
recorded, but before it was copied into the record book, the deed
was lost or destroyed through the negligence of the clerk.

Subsequently the land was conveyed by Carter Beverly to
*Copland & Williams, in trust, for the purpose of securing [275
the payment of certain sums of money to Ellis & Allan. merchants.
The land was sold under the deed of trust, and Bilis & Allan be-
came the purchasers. The bill was filed against Carter Beverly, ©

233

276 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

Bilis & Allen, by Peter R. Beverly, to obtain a docreo for the
conveyance of the land. Bilis & Allan filed their answer, giving
an account of the manner in which their debt arose against Carter
Beverly, and of the execution of the trust deed to secure the same. ,

They said they had no knowledge or suspicion that there was any
claim to the land, except a certain dower right, and denied that
they ever heard of complainant’s claim until the land was adver-
tised for sale; that they had made diligent inguiry in all the
offices where the said deed must have been recorded, and found no
incumbrance on the land. They claimed to be innocent purchasers,
without notice, and for a valuable consideration.

It was proved by the oath of the deputy clerk, that on January
18, 1808, a decd was acknowledged from Carter Beverly, to Peter
R. Bevorly ; that before said deed was copied into the record book,
he bolieved it was taken from the office, privately, by some per-
son to him unknown ; that a diligent search had been made for it,
but it had never beon found,

Section 1 of the act “regulating conveyances,” in Virginia, re-
quired the deed, after acknowledgment, etc., “to be lodged with
tho clerk of the court, to be there recorded.” In section 4, the
same act acquired “ the deed to be recorded,” etc. Judge Brooke
delivered the opinion of the court:

“The court is of opinion that, on a sound construction of the
act entitled ‘an act regulating conveyances,’ and upon the facts in
the record in relation to the deed in question, the appellees had
that constructive notice of the prior right of the appellant to the
Jand sold under the deed of trust, which that act affords to subse-
quent purchasers when its provisions are complied with. The

- 276] certificate of the clerk that the deed was *acknowledged
and ordered to be recorded, and the fact, proved by his deposition,
that it was lodged with the clerk Lo be recorded, was, on the part
of the appellant, a full compliance with section 1 of the act.” .
. . “Nor would that construction be tolorated, which would
make it depend on the acts or omission of the clerk, over whom he
has no control, and with whom the law compels him to deposit his
decd. A different construction would be attended with great mis-
chicf, The act having prescribed no time to the clerk to record a
deed, by spreading it on the record, its validity would be fluctu-

_ ating and uncertain, and the object of the act defeated. ‘If there
is any defect in the notice when searched for, the subsequent pur-

234.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 278

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

chaser, perhaps, has his remedy against the clerk, if it was his
duty to make it perfect. Ifthe deed, in this case, would have
given more perfect notice, by the inspection of it, the appellant
being compelled by the act to lodge it with the clerk, his loss of it
would more properly subject him to the action of the subsequent
purchaser, in the event that he sustained damage.”

Tho complainant had a decree in his favor.

In Administrator of Nye v. Estate of Manwell, 14 Vt. 14, it
was said said by Judge Redfield, in giving the opinion of the
court: “It is true that a deed of land, to be admitted as evidence,
even in a suit between the parties, if proved only by the acknowl-
edgment of the grantor, must be first recorded. But when the
clerk of the proper office has duly certified, upon the deed, that it.
has been properly recorded, we do not think the effect of the evi-
dence can be defeated by showing a mistake in the record; cer-
tainly not, where that mistake does not affect the interest of the
person against whom the evidence is offered.”

In the case of Sawyer et al. v. Adams, 8 Vt. 172, which was a
majority decision like the one I am considering, and, if I may
be allowed to express the opinion, equally erroneous, Judge Phelps,
in his dissenting opinion, takes occasion to say: “By section 5
of the act relating to conveyances, *Rev. Laws, 167, it is [277
required that deeds of lands ‘be recorded at longth in the clerk’s
office of the town in which such lands lie’ . . . I admit that
the deed must be recorded at length in a book which is already,
or which becomes upon the recording of the deed, legally a part
of the record of land titles in the town. But when that is done,
T hold the title to be perfected. I can not admit that the town
clerk is thereafter to be regarded as the agent of the party whose
deed is recorded, for the purpose of giving notice of the deed, nor
that the party is responsible for the officer’s doings. Hence, if
the town dlerk should afterward obliterate, obscure, or even tear
out the record, it would not, in my apprehension, defeat the title.

. . « Suppose the clerk should destory his alphabet, which
would render it necessary to examine the whole record in course;
could it be said that the record would be rendered null and the
titles defeated? . . . The objection in this case resolves itself
into this: The order of time was not observed. Does this vitiate
the record? I apprehend not. It might deccive a person ex-
amining the record, and it might not; and it is for this reason that.

235

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

I hold tho record sufficient to give cffect to the deed, leaving it to
the person who may be misled, to seek his remedy.

“T bave already remarked, that, in my opinion, a deed may be
so recorded as to give full effect to it, and yet the great object of
the statute, the giving notice to third persons, may be defeated, as
respects particular persons; and that the remedy for the person de-
ceived, is by action against the town clerk, and not by avoiding the
title.”

In Alabama, where the registry laws are very similar to our own,
it has been decided that the deposit of a deed for record is equiva-
lent, so far as the question is connected with registration, to the
recording of the deed. Dubose v. Young & McDowell, 10 Ala.
868. Sce also Greenleaf’s notos to Cruise on Real Property, vol. 2,
p. 546, where the learned commentator says: “ And a deed is reg-
278} istered in contemplation *of law when it is entitled to reg-
istration, and is deposited with tho register, in his office, for that
purpose.”

In Piatt v. St. Clair’s heirs and others, Judge Wright, in his Ohio
Supreme Court Reports, 529, remarks : “« This deed was recorded, but
the recorder, in searching for conveyances, in the multitude of them,
by mistake overlooked this. . . . The question before us is not
one of notico to an after-purchaser of the same property; but if
it were, the fact of the deed being on record would be conclusive ;
the mistake of the recorder, in overlooking it, could not have the
effect of divesting the legal title from one guilty of no laches or fault.”
So in the case at bar: The decd of Jennings was recorded. It
showed him to be the proprictor, in fee simple, of the identical
tract of land, fairly and fully described by its metes and bounds
and number of acres. It further showed that the land conveyed
‘was the same land that Granger then resided on, and the brother-
in-law of Wood swore that no person by the name of Granger, ex-
cepting Lemuel, lived in that neighborhood. The mistake of the
recorder in writing the name of the grantor npon his record or in
his index, would not divest tho legal title from Jennings, who was
“guilty of no laches or fault.”

If aslip of the pen, a mere clerical error of the recorder, is to
Have the effect to avoid the grant without any fault in the grantee,
then it behooves the legislature speedily to provide an additional
officer for each recording office—one whose duty it shall be to
compare every word with the original deed, and see to it that the
236

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 279

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

letters are all crossed and dotted in strict similarity with those in
the writing which is copied; and even then mistakes may inter-
vene, which, under the present decision, will oust the first gran- ©
tee of his title. .

The only safe and sensible rule, is to hold a deed to be recorded
or registered, in contemplation of law, when it is “ entitled to reg-
istration,” and is deposited with the recorder, in his office for that
purpose. If through any fraud, neglect, or mistake of the record-
ing officer, the proper notice is not conveyed to a subsequent pur-
chaser or incumbrancer, who suffers prejudice *thereby, let [279
the person thus injured by lack of notice have his redress upon
the man who “makes the mischief.” The Bank of Kentucky v.
James Haggin, 1 Marsh. 225. .

I. The defendant, Wood, at the date of its conveyance from
Granger, bad notice of the prior grant to Jennings—if not actual,
at least sound constructive notice ; and therefore, his purchase was
made mala fide, and can not avail him, as against the prior unre-
corded deed.

In Cunningham v. Buckingham, 1 Ohio, 264, Judges Hitchcock
and Burnet held, on the circuit, that “the omission to record a
deed, did not necessarily ronder it void. That its validity or in-
validity depended on the fact of notice, which might be proved by
the same description of evidence that is admitted in other cases,
That violent presumption, or the proof of such facts as imply
notice, was sufficient. . . . . . That a man was not at lib-
erty to shut his eyes against the truth and shelter himself under
the plea of ignorance. That where a fact comes to his knowledge,
that necessarily puts him.on his guard, he is bound to make dili-
‘gent inquiry, and to search for information at the sources from
iwhich it is most natural to expect it.”

Again, in Leiby v. Wolf (10 Ohio, 84), Lane, Ch. Justice, in giv-

" ing the opinion of the whole court, says: ‘ Whenever tho state of
the title on the record would lead a searcher of incambrances, who
‘was using common prudence and care in investigating a title, to a
knowledgo of a fact, the law assumes that he acquired the knowl-
edge of it, A purchaser from Wolf, therefore, ought to learn all
conveyances from Wolf existing on the record at the time of his
purchase.”

Apply this doctrine to the case at bar, and what becomes of

237

280, 281 * SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Lessee of Jennings v. Wood.

‘Wood's claim that he is a bona jide purchaser without knowledge
of the existonce of Jennings’ deed?

In the first place, I hold that the very slight difference in the
formation of the two first letters (when written) of the Chris-
tian names Lemuel and Samuel, would of itself, put a man of
280] ‘ordinary prudence upon his guard, and lead him to ex-
amine “the premises” in the deed.

But before “ the searcher of incumbrances” would come to this,
whon examining the title of Lemuel Granger to the lands in con-
troversy, he would find, regularly entered of record in the rec-
corder’s office of Stark county, a mortgage deed from Lemuel
Granger, to Simeon Jennings, of the premises in question, bearing
date February 6, 1839, given to secure the payment of a note for
$130, payable in one year.

Ile would also find, duly recorded, another mortgage deed from
Lemuel Granger to Simeon Jennings, of the same premises, bearing
date March 2, 1841, given to secure the payment of a note for $54.

He would also find, duly recorded, another mortgage deed from
Lemuel Granger to Simeon Jennings, of the same premises, bear-
ing date April 16, 1842, given to secure the payment of a note for
$273.

After making these discoveries, the candid inquirer would seek
to ascertain from the record, or from the mortgagee, whether these
incumbrances had been removed. If from the record, he should,
in turning over the leaves, find, in a modorn index or alphabet,
mention made of a deed from Samuel Granger to Simeon Jennings,
but nothing further from Lemuel Granger, he would say at once,
as the witness said in court, “there is no other Granger living in
this community but Lemuel, and as this deed appears to be made
to Simeon Jennings, the mortgagee, it is worth my while to read
the description of the premises conveyed.”

In doing this, he would meet with actual notice of the grant.
And 80 if he should apply to Jennings, the mortgagee. He would
be told what he could not learn from the record, that the mort-
gages wero satisfied, not by the payment of tho money, but by a
conveyance in fee of the promises from Granger to Jennings.

In truth, it would seem that on which side soevor the inquirer
281] *might turn, he would encounter unmistakable signs of the
claim of Jennings to the land.

Did Robert Wood make an investigation of the title before he

238

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 282

Lessee of Jennings v, Wood.

took from Granger a deed of the land? If he neglected to in-
quire, it was at his peril, and he is in that case chargeable, con-
structively, with notice of what he might have loarned had he
made an examination.

Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 269; Jackson ex dem. Gilbert v. Bur-
cott, 10 Johns. 457; Kendall v. Lawrence, 22 Pick. 540; Newman
v. Chapman, 2 Rand. 93; Worseley v. De Mattos, 1 Barr. 474.

III. I insist, moreover, that the plaintiff below was entitled to
recover upou the introduction of either one of the three mortgage
deeds from Lemuel Granger to Simeon Jennings, all of which had
become absolute at law, were prior in date to defendant's deed,
and all duly recorded.

But it is claimed that these mortgages were satisfied by the de-
livery of the absolute deed, and consequently that they would not
support the action of ejectment.

The great error into which a majority of the court has fallen,
as I apprehend, is this, that they venture to treat a mortgage as
satisfied, without satisfying the debt which the mortgage was
given to secure. So far as the records of the county show, the
condition of each one of these mortgago deeds is broken, and
there is no entry, whatever, of satisfaction.

The parol proof offered on the trial below, tended to show that
the absolate deed was designod to satisfy the mortgage debt, but
it also appeared that not one dollar in money had been paid by
the mortgagor for this purpose.

The great difficulty with this decision is, that it permits those
claiming under the mortgagor to set up the absolute deed for one
purpose, and to break it down for another. It is a sufficient deed
to operate as a satisfaction of the mortgage debt, and to oust Jen-
nings of the fee which vested in him upon the breach of the sev-
eral conditions in the mortgage deeds; but having answered that
end, it is good for no. other purpose whatever.

*If this absolute deed is inoperative by reason of the mis- [282
take committed by the recorder, and the land does not pass to
Jennings, how, in the name of common senso, has the mortgage —
debt been paid?

But this is all wrong. The legal title to this land was in Jen-
nings, from the time the condition in the first mortgage deed
was broken, in February, 1840. The deed of June 8, 1844, was

239

283 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Myers of al. », Manhattan Bank.

useful for no other purpose than to convey to him the equity of
redemption, until then, outstanding in Lemucl Granger.

The acceptance of this last deed by Jennings did not have the
effect to extinguish any one of the mortgage deeds. All or any
of them could be kept open, if the interest of the assignee of the
equity required it. 7 Green], 381; 6 Serg. & Rawle, 559; 5 Pet.
481, .

In Hughes v, Bdwards, 9 Wheat. 499, the court say: “Tho
mortgagor after forfeiture, has no title at law, and none in equity
but to redeem upon the terms of paying the debt and interest.
His conveyance to a purchaser with notice, passes nothing but an
equity of redemption, and the latter can, no more than the mort-
gagor, assert that equity against the mortgagee, without paying
the debt or showing that it has been paid.”

The case of Warner v. Winslow, 1 Sanford’s Ch. 430, is in many
of its prominent features, “on all fours” with the case at bar, and
shows clearly and conclusively, that after Jennings had purchased
in the equity of redemption from Grangor, the mortgage deeds
would be rendered operative to protect his interest in the land,
even though the mortgage debt should have been paid. If the
mortgage deeds were operative, I suppose no one will doubt the
right of the plaintiff below to recover in ejectment.

In Frische v. Kramer’s Lessee, 16 Obio, 188, Judge Hitchcock
laid down the law correctly, “that after condition broken, the
mortgagee may ‘maintain ejectment for the land against the mort-
gagor, or any one claiming under him.”

283] .*On either one of these three points, I would have advised
that the judgment below be reversed.

James Myzrs er au. v. Taz Mannarran Bank.

The territory of Michigan was organized by act of Congress, in 1805, and a
territorial government erected therein, that continued until her admission
into the Union, in 1837. In 1835, the people adopted a State constitution,
and elected a legislative body under it, which passed an act to incorporate
the Manhattan bank, in March, 1886, Held: that the creation of a cor-
poration is an exercise of sovereign legislative power; that at the time

said act of incorporation was passed, the territorial government was still ~

240

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 284

‘Myers et al. ». Manhattan Bank.

in existence, and therofore the legislative assembly, under tho constitu-
tion, could not oxercise legislative power, and said act was void, as repug-
nant to the act of Congress organizing the territory.

The village of Manhattan, where the bank was located, was never de facto
under the jurisdiction of the State of Michigan.

If the bank had beon incorporated and authorized to do # banking business
while it remained under ihe jurisdiction of Michigan, such authority
would not have continued after it came under the jurisdiction of this
state. (1)

Associations “incorporated by a law of this state” are alone exempted from
the operation of our restraining laws, and slone authorized to issue notes
and bills to ciroulate as money. (Act of January 27, 1816, “to prohibit
the issuing and circulating unauthorized bank paper,” and amendatory
acts.)

All securities given to an unauthorized bank are void.

Error to the common pleas of Lucas county.

In the common pleas, the Manhattan Bank sued Myers, and
Stephens B. Comstock, in assumpsit, on a note executed by Myers’
partner, in the name of the firm of Myers & Oo., to Comstock, or
order, December 31, 1837, payable at the Manhattan Bank, sixty
days after date, for $1,000; which note was indorsed by Comstock,
and at its date discounted by the bank. The defendants below
pleaded three pleas:

I. General issue.

IL. Special plea. That said bank at the time when, etc.,*was [284
a company located and doing business in this state, and that said
company, not being incorporated by a law of this state, did loan
money in this state, and issue in this state notes and bills, payable
to bearer, passing and circulating by delivery, and that said
promissory note mentioned in the declaration, was made payable
at said bank, ete.

UI. Special plea. That said bank, at the time when, etc., was an
unauthorized bank, within the meaning of the statute of this state,
in such case made and provided, and that the promises, and each
of them in the declaration, were payable at said bank, ete.

Replication to second plea. That said bank was incorporated by
an act of the legislature of Michigan, approved March 25, 1836,
by which the bank was authorized to loan money, issue notes and
bills, payable to bearer, circulating by delivery, to discount and

(1) See act of January 27, 1816, Swan’s Stat. 126.
VOL, XX—16 2A

285 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Myers et al. v. Manhattan Bank.

own the note declared on; that Manhattan continued to be within
The State of Michigan, and subject to the enactments of the legis-
ture thereof up to June 23, 1836; that, by a change of boundary,
Manhattan, on said day, became, and has since continued, a por-
tion of Lucas county, Ohio; and that said act of incorporation, on
said day, became, and since has been, in force in Ohio, and that
the note declared on was acquired by the bank, in pursuance of
the act of incorporation. Concludes with verification.

Replication as to third plea. That the bank was an unauthorized
bank, but was authorized, ete. Concludes to the country.

Four rejoinders, by Myors and Comstock, as to replication to
second plea, all concluding to the country:

1. That the act incorporating said bank was not, at the time
when, ete., and never has been, a part of the public statute law of
the State of Michigan.

2. That said bank was not, by said act of incorporation, au-
thorized to transact business of banking in Manhattan.

3. That Manhattan was not, at the time of the passage of
285] *said act of incorporation, within the State of Michigan, and
subject to the enactments of the legislature thereof.

4, That the act of incorporation never was in force in Ohio.

Tbe cause was submitted to the court upon the issues thus
joined, and the finding was as follows:

“And the court, being fully advised in the premises, do find as
to the first issue, that the defendants did assume and promise in
manner and form as the said plaintiffs have complained against
them ; and as to the second issue joined between the parties—that
the act in the plaintiff’ s replication to the second plea mentioned,
was a part of the public statute law of said State of Michigan, in
manner and form as the plaintiffs have, in their replication, al-
Jeged; and as to the third issue joined between the parties—that
tho plaintiffs were, by said act of the legislature of the State of
Michigan, in the plaintiff’s replication to the third plea set forth,
authorized and empowered to loan money, issue notes and bills
payable to bearer, passing and circulating by delivery; to make
contracts, and to receive, hold, and own, such promissory notes as

_in said declaration set forth, in manner and form as in said repli-
cation alleged.”

Upon this finding the court assessed the damages of plaintiff.

Motion for new trial overruled, and judgment rendered for
242

‘ DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 286

‘Myers et al. v. Manhattan Bank.

plaintiff below. On the trial a bill of exceptions was taken by
defendants below, setting out all of the evidence which is stated
of thé opinion of the court.

This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse said judgment.

Youne & Warrs, for plaintiffs :

The whole matter resolves itself into the single question, wheth-
er the act of incorporation passed by the legislature’ of the State
of Michigan, on March 25, 1836, will protect the defendants in er-
ror from the operation of the statutes of this *state to pre- [286
vent unauthorized banking? If not, the judgment of the court
below is clearly erroneous.

We contend: First. That the legislature of the State of Michigan
had no power to bind ‘the people of this state by the act in ques-
tion.

Second. Tf it had, that the defendants in error have not shown
themselves entitled to the enjoyment of the franchises thereby
conferred.

1. Had the legislature of Michigan power to bind the peoplo
of this state by the act in question?

Until the admission of Michigan into the Union as a state, her

‘territorial government only was recognized by the constitution of
the United States. A territorial and state government can not
exist at onc and the same time. Owings v. Speed, 4 Wheat, 714.
It follows, then, that the torritorial government continued. until
superceeded by that of the state, and until the new state govern-
ment was recognized by act of Congress.

All state legislation, as such, is uuauthorized until the admission
to the Union is complete. This act of incorporation was an exer-
cise of the power of state legislation, and therefore, so far as the
people of other states are concerned, unconstitutional and void.
Jones v. Scott, et al., 5 Howard, 343.

Let us next inquire whether, by the admission of Michigan into
the Union, after the act of incorporation, her case is different?

For the purposes of this argument, we might admit that all her
legislation for the territory, over which she was finally permitted
to maintain jurisdiction, was ratified by the admission. The ques-
tion, however, still remains, whether, by such admission, the par-
ticular act, now in controversy, was made effectual.

And here it should be borne in mind, that the State of Michigan

243

287, 288 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Myers et al. », Manhattan Bank.

never did, in fact, have actual jurisdiction over the territory with-
in which this bank was to be located.

It will nover be claimed that the legislation of Michigan can
have an oxtra territorial operation; and to bind the people by
287] *her acts while in a state of revolution, she must at least
put herself in the position as a government de facto. If the ter-
ritovial govérnment had been abolished, then that of Ohio was in
force. If the territorial government still remained, then both the
claims of Ohio and Michigan were unconstitutional and inopera-
tive. Hither horn of the dilemma is fatal to the bank.

But even if it were different, and the State of Michigan had,
during the contest, asserted, and, so far as Ohio was concerned,
maintained her jurisdiction over this territory, it by no means fol-
lows that her legislation in this case was affirmed by tho act of
admission.

The language of this act of Congress is as follows: “Be it on-
acted, etc., that the constitution and state government which the
people of Michigan have formed for themselves, be and the same
is, accepted, ratified and confirmed: Provided, this admission is
upon this condition, that said state shall consist of, and have juris-
diction over, all the territory included within the following bound-
aries, and none other:”.... (6,U.S. Stat. at Large, 309)—not
including Manhattan.

Here, certainly, there is no express ratification of her former
legislation.

II. The next inquiry is, whether the defendants in error have
shown themselves entitled to the franchise granted by the act of
incorporation.

Sec. 4 of the act of incorporation provides, “that when $20,000
- of the capital stock of said bank shall be paid in, the commissioners
or directors shall procure a convenient place in said village of
Manhattan, and commence operations.” This amounts to a pro-
hibition against the commencement of business until this amount
of capital is paid in. Miner v. The Mechanics’ Bank of Alexan-
dria, 1 Pet. 63; Angell & Ames on Corp. 111.

The act does not create the corporation eo instante. The stock
must bo subscribed before it can enter upon the enjoyment of its
franchise. Walker v. Devereux, 4 Paige, 245.

288] Evidence of user shows sufficiently an acceptance of the
244.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 289

Myers of al. v. Manhattan Bank.

act of incorporation, but not the performance of a condition pre-
cedent. Angell & Ames on Corp. 574.

No proof of a performance of these conditions was offered. The
state might waive the performance, but it is no proof of such waiver
that a corporation uses its franchises. . .

Hitt & Perigo, (1) for defendant:

1. The village of Manhattan was within the jurisdiction of
Michigan, de jure and de facto, at the time the act to incorporate
the Manhattan Bank was passed, and until the change of boundary
by the act of Congress on June 15, 1836.

By the act of Congress of April 30, 1802 (2 U. 8. Stat. at
Large, 173), “to enable the people of the eastern division of the,
territory northwest of the river Ohio, to form a constitution and
state government, and for the admission of the same into the
Union,” the boundaries of the State of Ohio were fixed, and the.
boundary on the north was to be a line running due east from the
southery extreme of Lake Michigan until it should intersect Lake
Brie ; or, in other words, the “ Fulton Line,” the boundary claimed
by Michigan, and south of all the territory afterward in dispute
between Michigan and Ohio.

This boundary appears to have been unsatisfactory to the con-
vention that formed our first constitution, doubts having arisen
as to the latitude of the southern extremity of Lake Michigan,
and a proviso was therefore inserted in sec. 6, art. 7, of the con-
stitution, changing the boundary between Ohio and Michigan and
fixing upon the present boundary, or “Harris Line,” if Congress
should assent thereto ; but Congress did not assent. On the contrary,
an act was passed, after Ohio was admitted into the Union, to or-
ganize the Territory of *Michigan (January 11, 1805, 2 [28%
U. S. Stat. at Large, 309), and by this act the southern
boundary of Michigan is fixed upon the “ Fulton Line,” the same
line designated by the act of April 30, 1802, as the northern bound-
ary of Ohio, and thus the legal boundary remained, with the jur-
isdiction rightfully in Michigan, antil June 15, 1836, when the
present boundary was established by act of Congress.

In this position we are sustained by three different adjudications.
See Piatt v. Oliver, 2 McLean, 282-284, and same case, 3 How.
405-408, and Daniels v. Stevens’ Lessee, 19 Ohio, 222.

1) See also the argument of the same counsel in 19 Ohio, 222.
245

290 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Myers et al. 0. Manhattan Bank.

The matter of jurisdiction de facto is equally in favor of Mich-
igan.
othe act of incorporation of the Manhattan Bank was an exer-
‘cise of jurisdiction to the fullest extent of logislative power, and,
taken in connection with the act of February 12, 1835, by the
Michigan legislative council, prescribing severe penalties against
those who should act under Obio authority on the disputed terri-
tory, is a perfect offset to everything done or attempted by legis-
lative enactment in Ohio.

Moreover, it appears by the bill of exceptions, that “a large
majority of the inhabitants of the village of Manhattan recognized
the authority of Michigan until her admission into the Union,”
and that officers acting under the authority of Michigan resided
there. And see House Journal, 34 Ohio, 126, 127; 34 House
Journal, 85, 61, 123, 144; 33 Ohio L. 92; Act of June, 1835, 34
House Journal, 56-122.

The “Harris Line” was not ostablished until the act of Con-
gress of Juno 15, 1836. Soe 19 Ohio, 222; 44 Ohio L. L. 310; 45
Ohio L. L. 209.

II. The village of Manhattan being rightfully and in fact under
the jurisdiction of Michigan when the act to incorporate the Man-
hattan Bank was passed, as the act emanated from the govern-
ment de facto, it must be held valid.

“It is the government de facto of a country, whose laws
290] *and proceedings are recognized, whether it be a govern-
ment de jure or not. Daniels v. Stevens’ Lessee, 19 Ohio, 222.
But if this were not tho rule, the facts before us are abundant to
show that the act in question emanated from the government
de jure. :

It is a part of the public history of the country, that in May,
1835, Michigan bad a population of over 60,000, and having that
population, article 5 of the ordinance of 1787 (1 U. S. Stat. at
‘Large, 51, note), gave her liberty to form a permanent constitu-
tion and State government, and a right to be admitted by her del-
egates into the Congress of the United States. And by the act
of Congress of August 8, 1789 (Ib. 51), this ordinance was to “con-
tinue to have fall effect.”

The right to form a permanent state government was a political
vested right, dependent only upon the fact of sufficient popula-
tion. ont no provision was made by Congress direct, for num~

46 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 291

‘Myers et al. ». Manhattan Bank.

bering the people, nor was it necessary; for they wero competent
to number themselves, and there can be no doubt that the enum-
eration taken under the laws of the territory was satisfactory and
binding upon Congress and the people of Michigan. The right
of suffrage, accruing to an individual when he attains the roqui-
site age, is no more full, direct, or positive, than was the right in
the people of Michigan to form their state government when they
numbered 60,000. “When the fact happens, the right accrues
and becomes active.” ,

But, waiving the ordinance of 1787, the course pursued by the
people of Michigan may still be sustained by well established
precedent, .

February 4, 1791, Kentucky was admitted without a previous
law of Congress authorizing a convention. Ib. 189.

February 18, 1791, Vermont was admitted under like circum-
stances. Ib, 191.

12 Pet, 724; 1 U.S, Stat. at Large, 401; 5 How. 343, 379. The
court say: “No case can be found where an objection of this char-
acter to a statute has ever been sustained.” 19 Ohio, 222, is to
the same point. 1 Doug. Mich. 119.

*III, It was unnecessary for the plaintiff below to prove [291
that $20,000 of its stock was paid in, or that $2,000 bonus was
paid to the State of Michigan.

By section 4 of the act, the stockholders were made a body cor-
porate until June 1, 1857, and when $20,000 was paid in, the com-
missioners or directors were to procure a convenient place in the
village of Manhattan, and commence operations.

Sec. 22 provides that “unless the sum of $30,000 in specie be
paid into the bank in two years from the passage of the act, and
$10,000 into the Treasury of Michigan in four years, $2,000 of
which was to be paid before the bank should “ commence opera-
tions,” then this act shall become void and of no effect. .

Counsel opposed to us maintain that these conditions are not
cause of forfeiture merely, but are “ prerequisite to the very ex-
istence of the corporation.” Now let us see what in legal con-
templation was to be done before these “ prerequisites” should re-
quire attention.

Notice has to be given; the books opened; stock subscribed,
and part of it paid in; election ordered; directors chosen, anda
president and cashier, or one of them at least—as the remaining.
247

292° SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Myers ot al. o. Manbatian Bank.

“ prorequisites” impose duties rendering such an officer, or officers,
indispensable. An office or banking house, has to be leased, pur-
chased or erected, and money paid or contracts entered into for
the same. And now the first $2,000 of the bonus is due to the
State of Michigan, but it has not been paid. Now, what have we
got before us? Hore is a bank charter, under which stock has
beon subseribed and paid in, a perfect organization effected in
every particular, and contracts have been made and are outstand-
ing for a banking house; an dyet gentlemen tell us that the cor-
poration has not, as yet, come into existence? Is not this declara-
tion absurd? If no corporation existed, how could directors,
president, or casbier be chosen ?

Clearly, then, the conditions are not those upon which the
292] *bank was to come into existence, but upon which its exist-
ence might be continued. And as the bank has once existed,
it devolved upon the defendant below, to allege and prove its dis-
solution. American Life and Trust Co. v. Bayard ot al. 5 Logal
Obs. 18, 14. Ho could not provo or object that it had not been
duly organized. 1 Hall, 191; State v. Carr, 5 N. H. 367.

Cause of forfeiture can not be inquired into collaterally. Re-
eeivers of the Bank of Circleville v. Renick, 15 Ohio, 322; John-
son v. Bentley, 16 Ohio, 79, 104.

The bank has always been recognized. The legislature of Ohio
in 1838, 1839, ropoaled part of its charter, 37 Ohio L.L. 212. The
courts, too, have administered upon it as an Ohio corporation for
the benefit of its creditors.

Ranney, J. On December 31, a. p. 1837, the defendant in error
discounted for the plaintiff the promissory note upon which this
suit was brought, and which was made payable at their banking
house located in the village of Manhattan, in the county of Lucas.
The only question prosented for our consideration is, was the de-
fendant in error, the plaintiff below, at that time an authorized
or unauthorized bank? If the former, the judgment of the court
of common pleas is correct; if the latter, it is erroneous.

From the bill of exceptions it appears that the defondant in
error was incorporated and authorized to do a banking business at
said village, by an act of the legislature of the State of Michigan,
passed on March 25, 1836; the village of Manhattan being at the
time upon the territory then in dispute between this state and the

248

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 293, 294

‘Myers et al. ». Manhattan Bank,

state or territory of Michigan. In January, 1836, the legislative
council of that territory passed an act providing for the calling of
a convention to form a constitution and state government, which
assembled in May following, adopted a constitution, and submitted
it to the people for ratification. It received their approval, and
at the same time in pursuance of its provisions, state officers, a
general *assembly, and a representative in Congress were [293
elected. The first goncral assembly convened, under this instru-
ment, on the first Monday November 1, 1835, and at the same
session this act of incorporation was passed.

In June, 1835, the legislature of the State of Ohio passed an act
erecting the county of Lucas, the northern boundary of which
was the present northern boundary of the state, and included
within its limits the village of Manhattan, where the bank was to
be located. On September 5, 1835, a term of the court of com-
mon pleas was held at Toledo, in the township of Port Lawrence,
and upon the territory in dispute botween Ohio and Michigan.
Manbattan was a village in the same township.

After the county of Lucas was erected, a majority of the in-
habitants of the township of Port Lawrence acknowledged the
authority of this state. All elections after that time were held
under ihe Ohio laws—none were ever had in that township under
the authority of the State of Michigan. No vote was taken in the
township upon the question of the adoption of the constitution,
and the authority of tho State of Michigan was never recognized
by the township as such. In the village of Manhattan there were
officers elected under the territorial governmont, who continued
to act until tho settlement of the boundary dispute; aud a majority
of the inhabitants of that village recognized the authority of
Michigan until her admission into the Union.

On June 15, 1836, an act of Congress was passed, entitled “an
act to establish tho northern boundary line of the Stato of Ohio,
and providing for the admission of the State of Michigan into the
Union, upon the conditions therein expressed.” ‘This act estab-
lished the present northern boundary of this state, and provided
that the constitution and state government, which the people of
Michigan had formed for themselves, should be accepted, ratified,
and confirmed, and the State of Michigan admitted into the
Union, upon the express condition that the state should consist of,
and have jurisdiction over, the *territory included within the [294

249

295 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Myers et al. v. Manhattan Bank.

boundaries thereby established, and none other. Those boundaries
excluded the village of Manhattan from Michigan. On December
15, 1836, the people of Michigan gave their assent to the provisions
of this act of Congress, in the manner pointed out by the act itself;
and on January 26, 1837, another act was passed by Congress
admitting the State of Michigan into the Union, on an equal foot-
ing with the original states; and her senators and representa-
tives, already elected, wore admitted to seats in Congress.

From this statemont of facts, it appears that the act of incor-
poration relied upon, -was passed by the general assembly of
Michigan, after the adoption of the constitution of that state by
the people; and before her admission into the Union by Congress,
it attempted to create a corporate body on torritory then in dis-
pute between Ohio and Michigan; which territory, before the dis-
counting of the note in question, was, by act of Congress and the
consent of the people of Michigan, settled to belong to, and was
brought under the unquestioned jurisdiction of the State of Ohio.
To affirm the judgment rendered in this case, by showing the de-
fondant in error an authorized bank, we must be able to settle in
its favor the three following propositions:

1. That the general assembly of the State of Michigan, at the
time this act was passed, possessed legislative power.

2. That the village of Manhattan was at that time de facto
under the jurisdiction and control of that state government; and,

3. Assuming the truth of the two first propositions, that the
right to bank, conferred by the law of Michigan, continued in
force, and gave the same right to bank in the state after the terri-
tory came under our unquestioned jurisdiction.

Before proceeding to consider either of these positions, the fol-
lowing may be laid down as axioms disputed by no one, via:
That the creation of a corporation is an exercise of sovereign
295] *legislative power, and that it can not be done beyond the
territorial limits of the state exercising such power.

Did such sovereign legislative power pass the act relied upon
by the defendant in error? is the first question. In accordance
with tho provisions of the ordinance of 1787, “for the govornment
of the territory of the United States northwest of the river
Ohio,” and under the authority of section 3 of article 4 of the
constitntion of the United States, Congress, on January 11, 1805,
passed an act to organize the territory of Michigan. It is unnec-

250

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 298

‘Myers ot al. x. Manhattan Bank.

essary to go into detail, but it is sufficient to say that the territorial
government thus provided for, went into operation, and was regu-
Jarly supplied with a succession of officers in all its various de-
partments, down, at least, to the passage of the act of June, 1836,
providing, upon certain conditions, for the admission of Micbigan
into the union. It is very cloar that a territorial and state gov-
ernment could not exist at one and the same time, over the samo
territory. Owings v. Speed, 4 Wheat. 714. It follows, thereforo,
that before a state goyernment, clothed with legislative power, could
come into existence, the territorial government must have ceased.
to exist. The territory was ceded to the federal government, and
pelongedto the federal government in trust, for the purposes spec-
ified in the deeds of session. The territorial government was
erected by a law of the federal government constitutionally made,
in respect to which the constitution of the United States (art. 6),
declares that it “shall be the supreme law of the land, and the,
judges of every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the con-
stitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. ”

Up to the time that the state legislature of Michigan assumed
to incorporate this company, this law bad not been in any way re-
pealed or revoked by the power that made it, nor had they agreed
to or approved of any state government to supersede tho one cre-
ated by it. Nor had the territorial government receded from tho
territory ; on the contrary, it was in full life, manned in all its de-
partments by appropriate officers.

*How, then, was this government, created by a “supreme [296
law” of Congress, brought toa close, and overthrown, so as to
make room for the state government, which brought into existence
this act of incorporation? .It is claimed to have been done by tho
people of Michigan, by the adoption of a state constitution, and
the olection of officers under it; and further, that this might le-
gally be done, as it was done, without the assent of Congress, or
any action on the part of the general government, by virtue of
article 5 of the ordinance of 1787, This article, after providing
that thore should be formed in the territory.not less than three,
nor more than five states, and giving the outline of the bounda-
ries of each, proceeds to say, that “whenever any of the said states
shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such state shall
be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United
States, on an equal footing with, the original states, in all respects

251

297 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Myors et al. o. Manhattan Bank.

whatever; and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitu-
tion and state government; provided the constitution and govern-
ment so to be formed, shall be republican, and in confirmity to the
principles contained in these articles.”

By article 4, it is provided that ‘the said territory, and the
states which may be formed therein, shall forever remain a part
of this confederacy of the United States of America, subject to the
articles of confederation, and to such alterations therein as shall
be constitutionally made,” etc. These extracts, subject to such
modification as the subsequent adoption of the present constitution
effected, and cspecially section 3 of article 4, in relation to the ad-
mission of new states, show the relation that this territory bore
to the general government, and the rights of inhabitants as to a
change from a territorial to a state government. We have seen
that tho territory, either undor state or territorial government,
must “forever remain a part of this confederacy.”

To sustain the power of the State of Michigan to legislate be-
fore her admission into the Union, we are referred to the case of
297] Scott. The Detroit Young Men’s Society, decided by *the
Supreme Court of Michigan (1 Doug. 119), and to the same caso
in the Supreme Court of the United States, 5 How. 343. In this
case it became indispensable for the defendants in error to estab-
lish two facts: first, that they were duly incorporated; and, sec-
ond, that they bad a deed from the government of the land in con-
troverry. The first they established by an act of the legislature
of the State of Michigan, passed on March 26, 1836; and the sec-
ond by a deed from the government and judges of the territory
of Michigan, under the authority of an act of Congress passed in
1806, executed on July 1, 1836.

The state court, holding that the act of incorporation “ was not
invalid, on the ground that the state government had no legal
existence until after the admission of Michigan into the Union,
January 26, 1837,” and that “ notwithstanding the previous organ-
ization of the state government, the governor and judges of the
territory of Michigan remained in office until after July 1, 1836.”
The reasons for both these conclusions, seemingly contradictory,
are given at length in the opinion. Iwill not stop to cxamino
them further than to say, that the first is based upon the assump-
tion that article 5 of the ordinance secured, absolutely, the righ to
the people of Michigan to form a state government whenever the

* 252

. DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 298.

‘Myers et al. v. Mnhattan Bank.

territory contained 60,000 free inhabitants; and that “that right .
could in no way be modified or abridged, or its exercise controlled
or restrained by the general government.” The Supreme Court
of the United States dismissed the cause for the want of jurisdic-
tion, and held that “in order to givo this court jurisdiction, the
statute, the validity of which is drawn in question, must be passed
by a state a member of the Union, and a public body owing obe-
dience and conformity to its constitution and laws,” and that if
public bodies, not duly organized or admitted into the Union,
undertake to pass laws which might encroach on the Union or
its granted powers, they might bo put down under the power
to suppress insurrections, or by the penal laws of the states or
territories in which they are situated; but that their measures
*were not examinable by this court on writs of error. They [298
are not a state, and can not pass statutes within the meaning of
the judiciary act.

This decision entirely overthrows the position taken by the
court below, and settles the question that Michigan, at this time,
was not a state “in this confederacy,” “ owing obedience and con~
formity to its constitution and laws.” If is insisted that it was
no longer a territory. If a state at all, thorefore, it must have
been one out of “ this confederacy,” in direct violation of the very
ordinance to which she appeals. Justices McLean and Nelson
dissented from the majority of the court upon the qnestion of
jurisdiction. There is nothing to show any difference of opinion
between them and the majority, on the main question; indeed,
tho view taken by the majority, so far as it has any bearing,
greatly strengthens that of the minority. I regard the views
taken by Justice McLean of the merits of the controversy, in the
opinion delivered by him, in which Justice Nelson concurred, as
entirely unanswerablo, and adopt them to the fullest oxtent. He
says: “Michigan was an organized territory of the United States.
Its governor, judges, and all otber territorial officers, wore in the
discharge of their various functions. The sovereignty of the
Union extended to it. Under theso circumstances the people of
Michigan assembled, by delogates in convention, and adopted a
constitution, and under it clected members of both branches of
their legislature, governor, and judges, and organized the state
government. No serious objection need be made, in my judg-
ment, to the assemblage of the people in convention to form a

253

299 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Myers et al, ». Manhattan Bank.

constitution, although it is the more regular and customary mode
to proceed under the sanction of an act of Congress.

“Bat until the State is admitted into the Union by act of Con-
gress, the territorial government remains unimpaired. No act
of the people of the territory, without the sanction of Congress,
can change the territorial into a state government. Tho act to
incorporate the Detroit Young Men’s Society, was the exorcise of
299] sovereign power—a power totally repugnant to the *sover-
cignty of the Union in its territorial form. This act of incorpo-
ration was repugnant to the constitution of the United States,
under which the territorial government was organized; it was
repugnant to the laws of Congress, which formed that organiza-
tion; it was an exercise of sovereignty incompatible with the
sovereignty of the Union, in all its legal forms,

«“ The two sovereignties of the state and the territorial govern-
ment-can not exist at the same time, within the same limits. The
territorial government exists in full vigor until it is abolished by
the admission of the state.”

Satisfied of the correctness of these positions, and yielding
obedience to the positive requirements of the constitution of the
United States, we hold that the legislature of the State of Michi-
gan, assembled under tho constitution afterward submitted to
Congress, could not, on March 25, 1836, when the act in question was
attempted to be passed, rightfully exercise any legislative power
whatever,

The next question arising, is, was the village of Manhattan at
this time de facto under the control and jurisdiction of this in-
choate state government? We have come to the conclusion that
it was not a government de jure. The utmost that possibly could
be claimed for it, would be, that its acts were binding upon those
who lived under and submitted to its authority. No question here
arises between this state and the territory of Michigan. A ques-
tion of that character was raised and settled by this court at its
last term, in the case of Daniels v. Stevens’ Lessee, 19 Ohio, 222.
It was there held that until the act of Congress of June, 1836, the
territory in question did not come within the actual jurisdiction
of the State of Ohio. No doubt is suggested of the correctness
of that decision, although it must be confessed that it took a dif
ferent viow of the mattor from that constantly maintained by the
legislative and executive departments of the government of this

254

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 3800, 301

~
Myers of al. ». Manhattan Bank,

state. In Juno, 1835, the general assembly erected the county of
Lucas, and, in the most positive manner, extended the jurisdiction
of our *laws to the present boundary of the state, including [800
all the territory in dispute.

Governor Lucas, in his message to the general assembly in De-
cember following, says: “ Farris’ line bas been traced and plainly
remarked. Tho laws of Ohio are in full operation south of that
line, and jurisdiction actually: ewercised to the same, in accordance
with what must be considered, by a careful and impartial examina-
tion of the facts, as the established, incontrovertible, constitutional
rights of the state.” But itis not enough to make this act of in-
corporation valid, to show that Manhattan was aot within the
jurisdiction of Ohio, but it must at least be shown that it was
under the actual control, and submitted to the assumed authority
of the State of Michigan. Submission to the ¢erritorial government
is as fatal as though the territory had been in Obio, As a govern-
ment can only act through its officers and constituted authorities,
their presence, and the exercise of their functions, are commonly
the evidence which marks the exertion of authority, and deter-
mines the character and extent of the jurisdiction claimed and ex-
ercised over the people. The bill of exceptions in this case does
not furnish one particle of evidence that any authority whatever
was over exercised by the State of Michigan, within the township
in which this bank was located; but the contrary is most mani-
fest. They took no part in framing or adopting the constitution.
Before its adoption they organized and acted, and ever aftor
held elections under the laws of Ohio, and acknowledged its juris-
diction. They held no elections under the laws of Michigan, and
never acknowledged its authority. It is true that a majority of
the inhabitants of the village of Manhattan, constituting, however,
but a small minority of the township in which it was located, were
favorable to Michigan, and recognized her authority ; and terri-
torial officers, residing Uhere at the time the township organized
under the Ohio laws, continued there until the final settlement of
the dispute. There is no evidence whatever, that any state officer
‘was ever within *the township, or that one act indicative of [801
authority by the state, was ever performed there.

We can not, therefore, say, that at the time of the passage of
the act in question, the state government of Michigan was de facto
in the exercise of jurisdiction over the territory where this bank

. 255

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Myers ot al. v. Manhattan Bank.

was located. I have not adverted specially to tho question as to
what effect the subsequent admission of the state into the Union
might have upon her prior legislation, considering it clear that if
she had neither rightful nor actual jurisdiction over this terri-
tory, and the ultimate settlement of the question left it out of the
limits of the stato, it could in no way affect this question, what-
ever might be its effect in places differently situated, and ulti-
mately falling within the limits of the state, ,

But suppose the two propositions we have already considered
were otherwise, and this bank could have beon considered as duly
incorporated by the law of Michigan, could it still continue to do
such business in this state. I am fully aware of the principle by
which private rights of property are respected and protected,
upon a change of territorial jurisdiction from one government to:
another, and fully impressed with the importance of maintaining
itunimpaired. But this principle can never be made to extend
to mere privileges and capacities created and allowed by the gov-
ernment from which the territory is taken, especially when they
conflict with the policy or municipal regulations of the govern-
ment to which it is attached. It would hardly be supposed that
a license to sell intoxicating liquors, granted to a person residing
on this territory while it was under the jurisdiction of Michigan,
would protect him against an indictment under our law, after it
fell within our jurisdiction, although his license had not expired.

Indeed, the principle may be still moro broadly stated, and it
will be found fully sustained by the jurisprudence of every civil-
ized stato, While asa genoral rule it is true that contracts good
in the place where made, are good and will be enforced every-
where, still, the rule is always taken with this important
302] *qualification, that they are not contra bonos mores, or op-
posed to the policy, positive law, or criminal prohibitions of the
state in which they are sought to be enforced. Story’s Conflict

_of Laws, 203; 6 Mass. 378; 13 Ib. 1; 8 Martin, 95; 2H. & J. 193.

This policy each stato must determine for herself. The policy
of Obio upon the question under consideration has been settled
for nearly forty years, by laws still in force. By the “act to
prohibit the issuing and circulation of unauthorized bank paper,”
passed January 27, 1816 (Swan’s Stat. 136), every company or
association, issuing notes or bills intended to pass or circulate by
delivery, not “incorporated by a law of this state,” was declared to

256

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

‘Myers et al. ». Manhattan Bank,

be an unauthorized bank. Any person acting as an officer, or
knowingly receiving or passing their notes, was made liable to
indictment, and subjected to severe penalties; while “all bonds,
Pills, notes, or contracts,” made payable at or to such bank, were
“declared null and void.”

Now it will not be doubted that it was competent for the logis-
Jature to have allowed all persons to bank, or to have prohibited
all; or to do as they have done, allow all incorporated by a law
of this state,” and prohibit all others. The policy of this legisla-
‘tion is perfectly obvious. They intended to guard tho community
against fraud and imposition, by exacting of persons engaging in
this business, the proper security before they were suffered to
enter upon it, and to make them directly amenable for abuses, to
our own laws. This policy would be entirely subverted by allow-
ing institutions created by the laws of other states, and beyond
our control, to do business here. The defendant in error is
claimed to have incurred one of the penalties of this act, to wit:
the forfeiture of the debt sued upon. She admits that she was en-
gaged in the business of banking at the time she took the note
in suit, but claims to have been authorized to do so, not “by a law
of this state,” but by a law of the State of Michigan, which sho
brought with her, and so far repealed our restraining and criminal
*laws. We can not acknowledge the right to make any [803
such importation. To do so would be pressing the doctrine of
comity between states, to a point beyond where it has ever been
carried, and to the subversion of the rights and interests of our

* own citizens, and of our long settled internal policy. Sitting here
to administer the laws of this stato, we can not make exemptions
to their operation which the law itself has not made, and as this
case does not fall within any prescribed exemption; we have no
power to prevent its falling under the operation of the statute.

The court of common pleas erred in overruling the motion for
a new trial, and in entering judgment for the plaintiff below, and
for that cause, the judgment is reversed,

Hircucoor, C. J., was absent.

An action can not be sustained in the courts of a state on an agreement en-
tered into in violation of the laws of the United States, or of the laws of the
particular state. Note to Chitty on Contracts, citing 4 Dall; 6 Binn. 321; 4

VoL. XX—17 257

304 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
Black v. Webb.

§.& B 159; 4 Dall. 308;,28.& R.3i7; 14 Johns. 146; 5 Day, 642; 1 Yeates,
483; 8 Johns. 304; 4 Rawle, 185; 1 West. Law Journal, 261.

‘As to contracts, etc, in Ohio, void in violation of law; illegal exeeutory
contracts not inforced; parties to illegal executed contracts not aided, ete., see
Moore v. Adams, 8 Ohio, 074; Roll v. Raquet, 4 Ohio, 418; Raquet . Roll, 7
Ohio, 77. [But where a person has been fraudulently induced by threats of «
groundless prosecution to execute a note, chancery will enjoin collection, 18
Obio, 548.] Seymour v. Tarnpike Co., 10 Ohio, 476; Nichols v. Poulson, 6
Ohio, 205; Chaffee v. Garrett, 6 Ohio, 421; Spingeon v. McBivain, 442; Gill-
man 2. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 281; 6 Ohio, 21.

A statutory imposition of a mere penalty upon the performance of an act,
as the sale of town lots before plat recorded, does not necessarily vitiate the
contract itself. 9 Ohio, 201.

Sundry contracts—Sellers v, Dugan, 18 Ohio, 493, Brown v. Timmany, 20
Ohio, 81, Illegal contracts in relation to interest—8 Ib. 257; 11 Ib. 489, 498,
417; 10 Ib. 878; 12 Ib. 158, 544; 17 Ib. 605, 336; and see Wilcox Dig.; 2
Swan’s Practice, 915; Curwen’s Cases Overruled, 6; and see Collins v. Blan-
tern, 2 Wils. 341; Ward ». Lloyd, 7 Scott N. R. 499; Prole v. Wiggins, 3 B.
N.C. 230; Paxton v. Popham, 9 East, 408; Id. 417; 5 B. N.C. 666; Outhboré
v. Haley, 8 Torm, 390; 6 Term. 16; 1 Term, 784; 3 Ib. 422; 2B. & A,
368, ete. cited in Broom’s Legal Max. 351.

304] *Joun Buack v. Wintiam WEBB.

Where B. gave to W. a memorandum in writing, substantially setting forth
that B. had received $175 as an advance to buy barley for W., and B,
agreed to deliver at a certain place, within a certain time, and for a cer-
tain price, 1,000 bushels of merchantable barley, it is a contract of sale,
and not an agreement constituting an agency.

‘When before the time stipulated for the delivery, and before actual delivery,
a portion of the barley stored in the warehouse, mentioned in the agree-
ment, was destroyed by a flood, the loss falls upon B., the property being
at his risk until delivery.

Brnor to the common pleas of Stark county.

In the common pleas the action was assumpsit, tried at the
October term of the court, a. D. 1850, and verdict for plaintiff,
(Webb), $253.43, damages, for which judgment was rendered.

Exceptions were taken to the ruling of the court in refusing to

258

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 305

Black v. Webb.

set aside the verdict and grant a new trial; and the whole testi-
mony is set out in the bill of exceptions.

The plaintiff below predicated his right to a recovery upon an
alleged violation of the following writton memorandum, signed by

defendant:
“QOanton, February 7, 1888,

“Received (175) one hundred and seventy-five dollars as an
advance to buy barley for Wm. Webb, for which I do agree to
deliver (1,000) one thousand bushels of barley to Mr. Reynolds’
warehouse, in Massillon, at (35) thirty-five cents per bushel, by
the middle of April next—the said barley to be good merchanta-
able barley. “Joun Buaox.”

It appeared in evidence, that between February 7 and 22,
1848, Black deposited in the warehouse of Reynolds, at Massillon,
six hundred and fifty-two bushels of barley, which was placed to
his credit on the books of Reynolds, and *for which [805
receipts were given, as the different parcels arrived, of the tenor

following:
8 “Massrnnon, February, 19, 1848.

“Received in store, of J. Black, per M: Fulmer, fifty-one and

forty forty-eighths bushels barley, at charge and risk of owner.
«J, L. Reyyoups & Co.”

During the night of February 22, 1848, the reservoir at Mass-
illon broke, and the waters swept away the warehouse of Rey-
nolds & Oo., and the barley deposited therein was all lost. After
the flood, and between that and the middle of April, 1848, Black
delivered at the warehouse of Reynolds, in Massillon, three hun-
dred and fifty-one bushels of barley, which was also receipted for
in his name, and credited to him on the books of Reynolds & Co.
These last receipts, together with those for the lost barley, making,
in all, receipts for one thousand and three bushels, were tendered
to Webb on or before April 15, 1848, but he refused to receive
them, It was understood at the time of this tender, by Webb and
the agent of Black, who made it, that there were then no more
than three hundred and fifty-one bushels of barley remaining in
the warehouse—the rest having been swept away by the flood.
He was willing to receive the quantity on hand at the stipulated
price per bushel, but was not willing to lose the barley that had
been destroyed.

The firm of Reynolds & Oo. never received orders from Black

259

“06 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Black v, Webb.

to deliver any portion of the barley to Webb, and would have do-
livered the property, at any moment, to the person returning to
them their warehouse receipts.

It was in evidence that Black resided in Canton, and bought
the barley there, and sent it to Massillon; that while Black was
buying the barley in smali loads, at Canton, Webb, who was occa-
sionally in Canton, frequently camo to Black’s store, and if barley
was offered by persons when Webb was there, he oxamined it.
This frequently happened. One load, thus offered, Webb said ho
would not take, it being of inferior quality.

306] *Getswotp & Hazurrt, for plaintiff.

Webb sued to recover his advance to Black, of $175, and the
advance in the price of barley. The question arising is, which
party sball sustain the loss occasioned by the destruction of the
barley? We claim that, in the language of the contract, “ Black
was buying barley for Webb,” was an agent, and that when tho
parley was stored in the warehouse of Reynolds it was at the risk
of Webb. Tho fact that Black took warehouse receipts in his own,
name does not conflict with this view: If he purchased faster than
‘Webb advanced money, he had a right to hold on to the barley
‘until paid. But it can not be objected that tho receipts gave Black
the power to sell tho barley, for he did not do so. An agont may
always abuse his trust, but he is still an agent. The parties did
not contemplate a delivery of all the barley on one day. The
contract was to buy for Webb, and he was not divested of his
ownership by taking receipts in Black’s name. The barley
was his.

G. W. Bunpen & Lurrer, for defendant:

None of the doctrines of the law applicable to principal and agent
can be enforced against either of the parties in this case. “For au-
thorities wo refer—

1. As to powers and duties of agents;

2, As to rights and liabilities of principals ;—to 2 Kent, 617; 1
Kinne’s Law Comp. 20; 8 B. Monroe, 310; Peterson v. Poignard,
6 Washburn, 129; 2 Wills, 325; Pet. U. 8. Dig., tit. Agency.

An agent is a person authorized to do some act or business, in
the name of the principal. He is the mere creature of the prin-
cipal—bound by his authority, and subject to his instructions. Tn
this case, Black was not bound to obey instructions, and not liable
for buying bad barley. Webb was not liable for any fraud or mis-

260

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 307, 308
Black v. Webb.

conduct of Black. He would have been, *if Black wasa [807
mere agent. The death of cither party would not have termin-
ated this contract, as it would an agency. If the relation of prin,
cipal and agent existed, Webb could have terminated the agency,
changed the price to be paid for barley, the quantity to be delivered,
and the place of delivery. :

Black was bound to buy 1,000 bushels of barley, let the price
be what it might. Tf he was an agent, he could not buy ata price
exceeding 85 cents per bushel, and if he could not buy beyond

~ that price he was not bound to deliver a bushel. Such is not the
truco construction of the contract. Tho ownership of the barley
never passed to Webb. 2 Kent, 500, 496; Long on Sales; Story’
‘on Sales, 314, sec. 504; Chit. on Cont. 376, n.1; Ward v. Shaw,
7 Wend. 404; Story on Cont. 316, sec. 507. Webb was not bound
to receive the barley before the “ middle of April,” and the tender
was about April 1, of the warehouse receipts—not barley.

Joun Harnis, for plaintiff, in reply:

The contract was ‘only signed by one of the parties, and was
delivered to the other. It was a receipt for the $175. Had the
parties understood it as anything other than a contract of agency
Black would have exacted something from Webb to perfect ihe
contract, or to bring Webb to accept and pay for, as well as Black
to buy and deliver. - Black was under no obligation to buy except
as Webb advanced money. If Black had bought barley at 20
cents or 50 cents per bushel, it would not affect his agency. If
Black received the $175 “ to buy barley for Webb,” it can make
no difference ifhe bought at 10 cents per bushel. He might have
bought as agent to bring custom to his store also, if he made no
profits on the barley.

Spatpine, J. There is but a single question growing out of
the facts in this case. Was Black the agent of Webb in pur-
ebasing and storing this barley at Massillon? or was he the
vender of a thousand bushels of barley to Webb, to be delivered
*within a given time, at a certain place, and for a stipulated [308
price? Ifthe former, the law will cast the loss upon his prin-
cipal ; but if the latter, the misfortune will be his own, unless he
had perfected a delivery of the grain bofore the accident.

We have none of us any doubt that the conduct of Black, in
this’ whole transaction, was what the parties contemplated it

261

* 309 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Black v. Webb.

would be when they entered into the arrangement of the 7th
February. He was expected to purchase the barley, in small
parcels, at different intervals, and to store it, as occasion might
require, at the appointed place in Massillon ; and when the quan-
tity of a thousand bushels should be there deposited, it was doubt-
less the understanding that the warehouse receipts would be
taken by Webb, and the balance of the purchase money be paid
over to Black. But a contingency has happened that could not
have been foreseen, and, of course, was not provided for by the
parties. It was not anticipated that the canal reservoir at Mas-
sillon would break through its banks and flood the town. If it
had been, the parties could have stipulated as to the loss arising
upon the happening of that event. As it is, a loss has occurred
‘without the fault of either party, and the law must decide upon
whose shoulders it shall rest.

Tt seems to a majority of our number that this was a contract
of purchase and sale, and not an agreemont constituting an agency.
If we change very slightly the order of the phraseology, the in-
tent of the parties will become more apparent.

“T do agree to deliver at Reynold’s warehouse, in Massillon, by
the middle of April next, 1,000 bushels of good morchantable bar-
ley, at 35 cents per bushel, and have received from William Webb
$175 as an advance to buy barley for him.

“Joun Biaox.

“« February 7, 1848.”

Now, it made no manner of difference with William Webb
309] whether the price of barley rose or fell in the market be-
tween the 7th of February and the 15th of April, 1848. He was
sure of 1,000 bushels at the price of 35 cents; and, peradventure,
it might cost John Black 50 cents a bushel, before the day of
delivery arrived. There is nothing characteristic of an ‘agency
in this.

If Black purchased all or a part of this “ thousand bushels” of
parley from the farmers of Stark county, on a credit, his insolvency
would not justify them in asserting a claim against Webb for the
price of their property delivered to Black. There is nothing
characteristic of an agency in this.

Again: Webb had no right, by the terms of the agreement, to
dictate to Black when and where he should buy this barley, or

| whon he should stop purchasing. There is nothing characteristic
262

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Negley v. Gard and wife.

of an agency in this. In fact, we do not discover from the testi-

“mony, that any right of property in this barley could vest in
Webb—not even to the extent of the money advanced—until such
time as Black should see fit to make actual delivery of the grain
or pass over to him the warehouse receipts. It is in evidence that
the warehousemen would have felt bound to deliver the barley to
any person, or persons, presenting to them those receipts. These
important evidences of ownership Black retained within his own
control until after the loss.

How can it be said with certainty that this barley would have
been transferred to Webb in case the warehouse had not been
swept away? Black had, in himself, the absolute power of dis-
posal, at any and all times, so long as he retained the receipts;
and Webb could, with no sort of propriety, object to a sale of the
property in store, so that, at the last, he received, in quantity and
quality the barley, which Black had agreed to deliver to him.

By making application of these tests, and others that could be
easily enumerated, we are brought to the conclusion that John
Black, the plaintiff in error, purchased this barley—not as the
agent or factor of Wm. Webb, but on his own private account, and
for the purpose of filling a contract of sale, *entered into, [310
and then subsisting between himself as the vender, and Wm. Webb
as the vendee,

In this view of the subject, the risk of the property would re-
main with Black until he should deliver the barley or transfer the
contract thereofto Webb. The loss happened before such delivery
or transfer, and must be borne by Black alone,

‘The judgment of the common pleas will be affirmed with costs.

Rayner, J., dissented. .
Hircucoox, C. J., was absent, and did not participate in the
decision of this cause.

Joun OC. Nuanry v. AnExanper GARD anp Wire.

In construing a will with codicils, the whole is to be taken together as parts
of one instrument, and if a codicil is signed and attested at the same time
263

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Negley v. Gard and wife.

and place with the body of the will, it may woll be considered as consti-
tuting a part of the original will. (1)

‘Where an executor or administrator, after final settlement, distributes the
Dalance in his hands to a part only of the distributees, such distribution
will not avail Rim against the claims of such distributess as have not re-
ceived their share. :

‘Where one of two executors or administrators has in his hands the balance
remaining for distribution, an action may be maintained against him,
without joining his co-executor or administrator.

Error to the common pleas of Montgomory county.

Alexander Gard and Mary Ann Gard, his wifo, late Mary Ann
$11] Robinson, prosecuted an action in the court of common *pleas
for Montgomery county, against John C. Negley, and declared in
assumpsit for money had and received.

The defendant Negley having pleaded the general issue, the
case was submitted lo a jury, at the January term, 1851, of the
court, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.

‘The defendant below, now plaintiff in error, then filed a motion
for a new trial, which was overruled by the court, and judgment
entered upon the verdict.

Exceptions were taken to the opinion of the court in overrul-
ing the motion for a new trial, as well as to its rulings upon the
trial, and in its charge to the jury. To revorse the aforesaid judg-
ment this writ of error is prosecuted.

Tho crrors assigned present the questions decided by the court.
Sufficient of the bill of exceptions appears in the opinion of the
court,

The court below charged the jury; that “the plaintiffs are en-

* titled to recover a distributive proportion of the surplus of said
estato, after paying the specific legacies named in said will.”

P. P. Lowr & EB. J. Forsyrn, for plaintiff, claimed :

That Nogley, and John McClure, tho co-cxecutors, could not be
sued separately, but must be joined. 5 Pick. 104; Hammond on
Partics 273; 1 Halst. 195.

The settlement made in court with the heirs of N. Lyon, is a

(1) Ex antecedentibus ot consequentibus fit optima interpretatio, 2 Inst. 317.
‘The law will judge of a deed, or other instrament consisting of divers parts or
clauses, by looking at the whole; and will give to each part its proper office,
so as to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties, Broom's Legal
Max. 249. .

264

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 812

Negley v. Gard and wife.

bar to a recovery in this form of action. The remedy is by vacat-
ing tho settlement in the manner provided by law.

The specific legacies in the will must be paid before those in the
codicil. If so, then by what mode of construction is it that the
devisees in the codicil can claim a distributive share of the sur-
plus, when they could not got the specific legacy only upon the
condition that the estate “reached?”

E. W. Davis, for defendants :

That the legacy to the children of Joanna Robinson is contained
+in'the codicil and not in the will, can notaffect their claim. [812
Both are to be construed as onc instrument, 5 Johns. Ch. 343,
Wescott v, Cady. The oxecutor has construed the “within named”
legatees as excluding’the children of said Joanna, contrary to the
intention of the testator. In equity, in case of a deficiency of as-
sets to pay legacies, all the legatees abate ratably. If so all
should share ratably in a surplus. Nash v. Dillon, 12 Eng. Cond.
Ch’y Cases, 116.

We do not seek to disturb the settlement of the account of log-
acics paid. That is correct. But the surplus, whether paid out

or not to legatecs, must be held liable to the claim of plaintiffs
below. There has been no settlement of the surplus. It is not
necessary to make the co-executor a party. Nogley had admitted
of record that he has the surplus, and the action is for money had
and received. .

Hrroncoox, 0. J. Several bills of exceptions were tendered
and allowed in this case, and various crrors assigned; but it is
believed that the whole case depends upon one or two points pre-
sented by the record. On the trial of the case, the tplaintifis be-
low offered in evidence the will of Nathaniel Lyons, oxecuted on
July 7, 1833, and admitted to record in the month of September
of the same year. They also exhibited in evidence the account of
Negley, one of the executors, admitting a large balance to be in
his hands, after the payment of debts and specific legacies, and
also showing that at subsequent terms of the court, this surplus
had been paid over to a part of the legatees other than the then
plaintiffs, the vouchers for which latter payments had been ex-
amined and approved by the court of common pleas, and ordered
to be filed. They also proved that the then plaintiff, Mary Ann

: 265

313, 314 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Negley v. Gard ana wife.

Gsrd, was one of the children of Joanna Robinson. Having in-
troduced this evidence, the then plaintiffs rested.

Whereupon the defendant, now plaintiff in error, moved for
judgment of nonsuit, which was overruled by the court. This
318] *decision of the court was excepted to, and is now assigned
for error.

Whether the court of common pleas erred in this particular,
depends, principally, upon the construction of the will of Nathan-
iol Lyons,

The testator, after directing his debts to be paid, directs his ex-
ecutors to sell all his real and personal estate, and to make provis-
ion for tho support of his wife as long as she shall live; and in the
further disposal of his estate he proceeds as follows: “I will and
dovise to my son Jotham, two hundred dollars for bis legal share,
and should my estate reach, as 1 have directed it to be divided,
my said executors shall allow him to the amount of $400 for his
service, or work which he done for me after becoming of age.

«2, Twill and direct, that should I leave this world before de-
livery of a deed of conveyance, and which is executed and made
to my daughter, Mary Winkley, for a tract of land whereon she
lives, and occupies, lying in Indiana, that my said executors shall
make delivery according to law, to her, said deed for her full share
and portion, which I grant to her, besides $100 to her son John
Winkly, when he arrives to his age, ete.

“3, I will and direct that my daughter Sarah shall have $100 ;
to my grandsons, Richard and William Taylor, each of them $150,
and my said daughters, my grand-daughters, Jean and Hannah
Shearer, cach $100 when they arrive at their lawful age or mar-
riage.

«4, I -will and direct that my daughter Phebe shall have $100,
and to cach of her daughters, namely, to Hliza Ann, Marcy, Char-
lottc, and Lucretia, $100, each of them when they arrive at their
lawful age or marriage.

“5, I will and direct that Blizabeth, my daughter, shall have
$100, and to her sons and daughters, my grandchildren, namely,
to John, Nathaniel, and Marcy Holmes, each of them $100. And
further, 814] I will and and devise *to my grandson, John
Holmes, when he arrives at his lawful age, a tract of land contain-
ing forty acres,” ete,

Noxt, after again directing his executors to sell bis real and per-

266

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 315

. Negley v. Gard and wife.

sonal estate, and make provision for his widow, he proceeds as
follows: ‘“ As soon as the assets come to hand, pay each in propor-
tion to their share, and further, should my estate not reach, to pay
each the amount expressed herein, to be proportioned to each, and
should an overplus be left, after exposing and settling up all the
within-mentioned moieties or portions, then and in that case, to be
farther distributed to each of the within mentioned legatecs, or to
their heirs within mentioned, paying al] reasonable expenses,” etc.

By the last clause of the will, John 0. Negley and John Me-
Clure, are appointed executors, and the will is duly signed and at-
tested. Next follows upon the same paper, the following, which is
stated to have been signed by the testator, and attested by the
same witnosses, at the same time with the signing and attesting
the will:

“Codicil. Before signing, the testator annexed, or caused this
codicil to be annexed, that is to say, that be wills and directs if the
estate reaches, each of his daughter Joanna Robinson’s children,
fifty dollars, and if not sufficient, to each a less proportion accord-
ing to the judgment of the said executors.”

It appears from the bill of exceptions that the several specific
legacies were paid, and the controversy in this case is as to the
surplus, which, by the terms of the will, is to be divided among
the respective legatees.’ It is insisted on the part of the dofendant
in error, that the children of Joanna Robinson are as much lega-
tees as those named in the body of the will, and as well entitled
to the surplus. This is controverted by the plaintiff in error, who
claims that this surplus was rightly distributed to the legatees
named in the body of the will.

Had this codicil, as it is termed, been executed on a day subse-
quent to the execution of the will itself, there might have been
more difficulty in arriving at the intention of the testator. *In [315
such case, however, I am not satisfied that there would have been
any great difficulty. In construing a will, to which are attached
or added codicils, the whole is to be taken together as one instra-
ment. The codicils constitute a part of the will. Westcott v.
Cady, 5 Johns. 343.

But this is a case peculiar in its aspect. ‘The will was drawn up
and prepared for signature, when it is discovered that no provision
is made for the children of one of the testator’s danghters. Whether
this happened from forgetfulness in the testator or by mistake of

267

316 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Negley v. Gard and wife. .

the scrivener, we know not. But when the discovery was made, or
at any rate before the will was signed, this addition of what is
called a codicil is made, and then the two are signed at one and the
same time, and attested by the same witnesses. The attesting
-Glause of the body of the will is, “signed, sealed and published
by the testator, as his last will and testament, in our presence.”
‘The attesting clause in the addition— at the same time and place
the testator signed and acknowledged this annexed codicil.” The
testator and witnesses appear to have been peculiarly anxious to
make it known that this was all part of one and the same trans-
action. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to find any good
reason why avy difference should be mado in the distribution of
the surplus, between the legatees named in the differont parts of
the instrument; and it seems Lo me that the same construction must
be given, that would have been, had there been but one signing,
and that at the end of what is termed the codicil.

It is claimed that the children of Joanna Robinson, were to be
excluded from any legacy whatever, until the other legatees were
all paid. This is inferred from the mode of expression: “If the es-
tato reaches.” This is substantially like other parts of the will. The
first bequest is to his son Jotham—the sum of “$200 for his legal
share.” Then follows “and should my ostate reach,” then an ad.
ditional sum of $400, etc. After directing other legacies to be paid
in full, it is added, “and farther, should my estate not reach
316] *to pay the amount,” etc. In such caso the executors are
directed to pay in proportion to the respective legacies. Taking,
the will itself and the attending circumstances into consideration, -
we are of opinion that the children of Joanna Robinson were en-
titled to their share of the surplus.

Another ground upon which it was insisted that tho plaintiffs
should be nonsuited, was, that in the account exhibited, it appeared
that the plaintiff in error had paid over this surplus to other lega-
tees, and that his vouchers had been examined and approved by
the court of probate. And it is claimed that this account so set-
tled, is conclusive until opened upon motion, or impeached by bill
in chancery.

Where an executor or administrator files his account with the
court for final settlement, and the same is approved by the court,
this is conclusive, unless impeached in chancery. But if fromsuch
account it appears that there is a balance in the hands of the exe-

268 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 31r

Negley v. Gard and wife.

eutor or administrator for distribution, that balance must be dis-
tributed. The executor may or may not at his election make re-
turns to the court of this distribution. The act in force which
governs the settlement of this estate, is the act of March 12, 1831.
Section 14 of this act provides, that after an executor or adminis--
trator shall have made his settlement with the court, by which the
balance in his hands for distribution, shall have been ascertained,
and shall have made distribution such executor or administrator
may, at his option, file in court an abstract of his payments with
the receipts, etc. He may do it at his option, but be is not bound
to doit. The next section makes it the duty of the clerk to give
notice within thirty days after the term, of the filing of such ab-
stract and vouchers. And in section 16 it is provided, that at the
next term of the court after the notice is given, the receipts filed
shall be examined by the court, and if no objections are made, the
court shall allow the same and direct the same to be recorded;
“and the executors or administrators shall, by such allowance, be
discharged from so much of the sum found by the settlement with
the court as aforesaid, *lo be in the hands of such executor [817
or administrator, as the persons whose receipts are allowed as in
this section provided, are entitled to.” The only effect of this ac.
tion of the court is to place upon the record the receipts in the
hands of the executor or administrator, and make them final ag
against those who have signed them, as to so much of the distri-
butive share to which they are entitled. But although the receipts.
may cover the whole property, those who are entitled to a distri-
butive share, and have not received it, are not precluded from en-
forcing their claim.

We think the court of common pleas did not err in overruling
the motion for a nonsuit.

This in effect disposes of the whole case, with the exception of
one point made by the plaintiff in error, which was this: That
the suit was commenced against him alono, whereas it should have
been commenced against him and his co-oxecutor, McClure. It
is sufficient to say that this is an action for moncy had and
received, and the record shows that the money was in the hands
of Negley as acting executor.

The judgment of the court of common pleas is affirmed with
cost. 1

269

318, 319 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Mad River and Lake Brie Railroad Company ». Fulton.

318] *Ton Map River anp Lane Erin Ramroap Company v.
Cocuran Fuuron. (1)

‘Tho owner of a trunk is s, competent witness in a suit brought by him against
2 common carrier, for its loss, to prove the contents of the trunk, and
their value, and for the same reason, the evidence of the wife of the owner
is admissible to prove the same facts.

The rule for the admission of such evidence, does not extend further than
to the proof of such articles as are commonly carried in a traveling
tronk, (2) .

Error to the court of common pleas of Seneca county.

Tho action below was assumpsit brought by Fulton against the
Mad River and Lake Erie Railroad Company, to recover the value
of a traveling trunk and its contents. The declaration avers a con-
tract,on the part of the railroad company, as common carrier, to
carry the wife of plaintiff below, and her traveling trunk and

contents, from Tiffin to Springfield in the railroad cars of said
company, and avers the loss of the trunk and contents by said
company.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

The court below overruled a motion for a new trial, made by
defendants below, and the ovorruling of said motion, and the
admission of evidence of the deposition of the wife of the plaintiff
below, on the trial, are assigned for error.

Lang, Sronz & Laws, for plaintiff in error:

This writ of error presents two questions :—

I. Whether the owner of a trunk lost by a railroad company, is a
competent witness to provo the contents and their value?

319] *II. Whether the wife of such owner is a competent wit-
ness for her husband in such a suit?

I. The main point is one where we can add nothing to the
former discussions and obvious reasoning. I have nover met with
any authority in any respectable book except Greenleaj’s Evidence.

(1) See Levi Sams v. Stewart & McKibben, reported in this vol. on p. 69;
1 West. Law Journal, 448,
(2) See State of Ohio for use Monroe Tp. v. Geo. Williams, ot al. 18 Obio,
495.
270

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 320

Mad River and Lake Erie Railroad Company v. Fulton.

His opinion, as a lawyer, has since been deliberately overruled by
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, where the authorities are
collected and discussed. 12 Metc.44. There is no case in the law,
(Connecticut book-debt excepted), in which a party plaintiff is a
competent witness for himself on the main issue.

IL. But if he were competent, his wife is not. His exclusion is
on the ground of interest: her exclusion depends on a different
rule—a rule of policy, to prevent any possible interference with
the marital relation.

If the wife be competent for the husband, she may be called by
the other party to testify in chief, or may be even examined as to
facts against him. She may be required to testify as to every point
connected with the case, If she enumerate the contents of the
trunk, she may be evon examined as to the title, and required to
relate all she may know, however it may affect her husband.

We can not doubt the reversal of the judgment.

‘W. H. Grzson, for defendant in error:

On the trial in the common pleas, the present defendant in
error, “to prove the description ‘and value of the contents of the
trunk,” offered the deposition of his wife, which deposition was
objected to by counsel for plaintiff in error ; but the objection was
overruled by the learned judge presiding, and the deposition was
read, Did the court below err in permitting this deposition to be
read? This appears to be the only question for decision.”

From necessity, a party must, in certain cases, be allowed to
*give evidence in his own favor, to provent “a failure of [820
justice.”

But we insist that the rule adopted on the trial of this canse, in
the court below, is at once a reasonable and necessary rule. When
an individual contracts to be carried on a railroad, his baggage is
taken into the care of the company. It is removed from the eye
and control of the owner. The company has fall power to pro-
tect the property thus committed to its exclusive care, by all
necessary vigilance. Its failure to do so is not chargeable on the
owner, as he has no power to control or prevent it. He is abso-
lutely excluded from his baggage, and the latter is secured. by the
application of locks and guards, and placed beyond the observa-
tion of the owner. .

The company may, as a protection against bad faith and false
swearing, shield itself: First. By a return of the property, to the

271

B21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Maa River and Lake Brio Railroad Company ». Fulton,

owner, which, with ordinary care on the part of the company, no
combination of circumstances need prevont its doing. Second.
Tho charactor of the party is open to assault. It may be disered-
ited, if unworthy of beliof. Would a respectable witness, for a
Few dollars, perpetrate a foul crime? Not often. The statements
given by him will generally be entitled to entire confidence. They
will often be corroborated, (as in the present case), by the testi-
mony of others. Perjury practiced to injure the company, may
be readily exposed and punished. It is a rule as ancient as truth-
fal, that “for every wrong there is a remedy.” If the rule‘in-
sisted upon by the plaintiff in error be correct, the owner can do
nothing more than prove the delivery of his trunk to the company
—the payment of his fare to its agent, the size and external de-
scription of the trunk, and exhibit a check, admitting the receipt
of it into the hands of the company.

This proof be can easily make. But the number and value of
the Jost articles contained in the trunk, it is often impossible, and
always difficult, to prove. The number, description and value of
articles in a lost trunk, can not often be proved, except by the
321] oath of the person who placed them in charge of tho *com-
pany, and who is most nominally their owner. Experionce and
observation teach this.

The necessity for a departure from the common law rule in this
particular, is too evident to be overlooked by American courts.
In the case cited in Massachusotts (12 Metcalf), tho court refused
to depart from the common-law rule. Our courts should respect
the decisions of the courts of other states, but are not bound by them.
A rule that is unsupported by reason, should not be adopted. The
authority cited is not founded in reason or justice, and should not
influence this court.

We have demonstrated the justice of the rule we claim, and
now assume that it is sanctioned by respectable authority. The
caso of John Romand v. Arthur McGill et al., recently decided in
Pennsylvania, is a caso directly in point. In that caso, suit was
brought to recover the value of two trunks and their contents,
and tried in the District Court of Allegheny county. The plaint-
iff's counsel offered in evidence the deposition of plaintiff and his
wife, to prove the articles lost, and the value of cach. Among the
items were valuable articles of jewelry. The depositions wore
objected to, but the court permitted them to be read to the jury-

272 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Mad River and Lake Erie Railroad Company ». Fulton.

The case was taken to the Supreme Court, on writ of error, and
one of the errors assigned was, “that the court erred in admitting
the testimony of the plaintiff and his wife, as to the value of the
articles in the trunk.” Rodgers, J., in delivering the opinion of
the court, appears to recognize it as an established rule, that a
party may, under certain circumstances, prove, by his own oath,
the contents of a box or trunk, and says the rule “applies, with as
much, if not greater force, to the wife, as to the husband.” To
reject her as incompetent, the court says, “will amount almost to
a repeal of the rule, and in most cases to a denial of justice. This
cace is precisely analogous to the case at bar. And the rule laid
down by the learned judge, is necessary and reasonable, and we
think entitled to great weight. See 3 Barr (Pa.), 451.

*Prof. Greenleaf, of Massachusetts, a man whose legal [822
attainments are surpassed by few in the United States, in his,
treatise upon the Law of Evidence, vol. 1, p..416, and notes, affirms
tho rule laid down in the case cited in Barr—the rule which we
insist upon in this case,

Story on Bailments, 3 ed. 454; Herman v. Drinkwater, 1
Greenl. (Me.) 27; Clark v. Spencer, 10 Watts (Pa.), 335; Dugham v.
Rogers, 6 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 500, and Crane v. Whitesell, 8 Watts
& Serg. (Pa.) 369. These cases recognized and established the rule
Jaid down in McGill et al. v. Rowland, and give us a clear
advantage in the weight of authority. Our authorities, we think,
are at least “respectable,” notwithstanding counsel say they have
never met with any “respectable” authority laying down the rule
that we claim. The decisions of the Supreme Courts of Pennsyl-
vania and Maine are regarded by the profession as of great re-
spectability.

The learned counsel of plaintiff in crror assume that if the party
were competent as a witness, the wife is not. They say “her ex-
clusion depends on a different rule; a rule of policy to prevent
any possible interference with the marital relation.” In Little-
field v. Rice, 10 Metcalf’s (Mass.) Reports, the wife who keeps her
husband’s books was held to be competent as a witness “for him,
in a suit upon his book-account, to testify that sho made the
entries by his direction and in his presence.”

There are other cases in which the wife may be a witness for
the husband. The cases just cited in Pennsylvania are conclusive,
as to her competency in a case like the one at bar.

VOL, Xx—18 273

823, 324 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Mad River and Lake Erie Railroad Company v. Fulton.

Catpwett, J. In the court below, the proceeding was an action
of assumpsit, brought by Cochran Fulton against the railroad
company, to recover the value of a trunk and contents. The
plaintiff in the court below proved, on the trial, that on February
10, 1850, his wife took passage in the defendant’s cars at Tiffin,
for Springfield, having a trunk worth from six dollars to ten dol-
lars, which contained her clothing. One witness testified that ho
823] saw one lady’s dress, and some other ‘articles of clothing
put into the trunk, The company delivered its check to Mrs.
Fulton at Tiffin, for the trunk, and it was admitted that the
trunk was not afterward delivered to her, but was lost or stolen
somewhere on the way between Tiffin and Springfield. Mrs.
Fulton having passed through from Tiffin on the cars, at Spring-
field presented her check, and demanded the trunk.

The plaintiff below having proved the above facts by other wit-
nesses, then offered the deposition of his wife, to prove the deserip-
tion and value of the contents of the trunk. To the introduction
of this evidence the defendant below objected ; the court overruled
the objection, and permitted the evidence to be offered, to which
the defendant excepted. The court gave judgment for the plaint-
iff for the value of the trunk, and algo for the value of the contents.
The contents of the trunk, as thus proved, consisted principally
of wearing apparel, with the addition of a few other articles, such
as ave frequently carried in a person’s traveling trunk.

The only question arising in the case is, whethor the wife of the
plaintiff was a competent witness to prove the articles containod
in the trunk, and also their value. Upon this point the decisions
in the difforent states are somewhat conflicting.

In Massachusetts, the rule has been established excluding such
evidence. In the case of Snow v. The Eastern Railroad Company,
which, like the present, was a suit brought against the company
for the price of a trunk and contents, the court of common pleas
permitted tho plaintiff to testify to the articles contained in the
trunk, and also to their value. The Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts, on writ of error, to the ruling of the common pleas, held that
the evidence was inadmissible, and on that ground reversed tho
judgment. In Pennsylvania, there have been numerous decisions
the other way. The cases of Whitesell v. Crane, 8 Watts & Serg.
369, and McGill ct al. v. Rowland, are both cases against stage com-
824] panies, for lost tranks, and in both instances the *court held

274 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851, 325°

‘Mad River and Lake Erie Railroad Company v. Fulton.

that the plaintiffs were competent to prove the contents of the
trunks, and the value of the articles.

The Supreme Court of Maine, Herman v. Drinkwater, 1 Greenl.
27, decided that whon a captain of a vessel had converted the
goods, contained in a box, which he had undertaken to ship from
Liverpool to New York, in a suit against him, by the owner of the
goods, that the owner was a competent witness to prove the con-
tents of the box. The question has never been decided in this
court, and the decisions in other states being conflicting, we feel at
liberty to adopt such rule as to us appears best calculated to pro-
mote the ends of justice.

The common-law rule, that a man shall not give evidence i in his
own Caso, is no doubt one that has its foundation in reason, and
that could not, as a general rule, be departed from without being
attended with pernicious results. The rule is established, not be-
cause it will tend to the promotion of justice, in all cases, that such.
arule should exist. It can not be denied, that in many instances,
@ party to a suit would give the true state of facis in the case—
would be able to give testimony that would be necessary to a cor-
rect decision of the matter in controversy. And if such would,
generally, be the character of that kind of evidence, it would tend,
in the genoral result, to the promotion of justice, and no rule for
its exclusion could, with propriety be established. But on ac:
count of the strong temptation that selfishness and prejudice pre-
sent to a party, when testifying in his own behalf, to misstate the
facts, it has been thought best calculated to subserve the objects
of judicial investigation, as a general rule, to exclude such evi-
dence altogether. There are cases, however, where from the pe-
culiar circumstances of the thing about which the evidence is to
be given, rendering the testimony of the party necessary; and
where, from some cause, the danger to be apprehended, from a

* party to a suit being a witness, being somewhat removed, excep-
tions have been made. As where a party to the suit, having first
proved the existence of a paper, is permitted to *prove its [826
joss, for the purpose of introducing secondary evidence of its con-
tents. Here the property is of that kind that the loss of it would
not be likely to be known to any ono but the owner, and therefore
the necessity of his testimony. The fact that the existence of the
paper has first to be proved by other evidence, does away with

275

326 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Mad River and Lake Erie Railroad Company v. Fulton.

much of the danger that is ordinarily to be apprehended froma
party’s inclination to swear falsely for his own benofit.

Another similar example is the departure that has, almost
everywhere, been made from the rule, by permitting a party to
testify to his book-account of the salo and delivery of goods, per-
formance of labor, etc. Hore the convenience of business is sup-
posed to create a necessity for a departure from the rule; and the
general notoriety of the transaction is considered a sufficient
guaranty against the false claim that a party, under other circum-
stances, might be able, by his own oath, to prove.

In the first place, then, does the necessity exist for the evidence
of the party, in a case like the present? In many cases no per-
son but the owner will be able to give a detailed account of the
contents of a traveling trunk, containing his ordinary apparel and
such other articles as may be necessary to his comfort whilst per-
forming his journey. If he is a married man, his wife, as in the
present instance, will be the only other person besides himself that
will be likely to know what his trunk contains, and she is ex-
cluded by the general rule, The traveler has delivered hig trunk
to the common carrier, who has obligated himself to redeliver it
to him; but although he is able to prove, by other evidence, the
delivery of the trunk, and the failure of the carrier to redeliver it, -
yet because he is unable to prove the contents, his remedy is
merely nominal—it amounts to nothing—and that in a case too
where public policy requires in a peculiar manner that this rem-
edy should be complete. But it is said that a person should have
his trunk examined before he starts on his journey, by some one
who would be a competent witness. This, however, is requiring
more than the most careful will perform. <A person starting on
326] *a journey does not calculate asa thing likely to happen
that he will lose his trunk; and when he has delivered it over to
be transported, it is only by the delinquency of the carrier that
he does lose it. It is said, however, that if a party be pormitted
to testify to the value of his own property, companios like the
plaintiff in error, whose business it is to carry passengers, will be
subjected to great imposition. We think this objection is imagi-
nary rather than real. Ifthe person be known in the community
where the suit is brought, it will not be difficult to rebut any ex-
orbitant claim that he might set up for the value of his wardrobe.
The character of an individual’s wardrobe is generally about as

276

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 327

Carpenter and wife v. Sloane ot al.

well known among his acquaintances as that of any other part of
his property. And if the party should be a stranger, a great deal
of evidence could, in most cases, be obtained, that would enable a
sensible jury, from their knowledge of men and things, to detect
any attempted extortion. Cases might occur where a person, by
his own oath, would recover more than he was entitled to; but we
think that this evil is much less to be apprehended than the en-
tire failure of justice that would necessarily arise from the exclu-
sion of his testimony. It is contended, however, on the part of
plaintiff in error, that even if the plaintiff below in this case,
would be a competent witness to prove the contents of the trunk,
his wife would not, and that the court erred in admitting her evi-
dence. We do not see why the same rule that would admit the
owner, in such a case, to testify, would not permit his wife. Tho
same reasons would apply in the one case as in the other.

In the case in 3 Barr to which we have before referred, this
question was directly presented, and the court there held that the
same reasons that would authorize the husband to testify, would
apply to the wife, and that her evidence was admissible. No ex~
ception has been taken, in this instance, to the character of the
articles proved to have been in the trunk. We would merely re-
mark, however, that we do not intend to carry the principle
farther than to such articles as are ordinarily carried in a travel-
ing trunk,

*A majority of the court are of opinion that the evidence [827

* complained of was competent, and that the court of common pleas
ruled correctly in admitting it. .

The judgment of the court of common pleas will therefore be af=

firmed.

Hrroncocx, C. J., dissented.

Tar Stare or Onr0, FOR THE UsE or THomAS CARPENTER ‘AND
wire v. Joun SLOANS ET Alw

A guardian for a minor, appointed by the court of common pleas, has no
power to act or to control the property of his ward, until he has given
pond, with security approved by the court,

© att

{200 827)

aos 280)

B28 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Carpenter and wife v. Sloane et al.

Letters of guardianship, issued to him by the clerk, before such bond is given?
confer no such power, and have no legal effect whatever.

‘The issuing of such letters, under such circumstances, by the clerk, does not
constitute a breach of his official bond, so as to charge his sureties. (1)

Enzor to the court of common pleas of Wayne county

The action in the common pleas was brought in September, 1847,
328] on the official bond, dated in May, 1831, of Sloane, as *clerk of
said court, against him and his sureties. The breach assigned in
the declaration, is, that on October 24, 1837, Sloanc, as clerk afore-_
said, issued letters of guardianship to Ralph Funk as guardian of
Mary May, now wife of Carpenter, without first requiring of Funk
a bond, as required by law and the order of court appointing him.
guardian, for the faithful discharge of his duties as such ; by virtue
of which lotters Funk took possession of the goods and lands of
his ward, of the value of $2,000, converted the same to his own
use, and died in March, 1846, insolvent, without having settled
his accounts as guardian, or otherwise accounted.

The defendants filed a general demurrer to the declaration,
which was sustained, and final judgment entored in their favor.

The plaintiff exeepted to the decision of the court in sustaining
the demurrer. This writ of error is brought to reverse said judg-
ment.

L. V. Brezor & Dray, for plaintiff:

Is the clerk of the court, acting as a court of probate, liable for
loss arising from his neglect to take bond, as dirocted by the court,
before issuing letters of guardianship?

(1) A guardian derives his power to act from the appointment and bond.
Lessee of Maxon v. Sawyer, 12 Ohio, 195. Letters of guardianship need not
issue. But whore o guardian’s sale has been confirmed by the court, and the
journal entry of the appointment of the guardian shows that a bond has been
directed and securities approved, it will be presumed that the bond was ex-
ecuted. Ib. In Ohio the guardianship of a minor female expires, by statute,
‘when the ward arrives at the age of twelve. A re-appointment is necessary. If,
without such re-appointment, the former guardian, after the ward arrives at
twelve years of age, files petition and procures a sale of land, such sale is
void. Lessee of Perry v. Brainard, 11 Ohio, 442; Bste v. Strong, 2 Ohio, 451;
Palmer », Oakley, West. L. Jour. 409—Mich. Sup. Court, Jan. 1847; Camp-
bell v. English and wife, Wright's 8. 0. 119.

See Bohart ». Atkinson, 14 Ohio, 228, where an irregular sale was held rati-
fied by the ward receiving the proceeds of the sale, with full knowledge of the
facts.

278

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 329

Carpenter and wife ». Sloane et al.

Our statute speaks of letters of guardianship in one place only-—
the clerk shall be entitled to fifty cents for issuing them. If such
letters are void, as claimed, it can hardly be supposed that the legis-
lature would compel a ward to pay the clerk fifty cents for issu-
ing them.

The law bolds every one liable for false or fraudulent represen-
tations, and is much more strict on officers, in holding them to
Hiability, than on private individuals. 2 U.S. Dig. Sup. 97, 478:
« The letter of guardianship is evidence that the guardian was duly
appointed.” If this is law, the doctrine that letters of guardian-
ship, issued before bond given, are void, and that all persons must
look to the appointment, and its regularity, is erroneous. 10 Ver.
mont, 427: “Letters of guardianship create a trust coupled with
an interest.”

*Strong v. Harris, 3 Humph. 451; 2 Sup. U. 8. Dig. 98. Jus- [829
tices appointing guardians are “holden liable for taking insufficient
sureties.” 1 Swift’s Dig. 51; 1 Day, 315. In Connecticut an action
will ‘not lie against a judge for neglecting to take security of a
guardian, because it is an error in judgment in a judicial proceeding.
As a consequence, a ministerial officer would be holden liable; and
see 14 Pick. 280; 12 Mass. 363; 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 857;
Swan’s Stat. 223, sec. 6; Ib. 162, sec. 1; 2 Ham. 409; 15 Ohio, 15;
6 Ohio, 68 ; Stat. 430, sec. 1; Wilcox’s Practice, 2 ed. 553.

Wittram Tourver, for defendants:

‘The law will not support this action:

1. The clerk did not omit to do any act enjoined upon him by
Jaw. Ho was not required to prepare a bond or compel its execu-
tion. He was merely to receive one, when duly executed, and then
file it. Vide Stat.

2, He did no act forbidden by law.

The court entered on their journal an appointment of guardian.
In issuing lettors the clerk certified that fact and nothing more. He
did not state that a bond was given.

8. Funk never was a legal guardian.

The appointment mado. him a guardian de nomine, and had he
then executed and filed his bond, he would have been a guardian
de jure. The statute declares that before he shall act he shall give
bond. .

4. There is no such instrument known, either to the statute or
common law, as letters of guardianship. The appointment and giv-

279

330 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Carpenter and wife v, Sloane et al.

ing bond conjoined, constitute the guardian. No certificate is re-
quired.

It is also claimed that the suit, if sustainable at all, should have
been brought first against the principal in the bond, the damages
ascertained, execution issued and returned unsatisfied, before pro-
ceeding against the sureties.

380] “Ranney, J. The action in the courtbelow was brought upon
the official bond of Sloane, one of the defendants in error, as clerk
of the court of common pleas of Wayne county. It is averred
that on October 24, 1837, one Ralph Funk was appointed guardian
of Mary May, then a minor (now the wife of Carpenter), and
ordered to givo bond in the sum of $1,000; that without requiring
him to give such bond, Sloane issued to him letters of guardianship,
under the seal of the court, by virtue whereof he took into pos-
session the property of the minor, squandered it, and finally died
insolvent. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained by the
court of common pleas, and the main question prescuted for our
consideration is, whether the facts so charged constitute a breach
of the official bond. By section 6 of the “act to organize the
judicial courts,” passed February 7, 1831 (Swan’s Stat. 223), each
clerk is required to give bond, to be approved by the court by
which he is appointed, in the sum of $10,000, “conditioned that
he will truly and faithfully pay over all money that may be by
him received, in his official capacity, and that he will enter and
record all the orders, decrees, judgments, and proceedings of said
court, and faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the
duties of his said office.”

Té is not claimed here, that Sloane has received money which he
has failed to pay over, or that he has refused or neglected to enter
and record all the orders, ete., of the court, Has he failed to dis-
charge any of the duties of bis office, as specified in the last clause
of the condition of the bond? To do so, he must have neglected
or refused to do something required of him by law; or attempting
to perform some duty, he must have done it so improperly or neg-
ligently as to have occasioned loss to those who had a right to rely
upon his official acts. If, in any matter outside of his official duties,
he injures others, he stands, like all other persons, liable to make
reparation ; but it can not work a breach of his official bond.

‘The wrongful act here complained of, is issuing letters of guard-

280

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. ” 331, 332

Carpenter and wife v. Sloane ot al.

janship before taking bond. The first section of the ** act [881
for the appointment of guardians” (Swan’s Stat. 430) requires the
guardian appointed, “ before entering on the discharge of the duties
of his appointment, in every ease, to give bond,” etc., which shall be
filed with the clerk of the court. There is nowhere in our law
any obligation upon the clerk to issue letters of guardianship, nor
any authority to do so, further than may be inferred from a clause
introduced into the act regulating the foes of officers, which allows
the clerk to receive fifty cents for issuing such lettors. The law
does not impose upon the clerk the obligation to see that the
guardian gives bond. The law seems to suppose that it will be
given upon the spot, and approved by the court; at all events, the
guardian has no power or authority whatever to do one legal act,
as such, until the bond is given. It is a condition precedent to
his right to act, and although the clerk should issue to him lotters
of guardianship, he would still have no more power or authority
than before—which was none at all. When the appointment is
made, and the bond given, the guardian does not require letters
of guardianship to enable him to act; and if he does procure them,
they can be regarded as nothing more than an official certificate
of the journal entry. The clerk has no obligation resting upon
him to see that the bond is givon, nor has he any power whatever
to constitute the appointee a guardian until the bond is given. It
is therefore legally impossible that he could have come into the
possession of the property of the ward, by virtue of any letter of
guardianship issued to him, since such a letter would have no vir-
tue or force whatever in it. .

We can not, therefore, say that Sloane has failed to discharge
any duty of his said office, so as to charge his sureties in the
official bond, especially under the doctriné constantly applied in
this court, and reiterated again at this term, that the undertaking
of sureties is to receive a strict construction, and not to be extended.
by implication to cases not falling within the terms of the contract
into which they enter.

It may have been improper for Sloane to have issued the let-
tors *of guardianship until the bond was executed and filed. [382
Whether he might not be liable to any person who could show
that he had been thus misled to his injury, it is not now necessary
to determine,

The judgment of the court of common pleas must be affirmed.

Huircxcoor, C. J., was absent.
281

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Turner v. Adm’r of Moore.

Jour Turner v. Josep Canisman, ApuinistraroR oF JouN
Moor, DECEASED.

A new promise i, in law, available to sustain a recovery upon an old contract,
against 9 plea of bankruptcy.

The “bar” arising from the bankruptcy is strictly a personal privilege, and is
“waived” by the subsequent promise.

‘When the “ bar” is “waived” by a new promise to pay an old debt, it is com-
petent to declare on the old liability without suing on the new promise.

Brxor to the court of common pleas of Union county.

In the court below, Chrisman, as administrator of Moore, sued
Turner, in 1847, in an action of debt, upon a single bill executed
by Turner to Moore, dated March 10, 1834, payable one day after
date. The declaration contains special counts on the note, charg-
ing the indebtedness to the intestate, and the common counts
averring the indebtedness to the administrator.

Plea, general issue, with notice that defendant would give in

evidence a certificate of discharge under the bankrupt law of Con-
gress, of August, 1841,
333] On the trial the plaintiff below gave in evidence the note *de-
clared on. The defendant gave in evidence his certificate of dis-
charge under the bankrupt law. The plaintiff below thon proved
by parol that the defendant, subsequontly to his discharge, and
before suit brought, made a verbal promise to pay the adminis-
trator the note declared on. The defendant below objected to the
evidence, but it was received by the court, and final judgment
given in favor of the administrator. Motion for a new trial over-
ruled, and exceptions taken by Turner.

This writ of error is brought to reverse the judgment,

Curry & Axzison, for plaintiff in error:

The certificate of discharge, under the bankrupt law, does not
operate merely as a suspension of the remedy, but effects an
absolute extinguishment of the debt—so complete that it can not
be revived again. Such is the effect of the language of the law.
U.S. Stat. at Large, 440.

If we admit that in such case a moral obligation remains, which
is a sufficient consideration for a new promise, still, the original

282,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 334

Turner v. Adm’r of Moore.

debt remaining extinct, it results that if any suit be maintainable,
it must be founded upon the new promise. —-

The defendant in error relies upon the English practice, which
has been followed, to some extent, in this country. That practice
proceeds upon the idea that a new promise, after certificate in
bankruptcy, is to be viewed in the same light precisely with a
new promise made after the taking effect of the bar of the statute
of limitations. It is put on that express ground in the cases
cited by defendant in error, from 14 Johns. 178, and 8 Mass. 127.
Such ground we think to be entirely unsatisfactory. The only
effect of the bar of the statute of limitations is to suspend the
remedy. The certificate in bankruptcy extinguishes the debt.
The two things are essentially unlike; but if they were exactly
similar, we are not bound here by the English practice. So this
court has already decided. In Hillv. Henry, 17 Ohio, 9, it was held
that *the acknowledgment and promise to pay a debt which [834
is barred by the statute of limitations does not revive the original
cause of action, but if a creditor would enforce a collection he
oust do it by a suit on the subsequent promise. There is another
reason why tho proof of the new promise, in this case, ought to
have been ruled out. Upon the supposition that the old debt had
been revived by the new promise, still, no recovery could be had
upon the old debt, unconnected with the new promise. Both
together were required to make a case for the plaintiff below.
And, this being true, he ought to have shown his whole case ia
his pleadings. The court ought not to have permitted him to
present a part of his case in the pleadings and anothor part
by oral proof at the trial. Ifsuch has been the English practice,
it ought not to be followed here. Even there it has not gone un-
questioned, In 1 Bac. Abr. 452, it ig said that the practice of
allowing tho plaintiff, after plea in bankruptey, to give in proof
the special matter to show that he is not barred, “hath been ques-
tioned by high authority; and it hath been thought that the
plaintiff should set out, in his declaration, the matter of which
he would avail himself.” See also Penn v. Bennett, 4 Campb.
206 ; Leeper v. Tatton, 16 Hast, 420.

P. B. Wixcox, for defendant in error:

A. count on a promise to the intestate may be joined with a
count on a promise to the administrator. 1 Chit. Pl. 203, 8 Am.
ed.; 5 Binn. 573,

283

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Turner v, Adm’r of Moore.

A new promise, after a certificate of bankruptcy, may be given
in evidence under the common counts, “because the new promise
had révived the old debt.” Lord Kenyon, Peake, 68; 3 Peters-
dorf's Abr. 948, .

And tho plaintiff may declare upon the original cause of action
without noticing the subsequent promise. 14 Johns. 178; 8 Mass.
127.

Z. T. Fiswer, on same side :

335] “It is expressly stated in 1 Chitty on Pleadings, 54, that
when the subsequent promise of a bankrupt is effectual, it is suffi-
cient to declare upon the original consideration. In the case of
Shippey v. Henderson, decided in New York, it is expressly said
by the court, that when a debt is barred by a certificate of bank-
ruptcy, it is sufficient to declare upon the original consideration,
and that a promise made by the bankrupt, after certificate granted,
will support an action. 14 Johns. 178. In 1 Selwyn’s Nisi Prius,
219, it is said that, “in the case of an express promise after cer-
tificate, the plaintiff is not obliged to declare specially, but may
declare on the original cause of action, and if the bankruptcy be
pleaded, the plaintiff may give the subsequent promise in evi-
dence.” The bankruptcy is not pleaded in this caso, but the no-
tice filed with the general issue amounts to the same thing under
our statute. The same principle was held in the case of Maxim
v. Murre, 8 Mass. 127.

The plaintiff below can recover under the common counts, by
proof of a subsequent promise, because the new promise had
revived the old debt. 3 Petersdorf’s Abr. 948; 1 Chit. on Plead-
ings, 204.

Sratpina, J. The action is brought by the personal represent-
ative of the payee against the maker of a sealed note. A count
on a promise to the intestate is joined in the declaration with a
count on a promise to the administrator. This is good pleading.
My. Chitty says: “It is frequently necessary to add a set of
counts on promises to the plaintiff, in his representative capacity,
in order to admit of evidence of a promise or acknowledgment to
the plaintiff, to take the case out of the statute of limitations.”
1 Chit. Pl, 7 Amer. ed. 438.

The promise to the administrator could be given in evidence
under the common counts. In Williams ». Dyde, Peake’s N. P.

284.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 336, 337

‘Turner v. Adm’r of Moore.

Cas. 68, a subsequent promise by a bankrupt, after he was ‘dis-
charged by his certificate, was allowed to be given in evidence
upon a count for goods sold, and a plea of discharge under [886
his certificate.

Although there seems to be a marked distinction between the
effect produced upon a debt by the oporation of the statute of lim-
itations, and a certificate of discharge in bankruptcy, a subsequent
promise by the debtor, is held sufficient, in either case, to over-
come the plea, and entitle the plaintiff to recover on the original
ground of action. The running of the statute of limitations does
not discharge the debt. It only suspends the remedy on the pre-
sumption that the debt is paid. By an acknowledgment of the
debt, or a new promise to pay, that presumption is removed, and
the remedy is restored.

In bankruptcy, a debt is discharged by the operation of the cer-
tificate, and a note or bond becomes functus officio. 5 Mass. 509.
The words of the statute are: “And such discharge and certifi-
cate, when duly granted, shall, in all courts of justice, be deemed
a full and complete discharge of all debts, contracts, and other en-
gagements of such bankrupt, which are provable under this act.
United States Statutes at Large, 440. In Roberts v. Morgan, 2
Esp. 736, Eyre, 0. J., says: “A debt barred by a certificate, un-
der a commission of bankruptcy, by a new promise to pay it,
becomes a new debt.” Lord Mansfield also says: ‘Where there
has been a new promise after the discharge, the bankrupt is liable
as on a new contract.” Douglass, 192. And in Truman v. Fenton,
Cowp. 544, the same learned judge says: “The moral obligation
‘uniting to a new promise, makes a new undertaking and agreement.”
In Walbridge v. Harroon, 18 Vt. 450, Williams, C. J., says: “In
bankruptcy, the debt is discharged, and the new promise alone
gives the action.”

Aliter —Thompson, C. J., in Shippey v. Henderson, 14 Johns.
180, where he says: “.A subsequent promise can only revive a
precedent good consideration, the remedy having been suspended
by the discharge.”

However much jurists may have differed as to the effect of a
bankrupt’s discharge upon the original indebtedness; whether
it worked an extinguishment of the debt, or only asuspen- [837
sion of the remedy, it is very clear that along train of authori-
ties in England and America has settled the rule that a plaintiff,

285

338 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

. Turner v. Adm’r of Moore. !

declaring on the original cause of action, may overcome the plea
of bankruptcy, and recover his debt upon parol proof of a subse-
quent promise to pay the same.

I find but one well-defined case to the contrary, and the synop-
sis of that, as taken from the U. 8. Digest for 1849, is as follows:

“The parol promise of a certificated bankrupt to pay a debt
due by note or specialty, before his bankruptcy, will not author-
ize an action upon the note or specialty.” Graham v. Hunt, 8 B.
Mon. 7. .

This volume of reports is missing from the State Library; and
I have not been able to procure it from the private libraries of the
city. The troublesome question is, how can a plaintiff declare
upon, and recover for a debt that has been discharged? Ought he
not rather to declare upon a new promise of the bankrupt debtor ?
Lord Ellenborough answers in Leaper v. Tatton, 16 Hast. 423: “It
isthe common practice to declare on the original contract, and if
the statute be pleaded, the only question is, whether the defense
given by it has been waived.”

Marcy, J.,in Depuy v. Swart, 3 Wend.141 says: “It is well es-
tablished, that the plaintiff may declare on the original cause of
action. The inconsistency of making the new promise the basis
of the action, and at the same time allowing the plaintiff to declare
upon the antecedent debt, which has been discharged, or the remedy
upon it barred, has been often presented to the courts of England
and this country; and although it has been sanctioned, it has been
I6oked upon as a deviation from the general rule, requiring a
plaintiff to state in his declaration the agreement, or whole cause
of action whereon his suit is brought. . . .

“The replication setting up this contract has not been consid-
338] ered a departure, because it is not entirely a new matter ; *it
derives that which is necessary to support its consideration from
the old debt, The issue is, in fact, upon the new contract, and the
note given on the old contract is only brought into view as far-
nishing the consideration which the plaintiff must show for the new
promise. The note, in my opinion, has no valid existence for any
other purpose.” .

As an individual member of this court, I should feel better sat-
isfied with the establishment of a rule that required the suit to be
predicated upon the new promise ; for, I must confess, the reasoning
of the judgos in the cases examined, has failed to convince me that

286

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 339

Turner v. Adm’r of Mooro.

the practice was sound in its inception, whatever it may have be-
come by long-continued usage.

That a new promise is in law available to sustain a recovery
upon an old contract, extinguished by an act of bankruptcy, I do
not for a moment doubt. But to give a satisfactory reason for
this well-established rule, is a work of more difficulty. The only
tolerable explanation, to my mind, is that ‘made by Lord Hllen-
borough, in 16 Hast, and that was a case where the statute of lim-
itations was pleaded, I think “the bar,” whether founded upon
this statute or upon bankruptcy, is a strict personal priviloge, and.
susceptible of being waived by a new promise.

The learned court in Massachusetts, that tried the case of Maxim
v. Morse, 1 Mass. 129, reasons in this wise upon the subject: “The
inconsistency objected in this case, is in appearance more than in
reality. A good collateral fact was put in issue, on which a regu-
lar judgment may be entered in the action. The pleadings are
very similar to those which frequently arise under the statutes of
limitation. The defendant pleads what is prima facie a legal bar
to the plaintiff’s demand; the plaintiff replies other matter, which
shows the defendant bound as well by law as in conscience, to pay
the debt—and this matter is found for the plaintiff. There re-
mains no reason why he should not have his judgment on the
verdict.”

The action was debt on a judgment. The defendant pleaded
his certificate in bankruptcy in: bar. The plaintiff replied a
*subsequent promise to pay the debt. The defendant re- [339
joined that he did not make the promise, ete.; upon which issue
the jury returned that the defendant did promise, as alleged in
plaintiff’s replication, and. found the amount of the debt to be
ninety dollars. The defendant moved an arrest of judgment, on
the ground that the plaintiff had misconceived his action ; and that
it ought to have been in case upon the defendant’s promise, in
stead of debt upon the judgment. McKinley v. O’Keson, 5 Bart
(Pa.), 369, is to the same effect.

This court will yield to the weight of authority on this subject,
and hold with the English courts, and the courts of most of the
states in this Union, that a new promise, after a certificate of
bankruptcy, may be given in evidence to support a recovery,
although the plaintiff may have declared upon the original cause
of action, without noticing the subsequent promise, At the sama
287

340 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hunter o, Field.

time it will be mindful to exact that measure of proof which will
show the promise, on the part of the bankrupt, to have been dis-
tinct and unequivocal. A vague or conditional promise, or a mere
acknowledgment of the debt, will not make him liable. 8
Haumph. 510; 12 Smedes & Marsh. 492; 9 Ala. 322.

The case of Hill v. Henry, 17 Ohio, 9, cited by counsel for plaintiff
in error, owes its decision to the peculiar phraseology of section 5
of the act of 1881, for the limitation of actions. It has no bearing
on the questions arising in this case.

The judgment of the court of common pleas will be affirmed,
with costs.

Hrronooog, 0. J., was absent.

340] *Wittiam Hunrrr v. Joan Fran.

An officer of the state can not maintain a suit in his own name, for an amount
of money due to the state for tolls, penalties, otc., on the National Road,
although he may have taken a note for the amount, payable to himself,
in his individual capacity.

No authority is given to such officer to take suck note, and it creates no legak
liability in his favor, being without consideration,

Is is contrary to public policy to permit oflcers of the state to transact the
business of the state, and to contract in their own name. All contracts
for money due the state should be made in the name of the state, and all
suits brought in the name of the state. (1)

Brror to the Suprome Court of Franklin county.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

8. W. Anprews, for plaintiff in error:

I. The action can not be maintained in the name of the defond-
ant in error. He was an agent of the State of Ohio at the time he
received the note upon which the suit is brought, and received it
as evidence of a debt which was due to the state, The defendant
in error should have made his contract, not in his own name, but
in the name of the state.

(1) See The State ». Parry, Wright's 8: 0. 662.
288

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Hunter v. Field.

Irish v. Webster et al., 5 Green. 171; Gilmore v. Pope, 5 Mass.
491; Bainbridge v. Downie, 6 Mass. 253.

If this is a contract with the defendant in error, yot being
made with him for the benefit of the state, and all the important
considerations moving from the state, the state only, can maintain
an action upon the note. Brown v. Morris, 2 Taunt. 379.

An agent contracting on behalf of the government, is not per-
sonally bound by such contract. By parity of reasoning, upon any
such contract, no suit lies by him; but it must be *brought [841
in the name of the government. Story on Agency, 382, 383. A
recovery on this note would not be a bar to an action by the state
for the same cause of action.

Il. The board of public works had no power to make the third
and fourth orders adopted by them March 7, 1845, requiring the
payment of tolls for traveling on the National Road at interme-
diate points between toll-gates, and imposing penalties for failure
to report such travel. The note sued on, having been given for
such tolls and penalties, is without consideration and void.

III. If the acts of 1843 and 1844 in terms confer on the board

power to make these orders, they are unconstitutional, as attempt-
ing to vest legislative power in the board, which, by the constita-
tion, is vested exclusively in the legislature.

A. F. Parry, for defendant.

Catpwett, J. It is alleged that the Supreme Court erred in
affirming the judgment of tho common pleas, in which court this
suit was originally prosecuted.

The action in the common pleas was assumpsit, brought by the
defendant in error, Field, against Hunter, on a promissory note
for thirty dollars, dated on January 24, 1847, payable to Field, or
bearer, thirty days after date.

There is no dispute about the facts, so far as the main quostion
in controversy is concerned. Field was the superintendent on the
National Road. Hunter had been driving on the road, without
passing through any toll-gate, and by a rule of the board of pub-
lic works, was required to report his travel on the road to those
having charge of it, under a penalty for non-compliance. Field,
the superintendent, had brought suit before a justice of the peace,
against Hunter, for the tolls, for the travel on the road, and also
for fines and penalties for not reporting. This note was given by

Vou. xx—19 289

B12, 343 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Hunter ». Field.

Hunter to Field as a satisfaction of this claim, and the suit before
the justice was thereupon withdrawn. The main question pre-
842] sented in the case, is *whether Field, being an officer of the
state, and the money being due to the state, could maintain a suit
in his own name? The courtof common pleas held that he could,
and so charged the jury. A verdict was found for Field, on which
the court entered judgment. Hunter excepted to the ruling and
judgment of the court, and having obtained a bill of exceptions,
presented the case to the Supreme Court on error, and in that court
the judgment of the common pleas was affirmed. Was thore error
in this proceeding? We think there was. Whatever remedy an
authorized agent might have on an obligation given to him in his
‘own name, where the transaction was between individuals, we
think public policy forbids a public officer thus to transact busi-
ness in his own name. The money, in this instance, was coming
to the statebelonged to the state. If public officers wore per-
mitted to take notes for dues of the state in their own name, and
bring suit, much confusion must necessarily follow in the transac-
tion of public business, and frauds might be perpetrated on the
community. Public officers are constantly changing, and it is ab-
solutely necessary that the accounts of the government should bo
kept in such a way as to distinguish between the claims of the
state and the personal claims of its agents. Take the present caso,
and suppose that Field, the superintendent, after taking this note,
had died; if he carried out the theory on which this note was
given to him in his own name, then no account would be found
against Hunter in fayor of the state. He could not with pro-
priety have any such account, all accounts being embraced in the
note. Unless proof other than the papers left should come to
hand, the note would go into the possession of Field’s personal
representative, and form a part of the assets of his estate, and the
state be thus defrauded of its dues. Similar difficulties might
arise in case of removal, resignation, etc., of the officer.’ This
note is negotiable, and might have been sold by Field to a bona
Jide purchaser.
343] Indeed, we think that such a mode of proceeding is *in-
compatible with public policy, and must, if permitted, lead to
great mischief. .
No legal authority was given to the superintendent to take a
note in his own name, for a liability to the state; as.a consequenco,
290

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Burch.

we think the promise to him was wholly without consideration—
there was no consideration that would create a legal liability to
him. The cases of Gilmore v. Pope, 5 Mass. 491, and Irish v.
Webster et al., 5 Greenl. 171, although differing somewhat in their
details from the present case, are both applicable to the main
question here presented.

In the latter case the court say: “If there is a want of clear-
ness in the subject under consideration, and if some of the cases
are but faintly distinguishable from others, touching the question
in what instances an agent may sue in his own name, on a prom~
ise made to him as such, public policy seems to require that an
agent of the state should make his contracts, not in his own name,
but in the name of the state; and that all securities he may re-
ceive should be made payable to the state; and that when they
have been made payable to him as agent, the suit should be in the
name of the state.” We think, then, the ruling of the court of
common pleas, as shown by the record, was erroneous, and that
the Supreme Court erred in affirming the judgment of the com-,
mon pleas.

The judgment of the Supreme Court will therefore be reversed.

Huironcoox, C. J., was absent.

*SamugL Reynonps v. Joun 8. Sranssury anp James K. [344
Boron.

‘The record of a judgment of a former recovery may be given in evidence
under the general issue in assumpsit, without notice. (1)

Tt is competent for a court to set aside » judgment of » previous term for ir
regularity on motion; and although the court, in the exercise of such
power, may act erroneously, such error will not render the proceeding
void, so that the record can be collaterally impeached. (2)

Q) Inman ». Jenkins, 3 Ohio, 271, overruled.

(2) As to entering, setting aside and amending judgments and orders, and
entering them nunc pro tune, see note to Swan’s Rev. Stat. 674, 496; Statute of
Amendments, Swan’s Rov. Stat. 687, 688, and decisions referred to in argument
in Waggoner 0. Dubois, 19 Obio, 88, 104; Hanly v. Levin, Ohio, 239; U. S-
Bank v. Moss et al., 6 Howard’s U. 8. 38.

291

PO

B45 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Burch.

“When one party to a judgment moves to set it aside at a subsequent term to
that in which it was entered, it is necessary to give the court jurisdiction
that the opposite party should have notice.

In favor of the judgment or proceedings of a court of general jurisdiction, it
will be presumed that the court had jurisdiction of the person of the de-
fondant, although that fact may not affirmatively appear on the record. (1)

Error to the commercial court of Cincinnati.

845] *In the court below, the action was assumpsit. Reynolds,
the plaintiff below (and plaintiff in error) declared in the com-
mon counts.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion of the
court. .

After verdict for defendants in the court below, a motion for
new trial was overruled.

The record of the proceeding in the superior court of Cincin~
nati, setting aside the judgment in said court rendered at January
term, 1847, for $410.97 in favor of Samuel Reynolds against John 8.
Stansbury, is as follows:

«State ‘of Ohio, Hamilton county, ss. Superior court of Cin-
cinnati. Samuel Reynolds v. John S. Stansbury. Judgment, Jan-
nary term, 1847. Damages $410.97, and for costs $5.89,

(1) As to conclusiveness of proceedings of cours, impeaching collaterally,
ete., see an article in West. Law Journal, 1850, 1851, p.865; Wileox’s Dig. 342;
Id. Sup. 84; Note to Swan’s Rev. Stat. 12, 89, 92; Robb v. Irwin, 18 Ohio,
689; Paine’s Lessee v. Morland, 16 Ohio, 435; Lewis ». Lewis’ Administra-

‘trix, 15 Ohio, 715; Boswell v. Sharp, 15 Ohio, 447, commented on, 5 West.

Law Journal, 85; samo cause of action, in Boswell v. Dickerson, 4 MeLean,
262, taken to Supreme Court of the United States, and decided in that court;
Donglass v. Massie, 16 Ohio, 273; Lessee of Cochran v. Loring, 17 Ohio, 4095
Morgan’s Lessee v. Barnet, 18 Ohio, 535; Newman’s Lessee v. Cincinnati, 18
Ohio, 323; Snively v. Low, 18 Ohio, 368, modifying Adams ». Jeffries, 12 Ohio,
253, 971, See Hambleton v. Dempsoy & Co. and Cotterell v. Long, reported
in this volume; and eee Kemp v. Kennody, 1 Pet. Cond, 30; Shivers v, Wilson
et al., Har. & Johns. 180; Walker o Turner, 6 Pet. Cond. 668; Ross v.
McOlung, 6 Pet, 288; Williams v. Blount, 2 Mass. 213; 2 Ohio, 229; 4 Ohio,
149; 16 Ohio, 479; Harper v. L. and 0. R., 2 Dana, 227; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec.
547,n.; 10 Ohio, 277, n.; Swan’s Prac. 878. See Lessee of Maxom v. Sawyer
12 Ohio, 201; 9 Ohio, 19; 11 Ohio, 443; 2 Ohio, 401.

‘Pho reversal of a judgment does not affect title of purchaser. Act of March
1, 1831, regulating judgments and executions, sec, 22, Stat, 479; Hubbell ».
Broadwell, 8 Ohio, 120; and sce act of March 2, 1846, for the protection of
purchasers at judicial sales, 44 Ohio L, 114,

292

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 346

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Burob.

“On motion of plaintiff, it is ordered that this judgment be set
aside at plaintiff's costs, and plaintiff has leave to take the bill of
exchange from the files.”

The judgment thus set aside was taken on a declaration con-
taining a single common count, for money had and received.
The precipe was indorsed “suit brought for money had and re-
ceived,” and to recover on the bill of exchange afterward with-
drawn under said order.

This bill of exchange is the same one mentioned in the opinion
of the court, and was drawn by the plaintiff and one Hiram Bond,
on, and accepted by defendant Stansbury.

Corvin & Mrronent, for plaintiffs :

The plaintiff asked, among others, the following instructions to
the jury :

"1, That in the case of Reynolds against Stansbury, in the
superior court of Cincinnati, the plaintiff could not recover,
*upon the pleadings, for tobacco sold by Reynolds to Stans- [846
bury ;” which the court refused to give,

“2, That this case being brought, and the plaintiff seeking to
recover for the price and value of tobacco sold by Reynolds to the
defendants, the case of Reynolds against Stansbury, in the superior
court of Cincinnati, is not a bar to this suit, and if the jury aro
satisfied that the defendants were partners, and the plaintiff sold
the tobacco while they were partners, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover for the amount due ;” which the court refused to give, and
instructed and charged the jury that the “judgment in the superior
eourt of Cincinnati, in favor of plaintiff against said Stansbury, ix
@ bar to the plaintiff’s recovery in this suit.”

‘We appear for the plaintiff and claim:

I. That the court erred in admitting in evidence the copy of the
record of the judgment in the superior court, and the parol proof
that the cause of action in this case, and the one mentioned in

. that record, were the same; because—

1, A former recovery can not be given in evidence under the ©
general issue, without notice. Inman v. Jenkins, 3 Ohio, 271.

2. The declaration in the case in the superior court was for
money had and received ; the present action is brought to recover
the price and value of tobacco; and the offer to prove by parol, -
that the cause of action was the same, would contradict the record.
1 Green]. Ev. 532.

293

TT

B47 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Burch.

II. The the court erred in charging that the judgment in the
superior court was a bar to the recovery in this suit. Pierce.v.
Kearney, 5 Hill, 85; Naughten v. Patridge, 11 Ohio, 232; 3 Johns.
Cases, 72, n. a, 2 ed.; Brazee v. Payntz, 3 B. Mon. 178; Watson-
v. Olvon, 1 Rich. 111.

III. That the court erred in rejecting the record offered by the
plaintiff, showing that the judgment in the superior court had
been set aside, and in refusing to permit the plaintiff to prove that
fact.

The ruling of the court below, on this point, can not be sus-
847] tained, *unless this court is willing to decide that a court of
general jurisdiction has no power, for any cause whatever, on
motion, at a subsequent term to the rendition of a judgment, to
set aside that jadgment. This power, and the exercise of it, by
motion, is fully recognized in the English and American courts,
and is indispensable to the administration of justice. In the lan-
guage of Judge Sherman, repeated by Judge Wood, and recog-
nized by Judge Hitchcock, it has long since become one of the
plain and accustomed romedies of a court of law. Hunt v. Yeat-
man, 3 Ohio, 15; Critchfield v. Porter, 3 Ohio, 518; McKee v. Bank
of Mount Pleasant, 7 Ohio, 175, 187, pt. 2; Sloo v, Lea, 18 Ohio,
307; Shelton v. Gill, 11 Ohio, 419; Hitchcock, C. J., in Abernathy
v. Latimoro, 19 Ohio, 288; De Medina v. Grove, 59 H, C. L. 170.

For the purposes of jurisdiction all parties properly in court at
the commencement of the caso remain so until satisfaction of the

, judgment is had and entered of record.

It is unnecessary to discuss the question whether notice to the
other party was or was not necessary. The superior court isa
court of general jurisdiction: if it had the power, upon notice to
the other party, and for good cause shown, to set aside the judg-
ment, then there was error in the ruling of the commercial court.

The legal presumption is that every step which it was necessary
to take for the legal and proper exercise of that power by the .
superior court was duly taken before the power was exercised.
The action of the superior court can not be impeached collaterally.
Until reversed, or set aside, the order vacating the judgment
remains, and thero is no judgmont in force. Robertson v. Smith,
18 Johns. 459; Sloo v. Lea, 18 Ohio, 307.

T. Watxer, for defendants :

The questions of law arise upon the following points:

294.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. . 348, 349°

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Burch.

I. Defendants, under the general issue, offered the record of
*a, former recovery by the plaintiff in the superior court [848
against Stansbury alone, for the same cause of action, as proved
by parol, to which the plaintiff excepted. But the court admitted
the record ; and we insist {hat it was rightly done, and was a bar.
See 1 Greenleaf’s Ev., sec. 531; 3 Cowen & Hill’s Notes to Phillips
on Ev. 838; Henderson v. Reeves, 6 Blackford, 101. Indeed,
although there was an early decision on the circuit to the contrary
(see Inman v. Jenkins, 3 Ohio, 271), yet we understand the prac-
tice has for years been settled throughout the state to receive such
evidence under the general issue.

II. But plaintiff then offered the record of an ex parte ordor of
the superior court, at a subsequent term, setting aside the judg--
ment, which was regular upon its face, on motion of plaintiff,
without any notice given or reasons assigned, to which the defend-
ants objected, and the court sustained the objection. We insist
that the court was right.

When a judgment has once been regularly entered, and the term.
expired, it has passed from the control of that court, and become
a fixed thing. A higher court may reverse it, or it may be im-
peached for fraud; but in no other way can it cease to be a judg-
ment.

There was no reason assigned or notice given. It was purely
an ex parte proceeding. ‘This, indeed, makes no difference, except
to exhibit more strikingly its anomalous character. For in Brack-
enridge v. McCulloch, 7 Blackford, 334, a case almost identical-
with this, it was held that the judgment could not be vacated even
by scire facias, when there must be both notice and cause shown.

And the doctrine is carried still further in Assignees of Medford
v. Dorsey, 2 Wash. O. C. 433.

In Bodkin v. Commissioners of Pickaway, 1 Ohio, 375, it was
held that a final judgment could not even be amended at a subse-
quent term, except in matter of form. We doubt the propricty of
even this excoption. .

In Reed v. Hatcher, 1 Bibb, 346, the same doctrine was
*held as in the cases from Blackford and Washington. See [349
also 6 Howard’s Miss. 114; 1 Smedes & Marshall, 391.

Catpwett, J. The proceeding in the commercial court of Cin-
cinnati was an action of assumpsit, brought by Reynolds to reccver
295

350 . SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Reynolds ». Stansbury and Burch,

the price of a quantity of tobacco, which he claimed to have sold
to the defendants, Stansbury & Burch, as partners. The defend-
ants plead the general issue, and claimed that no partnership ex-
isted between them, and that Burch had nothing whatever to do
in the purchase of the tobacco. The plaintiff having offered evi-
dence for the purpose of proving the sale of the tobacco, and
tending to prove the partnership of defendants, gave in evidence
a bill of exchange for $487.77, dated March 13, 1846, drawn upon
and accepted by the defendant Stansbury, which bill was claimed
to have been given for the tobacco.

The defendants then offered in evidence a copy of the record of
a judgment, recovered by Reynolds against Stansbury, in the su-
perior court of Cincinnati, at the January term, 1847, for $410.97,
and offered to prove by parol, that the cause of action. in that suit,
and the one mentioned in the record, were the same. To this
evidence the plaintiff objected. The objection was overruled by
the court, and the evidence admitted.

The plaintiff then offered a record of proceedings had in the
superior court of Cincinnati, showing that the judgment of
Reynolds against Stansbury had been set aside at the January
term of that court, 1849, on motion of the plaintiff Stansbury.
‘This record does not show affirmatively that Stansbury had no-
tice of the motion to set aside the judgment, nor does it show for
what cause the judgment was vacated. Tne defendants objected
to the admission of this record, “because not showing that
Stansbury had notice of the motion, or for what cause the
judgment was vacated, the court had no authority, at a subse-
quent term, on motion, to set aside the judgment.” The court
sustained the objection, and refused to permit this record to go in
350] evidence; to which ruling of the court the *plaintiff ex-
cepted. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The
plaintiff has assigned for error the rulings of the court above re-
ferred to, in admitting the record of the recovery of the judgment
in the superior court, and refusing to permit the record of the
court setting aside that judgment to go in evidence, and also
claiming that the court erred in their charge tothe jury, which is
set forth in the bill of exceptions. It is contended, in the first
place, that the court erred in permitting the record to be given in
evidence under the general issue, without notice.

In the case of Young etal. v. Black, 7 Cranch. 565, this same

296

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 351

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Bareh.

question was presented precisely as it is in this case. Justice
Story, in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, says:
“The defendant offered in evidence a record of a former suit be-
tween the same parties, in which judgment was rendered for the
defendant, supported by parol proof that the former suit was for
the same cause of action as the present suit. The plaintiffs denied
its admissibility under the general issue, and we are all of opinion
that the objection can not be supported.”

In 1 Phillips’ Evidence, page 243, the author states the rule
thus: “In an action of assumpsit, the defendant may either
plead a judgment recovered, or give it in evidence under the gen-
eral issue.” .

, In 1 Groenleaf’s Evidence, section 531, it is laid down as
well settled that a former recovery may be shown in evidence un-
der the general issue, as well as pleaded in bar. The plaintiff
relies on the case of Inman v. Jenkins, 3 Ohio, 271. The court in
that case decide that a judgment of a former recovery can not be
given in evidence under the general issue, without notice. That
is a circuit decision, and is, as we think, contrary to the current
of authority on the subject. Indeed, so far as our examination
bas extended, the decisions are all on the other side. We think,
then, that the commercial court decided correctly in admitting the
record under the plea of the general issue.

The next question which we propose to consider is whether
*the court decided correctly in ruling out the record show- [351
ing that this judgment had been set aside by the court. And this
necessarily presents the other question—whether the court could
treat this record, in a collateral proceeding, as a nullity. This is
no doubt a question of some difficulty. It is contended in the first
place, on behalf of defendants in error, that the term of the court
at which the judgment was entered having passed, the judgment
was beyond the control of the court, and that it could not, as in
this case, at a subsequent term, setit aside. The question whether
a court has the power, on motion, to set aside a judgment entered
at a previous term, for irregularity, is one that has been fre-
quently adjudicated in this state. .

In the case of Hunt et al. v. Yeatman, 3 Ohio, where the ques-
tion was directly presented, the court held that the power of a
court to set aside a judgment for manifest irregularity, was one
that was exercised by all courts; and that the power may be ex-

297

352 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Burch.

ercised, not merely at the term in which the judgment is rendered,
but at a subsequent term. And the court, in that instance, sus-
tained the action of the court in error, in setting aside a judgment
entered at a previous term.

The case of Critchfield v. Porter, 518 of the same volume, was
on a bill in chancery, where the complainant sought to be relieved
against a judgment rendered against him, on the ground that the
attorney who appeared for him and plead had no authority to act,
and that he had not been served with process. The court dis-
missed the bill on the ground that the complainant had a clear
and ample remedy at law, by motion to have the judgment
opened, although the term of the court at which it was entered
had passed.

In the cases of Shelton v. Gill, 11 Ohio, 419; Sloo v. Lea, 18”
Ohio, 307; and Abernethy v. Latimore, 19 Ohio, 288, the court
fully recognized the same principle. Tbe courts in New York
appear to have adopted the same rule, Phillips v. Howley, 6 Johns:
129, and Morgan & Smith v. Dyer, 9 Johns. 255, are both cases in
352] which the court held that it was *competent for a court to
open a judgment on motion, for good cause, at a term subsequent
10 the one at which it was rendered.

In Indiana, North Carolina, and some of the other states, the
contrary rule has been established. See 7 Blackf. 334; 7 Iredell, 346.
There, no doubt, is a direct conflict between the decisions on this
subject. Still we must consider the rule as settled in Ohio, that a
court, in a proper case, has the power, on motion, to set aside a
judgment ontered at a previous term. And we suppose that that
power must be limited to cases where thore has been irregularity
in entering the judgment.

It may be proper here to remark, that all the authorities to
which we have referred, as sustaining the power of the court to
sot aside a judgment in such a case (except that of Sloo v. Lea, 18
Ohio), are cases where the right to set aside the judgment was
sought by the defendants to it.

It is not likely that the case would frequently occur in which
a plaintiff would ask to sot aside his own judgmont. Yot still,
when the power of the court has once been established over a judg-
ment at a subsequent term from that at which it is entered, we do
not see but that a case might arise where an irregularity had
crept into a judgment, without the fault of the plaintiff, where

298

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 355.

Reynolds o. Stansbury and Burch.

justice would require the exercise of the power on his behalf as
well as that of a defendant, In the case of Sloo v. Lea, the court
suggest the right to set aside the judgment, on motion, as one of
the remedies which belonged to the plaintiff in the judgment. If
the superior court, then, had power over this judgment at the
time they set it aside; if they had power to set it aside for ir-
regularity, they may have adjudged that irregularity existed when
none did exist, and their proceedings, therefore, clearly be erro-
neous. Yet the record of such proceedings could not be collater-
ally be impeached—could not be treated as a nullity.. The Su-
preme Court of the United States, in the case of Voorhees ». Bank
of the United States, 10 Pet. 449, say: “The line which separates
error in judgment from the usurpation of power is very definite,
and is precisely that which denotes the cases where a judgment or
*decree is reversible only by an appellate court, or may be [853
declared a nullity collaterally, when it is offered in evidence in an
action concerning the matter adjudicated, or purporting to have

+ been so. In the one case, it is a record imputing absolute verity 5
in the other, mere waste of paper.

But itis said that the record in this case does not show that
Stansbury had notice of the motion to set aside the judgment;
and, therefore, the court did not acquire jurisdiction in the mat-
ter. Now we suppose, as the proceeding was an adversary one,
and one that affected the rights of Stansbury, that it was necessary
he should have notice, in order to invest the court with jurisdic-
tion. But the record does not state whether he had or had not
notice. It is entirely silent on the subject.

It is a principle well established, that to support the judgment
or proceedings of a court of inferior and limited jurisdiction, it is
necessary that it should be shown fram the face of the record
that the court had obtained jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant; but that in favor of the proceedings of a court of
general jurisdiction, it is presumed that it had jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant, although that fact does not appear on the
record. (1) In order to impeach the proceedings of a court of
general jurisdiction, collaterally, it is necessary that the party
impeaching it should prove affirmatively that process was not

(1) Judge Spalding held, that notice might be presumed, not to bring the
parties into court, originally, but to uphold subsequent proceedings. (1)
(1) Spencer ». Brockaway, 1 Ohio, 259.
299

"B54, 855 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Reynolds ». Stansbury and Burch.

served. In 17 Wend. 483, the rule is laid down to be that, “An
inferior court shall, when questioned, show that it acted within its
jurisdiction, whereas, in courts of general jurisdiction, it is pre-
sumed, until the contrary is shown.” In the case of Wheeler v.
Raymond, 8 Cowen, 314, and the case of Bloom et al. v. Burdock,
354] 1 Hill, 180, *this principle is clearly established. Tho
‘superior court of Cincinnati is a court of general jurisdiction,
within the legal acceptation of that term, and its jurisdiction will
be presumed, although that fact does not affirmatively appear on
the record. Altbough we think it likely that the superior court may
‘have erred in setting aside this judgment; yet, having the power
to set aside a judgment of the court at a subsequent term, if in
this instance it exercised that power erroneously, tho proceed-
ing would not therefore be void. Anda majority of the court are
of opinion that the commercial court erred in not permitting the
record to go inevidence. We do not think it necessary to proceed
farther in the examination of the other errors assigned.

The judgment of the commercial court will be reversed, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings,

Rannzy, J., dissenting. I find myself unable to concur with
tho majority of the court in the opinion pronounced in this case.
The whole controversy resolves itself into a single point. Rey-
molds sued Stansbury and recovered a judgment against him for
the same cause of action upon which this suit is now prosecuted.
Sloo v. Lea, 18 Obio, 307, bas settled that this judgment was a
good bar to this action. To avoid the effect of this bar, which
was interposed by the defendant, Burch, the plaintiff offered to
show that this judgment, about two years after its rendition,
had been set aside, upon his motion, by the superior court, where
it was recovered; and that there was, consequently, no subsist-
ing judgment. The record offered to prove this was rejected, be-
cause it did not appear that Stansbury had any notice of the
motion, or for what cause the judgment was vacated. No written
motion was filed, nor is any irregularity in entering the judgment
alluded to in the order vacating it, or pretended to have existed
in point of fact.

355] Did the order nullify. the judgment? If so, the court *be-

low erred. If the order was a nullity, the judgment was in

force and a good bar to this action, and the court did not err in
300

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 356

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Burch.

rejecting the evidence. Ido not deny the power of the courts of
this state to set aside judgments rendered by them, for manifest
irregularity in entering them, at a term subsequent to the rendition.
Although the power has been denied in other states, I think it is
well settled by our decisions, and upon good reason. A plaintiff
may, perhaps, for such cause, set aside his own judgment, and for ”
causes dehors the record.

Tyield the power to the fallest extent claimed, but I insist that
it shall be exercised without violating the first principles of natural
justice and positive law; in other words, that it shall be done for
cause, and after the parties have had an opportunity to be
heard; and not arbitrarily and behind the back of one of them.

I lay down the following propositions as indisputably correct:

1. As soon as the judgment was rendered, the parties were out
of court. There was no longer any cause pending or any parties
before it, or within its control.

2, Hach of the parties had an interest in the record that evi-
denced the termination of the litigation, and a right to insist
that it should remain unaltered and unimpaired, except by some
other judicial action of that or some other court, in pursuance of
law.

38. A motion to set aside a judgment invokes judicial action, and
if made after the term of its rendition, is the commencement of a
judicial proceeding, having for its object the nullification of the
record in which the adverso party is so interosted.

4, To warrant such judicial action, the court must have juris-
diction of the cause, and the parties. If either is wanting, any
order they may make is coram non judice, and void to all intents
and purposes.

I shall take no time in insisting that some irregularity must be
pointed out upon the record, before the court can act. It might
perhaps be successfully replied, that having jurisdiction over the
judgment, and a right to set it aside in a proper *case, the [356
jurisdiction would still remain, although the power should bo ex-
ercised improperly. But the court had no jurisdiction over the
party defendant in this case. He could only be brought before it
by a notice, and it is not pretended that any was given. If it is
said that there is no statute requiring such notice, I answer that
no statute authorizes judgments to be set aside upon any terms.
To get such a power, you must go to the common law, and by that

301

357 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Burch.

‘same common law, I can demonstrate that you can not exercise
any judicial power until the parties are before the court, and an
opportunity given them to be heard. Amongst the multitude of
authorities to this point, I shall cite but three or four.

In the case of Borden »v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 141, Thompson, C. J.,
says: “To give any binding effect to a judgment, it is essential
that the court should have jurisdiction of the person and of the
subject matter; and the want of jurisdiction is a matter that may
always be set up against a judgment, when sought to be enforced,
or where any benefit is claimed under it. The want of jurisdiction
makes it utterly void and unavailable for any purpose.” And he
states this doctrine to be founded upon “general principles,” and
“that to bind a defendant personally, by a judgment, when he was
never personally summoned, nor had notice of the proceedings,
would be contrary to the first principles of justice.”

In the case of Kinderhook v- Claw, 15 Jobns. 538, it was held
that “whenever magistrates proceed judicially, both the parties
to the proceedings are entitled to be heard, and notice to both is
indispensably requisite, notwithstanding there is no direction in
the act by which the tribunal is constituted, that notice shall be
given ;? and Vanness, J., says: “This principle has been so long
and so frequently settled, that it is unnecessary to cite cases in
support of it.” See also Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 Hast, 192 ; Bissell
v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 464. The case of the Miami Exporting Company
v. Brown, 6 Ohio, 535, was a scire facias to revive ajudgment. It
appeared that the judgment had been rendered upon notice accord-
357] ing to a provision *of the charter, but the notice was not
signed, nor did-it appear to have been served, Lano, J., says:
“Both these facts must appear in the record, as the foundation of
the jurisdiction. If they do not thus appear, the judgment is
coram non judice.”

This question was fully considered by this court in the case of
Adams v. Jeffrics, 12 Ohio, 253. It was there held that “an ad-
ministrator’s sale, made under an order of court since 1824. with-
out showing that the heirs wore parties to the proceeding, is void.”

Lane, C. J., says: “The heir has a right to be a party to the
proceedings which deprive him of his estate; and we are con.
strained to deny the jurisdiction of a court which attempts to pro-
cood without him.” “The judge further says: “All the cases as-
sume that the jurisdiction of the court is first established; and no

302

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Reynolds v. Stansbury and Burch.

attempts are made to sustain these proceeding by intendment or
presumption, until after this essential prerequisite. Those judges
who have been most ingenuous in surmounting the irregularities
of such tribunals, have been careful to show how the jurisdiction
was not contested. This want of jurisdiction may always be
shown, as it renders the act done void or unavailable for every
purpose.”

It is of no importance that the court have jurisdiction over the

subject matter, unless they have also acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the party, by a proper notice. The distinction upon
this subject is thus clearly stated by the Supreme Court of Vermont,
in the case of Corliss v. Corliss, 8 Vt. 389. They say: “Nor is
the difficulty removed, by simply insisting on the jurisdiction of
the probate court over the subject matter, and the consequent con-
clusiveness of its final decree. For this view of the subject is coun-
teracted by the consideration, that to conclude the rights of a per-
son by any proceeding of ajudicial nature, to which he was not
a party, and against which he could not defend, is repugnant to
the first principles of justice. Notice is so essentially necessary,
that without it such proceedings are uniformly held to be void,
**except in cases where the statute has provided specific [3858
means of relief. So far has this principle been carried, that such
proceedings have frequently been adjudged void for want of no-
tice, even where none was expressly directed by statute.”

In the light of these authorities, it seems to me the conclusion
is irresistible, that before any court can ‘affect the interests of a
party to a judgment, he must be notified, and thus brought before
them. Without such notice, the court couldnot render a judgment
against him for one cent, that would not be utterly void. Can we,
‘on the other hand, hold that he may be deprived of an interest of
hundreds of dollars, in a judgment rendered in his favor behind
his back.

This power to set aside judgments wouldi ndeed be most for-
midable and dangerous, if it can be exercised in this manner. It
may be done for causes dehors the record, and of course upon
proof. But the other party has no opportunity to cross-examine
the witness, to introduce rebutting testimony, or to except to the
opinion of the court. He is bound hand and foot, and obliged to
submit to such case as his adversary chooses to make, however
false and fraudulent it may be. If it can be doné for the plaintiff,

303

359 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Reynolds », Stansbury and Burch.

it can for the dofendant, by a stronger showing of both reason and
authority, and that without limit as to time. Liens, levies, and
titles to real property resting upon judgments, may be swept
away, while those interested in them are unconscious of the pro.
cess by which it is done.

The first mistake of the counsel for the plaintiff in error, is
found in the assertion that, “for the purposes of jurisdiction, all
parties properly in court at the commencement of the case, remain
80 until satisfaction of the judgment is had and entered of record.”
No authority is cited in support of this position, and I venture to
say none can be found. Certainly the parties can not be in court
longer than the cause is, and that there is no lis pendens after the
judgment, is a position too clear to require a reference to the au-
thorities that support it.

Proceeding from this erroneous assumption, it is next contended
359] *that the superior court is a court of general jurisdiction,
and that it must be presumed that every step necessary to be taken.
for tho legal and proper exercise of the power, was duly taken be-
fore the power was exercised.

This argument is all built upon the erroneous assumption be-
fore stated—that the parties are already in court—when in fact
there was no cause, and consequently no parties, in the superior
court, and had not been for more than two years before they mado
the order in question. The true question is, can the jurisdiction
of the court over the parties be presumed, or must it be made to
appear? This question is answered in the cases cited from 6 and
12 Obio. In the first, it is said the notice “ must appear in the
record as the foundation of the jurisdiction ;” and in the last it is
said that “all the cases assume that the jurisdiction of the court
is first established, and no attempts are made to sustain their pro-
ceedings by intendment or presumption, until after this essential
prerequisite.” I am aware that the record of a court of general
jurisdiction; need not show the specific cause of action upon which
the judgment is rendered. And why? Because their jurisdiction
being general, they have a right to render judgments in all cases.
But the reason ceasing, the law ceases. No court has jurisdiction
over any person until he is properly notified and brought before
thom; and hence their jurisdictien over him must be made to ap-
pear in all cases, before they can take one step to affect his rights
and interests: and this as well in courts of general, as of limited.

304

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 360, 361

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

jurisdiction. If this were not so, an objection to the jurisdiction
over the person could never be taken. For being assumed in the
first instance, the negative, that he had no notice, could rarely, if
ever, be proved. Does any one suppose that an action could be
maintained upon the record of a judgment of the superior court,
that did not show that the party had been served with process? I
presume not. The report of the case of Weyer v. Zane, 3 Ohio,
306, which seemed to hold the contrary, is explained, and oxpressly
repudiated by Judge Lane, in tho case of Adams v. Jeffries,
*before cited. It seems that judgment was rendered upon [860
a judgment bond, given to the sheriff by a defendant in execution,
whose goods were levied upon, the law expressly providing that
when amerced for not making the money, he might have judgment
on the bond at the same term, without further process. In respect
to the report, the judge says: “ The proceeding in that case was
under this statute; and the reporter, without adverting to these
provisions, has sought to justify a sound judgment by stretching
good principles too far.” If, then, jurisdiction over the person
would not be presumed when a judgment is sought to be enforced,
can it be presumed in favor of proceedings by which one is va-
cated? Ican not realize that either reason or law.makes such a
distinction. I am therefore clearly of opinion, with the commer-
cial court, that the proceedings of.the superior court upon the mo-
tion of the plaintiff to vacate the judgment, were entirely unau-
thorized and void, and of consequence had no effect whatever
upon that judgment.

This opinion, of course, has no relation to proceedings in rem,
where jurisdiction is obtained by the seizure of property; nor
do I undertake to say that the notice must, in all cases, appear in
the record. I say only it must be shown, before any effect can be
given to the proceedings.

*Joun Kuauer v. Taomas J. Wiseman anp Henry W. . [361
Borcuert.

‘The judgment of an inferior court will not be reversed on error for an Srro-
neous charge to the jury, unless such charge be upon questions material to

VoL. XX—20 305

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO,

Kugler . Wiseman and Borchelt,

the case, and such as have resulted prejudicially to the plaintiff in
error, (1)

“Where persons agree on the 18th of April, in writing, to perform certain work:

py August Ist, and the written contract is signed by the parties, and is

. also signed by a surety as such, for the performance of the work, and after
ward, the work having been commenced, is suspended at the instance of
the party for whom it was contracted to be done, with the intention not
to have the work completed, and again resumed a month after the time
fixed by the contract for the completion of the work, at the instance of
the party for whom the work was, by the contract, to be done, upon his
promise to pay, over and above the contract price, the additional cost of
the work, in consequence of an increase in the price of wages and mate-
vials, and the work being finished in January following, suit is brought,
not on the contract, but for the work and labor, the original contract is
competent evidence to the plaintiffs, and it is no objection that the surety
is not a party plaintiff.

In such case it is competent, as a means of arsiving at the increased cost of
the work, in consequence of a rise in the price of wages and materials, to
inquire of a witness generally the difference in the price of wages and
materials in the spring and summer months, and the fall and winter
months—although the question is not limited to the particular year in
which the work is done. Inquiry may be made as to the difference in
prices generally, and then ascertain whether the difference in this par-
ticular year varied from others.

It is competent to prove, in such case, the difference in the way of per contum,
between the price of materials and labor in the early and latter part of
tho year 1846 (the year the work was done).

Tn such case, the surety in such contract is a competent witness for the plaint-
iffs seeking to recover for their work and labor. The suspension of the
work released the surety from liability.

In such case, the party sued for the work, being entitled, under the statute, to
swear to his book-account against the plaintiff, but not availing himself
of the privilege, can not offer his book of accounts in evidence against
plaintiffs, upon proof that the book is his book of accounts; that the plaint-
jffs compared their memorandum book with it at one time, and there ap-
peared to be no difference, so far as the witness observed—being at that
time engaged about his own business in posting books.

‘The suspension of the work by the party for whom it was to be dono, until
after the time when the work was to have been completed, releases the
other parties from obligation to complete the work under the contract,
and puts an end to contract; but the party thus suspending the contract
is liable for a breach of it.

(1) See the authorities upon this point cited in argument in Choteau».
Raitt; in Ash v. Marlow, and Washington Mut, Ins. Co. v. Reed & Brown, in
this volume of Reports.

306

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

In the case stated, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for labor and materials
before the suspension of the work as well as after. If, after the plaintifis
had been released from the contract, by the suspension of the work, a new
contract was made by which the work was resumed, it is for the
jury to determine what that contract was, and whether time was to be
given as in the original contract, for making a portion of the payments
for the work,

*Error to the Supreme Court of Hamilton county. [362

The original action was assumpsit, commenced by Wiseman and
Borchelt against Kugler, in the court of common pleas of Hamilton
county. The declaration contained the common counts, for work
and labor, goods sold, money paid, had and received, ete.

To this declaration the then defendant, Kugler, pleaded the gen-
eral issue, and gave notice of set-off.

At the November term of the court, A. p. 1849, the caso was
tried by a jury, a verdict returned in favor of Wiseman and
Borchelt, and their damages assessed at $1,175. A motion was then
made for a new trial, by Kugler, which was overruled by the court,
and judgment entered upon.the verdict. Kugler, by his counsel,
then presented a bill of exceptions, which was signed and sealed by
the judges, and made part of the record.

The bill of excoptions is of great length, setting forth all the
testimony in the case; but it is belioved that sufficient appoars in
the opinion of the court to show, not only the points decided, but
also the evidence, so far as it had any reference to those points, -
and it is deemed unnecessary, by the court, to insert in the report
the bill of exceptions at length.

‘The errors assigned in the Supreme Court were:

“1. The court of common pleas admitted improper and illegal
testimony, and ruled out competent and legal testimony.

“2, The court erred in its charge to the jury.

“3, The court refused to charge as requested.

«4, The court refused to grant a new trial.

“5, The court gave judgment for Wiseman and Borchelt.”

The Supreme Court of Hamilton county affirmed the aforesaid
judgment, and this writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court.

The errors assigned in the court are, in substance, that the Su-
preme Court erred in affirming the judgment of the court of com-

mon pleas,
307

363, 364 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Kagler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

363] Fox & Frunon, for plaintiff in error:

“L The plaintiffs, in order to sustain their action, gave in evi-
dence the original agreement between the parties, dated April 18,
1846. It purports to be an agreoment between “ John Kugler of
the one part, and H. W. Borchelt and Thomas Wiseman, princi-
pals, and John Wiseman, as security, all of Cincinnati, of the second
part.”

By this agreement, the party of the second part, for $5,300, agrees
to furnish materials and labor for erecting three houses, etc.

The first exception is on the admission of the contract offered
by tho plaintiffs below, to the admission of which the defendant
below objected, because it was a contract in the name of Kugler,
on the one part, and Thomas J. Wiseman, Henry W. Borchelt, and
John A. Wiseman, of the other part, and the latter was not a party
plaintiff in the cause. Stage v. Olds et al., 12 Ohio, 147; 12 Ohio,
167; 1 Chit. Pl. 6; 2 Greonl. Ev., sec. 110; 3 Scam. 526 8 Shep.
111; 2 Ib, 295.

IL, Another question propounded by the plaintiff in these words
‘was objected to, viz: “ State generally what is the difference in the
prices of labor and materials in the spring and summer months,
and fall and winter months, particularly lumber and bricks, and
carpenters’ work and bricklayers’ wages.”

The objection urged to this question was, that the question was
not confined to the year 1846,

It appears perfectly clear that the question ought to have been
confined to the year 1846—what difference did it make in the case
if there was any such increased price in 1844 or in 1848?

Again, the question was objectionable because it was to prove a
general fact instead of a specific fact.

IIL. Another objection urged during the progress of the trial,
was as to the admissibility of John A. Wiseman to testify in the
cause. He was offered by the plaintiffs, objected to by the defend-
ants, but the objection was overruled.

Mr. Wiseman is one of the contracting parties, and as such,
864] *was directly interested in the event of the suit. Itisclaimed
he was a surety merely, and therefore competent. If we admit
the fact that he was a mere surety (which we do not), the prin-
ciple is the same. He was directly interested ih establishing the
cause of the complainant, for, by so doing, he would relieve him-

308

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

self from liability on the contract with Kugler. But the fact is,
this is a joint contract. 12 Ohio, 167.

IV. We asked the court to charge, that all the plaintiffs could
recover in the action is the value of the extra labor and materials
occasioned by the suspension of the work, provided the original ©
contract was not altered or changed further than to pay for any
extra price which such materials and labor cost.

This the court refused to give, because, they said, if there was
no other alteration, no recovery could be had.

Now, it is well settled that where a carpenter or builder agrees
to erect any building for a particular sum of money, but additions
or alterations are afterward made, the tradesman is bound by the
contract as far as it can be traced, and entitled to recover on a
quantum meruit for the excess only. 2 Com. on Cont. 360.

Soin Wright v. Wright, 1 Litt. 182, it is said, as far as it (the con-
tract) can be traced, the parties should be bound by the contract,
and for any excess of labor in consequence of the enlargement of
the plan, etc., damages commensurate with the value may be re-
covered. Bank of Columbia v, Patterson’s Adm’r. 7 Uranch, 299;
2 Pet. Cond. 501; Story on Bailments, sec. 441.

And in Chitty on Contracts, it is said, “and where additions are
ordered and made to a building which a workman contracts to re-
pair or erect and finish, for a certain sum, the original contract
shall exist as far as it can be traced to have been followed, and the
excess only paid for according to the usual rate.”

V. The third charge asks the court to instruct the jury, that the
plaintiffs can not recover the items of $1,325, due in six months,
and $1,325, due in twelve months after the buildings *were [365
completed, because they were not due when the suit was. brought.

The modification of the charge can not affect the case, because
there was no evidence of an abandonment of the contract—no
evidence that either party did not rely upon the original contract
for everything, except as to the additional compensation by reason
of any rise in the price of.materials, The party himself, on the
trial, relied upon the original contract, as still subsisting, to prove
the value of the work done and materials furnished. Without
this contract he offered no evidence as to the value of the work
done.

VI. The fifth charge asked, was, that if there is no evidence of
any new contract except as to the additional cost of the work

309

B66 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Kugler , Wiseman and Borchelt.

and materials, the written contract must govern the parties as to
time of payment, without regard to the question whether the de-
fendant bas paid money faster than the same was due, Chit. on
Cont. 566; Koon v. Greenman, 7 Wend. 123. .

VII. During the progress of the trial the defendant offered in
evidence the original book of items, showing the amounts actually
paid to the plaintiffs during the progress of the work, connected
with the testimony of Richard Lloyd, who stated that he was
present (in the office of P. Andrews, for whom he is clerk, and
where Kugler also kept his office, near to the buildings in ques-
tion), about the time the buildings were nearly finished, when
‘Wiseman, one of the plaintiffs, and Kugler, came into the office;
that Kugler then took the book in question, which the witness
identified, and Wiseman also had his memorandum-book; they
then compared notes, and they appeared to agree in relation to
the items entirely, and there was no difference betwoen them;
there was no objection raised by Wiseman to Kugler’s account.

The question is, can not this book, with the evidence of Lloyd,
be submitted for the consideration of the jury? We do not claim
366] it is conclusive, but ask if it is not competent *evidence to
be left to the jury as an admission made by the party. Greenleaf
on By., sec. 199.

It is well settled that if a merchant renders an account to an-
other merchant, and it is not objected to, it is considered as allowed.
1 Greenleaf on Hv., sec. 197; Freeland v. Herron, 7 Cranch, 147
3 Johns. Ch. 575; 1 Stark, 327; Coo v. Hattere, 18. & R. 406.

VIII. It is claimed, however, that the contract was evidence to
show the original amount of the contract price, and that for all
-the extra price the two plaintiffs (and not they and John A. Wise-
man) alone could recover. If this was so, still the verdict is
wrong, because in that view of the case, all that these plaintiffs
could recover would be the extra price or cost of materials and
labor; but they have added to the original price twenty per cent.
for extras, and in that way only can they begin to sustain the
verdict.

Bat this view is directly contradicted in 2 Fair. 348; Robinson
v. Godfrey, 3 Com. Li. 101; 4 Wend. 291.

Every authority cited by defendants in error, when examined
will be found to sustain every position assumed by the plaintiff in
error. They establish these principles:

310

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 367

Kugler v, Wiseman and Borchelt.

1, That where a special contract has been made, it is binding
upon the parties, both as to price, terms of payment, etc.

2, That if additional or extra work has been done, or if the
work has been delayed and again resumed, and done and accepted,
the contract is binding, so far as it goes, and the value of the ad-
ditional work, or the extra price occasioned by the season of the
year in which it was done, may be recovered. (In this case this
was the exact agreement made.) The agreement made, and the
one which would have been implied if no agreoment had been
made, are the same.

8. If the original contract was in the name of two, and the extra
work was done in addition, both original parties may recover for
the original price, and for the additional price.

Puen & Prnpizron, for defendants:

*Kugler directed Wiseman and Borchelt to stop the work [867
and abandon the contract of April 18, 1846. Some time afterward,
however, Mr. Kugler made application to Wiseman and Borchelt
to renew the contract and proceed with the work. They refused
to do so, it appears, because the delay would throw the job on their
hands during the fall and winter months, when wages, materials,
ete., Were commanding much higher prices than during the months
originally allotted for it. My. Kugler assented to the justice of
this objection, desired them to undertake and finish the houses
according to the original plan, and promised to pay them (speci-
fying no times of payment) the enhanced value of the work and
materials. He declared his perfect willingness, also, to pay what-
ever “any man” would say was right.

On this footing, as the proof shows, Wiseman and Borchelt re-
commenced the work. The surety, John A. Wiseman, was not
even notified of the renewal ; much less, therefore, did he consent

* to become liable again. And after all the work had been com-
pleted, Kugler told him, the surety, that he had never expected to |
hold him.

‘Wo claim, then, to recover the price and value of labor por- -
formed and materials furnished by Thomas J. Wiseman and Henry
W. Borchelt for Johu Kugler, in the erection of three houses;
which labor was performed, and which materials were furnished
under a parol agreement or contract, to which John A. Wiseman
was not a party, and of which (at the time it was made) he knew
nothing. The agreement was that the defendants in error should

311

368 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

perform the work and furnish the materials specified in a certain
paper and in’the manner therein specified ; which paper purported.
to be a contract signed by John Kugler of the one part, and
Thomas J. Wiseman and Henry W. Borchelt, principals, of the
othor part, and to which also, as surety, John A. Wiseman had put
his namo, And which paper—the contract of April 18, 1846—
farthermore, had once been a contract between its signers, but had
been set aside, and abandoned, at John Kugler’s own instance. Wo
868] *claim that the defendants in error, by that parol agreement,
were entitled to receive the compensation mentioned in that pa-
per ($5,300), and such further sum as the increased rate of wages
and price of materials in the fall and winter months of the year
would render honest and reasonable.

On this claim, and no other, the jury found a verdict, and the
court of common pleas gave judgment,

The plaintiffs below procecded with their evidence in this order:

1. They proved, by exhibiting the paper, the quantity and kind
of work to be performed and. materials to be furnished.

2. They proved that the paper was no longer a contract, and at
whose instance it was abandoned. :

3. They proved the terms of the parol agreement.

4, They proved the fact of an increase in the rate of wages and
prices of materials during the fall and winter months of every
year, and the reasons for it.

5. They proved that the year 1846 was not an exception to the
course of other years.

6. They proved what was the rate of increase, in 1846, both as
to wages and materials.

I. Was the contract of April 18, 1846, competent evidence? It
was offered as any specification, memorandum, or other document,
which the parties had before them, or to which they made refer-
ence, might have been offered. The parol agreement, upon which
we sued, referred to the paper as specifying the work to be
performed and the materials to be furnished, and as aiding the
parties to fix the compensation payable. Jewett v. Weston, 2 Fair.
346.

The paper was competent and necessary, also, as a standard for
estimating the price payable under the parol agreement. Jewett
v. Weston, 11 Maine, 348. .

IL. The general question as to difference in value of labor and

312

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 369, 370

Kugler v. Wisoman and Borchelt.

materials in spring and fall. 2 Phil. on Ev., Cow. & Hill's
Notes, 294; Seller v. Norman, 4 C. & P. 80; Dwight v. Brown, 9
Conn. 83.

*IIL. Was John A. Wiseman a competent witness? We [369
claim he was. Stage v. Olds, 12 Ohio, 167; Smethurst v. Wool-
ston, 5 Watts & S. 106.

An objection to the witness, in limine, must be certain, clear,
and apparent ; for if his competence be doubtful or depend upon
further developments, he will be sworn—subject to the court’s
charge or subsequent direction.

We offered testimony which tended to prove, in the court’s
opinion, an abandonment of the written contract; we then offered
John A. Wiseman as a witness, ‘and his evidence was received.
But the court instructed the jury, time and again, that unless wo
had proven the abandonment claimed, to the jury’s satisfaction, we
could not recover anything—neither with nor without John A.
‘Wiseman’s evidence.

IV. Defendant below asked the court to charge that, if the
original contract had only been altered in respect of the pice to
be paid, the plaintiffs below could only recover a certain amount.
The court charged the jury that, in such an event, we could re-
cover nothing.

Now, when a party can gravely assign, for case of error, that
the court gave him more than he asked, we do not think it a mat-
ter for argument.

V. The third instruction prayed by the plaintiff in error was,
in effect, that the times of payment specified in the written con-
tract bad been carried into the subsequent parol contract, and that,
therefore, two installments of money were not due.

. This was a question of fact, to be determined by the jurors
themselves. The abandonment of the written contract, and the
terms of the parol contract, were the very matters in dispute.
But the court told the jurors to examine this evidence, and to give
effect, by their verdict, to any contract which the parties might
have made; and that, if no specific price had been fixed, they
must take the market price, at the time, as a rule for ascertaining
the value. This instruction, we submit, was perfectly correct.

*V1. The fifth instruction prayed is divisible into two [870
branches. The court has given the first branch,.in charge, by its
first instruction. The second branch, we submit, was unwarrant-

313

371 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

able, and properly refused. Any and every variation from the
terms of a written contract, by the express or implied assent of
the parties, must afford some proof upon the question whether the
contract was or was not abandoned, To have instructed the jury
that any variation could have no effect in deciding that question,
would clearly have been erroneous.

VII. Was: Kugler’s book of account competent evidence? We
claim not, for these reasons:

1. Mr. Kugler did not offer to swear to its correctness, as the
statute, in the case of a book-account, requires.

2. It was not proven to be in’ the handwriting of a clerk who
was either dead or absent, 1 Phil, Hv. 259.

3. It was not even proven to be in Kugler’s own handwriting.
1 Greenl. Bv., see. 118.

4, The entries were not proven to have been made contempo-
raneous to the payments or transactions themselves. 1 Greenl.
By., see. 118 ; Walker v. Bollman, 8 Watis, 544.

5. Besides the charges for articles said to have been obtained
. from people living in Cincinnati, by the plaintiffs below, on Kug-
Jer’s order, the charges were all for money alleged to have been
paid to Thomas J. Wiseman himself. Oram v. Spear, 8 Ohio, 494,
decides that money paid is not properly proven by a book-account.

Finally. The counsel for plaintiffs below asked this question :
“State the difference, by way of per centum, between the prices
of materal and labor in the early and latter parts of 1846.”

This was a proper question.

Robson v. Godfrey, 1 Holt’s N. P. Cas. 85; Oldfield v. Lowe, 9
B: & C. 73; Lucas ». Goodwin, 3 Bing. N. Cas. 737; Pepper v:
Burland, Peake, 103; Dubois v. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co.,
4 Wend. 285 ; 12 Wend. 334; Chit. on Cont. 110, 541.

371] *Hrroncoor, O.J. The questions presented for the con-
sideration of this court are precisely the same as were presented
to the Supreme Court in the county of Hamilton, and although in
form the case comes before this court by writ of error, it is, in
fact, rather in the nature of a rehearing.

The record, including the bill of exceptions, is very volami-
nous, and various points of law were made and ruled, in the prog-
ress of the trial, in the court of common pleas, to the ruling of
the court, upon which exceptions were taken, and in which ruling

314

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. . B72

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

it is now insisted that the court of common pleas erred. That
court was requested by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, to
give certain specific instructions to the jury, which were not
given, and herein it is claimed there was error. It is further
claimed that there was error in refusing a new trial. These
several matters I propose to examine in the order in which they
are presented by the record. :

Before doing this, however, it may be proper to give a general
view of the case, as presented by the bill of exceptions.

On April 18, 1846, a written contract or agreement was entered
into between John Kugler, the plaintiff in error, of the one part,
and Thomas J. Wiseman and Henry Borchelt, defendants in error,
and John A. Wiseman, of the other part; John A. Wiseman sign-
ing as surety.

By the terms of this agreement, the party of the second part
agreed, for the consideration of $5,300, to finish and complete
three houses on Hast Front street, in Cincinnati, they furnishing
tho materials, of the dimensions and after the manner specified in
the contract—to be completed on the Ist day of August then next
following.

For this work Kugler agreed to pay $5,300; a part in advance;
a part during the progress of the work; $1,325 six months after
the buildings were finished; and a like sum of $1,325 in twelve
months from the same time, with interest. Wiseman and Borchelt
were to commence at and complete the building from the top of
the cellar wall.

In pursuance of this contract, Thomas J. Wiseman and Borchelt
*made preparations for and commenced the work. Quanti- [372
ties of lumber and other materials were prepared. At about the
time they were prepared to put in, or were putting in the first
tier of joists, Kugler, having sustained, or supposing he had sus-
tained heavy losses in his business, and believing be should not
be able to complete the buildings, put a stop to the work, This
was probably the latter part of May, or some time in June. Tho
exact time can not be ascertained from the testimony ; but there is
no controversy but that the work was suspended by his procure-
ment. Ho visited New Orleans, and perhaps other places, and:
ascertained that his losses had not been as great as he had appre-
hended. After bis return to Cincinnati, he was anxious that the

buildings should be completed, and applied to Thomas J. Wise-
. 315

873 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

man, or Wiseman and Borchelt, to persuade them to go on with
the work. Wiseman objected, on the ground that the work was
to have been done in the spring and early part of the summer,
when labor and materials were of less value than in the latter
part of the summer and fall. Kugler urged him to go on, assuring
him that he should lose nothing, and that he would pay in pro- '
portion, or according to this increased value. Finally, Wiseman
and Borchelt went on with the work, and finished it in January
following. It does not appear that John A. Wiseman had ever
any concern with the work, or that he was a party to this ar-
rangement, pursuant to which the work was recommenced, after it
had been suspended. How long the work was suspended does not
appear; but it would seem but a small portion had been dono
when the suspension took place. One witness, and I think he is
the only one who speaks of the recommencement, says he sup-
poses it was recommenced about the last of August, or 1st of Sep-
tember, one month after, by the terms of the contract, the entire
work should have been completed. Such is the general aspect of
the case, although, owing to the diversity of testimony, there may,
perhaps, as to some matters stated, be some doubt.

On the trial of the case, the plaintiffs below first offered in evi-
373] dence to the jury the written contract before referred to. “Lo
this testimony the counsel for Kugler objected, because that in-
strument was signed by John A. Wiseman, and he was not a
party to the suit. This objection was overruled by the court,
and the written instrument went to tho jury. In this, it is said
that the court of common pleas erred. We think otherwise. The
action was not based upon the contract. It was a claim set up,
not by the two Wisemans and Borchelt, but by Thomas J. Wise-
man and Borchelt, to recover compensation for work and labor
which they had done and performed for Kugler, not strictly in
pursuance of that contract, but in pursuance of an arrangement
- made, as they claimed, after they had been prevented, by the act
of Kugler himself, from the performance of that contract, but
which had reference to it, so far as the price to be paid was con-
cerned. It was an item of evidence which might properly go to
the jury. The legal effect would depend upon other testimony,
which might subsequently be introduced. But if, as Kugler's
counsel contends, the work was done under this original contract,
and John A. Wiseman was a party to that contract, and should

316

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

have been a party plaintiff, Kugler could not well have objected
to the introduction, by the plaintiffs, of this contract, as the only
effect would have been to prove themselves out of court.

In the farther progress of the trial, the plaintiff's counsel pro-
pounded the following interrogatory to a witness: “State gen-
erally what is the difference in the prices of labor and materials
in the spring and summer months, and the fall and winter months,
particularly lumber and brick, and carpenters’ and brick-layers’
wages.” This question was objected to, because the question was
confined to the year 1846—the year in which this,work was done.
The court, however, overruled the objection, and permitted the
question to be propounded and avswered. Now if the object was
to ascertain the difference in this particular year, we do not see
that there could be any substantial objection to the interrogatory,
as propounded. Inquiry might be made as to the difference of
prices *generally, and then ascertain whether the difference [874
in this particular year varied from other years.

Another witness was inquired of by the then plaintif’s counsel
to “state the difference, in the way of per centum, between the
price of materials and labor in the early and latter part of the
year 1846.” To this question the counsel for defendant below
objected, because the question was incompetent, as not showing .
the actual increased expense of the price of materials and labor to
the plaintiffs, but the court overruled the objection, and permitted
the question to be propounded and answered.

Whether the decision upon this question was proper, must
depend upon the peculiar circumstances of the case, and the
previous testimony in the case. The previous evidence conduced
to prove that the original contract had been ended by the act of
the defondant below. He had prevented the othor parties to the
contract from complying with that contract. He had caused them
to suspend the work, after but comparatively little had been done,
until long after the entire job should have been completed. Sub-
sequently he persuaded them to resume the work under an en-
gagement to pay them, in addition to the contract price, either the
enhanced price of labor and materials in the latter part of the
year, or what should actually be the increased cost to the builders
in consequence of such enhanced price. What the contract was,
in this particular, the jury must determine from the evidence.
The evidence not being perbaps explicit, it was proper that this

317

375 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

question should be propounded and answered; and if the jury
should be satisfied that the contract was for the enhanced price, as
contended for by the plaintiffs below, then they would have the
evidence before them from which to ascertain the amount.

Among others, the plaintiffs below offered, as a witness, John

_A. Wiseman, and he was objected to as incompetent, on the ground
that he had signed the original contract, which had been given
in evidence, and therefore was interested in the event of the suit.
375] This objection was overruled, and he was *examined. This
decision of the court was excepted to, and it is claimed to have
boon erroneous: :

If John A. Wiseman could gain or lose by the event of the suit,
then he should have been excluded. But it is impossible for this
court to see how he could have gained anything, or could be sub-
ject to any loss. Counsel say that a verdict against the defondant
below might, by possibility, prevent him from the recovery of any
damage upon the original contract, in consequence of the work
not having been well done. Even admitting this, which we do
not, it does not constitute that direct and certain interest which is
necessary to exclude a witness.

But the testimony introduced before this witness was offered,
conduced to show that the performance of this contract had been
prevented by the act of the defendant below, by which Jobn A.
Wiseman was discharged from any obligation imposed upon him
by that contract. And it conduced to show further, that much the
largest portion of the work was done in pursuance of a new ar-
rangement, entered into between Kugler and Thomas J. Wiseman,
and Borchelt, after the time when, according to the original con-
tract, the whole work should have been completed. To'this latter
arrangement Jobn A. Wiseman was not a party, nor had he in it
any interest. We think he was a competent witness.

In the further course of the trial, and in making his defense, the
thon defendant brought forward a book, and proved by a witness
that it was his (the defendant’s) book of accounts—in which was
an account against the plaintiffs below. The witness further testi-
fied, that on one occasion, toward the close of the work, Wiseman
was in the office, and had his memorandum-book with him; that
Wiseman and Kugler were looking over the book of accounts and
the memorandum-book, and that there appeared to be no differ-
enco between them. At this time the witness was engaged about

318

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 376, 377

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

his own business, in posting books. Having offered this testimony,
the book itself was offered in evidence. It was objected to by
plaintiffs’ ‘counsel, and tho objection sustained. In this, it [876
is claimed, that the court erred.

We are not prepared to say that there was any error in this de-
cision of the court. I suppose it was intended to infer from the
circumstances, that the correctness of the account was admitted.
Thoso circumstances were not sufficient to justify such inference.
The defendant in error, under the statute, might have sustained
his account by his own oath. This, for some cause, he did not do,
and not having done it, I think the court very properly sustained
the objection to receiving the book in evidence.

After the evidence in the case was closed and the arguments of
counsel, the defendant below, now plaintiff in error, requested the
court to instruct the jury, “that if they believed the original con-
tract was only altored, so far as to pay for extra price of materials
and labor done, between the price of such materials and labor in
the time nientioned in said contract, and what such matorials
would be worth at the time the work was actually done, then all
‘the plaintiffs can recover in this suit is the amount of such differ-
ence in the costs of labor and materials, and they can not recover
the original contract price.”

In response to this, the court instructed the jury “that if that
was the only alteration the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover
at all, because John A. Wiseman, under that view. of the case,
would have a right to recover, and he was not a party.”

In this it is claimed there is error. I am not fully satisfied
myself with the charge, but how the plaintiff in error can com-
plain, is not so readily seen. His request was, that in a certain
hypothetical state of case, the plaintiff below could recover only
to a certain extent. The court replied that in such state of case,
the plaintiffs could not recover anything. Admitting the court
to be wrong, no injury was done ‘to the plaintiff in error, unless
it would have been better for him to have a verdict against him
to a limited amount, than a verdict in his favor. Foran error
committed by an inferior court, the *superior court will not [877

. Teverse a judgment, unless that error was calculated to do an in-
jury to the party seeking the reversal.

The plaintiff in error, by his counsel, further requested the
court to instruct the jury “that if they believed the defendant

319

377 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Engler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

agreed to pay, in addilion to the contract price, such additional
price for materials and labor, as the cost of such materials and

_ labor would amount to, more than the same materials and labor
would have cost, if the buildings had been erected in May, June
or July, according to the terms of the original contract, it is
incumbent on the part of the plaintiffs to prove the amount,
which the additional cost and labor amounted to, and they can
only obtain such additional costs of materials and labor, in addi-
tion to the original contract.”

This instruction the court refused, but instructed as before, with
the addition, “that if a subsequent parol contract was made, by
which the parties accepted the original contract to regulate the
price, they must look to the evidence to see the difference between
the old and new contract, that the plaintiffs would be entitled to
the market value of labor and materials, according to the course
of trade.”

As before, the court instructed, that in the hypothetical case
supposed, there could be no recovery, but added, in substance, that
if there was a subsequent parol contract, as claimed’ by plaintiffs
below, the plaintiffs were entitled to the market value of labor
and materials, without positive proof of the actual increased cost
to them. .

Tn this we think there was no error.

Again, the plaintiff in error requested the court to instruct the
jury, “that the plaintiffs can not recover in this case, the items of
$1,325, due in six months, and $1,325, duc in twelve months after
the buildings were completed, because the time for such payments
had not arrived when this suit was brought.”

The court refused to give this instruction, as charged, but told
the jury if the original contract was abandoned, they must look to
378] the subscquent contract; and if by that there was *to be
paid the $5,300, and also the additional price in the materials and
wages, the plaintiffs were entitled to the fair market value in the
rise of materials and labor, no matter what the same might have
cost the plaintiffs.” .

Did the court err in refusing this instruction as asked? By the
terms of the original contract, a credit was to be given, and the
great struggle through the whole case seems to have been—on the
one side, to make out that the work was done upon this contract,
with some little addition of payment to be made for the rise of

320

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 379

Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt.

materials and labor, in consoquence of the work having been de-
Jayed by the plaintiff in error; and on the other side, to establish
-the fact that a subsoquent contract was made, by which the old
one was abandoned, with the exception of the price therein fixed
to be paid for the erection of the buildings. That the original
contract was not complied with, was not the fault of the builders,
but of the owner of the property. In consequence of his sup-
posed embarrassments, he stopped the work, and would not per-
mit the builders to complete it according to contract, and he kept
it suspended until the time had elapsed within which the work
should have been done. Undoubtedly, by this conduct, the other
contracting party was released from all obligation under this con-
tract. Not only so, but by his own conduct, the plaintiff in error
had rendered himself liable to the other contracting party for a
breach of the contract. That contract was put an end to.

At a subsequent period, and after the time when the buildings
should have been completed, Kugler applied to the builders, re-
questing them to go on with the work. The evidence recited in
the bill of exceptions, shows that they refused to do it, assigning
for cause of refusal that materials and labor were more expensive
in the latter part of the year, than at the time, when, by the terms
of the original contract, the work should have been dono, they
would have been. In other words, that building was more
exponsive in the latter part of the year than in the early.
The proposition was thon made by Kugler, to pay this in-
creased expense. At least such is the claim, and the *proof [379
seems to warrant it. It does not appear that in this new ar-
rangement anything was said about the time of payment.
Whether thore was such a new contract was for the jury to de-
termine, and they have found that there was. At least they must
have found this, in order to have found for the plaintiff. Besides,
had the suit been brought upon the original contract, even had
John A. Wiseman been a party plaintiff, there could havo been no
recovery, for the work was not done in accordance with the con-
tract. By that contract it should have been done’ by the Ist of
Augnust—it was not done until the January following. In somo
of the instruction requested, the counsel for plaintiff in error seem
to suppose that, although the defendants in error might have re-
covered for the labor performed and materials furnished after the
work was recommenced, yet they could not recover for the labor

VoL, xx—21 321

880, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Kugler v. Wiseman ond Borchelt

and materials furnished before the work was suspended, because
John A, Wiseman is not a party. Now it is impossible not to un-
derstand the relation of these parties. True, John A. Wiseman
signed the contract; but he signed as security that Thomas J-
‘Wiseman and Borchelt would do the work and furnish the ma-
terials. It could not have been expected that he was to do one or
the other. If they failed, he then would be liable. In no court
could he gain anything. The only interest he had in the matter
was to see that they performed the contract. Such is the common-
sense construction of the whole matter, And under such circum-
stances, it seems to me that in an action like the present, they
would be entitled to recover, as well for the work and labor per-
formed, and materials furnished, before as after the suspension of
the work,

If there was such a new contract as claimed by the plaintiffs,
below, and in it nothing said as to the time of payment, then the
court might well withhold the instruction last referred to.

Again, the court was requested to instruct the jury, “that if
there is no evidence of any new contract, except as to the addi-
tional cost of the work and materials, the written contract must
880] govern the partics as to the time of payment, without *re-
gard to the question whether the defendant has paid money faster
tban the same was due. That the mere fact that Kugler has paid
money faster than the contract called for, at plaintiff’s request,
will not affect the matter, as to the times of payment mentioned
in the contract.”

This charge the court refused to give, but instructed the jury
in the hypothetical case stated, the plaintiffs could not recover
at all.

Tf there was error in this, it certainly was not an error of which
the plaintiff in error can complain. It was not an error by which
he could be injured.

The next instruction requested was, “that the jury can not
allow anything for extra wages for work done, or costs of ma-
terials, by a per centage on the whole amount of the contract
price ; but must confine themselves to the actual advance prices
paid for materials and labor furnished and performed; and that
for all such items of materials and labor done and furnished at the
same prices they would have been charged, if done or furnished

322

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Kuglor ». Wiseman and Borchelt.

in the time mentioned in the original contract, they are not en-
titled to additional credits.”

This charge was requested upon the assumed hypothesis that
the original contract was still in force; that the work was done
under it, and that there was no new contract except as to the in-
creased value of labor and materials. The court had repeatedly
told the jury that if such was the state of case, the plaintiffs could
not recover at all. As to the instruction requested as last stated,
the court refused to give it as requested, but charged the jury
“that the difference might be estimated by a per centage, and

" they might ascertain the customary prices of labor and materials
in the spring and fall, and allow the fair average difference, no
matter what it cost the plaintiffs, whether more or less than the
average.” This is complained of as error, ,

If the contract, in pursuance of which this work was done and
the material furnished, was as claimed by the plaintiffs below;
that is, if, when the work was resumed, the defendant below
agreed to pay the original contract price, and in *addition [88L
thereto, the increased price of labor and materials, in consequence
of the advanced prices, then the increased price might be as-
certained by ascertaining the per centage advanced, or in any
other feasible manner. Such seems to have been the opinion of
the court of common pleas, and we think it was correct in prin-
ciple.

Other instructions were requested, which were given. Those
above referred to, are all in which it is complained that any error
intervened.

The last error alleged is, that the court of common pleas did
not grant a new trial. (1)

We have carefully examined the whole record, voluminous as it
is, and from that examination, are satisfied that the verdict of the
jury was in accordance with the evidence, and no new trial should
have been granted.

The judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed.

(1) As to new trials, see note to Swan's” Revised Statutes, 674, 496; 5 Ohio,
644; also Wilcox Dig. Bxceptions must be taken to any ruling of the court
at the time it is made, or such ruling can not be assigned for error. Geauga
Tron Co. . Street, 19 Ohio, 300. The overruling of a motion for new trial-
because the finding of the court or jury was against evidence, can not be re,
versed on error unless the bill of exceptions discloses all the evidence. Wagers
v. Dickey, 17 Ohio, 489, Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio, 426. 308

382 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Myers & Waterson v. Erwin & Co.

Myers & Warerson v. Hunter Erwin & Co.

‘When a plea in abatement is met by a replication, and issue in fact is there
upon joined and found for the plaintiff, final judgment must be awarded
in his favor.

The legal consequence will be the same whether such issue be tried by the
court or the jury.

Eperor to the court of common pleas of Butler county.

882] *The action was indebitatus assumpsit, brought by Hunter
Erwin & Co., against Peter Myers and Thomas W. Waterson, as
partners in trade under the name of Myers & Waterson.

The defendants in the court below pleaded, in abatement of the
plaintiffs’ writ, that the several promises in the declaration men-
tioned, if any such were made, were made by them jointly with
one Alexander P, Miller, under the name and style of Myers,
Waterson & Oo., and not by them alone.

To this plea the plaintiffs in the court below replied, but the
promises were made by the said Poter Myers and Thomas W. Water-
son alone, as alleged in the declaration, and, upon this, issue was
joined.

The cause was tried at the September term, 1850, without the
intervention of a jury. The court found the issue for plaintiffs
below.

The defendants moved for leave to plead to the morits of the
action ; which the court refused, and rendered judgment for plaint-
iffs for $151.45 damages, and costs of suit. The defendants then
submitted a motion for a new trial, which was overruled ; where-
upon exceptions were taken, etc.

The assignment of errors presents the following propositions:

1. That the court erred in deciding that the judgment, upon a
plea in abatement, when the verdict is in favor of the plaintiff,
must be final,

2. That the court erred in ruling that defendants, by pleading
in abatement, and the issuing being found against them, were con-
cluded from trying the cause on its merits.

Wiu1am EB. Brown, for plaintiff:

. Our statute removes all objections to which this class of pleas in
324.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 883, 38

Myers & Waterson v. Erwin & Co.

abatement were liable, at common law. It requires the party
pleading them, to swear to the truth of them. Swan’s Stat. 661,
sec. 65. It permits the plaintiff, even after a verdict against him
on the plea, to amend and issue a summons for the *rest [883
of the defendants. Swan’s Stat. 661, sec. 66; 1 Swan’s Prac. and
Pree. 79.

If the plaintiff is allowed to amend by making more defendants
aftor a verdict, is it just or reasonable to say that a defendant can
not be permitted to try the cause on its merits? If nothing in-
jarious to the rights of the plaintiff can result from pleading in
abatement, in this state, does not the reason of the common law
rule, which regards this class of pleas with so much disfavor,
fail? Ifthe reason fails, the rule can not apply.

The statute makes this perfectly clear. It declares “when a
ples in abatement shall be judged insufficient, the plaintiff shall
recover full costs to the time of overruling such plea.” Swan’s
Rev. Stat, 661, sec. 65. The plaintiff loses nothing by the plea in
abatement, nor is the suit necessarily delayed.

THomas Miuirciy, for defendant:

I. On a plea in abatement, if the jury find against the plea, they
ought also to assess the damages—otherwise a venire de novo must
be awarded. 2 Penn. 361; 3 N. H. 232.

On an issue in abatement, the plaintiff must be prepared to
prove his damages, otherwise he will recover nominal damages.
3 Stark. Ev., pt. 1, page (2) and (1) where all the authorities
are collected. “The judgment upon a verdict in favor of plaint-
iff upon an issue in abatement is jinal, and the jury assess the
damages.”

See note Wilcox, Ohio Forms and Prac. 111-112, (edition of
1848). See note 2, Swan’s Prac. and Prec. 649, note (e).

II. The decision of the court being sustained by all the common
Jaw authorities, the question arises, has our statute changed the
law on that subject? I conceive the act of 1831 has not the effect
claimed for it, and such is the construction given in Wilcox and
Swan’s Practice. :

*III. But suppose the judgment on the issue in abate- [884
ment was not final, it was a matter resting in the discretion of the
court, whether to permit the defendants to plead to the merits; and
if the court did err in the matter of discretion, it can not be

325

385 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Myers & Waterson v, Erwin & Co.

assigned for error. 6 Serg. & R. 510; 6 Cranch, 206, 217; 4 Ib.
237.

Sparpina, J. The plaintiffs in error claim that the judgment
below shall be reversed, because, after issue joined on the plea in
abatement and found against them, a respondzat ouster was nob
awarded. The common-law rule on this subject is well established.

“When a plea in abatement is regularly put in, the plaintiff
must reply to it or demur. If he reply, and an issue in fact bo
thereupon joined and found for him, the judgment is peremptory,
quod recuperet ; but if there be judgment for the plaintiff on
demurrer to a plea in abatement, the judgment is only interlocutory,
quod respondeat ouster.” 1 Tidd’s Prac. 641:

The principles lying at the foundation of this rule of practice
are asserted in Hichorn v. Lemaitre, 2 Wilson, 367; Amcots v.
Ameots, T. Raym, 118; Bonner v, Hall, 1 Ld. Raym. 338; Medina
v. Stoughton, Ib. 593; Crosse v. Bilson, 2 Ld. Raym. 1022; 2 Wms.
Saund, 211, a. 3.

The same rule is recognized in Massachusetts, in the case of the
Boston Glass Manufactory v. Mary Langdon and Trustee, 24
Picker. 49. The syllabus of this case is as follows: “Where, in
an action by @ corporation upon a promissory rote, the defendant
pleaded in abatement, that there was no such corporation as was
in the writ supposed, and issue was joined upon that fact, the de-
fendant was not permitted, on the trial before the jury, to allege
and prove, in reference to the damages, that there was no con-
sideration for the note, the judgment against the dofendant being
peremptory in case of his failing to support his plea in abatement,”
885] In New Hampshire the court ruled in Dodge v. Morse, *3.
NN. H. 232, that if issue be taken upon a plea in abatement, and
the jury find for the plaintiff, they must assess the damages in the
same manner as when an issuo is found for the plaintiff upon a
plea in bar. So in Jewett v. Davis, 6 N. H. 518, where Chief
Justice Richardson remarks: “It is objected that there is error in
the judgment of the court below, because judgment was rendered
for the plaintiff to recover his damages, instead of a judgment of
respondeat ouster. But in this respect the judgment was correct.’”

In Vermont, the same final judgment is rendered, whether the
issue is tried by the court or the jury. Peach v. Mills, 13 Vt. 561.

In New York, Marcy, Judge, lays down in Haight v. Holley,
B Wend. 262; “ Where the judgment is on demurrer, it is a re-

326

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 386

‘Myers & Waterson 0. Erwin & Co.

spondeat ouster, but where the issue of fact, on a plea in abatement,
is found against the defendant, the judgment is final.” McCartee
v. Chambers, 6 Wend. 649, is another case directly in point.

In Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Indiana, the courts have come
to the same result. W. Haffy v. Shore, 2 Pent. 361; Moore v.
Morton, 1 Bibb, 234; John v. Clayton, 1 Black, 54.

In Alling v. Shelton, 10 Conn. 436, the fact alleged in the
plea in abatement was traversed by the plaintiff, on which issue
was joined to the jury. After a trial on this issue, the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The court accepted the
verdict, and thereupon rendered judgment that the defendant
answer over to the plaintiff's declaration. This was assigned for
error by plaintiff, and on this ground alone judgment was re-
versed. Williams. C. J., in pronouncing an opinion, distinguished
for its depth of research, lays down the law distinctly on this sub- ~
ject, “that where the issue ig joined to the jury, in a plea in
abatement, and they find against the defendant, they must assess
damages for the plaintiff” The true reason, he says, is, “ that
pleas of this description are usually merely dilatory pleas, which
it is the policy of the law to discourage. *They are those [386
required to be filed early, tried early, and not allowed to be
amended and made conclusive, if the defendant will risk a trial
by jury thereon.”

It is proper to remark, however, in this connection, that by a
practice long continued and peculiar to the courts of Connecticut,
this common-law rule is varied in those cases where the issue has
been tried by the court instead of the jury. Upon afinding by the
court for the plaintiff, in an issue of fact, made up under a.plea in
abatement, the judgments have been, for more than half a cen-
tury, respondeat ouster. “A distinction,” says Judge Gould, in his
excellent Treatise on Pleading (page 300), for which it seems dif-
ficult to assign any satisfactory reason.”

In this state, an issue in fact, decided by the court, is followed
by the same legal consequences as a verdict returned by the jury.
The judges, pro hae vice, are the jury.

The counsel for plaintiffs in error press upon our consideration
the suggestion, that the common-law rule, in regard to the effect
of pleas in abatement, is essentially modified by our statute.

It is said that pleas in abatement are not admitted without affi-
davits of their trath—that it permits the plaintiff to amend and
327

387 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Myers & Waterson v. Exwin & Co.

make new parties after plea of non joinder ; and that where a plea
in abatement shall be adjudged insufiicient, it entitles the plaintiff
to full costs to the time of overruling such plea. In reply, I
have only to say that, if, at common law, it was an object to dis-
courage false dilatory pleas, it may be more important, under the
operation of our statute, to put a stop to dilatory pleas in which
perjury may be assigned, The statute does not permit the plaint.
iff, after plea in abatement, to issue his summons for other defend-
ants. It remains to be determined whether our courts will per-
mit this to be done after verdict for defendant.

That a judgment for full costs follows the overruling of a plea
in abatement, by no means signifies that the legislature designed
887] thereby to change the rule of the common law, in *regard
to the effect of a finding against the defendant, upon such a plea.
It evidently means the overruling of a plea for insufficiency, and
upon demurrer. In all such cases, even at common law, the de-
fondant would be required to “ answer over ;” and itis a reasonable
requisition of our statute, that he be made to pay full costs. We
are fully persuaded that the statute of Ohio has made no inroads
upon tho rulo in question ; and hence the law is so, that if, under
a plea in abatement, an issue in fact, tried by the court or the jury,
pe found for the plaintiff, jinal judgment must be awarded in his
favor. .

The judgment is affirmed.

I, The judgment on a plea in abatement is either,
1. That the writ or declaration be quashed—casseter breve, or narvatio;
2, Respondeat ouster; and,
3, Final, quod recuperet.
Judgment is rendered either,
1. Without issue taken on the plen; or,
2, With issue.
Issues are either,
1, Issues in law; or,
2. Issues in fact.
IL. Issues on pleas in abatement are either,
1, Such as must be tried by the court; ox,
2. Such as may be tried either by the court or jury.
The kind or form of judgment, rendered on an issue upon a plea in abatex
ment, depends upon the question whether the issue be found,
1, For the plaintiff, and against the plea; o,
2, For the defendant, and in favor of the plea.

328

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 383

Myers & Waterson v. Erwin & Co.

Of judgment without an issue.

‘When a good plea in abatement is filed, the plaintiff may omit to talke issue
upon it, and pray that his writ or declaration may be quashed, in order that
he may resort to a better one by commencing a new suit. In such caso the
cause will be discontinued, and judgment of casseter breve or narratio be ren~
dered. Steph, 109. As to entering nolle prosequi, sce 2 Swan's Pr. 31, 75, 900.

As to what issues must be tried by the court.

All issues in law, can be tried only by the court. When, therefore, a de-
murrer is filed to a plea in abatement, it prosents an issue in law, which is to
be decided by the court only. ‘When an issue is made, to be tried by inspec-
tion and examination of a record, although an issue of fact, such issue can
only be tried by the court. Steph. 101; 2 Ohit. 602; Oo. Lit. 117, b. Thus,
plea in abatement, another action pending, replication nul tiel record. Such
issue must be tried by the court, if upon a domestic record, Johnson v. Hub-
Dell et al., Wright’s 8. 0.69. This is the rule as to all domestic records, in-
cluding those of the courts of othor states of this Union. But such an issue
upon the records of foreign courts, is not necessarily tried by the court. 2
Swan’s Pr. 652, citing 6 Pick. 227; 1 Green]. Hiv. 547, n.
®Of judgments on issues which must be tried by the court, where the issue [BSS

is found for defendant, and in favor of the plea.

On all such issues, whether of law or of fact, the judgment must be that the
writ or declaration be quashed, “upon such pleas as are in abatement of the
writ or bill, and that the suit do stay or be respited, ete, upon such pleas as
are in suspension only.” Steph. on PL 107.

Of judgment on issues which must be tried by the court, when the issue és found
for the plaintiff, and against the plea.

On all such issues of law, orof fact, the judgment is respondeat ouster.
Steph. on Pl. 105. It is a general rule that, “on demurrer, the court will
consider the whole record and give judgment for the party who, on the whole,
appears to be entitled to it.” But “if a plaintiff demur toa ploa in abatement,
and the court decide against the plea, they will give judgment of respondeat
ouster without regard to any defect in the declaration.” Steph. on Pl. 144,
No plea in abatement, in the same degree, can be received after a respondeat
ouster, 1 Sellon’s Pr. 275; 1 Ohit. Pl. 466. After plea in abatement, no-ex-
ceptions can be taken to the declaration. Id.

Of issues which may be tried either by the court or jury.

All other issues of fact, not above specified, may be tried either by submis-
sion to the court by consent of the parties, or by a jury, if required by either
party. Walker's Am. L., 2d ed. 525. Act of March 14, 1837; Swan’s Stat.
691, sec. 158; Mills v. Noles, 1 Ohio, 534; 6 Ohio, 277; 6 Ohio, 621. The act
of 1837 applies to issues of facts, in actions sounding in contract, so tha in such
cases the court may be required to try such issues. As to issues of fact not
sounding in contract, perhaps the court could not be required to try them, but
by consent might do so.

Of judgment on all other issues of fact decided by court or jury.
“When an issue of fact is decided in favor of the plea, the same judgment is
329

389 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Brown & Oo. v. Webb.

yendered as by the court on such issue—that tho writ or declaration be quashed,
etc. Steph. on Pl. 107. To this rule an exception has been made by our stat~
ute, providing that where partners are sued, and the defendants plead in abate-
ment that all tho partners are not joined, the suit shall not abate, but the
plaintiff may make the other partner a party by service of a writ, and the
‘cause shall proceed. ‘Swan's Stat. 661, soc. L. As to judgment for costs, when
plea is adjudged insuflicient, see sec, LXIX.

But when an issue of fact is decided against the plea, the judgment is final,
quod reouperet, and no leave will be given to plead. Steph. on Pl. 105;
1 Sellon’s Pr. 273, C., Myers & Waterson ». Hunter Erwin & Co., above.

‘When a judgment is rendered on an issue, on a plea in abatement, that the
writ or declaration be quashed, the plaintiff may again commence his suit in
more correct form, whether such issue be decided by the court or jury. Steph.
on Pl. 107.

“When an issue, in fact, of the kind that may be tried by a court or jury upon
a plea in abatoment, is submitted to the court or jury, the whole evidence
of the plaintiff is received on the hearing, not only in support of the issue, but
in support of the plaintiff's claim, and if the issue is found against he plea,
the court or jury assess the plaintifl’s damages, and return the assessment of
damages, with the finding upon the issue. If the jury omit to assess the
damages, such omission can only be supplied by a venire de novo. 1 Sellon’s
Pr. 274.

‘Where a fact is pleaded in abatement, and issue taken thereon, the plaintiff
should be prepared to prove his damages on such issue, otherwise he will re-
BS9] cover *nominal damages only. Welekor v. Le Pelleticr, 1 Camp:
479; 2 Swan's Pr. 950, No. 22. But this applies only to actions sounding in
damages, for in actions where a specific thing is demanded, as debt, etc, if
issue is joined upon a fact in a plea in abatement, and verdict thereon for
plaintiff, the judgment thereon is peremptory, quod reenperet, 1 Sellon’s
Pr, 274,

‘Where an iseuo in fact is joined on a plea in abatement, the defendant, per-
haps, can only give such evidence as to the plaintift’s claim on the merits, as
could be given by a defendant, in default for plea.

Joun H. Brown & Co. v. Groran N. Wusz.

A conveyance of goods made for the purpose of defrauding creditors, the ven:
dor and purchaser both participating in the fraud, is void under the stat-
ute of frauds, as to the creditors of the party making such conveyance,
‘but is valid as between the parties to such conveyance. (1)

. (2) Tromper o, Barton, 18 Ohio, 418,
330

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 390

Brown & Co. ». Webb.

A creditor of the party making such fraudulent conveyance, with notice of
the fraud, may, with the consent of his debtor, take a valid mortgage, in
good faith, to secure his claim from the purchaser of the goods thus con-
veyed, without being required to resort to legal process to reach the
goods. (1)

A morigage of personal property, where the mortgagor retains possession by
virtue of the mortgage, with » power of sale, is void, as against subsequent
purchasers, and execution creditors, (2) but when possession is taken by
the mortgagee, the mortgage becomes valid so as to protect the mortgaged
property from execution creditors not having made a levy, and against
subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor.

‘Where a debtor, in contemplation of insolvency, executes a chattel mortgage
to one creditor, for the purpose of securing such creditor in preference to
others, with an understanding that the mortgagee shall satisfy his claim
out of the goods, and then surrender the residue to the mortgagor, the
mortgage will be deemed an assignment of property in trust, and the
mortgagee will be deemed a trustee, holding the mortgaged property for
the benefit of all the creditors in proportion to their respective de-
mands. (3)

Error to the Supreme Court of Stark county.

*The original action in the common pleas was trespass, [890
brought by the plaintiffs, Brown & Co., against Webb, who was
sheriff of Stark county.

In February, 1848, Alexander Garnier, of Canton, Stark county,
purchased from sundry houses in New York and Philadelphia,
goods to the value of about $10,000. He purchased from the
plaintiffs, goods to the value of $3,258, the largest purchase made,
and about $1,000 greater than the amount purchased of any other
house. All the purchases were on credit, for which Garnier gave
his notes, falling due in August and September, 1848, except, only,
that the purchase from plaintiffs was charged on book, but no note
taken, nor was any definite time of payment fixed, though it was
understood by the parties that the principal portion of his in-
debtedness to plaintiffs was to be paid in April or May, 1848,

(1) Morris ». Way, 16 Ohio, 469.

(2) Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio, 547; Hombeck v. Vanmetre, 9 Ohio, 153,

(3) Wilcox v. Kellogg, 11 Ohio, 394; Bates v. Coe, 10 Conn. 293; Perry v.
Holden, 22 Pick. 269; Henshaw et al. ». Sumner, 23 Pick. 446; Low v. Wy-
man, 8 N. H. 537; Meredith Man. Co. v. Smith et al, Id. 34; U.S. An. Dig,
1847, 62; Baker o, Hall, 13 N. H, 298; Goodrich v. Downs, 6 Wills, 438; 6
Hill, 438; Lang o. Leo et al. 3 Ran, 410; see Fassett & Co. 0, Traber, 20
Ohio.

331

391 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
Brown & Co. v. Webb.

Garnier not being well acquainted with the English language, or
the business of buying goods, took with him Nicholas Boar, to
aid in purchasing. The goods were brought to Canton, and Gar-
nier commenced retailing thom in the usual way.

In addition to these facts, it was proved on trial, at the April
term, 1849, that on June 23, 1848, Garnior sold his entire remain-
ing stock of goods to Bour for $8,800, for which he received a note,
secured by mortgage on Bour’s real estate, for $5,000, and the
residue in Bour’s individual notes, payable at different dates.

Tn July, 1848, George Dietrick, agent and clerk of plaintiffs, came
to Canton, and not finding Garnier able to pay for the goods he
had purchased of plaintiffs—finding that Bour bad possession of
the goods, and being anxious to secure the amount due the plaint-
iffs, got Bour to take an assignmout of plaintiff’s account for
$3,258, against Garnier, and to give his own notes to plaintiffs, for
the amount, with a chattel mortgage on the goods, to secure the
payment of the notes. This was done, in due form, on July 14,
1848 ; and on the same day, plaintiffs took possession of the goods,
as they proved, and commenced taking an invoice, which was com-
391] pleted *about the 24th of July. The invoice amounted to
about $7,000. The mortgage was duly deposited with the recorder
of Stark county, as required by the act of the general assembly,
on the day it was executed ; Garnier residing at the time in the
township where said recorder’s office was located. The plaintiffs
proved that they continued in possession, with the view of selling
enough to make their claim, until the 24th of July, when the de-
fendant Webb, as sheriff, levied on the entire stock of goods, and
took them from the plaintiffs. This levy was made pursuant to a
writ of execution, in favor of Walter F. Stona, against said Gar-
nier, dated July 22, 1848, for $3,300, which embraced several of
the claims of the “ eastern creditors” of Garnier above mentioned,
and who had, by pursuing Garnier to Sandusky, and causing him
to be imprisoned, obtained from him a judgment note in the name
of Stone, for the amount of their claims, before thoy fell due.
‘Before Webb would levy, he took full indemnity against all loss
or damage that he might sustain in consequence of the levy. Ho
subsequently sold the goods so levied on, before this suit was
brought, for about $6,000, which has been appropriated in dis-
charge of said execution, and others, against Garnier. Garnier
and Bour are worth nothing. Garnier has gone to parts unknown.

332,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 392 |

Brown & Co. v, Webb.

,While the plaintiffs were taking the invoice, and nearly a week
before the levy, they received from Garnier an order on Bour, re-
questing him to pay plaintiffs their claim. This order, before the
levy, was accepted by Bour, and he agreed to pay it in goods. The
levy was made peaceably, but against the remonstrance of plaint-
iffs’ agent. The chattel mortgage to plaintiffs contains these pro-
visions: “ Provided always, and those presents are upon the ex-
press condition, that whereas the said Nicholas Bour has this day
given to the said John H. Brown & Co., his four certain promis-
sory notes, for the respective amounts and payable respectively,
as follows: One for $700, payable six months afier date;
one for *$700, payable one year after date; another for [892
$814.16, payable eighteen months after date; and another for
$814.16, payable two years after date—all with interest and cur-
rent rate of exchange in Philadelphia.

“Now if the said Nicholas Bour shall pay the said promissory
notes, according to the tenor and effect thereof, then these presents
to be void, otherwise in full force; provided, further, and it is
hereby expressly agreed, that said Nicholas Bour be authorized to
retail said stock of goods and merchandise in order to realize
fonds to meet and satisfy said several notes—the said John H.
Brown & Oo. retaining, however, the privilege, either through
themselves or their attorneys, Brown & Myer, at any time they
may deem the safety of their claims require it, to take possession
of the said stock of merchandise, and to sell the same, or any part
thereof, as may be necessary to satisfy their claims aforesaid, and
also to superintend or have the supervision and control of the sale
of said goods, by retail, by the said Nicholas Bour, and to keep an
account thereof, or hold the said Nicholas Bour to such regular
account thereof. It is also further agreed and understood, that all
subsequent supplies to said stock shall be in every way subject to
the stock now on hand, under and by virtue of the terms of these
presents.”

The defendant proved, that notwithstanding the invoice, Bour
was in possession of the goods at the time of the levy, and did
business as usual; that Dietrick was advised to remove the goods,
but declined, The testimony as to whether the plaintiffs, by their
agents, or Bour, had possession at the time of the levy, was con-
flicting. One of plaintiffs’ witnesses testified that an agent of
plaintiffs remained in the store up to the time of the levy, and the

333

398, 394 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
Brown & Co. v, Webb.

arrangement was, that he was to receive the proceeds of sales
until plaintiffs’ claim was paid, but that Bour might be in the
393] store as much as he pleased, and *aid in selling goods; and
after plaintiffs’ claim was paid, the balance of the goods was to
be given up to Bour. (1)

The defendant introduced proof tending to show that the sale
of the goods, by Garnicr to Bour, was fraudulent, and made by
both parties to the sale to defraud the creditors of Garnier, and
that at the time plaintiffs took their mortgage they had notice of
said fraud.

The action in the common pleas was presented against Webb,
for levying on, removing, and selling the goods by him sold on the
execution aforesaid.

There was other testimony on the trial not material to the de-
cision in this court.

The plaintiff asked the court below to charge the jury, “ that,
if the proof established the fact that plaintiffs were honest credi-
tors of Garnier, and the mortgage was taken from Bour for the
purpose of securing their claim, the mortgage is good and valid,
even though the plaintiffs had notice that the sale from Garnier to
Bour was fraudulent.” This the court refused, but did charge,
“that if, at the time of making the mortgage to plaintiffs, Deitrick,
as agent of plaintiffs, had sufficient knowledge of the nature of
the transactions between Garnier and Bour, to induce him to be-
lieve that the same were fraudulent, said mortgage was fraudulent
and void, as against existing creditors ;” and “that the fact that
the mortgage covered an amount of property so much greater in
value than the amount of plaintiffs’ claim, might be taken into
consideration, by the jury, wfth the other facts in-the case as evi-
dence of fraud on the part of the plaintiffs.”

The jury returned a verdict for defendant,

The plaintiffs moved to set aside the verdict, and for a new 7 trial,
because of the charge given, the refusal to charge as asked, and
394] for other reasons, not passed upon in the decision *now
made; which motion was overruled, and judgment rendered for
defendant for costs.

(1) See Fasset v. Traber, 20 Ohio, as to the effect of such an arrangement,
and as to the liability of such trustees; also 10 Ohio, 230; 12 Ohio, 340; 15
Ohio, 593. See also Davies v. Lowery, 15 Ohio, 655; 18 Ohio, 509; 13 Ohio,
300.

334

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 395

Brown & Oo. v. Webb.

Exceptions were duly taken, and the cause was removed on
error to the Supreme Court of Stark county, by which court the
judgment of the common pleas was affirmed.

This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the judgment of af-
firmance.

Beiprn & Lerrer, Brown & Myurs, for plaintiffs, insisted:

That, if Deitrick had reason to believe (as he had not), that the
sale to Bour was fraudulent, as against the creditors of Garnier,
it could not affect the validity of plaintiffs’ claim, nor their right
to the goods, nor the chattel mortgage. The plaintiffs were co-
creditors of the subsequent execution creditors who made tho
levy. It was not fraudulent in plaintiffs to pursue the goods in
the hands of Bour, if he was a fraudulent vendor of their debtor,
nor was it fraudulent in them, as against the other creditors of
Garnier, to make any fair arrangement to secure their claim,
whether by suit against, or by voluntary agreement with Bour.
As between Bour and Garnier, however fraudulent their acts and pur-
poses as against the creditors of Garnier, the sale was good, and could
not be disturbed. None could disturb it but creditors.

Suppose this case presented a mere struggle botween the credi-
tors of Garnier, and it be admitted that Garnier and Bour had acted.
fraudulently, not only in buying the goods “in the east,” but also
in the sale of them to Bour, still the question is one of “supertor
diligence,” and if the plaintiffs, by means of their chattel mort-
gage, got the first lien, and took possession of the goods from the
fraudulent vendee, it would be, as it in fact is in this case, a gross
fraud on them, for a subsequent execution creditor to come in and.
sweep away that lien, and appropriate the goods.

No ono can doubt but that the plaintiffs could accomplish, by volun-
tary agreement with Bour, if he were a fraudulent *vendee, that [895
which the law would undoubtedly have enabled them to do by suit.

To render the title of a purchaser from a fraudulent vendee void,
there must have been a fraudulent intent by the purchaser ; because
if innocent and bona fide, his title is good. But, it will be borne
in mind that the plaintiffs are not mere vendees or mortgages of a
fraudulent vendee, but they are also creditors of the fraudulent
vendor. And, we should like to know how the plaintiffs can be
said to have intendéd a fraud, in securing a just debt, by taking a
transfer of goods from the fraudulent vendeo of their debtor. If
the plaintiffs in doing so, intended a fraud, or did that which can
335

396 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Brown & Co. v. Webb.

be called fraudulent, then, we say, the creditors in the Stone judg-
ment and execution, committed a gross fraud against all the unpaid
ereditors of Garnier,

“An innocent purchaser of goods for a valuable consideration,
from a fraudulent vende in possession, obtains a good title, against
the croditors of the fraudulent vendee.” 6 Shep.391; 2 U.S. Dig.,
528, 544.(1)

Upon the same principlo, it has been decided that “A mortgage
to secure a pre-existing debt can not be a fraud on other creditors. 7
Iredell, U. 8. Dig. IT Ann., 281, 856; Id. sec. 57; 25 Maine, 414;
U. 8. Dig., 284, sec. 107, I Ann.

‘We assert there is but one instance known in the law, where it
has been held that a sale of goods, obtained by fraud, would affect
the title of a subsequent innocent vendeo; and that is, where
the fraudulent vondee effected his purchase by his own fraudulent
conduct toward his vendor, who acted in good faith, and in no way
participated in the fraud, but was duped and deceived. In cases
of this description, cited in note d, of 2 Kent’s Com. 514, it was
held, that the purchaser from the fraudulent vendce could not
protect himself, because he could claim no better title than his
vendor had, and as he had none at all, the original vendor, who
396] *had been defrauded, could seize the goods in the hands of
the innocent vendee.

Garnier can not dispute tho title of Bour, even if the sale were
fraudulent. 2 Kent, 512.

The order from Garnier to Bour, in favor of plaintiffs, beyond
all controversy, it seems to us, gives title to plaintiffs for the goods.
If the sale from Garnier to Bour was fraudulent against creditors
of Garnier, and Bour could not convey title, why Garnier could,
with Bour’s consent, as by the order, especially to a creditor. True,
when this order was received, plaintiffs were in possession of the
goods under the chattel mortgage. But how can that impair the
power of the order? No lawyer will doubt, that, if one get pos-
session of property, under a bad title, the possession may be pro-
tected and perfected, by “getting in” a good title, before he is de-
prived of his possession, This order was received by plaintiffs
and accepted by Bour six days before the levy by defendant.

(1) See Nichols v. Bailey, 10 Ohio, 230.

336

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 397

Brown & Oo. v. Webb.

HH. Griswotp, for defendant: .

1. A purchaser from a fraudulent vendee, with notice, obtains
no better title than his vendor, and the property may be reached
in his hands, by execution, at the suit of the creditors of the”
fraudulent debtor. .

2. But it will be claimed by the plaintiffs that, being creditors
of Garnier, they had a right to pursue the goods, and having ob-
tained possession of them peaceably, have a right to retain posses-
sion against execution creditors. ,

I find but few authorities bearing on this precise question, but
such as I do find sustain me in the position that a creditor of the
fraudulent grantor can not obtain possession in this way. Owen
v. Dixon, 17 Conn. 492; Crowninshield v. Kittridge, 7 Met. 520;
Osborne v. Moss, 7 Johns. 161. These authorities show that
whore there has been a fraudulent conveyance, the creditor, with
notice, can not take possession of. the property, except by virtue of
legal process, nor can be by *so doing obtain an advantage [897
over other creditors. The property remains in his hands subjoct
to execution. .

38. The chattel mortgage is void, because the possession of the
goods was retained by Bour, coupled with a power of sale, 16
Ohio, 547. This authority is applicable to this case, is in point,
and conclusive.

Besides, I claim that the weight of the evidence is, that plaintiffs
did not have possession of the goods, and so no vitality could be
given to the mortgage by reason of a possession. But, granting
(for the argument) the plaintiffs did take possession, still, they
thereby acquired no title. The mortgage was void at its incep-
tion because of its provisions, and no subsequent act of the parties
could give it efficacy. Rowley v. Rico, 11 Met. 333. In the
case at bar, the possession was taken solely under the mortgage, if
at all.

4. The plaintiffs’ mortgage was void, because it operated to hin-
der and delay creditors. The plaintiffs’ claim was about $3,000—
the goods mortgaged were worth $7,000. It was correct, therefore,
for the court to charge that these facts might be taken into consid-
eration as evidence of fraud.

5. The mortgage was void because it attempted to cover future
purchases of goods. This objection and the preceding one, taken
together, establish its invalidity. 16 Ohio, 553.

VOL, xx—22 337

398 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
"Brown & Go. 0. ‘Webb.

The case of Frost'v. Goddard, 12 Shep. 414 (1 An. Dig. 284
soc. 107), does not conflict with the law as I have claimed it to be.

That authority only applies to a purchase “in satisfaction of a
debt.”

G. W. Busy, in reply:

The proof shows that plaintiffs had possession of the goods be-
fore and at the time of the levy.

Can it be said that plaintiffs are to be prejudiced because, during
the time Dictrick had possession of the goods, he permitted Bour,
occasionally, to come to the store, and sell a few small parcels of
398] the goods, in discharge of some stall claims *due from Gar-
nier? All the plaintiffs desired was that they should have goods
enough to make their claims. This is clear evidence that they in-
tended no harm or delay to the creditors of Garnier, and that they
were moved by no “fraudulent intents.”

The caso in 16 Ohio, 547, can not be applied to this. In this
case there is an express provision, that plaintiffs might, without
any contingency, take possession of the goods; and they did take
possession, nine or ten days before any other rights supervened, or were
asserted. In the caso in 16 Ohio, 547, the mortgagees never had
possession. The case is in chancery, (1) and presents facts and
circumstances, and matters of consideration, wholly different from
those involved in this case. .

The case of Rowley v. Rice, 11 Mot. 333, establishes the fact,
that if tho plaintiffs’ mortgage were invalid, and they merely took
possession of the goods, with an understanding between them and
Bour, that they were to hold them until they made the amount of
their claim, their title was perfect. It is further said in this case,
that “if the parties acted under a mistaken belief that the plaint-
iffs had good title, under the mortgage, it would not invalidate
another good title, under which the plaintiffs might claim.” Had
not the plaintiffs, in the case at bar, just as good title, aside from
their mortgage, as the plaintiff had in the case of Rowley v. Rice?
I say they had. First. By the order of Garnier, accepted by
Bour. Second. By the mutual understanding between Bour and
plaintiffs’ agent, Dictrick, when the agent took possession, that
the agent should go on and sell enough to make the plaintifis’
claim.

(1) Hampson v, Sumner, 18 Ohio, 447.
338

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 399, 400

Brown & Co. v. Webb.

Catpwstt, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

On the trial of this cause, on error, in the Supreme Court,
**many errors were assigned to the ruling of the common [399
pleas, on the trial in that court, on points of evidence, and also to
the charge of the court to the jury. We propose, however, to
confine ourselves to a single assignment, as that raises the prin-
cipal question in controversy, and in the opinion of the court is
decisive of the case. That question is thus presented by the bill
of exceptions: “The plaintiffs requested the court to charge the
jury, that if the proof established the fact that plaintiffs were
honest creditors of Garnier, and the chattel mortgage was obtained
from Bour for the purpose of securing their claim, the mortgage
ig good and valid, even though the plaintiffs had notice that the
sale from Garnier to Bour was fraudulent. Which charge the court
refused to give to the jury, but, on the contrary, the court charged
the jury, that if, at the time of making said chattel mortgage,
Dietrick, as the agent of the plaintiffs, had sufficient knowledge
of the nature of the transactions between Garnier and Bour, to in-
duce him to believe that the same was fraudulent, said mortgage
was fraudulent and void as against existing creditors.” The point
on which this charge was given was one directly raised by the
evidence in the case, and was pertinent to the issue between the
parties. Did the court of common pleas charge the law? We
think they did not.

Taking it for granted, that the transfer from Garnier to Bour
was fraudulent, and that plaintiffs knew of that fact, we do not
see why they, as creditors, were deprived of any of their rights, in
securing their claim. The sale from Garnicr to Bour was void,
and of no effect, as against the rights of creditors, but good as be-
tween the parties.

Before the sale of the goods to Bour, the plaintiffs would have
had a right to have their claim secured by a mortgage from
Garnier on the goods, and we do not see why Garnier and Bour
might not agree, as they did, that plaintiffs might have the benefit
of the goods as security for their debt, as though no such sale had
taken place, They were thus doing away the fraud committed
by the sale, and using the goods in *the way the law [400
required they should be used—in the payment of Garnier’s debts.
The creditors who made the levy on the goods, and thus took them,
out of the possession of plaintiffs, had no preferred claim on them.

339

AOL SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
Brown & Oo. v. Webb.

‘At the time tho goods were-mortgaged to plaintiffs, the claims of
the judgment creditor were not due. It was only by obtaining a
power of attorney from Garnier, to confess a judgment, that they
were enabled to proceed to their claims at the time they did. We
do not think it was necessary for the plaintiffs to proceed by legal
process, to secure their claim in the goods; but that if, by a fair
transaction, they obtained a security on the goods, without exe-
eution, such security would bo available, and could not bo treated
as a nullity.

It is true, that, from all the circumstances attending the taking
of the mortgage from Bour, on the stock of goods, the mortgage
would probably (if that question were before us for decision), be
held to come within the provisions of the statute (Swan’s Stat.
717, sec, 68), and inure to the benefit of all the creditors. But
that would not vitiate the mortgage so as to render it a nullity;
the statute merely gives such assignments a particular direction ;
it does not avoid them; it makes an assignment that was intended
for the benefit of one or more creditors, exclusively, to inure to
the benefit of all the creditors. If, then, this mortgage of plaint-
iffs was such an assignment, as we think it was, the other creditors
had not a right to appropriate the entire property to the payment
of their claims by execution; but they had a right to share
equally, under the assignment, with the plaintiffs, in proportion
to their respective claims. We think the court of common pleas
erred in their charge to the jury, and that the judgment of the
Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment of the common pleas, is
erroncous. The judgment of the Supreme Court will therefore be
reversed,

We have examined the authorities cited in this case, on both
sides, and, without going into a detailed examination of them, we
401] would merely remark tbat we do not think they conflict *with

‘the conclusion to which we have come, but, on the contrary, so far
as they apply, we think they harmonize with it. Judgment
reversed. :

340

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 402

Morgan et al. v. Mason.

Tuomas C. Mokean ur an. v. Henry Mason.

The grant of aright to build a dam across a stream of water, and to raise the
water to a specified height upon the lands of the grantor, creates an ease-
ment, which may be attached by the grantee to his lands as an incident
or appurtenance,

‘When the water was takén from suchidam onto the lands of the grantee, by
means of a race, and mill built thereon, a judgment subsequently ren-
dered against the grantee, attaches as a lien, not only upon the land, but
also upon the easement, which has become a part thereof, and a sale of
the land with the mill, under such judgment, carries with it the fall ‘bene~
fit of the easement also.

‘This will be the case, although the description of the land in the levy is by
metes and bounds, and said easement is not expressly described or alluded
to in such levy, upon the principle that it attaches to the land and mill
as a part thereof.

Enror to the common pleas of Columbiana county:

Mason, the plaintiff below, sued Morgan and others, in an ac-
tion on the case for diverting the water from a water-course.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The plaintiff be-
low owned what is designated, in the opinion of the court, as the
“onc-acre tract,” along which the water-course flowed, and which
was diverted by a race from the dam above the “one-acre tract”
to the mill of defendant below.

-Umsstanrren, Stanton & Wattacz, and W. K. Ursam, for
plaintiffs in error:

The water-right, being appurtenant to the mill erected upon the
land described in the sheriff’s levy and deed, passed by the same
conveyance that passed the mill. Express words of *de- [402
scription are not essential to pass an incorporeal right appurtenant
to land. Oo. Lit. 307; Nichols v. Chamberlin, 2 Cro. Jac. 121;
Angell on Water-courses, 39-46.

“If the owner of a house builds a conduit thereto through his
otter land, and conveys the water by pipes to his house, and then

sells the house with all the appurtenances excepting the land, the |

conduits and pipes pass, together with a right to dig and open the
earth, for the purpose of repairing the pipes and laying new ones,
B41

mo fo

Seat

56_478

403 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Morgan et al. ». Mason.

if necessary, because the water was an appurtenance to the house.”
2 Oro. Jac, 121,

«By a devise of a mill with the appurtenances, the right to use
of the water, and the right of a piece of land which was used with
the mill, passed.” Blaine’s Lessee v. Chambers, 1 Serg. & Rawle,
169.

In Kent v. Waite, 10 Pick. 238, it was held, “ that an easement
appurtenant to land, will pass by a deed of the land, without an
express grant of the easoment, or of the privileges and appurte-
nances.” :

No matter where the easement is located, if it be appurtenant
to the mill, it passed by the same deed that passed the mill. If
the dam were a mile off, is mattered not. Pickering v. Staples, 5
Serg. & Rawle, 107; Now Ipswich Woolen Factory v. Batchelder,
3N.E. .

Mason & Porrsr, for defendant in error:

That the sheriff's deed, by having the addition “with all and
singular the appurtenances and privileges thereunto belonging,”
could pass the water-privilege if it did not pass by the description

‘ in the levy and the sale, we think no one will seriously doubt.

The sheriff is 4 mere creature of the law, and is only permitted
to convey that which by levy, appraisement, and sale, in the mode
prescribed by law, he has struck off to the highest bidder. Barnes
p. Pillington, 1 Wash. 29; 14 Jobns. 352. The same rule is laid
403] down in 1 Johnson’s Cases, 286. In 10 Ohio, 42, *Judge
Wood quotes, with approbation, the rule laid down in 14 Johnson.

Upon what did the sheriff levy and sell, and what passes by the
levy and sale?

The sheriff levied “upon the following described real estate,”
to wit, “a tract of land,” describing the same by metes and
bounds ;” and also returns that “he offered the said real estate to
wit, said tract contatning fifteen acres and ten one-hundreths for
sale, and sold the same to Morgan & Rogers,” no mention being
made in the levy, or in the return of the sale, of any mill-structure,
or water-privilege, or any appurtenances thereunto belonging.

The case of Jackson, ex dem., etc. v. Striker, 1 Johns. Cas, 286,
is directly in point.

To the samo point is the decision in 12 Ohio, in case of Lock-
wood et al. v. Mills et al., 480, where it was held that when lands
are granted by metes and bounds, all the area within these

342

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 404

‘Morgan ot al. . Mason,

bounds, and no more, passed.. This rule is particularly applicable
to sales of real estate on execution, whon, by our statute, no realty
can be sold without an appraisement, and a bid of two-thirds of
its value. .

In 12 Ohio, 95, in the case of Cassilly v. Rhodes, it was there
decided that what was on the land and attached to the freehold,
the crops of the debtor, did not pass to the purchaser, because the
value of the crops was not included in the appraisement.

Was the water-right appendant or appurtenant to the fifteen-
acre tract sold by the sheriff?

From the title-papers it appears that the one-acre tract, with
the water-privileges, was held by McLaughlin, by a separate con-
veyance, and came to him from a different grantor. The sheriff
might have included in his levy the several tracts together, with
the water-privilege, but was governed by the title, as of record,
and made his levy accordingly.

Previous to July 31, 1837, when May and wife made the deed,
there had been in existence a water-right of “some kind, as [404
appears from the testimony. McLaughlin, in taking the convey-
ance, clearly shows that he did not intend to attach the water-
right last obtained to the filteen-acre tract.

Ho also conveys, by deed of same date, to May and wife, three
acres off the mill tract, adjoining the lands of May, and the one one-
acre tract and water-right; thus completely separating the fifteen-
acre tract, the one-acre tract, and the water-right. The acts of Mc-
Laughlin, before the levy, show the same understanding on his
part; as at the time he gave the mortgage on all his real estate to
Mason, he mortgaged the water-right as a part and parcel of
the one-acre tract, and not of the tract sold by the sheriff.

Tho water-right is then not appendant or appurtenant to tho
fifteen-acre tract.

It is claimed that the water-right passes because it is appurte-
nant to the mill, The mill passes, because it is on or appendant to
the land. If what is appurtenant to the mill passes in a convey-
ance of the Jand merely, on the same principle, what is appur-
tenant to the water-right will pass, and therefore the mill-dam
will be included, and so on ad infinitum, until the water-right, the
mill-dam, and the one-acre tract, together with the three-acre
tract conveyed to May, will each of them be merged in the fifteen-

acre tract.
343

405 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Morgan et al. v. Mason.

In the case cited (10 Pick. 238), a user was proven of the way in
dispute, on the part of the plaintiff, for upward of forty years—a
sufficient time to establish a title by prescription. The way in
that case was also appurtenant to the land. In this case it is not
claimed that the water-right was appurtenant to the land, but to
the mill.

In the case of the New Ipswich Factory, 3 N. H. 190, the
.grantor had conveyed almost the entire land to the grantee upon
which the raceway was erected, and the raceway being in itself
indivisible as to its use, to have decided differently would have
shut up the mill of the grantee. There is also a distinction be-
tween the right of passing off water diverted from its natural
405] cbannel, when the privilege is granted *of carrying it to
the mill, and that of appropriating water when no easement to
use it for any purpose has ever been given.

In all the cases cited, the grants have been by devise, which are
liberally construed, in order to carry out the intention of the tes-
tator ; or by deed from vendor to vendec, where the construction
given is most strongly to be made against the grantor.

In the case of Grant v. Philip Chase ot al., 17 Mass. 443, the
court there held that in a conveyance of a tract of land by metes
and bounds, with all the privileges and appurtenances thereunto
belonging, nothing passed as parcel of the granted premises bat
what was included within the boundaries of the deed.

In the case of Pierce v, Selleck, 18 Connecticut, 321, the court
there hold, that although an individual is the owner of two par-
cels of Jand, to one of which he has no access except over the
other, and he conveys the accessible parcel, reserving the inacces-
sible one, a right of way to the latter over the former is reserved
to the grantor; yet if he afterward conveys the inaccessible par-
cel to a third person, the grantee has not, by the conveyance, the
samo right of way, and it will not pass as an appurtenance of the
land.

Woe further cite, to sustain this position, the case of Russell v.
Jackson, 2 Pickering, 573; Manning v, Smith, 9 Conn. 289; 3
Rawle, 256. :

The judgment of McCormick, mentioned in sheriff's deed, to
the plaintiffs in error, was not a lien on the water-right without
a levy. The statute provides (see Swan, 468), “That the lands
and tenements of the debtor shall be bound for the satisfaction of

B44.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 406

Morgan et al. ». Mason.

any judgment, from the first day of the term, ete, in all cases
where such land lies within the county,” etc. The obvious meaning
is, that the word tenements should be taken in its common meaning
of houses and buildings, for by the wording of the law, the judg-
ment is only a lien when the land lies in the county. In tho
Northern Bank of Kentucky v: Roosa et al., 13 Ohio, 384, the
court say that ‘the section referred to “gives the judgment [406
a lien on lands in the county.”

In Baird et al. v. Kirtland, 13 Ohio, 21, it has also been
decided that a possessory interest in land may be sold, but is only
bound from the time of the levy. If u water-right be not bound
until levy, the plaintiffs in error acquired no right whatever to the
water-privilege. The mortgage of McLaughlin to Mason was
made and recorded prior to the levy, although subsequent to the
judgment, and would hold against the levy, actual or constructive.

Ranney, J. .The plaintiffs in error. were sued in the court
below, in an action on the case, for diverting a water-course, called
the west fork of the Little Beaver. They pleaded not guilty,
and upon trial a verdict was found against them, upon which the
court rendered a judgment. They prayed certain instruations
from the court to the jury, which being refused, they excepted,
and now present the same questions to this court, upon this writ
of orror. The object of the controversy is, to determine to which
of two tracts of land a certain water-right attaches. . Leaving
out of the question such details as tend only to confuse, a clear
understanding of the points raised.and decided will be obtained
from the following state of facts: On February 27, 1834, Thomas
Pollock conveyed, by deed of that dato, to Joseph McLaughlin
15.10 acres of land, lying on one side of said stream, by particular
description. On July 31, 1837, John May, who owned lands
above those thus conveyed, on both sides of the stream, and
also on the opposite side of the stream against them, conveyed
to McLaughlin one-acre of land, upon the opposite side of the
stream, extending as far up the stream as the land conveyed by
Pollock to McDuaughlin, and also the right to build a mill-dam
along the whole length of the upper line of the tract, so as to raise
the water to a certain mark, particularly specified, and to have
the right, at all times, to enter'‘upon the lands of May to keep the
same in repair.

345

407, 408 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Morgan ct al. «. Mason.

407] *A dam was accordingly orected, from which the water,
‘by means of a race, was taken out upon the 15.10 acre tract, and
after being carried through the whole length of that tract, was
again discharged into the stream at a considerable distance below
the lower boundary of the one-acre tract. On this race, and sup-
plied by water from it, was a mill, which the bill of exceptions in-
forms us was first erected in 1829, and until 1837 supplied with
water from the same race, taken from adam built some rods
further up the stream than the present one, but under what au-
thority does not appear. Since 1837, the mill has been propelled
by water taken from the dam built in pursuance of the deed from
May to McLaughlin, before referred to. On August 10, 1887,
McLaughlin conveyed to May three acres from the upper end of
the 15.10 acre tract, reserving the right to keep up the dam on the
north side. It is not important further to notice this conveyance.
At the April term of the court of common pleas for Columbiana
county, for the year 1845, Andrew McCormick recovered a judg-
ment against McLaughlin, upon which, on September 15, 1845,
the 15.10 acre tract was levied upon, and in the levy particularly
described by metes and bounds, as in the deed from Pollock to
McLaughlin. At the sale, the plaintiffs in error became the pur-
chasers, and received a deed from the sheriff, dated March 20,
1846, which, after setting forth the levy, sale, and confirmation,
proceeds to convey the land so specifically described, “with all
and singular the privileges and appurtenances thereunto belong-
ing.” This is the plaintiff's title.

On July 3, 1845, McLaughlin mortgaged both these tracts, to-
gether with other lands, to Henry Mason, the defendant. The
mortgage money being unpaid, at the March term, 1846, of the
same court, he obtained a decree for the sale of all the lands
apecified in his mortgage, except the 15.10 acre tract which had
peen already sold on the prior lien, as before stated, and at the
sale he became the purchaser of the one-acre tract, and received a
deed from the proper officer, on August 1, 1846. This constitutes
the defendant's title.

408] *Upon this state of facts, the court of common pleas

cbarged the jury, that, while the judgment would operate as a

lien upon the appurtenant water-right, by which the water was

obtained to propel the mill, yet that such water-right, upon a

tract of land other than that upon which the mill was situate,
346

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 409

Morgan et al. v. Mason.

though subject to levy and execution, would not pass to the pur-
chaser, at sheriff’s sale, unless the same was included expressly
in the levy. If not so expressly included, the land only within
the boundaries specified, and the mill thereon, would pass to the
purchaser at the sale.

Was this instruction correct? is the only question presented for
our consideration. We do not attach any importance to the fact
that the sheriff, in his deed, has professed to convey the lands,
with the privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging. The
extent and operation of his deed must be measured by the levy
that ho made, and the appraisement and sale consequent thereon,
and can not be enlarged by any expressions that he may have
made use of in his deed. Without a judgment, levy, and sale, the
sheriff possesses no more power or authority to convey the lands
of a debtor, than any private person; and, consequently, without
these indispensable requisites, can give no better title to them.
Any interest, not Jevied upon, can not be legally sold, and, if not
legally sold, can not be conveyed. Of this we think there can be
no doubt.

The great question here is, what was included in the levy?
That the land, with every substantial erection thereon, including,
of course, the mill, was covered by it, is not denied. To include
all these, there was no necessity or propriety in going further
than to give a description of the land by metes and bounds.

The absolute title to all these was carried to the purchaser by
the sale and conveyance. A principal thing will draw to it all
its incidents and appurtenances, and upon a transfer of the prin-
cipal thing, they will pass with it, although not specifically named.
This results, inevitably, from the nature and character of the
principal and its incidents, and the relation they *sustain [409
to each other.(1) The land and the mill having passed to the
plaintiffs in error, by the sheriff’s deed, as the principal thing,
can the water-right, which now constitutes the matter in contro-
versy, be regarded as an incident appendant to that principal, and

(1) Accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur secum principale. Co. Lit. 152, a.
‘The incident shall pass by the grant of the principal, but not the principal by
the grant of the incident. See also 11 Rep. 52, Whoever grants a thing is sup-
posed also tacitly to grant that without which the grant itself would be of no
effect. Broom’s Legal Maxims, 198.

347

A10 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Morgan et al. ». Mason.

so carried along with it? That land can not be appurtenant to
land, as a general rule, is well settled.

The right, here claimed, of raising a water-power upon one
piece of land to be used and enjoyed upon another, comes under
the general term—easement.

A late learned writer (Angell on Water-courses, sec. 142) in-
forms us that they were treated of by the civil law under the name
of services, where they were divided into real and personal. The
former were defined to be “a service which one estate owes to
another; or the right of doing something, or of having a privi-
lege in one man’s estate for the advantage and convenience of the
owner of another estate.” “The estate unto which the service is
due, is called pradium dominans, or the ruling estate, and tho
other estate which suffers or yields tho service, is called pradium
serviens, or an estate subject to a privilege or service. To consti-

: tute such service, it is therefore necossary that there be two es-
tates, the one giving and the other receiving the advantage.”

The extract I have quoted exactly defines the interest claimed
by the plaintiffs in error as belonging to the estate of the pur-
chaser. As they claim it, it is the right of crecting a dam and
flowing back the water upon the estate of May, for the advantage
and convenience of the estate they purchased, on which the mill
was situate. That McLaughlin bought this right or easoment of
May, for the advantago of the mill on the 15.10 acre tract, can not
bedoubted. That he so applied it and used it down to the time that
410] that tract was sold to the plaintiffs *in error, is equally
clear. That he did not buy it or use it for the benefit of the one-
acre tract is undeniable.

It is truo that it was acquired by the samo deed by which the
one acre-tract was, and that the whole was mortgaged to Mason
by the same description found in the deed from May. But at the
time the judgment was obtained, both tracts, as well as the ease-
ment, belonged, unincumbered, to McLaughlin, and the easement
had been made subservient, and attached to the 15.10 acro tract.
If, at that time, it attaches as an incident to that estate, the same _
judgment that bound that estate bound its incident also. That it
did so attach, as an incident or appurtenance, to the fifteen acre
tract, and passed with it without any special description in the
levy or deed, I think very clear from the authorities.

Tho same author from whom I have already quoted (p. 164, sec.

348

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 411

Morgan ot al. v. Mason.

158), upon the authority of a great number of English and Ameri-
can cases, lays down the general rule thus: “The maxim of the
law is, that whoever grants a thing is supposed also tacitly to grant
that without which the grant would be of no effect; and accord-
ingly, whenever anything is granted, all the means to attain it,
and all the fruits and effects of it, are granted also, and will, pass
inclusive, together with the thing, by the grant of the thing itself,
without the words cum pertinentiis, or with ‘appurtenances,’ or any
like words.”

The following cases will illustrate the application of this rule
under a variety of circumstances. It is true that in some of them
stress is laid upon tho fact that the term appurtenances was found
in the deed, but it will be seen that the weight of authority fully
sustains Mr. Angell in saying that that, or any similar word, is-
not necessary.

The direct question as to the necessity of any such provision
was made in Kent v. Waite, 10 Pick. 141. The court say: “It is
admitted that the plaintiff has a valid title to the wood-lot, but it
is denied that he has any title to the right of way, because in some
of his title-deeds there is no express grant of the right of way,
nor of the appurtenances of the *wood-lot. But this omis- [411
sion is not material ; for the principle seems to be well settled, that
aright of way or other easement appurtenant to land, will pass by
a grant of the land, without any mention being made of the ease-
ment or the appurtenances. This principle is laid down by Lord
Coke; and is supported by a strong current of authorities, There
is a dictum to the contrary in the case of Higgins v. Grant, Cro.
Eliz. 18, but it is wholly unsupported.”

Justice Story, in the case of the United States v. Appleton, 3
Suman. 502, is equally explicit upon this point. Referring to the
ease of Staples v. Hayden, 6 Mod. I., he says: “It is observ-
able, that ih this case reliance is placed on the language of the
grant, ‘with all the ways, etc. But this is wholly unnecessary,
for whatever are properly incidents and appurtenances of the
grant will pass without the word ‘ appurtenances,’ by mere opera-
tion of law. So it is laid down by Lord Coke in Co. Lit. 307. The
same doctrine is affirmed by Lord Chief Baron Comyn (Dig., Grant,
B. 11), and it has been fully supported by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in a very recent case.” The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania have, in effect, adopted the same rule.

349

412 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Morgan et al. v. Mason.

In Swartz v. Swartz, 4 Barr, 359, Gibson, O. J., says: ‘Though
the rule admits of exceptions, it is generally true that land can
not be appurtenant to land; but that a licenso or privilege may,
was ruled in Pickering v. Staples, 5 Serg. & R. 107, in which a
water-right was allowed to pass without the word ‘privileges,’ as
appurtenant to a saw-mill. The privileges in this case as well as ”
in that was enjoyed in connection with the land which was the
subject of the conveyance—it would have been useless separated
from it—and it is not to be doubted that it passed by the word
* appurtenances.’”

By the very recent case of Hinckliff v, Harl of Kinmoul, 5 Bing:
(N. ©.) 1, it appears to be the sottled modern doctrine in England.
Tho question there was whether a right of way claimed to be in-
cident to an estate, could be maintained under a lease that did
412] not contain the word “appurtenances.” *Tindal, C. J., says:
“We are of opinion that upon the facts found in this special ver-
dict, such a right did pass as a necessary incident to the subject
matter actually demised, although not specially named in the
lease.”

I think these cases conclusively settle that incidents and appur-
tenances to property will pass upon its alienation without being
named. What can be regarded as such, and when they arise, is
also mado very clearly to appear by the adjudged cases.

In the case of Hazard v. Robinson, 3 Mason, 279, Justice Story
Jays down the following general rule: “ Whatever is actually en-
joyed with the thing granted, as a beneficial privilege at the time
of the grant, passes as parcel of it; but not otherwise.”

The samo learned judge considered the subject very fully in the
ease of the United States v. Appleton, before cited. The question
in that case arose upon the claim of the defendant to the uso of a
door and piazza as a passage to the strect, the same being enjoyed
at the time he purchased the property.

The following extracts from the opinion will show the view of
the law taken by the judge, and the ground upon which his de-
cision was based: “The general rule of law is, that when a house
or store is conveyed by the owner thereof, everything belonging
to, and in use for, the house or store, as an incident or appurte-
nance, passes by the grant. It is implied from the nature of tho
rant, unless it contains some restrictions, that the grantee shall
possess the house in the manner, and with the same beneficial

350

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

‘Morgan et al. v. Mason.

rights as were then in use and belonged to it. Thus, if a man
sells a mill, which, at the time has a particular stream of water
flowing to it, the right to the water passcs as an appurtenance,
although the grantor was, at the time of the grant, the owner of
all the stream above and below the mill. Tho law gives a reason-
‘able intendment in all such cases to the grant; and passes with
the property all those easements and privileges which at the
time belong to it, and are in use as the appurtenances. In
truth, every grant of a thing *naturally and necessarily im- [413
parts a grant of it as it actually exists, unless the contrary is pro-
vided for.”

In the case of New Ipswich Factory v. Batchelder, 3 N. H. 190,
it was held that whore a grantor deeded a piece of land by metes
and bounds with a mill upon it, and at the time there was a race-
way running beyond the bounds of the lands granted, into other
land of the grantor, to carry the water off which was necessary to
the convenient use of the mill, that the right to have the water
flow off uninterruptedly through the whole extent of the raceway,
passed as appurtenant to the mill. The court remark that, “Tt is
‘well known that in the conveyance’of real estate some things have
always been hcld to pass as incidents té other things,” and that
“a raceway may be as necessary an appurtenance to a mill, to
conduct the water from it, as a canal to conduct to it the water
necessary to work it. In many cases a severance of the appurte-
nance from the thing to which it is appurtenant would render both
useless.”

In Kilgour v. Ashcom, 5 Har. & Johns. 82, it was held that
when K. died intestate, seized of a tract of land on which there
was a grist mill, then in operation, on a division of the land, under
the act to direct descents among his heirs, the mill was on the
part allotted to his son John, the dam of which covered a portion
of the part allotted to his daughter Mary, John had a right to-use
the mill and dam in the same way, and to the same extent, as they
had been used by K. in his lifetime.

In Blake v. Clark, 6 Greenl. 436, it was held that, “by the con-
veyance of a mill eo nomine, no other land passes in fee, excopt the
land under the mill and its overhanging projections. But the
term ‘mill’ may include the free use of the head of water existing
at the time of its conveyance, or any other easement which has
been made with it, and which is necessary to its enjoyment.”

351

TO

414, 415 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Morgan et al. », Mason.

The right to overflow other lands of the grantor, outside of the
414] boundaries of the grant, involving the same general *princi-
ple, was most positively affirmed by the Supreme Court of New
York, in Oakley v. Stanley, 5 Wend. 525. Sutherland, J., says;
“Caldwell intended to sell and Hatch intended to buy a valuable
water-privilege, for which a large consideration was paid. The
right to overflow the adjoining premises of the grantor to the
extent necessary to the profitable enjoyment of the privilege pur-
chased, and in the manner in which it existed and had been used
previous to the grant, passed to the grantee as necessarily appur-
tenant to the promises conveyed.”

In the light of these authorities, as well as many more that
might be referred to, we are very clear in the opinion that this
easement created in the estate of May, by his deed to McLaughlin,
was by the owner attached as an incident to, and became a part
of the fifteen 10-100 acre tract upon which the mill was situate,

‘ and that it passed by a conveyance of that tract, just as necessarily
and inevitably, as the buildings and fences upon it; and that to
effect such transfer, there was no more necd of expressly naming
the one than the other.

The lien of the judgment covered the land with all its incidents
and appurtenances as then used and enjoyed, and the sale of the
land carried them all to the plaintiffs in error, The judgment
debtor, after the lien of the judgment attached, could not have
separated the incident from its principal; nor could the sheriff
work such separation in his sale. They together constituted one
indivisible whole, the whole of which the lien covered, and the
sale transferred.

A different doctrine might be ruinous to either debtor or
creditor. If the debtor could separate the appurtenance, he might
destroy the principal part of the security of the creditor, and if
the.creditor, through the sheriff, could do it, he might sacrifice
the property of the debtor; since in eithor case, valuable mill
property would be comparatively valueless without the appurte-
nance thus attached, The plaintiffs in this case did not expect to
buy a mill without water-power to drive it, and we hold they did
not.

415] *It follows, from these views, that the court of common pleas
erred in instructing the jury, that the benefit of this appurtenance
352

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 416

Little Miami Railroad Co, v, Stevens.

would not pass to the purchaser, unless expressly named in the
levy, and for this error the judgment is reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings.

Hirowooor, CO. J., was absent.

Tue Lreriz Mramt Rarroap Company v. Joun Srevens. (1)

“Where an employer placed one person in his employ under the direction of
another, also in his employ, such employer is liable for injury to the per-
son of him placed in the subordinate situation, by the negligence of his
superior.

‘When a railroad company places the engineer under their employ under the
control of the conductor, who directs when the cars are to,staxt, stop, ete.,
the company are liable to the engineer for an injury received, occasioned
dy the negligence of the conductor, whilst they are both engaged in their
respective employments.

Brror to the common pleas of Hamilton county.

In the common pleas, Stevens sued the Little Miami Railroad
Company, in an action on the case, to recover damages for injury
to his person, occasioned by a collision between two trains of rail-
road cars belonging to said company.

One of the counts in the declaration is as follows:

“And also, for that whereas, before the time of the committing
of the grievances hereinafter next mentioned, the defendant was
possessed of a certain othor railway running from Cincinnati, in
the county aforesaid, to Springfield, to wit, also in the county
aforesaid, and of two cortain other locomotives with *other [416
trains of railway, cars attached to each, the one thereof running
from Cincinnati aforesaid to Springfield aforesaid and back again
the ensuing day, and the other thereof also running from Spring-
field aforesaid to Cincinnati aforesaid and back again the ensuing
day, which said two last-mentioned locomotives, with their respect-
ive trains, were used and accustomed to mect and safely pass each
other at Plainville, in the county aforesaid, by the express direc-
tion and arrangemont of the defendant, to wit, at the county

(1) See this case reported in 7 West, Law Journal, 1849, 1850, p. 369.
VOL. XX—23 353

Al7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. ». Stevens.

aforesaid. And whereas, the plaintiff, at and before the time of
the committing of the grievances hereinafter next mentioned, was
employed by the defendant as engineer upon one of the said last-
- montioned locomotives, at and for a certain reward agreed upon
by the parties in that behalf, and was accustomed to stop the said
last-montioned locomotive at Plainville aforesaid, in the county
aforesaid, under the direction and arrangement of the defendant
as aforesaid, and there safely to pass the other of the last-men-
tioned locomotives as aforesaid, to wit, at the county aforesaid.
And whereas, by reason of the premises, it became the duty of the
defendant, by its agents and servants, to give the plaintiff due and
timely notice of any chango in the place of meeting and passage
of the two last-mentioned locomotives and their respective trains,
to wit, at the county aforesaid. Yet the defendant, by its agents
and. servants, not regarding its duty as aforesaid, but contriving
to injure and aggrieve the plaintiff in this behalf, did, by its
agents and servants, horetofore, to wit, on the 12th day of Au-
gust, in the year cighteen hundred and forty-six, change the place
of meeting and passage of the said last-mentioned locomotives,
with their trains, from Plainville as aforesaid to Columbia, to
wit, also in the county aforesaid, the said change to take offect on
tho ensuing day, to wit, on the 13th day of August afore-
said, without giving the plaintiff due and timely notice thereof,
to wit, at the county aforesaid. Whereby, whilst the plaintiff
was proceeding, in the capacity of engineer as aforesaid, on one
of the said last-mentioned locomotives, with the train thereto be-
417] longing, from Cincinnati as aforesaid, *to Springfield as
aforesaid, to wit, on the 13th day of August, in the year eight-
eon hundred and’ forty-six, according to the provious express
direction and arrangement of the defendant in that behalf, be-
tween Columbia as aforesaid and Plainville as aforesaid, to wit,
at the county aforesaid, the other of the said last-mentioned loco-
motives unavoidably ran against, and came into collision with
the said locomotive on which the plaintiff was, in capacity of
ongineer aforesaid, and violently crushed the same. Whereby
the plaintiff then and there was greatly scalded, bruised, lacer-
ated, hurt and wounded, and in consequence thereof became and
was sick, sore, lame, and disordered, and so remained,” etc., set-
ting out the injuries at length.
Plea, general use.
354

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. “418

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens.

At the February term, 1850, of the common pleas, the cause was
tried to a jury, who returned a verdict for plaintiff below, and
assessed his damages at $3,700.

The defendant moved to set aside the verdict, and for a new
trial, because of the rulings of the court, the charge given, and
refusal to charge the jury as requested, because of discovery of
new testimony, and that a witness under subpena left during
trial; and also moved in arrest of judgment, for that the declara-
tion was insufficient; which motions the court overruled, and en-
tered judgmeht on the verdict.

On the trial a bill of exceptions was taken by defendant be-
low, which was made part of the record, and sets out all the evi-
dence.

This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse said judgment, and
the errors assigned present the question as to the correctness of
the action of the common pleas.

The bill of exceptions discloses the following state of facts:
Stevens was an engineer, employed by the railroad company, to
run their engine attached to a locomotive, with a train of cars,
prior to and on August 13, 1846. He was in this employ on said
day, on the train going up from Cincinnati to Springfield; and a
little above the town of Columbia, this *ascending train [418
éame in collision with the descending train; by which collision
Stevens was severely injured in a way to affect him for life. Tho
collision took place on the day after the completion of the Little
Miami Railroad to Springfield. On that day (August 13th) a change
of place for passing the cars (that is, the up and down trains) was
to take place in pursuance of a previous arrangement of the com-
pany. The trains had been in the habit of passing each other at
a place called Plainville, some three miles above Columbia. On
that day the cars were to pass at Columbia. Cards had been do-
livered te all the enginoers and conductors except Stevens, giving
notice of the change in the time and place of passing. The times
and places of passing had been previously governed by similar
cards, also furnished the conductors and engineers by the com-
pany, in accordance with a custom of the company by which the
engineers and conductors are notified of all changes in the times
and places of passing.

On the trial it was further proved as follows:

Isaac West, witness for Stevens, testified as stated in the opinion

355

Al SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

of Judge Caldwell; also, “that on day of collision the ascending
train left Cincinnati between nine and ten o'clock a.m. The cars
went on, not very fist; blew the whistle at road-crossings, and
passing under bridge; blew half dozen times after left Columbia
to bridge; thought something wrong, and went aft on the cars,
Running ten or twelve miles an hour until they saw the other
train; trains came in collision quarter of a mile beyond bridge,
on a curve; could see each other one, hundred and fifty or two
hundred yards apart; no man was started on ahead of the train ;
did not hear the whistle or bell of descending train; ascending
train had nearly stopped when descending train ran into it; sus-
pected danger from Stevens asking Smith if did not change pass-
ing places that day, and frequent blowing of whistle.

Wm. L. Hazen, witness for Stevens: Was conductor on de-
scending train when collision occurred; was running fifteen miles
419] per hour; was not ringing the bell, nor blowing whistle *when
met ascending train; met in curve, and on right of curve coming
down is heavy hill—a gravel bank; could not see the other train
more than three hundred feet. When the engineer on down train
saw the other train he gave signal of alarm by whistle, and they
tried to check descending train; proves collision, custom to de-
liver new cards when time of passing changed, ete.

The conductors have charge of the trains, not the engineers ; they
give directions when to go on and when to stop. Alexander H. Lewis,
Freight clerk or agent at the depot at Cincinnati for the company,
‘went up with witness to Springfield on cars, August 12th; returned
with witness on 13th, and was at collision. Clemont, the super-
intendent of the road, went to Springfield, August 12th, and was
there on morning of 13th. Conductors control according to the
rules on the card; if danger apprehended, they send a man ahead
of train one hundred yards, and keep him ahead until out of
danger. Jt is not determined who should send the man ahead, the con-
ductor or engineer ; but the conductor has to keep one hundred yards
behind him.

If the conductor wants to stop, he notifies engineer, and it is
his duty to stop until conductor directs him to go on. Conductor
does not direct to run fast or slow, unless he knows of danger.
Not customary for engineer to stop at any unusual place, unless
something broken. After the collision, Stevens told witness that ho
‘was running fast; that he had been blowing his whistlo on all the

356

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens,

curves after leaving Columbia, because he was expecting the train ;
that he (Stevens) had no new card. The whistle and noise of one
train can not be heard by people on another. Stevens gave no
reason why he expected to meet the other train.

John W. Reynolds, witness for Stevens: Is an engineer—was on
ascending train when collision occurred. The bell was rung at
road-crossings, and not at other places—whistle blown three or four
times.

The engineer runs by conductor's orders, so far as stopping and
going on, keeping the time-card in view at the same time. Engineer
always has card, and is put there to make his time. *He [420
controls the motion as to time in particular places on road. Should

“not run as fast around curves as on straight road. If in doubt in
going round curve, should send a man ahead, and keep him ahead
one hundred to one hundred and fifty yards, and so run until out
of danger. Imprudent to run at rate of ten or fifteen miles an
hour around a curve, where there is danger of meeting a train.
Engineer’s business to look out for train ahead. If there was
‘danger of meeting a train, Stevens was running at an imprudent
speed. Was under no apprehension of meeting a train, but was
under apprehension something was wrong, by frequent blowing
of whistle.

Paul Hueston, witness for Stevens. (See his evidence in the-
opinion of Judge Caldwell.)

Perry Little, for company : Was on ascending train which was
running twelve or fifteen miles an hour—run usual speed on curve
‘when came in collision. Will take one hundred yards to stop
such a train. Stevens did all he could to stop his train when he
saw the other one.

Samuel T. Vanloan, engineer on the descending train: In start-
ing from a stopping place, if a train is due, and not there, custom
to send a man ahead around curves one hundred to one hundred
and fifty yards. If an engineer was in doubt or uncertainty,
whether the traiis would pass at Columbia or Plainville, it would
be his duty to run slow. Was running his train fourteen miles per
hour. Saw ascending train four hundred or four hundred and
fifty feot before collision—tried to check up.

NV. Morrell, chief clerk and book-keeper for company: “The
company paid wages and expenses of sickness of Stevens after the
injury ; last payments made April, 1847.

357

pO

421 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

On the morning of the collision, Thomas DL. Cole, assistant in
engineering department, delivered to George Smith, the conductor
on the train on which Stevens was engineer, a time-card (one of
the new ones). Smith showed it to witness after it was handed to
him. Is certain it was that morning that Smith got the card.

The time-cards were in evidence. The caption is: “ Instruc-
421] tions *to conductors and engineers for running trains.” The
rules ave printed on the cards.

By the 10th rule it is declared, that “in cases of uncertainty as
to the occupation of the track, a man must be sent ahead or back,
and kept at least one hundred yards distant until the danger is over.”

By the 16th rule, “care at all times is earnestly enjoined. Al-
ways take the safe side in cases of doubt.”

(Signed,) “W. H. Crummyz, Superintendent.”

The defendants below, as the second charge, asked the court to
charge the jury, “ that where two or more persons are employed
by an individual or company, and in doing the work they are em-
ployed to do, one of them, by his negligence and inattention to his
duties causes an injury to another, no action can be sustained
against the employer, whether he bo an individual or a company.”
This charge the court refused.

The sixth instruction asked by defendants in these words was
given: “If the plaintiff, by his negligenco, or by reason of his not
observing the usual rules and precautions ordinarily used by skill-
ful men in such cases, contributed toward bringing on the-collision,
he can not recover for any injury he has sustained.”

The eighth charge asks the court to charge that “if the jury
Deliove Stevens was in doubt and uncertainty as to whether the
trains ought to pass at Columbia instead of Plainville; and if he
expected to meet the down train between Columbia and Plain-
ville, it was his duty to run slow, and if it was prudent, and ac-
cording to the usages of engineers, and required by the printed
rules of the company in case of doubt and uncertainty, to send a
man ahead of the train, and keep him from one hundred to one
hundred and fifty yards ahead of the engine, until the bends and
curves in that place had been passed, and all apprehension of
danger was over; and the plaintiff neglected to send aman ahead,
as required by prudence and the printed rules, and such neglect
contributed to bring on the collision, and produce the injury, the
plaintiff is not entitled to a verdict.”

358

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 422, 423,

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens.

*This charge asked by the defendants below, the court re- [422
fused to give.

On the motion for a new trial, the affidavits of B. W. Davis and
‘W. H. Clement were filed. Davis states that he was on the ascend-
ing train at time of collision; that when Stevens checked the
train at Columbia, Smith, conductor, told Stevens to go on; that
he (Smith) had understood that the trains were to change tbeir
passing places on that day, and were to pass at Columbia, but he
had no authority from Clement. Smith also directed Stevens to
plow the whistle while going around the curves. Affiant never
communicated these facts to any agent or attorney of the company
until after trial.

Clement, superintendent of the company, left Cincinnati two
days before the collision ; and before leaving, he directed that the
trains should pass at Columbia, instead of Plainville, on that day,
and had time-cards prepared accordingly ; that he left with A. H.
Lewis, clerk in the freight department, now cards to deliver to
Stevens, engineer, and Smith, conductor. Affiant was under sub-
pena as a witness on this trial, and was in attendance, but was
suddenly called away during trial, after adjournment of court one
day, and its meeting next day, in consequence of sudden rise of
waters, making it impossible to again appear at trial.

Cuarius Fox & Frencu, for plaintiff in error:

It is well settled that the master is not liable for injuries sus-
tained by ono workman or servant by the careless or negligent
or unskillful act of another workman or servant. Story on Agency,
sec. 453; 3 Mees. & Welsb. 1; 4 Met. 49; 6 Hill, 592; 10 Mees. &
‘Welsb. 115; 9 Mees. & Welsb. 710; 6 Mees, & Welsb. 505. We
therefore claim, under these authorities, that the court should haye
given the second charge to the jury, as asked by the railroad com-
pany. 15 Conn. 124; 42 Eng. O. L. 276.

In view of the evidence we claim also that the eighth charge
should have been given. Stevens was himself in fault. [423
The agent is bound by the general and known and safe mode of do-
ing the business, and any departure from it not required by neces-
sity will be at the peril of the agent, and involve him in full re-
sponsibility for any loss occasioned thereby. Story on Agency,
sec. 199, 77, 96.

But where there are written instructions given by the principal

, to the agent, the latter will be compelled to “ adhere faithfully to
359

fF

424. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v, Stevens.

those instructions in all cases to which they ought properly to be

applied.” Story on Agency, sec. 192; 1 Sand’s Sup. Ct. 111, 360. -

«Tf he unnecessarily exceeds his commission or risks the prop-
erty of his principal, he thereby renders himself responsible to his
principal for all losses and damage which are the natural conse-
quences of his act, and it will constitute no defense for him, that
he intended the act to be a benefit to the principal. Story, 192,
333. So it is said the law never holds out a premium for any
violation of duty.”

Again, it is well settled that whenever it can be shown that a
Joss has occurred to the principal from any violation of duty on
the part of an agent, whether by exceeding his authority by posi-
tive misconduct, or mere negligence or omission of the agent, in the
proper functions of his agency, or in any other manner, the agent
is liable for all losses so occasioned. Story, sec. 217.

Thus, if a captain doviates from his voyage, he is unquestion-
ably liable to his owners for all losses sustained, directly or indi-
reetly, by such deviation, and admiralty courts will enforce this
liability. Abbott on Shipping, 167, now. ed. 218 ; Story on Agency,
sec. 219. .

Guorcze E, Puan, Prrer Zinn, Guo. H. Penpieton, of counsel
for the dofondant in error, submitted a printed argumont of forty-
eight pages, maintaining these propositions:

I. A railroad company is liable to its engineer for any injury
424] *he may sustain by reason of the neglect of another em-
ploye to give notice of a change in the place of meeting of two

» trains.

II. Tho rule in cases of collision is, that even if the plaintiff was
in fault, yet unless he could have avoided the consequences of the
defendant’s neglect or misbehavior, by the use of ordinary care,
he is entitled to recover.

‘We propose to show, by reason and by authority, that Stevens
has no right of action against any other servant of the plaintiff in
error, for the damage which he sustained. And we also propose
to show, by reason and by authority, that he is entitled to his ac-
tion against the employer of those negligent and unfaithful serv-
ants. McOomb v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 477; 1 Bl. Com. 421; Lane v.
Cotton, 12 Mod. 472; Middleton v. Fowler, 1 Salk. 282; Boson v.
Sandford, 2 Salk. 440; Doe v. Martin, 4 Torm, 66; Locke v.
Stearns, 1 Met, 560; Holt’s N. P. Cases, 227, n.; Bruker v. Fro-

360

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. . 425

Little Miami Railroad Oo, v. Stevens.

mont, 6 Term, 659; Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; Dixon v. Bell,
1 Stark. 228; 1 Hawk. P. C., chap. 13, sec. 8; Bllis v. Turner, 8
Term, 531; 1 Bl. Com. 429-431, n.; Dane’s Abr., ch. 54, art. 5;
Cameron v. Reynolds, Cowp. 403; Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio,
161; Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628; Holt », Wilkes, 3 B. & Ald.
304; 18 Ohio, 299.

The following authorities were oxamined and reviewed, to wit:
Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 916; 1 McMullen, 365; 3 Mees.
& Welsb. 1; Rapson v. Cubit, 9 Mees. & Welsb. 710; Quarman v.
Burnett, 6 M. & W. 505; 4 Met. 49; 6 Hill's N.Y. 592; Winter-
bottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W.109; 3 Cush, 270.

A master allows his household servant, who is too ill to help
himself, to be put into a damp and unwholesome room, or to have
only unhealthy food, and thereby the servant dies; here is only a
case of neglect, one of the risks which a servant assumes by his
contract of services, we are told. But the common law goes to
the “alarming extent” of declaring that this is murder 6r man-
slaughter, in the master, according to *cireumstances, [425
Squire’s Case, 1 Russ. on Crimes, 426; Huggins’ Case, 2 Stra. 882;
Self's Case, 1 Hast’s P. 0. 226; Marriott's Case, 8 OC. & P. 425; 1
Hale’s P.0. 481. -

The following cases were commented on: Hutchinson v. The
York, Newcastle and Berwick Railroad Co., 19 Law J. 296; Scudder
v. Woodbridge, 1 Kelly, 195 ; Hakin v. Thom, 5 Esp. 6; Holt’s N.
P. C. 227, n.; 1 Bl. Com. 432.

In the case in 19 L. J. 296, it is said: “ Though we have said
that a master is not responsible, generally, to one servant, for any
injury caused to him by the negligence of another servant, while
acting in one common service, yot this must be taken with the qual-
ification, that the master shall have taken care not to expose his serv-
ants to unreasonable risk. The servant, when he engages to run
the risk of his service, including those arising from the negligence
of fellow-servants, has a right to understand that the master has
taken reasonable care to protect him from risk by associating him
only with persons of ordinary skill and care.”

But we claim that this case at bar is within the exception ad-
mitted by the very authorities cited against us. The South Caro-
Jina court said that a case might arise in which the railroad com-
pany would be liable, even to a servant, for employing improper
and unfit agents. The Massachusetts court cautions the commu-
361

Po

! 428 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

: nity against general inferences, and then states our case as one not
decided. Lord Abinger declared that a master “was bound to
provide for the safety of his servant, in the course of his employ-
ment, to the best of his judgment, information, and bolief.”’ It
appears from the testimony in this case, that, although a change
had been made by the board of directors and the superintendent—
the latter of whom as fully represented the corporation as the
former—in the place and time for the trains to meet and pass, to
take effect on the 13th of August, no diligence at all was used to
give the engineer a now time-card or any other notification. The
426] testimony of Mr. *Morrill shows that no attempt even was
made to give Stevens a new card.

Now, in each of the railroad cases (Massachusetts and South
Carolina) cited by the present plaintiff in error, it was proven that
the company had selected a prudent, experienced, and careful serv-
ant to perform the duty, through neglect of which the mischief
occurred. And it is upon this ground chiefly, that the plaintiffs in
those casés were not permitted to recover.

Where have we such evidence? There is no proof that Clement,
or Lewis, or Cole, or Smith, was either trusty or competent. If
what Morrill says bo true, in any degree, Smith was not trustworthy
atall. The testimony in the case leaves it doubtful whether the
principal officer himself, the superintendent, was prudent, careful,
or even competent. And, clearly, Mr. Lewis was incompetent and
unfit to be trusted : he went to the celebration, at Springfield, with
the new cards in his pockets; and thus idly exposed both Smith
and Stevens to imminent danger. Was he a proper man to be
selected by the superintendent for the duty of delivering the cards?
We leave tho court to answer.

As to Stevens being himself in fault, the true rule is, that, al-
though the plaintiff was also aegligent, yet unloss he might have
avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence by the ex-
erciso of ordinary care, he may recover. Bridge v. The Grand
Junction Railway Co, 3 M. & W. 244; Thorogood v. Bryan,
18 Law Jour. 336; Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546. The defend-
ant must take such precautions as will not compel the plaintiff, or
any other person, to deal with remote probabilities in order to save
life or limb.

D. T. Wriaut, on same side:

Woe claim that the mastor is responsible for acts of neglect or

362

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 4217, 428:

Little Miami Railroad Co. v Stevens.

carelessness in his servant, while in his employ, upon the maxim,
“ Qui facit per alium facit per se.”

*Dhe motion in arrest of judgment claims an exception to [427 -
this general rule, to wit: that the master is not liable to one serv-
ant for injury arising from the carelessness of another, both be-
ing in the common employ.

Authority is not needed in support of the general proposition
above laid down; it is for the plaintiff in error to establish the
exception.

The law has long been well settled, that the master is liable for
the injuries done by his servant. When, therefore, the parties
contracted, they contracted with a view to that law, and with the
understanding and knowledge that a master is so liable. 2 Bl.
Com. 448; 2 Kent’s Com. 450; 18 Ohio, 229; 15 Ohio, 474; 10
Ohio, 159; 4 Ohio, 500.

One great reason for the recovery in this case, is, that if John
Stevens can not recover against the company, he is romediless ;
and it is the favorite maxim of the common law, that there is no
wrong without a remedy. He can not recover against the wrong-
doer, for that wrong-doer is responsible only to the master. Story
on Agency, sec. 308; Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 488; 1 Black. Com.
431, n. 26; Story on Bailments, sec. 404,

This and the preceding argument reviewed the authorities cited
for plaintiff in error very elaborately and with great ability, main-
taining that the case at bar did not come within the principle of
those authorities, and that, so far as applicable to this case, they
should not be adopted as law.

Capris Fox, in reply:

The court will perceive that the case of Stevens, as set forth in
the declaration, is one founded upon the alleged nogligence of the
company. The only evidence of negligence offered in the court
below, is the omission on the part of one of the men employed by
the railroad company, to give notice of the change as to the place
of passing trains. It is not pretended that there was any other neg-
ligence, nor was there *a-particle of evidence offered tending [428
to show negligence on the part of the company; and whether a
charge of negligence against the principal or employer is proved.
by evidence tending to show that another person in the employ of
the same principal, is to be taken as the negligence of the company,

so as to subject the latter for an injury sustained, is the great
363

429 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

question to be settled. I call it a great question, because it in-
volves very important results or consequences to the whole com-
munity. The principle at issue not only embraces railroad com-
panies and their employes, but affects all the transactions of life
in which agents are employed.

The case is admitted to be a new one in this state, and until
within some ten or fifteen years, I am not aware that the question
has been agitated in other states or countries. But if any one
question can be regarded as settled by well-considered modern
authorities, this question is settled against the claim sot up by
Stevens. 3 Cush. 270; 6 Barb. 240; Bush v, Steinman, 1 Bos. &
Pul. 404, is overruled by the English courts. See West. Law
Jour., January, 1852.

In refusing the eighth charge, we think the court substantially es-
tablish this proposition: that no matter what rules the board of direct-
ors establish for the safety of life and property, still the agent may or
may not observe them as he pleases; they are not binding upon the
servant, and if he violates them, ag he did in this case, by not run-
ning slow, and by not sending a man ahead of the train from one
hundred to one hundred and fifty yards, and keeping him that
distance ahead, and he has brought an injury on himself by the
violation of the directions of his employer, still he can recover.
‘This is the effect of refusing to give the charge as asked.

Here again the defendant's counsel claim a protection under the
plea that the conductor regulates the time of running. But this
is not true in point of fact. The time of arriving at and depart-
ing from any particular point is fixed by the superintendent, with
the approbation of the board of directors. This time is fixed on
429] what is called the time-card, and it is in fact *more partic-
ularly compulsory upon the engineer than on any other officer of
the company. He keeps the time by the time-piece on his own
car, and he is the only person who can so conduct the engine as
to make ib run fast or slow. The car conductor has no more con-
trol over the engine than any of the passengers. If there is any
one officer superior to another as to the speed of running, it is the
engineer; and he has men about him who are kept for the pur-
pose of supplying fuel and water to the engine, and in case of any
doubt and uncertainty about meeting another car, they, or one of
them, is to be sent ahead—not only to be sent ahead, but he is to
be kept from one hundred to one hundred and fifty yards ahead

364. .

i

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 430

Little Miami Railroad Co. » Stevens,

until the uncertainty is removed. Now, bow can this be done
unless the engineer stops his engine in part—unless he runs it so
slow that an active man can keep ahead of the engine?

Catpwett,J. Stevens was the engineer on one of the trains of
ears of the Little Miami Railroad Company. The upward and
downward trains of cars had, previous to August 18, 1846, passed
each other at Plainville, about nine miles from Cincinnati. A
change of the place of passing had been determined on, namely, that
the cars should pass at Columbia, instead of Plainville, the two
places being about three miles apart. This change was to take
place on August 13, 1846, the day on which the collision occurred.
It is the universal custom of the company, when a change of this
kind takes place, to give the engineers a printed card, setting
forth the times of starting, places where the cars are to pass, time
of running, ete., containing the change that has been made. On
the day on which the collision took place, the plaintiff, Stevens,
was the engineer on the upward train from Cincinnati to Spring-
field, and George Smith was the conductor. On the route, the
conductor, according to the rules of the company, is the com-
manding officer, so far as determining when the cars shall start
and stop, etc. The upward train came in collision with the down-
ward train, about seven miles from Cincinnati, *between [480
Columbia and Plainville, and Stevens was very much injured by
scalding; his recovery was doubtful for some time; he was con-
fined for months, and has been injured for life. The engineer and
conductor of the downward train had received their cards, stating
the change, and they were running in accordance with it, expect-
ing to pass the upward train at Columbia. There is no evidence
that Stevens had received a card stating the change; indeed, it is
clearly inferable, from the evidence, that he had not. Paul Hues-
ton, who was the baggage-master on the train, states, that, at the
time of the collision, he had heard nothing about the change; he
also states, that, at the time the collision took place, A. H. Lewis,
who was an officer of tho company (in what capacity does not ap-
pear), took ont of his pocket two cards, and handed them to him,
and told him to give one of them to Stevens, the engineer, and
the other to Smith, the conductor. N. Morrill, the chief clerk,
testifies, that, on the morning of the day on which the collision
took place, Thomas L. Cole, an assistant in the engineering de-

365

431 SUPREME COURT OF OHio.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v, Stevens.

partment, handed to Smith, the conductor, a time-card, and that
Smith showed it to him, witness, after he had received it; he says
he knows of no card being delivered to Stevens. Isaac West
states, that, when the cars reached Columbia, Stevens stopped;
that Smith, the conductor, went forward through the cars and
asked him why he stopped; that Stevens inquired of him whether
the change did not take place that day, and the cars pass there;
that Smith replied that the change did not take place on that
day, but named a subsequent day on which it was to take place ;

- Smith then told Stevens to go on, and the cars immediately pro-
ceeded. :

Other witnesses speak of the stoppage of the cars at Columbia,
and also of seeing Smith in the attitude of conversation with
Stevens, but they did not hear what, if anything, was said. One
witness states that he saw Smith give the motion of the hand to
Stevens to proceetl.

The cause was submitted to the jury, who found a verdict for the
431] plaintiff, The defendant moved for a new trial, and *also an
arrest of judgment, which motions were overruled, and judgment
entered on the verdict, The defendant took a bill of exceptions,
in which the evidence is set forth, as well as a number of charges,
which were asked to be given by the court to the jury by the de-
fendant, which were refused by the court. ~

The main question arises on the refusal of the court to charge
on asingle point, and on the charge affirmatively given on the
same point; and although this question is presented in different
forms by the charges asked, yet, we think it is fully presented by
the second charge asked and refused, which reads as follows: “That
where two or more persons are employed by one individual or
company, and in doing the work they are employed to do, one of
them, by his negligence and inattention to his duties, causes an
injury to the other, no action can be sustained against the em-
ployer, whether he be an individual or a company.”

The proposition here stated, and contended for on the part of
the company, is, that whilst it is admitted that the company would
be liable to the fullest extent for an injury done toa person having
no connection with the company, by the negligence of one of their
agents, yet that Smith and Stevens, both being in the employ of
the company, the company would not be liable for an injury done

366

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens.

to Stevens, through the negligence of Smith and the other agents
of the company.

It is a general rule that a person in the management of his
business, whether he does it himself, or acts through agents, must
so conduct that business as not to interfere with the rights of, or
produce injury to others. This devolves on the party care and
prudence in the management of his business, and renders him
civilly responsible for any injury that may result to others from
the want of such care and prudence, whether the injury may be
done under his own immediate supervision, or under the control
of agents. This doctrine is founded in reason. What can be
more reasonable than that he who puts any power in motion for

“his own benefit, which, from its nature, may be destructive to the
property and life of *others, if not carefully managed, [482
should be accountable for such injury as may be caused by the
careless management of such power? An injury has been done;
it has fallen on a party who is guilty of no wrong, no carelessness ;
it has been done by a force put in motion by a party who has
caused the injury by his careless management. On whom shall
the loss fall? On the innocent person who had no control or

- management of the thing that produced it? Orshall it not rather
fall on the person who put the power in motion, for whose benefit
it moves, who is in duty bound to provide for its proper manage-
ment, who selects his agents, controls their movements, and who
gives them their authority to act?

Indeed, the rule is not only a reasonable one, that the employer
should make good the injuries thus done by the carelessness of his
agents; but it is necessary as a preventive of mischief, and a pro-
tection to community, that it should be strictly adhered to. The
rule is founded on the principles of justice between man and man,
and abstractly considered, is of universal application. There
must be some good reason for taking any case without its appli-
cation.

It is said, however, that when a party contracts to perform
services, he takes into account the dangers and perils incident to
the employment, and receives wages accordingly. Take this for
granted; and we think it falls far short of sustaining the main
proposition. If the party does contract in reference to the perils

incident to the business, he will only be presumed to contract in

reference to such as necessarily attend it when conducted with

367

A33 SUPREME COURT OF.OHIO

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

ordinary care and prudence. So far as an implied contract, in
reference to the business, will be presumed, it will be on the hy-
pothesis that the business is to be properly managed. He can
not be presumed to have contracted in reference to injuries inflicted
on him by negligence—by wrongful acts. An express stipulation
would at least be necessary to make it a part of the contract.
The employer has paid him no money for the right to break his
logs, or, as in this case, to empty on him the contents of a boiler
433] of scalding water. It *was not the expectation, when the _
company hired Stevens, that the two trains should ran by differ-
ent cards and thus come in collision.

When a man employs another to do work for him, each incur
their obligations. The person hired is bound to perform the labor
according to the agreement, and the employer is bound to pay;
besides that, neither party has parted with any of his rights.
The employer has no more control over the person he has em-
ployed, outside of the service to ‘be rendered, than he has over the
person of any’ other individual; and.is equally accountable for an
injury to it. .

In this case tho evidence leads the mind irresistibly to the con-
clusion that Stevens had not received a card, or any certain in-
formation that the change was to take place on the day of the col-
lision. The effects of a collision are so dangerous, that it was cer-
tainly the duty of the company to furnish him with that informa-
tion; without such information he, as a matter of course, would
ran by the card that he had formerly been running by, which
would placo the trains in danger of a collision. It would appear
from the evidence that he had heard something of it, but ho was
told by Smith, the conductor, that the change was not to take
place on that day, and to proceed. He obeyed, and suffored the
injury in consequence,

It is said that Stevens was guilty of negligence himself, in not
stopping at Columbia. And further, that he was negligent in
running as fast as he did, and not keeping a man on ahead to give
notice of the approach of a train, he, Stevens, having reason, as is
alleged, to believe that they were in danger of meeting the other
train, And several charges were asked as to what would constitute
negligence on his part; some of these charges the court overruled,
and which ruling of the court is assigned for error.

When we take into account the fact that Stevens had not

368

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. - 434, 435

Little Miami Railroad Co. v, Stevens.

received the ordinary notice of the change, and the fact that he
was told that, the change did not take place until a subsequent
day, by the person who had the control of the cars, and *the [434
right to give him his orders as to running and stopping, we do not
think that there was evidence showing negligence on his part;
and that charge, from the stato of evidence, was immaterial.
Stevens bad engaged to labor for the company in a subordinate
capacity ; he has received the injury from the negligence of those
placed over him by the company, as the jury have found, and we
do not see why the company aro not liable to him for the amount
of the damage he has sustained.

It is contended, however, on the part of the company, that
public policy forbids the right of a party to bring suit against his
employer for an injury by another in the same employ, because it
is supposed that it will lead to carelessness on the part of those
employed, when they know that they can recover for any damage
that they may receive. In answer to this, it may be remarked
that it is only where the person has been careful himself, that any
right of action accrues in any case. Besides, we do not think it
likely that persons would be careless of their lives and persons or
property, merely because they might have a right of action to re-
cover for what damage they might prove they had sustained. If
men are influenced by such remote considerations to be careless
of what they are likely to be most careful about, it has never come
under our observation. We think the policy is clearly on the
other side. It is a matter of universal observation, that in any
extensive business, where many persons are employed, the care
and prudence of the employer is the surest guaranty against mis-
management of any kind. The employer would, we think, be
much more likely to be careless of the persons of those in his em-
ploy, since his own safety is not endangered by any accident,
when he would understand that he was not pecuniarily liablo for
the careless conduct of his agents. Indeed, we think that those
who have othors in their employ are under peculiar obligations to
them to provide for their safety and comfort, and we think they
should at least be held legally responsible to them as much as to »
stranger.

*We could easily suppose a case where two persons em- [435
ployed by the same individual, and standing on a perfect equality
—where the business was managed as much by one as the other—
VOL, XX—24 369

436 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

where they would stand on the same footing as men in the com-
munity generally do—in which the employer would not be liable
for ‘an injury done to one by the negligence of the other. But we
regard this case as standing on entirely a differont footing.

Among other cases, we have been referred to those of Farpfell v.
The Boston and Worcester Railroad Corporation, 4 Met. 49, and
Murray v. South Carolina Railroad Company. The case in 4 Met-
calf denies the right of recovering principally on two grounds,
namely, that the person employed contracts with referonce to the
perils of the employment; and that he receives a compensation,
in the way of wages, for such perils, and therefore he can not re-
cover; and that it would be contrary to public policy to permit a
recovery, as the tendency would be to produce carelessness on the
part of persons thusemployed. The decision in 1 McMullen appears
to be based principally on the first of these two propositions. We
have noticed both of these propositions in our previous remarks.
In both cases, much stress is laid upon the fact that no precedent,
of a recovery under such circumstances, is to be found. It is to be
noticed, that in both of these cases the facts differ in some partic-
ulars from the present; we must admit, however, that the reason-
ing in those cases would cover the one now before us. So far as
those cases decide that a recovery can not be had in a case like the
one now before the court, we think they are contrary to the gen-
eral principles of law and justice, and we can not follow them as
precedents. The court, then, are of the opinion that there was
no error in the charge of the court, and that the evidence war-
ranted a recovery on the part of Stevens.

The judgment will therefore be affirmed.

. Hrroncoor, ©. J., prepared an opinion expressing his views of
436] this case. *Spanprna, J., dissented, and delivered his opi-
nion. The opinions aforesaid follow:

Hrroucoor, 0.J. Iconcur in the opinion of the court affirming the
judgment of the court of common pleas; and it seems to me that this
may be done without conflicting at all with tho authorities which
have been cited by the plaintiffs in error. If this case were, in
its principal features, like any one of those reported and referred
to, I should hesitate long before I would consent to disregard those

370 :

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens.

decisions. They were decisions made by highly respectable tri-
bunals, and by men whose opinions are entitled to the highest con-
sideration. But in each case referred to as being decided in the
“United States, the action was commenced for an injury received
by one employe or servant of the company, in consequence of the
neglect or default of another employe or servant of the same com-
pany, both at the time being engaged in the running of the cars.

This case, as it appears from the bill of exceptions, is entirely
different. The neglect complained of, is not the neglect of an
employe or servant of the company upon the road, but the neg~
lect of the company itself; so far as an incorporated company can
be chargeable with neglect.

It appears that the company determine upon the places where
the trains shall pass each other, when running the same way or
different ways. Through their superintendent they furnish their
engineers and conductors with cards, stating the several places
whore the trains are to pass, with other instructions, by which the
engineers and conductors are to be regulated in running.

Previous to August 13, 1846, the day on which the collision which
caused the injury took place, Plainville had been the place fixed
for the passing of the up and down trains upon the road of the
plaintiff in error. Before that day, however, tho company had
determined on a different place at which these trains should pass
each other. The change was to take place *on the 13th of [437
August; and on that day and afterward, until further directions
given, the up and down trains were to pass each other at Columbia,
Cards were prepared in conformity with this change, and it seems ©
were furnished to the conductor and engineer of the down train.
There is no proof, however, that any such card was furnished to Ste-
vens, the engineer of the up train, and it is doubtful whether any was
furnished the conductor. One witness swears that after the acci-
dent occurred, he saw the cards delivered, by a man by the name
of Lewis, to both Stevens, the engineor, and Smith, the conductor,
Here seems to have been the cause of collision. The card by which
the engineer on the down train ran, directed him to pass the up
train at Columbia, while the card by which the engineer of the
up train ran, directed him to pass the down train at Plainville.
While thus running, in pursuance of the directions given to them
respectively, the collision took place. Had cards been delivered

to the conductor and engineer on the up train, as they should
371

438 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

have been, there is no probability that there would have been any
collision. ,

Here was negligence, in consequence of which an injury re-
sulted to the defendant in error. It was not the negligence of
any employe of the company, asststing in running the cars; un-
Jess, by possibility, the conductor of the train had been notified of
the change, of which there is no satisfactory proof. But it was
tho negligence of the company itself, or of its immediate agent,
the superintendent of the road.

Now, suppose an individual had been placed in tho situation of
the railroad company, and a similar injury had resulted, in conse-
quence of a like neglect on his part, can there be a doubt that he
must bave been liable to respond in damages for that injury? Tf,
ander such circumstances, an individual would bo liable, surely
there can be no sound reason why a corporation should not be.
In this respect, I should be disposed to put corporations and in-
dividuals upon the same footing.

But it is said a corporation acts by agents, and if it employs
faithful and competent agents, this is all that can be required.
438] *True, a railroad company must act by agents, but I apprehend
it must be responsible for the acts or neglects of those agents, so
long as the agents are acting within the scope of their authority.
Tho superintendent is a proper representative of the company,
and, perhaps, to a certain extent the conductor of a train may
be. But the employes or servants of a company, engaged in
making or repairing. their road, or in running their cars, can not
“bo held to be their agents.

It is because this injury resulted from the negligence of the
company itself, or of an agent whose duty it was to give the notice
before referred to, that I hold the judgment should be affirmed;
and it seems to me the case is entirely different from those referred
to in the books, .

As to the’charge of the court of common pleas, although not
given precisely as asked by the plaintiff in error, it did appear
to me to be all that could, with propriety, be required.

The damages assessed by the jury appear to have been high,
and, I might think, extravagant, considering the commendable
conduct of the company after tho accident; but of that, this court
can not as well determine as the court which heard the trial.

Sparpine, J., dissenting: In this case I find myself unable to
372

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 439-

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

conour in the opinion which has been expressed by my learned
associate, and which has been concurred in by a majority of this
court. The facts, in briof, are these: The defendant in error was
in the employ of the Little Miami Railroad Company, prior to and
on August 13, 1846, in the capacity of engineer on a train of cars.
On that day, in going from Cincinnati to Springfield, a short dis-
tance above Columbia, the ascending train, on which he was con-
ductor, came in collision with the descending train, which re--
sulted in serious injury to the person of Stevens, and for this in-
jury ho sued the railroad company to recover damages.

This collision took place on the day after the completion of the
Little Miami Railroad to Springfield.

*Previous to that day a change of place for passing the [439
ears (that is, the up and down trains) had been agreed upon,
They had been in the habit of passing each other at a place called
Plainville, some three miles above Columbia. On that day the
cars wero to pass at Columbia. Cards had been delivered to all
the engineers and conductors to that effect, except Stevens.

The testimony shows that Smith, the conductor on this train,
was furnished with a card by the company in due season, fixing
the time of passing different towns, as then recently changed by
the company; that Clement, the superintendont of the company,
in due time placed the new cards in the hands of a suitable
agent of the company, to be delivered to all the conductors
and onginoors, including Stevens; but by inattention, mistake, or
perhaps negligence of the agent, a card was not delivered to
Stevens. At least the testimony tended to prove this. Morrell,
a witness, states that Cole, an agent of the company, delivered
a new card to Smith, conductor on Stevons’ train. Hueston
states that A. H. Lewis, agent of the company, went from Spring-
field on the desconding train on the day of tho collision, and after
tho accident gave him (Hueston) new cards to deliver to Smith
and Stovens. Hazen states that Lewis went up to Springfield the
day before the collision.

Upon these facts a jury might well inquire, if in law it was
material whether Cole and Lewis were not directed to deliver the
new cards, and whether that was not the mission of Lewis to
Springfield on the day previous to the change. Clement, in his
affidavit, which was proper on motion for a new trial, states that
he directed Lewis to deliver a new card to Stevens.

373

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

AA0, 441

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v, Stevens.

Now, if it was the duty of Smith, the conductor, to notify
Stevens of the change, if the conductor is the commanding officer,
or if Cole or Lewis had been directed to furnish Stevens with a
new card, in either event, the second charge asked to be given to
the jury by defendant below was very material in this case.

Upon these facts the plaintiff below recovered judgment,
440] *and the question now presented is, was he entitled to re-
cover? Did the court below rule correctly?

In the view I have taken of this case, I think the judgment
ought not to be sustained, and I have arrived at this conclusion
mainly from the following considerations:

1, It is not warranted by any English or American decisions,
‘put is in direct opposition to the well-settled law of both countries.

2. The law thus settled is founded in wisdom, and on principles
of public policy, adapted to our condition, and should not, there-
fore, be changed. (1)

3. Upon the facts in this case, other than those already adverted-
40, the plaintiff below was not entitled to recover under the law
as it exists, applicable to those facts.

If I am correct in these positions, then it would seem that the
principles announced in the opinion of the court are in conflict
with recognized authority, in violation of public policy, and liable
to produce “alarming consequences,” ’ when carried into the prac-
tical details ‘of business.

‘What, then, is the question of law presented in this case? Te.
is this: As between principal and agent, is the principal liable for
an injury which one agent receives through the negligence or
carelessness of another, without the fault, assent, or direction of;
the principal?

The evidence shows that the railroad company used all the care
and diligence which prudence required, to furnish Stevens with
notice of the change in the time and place the trains were to pass.
Smith, the conductor on the train, was furnished with a card. A
suitable agent of the company was directed to furnish Stovens, as
well as all the engineers and conductors, with cards, and all were
furnished except Stevens. The result was, as claimed by Stevens,
that he came in collision with the descending train, and sustained
personal injury.

If this be true, why shall the company be held responsible?
AAL] *Not for any act or neglect on their part, for all was done

374 (1) 1 Ohio, 245; 6 Ohio, 447.

. " DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 442

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

that the most prudent and cautious could do. If the company
are liable, then, it is because the principal is responsible to one agent
Sor 'the negligence of another, in a case where the principal has been
guilty of no laches.

I. Such is not the law. It is now well settled that the employer
is responsible to strangers for all injuries produced by the negli-
gence or carelessness of the servant, while the latter is doing the
employer’s business, but the rule bas not been extended further.
2 Kent’s Com. 259; 4 Met. 49.

But even this proposition was reluctantly assented to in 6 Term,
659, on the authority of Tuberville and Stamp. Id. Raym. 264.

It is said in some of the books (1 Hast, 106), the master is liable
because he employs an unskillfal or negligent servant.

Again, it is well sottled, that if a servant willfully runs his
master’s carriage against another's carriage, and does an injury,
the master is not liable for the injury thus occasioned. McManus
v. Critchett, 1 East, 106 ; Story on Agency, sec. 556.

No master is chargeable with the acts of his servant, but when
he acts in execution of the authority given him. Salk. 282; 1
East, 106.

Such is the law as between the principal and strangers who may
be injured by the nonfeasance or misfeasance of his agent, But
these rules have never before been applied as between the principal
aud an agent who may have been injured by the negligence of
another agent, Thus it is laid down in Story on Agency, in broad
terms, “that the principal is not liable for any injury done to one
agent by another, while engaged in the same business or employ-
ment. That the relation of master and servant, or principal and
agent, creates no contract, and therefore no duty on the part of
the principal; that the servant or agent shall suffer no injary from
the negligence of others employed by him in the same business or
service; and that, in such cases, the sérvant or agent takes upon
himself the hazard of any such injury which may arise in the
*course of such business or employment; and his remedy for [442
any such injury, by the misconduct or negligence of a fellow serv-
ant or agent, lies solely against the wrong-doer himself.” Story
on Agency, seo. 453.

In Priestly v. Fowler, (1) 3 Mees. & Weisb. 1, the facts were
these: Two servants were employed in conveying goods for their

(2) Hutchison v, York, etc, Railroad Co. West. Law Journal, 663,
375

“443 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

employer, and, by the negligent overloading of the van by one
servant, it broke down upon the road, and thereby the other
servant, in his proper place, received an injury, and brought his
suit against his employer, to recover damages for the injary. Held,
that the action could not be sustained.

Lord Abinger, C. B., in pronouncing the opinion of the court,
said: “It is admitted that thore is no precedent for the present
action, by a servant against his master. . . If the master be
liable to the servant in this action, the principle of that liability
will be found to carry us to an alarming extent. Tho master
would be liable to the servant for the negligence of the chamber-
maid, for putting him in a damp bed; for that of the upholsterer,
for sending in a crazy bedstead, whoreby he was made to fall
down while asleep, and injure himself,” ete. “But in truth, the
mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an
obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant,
than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself.”

As between the principal and strangers who were affected by the
acts of his agent, in the cases where the principal is liable, there
is an implied obligation or contract on the part of the principal,
to procure trustworthy agents, aud this iy the foundation of the
liability of the principal. Story on Agency soc. 52.

Now, as between the principal and his agent, in the manage-
ment of business requiring more than ono agont, the agents all
assume the duties of their positions, knowing that tho business is
443] to be managed by various agonts, and there is no *implied
obligation or contract by which the principal guaranties the abso-
Tule and perfect fulfillment, in every particular, of every duty to
be discharged by each agent.

In Farnell v. Boston and Worcester Railroad Company, 4 Met.
49, Farnell, as enginecr on a train of cars owned by the railroad
company, sued the company for personal injury received by him,
in consequence of other trustworthy agents of the company hav-
ing negligently left a switch in an improper position, by reason of
which the locomotive was thrown off the track, and the plaintiff
injured. In this case it was held, that, “where a master uses due
diligence in the selection of competent and trustworthy servants,
he is not answerable to one of them, for an injury received by him
in consequence of the carelessness of another, while both are en-

3876

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens.

gaged in the same service;” and, upon the facts, the plaintiff, it
was held, had no right to recover.

The chief justice, in delivering his opinion, says: “It is laid
down by Blackstone, that if a servant, by negligence, does any
damage to a stranger, the master shall be answerable for his neg-
lect. But this presupposes that the parties stand to each other in
the relation of strangers, between whom there is no privity, and
the action in such case is an action sounding in tort. The maxim,
respondeat superior, is adopted in that case from general consider-
ations of policy and security. But this doos not apply to the case
of a servant bringing his action against his own employer, to re-
cover damages for an injury arising in the course of that employ-
ment, where all such risks and perils as the employer and the serv-
ant respectively intend to assume and bear, may bo regulated
by the express or implied contract between them, and which, in
contemplation of law, must be presumed to be thus regulated.”

The court also held tho action could not be sustained on the
ground of any implied contract; for the law does not imply any
such contract from the relation of master and servant. The per-
son employed takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks
and perils incident to the performance of such services, *and [444
on legal presumption, the compensation is adjusted accordingly.

In Brown v. Maxwell, 6 Hill, 592, it appeared that Brown car-
ried on the business of stone-cutting, and Maxwell and others
were in his employ. Scott was Brown’s foreman, and had charge
of the work. In Brown’s absence, Scott directed a stone to be
taken from a pilo, which was so carelessly removed that another
stone fell on Maxwell, engaged in his proper place, and broke his
leg. The injury resulted from the negligence of the foreman
and other agents. It was held that, on the facts, Brown was nog
liable.

In Murray v. 8. C. Railroad Company, 1 McMullen, 385, the syl-
Jabus is:

“The railroad company are not liable to one of their agents for
an injury arising from the negligonco of another agent.”

Murray, a fireman, had his leg crushed in consequence of an
engineer on his train negligently running over a horse.

In Hayes v. The Western Railroad Co., 3 Cush. 270, the same
principle is laid down and fully sustained. The syllabus, in
part is: .

377

A45 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

«The proprietors of a railroad are not responsible to a brake-
man in their employment for an injury sustained by him in con-
sequence of the neglect or fault of another brakeman, engaged in
the same service, even though the latter be at the same time con-
ductor of a train of freight cars.”

In Coon v. Syracuse and Utica Railroad Co., 6 Barb. 231, the
same doctrine is maintained.

If these authorities, in both England and the states of this
Union, do not establish and settle this question, then I think it can
not be settled by authority; especially when there is no well-
adjudicated case to the contrary. But it is attempted to distin-
guish the case at bar from the authorities cited, in the following
particulars:

445] First. That in some of the cases cited it was in proof *that
the defendant used reasonable prudence in procuring trustworthy
and proper agents.

Second. That the engineer, in this case, was a subordinate officer,
acting under the direction of the conductor, and was not an agent
of the same class; or,in other words, that the engineer acted under
the direction of the conductor, and the act or negligence of the con-
ductor was the act of the principal, and hence the railroad com-~
pany is lisble for an act of their own negligence.

It seems to me that this attempt to distinguish, only creates a
distinction without a difference, and simply distinguishes this case
from those cited, as being in conflict with them. But I will con-
sider these propositions in their order: .

In 1 McMullen, 385, the engineer, by whose negligence the in-
jury occurred to another agent of the same principal, was proved
“to be a skillful professional engincor,”

In 4 Metcalf, 49, the agreed statement of facts admitted that the
agent whose negligence caused injury to a fellow-agent, “was a
careful and trustworthy servant.” In all the other cases there
was no proof upon the subject. The case in 1 McMullen is de-
cided independently of the fact so proved, and in 4 Metcalf it was
unnecessary to go further than to decide upon the state of facts
before the court.

In the case at bar there was no proof on the subject, nor was
any attempt made on the part of the plaintiff below to prove that
the conductor and other agents of the company were not trust-
‘worthy, and such as a prudent company would select.

378

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens,

The claim of the plaintiff below imputed nonfeasance to the
railroad company, by means of negligence in their agents, result-
ing in the injury for which the suit was brought. That was asub-
ject of averment in the declaration, material to the plaintiffs claim,
and like all other material facts, must be proved. Gould on Pl,
chap. 4, sec. 7; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 74. And this is the rule both
of the civil and the common law. Negligence is not presumed,
but the contrary ; and if the plaintiff would seek to recover by
reason of it, the onus prodandi *is on him, or rather, it will [446
not be presumed that agents selected by the company were not
trustworthy, so as to impute negligence to the company. Wright
Sup. 0. 202; 1 Green. Ev., sec. 80; 17 Johns. 92; Lane v. Crombie,
12 Pick. 177; 6 Johns. 90.

The authorities also show that_unless it is proved that agents
-are not trustworthy, it will not be presumed. So far, then, as the
employment of trustworthy servants is concerned, there is no
proof or legal presumption that such were not employed by the
company. Upon this point the law and evidence is with the do-
fendant below. Tho utmost that has ever before been claimed, is,
that the principal “is bound to provide for the safety of his serv-
ant, in the course of his omployment, to the best of his judgment,
information, and belief” (1 Mees. & Welsb. 5), which, upon the
law and facts, the company fully did. The action in the case
at bar, however, is not for employing agents not trustworthy, but for
changing the place of passing for the cars, “ without giving the plaint-
iff (below) due and timely notice thereof.”

The declaration proceeds upon the ground that the company
were not only “bound to provide for the safety of their servants
to the best of their judgment, information, and belief,” as by di-
recting trustworthy agents to give Stevens “a new timo-card,’' but
that the company were bound to furnish the card absolutely by their
agents (and corporations can only act through agents), and that
they are responsible for the failure of the agents to farnish such
card, when the failure was without the fault of the company. If
this is so, then the company impliedly guarantics to cach one of
their agents the perfect performance of every duty of every other
agent. There is in reason and law no such implied contract.
This is carrying the liability of the principal to an extont which
will render the employment of agents impracticable, and impose

379

44, 448 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens. -

on the principal a duty unheard of in the judicial history of the
common law.

IL. It is claimed that the engineer was a subordinate officer,
447] *acting under the direction of the conductor ; and that the
conductor being the superior officer, acting for the company, his ,
negligonce was that of the company. ,

The question decided in tho cases cited, is, that a principal is
not liable for an injury to one servant resulting from the negli-
gence of another. It is a broad, comprehensive doctrine, and ap-
plies to all agents engaged in the business of the principal. It is
not limited to superior or inferior agents.

In the case of 6 Barbour, 240, Pratt, J., says: “The reasoning
of Ohiof.Justice Shaw, in Farwell v. B. & W. Railroad Company, is
equally cloar and conclusive, and applies as well to injuries sus-
tained by an agent in consequence of the negligence of another
agent, endowed with greater’ or less authority by the principal,
or of one of the same authority. There can not, therefore, I think,
be any reason for a distinction.”

Th that case, a conductor run a train over a trackman, and this
act was as much the act of the company as was that of Smith, the
conductor, in the case at bar, in not disclosing the proper time of
passing to the ongineer, or of the other agents of the company, in
neglecting to furnish Stevens with a new card. The same opinion
seoms to havo been entertained in the case referred to in 3 Cushing.

In Brown v. Maxwell; 6 Hill, 582, the injury to an agent oc-
curred by the negligence of the foreman and other agents. The
foreman is in law the principal, and yet, as to a subordinate agent,
his negligence was not held to be the negligence of the principal.

It is immaterial that the negligence of subordinate agents con-
tributed to tho injury. Jf the negligence of a foreman was the
negligence of the principal as to a subordinate agent (which it is
not), and such negligence contributed to the injury, the principal
would be responsible. Brand v. Troy and Schenectady Railroad
Oo., 8 Barb. 369; 6 Barb. 235; 6 Hill, 592. This is a rule applica-
ble to collisions generally.

There is, then, upon principle and authority, no such distinction
as claimed by the defendant in error.

448] *But, admitting the claim of plaintiff below, that the en-

gineer is an officer subordinate to the conductor, and receiving

the commands of the company through him, yet he (the engineer),
380

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 449

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens.

knowing this, does, by his contract to serve in that capacity, im-
pliedly agree to hazard all the risks of the situation—among
which are included the casual negligence of the conductor, not
arising from the fault or nonfeasance of the company. So that,
in any viow of the case, it rests upon the plaintiff to show positive
nonfeasance, or default, on the part of the company, in not pro-
caring trustworthy conductors; and if be can not show this, he
can not hold the company responsible for injuries arising from
the neglect of such conductor.

Bat if there were, the proof in this case does not establish, to
my mind, that the engineer was subordinate to the conductor.
The “time-cards” furnished to both were printed cards, directed
to the conductor and engineer, as “Instructions to Conductors
and Engineers for Running Trains ;” and whatever the facts may
be, there is no proof to warrant the assumption that one was a
subordinate officer. Besides, the nogligence of the conductor, who
was furnished with one of the new time-cards, could not have
been evidence of negligence on the part of the company, as the
object in furnishing him with the card was to give the train of
cars he conducted the benefit of it.

Another agent distributed, or was directed to distribute, the
new time-cards. In this respect the company used all the dili-
gence which prudence required ; and especially should this view
be taken on a motion for a new trial, with the evidence before the
court.

The opinion pronounced by a majority of this court proceeds
solely upon the ground that the negligence was that of Smith, the
conductor, in not notifying Stevens of the change. He was on
the train, engaged with Stevens in running it.

The learned chiof judge, in his opinion, proceeds upon the
ground that the negligence was not that of the conductor, but
that of the superintendent—of a person not engaged in run-
ning the train, I think the court below, on a motion for a new
*trial, could not properly take this view, with the affidavit [449
of the superintendent on file, showing that he directed an agent
io deliver the new cards, besides the other evidence upon that sub-
ject. In either event, whether the negligence was that of the
conductor or of another agent of the company directed to deliver
the new cards, in the view I have taken, the court below should
have given to the jury the second charge, as requested.

381

450 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens.

IL. The solemn adjudications of courts of recognized authority
should be followed, unless not applicable to our condition. There
is nathing to distinguish this state from others, as to the liability
of the principal to the agent. The province of the court is defined
by the maxim, jus dicere et non jus dare, and it is an ancient and
true maxim, that “omnis tnnovatis plus novitate perturbat, quam
utilitate prodest.” It has been declared that even when the reason
of arule can not well be discerned, “the wisdom of the rule has
in the end appeared, from the inconveniences that have followed
the innovation.”

I would not, therefore, overturn the solemn decisions of courts
of high authority, except for the most weighty reasons to warrant
such acourse. The authorities cited, as I conceive, are founded
in wisdom and policy.

In Priestly v. Fowler, 3 Mees. & Welsb. 7, the court say: “To
allow such an action to prevail, would be an encouragement to the
servant to omit that diligence and caution which he is in duly
bound to exercise in behalf of his employer, to protect him against
the misconduct or nogligence of others who serve him, and which
diligence and caution, while they protect the master, are a much
better security against an injury the servant may sustain by the
negligence of others engaged under the ‘master, than any recourse
against bis master for damages could possibly afford him.’”

At the present term of this court, we have decided that, as a
matter of public policy, the owner of a trunk delivered to a common
carrier, and by him lost, may prove its contents, and their value.
450] The agents of railroad companies are intrusted with *the
care of the lives and property of individuals. Any principle
which may encourage negligence endangering these, is fatal to all
the groat interests of society, and subversive of its order and well-
being. These companies can only be managed by a variety of
agents, and if we are to teach each agent, that for the negligence
of the others, resulting in injury to himself, he can grasp the
treasures of the company, and procure a competency for life, he
ceases his vigilance over those with whom he co-operates—a bribe
is held out to him to incur personal risks, which he may have
facilities to render partially harmless to him, but which may carry
destruction to a hundred homes, and make widows and orphans
throughout the land, by a reckless waste of human life. “Salus
populi suprema lex.” .

382

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. A5L

Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens.

Let the agents understand that each shall be liable to the other,
for negligence resulting in personal injury, and remove the bribe
to incur personal hazards, and a motive is constantly operating to
protect the lives and property of those intrusted to their caro,
This is one of the reasons for the rule in 4 Metcalf, 49. The court
say, “ Where several persons are employed in the conduct of one
common enterprise, and the safety of each depends much on the
care and skill with which each other shall perform his appropriate
duty, each is an observer of the conduct of others—can give notice
of any misconduct, incapacity, or neglect of duty.”

The rule, as recognized by the cdurt, will result in great practical
inconvenience and wrong. If I employ two cooks, and use all the
care in their selection that prudence requires, no matter how well
they may know each other, while I have no personal means of
knowing either, except by prudont inquiry, I am responsible to one
of them, if she is scalded by the negligence of anothor. I conceive
that such is not the implied contract arising out of these relations.
And this consequence will extend to every case where the relation
of principal and agent exists.

III. Aside from all these considerations, the judgment below
ought not to be sustained, It is a well-settled principle in
*ease of collision or injury, that a party who is himself inde- [451
fault, (1) and thereby causes or contributes to the injury, can not re-
cover. 8 Barb. 369; 6 Barb. 235; 6 Hill, 592; 21 Wend. 188, 615; 19
‘Wend. 399. The evidence satisfies me, that Stevens, although not
furnished with a “new time-card,” so as thereby to know the place
and time of passing the descending train, yet was otherwise put
upon inquiry ; did know, or had reason to know of the change, and
did not use that caution to avoid the collision, which prudence
and the rules of the railroad company required.

The evidence shows that on the day of the collision Stevens
stopped the train at Columbia, the new passing place, and asked
the conductor if the change was not to take place there on that day;
that Stevens stopped because he believed so, but when the con-
ductor told him thoy did not change there on that day, he went
on as though in doubt and uncertainty.

(1) Volenti non fit injurin. (‘Wing Max. 482.) It is a general rale of the
English law, that no one can maintain an action for a wrong where he has
consented or contributed to the act which occasions his loss. Broom’s Legal
‘Maxims, 128, and authorities there cited.

383

452 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens.

It was claimed by the company that by printed rules, which
were in evidence, directed to conductors and engineers, it was the
duty of the engineer in cases of doubt to stop his speed.

By rule 10 it is declared that “in cases of uncertainty as to
the occupation of tho track,a man must be sent ahead or back,
and kept at least one hundred yards distant until the danger is
over.”

By rule 16: “Care at all times is earnestly enjoined. Always
take the safe side in: cases of doubt.” .

It was proven by West, a witness of plaintiff below, who was
an engineer, that he thought when they left Columbia there was
something wrong, and he went back. He noticed they blew the
whistle a great deal; that it was a crooked place in the road;
452] ‘bat no man was started ahead of the train *in this danger-
ous place. Witness knew there was something wrong from their
checking up, ete.

Stevens himself told the witness Hazen, a few days after the
collision, in answer to inquiries, “that be had been blowing his
whistle on all the curves after leaving Columbia, because he was
expecting the train.”

Stevens undoubtedly knew, or had reason to believe, that the
ebange was to take place, yet he did not send a man ahead, and
the result was that a collision took place on a curve, which might
have been avoided if he had used proper precautions, such as the
rules of the company required.

The defendant below requested the court to charge, “ that if the
jury believe Stevens was in doubt and uncertainty as to whether
the trains ought to pass at Columbia, instead of Plainville; and
if he expected to meet the down train between Columbia and
Plainville, it was his duty to run slow; and if it was prudent, and
according to the usages of engineers, and required by the printed
rules of the company, in cases of doubt and uncertainty, to send
aman ahead of the train and keep him from one hundred to one
hundred and fifiy yards ahead of the engine, until the bends and
curves in that place had been passed, and all apprehension of
danger was over ; and the plaintiff neglected to send a man ahead,
as required by prudence and the printed rules, and such neglect
contributed to bring on the collision and produce the injury, the
plaintiff was not entitled to a verdict.”

384

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. ; 453

Ketchum ». Stout.

This charge was refused, and in this I think the court erred,
as well as in the refusal to give the second charge asked for.

In any view which can be taken of this case, it is clear to my
mind, that the plaintiff below was not entitled to recover, and,
upon the evidence before the court, that a new trial should havo
been granted.

*Apner Kurouum v. Joun B. Srour. [453.

‘Where a purchase of land is made by metes and bounds estimated to contain
a specific quantity, or for “more or less,” and a gross sum to be paid for
the entire tract, the purchaser will not be entitled to an abatement in the
price, should the numbor of acres fall short of the estimated quantity; more
especially should the land, at the time of parchase, be of equal value to
the price paid. : .

Any misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the vendor may take a
case out of this rule,

‘Tus is a bill in chancery reserved in Coshocton county.

The complainant filed the bill to enjoin a judgment at Jaw, and to
procure an abatement in the price of a certain tract of land, pur-
chased by the complainant of the defendant in 1844. The case is
sufficiently stated by the judge delivering. the opinion of the court.

Spanatur, Humricxnouss & Love, for complainant:

Where a party covenants to convey land with specified bounda-
ries, his covenant is satisfied by conveying, and although the quan-
tity of land conveyed be mentioned in the deed and yet prove de-
ficient, no action results to the grantee. Howes v. Baker, 3 Johns,
Ch. 506; Mann & Tolls v. Pearson, 2 Johns. 37; Powell v. Clarke,
5 Mass. 355. The purchaser can not at law excuse himself from a
strict performance, on his part; but a court of conscience will not
permit such gross injustice to result from the obvious mistake of
the parties. 1 Sugden on Vendors, 382, 383, 199, 200-393.

Mistake is indeed one of the great heads of equity jurisdiction.
Tn a case of this kind, equity relieves a purchaser in two ways:
First, by decreeing a rescission of the contract,in a case where the
parties can be placed in statu quo ; secondly, by decrecing perform-
ance of the contract as far as it can be carried into effect, with an

Vou, xx—25 385

454, 455 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Ketchum ». Stout.

454] abatement in the price *proportioned to the deficiency in
the quantity of the land. 2 Story’s Eq., sec. 779; Hill v. Buckley:
Ves. Jr. 394.

This case, upon the facts, stands as ono of mistake, not of fraud.
The complainant has not yet accepted a deed; and since by the
proof it is established that the contract between the parties was to
convey, by given metes and bounds, a tract of land “estimated to
contain 215 acres or a little upward” for a gross sum, and that
the parties were mistaken as to the number of acres, it is a case in
which equity will relieve by an abatement of the price. 26 Law

+ Lib. 18; Portman v. Mill, 2 Russ. 573; 1 Sug. Vend. 382, 383, sec. 3.
“Tf an estate be sold at so much per acre, and there is a deficiency in
the number conveyed, the purchaser will be entitled to a compen-
sation, although the estate was estimated at that number in an old
survey. The rule is the same, though the land is neither bought
nor sold professedly by the acre; for the presumption is, that in
fixing the price, regard was had on both sides to the quantity
which both suppose the ostate to consist of.”

The rule is not changod by the fact that the complainant lived.
near the premises and might have known the quantity of acres.
2 Sug. Vend. 391; Mirch v. Winchester, 1 Ves. & Boa. 375.

Marrunws & TrpBaut, for respondent, insisted:

That the land was sold by its boundaries for a gross sum, and
not by the acre; and that the boundaries were known to the com-
plainant at the time of the purchase, . The estimated quantity in
the contract is descriptive, and forms no part of the contract.
The parties were not mistaken as to the boundaries, and it was
that certain tract, thus bounded, which was sold.

The contract shows that there was no misrepresentation, for it
describes the land, as “ estimated to contain 215 acres,” etc., and the
proof shows, that it had been so estimated in prior conveyances.
455] The court will apply to the purchaser the maxim, *caveat
emptor, and will not abate the contract price. Fenton v. Brown,
14 Ves. 144; 20 Law Lib. 123; Powell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 355; 2
Johns. Ch. 37; 1 Sug. on Vend. 382-384; Chit. on Cont. 297, n.
It is not claimed there was any fraud or mistake as to the bound-
aries or value of the land, and there is no ground of relief. Ab-
bott v. Allen’s Ex’r, 2 Johns. Ch. 519; 1 Johns. Ch. 213.

Hironcock, 0. J. The facts of this case, as disclosed by the bill,
886

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 456

Kotchum ». Stout.

answers, exhibits, and testimony, are substantially as follows: On
January 12, 1835, the defendant, Stout, purchased of the executors
of Joseph Higbee, a tract of land in Coshocton county, the samo
being a part of the first quarter, fifth township, fifth range United
States military land, for the consideration of nine hundred and
thirty-two dollars and fifty-five cents. In the contract of sale and
purchase, the land is described by metes and bounds, and is sold
for two bundred and fifteen acres and thirty-five hundredths, “be
the same more or less.” Subsequently the land was conveyed to
Stout. On May 28, 1844, Stout, by contract, sold this same land to
Ketchum, the complainant, for the consideration of three thousand.
dollars. In this contract the land is described as “situate in La-
fayette township, Coshocton county, Ohio; being in the first
quartor of the fifth township and fifth range, and bounded as fol-
lows: On the north, by the Tuscarawas river; on the east, by land
now owned by Daniel Miller ; on the south, by the leading road;
on the west, by land now owned by Isaac W. Miller, Thomas M,
Wiggins, and Thomas Miller, estimated to contain about two hun-
dred and fifteen acres, or a little upward.” At tho time of entering
into this contract, the complainant, Ketchum, was residing, and
for years had resided, near this land, upon the opposite side of the
road, and the lines of the tract appear to have been notorious.
Stout was rosiding in a different township, but had previously
occupied the land by a tenant.

The provision of the contract as to payments is as follows:
*« The said party of the second part (Ketchum) is to pay [456
the said sum of $3,000, as follows: he is to pay off three
certain judgments, now standing in the court of common pleas,
against the said party of the first part (Stout)—one in favor of
Lawrence and Trimble, one in favor of William R. Thompson &
Co,, one in favor of John Miller—and such other amounts and
claims as are a lien on said land. In making payment, as afore-
said, the said party of the second part is not to pay interest on five
hundred dollars of said purchase money until from and ‘after
June 1, 1845 ; and he is not to pay interest on another five hun~
dred dollars of said purchase money until from and after June 1,
A.D. 1846. The remaining two thousand dollars of said purchase
money is to draw interest until applied to the payment of said judg-
mentsand lien. After paying off the amouut of said judgments and
liens, out of the said three thousand dollars purchase money, as

387

ABT SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Ketchum ». Stout.

aforesaid, the said party of the second part is to have time to pay
the residue thereof, as aforesaid, for the ono-half residue, until
June 1, 1846, and for the other half of such residue till June 1,
1847, to the party of the first part.” Itis further provided that

* Ketchum was to pay the taxes accruing subsequent to the con-
tract; and, furthor, that he should have the possession, with cer-
tain exceptions, on the 1st day of August next after the date of the
contract, and fall possession of the entire premises on October Ist.
‘He took possession accordingly, and has remained in possession ever
since. In September, 1844, he paid to Trimble and Lawrence, on
their judgments, three hundred dollars. In January, 1845, he
caused the land to be surveyed ; and according to the survey then
made, the quantity within the metes and bounds was found to be
only one hundred and sixty acres, instead of two hundred and
fifteen, as estimated—falling short forty-nine acres. There is an
allegation in the bill, that the defendant, Stout, represented the
quantity of land to be two hundred and fifteen acres, and that it
was taken upon this representation. ‘This is denied in the an-
457] swer, and *upon this point there is no proof. It is appar-
ent that Stout purchased the lands, by metes and bounds, as con-
taining two hundred and fifteen acres “ more or less,” and there
is nothing im the case to show that, until after he had sold to
complainants, he ever suspected there was any mistake as to the
quantity.

After the payment of the three hundred dollars, before referred
to, as made upon one of the judgments named in the contract, the
complainant made no further advances toward the performance of
that contract. He continued in possession of the property, how-
ever, without taking any steps to rescind the contract. “It is only
by inference that we are led to the conclusion that he even notified
the defendant of the deficiency in the land, Being thus in pos-
session, in Juno, 1847, he suffered the land to be sold on the judg-
ment of Thompson & Co., one of the judgments named in the con-
tract—purchased the same in at sheriff’s sale for the consideration
of $2,215, which was applied, together with three hundred dollars
before referred to, in discharge of the judgments specifically named
in the contract. This sale was confirmed by the court, a deed
ordered and executed by the sheriff, under which complainant now
claims title to the land. In addition to these judgments, the com-
plainant paid fifty-five dollars and fifty cents to relieve the land

388

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 458

Ketchum ». Stout.

from taxes assessed before his purchase, and also eighteen dollars
and sixty-three cents, to relieve the same from the liens of other
judgments, not specifically named in the contract.

It is shown by the evidence in the case, that at the time of sale
by Stout to the complainant, the tract of land was well known in
the neighborhood, with its boundaries, and estimated to contain
two hundred and fiftcen acres, and a little more; and that as it
lay it was worth three thousand dollars, without taking into view
the quantity. On June 15, 1843, the complainant himself, with
two other freeholders, was called upon by the shoriff of the county -
to appraise the same land, and appraised it at four thousand dol-
lars. This, however, was before the survey, which took place iz
January, 1845, Again, the same land was appraised on August
18, 1846, *ander the direction of the sheriff, by three other [458
frecholders, and was estimated by them to be worth three thou-
sand three hundred and twenty dollars. This was after the de-
ficiency in quantity bad been ascertained ; and it was, as I suppose,

“under this appraisement that the complainant purchased at
sheriff’s sale.

At the June term of the court of the common pleas of Coshocton
county, A. D. 1849, the defendant Stout commenced an action of
covenant, upon the aforesaid contract, against the complainant, to
recover the balance of purchase money still due. The same mat-
ter was set up in defense in that case as is now set up in this, for
relief. 7 :

This case was tried at the March term of the court, a. p. 1850,
and a judgment was rendered, in favor of the then plaintiff, for
ten hundred and thirty-six dollars and sixteen cents damages and
costs. :

The complainant admits, in his bill, that upon the trial of the
caso, he received credit for all he had paid upon the judgments,
and also for taxes.

This bill is filed for the purpose of enjoining the judgment so
as aforesaid rendered, and the sole ground of relief relied on, is,
that the quantity of land as sold and described by metes and
bounds, is not equal in quantity to the estimated number of acres,
There is no pretense that there has been any fraud, or even mis-
representation. There is no pretense that the defendant had any
better knowledge as to the quantity of the land, than had the com~
plainant. There is no pretense but what the boundaries were well

389

459 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Ketchum ». Stout.

known and understood. Nor can it be pretended but that the
complainant had equal means of ascertaining the exact quantity,
before the purchase, as had the defendant. In fact, his position
was such that he would bo more likely to suspect a deficiency than
would the defendant; for he resided, and had for some time re-
sided, adjoining the land, while the defendant resided in a differ-
ent township, and there is no evidence in the case that the defend-
ant ever had any possession except by his tenants. Still the
459] complainant *agreed to purchase the entire tract, and for
the stipulated price. Notatso much per acre, but for a round sum
to be paid for the whole; and that whole was estimated “at about
two hundred and fifteen acres and something more.” But it is
insisted by complainant’s counsel that he is entitled to relief, and
the position is assumed, that, although land is sold by metes and
pounds, at an ostimated quantity, be the same more or less, if the
land falls short of that ostimated quantity, the purchaser is en-
titled to an abatement, as fully as ho would have been had the
land been sold by the acre. It is admitted that in such case he
can have no relief at law, but that in chancery he may be re-
lieved. ' ,

It might be admitted, that where the vendor represents the tract
so sold to contain more land than what is within the boundaries
set forth, relief might be granted; still, it would not settle this
case, for there is no evidence of any representation one way or the
other.

Authorities have been cited to show that where a vendor has not
title to all the land which he contracts to sell, the vendee may
have an abatement. Of this there can be no doubt. The vendor
contracts to sell an entire tract of land, to one-half of which he
has no title. In such case, as a general rule, the vendee might re-
scind the contract, or he might compel a specific performance, so
far as the vondor can perform, and insist upon an abatement of
the price as to the residue. For instance, he contracts to pur-
chase a tract of one hundred acres, and the vendor has title to but
fifty of the hundred. The vendor can be compelled to convey the
fifty acres for which he has title, and he will not be allowed to
yveceive pay for that to which he can make no title. In such
case, however, the power of the court should be invoked in rea
sonable time.

In the case before the court, however, there was no defect of

390

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 460, 461

Ketchum ». Stout.

title. The vendor had good title to the entire tract sold. The
only difficulty is, that the quantity does not agree with the esti-
mate.

To sustain the position assumed by complainant’s counsel,
*1 Sug. Vend. 372, 373, is cited, and some of the cases to [460
which that writer refers. It is evident that Mr. Sugden favors.the
opinion advocated by complainant’s counsel, but the most that can
be collected from his treatise is, that there is no settled rule upon
the subject. In his section treating of defects in the quantity of
the estate, and which is the section quoted by counscl, he says:
“Tf an estate be sold at so much per acre, and there be a deficiency
in the number conveyed, the purchaser will be entitled to a com-
pensation, although the estate was estimated at that number in an
old survey.” Of this, I suppose, there can be no doubt. He then
adds: “The rule is the same, though the land is neither bought
nor sold, professedly, by the acre. The presumption is, that in
fixing the prico, regard was had, on both sides, to the quantity
which both suppose the estate to consist of. The demand of the
vendor, and the offer of the purchaser, are supposed to be in-
fluenced, in an equal degree, by the quantity which both believe
to be the subject of their bargain. The general rule, therefore, is,
that where a misrepresentation is made as to the quantity, though
innocently, the right of the purchaser is to have what tho vendor
can give, with an abatement out of the purcbase money for so
much as the quantity falls short of the representation.”

In support of this position, Hill v. Buckley, 17 Ves. 391, is
cited. Taking the syllabus of the case, the position is sustained.
But when the case itself is examined, il will be found that a state-
ment has been made to the purchaser as to the quantity, and a
measurement furnished by the agent of the vendor, which induced
the purchase, which was incorrect; but this fact was not known
to either of the partics. The master of the rolls, in commenting
upon the case, refers to these facts, and says: “ Where a misrep-
resentation is made as to quantity, though innocently, I appre-
hend the right of the purchaser to be, to have what the vendor
can give, with an abatement out of the purchase money for so
much as the quantity falls short of the representation.”

*In the case now before this court, there is no proof of any [461

misrepresentation as to the quantity of land, but it appears that
391

462 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Ketchum v. Stout.

the complainant, to say the least, had as much knowledge as to
the quantity as the defendant.

In tho next paragraph, Mr. Sugden says: “ But where lands in
a conveyance are mentioned to contain so many acres by estima-
tion, or the words ‘more or less’ are added, if there be a small
portion more than the quantity, the vendor can not recover it;
and if there be a small quantity less, the purchaser can not obtain
any compensation for the deficiency.” Thus much counsel quote,
but omit what next follows in the same paragraph: “Indeed, a
case is said to have been decided, where a man conveyed his land
by the quantity of one hundred acres, were it ‘ more or less,’ and
it was not above sixty acros; but the purchaser had no relief, be-
cause it was his own laches,” and 2 Frum, 106, is “cited”? In
this case, the comparative deficiency of land was much greater
than in the case now beforo this court.

In the next paragraph, Mr. Sugden says: “That, however, was
tho case of an actual conveyance, Where the contract vests in
fieri, the goncral opinion has beon that the purchaser, if the quan-
tity bo considerably less than was stated, will be entitled to an
abatement, although the agreement contain the words ‘more or
less,’ ov ‘by ostimation.’”

Other authorities are cited, to show that a difference prevails
where the contract is in fleri and where it bas been executed by
conveyance. Admitting that there is a difforence, does the com-
plainant come beforo the court under such circumstances as to
tako advantage of ib? It scoms to mo not. True, he has not re-
coived a conveyance from the defendant, but he has acquired all
tho title which was in the defendant, and he has acquired this title
at sheriff’s sale, after neglecting to perform his own contract, by
satisfying tho judgmont upon which the land was sold. Had he
complied with his contract by paying off this and the other judg-
ments, as he was bound, he might with a better face have como
462] into this court for a specific performance, *and in such ap-
plication have insisted upon an abatement.

Upon this question, whether there can be any abatement whero
the land sold is described by measurements, metes, and bounds,
and so far as the quantity is concerned, is sold “by estimation,”
or “for more or less,” there is much contrariety of decision, us is
apparent from an examination of the authorities referred to in tho
notes appended to the American edition of Sugden. No certain

392 .

‘ DECEMBER TERM. 1851. 463

Ketchum v. Stout.

rule seems to have becn established even in England. Mr. Sugden
says, on page 378 of the American edition: “But however the rule
may be finally established, yet a seller, knowing the true quan-
tity, would not be allowod to practice a fraud, by stating a false
quantity, with the addition of the words ‘more or less,’ or the
like.” This is unquestionably correct; for these words contain
no power to relieve a vendor from his own fraud, whatever that
fraud may be. But where there is no fraud, no concealment, no
misropresentation, they must have some effect.

So far as my knowledge extends, the general course of decisions
in this state, upon contracts for the sale of land, or for the con-
veyance of land, the land being described by metes and bounds,
and the quantity “ostimated,” or sold “for more or less,” has
been, that the purchaser should take all within the prescribed
bounds, although more than the estimated quantity, and that
there could be no abatement should the quantity fall short. At
any rate, I have never known of any such abatement, And such,
I beliove, has been the general current of decisions-in the United
States, although they are not perhaps uniform.

But, oven admitting the rule to be otherwise in some cases, is
this a proper case to give this complainant relief? What has been
his conduct? He bought the land in controversy by its metes
and bounds, with which he was well acquainted, and contracted
to pay a gross sum for the entire tract. The payments first to be
made by him were to be applied in satisfaction of corlain judg-
ments which were liens upon the land. This contract *he [463
neglected to comply with, but suffered the land to be sold upon
one of these judgments, and purchased in himself, thereby ousting
the vendor of his title. Was this acting in good faith? True, he
had ascertained, as he supposed, that the land fell short of the es-
timated quantity. But if, in consequence of this, he felt himself
aggrieved, he should at once have notified the vendor, and have
requested a rescission of the contract. Possibly, had the vendor
refused to have rescinded, he might have compelled it. This
course, however, did not mect his approbation. He preferred, in
the first place, to get the title out of the vendor’s hands through
the instrumentality of a shoriff’s sale: The reason which he as-
signs for this course is, that he had paid three hundred dollars,
which would otherwise have been lost in consequence of the
vendor's insolvency. But although he could charge the vendor

393.

AG4 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cotterell v. Long et al.

in his bill with insolvency, he has not undertaken to prove the
ebarge.

Besides, what has he lost by this contract, should he be compelled
to pay the judgment? The land is proven at the time of his pur-
chase to have been worth $3,000, irrespective of the number of
acres. In the year 1843—the year before-his purchase—he him-
self, with two other freeholders, under the solemnity of an oath,
appraised it at $4,000. And in 1846, after the deficiency in quantity
had been ascertained, it was again appraised at $3,320. The price
agreed to be paid for the land, then, did not exceed its actual value,
and all the defendant can lose, should he be compelled to pay the
full amount of the contract price, will be the opportunity of ac-
quiring a valuable farm at about $1,000 less than its worth.

Itscems to the court that the equity of the case is with the de-
fendant.

The injunction is therefore dissolved, and the bill dismissed at
the complainant’s cost.

464] *Moszs Corrmrenn anp Joun CorrrrrLi v. Enocn Lone
ET AL.

‘Ifa contract for the conveyance of land be intended as security for a debt, it
is a mortgage, whatever may be its form or the name given it by the
parties.

‘Tuts is a bill of review, reserved in the county of Clermont.

The following is a concise statement of the case:

On April 7, 1829, William Cotiorell, the father of complainants,
executed and delivered to Thomas Morris the following instrument:

“This shall oblige me, my heirs, executors, ctc., to make or cause
to be made to Thomas Morris, his heirs or assigns, a good and suf-
ficient deed of conveyance for a certain tract or parcel of land,
lying in the township of Miami, in the county of Clermont and
State of Ohio, supposed to contain thirty acres—it being the’same
tract of land devised or left to me by the last will and testament
of my father, Thomas Cotterell, and of which I am to have the
possession on the death of Peggy Cotterell, the widow and relict

394

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 465

Cotterell », Long et al.

of my said father; or I will pay to the said Thomas Morris $100
in two years from this date, and in default of payment of the
above sum at the time stipulated for payment, then this obligation
for the conveyance of the land aforesaid shall be absolute. In
witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this April
7, 1829,

«Wipiram Correreny. [1. 8.]

“Witness: J. D. Morris.”

On August 11, 1832, Thomas Morris, in consideration of $100,
assigned this obligation to Moses Long, and bound himsolf, his
heirs, etc., to cause to be made and completed to him, the said
Moses Long, a good and sufficient title to the land therein
described, ‘with the exception therein mentioned.”

*On November 5, 1833, Moses Long, in consideration of one [465
hundred dollars, assigned to Enoch Long all his right and title to
said obligation, and bound himself to cause to be made to said
Enoch Long a good and sufficient title to the land, “with the ex-
ception therein mentioned.”

On November 6, 1833, Enoch Long filed, in the court of common
pleas of Clermont county, his bill in chancery agains) Thomas
Morris, Moses Long, and Mary Ann, Moses and John Cotterell,
infant heirs of William Cotterell, deccased, setting forth the obli-
gation, the assignment, and the failure of William Cotterell to
execute the deed or to pay the money; and calling upon all the
defendants to answer under oath, and praying that the legal title
in said tract ofland might be perfected in the petitioner.

At the same term of court, on motion of counsel for complain-
ant, Owen T. Fishback, Esq., was appointed guardian ad litem
to the infant defendants.

At the August term, 1834, Thomas Morris filed his answer, in
which he stated that William Cotterell, in his lifetime, gave him
the title-bond mentioned in the bill, and that he assigned the
same to Moses Long; that he never did, at any time, reccive from
the said William Cotterell any part of the said sum mentioned in
said bond, but that he sold the same, in good faith, to Moses Long,
and verily believed that the complainant was justly entitled toa
decree for the land.

At the same term of court, Moses Long answered and acknowl-
edged the assignment from himself to complainant, and expressed.

his belief that his assignee was entitled to the land.
395

466 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cotterell v. Long et al.

On Septembor 5, 1834, the guardian ad litem filed an answer in
Dehalf of the infant heirs of William Cotterell, deceased, in which
he stated that he had seen and inspected the title-bond mentioned
in complainant's bill, and that it appeared to him to have been
fairly executed; that he knew nothing about the original transac-
tion, nor did he know any reason why the complainant should ©
466] not obtain the relief he *sought, saving to the infant heirs
such rights as they might be entitled to on their arrival at full
age.

At the same term, to wit, the August term, A. p. 1834, the court
-of common pleas, upon said bill, answers, and exhibits, rendered a
decree in which they found the equity of the case with the com-
plainant, and ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the land mon-
tioned in his bill, to wit, thirty-seven acres of land in the county
of Clermont, on the waters of the Little Miami, being a part of
surveys, ete., bounded, ote., “of right belongs to the complainant,
and that the said infant heirs of William Cottercll, deceased, do
each, three months after coming of full age, make and execute to
said complainant, a quitclaim deed for the land hereinbefore de-
scribed, and in default of making such conveyance, then this
decree to operate as such.”

To reverse this decree, this bill of review is brought, and the
following are the errors relied upon to sustain it:

1. There was no service of process upon the infant defendants.

2, Tho personal representatives of William Cotterell were not
made parties,

8. The bond or agreoment of Cotterell was nothing more than a
security for the payment of the one hundred dollars; and thero
was no finding by said decree of the amount duo thoreon, and
there was no day given for the payment of the money.

4, Tho decree does not find that the assignments of said bond,
‘by Morris and Long, were, in fact, made.

5. The decree does not find the execution and delivery of the
ond by Cotterell to Morris.

6. If the bond had been properly executed, and the assignments,
duly made, all that the complainant would have been entitled to
by said decree would have beon the amount specified therein,
with interest; and a day should have been given for the payment
-of the same, and, in default of payment, a sale of the land ordered.

396

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 467, 468

Cotterell v. Long et al.

*7, The decree does not find that the money due on said [467
pond had not been paid.

8. The decree directed said infant defendants to convey said
Jand, when William Cotterell had nothing but a life estate therein,
by the will of Thomas Cotterell, and said defendants, by said will,
had the fee simple.

9. No day was given said defendants to show cause against the
decree, after their arrival at full age.

Sundry depositions are introduced on either side, but if strictly
admissible in a proceeding of this sort, they are of no essential
importance, any further than to show the respective ages of the
present complainants, Moses and John Cotterell, and the nature
of the indebtedness of William Cotterell to Thomas Morris, at the
time the bond was executed. It appears from the deposition of
Joseph Cotterell, who was the brother of William Cotterell,
deceased, that Moses Cotterell was born in the year 1824, and
Jobn in the year 1827. The bill of review was filed September
19, 1849.

On cross-examination by defendants in error, Joseph Cotterell
was asked by them this question: Did not William Cotterell give
Thomas Morris his interest in this land for his services in the case
in which he was charged with killing his wife? To which the
witness answered, that he understood he was to give him $100;
and to secure that amount, he signed him his interst in the land.
The will of Thomas Cotterell gives this land to his wife, Peggy
Cotterell, for life; remainder to his son William, and his heirs.
Peggy Cotterell lived to an advanced age, and died in 1847 or
1848.

Fisupack, Swine & Fisupacx, for complainants:

I. It is the well-settled doctrine, both of English and American
courts, that whenever the rights of infants are sought to be af-
fected by proceedings in court, they must be brought before the
court by actual or constructive process upon them, or publication
of notice against them. Ontario Bank v. Strong, *2 Paige’s [468
Ch. 304; Grant v. Vanschoonhoven, 9 Paige’s Ch. 255; Walker
v. Hallett, 1 Ala. N. 8. 379; Waller v. Bank of Mobile, 6 Ala
452; Collard’s Heirs v. Groom, 1 J. J. Marsh. 487; Graham et al.
». Sublet, 6 J. J. Marsh. 44; Jonés v. McGrisky, 3 Dana, 425;
Huston v. McClasty, 3 Litt. 274; Carrington’s Hoirs v. Bronts,

i McLean, 174; Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466.
307

469 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cotterell v. Long et al.

Il. The personal representatives of William Cotterell were
necessary parties to said bill. Massie’s Heirs v. Donaldson, 9
Ohio, 377; Huston v. McClasty’s Heirs, 3 Littell, 274.

III and VI. The third and sixth errors aré of the same char-
actor, and present the question :—What was tho truo nature and
character of the obligation from Cotterell to Morris? It was a
mere security, in the character of a mortgage, for the payment of
money ; and was so intended by the parties. Hughes ot al. v.
Edwards and wifo, 9 Wheat. 489; Morris v. Nixon, 1 Howard’s
U. S. 118; Miami Exporting Co. v. Bank of United States and
Ruffner, Wright’s 8. C. 249; Jarbrough v. Newell, 10 Yerg. 376;
King v. Newman, 2 Muml. 240; Ketchum v. Johnson, 3 Greene,
Ch. 370; Wright v. Bates, 13 Vt. 341; McIntyre v. Humphreys, 1
Hoff. Ch. 31; Henry v. Davis, 7 Johns. Ch. 40; Oldham v. Halley,
2 J.J. Marsh. 113; Secrist v. Tromer, Ib. 471; Edrington v.
Harper, 3 J. J. Marsh. 353; Bishop v. Rutledge, 7 Ib. 217 ; Harri-
son v. Leeman, 3 Blackf. 51.

The condition of defeasance exists in the agreement; but should
it be doubtful whether it be a conditional sale or mortgage, this
court will construe it a mortgage. Skinner v. Miller, 5 Littell,
84; Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumner, 486; Conway’s Executor and
Devisces v. Alexander, 7 Cranch, 218. ,

No bond to pay the money from Cotterell to Morris, or covenant
to pay, in the instrument itself, is necessary to constitute the con-
tract a mortgage. Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumner, 534; 4 Kent, 145.
These authorities are not changed by the case of Walton et al. v.
Coulson, 1 McLean, 120.

IV, V, VII. The fourth, fifth, and seventh errors are of the
469] *samo character, The execution of the bond and the assign-
ments thereof should have beon duly proven, and those facts
should have been specially found in the decree. The answer of a
guardian ad litem is not binding upon infant defendants, and no
decree can be pronounced on its admissions without service of
process. Wright v. Miller, 1 Sandf. Ch. 103; 1 Dan, Oh. Pr. 217,
219; 2 Tb. 1217; Mills v. Dennis et al., 3 Johns. Ch. 367.

VIII. As to the eighth error, see 15 Gris. Ohio, 559.

IX. A decree, directing infants to make a conveyanco, must
give them a day after their arrival at full age to show cause against
it. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 209; 2 Ib. 1214; Bing. on Infancy, 135; Kel-
sall v. Kelsall, 2 Mylne & Keen, 409; 2 Vern. 232, 342; 2 P. Wms.

398

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 470

Cotterell v. Long et al.

403; Ooffin v. Heath ct al., 6 Met. 76; Mills v. Dennis, 3 Johns.
Ch. 367; Pope v. Lemaster, 5 Litt. 77; Collard’s Heirs v. Groom,
2J. J. Marsh: 487; 1 Amer. Dec. 121, 122.

The proof shows that all of the complainants were minors when
the bill of review was filed, but if only one of them had been within
the “saving clause” of the statute, his right to review the de-
cree would inure to all. Williams etal. v. Phillips, 3 Ham. Ohio,
50; Massee v. Matthews’ Ex’r et al., 12 Stant. Ohio, 351; 2 Bibb,
3871.

Joun W. Lows, for defendants:

Errors 38, 6, and 7 do not exist in fact, because nothing was ever
due on the bond—there is no promise or obligation on the part of
Cotterell to pay the $100 mentioned in it. The bond was never
regarded between the parties to it, nor intended by them as a se-
curity for the payment of $100. Morris, with this bond in his pos- -
session, could not have sued Cotterell either on the bond or for his
professional services. The tender of a deed would have dis-
charged it.

A debt must exist before it can be secured, and this instrument
can not be considered a mortgage or a security until there *is [470
some dobt to secure. The title-bond provides for nothing but the
making of a deed; a court of equity could compel a conveyance,
but not the payment of money. The principle sustained by the
authorities is, that, if an instrument is given to secure a debt, it
may be regarded as a mortgage; but no such case is mado out.

As to the ninth error it is claimed that the decree did give three
months to the minors, after arriving at the age of majority, to ex-
ecute a quitclaim deed, and during that time they could show
cause against the decree.

The errors assigned relate, jirst, to tho jurisdiction of the court
over the infants at the time of decree; and secondly, to the char-
acter of the obligation upon which the decree was rendered.

I. The original bill shows that a precipe for a subpoena, against
all the defendants, was filed, and it was doubtless issued and
served, though it does not appear in the record. In Trumpon v.
Barton, 18 Grisw. Ohio, 425, the court say “they would hardly
reverse a former decree unless some benefit might by possibility
result to those seeking it.”

IL. The authorities cited do not sustain the position that this

- bond is a mortgage. There are authorities in point that it is not.
399

471 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cotterell v, Long et al.

Walton & Payne v. Coulston, 1 Mclean, 120; 9 Pet..62; 7 Cranch.
218, 237; 9 Ohio, 28; Glover v. Paine, 19 Wend. 518; Flomming
v. Litton, Dev. & Battel, 623; Sug. on Vend. 187;-5 Leigh, 434;
‘Hickman’v. Cantrell, 9 Yerg. 172; 1 Mad. Ch. 517; Bennott v.
‘Robb, 2 Yerg. (Tonn). 6; 4 Kont, 144.

In a dofeasible purchase, the condition must be strictly performed
at the day, or no relief will be granted. Chapman v. Tarner, 1
Call, 192; David v. Thomas, 1 Russ. & M. 506; Conway v. Alex-
ander, 7 Cranch, 218; Chit. on Cont. 728. This bond was but a
conditional sale, or rather a sale with a privilege to repurchase,
within a given time, at a stated price.

Sraupina, J. In the view wo tako of this case, it only be-
comes necessary to notice the third ground of error, in the
471] *assignment of errors by counsel for complainants, to wit,
that the agreement was nothing more than security for the pay-
ment of the $100.

It is true that is nowhere appears among the papers that the in-
fant heirs were served with process in the suit which so vitally
affected their interests; and, under other circumstances, this
omission would have received our serious consideration. As it is,
the whole case will be made to turn upon the character of the in-
strument executed by William Cotterell to Thomas Morris, on
April 7, 1829,

The court of common pleas of Clermont county, in making
their decree, treated it as a conditional sale. In this we think
they erred. The deed is in equity a mortgage. Upon its face it
is really no more than a security for the payment of $100 in two
years, although it commences with an undertaking to convey land.
This undertaking to make conveyance of the land, however, it
must be remarked, is exceedingly limited. It is only in default
of payment of the $100 by the time stipulated (two years), that
the obligation to convey becomes absolute. How does this diffor
in offoct from the ordinary mortgage deed? In the case of this
latter instrument, the lands are first actually transferred with
covenants of seizin and warranty; but then a simple condition is
insorted, that if a certain ‘sum of money be paid by the grantor
to the grantee in a given timo, the whole conveyance shall be
void.

In the agreement we are considering, there is only a promise for

400 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. A412

Cotterell v. Long ot al.

a deed, and then a stipulation that, if the money be paid in two
yoars, this promise for a deed is not to be considered an absolute
promise. In the language of the instrument: “On default of pay- “
ment of the above sum, at the time stipulated, then this obligation
for the conveyance of the land aforesaid shall be absolute.”

Who can fail to see that the object of Thomas Morris, in taking
this obligation from William Cotterell, was to obtain security for
his debt? And if so, the instrument is a mortgage, no matter
what shape it may have assumed.

*Chief Justice Buchanan, in Dougherty v. MeOolgan, 6 [472
Gill & Johns. 281, asserts this doctrine: “ Whenever the intention
is to take a security for a subsisting debt, or for money lent, and
to avoid or restrict the equity of redemption, chancery, seeking to
protect the debtor against the rapacity of the creditor, and to do
full and equal justice between the parties, will defeat such inten-
tion, by treating the transaction as a mortgage, and extending to
the debtor the benefit of the equity of redemption.”

See also Page v. Foster, 7 N. H. 394, wherein tho judge re-
marks: “If it was intended as a security, it is a mortgage.”

And so in Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 533, where Judge Story lays
down the rule: “If a transaction resolve itself into a security, what-
ever may be its form, and whatever name the parties may choose
to give it, it is in equity a mortgage. If it be not a security, then
it may be a conditional or an absolute sale.”

It is true that the agreement to convey the land is followed by
a seeming alternative, to be adopted by the obligor, at his option,
within two years: “Or I will pay to the said Thomas Morris $100
in two years,” etc. But the legal effect of this phraseology is to
create a defeasance, as much as if the words were, “on condition,”
or “provided, however,” etc. Chief Justice Shaw, in Nugent v.
Riley, 1 Met. 110.

Again, it is urged that this deed from William Cotterell to
Thomas Morris was not a mortgage, inasmuch as there was no
personal obligation given for any debt, from the former to the
latter. This the law does not require, “A mortgage is the con-
veyance of an estate by way of pledge for security of a debt, and
to become void on the payment of it.’ 3 Kent’s Com. 129. “It
is none the less a mortgage because there was no collateral per-
sonal security for the debt taken at the time.” Rice et al. v. Rice,
4 Pick. 349; Smith v. People’s Bank, 11 Shep. 195.

VOL, xXx—26 401

473 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Cotterell o. Long ot al.

If the claim of Morris to the $100 could have been enforced
473] either in personam or in rem, it would have been *a subsist-
ing debt between the parties, and the conveyance of land would
be construed a mortgage. See Judge Story’s opinion in 2 Sum-
ner, 584, already cited. But, as the same learned judge re-
marks elsewhere, “it is well known that courts of equity lean
against construing contracts of this sort to be conditional sales;
and, therefore, unless the transaction be clearly made out to be of
that nature, it is always construed to be a mortgage.” So Lord
Hardwicke laid down the doctrine in Longuet v. Scawen, 1 Ves.
406, and it has never been departed from. The onus probandi,
then, is on the defendants to establish it to be a conditional sale,

The assignees of Thomas Morris have given us no such proof.
Nay, the very assignment of Morris to Moses Long contains no
slight evidence that the assignor, himself an astute lawyer, was
fully conscious that, although his contract for a conveyance had,
by its terms, become absolute, an equity of redemption still sub-
sisted in the heirs of William Cotterell. It makes a show of war-
ranting a title to Long, his heirs and assigns, but winds up with
this pregnant reservation: “with the exception therein mentioned.’

What nced of alluding to the stipulation that the paymént of
a $100, if made within two years, would relieve the land, the time
having elapsed, if the parties regarded the transaction as a condi-
tional sale?

On the whole, we are unanimously of the opinion, without ref-
erence to the depositions, that the contract executed by William
Cotterell to Thomas Morris, on April 7, 1829, was intended by the
parties as security for the payment of a debt, and consequently,
‘in equity, must be regarded as a mortgage. The decree of the court
of common pleas of Clermont county is erroneous and will be re-
versed.

The cause will be remanded to that court, with directions to take
an account of the money due, by reason of the original debt of
$100, and interest, and to charge said land therewith as upon a
mortgage.

402

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 474, 475
MeGuiffey v. Finley et al.

*Auexanper H. MoGurvey v. ALExanpern Finzey anp [474
Awn ELuen Finuty, ais wire; Susan Connery anp Hpwarp
CoNNERY, HER HUSBAND.

In a suit in equity to foreclose by an assignee of a mortgage, if the assign
ment has been absolute, transferring the entire interest of the mortgagee,
it is not indisponsably necessary that the mortgagee should be a party,
although this court believes the better practice to be in all such cases to
make him a party. :

Tuis is a bill in chancery reserved in Hamilton county.

The bill in this case shows that Alexander Finley and his wife,
on February 1, a. . 1850, mortgaged to Nathan L. Rice certain
real estate in Cincinnati, which is particularly described, té secure
the payment of a certain promissory note of that date, for the sum.
of $575, made by the said Alexander Finley, and indorsed by Ann
Ellen Finley, and payable four months after date to the said Na-
than L. Rice or order. That, on June 27, 1850, the said note and
mortgage were, by the-said Nathan DL. Rice, assigned and trans-
ferred to the complainant, whereby all the right and title of said
‘Rice in and to said note and mortgage, and the money thereby se-
cured, became vested in complainant.

The assignment was made on the mortgage, and both the mort-
gage and assignment are referred to and made part of the bill.

It is then stated in substance, that the money not being paid ac-
cording to the terms of the note and mortgage, the estate had be-
come absolute at Jaw, etc. The complainant then states that he is
informed that Susan Connery and her husband, Edward Connery,
claim some interest in the land, and prays that Alexander Finley
and Ann Ellen Finley, his wife, Susan Connery and Edward Con-
nery, her husband, may be made defendants. The prayer of the
bill is as usual in cases for the foreclosure of a mortgage.

*A copy of the mortgage is attached to the bill, andthe [475
original is before the court as an exhibit, with the note attached.

Subpena was issued for all the defendants named in the bill, but
they are in default for answer.

The assignment indorsed on the mortgage is as follows:
“For value received, I hereby assign and transfer to Alexander
403

AT6 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McGuifey v. Finley ot al.

HH. McGuffy all my interest in and under the within mortgage, and
tho note therein described.

«N. L, Riz.
“« June 27, 1851.”

Rice is not a party to the bill.

McGurrey & Honcomnn, for complainant:

Is a mortgagee, who has assigned his whole interest in the debt
and mortgage unconditionally, but not by deed, a necessary party
on a bill to foreclose filed by the assignee?

It would seem from the language of the authorities, that this
question is sottled. Story’s Equity Pleadings, secs. 153,199, This
doctrine, it is true, is stated where he is treating of the proper
parties as plaintiffs to a bill to foreclose; but the principle is the
same. .

So in Calvort on Partios, marginal page, 185: “If an assign-
ment of all tho interest of the mortgagee has been made and the
mortgagor filed a bill against the assignee to redeem, or the as-
signee against the mortgagor to foreclose, the mortgagee need not
be brought before the court.” Whitney v. McKinney, 7 Johns. Ch.
144; Hobart v. Abbott, 2 P. Wms. 642; Johnston v. Hart, 3 Johns.
822; Williams v. Sawell, 4 Ves. 389; Miller v. Bauer, 3 Paige, 168;
Hosford v. Nivhols, 1 Paige, 220; Anderson v. Walls, 6 B. Mon.
542; Shaw v. Hoadley, 8 Blackf. 165; Newman v. Chapman, 2
Rand.

Bat it is insisted that the mortgagee should be made a party,
because he holds the legal title, after conditions broken, and does
476] *not pass all his interest by a written assignment on the mort-
gage, unless such assignmont is a regular deed of conveyance.

There is some confusion in the authorities in respect to the con-
dition in which the mortgagee stands after condition broken. The
weight of opinion is in favor of the doctrine that he may pass his
whole interest without an instrument under seal. 11 Ohio, 341;
Lessee of Phelps v. Butler, 2 Ohio, 224; Lessee of Hill v. West, 8
Ohio, 443; 4 Kent’s Com. 194; Brace v. Harrington, 2 Atk. 235;
Brown v. Kirby, 10 Obio, 215.

Admitting that the legal title is in the mortgagee, after the as-
signment, that title is an airy phantom, and does not require the
“potent wand of a chancellor’s decree to dissipate it into nothing-
ness.

Tho question of legal title is in no way involved. We simply

404

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. ATT

McGuffoy v. Finley et al.

seek the payment of a debt, and we ask this payment of the mort~
gagor, not of the mortgagee. .
And if the ground assumed by defendant’s counsel be tena-
ble, it must follow that a debt evidenced by negotiable paper can not
be assigned, except by deed, if it happened to be secured by mortgage t
The point raised in this case has been decided by Judges
Spalding and Avery, on the circuit, in the case of Hill v. Welsh,
Pickaway Supreme Court, November Term, 1850; 8 Western Law

Journal, 371.
No argument came to the hands of the reporter, for defendants.

Hrroncoox, 0. J. It will be scen by the statement of the case,
that Nathan L. Rice, the original mortgagee, is not a party in this
case, cither as complainant or defendant; but the exhibits show
that there was.an absolute and unconditional transfer of the note
and mortgage by Rico, for a valuable consideration, to the com-
plainant, and the sole question raised, is, whether, under the cir-
cumstances of the case, the complainant *is entitled to ade- [477
cree; in other words, whether the assignee of the original mortgagee
can enforce the mortgage against the: property mortgaged without.
having his assignor before the court.

According to the earlier practice of this court, it is believed to
have been absolutely necessary, in such case, that the mortgagee
should be made a party ; and the same rule was applied in all cases
where an assignee came into court to enforce a contract, made and
entered into between his assignor anda third person. We believe
that this rule is founded in good sense; and that it should never
have been departed from. The gonoral rule is, that all parties in-
terested in the subject matter of litigation in a chancery proceed-
ing, should be before the court.

It may be said that a mortgagee, having made an absolute and
unconditional assignment, has no interest. The fact, however, that
such an assignment has been made, may be material to be ascer-
tained by proof, as the assignment can not prove itself. Upon the
existence of this fact, the question, whether the assignee has any
title, must depend ; and it is contrary to our usual notions of logal
propriety, that evidence should be introduced to prove that one
who was once interested in a contract or mortgage, has parted
with that interest, when he is not before the court to contest, if he

thinks proper, the proof so offered. Bat, although such is believed
405

ATS SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

McGuffey ». Finley ot al.

to have been formerly the uniform practice of this court, yet, within
these lattor days, the rule has been, in some instances, departed
from, and bills in chancery have been sustained at the suit of the
assignee of a mortgage, or other contract, without having the as-
signor before the court. In adopting this practice, wo have fol-
lowed the courts of other states in the Union, and perhaps the
courts in England.

In Whitney v. McKinney, 7 Jobns. Ch. 144, Kent, Chancellor,
says, “I do not apprehend it to be necessary, in all cases of a bill
to foreclose, by the assignee of a mortgage, that the mortgagee
should be made a party dofendant.” Again, on page 147: “ But
478] where the assignment is absolute, and the *assignee parts
with all his interest in the mortgage, and there is nothing spécial
and peculiar in the case, the assignee is under no necessity to make
the mortgagee a party to a bill to foreclose.” To sustain the text,
the chancellor cites 7 Ves. 287; 4 Ves. 389. . .

In Miller v. Bear, 3 Paige, 466, Chancellor Walworth says:
“There are many cases where an assignee of a chose in action, or
of an interest in property, is now permitted to sue, without bring-
ing the assignor before the votrt, where the latter was formerly held
a necessary party. Where the assignee has the equitable interest
in himself, so that nothing remains to be done by the assignor,
who has parted with his entire interest in the property, both at
Jaw and in equity, I sce no benefit which can result to any person
by making him a party.”

In Story’s Hquity Pleadings, sec. 153, it is said: “ The true prin-
ciple would seem to be, that in all cases where the assignment is
absolute and unconditional, leaving no equitable interest whatever
in the assignor, and the extent and validity of the assignment is
not doubted or denied, and there is no remaining liability in the as-
signor to be affected by the decree, it is not necessary to make the
Jatter a party.”

But it is unnecessary to cite further authorities. All the cases
referred to by complainant's counsel, go to sustain the principle to
a greater or less extent. We yield to these authorities; but still
we believe the old practice to be the best, and, as before stated, re-
gret that it should bave been departed from.

The complainant is entitled to a decree for a sale of the mort-
gaged premises, having first ascertained the amount due upon the
note secured by the mortgage. (1)

(1) For decisions in relation to mortgages, see Wileox’s Dig. ; and for other
406

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 479, 480

Blizzard, Adw’r, ete. v. Filler, Adm’r, et al.

*Witiram BuizzaRD, ADMINISTRATOR DE BONIS Non or Hazen [479
Cuary, prceasep, v. Winutam OC. Finumr, ADMINISTRATOR
or Henry Karns, prcgasmp, Tuomas Foster, ALFRED
CHAPMAN, AND SrupHun D. Karns.

At common law, no action could be sustained by an administrator de bonis
non against the representatives of a deceased administrator, or the sure-
ties in his official bond.

Section 26 of the act ‘of 1840, to provide for the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons, does not, in this particular, change the common law.

Such suit can not be maintained upon general chancery principles.

‘Turs is a bill in chancery reserved in Muskingum county. .

The bill was filed upon leave granted by the court, (1) and al-
leges the death of Hazol Clary, the proof of a verbal will, the ap-
pointment of Henry Karns as his administrator, with the will
annexed; that defendants Foster, Chapman, and Karns became
his sureties in the administration bond; that large sums came
into the hands of Henry Karns, as administrator of Clary, which
he failed properly to administer; that he died hopelessly insolv-
ent, and that defendant Filler administered upon Karns’ estate;
and complainant was appointed administrator de bonis non of
Clary. Prayer for an account, and for goneral relicf.

Process is served upon all the defendants. Filler alone an-
swors, and his answer is replied to. The other defendants do not
plead, answer, or demur; S. D. Karns appears on one occasion,
and moves for a continuance. The other defendants attend at the
taking of depositions, *

The only opinion sought from the Supreme Court is, whether a
court of equity has jurisdiction of the case. '

*C. B. Gopparp, for complainant: [480

The bill was evidently filed upon the supposition that section
26 of the act of 1840 (Swan’s Stat. 343, 344) applied to the case.

decisions, 17 Ohio, 264, 366, 371, 482; 18 Ohio, 36, 273, 428; 19 Ohio, 212;
1 West. Law Journal, 207, 398; 2 West. Law Journal, 70, 325; 7 Ib. 581; 8
Tb. 266, 371, 472, 536. See also 18 Ohio, 567.

(1) Seesection 184 of the act of March 23, 1840, to provide for the settlement
of the estates of deceased porsons.

407

481 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Blizzard, Adm’r, ete. v. Filler, Adm’r, et al.

If it do not, I claim jurisdiction upon general principles: 1. This
suit being necessary to avoid circnity of action, to marshal the as-
sets, and to subrogate the sureties in the bond to complainant’s
rights, against the estate of Henry Karns. 2. No objection was
taken to the jurisdiction by defendants by demurrer, but they
have proceeded to take testimony. See 9 Watts, 479, 485, 495.
O. W. Suarez and N. A. Guriix submitted the case without ar- -

gument,

Ranyzy, J. The single question presented for the considera-
tion of the court in this case is, can an administrator de bonis non,
appointed upon the death of the first administrator, bring a suit
upon bis official bond, upon an allegation that money came into
his hands for which he failed to account? Karns was the admin-
istrator of Clary, and befcre he had settled the estate, died. Bliz-
zard was then appointed administrator de bonis non on the estate
of Clary, and Filler administrator on the estate of Karns. The
other defendants were Karns’ sureties. It is alleged that Karns
failed properly to administer the estate, converted a part of the
assets, and died hopelessly insolvent.

Without the aid of legislative provision, it is undeniably clear
that no right of action arises in favor of the administrator de
bonis non, cither against the representatives of the deceased ad-
ministrator or the sureties in his official bond. The reason of this
is found in the fact that he represents only the decedont, and is
authorized to administer upon such of his goods only as have not
been previously converted by some other representative (1) of
the estate. To no other can he be made liable.

481] “But it is claimed that such legislation does exist, and we
are referred to section 26 of tho administration law (Swan’s Stat.
348, 344), as authorizing this bill. By that section it is enacted,
that “an administrator appointed in place of an executor or ad-
ministrator, who has resigned, been removed, or whose letters have
been revoked, shall be entitled to the possession of all the personal
effects and assets of the estate unadministered,and may maintain a
suit against the former executor or administrator and bis sureties
on the administration bond, for the sume, and for all damages
arising from the maladministration or omissions of the former

(2) 7 Ohio, 270.

408

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 482

Blizzard, Adm’, ete. v. Filler, Adm’, et al.

exccutor or administrator, in the manner prescribed in the seventh
part of this act.”

By section 189 of the same law, it is provided that a suit in
chancery, “instead of a proceeding at law,” may be instituted
by any person interested in an estate upon the executor’s or ad-
ministrator’s bond. Karns did not resign, nor was he removed, or
his lettors of administration revoked. This case is not, therefore,
within the terms of the act referred to; and unless this court are
authorized to add to the section, this case can not be brought
within its provisions. The three sections of the law proceding the
one cited, provide in what cases the administrator may be re-
moved, and for what his letters may be revoked, as well as for the
appointment of an administrator de bonis non, in the event of his
death ; but the case of death is manifestly, designedly, left out of
the section allowing the socond administrator to sue upon the
bond of the first. This leaves the matter in that case as it stood.
at common law, and there it is well settled that he could not
maintain an action. If it is desirable that cases like this should
be brought within such a remedy, the power is with the gencral
assembly, but without legislation can not be applied by this court.
We ave referred to the cases of the Commonwealth v. Strobecker,
Drenkle v. Shannon, and Weld v. McClure, all in 9 Watts, 479,
485, 495, as sustaining the positions of the complainant's counsel.
The first of these was the case of a dismissed administrator, and
was decided upon a statute of the *State of Pennsylvania, [482
very similar to our own. The genoral doctrine is explicitly rec
ognized by the judge delivering the opinion, that without such
legislation the proceeding could not be maintained.

The case of Drenkle v. Shannon was also decided upon section
81 of a law of that state, passed in 1834, which provided that
“administrators de bonis non, with or without a will anhexed, shall
have power to demand and recover from their predecessors in the
administration, or their legal representatives,” etc. This section
differs from our statute in extending to al/ administrators de bonis
non, and expressly provides for proceedings against the legal rep-
resentatives of a, deceased administrator. The judge says: “Tho
object of this section was to change the common law in respect to
the matters therein provided for ;” and further, he says: “Hvery
one acquainted with the law as it stood before the passage of the
act, must be sensible of the embarrassment that arose with
409

483 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Tho Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Oo. v. The City of Zanesville.

creditors, legatees, and distributees of the deceased persons, in re-
lation to having the respective claims adjusted and paid, from the
circumstance of their being compelled to look to various sources
and different persons, in some instances, for that purpose.” Here
again the common-law rule is acknowledged, and the decision
placed upon a statute with which we have none to correspond.
The case of Weld v. McClure was the case of a dismissed ad-
ministrator. Sergeant., J., in delivering the opinion, says: “Tho
ineapacity under which an administrator de bonis non labored
previous to the act of February 24, 1834 (tho one referred to in
tho last case), to recover the assets in the hands of the representa-
tives of a prior executor or administrator who had died, arose
from the want of title to the property of the decedent not remain-
ing in specie. That reason does not apply in the case of a dis-
missed executor or administrator, because section 3 of the act of
April 4, 1797, expressly gives to the successor the administration
of the unadministered part of the estate, and directs that the dis-
483] missed party “surrender up the residue of the estate.” Our
law is the same, in effect, as this law of 1797, but we have no pro-
vision corresponding to the act of 1834. Without it we have the
authority of this case for saying that it would be governed by the
common law, and no action could be maintained. The fact that
no objection to the jurisdiction is taken, can bave no weight in
this case. We do not decide it upon the ground that the remedy
is at law, but upon the ground that no remedy in favor of the
present plaintiff exists either at law or in chancery. The Dilk
must be dismissed.

Tan ZAnesvitie Canan any Manuracturine Company v. Toe
Crry or ZaNEsVILLE.

A gift to a charitable use is to receive the most liberal construction.

The McIntire fand, given to establish “a school in the town of Zanesville,
for the poor children in said town,” is not limited in its benefits to the
children of parents residing in that locality which constituted the town
corporate of Zanesville, at the decease of the testator.

The charity will be administered for the benefit of poor children in the town

of Zanesville, according to the most general and popular sonse of the

term.

410

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 484

The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The City of Zanesville.

Tus is a bill in chancery reserved from Muskingum county.

The case stands upon bill and answer. The facts are undis-
puted. :

John McIntire, by his last will, dated March 18, 1815, directs
that his estate be sold and invested in the stock of the Zanesville
Canal and Manufacturing Company; “and the president and di-
rectors of said company are, annually, forever to appropriate all
the profits, rents, and issues of my stock as aforesaid, and all my
estate, of whatever kind the same may be, for the use and support
of a poor-school which they are to *establish in the town of [484
Zanesville for the use of the poor children in said town. The children
who are to be the objects of this institution are to be fixed upon
by the president and directors of said company.”

This will was proved August 4, 1815.

Jobn McIntire and Jonathan Zane were the original proprietors
of the town of Zanesville, which was laid out upon the section
granted by Congress to Ebenezer Zane. See Swan’s Land Laws,
147. The section included land on each side of the river Mus-
kingum and on each side of Licking creck.

The town plat was exclusively confined to the east side of the
Muskingum. Twenty lots were, however, subsequently laid out
on the west side, and north of Licking, forming what is commonly
called West’ Zanesville; and additions were made to the town, on
the east side, by McIntire and others, upon Congress land adjoin-
ing the section.

An act to incorporate the town of Zanesville was passed Jan-
uary 21,1814. Section 1 of that act reads as follows:

“All that part of the town of Zanesville, in the county of
Muskingum, included in the original plat thereof, and now on
record in the county of Muskingum, together with all tho addi-
tional lots since added thereto, on the east side of the river Mus-
Kingum, and now on record in the county of Muskingum, be and
the same is hereby erected into a town corporate, and shall hence-
forth be known and distinguished by the name of the ‘Borough
of Zanesville ;’ subject, however, to such alterations and regulations
ag the legislature may from time to time think proper to make.”

The limits of the town have since been enlarged by successive
legislative enactments, all subsequent to Mr. McIntire’s death ; and,
March 19, 1850, a city charter was granted, and the limits much
enlarged. 48 Laws of Ohio, 473.

4u1

485, 486 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

The Zanesville Canal and Munufacturing Co. o. The City of Zanesville,

After the date of his will, April 21, 1815, Mr. McIntire laid out
485] an addition to the town, and caused tho plat to be *recorded,
His exccutors laid out another subsequent to his death. .

The directors of this company, who are mado the trustees by
Mr. McIntire’s will, pray the aid of this court in executing the
trust. There are poor children living beyond the bounds of the
town, as incorporated at the time of Mr. McIntire’s death, whom
they would “fix upon as objects of this institution,” if the law
will permit them to do it.

At the session of the general assembly next after the death of
the testator, the corporate powers of tho Zanesville Canal and
Manufacturing Company, conferred by the original act of incor-
poration of February 21, 1812 (10 Ohio Stat. 173), were enlarged
by a now act of incorporation, entitled “an act to incorporate the
stockholders of the Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Com-
pany,” passed February 24, 1816. 14 Stat. 298. This act author-
izes the corporation to act as trustce under the will of McIntire.

At tho date of the will and at the time of the death of the testa-
tor, Zanosville was an incorporated town, with boundaries defined
by its charter. There were certain lots, called additions to the
town, not included within its corporate limits, These, with tho
facts stated in argument and in the opinion of the court, are all
that aro material.

C. B. Goppana, for complainants, referred to the following au-
thorities :

Kent v. Burnett, 10 Ohio, 392; Regina v. Cottle, 3 Bng. L. &
Eq, 474; Regina v. Fisher, 8 0. & P. 614 (34 B. OC. L. 550); Mallan
v. May, 18 Mee. & Welsby, 510; also 518, in note.

Cmanuts C. Convenss, for city of Zanesville:

I claim that the true construction of the will brings within
tho rango of selection by the trustees of the charity, the poor
486] *children of Zancsville as it now exists, and may hereafter

extend itself; and that this bequost to purposes of general charity
is not to be restricted to the territory that was included within the
narrow limits of the corporation of Zanesville, as defined at the
time of the death of the testator.

1. The language of the will itself, in the clause creating the
charity, speaks that intent. The bequest is for the benefit of the
poor children of the town of Zanesville generally, not only as the
town chanced then to be, but as it might be in all future time.

412

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 487

‘The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The City of Zanesville.

The original charter of the town, in force at the date of the will,
was “subject to such alterations and regulations as the legislature
might think proper from time to time to make.” The testator
must, therefore, be taken to have contemplated the exercise of this
power at some future day, by way of an enlargement of the lim-
its. There are no restrictive words in the bequest, binding down
the gift to the particular blocks or squares at that time embraced
within the corporate limits of the town. The terms of the will
are comprehensive and general. This bequest is not one that ex-
hausts itself at once in persons particularly designated. The be-
quest is to the trustees, who are ascertained and certain—the ben-
eficiaries are not designated—only a class, from which they are at
a future time to be taken. The selection is lodged in the trustees.
The only restriction is, that the beneficiaries shall be taken from
among “the poor children in the town of Zanesville.” If at the time
of selection, those “ fixed upon ” as subjects of tho testator’s bounty,
are “poor children of Zanesville,” the restriction is satisfied.

In the interpretation of charitable bequests, greater liberality
of construction obtains than in cases of ordinary legacies. The
construction that gives the limits of Zanesville as they are, or may
be, as the limit of the range of this charity, is more reasonable
than that which fixes as such limit unalterably the boundaries of
Zanesville as it chanced to be at the date of the will or testator’s
death. .

2, If we look to the condition of things at the time of the ox-
ecution of the will, and to the relation in which the testator
*stood to Zanesville, it is very clear that any such restric. [487
tion as limits this charity to a part only of what now constitutes
or may at any time hereafter constitute Zanesville, is repugnant
to the general intent of tho testator.

Parol evidence is admissible, to show the condition of things at
the time of the execution of the will, and the relation of the tes-
tator to the town of Zanesville. (1) Boys v. Williams, 2 Russ. &
Mylne, 689; 8. ©., 13 Eng. Cond. Ch. 232, 235; Tucker v. The
Seamen’s Aid Society et al., 7 Met. 205; 1 Jarman on Wills, 358,

(1) See Hildebrand o. Fogle, 20 Ohio, 147. In Wigram on Extrinsic Evi-
dence, in aid of the interpretation of wills, seven propositions are maintained
as the results of principle and authority, and as illustrating the classes of cases-
in which extrinsic evidence-may be received, It is said that “every claimant
under a will has a right to require that a court of construction shall, by means.

413

488 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The City of Zanesville.

363; Gresley’s Eq. Ev. 282, 283; Wigram on Ambiguities in Wills
and the Admissibility of Parol Evidence, 2 ed. 75.

The lots in Zanesville were owned in common by Zane and Mc-
Intire, and partition was not made until after the death of McIn-
tire. McIntire owned other lands adjoining “ Zano’s Grant,” near
to and adjoining Zanesville, which was laid out on said “grant.”
The testator evidently contemplated that the town would expand
itself beyond the limits which served its municipal purposes prior
to his death. He and others laid out additions after the making
of his will. The fund which is to support this charity is yet to be
inereased by the provisions of the will, out of the proceeds of the
testator’s real estate.

In view of all the facts, the construction claimed is the natural
and obvious one. The liberal spirit in which the bequest was
made, calls for the like liberal spirit in its administration. I in-
voke that construction of the will, which will widen, not narrow,
the channel in which this munificent charity shall flow forever.

488] ‘*Spatpina, J. The petitioners invoke the aid of this
court in giving a construction to the will of John McIntire,
wherein a munificent bequest was made for the establishment of a
school in the town of Zanesville, “for the use of the poor children
in said town.”

The single question raised and discussed is, whether the funds
placed under the control of the president and directors of tho
Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Company, for the support of
such school, are so to be administered as to confine the benefit of
thom exclusively to poor children residing in the district which
constituted the town of Zanesville, at the decease of the testator,

It is a rule in equity, that a gift of real or personal estate,
either inter vivos, or by will, to promote education, is a charity. It
is also considered as a settled rule, that such a gift to a charitable

‘use is to receive a most liberal construction. It is not like penal
enactments and contracts made in restraint of some general right,
both of which are to be construed with the utmost strictness.

If an act of the general assembly, passed in 1815, inflicted a

‘of extrinsic evidence, place itself in the situation of the testator, the meaning
of whose language it is called upon to declare.” The authorities are referred.
to in notes. Seo 2 Now Library of Law and Equity, 96; and see Broom’s
Legal Maxims, 300; 2 Just. 11.

414

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 489

The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The ctty Zanesville.

penalty upon any person who should vend spirituous liquors
within the town of Zanesville, its operation would be restricted to
such offenses as might be committed within the corporate limits
as they existed at that date. Such is the spirit of our decision
made at this term, in Robert Hall v. The State of Ohio. So, where
the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from carrying on the
profession of a surgeon-dentist in “Great Russell street,” London,
Mallan v. May, 18 Meeson & Welsby, 511. The defendant bad
pound himself not to practice in “ London.” The city of London
is an ancient city and county of itself, with well-defined limits—
and “Great Russell street” is not within such city limits. The
court said: “ Words were to be construed according to their strict
and primary acceptation, unless from the context of the instru-
ment, and the intention of the parties to be collected from it, they
*appear to be used in a different sense, London in its [489
proper sense as the city of London, was intended, and not London
in its popular or colloquial sense.”

The difficulty that exists in the application of the bounty of
Jobn McIntire, has arisen from the fact that when he made his
will, and at the time of his decease, Zanesville had been erected
into a town-corporate, with certain well-defined boundaries, which
have been subsequently, from time to time, extended, until finally
it bas attained a city charter, covering a greatly increased terri-
tory and population. If there had been no act of incorporation
whatever, and the people living upon “Zane’s Grant” had con-
inued to call their place of residence by that good old Saxon name,
“a town,” the trustees of this charity would have had no trouble
in designating its beneficiaries, . . . fora town isa town
still, whether it “consist of twenty houses or of twenty thousand.”

So says the philologist, (Webster’s Dict. Unabridged), and so says
the jurist (8 Carrington & Payne, 612), Pattison, Judge: “I do
not see how I can say that ‘town’ is to have two different mean-
ings. Itis very difficult to define what is a town in ordinary mean-
ing. It varies from day to day; by the erection of new houses.”
We think the increase in population, and the consequent extension
in territorial limits of Zanesville, furnishes no sufficient reason for
restricting the application of the McIntire school fund to the “blocks
and lots” laid out and incorporated at the time of the testator’s de-
cease, if he did not thus limit his benevolence. by the precise lan-
415

490 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The City of Zanesville.

guage of his bequest. That he did not use words requiring at our
hands such a restricted application, we are well persuaded.

Tho testator has directed in his will, that the rents, issues, and
profits of his estate be appropriated by his trustees to the use and
support of a school “which they are to establish in the town of
Zanesville, for the use of the poor children in said town.” The ad-
vovates of strict construction claim that Mr. McIntire intended to
confine the selection of the objects of his bounty to the corpora-

* 490] tion of Zanesville as it existed in 1815, *Has he said so in
his will? So far from it, he has omitted to use the name given to
that corporation by the act creating it, which was passed January
21, 1814, to wit, the “Borough of Zanesville,” and has used the
words “town of Zanesville,” as we think in their old, popular, and.
colloquial sense, which would designate the cluster of log cabins
first erected on the village-plat of John McIntire and Jonathan
Zane, as well as the wide-spread city with its teeming population.

If wo travel out of the will, however, and take a survey of the
position that the testator occupied in respect to the inhabitants of
Zanesville, at the time he conceived the generous purpose of ma-
king this bequest, every doubt, it seems to us, must be put at rest.
This the law permits us to do. Yea, further—*it is obviously es-
sential,” says a learned elementary writer, “that the judicial ex-
positor should place himself as fully as possible in the situation of
the person whose language he has to interpret; and, guided by the
light thus thrown on the testamentary scheme, he may find him-
self justified in departing from a strict construction of tho testa-
tor’s language, without allowing conjectural interpretation to usurp
the place of judicial exposition.” 1 Jarman on Wills, 363.

“At an early day,” says the counsel, “John McIntire, the tes-
tator, and Jonathan Zane, being the owners, as tenants in common,
of the section of land known as ‘ Zano’s Grant,’ on tho Muskingum
river, laid out, on a portion of said section, the town of Zanesville.
Some time afterward they made partition, allotting to each in sev-
eralty, all the section oxcept that part of it embraced within their
plat of Zanesville. No partition of the lots in said town was made
until after the death of McIntire, when it was effected upon the ap-
plication of Zane. McIntire also owned other lands adjoining
“Zane’s Grant,’ near to, and some of them adjoining the town of
Zanesville. He directed, by his will, his executors to sell, so soon
after his death as they might think proper, all his real estate, except

416

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 491, 492

‘The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The City of Zanesville.

that part of it lying within ‘Zane’s Grant,’ which last should be
sold after the death of his wife. He directed that the proceeds of
*such sales should be invested in a particular manner; and, [491
upon the happening of the contingencies mentioned in the will, the
rents, issues, and profits of all his estate were to bo appropriated
to the support of bis charity.”

Zanesville was then in its infancy. It was but beginning to
grow ; and it could not but have been contemplated by its original
founder and proprietor, that it would, in provess of time, expand
itself greatly beyond the limits which, at that early day, served
its municipal purposes. In fact, the bill shows that after the date
of his will, to wit, on April 21, 1815, Mr. McIntire laid out an
addition to the town, and caused the plat to be recorded. His
executors laid out another addition upon lands appropriated to this
charity, subsequent to his death, but in pursuance of a plan formed.
by the testator himself,

It further appears from the Dill, that as early as 1809, Mr.
McIntire laid out»lots numbered one to twenty, inclusive, on the
west side of the Muskingum River, calling them “ additional lots
annexed to the town of Zanesville ;” a plat of which was recorded
prior to the passage of the act of incorporation of the date of Jan-
uary 21, 1814,

It seems that nono of these last-mentioned additions to the town
of Zanesville, laid out by Mr, McIntire, and by his executor, are
within the corporate limits of the “ Borough of Zanesville,” as it
existed at the death of the testator; and, of consequence, if the
rule of strict construction prevails, the children of citizens living
in those precincts, although never so poor, must be debarred the
privilege of attending the school. We do not thus interpret the
will of John McIntire. His object was to create a perpetual fund,
the magnitude of which would be commensurate with the growth
of the place and the wants of the people, to supply the means of
education—not to the rich—not to those in modorate circumstances
—but to the poor children in the town of Zanesville. A noble be-
quest! But could a heart capable of such disinterested philan-
thropy, circumscribe, by mathematical lines, in the same town, the
*objects of its bounty? More especially would the testator be [492
supposed incapable of doing this in a growing manufacturing dis-
trict, where the very class of people he is seeking by his bounty
to elevate, are, by the pressure of circumstances, constantly forced

VOL, XX—27 AlT

! Wo Ha3|
+ {BT 579)

493 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Collins et al. v. Hope et al.

back from the center to the circumference ; where, and where only,
their poverty will allow them to live.

Wo advise that the trustees of this charity be not restricted in
the solection of the “ poor children ” who are to be admitted into
their school, by any arbitrary lines, whether of town corporate,
borough, or city; but that the fund be administered according to
the dictates of that enlarged philanthropy which we may suppose
actuated its founder in making the bequest. In this spirit let the
almoners of John McIntire’s bounty select the beneficiaries indis-
eriminately, from Zanesville, according to the popular acceptation
of the term—not Zanesville on the east of the Muskingum—not
Zanesville on the west—not Zanesville as it was—not Zanesville
as it is; but Zanesville as it may be found whenever the grateful
duty is to be performed.

Joun Contins Er aL. v. Tuomas Hope Er a.

“Wills are to be construed from the written language of the instrument, not by
evidence aliunde,

Parol evidence may be received for the purpose of eounteracting fraud in the
devisee, and in some peculiar cases to attach a trust to the estate devised.
But, in such cases, courts will act with the extremest caution.

Turs is a bill in chancery reserved in the county of Ross.

The facts in the case, as the same are disclosed by the pleadings
and evidence, are as follows:

On December 3, 1831, Nathan Reeves, then a resident of Chilli-
498] cothe, made his last will and testament, and died a few *days
after its execution. The will is short, and gives the whole property
to the wife of the testator in the words following:

“Tt is my will and desire that, after my decease, all my estate,
of every description, real and personal, be held and pussessed by
my beloved wife, Nancy Reeves, to her and her heirs and assigns
forever, to be disposed of in such manner as she may judge best.
My meaning herein is, that the residue of my estate, after pay-
ment of all debts due by me at the time of my decease, shall be-
long to my said wife, her heirs and assigns forever.”

418 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 494

Collins et al. v. Hope et al.

This will was duly admitted to probate by the court of common
pleas of Ross county, on Decembor 14, 1831.

Nancy Reeves, the widow and general devisee, survived her
husband until October 31, 1841, when she died, leaving a will,
dated August 3, 1835, by which she devised all that then remained
of the property devised to her by her husband, to their daughter
Oynthia Wells, to the childron of Cynthia, and to the children of
their son, James Reeves, deceased.

This will was duly admitted to probate, and remains uncon-
tested.

The complainants are certain of the testator’s grandchildren
being the children of Eliza D. Collins, a daughter of the testator
by his said wife Nancy, for whom no provision was made in the
will of Nancy. ;

They claim that their grandfather, Nathan Reeves, in Novem-
ber, 1831, was desirous of making his will so as to divide his prop-
erty equally among his children, but in such a way as to prevent
his son-in-law, James Wells, and his son, Samuel T. Reeves, who
were men of dissipated habits, from controlling their portions of
said estate; that he gave instructions to his attorney, Thomas
Scott, to prepare a draft of the will accordingly; that during the
proparation of the will the testator became very feeble, and a few
days prior to his death, Mr. Scott was again sent for ; that, fearing
the will could not be prepared before his death, Nancy, his wife,
well knowing his wishes and intentions, proposed that he should
devise all the *property to her, with the understanding that [494
sho would convey the property as he desired it should go; that,
yielding to this assurance, ho made the will in favor of Nancy,
and, shortly thereafter, died. They insist that Nancy Reeves,
under and by virtue of the will of Nathan Reeves, took the estate
in trust, to be equally divided, at her death, among the four
children of the said Nathan, and they ask that one-fourth part
theroof be decreed to them in right of their mother Eliza D.
Collins, deceased.

In support of the claim set up by complainants in their bill, but
two material witnesses are introduced.

Thomas Scott testifies, that, during the last sickness of Nathan
Reoves, and about six or cight weeks previous to his death, he
was sent for to the house of said Reeves, in order to write his last
will; that Mr. Reeves explained to him, in the presence of Mrs,
419

495 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Collins et al. 0. Hope et al.

‘Nancy Reeves, and as witness thinks, in presence of David Col-
lins, the manner in which be intended and desired to dispose of
his estate; that, although there bad been some inequality in tho
advancements already made, his desire was that the residue of his
estate should be equally divided between his children, but that ho
wished his will so prepared that Mr. Wells, hia son-in-law, and
his son Samuel, should not have the control of the portions that
would otherwise fall into their hands. Witness suggested that a
trustee would be necessary to protect that part of the property
intended for the benofit of the families of his son Samuel and his
son-in-law Wells; and Mr. Reeves roplied that he would try and
select one. Mrs. Reeves was to have a life estate in the property.
The preparation of the will was postponed to some future day;
Mr. Reeves observing that he would send for witness when he
was ready to proceed.

A-short time previous to the death of Mr. Reeves, witness was
again sent for to prepare his will. He appeared so feeble, and
conversed with so much difficulty, that witness was fearful the
will could not be prepared, in accordance with previous instruc-
tions, before he would be incapable of executing it. Witness

. 495] *thon observed to Mr. Reeves, that his wife, Mrs. Reeves,
knew the disposition he desired to make of his property ; to which
he replied in the affirmative, she being present and assenting
thereto.

Witness then asked Mr. Reeves “whether he bad such con-
fidence in his wife that, if he devised it to her, she would dispose
of it in such manner as he had before indicated?” His answer
‘was, that he had. He consented that the will might be so drawn,
transferring the property to her, and it was so drawn and exe-
cuted, .

Some few days aftor the death of the testator, and after probate
of his will, witness called on Mrs. Recves, and urged upon her tho
propriety of executing an instrument, disposing of the property
in the manner in which her husband had desired it to be done;
and she promised to execute such instrument,

David Collins, who was the executor of Nathan Reeves, and is
the father of complainants, testifies that a few days before the
death of his father-in-law he was sent for, and the messenger
stated that Mrs, Reeves wished to see him previous to his seeing
“the old man.”

420

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 496

Collins et al. v. Hope et al. .

He called on her first, and was told by her that her husband
wished witness to get some person to write his will; that he had
spoken to Judge Scott to draw it some time before, and wished
witness to go and bring him down, as the doctor said his recovery
was doubtful. She also stated that “the old man” wished his
property to be equally divided among all his children, but that
she thought he was too weak to go into details in making a divi-
sion, and wished witness to use his influence with her husband to
induce him to will all his property to her, and she would im-
mediately make a will carrying out his wishes,

Witness went after Judge Scott, and in his presence Mr. Reeves
stated that his wife wished him to devise all the property to her
for her life, and then she would divide it among all the children,
as he intended to do. Judge Scott suggested that *he had [496
better have his wife present, and see if she was willing to do as
he wished. :

Mrs. Reeves came, and in presence of witness and Judge Scott,.
promised that if her husband would will it to her, so that sho |
could have the use and control of the property during her life, she
would then divide it equally among his heirs. -She farther prom-
ised that she would, soon after his death, make her will; and Mr:
Reeves requested Judge Scott to draw it for her, as he knew his
wishes respecting Wells and his son Samuel. Judge Scott then
wrote the will.

Wittram T. McOtintiox, T. Ewine, and H. H. Hunrns, for
complainants:

The principles on which the case resis—Assuming the truth of
the testimony on the part of complainants, the equitable prin-
ciples on which the case depends are comprehensively and ac-
eurately stated in the well-considered opinion of Chancellor Bland,
in Colgate D. Owing’s case. Bland’s Ch. 370. The chancellor
says: “If a person, before his death, communicate his intention
to make or alter his will, and give a legacy or portion of his prop-
erty to a certain individual or individuals, and the heir or any one
else interferes, and prevents the making or alteration of a will by a
promise td pay the amount of the proposed legacy, to transfer the
property, or to give something else in lieu of it to the individual or in-
dividuals thus intended to be benofited, the promise so made is bind-
ing, and being made on consideration of a loss to the individual,
who may therefore enforce the specific performance of it in a

421

A9T SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Collins et al. v. Hope et al.

court of equity.” Hoveden on Frauds; and 1 Story’s Eq., sec.
526.

It by no means conflicts with the well-known rule, that parol
tostimony is inadmissible to vary, control, contradict, or explain
a written will. It depends on proof extrinsic of the will, and
perfectly consistent with it.

It belongs to a peculiar class of trusts (a class which may be
497] *said to belong to the great family of trusts which exist by
operation of law)—trusts which owe their validity, not to the will
or the declaration of the testator, but to the fraud of the devisce.
‘In such case the trust arises ex maleficio, and therefore equity turns
the holder of the legal titlo into a trustee. We refer to the following
English cases, illustrating this doctrine. Thynn v. Thynn, 1
Vern. 295; Devemill v. Bains, Prec. in Ch. 3; Oldham v. Little-
field, 2 Vorn. 506; Drakeford v. Wilks, 3 Atk. 539; Barrow v.
Greenough, 3 Ves. Jy. 151; Chamberlain v. Ager, 2 Vez. &
Beames, 259; Strickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves. Jy. 638; Mestaer v.
Gillespie, 11 Vez. Jr. 688; Hugonin v. Beasly, 14 Vez. Jr. 290;
Beach v. Kennigate, Ambler, 47; Wicket v. Baby, 3 Brown’s Parl.
Cases, 16, cited in 10 Yerg., 273, and 2 Story’s Hq. 16; Marriott
v. Marriott, 1 Stranger, 666; Podmore v. Gunning, 5 Simons, 485;
7 Eng. Ch, 505; Podmore v. Gunning, 7 Simons, 644; 10 Eng. Ch.
241. We also refer to following American cases: Richardson v.
Adams, 10 Yerg. 273; Colgate D. Owing’s case, Bland’s Ch. 307;
Brown v. Brown, 1 H. & J. 430; McKee v. Jones, 3 Barr’s Penn. St.
497; McKee v. Jones, 6 Ib. 428; Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts, 163,
214; Gaullaher v. Gaullaher, 5 Watts, 200; Fay v. Fay, 2 Hay. 131.

In Ohio, as in North Carolina, we have no provision in the
statute of frauds, nor any statute, requiring express trusts to be
evidenced by writing, in relation to lands 6r porsonalty. (1)

(1) As to trusts which “result from the established doctrines of equity,
. without any declaration by the parties,” and which may be “set up upon
parol evidence,” see Walkers Am. Law, 314, soc. 841 and note, Stedle v.
‘Worthington, 2 Ohio, 182, 264; Woods v. Dille, 11 Ohio, 455; 1 Ohio, 314;
‘Flemming v. Donahoe, 5 Ohio, 255; Stiver v. Stiver, 8 Ohio, 217; Miami Ex.
Co. Bank U.8., Wright 8. U. 249; Watson v. Le Row, 6 Barb. 8. 0. 481;
Rathbun ». Rathbun, Ib. 98; Morton v. Southgate, 28 Me. (15 Shep.) 41;
Lommond ». Peoples, 6 Ired, Eq. 187; Mahomer v. Harrison, 18 8. & M. 53;
Smith v, Sackett, 6 Gilman, 534,
422,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 498, 499

Collins et al. v. Hope et al.

Huyry Sransexy and Joun L. Green, for defendants, very
fally reviewed the evidence in the case, and the *authorities [498
cited, and insisted that the authorities did not, upon the facts,
support the complainants’ claim to relief; and they insisted that
all the English cases relate to trusts as to personalty. Two of
the American cases relate to lands, but they fasten the trust, not
on the testator’s estate; they do not in any particular change the
will of the testator; but they raise a trust on the devisee, in refer-
ence to property of his own.

In all the cases, the controlling fact is present, of the prevention
of a bequest or testamentary act in favor of the plaintiff, by the
interference of the alleged trustee, and upon the faith of the parol
promise. No such case as the one at bar has ever, yet been sus-
.tained; for here it is claimed an entire will, embracing all the
estate of the testator—realty as well as’ personalty—is, in effect, to
be set aside upon a parol declaration of a very equivocal character;
and that, too, after the death of the supposed trustee, after the
lapse of many years, and against the denial of defendants in their
answer.

The ground upon which such trusts are sot up is simply that of
fraud, practiced by the party on whom the trust is to be fastened;
and nothing short of that can ever be held sufficient. If that ele-
ment is not present, no matter how clear may be the proof of the
testator’s intontion, no matter how distinct and repeated may be
his declarations, they can not be admitted to control the written
will, or to make it speak any othor language than the written
language. 1 Story’s Hq. 256; Hill on Trustees, 60; 1 Jarman on
Wills, 349.

The general doctrine, as to the inadmissibility of parol evidence
to contradict or impeach the provisions of a will, has been often
recognized in Ohio, Painter v. Painter, 18 Ohio, 263. In regard
to the proof now offered, there is a graver objection to it than this
common rule of evidence; for here the proof conflicts with a
written will—with a document, which to have any efficacy at all,
must be written. The law of Ohio scarcely tolerates parol ovi-
dence of a testamentary intent, or disposition, even where there
is no written will with which it comes into conflict. The case of
@ nuncupative will is the *only one in which it is allowed. [499
In the case at bar, there is a written will, and the evidence to con-
tradict it has rested in parol for a greater number of years than
the number of days allowed in a nuncupative will! After so great

. 423

500 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Collins et al. v. Hope et al.

a lapse of time, the clearest case of fraud should be made out to
allow parol proof to overcome a written will. The written will
was not procured by the wife, nor did she prevent any intended
will. In making the devise, the testator trusted to the discretion
of his wife.

To create a trust there must be fraud, A knowledge of the
testator’s intentions, and a refusal to carry them out, is not fraud.
Fraud is not established by proof of the declared intentions of
the testator, and the promise to fulfill them by his wife—not fraud
in that senso of the term which will justify the introduction of"

_ parol proof to change, much less to contradict, a written instru-
ment. There must be fraud in procuring the will, as by the false
reading of it, the falso suggestion, or concealment of material
facts, ete.

MoCurnziox, Ewine & Hunrer, in reply,

The objections urged against complainant’s claim are:

1. That a trust in reference to real estate can not be shown by
parol. The English and American cases establish the contrary.

2, That the parol proof is inadmissible by reason of oar statute
of wills, which requires wills to bo in writing. We answer, the
complainants do not seek to disturb the will, bat in a manner
claim under it. This same objection has been made and over-
ruled in England, Maryland, Tennessce, and Pennsylvania, and
yet in those states, as in Ohio, wills are required to be in writing.

3. That there is no proof of fraud on the part of Mrs. Reeves.
The proof settles that. Her refusal to perform a prior promise,
relates back to the inception of the transaction, and taints it
with fraud in the eye of the law, as in Podmore v. Gunning, cited
above.

500] *Finally, the lapse of time is set up. Complainants could
not know that Mrs. Reeves would refase to execute her promise,
until she died, and the bill was filed within four years after the pro-
‘bate of her will. A portion of the complainants had, until re-
cently, been minors, and one was a minor when the bill was filed.

Spazpine, J. If ever a will was made in so plain, direct, and
simple language as to be “its own best interpreter,” it would seem
to me, that the last will and testament of Nathan Reeves is such
an instrument.

In the first paragraph, the testator gives all his estate, real and

42d.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 501

Collins et al. v. Hope ot al.

personal, to his wife Nancy, and “to her heirs and assigns for-
ever.” ’ This is a devise in fee, It was claimed that a life estate
was intended, and that the devisee was to dispose of the remainder
according to the well-known and expressed wishes of the testator.

The next following sentence is an ample refutation of any such
claim: “To be disposed of in such manner as she may judge best.”
And as if to make “assurance doubly sure,”” the tostator then pro-
ceeds to reiterate his devise in foe simple. “ My meaning herein is,
that the residue of my estate, after payment of all debts due by
me at the timo of my decease, shall belong to my said wife, her heirs
and assigns forever.” It is not seriously contended by counsel for
complainants, that parol ovidence can be introduced in this case
for the purpose of contradicting, adding to, or explaining the will
of Nathan Reeves.

That.“ the judgment of a court in expounding a will should be
simply declaratory of what is in the instrament,” seems to be con-
ceded. Otherwise, as has often been remarked with great porti-
neney, courts would permit the witness to make the will instead
of the testator. Parol evidence is admissible, however, for the pur-
pose of counteracting fraud, as “to show that one paper was ob-
truded on the testator for another, which he intended to execute.”
8 Durn. & Bast, 147.

*So “if a father devises to the youngest son, who prom- [501
ises that if the estate is devised to him, he will pay £10,000 to the
eldest son. Equity would compel the formor to discover whether
that passed in parol; and if he acknowledged it, even praying
the benefit of the statute, he would be a trastce to the value of
£10,000.” And it is said to be clear, that in such a case, if the
trust were denied by the heir or devisce, it might be proved aliunde.
1 Jarman on Wills, 357, Butin all such cases courts will movo with
the utmost caution.

If parol evidence of the avtual intention of a testator is inad-
smissiblo for the purpose of controlling or influencing the construc-
tion of the written will, when the attempt is made directly to over-
turn its provisions, how extremely guarded should courts of jus-
tice be, when the same end is sought to be attained, through an in-
direct and covert attack, by means of tho same instrumentality.

Th the case at bar, the parol testimony introduced by the com-
plainants, falls far short of satisfying this court that the testator

425

502 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Collins et al. v. Hope et al.

intended that his wife should take, by his will, anything short of
an absolute estate in the premises devised.

The principal witness, who was the draughtsman of the will—him-
self a profound lawyer—does not venture to say that any alteration
was made in the will of Nathan Reeves at the instance of his wife,
who was made his only devisee. On the contrary, Judge Scott
says exprossly, that he himself suggested to the testator the pro-
priety of devising the whole property to his wife, “if he had con-
fidence in her that she would dispose of it in such manner as ho
had before indicated.” In this he is contradicted by Mr. Collins,
who evidently is not an unbiased witness, and his testimony will
receive no further comment. The testator declared he had that
confidence in his wife; and the will was executed accordingly,
Mrs. Reeves declared that she understood her husband’s wishes in
that respect, and would act accordingly. Has she done so? No
mortal can tell. The will was executed some six weeks after the
conversation between Judge Scott and Nathan Reeves, touching
502] an equal distribution *of the property among the children.
‘We do not know how often he changed his mind after that, nor
what new rule of distribution he may have imparted to his wife,
She said, in the presence and hearing of the witness, that she fully
understood her husband’s wishes in regard to the property. As
sho was the mother of the children of whom he was the father, it
is by no means surprising that he placed his whole property within
her unlimited control. ‘She had the same interest with himself in
making provision for tho wants of their children. She had the
same parental feelings to gratify, in contributing to their comfort
and happiness’ She bas dealt out to these children, from the abun-
dance left her by her husband, most profusely; perhaps not in
exactly equal proportions, but of this she was made the judge, by
the express language of the will. .

We can see nothing in the conduct of this devisee, eithor before
or after the decease of the testator, that can be tortured into a
fraud upon the rights of the complainants. She did not, as we be-
lieve, solicit her husband to alter his intended bequests to his chil-
dren; and consequently, his absolute devise to her can not be bur-
dened with a trust created by proof aliunde.

The bill will stand dismissed, with costs.

426

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 503, 504

Glass et al. v. Greathouse.

*Davip Guass Er Au, v. Isaac anp Tuomas GreatHouss. [508

In a case in chancery where there are two defendants, and the bill is dismissed
as to one and a decree against the other, an appeal by the latter does not
vacate the decree as to the former; more especially where there is not
that necessary connection between the defendants but that the rights of
one can be determined without affecting the rights of the other.

In such case, if the complainants are not satisfied with the decree dismissing
the Dill as to one of the defendants, it is incumbent on them to appeal.
An appeal by the other defendant against whom a decree is rendered,
does not appeal the case as to the defendant as to whom the decree dis-
misses the bill, nor is such latter defendant a party on appeal in the court
above, so that his right may be passed upon.

If an administrator purchase land at his own public sale, he will be held to
have purchased in trust for the heirs, and upon being refunded the amount
by him paid, will be decreed to convey to the heirs. If he has sold the
land to a third person, he (the vendor) will be held to account to the heixs
for its value at the time of its original purchase or otherwise, as the case
may be, with interest, first deducting the amount by him paid.

Such is the rule, whether the administrator purchase directly or through
another person for his benetit.

Br in chancery, reserved in Highland county.

The complainants are the heirs at law and legal representatives
of Robert Glass, late of Highland county, deceased. It is stated
in the bill that said Robert Glass died in 1828, leaving personal
property, and also seized of 220 acres of land in Highland county,
which is particularly described in the bill, and which is the prin-
cipal subject of controversy in this case. At the time of his death
he left a widow, who is still surviving. It is further stated, that
at the July term of the court of common ploas of Highland county,
1828, lotters of administration were granted to tho defendant,
Isaac Greathouse, who accepted the trust, and at the April term
of the same court, 1831, filed a settlement account with the court,
showing that there then appeared in his hands $350.66, to be dis-

‘tributed among the widow and heirs. It is charged that this bal-
ance has never been accounted for, and the defendant, Isaac, is
now called upon to account for it.

*It is farther charged, that at the same term of the court, [504
to wit, the April term, 1831, one Jonathan Allison, of the State of

427

505 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Glass et al. v. Greathouse.

Virginia, commenced a suit at law against Greathouse, as admin-
istrator, for the recovery of a certain debt against the estate, which
‘pretended debt was known by the said administrator to have been
paid, and that the administrator collusively procured: said suit to
, be commenced against him, with design to defraud the estate, and
that at the October term of the court, 1832, although he knew
there was a good defense in the case, suffered judgment to be
rendered against him for the sum of $279, with costs.

It is further stated, that at the April term of the same court,
1833, Greathouse presented a petition, praying for an order to sell
the real estate before named, to satisfy said judgment, falsely rep-
resenting that the aforesaid balance of $350.66, in his hands at the
time of the settlement aforesaid, had been principally distributed
to the widow and heirs, and that nothing remained in his hands
to discharge the payment except tho sum of $60.87. Such pro-
ceedings were had, that at the October term of the court, 1833, an
order of sale was made, said real estate having beon previously
appraised at $450, exclusive of or subject to the widow’s dower.
The first order was that the land should be sold for cash in hand
at not less than two-thirds-of the appraised valuo. At the March
term, 1834, the administrator roported that he had twice offered
the land for salo, and that it remained unsold, for want of bidders.
The court then ordered the land to be sold at not Jess than $260. At
the June term of the court, 1834, the administrator again reported
that the land had been offered, and not sold for want of bidders.
Another order was then mado by the court, that the land should
be sold for not less than one-half the appraised value. In pur-
suance of this latter order, the land was again offered for sale’ at
public auction, and struck off to Lewis Lewis, who bid for the
505] same $235, which *was the highest and best bid, and more
than one-half the appraised value. This sale was on August 2,
1834. The sale was confirmed at the October term of the court of

* the same year; and on the 17th day of October, after the confir-
mation, Isaac Greathouse, as administrator, conveyed the land to
Lewis, and Lewis on the next day, to wit, on the 18th day of Oc-
tober, reconveyed the same land to Greathouse, whereby the title
became vested in him.

It is further charged in the bill, that from the inception of the
proceedings on the petition to sell land, down to the time of actual
sale, the conduct of the said administrator was fraudulent through-

428

DECEMBER TERM, 1851 506-

Glass et al. v, Greathouse,

out. That by fraudulent means he procured the order of sale;
that by like fraudulent means he procured the land to be appraised:
muuch below its real value; that by fraudulent means he provented
the salo, until the order was made that it should be sold at not less
than one-half the appraised value; and that by fraud and collusion
with Lewis, he caused the land to be struck off to Lewis, whilo in
fact Lewis was acting for him, and bid in the land as his agent.
As evidence of this last charge, it is stated that the amount bid
for the land, and inserted as a consideration of the decd from
Greathouse to Lewis, was $225, and tho consideration of the deed
from Lewis to Greathouse, was $226.

It is further charged, that on January 30, 1844, Isaac Greathouse
by deed duly executed, the consideration of which, as expressed,
was “natural love and affection and fifty dollars in money,” con-
veyed the same land to the defendant, Thomas Greathouse ; and
that at the time of the conveyance, Thomas Greathouse had full
knowledge of the rights of the complainants, and of the truth of .
the charges made against his father.

It is further stated, that at the time of the death of their ances-
tor the complainants were infants, and that some of them had ar-
rived at full age but a few years before the filing of the bill.

The prayer of the bill is, that the defendants may be considered
*as holding the land in trust for the complainants, and that [506-
the defendant Thomas be decreed to convey the same to them;
that the two defendants account for the rents and profits; and that
the defendant Isaac account for the moneys in his hands, as appears
by his settlement with the court in 1831; and for general relief.

The bill was filed at the March term of the court of common
pleas of Highland county, a. p. 1848.

In his answer, Isaac Greathouse admits the death of Robert
Glass, and that he was appointed his administrator. He admits
there was personal property, and states the whole amount of assets
which came into his hands. He admits the settlement with the
court in March, 1831, at which time there appeared to be in his
hands $350.66 ; but insists that, previous to that time, he had paid _
to the widow and guardian of the heirs of Glass, from the assets
in his hands, considerable sums of money, which were not stated in
the account, by the advice of his counsel ; and that, in truth, thera
“was but about sixty dollars, belonging to the estate, in his hands:

429

507 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Glass et al. v. Greathouse.

at the time of the commencement of the suit by Allison, and which
he paid over to Allison after the rendition of the judgment.

He admits the commencoment of the suit by Allison, but denies
that it was done by collusion; denies that he knew or was in-
formed that the claim had been paid, or that he knew of any other
defense in the case than the defense which was actually mado;
alloges that in this whole transaction he acted with the utmost
good faith.

Ho admits the filing of a petition for the sale of the land, and
that the same was sold as alleged in the bill, but denies that, when
sold, Lewis purchased for him or by his procurement; and allegos
that, after the sale, he purchased of Lewis in good faith, paying
him one dollar additional price as a compensation for his trouble.

He admits the conveyance to his son Thomas, and that the con-
sideration was love and natural affection and fifty dollars. This
507] fifty dollars he says was actually paid to him by hisson. *He
denies, all and singular, the numerous frauds charged against him _
in the bill.

Thomas Greathouse, in his answer, denies that, at the time of
his purchase or before, he had any knowledge of the claims of the
complainants, or of any improper conduct of his father and grantor,
relative to the estate, and insists that he is a dona ide purchaser
for a valuable consideration, without notice. _

In the court of common pleas, there was a decree against Isaac
Greathouse, and the bill was dismissed as to Thomas. Both the
complainants and the defendant, Isaac Groathouse, gave notice of
appeal. The appeal was perfected by Isaac, he giving bond ac-
cording to law.

_ The conclusions arrived at from the evidence are stated in the
opinion of the court.

D. Scorr, for complainant:

The claim of Allison against the estate of Robert Glass, and the
judgment procured thereupon against Greathouse, as administra-
tor, were fraudulent. Greathouse knew of Allison’s claim. How?
Was it regularly authenticated and received by him, or was it re-
jected? If the first, Greathouse should have paid it before dis-
tribution or settlement, and, failing to do so, he made the suit
brought by Allison his own. 7 Ohio, 21, pt.1. If the last, Allison
had his right of action against him, which he should have pros-
ecuted within the legal limits, and before the settlement of the

430

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 508

Glass et al. v. Greathouse.

administrator; otherwise his action would seem to be against the
heirs or distributees. 2 Ohio, 156. The failure of the administra-
tor to give notice of the claim to the heirs of Glass is a badge of
fraud. Allison recovered judgment in October, 1832, and in April
following, assumed the duties of an administrator of Glass. I say
assumed, for, under the statute (Chase, 1311, sec. 18), he was not
authorized to petition as administrator to sell land to pay debts,
after having made his final settlement with the court.

In the spring of 1831, he volunteered to become a defendant
**to Allison’s suit, for no one had then a right of action [508
against him, except for the balance then in his hands, as found on
his previous final settlement, and that not in his character of ad-
ministrator of Glass. 6 Ohio, 21; 2 Ohio, 156.

Though Greathouse was exccuting a usurped trust, he will be
held toa faithful discharge of it. His trust was not fairly exe-
cuted. He omitted to give notice to the heirs of Glass, of the
claim, of his petition to sell, or of the fact that their land was to
be sold; and this he was bound, in good faith, todo. They lived
in Virginia, and should have been notified by letter or actual notice.
1 Story’s Eq., sec. 218. The evidence shows that Lewis purchased.
the land sold by Greathouse as administrator, merely as the agent
of Greathouse, and for him. A purchase by the trustee of the
particular property of which he has the sale, “per interpositam
personam,” carries fraud on its face. 4 How. 552; Davono v. Fan-
ning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252; 8 Ohio, 216, 552; 10 Ohio, 117; 9 Ohio,
57; 12 Ohio, 351; 5 Pick. 519; 15 Pick. 24; 5 Mot. 462; 4 Binn. 7;
7 Bary, 48; 11 Conn, 343; Cox, 26; 3 Har. 74; 5 Har. & Johns.
147; 1 Hawks, 479; 2 Blackf. 377; Pook, 443; 1 Gilman, 615; 3
Maule & Selw. 574; 2 Story’s Jur., sec. 12, 58.

* The sale was absolutely void. (1) The administrator, Greathouse,
acquired no property in the land by the conveyance from Lewis.
He therefore could convey none to his son, who, according to the
evidence, had notice that Lewis bought for the administrator.
“An abuse of a trust can confer no rights on the party abusing it,
nor on those who claim in privity with him.”(2) 2 Story’s Hq., sec.
12, 58; 3 Maule & Selw. 574; 2 How. 401. The remody of com-

(1) See 6 West. Law Journal, 565; Bohart v. Atkinson, 14 Ohio, 228; Arm-
strong v. Hueston, 8 Ohio, 552.

(2) See 4 West. Law Journal, 298, Archer v, Hudson, and note. Also 384,
Davies v. Lowery, 15 Ohio, 655. °

431

509, 510 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Glass ot al. v. Greathouse.

plainants is not impaired by lapse of time. 4 How. 561; 6 Wheat.
481; 10 Ves. 467; 1 Cox, 149; 10 Pot. 177.
509] *N. Barner and J. H. Taomrson, for defendants:

The first question to be determined, is this: Is the whole cause
appealed up, and before the court? By the deerce pronounced in
the court of common pleas, the defendant, Thomas Greathouse,
was dismissed, and out of court. The other defondant, Isaac
Greathouse, afterward appealed from the decree against him.
Now, as Thomas Greathouse was out of court, can any act of his
co-defendant bring him again before the court? An appeal
operates precisely as a continuance. So does a new trial. Sup-

“pose a case to be tried against two defendants, and a decree or
judgment is rendered against one, and the other is dismissed or
acquitted, and the one against whom the decree or judgment is
rendered, applics for and obtains a new trial, does that bring the
party who was dismissed or acquitted before the court on the
second trial? Surely not.

This is 2 proceeding in personam, and not in rem; and, therefore,
although the land in controversy would be held subject to the
same extent for any amount this court might decree against Isaac
Greathouse, not exceeding the sum fixed by the decreo in the court
below, nevertheless, as this lion is to the projudice of Thomas
Greathouse only, and he does not complain of it, who can?

There are two questions, and but two, in this case. The first, as
to the proceedings of Isaac Greathouse, as administrator, previous
40 the sale of the land to Lewis. The second, as to the fairness
and effect of the sale to Lewis.

It is alleged that Greathouse, by collusion with Jonathan Alli-
son, caused the judgment to be obtained against him as adminis-
trator. This allegation on the bill is not sustained by proof.

“The next question is, whother the sale was fairly and legally
made. Itis alloged that the salo to Lewis was not real, but was
in facta sale to the administrator through Lewis. Thero is no
proof going to establish the fact. For principles of law applicable
510] to this part of the case, we refer to 4 Ohio, 446, and 11 Obio,
193, particularly the latter. All the presumptions are in favor of
the legality of the proceedings, and an innocent purchaser can not
be injured or implicated, except whore actual notice is brought
home to him. The proof shows that Lewis was really and bona
Jide the purchaser ; but if the court take the otlier view of the sub-

432

DECEMBER TERM, 1851 BIL

Glass et al. v. Greathouse.

ject, still wo insist that can not affect ‘the land in the hands of
Thomas Greathouse. And what must be its effect on his fathor?
There was no statute forbidding him to buy at the sale, and the
judicial decisions relied upon were not then made. Why, then,
was the purdhase made through Lewis? Tor fraud? No. But
to enable the party to get @ conveyance; he could not convey to
himself.

What, then, are his liabilities, if he is to be considered in the
light of trustee? We answer, Nothing, if the sale was fairly made,
for a fair price, and the proceeds of the sale fairly applied; but if
it was not, then he would be liable for the difference between the
price obtained and a fair one. ,

If, however, the court are even satisfied that Lewis actually
bought for Greathouse, and that Thomas Greathouse knew that
fact when he bought of his father, we submit that, under the au-
thority of Wade v. Pettibone, 11 Ohio, 57, the complainants can
not recover. The complainants lived in Brooke county, Va., and
knew of the sale as early as January, 1835, if not earlier. This
suit was not brought until 1847. Glass died in 1828. Some of
the complainants were nearly forty years of age; and all of them
were of age previous to the commencement of this suit—tho
youngest being twenty-two years of age.

If the purchase in the first place was wrong, and Greathouse
held as trusteo, in 1847, the complainants could not assert their
claim, having had notice in 1835.

In the case in 11 Ohio, 59, the delay was twenty-five months—
here it is thirteen years.

By the authorities, the administrator shall not be permitted
to make any profit of the estate committed to his charge by
*purchase. It is not a settled, fixed, invariable rule in equity, [511
that all sales and purchases will be held void; “but that a court
of equity will look into transactions between persons in these
relative situations with extreme jealousy, and if it find the slightest
trace of undue influence used, or unfair advantage taken, will in-
terfere and give redress.” See Hill on Trustees, 160-170, 535, 538.
In a word, the purchase is voidablo, and not void. See 5 Pick.
519; Hill on Trustees, 535, 538; 10 Ohio, 117. And a court of
equity will set aside the sale, or order anothor sale of the premises,
as the propriety of each transaction demands, in view of the facts;
and the court have established three principles by which they
VoL, Xx—28 433

512 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Glass et al. v, Greathouse.

are governed: 1. Was there fraud in the purchase? 2, Would
the property have commanded a higher price at the time of the
sale? 3. Although the property might have commanded a higher
price at the time of the sale, and profit has been actually made by
the purchaser, yet subsequent acquiescence for a reasonable time
operates as a bar to any remedy. Welch v. Perkins, 8 Obio, 523
Dunlap v. Mitchell, 10 Ohio, 117; Wade v. Pettibone, 11 Ohio, 57.
The infancy of some of the defendants is no excuse for the long
acquiescende. Henry v. Conn, 12 Ohio, 194, 195; Scott’s Ex’rs v.
Barber's Heirs, 14 Ohio, 547. See Christmas v. Spink, 15 Ohio,
600, and also 716.

Hrrencocg, 0. J. The first question submitted to the court for
consideration is, whether Thomas Greathouse, one of the original
defendants, is before this court. As to him, the bill was dismissed
in the court below. From this decree the complainants gave
notice of appeal, but they never perfected that appeal. By
neglecting so to do, they lost all claim against him, unless the
appeal by the defendant, against whom a decree was rendered,
vacates the decree rendered in favor of his co-defendant.

I¢ seems to be supposed that section 6 of the act of March 12,
512] 1845, “to amend the act to direct the mode of *proceeding
in chancery ” (43 Ohio L. 125), may bave some influence upon this
subject. That section provides that “any party to a suit in chan-
cory may appeal his separate part of the suit; in which case, the
court from which the appeal is taken, shall direct the amount and
condition of the bond on appeal.” I do not suppose that this
section has any reference to-a case like the one now before the
court. That section was intended to provide for difficulties which
frequently arose in practice, as to how much of a caso was re-
moved by an appeal, where a part of those against whom a decree
was entered were satisfied and a part not. In such case the ques-
tion was often raised whether an appeal by one of the dissatisfied
parties vacated the decree, and removed the case as to those who
were satisfied. The court generally held, that where there was
that intimate connection between the parties, that the rights of
one could not be adjudicated without the adjudication of the
rights of the others, the appeal of one vacated the whole decree.
But in cases not so situated, the decree as against him alone who

434

DECEMBER TERM, 1861. 518

Glass et al. v. Greathouse.

appealed was vacated. This statute removes all doubt upon the
subject.

But in the case now before us, there was a decree against but
one of the two defendants, and he appealed. From what? Un-
questionably from the decree against himself, not from the decree
in favor of his co-defendant. There is no necessary connection
between these defendants, so that the right of one can not be de-
termined without deciding upon the rights of the other. We are
of opinion that Thomas Greathouse is not before this court.

The bill in this case charges fraud upon Isaac Greathouse in
every page, and almost every sentence, but whether any has in
fact been committed, must depend entirely upon the evidence, and
in truth there scems to be no difficulty as to any question of law.

There are numerous depositions, and without reciting the sub-
stance of them, I propose to state rather the conclusion to which
our minds are brought by their examination, than to recite the
language of the several witnesses.

*It is charged that there was fraud, upon the part of Great- [51s
house, in taking out letters of administration, and in his proceed-
ings down to the time of the settlement account filed with the courtin
1831; that there was fraud and cdllusion between him and Allison,
in the commencement of the suit by the latter in 1831, and in the
failure of the former to make defense to that suit, whon he knew
that the claim was without foundation, and might be successfully
defended against ; that there was fraud in Greathouse in not apply-
ing the $350.66, found in his hands at the settlement in 1831, to
the satisfaction of the judgment recovered by Allison; but, instead

. thereof, procuring an order of the court to make sale of the real
estate to make the payment; that thero was fraud in his conduct,
after the order of sale was made, in preventing the land from being
sold for its true value; and finally, that there was fraud in his em-
ploying Lewis to purchase the land for his own use.

The first point made is, that Greathouse conducted fraudulently
in procuring letters of administration, and in his proceedings in
the settlement of the estate down to the time of filing the account,
in 1831.

There is nothing in the evidence to show any improper conduct
on the part of Greathouse down to this time. It would seem that
his proceedings were in accordance with the laws and customs ‘of
the country. It is true that the widow states that after the death

435

5i4 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Glass et al. v. Greathouse.

of her husband she was about to sell the porsonal property which
was left by him and return to Viginia, from whence they had re-
cently removed. That Greathouse advised her that it would not

. be safe to sell the property without taking letters of administration.

* That she went with him to court, and tho court inquired of her
whother she was willing that he should be appointed administrator,
and she replied that she was. That she supposed that she was ap -
pointed administrator with him, and so continued, to believe for
some considerable length of time; and that when she ascertained
it was not so, she thought things were not going as they ought.
514] Now, this is *all the evidence thero is upon this point, and
this falls far short of proof of any misconduct on the part of
Greathouse.

The next charge is that there was collusion betweon Allison and
Greathouse; that the latter declined making defense in the suit of
the former against him, although he knew that a good and suc-
cessful defense could have been made. There is mach testimony

- as to the justice of this claim of Allison ; and taking the whole
into consideration, it is, perhaps, doubtful whether it was just or
not. But there is an entire lack of testimony to show that Great-
house knew of any defense that could be made. Instead of collu-
sion between him and Allison, the evidence is that there had been
no meeting, no correspondence between them until after the com-
mencement of the suit. It is complained of him that he did not
correspond with tho family, residing in Virginia, upon the subject.
Tho proof shows that onc of the guardians of the children was

" present at the time of the commencement of the suit, so that the
family wore not ignorant of its pendency, This suit was not dis-
posed of in that haste which might have been expected had there
een any collusion. It was commenced in April, 1831, and judg-
ment entered in October, 1832. The case was defended, as the
record (which is made an exhibit) shows, and at the October term,
1832, was submitted to the court on a plea of the general issue and
of plene administravit, and the court found that the defendant had
fully administered the assets that had come to his hands to be ad-
ministered, except the sum of $68.45. And a judgment was ren-
dered against the defendant for the sum of $279.64, to be levied of
assets that might subsequently come to his hands to be adminis-
tered.

436

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. . 515

Glass et al. v. Greathouse.

The charge of fraud, with respect to this judgment, is entirely
unsustained by the evidence.

The next charge is that the conduct of Greathouse was fraudu:
lent in not appropriating the $350.66, found in his hands at the set-
alement in 1831, to the payment of this judgment; but, instead
thereof, procuring an order for the sale of the real estate.

*Tbe sum of sixty-eight dollars forty-five cents, found by [515
the court in his hands, under the plea of plene administravit, was
so appropriated. But what became of the balance? The evidence
in the case shows. Previous to that settlement, it had been paid
over to the widow and guardian of these complainants, to supply
their necessities. It was thus paid over by the advice of counsel,
but was not: brought into the account, because not paid subse-
quent to an order of court. But it was allowed to the adminis-
trator on his plea of plene administravit. There can be no doubt
that this money went to the support of the widow and heirs, And
those heirs now ask this court, as a court of equity, again to charge
the administrator with this sum, because the payment made was
not strictly regular. We do not feel inclined to comply with this
request.

Another thing should be stated in this connection. At the very
time Allison commenced this suit, the guardian was prosent to re-
ecive the balance of this money, and it was only withheld in con-
sequence of the commencement of that suit. The charge of fraud
in this particular is not proved,

There is much testimony in the case relative to the value of the
land, and great effort is made to show that it was appraised at
Jess than its value, and that Greathouse himself prevented its be=
ing sold for its true value. But the evidence shows that the ap-
praisers were judicious and honest men; that the property was
repeatedly offered, openly and publicly, for sale, and not sold, for
want of bidders, There is not a particle of proof to show that
Greathouse interfered with the appraisers, or to prevent a sale. In
fact, down to the time of sale, we discover nothing in the conduct
of the defendant, in the whole case, inconsistent with the character
of an honest and an upright man.

But it is charged that when the sale was actually made, the pur-
chase was made for the use and benefit of the defendant. If so,
it was wrong, and although he may have acquired the legal title,
he could only take it in trust for the complainants, to be trans-

437

516, 517 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Glass et al. v. Greathouse.

erred to them when he should be refunded the amount which he
516] advanced as a consideration for the land, *in the payment
of the judgmont against the estate. His situation, as adminis-
trator, precluded him from the right to make the purchase.

It is positively denied, however, in the answer, that the pur-
chase by Lewis was made for him or his benefit. The decision of
this question must depend upon the proof. It is shown by the
evidence, that on October 17, 1834, he, as administrator, conveyed
the land to Lewis, the purchaser, for the consideration of $225 ;
and that on the very next day, Lewis, by deed of release or quit-
claim, conveyed the same to him for the consideration of $226.
This is a very suspicious circumstance, nor is the suspicion en-
tirely removed by the circumstance that these deeds were made,
months after the land was sold. It is further in proof that Lewis
‘was insolvent, and not in a situation to pay for the land. In ad-
dition to this, there is evidence'in the case, both of the declarations
of Lewis, who is now dead, made before the execution of the deed,
and of the defendant himself, which go strongly to sustain the
position that Lewis purchased for the defendant.

Taking all the circumstances, and the testimony in connection
therewith, we are satisfied that this sale, although ostensibly to
Lewis, was in fact to the defendant himself;-and that as against
him the complainants are entitled to relief, unless there is some-
thing further in the case to exonerate the defendant.

‘The defendant, in his answer, insists that long after the land
came into his hands he offered the complainants to give it up to
them, upon being repaid the amount which he had advanced
upon it; but of this there is no proof. On the contrary, John
Glass, one of the sons of Robert, testifies that in 1836 or 1837,
he offered, in bebalf of the heirs, to redeem the land, but that
the defendant would not permit it to be done. This witness,
although one of the heirs of Robert Glass, is not a party in this
ease. He, as he says, before the commencement of the suit, trans-
ferred his interest in the estate to the complainants, undoubtedly
to place himself in a position to be a witness. But his testimony
517] is sufficient to rebut an allegation in the answer, *which is
entirely unsustained, and which, even without this contradiction,
could have had no effect.

On tbe part of the defendant, it is claimed that here has been
an acquiescence on the part of the complainants for a great length

438 ’

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 51s

‘Wood v. Warden, Adm’s, eto. _

of time, and that is in fact a stale demand, which should not be
enforced in a court of equity. The land was sold in 1834, and at
that time most of the complainants were within age. The Dill
was filed in 1848—fourteen years after the sale. Hero was a lapse
‘of fourteen years after the sale. But whon it is considered that
some of the heirs did not arrive at full age until shortly before the
filing of the bill, here has not been that lapse of time which would
induce the court to withhold relief.

But a question arises as to the relief which shall be granted.
The land has been sold, and, for aught we know, to a bona fide
purchaser, without notice, and for a good and valuable considera-
tion. That purchaser who, from aught that appears, now holds
the legal title, is not before the court. Under these circumstances
no decree can be made for the land. But as tho complainants can
not have this relief, we think they are entitled to compensation ;
and in our opinion, the proper rule of compensation will be to
charge the defendant with the value of the Jand at the time of
sale, and credit him with the amount by him paid for it, and
which amount was appropriated in part satisfaction of a judgment
against the estate.

We take the appraisal as evidence of the value, believing that
appraisal to have been made by good and judicious men. Had the
defendant sold the land, as it then was, at an advanced price, he
might with propriety have been charged accordingly.

The land was appraised at $450; it was sold for $225. The dif.
ference is $225, for which, with interest from October 18, 1834, the
complainants may take a decree.’ The defendant will also be

* charged with the costs. Decree accordingly.

*Sauty Woop v. Rosmrr B. Warpen, Apminisrrator or [518
Exisna Woop.

“Where a post-nuptial agreement is made between husband and wife, by
which property is set apart for her separate use, the agreement, although
void in law, will be sustained in equity, unless the rights of creditors
interfere. :

A note executed by the husband to the wife, acknowledging the receipt of
$100 ot her hands, and promising to allow her six per cent. per annum

439

519 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Wood v. Warden, Adm’r, ete.

interest thereon during her life, and if she survives the maker of thé
note, to be paid her or her heirs evtra of her third, will be constraed
such an agreement.

It is not essentially necessary that the consideration of such note should
spring from the wife's property or earnings, to entitle her to come in as
a creditor against the estate of her deceased husband.

Tus is a bill in chancery, resorved in the county of Hamilton.

The complainant filed her bill in the commercial court of Cin-
cinnati, on October 27, 1848, setting forth that in the month of
August, A. D. 1847, hor husband, Elisha Wood, since deceased, re-
ceived in money, of her private property, the proceeds of her own
labor, which he, the said Elisha, had bofore that time specially ap-
propriated to her as her own, the sum of one hundred dollars;
and then and there made and delivered to the said Sally his
memorandum in writing to the effect following:

That he, the said Elisha, had received of the said Sally, his
wife, one hundred dollars, to be paid by him to her at six per
cent. interest, yearly, as long as she, the said Sally, should live,
and if the said Sally should survive him, then the amount named
in said memorandum, that is to say, the said sum of one hundred.
dollars, with interest, should be paid to said Sally beyond her
thirds, or the sums allowed to her by law, as the widow of said
Blisha : 7

That some time in the month of September, a. D. 1847, the
said Elisha Wood deceased, leaving the complainant, his widow,
surviving him, whereby she became entitled to claim, and doth
5419] *now claim, the said sum of one hundred dollars aforesaid
as her own property from the estate of her own husband.

That the decedent's estate is perfectly solvent, and that the ad-
miniatrator thereof hath, in his hands, assets that may be re-
duced to possession and converted into money, sufficient to dis-
charge all the claims against said estate, including the debt of said
complainant.

The prayer of the Dill is, that Robert B. Warden, as admin-
istrator on the estate of Elisha Wood, be decreed to pay com-
plainant the amount of said note and interest. The memorandum
in writing, referred to in said bill, is made an exhibit, and is of the
tenor following :

“Crnommati, Onso, August 16, 1847.
“Blisha Wood received of Sally Wood, his wife. $100. with in-
440

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 520.

‘Wood v. Warden, Adm’r, ete.””

terest at six per cent. yearly, as long as she lives, andif he dies
first, this note is to be paid her or her heirs extra of hor thirds.
«“Exisna Woop.”
The answer of the administrator, filed June 1, 1849, says that
he is advised and believes that the said note was given without
any proper consideration whatever, legal or equitable.
That it was obtained from the said Elisha Wood by undue in-
fluence and by threats, without any expectation on the part of said
deceased that the said Sally would live to claim the benefit thereof,
and was rather intended to pacify an unruly wife, than to make
provision for a dutiful one.
‘That there aro no assets in his hands belonging to said estate,
put there is real estate which may be subjected to the payment of
any decree that may be rendered herein against him as admin-
istrator.
The complainant offered in evidence the deposition of Louisa
Noel, who swears to the execution and delivery of the note, by
Elisha Wood to his wife Sally Wood, in her presence.
This witness says the note in question was given in lieu of a
former note of the same kind, said to have been lost. That this
note is about the same in meaning and in words with the
**one that was lost. Witness had seen the first note and heard [520
it read some two or three years previous to the signing of the last
one. Witness occupied rooms up-stairs, in the house in which.
Mr. and Mrs. Wood lived. Understood Mrs. Wood had earned
the money by washing.
Upon cross-examination, as well as in a second deposition taken.
by defendant, this witness says the money was loaned to Mr
Wood, to pay his assessment for opening Commerce street. The
note was given for the $100 thus loaned. The money was earned by
taking in washing and selling milk, by Mrs. Sally Wood and two
daughters of Elisha Wood by a formor wife. Mrs. Wood said the
money was earned by herself and these two children ; they worked
for her; they all worked together; does not know who collected
the money; heard her say that she bad the $100; does not know
the ages of the girls, nor how much work they did; heard Mr.
and Mrs. Wood both say that the money for which the note was
given was earned by Mrs. Wood after the marriage.
The defendant introduced the deposition of Henry Noel, who
441

521 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Wood o. Warden, Adm’s, ete.

states that he heard complainant say that she had gotten this note
from Mr. Wood for money that she had lent him. She further
said it was given for $100 ; that she and his daughters had earned
the money by washing and selling milk.

No other testimony was offered.

The commercial court made an order dismissing the bill, from
which complainant appeals.

Srorznz & Gwynne, for complainant:

Though the girls may have assisted somewhat in the work, the
wife had the money, and loaned it to her husband. It was recog-
nized by him as hers, and this note was given to insure the repay-
ment to her. Can his design be frustrated ?

521] *It is settled in Huber v. Hubex’s Adm’rs, 10 Ohio, 371,
that the complainant is ontitled to a recovery.

A post-nuptial contract between husband and wife, by which
property is set apart for her separate use, although void at law,
will be sustained in equity. Garlick v. Strong, 3 Paige, 440; Liles
v. Fleming, Dev. Hq, 185.

Even gifts between husband and wife, without the intervention
of trustees, have often been supported in equity. 3 Dessau. 158;
Lucas v. Lucas, 1 Atk. 270.

In Slanning ». Style, 3 P. Williams, 337, the testator permitted
his wife to make profit of his butter, eggs, etc., and borrowed £100
-—the proceeds thereof. The wife came in as a creditor against
her husband’s estate. That case is similar to the present.

A. N. Rippin, for respondent :

The money loaned was the property of Elisha Wood. He was
ontitled to the earnings of his wife and daughters by a former
marriage; and the same was exponded for the joint benefit of
both.

This case is unlike the case in 10 Ohio, 371. In that case, the
note given by John Huber to Hlizabeth Huber, was for money that
came to the wife from the proceeds of her dower estate, belonging
to a former husband, and the court decided that in equity, sho
might set it up against his administrator.

I claim, for the respondent, that the note given by Hlisha Wood
to his wifo, for earnings made during the marriage with him by
her, and his two daughters by a former wife, is void in law and
equity. Clancy on Rights of Married Women, 112.

442,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 522, 523
‘Wood v. Warden, Adm’r, eto.

Srazpine, J. It was decided by this court, in Huber v. Huber’s
Adm’'rs, 10 Ohio, 371, that where money comes to a wife, in right
of a former husband, and the second husband borrows it of her,
and gives her a note for it, the note is good; and after his death
she may set it up in equity against his administrators.

*No new rule of equity jurisprudence was established by [522
that decision. It was simply the application of sundry well-estab-
lished principles to a new and interesting state of facts. In cer-
tain cases the wife has always been treated as a creditor to her
husband's estate. She has been recognized in that character in
respoct to her paraphernalia ; as where “the husband, in his life-
time, being under the necessity of raising money, pledges her
jewels, etc,, and dics, leaving personal property more than suffi-
cient to pay his debts. Sho shall have the aid of his personal
estate to redeem her paraphernalia thus pledged.”

So, too, “where real estate is devised for the payment of debts,
and the executor takes the paraphernalia, on account of a defi-
ciency of assets in the personal funds, to pay the debts, she shall

. have the same right against the estate, so devised for the payment
of debts, to refund to her the real value of her paraphernalia, as a
creditor can have who has not paid his debt for the want of assets.”
Reeve on Domestic Relations, 38. These benefits result to her,
not by virtue of any agreement on the part of the husband, but
by mere operation of law.

In another class of cases, where wives have made savings out
of certain allowances, given to them by their husbands, for private
expenditure during cohabitation, the amount will be decreed to
them as against the representative of the husband; and this, too,
in the absence of any agreement made for such an allowance be-
fore coverture. Clancy’s Husband and Wife, 272, 276.

It was settled at an early period, in England, that where a hus-
band voluntarily allows his wife, after marriage, to make profit
of the produce of his farm, her savings should be her own, sub-
ject, after the death of her husband, to no claims but those of
ereditors.

In Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Williams, 337, which has been a lead-
ing case on the subject we are now discussing, the chancellor held,
that where the husband had borrowed £100 from *his wife, [523
which she bad saved during coverture, from the sale of pigs,
poultry, butter, etc., the same should be allowed to her, as a cred-

443

524 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘Wood v. Warden, Adm’r, ete,

itor, out of his assets, although it was objected that there was no
writing whatsoever, whereby to raise a separate property in
the feme covert. The lord chancellor declared, that “courts of
equity had notice of these separate interests in femes covert, by the
agreement of their husbands, That it was a reasonable encour- |
agement of a, wife’s frugality, and that such an agreement would
be of no’ avail, if it were determined by the death of the hus-
band.”

A more general rule, and one that has been too long and too
firmly settled to be easily shaken, is this: Where an agreement is
made between the husband and wife, after marriage, by which prop-
erty is set apart for her separate use, the agreement, although void
at law, will be sustained in equity, unless the rights of creditors
interfere. 3 Paige’s Ch. 452; 1 Devereaux’s Hq. 187; 3 Dessaus-
sure’s Hg. 158; 15 Vt. 537. .

Let an application of these principles be made to the facts in
the case at bar, and how stands it? The wife of defendant’s in-
testate, during the oxistence of coverture, collected the sum of
$100 from sales of milk and for labor in washing, performed for per-
sous out of the family by herself and hor two step-daughters. This
sum her husband borvowed in order to pay his taxes, and delivered
to her his agreement in writing, whereby, after acknowledging the
receipt of the money at her hands, he stipulated to allow her an
interest of six per cent. per annum as long as she lives; and agrees,
in case she survives him, that the note shall be paid to her or her
heirs, over and above her dower estate. What clearer appropria-
tion of this fund, for the sole and separate use of the wife, could
have been made by the husband? .

But it is insisted that the money, when it came into her hands,
524] was not the money of the wife; and herein the case *is
claimed to be unlike the one determined in 10 Ohio.

It is true that, in point of fact, the consideration of" the note, in
Huber v. Huber’s Adm’rs, was money that came to the wife
from her first husband’s estate. It came to the hands of Huber as
the money of his wife, and hence became his by force of law, as
much as if he had acquired it by his own industry.

That case, however, did not turn upon the fact that the wife was
the meritorious cause of the acquisition of the money; for that
circumstance alone would full far short of furnishing sufficient
cause to justify a court of equity in setting wp, as a valid charge

. 444,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 525

‘Wood v, Warden, Adm’, ete.

upon the estate of the husband, a claim of the wife for money lent
and advanced to him during coverture.

It was the ascertainment of the husband’s intention to set apart
and appropriate that amount of money for the exclusive benefit
of his wife that induced a court of vhancery to decree payment of
the note from assets in the hands of his administrators.

The judge who pronounced the opinion says: “A note from a
husband to his wife is a very unusual thing; and this very circum-
stance in this case is, in consequence of its uncommonness, a con-
vincing argument that he intended to withdraw the money, of
which it was the evidence, from his own control, and give it abso-
Iutely to his wife.” .

The note, or memorandum in writing, is of no other account in

settling the question in equity than to make manifest the agree-
ment of the parties, or, more properly speaking, to show the in-
tention of the husband to appropriate the fund to the use of his
wife. :
In the case cited from P. Wms., there was no note or agreement
in writing binding the husband or his representatives to repay,to
the wife the £100; yet, on proof made that the money was bor-
rowed from her savings, the chancellor decreed that she should
stand as a creditor of the husband’s estate to that extent. Nor
‘was the money borrowed in that case the “money of the [525
wife. It arose from the sale of the husband's poultry, etc., made
by her, with his consent, and with the understanding that the
avails of the traffic should inure to her sole benefit. Nevertheless,
the poultry, pigs, etc., were his, and the money realized from the
sale thereof was his, to a greater extent, if possible, than the avails
of the milk sold and of labor performed over the wash-tub could
be claimed to be the property of defendant’s intestate.

The single circumstance disclosed by the evidence, that the two
daughters of Blisha Wood by ‘a former marriage, helped their
step-mother to vend the milk and wash the clothes, can not bo
made to cut much of a figure in this case. At the outside, no
stronger claim can be set up for defendant, on this branch of the
caso, than that the money earned by the wife and daughters be-
Jonged to the husband and father. Let this be conceded as a legal
proposition, and still the complainant’s case is made out in equity,
if, as we find here, the same money was afterward set apart, and
appropriated by the husband to the exclusive use of the wife. If

445,

526 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Wood v. Warden, Adm’r, ete.

it could be determined that she had been the meritorious cause of
acquiring the fund originally, is would only add strength to an
equity sufficiently strong without it.

‘The claim set up in the answer, that the note was obtained from
the said Elisha Wood by undue influence and by threats, and was
rather intended to pacify an unruly wife, than to make provision
for a dutiful one, scems to rest entirely in the imagination of the
administrator, or his attorney. There is not a particle of testi-
mony to sustain it. On the contrary, the idea is repudiated by
the principal witness in the case, when interrogated by the de-
fondant’s counsel.

A majority of this court are of opinion that the equity of this
oase is manifestly with the complainant, and will order and decree
that the defendant pay the amount of the note mentioned in the
bill, with interest, to complainant, as also the costs of this suits
526] from assets in his hands to be administered; *and that the
same be made a charge upon the lands of the intestate until fully
paid. Decree for complainant.

Hrroncocr, C. J., dissenting. Not concurring in opinion with
the majority of the court in this case, but believing that the bill
should be dismissed, it is proper for me to state the reasons by
which I am influenced in coming to this conclusion. The ob-
ject of the bill is to enforce the collection, against the estate of
Elisha Wood, of’ a note for one hundred dollars, given by him to
his wife, the present complainant, about three months before his
death. It is admitted by complainant’s counsel, that this note can
not, at law, be collected, and therefore resort is had to chancery.
It appears from the case, that the personal assets of the estate have

* been exhausted ; and if this claim is sustained, the lands descended
must be sold to meet the payment.

Whether this claim can be sustained in chancery, must depend
upon the circumstances attending the transaction. It appears that
Sally Wood was the second wife of Elisha; that during their co-
habitation, children of his, by a former murriage, were living
with them, especially two daughters, who are named in the depo-
sition.

On August 16, 1847, the note in controversy was executed, and
in November following, the maker died. A witness who was pres-
ent at the execution of the note, understood from conversation be-

446

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

‘Wood v, Warden, Adm’s, ete.

tween Wood and wife, that there had been a previous note for the
like sum, which had been lost; and the witness states that while
they were conversing on the subject, Wood told his wife 4o draw
such a note as she liked, and he would sign it. This note was ac-
cordingly drawn and signed. .

In other conversation with the parties, and especially with the
complainant, witness learned that the consideration of this note was
as follows: Subsequent to the marriage, and during *the [527
cohabitation of the parties, the complainant had taken in washing,
which had been done by herself and the two daughters of Wood
by his former marriage, for which she received one hundred dol-
lars, which she loaned to her husband. To one witness she stated.
that a part of the consideration was milk sold, for which money
had been received; that the washing was done by one of the
daughters, the ironing by herself, and that another daughter dis-
tributed the milk. These were the daughters of Wood, the step-
daughters of the complainant.

As a general rule, contracts between husband and wife are void,
both in law and equity. Notes given by the husband to the wife pre-
vious to the marriage, and which become due during coverture, are
annulled by the marriage ; and although such note may remain in
the hands of the wife after the death of the husband, can not be
enforced against the estate of the husband. Reeve’s Domestic
Relations, 86. But where the contract is of that nature that it
can nob be carried into effect until after the death of the husband,
although entered into previous to the marriage, such contract will
survive to the wife. If such be the law—if a note given before
marriage, but which falls due during coverture, is by the marriage
annulled, it would seem strange that a note given by the husband.
to the wife during coverture, should be held binding upon the
husband’s estate after his death. As a goneral rule, it can not be
80 held. .

But to this general rule I admit there are exceptions. The case
of Huber v. Huber’s Adm’rs is one of that character. In that
ease the complainant had received from the estate of her former
husband $100 as her share of the estate, which Huber, the husband,
borrowed from her, and gave her his note. This note was en-
forced in equity at the suit of the payee against the estate of
Huber, after his decease. It will be seen that the consideration

- of the note was the money of the wife, which was treated by the
AAT

528, 529 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Palm, Adm’r, v. The Medina Fire Ins. Co.

husband as her separate property, in borrowing the same from her,
and giving his note for the payment.

The, case of Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Williams, 337, was one
528] *in which a widow was permitted to come in 4s a creditor
to her husband’s estate, after his decease. In that case, the hus-
band had voluntarily allowed the wife after marriage, for her
separate use, to make profit of various articles beyond what was
used in the family, and sho bad accumulated one hundred pounds.
This sum she loaned to her husband; and the court hold, that to
the extent of this sum she might come in as a creditor of her hus-
band.

To assimilate the caso now before this court to the one last re-
ferred to, there should have been evidence to show that Wood had
allowed his wife to receive, as her separate property, money for
washing and milk. There is no such evidence in the case, unless
it is to be presumed from the circumstance of his having executed
the note. To my mind, this is not sufficient. Without such pre-
vious allowance or agreement, the earnings of the wife must have
been the property of the husband; and when he borrowed from
her, he but borrowed that which was his own.

T would notso much object to the decision of the majority of
the court, had this money been the avails even of the labor of the
wife, But it was not so—at least, but in part. The evidence in
the case shows that the washing was done by one step-daughter,
the milk distributed by another, and all that was done by the wife
was the ironing of the clothes. Now, it does seem to me that it is
not in accordance with the principles of equity to take from these
step-daughters a part of the inheritance which desconded upon
them from their ancestor, to pay their step-mother for work
which they themselves have performed.

T think the bill should be dismissed.

529] ‘Jurrurson Pate, Apwinisrrator or Frupurick BoLLMEyEr,
v. Tus Mepins Counry Morvan Fins Insoranoz Company.

“When a contract of insurance has been completed by the party applying for
insurance, doing all that is required to be done on his part, although the

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 530

Palm, Adm’r, v. The Medina Fire Ins, Co.

agent contracting on the part of the company has not power to issue a
policy, the risk commences from the time of making such contract, if
there be no stipulation to the contrary.

‘When a contract of insurance has been made with an agent, and the applica-
cation, with the deposit note, has been sent on to the office of the company
from which the policy is to issue, the company are liable, although the loss
occurs before the arrival of the letter containing the application,

If the contract between the agent and the person applying for insurance be
fair and strictly in accordance with the rules of the company, such lia-
bility will exist, although there be prinéed on the blank application the
qualification that the policy will issue “if approved” by the company.
Such qualification only saves the company the right to object-to an unfair
or improper contract.

Tuus is a bill in chancery, reserved in Summit county.

The principal facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the
eourt. .

The pamphlet, “ By-Laws, Instructions to Agents, and Charter
of the Insurance Company,” contains, in addition to the provisions
veferred to in the opinion of the court, and besides others, the fol~
lowing circular to agents :

“To —— , Agent of the Medina County Mutual Fire Insurance

Company :

“Str: The Directors of the Medina County Mutual Fire Insur-
ance Company wish you to act as agent of this society. The
duties of such agency are, to ascertain the value of property to be in-
sured, the amount of risk, surveying, measuring, and making plan
of building, and ascertaining the loss incurred in case of fire.”

“In all cases the applicant should describe the property to
*be insured, and sign the description and application, as it [530
forms an important part of the contract of insurance; for which
purpose the necessary blank forms, and this circular of instruc-
tions, will be furnished.

“ As to the regulation of premiums or rates, no schedule can be
given which will dispense with the exercise of a sound discretion
on your part. The classes of hazards and schedules furnished you
contain the rates of premium on the several kinds of property and
trades, subject to the ordinary risks and exposures. But these
are to be varied according to the increase of the risk attending
the property insured, and the risk may be so unusually great as
to prevent an insurance at all.

VoL. XX—29 . 449

Ps

531 - SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Palm, Adm’r, , The Medina Fire Ins. Co.

“The rates herewith are estimated without regard to collateral
. or external danger.

“A brick building, with slated roof, would not be so much ex-
posed at forty feet distance, as a wooden one of the same size at
eighty feet; so that much depends, after all the directions that
can be given, upon your own judgment as to the increase of pre-
miums.

“ You will fix such rates of premium as you shall deem just and
proper, fill up and take a note therefor, and receive and indorse
on the back thereof, the three per cent. which you may forward
from time to time, together with the fifty conts received for each
policy, not less frequently than quarterly, or when ordered by the
treasurer.

“You need not number the application nor note, and leave the
day of the month in note blank. Let the indorsement be as fol-
Jaws on the back: ‘ Received at date, one dollar’ (or such sum as
may be paid).

“We trust you will use your best exertions to explain the prin-
ciples upon which the company is formed, and to advance its in-
terest in your town and vicinity.

“Tt is requested that the advertisements furnished you should
be posted up in public places in your vicinity.

531] BY-LAWS.

“And the rates of insurance on all buildings differently situ-
ated, to be in proportion as agents shall think the situation and
hazard require, not exceeding twenty-five per cent. on the amount
insured for the deposit or premium note.

“Such buildings and goods as are particularly extra-hazardous,
may be insured at the discretion of the board of directors, and
not otherwise; and all such classes as are not named, may be in-
sured at such rates as the board of directors may determine after
application is made, and coming within the provisions of the act
of incorporation.

“Three percent, of the premium note shall be paid and in-
dorsed thereon at the time of making application, dne dollar for
each survey and application, and fifty cents for each policy, and
recording the same by the person receiving it.

“The general agent shall be authorized to appoint such agents
4o act for this company as he shall deem necessary, and take from
each agent, so appointed, a bond. with security to the directors of

450

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 532

Palm, Adm’r, v, The Medina Fire Ins. Co.

said company, in the sum of $1,000, previously to acting ‘as such
agent.”

The premium note given by Bollmeyer, was as follows:

“$78, For value received in Policy, No. ——, dated the
day of ——, 1846, issued by the Medina County Mutual Fire In-
surance Company, I promise to pay said company, or their treas-
urer for the time being, the sum of $78, in such portions, and at
such time or times, as the directors of said company may, agree~
ably to their act of incorporation, require,

(igned,)

“Dated, May —, 1846.”

The property to be insured, described in Bollmeyer’s applica-
tion, was not of the class designated particularly extra-hazardous.
The secretary of the company testified, that if a policy had been
made on Bollmeyer’s application, it would have been dated, and.
taken effect at noon on the day the application *was re- [532
ceived at the office of the company, in Medina, which was after the
fire; the general practice of the company having been, to date
policies the day the applications are received at the office, to take
effect at noon on that day, unless the time for the date of the pol-
icy in the premium note had been filled up by the agents for the
policy to date a different date.

R. P. Rawwey, for complainant:

The sole ground of refusal to issue the policy, and pay the loss,
was stated upon the single point, that the application did not reach
Medina until after the fire. .

The applicant had done everything on his part to entitle him
toa policy. If the contract of insurance was completed before
tho loss, a court of equity has power to compel the issuing of the
policy, and the adjustment of the loss. What, then, constitutes a
contract for insurance? I answer, the same circumstances that
will make a contract in any other case, The minds of the parties
must assent in person, or through agents. It may require more
to be done to clothe it with the necessary legal forms, but the
contract is back of, and precedes the mere final written evidence
of the contract. Is the policy the contract? No; itis only evi-
dence of it. If the policy were the contract, there never could
be such a thing asa bill to enforce the specific performance of the

contract by the delivery of the policy. The charter of the com-
451

533 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Palm, Adm’r, v. The Medina Fire Ins. Co.

pany contemplates that membership, with all the rights and obli-
gations growing out of it, may exist before the policy issues.

Section 5 provides, “That every person who shall become a
member of said company, by effecting insurance therein, shall, be-
fore he receives his policy, deposit his promissory note for such a
sum of money,” etc.

Section 6 provides, that “every tember” shall pay his share
of all losses; and section 7, that “ every member” shall be enti-
tled to indemnity for losses. The policies that issue are all in
533] *the past tense, and recite that the insured has become
a member of the company, and obligated himself to pay the
note, ete.

In this case, the facts show that the contract was complete. The
only cases in which the directors reserve tho right to determine
on making the contract and fixing rates, is as to property “par-
ticularly extra-hazardous’—in all other cases, by the rules and
intructions of the company, their agents make the contract.
Take all the instructions and by-laws together, and they amouit
to a standing offer to the public to insure any one upon the terms
specified in the offer. When any one accepts those terms with the
assent of the agent, it is an acceptance of the offer of the company,
and constitutes a contract.

The only control which the company retained in their own
hands, was the same that every principal does over the contract
of his agent, to see that it conforms to his instructions. If it does,
he can not repudiate it; if not, he may.

But there is printed on the application these words:

“All policies of insurance are issued from the office of the com-
pany, at Medina, upon applications sent in by agents and others;
and, if approved, will bear the date of the reception of said applica-
tion, unless requested by the applicant to bear date of some future
day. It will be the duty of agents to mako out the applications
of persons who may apply to thom for insurance in the company,
and forward them per mail, or otherwise, to the office of the com-
pany.”

This is merely printed on the back of the application.

Now, it is evident that these are not the rules or by-laws of the
‘company, but are intended as a condensed summary of the sub-
stance of their regulations, put in small space to be more generally
circulated ; and it is further evident that the clause relied upon by

452

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 584, 5385

Palm, Adm’r, ». The Medina Fire Ins. Co.

the defendant is an abridgment of the very by-law upon which I
rely, and should receive the same construction. A reception by an
authorized agent is a reception by the company :

Witssam H. Canrirrnp and Warrman Mxap, for defendants:

*It is insisted by defendants that the agent at Warren [534
had no authority to make any contract, but that the application
“was made by Bollmeyer and received ‘by the agent of the com-
pany, to be forwarded to the office of the company, to be there ap-
proved or disapproved ; and if approved, a policy to issue thereon,
to take effect from the time it should be received at the office.

This was the almost invariable rule of the company, known to
Bollmeyer both by the notice printed on the application, and by
having been previously insured under two different policies, both
dated, and to take effect at the time they reached the office of the
company, and not at the date of the application.

McConnell, the agent at Warren, testifies that he had no power
to bind the company, and frequently, and always when interro-
gated as to his power, said, that policies‘could not issue until ap-
proved by the directors of the company.

There is no proof that ever Bollmeyer had notice of the by-laws
in relation to the date of policies, but he had notice of what was
printed on his application, as he must have seen it. If he would
avail himself of a contract, he must show that the company had
given power to the agent to contract, and that the agent did con-
tract; which has not been done. The application was a mere propo-
sition, and if a policy had issued, it could not’ have taken effect
earlier than the 2d or 3d day of June, after the fire, If the policy
had issued, dated at the date of the application, and Bollmoyer
had been required to pay an assessment on his premium note, to
meet losses before the application .and note wero received at the
office, but after the date of the application, what would be the lan-
guage of the complainant, in defense of asuit brought by the com-
pany for the collection of such an assessment? He would point, in
emphatic language, to the notice printed on the application—that
policies should date and take effect at the time the application was
received at the office. Ho would point to the general practice of
the company, and to his two prior policies, and thus be relieved
from *liability. (1) This case is unlike the case of Perkins 1585
v. The Washington Ins. Oo., 6 Johns. Ch. 485.

{1) Saydam ». Columbus Ins. Co, 18 Ohio, 459; Neville». Cincinnati Ins,
Oo, 19 Ohio, 452. °
453

536 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Palm, Adm’r, ». The Modina Fire Ins. Co.

Again: the complainant did not expect his insurance to com-
mence at the time of making his application, because his premium
note was not filled up, showing the time the policy was to be
dated. That was left to be done by the company, according to
their custom.

M. Brrowarn, for complainant, in reply:

The real issue is, what shall be the true date of the policy? The
by-law, not any departure from it, speaks the answer. Corporations
speak only by their by-laws.

It was a matter of no moment, whether the loss occurred before
the papers reached Medina or not. McConnell, the agent at War-
ren, might have kept them several days before sending them; and
when sent, if nothing variant from his instructions had been done—
if, when sent, they were such as the directors were bound to ap-
prove, they must have issued the policy, fire or no fire. 4 Cow.
650, Woodworth’s opinion. When Bollmeyer made his applica-
tion, he was bound from that date; and it is absurd to say that one
party shall be bound and not the cther. 4 Cow. 645; Law Re-
porter, vol. 10, No. 11, p. 499.

‘The date of the policy is regulated by a by-law of the company,
not by any arbitrary exercise of discretion on the part of the com-
pany. Bollmeyer was never informed by McConnell, that he could
not bind the company. Bollmeyer had a right to rely upon the
by-laws of the company. 9 Howard, 390.

Carpwetx, J. This is a bill filed for the purpose of charging
the defendant, as insurer, for a loss occasioned by fire, sustained by
Frederick Bollmeyer.

536] *The facts of the case, as appear from the pleadings and
evidence, are these: The Medina County Mutual Insurance Com-
pany had an agency at Warren, in Trumbull county, the place of
rosidence of said Frederick Bollmeyor. On the 27th of May, 1846,
Bollmeyer applied to McConnell, the agent of the company, for an
insurance on his stock of goods and groceries in Warren. The
amount of insurance fixed upon the stock was $600. Bollmeyer
made his deposit or premium note, for $78, with security to the
company, paid $1.67, the per cent. required to be paid down, which
was passed by the agent to the credit of the company, and at the
same time paid for a policy. The application of Bollmeyer, to-
gother with the premium note, was mailed on May 27 or 28 (not
ABA

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 587

Palm, Adm’s, v. The Medina Fire Ins. Oo.

eertain, from the evidence, which of these days), to the office of the
company, at Medina. The application and note reached Medina
on the 2d of June, and were taken out of the office by the agent of
the company, at that place, on the same day. The property was
destroyed by fire on the night of the first of June. Information
of the destruction of the property reached Medina about the same
time that the application and note were received by the agent at
Medina, and was about the same time communicated to him. Boll-
meyer made out an authenticated statement of his loss, and through
their agent, presented it to the company. The company refused
to issue the policy or pay the loss. McConnell, the agent at War-
ren, within a few days after the loss, tendered to Bollmeyer the
amount he had paid, which he refused to receive. The bill prays
that the company be decreed to issue a policy, and for general re-
lief. It is contended, in the first place, on the part of defendant,
that the agent had no authority to bind the company. The agent,
in his deposition, states, that he never pretended, by anything that
he did, to bind the company; and that whenever he was interro-
gated on the subject, he always stated that he had no such author-
ity. The obligation of an agent’s acts is not to be determined so
much by his own or his principal’s *opinion, as by the acts [537
themselves. What were the acts which the agent of the company
was authorized to do?

He was authorized to receive applications, to examine the prom-
ises, determine the character of the risk, agree upon the amount
to be insured and the amount of premium, receive such portion
of the premium as was to be paid in hand, and take the obliga-
of the party insured, with such security as he might approve, for
any future liability.

The agent is the only person, from the very nature of the case,
that can be presumed to have the information necessary to act
for the interest of the company, and is the only person with whom
the party applying has anything to do. In this instance, Boll-
meyer had done everything that it was possible for him to do,
on his part; all of which had been agreed upon with the agent.
Tt is not necessary, to perfect a contract of insurance, so as to bind
the parties, that a policy should have issued; indeed it is not
necessary that any writing whatever should have been executed,
by the signature of the parties. (1) Like any other contract, it

(1) Corporations may contract, by parol, within the sphere of their proper

538 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Palm, Adm’r, v. Tho Medina Fire Ins. Co.

is only necessary that the minds of the parties should have fully
met, See Duer on Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 66, 67.

It is said, however, that it is one of their rules, that the com-
pany are to approve the applications sent in by their agents,
before such applications and contracts are binding, and that Boll-
meyer had notice of that fact. This is based on the fact, that on
the blank application, with many other stipulations, is printed the
following: “ All policies of insurance are issued from the office
588] of the company at Medina, upon applications *sent in by
agents and others, and if approved, will bear date of the reception
of such application, unless requested by the applicant to bear date
of some future day.” We do not think the qualification, “if ap-
proved,” here inserted, reserves to the company the arbitrary
right of setting aside, at pleasure, any contract that their agents
may make, no matter how fair it may be, or how strictly it may
comply with their terms of insurance, or with their directions to
their agents. Such a construction would permit them to trifle
with the community to a most glaring extent.

The company, in a caso where their agent had been imposed
upon, or where @ contract had been made by him that would
operate as a fraud on their rights, would have a right to refuse
to ratify such contract, and thus clear themselves from incurring
liability. And we suppose this phrase merely refers to such a state
of caso, They, no doubt, like any other party, have the right to
defend themselves against fraud or mistake, and in such a case,
they would not bind themselves by ratifying such contract by
issuing a policy. We think this is what is referred to, and nothing
more. In the case now under consideration, it is not contended
that everything was not fair, and strictly in accordance with the
rules of the company.

We are of opinion that the contract made between McConnell

fonctions. Hamilton v. Lycoming Mat. Ins. Oo. 10 Law J. 498; 5 West.
Law J. 419; Ang. & Ames on Corp., chap. 8, sec. 7. A policy of insurance
must be in writing. Cockerill », Cin’ti Mut. Ins. Co. 16 Obio, 164, per Read,
J. All the books upon the subject, and decisions, unite in declaring that a
policy must be in writing, To hold that there could be such a thing as a
verbal policy, would be contrary to all comme reial usage and the authority of
all the books and decisions. Ib.; Stark Co. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hurd, 19 Obio,
149; 2 Cush. 489; 19 Law J, ns, E. P. 222; 7 West. Law J. 529; 17
Ohio, 192.
456

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 539

Palm, Adm’r, v. The Medina Fire Ins. Co.

and Bollmeyer was a valid contract, binding on both parties; and
that it did not require the ratification of the company.

But it is said that the contract was not, by its terms, to take
effect until after the fire occurred ; in other words, that the risk

-had not commenced, when the loss took place. Amongst the

general rules of the company, printed in a pamphlet, which con-
tains instructions to the agents, the by-laws, charter and general
rules, is the following provision, which is one of the by-laws of
the company :

“All policies issued shall take effect from the day on which
the application shall be dated, and the premium note deposited,

. unless directed by the applicant to be dated on a future day.”

Now, as seen above, the policies are to be issued from Me-
dina; *but by the terms of this rule, to take effect from the [589
time the application is dated, the application is dated on the 27th
of May, before the loss occurred. It is said, however, that by
the stipulation, which we have given above, from the printed mat-
ter on the blank application, it is required that the policy shall
have date from the time of reception of the application at Medina.
Taken in the connection in which this is found, it may read either
to the reception at Medina, or to the first reception of it by the
agent; but when we take it in connection with the general rule,
which requires that the policy shall take effect from the time the
application is dated, which clearly refers to the time when it is
made to the agent, we think there can be little doubt that the re-
ception spoken of on the blank application, refers to the first re-
ception by the agent—this requires no forced construction, and
makes the two provisions harmonize. But even if such contradic-
tion existed, it would not avail the defendant. The principle of
the rule, that as between parties contracting, in a doubtful case,
the construction shall be taken whichis against the party creating
the writing, would apply here with peculiar force. It is said, how-
ever, and the evidence appears to warrant it, that the custom of the
company was to issue the policy, to take effect on the day that tho
application was received at Medina; that the defendant had re-
ceived policies previously, dated in that way, and must have known
such custom. This, however, does not appear to have been a uni-
versal custom, and would not do’ away with the effect of their
printed rules, if it were.

457

540 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Fassett v. Traber et al.

This case bears a very strong analogy to the case of Tayloe v.
The Merchants’ Fire Insurance Company of Baltimore, 9 How. 390.

In that case, the agent of the company wrote to Tayloe, he be-
ing in Alabama, stating the terms on which the company would
take the risk, and stating that if Tayloe was agreed to the terms,
and would send his check for the amount of the premium, that the
matter would be concluded. Tayloe, on receipt of the letter,
540] mailed his check for the amount of the *premium. Before
the letter with the check reached the company, the property was
destroyed by fire. The court held, that the contract of insurance
took effect from the mailing of the letter with the check, and that
the company were liable for the loss.

We think in this case that the contract of insurance took effect
from the 27th of May, the time of its being entered into between
Bollmeyer and the agent, McConnell, and that the company are
therefore liable for the loss.

Decree accordingly.

Judge Raynuy did not sit in this case, having been of counsel
for one of the parties.

20 540!
49 500

Atrrep AND Jamus Fassert v. Henry TRABER ET AL.

“When two creditors have each a lien on the same property of their debtor,
and the one having the prior lien has also a lien on another fund for the
same debt on which the subsequent lienholder has no claim, such prior
Menholder will be compelled, in equity, to exhaust such fund before he
proceeds to subject the property on which the other creditor has his lien.

Tf, after bill fled by the subsequont lienholder to compel such subrogation,
the prior lienholder delivers up his claim on the second fund, to the
debtor, he will be compelled, as between him and the subsequent lien
holder, to account for such fund as so much paid on his claim. (1)

‘Tnis is a bill in chancery, reserved in Butler county.
‘The material facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The
Dill was filed by the complainants, partners as “Fassett & Co.,”

(1) See Bank of Muskingum v. Carpenter, 7 Ohio, 21, pt. 1.
458

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 541, 542

Fassett v. Traber et al.

" among other purposes. to distribute the proceeds of the sale of a
house and lot in Rossville, mortgaged by Henry Traber to Traber
& Aubery.

*Traber & Aubery, after surrendering two notes on Baird, [541
as stated in the opinion of the court, have not a sufficiency of as- -
sets in their hands, received from Henry Traber, to pay his lia-
bility to them, unless a portion of such liability is satisfied out of
the proceeds of the sale of the house and lot aforesaid.

Wu. E. Brown, for complainants, claimed :

1. That Traber & Aubery had other securities sufficient to pay
them, without their mortgage on this real estate, and to which, in
equity, we can compel them to resort first. .

2. That the sale of the store to Baird, and the assignment of the
Baird notes, and giving the two mortgages to Traber & Aubery,
was done to defraud and delay Henry Traber’s creditors ; and that
Traber & Aubery were a party to the fraud.

The following authorities were cited: 4 Johns. Ch. 19; 17 Vesey,
520; Mitchell v. Gazzam, 12 Ohio, 315; Swift ot al. v. Holdridge,
10 Ohio, 230; 5 Cowen, 549; 10 Paige Ch. 365.

Scorr & Moon, for defendants, insisted :

That the evidence showed that Traber & Aubery acted in entire
good faith, and without any intention of combining with Henry
Traber to defraud his creditors.

They accepted two drafts merely for the accommodation of Henry
Traber, drawn by Henry Traber on them, in favor of Hallowell &
Co., and it was but right that he should try to make them perfectly
secure. Traber & Aubery have delivered (1) up the notes on Baird
to Henry Traber, as the condition upon which they took them
failed, namely, to save said Traber & Aubery from paying their
own money on their acceptances in favor of Hallowell & Co. Said
Traber & Aubery have, *therefore, nothing to rely upon for [542
their security but the said mortgages. “The surrender of the Baird
notes was made in accordance with a previous agreement to that
effect, if not paid when due, and though surrendered since the bill
was filed, the arrangement was made before.

Catpwett, J. This is a bill filed by Fassett & Co., who are
ereditors of Henry Traber, for the purpose of reaching certain

(1) See Switt o, Holdridge, 10 Ohio, 280; Mitchell v. Gazzam, 12 Ohio, 316,
340; Brown & Co. v. Webb, 20 Ohio. 459

543 . SUPREME COURT OF OHTO.

Fassett o. Traber et al.

property of his, which they allege has been fraudulently trans-
ferred, for the purpose of defrauding creditors.

The facts, as exhibited by the evidence in the case, are substan-
tially these: On May 11, 1849, the complainants, who reside in
Philadelphia, recovered a judgment, in the commercial court of
Cincinnati, against the defendant Henry Traber, for the sum of '
$958. On May 12, 1849, an execution was issued on said judg-
ment, and levied on the 14th of the same month on 2 house and lot
in Rossville, Butler county, the place of residence of the said Henry
Traber.

‘Traber had been, for some time previous to this, doing business
in Rossville, as a merchant; and, on the 11th of May, the same
day on which the judgment was recovered, and three days before
the levy was made, he gave to Traber and Aubery a mortgage on
the lot above referred to, and sold out his store of goods to his clerk.
and brother-in-law, Cornelius Baird, for the sum of $2,500. Honry
Traber reccived from Baird, as a part consideration of the store,
his two notes for $673.37 each, payable, respectively, in four and
six months; which two notes were, on the same day, assigned by
him to Traber & Aubory. He, at the same time, gave a mortgage
4o Traber & Aubery for $200, on certain household property. The
mortgage on the lot, the mortgage on the household property, as
well as the assignment of the notes, are claimed by defendants to
shave been made to secure Traber & Aubery against the acceptance
of two drafts drawn by Henry Traber on them, in favor of Hal-
lowell & Co., of Philadelphia, which drafts were drawn in March,
543] 1849, payable in six and twelve months *from date, for
$673.37 each ; and also to sccure an account for money advanced
and liabilities incurred by Traber & Aubery, to and for Henry
‘Traber, amounting to between $200 and $300, and on which it is
claimed there is due, after deducting some credits, near $200.

The bill'in this caso was filed on June 4, 1849, charging the
several mortgages and transfers made by Henry Traber to Traber
& Aubery as fraudulent and void, and also charging that the salo
of the store to Cornelius Baird was fraudulent, and without any
consideration; that Baird was a man of no means; and that the
whole proceeding should be declared fraudulent and void; and
praying, in that alternative, that if the securities of Traber &
Aubery should be held valid, that inasmuch as they, Traber &
Avbory, had a security on two funds, the two notes of Baird and

460

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 54a

Fassett v. Traber et al.

the mortgage on the personal property, in addition to the mort-
gage on the house and lot, they should be compelled to exhaust
the other securities before they resorted to the house and lot, om
which alone the complainants had a lien,

Some time in 1850, some six or eight months after the filing of
the bill (the time is not definitely stated), Traber & Aubery de-
livered up to Henry Traber the two notes of Baird, which they
had received as collateral security; and Cornelius Baird, who is
tbe only witness who speaks on that subject, states that that was
the agreement at the time the notes were transferred ; that in case
they were not paid at maturity, they should be retransferred to
Henry Traber. The bill calls on all the defendants to answer
under oath. Henry Traber, Traber & Aubery, and Cornelius
Baird, bave all answered, denying all fraud in the sale and trans-
fer of the store, as well as in the giving and receiving the securi-
ties; and from the view which we have taken of the case, we do
not think it necessary to go into a detail of the evidence on which
the complainants rely, as proof of positive fraud ; nor to determine
that question. The store of goods was retained by Baird until the
month of March, 1850, when he sold it to-Samuel Smiley, who
gave his notes therefor to the *amount of $2,073.50, said [544
notes being payable in October, 1850, 1851, and 1852.

In January, 1851, Smiley sold the same stock of goods to Jacob
Traber, of the firm of Traber & Aubery, who paid for it by de~
livering to Smiley his notes given to Baird for its purchase.

The lot in the town of Rossville has been sold, by order of
court, and the fund arising therefrom, with the exception of eight
hundred dollars, belonging to Elliott, a prior lienholder, is now
ready for distribution. And about this fund the principal con-
troversy arises.

Now, it will be seen from the facts above stated, that Traber &
Aubery received an amount of security, irrespective of the mort-
gage on the lot, greater than the amount of the liabilities thoy had
assumed for Henry Traber, and bis indebtedness to them. Traber

” & Aubery had gotten possession, as would appear, of most, if not
all the property (1) of Henry Traber, who was insolvent.(2) The
Fassetts, who had a lien only on the lot on which they had made

(1) Brown & Co. v. Webb, 20 Ohio.
(2) Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Reeder, 18 Ohio, 35; Greene ». Ramage,
18 Ohio, 428; 14 Ohio, 365.
461 .

545 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Fassett v. Traber et al.

their levy, had a clear right to compel Traber & Aubery to resort
to those other securities, on which they, the Fassetts, had no lien,
and to exhaust them before they could come on the lot. This the
Fassetts attempted to do, by filing this bill. Long after the bill
is filed, Traber & Aubery deliver over the two notes, correspond-
ing precisely in amount with the two drafts, to Henry Traber, the
debtor. If they had retained these notes they would have been
compelled to apply the proceeds to the payment of their debt;
and having, after the commencement of this suit, placed the notes
beyond their control, as between them and the complainants, they
are bound to account for their amount. Any other holding would
permit them to commit a fraud on complainants.

Nor does it at all help the matter for the defendants, that the
delivery of these notes was in accordance with a previous agree-
545] ment. *A creditor has a right to secure himself by obtain-
ing a lien on the property of a failing debtor; and if done fairly,
he may thus obtain a preference over other creditors. (1) But in
such a case it is necessary that the utmost good faith should be
observed toward the rights of other creditors. The creditor must
act solely for the purpose of securing himself, without interposing
any barrier to the rights of others, except such as may be neces-
sary to effect that object. (2) In this case the agreement was, that
if the notes were not paid at maturity, they should be delivered
over to the debtor; the effect of which was, that Traber & Aubery:
appropriated this property as against the creditors of Henry
‘Traber, but to operate as their security or not, at his option.

The decree of the court, then, will be, that Traber & Aubery
will be held to account for, as in payment of their claim on the
lot, the amount of the two notes by them thus delivered up, and
also to account for the personal property received under the mort-
gage; and the complainants will be subrogated to their rights in
the fund arising from tho sale of the lot.

Decree accordingly.

(1) See Mitchell ». Gazzam, 12 Ohio, 336, per Read, J. The dictum of
Read, J., in its broadest senso, seems to have been doubted. Ourwon’s Cases
Overruled, 26; Hull v. Jeffrey, 8 Ohio, 390; Wilcox v. Kellogg, 11 Ohio, 394;
and see upon this subject, and the construction of the act of March 14, 1838
(Swan’s Stat. 717), the authorities referred to in the note to Brown & Oo. v-
‘Webb, 20 Ohio.

(2) See Brown & Co. v. Webb, 20 Ohio.

‘ 462

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 546, 547

Follett v. Reese et al.

Oran Foutsrr v. Groner B, Remse ur an. [546

No lien for the purchase money, upon » sale of real property, will attach,
where the vendor takes from the vendee personal security for the payment
of the consideration money. .

“Where an equitable interest in land was sold, and security taken for the pur-
chase money, by which the vendor's lien was extinguished, and the legal
title to the property afterward came to the vendor by a deed of trust, he
‘will not be permitted to hold on to the legal title until his own debt is
paid, it not being provided for in the deed.

‘The assignee of an equitable title, as a general rule, takes it subject to any
claim that could be asserted against the assignor; but if the holder of the
legal title has, by his conduct or representations, in any way misled the
assignee, his rights may be lost or postponed.

Specific interest in, or liens upon the property assigned, can only be set up
against the assignee—not the general indebtedness of the assignor, al-
though such indebtedness may have accrued from the purchase of the
same property.

Tus is a bill in chancery, reserved in Erie county.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

P. B. Witcox, for complainant :

It may be conceded, that when Follett sold to William J. Reese,
in 1835, and took collateral security, his lien was gone. As things
then stood, Follett’s only remedy was against the maker and in-
dorser of the notes. But afterward, Follett being seized of the
legal title, it seems clear, that in this state of the case, lien or no
lion, no court of equity would compel Follett to give up his legal
title to William J. Reese, until he had paid the purchase money in
fall. Thus they stood from June 20, 1839, to August 22, 1840-
Reese, knowing he could never get the legal title himself without
paying for the land, undertook to convey it to George and Jacob
Reese. It seems to me clear, that George and Jacob Reese could
take no greater equity than William J. Reese had. George and
Jacob Reese purchased after Follett got the legal title. “A pur-
chaser of a chose in action must always abide by the case of the
person from whom he buys.” 1 Ves. Jr. 248; 1 Johns. 552; Wright,
698; Tulman v, Anderson, 4 Harris & McHenry.

*It can make no difference that Follett took the legal title [547

463 ‘

548, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO..

Follett v. Reese et al.

as trustee. As George and Jacob Reese had not then purchased,

" Follett became trustee to convey the legal title to William J.
Reese. In equity, a vendor is always a trustee for the vendee and
his assignees. Follett is no more and no less a trustee, because the
trusts are expressed totidem verbis in the deed.

But further, a vendor may go at once into equity to enforce his
lien without any previous suit on the notes. 3 J.J. Marsh, 5593
Ib. 324. In several states the vendor’s lien has been disallowed ;
but in none of them has there been a case where a vendor has
been compelled to surrender up the legal title, while the purchase
money remained unpaid.

B. Lan, on same side:

I. Should it be claimed that George and Jacob ‘Reese desorve
protection as purchasers, let us look a moment if any increased

claims for protection arise,
1. They are not “purchasers for a valuable consideration with-

out notice,” in any sense which makes them favorites in chancery.
That privilege requires: 1. Legal titles; 2. Considoration paid;
3. Absence both of actual notice or of enough to excite inquiry.
Here is actual notice of the debt, and no legal title. This doctrine
prevails in settling precedence between equities. The principle
is, that-where equities are equal, the legal title prevails.

2. If Follett encouraged George and Jacob Reese to purchase,
or stood by and concealed his claim, he would be postponed. But
nothing of the kind exists. His sale was in 1836; the title came
back to him in 1839, so as to give him all the right he has; while
George and Jacob Reese’s purchase was from William J., in 1840,
without his agency or presence.

3. Between equal equities, the oldest is the best. Follett is of
1839; Jacob, and George Reese of 1840.

IL. We should not forget to discriminate between the original
equity and the lien for the purchase money which springs
548] “from it. The purchase-money lien depends upon circum-
stances. The earlier chancellors who recognized it were unsettled
in their opinion of its basis. Some placed it on the presumed con-
tract, some on the civil law, and some on other grounds; it is now
appropriately fixed upon and holden to arise from the simple _
principle, that one man ought not to have another's property
without paying for it, The seller’s equity is not extinguished
until payment. But the lien is a secondary and derivative thing,

464.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 549

Follett v. Reese et al.

which may be waived, postponed, or lost, without affecting the
equity which lies behind it.

III. But has the surety no right to protection? The vendor's
lien was originally regarded as resulting exclusively to the vond-
or’s benefit. But when Eldon, in Machrette v. Synimons, 15 Ves.
329, explored the doctrine to its foundation, and announced that
“a person having got the estate of another shall not, as between
them, keep it and not pay the consideration,” it assumed a more
definite form, aud has drawn other consequences. Story’s Eq.
Jur., sec. 1221; Leading Cas. in Eq. 220. Among them is the
ordinary right of subrogation. It is established, that a surety for
the purchase money upon a sale of land is entitled to be subro-
gated to the rights of the creditor, as against the vendee and all
who stand in his rights. 6 Dana, 137; 4 Har. & Jobns. 522; 11 Gill,
320, 329; 3 B. Mon. 50; 11 Gill & Johns, 219, 245; 6 Paige, 520.

Henry Sranzery, for George B. and Jacob Recse:

As to Follett’s claim, upon the footing of a vendor's lien, see
Williams v. Roberts, 5 Ohio, 35. .

But Follett, as the holder of the legal title, claims a right in
equity to enforce the payment of his unpaid purchase money.
The legal title was vested in him by conveyance made upon a cone
sideration paid by the then owners of the equitable titlh—Camp,
Neill, and William J. Reese—at their request, 1o carry out certain
well-defined trusts. No trust for Follett is "enumerated. [549
He did not take the title as owner, or in the character of a party
having any beneficial interest, but as a strict trustee for others.
‘When he so received the title, he had no lien upon, nor interest
in, no equitable charge upon the land conveyed to him, which he
had formerly sold to William J. Reese. Follett seeks to assert his
claim, in violation of the trust, not merely against William J.
Reese, his vendee and debtor, but against bona fide purchasers
who have paid full value, without notice of his unpaid purchase
money. He can not do so, but must perform the trust he bas as-
sumed. “It is one of the settled principles of courts of equity,
that trustees shall not take advantage of their situation to obtain
any personal benefit to themselves, at the expense of their cestut
que trust.” Till on Trustees, 535. So stringent is this doctrine,
that a trustee is not allowed, except under special circumstances,
to make a charge on the footing of compensation for services.
Follett had no equity prior to George B. and Jacob Reese; and if

VoL. Xx—30 46

550 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Follett v. Reese ef al.

it had happened that he had such an equity—that is, any claim or
lien on the land, as against William J. Reese, for his unpaid pur-
chase monoy—he can not, after accepting the trust, set up any such
claim. Whenever a contract of sale contains a clause indicating
that the vendee has a right to sell, there is no lien on the land,
against a subsequent purchaser, in favor of the original vendor.
Sug. on Vend. 552; Ex parte Parker, Glyn & Jarn. 228; Coatle v.
Pollard, 9 Price, 544 ; Springle v. Morrison, 3 Litt. Ky.) 52. Chan-
cery will “not, in any case, permit a trustee to derive a benefit
from the trust.” Greenl. Cruise Dig, tit. Trust.

P. B. Wincox, in reply, cited Fulgate v. Hanford’s Ex’r, 3 Litt.
(Ky), 262; 2 Freem. 123; 3 Sug. Vend. 294.

E. B. Sapusr, for Follett, submitted an argument, and cited 2
550] Story’s Eg. sec, 1217, n. 4; *Ib., sec, 1225; Suydam & Jack-
son v. Harper & Palmer, Wright, 698 ; Secrist v. McKenna, 1 Strob.
Hg. 356; 8 An. U.S. Dig. 125, sec. 114; Har. & McHen. 357.

Ranney, J. This cause was reserved for the purpose of settling
the single question, whether the complainant is entitled to enforce
a lien which he claims to the avails of the trust property in bis
hands, as against the defendants, George B. and Javob Reese, for
the payment of the balance of the purchase money still due him,
‘The facts of the caso, so far as they bear upon this question, are
these; In the year 1833, Wildman & Mills, claiming to be the true
owners in fee of a tract of 559 32-100 acres of land adjoining San-
dusky City, sold it to Follett, Camp & Neill, for $13,983, payable
in five equal annual installments, and bound themselves, in writing,
to make a deed when payment was made. Soon after, the pur-
chasers took Isaac A. Mills in for one-fourth in the purchase, and
the four then stood equal owners of the interest so acquired. On
August 12, 1835, Follett sold his equitable interest, with certain
reservations, to William J. Reese, for the consideration of $35,000,
which, with the exception of $393.34, was secured to be paid by
five promissory notes drawn by Reese, with Neill as his surety. A.
written contract, specifying the terms of this sale, was at the time
executed; and at the same time Follett assigned to Reese the
written contract he held from Wildman & Mills, and, with his wife,
also executed to him a quitclaim deed of all his right, title, and inter-
-est in the property. Prior to June 20,1839, a joint sale of a part

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Follett 0. Reese et al.

of tlie property was made to the Mad River and Lake Brie Rail-
road Company, and sales to other purchasers, and an amicable par-
tition of the residue had been made amongst the several proprie~
tors. Over $12,000 of the purchase money still remaining due to
Wildman & Mills, an arrangement was made with the Urbana
Banking Company, by which the money was procured and the debt
paid off, under an agreement that Wildman & Mills should convey
the legal title to Follett, in *trust—first, to convey tothe rail- [551
road company the land sold to it; second, to convey to the other
purchasers the lots sold to them, respectively, on payment of the bal-
ance of any purchase money remaining due; third, to raise money,
by sale, mortgage, or otherwise, to pay the debt to the Urbana
Banking Company ; and fourth, after paying all expenses, to convey
to Camp, Neill & Reese, in equal or such other proportions as they

* should agree upon, all the remaining interests and property thereby
conveyed to said Follett. Follett accepted the trust, and received
the deed from Wildman & Mills at the date last mentioned. On
August 22, 1850, William J. Reese sold and conveyed, by absolute
deed, for the consideration of $15,000 paid down, and which is
proved to be more than their value, the specific lots set off to him
in the amicable partition, to the defondants, George B. and Jacob
Reese. Three of the notes, of $7,000 each, givon by William J.
Reese to Follett, remaining unpaid, judgments were afterward re-
covered against him and his surety Neill; and it is conceded that
William J. Reese is entirely insolvent. Under this state of facts,
it is claimed by Follett that he is entitled to retain the legal title
to the property in his hands, not only for the satisfaction of the
specific trusts named in the deed, but also for the satisfaction of
the debt due to him upon which Neill is surety, and that the legal
title can’not be taken from him until this debt is paid and Neill
discharged. On the other land, it is claimed that he can assert
no liens upon this property, except such as are specified in the
trust deed. :

If the purchase of George B. and Jacob Reese was bona jide, and
for an adequate compensation (and this is not denied), it is clear
that no charge can now be made upon the property they purchased,
that did not at the time exist as alien upon it. Thedebt due.
Follett is for the purchase money of the equitable interest that he
then held; and the first inquiry is does a vendor's lien arise in

AGT

B52, 553 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Follett v. Reese et al.

his favor? Conceding that such lien may arise upon the sale of
an equitable interest in lands, it is now perfectly well settled,
552] whatever doubts might once have beon *entertained, that
the taking of personal security for the purchase money will
operate as an extinguishment of any such lion. Mayheim v.
Coombs et al., 14 Ohio, 428. Follett did take such security; and
it necessarily follows that from August, 1835, until June, 1839, no
Jien for this purchase money existed upon the property, and the
interest of William J. Reese in it could have been sold and trans-
ferred, free of any such charge. This position is not controverted
by the complainant’s counsel; but it is insisted that when Follett
was invested with the legal title, in 1839, a right to retain it until
his debt was paid immediately accrued, and was subsisting at the
time William J. Reese sold to George B. and Jacob Reese, and that
they can stand in no better situation than their grantor. This
claim is placed upon the general ground “that one man ought not
to have another’s land without paying for it,” and that “no court
of equity could ever compel Follett to give up his legal title to
William J. Reese until he had paid the purchase money in full.”
It is very true that no man ought to have another’s property, of
any kind, without paying for it, and that no person can be com-
pelled to surrender his title to property without his consent, until
it is paid for. But in this country, interests in real estate are sub-
jects of commerce, as well as personal property ; and where tho
owner chooses to part with the title to his property before he re-
ceives his pay, it can scarcely be expected that the law should,
under ordinary circumstances, hamper its transmission, by follow-
ing it up with liens which the owner had failed to stipulate for.
It need not be feared that, in most cases, the interest of the owner
will not be consulted, in determining whether the property shall
go before the pay is received. In this instance, when Follett
agreed to part with all his interest to one-fourth part of bis real
estate for the notes of Reese, sccured for $35,000, the whole of
which, two years before, had been bought for $13,983, and but a
small part of it paid, we have no doubt that he, at least, acted very
judiciously ; and we see no hardship in holding that the debt was
one at large, and constituted no lien upon the estate. He very
558] correctly *considered the notes better than his interest in
the property, and consented to part with his interest and retain
468

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 5bL

Follett v. Reese et al.

no lien. He was competent to consent; and having done so, can
not call upon a court to relieve him from it.

But the legal title to the property afterward came to his hands;
—but how? The answer is, as a trustee merely. Before this
deed was made, it must be admitted that he had no interest in the
land, or lien upon it, If the deed had been made to any other
* person, he would still have continued without any such lien or in
terest. All the right or interest, therefore, that he now has in or
to the property, is derived under and by virtue of the trust deed.
The title did not come into his hands as a matter of right on his
part, nor was it forced upon him. It was conveyed to him in pur-
suance of a clear and definite contract to which he was a party.
By that contract he agreed to convey to William J. Reese the bal-
ance of the property that might remain, after certain specified
trusts were satisfied. He now seeks to add to those specified
trusts the payment of a debt to himself, not mentioned in the
trust deed by which he obtained the title to the property, and
which was never a lien upon it.

Since all the right and interest that Follett has to this property is
derived from the trust deed, we must go to that to ascorlain what
interests are created by it. We find no lien there given to secure
Follett’s debt, and we can no more add it to the trust doed than
we could have raade the whole deed originally. Reese had a per-
fect right to incumber his property for the benefit of those to whom.
he owed debts, or to refuse to do so, and leave them to thoir legal
remedies. Follett stood exactly in that situation. Reese did not
secure him upon his property, and it was impossible for Follett to

obtain such security without Reese’s consent. No equitable lien
for the purchase money arose in Follett’s favor, because he saw fit
voluntarily to relinquish it by taking personal security ; no in-
terest or lien in his favor was created by the trust deed, because,

he saw fit, voluntarily, not only to take it without any such
*stipulation, but to agree to hold the property, and all the [554
interest in it, for other and different purposes. We take from him

no legal advantage he ever possessed ; ho has himself voluntarily
relinquished it. We deprive him of no right under the deed by
which he holds the property ; we only refuse to aid him to com-
mit a breach of trust, in the face of his own positive agreement.
We are referred to a class of cases where the courts have given a
great advantage to the holder of the legal title, and have refused
469

555 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Follett v. Reese et al.

to deprive him of it in favor of one having no higher equity. We
acknowledge the doctrine as founded in reason and justice, and
fully sustained by authority. To give it application, however, the
first indispensable requisite is, that the legal title is used to protect
a specifie equitable interest in, or lien upon, the property. This
requisite is entirely wanting in this case; and the doctrine is
sought to be extended so far as to cover the debt of a mere cred-
itor at large, having no such interest or lien ; au application of the
rule, we think, sustained by no authority. The case of Tubman
v. Anderson, 4 Harris & McHenry, relied upon by the complain-
ant’s counsel, does not in the least conflict with these views. In
that case, Anderson sold to Trueman on credit, and Trueman as-
signed to Tubman. After the assignment, Anderson agreed to
convey to Tubman before receiving all the purchase money, and
to look to Trueman for it. The court very properly refused to
enforce this promise, upon the ground that it was made without
consideration. Anderson had done nothing to induce Tubman to
purchase; he had incurred no obligations by which he had ob-
tained the legal title; he had an unquestioned interest in the land
tothe extent of the whole purchase money, which could not be re-
leased by a promise withoat consideration. In all these par-
ticulars that case differs from this.

Follett, by the positive terms of the trust deed, had given the
strongest assurance, to any one that might purchase Reese’s inter-
est, that the land should be conveyed as soon as tho other specified
555] trusts were satisfied; by incurring the obligation to *do so,
he got the legal title; and the legal title, when obtained, covered
no equitable right or lien of his in the property, for he had none.

From this view of the case, we are of opinion that Follott had
no lien upon the property for the security of his debt, at the time
it was sold by William J. to George B. and Jacob Reese. It is in-
doubtedly true, as a general rule, that the assignee of an equity
takes it subject to any claim that could at the time be made against
the assignor. In other words, “the purchaser must abide by the
case of the seller.” But it is agreed on all hands, that this rule is
subject to the qualification of another rulo, as stated in the case of
Springle v. Morrison, 3 Litt. 52, that “if a person having a right
to an estate encourage, or even permit, a purchaser to buy of another,
the purchaser will hold it against the person who has the right.
The doctrine is founded on good reason, and is abundantly sup-

470

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

@wynne v, Niswangoer.

ported by authority.” We have already said, that any purchaser
from Reese would have a right to rely upon tho terms of the trust
deed; and as Follett was a party to that deed, and thus responsible for
its representations, it would be very difficult to upbold any lien of
his upon the property, as against a purchaser, if any had existed;
but none did. .

What, then, was “the case of the seller” by which the “pur-

chaser must abide?” He owned certain property, subject to cer-
tain specified incumbrances. He also owed the complainant a
debt, not secured upon the property. While he remained the
equitable owner of this property, it could have been subjected to
the payment of this debt, but was not. ,The fact that he owed the
debt, did not prevent him from selling the property. He did sell
it bona jide, and received his pay for it, and the purchaser took it

_ discharged of all incumbrances except those named in the trust
deed.

We have not particularly alluded to the effect of the compromise
decrees made in 1845. They certainly can not strengthen the
complainant’s case; and construing them as claimed by him, we
ave still of opinion that he has no lien upon the trust *prop- [556
erty for the debt due him, as against the defendants, Geo. B. and
Jacob Reese, and of course thore is no right to which Neill can be
substituted ; and a decree will be entered accordingly.

Hironcook, C. J., was absent.

Eni W. Gwrwvz v. Curisropaur Niswaneur.

“Where a party has made an entry and survey of lands under # warrant, suck
lands become subject to taxation; and if sold for toxes, the purchaser at
such tax sale will take a legal title, as against the former owner, although
the patent bas never issued from the United States.

Ie the title of a purchaser at tax sale, under the statute of 1827, be defective

* at law, he can not have the aid of a court of chancery to perfect his title.

Tuts is a bill in chancery, filed by Gwynne, in June, 1845, in the
court of common pleas of Madison county, and was subsequently

removed, by appeal, to the Sapreme Court,
471

557 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. |

Gwynne v, Niswanger.

The material facts, and the manner in which the case now comes
up for decision, are stated in the opinion of the court.

Josuru R, Swan and Joun W. Anprews, for Gwynne:

Supposing the tax sale good, had the complainant a remedy at
law? We refer to 6 Ohio, 477; 7 Ohio, 158; 8 Ohio, 540; 10 Ohio,
154; 16 Ohio, 61; 14 Ohio, 217.

The general assembly had no power to divest the United States
of title. No title to lands belonging to the United States can be ac-
quired by a law of the state. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet.498. The
laws relating to listing, taxing, and selling entries and surveys not
patented, show that these lands were charged with taxes in the
557] name of the holders of the entries *and surveys; that the
survey was the subject of the tax and sale, and that this tax was
enforced by distress against the owner. To say that it was the
land, as disconnected from title, is only to say that no title, legal
or equitable, was sold. 7 Ohio, 190, pt. 2. The purchaser at tax
sale can not get a better title than was in the party whose interest
was subject to taxation.

Henry Sranzery, for Niswanger. ©

1. I claim that if any title passed by the tax salo, it was a legal
title; and if such title did not pass, there is no ground for equita-
ble relicf; and I propose, in the first place, to show that the decis-
ions of this court, when fully considered, establish that proposition.
Holt’s Lessee v. Hemphill, 3 Ohio, 232; Stewart v. Parrish, 6
Obio, 477; Wallace v. Seymour and Renick, 7 Ohio, 156, pt. 1;
Renick v. Wallace, 8 Ohio, 339; Douglas v. Dangerfield, 10 Ohio,
152,

The controversy between these parties was originally presented
at law upon an ejectment brought by Niswanger (13 Ohio, 74),
and was very summarily disposed of. Neither counsel nor court
seem to have noticed the case of Douglas v. Dangerfield, and the
only previous decision referred to by the court is Stewart v. Par-
rish, 6 Ohio, 477.

‘That ‘case proceeded upon the distinction recognized in Douglas
v. Dangerfield, for the court held that Parrish acquired by his tax
purchase, not an independent title to the land, but only such title
as was in the former owner. .

Following that case, founded on a distinction which did not
apply to Gwynne’s tax title; and wholly overlooking Douglas v.

472

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 55S.

Gwynne ». Niswanger.

Dangerfield, the court conclude that Gwynne did not acquire a
legal title, and intimate that his remedy is in equity.

According to the intimation so given, Gwynne then filed the
Dill in the case now before the court, which was met by demurrer,
and is reported in 15 Ohio, 367.

*The demurrer was overruled, and the court found the [558
decision upon Stewart v. Parrish, which did not apply, and upon
Niswanger v. Gwynne, which crroneously followed Stewart v.
Parrish. It is a singular fact, that Douglas v. Dangerfield was
again overlooked or not noticed.

I submit to the court that these decisions, when taken together,
ought not to be held as authority ; but that, upon the clear dis-
tinction recognized in Douglas v. Dangerfield, two errors have been
fallen into with respect to this tax title. First, in holding that a
legal title did not pass to the land; and secondly, in holding that
there was relief in equity.

It is the land that is taxed, not the title to it. Ross v. Borland,
1 Pet. 664.

2. [have ondeavored to show that the decisions of this court,
holding that a legal right does not pass at tax sales where the
legal title is in the United States, are erroneous.

But, if this has not been shown, it remains to be seen whether
an equitable right passes.

It was supposed that when a court of law was shut against the
tax purchaser, whose title was in conformity with the tax law,
that of necessity a court of equity must relieve him. But such is
not a necessary consequence.

“Tt has been said by Lord Northcote,” says Judge Story (Hq.
Jur. 627), “that where there is no legal remedy, it does not there-
fore follow that there must be an equitable romedy, unless thero
is also an equitable right.” Story’s Eq. 627; Hughey v. Horsey,
2 Ohio, 233.

Now, if a legal right does not pass at a tax sale, what sort of
equitable right passes? Even ata sheriff’s sale, if anything passes,
it is a legal right. No equity grows out of such a purchase, fail-
ing the legal right, although the purchaser at sheriff’s sale is a
favorite.

Much less can an equitable right arise out of a sale for taxes—
asale for a consideration usually so inadequate that, for that rea-
son alone, a court of equity would have nothing to do with it.

A713

559, 560 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Gwynne v, Niswanger.

* In this very case, the land was bought in for less than one-
559] *third its valuation on the duplicate, and such valuations
were notoriously greatly below the actual value.

Now if Niswanger, owning this land by entry, had by solemn
contract agreed to sell to Gwynne at such a price, and had subse-
quently acquired the patent and refused to convey, a court of
equity would not then have compelled him to convey. The rule
is, that a purchase at half the value prevents the court from in-
terfering in behalf of the purchaser. It is against conscience to
uphold and ratify such inadequacy, and to assist the parties to
such a sacrifice.

As to the construction of the act of 1827 (3 Chase, 1562). That
clause which declares that no error in listing, etc., shall invalidate
the title, is repugnant to all the other provisions of the statute, and
void. Smith’s Stat. L. 618; Alton Wood’s case, 1 Rep. 47; 6 Bacon’s
Ab., tit. Stat. 380. The evidence shows that the tax sale was ir-
regular and void.

Catpwett, J. This is a bill, filed by a purchaser, at a tax sale
of lands, to compel the assignee of the former owner to convey to
him the legal title.

The bill states, in substance, that the land in controversy, six
hundred and forty acres, was entered by David Ross, June 22,
1810, and surveyed April 26,1816. That the land was regularly
sold for taxes, in December, 1829, to Lyne Starling, for $201; that
the auditor made him a deed in July, 1831, and that Starling, in
1832, conveyed to the complainant. That about January 20, 1838,
no patent having been previously issued, the defendant, as assignee
of David Ross, obtained a patent for the land, and brought an
action of ejectment against complainant, and obtained a judgment,
which was affirmed in the court in bank, December term, 1844, and
that defendant was about to take out a writ of possession.

The bill prays for a perpotual injunction against the proceedings
on the judgment in ejectment, and that defendant be compelled to
convey all his title to complainant.

The answer admits most of the facts stated in the Dill, except
560] *those that relate to the regularity of the proceeding, re-
lating to the delinquency and sale of the land for taxes, which
are specifically denied. This controversy was first brought be-
fore this court, in an action of ojectment, reported in 13 Ohio, 74.

AT4

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 561

Gwynne v. Niswangoer.

The court in that case held, that the legal title of the patentee,
Niswanger, was not affected by the sale for taxes, made before the
patent issued, and that Niswanger, having obtained the patent for
the land, was entitled to recover in cjectment, notwithstanding the
tax title. The court also decided, that if the tax sale was regular,
Gwynne’s remedy was by bill in equity.

The complainant afterward filed this bill, to which the defendant
demurred, andthe cause was heard and decided on demurrer, and
is reported in 15 Ohio, 367. The question then presented on de-
murrer was the same that is here presented: whether a court of
chancery has jurisdiction in such a case. The court there docided
that Niswanger, by virtue of his patent, held the naked legal title;
‘but that he held it in trust for Gwynne, who, by the tax sale, had
acquired an equitable title, and overruled the demurrer.

The defendant then filed his answer, and the case as now pre-
sented was heard by this court, and is reported in 18 Ohio, 400.
The court then held, in conformity with the decision in 15 Ohio,
that Gwynne had obtained merely an equitable title to the land by
the tax sale; that the sale was regular, and that he was entitled to
a conveyance, from Niswanger, of the legal title. A now hearing
was afterward granted, and the cause now again comes up for de-
cision. Two questions are presented for the ‘consideration of the
court:

1. Is a purchaser at a tax sale (under the Jaw in force at the
time these proceedings were had) entitled to the aid of a court of
chancery, as against the former owncr, to enable him to perfect
his title?

2. If a court of chancery has jurisdiction in such a case,
*have the proceedings and sale in this case been regular and [561
legal, so as to entitle the purchaser to the relief sought?

‘The statute of 1827, the one in force when this sale was made, pro-
vides that the auditor “ shall execute and deliver to such purchaser
or purchasers, his or their heirs, or assignee or assignees, a deed
therefor, in due form of law ; which deed shall convey to the pur-
chaser or purchasers, his heir or their heirs, or assignec or assignees,
a good and valid title to the land so sold; and such deed shall be
received, in all courts in this state, as good evidence of title to the
purchaser or purchasers, his or their heirs, ete. Nor shall the title
conveyed by said deed to the purchaser or purchasers, his or their
heirs, assignee or assignees, be invalidated or affected by any error

AT5

562 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Gwynne v. Niswanger.

previously made in listing, taxing, selling, or conveying said lands.’
3 Chase’s Stat. 1562. Now, it can not be contended that a deed
made under this law, will not convey a complete legal title, if the
state had the power to make such title, The deed, it is provided,
shall be one conveying, in terms, the property absolutely, without
reservation or condition, in a form that, if made between individu-
als, and attended with the usual covenants, would hold the grantor
liable for a complete title against all claims, either legal or equita-
ble. It is also declared, that it shall convey a good and valid title
totheland. And the legislature, as if to remove every possible cavil,
gives it the still further explicit sanction, that it shall be received, in
all courts, as good evidence of title. It would be vain to say that
such a title was not complete, both in law and oquity, if the party
making it had the power to pass such a title. The power of tho
state has been exerted, to its utmost capacity, to make a perfect
title.

It is contended, on the part of complainant, that the patent, not
having issued to Ross at the time of the tax sale, the sale merely
conveyed an equity; that the legal title being in the United States,
the state could not intorfere with, or change its course, by any ap-
propriation or conveyance of land. This proposition is founded
562] on the supposition, that the sovereignty *of the United States,
in controlling the title to the land, still exists, and that it would,
‘be an attack on that sovereignty, for the state to moddle with the
logal titlo. It is true, if the United States has any interest in the
dand, has not parted with all control over it as owner ; if the gon-
exal government holds any title, cither legal or equitable, for its own
benefit, either of a pecuniary or strictly governmental character,
the state could not appropriate it, or change the legal title; such
attempted appropriation would be an attack on the sovereignty of
the general government. But what is the character of the right
which the United States holds in such a case? The party, by his
entry, location of his warrant, and survey, has made, as it were,
complete and perfoct payment for his land; he has acquired a per-
foct right to the title from the government; he has the faith of the
government of the United States pledged to complete his legal
title; he is treated by the government as the rightful owner of the
property. The United States holds the mere naked legal title,
which of right belongs to him, and which will be delivered to him,
and which, when delivered, will relate back to the time of the

476

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Gwynne v. Niswanger.

entry and survey. The state has the guaranty of the United
States, that he is the rightful owner of the land, and so far from
its being an attempted infringement on the sovereignty of the gen.
‘eral government, it is only carrying out its intentions, for the state
to treat the person thus holding it, as the real owner theroof. Now,
if it could be held that the general government, by thus holding
the title, had such a right that the state was precluded from dis-
posing of the legal title, for taxes, as against the owner, the samo
theory would prohibit the state from taxing the land. The states
have no more power to tax the lands of the United States, than
they have to make a title for them; the one would be an equal
attack on the rights of the genoral government with the other.
We think the proposition proves too much for the complainant’s
cause ; it would prove the tax unwarranted, and all the proceed-
ings under it void. It is to be observed that this is not a contro-
versy where any right is or can be set *up, on the part of [583
general government; it is solely between individuals. The state
would have a clear right to make, as between individuals, the
equitable title of Ross a legal one, and treat it as such. This
principle is clearly recognized in the case of Ross v. Borland et al.,
1 Peters, 664. That was an action of ejectment, and the state
court of Mississippi had held that a junior patent, issued on a
prior certificate, should prevail over a senior patent.

Tho Supreme Court of the United States, in that case, say:
“ For the plaintiff in error, it is argued, that the state court erred
in deciding that the elder grant should not prevail in the action
of ejectment. It is undoubtedly true, that upon common-law prin-
ciples, the legal title should prevail in the action of ejectment,
upon the same grounds that the legal right prevails in other ac-
tions, in courts of law. It is so held in those states in which the
principles of the common law are carried into full effect, and the
course of proceedings in the action of ejectment is according to
those principles. In the states where these principles prevail, it is
held, that in a trial at law, the courts will not look behind or be-
yond a grant, to the rights upon which it is founded, nor examine
the progressive stages of the title, antecedent to the grant. But,
in other states, the courts of law proceed on other principles. In
the action of ejectment, they look beyond the grant, and examine
the progressive stages of the title from its inception, whether by
warrant, survey, entry or certificate, until its final consummation -
477

564 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Gwynne v. Niswanger.

by grant; and if found regular and according to law in these pro-
gressive stages, the grant is held to relate back to the inception of
the right, and have dignity accordingly. This latter course seems
to bo the one adopted and pursued by the courts of Mississippi. It
is enough for us to say, that in doing so, and in applying their pe-
culiar mode of proceeding to titles derived through and under the
Jaws of the United States, they violated no provisions of any statute
of the United States.”

We think, then, that the State of Ohio had the power to de-
termine that Ross, who had a complete equitable right to the
564] “land, should be treated as the owner, and that the land
should be subjected to taxation ; that the state could sell this land
for taxes, and provide that the purchaser, as against Ross, or those
claiming under him, should take a good and valid title, both in
law and equity; and this the state has done. And the purchaser
at the sale, if the proceedings be substantially correct, has a com-
plete legal title, and does not require the aid of a court of chancery.
We are of opinion that much of the difficulty in this case arises
from attempting to make a tax title analogous to an ordinary chain
of title. A tax title, from its very nature, has nothing to do with
the previous chain of title; does not in any way conneut itself
with it. It is a breaking up of all previous titles. The party
holding such title, in proving it, goes no further than his tax deed ;
the former title can be of no service to him, nor can it prejudice
him.

Tt was well said by counsel in argument on this point, that a tax
sale operated on the property, not the title. In an ordinary case, it
matters not how many different interests may be connected with
the title, what may be the particular interest of the party in whose
name the property may be listed, for taxation; it may be a mere
equitable right; if the land be regularly sold for taxes, the prop-
erty, accompanied with a legal title, goes to the purchaser, no mat-
ter how many estates, legal or equitable, may be connected with it.

And in case the person in whoso name it was listed, who had
but an equitable title to the land at the time of the tax sale, gets
a conveyance from the person halding the legal title, he can not *
avail himself of it, The land is gone, and another title has in-
tervened. Just so with a person holding under a purchase from
the government; until the patent issues, he can hold nothing but
‘an equitable right, because he can not trace his title to any origi-

4T8

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 565, 566

Gwynne v. Niswanger.

nal source; but if the land be sold for taxes whilst his right is a
mere equitable one, he can not reclaim it, although he afterward
obtain a patent from the United States.

A majority of the court think the title created by a tax sale is
*a legal title, and when not good at law, that a court of chan- [565
cery has no power to aid the purchaser in completing his title.

Tho bill will therefore be dismissed.

Hircencoox, C. J., dissenting. This case is of considerable im-

portance to the parties concerned, but of much more importance
“on account of the principles involved. The complainant claims
under a sale for taxes, made under the act of January 29, 1827,
“for the remission of penalties, and for the sale of lands for taxes.”
This act has reference alone to lands which were delinquent for the
non-payment of taxes previous to 1820. At the time of sale, this
land, which is within the Virginia military district, had been ap-
propriated, by entry and survey, in the name of David Ross. The
legal tile was in the United States., After this sale, the defend-
ant, as assignee of Ross, acquired the legal title by a patent from
the President of the United States

Having thus acquired the legal title, he commenced an action
of ejectmont against the complainant, who set up his tax title, or
attempted to set it up, in defense. This defense was overruled by
the court, and the then plaintiff had judgment. The present bill
was then filed, to enjoin this judgment, and to compel the defend-
ant to release his legal title; the complainant claiming that, by
the tax sale, and conveyance in pursuance thereof, all the interest
of Ross, which was a perfect equitable interest, passed to, or be-
came vested in, the purchaser, and that the defendant having re~
ceived the patent as the assignee of Ross, is vested with the naked
legal titlo, and should be considered as holding the same in trust
for the equitable owner.

Two questions are properly raised in the case: 1. As to the
legality of the tax sale; and, 2. Admitting the sale to be legal
as to the title which was acquired by the purchaser, whether the
same was an equitable or legal title. As the case is decided upon
this latter point, it is unnecéssary to examine the first, and I shall
_ therefore say nothing about it, any further than *this, that [566
" nothing in the argument of defendant’s counsel leads me to doubt,

AT9

‘B67 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Gwynne ». Niswanger.

in the least, the correctness of the opinion expressed, when this
caso was last before the court.

Where the legal title to land sold for taxes is in an individual
there can be no question as to the nature of the interest acquired
by the purchaser. The title acquired by him is a fee-simple title,
even although the land shall not have been taxed in the name of
the former owner. It is only in case where the legal title, the fee
of tho land, remains in the government of the United States, at
the time of sale, and the individual owner has a more eanitablo
interest, that any difficulty can arise.

It is urged by counsel for defendant, that it would be a mon-
strous principle to establish that a court of equity will intorfere
to aid a purchaser at tax sale, and the usual denunciations are
uttered against tax titles. I am not aware that there is anything
eriminal, immoral, or wrong, in purchasing land at tax sales. If
the rightful owner neglects or refuses to pay his taxes, and no other
means of enforcing paymont remains, than the sale of the prop-
erty taxed, it would seem to me, the interest of the owner re-
quires that bidding at the sale should be rather encouraged than
frowned upon; for the greater the competition, the less loss will
the owner probably sustain. Where a tax title is defective, in
consequence of orrors committed by the officers intrusted with the
assessment and collection of the tax, or in conducting the sale, it
is true that a court of equity will not interfere to protect the title.
Neither will a court of equity interfere at the suit of a purchaser
at sheviff’s sale, to relieve against any irregularity in the execte
tion, levy, or sale.

But if, by tho sale for taxes, or on execution, the entire interest
of the formet owner of the land is transferred to the purchaser,
and that interest is but an equitable interest, a differont question
is presented. We know, as a general principle, according to our
law as it is now understood, an equitable interest of a judgmont
debtor in land, as such, can not be sold on execution. It is cer-
tainly within the power of the general assembly, however, to enact
567] that such equitable interest may *be sold on execution; and
after the enactment of such a law, if such interest should be sold,
would not a court of equity compel a conveyance from the holder
of the naked legal title, to him who has acquired the equitable
interest, although the right to that interest had been acquired by
purchaso at sheriff’s sale? It seems to me there can be no doubt

480

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

” @wynne v. Niswanger.

that such decree would be made; that a case thus situated would
be within the legitimate jurisdiction of a court of equity. Under
such a provision of law, all the interest of the jadgment debtor
would, by the sale, be vested in the purchaser, as completely and
fally as if these interests had been transferred to him by the act of
the judgment debtor himself.

Even without the enactment of such a law, I can easily imagine
a case, where, it seems to me, it would be difficult for a court of
equity to refuse its interference, to compel the holder of the naked
legal title to transfer that title to a purchaser at sherifi’s sale,
The bare possession constitutes a legal interest in land, which
may, if continued a certain length of time, ripen into a legal right
and title. A person in possession may defend in ejectment
against any one who has not a paramount right of possession.
And should he be ousted by having no paramount right, he may
sustain an action of ejectment to recover the land, relying alone
on his prior possession. This legal interest may be sold on exe-
cution atlaw. That is to say, an execution may be levied upon
the land, of which a judgment debtor is in possession, and that land
sold in pursuance of the levy. It is the land which must be sold;
not the interest of the judgment debtor in that land, but the land
itself. And it must be sold as land after an appraisal, according
to the statute, and must be sold for not less than two-thirds the
appraised value. But,when the land is sold, all the interest of
the judgment debtor therein is transferred to the purchaser,
whether that interest be a mere actual possession, or any greater
interest. Nothing but this interest, however, is transferred. A .
person having a paramount title is not affected by the sale. Now
suppose the judgment debtor has not only the possession of the
land, but has an equitable interest in it—that, too, must [568
pass to the purchaser. The purchaser having thus acquired an
equity in the land, there is certainly no good reason why he
should not have the aid of a court of equity to get in the legal
title.

As in case of a sale upon execution, if-an equity passes, that
equity may be enforced in the proper court; why may not the
same principle be applied in the case of sales of land for taxes?
Our laws authorize the taxing of land, to which tho legal title is
in the United States, provided that land has been appropriated to
individual use, as may be done in the military district, by entry

Vou, xx—31 481

569 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Gwynne ». Niswanger.

and survey. After such entry and survey, nothing remains in the
United States but the naked legal title. A perfect, equitable in-
terest is vested in him who owns the survey, and the legal title is
held in trust for him, his heirs and assigns. Now, if the tax law
can with propriety be so construcd, as that a sale for taxes shall
be held to transfer to the purchaser all the interest of the former
proprietor, and that interest is but an equitable interest, then the
purchaser becomes the equitable owner of the land, and as such
equitable owner, ought to have relief in chancery, as against him
who shall subsequently, under the same survey, acquire that
which still remains in the government—the naked legal title.

Tt may be presumed that considerations of this nature somewhat
influenced this court in the opinion expressed and decision made,
in the case of Niswanger v. Gwynne, 13 Ohio, 74. That was an
action prosecuted by the plaintiff to recover the very land now in
controversy, and Gwynne attempted to defend under his tax title.
But the court overruled the defense, and entered judgment for the
plaintiff. In overruling the defense, the courtsay: “The defendant
has, at best, but an equitable title, If the proceedings in tho tax
sale were regular, his remedy is a billin equity.” Such appears to
have been the unanimous opinion of the court. The court, in the
same case, hold that the purchaser at tax sale acquires no better
title than was held by the former owner, at the time of sale.

569] *True, the law of 1827, under which this land was sold
(Chase's Stat. 1560) provides that the deed to the tax-purchaser shall
convey to him “a good and valid title to the land sold,” and that
“such deed shall be received, by all courts in this state, as good
evidence of title to the purchaser or purchasers, his or their heir
or heirs, assignee or assignees.” But the court, as I suppose, en-
tertained the opinion that where the legal title to land was in the
United States, that title could not be divested by a sale for taxes,
under the law of the state. And this opinion is sustained by the de-
cision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Wil-
cox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, in which it was decided, that “ where a
patent had not been issued for a part of the public lands, a state has
no power to declare any title less than a patent valid, against the
claim of the United States to the land, or against a title held under
a patent granted by the United States.” And further, “ whenever
the question in any court, state or federal, is, whethor the title to
property, which had belonged to the United States, had passed,
482

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Gwynne o. Niswanger.

that question must be resolved by the laws of the United States,
But whenever the property has passed, according to those laws,
then the property, like all other in the state, is subject to state
legislation, so far as that state legislation is consistent with the
admission, that the title passed and vested according to the laws
of the United States.”

In the case of Niswanger v. Gwynne, the court held, although
such title did not vest in the tax-purchaser in that particular case,
as the statute seemed to contemplate, yet that all the title of the
former owner did vest in him, which was but an equity, thus giv-
ing to the statute all the effect which could be given to it, consist-
ent with our relations to the government of the United States.

This case, counsel for defendant contends, was erroneously de-
cided. He insists that the purchaser at tax sale takes a legal os-
tate; that in such case there can be no such thing as a derivative
title; that there is no connection between the former owner and
the purchaser. He says: “The title of the tax-purchaser, *if [570
any title passes to him, is, under this law, a legal title, and the
error has been fallen into, by connecting the land with the title.
The tax sale severs them forever. No covenant running with the
land, nor warranty; no incident to the title, as a title, passes to
the purchaser. He takes it by another right—by new and inde-
pendent and paramount grant.” And in his argument at bar, he
says that it is the creation of a new estate—a new fee,

It is rather bold ground to take, that a conveyance of land by
the public officer, pursuant to a sale for taxes, conveys a title par-
amount to the title of the United States, where, until the sale, the
legal title is in the United States. I am not sure that counsel in-
tends this, though such, it seems to me, is a necessary consequence
resulting from his argument.

But if, by the tax sale, a new estate—a new fee—is created,
what becomes of the old estate—the old fee? Does that still con
tinue to exist? Are there two estates in fee in the same land?
Now, it may not be technically correct to say that the title of the
former owner passes to the tax-purchaser. But I suppose, by the
sale and conveyance, if both are regular, the title of the former
owner ceases to be operative, or becomes extinct, and the tax-
purchaser acquires a title to the property exactly equal to the
title of the former owner, before the sale. If he does not occupy
the same ground, or stand in his shoes, he has as good a title—a

483

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Gwynne ». Niswanger.

title which must defeat that of the former owner, not so much be-
cause it is a paramount title,as because the title of the former
owner has ceased to be operative. If not the same, it is a similar
title.

Counsel insists that the former decisions of this court sustain
him in the position, that if any title passed by the sale in the case
under consideration, it was a legal title; and if such title did not
pass, then there is no ground for equitable relief. In my opinion,
every case heretofore decided, is diametrically opposed to the
position assumed by counsel,

The first case referred to is the case of Holt’s Lessee v. Homp-

hill’s Heirs, 3 Ohio, 232.
571] *This was an action of ejectment, and the defendant relied
upon a tax title, which, upon examination, was found to be de-
fective, and of course of no avail, and the plaintiff had judgmont.
In commenting upon the case, the judge delivering the opinion of
the court says: “But whatever may be the construction of the
statutes referred ‘to, as to the partios themselves, I do not hesitato
to say, that aftor the survey of the entry had been recordod, it is
not in the’ power of the claimant to destroy the tax-lien of the
state, or to avoid the effect of a sale regularly made, by the col-
lector, for the non-payment of taxes.”

With this sentiment I entirely concur. After an entry has been
regularly made and surveyed, if the land is subsequently taxed,
and regularly sold for the non-payment of the taxes, I would not
permit the holder of the survey to defeat the sale, by withdraw-
ing the entry and making a new entry. But how relief should be
given to the purchaser in such case, whether in law or chancery,
is a different question, and does not appear to have been consid-
ered by the court.

The next case referred to is Stewart’s Lessee v. Parrish, 6 Ohio,
ATT.

This, like the former, was an action of ejectment, and the des
fendant relied upon a tax title.

The land in controversy was in the Sandusky reservation, and,
in 1817, was entered under the laws then in force, and the first
payment made. The balance of the purchase money not being
paid, Stewart took the benefit of the laws then in force, and ob-
tained an eight-years’ credit on the land.

In 1826 it was entered on the list for taxation, and the taxes of

A8t .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 572

Gwynne v. Niswanger.

1826-27 being unpaid, was sold for those taxes to one Strain, un-
der whom the defendant claimed.

After the sale, and in 1830, Stewart completed the payment for
the land, and received a patent, under which he claimed title.

It will be seen from this statement of the case, that this was
United States land, which had been sold more than five years,
*but not paid for at the time of the sale for taxes. The law [572
under which this land was sold, I suppose, must have been the act
of February 5, 1825, entitled “an act to amend the act defining
the duties of county auditor.” Chase’s Stat. 1493. £n this act, it
is prescribed the deed of the auditor for lands sold for taxes,
“shall convey to the purchaser or purchasers a good title in law
and equity to the land” so sold.

The question raised to the court seems to have been as to
whether the title, acquired by Stewart under his patent, should
inure to the holder of the tax title.

The court say: “The sale in 1827 transferred, at best, the title
of Stewart, which he then held, and his title then was equitable
only. His subsequent acquisition of the legal title did not inure
to the benefit of that purchaser, for the sale by the public officer
raised no estoppel against him, as if he had transferred with war-
ranty. Admitting, then, for the present purposes, the legality of
the sale, and that Stewart’s interest passed by it—those rights,
being merely equitable, offer no defense to an action of ejectment
by the holder of the legal title.”

I do not see how, by possibility, it can be claimed that this de-
cision goes to sustain the position of defendant’s counsel. The
court hold expressly that the sale for taxes in 1827, and a deed
pursuant thereto, did not convey to the purchaser a legal title, —
pecause, at the time of the sale, the title to the land was in the
United States. Still, the letter of the law was that the auditor’s
deed should “convey to the purchaser or purchasers a good title
in law and equity.” But the court, in effect, admits that the
purchaser does, by the purchase and deed, acquire an equity.
Whether he can avail himself of this equity is not decided.

The next case in order is the case of Lessee of Wallace v. Sey-
mour and Renick, 7 Ohio, 156, pt. 1. In this case tho defend-
ants claimed under a tax title, under a sale of the land after entry
and survey, but before patent issued. The court decide, “that by
asale for taxes in the Virginia military district, surveyed but not

485

573, 574 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Gwynne » Niswanger.

578] patented, the whole interest passes *to the purchaser, and
no right remains in the original holder. But if such holder, to
defeat the sale for taxes, is permitted to withdraw the survey and
make a new one, upon which he obtains a patent, such patent is
not void. The purchaser holds the title subject to such rights as
may have been acquired by the purchaser for taxes.” In deciding
the case the court say: “Although the effect of the auditor’s deed.
is only to convey an equity where the former proprietor had no
greater estate, yet this is only between the owner of the legal
estate and the purchaser. The tax deed purports to convey a
legal estate. It is made by authority of the state, and as to all
the world except him who has the legal interest, would convey a
legal title. Further, should the former proprietor afterward ob-
tain his patent, although vested with the legal title, he must hold
it in trust for the purchaser at tax sale.” If he holds in trust, a
court of equity is the proper tribunal to enforce the trust.

The same matter was again brought before the court, by bill in
chancery, at the suit of the defendants at law, against the plaintiff,
and is reported in 8 Ohio, 539; and the court decreed that
‘Wallace should release his legal interest to the complainants,
‘Renick and the heirs of Seymour. The law under which the land
was sold, which was the subject matter of controversy, was the act
of January 30, 1822, entitled “an act providing for the remission of
penalties, and for the sale of lands for taxes” (Chase’s Stat. 1216),
commonly called the judgment law; and it is provided, that the
deed to be executed by the auditor “shall convey to the purchaser
all the title, either in law or equity, which the owner had in the
lands,” ete.

Surely, neither of these cascs militate against the decision of this
court, in the case of Niswanger v. Gwynne, above referred to, but
dircetly sustain that decision.

The case next in order is the case of Douglas v. Dangerfield, 10
Ohio, 152. It is claimed that, in this case, there was an actual
decision of the court; that the purchaser at tax sale, where the
land has been entered and surveyed, but not patented, acquires a
574] legal title. The sale in that case was a *sale of land, delin-
quent for the non-payment of taxes, under the general law then in
force—not a sale under the act of 1827, Nothing was, in fact, de-
cided by the court as to the title which a purchaser at tax sale
acquires, where the equitable interest is in an individual and the

486

DECEMBER TERM, 1861.

Gwynne v. Niswanger.

legal title in the government. It was not necessary to act upon
that question, nor did the court act upon it. As counsel for de-
fendant relies so entirely upon this case as an authority, it may be
proper to examine more particularly what it was, and what was
actually decided.

At the tax sales in December, 1829, Douglas purchased the land
in controversy, which had been listed in two several parcels—one
in the name of Theodorie Bland, and the other in the name of
William Dangerfield; but the duplicate did not show which part
of the survey, as to its locality, was listed in the names of the
respective owners:

After this sale, the land was transferred to Douglas, upon the
auditor’s books, and taxed to him as an entire tract, but the taxes
wore not paid, cither in 1830 or 1831; and in December, 1831, the
land was again offered for sale, for the-taxes of the two last-named.
years. At this sale, the land was purchased by the agent of
Douglas, for his benefit, and the certificate of purchase was trans-
ferred to him. In March, 1833, the auditor of the county, by deed
duly executed, again conveyed the land to Douglas, in pursuance
of this latter sale. There was evidence in the case tending to
prove that after the first sale, Douglas took possession of the land,
and exercised acts of ownership over it. In April, 1833, the land
was patented to Dangerfield, who claimed to be the assignee of
Bland, the original warrant-holder. But before the patent was
issued, the original entry was withdrawn, and a new entry and
survey made upon the same land.

Douglas claimed that, by his purchase, he acquired a. perfect
equity, and that Dangorfield, having subsequently acquired the
legal title, should be adjudged to hold the same in trust for him.

The case turned upon defects in the title of Douglas. So far
**as the first sale was concerned, the land appeared to have [575
been improperly listed and taxed, and of course, by his purchase
at that sale, he acquired nothing. He however took possession
of the land, exercising acts of ownership over it. It was trans-
ferred to him, and listed in his name as an entire tract. He did
not pay the taxes, however, but suffered the land to become de-
Hinguent for the non-payment. It was sold for taxes, and pur-
chased in for Douglas, by his agent. Under these circumstances,
the court were of opinion that, by this second purchase, he ac+
quired no additional interest in the land, and decided, that “one
487

576 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Gwynne v. Niswanger.

in possession of land claiming title, and in whose name it is listed
for taxation, acquires no additional interest, by suffering the land
to be sold for taxes, and purchasing the same himself.” The case
went out of court, because the complainant did not show in him-
self any title, legal or equitable. .

It is true that, in writing the opinion, I commented upon the
question, as to the nature of the title which a purchaser at a tax
salo woyld acquire, where the legal title to the land was in tho
government at tho time of sale, and only an equity in the former
proprietor; suggesting that the subject was surrounded with difti-
culties, and that at some future period there might be trouble with
respect to it. But I was particularly cautious to have it under-
stood, that what was said upon this subject, was not in consequence
of the action of the court, and concluded upon this matter by say-
ing: “ But, in this case, it is unnecessary for us to trouble ourselves
upon this question. When it does arise,” (it had not in that caso
arisen,) “it must be a purely legal question, to be settled by a court
of law.” And then went on to state the reasons why the com-
plainant’s case could not be sustained. It would havo been better
to have said nothing upon a subject upon which the court had not
acted ; but I still think that, under all the circumstances, no one
could have been led astray by what was said.

I said, the time would come when the questions upon this class of
576] cases must be settled, and the proper tribunal to settle *them,
would be a court of law. That time has arrived and passed by.
‘Thé whole subject was beforo the court, in the case of Niswanger v.
Gwyune, 13 Obio, 74. Tho decision was as before stated. Gwynne
was told that, by his purchase at tax sale, his grantor acquired
only an equitable interest; that in a court of law he could have
no relief, but must resort to a court of chancery. Had I beena
member of the court at the time this decision was made, I can
not now say what my opinion would have been. Probably I should
not have dissented from the decision made.

In consequence of this decision, Gwynne resorted to a court of
chancery, and filed the bill now before us. It was met by a de-
murrer. After full hearing before the whole court, at the Decem-
ber term, 1846, the demurrer was overruled, and the defendant
had leave to answer. By this decision, Gwynne was, in effect, told
that he was in the proper court, and if the proceedings, in conse-

488

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Gwynne v. Niswanger.

‘quence of which ho claimed title, were correct and in accordance
with law, he would be entitled to relief. 15 Ohio, 367.

The defendant answered, and the case was again before the court,
at the Docember term, 1849, as it is now, upon bill, answer, exhibits,
and testimony, and the court again held, that the complainant was
entitled to the relief sought, and decreed accordingly. Subse-
‘quently, however, a rehearing was ordered. 18 Ohio, 400.

Another case may be referred to; that is the case of Millikin
etal. v. L. Starling, Jr., which was decided in this court at the De-
eember term, 1847. 16 Ohio, 61. This was an action of ejectment,
‘and the defendants in the court below—plaintiffs in error before
this court—defended under a tax title. The land had been sold
for taxes, but at the time of sale the legal title was in the govern-
ment, although a patent had been subsequently issued to the plaint-
iff below, defendant in error in this court. The court below over-
ruled the defense of the defendant, and rendered a judgment for
the plaintiff. Upon hearing the case, this court affirmed the judg-
ment, expressly *deciding, that by a tax sale under such [577
circumstances, the purchaser did not acquire a legal title which
could avail him in ejectment, but recognizing the principle that
he acquired the legal interest.

From this hasty review, it appears, in all the cases referred to,
commencing with the case of Stewart's Lessee v. Parrish, decided
in 1834 (6 Ohio, 477), and coming down to 1849, this court has
aniformly held directly the reverse of what is claimed by defend-
ant’s counsel, It has been uniformly decided that the purchaser

- at tax sale, where the ‘legal title to the land was in the govern-
ment, did not acquire a legal title, but that he did acquire an in-
terest equal to that of the former individual proprictor, although
that interest was but an equity; and all these cases were decided
without a dissenting opinion. The only excepted case is the case
of Douglas v.. Dangerfield, which was decided upon another point.
In one case the court, acting as a court of chancory, decreed in
favor of the tax-purchaser, where the purchase was made under
such circumstances, against him who subsequently acquired the
legal interest.

Now, it would seem to me "that if any question could ever be
considered as settled, by a uniform course of decisions, the ques-
tions arising in this case ought so to be considered. But the de-
vision now made by a majority of the court overrules all theso

489

578 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Gwynne v. Niswanger.

former decisions, and establishes the principle, that where lands
are sold for taxes, if the sale is regular, the purchaser acquires
perfect legal title, although that title isin the government of the
United States, at tho time of sale; and the case of Ross v. Bor-
land (1 Pot. 655), is cited to show that, in similar cases, the court.
of the United States will regard and be controlled by state legis-
lation, and the practice of state courts upon similar subjects.
That was an action of ejectment. Both parties claimed title
under the United States. The plaintiff in ejectment held the
junior, the defendant the elder patent, although the entry under
which the junior patent issued, was the eldor entry. According to
578] our practice, the *holder of the elder patent would have been
held to be the trustee of the holder of the junior patent, which
‘was based upon the oldest entry, and would have been decreed to
convey accordingly ; at law, the elder patent must have prevailed.
But the court in Mississippi suffered the question to be settled at
law, and the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed this
judgment. It will be seen that no title remained in the United
States. The controversy was between two citizens, claiming title
to the same land; and, inasmuch as the rights of the United States
were not interfered with, the courts of the state wore allowed to
dispose of tho controversy in accordance with their ideas of pro-
priety. This case is in accordance with the principles laid down
in 13 Peters, before referred to.

It is desirable that the decisions of the same court should be
uniform, as far as the rules of law and equity allow. Questions
frequently arise in the course of litigation, the law arising upon
which is doubtful; and perhaps, so far as the rights of parties
litigant are concerned, it is a matter of little consequence how
they are decided. But when once decided, public policy and
private interest require that the decision should not be changed
for slight or trivial reasons. Cases are frequently. brought into
this court for the express purpose of settling a controverted point
of law. The case is decided, and the point of law is supposed to be
settled. But what is the use of this, provided, at the noxt term
of the court, or at any subsequent term, the decision is to be
overruled, and an entirely different and opposite rule is declared ?
Decisions of courts do not constitute the law of the land, but they
are generally considered as evidence of what the law is; and one
great object of publishing reports of cases is, to produce uni-

490

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 579

Gwynne ». Niswanger.

formity of decision. There is a common complaint of the uncer-
tainty of the law. The law itself is certain enough; the uncer-
tainty arises from the action of courts. And certainly nothing
can contribute to this uncertainty more than the contradictory
decisions of the same judicial tribunal.

I do not claim that every decision of a court must be *con- [679
sidered the law, as to the particular subject of litigation during
all succeeding time, by the same tribunal. It may be that an im-
portant principle of law has been violated in the decision of a
particular case. If it is followed in subsequent cases, great and.
essential injury may be done to parties litigant. In such case, I
hold that the error should be corrected at the earliest possible op-
portunity.

But where there can be no change of the final settlemont of the
rights of parties, by a change of decision, no change should be made.
Tn the case now. decided, the only question is, as to the proper
forum to grant relief. We all agree that if the sale for taxes was
regular, the complainant acquired an interest, either legal or
equitable. When the parties were before this court, as a court of
law, he was told he was not before the proper tribunal; that he
must resort to the equity side of the court. He has done so; and
now he is told, by the same court, that this is all wrong; he can
not have relief on the equity side of the court, he must resort to
the court as a court of law. In this particular case, perhaps no
injury can be done, because the suit pending in the court of law
‘was an action of ejectment, in which a single judgment is not con-
elusive. But if the case had been of that character where the
judgment would have been conclusive of the rights of the parties
in that tribunal, then this change of decision would deprive the
complainant of an interest which it is admitted he is entitled to.
Judgment was entered against him in a court of law, now a decree
is made against him in a court of chancery.

There is another circumstance connected with this case which
has great influence upon my mind, to induce me to add here to
the decisions heretofore made upon this subject. The legal title to ©
the land sold was in the United States, and the defendant now
holds the title which was then in the United States. It is, to say
the least of it, extremely doubtful whether the United States can
be divested of the legal title to lands under any law of the state.
Indeed, the Supreme Court have decided, in the case in 13 Peters,

491

580, 581 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Irwin's Heirs v. Longworth ot al.

580] before referred to, that *they can not be so divested of title,
.and, by that decision, the same principle is applied to the patentee
of the land, under the United States. By the decision now made,
the legal title by a sale for taxes, if the sale is regular, is held to
be in the purchaser for taxes, although the legal title at the time
-of sale was in the United States. By this decision, this court is
brought in direct conflict with the court of the United States, and
that, too, upon a subject in which that court has undoubted
jurisdiction. This state of things, it seems to me, should be
avoided at all events; especially should it be avoided, where it
ean be done without the sacrifice of any principle, and without
injury to any private rights.

Such are some of the considerations which have heretofore in-
fluenced this court while acting upon this subject. No conflict can
grow out of former decisions. The title of the United States is
recognized, and the purchaser for taxes is not deprived of his
rights. He acquires an equitable interest, and when the title
passes from the United States to the patentee, he will hold the
land, as did the United States, in trust for him who owns the
equitable interest. The United States had but the naked legal
title, and this alone passed by the patent.

It is unnecessary to say anything further, and perhaps I have
already said too much, but it seemed to me proper to state at
length the principal reasons which induced me to dissent from the
decision made by a majority of the court.

581] *Witt1am Irwin's Hurrs v. Nicwonas Loxeworts Er aL.

A deed of conveyance of xenl estate is valid to pass the fee, even though
in the granting part of the deed the grantor is also named as grantee,
where the deed desoribes the grantor as the party “of the first part,”
and the grantee as the party of the second part, with an “habendum”
clause to the party of the second part. In such case, the feo passes to
the party who is “to have and to hold” the premises.

A conveyance in such case is good where the grantee is described by sufii-
cient terms to designate who is intended, though neither his christian
nor surname is used. “That is certain which can be rendered certain.”

‘Whore there is no grantee named in the granting part of a deed, the party

492

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 582"

Trwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

named in the “Aabendum” may take. ‘Where the grantor is named as
grantee, it is a nullity; and the same rule applies as if no grantee were
named in the premises.”

“Where a conveyance of real estate, not warranted by law, is made in feo sim-
ple, “to delay creditors,” a surety of the grantor at whose instance the
conveyance was so made, and who holds a declaration of trust, subse-
quently made for his benefit, can not set up that the deed was made to
defraud creditors, to prevent the grantor or his heirs from asserting an
equity in the premises,

‘Where conveyance of real estate is made to a trustee to indemnify the
surety of the grantor, and the surety, after paying the debt, takes a con-
veyance from the trustee in satisfaction of the debt, under an order from
the heirs of the grantor, made for “the safety of the trustee,” and under
an impression that they “have no interest in the premises,” the equitable
rights of the heirs are not thereby prejudiced.

‘If the trustee in such case convey to the surety in satisfaction of the debt of
the grantor, the surety, as to minor heirs of the grantor, takes the prem-
ises charged with the trust; and the original trustee will be responsible
for a breach of the trast by his granteo.

In such case, an order to the original trastee to convey to the surety executed
by the heirs for the safety of the original trustee, is not a surrender of
the equity of the heirs in the premises so conveyed, unless the order con-
tain words which expressly or by inference surrender the equity.

If it is proved aliunde that the object of the order to convey was to invest the
grantee of the original trustee with the perfect title relieved of all equities,
such order can only be held effectual for that purpose when executed with
a proper understanding and knowledge on the part of the heixs of their
just rights.

This rule applies, though there has been no actual fraud or imposition prac
ticed on the heirs. :

‘Where a grantor conveys premises absolutely in feo to a third person, for the
purpose of indemnifying his surety, with the assent of the surety, and the
grantee executes a declaration of trust accordingly, the conveyance will,
in equity, be deemed » mortgage, and tho grantor and his heirs will have
an equity of redemption in the premises, until it is regularly assigned
foreclosed, or barred by lapse of time.

Tuis isa bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Hamilton.

The complainants in the original and amended bill are children
and heirs at law of William Irwin, who died in July, 1824.

¥Ho left, besides them, two other children: Archibald, who [582
was his partner in business under the name of William Irwin & Son, |
and Louisa, then the wife of Lewis Whiteman, but now deceased,
leaving three children—Harriet, William, and Louisa.

493

583 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Inwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

Harriet has married Wm. F. Irwin, and they are complainants
in a cross-bill. William and Louisa Whiteman are infants, and
appear by their guardian ad litem.

On August 13, 1821, William Irwin executed a deed to Thomas
D. Carneal, conveying, in the ordinary form of an absolute war-
ranty deed, sundry city lots in Cincinnati, and an undivided half
‘of a tract of land near the city, called the “ Hill Tract,” the whole
tract estimated to contain two hundred acres. The consideration
named was $5,000, but no part of it was paid by Carneal,.or in-
tended to be paid. Tho present controversy embraces only the
undivided half of the Aill tract

On January 21, 1839, Thomas D. Carneal, by quitclaim deed,
and for the consideration of one dollar, conveyed “all the right,
title, interest, claim and demand, which the said Carneal acquired
in the premises, by virtue of the deed from William Irwin,” to
Nicholas Longworth. The latter now claims to be the absolute
owner, while the complainants insist that he is merely a mort-
gagee, and that they have a right to redeem, upon the ordinary
terms. The city lots were conveyed by Carneal to Archibald
Irwin, and are not now in controversy,

It appears that, in the year 1820, Wm. Irwin was indebted to

the Bank of the United States to the amount of about $18,000,
evidenced by notes, upon which Nicholas Longworth was indorser
for his accommodation. For this debt the bank held a mortgage
from Irwin, upon a large amount of real estate in and about the city
of Cincinnati, which was then deemed, by all the parties in interest,
as sufficient security for the claim. The land in controversy formed
no part of the premises mortgaged to the bank. At this time,
Longworth wos the intimate friend and legal adviser of William
Irwin.
$83] *In 1881, Irwin, being a surety on the official bond of one
Smith to the government of the United States, and being appre-
hensive that a suit might be brought, which would affect his credit,
and cause him temporary embarrassment, consulted Longworth as
to what was best to be done. The nature of this interview will
bost appear from the principal answer of Nicholas Longworth, a
portion of which is subjoined :

“Tt was, I believe, early in the month of August, 1821, that
William Irwin called on me, and stated that a suit was then
pending, or that he daily expected one against him, as the security

494,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 584

Irwin's Heirs v. Longworth et al.

of James Smith to the government, and which would bind up, if
not sacrifice his property, when, in truth, nothing was due the gov-
ernment, as they expected soon to be able to show, and obtain a
discharge; that, in the interim, he wished to convey his real estate
to me, till he could get the claim settled. I suggested his convey-
ing to his son Archibald. This he refused, saying it would at once
be said to be fraudulent, and lead to bills in equity to set it aside.
I then proposed that he should make the conveyance to Thomas D.
Carncal, for the same object. This he refused, and more positively,
saying that it would lead to the same rosult, and was to him more
objectionable, as it would be doing indirectly what he refused to do
directly. I then observed to Mr. Irwin that the conveyance could
be made to Carneal, for my indemnity; but, if done, it must be
bona fide and absolute, and with the distinct understanding that it
was toremain for my indemnity, till the sum or sums it was to se-
cure were paid and satisfied ; for we all three might, and probably
would be called on to answer a bill, setting up the conveyance as
fraudulent. He observed that he expected it, that he wished it
bona jide, and so arranged as to stand the test. He then asked me
to draw the decd ; said he would call and get it, have it executed and
handed back to me to deliver to Carneal, and take the declaration
of trust to meet my own wishes and views, and in a manner to be
valid. He called for the deed, had it executed, and brought it back
tome. I named the subject to Carneal, who *is about as [584
negligent as myself, and the business rested till about the —— day
of March following, when Mr. Irwin called, quite out of humor,
having learned from Carneal, or some other person, that the matter
was not yet closed; though I had, for safety, given the deed for
record within six months. I immediately called on Mr. Carneal
at his residence at Elmwood, and drew up a declaration of trust,
and handed it to him to sign. On reading it, and discovering that,
after indemnifying me as the indorser of Mr. Irwin to the Bank of,
the United States, it was to go to secure his creditors generally, he
objected to accept the trust, unless a special provision was made to
secure the $2,912 loaned William Irwin to pay Johnson, and for
which Mr. Irwin and Mr. Carneal were under pledge to give me a
note—Carneal as security. Although so to do was against my in-
terest, I thought it reasonable, and, as a matter of necessity, not
choice, drew up a new declaration of trust, with the provision,
which he signed, and tho copy of which is hereunto attached. Its
495

585 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Trwin’s Heirs 0. Longworth et al.

insertion, at the time, I suppose met the approbation of Wm. Irwin,
and was done by me under the discretion in me vested by Mr.
Irwin.” :

It seems that Carneal had previously agreed, verbally, to become
surety for Irwin to Longworth, in $2,912, growing out of a trans-
action with one Johnson ; and he refused to accept the trust, unless
he, too, could be specially indemnified. The instrument then exe-

_ cuted by Carneal, and éalled the “ First Declaration of Trust,” is
as follows:

“This may certify, that whereas William Irwin has deeded to
me the equal undivided moiety of a tract of land, lying east of
Cincinnati, estimated to contain two hundred acres, situate in frac-
tional section number five, township three, and second fractional’
range, and also the north half of lots number one, two, and three,
in square number one, in that part of Cincinnati laid off by the
United States; said conveyance has been made me im trust for
the following purposes, and no other: Whereas, William Irwin
stands indebted to Nicholas Longworth in the sum of $2,912, for
585] so much money by him paid *for said Irwin to John John-
son; and whereas the said Nicholas Longworth stands as indorser
for said Irwin in the Branch Bank of the United States, in Cin.
cinnati, to a large amount, this may, therefore, certify, that I hold
the same in trust; in the first place, to secure said Nicholas Long-
worth in the repayment of the aforesaid sum and interest from the
date; and, secondly, to indemnify and save harmless the said
Nicholas Longworth, as the indorser of said Irwin; and, thirdly,
the overplus to the creditors, if any, of the said Wm. Irwin ; and,
lastly, to account to said Wm. Irwin,-his heirs, executors, and ad-
ministrators, for the remaining balance, if any, in my hands. If
said Irwin should not pay said Nicholas Longworth the aforesaid
sum of money and interest yearly, within five years from this date,
and pay the several notes in the branch bank, on which said
Nicholas Longworth is indorser, or otherwise obtain his discharge
from liability in the same, I am to sell the aforesaid premises at
private sale, or public auction, for cash or on credit, at the discretion
of said Nicholas Longworth, and apply the proceeds in the man-
ner heretofore pointed out: First, the private debt of said Nich-
olas Longworth ; secondly, the notes in the branch bank, on which
said Nicholas Longworth is indorser of said Irwin; thirdly, to pay
from the surplus, if any, other debts due by said Irwin: and, lastly,

496

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 586

Inwin’s Heirs ». Longworth et al.

to account to the said William Irwin, his heirs, executors, admin-
istrators or assigns, for the remaining balance, if any.
“Tomas D, CanwEaL.

“ March 16, 1822.”

Irwin was not consulted as to the terms of this instrument, thus
executed by Carneal and placed in the possession of Longworth,
‘When he came to know them he was much offended. Harsh
words passed between him and Longworth, and they never spoke
to each other again. In their last interview, however, Longworth
had proposed to “cancel all transactions” if Irwin would procure
his release from the bank. This the bank refused. Carneal then
interposed his friendly offices. He proposed to persuade Long-
worth to let the property remain in him “ag further se- [586
eurity to Longworth” for his liability as indorser, “ atonz.” To
this Longworth assented, or, as he says, “went a step beyond,” by
releasing Irwin from all other liabilities to him. Longworth drew
a paper to this effect, which Carneal showed to Irwin, who agreed
to the substance, but not to the. “wording.” Carneal drew an-
other, which obviated Irwin’s objection. It has no date, but was
signed by Irwin and Longworth, and left with Carneal for safe-
keoping. Wo other person ever saw it until it was exhibited in this
case.

This paper, called, by way of distinction, “The Second Dec-
lavation of Trust,” reads as follows:

«The real estate transferred to Thomas D. Carneal; to continue
as collateral security for Nicholas Longworth’s indemnity, as in-
dorser of William Irwin, in the Bank of the United States, or until
said Irwin releases said Longworth from said indorsements.

“The claim against Phillips to be assigned when judgment is
obtained, to be applied to the discharge of Jabez Longworth’s
debt, due from Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank. Longworth to
give a receipt for any balance due him on the amount paid for
‘William Irwin, on account of Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank, and

“ yelease said Irwin from the debt due for moneys paid Johnson
and look to the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank for the same.

(Signed,) “Wroram Inwiy, ,

«“Nicnoras Loyneworrs.”

Of this second declaration of trust, Longworth, in his answer,
gives the following account:

«TJ concluded to go a step beyond the proposal of Mr. Carneal.

VOL. XX—32 497

587, 588 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Irwin's Heirs o. Longworth ot al.

LI accordingly said to Mr. Carneal, ‘I will go beyond the proposal ;
I will absolutely discharge William Irwin from the $3,900, or about
that sum, due me (being the amount of a debt I paid of his to the
Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank), and also release him from the
payment of the $2,912 lent him, and its interest, and for which he
587] was to have given his note with *your indorsement, and
look to the bank for it, if they should ever be able to pay it.’ Tho
latter was a swum borrowed of John Johnson by William Irwin, to
relieve the bank, and lent by me to Irwin to pay Johnson; and
this was an additional reason with respondent, at the time of the
Joan, to require the note with Carneal’s indorsement. For, re-
spondent having been (if not then) a director in the bank, he
‘was apprehensive that Mr. Irwin would be less particular about
paying it. I proposed that Mr. Irwin should have the Phillips
claim prosecuted to judgment, and, when in judgment, assigned
to me, on account of the Jabez Longworth money loaned him, to
which they agreed, and it was inserted in the trust.

“And respondent did, as part of the same proposal, agreo that
the deed of trust to Carneal should continue for his indemnity as
indorser in the Bank of the United States alone, and should be
given up whenever that debt was paid by Irwin, or respondent’s re-
lease obtained. Mr. Carneal stated this arrangement to Mr. Irwin,
who, he informed me, was highly pleased with it, and had requested
him to have it reduced to writing, to prevent future misunderstand-
ing. It was drawn by Mr. Carneal, under the supervision of Mr.
Irwin, and was by us signed, and by us left in the hands of Mr.
Irwin for safe-keeping.”

On the death of Wm, Irwin, Carneal, the trustee, and White-
man, the son-in-law, were appointed administrators, with the will
annexed. Tho estate was probably insolvent, although no such re~
turn was made by the administrators; nor has there ever been
any formal settlement of the estate by them. Longworth has
never presented to them any account or vouchers for his
claim against the estate. In the, meantime, the property mort-
gaged by Irwin to the United States Branch Bank, has beon all
sold, and left a deficit, which Longworth says amounted, with in-
terest, on January 1, 1839, to $19,000. This amount he claims to
have paid. .

On January 11, 1839, the heirs of Wm. Irwin (Lewis Whiteman
588]. acting for his children), executed an order *of conveyance

498 ,

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 589

Trwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

without any consideration paid to them, directing Carneal to con-
vey the city lots to Archibald Irwin, and the undivided half of the
“hill tract,” to Nicholas Longworth. Of this paper the follow-
ing is a copy: .

«“ Whereas, on August 13, 1821, William Irwin, deceased, deeded
to Thomas D. Carneal a certain lot of ground on the corner of
Fourth and Ludlow streets, in the city of Cincinnati, and the un-
divided half of two hundred acres of land on the hills east of said
city, in trust for the use of Archibald Irwin, to discharge the
debts of William Irwin & Son; and whereas, subsequently the said
William Irwin, deceased, did, by written memorandum, agree that
the property aforesaid should be held for the security of Nicholas
Longworth, as his indorser in the Bank of the United States; now,
iknow all men by these presents, that we, the undersigned, heirs
of William Irwin, deceased, do hereby authorize said Thomas D.
Carneal to execute a deed to said Archibald Irwin for the lots
aforesaid, and to the said Nicholas Longworth a deed for the land
aforesaid, and do hereby express our free consent and approbation
to the same, as heirs of said doceased. Witness our hands and
seals at Cincinnati, January 11, 1839.

“L, Warreman, [u. 8.]
«J, FP. Irwin, = [t. 8.]
«Ww. Irwin, [z. s.]
“A, Inwin, [z. s.]

“Witness: N. Mogru.”

Under this order, Carneal, the trustee, on January 21, 1839,
conveyed the city lots to Archibald Irwin, and the hill tract to
Nicholas Longworth, they having agreed to such a division of the
property, after contending for many years that the trust had been
created for the single benefit of the one or the other, as the claim
happened to be preferred. On executing these conveyances,
Carneal took from the grantees receipts, of which copies are as
follow, viz:

“ Received, Cincinnati, January 17, 1839, from Thomas D. Car-
neal, Hisq., a deed for the lot mentioned in the within *mem- [589
orandum, which I acknowledge to be in full of all claims against
the estate of William Irwin, deceased, for liabilities for debts of
William Irwin & Son. .

“ ARoHIBALD Irwin.”

“T have received from Thomas D. Carneal, a quitclaim deed for

499

590 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Irwin’s Heizs v. Longworth ot al.

one hundred acres of land, more or less, east of Cincinnati, which

conveyances wero made me by the order of the heirs of William

Irwin, deceased, and which I accept in full of all claims and de-

mands against the estate. Nicnotas Loneworrs.
“Crnomnatt, January 21, 1839.” .

Tndorsed on the back:
“The conveyance is for the undivided half of two hundred acres,
more or less, Nicnotas Loneworrx.”

The following is the explanation given by Thomas D. Carneal,
Archibald Irwin, and N. G. Pendleton, as to the manner in which
the above order for a conveyance was obtained, and the purpose
for which it was required. Carneal says:

“That order [to convey] was obtained through N. G. Pendle-
ton, Esq., who acted, in the negotiation of compromise, as the
friend of Mr. Archibald Irwin, and in this way. Isaid to Mr. Pen-
dleton, Longworth and Irwin having agreed, I, as trustee, will not
make the conveyance unless so ordered to do so by the heirs of
Mr. William Irwin. That order must be given for my safety. Mr.
Pendleton agreed with me in opinion—agreed to obtain the order ;
it was obtained, and I made the conveyances accordingly, imme-
diately after the order was given. . . . At the time the order
‘was given on me by the heirs of Mr. William Irwin, deceased, to
make the deeds to Archibald Irwin and Nicholas Longworth, there
was an unpleasant misunderstanding between Mr. Archibald Ir-
win and myself, or his brothers, Mr. William Irwin, or Mr. Jamos
B. Irwin; hence, I had no conversation with either, on the subject
of the order, and, through Mr. N. G. Pendleton, required the order
of the heirs to make the deeds to Longworth and Archibald Irwin,
before I would make the deeds.”

590] *Archibald Irwin, in his deposition, says :

“My brother William was fifteen years old in the January pre-
ceding the execution of that deed, and my brother James was thir-
teen years old in April of that year, 1821. They never had any
means of knowing the trust under which the property was con-
veyed or holden, within my knowledge. I never talked with either
of them of the trust deed subsequently. They knew, generally,
that there was a controversy between Mr. Longworth and myself
about some property, but they never knew anything about the de-
tails of that controversy from me. . . There was no personal

500

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 591

Irwin's Heirs v. Longworth et al.

interview between Mr. Longworth, Mr. Carneal, and myself, in re-
gard to the compromise. My friend, Colonel Pendleton, passed
between myself and Mr. Carneal, and Mr. Longworth. He, Col-
onel Pendleton, brought me a paper, which ho said Mr. Long-
worth requested, or required I should sign, and asked me whether
I thought my brothers would sign it. I told him that I had no
doubt that they would sign anything that I would, adding that
they had no interest, as I verily believed, at the time, that they
had not. If I had not believed that my brothers had no interest,
Tshould never have made the compromise. . . . . . They
had no knowledge that they had any interest in the trust property
—that I am aware of; and I verily believe that they had no
knowledge whatever that they had any legal claim. I never, as
I have before stated, viewed them as having any rights. I con-
sidered that the property equitably and justly belonged to myself.
I had no conversation with them prior to, and at the execution of
the paper above referred to, to the best of my knowledge and be-
Hief, in relation to the subject. Idid not go to them with the paper
for their signatures. . . . Neither William nor James took
any part in the compromise between Longworth and myself, that
I knew of, except signing the paper. 1 have no knowledge, nor
do I believe that they, at the time, had any knowledge of a reccipt
given to Carneal, by either Longworth or myself. . . . They
had no knowledge, to the best of my belief, of the state of the ac«
counts *between the estate of their father, William Irwin, [591
and Mr. Longworth; if they did, they knew more about it than
I did myself.”

N. G. Pendleton says: “By the authority of Archibald Irwin, L
informed Carneal, that, in order to settle their conflicting claims
to the trust property, if he would convey to Irwin the lots on
Fourth street, he might convey the country property to Long-
worth. After some time, Carneal informed me that Longworth
assented to their arrangement; but that he (Carneal), for his secu-
rity, must have the assent of the heirs of William Irwin in writing.
Such assent was procured, and thereupon Carneal conveyed the
property according to the arrangement. . . . To the best of
my recollection, I had no conversation with William Irwin or with
James F. Irwin with respect to the negotiation.”

Lewis Whiteman says that the administrators never considered
that this “hill land” constituted any portion of the ostate, for the

501

es

592 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Irwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

reason that Archibald Irwin insisted that his father had created
.the trust in Carneal to secure him for debts and moneys which he
had advanced and was bound to pay for William Irwin & Son;
and that Mr. Longworth claimed that the property conveyed was
to secure him for his indorsemonts for William Irwin, and conse-
quently that the whole would be absorbed in satisfying these
several claims. . . . He says he has no recollection of holding
any conversation with William Irwin and James F. Irwin on the
subject of signing the paper. They were not present when wit-
ness signed.

The ‘granting clause of the deed from William Irwin to Thomas
D. Carneal is irregular in this, that it names “ Willlam Irwin” as
grantee, instead of Thomas D. Carneal. The habendum, etc., is
“to the only proper use and behoof of the said Thomas D. Car-
neal, his heirs and assigns forever.”

Longworth had taken possession of the property in controversy
some ten years before he received his deed from Carneal. In July
592] 1831, he wrote a letter to C. K. Smith, the then owner *of
the other undivided half of the “hill tract, in which he used this.
Janguage:

“TI go east soon, and before going I am anxious to bring my
business to a close with Irwin’s estate. This will be effected by
my releasing to the heirs, on their paying me a certain sum, or my
buying out their equity of redemption. In either case it will be im-
portant for me to buy your reservation, and the more so to effect a-
division, if I release to them.” . 4

The property is now confessedly of great value. Is is believed
that, from the mass of pleading, evidence, and exhibits, enough

* has been extracted and abstracted to present with fairness the con-
trolling facts in the case.

Wa. M. Corry, T. Warxur, T. Ewine, H. WH. Honrnr, and
Puen & Prnpteroy, for complainants.

T. Waker, for complainants, argued :

I. That Longworth acquired from Carneal the exact title, and
no more, which Carneal acquired from Irwin; so that Longworth
became trustee, first, for his own indemnity, and secondly, for the
representatives of Irwin, who yet have an equity of redemption
not divested by foreclosure, conveyance, or lapse of time.

- IL. The effect of the order to convey, executed for the safety of
502

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 593.

Irwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

Carneal, merely divested him of the trust, and devolved it upon
Longworth.

III. The order did not have the effect to release the equity of
redemption of Irwin’s heirs, because they were not aware of any
such right. They signed it under’ the mistaken belief that they

Li no interest in the property. 1 Story’s Hq., secs. 122, 140, 147;
fEeynam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 212; Turner v. Harvey, 1 Jacob, 169 ; 4
‘Cond. Eq, 79; and see Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Merivale, 171;
Willan v. Willan, 16 Ves. 72; Bowles v. Stewart, 1 Sch. & Lef.
209; Barstow v. Kilington, 5 Ves. 593; Bell v. Gardiner, 4 Man. &
Gr, 11, or 43 B.C. L. 16; D’Oliff v. South Sea Co., cited 6 Ves.
601; Washburn *v. Merrills, 1 Day, 139; 4 Kent’s Com. [593
158 ; Fonblanque, 107 ; Hullet v. Collins, 10 How. U. 8. 174.

IV. The complainants are within the rules established by these
authorities. They executed the order in ignorance of the material
fact, that they could have claimed a reconveyance by reim- ~
bursing Longworth for what he had paid to the branch bank. A
circumstance, not only tending to prove their ignorance, but to
account for it, is the false statement of a most material fact, con-
tained in the recital of the order to convey. The statement is, that
their father conveyed this property to Carneal “in trust for the
use of Archibald Irwin, to discharge the debts of William Irwin
& Son.”

Again, the total want of consideration is a very pregnant cir-
cumstance. It is not pretended that complainants ever received
one cent for relinquishing their claim.

T, Ewine, on same side, argued:

That the deed from Irwin to Carnoal did not convey the legal
title. 4 Kent’s Com. 468 ; 2 Black. 298; Goodtitle v. Gibbs, 5 Barn.
& Cres. 709; Deaver v. Rice, 3 Battles’ N. C. 433; Seymour’s case,
10 Coke, 419; Sammes’ case, 6 T. Coke, 467; Baldwin’s case, 2
Coke, 22; Windsmere v. Hobart, Hob. 482, 318 b, and note; Dod-
well v. Gibbs, 5 Barn. & Ores. 709; 12 Eng. C. L. 359; Coke Lit.
231, a; Shep. Touch. 75; Shyne v. Topham, 3 Hast, 115.

4. H. Hunrer argued, on the part of the complainants:

I. That they were induced to give their order to the trustee, Car-
neal, to convey, in ignorance of their rights and of the truth of
the facts upon which their rights depended, and by reason of an un-
true (though not a fraudulent) representation of the facts embodied

. 503

BO, 595 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Inwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

in the writing containing their order, in regard to the trusts under
which Mr. Carneal in fact held the title.

II. That there was not, in truth and fact, any contract or agree-
594] ment made between said Longworth and the heirs ; or *be-
tween him and the administrators of the estate of William Irwin,
whereby they agreed to give, and he to receive, said lands in pam
ment of his claims against said estate ; and,

III. That if it had been so agrecd, under a condition of ignos,
rance on the part of the complainants, as aforesaid, of their rights,
and to their injury, a court of equity will, upon the equitable terms
of full payment to the respondent of his demands, for the security
of which the trust was created, let them in to redeem.

V. Worraiveron, for defendant Longworth :

I. What was the effect of the deed to Carneal, without some
declaration, in writing, executed by him, specifying the purposes
for which he held the lands conveyed to him? There is no trust
apparent in the deed, which purports to be in consideration of
$5,000, which in fact was not paid. If the decd to Carneal was
made by Irwin with intent to defraud his creditors, then it is within
the statute of frauds, and void as to those creditors, but valid as to
all other partics, and transmits tho legal title to Carneal, beyond
the control of Irwin or power of Longworth. Neithor, if such be
the purpose of the transaction, can coerce Carneal, at law or in
chancery, to execute the trusts, for which he had in writing de-
clared he received the title to said lands. 18 Ohio, 418; 16 Ohio,
54; 15 Ohio, 430; 14 Ohio, 54; 10 Ohio, 162; 7 Ohio, pt. 1, p.78;
pt. 2, p.70; 4 Ohio, 418; 3 Ohio, 627; 1 Ohio, 469. Tf, then, the
deed was made with the intent to defraud creditors, without or
with the declaration of trust, it transmits the legal title to the
grantee beyond the control of the grantor, or of the beneficiaries
in the declaration of trust.

If the deed was made, not with an intent to defraud creditors,
but with intent that Carneal should in good faith hold the prop:
erty on special trust to secure Longworth or Archibald Irwin, then
the deed would transmit the legal title to Carneal, and he would
595] hold the property in his own right, and *would be liable for
‘the consideration expressed in the deed, unless he executed, in
writing, a declaration in trust, as required by the statute of frauds.
4 Russell, 423; 9 Conn. 96 ; 6 Hill, 219; 2 Story’s ae sec. 1199, n,
2; 2 Murphy, 279

504

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 596

Trwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

Tt is true, implied or resulting trusts are raised simply by
operation of law, and require no written declaration or written
proof; but express trusts must be evidenced by writing, though
they even be created by parol. 5 Ohio, 255; 4 Kent’s Com. 306.

We then conclude, the effect of the deed to Carneal, without
the declaration of trust, signed by him, of March 16, 1822, or some.
other declaration ‘of trust signed by him, would be to transmit to
him absolutely the lands thereby conveyed, and he would be liable
only for the consideration money expressed in said deed.

IL. What was the effect of the declaration of trust executed by
Carneal, March 16, 1822? The deed vests in him the legal title,
by virtue of which he could recover possession, 7 Ohio, pt.1, p. 76
—pt. 2, p.70; 15 Ohio, 408. If, then, as we maintain, the deed and
declaration of trust were intended to defraud the creditors of the
grantor Irwin, he could receive no aid-in chancery to enforce the
trust, but would be repelled. The complainants in both bills—his
heirs at law—are in no better condition than he was. 15 Ohio,
430; 4 Bibb, 70.

This brings us to consider the document executed by Irwin and
Longworth, and deposited with Carncal. It is no part of the deed
to Carneal, nor the declaration of trust executed by him. It is
not under seal, and it is made at a different time. It is in fact a
distinct and independent agreement, binding upon Longworth
and Irwin alone. 3 Bibb, 10; 10 Ohio, 438; 5 Ohio, 518; 9 Conn.
378. After this arrangoment, the property remained in Carneal
in trust, as before, except so far as that arrangement changed the
rights of Longworth ; but, as between the original parties, it did
not purify the original grant and certificate of fraud, and make
them valid. 5 Cowen, *571. The trust might have been [596
abandoned and re-arranged. 10 Ohio, 232; 12 Ohio, 339.

This point has no other bearing upon the case than this: If it
does not purify the original arrangement, it does not enable tho
complainants to invoke the aid of the chancellor in the execution
of the trust, any more than the original arrangement would, and
presents no grounds for their aid, or to prevent their rejection
from a court of equity. Butif it does purify the original arrange-
ment, and cleanse it of all fraud, and make it tractable in a court
of chancery as to Longworth, upon the principles announced in 8
Ohio, 533, then the complainants may ask the enforcement of the

trust.
505

7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Irwin's Heirs v. Longworth et al.

Can the complainants assume they executed the order of
January 11, 1839, without consideration and under a mistake?

1. As to the consideration, The order is under seal, and a seal
always imports a consideration.

But it may be said, we can not go out of the order to show the
inducement to its execution. We believe it is every day’s practice
between parties, to go back of a deed to ascertain the real con-
sideration. You can not contradict the consideration expressed
in the deed to have passed, but you can show a further or other
consideration. 1 A. K. Marsh. 582; 2 Ohio, 185; 5 Ohio, 258.
When fraud is charged, the whole matter is open for examination.
15 Ohio, 600.

These complainants are certainly charged with constructive, if
not actual notice. The legal effect of notice, constructive or actual,
is the same. 2 Hill, 461.- They are chargeable with their ances-
tor’s knowledge of the trust. 2 Ohio, 386; 6 Ohio, 238; 7 Ohio, 80,
pt. 2; 8 Ohio, 221; 15 Ohio, 430. Notice to their trustee is notice
tothem. 11 Wheat. 78; Story’s Agency, secs, 139, 140; 2 Hill, 461;
5 Obio, 425; 10 Ohio, 83, 465. ‘The order was sufficient notice to
put them on inguiry, 1 Gall. 41; 7 Conn. 324; 9 Conn. 286; 3
Conn. 446; 4 Cowen, 717; 4 Obio, 446; 5 Ohio, 425, 452; 8 Ohio,
597] 251; 10 Ohio, 83, 415; 13 Ohio, 426. Longworth was in
possession of the hill lands, and that was notice. 5 Ohio, 425,
452; 7 Ohio, 84, pt. 2; Ohio, 288; 18 Ohio, 426. There was no
such mistake, or ignorance of material fact, as will avoid the deed
to Longworth. 1 Story’s Bq., secs. 140, 157; 2 Kent, 484, 490; 5
Mason, 677; 11 Conn. 143; 2 Sumner, 390, 394; 3 Story, 700; 1
Ohio, 450; 18 Conn. 108; 9 Piek. 212. The resulting equity of the
heirs was transferred by the order to convey, and deed in pursu-_
ance of it, 13 Ohio, 426; 8 Ohio, 217; 15 Ohio, 427; 2 Story’s Hq,
sec. 1199; 8 How. 248, 235; 8 Peters, 582; Fell on Guaranties, 39,
sec. 28; 1 Bos. & Pul. 158; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 281; 5 Ohio, 257.

Carneal, as trustee, had power to sell; and after such sale the
right of redemption would be gone, except for extrinsic causes.
10 Ohio, 204; 1 Bald. 154; 4J. J. Marsh. 466; 2 Johns. Oh, 23; 4
Tred. Bg. 137, 288; 2 Gill, 376; 16 Ohio, 478, 76; 15 Obio, 427 ;
Sug. on Powers, 475; 7 Ohio, 79, 118, 216, pt. 2; 8 Ohio, 221; 12

. Ohio, 193; 2 Ohio, 194.

‘The administrators of Irwin, by assenting to the sale to Long-

worth, as they did by the deed to him and order to convey, cut off
506

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Irwin's Heirs v. Longworth et al-

the resulting trust in favor of the heirs. 6 Ohio, 237; 7 Ohio 80,
73, pt. 2; 15 Ohio, 696, 427; 5 Ohio, 540; 8 Ohio, 24; 17 Ohio,
356 ; 2 Johns. Ch. 23.

As the legal title was in Carneal, Whiteman only had courtesy
in his deceased wife’s resulting equity ; and by the order of Janu-
ary 11, 1839, that passed to Longworth. 4 Kent, 27; 1 Hill. Dig.,
sec. 38; 8 Johns. 207; 5 Conn. 235 ; 1 Powell on Mortg. 312; 5 Pick.
146; 3 Powell on Mortg. 922; 1 Sumner 128; 4 Mason, 414; 9
Paige, 168; 16 Pet. 54; 7 Wheat. 548; 4 Pet. 506; 6 Pet, 402; 2
Johns. Ch. 216; 7 Johns. Ch. 125; 7 Merivale 360. As to what is
a mortgage or deed of trust: 8 Ohio, 24; 11 Ohio, 334; 16 Ohio,
76, 469; 17 Ohio, 356; 15 Ohio, 427; 19 Ohio, 215. The deed to
Carneal was not a mortgage, but a deed of trust. When the
trust is satisfied, there might be a resulting trust, but no equity
of redemption. 3 Hill, 101. Carneal could sell *absolutely, [598
to execute his trust. 4 Kent, 318; 19 Conn. 134,

Henry Sranzzry, for Longworth :

The trust to Carneal was coupled with a power to sell absolutely.
Sug. Vend. 393, 169; 3 P. Wms. 9; 2 Vern. 153; Long ». Long, 3
Ves. Jr. 445; Kenworthy v. Bate, 6. Ves. Jr. 795; Barr v. McHwen
et al., 1 Bald. 0. C. 154; 9 Ves. Jr. 52; Osgood v. Franklin, 2 Johns.
Ch. 26. The decd to Carneal was not a mortgage. Morris v. Way,
16 Ohio, 217. A sale even under a mortgage containing a power
to sell, divests the equity of redemption. 1 Powell on Mortg.
12; Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 Johns. Ch. 50; Turner v. Johnson, 10
Ohio, 208. Lo 7

Gzorex E. Puce & Penpuzron, for complainants, in reply,
argued the following propositions:

I. The trust is evidenced by the paper which Irwin and Long-
worth signed.

1. The trustee could not convey without the consent of the heirs,

2, The trust was not fraudulent.

II. The administrators did not and could not release the equity
of redemption.

III. ‘Che original complainants are entitled to redeem the real
estate.

1. The order to the trustee does not release their right.

2, The order was without consideration.

3. They were ignorant of their rights at the time.

4, The order receites a material falsehood.

599, 600 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Trwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

5. There was suppressio veri throughout the transaction.

IV. Of the genoral equity of the mortgagor's heirs, and herein
of the right to an account, and the principles for stating the same.

I, Had the trustee a power of sale?

1. Under the first declaration of trust.

599] *The counsel for the defendants has insisted that the
paper which Irwin and Longworth signed, can not be taken as a
declaration of trust, because it wants the trustee’s signature. And
he claims, hence, that Carneal’s declaration, notwithstanding
Irwin’s repudiation of it, must be taken as evidencing some part,
if not all, of the trust. We do not understand any of the authori-
ties which he has cited as supporting that doctrine. 1 Pow. Mortg.
“151; Cottingham ». Fletcher, 2 Atk. 155.

2. By virtue of the absolute deed.

The following authoritics cited in Mr. Stanbery’s argument,
have no application : Sug. Pow. 393; Barr v. McEwen, 1 Bald. 154;
Long v. Long, 5 Ves. 445; Kenworthy v. Bate, 6 Ves. 795.

See the following: Cooper v. Whitney, 3 Hill, 101; Greene v.
Dodge, 6 Ohio, 80; Kramer v. The Steubenville Bank, 15 Ohio,
253; McConnell v. Scott, Ib. 401. In Morris v. Way, 16 Ohio,
469 ; Turner v. Johnson, 10 Ohio, 208; Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 Johns.
Ch. 45; Brisbane v. Stoughton, 17 Ohio, 482, there was an ex-
press power of sale. The Trust Company v. Reeder, 18 Ohio, 35,
is decisive.

3, Was the trust fraudulent?

I refer, on this point, to Tripp v. Vincent, 3 Barb. Ch. 603;
Swan’s Stat. 422, Stat. of Frauds; Swan, 717, 718, Ch. Act; Barr
v. Hatch, 3 Ohio, 527; Repplior v. Orrich, 7 Obio, 147, pt. 2;
Stevenson v. Agry, Ib. 248; Renick v. The Chillicothe Bank, 8
Ohio, 533; Swift v. Holridge, 10 Ohio, 232; 12 Ohio, 339; 16 Ohio,
78; 7 Ohio, 78, pt. 2; 13 Ohio, 584.

II. Did or could the administrators release the equity of re-
demption? Barr v. Hatch, 3 Ohio, 527; Howard v. Babcock, 7
Ohio, 78, pt. 2; Ludlow v. Cooper, 13 Ohio, 584.

They did not, we answer, for several reasons.

1. Neither of them professed, at the time, to act in that char-
acter. Whiteman acted as an heir, and Carneal as a trustee.

2, They neither acted together, nor in concert, at any stage of
600] *tho business; yet the office of administrator, though con-
fided to two, is a joint office.

508

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 601

Inwin's Heirs v. Longworth et al.

3. Archibald Irwin sent his receipt to Carneal on the back of
the original order, and that suggested to Carneal the propriety
of taking a receipt from Longworth also. But Whiteman did not
even know of this transaction.

4. The administrators did not consider this property as part of
the assets of their intestate, and never acted in respect of it, con-
sequently, as administrators.

5. Carneal, the trustee, required the order of the heirs before he
would convey; and it did not then occur to him, strangely, that
Whiteman’s signature and his own, as administrators, would suffice.

6. The administrators and Archibald Irwin never had any deal-
ings or account between them.

7. The administrators never had any account from Longworth
in respect of this land.

8. The administrator had, long previousiy, settled the estate.

III. Did the trustee execute any power of sale? 8 Sug. Vend.
228; 1 Powell on Mortg. 123, a, and the pages subsequent; 3 Sug.
Vend. 240; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr. 191; The York Buildings Company v.
Mackensie, 8 Bro. Parl. Cas. 42. As Longworth had possession, -
and did not account for profits, it is a good cause for ordering an
account and redemption.

As to the order of January 11, 1839, I claim that its legal effect
is only to change the trustee, and not to destroy the trust, Tho
order can have no operation, beyond its legal import, for several
reasons:

1. It contains a false and material recital

2. It was executed by William and James F. Irwin, whilst
utterly ignorant of their rights.

3. The character of the trust, the state of the accounts, the con-
dition of the property—all were concealed from them at that time.
Le Neve v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 646; Foster v. Swasey, 2 Woodb. &
M. 217; Veazie v. Williams, 8 How. U. S. 134; 3 Sug. Vend. 453;
1 Story’s Eq. 5; Leger v. *Bonaffe, 2 Barb. 8.0. 475; Wil- [601
liams v. Champion, 6 Ohio, 170; 2 Phil. Ev. (0. & H. Notes)
209; Hobbs v. Norton, 1 Vern. 186; Raw v. Pote, 2 Vern. 289;
Neville v. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. Ch. 543; Bruce v. Ruler, 2 Mann. &
R. 3; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Vos. 182; Louisiana Civil Code, art.
1875, and art. 116 of the Code Napoleon; 1 Story’s Eq. 207, 208,
4 ed.; Pearson v. Morgan, 2 Bro. Ch. 385; Hobbs v. Norton, 1
Vern, 136; Roosevelt v. Fulton, 2 Cow. 129; Smith v, Richards,
509

602 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Irwin’s Heirs o. Longworth et al.

13 Pet. 37; Evans v. Llewellyn, 2 Bro. ©. Cas. 150; Perkins
Gay, 35. & R. 331. .

4, There was no consideration to William and James F. Irwin
for their signatures. 2 Johns. Ch. 30; St. John v. Turner, cited in1
Powell on Mortgage, 122, 116; Longworth v. Flagg, 10 Ohio, 300;
10 How. U. S. 185; 1 Vern. 8; 1 Eldon, 59; 7 Johns. Ch. 40; 2
Oow. 332; 4 Dow’s Parl. Cas. 16.

IV. Was this trust, in equity, anything but @ mortgage?

I answor in the negative. Baird v. Kirtland, 8 Ohio, 23; Henry
v. Davis, 7 Johns Ch. 42; Clark v. Henry, 2 Cow. 331; Marshallv.
Stewart, 17 Ohio, 357; 1 Powell on Mortgage, 116, 119, 125; 1
Powoll on Mortgage, 157, a, note: the estate of the mortgagor is said
to be an equitable freehold, and an equitable estate of inheritance.
_ As to the objection that the interest of Irwin’s heirs could not
be sold on execution at law, see Jackson v. Williams, 10 Ohio, 69,
and Scott v. Douglas, 7 Ohio, 228, part 1. Woodruff v. Robb, 19
Ohio, 212, is conclusive.

V. Wortnveron, in reply, cited the following authorities as to
defects in the deed from Irwin to Oarneal: Fisher v. Butcher, 19
Ohio, 406 ; 2 Greenl. Cruise, 306, sec. 29; 10 Mod. ; 2 Ventris, 196,
141; Ellicott v. Slupes, 2 N. Hamp. 525; Cole v. Hulme, 8 Barn.
& Ores, 568; 15 Eng. C. L. 300; Carr v. Williams, 10 Ohio, 305; 2
West. Law J. 68; Purcell v. Goshorn, 17 Ohio, 124; 2 Hilliard, 353,
sec. 149; Ib. 325, sec. 15; Big. Dig. 211; Stearns ». Godfrey, 4
602] Shep. (Me.) 158; 4 Dev. & B. *(N.C.) 433; 4 Kent, 468;
Bridge v. Wellington, 1 Mass. 219 ; 2 Thos. Coke, 240; Shep. Touch.
98, 75, 88; 2 Prest. Conv. 440; 3 Hast, 115; Cro. Bliz. 903; 7
Wend. 287; 20 Pick. 514; 2 Hilliard, 326, sec. 19; 2 Greenl. Cruise,
348, sec. 69; Ib. 351, sec. 85; 16 Johns. 172; 4 Mass. 186; 2 Dana,
23 ; 5 Iredell, 580; 7 Monroe, 544; 13 Ohio, 127; 2 Bl. Com. 296;
4 Kent, 495; 10 Johns. 456. ,

Sratpine. J. The questions presented in this case derive their
chief importance from the supposed magnitude of the property in
controversy. They are not new, and, of course, not difficult of
solution, if we give to them the same effect, whether applied to
estates of two thousand or two hundred thousand dollars value.

I shall first examine the objection started to the deed under
which Carneal held the land in controversy. It is said that this
deed. did not transfer the legal title in the premises from Irwin to

510 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Irwin's Heirs y. Longworth et al.

-Oarneal, because, in the granting clause, it purports to be a con-
veyance from William Irwin to “William Irwin,” and not to
Thomas D, Carneal. The objection is not tenable. If we recur to
the deed itself, it sufficiently appears, even in the premises, that Ir-
win bad no intention of retaining the fee in himself, It purports
to be an indenture made between “ William Irwin, of the first
part,” and “Thomas D. Carneal, of the second part.” It acknowl-
edges a consideration of five thousand’ dollars as paid by Thomas
D. Carneal to the said William Irwin, from which consideration
springs the grant made, nominally, to William Irwin, but com-
pletely repudiating him as the “holder of the legal title,” in lan-
guage that can not be misunderstood, and which follows the de-
scription of the lands thus: “And all the estate, right, title, in-
terest, claim and demand of him, the said William Irwin, of, in, and
to the said premises and every part thereo!.”

The parties to a deed must be truly and sufficiently described,
put conveyances are good when made to a grantee by a certain-
designation, without the mention of either the christian or sur-
name, “for “id est certum, quod potest reddi certum.” 4 Kent's [608
Com. 462. .

“ Astrict, literal, and grammatical construction of an instrument,
in its various parts, taken separately, would sometimes be absurd,
sometimes contradictory, and frequently unjust; because against
the manifest intention of the parties. But a liberal consideration
is to be had of the whole instrument, in relation to the subject mat-
ter, to discover what was the true intention of the parties.” Sum~-
ner’s Adm’r, etc. v, Williams, 8 Mass. 174,

Certainly, if we adopt these rules of construction the objection
disappears, for no intelligent mind can read this whole instrument
and be at a loss for the true intent and meaning of the parties.
But in a more critical view of the subject, the deed we are con-
sidering is effectual to pass the fee.

William Irwin could not convey to himself. The ineertion of
his name as the grantee is a nullity. The deed then stands as if no
grantee was named in the “ premises,” and where that is the case,
one named in the “habendum” may take. 2 Hilliard on Real
Prop. 355, sec. 149.

“Tf one give or grant land, habendum, to B., and his heirs, and
he is not named in the premises, yet this is a good deed to make
an estate in fee simple.” Sheppard’s Touchstone, chap. 5, p. 75.

511

604 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Inwin’s Heirs o. Longworth et al.

Here, then, we have a decd, absolute on its face, conveying the
land in controversy to Thomas D. Carneal. It is admitted that
Carneal did not pay, and that be was never expected to pay one
dollar of the consideration money, named in the deed to William
Irwin, for the land.

He says, in his deposition, that William Irwin called upon him
in the year 1821, and said to him: “With your consent, I shall
wake to you a deed for some lots in Cincinnati, and for my inter-
est in a tract of land near this city, held jointly by Wm. H.
Harrison and myself. Mr. Nicholas Longworth will prepare the
604] deed and hand it to you, executed by me, and tale *from
you such a paper as will make the conveyance bona fide and stand
good in law.”

For what purpose was the deed made? In August, 1838,
Nicholas Longworth made a voluntary affidavit, in respect to the
particulars of this transaction, and the same is now produced as

. evidence in the cause.

Tn this affidavit Longworth says he is “ as positive as he can be
of any fact, after the lapse of so many years, that the sole reason
given by William Irwin to him for the conveyance, was to prevent.
certain claims against Irwin & Son from becoming a lien on said
real estate, and for no other reason.”

This is somewhat variant from the reason assigned in his prin-
cipal answer, which was, that Irwin feared the sacrifice of this
property by means of a judgment about to be obtained against
him by the government, as the surety of Smith.. Itis a matter
of no moment, however, so far as the decision in this case is con-
cerned.

Hither version, in connection with what Longworth further
says in the same affidavit, will seem to satisfy a mind of less than
ordinary quickness of apprehension, that Irwin wished to “hinder
and delay creditors; and that Longworth at first consented to
make Carneal a trustee of the property, ostensibly for his benefit
as an indorser at the bank, but in reality, to hold the same for the
use of Irwin.

The explanation of Longworth, as given in his affidavit, is this:

“T then told him that, to stand the test, the conveyance must be
bottomed on a real bona jide transaction. ‘If I have anything to
do with it, is must be so that if called upon we can answer under
oath. I am your indorser to the Bank of the United States, who

512

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 605, 606

Irwin's Heirs v. Longworth et al.

have your mortgage ; 1 do not ask or claim other security. If you
wish, I am willing the property shall be deeded to Carnoal to save
me harmless from any eventual loss as your indorser to the bank.
This can not be ascertained for years, and I will hold the property
safe; but remember, *we may both be called to answer wader [605
oath ; if so conveyed we must distinctly understand that it is to he
held bona fide for that purpose, and that you hereafter wholly rely
on my pleasure whether to let you use or dispose of any of the
property or not.’ To this he readily assented.”

We do not entertain a doubt that up to the moment of the exe-
eution of the “second declaration of trust,” upon an exhibition
of the testimony adduced in this case, a court of chancery would
have given to the general creditors of William Irwin the benefit
of the property embraced in his deed to Carneal. We lay en-
tirely out of view, then, tbe first “declaration” signed by
Thomas D. Carneal, as well because it was part and parcel of a
scheme to delay general creditors, not warranted by the law, as
because it never received, in many of its important details, the
sanction of William Irwin, and was finally abandoned by the par-
ties in interest.

Nicholas Longworth may not impeach this deed of August 13,
1821, for fraud. Asa quasi creditor of the grantor, he chose, by
joining in the second declaration of trust, to regard it as valid
collateral security for the bank debt, and will be bound thereby.
G. & W. Renick v. Bank of Chillicothe, 8 Ohio, 533,

We now “take our departure” with a deed of the premises
from Irwin to Carneal, and a written “declaration of trust,”
signed by Irwin and Longworth and lodged with Carneal, speci-
fying that the estate transferred by said deed to Carneal “shall
continue as collateral security for Nicholas Longworth’s indem-
nity as indorser of William Irwin, in the Bank of the United
States.” .

This is “plain sailing.” The immediate and direct securities
given to the bank by Irwin, and supposed to be ample, were to
be first exhausted. In the event of a deficit, however, the land
and town lots held by Carneal as a naked trustee were to be made
available for its payment.

At this period it must have been considered by all the parties
in interest, that there was a large resulting trust in William
‘Irwin. He could, at any moment, call for a reconveyance [606

VoL, XX—33 "518

607 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Irwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

of all the lands held by Carneal, by paying his bank debt, or by
procuring the release of Longworth in some other way. If mat-
ters wero pushed to extremities, it was believed that the property
directly pledged to the bank would sell for enough, or nearly
enough, to liquidate the whole claim, and leave intact the greater
part of the trust property.

In 1824 William Irwin died, and from that period onward the
equitable interest of Irwin and his heirs séems to have becomo
obseure. The fee of the land was in Carneal, and from 1829 the
possession and apparent ownership existed in Longworth. Lt is
true that Archibald Irwin occasionally gave demonstration that
Longworth was a usurper of his exclusive right. But for long
years, and whilst these complainants were passing from childhood
to manhood, no voice was heard to whisper that the personal rep-
resentatives or heirs at law of William Irwin had any available in-
terest in this great property. Longworth was in possession and
claimed the whole. Archibald Irwin, although out of possession,
claimed the whole, or at least the claims of each were predicated
upon an alleged expenditure of money for William Irwin to so
great an amount as to place the property entirely beyond the
hopes of the administrators on the estate, saying nothing of the
heirs and devisees.

In this condition of things, some time in the year 1838, or in the
beginning of 1839, Archibald Irwin, through his friend N. G.
Pendleton, proposed to Nicholas Longworth a division of the trust
property. The proposition was accepted, and Carneal, the trusteo,
agreed to convey the lands in conformity with their arrangement,
if tho heirs of William Irwin would sign an.order for his safely.
Col. Pendleton, the common friend of Nicholas Longworth and
Archibald Irwin, applied to the latter to ascertain if his brothers,
the present complainants, would probably sign the order. Archi-
bald replied that “they would sign anything that he would, bat
that they had no interest.” The order was obtained and the deeds
607] wore made, by which *Lhomas D. Carneal conveyed to Nich-
olas Longworth all the interest in the “hill tract” which he had
acquired by virtue of the deed from William Irwin; and to Archi-
bald Irwin all the interest in the city lots which he had acquired
from the same source.

Before the execution of this quitclaim deed by Carneal to Long.
worth, no one had the boldness to deny the existence of an out-

514.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Inwin’s Heirs v. Longworth et al.

standing equity of redemption in the heirs of William Irwin.
‘Whether the property was worth the serious exertion of the right
when made subject to the somewhat magnified claims of both
Nicholas Longworth and Archibald Irwin, is another and different
question. Longworth himself admitted, in the most explicit terms,
in his letter to OC. K. Smith, that the heirs of Irwin had ‘an equity
of redemption ” in this property.

How has the conveyance from Carneal affected this right? So
far as it concerns the interest of the children of Louisa Whiteman,
deceased, the condition of things is not changed at all, except that
Thomas D. Carneal has devolved his trust upon Nicholas Long-
worth, who will be made answerable to these children in his stead.
If, however, by any unforeseen reverses of fortune, Longworth
should no longer possess the ability to respond to this class of cestue
que trusts, we do not see how Carncal can escape liability for a
palpable breach of the trust. As it respects the complainants, we
find nothing in their written order of January 11, 1839, which
purports to convey to Longworth their equity in the property.
-Upon its face, the instrument is nothing more than a safeguard to
Carneal in executing deeds to Longworth and Archibald Irwin.
He procured the order to be made, not to pass an equity from the -
heirs of Irwin to anybody, but for his own safety in conveying the
fee of the land to Longworth and Archibald Irwin. He is author-'
ized by the order, so far as the complainants are concerned, to
make the deeds. If we travel outside of the order, and attempt
to establish, by evidence atiunde, that the object had in view by
the parties was to place the whole title to the “hill tract,” legal
and equitable, in Nicholas Longworth, we shall ascer- [608
tain, by the same species of evidence, what is equally fatal to his
claim, to wit, that William Irwin and James F. Irwin, the com-
plainants, were not acting in this business of directing convéy-
ances with that knowledge and understanding of their just rights
which they should possess before they can be bound thereby. 3
Serg. & Rawle, 331; 1 Story’s Eq., sec. 122.

Not only was there an error in reciting, in the paper itself, the
uses to which the estate had beon subjected in the hands of the
trustee ; but, if we may belicve the testimony, these complainants
were taught to believe, by their elder brother, that they had no
interest in the trust property. Under such circumstances, we
should feel bound to interfere and set aside the instrument, if it

515

609 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Griffith et al. v. The Comm’rs of Crawford County, etc.

did, indeed, contain an express relinquishment of their equity of
redemption. -

In Evans v. Lewellyn, 2 Brown’s Ch. 151, a conveyance was
set aside as improvidently entered into, where the plaintifis were
uninformed of their rights, though there was no actual fraud or
imposition, The authorities are numerous to this effect, and I shall
only cite, in addition, the strongly marked case of Hallett ct al. v.
Collins, recently decided in the Supreme Court of the United
States, and reported in 10 How. 174: “The assignee obtained re-
leases, for an inadequate consideration, from the heirs of Collins,
who had just come of age, were poor, and ignorant of their rights.
‘These releases were held void.”

Weare entirely satisfied that the defendant, Nicholas Longworth,
holds the premises commonly called the “hill tract,” consisting of
one hundred acres, more or less, of land, near the city of Cincin-
nati, as the same were conveyed to him by Thomas D. Carneal, in
the character of a mortgagee, for the security of any unpaid bal-
ance of the debt due to the late United States Branch Bank, at Cin-
cinnati, by William Irwin, deceased, upon which the said Long-
worth was surety for said Irwin.

The complainants, as heirs at law of said William Irwin,
609] *deceased, have aright to redeem the premises upon pay-
ment of the mortgage debt and interest. -

A decree will be rendered accordingly.

Hrroscoox, C. J., dissented. See his dissenting opinion in
Appendix B.

JAMES GRIFFITH ET AL. v. THE Commissioners or ORAwForD County
AND THE Ouro AND Inprana RaruRoap Company.

Pending a suit in the common pleas, this court has no constitutional jurisdic-
diction of a motion to dissolye an injunction therein. 1

A special legislative enactment will not confer jurisdiction upon this court to
prevent the operation of an injunction allowed by the common pleas, in
case of which that court has taken jurisdiction.

Obiter dictum by Judge Sparprx@ alone:

‘That the legislaure has no constitutional power to authorize the majority of
citizens in a county to vote a subscription of stock to a railroad company,
that shall be binding on the property of the minority.

516

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 610

Griffith et al. o. The Comm’rs of Crawford County, ete.

urs is a motion to dissolve an injunction reserved in the county
of Crawford.

The complainants filed their bill in the court of common pleas
of said county, representing that they are citizens and tax-payers
therein ; that at the annual election, held in October, 1848, the
question of authorizing the commissioners of said county to sub-
scribe $100,000 to the capital stock of the Ohio and Pennsylvania
Railroad Company was submitted to the legal voters of said county,
under the provisions of an act of the general assembly of the State
of Ohio, *passed February 26, 1846 (44 Ohio L.L.192),and [610
a majority of the votes cast on said question was in favor of such
subscription ; that said Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad was not
located through said Crawford county, or to the town of Bucyrus,
and consequently the commissioners of said county refused to sub-
scribe stock thereto; that on the 20th day of March, 1850, the
Ohio and Indiana Railroad Company was incorporated by an act
of the general assembly of Ohio (48 L. L. 297), and that after-
ward, on’ the 23d day of March, 1850, the same gonoral assembly
passed an act authorizing and requiring the county commissioners
of said Crawford county to change the subscription of stock au-
thorized to be made to the “ Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany,” and subscribe the same to the capital stock of any company
which was then, or thereafter might be, incorporated to construct a
railroad commencing or terminating at any point in, or passing
through or adjoining the town of Bucyrus, the county-seat of said
county (48 L. L. 277); that pursuant to the provisions of this last-
mentioned act, the county commissioners did subscribe $100,000 to
tho capital stock of said “Ohio and Indiana Railroad Company ;”
that said commissioners issued the bonds of said county for $10,000,
and delivered the same to said company, and that said bonds are
now in the possession and under control of said company ; that
the balance of said bonds have not yet been issued by said com-
missioners, but that the officers of said company are importuning
them for the same; that said subscription was contrary to law, etc.

The prayer of the Dill is, that the company may be restrained
from selling, or in any manner disposing of said bonds; and that
the commissioners be enjoined from issuing additional bonds, as
well as from levying a tax for the payment of those already issued,
and for general relief.

On November 6, 1850, an injunction was allowed by the presi-

517

611, 612 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Griffith et al. ». The Comm'rs of Crawford County, ete.

dent judge of said court of common pleas, which has continued
in force until the present time. .

611] *On March 24, 1851, the general assembly of the State of
Ohio enacted, that in any cause in equity, pending in the counties
of Wyandot and Orawford, wherein an injunction has been allowed
by the court of common pleas, or the president judge thereof, the
party against whom such injunction has been allowed, “ may file a
motion in the Supreme Court of the county in which such cause is pend-
ing, or in the Supreme Court in bank, with copies of the papers in the
cause in the common pleas; and the Supreme Court in the county,
or the court in bank, shall have competent power and jurisdiction to
hear and determine said motion; and such determination shall be
duly certified back to the common pleas, by the clerk of the Su-
preme Court or the court in bank, as the case may be.” 49 Local
L, 321.

Under this act, the motion to dissolve the injunction in this case,
was filed in the Supreme Court for Crawford county, at its last
term, and was reserved for the opinion of all the judges here.

Tt is objected by complainants below :

1. That the question, as to the dissolution of the injunction, is
not properly in this court for its decision.

2. That the act authorizing the county of Crawford to subscribe
to the capital stock of the railroad in question, is void; for the
reason, that it is in violation of the great and essential principles
of liberty and free government, as recognized and established by
the “bill of rights.”

C. K. Wazson, O. Bowsn, and W. H. Grsson, for complainants.

O. Bowen claimed :

1. That the following authorities warrant the intervontion of
chancery in all cases of this description: Mohawk & H. R. Railroad
v. Archer, 6 Paige, 88; Oakley v. Trustees of Williamsburg, Ib.
164; Gardner v. Trustees of Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Belknap v.
Belknap, Ib. 463; Cooper et al. v. Alden, Harrington’s Ch. 72;
612] Bonaparte v. The *Camden and Amboy Railroad Oo., Bald.
©. C. 205; Corning et al. v. Lawrence, 6 Johns. Ch. 440; Living-
ston v. Livingston, Ib. 497; Shand v. Aberdeen Canal Co., 2 Dow.
519; Bradley v. Comm'rs, 2 Humph. 428. See, as to this case,
U.S. Hq, Dig. 67, art, 122, .

2. It is claimed that the bills are multifarious.

All of those who sue have a common interest to avoid the imposi-

518

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Griffith ot al. v. ‘The Comm'rs of Crawford County, ete.

tion of the proposed tax upon them. Story’s Hq. Pl., sec. 112; Mit-
ford’s Pl. 408; Cooper v. Alden, Har. Ch.; Corning v. Lawrence,
6 Jobns. Ch.; 4 Cow. 682; 2 Sim. & Stu. Ch.

Under the act of February 28, 1846 (44 Gen. Laws, 82), and the
act of March 23, 1850 (48 Local Laws, 277), a vote of the people
was required before a subscription could be made, or even
“changed.” Smith’s Com. 879; Rex v. Lexdale et al., 1 Burr. 447;
Oburch v. Cook, 2 Mass. 21.

C.K. Wasson maintained that the case is not properly in this
court for decision. This court acquired no jurisdiction by virtue
of the act of March 24, 1851. Const. of Ohio, of 1802, art. 3, sec.
1; sec. 2, same art.

To what class of cases does this motion belong? Does it confer
original jurisdiction? We think not. The court-of common pleas
took original jurisdiction by bill, and two courts can not hold
original jurisdiction of the same subject-matter. Is such jurisdic-
tion appellate? We think not. It is an appeal from nothing in
the common pleas. The motion in the Supreme Court vacates no
order or decree in the common pleas. The acts authorizing the
county of Crawford to subscribe to the capital stock of the railroad
in question, are void, for the reason that they are in violation of
the general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free gov-
ernment, recognized and established by the bill of rights.

The right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and
holding it inviolate, subservient only to the public welfare, on pay-
ment of compensation in money, is expressly secured. It follows
that the grant of legislative power in the Constitution *of [613
Ohio, must be in harmony with the great principles and objects of
free government. The bill of rights thus becomes the basis on
which the general assembly is authorized to exercise legislative
power. To determine the extent of the legislative authority under
our constitution, we ave not confined to the letter of the constitu-
tion, but we may properly look to its declared principles and ob-
jects; and a statute violating these, is as clearly void as one vio-
lating the letter of the constitution. Take, for example, the oft-
repeated illustration of a law making a man a judge in his own
case ; such a law would contravene a declared principle only of
our state government. The declaration of principles in our bill of
rights, “that all men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain natural, inherent, and inalienable rights, among which

519

614 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Griffith et al. 0. Tho Comm’rs of Crawford County, eto,

are the enjoying and defending life and liberty—acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting property—and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety,” would be subverted, so far.as it secures equality of right
among citizens. Itwould notbe true that two citizens enjoyed equal
freedom, if one had power under the law to judge and determine their
disputed rights. According to this declared principle, each citizen
has an equal right with his fellows to have his claims submitted to
an impartial tribunal; and any statutory violation of that right,
would be void, for want of power in the general assembly to
pass it. .

This is by no means a new rule of construction, as applied to
constitutional law. It is distinctly recognized by Judge Brooke,
in his dissenting opinion, in Godden v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 150; Rice
v. Foster, 4 Harrington, 485; Parker v. The Commonwealth, 6
Barr, 507; Lexington v. McQuellin’s Heirs, 9 Dana, 513; Sutton’s
Heirs v. The City of Louisville, 5 Dana, 28; The People v. Brook;
lyn, 6 Barb. (N.Y) 216.

We must be pardoned for our inability to see how a railroad
in the hands of a private corporation, becomes a public im.
provement, calling into requisition the right of eminent domain
614] and.*the power of taxation. It certainly seems to us like
an entirely private affair, with nothing public about it.

But to bring the cases in controversy within the range of proper
constitutional taxation, they must be shown to present a case of
equality of burden throughout the community.. Is this shown?
The subscription, authorized in these cases, is by counties, towns,
and townships; and to be valid, should be by the state. Bank
U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 9 Wheat. 907.

‘The acts authorizing the subscription to the stock of railroads,
in the county of Crawford, are void, because they delegate legis-
lative powers to the county.

The cases of the City of Bridgeport v. The Housatonic Railroad,
15, Conn.; Godden v. Crump, 8 Leigh; Nichol v. The Mayor of
Nashville, 9 Humph. ; and Talbot v. Dent, are particularly relied
upon as authorics to sustain these statutes.

In reply to these cases, we say that they can not be relied upon
by this court as binding authorities. They all relate to subscrip-
tions made in pursuance of corporate powers confined to cities.
The distinction between the legal powers of cities and those of
counties and townships, is broad and unmistakable. Ang. &

520

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Griffith et al. v. The Comm'rs of Crawford County, ete.

Ames on Corp. 10, 16; Dowat’s Civ. L. 457. The commissioners
have legislative discretion in making selections of projects. A.
fand is placed in their hands to purchase an improvement for the
town of Bucyrus, at the expense of the county.

Henry Stanzery, M. Bmowanp,. and T..W. Barrnmy, for re-
spondents.

Henry Sransery, for respondents:

I. As to jurisdiction to hear these motions—special act of Man ch
24,1851. 49 Local L. 321. The torms original or appellate, cover
all jurisdiction.

*In this case the jurisdiction is original. Itis to try and [615
determine an original motion filed in Supreme Court upon copies
of the papers, and to certify decision to common pleas.

No question can be made of the power to confer a special juris-
diction on Supreme Court—powor often exercised, as in Hampson
v. State; Seely v. State; tax appeals from decisions of auditor and
attorney-general to court in bank.

The decision on the motion binds the common pleas, and the
cases then proceed in common pleas to final decree.

IL. We make objections :

1. That the bill is multifarious. ‘Armstrong v. Treasurer of
Athens County, 10 Ohio, 235.

2. That it does not make a case for the interference of a court
of equity. .

_ Whe relief asked is to enjoin the levy of a tax upon all the tax-
able property of the connty. The plaintiffs show no special inter-
est in the subject—none that is not common to the whole body of
tax-payers in the county.

Tax is contingent—the injury contingent and slight.

Bills are premature. Should wait until proceedings are had for
a sale.

Remedy at law ample. McCoy v. Corporation of Chillicothe, 3
Ohio, 378 ; Le Roy ¥. Corporation of New York, 4 Johns. Ch. 352.

The extreme cases—for equity jurisdiction against tax—are Os-
born v. Bank U.S., 9 Wheat. 738; Burnet v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio,
73; Culbertson v. Cincinnati, 16 Ohio, 577. All cases of irrepar-
able injury, or affecting title to land.

IIL. It is objected that the subscription was made without popu-
ular vote. None was required under the act of March 23, 1850.
48 Local L. 277. The first section of this act is:

521

616, 617 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Griffith ot al. v. The Comm’rs of Crawford County, ete.

“That the commissioners of Crawford county be and they are
hereby authorized and required to change the subscription, here-
tofore authorized by a vote of the people of Crawford county to be
made to the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad, and to subscribe to
616] the capital stock of any company or companies *which are
now, or may hereafter be, incorporated to construct a railroad,
commencing or terminating at any point in, or passing through or
adjoining the town of Bucyrus, the county-seat of said county, the
sum of $100,000.”

It is said that this special act must be construed in connection
with the general law passed February 28, 1846, which provides,
that when county commissioners shall thereafter be authorized to
subscribe to the capital stock of railroads, a popular vote shall be
taken before the subscription is made.

‘We answer to this :

1. That this special law is not simply a law to authorize a sub-
scription, but to change a subscription heretofore authorized by a
popular vote ; and it does something more than merely authorize
that, for it requires the act to be done.

2, That the construction contended for would render the special
act useless. . .

It is claimed that the acts authorizing theso subscriptions are void,
because such subscriptions are not within the corporate purposes
of a county. County purposes now embrace a great field of the
usual subjects of legislation. The support of the poor, the care of |
the insane, the subject of education, the public buildings, the subject
of roads and highways—these are all legitimate county purposes.

As incident to these corporate purposes, and to carry them out,
a board of commissioners is provided for each county, represent-
ing the corporate body, with power to contract, to sue and be sued,
and, within certain limits, to levy taxes. Hitherto the general as-
sembly has been acknowledged as the proper authority to create
and define the corporate purposes of a county.

No one can question the power of the legislature to authorize a
county to make a railroad, as well as a plank-road; butit isargued
that the legislature can not authorize a county to aid an incorpo-
rated company in constructing the road. What is this but denying
to the legislature the choice of means to carry out a lawful pur-
617] pose? If it be admitted that the construction *of railroads
in a county is a legitimate county purpose, then, whether the au-

522

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 618

Griffith et al. The Comm’rs of Crawford County, ete.

thority is given to the county to construct the road entirely with
its own funds, or to lend its funds to others in aid of its construc-
tion, can, in a constitutional point of view, make no difference,
‘When it comes to that—a mere question of the mode by which a
legitimate power is to be carried out—it ceases to be a judicial
question, unless, indeed, there were a constitutional prohibition of
the means used. Here thore is nothing of the kind. The legisla-
ture are left at large—free from any restraint as to the particular
mode by which the roads and highways in a county are to be con-
structed.

It is said that county funds are public funds, and that they can
not be used in matters of private concern. But is a railroad a
mere private concern? It may belong to individuals, so fay as its
managemont and profits are concerned, but it is essentially a pub-
lic thing; and it is precisely on that ground, and no other, that a
railroad company can appropriate private property for its track,
Tt is a public use.

When this point was under discussion in the opening argument,
a significant question was put from the bench. It was asked,
whether the legislature could authorize a county to subscribe to a
cotton factory within the county? The question, with due sub-
mission, is not to the point. The manufacture of cotton is not a
public use, like a road. It is altogether a matter of private enter~-
prise. But perhaps the question is best answered by putting
another—and that is, can a cotton factory appropriate private
property for the site of its works? A question easily answered.
Private property can not be taken for a cotton factory, nor can
public property; but either may well be appropriated to a railroad,
just because that is a public use—whether made by the public or
by an incorporated company.

Onur statutes aro full of precedents in favor of this sort of legis-
lation. One signal instance occurs to me in relation to the surplus
revenue received from the United States. That was distributed
by the state among the counties, by way of loan at *interest, [618
with authority to the counties to loan their proportion to any in-
corporated railroad or canal company, whose road or canal was:
“within the county, or connected with it.” The property of the
county was made subject to taxation, to secure the payment of the
interest and the final payment of the principal.

Not a decision has been found that sustains this objection.
523

619 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Griffith ct al. ». The Comm'rs of Crowford County, ete.

Godden v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120; Bridgeport v. Housatonic
Railroad, 15 Conn. 475; Nicol v. Nashville, 9 Humph. 252; Talbot
-v. Dent, 9 B. Mon. 526; Chesney v. Hooser, Ib. 330; Thompson v.
Leland, 24 Wend. 65.

M. Brrosarp, for respondents:

I. The facts make no case for chancery. 3 Ohio, 378; 16 Ohio,
-577 ; 4 Johns. Ch. 352; 9 Johns. Ch. 738; 1 A. K. Marsh, 412, 555.

II. The laws in question are constitutional.

1. The power of assessing taxes by law, authorizing goneral and
local taxation, is a necessary ingredient of government.

2. It is a power to be exorcised by the general assembly, subject
to no control by the judiciary.

38, The defining of the powers of counties is exclusively a matter
of legislative jurisdiction.

4, In construing the state and United States constitutions, this
-distinction is to be observed: By the first, all legislative power is
vested which pertains to a sovereign state, and is not limited by
the constitution of tho state or United States. By the latter, only
delegated powers may be exercised.

5. Before a court is authorized to declare a law unconstitutional,
it must be able to point directly to the clause of the constitution
with which it conflicts, and it can not declare a law void upon any
theoretical notion of a conflict with what the judges may suppose
are elementary principles of government.

6. The anthority to subscribe stock, on condition that a majority
619] *of a county vote for subscription, is not a delegation of the
legislative power.

7. It is not a taking of private property for public use, within
the meaning of article 8, section 4, of the old constitution.

8. The fact that a way may be authorized to be constructed by
an incorporated company, in no sense affects its charactor as a
public road demanded by the public wefare, and can not affect the
-question of the power to exercise the right of eminent domain,

To sustain these positions, we cite—

Rutherford’s Inst. 272; Calden v. Bull, 3 Dall. 400; Marsh. on
Const. 521, 181, 409; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 436; P,
Bank v. Billings et al., 4 Pet. 565; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend.
69; 25 Wend. 282; 15 Conn. 496; Bennett v. Boggs, 1 Bald, 76;
9 B. Mon. 335, 520; 9 Dana, 521; Godden v. Crump, 8 Leigh,
154; People v. Wren, 4 Scam. 269; Samo v. Reynolds, 5 Gilman,
15; 19 Ohio, 197, 418; 18 Ohio, 513; 3 Ohio, 378; 16 Ohio, 579;

524.

DECEMBER TERM, 1851.

Griffith et al. v. The Comm’rs of Crawford County, ete.

A Johns, Ch. 352; 9 Wheat. 738; 1 A. K. Marsh, 412, 555; 7 Ohio,
112, pt. 2; 11 Ohio, 393; 6 Ohio, 488; 4 Har. 495; 6 Barr; 8
Barr ; Nicol ot al. v. Mayor of Nashville, 9 Humph, 252; 8,10 and
11 Barr; Norwich v. Co. Comm’rs, 18 Pick. 60; Sawyer v. City of
Alton, 3 Scam. 127; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349; Trustees
of Paris v. Berry, 2 J. J. Marsh. 483; 3 Harr. 355; Aurora v.
United States, 7 Cranch, 382; 3 Kent, 278; West. Law Jour.
1849-50, p. 218.

Sratpine, J. The motion in this case has been considered in
connection with one of a similar character reserved in the county
of Wyandot, in the absence of the chief judge, who was called!
home by reason of sickness in his family.

The decision is made by the three remaining members of the
court, who are all clearly of the opinion that the motion to dis-
solve the injunction, allowed in the common pleas, is irregularly
**before this court, and that the same should be dismissed [620
for want of jurisdiction.

The constitution of Ohio, in force at the time of the special
enactment of March 24, 1851, provides, that the Supreme Court
shall have original and appellate jurisdiction, both in common law
and chancery, in such cases ag shall be directed by law; that the
court of common pleas shall have common Jaw and chancery jur-
isdiction in all such cases as shall be directed by law.

Section 1 of the act directing the mode of proceeding in chancery
provides, that the court of common pleas shall have jurisdiction
in all cases properly cognizable by a court of chancery, in which
plain, adequate, and complete remedy can not be had at law.

Section 2 provides, that the Supreme Court shall have cone
current jurisdiction with the courts of common pleas, in all cases
properly cognizable by a court of chancery, where the title to, or
any contract in relation to land is in question, or the sum or mat-
ter in dispute exceeds one thousand dollars in value; and appel-
late jurisdiction in all cases regularly brought before them from
the chancery decisions of the court of common pleas.

Section 50 provides, that the Supreme Court, or any judge
thereof, and the court of common pleas, or any president judge
thereof, may allow injunctions in all cases, where it is usual for
courts of equity to interfere by injunction, on petition filed, show-
525

621 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Griffith ct al. v. The Comm'rs of Crawford County, ete.

ing good cause in equity for such injunction, and verified by affi-
davit.

The blll in the case was regularly filed in the court, of common
pleas of Crawford county; which court had undoubted jurisdic-
tion, under our constitution and laws. That court, or the presi.
dent judge thereof, allowed an injunction, “ on petition filed, show:
ing good cause in equity, and verified by affidavit.” The cause is
still pending there, awaiting a trial upon its merits.

The common pleas having obtained jurisdiction, it follows, as a
621] *necessary consequence, that the only jurisdiction which
this court can take of the cause, under the constitution, is by appeal.
Our original jurisdiction (if the amount involved is sufficient to
give the two courts current jurisdiction) is gone, by reason of the
complainants having elected to file their bill ia the common pleas.
The fifty-second section of the practice act provides, that any per-
son may appeal to the Supreme Court for any jinal sentence or de-
eree pronounced in any suit in chancery, in the court of common
pleas, on giving notice, etc. The time, therefore, has not arrived
for the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction in this case. We can
not, and will not, interfere with the constitutional powers of the
common pleas, which are, in their own proper sphere, as sacred as
those that appertain to this tribunal, If, however, we may right-
fully take cognizance of this motion, we are at a loss to see what
possible good can result from it. Upon the supposition that we
allow the motion to prevail for the dissolution of the injunction,
there is nothing to prevent the court of common pleas from making
another, and repeated orders, enjoining the party, so long as they
have possession of the cause. The most casual observer will see
that this would end in a clashing of jurisdiction, that would be
simply ridiculous; and this might be the least of its evil conse-
quences. We think the legislature improvidently passed the act
allowing this motion to be filed in the Supreme Court while the
cause was yet depending in the common pleas, and that they have
failed to give to this court that sort of jurisdiction which is recog-
nized and required by the constitution. The motion will there-
fore be dismissed, with costs.

In making known this determination of the court, I claim the
right to say, that no one can regret more than myself that the case
was not presented in such a shape as to enable us to decide the
second point made by complainants’ counsel. Without commite

526

‘DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 622, 623

Griffith et al. v. The Comm'rs of Crawford County, ete.

ting this court, or any member thereof other than myself, to any
particular construction of that sort of legislation which enables a
majority in a county to vote the property of the minority into a
joint-stock company, I can not forbear the *remark, that it [622
seems to me, not only a violation of the essential principles of lib-
erty and free government, but in direct derogation of section 4, ar-
ticle 8, of the late constitution of Obio: “Private property ought and
shall ever be held inviolate, but always subservient to the public
welfare, provided a compensation in money be made to the owner.”
It is an important matter to know whether the security of the cit-
izen and the safety of his property rest in the discretion of the leg-
islature, or in the guaranty of the constitution. .

Mauch of the curious speculation afloat, in regard to the abso-
utism of legislative power in these American states, is drawn from
the notions formerly entertained of the British parliament. Ac-
cording to Lord Coke, “the power and jurisdiction of parliament
ig so transcendent and absolute, that it can not be confined, cither
for causes or persons, within any bounds, OF this high court,” he
adds, “it may be truly said, si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima ;
si dignitatem est honoratissima ; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima.”
This is very far from being the case with our state logislatures.
‘Wo all ought to know and feel, that in this country there is no ab-
solute sovereignty except that which resides with the body of the
people.

Legislative bodies are, at best, nothing more than limited agen-
cies, constituted by the people for their own convenience, in carry-
ing on the necessary functions of civil government, They have
a right to tax the people for the ordinary expenses of the govern-
ment. They havo a right, under the constitution, to take private
property for public use, by paying a compensation in money to the
owner. But they have no right to say themselves, much less to
give to one class of the people the right to say, that another class
shall be taxed on their property to support stage, steamboat, or
railroad transportation.

It need not be denied that railroads are, in many instances,
public improvements of great usefulness. But because they ac-
commodate individuals and advance the public interest, it will not
do to say that they are such a pudlic use that private *prop- [623
erty may be taken, without the consent of the owner, to construct

them. If an incidental benefit, resulting to the community from
527

624, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Carey ot al. ». The Comm’rs of Wyandot County.

the manner in which individuals, in pursuit of their own interest,
use their property, will constitute a public use of i, it will be found
extremely difficult to set bounds to the power of appropriating
“private property. As it is only on the plea that railroads are pub-
lic highways—in other words, “a public use”—that the right is
claimed to legislate 2 man's moncy from his pocket to make them,
whether he desire or not to take part in the work.

I have no uncommon sympathy for that class of our population:
who will suffer most by this internal improvemont piracy; but if
the rights of minorities are not observed, it will not be long before
the majorities will be in bondage. TI look upon this thing of taking
private property, or subjecting it to unusual burdens without
the consent of the owner, as a great stride toward despotic power.
The people of a county, by the vote of a majority, have no more
right, under legislative sanction, to say that a single unwilling
citizen shall mortgage his farm to build a railroad through their
district, than they have to say he shall help support a line of stages
running through the same territory.

It will not do to talk about the, discretion of the legislature in
this matter. The framers of our constitution took care to insert a
clause, at the close of the last article, which is pregnant with
meaning: “To guard against the trangression of the high powers
which we have delegated, we declare that all powers not hereby
delegated remain with the people.” Amongst the most important
of those powers remaining with the people, is, in my.apprehension,,
the right of every citizen to manage his own private property in
his own private way.

Motion dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Hrroncoor, 0. J., prepared an opinion dissenting from some of
the principles maintained above, for which see Appendix A.

624] *Jomy Carzy mr au. v. Tan Commissionurs op Wyanpor
Country.

‘Tuts is a motion to dissolve an injunction reserved in Wyandot
528 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 625

Carey et al. ». The Comm’rs of Wyandot County.

county, and was considered and decided in connection with the
last preceding case.

On March 20, 1850, “the act to incorporate the Ohio and In-
diana Railroad Company” was passed, with authority to construct
a railroad, commencing at a suitable point, to be selected by said
company, on the Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati Railroad,
near Sultzer’s tavern, in the county of Richland; thence to
Bucyrus, in the county of Crawford; thence to Upper Sandusky,
in the county of Wyandot; and thence, on such route as the
directors of said company or a majority of them may select, to the
western line of the State of Ohio; and thence to Fort Wayne, in
the State of Indiana. .

Section 4 of this act provides, “ that the county commissioners
of any county through which said railroad may be located, by and
with the consent of a majority of the legal voters of such county,
. . + be and they are hereby authorized and required to sub-
scribe, in the name and for the benefit of such county, to the
capital stock of said company any sum not exceeeding one hundred
thousand dollars,” ete. 48 Local Laws, 297.

Section 12 also provides, “that before any stock shall be sub-
scribed in said company by the commissioners of any county,
under the provisions of this act, the question shall be submitted
to the qualified electors of such county, whether the county shall
‘become a subscriber or not,”*in the manner prescribed in said act.
This charter is also subjected to the restrictions of the general
railroad act of February 11, 1848.

At the October election, 1850, a vote was taken in Wyan- [625
dot county, on the question for and against a subscription of
$50,000 to the capital stock of the Ohio and Indiana Railroad,
which resulted in favor of it by a majority of ninety votes.

The commissioners of that county soon thereafter were prepar-
ing to subseribe the $50,000 in pursuance of this vote ; whereupon
the complainants filed their bill. They represent and show that
they are citizens of Wyandot county, and the owncrs of large
tracts of veal estate, as well as of large amounts of personal prop-
erty within the county, upon which they are required to pay
taxes, and which are annually assessed upon the duplicate for
county, state, and other purposes of taxation. .

The faith of the county subscribing stock under the aforesaid
charter, and the net profits or dividends upon the stock so sub-

VoL. XX—34 529

626 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Carey ot al. v. The Comm’rs of Wyandot County.

scribed, are pledged for the payment of tho indebtedness and in-
terest, which may become due from the county by reason of such
‘stock subscription. And the county commissioners and auditor are
roquired, annually, to assess a tax upon the property of the county,
sufficient in amount to pay the annual interest on such loan, and
to provide a sinking fund to extinguish the principal of the in-
debtedness ; and such assessment of taxes is to be placod on the
county duplicate, and collected as other county and state taxes are
collected.

‘The bill alleges that complainants voted against the said sub-
seription, and have never given their assent to it; that fraudulent
representations were made to procure votes in favor of said sub-
scription, which are particularly mentioned in the bill; and that
at the time of taking said vote, said Obio and Indiana Railroad
had not any portion of it been located in Wyandot county, nor
west of Bucyrus, in Crawford county.

The bill prays that the commissionors be enjoined from sub-
soribing said $50,000 of stock to the Ohio and Indiana Railroad
Company.

An injunction was allowed by a single judge, in vacation, re-
straining the subscription of stock by the commissioners, and con-
tinued by the court of common pleas of Wyandot county,
626] *until the removal of the cause into this court. On March
24, 1851, the legislature passed “an act to amend the act entitled
an act directing the mode of proceeding in chancery, in the
counties of Wyandot and Crawford ;” by the terms of which, «in
any cause in equity then pending, or which might thereafter be
instituted, wherein an injunction has been allowed by the court
of common pleas, or any president judge thereof, any party
against whom said injunction has been allowed, may file a motion

* in tho Supreme Court, in the county in which such case is pend.
ing, or in the Supreme Court in bank, setting forth the grounds of
the same; and the Supreme Court in the county, or the court in
bank, shall have competent power and jurisdiction to hear and
determine said motion to dissolve the injunction, on ten days’
notice to the other party,” etc. 49 Local Laws, 321.

Under this law motion was made in the Supreme Court of
Wyandot county, at the July term, 1851, to dissolve the injunc-
tion ; which motion was reserved for decision here.

An answer was filed by John Welch, one of the commissioners

530

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. . 627

Carey et al. v. The Comm'rs of Wyandot County.

of Wyandot county, in person; and for Ethan Terry and Isaac
‘Walgamotte, the other two commissioners of that county, an an-
swer was filed by the attorneys for the railroad, who also repre-
sent the county commissioners. At the April term, 1851, of the
common pleas, this answer, on the motion of the complainants,
was stricken from the files, on the ground that it was not signed,
in person, by the respondents; and for the reason, also, that an
answer by the board of commissioners should be filed, in pur-
suance of an order entered upon their journal for that purpose,
and should assume to be their official act, as a board of commis-
sioners.

The respondents are now urging the dissolution of the injunc-
tion, under their motion for that purpose.

O. Bowsn, 0. K. Watson, and Wu. H. Greson, for the com-
plainants. The same arguments were submitted as in the last
preceding case.

0, Bowsn argued the further questions arising in this case. [627

The first question we present, is, whether the commissioners of
‘Wyandot connty are authorized to make a subscription of stock
to the Ohio and Indiana railroad, issue bonds, and pledgo the
faith of the county for their payment?

We insist that the vote of the qualified electors, which must by
law precede the subscription, was prematurely given—that it is a
nullity. The language of the railroad charter, under which the
proceedings to secure the subscription were attempted to be had,
is, “that the county commissioners, through which said railroad
may be located, by and with the consent of a majority of the legal
voters,” be authorized and required to subscribe, etc. To locate,
means to designate and determine the place of—to settle the
particular spot or position of a thing. Location is an act com~
pleted. It imports, when applied to railroads, much more than
_power to construct a road through the county, or than the
organization of a company with authority for that purpose. It
implies that the power has been obtained, the organization of the
company perfected, and everything precedent to the establishment
of the road performed. Questions as to points of commencement
and termination—its angles and curves, courses and distances—
are settled by it, and to be seen and understood as fully as if the
grubbing and grading of the work were completed. When the
vote was taken in October, what had been done toward locating

531

628 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Carey et al. x, The Comm’rs of Wyandot County.

the road in Wyandot county? No route was established for it
through any part of the county. The action of the people, it is
fair to presume, might be much influenced by the course the road
should pursue through their county.

Smith’s Com. 560, sec. 504; Stourbridge Canal Co. v. Wheely, 2
B. & Adol. 793.

We contend, further, that the vote of the people of Wyandot
county was a nullity, for the reason that, when it was taken, no
organization of the Ohio and Indiana Railroad Company had been
perfected. Itis averrod in the bill, and not denied, that at the date
628] of the election, there had not been subscribed by *individuals,
to the capital stock of the railroad company, more than $20,000.
The charter requires that $50,000 shall be subscribed, as precedent
to any organization of this company. It is said, in the bill, that
about the sum of $25,000 was authorized to be subscribed by town-
ships; but no actual subscriptions by them had been made; and
if there had been, there is the same premature action, which, we
have shown, vitiates the vote of the county, attending the vote of
the people of any township before then taken.

We have not understood that the motion to reinstate the answer
of the commissioners of Wyandot county will be insisted upon,
but if it should, we refer to the following authorities, viz: Cooper's
Hq. Pl. 226; Daniel’s Ch. Practice, 269; Bayley v. De Nalkins, 10
Ves. 441; Harding v. Harding, 12 Ves. 259; Wilson v. Grace, 14
Vos. 172; Rogers v. Cruger, 7 Johns. 558; Dumond v. Magee, 2
Johns. Ch.; Dennison v. Bossford, 6 Paige's’ Ch. 370; and Story’s
‘Eq. Pl. (4 ed.) 895. Judge Story says: “ Where an oath is not
required, generally there must be the signature of the defendant
to the answer.”

Bat the answer is not properly executed, for another reason.
The county of Wyandot is a quasi corporation, and the county
commissioners representing it must answer, in chancery, as such
corporation. The answer must be the act of the corporation,
adopted as such by the action of the commissioners, as a board.
Story’s Eq. Pl. 278, (4 ed.) in its support.

0. K. Warsow further argued that the act authorizing the sub-
scription was void, bocause it delegates legislative power to the
counties and townships. Parker v. Com., 6 Barr, 507; Rice v.
Foster, 4 Har. 479.

On the other side, it is claimed that the state legislatures are

532

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 629, 630

Carey et al. v. The Comm’rs of Wyandot County.

clothed with powers of taxation, limited only by express constitu-
tional provisions. To this we reply that under our constitution,
all powers not delegated to the state government are expressly
reserved to the people. 8 Leigh, 150, per Judge *Brooke; [629
4 Har, 485; 6 Barb. 8. C. (W. ¥.) 215; 9 Dana, 513 ; Sutton’s Heirs
», Louisville, 5 Dana, 28.

T. W. Barriey, Samvgn F. Vinton, J. D. Srars, M. Bircaarp
and H. Sranpery, for respondents, The same arguments were
submitted as in the last preceding case.

I. Sranzery argued the further questions arising in this case:

I. As to the objection, that there should have been an actual
survey of the line before the vote:

1. We say that, as to Wyandot county, the act of incorporation
does locate the road through that county, within the meaning and
spirit of this section.

The line of this road is in part fixed, and in part left at large
by the act. Its line is fixed through Wyandot county, by way of
the county seat; and no power can change it, so as to avoid the
county. West of Wyandot county, the location is left at large.
This uncertainty as to the route of the road west of Wyandot, and
as to the particular line to be ran through Crawford and Wyandot,
as to the towns and townships in those counties, was undoubtedly
the reason of this provision. The intent of the legislature was,
that no county, town, or township should subscribe unless the road
passed through it.

As to Wyandot county, there was no contingency—no may be—
astotheroad. The question did not depend on a survey; the law
settled the question, and brought Wyandot precisely in the condi-
tion for subscription.

The conclusion is inevitable, that the act locates the road through
this county, unless the intent of the legislature was not merely
that the road should pass through the county, but should pass
through it on some definite and surveyed line. It is clear that the
legislature had no such meaning.

2. But if the legislature meant an actual survey, and the appro-
priation of a particular line through Wyandot, yet the *act [630
does not require such location as a condition precedent to the vote.

The location has reference to the subscription. The county .
commissioners, when authorized by the vote, may make the sub-
scription to the road, if located through their county.

533

631 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

Carey et al. v. The Comm'rs of Wyandot County.

What is there to prevent the vote prior to the location—or, in-
deed, as an inducement to the location? The vote simply gives
authority to make the subscription. It is the subscription which
is the binding thing; and if the road is located before it is made,
the location is in good time.

The court will not fail to see that, as yet, there has been no sub-
scription in Wyandot; and that the plaintiffs seek to maintain
their bill, on the ground that there was no location prior to the vote.
They have enjoined the subscription, not because the road is not
yet located, not until it shall be located, but absolutely because
it was not located at the time of the vote, The provisions of sec-
tion 12 of the act show that the vote may be taken at any spring
or fall election.

IL. Is the act authorizing a subscription upon a vote of the
people void, because of a delegation of legislative power? In
othor words, has this act of the general assembly the character of
a law! Is it of itself—proprio vigore—a law; or is it merely a
proposition, having no effect as a law without the assent of the
people of the county expressed by a popular vote?

These propositions are undeniable:

1. That the body of the people, or the majority of qualified
voters of a county, have no legislative power of any sort. They
gan neither pass laws, nor levy taxes for works of county improve-
ment, or for any other purpose. Nor can they either approve, so
as to ratify; or veto, so as to annul, any laws passed by the gen-
eral assembly.

2, That all legislative power in the State of Ohio is vested in

the general assembly, subject to the limitations declared in the
constitution of Ohio, or imposed by the constitution of the United.
States.
631] *3. That a law may be made to depend on a contingency—
may take effect at a future day, or upon the happening of a future
and contingent event, beyond the control of the legislative au-
thority.

Now I maintain that this act has all the qualities of a law, and
exists as a law from the moment of its enactment, without refer-
ence to any action, or any sanction, by the people of the county.

. Everything to be done under its provisions is done in virtue of
the act itself, and can only be done according to those provisions.
534 .

DECEMBER TERM, 1951. 632

Carey et al. v. The Comm’rs of Wyandot-County.

Many things to be done under those provisions are not mandatory,
but optional, on the part of persons to be affected. .
In what particular do the voters, who assent to make the sub-
scription, exercise more legislative power than the railroad com-
pany which assents to receive the subscription? The assent of
both is required, and is equally necessary to give effect to the
principal thing to be accomplished—that is, the subscription.
The assent required, or proposed as well to the railroad com-
pany as to the voters, is simply an assent to be given under the
law, and in conformity with the law—an assent to certain pro-
visions, which, if given, calls into exercise certain other pro-
visions. .
If this act of the general assembly were so framed, that by its
terms it should not become a@ aw without the approval or consent
of the voters, or of a corporation, or of the governor, or any other
individual or authority, independent of the general assembly,
then, indeed, there would be some semblance of a delegation of
legislative power; but even then it would not be strictly legisla-
tive power, but rather a power of approval or rejection, very
analagons to the power conferred by the federal constitution on
the president.
But there is nothing of that character—no such conditional
provision in this act. The general assembly have passed it upon
their own authority, and it stands as a law from the date *of [632
its enactment—in no respect subject to approval or rejection by
any other power or authority,
It is simply a law to authorize a subscription—not to compel a
subscription ; the contingency as to a subscription depending on
the assent of a majority of the voters, and only to be made when
that assentis given. If that assent is given, the law provides what
further is to be done, in the making of the subscription, the issu-
ing of the bonds, and the levy of a tax, .
Here, then, is a law containing various provisions, some of which
provisions are dependent on a contingency—on an option or con~
sent of third persons. The law is dependent on no contingency
—on no option or consent from without. Whether the contin-
gency happen or not, whether the assent be given or not, this act
is all perfect as a law.
Take now a familiar instance in which an act of the general as-
535

633 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

‘ Carey ef-al. ». The Comm’rs of Wyandot County.

sembly depends on a contingency. Take the common case of an
act of incorporation. Can it be said that when such an act has
passed the legislature that it is nota law? And yet it depends on
a contingency, on an assent to be given; for untilit is accepted—
until a corporate body is organized and assents to receive it—the
act does not have its full effect. Is that a delegation of legislative
powor?

Take another instance: the act passed by Congress for the dis-
tribution of the public moneys among the states. That act pro-
vided for a pro rata distribution to the states of a large amount of
public money accumulated in the treasury of the United States ;
and it provided for the deposit with each state of its share, upon
certain conditions to be agreed to by each state for itself. Some
of the states accepted, others rejected the deposit. Will any one
say that this act of Congress was not a law?

T havo said that if this act of the general assembly, by its terms,
was so framed as not to become a law unless sanctioned by a pop-
ular vote, there would be some ground for the objection, that as a
law it is not made by the true legislative authority. It might then
633] be argued with some plausibility, that the *people make the
Jaw—that the people are left to say whether it shall or shall not
be a law, and thoreby exercise a legislative power. I do not say
that such a logislativo act would be void, but I do say itis only
such an act that could give rise to the objection now urged; and
T further say, that no authority can be found in favor of this ob-
jection, except in reference to an act of that character.

This is precisely the sort of legislative act which was before the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Parker v. Com-
monwealth, 6 Barr, 507.

Samurn F. Vinton, for respondents, in support of the constitu-
tionality of the law, cited the following authorites: 11’ Penn. St.
70; City of Louisville v. Hiatt, 2 Mon. 178; 9 Dana, 514; Adams
v. How, 14 Mass. 345; Wellington v. Petitioners, etc., 16 Pick. 95;
Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 534; Barnes v. Falmouth, 6 Mass.
417; Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 254; Rice v. Foster, 4
Har. 479; Parker v. Com. Penn., 6 Barr, 507; was reviewed in
Com. v. Judges Q. Sess., 8 Penn. St. 391, and Com. », Painter, 10
Penn. St. 214; Com. v. McWilliams, 11 Penn. St. 61; 7 Cranch,
382; 2 Yeates, 493; Godden v. Crump et al., 8 Leigh, 120.

536

DECEMBER TERM, 1851. 633

Carey et al. , The Comm'rs of Wyandot County.

Spatpina, J. The opinion of the court delivered in the last
preceding case disposes of this.
Motion dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

For the dissenting opinion of Hrrewcoox, ©. J., in this and the
last preceding case, see Appendix A.
537

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

[A]
OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE HITCHHOOCK, ON THE CONSTI-

TUTIONALITY OF COUNTY SUBSCRIPTIONS TO RAILROAD
COMPANIES.

Jauzs Grirmita Er AL. v. Tae Commissionurs or Orawrorp
County anp Tux Onto anp Inprana R. RB. Co.

In Cuanozry. Motion to dissolve an injunction, reserved in
Crawford county. .

Joun CaRgy ET AL. v. THE Comissioners or Wranpot Country.

In Cuancrry. Motion to dissolve an injunction, reserved in
‘Wyandot county.

‘The material facts in these two cases, the arguments of counsel,
and the decision of the court, are all found in the foregoing vol-
ume, and are therefore not restated here.

Hiroxcoor, C.J. Although present in court during the argu-
ment of these cases, still, having been necessarily absent when the
question of jurisdiction, the only question which seems sto have been
considered, was settled, I do not consider myself responsible for
the decision made. With that decision, however, 1 have no dispo-
sition to complain. Had the judge delivering the opinion, satis-
fied himself with stating the point decided, and the reasons which
induced the court to come to the conclusion at which it arrived, I
should have remained silent. But since that judge has gone be-
yond this, and has expressed his individual opinion upon the main.
question involved in these cases, it seems to me to be an incumbent
duty to examine that question, and to express my own views upon it.

2,3 APPENDIX.

Opinion of Ohief Justice Hitchcock,

The question is simply this: whether the laws of the state au-
thorizing the commissioners of a county, with the assent of a
2] *majority of the electors of the county, to subscribe stock to a
railroad company, incorporated for the purpose of aiding in the con-
struction of a railroad, which shall pass through the county, are
constitutional. Every question of this character is of the first im-
portance; as its solution may depend upon the exercise‘of power
by one department of the government over another. But in the
present cases, it is of much more than ordinary importance. The
railroads in the state which have been already constructed, have
been in part constructed by the aid of city and county subscrip-
tions. To secure the payment of this stock, so subscribed, bonds
have been executed; and these bonds have been sold in the mar-
ket, for the purpose of raising means to carry on the work. They
are now in the hands of bona fide holders, who have received them,
in part at least, upon the faith of the incorporated bodies by whom
they were issued.

Other roads.are in the course of construction; and the means by
which they ave being constructed, have been derived from a similar
source. To hold that the laws under which these bonds were exe-
cuted, are unconstitutional, is to hold that the bonds themselves
are void; and the bona fide holders will be compelled to lose the
many millions which they have advanced‘upon them, In addition
to this, if these laws are held to be unconstitutional, an cntire stop
will be put to works of this character. For many years to come
railroad improvements must cease in this state. Not only so, but
if the judge is correct in his obiter dictum opinion, the roads already
constructed may be destroyed. Notwithstanding all this, however,
if those laws are unconstitutional, clearly so, the duty of the court
is obvious—it must refuse to enforce them. But no court will,
where such consequences are to result, act hastily, nor without the
most serious deliberation.

‘The power of a court, in a proper case, to declare a legislative
enactment unconstitutional, does not, at the present day, seem to
be seriously doubted. In this particular, a great change has come
over the public mind, since the adoption of constitutional forms of
8] government in these United States ; and especially *so in this
state, since the adoption of our constitution of 1802. In the early
history of this country, it will be seen that the right of judicial
tribunals to exercise this power was strongly contested by some of

4

APPENDIX.

Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

our most able men. In the front rank of these stood Mr. Jeffer-
son, whose opinions have been more respected, by a portion of the
community, than the opinions of any other man who has occupied.
a public station in the country. He uniformly denied the right of
any court to decide upon the constitutionality of laws, and held,
that in the exorcise of such power, a court was guilty of judicial
usurpation. In his opinion, the power to correct unconstitutional
as well as injudicious legislation rosted alone with-the people; and
the power was to be exercised through the ballot-box.

Such was the opinion entertained by a majority of the public
men of this state, at the time of, and soon after the adoption of our
own constitution. The journals of the general assembly show, ©
that one judge of the Supreme Court, and one president judge of
the court of common pleas, were impeached for the exercise of this
power. True, they were not found guilty by the high court of im-
peachment, the constitution requiring the concurring vote of two-
thirds of the members of that court to convict; and in each case
the vote was one less than this constitutional majority.

As before remarked, however, this power seems now very gen-
erally conceded to.the courts; and I can not well see how it could
be otherwise. Tho constitution is the paramount law of the state.
This instrument the judges of the court, as well as the other offi-
cers of the government, are sworn to maintain and defend. In it
the powers of the several branches of the government are well de-
fined. If the general assembly, in the exercise of its legislative
power, transcend the limits prescribed for it, such an enactment is
not a law, and no court can, consistently with the oath imposed
upon its members, enforce it as law.

But although this power exists in the courts, it should be exer-
cised with extreme caution. Before a court can be *justified in [4
disregarding a legislative enactment, on the ground that it con-
flicts with the constitution, such conflict must be evident, clear, un-
mistakable. It must be in opposition both to the letter and spirit of
the instrument. If, after full examination, any doubt exists, the
enactment must be enforced. If error occurs in the determination
of a question of this character, it is far better the error should be
committed in sustaining the legislative enactment, than in refusing
to enforce it. It is no light or trivial thing for a court to disregard
a legislative act, on constitutional grounds. Such hitherto has
been the principle by which the courts of the country have been

‘ 5

5 APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

governed ; and when they shall depart from it, well may they be
denominated, in the language of Mr. Jefferson, “sappers and
miners of the constitution.”

At the February term of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 1796, in the case of Hylton v. The United States, 3 Dallas,
171, a question was raised as to the constitutionality of a law of
Congress of June 5, 1794, laying “a tax on carriages for the con-
veyance of persons, kept for the use of the owner.” The court
held the law to be constitutional. Judge Chase, in delivering his
opinion, uses this language: “As I do not think the tax on carriages
is a direct tax, it is unnecessary for me to determine, at this time,
whether this court constitutionally possesses the power to declare
an act of Congress void, on the ground of its being made contrary
to, and in violation of the constitution; but if the court have such
power, I am free to declare that Z will never eaercise it but in a very
clear case.”

At the February term of the same court, 1800, in the case of

Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dallas, 14, the constitutionality of a law of
Georgia was drawn in question. In commenting upon the subject,
Justice Washington says: “The presumption must always be in
favor of the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demon-
strated.”
5] In the same case, Justice Chase says: “It is indeed a *gen-
eral opinion, it is expressly admitted by all this bar, and some of
the judges have, individually, on the circuits, decided, that the
Supreme Court can declare an act of Congress to be unconstitu-
tional, and thorefore invalid; but there is no adjudication of the
Supreme Court itself upon this point.”

Up to this time it would seem that the Supreme Court had never
exercised this power; but it was exercised in the colebrated caso
of Mazbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 117. In this latter case, Chief
Justice Marshall goes into a labored argument to prove that the
court possesses the powor; and the law then under consideration
was declared unconstitutional.

In the case of Fletcher v. Peck, 8 Cranch, 87, the same chief
justice uses this language: “ The question whether the law be void
for its ropugnancy to the constitution is, at all times, a question of
much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the
affirmative in a doubtful case. The court, when impelled by duty
to render such a judgment, would be unworthy of its station, could

6

APPENDIX.

Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

it be unmindful of the solemn obligations which that station im-
poses. But it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture
that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its
powers, and its acts to be considered void. The opposition between
the constitution and laws should be such that the judge feels a
clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other.”

Such are the principles and rules of action by which the Supreme
Court of the United States is controlled in deciding upon the con-
stititionality of laws; and in this particular there is no difference
between that court and the courts of the several states. Thus, in
Pennsylvania, it is held that the courts can not interfere to set
aside a law, unless the legislature have encroached on ground
which they are positively or by necessary implication forbidden to
enter. 11 Penn. St. 70.

In Kentucky it is held that if it be doubtful or questionable
whether the legislative power has exceeded its limits, the judiciary
can not interfere, though it may not be satisfied that the *act [6
is constitutional. City of Louisville v. Hiatt, 2 Mon. 178.

In that case, the court hold the following language: “ And al-
though we frankly admit that we have never been perfectly satis-
fied as to the constitutional validity of the power involved and
considered in the case of the City of Lexington v. McQuillan’s
Heirs, 9 Dana, 514; yet, still feeling as we did when we decided
that case, that we are not able to perceive clearly, or to prove satis-
factorily, that the legislature, in enacting section 11 of the chartor
of Lexington, transcended the boundaries of legislative power
prescribed by the supreme organic law of the state—it does
seem to us that we should be justly chargeable with wandering
from the appropriate sphore of the judicial department, were we,
by subtle elaboration of abstract principles, and metaphysical
doubts and difficulties, to endeavor to show that such a power may
be questionable, and on such unstable and unjudicial ground to defy
and overrule the public will, as clearly announced by the legisla-
tive organ.” *

In the case of Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 345, the court say:
“We must premise that so much respect is due to any legislative
aet, solemnly passed and admitted into the statute book, that a
court of law which shall be called upon to decide its validity will ©
presume it to be constitutional till the contrary clearly appears. So
that, in any case substantially doubtful, the law would have its

rs

7 APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

force. The legislature is, in the first instance, to bo the judge of tts
own constitutional powers, and it is only when manifest assumption
of authority, or misapprehension of it shall clearly appear, that
the judicial power will refuse to execute it.”

The same court, in another case, hold this language: “When
called upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation,
passed with all the forms and solemnities requisite to give it the
force of law, courts will approach the subject with great caution,
examino it in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as
7] deliberation and patient attention can throw any new “light on
the subject; and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and
invalidity of the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond reason-
able doubt.”

But it is unnecessary to cite additional cases upon this point.
‘Whenever the question has been raised, the decisions have been
uniform, so far as I have any knowledge. I am not the advocato
of legislative supremacy, but would have every act tested by the
constitution ; and, in my opinion, overy legislative act which con-
flicts with the constitution is void. But the legislative powor of
the state being vested in the general assembly, the acts of that
body, when enacted in the forms prescribed by the constitution,
aro binding upon the people and courts of the state, until it can be
shown that the same are in conflict with the constitution. It is
not to be credited, as a general thing, that the legislative depart-
ment of the government will transcend the limits prescribed for
its action. It may do so through mistake—never by design. At
least, it will not do so by design until it becomes corrupt. And if
the day shall ever arrive when the legislative department of the
government shall become corrupt, can we be sure that we shall
have an uncorrupt court to check its action?

The laws claimed by the complainants in these cases to be un-
constitutional are Jaws which authorize the commissioners of the
two counties of Crawford and Wyandot to subscribe stock to a
certain railroad company, for the purpose of aiding in the con-
struction of a railroad through those counties. ‘So far as the latter
county is concerned, the subscription is not to be made until the
question is submitted to the people, and the subscription advised by
a majority of votes.

This law is no way different from many others in our statute-
books, authorizing similar subscriptions, upon like terms. In order

i

APPENDIX. 8,9

Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

to determine whether they conflict with the constitution, it is nec-
essary that we should ascertain their nature, purport, and effect.

It is said that these laws are “void, for the reason that they are
*in violation of the general, great, and essential principles of lib- [8
erty and free government, recognized and forever unalterably estab-
lished by the bill of rights.” And again it is said: “To determine
the extent of the legislative authority, under our constitution, we
are not confined to the letter of the constitution, but we may properly
look to its declared principles and objects; and a statute violating
these is as clearly void as one violating the letter of the constitu-
tion.” This is not in accordance with the rule heretofore pre-
scribed by the courts of the country for their action in deciding
questions of constitutional law, although it may be in accordance
with the dogmas of some modern theorists, who seem to have little
regard for written constitutions, except as the same may comport
with their ideas of right and justice. Lot this new rule be adopted,
and the validity of a law would not so much depend upon the
written constitution of the country as updn the opinion of the
judges who should be called upon to decide upon its validity—
whether it comported with the nature and fitness of things. In
short, the constitutionality of the law would depend upon the
opinion of the court whether or not it was expedient. Inexpediency
would be as fatal to the validity of a law as unconstitutionality.
It seems to me that the adoption of the principle contended for
would strike at tho foundation of all constitutional government.

The “principles and objects” of the constitution of Ohio are set
forth in the preamble to that instrument as follows: “We, the
people of the eastern division of the territory of the United States,
etc., in order to establish justice, promote the welfare, and secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain
and establish the following constitution or form of government;
and do mutually agree with each other to form ourselves into a
free and independent state, by the name of the State of Ohio.”

In section 1 of article 1 it is provided as follows: “The legisla~
tive authority of this state shall be vested in a general assembly, .
which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives, both
to be elected by the people.”

*To the legislative authority thus granted there is no restric- [9
tion, except what is contained in the declaration ofrights, which forms
the eighth article of the instrument. It is unnecessary to refer to

9

TO APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

these restrictions, which are few; still, it is well enough for us to
bear in mind the ninth section, which declares, “that no power of
suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the legislature.” To
declare a law unconstitutional operates to suspend that law.
Courts may err in giving construction to the constitution or to
Jaws. The men who constitute the legal tribunals of the country
are not infallible. And they should beware, lest, in attempting to
correct the action of another branch of the government, by declar-
ing that action inconsistent with the constitution, they themsclvos
violate that instrument.

What is the purport, tenor, and effect of these laws authorizing
subscriptions of stock to railroad companies, by the coramissioners
of a county, by and with the assent of the people of the county?
From the first organization of the territorial government, counties
have existed as distinct political divisions. By the constitution of
the state, provision is made that the representation in the general
assembly shall be apportioned among the several counties; that
associate judges of the court of common pleas shall be elected in
each county; and in’ cstablishing new counties the general as-
sembly is restricted so far, that no new county can be established
with less than certain territorial contents. On February 13,
1804, the general assembly enacted a law, “establishing boards of
county commissioners.” Chase’s Stat. 410. By this law provision is
made for the election of three commissioners by the electors of
each county, and the duties of these commissioners are prescribed.
They are the managers of the prudential concerns of their re-
spective counties, and aro directed to “have a just and accurate
record kepéof their corporate proceedings.” They are to assess county,
taxes and erect public buildings, in such manner as shall be pre-
scribed by law; to liquidate all accounts, debts, and demands due
10] from the county, and draw orders upon the county *treasurer
for the same, and such orders are receivable in payment for the
county taxes. By an amendatory act of January 27, 1807 (Chase’s
Stat, 560), they are authorized to recover, by suit, any claim due
the county, and are made capable of suing and being sued in any
court of judicature within the state.

Since the enactment of the aforesaid laws, the coustitutionality
of which has never beon questioned, the powers of county com-
missioners have, from time to time, been enlarged or diminished,
as the interest of the counties seemed to demand. In some in-

10

APPENDIX. iw

' Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

stances they have been authorized to purchase land for the use of
the county; in others, to sell and convey land belonging to the
county. In some instances they have been authorized to borrow
money upon the credit of the county, and levy taxes sufficient to
pay the interest on the same, and, finally, the principal. From
the first organization of the board they have been the proper tri-
bunal to decide upon opening or vacating public highways, in
their respective counties. Under peculiar circumstances, they may
alter or vacate roads, laid out and established by the direct au-
thority of the state. They are authorized to assess taxes for the
erection of poor-houses; for the support of the poor; forthe erec-
tion and repair of public buildings; for the opening and repairing
of roads; for the erection of bridges; for the purposes of schools,
and for county purposes generally.

The only effect of the laws now under consideration is to enlarge
the powers of these boards of county commissioners. In addition
to their other powers, they are authorized to subscribe stock to
certain railroad companies for the purpose of constructing railroads
through their respective counties. In the case of the Commission-
ers of Crawford County, the authority is absolute; in the case of
the Commissioners’ of Wyandot, it is dependent upon a previous
vote of the electors of the county. And such is the provision of
most, if not all, tho other laws of the state authorizing similar
subscriptions. And where the subscriptions are made, the com-
missioners are *authorized, if it shall become necessary,to [IL
assess a tax to meet the interest, and eventually the principal.
Such are the laws which are claimed to be unconstitutional.

Supposo, under the constitution of 1802, the general assembly
should have enacted a law authorizing the commissioners of any
one county in the state to construct a railroad or a turnpike road
through the county—would such law have been unconstitutional ?
Its enactment would have been an exercise of legislative power;
and all the legislative power of the state is vested in the general
assembly, with very few restrictions. And certainly there is no
express restriction to prevent the enactment of a law of this char-
acter. So far as the constitution is concerned, the general assembly
have the same power to authorize commissioners of a county to
construct a railroad that they have to authorize them to erect a
poor-house or bridge, to construct a county road, or to assess a tax
for the support of schools.

i

12 APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

Such law might be thought to be inexpedient or impolitic; but
the inexpediency or impolicy of a law has nothing to do with its
constitutionality. The question of expediency is a question for
the law-making power, and the corrective for inexpedient legisla- *
lation lies with the people. The question of constitutionality is
also a question for the law-making power ; but it may be reviewed
by the courts. And if, upon such review, courts are govorned by
the rules heretofore recognized as being of vital importance, no
danger is to be apprehended. It ought to be remarked, perhaps,
that the corrective for unconstitutional logislation rests with the
people more fully even than with the courts.

Now, if the general assembly possessed the power, under tho
constitution of 1802, to authorize the commissioners of a county to
construct a railroad through their county, what is there in the
same constitution to prohibit that body from enacting a law au-
thorizing those same commissioners to subscribe stock in a com-
12] pany incorporated for the purpose of constructing “such
road? I have examined the instrument with some care and I find
nothing. .

But it is said by counsel for complainants that, “whon the con-
stitution recognized counties it was as subdivisions of the state,
with such local administrative capacities as have been given to
them by immemorial usage, and nothing more.”

If this be true, then all the laws of the state, which have con-
ferred powers upon the counties, which they did not possess “by
immemorial usage” at the adoption of the constitution, must be in
conflict with that instrument. Where is the immemorial usage
which will justify the general assembly in authorizing counties or
county commissioners to borrow money, to purchase and convey
land, to erect poor-houses, to assess taxes for the support of the
poor, and for road and school purposes? It can not be found.

It is said further, that the powers of counties are local, and,
therefore, “they can not engage in building railroads, for railroads
belong to the great commercial world.” All other roads, as much
as railroads, belong to the commercial world, and the same argu-
ments might be used against taxing the people of a county for the
construction of a county road, as of a railroad passing through the
county. A county road is not for the exclusive use of the people
of the county. Others may pass over it for commercial or other
‘purposes, as they deem proper. Still, the county is or may bo

12

APPENDIX.

Constitationality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

taxed to keep the road in repair. It is true there is hot the same
absolute necessity for a railroad as for these county roads. But
they are convenient for the people of the county as well as for
others who may travel over them, and they have a direct tendency
to enhance the value of the property of those residing in their
vicinity; and by this enhancement of the value of property a
county may be more than indemnified for its expenditures in con-
iributing to their construction.

Tf, under the constitution of 1802, an act of the general assembly
authorizing the county commissioners of a county to *construct [13
a railroad through said county, or authorizing them to subscribe
stock in a company, incorporated for the construction of such road,
would have been constitutional, is it rendered unconstitutional by
attaching a condition thereto, that the authority shall not be exer-
cised until the people, by a majority of votes, shall have assented
to or approved of the making the road or of the subscription?

Tt is claimed by the counsel for complainants, that the law is ren-
dered unconstitutional, because, ‘as it is said, the law receives its
force from this vote of the people, and that, in this voting, the peo-
ple exorcise legislative power. If it be so, the laws are unconsti-
tutional ; for by the constitution, the legislative power of the state
is vested in the general assembly.

It seems to me that counsel misapprehend the nature of these
laws. The power to make a law is one thing ; an authority or dis-
cretion to be exercised under a law is a different thing. The power
to make the law is vested in the general assembly, but whether the
law when made shall ever become effective, may depend upon cir-
cumstances. The general assembly exercises its legislative powor
in the enactment of a law incorporating a railroad or other com-
pany. The law is perfect in all its parts—but it does not become
effective until it is accepted by the company, and an organization
is perfected under it.

Suppose the laws under consideration had given the commission-
ers authority to subscribe or not at their discrotion—could it have
been objected to, as unconstitutional, because it was not mandatory
in itsterms? I think not. Now this, in substance, is the effect of
these laws, with this difference—the discretion, instead of being ex-
ercised by the commissioners of the county, is to be exercised by
the people of tho county. And it is proper that this discretion
should be so exercised. The debt created, in consequence of the
13

7 APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

subscription, is a debt against the county, and may have to be dis-
charged by a tax upon the people of the county. In voting for or
against a subscription, the people do not exercise legislative power.
14] They do not make the law. *They act under, or in pursu-
ance of, a law already made; and without the law, their action
would be a nullity.

But it is said, by counsel for complainant, that the Court of Ap-
peals of Delaware and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have
declared such kind of legislation unconstitutional, and two cases
aro referred to as sustaining this dictum. The case decided by the
court of errors and appeals in Delaware, is the case of Price v.
Foster, decided in June, 1847. 4 Harrington, 479.

‘The circumstances of the case were these: There was a general
law of the state in force, authorizing and regulating the granting
of licenses to keepers of taverns and retailers of spirituous liquors.
On February 19, 1847, the logislature of the state passed an act,
entitled “an act authorizing the people to decide, by ballot,
whether the license to retail intoxicating liquors shall be per-
mitted among them.”

The new act directed that on. the first Tuesday of April, 1847,
the citizens of the several counties in the state should decide, by
their votes, whether or not the retailing of intoxicating drinks
should be permitted in said countios ; that if at the election there
should be a majority for “ no license,” in any or all the counties of
the state, it should not thereafter be lawful for any person to retail
incoxicating liquors within such counties. It also contained a pro-
vision, that on the application of one-ninth of the legal voters of
a county, to the levy court, the question of “license” or “no li-
cense ” should again be submitted to the electors at the April cleo-
tion of any subsequent year, and if there should be a majority of
votes for “no license” in any county, it should be an indictable
misdemeanor to sell liquor in any such county, contrary to that act.
But if, at said election, thore should be a majority of votes for “li-
cense,” then the laws theretofore in force, regulating the licensing
of taverns, etc., should remain and be in full force, as before, so
far as respects such county or counties which should so determine.
15] *At the April election next after the passage of the act, the
people of New Castle county decided against license in that county, ,
and the suit was brought to test the constitutionality of the law.
The court decided that the law was not constitutional. They

14

APPENDIX. * 16

Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

rested their decision upon the principle that the law-making power
could not be delegated by the legislature, and that in this enact-
ment an attempt was made to do this. They held, that the refer-
ence to the people to decide whether or not license should be
granted; that according as they might decide in any county, the
old law should continue in force, or be repealed or suspended in
that county, and the new law take its place, a violation of which
was to constitute an indictable offense ; that the people of a county
might, by their vote at subsequent elections from year to year, re-
wive the old law and suspend the new one—wore, taken altogether,
a plain surrender to the people of the law-making power over this
subject. They held that the laws in force when this act was passed
owere valid laws, and must remain in force until repealed by the
legislative power.

In reference to this case, it is sufficient to say that the law then
in question was entirely different from the laws of this state au-
thorizing county snbscriptions of stock in railroad companies.
There was a general law of the state upon the subject of granting
licenses to retail ardent spivits. This law was not expressly re-
pealed by the act of 1847. By this latter act, however, the people
of tho several countios were authorized to suspend the operation of
this law by their vote at one time, and in like manner at another
restore it to vitality. The laws of this state, authorizing sub-
scriptions, are conditional laws, or laws to take effect upon the
happening of a contingency; and that contingency is, that a ma-
jority of the people of the county shall, by their vote, assent to, or
advise the subscription.

Tt socms that in Delaware they have a law which provides that
the school fund of the state shall be divided among the several
school districts, and an equal proportion given to cach, *on [16
condition that the voters of such district raise by subscription or
tax, each year, a sum cqual to half of such district’s share of the
school fund; but that no tax shall be levied unless, upon a vote by
pallot, there should be a majority of votes for the tax. This law
was pressed upon the consideration of the court, in the argument

* in favor of the law then immediately under consideration.

In commenting upon this argument, the judge delivering the
opinion of the court says: “A law may be limited to expire at a
certain period, or not go into operation until a future time, or the
happening of a contingency, or some future event, or until some condi-

15

Ww ’ APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

tion be performed. Of this description are many of the laws of the
general government respecting duties and imports, and laws of our
state respecting corporations, which latter are not to operate until
some condition be performed, or the assent of the corporation be
given.”

This last example meets the case of these railroad subscriptions.
The acts authorizing them are laws relative to corporations, en-
Jarging their powers, and giving them rights or privileges not be-
fore possessed by them—the right of subscribing for stock on con-
dition the corporators, the electors of the counties, assent; and
these laws do not have any effective operation until this assent is
obtained.

The same judge, in commenting on the school law, says: “To

say that the authority given to the school voters, the members of a
corporation, to determine whether a tax shall be laid or not, is a
grant of legislative power—is an abuse of language. Logislative
power is the power of making laws. The making of a law pre-
seribing by what persons or by what body, when and in what
manner, taxes shall be laid and collected, is the exercise of a legis-
lative power. But the making of a resolution or order, or the de-
tormination or direction by the persons or body appointed for such
purpose by the law, that taxes shall be laid and collected, is simply
the execution of an authority granted by statute.”
17] *Upon a full examination of this case of Rice v. Foster, and
the argument of the court upon the subject, it seems to me that the
decision goes to sustain rather than to militate against the consti-
tutionality of the laws of Ohio now under consideration.

In 1847, the general assembly of Pennsylvania passed a law
similar in its general features to the statute of Delaware, before re-
ferred to. A question upon the constitutionality of this law was
raised in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Parker
». The Commonwealth, 6 Barr, 507, and the Supreme Court hold
the law to be unconstitutional. This, however, was a majority de-
cision, two of the five judges holding the law to be valid.

This case, which was decided in 1847, has since come under re-
view on two several occasions in the same court. It was first re-
viewed the next year, in the case of the Commonwealth v. The
Judges of the Court of Quarter Sessions, 8 Barr, 391. Tho case is
as follows: A new township, called Washington, having been ere-
ated out of the old township of Bethel, by commissioners appointed

16

APPENDIX.

Constitutionality of County Subseriptions to Railrond Companies.

by the court of quarter sessions of Lebanon county, the legislature,
by an act of March 8, 1847, directed an election to be held within
the townships of Bethel and Washington, by the qualified voters,
in order to determine by ballot whether the new township should
be continued or annulled. The question was to be determined by
a majority of the votes polled. An election was accordingly held,
and a majority of votes cast against the continuance of the new
township. This result was duly returned and filed among the rec-
ords of the court. On the part of the relator it was claimed this
act was within the principle settled in the case of Parker v. The
Commonwealth, before referred to, and was, therefore, unconstitu-
tional and void. . .

The court, however, held otherwise, and say, that “ this position
is founded in an entire misapprehension of the doctrine of that
case; that the erection of a township or the creation of a new dis-
trict, for mere municipal purposes or convenience in the transac-
tion of public business, is in no degree similar *to the exercise [18
of legislative powor. The one is the exercise of sovereignty, the
other in its very nature a subordinate function. The latter, like
the laying out of a public road or highway, or the erection of a
bridge, may require the exercise of judgment and skill, but there
is nothing, either in the positive provisions of our constitution, or
the genius of our institutions, which prohibits the actions of other
than legislative bodies.”

After stating that the business of making new townships and
dividing old ones had been, from early date, confided to the courts.
of quarter sessions in the state, the court proceeds to say: “But,
if the legislature can authorize the courts to decide questions of
this character, they can also authorize the people primarily to do
so. The difficulty is simply in the right to impart the power to
act. If it can be given to a selected few, it may also be delegated
‘to all inhabitants of a district, unless positively prohibited.”

Let us apply this reasoning to the question now under consider-
ation. By the general powers vested in county commissioners as
a corporate body, they were not authorized to subscribe to tho
stock of a railroad company. A contract of this description wae
not of the same character with those contracts which they were
empowered to enter into. To increase or enhance the delegated
authority so as to embrace contvacts of this description, required
the oxercise of legislative power, and this power was exercised in

17

19 ° APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock,

the enactment of the laws authorizing subscriptions to be made.
By these laws they are made competent to enter into the contract.
Whether this authority should be exercised, might depend upon
the discretion of the commissioners, “the selected few,” or it
‘might depend upon the discretion of the inhabitants of the county
generally. ‘

The case of Parker v. The Commonwealth came under review of
the same Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth v. Painter
etal., 10 Barr, 214. The case is stated thus: In April, 1847, the
Jegislature of Pennsylvania passed an act providing that the qual-
19] ified electors of the county of “Delaware should determine by
ballot, at the next general election, whether the seat of justice
should be continued as at present, or be removed to another place,
and directing, in the event of there being a majority for the change,
the commissioners should determine the exact location for the
new public buildings, and proceed to erect them. The question
zaised was as to the validity of this law, and the court held it to
be valid and constitutional.

T have already expressed the opinion that, under the constitution
of 1802, the general assembly of Ohio possessed the legitimate
power to authorize the commissioners of a county to construct a
railroad in the county, or to subscribe stock to a company, incor-
porated for the purpose of constructing such road, and that a law
conferring such authority would not be rendered unconstitutional
on account of a condition attached to it, that before the subserip-
tion was made, it should be approved of by a vote of tho people.
I now propose to refer to a few decided cases in support of this
opinion.

‘The first case I shall refer to is the case of the Commonwealth v.
McWilliams, 11 Penn. St. 61.

This case is first referred to, not because it is first in point of
time, but because it was decided by the same court which decided:
Parker's case, so strongly relied upon by counsel. for complainants.

‘The case was this: In the year 1846, the legislature of Pennsyl-
vania passed a law authorizing the supervisors of the public high-
sways in the townships through which the road of the Spruce Creek
and Water Creek turnpike company might pass, to subscribe for,
and in the name and behalf, and for the use of the inhabitants of
such township, any number of shares, not exceeding 3,800, on the
‘capital stock of said turnpike road. Under this act the supervisors

18

APPENDIX. 20, 28

Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

of Franklin township subscribed for stock in the road, and laid a
tax to pay for the subscription. The collection of the tax was re-
sisted on the ground that the act was unconstitutional. The opin-
ion of the court was delivered by the same judge who delivered it
in the case of Parker v. The Commonwealth.

*He says: “The act of 1834 empowers the supervisors of [20
townships to assess and levy township taxes for the purpose of
making and repairing roads and bridges, and for such other pur-
poses as may be authorized by law. And the act of 1846, as we
have seen, authorizes these supervisors to subscribe to the stock in
question. The tax in controversy is therefore levied for a distinct
purpose, authorized bylaw. But it is suggested that the latter act
is unconstitutional. What provision of the constitution of Pennsyl-
vania does it infract? None has been pointed out, for none such
exist.” This may be said of the cases now under consideration.
No provision of the constitution of Ohio is pointed out by counsel as
being violated. But the acts in question are said to be unconstitu-
tional and void, “for the reason that they are in violation of the
general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free govern-
ment, recognized and forever unalterably established by the bill of
rights.”

But the judge proceeds: “Of late years, it has been much the
fashion to impeach the action of legislative bodies as unconstitu-
tional, where it happens not to accord with the party’s notions of
propriety and absiract right. This is very frequently done in
sheer oblivion of the doctrine that express prohibition or necessary
implication is necessary to oust the state legislature of authority.
Where this prohibition is not found in the primordial law, the exertion
of a power can not be deemed unconstitutional, even though it seem
to trespass upon our ideas of natural justice and right reason.”

After commenting on the importance of roads, the court proceed *
to say: “ With us, accordingly, much attention has been bestowed
upon them, and liberal powers for raising money by taxation
vested in the officers charged with their superintendence. No one
has yet dreamed of doubting the validity of that power, when ap-
plied to the maintenance of the ordinary roads of the country;
and yet it is difficult to distinguish between these and a public
turnpike road, so far as the advantage of the community is involved.
The right to exert the *power of taxation in support of the [21

. 19

22 APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

latter, was considered at an early day in this state, in McClenagan
». Corwin, 3 Yeates, 362.”

Here was a law authorizing supervisors of the public highways
in townships to subscribe stock to a turnpike company, and the
validity of the law was sustained by the same court which decided
the case of Parker v. The Commonwealth.

But the court does not stop here. After citing from the opinion
in the case reported in 3 Yeates, the judge proceeds as follows: “A
very signal instance of the exercise of a similar power is afforded.
by the recont act of March 27, 1848, authorizing the city of Phila-
delphia, the county of Allegheny, the cities of Pittsburg and Alle-
gheny, and the municipal corporations of the county of Philadelphia,
to subscribe for shares of the capital stock of the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, to borrow money to pay therefor, and to pay
the principal and intorest of the sum so borrowed. The exercise
of this authority may, of course, entail additional taxation on the
inhabitants of the several places designated. Yet, though before
the enactment the right of a municipal corporation to subscribe
to the stock was strongly contested, no one has doubted it since ;
and, on the faith of this legislation, millions of dollars have been
subscribed.”

Does the court express the least doubt of the validity of the
legislation referred to in the last-quoted paragraph ? On the con-
trary, it is spoken of in terms of approbation. And no one read-
ing this case can for a moment doubt that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would hold the laws of Ohio, authorizing counties to
subscribe stock, to be valid and constitutional.

The next case I shall refer to is the case of Goodin v. Crump
etal., 8 Leigh, 120.

The James River and Kanawha Company was incorporated by
the legislature of Virginia, with power to unite the navigable
waters of the James and the Ohio rivers, through the valley of the
Great Kanawha, by a vanal or railroad. A majority of the citizons
of the city of Richmond, qualified by law to vote for members
22] of the city council, petitioned the legislature to pass *a law
authorizing a subscription by the city in the stock of the company.
A. minority objected to the law. An act, however, was passed,
giving the authority asked for, and empowering the city authorities
to lay taxes, ete., to meet the liabilities incurred by the subscrip-
tion. The stock was taken, and a tax laid by the corporation to

20

APPENDIX. 23

Constitutionality of ‘County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

pay the interest. Goodin, one of the minority who had refused
his assent to the law, filed his bill in chancery to enjoin the collec-
tion of the tax laid on his property, on the ground that it was an
unconstitutional law.

The court, however, sustained the law, and dismissed the Dill.
The case shows that the court considered the law as an enlarge-
ment of the corporate powers of the city—as an amendment, in
effect, of the city charter.

Tt was insisted by counsel for complainant ‘in that case, as it is
insisted by counsel in this case, that the legislature, from the nature
of the thing, was limited to the object for which a municipal cor-
poration or limited jurisdiction was created ; that the corporation
of Richmond being created for local objects, a power to tax a
minority, against their consent, for a general object common to all
the state, could not be conferred upon it. It was argued by them
that the James and Kanawha river improvement was one in which
the people of the whole state had an interest; and that the city
of Richmond could no more be empowered to assess a tax on a dis-
senting minority for this purpose, from which the rest of the
citizens of the state were exempt, than a like tax could be laid on
them exclusively to pay the expenses of the legislature.

The court, in the first place, considered the question of the right
of the legislature to confer new powers or privileges wpon a corpora-
tion, on the consent of the majority against the will of the minority
of the corporators. On this point they hold the following language :
“In this case it is contended that the legislature had no constitu-
tional power to authorize the subscription by the corporation to
the James River and Kanawha company. Yet it is admitted that
the legislature has the power of incorporating a town with certain
corporate powers, and it *can not be denied that this power [23
may be exercised without the unanimous consent of the inhabit-
ants. It would‘annihilate the power, if the fiat of one man or ten
men could arrest its exercise. Some number, thon, loss than the
whole, must suffice to render valid the acceptance of the act of in-
corporation. And if a number less than the whole will suffice,
who is to decide upon the plus or minus? Cortainly not the
judiciary ; and as certainly it must fall within the legislative prov-
ince. But the legislature has declared the assent of a majority
sufficient. We must therefore take it that an original charter,
accepted by a majority of the inhabitants, is valid; and pari

21

24 APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

ratione, a charter giving new powers and privileges, at the instance
of a majority, or accepted by them, is also valid.”

This shows that the assent or acceptance of the corporators,
whether express or implied, may be given by a municipal as well
as a civil corporation. Nor is it material whether this assent be
given bofore or after the enactmont of the law.

The cout further say: “But it is said that corporate powers
must be confined to the limits of the corporation. This, I think,
is a most imperfect test; for, confessedly, the limits of the corpo-
ration may be extended, so that, by this mode of reasoning, you
extend the power by extending the boundaries of the city. More-
over, it is not denied that a corporation may bring water into the
city from a point beyond it, and it may erect its works for that
purpose without its own jurisdiction. This affords us a better test.
The interest of the corporation is the true test of the corporate char-
acter of the act; for overy by-law, says Lord Holt, by which the
benefit of the corporation is advanced, is good for that reason.

“Tf, then, the test of the corporate character of the act is the

probable benefit of it to the community within the corporation,
who is the proper judge whether a proposed measure is likely to-
conduce to the public interest of the city? Is it this court, whose
avocations little fit it for such inquiries? or is it the mass of the
people themselves, the majority of the corporation, acting (as they
must do if they act at all) under the sanction of the legislative body?
The latter assuredly.
24] *“ The principles of good sense, not less than those of our
institutions, inculeate the propriety of leaving to individuals and
to communities the right to judge for themselves what their interest
demands, instead of fettering and controlling, under the false
notion that we, the governors, know what is good for them better
than they themselves. Without, thorefore, entering into the in-
quiry whether the subscription was for their benefit or not, I am
of opinion that they were the proper judges, subject, nevertheless, to
that control which necessarily exists in the charter-granting power.”

The opinion in this case certainly goes fully to sustain the valid-
‘ity of the laws of Ohio which are now brought in question. And
there can be no doubt that the Court of Appeals of Virginia, as
well as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, would hold these laws
to be constitutional.

In Virginia they have a law in force, enacted in 1848, which

22

APPENDIX. 25

Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

authorizes county subscriptions to railroad or turnpike corpora-
tions where the road to be constructed passes through or near by
the county, provided a vote is first taken, and such subscription is
assented to or advised by three-fifths of the persons voting.

The case of Bridgeport v. Housatonic Railroad, 15 Conn. 475,
sustains the principles laid down in the two last cases reforrod to,
and is a strong authority to sustain the constitutionality of the
laws under consideration. It is unnecessary to quote from this
ease anything more than the syllabus :

“In May, 1836, a railroad company was incorporated, with
power to construct a railroad from the northern line of the state
to the city of Bridgeport. On March 2, 1837, the city of Bridge-
port voted that it was expedient to aid in the construction of such
railroad by subscribing one hundred thousand dollars to the capital
stock of the company, and at the same time appointed an agent to
make such subscription, and agents also to raise that sum, by pro-
curing loans of money at an interest not exceeding six per cent.
per annum, with power to pledge the credit of the city therefor by
issuing its securities. The *subscription was accordingly made [25
on the books of the company, which was confirmed by the city on
March 25th, when a further subscription of fifty thousand dollars
was authorized, and the agents directed, as before, to raise the
requisite sums. At the same time, the city voted that a petition
should be presented to the legislature for the passage of an act
validating its former proceedings on this subject, and praying that
such further powers might be conferred on the city as should be
necessary to carry these proceedings into effect. Such a potition
being presented, the legislature, in 1838, granted the prayer
thereof, and ratified, confirmed, established, and made obligatory
on said city, and the citizens thereof, all their former proceedings
in the same manner and to the same extent as if all the necessary
powers for that purpose had been conferred by the charter of the
city; and also empowered the city, at any legal meeting called for
that purpose, to adopt such other measures as, in their opinion,
might be necessary to carry into effect all the former proceedings ;
and to provide for the negotiation and payment of the subscrip-
tions, loans, and securities, and providing that the securities which
had been, or might be issued, should be obligatory on the city, to
all intents and purposes, and might be enforced and collected in
the same quanner and to the same extent that debts lawfully con-

E 23

26 ‘APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

tracted by towns in this state are enforced under the existing laws.
This legislative act, in conformity with a proviso contained in it, was
afterward duly accepted and approved by the freemen of the city.

“Tn an action of debt on one of the bonds of the city, executed
by its agents, duly appointed and empowered, under the seal of the
corporation, and issued. for stock in the railroad company, to re-
cover interest, payable semi-annually, which had become due, it
was held:

“1. That the legislative act of 1838 (aside from any unconstitu-
tional infirmity) gave validity to the previous proceedings of the
city and its agents, whether they were otherwise valid or not.

«2. That such act was not inoperative, as being reactive, unjust,
or unconstitutional.

26] *3. That the city was thereby empowered to issue its
bonds for stock in the railroad company.

«4, That the bonds were not rendered invalid, because they were
issued in full of the subscription, while the stock was payable by
futuro installmonts, nor because the interest was payable semi-
annually.”

The case of Talbot v. Dent, 9 B: Mon. 526, is a case in point.
The action was replevin to try the validity of a tax.

The question raised was as to the validity of a law of the State
of Kentucky, which authorized the mayor and council of the city
of Louisville, with the consent and approbation of a majority of
the qualified voters of said city, expressed by a vote at a regular
election of city officers, and upon a regular submission of the ques-,
tion, after due notice, to subscribe for stock, not exceeding a pre-
scribed amount, in the Louisville and Frankfort Railroad Company;
such stock to be paid for by tax upon the property subject to city
taxation.

The court held the act to be valid and constitutional; and held,
farther, that taxation, by a local corporation, for a local purpose,
and tending to promote the local prosperity, is within the scope of
corporate powers of city corporations, when sanctioned by legisla-
tive authority, though not consented to by each individual.

The case of Chesney v. Hooser, 9B. Mon. 250, was an action of
trespass to try the validity of a corporation tax, and decided, like
the last case, by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

In this case the court held:

24

APPENDIX. ~ 27, 28

Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

1. The legislature have the constitutional power to confer taxing
power upon local corporations for their government and security:

2, All the lands of the commonwealth are held subject to tho
general powers of the legislature to tax them, either for general
purposes of government, or for local purposes, within localities in
which they may be situatod.

*3. When a town stands in noed of a local government, the [27
legislature may not only provide such government, but may con-
stitutionally give powers to its local authorities to tax the property
and citizens’ within its limits for the support of such government.

The case of Nicol v. Mayor and Aldermen of Nashville, 9 Humph.
252, was a case in which the constitutionality of a law of Tennes-
see, authorizing the city of Nashville to subscribe stock to a rail-~
road company, was drawn in question, and the court sustained the
constitutionality of the law.

It is unnecessary to rofer to further cases. Those already cited
go clearly to sustain the constitutionality of the laws of this state;
and if decided cases are to have any influence, these are sufficient.

Counsel for complainants, however, say that these cases relate to
subscriptions made in pursuance of corporate powers, confined to,
cities, and claim that the distinction between the legal powers of
cities and those of counties and townships are clear and unmis-
takable. In the case cited from Pennsylvania, the subscription was
made by the supervisors of a township. It was not a city, but a
township subscription.

It is truc there is a manifest distinction between the legal powers
of cities and countios or townships. But whence arises the dis-
tinction? Clearly from their acts of incorporation. In neither
city nor county is there any natural grinherent power. The power
which either possesses is power delegated by the supreme power of
the state. And if it be within tho constitutional power of the
general assembly to authorize an incorporated city to subseribo
stock to a railroad or canal company, it is equally competent to
confer the same authority upon a county, although the corporate
powers of the latter are in many respects different from those of
the former. If the termination of a railroad at or near a city will
conduce to the prosperity of the inhabitants of that city, may not
the same railroad couduce to the prosperity of the inhabitants of
the counties through which it shall be constructed? This is a
question that can as *well be determined by the inhabitants [28°

2

29 "APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

of a county as by those of a city. At least I should be unwilling
to say that the latter wore any more competent to determine upon.
their own interests than were the former. And I believe either
are more competent to determine this question for themselves than
this court.is to determine it for them.

Although counsel for complainants have not pointed out the par-
ticular part of the constitution which is violated by the laws now
under consideration, the judge delivering the opinion of the court,
in his obiter dictum, expresses the opinion that this description of
legislation is “not only a violation of the essential principles of
liberty and free government, but in direct derogation of section 4,
in article 8, of the late constitution of Ohio.”

This section 4 is as follows: “Private property ought and shall
ever be held inviolate, but always subservient to the public welfare,
provided a compensation in money be made to the owner.”

If I understand the opinion of the judge, he supposes this sec-
tion is violated by these laws, because the county commissioners,
having made the subscriptions authorized, are empowered, if it
shall become necessary, to assess taxes upon the taxable property
of the county, to meet the interest and eventually pay the princi-
pal of tho sum subscribed. I have never supposed that this sec-
tion had any reference whatever to the power of taxation. If to
levy and collect taxes is to take private property for public use
within the moaning of this section, no person can be compelled to
pay a tax until he has first received a “compensation in money.”
If the principle be sound, it must apply to taxes of every deserip-
tion—to taxes for state, as well as for county, school, and corpora-
tion purposes. There is a difference between the simpler power of
taxation and the power of taking private property for public use.
This section of the constitution relates to the latter—to a case
where the property is taken; as, for instance, land for the purpose
of a public road, or the materials for its construction. These can
29] not be taken until compensation *is made; but when the road.
is once established, a tax may be exacted of the community gen-
erally, to keep it in repair. If it be not so, then all our laws levy-
ing taxes for road purposes are unconstitutional.

Tt seems to me that the case of Thomas v. Leland et al., 24 Wend.
65, is fatal to this objection. The facts relative to the case were,
that some time previous to 1834, the canal commissioners had fixed
on Whitesboro as the termination of the Chenango canal, thinking

26

APPENDIX.

Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

that its connection with the Western canal could be more econom~-
ically made at that point than at Utica. March 24, 1834, a law
was passed authorizing a change, so that the termination should
be at Utica; provided, those more immediately interested should
defray the extraordinary expense. Hereupon, several individuals
bound themselves to pay this extraordinary expense. Afterward
the legislature of the state, deeming the debt thus contracted to be
partial and onerous, and believing the termination at Utica would
be beneficial to that place, passed an act in 1835, the object of
which was to levy a tax on the owners of real estate in Utica, to
pay this additional expense.

The constitutionality of this law was drawn in question, and one
objection was that it was seeking to take private property for pub-
lic use without compensation. In commenting upon the argument
of counsel, Judge Cowen, in delivering the opinion of the court,
proceeds as follows:

“But, it is said, that if the act had i in view the construction of the
canal, then it was unconstitutional, asseeking to take private property
for public use without just compensation, or any compensation. To
sustain this argument, it must be denied that the general profit of
the community to which we belong will warrant a tax affecting our
property. One answer in the case at bar is, that the improvement
in question was, in itself, a compensation to the plaintiff. Such, at
any rate, was the theory of the proceeding, and we must intend it
was carried out in practice. Such was the view taken by the legis- _
lature, and they must be left to judge of the compensation.

«But the argument proves quite too much. It would goto [80
eut off entirely many acknowledged powers of taxation—such as
that which raises money to reliove the poor, or establish and keep
on foot common schools, to build bridges, or work the highways,
Fé confounds two distinct legislative powers: a simple power of
tanation, with the power of taking private property for public use.
The former acts upon communities, and may be exerted in favor
of any object which the legislature shall deem for the public bene-
fit. A tax to build a lunatic asylum may be mentioned as one
instance. If the power to impose such a tax were to be rested on
the ground of individual pecuniary benefit to each one who should
be called on to contribute, it is quite obvious it would not be main-
tained fora moment. Yet who would doubt that such might be
imposed on a local community, a county, or even a town?”

27

“Bl APPENDIX.

Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

It seems to me that the distinction between taking private prop-
erty for “public use,” or “ the public welfare,” and the levying and
collecting of taxes, is too obvious to require further comment, and
Tcan not think that the before-recited section of article 8 of the
constitution has any application to the cascs now under considera-
tion.

But this section is important, taken in connection with another
stetement of the judge, in his opinion before referred to. In
speaking of railroads and their utility, he says: “But because
they accommodate individuals, and advance the public interest, it
‘will not do to say that thoy are such a public use, that private prop-
erty may be taken without the consent of the owner to construct
them.” Ido not know that I fully understand what is intended
by this declaration. If the intention is that a railroad corpora-
tion is of that character that it can not acquire the right of way
over a man’s land without the assent of the owner, it is at war with
the entire legislation of this state, and of every other state in the
Union which has legislated upon the subject. And if any such
dovirine is sustained, it will not only prevent the construction of
any further railroads in the state, but will lead to the destruction
of those already constructed. This right of way can not be ac-
81] quired *without making compensation. But railroads have
heretofore, in the legislation of this state, been so far considered
a public use,” or, in the words of the constitution, for the “ public
welfare,” that the corporation has been authorized to acquire the
right of way by ‘making compensation,” even against the assent
of the owner of the land. In this respect the legislation of other
states in the Union has been similar to our own. Railroads have
been considered, in this particular, as much a “ public use,” as have
been public highways. I am unwilling to believe that the judge
intended to intimate a doubt as to the constitutionality of this
course of logislation.

But the judge says that this description of legislation is in “vio-
lation of the essential principles of liberty and free government ;”
and such is the position assumed by the counsel for complainant.
Is it so? And if it be so, does it furnish any good reason to de-
clare tho legislation invalid? If all men would definitely agree
upon what constituted the “essential principles of liberty and free
government,” it might do to test the validity of a law by these
principles. But herein consists the difficulty. Upon this subject

28

APPENDIX. 32

Constitutionality of County Subscriptions to Railroad Companies.

there is great contrariety of opinion. And if this were adopted as
a test of the validity of laws, legislative enactments would or
would not be enforced according to the opinions of the judges be-
fore whom they might come in review, as to what constituted the
“principles of liberty and free government.” The same enactment
would be held invalid by one set of judges, which would be en-
forced by another. There is now great complaint of the uncer-
tainty of the law; but by the adoption of this test, that which
now, to a certain extent, is uncertain, would be rendered. tenfold
more so. We have in Ohio a class of enthusiasts who hold all
laws to be inconsistent with the “principles of liberty,” and deny
entirely the power of human government. They hold that each
man’s actions must be controlled by the dictates of bis own con-
science; and so long as he acts accordingly, it is usurpation to at-
tempt to make him amenable to any human tribunal. The num-
ber of this class, it is true, is small, and it can not be expected
they will ever make much difficulty in the state. .

*By the constitution of the state, I have ever supposed that [32
the “principles of liberty and free government” were well estab-
lished. And to my mind, it is clear that “liberty and free govern-
ment can not exist without laws. And just so far as the laws are
sustained, so far the liberties of the people will be sustained.
From. the community of the entire state down to the communities
of school districts, the principle prevails that the will of the ma-
jority must control. In the election of officers, a plurality even
controls. By the vote of a majority, vast sums have been ex-
pended by the state in works of internal improvement. This has
ever been opposed by a minority. Still the tax operates alike
upon all. Is this opposed to the “principles of liberty and free
government?” By the vote of a majority in a township, a town-
house can be erected. Can those who vote in a minority be ex-
empt from the expense?

By the vote of the majority of a school district, a tax can be
levied for the support of schools in the district, and this tax must
be paid as well by the minority as the majority. Is this unjust,
and in violation of “the principles of liberty?” If a majority of
the people of a county think it advantageous to their county to
have a railroad constructed through the same, and vote accord-
ingly, can the minority with any greater propriety complain that
they are taxed with the majority to defray the expense, than in

29

32 APPENDIX.

Opinion of Judge Hitchcock.

the cases before referred to? If the improvement is beneficial to
the county, they partake of that benefit equally with the majority,
and in justice are equally bound to contribute to the expense.

Thave said much more upon the questions involved in these
cases than Tintended. They are highly important, and after the
most mature deliberation and reflection, I can come to no other
conclusion than that the legislation drawn in question is in accord-
ance with the constitution of the state. It is nowhere prohibited
in that instrument, and is fully within the scope of the legislative
power vested in the general assembly.

30

[A]

DISSENTING OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE HITCHOOCK, IN
IRWIN v. LONGWORTH AND OTHERS.

Wiuitam anp James F. Irwin v. Nionoras Lonaworrn BT AL.
In Onanorry. Original bill.

Writram F. Irwin anv Harrier Inwiy, ois wire, v. Nicnonas
Loneworts EY AL.

In Cuancmry. Cross-bill. Reserved in Hamilton county.

The material facts, the arguments of counsel, and the decisions
of the court, are all found in the foregoing volume, and are there-
fore not restated here.

Hrroncoox, ©. J., dissenting. These cases are of some consider-
able importance, not so much on account of the principles involved
as on account of the value of the property in controversy. They
were fully argued in the last term of the Supreme Court, in Ham-
ilton county, and have again been argued at the present term of
the court in bank. Although present during both arguments, yet
Iwas necessarily absent when the cases were disposed of. Not
concurring fully in the decision. made, I deem it proper to express
my opinion upon the controversy.

‘William Irwin, the former owner of the premises in controversy,
died in 1824, leaving a widow and four children, to wit: Archibald
Irwin, who is a defendant in these cases ; William Irwin and James
F. Irwin, the complainants in the original bill, and Louisa, inter-
married with Lewis Whiteman. He also “left a grandson, [84
who died in infancy. He also left a will; and Lewis Whiteman and
Thomas D. Carneal were appointed his administrators, with the
will annexed. .

Mrs. Whiteman died in 1832, leaving three children—Havrriet,
William, and Louisa. Harriet intermarried with William F. Ir-
win, and, with her husband, is complainant in the cross-bill.

The leading facts and circumstances of the cases, as they appear

31

35 APPENDIX.

Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

in the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, are as follows: In 1821,
William Irwin, the deceased, was the owner of three lots in the
city of Cincinnati, and about one hundred acres of land on the
hills adjoining the city; and, being in somewhat doubtful cireum-
stances, was anxious to place this land and the lots in a situation
that they could not be reached by execution. At this time he was
in the mercantile business, in company with his son Archibald.
He applied for counsel to Mr. Longworth, who was his intimate
friend and legal adviser. Mr. Longworth advised that the prop-
erty should be conveyed in trust, to indemnify Archibald for his
liability upon claims against the firm of William Irwin & Son. He
-was informed that Archibald would not consent to this, as it might
lead to @ suspicion with respect to his integrity. Longworth him-
self urged Archibald to consent to such an arrangement, but he
utterly refused. .

At this time, William Irwin was indebted to Longworth, among
other things, in the sum of between two and three thousand dol-
lars, for money paid by Longworth to John Johnson, for Irwin,
and for the payment of which to Longworth, Thomas D, Carneal
was security; and Longworth was also indorser to the Bank of
the United States for Irwin upon several notes. These notes to
the bank were secured by mortgage on real estate, which was sup-
posed to be more than sufficient for their satisfaction.

Archibald Irwin not agreeing that the land and lots, before re-
ferred to, should be conveyed in trust for his indemnity, and his
father, William Irwin, being urgent that they should be placed be-
yond the reach of exceution, it was at length agreed between
35] *him and Mr. Longworth that the same should be conveyed.
to Thomas D. Carneal, in trust, to indemnify Longworth against
his bank indorsements. Longworth drow the deed, which is ab-
solute in its torms, the consideration expressed being five thousand
dollars, although no consideration was actually paid. It was exe-
cuted in August, 1821, and left with Longworth, to be delivered to
Carneal. Longworth procured it to be recorded, but did not de-
liver it to Carneal until March 21, 1822.

At the time of delivery, Longworth had prepared a declaration
of trust, according to the understanding between himself and Ir-
win, but this declaration Carneal refused to sign, or to receive the
deed upon such terms, insisting that the debt due from Irwin to
Longworth, upon which Carneal was security, should be provided

. 82

APPENDIX. : 36

Irwin v. Longworth et al.

for as well as the bank indorsements. Finally, the following
declaration of trust was drawn up and signed by Carneal, who re-
ceived the deed: .

“This may certify that, whereas, William Irwin has deeded to
me the equal, undivided moiety of a tract of land, lying east of
Cincinnati, estimated to contain two hundred acres, situated in
fractional section No. 5, township 3, and fractional range 2, and
also the north half of lots Nos. 1, 2, and 3, in square No. 1, in that
part of Cincinnati laid off by the United States. Said conveyance
has been made me in trust, for the following purpose, and no other:
‘Whereas, William Irwin stands indebted to Nicholas Longworth
in the sum of $2,912, for so much money paid by him for said
Irwin, to John Johnson; and whereas, the said Nicholas Long-
worth stands as indorser for said Irwin in the Branch Bank of
the United States, in Cincinnati, to a large amount; this may there-
fore certify that I hold the same in trust—in the first place, to se-
cure said Nicholas Longworth in the repayment of the aforesaid
sum and interest from the date; and, secondly, to indemnify and
save harmless the said Nicholas Longworth as the indorser of said
Irwin ; and, thirdly, the overplus to the creditors, if any, of the
same William Irwin; and lastly, to account to said William Irwin,
his heirs, executors, and administrators, *for the remaining [86
balance in my hands. If said Irwin should not pay the said Nich-
olas Longworth the aforesaid sum of money and interest yearly,
‘within five years from this date, and pay the several notes in the
Branch Bank, on which said Nicholas Longworth is indorser, or
otherwise obtain his discharge from liability in the same, I am to
sell the aforesaid premises at private sale or public auction, for
eash or on credit, at the discretion of the said Nicholas Longworth,
and apply the proceeds in the manner heretofore pointed out.
First, the private debt of the said Nicholas Longworth ; secondly,
the notes in the Branch Bank, on which said Nicholas Longworth
is indorser of said Irwin; thirdly, to pay from the surplus, if any,
other debts due by said Irwin; and, lastly, to account to said Wil-
liam Irwin, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, for the
remaining balance, if any.” Dated March 16, 1822, and signed
“Thomas D. Carneal.”

William Irwin was not present at the delivery of the deed and
execution of the declaration of trust. It is pretty manifest, how-
ever, that he had authorized Longworth to transact the business,

33

37 APPENDIX.

Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

and the great effort was so to arrange it as to put the property be-
yond the reach of creditors. Not that William Irwin designed any
actual fraud. He probably fully believed himself able to pay all
his debts, provided he could have his property in a situation to dis-
pose of it without a forced sale. And there can be no doubt that
Longworth expected to have the property reconveyed at the re- *
quest of Irwin, believing that so far as the bank debts were con-
cerned, the property mortgaged to the bank by Irwin was fully
adequate to satisfy those debts.

Soon after the delivery of this deed to Carneal, Longworth left
the state upon a visit to New Jersey, and was absent for some time.
During his absence, Archibald Irwin called upon Carneal, and re-
quested of him a conveyance of the land and lots. Carneal was
about to comply, when he recollected the declaration of trust exe-
cuted by him to Longworth, and went in company with Archibald
37] to Longworth’s house, found the writing, *and read the
same. Archibald was surprised, and so was William Irwin; but,
after a little reflection, the latter remarked in substance, “Tt will
be all right when Longworth returns, he said it must be so fixed
‘as to stand in law.”

After the return of Longworth there were several interviews be-
tween him and William Irwin, some of them of an angry charac-
ter—Irwin insisting that the land was only to be holden for the
bank debts, which both supposed to be otherwise secure; and Long-
-worth contending it was as well to secure the Jobnson debt as the
other. Longworth proposed, however, that if Irwin would get
him discharged from liability on the indorsements, or would secure
to him the Johnson debt, he would give up the land. This Irwin
was not able to effect. At length the matter was so arranged that
Longworth agreed to give up his other claims against Irwin, and
Jet the land remain as an indemnity on account of his indorse-
ments. An instrument of writing was drawn by Carneal, and
signed by Longworth and Irwin, as follows:

“The real estate transferred to Thomas D. Carneal, to éontinue
as collateral security for Nicholas Longworth’s indemnity, as in-
dorser of William Irwin, in the Bank of the United States, or un-
til said Irwin releases said Longworth from said indorsements.

“The claim against Philips, to be assigned when judgment is
obtained, to be applied to the discharge of Jabez Longworth’s debt,
due from Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank. Longworth to give a

34

APPENDIX. 38:

Irwin v. Longworth et al.

receipt from any balance due him on the amount paid for William
Irwin on account of the Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank, and re-
lease said Irwin from the debt due for moneys paid Johnson, and
look to the Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank for the same.”

This paper is signed by William Irwin and Nicholas Longworth,
and was placed in the hands of Carneal. It is without date. It
was deposited with Carneal, and remained in his possession until
tho year 1839, if not afterward.

Notwithstanding the execution of the deed to Carneal, *Wil- [88
liam Irwin continued in possession of the real estate during his life,
and his heirs for some years after his death. William Irwin died
in 1824, Some years after his death, the taxes on the hill-land
being unpaid, Longworth bid it in for the unpaid taxes; but
whether he received a deed from the auditor does not appear. In
1827-28, or ’29, he entered into possession of this hill-land, and has
continued in possession ever since. The town-lots still continued
in possession of the Irwin heirs.

After the death of William Irwin, Archibald Irwin interposed a
claim that the deed executed by his father to Carncal was, in
reality, in trust for his benefit, to indemnify him for the payment
of debts due from the firm of William Irwin & Son; and insisted
that, notwithstanding the original declaration of trust, and the sub-
sequent memorandum signed by William Irwin and Longworth,
and deposited with Carneal, he was entitled to the land. Long-
worth, on the contrary, insisted that he was entitled to be indem-
nified for his indorsements to the Branch Bank, according to the
stipulation of the before-named memorandum. This controversy
between Archibald Irwin and Longworth continued from the
death of William Irwin to the year 1839. There was nothing
secret about it; but it was well understood by their mutual friends.
Different propositions for compromise were made through frionds,
but none of them complied with. These propositions were made
through friends, because the parties were so far estranged from
cach other that they held no personal intercourse.

In the meantime, the property mortgaged by William Irwin to
secure the notes due from him to the Branch Bank, and which had
been indorsed by Longworth, was exhausted, and Longworth was
compelled to pay to the bank an amount which, with interest to
the year 1839, amounted to nearly twenty thousand dollars. Archi-
bald Irwin had also paid of the debts of William Irwin & Son an

85

39,40 APPENDIX.

Dissenting Opinion of Ohief Justice Hitchcock.

amount’ nearly equal to twenty thousand dollars, and which, with
interest, exceeded that sum.

Archibald Irwin, through bis friend, N. G. Pendleton, in
39] *order to compromise this difficulty, proposed that Longworth
should take the hill-land, and suffer him, Archibald, to have the
town-lots. Fora long time Longworth refused to accept of this
proposition, on the ground that the hill-land was not of sufficient
value to indemnify him; but at length, in January, 1839, through
the advice and persuasion of friends, who were anxious that this
long existing feud should cease, concluded to comply with the
proposition.

Carneal, the trustee, however, refused to convey according to
this arrangement, unless with the consent and approbation of the
heirs of William Irwin. This was made known to Archibald Ir-
win, and he drew up an instrument, which was signed by himself,
his brothers William and James F. Irwin, and Lewis Whiteman,
husband of Louisa J. Whiteman, and natural guardian of his and
her children. his instrument is as follows:

“Whereas, on August 13, 1821, William Irwin, deceased, deeded.
to Thomas D. Carneal a certain lot of ground on the corner of
Fourth and Ludlow streets, in the city of Cincinnati, and the un-
divided half of two hundred acres of land on the hills east of said
city, in trust for the use of Archibald Irwin, to discharge the debts
of William Irwin & Son; and whereas, subsequently, the said Wil-
liam Inwin, deceased, did, by written memorandum, agree that the
property aforesaid should be held for the security of Nicholas Long-
worth, as his indorser to the Bank of the United States; now,
know all men by these presents, that we, the undersigned, heirs
of William Irwin, deceased, do hereby authorize said Thomas D.
Carneal to execute a deed to the said Archibald Irwin, for the lots
aforesaid, and to the said Nicholas Longworth a deed for the land
aforesaid, and do hereby express our free consent and approbation
to the same, as heirs of said deceased. Witness our hands and
seals at Cincinnati, January 11, 1839.

(Signed,) «ZL, Worreman, [t. 8.]
“J. FInwin, [ts]
“W. Inwin, [z. 8]
« Witness: N. Morrx. “A, Inwin, [z.8.]”
40] *At the date of this instrument, William Irwin, the com-
plainant, according to the testimony of Archibald Irwin, was
36

APPENDIX. . AL

Irwin v. Longworth et al.

thirty-three years old, and James F. Irwin nearly thirty-one.
They were men in business, and well educated.

The testimony as to the value of the hill-land at the time is some-
what conflicting ; but from all the evidence, I am satisfied that its
actual value could not probably have exceeded ton thousand dol->.
lars—certainly it could not have exceeded fifteen thousand. Ido
not believe it could have been sold in the market for the first-
named sum. The city lots were probably worth from eight to
twelve thousand.

Longworth had no part in procuring the before-recited order on
Carneal, and there is no proof that he ever saw it until after the
execution of the deeds in pursuance of it.

This instrument or order, having been delivered to Carneal, he
executed the conveyances as therein directed, on January 21, 1839.
The conveyance to Longworth is in the ordinary form of a quit-
claim deed. In executing the conveyances, he took from the
grantee’s writings, of which the following are copies:

“Received, January 17, 1839, from Thomas D. Carneal, Esq., a
deed for the lot mentioned in the within memorandum, which I
acknowledge to be in full of all claims against the estate of Wil-
Tiam Irwin, deceased, for liabilities for debts of William Irwin &
Son. AncurpaLp Irwin.”

“T have received from Thomas D. Carneal a quitclaim deed for
one hundred acres of land, more or less, east of Cincinnati, which
conveyances wore made me by order of the heirs of William Irwin,
deceased, and which I accept in full of all claims and demands

against the ostate. Nicnozas Loneworrs.

“ Omemnati, January 21, 1839.”

Indorsed on tho back:

“The conveyance is for the undivided half of two hundred acres,
more or less. * Nicnonas Loyeworra.”

*The complainants in the original bill seek relief. against [41
the effect of tho before-recited order upon Carneal, by them signed,
and to be let in to redeem the hill-land, upon the payment to
Longworth of the amount which he has been compelled to pay to
the Branch Bank, upon his indorsement; and they base this appli-
cation upon an alleged mistake as to their rights, at the time they
signed the instrument. This alleged mistake is set forth in their
amended bill, filed in November, 1845, as follows:

“Your petitioners further represent, that the recital in said in-

37

42 APPENDIX.

Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

strument that,the said lands and tenements had been conveyed to-
the said Thomas D. Carneal, in trust for the use of Archibald Irwin,
to discharge the debts of William Irwin & Son, was utterly false in
substance and in fact; that your petitioners did not know the
Falsehood of said recital, but the fact was well known to the said
Nicholas Longworth to be, that said deed was not made for that
purpose. Your petitioners pray that no effect may be given to said
instrument, the same having been obtained from your petitioners
upon a mistaken view of the facts, and by misrepresentation and
concealment, on the part of the said Nicholas Longworth, of facts
affecting your petitioners’ rights, as aforesaid ; and your petitioners
pray that said instrument may be declared void.”

In this charge in the bill there is no allegation, nor in any other
part of the bill is there any allegation that there was any mistake
or any misapprehension of the trust, so far as Longworth is con-
cerned. It was precisely as set forth in the order upon Carneal.
It is charged, it is true, that complainants had a mistaken view of
the facts, in consequence of the misrepresentation and concealment
of Longworth. But where is the evidence of this misrepresenta-
tion and concealment? It is not in the case. On the contvary, the
complainants have been at great pains to show that Longworth
has uniformly insisted that the trust was for his benefit, and not
for the benefit of Archibald Irwin. And they are compelled to do
this in that aspect of the case in which they insist there was a mis-
take or misapprehension on their part.

42] But what is the position in which thoy place themselves
by this allegation, in connection with the prayer of their bill?
They charge that they executed this instrument of writing upon
the supposition that the Jand was conveyed to Carneal in trust for
their brother Archibald, for the payment of the debts of William
Trwin & Son; and that subsequently there was an agreemont in
writing that Carneal should hold the land in trust, to indemnify
Longworth for his indorsement to the Branch Bank. Having this
impression, they were willing and consented that the hill-land
should be conveyed to Longworth, and the city lots to Archibald,
and directed accordingly. Now they have ascertained that there
was no trust in favor of Archibald, but that it was entirely in favor
of Longworth. Under these circumstances they pray, not that
Archibald, who had no interest, should release to them the prop-
erty which he has thus acquired through their mistake, but that
38

APPENDIX. 43

Irwin v. Longworth et al.

Longworth, who had a greater interest than they supposed, and
who relinquished a part of that interest, may be decreed to hold
the land which he has acquired, subject to their right of redemp-
tion. This does not seem to me like seeking equal and exact jus-
tice, but would rather appear to be a consequence flowing from
that family feud, of which we hear so much’ in these cases.

T have said that the application for relief is based upon the alle-
gation that there was a mistake or a misrepresentation in this
order or memorandum, in this particular; that it is therein alleged
that the lands and lots were conveyed “ in trust for the use of Archi-
bald Irwin, to discharge the debts of William, Irwin & Son ;” and that *
the complainants had no knowledge of this mistake, but supposed
the fact to have been as therein represented. True, in the original
bill, direct and positive fraud is charged upon Longworth; butof
this there is no proof, and in the amended bill this charge is aban-
doned. In argument it is said they did not know that they had
any interest in the land, or any right to redeem. But if the land
had been conveyed in trust for the purpose of paying these debts,
or for the purpose of indemnifying Longworth for his indorse-
ments, the payment *of the debts, or the payment of the notes [43
which Longworth indorsed, by the grantor or his heirs, would
have relieved the land from the incumbrance, and the trustee must
have reconveyed. Had the deed of conveyance been technically a
mortgage, such payment, according to the decisions of this court,
would not only have released the land from the incumbrance, but
would have reinvested the grantor, or his heirs, with the legal
title. Such are the principles of law, as we recognize them. Al-
though a man may be relieved in equity, where he has acted in
ignorance of facts which were important for him to know, it must
be an extreme case which will justify a court in relieving him on
account of his ignorance of the law. Cases may arise where courts.
will interfere to relieve, on account of ignorance of the law; as
where young and inexperienced heirs have been defrauded of their
inheritance, or have been induced to convey away their inherit-
ance without adequate compensation. But it will not,be claimed
that the original complainants in these cases were either very
young or very ignorant, at the time they signed the order or mem-
orandum of January, 1839. On the contrary, one of the two was
thirty-three years of age, and the other more than thirty. They
were doth engaged in business, and had been well educated.

39

44 APPENDIX.

Dissenting Opinion of Ohief Justice Hitchcock.

Now, as to the falsity of tho allegation that this deed to Carneal
was made “in trust for Archibald Irwin, to discharge the debts of
William Irwin & Son.” This instrument was drawn up by Archi-
bald Irwin himself, and as a witness he still swears that such was
the fact. That there was any such trust that could be enforced in
Jaw or equity can not be protended, and the reason is, that there
is no written memorandum to that effect. If there was any such
trust, it was merely a parol trust; and it is not described in the or-
der as anything more than a parol trust, while it is stated that,
“gabsequently, the said William Irwin, deceased, did, by written

+ memorandum, agree that the property aforesaid should be held for
the security of Nicholas Longworth, as his indorser,” ete. It may
‘bo well to inquire as to the real design of William Irwin in making
44] this *doed to Carncal. It certainly was not for the purpose
of securing Longworth on account of his indorsements. Long-
worth did not require any such security, for he supposed that the
property already mortgaged by Irwin to the bank was abundantly
sufficient to pay the demands and save him harmless. The deed
was not made at his solicitation and request. On the contrary, the
part by him taken in the transaction was in compliance with the
expressed wishes of William Irwin. In my mind, there can be no
doubt that the leading object was to put the property beyond the
reach of croditors, and place it in a situation that he could control
it, and with its avails, pay the debts of William Irwin & Son. The
design was to benefit Archibald Irwin. It appears from the
statements of Longworth, which are made evidence in the case by
the complainants, that, upon the first application of William Ir-
win to him relative to the business, he advised that the property
should be conveyed to Archibald, or that it should be conveyed to
some other person, in trust for Archibald. This was declined,
however, on the alleged ground that Archibald would not consent
from motives of delicacy.

During the absence of Longworth in New Jersey, Archibald
applicd to Garneal for a conveyance of the property; and this, too,
with tho assent of his father. Would he have done this unless he
had supposed that he had an interest, or unless he had supposed
tho conveyance for his bencfit? Oarneal seems, in the first in-
stance, to have been willing to comply with this request, and'would
have conveyed accordingly but for his recollection of the writing
he had given to Longworth, and which seems to have made so

40

APPENDIX. 45

Irwin 0. Longworth et al.

little impression upon his mind that he did not recollect its con-
tents until he examined the writing itself, Carneal undoubtedly
understood that the conveyance to him was for an objoct different
than that expressed in the declaration of trust. This declaration
of trust in favor of Longworth was intended so to fix the matter
that it “would stand in law.” Longworth himself states that, not-
withstanding the deed and declaration of trust, it was his expec-
tation that Irwin would retain the property and dispose of [45
it as he thought proper. And if there is anything in the whole
case, from which it can be inferred that Longworth acted in bad
faith toward William Irwin or his family, it consists in this, that
he held on to this trust property contrary to the expectation of T-
win; and his apology for this must be that, at the time of the
transaction, he declared, as he says to Irwin, that it was to be at
his election whether or not to give it up. To bring all these cir-
cumstances into consideration, I am of opinion that, when Wil-
liam Irwin made the conveyance to Carneal, he did it with the in-
tent and expectation that Archibald Irwin would receive the bene-
fit of the land; and that the latter, when he testifies under oath
that the land was conveyed in trust for his use, to pay the debts
of William Irwin & Son, is substantially correct. This opinion is
strengthened by the testimony of both Archibald Irwin and
Thomas D. Carneal, as to the conduct and declarations of William
Irwin. The real object was the indemnity of Archibald; but that
the conveyance might “stand good in law,” the ostensible one was
the indemnity of Longworth for his indorsements. The former
rested in parol, the latter was reduced to writing.

Longworth refusing to yield his security, there was altercation
between him and William Irwin in the lifetime of the latter; and
after his death, the same contention was continued between Archi-
bald and Longworth—the former contending that the trust was for
him, and the latter relying upon the original declaration of trust
of 1821, and the subsequent modification in writing, which bears
no dato. The former could not be enforced as resting merely in
parol; but the latter, being in writing, was valid.

Had the statement, in the order of January, 1839, been that this
trust in favor of Archibald Irwin was in writing, then, indeed, it”
would not have been in accordance with the fact. But such is not
the statement. Counsel for complainant characterize this state-
ment as being false, as being a lie. If it were so, by whom was

41

46,47 APPENDIX.

Dissonting Opinion of Ohief “Justice Hitchcock.

this falsehood uttered? Not by Nicholas Longworth, but by
46] Archibald Irwin; and because Archibald “Irwin has uttered
this falsehood, they seek relicf, not against him, but against Long-
worth. He is excused on the ground that he really believed he
was telling the truth. He did so believe, and still so believes; and
I am satisfied that he is correct in this belief, and that the only
difficulty which lay in his way was, that the trust for his benefit
was not reduced to writing; and the reason why it was not re-
duced to writing was, the apprehension that in such case the decd
itself would bo held to be fraudulent as to creditors. .
The complainants, insisting upon the falsity of this statement,
in the order of January, 1839, say they were ignorant of this fact—
were ignorant that they had any interest in this property; and,
having ascertained their mistake, now seck relief. Having signed
the order, and having done it voluntarily—certainly having done
it without any influence exerted over them by Longworth, or any
one acting for him—it is for them to make proof of this allegation
in the pleadings. The proof made is of their respective ages at
the time of the execution of the decd to Carneal, at which time
‘William was fiftcen years of age, and James F. nearly thirteen.
At the date of the order the former was thirty-threo and the latter
more than thirty. There is also the testimony of Archibald Irwin
and Lewis Whiteman. The former states that he doos not know
as to their knowledge; that he never communicated with them;
that he never told them that they had any interest in the land, for
he did not suppose they had any, belicving it in equity to belong
to himself. Whiteman, who was one of the administrators of Wil-
liam Irwin, says that he did not suppose that they had any in-
terest. He knew that the land had been conveyed to Carneal, and
" supposed the trusts to have been as sot forth in the order; that the
administrators, in their accounts, took no notice of the land or the
demands of Longworth and Archibald; and that he was satisfied
that the property conveyed to Carneal was not sufficient in valuo
to indemnify Archibald for the payment of the debts of William
* Irwin & Son, and to indemnify Longworth on account of his in-
47] dorsement to the Branch Bank. The reason why he *did not
suppose these complainants had any interest was, that the property
itself was not of sufficient value to satisfy the claims, for the satis-
faction of which it was pledged; and such, undoubtedly, was the
opinion of the other witness.
42

APPENDIX. "4 48

Irwin v! Longworth et al.

It may be well to inquire what knowledge, with respect to this
whole transaction, these complainants did possess, and whether
that knowledge was of a character to lead them to such inquiries
as would have made them acquainted with the true state of facts.
If it was, it is sufficient. An individual will be charged with no-
tice, where the circumstances of the case are such as to put a pru-
dent and reasonable man upon inquiry.’

These complainants knew,that this land had been deeded by
their father to Carneal, and that this conveyance was accompanied.
with a trust. Whether they knew of the controversy between
their father and Longworth with respect to this trust, after the
exccution of this deed, does not positively appear in the case. But
it does appear in their answer to the cross-bill that they were well
acquainted with the protracted controversy between their brother
Archibald and Longworth, as to which of the two were entitled to
the benefit of this trust. They must have known, or at least it is
reasonable to suppose they must have known, something with
respect to the particulars of this controversy. If they did not
know it before, the presentation of the order itself gave them the
information. This, at any rate, was sufficient to put them on in-
quiry. In this it is recited that the deed was made to Carneal in
trust “for the use of Archibald Irwin, to discharge the debts of
‘William Inwin & Son,” and that subsequently, by a written mem-
‘orandum, William Irwin agreed that the property should be held
to indemnify Longworth. Of the truth of the facts herein stated,
they could casily have beon advised by application to Carneal, the
trustee, or to Longworth. This inquiry they did not make. The
writing which was presented to them was made by their brother,
and, so far as appears, they freely affixed their signatures and seals
to it. And, in consequonce of the order so drawn and executed,
the hill-land was conveyed to Longworth, and the *city lots [48
to Archibald, and this by separate and distinct deeds of convey-
ance.

It is said that these complainants received no consideration for
the exccution of this order upon Carneal, and that therefore, under
the circumstances of the case, thoy should not be bound by it.
Whether they received any consideration or not, a sufficiont con-
sideration passed from Longworth. Hoe had been damnified by his
indorsements for the elder Irwin to the amount of nearly twenty
thousand dollars, and for his indemnity he had a lien not only

43

49 "APPENDIX.

Dissenting Opinion of Chiof Justice Hitchcock.

upon the hill-land but upon the city lots. This lien upon the city
lots he relinquished, and also released his entire claim upon the
estate of William Irwin. Ordinarily, I suppose that it may be
considered that it is of somo benefit to a child that a large claim

* against its father’s estate is released. Perhaps it is not so in this
case, for it is said by complainants’ counsel, that the estate of the
father was insolvent, and these complainants could expect nothing
from the assets.

But there is another view which may be taken of this matter.
There had been a controversy between Archibald Irwin and Long-
worth, with respect to this property, from the death of William
Irwin, in 1824, until 1839, each claiming that the deed to Carneal
was in trust for his own benefit—a controversy which was well un-
derstood by these complainants. Terms of compromise had been
proposed by Archibald, which were at first rejected by Longworth,
but at length assented to by him, in consequence of the earnest
solicitation of friends. Still the trustee refused to convey in par-
suance of this compromise, unless with the assent of the heirs of
William Irwin. That assent was given by these complainants, and
this was supposed to be a close of this unpleasant business. Can
it be doubted that when this order was signed by these complain-
ants, they understood the purport and object of it? That the in-
tention was to perfect a settlement between their brother and Long-
worth? Shall they now be permitted to avoid this act—to defeat
this sottlement, on the pretense that they received no considera-
tion? ‘

49] *But I am wrong, perbaps, in intimating that they wish to
defeat this: settlement. They are well satisfied that it should re-
main, so fur as Archibald is concerned—that he should retain the
property conveyed to him; although the gravamen of thoir com-
plaint against Longworth is, that in drawing up the order, Archi-
bald stated a falsehood, in saying the deed to Carneal was in trust
for his use, to discharge the debts of William Irwin & Son. Ad-
mitting this to be a falsehood, which I do not believe, why should
the sin of Archibald bo visited upon Longworth? It might be
good ground of complaint against the former, and good ground to
induce a court of chancery to deerce that he should relinquish his
hold upon the lots conveyed to him by Carneal. But so long as
there was no mistake in this order, as to the trust in favor of Long-
worth—so long as on his part there has been no misrepresentation,
44

APPENDIX. *

Irwin v, Longworth et al.

no concealment, but a constant and uniform affirmation as to his
rights—it does seem to me that it is not in accordance with the
principles of equity and good conscience, to divest him of this
property, or to subject him to any further altercation with respect
to it.

Admitting that in the ordor referred to, there was such mistake
as is alleged by these complainants, and they were ignorant of it,
does it follow, as a matter of course, that they are entitled to the
relief which they seek? Courts of equity will, in a proper case,
relieve against mistakes. But in order to entitle himself to relief,
a complainant must not only establish the mistake, but he must
show that this mistake has been prejudicial to him. Now how
have these complainants been projudiced by this alleged mistake?
There is no controversy but that Longworth had a lien upon the

« entire property deeded to Carneal, to indemnify him for his in-
dorsements to the bank. About this thore is no pretense of any
mistake. The evidence in the case shows that the aniount which
he had been compelled to pay in consequence of these indorse-
ments, together with the intorest, amounted, in January, 1839, to
very near twenty thousand dollars. This was a debt against the
estate of William *Irwin, to ‘say nothing about the debt to [50
Archibald Irwin and debts to others. And this debt being a lien
on the real estate, the heirs of William Irwin could not have the
enjoyment of the estate but upon the payment of this debt. Such
being the situation, Longworth, at the earnest solicitation of his
friends, agreed to take for his debt, the hill-land, and relinquish
his claim to the city lots. To this the complainants, as two of the
heirs of William Irwin, agreed, and directed the hill-land to be
conveyed to Longworth—which was done; and he discharged or
released the estate of William Irwin, from all claims or demands
which he had against it. The hill-land was by him received in
full satisfaction of what he had been compelled to pay on the bank
indorsements. It was received as full indemnity, and being so re-
ecived, his lien upon the city lots was entirely removed. This is
the plain, common-sense nature of the transaction. The fact that
these complainants assented that the city lots should be conveyed
to their brother, or the fact that they now consent that that brother
shall retain them as his property, although they insist that he has
no right to them whatever, can not affect Longworth or his in-
terests.

45

51 * APPENDIX.

Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

Now, was this arrangement advantageous or prejudicial to the
complainants and other heirs of William Irwin? This must de-
pend upon the value of the property received by Longworth, in
satisfaction of his debt. As heretofore stated, the testimony as to
its value in January, 1839, is somewhat conflicting ; but taking the
testimony altogether, I am satisfied that its value did not exceed
fifteen thousand dollars, and do not believe that it could have been
sold in the market for ten thousand. In fact, I very much doubt
whether the entire property covered by the deed of trust, could
have been sold for a sum sufficient to satisfy Longworth’s debt. If
Tam right in this, it follows that this arrangement—even admit-
ting it to have been assented to by complainants, under a mistaken
view of their rights—was not prejudicial to them. On the con-
trary, it was advantageous to them. That is, it was advantageous
51] to them, if to pay a debt *of twenty thousand dollars with
property of less value than fifteen thousand, can be said to be ad-
vantageous to the debtor.

Tt is said by counsel for complainants that, by a decree against
Longworth, no wrong is done to him, as he will, in that event, re-
ecive what is justly his due, in consequence of paymonts made by
him on his indorsemonts. This is, in a certain sense, true; and it
would, in the same sense, be truc, that no wrong would be done to
a vendee of land, by a decree against him to reconvey, upon the
repayment of the purchase monoy and interest by the vendor. As
the case now stands, Longworth must be treated as a purchaser,
not as a mortgagee, and like any other purchaser, is entitled to the
benefit of the increased value of the property, if there has been
any such increased value. That there has been, is abundantly
manifest from the whole caso, and hence this litigation. Had the
value of the property remained as in January, 1839, this court
would nover have been troubled by these complainants with a bill
to redeem. It is the enhanced value of the property which alone.
gives importance to the cases. But in deciding the cases, this court
is bound to look upon the property according to its value in 1839,
not in 1844 or 1852.

Tt is further urged by counsel for complainants, that, under tho

. circumstances attending the conveyances from Carneal to Long-
worth and Archibald Irwin, the only legitimate effect of those con-
veyances was to transfer the legal estate to the grantees, subject to
the same trusts which were attached to it in the hands of Carneal

46 .

APPENDIX.

Irwin . Longworth et al.

himself; in other words, that there was a mere devolution of trust.
At least, such is the claim so far as relates to the property conveyed.
to Longworth. As to that conveyed to Irwin, the complainants
take no interest in it.

If this court abide by the principle, that the intention of parties
in the transaction of business, so far as the same can be collected
from. their written or parol declarations, or by their actions, shall
govern, here was certainly no devolution of trust. No such thing
entered the minds of the parties. The complainants knew that the
legal title to the hill-land and city lots was in Carneal. They
know that it was claimed by their brother *that Carncal held [52
the title in trust to his use, for a particular purpose. They knew
that Longworth claimed that it was holden in trust for his indem-
nity. They knew that, upon his subject, there had been a con-
troversy between tho two of many years’ standing. These things
they certainly knew, whether they were actually acquainted with
the merits of this controversy or not. And when the order or
memorandum of January, 1839, was prosented to them for their
signature, they must have known or believed that this long exist-
ing controversy had becn compromised between the parties, by an
agreement to divide the land. Possessing this knowledge, they
signed the order, thereby directing Carneal to convey the hill-land _
to Longworth, and the city lots to their brother. Was it their
intention that Longworth and their brother should hold these
lands merely as trustees, or that they should hold them as their
own absolute property? There can be no doubt that the latter
was the intention.

‘When we look to the conduct of the two grantees, we find that
each one of them, upon the reception of his deed, discharged the
estate of William Irwin from all claims which they had against
the estate, and the claims thus discharged constituted the consid-
eration by them paid for the land.

Under such circumstances, it seems to me, it will not do to say,
here was a mere devolution of trust.

Upon the whole case, so far as the complainants in the original
pill are concerned, I am not satisfied that they are entitled to any
relief, but, on the contrary, am of opinion the Dill should have
been dismissed. And Iam led to this conclusion by a variety of
considerations. I am satisfied that in the conveyance of the prop-
erty to Carneal, William Irwin designed to put it beyond the reach
AT

58, 54. APPENDIX.

Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Hitchcock.

of creditors, and to place it in a situation that Archibald could
have the use of it, or appropriate it to pay off the debts of William
Irwin & Son; that this was well understood by the trustee and by
Longworth ; but lest on this account the deed should be deemed

_ fraudulent, the trust for the indemnity of Longworth was inserted,
58] but inserted with *the understanding that Longworth might
or might not, at his clection, insist upon its enforcement. There
was, in substance, a trust for the benefit of Archibald Irwin, but it
rested in parol, and therefore could not be enforced. The recital
in the written order of January, 1839, that the property was con-
veyed to Carneal, in trust, “for the use of Archibald Irwin, to pay
the debts,” etc., instead of being false, as alleged jn the bill and in
the arguments of counscl, is substantially true. But if it was not
true, and the complainants acted under a mistaken apprehension in
supposing it to be true, the facts with which they were acquainted,
and even the order itself, were sufficient to put them upon inquiry,
and if they proceeded to act without making inquiry, they can not
avoid this action upon the pretense that they acted in ignorance.
If there was a mistake in the order as to the trust in favor of Arch-
ibald, there was no mistake so far as the trust in favor of Long-
worth is concerned. He had practiced no deception, no fraud

. upon these complainants; and if they have been deceived by their
brother, Longworth ought not to suffer in consequence. Admit-
ting a mistake, and admitting that in consequence of this mistake
the complainants acted under a misapprehension, still they are not
entitled to relief, because this action was not prejudicial to them;
ag the only effect of it was to pay a debt due from their father’s
estate, of nearly twenty thousand dollars, with property of less
value than fifteen thousand.

It may be proper to say that a case is referred to by counsel, and
is cited by the court in this case, to sustain its decision in 10 How-
ard’s Reports. An examination of that case will show that the
party against whom relief was sought, had been guilty of the
most palpable fraud, and it was on this ground relief was granted.
In this case there is no pretense of any fraud on the part of Long-
worth.

As it respects the complainants in the cross-bill, they stand in
a different situation from the complainants in the original bill.
They were infants at the time of the execution of the order before
54] referred to, and of the deeds to Longworth and *Archibald

48

APPENDIX. 54,

Irwin ». Longworth et al.

Irwin. They never assented to that order, although it was signed
by their father. I incline to the opinion that they are entitled to
relief, unless precluded from present relief by the fact that their
father had an interest in the land as tenant by the courtesy. If,
as insisted by complainants’ counsel, this deed to Carneal is to be
considered as an ordinary mortgage; and an equity of redemption,
technically speaking, remained in William Irwin, and descended:
to his heirs, then Lewis Whiteman had an interest. But I am not
entirely satisfied of the soundness of the argument upon this sub-
ject. However, it will be of no use to enter into a particular exam-
ination of the matter ; and I shall not do it. 49

ABANDONMENT—

1, Upon abandonment for loss, the master of a boat becomes the agent of the:
underwriters; until then, he is agent of the assured, Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. May, 214. .

2, The assured, in case of loss not absolutely total, may, in certain cases,
make it in legal offect total, Ib. 214.

ABATEMENT—

~ 1, When a plea in abatement is met by a replication, and issue in fact is
thereupon joined and found for the plaintiff, final judgment ‘must be
awarded in his favor, whether such issue be tried by the court or the
jury. Myers & Waterson v. Hunter, Erwin & Co. 381.

2, The several kinds of judgments, on pleas in abatement: issues on, how
tried; and practice on, generally. Ib, see note 387.

8. Where a purchase is made of land by “metes and bounds,” estimated to
contain a specific quantity, or for “more or less,” and a gross sum to
be paid for the entire tract, the purchaser will not be entitled to an.
abatement in the price, should the number of acres fall short of the es-
timated quantity. Ketchum ». Stout, 453.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION—PAYMENT—

1. Where a party recovered a judgment against another who was insolvent,
and the plaintiff afterward agreed to receive from him the sum of $550
onthe judgment, and the payment of $100 for attorney’s fees, which
sums were paid accordingly, and a receipt in full given for the judg-
ment, although both sums amounted to much less than the judgment:
Held, that a satisfaction of such judgment would, from this stato of
facts, be ordered to be entered. Harper v. Graham, 105,

2, Satisfaction rendered by one of several joint trespassers is satisfaction as
toall. Ib. 108, note,

3. An accord on mutual promises to perform is not good, unless performed
before suit brought. Ib. 105, note.

4, Accord and satisfaction may be given in evidenceunder the general issue
in assumpsit. Tb. 105, note,

5. The plea of accord, ete., with George E., agent, is not sustained by proof
of an accord with John HZ. Tb. 105, note.

6. Payment of less than the sum due upon a liquidated demand, although
agreed to be received in satisfaction, can not, as a general rule, be made

(61)

32 INDEX.”

Account—Action.

Accorp anp Sazisraction—Paxyment—Continued.
available as such. But a release under seal operates as satisfaction.

Tb. 115.
1. Exceptions to the general rule—cases taken out of it: Ib. 116.

8 Whether a conveyance of land by a mortgagor to a mortgagee, in satis-
faction of the mortgage debt, extinguishes the mortgage.” Lessee of
Jennings v. Wood, 261.

9, That where 2 mortgagee purchases the mortgaged premises and receives
a deed in feo simple paying off a part of the consideration by the deliv-
ery of the note which the mortgage was given to secure, to the maker,
such mortgage is thereby paid off and extinguished, and has no effect
either in law or equity, although it may appear uncanceled on the rec-
ord. Ib. 261.

ACCOUNT—

1, A party defendant, entitled undor the statute to swear to his book of ac-
counts, but not availing himself of the privilege, can not give the book
itself in evidence upon proof that it is his account book, and upon
proof tending to show that it corresponds with the account béok kept
by the plaintiff of thesame items. Kugler v. Wiseman et al. 361.

2, When « creditor has a lien upon two funds of his debtor, and a subse-
quent creditor files a bill to reach one of the funds, if the prior creditor,
after bill filed, surrenders one of the funds, he will, as between the cred-
itors, be held to account for it as so much paid on his claim, Fassett
v, Traber et al. 640,

ACQUIESCENCE—

See Vorp ann VorpsBin.

1, When the acquiescence of a claimant of land, in the title and possession
under which an adverse claimant holds, will in law amount to a pre-
sumption of a grant, Blake v. Davis, 231.

2. An irregular judicial sale by a guardian may be ratified by the ward re-
ceiving the proceeds of the sale with full knowledge, after the age of
majority. Ohio v. Sloane, 327, note.

3. When the owner of land is estopped from setting up his claima by know-
ingly permitting improvements by an adverse claimant, Blake ».
Davis, 231, note.

ACTION—

1. When a title has passed to water-craft, by proceedings under the water-
craft laws of Ohio, whether such proceedings are a bar to a subsequent
suit in rem in admiralty for the same supplies. Oanal-boat M. v. Kent
et al, 54, note.

2, Case will lic for wrongfully suing out a writ of attachment against the
plaintif’s effects, to his injury, though the attachment suit was founded
on & just indebtedness. Ash v. Marlow, 119, note.

3. Whether a void tax, paid under protest, can be recovered from the tax
collector. Hambleton v. Dempsey, 171.

4, An action can not be sustained on an illegal contract, 340, 303, note.

INDEX. 53

Administrators and Executors.

Acrvor—Continued.
” But a party not in default may rescind an illegal executory contract
and recover back money paid on it. Brown ».Timmany, 81. -

5. Where an executor or administrator, after final settlement, distributes
the balance in his hands to only a part of the distributes, such distri-
bution will not avail him against the claims of such distributes as have
not received their share. Negley v. Gard and wife, 310.

6 Where one of two executors or adwinistrators has in his hands the bal-
ance remaining for distribution, an action may be maintained against
him without joining his co-executor or administrator. Ib, 310.

7. A new promise is in law available to sustain a recovery upon an old con-
tract, against © plea of bankruptcy. Turner v. Chrisman’s Adm’r, 332.

8. An officer of the state can not maintain a suit in his own name for an
amount of money due to the state for tolls, penalties, etc, on the Na-
tional Road, although he may haive taken a note for the amount pay-
able to himself individually. Hunter v, Field, 240.

9. Where an employer placed one person in his employ under-the direction
of another also in his employ, such employer is liable for injury to the
person of him placed in the subordinate situation by the negligence of
his superior. Little Miami Railroad Oo. 0. Stevens, 415.

10. Whether » party in fault can maintain an action for an injury sustained.
by collision, Ib, 424-451,

11, Whether an action can be maintained upon a covenant to convey, or of
warranty in a dood, if the ‘motes and bounds” contain less acres than
specified. Ketchum ». Stout, 454,

12. At common law no action could be maintained, by an administrator de
bonis non. against the representatives of a deceased administrator or
the sureties in his official bond. Section 26 of the act of 1840, to pro-
vide for the sottlement of the estates of deceased persons, does not in
this praticular change the common law. Adm’r de bonis non of Clary
v. Filler, Adm'r of Karns, 479.

18, Actions upon the bonds of executors and administrators, executed prior
to 1840, are governed by, and must be prosecuted under the laws in
force when they were entered into. MeGovney o. State, 93.

14, All contracts for money due tho state should be made in the name of the
state, and all suits brought in the name of the state. Hunter v. Field,
840, Seo 6 Ohio, 101.

ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS—

1, The act of March 23, 1840, to provide for the settlement of the estates of
deceased porsons, does not extend to estates in‘tho course of settlement
when it took effect. McGovney ». State, 93.

2, The bonds of executors and administrators, taken in such cases, are gov-
erned by, andgmust be proseouted under the laws in force when thoy
were entered into: Ib. 93.

3. In construing a will with codicils, the whole is to be taken together, as
parts of one instrument; and if a codicil is signed and attested at the
samo time and place with the body of the will, it may well be consid-

54 INDEX.

Admiralty.

ADMINISTRATORS AND Exrourors—Continued,
ered as constituting a part of the original will. Negley ». Gard and
wife, 310.

4, Where an executor or administrator, after final settlement, distributes
the balance in his hands to part only of the distributees, such distri.
bution will not avail him against the claims of such distributees as have
not received their share. Ib. 310.

5 Where one of two executors or administrators has in his hands the bal-
ance remaining for distribution, an action may be maintained against
him, without joining his co-executor or administrator. Ib. 310.

6. A count, on a promise to the intestate, may be joined with a count on
® promise to the administrator. Turner v. Moore’s Adm’r, 335.

7. Whether, upon a bill to forclose a mortgage, the executor or administra-
tor of a deceased mortgagor is a necessary party, 468.

.8. At common law, no action could be sustained by an administrator de bo-
nis non against the representatives of a deceased administrator, or the
sureties in his official bond. Adm’r de bonis non of Clary v. Adm’r of
Karns, 479.

9. Section 26 of the act of 1840, to provide for the settlement of the es-
tates of deceased persons, does not, in this particular, change the com-
mon law. Ib. 470.

10, Such suit can not be maintained upon general chancery principles. Ib. 479.

11, If an administrator purchase land at his own public sale, he will be held
to have purchased in trust for the heirs, and upon being refunded the
amount by him paid, will be decreed to convey to the heirs. If ho has
sold the land to a third person, he (the vendor) will be held to account
to the heirs for its value, at’the time of his original purchase or other~
wise, as the case may be, with interest, first deducting the amount by
him paid, Glass et al. v. Greathouse, 503.

12. Such is the rule, whether the administrator purchase directly or through
another person, for his benefit. Ib. 503.

18. The executor or administrator of a deceased husband, can be compelled
jn chancery to satisfy, out of assets, a post-nuptial agreement made
between husband and wife, by which property is set apart for her uso.
And a note from the husband to his wife for the payment of money,
“ewtra of her third,” will be construed such an agreement, whether
the consideration spring from the wife's property or earnings, or not.
‘Wood v. Warden's Adm’r, 518.

14. ‘The right of an executor or administrator to surrender a resulting equity,
or an equity of redemption. Irwin ». Longworth, 597.

18. The power of surviving executors to make deeds and sales of realty, as
dixected by will; the effect of the statute of limitations on such power,
and the effect of conveyances. Ward v. Racer, 258.

ADMIRALTY— .

1. How far a judgment in rem, in Ohio, under the water-cvaft laws of this
state, will be regarded as nullity in other states, unless the owner of
the boat appeared in tho suit, 54, note,

INDEX.

Advances—Agency and Agent.

Apmreanry— Continued.

2. Whether the title acquired in virtue of such a judgment is subordinate
to the lien in favor of » material-man, conferred by the general mari-
time law of the United States, and by the act of Congress of February
26, 1845, ch. 20; p. 54, note.

3. Whether » judgment under the Ohio water-craft laws for supplies, is
bar to a subsequent suit in rem, in admiralty, for the same supplies.

ADVANOES— ©

‘Whether advances made by one part owner of a boat, is a lien on the boat.

McDonald ». Black’s Adm’r, 185.
ADVERSE POSSESSION—

1, When a grant to persons in adverse possession presumed, 231, note.

2. A deed made in 1885, by two surviving executors of a person who died
seized of the premises in 1804, will not prevail against an adverse pos-
session of more than twenty-one years since the death of the last devi-
see. Lessee of Ward v. Racer, 250.

8, If one in possession without title is ousted by one having no paramount
right, such prior possession will enable the person ousted to recover
in ejectment. Gwynne v. Niswanger, 567.

4, Possession without title is sufficient to defeat an ejectment, brought by
one without a paramount right of possession. Ib. 567

ADVICE OF COUNSEL—

If the defendant, in an action for malicious prosecution, would take shelter
under the “advice of counsel,” he must be prepared to show that he
communicated to such counsel all the facts bearing upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused of which he had knowledge, or by reasonable

. diligence could have agcertained. Ash v. Marlow, 119.
AGE OF CONSENT—

1, Under the statute, the age of consent is eighteen in males, and fourteen
in females. Shafher 9. State, 1.

2, Marriages contracted under the age of consent are void, unless confirmed
by cohabitation subsequently. Ib. 1.

AGENOY AND AGENT—

See Powrrs.

1, One who shares with others in the profits and losses of an enterprise is,
as to third persons, a partner—not an agent. Choteau o. Raitt, 144,

2, One who, for his services, is to share in the profits, but not losses of an
enterpriso, and who acts only under employment, is an agent, Ib. 144,

8, The death of a party revokes a power of attorney given by him, not
coupled with an interest, McDonald v, Black’s Adm’r, 185.

4, Upon abandonment for loss, the master of a boat becomes agent for the
underwriters; until then he is agent of the assured, 214,

5, When a grant from the agent to his principal is presumed, 247.

6. Where B. gave to W. 2 memorandum in writing, substantially setting
forth that B. had received $175, as an advance to buy barley for W.,
and B. agreed to deliver at a certain placo, within a certain time, and
for a gertain price, 1,000 bushels of merchantable barley, it is a cons

56 . INDEX.

Agreement.

Agryoy anp AcEnt—Continued,
tract of sale, and not an agreement constituting an agency. Black ».
“Webb, 304,

7, When, before the time stipulated for the delivery, and before actual de-
livery, » portion of the barley stored in the warehouse mentioned in the
agreement, was destroyed by a flood, the loss falls upon B., the prop-
erty being at his risk until delivery. Ib. 804.

8 The general powers and duties of agents, and the rights and liabilities
of principals. Ib. 306.

9. Where an employer placed one person in his employ under the direction
of another, also in his employ, such employer is liable for injury to the
person of him placed in the subordinate situation by the negligence of
his superior. Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens, 415.

10, When a railroad company places the engincor, under their employ,
under the control of the conductor, who directs when the cars are to
start, stop, ele., the company are liable to the engineer for an injury
received, occasioned by the negligence of the conductor, whilst thoy
are both engaged in their respective employments. Ib. 415.

11. Whether employes of a railroad company are agents, Ib. 438,

12, A contract for insurance, made on behalf of an insurance company, by
an agent not authorized to issue policies, but empowered to make con-
tracts on which policies shall issue, “if approved” by the company, is
a binding contract, which will be enforced in chancery, in favor of a
party who has done all that is required, and the company will be held
liable from the date of the contract, although they refuse to issue 2
policy; the only right of refusal reserved to the company, by the terms
“if approved,” being the right to object to an unfair or improper con-
tract, Palm, Adm’y, v. Medina Ins. Co. 529,

AGREEMENT—

1, Anagreement of counsel for the defendant, waiving non-joinder of a
proper party plaintiff, does not render competent as a witness for the
plaintiff, the party who should have been so joined. Choteau», Riatt,
148.

2, Where a post-nuptial agreement is made between husband and wife, by
which property is set apart for her separate use, the agreement, al-
though void in law, will be sustained in equity, unless the rights of
ereditors interfere. Wood v. Warden, Adm'r, 518,

3, A note, executed by the husband to the wife, acknowledging the receipt
of $100 at her hands, and promising to allow her six per cent. per an-
num interest thereon during her life, and if she survives the maker of
the note, to be paid her or her heirs extra of her third, will be con-
strued such an agreement. Ib. 518.

4. Tt is not essentially necessary that tlie consideration of the note should
spring from the wife's property or earnings, to entitle her to come in as
a creditor against the estate of her deceased husband. Ib, 518,

INDEX.

Answer—Assets.

ANSWER—

1. How county commissioners must answer in chancery; whether the an-
swer must be adopted officially by the board. Carey v. Comm'rs, 628.

2, Whether defendants in chancery must sign an answer not required to be
sworn to. Ib. 628.

APPEAL—

1. Ina case in chancery where there are two defendants, and the Bill is dis-
missed as to one, and a decree against the other, an appeal by the latter
does not vacate the decree as to the former; more especially where
there is not that necessary connection between the defendants but that
the rights of the one can be determined without affecting the rights of
the other. Glass ». Greathouse, 503.

. 2 In such case, if the complainants are not satisfied with the decree dismiss-
ing the bill as to one of the defendants, it is incumbent upon them to
appeal. An appeal by the other defendant, against whom a decreee is
rendered, does not appeal the case as to the defendant as to whom the
decree dismisses the bill, nor such latter defendant a party on appeal in
the court above, so that his right may be passed upon. Ib. 503,

APPURTENANCES—

1. The grant of a right to build a dam across. stream of water, and to
yaise the water to a specified height upon the lands of the grantor,
creates an easement, which may be attached by the grantee to his lands
as an incident or appurtonance. Morgan et al. v. Mason, 401.

2, A grant of the land to which such easement is attached, by a deed de-
scribing only the “metes and bounds,” carries with it the easement,
even though the conveyance does not, in terms, describe the land as
conveyed, “ with the privileges and appurtenances.” Ib. 410.

3. A grant per sé carries with it, as an appurtenance, that, without which
the grant would be of no effect. Tb. 409, note,

ARREST OF JUDGMENT—

On an indictment containing two counts substantially alike, a verdict of
guilty upon one, and of acquittal upon the other, does not necessarily
present such a case of ropugnancy as to require an arrest of judgment,
26, note,

ARREST OF AOOUSED IN ORIMINAL OASES—

1, Whether a constable can arrest, without warrant, for crimes not com-
mitted in his acual view. Jones 0. Ohio, 38,

2, Whether the officer making an arrest must actually produce his warrant,
if demanded. Ib. 43.

ASSESSOR— oo

See Taxes; Opricun.

ASSETS—

Seo Esrarzs; ADMINISTRATORS.

1. When two creditors have each a lien on the same property of their
debtor, and the one having the prior lien has also a lien on another
fund for the same debt, on which the subsequent lienholder has no
claim, such prior lienholder will be compelled, in equity, to exhaust

58 INDEX.

Assignment—Assampsit.

Assnrs—Continued,
such fund before he proceeds to subject the property on which the other

creditor has his lien, Fassett ». Traber ot al. 640.

2, If, after bill filed by the subsebuent lien holder to eompel such subroga-
tion, the prior lien holder delivers up his claim on the second fund to
the debtor, he will be compelled, as between him and the subsequent
lien holder, to account for such fund as so much paid onhisclaim. Ib.
540.

3, A party receiving property, part of the assets of an estate, can not, when.
sued for it, set off debt due from the estate to him. McDonald v
Black’s Adm’r, 186. .

ASSIGN MENT—

See Dusror anp CreprTor.

1. Where a debtor, in contemplation of insolvency, executes a chattel mort-
gage to one creditor for the purpose of securing such creditor in prefer
ence to others, with an understanding that the mortgagee shall satisfy
his claim out of the goods, and then surrender the residue to the mort~
gagor, tho mortgage will be deemed an assignment of property in trust,
and the mortgagee will be deemed a trustee, holding the property for
the benefit of all the creditors, in proportion to their respective demands.
Brown & Oo. v. Webb, 389.

2, A creditor may receive an assignment to himself from a failing debtor,
to secure his claim, if done fairly, without interposing any barrier to the
rights of others. Fassett ». Traber, 545,

8, As to the effect of taking more property than will secure the claim of such
creditor, Ib. 545.

4, In asuit in equity, to foreclose, by an assignee of a mortgage, if the assign
ment has been absolute, it is not indispensably necessary that the mort-
gagee should bea party. McGuffey v. Finley et al. 474,

5» Whether a mortgagee, afler condition broken, may assign his interest’
without adeed. Ib. 476.

ASSUMPSIT—

See Common Coums. :

1. Money paid on an agreement, entered into on Sunday, may be recovered
Dack so long as the contract remains executory. Aliter, if the agree-
ment has been executed, Brown . Timmany, 81.

2, A new promise is, in law, available to sustain a, recovery upon an old con=
tract, against a plea of bankruptcy, and it is competeet to declare on the
old liability without suing on the new promise. Turner », Moore's
Adm’r, 332,

3. An officer of the state can not maintain asuitin his own name, for money
due the state, although he may have taken a note for the amount, pay-
able to him individually. All suits for money due tho state, should be
brought in the name of the state. Hunter ». Field, 340.

4, Where an executor or administrator, after final settlement, distributes
the balance in his hands to a part only of the distributes, such distri-

INDEX.

Attorney—Banks,

Assumpst1—Continued.
bution will not avail him against the claims of such distributees as have
not received their share. Negley v. Gard, 310.

5. Where one of two executors or administrators has in his hands the bal-
ance remaining for distribution, an action may be maintainod against
him, without joining his co-executor or administrator. Ib.

ATTORNEY—

See Powsrs.

1, An agreement of counsel for the defendant, waiving non-joinder of &
proper party plaintiff, does not render competent as a witness for the
plaintiff the party who should have been so joined. Choteau ». Raitt,
145.

2. The death of a party revokes a power of attorney given by him not
coupled with an interest. McDonald v. Black’s Adm’r, 185.

8. The right of an attorney to comment on the character of a party or wit-
ness. Jones v. Ohio, 41-48,

AUTREFOIS ACQUIT—

‘Where distinct offenses are charged in separate counts of an indictment, and
a verdict of guilty is renderéd on one count, and there is no finding on
the other, whether judgment on the verdict would be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged in the other count. Wilson v. The
State, 28-30. :

AVERMENT— .

A clerical error in an executor’s bond in a suit at law can not be aided by
averment of the mistake as against a surety. McGovney v. Ohio, for
the use of Lee’s Adm’r, 93,

BAIL—

See Surgery.
BAILMENTS—

See Common Carriers.
BANKRUPT LAW—

1. A. new promise is, in law, available to sustain a recovery upon an old
contract, against a plea of bankruptcy. Turner v. Moore’s Adm'r, 332.

2, The “dar” arising from the bankruptey is strictly a personal privilege,
and is “waived” by the subsequent promise. Ib. 332.

3. When the “bar” is “waived” by a new promise to pay an old debt, it is
competent to declare on the old liability without suing on the new
promise. Ib. 332.

4, The promise of a certificated bankrupt to an administrator, to pay the
debt of his intestate, can be given in evidence under the common counts
Tb. 335
BANKS—

1. The power to create a banking corporation is an exerciso of sovereign
legislative power. Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 283.

2, In March, 1836, when the first legislative body elected under the first
constitution adopted by the people of Michigan, passed the act to incor-
porate the Manhattan Bank, the territorial government of Michigan

60 , INDEX.

Bar—Bill of Exceptions.

Banxs— Continued.
was still in existence, and therefore the legislative assembly could not
pass said act of incorporation. Ib. 283.

8. If the bank had been incorporated and authorized to do a banking busi-
ness while it remained under the jurisdiction of Michigan, such authority
would not have continued, after it came under the jurisdiction of this
state. Ib. 283.

4. Associations “incorporated by a law of this state,” are alone exempted
from the operation of our restraining laws, and alone authorized to issue
notes and bills to circulate as money (act of January 27, 1816, “to pro-
hibit the issuing and circulating unauthorized bank paper,” and amend-
atory acts). “Ib. 283.

5. All securities given to an unauthorized bank are void. Ib. 283.

6. How far the proper organization of a bank may be inquired into in the
trial of an action brought by the bank. Ib. 292,

BAR—
See Formrr Rucovrry.
BEQUEST—Sco Wits.

1. A bequest to a charitable use is to receive the most liberal construction.
Zanesville, C. & M. Co. ». Zanesville, 483.

2, The McIntire fund given to establish “a school in the town of Zanes-
ville, for the poor children in said town,” is not limited in its benefits
to the children of parents residing in that locality which constituted
the town corporate of Zanesville at the decease of the testator. Ib. 483,

8. Tho charity will be administered for the benefit of poor children in the
town of Zanesville, according to the most general and popular sense of
the term. Ib. 483.

BIGAMY—

1, A second marriage, by a party having previously married under the
statutory age of consent, does not constitute bigamy, unless the previous
marrige has been confirmed by cohabitation, after age of consent, and
Defore the second marriage. Shafher v. State, 1.

2. Ina prosecution for bigamy the prior marriage must be proved to be
valid; it will not be presumed, Ib. 3,

3. A marriage by a party under the age of consent is void unless confirmed
by cohabitation after such age, and in a prosecution for bigamy for a
subsequent, marriage, the state must prove such confirmation ; the defend-
ant is not bound to prove that he dissented from the contract after
arriving at such age. Ib. 7.

4, The admissions of the defendant may be given in evidence in a prosecu-
tion for bigamy to prove the prior marriage. Ib. 7, note.

5. Evidence of two marriages, the former of which is void, will not sustain
an indictment for bigamy. Ib. 7, note.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS—

1, To make the failure of the court to instruct the jury upon a point of law
aground of error, the bill of oxceptions must show that the court was
requested to charge upon such point. State v. Jones, 34.

N

INDEX. 6t

Board of Equalization—Boat.
Brit or Excurtions—Continued.

2 The judgment of an inferior court can not be reversed for matter not ap-
parent upon the record, and if the errors assigned have any‘reference to
the facts of a case, those facts should be made part of the record by bill
of exceptions, Jones v. Ohio, 34. See also 202.

8. Under the act of March 12, 1846, where a cause is submitted to the court

‘without a jury, the same right exists to except to the ruling of the infe-
’ rior court in refusing on motion for a new trial to set aside their own.
finding, as though the cause had been submitted to a jury, 74, note.

4, A court has powor to correct “bills of exceptions” at any time during
the trial term, Ash v- Marlow, 119.

5. Whether objections must be interposed and exception taken at the time
of the ruling of the court. Choteau v. Raitt, 186. 5 Ohio, 172.

6," Whether the charge of the court must be excepted to before verdict. Ash
v, Marlow, 128. 8 Ohio, 172. See also Myers v. Hunter & Co. 881,
note.

7. The judgment of an inferior court will not be reversed on error for an
erroneous charge to the jury unless the bill of exceptions shows the facts
upon which the charge is made material to the issue, and unless such
charge has resulted prejudicially to the plaintiff in error. Kugler
Wiseman et al. 361.0

8 Where the bill of exceptions refers to depositions of persons by name as
in evidence, though not in terms made part of the bill, yot if copied into
the record and no objection be talten in the Supreme court, the whole
record will be considered on the hearing in bank. If the deposititions
were not properly made part of the record, it should have been cor-
rected in the Supreme Court on the circuit. Washington Ins. Co. ».
Reed et al. 207.

9. A ill of exceptions must disclose all the evidence, or the overruling of
a motion for a new trial, because the finding of the court or jury was
against evidence, can not be reversed on error. Myers c. Hunter & Co.
381, note.

BOARD OF EQUALIZATION—

If a board of equalization add to the valuation returned by the assessor,
the law will presume it to be done upon sufficient evidence, unless the
contrary be made.to appear by the party aggrieved. Hamilton». Demp-
sey & Co. 168

2, The law gives notice that the board will meet at atime and place certain.
No special notice to the tax-payer is requisite. Ib. 163.

BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS—
See Orsrorr.
BOAT—
See Warzr-crarr; Insurance. .
Injury to a flat-boat by the waves raised by a steamboat is one of the
perils insured agatnst in an ordinary policy of insurance, Washington
Ins. Co. v. Reed, 199.
2, Ifa boat be unduly laden she is unseaworthy. But whether or not un-

¢

62 INDEX

Bonds—Building Contracts.

Boat—Oontinued,
uly Jaden depends upon the capacity of the boat, not upon the navi:
gable condition of the river. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. May, 211.

3, Ifa boat insured meets with a disaster, the captain and crew are bound
diligently to labor for the recovery of the property, whether required
by the policy ornot. Tb. 211.

4, Whether a lien attaches to a steamboat for advances made by oné part-
owner upon the shares of the other—Quere? But in any event, to
create such lien it mast be shown that such advances were made to dis-
charge debts and liabilities incurred with the consent of all the owners-
and for which they were liable. McDonald v. Black’s Adm’r, 185.

BONDS—

1, The bonds of executors and administrators of estates in course of settle-
ment when the act of March 23, 1840, to provide for the settlement of
the estates of deceased persons, took effect, are governed by and must
be prosecuted under the laws in force when entered into. McGovney
», Ohio, 93,

2, An executor’s bond deseribing the testator as James T. , can not, by
parol evidence, be mado applicable to the estate of Joseph L.
‘Th. 93.

3, At common law no action could be sustained by an administrator de bonis
nom, against the representatives of a deceased administrator, or thesure-
ties in his official bond. Blizzard v. Karns, 479.

4, Ssection 26 of the act of 1840, to provide for the settlement of the
estates of deceased persons, does not, in this particular, change the com-
amon law. Ib, 479.

5. A guardian for a minor appointed by the court of common pleas, bas
no power to act or to control the. property of his ward, until he has
given hond with security approved by the court. Ohio v. Sloane ot al.
327.

6, Letters of guardianship issued to him by the clerk before such bond is
given, confer no such power. Ib. 327.

7, The issuing of such letters under such circumstances by the clerk does
not constitute a ‘breach of his official bond so as to charge his sureties.
Tb. 327.

BOOK OF ACCOUNTS— .

A book of accounts is not competent evidence in favor of a party entitled
under the statute to swear to it, but not availing himself of the privi-
lege, upon proof that it is his account book, and upon proof tending to
show that it corresponds with the account book, of the same items kept
by the party adversely interested in the suit. Kugler ». Wiseman et
al. 361.

BOUNDARY—

‘The true boundary line between Ohio and Michigan. Myers o, Manhattan

Bank, 233.
BUILDING CONTRACIS—
1. Where a building contract is entered into, the work commenced, and suse

INDEX.

Canal-boat—Cases Examined, ete.

Buripine Conrracrs—Continued.
pended at the instance of the party for whom the’ work is to be done,
with an intention not to have it resumed, but subsequently the work is
resumed upon an agreement that an increased price, pruportionate te
the increase in the price of wages and materials; ina suit, not on the
contract, but for work and labor, the original contract is. competent
evidence. Kugler v. Wiseman et al. 361.,

2, In such case, a surety in the original contract, for the faithful perform-
ance of the work, is not a necessary party plaintiff, but being released.
from liability by the suspension, is competent as a witness, Tb. 361.

3, It is competent in such case, as 2 means of arriving at the increased cost
of the work, to inquire of a witness generally the difference in the price
of wages and materials in the summer months, when the work was sus-
pended, and the fall and winter months, when finished, although the
question is not limited to the year when done. This is competent to
ascertain if the year when the work was done differed from others.
Tb. 361.

4. It is competent to prove the difference in price of labor and materials in
such case, in the early and latter part of the year, by way of per centum.
Tb. 361.

5. The suspension of the work, as stated, puts an end to the contract; but
the party at whose instance the work was suspended, is liable for @
breach of it, Ib. 361. .

6. In such case, the builder is entitled to recover for labor and materials.
Th. 361. .

7. What the new contract was by which the work was resumed, is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. Ib. 361.

CANAL-BOAT—

See Warer-crarr.

OASE— -

1. Onse will lie for falsely or maliciously suing out » writ of attachment
against the plaintif’s effects, to his injury, though founded on a just in-
debtedness. Ash v. Marlow, 119, note.

2, The law applicable to an action on the case for malicious prosecution.
Tb. 119.

3, Where an employer placed one person in his employ under the direction
of another, also in his employ, such employer is liable, in an action on
the case, for injury to the person of him placed in the subordinate situ-
ation, by the negligence of his superior. Little Miami Railroad Co. v.
Stevens, 415.

4. Form of declaration for such action. Ib. 415.

5. Whother a party in fault can maintain an action for an injury which he
contributes to produce, Ib. 424-451.

CASES EXAMINED, OVERRULED, DOUBTED, EXPLAINED, AND

MODIFIED BY STATUTE—

1. Wilson ». Runyan, Wright, 651; Seely 0. Blaix, Ib. 683, Character of

witness— overruled. Bucklin v. Ohio, 18.

64

INDEX.

Caveat Emptor.

Cases EXAMINED, ETO.—Continued.

2.

3.

4

5.

6.

i.

8.

9.

10.

Hurley ». Ohio, 6 Ohio, 404. Verdict respond to every count—doubted.
‘Wilson v. Ohio, 30.

Cases under water-craft laws. Oanal-boat Montgomery » Kent, 54,
note.

Markle ». Akron, 14 Ohio, 586; Reynolds v. Rogers, § Ohio, 171; Wal-
worth v. Walworth, Wright, 673; Utter ». Walker, Ib. 46. Decisions
against weight of evidence, upon facts submitted to the court—not re-
viewed on error. Under act of March 12, 1845—reviewed, if mo-
tion for new trial overruled. Spafford v. Bradley, 74, note; Choteau ».
Raitt, 142.

Sellers v. Dugan, 18 Ohio, 493. Sunday contract—explained. Brown »
Timmany, 86. .

Carey v. Robinson, 13 Ohio, 181; Whitney v. Webb, 10 Obio, 513. Stat.
ute of limitations—cumulative disabilities—cases discussed in argu-
ment—13 Ohio, 181—recognized. Ward v. Racer, 250.

Hill ». Henry, 17 Ohio, 9; statute of limitations—construction of, de+
pendent on phraseology of section 5. Turner v. Moore's Adm’r, 329.
Huber v. Huber’s Adm’rs, 10 Ohio, 871. Post-nuptial agreement enforced

affirmed, Wood ». Warden, 518.

Inman ». Jenkins, 3 Ohio, 271. Former recovery not provable under the
general issue in assumpsit—overruled. Reynolds v. Stansbery, 344.

Mitchell v. Gazzam, 12 Ohio, 33. Dictum, that creditor may not secure
priority from failing debtor—conéra, per Caldwell, J., in Fassett ». Tra
ber, 545. See also Brown & Co. v. Webb, 389.

11. Niswangor v, Gwynne, 13 Ohio, 74. Tax sale in Virginia Military Dis-

12.

13.

trict after survey, but before patent, even if regular, no defense at law
against title of patentee. Dictum, that remedy in equity; same parties,
15 Ohio, 367, and 18 Ohio, 400. Upon regular tax sale, equity will de-
cree legal title of patentees to tax purchaser—overruled; and Douglas
v. Dangerfield, 10 Ohio, 152, and other cases upon tax titles, explained.
Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556. .

‘Tremper v. Barton, 18 Ohio, 418. Ohattel mortgage—affirmed and ex-
plained. Brown & Co. v. Webb, 389.

“Bank of Virginia v. Bank of Chillicothe, 16 Ohio, 170; Acheson ». Sut.
Tiff, 18 Ohio, 122; Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio, 426. Exhibits to bills of
exceptions. Washington Insurance Co. v. Reed, 207.

CAVEAT EMPTOR—

Ll.

2.

3.

‘Where a purchase of land is made by metes and bounds, estimated to
contain a specific quantity, or for “ more or less,” and a gross sum to be
paid for the entire tract, the purchaser will not be entitled to an abate-
ment in the price, should the number of acres fall short of the estimated
quantity; more especially should the land, at the time of the purchase
be of equal value to the price paid. Ketcham v. Stout, 453.

Any misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the vehdor may
take a case out of thisrule. Ib. 453.

‘Where n fact comes to the knowledge of a purchaser sufficient to put him
on his guard, he is chargeable with notice. Jennings v. Wood, 279.

INDEX. 65

Certiorari—Chattel Mortgage.

CERTIORARI—

Execution issued after satisfaction, may be set aside on motion, and satisfac-
tion entered, and if such motion be improperly overruled, certioraré
will be proper remedy. Harper v, Graham, 105. .

OHANOLRY—
See Equiry.
 OHARACTER— .

1, Where a witness is called for the purpose of impeaching the character,
for truth and veracity, of a witness called on the other side, such im-
peaching witness can only speak of the general reputation of the wit-
ness sought to be impeached, in the community and can not give his
‘own opinion of his character. Bucklin v. Obio, 18.

2, Whether the character of a witness, for trath and veracity, may be im-
peached by evidence of the general character of the witness sought to
‘be impeached, without being limited to reputation, as to trath and ve~
racity. Quare? Tb. 16,

8. The right of counsel, in the argument of a cause, to comment on the
-cbaracter of a party, 41, 48.

4, Where the character of a pilot for skill is material, by reason of a disas-
ter, his character at and before the disaster, not since, may be inquired

into, 224.
CHARGE OF COURT TO JURY—

1. The failure of the court to charge the jury upon a particular point is.
not error, unless the court is requested to instruct upon the point. Jones
». Ohio, 84. .

2, If the court mistakes the law in a charge, or refuses on request to charge
on a point material to the issue, it is error. Ib. 46. See also Kugler v.
‘Wiseman, 361.

3. The time when the charge of the court must’ bo excepted to, 123, 136,.
381,

CHARITY AND CHARITABLE USES—

1, A giftto a charitable use is to receive the most liberal construction.
Zanesville 0. & M. Oo. v. City of Zanesville, 483.

2, The McIntire fund, given to establish “a school in the town of Zanes-
ville, for the poor children in said town,” is not limited in its benefits to
the children of parents residing in that locality which constituted the-
town corporate of Zanesville at the decease of the testator. Ib, 483.

3, The charity will be administered for the benefit of poor children in the
town of Zanesville, according to the most general and popular sense of
the term, Tb. 483.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE—

1. A mortgage of personal property, under the statute of 1846, is “abso-
lutely void” as to other creditors of the mortgagor, who assert their
rights against the property after its execution, and before it be deposited
with the recorder or township clerk. Wilson v, Leslie, 161.

2. Such a mortgage is not void in toto, by reason of an omission to mako the
doposit “forthwith,” but becomes effective whenever it be deposited.

66 INDEX.

Clerk of Court—Comity.

OnarrzL Morraace—Continued.
and the mortgagee will not be prejudiced by a levy made at the in-
stance of another creditor. Ib. 161.

8. A creditor of a party making a fraudulent conveyance, with notice of
the fraud, may, with the consent of his debtor, take a valid mortgage
in good faith to secure his claim from the purchaser of the goods thus
conveyed, without being required to resort to legal process to reach the
goods. Brown & Co. ». Webb, 389.

4, A mortgage of personal property, where the mortgagor retains possession

by virtue of the mortgage, with a power of sale, is void, as against

subsequent purchasers and execution creditors; bat when possession is
taken by the mortgagee, the mortgage becomes valid, so as to protect
the mortgaged property from execution creditors not having made »

levy, and against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor. Ib. 389.

. A. chattel mortgage executed by an insolvent debtor, to secure a prefer-

ence to one creditor over others, with an understanding that the mort-

gagee shall satisfy his claim and then surrender the residue of the
mortgaged property to the mortgagor, will be deemed an assignment

in trust for the benefit of all the creditors, Swan’s Stat. 717, seo. 68.

Brown & Oo. v. Webb, 389; see also 545,

6, A creditor may take a chattel mortgage from a failing debtor to secure
his claim, if done fairly. Ib.

-OLERK OF COURT—

1, The clerk of court has no power to issue letters of guardianship, until
the guardian has given bond with security approved. Oarpenter v.
Sloane, 327.

2, The issuing of such letters before bond given, does not constitute a
breach of the official bond of the clerk, so as to charge his sureties.
Th, 327.

CODICIL—

See Witt.

In construing a will with codieils, the whole is to be ‘taken together, as
parts of one instrument; and if a codicil is signed and attested at the
same time and place with the body of the will, it may well be consid-.
ered as constituting a part of the original will. Negley ». Gard, 310.

COLLISION—

How far a party who contributes to a collision can recover for an injury
sustained in consequence of it. Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens,
424-451, note.

<OOMITY—

1, The principle by which private xights are protected upon a change of
territorial jurisdiction from one government to another, can not extend.
to mere privileges and corporations allowed by the government from
which the territory is taken, when they conflict with the ‘municipal
regulations of the government to which it is attached. Myors v. Man«
hattan Bank, 301.

e

INDEX.

Common Carriers—Common Counts.

Comrry—Continued,

2. Judicial records of other states of this Union are domestic; the records

of courts of other nations are foreign, Ib. 387, note.
COMMON OARRIERS—

1. Under the water-craft law of February 26, 1840, an action can not be
sustained against a boat by name for the breach of an executory contract
to carry goods upon such boat. Oanal-boat M. v. Kent, 54,

2, Common carriers are Hable for all losses to goods after they are taken
into their possession, unless occasioned by inevitable accident or the
public enemies, Tb. 59. .

3. Upon an executory contract to carry goods, 2 common carrier is only
liable for a refusal to carry as other persons. Ib. 60.

4, A person whose business is not carrying of goods, and who does not hold.
himself out to the world as such, will not be regarded as a common
carrier, although he may occasionally carry goods for hire. Samms v.
McKibben, 69.

5. That the person thus occasionally carrying, will be responsible in caso
of the loss of the goods only as an ordinary bailee for hire, and to excuse
himself from liability need only show that he has used ordinary care
and diligence. Ib. 69.

6. The owner of « trunk is a competent witness in a suit brought by him
against 2 common carrier, for its loss, to prove the contents of the
trunk, and their value, and for the same reason, the evidence of the
wife of the owner is admissible to prove the same facts. M. RB, & L,
E.R. R. Co. v. Fulton, 318.

7. The rule for the admission of such evidence does not extend further than
to the proof of such articles as are commonly carried in a traveling
trunk. Ib. 318.

COMMON COUNTS—

1. The promise of a certificated bankrupt to pay his provious liability can
‘be given in evidence under the common counts. Turner v. Moore's
Adm’r, 332.

2, Money paid on agreement entered into on Sunday may be recovered
Dack on the common counts so long as the contract remains executory.
Brown & Timmany 81, 303, note.

8, Where an executor or administrator, after final settlement, distributes
the balance in his hands to a part only of the distributes, such distri-
bution will not avail him against the claims of such distributees as have
not received their share; and where one of two executors or adminis-
trators has in his hands the balance remaining for distribution, an ac-
tion may be maintained against him, without joining his co-executor
or administrator. A recovery may be had insuch cases on the common
counts. Negley v. Gard and wife, 310.

4, In what cases a recovery may be had upon the common counts, for work:
and labor done under a contract suspended or rescinded during tha
work. Kugler v. Wiseman, 361.

68 . INDEX.

Common Law—Oonstitutional Law.

COMMON LAW—
How far courts recognize the binding force of judicial decisions, 440,
note; 449.

CONFLICT OF LAWS—
1. How far proceedings under the Ohio water-craft laws regarded as binding

in the courts of the United States, and of other states. Canal-boat M.
», Kent, 54, note. :

2, How far the lien of material-men under the laws of the United States
overreaches the title to water-craft acquired under the Ohio water-
craft laws. Tb. 64, note.

8, A foreign court can not authorize a sale of land in Ohio, 231, note.

4, Corporations created in one state, but which upon a change of territorial
jurisdiction fall within another state, do not continue to exist, if in
‘viclation of the policy and laws of the latter state. Myers v. Man-
hattan Bank, 283.

5, A territorial and state government can not exist over the same territory
and people at the same time. Tb. 286,

6, Judicial records of other states of this Union are domestic; of other
nations, foreign, 387, note.

t. Under the law of 1827, 2 tax sale passes the legal title to the purchaser
as against the former owner, although the land being in the Virginia
military district has only been entered and surveyed, but not patented.
Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556,

OONSIDERATION—
1. When a contract may and may not be avoided for failure of considera-

tion, 78, 601.

2, Money paid in part execution of an illegal exeoutory contract, may be
recovered back by ® party not in default, who rescinds. Brown. Tim-
many, 81.

8. The moral obligation to pay a debt discharged by a certificate of bank-

» ruptey, is a sufficient consideration to support a new promise to pay it.
‘Turner v. Moore’s Adm’r, 382.

4, A note to an oflicer of state by name individually, for tolls and penalties
on the National Road, is without consideration and void. Hunter v.
Field, 340.

8. Whether the making or altering » will in» particular manner at the
instance of an heir or others, upon a promise to pay money or transfer
property, will support the promise to pay or transfer, 496.

6, A post-nuptial contract between husband and wife, though void at law,
will be enforced in chancery against the husband's estate, unless the
rights of creditors interfere, and it is not essontially necessary that the
consideration for such contract spring from the wife's property or earn~
ings. Wood v. Warden's Adm’s, 518.

1, How far the consideration of a deed may be inquired into, 696.

CONSTABLE—

Seo Orriomr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—
1, The constitutionality of the act of February 9, 1846, to prohibit the sulo

INDEX.

Constitutional Law.

ConstirutionaL Law—Continued.
of intoxicating liquors in the vicinity of certain manufacturing estab-
lishments in Scioto and other counties argued, 9.

2, The power to extend a law to places or things not existing at the time of
its enactment—whether it can be exercised except by the legislature, 13.

3. The constitutionality of laws dependent on a vote of the people, 13;
Griffith ». Commissioners, 609. And see APPENDIX A.

4, Pending a suit in the common pleas, this court has no constitutional
jurisdiction of a motion to dissolve an injunction therein. Griffith et
al. v. Commissioners of Crawford Oo. 609.

5. A special legislative enactment will not confer jurisdiction upon this
court to prevent the operation of an injunction allowed by the common
pleas in a case of which that court has taken jurisdiction. Ib. 609.

6. Obiter dictum by Judge Spalding alone. That the legislature has no
constitutional power to authorize the majority of citizens in » county
to vote a subscription of stock to a railrond company, that shall be bind-
ing on the property of the minority. Ib. 609.

7. That on the trial of an indictment for a criminal offense, and ‘at the re-
turn of the verdict, it is the right of the accused to be present, and if
provented by imprisonment or other improper means, he is entitled to
a new trial. Rose v. Ohio, 31.

8. The constitutional right to arrest without warrant, in criminal cases, 38.

9. The constitutionality of the Ohio water-craft laws, 54, note.

10, Whether the legislature can revive a lapsed power in a will, and pass a
retroactive law anthorizing surviving executors to sell under the power
in the will, 258,

11. The zerritory of Michigan was organized by act of Congress in 1808, and
a territorial government erected therein that continued until her ad-
mission into the Union in 1837. In 1835, the people adopted a state
constitution and elected a legislative body under it, which passed an act
to incorporate the Manhattan Bank in March, 1836. Held, that the
creation of a corporation is an exercise of sovereign legislative power;
that at the time said act of incorporation was passed, the territorial
government was still in existence, and therefore the legislative asssmbly,
under the constitution, could not exercise legislative power, and said
act was repugnant to the act of Congress organizing the territory, and
void. . Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 283.

12. Bules of construction applicable to the constitution of the United States ~
and of astate. Griffith ». Commissioners, 618,

18. Whether section 4, article 8, of the constitution of 1802, providing for
the inviolability of private property in any way, limits or affects the
taxing power, 622. And see APPENDIX A.

14, The legislature can, in adopting rules of evidence, make an equitable title
have the effect of a legal one. Gwynne». Niswanger, 556,

15. Where a party has made an entry and survey of lands under a warrent,
such lands become subject to taxation, and if sold for taxes, the pur-
chaser at such tax sale will take a legal title, as against the former

70 INDEX.

Construction,

ConeriteTionaL Law—conrnued.
owner, although the patent nas never issned from the United States.
Tb, 556.

16, A grant may by law be made xo relate back to the inception of the right,
and have effect accordingly. Yb. 563.

Ur. Whether in passing upon tne constitutionality of a law, courts can look
peyond the letter of the constitution to its spirit and objects, and de-
clare a Jaw void though not 1a direct conflict with an express consti-
tutfonal provision, 613, And see APPENDIX A.

OoxsSrR cxrTON—

1. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly, and can not be extended by
implication to cases not falling within their terms. Hall ». Stato, 7.

2, Such stavuves of a local character referring to persons, places, or things,
unless othorwise expressed, are to be confined to such persons, places, or
things as existing at the timo of their passage. Ib. 7.

3. The bonds of executors and administrators of estates in course of settle-
ment when tne act of March 23, 1840, took effoct, are governed by,
and must be prosecuted under the laws in foree when they wore entered
into. MeGovney v. State, 93. :

4, The undertaking of a surety can not be extended beyond the terms of a
contract into whien he has eritered. Ib. 93. .

8, An executor’s bond describing the testator as James L. Findley, can not,
by parol evidence, be made applicable to the estate of Joseph L. Find-
Jey. Ib. 93.

6. The construction of a contract may be ascertained by parol proof of the
circumstances under which it was made. Hildebrand v. Fogle, 147.

7, Whether a deed executed under a power has relation back to the incep-
tion of the power, 250.

8. Whether, under section 5 of the ordinance of 1787, the right of the
people to form a state government can be controlled by the general

* government, 297.

9. The powers .of the territorial and state governments of Michigan and of
Congress over the same, 294.

10. In construing a will with codicils, the whole is to be taken together as
parts of one instrument, and if » codicil is signed” and attested at the
same time and place with the body of the will, it may well be consid-
ered as constituting a part of the original will. Negley v. Gard, 310.

11. The grant of the principal carries the incident, but not vice versa, 409,
note.

12. A sheriff's deed under judicial proceedings conveying land by metes and
bounds, carries with the conveyance an appurtenant water-right. Mor-
gan v. Mason, 401.

13. If a contract for the conveyance of land be intended as security for debt
it isa mortgage, whatever may be its form, or the name given it by
the parties. Cotterell ». Long, 464,

14, Wills are to be construed from the written language of the instrament,
not by evidence aliunde. Collins v. Hope, 492.

INDEX. vem

Contracts,

Oonstrtction— Continued.

15, If the contract betweon the agont of an insurance company and a per-
son applying for insurance be fair and in accordance with the rules of
the company, the liability of the company is fixed for a loss within the
scope of the policy agreed to be issued, although not issued, and the
reservation of a right to issue the policy, “if approved,” only saves the
Tight to object to an unfair or improper contract. Palm, Adm'r, 2. -Me-
dina Insurance Oo, 529.

16, A conveyance is good where the grantee is described by sufficient terms
to designate who is intended, and if no grantee is named in the grant-
ing part of the deed, the grantee named in the habendum clause will
take. Irwin ». Longworth, 581.

17. Rules of construction applicable to United States and state constitutions,
618.

18. The term “for whom it may concern,” in a policy of insurance, does not
vest in the mortgagee jof insured property any interest in the policy.
McDonald v. Black, 185.

CONTRAOTS—

1, A common carrier is liable for all damage to goods which he undertakes
to carry, after taken into his possession, except that arising from inev-
itable accident or the public enemy, but is only Hable as other persons
for failure to comply with an executory contract to carry goods. Canal-
boat M. ». Kent, 60,

2. Money paid on an agrecment, entered into on Sunday, may be recovered

back as long as the contract remains executory. Aliter, if the agree-

ment has been executed. Brown v. Timmany, 81.

Tegal contracts; no suit upon them sustained; when executed, money
paid on not recoverable; otherwise, of executory contracts in a suit by
a party not in default who rescinds, 88, 303, note. See also Myers o
Manhattan Bank, 283.

4, Whon asubcontract in writing for carrying the United States mail pro-
vides for payments to be made quarterly, in May, August, November,
and February, it is competent to show by parol evidence from the oir-
cumstances and situation of the contracting parties that the contract had
relation to the quarterly divisions of the year fixed in the post-office
department, and when such quarters commence and terminate. Hilde-
brand v. Fogle, 147.

5. Extrinsic parol evidence is admissible to give effect to a written instrament
by applying it to its proper subject matter by proving the cireum-
stances under which it was made, thereby enabling the court to put them.
selves in the place of the parties, the better to understand the terms
employed in the contract, and to arrive at the intention of the parties.
Th. 147.

6. A new promise is, in law, available to sustain a recovery upon an old con-
tract, against a plea of bankruptey. The “ bar” arising from the bank-
rupiey is strictly » personal privilege which is waived by the subsequent
promise. siamer 2, Moore’s Adm’r, 332,

»

72 INDEX.

Contracts.

Conrracrs—Continued. .
7. It is contrary to public policy to permit officers of the state to transact
the business of the state, and to contract in their own name. All con-
tracts for money due the state should be made in the name of the state.

and all suits brought in-the name of the stato. Hunter v. Field, 340.

8 The suspension of the work on a contract to build, by the party for whom
the work is to be done, until after the contract time of completing it,
releases the other party from the obligation to complete the work, and
puts an end to the contract; but the party suspending the contract is
liable for a breach of it. Kugler v, Wiseman, 361.

9. In such caso the party having performed the work is entitled to recover
for labor performed and materials furnished, and the original contract
is competent as an item of evidence. Ib. 361.

10. If, after the plaintiff in such case had been released from the contract by
the suspension of the work, a new contract was made by which the
work was resumed, it is a question of fact for the jury to determine
what that contract was. Ib. 361.

11. If a contract for the conveyance of land be intended as security for a

* debt, it isin equity a mortgage whatever may be its form or the name
givon it by the parties. Cotterell & Long, 464. See 597.

12, Whore a post-nuptial agreoment is made between husband and wife, by
which property is set apart for her separate use, the agreement, al-
though void in law, will be sustained in equity, unless the rights of
creditors interfere. Wood ». Warden, Adm’r, 518,

18. When a contract for insurance has been completed, by the party apply-
ing for insurance doing all that is required to be done on his part, al-
though the agent contracting on the part of the company has not power
to issue a policy, the risk commences at the time of making such con-
tract, if there be no stipulation to the contrary. Palm, Adm’r, o.
Medina Insurance Co. 529.

14, When a contract of insurance has been made with an agent and the ap-
plication with the deposit note "has been sent on to the office of the
company from which the policy is to issue, the company are liable,
although the loss ocours before the arrival of the letter containing the
application. Ib.

15. If the contract between the agent and the party applying for insurance
‘be fair and strictly in accordance with the rules of the company, such
Kability will exist, although there be printed on the blank application
the qualification that the policy will issue “if approved” by the com-
pany; such qualification only saves the company the right to object to
an unfair or improper contract. Tb. 529.

16. Corporations may contract by parol within the sphere of their proper
fanctions. A contract of insurance may be made so as to bind the
parties without any writing executed by the signature of the parties.
Palm v. Medina Ins. Oo, 587. See note (a), 587.

INDEX.

Copy—Count.

coPY—

1. The copy of a forged note can not be received in evidence unless the
absence of tho original is excused, 52. .

. 2. Whether by proving that a letter has been deposited in due time in a
post-office directed to a party, a copy can be received in evidence to
charge the person to whom directed. Choteau v. Raitt, 146.

8, A notice given to produce a paper, claimed to be in the possession of a
party to whom the notice is given, is not, as a general rule, 2 reasonable
notice unless given before the trial of the cause. Tb. 182-146.

4, If such paper is with a party in court, such notice might be reasonable,
Tb. 148,

CORPORATIONS—

"1, The owners of all the stock of a corporation can not insure the corporate
property as private property in the Knox Mutual Insurance Company.
Phillips et al. v. Knox Mutual Insurance Co. 174,

2, The creation of a corporation is an exercise of sovereign legislative
power. The legislative assembly under the first constitution of Mich-
igan during the existence of the territorial government could not incor-
poratea bank. The act to incorporate the Manhattan Bank is void.
Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 283.

2, If the Bank of Manhattan had been incorporated while it remained
under the jurisdiction of Michigan, such authority would not have con-
tinued after it came under the jurisdiction of Ohio. Ib. 283.

4, Associations “incorporated by a law of this state,” are alone exempted
from the operation of our restraining laws, and alone authorized to
issue bills to circulate as money. Ib. 283.

"5, All securities given to an unauthorized bank are void. Ib. 283.

6. How the proper organization of a corporation may be inquired into.
Tb. 292,

7. Cause of forfeiture of charter can not be inquired into collaterally. Ib.
292,

8. When a railroad company places the engineer, under their employ,
under the control of the conductor, who directs when the cars are to
stop, start, etc, the company are liable to the engineer for an injury
received, occasioned by the negligence of the conductor, whilst they
are both engaged in their respective employments. Little Miami Rail-
road Co. v. Stevens, 415.

9. Corporations may contract by parol within the sphere of their proper
functions. It is not necessary, to perfect a contract of insurance, that
any writing should have been oxecuted by the signatures of tae parties,
Palm, Adm’r, 0, Medina Insurance Oo. and note (a), 537.

10 The right of a corporation to appropriate private property for public
use, Griffith », Commissioners, 609. And see AprENDix A.

11, Subscription to the capital stock of railroad companies on behalf of a
county—whether it can be made. Ib.

coUNT—

See Ductanation; Common Counts.

vos INDEX.

Oounty Commissioners—Courts.

Count—Continued.

1. Where distinct officers are charged in separate counts of an indictment,
the jury must either return a general verdict, or else respond to each
charge in the finding. Wilson v. Ohio, 26.

2. Practice as to judgment, ote, on indictment containing several counts,
26, note.

3. A count on a promise-to the intestate may be joined with a count on @
promise to the administrator. Turner v. Moore's Adm’r, 335.

4, Form of count in case against principal for injury sustained by one agent
by reason of the negligence of another. Little Miami Railroad Co.
v. Stevens, 415.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS—

1. The power of county commissioners to levy taxes and subscribe to tho
capital stock of railroad companies under laws authorizing such sub-
scriptions with and without a vote of the qualified voters of the county.
Griffith ». Comm'rs of Orawford Co. 609; Carey v. Comm'rs of Wyan-
dot Co. 621. AppEnDrx A.

2. How county commissioners must answer in chancery, 628.

8. Powers of county commissioners. Ib. 609-621. Appmyprx A.

COURTS—

1, Whether courts ea officio take notice of local acts not set out in plead-
ings. Hall o. State, 9; Brown », State, 11 Ohio, 280. .

2, The court may refuse to receive a verdict of not guilty on one count in
an indictment containing threo counts, when the jury can not agree as.
to the other two counts, 26, note.

8. Whether a division of opinion in the court as to the law in a criminal
case is to go to the jury and be resolved in the prisoner's favor. Jones
v. State 41."

4, The mere failure of a court to instruct ‘the jury upon point of law
arising in a case, is not a ground of error, unless upon request the court
refused to instruct. Jones v. Ohio, 34.

5. Whether the court or jury determine the fact that the foundation is laid
for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of a lost
note, in a prosecution for forgery. Hart », State, 52.

6. In an action for malicious prosecution, “ probable cause” is a mixed ques~
tion of law and fact. The court must leave the facis with the jury,
with instructions as to what is probable cause. Ash v. Marlow, 119.

7. A court has power to correct bills of exceptions at any time during the
trial term. Ib. 119.

8, Whether a court is required to sign a bill of exceptions as to matters not
excepted to before verdict, 123, 188, 381, note.

9. The court of common pleas may set aside their own finding, on a case
submitted to them, because against the weight of evidence; but no ex-
ception can be taken for refusal, unless motion be made for a new trial.
Spafford v. Bradley, 74; see also Choteau v. Raitt, 144,

10. When the common pleas finds that a witness offered on trial, is not so

INDEX. 1

Courtesy—Crimes,

Counrs—Continued.
interested a8 to be disqualified, the Supreme Court may, on error, review
that finding, Ib. 144.

11. A court can not enter judgment on a special verdict, unless it find the
truth of the facts, Hambleton v. Dempsey, 168; see also Blake v.
Davis, 231.

12. Whether s conveyance is to be presumed, from circumstances alleged to
be sufficient to justify it, is a question of fact for the jury, under the
advice of the court. Blake » Davis, 231.

18. A foreign court can not authorize a sale of land in Ohio, Ib. 231, note.

14. It is comapetent for a court to set aside a judgment of a previous term for
irregularity, on motion; and any error in the exercise of such power
will not render the proceeding yoid, so that the record can be collater-
ally impeached. Reynolds », Stansbury, 344.

15. When a party to » judgment moves to set it aside at a subsequent term
to that in which it was entered, it is necessary, to give the court juris-
diction, that the opposite party should have notice. Ib. 344,

16, In favor of the proceedings of » court of general jurisdiction, it will be
presumed that the court had jurisdiction of the person of the defend-
ant, although that fact may not affirmatively appear on the record.
Tb. 344,

11. The power of ontering, setting aside, and amending judgments and
orders, and entering them une pro tune generally, 344, note.

18, Issues—when tried by the court and when by jury. Myors & Waterson
». Hunter, Erwin & Co. 387, note.

19. How far courts recognize the force of judicial decisions, 440, note; 449

20. Whether two courts can have jurisdiction of a cause at the same time.
Griffith v. Commissioners of Crawford, 609.

21. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to enter judgment by confession
‘on warrant of attorney. Spafford v. Bradley, 75, note.

COURTESY—

“Whether o husband has courtesy in a resulting equity of the wife in real

estate, and how it may be released, 597.
COVENANT—

‘Whether « covenant to convey or of warranty, in a deed for land, is
broken, if the metes and bounds contain less acres than specified.
Kotchum v. Stout, 453.

OREDITOR—
See Deron anp CREDITOR,
OREW—

See Mastan anp Crew.

cRIMES—

1, Marriages in this state contracted by male persons under the age of
eighteen, and female persons under fourteon, are invalid, unless con-
firmed by cohabitation after arriving at those ages respectively. Shaf-
her». Ohio, 1.

2, Such a marriage, not thus confirmed, does not subject a party to punish-

76 INDEX. .

Cross-examination.

Crrus—Continued,
ment for bigamy, for contracting a subsequent marriage while the first
husband or wife is living. Ib. 1.

8, Evidence of two marriages, the former of which is void, will not sustain
a prosecution for bigamy. Shather v. Ohio, 1, note 2.

4, On an indictment for bigamy, the admissions of the defendant as to a
prior marriage are competent evidence to prove the fact of such mar-
riage. Ib, note 2.

5. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly, and can not be extended by
implication to cases not falling within their terms. Hall v. Ohio, 7.

6, Such statutes of a local character, referring to persons, places, or things,
unless otherwise expressed, are to be confined to such persons, places or
things as existed at the time of their passage, Ib. 7.

7. The act of February 9, 1846, “to prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquors in the vicinity of certain manufacturing establishments in the
counties of Scioto, Lawrence, and Jackson,” is to be confined to such
manufacturing establishments as existed at the time of its passage.
‘Tb. 7.

8. Where distinct offenses are charged in separate counts of an indictment,
the jury must either return a general verdict, or else respond to each
charge in their finding. Wilson v. Ohio, 26.

9, Where the defendant was charged in one count with an assault with
an intent to commit murder, and in another count with shooting with
intent to kill, which are distinct offenses under the Ohio statute, the
jury returned guilty of “an assault with intent to kill and murder G.
‘L. in manner and form as alleged,” etc, but said nothing as to the
charge of shooting, etc, the findingis insufficient. Wilson v. Ohio, 26.

10, Practice as to verdict, judgment, etc., on indictments containing several
counts, 26, note.

11. On the trial of an indictment, and at the return of the verdict for a crim-
inal offense, it is the right of the accused to be present, and if pre-
vented by imprisonment or other improper means, he is entitled to a
new trial, Rose v. Ohio, 31.

12, The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in murder cases is not talcen away
py the act of March 12, 1845. Jones v. Ohio, 34.

18. The right to arrest for crimes without warrant, 37,

14. The duty of the court to instruct the jury in criminal cases. Jones v.
Ohio, 46.

15. A charge in an indictment for forgery, that the defendant has forged a
promissory note, described in the indictment as a note without a seal, is
not supported by evidence tending to prove that defendant had com~
mitted forgery of a note under seal. It is error in the court to admit
such evidence in proof of the charge. Hart v. Ohio, 49.

16. Whether an indictment upon a local act must set out the act. Hallo
Ohio, 9. See Brown v. Ohio, 11 Ohio, 280.

OROSS-EXAMINATION—

1. Much latitude is allowed on cross-examination. Ash v. Marlow, 128.

INDEX. qT

Debtor and Creditor.

Onogs-ExAMINATION—Continued.

2. Before a witness can be contradicted by proving statements out of court
at variance with his testimony, he must be first inquired of, upon cross-
examination, as to such statements. King v. Wicks, 87.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR—

1. A mortgage of personal property, under the statute of 1846, is absolutely
void” as to other creditors of the mortgagor who assert their rights
against the property after its execution, and before it be deposited with
the recorder or township clerk, ‘Wilson v. Lestie, 161.

2 Such a mortgage is not void in toto, by reason of an omission to make the,
deposit “forthwith,” but becomes effective whenever it be deposited;
and in case of a temporary withdrawal of the paper from the recorder’s
office, the mortgagee will not be prejudiced by a levy madé at the in-
stance of another creditor. Ib. 161.

8, Where the delay in depositing a chattel mortgage, as required by the
statute of 1846, has been so great as to taint the transaction with fraud,
am execution may hold the chattels mortgaged even after the deposit.
Tb. 166,

4, A conveyance of goods made for the purpose of defrauding creditors, the
vendor and purchaser both participating in the fraud, is void, under the
statute of frauds, as to the creditors of the party making such convey-
ance, but is valid as between the parties to such conveyance. Brown &
Co. v. Webb, 389.

5, A creditor of the party making such fraudulent conveyance, with notice
of the frand, may, with the consent of his debtor, take a valid mortgage,
in good faith, to secure his claim from the purchaser of the goods thus
conveyed, without being required to resort to legal process to reach the
goods. Ib, 389.

6. A mortgage of personal property, where the mortgagor retains possession

by virtue of the mortgage, with a power of sale, is void as against sub-
sequent purchasers and execution creditors; but when possession is
taken by the mortgagee, the mortgage becomes valid, so as to protect
the mortgaged property from execution, creditors not having made a
levy, and against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor. Ib. 389.
‘Where a debtor, in contemplation of insolvency, executes a chattel mort-
gage to one creditor for the purpose of securing such creditor in prefer
ence to others, with an understanding that the mortgagee shall satisfy
his claim out of.the goods, and then surrender the residue to the mort-
gagor, tho mortgage will be deemed an assignment of property in trust,
and the mortgagee will be deemed a trustee, holding the property for
the benefit of all the creditors, in proportion to their respective demands
Tb. 389.
8 If a contract for the conveyance of land be intended as a security for a
cbt, it is a mortgage, whatever may be its form, Cotterell v. Long,
464,

78 INDEX.

Declaration.

Dzsror anp Ormprror—Continued.
9. A post-nuptial contract can not be made between husband and wife, se-
curing property to her to the prejudice of creditors of his estate. Wood.
v. Warden, Adm’r, 618.

10. When two creditors have each a lien on the same property of their
debtor, and the one having a prior lien has also a lien on another fund for
the same debt, on which the subsequent lienholder has no claim, such
prior lienholder will be compelled in equity to exhaust such fund, be-
fore he proceeds to subject the property on which the other creditor has
alien, Fassett & Oo, v, Traber, 540.

11. Tf, after bill filed by the subsequent lienholder to compel the assets tobe
marshaled, the prior lienholder delivers up his claim on the second
fund to the debtor, he will be compelled, as between him and the sub-
sequent lienholder, to account for such fund as so much paid on his
claim. Ib, 540.

12, A creditor may secure his claim by obtaining a lien on the property of a
failing debtor, and if done fairly, may obtain 2 “preference over other
creditors; but he must not interpose any barrier to the rights of others;
and by taking an assignment of so much property, or in such manner
as to amount toa fraud upon the rights of other creditors, he may be-
come a trustee for the equal benefit of all the creditors, Fassett ».
‘Traber, 645; Brown & Co. v. Webb, 400.

13, No lien for the purchase money, upon a sale of real estate, will at-
tach, where the vendor takes from the vendee personal security for the
payment of the consideration money. Follett v. Reese, 546.

14. Where an equitable interest in land was sold, and security taken for the
purchase money, by which the vendor's lien was extinguished, and the
legal title to the property afterward came to the vendor by a deed of
trust, he will not be permitted to hold on to the legal title until his own
debt is paid, it not being provided for in the deed. Ib. 546.

18. Whore a conveyance of real estate is made to defraud creditors, a surety
of the grantor, at whose instance the conveyance was made, and who
holds a declaration of trast subsequently made for his benefit, can not
set up that the deed was so made to defraud creditors, to prevent the
grantor or his heirs from asserting an equity in the premises. Irwin x
Longwort 58.

DECLARATION—

1. Form of declaration against principal by agent, for injury sustained by
negligence of superior agent. Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Stevens,
415,

2, A count on a promise to the intestate may be joined with a count on
promise to the administrator. Turner v. Morris’ Adm’r, 335.

8. Upon local statutes. Hall». Ohio, 9; Brown 2. State, 11 Ohio, 280.

4. A clerical errorin an executor’s bond can not'be cured as against a
surety by averment or evidence. McGovney ». Ohio, 93,

INDEX. 79

Decree—Deed.

Deoraration—Continued.

5, In an action for a debt barred by a certificate of bankruptey, when the
“par” has been “ waived” by a new promise to pay an old debt, it is
competent to declare on the old liability, without suing on the new
promise, Turner 0. Chrisman, 332,

DECREE—

See Equirr.

DEED—

See TRusts.

1, How purchasers aro affected by recitals in the chain of title under which
they claim, Blake ». Davis, 231, note.

2, Where a purchaser of land hands his deed to the recorder, and the re:
corder by mistake enters the name of another person as the grantor in
the deed, in place of the true grantor, the deed is not duly recorded:
and will not be notice to » subsequent purchaser without actual notice;
‘Dut such purchaser will hold the land as against the title of the former
purchaser. Jennings ». Wood, "261.

8. That a party can only be chargeable with constructive notice from the
record, when the record would give him actual notice. Ib. 261.

4, That where a mortgagee purchases the mortgaged premises, and receives
a deed in fee simple, paying off » part of the consideration by the de~
livery of the note which the mortgage was given to secure, to the
maker, such mortgage is thereby paid off and extinguished, and has no
effect either in law or equity, although it may appear uncanceled on the
record, Tb. 261. :

5. Whether an original deed with its execution proved and the recorder’s
indorsement of the record of it, is evidence of the record. Ib. 272.

6. A conveyance of land by metes and bounds, either by the owner or
under judicial proceedings against him, passes an appurtenant water-
right without the terms, “with the privileges and appurtenances.”
Morgan ». Mason, 401.

7, In the absence of fraud, a purchaser of lands by metes and bounds, esti-
mated to contain a given quantity, “ more or less,” for » gross sum, will
not be entitled to an abatement in price if the number of acres falls
short of the estimated quantity. Ketchum v. Stout, 453.

8 Whether a covenant to convey or of warranty in a deed for land is
proken, if the metes and bounds contain less acres than specified.
Th. 454.

9, The purchaser at a tax sale, under the law of 1827, takes a legal title as
against the former owner, although the patent has never issued, the
Jand having been entered and surveyed, and being in the Virginia mil-
itary district, Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556.

10, If the title of a purchaser at tax sale, under the statute of 1827, be de-
fective at law, he can not have the aid of court of chancery to perfect
his title. Tb. 556.

11, A grant may by law be made to relate back to the inception of the right,
and have effect accordingly. Ib. 563.

80 INDEX.

Demurrer—Depositions.

Drrp—Continued.

12, Whether » grant under » power relates back to the inception of the
power, 252, .

13. A deod of conveyance of real estate is valid to pass the fee, even though
in the granting part of the deed the grantor is also named as grantee,
where the deed describes the grantor as the party “of the first part,”
and the grantee as tho party of the second part, with a “Aabendum”
clause to the party of. the second part. In such cases, the fee passes to
the party who is “to have and to hold” the premises. Irwin v. Long+
worth, 681.

14, A conveyance in such case is good, where the granteo is described by
sufficient terms to designate who is intended, though neither his Christian.
nor surname is used, “That is certain which can be rendered certain.”
Ib. 581. 1

18. Where there is no grantee named in the granting part of a deed, the
party named in the “Aabendum” may take, Where the grantor is
named as grantee, it is a nullity, and the same rule applies as if no
grantee were named in “the premises.” Ib. 581. 1

16, Where a deed of real estate is made to defraud creditors, a surety of the
grantor, at whose instance the conveyance was made, and who holds a
declaration of trust subsequently made for his benefit, can not set up
the fraud to prevent the grantor or his heirs from asserting an equity in
the premises. Tb. 581.

17, When a deed of trust will be deemed a mortgage, and of the equity of
redemption in such case, Ib. 581, 597.

18, Whether a party who receives a deed, absolute on its face, but in fact as
trustee to seoure a creditor, no declaration of trust being executed, as re-|
quired by the statute of frauds, takes the property in trust, or holds it
absolutely, being liable for the consideration named in the deed.!
‘Th. 595.

19. How far the consideration of a deed may be inquired into. Ib. 596.

DEMURRER—

‘A defect in the conclusion of a plea can not be reached by general demurrer

Lyon ». Fish, 100.
DEPOSITIONS—

1. The proper service and transmission of a notice to take depositions may
‘pe proved, although the notice on file is not attached to the depositions.
Ash v. Marlow, 127.

2, A notice to take depositions between different plaintiffs and the same de-
fendants, in different causes, on the same day and at the same place,
can not be objected to on the ground that it embraces more than one
suit, unless it it shown that the rights of the parties are prejudiced
thereby. Ib. 127. :

3. Formal objections to depositions can only be taken advantage of by
written exceptions, within the rules of court, and come too late after
the jury is impaneled. Ib. 127.

INDEX.

Devise—Bjectment.

Derosrrrons—OContinued.
4, Whether a general objection to a deposition on the ground of incom-
petency is good, when part of the deposition is competent. Ib. 123,
DEVISE— .
See Writs.
DIES NON—
See Sunpay ConTRAcTS.
‘DISABILITY—

1, Whether the death of devisees under disability interrupts the disability
so as to defeat the operation of the saving clause of the statute of lim-
itations as to the holders of title acquired under » power in the will.
‘Ward v. Racer, 252.

2, If one of several minor heirs are within the saving clause of the statute,
whether his right to file a bill of review inures to all. Cotterell x
Long, 469. .

DISTRIBUTION—

See Esrarzs.

EASEMENT—

1. The grant of aright to build a dam across a stream of water, and to-
raise the water to a specified height upon the lands of the grantor,
creates an easement, which may be attached by the grantee to his lands
as an incident or appurtenance. Morgan v. Mason, 401.

2. When the water was taken from such dam onto the lands of the grantee,
‘by means of a race, and a rill built thereon, a judgment subsequently
rendered against the grantee, attaches as a Zien, not only upon the land,
but also upon the easement, which has become a part thereof, and a sale-
of the lund with the mill, under such judgment, carries with it the full
benefit of the easement also. Ib. 401.

3. This will be the case, although the description of the land in the levy is
by metes and bounds, and said easement is not expressly described or
alluded to in such levy, upon the principle that it attaches to the land
and mill as apart thereof. Ib, 401. ”

EJEOTMENT—

1, When grants, assignments, ete. presumed in aid of title, 231, note.

2, That under the articles of association entered into between the proprietors
of the Ohio Company and the partition thereunder made, deeds of con-
veyance from the directors to the agents, and from the agents to the
several proprietors, us therein provided for, may be presumed to protect
the equitable rights and possession of those claiming under said pro-
prietors. Blake’s Lessee v. Davis, 231.

8. Such presumption can not be made in aid of a party who is not the right-
ul equitable owner of the land, and in the actual possession, or what is
equivalent thereto, Ib. 231.

4, Where the proprietor of a share in said company died in 1793, and his
share was sold to pay debts in 1795 by his administrator, in pursuance:
of an order of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, where the:
parties all resided, said partition not having been made until 1796, and

82 INDEX.

Ejectment.

Esrormen't—Continued.

the heir not having made any claim to the property, paid taxes, or ex-
ercised any acts of ownership over it until 1846, when she and her hus-
and conveyed it to the lessor of the plaintiff—conveyances having
‘been made, and a possession of nearly twenty years had under the
purchaser at the administrator's sale: Held, That although said judicial
proceedings could not affect interests in lands in this state, yet such long
acquiescence under them without claim to the land, and want of pos-
session by the plaintiff or those under whom he claims, would prevent
any such presumption from arising in his favor as against the actual
occupants of the land. Ib. 231.

%. Whether a conveyance is to be presumed from circumstances alleged to
de sufficient to justify it, is question of fact for the jury, under the ad-
vice of the court. Ib. 231.

6. Where a purchaser of Jand hands his deed to the recorder, and the re-
corder by mistake enters the name of another person as the grantor in
the deed, in place of the true grantor, the deed is not duly recorded
and will not be notice to a subsequent purchaser without actual notice;
‘but such purchaser will hold the land as against the title of the former
purchaser. Lessee of Jennings v. Wood, 261.

7. That a party can only be chargeable with constructive notice from the
record when the record would give him actual notice. Ib. 261.

8, That where a mortgagee purchases the mortgaged premises and receives
a deed in fee simple, paying off a part of the consideration by the de-
livery of the note which the mortgage was given to secure, to the maker,
such mortgage is thereby paid off, and extinguished, and has no effect
either in law or equity, although it may appear uncanceled on the
record. Ib, 261.

9, A deed made in 1835, by two surviving executors of a person who died
seized of the premises in 1804, will not prevail against an adverse pos-
sossion of more than twenty-one years since the death of the last
devisee. Lessee of Ward v. Racer, 250,

10. If the deed of 1836 has relation back to the “inception of the power”
so as to defeat tho estate in the heirs of the last devises, it will be
deemed in law to give a right of action to the lessor of plaintiff at the
same early period. Ib. 250.

11. Whether an original deed, with its execution proved, and the recorder’s
indorsement of the record of it, is evidence of the record, 272.

12, A sale of land under an order of court by a guardian after his term of.
service expires is void, but may in eguity be ratified by the heir, 327,
note. :

18, Where » party has made an entry and survey of lands under a warrant,
such lands become subject to taxation; and, if sold for taxes, the pur-
chaser at such tax sale will take a legal title, as against the former
owner, although the patent has never issued from the United States,
Gwynne », Niswanger, 556.

14, Whether a patent for land in the Virginia Military District relates back
to the time of the entry and survey. Ib. 562.

INDEX.

Eminent Domain—Hquity.

Esncrment— Continued.

15. The state can, in adopting rales of evidence as between individuals, make
an equitable title have the effect of a legal one. Ib. 563.

16. A grant may by law be made to relate back to the inception of the right
and have effect accordingly. Ib. 563.

17. Whether a deed under a power relates back to the inception of the
power. Ward’s Lessee v. Racer, 252.

18. Whether a joint power in a will can be executed by surviving execu-
tors, and the effect of the statute upon that subject upon wills made
prior to it. Ib, 257, 258.

19. If one in possession without title, is ousted by one having no paramount
right, such prior possession will enable the person ousted to recover in
ejectment, 567.

20. Possession without title is sufficient to dofeat an ejectment brought by one
without a paramount right of possession, 567.

EMINENT DOMAIN—

The right of a corporation to appropriate private property for public uses.

Griffith v. Comm'rs of Crawford Oo. 609. APPENpIx A:
ENTRY—

‘An entry and survey in the Virginia Military District, is subject to taxa-
tion and sale for taxes before patent issues; and upon a sale for taxes
under tho law of 1827, as between the original owner and tax purcha-
ser, the purchaser takes a legal title. Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556.

EQUITY—
ACCOUNT.

1, When a creditor has a lien upon two fands of his debtor, and a subse
quent creditor files a bill to reach one of the funds, if the prior credi-
tor, after bill fled, surrenders one of the fands, he will, as between the
creditors, be held to account for it as so much paid on his claim. Fas-
sett 0. Traber, 540,

2, If, after bill filed by the subsequent lien holder to compel such subroga-
tion, the prior lien holder delivers up his claim on the second fund to
the debtor, he will be compelled, as between him and the subsequent
Tienholder, to account for such fand as so much paid on his claim. Ib.

540.
THE ABATEMENT OF PRICE,

8, Where a purchase of land is made by metes and bounds, estimated to
contain a specific quantity, or for “ more or less,” and a gross sum to be
paid for the entire tract, the purchaser will not be entitled to an abate-
ment in the price, should the number of acres fall short of tho estimated
quantity; moré especially should the land, at the time of the purchase,
be of equal value to the price paid. Ketchum v. Stout, 453.

4, Any misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the vendor may
take a case out of thisrule. Ib. 453.

ADMINISTRATOR.

5. No suit can be maintained upon general chancery principles, by an ad-

ministrator de bonis non, against the administrator of a deceased admin-

84 _ INDEX.

Equity.

Equrry—Continued.
istrator, or thesureties in his official bond. Blizzard, Adm’r de bonis
non v. Harris Adm’r, 479.

6, If an administrator purchase land at his own public sale, he will be held
to have purchased in trust for the heirs, and upon being refunded the
amount by him paid, will be decreed to convey to the heirs. If he has
sold the land to a third person, he (the vendor) will be held to account
to the heirs for its value at the time of his original purchase or other-
wiso, as the case may be, with intorest, first deducting the amount by
him paid. Such is the rale whother the administrator purchase di-
rectly or through another person for his benefit. Glass v. Greathouse,
503.

7. Whether a purchase by an administrator at his own sale, per interposi-
tam personam, is of itself evidence of fraud. Tb. 608.

AGENTS—CONTRAOT—INSURANCE,

8. When a contract of insurance has been completed, by the party apply-
ing for insurance doing all that is required to be done on his part, al-
though the agent contracting on the part of the company has not
power to issue a policy, the risk commences from the time of making
such contract, if there be no stipulation to the contrary. Palm, Adm’r,
. Medina Insurance Co. 529.

9. When a contract of insurance has been made with an agent, and the ap-
plication with the deposit note has been sent on to the office of the
company, from which the policy is to issue, the company are liable, al-
though the loss occurs before the arrival of the letter containing the
application. Ib. 529.

10. If the contract between the agent and the person applying for insurance
be fair and strictly in accordance with the rules of the company, such
liability will exist, although there be printed on the blank application
the qualification, that the policy will issue “if approved” by the com-
pany; such qualification only saves the company the right to object to
an unfair or improper contract. Ib. 629.

AGREEMENT, POSI-NUPTIAL—HUSBAND AND WIE.

11, Where a post-nuptial agreement is made, between husband and wife, by
which property is sot apart for her separate use, the agreement, al-
though void at law, will be sustained in equity, unless the rights of
ereditors interfere. Wood ». Warden’s Adm’r. 518,

12, A note, executed by tho husband to the wife, acknowledging the receipt
of $100 at her hands, and promising to allow her six per cent. per an-
num interest thereon during her life, and if she survives the maker of
the note, to be paid her or her heirs evtra of her third, will be con-
strued such an agreement. Ib. 618,

13, It is not essentially necessary that the consideration of the note should
spring from the wifo’s property or earnings, to entitle her to come in as
acreditor against the estate of her deceased husband. Tb, 518.

APPEAL.
14, Ira case in chancery where there are two defendants, and the bill is dis-

INDEX. | 85

Equity.

Equiry—Continued.

15.

16.

iy.

18.

19.

20,

a1,

22.

23.

24,

missed as to one, and a decree against the other, an appeal by the latter ,
does nof vacate the decree as to the former; more especially where

there is not that necessary connection between the defendants but that

the rights of the one can be determined without affecting the rights of
the other. Glass v, Greathouse, 503.

In such case, if the complainants are not satisfied with the decree dismiss-
ing the Dill as to one of the defendants, it is incumbent on hem to
appeal. An appeal by the other defendant, against whom a decree is
rendered, does not appeal the case as to the defendant as to whom the
decree dismisses the bill, nor such latter defendant a party on appeal in
the court above, so that his right may be passed upon. Tb. 503.

4 ANSWER.

How county commissioners must answor in chancery ; whether the an-
swer must be adopted by the commissioners as a board. Carey ». Com-
m’rs of Wyandot Co. 628.

‘Whother defendants must sign an answer not required to be sworn to.
Tb. 628.

CHARITY AND CHARITABLE USES.

A. gift to » charitable use is to receive the most liberal construction,
Zanesville Canal Oo. v. City of Zanesville, 483.

The McIntire fund, given to establish “a school in the town of Zanes-
ville, for the poor children in said town,” is not limited in its benefits to
the children of parents residing in that locality which constituted the
town corporate of Zanesville at the decease of the testator. Ib. 483.

The charity will be administered for the benefit of poor children in the
town of Zanesville, according to the most general and popular sense of
the term. Ib. 483.

FRAUD.

Any misrepresentation or concealment on the part of a vendor of real
estate as to the amount of land contained in specified metes and bounds,
sold for a given price, may make the vendor liable for a deficiency in
the number of acres called for in the conveyance. Ketchum ». Stout,
453.

‘Where the delay in depositing a chattel mortgage, as required by the act
of 1846, has been so great as to taint the transaction with fraud, an ex-
ecution at Jaw may hold the mortgaged chattels even after the deposit.
‘Wilson », Leslie, 166. :

‘When the owner of land is estopped from setting up his claim by know-
ingly permitting an occupant, under color of title, to make improve-
ments, 231, note.

A party defendant may avoid a contract for the fraud of the complain-
ant, and chancery will enjoin collection of a note fraudulently procured
by threats of a groundless prosecution, 303, note.

INDEX.

Equity.

Equrry—Continued.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR—STATUTE OF FRAUDS—CHATTEL MORTGAGE—TRUSTS,

25. A conveyance of goods made for the purpose of defrauding creditors,
the vendor and purchaser both participating in the fraud, is void, under
the statute of frauds, as to the creditors of the party maleing such con-
veyance. Brown & Co. ». Webb, 389.

26. A creditor of the party making such fraudulent conveyance, with notice of
tho fraud, may, with the consent of his debtor, take a valid mortgage
in good faith to secure his claim from the purchaser of the goods thus
conveyed, without being required to resort to legal process to reach the
goods. - Ib. 389.

27, A mortgage of personal property, where the mortgagor retains possession
by virtue of the mortgage, with a power of sale, is void, even at law,
a8 against subsequent purchasers and execution creditors; but when
possession is taken by the mortgagee, the mortgage becomes valid, so as
to protect the mortgaged property at law from execution creditors not
having made a levy, and against subsequent purchasers from the mort+
gagor. Ib. 389. :

28, ‘Where a debtor, in contemplation of insolvency, executes a chattel mort-
gage to one creditor for the purpose of securing such ereditor in prefer-
ence to others, with an understanding that the mortgagee shall satisfy
his claim out of the goods, and then surrender the residue to the mort-
gagor, the mortgage will, in equity, be deemed an assignment of prop-
erty in trust, and the mortgagee will be deemed a trustee holding the
mortgaged property for the benefit of all the creditors, in propor-
tion to their respective demands. See Act of 1838, Stat, 717, sec. 68.
Tb, 400.

29. When two creditors have each a lien on the sate property of their
debtor, and the one having ‘the prior lion has also a lien on another fund
for the same debt, on which the subsequent lien holder has no claim,
such prior lien holder will be compelled, in equity, to exhaust such fand
before he proceeds to subject the property on which the other creditor
has his lien. Fassett ». Traber, 540.

30. If, after bill fled by the subscquent lienholder to compel such subroga~
tion, the prior lien holder delivers up his claim on the second fund to
the debtor, he will be compelled, as between him and the subsequent
Jien holder, to account for such fund as so much paid on his claim.
Th, 540.

31. A creditor may secure his claim by obtaining a lien on the property of
a failing debtor, and if done fairly, may obtain a preference over other
creditors, but he must not interpose any barrier to the rights of others.
By taking an assignment of so much property, or in such manner as to
amount to a fraud upon the rights of other creditors, he may become a
trustee for the equal benefit of all the creditors: Fassett v. Traber,
545; Brown & Co.v. Webb, 400.

INDEX.

Equity.

Eaqurry—Continued.”

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR—MORTGAGE OF REALTY—TRUSTS OF RUALTY—sTAT-
. UTE OF TRAUDS.

32. If a contract for the conveyance of land be intended ag security for debt,
it isa mortgage, whatever may be its form, or the name given it by
the parties, Cotterell v. Long, 464,

33. Whether » mortgagee, after condition broken, may-assign his interest
without a deed, 476,

84, Where a conveyance of real estate, not warranted by law, is made in feo
simple, “to delay creditors,” a surety of the grantor at whose instance
the conveyance was made, and who holds a declaration of trust subse-
quently made for his benefit, can not set up that the deed was so made
to defraud creditors, to prevent the grantor or his heirs from asserting
an equity in the premises. Irwin v. Longworth, 581.

35, Where a conveyance of real estate is made to a trustee, to indemnify
the surety of the grantor, and the surety, after paying the debt, takes a
conveyance from the trustee, in satisfaction of the debt, under an order

« of the heirs of the grantor, made “for the safety of-the trustee,” and
under an impression that they ‘have no interest in the premises,” the
equitable rights of the heirs aro not thereby prejudiced. Ib. 581.

36. If the trustee, in such case, convey to the surety, in satisfaction of the
debt of the grantor, the surety as to minor heirs of the grantor, takes
the premises, charged with the trust, and the original trustee will be
responsible for a breach of the trust by his grantee. Ib. 581.

84. In such case, an order to the original trustee to convey to the surety, ex-
eouted by the heirs, for the safety of the original trustee, is not a sur
render of the equity of the heirs in the premises so conveyed, unless
the order contain words which expressly or by inference surrender the
equity. Ib. 581.

88, If it is proved aliunde that the object of the order to convey was to in-
vest the grantee of the original trustee with the perfect title, relieved
of all equities, such order can only be held effectual for that purpose
when executed with a proper understanding and knowledge, on the
part of their just rights. Ib. 681.

39, This rule applies though there has been no actual fraud or imposition
practiced on the heirs.

40. Where a grantor conveys premises absolutely in fee, for the purpose of
indemmifying his surety, with tho assent of the surety, and the grantee
executes a declaration of trust accordingly, the conveyance will in
equity be deemed » mortgage, and the grantor and his heirs will have
an equity of redemption in the premises, until it is regularly assigned,
foreclosed, or barred by lapse of time. Ib. 581,

41, Where an equitable interest in land was sold, and security taken for the
purchase money, by which the vendor's lion was extinguished, and the
legal title to the property afterward came to the vendor by a deed of
trust, he will not be permitted to hold on to the legal title unless his

40

88 INDEX.

Equity.

Equrry—Continued
own debt is paid, it not being provided for in the deed. Follett
Reese, 646. :

42, The assignee of an equitable title, as 9 general rule, takes it subject to
any claim that could be asserted against the assignor; but if the holder
of the legal title has, by his conduct or representations, in any way mis-
led the assignee, his rights may be lost or postponed. Ib. 546.

48. Specific interests in or liens upon the property assigned can only be set
up against the assignee; not the general indebtedness of the assignor,
although such indebtedness may have accrued from the purchase of the
same property. Ib. 546.

See ADMINISTRATOR, ante.
‘VENDOR'S LIEN.

44, No lien for the purchase money, upon a sale of real property, will at-
tach, where the vendor takes from the vendee personal security for the
payment of the consideration money. Follett v. Reese, 546.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

45, When the terms of a contract of insurance have been agreed on, and the
applicant for insurance has done all that is required on his part, equity
will decree » specific performance of the contract. Palm, Adm’r, ».
Medina Ins. Oo, 529.

46, When a promise, upon the faith of which another party has acted, will
be decreed to be specifically performed, 496.

. WILLs. .

47, Wills are to be construed from the written language of the instrument,
not by evidence aliunde. Collins v. Hope, 492.

48. Parol evidence may be received for the purpose of counteracting fraud
in the devisee, and in some peculiar cases, to attach a trust to the estate
devised. But in sucli cases, courts will act with the extremest caution.
Tb. 492.

See Onaniry, ante.
JUDICIAL AND TAX SALES.

49, If the title of a purchaser at tex sale, under the statute of 1827, be de-
fective at law, he can not have the aid of a court of chancery to perfect
his title. Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556,

50. A court of equity will not interfere, at the suit of a purchaser at a sher-
iff's sale, to relieve against any irregularity in the proceedings previous
to the sale, 566,

PLEADING AND PRACTICE—JURISDIOTION.
(a) Parties.

51. Whether, upon a bill to foreclose a mortgage, the personal representative
of a deceased mortgagor is necessary party, 468,

52, In a suit in equity to foreclose by an assignee of a mortgage, if the as-
signment has beén absolute, transferring the entire interest of the mort-.
gagee, it is not indispensably necessary that the mortgagee should be a
party, although this court believes the better practice to be, in all such.
cases, to make hima party. McGuffey v. Finley et al. 474,

INDEX. 89

Equity of Redemption—Hguitable Title.

Equiry—Continued.

53, Whether the executor or administrator of a deceased mortgagor is a nec-
essary party to a Dill to foreclose, 468.

(b) Decree,

54, Whether a decree requiring infants to convey, must give them a day

. after arriving at the age of majority to show cause against it, 469.

65. In a case in chancery where there are two defendants, and the bill is
dismissed as to one and a decree against the other, an appeal by tho
latter does not vacate the decree as to the former; more especially
where there is not that necessary connection between the defendants,
but that the rights of one can be determined without affecting the
rights of the other, 503,

(0) Bill of Review.

56. If one of several minors is within the saving clause of the statute of
limitations, whether his right to review a decree inures to all, 469.

(8) Injunction—Jurisdiction.

57. When the collection of a tax enjoined, 611.

58. Pending a suit in the common pleas, the Supreme Court has no constitu-
tional jurisdiction of a motion to dissolve an injunction, Griffith v.
Commissioners, 609.

69. Such jurisdiction can not be conferred by aspeciallaw. Ib. 609,

60. The collection of a note, frandulently procured by threats of a ground-
less prosecution, will be enjoined, 303, note.

(0) Multifariousness.

61. Whether soveral, interested in enjoining the collection of a tax, can
unite in a bill for that purpose, 612.

See AppraL; Answsr, ante,

EQUITY OF REDEMPTION—

1. Whether a purchaser who takes from his mortgagee a deed absolute, in
payment of an existing mortgage, takes the fee or a release of the
equity of redemption, 261.

2, Whether there is an equity of redemption in favor of the grantor, in a
deed of trust executed to indemnify the surety of the grantor, 597, 581.

8. The right of an executor or administrator to surrender an equity of ro-
demption, 597.

4, If a contract for the conveyance of land be intended as security for a
debt, it is a mortgage, with an outstanding equity of redemption in the
maker, whatever may be its form. otterell v. Long, 464.

EQUITABLE TITLE—

1, The assignee of an equitable title, as a general rule, takes it subject to
any claim that could be asserted against the assignor; but if the holder
of the legal title has, by his conduct or representations, in any way
misled the assignee, his rights may be lost or postponed. Follett o.
Reese, 546.

2. Where an equitable interest in land was sold and security taken for the
purchase money, by which the vendor's lien was extinguished and the
logal title afterward came to the vendor by a deed of trust, he will not

90 INDEX.

Error.

Hovrraniy Trrzz—Continued.
be permitted to hold on to the legal title until his own debt is paid, it
not being provided for in the deed. Ib. 546.

8. The state can, in adopting rules of evidence, make an equitable titlo
have the effect of a legal one, as between individuals. Gwynne v. Nis-
wanger, 563. :

4. A tax sale of lands, entered and surveyed in the Virginia military dis-
trict, made under the law of 1827,, as between the owner of the survey
and the purchaser, conveys a legal, not an equitable title, although the
land has never been patented. Ib. 563.

5, An equitable interest in land can not be sold on execution, as a general
rule; but where the judgment debtor is in possession, his interest may
be levied on and sold, and in such case, chancery will decree the legal

_ title from third persons to the purchaser. Per Hitchcock, 0. J., 566,
601.

6. A purchaser at judicial and tax sales, can not have the aid of chan-
cery to reliove against irregularities in the proceedings previous to the
sale, 566,

ERROR—

1. That the mere failure of an inferior court to instruct a jury upon a par-
ticular point of law, arising in a case, is not erroneous, To make such
failure a ground of error, the court should have been requested to in-
stract upon the point. Jones v. Ohio, 34.

2, The jadgment of an inferior court can not be reversed for matter not
apparent upon the record, and if the errors assigned have any refer-
ence to the facts of the case, those facts should be made part of the rec-
ord by bill of exceptions. Ib. 34.

3, A. judgment of the Supreme Court on the circuit, reversing the judgment
of an inferior tribunal for refusing a new trial, where it was claimed
that the finding was against the evidence, will not, as a general rule, be
considered the subject of reversal here. Spafford v. Bradley, 74. :

4, Nor will the action of an inferior tribunal, in granting a new trial in a
like case, be held exceptionable by the Supreme Court. Ib. 74.

5. It is error for the common pleas, on motion for a new trial, to refuse to
set aside their own finding in a cause submitted to the court, where the
finding is against the weight of evidence. Ib. 75, note,

6. Where the common pleas finds that a witness offered is not so interested
as to be disqualified, the Supreme Court may, on error, review that find
ing, 142.

7. The bill of exceptions must show that the error complained of is mate-
rial to the issue, 203; see also Kugler v. Wiseman, 361.

8. Whether error in the decision of a question addressed to the discretion
of the court, can be assigned for error, 384,

9. Ié is error to enter judgment on a special verdict, unless it find the truth
of the facts. Hambleton v. Dempsey, & Oo. 168; see also Blake ».
Davis, 231.

See Crrmzs; Verpicr.

INDEX.

Estates—Evidence.

ESTATES— .

See ADMINISTRATORS.

1. The act of March 23, 1840, to provide for the settlement of the estates
of deceased persons, does not extend to estates in the course of settle-
ment when it took effect. McGovney ¥. Ohio, ete., 93.

2. The bonds of executors and administrators taken in such cases are gov-
erned by, and must be prosecuted under, the laws in force when they
were entered into, Ib, 93.

8. A party receiving property, part of the assets of an estate, can not when
sued for it, set off a debt due from the estate to him. McDonald »,
Black’s Adm’r, 185. .

4, Where an executor or administrator, after final settlement, distributes
the balance in his hands to a part only of the distributees, such distri-
bution will not avail him against the claims of such distributees as have
not received their share. Negley v. Gard, 310.

5. Where one of two executors or administrators has in his hands the bal-
ance remaining for distribution, an action may be maintained against
him without joining his co-executor or administrator. Ib. 310.

6. Where a post-nuptial agreement is made between husband and wife, by
which property is set apart for her separate use, the agreement, al-
though void in law, will be sustained in equity against the husband’s es
tate. Wood v. Warden, Adm’r, 518.

7. A. promissory note, executed by a husband to his wife, acknowledging
the receipt of money from her, and if she survives the maker, to be

_ paid her or her heirs extra of her third, will be sustained against his os-
tate, whether the consideration of the note spring from the wife's prop-
erty or earnings, or not, unless the rights of creditors interfere. Ib.
518.
ESTOPPEL—

See Fraup.

1, When the owner of land is estopped from setting up his claim by know-
ingly permitting one in possession, under claim of title, to make im-
provements, 231, note. ’

2. How far a party, claiming that a mortgage is merged in a subsequent
deed, is estopped from denying the validity of the deed, 263.

EVIDENCE—

I. Depositions. See Dzrosrrrons.

IL. Documentary evidence.

1, Judicial records of other states of the Union are domestic, the validity
of which will be determined by the court; the records of courts of
other nations are foreign, and provable as matters of fact. Myers,
». Hunter & Co. 887, note.

2, Whether an original deed, with its execution proved, and the indorse-
ment of the recorder’s record of it, is evidence of the record, Ib. 279.

3, The record of a deed is not competent evidence, if the recorder by mis-

take enters the name of another grantor in place of the true grantor,
in the record. Jennings v. Wood, 261.

92 . INDEX.

Evidence,

Eeyrpence—Continued.

4. The record of 2 judgment of a former recovery may be given in evi-
dence, under the general issue. Reynolds ». Stansbury, 344.

5. In favor of the judgment or proceedings of a court of general jurisdic-
tion, it will be presumed that the court had jarisdiction of the person
of the defendant. Ib. 344.

6. Conclusiveness of such records, and impeaching collaterally. Ib. 344,
note.

7. How far a judgment against one is 2 bar to a subsequent suit against
the same defendant and others, for the same cause’ of action. Ib. 346,
354,

8. An account book is not competent in evidence, upon proof tending to
show that it corresponds with the account kept by the party to be
charged upon it ina suit. Kugler v. Wiseman, 361.

9, A surety, for whose benefit a deed of trust is made to defraud other cred-
itors, with the knowledge of the surety, can not himself impeach the
deed for fraud. Irwin v. Longworth, 581.

10. As between the parties, a chattel mortgage is not void én toto by reason
of an omission to deposit it, as required by statute, but becomes valid
when deposited. Wilson ». Leslie, 161.

11. Under the law of 1827, a tax sale of lands entered and surveyed, but not
patented, in the Virginia military district, conveys the legal title as
between the tax purchaser and former owner. Gwynne v. Niswanger,
556.

12, An equitable title may by law be made to have the effect of a legal one.
Th. 556.

18, Whether a patent in the Virginia military district relates back to the
time of the entry and survey. Ib. 562.

14, A dood is sufficient to convey the feo, if its terms sufficiently indicate
the grantee, though not named in the granting part of the deed. Tt is
sufficient if named in the habendum. Irwin v. Longworth, 581.

15. Whether the execution of a deed under a power relates back to the in-
ception of the power. Ward v. Racer, 252.

16, Whether surviving executors, under a will containing a power to sell,
can execute such power, and the effect of the statute of wills on sur-
vivorship. Ib. 257.

17. In an action for work and labor performed in part execution of » written
contract since rescinded, the contract is competent evidence. Kugler

| ® Wiseman, 361.

18. In an action for malicious prosecution, the transcript of a justice show-
ing that the accused “was bound over to court,” is not conclusive evi-
dence of probable cause. Ash v. Marlow, 119.

19. An executor’s bond, describing the testator as James L., is not competent
evidence in an action against the sureties of the executor of Joseph L.
McGovney ». Ohio, 93.

20. On an indictment for forgery of a note not under seal, evidence of a note
under seal is not competent. Hart v. Ohio, 49.

INDEX. 93

Examination—Executor.

Evipunor—Continued. .

21, A creditor's false affidavit is not conclusive evidence of probable cause,
in an action for maliciously suing out an attachment. Ash v. Marlow,
119, note.

Evidence in support of actions, See Actions, and the several actions and
titles.

Best and secondary evidence. See Paro. Eyrpzyox and Snconpary Eyi-
DENCE.

Burden of proof. See Onus Propanpr.

Criminal evidence. Seo Crrmits, Inprcrwenz, Breamy, Forazry, ete
Equity evidence. See Equirx.

Judicial knowledge. See Cours.

Opinions and skill, See Expzrrs.

‘Witness. See Wrrwuss.

(a) Character for truth and veracity. See Impzacurna Wrrnuss.

(b) Contradictory statements. See Impzacnina WitNuss.

(c) Competency. See Ivrmrusr.

(a) See Exammarton; Cross-rxamrwarron.

Presumptions of law and fact. See Presumprions axp Presumprive
Evivencz; Esrorprrn; Acqurescence.

Evidence for court and jury. See Questions or Law anp Fact; Courzs.
EXAMINATION—

See Wirnuss; Evrpznce,

1. Before a witness can be contradicted by proving statements out of court
at variance with his testimony, he must be first inquired of, upon cross~
examination, as to such statements, King v, Wicks, 87.

2, Much latitude is allowed on cross-examination. Ash v. Marlow, 128.

3. To ascertain the additional cost of performing work in the fall months
over the spring months, it is competent to inquire generally the differ-
ence in the price of wages and materials in the spring and fall months,
although the question is not limited to the particular year. Kugler
». Wiseman, 361. :

4, It is competent, in such case, to prove the difference in the way of per
centum in the cost of labor and materials during the spring and foll
months. Ib. 361.

5. It is not proper, asa general rule, to inquire of a witness on the stand,
who has heard the testimony in a case, his opinion, from the knowledge
he derives from the testimony, as to a particular fact. Oincinnati‘Ins.
Oo. v. May, 211.

EXEOCUTOR—

1, The bonds of executors in force prior to the act of March 23, 1840, are
governed by, and must be prosecuted under the laws in force when
entered into. MeCovney ». Ohio, 93.

2, An executor’s bond, describing the testator as James L., can not by parol
evidence be made applicable to the estate of Joseph L. Ib. 98.

3. A deed made in 1835 by two surviving executors of a person who died

94 INDEX.

Exceptions—Execution,

Exucvtor—Continued.

seized of the promises in 1804, will not prevail against an adverse pos-
session of more than twenty-one years since the death of the last
devises. Ward’s Lessee v. Racer, 250.

4, When a power to sell, conferred by will, is extinguished by lapse of time,
Tb, 252.

5. Whether the execution of a power to sell, conferred by will, relates back
to the inception of the power. Ib. 252.

6, Whether surviving executors can execute a power to sell, conferred by
will, and the effect of the statute of wills upon such power. Ib. 258,

‘7. Where an executor after final settlement distributes the balance in his
hands to a party only of the distributes, such distribution will not
avail him against the claims of such distributees as have not received
their share. Negley ». Gard, 310,

8 One of two joint executors is liable to an action for a balance remaining
in his hands for distribution. Tb. 810. .
EXOEPTIONS—
See Bint o Excuprions.
1. Formal objections to depositions can only be taken advantage of by ex-
coptions filed within the rules of court. Ash v. Marlow, 128.

2, Whether a general objection to a deposition for incompetency when pars
is competent, is good. Ib. 123.

3. Whether the charge of the court must be excepted to before verdict.
Th. 183. See also 136; 381, note,

EXECUTION—

1, Where a return has been made on an execution issued by a justice of the
peace, of “no goods in the township” where the justice resides, with a
suggestion that “there are goods of the judgment debtor” in another
township of the same county, an execution issued to any constable of
either of the two townships, although not strictly in accordance with
the statute, is not therefore void. Lyon v. Fish, 100.

. Execution issued after satisfaction may be set aside on motion and notice.

Harper v. Grabam, 108.

8, An execution levied upon chattels will hold them, although covered by
a prior mortgage, if the delay in depositing the mortgage as required by
law has been such as to taint it with fraud. Wilson 0. Leslie, 166.

4, A mortgage of personal property where the mortgagor retains possession.

* by virtue of the mortgage, with a power of sale, is void as against sub-

sequent purchasers and execution creditors; but when possession is
taken by the mortgagee the mortgage becomes valid so as to protect the
mortgaged property from execution creditors not having made a levy,
and against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor. Brown & Co.
v Webb, 389.

6. An execution levied upon land by metes and bounds covers an appur-
tenant water-right, though not specially mentioned. Morgan v, Mason,
401.

6, An equitable interest in land can not, as a general rale, be sold on execu=

~

INDEX. 95

Exhibits—Formor Recovery.

Exxourton—Continued.
tion, but it may if accompanied by possession in certain cases. Por
Hitchcock, ©. J., 566.

7 A court of equity will not interfere at the suit of a purchaser at a sher-
iff’s sale to relieve against irregularities in the proceedings previous to
the sale, but may, upon a sale of an equitable title, decree the legal
title to the purchaser. Ib. 566.

EXHIBITS—

‘Where a bill of exceptions refers to depositions of persons by name, as in
evidence, though not in terms made part of the bill, yet if copied into
the record and no objection be taken in the Supreme Court on the
circuit, the whole record will be considered on the hearing in bank.
‘Washington Ins. Co. v. Reed, 207.

EXPERTS—

1. It is not proper as a general rule to inquire of a witness who has heard
the testimony in a case, his opinion from the knowledge he derives
from the testimony, as to a particular fact. Ins. Oo. v. May, 211.

2. It is not competent to ask a pilot, from his knowledge of a certain place
in the river, whether a competent pilot would run a boat in a given
place without criminal neglect or fraud. Ib. 224.

3. Whore the character of a pilot is material by reason of a disaster, his
character for skill at and before the disaster, not since, can be inquired
into. Ib, 224,

FACT—
See Quusrions or Law anp Facr.
FORGERY— .

A charge in an indictment for forgery, that the defendant had forged a
promissory note, described in the indictment as a note without a seal, is
not supported by evidence tending to prove that defendant had com-
mitted forgery of a note under seal. It is error in the court to admit
such evidence in proof of the charge. Hart v. Ohio, 49.

FORMER ACQUITTAL—

“Where distinct offenses are charged in separate counts of an indictment, and
a verdict is rendered on one count, whether it is a bar to another prose-
cution for the offense charged in the other counts. Wilson v. Ohio,
28, 30.

FORMER RECOVERY—

1. Where a title has passed to water-craft by proceedings under the water-
craft laws of Ohio, whether such proceedings are a bar to a subsequent
suit in rem in admiralty for same cause of action—supplies. Canal-
dont M.v: Kent, 54, note.

2. The record of a judgment of a former recovery may be given in evi-
dence under the general issue in assumpsit without notice. Reynolds
v, Stansbury, 344,

3. How far the cause of action in a former recovery may be proved by
parol to be identical with the cause of action being tried in a subse-
quent suit, 346,

96 INDEX.

Fraud.

Formmn Rucovsny—Continued.
4. How far a judgment against one is a bar to a subsequent suit against
the same defendant and others for the same cause of action, 346, 354.
FRAUD—
1, When the delay in depositing a chattel mortgage as required by lav,
will taint it with fraud. ‘Wilson v. Leslie, 166,
2. When the owner of land is estopped from setting up his claim by know-
ingly permitting one in possession under claim of title to make im-
provements, 281, note. *
8, An innocent party defrauded, may avoid the contract for fraud, 303,
note.
4, A conveyance of goods made for the purpose of £dofreading creditors, the
vendor and purchaser both paxticipating in the fraud, is void, under the
statute of frauds, as to the oreditors of the party making such convey-
ance, but is valid as between the parties. Brown & Co. v. Webb,
389,
5. In such case a creditor of the vendor with notice of the fraud may in
good faith, with the assent of vendor and vendee, take from the fraudu-
lent vendee a valid mortgage to secure his claim, and will not be com-
pelled to resort to legal process. Ib. 389.
A mortgage of chattels where the mortgagor retains possession by vir-
tue of the mortgage, with a power of sale, is void as against subse-
quent purchasers and execution creditors; but when possession is taken
by the mortgagee, the mortgage becomes valid so as to protect the
mortgaged property from execution creditors not having made a levy,
and against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor. Ib. 389. .
7. Wher an insolvent debtor executes a chattel mortgage to one creditor to
secure a preference to such creditor, with an understanding that the
mortgagee shall satisfy his claim out of the goods, and then surrender
the residue to the mortgagor, the mortgago will be deemed an assign-
ment of property in trast for the equal benefit of all the creditors under
the act of 1838. Swan’s Stat. 717; Ib. 389. And see Asstanmunr.
8, Misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the vendor of real es-
tate, as to the amount of land contained in metes and bounds estimated
to contain a given number of acres, may be sufficient to set the sale
aside or to require an abatement of price. Ketchum v. Stout, 453.
9. Parol evidence may be received for the purpose of counteracting fraud
in the devisee, and in some peculiar cases, to attach a trust to the estate
devised. But in such cases courts will act with the ewtremest caution.
Collins ». Hope, 492.
10, How fav » promise, upon the faith of which a testator has made a will
ini a particular manner, may be decreed to be specifically performed.
Tb. 496.

11, If an administrator purchase by himself or through another at his own
sale, he will hold in trust for the heits, upon being refunded the amount
of tho purchase money. Glass v. Greathouse, 503.

12. The assignee of an equitable title, as a general rule, takes it subject to

-

INDEX.

General Issue—Grant.

Fravp—Continued.
any claim that could be asserted against the assignor; but if the holder
of the legal title has by his conduct or representations in any way mis-
Jed the assignee, his rights may be lost or postponed. Follett v. Reese,
546.

13, A party interested in and privy to a conveyance in trust made to defraud
creditors, can not, upon acquiring the legal title under the trustee, set
up the fraud to defeat an equity of redemption in the heirs of the
fraudulent grantor. Irwin v. Longworth, 681.

14. Whether the purchase by a trustee of trust property per interpositam
personam, is evidence of fraud, 508,

GENERAL IssvE—

See Preapine; PLE.”

GRANT—

See Deep; Powzrs.

1, When grants, assignments, ete., presumed in aid of title, 281, note.

2, When grant presumed from trustoo to cestui gue trust, 243.

3, A party can only be chargeable with constructive notice, from the record
of doods in the recorder’s office, when the record would give him actual
notice. Lessee of Jennings v. Wood, 261.

4, A grant of mortgaged premises to the mortgagee in payment of the
mortgage debt, passes a fee-simple estate, and not an equity of redemp-
tion. Tb. 261.

5. The grant of a right to build a dam across a stream of water, and to
raise the water to a specified height upon the lands of the grantor,
creates an easement, which may be attached by the grantee to his lands
as an incident or appurtenance. Morgan v. Mason, 401.

6. ‘When the water was taken from such dam onto the lands of the grantee,
by means of a raée, and a roill built thereon, a judgment subsequently
rendered against the grantee, attaches as a lien, not only upon the land,
Dut also upon the easement, which has become a part thereof, and a sale
of the land with the mill, under such judgment, carries with it the fall
Denefit of the easement also. Ib. 401.

'r, This will be the case, although the description of the land-in the levy is
by metes and bounds, and said easement is not expressly described or
alluded to in such levy, upon the principle that it attaches to the land
and mill as apart thereof. Ib. 401.

8, A grant may be by law made to relate back to the inception of the right,
and have effect accordingly. Gwynne v. Niswanger, 563.

9, Under the act of 1827, the auditor’s deed, upon a sale for taxes, of land
in the Virginia military district, entered and surveyed, but not pat-
ented, conveys a legal title as against the former owner. Tb. 586.

10. Whether a grant under a power relates back to the inception of the
power, 252.

11, Whether one of two surviving executors can execute a power to sell con~

tained in 9 will, and the effect of the statute of wills as to the powers:

of survivors. Ward v, Racer, 256, .

‘98 INDEX.

Guardian and Ward—Impeaching Witness.

Grant—Continued,
12. A grant is sufficiently certain as to the grantee, if only named in the
habendum clause of a deed, or if otherwise described so as to designate
the party intended. Irwin v. Longworth, 581.
GUARDIAN AND WARD—

1, A guardian appointed by the court of common pleas, has no power to
act or to control the property of his ward, untilhe has given bond, with
security, approved by the court. Carpenter v. Sloane, 327.

2, Letters of guardianship issued to him by the clerk before such bond is
given, have no legal effect: Ib. 327.

8. Letters of guardianship need not issue to enable 2 guardian to act. Ib.
327, note.

4, A sale of land under an order of court, procured by a guardian after his
term has expired, is void. Ib. 327, note.

5, An irregular judicial sale by a guardian may be ratified by his ward re-
ceiving the proceeds of the sale, with full knowledge, after the age of
majority. Ib, 32%, note.

AEARSAY—

1. How for a partnership may be proved by general reputation. Choteau
v, Raitt, 140-143,

2, Custom may be proved by parol toannex incidents to a written contract.
Hildebrand v. Fogle, 147.

HUSBAND AND WIFE—

1, Marriages in this state contracted by male persons under the age of
eighteen, and female persons under fourteen, are invalid, unless con-
firmed by cohabitation after arriving at those ages respectively. Shaf-
her ». Ohio, 1.

2, The wife is a competent witness for the husband to prove the contents of
a traveling trunk, and value, in an action against a common carrier
for its loss; but this rule dogs not extend further than to the proof of
such articles as are commonly carried ina traveling trunk. M. BR. &
L. E.R. BR, Oo. v. Fulton, 318.

3. Where a post-nuptial agreement is made between husband and wife, by
which property is set apart for her separate use, the agreement, al-
though void in law, will be sustained in equity, unless the rights of
creditors interfere, Wood v. Warden, Adm’r, 518.

4, A note executed by the husband to the wife, acknowledging the receipt

. of $100, to be paid her or her heirs ewfra of her third, if she survives
the maker of the note, will be construed such an agreement. Ib. 518.

5, It is not essentially nevessary that the consideration of such note should
spring from the wife's property or earnings. Ib. 518.

6. Whether a husband is entitled to courtesy in a resulting equity of the
wife in real estate, and how it may be released, 597.

IMPEACHING WITNESS—

1. Where a witness is called for the purpose of impeaching the character for
truth and veracity of a witness called on the other side, such impeach-
ing witness can only speak of tho general reputation of the witness

INDEX.

Impeaching Collaterally—Incidents.

Impzacuine Wrrness—OContinued.
sought to be impeached, in the community, and can not give his own
opinion of his character. Bucklin v. Ohio, 18.

2, Whether the question should be limited to general character for truth
and veracity, or whether it should not be permitted to general charac-
ter, without such limitations. Ib. 25,

8. Before a witness can be contradicted by proving statements out of court
at variance with his testimony, he must be first inquired of, upon cross
examination, as to such statements. King v. Wicks, 87.

IMPEACHING COLLATERALLY— .

1. As between the parties, a chattel mortgage is not void in toto, by reason
of an omission to deposit it, as required by statute, but becomes effective
when deposited. Wilson ». Leslie, 161.

2, How far the proper organization of a corporation can be inquired into by
the defendant, in an action brought by the corporation. Myers 0.
Manhattan Bank, 292.

8. The court will inquire into the power to create a corporation. Ib. 283.

4, As to conclusiveness of proceedings of courts, impeaching, collaterally,
etc, Reynolds ». Stansbury, 344, note.

5. In favor of the judgment or proceedings of a court of general “jurisdic-
tion, it will be presumed the court had jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant, although that fact may not affirmatively appear on the
record. Tb. 344, Sce also 468.

6. If such court, in the exercise of the power to set aside a judgment of a
previous term, act erroneously, such error will not render the proceed~
ing void, so that the record can be collaterally impeached. Ib. 344,

INCEPTION—
Seo Powrrs; Parsnm, 2; Gnanz, 8.
INCIDENTS—

1, Policies of insurance are not incidents to the thing insured, but agree-

ments between the parties. A mortgagee of the property insured takes
- nothing by the policy. McDonald v. Black, 193.

2, The custom of a country may become an incident to a written contract,
though not so expressed, and may be annexed to the contract by parol.
Hildebrand v. Fogle, 147.

3. The incident passes by the grant of the principal, but not vice versa,

"409, note.

4, The grant of aright to build a dam across a stream of water, and to
raise the water ‘upon the land of the grantor, creates an easement,
which may be attached by the grantee to his lands as an incident or
appurtenance. Morgan v. Mason, 401.

5. Where the water was taken from such dam onto the lands of the grantee,
by means of a race and a mill built thereon, a judgment subsequently
rendered against the grantee attaches as a lien, not only upon tho
land, but the easement; and a sole of the land by metes and bounds,
with the mill, under such judgment, carrios with it the easement. Ib.
40L.

100 INDEX.

Indictment—Insurance.

INDICTMENT—
See Crivx; Issuzs; Vrrpicr.
1, Whether an indictmont upon a local act must sot out the act. Hall v.

Ohio, 9. See Brown v. Ohio, 11 Ohio, 280. .

2. Whether distinct offenses may be charged in an indictment, 28, 29.

8, Whether an indictment for forgery of a lost note should aver the loss.
Hart ». Ohio, 51,

4, On an indictment for bigamy, the admissions of the defendant as to a
prior marriage are competent evidence to prove the fact of such
marriage. Shafher v. Ohio, note 2.

“b. Where distinct offenses are charged in separate counts of an indictment,
the jury must either return a general verdict, or else respond to each
charge in the finding. ‘Wilson v. Ohio, 26.

6. Where the defendant was charged in one count with an assault with
an intent to commit murder, and in another count with shooting with
intent to kill, which are distinct offenses under the Ohio statute, the
jury returned guilty of “an assault with intent to kill and murder G.
L, in manner and form as alleged,” etc, but said nothing as to the
charge of shooting, ete,, the finding is insufficient. Ib. 26.

1. Practice as to verdict, judgments, etc., on indictments containing several
counts, 26, note.

8. On the trial of an indictment, and at the return of the verdict for a crim-
inal offense, it is the right of the accused to be present, and if pre-
vented by imprisonment or other improper means, he is entitled to a
new trial. Rose v. Ohio, 31.

9, A charge in an indictment for forgery, that the defendant has forged a
promissory note, described in the indictment asa note without a seal, is
not supported by evidence tending to prove that defendant had com-
mitted forgery of a note under seal. It is error in the court to admit.
such evidence in proof of the charge. Hart 0. Ohio, 49.

INEVITABLE INJURY—

See Insurancz.

INFANTS—

See Mryon; Guarpran AND Wap.

INNOCENT PURCHASER—

See Venpor any Puromasnr.

INJUNOTION—

1. When the collection of # tax will be enjoined. Griffith ». Commission-
ers, 609.

2, Pending a suit in the common pleas, the Supreme Court has no constitu-
tional jurisdiction of a motion to dissolve an injunction therein.
Tb. 609.

3. A special legislative enactment will not confer jurisdiction upon this
court to prevent the operation of an injunction allowed by the common
pleas, in a case of which that court has taken jurisdiction. Ib. 609.

INSURANCE—

1. Where a building and the land on which it stands is the property.of an

INDEX.

Tnsurance.

Insvranoz—Continued.
incorporated company, the stockholders of the company can not insure
the same as their individual property in a mutual insurance company.
Phillips », Knox Ins. Go. 174,

2. Whether a misstatement of title not affecting the risk avoids a policy of
insurance. Ib. 176, 177.

3. A mortgagee can not claim the benefit of a policy of insurance effected
upon the mortgaged property by the mortgagor. Each have insurable
interests, but neither can, as a general rule, take advantage of an in
surance effected by the other. McDonald v, Black’s Adm’r, 185.

4. Tho rule isthe same, although the policy effected by the mortgagor may
contain the words “for whom it may concern,” if at the time the
mortgage upon personal property has not become absolute at law by
failure to pay the money. Ib. 185.

. 5, A policy of insurance is not an incident to the thing insured, but 2 con-
tract between the parties. A mortgagee of the insured property can
not claim the benefit of a policy issued to the mortgagor. Ib. 193.

6. Injury to a flat-boat by the waves raised by a steamboat, is one of the
perils insured against in any ordinary policy of insurance, although the

> steamboat was an ordinary steamboat, and the swell raised by her an
ordinary one. Washington Ins. Co. ». Reed et al. 199.

4. The insurer does not insure against certain loss, such as must inevitably
happen to all boats, as wear and tear and the like; but insures against
accidents such as may or are likely to happen. Ib. 199.

8. The question whether the external force that produced the injury was
great or small, may be important as an item of evidence in determining
whether the vessel was seaworthy or not; but if the force causing the
injury fall within the class of perils insured against, if the vessel be
seaworthy, it matters not whether it be great or small, the insurer will
De liable. Ib. 199.

9. If a steamboat or other vessel be unduly laden, she is unseaworthy. But
whether or not unduly Jaden depends upon the capacity of the boat or
‘vessel, not upen the depth of water upon the shoals and bars in the
river upon which she is being navigated. Cincinnati Ins. Oo. ». May,
au. :

10. The capacity of the eraft, not the capacity of the river, is to control in
deciding a question of this character. Ib. 211.

11. If a boat or vessel insured meets with a disaster, the captain and crew
‘are bound diligently to labor for the recovery of the property; but the
insertion of a clause in the policy requiring such labor and effort, does
not impose any additional duty upon the assured. Ib, 211.

12, The negligence of the master and crew is no defenso to an action on a,
policy of insurance where the loss is ocoasioned by perils insured against,
222, note. Wright, 539.

13. Upon abandonment, the master becomes agent of the underwriters.
‘Until then he is agent of the assured, 214.

102 INDEX.

Insolvency—Interest.

Tnsurancu—Continued.

14, When a loss may be made total, though not in fact so, and when not, so
as to charge the insurer as for total loss, 214. .

15. Whether a warranty in a policy not complied with, but the breach of
which did not contribute to a loss, will defeat a recovery, 217.

16. Whether a policy of insurance must be in writing, and whether the con-
tract of insurance can be so consummated without writing that a spe-
cific performance will be decreed. Palm, Adm’r, ». Medina Insurance
Oo. 537, note.

17. When a contract for insurance has been completed, by the party apply-
ing for insurance doing all that is required to be done on his part, al-
though the agent contracting on the part of the company has not power
to issue a policy, the risk commences at the time of making such con-
tract, if there be no stipulation to the contrary. Ib. 529.

18. When a contract of insurance has been made with an agent, and the ap-
plication with the deposit note has been sent on to the office of the
company from which tho policy is to issue, the company are liable,
although the loss occurs before the arrival of the letter containing tho
application. Ib. 529.

19. If the contract between the agent and the person applying for insurance
be fair and strictly in accordance with the rules of the company, such
liability will exist, although there be printed on the blank application
the qualification that the policy will issue “if approved” by the com-
pany; such qualification only saves the company the right to object to
an unfair or improper contract. Tb. 529.

20. Whether a policy is assignable with the consent of the underwriter, 199.

21. Whether, if a policy never attached, the assured has a right to a return -
of premium, 205.

INSOLVENCY—

See Dusror AND CREDITOR.

‘Where a debtor, in contemplation of insolvency, executes a chattel mort-
gage to one creditor for the purpose of securing such creditor in prefer-
ence to others, with an understanding that tho mortgagee shall satisfy
his claim ous of the goods, and then surrender the residue to the mort~

gor, the mortgage will be deomed an assignment of property in trust,
and the mortgagee will be deemed a trustee, holding the mortgaged
property for the benefit of all the creditors, in proportion to their respect-
ivedemands. Brown & Co. v. Webb, 389.
INTEREST—

1. Whether a witness entitled to reward upon conviction, is competent as a
witness. Jones v. Ohio, 42-44.

2. One partner can not, after suit brought, release his interest in partner-
ship concerns so as to be a competent witness for the other partners in
asuit by them. Choteau v. Raitt, 145,

3. When the common pleas finds that a witness offered is not so interested
as to be disqualified, the Supreme Court may, on error, review that find-
ing. Ib. 142,

INDEX.

Issues.

‘Inrerrsr—Continued.

4, ‘The surety in a contract for work and labor, which is rescinded after part

execution, is a competent witness in an action for the work and labor.
Kugler v. Wiseman, 361.

"8, Whether a witness is interested is a question for the court, Ib. 135-145,

6. Illegal contracts in relation to interest upon money loaned, 303, note.

7, The owner of articles commonly carried in a traveling trunk, is acompe-
tent witness against a common carrier for their loss. The wife of the
owner is competent. Railroad Oo. v. Fulton, 318.

8, The effect of the act to improve the law of evidence on suits pending.
Choteau v. Raitt, 132.

ISSUES—

1. When issues are tried by the court and when by a jury, 387, note.

2. A former recovery may be given in evidence under the general issue in
assumpsit. Reynolds v. Burch, 344.

8. Whether a jury must pass upon all the issues in a civil and criminal
case, 27-30.

4. When a plea in abatement is met by a replication, and issue in fact is
thereupon joined and found for the plaintiff, flaal judgment must be
awarded in his favor. The legal consequence will be the sume whether
such issue be tried by the court or the jury. Myers & Waterson ».
Hunter, Erwin & Oo. 381.

B. On an indictment containing two counts substantially alike, the verdict
of acquittal upon one, and of guilty upon ‘another, does not present a
case for arrest of judgment. Wilson v. Ohio, 26, note.

6. Where an indictment contains two counts for the same offense, one good
and one bad, judgmont may be given on the good count, upon a gen-
eral verdict of guilty. Ib. 26, note.

1. Where an indictment contains three counts, the court may refuse to re~
éeive a verdict of not guilty on one count, the jury not agreeing on the
others. Ib, 26,

8. Where distinct offenses are charged in separate counts of an indictment,
the jury must either return a general verdict, or else respond to each
charge in their finding. Ib. 26.

9. Where the defendant was charged in one count with an assault with in-
tent to commit murder, and in another count with shooting with intent
to kill, which are distinct offenses, under the Ohio statute, the jury re-
turned guilty of “an assault with intent to kill and murder Georgo L,
in manner and form as alleged,” ete., but said nothing as to the charge
of shooting, etc., the finding, is insufficient. Ib. 26.

10. Accord and satisfaction may be given in evidence under the general issue
in assumpsit. Harper v. Graham, 105.

11, The plea of accord, etc. with George B., agent, is not sustained by proof
of an accord with John EH, Ib. 105.

12, The several kinds of judgments on pleas in abatement—issues on, how
tried, and practice on, generally. See note, 387.

41

104 INDEX.

Joinder—Judgments and Judicial Proceedings.

Issums— Continued.

18. How the question of the proper organization of a corporation can be
made. Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 287, 389.

JOINDER—

See Parrigs To Acrrons,

JOINDER OF COUNTS IN DECLARATION—

A. count on a promise to the intestate may be joined with a court on a pro-
mise to the administrator. Turner v. Moore’s Adm’r, 335,

JOINDER OF COUNTS IN INDIOTMENT—

‘Whether distinct crimes may be joined in separate counts of an indictment.
Wilson v. Ohio, 26.

JUDGMENTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS—

1. Where a title has passed to water-craft by judicial proceedings, instituted
to recover for supplies, under the Ohio water-craft laws, whether such
proceedings are a bar to a subsequent suit in rem, in admiralty, for the
same cause of action. Canal-boat M. v. Kent, 54, note.

2. It is competent for a court to set aside a judgment of a previous term
for ixregularity, on motion; and, although the court in: the exercise of
such power may act erroneously, such error will not render the pro-
ceeding void, so that the record can be collaterally impeached. Rey-
nolds v. Burch, 344, 868.

3. When one party to 2 judgment moves to set it aside at a subsequent
torm to that in which it was entered, it is necessary, to give the court
jurisdiction, that the opposite party should have notice. Ib. 344.

4, In favor of the judgment or proceedings of a court of general jurisdic
tion, it will be presumed that the court had jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant, although that fact may not affirmatively appear on
therecord. Ib. 344; Cotterell v. Long, 468.

5, The record of a judgment of a former recovery may be given in evi-
dence under the general issue. Reynolds v. Stansbury, 344.

6. The power of courts to enter, set aside and amend judgments and orders,
and of entering mune pro tune. Tb. 344, note.

4. The reversal of a judgment does not affect title acquired under it. Ib.
344, note.

8. How far a judgment against one, is a bar to a subsequent suit against
the same defendant and others, for the same cause of action. Ib.
346, 354,

9. When it is competent to prove by parol that a former judgment was
rendered for the same cause of action in 2 subsequent suit. Ib. 346.

10. When » plea in abatement is met by a replication, and issue in fact is
thereupon joined and found for the plaintiff, final judgment must be
awarded in his favor. ‘The legal consequences will be the same whether
such issue be tried by the court or the jury. Myers etal. ». Hunter
& Oo, 881.

11. A judgment is a lien, not only on land, but an appurtenant water-right.
Morgan v. Mason, 401. .

INDEX. 105

Jurisdiction.

Tuvaments ap Juprora, Proceprvas—Continued.

12, An equitable interest in land can not be sold under a judgment, unless
the judgment debtor is in possession, 666, 601.

13. A foreign court can not authorize a sale of land in Ohio, 231, note.

14, A sale of land, under an order of court, by » guardian, after his term
has expired, is void, but may be ratified by the ward, after the age of
majority, 327, note.

15, Conclusiveness of judicial proceedings and presumptions in their favor,
impeaching collaterally, etc. 344, note; 468.

16, Judicial records of other states of the Union are domestic; of other
nations, foreign, 887, note.

17, A grant of land by motes and bounds, under judicial proceedings, carries
with it an appurtenant water-night. Morgan ». Meson, 401.

18, If an administrator purchase land at his own public sale, he will be held
to have purchased in trust for the heirs, and upon being refunded the
amount by him paid, will be decreed to convey to the heis. If he has
sold the land to a third person, he (the vendor) will be held to account
to the heirs for its value at the time of his original purchase or other-
wise, as the case may be, with interest, first deducting the amount by
him paid. Such is the rule whether the administrator purchase di-
rectly or through another person for his benefit. Glass v. Greathouse,
803,

19. Defects in judicial proceedings and tax sales, prior to a sale, can not be
corrected or aided in equity. Gwynne v. Niswanger, 566.

20, To authorize a judgment upon s special verdict, all the facts essential to
the right of the party in whose favor judgment is to be rendered, must
be found by the jury. Finding evidence sufficiont prima facie to es-
tablish such facts is not sufficient. Blake v. Davis, 281; Hamilton v.
Dempsey, 168.

SURISDICTION—

1. The act of March 12, 1845, does not take from the Supreme Court the
jurisdiction in murder cases conferred by prior laws. Jones v. Ohio, 34.

2. How far the jurisdiction conferred by the Ohio water-eratt laws conflicts
with the admiralty jurisdiction conferred on the courts of the United
States, 54, note.

8, No special notice to a tax-payer is necessary to sustain the action of the
board of equalization as to the taxable property of such tax-payer.
Hambleton v. Dempsey, 168.

4, A sale of land, under an order of court, by a guardian, after his term
has expired, is void, 327, note.

5. It is competent for a court to set aside a judgment of a previous term
for irregularity, on motion; and although the court, in the exercise of
such power, may act erroneously, such error will not render the pro-
ceeding void, so that the record can be collaterally impeached. Reynolds*
v. Burch, 344.

6. When one party to a judgment moves to set it aside at a subsequent

106 INDEX.

Tary—Iustice of the Peace.

JuRIspiorion—Continued.
torm to that in which it was entered, it is necessary, to give the court
jurisdiction, that the opposite party should have notice. Ib. 344.

7. In favor of the judgment or proceedings of a court of general jurisdic
tion, i will be presumed that the court had jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant; although that fact may not affirmatively appear on
the record. Ib. 344; Cotterell ». Long, 468.

8 At common law, no action could be sustained by an administrator de
bonis non, against the representatives of a deceased administrator, or
the sureties in his official bond. Adm’r do bonis non of Clary ».
Filler, 479.

9. Section 26 of the act of 1840, to provide for the settlement of the estates:
of deceased persons, does not, in this particular, change the common

law. Tb. 479.
10. Such suit can not be maintained upon general chancery principles. Ib.
A419.

11. If the title of a purchaser at tax sale, under the statute of 1827, be de-
fective at law, he can not have the aid of a court of chancery to perfect
his title. Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556.

12, A court of equity will not interfere, at the suit of a purchaser at a
sheriff's sale, to relieve against any irregularity in the proceedings pre-
vious to the sale. Ib. 656.

_ 13, But when an equitable interest in land, of which a judgnient debtor is
in possession, has been sold on execution, equity may decree the legal
title to the purchaser. Per Hitchcock, 0. J., Ib. 566,

14, Pending a suit in the common pleas, the Supreme Court has no constitu
tional jurisdiction of a motion to dissolve an injunction therein, Guif-
fith ». Commissioners, 609.

15. A special legislative enactment will not confer jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court, to prevent the operation of an injunction allowed by
the common pleas, in a case of which that court has taken jurisdiction.
Th. 609,

16. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to enter judgment by confession,
on warranty of attorney. Spafford ». Bradley, 75, note.

JSURY—
See Porzine Jury; Quustions or Law anp Facr.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE—

1. Proof that a justice of the peace “bound the accused over to court” is
not conclusive evidence of probable ‘cause, in an action for malicious
prosecution. Ash v. Marlow, 119.

2. When a return has been made on an execution issued by a justice of the
pence, of “no goods in the township” where the justice resides, with a
suggestion that “there are goods of the judgment debtor” in another
township of the same county, an exception issued to any constable of
either of the two townships, although not strictly in accordance with
the statute, is not therefore void. Lyon ». Fish, 100.

. . INDEX. 107,

Lease—Lien.
LEASE—
‘Whothor a perpetual lease is realty or personalty, 178.
LETTER— .

Whether, by proving that a letter has been mailed, the foundation is laid
for giving in evidence a copy of it, to charge the person to whom di-
rected. Choteau v. Raitt, 146. .

LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP—

See GuaRpian.

LEGISLATURE—

1, A special legislative enactment will not confer jurisdiction upon this
court fo prevent the operation of an injunction allowed by the common
pleas, in a case of which that court has taken jurisdiction. Griffith et
al. v. Commissioners, 609.

2. Obiter dictum by Judge Spalding alone. That the legislature has no
constitutional power to authorize the majority of citizens in a county |
to vote a subscription of stock to a railroad company, that shall be
binding on the property of the minority. Ib. 609,

LEVY— . ,

1. The rights of a mortgagee of chattels will not be prejudiced by 2 levy
made during the temporary withdrawal of a chattel mortgage from the
recorder’s office. Wilson v. Leslie, 161.

2, Where the delay in depositing » chattel mortgage, as required by the
statute of 1846, has been so great as to taint the transaction with fraud,

” an execution may hold the chattels mortgaged even after the deposit,
Tb. 166.

8. An execution may be levied on an equitable interest in land, of which
the judgment debtor is in possession, 566, 601.

4, A levy upon land by metes and bounds, and sale under it, conveys an ap-
purtenant water-right extending beyond the metes and bounds on the
lands of the debtor. Morgan v. Mason, 401.

LIEN— .

1. How far tho lien of material-men, under the laws of the United States,
overreaches title to water-craft acquired under the Ohio water-craft
laws, 54, note.

2, Whether a lien attaches to a steamboat for advances made by one part-
owner upon the shares of the others, gure? But in any event, to
create such a lien it must be shown that such advances were made to
discharge debts and liabilities incurred with the consent of all the own-
ers, and for which they were all liable. McDonald v. Black's Adm’r,
185.

3. A judgment is a lien, not only on the land of the debtor, but an appur-
tenant water-right, Morgan v. Mason, 401.

4, When two creditors have each a lien on the same property of their
debtor, and the one having a prior lien has also alien on another fund for
the same debt, on which the subsequent lienholder has no claim, such
prior lienholder will be compelled in equity to exhaust such fund, be-

‘108 INDEX.

Limitations.

Lien—Continued.
fore he proceeds to subject the property on which the other creditor has
alien. Fassett & Co. ». Traber, 540.

5. If, after bill filed by the subsequent lien holder to compel such subroga~
tion, the prior lien holder delivers up his claim on the second fund to
the debtor, he will be compelled, as between him and the subsequent
lienholder, to account for such fund as so much paid on his claim. Ib.
540.

6, No lion for the purchase money, upon a sale of real property, will at-
tach, where the vendor takes from the vendee personal security for the
payment of the consideration money. Follett v. Reese, 646.

1. Specific interests in or lions upon the property assigned can only be set
up against the assignee; not the general indebtedness of the assignor,
although such indebtedness may have accrued from the purchase of the
same property. Ib. 546.

8. Whether a vendor's lien exists in favor of the vendor of an equitable
title. Ib. 551.

9. A judgment isa lien upon an equitable title of the judgment debtor in
possession, 566, 601.

LIMITATIONS—

See Disanrurry.

1. When grants, assignments, ete, presumed in aid of title, 247, note.

2. A deed madein 1835, by two surviving executors of a person who died
seized of the premises in 1804, will not prevail against an adverse pos-
session of more than twenty-one years since the death of the last
devisce. Lessee of Ward v. Racer, 250.

8. If tho deed of 1835 has relation back to the “inception of the power,”
so as to defeat the estate in the heirs of the last devisee, it will be
deemed in law to give a right of action to the lessor of plaintiff at the
same early period. Ib. 250.

4. When a power conferred by will is extinguished by lapse of time. Ib.

252. .
5. How far the legal title of trustee is affected by the statute of limita-
tiohs. Tb. 252.

6. Whether a title derived under a power to sell, conferred on executors, in
a will against whom the statute never run, is subject to the statute of
Timitations, in the same manner as tho title of the devisees named in
the will. Tb. 212.

7. Tho statute of limitations does not discharge the debt, but only suspends
the remedy, and that is restored by an acknowledgment of the debt, or
a promise to pay. ‘Tumer 2, Chrisman, 336.

8. The decision in Hill ». Henry, 17 Ohio, 9, was made upon the peculiar
phraseology of the statute. Ib. 339.

9. If one of several minors is within the saving clause of the statute of
limitations, whether his right to review a decree inures to all, 469.

10. Whether a patent for land in the Virginia military district relates back
to the time of the entry and survey, 562.

INDEX. 109

Local Statutes—Manhattan.

LOCAL STATUTES—
1. Penal statutes of a local character, referring to persons, places, or things

unless otherwise expressed, are to be confined to such persons, places,
or things as existed at the time of their passage. Hail o. State. 7.

2, Tho act of February 9, 1846, “to prohibit the sale of intoxicating
Jiquors in the vicinity of certain manufacturing establishments, in the
counties of Scioto, Lawrence, and Jackson,” is to be confined to such
manufacturing establishments as existed at the time of its passage.
Tb. 7.

3, Whether local statutes must be set out in pleadings. Hall v. State, 9;
Brown ». State, 11 Ohio, 280.

4, A special legislative enactment will.not confer jurisdiction upon the Su-
preme Court to prevent the pperation of an injunction allowed by the
common pleas, in a case of which that court has taken jurisdiction.
Griffith ». Commissioners, 609.

5. Obiter dictum by Judge Spalding alone. That the legislature has no
constitutional power to authorize the majority of citizens in a edunty
to vote a subscription of stock to a railroad company, that shall be

ss binding on the property of the minority. Tb. 609.

‘When the loss of property insured, is, in law, partial, and when and how
made total, 214, .
MAIL—
See Lurren.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION—
1. Ifthe defendant, in an action for malicious prosecution, would take shel-

ter under the “advice of counsel,” he must be prepared to showthat he
communicated to such counsel all the facts bearing upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused, of which he had knowledge, or by reasonable
diligence could have ascertained. Ash v. Marlow, 119.

2. “A reasonable ground of euspicion supported by circumstances sufli-
ciently strong in themselves to warrant 0 cautious man in the belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,” is
a good definition of the term “probable cause.” Ib. 119.

8. “Probable cause” is a mixed question of law and fact. The court must
leave the facts with the jury, with instructions as to what is probable
cause, Ib.119,

4, Proof that the examining magistrate “bound the accused over to court,”
is not conclusive evidence of “probable cause.” Ib. 119.

B. To sustain a suit for malicious prosecution, it must have been malicious
without probable cause, and have been ended. Ib. 119, note.

6. A defendant may show the charge trne as probable cause. Ib. 119, note.

7, A. case will lie for maliciously suing out an attachment, though the in-
Aebtedness was just. Ib. 119, note.

MANBATTAN—
‘The village of Manhattan, where the Bank of Manhattan was located, was

never de facto under the jurisdiction of the state of Michigan. Myers
». Manhattan Bank, 283,

110 INDEX.

Manhattan Bank—Mistake.

MANHATTAN BANK—
See Banks.
MARRIAGES—
See Acz or Consent; Bicamy; Hussanp AnD Wire.
MARSHALING ASSETS— .
See Asszts; Equiry.
MASTER AND CREW—
* Sec Insuranon, .
MASTER AND SERVANT—
See Acunoy anp Acunr.
MECHANICS—
See Burmpine Contracts; Common Counts; Exrrnrts.
_ MERGER—
How far a mortgage is merged by a subsequent deed of the mortgaged
premises to the mortgagee, in satisfaction of the mortgage debt, 263.

METES AND BOUNDS—

See Dump. :
MoINTIRE FUND—

See Crarrry anp Cuartranin Usns.
MICHIGAN—

See Consrrrutronan Law; Manaarran; Bounpany.
MILL—

See Easumunt—
MINORS—

See Equiry; Decruz; Guarpran anp Warp; Limitations, 9; A@z or
Consrnt.

MISTAKE—

1, Where a purchaser of land hands his deed to the recorder, and the re-
corder by mistake enters the name of another person as the grantor in
the deed, in place of the true grantor, the deed is not duly recorded.
and will not be notice to a subsequent purchaser without actual notice;
Dut such purchaser will hold the land as against the title of the former
purchaser. Jennings v. Wood, 261.

2, An executor’s bond, describing the testator as James L., can not by parol
evidence or averment in pleading, bo made applicable to ,the estate of
Joseph L. MeGovney v. State, 93.

8, A court of equity will not interfere at the suit of a purchaser, at sheriff's
or tax sale, to relieve against any irregularity in the proceedings pre-
vious to sale. Gwynne v. Niswanger, 566.

4, Where a purchase of land is made by metes and bounds, estimated to
contain 9 specific quantity, or for “ more or less,” and a gross sum to be
paid for the entire tract, the purchaser will not be entitled to an abate-
ment in the price, should the number of acres fall short of the estimated
quantity ; more especially should the land at the time of the purchase
be of equal value to the price paid. Ketchum ». Stout, 453.

5, If the title of a purchaser at tax sale, under the statute of 182%, be de-

INDEX.

Mortgages.

Misraxu—Continued.
fective at law, he can not have the aid of a court of chancery to perfect
his title. Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556.

6. A deed of conveyance of real estate is valid to pass the fee, even though
in the granting part of the deed the grantor is also named as grantee,
where the decd describes the grantor as the party “of the first part,”
and the grantee as the party of the second part, with a “ habendum”
clause to the party of the second part. In such cases, the fee passes to
the party who is “to have and to hold” the premises. Inwin v. Long-
worth, 581. .

7. A conveyance in such case is good, where the grantee is described by
sufficient terms to designate who is intended, though neither his Ohristian
nor surname is used. “That is certain which can be rendered certain.”
Tb. 681. :

8. The surrender of an equity of redemption under a mistake of a material
fact, even without fraud on the part of the person to whom the surren-
der is made, will, as against the person to whom it is made, be relieved.
against in equity. Ib, 681.

MORTGAGES—

1. A mortgage of personal property, undor the statute of 1846, is “abso-
lutely void” as to other creditors of the mortgagor who assert their
rights against the property after its execution, and before it is deposited.
with the recorder or township clerk. Wilson v. Leslie, 161.

2, Such a mortgage is not void in toto by reason of an omission to make the
deposit forthwith,” but becomes effective whenever it is deposited ;
and in case of » temporary withdrawal of the paper from the recorder’s
office, the mortgage will not be prejudiced by a levy made at the in-
stance of another creditor. Ib. 161.

8, A mortgagee ean not claim the benefit of a policy of insurance effected
upon the mortgaged property by the mortgagor. Bach have insurable
interests, but neither can, as a general rule, take advantage of an insur-
ance effected by the other. McDonald v. Black, 186.

4, The rule is the same, although the policy effected by the mortgagor may
contain the words “for whom it may concern,” if at the time the mort-
gage upon personal property has not become absolute at law, by failure
4o pay the money.’ Ib. 185.

5. That where the mortgagee purchases the mortgaged premises and re-
ceives a deed in fee simple, paying off a part of the consideration by the
delivery of the note which the mortgage was given to secure, to the
maker, such mortgage is thereby paid off and extinguished, and has no
effect either in law or equity, although it may appear uncanceled on the
record. Jennings v. Wood, 261.

6, A creditor of the party making a fraudulent conveyance, with notice of
the fraud, may, with the consent of his debtor, take a valid mortgage
in good faith, to secure his claim from the purchaser of the goods thus
conveyed, without being required to rgsort to legal process to reach the
goods. Brown v. Webb, 389. .

112 INDEX.

‘Multifariousness—Negligence.

Morreaars—Continued.

7. A mortgage of personal property, where the mortgagor retains possession
by virtue of the mortgage, with a power of sale, is void as against”
subsequent purchasers and execution creditors; but when possession
is taken by the mortgagee, the mortgage becomes valid, so as to protect
the mortgaged property from execution creditors not having made a
levy, against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor. Ib. 389.

8, Where a debtor, in contemplation of insolvency, executes a chattel mort-
gage to one creditor for the purpose of securing such creditor in prefer-
ence to others, with an understanding that the mortgagee shall satisfy
his claim out of the goods, and then surrender the residue to the mort-
gagor, the mortgage will be deemed an assignment of the property in
trust, and the mortgagee will be deemed a trustee holding the mort-
gaged property.for the benefit of all the creditors, in proportion to
their respective demands. Ib. 389. |

9. If a contract for the conveyance of land be intended as security for a
debi, it is a mortgage, whatever may be its form or the name given it
by the parties Cotterell ». Long, 464. |

10, In a suit in equity to foreclose by an assignee of a mortgage, if the as-
signment has been absolute, transferring the entire interest of the mort-
gagor, it is not indispensably necessary that the mortgagor should be a
party, although this court believes the better practice to be, in all such
cases, to make him a party. McGuffey ». Finley, 474.

11, Decisions as to mortgages generally. Ib. 478, note.

12, Whether a mortgagee, after condition broken, may assign his interest
without a deed, 476, 261,

18. As to what is a mortgage und whas is a deed of trust and of equity of re-}
domption in the same, 597.

MULTIFARIOUSNESS—

“Whether several interested in enjoining the collection of a tax can unite

in a bill of chancery. Griffith v, Commissioners, 612.
“MURDER.

‘The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in murder cases was not taken away

by the act of March 12, 1845. Jones v. Ohio, 34.
NATIONAL ROAD—

An officer of state can not maintain a suit in his own name, for money due
the state for tolls, penalties, etc., on the National road, although he may
have taken a note for the amount, payable to himself in his individual
capacity. Hunter v. Field, 340!

NEGLIGENCE—

1. How far o party guilty of negligence can recover for injury produced
by acollision. Little Miami Railroad Oo. v. Stevens, 424, 451.

2, Where an employer placed one person in his employ under the direction
of another, also in his employ, such employer is liable for injury to the
person of him placed in the subordinate situation by the negligence of
his superior. Ib. 415,

3. When a railroad company places the engineer under their employ, under

INDEX.

New Trial—Notice.

NuerigEnon—Oontinued.

«the control of the conductor, who directs when the cars are to start,

" stop, ete., the company are liable to the engineer for an injury received.
occasioned by the negligence of the conductor whilst they are both en-
gaged in their respective employments. Ib. 415.

NEW TRIAL—

See Error; Cnarar; Practicr.

1, A judgment of the Supreme Court on the cirouit, reversing the judg-
ment of an inferior iribunal for refusing a new trial, where it was
claimed that the finding was against the ovidence, will not, as a general
rule, be considered the subject of reversal here. Spafford v. Bradley, 74.

2. Nor will the action of an inferior tribunal, in granting a new trial in a
like case, be held exceptionable by the Supreme Court. Ib. 74.

A new trial will be ordered by the Supreme Court if the common pleas
improperly overrules a motion for a new trial, made on the ground that
the verdict of the jury, or the finding of the court, in a case submitted
to the court without a jury, was against the weight of evidence. Ib. ,
74. See also 142,

4. The overruling » motion for a new trial because the finding of the court
or jury was against the weight of evidence, can not be reversed on
error, unless the bill of exceptions discloses all the evidence. Myers &
‘Waterson v. Hunter Erwin & Co, 381, note.

5. As to granting new trials generally. | Ib. 381, note.

6. If the defendant is not present when the verdict of the jury is returned
in a criminal case, he is entitled to a new trial. Rose v. Ohio, 31.

NOTICE—

1. The proper service and transmission of a notice to take depositions may

"be proved when the notice is on file, though not attached to the deposi-
tions. Ash 2. Marlow, 127.

2, A notice to take depositions between different plaintiffs and the same
defendants in different causes on the same day, and at the same place,
can not be objected to on the ground that it embraces more than one
suit, unless it is shown that the rights of the parties are projudiced
thereby. Ib. 127.

A motion to produce a paper claimed to be in the possession of the party
to whom the notice is given, is not, as a genera! rule, a reasonable
notice, unless given before the trial of the cause in which said paper is
wanted is commenced. Choteau v. Raitt, 182.

. If such paper is with a party in court, such notice might be reasonable.
Th. 146,

. The practice act, section 113 (xcvix), does not impair the right to give
parol evidence of writings in possession of an adverse party after
reasonable notice to produce. Ib. 187. Swan’s Stat. 676.

6. A chattel mortgage, though not deposited immediately upon its execu
tion as required by law, is notice to creditors and purchasers, when de-
posited, of the rights conferred by it, unless the delay has been so great
as to taint the transaction with fraud. Wilson ». Leslie, 161,

114 . INDEX.

Officers.

Norrox—Continued.

1%. No special notice to tax-payers is necessary to sustain the proceedings of
the board of equalization, Hambleton 0. Dempsey, 168.

8. The effect of recitals in title-papers under which a purchaser claims, 231,
note.

9. Whore a purchaser of Jand hands his deed to the recorder, and the
recorder by mistake, enters the name of another person as the grantor
in the deed, in place of the true grantor, the deed is not duly recorded,
and will not be notice to a subsequent purchaser without actual notice;
but such purchaser will hold the land as against the title of the former
purchaser. Jennings ». Wood, 261.

10, That ». party can only be chargeable with constructive notice from the

"record when the record would give him actual notice. Ib. 261,

11. When a defective record is notice binding third persons, Ib. 279.

12, When one party to a judgment moves to set it aside at a subsequent term
to that in which it was entered, it is necessary to give the court juris-
diction, that the opposite party should have notice. Reynolds v.
Burch, 344.

18, In favor of the judgment or proceedings of a court of general jurisdic-
tion, it will be presumed that the court had jurisdiction of the person.
of the defendant, although that fact may not affirmatively appear on
the record. Ib, 344.

14. Whether one who has purchased from a trustee takes subject to the trust.
Glass v. Greathouse, 508. See also Irwin ». Longworth, 581.

16, Whether heirs are chargeable with the ancestor's knowledge of the trusts
upon which his lands are conveyed, expressed in a writing outside of
the deed, of which they have no actual notice. Ib. 596,

16. Whether possession is notice of the rights of the party in possession.
Tb. 597.

OF FIOERS— :

1, Of arrests by officer without warrant. Jones 0, Ohio, 37.

2, Whether an officer must produce warrant when arrrest made. Ib. 43.

3, If 2 board of equalization add to the valuation returned by the assessor,
the law will presume it to be done upon sufficient evidence, unless the
contrary be made to appear by the party aggrieved. Hambleton v.
Dempsey & Co. 168.

4. An officer is liable in damages to any person injured by his improper
conduct. . Jennings v, Wood, 273.

5. The issuing of letter of guardianship by the clerk of court, before the
guardian has given bond, does not constitute a breach of his official
Dona so as to charge his sureties. Ohio 0. Sloane, 327.

6, An officer of the state can not maintain a suit in his own name for an
amount of money due to the state for tolls, penalties, ete, on the
‘National Road, although he may have taken », note for the amount, pay-
able to himself in his individual capacity. Hunter v. Fil, 340.

1. No authority is given to such officer to take such note, and it creates no
logal liability in his favor, being without consideration, Ib. 340.

INDEX.

Ohio Company's Purchase—Part Owner.

‘Oxrrours—Continued.

8. It is contrary to public policy to permit officers of the state to transact
the business of the state and to contract in their own name. All con-
tracts for money’ due the state should be made in the name of the state,
and all suits brought in the name of the state. Ib. 340.

9. Whether a void tax, paid under protest, can be recovered from a tax col-
lector. Hambleton v. Dempsey, 168.

10. Where a return has been made on an execution issued by a justice of the
peace, of “no goods in the township” where the justice resides, with a
suggestion that “there are goods of the judgment debtor” in another
township of the same county, an execution issued to any constable of
either of the two’townships, although not strictly in accordance with
the statute, is not therefore void. Lyon », Fish, 100.

OHIO COMPANY'S PURCHASE—

See Hyzormrnt.

OHIO—
See Bounpary; Orricer.
ORDINANOE OF 1787—

‘The right of the people to form a state government, under the ordinance of
1787, and to supersede a territorial government established by Con-
gress. Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 297.

ONUS PROBANDI— :

1. In a prosecution for bigamy, where the defense is that the prior marriage
was void, because contracted by defendant under age of consent, the
onus is on the state to prove that the party confirmed such prior mar-
riage by cohabitation after age of consent. The defendant is not bound
to prove that he dissented from the contract of marriage after arriving
at the age of consent. Shafher ». State, 6.

2. On an indictment for selling spirituous liquors, as to defense that the
Jiquors were imported and sold in original casks, ete. Hall ». State, 11.

3. The onus as to circumstances of justification, on an indictment, except
where the defense is under a license. Ib. 11.

4, In a prosecution for forgery of a lost note, the state must excuse the non-
production of the note, before secondary evidence can be given. Hart *
». State, 53,

5. Lf a justice of the peace be sued for maliciously issuing execution, evi-
dence must be given of his acting without authority—it will not be
presumed, Ash . Marlow, 119.

6. Whether a corporation must show, on the general issue, a compliance
with the charter, in order torecover. Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 292.

1. Courts of equity lean against construing a contract for the security of a
Gebt to be» conditional sale. The onus probandi is on the party assert
ing sych contract to be a conditional sale, to give it that character,
Cotterell v. Long, 473.

PART OWNER—
See Boar.

116 INDEX.

Partner—Parol Evidence.

PARTNER—

1. In the prosecution of a partnership claim, as @ general rule, all the part-
ners are necessary parties; and if one of the partners has been omitted
he is not » competent witness for the plaintiffs, although the counsel for
defendant may have stipulated, before the trial, that the omission to
make the proper party shall not defeat the action. Choteau v. Raitt,
132.

2. After the death of an ostensible partner, a surviving dormant partner
may sue alone upon a partnership contract, Ib. 132, note.

8, The name of a dormant partner, though interested and an ostensible
partner, if it can be clearly proved that he had no interest, may be
omitted. Ib. 132, note,

4. One who shares in the profits and losses ‘of an enterprise, is as to the
public a partner, but as to other members of the firm, where such is
the contract, may only be an agent. Ib. 144.

5. One who, for his services, is to share in the profits, but not losses, of an
enterprise, and who acts only under employment, is an agent, Ib. 144.

6, One partner can not, after suit brought, release his interest in the part
nership concerns, so as to-be a competent witness for the other partners,
in a suit brought by them. Ib. 148.

1. How fara partnership may be proved by general reputation. Ib. 140,
143.

PAROL EVIDENCE— :
1, An executor’s bond, describing the testator as James L., can not by parol

evidence be made applicable to the estate of Joseph L. McGovney v.
Leo, 93.

2. Where a subcontract in writing, for carrying the United States mail,
provides for payments to be made quarterly, in the months of May,
‘August, November, and February, it is competent to show by parol
evidence, from the cireumstances and situation of the contracting
parties, that the contract bad relation to the quarterly divisions of the
year fixed in the post-office department, and when such quarters com-
mence and terminate. Hildebrand ». Fogle, 147.

3, Bxtrinsic parol evidence is always admissible, to give effect to a written
instrament, by applying it to its proper subject matter, by proving the ,
civeumstances under which it was made, thereby enabling the court to
put themselves in the place of the parties, with all the information pos-
sessed by them, the better to understand the terms employed in the con-
tract, and to arrive at the intention of the parties. Ib. 147.

4, How far the cause of action in a former recovery may be proved by parol
to be identical with the cause of action being tried in a subsequent suit,
Reynolds v. Stansbury, 344.

5. How far parol evidence may be received to oxplain an instrument releas-
ing an equity of redemption or discharging a trust. Irwin o. Long- .
worth, 581.

6. Wills are to be construed from the written language of the instrument,
not by evidence aliunde. Collins ». Hope, 492.

INDEX.

Patent—Parties to Actions.

Panoz Eyrpence—Continued.

1. Parol evidence may be received for the purpose of counteracting fraud in
the devisee, and in some peculiar cases, to attach a trust to the estate de-
vised. But in such cases, courts will act with the extremest caution.
Tb. 492, .

8. When parol evidence may be received in equity in aid of the interpreta-
tion of wills, 48%, note.

9. When parol evidence may be received to set up trusts, 497, note.

PATENT— .

1. Where a party has made an entry and survey of lands under a warrant,
such lands become subject to taxation; and if sold for taxes, the pur-
chaser at such tax sale will take a legal title, as against the former
owner, although the patent has never issued from the United States.
Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556.

2, Whether a patent for land in the Virginia military district relates back
to the time of the entry and survey. Ib. 562.

PARTIES TO ACTIONS—

1. In the prosecution of a partnership claim, as a general rule, all the
partners are necessary parties; and if one of the partners has been
omitted, ho is not a competent witness for the plaintiff, although the
counsel for the defendant may have stipulated, before the trial, that the
omission to make the proper party shall not defeat the action. Choteau
», Raitt, 132.

2. A notice given to produce a paper claimed to be in the possession of the
party to whom the notice is given, is not, as a general rule, a reasona-
ble notice, unless given before the trial of the cause, in which the paper
is wanted, is commenced. Ib. 182.

3, After the death of an ostensible partner, ® surviving dormant partner
may sue alone upon a partnership contract. Tho names of dormant
partners, though interested, and of an ostensible partner, if it can be
clearly proved, that he had no interest, may be omitted. Ib. 182, note.

4, Where one of two executors or administrators has in his hands the bal-
ance remaining for distribution, an action may be maintained against
him, without joining his co-executor or administrator. Negley v. Gard,
310.

5. All contracts for money due the state should be made in the name of the
state, and all suits brought in the name of the state. Hunter v. Field,
340. See 7 Ohio, 101.

6, The surety in a contract for work and labor which is rescinded, is not a
necessary party plaintiff in an action for work and labor performed,
under the contract, when the suit is not upon the contract, Kugler v.
‘Wisoman, 361.

1. In a suit in equity to forclose by an assignee of a mortgage, if the as-
signment has been absolute, transferring the entire interest of the mort~
gagee, it is not indispensably necessary that the mortgagee should be »
party. McGuffey v. Finley, 474.

1

118 INDEX.

Payment—Practice.

Parvrzs vo Aérrons—Continued.
8, Whether, upon a dill to foreclose a mortgage, the personal representa-
tive of deceased mortgagor is a necessary party. Cotterell v. Long,
468, And see Equrry.
PAYMENT—
‘See Accorn, 8
PERILS—
Seo Insuranoy, 6, 7.
PERSONALTY—
See Lzasz, 1.
PENAL STATUTES—
Seo Onruns, 5, 6.
PILOT—
See Expurr, 1. 2.
PLEADING—
I. Criminal pleading. See Inprormunt.
II. Equity pleading. Seo Equrry.
TIL. Pleading at law.
1. Parties. See Parrrzs ro Actions.

a. Declaration. See Drcuaration; Common Counts.

a. Demurrer.

‘A defect in the conclusion of a plea can not be reached by a general
demurrer. Lyon ». Fish, 100.

v. Plea.

1, Accord and satisfaction may be given in evidence under the general issue
in assumpsit. Harper v. Graham, 108.

2, The plea of accord, ete, with George E., agent, is not sustained by proof
of an accord with John E. Ib. 105, note. +

* 8. Phe record of a judgment of a former recovery may be given in evi-
dence under the general issue in assumpsit, without motion. Reynolds
». Burch, 344.

4, When 4 plea in abatement is met by a replication, and issue in fact is
thereupon joined and found for the plaintiff, final judgment must be
awarded in his favor. Waterson v. Erwin & Co. 381.

5. The several kinds of judgments on pleas in abatement—isswes on, how
tried, and practice on, generally. Tb. 387, note.

6. How the question of the proper organization of a corporation can be
made. Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 287, 291. .

PRACTICE—
I. Criminal practice. See Crrmms; InpIcrMENT, AND THE SEVERAL
TrtLEs.
IL. Ohancery practice. See Equrrx.

TIT. Practice, civil at law.

Seo Brun or Excuprions; Exourrions; Vexpror; Jupamenr; Enron;
New Trrat; Cours, nro.

1, Tho-mere failure of an inferior court to instruct a jury upon a partion
lar point of law, arising in a case, is not erroneous. Jones v. Ohio, 34

Be

INDEX.

Practice.

Practice—Continued. .

2. ‘To make such failure a ground of error, the court should have been
requested to instruct. Ib. 34.

3, If the court mistake the law in a charge, or refuse on request to charge
on a point material to the issue, it is orror. Ib. 26. See also Kugler
». Wiseman, 361.

4, The time when any ruling or charge of the court must be excepted to,
Ash v. Marlow, 132. See also Choteau o. Raitt, 196; Myers e, Hunter
& Oo. 381.

5. The court of common pleas will, on motion, set aside verdict and grant
a new trial, because the verdict is against the weight of evidence, or
‘ecause the finding of the court in a cause submitted, is against evi-
dence, and a refusal in a proper case isa ground of error. Spafford v.
Bradley, 74, note. See also Choteau v. Raitt, 142.

6. A judgment of the Supreme Court on the circuit, reversing the judg-
ment of an inferior tribunal for refusing a new trial, where it was
claimed that the finding was against the evidence, will not, as a gen-
eral rule, be considered the subject of reversal in bank. Safford v.
Bradley, 74.

7. Nor will the action of an inferior tribunal, in granting a new trial in a
like case, be held exceptionable by the Supreme Court. Ib. 74.

8, A court has power to correct a bill of exceptions at any time during the
trial term, Ash v. Marlow, 119.

9, A notice given to produce a paper, claimed to be in the possession of the
party to whom the notice is given, is not, as a general rule, a reason-
able notice, unless given before the trial of the cause in which said
paper is wanted is commenced, or unless the paper is present in court.
Choteau ». Raitt, 132.

10. ‘When the common pleas finds that a witness offered is not so interested.
as to be disqualified, the Supreme Court may, on error, review that
finding. Ib. 142.

11, The practice act, section 113 (xovit), doos not impair the right to give
parol evidence of writing in possession of an adverse party, after
reasonable notice to produce. Ib. 137. Swan’s Stat. 676.

12, To authorize a judgment upon a special verdict, all the facts essential to
the right of the party in whose favor judgment is to be rendered, must
‘pe found by the jury, finding evidence sufficient prima facie to'establish
such facts, is not sufficient. Blake v. Davis, 281; Hambleton 0. Demp-
sey, 168.

13, It is competent for a court to set aside a judgment of a previous term
for irregularity, on motion; and although the court, in the exercise of
such power, may act erroneously, such error will not render the pro-
ceedings void so that the record can be impeached collaterally. Rey-
nolds ». Burch, 344,

14, When one party to judgment moves to set it aside at a subsequent term to
that in which it was entered, it is necessary to give the court jurisdic.
tion, that the opposite party should have notice. Ib. 344.

42

120 INDEX.

Public Policy—Powers.

Pracrice—Continued.

15. The practice as to entering, setting aside, and amending judgments and
orders, and entering them nune pro tune. Ib. 344, note.

16. When a plea in abatement is met by a replication, and issue in fact is
thereupon joined and found for the plaintiff, final judgment must be
awarded in his favor. Myers v. Hunter, 381,

17. The legal consequences will be the same whether such issue be tried by
the court or the jury. Ib. 381.

18, Issues, when tried by the court or jury. Tb. 387, note.

PUBLIC POLICY—

1. It is contrary to public policy to permit officers of the state to transact
the business of the state, and to contract in their own name. Hunter
». Field, 340.

2, The owner of a trunk is competent as a witness against a common
carrier, in an action for its loss, upon the ground of public policy
Railroad Co. v. Fulton, 318.

8. Ib isa maxim of the law, “salus populi suprema lew.” Tb. 450.

4. How far public policy controls in construing the constitution and laws.
Grifith v. Commissioners, 609.

POLIOY—

Seo Insurancu.

POLLING JURY— .

1, In criminal cases the verdict should be received in presence of the pris-
oner, that he may have the jury polled. Rose v. State of Ohio, 31, note.

2, In civil cases it is in the discretion of the court whether the jury shall
de polled. Tb. 33.

3, In acriminal case the right to poll the jury may be waived by the ac-
cused, but whether it can be waived by counsel is doubtful. Ib. 34.

POST-OFFICE—

- See Lerrzr.

POSSESSION—

See Limrrasions; Esecrmznr.

1. When grants presumed to party in possession of land, 234,

2. An equitable title, accompanied by possession by a judgment debtor, is
subject to execution, 566.

3. ‘Whether possession is notice of the rights of the party in possession, 607.

POST-NUPTIAL OONTRACT—

See Hussanp AnD WI8z.

POWERS—

1. The death of a party revokes a power of attorney given by him, not
coupled with an interest. McDonald ». Black, 185,

2, A dood mado in 1836, by two surviving executors of a person who died
seized of the premises in 1804, will not prevail against an adverse pos-
session of more than twenty-one years since the death of the last
devisee. Ward 0. Racer, 250. :

8. If the deed of 1836 has relation back to the “inception of the power,”
so as to defeat the estate in the heirs of the last devisee, it will be

INDEX. 121

Presumptive Evidence and Presumptions of Law—Principal and Agent,

Powsrs—Oontinued.
deemed in law to give a right of action to the lessor of plaintiff at the
same early period. Ib. 250.

4, When powers are extinguished by lapse of time. Tb. 252.

5. Whether the execution of a power to sell contained in a will, divests the
estate of the devisees in the will and relates back to the inception of
the power. Ib. 252.

6. Whether sarviving executors can execute a power, and the effect of the
statute of wills as to survivorship. Ib. 257.

PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENOE AND PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW— |

1, In @ prosecution for bigamy, a valid prior marriage must be proved; it
will not be presumed valid, as in civil cases. Shafher v. Ohio, 3.

2. If a justice of the peace be sued for maliciously issuing execution, evi-
dence must be given of his acting without authority; it will not be
presumed. Ash v. Marlow, 119.

3. If a board of equalization add to the valuation returned by the assessor,
the law will presume it to be done upon sufficient evidence, unless the
contrary be made to appear by the party aggrieved. Hambleton
Dempsey & Co. 168.

4, Under the articles of association entered into between the proprietors of
the Ohio Company and the partition thereunder made, deeds of convey-
ance from the directors to the agents, and from the agents to the several
proprietors, as therein provided for, may be presumed to protect the
equitable rights and possession of those claiming under said proprietors.
Blake v. Davis et al. 231.

6, Such presumption can not be made in aid of a party who is not the
rightful equitable owner of the land, and in the actual possession, or
what is equivalent thereto. Ib. 231.

6. Whether a conveyance is to be presumed from circumstances alleged to
be sufficient to justify it, is question of fact for the jury, under advice
from the court. Ib. 231,

7. As to when grants, assignments, ete. will be presumed in aid of the title
of an occupant. Tb. 231, note,

.8, When a guardian’s sale has been approved, and the journal entry of
his appointment shows that he gave bond, it will be presumed that
the bond was given. Ohio». Sloane, 372, note,

9, In favor of the judgment or proceedings of a court of goneral jurisdie~
tion, it will be presumed that the court had jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant, although that fact may not affirmatively appear on
the record. Reynolds v. Stansbury, 344,

10. Whether the purchase by a trustee of trust property is presumed fraud-
ulent. Glass v, Greathouse 508.
PREMIUM—
See INsURANOE, 21.
PRIOE—
See Anaruwenn, 3; Burprna Conrracr, 3, 4.
PRINOIPAL AND AGENT—
See Acenr,

INDEX.

Principal and Surety—Questions of Law and Fact.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—
* See SuREry.
PRIVATE PROPERTY—

See ConsrrrurionaL Law.
PROCEEDINGS IN REM—

1. How far proceedings under the Ohio water-oraft laws regarded in courts
of other states and of the United States. Canal-boat Montgomery ».
Kent, 54.

2, Such proceedings can not be had against water-craft, under the water-
craft laws, on an executory contract to carry goods. Ib. 54.

"8, Such proceedings can not be sustained under the water-craft laws for
money loaned to pay tolls. McGuire v. Canal-boat Kentucky, 62.

4, A. tax sale operates on the property, not the title. Gwynne v. Niswan-

ger, 564,
PROCESS—

1. How far proceedings in rem under the water-craft laws sustained in the
courts of the United States. Canal-boat Montgomery v. Kent, 54,
note.

2. No special notice to tax-payers is necossary to sustain the proceedings of
the board of equalization, Hambleton v. Dempsey, 168.

"8, In favor of the judgment or proceedings of a court of general jurisdic
tion, it will bo presumed that the court had jurisdiction of the person.
of the defendant, although that fact may not affirmatively appear on
the record. Reynolds v. Burch, 344.

4, As to conclusiveness of judicial proceedings, impeaching collaterally,
ete. Ib. 344, note. .

5. A creditor of the party making a fraudulent,conveyance, with notice of
the fraud, may, with the consent of his debtor, take a valid mortgage
in good faith, to secure his claim from the purchaser of the goods thus
conveyed, without being required to resort to legal process to reach tha
goods. Brown v. Webb, 389.

PROMISSORY NOTE—

See Huspanp anp WirE,
PROBABLE CAUSE—

See Maxicrous Prosrovtron.
PUBLIC USE—

See Consarrutionan Law.
PURCHASER—

See Cuarru, Morraacn; Morreacr; Depron anp Orzprror; Norion;
Exxovtion.

QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT—

1. Whether a witness is interested is a question for the court, 135, 145,

2, Whether the court or jury determine the fact that the foundation is laid
for the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of a lost note,
in a prosecution for forgery. Hart ». State, 52.

3, Whether the court or jury determine, upon the facts and under the law,
who are common carriers. Samms v. McKibben, 71-73,

INDEX.

Railroad Companies—Records.

Quustions oy Law anv Pact—Continued.
4, In an action for malicious prosecution, probable cause is a mixed ques~
tion of law and fact; the court must leave the facts with the jury, with

. instructions as to what is probable cause. Ash v. Marlow, 119.

5. Whether a conveyance is to be presumed from circumstances alleged to
be sufficient to justify it, is a question of fact for the jury under the
advice of the court. Blake v. Davis, 231.

6. The existence of a verbal contract and its stipulations, is a question of
fact for the jury. Kugler », Wiseman, 361.

+. Judicial records of other states of the Union are domestic, the validity
of which will be determined by the court. An issue upon judicial rec-
ords of foreign nations, is not necessarily tried by the court. Myers v.
Hunter & Co. 387, note.

RAILROAD COMPANIES—

1. The owner of articles commonly carried in a traveling trunk, isa compe-
tont witness against a railroad company, to prove the contents of the
tronk and their value, in an action against the company. M.R. & L.
E. BR. RB. Oo. v, Fulton, 318,

2. The wife is a competent witness as to a lost frank, when the facts are
alone known to her. Ib, 818,

8, Where an employer placed one person in his employ under the direction
of another, also in his employ, such employer is liable for injury to the
person of him placed in the subordinate situation by the negligence of
his superior. Miami R. R. Co. v. Stevens, 415. .

4. When a railroad company places the engineer under their employ under
the control of the conductor, who directs when the cars are to start,
stop, ete., the company are liable to the engineer for an injury received
occasioned by the negligence of the conductor whilst they are both en~
gaged in their respective employments. Ib. 415.

5. Whether a party in fault can maintain an action for an injury, sustained
by acollision. Ib. 424, 451.

6. Obiter dictum by Judge Spalding alone. That the legislature has no
constitutional power to authorize the majority of citizens in a county
to vote a subscription of stock to a railroad company, that shall be
binding on the property of the minority. Griffith ». Commissioners, 609.

* Contra, per Hitchcock, 0. J. See APpENDrx A.
RATIFICATION—

See Acz or Consent; AcqurescEnce; Vorp anp Vorpasiz.

An irregular judicial salo may be ratified by a party interested, with full
knowledge, receiving the proceeds of it, Ohio v. Sloane, 327.

REALTY—
See Least; Easrmenr; Drxp
RECITALS—
See Norroz; Dzxp.
RECORDS—
See Jupicran Procszprves.
1, Judicial records of other states of the Union are domestic, the validity

124 INDEX.

Recorder—Reversal.

Rucorps—Continued.
of which will be determined by the court: An issue upon judicial rec-
ords of foreign nations is not necessarily tried by the court. Myers x.
‘Hunter & Co. 387, tiote.

2, Whethér an original decd, with its execution proved, and the recorder’s
indorsement of the record of it, is evidence of the record. Jennings
». Wood, 272.

3. When a defective record is notice binding third persons. Ib. 279.

4, Where a purchaser of land hands his deed to the recorder, and the re-
corder by mistake enters the name of another person as the grantor in
the deed, in place of the trae grantor, the deed is not duly recorded,
and will not be notice to a subsequent purchaser without actual notice;
‘but such purchaser will hold the land as against the title of the former
purchaser. Lessee of Jennings v. Wood, 261. |

5. That a party can only be chargeable with constructive notice from the
record, when the record would give him actual notice. Ib. 261-

6. That whero a mortgagee purehases the mortgaged premises and receives
a deed in fee simple paying off a part of the consideration by the de-
livery of the note which the mortgage was given to secure, to the
maker, such mortgage is thereby paid off and extinguished, and has no
effect either in law or equity, although it may appear uncanceled on
therecord. Ib, 261.

RECORDER—

See Drzps.

1, The act regulating tho recording of deeds and mortgages construed.
Jennings v. Reed, 261.

2. The recorder of deeds is liable for any injury resulting from improperly
recording a deed. Ib. 273.

RELATION—
See Powzrs; Parent.
RELEASE—

1. One partner can not, after suit brought, release his interest in partner=
ship contracts, so as to be a competent witness in a suit by them.
Choteau v, Raitt, 145.

2, Whether a conveyance of the mortgaged premises to a mortgagee from
a mortgagor, in payment of the mortgage debt, is a release of an equity
of redemption, or the grant of a fee. Jennings v. Wood, 261.

3, A release of an equity of redemption, made in ignorance of a material
fact, even without fraud in the person to whom the release is made,
will bo rolieved against in equity, as between tho parties, Trwin v
Longworth, 581.

4, A release of a debt under seal is a good discharge of a debt. See Ac+
corp. Harper v. Graham, 114,

REVERSAL—

See Error.

The reversal of a judgment does not affect the title of a purchaser. Rey-
nolds v. Stansbury, 344, note.

INDEX.

Reputation—Secondary Evidence,

REPUTATION—

See Impzacnine Witnuss; OHARACTER.

A partnership may be proved by general reputation. Choteau v. Raitt,
140, 143,

BEVIEW—

See Equiry.

RISK—

Seo Insurances,

Until delivery, personal property contracted to be sold is at the risk of the
seller. Black ». Webb, 304.

SALES—

See Vuwpor anp PorcHaser.

1. Where B. gave to W.a memorandum in writing, substantially setting
forth that B, had received $175 as an advance to buy barley for W.,
and B, agreed to deliver at a certain place, within a certain time, and
for a certain price, 1,000 bushels of merchantable barley, it is a contract
of sale, and not an agreement constituting an agency. Black ». Webb,
304,

2. When, before the time stipulated for the delivery, and before actual de-
livery, a portion of the barley stored in the warehouse mentioned in
the agreement, was destroyed by a flood, the lose falls upon B., the
property being at his risk until delivery. Ib. 304.

8, If an administrator purchase land at his own public sale, he will be held
to have purchased in trust for the heirs, and upon being refunded the
amount by him paid, will be decreed to convey to the heirs. If he has
sold the land to a third person, not a party to the bill seeking relief, he
(the vendor) will be held to account to the heirs for its value at the
time of his original purchase or otherwise, as the case may be, with
interest, first deducting the amount by him paid. Gass v. Greathouse,
503,

4, Such is the rule, whether the administrator purchase directly or through
another person for his benefit. Ib, 503.

5. Where a purchase of land is made by metes and bounds, estimated to
contain a specific quantity, or for “ more or less,” and a gross sum to be
paid for the entire tract, the purchaser will not be entitled to an abate-
ment in the price, should the number of acres fall short of the estimated
quantity ; more especially should the land at the time of the purchase
bo of equal value to the price paid. Ketcham v. Stout, 453.

SEAL—
Arelease of a debt under seal is a good discharge of a debt. Harper w
Graham, 114.
SEA WORTHINESS—
See Insurance.
SECONDARY EVIDENOE—

1, The copy of a forged note can not be received in evidence unless the ab-
sonce of the original is excused. Hart v. Obio, 52.

2, Whether, by proving that a letter has been deposited in due time in a

126 : INDEX.

Servant—Statutes Construed and Examined.

Szconpany Evmenca—Continued.
post-office, directed to a party, a copy can be received in evidence, to
charge the person to whom directed. Choteau v. Raitt, 148.

3. A note given to produce a paper claimed to be in the possession of the
party to whom the notice is given, is not, as a general rule, a rensonable
notice, unless given before the trial of the cause. Ib. 182, 146.

4, If such paper is with a party in court, such notice might be reasonable.
Ib. 146.

5. Whether the foundation is laid for the introduction of secondary evi-
dence. Hart v. Ohio, 62.

SERVANT—

See Agu.

SET-OFF— ‘

A party receiving property, part of the assets of an estate, can not, when
sued for it, set off a debt due from the estate to him. McDonald».
Black’s Adm’r, 186.

SETTLEMENT Sec Esrarns.

SPEOLAL VERDIOT— Seo Vurpror.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—

1. When the terms of a contract of insurance have been agreed on, and
the applicant for insurance has done all that is required on his part,
equity will decree a specifle performance of the contract. Palm,
Aam’r, v. Medina Ins. Co. 529.

1, When a promise, upon the faith of which another party has acted, will
de decreed to be specifically performed. Tb. 496.

SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS—

1, The act of February 9, 1846, “to prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquors in the vicinity of certain manufacturing establishments, in the
counties of Scioto, Lawrence, and Jackson,” is to be confined to such
manufacturing establishments as existed at the time of its passage.
Hall v. Ohio, 7

2, The constitutional power to pass laws regulating the sale of spirituous
liquors. Ib. 9.

SHERIFE—

Seo Exuovriow.

Equity will not correct errors in proceedings previous to a sheriff's salo;
Dut if an equitable title to land in the ocoupancy of the judgment
debtor is sold, the legal title may be decreed to the purchaser, Por
Hitchcock, C.J. Gwynne v. Niswanger, 566.

STATE

See Bounpany.

All contracts for money due the state should be in the name of the state,
and all suits brought in the name of the state. Hunter v. Field, 340.

STATUTES CONSTRUED AND EXAMINED—

See Oonsrruorion ; Locan Srarurns.

1. The act of March 7, 1835, to provide for punishment of crimes. Bigamy:
Shafher » Ohio, 1.

,

INDEX.

Statutes Construed and Examined.

Srarvurzs ConstRvED AnD ExamiveD—Continued.

2, The act of January 6, 1824, regulating marriages. Ib. 1.

3. The act of February 9, 1846, to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors
in the vicinity of certain manufacturing establishments in the counties
of Seioto, Lawrence, and Jackson. Hall v. Ohio, 7.

_ 4, The act of March 12, 1845, “to regulate the judicial courts, and the prac-
tice thereof.” Jones v. Ohio, 84; Spafford ». Bradley, 74, and note;
Choteau ». Raitt, 142,

B. The water-craft laws of Obio. Canal-boat M. v. Kent, 54, and note;
McGuire v. Canal-boat K. 62,

1. The act of March 23, 1840, to provide for the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons. MceGovney v. Ohio, 93. See also section 26 of the
same act. Blizzard », Filler, 479.

. The act of March 14, 1881, defining the powers and duties of justices and
constables. Lyon ». Fish, 100. .

8, The act “to improve the law of evidence.” Choteau ». Raitt, 137.

9, Section 113 (xcvir), practice act. Swan’s Stat. 676. Notice to produce
papers on trial. Tb. 137.

The statute of February 24, 1846, in relation to chattel mortgages. Wil-
son v. Leslie, 161, And see Brown & Co. v. Webb, 889; Fassett o. Tra-
ber, 540,

. Tax laws construed—board of equalization, Hambleton v. Dempsey,
168, and note.

. The charter of the Knox County Mutua! Insurance Company. Phillips,
Beckel & Co. v. Ins. Co. 174.
The act of 1881 relating to wills. 3 Ohase’s Stat. 1788. "Ward v. Racer, 258-
. The act of January 27, 1816, to prohibit the issuing and circulating un-
authorized bank paper. Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 281.

‘The acts of Congress and of Michigan in relation to the territorial and
state government of Michigan, and the charter of the Manhattan Bank,
Th. 288.

16, The act of February 7, 1881, to organize the judicial courts. Swan’s Stat.
223. Olerk—breach of official bond. Ohio v. Sloane, 330.

17. The act of March 8, 1831, to regulate the practice of the judicial courts,
Section 65, (xxix) Stat. 661. Myers v. Hunter & Co. 883,

18. Statute of amendments. 43 Ohio L., 114. Ib. 383.

19. Statute of frauds and the statute regulating assignments in. trust, section
3. Swan’s Stat, 717, Brown & Co. v. Webb, 389. And see Fassett o.
Traber, 540.

20, Parol evidence to set up trusts. Collins v. Hope, 497; Irwin v. Long-
worth, 581. .

21. The statute regulating the liens of judgments. Morgan ». Mason, 401.

22. The act of January 29, 1827, regulating tax sales. Gwynne v. Niswan-
ger, 586,

23, Acts authorizing county subseriptions to railroad companies. Griffith 0.
Commissioners, 609; Carey v. Commissioners, 621, APPENDIX A.

24, Local statutes regulating motions to dissolve injunctions in Wyandot

123 INDEX.

Statute of Frauds—Surety.

Srarvrzs Consrnvep anp Exammrnp—Continued,
and Crawford counties, and the general chancery practice actas affected
thereby. Ib. 609, 621. Arrrnprx A.

25. Statute of limitations. See Lrurrarions.
26, The statute in relation to recording deeds, ete. Jennings » Wood, 261.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS—

1. A conveyance of goods made for the purpose of defrauding creditors, the
vendor and purchaser both participating in the fraud, is void, under the
statute of frauds, as to the creditors of the party making such convey~
ance, but is valid as between the partioe to such conveyance. Browne.
Webb, 389.

2. A mortgage of personal property where the mortgagor retains possession
by virtue of the mortgage, with a power of sale, is void as against sub-
sequent purchasers and execution creditors; but when possession is
taken by the mortgagee the mortgage becomes valid so as to protect the
mortgaged property from execution creditors not having made a levy,
and against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor. Ib. 389.

8. Whether express trusts must be evidenced by writing. Collins ». Hope,
497; Irwin ». Longworth, 881, 595.

4, Whether, if a conveyance is made to a trustee for the purpose of defraud-
ing creditors, a party privy to and interested in the conveyance in
trust, can compel the execution of the trust. Irwin v. Longworth, 594.

8, Whether a party who receives a deed absolute on its face, but in fact as
trustee to secure a creditor, no declaration of trust being executed at
the time, as required by the statute, takes the property in trust, or holds
it, being liable for the consideration named in the deed. Ib. 595."

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—

See Lacrrarrons.

SU BSORIPTIONS—

See Rartroap Compantzs,

SUBROGATION—

See Assurs.

SUNDAY OONTRACTS—

Money paid on an agreement entered into on Sunday, may bo recovered
ack, so long as the contract remains executory. Aliter, if the agree-
ment has been executed, Brown ». Timmany, 81.

SURETY— .

1, The bonds of executors and administrators in foree when the act of
March 28, 1840, in relation to estates, took effect, are governed by, and
must be prosecuted under the laws in force when they were entered
into. McGovney v. Ohio, 93.

2. An oxecutor’s bond, describing the testator as James L. Findley, can not
by parol evidence, be made applicable to the estate of Joseph L. Find-
Jey. Ib. 94.

3, The undertaking of a surety can not be extended beyond the terms of
tho contract into which he has entered. Tb. 93.

4, The issuing of letters of guardianship before bond is given by the guard-

INDEX. 129

Survey—Taxes.

Surery—Continued.
ian does not constitute a breach by the clerk of the court of his offi-
cial bond, so as to charge his sureties. Ohio v. Sloane, 327.

5. A surety ino building contract partly performed and rescinded, is a com-
petent witness in a suit for the work and labor performed, and is not a
proper or necessary party plaintiff. Kugler v. Wiseman, 361. .

6. At common law, no action could be sustained by an administrator de
Bonis non, against the representatives of a deceased administrator, or
the sureties in his official bond. Blizzard v, Karns, 479.

7, Section 26 of the act of 1840, to provide for the settlement of the estates
of deceased persons, does not, in this particular, change the common
law. Ib. 479.

8. When an equitable interest in land was sold, and security taken for the
purchase money, by which the vendor's lien was extinguished, and
the legal title of the property afterward came to the vendor by a
deed of trust, ho will not be permitted to hold on to the legal title
until his own debt is paid, it not being provided for on the deed.
Follett v. Reese, 546,

9. Where a debtor, with the assent of his surety, makes a deed of trust to
defraud creditors, but to indemnify the surety, such surety can not set
up the fraud to defeat an equity of redemption. Irwin v. Longworth,
581. See Hquiry; Trusts or Reaury.

SURVEY—

“Whore a party has made an entry and survey of lands under a warrant,
such lands become subject to taxation, and if sold for taxes, the pur-
chaser at such tax sale will take a legal title as against the former
owner, although the patent has never issued from the United States.
Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556,

SURVIVORS—

1, Surviving partners may sue alone upon partnership contracts. Choteau
. Raitt, 182, note.

2. How far a power conferred by will to sell, can be executed by surviving
executors, and the effect of the statute of wills upon survivorship, 267.

SUSPENSION OF WORK—

See Burpine OontRacr.

TAXES—

1. If a board of equalization add to the valuation returned by the assessor,
the law will presume it to be done upon sufficient evidence, unless the:
contrary be made to appear by the party aggrieved. Hambleton v.
Dempsey, 168.

2. The law gives notice that the board will meet at a time and place certain.
No other notice is requisite. Ib. 168.

3, The tax laws construed. Ib. 168, note.

4, Whether a void tax, paid under protest, can be recovered in an action
against the tax collector. Ib, 171.

180 INDEX.

Tax Titles—Titles,

Taxus—Continued.

5. Where a party has made an entry and survey of lands under a warrant,
such lands become subject to taxation. Gwynne ». Niswanger, 586,

6. When the collection of a tax will be enjoined, and who may unite in a
Dill for that purpose. Griffith ». Commissioners, 611.

7 Whether taxes can be constitutionally levied to aid in the constimetion
of a railroad company. Ib. 609; ArpEnprx A.

8. The constitutional power to levy taxes, and how far it may be delegated
by the legislature, Ib. 609; Appenprx A.

9. Whether section 4, article 8, of the constitution of 1802, limits or affects
the taxing power. Ib. 609; Arprnprx A.

“TAX TITLES—

J. Where a party has made an entry and survey of lands under a warrant,
such lands become subject to taxation, and if sold for taxes, the pur-
chaser at such tax sale will take a legal title as against the former
owner, although the patent bas never issued from the United States.
Gwynne v. Niswanger, 556.

2. If the title of a purchaser at tax sale, under the statute of 1827, be de-
fective at law, he can not have the aid of a court of chancery to
perfect his title. Ib. 556.

8. Tho general assembly can, in adopting rules of evidence, make an equi-
table title have the effect of a legal one. Ib. 556.

4, A valid tax title overreaches all previous titles, as against persons not
under disability. Ib. 564.

B. A tax sale operhtes on the property, not the title. Ib. 564.

“‘TITLUS—

See Tax Trrzus.

1. When grants, assignments, ete., presumed in aid of title, 261, note.

2. When a claim to title is waived by knowingly permitting a party in
possession to make improvements, under claim of title. Blake v. Davis,
231, note.

8. Whether a mortgagee, who takes from his mortgagor a conveyance of
the mortgaged premises in payment of the mortgage debt, acquires
thereby a fee, or the release of an equity of redemption. Jeunings v,
“Wood, 261.

4, A sale of land under an order of court, procured by » guardian after
his term has expired, is void. Carpenter v. Sloane, 327, note.

5, An irregular, judicial sale by a guardian, may be ratified by his ward
receiving the proceeds of the sale with full knowledge, after the age of
majority. Ib, 327, note. |

6. The reversal of a judgment does not affect the title of the purchaser,
344, note. 4

7. A. purchase by an administrator or trustee, at his own sale, takes tho title
in trast, Glass ». Greathouse, 508.

“8. Where an equitable interest in land was sold, and security taken for the
purchase money, by which the vendor's lien was extinguished, and the
legal title to the property afterwards came to the vendor by a deed of

_

INDEX. 13st

‘Trial—Trast and Trustee.

‘"Trrs—Continued.
trust, he will not be permitted to hold on to the legal title until his
own debt is paid, it not being provided for in the deed. Follett
Reese, 546.

9, The assignee of an equitable title, as a general rule, takes it, subject to
any claim that could be asserted against the assignor; but if the
holder of tho legal title has, by his conduct or representation, in any
way misled the assignee, his rights may be lost or postponed. Ib. 546.

10. The state can, in adopting rules of evidence, make an equitable title
have the effect of a legal one, as between individuals. Gwynne v.
Niswanger, 563,

11. A grant may be by law made to relate back to the inception of the
right, and have effect accordingly. Ib. 663.

12, An equitable interest in land can not, as a general rule, be sold on ex-
ecution, but it may, if accompanied by possession, in certain cases, Per
Hitchoock, 0. J., 586.

13, A court of equity will not interfere, at the suit of a purchaser at »
shorift’s sale, to relieve against irregularity in the proceedings pre-
vious to the sale, but may, upon a sale of an equitable title, decree the
legal title to the purchaser. Ib. 566.

TRIAL—

On the trisl of an indictment for a criminal offense, and at the return of
the verdict, it is the right of the accused to be present, and if pre-
vented by imprisonment or other improper means, he is entitled to a
new trial. Rose ». Ohio, 31. :

TRUST AND TRUSTEE—

1. When grant from trustee to cestui gue trust presumed. Blake v. Davis,
248,

2. How far the legal title of a trustee affected by the statute of limitations.
Ward v. Racer, 263.

8, Where », debtor, in contemplation of insolvency, executes a chattel mort-
gage to one creditor for the purpose of securing such creditor in prefer-
ence to others, with an understanding that the mortgagee shall satisfy
his claim out of the goods, and then surrender the residue to the mort=
gagor, the mortgage will be deemed an assignment of property in trust,
and the mortgagee will be deemed a trustee, holding the mortgaged
property for the benefit of all the creditors, in proportion to their respect~
ivedemands. Brown & Co. v. Webb, 389.

4, Parol evidence may be received for the purpose of counteracting fraud
in the devisee, and in some peculiar cases, to attach a trust to the estate
devised. But in such cases courts will act with extreme caution. Col-
Tins v. Hope ot al. 492,

5, Trosts which may be sot up, upon parol evidence. Ib. 497} Irwin w
Longworth, 581. .

6. If an administrator purchase land at his own public sale, he will be
held to have parchased in trust for the heirs, and upon being refunded
the amount by him paid, will be decreed to convev to the heirs. Ifhe

132 INDEX.

Truth and Veracity—Variance.

‘Trust anv Trusrex—Continued.
has sold the land to a third person, not a party in court, he (the vendor)
will be held to account to the heirs for its value at the time of its orig-
inal parchase, or otherwise, as the case may be, with interest, first de-
ducting the amount by him paid. Such is the rule, whether the admin-
istrator purchase directly or through another person for his benefit.
Glass v. Greathouse, 503. .

7. Where a creditor has a lien upon two funds of his debtor, and a subse-
quent creditor files a bill to reach one of the funds, if the prior cred-
itor, after bill filed, surrenders one of the funds, he will, as between the
creditors, be held to account for it as so much paid on his claim. Fas-
sett ». Traber, 540,

8, Where an equitable interest in land was sold and security taken for the
purchase money, by which the vendor's lion was extinguished, and the
legal title afterward came to the vendor by a deed of trust, he will not
be permitted to hold onto the legal title until his own debt is paid, it
not being provided for in the deed. Follett v. Reese, 546.

9. The assignee of an equitable title, as a general rule, takes it subject to
any claim that could be asserted against the assignor; but if the holder
of the legal title has by his conduct or representations in any way mis-
Jed the assignee, his rights may be lost or postponed. Ib. 646.

10. A party interested in and privy to a conveyance in trust made to defraud .
creditors, can not, upon acquiring the legal title under the trustee, set
up the fraud to defeat an equity of redemption in the heirs of the
fraudulent grantor, Irwin v. Longworth, 581.
11, Whether, if a conveyance is made to a trustee for the purpose of defraud-
ing creditors, a party privy to and interested in the conveyance in trust,
can compel the execution of the trast. Ib, 594.
12. Whether a party who receives a deed, absolute on its face, but in fact as
trustee to secure 2 creditor, no declaration of trust being executed at
the time, as required by the statute of fronds, takes the property in
trust, or holds it, being liable for the consideration named in the deed.
Tb, 595.
18. Whether a trustee, who takes » conveyance of land to hold for the ben-
efit of sureties, can sell, and whether such sale will bar an equity of re- .
demption. Ib. 697. And see Hqurry; Truss or Ruaury.

TRUTH AND VERACITY—

See Imeracuina Wrswuss.

USE—

See Truszs.

USURY—

Illegal contracts in relation to interest. Myers v. Bank, 303, note.

UNAUTHORIZED BANKING—

Seo Banks.

VARIANOE—

1, A charge in an indictment for forgery, that the defendant has forged »

INDEX. 133

Vendor’s Lien—Vendor and Purchaser.

‘Varrance—Continued.
promissory note, described in the indictment as a note without a seal, is
not supported by evidence tending to prove that defendant had com-
mitted forgery of a note under seal. It is error in the court to admit
such evidence in proof of the charge. Hart v. Ohio, 49.

2, The plea of accord, ete., with George B., agent, is not sustained by proof
of an accord with John E. Harper v. Graham, 105, note.

3, Where an affidavit was made charging crime, which charge was the sub-
ject of an action for malicious prosecution, and the declaration stated
the substance in general terms of the affidavit as dated on or about May
24th, an affidavit dated May 16th, of the same year, is competent evi-
dence. Ash v. Marlow, 119, note.

VENDOR'S LIEN—

1. No lien for the purchase money, upon a sale of real property, will at-
tach, where the vendor takes from the vendee personal security for the
payment of the consideration money. FFollet ». Reese, 546.

2. Where an equitable interest in land was sold and security taken for the
purchase money, by which the vendor's lien was extinguished, and the
legal title for the property afterward came to the vendor by a deed of
trust, he will not be permitted to hold on to the legal title until his own
debt is paid, it not being provided for in the deed. Ib. 546.

3. Whether a vendor's lien exists in favor of the vendor of an equitable
title. Ib. 551.

VENDOR AND PUROHASER—

See Desror anp Ormprror.

‘1. Where B. gave to W- a memorandum in writing, substantially setting
forth that B. had received $175 as an advance to buy barley for W., and
B. agreed to deliver at a certain place, within o certain time, and for a
certain price, 1,000 bushels of merchantable barloy, it is a contract of
sale, and not an agreement constituting an agency. Black v. Webb,
304,

2, When before the time stipulated for the delivery, and before actual de-
livery, a portion of the barley stored in the warehouse mentioned in
the agreement, was destroyed by a flood, the loss falls upon B., the prop-
erty being at his rick before delivery. Ib. 304.

8. Where a purchase of land is made by metes and bounds, estimated to
contain a specific quantity, or for “ more or less,” and a gross sum to be
paid for the entire tract, the purchaser will not be entitled to an abate-
ment in the price, should the number of acres fall short of the esti-
mated quantity; more especially should the land at the time of the

. purchase be of equal value to the price paid. Ketchum v. Stout, 453.

4. Any misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the vendor may
take a caso out of this rule. Ib. 453.

8. Whether a covenant to convey or of warranty, in a deed for land, is
proken, if the metes and bounds contain less acres than specified, Ib.
453,

134 INDEX.

Verdict.

‘Vuxpor anp Puronaser—Continued.

6. If an administrator purchase land at his own public sale, he will be held
to have purchased in trust for the heirs, and upon being refunded the
amount by him paid, will be decreed to convey to the heirs. If he has
sold the land to a third person, he (the vendor) will be held to account
to the heirs for its Value at the time of his original purchase, or other-
wise, as the case may be, with interest, first deducting the amount by
him paid. Glass v. Greathouse, 503.

4. Such is the rule, whether the administrator purchase directly or through
another person for his benefit. Ib. 503.

8. Where an equitable interest in land was sold and security taken for the
purchase money, by which the vendor's lien was extinguished, and the
legal title to the property afterward came to the vendor by a deed of
trust, he will not be permitted to hold on’to the legal title until his own
debt is paid, it not being provided for in the deed. Follett v. Reese,
546.

9. The assignee of an equitable title, as a general rule, takes it, subject to
any claim that could be asserted against the assignor; but if the holder:
of the legal title has, by his conduct or representations, in any way
misled the assignee, his rights may be lost or postponed. Ib. 546.

10. Specific interests in or liens upon the property-assigned can only bo set
up against the assignes; not the general indebtedness of the assignor,.
although such indebtedness may have accrucd from the purchase of the:
same property. Tb 646.

VERDIOT—

1. Whore distinct offenses are charged in separate counts of an indictment,
the jury must either return a general verdict, or else respond to cach
charge in their nding. Wilson 2. Ohio, 26,

2. Where the defendont was charged in one count with an assault with in-
tent to commit murder, and in another count with shooting with intent
to kill, which are distinct offenses, under the Ohio statute, the jury re-
turned guilty of’ an assault with intent to kill and murder George L,
in manner and form as alleged,” etc., but said nothing as to the charge
of shooting, etc., the finding is insufficient. Tb. 26.

8. A verdict of guilty upon one and of acquittal upon another of two counts
substantially alike, in an indictment, is not cause for arrest of judg-
ment. Ib. 26, note,

4, Judgment may be given upon one, the good count, in an indictment eon-
taining one good and one bad, upon a general verdict. Tb. 26, note.

5, The court may refuse to receive a verdict of not guilty on one count of
an indictment when the jury disagree as to the others. Ib, 26, note.

6. Where distinct offenses are charged in separate counts of an indictment,
and a verdict of guilty is rendered on one count, and there is no find-
ing on the others, whether judgment on the verdict would be a bar to
another prosecution for the offerise charged in the other counts. Wil-
son v. Ohio, 28, 30.

%. Onthe trial of an indictment, and at the return of the verdict for a crim~

. INDEX. 185

Virginia Military District—Void and Voidable.

‘Vrpior—Continued,
inal offense, it is the right of the accused to be present; and if pre-
vented by imprisonment or other improper means, he is entitled to a
new trial. Rose v. Ohio, 31.

8. A verdict may be set aside as against the weight of evidence, and if re
fused ina proper case, is cause for new trial, 75, 142,

9. A special verdict is irregular and insufficient, unless it find the truth of

. the facts—it will not do to refer the evidence to the court, and ask their

jadgment upon it. Hambleton v. Dempsey, 168.

10, To authorize a judgment upon a special verdict, all the facts essential to
the right of the party in whose favor judgment is to be rendered, must
be found by the jury. Finding evidence suflicient prima facie to es-
tablish such facts is not sufficient. Blake v. Davis, 231.

VIRGINIA MILITARY DISTRIOT—

See Survey; Tax Trruzs.

VOID AND VOIDABLE—

1. A chattel mortgage is not void in todo by reason of an omission to mako
the deposit forthwith, but becomes effective whenever it be deposited.
‘Wilson v. Leslie, 151.

2, No special notice to tax-payers is necessary to sustain the proceedings
of the board of equalization. Hambleton v. Dempsey, 168.

3. Whether a void tax paid under protest, can be recovered in an action
against the tax collector. Ib. 171.

4, A policy of insurance by the Knox County Mutual Insurance Company
on the property of a corporation, effected by all the stockholders as on
their individual property, is void. Phillips et al. v. Ins. Co. 174.

5, The act of the legislature of the State of Michigan to incorporate the
Manhattan Bank was void. Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 283.

6. Corporations created in one state, but which, upon a change of territorial
furisdiction, fall within another state, do not continue to exist if in
violation of the policy and laws of the latter state. Ib. 283,

%, & contract in violation of law is void, but the imposition of a statutory
penalty does not always render the prohibited act or contract void,
303, note,

8, Illegal contracts; no suit upon them sustained—when executed—money
paid on not recoverable; otherwise of executory contracts—in a suit by
a party not in default, who rescinds. 83, 303, note; Myers v. Mam
hatton Bank, 283.

A sale of land, under an order of court, procured by a guardian, after
his term has expired, is void, but may be ratified by the ward, after
the age of majority. Carpenter v. Sloane, 327.

10, It is competent for @ court to set aside » judgment of a previous term
for irregularity, on motion; and although the court, in the exercise of
such power, may act erroneously, such error will not render the pro-
ceeding void, so that the record can be collaterally impeached. Reynolds
». Bureh, 344,

11, A conveyance of goods made for the purpose of defrauding creditors,

ba

136 INDEX.

Vote—Water-craft Law.

Vor anp Vorpasie—Continued.
the vendor and purchaser both participating in the fraud, is void under
the statute of frauds, as to the creditors of the party making such con-
veyance, but is valid as between the parties to such conveyance.
Brown v. Webb, 389.

12, A mortgage of personal property, where the mortgagor retains possession
by virtue of the mortgage, with a power of sale, is void as against
subsequent purchasers and execution creditors; but when possession
is taken by the mortgagee, the mortgage becomes valid, so as to protect
the mortgaged property from exceution creditors not having made a
levy, and against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor. Ib. 389.

VOTE— -
Sco Rarzroap Companrns,
WAIVER— .

1. Ina criminal ease, the right to poll the jary may be waived by the ac-
cused, but whether it can be waived by counsel is doubtful. Rose v.
Ohio, 34. .

2. An agreement of counsel for the defendant, waiving nonjoinder of a
proper party plaintiff, does not render competent, as g witness for the
plaintiff, tho party who should have been so joined. Choteau ». Raitt,
145.

3. Where the bill of exceptions refers to depositions of persons by name, as in
evidence, though not in terms made part of the bill, yet if copied into
the record and no objection be taken in the Supreme Court, the whole
record will be considered on the hearing in bank. If the dopositions
‘were not properly made part of the record, it should have been cor-
rected in the Supreme Oourt on the circuit, Washington Ins. Co. 0.
Reed et al. 207. .

4, When aclaim to title will be waived by permitting ax occupant under
color of title to make improvements. Blake v. Davis, 231, note.

5, An irregular judicial sale by a guardian may be ratified by his ward re-
ceiving the proceeds of the sale with full knowledge, after the age of
majority. Ohio v, Sloane, 327, note.

6. The “bar” arising from a certificate of discharge in bankruptey, is
strictly a personal privilege, and is waived by » subsequent promise to
pay the debt. Turner v. Chrisman, 332.

WARRANT—

Seo Arausr.
WARRANTY—

See Insurancr; Dux,
‘WATOHMEN—

See AnrEst.
WATER-CRAFT LAW—

1. Decisions under the Ohio water-craft laws collected. Canal-boab My o,
Kent, 54, note.

2. The constitutionality of the water-craft laws. Ib. 64, note.

3. How far the title acquired by virtue of proceedings -under the water-

INDEX. 137°

Water Privilege—Will.

‘Warzr-crarr Law—Continued.
craft laws, is subordinate to the lien in favor of a material-man con-
ferred by the laws of the United States. Ib. 64, note.

“4, How far a judgment under the water-craft laws, for supplies, is 2 bar to
subsequent suit in rem, in admiralty, for the same supplies. Ib. 54,
note. . :

. For the breach of an executory contract to carry goods upon a particu-
Jar boat or vessel, between the owner of the goods and the owner of
tho boat or vessel, an action can not be sustained against said boat or
vessel by name, under the water-craft law of February 26, 1840. Ib. 54.

6. Money loaned to the owner or master of a steambont or other water-
craft, for the purpose of paying tolls, or for paying for materials, sup-
plies, or labor in the building, repairing, etc., of such craft, can not be
recovered in an action against the craft by name, under the act of Feb-
roary 28; 1840. McGuire v. Cunal-boat K. 62,

‘Whether a lien attaches to a steamboat for advances mado by one part-
“owner upon the shares of the others, guwre? But in any event, to
create such lien it must be shown that such advances were made to
discharge debts and liabilities incurred with the consent of all the own-
ers, and for which they were all liable. McDonald ». Black, 185.

» Tf a steamboat or other vessel be overloaded or unduly laden, she is unsea- *
worthy. But whether or not unduly laden depends upon the capacity
of the boat or vessel, not upon the depth of water upon the shoals
and bars in the river upon which she is being navigated. Cincinnati
Ins. Co. v, May, 211.

9. The capacity of the craft, not the capacity of tie river, is to, control in
deciding a question of this character. Ib, 211.

10. If a boat or vessel insured meets with a disaster, the captain and crew
are bound diligently to labor for the recovery of the property; but the
insertion of a clause in the policy requiring such labor and effort, does
not impose any additional duty upon the assured, Ib. 211.

WATER PRIVILEGE—

See EAsEMEnt.

WILL—

See Pownrs; Drsanrurry.

1. In construing a will with codicils, the whole is to be taken together as
parts of one instrument; and if a codicil is signed and attested at the
same time and place with the body of tho will, is may well be consid-
ered as constituting part of the original will. Negley ». Gard, 310,

2. A gift to a charitable use is to receive the most liberal construction.
Zanesville C. & M. Co. v. Zanesville, 483.

3. The McIntire fund, given to establish a school in the town of Zanesville,
for the poor children in said town, is not limited in its benefits to the
children of parents residing in that locality which constituted the town
corporate of Zanesville at the decease of the testator. Ib. 48 3.

. 4 The charity ‘will be administered for the benefit of poor children in the

oe

s

2

188 INDEX.

Witness.

“Wit1—Continued.
town of Zanesville, according to the most general and popular sense of
the term. Ib. 483.

5. Wills are to be construed from the written anguage of the instrument,
not by evidence aliunde, Oollins et al. v. Hope et al. 492.

6. Parol evidence may be received for the purpose of counteracting fraud
in the devisee, and in some peculiar cases, to attach a trust to the es-
tate devised. But in such cases courts will act with the extremest cau-
tion. Ib. 492. .

1. How far a promise, upon the faith of which a testator has acted in
making his will, will be decreed to be specifically performed. Ib. 496.

WITNESS—

Seo InrerusT; CROsS-EXAMINATION; ExPurs.

1. The surety in a contract for work: and labor, which is rescinded after part
execution, is a competent witness in an action for the work and labor.
Kugler v. Wiseman, 361.

2. When a witness is called for the purpose of impeaching the character for
truth and veracity of a witness called on the other side, such impeach-
ing witness can only speak of the general reputation of the witness
sought to be impeached, in the community, and can not give his own
opinion of his character. Bucklin v. Ohio, 18.

8. Before a witness can be contradicted by proving statements out of court
at variance with his testimony, be must be first inquired of, on cross
examination, as to such statements, and the time, place, and person in-
volved in the supposed contradiction. King v. Wicks, 87.

4, It is not proper, as a general rule, to inquire of a witness on the stand,
who has heard the testimony in a case, his opinion, from the knowledge
he derives from the testimony, as to a particular fact which is material
in tho determination of the issue in the case. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.
May, 211. .

8. Tho owner of a trunk is a competent witness in a suit brought by him
against a common carrier for its loss, to prove the contents of the trunk:
and their value; and for the same reason, the evidence of the wife of
the owner is admissible, to prove the same fact. Mad River & L. E.
B.RB. Co. ». Fulton, 318.

6. The rule for the admission of such evidence does not extend further than
to the proof of such articles as are commonly carried in » traveling

trunk, Tb, 318,

INDEX. 137°

Water Privilege—Will.

‘Warzr-crarr Law—Continued.
craft laws, is subordinate to the lien in favor of a material-man con-
ferred by the laws of the United States. Ib. 64, note.

“4, How far a judgment under the water-craft laws, for supplies, is 2 bar to
subsequent suit in rem, in admiralty, for the same supplies. Ib. 54,
note. . :

. For the breach of an executory contract to carry goods upon a particu-
Jar boat or vessel, between the owner of the goods and the owner of
tho boat or vessel, an action can not be sustained against said boat or
vessel by name, under the water-craft law of February 26, 1840. Ib. 54.

6. Money loaned to the owner or master of a steambont or other water-
craft, for the purpose of paying tolls, or for paying for materials, sup-
plies, or labor in the building, repairing, etc., of such craft, can not be
recovered in an action against the craft by name, under the act of Feb-
roary 28; 1840. McGuire v. Cunal-boat K. 62,

‘Whether a lien attaches to a steamboat for advances mado by one part-
“owner upon the shares of the others, guwre? But in any event, to
create such lien it must be shown that such advances were made to
discharge debts and liabilities incurred with the consent of all the own-
ers, and for which they were all liable. McDonald ». Black, 185.

» Tf a steamboat or other vessel be overloaded or unduly laden, she is unsea- *
worthy. But whether or not unduly laden depends upon the capacity
of the boat or vessel, not upon the depth of water upon the shoals
and bars in the river upon which she is being navigated. Cincinnati
Ins. Co. v, May, 211.

9. The capacity of the craft, not the capacity of tie river, is to, control in
deciding a question of this character. Ib, 211.

10. If a boat or vessel insured meets with a disaster, the captain and crew
are bound diligently to labor for the recovery of the property; but the
insertion of a clause in the policy requiring such labor and effort, does
not impose any additional duty upon the assured, Ib. 211.

WATER PRIVILEGE—

See EAsEMEnt.

WILL—

See Pownrs; Drsanrurry.

1. In construing a will with codicils, the whole is to be taken together as
parts of one instrument; and if a codicil is signed and attested at the
same time and place with the body of tho will, is may well be consid-
ered as constituting part of the original will. Negley ». Gard, 310,

2. A gift to a charitable use is to receive the most liberal construction.
Zanesville C. & M. Co. v. Zanesville, 483.

3. The McIntire fund, given to establish a school in the town of Zanesville,
for the poor children in said town, is not limited in its benefits to the
children of parents residing in that locality which constituted the town
corporate of Zanesville at the decease of the testator. Ib. 48 3.

. 4 The charity ‘will be administered for the benefit of poor children in the

oe

s

2

188 INDEX.

Witness.

“Wit1—Continued.
town of Zanesville, according to the most general and popular sense of
the term. Ib. 483.

5. Wills are to be construed from the written anguage of the instrument,
not by evidence aliunde, Oollins et al. v. Hope et al. 492.

6. Parol evidence may be received for the purpose of counteracting fraud
in the devisee, and in some peculiar cases, to attach a trust to the es-
tate devised. But in such cases courts will act with the extremest cau-
tion. Ib. 492. .

1. How far a promise, upon the faith of which a testator has acted in
making his will, will be decreed to be specifically performed. Ib. 496.

WITNESS—

Seo InrerusT; CROsS-EXAMINATION; ExPurs.

1. The surety in a contract for work: and labor, which is rescinded after part
execution, is a competent witness in an action for the work and labor.
Kugler v. Wiseman, 361.

2. When a witness is called for the purpose of impeaching the character for
truth and veracity of a witness called on the other side, such impeach-
ing witness can only speak of the general reputation of the witness
sought to be impeached, in the community, and can not give his own
opinion of his character. Bucklin v. Ohio, 18.

8. Before a witness can be contradicted by proving statements out of court
at variance with his testimony, be must be first inquired of, on cross
examination, as to such statements, and the time, place, and person in-
volved in the supposed contradiction. King v. Wicks, 87.

4, It is not proper, as a general rule, to inquire of a witness on the stand,
who has heard the testimony in a case, his opinion, from the knowledge
he derives from the testimony, as to a particular fact which is material
in tho determination of the issue in the case. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.
May, 211. .

8. Tho owner of a trunk is a competent witness in a suit brought by him
against a common carrier for its loss, to prove the contents of the trunk:
and their value; and for the same reason, the evidence of the wife of
the owner is admissible, to prove the same fact. Mad River & L. E.
B.RB. Co. ». Fulton, 318.

6. The rule for the admission of such evidence does not extend further than
to the proof of such articles as are commonly carried in » traveling

trunk, Tb, 318,