State: North Carolina
Volume: 369
Term: 2016-2017
Jurisdiction(s): North Carolina
Source: https://static.case.law/nc/369.pdf

NORTH CAROLINA
REPORTS

VOLUME 369

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

19 AUGUST 2016

9 JUNE 2017

CITE THIS VOLUME
369 N.C.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Justices of the Supreme Court .......... 0... c cece cece eee

Superior Court Judges...

District Court Judges ......... 0.00 cece cece cece ences
Attorneys General... 6... cece ccc eee eee e een enn eeee
District Attorneys.......... “Lene e teen cent eee eens
Public Defenders. ........ 00... cee cece cence eee eee eee
Table of Cases Reported ...
Orders of the Court... 1... 6... c eee e ete eect eee eee

Petitions for Discretionary Review. ............0.0.eeeee ee
Licensed Attomeys......... 00.6 cece eee cece teen eee
Opinions of the Supreme Court ............ 0.00 e cece ee eee
Rules of Appellate Procedure . .

Investiture Ceremony of Justice Morgan..............2.005

Order Concerning the Client Security Fund of the
N.C. State Bar ..

Formal Advisory Opinion of the Judicial Standards
Commission, 2016-01 0.0.6... 6c cece e cece cece eee eee

Formal Advisory Opinion of the Judicial Standards
Commission, 2017-01 2.0... 0... c ccc cece eee eee

Amendments to the Rules Concerning the Organization of the
State Bar. ..

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the N.C. State Bar
Concerning Discipline and Disability of Attorneys .........

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the N.C. State Bar
Concerning the Board of Law Examiners .................

763
887

895

896

898

900

902

931

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the N.C. State Bar
Concerning the Administrative Committee..............+5

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the N.C. State Bar
Concerning Continuing Legal Education ..

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the N.C. State Bar
Concerning Legal Specialization. .............0-0:eeeeeee

Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the

Order Amending Rule 7 of the N.C. Rules of
Appellate Procedure. ..... 06.6. e cece cece e cece eee eee

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the N.C. State Bar
Concerning Judicial District Bars.............0.0ee ee eeee

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the N.C. State Bar
Concerning the Discipline and Disability of Attorneys ......

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the N.C. State Bar
Concerning the Plan of Legal Specialization..............+

Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the N.C. State Bar
Concerning Organizations Practicing Law ...

Amendments to the N.C. State Bar Rules of
Professional Conduct......... 6... secs cece cence ee en eee

Order Waiving Rule 2A, 2B, and 7B of the Rules Implementing
Mediation in Matters Before the Clerk of Superior Court
During Pilot Clerk Mediation Program ..

Formal Advisory Opinion of the Judicial Standards
Commission, 2017-02 ...... 66. cece cece reece eee e eee

Headnote Index. ...... 0.06 cece eee eee recente een e ee

iv

933

938

942

949

955

959

961

963

965

968

977

979
981

This volume is printed on permanent, acid-free paper in compliance
with the North Carolina General Statutes.

THE SUPREME COURT

OF
NORTH CAROLINA
Chief Justice
MARK D. MARTIN
Associate Justices
ROBERT H. EDMUNDS, JR.! . CHERI BEASLEY
PAUL MARTIN NEWBY SAMUEL J. ERVIN, IV
ROBIN E. HUDSON . MICHAEL R. MORGAN?
BARBARA A. JACKSON
Former Chief Justices

RHODA B. BILLINGS
JAMES G. EXUM, JR.
BURLEY B. MITCHELL, JR.

HENRY E. FRYE
1. BEVERLY LAKE, JR.

SARAH PARKER,

Former Justices
ROBERT R. BROWNING ROBERT F. ORR
J. PHIL CARLTON GEORGE L. WAINWRIGHT, JR.
WILLIS P. WHICHARD EDWARD THOMAS BRADY
JAMES A. WYNN, JR. PATRICIA TIMMONS-GOODSON
FRANKLIN E. FREEMAN, JR. ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR.

G. K. BUTTERFIELD, JR.
Clerk
J. Bryan Boyp

Tibrarian
‘Tuomas P. Davis

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

Director
Marion R, WARREN

Assistant Director
Dav F. Hore

OFFICE OF APPELLATE DIVISION REPORTER

Harry James Hurcueson
Kiwperiy Woopett Sierepzxt
Jennirer C. PeTeRSON

‘unm ended 31 December 2016, *Sworn in A January 2017,

DISTRICT

8A

8B

9A
10

14

TRIAL JUDGES OF THE GENERAL
COURT OF JUSTICE

SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

JUDGES
First Division

Jerry R. Tuer

J. Cartron Coue
‘Way.anp Sermons
Mav K. Bouwr, UL
Jerrery B. Foster
Auma L. Hinton

Cy A. Granr, Sr.
Quen T. SUMNER
Miron F. Frees, Jr.
Waurer H. Gopwiy, JR.

Bensamn G. ALFORD
Joun E. Nosuxs, Jk.
Josava W. Winey!

W. Dovaras Parsons”
Chartes H. Henry
Jay D. HockENBuRY
Pavuits M. Goran
R. Kony Harrews?
Paut L. Jonss*
Inewpa J. Pare®
Anwotn O, Jones, HI®
_Woutam W. Brann?

Roseer H. Hoscoop
Heney W. Hii, Jr.

W. Oswonp Swares, IIL
Donato W. SrerHens®
Howarp BE. Mannine, Jr.?
Micuast R. Morcan!?
Pavt C. Gessner!
Paut C. Ripseway!?

G. Bryan Conins, Jr.
A. Grattan SHIRLEY
Resecea W. Horr!
Vinston M. Rozter!4
Orzanpo F Hupson, Jr.
James B. Harp, Jk.

ADDRESS

Manteo
Hertford
Washington
Greenville
Greenville
Roanoke Rapids
Ahoskie

Rocky Mount
Wilson

Tarboro

New Bern
Morehead City
New Bern
Clinton
Jacksonville

Wilmington
Wilmington
Burgaw
Kinston
Kinston
Fremont
Goldsboro

Louisburg
Henderson
Semora
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Durham
Hillsborough

DISTRICT

156A

15B

TA
11B
12

138A
13B
16A
16B

19D

17A

17B

18

19B
21

23,

194,
190
20A
20B

224,

JUDGES

ELaIne M. O’Neab
Micuast O’FocunupHa
Wayne Apgranay!®
James Roperson’®

D. Tuomas Lamagre!”
Cart R, Fox

R. ALLEN Bappour

Fourth Division

C. Winston Gu.curist
‘Tuomas H. Lock
Jams F. Asions, Jr.
Chame Ein.

Gate M. Apams
Mary Ann Tatty
Douetas B. Sasser
Ota M. Lewis
Ricuarp T. Brown
Tanya T. WaLLAcE
Roserr F. Fioyn, Jr.
James Gregory Bau
James M. Wesp

Fifth Division

Eww Graves Wirson, Jr.
‘Stancey L, ALLEN

A. Mosas Massay!®
Anpy Crown!
Anonta B. Pockert”?
Linpsay R. Davis, Jr.
Joun O. Craic, I

R. Sruart ALBRIGHT
Susan Bray

Pararice A. HINNANT
‘Vance Braprorp Lone
L. Topp Burke

Davin L. Hatt

Enic C. Morcan
Ricuarp 8. Gorrie
Micuart Duncan

Siath Division

Marq B. McGee
Anna Mitts Waconer
Kevin M. Brivezs
Curisropuer W. Braco
Jerrery K. CARPENTER:
JosePH CRossWwHITE
Juua Lynn Guierr

ADDRESS

Durham

Durham

Burlington
Burlington
Burlington
Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill

Lillington
Smithfield
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Whiteville
Southport
Laurinburg
Rockingham
Fairmont
Lumberton
Southern Pines

Eden
Sandy Ridge
Mount Airy

King

Westfield
Greensboro
High Point
Greensboro
Greensboro
Greensboro
Asheboro
Winston-Salem
Winston-Salem
Kernersville
Winston-Salem
Wilkesboro

Concord
Salisbury
Oakboro
Monroe
Wadesboro
Statesville
Statesville

DISTRICT
22B

225A
25B

26

274

278

24
28

29A
29B
30A,
30B

JUDGES

Marx E. Kass
‘Tazovore S. Royster, Jr.2!
Lort Hanauron”

Seventh Division

Rozert C. Ervin
Daniet A. Kugsnerr
Narnamtet J. Poovey
Grecory R. Haves

W. Ropert Brut
‘Yvonne Mass Evans’?
Linwoop 0. Fousr"#
Enic L. Levinson
Hucu Lewis

Lisa C. BELL

CarLA ARCHIE

Jesse B. Caupwet, IT
Ropert T. SumNer
Forrest Donatp Bringes
'W. Topp Pomeroy

Bighth Division

Gary Gavenus

R. Grecory Horne
ALAN Z. THORNBURG
Marvin Pore

J, Tromas Davis
Mark E. Powe
Wruiam H. Cowarp
Brapuey B. Lerrs

SPECIAL JUDGES

Lours A. Buzpsoz, HI
Apam Conrap?>
Rrowarp L, DouceTon
Jamas L. Gauz?®
Burcuer Gray
Anprew Hara?”
Kenpra D. Hi?8
Jnrrney P. Hur
Grecory P. McGuire
Micuaet L. Rosinson
Cassy M. Viser
Eperw T. Watson, I
Reusen F. Youre”?

ADDRESS
Lexington

Mocksville

Morganton
Morganton
Newton
Hickory
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Gastonia
Gastonia
Shelby
Lincolnton

Burnsville
Boone
Asheville
Asheville
Forest City
Hendersonville
Highlands
Hazelwood

Charlotte
Charlotte
Sparta
Greensboro
Durham
Raleigh
Raleigh
Brevard
Raleigh
Winston-Salem
Charlotte
Wilmington
Raleigh

SUDGES ‘ADDRESS

EMERGENCY JUDGES

Suaron T. Barrerr . Asheville
Baverty T: BEAL Lenoir
‘Micuant E. Braue Rockingham
Riouarp D. Bonzn®? Charlotte
C. Preston CorNetius Mooresville
W. Russet, Duxe®! Greenville
James L. Gan? Greensboro
Tuomas D. Hatewoop Greenville
A. Ropinson Hasse, Greensboro
Ctarence E. Horron, Jk. Kannapolis
Ropert F. JOHNSON Burlington
Paut L. Jones! Kinston
‘Timomay S. Kinoaro Newton
Cuartes C. Lama, Jr54 ‘Terrell
Russewt J. Lanter, Jr.2> Wallace
W. Daw Lee Monroe
A. Moses Massev*® Mount Airy
Jerry Casi Marr Pilot Mountain
Janes W. Morcan Shelby
Cauwin Murray Charlotte
J. Rican PARKER Manteo
Wiruiam R. Prrrman Raleigh
Joun W. Surrit Raleigh
Rowatp E. Spivey Winston-Salem
Rowazp L. STEPHENS Durham
Kenwetn C, Trrus Durham
Gary E. Trawicx, Jr.27 Burgaw
Josep E. Turner Greensboro
Wittiam Z. Woop, JR. Lewisville

RETIRED/RECALLED JUDGES
W. Doveras Atpriont Greensboro
J.B. Auten, Jr.28 Burlington
Henry V, Barnarzs, Jr. Raleigh
ANTiioNY M. BRANNON Durham
FRank R. Brown ‘Tarboro
Srarrorp G. Buniock Raleigh
HL Wiuuiam Constancy Charlotte
B. Cralc Buus Laurinburg
Larry G, ForD Salisbury
‘Marvin K. Grav? Charlotte
Zoro J. Guice, JR. Hendersonville
Knox V. Jenkins? Four Oaks
Jouw R. Jouy, Jt Raleigh

JUDGES ADDRESS

Roserr D. Lewis Asheville
Howar B. Manwine, Ja. Raleigh
Junius A. Rousssay, J. Wilkesboro
THomas W. Seay Spencer

W. Ervin Spainnour Concord
James C. SPENCER Burlington
Jacx A. Taompson‘? Fayetteville
aren A. Watxer, Jr, Raleigh

+ Sworn an 1 January 2017, * Deceased 24'September 2017. *Sworn in 11 December 2017, “Retired on 31 December 2016.
‘Sworn 1 January 2017. ¢Resigned 81 December 2016. 7 Sworn 1 January 2017. * Reured on BI October 2017. * Retired on 25 July 2016
Resigned on 31 December 2017, " Retired on 81 December 2016.  Bocame Senior Resident on 1 November 2017.

™ Swom mn 1 Fanvary 2017, !*Swom in 24 February 2017. # Retired on 30 June 2017. # Boeame Senior Resdent on 1 July 2017.

"Sworn 14 July 2017. Retired on $1 December 2017. # Became Seruor Resident-on { January 2017. ® Sworn in | January 2017.
‘Retired on 31 December 2017. # Sworn mn 1 January 2017, * Retured on 31 December 2017. Retired on 81 October 2017.

‘= Swom mn 23 December 2016, * Retired on $0 September 2016. * Sworn in 30 December 2016. * Resigned on 31 Decomber 2017,

® Resigned on 28December 2017. ® Resigned on 22 September 2017. * Resigned on 27 July 2017. # Swom in 4 October 2016.

‘© Swom mn 24 Apri 2017. * Deceased 27 March 2016, * Deceased 20 June 2017. * Som in 11 Apsil 2017. ® Retired on 20 October 2016.

+= Deceased 27 Noveriber 2016. © Deceased 7 November 2017, * Deceased 9 November 2016 * Resigned on 31 December 2017.

© Resigned on 24 April2017,

DISTRICT

3B

DISTRICT COURT DIVISION

JUDGES

Epear L. Barnes (CuiEr)
Amper Davis

Euta E. Rep

Roser P. Triverrs
Meapee W. Harris, I
Micuast A. Paut (Cum)
Reeiva Rogers PARKER
Curisropuer B. McLenpon
Darreut B. Cavron, JR.
Dav A. Lascn (Cum)!
Parriows Gwyverr Hipurn®
G. Gaten Brappy

Brian DrSoro

Lee F. Teacue

Wenpy S. Hazeuton?

L. Waurer Mins (Cer)
Paut M. Quin

Karen A. ALEXANDER:
Perer Mack, Jr.

W. Davin MoFapven, IL
Cunton Rows

Pat A. Harpisow (Carer)
‘Wrutam M. Cameron, IIT
‘Saray Cown Sraton
Carot Jones Witson
Howny L. Sravens, IV
James L. Moore

Wiuuutam B. Surron
Micuaet C. Surzest

J. HL. Corpenina, I (Curr)
James H, Farson, IT
‘Sanpra A. Ray

Ricuarp Russet Davis
Metinpa Haynie Croucn
Jerrrey Evan Nogcker
Cuap Hoaston

Rosin W. Ropinson
Lipsey L. McKee

Brenpa G. Branon (Crier)
‘W. Turner Srepuenson, II
‘Teresa R. FREEMAN
Versuenta B. Moopy
‘Wituam Cuariss Farris (Caras)
Joun M. Brit

Pett C. Cooper

Jon J. Covoro

Antirony W. Brown

‘Wayne S. Boyette
Exizapera Fresnwarer Scrat

ADDRESS

Manteo
‘Wanchese
Elizabeth City
Kitty Hawk
Edenton.
Washington
Williamston
Williamston
Washington
Greenville
Greenville
Grimesland
Greenville
Greenville
Greenville
New Bern
Atlantic Beach
New Bern
New Bern
New Bern
New Bern
Jacksonville
Richlands
Jacksonville
Kenansville
Warsaw
Jacksonville
Clinton
Jacksonville
Wilmington.
Wilmington
Wilmington
Wilmington
Wrightsville Beach
Wilmington
Wilmington
Wilmington
Wilmington
Roanoke Rapids
Roanoke Rapids
Roanoke Rapids
‘Windsor
Wilson
Tarboro
Rocky Mount
Rocky Mount
Spring Hope
Tarboro
‘Wilson

DISTRICT

oA

10

ll

12

JUDGES

Dav B. Branmiey (Cann)
R. Lestr TURNER
Evmasete A. Hear
Cares P. Gaytor, IT
Enicxa Y. James
Annerre W. Turn®
Curmis Stackouse®

J, Henry Bans!

Joun W. Davis (Curer)®
Carouyn J. YaNcEY
AMANDA STEVENSON
Avan S, Kerra

Carouine S. Burnerre9
Bensanun S. Hunter?
‘Marx E. Gantoway (Carer)
L, Micuart Gewrry!!
Joun H. Sruurz, 102
Roser BiAcKWEit Raper (CwEr)
Monica M. Bousman
Crate Croom

Desra ANN Smrra Sasser
‘Vunston M. Roamer, Jr.J8
Kris D. Batey

Lori G. Caristian
Curistine M. Watozyk
Enric Craic Cuasse
Jacqueune L. Brewer!
Anna Evena WortEY
Nep Witson Mancum
Marcaret Eacies

Kerrn O. Grecory
Micaset J. Devin

. Louis B. Meyer, II

Dante J. Nacue

Varran A. DavIDIAN
Jerrerson G. GRIFFIN
Sam S. Hamapant!
Asunica P. Donsron!®
Jacquawn L, Lee (Cues)
Siva L. Love, Jr.

O Henry Wits, Jr.
Appi M. Harris-Rawis
Resso O, Farctora, IL
Roserr W. Bryant, Jr.

R. Date Stuses!?

Paut A. Hoxcomns
Caron H. Srewarr

‘Mary H. Waus

Joy A. Jones

Surry F. Woon'®

Rosser J. Suient, I (Came)
Epwarp A. Pong

xiii

ADDRESS

Goldsboro
Pink Hall

> Kinston

Goldsboro
Goldsboro
Kinston
Goldsboro
Henderson
Louisburg
Creedmoor
Oxford
Louisburg
Henderson
Louisburg
Roxboro
Pelham
Roxboro:
Raleigh
Garner
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Cary
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Apex
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Raleigh
Smithfield
Sanford

Clayton.
Smithfield
Smithfield
Smithfield
Smithfield
Selma
Fayetteville
Parkton

DISTRICE

13

14

1bA

15B

164,

16B

17A

JUDGES

‘Taumace Baccerr
Dav H. Hasty

Laura A. Devan!®

Tow S. Kine

Lov Onveria

Cuert Sizer-Mack

Srepupy C. Stoxes

‘Apri, M. Suara

‘Tireany M. Wewrereip??
Sorry A. Jou?!

‘Manton R. Warren
Wiuam F. Farisy

Scorr Ussery (Cer)?
PAULINE HANKINS

Wine Frep Gore

Jason C. Disprow

C. Asay Gorn”

‘Marcra H. Money’

Janes T. Hitt, (Cater)*®
‘Winuiam ANprew Marsu II?
Brian C. Wits

Parricta D. Evans

Dorerra WAL

Frep BArTacLia, JR.
‘Suanonxa L. Renweuar?®
Amanpa L. Manis”?
Braptey Ret Auten, Sr. (Carer)
Davip Tuomas Lameera, Jr.2?
‘Kararen W. Overby

‘Sreven H. Messicx

Larry D. Brown?

Josep M. Buckner (Cer)
‘Cartes T. ANDERSON”
Bevert A. Scarverr
Lunsrorp Lone?

‘Janes T. BRYAN

Samanria Cape

Suoert T. Munreu.?>
Scorr’T. Brewer (Crier)
Lisa D. THACKER

Raia M. Jos

Awanpa L. Wison

Micra A. Stone
‘CuristopHer W. RHUE

J. Srantey Carwtcat, (Cine)
Hever L. RICHARDSON
Juprrd Misa Dantes
Wram J. Moore

Dats G. Desse

‘James A. GRocaN (CHIEF)
Curis Freeman

Curistive F. Srraper

ADDRESS

Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
Fayetteville
‘Tabor City
Ash
Southport
Elizabethtown
‘Tabor City
Whiteville
Southport
Whiteville
Durham
Durham
Durham.
Durham
Durham
Durham
Durham
Durham
Durham
Burlington
Burlington
Burlington
Burlington.
Graham
Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill
Durham
Chapel Hill
Hillsborough
Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill
Monroe
Polkton
Raeford
Rockingham
Laurinburg
Laurinburg
Lumberton
Lumberton
Lumberton
Maxton
Maxton
Reidsville
Wentworth
Reidsville

DISTRICT
17B

18

194

19B

19C

2048,

20B

21

JUDGES

CHarues Mircuent Nraves, Jn2°
Spanour Gray Key, Jr,
Anonta B. Pucxerr®?

Wuuam F. Souraern II (Cuer)°s
Manton M. Boons®?

HL Tomas Jarreut, Jr. (CHER)
Susan R. Burcu

‘Tueresa H. Vincent

‘Kiwperty MIcuetie Furtcuer
Anceta C, Foster

Avery Micnette Crump

Berry J. Brown

Jan H. Samer“?

AnceLa B. Fox

‘TapaTua Houuipay

Davin Suereni!t

Ranois L, Jonss!?

Jonanaan G. Kremer’?

Lora C. Cussace

Marx Cummines*®

Toma A. Curcan®S

Wiustam B. Davis “7

Wruam G. Hanoy, Jr. (Caner)
Donna G, Heperretn Jounson
Brent CLONINGER

Curisty E. WitHELM
Narwantet E. Wiseiat®®
Jayvrene Russet. Maness (Cxigr)
Lee W. Gavin

Scorr C. Eruerince

Janes P. Hint, Jr.

Donatp W. Creep, JR.

Rosert M. Witkins

Sreve Brrsy

Cuartes E. Brown (Caer)
Bern Spencer Dixon

Kew G. Eppincer

Roy Marswant Broxerr, Jr.
Jamns RANDOLPH

Wicuiam Tuoxer (Came)

Joun R. Nance

N. Hor Gwyn (Cuner)

Joszrx J. WILLIAMS

Wiuiam F. Hetms:

‘Srepuen V. Hicpon

‘Lisa V. L. Menerss (CHige)
Winuam Tomas Granam, Jr.?
‘Vicroria Lang Roemer

Laurie L. Hurceins

Lawrence J. Fine

Denise S. HarTsrievD

GrorcE BepswortH

Canute D. Banxs-Payne

xv

ADDRESS
Elkin

Elkin
Westfield

King |

Dobson

High Point
High Point
Summerfield
Greensboro
Greensboro
Browns Summit
Greensboro
Greensboro
Greensboro
Greensboro
Greensboro
High Point
Greensboro
Greensboro
Greensboro
Greensboro
Greensboro
Kannapolis
Concord
Mount Pleasant
Concord
Concord
Carthage
Asheboro
Asheboro
Asheboro
Asheboro
Asheboro
Carthage
Salisbury
Salisbury
Salisbury
Salisbury
Salisbury
Albemarle
Albemarle
Monroe
Monroe
Matthews
Monroe
Winston-Salem
Kernersville
Winston-Salem
Winston-Salem
Clemmons
Winston-Salem
Winston-Salem
Winston-Salem

DISTRICT

222A

2B

25

26

JUDGES

Davip SippreL,

Gornow A. Minter
‘Taropore KazaKos
Carrie F. Vioxery®?

L. Dave Gratiam (Cer)
H. Tuomas Cxurcn
Desoran Brown

Epwarp L. Henpricx, IV
Curistins UNDERWOOD
‘Wayne L, Micnart (Car)
Jmmy L. Myers

Apri C. Woop

Mary C, Paun

CARLTON TERRY

J. Ropweit Penry®)

Dav V. Byrp (CHEF)
Jeane Reavis Houston
‘Witiam Finuey Brooxs
Ropert Crumpron
"Tueovore Wricur McEwrme (Cum)
F. Warren Hucues®

Hat Gene Harrison
Resecca E, Eacers-Grvpar™
Larry B.

Burorp A. Cagrry (Cuter)
Sueraie Wiison Evuiorr
Any Siemon WALKER
Roser A. Mununax, Jr.
Marx L. Kiuuian

Cuirron H. Seer

Davin W. Aycock

Westey W. BarKLEY
Ricnarp 8. Houtoway
Recan A. Mier (Cur)
Louis A. Troscx, JR.
Ricxye McKoy-Mrroveu,
Becky Tuorne Tv
Curisty Towntey Mann
Ronatp C. CHAPMAN
Donnie Hoover

Paice B. McTaenta
Kiperwy Y. Best-Sraton
Crartorre Brown-Wuntams®>
EuizaBets THORNTON TROSCH
Jena P. CULLER

‘Tyyawot M. Hanps

‘Karen Eapy-WinLiaMs:
Donat Cureton, Jr.
‘Sean Suara

Marr Osman

Gary HenpeRsON

Davip Stricktanp

Auicta D. Brooxs

ADDRESS

Winston-Salem
Winston-Salem
Winston-Salem
Winston-Salem
Taylorsville
Statesville
Mooresville
‘Taylorsville
Olin
Lexington
Advance
Lexington
Thomasville
Advance
Lexington,
Wilkesboro
Yadkinville
Wilkesboro
Wilkesboro
Spruce Pine
Burnsville
Spruce Pine
Boone
Marshall
Hickory
Newton
Newton
Newton
Hickory
Hickory
Hickory
Newton
Lenoir
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Cornelius
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte

DISTRICT

27a

27B

294

298

30

JUDGES

‘Youanba M. Trorman®®
Arerua V. Brake’?

‘Tracy H. Hewert®S

Jou K. Greenies (Caer)
AncrLa G. HOYLE

James A. Jackson
Micuart K. Lanps
Richarb ABERNETHY
Pennie M, THROWER

Crate R. Cortins

Larry Janus WiLson (CuIE®)
XK. Dean Biack

Au B, Paxsoy, JR.
Mereprrit A, SHurorD
Jeanerre R, REEVES
Jusmy K. Brackert®?

J. Carwin Haut (Cater)
Parricia Kaurmann Youna
June M. Kerpce

Anprea Dray

Warp D. Scorr

Epwwn D. Cuontz

Susan Martz Dorson-Surre:
©. Ranpy Poot (Carer)
‘Laura ANNE POWELL
Rosert K, Marretie
Arnena F. Brooxs (Cums)
Tuomas M. Brrrramn, JR.
Peer Knicur

‘Enaty Cowan

Ricuarp K. Wanker (Carer)
Monica Hayes Lesur,
Donna Forca

Roy WuEWICKRAMA
Kristina L. Earwoop
‘Tessa S. SELLERS

EMERGENCY JUDGES

Tuomas V. ALprince, Jr.6?
Surry Fownar ALLowAY
Cxantes T. L. Anpgrson®!
Kyie D. Austin

C. CartsropHer BEAN
Repacca W. Blackwore
Jossri A. Buck

Roper M. Brapy
Jacques L. Brewsr®?
Cuartorre Brown-Wiuams®
Jou B. Carrer, Jr.

ADDRESS

Charlotte
Charlotte
Charlotte
Gastonia
Belmont
Gastonia
Gastonia
Gastonia
Gastonia
Gastonia
Shelby
Denver
Shelby
Lincolnton
Shelby

Asheville
Asheville
Asheville
Asheville
Asheville
Candler
Asheville
Marion
Rutherfordton
Rutherfordton
Fletcher

Mills River
Hendersonville
Hendersonville
Hayesville
Waynesville
Clyde
Waynesville
Waynesville
Murphy

Ocean Isle Beach
Greensboro
Chapel Hill
Pineola
Edenton
Wilmington
Greenville
Lenoir
Apex
Cornelius
Lumberton

JUDGES

Samus. Carney
‘Aupert A. Corner, JR,
Suetty H. Desvouscrs
Tuomas G. Foster, Jr.
Daw K. Fox

ADDRESS

Charlotte
Smithfield
Raleigh
Pleasant Green
Hendersonville

Guoree J. Franxs®® Fayetteville
Nancy E. Gorpon Durham
Jane POWELL GRAY Raleigh
Joyor A. Hamiton Raleigh
Riomiwn D. Hour Waynesville
Suewwy S. Hour Wilmington
James M. Honsycurr Lexington
F. Warren Hugues” Burnsville
Jerry A. Jouy®8 Tabor City
A. Euzanem Keever Fayetteville
‘Wayne G. Kimpie®® Jacksonville
Davi Q. LaBare” Durham
Witua C, Lawron Raleigh
Daw A. Lescn™! Greenville
‘Wuuutam L. Lona™ Chapel Hill
Wruam A. Marsa”? Durham
Haron Paut McCoy, Jr. Halifax
‘Wim G. Mcliwam’* Wagram
‘LawreNce McSwars Greensboro
Cuartes M. Neaves’® Elkin
‘Tuomas R.J. NEWBERN Aulander
‘Troranis X. Nrxon7® Charlotte
L, Suzanne Owstey Hickory
Dennis J. REDWING Gastonia
Awwe B. Sausury Cary
J. Larry Senrer Raleigh
JosarH E. Serzer, JR. Franklinton
Russet Sweren U1"? Raleigh
Caruerme C. Stevens”? Chapel Hill
Wiwam G. Srewarr Wilson
Rosert D. Srusss”® Clayton
Leonaro W. THAGARD Clinton
‘Jerry WADDELL Bryson City
Freprick B. WILKINS, JR. Reidsville
RETIRED/RECALLED JUDGES
Ciaupe W, Auzsn, JR. Oxford
Grarron G, BEAMAN Elizabeth City
Sanat P. Barey Rocky Mount
Cuesrer C, Davis Winston-Salem
M. Parricia DEeVine Hillsborough
Dani, Freprick FIvcit Oxford
Lous F. Foy, Jk. Pollocksville
Jamies R. Founwoop Raleigh

Samust G. Grimes

Washington

JUDGES ADDRESS:

Lawrence Hammon, Jr. Asheboro
Jane V. HARPER Charlotte
Jousra J. Harper ‘Tarboro
Jou H. Horns, JR. Laurinburg
Pamir F. Howsrrox, Jr. Charlotte
Wruan K. Hunter High Point
Lian B. Jorpan Randleman
James E. Mareny Greenville
Epwarp H. McCormicx®? Lillington
Frrrz Y. Meroer, J, Summerfield
‘Teomas F: Moore Charlotte

J. Bruce Morron Greensboro
Onis M. Ouver Dobson

J. Ropwent Penry®! Lexington
Naver C, Pras Elizabethtown
Jan H. Samer® Greensboro
Maroarar L. Suarpe Greensboro
Cuantes M. Vincenr® Greenville

J, Kewr Wasupurn Burlington
Cnaries W. Witxivson, JR. Oxford

‘Retired on 31 December 2016, * Became Chet District Court Judge on I January 2017 * Sworn in 1 January 2017. 'Swom in 1 January 2017
‘Resigned 91 December 2016. *Swomm I January 2017. * Retired on 31 Janvary 2017, *Became Chet Disc Court Judge on 1 February
2047. *Svom mn 1 January 2017 ™ Sworn in 18 June 2017. * Retred on St December 2016." Swom in January 2017 ® Resigned on 24
February 207. "Rtied on 31 July 2017, "Sworn June 2017. " Swornin 17 November 2017. Reured on 31 December 2016. "Sworn,
in January 2017, ® Retired on31 December 2016. ®Swvom in I January 2016. * Retired St December 2016 * Resigned on 31 March 2015
Became Chief District Court Judge on 1 January 2017 * Sworn m 1 January 2017. “Retired on 5 April 2017. * Became Chiot District Court
‘Sudge on 6 April 2017. # Resigned on 31 December 2017. * Sworn in 1 January 2017, Sworn n22 August 2017, ® Resigned on 30 June
2047. # Sworn n 27 October 2017, * Retced on 3L Decerber 2016, ® Retired on SL December 2016 > Sworn i January 2017. Sion -
1 January 2017. * Retired on 1 September 2017. * Resigned on 31 December 2016 ® Became Distict Court Judge on L May 2017. ® Sworn
in 27 February 2017. PRotired on 31 December 2016 * Sworn in 17 July 2015 and resigned 31 Decermber 2016. “Resigned on 31 December
2016 © Resigned on 31 December 2016. Swom in 1 January 2017. Sworn in 1 January 2017, © Sworn n 1 January 2017.“ Sworn in L
January 2017, “Som non 6 December 2016. © Reired on 51 December 2016 © Swom in on 1 January 2017. Retied on 31 December
2016 # Redred on 51 December 2016, © Sworn 18 February 2016. “Sworn 6 March 2017. Reured on 31 December 2016. * Resigned
‘on31 December 2016. © Swom in I January 2017. ® Sworn in28 Apnl 2017 Swornin 18 December 2016 “Resigned on 10 August 2017.

© Swomin20 March 017. © Resigned on 6 February 2017. © Sworn in27 October 2017. Sworn n 7 March 2017 and resigned on 2July
2017. © Sworn in3 March 2017, ® Sworn w 23 July 2015 and resigned on 12 October 2017 Sworn in 1 February 2017. ®Swor in 6 Apo
2017. © Resigned on 17 Jy 2017. Resigned on 6 May 2017, " Swom 3 Apsl2017. "Sworn int March 2017, "Sworn in 27 Masch 2017
snd resigned 28 July 2017. "Resigned on 19 June 2017 ® Swom n 12 October 2017, * Died on 10 May 2017. * Resigned on 20 uly 2015,
Resigned on 5 December 2017. ® Sworn in 6 March 2017. # Resigned on 21 March 2016. ** Sworn n 11 August 2017, © Swom in 10 Apel
2017. ®Sworn in on 0 October 2015.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA
Attorney General
Josh Stein
Chief of Staff Deputy Chief of Staff
Sera Drarnn Davin Euuorr .
Chief Deputy Attorney General Senior Policy Counsel
AugxanDer McC. Psrers Sreve Manos
General Counsel Solicitor General
Swain Wood Mart Sawcnak
. Senior Deputy Attorneys General
Kevin ANDERSON AxaNa Marquis-ELDER Cuartes H. Hopgoop
Amar Masmunpar ‘Dan Hirscuman Donna D. Smit
‘Lesuz DismuKes ‘Enzapera L. McKay Srewart JOHNSON

Special Deputy Attorneys General

Daw J. Avior IL
Jonataan P. Bass.
Grapy L. BALENTING, JR.
AtESIA BALSHAKOVA
James BarHerson
James Bernier

Marc D. BernsTenn
Amy L. BircHer
Karen A. Buu
Ricuarp H. Braprorp:
Lisa B. BRADLEY
Srepuante A, BRENNAN
Anne J. Brown

Hipa Burnett-Baker
‘Sonya M. Cartoway-Duruam
Tuomas CAMPBELL
M.A. Katty CuaMBErs
Kerra CLayton
Lauren M. CLemMons
Douatas W. CorKHiLL
Kiwperty A. D’arrupa
New. C. Darron
Leonarp Dopp

James Doserrr

June S. Ferret
Josspit FINARELLI
Joun R. Gropw, Jr.
Ryan Hac

Matopy R. Hairston

Rory AGAN
ALISON A. ANGELL
‘Sreven A. ARMSTRONG

Anpen Harris
Jennurer Harrop
Curistiva S. Haves
E. Burke Havwoop
Micart Henry
Josepy E. Herrin
Isnam Faison Hicks
Tamera S, Hint
Amy Kunstiine Irene
Tenis S. Jacops
Creecy C, Jonnson
Danie S. Jounson
Durwn P. Jonzs
CaraerIne F. Jorpan

Freeman E, Kirpy, Jr,

‘Trany Lucas
Mary L, Lucasse
Ann W. Marrisws
Jasmine McGuee
Jess D. Mexeen
Brenpa E. Menarp
Derrick Mrrrz
Anne M. Mippreton
Danien Mosteiter
Josrru Newsome
Danist O'BRIEN
Ryan Park

‘Suaron Parricx-Witson

Joun A. Payne

Kumperty D. Porrer
Brian Rasinovitz,
Pump T, ReyNoLDs
Trtorny Ropgers
Scorr T. SLUssER
BraprorD SNEEDEN
M. Denise StanrorD
James M. Stanuey
Euzaperi N. Srrick.aND
Scorr Srroup

Ker D. Srorcis

Gary M, Teacug
Joserrine Terren
Buaxe Tuomas
Karuryn J. Tomas
Douetas P. THOREN
‘Teresa L, TowNsEND
Marrnew TuLcein

_ Victoria L. Voronr

Otca VysoTsKaya
Sanpra WALLACE-SMirHt
Mareaner L. Weaver
Larissa S. WILLIAMSON
‘Micuag. Woop

Panu K. Woops
Parrick Wooren
‘Tamara S. Zupa

Assistant Attorneys General

Jane ATMATADIS
Many Caria Bass
Rana BADWAN

xx

Joun P. BARKLEY
Scorr K. Braver
Nicaoas Brnzamin

Francisco BENzoNI
Micuast Barerr
Carote Biccers
Karaieen N. Bouton
Barry H. Biocn
‘CuristorHer Brooxs
Roperr BroucHTon
Brirrany Brown

J, Rick Brown

Sn A. Bryan
Martaew Buckner
Micuae Buutert
Bernany A. Burcon
Cara Byrne

‘Kuwperty CALLAHAN
Bert ConcePcion
Joun ConGLETON
Scorr A. ConKuN
Mouty Cozarr
Manrspen CRrawiBy
Recina Cucuruito
ALEXANDER M. Hicutower
Kiwperty D’Arrupa
Anna Davis

‘Troms H. Davis
Ciarence J. Detrorce DI
ApRIAN DELLINGER,
Micuetie Dennine
Torrey Dixon

Muinp Donere
Brenpa Eappy
Lauren EarNuarpr
Josspu E, Exper
Jupira Estevez

Marte Evirr

Forrest FALLANCA
Lisa FINKELSTEIN
Marcarer A. Force
earner H. Freeman
‘TeRRENCE D. FRIEDMAN
ANDREW FUuRUSETH
Davin Gore

Deporat GREENE
Atexanpra S. GRUBER.
Mary Euizasera Guzman
Heatner Haney
‘Nancy Dunn Harpison
Wruiam Harkins
Huon Harris

Wurm P. Harr, Jr.
Karnryne Haracock
Anprew Hayes

Ernest MicakL HEAvNER

Jessica Heums
‘Tamika HENDERSON
Wrrtey Henperx Beuic
Micuas: Henry

Canpace Horrman
Suerrt Horner-Lawrence
Kacy Hunt

Derex Hunter

Jossru Hype

‘Lauren Ike

Lareena Jonss-PamLuirs
Coun Justics

Aun Ketter

Anne E, Kirsy

Brent D. Kizian

Dana Kyn-Eun

Lewis LAMAR

CarHerine Laney

Suerrr LAWRENCE
‘Tuomas Lawron

Gwenpa Laws

Mapeuive Lea

Kyu Eun Les

Resecca E. Lem

Davin Lennon

Micueiie Licuort
Marrnew Lites

Jeremy LINDSEY

Kevin Manoney

Steven McAuuster
Marmn T. McCracken
Karaerins McCraw
Kinpette McCurien
Jarrett McGowan
‘Laura McHenry

Neat McHenry

Carotyn McLain
Curisropier McLennan
Kevin G. Manoney
Micuact Suawn Marr
Mercepes Restucha-Kiem
‘Les Miter

Tromas H. Moore
‘Kowperty Murrett
‘Tracy NAYER

Exten A. Newsy

Joun F. Oars

Roserta A. OvELLETTE
‘Zacuary Papcer

‘Sonpra C. Panico

Joun Parris
Curry A. Perry
‘Largena PHILups

‘LaSnawn L. Pravanr
Epony J. Prrrman
Caray Pore
Sanpra Posten.
Raseev K, PREMAKUMAR
Stacy Race

Kena Rakes
‘Knaperty RanporPa
Perer A. REGULASKI
‘Yvonne B. Ricct
Kristine RICKETTS
Timoriy RopcErs
Jason Rosser
Kenneta Sack
ALEXANDER SAUNDERS
Sruarr SAUNDERS
Joun SCHAEFFER
Eniy Scorr

Asuisi SHARDA
Jonaraan D. Saw
Kararyn Suretps
CARRINGTON SKINNER
Marc X. Syeep
Asner SPILLER
Dantet Spintman
Mary ANN STONE
Dyzan Sucar

Nora SULLIVAN
Jessica SUTTON
Ana Szamost
Matissa Taxtor
Joun Titery
‘Vanessa N. Torren
Payius A. TURNER
Kristin Utoxer
Janets VARLEY
Nancy Veccnta
Nicnotaos G. Vianos
Meuissa WALKER
ALEXANDER WALTON
Wiuiam Warton:
ALEXANDER WARD
James A. WEBSTER
Enzapeta J. Weese,
Ouver G. WHEELER
Ronatp Wittiams
Donna B. Woscix
Tromas M. Woopwarp
Curistine Wricur
Wayne YANcEY
Nicuoias Yares
‘Ryan ZELLAR

District

a>

OCOIATAWwHNE

pss

iB

-
i}

13

4

1bA
16B
16A
16B
16C
17A
1B

19A
19B
19C
19D
204,
20B
21

224
223
23

25
26
27h
27B

294
29B
30

DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

District Attorney

Anpy WomeLe
Sera Epwarps
‘Kiwperty Ross
Scorr THomas
Ernie Lee

Ben Dav
‘Vaverip ASBELL
Ropert Evans
Marr De.eriner
Mie Waters
JACQUELINE PEREZ
‘Lorrin FReeMAN
Vernon Stewart
Susan Dove
Buy West

Jon Davi

Roesr Ecuots
Par Napotsxt

Jim Woopat
Krrsty Newron
Jounson Brrr
Reece SAUNDERS
‘THomas Kerra
Ricky Bowman
Douce Henperson
RoxANN VANEEKHOVEN
Anpy GrEcson
Branpy Cook
Maureen Kruger
‘Lynn CLODrELTER:
Trey Ropinson
Jim O’New,
‘Saran Kirkman
Garry Frank
Tom Horner
Sera Banks
Davip Learner
Anprew Murray
Locke Bett

Mike Miter
Topp Winiiams
Tep BEw

Gree Newman
Asuety WELCH

Address

Elizabeth City
Washington
Greenville
New Bern
Clinton
Wilmington
Winton
Rocky Mount
Goldsboro
Oxford
Roxboro
Raleigh
Lillington
Smithfield
Fayetteville
Bolivia
Durham
Graham.
Hillsborough
Raeford
Lumberton
Rockingham
Wentworth
Dobson
Greensboro
Concord
Asheboro
Salisbury
Carthage
Albemarle
Monroe
Winston-Salem
Statesville
Lexington
Wilkesboro
Burnsville
Newton
Charlotte
Gastonia
Shelby
Asheville
Marion
Hendersonville
Waynesville

PUBLIC DEFENDERS

District Pustic DEFENDER ADDRESS
1 THOMAS P. ROUTTEN Elizabeth City
2 THOMAS P. ROUTTEN Washington
3A ROBERT C. KEMP, IIT Greenville
8B JAMES Q. WALLACE, II Beaufort:
5 JENNIFER HARJO Wilmington
10 CHARLES F. CALDWELL Raleigh |
12 BERNARD P. CONDLIN Fayetteville |
14 LAWRENCE M. CAMPBELL Durham
15B SUSAN SEAHORN Hillsborough
164, JONATHAN L. McINNIS Laurinburg
16B RONALD H. FOXWORTH Lumberton
18 FREDERICK G. LIND Greensboro
21 PAUL JAMES Winston-Salem
26 KEVIN P. TULLY Charlotte
27h KELLUM MORRIS Gastonia
28 M. LEANN MELTON Asheville
29B PAUL B, WELCH Brevard

CASES REPORTED

City of Asheville v. State of N.C. ....
CommsScope Credit Union
v. Butler & Burke, LLP.
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
MGI eee eee e ee eeee eres

E, Carolina Reg'l Hous. Auth.
v. Lofton ......... 6c cece eee ee

Fisher v, Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop.
Stabilization Corp. :

Hanesbrands Inc. v. Fowler ........
Harrison v. Genuma Power

Sys LLC voseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees
Holt v. N.C. Dep't of Transp.
Inre OLS. .oeeeeeeeeee

Inre Foreclosure of Beasley .......
Inre Foreclosure of Lucks .
In re Hughes

Inre LaBarre
Inre Mack ..
Inre Redmond
Inxre Smith ..

Midrex Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep't
of Revenue .
‘Murray v. Univ, of N.
Chapel Hill

N.C. State Bar v. Tillett ............
O'Neal v. Inline Fluid Power, Inc. ...
Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co.

v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. ........

Piro v. McKeever .

Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town
of Carthage ........eeeeeeeeeee

State v. Allman .
State v. Anderson
State v. Baker. .
State v. Barnett
State v. Campbell

Pace
80

48

202
216
572

57

221
222
489
538,
236
490

451

250
585
264
290
500
291

Pace
State v. Carvalho 309
State v. Collins 60
State v. Curtis 310
State v. Dalton 31
State v. Floyd . 329
State v. Godwin . 604
State v. Holloman . 615
State v. Jones . 681
State v. Juarez 351
State v, Knight 640
State v. Lowe 360
State v. McKiver 652
State v. Miller . 658
State v. Moir . 370
State v. Nkiam 61
Statev. Peny .- 390
State v. Romano 678
State v. Ross .. 393
State v. Saldierna 401
State v. Seam .
State v. Stith ..
State v. Thomsen
State v. Todd ...
State v, Walston .
State v. Young ..

Stokes v. Crumpton .

‘Town of Beech Mountain v. Genesis

Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. ..
‘Town of Boone v. State of N.C.
Turner v. Thomas

US. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Pinkney ... 723
United Cmty. Bank v. Wolfe ........

Walker v, N.C. State Bd. of
Dental Exam’rs...
Wilkes v. City of Greenville .

517

xxiv

ORDERS

Pace
Dep't of Transp. v. Adams Outdoor Advert.

of Charlotte Ltd. P’ship . 62
Doss v. Adams . 518
Neckles v. Harris Teeter ........-.. 749

SED Holdings, LLC v. 3 Star

Props, LLC ..
Sound Rivers v. N.C. Dep't of

Envtl. Res. 179
State v. Gann .. 519
State v. Ledbetter 64

Pace

State v. Martinez . 520
State v. Perry .. 29
State v, Richardson 28
State v. Seam 29
State v. Todd 180
State v. Young . 29
US. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v, Pinkney... 65
Wilkie v. City of Boiling

Spring Lakes 561

PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER G.S. 7A-31

Pace

Abrons Family Practice & Urgent Care, PA

v. N.C. Dep't of Health

& Human Servs. ... 486
Abrons Family Practice & Urgent Care, PA

v.N.C. Dep't of Health

& Human Servs. ............05- 534
Abrons Family Practice & Urgent Care, PA

v. N.C. Dep't of Health

& Human Servs. ...
‘Acts Ret.-Life Cmtys., Inc. v. Town

of Columbus .
Adams v. City of Raleigh
“Allscripts Healthcare, LLC v. Etransmedia

Tech., Inc. . 7
Allscripts Healthcare, LLC v, Etransmedia
530

Tech., Inc.

Tech., Inc. ...... 569
Alston-Toure v. Toure . 194
‘Assurance Grp., Inc. v. Bare 66

‘Azige v. Holy Trinity Ethiopian Orthodox
Tewahdo Church . 195

Azige v. Holy Trinity Ethiopian Orthodox
‘Tewahdo Church.

Ball v. Bilis 40
Bazargani v. Marks . 533
Bell v. Goodyear Tire

& Rubber Co. . 567
Blondel v. Ahmed 187

Pace
Blue v. Mountaire Farms, Inc. ...... 528
Boger v. McGee ......2..22022000 527
Bolier & Co., LLC v. DECCA Furniture
(USA), Ine. . 759
Boyd v. Rekuc. . 34
Brookbank v. Williams . 563
Bruns v. Bryant . 45
Bruns v. Bryant 188
Bruns v. Bryant . 758
Brunson v. State of N.C. 529
Bryant v. Bryant 526
Bryant v. Bryant .. 752,

Burns v. Kingdom Impact Global
Ministries, Inc. .

Campbell v. City of Statesville .
Campbell v. City of Statesville...
Cape Hatteras Blectric Membership Comp

48

v. Stevenson vee 483
Caron Assocs., Inc. v. Southside

Mfg. Corp. ... 189
Carter v, State of N.C. 38
Catawba Cty, v. Loggins 68
Catawba Cty. v. Loggins. 527
Chafin v, Chafin . 486
Chamberlain v. Bray .. 31
Chamberlain v. N.C. Dep't of :

Pub. Safety 42,
Chamberlain v. State of N.C. 37
Cherry v, Wiesner . 33
Christenbury Eye Ci

v. Medflow, Inc. 67

PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER G.S. 7A-31

Pace
Christopher v. Cobblestone HOA of

Clayton, Inc. 0... cee eeeee eee 196
City of Charlotte v. Univ. Fin.

Props., LLC . 37
Clark v. Dep't of Pub. Safety - 527
Clark v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety 195
Cooper v. Berger . 525
Cooper v. Berger . 562
Corbett v. McCrory ...........5+6- 191
Corwin v. British Am.

Tobacco PLC ..

Corwin v. British Am.

‘Tobacco PLC . 751
CSX Transp,, Inc. v. City

of Fayetteville.........-.6.-0 72
Darden v. Dep't of Pub. Safety ..... 534
Davidson Cty. Broad. Co., Inc.

v. Iredell Cty...... 530
Davis v. Hulsing Enters. LLC. 35
Dellinger v. Lincoln Cty. 190
DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

‘756
Bal

DOT v. Adams Outdoor Adver. of
Charlotte Ltd. Pship ........... 70

Draughon v. Cobblestone HOA of
Clayton, Inc. ee... eeeeeee eee

. Brooks Wilkins Fam. Med., P.A.
v. WakeMed . .
Easter-Rozzelle v. City

of Charlotte . 181
Eli Global, LLC v. Heavner 621
Falin v; Roberts Co. Field

Servs., Inc. 66
Fannie Mae v. Price . 186
Farrell v. Thomas ... 36
Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue . 198
Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop.

Stabilization Corp. ...........-. 201
Franks v. Cobblestone HOA of

Clayton, Inc. .........6. eee 196

Friday Invs., LLC v. Bally Total Fitness

of the Mid-Atl, Inc. . 185
Frisciav. Taylor . 43
Frisciav. Taylor. 197

Pace
G.S.C. Holdings, LLC v. McCrory 752
Gentry v. Brooks 753
Gerity v. N.C. Dep't of Health

& Bum. Servs. 185
Greene v. White . 199
Greene v. White . 485
Gurganus v. Gurganus . 153
Hall v. Sison. 486
Hanesbrands Inc.

v. Kathleen Fowler ...........5 47
Harrell v. Midland Bd.

of Adjustment TL
Harrington v. Roeder 47
Harris v. Gilchrist ... 68
Harris v. S. Commercial Glass . 8
Harris v. S. Commercial Glass . 569
Hart v. Brienza.... 69
Hashemi v. Hashemi-Nejad . bal
Hawkins v. Sutton 197
Head v. Gould Killian CPA

Grp, PA... 523
Hedden v. Isbell . 487
Hildebran Heritage & Dev. Ass'n, Inc.
Hoover v. Hoover 187
Hopper. Allen . 750

Howell v. N.C. Wayne Cty. Dep't of Health
46

Howell v. N.C. Wame Owe Dep't of. seat
& Human Servs. . 482

Huff v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety on
Huff v. Paramore 193
Hunt v. Perry ... 2 45
Hydev. Poole ..........000eeeeee 481
Inre AB. & IB. 182
InreAE.C. .. 527
Inre AHL. 562

487

756
In re Adoption of C.H.M. 529

Inre Alex Ohara King

Pace
192

Inre Chaves

Inre Collins . 564
Inre Coming Inc. BT
InreD.LW. . 43
Inre DP. & BP. B71
Inre Forclosure of Maine . 41
Inre Forclosure of Maine . 184
Inre Foreclosure of Adams 526
Inre Foreclosure of Bagwell %
Inre Foreclosure of Friscia 72
Inre Foreclosure of Friscia 185
Inre Gutowski . 187
Inre Hughes 182
Inre Hughes 33
Inre JAM. 480
InreJAM. . 750
Inre M.. 187
Inre Michelin N. Am, Inc, 36
Inre N.C. Rate Bureau 192
Inre N.C, Rate Bureau 580
InreN.GE 484
InreODS. . 43
Inre Peacock 14
Inre Price .. 32
In re Redmond . 38
In re Redmond . 182
Inre S.G.H. & JAH. 565
Inre Short 31
Inve Short 181
Inre Smith 38
Inre Smith 182
Inre TK... 757
Inre Thompson 524
Anre W.CD. 536
Inre White .. 74
Jamestown Pender, LR. N.C. Dep't

of Transp. . 535
Jarrett v, Jarrett 194
Johnson v. Johnson . 566
Johnson v. Johnsonow . 562
Johnson v. Prevatte . 183
Jordan v. State . 526
KB Aircraft Acquisition, LLC

v, Berry 581

Keaton v. ERMC I
Keaton v. ERMC I .

PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER G.S. 7A-31

Pace

Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Fam. Tr.
v.N.C. Dep't of Revenue ........ 46
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Fam. Tr.
v.N.C. Dep't of Revenue ...
King v. Albemarle Hosp. Auth.
Kornegay Fam. Farms, LLC v. Cross
Creek Seed, Ine. ..........ceee 69
Kornegay Fam. Farms, LLC v. Cross
Greek Seed, Inc. :

189
570

Larsen v. Arlington Condo. Owners
Ass'n, Inc. ... :

Leavitt v. Hargrove

Leavitt v. Hargrove

Leavitt v. State of N.C. . 69
Ledford v. Ingles Mkts., Inc. 69
Lennon v. N.C. Dep't of Justice 38
Lewis v. Transit Mgmt.

of Charlotte ... 750
Long v. Currituck Cty. 44
Long v. Currituck Cty. 74
Maine v. Nichols 184
Maldonado-Reynolds v. Perry . 76

McKenzie v. Dist. Ct.
McKenzie v. Horne ..
McLean v. Bank of Am., N.A.
Meinck v. City of Gastonia .
Merrill v. Winston-Salem Forsyth Cty.

Bd. of Educ.
Montessori Children’s House of Durham

v. Blizzard ... 31
Moore v. Caldwell . 34
Moore v. Daniels .. 79
Morris v. Scenera Res., LLC . 47
Murray v. Univ. of N

Chapel Hill .. 183
‘Murray v. Univ. of N.C. at

Chapel Hill ....
N.C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs.

v. Parker Home Care, LLC....... 188
N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety

VLedford ........ seers 40

N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety

N.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Mission
Battleground Park, DST ........

.

Pace
N.C. State Bar v. Sutton . 584
N.C, State Bar v. Tillett. 70
Neckles v. Harris Teeter . ‘750
Nereim v. Cummins . 186
Next Advisor Continued, Tne.
v. Lendingtree, Inc. ..........-5 197
Next Advisor Continued, Inc.
v. Lendingtree, Inc. .. 198
Next Advisor Continued, Inc.
vy. Lendingtree, Inc. 484
Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle . 46
Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle . 47
Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle 79
Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle . 484
Ninti v. Mecklenburg Cty. Wy
Noorsob v. Sup. Ct. of N.C. . 527

Ocwen Loan Servicing v. Reaves ... 564

Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford
"Fire Ins. Co. 567

Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l

Hosp., Inc. . 46
Piazza v. Kirkbride . 37
Pittsboro Matters, Inc. v. Town

of Pittsboro . 190
Plasman v. Decca Furniture

(USA), Inc. ..... TB
Plasman v. Decca Furniture

usa), Ine. 755
Ponder v. Ponder 528
Poole v. State of N.C. 522
Powell v. P2Enterprises, LLC . 186
Powell v. State of N.C. BB
Powell v. State of N.C. 481
Price v, Barlow 43
Price v, Smith... 7

Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town
of Carthage ...

Radcliffe v. Avenel Homeowners
Ass'n, Inc. ..
Ragland v. Nash-Rocky Mount Bd.

2
Rainey v. City of Charlotte 71
Reavis v. State of N.C. 199
Reid v. State of N.C. 187
Riggsbee v. Jones 42

PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER G.S. 7A-31

Pace
Riggsbee v. Jones 528,
Riggsbee v. Jones 568
S. Shores Realty Servs., Inc.
V. Miller... 0... cece cece eee e eee 563
Sain v. Cobblestone HOA of
Clayton, Inc. 196
Sanchez v. Cobblestone HOA
of Clayton, Inc. .......-.... eee 196

Sanderford v. Duplin Land
Dev, Ine, .
Sandhill Amusements, Inc. v. Shé

of Onslow Cty. ... 581
Sangster v. Shandles 484
Sauls v. Sauls 570
SED Holdings, LLC v.

Props, LLC ......2eecseeeeeee 70
SED Holdings, LLC v. 3 Star

Props., LLC 184
SED Holdings, LI

Props., LLC 528

Settlers Edge Holding Co., LLC
v. RES-NC Settlers dge, LLC... 522

Shreve v. N.C. Dept. of Justice 183
Snipes v. Britthaven, Inc. 8
Snipes v. Britthaven, Inc. 192

Sound Rivers v. NCDENR, Di
of Water Res.
Spruill v. Westfield Ins. Co. .
State v. Adams .
State v. Adams
State v. Adams
State v. Adkins
State v. Ali .
State v. Allen .
State v. Anderson .
State v. Andrews
State v. Anthony
State v. Applewhite
State v. Applewhite
State v. Ashworth .
State v. Ashworth .
State v. Baker...
State v. Baker .
State v, Baldwin .
State v. Barbee
State v. Barnes
State v. Battle .
State v, Battle.
State v. Batts .

PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER G.S. 7A-31

Pace

State v. Batts . 566
85

34

523,

State v. Berrero . 7

State v. Best . .

State v. Bishop

State v. Bishop

State v. Black .

State v. Blazevic . 188
State v. Boger . .

State v. Boger .

State v. Boger .

State v. Boger .

State v. Boger .

State v. Bohannon

State v. Boston.

State v. Bouknight 154
State v. Brice 42
State v. Brice 185
State v. Briggs . 198
State v. Brisbon 480
State v. Brown . 38
State v. Brown . 70
State v. Brown . 193
State v. Brown . 487
State v. Broyal . 197
State v. Brunson . 43
State v. Bullock 37
State v. Bumpers . 42
State v. Bumpers . 184
State v. Burke . 37
State v. Burke - 69
State v. Cain ... 191
State v. Campbell 43
State v. Cardenas . 191
State v. Carson. 756
State v. Carter . 183
State v. Carter . 481
State v. Carvalho . 201
State v. Castillo .. 40
State v. Chekanow . 484
State v. Christen ... 524
State v. Clapp . . 189
State v. Clark 31
State v. Clay . 565
State v. Cole . 191
State v. Coleman . 199
State v. Coleman . 487

State v. Coleman .
State v. Cook ..
State v. Cooper
State v. Cooper.
State v. Corbett,
State v. Coxton ..
State v. Crabtree .
State v. Craig ..
State v. Crandell .
State v. Crandell .
State v. Cummings .
State v. Curtis
State v. Curtis .
State v. Dail .
State v. Daughtridge
State v. Dawson
State v. Daye
State v. Deese .
State v. Dennings .
State v. Dick .
State v. Dick .
State v. Dockery .
State v. Dominguez .
State v. Dove ..
State v. Dupree
State v. Eaton. .
State v. Echeverria .
State v. Edwards .
State v. Eubanks .
State v. Eubanks .
State v. Farrar .
State v. Farrow
State v. Felton .
State v. Ferrell .
State v, Ferrell .
State v. Fields .
State v. Flowers
State v. Fowler .
State v. Fox .
State v. Fraley .
State v. Frazier .
State v. Frazier .
State v. Fredrick .
State v. Freeman .
State v. Frione .
State v. Frye .
State v. Fullard
State v. Gabriel

Pace

535
32

PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER G.S. 74-31 —

Pace
State v. Gann . 42
State v. Gann 529
State v. Godbey . 487
State v. Godwin . 68
State v. Goins . 44
State v. Golden . 47
State v. Goodman .

State v. Goodwin
State v. Gordon .
State v. Gould
State v. Grady ..
State v. Graham .
State v. Gray.
State v. Gray.
State v. Green
State v. Griffin
State v. Gutierrez
State v. Haizlip
State v. Haizlip
State v. Haizlip
State v. Haizlip
State v. Haizlip
State v. Hall .

State v, Hammonds
State v. Hancock
State v. Harris ..
State v. Harshaw
State v. Hayes
State v. Hayes
State v. Hendricks .
State v. Hernandez
State v. Hinton
State v. Hinton
State v. Hinton . .
State v. Holden ...
State v. Holloman .
State v. Holloway .
State v. Holloway .
State v. Hoover .
State v. Hoover .
State v. Hoover .
State v. Howard .
State v. Howell. .
State v. Howell
State v. Hudson .
State v. Huey .
State v. Huggins .
State v. Hunt ...

State v. Hurd .
State v. Hyde .
State v. Hyde .
State v. Hyde .
State v. Hyman
State v. Hyman
State v. Ingram...
State v. Jackson .
State v. Jacobs
State v. James
State v. James
State v. James
State v. Jennings
State v. Jilani
State v, Jilani
State v. Jilani ...
State v. Johnson
State v. Johnson
State v. Johnson ..
State v. Johnson
State v. Joiner
State v, Joiner
State v. Jones .
State v. Jones .
State v. Jones .
State v. Jones .
State v. Jones .
State v. Keller .
State v. Killian
State v. Killian
State v. King ..
State v. Kirkman
State v. Klingler .
State v. Lail .
State v. Lanclos .
State v. Lanier ..
State v, Ledbetter .
State v. Ledbetter .

State v. Lutz
State v. Macias

Pace

33
34
182
67
529
568
195
198
‘754
191
537
759
69

PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER G.S. 7A-31

Pace Pace

766 | State. Parisi .. . 1
487 | State v. Parker . . 759
536 | State v. Patterson . 199
State v. Patterson . 760
State v. Pearson . 199
State v. Pegram - 6
State v. Martinez State v. Perry . 8
State v. Mbaya State v. Perry - 35
State v. McBride State v. Phillips . 82
State v. McGill State v. Pigford . 189
State v. McKinnon . State v. Pineda . . 182
State v. McKiver State v. Pole . 38
State v. MeMickle State v. Portillo . 44
State v. McNeill . State v. Powell . 488
State v. McPhail State v. Price . 38
State v. McPhaul State v; Price . Bt
State v. Mellon State v; Price . 183
State v. Mellon State v. Pridgen a)
State v. Melvin State v. Pulley . . 8L
State v. Mendoza State v. Pulley .

State v. Metzger . State v. Ramey .

State v. Miller . State v. Rawlings .

State v. Mills State v. Raynor

State v. Millsaps . State v. Reed

State v. Monroe « State v. Reed

State v. Moorehead . State v. Reed

State v. Morganherring State v. Reed

State v. Mosher State v. Reid .

State v. Murchison . State v. Reed

State v. Murphy State v. Revels .

State v. Murrell State v. Reynolds .

State v. Murrell State v. Richardson .

State v. Nealen . . State v. Ridgeway

State v. Newell . State v. Roberts ..

State v. Newell . State v. Robinson

State v. Nichols -| State v. Robinson

State v. Nolasco State v. Robinson

State v. Noonsab . State v. Rogers .

State v. Noorsob . : State v. Romano .

State v. Noorsob . . State v. Ross .

State v. Norman : State v. Russom ..

State v. Nuon : State v. Sabbaghrabaiotti .

State v. Oakley . : State v. Sabbaghrabaiotti .

State v. Odueso : State v. Sadler .

State v. Oliver .
State v. Ore

State v. Ore
State v. Palacios .
State v. Parisi

PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER G.S. 7A-31

Pace

State v. Santana . 754.

State v. Santifort 566
State v. Schalow 480
State v. Schalow Bal
State v. Seam .. 32
State v. Seam 480
State v. Shaw . 189
State v, Shepherd . 562
State v. Shepherd . TBA
State v. Sheridan 565
State v, Sinclair . 3
State v, Smarr 47
State v. Smarr 200
State v. Smith 33
State v. Smith 34
State v. Smith 7
State v. Smith 186
State v, Smith 484
State v. Smith 524
State v. Smith 534
State v, Smith . 570
State v, Sorbello 199
State v, Spann .. BTL
State v. Spencer . 200
State v. Stanley . 196
State v. Stanley . 759
State v. Stasiv . 82
State v. Steele 4t
State v. Stewart . 565
State v. Stith .. 36
State v, Stout . 527
State v, Stroud 754
State v. Sutton 563
State v. Swink 154
State v. Tart 46
State v. Taylor 7
State v. Taylor 565
State v. Taylor 567
State v. Thomas . 485
State v. Thompson 485
State v. Thomsen 46
State v. Thorne . 37
State v. Todd . 66
Statev. Todd . 181
State v. Trull 200
State v. Turner 200
State v. Tamer 585
State v. Turner 536

State v. Valentine

State v. Whitaker

State v. White... 571
State v. Whitehead 488
State v. Wiley . 38
State v. Wiley . 481
State v. Williams 37
State v. Williams 69
State v. Williams 7
State v. Williams 488
State v. Williams 562
State v. Williams 563
State v. Williams 4
State v. Williams 7
State v. Williamson 526
State v. Wilson 182
State v. Wilson 527
State v. Wray . 533
State v. Wray . 570
State v, Wright 193
State v. Young 32
State v. Young 199
State v. Young 201
State v. Zuniga .. 6
Stokes v. Crumpton . 68
Stroud v. Pate Dawson, In« 42,
T&A Amusements, LLC
753
Wi)
+. 482
‘TD Bank, N.A. v. Eagles Crest at Sharp
‘Top, LLC es)
| Teague v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. 482
Terry v. State of N.C. ... 71
‘Thompson v. Evergreen
Baptist Church ..........0.0605 198

‘Town of Beech Mountain v, Genesis

Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc. .
‘Town of Beech Mountain v. Milligan
‘Townsend v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. ..
Tropic Leisure Corp. v. Hailey .
‘Tseng v. Martin .
Tully v. City of hiington :
‘urchin v. ENBE, LLC
Turner v, Cherry Hosp. «0.000000

US. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Pinkney .
Union Cty. v. Town of Marshville
Union Cty. v. Town of Marshville
United Cmty. Bank v. Wolfe ...
Usher v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Hosp. Auth.

PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER G.S. 7A-31

Pace

41

5
523
754
757
193
189
198

7
199
484

45
188
524

753
481

Pace

Wesley v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd.
70

Whicker v. Compass Grp. USA, Ine/”
Crothall Servs, Grp.

WidenI77 v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp. 192
Wiley v. L3 Comme’ns Vertex
Aereospace, LLC .............5 523

Wilkie v. City of Boiling

Spring Lakes
Williams v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc. 563
Williams. Pemy .......0ccceves1 522
Willowmere Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. City

of Charlotte oo
Wilson v, Curtis . 195
Wilson v, Wilson 77
Wilson v, Wilson 191
Worley v, Moore .. 190

‘Yahudah Washitaw of East Terra
Indians v. PHH Mortg. Corp. .

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

The following persons were admitted to the North Carolina Bar by
examination by the Board of Law Examiners in February 2016 and have
been issued a certificate by the Board.

Meghan Leigh Abernathy.
Anson Andrew Adams..
John Julian Aldridge IV
Andrew Paul Alexander.
Justin Bradley Allen
Alecia Janelle Amoo.
Ashley Lauren Anderson..
James P. Anderson.
Laurin Clark Ariail.
Isaac Benjamin Arledg
Erik Wayne Armstrong.
Erin Vocke Bailey
Robert Martin Barickman.
Jennifer Christine Baril.
Samantha Nicole Barnar:
Robert Loren Baxter. sammamish, WA
Denise V. Beals.. *

Christopher John Beddor
Vanessa Beltran-Ortiz...
Sara Brooke Blackman-Cheng Philadelphia, PA.
Joshua Dale Blanton..
Joseph Anthony Bomar.
Katherine Elizabeth Booth .
Joshua Lee Bower
Michael Taylor Bradbury
Joseph Zachary Brewer
Janean Lucille Bryant
Allen Kwabena Buansi. Chapel Hill
Atenas W. Burrola.
Nicholas Kehoe Byme.. Raleigh
Amanda Brisson Cannave
Stacey Amanda Cargile
Derek Howard Carr.. akland, CA
Michael Sylvester Cashman. reenville, SC

Rex Hyun Cho...
Erick Gabriel Cipau.. Raleigh
Mallory Jordan Clark Durham
Joseph Michael Clay. Raleigh
Ryan Allen Claytor Marion
Gretchen Nicole Cleevely Raleigh
Cynthia Louise Collins Chapel Hill
Marshall Parker Conr Cary
Stephanie Lynn Cooper Harrisburg
Adrienne Elizabeth Coronado Raleigh

xxiv

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Casey Leanne Couch . Charlotte
Dufferin Carlyle Culpepper . Charlotte
Awanti Ashok Damtle...

Tatiana Sergeyevna Daniel
‘Aaron Rhoades Dar
Frederick C. Davis
Joshua Carl Dawsor
Colin Thomas Dean . Charlotte
David Eugene Dean . Charlotte
Joshua John DeBottis, . Charlotte
Anthony Thomas DelNero

Kaitlin Caswell Dewberry...
Daniel Michael Diamonc

Scott Wells Drorbaugh
Andrew George Dualan.
Daniel Robert Dziuban.
Jamie Lauren Eck.

Steven Ashley Farr
Grace Daniel Faulkenberry
Paul David Florence Greensboro
Ibelis Flores. Concord
Brandon T. Forbes. . Charlotte
Richard Godwin Alexander Ford . Charlotte
‘Timothy Lee Fridley Charlotte
Michael Todd Fulks
Rhett Fulle
Melissa Li Voti Garcia,
Ikee Inez Alberta Marie Gardner
Tracie Ellen Gardner.
Philip J. Gibbons Jr.
Erin Elizabeth Gibbs ..
Lindsay Lee Goldsmi
Scott Kenneth Goldsmith..
Alexis Janae Gonzalez
Katherine Hopkins Graham.
Stacy Goto Grant
C. Douglas Green.
Celeste Griffin-Churchill
Leslie Ann Griffith...
Richard Gatlin Groberg.
Melissa Stewart Groff.

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Nathan Joseph Gudeman.
Katherine Ashley Hahn

Kyle David Hamilton
Christopher Randall Hampton. Yadkinville
Ashley B. Harris Raleigh

Alexandria Skye Hartill.
Heather Elizabeth Hazelwood.
David Benjamin Hefferon

Konner Prestin Higgins

Christopher Allen Hodgson thapel HM
Kelly Knight Holder. ireensboro
Pilar Horne-Davis.. ale

Teagan Irene Hurnphris Cary
Nhung Do Hurst. Boone
Alexis Marie Iffert. harlotte
‘Trevoria LaChelle Jackson ..

Michael Robert Jims.

Carrie Victoria Johnson Walters
Kayla Lynn Kanary.

Patrick William Keeley.

Richard Walter Keene IIL Raleigh
Jonathan Ashley Kendricl Hendersonville
Glenn Sandler Kern Asheville
Matthew David Kil; Charlotte
Nikdd L. Kimball Charlotte

Bryan Paul King Charlotte
James Thomas Koebel Wilmington
Jessalee Lumsden Landfried Durham
Robert Stephen Latreille.

John Morris Lawin;

Steven Edwin Lechner.
Amanda Blake Lingerfelt.
Nicholas McLeod Livengoos
Thomas Donald Lodwick.
Steven Lars Lundberg.
Lindsey Bllen Lynskey.
Scott Douglas MacLatchi
Andrew Charles MacLeod
Lauren Nicole Madonia.

Madison Elle Marvell.
Mark Christian Marvelli
Rachel Christine Matesic.

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Rheanna Jean Matonis
Wesley David Mayberry ..
Erin Elizabeth McKee.
Hayden Brooks Nyland McNeill.
Marianella Medelius Marsano
Eric John Meehan.

. Winston-Salem
.-Alexandria, VA
. Winston-Salem

Bradley Scott Moree.

Molly Elizabeth Morgan..
Zachary Joseph Moulton.
Amanda Marie Moyer..
Patrick K. Murphy.
Jason T. Mushnick
Elizabeth Bahati Mutisy:
Kellie Zagorski Myers..
Courtney Kristin Neal..
Gregory Todd Nelson...
Vincent John Nicolsen.
Stacie Marie Noe..
Grayson David Oakley
Kaitlyn J. O'Connor
Michael Francis Ohrenberg¢
Meghan Marie O'Keeffe
Hamid Reza Olang..

rightsville Beach
Raleigh

Nicole Ann Vibbert Price
Stephanie Marie Proietty.
William Arrington Pully
Stephen Kyle Pytlik

Kathleen Marie Ramaker.

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Hannah Victoria Randolph
Amanda Katherine Reasoner.
Joshua Michael Reed,
Caroline Marie Richardson.
Jessica Richardso
MaryJane Richardsor
Kate Kennedy Rizzuto .
Marcos Michael Roberson.
Jennifer Jeanne Robinson ..
Maureen Leila Robinson
Paul Will Durant Robinson
Cameron David Rodefier:
Jonathan Kevin Ros
Gregory Lee Rouse
Christopher Houston Rumfel
Paul Runes.
Robert William Schulte II
Emily Elizabeth Seawell
Rebecca Sedgwick
Gelila Anbesaw Selassie
Monique Michelle Sexton
Kathleen Anna Sicuranza,
Elizabeth Gray Simmons
Kierra Lashae Simmons...
Richard Inglesby Simons
Holly Simpson..

Ashley Berger Snyder

Christopher Steingass
Daniel James Stephenso
Russell Taylor Stewart
Zhan Su.

Lindsey Elizabeth Surratt

Leslie Shannon Swimme
Natasha Tam Wing Little
Hannah Katherine Tedde
‘Alison Cara Templeton.
Kimberly Russell Thaxton.
Barbara JoAnne Thomas
Lee Michael Thomas...
Kellye Nicole Thompson,
‘Troy Norman Thresher.

Michael Jacy Thurmond. springfield, VA

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Katheline Tran.
Madeline Jade ‘Trilling
John William Tucker.
Justin Danson Tuck
Joshua Robert Valentine
Mary Katherine Varner.
Michael Joseph Vivenzio.
Jennifer Vuillermet.
Sean Charles Wagnei
Xiaoyang Wang.

Benjamin Matthew Weado Charlotte
Tiffany Ann Webber. Harrisburg
Anna Marie Welsh Charlotte
Joshua Benton Whaley Hickory

Amy C. White. Fayetteville
Brycen Gregory Raleigh
Clayton Robert Williams. Charlotte
Jaime Delrae Lester Williams. Raleigh
Peter Gannon William: Charlotte
Ashley Meredith Williams: Concord
Melissa Mary Wilson..... .. Vale
Jeremy Alexander Winters Chapel Hill
Susan Brown Wolfe Charlotte
Joseph Coleman Wombw

Emily Mee Sam Wong.

Eric Scott Worthingto

James Paul Wynn.

Paula Janelle Yost.

Brandon Davis Zeller

Diamond Desire Zephir.

Erik Randall Zimmerman.

Mark Henry Zwaanstra.

The following persons were admitted to the North Carolina Bar by
examination by the Board of Law Examiners in July 2016 and have been
issued a certificate by the Board.

Taylor Lena Abbasi.

Morgan Parker Abbott Raleigh
Gregory Bates Adair. Clinton, SC
Andrew McClain Adams Winston-Salem
Taylor Jacob Adams Monroe
Jacquelyn Faith Adcock. Durham
David Winston Addison... Mebane
April Faridah Adeeyo .. Durham
Rafiyat D. Adegbuyi. orrisville
Shayan Ahsan Ahmed. Kenner, LA
‘Travis Worth Albea.. Greenville

Kelsey Brooke Alcide..

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Kimberly Ann Alderson Tobler
‘Anna Marie Allen
Jackeline Ambrose-Muzyl
Anthony Nathaniel Amos.
Christina Lucille Andersoy
Eric Steven Anderson.
Howard Walton Anderson
Lucas Anthony Anderson.
Jessica Leah Ans...
Ashlee Nicole Aragon.
Kerry-ann Candice Arcl
Meghan Elizabeth Ashworth
‘Michael Jonathan Atkins Jr.
Dana Copeland Atkinson..
Kelly Jean Austin
Taylor Craig Auten
Andrew Craft Avram.
Hurshell Eugene Baggett..
Christopher R. Bagley
Delsie-Anne Christina Baile;
Kaitlyn Brooke Baile
Melissa Williams Bailey.
Jordan Anthony Ballard.
Kelly Morrow Barco...
Joshua Daughtry Barefoo'
Seth Elliot Barefoot.
Katharine Yale Bares...
Caroline Maranda Bassett
Sara Maurizi Beauvalot.
Michael Alexander Becke
Jordan Elizabeth Bentz
Brett Oliver Berne..
ShaKeta Denise Berti
Kinnari Mahendra Bhojani.
Peter John Bigham Jr.
Joseph Letrell Bishop.
Mitchell Hendrix Blankenship
Jonathan David Blanto
‘Anna Nicole Blood.
‘Tiffany Jean Bolin
Jessica Davis Boney...
Joshua Bonney...
Olivia Mary Bouffard
Michael O'Brien Bowlin Jr.

~ Meghan Hileen Boyd Ward ..
Josiah Dan Bragg...

Charles Boyce Brooks IIL

LICENSED ATTORNEYS
Adam Hatley Brown
Catherine Sims Brown.
Jared Brown.
Lindsey Morgan Brown.
Martha Stockton Brown.
Hampton H. Bruton
John Hunter Bryson
Christopher Michael Bullard.
Jone Kala Bullet.
Jonathan Michael Bunker..
Daniel Joseph Burk«
Nicole Grace Burnette
Noal Austin Butler...
Christopher Aaron Byrd.
Alana Marie Byrnes
Laura Lee Campbell.
John Michael Cantril
Emily Victoria Carico.
Kyle Joseph Carlson.
Michael Arthur Carpenter.
Cari Elizabeth Carson
Brooks Ryan Carter.
Ashlea Marie Carver
Diana Carolina Castro Ramos.
Michael Kyle Caswell.
Heather Christine Cavanaugh
Andres Adolfo Geberio..
Amanda Brooke Chatman
Hannah Dajung Choe.....
‘Tyler Floyd Chriscoe
Kirsten Renae Clancy.
Victoria Lynette Clarkson.
Zachary Tyler Clouser ...
Richard Scott Cogar
Clinton Heidt Cogbum.
Michael Bernard Cohen
Meghan Kathleen Coniglione
Michael Alexander Conners.
James Spencer Cook.
Aneshia Allister Cooper.
Lacey Renee Coppage
Kellie Marie Corbett
Catherine Collette Corser.
Jennifer Rose Coiner..
Carly Michelle Couch:
Caitlin Anne Counts
Alexander Covington.
Matthew Lewis Cox.
Samantha Lynne Cox.
Kevin Raymond Crandall.
Connor Harris Crews
James Joseph Cronin

Greensboro
. Chapel Hill
. Creedmoor

fe

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Brittany Charlotte Croom.

Benjamin James Patrick Cross Chapel Hill
Sabrina Lee Cuadrado. Graffrey, SC
Megan Ashley Cullen. .. Charlotte
Devin John Cummins Williamsburg, VA

Andrea Lynn Curle . Los Angeles, CA
John Edgar Romaine Curtis Havelock
Anna Shepard Daniel, Carrboro
Caroline Elizabeth Daniel tharlotte

Nicole Kahlia Daniels.

David Journey Darr tharlotte
Nicholas D'Auria. ‘inehurst
Skye Alexandria Davic . Raleigh
Brandy Lee Davis. Winston-Salem
Charlotte Elizabeth Davis Charlotte
Hillary Dawe Charlotte
Premela Gillian Deck Cary

Shannon Lynn DeJesus
Michele Delgado... Chapel Hill
Zabrina Barbosa Delgado
Cara Artuso Dempster .. Knightdale
Jeb Stuart Dennis...
Jack Darren Densmore Goodlettsville, TN
‘Taylor Diamond
Maggie Harris Dickens.
Jaren Dickerson.

Patrick A. Doerr... Silver Spring, MD
Preston Howard Dole. se

Eric Thomas Dolenti
Peter Francis Donohue
Jon Parker Douglas
JoLisa D’nise Drayto
Mary Frances Dudley
Brian Matthew Dunaway
Kathleen Phillips Dunn
Cassandra Marcella Duran ..
Patricia Genevieve Duret. Indianapolis, IN
LaFarran Renee Durman
John Heyward Earnhardt.

James Anthony Eatman Raleigh
Justin Michael Edge .. Boone
‘Adam Elkins... Troy
Joseph Haydon Ell Raleigh

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Joseph Wesley Ellis .

Olivia Harper Ensign. Woodland, CA
Erin Holcomb Epley. ewisville
‘Ashley Sarah Esco Raleigh
Rebecca Amelia Ewing yacham.
Taylor By... raxhaw
Joseph Sherwood Ezzell. Mount Olive
Anastasia Elizabeth Fanning.. Charlotte
Richard Benjamin Faulkner lorehead City
Ryan Mitchell Feinberg.. Wilmington
Paige Dorothy Miles Feldmann. Raleigh
Sean William Fernandes ‘reensboro:
Alma Delia Fernandez. Charlotte
Joseph Anthony Ficarrotia. ‘Washington, DC
Amanda Leigh Fisher .. ‘Ashburn, VA
Meredith FitzGibbon Charlotte
Ashley Lynn Flaherty. Charlotte
‘Melissa Kay Flanagan. Fuquay-Varina
Macy Lee Flinchum ‘lemons
Patricia Ann Flood. Chapel Hill
Wilson Frank Fon; Climax
Sumner Christopher Fontain: Greensboro
Catherine Ann Forneri ‘Mebane
Rebecca Forte... Monroe
Oliver Daniel Frey. Dublin, OH
Andrew Corey Frost. Chapel Hill
Bernard Charles Funk Charlotte
Koral Elyse Fusselman. Asheville
Amanda Lynne Gainey . Newport
Chelsea Elise Gajewski. Charlotte
Tarrah Janel Garabato Brown. Mooresville
‘Timothy Edward Garcia. festminster, CA
Rudolf Alexander Garcia-Gallont. Winston-Salem
Jane Creighton Garrity. Winston-Salem
Regan Michelle Gatlin. Smithfield
Rebecca L, Gauthier. Charlotte
Brandon Michael George Graham
Matthew Eric Gerber Greensboro
Lily Clara Geyer .Woodbridge, VA.
George Everett Gibbs Jr. Matthews:
John Thomas Gibsor Greensboro
Nicole Shae Giffin. Charlotte
Luke Andrew Gilhooly ‘tanfordville NY
Rebecca Paige Gitlen . Raleigh
Robert J. Glowacki Jr. Raleigh
Jacob Allen Goad. Durham
Ethan Goemann Charlotte
Justin Bradley Gofo Charlotte
Mary Ellen Goode Charlotte

Rachel Tait Goodling.

Raleigh

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Delia Rose Ledesma Goubeaux
Dawnielle Y. Grace
David James Grant
Evin Lamar Grant "
Damon Gray .... funtersville
Susan Pegram Greeson
Jasmine Meche’ Gregory.
Ashley Nichole Grisham
Stacey Marinn Groce.
Mary Catherine Simpson Gross
Stephen Arnott Guardipee.
Kaylee RaeAnne Gum.
Benjamin Simon Gurlitz.
Brian Gwyn.
Eric Dean Hageman,
Lauren Ellis Halbert...
Joshua Richard Hall ..
William Barrett Hamner.
Ross Tanner Hardeman.
‘Maren Margaret Erling Hardin.
Toni Johnson Hardin.
Jaren Soibhan Hardy.
Jeremy Ham.

Joshua Owen Harper.
Jennifer Lynn Harringto
Quintina Cherrice Harrington.
Molly Hunter Harris...
Precious Harrison-Cobb
William Robinson Hartzel
Amanda San Mei Hawkins.

Erica Jade Taylor Helmle..
Hannah Elizabeth Heltzel
Audrey K. Henderson.
Andrew Eliezer Henlde
Barbara Hemy.....

Erica Martin Henson
Christian Nathaniel Herring
Kimberly Anne Herron.
Margaret Wilks Hertzler
Patricia Isabell Heyen
Heather Marie Higgins .
Camille Elyse Hill.
Eric Robert Hinderliter
Travis Styres Hinman

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Elise Christine Hofer.
Michaela Connors Holcombs
Laura Holland..
Caleb John Holloway
Patrick Dale Holme
Tyler Stewart Hood.
Martin Lee Horowi
Caline KitLien Hou
Joseph C. Hoyle ..
Alexandra Bradsher Hubbard.
Margaret Unger Huffman.
Ivana C. Hughes.
Felicia Marie Hyde.
Warren David Hynson

Morgan Mikolajczyk Insley.

Robin Elizabeth Jenkin:
Kenia Soares Johannes
Alicia Michelle Johnson.
Astrid Tikiya Johnson
Emily Karen Johnson
Kayla Brooke Johnson...
Lindsay Marie Johnson
William Hester Johnson
Kelly Jones...
Britny Marie Kaltenbach..
Katlin Jessie Karges.
Daniel P. Karlsson.
Devon Howell Karst
Anna Marie Karvelis .

Danielle Elizabeth Kimelstein.
Christopher Gary King.
Alexander Frank Kingsley.
‘Taylor Marie Kinsey...
Alexandria Paige Kirby
Lindsey Ameliann Knapp...
Michael Eldon Kohagen.
Kelsey Kolb..

Charles Michael Kunz.

Durham

Charlotte

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Marissa Ann Kuzbyt....
Cameron Alexandra Lamb:
Thomas Elmo Lamm
Jacob Josiah Lan
Elizabeth Amanda Larner.
Ma‘idah Nasrin Lashani.
Allison Leigh Laubach
Kerriann Elise Laubach.
Daniel James Lawall..
Jonathan Daniel LeCompte
Joshua David Lee
Scottie Forbes Le
Eunice Yoohyang Lee-Ahn.
Benjamin Leighton.
Dominic Michael Lerario
Ryan Bowen Leverone

Daneen Furr Lipscomb .
Safari Littl
Michele Lee Livingstone
Selby Alvin Lo .
Jeremy Daniel Locklear
John Charles Lohman.
Giancarlo Lookman
Aracely Lopez...
Jordan Blizabeth Leigh Lowery
Holly Ann Wilcox Luther
Michael Robert Lynch . Charlotte
Sarah Elisabeth Mabry-Caraffa. Raleigh
Madison Locke Mackenzie Raleigh
Sean R. Madden... Raleigh
Jaclyn A. Mafietore .Greensboro
Anna Christina Majestr w
Patricia Louise Mallory. i
Joseph B. Mangun..
Matthew P. Margiotta Raleigh
Andria Dayna Marque:
Jessica Ann Marsden.
Kevin Anthony Marshall.
Edward William Martin . Charlotte
Carmela Mastrianni Hillsborough
Jovanna Nicole Mast . Charlotte
Kelly William Mathews. . Charlotte
Jonathan Chambers Mattox... Bryson City
Chelsey Marie Maywalt.. i

Katie McAbee...
Ashley Jordan McBride.

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Melissa Andrea McCallop.
Nicole Marie McCluney.

Mark Christopher Melntyr.
Ryan James McIntyre
Benjamin Russell McKaig.
‘Timothy McLister....
Sarah Bess McPherso
Amanda Dwyer McQuade.
Adam Russell Melrose.
Maria Rafaella Mendoza Guillem,
Lora Meredith Mercer

Chandler Abernathy Michael
Marion William Middleton

‘Sean Frank Miles

Taittiona Miles..

Daniel Lee Miller. ‘Manhattan, NY
John Thomas Miller. Rutherfordton
Matthew James Millisor. Greensboro
Rebekah L. Mills. arkesburg, PA
Elena Faria Mitchell .. Charlotte
Sharelle Mitchell. Henderson
Samantha Carien Mob . Charlotte
Maria Concetta Moore

Sadler Blaydes Moore . Weddington
Leora Hermanson Moreno. srooklyn, NY
Jonathan David Morgan. arner
Samuel Kerr Morris-Bloot

Brennon Blake Morton...

Jeremiah Grant Mosteller Denver
Cassandra Nicole Motley LA
Deborah A. Moy.. .. Whitsett
Michael Mulvey Philadelphia, PA.
Gerald Patrick Murphy Jr.

Lindsay Gayle Murphy

Kevin James Murtagh

Alexander Thomas Arthur Myers

Logan Drew Myrick.

Meredith Renee Nall. Charlotte
Yohan Namkung.. Chapel Hill

Benjamin Neece. Durham
Henry Coble Nese
Whitney Maquel Nelthorp:
Joni O'Neal Nichols
Kristi Alyse Nickodem Chapel Hill
Stephanie Marie Nieha ‘Wayzata, MN
Steven James Niezgoda.. Durham
Yuping Niou..

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Nkia (No last name)
Daniel Jared Nobles
Jacob Granville Oakes
Claire Regina O’Brien.
Frank Baner O'Hale
Amy Claire O'Neal
Dorothy Clayton O'Neill.
Shawnice Nickelle Orange.
Maria Ortiz.
Daniel Patrick O'Shea
Caroline O'Connor Outten.
Lauren Yvonne Paglia..
Addison Tomasko Palanza..
‘Timothy Thomas Palmer.
Michael Edward Palombo ..
Diane Kristine Pappayliou.
Amanda Amber Pasha.
Kruti Harshad Patel.
Nishma Patel
Charise Sylvia Patterson

Nolan Ray Perry

Erika Michele Pete
Colin Petersen.
Joseph Petersor
Madeleine Michelle Pfefferle.
Melanie Ann Pfeifer.
Haley Elizabeth Phillips.
Robert Cooper Pickren.
Bonnie Fletcher Pierc
Stacy Miranda Pigden.
William Piontek.
Ashley Kendall Pittm:
Gregory Alan Posch.
James Frederick Potts
Kaitlin Price:
Brittany Alexis Pucke
Victoria Pugh.
Margaret Katherine Ramseur
Austin Yates Raymond
‘Timothy James Readling.
Alexander Jordan Recto:
James Patrick Redmo
Monica Rochelle Reid
Elizabeth Astrid Reim

Oklahoma City, OK

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Amanda Marie Reney
Jeanna Suzanne Revel
Lindsey Blair Revel:
Alexis Reynolds ..

Taylor Stephen Ric

Daniel Parker Richey
Jocelyne Michelle Riehl.
Erinn Leslie Rigney.
Christopher Robert River:
Alec Carlisle Robersot
Kayla Louise Robinso!
Patricia Ryan Robinson.
Chelsea Lauren Rodrigu
Andrew Roy Rogers...
Erica Barbara Elizabeth Roger:
Caolan John Ronan.
Austin Roop...

Harvey Lee Rous

Edna Nicole Roy

Jamie Elizabeth Rudd.
Geneva Griswold Runion
Edward Nathan Russell I
John Ira Sanders

Mary Caitlyn Sanders
Robert Gwinn Schaaf.
George Edward Schinkel.
Angela C. Schulz

Gabriel Thomas Scott.
Mary Woodell Scruggs.
Alexandra Victoria Seabol
‘Aaron Michael Seagroves
Candace Moore Seagrove:
Lillie Martin Seifart.
Bradley Alan Setzer.
Jamison Louis Shabanowitz.
Meredith Susan Sharpe
Tsabella Houston Shaw.
Joseph Robert Shealy.
Charlotte Alice Sheppard.
Maxwell Davis Shipley.
Richard Seth Sholar.
Austin Jeffrey Shor
Heather Dawn Short.
Joseph R. Shuford.

John Thomas Sim...
‘Taylor Brandon Simmons
Rosanne Niforos Si
Laura Patricia Sloane:
Mesha Sharnay Sloss.
Shirley Bergen Smircic..

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Carson Thomas Smith.
Eleanor Margaret Smith..
Emily Elizabeth ‘Smith.
Holly Rebecca Smith.
Jared Shane Smith.
Kelvin Dwayne Smith..
Shernika Nicole Smith
Sloan Winstead Smith
Matthew Hammond Sommer
Caroline Diane Sorensen...
Robert Scott Sparks
Brandon Mark Spleen..
Eric Thomas Spose..
‘Andrew B. Spradlin
Cristina Chenlo Stam...
Henry Austin Stapp.
Andrew David Steffenser
Jake Stewart..
Brittany Nicole Stiltne!
Sheldon McCurry Stokes
Jordan Alayna Stomean..
Dana Caroline Stone.
Jessica Dianne Ston
‘Troy Robert Stone.
Stacy Elise Strickland
Sean Stroehle
Dylan Carroll Sugar.
Kenille Renae Sumler..
Preetha Lakshmi Suresh.
Ryan P. Suttor
Katelin Elizabeth Taylor..
Lisa Marie Taylor
‘Trey Benjamin Taylor..
Valerie Jo Thelen.
Jamie Lynne Thom:
Stuart Gallagher Thomaso!
Kacey Jo Tilley

Donna Marie Tooill..
Kristina Marie Torpy.
‘The Honorable Vincent George Torpy Jr.
Dinh Tran...
Lauren E. Travers.
Melissa. Ann ‘Travis.
Melissa Anne Tulis.
Lauren Andrea Tuttle .
Joe Elias Valentin

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Patrick Taylor Vander Jeugat.
Isaac Anthony Vargas.
Richard William Veronen Jr.

Seth ‘Tyre Walker.
Victoria Velazquez Walker.

Kelly Anderson Warlich
Phillip Ryan Waters
Kandace Lauren Watkin:
Kristen Peters Watson.
Jessica Laura Watts
Britney Weaver.
Justin Garrett Webb
Chelsea Mullane Weiermille:
Meredith Elizabeth Weisle
David Michael Welch..

Alexandria June Weller...

Kathryn Gillespie Wellman

Brittany Sade’ Whidbee. Elizabeth City
Jefferson Palmer Whisenant Moore, SC

Gregory Donald Whitaker. Fairfax, VA
James Merritt White Concord
Megan Christine Whit jolumbia, SC
John Carter Whittington Raleigh
Jeffrey Scott Wilkerson. Charlotte

Benjamin Charles William:
James David Williams
Andrew Garner Wilso1
Patricia Lea Wilson.
Zachary James Wilso1
Joshua Aaron Windham.
Jonathan Brian Winslow Ir
Melissa Pekrun Woodar
John David Wooten IV

Asheville
Henrico, VA
. Charlotte

Joshua Aaron Yost..
Alyse Atkinson Young

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Elizabeth City

Jean Ye Zhuang.

The following persons were admitted to the North Carolina Bar by
comity by the Board of Law Examiners in 2016 and have been issued a
certificate by the Board.

Maureen Louise Abell
Jeffrey D. Adams .....

‘Timothy Vitow Anderson
MaryBlizabeth Andriko-Moore
Brian James Bailey
Devinn Nicole Barnette ..
Joseph Martin Barry
Tabitha Angel Bingham .
Lee Carroll Bollinger, III

Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Applied from the State of Virginia
pplied from the State of Pennsylvania
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of New York
. Applied from the State of Kentucky
Applied from the State of Hinois

Lynn Krisay Brehm \pplied from the State of Pennsylvania
Kenneth Michael Brown . Applied from the State of Washington
Matthew Edmund Browning Applied from the State of Texas
Christina Bowden Burgess Applied from the State of New York
Terrence Francis Canela Applied from the District of Columbia
Joshua Brown Carpenter Applied from the District of Columbia
Mary Summer Carroll \pplied from the State of Pennsylvania
Michael Moonkyung Choy Applied from the State of Hinois
Kelly Leigh Christopher Applied from the State of Georgia
Kirk Robert Chrzanowsk .pplied from the State of Illinois
Debra Satinoff Clayman . Applied from the State of District of Columbia
Daniel Tyler Cowan Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Josef C. Culik . Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Kenneth Andrew Cutshaw Applied from the State of Georgia
Melinda Ellen Cyr Applied from the State of New Hampshire
Lisa Ann D’Agostino Applied from the State of Georgia
Carlyn Beth Ferguson Davis .. Applied from the State of Ilinois
Meredith Curran Desharnais Applied from the State of Massachusetts

Joshua Michael Diver
Jamie D. Dunkel ..

Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Applied from the State of Oklahoma

David Mark Eaton .pplied from the State of Mississippi
Kelly Eisenlohr-Moul Applied from the State of Georgia
Ann MeNellis Elmore Applied from the State of Georgia
Heather June Enlow-Novitsky .pplied from the State of Ohio
Michael G. Flanagan .pplied from the State of Ilinois
Daniel Chappell Flint pplied from the State of Michigan
Joseph John Fontanetta Applied from the State of New York
Paul Louis Frampton, Jr Applied from the State of West Virginia
Benjamin Robert Freeman Applied from the State of West Virginia
Michael T. Freeman Applied from the State of Virginia
Aline D. Galgay ... Applied from the State of New York
Rachel Mary Garcia Applied from the State of Ilinois

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Megan Erin Gemunder .
Michelle Marie Gerred ..
Michael McGrath Giovannini
Christopher O’Neil Grant
Kristi Lee Graunke

John Everette Hall, Jr.
Mark Steven Hanor
Richard Cushman Haskel
Mark Alexander Hiller ..
Julia Carole Thompson Hord ..
Maria Walters Hughes
Sarah Jane Jacobs ..

Adam David Johnson

Carol ¥. Kendrick

Mark S. Kestnbaum

Kristin Joanne King

Amber Shauntise Koger
Mary Barbara Kubicz

David William Lamb ..
‘Timothy Ryan Langle;
Michael Lantrip .

Rebecca Lynn Lepkowski
John Clinton Lloyd
Christopher Allen Lott
Corrine Lenore Lusic
Christy MacPherson Maple
Jared Paul Martin.

Philip Leroy Martin

Gina B. Masterson

David Jonathan Matthews
Julia Alexandra May
Merideth Queen Harness McEnt
Mark Steven McKain

Kurt William Meyers

Beth Renee Minear

Michael A. Minicozzi
Candice Brittany Minjares
Alexander Barrett Morrison
Robert Nason Nye, IIL.
Christopher Michael O’Connor
Mark Vincent Odulio

Mary Elizabeth O'Neill
Brian K. Parker

‘Thomas A. Pasqué

Mark David Perkins

Kris Reed Poppe

Barbara L. Portwood
Emanuela Prister

‘Tanisha Renae Reed

Senta Fiona Rhodes

Applied from the State of Colorado
Applied from the State of Ohio
Applied from the State of Georgia
pplied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Georgia
Applied from the State of Georgia
Applied from the State of Tennessee

.. Applied from the State of Hinois
Applied from the State of New York
‘Applied from the State of Georgia
Applied from the State of West Virginia
‘Applied from the State of Tennessee
Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Hinois
\pplied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Minnesota
Applied from the District of Columbia.
Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Applied from the State of Georgia
‘Applied from the State of Texas
Applied from the State of Nebraska
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the District of Columbia
Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Applied from the State of Georgia
Applied from the State of Ilinois
Applied from the State of Utah
Applied from the State of Colorado
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Hawaii
Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
Applied from the District of Columbia
Applied from the State of West Virginia
Applied from the State of Arizona
Applied from the State of inois
Applied from the State of Tennessee
Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
Applied from the District of Columbia
Applied from the State of West Virginia
Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
Applied from the State of Illinois
Applied from the State of Iinois
‘Applied from the State of Ohio
Applied from the State of Minnesota
Applied from the State of Texas
Applied from the State of Llinois
Applied from the State of Pennsylvania

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Laura Roxana Roberts
Jay Arthur Rosenberg
Adana A. Savery ..

Appliéd from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Ohio
\pplied from the State of New York

Edwin Allen Dawes Schwartz... . Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
Neil Charles Shulman ‘Applied from the State of New York
John Stuart Sieman Applied from the District of Columbia
Edward C. Silva... Applied from the State of Massachusetts

Robert Gerard Slug; Applied from the State of Virginia
‘Anna Richardson Smith Applied from the State of Virginia
Jennifer Lee Snyder Applied from the State of New York
Joseph PL. Snyder . Applied from the State of Georgia

Michael Thomas Sprenger
Jonathan Daniel Stoian ..
Deborah Ann Strain.
James McKay Suggs Jr.
Pamela R. Tankle ....
Christine Dajohnna White Tennon ..
Abigail Morgan Terhune
Aaron Zachary Tobin ..
Daniel James Tounsel I
Devin Therese Trego ..
Alena Elizabeth Van Tull

Applied from the State of Ohio
Applied from the State of New York
. Applied from the State of Michigan
.. Applied from the State of Texas
Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Applied from the State of Texas
Applied from the State of Arizona
‘Applied from the State of Texas
.pplied from the State of Hlinois
. Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
‘Applied from the State of New York

Jonathan Matthew Vanes ‘Applied from the State of New York
Mariana Vazquez-Garcia Applied from the State of New York
Jean Wright Veilleux Applied from the District of Columbia
Andrew O. Vouziers pplied from the State of Ilinois
Howard Warren Walker .. Applied from the State of Georgia
Eric Ryan Waller .... plied from the State of West Virginia

John Theodore Warsinsky
Daniel Stuart Weinstock

Applied from the State of West Virginia
. Applied from the State of Pennsylvania

Jeffrey Brian Werbitt... Applied from the District of Columbia
Molly Elizabeth Brock White Applied from the State of West Virginia
David Ethan Wicclair . Applied from the State of Pennsylvania

Jonathan Earl Williams .. ‘Applied from the State of Tennessee
Cameron Clark Winfrey ‘Applied from the State of Texas
Margaret Wai Wong Applied from the State of Ohio

Michael Kent Woolley Applied from the State of Utah

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

The following persons were admitted to the North Carolina Bar by
examination by the Board of Law Examiners in February 2017 and have
been issued a certificate by the Board.

Caroline H. Allen.
Matthew Yarn Allen.
Abraham Franidin Mat Al-saeedi
Fernando Julio Alvarez-Perez...
Khawaja Saanval Amin.
Charles Noel Anderson IIT
Sharlene Gilmer Anderson
Bruce Warren Andrews Jr.
Rosa Schmoyer Antunez.
Nana Akonorbea Afua Asante..
Erin M. Ball.
Caroline Bergen Barrineau

Elizabeth Overby Bhuta.
Corey John Biazzo.
Milton Lloyd Blackmon.
Laura Elizabeth Boorman.
Corey Brown...
Rachel Brunswig.
James Ellis Buchanan
Frank William Bullock
Brittey Ariel Burch...
Shante Monique Burke-Hayer ..
Kirstyn Leigh Burleson...
Jared Michael Burtner.
Matthew Cooper Butler
Justin Gary Byrd.....

Patrice Olivia Clark
Kevin Cley:
Jalecia Shontel Coley
Leonard D. Conapinski
Philip James Corson...
Jennifer Aileen Coupland .
Hamilton Reid Crai
Ashley Taylor Crawle

Robert Lee Creech. . Charlotte

lv

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Nathan Riley Creger....
Havlin Crispin Crittendor Charlotte
Randall Scott Crowe. Charlotte
‘Thomas Michael Cul Greenville, SC
Alexander Erwin Davis wharleston, SC
Ashleigh Loring Davis Raleigh
Manuel Christian Davis.

Ashton Nicole Dillard..

Julie Anne Dogan.

Camille B. Doom.
Sterling Alyssa Dunn
Keith Alan Dunsmore.
Ashley Letitia Edward
Emily Elizabeth Edwards
Hannah Elizabeth Emory.
Julie Davis Epperly..
Allen David Ervin.
John A. Fallone
Deirdre Ann Farrington ..
Danielle Rae Feller.
Monique Shontae Ferebee. Charlotte

Jeffrey Mare Friedman
Caroline Marie Gieser

Jeremy Dave Gonzalez
Molly-Catherine Kaiser

Andrew Gordon...

‘Thomas W. Graham II

Caleb Wayne Grant.

Ashleigh Monique Greene. Browns Summit
Robert Wade Grimmett-Nonis.. Charlotte
Nina Nicole Gunnell... Charlotte
Zoe Anne Hansen Burnet Garner
Joseph Jackson Harris

Mirsada Haticic...

Shira Loree Hedgepetl

Sean Michael Helle.

Meredith Marie Hermann. Winston-Salem
Jonathan Ross Holder Greensboro
Kevin Robert Hornik Hillsborough
Constance Marie Howar Virginia Beach, VA
Susan Samon Howard. Durham
Matthew Lewis Hubbar Durham
‘Tucker Andrew Idol. Raleigh
Chrishonda Shonta Jefferson. Cary
Colby Bradford Jenkins...

Leah Jechae Kang

Kara Jessica Keith.

Wi

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Krystine Paige Keller.
Samantha Jo Kelley
Jaren Bugene Kelly
Valerie Ann Kilgore....
Liewingtina Constance King.
Kelsey Louise Kingsbery.
Aaron Steven Kirschenfel
‘Theresa Lynne Kitay.
Emily Caitlin Koll.
Sarah Elizabeth LaBruc
William George Lamb
Rebecca Jean Lawrence
Justin Michael Laws..

. Charlotte

Molly Amn Lovedale.
‘Ta’Juanna M. Lyons
Patterson Andrew
Robert M. Mahoney
Elizabeth Faye Malan.
Bernard M. Marshall.
Peter Glenn Mattocks.
Kathleen Anne McConnell.
Chelsea Cooke McKay
Stephen Paul McLaughlin Jr.
Alison Marie Melvin.

Dominique Mincey..
Sarah Elise Morin-Gage
Stephanie Iris Murray.
Danielle Marie Nodar
Kathryn Alice Nunalee..
Elvira Victoria Nunez.
Irene Oberman Khagi

Robin Milo Perrigo
Joseph Thomas Petrack.
Cherie Yvette Pierce.
Jessica Grissom Plummer
Joseph Thomas Polonsky.

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Brooke Elizabeth Schram.
Megan Elizabeth Schultz.
Danielle Rose Scimeca.
Mary Lynn Anna Seery
Victoria Elease Sheppard-Anderson.
Jessica Marie Sherman.
Arista Jamil Barbriel Sibre
David Louie Simmons
Gregory Richard Simons,
Mary Ashton Slagle..

Maria Adriana Slater.
Caitlin Marie Slavin
Ryan Hayden Smith. Raleigh
Benjamin Lee Snowden .. Raleigh
Jeanine Rafiq Soufan Durham
Sean M. Spiering .. -Asheville
James Tyrell Stanley. Durham
Jennifer Michelle Steven: Charlotte
Rebecca LeAnn Stone Hendersonville
Ryan Maxwell Stowe Salisbury
Emily Nicole Straus: Durham
Mare Stephen Subin Pinehurst
Sharon Suh.... Artesia, CA
Archie Lee Sumpter Raleigh
Lalisa Sharmaine Sweat... Durham
i Charlotte
Huntersville
lo Junction, VA.
Sidney Alexis Thomas. ..Durham
Laura Marie Tonch. Mooresville
Adriana Toomey... Charlotte
Kayleigh Lynn Toth.. Charlotte
Jonathon Dean Townsend i

Sara Williams Trexler.

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Jaylene Elizabeth Trivin: Chapel Hill
Christopher Theodore Greathouse reenville, SC
Nathaniel Robert Ulmer. Denver, CO

Elijah James Van Kuren
BreAnna VanHook.
Daniel K. Vazquez.
‘Andrew John Vetrone
Mauricio Videla...
Courtney N. Viebrock.
Nathan Paul Viebrock
Adam Stephen Vorhis
Emily Grace Watsor
Sarnuel Melvil Wheele
Matthew Benedict White . .Greensboro
Megan Somers White. Cornelius
Bethany Marie Wigfeld.
Jackson Antwaun Williford ..
Elizabeth Ann Wood
Julia Kay Wood...
Hillary Kathryn Woodard.
Kristie Nicole Young.
Yao Zhu.

The following persons were admitted to the North Carolina Bar by
examination by the Board of Law Examiners in July 2017 and have been
issued a certificate by the Board.

Hannah Katherine Abernethy
Ragini Ajay Acharya...
Courtney Marie Achee .
Chavez Adams
Hunter Weston Adams .
Paul Robert Adams.
Samuel Stuart Adams.
Paul Michael Allen..
Keridra R. Alleyne
Zachary Charles Allred.
Jonathan Hunter Altstadter..
Maggie Louise Amos..
Denise Patrice Anderson.
Desmon Lamar Andrade
Riley Mitchell Andrews.
Allain Charles Andry

Kristin Maria Athens.
Elizabeth Ann Bakale-"

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Carly Grace Baker

Daniel P. Ball...

Meredith Grey Ballard.

Christina Jansen Banfiel

Chelsea Christina Banister Raleigh

Jackson Allan Barnes yurham,

Jenny Marie Barnes. yurham,
Indian Trail

Jennifer Elizabeth Bayles-Quirk

Deirdre Lynette Beasley. Durham

Nanette Corrales Becerra. Apex

Brenton Shane Begley.

Marcus Deshun Benning.

Monica Corrine Berry. . Winston-Salem

Maxwell Tanner Bertini .

Jessica Ann Bertovich Wilmington

Daniel Paul Bethe: Charlotte

Morgan Taylor Bethea, Charlotte

Lia Charlene Bi Durham

Peter Andrew Bigelow. Falls Church, VA

Anthony Joseph Biraglia. srookfield, CT
Leland Latham Black. ‘lemmons
Jeffrey L. Bloomfield. .. Winston-Salem
Danielle Nicole Boaz, ... Charlotte

Parris L. Booker... . Winston-Salem.
Bethany Allison Boring. Graham,
Allison Lauren Bowman. .. Winston-Salem

Charles Howard Bowyer. Charlotte

Kathryn Mererid Boyd. ‘Mebane
Philip A. Boyers High Point
Brandon Lamar Boy] Raleigh
Dorothy Michelle Brackett. Pittsboro

Justin Michael Bradley. Erwin,
Brittany LeeAnn Brattain, lorence, SC
Jonathan Lawrence Braverman .. Durham

Alexander Rittenhouse Brick. Tallahassee, FL
Brittany Diane Bridges. Raleigh
Leah Suzanne Brit Lumberton
Laura Suzanne Browder. Greensboro
‘Andrew Michael Brown. Mooresville
Christopher Allen Brown. Charlotte

Christopher Joel Brown.. Durham:
Maya Elizabeth Brown,
Christopher . Bryant.
Blitsa Hristova Bryant,
Rachel Mary Helen Buck Charlotte
Bret Michael Buckler .. . Advance
‘Tiffany Marie Burba..

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Kathleen Margaret Bure.. Charlotte
Matthew Christopher Burl ‘i
Jonathan William Burns.
Gregory Anthony Buscemi
Donald James Butler.
Dominique N. Caldwel
Rachel Marie Cane...
Nicole Grace Cangcuesta..
Sarah Russell Cansler..
Dione Carroll.
Kathleen Erin Carroll.
Eric Carter.
Caroline Esther Brown Casello
Claudine Noel Chalfant.
Kent Richard Chalmers.
Jacob Douglas Charles.
Gary Tyrone Chavis
Darren Keith Chester .
Jason Stone Chestnut.
Jocelyn Nicole Chidse;
Naomy Christine Chimeng
Daniel Choyce..
Jongwoo Chung
Kayla Marie Churel
Ronnie Ke’Ashla Clark.
Joshua Michael Clarkson
Megan Colleen Clemency
Cassidy Ann Cloninge:
Matthew Daniel Cloutier.
Joshua Stevenson Coffey
Alexandra Lesley Coggins
Jennifer Rae Coleman.
~ Adam Joseph College.
Margaret Tara Collins.

Maria Catherine Collins.

Lisa Hanley Colon.

Daniel Lee Colston .

Hannah Alicia Combs.

Cheryl Denn Comer. Gastonia
Paul Leonard Comer IV. Charlotte
Cynthia Gale Cook. i
Nathaniel Howard Cook

William Winstead Cooke Greensboro
Katashia Latrice Cooper . Rocky Mount
Elizabeth Anne Corbet .. Raleigh
Adam Sterling Coto .. Vale
David William Co Charlotte
William Randolph Cox Concord

Allie Marie Craver...

Brooke McIntosh Crump .Mount Gilead

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Drew H. Culler
Rebecca Ann Daddino.
Clifton Andrew Dandison..

Rebecca Buff Darchuk. Asheville
Skylar Elaine Davenport. Raleigh
Shane Lewis Davidson. . Cary
Clinton Ross Davis Raleigh
Emily Ann Davis . Charlotte
Garrett Lee Davis. Durham
Matthew Steven Davis. . Charlotte
Nicole Danielle Davis. Carrboro
Robert Davis IIL...
Benjamin Charles DeCelle. .. Concord
Marcus Ryan Deel. Joint Base Lewis McChord, WA.
Elizabeth Louise DeFranc« Asheboro
Conor Priest Degnan.. Charlotte
Michael Charles DeLuca. Raleigh
Christopher Birkland Dempsey Annapolis
Jessica Marie Dentzer... . Charlotte
Andrew William Deschler.. Raleigh
Taylor Mioko Dewberry.
Candice Ashley Diah ..
Andrew John Dickerhoff Raleigh
Rylee Michelle Dillard. . Charlotte
Sarah Bain Dillard... Wilson
Garrett John Dimond Raleigh
Matar Diout... - Charlotte
Adam James Doane Charlotte
Jonathan Vaughn Doerr Durham
Jennifer Lee Dumont. Raleigh
Casey Nichole Duncan. Raleigh
Debra Corinne Duncan... Monroe
Samatha Renee Duncan. Raleigh
Sharon Elizabeth Dunmore. . Greensboro
Kimberly Ann Edwards.. . Cary
Washington.
Greenville
chapel Hill
‘aratoga
Four Oaks
Austin Entwistle.. Concord
Annemarie Chase Ernst. Mills River
Zachary Warne Ernst. Cocoa Beach, FL
Raymond Edward Escobar. Flmington, DE
James Ford Eubanks.. Morehead City
Jonathan Mackenzie Eure Morganton
Ryan Christopher Evans. Chapel Hill
Christopher Eason Faircloth. . Wilmington
Phillip Michael Fajgenbaum. Raleigh
Amanda Marie Fannin

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Alexia Lindley Faraguna.
John Harmon Feasel.
Kyleigh Feehs
Casey Christine Fidler.
Joshua Finney...
Nicholas Ivan Fisher.
Chelsea Rand Flynt...
Daniel Lewis Fox...
Jacob Richard Franchek
Jennifer Kay Fredette.
Lauren Nicole Freedman
Alexander Henry French
Kyle Matthew Frizzelle..
Heather Call Fuller

Noah Drayton Garrett
Josiah Bradford Garton ..
Shaquansia Gay
Ryan James Geibl

Jacob Ronald Glass ..
Abigail Anne Golden.
‘Tara Michele Gore ...
Austin Mitchell Grabowski.
Mark Van Lanier Gray IL.
Kirstin Joi Greene
John Lee Gregg
Adam Lane Gregory.
Grace Anthony Gregson.
Maxwell Lee Gregson..
Sara Esperanza Guerra
Emily Holland Gunner
Niccolle Claire Gutierrez
Emma Katherine Haddock.
Jessica Anne Hajar
Amir Ragab Hamdoun.
Nathaniel Ramsey Hamilton
Racheal Verna Hammon¢
Rebecca Lane Hammond.
Charles William Hands.
Molly Hopkins Hanes...
‘Alia Hassan Haque
Kaitlyn Ann Haran
Ryan O’Keith Hargrave.
Serenity Hargrove...
Steven Huntington Harris
Ashley Nicole Hartman.
Weston Philip Harty.

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Jacob Daniel Harwood.
Robert Leslie Hash

Edward Lawrence Hedrick.
Steven Christopher Hemri Winston-Salem.
Abigail Watts Henderson
Lauren Blaine Henderson..
Nicole Henderson...
Alexander Hentschel..

Kathryn Joy Hesman .. . Charlotte
Erica Morgan Hicks.

Robyn Alise Hicks-Guinn. Charlotte
Brooklyn Nicole Hildebran Hampton, VA
Alexandra Sophia Hilditch. Raleigh
Brittany Leigh Hil .Greensboro
Caitlin Veronica Hill . Charlotte
Ashiey Renee’ Hill i

Jordan Clarke Hilton. .Greensboro

Samuel Armfield Hipps..
Michael Elliot Hirsch.. Fort Mill, SC
Dexter Cummings Hol
Ann Marie Roslyn Holder ..
Alisha Patrice Hollan«

Nicholas Presley Holloman.
Darrion Rashawn Holloway Virginia Beach, VA
Jonathan Michael Holt...

Seongun Matthias Hong. Charlotte
Craig Marshall Horsman. Mooresville
Daniel Horwitz Chapel Hill
Dorwin Llewelldyn Howard Oxford

LaQuonta Lynette Howell
Karlie Love Hudson.
Jenica Dawn Hughes..
Lauren Grace Marie Hunstad

Christopher McGee Hurley Wake Forest
Emily Beth Hurtt.... jold Spring, KY
Elizabeth Marie Hutchens . Cary
John Grover Hutchens Charlotte
Lex-Jordan Osili Ibegbu. Raleigh
Esosa Igichon.. Charlotte
Michael Anthony Ingersoll. Charlotte
Max Edward Isaacson. Raleigh

Joseph John Ittoop
Volha Ivanushko..

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Dondrea Allese Jacksot Fayetteville
Jennifer Lynne Jacksor Greenville
Jonathan Claude Jakubowski Pittsboro
Matthew Thomas James urharn
Emily Catherine Jeske Raleigh
Josue Alfredo Jimenez Charlotte
Eunji J Charlotte

Charlene Graham Johnson.

Erika Johnson

Ivy Alexandra Johnson.

Ellison Green Johnstone. Charlotte
Brian Patrick Jones... Farwell, MI

Edna Nicole Jones.
Eric Preston Jone
Henry Weldon Jones
Sa’Metria Desiree Jones.

Travis Ray Joyce... .. Hillsville, VA
Whitney Natalie Kamerzel .. Charlotte
Elizabeth Anne Kapopoulos Charlotte

Kyle Matthew Karnes...

Stacy Lynn Kelly....

Aaron Michael Kennedy.. Charlotte
Correll L. Kennedy... .. Winston-Salem
Kenneth Max Kennedy. ... Raleigh
Michael Justin Kerrigan... Battle Creek, MI
Sara Kathleen Kid Raleigh
James Claiborne King. Durham
Melody Jo King. . DeLeon Springs, FL
Selena Anne King.. .. Marshall
William Parker King.

Andrew Hampton Kite

Leslie Magen Kite..

Natalie Desneiges Klemann,
Margaret Troy Kocaj
Brandon Alexander Konecny,
Christina Joy Koscianski
Alison Mulnix Kralick.
Spencer Christian Krant:
Cheslie Kryst

Wayne Douglas Lear
Christopher John Leddy..
Evan Anderson Lee..
Parker Cheatham Lee..

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Carey Sue LeRoux..

Preston Wyatt Lesley.
Jarelle Anthony Lewis
Ryan William Lifland
Michelle Ann Liguori
Michael S. Litrenta..

Andrew Scott Loge
Michael Anthony Loiacon:
Maria D. Lopez Delgado
Laura Diane Love..
Jamey Mavis Lowdermilk.
Amelia Elderidge Lowe
Kyra Lowry.
Benjamin Seth Lumpkins..
Christopher Ryan Lusby

James Conlan Lynch..
Kathleen Elizabeth Lynch.
‘Alexandra Michelle Maccioli
Steven Mark Maddox.....
Michael Braxton Marcela.
Chanda Denee Marlowe
Jeremy Marlowe.
Sarah Blizabeth Mars!
Carson Ray Martin.

Pawleys Island, SC
Roanoke Rapids
Durham
. Raleigh
lorrisville

Rachel Susan Matthews. .
Philip David Mayer Chapel Hill
Rhian Cruise Mayhew
Richard H. McAuliffe
Sharee Latrice McCall
Patrick Ryan MeConnel

Christian Blair McCullen Clayton
Paige Nicole McElravy.. ile, SC
i Raleigh

weensboro:

Charlotte

British Alexander McLean. Winston-Salem
Joseph McManus Archdale
Aria Quinn Merk Raleigh

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Greensboro
Raleigh
Charlotte
‘San Diego, CA
Charlotte
lolden Beach
‘Tirrill Moore ... Raleigh
Elizabeth Sterling Moose lorence, SC
Glenn Andrew Morrison Fuquay-Varina
Rebekah Elese Morrison. ‘Madison
Jacob Morse .. Raleigh
‘Tempestt Head Morton lorrisville
Ashleigh Casey Mothershead Charlotte
‘Abby Moua. Hickory
Hannah Marie Lassiter Munn. Charlotte
Meredith Lynne Murchison. Charlotte
Hannah Raheal Murphy Raleigh
Sean Christopher Murphy Durham
Caroline Collins Muse. Charlotte
Seth Ian Muse. Charlotte
Tagreed Sami Nafisi Charlotte
Johnathon Naylor. facksonville
‘Tenika Breanna Neely. . ADEX
Mark Allen Nesdill... Charlotte
Mary Lawrence Newton... Raeford
Jamie Terrell Nichol: Rock Hill, SC
Annelise Nininger-Finch Raleigh
Jason Graham Norman. Charlotte
William Pendleton Norrell. Elizabeth City
Amiee Nwabuike.. Raleigh
Molly Ann Oneil Raleigh
Rachel Ann Oplinger Sewickley, PA
Alexander Louis Ortiz Fairview
Amanda Lea Owens. lew Bern
Mark West Owens. Greenville
‘Tyler Ray Owens.. Durham
Meredith Elizabeth Pace. Winston-Salem
Emily Spring Page. .. Durham
Whitney R. Pakalka Winston-Salem
Dylan Eugene Paradis. Raleigh
Chelsea Victoria Paris! Raleigh
Ryan Young Park. Durham
Meredith Jane Parker.. Garner
William Osvaldo Parra. Durham
Alexander Jay Paschal Garner
Melissa Elizabeth Roque ami, FL
David Andrew Pasley ..
Harsh Atul Patel...
Martha Grace Ashcroft Patterson. Mooresville
Brian Martin Payne.. oatesville, PA

Ixvii

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Melodie Pellot Hernandez
Nathaniel James Pencook
Kathleen Elizabeth Perkins.
Benjamin Michael Petitto
Andreu Lyndon Phillip ..
Anderson Herman Phillips.
James Nathanial Pierce.

Elizabeth Cohen Ponde
Jillian Katheryn Pope
‘Matthew Walker Poppe.
Alexandra James Portaro
Joelle Courtney Portzer
James Fitzsimmons Powers
Michelle Christine Prendergast.
Nicholas Anthony Presentato ..
Jessica Nicole Price.
Samuel Sutherland Price ..

Ashley Autry Prince...
William Christopher Wood Pruden. Raleigh
Jason Buran Pruett Whitsett

Michael Lanser Rafetto Raleigh
Cedric Darnell Rainey narlotte
William Harris Reave Greenville
Dillon Alexander Redding Faquay-Varina
Sarah Blizabeth Redd; Charlotte
Nicole Regna Winston-Salem
Cecilia Reyna...

‘Tyler Alexander
Emily Paige Rhode:
Morgan Leigh Rich.
Zachary Richardso1 . Fayetteville
Erin Barts Riddick.
Ragan Hope Riddle.
Alyssa Michelle Riggins
Jessica Marie Rigsbee
Donna Rinck.
Kelsey Marie Rin;
Adam Kristian Roberts.

Peter Bruce Robinson. Durham
William Russell Robinson Durham
James Rodgers... ermantown, TN
Preston William Rollero Knightdale
Jessica Marie Roman. Raleigh
Kiara Barbara Ross. jouth Chesterfield, VA
Joshua Ryan Rowlan Durham

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Heather Gail Rubinstein.

Navdeep Singh Sandhu
Kaylyn Antoinette Sands.
John Joseph Sauve

Sheldon Leigh Schenc Raleigh
Zachary John Schilawski Raleigh
Frederic Hilton Schilling.

Mollie McLauchlin Schrull.. Sanford

‘Tiffany Scot Charlotte
Gregory Michael Seraydarian. ills, MI
Jillian Christine Sewell. ‘Wilmington
Zainah Shafi. Raleigh
Leticia Louise Shapiro.
Sara Shariff... Charlotte
Angela Ruth Sheet New Bern
Jared Keith Simmons Raleigh
Michael Antonio Simmons. Fayetteville
Micah Raines Simonsen...
Samantha Simpso1
Tanisha Marie Sims.
Kevin Michael Sisson
Cordon McLendon St
Charles Ruppe Smith.

‘Jenna Rose Smith

Shelby Elizabeth Smith. Arlington, VA.
Shelby Nikol Smith. i
William Gray Smit
George Thomas Smith, IL.

Gabriel Glenn Snyd¢

Alexandra Southerlan Hope Mills
Frank Clark Spencer Charlotte
Alton Dennis Stainback I... Henderson

Kendra Nicole Stark
Malaika Ralphael Staten
Christopher Albert Stella.
Holly Renee Stephens
Deirdre M. Stephenson
Christopher John Stev
Christopher James Stipes

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Stratton Fielding Stokes
Caitlin Stone.
Lauren Elizabeth Stovall.
Joseph Edward Strader.
Daniel David Stratton.
James Neal Stricklan
Demetria Elaine Stuart.
David Arthur Swenton ..
Nadira Aisha Swintoy
Jesse Swords...
Grace Alexandra Sykes.
James Harrison Taylor...
Rebecca Larkin TaylorParker.
Samuel Best Thomas.
Jovon Andre-Michael Thompson.
Russell Carsby Thornton...
Elizabeth Irene Thueme.
Kaitlyn Lassiter Tickle
Allison Weller Tikare.
James Roland Todd
Brittany C. Tomkies
Elliott Tomlinson
Matthew L. Tomsic

Crystal Gail Fennell Uhlenhake..
Samantha Evelynn Unmann
Sean David Valle...
Landon Glenn Van Winkle
Paige Elaine Vankooten

Kasi Elizabeth Wahlers.
Caroline Elizabeth Waho!
Ashley Elizabeth Wai
Brian George Walker.
Brianna Hawkins Walther.
Rachael Elizabeth Warden.
Lindsey Ann Ware.
Scott Edward Warnick.
Spencer David Warren
Candace Melanie Washington.
Erica Washington...
Robert James Wayland Jr.
Peter Harrison Webb.
James Ezekiel Webster.
James Earl West..

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Sarah Wesley Wheaton.
Brandon Thomas Wheeler.. Raleigh
Chimeaka LaVette White. Greensboro

Ethan Reed White Concord
Kristen Andrea Whitt. Charlotte
Amanda Marie Whortor Raleigh
Jonathan Drew Willardson Wilkesboro

Linder James Willeford
i oxville, TN

Marion Jesse Williams.
‘Tatjana Jarne Williams.
‘Trent Wesley Williams.
Mackenzie Lee Willow-Johnson.
Kristen Lauren Wills
Jessica Lyn Green Willson...
Kristin Renee Windley..
Joshua Taylor Winks
John William Wolf.
Kaitlin Helms Wolf.
Margaret Petersen Wolf ..
Beth Ellen Wolfe...

Audrey Marie Zop)

The following persons were admitted to the North Carolina Bar by
comity by the Board of Law Examiners in 2017 and have been issued a
certificate by the Board.

Daniel DeCederfelt Adams Applied from the State of New York

David Lawrence Arnold... Applied from the State of Virginia
Andrea Aycinen: . Applied from the State of Ohio
Joshua Ellis Bake Applied from the State of Virginia
Brandy Burnette Balding .pplied from the State of Tennessee
Samantha Hayes Barber. Applied from the State of Georgia

* Ava Greene Bedden. Applied from the State of Virginia
John William Bellflower. Applied from the State of Georgia
Todd Berman. Applied from the State of Virginia
Charles Gerald Biskobin; Applied from the State of Georgia

. Applied from the State of Ohio
Applied from the State of Virginia
pplied from the State of New York

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Applied from the State of Ilinois

Kathryn Sammon Burns. Applied from the State of New York
Stephen Vincent Carey. Applied from the District of Columbia
Karen Robins Carnegie . . Applied from the State of Virginia
Cheryl Elizabeth Carroll Applied from the District of Columbia

Brady Thomas Carter Applied from the State of Pennsylvania.
Beatrice Summer Chandler Applied from the State of Georgia
Christine Irene Chelf.. Applied from the State of New York

David Michael Classen.
Irena Como..
David Compagnone
Sharon Ann Correll.
Sarah Jeanette Cortesio.
Matthew Scott Criswell.
Andrew Kiernan Cuddy..

‘Applied from the State of Minnesota
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Connecticut
‘Applied from the State of Wisconsin
Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
-Applied from the State of West Virginia
‘Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Ohio
\pplied from the State of Ilinois
Applied from the State of New York
pplied from the State of Washington
Applied from the District of Columbia.
‘Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the District of Columbia.
‘Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Texas
Applied from the State of New York
pplied from the District of Columbia

William Eugene Doyle,
Suzanne M. Dugan

Catharine Elizabet

David Scott Binfeldt.. ..Applied from the State of Utah
Kate Sablosky Blengold Applied from the District of Columbia
Scott Andrew Blengold.. Applied from the District of Columbia
Susan Langley Elliott. Applied from the State of Georgia

‘Timothy Edward Emmet Applied from the State of Virginia
James H. Exlinger. Applied from the State of Missouri
Collin Roger Evans. .pplied from the State of Iinois
David Anthony Fazzolare, Jr. Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Kelli Hamby Ferry. Applied from the State of Virginia

‘Thomas Clark Fitzgerald IL ..
Charles John Fratus

Applied from the State of Georgia
Applied from the District of Columbia
Applied from the State of Idaho

Daniel Charles Gasink. Applied from the State of Virginia
Alison Jacobs Gates Applied from the State of Texas
Paul Philip Gordon. Applied from the State of Wisconsin
Rachel Israella Gurvich. ... Applied from the Massachusetts
Danielle Beth Hall Applied from the State of New York

David William Hall.
Carrie Margaret Harris
David A. Harris.
Ronald Howard Hatfield J
Edmund John Haughey, 11

. Applied from the State of Colorado
Applied from the State of Virginia
Applied from the State of Georgia
\pplied from the State of West Virginia.
Applied from the District of Columbia

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Michael F. Hayden... Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Nichole Theresa Hayden. Applied from the State of South Carolina
Jessica Ann Hayes.... Applied from the State of Virginia

. Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
Applied from the State of New York
. Applied from the State of Pennsylvania

David Stuart Holland. Applied from the State of Virginia
Jeremy Paul Hopkins Applied from the State of Virginia
Brandon Griffin Hudson. Applied from the State of Virginia
Amara M. Hunter .. Applied from the State of Michigan

Carole Anne Dominello Hussey. ‘pplied from the State of Hlinois
Thomas Wayne Huyck. Applied from the State of Georgia
Clara Ann Ignich Applied from the State of New York
Erica Jackson ‘Applied from the State of Georgia

Camille Janette Jarvis
Amber Leigh Jordan

Applied from the State of Utah
Applied from the State of Texas
Applied from the State of Massachusetts
... Applied from the State of Tennessee
Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the District of Columbia
Applied from the State of Georgia

Judith Ann Lampley.
Jack Collins Lance.

Lindsey Wise Lane Applied from the State of Tennessee
Aaron Charles Lang.. Applied from the State of New York
Jonathan A. Lang .. . Applied from the State of Pennsylvania

Ryan Auguste Laros
Kristle Ashley Lee
Robert L. Lindholm.

Applied from the State of New York
. Applied from the State of Missouri
Applied from the State of New York

John David Little.. plied from the State of West Virginia
Samantha Kaye Lloy‘ . Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
Jonathan Pollard Long Applied from the State of Colorado
Susan Lowe. Applied from the State of New York
Melissa Elaine Loyd. Applied from the State of Texas
Amanda DiOrio Lynde. .pplied from the State of Ilinois
Brian Alan Lynde .. .pplied from the State of Ilinois
Anil Jasbeer Makhij Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Jacob Oakman Malatesta. . Applied from the State of Mississippi
Mary L. Maloney. Applied from the State of New York

Micah John Malo

Applied from the State of Texas

Holly Nicole Manel Applied from the State of Tennessee
Bruce Talbot Margulie: Applied from the District of Columbia
Derek Todd Marks... . Applied from the State of Pennsylvania

Alison Gillespie Monroe Martin
Aubrey H. McBachern..
Matthew Adams McGe
Douglas William Meier
Anna Berney Mille

Applied from the State of Virginia
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Texas
Applied from the District of Columbia
Applied from the State of Colorado

Michael Ryan Miller. Applied from the State of New York
Nicole Rodriguez Modesit Applied from the State of Ohio
Nada Rashdan Mohamed. Applied from the State of Ohio

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Michele Mons... Applied from the State of Ohio
Caroline Corry Munroe. Applied from the State of Georgia
Victoria Diane Starks Nabors. Applied from the State of Georgia
Connor Patrick Nathanson. Applied from the State of Ohio
Steven Andrew Nigh ‘Applied from the State of Wisconsin
Robert R. Norfleet... pplied from the State of Kentucky
‘Andy Robert Norman Applied from the State of Iinois
Sherrill Ann Oates... Applied from the State of Texas
Peter John O'Hara. Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
Aver Eden Oliver. Applied from the State of Georgia
Gabriel J. Oros Applied from the State of Pennsylvania

Nikki Amber Oit..
Alissa Marie Pacchiol

. Applied from the State of Virginia
. Applied from the State of New York

Roger Lee Patrick .. Applied from the State of Ohio
Robert Lottier Peresich. . Applied from the State of Virginia
Brian Charles Perkins Applied from the State of Kansas
David Peters. . Applied from the State of New York

Kyle Genaro Phillip:
Brittni Alecia Pickering.
Stefi Peralta Porter
Melanie Ann Prince
Sarah Blizabeth Proctor.
Kristin Mae Rabkin
Maire B. Corcoran Ragozzin
Caitlin Reynolds-Vivanc
April R. Rieger.
Ersula Drena Rivers

Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
.Applied from the State of Georgia
Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
. Applied from the State of Virginia
Applied from the State of Georgia
. Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Maine

. Applied from the State of Virginia
. Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of Pennsylvania

Roxanna Manoochehri Robertso1 Applied from the State of Texas
Jesse Sean Benoit Roisin. Applied from the State of Massachusetts
Melissa R.C. Rosad . Applied from the State of New York
Raymond B. Roth Applied from the State of Ilinois
Phillip Anthony Rubin Applied from the District of Columbia
Thomas Carl Sanchez. Applied from the State of Texas
Luisa Santiago. Applied from the State of Minnesota
Erin M. Satterthwaite Applied from the State of New York

John Howard Schaeffer
Matthew Allen Schmidt.

.pplied from the State of Ohio
.pplied from the State of Pennsylvania

Christopher David Seamster ‘Applied from the State of New York
Samantha Hill Sears Applied from the State of Georgia
Benjamin M. Sheridan. Applied from the State of West Virginia
Janelle Catherine Shewmaker. Applied from the State of Tennessee
Joseph Shin. . Applied from the State of Virginia

Jennie L. Shufelt...
Robert Brian Sled:
Douglas Allen Spencer.
Dana Kathleen Stafford.
Terence Patrick Steed.

Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of New York
Applied from the State of West Virginia
Applied from the State of Ilinois
. Applied from the State of New Jersey
Applied from the State of Virginia
Applied from the State of Virginia

Melissa Szczepanik .. Applied from the State of Ohio

LICENSED ATTORNEYS

Applied from the State of Georgia
Applied from the State of Georgia
Applied from the State of New York

James Churchill Donaldson Thomas.
Delia Corinne Thrasher.
Kira Treyvus...

Lisa Joye Taroso Applied from the State of Ohio
Alex Robert Velins ‘pplied from the State of New York
Ashley Earnestine Walke1 Applied from the District of Columbia
Charissa Nyelle Walker Applied from the State of Ohio
Robert Joseph Wal Applied from the State of Ohio
James W. Wallace.. .pplied from the State of Pennsylvania
Jennifer Westerlund.. ‘Applied from the State of New York
Brandi Leigh Wicclair . Applied from the State of Pennsylvania
Marla Rizzo Wolfe Applied from the District of Columbia
Joshua Steven Woo! Applied from the State of Georgia
Anthony Sunggiu Yim Applied from the State of Ilinois
Shamira Youkhaneh. Applied from the State of Ilinois
Lisa Jacqueline Zak. Applied from the State of Ohio

CASES

ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE

SUPREME COURT |

OF

NortH CAROLINA
aT
RALEIGH

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC, Puainnirr

v.
HERBERT A. GRAY, Darenpant/Tairp-Parry PLanvnire
v.
JOHN WIELAND HOMES AND NEIGHBORHOODS OF THE CAROLINAS, INC.,
‘Tameo-Parry DBrENDANT,
AND
BUILDER SUPPORT SERVICES OF THE CAROLINAS, INC. #/x/s JOHN WIELAND
HOMES AND NEIGHBORHOODS OF THE CAROLINAS, INC., Fourra-Party PLAIvTIFF

v.
YARBROUGH-WILLIAMS & HOULE, INC., LUCAS-FORMAN, INC., anp CARTER LAND
SURVEYORS & PLANNERS, INC., Fourts-Party DEFENDANTS.

No. 108PA14-2
Filed 19 August 2016

Statutes of Limitations and Repose—easement—utility—relief
for encroachment—recovery of land
In an action by a utility to recover the use of its easement, the
applicable statute of limitations was the twenty-year statute for real
estate found in N.C.G.S. § 1-40 rather than the six-year statute of limi-
tations for incorporeal hereditaments found in N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(8).
Although easements are incorporeal hereditaments, plaintiff was
seeking full use of its easement. Because the easement is real prop-
erty, the claim is for the recovery of real property. Pottle v. Link, 187
N.C. App. 746 (2007), was overruled insofar as it deemed N.C.G.S.
§ 1-40 inapplicable to actions involving encroachments on ease-
ments. Moreover, the state is criss-crossed with utility facilities,
and their accompanying easements are not always readily subject.
to routine inspection by the owning utility. The drafters of N.C.G.S.

2 IN THE SUPREME COURT

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC v. GRAY
[869 N.C. 1 (2016)]

§ 1-50(a)(8) did not intend that a utility’s right to maintain such
easements could be successfully challenged in a time as short as
six years.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. __, 766 S.E.2d 354
(2014), affirming an order of summary judgment entered on 1 November
2013 by Judge Richard D. Boner in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.
On 10 June 2015, the Supreme Court allowed defendants’ conditional
petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 6 October 2015.

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Debbie W. Harden,
Meredith J. McKee, and Jackson R. Price, for plaintiff-appellant/
appellee.

James, McElroy & Diehl, P.A., by Preston O. Odom, III and John
R. Buric, for defendant/third-party plaintiff—appellee/appellant
Herbert A. Gray; DeVore, Acton & Stafford, PA, by Fred W. DeVore,
III and Derek P. Adler, for third-party defendant/fourth-party plain-
tiff-appellee/appellant John Wieland Homes and Neighborhoods
of the Carolinas, Inc.; and Hamilton Stephens Steele & Martin,
PLLC, by Erik M. Rosenwood and Mark R. Kutny, for fourth-party
defendant—appellee/appellant Yarbrough-Williams & Houle, Inc.

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Joseph W. Eason and D.
Martin Warf, for North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation
and North Carolina Association of Electric Cooperatives,
amici curiae.

Kimberly S. Hibbard, General Counsel, and Gregory F
Schwitzgebel, III, Associate General Counsel, North Carolina
League of Municipalities; and Daniel F McLawhorn, City of
Raleigh Associate City Attorney, for North Carolina League of
Municipalities, amicus curiae.

Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P., by
Matthew D. Rhoad, for Public Service Company of North Carolina,
Inc. d/b/a PSNC Energy; and Piedmont Natural Gas Company,
Ine., amici curiae.

EDMUNDS, Justice.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC v. GRAY
[369 N.C. 1 (2016)

Defendant Herbert A. Gray (defendant) owns real property located
in Huntersville, North Carolina. Plaintiff Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
(plaintiff or Duke) owns an easement allowing construction of and
access to its power lines. A portion of defendant's property encroaches
on plaintiff's easement and defendant has failed to remove the encroach-
ment upon plaintiff's request. We consider whether plaintiff has a right
to eject defendant’s encroachment from the easement. Defendant con-
tends that N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(8), which establishes a six-year statute of
limitations for injury to any incorporeal hereditament, bars plaintiff's
claim. We conclude that removal of the encroachment is a recovery
of real property lying outside the scope of subdivision 1-50(a)(8). As a
result, this action falls within the twenty-year statute of limitations set
out in N.C.G.S. § 1-40. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

J.L. and Pearl D. Wallace, defendant’s predecessors in title, executed
a duly recorded easement agreement with Duke Power Company, now
plaintiff Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, on 18 May 1951. The agreement
granted plaintiff certain rights in a two hundred-foot-wide strip of land,
including “the right to enter said strip . . . and to construct, maintain and
operate within the limits of same, poles, towers, wires, lines, apparatus
and appliances for the purpose of transmitting electric power and for
telephone purposes,” and “the right to keep said strip of land free and
clear of any or all structures . . . except those placed in or upon same
by said Power Company.” The agreement also stated that “[t]he right
of way and easements hereby granted shall be binding upon and shall
inure to the parties hereto, their successors, heirs and assigns.” Plaintiff
thereafter constructed an overhead 100,000 volt electrical transmission
line within the easement in 1951. A 230,000 volt transmission line was
constructed in 1957 and 1958.

In September 2005, Yarbrough-Williams & Houle, Inc. (Yarbrough-
Williams), a corporation specializing in professional land survey-
ing, created a plat titled “Skybrook Phase 8 Map 1” and recorded it in
Mecklenburg County. At the same time, Yarbrough-Williams physi-
cally staked out the boundaries of the surveyed property, including the
boundaries of Lot 533, the property at issue. The following month, John
Wieland Homes and Neighborhoods of the Carolinas, Inc. (Wieland),
now Builder Support Services of the Carolinas, Inc., purchased the
Skybrook development, including Lot 533. In December 2005, Wieland
contracted with Lucas-Forman, Inc. (Lucas-Forman), another corpora-
tion specializing in land surveying, to plot and stake the location of the
building footprint for Lot 533. In January and February 2006, Wieland

4 IN THE SUPREME COURT

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC v. GRAY
[369 N.C. 1 (2016)]

dug the footings and poured the foundation for a house on-the Lot. On
16 February 2006, Wieland contracted with Carter Land Surveyors &
Planners, Inc. (Carter Land Surveyors), yet another company special-
izing in land surveying, to conduct a foundation survey of Lot 533. The
purpose of this week-long foundation survey was to confirm that no set-
back, easement, right-of-way, or boundary violations existed.

Thereafter, Wieland completed construction of the house in ques-
tion on Lot 533, and the county issued a certificate of occupancy on
11 October 2006. In early 2007, defendant purchased the house and lot
from Wieland for $608,667.00. During the process, Wieland provided
defendant a copy of the foundation survey. Defendant remains the
owner of Lot 533, which now bears the address of 14440 Salem Ridge
Road, Huntersville, North Carolina.

Three years later, around 17 February 2010, defendant received a
letter from Duke alleging that a portion of his home was encroaching on
Duke's right-of-way and asking defendant to remove the encroachment.
When defendant did not comply, plaintiff filed suit in Superior Court,
Mecklenburg County, on 12 December 2012, seeking injunctive and
other relief. On 3 January 2013, defendant filed an answer and counter.
claim, adding a third-party complaint against Wieland. Plaintiff replied
to the counterclaim and third-party complaint on 13 February 2013.
Wieland answered the third-party complaint and filed both a motion
to dismiss and a fourth-party complaint against Yarbrough-Williams,
Lucas-Forman, and Carter Land Surveyors on 8 March 2013. On 7 May
2018, Yarbrough-Williams filed a motion to dismiss the fourth-party com-
plaint. This filing also included Yarbrough-Williams’s answer and affir-
mative defenses. Lucas-Forman filed an answer to and motion to dismiss
the fourth-party complaint on 13 May. Finally, Carter Land Surveyors
filed a motion to dismiss the fourth-party complaint on 21 June. The
trial court denied Yarbrough-Williams’s and Lucas-Forman’s motions to
dismiss on 6 September, and Carter Land Surveyors’ motion to dismiss
on 13 September 2013.

Wieland filed a motion seeking partial summary judgment on
10 September 2013, and defendant followed with a motion for summary
judgment on 2 October 2013. Both argued that the six-year statute of lim-
itations for an injury to an incorporeal hereditament set out in N.C.G.S.
§ 1-50(a)(8) had run and that, as a result, plaintiff had no legal remedy.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court on 1 November 2013 granted
the motions for summary judgment filed by defendant and by Wieland,
finding that plaintiff's claims were barred by the six-year statute of limi-
tations pertaining to incorporeal hereditaments. The court further found

IN THE SUPREME COURT 5

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC v. GRAY
[869 N.C. 1 2016)]

that the limitations periods set out in N.C.G.S. §§ 1-40 and 1-47(2) did -
not apply.

Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, ___.
N.C. App. __, 766 S.E.2d 354 (2014). The Court of Appeals concluded
that an easement constitutes an incorporeal hereditament and, based
on the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(8), an action for injury to an
incorporeal hereditament must be brought within six years. Id. at__,
766 S.E.2d at 358. In its analysis, the Court of Appeals found itself bound
by its holding in Pottle v. Link, 187 N.C. App. 746, 654 S.E.2d 64 (2007),
appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 509, 668 S.E.2d 31 (2008), in which that court
concluded that an action by the owner of a dominant estate for injunc-
tive relief against the servient estate owner’s encroachment constituted
an action for injury to an incorporeal hereditament governed by subdivi-
sion 1-50(a)(8). Duke Energy Carolinas, ___N.C. App. at___, 766 S.E.2d
at 361.

The Court of Appeals further held that the statute of limitations for a
claim based on injury to an incorporal hereditament begins to run “from
the time that the claim accrues, even if a plaintiff is not aware of the
injury at that time.” Jd. at ___, 766 S.E.2d at 359. The court determined.
that plaintiff should have been aware of the encroachment when the
certificate of occupancy was issued on 11 October 2006, denoting the
completion of construction, and thus was required to file suit against
defendant by 11 October 2012 to avoid running afoul of the statute of lim-
itations. Id. at __, 766 S.E.2d at 359. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the statute of limitations had expired when plaintiff filed
its complaint on 12 December 2012. Id. at __, 766 S.E.2d at 358. On
10 June 2015, this Court allowed plaintiff's petition for discretionary
review and a conditional petition for discretionary review filed by defen-
dant, Wieland, and Yarbrough-Williams.

The key issue before us is whether the trial court and the Court
of Appeals erred in identifying the applicable statute of limitations. We
review determinations by the Court of Appeals for errors of law. N.C.
R. App. P. 16(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant and Weiland on the grounds
that the six-year statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claims. To prevail
on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must first show
that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
no genuine issues of material fact exist. N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Beverage
Sys. of the Carolinas, LLC v. Associated Beverage Repair, LLC, __
NC. 784 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2016). Allowing a defendant’s motion

—

IN THE SUPREME COURT

"DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC v. GRAY
[869 N.C. 1 2016)

for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations is appro-
priate only when all the facts necessary to establish the limitation are
alleged or admitted by the plaintiff, with the plaintiff receiving the ben-
efit of all relevant inferences. City of Reidsville v. Burton, 269 N.C. 206,
210, 152 S.E.2d 147, 150 (1967) (citations omitted).

Defendant argues that the appropriate limitation period is the six
years set out in N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(3), while plaintiff contends that the
twenty-year statute of limitations found in N.C.G.S. § 1-40 is proper.
The former, set out in Chapter 1, Article 5 (“Limitations, Other Than
Real Property”), applies to actions for “injury to any incorporeal her-
editament.” N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(3) (2015). The latter, set out in Chapter
1, Article 4 (“Limitations, Real Property”), applies to “action[s] for the
recovery or possession of real property.” Id. § 1-40 (2015). As a result,
we must determine whether this action involves injury to an incorporeal
‘hereditament or recovery of real property.

We begin our analysis by considering the characteristics of an incor-
poreal hereditament, which has been defined as “[a]n intangible right
in land, such as an easement.” Incorporeal Hereditament, Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 589,
598, 127 S.E. 697, 702 (1925) (“An easement is an incorporeal heredit-
ament, and is an interest in the servient estate.” (citations omitted)).
Consistent with this definition, we have observed that “[aJn easement
always implies an interest in the land. It is real property, and it is cre-
ated by grant.” Davis, 189 N.C. at 600, 127 S.E. at 703 (citations omitted)
(quoting Atl. & Pac. R.R. v. Lesueur, 2 Ariz. 428, 430, 19 P. 157, 158-59
(1888)); see also Real Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
(‘Real property can be either corporeal (soil and buildings) or incor-
poreal (easements).”). Accordingly, the easement in this case, while an
incorporeal hereditament, is also real property.

Next, we review the nature of plaintiff's action. Plaintiff's easement
gives plaintiff a property right to a degree of control over the use of an
identified swath of land, specifically including “the right to keep said
strip of land free and clear of any or all structures.” Plaintiff alleges that
the encroachment of defendant’s home into that strip interferes with
and invades its rights over that tract. While plaintiff has alleged an injury
to its rights as possessor of the easement, the remedy plaintiff pursues is
not damages for any injury to the easement. Instead, plaintiff wishes to
regain control over the part of its easement now occupied by defendant's
house. Because plaintiff seeks to recover full use of its easement, and
because the easement is real property, we conclude that this action is
for the recovery of real property. By definition, the statutes of limitation

IN THE SUPREME COURT 7

DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC v. GRAY
[369 N.C. 1 (2016)]

in Chapter 1, Article 5 do not apply to the recovery of real property.
See N.C.GS. § 1-46 (2015) (stating that the limitations periods found in
Article 5 are for “actions, other than for the recovery of real property”).
Consequently, we conclude that plaintiff's claim is subject to the section
1-40 twenty-year statute of limitations. For similar reasons, the ten-year
statute of limitations for sealed instruments found in N.C.G.S. § 1-47(2)
is inapplicable because it too is contained in Chapter 1, Article 5 of the
General Statutes.

Not only do we conclude that this result is dictated by the language
found in the applicable statutes and cases, we acknowledge that utility
facilities crisscross the state above, on, and beneath the ground. Their
accompanying easements are not always readily subject to routine
inspection by the owning utility. We do not believe that the drafters of
N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(8) intended that a utility’s right to maintain such ease-
ments could be successfully challenged in a time as short as six years.

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and conclude that
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant
and Wieland upon finding that Duke’s claims were barred by N.C.G.S.
§ 1-50(a)(8). In addition, we overrule the decision of the Court of Appeals
in Pottle v. Link, 187 N.C. App. 746, 654 S.E.2d 64 (2007), insofar as that
opinion deemed section 1-40 inapplicable to actions involving encroach:
ments on easements. Defendant’s pending claims against other parties
are unaffected by this result.

Defendant, Weiland, and Yarbrough-Williams raised several addi-
tional issues in their conditional petition to this Court. The first issue
is whether plaintiff failed to assert that the encroachment materially
interferes with its use of the easement. The second issue is whether the
doctrine of laches applies if plaintiff knew or should have known of
the alleged encroachment more than six years preceding the filing
of this action. As to both of those issues we hold that discretionary
review was improvidently allowed. Furthermore, we do not reach the
remaining issues raised in the parties’ petitions for discretionary review
because we have determined that Chapter 1, Article 5 does not apply to
this case.

For the forgoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for remand to the trial
court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED IN PART.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

E, CAROLINA REG’L HOUS. AUTH. v. LOFTON
[869 N.C. 8 (2016)]

EASTERN CAROLINA REGIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
v.
SHERBREDA LOFTON

No. 82PAI5
Filed 19 August 2016

Landlord and Tenant—public housing—drug activity—eject-
ment—exercise of discretion by landlord
Summary ejectment was inappropriate in a case involving drug
activity in federally subsidized housing where plaintiff-Housing
Authority did not exercise discretion before pursuing defendant's
eviction, as required by federal law.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, _ N.C. App. __, 767 S.E.2d 63
(2014), affirming an order and judgment entered on 29 August 2013 by
Judge David B. Brantley in District Court, Wayne County. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 16 November 2015.

Ward and Smith, PA., by Michael J. Parrish and E. Bradley Evans,
Sor plaintiff-appellant.

Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., by John R. Wester, Thomas
Holderness, and Erik Randall Zimmerman, pro hac vice; and Legal
Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by John Keller, Theodore O. Fillette,
III, Peter Gilbert, and Andrew Cogdell, for defendant-appellee.

Brownlee Law Firm, PLLC, by William K. Brownlee, for Apartment
Association of North Carolina, amicus curiae.

John R. Rittelmeyer and Yasmin Farahi for Disability Rights
North Carolina, amicus curiae.

Francis Law Firm, PLLC, by Charles T: Francis and Ruth Sheehan,
for Housing Authority of the City of Raleigh, amicus curiae.

NEWBY, Justice.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

E. CAROLINA REG’L HOUS. AUTH. v. LOFTON
[869 N.C. 8 (2016)]

In this case we consider whether public housing authorities must
exercise discretion when pursuing evictions that are not otherwise man-
dated by federal law. Recognizing that public housing is the housing of
Jast resort, Congress intended public housing authorities to exercise
discretion in certain eviction proceedings, such as the lease violation at
issue here arising from the actions of a third party. The trial court's find-
ings establish that plaintiff failed to exercise its discretion before pur-
suing defendant's eviction. Accordingly, plaintiff has not established its
right to summary ejectment. Nonetheless, because the Court of Appeals
erred by imposing an unconscionability analysis, we modify and affirm
the decision of that court.

Defendant is a tenant in Brookside Manor, which is owned and oper-
ated by plaintiff, a federally subsidized housing authority. The tenancy
is governed by a signed lease that contains various provisions required
by federal Jaw.! Relevant here, the lease prohibits “[aJny drug-related
criminal activity on or off the premises” and provides that plaintiff “may
terminate... the Lease and the tenancy” for any such activity “by Tenant,
any of Tenant’s household members, any guest of Tenant, or another

person under Tenant's control.” Plaintiff’s “Resident Handbook” and
“Admission and Continued Occupancy Policy,” both incorporated into
the lease, restate the same, characterizing “[djrug-related criminal
activity engaged in on or off the premises by a tenant, member of the
tenant’s household or guest, and any such activity engaged in on the
premises by any other person under the tenant's control, [a]s grounds to
terminate tenancy.”

Defendant often asked Cory Smith to baby-sit her children while she
worked at night. On 26 April 2013, Smith arrived at defendant’s apart-
ment to watch the children while defendant slept before work and later
while she worked. While defendant slept, law enforcement entered the
apartment and arrested Smith for outstanding child support warrants.
Officers searched Smith incident to his arrest and found four small bags
of marijuana in his pocket.

1. The operation and management of public housing authorities, including lease
terms and procedures, are governed by the United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No.
75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), and its regula-
tions, see 24 CER. §§ 966.1 to 966.57 (2016).

2. The lease defines a “guest” as “a person temporarily staying in the unit with the
consent of Tenant or other member of the household with authority to consent on behalf
of Tenant.” The lease defines a “person under Tenant's control” as “a person not staying as
a guest in the dwelling unit, but [one who] is or was present on the premises at the time of
the activity in question because of an invitation from Tenant.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT

E, CAROLINA REG’L HOUS. AUTH. v. LOFTON
“(869 N.C. 8 (2016)]

Defendant consented to a search of her apartment, during which
officers discovered a partially prepared “marijuana blunt” in plain sight,
marijuana in plain sight on the kitchen counter, plastic bags for packag-
ing marijuana for sale, and fourteen more bags of marijuana behind a
pan on the kitchen counter. Smith admitted that the marijuana belonged
to him, and he was charged with felony possession with intent to sell
and deliver a controlled substance, Defendant was not charged.

On 22 May 2013, plaintiff notified defendant in writing that she
had breached the lease because of the drug-related activity that had
occurred in her apartment by Smith, a person under her control. Plaintiff
stated it had terminated defendant's lease and ordered her to vacate her
apartment. When defendant failed to comply, plaintiff sought summary
ejectment. Following a hearing, the magistrate entered judgment for
plaintiff, entitling plaintiff to take possession.?

Upon appeal to the District Court, Wayne County, for a trial de novo,
defendant admitted that Smith placed marijuana in various places in the
apartment, that Smith was under her control, and that her lease made her
“responsible for the conduct of her guests or persons under her control.”
Plaintiff's manager testified that she believed any drug-related criminal
activity required eviction. In its order the trial court noted defendant's
acknowledgement that “drug-related criminal activity” occurred in her
apartment and that such activity would “authorize Plaintiff to evict
her from her apartment” despite “her lack of knowledge of” the criminal
activity. Nonetheless, the trial court found in part:

8. Plaintiff did not produce evidence that it consid-
ered any mitigating factors or used any discretion in mak-
ing its decision to terminate Defendant's lease. The only
decision Plaintiff considered was whether Defendant met
the criteria for having a person under her control who
engaged in drug-related criminal activity.

9. It did not appear that Plaintiff, through its two wit-
nesses, understood that it even had the authority or duty

3. In the initial complaint, plaintiff appears to have elected to pursue defendant's
eviction under N.C.GS. § 42-63 (2015), which allows for eviction as a result of certain
criminal activity. Nonetheless, the complaint also described the specific lease terms vio-
lated by defendant. On 8 July 2013, the parties stipulated to amend the complaint “as
though Plaintiff had selected the additional ground for eviction ‘the defendant breached
the condition of the lease described below for which re-entry is specified’ ” Thereafter,
both parties proceeded solely under the lease violation theory. Thus, any argument pursu-
ant to the statutory provision is not before this Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
E, CAROLINA REG’L HOUS. AUTH. v. LOFTON
[369 N.C. 8 (2016)]

to consider other factors other than whether Defendant
met the criteria for lease termination.

The trial court denied plaintiff's request to evict defendant, concluding
that federal law required plaintiff to exercise discretion in making its
decision. Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on a
different basis, concluding that plaintiff must prove that evicting defen-
dant was not unconscionable under North Carolina law. E. Carolina
Reg'l Hous. Auth. v. Lofton, ___ N.C. App. __, 767 S.E.2d 63 (2014). We
allowed plaintiff's petition for discretionary review.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision, the equitable defense
of unconscionability is not a consideration in summary ejectment pro-
ceedings. To prevail in a summary ejectment proceeding under North
Carolina law, a landlord must establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that a tenant breached the lease. See N.C.G.S. §§ 42-26(a)(2), -30
(2015); see also Durham Hosiery Mill Ltd. P’ship v. Morris, 217 N.C.
App. 590, 593, 720 S.E.2d 426, 428 (2011) (“A tenant may be removed
in a summary ejectment action when the tenant has ‘done or omitted
any act by which, according to the stipulations of his lease, his estate
has ceased.’ ” (quoting N.C.G.S. § 42-26(a)(2) (2009)); id. at 595-96,
720 S.E.2d at 429 (rejecting as “clearly dicta” the language in Morris
v. Austraw, 269 N.C. 218, 223, 152 S.E.2d 155, 159 (1967), perceived as
requiring an unconscionability analysis).

If the lease at issue related to a private landlord-tenant relation-
ship, our analysis would end here. When the government is the landlord,
however, certain duties arise under applicable law. Federal statutes
and regulations govern federally subsidized public housing and require
public housing authorities to incorporate certain provisions into their
leases. In its role as the final forum for review of government housing
decisions, the Court is not to second-guess or replace plaintiff's dis-
cretionary decisions but to ensure procedural and substantive compli-
ance with the federal statutory framework. See Charlotte Hous. Auth.
v. Patterson, 120 N.C. App. 552, 555, 464 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1995) (“In fed-
erally subsidized housing cases, the court decides whether applicable
rules and regulations have been followed, and whether termination of
the lease is permissible.” (citation omitted)). “A trial court’s findings
of fact are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence.”
Durham Hosiery, 217 N.C. App. at 592, 720 S.E.2d at 427 (citation omit-
ted). The trial court found that plaintiff, believing Smith’s drug-related
activity mandated defendant's eviction, did not exercise discretion. Thus,

12 IN THE SUPREME COURT

E. CAROLINA REG’L HOUS. AUTH. v. LOFTON
[369 N.C. 8 (2016)]

the sole remaining question is whether under federal law plaintiff was
required to exercise some degree of discretion in its eviction decision.

Federally subsidized public housing is a safety net designed to
provide homes to those least able to afford other housing options.
Like everyone else, individuals who live in federally subsidized hous-
ing are entitled to be free from “any criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises.” 42 U.S.C..
§ 1437d(@)(6) (2012); see also N.C. Const. art. I, § 1 (“We hold it to be
self-evident that all persons are created equal; that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit
of happiness.”); The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
(‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
Recognizing the devastating effect of illegal drugs in public housing,
Congress adopted the Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5122, 102 Stat. 4181, 4301 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 11901 (2012)). The Act requires leases to include language
granting public housing authorities broad discretion to terminate leases
to ensure that the housing is “decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs.”
42 U.S.C. § 11901(1).

Under federal law, public housing leases must “allow the agency
... to terminate the tenancy,” id. § 13662(a) (2012), for any household
member “who... . is illegally using a controlled substance,” id. § 18662(a)
(4), or whose drug abuse “interfere[s] with the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents,” id. § 13662(a)
(2). The lease must prohibit not only household members from engag-
ing in drug-related activity but also forbid any guest or person under a
tenant's control from engaging in such activity. Id. § 1487d(@)(6) (“Each
public housing agency shall utilize leases which . . . provide that . . .
any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in
by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or
any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for
termination of tenancy|.]”); 24 C.FR. § 966.4(f)(12)@), (ii) (2016); Public
Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 51,567
(Oct. 11, 1991). Violation of these provisions “shall be cause for termina-
tion of tenancy” as determined by the local public housing authority in
its discretion. 42 U.S.C. § 1487d()(6); see 24 C.FR. § 966.4(@)(6)(vii)(B)
(When terminating a tenancy for drug-related criminal activity, the housing
authority “may consider all circumstances relevant to a particular case.”).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 18

E. CAROLINA REG’L HOUS. AUTH. v. LOFTON
[369 N.C. 8 (2016)]

In the seminal case interpreting public housing law, Department of
Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 122 S. Ct. 1230,
152 L. Ed. 2d 258 (2002), some tenants questioned the extent of agency
officials’ authority to evict residents from public housing. The Supreme -
Court of the United States held that a housing authority could evict a
tenant and her family as a result of a guest's illegal activity even when
the tenant was unaware of the activity and had no reason to suspect it.
Id. at 136, 122 8. Ct. at 1236, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 270; see also id. at 131, 122
S. Ct. at 1234, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 267 (“[TJhe plain language of § 1437d(2)
(6) requires leases that grant public housing authorities the discretion to
terminate tenancy without regard to the tenant’s knowledge of the drug-
related criminal activity.”).

The decision in Rucker, however, emphasizes the importance of
housing officials exercising discretion before pursuing these “no-fault”
evictions. Id. at 134-36, 122 S. Ct. at 1235-36, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 268-70.
In particular,

[t]he statute does not require the eviction of any tenant
who violated the lease provision. Instead, it entrusts that
decision to the local public housing authorities, who are in
the best position to take account of, among other things,
the degree to which the housing project suffers from “ram-
pant drug-related or violent crime,” “the seriousness of
the offending action,” and “the extent to which the lease-
holder has . . . taken all reasonable steps to prevent or
mitigate the offending action.” [A] local housing authority
may sometimes evict a tenant who had no knowledge of
the drug-related activity.

Id. at 133-34, 122 S. Ct. at 1235, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 268 (first alteration in
original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11901(2) (1994 & Supp. V) and Screening
and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other Criminal Activity, 66 Fed. Reg.
28,776, 28,803 (May 24, 2001)). Congress thus “afford[ed] local public
housing authorities the discretion to conduct no-fault evictions for drug-
related crime,” id. at 135, 122 S. Ct. at 1236, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 269 (cita-
tion omitted), by “requir[ing] lease terms that give local public housing
authorities the discretion to terminate the lease,” id. at 136, 122 S. Ct. at
1236, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 270. See also id. at 130, 122 S. Ct. at 1238, 152 L. Ed.
2d at 266 (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d()(6) “unambiguously requires
lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discre-
tion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of ... guests”). In sum,
while a public housing authority may conduct no-fault evictions, it must
exercise discretion in doing so.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

E. CAROLINA REG’L HOUS. AUTH. v. LOFTON
[369 N.C. 8 (2016)]

Shortly after the decision in Rucker, the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) described the discretion
given to public housing authorities to seek no-fault evictions based
upon the actions of third parties. While characterizing the power as “a
strong tool,” HUD emphasized that no-fault evictions “should be applied
responsibly.” Letter from Mel Martinez, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., to Pub. Hous. Dirs. (Apr. 16, 2002). Moreover, HUD directed
that enforcement of the clause be “left to the discretion of each public
housing agency . . . to be guided by compassion and common sense,”
with eviction as “the last option explored.” Id. Shortly thereafter, HUD
reiterated that Rucker “made it clear both that the lease provision gives
PHAs [Public Housing Authorities] such authority and that PHAs are
not required to evict an entire household—or, for that matter, anyone—
every time a violation of the lease clause occurs.” Letter from Michael
M. Liu, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to Pub. Hous.
Dirs. (June 6, 2002). Instead, HUD explained, “PHAs are in the best posi-
tion to determine what lease enforcement policy will most appropriately
serve the statutory interest of protecting the welfare of the entire ten-
ant population.” Id. Accordingly, HUD “urge[d]” PHAs, when making an
ultimate decision, “to consider a wide range of factors” and to “balance
them against the competing policy interests that support the eviction of
the entire household.” Id.; see also 24 CER. § 966.4()(6)(vii)(B).

Discretion “involve[s] an exercise of judgment and choice, not an
implementation of a hard-and-fast rule exercisable at one’s own will or
judgment.” Discretionary, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Here
the trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to exercise its discretion
before seeking defendant’s eviction. The trial court found that plaintiff
was unaware of its responsibility to exercise discretion; therefore, plain-
tiff only considered whether the facts permitted eviction, thereby omit-
ting the critical step of determining whether eviction should occur in
this case. Neither the federal statutory framework nor plaintiff’s lease
or policies compel eviction; they only delineate the grounds or cause
for eviction. Though the decision to evict lies in plaintiff's discretion,
which courts will not second-guess, plaintiff does not exercise discre-
tion when it is unaware it has a choice. See Hous. Auth. of Covington
v. Turner, 295 S.W.3d 123, 129 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009) (Moore, J., concurring)
(‘[Dliscretion must be exercised, rather than a blind application of the
law because 42 U.S.C. § 1487d(1)(6) does not require evictions.”).

While we affirm the outcome of the Court of Appeals’ decision,
namely that summary ejectment was inappropriate in this case, we do
so for a different reason. We hold that plaintiff failed to exercise its

IN THE SUPREME COURT 15

QUALITY BUILT HOMES INC. v. TOWN OF CARTHAGE
[369 N.C. 15 (2016)]

discretion as required by federal law before pursuing defendant's evic-
tion. Accordingly, we modify and affirm the decision of that court.

MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.

QUALITY BUILT HOMES INCORPORATED anp STAFFORD LAND COMPANY, INC.
v.
TOWN OF CARTHAGE

No. S15PAI5
Filed 19 August 2016

Cities and Towns—water and sewer impact fee ordinances—for
future use and expansion—invalid

The Town of Carthage exceeded its municipal authority under
the Public Enterprise Statutes by adopting water and sewer “impact
fee” ordinances that, upon approval of any subdivision of real prop-
erty, triggered immediate charges for future water and sewer sys-
tem expansion. These fees were assessed regardless of the property
owner's actual use of the systems or whether Carthage actually
expanded its systems. The plain language of the statute empowered
the Town to charge for contemporaneous use of water and sewer
services, not to collect fees for future discretionary spending.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. __,
776 S.E.2d 897 (2015), affirming an order allowing summary judgment
entered on 17 October 2014 by Judge James M. Webb in Superior Court,
Moore County. On 5 November 2015, the Supreme Court allowed defen-
dant’s conditional petition for discretionary review as to additional
issues. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 May 2016 in session in the Old
Burke County Courthouse in the City of Morganton pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-10(a).

Ferguson, Hayes, Hawkins & DeMay, PLLC, by James R. DeMay;
and Scarbrough & Scarbrough, PLLC, by James E. Scarbrough, for
plaintiff-appellants/appellees.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

QUALITY BUILT HOMES INC. v. TOWN OF CARTHAGE
[369 N.C. 15 (2016)]

Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Susan K. Burkhart, for
defendant-appellant/appellee.

Law Office of John T. Benjamin, Jr., PA., by John T. Benjamin,
Jr. and William E. Hubbard, for Leading Builders of America,
amicus curiae.

Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, PA., by Edward F Hennessey;
and J. Michael Carpenter, General Counsel, for North Carolina
Home Builders Association, Inc., amicus curiae.

Ellis & Winters LLP, by Matthew W. Sawchak and Paul M. Cox; and
F: Paul Calamita for North Carolina Water Quality Association,
amicus curiae.

NEWBY, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the Town of Carthage exceeded
its municipal authority under the Public Enterprise Statutes, N.C.G.S.
§§ 160A-311 to -338 (2015), by adopting certain water and sewer “impact
“fee” ordinances. Upon approval of a subdivision of real property, the
ordinances trigger immediate charges for future water and sewer sys-
tem expansion, regardless of whether the landowner ever connects to
the system or whether Carthage ever expands the system. As creations
of the legislature, municipalities have only those powers delegated to
them by the General Assembly. When Carthage adopted the ordinances
at issue here, it exercised power that it had not been granted. The impact
fee ordinances are therefore invalid and, accordingly, we reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

In 2008, following a period of rapid population growth, Carthage
adopted two similar impact fee ordinances: one pertaining to its water
system, and the other pertaining to its sewer system. In their current
form, the ordinances state that the impact fees “shall be used to cover
the costs of expanding the [water and sewer] system[s].” Carthage,
N.C., Code §§ 51.076(F) (water), 51.096(H) (sewer) (2015). These costs
include “water treatment plant expansion, elevated storage expansion,
and transmission mains” for the water system, id. § 51.076(F), and
“gravity mains, force mains, and lift stations” for the sewer system, id.

§ 51.096).

Under both ordinances, a landowner who seeks to subdivide prop-
erty and receives “final plat approval,” id. §§ 51.076(C)(1), 51.096(B),

IN THE SUPREME COURT

QUALITY BUILT HOMES INC. v. TOWN OF CARTHAGE
[869 N.C. 15 (2016)]

must pay water and sewer impact fees “based on water meter size accord-
ing to the town’s fee schedule,” id. §§ 51.076(B), 51.096(A), in amounts
ranging from $1,000 to $30,000 per connection. Carthage, N.C., Fee and
Rate Schedule 4 (July 1, 2016). “If a [property] has received its final plat,
then the entire [water and sewer] impact fee[s] shall be paid at the ear-
liest or next occurrence of . . . [the] (a) Tap fee; or (b) Development
permit.” Id. §§ 51.076(C)(2), 51.096(C); see also Fee and Rate Schedule 4
(“Water/Sewer Impact Fees are due upon final plat approval for new
subdivisions (major or minor) or upon application for building permit,
whichever occurs first.”). Tap fees cover Carthage’s costs “‘to ‘tap’ or
access” the “water and/or sewer line that exists in front of the property,”
whereas “impact fees offset .. . costs to expand the system to accom-
modate development.”

Impact fees are assessed “in addition to the regular water and sewer
tap fees,” and the monthly service charges to water and sewer custom-
ers. If a property owner does not pay the impact fees, Carthage “will
refuse” to issue building permits. Certain exceptions exist “for tempo-
rary or emergency service,” id. § 51.076(A)(2)(b), and any service solely

for “fire protection,” id. §§ 51.076(E), 51.096(G), but in all instances,
impact fees are assessed regardless of the property owner’s actual use
of the systems or whether Carthage actually expands the systems. In
2014 Carthage’s Town Manager reported that the Town had “neglected
to make needed improvements to its water and sewer systems for
many years.”

Plaintiffs are North Carolina corporations engaged in residen-
tial homebuilding. At the time of filing their action, plaintiffs had paid
Carthage a total of $123,000 in water and sewer impact fees.

On 28 October 2013, plaintiffs filed their complaint seeking, inter
alia, a declaratory judgment and monetary damages.! Plaintiffs allege
that “Carthage has acted outside the scope of its legal authority” by
“charging” the impact fees “without a specific delegation of authority
from the General Assembly” and that, accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled
to aretur of all impact fees paid, plus interest and attorneys’ fees.

Carthage timely answered the complaint, contending that “the
water and sewer fees imposed by Defendant were authorized by North
Carolina's Public Enterprise Statute” and asserting various affirmative
defenses, including, inter alia, the statute of limitations and estoppel.

1. Not at issue here, on 28 June 2014, plaintiffs amended their complaint to, inter
alia, add equal protection and due process claims.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

QUALITY BUILT HOMES INC. v. TOWN OF CARTHAGE
[869 N.C. 15 (2016)]

All parties moved for summary judgment. On 17 October 2014, the
trial court entered an order granting summary judgment for Carthage.
Plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment order to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Carthage. Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of
Carthage, ___ N.C. App. __, 776 S.E.2d 897, 2015 WL 4620404 (2015)
(unpublished). Applying “broad construction” interpretation principles
under N.C.G.S. § 160A-4, the Court of Appeals concluded that Carthage
acted within its delegated municipal authority to impose and collect the
impact fees under the Public Enterprise Statutes, Quality Built Homes,
2015 WL 4620404, at *4-5 (citing, inter alia, N.C.G.S. § 160A-4 (2018);
Homebuilders Ass’n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 43-44,
442, S.E.2d 45, 50 (1994); and Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette, 305 N.C.
248, 252, 287 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1982)), which enable municipalities to
“establish and revise . .. schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and pen-
alties for the use of or the services furnished by any public enterprise,”
N.C.G.S. § 160A-314(a).2

We allowed both plaintiffs’ petition and defendant's conditional peti-
tion for discretionary review. We review matters of statutory interpreta-
tion de novo, In re Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612, 616, 684 S.B.2d
151, 154 (2009) (citations omitted), as well as orders granting summary
judgment, viewing the allegations as true and “the presented evidence
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Dalton v. Camp, 353
N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001) (citation omitted).

From the very formation of our State government, municipalities, in
their various forms, have been considered “creatures of the legislative
will, and are subject to its control.” Lutterloh v. City of Fayetteville, 149
N.C. 65, 69, 62 S.E. 758, 760 (1908); see King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367
N.C. 400, 405, 758 S.E.2d 364, 369 (2014); Bd. of Trs. af Youngsville Twp.
v. Webb, 155 N.C. 379, 384-85, 71 S.E. 520, 522 (1911). Fundamental to
our system is the legislature’s ability to confer upon municipalities cer-
tain authority needed to effectuate the purposes of government. N.C.
Const. art. VII, § 1 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the organi-
zation and government... of counties, cities and towns, and... may give
such powers and duties to .. . [them] as it may deem advisable.”); White
v. Comm'rs of Chowan Cty., 90 N.C. 437, 438 (1884) (“[Municipalities]

2. Because of its resolution of the matter, the Court of Appeals did not reach the
statute of limitations or estoppel issues. Quality Built Homes, 2015 WL 4620404 at *5.
Moreover, the court overruled plaintiffs’ argument that they are entitled to recover attor-
neys’ fees and costs. Id. at *6.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

“QUALITY BUILT HOMES INC. v. TOWN OF CARTHAGE
[869 N.C. 15 2016)

contribute largely to the life-principle of American liberty, and are
. .. invested with appropriate corporate functions . . . [which] may be
enlarged, abridged or modified at the will of the legislature . . . .”); see
also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *470 (“[Municipalities] are
erected for the good government of a town or particular district ....”)

The General Assembly delegates express power to municipalities
by adopting an enabling statute, which includes “implied powers . . .
essential to the exercise of those which are expressly conferred.” O’Neal
v. Wake County, 196 N.C. 184, 187, 145 S.E. 28, 29 (1928); see Lanvale
Props., LLC v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 150, 731 S.E.2d 800,
807 (2012); Town of Saluda v. County of Polk, 207 N.C. 180, 186, 176 S.E.
298, 301-02 (1934). “All acts beyond the scope of the powers granted to
a municipality are [invalid].” City of Asheville v. Herbert, 190 N.C. 732,
735, 180 S.E. 861, 863 (1925) (citations omitted).

When determining the extent of legislative power conferred upon a
municipality, the plain language of the enabling statute governs. Smith
Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 811, 517 S.E.2d
874, 878 (1999) (citation omitted). If the “language of [the enabling] stat-
ute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction,
and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning.” Jd. at 811, 517
S.E.2d at 878 (quoting Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, BSA, 322 N.C.
271, 276, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1988)). “[A] statute clear on its face must
be enforced as written.” Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 419-
20, 451 S.E.2d 284, 289 (1994) (citation omitted).

Ifthe enabling statute is ambiguous, the “legislation ‘shall be broadly
construed . . . to include any additional and supplementary powers that
are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and
effect.’ ” King, 367 N.C. at 405, 758 S.E.2d at 369 (citation omitted) (quot-
ing N.C.G.S. § 160A-4). The “broad construction” mandate of section
160A-4 is “a rule of statutory construction rather than a general direc-
tive,” Lanvale Props., 366 N.C. at 154, 731 S.E.2d at 809, and, as such, is
inoperative when the enabling statute is clear and unambiguous on its
face, see id. at 154-55, 731 S.E.2d at 809-10 (citations omitted).

Carthage asserts that under the Public Enterprise Statutes it has
broad authority to “collect monies” for the “operation, maintenance
and expansion” of its water and sewer systems, and that such authority
extends to the collection of impact fees. Carthage claims that “impact
fees” fall squarely within its “authority to charge ‘fees’ or ‘charges’ ”
under N.C.G.S. § 160A-314. We disagree. While the enabling statutes allow
Carthage to charge for the contemporaneous use of its water and sewer

20 IN THE SUPREME COURT

QUALITY BUILT HOMES INC. v. TOWN OF CARTHAGE
[369 N.C. 15 (2016)]

systems, the plain language of the Public Enterprise Statutes clearly fails
to empower the Town to impose impact fees for future services.

The enabling statutes at issue here provide, in pertinent part, that
“[a] city may establish and revise . . . rents, rates, fees, charges, and pen-
alties for the use of or the services furnished by any public enterprise,”
N.C.G.S. § 160A-314(a), that “[a] city shall have authority to acquire, con-
struct, establish, enlarge, improve, maintain, own, operate, and contract
for the operation of any or all of the public enterprises . . . to furnish
services,” id. § 160A-312(a), and that “a city shall have full authority to
finance the cost of any public enterprise by levying taxes, borrowing
money, and appropriating any other revenues therefor,” id. § 1604-313.

These enabling statutes clearly and unambiguously empower
Carthage to charge for the contemporaneous use of water and sewer
services—not to collect fees for future discretionary spending. See
Smith Chapel, 350 N.C. at 811, 517 S.E.2d at 878 (finding that the “plain
language” of N.C.G.S. § 160A-314 is “clear and unambiguous”). A munici-
pality’s ability to “establish and revise” its various “fees” is limited to
“the use of” or “the services furnished by” the enterprise, which provi-
sions are operative in the present tense. See Dunn v. Pac. Emp'rs Ins.
Co., 332 N.C. 129, 134, 418 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1992) (“Ordinary rules of
grammar apply when ascertaining the meaning of a statute . . . .” (cita-
tions omitted)).

Though the enabling statutes allow municipalities to charge for
“services furnished,” unlike similar county water and sewer district
enabling statutes, the language at issue here fails to authorize Carthage
to charge for services “to be furnished.” See McNeill v. Harnett County,
827 N.C. 552, 570, 398 S.E.2d 475, 485 (1990) (holding that the latter part
of the enabling phrase “services furnished or to be furnished,” N.C.G.S.
§ 162A-88 (1987) (emphasis added) (governing county water and sewer
districts), plainly allowed the charge for prospective services, which
are “not limited to the financing of maintenance and improvements of
existing customers”).? Since 1982 this Court has cautioned that munici-
palities may lack the power to charge for prospective services absent

3. Enabling statutes pertaining to other entities employ the same “to be furnished”
prospective language, which section 160A-814(a) does not. E.g., N.C.G.S. § 1624-9 (2015)
(enabling water and sewer authorities to “establish and revise a schedule of rates . . . for
the services furnished or to be furnished”); id. § 162A-14(3) (enabling certain “govern-

ing bod{ies]” to “fix... charges .. . for the ser'vices furnished or to be furnished by any
water system or sewer system of the authority”); id. § 162A-49 (2015) (same for district
boards of metropolitan water districts). Accord id. §§ 162A-58(8), -72, -73(3), -85.13(a),
-85.19(a)(8) (2015).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 21

QUALITY BUILT HOMES INC. v. TOWN OF CARTHAGE
[869 N.C. 15 (2016)

the essential “to be” language. Bissette, 305 N.C. at 251, 287 S.E.2d at
853 (dictum) (“[W]Je agree that under [N.C.G.S. § 1604-314(a)] a munici-
pality may not charge for services ‘to be furnished.’ ”). We simply can-
not read language into a statute where it does not exist. N.C. Dep’t of
Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009) (We
“presum[e] that the legislature carefully chose each word used.” (cita-
tion omitted)); Carlyle v. State Highway Comm’n, 193 N.C. 36, 47, 136
S.E. 612, 619 (1927) (“If the courts attempt to read into the law words of
their own..., then this would amount to erecting a legislative despotism
of five men....”).

The language of the impact fee ordinances plainly points to future
services, thus requiring Carthage to invoke prospective charging power.
Both ordinances contemplate “expanding” the systems, including
“plant” and “storage expansion,” and the water impact fee is assessed
on property that is “to be served” by the water system. The fees are not
assessed at the time of actual use, but are payable in full at the time
of “final [subdivision] plat approval’—a time when water, sewer, or
other infrastructure might not have been built and only a recorded plat
exists. Moreover, Carthage charges the impact fees in addition to tap
fees, which are assessed when a property owner actually connects to
the system. Indeed, plaintiffs were required to pay some impact fees
before improving or establishing a need for services on their property.
Cf. Bissette, 305 N.C. at 251-52, 287 S.E.2d at 853 (concluding that an
increased rate on all customers to fund a new treatment plant “did not
reflect any services yet to be furnished, but merely the same service
which had previously been furnished”).

Municipalities routinely seek and obtain enabling legislation from
the General Assembly to assess impact fees. £.g., Act of June 28, 1988,
ch. 996, sec. 1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Law (Reg. Sess. 1988) 178, 178 (enabling
Rolesville to “provide by ordinance for a system of impact fees”); Act
of June 23, 1987, ch. 460, sec. 13, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 609, 613 (same
for Pittsboro); Act of July 8, 1986, ch. 936, sec. 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws
(Reg. Sess. 1986) 221, 221 (same for Chapel Hill); see also Mills v. Bd.
of Comm’rs of Iredell Cty., 175 N.C. 215, 218, 95 S.E. 481, 482 (1918)
(noting that county demands for additional authority, such as “raising of
proper funds . . . for improvements in some fixed place or in restricted
territory . . . can only be conferred by legislative enactment” (cita-
tions omitted)). Yet it appears that Carthage has elected not to pursue
such legislation.

Furthermore, Carthage has the authority to charge tap fees and to
establish water and sewer rates to fund necessary improvements and

22 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. THOMSEN
[869 N.C. 22 (2016)]

maintain services to its inhabitants, which is sufficient to address its
expansion needs. See Bissette, 305 N.C. at 251-52, 287 S.E.2d at 853 (con-
cluding that the town validly increased rates on all customers to pay for
“a necessary improvement to the already existing sewer system without,
which the Town could not continue to provide sewer service”).

While the Public Enterprise Statutes at issue here enable Carthage
to charge for the contemporaneous use of its water and sewer systems,
the statutes clearly and unambiguously fail to give Carthage the essential
prospective charging power necessary to assess impact fees. Because
the legislature alone controls the extension of municipal authority, the
impact fee ordinances on their face exceed the powers delegated to
the Town by the General Assembly, thus overstepping Carthage’s
rightful authority. See Smith Chapel, 350 N.C. at 812, 517 S.E.2d at 879
(holding that “the [town’s] ordinance on its face exceeds the express
limitation of the plain and unambiguous reading of” the applicable
Public Enterprise Statutes).

The ordinances are therefore invalid and, accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment for the Town of Carthage. We conclude that
discretionary review was improvidently allowed as to the remaining
issues on appeal and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for con-
sideration of the unresolved issues.

REVERSED AND REMANDED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED IN PART.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v
ZACHARY DAVID THOMSEN

No. 308415,
Filed 19 August 2016

1. Jurisdiction—subject matter—writ of certiorari—issued by
Court of Appeals—review of sua sponte motion for appropri-
ate relief

Where the trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea and imme-
diately thereafter granted its own motion for appropriate relief,
vacated the judgment and the mandatory 300-month sentence, and

IN THE SUPREME COURT 23

STATE v. THOMSEN
[369 N.C. 22 (2016)]

sentenced defendant to 144 to 233 months, the Court of Appeals
had subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Pursuant
to the state constitution, the General Assembly has the power to
define the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c)
empowers the Court of Appeals to review trial court rulings on
motions for appropriate relief by writ of certiorari, and this default
rule controls unless a more specific statute restricts jurisdiction.
Here, if the trial court’s sua sponte motion was pursuant to sub-
section 15A-1415(b), the holding in State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40
(2015), controlled and the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction. And
if the motion was pursuant to subsection 15A4-1420(d), the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction because nothing in the General Statutes
revoked the jurisdiction conferred by subsection 7A-32(c).

2. Appeal and Error—additional issue on appeal—rendered moot
by holding .
Where the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari to
review the trial court’s ruling on its sua sponte motion for appro-
priate relief, the Supreme Court did not consider the second issue
raised by the parties on appeal: whether the decision by the Court
of Appeals petition panel to issue the writ constituted a ruling on
jurisdiction that bound the subsequent opinion panel. Because the
Supreme Court addressed the underlying subject matter jurisdic-
tion question de novo, this issue was moot.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 776 S.E.2d 41 (2015),
vacating an order granting appropriate relief and judgments entered on
13 December 2013 by Judge James M. Webb in Superior Court, Mooré
County, and remanding for a new sentencing hearing. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 22 March 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Anne M. Middleton, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State.

Bruce T. Cunningham, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

Defendant Zachary David Thomsen pleaded guilty to rape of
a child by an adult offender and to sexual offense with a child by an
adult offender, both felonies with mandatory minimum sentences
of 300 months. See N.C.G.S. §§ 14-27.2A, -27.4A (2013). Pursuant to a

24 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. THOMSEN
[869 N.C. 22 (2016)]

plea arrangement, the trial court consolidated the convictions for judg-
ment and imposed a single active sentence of 300 to 420 months. After
imposing the sentence, the court immediately granted its own motion
for appropriate relief and vacated the judgment and sentence. It con-
cluded that, as applied to defendant, the mandatory sentence violated
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court then
sentenced defendant to 144 to 233 months, pursuant to the Structured.
Sentencing Act. See id. § 15A-1340.17(c), () (2015).

The State did not file a notice of appeal. Instead, it petitioned the
Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s order
granting defendant appropriate relief. Defendant filed a response argu-
ing that the Court of Appeals had already decided in State v. Starkey, 177
N.C. App. 264, 628 S.B.2d 424, cert. denied, 636 S.E.2d 196 (2006), that
it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review a trial court’s sua sponte
grant of appropriate relief, either by the State’s appeal or by writ of cer-
tiorari. The Court of Appeals allowed the State’s petition and issued
the writ. In his merits brief before that court, defendant again argued
that the court lacked jurisdiction. The State responded that, by issuing
the writ, the court had already ruled that it had jurisdiction, and that it
would violate the law of the case doctrine articulated in North Carolina
National Bank v. Virginia Carolina Builders, 307 N.C. 563, 299 S.E.2d
629 (1983), if another Court of Appeals panel overruled that decision.

Ina divided opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed with the State. See
State v. Thomsen, __ N.C. App. __, ___, 776 S.B.2d 41, 48 (2015). The
court held that it was bound by the petition panel’s decision on juris-
diction and could not address it anew. Id. Addressing the merits, the
court held that defendant’s original sentence of 300 to 420 months did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at__, 776 S.E.2d at 50. The court
then vacated defendant’s sentence and the trial court’s order granting
appropriate relief, and remanded the case for a new sentencing hear-
ing. Id. A dissenting opinion maintained that the opinion panel was not
bound by the petition panel’s decision on jurisdiction, and that the Court
of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari that
the State sought. See generally id. at ____, 776 S.E.2d at 50-55 (McGee,
C.J., dissenting). Defendant appealed to this Court on the basis of the
dissenting opinion.

We therefore must address whether the Court of Appeals has
subject-matter jurisdiction to review, pursuant to the State’s petition for
writ of certiorari, a trial court’s grant of its own motion for appropriate
relief. “We review issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”
State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264,'266, 732 S.E.2d 571, 573 (2012).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 25

STATE v. THOMSEN
[869 N.C. 22 (2016)]

[1] The North Carolina Constitution provides that “[t]he Court of
Appeals shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the General Assembly
may prescribe.” N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12(2). The General Assembly has
exercised this constitutional authority in N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) by giving
the Court of Appeals “jurisdiction . . . to issue the prerogative writs,
including . . . certiorari, . . . to supervise and control the proceedings
of any of the trial courts of the General Court of Justice.” N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-32(c) (2015). This statute empowers the Court of Appeals to review
trial court rulings on motions for appropriate relief by writ of certio-
rari unless some other statute restricts the jurisdiction that subsection
7A-32(c) grants. See State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40, 42-43, 770 S.E.2d 74, 76
(2015). In other words, because the state constitution gives the General
Assembly the power to define the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
only the General Assembly can take away the jurisdiction that it has
conferred. Subsection 7A-32(c) thus creates a default rule that the Court
of Appeals has jurisdiction to review a lower court judgment by writ of
certiorari. The default rule will control unless a more specific statute
restricts jurisdiction in the particular class of cases at issue.

In State v. Stubbs, we addressed whether the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review a trial court’s grant of a defendant’s motion for
appropriate relief by writ of certiorari. Id. at 41, 770 S.E.2d at 75. The
State filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals, seek-
ing review of the trial court’s grant of appropriate relief for which the
defendant had moved under N.C.G.S. § 154-1415. Id. at 41-48, 770 S.B.2d
at 75-76. We noted that another statute, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c), specifi-
cally addresses review of trial court rulings on section 15A-1415 motions
for appropriate relief. Id. at 42-43, 770 S.H.2d at 76. But subsection
15A-1422(c), we concluded, contains no “limiting language . . . regarding
which party may appeal a ruling” on a motion for appropriate relief that
would alter the “broad powers” of review by certiorari that subsection
7A-32(c) grants. Id. at 43, 770 S.E.2d at 76. Importantly, we were not
concerned with whether subsection 15A-1422(c) provided an indepen-
dent source of jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals to issue the writ.
See id. Rather, we focused on the absence of language in subsection
15A-1422(c) that would limit the court’s review. See id. Finding none,
we held that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to issue the writ. Id.

The sole relevant difference between Stubbs and this case is that
the trial court here granted appropriate relief on its own motion rather
than on defendant's. See Thomsen, ___ N.C. App. at __, 776 S.E.2d
at 43. A defendant may move for appropriate relief under subsection
15A-1415(b)(4) if he “was convicted or sentenced under a statute

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. THOMSEN
[369 N.C. 22 (2016)]

that was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of North Carolina.” N.C.G.S. § 154-1415(b)(4) (2015). We
recognized in Stubbs that the State can seek review by certiorari from
a “ruling on a motion for appropriate relief pursuant to G.S. 15A-1415.”
Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 43, 770 S.E.2d at 76 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A4-1422(c)
(2015)). N.C.G.S. § 15A4-1420(d), in turn, provides that “[a]t any time
that a defendant would be entitled to relief by motion for appropriate
relief, the court may grant such relief upon its own motion.” N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1420(d) (2015). But section 15A-1422 does not mention review of
relief granted “pursuant to” subsection 1420(d). So the parties disagree
on whether the trial court’s sua sponte motion was “pursuant to” subsec-
tion 15A-1415(b) or “pursuant to” subsection 15A-1420(d), as both were
necessary here to give the trial court the authority to grant relief on its
own motion.

We ultimately do not need to decide this question because, in either
case, the Court of Appeals would have jurisdiction to issue the writ. If the
trial court made its motion “pursuant to” subsection 15A-1415(b), then
the holding in Stubbs directly controls. But even if the trial court made
its motion “pursuant to” subsection 15A-1420(d), the Court of Appeals
still has jurisdiction because nothing in the Criminal Procedure Act, or
any other statute that defendant has referenced, revokes the jurisdiction
in this specific context that subsection 7A-32(c) confers more generally.

Section 154-1422 includes a number of provisions that address
appellate review of rulings on motions for appropriate relief, but makes
no mention of subsection 15A-1420(d) or sua sponte motions. In defen-
dant’s view, this means that the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to
review sua sponte grants of relief. But, as discussed above, just the
opposite is true. The absence of “limiting language,” Stubbs, 368 N.C. at
43, 770 S.E.2d at 76, regarding review of sua sponte motions means that
the jurisdiction prescribed by subsection 7A-32(c) remains unchanged.
We therefore hold that the Court of Appeals had subject-matter jurisdic-
tion to issue a writ of certiorari in this case.

The presence of provisions in section 15A-1422 that limit the Court
of Appeals’ jurisdiction to review motions for appropriate relief in other
contexts confirms that the General Assembly knows how to restrict
that court’s jurisdiction when it elects to do so. For example, subsec-
tion (b) states that “[t]he grant or denial of relief sought pursuant to
GS. 15A-1414 is subject to appellate review only in an appeal regularly
taken.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(b) (2015) (emphasis added). Subsection (d)
states that “[t]here is no right to appeal from the denial of a motion for
appropriate relief when the movant is entitled to a trial de novo upon

IN THE SUPREME COURT 27

STATE v. THOMSEN
[369 N.C. 22 (2016)}

appeal.” Id. § 15A-1422(d) (2015) (emphasis added). And subsection (f)
attempts to limit the jurisdiction of this Court, stating that “[d]ecisions of
the Court of Appeals on motions for appropriate relief that embrace mat-
ter set forth in G.S. 15A-1415(b) are final and not subject to further review
by appeal, certification, writ, motion, or otherwise.” Id. § 15A-1422(f)
(2015), invalidated in part as stated in State v. Blackwell, 359 N.C.
814, 618 S.E.2d 213 (2005), vacated in part on other grounds by State
v. Blackwell, 361 N.C. 41, 638 S.E.2d 452 (2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S.
948 (2007). In contrast, the conspicuous absence of any mention in sec-
tion 15A-1422 of either subsection 15A-1420(d) or sua sponte motions
compels the conclusion that the Court of Appeals lawfully issued the
writ of certiorari in this case.

Finally, defendant argues that the Court of Appeals was not autho-
rized by Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure to
issue the writ of certiorari in this case. But, as we explained in Stubbs,
if a valid statute gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari, Rule 21 cannot take it away. Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 43-44,
770 S.E.2d at 76 (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 1(c) (“These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the appel-
late division as that is established by law.”)). To the extent that State
v. Starkey holds otherwise, it is overruled.

[2] The parties have briefed a second issue—namely, whether the deci-
sion by the Court of Appeals petition panel to issue the writ consti-
tuted a ruling on jurisdiction that bound the subsequent opinion panel.
Because we have addressed the underlying subject-matter jurisdiction
question de novo, however, this additional issue is now moot. We also
express no opinion on whether the State had a right pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1445(a)(8)(c) to appeal the trial court’s grant of appropriate relief.
In a footnote in its brief before the Court of Appeals, the State argued
that it did, but it has abandoned that argument in this Court. In any
event, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to issue the writ of certio-
rari that the State sought. We therefore affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

AFFIRMED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. RICHARDSON
[369 N.C. 28 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

2
)
v. 5) From Johnston County
p)
)

JONATHAN DOUGLAS RICHARDSON
No. 272A14

ORDER

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the
4th of August 2016 by defendant and designated Motion for an Order
or Orders Regarding Deadline for Transcript Preparation. The time for
preparation of the transcripts is extended until 7 October 2016.

By order of the Court in Conference, this 8th day of August, 2016.
s/Ervin, J.
For the Court
WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 8th day of August, 2016.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk of the Supreme Court

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT 29

STATE v. YOUNG
[369 N.C. 29 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )
)
w 5) From Buncombe County
)
DAVID MARTIN BEASLEY YOUNG 5)
,
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 5)
)
vw ) From Guilford County
)
DOMINIQUE JEVON PERRY 5)
}
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA y
Pp)
v ) From Davidson County
)
SETHY TONY SEAM 5)
No. 80A14
No. S1A14
No. 82A14
ORDER

The Court, on its own motion, ordered that the parties submit sup-
plemental briefs on the effect of Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct.
718 (2016), on the proceedings in these cases.

The Court, on its own motion, now orders that these three cases are
consolidated for oral argument. Pursuant to Rule 30(b), appellants will
have a total of thirty minutes for oral argument and appellees will have
a total of thirty minutes for oral argument.

By order of the Court in Conference, this the 18th day of August 2016.

lartis .
For the Court

30 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. YOUNG
[869 N.C. 29 (2016)]

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 18th day of August 2016.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk, Supreme Court
of North Carolina

s/M. ne’
Assistant Clerk

Justice Ervin is recused in No. 82A14, State v. Sethy Tony Seam.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disrosirion oF Petinions ror Discrenonany Review Unoge G.S. 7A-31

18 Aucusr 2016
O1sPLL3 State v. Tracy 1, Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
Lamont Clark Habeas Corpus 07/14/2016
2. Def's Pro Se Motion for Petition toa | 2, Dismissed
Constitutional Challenge
0s9P14-3 Robert S. 1, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for 1. Dismissed
Chamberlain Petition/Grievance/Complaint a
v. D.W. Bray 2, Dismissed
2, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Notice
of Appeal Ervin, J.,
recused
o39P16 State v. John 1. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 1, Allowed
David Watson 02/09/2016
Dissolved
08/18/2016
2. Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2, Denied
8, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § TA-31 8. Denied
(COA15-715)
042P04-8 State v. Lary Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR Dismissed
‘McLeod Pulley (COA15-91)
045P16 Montessori Defs’ PDR Under N.C.GS. § 74-31 Denied
Children’s House —_| (COA15-406)
of Durham v. Philip
Blizzard and
Patricia Blizzard
O46P16 In the Matter of 1, Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ | 1. Denied
‘Todd W. Short of Certiorari to Review Order of COA} 07/13/2016
(COAPI6-40) i
2. Dismissed
2, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for as moot
ADA Accommodations 07/13/2016
8. Petitioner's Pro Se PDR Prior toa 8. Denied
Decision of COA (COA16-580) 07/18/2016
4, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for 4. Dismissed
Expedited Consideration of Petition for | 48 ™moot
Writ of Certioraré (COAP16-40) 07/13/2016
5, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for 5. Dismissed
Expedited Consideration of PDR as moot
(COA16-580) 07/13/2016
6. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Stay of | 6. Denied
Order Entered by COA (COAI6-580) 07/05/2016
7. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Leave | 7. Allowed
to Amendment Certificate of Service 07/05/2016
on Petitioner's Motion for Expedited
Consideration of Petitioner's Writ of
Certiorari, inter alia
Filed on 30 June 2016
8, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Strike _| 8. Denied

07/13/2016

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Perrrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

18 Aucusr 2016
9. Petitioner's Pro Se Renewed Motion 9. Dismissed
to Expedite Petitioner's Writ of as moot
Certiorari from Order of COA 07/13/2016
047P02-17 State v. George Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
W. Baldwin. of Habeas Corpus 06/28/2016
Ervin, J.,
recused
048P15-2 State v. Ronald 1. Def's Pro Se Motion for Notice of 1. Dismissed ex
Dewayne Deese, III | Appeal (COAP16-378) ‘mero motu
2, Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR: 2. Dismissed
3. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 3. Dismissed
Certiorari to Review Order of COA
063P15-2 State v. Isidro 1. Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR 1. Dismissed
Garcia He \dez
aera 2. Def's Pro Se Motion for Subpoena _{ 2. Dismissed
Duces
Tecum Ervin, J.,
recused
064A16-2 Inre Price Def's Pro Se Motion to Reconsider Dismissed
066A16, State v. Shamele Def’s Motion for Leave to File Reply Denied
Collins Brief Out of Time 07/01/2016
066A16 State v. Shamele Def's Attorney's Motion to Withdraw Allowed
Collins as Counsel 07/12/2016
068P16 State v. Corey Def's Pro Se PDR Under Denied
Demond Phillips N.C.GS, § 74-31 (COAI5-730)
O78P16 State v. Terry 1 Def's (Charles Hezekiah Gilchrist, Jr.) | 1. Denied
Cherrelle Gray, PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA15-500),
Jr. and Charl
Heatéch 2, Def's (Terry Cherrelle Gray, Jz) PDR | 2, Denied
Gilehtist, Jr. Under N.C.G.S. § TA3L
O79P16 State v. Marko Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31. Denied
Stasiv (COA15-806)
O80A14 State v. David Special Order
Martin Beasley 08/18/2016
Young
O81Al4 State v. Dominique Special Order
Jevon Perry 08/18/2016
082A14 State v. Sethy Special Order
‘Tony Seam 08/18/2016
Ervin, J.,

recused

IN THE SUPREME COURT 33
Disrostrion oF Perrmons ror Disorevionary Review UNpeR G.S. 7A-31
18 Auaust 2016
08516 State v: Kalvin L. Def’ Petition for Writ of Gertiorari | 1. Dismissed
Michael Smith to Review Order of Superior Court,
Forsyth County
2, State's Motion for Extension of Tame | 2. Allowed
to File Response to Petition for Writ | 08/24/2016
of Certiorari
08616 Inre Redmond Johanna Schoen, Ph.D's Motion for Denied
Leave to File Amicus Brief 08/18/2016
o87als Inre Hughes Johanna Schoen, Ph.D's Motion f6r Denied
Leave to File Amicus Brief 08/18/2016
088P15-3 | State v. Mason 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Notice L
W. Hyde in Advance
2. Def's Pro Se Motion for Notice of 2
Request for Assistance
8, Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 8, Denied
Habeas Corpus 07/05/2016
4, Def's Pro Se PDR Under 4.
N.C.GS. § TA-31 (COALB-1260)
5. Def's Pro Se Motion to Show Cause | 6, Dismissed.
07/19/2016
6. Def's Pro Se Motion to Allow 6. Dismissed
Applicant the Opportunity to Correct/ as moot
Amend Any Defects, Errors, Flaws in | 07/19/2016
the Applicati
 Apprication Ervin, J.,
recused
088ai6 Inre Smith Johanna Schoen, Ph.D's Motion for Denied
Leave to File Amicus Brief 08/18/2016
103P 16 Louis Cherry and | Respondent's (Gail Wiesner) PDR Under | Denied
Marsha Gordon N.C.GS. § 74-31 (COAI5-155)
v. Gail Wiesner,
City of Raleigh, and
Raleigh Board of
Adjustment
City of Raleigh,
a Municipal
Corporation
v. Raleigh Board
of Adjustment,
Louis W, Cherry, I,
Marsha G. Gordon
and Gail P, Wiesner
104Pi62 | State. William Def’s Pro Se Motion to Reconsider Dismissed
Gerald Price

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposrrion oF Petrrions For Discretionary Review Unper G.S, 7A-31

18 Aucust 2016
1u4Pi6 State v. Lary Cook | Def’s Pro Se PDR Under Denied
N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COAI5-278)
129P16 State v. Dwain Bell | 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | 1. Denied
Habeas Corpus
2. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Bill 2. Dismissed
of Complaint
8, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for 3. Dismissed
Objection to Order of Bill of
Complaint Dismissed
132P11-10 | State v. Gregory 1, Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ 1 Denied
Iynn Gordon of Mandamus
2, Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR 2. Denied
(COAPI5-180)
133P16 State v. William 1. Def's Pro Se Notice of Appeal Based | 1. Dismissed
Gerald Price ‘Upon a Constitutional Question ex mero motu
2, Def's Pro Se PDR Under
N.C.GS. § 7A-31 (COA15-1073) 2. Denied
188P 122 Statev.Dartanya _| Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Levon Eaton (COAL6-255)
4oPi6 ‘Timothy S.Boyd —_ | Defs’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
v. Gregory M. Relcue, | (COA15-780)
M.D., and Raleigh
Adult Medicine, PA.
144P16 State v. Anton 1, Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1. —
‘Tolandis Smith Constitutional Question (COA15-921)
2, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31 2, Denied
8, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 8, Allowed
151P16 State v. James 1 State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
L. Johnson (COAI5-793) 04/22/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2, Allowed
of Supersedeas
8, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A-31 | 3. Allowed
154P16 State v. Justin Def’s Petition for Writ of Certiorarito | Denied
Duane Hurd Review Decision of COA (COA15-588) .
Ervin, J.,
recused
158P06-8 State v. Derricke Def's Pro Se Motion to Appeal an Dismissed
D. Boger Consolidation of Sentences
+ | (COAPI6234)
158P16-2 Larry Brandon - | Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Order and | Dismissed

Moore v. Judge Jesse
B. Caldwell, IIT

Proposed Order

IN THE SUPREME COURT 35
Disrosimon or Patvrions ror Disoretionary Review Unpsr G.S. 74-31
18 Aueusr 2016
159P16 State v. Ronald Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-B1 Denied
Perry, Jr. (COA15.967)
160A16 ‘Thomas AE. Davis, | 1. Defs' Notice of Appeal Based Upon a | 1.—
Jn, Administrator | Dissent (COA16-368)
of the Estate of
Lisa Mary Davis 2. Defs’ PDR As to Additional Issues 2, Allowed
@eceased)
v. Hulsing
Enterprises, LLC,
Bulsing Hotels
NC Management
Company, Hulsing
Hotels North
Carolina, Inc.,
Hulsing Hotels,
Inc, d/b/a Crowne
Plaza Tennis & Golf
Resort Asheville
and Mulligan’s
165P16 State v. Simaron 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ 1. Dismissed
Demetrius Hill of Mandamus
2. Def's Pro Se Motion for Peremptory | 2. Dismissed
Setting as moot
166P16 State v. Jaahkii 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Quran Harris (COA16-770) 05/09/2016
Dissolved
08/18/2016
2. State’s Petition for Writ of 2. Denied
‘Supersedeas
3, State's PDR Under N.C.GS. §7A-31 | 8. Denied
169P16 State v. Matthew | Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Chad Beaver (COAI6-1179)
170P16 State v. Dennis 1, Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1.—
Sherwood Lewis | Constitutional Question (COA16-191)
2, Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7ABL 2. Denied
3, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 3. Allowed

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition oF Petitions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 74-31

18 Aucusr 2016

17iP16 Inthe Matter of the | 1. Mecklenburg County's PDR Under 1. Denied
Appeal Of N.C.GS, § 74-81 (COAI5-415)
arenes yor om | 2-Michelin North America, Ine’'s 2, Dismissed
the Decision of Conditional PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 | as moot

the Mecklenburg * | 3, Wake County's Conditional Motion for | 3. Dismissed

County Board of I ‘
Equalization and Leave to File Amicus Brief as moot

Review Concerning
the Discovery of
Certain Business
Personal Property
and the Proposed
Discovery Values
for Tax Years
2006-2011

State v. Mohammed | 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ 1. Denied
Nadder Jilani of Mandamus

2. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Writ 2. Denied
of Prohibition

8. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ 8. Denied
of Mandamus

17BA16 State v. Morris 1. Def’s Motion to Extend Time to File | 1. Allowed
Leavett Stith Brief

2. Def’s Motion to Deem Brief Timely 2. Allowed
Filed

State v. Travis 1, State’s Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Taylor Dail (COAP16.291) 05/11/2016
Dissolved
08/18/2016

2. State's Petition for Writ of 2. Denied
‘Supersedeas

8. State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari | 3. Denied
to Review Order of COA

176P16 State v. Larry | Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
James Waters (COA15-686)

I79A16 Peter Jerard Farrell 1. Petitioner's Notice of Appeal Based
v. United States Upon a Dissent (COA15-257)

Army Brigadi
General Retired, | 2- Petitioner's Notice of Appeal Based
Kelly J. Thomas, Upon a Constitutional Question

Commissioner of | 3, Respondent's Motion to

N.C. Division of ~
Motor Vehicles, in| PiSmiss Appeal

his Official Capacity

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposrrion oF Petitions For DiscrenionarY Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

18 Aucusr 2016
181A934 —_| State v. Rayford Def's Motion to Supplement the Printed | Allowed
Lewis Burke Record on Appeal Ervin, J
BAL irvin, J.,
DEATH) reeused
18116 Lawrence Piazza _| 1. Def's (Gregory Brannon) Notice of — | 1.—
and Salvatore Appeal Based Upon a Dissent (COA15-48)
‘Lampuri v. David
Kirkbride, Gregory | 2-Def's (Gregory Brannon) PDRasto | 2. Allowed
Brannon, and Additional Issues
Robert Rice
183P16 City of Charlotte, | 1. Def's (University Financial Properties, | 1. Denied
a Municipal LLC) PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7431
Corporation v. (COA15-473)
University Financial as
Properties, LLC, 2, Plt’s Conditional PDR Under 2. Dismissed
aNorth Carolina | N- § TASL as moot
Limited Liability
Company ffida
University Bank
Properties Limited
Partnership, a North
Carolina Limited
Partnership, et al.
185P16 Robert Sarauel Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Petition | Dismissed
Chamberlain to Renounce Citizenship
v. State Ervin, J.,
recused
186P16 State v. Terry Def's Pro Se PDR Under Denied
‘Thorne N.C.GS. § 74-81 (COAI5-404)
194A16 State v. Michael 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Antonio Bullock (COA15-731) 05/28/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ, 2. Allowed
of Supersedeas 06/16/2016
8, State's Notice of Appeal Based Upon | 3. —
a Dissent
195P16 State v. James Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
David Williams (COA15-1052)
199P16 State v. Joseph 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
M. Romano (COA15-940) 05/24/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ of 2 Allowed
Supersedeas
8, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§ 74-31 | 3. Allowed
4, Def’s Conditional PDR Under 4, Allowed
N.GGS. § 731

38 IN THE SUPREME COURT
‘Disposition or Peririons ror Discretionary Review Unver G.S, 7A-31
18 Aueusr 2016
200P07-5 State v. Kenneth Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
E, Robinson Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Halifax County
200P16-2 North Carolina Def’s Pro Se Motion for Responsive Dismissed
State Barv. Dianne | Pleading Regarding Dismissal
Michele Carter El Ervin, J.,
Bey v. State, et al. recused
201P16 State v. Timothy Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Wiley, Jz. Certiorari to Review Order of Superior | *
Court, Jackson County
208P16 State v.RobertLee | Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Baker, Jr. (COAL5-728)
204P16 Matthew S. Lennon | Petitioner's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7-31 | Denied
v.N.C. Department | (COA15-660)
of Justice and the
N.C, Department of
Public Safety
207P16 State v. Anthony 1. Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1. Dismissed
‘Tyrone Brown Constitutional Question (COA15-825) | ew mero motu
2. Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31 2, Denied
208P16 State v. Joshua 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1 Allowed
Earl Holloman (COAI5-1042) 05/27/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ, 2, Allowed
of Supersedeas
8. State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A-81 | 3. Allowed
209P16 State v. Willie Def’s Pro Se Motion for PDR of the Dismissed
Bernard Melvin Order of COA (COAPI6-139)
210P16 State v. Dale 1. Def's Pro Se PDR Under N.C.G.S. 1. Denied
Patrick Martin § TA-31 (COA15-830)
2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In 2, Allowed
Forma Pauperis
214P16 State v. Robert 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
‘Thomas Pole Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, New Hanover County
2. Def's Pro Se Motion for the 2. Dismissed
Appointment of Counsel as moot

IN THE SUPREME COURT

‘Disposition oF Petirions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

Gail Campbell, John
Fox, Jr, Sylvia Fox,
‘Alan Harpe, Robin
Harpe, Bill Sherrill,
Norma Jean
Sherrill, Richard
Gordon, Susanne
Gordon, Joe Brown,
Patty Hewitt, Larry
Marlin, First RX
Pharmacy, Beth
Bush, Charles
MeNiel, Carol
MeNiel, Nga
Amador, Jack
Moore, Maria Moore,
Jody Parlier, Cathy
Parlier, David Lynch,
Judith Lynch, Vietor
Melntyre, Louise
‘Melntyre, Brian

Fox, Cartie Norman,
Charles Johnson,
‘Mary Johnson
Landrea, Rhyne,
‘Tom Brandon,

Sara Brandon,
Michael Kepley,
Sandy Kepley,

Vince Cherry,

Jamés Fox Worthy,
Sheila Fox Worthy,
Chuck Dockery,

Kim Dockery, Bill
Murdock, Jeannie
‘Murdock, Shirley
Silva, Brent Warren,
Michelle Warren,
Jim Howard,

18 Aucusr 2016
215P16 State v. Mickey 1, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 1.
Gene Mellon (COA15-459)
2. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 2. Allowed
06/15/2016
8, State's Petition for Writ of 3.
Supersedeas
4, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 4.
217P16 ‘State v. Ali 1. Def's (Abdulkadir Sharif Ali) PDR 1. Denied
Mahamed Sheikh | Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COAI5-688)
and Abdulkadir
Sharif Ali 2, Def’s (Ali Mahamed Sheikh) PDR 2. Denied
Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31
8. Def’s (Abdulkadir Sharif Ali) Motion | 8. Allowed
to Amend PDR
218P16 Mike Campbell, Petitioners’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 | Denied
Rhonda Campbell, | (C0416-320)

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition oF Perrrions ror Discretionary Review Unpzr G.S. 7A-31

18 Aucusr 2016

Janet Howard, HORL
North Carolina
Properties II, LP
DBA Brookdale
Senior Living
Center, Louise
Gordon, Travis,
Blaclowelder,
Statesville Bovine
and Equine Center,
Jared Reimann,
‘Aimee Reimann,
Lee Shepard, Cecil
Davis, Imogene
Davis, John

Company, LLC, Judy
Voelske, Voelske

Automotive, Cooney
Properties, LLC, and

Dr. Ohip Cooney
v.
The City of
Statesville, North
Carolina, Love's
‘Travel Stops &
Country Stores,
Inc,, and Roserock
Holdings, LLC.
220P16 State v, Julie Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § TA-3L Denied
Watkins (COA15-1221)
222P16 State v. Jefirey 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upon a_| 1. —
Castillo Constitutional Question (COA15-855)
2, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-B1 2. Denied
8, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 3. Allowed
223P16 North Carolina Petitioner's PDR Under N.C.G.S. §7A-31 | Allowed
Department of (COAL5-595)
Public Safety
v. Chauncey
John Ledford
225P16 Charles Anthony —_| Pit's Pro Se Motion for PDR Denied
Ball v. James M. 06/30/2016

Ellis, Administrator
of Estate

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition oF Peririons ror Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 7-31

18 Avausr 2016
226P16 Inre Foreclosure | 1. Petitioners’ Pro Se Motion for Notice | 1. Dismissed
ofDeedof Trust | of Appeal ex mero moti
From Burman
Howard Maine, 2. Petitioners’ Pro Se Petition for Writ | 2. Dismissed
Betty Farmer Maine | of Mandamus
and Brandon "avi8 | 3, Petitioners’ Pro Se Motion for 3. Dismissed
Pee Brame Lo | Notice of Appeal ex mero motu
Recorded in Book
405, Page 2169, in
the Ashe County
Public Registry by
Morrison Trustee
Services, LLC,
Substitute Trustee
230A16 ‘Town of Beech 1 Def's Motion to Stzike Issue Tfrom | 1. Allowed
Mountain Notice of Appeal Based on Dissentin | 07/07/2016
¥. Genesis Wildlife | COA (COAIB-260; 15-517)
Sanctuary, Inc.
enemas 2. Pls PDR Under N.G.GS. § 74°31 2. Dismissed
07/07/2016
3, Pls Petition in the Altemativefor | 8, Allowed
Writ of Certiorari to Review Decision | 07/07/2016
of COA
230A16 ‘Town of Beach Plt’s Motion to Amend New Brief Allowed
Mountain (COA16-260; 15517) 08/16/2016
v. Genesis Wildlife
Sanctuary, Inc.
282013 | Statev, Michael __| Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint Counsel | Denied
Bugene Reed, I
Hudson, J.,
recused
292P16 State v. Jereray Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ, Denied
Jerome Oliver of Mandamus
298P16 State v. Alonzo 1. State's PDR Under NC.GS.§7A31 | 1.
Antonio Murrell | (COA15-1097)
2, State's Motion to Deem Petition 2
‘Timely Filed
8, State's Petition in the Alternative for | 8.
Writ of Certiorari to Review Decision
of COA
4, State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 4. Allowed
06/22/2016
5. State's Petition for Writ 5
of Supersedeas
234P16 State v, Willie James | Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-91 Denied
Steele, Jr (COAI6-827)

42, IN THE SUPREME COURT
DisPostrion oF Peririons ror Discretionary Review Unpae G.S. 7A-31
18 Aveusr 2016
236P 16 In the Matter of: Respondent-Mother's Pro Se PDR Under | Denied
CNP, MSN. N.C.GS. § 74-81 (COAI5-1199)
ADS, MCNILP.
23716 Avery M.Riggsbee | 1. Pit’s Pro Se Motion for Petition for _| 1. Dismissed
v. W. Baine Constitutional Violation
Jones, Jr, Judge . .
Government 2, Plt's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In. 2, Allowed
Employees Forma Pauperis
238P16 State v. Corey L. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Hendricks-Bey of Mandamus
230P16 State v. Chad 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Braxton Bumpers | (COAI6-1) 06/24/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ
of Supersedeas a

8. State's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 | 3.

241P16 Robert Samuel 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for 1. Dismissed
Chamberlain Petition for Court Order to Receive
v.North Carolina | Medical Care for Pretrial Detainees and
Department of Put a Stop to Pretrial Detainees Sick

Public Safety, etal. | Calls Going Unanswered

2, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Petition | 2. Dismissed
to Seek a Court Order to Remove

Locking Devices/Latches and Chains Ervin, J.,
from Cell Doors recused
242P16 State v. Greggory | 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for PDR 1. Dismissed
G. Mosher, Jr. ; smi
2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 2. Dismissed
Counsel as moot
243P16 State v. Jimmy 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Lee Gann (COAI5-1344) 06/27/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
244P16 State v. Sandra 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1, Allowed
Meshell Brice (COA15-904) 06/28/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
8 State's PDR Under N.C.GS.§7A31 | 3.
245P16 ‘Triando M. Stroud v. | Petitioner's Pro Se PDR Under N.C.G.S._| Denied

Pate Dawson, Inc. | § 7A-31 (COA15-1066)

IN THE SUPREME COURT 43
Disposition oF Pzririons ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
18 Avoust 2016

246P16 Chuistopher Charles | Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Friscia and Maria | of Mandamus 07/13/2016
Adriana Friscia
¥. Nathan J. Taylor,
etal, db.a. Nathan
J. Taylor, McGuire
Woods, et al.

Law Fira

24716 State v. Jonathan | Def's Pro Se PDR Dismissed
Eugene Branson

2911-5 | State-v, Bobby 1 Def’s Pro Se Notice of Appeal 1. Dismissed
Ray Grady Based Upon a Constitutional Question | ev mero motu

(GOA15-438)

2, Def's Pro Se PDR Under 2. Denied
NGS. §7A31

3. Def's Pro Se Motion to Procure 3, Dismissed
Documents and Transcripts at the ‘as moot
Government's Expense

252PA142 | State. Thomas _| Def's Motion to Strike Section Dof the | Denied

Graig Campbell State's Brief as Outside the Scope of | 08/10/2016
this Court’s Special Order Allowing the
State's PDR in Part and Denying the
State's PDR in Part

25epais | Inre DLW, 1, Respondent-Mother’s Pro Se Petition | 1. Denied

D.LNW,VAW. | for Rehearing 0629/2016
2, Respondent-Mother’s Pro Se Motion | 2. Denied
to Stay the Mandate 06/29/2016
257P16 William Gerald 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ | 1. Denied
Price v. Pamela of Mandamus
Barlow, etal, db.a. .
Clerk of Superior | 2- Respondent's (Federal Mortgage 2, Dismissed
Court of Ashe, ‘Association a/lda Fannie Mae) Motion | without
North Carolina for Sanctions prejudice
258P16 Statev. Richard | Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | Denied
Lee Nealen Habeas Corpus 07/11/2016
259P16 Inthe Matter of __ | Respondent-Father's PDR Under Denied
ops. N.C.GS. §7A-31 (COAIS-1158)

26216 Ronald. Keaton, | 1. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Jr, Employee o7nsr016
¥. ERMG, ID, ” ;

Employer, New 2. Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2.
Hampshire 8.Def's PDR UnderN.C.GS.§7A31 | 3.
Insurance Company,

Carrier (Carl 4. Def’s Motion to Hold PDR. 4
Warren & Company, | in Abeyance

Third-Party

Administrator)

8. Respondent's (Elizabeth Letendre)
PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-B1

44 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Dispostrion oF Peririons ror Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
18 Aucusr 2016
265A16 State v. Jose Merlin | 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal of Right Le
Henriquez Portillo | Pursuant to N.C.GS. § 7A-30(1) Raising
‘Allegedly Substantial Constitutional
Question
2, State's Motion to Dismiss Notice 2. Allowed
of Appeal
268P16 OwenD.Leavitt | 1. Pits Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
v. Willie Hargrove | Certiorari to Review Order of COA
(COAP16-351)
2, Plt’s Pro Se Motion to Proceed Jn 2, Allowed
Forma Pauperis
2T2Al4 State. Jonathan | Def's Motion for an Order or Special Order
Douglas Richardson | Orders Regarding Deadline for 08/08/2016
(DEATH) ‘Transcript Preparation
27216 Jeffrey Lee Def’s Pro Se Motion for
McBride. State + | Complaint/Claim
278A16 State. Jamison | 1. State's Motion for'Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Christopher Goins | (COA16-1183) 077222016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2, Allowed
of Supersedeas 08/01/2016
3, State's Notice of Appeal Based 3.
Upon a Dissent
2TAP 6 Michael P.Longand | 1. Respondent's (Blizabeth Letendre) | 1. Allowed
Marie C. Long Motion for Temporary Stay (COAI5-376) | 07/28/2016
, Currituck County,
Noe eet | 9, Respondent's (ilizabeth Letendre) | 2,
Elizabeth Letendre | Petition for Writ of Supersedeas

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition of Perimions ror Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 74:31

45

18 Aucusr 2016
282P16 Jeremy Bruns and | 1, Pits’ Pro Se PDR Prior toa 1. Denied
Jenny Bruns Determination of COA (COA16-699) 08/18/2016
¥. Rhonda Bryant,
Dalton Bryant, Sx, | 2. Pits’ Pro Se Petition for Writ 2, Denied
Dalton Bryant, of Mandamus 08/18/2016
Jr, Pat McCrory,
as Governor of
North Carolina,
Frank Perry, as
Secretary of the
North Carolina
Department of
Public Safety,
Anthony Tata, as
Secretary of the
North Carolina
Department of
ortation,
‘Veronica McClain,
USAA, and State of
North Carolina.
287P16 State v. Arvin 1 State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Roscoe Hayes (COAL6-207) 08/05/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
3, State's PDR UnderN.C.GS.§7A31_— ] 3.
289P 15 United Community | Plt's PDR Under N.C.G8. § 7A-31 Allowed
Bank (Georgia) (COAL4-1309)
v. Thomas L. Wolfe
and Barbara J.
Wolfe, Trustees
of the Thomas L.
Wolfe and Barbara
5. Wolfe Irrevocable
‘Trust, Thomas L.
Wolfe, individu-
ally and Barbara J.
Wolfe, individually
290P16 Michael Eugene Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for PDR Denied
Huntv. Mr. Frank L. | (COAPI6-493) 08/12/2016
Perry, Secretary of
N.C. Department of
Public Safety
291P16 State v. John Frede | 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Sabbaghrabaiotti | (COA15-1028) 08/10/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2
of Supersedeas
8 State's PDR Under N.C.G.8.§ 731 | 8.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposrmion oF Petrrions ror DiscreTionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

18 Aucusr 2016
307P15-2 | ‘The Kimberley 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Rice Kaestner (COA15-898) 07/25/2016
1992 Family Trust
yNorth Carolina | 2-Stale's Petition for Writ 2.
Department of of Supersedeas
Revenue
308415 State. Zachary | Def’s Motion to Amend Brief Allowed
David Thomsen
826P15-2 | Burl Anderson 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | 1. Denied
Howell v. N.C. Mandamus (COAP16-339) 06/29/2016
Wayne County eae "
Department of 2, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Proceed | 2. Allowed
Health and Human | 2 Forma Pauperis 06/29/2016
Services, by and | 3, Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ | 8. Denied
through Reese ’
Phelps; LouJones | % Mandamus 06/29/2016
889P15 State v. Terry Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-B1 Denied
Lyn Pegram (COAL4-921)
368P124 | Sherif A. Philips, | 1. Plt's Pro SeMotion for Petition for _| 1. Denied
M.D. v. Pitt County | Reconsideration of Recusal Honorable | 07/22/2016
Memorial Hospital, | Judge Richard L. Doughton
Incorporated; Paul
Bolin MD; Ralph | 2-Plt’s Pro Se Motion to Siay Execution | 2. Denied
Whatley, MD, Sanjay | of Judgment 0772212016
Patel, M.D, and
Cynthia Brown, MD.
879P105 | State v. Ralph 1. Def's Pro Se Motion for Notice 1. Dismissed
Franklin Fredrick | of Appeal
2. Del's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 2, Dismissed
Cortiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Rutherford County
382P15.2 | State v. Richard Def’s Pro Se Motion for Petition for Denied
Jackson Hill Rehearing of Denial of Petition for Writ
of Certiorar
4077152 | Statev. Lay Def’s Pro Se Motion for Certificate Dismissed
Ricardo Tart of Appealability
409PA15 | Gregory P. Nies Amici Curiae’s Motion to Withdraw and | Allowed
and Diane S. Substitute North Carolina Counsel 06/22/2016
Niesv. Town of
Emerald Isle, a
North Carolina
Municipality

IN THE SUPREME COURT

‘Disposirion oF Perrrions ror Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

18 Aucusr 2016
409PA15 Gregory P. Nies Pits’ Motion for Extension of Time to | Allowed
and Diane 8. File Reply Brief 08/10/2016
Nies v. Town of
Emerald Isle, a
North Carolina
Municipality
429PA13 Morris v.Scenera _ | 1. Pit’s Motion for Attorneys’ Feesand | 1. —
Research, LLG, etal. | Expenses Incurred on Appeal 06/30/2016
2. Pit's Motion in the Alternative to Issue | 2. Allowed
a Mandate Remanding this Motion to the | 06/30/2016
‘Trial Court for Further Proceedings
438415, Hanesbrands, Ine. | Def’s Motion for Continuance of Allowed
v. Kathleen Fowler | Oral Argument 06/28/2016
441P92-8 | Johnnie L. Def's Pro Se Motion to Compel Denied
Harrington .
v. Christie S. Ervin, J.,
Cameron Roeder, recused
Clerk of Court
44613 State v. Mario Def's Motion to Amend Record Allowed
Andrette McNeill | on Appeal
(DEATH)
449P1i-14 | State v. Charles 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Eta Parte 1. Denied
Everett Hinton Inquiry into Restraints on Liberty by 08/18/2016
Judicial Writ of Habeas Corpus
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Judicial 2. Dismissed
Notice of Adjudicative Facts 08/18/2016
3, Def's Pro Se Motion for Oral Hearing | 3. Dismissed
Opportunity to be Heard 08/18/2016
4, Def's Pro Se Motion for Findings by | 4. Dismissed
the Court and Interrogatories to All 08/18/2016
Interested Persons, Individuals, and
‘Third-Parties Ervin, J.,
recused
509P13-2 State v. Robert Det's Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Lee Golden of Mandamus 06/29/2016
sudPis5 State v. Raymond | Def's Pro Se Motion to Dismiss for Lack | Dismissed
Dakim Harris Joiner | of Territorial Jurisdiction
579P01-3 | Antorio Rice Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Smarr v. State Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Gaston County
669P03-3 State v. Tony Det’s Pro Se Motion for PDR de novo _| Dismissed
Robert Jones (COAPI6-107) Exvin, J.

recused

IN THE SUPREME COURT

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION v. BUTLER & BURKE, LLP
[369 N.C, 48 (2016)]

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION, Pranrirr

v.
BUTLER & BURKE, LLP, a Nortu Carouina Limiren Liapinrry PARTNERSHIP,
Derenpanr AND Tairp-Party PLAINTIFr:

v.
BARRY D. GRAHAM, JAMES L. WRIGHT, ED DUTTON, FRANK GENTRY, GERAL
HOLLAR, JOE CRESIMORE, MARK HONEYCUTT, ROSE SIPE, TODD POPE, JASON
CUSHING, anp SCOTT SAUNDERS, Tairp-Party DerenpaNnts

No. 5PAI5
Filed 23 September 2016

! 1. Fiduciary Relationship—auditor—duties to third parties—
not a fiduciary relationship
The trial court erred by allowing a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) in an
action for breach of fiduciary duty and other claims arising from
an auditor's failure to discover that plaintiff's General Manager
had not filed required tax returns for plaintiff (which was exempt
from federal tax) for several years. Independent auditors often have
significant obligations to third parties or to the public at large that
would prevent them from acting solely in their audit clients’ best
interests, and a fiduciary relationship therefore does not arise as a
matter of law, although it may exist in fact.

2. Appeal and Error—evenly divided Supreme Court—Court of
Appeals ruling stands—no precedential authority
The decision of an evenly divided Supreme Court left intact the
ruling of the Court of Appeals on whether certain defenses were
sufficiently alleged in the complaint, although the Court of Appeals
opinion was without precedential authority.

; Justice BEASLEY did not participate in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case.

_ On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, 237 N.C. App. 101, 764 S.E.2d
642 (2014), reversing an order entered on 26 September 2013 by Judge
Richard L. Doughton in Superior Court, Catawba County. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 1 September 2015.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION v. BUTLER & BURKE, LLP
[369 N.C. 48 (2016)]

Carlton Law PLLC, by Alfred P. Carlton, Jr. and Ian 8. Richardson;
and Patrick, Harper & Dixon, LLP, by L. Oliver Noble, Jr., for
plaintiff-appellee.

Sharpless & Stavola, PA., by Frederick K. Sharpless; and Wiley
Rein LLP, by Richard A. Simpson, pro hac vice, and Ashley E.
Eiler, pro hac vice, for defendant/third-party plaintiff-appellant.

Alston & Bird LLP, by Brian D. Boone, for Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America, amicus curiae.

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Brent F. Powell, C.
Mark Wiley, and Michael R. Cashin, for Cherry Bekaert LLP,
CliftonLarsonAllen LLP, and Dixon Hughes Goodman LLP
amici curiae.

Allen, Pinnix & Nichols, PA., by Noel L. Allen and Nathan E.
Standley, for National Association of State Boards of Accountancy,
amicus curiae.

Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P,, by J.
Mitchell Armbruster, Michael W. Mitchell, and Lauren H. Bradley,
Sor North Carolina Association of Certified Public Accountants,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and Center for
Audit Quality, amici curiae.

Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo LLP, by Mel J. Garofalo,
Sor North Carolina Chamber, amicus curiae.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff CommScope Credit Union seeks damages from defendant
Butler & Burke, LLP, the certified public accounting firm that plaintiff
hired to conduct annual independent audits of its financial statements. We
allowed discretionary review to address whether defendant owed a fidu-
ciary duty to plaintiff and whether plaintiff's claims against defendant are
barred by the doctrines of contributory negligence and in pari delicto.

I

Plaintiff is a North Carolina state-chartered credit union with its
principal place of business in Catawba County. Defendant is the CPA

50 IN THE SUPREME COURT

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION v. BUTLER & BURKE, LLP
[369 N.C. 48 (2016)]

firm that plaintiff engaged to provide independent audit services from
2001 to 2010. Federal tax law required that plaintiff annually file Form
990, entitled “Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax,” with
the Internal Revenue Service. See 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(1) (2006); id.
§ 6033(a)(1) (2000); see also id. § 501(a), (c)(14)(A) (2006); td. § 501(a),
(©)4)(A) (2000). Plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court, Catawba
County, alleging that, in performing its annual audits, defendant had
“fail[ed] to request and review Plaintiff's tax returns, and thereby fail[ed]
to discover that Plaintiff's then[-]General Manager had not filed” Form
990 “from 2001 to 2009.” Plaintiff alleged that defendant’s inaction
“resulted in the Internal Revenue Service's assessment of penalties upon
Plaintiff in the ... amount of . . . $374,200.” Plaintiff asserted claims
for breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and profes-
sional malpractice.

Defendant answered the complaint and pleaded seven affirma-
tive defenses, including contributory negligence and in part delicto.
Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and for judg-
ment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). The trial court granted defen-
dant’s motion and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The court
stated that the relationship between an independent auditor and its
audit client may give rise to a fiduciary duty as a matter of law because
that relationship “appears much more like that between attorney and
client, [or] broker and principal, than that between mutually interdepen-
dent businesses.” CommScope Credit Union v. Butler & Burke, LLP,
237 N.C. App. 101, 105, 764 S.E.2d 642, 647 (2014) (citations and internal
quotations omitted). The court determined that, even if no fiduciary duty
exists as a matter of law, the specific allegations in plaintiff's complaint
were sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because
the terms of the audit engagement letters discussed in the complaint
“assur[ed] Plaintiff that [defendant] had the expertise to review finan-
cial statements to identify ‘errors [and] fraud[,]’ even by Plaintiff's own
management and employees.” Jd. (third and fourth alterations in origi-
nal). The court concluded that defendant had thus “sought and received
‘special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is
bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one
reposing confidence.’ ” Jd. (quoting Harrold v. Dowd, 149 N.C. App. 777,
784, 561 S.E.2d 914, 919 (2002)).

Next, the Court of Appeals addressed defendant’s motion to dismiss
as applied to plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, negligence, and

IN THE SUPREME COURT 51

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION v. BUTLER & BURKE, LLP
[69 N.C. 48 (2016)]

professional malpractice. Defendant's motion had stated affirmative
defenses based on the doctrines of in pari delicto and contributory neg-
ligence, and based on the terms of the engagement letters. The court
concluded that defendant’s affirmative defenses of in pari delicto and
contributory negligence would not entitle defendant to dismissal at this
stage because “nothing in the pleadings establishes either that [plain-
tiff’s General Manager's] failure to file the tax returns was (1) negligent
rather than intentional wrongdoing or excusable conduct or (2) imputed
to Plaintiff as a matter of law.” Id. at 110-11, 764 S.B.2d at 651. The court
also concluded that the terms of the engagement letters were too ambig-
uous to warrant dismissal of plaintiff’s claims based on the pleadings
alone. Id. at 111-12, 764 S.E.2d at 651-52.

The court therefore reversed the trial court’s order granting defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 112,
764 S.E.2d at 652. We allowed defendant's petition for discretionary
review and now affirm in part and reverse in part.

au

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) and for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Bridges
v. Parrish, 366 N.C. 539, 541, 742 S.E.2d 794, 796 (2013); Toomer
v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 171 N.C. App. 58, 66, 614 S.E.2d 328, 335,
disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 78, 623 S.E.2d 263 (2005).

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
must decide “whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated as true,
are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
some legal theory.” Bridges, 366 N.C. at 541, 742 S.E.2d at 796 (quoting
Coley v. State, 360 N.C. 493, 494, 631 S.E.2d 121, 128 (2006)).

On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “[a]ll well pleaded fac-
tual allegations in the nonmoving party's pleadings are taken as true and
all contravening assertions in the movant’s pleadings are taken as false.”
Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 682-83, 360 S.E.2d.
772, 780 (1987) (quoting Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 187, 209
S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974)). As with a motion to dismiss, “[t]he trial court is
required to view the facts and permissible inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. at 682, 360 S.E.2d at 780 (quoting
Ragsdale, 286 N.C. at 137, 209 S.E.2d at 499). A Rule 12(c) movant must
show that “the complaint . . . fails to allege facts sufficient to state a
cause of action or admits facts which constitute a complete legal bar” to
a cause of action. Jones v. Warren, 274 N.C. 166, 169, 161 S.E.2d 467, 470

52 IN THE SUPREME COURT

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION v. BUTLER & BURKE, LLP
[369 N.C. 48 (2016)]

(1968) (quoting Van Every v. Van Every, 265 N.C. 506, 510, 144 S.E.2d
603, 606 (1965)).

[1] We now address whether the facts pleaded in plaintiff's complaint,
if true, would establish that defendant owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiff
when defendant performed its independent audits of plaintiff's financial
statements. For a fiduciary duty to exist, there must be a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the parties. Dalion v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548
S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001). This Court has defined a fiduciary relationship .
as one in which “there has been a special confidence reposed in one
who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and
‘with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence.” Green
v. Freeman, 367 N.C. 186, 141, 749 S.E.2d 262, 268 (2013) (quoting
Dalton, 353 N.C. at 651, 548 S.E.2d at 707). All fiduciary relationships are
characterized by “a heightened level of trust and the duty of the fiduciary
to act in the best interests of the other party.” Dallaire v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 367 N.C. 363, 367, 760 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2014).

The very nature of some relationships, such as the one between a
trustee and the trust beneficiary, gives rise to a fiduciary relationship
as a matter of law. See, ¢.g., Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co. v. Johnston, 269
N.C. 701, 711, 153 S.E.2d 449, 457 (1967). The list of relationships that
we have held to be fiduciary in their very nature is a limited one, see
Dallaire, 367 N.C. at 367, 760 S.E.2d at 266 (listing categories), and we
do not add to it lightly. We have not previously included the relationship
of an independent auditor and its audit client in this list, and for good
reason. Independent auditors often have significant obligations to third
parties or to the public at large that would prevent them from acting
solely in their audit clients’ best interests. Though an auditor contracts
to audit an individual client, the audit report is frequently intended to
benefit and to be relied on by third parties such as investors or credi-
tors. Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C.
200, 211, 367 S.E.2d 609, 615 (1988). Because of this, we have held that
an independent auditor owes a duty to avoid negligent misrepresenta-
tions not only to the auditor's client, but also “to any other person, or
one of a group of persons, whom the accountant or his client intends
the information to benefit.” Id. at 210, 214, 367 S.E.2d at 614, 617 (sum-
marizing and adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (Am. Law
Inst. 1977)).

The obligation to third parties is even more pronounced when
a CPA firm audits the financial statements of a company that is sub-
ject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1984. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012). For instance, as amici point out, the

IN THE SUPREME COURT 53

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION v. BUTLER & BURKE, LLP
[369 N.C. 48 (2016)]

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 prohibits these auditors from providing.
additional services—such as investment advising or legal services—to
their audit clients that could compromise their ability to act impartially
and in the public interest. Id. § 78j-1(g)(7)-(8). Federal law also prohib-
its independent auditors who audit these companies from “[p]roviding
an expert opinion or other expert service for an audit client.” 17 C.ER.
§ 210.2-01(¢)(4)(x) (2016). And the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that independent auditors “assume[ ] a public responsibil-
ity transcending any employment relationship with the client,” and that
they “owe[ | ultimate allegiance to the [client’s] creditors and stockhold-
ers, as well as to the investing public,” rather than to the audit client.
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). These
federal requirements—whether or not they apply to audits of state-char-
tered credit unions—underscore why we cannot conclude that an inde-
pendent auditor is always in a fiduciary relationship with its audit client.

Though no fiduciary relationship arises here as a matter of law, one
may arise in fact. We have recognized that the existence of a fiduciary
relationship “depends ultimately on the circumstances.” HAJMM Co.
v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 588, 403 S.E.2d 483, 489
(1991). Specifically, a fiduciary relationship arises whenever “there is
confidence reposed on one side, and resulting domination and influence
on the other.” Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N.C. 577, 598, 160 S.E. 896, 906
(1931) (quoting 25 C. J. Fiduciary § 9 (1921)). Thus, we must deter-
mine whether the specific allegations in plaintiff's complaint could,
if true, give rise to a fiduciary relationship in fact between plaintiff
and defendant.

The complaint alleges that, each year from 2001 to 2009, defen-
dant agreed to audit plaintiff's financial statements and other related
records “in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards,”
also known as GAAS. As the complaint indicates, when a CPA firm
performs an independent audit, North Carolina law defines GAAS
as including the Statements on Auditing Standards issued by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 21 N.C.
Admin. Code 08N .0403 (2016).

Under the AICPA Statements on Auditing Standards in effect when
defendant conducted its audits, the object of a financial statement
audit was to express an opinion on whether the financial statements
fairly presented the financial position of the audit client. Codification of
Accounting Standards and Procedures, Statement on Auditing Standards,
AU § 110.01 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972) [hereinaf-
ter “AU”]. The independent auditor had to “maintain independence in

54 IN THE SUPREME COURT

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION v. BUTLER & BURKE, LLP
[369 N.C. 48 (2016)}

mental attitude in all matters relating to the audit.” Id. § 220.01 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006); accord id. § 220.01 (Am. Inst.
of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972). This required that the independent
auditor be “without bias with respect to the client” and demonstrate “a
judicial impartiality that recognizes an obligation for fairness not only
to management and owners of a business but also to . . . those who may
otherwise rely . . . upon the independent auditor’s report.” Id. § 220.02 °
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972).

To protect the public’s confidence in the independence of indepen-
dent auditors, this standard required not only that an auditor “be inde-
pendent,” but that the auditor also “be recognized as independent.” Id.
§ 220.03. To be recognized as independent, an auditor had to “be free
from any obligation to . . . the client, its management, or its owners.”
Id. So under AICPA standards, and thus under the terms of the audit
engagement, defendant had to maintain its independence from plaintiff
and be free from obligations to or bias about plaintiff. Defendant was
required to consider the interests of third parties who might rely on the
audit, and to further those interests, even though they could conflict with
the interests of the audit client. By contrast, a fiduciary must act in the
best interests of its principal. See Dallaire, 367 N.C. at 367, 760 S.E.2d at
266. Defendant's commitment to audit plaintiff's financial statements in
accordance with GAAS thus did not create a “fiduciary relationship . . .
in fact.” Dalton, 353 N.C. at 651, 548 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting Abbitt, 201
N.C. at 598, 160 S.E. at 906).

Nor does the complaint allege that defendant agreed to perform any
additional services for plaintiff that could give rise to a fiduciary rela-
tionship in fact. In reaching the contrary conclusion below, the Court of
Appeals relied on Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 127 N.C. App. 1, 487
§.E.2d 807, disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 398, 494 S.E.2d 410 (1997), “where
the accountants were providing accounting and tax-related services,”
CommScope, 237 N.C. App. at 105, 764 S.E.2d at 647. Here, however,
plaintiff's complaint does not allege that defendant provided tax-related
services or, as we discuss below, agreed to do anything other than con-
duct an audit in accordance with GAAS.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that, under the facts pleaded in the
complaint, defendant sought and received a special confidence from its
audit client, through defendant's pledge to “plan and perform [ Jaudit{s]
to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements
are free of material misstatements, whether from errors, fraudulent
financial reporting, misappropriation of assets, or violations of laws or
government regulations that are attributable to... . acts by management

IN THE SUPREME COURT 55

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION v. BUTLER & BURKE, LLP
[369 N.C. 48 (2016)]

or employees acting on behalf of” plaintiff. CommScope, 237 N.C. App.
at 105-06, 764 S.E.2d at 648 (brackets in original). The Court of Appeals
held that this pledge, read in the light most favorable to plaintiff, gave
rise to a fiduciary duty. Id. at 106, 764 S.E.2d at 648. But defendant's
pledge simply mirrored what the provisions of GAAS required. In every
independent audit engagement that complied with GAAS, the audi-
tor had to “plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance
about whether the financial statements are free of material misstate-
ment, whether caused by error or fraud.” AU § 110.02 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1997). In other words, defendant's pledge
was well within the realm of what an independent auditor was obligated
to do under GAAS in the first place. That pledge did not elevate defen-
dant’s relationship with plaintiff into a fiduciary one.

The complaint also alleges that plaintiff retained defendant to
“notif[y] . . . appropriate credit union personnel of recommended
improvement in administrative or accounting functions.” Viewed in iso-
lation, this allegation might be construed to mean that defendant agreed
to provide accounting or consulting services outside the scope of an
independent audit. But the rest of the complaint makes it clear that
defendant did not, and that defendant's promises simply tracked what
GAAS requires for an independent audit. According to the complaint,
defendant specifically represented to plaintiff that the engagement
would “include obtaining an understanding of internal control sufficient
to plan the audit and to determine the nature, timing, and extent of audit
procedures to be performed.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant also agreed
that “/i]n the course of performing audit procedures, [it] would be alert
to situations for which [it] could make recommendations for improve-
ment in administrative or accounting functions” (emphasis added),
and that it would “communicate those recommendations to the
Supervisory Committee in a letter separate from [the] report on [plain-
tiff’s] financial statements.”

This is simply what defendant had to do when following the AICPA
standards. When defendant first agreed to conduct independent audits
of plaintiff's financial statements, GAAS Standard of Field Work No. 2
required an independent auditor to obtain a “sufficient understanding of
internal control . . . to plan the audit and to determine the nature, timing,
and extent of tests to be performed.” AU § 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants 1972). Although later amended, this standard did not
significantly change the nature of the auditor's responsibilities. See id.
§ 150.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006). The auditor did
not have to actively search for deficiencies in the audit client’s internal

56 IN THE SUPREME COURT

COMMSCOPE CREDIT UNION v. BUTLER & BURKE, LLP
(869 N.C. 48 (2016)]

controls. Id. § 325.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2009); id.
§ 825.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006); id. § 325.04 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1997). If the auditor became aware of
sufficiently serious deficiencies during the course of the audit, however,
it generally had to report them to the client. Id. § 325.17 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 2009); id. § 325.20 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 2006); id. § 325.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1997). But the audit’s purpose was still “to report on the financial state-
ments and not to provide assurance on internal control.” Id. § 325.11
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989) (emphasis added); accord
id. § 325.22 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2009); id. § 325.25
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2006). Defendant operated
within this framework and agreed to find internal control deficiencies
only to the extent necessary to perform its audits. Because defendant
did not agree to affirmatively search for deficiencies outside of the per-
formance of its audits, it did not agree to do anything beyond what an
independent auditor normally does.

Thus, plaintiff's allegations, treated as true, do not establish that
defendant owed it a fiduciary duty in fact. And as we have seen, the
relationship between an independent auditor and its audit client does
not categorically give rise to a fiduciary duty as a matter of law. The trial
court correctly dismissed plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim. We
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on this issue.

m

[2] Our disposition of plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim leaves
us with one other issue. As we have said, the Court of Appeals also held
that plaintiff's complaint withstood defendant’s motion to dismiss plain-
tiff's other claims. See CommScope, 237 N.C. App. at 112, 764 S.B.2d at
652. Defendant argued before the Court of Appeals, and again argues
in this Court, that those claims are barred by the affirmative defenses
of contributory negligence and in pari delicto. The members of the
Court are equally divided, however, on whether the facts alleged in
the complaint establish these defenses. The decision of the Court of
Appeals on this issue is accordingly left undisturbed and stands without
precedential value. See, ¢.g., State v. Long, 365 N.C. 5, 705 S.E.2d 735
(2011) (per curiam); State v. Greene, 298 N.C. 268, 258 S.E.2d 71 (1979)
(er curiam).

We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in part
and reverse it in part, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for

IN THE SUPREME COURT 57

HOLT v. N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
[869 N.C. 57 (2016)]

further remand to the trial court for additional proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

Justice BEASLEY did not participate in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case.

DANIEL anp LISA HOLT, Apmanisrrators or raz ESTATE OF HUNTER DANIEL HOLT;
STEVEN GRIER PRICE, Ivorvipvatty; STEVEN GRIER PRICE, ApmmisTRator oF
‘me ESTATE OF McALLISTER GRIER FURR PRICE; anv STEVEN GRIER PRICE,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF CYNTHIA JEAN FURR

v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

No. 76A16
Filed 23 September 2016

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 781 S.E.2d 697
(2016), affirming a decision and order filed on 29 December 2014 by the
North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Supreme Court on.
29 August 2016.

DeVore Acton & Stafford PA, by Fred W. DeVore, III, F. William
DeVore IV, and Derek P. Adler, for Price plaintiff-appellees; and
Rawls Scheer Foster & Mingo PLLC, by Amanda A. Mingo, for Holt
plaintiff-appellees.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Melody R. Hairston and
Amar Majmundar, Special Deputy Attorneys General, for
defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

58 IN THE SUPREME COURT

INREGLS.
[369 N.C. 58 (2016)]

IN THE MATTER OF C.L.S.

No, 54416
Filed 23 September 2016

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals, _ N.C. App. __, 781 S.E.2d 680 (2016),
affirming an order entered on 4 March 2015 by Judge J.H. Corpening, IT
in District Court, New Hanover County. Heard in the Supreme Court on
29 August 2016.

Jennifer G. Cooke for New Hanover County Department of Social
Services, petitioner-appellee; and Ellis & Winters LLP, by Steven
A. Scoggan, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

David A. Perez for respondent-appellant father.
PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 59

STATE v. ANDERSON
[369 N.C. 59 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
ve
APRIL JEAN ANDERSON
No. 482PA15
Filed 23 September 2016

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 74-31 of a unani-
mous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___,
780 S.E.2d 758 (2015), finding no error after appeal from judgments
entered on 16 July 2014 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Superior Court,
Catawba County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 31 August 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberley A. D’Arruda, Special

Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

James N. Freeman, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM.

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.

60 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. COLLINS
[369 N.C, 60 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

ve
SHAMELE COLLINS.

No. 66A16
Filed 28 September 2016

Appeal and Error—preservation of issues—failure to object
below—failure to raise on appeal
The decision of the Court of Appeals on an evidence question
in a criminal prosecution was affirmed by the Supreme Court where
defendant did not raise the issue at trial and so did not preserve it
for appeal. The decision of the Court of Appeals on the remaining
issue was not affected.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 782 S.E.2d 350
(2016), finding no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant's motion
to suppress, but vacating the judgment entered on 8 September 2014 by
Judge William Z. Wood in Superior Court, Forsyth County, and remand-
ing for resentencing. Heard in the Supreme Court on 29 August 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Douglas W. Corkhill, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Erik R. Zimmerman for defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court based upon a dissent at the Court
of Appeals. State v. Collins, __ N.C. App. __, __, 782 S.E.2d 350,
360-62 (2016). The majority at the Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized at the
time of his arrest, concluding, inter alia, that “defendant failed to raise
the timing of [the police officer's] observation of powder on the floor”
before the trial court. Id. at ____, 782 S.E.2d at 358. We agree that defen-
dant failed to preserve his timing argument for appeal because he did
not raise this argument before the trial court. See State v. Eason, 328
N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991) (“In order to preserve a ques-
tion for appellate review, a party must have presented the trial court
with a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds

IN THE SUPREME COURT 61

STATE v. NKIAM
[869 N.C. 61 (2016)]

for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not apparent.” (citing
N.C. R. App. P. 10(b) (recodified 2009 as N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1)))). We
therefore modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals solely
on this ground. The remaining issue addressed in the majority opinion
of the Court of Appeals concerning defendant's right to be present at
sentencing is unchallenged and unaffected by our decision.

MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.
ARCHIMEDE NGADIENE NKIAM

No. 385PA15.
Filed 23 September 2016

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-81 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 778 S.E.2d 863
(2015), reversing and remanding an order denying defendant’s motion
for appropriate relief entered on 26 November 2013 by Judge Donald W.
Stephens in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court
on 29 August 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Hale Blau & Saad, by Daniel M. Blau and Robert H. Hale, Jr., for
defendant-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.

62

DEP’T OF TRANSP. v. ADAMS OUTDOOR ADVERT. OF CHARLOTTE LTD. P’*SHIP

IN THE SUPREME COURT

[369 N.C. 62 (2016)]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

ADAMS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING OF
CHARLOTTE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

)
)
vw ) From Mecklenburg County
)
>
)

No. 206P16

ORDER

The petition for discretionary review is allowed for the limited pur-

pose of addressing the following issues as set forth in the petition:

The petition is denied as to any remaining issues.

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to conclude that
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-131 is the specific and controlling
statute in this case involving the condemnation of a bill-
board location?

2. Did the Court of Appeals’ decision violate the due pro-
cess of law principles under the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution and violate the law of the land
clause of the Article 1, Section 19 of the North Carolina
Constitution for denying Adams an effective and adequate
remedy for just compensation?

7. Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that the sta-
tus of Adams’ compliance with zoning and other land use
laws and the effect of having in place a State permit for the
use of the CHS Lot for outdoor advertising cannot be fac-
tors for the jury to consider in determining just compensa-
tion for the condemned lease?

8. Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that a
reasonable expectation of lease renewal cannot be con-
sidered by the jury as a factor in determining just compen-
sation for the condemned lease?

IN THE SUPREME COURT 63
DEP’T OF TRANSP. V. ADAMS OUTDOOR ADVERT. OF CHARLOTTE LID. P’SHIP
[369 N.C. 62 (2016)]

By Order of the Court in Conference, this 22nd day of September,
2016.

s/Ervin, J
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 23rd day of September, 2016.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk of the Supreme Court

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk

64 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. LEDBETTER
[369 N.C. 64 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )
vw } From Rowan County
DONNA HELMS LEDBETTER }
No. 402P15
RDER,

Defendant's petition for discretionary review is allowed for the lim-
ited purpose of remanding to the Court of Appeals to reconsider its hold-
ing in light of State v. Thomsen, ___ N.C. __, 789 S.E.2d 639 (2016), and
State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40, 770 S.E.2d 74 (2015). See Thomsen, ___
N.C. at___, 789 S.E.2d at 642. (recognizing N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c) “creates a
default rule that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review a lower
court judgment by writ of certiorari”); Stubbs, 368 N.C. at 44, 770 S.E.2d
at 76 (recognizing that Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure cannot take away jurisdiction given to the Court of Appeals
by N.C.GS. § 7A-32(c)).

By Order of the Court in Conference, this 22nd day of September,
2016.

s/Ervin, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 23rd day of Septernber, 2016.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk of the Supreme Court

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT 65,

U.S. BANK NAT'L ASS'N v. PINKNEY
[369 N.C. 65 (2016)]

U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, as TRUSTEE FOR THE
C-BASS MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET.
BACKED CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2006-RP2

w From Forsyth County
WILLIE LEE PINKNEY,
CLARA PINKNEY, SIDDCO, INC.,
an POORE SUBSTITUTE
TRUSTEE, LTD

Beeevuevevresvy

No. 229P16

ORDER

The petition for discretionary review is allowed for the purpose of
addressing the issues set forth in the petition and the following addi-
tional issue: “Whether any provision of North Carolina law, including,
but not limited to, N.C.G.S. §§ 25-3-203, -3-301 (2015), would preclude
dismissal with prejudice of the claims asserted in plaintiff's complaint,
including the claim for judicial foreclosure, despite the apparent absence
of a complete chain of indorsements?”

By Order of the Court in Conference, this 22nd day of September,
2016.

s/Ervin, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 23rd day of September, 2016.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk of the Supreme Court

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk

66 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Dispostrion oF Petitions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. TA-BL
22 Sepromper 2016
018A142 —_| State v. Paris 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay _| 1. Allowed
Sujuan Toad (COA15-670) 09/02/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2. Allowed
of Supersedeas
3. State's Notice of Appeal Based Upon | 8.—
a Dissent
063P108 | State v. Myron 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for PDR Under _| 1. Dismissed
Roderick Nunn N.G.GS, § 74-81 (COAPI6-566)
2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 2, Dismissed
Counsel as moot
os7Pi6 ‘The Assurance Defs’ PDR Under N.C.G.S, § 74-31 Denied
Group, Inc. (COA15-386)
v. Samuel Allen
Bare and Deborah
Iymn Bare,
Marcheta Perry
Sawyer, Timothy
Mark Byrd, Gregory
‘Todd Byrd, James
Chandler Beck,
Michael Wayne
Anderson, Jeffrey A.
Heybrock, Charles
Bernard Moore, J.
o77ei6 Franidin Falin, Defs’ PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Employee v. The | (COAI5-565)
Roberts Company
Field Services,
Tne,, Employer
Self-Insured (Key
Risk Management
Services, Inc.,
Third-Party

Administrator)

IN THE SUPREME COURT 67
Disposrion or Pervtions ror Discretionary Review UNpsr G.S. 7A-31
22 Sepremper 2016
088P16-3 State v. Mason 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Notice 1. Dismissed
W. Hyde in Advance
2. Def's Pro Se Motion for Notice of 2, Dismissed
Request for Assistance
3, Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 3. Denied
Habeas Corpus 07/05/2016
4. Def's Pro Se PDR Under 4. Denied
N.C.GS. § 7A31 (COAI5-1260)
5. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Show Cause _| 5. Dismissed
07/19/2016
6. Def's Pro Se Motion to Allow 6. Dismissed
Applicant the Opportunity to Correct/_j as moot
Amend Any Defects, Errors, Flawsin | 07/19/2016
the Application
Ervin, J.,
recused
102P16 Kenneth C. Adams | Pit's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
v. The City of (COA15-782)
Raleigh
119P16 Freddie Wayne Petitioner's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-81 | Denied
Huff, Irv. N.C. (COA15-703)
Department of
Public Safety
181P01-18 | State v. Anthony 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ 1 Dismissed
Dove of Mandamus
2. Def's Pro Se Motion for 2. Dismissed
Impartial Jurist
Ervin, J.,
recused
131P162 Somehoi Noonsab | Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Dismiss | Dismissed
v. State of North
Carolina
Judge Paul Gessner
41P16 Chuistenbury 1, Plt’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari | 1. Allowed
Eye Center, PA. to Review Order of Superior Court,
v. Medflow, Inc. Mecklenburg County
and Dominic James
Riggi 2, Pit’s Petition in the Alternative for | 2. Dismissed
Discretionary Review Under as moot

N.C.G.S. § 7431 (COAI5-1120)

68 IN THE SUPREME COURT

‘Disposirion oF Perrrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S, 7A-31

22 Sepremper 2016
152P16 Catawoa County, | 1. Plt Catawba County's Motion for 1. Allowed
by and through ‘Temporary Stay (COAIB-711) 04/25/2016
its Child Support .
‘agency, ex rel, 2. Plt Catawba County's Petition for 2, Allowed
ShawnaRackley | Writ of Supersedeas
v-Jason Loggins | 3, pit Gatawba County's PDR Under 3, Allowed
NCGS. §7A31
4,N.C, Department of Health and 4, Allowed
Human Services’ Conditional Motion for
Leave to File Amicus Brief
156P16 Polyfield Haris, _| Plts’ PDR Under N.G.GS. § 7-31 Denied
William Hanis, (COA16-437)
‘Tonya Barkley,
Samantha Davis,
and Patricia Perkins
v, Myra H. Gilchuist,
Valerie Harris, The
Estate of Thomas
Hanis, Roosevelt
Harris, Dorothy
Morant, and Helen
Howard
158P069 | State v. Derick Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Denied
Boger Habeas Corpus 09/20/2016
167P16 State v. William 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | I. Allowed
Edward Godwin, 1 | (COA16-766) 05/09/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2. Allowed
of Supersedeas
3, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 | 3. Allowed
4. Def's Conditional PDR Under N.C.G.8. | 4. Allowed
STASI
168A16 ‘Thomas A. Stokes, | 1. Pits Notice of Appeal Based Upon a
Tilv. Catherine C.” | Dissent (COAI41844)
Grampton (form:
Seen Comer | 2. pies POR as to Adaltional Issues 2. Allowed
3, Plt’s Motion for Leave to Amend 3, Allowed
Notice of Appeal and PDR
Edmunds, J.,
recused

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Parimions ror Disore tionary Review Uner G.S. 7A-B1

22 Supremer 2016
172P16 Grystal Whicker, _| Pits PDR Under N.C.GS. § 731 Denied
Employee v. Compass | (COA15-1201)
Group USA, Inc/
Grothall Services ;
Group, Employer, i
SelfInsured
(Gallagher Bassett \
Services, inc., i
Administrator);
and Novant Health,
Inc,, Alleged Joint
Employer,
Self-Insured
181A984 | State v. Rayford Petitioner-Appellant’s Motion to Amend | Allowed
Lewis Burke Petitioner-Appellant’s Brief 09/09/2016
@EATH) .
Exvin, J.,
recused
182A16 Kimberly Ledford | 1. Pit's Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1. —
v-Ingles Markets, | Constitutional Question (COA15-522)
Inc., Employer, Self-
Insured 2. Def's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 2, Allowed |
|
184P16 Corey Scott Hart —_| Def's (James Patrick Brienza) PDR Denied
v. James Patrick ‘Under N.C.GS. § 74-31 (COA15-1078)
Brienza and Gaston
County
187P16 Kornegay Family —_| 1. Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to | 1. Allowed
Farms, LLG, etal. | Review Decision of the Business Court
v. Cross Greek
Seed, Inc. 2. N.C. Association of Defense 2, Allowed
Attorneys’ Conditional Motion for Leave
to File Amicus Brief
189P16 State v. Shawn Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Jarmine Murchison } (COA15-563)
192P 16-2 Owen D. Leavitt Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Dismissed
v. State Certiorari/Appeal Notice and Objection
196P16 State v. JimmyLee | 1. Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 1. Denied
Williams, Jr. (COAI5-826)
2, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 2, Allowed
197P16 State v. Javonta 1. Def’s Gillis) PDR Under 1. Denied
Marquez Ellis, N.G.GS. § 74-81 (COAI6-665)
and Stephon |
Deandre Jennings | 2-Def's (Jennings) PDR Under 2, Denied
NCGS. § 781
8. State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal of _| 3. Dismissed
Defendant Ellis

70 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposition oF Petitions ror Discretionary Review Unver G.S. 7A-31
22 Sepremper 2016
202P16 Odina Wesley and Pits’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31 Denied
Norris Wesley, (COAL5-648)
co-Administrators
of the Estate of
Hasani N’Namdi
‘Wesley, Deceased
v. Winston-Salem/
Forsyth County
Board of Education
and Billy
Roger Bailey
205P16 State v. Robert 1. Def's NOA Based Upon a
Stanley Brown, Jr. Constitutional Question (COA15-1192)
2. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 2. Denied
3. State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 8. Allowed
206P16 Department of 1. Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1.—
‘Transportation Constitutional Question (COA15-589)
v. Adams Outdoor .
“Advertising of 2, Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A31. 2. Special
Charlotte Limited Order
Partnership 8, Plt's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 8, Allowed
208PA15 N.C. State Bar Plt's Motion to Amend New Brief Allowed
vy. Tillett, . 08/23/2016
‘211P16 SED Holdings, Defs’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Allowed
LLC v. 3 Star (COA15-747)
Properties, LLC,
James Johnson,
‘TMS LLG, Mark
‘Hyland, and Home
Servicing, LLC
213P16 State v. Christopher | 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Allen McKiver (COA15-1070) 06/06/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2. Allowed
of Supersedeas
3, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-81 | 8. Allowed
215P16 State v. Mickey 1. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 1. Denied
Mell JA15-459)
Gene Mellon (CO: 1) 2, Allowed
2, State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 06/15/2016
Dissolved
09/22/2016
8. State's Petition for Writ 3. Denied
of Supersedeas
4. State’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 4, Denied

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition of Petitions FoR Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

22 SepremBer 2016
221P16 State v. Comelius | Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § TA-S1 Denied
Demetric Griffin | (COA15-492)
224P16 State v. James Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-81 Denied
Michael Smith (COA15-614)
227P16 State v. Brandon 1. Def'’s Pro Se Motion for Notice 1. Dismissed
Williams of Removal
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Notice 2, Dismissed
of Appeal
29P16 U.S. Bank National | Pit's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Special Order
Association, as (COAI15-797)
‘Trustee for the
C-Bass Mortgage
Loan Asset-Backed
Certificates, Series
2006-RP2 v. Willie
Lee Pinkney, Clara
Pinkney, SIDDCO,
Ine., and Poore
Substitute ‘Trustee,
i)
281P16 Ervin Rainey, Pit’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-B1 Denied
Employee. City | (COA16-953)
of Charlotte,
Employer, and Self-
Insured, Carrier
233P16 State v. Alonzo 1, State's PDR Under N.C.GS. §7A31 | 1, Allowed
Antonio Murrell (C0A15-1097)
2, State's Motion to Deem Petition 2, Allowed
‘Timely Filed
8, State's Petition in the Alternative for | 3. Dismissed
Writ of Certiorari to Review Decision | as moot
of COA
4, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 4, Allowed
06/22/2016
5, State's Petition for Writ of 5. Allowed

Supersedeas

72 IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Peririons ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

22 Supremper 2016
235P16 CSX Transportation, | Defs’ PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Inc. v. City of (COA16-1286)
Fayetteville and
Public Works
Commission of the
City of Fayetteville,
alia Fayetteville
Public Works
Commission v. City
of Fayetteville,
Third Party Plaintitt
v. Time Warner
Cable Southeast,
LLG, Third Party
Defendant
2AGP1E-2 In the Matter of Petitioners’ Pro Se Motion for Notice _| Dismissed
the Foreclosure of Appeal
of aDeed of Trust,
Executed by
Christopher C.
Friscia and Maria
‘A. Friscia in the
Original Amount,
of $161,600.00
Dated March 10,
2006, Recorded in
Book 20146, Page
24, Mecklenburg
County Registry
261P16 Kimarlo Ragland —_| 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Notice of Appeal | 1. —
v. Nash-Rocky Based Upon a Constitutional Question
‘Mount Board of (COA15-862)
Education
2. Petitioner's Pro Se PDR Under 2, Denied
NCGS. § 7A31
8, Respondent's Motion to 3. Allowed
Dismiss Appeal
4, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for 4, Dismissed
Addendum to Notice of Appeal and PDR | as moot
258P16 State. Chalmers | Def’s PDR Under N.C... § 7-31 Denied
Gray Bohannon, Jr. | (COAL5-389)

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Petrrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 74-31

22 SepremBer 2016

73

256P16

State v. Jonathan
James Newell

1. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Disclose the
Past and the Present Relationships,
Associations, and Ties Between Defense
‘Attorney and Victim's Father
(COAP16-283)

2, Def's Pro Se Motion for Notice
of Appeal

8. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to Review Order of COA

4. Det’s Pro Se Motion for Nunc Pro
Tunc Order to Correct Judicial and
Procedural Act on Subject Matter
Jurisdiction

5. Def’s Pro Se Motion for a Subpoena
Duces Tecum

6. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Grant
Belated Appeal

7. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Dismiss First,
Degree Murder Bill of Information

8, Def's Pro Se Motion to Plead to Lesser
Degree or Offense

9. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed No
Security for Costs in Criminal Appeal

1. Dismissed

2. Dismissed

3. Dismissed

4, Dismissed

5. Dismissed

6. Dismissed

7. Dismissed

8. Dismissed

9. Dismissed

260P16

Archie David
Powell, Jr. v. State

Pit’s Pro Se Motion for Complaint/Claim

Dismissed

261P16

State v. John
Sinclair

Def’s Pro Se Motion for Notice of Appeal.

Dismissed

263P16

State v. Norman
Johnson Oakley, Jr.

Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-BL
(COAI5-1126)

Denied

266P16

State v. Timothy
‘Terrell Crandell

1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upon a
Constitutional Question (COAI5-461)

2. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § TASL

8. Def’s Petition for Writ of Certiorart
to Review Decision of COA

4. State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal

2. Dismissed
3. Denied

4. Allowed

74 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposrrion or Penrtions ror Discretionary Review UNDER G.S. TAcBL
22 Serremper 2016
274P 16 Michael P. Long and | 1. Respondent's (Elizabeth Letendre) | 1. Allowed
Marie C. Long Motion for Temporary Stay (COA15-376) | 07/28/2016
¥. Currituck County, Dissolved
North Carolina and 09/22/2016
Elizabeth Letendre
oth erent 2. Respondent's (Blizabeth Letendre) | 2. Denied
Petition for Writ of Supersedeas
3, Respondent's (Blizabeth Letendre) | 8, Denied
PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31
4, Conditional PDR Under 4. Dismissed
NCGS. § 7A31 as moot
276P16 Inthe Matter of the | Respondent's PDR Under Denied
Estate of Richard | N.C.G.S. § 74-31 (COA15-1288)
Dixon Peacock Date
of Death:
12/9/2018
278P 16 Statev. Michael __| Det’s Pro Se Petition for Writ Dismissed
Lawrence Klingler | of Mandamus
281P16 State v.Dequonta | 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
McKinnon Gertiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Wayne County
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to 2, Dismissed
‘Appoint Counsel ‘as moot
288P16 Inte Alexander __| Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
White of Mandamus
2esp07-2 | State, Danyl 1, State's Motion for Tempormy Stay | 1. Allowed
Anthony Howard o7nen014
Dissolved ex
mero motu
mune pro tune
08/31/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2, Dismissed
of Supersedeas as moot.
08/31/2016
286P16 State v Justin Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § TABI Denied

Kyle Mills

(COA16-64)

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Petitions For Discretionary Review Unvsr G.S. 7A-31

22 Sepremper 2016

State v. Arvin
Roscoe Hayes

1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay
(coai6207)

2, State's Petition for Writ,
of Supersedeas
8, State's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A31

4. Def’s Motion to Modity
‘Temporary Stay

1, Allowed
08/05/2016
Dissolved
08/31/2016

2. Denied
08/31/2016

3. Denied
08/31/2016

4, Dismissed
as moot
08/31/2016

‘The Town of Beech
Mountain v. John
Milligan and wife,
‘Sharon Milligan

Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-B1
(COA15-1267)

Denied

State v. Jose
Tsmacl-Ruiz Zuniga

1. Def's Pro Se Motion for Petition for
‘Writ of Exror

2, Def’s Pro Se Motion to Appoint
Counsel

L. Dismissed

2. Dismissed
as moot

1. Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR Under
N.C.GS. § 74-31 (COAP16-642)

2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint
Counsel

1. Dismissed

2. Dismissed
as moot

Ninti El Bey
v. County of
Mecklenburg,
Register of Deeds
David Granberry,
Official and
Individual Capacity

Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Mecklenburg County

Dismissed

Michael Anthony
‘Taylor v. Ola Mae
Lewis, Senior
Resident Superior
Court Judge of
Brunswick County

1. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Notice
of Appeal (COAP16-462)

2. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Appoint
Counsel

1. Dismissed
ex mero motu
09/02/2016
2. Dismissed
as moot
09/02/2016

State v. Robert
‘William Ashworth

1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay
(COA15-1279)

2, State's Petition for Writ
of Supersedeas

8. State's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Allowed
08/22/2016

2.

S15P16

Def’s Pro Se PDR Under
N.C.GS. § 7-31 (COAI5-1081)

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition oF Petimions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

22 Serremper 2016
B17PA142 State v. Rodney Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Nigee Pledger (COAI4-21-2)
Taylor
817P16 State v. Ronald Def’s Pro Se Motion for Writ of Dismissed
‘Thompson Corbett | Prohibition 09/12/2016
S18P16 In the Matter of 1. Petitioner's (Donald R. Bagwell) Pro I. Dismissed
the Foreclosure Se Motion for Writ of Prohibition and/or | 08/30/2016
of a Deed of Trust ‘Temporary Restraining Order
FB begwal on | 2, Petitioner's Donald R. Bagwell) Pro | 2. Dismissed
Sylvia}. Bagwen _ | Se Petition for Writ of Mandamus 08/30/2016
Dated February 26, :
2003 and Recorded
in Book 2910 at
Page 583 in the
Orange County
Public Registry,
North Carolina,
etal.
318P162 In the Matter of 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Writ 1, Dismissed
the Foreclosure of Prohibition and/or Temporary 09/08/2016
of a Deed of Trust Restraining Order
‘Dor
Lerner) ald 2. Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ 2. Dismissed
SyiviaJ. Bagwell | of Mandamus 09/08/2016
Dated February 26,
2008 and Recorded
in Book 2910 at
Page 533 in the
Orange County
Public Registry,
North Carolina,
etal.
319P16 James B. Price 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | 1. Denied
v. Larry Smith, Certiorari to Review Order of Superior | 08/29/2016
Interim Chief of Court, Durham County (COAP16-290)
Police, Duzham a ;
Police Departinent, | 2: Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Proceed | 2. Allowed
and Michael D. In Forma Pauperis 08/29/2016
Andrews, Sheriff
of Durham County,
North Carolina
323P16 Danielle Star Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ Dismissed
Maldonado- of Mandamus 09/01/2016
Reynolds v. Frank
L. Perry, Secretary,
N.C. Department of
Public Safety

IN THE SUPREME COURT 17
Disposition or Perimions For Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31.
22 SepremBer 2016
S26P153 Burl Anderson Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Appeal Jn} Dismissed
Howell v. North Forma Pauperis (COAP16-339)
Carolina Wayne
County Department
of Health and
Human Services, By
and Through, Reese
Phelps; Lou Jones
Petitioner's
826P16 State v. Pedro Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Berrero of Mandamus
828P16 Linwood Wilson 1. Pits Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1
v. Barbara Wilson} Certiorari to Review Order of COA,
(COAL6-1141)
2. Pit's Pro Se Motion for 2 Denied
‘Temporary Stay 09/06/2016
3. Plt’s Pro Se Petition for Writ 3.
of Supersedeas
s29P142 State v. Dwayne 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
Demont Haizlip Gertiorari to Review Order of COA 09/19/2016
(COAP16-617)
2. Det's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis 09/19/2016
8. Def's Pro Se Motion to 8. Dismissed
Appoint Counsel as moot
09/19/2016
Ervin, J.,
recused
330A16 | Aliscripts Pit’s Motion to File and Maintain Certain | Allowed
Healtheare, LLC Documents from the Record on Appeal | 09/06/2016
y, Btransmedia Under Seal
Technology, Ine.
BB1AIG State v. Amanda 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Gayle Reed (COAI5-363) 09/06/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2

of Supersedeas

78 IN THE SUPREME COURT
‘Disposition or Petitions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 74-31
22 Sepremper 2016
382P16 Sandra D. Snipes —_| 1. Defs’ (Britthaven, Inc., Principle Long | 1. Allowed
and William J. ‘Term Care, Inc,, and Spruce LTC Group, | 09/07/2016
Snipes v. Britthaven, | LLC d/b/a Richmond Pines Healtheare
Inc, Prineiple Long’ | and Rehabilitation Center) Motion for
‘Term Care, Inc., ‘Temporary Stay (COA16-291)
Prose Rneeta | 2-Dets (Brtthaven, Ine, etal.) Petition | 2
Pines Healthcare | for Writ of Supersedeas
and Rehabilitation + Bri ;
‘ 3, Def’ (Britthaven, Inc,, et.al. Petition | 3.
Center, and Fred | tor Writ of Certiorari to Review Order
McQueen, Jr, M.D.
of COA.
3384952 | State v. Keith Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Antonia Wagner | of Mandamus
S45P16 State v. Dwayne 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
Demont Haizlip Certiorari to Review Order of COA 09/19/2016
(COAP16-616)
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Proceed In _| 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis 09/19/2016
3, Def's Pro Se Motion to 8. Dismissed
Appoint Counsel as moot
09/19/2016
Ervin, J.,
recused
46P16 Gurney B. Harris | 1. Defs’ (Southeastern Installation, Inc. | 1. Allowed
vy. Southern and Cincinnati Insurance Company) 09/20/2016
Commercial Glass, | Motion for Temporary Stay
Auto Owners (COA15-1363)
Insurance, and
Southeastern 2. Defs’ (Southeastern Installation, Ine. | 2
Installation, and Cincinnati Insurance Company)
Inc., Cincinnati Writ of Supersedeas
Insurance Company | 3, nefs’ (Southeastern Installation, Inc. | 8.
and Cincinnati Insurance Company)
PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31
4, Defs’ (Southeastern Installation, Ine. | 4.
and Cincinnati Insurance Company)
Motion to Hold PDR in Abeyance
362P15-2 | State. Bryant 1, Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
‘T Dennings Certioraré to Review Order of Superior
Court of Cumberland County
2, Det's Pro Se Motion to Proceed in _| 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
3, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 8, Dismissed
Counsel ‘as moot

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition oF Perrrions ror Discretionary Review Unpsr G.S. 7A-31

79

22 Supremper 2016
402P15 State v. Donna 1. Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 1. Special
Helms Ledbetter | (COAI5-414) Order
2, State's Motion to Strike Def’s Reply to | 2. Allowed
State's Response
8. Def's Motion to Hold PDR in 3. Allowed
Abeyance 04/18/2016
4. Def’s Motion for Temporary Stay 4, Allowed
12/17/2015
5. Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 6. Dismissed
. asmoot
6. Def's Motion to Lift the Abeyance of | 6. Allowed
the PDR
409PA16 Nies v. Town of Russell Walker's Pro Se Motion for Denied
Emerald Isle Leave to File Amicus Brief (COA15-169) | 09/01/2016
451P072 | Carl Wayne Moore, | Petitioner's Petition for a Writ af Denied
Sr. v. Superintendent | Habeas Corpus 09/12/2016
Faye Daniels
s82P112 | Statev. Douglas Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint Counsel | Dismissed
Harold McMickle
Beasley, J.,
recused
Ervin, J.,
recused

IN THE SUPREME COURT
CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 80 (2016)]

CITY OF ASHEVILLE, 4 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

v
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA anp ths METROPOLITAN SEWERAGE
DISTRICT OF BUNCOMBE COUNTY

No. 391PA15
Filed 21 December 2016

Constitutional Law—North Carolina—prohibited local act—

health and sanitation—water and sewage system

Where the General Assembly passed legislation that effectively
required the City of Asheville to involuntarily transfer the assets it
used to operate a public water system to a new metropolitan water
and sewerage district, the Supreme Court held that the legislation
was a prohibited local act relating to health and sanitation, in viola-
tion of Article II, Section 24(1)(a) of the state constitution. First,
the legislation was crafted such that the involuntary transfer provi-
sion would apply only to the City of Asheville, and this classifica-
tion bore no reasonable relationship to the stated justification of
the legislation. Second, in light of its stated purpose and practical
effect regarding public water and sewer services, the legislation had
a material connection to issues involving health, sanitation, and the
abatement of nuisances.

Justice NEWBY dissenting.
Chief Justice MARTIN joins in this dissenting opinion.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 and on appeal

of right of a substantial constitutional question pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-30(1) from a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, __
N.C. App. __, 777 S.E.2d 92 (2015), affirming in part and reversing and
remanding in part a summary judgment order entered on 9 June 2014,
as clarified by means of a consent order entered on 3 July 2014, both by
Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in
the Supreme Court on 17 May 2016 in session in the Old Burke County
Courthouse in the City of Morganton pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-10(a).

Ellis & Winters LLP, by Matthew W. Sawchak, Paul M. Cox, and
Emily E. Erixson; Campbell Shatley, PLLC, by Robert F: Orr; Long,
Parker, Warren, Anderson & Payne, P.A., by Robert B. Long, Jr.;

IN THE SUPREME COURT 81

CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 80 (2016)]

and City of Asheville City Attorney’s Office, by Robin T. Currin,
Sor plaintiff-appellant.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by I. Faison Hicks, Special Deputy
Attorney General, for defendant-appellee State of North Carolina.

Cauley Pridgen, PA., by James P. Cauley, III and Gabriel Du
Sablon, for City of Wilson, amicus curiae.

Allegra Collins Law, by Allegra Collins, and Alexandra Davis, for
International Municipal Lawyers Association, amicus curiae.

Kimberly S. Hibbard, General Counsel, and Gregory F: Schwitzgebel
III, Associate General Counsel, for North Carolina League of
Municipalities, amicus curiae.

ERVIN, Justice.

In 2013, the General Assembly enacted legislation that effectively
required the City of Asheville to involuntarily transfer the assets that it
uses to operate a public water system to a newly created metropolitan
water and sewerage district. See Act of May 2, 2013, ch. 50, 2013 N.C.
Sess. Laws 118, amended by Act of July 22, 2013, ch. 388, secs. 4-5, 2013
N.C. Sess. Laws 1605, 1618. Following the enactment of this legislation,
the City sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in Superior
Court, Wake County. The trial court concluded that this involuntary
transfer violated various provisions of the North Carolina Constitution,
declared the relevant statutory provisions to be void and unenforceable,
and permanently enjoined the State from enforcing the legislation. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order, in part,
and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the
State. City of Asheville v. State, ___ N.C. App. __, ___, 777 S.B.2d 92,
102 (2015). In view of our determination that the legislation in question
constitutes a prohibited “[I]ocal ... act... [rJelating to health[ and] sani-
tation” in violation of Article II, Section 24(1)(a) of the North Carolina
Constitution, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision. N.C. Const. art.
Il, § 24(1)(@).

The City is a municipal corporation that is authorized, among
other things, to own and acquire property. N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-1(2), -11
(2015). Pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-311(2) and 160A-312, along with
Chapter 399 of the 1933 Public-Local Laws, Chapter 140 of the 2005

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CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 80 (2016)]

Session Laws, and Chapter 139 of the 2005 Session Laws (the last three
of which are referred to collectively as “the Sullivan Acts” and individu-
ally as “Sullivan I,” “Sullivan II,” and “Sullivan III,” respectively, see City
of Asheville v. State, 192 N.C. App. 1, 4-5, 665 S.E.2d 103, 109 (2008)
(Asheville I), appeal dismissed & disc. rev. denied, 363 N.C. 123, 672
§.E.2d 685 (2009)), the City owns and operates a system for the supply,
treatment, and distribution of water and for the operation of sanitary
disposal systems serving individuals and entities both within and out-
side of its corporate limits.! See N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-311(2), 312 (2015); Act
of Apr. 28, 1933 (Sullivan I), ch. 399, 1933 N.C. Pub.-Local Laws 376 (cap-
tioned “An Act to Regulate Charges Made by the City of Asheville for
Water Consumed in Buncombe County Water Districts”); Act of June 29,
2005 (Sullivan IID), ch. 139, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 248 (captioned “An Act
Regarding the Operation of Public Enterprises by the City of Asheville”);
Act of June 29, 2005 (Sullivan ID), ch. 140, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 244 (cap-
tioned “An Act Regarding Water Rates in Buncombe County”). As of 29
August 2018, the City provided water service to approximately 124,000
customers, approximately 48,000 of whom received service outside the
City’s municipal limits. The City’s water system has been built and main-
tained over the course of the past century using a combination of taxes,
service fees, connection charges,’ bonded indebtedness, federal and
state grants, contributions from Buncombe County, and donations from
property owners and developers.2

Customers in Buncombe County served by the City’s water sys-
tem receive sewer service from the Metropolitan Sewerage District of
Buncombe County, a political subdivision that is authorized, among
other things, to own, operate, and maintain a system for the treatment
and disposal of sewerage in its assigned service area. See N.C.G.S.

1. As of June 2014, the City’s water system consisted of a sizeable watershed; two
impoundments; three water treatment plants; 29 treated water storage reservoirs; 1,661
miles of transmission and distribution lines; at least 40 pump stations; and certain intan-
gible assets, including, but not limited to, approximately 147 trained and certified employ-
ees, numerous licenses, wholesale water supply contracts, contracts for the supply of
goods and services, and revenue accounts containing more than $2,218,000.00 that are
held for the purpose of ensuring repayment of outstanding bonded indebtedness.

2, Although some of the assets of Asheville’s water system were, at one time, owned
by Buncombe County, the County conveyed its interest in those assets to the City on
15 May 2012.

3. Although the Metropolitan Sewerage District has been joined as a party defendant
in this case, it has not taken a position with respect to the merits of any of the claims
asserted in the City’s pleadings.

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[369 N.C. 80 (2016)]

§§ 162A-65(8), -69 (2015). The Metropolitan Sewerage District has never
provided water service to any customer.

Tn May 2018, House Bill 488, which is entitled “An Act to Promote
the Provision of Regional Water and Sewer Services by Transferring
Ownership and Operation of Certain Public Water and Sewer Systems to
a Metropolitan Water and Sewerage District,” became law. Ch. 50, 2013
N.C. Sess. Laws 118. According to Section 2 of the legislation, two or
more political subdivisions are authorized to voluntarily establish anew
type of entity, to be known as a “metropolitan water and sewerage dis-
trict,” which is “authorized and empowered” to “exercise any power of
a Metropolitan Water District under G.S. 162A-36, except subdivision (9)
of that section”; to “exercise any power of a Metropolitan Sewer District
under G.S. 162A-69, except subdivision (9) of that section”; and “[t]o
do all acts and things necessary or convenient to carry out the powers
granted by” the newly created Article 5A. Id., sec. 2, at 119-24. Pursuant
to Section 1(a) of the legislation, “[a]ll assets, real and personal, tan-
gible and intangible, and all outstanding debts of any public water sys-
tem” meeting certain statutorily specified criteria “are by operation of
law transferred to the metropolitan sewerage district operating in the
county where the public water system is located” regardless of whether
the municipality in question consents to the required transfer.‘ Id., sec.
1(a), at 118-19. Finally, Section 5.5 of the legislation provides that no
metropolitan sewerage district can be created in any county which cur-
rently lacks such an entity without the consent of all the affected politi-
cal subdivisions in the proposed district, id., sec. 5.5, at 125, a provision
that has the effect of preventing any involuntary transfers of the type
required by Section 1 in the future.

On 14 May 2018, the City filed a complaint and a motion seeking
temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief in which the
City alleged that the involuntary transfer provisions of the legislation,
which were specifically designed to apply to the City and to no other
municipality in North Carolina, constituted an invalid local act “[rjelat-
ing to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances” prohibited
by Article II, Section 24(1)(a) of the North Carolina Constitution and
“{rjelating to non-navigable streams” prohibited by Article II, Section
24(1)(e) of the North Carolina Constitution; violated the City’s due pro-
cess and equal protection rights as guaranteed by Article I, Section 19

4. The first six sentences of Chapter 50 of the 2013 North Carolina Session Laws are
titled Sections 1(a) through 1(£). Chapter 388 of the 2013 Session Laws added Section 1(g).
‘The parties regularly referred to these seven sections as simply “Section 1.”

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[369 N.C. 80 (2016)]

of the North Carolina Constitution; worked an unlawful taking of the
City’s property in violation of Article I, Sections 19 and 35 of the North
Carolina Constitution; impaired the City’s contracts with the holders
of the bonds that had been issued to finance the construction of the
City’s water system in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the United
States Constitution; impaired the City’s obligations to its bondholders
under N.C.G.S. § 159-93; and, in the alternative, took the City’s property
without just compensation in violation of Article I, Sections 19 and 35
of the North Carolina Constitution. Based upon these claims, the City
sought a declaration that Section 1 of the legislation is unconstitutional;
asked that the enforcement of Section 1 of the legislation be temporarily
restrained and preliminarily and permanently enjoined; and requested
that, in the alternative, the City be awarded monetary damages sufficient
to indemnify the City from any loss that might result from the enactment
of the legislation. On 14 May 2018, Judge Donald W. Stephens entered a
temporary restraining order precluding the implementation or enforce-
ment of Section 1 of the legislation.®

On 23 August 2013, the Governor signed Chapter 388 of the 2013
Session Laws, which had been enacted by the General Assembly on
22 July 2013 and which amended Section 1 of the Act in two ways. Ch.
388, secs. 4-5, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1618. More specifically, the newly
enacted legislation repealed Section 1(a)(2) of Chapter 50 of the 2013
Session Laws so as to effectively eliminate one of the original criteria
necessary to trigger an involuntary transfer of a covered municipality's
water system, id., sec. 4, at 1618 (stating that “Section 1(a)(2) of S.L.
2013-50 is repealed”), and added a new exemption from the existing
involuntary transfer requirement, id., sec. 5, at 1618 (amending “S.L.
2013-50 . . . by adding a new section” 1.(g)). As a result, the trial court
entered a consent order providing, among other things, that the parties
would be allowed to amend their pleadings to reflect these modifica-
tions to the legislation.

On 2 October 2018, the City filed an amended complaint in which it
asserted the same substantive claims that had been raised in its initial
pleading.6 On 7 November 2013, the State filed a responsive pleading in
which it alleged, among other things, that the City lacked the capacity

5. The enforcement of Section 1 of the legislation has been enjoined throughout the
course of this litigation.

6. The City predicated its amended impairment of contract claim upon both
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the
North Carolina Constitution.

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[869 N.C. 80 (2016)]

and standing to bring its claims against the State and denied the mate-
rial allegations of the City’s complaint. On 27 February 2014, the State
and the City filed motions seeking summary judgment in their favor. On
9 June 2014, the trial court entered an order finding that there were no
genuine issues of material fact and determining that the legislation (1)
“was specifically drafted and amended to apply only to Asheville and the
Asheville Water System,” making it “a local act which relates to health
and sanitation in violation of Article II, Section 24(1)(a) of the North
Carolina Constitution” and “a local act relating to non-navigable streams
. .. in violation of Article II, Section 24(1)(e) of the North Carolina
Constitution”; (2) “is contrary to the law of the land in violation of Article
I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution as the means utilized to
achieve what the legislation sought to obtain bears no relation, rational
basis or otherwise, to the Act’s stated purpose”; and (8) “is not a valid
exercise of the sovereign power of the legislative branch of government
(or the State of North Carolina) to take or condemn property for a public
use” in violation of Article I, Sections 19 and 35 of the North Carolina
Constitution. In the alternative, the trial court further determined that,
in the event that the General Assembly had the authority to order the
involuntary transfer of the City’s water system, “Asheville, as the owner
of the Asheville Water System, is entitled to be paid just compensation.”
In light of these determinations, the trial court permanently enjoined
enforcement of the legislation. As a result of its decision to grant the
relief that had been requested by the City on other grounds, the trial
court “decline[d] to address” the claims that the City asserted pursuant
to the state and federal contract clauses.” On 3 July 2014, the trial court
entered a consent order indicating that it had declined to rule on the
claims that the City had asserted pursuant to the contract clauses and
N.C.G.S. § 159-93 on the grounds that they had “been rendered moot by
the Court’s ruling on the other claims.” The State noted an appeal to the
Court of Appeals from the trial court’s orders.

Before the Court of Appeals, the State argued that the trial court
had erred by concluding (1) that the City had the capacity and stand-
ing to bring its claims against. the State; (2) that the Act is a “local[]...
act” “[rJelating to health[ and] sanitation,” N.C. Const. art. II, § 24(1)(a),
and “non-navigable streams,” id. art. I, § 24(1)(e); (8) that Section 1 of
the legislation violated the City’s state equal protection and substantive
due process rights; and (4) that Section 1 of the legislation effected an

7. Although the trial court did not directly reference the City’s claim pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 159-93, it did not address this claim either.

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unlawful taking of the City’s ptoperty and, alternatively, that the City
would be entitled to just compensation in the event that the involuntary
transfer of its water system was lawful. In response, the City asserted
(1) that it “unquestionably has standing to challenge the constitutional-
ity” of the Act; (2) that Section 1 of the legislation is an unconstitutional
“local act” “relating to health and sanitation” in violation of Article II,
Section 24(1)(a) and “relating to non-navigable streams” in violation of
Article II, Section 24(1)(e); (8) that, although the Court of Appeals “need.
not reach the[se] issue[s,]” the legislation “violates both the takings ele-
ment... and the due process and equal protection elements of” Article I,
Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution; and (4) that, if the Court
of Appeals were to reverse the trial court, the City’s bond-related claims
“would remain for consideration” before the trial court.

After determining that the City had standing to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the legislation “because it ha[d] not accepted any ben-
efit from” the Act, City of Asheville, N.C. App. at ___, 777 S.E.2d
at 95 (citing Town of Spruce Pine v. Avery County, 346 N.C. 787, 790,
488 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1997)),8 the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court had erred by invalidating the legislation, id. at __, 777 S.E.2d
at 102. After assuming for purposes of argument that the legislation
“constitute[d] a ‘local law,’ ” the court held that “it is not plain and clear
and beyond reasonable doubt” that Section 1 “falls within the ambit of”
Article II, Section 24(1)(a) or Article II, Section 24(1)(e) of the North
Carolina Constitution. Id. at____, 777 S.E.2d at 97. Instead, the legislation
“appear[s] to prioritize concerns regarding the governance over water
and sewer systems and the quality of the services rendered.” Id. at __,
777 S.E.2d at 98 (citing ch. 50, sec. 2, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 119-24 (cod-
ified at Article 5A in N.C.G.S. Chapter 162A)).9 In addition, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the legislation did not violate the City’s right to
equal protection under the state constitution, id. at ___, 777 S.E.2d at
99-101, effectuate a taking of Asheville’s water system for an invalid pur-
pose, id. at__, 777 S.E.2d at 101, or result in a valid taking for which the
City was entitled to just compensation, id. at___, 777 S.E.2d at 101-02.10

8. The State has not sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to
the standing issue.

9. Onthe basis of a similar analysis, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[tJhere is
nothing in the . . . Act which suggests that its purpose is to address some concer regarding
anon-navigable stream.” Id. at ___, 777 S.E.2d at 98. The City has not requested review of
this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision.

10. The City has not sought review by this Court of the Court of Appeals’ decision to
reject its due process and equal protection claims.

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[369 N.C. 80 (2016)]

Finally, with respect to the claims that the City had asserted pursuant to
the contract clauses and N.C.G.S. § 159-93, the Court of Appeals stated
that, because the City had not argued that those claims constituted “an
alternative basis in law for supporting” the relief sought, it had waived
the right to assert those claims in the future. Id. at__, 777 S.E.2d at 95
n.2 (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)); id. at __, 777 S.E.2d at 102-03. Asa
result, the Court of Appeals reversed, in part, the trial court’s order and
remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of summary judgment
in the State’s favor. Id. at __, 777 S.E.2d at 102. After the City unsuc-
cessfully sought rehearing of the Court of Appeals’ decision with respect
to, among other things, the claims that the City had asserted in reliance
upon the contract clauses and N.C.G.S. § 159-93, this Court retained
jurisdiction over the City’s notice of appeal and allowed the City’s peti-
tion for discretionary review.

In seeking relief from this Court, the City argues that the Court of
Appeals erred (1) by concluding that Section 1 of the legislation is not
an unconstitutional local act relating to health and sanitation prohibited
by Article Il, Section 24(1)(a) of the North Carolina Constitution; (2)
in holding that Section 1 of the legislation does not effectuate a taking
for which Asheville is entitled to compensation pursuant to Article I,
Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution; and (3) by appearing to

- hold that the City had abandoned any right to assert its claims pursuant.
to the contract clauses and N.C.G.S. § 159-93 on remand by failing to
raise them on appeal pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the North Carolina Rules
of Appellate Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the Court of
Appeals’ decision is reversed.1

It is well settled in this State that the courts have the
power, and it is their duty in proper cases, to declare an
act of the General Assembly unconstitutional—but it must
be plainly and clearly the case. If there is any reasonable
doubt, it will be resolved in favor of the lawful exercise of
their powers by the representatives of the people.

11, Although we need not reach the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred by
apparently holding that the City had waived the right to have the claims that ithad asserted
pursuant to the contract clauses and N.C.G.S. § 159-98 considered on remand by failing to
assert those claims as an alternative basis for upholding the trial court’s order pursuant
to Rule 10(¢) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, we disavow that hold-
ing in order to avoid confusion in subsequent cases. Simply put, nothing in the relevant
provisions of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure or any of our prior cases
requires an appellee to challenge legal decisions that the trial court declined to make on
the grounds that the case could be fully resolved on some other basis on appeal pursuant
to Rule 10(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure at the risk of losing the
right to assert those claims at a later time.

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[369 N.C. 80 (2016)}

Glenn v. Bd. of Educ., 210 N.C. 525, 529-30, 187 S.E. 781, 784 (1936). In
determining “the constitutionality of a legislative act it is not for this
Court to judge its wisdom and expediency. These matters are the prov-
ince of the General Assembly.” Adams v. N.C. Dep't of Nat. & Econ.
Res., 295 N.C. 688, 690, 249 S.E.2d 402, 406 (1978). On the other hand,
“‘Tijf there is a conflict between a statute and the Constitution, this
Court must determine the rights and liabilities or duties of the litigants
before it in accordance with the Constitution, because the Constitution
is the superior rule of law in that situation.’ ” Id. at 690, 249 S.E.2d at 406
(quoting Nicholson v. State Educ. Assistance Auth., 275 N.C. 439, 447,
168 S.E.2d 401, 406 (1969) (citation omitted)).

Article II, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution, which
expressly forbids the General Assembly from “enact[ing] any local, pri-
vate, or special act or resolution” concerning fourteen “[p]rohibited sub-
jects,” N.C. Const. art. II, § 24(1), “is the fundamental law of the State
and may not be ignored,” High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C.
650, 656, 142 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1965). More specifically, Article II, Section
24 of the North Carolina Constitution provides that:

() Prohibited subjects. - The General Assembly shall
not enact any local, private, or special act or resolution:

(a) Relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement
of nuisances;

(8) Prohibited acts void. - Any local, private, or spe-
cial act or resolution enacted in violation of the provi-
sions of this Section shall be void.

N.C. Const. art. II, § 24(1)(a), (8). Although the General Assembly shall
not “enact any local, private, or special act” regarding any of the four-
teen prohibited subjects listed in Article II, Section 24(1) “by the partial
repeal of a general law,” id. art. II, § 24(2), it “may . . . repeal local, pri-
vate, or special laws enacted by it,” id., and “enact general laws regulat-
ing the matters set out” in the relevant constitutional provision, id. art.
Ti, § 24(4).

As the history of Article II, Section 24 of the North Carolina
Constitution!2 demonstrates:

12. At the time of its original adoption, the language now contained in Article II,
Section 24 appeared in Article II, Section 29.

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[369 N.C. 80 (2016)]

The organic law of the State was originally drafted
and promulgated by a convention which met at Halifax
in December, 1776. During the ensuing 140 years, the
Legislature of North Carolina possessed virtually unlim-
ited constitutional power to enact local, private, and
special statutes. This legislative power was exercised
with much liberality, and produced a plethora of local,
private, and special enactments. As an inevitable conse-
quence, the law of the State was frequently one thing in
one locality, and quite different things in other localities.
To minimize the resultant confusion, the people of North
Carolina amended their Constitution at the general elec-
tion of 1916 so as to deprive their Legislature of the power
to enact local, private, or special acts or resolutions relat-
ing to many of the most common subjects of legislation.

In thus amending their organic law, the people were
motivated by the desire that the General Assembly should
legislate for North Carolina in respect to the subjects
specified as a single united commonwealth rather than
as a conglomeration of innumerable discordant com-
munities. To prevent this laudable desire from degener-
ating into a mere pious hope, they decreed in emphatic
and express terms that “any local, private, or special act
or resolution passed in violation of the provisions of this
section shall be void [. . . .]”

Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 185-86, 581
S.E.2d 415, 426-27 (2003) (quoting Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 732-33,
65 S.E.2d 313, 314-15 (1951) (first alteration in original) (quoting N.C.
Const. of 1868, art. II, § 29 (1917) (now art. II, § 24(8)))).

It was the purpose of the amendment to free the General
Assembly from the enormous amount of petty detail which
had been occupying its attention, to enable it to devote
more time and attention to general legislation of statewide
interest and concern, to strengthen local self-government
by providing for the delegation of local matters by general
laws to local authorities, and to require uniform and coor-
dinated action under general laws on matters related to
the welfare of the whole State.

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High Point Surplus Co., 264 N.C. at 656, 142 S.E.2d at 702. We are called
upon to evaluate the constitutionality of Section 1 of the legislation
against this historical backdrop.

“The first issue [that must be resolved in this case] is whether the
Act is a local act prohibited by Article Il, section 24 of the Constitution
or is a general law which the General Assembly has the power to enact.”
Adams, 295 N.C. at 690, 249 S.E.2d at 406. “A statute is either ‘general’
or ‘local’; there is no middle ground.” High Point Surplus Co., 264 N.C.
at 656, 142 S.E.2d at 702. “[NJo exact rule or formula capable of con-
stant application can be devised for determining in every case whether
a law is local, private or special or whether [it is] general.” McIntyre
v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 517, 119 S.E.2d 888, 893 (1961). The primary
test that this Court has employed for the purpose of differentiating
between general and local acts for the past half-century has been the
“reasonable classification” test adopted in McIntyre, id. at 517-19, 525-
26, 119 S.E.2d at 893-95, 898-99. See, e.g., Williams, 357 N.C. at 183-85,
581 S.E.2d at 425-26; City of New Bern v. New Bern—Craven Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 338 N.C. 480, 435-37, 450 S.E.2d 735, 738-39 (1994); Adams, 295
N.C. at 690-91, 249 S.E.2d at 406-07; Treasure City of Fayetteville, Inc.
v. Clark, 261 N.C. 130, 133, 184 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1964). In applying this test,
we must remember that “the number of counties included or excluded
[from the ambit of an act] is not necessarily determinative.” High Point
Surplus Co., 264 N.C. at 656, 142 S.E.2d at 702.

Conceivably, a statute may be local if it excludes only one
county. On the other hand, it may be general if it includes
only one or a few counties. It is a matter of classification.
For the purposes of legislating, the General Assembly may
and does classify conditions, persons, places and things,
and classification does not render a statute “local” if the
classification is reasonable and based on rational differ-
ence of situation or condition; “[u]niversality is immate-
rial so long as those affected are reasonably different from
those excluded and for the purpose of the [act] there is a
logical basis for treating them in a different manner.” A law
is local “where, by force of an inherent limitation, it arbi-
trarily separates some places from others upon which, but
for such limitation, it would operate, [ ] where it embraces
less than the entire class of places to which such legisla-
tion would be necessary or appropriate having regard to
the purpose for which the legislation was designed, and
where [the] classification does not rest on circumstances
distinguishing the places included from those excluded.”

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Id. at 656-57, 142 S.E.2d at 702 (first alteration in original) (quoting
McIntyre, 254 N.C. at 518, 119 S.E.2d at 894) (citations omitted)). Put
another way, a local law “discriminates between different localities
without any real, proper, or reasonable basis or necessity a necessity
springing from manifest peculiarities clearly distinguishing those of one
class from each of the other classes, and imperatively demanding legis-
lation for each class separately that would be useless or detrimental to
the others.” McIntyre, 254 N.C. at 518, 119 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting 50 Am.
Jur. Statutes § 8, at 25 (1944) (footnotes omitted)).

On the other hand, a law is general “ ‘if it applies to and
operates uniformly on all the members of any class of
persons, places or things requiring legislation peculiar to
itself in matters covered by the law.’ [ ] Classification must
be reasonable and germane to the law. It must be based
on a reasonable and tangible distinction and operate the
same on all parts of the [S]tate under the same conditions
and circumstances. Classification must not be discrimina-
tory, arbitrary or capricious.”

High Point Surplus Co., 264 N.C. at 657, 142 S.E.2d at 702-03 (quot-
ing McIntyre, 254 N.C. at 519, 119 S.E.2d at 894) (citation omitted)).
As noted by a leading scholar cited with regularity by this Court, e.9.,
Adams, 295 N.C. at 690-91, 249 S.E.2d at 407:

In barest outline, a statutory classification is held to be
“reasonable” if it satisfies the following five tests: (1) the
classification must be based upon substantial distinctions
which make one class really different from another; (2)
the classification adopted must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (8) the classification must not be based upon
existing circumstances only; (4) to whatever class a law
may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof;
and (5) if the classification meets these requirements, the
number of members in a class is wholly immaterial.

Joseph S. Ferrell, Local Legislation in the North Carolina General
Assembly, 45 N.C. L. Rev. 340, 391-92 (1967) [hereinafter Ferrell, Local
Legislation] (footnotes omitted). The reasonable classification test uti-
lized to distinguish between general and local legislation is not equiva-
lent to the rational basis test utilized in due process and equal protection
cases. See id. at 391-92 (footnotes omitted).

In Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987),
this Court articulated a different test for determining whether an act is

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general or local that focused on “the extent to which the act in question
affects the general public interests and concerns,” id. at 651, 360 S.E.2d
at 763 (applying this test to legislation that provided for a specific public
pedestrian beach access point and related facilities at Bogue Inlet in
Carteret County), which we have not utilized in any subsequent case.
We “departed from the reasonable classification method of analysis” in
Town of Emerald Isle because it was “ ‘ill-suited to the question pre-
sented [there], since by definition a particular public pedestrian beach
access facility must rest in but one location.’ ” City of New Bern, 338
N.C. at 436, 450 S.E.2d at 739 (quoting Town of Emerald Isle, 320 N.C. at
650, 360 S.E.2d at 762). The City contends that the legislation is a local
law under either test while the State advances the opposite contention.
We find the City’s argument persuasive.

The legislation states that:

Whereas, regional water and sewer systems provide
reliable, cost-effective, high-quality water and sewer ser-
vices to a wide range of residential and institutional cus-
tomers; and

Whereas, in an effort to ensure that the citizens and
businesses of North Carolina are provided with the high-
est quality services, the State recognizes the value of
regional solutions for public water and sewer for large
public systems; Now, therefore,

Ch. 50, pmbl., 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws at 118. Simply put, the General
Assembly stated that large, public regional water and sewer systems
will better ensure that North Carolina citizens have access to higher
quality, cost-effective water and sewer services and that the creation of
regional water and sewer systems should be encouraged for that reason.
In view of the fact that the stated purpose of the legislation contains
no indication that it was site-specific in nature, we conclude that the
reasonable classification test should be utilized in determining whether
the legislation is local or general in nature. See, e.g., Williams, 357 N.C.
at 184-85, 581 S.E.2d at 426 (applying the “reasonable classification” test
on the grounds that, while “the enabling legislation and the Ordinance
allowing for the creation of a comprehensive civil rights ordinance apply
only to Orange County, this legislation is not site-specific as in Emerald
.Isle because ‘[s]uch a legislated change could be effected as easily
in [Orange County] as in any other [county] in the state’ ” (alterations in
original) (quoting City of New Bern, 338 N.C. at 436, 450 S.E.2d at 739)).

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According to Section 1 of the legislation, as amended, the involun-
tary transfer of a municipal water system to a metropolitan water and
sewerage system is required if, and only if, (1) “[t]he public water system
is owned and operated by a municipality located in a county where a
metropolitan sewerage district is operating” and (2) “[t]he public water
system serves a population of greater than 120,000 people.” Ch. 50, sec.
1(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 118-19, as amended by Ch. 388, sec. 4, 2013
N.C. Sess. Laws at 1618. In other words, the involuntary transfer provi-
sions of Section 1 do not apply to any municipality that operates a water
system unless that municipality serves more than 120,000 customers
and is located in a county in which a metropolitan sewerage district pro-
vides sewer service pursuant to Article 5 of Chapter 162A of the North
Carolina General Statutes, N.C.G.S. §§ 162A-64 to -81 (2015). Although
the legislation appears to create a class of municipalities to which the
involuntary transfer provisions of Section 1 apply, an examination of
the criteria delineating the composition of that class demonstrates that
the involuntary transfer provision has been crafted in such a manner
that it does not and will not apply to any municipality other than the City.

According to the undisputed record evidence, there are only
three metropolitan sewerage districts presently operating in North
Carolina: the Metropolitan Sewerage District of Buncombe County,
the Contentnea Metropolitan Sewerage District in Pitt County, and the
Bay River Metropolitan Sewerage District in Pamlico County. The only
municipal water system located in a county served by one of these three
metropolitan sewerage districts that has over 120,000 customers is that
owned and operated by the City. Although existing population growth
trends create some possibility that the water system operated by the
City of Greenville could reach the 120,000 person threshold in the fore-
seeable future, the General Assembly took affirmative action to elimi-

“nate any risk that Greenville would ever have to involuntarily transfer its
water system to the Contentnea Metropolitan Sewerage District.

As originally enacted, the legislation contained a third criterion
that had to be met before an involuntary transfer was required, which
was that “[t]he public water system has not been issued a certificate
for an interbasin transfer.” Ch. 50, sec. 1(a)(2), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at
119. In view of the fact that Greenville possessed an interbasin transfer

1. The record clearly establishes that none of the municipal water systems located
in the territory in which the Bay River Metropolitan Sewerage District operates have any
prospect of serving the requisite number of customers in the foreseeable future.

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certificate, it was exempt from the involuntary transfer requirement
contained in the original version of the legislation. Although the enact-
ment of Chapter 388, Section 4 of the 2013 Session Laws eliminated the
interbasin transfer certificate exception from the involuntary transfer
provision of the legislation, Section 5 of Chapter 388 of the 2013 Session
Laws added Section 1(g), which provides that, “[flor purposes of this
section, a public water system shall not include any system that is oper-
ated simultaneously with a sewer system by the same public body, in
conjunction with the provision of other utility, services for its custom-
ers,” to the legislation. Ch. 388, sec. 5, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1618. In
view of the fact that Greenville provides both sewer and water service to
its customers in conjunction with a system for the supply of electricity
and natural gas, the enactment of Section 1(g) had the effect of preserv-
ing Greenville’s exception from the involuntary transfer requirement.

In addition, we note that Section 5.5 of the legislation prohibits the
creation of any new metropolitan sewerage districts without the con-
sent of all relevant local governmental entities. Ch. 50, sec. 5.5, 2013
N.C. Sess. Laws at 125. The inclusion of Section 5.5 ensured that all of
the other municipalities that currently operate water systems that serve
more than 120,000 customers, such as Charlotte, Durham, Fayetteville,
Greensboro, and Winston-Salem, or will operate such systems in the
future will never be subjected to the involuntary transfer provisions
of the legislation. Thus, the undisputed record evidence clearly shows
that the City is the only entity that will ever be required to involuntarily
transfer its water system to a metropolitan sewerage district under
the legislation.

Although the fact that the City is the only municipality that will ever
be subject to the involuntary transfer provisions of the legislation does
not, standing alone, mean that the legislation is, per se, a “local” act,
see High Point Surplus Co., 264 N.C. at 656, 142 S.E.2d at 702 (stating
that a statute “may be general if it includes only one or a few counties”),
it does, however, indicate the existence of a serious question concern-
ing the extent to which the classification contained in the legislation is
“reasonable and germane to the law” and “based on a reasonable and
tangible distinction,” id. at 657, 142 S.E.2d at 702 (quoting McIntyre, 254
N.C. at 519, 119 S.E.2d 894 (citation omitted)). Nothing in the legisla-
tion in any way explains why every other municipality in North Carolina
except the City should have the right to decide for itself whether to
transfer its water system to a metropolitan water and sewerage district.
Moreover, nothing in the legislation does anything to explain why the
benefits that the General Assembly expects to result from the creation

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of metropolitan water and sewerage districts should not be made avail-
able to the customers of every large municipal water system in North
Carolina. The total absence of any justification for singling out the City’s
water system from other large municipally owned systems and the steps
taken during the drafting process to ensure that the involuntary transfer
provisions of the legislation did not apply to any municipality except
the City demonstrate that the involuntary transfer provisions were never
intended to apply to any municipal water system except that owned by
the City. As a result, given the absence of any reasonable relationship
between the stated justification underlying the legislation and the clas-
sification adopted by the General Assembly for the purpose of achieving
its stated goal, the legislation is, without doubt, a local rather than a gen-
eral law. See, e.g., Treasure City of Fayetteville, 261 N.C. at 133-36, 134
§.E.2d at 99-101 (holding that a statute prohibiting sales of certain goods
on Sunday that did not apply to all or portions of twenty-nine counties
for the stated reason that the excluded territories were resort or tourist
areas was a local, rather than a general, act given that the legislation did
not apply to all of North Carolina’s resort and tourist areas and given
that some of the goods and services whose sale was prohibited by the
legislation were of primary interest to permanent residents rather than
tourists); see also Ferrell, Local Legislation 394 (noting the Court's hold-
ing that the statutory provision at issue in Treasure City was a local act
given that the classification embodied in the challenged legislation was
“a sham”).

In spite of the absence of “any real, proper, or reasonable basis or
... necessity springing from manifest peculiarities clearly distinguish-
ing . . . and imperatively demanding” the involuntary transfer of the
City’s water system to a metropolitan water and sewerage district in
the face of an apparent determination that similar treatment would be
“useless or detrimental to [every] other[ ]” North Carolina municipality,
McIntyre, 254. N.C. at 518, 119 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting 50 Am. Jur. Statutes
§ 8, at 25 (1944) (footnotes omitted)), the State hypothesizes that the
General Assembly’s decision to treat the City differently than all other
North Carolina municipalities might hinge upon the “unique facts” and
history of the “Asheville-Buncombe-Henderson region,” which the State
claims to consist of a “prolonged history of conflict between” the City
and residents of Buncombe and Henderson Counties who are dependent
on the City’s water system that has been “characterized by charges of
discrimination and the misuse of public monies and other resources”
and has “engendered a toxically high level of public distrust and cyni-
cism concerning local government in that region which itself makes

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sound democratic governance there difficult to achieve.” More specifi-
cally, the State asserts, as a purely hypothetical matter, that the General
Assembly “could have” singled out the City’s water system for involun-
tary transfer due to “fundamental and serious governance problems”
that affect extraterritorial customers located in portions of Buncombe
County outside the City’s municipal limits and in Henderson County. In
addition, the State hypothesizes that, given the area’s status as a tourist

- destination, the General Assembly “could reasonably have concluded”
that an involuntary transfer of the City’s water system would prevent
the “atmosphere of conflict in this region” from “tarnish[ing] . . . this
region in the eyes of the public generally” and “threaten[ing], among
other things, the vitality of a local tourist industry which is enormous
and is of tremendous importance to all the citizens of this State.” We do
not find this argument persuasive.

At the outset, we note that this aspect of the State’s defense of the
legislation seems rooted in the rational basis test employed in the due
process and equal protection context. See, e.g., Inre R.L.C., 361 N.C. 287,
295, 643 S.E.2d 920, 924 (noting that, in the context of an as-applied due
process challenge, evaluating “whether the law in question is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose” does not require “courts to
determine the actual goal or purpose ‘of the government action at issue”
and allows the reviewing court to uphold the legislation on the basis of
“any conceivable legitimate purpose” (citations omitted)), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 1024, 128 S. Ct. 615, 169 L. Ed. 2d 396 (2007). However, nothing
in our Article Il, Section 24 jurisprudence suggests that we should focus
on a hypothetical, rather than the actual, justification for the challenged
legislation in determining whether it should be deemed general or local
in nature. Furthermore, a decision to approve the use of the hypotheti-
cal purpose approach suggested by the State would deprive Article II,
Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution of any meaningful effect
by rendering it indistinguishable from the substantive due process
provisions of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.
Of. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27, 171 L. Ed. 2d
637, 679 n.27, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2008) (rejecting such a result
under the federal constitution and, more specifically, stating that, “[i]f
all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was
a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have
no effect”). As aresult, we will focus our analysis upon the extent, if any,
to which there is record support for the State’s argument to the effect
that the legislation is a general, rather than a local, act.

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[369 N.C. 80 (2016)]

Although the State has directed the Court's attention to “[t]he docu-
mented historical record” reflected in this Court’s decision in Candler
v. City of Asheville, 247 N.C. 398, 101 S:E.2d 470 (1958), and the Court of
Appeals’ 2008 decision in City of Asheville, these materials provide no
support for the State’s argument that the legislation is a general, rather
than a local, law. Instead, we explicitly stated in Candler that “[t]here is
nothing on this record which tends to show that the rate or rates to be
charged” to extraterritorial customers “are unjust and confiscatory.” Id.
at410, 101 S.E.2d at 479. Although the Court of Appeals did note the exis-
tence of “ample support in the record to justify the Legislature’s findings
that Asheville and Buncombe County have experienced a ‘complicated
pattern of dealings’ with respect to the development and maintenance of
its water distribution system” in Asheville I, 192 N.C. App. at 31-32, 665
§.E.2d at 125 (quoting Sullivan II, ch. 140, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws at 246),
the court also stated that (1) it was “not clear from the record that this
history is one of ‘manifest peculiarities clearly distinguishing’ Asheville
and Buncombe County from other municipalities and counties across
the State,” id. at 32, 665 S.E.2d at 125 (quoting McIntyre, 254 N.C. at 518,
119 S.E.2d at 894); (2) it was “not persuaded that the history of the devel-
opment of the [Asheville]. water distribution system” justified a deci-
sion to treat the City as unique for legislative classification purposes,
id. at 32, 665 S.E.2d at 126; and (8) the statutory provisions at issue in
Asheville I appeared to “ernbrace| ] less than the entire class of places to
which such legislation would be necessary or appropriate having regard _
to the purpose for which the legislation was designed,” id. at 32, 665
S.E.2d at 126 (alteration in original) (quoting Williams, 357 N.C. at 184,
581 S.E.2d at 426 (quoting McIntyre, 254 N.C. at 518, 119 S.E.2d at 894)).
Based upon these determinations, the court in Asheville I held that the
challenged statutory provisions were “local acts.” Id. at 32, 665 S.E.2d at
126. Moreover, the State conceded during oral argument that the present
record contains no support for any assertion that the City continued to
engage in abusive or discriminatory behavior after 2008. Finally, even if
the legislation is intended to ensure the availability of better water ser-
vice at a lower cost in Buncombe County by fostering the creation of a
large, regional water and sewer system, the classification upon which the
legislation relies “embraces less than the entire class of places to which
such legislation would be necessary or appropriate having regard to the
purpose for which the legislation was designed,” Williams, 357 N.C. at
184, 581 S.E.2d at 426 (quoting McIntyre, 254 N.C. at 518, 119 S.E.2d
at 894), given that none of the other public water systems owned and
operated by Buncombe County municipalities receiving service from
the Metropolitan Sewerage District, including Biltmore Forest, Black

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Mountain, Montreat, Weaverville, and Woodfin, are subject to the stat-
ute’s involuntary transfer provision despite the fact that several of those
municipalities charge higher rates to extraterritorial customers than to
municipal residents and given that the Town of Hendersonville, which
is located in Henderson County, owns and operates a municipal water
system that charges higher rates to extraterritorial customers than to
municipal residents as well. Thus, for all these reasons, the State’s effort
to establish that the legislation is a general, rather than a local, act nec-
essarily fails.

Having determined that Section 1 of the Act is a local law, we
must next consider whether the legislation “[rJelat[es] to health{ and]
sanitation.” N.C. Const. art. II, § 24(1)(a). In answering this question
in the negative, the Court of Appeals began by noting that, in the 2008
City of Asheville case, it had concluded that “the mere implication of
water or a water system in a legislative enactment does not necessitate
a conclusion that it relates to health and sanitation in violation of the
Constitution,” éd. at__, 777 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting Asheville I, 192 N.C.
App. at 37, 665 S.E.2d at 129); that this Court’s precedent “instructs”
that a local law does not relate to health or sanitation “wnless (1) the
law plainly ‘state[s] that its purpose is to regulate [this prohibited sub-
ject],’ or (2) the reviewing court is able to determine ‘that the purpose
of the act is to regulate [this prohibited subject after] careful perusal of
the entire act,’” id. at ___, 777 S.B.2d at 97-98 (second and third altera-
tions in original) (quoting Asheville I, 192 N.C. App. at 33, 665 S.E.2d at
126 (first alteration in original) (citing and quoting Reed v. Howerton
Eng’g Co., 188 N.C. 39, 44, 123 S.E. 479, 481 (1924))); and “that the best
indications of the General Assembly's purpose are ‘the language of the
statute, the spirit of the act, and what the act seeks to accomplish,’ ”
id. at___, 777 S.E.2d at 98 (quoting Asheville I, 192 N.C. App. at 37, 665
S.E.2d at 129 (quoting State ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau,
300 N.C. 381, 399, 269 S.E.2d 547, 561 (1980))). As a result, the Court of
Appeals “first look[ed] to see if the . . . Act expressly states that its pur-
pose is to regulate health or sanitation” and answered that question in
the negative on the theory that the Act’s “stated purpose,” as reflected
in its preamble, “is to address concerns regarding the quality of the
service provided to the customers of public water and sewer systems.”
Id. at ___, 777 S.E.2d at 98. Secondly, the Court of Appeals “peruse[d]
the entire... Act to determine whether it is plain and clear that the Act’s
purpose is to regulate health or sanitation” and determined that “there
are no provisions in the Act which ‘contemplate[ ] . . . prioritizing the
[Asheville Water System’s] health or sanitary condition[.]’” Id. at __,
777 S.E.2d at 98 (alterations in original) (quoting Asheville I, 192 N.C.

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App. at 36-37, 665 S.E.2d at 128). On the contrary, the fact that Section
2 of the legislation “allows for the ‘denial or discontinuance of [water
and sewer] service,’ by [a metropolitan water and sewerage district]
based on a customer's non-payment,” id. at ___, 777 S.E.2d at 98 (first
alteration in original) (quoting Ch. 50, sec. 2, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 122
(codified at N.C.G.S. § 162A-85.13(c))), “belies Asheville’s argument that.
the purpose of the Act relates to health and sanitation,” id. at ___, 777
§.E.2d at 98 (citing Asheville I, 192 N.C. App. at 35, 665 S.E.2d at 127). As
a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that the legislation “appear[s]
to prioritize concerns regarding the governance over water and sewer
systems and the quality of the services rendered,” id. at___, 777 S.E.2d
at 98 (citing Ch. 50, sec. 2, 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws at 119-24), rather than
health and sanitation.

In making this determination, the Court of Appeals distinguished
several cases upon which the City relied before finding this Couwrt’s
decision in Reed v. Howerton Engineering Co. controlling with respect
to the health and sanitation issue. Id. at ___, 777 S.E.2d at 98-99. After
noting that our decision in Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 143
S.E. 530 (1928), was “[t]he most compelling of” the cases cited in sup-
port of the City’s position, the Court of Appeals stated that this Court
“base[d] its ruling [in Drysdale] on the fact that the act [was] a local
law” and did not make “any determination regarding which of the 14
‘prohibited subjects’ was implicated by the act” at issue in that case,
City of Asheville, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 777 S.E.2d at 98. In addition, the
Court of Appeals distinguished City of New Bern, 338 N.C. at 437-38,
450 S.E.2d at 739-40, Idol, 233 N.C. at 733, 65 S.E.2d at 315, and Sams
v. Board of County Commissioners, 217 N.C. 284, 285, 7 S.E.2d 540, 541
(1940), on the grounds that they “deal[t] with legislation that empowers
a. political subdivision with authority to enforce health regulations in
a county” while the legislation at issue in this case “does not empower
anyone to enforce health regulations” or “impose any health regula-
tions on the Asheville Water System,” City of Asheville, ____ N.C. App.
at ___, 777 S.E.2d at 99. Moreover, the Court of Appeals pointed to our
decision in Reed, which rejected a challenge to legislation that “created
sewer districts in Buncombe County,” “because the language in the act.
did not suggest [that health or sanitation was] the act’s purpose” and
because the challenged act “merely sought to create political subdivi-
sions through which sanitary sewer service could be provided.” Id. at
—_, 777 §.E.2d at 98-99 (citing Reed, 188 N.C. at 42-45, 123 S.E. at 479-
82). Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that our decision in Lamb
»v. Board of Education, 235 N.C. 377, 70 S.E.2d 201 (1952), which invali-
dated a statute that “imposed a duty on the Randolph County Board of

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Education to provide ‘a sewerage system and an adequate water supply’
for its schools” because it “relat{ed] to health and sanitation” given “that
‘its sole purpose’ was to make sure that school children in Randolph
County had access to ‘healthful conditions’ while at school,” did not
support the City’s position given the directness with which the statute
addressed health and sanitation issues.!4 City of Asheville,__N.C. App.
at___, 777 S.E.2d at 99 (quoting Lamb, 235 N.C. at 379, 70 S.E.2d at 203).
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that its decision was fully consis-
tent with this Court’s precedent concerning the proper application of
Article II, Section 24(a)(1) of the North Carolina Constitution.

The City claims that the Court of Appeals utilized an overly narrow
construction of Article II, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution
that conflicted with its purpose, ignored the distinction between
“(rJelating to” and “regulat{ing],” and employed a “ ‘regulation’ standard”
stemming from our decision in Reed in preference to the approach uti-
lized in our more recent decisions. In addition, the City asserts that the
Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with three lines of decisions from
this Court, including (1) a line of decisions, such as Drysdale, City of
New Bern, and Lamb, that hold that water and sewer services are inher-
ently related to health and sanitation; (2) a line of cases, such as City of
New Bern, Idol, Board of Health v. Board of Commissioners, 220 N.C.
140, 16 S.B.2d 677 (1941), and Sams, that hold that local laws addressing
the governance of health-related services relate to health and sanitation;
and (8) a line of cases, such as City of New Bern and Williams, that
indicate that the “practical effect” of challenged legislation must be con-
sidered in determining whether the act involves one of the prohibited
subjects specified in Article I, Section 24(1). On the other hand, the
State contends that the analysis employed by the Court of Appeals is
firmly grounded in our decision in Reed, which remains good law, and
that Lamb merely establishes that an act involving water and sewer ser-
vices relates to health and sanitation if it does nothing other than to
prescribe the manner in which sewer and water service is provided. In

14. As the City points out, the law at issue in Lamb did not require the County Board
of Education to provide water and sewer services to public school children and to ensure
the provision of healthful conditions for Randolph County school children. Instead, the law
“purport{ed] to limit the power of the County Board of Education to provide for sanitation
and healthful conditions in the schools by means of a sewerage system and an adequate
water supply,” Lamb, 235 N.C. at 379, 70 8.B.2d at 208, by prohibiting the County Board
of Education “from expending ‘in excess of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) under any
one project or contract for the purpose of extending any public or private water or sewer
system so that such extended system will serve any public school in Randolph County’ ”
absent approval by a majority of voters at a special election, id. at 379, 70 S.E.2d at 203
(quoting Act of Apr. 14, 1951, ch. 1075, sec. 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 1079).

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addition, the State contends that the Court of Appeals’ decision, rather
than impermissibly narrowing the term “[rJelating to,” correctly focused
upon the purpose of the Act, which, in the State’s view, was intended to
work a change in the governance of the City’s water system. Once again,
we find the City’s argument persuasive.

In concluding that the legislation is not unconstitutional because it
does not “expressly state[ ] that its purpose is to regulate health or sani-
tation” and because “it is [not] plain and clear,” when viewing the Act as
a whole, that its “purpose is to regulate health or sanitation,” the Court
of Appeals placed principal reliance upon our decision in Reed. City of
Asheville, __ N.C. App. at ____, 777 S.E.2d at 98. In Reed, we considered
whether legislation that established a procedure pursuant to which the
Buncombe County Board of Commissioners could create sanitary dis-
tricts for the purpose of providing water and sewer service in rural areas
of the county was a local act relating to health, sanitation, and the abate-
ment of nuisances. 188 N.C. at 40-41, 44, 123 S.E. at 479-80, 481. Although
this Court upheld the legislation because it was not a local law and did
not relate to health and sanitation because it did “not state that its pur
pose [was] to regulate sanitary matters, or to regulate health or abate
nuisances” and was, instead, intended “to provide districts in Buncombe
County wherein sanitary sewers or sanitary measures may be provided
in rural districts,” id. at 44, 123 S.E. at 481, the second of these two
holdings was substantially limited four years later in Drysdale, 195 N.C.
at 726-28, 143 S.E. at 532-33, in which this Court invalidated a statute
that created a single, special sanitary district in Henderson County as an
impermissible local act.15 In reaching this result, Drysdale distinguished
Reed on the grounds that the legislation at issue in that case “applied
generally to the entire county of Buncombe.” Drysdale, 195 N.C. at 728,
143 S.E. at 533, While the State contends that this Court’s decision in
Town of Kenilworth v. Hyder, 197 N.C. 85, 147 S.E. 736 (1929), treats the
“health and sanitation” holding in Reed “with unambiguous approval,”
we decline to read Hyder that expansively given that it did not utilize the
regulation standard employed in Reed; looked to Reed for the primary
purpose of noting that the relevant sanitary district had been established
pursuant to the legislation that had been challenged in that earlier case;

16, In spite of the fact that the Court of Appeals expressed uncertainty about the
prohibited subject to which the statute at issue in Drysdale “related,” it is clear from our
opinion that the statute in question was deemed to impermissibly relate to health and
sanitation, which is how subsequent opinions of this Court have understood that decision.
Eg., Gaskill v. Costlow, 270 N.C. 686, 688, 155 S.E.2d 148, 149 (1967); Sams, 217 N.C. at
285, 7 S.E.2d at 541.

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and stated, in essence, that, since the legislation at issue in Hyder was
little more than a continuation of the legislation at issue in Reed and
since the legislation at issue in Reed had been upheld by this Court, there
was “no convincing reason” for concluding that the legislation at issue in
Hyder constituted a prohibited local act. Id. at 89, 147 S.E. at 738 (cita-
tions omitted). As a result, Reed provides no basis for a determination
that the legislation does not relate to health and sanitation.

In addition, while the stated purpose of the legislation is undoubt-
edly relevant to the determination of whether a local law violates Article
IL, Section 24(a), our recent precedent clearly indicates that the practi-
cal effect of the legislation is pertinent to, and perhaps determinative of,
the required constitutional inquiry. E.g., Williams, 357 N.C. at 189, 581
S.E.2d at 429 (concluding that, while “the record demonstrates that . . .
the intent of the enabling legislation and the Ordinance [enacted pursu-
ant to the authority granted by the challenged legislation] is to prohibit
discrimination in the workplace, the effect of these enactments is to
govern the labor practices of [certain businesses] in Orange County”);
City of New Bern, 338 N.C. at 434-42, 450 S.E.2d at 737-42 (concluding
that the challenged legislation, which shifted the responsibility for
enforcing the State Building Code with respect to certain buildings from
the City of New Bern to Craven County, constituted unconstitutional
local acts related to health and sanitation). As a result, the approach
adopted by the Court of Appeals for determining whether the legislation
constituted an impermissible local law relating to health and sanitation
departs from that required by our precedents, properly understood.

Admittedly, this Court has not, to date, clearly indicated when a local
act does and does not “relate” to a prohibited subject for purposes of
Article II, Section 24. Although “related” can be defined as “[c]onnected
in some way; having a relationship to or with something else,” Related, .
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), we cannot conclude that the
existence of a tangential or incidental connection between the chal-
Jenged legislation and health and sanitation is sufficient to trigger the
prohibition worked by Article II, Section 24(1)(a) of the North Carolina
Constitution. On the other hand, we recognize that, as a purely textual
matter, “relating to” is not equivalent to “regulating.” Compare N.C.
Const. art. II, § 24(1)(a) (“[rlelating to health, sanitation, and the abate-
ment of nuisances”), with id. art. II, § 24(1)(j) (“[rlegulating labor, trade,
mining, or manufacturing”); see generally Williams, 357 N.C. at 189, 581
S.E.2d at 429 (defining “regulate” as “ ‘to govern or direct according to
rule[,] . . . to bring under [ ] control of law or constituted authority’ ”
(quoting State v. Gulledge, 208 N.C. 204, 208, 179 S.E. 883, 886 (1935)

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(ellipsis in original), (quoted in Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C.
549, 559, 359 S.E.2d 792, 798 (1987) (applying that definition of “regu-
Jate” to Article II, Section 24(1)())). As a result, in light of the relevant
constitutional language and the import of our prior decisions interpret-
ing and applying the prohibition set out in Article II, Section 24 of the
North Carolina Constitution, the ultimate issue that we must decide in
this case is whether, in light of its stated purpose and practical effect, the
legislation has a material, but not exclusive or predominant, connection
to issues involving health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances.

In view of the fact that “[p]ure water is the very life of a people,”
Drysdale, 195 N.C. at 732, 143 S.E. at 535, and the broad interpretation
that this Court has given to Article II, Section 24(1)(a) since Reed,16
we have no hesitation in concluding that the legislation impermissibly
relates to health and sanitation. As an initial matter, we note that the
stated purpose of the legislation is to “provide reliable, cost-effective,
high-quality water and sewer services” to affected customers. Ch. 50,
pmbl., 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 118. Although the State contends that the
purpose-related language contained in the legislation implicates issues
such as customer service rather than the healthfulness of the water
that is provided to customers for cooking, cleaning, and personal con-
sumption, the substantiality of the relationship between the purity of
the water that customers receive and the quality of service provided to
water customers is beyond serious dispute. Thus, the stated purpose for
the enactment of the legislation demonstrates the existence of a mate-
rial connection between the reason for its enactment and issues involv-
ing public health and sanitation.17

16. The only time that this Court has rejected a claim that a local law impermissibly
“related to” health and sanitation after Reed occurred in Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc.
v. City of Greensboro, 324 N.C. 499, 380 S.E.2d 107 (1989), in which we held that a local
act obligating the City of Greensboro to provide solid waste collection to newly annexed
areas did not relate to health and sanitation given that the “effect” of the local act was to
make a general law of statewide application applicable to an annexation being effectuated
by the adoption of a local act and given that the challenged legislation did not “subject the
annexed area to a different treatment than” would have been the case if Greensboro “had
annexed the atea under the general annexation law.” Id. at 505, 380 S.H.2d at 111.

17. Although the Court of Appeals reasoned, in reliance upon its 2008 decision in
Asheville I, that a provision in the legislation at issue here allowing for the discontinuance
of water and sewer services by a metropolitan water and sewerage district for nonpay-
ment “belies (the City’s] argument that the purpose of the [legislation] relates to health
and sanitation,” City of Asheville, __N.C. App. at___, 777 S.E.2d at 98, we do not find this
argument persuasive. A careful analysis of the Sullivan Acts reveals that each of them was
intended to address economic, rather than health and sanitation, issues given that they
prohibited the City from charging higher extraterritorial rates, required the City to place

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An analysis of the practical effect of the legislation reinforces the
strength of the connection between the issues addressed in the legis-
lation and public health and sanitation. As an initial matter, we note
that the City, in the course of operating its water system, is required to
ensure compliance with the North Carolina Drinking Water Act, N.C.G.S.
§§ 180A-311 to -329 (2015), which appears in a chapter of the General
Statutes entitled “Public Health” (Chapter 130A) and which is intended
“to regulate water systems within the State which supply drinking
water that may affect the public health,” id. § 130A-312. In view of the
fact that the City’s water system is a “public water system” for purposes
of the North Carolina Drinking Water Act, see id. § 180A-313(10), the
City must show compliance with the North Carolina Drinking Water
Act and related regulations in order to obtain approval from the North
Carolina Department of Environmental Quality for the construction,
alteration, and additions to water system facilities, see id. § 130A-317
(c), (d); Asheville, N.C., Code of Ordinances, ch. 21 (2016). In addition,
the City is required to ensure that its water treatment operators are certi-
fied pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 90A-20 to 904-32 in order to “protect the pub-
lic health and to conserve and protect the water resources of the State.”
N.C.G.S. § 90A-20 (2015). Finally, the City is required to provide annual .
reports concerning the source and quality of the water that it provides to
its customers, including the existence of any identified risks to human
health stemming from consumption of the water provided by its system.
See 40 C.ER. §§ 141.151-.155 (2016). As a result, consistent with its stated
purpose, the legislation has material health and sanitation effects.

The fact that the legislation changes the governance of the City’s
water system does not operate to remove it from the prohibition worked
by Article II, Section 24(1)(a) of the North Carolina Constitution. As
we have clearly held, a local act that shifts responsibility for enforcing
health and safety regulations from one entity to another clearly relates
to health and sanitation. E.g., City of New Bern, 338 N.C. at 440, 450
S.E.2d at 741 (invalidating local legislation that shifted responsibility
for enforcing the State Building Code with respect to certain buildings
from the City of New Bern to Craven County given that “the Building
Code Council's stated purposes for the different inspections under
the Code evince an intent to protect the health of the general public,”

funds derived from its water system in a separate account, and precluded the City from
transferring monies derived from the operation of the water system to any fund that was
not related to the operation and maintenance of the system. Asheville I, 192 N.C. App. at
36-39, 665 S.H.2d at 127-30.

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that “[t]he Code regulates plumbing in an effort to maintain sanitary
conditions,” and that “enforcement of the fire regulations protects lives
from fire, explosion and health hazards”); see also Idol, 233 N.C. at 733,
65 S.E.2d at 315 (finding it clear “beyond peradventure” that legislation
authorizing the consolidation of the Winston-Salem and Forsyth County
health departments and providing for the appointment of a joint city-
county board for administering-the public health laws in the affected
jurisdictions was a prohibited “local act relating to health”); Bd. of Health
v. Ba. of Comm'rs, 220 N.C. at 143, 16 S.E.2d at 679 (emphasizing this
Court’s “commit[ment] to the proposition that a law affecting the selec-
tion of officers to whom is given the duty of administering the health
Jaws is a law ‘relating to health’ ” in the course of invalidating a local law
requiring that the county health officer appointed by the county board of
health be confirmed by the Nash County Board of Commissioners) (cit-
ing Sams, 217 N.C. 284, 7 S.E.2d at 540)). As a result, given the fact that
the legislation works a change in the governance of the City’s water sys-
tem, our prior decisions reinforce, rather than undercut, our conclusion
that the legislation impermissibly relates to health and sanitation in vio-
lation of Article II, Section 24(1)(a) of the North Carolina Constitution.

As the State and our dissenting colleague note, Article VII, Section 1
of the North Carolina Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that

[t]he General Assembly shall provide for the organi-
zation and government and the fixing of boundaries of
counties, cities and towns, and other governmental sub-
divisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this
Constitution, may give such powers and duties to coun-
ties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivi-
sions as it may deem advisable.

N.C. Const. art. VII, § 1. Although North Carolina is not a home rule
jurisdiction, and although our constitution, consistent with the language
of this provision, gives the General Assembly exceedingly broad author-
ity over the “powers and duties” delegated to local governments, id.,
that authority is subject to limitations imposed by other constitutional
provisions.}8 Aside from the fact that the legislation does not actually

18. The legislation cannot be properly understood as nothing more than an exercise of
the General Assembly’s plenary authority to create new units of local government. Instead
of simply creating a new unit of local government, the General Assembly took a number of
actions in the legislation, including creating the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage District
through a repurposing of the Metropolitan Sewerage District and effectively eliminating
the City’s ability to operate its existing water system. In similar instances, such as Idol,

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[869 N.C. 80 (2016)]

prohibit the City from operating a water system, the General Assembly's
authority over the “powers and duties” delegated to local governments
is expressly subject to the limitations set out in Article II, Section 24,
which “is the fundamental law of the State and may not be ignored.”
High Point Surplus Co., 264 N.C. at 656, 142 8.E.2d at 702. As a result,19
for all these reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and
instruct that court to reinstate the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the City.20

REVERSED.

Justice NEWBY dissenting.

Throughout our history, when communities needed a governmental
provision of water and sewer services, the General Assembly, by local
act, would grant a local government unit the authority to act. Here the
majority's holding ignores this historic constitutional understanding of
the plenary authority of the General Assembly to oversee local govern-
ment subdivisions and create new ones when necessary. Our history and.
our coristitution recognize this plenary authority is necessary because
the General Assembly is uniquely situated to oversee local government

238 N.C, at 783, 65 S.E.2d at 315, which involved legislation creating a joint city-county
board of health, and Sams, 217 N.C. at 285-86, 7 S.E.2d at 541, which involved legislation
creating a county board of health, this Court invalidated the challenged legislation as
impermissible local laws relating to health and sanitation even though the legislation at
issue in those cases involved the creation of new units of local government like the one
at issue here.

19. In view of our conclusion that the legislation is an unconstitutional local law
relating to health and sanitation, we need not address the City’s challenge to the Court of
Appeals’ holding that the legislation did not result in a compensable taking and express no
opinion’concerning its correctness.

20, Although the General Assembly has, in the past, enacted legislation authorizing
various units of local government to operate systems for the provision of water service, we
do not believe that our decision in this case in any way impairs the ability of the affected
units of local government to operate their water systems in a lawful manner. Aside from
the fact that we do not know whether such legislation could be properly characterized
as local, rather than general, in nature or relates to health and sanitation under the test
that we have deemed appropriate in this case and the fact that the legislation in question
appears to have allowed the initial provision of water service rather than requiring the
reallocation of the responsibility for providing water and sewer service from one entity of
local government to another, the current effect of any such legislation would be to allow
the affected unit of local government to do what has otherwise been authorized by general
legislation, an outcome which this Court held did not result in a violation of Article I,
Section 24 in Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, 324 N.C. at 502, 380 8.B.2d at 111,

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and address changing needs. Now the Court brings uncertainty as to
whether there are any lawfully established water or sewer districts in
North Carolina. Even assuming the legislation at issue is a local act, the
legislature first gave the City of Asheville, and countless other munici-
palities across our State, its water district by local act. If it is unlawful
to modify that district by local act, then it was unlawful to establish it by
local act initially. The majority's complicated analysis casts this Court
in the ill-suited role of legislating which local governmental authorities
shall govern various water and sewer services. Because the General
Assembly exercises its plenary authority in creating a water and sewer
district, its action is constitutional. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

This Court presumes that legislation is constitutional absent an
express constitutional prohibition on the legislature’s otherwise ple-
nary police power and until its unconstitutionality is plainly and clearly
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., Hart v. State, 368
N.C. 122, 126, 774 S.B.2d 281, 284 (2015); see also Kornegay v. City of
Goldsboro, 180 N.C. 441, 445, 105 S.E. 187, 189 (1920) (“[C]ourts always
presume[,] in the first place[,] that the act is constitutional . . . [and] that
the Legislature acted with integrity and with an honest purpose to keep
within the restrictions and limitations laid down by the Constitution.”
(quoting Lowery v. Bd. of Graded Sch. Trs., 140 N.C. 33, 40, 52 S.E.
267, 269 (1905)). The presumptive constitutional power of the General
Assembly to act is consistent with the principle that a restriction on
the General Assembly is in fact a restriction on the people. See Baker
v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 336-37, 410 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1991). Thus, this
Court is powerless to review an act of the people through the General
Assembly for its political propriety so long as it reasonably relates to
the need sought to be remedied and falls within legislative discretion.
Greensboro-High Point Airport Auth. v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 8, 36
S.E.2d 803, 809 (1946).

The General Assembly has long enjoyed plenary power to create
political subdivisions of local government,! and this authority has been

1. Before its express inclusion in the 1868 state constitution, this Court recognized
the General Assembly's historic duty and plenary power to create and abolish political
subdivisions of local government. See, ¢.g., White v. Comm'rs of Chowan Cty., 90 N.C.
437, 438 (1884) (County subdivisions “are indeed a necessary part and parcel of the sub-
ordinate instrumentalities employed in carrying out the general policy of the state in the
administration of government... [and their functions] may be enlarged, abridged, or modi-
fied at the will of the legislature . . . [as] they are intended only to be essential aids and
political agencies.”); see also Lilly v. Taylor, 88 N.C. 489, 494-95 (1883) (affirming the
legislature’s creation and subsequent repeal of the charter of the Town of Fayetteville);
Milis v. Williams, 38 N.C. (11 Ired,) 558, 563-64 (1850) (upholding the legislature's “power
to create and abolish” Poll County).

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reaffirmed with each adoption of our state constitution. N.C. Const. art.
VIL, § 1; N.C. Const. of 1868, Amends. of 1875, art. VII, § 14 (“The General
Assembly shall have full power by statute to modify, change, or abrogate
any and all of the provisions” pertaining to municipalities.); id., art. VII,
§ 4 (“It shall be the duty of the Legislature to provide for the organiza-
tion of cities, towns and incorporated villages . . . .”); see also Report of
the North Carolina State Constitution Study Commission 143 (1968)
[hereinafter 1968 Constitution Commission Report] (recognizing “the
General Assembly|’s] full power to revise or abolish the form and pow-
ers of county and township governments”).

The General Assembly creates governmental subdivisions to facili-
tate local self-government, dividing governing authority between local
governmental units that may otherwise compete for jurisdiction. See
Hailey v. City of Winston-Salem, 196 N.C. 17, 22, 144 S.E. 377, 380 (1928)
(‘When a new governmental agency is established by the Legislature,
such as a municipal corporation, it takes control of all the affairs over
which it is given authority, to the exclusion of other governmental agen-
cies.”). Local governmental subdivisions are “parts and parcels of the
State, organized for the convenience of local self-government,” People
ex rel. Van Bokkelen v. Canaday, 73 N.C. 198, 222 (1875), which the
General Assembly may create, organize, abolish, arrange, and rearrange
to meet local needs. See also Town of Boone v. State,___N.C.__,__,
__.S.E.2d__,____ (2016) (No. 93A15-2); Holmes v. City of Fayetteville,
197 N.C. 740, 746, 150 S.E. 624, 627 (1929) (recognizing municipalities as
“mere instrumentalities of the State for the more convenient administra-
tion of local government”), appeal dismissed per curiam, 281 U.S. 700,
50S. Ct. 353, 74 L. Ed. 1126 (1930).

Moreover, the legislature can create “separate corporate agenc[ies]
to serve [ ] particular governmental purposes” and “call upon them to
perform such functions as the Legislature may deem best.” Johnson,
226 N.C. at 9-10, 36 S.E.2d at 809 (citing Brockenbrough v. Bd. of Water
Comm'rs, 134 N.C. 1, 17, 46 S.E. 28, 33 (1903)). “A municipality acting
in its governmental capacity is an agency of the State for the better
government of those residing within its corporate limits .. . .” Candler
v. City of Asheville, 247 N.C. 398, 406, 101 S.E.2d 470, 476 (1958); see
also McCormac v. Commr’s of Robeson Cty., 90 N.C. 441, 444 (1884)
(“[I]t is within the power and is the province of the legislature to. . .
invest the inhabitants . . . with corporate functions, more or less exten-
sive and varied in their character, for the purposes of government... .”).
The General Assembly is the political body designated to oversee local
government and to make necessary modifications as local conditions

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change. In organizing local government, and making necessary modifi-
cations, the General Assembly must weigh competing local interests and
needs. Ultimately, the legislature alone must determine the propriety of
changes in local government by exercising its political judgment.

This broad historic power of the General Assembly, acknowledged
by our case law, has remained unchanged and is now expressly incor
porated into Article VII, Section 1 of our current constitution, adopted
in 1971:

The General Assembly shall provide for the organi-
zation and government and the fixing of boundaries of
counties, cities and towns, and other governmental sub-
divisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this
Constitution, may give such powers and duties to coun-
ties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivi-
sions as it may deem advisable.

N.C. Const. art. VIL, § 1. As such, Article VI, Section 1 “is not a delega-
tion of power to the General Assembly” but “a general description” and
“merely a recognition” of “the General Assembly’s power to provide for
the organization and powers of local government,” 1968 Constitution
Commission Report 85, as affirmed in the 1875 amendment, which
“gave the General Assembly full power to revise or abolish the form and
powers of county and township governments,” id. at 143.

By its plain meaning, the text of the first clause, “[t]he General
Assembly shall provide for the organization and government and the fix-
ing of boundaries of counties, cities and towns, and other governmental
subdivisions,” mandates the statutory creation and structuring of local
governmental subdivisions. See State v. Webb, 358 N.C. 92, 97, 591 S.B.2d
505, 510-11 (2004) (The constitution is construed for its plain meaning.);
see also Dunn v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 129, 184, 418 S.E.2d 645,
648 (1992) (Ordinary rules of grammar apply.). “Organization” means
something “put together into an orderly, functional, [and] structured
whole.” Organize, The American Heritage Dictionary 926 (new coll.
ed. 1979). “Government” is defined as “[t]he act or process of governing;
especially, the administration of public policy in a political unit; political
jurisdiction.” Government, id. at 570. The “fixing of boundaries” means
establishing borders or limits. See Fia and Boundary, id. at 497, 156.
“Other governmental subdivisions” includes a “special-purpose district
or authority,” Local Government, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014), such as an administrative water district, operated in compliance
with principles, rules, and regulations, see id. (listing examples of local

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[869 N.C. 80 (2016)}

government units). Thus, the plain meaning of the phrase “organization
and government and the fixing of boundaries” embraces the creation,
expansion, retraction, and dissolution of all forms of local government,
including “other governmental subdivisions.”2

Our case law has historically treated “other governmental subdivi-
sions” similarly to traditional political subdivisions. See Town of Saluda
v. Polk County, 207 N.C. 180, 186, 176 S.E. 298, 301-02 (1934) (“[T]he
legislature alone can create, directly or indirectly, counties, townships,
school districts, road districts, and the like subdivisions, . . . to effectuate
the purposes of the government... . Such organizations are intended to
be instrumentalities and agencies employed to aid in the administration
of the government, and are always under the control of the power that
created them, unless the same shall be restricted by some constitutional
limitation.” (quoting McCormac, 90 N.C. at 444-45); see also N.C.G.S.
§ 162A-65 (2015) (defining “political subdivision” for purposes of water
and sewer authorities as “any county, city, town, incorporated village,
sanitary district, water district, sewer district, special purpose district or
other political subdivision,” id. § 162A-65(a)(8), and “governing body” as
“the board, commission, council or other body . . . of a political subdivi-
sion in which the general legislative powers . . . of such political subdi-
vision are exercised,” id. § 162A-65(a)(6)). As such, the text of the first
clause of Article VI, Section 1 contemplates the legislative creation of
Jocal governmental subdivisions, along with counties, cities, and towns,
without constitutional limitation.

The second clause of Article VI, Section 1 concerns the author-
ity of the General Assembly to confer specific “powers and duties” on.
local governmental units. Unlike the first clause, the second clause in
Article VIL, Section 1 includes an express limitation; namely, it prohibits
any legislative delegation of “powers and duties” to local governmen-
tal units that is “otherwise prohibited by this Constitution.” Only under
the second clause, then, is the General Assembly's authority over local
governments expressly subject to limitations imposed by other constitu-
tional provisions, including the constraints on local acts listed in Article
I, Section 24 first adopted in 1917. For example, under the Article I,
Section 24 prohibition on certain local acts, the General Assembly can-
not grant to one county the power to enact local employment legislation,

2. See Town of Boone, N.C. at__, _ SE.2d at __ (Ervin, J., concurring in
result) (“[T]he plain language in which the provision in question is couched suggests to me
that ‘organization and government’ refers to the creation of units of local government and
the manner in which those units of local government are governed . ...”).

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[869 N.C. 80 (2016)]

see Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 191, 581
§.E.2d 415, 430 (2003), or remove a city’s power to enforce certain ordi-
nances regarding specific properties within its municipal limits, see City
of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven Cty. Bd. of Educ., 338 N.C. 430, 442,
450 S.E.2d 735, 742 (1994).3 See also Town of Boone,__N.C.at__,___
S.E.2dat___.

The question before this Court is whether the legislation at issue,
Act of May 2, 2013, ch. 50, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 118 (the District Act),
which creates a new regional district to govern water and sewer ser-
vices within certain areas of Buncombe and Henderson Counties, is an
exercise of the General Assembly's plenary authority to “provide for the
organization and government and the fixing of boundaries” of local gov-
ernment under the first clause of Article VII, Section 1 or whether it
confers specific “powers and duties” on a local governmental unit under
the second clause. If the General Assembly’s action creating the regional
water and sewer district arises under its plenary authority recognized in
the first clause of Article VI, Section 1, the analysis ends, and there is
no need to address the application of the second clause and any restric-
tions imposed by Article II, Section 24.

As admitted by the City, the District Act creates a new political sub-
division. Moreover, the statutory text of the District Act provides for

3. This approach of conducting an Article I, Section 24 analysis only when the chal-
lenged statute specifies a specific “power” or “duty” is consistent with our prior decisions.
In Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, the plaintifis challenged a local
act annexing certain land to the City of Greensboro. 324 N.C. 499, 501, 380 S.E.2d 107, 108
(1989). While the annexation clearly arose under the authority to “fix the boundaries of
Cities” acknowledged in Article VII, Section 1, éd. at 503, 380 S.B.2d at 110, because the
act also contained a specific “provision regarding solid waste collection,” the plaintiffs
argued the statute violated Article Il, Section 24, id. at 504, 380 $.H.2d at 110, Because the
statute specified a particular “power,” this Court conducted an analysis under- Article IL.
Id. at 504-06, 380 8.E.2d at 110-11. When viewed as a whole, the explicit grant of power
was a “small part” of the legislation, id. at 506, 380 S.E.2d at 111, and this Court concluded
that “[t]he provision . . . regarding solid waste collection” did not violate Article II, Section
24, id. at 506, 380 S.B.2d at 111. See also, e.g., Lamb v. Bd. of Bduc., 235 N.C. 877, 379-80,
70 S.B.2d 201, 208 (1952) (concluding that an act expressly restricting certain express
powers of the Randolph County Board of Education violated the Article II limitations on
local acts); Idol . Street, 233 N.C. 730, 788, 65 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1951) (concluding that an
act that “confer[red] power upon the Board of Aldermen of the City of Winston-Salem and
the Board of Commissioners of Forsyth County” to, inter alia, “name a joint city-county
board of health,” which varied from general law, “[wa]s a local act relating to health” in
violation of the Article Il imitations on local acts); Bd. of Health v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 220
N.C. 140, 143-44, 16 S.B.2d 677, 678-79 (1941) (concluding that an act removing from the
Nash County Board of Health the power to appoint a county health officer was a local act
relating to health in violation of the Article II limitations on local acts).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 80 (2016)]

the organization and government of that new political subdivision. The
stated purpose of the District Act is to enhance services to users by
creating a regional water and sewer system to “provide reliable, cost-
effective, high-quality water and sewer services.” Ch. 50, 2013 N.C. Sess.
Laws at 118 (emphasis added). Creating this type of local governmental
subdivision to enhance water and sewer services falls squarely within
the legislature’s plenary power as described in the first clause of Article
VII, Section 1, and thus the District Act is constitutional.

Initially established by local act in 1883, the City’s public water “sys-
tem currently serves approximately 124,000 customers, some 48,000
of whom are located outside Asheville’s city limits” in portions of
Buncombe and Henderson Counties. See N.C.G.S. § 160A-312(a) (2015)
(authorizing a city to operate a water supply and distribution system
inside and “outside its corporate limits, within reasonable limitations”).
In 2013 the General Assembly created a new local governmental sub-
division to provide regional water and sewer services to the City and
those portions of Buncombe and Henderson Counties. Ch. 50, 2013 N.C.
Sess. Laws 118 (captioned “An Act to Promote the Provision of Regional
Water and Sewer Services by Transferring Ownership and Operation of
Certain Public Water and Sewer Systems to a Metropolitan Water and
Sewerage District.”).

The “transfer provision” regionalizes water and sewer services
by combining the City’s public water system with the Metropolitan
Sewerage District operating in the same county to form a new govern-
mental subdivision. The transfer provision provides in part: “All assets,
real and personal, tangible and intangible, and all outstanding debts . . .
are by operation of law transferred to the metropolitan sewerage dis-
trict operating in the county where the public water system is located,
to be operated as a Metropolitan Water and Sewerage District... .” Id.,
sec. l(a), at 118. All assets and all outstanding debts of both the City’s
water system and the Metropolitan Sewerage District transfer to the
new regional district. Id., sec. 1(b)-(), (f), at 119.4 The transfer between
the City and the Metropolitan Sewerage District occurs by operation of |
law® because both systems operate in the same county and meet certain
criteria. See id., sec. 1(a)-(£), at 118-19.

4, “All necessary permits for operation” are also “transferred to the Metropolitan
Water and Sewerage District . . . to ensure that no current and paid customer loses services
due to the regionalization of water and sewer services.” Id., sec. 1(e), at 119. Moreover,
the General Trust Indenture, which governs the bonds issued and secured by a pledge
of “[aJll Net Revenues of the Water System,” contemplates a transfer “to another politi-
cal subdivision or public agency in the State authorized by law to own and operate such
systems.” The trustee allows a transfer “if such political subdivision . . . assumes all of the

IN THE SUPREME COURT 113

CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 80 (2016)]

By its terms and stated purpose, the District Act creates a regional
governance solution for water and sewer systems and defines a “metro-
politan water and sewerage district” as a political subdivision and deems
it “a public body . . . exercising . . . essential governmental functions to
provide for the preservation and promotion of the public health and wel-
fare.” Id., sec. 2, at 121.6 The newly created regional district combines
the authority of the previously separate water and sewer districts “[t]o
do all acts and things necessary or convenient to carry out the powers
granted by this Article.” Id. at 122. Overall, the regional district operates
with the same power as a city in enforcing its ordinances, and the dis-
trict board may not privatize its water and sewer services. See id.

Likewise, the District Act amends N.C.G.S. § 1624-85.3 to provide
for the organization and governance of metropolitan water and sew-
erage districts like the one created here, including a governing board
with regional representation. Id. at 120-21.” The District Act requires

obligations of the City under this Indenture” and if the transfer does not produce a “mate-
rial adverse effect on the ability of the Water System to produce Revenues,” on the bond
rating, or with regard to tax treatment. These revenue bonds do not rely upon the City’s
taxing power. See also Ch. 50, sec. 2, 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws, at 122 (requiring that the rates
and fees “pledged to the payment of revenue bonds’ be sufficient to maintain the system).

5. Governing bodies of other political subdivisions may establish regional systems
by joint resolution. See Ch. 50, sec, 6.5, 2013 N.C. Sess, Laws, at 125 (requiring consent
from county commissioners and all municipal governing boards affected before creation
of district).

6. The District Act amended the definitions of “unit of local government” and
“tmunicipality” to include “metropolitan water and sewerage districts” and added “metro-
politan water and sewerage districts” to the list of political subdivisions that may borrow
money and issue bonds. Ch. 50, sec. 2, 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws, at 119-20; see also N.C.G.S.
§ 159-44(4) (2015) (defining a “unit of local government”); id. § 159-48(¢) (2015) (borrow-
ing and bond issuing); éd. § 159-81(1) (2015) (defining a “municipality”); id. § 159-81(8)
(2015) (revenue-bond issuing).

7. Generally, the District Act requires that the apportionment of members on the
district board be representative of the area serviced while considering population. See
Ch. 60, sec. 2, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws, at 120 (two from each county served); id. (one from
each municipality served); id. (two from each municipality served with a population
greater than 200,000); id. (one from each county served with a population greater than
200,000); id. (“One individual from a list submitted by the governing body of a county in
which a watershed serving the district board is located in a municipality not served by the
district .. ..”); éd., at 121 (“One individual by the governing body of any elected water
and sewer district wholly contained within the boundaries of the district.”). “[T]he district
board may expand to include other political subdivisions i” the additional political subdi-
vision “become[s] a participant in the district board.” Id.

‘The District Act also sets terms for members and provides procedures for meetings,
removal of members, filing vacancies on the district board, and the election and compen
sation of officers. Jd. Until all appointments are made, the district board of the County's

IN THE SUPREME COURT

CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 80 (2016)]

the regional district board to work with local municipalities under its
jurisdiction for the benefit of the district.$ The district board performs
administrative tasks such as fixing rates, fees, rents, and other charges
for the services furnished or to be furnished by the district water and
sewer system. See id. at 122 (“Such rates, fees, and charges may not
apply differing treatment within and outside the corporate limits of any
city or county within the jurisdiction of the district board” and “shall not
be subject to supervision or regulation by any . . . agency of the State or
of any political subdivision.”). In sum, as admitted by the City, the act,
creates a new “governmental subdivision” and provides for the “organi-
zation and government” thereof.

The broad constitutional authority acknowledged in the text of
the first clause of Article VII, Section 1 clearly affirms the legislature’s
ability to create and organize political subdivisions to meet changing
needs, resolve disputes between local governments, and provide new
governance solutions. The General Assembly's constitutional author
ity to do so remains even if its solution combines, divides, or regional-
izes the political power of preexisting subdivisions that once governed
local issues. Here it seems the General Assembly, in its discretion and
in accordance with the District Act’s stated purpose, finds regional gov-
ernance over certain water systems will ensure high quality water and
sewer services,

The role of the legislature is to balance the weight to be
afforded to disparate interests and to forge a workable
compromise among those interests. The role of the Court
is not to sit as a super legislature and second-guess the
balance struck by the elected officials . . . [but] only to
measure the balance struck by the legislature against the
required minimum standards of the constitution.

Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 491, 340 S.E.2d 720, 731 (1986). The
General Assembly's policy decision here falls within legislative discre-
tion and, as an exercise of legislative authority under the first clause of

metropolitan sewerage district “shall function as the district board of the Metropolitan
Water and Sewerage District.” Id., sec. 1(4), at 119.

8. The District Act outlines the permissible authority for the local governing bodies
within the regional district's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ch. 50, sec. 2, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws, at
122-23 (regulating the transfer of jurisdiction from smaller systems to the regional district
system for the benefit of the district, contracting with the district, revising rates or collect-
ing taxes to pay obligations to the district, and submitting to its electors agreements with
the district). When possible, the district board must coordinate with the local municipali-
ties when constructing any system improvements. Id. at 123.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 115

CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 80 (2016)]

Article VII, Section 1, does not implicate the constitutional constraints
described in Article II, Section 24.

Assuming the District Act is a local act? as held by the majority,
notably the legislature first created a water district for Asheville by local
act.19 When creating and organizing political subdivisions under its ple-
nary power as recognized in the first clause of Article VII, Section 1, the

9. The statutory definition of “local act” in reference to cities and towns “means an
act of the General Assembly applying to one or more specific cities by name, or to all cities
within one or more specifically named counties.” N.C.G.S, § 160A-1(6) (2016). The District
Act does not refer to the City of Asheville by name.

10. In 1883 the General Assembly appointed the Asheville Committee on Permanent
Improvements as trustee to oversee a $20,000 fund provided for “water supply.” Act of
Feb. 28, 1883, ch. 66, sec. 2, 1883 N.C. Priv. [Sess.] Laws 752, 753. The legislature followed
suit with other municipalities and subdivisions. E.g., Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 219, sec.
105, 1889 N.C. Priv. [Sess.] Laws 899, 924 (appointing the Board of Alderman for City of
Greensboro to manage and regulate “water-works” which “may be established, or land on
which water-pipes are run to and from said works”); id. sec. 107, at 924 (same for “system
of sewerage”); Act of Dec. 20, 1815, ch. XVI, sec. Il, 1815 N.C. [Sess.] Laws 18, 18 (empow-
ering and appointing City of Charlotte board of commissioners to “erect pumps or wells”).

The General Assembly revised the charter of the City of Asheville to provide for its
water authority in 1901, conferring upon the Board of Alderman the power “[t]o provide a
sufficient supply of pure water for said city, fix charges and rates therefor, and prescribe
rules and regulations governing the use of same,” Act of Mar. 13, 1901, ch. 100, sec. 80,
1901 N.C. Priv. (Sess.] Laws 222, 232, which included “construction, operation, repair and
control of such water-works,” id., sec. 66, at 259. The legislature designated a separate
subdivision of government, the Board of Health, to take “general charge and supervision
of . . . the healthfulness of the water supply.” Jd., sec. 32, at 234. In 1923 the General
Assembly revised the charter and restructured the local government, empowering a Board
of Commissioners to “build and construct” waterworks and sewerage systems, Act of Jan.
26, 1923, ch. 16, sec. 306, 1923 N.C. Priv. [Sess.] Laws 88, 164, both within the City limits
and beyond, éd., sec. 358, at 167, as well as a Commissioner of Public Works to supervise
the systems, id., sec. 25, at 96. :

In 1981 the legislature revised the charter again, which remains the charter today,
subject to various amendments. Act of Mar. 30, 1981, ch. 121, 1981 N.C. Priv. [Sess.] Laws
154, Under this charter, the General Assembly created a Department of Finance to take
charge of “the supervision and control of and over the water system and supply,” éd., sec.
32, at 161, and to “collect for the use of water,” id. at 163; see also Act of Apr. 6, 1951, ch.
618, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 554, 554 (allowing “the City of Asheville, Buncombe County and
political units therein to contract” for the water system).

In 1981 the legislature expressly repealed these charter provisions related to the
supervision and control of the water system, Act of Feb. 16, 1981, ch. 27, sec. 8, 1981 N.C.
Sess. Laws 13, 14, removing control from the Department of Finance and appointing a new
political subdivision to handle the authority. In 1981 the City and Buncombe County then
entered into a comprehensive local agreement that established, inter alia, an agency to
administer the jointly-owned water supply and distribution systems.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 80 (2016)]

legislature often must address the local needs and competing political
pressures of a geographic area. See Town of Boone, ___ N.C. at __,
____S.E.2d at __. If, as the majority declares, creating and organizing a
new water and sewer district is unconstitutional, would not the original
act establishing Asheville’s water district also be unconstitutional? The
need to organize water and/or sewer systems arose in localities across
the state at different times. The General Assembly authorized various
units of local government or created new ones to meet those needs as
they arose or changed. Under the majority's reasoning, all of the locally
legislated and similarly empowered districts would have been illegally
created.1! If the creation of a local governmental subdivision, as in
the District Act, is scrutinized under the second clause of Article VII,
Section 1, all such water and sewer districts would receive the same
review if challenged, and would be struck down as prohibited local acts.
Moreover, the majority, in contravention of our heightened standard for
reviewing the constitutionality of legislative acts, presumes the legis-
lature enacted the District Act in bad faith and that its enactment will
result in poor local governance. See Kornegay, 180 N.C. at 445, 105 S.E.

at 189 (presuming “the Legislature acted with integrity and with an hon-
est purpose to keep within the restrictions and limitations laid down by
the Constitution”).

The General Assembly is the only body politic with the oversight
and authority to create and organize local political subdivisions in its
discretion. It alone has the ability to resolve local governance disputes
such as those undergirding the litigious past of the water system at issue.

Spanning almost a century, legislation and litigation chronicle the
strained relationship between the City of Asheville’s water system

LL. See, e.g., Act of June 29, 1967, ch. 1019, sec. 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1463, 1463
(permitting the Town of Taylorsville and Alexander County to purchase a water system);
Act of Apr. 5, 1951, ch. 550, secs. 1, 2, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 461, 461 (appointing Town
of Dunn as new entity to acquire, build, manage, and operate the “water and sewerage
system” for the “unincorporated village of Erwin in Harnett County”); Act of Apr. 5, 1947,
ch. 1040, sec. 3, 1947 N.C. Sess. Laws 1519, 1520 (creating a “Board of Power, Water and
Airport Commissioners of the City of High Point... . to construct, to improve, [and] to bet-
ter... [the] water system”); Act of Jan. 30, 1945, ch. 24, sec. 1, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 37, 37
(moving all water-related property from the Board of Water Commissioners to the City of .
Charlotte, a separate corporation); Act of Jan. 18, 1939, ch. 1, sec. 1, 1939 N.C. Pub.-Local
[Sess.] Laws 11, 11 (establishing “sanitary districts” in Forsyth County); Act of May 8, 1935,
ch. 418, sec. 1, 1935 N.C. Pub-Local [Sess.] Laws 378, 378 (establishing joint water and
sewer systems for Haywood County municipalities); Act of Jan. 26, 1923, ch. 1, sec. 1, 1923
N.C. Priv. [Sess.] Laws 1, 1 (extending the “waterworks system’ for the Town of Lenoir);
Act of Jan. 1, 1917, ch. 71, sec. 2, 1917 N.C. Priv. (Sess.] Laws 134, 184 (establishing a sepa-
rate entity, the Board of Water Commissioners, to “provide for the better management and
proper operation of the. . . water-works system of the city of Durham”).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 117

CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 80 (2016)]

and its County water customers. See Act of Apr. 28, 1933 (Sullivan D,
ch. 399, 1933 N.C. Pub.-Local [Sess.] Laws 376 (captioned “An Act to
Regulate Charges Made by the City of Asheville for Water Consumed
in Buncombe County Water Districts”); Candler, 247 N.C. at 411, 101
§.E.2d at 479 (recognizing the legislature’s power to prevent by statute
the City of Asheville from charging certain county residents higher rates
than it charged to city residents). After several amendments and rein-
statements of the joint agreement between the City and the County that
was first established in 1981, that agreement ended in 2004, ultimately
leaving the City with ownership and control of the water system. Again,
it seems the parties soon after resorted to the legislature and the courts.
See Act of June 29, 2005 (Sullivan I), ch. 140, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 244
(captioned “An Act Regarding Water Rates in Buncombe County”); Act
of June 29, 2005 (Sullivan III), ch. 130, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 243 (cap-
tioned “An Act Regarding the Operation of Public Enterprises by the
City of Asheville”); City of Asheville v. State, 192 N.C. App. 1, 36-37,
665 S.E.2d 103, 128 (2008) (finding that a local act addressing equitable
rates “principally contemplate[d]” and “relate[d] only to matters which
are purely economic in nature . . . rather than prioritizing the system’s
health or sanitary conditions”), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied,
363 N.C. 123, 672 S.E.2d 685 (2009). The plenary power of the General
allows it, not the courts, to craft a resolution of this matter.

As acknowledged in the first clause of Article VII, Section 1, the
General Assembly has plenary authority. to establish new subdivisions
of local government. The General Assembly alone can consider the local
competing interests and craft a solution. Such legislative action is not
conditioned upon first providing a majority of this Court with satisfac-
tory justification. Johnson, 226 N.C. at 8, 36 S.E.2d at 809 (“We have no
power to review a statute with respect to its political propriety as long
as it is within the legislative discretion and has a reasonable relation
to the end sought to be accomplished.”). The majority’s holding that a
new political subdivision addressing regional problems with the water
system violates Article Il, Section 24 simply because the legislation
involves a water system erases the General Assembly’s historic author-
ity to establish convenient local governmental units acknowledged by
the first clause of Article VIL, Section 1. The General Assembly’s creating
anew local governmental subdivision does not offend the state constitu-
tion. This Court should not weigh the wisdom or expediency of a legisla-
tive act. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Chief Justice MARTIN joins in this dissenting opinion.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. YOUNG
[369 N.C. 118 (2016)}

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
ve
DAVID MARTIN BEASLEY YOUNG

No. 80A14
* Filed 21 December 2016

Constitutional Law—cruel and unusual punishment—life with-
out parole—defendant younger than 18
A seventeen-year-old’s sentence of life without parole for first-
degree murder was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution as interpreted in Miller v. Alabama,
__ US. __, 182 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Although N.C.G.S. § 15A-1380.5
might have increased the chance that defendant’s sentence would
be altered or commuted, it did not provide a sufficiently meaning-
ful opportunity to reduce the severity of the sentence to consti-
tute something less that life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole.

On writ of certiorari to review an order on a motion for appropriate
relief entered on 1 February 2013 by Judge Mark E. Powell in Superior
Court, Buncombe County. On 5 April 2018, the Court of Appeals allowed
the State’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the order pursuant
to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c). On 11 March 2014, the Supreme Court on its
own initiative certified the case for review prior to determination in the
Court of Appeals. Following oral argument on 6 May 2014, the Court on
28 January 2016 ordered supplemental briefing. Heard in the Supreme
Court on 12 October 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Robert C. Montgomery, Senior
Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Barbara S. Blackman
and Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for
defendant-appellee.

JACKSON, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the Superior Court, Buncombe
County correctly ordered that defendant, who was sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a murder he com-
mitted at age seventeen, must be resentenced as a result of the decision

IN THE SUPREME COURT ~

STATE v. YOUNG
{869 N.C. 118 (2016)}

in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 182 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Because we
conclude that defendant’s sentence is prohibited by Miller, we affirm.

On 3 May 1999, following a capital trial, a jury found defendant
guilty of first-degree murder pursuant to the felony murder rule based
on attempted armed robbery and “sale of a counterfeit controlled sub-
stance with a deadly weapon.” The jury also found defendant guilty
of one count each of possession with intent to sell or deliver, sale of,
and conspiracy to sell a counterfeit controlled substance. Defendant’s
convictions resulted from his involvement in a disputed drug-related
transaction that escalated into a fatal shooting on 8 January 1997. State
v. Young, 151 N.C. App. 601, 2002 WL 1543672, at *1 (2002) (unpub-
lished). Defendant was seventeen years old on the date of the offenses.
After considering whether defendant should receive a sentence of death
or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the jury recom-
mended life, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly.

In the wake of the Supreme Court's Miller decision, defendant filed
a motion for appropriate relief in Superior Court, Buncombe County
on 4 October 2012. The court conducted a hearing on 18 January 2013
and in an order filed on 1 February 2018, found that defendant “was
under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the crime” and
that when “the crime was committed, North Carolina law required the
mandatory imposition of life imprisonment without parole for all offend-
ers convicted of first-degree murder.” The court further explained that
pursuant to Miller, “mandatory imposition of life without parole upon
defendants who were under the age of 18 at the time of commission
of their crimes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Therefore,
the court concluded that the 2012 Miller decision retroactively applied
to defendant’s 1999 sentence, vacated the sentence, and ordered a new
sentencing hearing.

On 13 March 2013, the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari,
petition for writ of supersedeas, and motion for temporary stay with the
North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals allowed the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari and stayed the superior court’s order pending
disposition of the appeal. On 12 March 2014, this Court entered an order
on its own initiative certifying the appeal for discretionary review prior
to a determination by the Court of Appeals.

In a brief filed with the Court of Appeals, the State argued that
the superior court erred by giving Miller retroactive effect and vacat-
ing defendant’s sentence; however, on 25 January 2016, before this

120 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. YOUNG
[369 N.C. 118 (2016)

appeal was decided, the United States Supreme Court filed an opinion
in Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. __, 186 S. Ct. 718 (2016). In per-
tinent part, the Supreme Court concluded that “[w]here state collateral
review proceedings permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their
confinement, States cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substan-
tive constitutional right that determines the outcome of that challenge.”
Id. at___, 186 S. Ct. at 731-32. The Supreme Court then held that “Miller
announced a substantive rule of constitutional law.” Id. at__, 136 S. Ct.
at 736. On 29 January 2016, shortly after Montgomery was decided, we
ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs.

In its supplemental brief the State acknowledges that “(t]he United
States Supreme Court has now made clear [in Montgomery] that its hold-
ing in Miller applies retroactively to already final cases.” Nevertheless,
the State contends that defendant is not entitled to resentencing based
upon Miller and Montgomery. The State asserts that “[e]ven though
the General Assembly chose to call the sentence defendant received in
this case ‘life imprisonment without parole,’ ” defendant’s sentence “is
not really life imprisonment without parole but instead a sentence of
life imprisonment with ‘a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.’ ”
Specifically, the State argues that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1380.5—which was
enacted effective 1 May 1994 and repealed effective 1 December 1998—
applies to the offenses that defendant committed on 8 January 1997.
The State contends that section 15A-1380.5 thus provides a meaningful
opportunity for release and therefore, defendant's sentence is not of the
type addressed by the Miller decision. We disagree.!

In several recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has con-
sidered how the two gravest punishments imposed in the United States
criminal justice system should apply to persons who committed crimes
as minors. See, ¢.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010) (noting that
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the second great-
est punishment permitted by law); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568
(2005) (“Because the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the
Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.” (citing Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O’Conner, J., concurring))). In this
context, the Supreme Court has explained that “less culpability should
attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime

1. The State acknowledges that it did not raise this issue at the hearing on defen-
dant’s motion for appropriate relief. We conclude that the State has not preserved this
issue for appellate review. N.C. R. App. PB. 10(a)(1). Nevertheless, we now consider the
State's argument in order “to expedite decision in the public interest.” Jd. at R. 2.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 121

STATE v. YOUNG
[369 N.C. 118 (2016)]

committed by an adult.” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 (plurality opinion).
“Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager
Jess able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the
same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion
or peer pressure than is an adult.” Id. The Supreme Court has stated that
relative to adults, minors may lack maturity, may have a lessened sense
of responsibility, and may be more vulnerable to peer pressure and other
outside influences. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. Because of these differences,
minors’ “irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of
an adult.” Id. at 570 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835).

Another consideration emphasized by the Supreme Court in its
recent decisions is a minor offender's “capacity for change.” Graham,
560 U.S. at 74. The Supreme Court has stated that minors “still struggle
to define their identity” and are less likely than adults to be “irretriev-
ably depraved.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. Citing both its precedents and
literature from the social sciences, the Supreme Court concluded that
minors’ personality traits “are more transitory, less fixed”; that specific
traits such as “impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in
younger years can subside”; and that “[o]nly a relatively small propor-
tion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop
entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood.”
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993), and Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003), and cit-
ing Erik H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968)).

Most relevant to our analysis here are the decisions in Graham and
Miller, which set limits on the power of the States to impose a sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on defendants
who committed crimes before the age of eighteen. Miller, ___ U.S. at
__, 182 S. Ct. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. In Graham the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
“prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juve-
nile offender who did not commit homicide.” 560 U.S. at 82. In perti-
nent part, the Supreme Court reasoned that removing the possibility of
parole makes a life sentence “far more severe.” Jd. at. 70 (quoting Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 (1983), abrogated by Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957 (1991)). Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
“deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope
of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote
possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. YOUNG
| [369 N.C. 118 (2016))

Id. at 69-70 (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-01). In concluding that such a
harsh sentence is never proportionate for a nonhomicide offense com-
mitted by a minor, the Supreme Court determined that establishing “a
categorical rule [against life without the possibility of parole] gives all
juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and
reform.” Jd. at 79. The Supreme Court stated:

A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom
to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.
What the State must do, however, is give defendants like
Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. It is
for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and
mechanisms for compliance. ... The Eighth Amendment
does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted
of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will
remain behind bars for life. It does prohibit States from
making the judgment at the outset that those offenders
never will be fit to reenter society.

Id. at '75 (emphases added).

In Miller the Court addressed these same considerations with
respect to two defendants who were both convicted of a murder com-
mitted at the age of fourteen.__ U.S. at ____, 182 S. Ct. at 2460. Relying
upon Graham, the Court stated:

[Nlone of what [Graham] said about children—about
their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environ-
mental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific. . . .

Most fundamentally, Graham insists that youth mat-
ters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of
incarceration without the possibility of parole. In the cir
cumstances there, juvenile status precluded a life-with-
out-parole sentence, even though an adult could receive
it for a similar crime. And in other contexts as well, the
characteristics of youth, and the way they weaken ratio-
nales for punishment, can render a. life-without-parole
sentence disproportionate. .. .

But the mandatory penalty schemes at issue here pre-
vent the sentencer from taking account of these central
considerations. By removing youth from the balance—
by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole

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STATE v. YOUNG
[369 N.C. 118 (2016)]

sentence applicable to an adult—these laws prohibit a
sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s
harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes
a juvenile offender. That contravenes Graham’s .. . foun-
dational principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe
penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though.
they were not children.

Id. at __, 182 S. Ct. at 2465-66. The Court held that “the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison
without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Jd. at___, 132 S. Ct.
at 2469. Although a sentencing court may find that a specific homicide
justifies life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the judge
must “take into account how children are different, and how those dif-
ferences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison.” Id. at __, 182 S. Ct. at 2469.

Although Miller was decided in 2012, it must be given retroactive
effect during certain state collatéral review procedures. Montgomery,
___ US. at __, 186 S. Ct. at 731-32. “Giving Miller retroactive effect . . .
does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in
every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life without
parole. A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile
homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resen-
tencing them.” Id. at__, 186 S. Ct. at 736.

In this case, after a hearing on defendant's motion for appropriate
relief, the superior court found that defendant was convicted of first-
degree murder and that at the time of conviction, North Carolina law
required that all sentences of life imprisonment be imposed without
the possibility of parole. See N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (1997) (providing in part
that “any person who commits such murder shall be punished with
death or imprisonment in the State’s prison for life without parole”).
Nevertheless, the State argues that defendant’s sentence “is not really
life imprisonment without parole” because defendant may be able to
obtain release pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 154-1380.5, which at the time of
defendant’s conviction stated:

(a) For purposes of this Article the term “life impris-
onment without parole” shall include a sentence imposed
for “the remainder of the prisoner's natural life.”

(b) A defendant sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole is entitled to review of that sentence by a
resident superior court judge for the county in which the

124 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. YOUNG
[369 N.C. 118 (2016)}

defendant was convicted after the defendant has served
25 years of imprisonment. The defendant's sentence
shall be reviewed again every two years as provided by
this section, unless the sentence is altered or commuted
before that time.

(c) In reviewing the sentence the judge shall consider
the trial record and may review the defendant's record
from the Department of Correction, the position of any
members of the victim’s immediate family, the health
condition of the defendant, the degree of risk to society
posed by the defendant, and any other information that.
the judge, in his or her discretion, deems appropriate.

(d) After completing the review required by this sec-
tion, the judge shall recommend to the Governor or to any
executive agency or board designated by the Governor
whether or not the sentence of the defendant should be
altered or commuted. The decision of what to recom-
mend is in the judge’s discretion.

(e) The Governor or an executive agency designated
under this section shall consider the recommendation
made by the judge.

() The recommendation of a judge made in accor
dance with this section may be reviewed on appeal only
for an abuse of discretion.

Id. § 15A-1380.5 (1995) (repealed 1998).

Although this section might increase the chance for a sentence to
be “altered or commuted,” id. § 15A-1380.5(d), after careful consider-
ation of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, we conclude that section
15A-1380.5 does not support the State’s contention that defendant's sen-
tence “is not really life imprisonment without parole.” Section 15A-1380.5
states that a defendant “is entitled to review of [his or her] sentence by
aresident superior court judge,” but it guarantees no hearing, no notice,
and no procedural rights. In addition, the statute provides minimal guid-
ance as to what types of circumstances would support alteration or
commutation of the sentence. The section requires only that the judge
“consider the trial record” and notes that the judge “may” review other
information “in his or her discretion.” Jd. § 15A-1380.5(c). Ultimately,
“[t]he decision of what to recommend is in the judge's discretion,” and
the only effect of the judge’s recommendation is that “[t]he Governor or

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STATE v. YOUNG
[69 N.C. 118 (2016)]

an executive agency designated under this section” must “consider” it.
Id. § 15A-1380.5(e). Because of these provisions, the possibility of altera-
tion or commutation pursuant to section 15A-1380.5 is deeply uncertain
and is rooted in essentially unguided discretion. Accordingly, this sec-
tion does not reduce to any meaningful degree the severity of a sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See Graham, 560
US. at 69-70 (stating that life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole “deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving
hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote
possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence”).

Moreover, section 15A4-1380.5 does not address the central concern
of Miller—that a sentencing court cannot treat minors like adults when
imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.__ U.S. at____, 182 S. Ct. at 2466. As the Supreme Court stated
in Montgomery:

A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juve-
nile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather
than by resentencing them. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 6-10-801(c) (2013) (juvenile homicide offenders eligible
for parole after 25 years). Allowing those offenders to be
considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes
reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since
matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate
sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

___ US. at __, 186 S. Ct. at 736 (emphasis added). This statement
reflects the Supreme Court’s foundational concern that at some point
during the minor offender’s term of imprisonment, a reviewing body will
consider the possibility that he or she has matured. Nothing in section
15A-1380.5 requires consideration of this factor. In fact, after the judge’s
recommendation is submitted to “[t]he Governor or an executive agency
designated under this section,” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1380.5(e), nothing in sec-
tion 15A-1380.5 gives any guidance to the final decision maker because
this framework simply was not developed to address the concerns the
Supreme Court raised in Miller and Montgomery.

Based upon his conviction for a crime that occurred when he was
seventeen years old, defendant was sentenced to “imprisonment in the
State’s prison for life without parole” pursuant to a North Carolina stat-
ute that did not permit the sentencing court to consider a lesser pun-
ishment. Id. § 14-17 (1997). Although section 15A-1380.5 might increase
the chance that this sentence will be altered or commuted, it does not

126 IN THE SUPREME COURT

TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

provide a sufficiently meaningful opportunity to reduce the severity of
the sentence to constitute something less than life imprisonment with-
out the possibility of parole. We hold that defendant's sentence is pro-
hibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as
interpreted in Miller. As a result, the trial court correctly vacated that
sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing. The court’s order is
affirmed and the case is remanded for resentencing.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

TOWN OF BOONE, Piaintirr
v
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Derenpanr

COUNTY OF WATAUGA, Inrervenor-DerENDANT

No. 98A15-2
Filed 21 December 2016

Zoning—extraterritorial jurisdiction—withdrawal by legislature

An act by the legislature withdrawing extraterritorial jurisdic-

tion from the Town of Boone was squarely within the legislature’s

general power as described in the first clause of Article VI, Section

1 of the state constitution. Local jurisdictional reorganization is pre-

cisely the type of “organization and government and fixing of bound-

aries” contemplated by the first clause of Article VIL, Section 1 and
historically approved by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Justice ERVIN concurring in the result.
Justice HUDSON joins in this concurring opinion.

Justice BEASLEY dissenting.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(al) from an order entered on
29 July 2015 by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court, Wake County,
appointed by the Chief Justice under N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 22 March 2016.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 127

TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)}

Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P, by
Daniel FE. Smith, Jim W. Phillips, Jr., and Julia C. Ambrose, for
plaintiff-appellee.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Lauren M. Clemmons, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for defendant-appellant.

Eggers, Eggers, Eggers & Eggers, by Stacy C. Eggers, IV, for
intervenor-defendant-appellant.

NEWBY, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the General Assembly may with-
draw the previous extension of a town’s jurisdiction beyond its corpo-
rate limits and return governance to the county. The first clause of Article
VIL, Section 1 of our state constitution recognizes the historic plenary
authority of the General Assembly to provide for the “organization and
government and the fixing of boundaries of counties, cities and towns,
and other governmental subdivisions.” This language acknowledges the
legislative power to organize local government and fix the jurisdictional
boundaries. Extraterritorial jurisdiction affects the organization of local
governmental subdivisions by extending a town’s jurisdiction into the
county, thus shifting the political authority over certain subjects from
one local government to another. Here, by withdrawing the Town of
Boone's extraterritorial jurisdiction, the legislature.restored the local
jurisdictional boundaries as originally fixed, returning the governance of
territory located outside of the Town limits to Watauga County. The limi-
tations imposed by Article II, Section 24 do not apply to an action by the
General Assembly establishing or modifying the jurisdictional boundar-
ies of local governmental units. Because the legislative act withdrawing
the Town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction falls squarely within this plenary
power, we hold that the act is constitutional, and we reverse the deci-
sion of the trial court.

Historically, the General Assembly established the governmental
jurisdiction of a municipality by fixing the municipality’s corporate lim-
its. See State v. Eason, 114 N.C. 787, 795, 19 S.E. 88, 90 (1894) (“[T]he
jurisdiction of a municipality does not extend beyond [its boundary], in
the absence of some other language in the charter .. . .”). Beginning
in the late 1800s, the General Assembly began to extend the jurisdic-
tion of select municipalities beyond their corporate limits with regard to
designated governmental functions. See id. at 792, 19 S.E. at 89 (“[T]he

128 IN THE SUPREME COURT

TOWN OF BOONE v, STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

legislature unquestionably ha[s] the power to extend the jurisdiction of
the town, for police purposes . . . .”); see also, e.g., Act of Jan. 17, 1911,
ch. 2, sec. 27, 1911 N.C. Priv. [Sess.] Laws 3, 17 (extending the City of
Greensboro’s jurisdiction for sanitation and the protection of city prop-
erty for one mile “outside of said city limits”). Each grant of extraterrito-
xial authority was by local act on a city-by-city basis. Despite the growing
usage of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the General Assembly precluded
municipalities in Watauga County from governing extraterritorially. £.g.,
Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1834, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1387 (authorizing
municipalities to regulate the subdivision of land within one mile of
the corporate limits but excluding Watauga County and fifty-two other
counties); see also Act of June 19, 1959, ch. 1204, sec. 1, 1959 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1354, 1354 (expressly precluding towns located within Watauga
County from governing extraterritorially). In 1961 the General Assembly
granted extraterritorial jurisdictional authority to certain municipalities
located within Watauga County, including the Town of Boone, over ter-
ritory not more than one mile beyond their corporate limits. Act of May
30, 1961, ch. 548, sec. 134, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 748, 748. Article 19 of
Chapter 160A of the General Statutes includes the currerit codification
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

For twenty years, the Town did not attempt to govern within the
extraterritorial area. In 1981 the Town “initiate[d] the steps necessary
to extend extraterritorial [jurisdiction] to [the] one mile perimeter”
surrounding the Town and also sought “permission from the Watauga
County Board of Commissioners to extend this radius to two miles.” See
N.C.G.S. § 160A-360(a) (2015) (requiring approval from the county to
extend jurisdiction beyond the one-mile perimeter).! When the County
denied the Town’s request to exercise jurisdiction beyond the one-mile
extraterritorial area, the Town adopted Ordinance 82-11 to exercise
“(e]xtraterritorial zoning jurisdiction pursuant to [N.C.G.S. §] 1604-360”
for five specified areas located within the permitted one-mile perimeter
outside the Town limits. Boone, N.C., Ordinance 82-11 (Aug. 26, 1982).2

1. Even when a municipality wishes to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in an
area within one mile of its corporate limits, county approval is required if the county is
already enforcing zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, and the State Building Code
in that area. N.C.G.S. § 1604-360(e) (2015).

2. A municipality that wishes to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction must specify
by ordinance the areas to be included, defining the boundaries “to the extent feasible, in
terms of geographical features identifiable on the ground.” N.C.G.S. § 160A-360(b) (2015).
‘These boundaries must “at all times be drawn on a map, set forth in a written description,
or shown by a combination of these techniques.” Id. A copy of this delineation must be

IN THE SUPREME COURT 129

‘TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

In 2014 the General Assembly withdrew extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion from the Town and returned governance of the areas to the County.
Act of June 26, 2014, ch. 33, sec. 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess.
2014) 139, 140 (the Boone Act) (“Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the Town of Boone shall not exercise any powers of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction as provided in Article 19 of Chapter 160A of the
General Statutes.”). The Boone Act effectively reorganized the speci-
fied local governmental jurisdictions within Watauga County by confin-
ing the Town’s jurisdictional reach to its corporate limits and restoring
governance of the extraterritorial area to the County. See N.C.G.S.
§§ 160A-360(a)-(b) (2015).

The Town filed its complaint, challenging the Boone Act as a facially
unconstitutional local act prohibited by Article II, Section 24 of the
North Carolina Constitution. The State unsuccessfully moved to dismiss
the complaint and, in its answer, denied the Town’s allegations regard-
ing the applicability of Article II, Section 24.2 The County intervened,
asserting its “special interest” in the action as a “property owner” and
“the duly elected governing body for the citizens and residents residing
within the former extraterritorial jurisdiction.”

filed with the Register of Deeds and, as is true of the delineation of the municipality's
corporate boundaries, maintained in the office of the municipality's clerk. Jd. §§ 160A-22
(2015), 360).

To establish its extraterritorial boundary, the Town adopted Ordinance 83.2, describ-
ing the extraterritorial area by metes and bounds and topographical features, Boone, N.C.
Ordinance 83-2, § 1 (var, 31, 1983), and amended the zoning map to include the extrater-
ritorial area, id. § 4. The Town later expanded its reach of extraterritorial jurisdiction into
other specified areas located within the one-mile perimeter. J.g., id. 83-5 (Apr. 7, 1988);
id. 87-12 (Dec. 22, 1987); id, 92-08 (Sept. 3, 1992); id. 98-04 (Nov. 19, 1998); id. 99-02 (May
27, 1999). With each additional area, the Town amended its zoning map to reflect and
describe the new boundaries. E.g., id. 83-2, § 4; id. 88-5; id. 87-12, § 4; id. 92-03, § 4; id.
98-04, § 4; id. 99-02, § 4. County residents living within the added territory were then noti-
fied that the political body governing zoning and development had changed. See N.C.G.S.
§ 160A-360(al) (2015).

3. ‘The State contends that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, that “[p]laintiff lacks standing, as well as the capacity to sue, for the withdrawal
of its extraterritorial jurisdictional powers,” that reallocation of authority over planning
and development within the extraterritorial jurisdiction “constitutes a legitimate exercise
of legislative authority over [the legislature's} political subdivisions” and a non-justiciable
. .. political question[ ] within the purview of the legislative branch of government,” and
that plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under the state constitution. Because we resolve
this case based on the General Assembly's plenary power acknowledged in the first clause
of Article VII, Section 1, we do not address the other arguments.

4. Residents of extraterritorial jurisdiction areas are not allowed to vote in local
government municipal elections; they remain county residents for voting purposes. See
Ordinance 82-11; N.C.G:S. §§ 160A-360(al), 362 (2015).

130 IN THE SUPREME COURT

TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 126 (2016)]

A three-judge panel heard oral arguments and granted summary
judgment in favor of the Town, concluding “that the revocation of the
Town of Boone’s power of extraterritorial jurisdiction by [the Boone
Act] is unconstitutional pursuant to the prohibition on local acts con-
tained in Article II, Section 24” and enjoining its implementation. The
State and the County appealed that decision under N.C.G.S. § 74-27(al).

The State and the County argue that, under Article VII, Section 1 of
the constitution, the legislature delegates to municipalities the authority
to govern a particular territory and retains plenary power to modify the
governance of that geographic territory. To hold otherwise would allow
Article II, Section 24 to impermissibly restrict the General Assembly's
broad authority over municipalities as acknowledged by Article VII,
Section 1. The Town responds that the Boone Act is a prohibited local
act because it removes the authority of the Town to enforce its ordi-

" nances, some of which may “[rJelat[e] to health, sanitation, and the
abatement of nuisances,” N.C. Const. art. II, § 24(1)(a), or “[rjegulat[e]
labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing,” éd. art. II, § 24(1)(j), and that the
Act otherwise partially repeals N.C.G.S. § 1604-360, a general law, see
id. art Il, § 24(2).

The analytical framework for reviewing a facial constitutional chal-
lenge is well-established. Our “State Constitution is in no matter a grant
of power,” Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. 102,
112, 102 S.E.2d 853, 861 (1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 45, 79 S. Ct. 985, 3 L. Ed.
2d 1072 (1959), and as such, “[aJll power which is not limited by the
Constitution inheres in the people, and an act of a State legislature is
legal when the Constitution contains no prohibition against it,” id. at
112, 102 S.E.2d at 861 (citation omitted). See also State ex rel. Ewart
v. Jones, 116 N.C. 570, 570, 21 S.E. 787, 787 (1895) (“[Plower resides
with the people and is exercised by their representatives in the General
Assembly.”). “We seldom uphold facial challenges because it is the role
of the legislature, rather than this Court, to balance disparate interests
and find a workable compromise among them.” Beaufort Cty. Bd. of
Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 363 N.C. 500, 502, 681 S.E.2d
278, 280 (2009) (citation omitted). An act of the General Assembly will
be declared unconstitutional only when “it [is] plainly and clearly the
case,” State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 449, 385 S.E.2d 473,
478 (1989) (quoting Glenn v. Bd. of Educ., 210 N.C. 525, 529-30, 187
S.E. 781, 784 (1936)), and its unconstitutionality must be demonstrated
beyond reasonable doubt, Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 334-35, 410
S.E.2d 887, 889 (1991) (citations omitted).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 131

‘TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C, 126 (2016)]

Though not expressly stated in our first constitution, the General
Assembly has long enjoyed plenary power to create political subdivi-
sions of local government, establish their jurisdictional boundaries, and
invest them with certain powers, see Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town
of Carthage, __ N.C. ___, __, 789 S.E.2d 454, 457 (2016), which “may
be enlarged, abridged or modified at the will of the legislature,” id. at
__., 789 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting White v. Comm’rs of Chowan Cty., 90
N.C. 487, 438 (1884)). Our Constitution of 1868 affirmed “the duty of the
Legislature to provide for the organization of cities, towns, and incor-
porated villages.” N.C. Const. of 1868, art. VIII, § 4. By 1876, following
a brief suspension of “provisions relating to municipallities]” during
Reconstruction, see id., art. VII, § 12, the constitution reaffirmed that
“[t}he General Assembly shall have full power by statute to mod-
ify, change, or abrogate any and all of the provisions” pertaining to
municipalities, id., Amends. of 1875, art. VII, § 14. See Journal of the
Constitutional Convention of the State of North Carolina 162-63
(Raleigh, Josiah Turner 1875) (dismissing concerns that the 1875 amend-
ment to Article VII would provide “unlimited control of the Legislature”
over “the municipal government of cities, towns, &c.”).

Local political subdivisions are “mere instrumentalities of the State
for the more convenient administration of local government,” Holmes
v. City of Fayetteville, 197 N.C. 740, 746, 150 S.E. 624, 627 (1929), appeal
dismissed per curiam, 281 U.S. 700, 50 S. Ct. 353, 74 L. Ed. 1126 (1930),
whose territory and functions rest “in the absolute discretion of the
state,” State ex rel. Dyer v. City of Leaksville, 275 N.C. 41, 50, 165 S.E.2d
201, 207 (1969) (quoting Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178,
28S. Ct. 40, 46, 52 L.Ed. 151, 159 (1907); accord Greensboro-High Point
Airport Auth. v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 9-10, 36 9.E.2d 803, 809 (1946).
Under its plenary power, the General Assembly may create, organize,
and abolish these local governmental units, arranging and rearranging
local government to best meet the specific local needs of the people. See
People ex rel. Van Bokkelen v. Canaday, 73 N.C. 198, 222 (1875) (Political
subdivisions “are parts and parcels of the State, organized for the con-
venience of local self-government.”); accord White, 90 N.C. at 438. Each
locality presents different challenges and needs for the arrangement of
local governmental units. The General Assembly is the only branch
of government equipped to organize local government and, through
oversight, craft responses to the changing needs of local communities.

As acknowledged by the case law, this broad power of the General
Assembly has remained unchanged throughout our history and is recog-
nized in Article VII, Section 1 of our current constitution, adopted in 1971:

182 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

The General Assembly shall provide for the organi-
zation and government and the fixing of boundaries of
counties, cities and towns, and other governmental sub-
divisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this
Constitution, may give such powers and duties to coun-
ties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivi-
sions as it may deem advisable.

N.C. Const. art. VIL, § 1. As such, Article VIL, Section 1 “is not a delega-
tion of power to the General Assembly” but “a general description” and
“merely a recognition” of “the General Assembly's power to provide for
the organization and powers of local government,” Report of the North
Carolina State Constitution Study Commission 85 (1968) {hereinafter
1968 Constitution Commission Report], as affirmed in the 1875 amend-
ment, which “gave the General Assembly full power to revise or abolish
the form and powers of county and township governments,” id. at 143.5

The text of the first clause of Article VII, Section 1, “[t]he General
Assembly shall provide for the organization and government and the
fixing of boundaries” of local governmental entities, mandates the stat-
utory creation, structuring, restructuring, and defining of local govern-
mental subdivisions and their jurisdictional boundaries. We look to the
plain meaning of the phrase to ascertain its intent. State v. Webb, 358
N.C. 92, 97, 591 S.E.2d 505, 510-11 (2004) (The constitution is construed
for its plain meaning.); see also Dunn v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 332 N.C.
129, 134, 418 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1992) (Ordinary rules of grammar apply.).
Each word informs a proper understanding of the-whole. “Organization”
means something “put together into an orderly, functional, [and] struc-
tured whole.” Organize, The American Heritage Dictionary 926 (new
coll. ed. 1979). “Government” is defined as “[t]he act or process of gov-
erning; especially, the administration of public policy in a political unit;

8. Significantly, the text of Article VIL, Section 1, recognizing the General Assembly's
historic duty to provide for local government, was adopted against the backdrop of
Article II, Section 24 and the various court decisions describing its application. See 1968
Constitution Commission Report 85; see also N.C. State Bar v. DuMont, 804 N.C. 627,
635, 286 S.E.2d 89, 94 (1982) (relying on the 1968 Constitution Commission Report to
“ascertain{ | the intent of the framers and adopters, [and] the object and purpose of the
revision”). Following well-established principles of construction, one amendment cannot
be read to eliminate the other, and the one more recent in time is given its full application.
In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 159, 250 S.B.2d 890, 919 (1978) (considering constitutional
amendments “in pari materia with the other sections of our Constitution which it was
intended to supplement” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 8. Ct. 2859,
61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979); Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 444, 75 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1958)
(‘Constitutional provisions should be construed in consonance with the objects and pur-
poses in contemplation at the time of their adoption.” (emphasis added)).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

political jurisdiction.” Government, id. at 570. The “fixing of boundar-
ies” means establishing borders or limits. See Fix and Boundary, id. at
497, 156. Thus, the plain meaning of the phrase “organization and gov-
ernment and fixing of boundaries” includes the designation and realign-
ment of the political jurisdictions of local governmental units.

The General Assembly alone has the oversight responsibility and
authority to define, limit, and expand the otherwise competing juris-
dictions of local political subdivisions. See Hailey v. City of Winston-
Salem, 196 N.C. 17, 22-23, 144 S.E. 877, 380 (1928) (“When a new
governmental agency is established by the Legislature, such as a munici-
pal corporation, it takes control of all the affairs over which it is given
authority, to the exclusion of other governmental agencies.”).6 Setting
the jurisdictional boundaries of political subdivisions is left to legisla-
tive discretion.” Since the needs of each community differ, this Court
has repeatedly acknowledged the practical reality that the General
Assembly may exercise that discretion by local act.8

6. Instances of creating, organizing, and reorganizing political subdivisions have met.
this Court’s approval, both before and after the 1917 amendments that created the prede-
cessor to Article I, Section 24. See, ¢.g., Bethania Town Lot Comm. v. City of Winston-
Salem, 348 N.C. 664, 668, 502 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1998) (“The General Assembly may, by
special or local act, create municipalities and change the boundaries of municipalities.”
(citations omitted); Lilly v. Taylor, 88 N.C. 489, 490-91, 494-95 (1883) (affirming the leg-
islature’s creation and subsequent repeal of the charter of the Town of Fayetteville); Mills
2. Williams, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 558, 560, 563-64 (1850) (upholding the legislature's “power
to create and abolish” Polk County); see also In re Ordinance of Annexation No. 1977-4,
296 N.C. 1, 16-17, 249 S.E.2d 698, 707 (1978) (Municipalities have no inherent constitu-
tional right to their boundaries and derive authority only from the powers delegated by the
legislature. (citations omitted).

1. Sée Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 324 N.C. 499, 502, 380
S.E.2d 107, 109 (1989) (“The extension of boundaries of cities has been held to be a politi-
cal decision .....” (citations omitted)); see also Texsi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 44
N.C. App. 268, 273, 261 S.E.2d 21, 25 (1979) (recognizing the General Assembly's authority
to create, destroy, or change the boundaries of any political subdivision), aff'd, 301 N.C. 1,
269 S.E.2d 142 (1980); Jones v. Jeanette, 84 N.C. App. 526, 532, 239 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1977)
(stating that setting boundaries under Article VI, Section 1 is a “permissible legislative
function” “left to legislative discretion” (citing, inter alia, Hunter, 207 US. at 178-79, 28 S.
Ct. at 46, 52 L. Ed. at 159).

8. See Bethania Town Lot Comm., 348 N.C. at 668, 502 S.E.2d at 362; Plemmer
v. Matthewson, 281 N.C. 722, 725, 190 S.B.2d 204, 206-07 (1972) (The legislature may cre-
ate a municipality by special act and may provide procedures for annexation by special
act.); Town of Highlands v. City of Hickory, 202 N.C. 167, 168, 162 S.E. 471, 471 (1982)
(upholding a local act that extended the municipal limits of one town and repealed stat-
utes under which adjacent towns were organized); Holmes, 197 N.C. at 748, 150 S.E. at 628
(The legislature may extend by special act extraterritorial jurisdiction and the authority of
amunicipality to provide services outside its corporate limits.); State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635,
636, 74 S.E. 582, 582 (1912) (recognizing the legislature's authority to allow the exercise

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TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

The second clause of Article VII, Section 1 concerns the authority
of the General Assembly to confer specific “powers and duties” on local
governmental units. Unlike the first clause in Article VII, Section 1, the
second clause includes an express limitation; namely, it prohibits any
legislative delegation of “powers and duties” to local governmental units
that is “otherwise prohibited by this Constitution.” Only under the sec-
ond clause, then, is the General Assembly's authority over local govern-
ments expressly subject to limitations imposed by other constitutional
provisions, including the constraints on local acts in Article II, Section 24
first adopted in 1917. For example, under the Article II, Section 24 pro-
hibition on certain local acts, the General Assembly cannot grant to one
county the power to enact local employment legislation, see Williams
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 191, 581 S.E.2d 415, 430
(2008), or remove a city’s power to enforce certain ordinances regard-
ing specific properties within its municipal limits, see City of New Bern
v. New Bern-Craven Cty. Bd. of Educ., 338 N.C. 430, 442, 450 S.E.2d
735, 742 (1994).9

of extraterritorial jurisdiction outside municipal limits by local act); Lutterloh v. City of
Fayetteville, 149 N.C. 65, 69, 62 S.E. 758, 760 (1908) (recognizing validity of extension of
corporate boundaries through annexation by local act); see also In re City of Durham
Annexation Ordinance, 69 N.C. App. 77, 84, 316 S.E.2d 649, 654 (“Article VII, Section 1
is not a power of the General Assembly which must be carried out or enacted by general
laws as defined in Article XIV, Section 3.”), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 312
N.C. 493, 322 S.E.2d 653 (1984).

9. This approach of conducting an Article II, Section 24 analysis only when the chal-
lenged statute specifies a specific “power” or “duty” is consistent with our prior decisions.
In Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, the plaintiffs challenged a local
act annexing certain land to the City of Greensboro. 324 N.C. 499, 501, 380 S.B.2d 107, 108
(1989). While the annexation clearly arose under the authority to “fix the boundaries of
Cities” acknowledged in Article VII, Section 1, id. at 503, 380 S.H.2d at 110, because the
act also contained a specific “provision regarding solid waste collection,” the plaintifi's
argued the statute violated Article Il, Section 24, id. at 504, 380 S.E.2d at 110. Because the
statute specified a particular “power,” this Court conducted an analysis under Article II.
Td, at; 504-06, 380 S.E.2d at 110-11, When viewed as a whole, the explicit grant of power
was a “small part” of the legislation, id. at 606, 880 S.E.2d at 111, and this Court concluded
that “[t]he provision. . . regarding solid waste collection” did not violate Article I, Section
24, id. at 506, 380 $.U.2d at 111. See also, e.g., Lamb v. Bd. of Hduc., 235 N.C. 377, 379-80,
70 8.H.2d 201, 208 (1952) (concluding that an act expressly restricting certain express.
powers of the Randolph County Board of Education violated the Article II limitations on
local acts); Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 733, 65 S.B.2d 313, 315 (1951) (concluding that an
act that “confer[red] power upon the Board of Aldermen of the City of Winston-Salem and
the Board of Commissioners of Forsyth County” to, inter alia, “name a joint city-county
board of health,” which varied from general law, “[wals a local act relating to health’ in
violation of the Article II limitations on local acts); Bd. of Health v. Bd. of Coma'rs, 220
N.C. 140, 143-44, 16 $.E.2d 677, 678-79 (1941) (concluding that an act removing from the
Nash County Board of Health the power to appoint a county health officer was a local act
relating to health in violation of the Article If imitations on local acts).

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‘TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 126 (2016)}

Acting under its plenary authority, the General Assembly creates
municipalities. Historically, the municipality's governmental authority
ended at its corporate limits. The General Assembly first granted munici-
palities the authority to govern extraterritorially by amending municipal
charters.!0 Even after the adoption of the restrictions on local acts, the
legislature continued to delegate to select cities on an individual basis
the authority to enforce more comprehensive zoning regulations within
their one-mile perimeters.!! Over time extraterritorial jurisdiction has
become more common and the governmental authority expanded.!2

At its essence, jurisdiction is “[a] government’s general power to
exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory” or the
“geographic area within which political . . . authority may be exercised.”
Jurisdiction, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Extraterritorial
jurisdiction extends the Town’s jurisdictional boundary, allowing the
Town to impose certain ordinances—already applicable within its
corporate limits—one mile into County territory without the County’s
approval, thus superseding any County regulations on those same sub-
jects. See N.C.G.S. § 160A-360 (2015); see also Trey Allen, Univ. of N.C.
Sch. of Gov't, General Ordinance Authority, in County and Municipal
Government in North Carolina 77, 84 (Frayda S. Bluestein ed., 2d ed.
2014) (“A city may enforce zoning and other development ordinances
inside its corporate limits and within its extraterritorial jurisdiction
(ETJ).... When a city chooses to enforce development ordinances in its

10. See Rice, 158 N.C. at 636, 640, 74 S.E. at 582, 584 (upholding a City of Greensboro
ordinance regulating hog farming within one-fourth mile of the corporate limits, adopted
pursuant to the 1911 statutory delegation of authority by charter amendment).

11. E.g., Act of Apr. 23, 1949, ch. 1192, sec. 1, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 1521, 1521 (autho-
rizing Town of Tarboro to exercise zoning powers within one mile beyond the Town's
corporate limits); Act of Mar. 31, 1949, ch. 700, sec. 3, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 732, 733 (same
for City of Gastonia); Act of Mar. 28, 1949, ch. 629, secs. 1, 2, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 640,
640-41 (same for Town of Chapel Hill); Act of Mar. 25, 1949, ch. 540, secs. 1, 4, 1949 N.C.
Sess. Laws 541, 541-42, 548 (same for City of Raleigh); see also Report of the Municipal
Government Study Commission 18 (1958) [hereinafter Municipal Report] (“A total of
19 cities have, by special act, been given authority to zone for one mile or more beyond
their limits.”).

12. Whether enforcing its ordinances inside its municipal limits or extraterritorially, a
town receives the authority to govern territory from the legislature. See Holmes, 197 N.C.
at 744, 150 S.E. at 626 (“The general rule is that a municipal corporation has no extra-
territorial powers . . ..”); Town of Lake Waccamaw v. Savage, 86 N.C. App. 211, 213, 356
§.E.2d 810, 811 (recognizing that the General Assembly may by local act permit a town to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction), disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 797, 361 S.E.2d 89 (1987).

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TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

ETI, the county’s development ordinances no longer apply there . . . .”).
Extraterritorial jurisdiction remains extraordinary because it broadens
a municipality’s jurisdictional reach beyond its corporate limits. This
extension of extraterritorial jurisdictional authority deprives the resi-
dents of the extraterritorial area of meaningful representation and the
right to vote for local government representatives who shape policies
affecting their property interests.13 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 17, 84'S. Ct. 526, 535, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492 (1964) (“No right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election
of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live. Other rights, even the most. basic, are illusory if the right to vote
is undermined.”).

The pivotal question before this Court is whether the Boone Act,
which withdraws the Town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, is an exercise
of the General Assembly's plenary authority to “provide for the organi-
zation and government and fixing of boundaries” of local government
under the first clause of Article VII, Section 1. If so, our analysis ends, and
there is no need to address the application of the second clause of Article
VIL, Section 1 and any restrictions imposed by Article II, Section 24.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction is inextricably tied to a municipality’s
authority to enforce its zoning and development ordinances within
certain geographic boundaries. By retracting the Town’s jurisdictional
reach to its corporate limits, the Boone Act restores the local govern-
ment boundaries within Watauga County as originally fixed. This local
jurisdictional reorganization is precisely the type of “organization and
government and fixing of boundaries” contemplated by the first clause
of Article VII, Section 1 and historically approved by this Court. The
Boone Act withdraws from the Town its extraterritorial jurisdiction and
its governing authority to enforce certain ordinances within the one-
mile perimeter and returns governance of that territory to the County
and its residents. The General Assembly is the only body politic uniquely
qualified to oversee local government and set the jurisdictional lines that
divide the Town and the County.

18. County citizens residing within the affected territory cannot vote for Town offi-
cials. Ordinance 82-11; see N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-360(al), 362. While County residents subject
to the Town's extraterritorial jurisdiction are represented on the Town's planning board
and board of adjustment, Ordinance 82-11, these extraterritorial-jurisdiction appointees
may only vote on matters involving the extraterritorial area, see N.C.G.S, §§ 160A-360(al),
362; see also Municipal Report 18 (“[Governmental action affecting the use of prop-
erty should originate in a governing board elected by persons subject to such action... .
[and] residents of the area affected should be given a voice . . . through the naming of out-
side residents to local planning boards and boards of adjustment”).

IN THE SUPREME COURT * 187

TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

Because the state constitution authorizes the General Assembly
to reduce the Town’s jurisdictional reach, the removal of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction falls squarely within the legislature’s general power as
described in the first clause of Article VII, Section 1. For the reasons
stated above, the decision of the three-judge panel finding the Act
unconstitutional is reversed.

REVERSED.

Justice ERVIN concurring in the result.

Although I concur in the Court’s determination that the Boone Act
is not facially unconstitutional, I am unable to agree with the Court’s
determination to uphold the Boone Act pursuant to the first portion
of the first paragraph of Article VI, Section 1 of the North Carolina
Constitution, which recognizes the General Assembly's authority to pro-
vide for the “organization and government and the fixing of boundar-
ies of counties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivisions”
on the theory that the Boone Act effectuates a “reorganization” of the
authority granted to Boone and Watauga County. N.C. Const. art. VI,
§ 1. Instead, I believe that a determination of the constitutionality of the
Boone Act hinges upon the second part of the first paragraph of Article
VI, Section 1, which recognizes the General Assembly’s authority to
“give such powers and duties to counties, cities and towns, and other
governmental subdivisions as [the General Assembly] may deem advis-
able” so long as any legislation that is enacted pursuant to this provi-
sion is not “otherwise prohibited by [the North Carolina] Constitution.”
Id. For the reasons set forth below, while I believe that the General
Assembly's decision to alter the Town's regulatory authority is subject to
constitutional limitations, such as those contained in Article II, Section
24, I also believe that the Boone Act is not impermissibly connected
to the subjects about which the General Assembly lacks the authority to
enact local legislation. Moreover, even if the Boone Act does implicate
“the organization and government and the fixing of boundaries” provi-
sion, that determination does not obviate the necessity for the Court to
consider “any restrictions imposed by Article II, Section 24” given our
decision in Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 324
N.C. 499, 380 S.E.2d 111 (1989). As a result, while I concur in the result
reached by the Court, I am unable to join its decision.

Although the Court believes that its decision to uphold the consti-
tutionality of the Boone Act obviates the need to address the State’s

_ IN THE SUPREME COURT

TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
{869 N.C. 126 (2016)}

sovereign immunity and standing arguments, I do not find that assertion
convincing. Since both sovereign immunity and standing are threshold
issues, they must be addressed in order for the Court to reach the merits
of the constitutional claims that have been advanced for our consider-
ation. For that reason, I will begin by addressing the sovereign immunity
and standing arguments that the State has advanced in opposition to the
Town’s claims.

In seeking relief from the order of the three-judge panel of the
Superior Court, Wake County, before this Court, the State argues that
the panel erred by granting summary judgment in the Town’s favor
because (1) the Town’s challenge to the Boone Act is barred by the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity; (2) the Town lacks standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the Boone Act; and (3) the Town’s challenge
to the Boone Act in reliance upon Article II, Section 24 fails given that
the Boone Act falls squarely within the General Assembly's authority
regarding the “fixing of boundaries” pursuant to Article VII, Section 1 of
the North Carolina Constitution.4 With respect to the sovereign immu-
nity issue, the State contends that the Town failed to specifically allege
a waiver of sovereign immunity in its complaint; that nothing in the rel-
evant statutory provisions authorizes a municipality to file suit against
the State; and that the Town does not have a valid constitutional claim
sufficient to support a direct action against the State. In response, the
Town asserts that it was not required to do anything other than allege a
reasonable basis for determining that its claim is not barred by sovereign
immunity. Moreover, the State’s argument directed to the substance of
the Town’s claim does not serve the purpose for which sovereign immu-
nity exists, which is to obviate the necessity for the State to defend itself
in litigation in the absence of consent. The lack of any valid basis for
the State’s sovereign immunity argument is bolstered by the substantial
number of decisions stemming from challenges to legislation asserted
in reliance upon Article II, Section 24, none of which has suggested that
such claims are barred by sovereign immunity. I do not find the State’s
sovereign immunity argument to be persuasive.

“Sovereign immunity stands for the proposition that . . . ‘the State
cannot be sued except with its consent or upon its waiver of immunity.’”
Dawes v. Nash County, 357 N.C. 442, 445, 584 S.E.2d 760, 762 (2003)
(quoting Paul L. Whitfield, PA. v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39, 42, 497 S.E.2d
442, 414 (1998), and citing Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C.

1. The County echoes the State's substantive argument.

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TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)}

522, 534, 299 S.E.2d 618, 625 (1983)). “{SJovereign immunity .. . ‘is an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability ....’” Craig
v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 338, 678 S.E.2d 351,
354 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 86 L. Ed. 2d
411, 425 (1985)). “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . is a common.
Jaw theory or defense established by this Court,” so that, “when there
is a clash between . . . constitutional rights and sovereign immunity, the
constitutional rights must prevail.” Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C.
761, 786, 413 S.E.2d 276, 292, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985, 121 L. Ed. 2d
431 (1992).

The State’s argument in reliance upon the Town’s failure to specifi-
cally plead a waiver of sovereign immunity relies exclusively upon Vest
v. Easley, in which the Court of Appeals noted that “[i]t is well-estab-
lished law that with no allegation of waiver [of sovereign immunity]
in a plaintiff's complaint, the plaintiff is absolutely barred from suing
the state and its public officials in their official capacities in an action
for negligence.” 145 N.C. App. 70, 74, 549 S.E.2d 568, 573 (2001) (cita-
tions omitted). Instead of asserting a negligence-based claim for mon-
etary damages such as the claim at issue in Vest, however, the Town
has sought a declaration concerning the constitutionality of the Boone
Act. “A declaratory judgment may be used to determine the construction
and validity of a statute,” Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 320 N.C. 640,
646, 360 S.E.2d 756, 760 (1987) (citing City of Raleigh v. Norfolk S. Ry.
Co., 275 N.C. 454, 168 S.E.2d 389 (1969)), with “a municipality [being
entitled to] have its rights and obligations determined in a declaratory
judgment action,” id. at 646, 360 S.E.2d at 760 (citing Bd. of Managers
v. City of Wilmington, 237 N.C. 179, 74S,E.2d 749 (1953)). In light of that,
fact, this Court has regularly entertained declaratory judgment actions
against the State and its political subdivisions involving challenges to
the constitutionality of legislation as violative of Article II, Section 24.
E.g., id. at 645-52, 360 S.E.2d at 759-63; Bd. of Managers, 237 N.C. at 186-
90, 74 S.E.2d at 754-57. On the other hand, the State has failed to identify
a single decision of this Court holding that the Town was required to
plead a waiver of sovereign immunity as a prerequisite for challenging
the constitutionality of the Boone Act under Article II, Section 24 or
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity presents any obstacle to our
consideration of the merits of the Town’s constitutional challenge.2

2, Even if the Town was required to plead a waiver of sovereign immunity, I believe
that it. complaint satisfies this requirement given that a waiver of sovereign immunity is
inherent in the very constitutional challenge that the Town asserted in its complaint.

140 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 126 (2016)}

As previously noted, the State asserts that this Court’s decisions
under Article II, Section 24 have no bearing upon the sovereign immu-
nity claim that it has advanced in this case because the constitutionality
of the Boone Act is controlled by the boundary fixing provision of Article
VU, Section 1, rather than Article II, Section 24. However, even when
this Court has rejected constitutional claims predicated upon Article
Il, Section 24, those decisions rest upon substantive considerations
rather than upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Town of
Emerald Isle, 320 N.C. at 648-52, 360 S.E.2d at 761-63; Cheape v. Town
of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C, 549, 557-60, 359 S.E.2d 792, 797-99 (1987), with
such results obtaining even in cases involving challenges to legislation
related to annexation and the creation or alteration of municipal bound-
aries, see, ¢.g., Piedmont Ford Truck Sale, 324 N.C. at 505, 380 S.E.2d at
111 (holding that a local act obligating the City of Greensboro to provide
solid waste collection in newly annexed areas did not relate to health
and sanitation for purposes of Article II, Section 24(1)(a), because it had
the “effect” of making a general law of statewide application applicable
to an annexation being effectuated by means of a local act and because
the challenged legislation did not “subject the annexed area to a dif-
ferent treatment than” would have been the case if Greensboro “had
annexed the area under the general annexation law”). As a result, our
precedent indicates that the mere fact that a constitutional challenge to
legislation advanced in reliance upon Article II, Section 24 proves unsuc-
cessful does not establish that the underlying claim should have been
dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds.

Aside from the fact that the Town was not required to allege or
prove that a traditional cause of action exists under Article II, Section
24 in order to seek and obtain a declaration concerning the constitu-
tionality of the Boone Act, see Town of Emerald Isle, 320 N.C. at 646,
360 S.E.2d at 760 (stating that a plaintiff seeking a judicial declaration
“is not required to allege or prove that a traditional ‘cause of action’
exists against [a] defendant” (citing Sharpe v. Park Newspapers .of
Lumberton, Inc., 317 N.C. 579, 588, 347 S.E.2d 25, 31-32 (1986))), this
Court has “clearly establish[ed] the principle that sovereign irmmunity
[cannot] operate to bar direct constitutional claims,” particularly if
the plaintiff is left with “no adequate remedy at state law,” Craig, 363
N.C. at 340, 678 S.E.2d at 356 (citing Corum, 330 N.C. at 782-86, 413 S.B.2d
at 289-92). Although this Court's decisions in Corwm, 330 N.C. at ‘782-86,
413 S.E.2d at 289-92, and Craig, 363 N.C. at 338-42, 678 S.E.2d at 354-
57, specifically mention the constitutional protections contained in the
Declaration of Rights, no decision of this Court limits the applicability of
the principle enunciated in those cases to the constitutional principles

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‘TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)}

enunciated in Article I of the North Carolina Constitution. On the con-
trary, this Court held in Craig that the plaintiff was entitled to obtain
a decision on the merits with respect to a claim advanced in reliance
upon Article IX, Section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, which pro-
vides that “schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever
be encouraged,” in addition to the claims that he asserted pursuant to
Article I, Sections 15 and 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. Craig,
363 N.C. at 335, 342, 678 S.E.2d at 352, 357. The prohibition against local
legislation addressing certain subjects contained in Article II, Section
24 is an integral part of our State’s fundamental law and should not be
treated as of lesser importance. As a result, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity does not bar the Town from asserting a claim against the State
pursuant to Article II, Section 24.

In support of its contention that the Town lacks standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the Boone Act, the State places principal
reliance upon Wood v. City of Fayetteville, 43 N.C. App. 410, 259 S.E.2d
581 (1979), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 299 N.C. 125, 261
S.E.2d 926-27 (1980), in which the Court of Appeals held that the City
of Fayetteville lacked standing to challenge certain limitations that the
General Assembly had imposed upon Fayetteville’s annexation author
ity. According to the State, Wood and our decision in In re Martin, 286
N.C. 66, 209 S.E.2d 766 (1974), establish that a municipality, as a creature
of the State, is only entitled to exercise those powers granted to it by the
General Assembly and lacks the right to challenge the constitutionality
of legislation enacted by the body that created it. Moreover, given that
the ability of a municipality to exercise certain powers outside its cor
porate limits stems from a discretionary decision made by the General
Assembly rather than from any vested right possessed by the municipal-
ity, any decision by the General Assembly to eliminate that municipal-
ity’s authority to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot result in
any injury to that municipality sufficient to give it standing to bring suit
against the State. Finally, the State contends that there is no statutory
support for the proposition that the Town has the authority to bring suit
against the State on any basis.

After acknowledging that this Court has allowed municipalities to
assert claims against it in the past, the State claims that these cases are
distinguishable. For example, the State argues that, since this case is
governed by the boundary fixing provision of Article VII, Section 1 rather
than the limitations upon the enactment of local legislation contained in
Article I, Section 24, it is clearly distinguishable from the cases in which
municipalities have been allowed to challenge the constitutionality of

IN THE SUPREME COURT

‘TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)}

legislation, such as Town of Spruce Pine v. Avery County, 346 N.C.
787, 488 S.E.2d 144 (1997), and Town of Emerald Isle, each of which
involved the imposition of a new obligation on a local government.
Similarly, this case is deemed to be distinguishable from City of New
Bern v. New Bern-Craven County Board of Education, 328 N.C. 557,
402 S.E.2d 623 (1991) (New Bern D), given that New Bern I did not stem
from an action brought by a municipality against the State and given that
the challenged legislation involved the removal of the city’s authority
to enforce the State Building Code within, rather than outside, its own
municipal boundaries, coupled with a grant of authority to the county
to enforce the building code within the municipal boundary contained
in a local, rather than a general, law, see N.C.G.S. § 153A-320 (2015); id.
§ 160A-360(d) (2015). Finally, the State argues that, since there is no
earlier decision of this Court arising from a challenge to the withdrawal
of a municipality's extraterritorial jurisdiction, nothing forecloses
the State’s ability to challenge the Town's standing to prosecute the
present litigation.

In response, the Town argues that Wood and In re Martin do not
establish a standing rule of the breadth for which the State contends.
Moreover, the Town contends that a series of decisions after In re
Martin, including Town of Emerald Isle, New Bern I, and Town of
Spruce Pine, fatally undermine the State’s position. In the Town’s view,
these more recent decisions, especially New Bern I, demonstrate that
a municipality has standing to challenge the constitutionality of legisla-
tion depriving it of the ability to exercise regulatory authority, that the
General Assembly's authority to regulate municipal corporations is not

. without limit, and that allowing municipalities to challenge the consti-
tutionality of legislation pursuant to Article II, Section 24 is of critical
importance given that “they are the best positioned—indeed, they are
often the only parties positioned—to do so.” Finally, the Town contends
that the Boone Act is primarily concerned with powers rather than with
boundaries and that the Court has rejected similar boundary-related
arguments in the past, as is evidenced by our decision to invalidate the
legislation at issue in City of New Bern v. New Bern-Craven County
Board of Education, 338 N.C. 430, 450 S.E.2d 735 (1994) (New Bern ID.

As this Court has previously stated, “[t]he ‘gist of the question of

" standing’ is whether the party seeking relief has ‘alleged such a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation[ ] of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.’ ” Stanley v. Dep't of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 28,
199 S.E.2d 641, 650 (1973) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 20

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L. Ed. 2d 947, 961 (1968) (citation omitted)). According to N.C.G.S.
§ 1-254, “[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of construc-
tion or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration
of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder,” N.C.G.S. § 1-254
(2015), in order “to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and inse-
curity, with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations,” Walker
v. Phelps, 202 N.C. 344, 349, 162 S.E. 727, 729 (1982).

“An action may not be maintained under the Declaratory Judgment
Act... unless the action involves a present actual controversy between
the parties.” Town of Emerald Isle, 320 N.C. at 645-46, 360 S.E.2d at
760 (citing City of Greensboro v. Wall, 247 N.C. 516, 519, 101 S.B.2d
413, 416 (1958); see New Bern I, 328 N.C. at 559, 402 S.E.2d at 624-
25 (stating that, “in order to invoke the provisions of the Declaratory
Judgment Act[,] there must be a justiciable controversy between the
parties” (citations omitted)). “Although it is not necessary that one
party have an actual right of action against another to satisfy the juris-
dictional requirement of an actual controversy, it is necessary that liti-
gation appear unavoidable.” Gaston Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Harrison,
311 N.C. 230, 234, 316 S.B.2d 59, 61 (1984) (citation omitted). Litigation
is unavoidable for declaratory judgment purposes in instances in which
a “[clounty contends it has the right to enforce certain laws,” and a
“[clity says the [c]ounty does not have the right.” New Bern I, 328 N.C
at 561, 402 S.E.2d at 626. Thus, a municipality’s challenge to the consti-
tutionality of legislation affecting its legal position involves an actual
or justiciable controversy cognizable under the Declaratory Judgment.
Act. See, e.g., N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 198-99,
675 S.E.2d 641, 647-48 (2009) (concluding that a justiciable controversy

‘ existed between two governmental entities and sufficed to confer stand-
ing to seek and obtain a declaration concerning the nature and extent
of their disputed powers and duties); see also Town of Spruce Pine,
346 N.C. at 790, 488 S.E.2d at 146 (concluding that Avery County had
standing to seek a declaration concerning the constitutionality of the
Water Supply Watershed Protection Act in light of this Court’s deci-
sions in New Bern I and Town of Emerald Isle);3 Town of Emerald Isle,

3. Although Town of Spruce Pine does not specifically state that the County's chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the Water Supply Watershed Protection Act took the form
of a declaratory judgment action, the Court of Appeals’ decision clearly establishes that
it did. 123 N.C. App. 704, 711, 475 S.B.2d 238, 237 (1996) (stating that, “[fJor standing in a
declaratory judgment action, there must be a present, actual controversy at the time the
pleading requesting declaratory relief is filed” (citing Sharpe, 317 N.C. at 584, 347 S.E.2d at
29)), rev'd on other grounds, 346 N.C. 787, 488 8.H.2d 144 (1997).

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820 N.C. at 646, 360 S.E.2d at 760 (concluding that the Town had stand-
ing to seek a declaration concerning the constitutionality of legislation
requiring the Town to maintain facilities providing pedestrian beach
access because the action involved a present actual controversy between
the parties (citation omitted)). As a result, the Town clearly has standing
to seek a declaration concerning the constitutionality of the Boone Act.

The State’s reliance upon Wood and In re Martin for standing-related
purposes is misplaced. In In re Martin, this Court held, in the context
of an administrative appeal, that a county lacked standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a statute granting tax exemptions as violative
of the uniform taxation provisions of Article V, Section 2 of the North
Carolina Constitution. 286 N.C. at 71, 75-76, 209 S.E.2d at 770, 773. In the
aftermath of In re Martin, this Court has allowed a municipality to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of a statute affecting its rights or status in a
declaratory judgment action on multiple occasions. E.g., Town of Spruce
Pine, 346 N.C. at 790, 488 S.E.2d at 146; New Bern I, 328 N.C. at 558-61,
402 S.E.2d at 624-26; Town of Emerald Isle, 320 N.C. at 646, 360 S.E.2d
at 760. In re Martin does not articulate a broad standing rule of the
nature posited by the State. Instead, the Court’s standing decision in In
re Martin stemmed from the fact that, given that counties lack inherent
taxing authority, they do not have a right to complain that the enabling
legislation authorizing counties to tax personal property “is lacking in
breadth,” 286 N.C. at 74, 209 S.E.2d at 772; that the county, which was
seeking to avail itself of the authority to tax personal property pursuant
to the same legislation that it alleged to be unconstitutional, could “not
accept the benefits of the taxing power conferred upon it by the statute
and at the same time reject on constitutional grounds the statutory clas-
sification of property which ‘shall not be assessed for taxation,’ ” id. at
75, 209 S.B.2d at 772 (citation omitted); and that the county was pre-
cluded from challenging the constitutionality of the statute in question
because the “uniformity in taxation” requirement contained in Article
V, Section 2 “relates to equality in the burden on the State’s taxpayers”
rather than the county’s interest in collecting tax revenues, id. at 76,
209 S.E.2d at 773 (citation omitted). Thus, our decision in In re Martin
rested on a number of factors, most of which provide no support for the
State’s position with respect to the standing issue.

Although the Court of Appeals focused its attention in Wood on the
first of the three factors mentioned in In re Martin, 43 N.C. App. at 419,
259 S.E.2d at 586 (stating that, as was the case with Mecklenburg County
in In re Martin, “the City of Fayetteville . . . is a creature of the legisla-
ture and an agency of the state” that “has no inherent power to annex”

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and that, “[iJn light of Martin, . . . the City cannot question the limita-
tions placed by the legislature on its power to annex” (internal citations
omitted)), this Court is not bound by that decision.4 Contrary to the
approach adopted in Wood, we have interpreted In re Martin as holding
that a local government lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality
of a statute in the event that it has accepted benefits arising from the
same statute that it seeks to challenge. See, ¢.g., Town of Spruce Pine,
346 N.C. at 790, 488 S.E.2d at 146.5 Consistent with that interpretation
of In re Martin, in New Bern I, 328 N.C. at 559, 402 S.E.2d at 625, this
Court rejected the argument that a unit of local government lacks stand-
ing to seek a declaration concerning the constitutionality of a statute
divesting it of existing regulatory authority on the theory that the local
government has no inherent or “vested right” to exercise that authority.

In my opinion, the standing issue before the Court in this case is
remarkably similar to the one that we resolved in favor of the municipal-
ity in New Bern I. Like the powers at issue in this case, the inspection
power at issue in New Bern I and II was a component of a bundle of reg-
ulatory powers that had been granted to municipalities by the General
Assembly in Article 19 of Chapter 160A. See N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-360(a),
-411 to -439 (2015). Prior to the enactment of the legislation at issue in
New Bern I and II, the city had the authority to conduct inspections
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 160A-411 and had, in fact, performed them. New
Bern IT, 338 N.C. at 434, 450 S.E.2d at 738. Although this Court recog-
nized that the General Assembly had the authority to confer building
and fire and safety code enforcement responsibility upon municipal
governments and that the municipality had no inherent or vested right
to exercise that authority, we held that the City had the right to seek
a declaration of the extent, if any, to which the challenged legislation
violated Article II, Section 24 on the grounds that the city “had the right
to enforce the codes prior to the action by the General Assembly” and
that this “change in” an enforcement responsibility that had “previ-
ously belonged to” the city could be challenged “under the Declaratory
Judgment Act.” New Bern I, 328 N.C. at 559, 402 S.E.2d at 625 (citing
Bd. of Health v. Ba. of Comm'rs, 220 N.C. 140, 142-44, 16 S.E.2d 677,
678-79 (1941) (holding that legislation allowing the Nash County Board

4. The Court of Appeals has never cited Wood in any subsequent decision.

5. Although Wood does not mention the “acceptance of a benefit” theory, Fayetteville
was challenging the constitutionality of certain limitations that the General Assembly had
placed upon the exercise of authority contained in the same statute upon which Fayetteville
predicated its claim to have a right to annex the affected area. As a result, the outcome
reached in Wood is consistent with that compelled by the “acceptance of benefits” theory.

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of Commissioners to veto the appointment of the county health officer
by the county board of health and requiring that the appointment of the
health officer be confirmed by the county commissioners was subject to
constitutional challenge in a declaratory judgment action)). In addition,
we rejected an argument that the city lacked standing to bring a declara-
tory judgment action for the purpose of challenging the constitutional-
ity of the legislation in question on the grounds that no duty was being
imposed on the city by the challenged legislation, stating “[t]hat is not
the test,” that the city’s “status was changed by the acts of the General
Assembly,” and that the city “may challenge this change of status by an
action for a declaratory judgment.” Jd. at 560, 402 S.E.2d at 625. Finally,
this Court concluded in New Bern I that the parties’ disagreement over
the county’s right to enforce the laws in question had no effect on the
city’s ability to maintain the present litigation. Id. at 561, 402 S.E.2d at
626. Thus, the fact that both the Town and the County claim the right
to regulate land use in the Town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction and the
fact that the County has taken steps to resume exercising regulatory
authority in the affected area establish that the Town and the County
have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation[ ]
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.” Stanley, 284 N.C. at 28, 199 S.B.2d at
650 (quoting Flast 392 U.S. at 99, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 961 (citation omitted)).

The State correctly notes that the facts at issue in New Bern I and
II and the facts at issue here are different in that this case involves the
removal of an entire bundle of powers, rather than a single power, from
the authority that the General Assembly has delegated to the Town; that
the enforcement authority at issue in this case, unlike the authority at
issue in the New Bern cases, involves the exercise of regulatory author-
ity in an area located outside of the municipality’s corporate limits rather
than inside those limits; that the legislation at issue in New Bern I and II,
unlike the Boone Act, explicitly transferred enforcement authority from
the municipality to the county; and that the Town, unlike the municipal-
ity in New Bern I and II, was required to and did enact ordinances defin-
ing the area in which it intended to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
as a prerequisite for exerting regulatory authority there. However, while
these distinctions implicate facts that are relevant to a determination of
the merits of the Town's challenge to the constitutionality of the Boone
Act, Iam unable to see how they have any bearing on the proper reso-
lution of the standing issue in this case. Thus, for all these reasons, I
believe that the State’s challenge to the Town’s standing to maintain the
present action lacks merit.

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The ultimate issue before us in this case is whether the constitution-
ality of the Boone Act should be evaluated on the basis of the General
Assembly's authority to “provide for the organization and government,
and the fixing of boundaries,” N.C. Const. art. VII, § 1, or the General
Assembly's authority to “give such powers and duties” to local govern-
ments “except as otherwise prohibited by this Constitution.” As a result
of the fact that Article II, Section 24 was enacted for the purpose of
placing certain limits on the authority retained by the General Assembly,
including at least a portion of the authority recognized in Article VII,
Section 1, I believe that a proper resolution of the issue before us
requires a consideration of Article VI, Section 1, Article II, Section 24,
and the decisions of this Court discussing the reach of the limitations
on the legislative power to enact local legislation worked by Article II,
Section 24. After conducting what I believe to be the required analysis, I
am unable to escape the conclusion that the logic adopted by the Court
in upholding the Boone Act unduly enlarges the scope of the first por
tion of the first paragraph of Article VII, Section 1 and unduly narrows
both the second part of the first paragraph of Article VII, Section 1 and
the reach of the limitations on the scope of the legislative power set out
in Article Il, Section 24 in a manner that is not “in consonance with the
objects and purposes in contemplation at the time of their adoption.”
Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 444, 75 S.B.2d 512, 514 (1953).

Since the adoption of our first constitution in 1776, the General
Assembly has enjoyed considerable authority over units of local gov-
ernment. See generally John L. Sanders, The Proposed Constitution of
North Carolina: An Analysis, 23 Popular Gov't 1, 9 (Feb. 1959) (not-
ing that “North Carolina has a strong tradition of state legislative con-
trol and supervision of local government, both county and municipal,”
and that, “[f]rom 1776 until 1868, the Constitution left provision for and
control of local government almost entirely in the hands of the General
Assembly”). Although the delegates at the 1835 convention elected to
propose constitutional amendments to prohibit “private laws” address-
ing a number of subjects, including the granting of requests for divorce,
alimony, name changes, legitimation of individuals born out of wedlock,
and restoration of citizenship rights of convicted felons, N.C. Const.
of 1776, Amends. of 1835, art. I, §§ 3, 4, paras. 3-5, which were subse-
quently ratified by the voters, the delegates rejected a proposal that
“[t]he General Assembly shall have no power to pass any private law to
effect any object, that could be effected by a general law on the same
subject.” Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of North-Carolina
[1835] 379, 382 (Raleigh, Joseph Gales & Son 1836).

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The 1868 Constitution provided that “[iJt shall be the duty of the
Legislature to provide for the organization of cities, towns, and incor-
porated villages,” N.C. Const. of 1868, art. VIII, § 4, without requiring
the adoption of uniform legislation addressing that subject. Although
the framers of the 1868 Constitution limited the enactment of such legis-
lation with respect to private businesses, those limitations did not apply
to municipal and public corporations. Id., art. VII, § 1 (providing that
“[clorporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be cre-
ated by special act, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where,
in the judgment of the Legislature, the object of the corporations cannot
be attained under general laws,” with “[a]ll general laws and special acts
passed pursuant to this Section” being subject to “alter[ation] from time
to time or repeal[ ]”). In 1875, the General Assembly's authority over
local governments was expanded, with the changes by which this policy
was effectuated including the adoption of an amendment to Article VIL
of the Constitution of 1868 adding new language providing that “[t]he
General Assembly shall have full power by statute to modify, change
or abrogate any and all of the provisions of this article and substitute
others in their place, except sections seven, nine and thirteen.” Jd.,
Amends. of 1875, art. VII, § 14; see generally John V. Orth & Paul Martin
Newby, The North Carolina State Constitution 25-26 (2d ed. 2013) (stat-
ing that “[t]he principal aim” of these amendments “was to restore to
the General Assembly more of the power it had lost” in 1868 and that
“the General Assembly regained its former power over local govern-
ment” by means of Article VII, § 14). The 1875 amendments to the con-
stitutional provisions governing the relationship between the General
Assembly and local government were adopted despite concerns that
they would “abridg[e] the rights of the citizens by placing the govern-
ment and organization of cities, towns, and &c., under the unlimited
control of the Legislature.” Journal of the Constitutional Convention
of the State of North Carolina 162-63, 252 (Raleigh, Josiah Turner 1875).

The present version of the first paragraph of Article VII, Section 1
was recommended in the report of the North Carolina State Constitution
Study Commission. Report of the North Carolina State Constitution
Study Commission 33, 90 (1968). In support of this recommendation,
the Commission noted that, given the version of Article VII adopted in
1875, the constitutional provisions governing the General Assembly’s
authority over local government, except for those relating to financial
matters and providing for the office of Sheriff, were subject to modifica-
tion by the General Assembly, which “ha[d] often exercised that power.”
Id. at 33. “In view of this fact,” the Commission recommended eliminat-
ing the provisions contained in Article VII that prescribed the General

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Assembly’s authority over the organization and powers of local govern-
ment to the extent that they were subject to modification by statute and
inserting in their stead what is now the first paragraph of Article VII,
Section 1, which the Commission depicted as “a general description of
the General Assembly's power to provide for the organization and pow-
ers of local government” that, instead of constituting “a delegation of
power to the General Assembly,” “merely [recognizes] . . . the [General
Assembly's] power in this regard.” Jd. The Commission’s recommended
modifications to the constitutional provisions relating to the General
Assembly's authority over local governments were not “calculated . . . to
bring about any fundamental change in the power of state and local gov-
ernment or the distribution of that power.” Id. at 4. Those amendments
were submitted for ratification by the voters, approved at the 1970 gen-
eral election, and became effective on 1 July 1971, Act of July 2, 1969,
ch. 1258, secs. 1, 2, 4, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1461, 1479, 1484. As a result,
the General Assembly's well-established and long-standing authority
over the organization and powers of local government currently appears
in, while antedating, Article VII, Section 1, which provides, in pertinent
part, that:

The General Assembly shall provide for the organi-
zation and government and the fixing of boundaries of
counties, cities and towns, and other governmental sub-
divisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this
Constitution, may give such powers and duties to coun-
ties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivi-
sions as it may deem advisable.

N.C. Const. art. VIL, § 1.
Article II, Section 24 expressly precludes the General Assembly
from “enact[ing] any local, private, or special act or resolution” con-

cerning fourteen “[p]rohibited subjects.” Among other things, Article II,
Section 24 provides that:

(1) Prohibited subjects. - The General Assembly shall
not enact any local, private, or special act or resolution:

(a) Relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement
of nuisances;

(e) Relating to non-navigable steams;

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(j) Regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing;

(8) Prohibited acts void. — Any local, private, or spe-
cial act or resolution enacted in violation of the provi-
sions of this Section shall be void.

N.C. Const. art. II, § 24(1)(a), (8). Although the General Assembly is pro-
hibited from “enact[ing] any local, private, or special act” regarding any
of the fourteen subjects listed in Article II, Section 24(1) “by the partial
repeal of a general law,” id. § 24(2), the General Assembly “may . . .
repeal local, private, or special laws enacted by it,” id., and “enact gen-
eral laws regulating the matters set out” in the relevant constitutional
provision, id. art. II, § 24(4).

Article II, Section 24, which was Article II, Section 29 at the time of
its original adoption, was one of three constitutional amendments seek-
ing to curtail local, private, and special legislation that were submitted
for ratification by the General Assembly in 1915, were ratified by the
people on 7 November 1916, and became effective on 10 January 1917.
See Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 99, secs. 1, 8, 1915 N.C. Pub. [Sess.] Laws
148, 148-49, 151; see also Kornegay v. City of Goldsboro, 180 N.C. 441,
449, 105 S.E. 187, 191 (1920) (describing the adoption of former Article
IL, Section 29; Article VII, Section 1; and former Article VII, Section 4
as “a complete and comprehensive scheme” intended to “remedy” the
“fully realized . . . evils of special, local, and private acts” and “to get rid
of special legislation as far as practicable”).® As the history of Article II,
Section 24 demonstrates:

6. Article VII, Sections 1 and 4 provided, after the adoption of the 1916 amend-
ments, that:

Section 1. No corporation shall be created nor shall its charter be
extended, altered, or amended by special act, except corporations, for
charitable, educational, penal, or xeformatory purposes that are to be
and remain under the patronage and control of the State; but the General
Assembly shall provide by general laws for the chartering and organiza
tion of all corporations, and for amending, extending, and forfeiture of all
charters, except those above permitted by special act. All such general
laws and special acts may be altered from time to time or repealed; and
the General Assembly may at any time by special act repeal the charter
of any corporation.

[Section 4.] It shall be the duty of the Legislature to provide by general
laws for the organization of cities, towns, and incorporated villages,
and to restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money,

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The organic law of the State was originally drafted
and promulgated by a convention which met at Halifax
in December, 1776. During the ensuing 140 years, the
Legislature of North Carolina possessed virtually unlim-
ited constitutional power to enact local, private, and
special statutes. This legislative power was exercised
with much liberality, and produced a plethora of local,
private, and special enactments. As an inevitable conse-
quence, the law of the State was frequently one thing in
one locality, and quite different things in other localities.
To minimize the resultant confusion, the people of North
Carolina amended their Constitution at the general elec-
tion of 1916 so as to deprive their Legislature of the power
to enact local, private, or special acts or resolutions relat-
ing to many of the most common subjects of legislation.

In thus amending their organic law, the people were
motivated by the desire that the General Assembly should
legislate for North Carolina in respect to the subjects
specified as a single united commonwealth rather than
as a conglomeration of innumerable discordant com-
munities. To prevent this laudable desire from degener-
ating into a mere pious hope, they decreed in emphatic
and express terms that “any local, private, or special act
or resolution passed in violation of the provisions of this
section shall be void[.]”

Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 185-86, 581
S.E.2d 415, 426-27 (2003) (first alteration in original) (quoting Idol
v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 732-33, 65 S.E.2d 313, 314-15 (1951) (quoting N.C.
Const. of 1868, art. Il, § 29 (1917) (now art. Il, § 24(3)))).

contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to prevent abuses in
assessment and in contracting debts by such municipal corporations.

Ch, 99, sec. 1, 1915 N.C. Pub. [Sess.] Laws at 149. This Court held, in a sharply divided
opinion, that Article VII, Section 1 only applied to “private or business corporations, and
does not refer to public or quasi-public corporations acting as governmental agencies,”
Kornegay, 180 N.C. at 446, 105 S.E. at 189 (quoting Mills v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 175 N.C. 216,
219, 95 S.E. 481, 482 (1918)), and that, since the general law provision contained in Article
VIII, Section 4 was directory, rather than mandatory, id. at 448, 105 S.E. at 190, it did not
prevent the enactment of local or special legislation governing the organization and opera-
tion of municipal governments, id. at 448-50, 105 S.E. at 190-91, Article VII, Section 4 was
deleted from the North Carolina Constitution when Article VI, Section 1 was adopted. Ch.
1258, sec. 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1479.

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It was the purpose of the amendment to free the General
Assembly from the enormous amount of petty detail which
had been occupying its attention, to enable it to devote
more time and attention to general legislation of statewide
interest and concern, to strengthen local self-government
by providing for the delegation of local matters by general
laws to local authorities, and to require uniform and coor-
dinated action under general laws on matters related to
the welfare of the whole State.

High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 656, 142 S.E.2d 697,
702 (1965). :

Although the majority posits that Article VIL, Section 1 is more recent
in time than Article II, Section 24 and, consequently, that the provisions in
Article VI, Section 1 are to be given their “full application” to the extent
there is any conflict between these two constitutional provisions, I am
unable to agree with this logic. As was noted above, the modifications
to Article VI that led to the enactment of the first paragraph of Article
VII, Section 1 were not “calculated . . . to bring about any fundamental
change in the power of state ‘and local government or the distribution
of that power.” Report of the North Carolina State Constitution Study
Commission 4. In other words, Article VIL, Section 1 was not designed
to effectuate any substantive change to the General Assembly’s author-
ity over units of local government and did nothing more than reflect the
same legislative authority that existed when Article Il, Section 24 was
adopted, effectively making Article II, Section 24, rather than Article VII,
Section 1, more recent in time. As a result, given that the enactment of
Article VII, Section 1 did not have the effect of changing existing North
Carolina law, Article II, Section 24 and this Court’s decisions construing
it remain critical to a proper resolution of this case.

As noted earlier, the State and County argue that the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction constitutes the “fixing of boundaries” for
purposes of Article VII, Section 1, rendering the limitations on local leg-
islation imposed by Article I, Section 24 inapplicable to the Boone Act,
aproposition with which the Court appears to agree. Although the Town
acknowledges that Article VU, Section 1 gives the General Assembly ple-
nary authority over municipal boundaries, it contends that the “boundar-
ies” referenced in the relevant constitutional provision are the municipal
boundaries that are fixed at the time of initial incorporation or by means
of subsequent charter amendments or annexations rather than the area
within which a municipality is authorized to exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction; that extraterritorial jurisdiction relates to regulatory power

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or authority rather than the establishment of municipal boundaries; that
the establishment and exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is materi-
ally different from the initial establishment or subsequent alteration of
municipal boundaries; and that any alteration in the regulatory authority
that the Town is entitled to exercise is subject to constitutional limita-
tions, such as those contained in Article II, Section 24, on the General
Assembly's authority to “give such powers and duties to counties, cities
and towns, and other governmental subdivisions as it may deem advis-
able,” N.C. Const. art. VII, § 1. I find this interpretation of Article VIL,
Section 1 persuasive.

Neither the State, the County, nor the Court point to any cases hold-
ing that the exercise of extraterritorial land use regulatory authority con-
stitutes the “fixing of boundaries” for purposes of Article VI, Section 1.
The only reason that a municipality is required to define the area in which
it is entitled to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction is to specify the loca-
tion or locations within which the municipality can take a limited num-
ber of actions that could not otherwise be taken there with respect to
regulation of the planning, development, and use of land, including (1)
the subdivision of land, N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-371 to -377 (2015); (2) zoning,
id. §§ 160A-381 to -393 (2015); (8) historic districts and landmarks, id.
§§ 160A-400.1 to -400.15 (2015); (4) private development agreements,
id. §§ 160A-400.20 to -400.32 (2015); (5) wireless telecommunications
facilities, id. §§ 160A-400.50 to -400.53 (2015); (6) the acquisition of
open space, id. §§ 160A-401 to -407 (2015); (7) building inspections, id.
§ 1604-411 to -439 (2015); (8) minimum housing standards, id. §§ 160A-441.
to -450 (2015); and (9) community appearance standards, id. §§ 160A-451
to -455 (2015), as well as certain other “[mliscellaneous [p]owers”
delineated in Part 8 of Article 19 of Chapter 160A, such as community
development programs and activities, the acquisition and disposition
of property for redevelopment, urban development action grants, and
urban homesteading programs, id. §§ 160A-456 to -457.2 (2015); erosion
and sedimentation control, id. § 160-458 (2015); floodway regulation, id.
§ 160A-458.1 (2015); mountain ridge protection, id. § 160A-458.2 (2015);
downtown development projects, id. § 160A-458.3 (2015); designation
of transportation corridor official maps, id. § 160A-458.4 (2015); storm-
water control, id. § 160A-459 (2015); and programs to finance energy
improvements, id. § 160A-459.1 (2015). See David W. Owens, Univ. of
N.C. Sch. of Gov't, Land Use Law in North Carolina 31 & n.47 (2d
ed. 2011) (stating that, “[w]hen a city adopts an extraterritorial bound-
ary ordinance, the city acquires jurisdiction for all of its ordinances
adopted under Article 19 of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes” (cit-
ing N.C.G.S. § 160A-360(a)); see also id. at 30 (discussing how concerns

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about “chaotic” development “along the urban fringe, often in unregu-
lated areas just outside of city corporate limits,” resulted in the General
Assembly’s decision to authorize cities to implement “ ‘perimeter zon-
ing,’ which is now known as municipal extraterritorial jurisdiction”).
On the other hand, the initial creation of municipal boundaries and the
process of extending those boundaries through boundary extension leg-
islation or annexation results in the identification of those individuals
entitled to vote in municipal elections and receive municipal services and
required to pay municipal taxes and to be subject to the full panoply of
the municipality's authority. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 160A-31 (2015) (annexa-
tion by petition); Frayda S. Bluestein, Incorporation, Annexation, and
City-County Consolidation, in County and Municipal Government in
North Carolina 15, 17-24 (Frayda S. Bluestein ed., 2d ed. 2014) [hereinaf-
ter County and Municipal Government] (discussing the various forms
of statutorily authorized annexation, required provision of governmental
services, and taxation of newly annexed property); Trey Allen, General
Ordinance Authority, in County and Municipal Government, 77, 84
(stating that, “[flor the most part, a city’s police power ordinances apply
only within the corporate limits and to any city-owned property or right-
of-way outside the city,” although “[a] city may enforce zoning and other
development ordinances inside its corporate limits and within its extra-
territorial jurisdiction” (citing N.C.G.S. § 160A-176 (2013)). Thus, even
though a municipality must define the boundary within which it intends
to exercise extraterritorial regulatory authority, the enforcement of
those powers, rather than the establishment of a territorial boundary,
is the defining characteristic of extraterritorial jurisdiction, rendering
legislative decisions relating to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion subject to constitutional limitations not applicable to legislation
prescribing and governing the establishment of municipal boundaries.
New Bern II, 338 N.C. at 438, 450 S.E.2d at 740 (rejecting the county's
argument that local legislation removing the city’s authority to conduct
building code inspections relating to certain properties located within
the city’s corporate limits and shifting that authority to the county was
within the General Assembly’s “plenary powers to enact local laws pur-
suant to Article VII, Section 1” (citing State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325
N.C. 438, 448, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989))).

In addition, the Court holds that the Boone Act is not subject to the
limitations upon the enactment of local legislation contained in Article
Il, Section 24 because extraterritorial jurisdiction implicates the “orga-
nization and government” of units of local government as authorized

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by Article VI, Section 1,” and that the Boone Act “is an exercise of the
General Assembly's plenary authority to ‘provide for the organization
and government and fixing of boundaries’ of local government under the
first clause of Article VI, Section 1.” However, the Court has not cited
any prior decisions of this Court holding that the limitations imposed
by Article Il, Section 24 do not apply to legislation, such as the Boone
Act, effectuating what amounts to the reassignment of local government
jurisdiction over particular subjects of regulation, or that the “pow-
ers and duties” which the General Assembly is authorized to delegate
to local governments pursuant to Article VII, Section 1 are not subject to
the limitations upon legislative authority imposed by Article II, Section
24, and I know of none. On the contrary, this Court has repeatedly invali-
dated local acts changing the existing assignment of regulatory author-
ity among units of local government as violative of Article II, Section 24.

A careful review of this Court's decisions concerning Article I,
Section 24 demonstrates that we have repeatedly held that the enact-
ment of local legislation which had the effect of shifting, reassigning, or
re-delegating the authority to regulate certain activities from one unit
of local government to another violated Article II, Section 24 without
ever stating that the analysis required by Article I, Section 24 is lim-
ited to instances involving the exercise of “power” separate and apart
from the reassignment of regulatory jurisdiction. For example, we have
held that local legislation transferring the authority to enforce health
and safety regulations from one local government entity to another was
invalid pursuant to Article II, Section 24. See, e.g., New Bern IT, 338 N.C.
at 440, 450 S.E.2d at 741 (invalidating legislation that shifted responsibil-
ity for enforcing the State Building Code by expanding Craven County’s
jurisdiction to include certain properties located within New Bern’s
municipal corporate boundaries as impermissible local legislation relat-
ing to health and sanitation); see also Idol, 233 N.C. at 733, 65 S.E.2d
at 315 (finding it “clear beyond peradventure” that legislation authoriz-
ing the consolidation of the Winston-Salem and Forsyth County health
departments and providing for the appointment of a joint city-county
board to administer the public health laws in the affected jurisdictions
constituted a prohibited “local act relating to health”); Bd. of Health
v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 220 N.C. at 143, 16 S.E.2d at 679 (emphasizing our
“commit[ment] to the proposition that a law affecting the selection of
officers to whom is given the duty of administering the health laws is a

7. Neither the State nor the Town argued that the Boone Act involves the “organiza-
tion and government” of local governments as provided for in Article VI, Section 1.

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TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 126 (2016)]

law ‘relating to health’ ” while invalidating a local law requiring that the
county health officer appointed by the county board of health be con-
firmed by the Nash County Board of Commissioners (citing Sams v. Bd.
of Cty. Comm’rs, 217 N.C. 284, 285, 7 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1940))); Sams, 217
N.C. at 285-86, 7 S.E.2d at 541 (concluding that a local act “undertak[ing]
to create for Madison County, alone, a county board of health and to
name its members” “conflict[ed] with the constitutional restrictions
upon the power of the General Assembly imposed by” Article II, Section
24). The Court’s decision that the Boone Act is not subject to the limita-
tions upon the enactment of local legislation spelled out in Article I,
Section 24 conflicts with the clear import of these decisions.

As support for its broad interpretation of “organization and govern-
ment” as used in the first part of the first paragraph of Article VII, Section
1, the Court conducts a plain language analysis focusing upon dictionary
definitions of the relevant words. However, the plain language in which
the provision in question is couched suggests to me that the phrase
“organization and government” refers to the creation of units of local
government and the manner in which those units of local government
are governed rather than the powers that those units are entitled to exer-
cise. My interpretation is fully consistent with the numerous decisions
upon which the Court relies, almost all of which relate to the establish-
ment of municipal boundaries or the creation or abolition of units of
local government, rather than to the authority that units of local gov-
ernment are entitled to exercise. Unlike the majority's interpretation,
this interpretation of “organization and government” also avoids overly
narrowing or eviscerating the “powers and duties” language contained
in the second part of the first paragraph of Article VII, Section 1, see Bd.
of Educ. v. Ba. of Comm’rs, 137 N.C. 310, 312, 49 S.E. 353, 354 (1904)
(stating that, “{iJf different portions [of the state constitution] seem
to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make some words idle and nugatory” (quot-
ing Thomas M. Cooley, Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations 92 (7th ed.
1903))); see also Lacy v. Fid. Bank of Durham, 183 N.C. 374, 380, 111
S.E. 612, 615 (1922) (stating that the constitution should be “construed
so as to allow significance to each and every part of it if this can be
done by any fair and reasonable intendment” (citation omitted)), and
does not conflict with the numerous decisions invalidating local govern-
ment reorganizations cited in the preceding paragraph. As a result, for
all these reasons, I cannot agree that the Boone Act constitutes a valid
exercise of the General Assembly's authority to provide for the “organi-
zation and government” of local governmental bodies.

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Even if the enactment of local legislation eliminating the Town's
authority to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction constitutes the altera-
tion of municipal corporate boundaries and the exercise of the General
Assembly’s authority over the “organization and government” of units of
local government, our opinion in Piedmont Ford Truck Sale indicates
that the limitations on the enactment of local legislation imposed by
Article II, Section 24 remain relevant. In that case, the owners of recently
annexed property challenged the validity of a local act authorizing the
City of Greensboro to annex certain land contiguous to Greensboro’s
existing corporate limits, contending, among other things, that the
challenged legislation constituted an impermissible local law relat-
ing to health and sanitation in violation of Article II, Section 24(1)(a).8
324 N.C. at 500, 380 S.E.2d at 108. In rejecting the property owners’
challenge to the validity of the legislation in question, which, like the
challenge advanced by the Town in this case, rested upon the powers or
duties that the Greensboro would be required to exercise (or precluded
from exercising) in the relevant area, we acknowledged that the altera-
tion and extension of Greensboro’s municipal corporate boundaries fell
within the ambit of Article VI, Section 1. Id. at 501-02, 380 S.E.2d at
109. In spite of the fact that the legislation at issue in that case consti-
tuted “the fixing of boundaries” for purposes of Article VII, Section 1 and
effectuated what the Court has labeled in this case as a restructuring of
the regulatory jurisdiction made available to the City of Greensboro by
subjecting the annexed territory and those persons living within it to
the full panoply of rights, obligations, and regulations available to and
imposed upon City residents, this Court did not refrain from conducting
an Article II, Section 24 analysis, as consistency with the Court’s deci-
sion in this case would seem to require. Instead, we proceeded to analyze
the substance of the property owners’ contention that the legislation in
question, which required the City to provide solid waste collection ser-
vice in the newly annexed territory, constituted impermissible local leg-
islation relating to health and sanitation in violation of Article Il, Section
24(1)(a). Id. at 504-05, 380 S.E.2d at 110-11. Although we ultimately held
that the legislation in question did not violate Article II, Section 24(1)(a),

8 The language quoted by the Court from Piedmont Ford Truck Sale does not
appear in that portion of our opinion addressing the property owners’ claim in reliance
upon Article If, Section 24. 324 N.C. at 502, 380 8.E.2d at 109 (stating that “[t}he extension
of boundaries of cities has been held to be a political decision which is not protected
by the United States Constitution or the Constitution of North Carolina” in address-
ing the property owners’ argument in reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution
(citations omitted)).

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[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

id. at 505-06, 380 S.E.2d at 110-11, the fact that we reached the merits
of the property owners’ claim under Article II, Section 24 suggests that
a local act that alters local government jurisdictional boundaries and
reorganizes units of local government is not immune from challenge
under Article II, Section 24. Thus, even if the Boone Act amounted to
a revision of municipal boundaries or the organization of local govern-
ment, Piedmont Ford Truck Sale suggests that the limitations upon the
enactment of local legislation enunciated in Article II, Section 24 remain
applicable in the event that the legislation in question has the effect of
altering the local government's powers or duties relating to prohibited
subjects such as health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances. As
a result, for all these reasons, I believe that we are required to address
the merits of the Town’s challenge to the Boone Act under Article I,
Section 24.

The first step in determining whether the Boone Act violates Article
II, Section 24 would ordinarily be for us to decide whether the Boone
Act “is a local act prohibited by Article II, section 24 of the Constitution”
or “a general law which the General Assembly has the power to enact.”
Adams, 295 N.C. at 690, 249 S.E.2d at 406. In this case, however, the
State and the County have conceded that the Boone Act is a local act.?
As a result, we need only determine whether the Boone Act “[rJelat[es]
to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances,” N.C. Const. art.
Il, § 24(1)(a), “[rJelat[es] to non-navigable streams,” id. § 24(1)(e), or
“[rJegulat[es] labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing,” id. § 24(1)(@).

Although the stated purpose of a local act and its substantive provi-
sions are undoubtedly relevant to the determination of whether a local

9. The parties have made conflicting assertions about the origin of the Town’s
authority to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. In 1959, the General Assembly autho-
rized municipalities with populations of “2,500 or more” in eighty-one counties to “adopt ]
zoning regulations” “extending for a distance of one mile beyond [their corporate] limits
in all directions.” Act of June 19, 1959, ch. 1204, sec. 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1354, 1354-55
(codified at N.C.G.S. § 160-181.2 (1959)). However, municipalities located in eighteen coun-
ties, including Watauga, were specifically excluded from the coverage of this legislation.
Ta., sec. 1, at 1355. In 1961, the General Assembly authorized municipalities with a popu-
lation of 1,250 or more to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction and eliminated the exclu-
sion for municipalities located in Watauga County. Act of May 30, 1961, ch. 648, secs. 1,
1%, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 748 (amending N.C.G.S. § 160A-181.2 (1959)). In view of the fact
that an act “eliminating a county from a list of [counties] excepted” and “making the provi-
sions of” a general law applicable to that county is “tantamount to a re-enactment of the
general law making it applicable” to the county in question rather than a local law, State
»v. Ballenger, 247 N.C. 216, 217-18, 100 8.E.2d 351, 353 (1957), the 1961 Act appears to have
been a general, rather than a local, law.

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TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

law violates Article II, Section 24(1), City of Asheville v. State, ___N.C.
—__,__S.E.2d___,___ (Dee. 21, 2016) (93A15-2), our recent prece-
dent clearly indicates that the practical effect of the challenged legislation
is pertinent to, and perhaps determinative of, the required constitutional
inquiry, e.g., Williams, 357 N.C. at 189, 581 S.E.2d at 429 (concluding
that, while “the record demonsirates that . . . the intent of the enabling
legislation and the Ordinance [enacted pursuant to the challenged legis-
lation] is to prohibit discrimination in the workplace, the effect of these
enactments is to govern the labor practices of [certain businesses] in
Orange County”); New Bern II, 338 N.C. at 433-42, 450 S.E.2d at 737-
42 (concluding that legislation shifting the responsibility for enforcing
the State Building Code with respect to certain buildings from the City
of New Bern to Craven County constituted unconstitutional local acts
related to health and sanitation). Thus, we must determine the extent to
which the Boone Act impermissibly impinges upon one of the subjects
about which the General Assembly lacks the authority to enact local leg-
islation by examining the stated purpose of the challenged legislation,
the content of its substantive provisions, and the practical effect that the
challenged legislation will have if it is allowed to go into effect.

As we noted in City of Asheville, this Court has not, to date, clearly
indicated when a local act does and does not “relate” to a prohibited
subject for purposes of Article II, Section 24. For the reasons set forth
in that decision, the issue of whether a local law relates to one of the
prohibited subjects enumerated in Article I, Section 24 requires us to
consider whether, in light of its stated purpose and practical effect, the
Boone Act has a material, but not exclusive or predominant, connec-
tion to one of those purposes. In undertaking the required analysis in
a case, such as this one, which involves legislation implicating a broad
range of issues rather than a single subject that has been subject to a
facial, rather than an as-applied challenge, I believe that we are required
to evaluate the challenged legislation as a whole and to ascertain the
materiality of the relationship between the challenged legislation and
the prohibited subjects delineated in Article II, Section 24 by determin-
ing whether the challenged legislation, considered in its entirety, has a
material relationship to one or more of those prohibited subjecis.!° Any

10. The applicability of the analytical approach that I deem appropriate in this case
hinges upon the fact that the General Assembly has treated the range of issues about
which a municipality would ordinarily be entitled to exercise regulatory authority as a
unified whole. In other words, the applicable legislation authorizes a municipality, in the
exercise of its discretion, to do a number of different things in regulating land use in its

extraterritorial jurisdiction without in any way indicating that the availability of these dif- *

ferent types of regulatory authority should be treated as severable. A subject-by-subject

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other approach will fail to honor the presumption of constitutionality to
which legislation enacted by the General Assembly is entitled and result
in a mistaken understanding of the genuine purpose for and practical
effect of the challenged legislation.

Unlike the situation with respect to the legislation at issue in City
of Asheville, the Boone Act Jacks a statement of the purpose that moti-
vated the General Assembly's decision to eliminate the Town’s ability
to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, the clear effect of
the General Assembly's decision to enact the Boone Act is to prevent the
Town from regulating certain activities in the existing extraterritorial
area and to preclude the Town from exercising such authority in addi-
tional areas in the future. Although the Boone Act does not explicitly
“undo” the designation of the extraterritorial areas in which the Town
was entitled to exercise regulatory jurisdiction, see Act of June 26, 2014,
ch. 38, sec. 1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 2014) 139, 140 (stating
that “the Town of Boone shall not exercise any powers of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction as provided in Article 19 of Chapter 160A of the General
Statutes”), I am not convinced that the General Assembly intended to
create a zone in which no local governmental entity has the ability to
exercise regulatory authority. For that reason, I see no basis for believing
that the General Assembly intended to do anything other than to transfer
regulatory authority with respect to the affected area from the Town to
the County. See N.C.G.S. § 153A-320 (stating that “[eJach of the powers
granted to counties by this Article and by Article 19 of Chapter 160A of
the General Statutes may be exercised throughout the county except as
otherwise provided in G.S. 160A-360); id. § 160A-360(f1) (2015) (stating
that, “[w]hen a city relinquishes jurisdiction over an area that it is regu-
lating under this Article to a county, the city regulations and powers of
enforcement shall remain in effect until (i) the county has adopted this
regulation or (ii) a period of 60 days has elapsed following the action by
which the city relinquished jurisdiction”); ¢f. id. § 160A-360(d) (stating
that, in the event that “a city fails to adopt an ordinance specifying the
boundaries of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, the county of which it is a
part shall be authorized to exercise the powers granted by [Article 19] in
any area beyond the city’s corporate limits”). As a result, this Court must
evaluate the extent to which the entire bundle of powers removed from
the Town and transferred to the County has a material connection to one
of the prohibited purposes set out in Article II, Section 24, rather than

approach would, of course, be perfectly permissible in the event that the challenged
legislation addressed a number of discrete issues that the General Assembly has not
linked together.

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the extent to which any isolated power which the Town is prevented
from exercising by the Boone Act relates to a prohibited purpose.

In seeking to persuade this Court that the Boone Act relates to
health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances, the Town relies upon
a number of statutory provisions, including N.C.G.S. § 160A-381 (grant-
ing zoning authority to municipalities “[f]or the purpose of promoting
health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community” and
authorizing municipalities to regulate and restrict the height, number of
stories, and size of buildings and other structures; the percentage of lots
that may be occupied; the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces;
population densities; and the location and use of buildings, structures
and land); id. § 160A-383 (providing that “[zJoning regulations shall be
designed to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare” and
may address issues such as the provision of “adequate light and air”;
the prevention of “overcrowding of land”; avoiding undue population
concentration; lessening street congestion; securing “safety from fire,
panic, and dangers”; and facilitating the “provision of transportation,
water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements”); id.
§ 160A-383.4 (authorizing regulations seeking to reduce the amount of
energy consumption through the use of measures like density bonuses
and similar incentives); id. § 160A-412(a) (providing for the enforce-
ment of state laws and local ordinances relating to the “construction
of buildings and other structures”; the installation of facilities such as
plumbing, electrical, and air-conditioning systems; the “safe, sanitary,
and healthful” “maintenance of buildings and other structures”; and
other issues specified by the city council); id. § 160A-424(a) (provid-
ing that “[t]he inspection department may make periodic inspections,
subject to the council's directions, for unsafe, unsanitary, or otherwise
hazardous and unlawful conditions in buildings or structures within its
territorial jurisdiction”); id. § 160A-426(b) (providing that “an inspector
may declare a nonresidential building or structure within a community
development target area to be unsafe if” it “appears . . . to be vacant
or abandoned” and “appears . . . to be in such dilapidated condition as
to cause or contribute to blight, disease, vagrancy, fire or safety haz-
ard, to be a danger to children, or to tend to attract persons intent on
criminal activities or other activities that would constitute a public nui-
sance”); id. § 160A-432(c) (stating that “[nJothing in this section shall be
construed to impair or limit the power of the city to define and declare
nuisances and to cause their removal or abatement by summary pro-
ceedings, or otherwise”); id. § 160A-439(a) (authorizing the adoption of
ordinances providing for the repair, closing, and demolition of nonresi-
dential buildings or structures “that fail to meet minimum standards of

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maintenance, sanitation, and safety established by the governing body”);
and id. § 160A-441 (finding “that the existence and occupation of dwell-
ings in this State that are unfit for human habitation are inimical to the
welfare and dangerous and injurious to the health, safety and morals
of the people” and “that a public necessity exists for the repair, clos-
ing or demolition of such dwellings”). Although the statutory provisions
upon which the Town relies clearly implicate issues relating to health,
sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances, I do not believe the Boone
Act, when considered as an integrated whole, has a material relation to
health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances.

As an initial matter, many of the statutory provisions to which the
Town has directed our attention essentially amount to assertions that
the statute in question has been enacted pursuant to the State’s police
power. City of Raleigh v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 275 N.C. at 460-61, 168
§.E.2d at 394 (stating that “[t]he General Assembly may delegate to a
municipality, as an agency of the State, authority to enact ordinances in
the exercise of the police power” (citation omitted)); State v. Ballance,
229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734-35 (1949) (stating that the “police
power” authorizes the “enact[ment of] laws, within constitutional limits,
to protect or promote the health, morals, order, safety, and general wel-
fare of society” and that, for “a statute . . . to be sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the police power, it must have a rational, real, or substan-
tial relation to the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the gen-
eral welfare” (citations omitted)). Although the presence of language
invoking the police power is certainly relevant to the inquiry that must
be conducted pursuant to Article II, Section 24(1)(a), New Bern II, 338
N.C. at 439-40, 450 S.E.2d at 740-41, the ubiquity with which such lan-
guage appears in the General Statutes makes it difficult for me to treat
its presence as determinative for the purpose of ascertaining whether a
particular piece of legislation relates to any prohibited subjects listed.
As noted by a leading scholar cited with regularity by this Court, see,
e.g., Adams, 295 N.C. at 690-91, 249 S.E.2d at 407, using “[t]he recital of
legislative intent in” a statute that simply reflects “standard boiler plate
language used to invoke the exercise of the police power of the state in
the protection of the public health, safety and morals” to bring an act
within the coverage of Article II, Section 24 “would cast doubt on the
validity of any exercise of the police power in less than all the counties
should the General Assembly employ” words such as “ ‘health’ in the
usual descriptive formula.” Joseph S. Ferrell, Local Legislation in the
North Carolina General Assembly, 45 N.C. L. Rev. 340, 396 (1967) (not-
ing this Court’s reliance upon such language in State ex rel. Carringer
». Alverson, 254 N.C. 204, 207, 118 S.B.2d 408, 410 (1961), to support a

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TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 126 (2016)}

determination that legislation allowing municipalities with a population
of 500 or more in fourteen named counties to create a housing author-
ity related to health and sanitation for purposes of what is now Article
TI, Section 24(1)(a) and stating that “[a]n extension of Carringer would
cast doubt on the validity of any exercise of the police power in less than
all the counties should the General Assembly employ the word ‘health’
in the usual descriptive formula”).!! Thus, the fact that the statutory pro-
visions that a municipality is entitled to enforce while exercising extra-
territorial jurisdiction were enacted pursuant to the police power should
not obscure our obligation to examine the Boone Act in its entirety.

Upon examining the practical effect of the Boone Act in its entirety,
one cannot escape the conclusion that, while portions of the zoning,
building code, housing quality, and urban development regulations that
the Town enforces in its extraterritorial jurisdiction clearly implicate
health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances, the other powers
that the Town is entitled to exercise on an extraterritorial basis do not
have such a clear relationship to those subjects. For example, it is not
clear to me that extraterritorial regulation of subdivisions, N.C.G.S.
§§ 160A-371 to -377; historic districts and landmarks, id. §§ 160A-400.1 to
-400.15; private development agreements, id. §§ 160A-400.20 to -400.32;
wireless communications facilities, id. §§ 160A-400.50 to -400.53; open
spaces, id. §§ 160A-401 to -407; community appearance commissions,
id. §§ 160A-451 to -455; mountain ridges, id. § 160A-458.2; transportation
corridor maps, id. § 160A-458.4; downtown development, id. § 160A-
458.3; and energy improvements, id. § 160A-459.1 have much, if any-
thing, to do with health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances. In
addition, municipalities exercise zoning, building code enforcement, and
housing quality regulations for a number of different purposes, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the avoidance of unsightly, but not necessarily
unsanitary, conditions; the protection of property values; and the devel-
opment of needed infrastructure. Consistent with my understanding of
the reasoning underlying the regulatory authority that the Town exer-
cises in its extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Town’s Unified Development
Ordinance sets out twenty-five “goals” that the Town seeks to achieve
through its land use policies, the vast majority of which do not appear
to have any substantial bearing on health, sanitation, and the abatement
of nuisances. Boone, N.C., Unified Dev. Ordinance, art. I, § 1.04.01 Jan.

11, The statement from State ex rel. Carringer discussed in the text constituted mere
dicta given our holding that the trial court should have dismissed the plaintiff's action
based upon his failure to establish standing to challenge the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion in question. 254 N.C. at 208, 118 S.B.2d at 410-11.

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1, 2014).!2 As a result, when the challenged legislation is considered
as a whole, I am not satisfied that the General Assembly's decision to
eliminate the Town’s ability to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction has a
material relation to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances.

Although the Town has not made any effort to define a “non-navi-
gable stream” for purposes of Article Il, Section 24(1)(e), the obverse
of the term in question is well established for purposes of our State’s
common law regarding riparian rights, in which it is typically under-
stood to refer to streams that are passable by watercraft. Gwathmey
v. State, 342 N.C. 287, 300-01, 464 S.E.2d 674, 682 (1995) (stating that
“all watercourses are regarded as navigable in law that are navigable in
fact” (quoting State v. Baum, 128 N.C. 600, 604, 38 S.E. 900, 901 (1901)),
and that, “if a body of water in its natural condition can be navigated by
watercraft, it is navigable in fact and, therefore, navigable in law, even if
it has not been used for such purpose”). For that reason, I believe that
a non-navigable stream for purposes of Article Il, Section 24(1)(e) is a
body of water over which watercraft cannot ordinarily travel. Unlike the
prohibition against the adoption of local legislation relating to health,
sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances set out in Article II, Section
24(1)(a), this Court has never had the occasion to construe the prohibi-
tion against the enactment of local legislation relating to non-navigable
streams contained in Article II, Section 24(1)(e). However, given the fact
that both of these constitutional provisions utilize identical “[rJelating

12, More specifically, the Town's goals of “[p}rotect[ing] water quality,” “[p]rotect{ing]
designated water supply watersheds,” and “[s]upport[ing] public health through provision
of convenient exercise opportunities” appear to have a material relationship to health,
sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances, while “preserv[ing] and protect{ing] areas and
landmarks of historic significance,” “[p}reventing degradation of natural drainage areas,”
“fmJinimiz[ing] public and private losses due to flood conditions,” “{mJinimiz{ing] public
and private losses due to slope failure caused by land disturbance of steep and very steep
slopes,” “[p]reserv[ing] and protect[ing] the scenic beauty and natural environment of the
Town's hillside areas,” “[p}reserv[ing] and protect[ing] the overall quality of life for resi-
dents and visitors,” “[p]reserv[ing] and protect[ing] the character of established residen-
tial neighborhoods,” “[mjaintain{ing] economically vibrant as well as attractive business
and commercial areas,” “[e]ncouragfing] signage that maintains, enhances, and is compat-
ible with the beauty and unique character of the Town,” “[fJacilitat{ing] the creation of an
attractive environment,’ “{r]etain|ing] and expand[ing] the Town's employment base,”
“[fJacilitat{ing] safe and efficient movement of motorists, pedestrians and cyclists,”
“[e]ncourag[ing] public transit,” “[e]ncourag[ing] walkability and bikeability,”
“{mjaintainfing] orderly and compatible land-use and development patterns,”
“{ejncouragling] environmentally responsible development practices,” “[p}romot[ing] reha-
bilitationandreuse ofolderbuildings,”[m}aintain[ing] arangeofhousingchoicesandoptions,”
“{elstablishingclearandefficientdevelopmentreviewandapprovalprocedures,”"[p]rotect{ing]
community property values,” “[p]rotect[ing] and balancfing] private property rights,” and
“(bjringling) about [the] eventual improvement or elimination of non-conformities” do
not. Id.

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to” language, I believe that the same “materiality” test that this Court
adopted in City of Asheville, _N.C. at__,____ S.E.2d at ___, for pur-
poses of determining whether a particular local law relates to health,
sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances should be deemed applicable
to the prohibition against the enactment of local legislation relating to
non-navigable streams.

In seeking to persuade this Court that the Boone Act constitutes
an impermissible local law relating to non-navigable streams, the Town
points to N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-458, 160A-458.1, and 160A-459(a). Section.
1604-458 provides that “[a]ny city may enact and enforce erosion and
sedimentation control ordinances as authorized by Article 4 of Chapter
118A of the General Statutes, and in such enactment and enforce-
ment shail comply with all applicable provisions of Article 4.” N.C.G.S.
§ 160A-458. In addition, we note that N.C.G.S. § 113A-51, which serves
as the “Preamble” to Article 4 of Chapter 113A, provides that “[t]he sedi-
mentation of streams, lakes and other waters of this State constitutes a
major pollution problem,” that “[c]ontrol of erosion and sedimentation
is deemed vital to the public interest and necessary to the public health
and welfare,” and that “the purpose of” Article 4 is “to provide for the cre-
ation, administration, and enforcement of a program and for the adop-
tion of minimal mandatory standards which will permit development of
this State to continue with the least detrimental effects from pollution
by sedimentation.” Id. § 118A-51 (2015). Similarly, section 160A-458.1
provides that “[aJny city may enact and enforce floodway regulation
ordinances as authorized” and in compliance with “Part 6 of Article 21
of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes,” id. § 160A-458.1, with the pur-
poses of floodplain regulation being to “[m]inimize the extent of floods
by preventing obstructions that inhibit water flow and increase flood
height and damage,” “[p]revent and minimize loss of life, injuries, prop-
erty damage, and other losses in flood hazard areas,” and “[p]romote the
public health, safety, and welfare of citizens of North Carolina in flood
hazard areas,” id. § 143-215.51 (2015). Finally, section 1604-459 provides
that “[a] city may adopt and enforce a stormwater control ordinance to
protect water quality and control water quantity.” Id. § 160A-459. Once
again, while the bundle of powers that a municipality has the authority
to exercise in its extraterritorial jurisdiction includes authority that is
relevant to issues relating to non-navigable streams, along with other
water-related subjects, I am unable to say, when the Boone Act is con-
sidered in its entirety, that the apparent purpose or practical effect of the
withdrawal of the Town’s authority to exercise extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion upon non-navigable streams is a material one.

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TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
{369 N.C, 126 (2016))

Finally, the Town has failed to make a detailed argument to the effect
that the Boone Act impermissibly regulates trade. As we have previously
held, “trade,” for purposes of Article II, Section 24(1)(j), consists of “a
business venture for profit and includes any employment or business
embarked in for gain or profit.” Cheape, 320 N.C. at 558-59, 359 S.E.2d
at 798 (quoting Smith v. County of Mecklenburg, 280 N.C. 497, 508, 187
S.E.2d 67, 74 (1972), and citing Pleasants, 264 N.C. at 655-56, 142 S.E.2d
at 702)). In other words, “/p/rivate profit” is “an inherent element of the
concept of trade as used in” Article II, Section 24(1)(j). Smith, 280 N.C. at
510, 187 S.E.2d at 75 (citing Gardner v. City of Reidsville, 269 N.C. 581,
591-92, 153 S.E.2d 139, 148 (1967)). “[RJegulate” for purposes of Article
IL, Section 24(1)(j), means “to govern or direct according to rule[,] . . .
to bring under [ ] control of law or constituted authority.” Williams, 357
N.C. at 189, 581 S.E.2d at 429 (quoting State v. Gulledge, 208 N.C. 204,
208, 179 S.E. 883, 886 (1935) (ellipsis in original), quoted in Cheape, 320
N.C. at 559, 359 S.E.2d at 798 (using the stated definition of “regulate”
in applying Article II, Section 24(1)()). In instances where the aim or
practical effect of the challenged legislation is the complete prohibition
of a certain type of activity “without regard to whether profit or other
compensation [is] involved,” this Court has concluded that the legisla-
tion does not regulate trade or labor. Smith, 280 N.C. at 510, 187 S.E.2d
at 76 (citing State v. Chestnutt, 241 N.C. 401, 403-04, 85 S.E.2d 297, 299
(1955)); see Williams, 357 N.C. at 189-90, 581 S.E.2d at 429 (concluding
that the legislation in question and the related ordinance “regulate[d]
labor” because “the effect of these enactments [was] to govern labor
practices of ‘person[s] engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has 15 or more employees’ ” and “regulate[d] trade” because “[m]ost of
the employers affected by the [o]rdinance [were] businesses operated
for gain or profit,” such that “[r]egulation of these employers ha[d] the
practical effect of regulating trade” (citations omitted)). Although the
withdrawal of the Town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction would have an
impact on the business of exchanging real property for a profit, that fact
does not justify a decision to invalidate the Boone Act as an impermis-
sible attempt to regulate trade in violation of Article II, Section 24(1)(j)
given that the relevant regulations affect all land use-related activities
instead of being limited to those founded upon a desire for profit. Thus,
Iam not persuaded by this aspect of the Town's challenge to the Boone
Act as well.

As a result, for all these reasons, while I believe that the Town has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Boone Act as violative
of Article II, Section 24, and that the Town’s claim is not barred by sov-
ereign immunity considerations, I am unable, in light of the presumption

IN THE SUPREME COURT

TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

of constitutionality and the breadth of the issues addressed in the
Boone Act, to conclude that the challenged legislation constitutes local
legislation relating to one of the prohibited subjects listed in Article I,
Section 24. Although I agree with the result that the Court deems appro-
priate, I am unable to agree that the Boone Act implicates the General
Assembly's powers over the organization, government, and boundaries
of local governments and that the limitations on the enactment of local
legislation set out in Article II, Section 24 have no bearing on the proper
resolution of this case. As a result, I concur in the result reached by the
Court without concurring in its opinion.

Justice HUDSON joins in this concurring opinion.

Justice BEASLEY dissenting.

Because I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Boone Act
does not violate Article II, Section 24, I would affirm the decision of the
three-judge panel of the Superior Court, Wake County, that the revocation
of the extraterritorial jurisdiction powers of the Town of Boone (Town)
violated “the prohibition on local acts contained in Article II, Section 24
of the North Carolina Constitution.” Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

The first issue before us is to determine whether the facial chal-
lenge passes constitutional muster. The party bringing forth a facial
challenge “must show that there are no circumstances under which the
statute might be constitutional.” Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort
Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 363 N.C. 500, 502, 681 $.E.2d 278, 280 (2009) (cita-
tion omitted). This Court “seldom uphold[s] facial challenges because
it is the role of the legislature, rather than this Court, to balance dis-
parate interests and find a workable compromise among them.” Id. at.
502, 681 S.E.2d at 280. This Court has consistently stated that a facial
challenge is “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully.” State
v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 564, 614 S.E.2d 479, 485 (2005) (quoting United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L. Ed. 24
697, 707 (1987)). However, this Court’s analysis does not end there. This
Court must also “measure the balance struck by the legislature against
the minimum standards of the constitution.” Id. at 565, 614 S.E.2d at
486 (quoting Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 491, 349 S.E.2d 720, 731
(1986)). “The best way for the Court to discharge this function is for it
to enunciate a workable principle as to what process the law of the land
minimally requires.” Henry, 315 N.C. at 491, 340 S.E.2d at 731. Here those
minimum standards require that the General Assembly not enact local

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‘TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

laws that relate to the prohibited subjects enumerated within Article II,
Section 24. The Boone Act grants the General Assembly the authority to
withdraw certain powers from the Town that relate to the constitution-
ally prohibited subjects listed in Article II, Section 24; therefore, the act
cannot survive a facial challenge.

The General Assembly has broad powers; however, it was never
the intent of the drafters of the constitution that the General Assembly
be granted unbridled powers. Hence, Article II, Section 24 of the North
Carolina Constitution (the Local Act Prohibition) provides instances in
which the General Assembly is prohibited from enacting statutes that
directly impact the welfare and services of local governments. Under the
Local Act Prohibition, the North Carolina Constitution bars the General
Assembly from enacting local laws, rather than general laws, affecting
fourteen enumerated subjects. N.C. Const. art. II, § 24. In relevant part,
the Local Act Prohibition provides that:

(1) Prohibited subjects. - The General Assembly shall
not enact any local, private, or special act or resolution:

(a) Relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement
of nuisances;

(e) Relating to non-navigable streams;

(j) Regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing.

Id. art. Il, § 24(1). The Local Act Prohibition further provides that
“[alny local, private, or special act or resolution enacted in violation of
the provisions of this Section shall be void.” Id. art. II, § 24(3).

This Court has acknowledged that in enacting the Local Act
Prohibition “the people were motivated by the desire that the General
Assembly should legislate for North Carolina in respect to the subjects
specified as a single united commonwealth rather than as a conglomera-
tion of innumerable discordant communities.” Idol v. Street, 233 N.C.
730, 732-38, 65 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1951). Further, this Court has stated that
the purpose behind adopting the Local Act Prohibition was to

free the General Assembly from the enormous amount
of petty detail which had been occupying its attention, to
enable it to devote more time and attention to general leg-
islation of statewide interest and concern, to strengthen

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‘TOWN OF BOONE v, STATE OF N.C.
(869 N.C, 126 (2016)]

local self-government by providing for the delegation of
local matters by general laws to local authorities, and to
require uniform and coordinated action under general
Jaws on matters related to the welfare of the whole State.

Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 188, 581
S.E.2d 415, 428 (2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting High Point
Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 656, 142 S.B.2d 697, 702 (1965)).
Therefore, if the General Assembly aims to address one of the subjects
in the Local Act Prohibition, it must do so by enacting statewide laws
of general applicability rather than local acts. See Williams, 357 N.C.
at 188-89, 581 S.E.2d at 428 (concluding that if the General Assembly
decided “to address employment discrimination by means of a state
statute, Article Il, Section 24 requires that it enact either a statewide
law applicable to employers and their employees . . . or a general law
that makes reasonable classifications based upon rational differences
of circumstances”).

The Local Act Prohibition provides express restrictions on the
General Assembly’s authority in order to safeguard against an abuse
of legislative power. See N.C. Const. art. II, § 24 (limiting certain local,
private, or special acts). As previously stated, the General Assembly is
prohibited from enacting local, private, or special acts relating to one of
the enumerated subjects. Id. art. II, § 24(1). Additionally, the Local Act
Prohibition prevents the General Assembly from circumventing the pro-
hibitions in subsection (1) by also preventing the “enact[ment] [of] any
such local, private, or special act by the partial repeal of a general law.”
Id. art. Il, § 24(2). As a disincentive for the General Assembly to overstep
its powers, the Local Act Prohibition states that “[aJny local, private, or
special act or resolution enacted in violation of the provisions of this
Section shall be void.” Id. art. II, § 24(8) (emphasis added).

In addition to the constitutional limitations, this Court must deter-
mine through judicial review, whether the General Assembly has abused *
or overstepped its legislative power or authority, thereby assessing the
constitutionality of legislative acts. State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368
N.C. 633, 635, 781 S.E.2d 248, 250 (2016) (citing Bayard v. Singleton,
1N.C. Mart.) 5, 6-7 (1787)). Thus, this Court is required to ensure that
the General Assembly is acting within its powers and that its actions do
not violate direct prohibitions of our constitution.

The Boone Act, which was enacted in 2014 by the General Assembly,
withdrew the extraterritorial jurisdiction from the Town and returned.
regulatory control of the extraterritorial area to the County of Watauga.

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TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 126 (2016)}

Act of June 26, 2014, ch. 33, sec. 1, 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess.
2014) 139, 140 (the Boone Act) (“Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the Town of Boone shall not exercise any powers of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction as provided in Article 19 of Chapter 160A of the General
Statutes.”). The issue here is whether the Boone Act violates the Local
Act Prohibition of Article II, Section 24 of the state constitution.! It is
well settled law that courts in North Carolina

have the power, and it is their duty in proper cases, to
declare an act of the General Assembly unconstitutional—
but it must be plainly and clearly the case. If there is any
reasonable doubt, it will be resolved in favor of the law-
ful exercise of their powers by the representatives of
the people.

Glenn v. Bd. of Educ., 210 N.C. 525, 529-30, 187 S.E. 781, 784 (1936).

The majority is convinced that because Article VII, Section 1 grants
plenary power to the legislature, its analysis ends as it concludes that
the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to enact the
Boone Act. The majority concludes that Article II, Section 24 does not
apply here. According to Article VII, Section 1:

The General Assembly shall provide for the organi-
zation and government and the fixing of boundaries of
counties, cities and towns, and other governmental sub-
divisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this
Constitution, may give such powers and duties to coun-
ties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivi-
sions as it may deem advisable.

N.C. Const. art. VIL, § 1. The majority concludes that of the two clauses
in paragraph one of Article VII, Section 1, it is only under the second
clause that “the General Assembly's authority over local governments [is]
expressly subjected] to limitations imposed by other constitutional pro-
visions, including the constraints on local acts in Article II, Section 24.”
Assuming that the qualification contained within Article VIL, Section 1
only applies to the second clause, I disagree with the majority's conclu-
sion that the Boone Act falls exclusively within the first clause. As stated
in the concurring opinion, the provisions in Article VI, Section 1 relate

1. Along with the issue of whether the Boone Act violates the Local Act Prohibition,
this Court is presented with issues of sovereign inumunity and standing. I agree with the
analysis in the concurring opinion regarding these issues, as well as the procedural history
of this case.

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[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

to both municipal boundaries (clause 1) and municipal powers (clause
2). As the concurring opinion correcily states, “extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion relates to regulatory power or authority rather than the establish-
ment of municipal boundaries” and therefore, the Boone Act is more
properly interpreted as relating to the municipal powers in the second
clause. As such, the Boone Act is subject to Article VII, Section 1’s limit-
ing language, including the limitations imposed by Article II, Section 24.
The concurring opinion also correctly states that determining the con-
stitutionality of the Boone Act requires an analysis of Article II, Section
24’s prohibitions; the analysis does not stop at Article VIL, Section 1, as
argued by the majority. Additionally, while I agree with most of the dis-
cussion set forth in the concurring opinion regarding Article II, Section
24 and the test to be applied under it, I disagree with the application
of the test proffered in the concurring opinion to the facts of this case.
Specifically, in regards to whether the Boone Act violates the constitu-
tional limitations imposed by the Local Act Prohibition, I believe that
this Court's decisions in City of New Bern v. New Bern—Craven County
Board of Education, 338 N.C. 430, 450 S.E.2d 735 (1994), and Williams,
357 N.C. 170, 581 S.E.2d 415, guide our analysis.

To determine whether legislation violates the Local Act Prohibition
‘we must determine whether an act is local or general. This Court follows
the “reasonable classification” test to determine whether a law is general
or local. See McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 518-19, 119 S.B.2d 888,
894-95 (1961). An act is deemed local if it “discriminates between differ-
ent localities without any real, proper, or reasonable basis or necessity—
a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities clearly distinguishing
those of one class from each of the other classes, and imperatively
demanding legislation for each class separately that would be useless
or detrimental to the others.” McIntyre, 254 N.C. at 518, 119 S.E.2d at
894 (citation omitted). Conversely, a law is general if “any rational basis
reasonably related to the objective of the legislation can be identified
which justifies the separation of units of local government into included
and excluded categories.” Adams v. N.C. Dep’t. of Nat. & Econ. Res.,
295 N.C. 683, 691, 249 S.E.2d 402, 407 (1978) (quoting Joseph S. Ferrell,
Local Legislation in the North Carolina General Assembly, 45 N.C. L.
Rev. 340, 391 (1967)). Here the parties are in agreement that the Boone
Act is a local act. Therefore, the Boone Act discriminates against the
Town without “any real, proper, or reasonable basis.” McIntyre, 254 N.C
at 518, 119 S.E.2d at 894 (citation omitted).

In City of New Bern, this Court analyzed the constitutionality
of legislation that withdrew the City of New Bern's inspection and

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TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[869 N.C. 126 (2016)}

enforcement authority related to building, construction, fire, and safety
codes for specific properties located within the city limits and reas-
signed those responsibilities to Craven County. City of New Bern, 338
N.C. at 483-44, 450 S.E.2d at 737-38. The City brought a challenge under
Article II, Section 24. The legislation challenged in City of New Bern
effectively shifted the responsibility of enforcing the building code, a
power assigned to the city pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 160A-411, from the
city to the county.2 Id. at 437, 450 S.E.2d at 739-40. After concluding
that the challenged acts were local acts, rather than general, this Court
addressed whether the removal of the city’s power to exercise inspec-
tion and enforcement authority pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 160A-411 related
to “health, sanitation, or the abatement of nuisances.” Id. at 439, 450
§.E.2d at 740. This Court reviewed the legislature’s purpose for creat-
ing the building code and held that inspections pursuant to the building
code affect health and sanitation. Id. at 439-40, 450 S.E.2d at 740-41. This
Court concluded that by “alter[ing] the selection process of those who
will enforce the [c]ode,” the legislation affected health and sanitation
and was prohibited by the Local Act Prohibition. Jd. at 442, 450 S.E.2d
at 742.

The Court’s reasoning in City of New Bern, that a law altering who
is charged with enforcing health and sanitation laws is a law related to
health and sanitation, has been consistently applied to similar local leg-
islation brought before this Court. See Idol, 233 N.C. at 732-33, 65 S.E.2d
at 314-15 (holding unconstitutional a local act authorizing the board
of aldermen and board of commissioners to create a joint city-county
board of health); Bd. of Health v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 220 N.C. 140, 142-44,
16 S.E.2d 677, 678-79 (1941) (holding that local statutes that affected
the process of appointment of a health officer were unconstitutional
because they related to health); Sams v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 217 N.C.
284, 7 S.E.2d 540 (1940) (holding that legislation shifting the responsibil-
ity for enforcement of laws affecting the health of the public was barred
by Article Il, Section 29 (now Article II, Section 24)). Similarly, in the
present case the Boone Act directly impacts the enforcement of laws,
which themselves affect health and sanitation, by removing the Town's
power to enforce the building code, fire code, and plumbing code, and
other like regulations within the extraterritorial jurisdiction area. This

2. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 160A-411, the General Assembly authorizes cities to inspect
and enforce the North Carolina Building Code within their planning jurisdictions. This
statute also appears within Article 19 of Chapter 160A; thus, it is among the powers that
the Boone Act withdraws from the Town of Boone.

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Court in City of New Bern held that shifting the responsibility of enforc-
ing the building code away from the City ‘nescapably related to health
and sanitation, because the

Code regulates plumbing in an effort to maintain sanitary
conditions in the buildings and structures of this state and
thus directly involves sanitation, and consequently the
protection of the health of those who use the buildings.
The enforcement of the fire regulations protects lives from
fire, explosion and health hazards.

City of New Bern, 338 N.C. at 440, 450 S.E.2d at 741. This same reasoning
must be applied here in that the Boone Act shifts the responsibility for
enforcement of laws that affect health and sanitation—mainly, the build-
ing code, fire code, and plumbing code—from the Town to the County of
Watauga. The effect on the enforcement of the building, fire, and plumb-
ing codes in the present case is similar to that in City of New Bern,
because the Boone Act has “alter[ed] the selection process of those who
will enforce” those laws. Id. at 442, 450 S.E.2d at 742. As noted in the
concurring opinion and our recent decision in City of Asheville v. State,

NC. S.E.2d__, (2016), our current test focuses on
whether, in light of its stated purpose and practical effect, the Boone Act
has a material, but not exclusive or predominant, connection to one of
the prohibited subjects. Thus, I would hold that shifting the responsibility
for enforcement of the building code, fire code, and plumbing code would
have amaterial connection to health and sanitation and thus, is a violation
of the Local Act Prohibition of the North Carolina Constitution?

Moreover, this Court's decision in Williams lends further support for
the conclusion that the Boone Act violates the Local Act Prohibition. In
Williams the challenged legislation authorized Orange County to adopt
an antidiscrimination ordinance that made it unlawful for an employer
“{tlo fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to that individual’s
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, dis-
ability, familial status, or veteran status.” 357 N.C. at 175, 581 S.B.2d at
420. After concluding that the challenged legislation was a local act, this

3. The concurring opinion correctly notes that the facts at issue in this case dif-
fer from the facts at issue in City of New Bern because City of New Bern involved the
removal of a single power, rather than a “bundle of powers” as is the case here. However,
the principles espoused in City of New Bern—specifically the interpretation of whether
the act relates to health and sanitation—are instructive.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

‘TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

Court considered whether the legislation regulated any of the subjects
listed in the Local Act Prohibition. Specifically, the Court in Williams
sought to determine whether the legislation “regulate[d] labor or trade.”
Id. at 189, 581 $.E.2d at 429; see N.C. Const. art. Il, § 24(1)(j).

In considering whether the challenged legislation regulated labor or
trade, this Court rejected the argument that the legislation regulated only
the acts of discrimination and did not involve labor or trade. Williams,
857 N.C. at 189, 581 S.E.2d at 429. Rather, this Court concluded that
“while the intent of the enabling legislation and the Ordinance is to pro-
hibit discrimination in the workplace, the effect of these enactments is
to govern the labor practices of ‘person[s] engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce [that] has 15 or more employees’ in Orange County.” Id.
at 189, 581 $.H.2d at 429 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added).
Thus, the Court focused on the practical effect of the legislation, and
not its intended purpose, in determining that the legislation violated the
Local Act Prohibition. As demonstrated by Williams, this Court’s analy-
sis is not limited to the legislative purpose or intent of an enactment.
Rather, the analysis also considers the legislation’s practical effect, see
id. at 189-90, 581 S.E.2d at 429 (concluding that while the intent of the
legislation was to prohibit discrimination, the legislation had the “practi-
cal effect of regulating trade”), and whether it has a material connection
to the prohibited subjects of the Local Act Prohibition, as noted in the
concurring opinion and our recent decision in City of Asheville, __N.C.
at__,__ S.B2dat__.

Considering the practical effect of the Boone Act, I would hold
that the Act violates the Local Act Prohibition. The Boone Act removes
power from the Town of Boone to act within the extraterritorial juris-
diction area one mile outside of the town limits. The practical effect
of removing this power is that the Town of Boone cannot enforce its
ordinances within the one-mnile extraterritorial jurisdiction area, includ-
ing those ordinances that relate to health and sanitation, N.C. Const.
art. If, § 24(1)(a), relate to non-navigable streams, id. art. II, § 24(1)(e),
and regulate labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing, id. art. II, § 24(1)().
According to the Town’s Unified Development Ordinance (UDO),
the purposes and goals of the UDO include “{p]romotfing] the health,
safety, and general welfare within the Town of Boone and its environs,”
“[p]rotect[ing] water quality,” “[p]rotect[ing] designated water supply
watersheds,” “[p]revent[ing] degradation of natural drainage areas,”
and “[s]triv[ing] to minimize public and private losses due to slope fail-
ure caused by land disturbance of steep and very steep slopes.” Boone,
N.C., Unified Dev. Ordinance, art. 1, §§ 1.03.01, 1.04.01 Jan. 1, 2014).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)}

Because these ordinances themselves relate to health, sanitation, and
the abatement of nuisances, as well as other prohibited subjects, legisla-
tion that shifts the responsibility of their enforcement by removing the
Town’s ability to enforce those ordinances also relates to health, sanita-
tion, and the abatement of nuisances, and thereby violates the Local Act
Prohibition. See City of New Bern, 338 N.C. at 442, 450 S.E.2d at 742
(holding that the shifting of responsibility for enforcement of the build-
ing code affects health and sanitation, and thus, is prohibited by the
Local Act Prohibition); Bd. of Health, 220 N.C. at 143, 16 S.E.2d at 679
(concluding that two local statutes that affected the process of appoint-
ment of a health officer for Nash County were unconstitutional because
“[t]his Court is . . . committed to the proposition that a law affecting
the selection of officers to whom is given the duty of administering the
health laws is a law ‘relating to health’ ”). Thus, by determining that
the practical effect of the Boone Act relates to health, sanitation, and
the abatement of nuisances, I would conclude that there is a material
connection between the Boone Act and the subjects listed in the Local
Act Prohibition.

As stated above, while I agree with the general discussion in the con-
curring opinion, I disagree with the result that the Boone Act does not
violate the Local Act Prohibition. After analyzing individually each of the
subjects in the Local Act Prohibition that the Town alleged the Boone
Act violated, the concurring opinion concluded that the Boone Act does
not materially connect to either “health, sanitation, and the abatement
of nuisances,” N.C. Const. art. II, § 24(1)(a),4 “non-navigable streams,”

4. As quoted verbatim from the concurring opinion, the following statutory pro-
visions removed from the Town implicate issues relating to health, sanitation, and the
abatement of nuisances: N.C.G.S. § 1604-81 (2015) (granting zoning authority to munici-
palities “[flor the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of
the community” and authorizing municipalities to regulate and restrict the height, number
of stories and size of buildings and other structures; the percentage of lots that may be
occupied; the size of yards, courts and other open spaces; population densities; and the
location and use of buildings, structures and land); N.C.G.S. § 1604-883 (2015) (providing
that “[zJoning regulations shall be designed to promote the public health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare” and may address issues such as the provision of adequate light and air; the
prevention of overcrowding; avoiding undue population concentration; lessening street
congestion; securing safety from fire, panic, and dangers; and facilitating the provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements); N.C.G.S.
§ 160A-383.4 (2015) (authorizing regulations seeking to reduce the amount of energy
consumption through the use of measures like density bonuses and similar incentives);
N.C.GS. § 160A-412(a) (2015) (providing for the enforcement of state laws and local ordi-
nances relating to the construction of buildings and other structures; the installation of
facilities such as plumbing, electrical, and air-conditioning systems; the safe, sanitary, and
healthful maintenance of buildings and other structures; and other issues specified by the
city council); N.C.G.S. § 160A-424(a) (2015) (providing that “[tJhe inspection department

176 IN THE SUPREME COURT

TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C. 126 (2016)]

id. art. IL, § 24(1)(e),® or “labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing,” id.
art. Il, §24(1)(). However, this Court should not analyze each of the enu-
merated subjects in isolation. In determining if the Boone Act violates
the Local Act Prohibition, this Court should view the entire Local Act
Prohibition. Thus, if this Court views all of the statutes within Article 19
of Chapter 160A that relate to “health, sanitation, and the abatement of

may make periodic inspections, subject to the council's discretion, for unsafe, unsanitary,
or otherwise hazardous and unlawful conditions in buildings or structures within its ter-
ritorial jurisdiction”); N.C.G.S. § 160A-426(b) (2015) (providing that “an inspector may
declare a nonresidential building or structure within a community development target
area to be unsafe if” it “appears . . . to be vacant or abandoned” or “appears ... to be insuch
dilapidated conditions as to cause or contribute to blight, disease, vagrancy, fire or safety
hazard, to be a danger to children, or to tend to attract persons intent on criminal activities
or other activities that would constitute a public nuisance”); N.C.G.S. § 160A-432(c) (2015)
(stating that “[nJothing in this section shall be construed to impair or limit the power of
the city to define and declare nuisances and to cause their removal or abatement by sum-
mary proceedings, or otherwise”); N.C.G.S. § 160A-439 (2015) (authorizing the adoption
of ordinances providing for the repair, closing, and demolition of nonresidential buildings
or structures “that fail to meet minimum standards of maintenance, sanitation, and safety
established by the governing body”); and N.C.G.S. § 160A-441 (2015) (finding “that the
existence and occupation of dwellings in this State that are unfit for human habitation
are inimical to the welfare and dangerous and injurious to the health, safety and morals
of the people” and “that a public necessity exists for the repair, closing or demolition of
such dwellings”).

5. As quoted verbatim from the concurring opinion that notes that the following
statutory provisions removed from the Town implicate issues relating to non-navigable
streams: N.C.G.S. § 1604-458 provides that “[alny city may enact and enforce erosion
and sedimentation control ordinances as authorized by Article 4 of Chapter 118A of the
General Statutes, and in such enactment and enforcement shall comply with all applicable
provisions of Article 4.” In addition, N.C.G.S. § 1184-51 provides that “[t]he sedimentation
of streams, lakes and other waters of this State constitutes a major pollution problem,”
that “control of erosion and sedimentation is deemed vital to the public interest and neces-
sary to the public health and welfare,” and that “the purpose of” Article 4 is “to provide for
the creation, administration, and enforcement of a program and for the adoption of mini-
mal mandatory standards which will permit development of this State to continue with
the least detrimental effects from pollution by sedimentation.” N.C.G.S. § 1134-51 (2015);
N.C.GS. § 1604-458.1 provides that “[alny city may enact and enforce floodway regulation
ordinances as authorized” and in compliance with “Part 6 of Article 21 of Chapter 143 of
the General Statutes,” N.C.G.S. § 160A-458.1, with the purposes of floodplain regulation
being to “[mJinimize the extent of floods by preventing obstructions that inhibit water flow
and increase flood height and damage,” “[p}revent and minimize loss of life, injuries, prop-
erty damage, and other losses in the flood hazard areas,” and “[p}romote the public health,
safety, and welfare of citizens of North Carolina in flood hazard areas,” N.C.G.S, § 143-
215.51 (2015). N.C.GS. § 1604-459 provides that “[a] city may adopt and enforce a storm-
water control ordinance to protect water quality and control water quantity.” N.C.G.S.
§ 1604-459 (2015).

6. The Town fails to point to any statutory provisions in support of the argument that
the Boone Act relates to “labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing,”

IN THE SUPREME COURT 177

‘TOWN OF BOONE v. STATE OF N.C.
[369 N.C, 126 (2016)]

nuisances,” “non-navigable streams,” and “labor, trade, mining, or manu-
facturing” as a whole, then the Boone Act clearly has a material connec-
tion to the prohibited subjects enumerated in the Local Act Prohibition.

Because I disagree with the majority's holding that the Boone Act
does not violate Article II, Section 24, I would affirm the decision of the
three-judge panel of the Superior Court, Wake County that the revoca-
tion of the Town's powers of extraterritorial jurisdiction violated “the
prohibition on local acts contained in Article II, Section 24 of the North
Carolina Constitution.” Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

SED EOLDINGS, LLC v. 3 STAR PROPS., LLC
[369 N.C. 178 (2016)}

SED HOLDINGS, LLC )
v. 3 From Durham County
3 STAR PROPERTIES, LLC, er aL. >
No. 211PA16
ORDER

The following order was entered:

Defendants’ motion to appear, filed on 20 October 2016, is allowed.
This case is stayed by virtue of the automatic stay arising from the
bankruptcy proceeding against defendant 3 Star Properties, LLC in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in
Case 16-34815. Plaintiff’s motion to be permitted to proceed now in the
trial court against the remaining defendants, filed on 27 October 2016,
also appears to be subject to the automatic stay.

By order of the Court in Conference, this 1st day of November, 2016.
s/Ervin, J.
For the Court.

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 1st day of November, 2016.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk of the Supreme Court

‘s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT 179

SOUND RIVERS v. N.C. DEP'T OF ENVTL. RES.
[369 N.C. 179 (2016)]

SOUND RIVERS AND
NORTH CAROLINA
COASTAL FEDERATION

v From Beaufort County
N.C. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, DIVISION OF
WATER RESOURCES

MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS, INC.,
INTERVENOR

No. 57P16
ORDER

Intervenor Martin Marietta Materials has filed a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to review order of N.C. Court of Appeals (29 December 2015)
and a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review order of Superior Court of
Beaufort County (13 November 2015). Intervenor’s petitions are allowed
for the limited purpose of striking the provision of the trial court’s order
retaining jurisdiction for itself. Otherwise, the petitions are denied.

By Order of the Court in Conference, this 8th day of December, 2016.

s/Ervin, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 9th day of December, 2016.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk of the Supreme Court

s/M.C.
Assistant Clerk

180 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. TODD
[369 N.C. 180 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )
v 3 Wake County
PARIS JUJUAN TODD }
No. 18A142
ORDER

In the exercise of its supervisory authority, this Court, on its own
motion, allows review as follows: The Court orders the parties to brief
and argue the following issues, with the State treated as the appellant
and defendant treated as the appellee:

I Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing and remand-
ing the trial court’s judgment?

IL Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear and decide an
appeal taken from a decision of the Court of Appeals
arising from a trial court ruling granting or denying
a motion for appropriate relief pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 74-302), in light of the provisions of N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-28(a) and N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(f)?

By order of the Court in Conference, this 8th day of December, 2016.
s/Ervin, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 9th day of December, 2016.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk, Supreme Court of
North Carolina

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk, Supreme
Court of North Carolina

IN THE SUPREME COURT 181
Disposition or PeriTions ror Discretionary Review Uner G.S. 7A-31
8 Decempsr 2016
002P13-2 State v. Jason 1, Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
C. Johnson Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Swain County
2. Def's Pro Se Motion to 2, Dismissed
Appoint Counsel as moot
Ervin, J.,
recused
O15PI6-2 State v. Jaired Def's Pro Se PDR Under Denied
Antonio Jones N.C.G.S. § 74-31 (COA15-995)
O18A14-2 State v. Paris 1. State’s Motion for Temporary Stay 1 Allowed
Jujuan Todd (COA15-670) 09/02/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2. Allowed
of Supersedeas
8, State's Notice of Appeal Based Upon | 3. —
a Dissent
4, Def’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal 4-
5. Court's Order 5. Special
Order ex
mero mot
O19P15.2 State v. Henry Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Ford Adkins Certiorari to Review Order of
COA (COAP16-720)
46P 16-2 In the Matter of Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Extension | Dismissed
Todd W. Short of Time to File Petition for Writ of as moot
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of 10/21/2016
North Carolina
052P16 David Easter 1. Pl’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31 1. Dismissed
Rozelle, Employee | (COA15-594)
v. City of Charlotte,
Emmpoyen, 2, Plt’s Motion for Leave to File PDR. 2. Denied
Self-Insured Out of Time
8. Plt’s Petition in the Alternative for 38. Allowed
Writ of Certiorari to Review Decision
of COA
057P16 Sound Rivers and | 1. Intervenor's Petition for Writ of 1. Special
North Carolina Certiorari to Review Order of COA Order
Coastal Federation | (COAP15-925)
N.C. Department
Or Seer 2. Intervenor's Petition for Writ of 2. Special
and Natural Certiorari to Review Order of Superior | Order
Resources, Division | Court, Beaufort County
of Water Resources,
Martin Marietta,
Materials, Inc.,
Intervenor *

182 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Dispostrion or Perimions ror Discreonary Review Unper G:S. 7A-31
8 Decempen 2016
O70PAI62 | State v. Nicolas Det's PDR Under N.C.GS. § TA-31 Denied
Olivares Pineda (COA15-800-2)
O81P16 In the Matter of Respondent-Mother's PDR Under Denied
AB, JB. N.C.GS. § 7A-B1 (COAI5-910)
os4Pi54 | State v. Curtis Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ Dismissed
Louis Sangster of Mandamus
086A16 Inre Redmond State’s Motion for Withdrawal and Allowed
Substitution of Counsel 10/21/2016
O87A16 Inre Hughes State's Motion for Withdrawal and Allowed’
Substitution of Counsel 10/21/2016
088P15-4 | State v. Mason 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Objection 1. Dismissed
W. Hyd
Hyde 2. Def's Pro Se Motion for Petition for | 2. Dismissed
Writ of Error
Ervin, J.,
recused
088A16 Inre Smith State's Motion for Withdrawal and Allowed
: Substitution of Counsel 10/21/2016
104P118 | Statev. Titus Batts | Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Certiorari to Review Order of COA
: Ervin, J,
recused
107P985 | State. Randolph _| 1, Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
Wilson Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Warren County
2. Det's Pro Se Motion for 2, Denied
De Novo Review .
Ervin, J.,
recused
1USP15-2 | State. Victor 1, Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR 1. Dismissed
Adrian Gutierrez | (COAPI5-65)
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Subpoena __| 2. Dismissed
Duces Tecum. as moot
121P162 | Statev. Damario _| 1, Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upon | 1. Dismissed ex
Montreal Coxton _ | Constitutional Question (COA15-.5752) | mero motu
2. Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-B1 2. Denied
3. Def’s Motion to Deem PDR 3, Allowed
‘Dmely Filed
4, Def’s Petition in the Alternative for | 4. Dismissed
Writ of Certiorari to Review Decision |} as moot

of COA

IN THE SUPREME COURT 183
Disrostrion or Pentions ror Disorevionary Review UNpeR G.S. 7A-31
8 Decemper 2016
124816 Jillian Murray 1, Def’s Motion for Judicial Notice L
v. University of (COAI6-375)
North Carolina at
Chapel Hil 2. State's Motion for Withdrawal 2, Allowed
of Counsel 12/08/2016
3B1P168 | SomchoiNoorsob _| Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Notice to. | Dismissed
v.Supreme Court of | Appeal and Request for Certificate of | 10/17/2016
North Carolina ‘Appealability
133162 | State v. Wiliam Def’s Pro Se Motion for Request to Dismissed
Gerald Price Clarify (COAP15-1073)
198P16 Brad R. Johnson v. | 1. Pit's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
James R. Prevatte, | Certiorari to Review Order of
‘kr, Prevatte & COA (COAPI5-667)
Prevatte, PLLC _ ;
2, Plt Pro Se Petition for Writ of 2. Denied
Certiorari to Review Order of COA
151Pi44 | Kimberly Shreve _| 1. Pit's Pro Se Motion for Opposition to | 1. Dismaissed
v.North Carolina | Motion to Dismiss
Department of
Justice, Kristen 2, Plt's Pro Se Motion for Leave to Fe | 2. Dismissed
Fetter, Colon ‘Amended Complaint
Willoughby, and 3, Pit's Pro Se Motion for Oppositi isms
. position to | 3. Dismissed
Tina Hoagland Byrd | Goraksoper Order
TTSP16 N.C. Department of | 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Health and Human | (COA16-1026; COA15-1033) 05/11/2016
Services, Division of Dissolved
Medical Assistance 12/08/2016
v. Parker Home
Gare, LLC 2. State's Petition for Writ 2, Denied
Se } of Supersedeas
Division of Medical
‘Assistance, N.C. | 8:State’s PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A31 | 8. Denied
Department of 4, Cardinal Innovations Healthcare 4. Dismissed
Health and Human | Solutions, et al. Motion for Leave to File | as moot
services v. Parker | SOMHONS ce
Home Care, LLC
1s7pa16 | KornegayFamily | Def's Motion for Leave to File Record | Allowed
Farms, LLG, etal. | on Appeal 11/08/2016
¥. Gross Creek
Seed, Ine.
198P16 State v. Calvin 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Renard Carter (COAI6-1284) 05/24/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2, Allowed
of Supersedeas
3, State's PDR Under N.C.G.8.§ 74-31 | 3. Allowed
4, Def's Motion to Deem as Timely Filed | 4. Denied

the Response to PDR

184 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposition oF Perrrions ror Discreionary Review Unper G.S. TA-31
8 Decemper 2016
198P16 State v. Miguel Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A31 Denied
‘Melo Nolasco (COA15-972)
211PA16 SED Holdings, LLC | 1. Defs’ Motion to Appear 1. Allowed
v.3 Star Properties, 11/01/2016
LLC, etal. .
2. Plt’s Motion to Stay Proceedings 2. Special
Against 3 Star Properties, LLC, Because | Order
itis in Bankruptcy 11/01/2016
8. Plt's Motion that Plaintiff be 8. Special
Permitted to Proceed Now in the Order
‘Trial Court Against the Remaining 11/01/2016
Defendants
226P16-2 Inre Foreclosure _| Petitioners’ Pro Se Motion for Request| Dismissed
of Deed of Trust to Clarify
from Burman
Howard Maine,
Betty Farmer Maine
and Brandon Travis
Maine, Grantor, to
PBRE, Inc,, Trustee,
Recorded in Book
405, Page 2169, in
the Ashe County
Public Registry by
‘Morrison Trustee
Services, LLC,
Substitute Trustee
226P16-3 Betty F Maine and | Petitioners’ Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Brandon Maine of Mandamus
v. Keith B.
Nichols, et al.
228P16 State v. Derrick 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upon a | 1. Dismissed
Dewayne Wallace | Constitutional Question (COA15-783) | ex mero motu
2, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 2. Denied
3, State's Motion for Response to PDR to | 8. Dismissed
be Deemed Timely Filed as moot
239P16 State v. Chad 1 State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Braxton Bumpers | (COAI6-1) 06/24/2016
Dissolved
12/08/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2. Denied
of Supersedeas
3, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A-31 _| 8. Denied

IN THE SUPREME COURT 185
Disposition or Petitions ror DiscreTionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
8 Decemper 2016
244P16 State v. Sandra 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1 Allowed
‘Meshell Brice (COA15-904) 06/28/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2, Allowed
of Supersedeas
3. State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A31 | 8. Allowed
246P16-3 State v. Christopher | Defs’ Pro Se Motion to Reconsider Dismissed
Charles Friscia, The
‘Trust, and Maria
Adriana Friscia, The
‘Trust
248P16 Friday Investments, | 1. Defs’ PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 1. Allowed
LLG as Successor in | (COA15-680)
Interest to Tisano
Realty, Inc. v. Bally | 2: Defs’ Motion to Amend PDR. 2, Allowed
‘Total Fitness of
the Mid-Atlantic,
Ine. f/lva Bally
‘Total Fitness of
the Southeast,
Ine. f/lva Holiday
Health Clubs of
the Southeast,
Inc. as Successor
in Interest to
Bally Fitness
Corporation;
and Bally Total
Fitness Holding
Corporation
249P16 Kevin Gerity 1. Petitioner’s PDR Under 1. Denied
y. North Carolina | N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA15-843)
Department of 7 . .
Health and Human | 2. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of 2, Denied
Services Certiorari to Review Decision of COA
256P162 State. Jonathan | 1, Def's Pro Se Motion for Appeal 1. Dismissed
James Newell (COAP16-283)
2. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ 2. Denied
of Mandamus
8, Def’s Pro Se Second Petition for 8, Denied

Writ of Mandamus

186 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposition or Penrrions ror Discretionary Review Unpar G.S. 7A-31
8 Decemper 2016
257P16-2 Federal National _| 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for
Mortgage Notice of Appeal
Association alla
Fannie Mae v. 2, Respondent's Motion to 2. Allowed
William Gerald Dismiss Appeal
Price, the Trust, 3, Respondent's Motion for Sanctions _| 8. Dismissed
and Williara ‘without
Gerald Price "
prejudice
4, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for 4, Dismissed
Certified Certificate of Registration
Pursuant to RARA., U.S.C. 22, § 611
262P16 Ronald G. Keaton, | 1. Defs’ Motion for Temporary Stay 1 Allowed
Jr, Employee (COA15-1108) 07/13/2016
7, ERMG, If,
Teneves New 2, Defs! Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2.—
Be wpshire 8, Defs’ PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7-81 a
surance Company,
Carrier, Carl Warren | 4, Defs’ Motion to Hold PDR: 4—
& Company, Third- | in Abeyance
Party Administrator
5, Defs’ Motion to Withdraw PDR 5. Allowed
267P16 Robert V. Powell _| 1, Plt's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 1. Dismissed
v.P2Enterprises, | (COA15-542)
LLC and Robert,
Henry Powell 2, Pts Petition for Writ of Certiorari to | 2. Denied
Review Decision of COA
268P162 Owen D. Leavitt Plt's Pro Se Motion for Notice of Appeal | Dismissed ex
v. Willie Hargrove ‘mero motu
269P16 State v. Shameil 1, Def’s Pro Se Motion for Adversary 1. Dismissed
Dontel Smith Preliminary Hearing
2, Def's Pro Se Motion for Notice of 2. Dismissed
Discovery and Specific Demand for
Information
8, Def's Pro Se Motion to Transport 3, Dismissed
4, Def's Pro Se Motion to Activate 4, Dismissed
Indictment Information
270P16 Matthew Nereim —_| Plt's PDR Under N.C.GS, § 7A-31 Denied
v. Ryan Cummins; | (COA15-1253)
City Chevrolet
Automotive
Company;
Hendrick Lancury
Collision Center,
LLG; National
General Insurance
Company; and each

of them

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition of Petrrions ror Discretionary Revisw Unper G.S. 74-31

8 Decemper 2016

271A16 Pits Pro Se Notice of Appeal Based
Upon a Constitutional Question
(COAL5-1059)

Colleen Blondell | 1. Defs’ (Shakil Ahmed and Shabana
v.Shakil Ahmed, | Ahmed) Notice of Appeal Based Upon a
Shabana Ahmed, | Dissent (COA16-796)

Michael Fekete and
Susan Elizabeth 2, Defs’ (Shaldl Ahmed and Shabana
Fekete, Individually | Ahmed) PDR as to Additional Issues

279P16 In the Matter of 1. Petitioner's PDR Under
MAW. N.C.G.S. § 7-31 (COAI6-1153)

2. Petitioner's Motion to Deem PDR.
‘Timely Filed

8. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to Review Decision of COA

Inre Foreclosure _| 1. Respondents’ Pro Se Notice of Appeal
ofReal Property _| Based Upon a Constitutional Question
Under Deed of Trust | (COA4-881)

Ce 2, Respondents’ Pro Se PDR Und
Gutowski and Mary espondent 6 Inder
‘Ame Gutowski, in. | NCGS. § 7431

ree bO. Dated | 8: Respondents’ Pro Se Motion for Stay
November 9, 2006 | * Foreclosure Sale
and Recorded on 4, Respondents’ Pro Se Motion to Enjoin
November 15,2006 | All Other State Actions

in Book 4367 at
Page 502, Union 5. Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal
County Registry; | 6, Respondents’ Pro Se Motion for Stay
of Carolina, LLG, | #Light of Bankruptcy Fling

Substitute Trustee

Patricia B. Pit's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 74-81
Hoover. George | (COA15-1896)
Barry Hoover :

188 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposirion or Perrrions ror Discrevionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
8 Decemprr 2016
292P162 | Jeremy Bruns and | Pits’ Pro Se Motion to Reconsider PDR | Denied
Jenny Bruns v. Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31(@) and Writ of
Rhonda Bryant, Mandamus Under Rule 22
Dalton Bryant,
Sx., Dalton Bryant,
Jr, Pat McCrory,
as Governor of
North Carolina,
Frank Perry, as
Secretary of the
North Carolina
Department of
Public Safety,
Anthony Tata, as
Secretary of the
North Carolina
Department of
‘Transportation,
Veronica McClain,
USAA, and State of
North Carolina
284P16 State v. Jaronta Def’s Pro Se Motion of Dismissal Dismissed
Raynor
285P16 State v. Ceasar , Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Jones Certiorari to Review Order of the COA
(COAP13-558)
289P16 State v. Brian Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Jack Frazier (COA15-1089)
291P16 State v. John Frede | 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Sabbaghrabaiotti | (COAI5-1028) 08/10/2016
Dissolved
12/08/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2. Denied
of Supersedeas
8. State's PDR Under N.C.GS.§7A81 | 8. Denied
4, Def's Conditional PDR Under 4, Dismissed
NCGS. § 7A31 as moot
292P16 State v. Ramon Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
A. Black (COA15-1283)
298P16 Sammie Ray Usher, | Pit's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied |
Jz.v. The Charlotte- | (COA15-880)
Mecklenburg
Hospital Authority
294P16 State v. Dragan Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S, § 7A-BL Denied
Blazevic (COA15-1343)

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Petirions ror DiscreTionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

8 Decempan 2016
295P16 State v. Christopher | Def's Pro Se PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A- Denied
Shawn Frione 31 (COAI5-1143)
296P16 Caron Associates, Def's (Crown Financial, LLC) PDI Denied
Inc. v. Southside Under N.C.G.S. § TA-31 (Gone are)
‘Manufacturing
Corp. and Crown
Financial, LLC
298P16 State v. James Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Stanley Daye (COA16-74)
302P16 ‘State v. Marshall 1. Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 1, Dismissed
Tristan Shaw to Review Order of Superior Court,
(DEATH) ‘Moore County
2. State's Motion for Extension of Time 2. Dismissed
to File Response as moot
303P16 James K. Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Denied
Sanderford Review Decision of COA (COA15-1214)
vy. Duplin Land
Development, Inc.
304P16 State v. Michael ‘State's PDR Under N. §TA31 Denied
Ray Pigford (COA15-1047)
‘305P16 State v. Jeremy Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR Dismissed
Daniel Russom (COAP14-359)
306P16 John T. Turchin and | Pits’ PDR Under N. § TA-3L Denied
‘Susan Turchin (COA15-1236)
v. ENBE, LLC
307P15-2 The Kimberley 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1, Allowed
Rice Kaestner (COA15-896) 07/25/2016
1992 Family Trost he pants
v. North Carolina 2. State's Petition for Writ 2. Allowed
Department of of Supersedeas
Revenue 8, State's Notice of Appeal Based Upon a | 8. Dismissed
Constitutional Question ex mero motu:
4. State's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 4, Allowed
1. Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1. Dismissed
Constitutional Question (COA15-1079) ex mero motu
2, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 2. Denied

190 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disrosrmion oF Perrrions For DiscRETIONARY Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
8 Decemper 2016
808P16 State v. Robert 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1, Allowed
William Ashworth | (COAI6-1279) 08/22/2016
Dissolved
12/08/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ
of Supersedeas 2, Denied
3. State's PDR Under N.C.GS.§7A-31 | 8. Denied
4, Def's Conditional PDR Under 4, Dismissed
NCGS. § 70-31 as moot
S09A16 State v. Rico Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upon a _| Dismissed
Lamar Barnes Constitutional Question (COA15-1173) | ex mero motu
BLOAIG Worley, et al. Defs’ Motion to File Corrected Brief Allowed
v. Moore, et al. 1O/BL/2016
Ervin, J.,
recused
310A16 Worley, et al. Def's Motion for Extension of Time to | Allowed as
v. Moore, et al. File Reply Brief tothe 5 Days
Extension Only
11/23/2016
Ervin, J.,
recused
S1IPI6 Gary Dellinger, Intervenor Respondents’ PDR Under _| Denied
Virginia Dellinger, | N.C.G.S. § 7A-81 (COA16-1370)
and Timothy
S. Dellinger,
Petitioners v.
Lincoln County,
Lineoln County
Board of
Commissioners,
and Strata Solar,
LLG, Respondents
and Timothy P.
Mooney, Martha
McLean, and The
Sailview Owners
Association,
Intervenor
Respondents
B12PI6 Pittsboro Matters, | Intervenor's PDR Under N.C.G.S. Denied
Inc, etal. v. Town | § 7A-31 (COAI6-28)
of Pittsboro
¥ Chatharn Park
Investors, LLC
B16PI6 State v. Nathan Det's Pro Se Motion for Writ of Denied

Lorenzo Holden

Prohibition

IN THE SUPREME COURT 191
Disposivion oF Perrrions ror Discrevionary Review Unper G.S. 7Ac31
8 Drcemper 2016
S17P162 Ronald Thompson | Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | Denied
Corbett v. Pat Habeas Corpus 09/23/2016
McCrory, Governor
S20P16 State v. Janely Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-SL Denied
Higuera Cardenas | (COA15-1012)
S21P16 State v. Clayton Def's Pro Se PDR Under N.C.G.S8. Denied
James § TAB1 (COA16-853)
322P16 State v. Tishekka | 1. Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 1. Denied
Nicole Cain (COA16-1208)
2. Def's Motion to Deern PDR 2. Denied
‘Timely Filed
8. Def’s Motion in the Alternative to 3, Allowed
‘Treat PDR as a Petition for Writ
of Certiorari
S25P16 State v. Christopher | Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Roger Cole, Jr. (COAI6-1291)
S27P16 Bugene Elliott 1, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Petition | 1. Denied
McKenzie v. Daniel} for Mandate
M. Home, Jr,
eT 2, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Proceed | 2. Allowed
In Forma Pauperis
3, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Appoint | 3. Dismissed
Counsel as moot
S28PI6 Linwood Wilsonv. | 1. Plt's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
Barbara Wilson Certiorari to Review Order of COA
(COAI6-1141)
2. Plt's Pro Se Motion for 2. Denied
‘Temporary Stay 09/06/2016
3, Pit's Pro Se Petition for Writ 3, Denied
of Supersedeas
BB1A16 State v. Amanda 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Gayle Reed (COA15-363) 09/06/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2, Allowed
of Supersedeas 10/20/2016
3, State's Notice of Appeal Based 3

Upon a Dissent

192 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disrosmow or Petimions ror Discretionary Review Unver G.S. TA-31
8 Dropmner 2016
332P16 Sandra D. Snipes 1. Defs’ (Britthaven, Inc., Principle Long | 1 Allowed
and William J. Term Care, Inc., and Spruce LTC Group, | 09/07/2016
Snipes v. Britthaven, | LLC d/b/a Richmond Pines Healthcare Dissolved
Inc., Principle Long | and Rehabilitation Center) Motion for 12/08/2016
Term Care, Inc., ‘Temporary Stay (COA16-291)
ce LTC Group,
eee nee | 2-Dets’ Britthaven, In, et al) Petition | 2. Denied
Pines Healthcare for Writ of Supersedeas
and Rehabilitation a ie .
ts 8, Defs’ (Britthaven, Inc,, et al.) Petition | 3. Denied
Gentes and Fred, | for Writ of Certiovari to Review Order
[cQueen, Jr., M.D. ‘of COA.
833P16 State of North 1.N.C. Rate Bureau's Notice of Appeal. 1. Dismissed
Carolina ex rel. Based Upon a Constitutional Question ex mero motu
Commissioner (COA15-402)
of Insurance
v. North Carolina 2. N.C. Rate Bureau’s PDR Under 2. Denied
Rate Bureauinthe | NCGS. § 7A-81
Matter of the Filing
Dated January 3,
2014 by the North
Carolina Rate
Bureau for Revised
Homeowners’
Insurance Rates
and Homeowners’
Insurance Territory
Definitions
S836P16 WIDENI77 v. North | Plit's PDR Prior to Determination by Denied
Carolina DOT, I-77 COA
Mobility Partners
LLC and State of
North Carolina
837P00-2 State v. Waverly 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Orlando Harshaw, Jr. | Certiorari to Review Order of Superior ‘
Court, Catawba County
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Proceed In 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
38. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Appoint 3. Dismissed
Counsel as moot
Edmunds, J.,
recused
3839P16 State v. Silvestre Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Dismissed
Alvarado Chaves Review Order of Superior Court
840A95-5 State v. William Def's Pro Se Motion for Appeal of Denial | Dismissed
Morganherring, IV of Motion for Supplemental Post-
(DEATH) Conviction Discovery
‘840P16 State v. Alfred Def’s Pro Se Motion for PDR Dismissed
Lee Cooper (COAP16-192)

IN THE SUPREME COURT 1938

Disposition or Perivions For Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

8 Decemper 2016
S41P16 State v. Joe Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
‘Terry Wright Certiorari to Review Order of COA
(COAPI6-589)
342P16 State v. Antravis Def’s Pro Se PDR Under Denied
Quanealious Briggs | N.C.GS. § 7A-31 (COAI5-767)
343P16 John M, Huff, Jr. Plt's Pro Se Motion for Hearing Dismissed
v. William Hoyt,
Paramore, IIL
S45P16-2 State v. Dwayne 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ 1. Denied
Demont Haizlip of Mandamus . 09/29/2016
2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In 2, Allowed
Forma Pauperis 09/29/2016
348A16 Kevin J. Tully v. City | Pit's Motion for Withdrawal of Allowed
of Wilmington Appearance and for Substitution of 11/09/2016
Counsel
351P16 State v. Matthew | Def’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari to | Dismissed
Ryan Hoover Review Order of Superior Court,
Iredell County
352P16 State v. Jeral 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
‘Thomas Ore, Jr. (COA16-100) 09/29/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
8. State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A31 | 8.
S68PI6 State v. Camellia | 1. Det's Pro Se Motion for L. Dismissed
Brown Appropriate Relief without
prejudice
2, Def’s Pro Se Motion for Preparation of | 2. Dismissed as
Stenographic Transcript moot
8, Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 3, Denied
Habeas Corpus 09/26/2016
4, Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 4. Dismissed
Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Wake County
5. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In _| 5, Allowed
Forma Pouperis
6. Def's Pro Se Motion to 6. Dismissed

Appoint Counsel as moot

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition oF Perions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

8 Decemper 2016
S54P16 Catrina Jarrett 1. Def’s Motion for Temporary Stay 1 Allowed
v, William (COAI5-1346) 09/27/2016
Andrew Jarrett Dissolved
10/28/2016
2, Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2. Denied
10/28/2016
8, Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7-31 8. Denied
10/28/2016
85615 State v. Derrick 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
‘Aundra Huey (COA15-100) 10/26/2015
2, State's Petition for Writ 2. Allowed
of Supersedeas
8, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A-31 | 3. Allowed
368P15-2 State v. Shawn Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Louis Goodman Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Rowan County (COAPI4-917)
359P16 State v. Joseph Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorarito | Dismissed
Maurice Craig Review Order of COA (COAPI6-105)
360P16 State v. Thomas Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR Dismissed
J. Valentine (COAPI6-266)
362P16 Aleta Alston-Toure _| Plt's Pro Se Motion for Notice of Appeal | Dismissed
v. Yehudit Toure and
Nkrumah Jennings
363PI6 State. Credrick | 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
D. Washington Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Cabarrus County
2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In. 2, Allowed
Forma Pauperis
8, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 8. Dismissed
Counsel as moot
B64P16 State v. Bryan Def’s Pro Se Motion to Subpoena Dismissed
Lane Lanier Defense Witnesses 10/21/2016
365A16 State v. David 1. Slate's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
‘Michael Reed (COA16-33) 10/05/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ of 2, Allowed
Supersedeas 11/02/2016
8, State's Notice of Appeal Based Upon | 3.—
a Dissent
366P16 . State v. Angelo Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR Under Dismissed

Applewhite

N.C.G.S. § 7A-B1 (COAP16-651)

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Petrrions For Discretionary Review Unper G.S, 7A-31

8 Dacemper 2016
367P16 State v. Rahmil 1 State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Ingram (COA16-120) 10/05/2016
Dissolved
12/08/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ, 2. Denied
of Supersedeas
8. State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§ 7431 | 8. Denied
368P16 Azige, etal. v. Holy | Defs’ Motion to Withdraw and for Allowed
‘Trinity Ethiopian —_| Substitution of Counsel 1/22/2016
Orthodox ‘Tewahdo
‘Church, et al. Ervin, J.
recused
369P16 Jacqueline Clark _| Respondent's PDR Under Denied
v. North Carolina | N.C.G.S. § TA-B1 (COA16-624)
Department of
Public Safety
S70P04-15 | State v. Anthony 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Writ of Error | 1. Denied
‘Leon Hoover 10/07/2016
2, Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 2, Denied
Mandamus (COAP15-913) 10/07/2016
Hudson, J.,
recused
S7IPI6 Linwood Wilson 1. Pit’s Pro Se Notice of Appeal Based | 1. Dismissed
v. Joe Curtis, Upon a Constitutional Question ex mero motu
(COAI6-194)
2. Pit's Pro Se PDR Under 2. Denied
NCGS. § 74-81
8, Pit's Pro Se Amended PDR Under 3. Denied
NCGS. § 7A31
S72A16 State v. William 1. Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upon a | 1.—
Clifton Crabtree, Sr. | Dissent (COA15-1124)
2. Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upon a
Constitutional Question
3, Def's PDR as to Additional Issues 3, Denied
4. State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 4, Allowed
Based Upon a Constitutional Question
6, State's Motion to Deem Motion to 5. Allowed
Dismiss Notice of Appeal Based Upon a
Constitutional Question and Response
to PDR Timely Filed
Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
(COAI6-249)

196 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposition oF Peririons For Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 74-31
8 Decemper 2016
374P13-7 | State v. Marvin 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Notice of 1, Dismissed
Wade Millsaps Appeal (COAPI6-531; COAPI6-774)
2, Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 2, Dismissed
Mandamus .
Ervin, J.,
recused
374016 TatitaM. Sanchez | 1. Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1.—
v. Cobblestone Dissent (COA1S-1281) 10/13/2016
Homeowners
‘Association of 2, Def’s Motion to Consolidate Appeals | 2. Allowed
Clayton, Ine, a 10/13/2016
North Carolina non-
profit corporation
BS7BA1G Frank Christopher | 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1.—
v. Cobblestone Dissent (COA15-1282) 10/13/2016
Homeowners
‘Association of 2, Def's Motion to Consolidate Appeals | 2. Allowed
Clayton, Ine., a 10/18/2016
North Carolina non-
profit corporation
376P026 | State v. Robert 1 State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
‘Wayne Stanley (Coa16-436) 172016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas j
Ervin, J.,
recused
B76A16 Vincent Franks, 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1.—
Jn.v. Cobblestone _| Dissent (COAI5-1803) 10/13/2016
H ers
‘Assocation of 2. Def’s Motion to Consolidate Appeals | 2. Allowed
Clayton, Inc., a 10/13/2016
North Carolina non- .
profit corporation
STTAIG Robert Sain and 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1.—
Jennifer Sain Dissent (COA15-1302) 10/13/2016
v. Cobblestone . -
Homeowners 2, Def’s Motion to Consolidate Appeals | 2. Allowed
Association of 10/18/2016
Clayton, Inc., a
North Carolina non-
profit corporation

IN THE SUPREME COURT 197

Disposition or Petitions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

8 Decemper 2016
STBAIG Dennis Draughon | 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1.—
‘and Megan Draughon | Dissent (COA15-1280) 10/18/2016
v. Cobblestone .
Homeowners 2. Def's Motion to Consolidate Appeals | 2. Allowed
Association of 10/13/2016
Clayton, Inc., a
North Carolina non-
profit corporation
S706 State v. Henry Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Datwane Hunt (COAI6-143)
380P16 Statev.Jackson _| Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31 Denied
Cain Whisenant | (COA16-82)
389P16 State v. Marvin Def's PDR Under N.O.GS. § 7431 Denied
Hakeem Johnson | (COAI5-782)
S84P 16 State v. Phillip Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Wayne Broyal (COAI6-21) :
386P16 Statev. Quentin _| 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Lee Dick (COAL5-1400) 10/14/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
387P 16 Tony A. Hawkins | Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
v.EmestR. Sutton, | of Mandamus
Superintendent,
380A15-2 — | Statev. Tae Def’s Motion for Revision of Briefing | Allowed
Kwon Hammonds | Deadlines 10/13/2016
389P 16 People of North _| Petitioners’ Pro Se Petition for Dismissed
Carolina, ex rel Writ of Mandamus
Christopher Charles
Friscia and Maria
Andriena Friscia
v. Nathan J. Taylor,
etal.
S90P16 State v. Linda 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay “| 1. Allowed
Beth Chekanow | (COA16-1294) 10/19/2016
a i .
Breet | 2. state's Petition for Writ 2
of Supersedeas
SOLAI6 Next Advisor Defs’ Motion to Submit Appellate Filings | Allowed
Continued, Inc. Under Seal 10/19/2016
v. Lendingtree, Ine.

and Lendingtree LLC

198 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposirion or Partrions For Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
8 Decemper 2016

BOLA16 Next Advisor Def’s Motion to Amend Certificate of | Allowed
Continued, Ine. Service of Brief 12/01/2016
v. Lendingtree, Inc.,
etal.

S91A16 Next Advisor 1. Defs’ Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Denied
Continued, Ine. a .
v.Lendingtree, Inc, | 2 Defs’ Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2, Denied
etal 8, Defs’ Petition in the Alternative for | 8. Denied

Writ of Certiorari to Review Decision
of N.C. Business Court,
4, Defs’ Motion to Amend and 4, Dismissed
Supplement Record on Appeal ‘as moot
392A16 ‘The Fidelity Bank —_| Petitioner's Motion to Hold Appeal in | Allowed
v.N.C. Department | Abeyance Pending Determination of 10/28/2016
of Revenue PDR in Companion Case

393P16 The Fidelity Bank | Petitioner's PDR Prior toa Allowed
v.N.C. Department | Determination of COA (COAI6-1051)
of Revenue

94P16 State v. Daniel Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Scott Best (COAI6-27)

S96P16 ‘Teresa Thompson | Plt's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
v. Evergreen (COAI6-1031)

Baptist Church

B97AI6 State v. Adam 1. Def’s Motion for Removal of Current | 1. Allowed

Robert Jackson Appellate Counsel and Reappointment | 11/07/2016
of the Office of the Appellate Defender
2. Def's Motion for Current Appellate 2. Allowed
Counsel to Deliver Entire File to the 11/07/2016
Office of the Appellate Defender

398P16 State v. Erie 1. Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1. Dismissed

Lamar Lindsey Constitutional Question (COA15-1188) | ex mero motu
2, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 2, Denied
400P16 State v. Clairy Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § TA-31 Denied
Kanyinda Mbaya | (COA16-864)

402P16 State v. Jermuis 1. Def's Pro Se Notice of Appeal 1. Dismissed

Erell Andrews Based Upon a Constitutional Question | ex mero motu
(COA16-253)
2. Def’s Pro Se PDR Under 2, Denied
N.C.GS. § TASI

403P16 Ricky Turner Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | Denied
v. Cherry Hospital | Habeas Corpus 10/31/2016

IN THE SUPREME COURT 199

Disposition or Petitions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

8 Drcempsr 2016
404P16 State v. Samson Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for PDR Denied
Jamarco Coleman | (COAPI6-719)
A05P16 State v. Antonio Def’s Petition for Writ of Certioraré Denied
Freeman to Review Order of Superior Court,
Northampton County
406P16 State v. Michael 1, Def’s Pro Se Motion for PDR 1. Dismissed
A. Sorbello (COAPI6-721)
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Appoint 2. Dismissed
Counsel as moot
407P16 James Cummings | 1. Det's Pro Se Motion for Discretionary | 1. Dismissed
¥. State of Review (COAP16-706)
North Carolina
2. Def's Pro Se Motion for Appeal 2. Dismissed
408P16 State v. Lowell Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
‘Thomas Manring | (COA16-130)
410P16 State v. Joshua 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Sanchez (COAL6-1401) 11/07/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
411P16 Union County 1. Def’s Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Denied
v. Town of 11/15/2016
Marshville 2
2, Def’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas |"
Ervin, J.,
recused
418P16 State v. Wesley Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Patterson (COAI5-1145)
416P16 State v. Jeremy Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Rossco Bishop (COA16-276)
417P16 State v. Andrew 1. Def's Pro Se PDR Under 1. Dismissed
‘Young N. § TA-B1 (COAI5-1003)
2, State's Motion to Dismiss Def's 2, Dismissed
Appeal as moot
424P16 CoreyD.Greene __| Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Notice of | Denied
v. Susan White Appeal (COAP16-828) 12/02/2016
426P06-2 State v. Billy Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR Dismissed
‘Thomas Pearson —_| (COAP16-716)
430P16 Brian Reavis v. State | Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | Denied

of North Carolina | Habeas Corpus 11/23/2016

200 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disrostrion oF Patrnions ror Discretionary Revmaw Unoer G.S. TA-31
8 Dacemper 2016
436P16 State v. Howard 1. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Franklin Eubanks 12/05/2016
2. Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 2.
440P16 State v. Christopher | 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Glenn Turner (COA16-656) 12/06/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2
of Supersedeas
441P16 State v. Marian 1, State’s Motion for Temporary Stay 1, Allowed
Olivia Curtis (COA16-458) 12/06/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2,
of Supersedeas
444P08-2 State v. Rickey Def's Pro Se Motion for Order to Dismissed
Nelson Spencer Exhaust Defendant Arguments
459P00-6 State v. William Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
M. Huggins of Mandamus
510P04-3 State v. Jose Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Luis Macias of Mandamus 10/31/2016
579P01-4 State v. Antorio Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Rice Smarr of Mandamus
618P02-2 ‘State v. Michael Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari Dismissed
Ray Trull to Review Order of Superior Court,
Cabarrus County
669P03-4 State v. Tony 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Rehearing 1. Dismissed
Robert Jc
ones 2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Dismiss 2. Dismissed
8. Def's Pro Se Motion for Petition to 3. Dismissed
Show Just Cause Under Cornmon Law .
Ervin, J.,
recused

IN THE SUPREME COURT

. Disposition or Perrrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S, 74-31

20 Decemser 2016

State v. David
Martin Beasley
Young

1, Motion Requesting Court to Take
Judicial Notice (GOA13-646)

2, Addendum to Motion Requesting
Court to Take Judicial Notice

8, State’s Response to Motion
Requesting Court to Take

Judicial Notice

4, Addendum to Motion Requesting
Court to Take Judicial Notice

1. Dismissed
as moot

2. Dismissed
as moot

3. Dismissed
as moot

4, Dismissed
as moot

State v. John Joseph
Carvalho, It

State's Motion to Amend the Record
on Appeal

Dismissed
as moot

Fisher, et al.
v. Flue-Cured
Tobacco
Cooperative
Stabilization
Corporation

1. Pits’ Memorandum of
Additional Authority

2. Def’s Motion for Leave to Respond to
Memorandum of Additional Authority

IN THE SUPREME COURT

FISHER y. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C, 202 (2016)]

KAYE W. FISHER, DAN LEWIS anp DANIEL H. LEWIS FARMS, INC., GEORGE ABBOT,

ROBERT C. BOYETTE anp BOYETTE FARMS, INC., KYLE A. COX, C. MONROE
ENZOR, JR., Executor or rae Estars or CRAWFORD MONROE ENZOR, SR., ARCHIE.
HILL, KENDALL HILL, WHITNEY E. KING, CRAY MILLIGAN, RICHARD RENEGAR,

LINWOOD SCOTT, JR. ano SCOTT FARMS, INC., ORVILLE WIGGINS, ALFORD JAMES

WORLEY, Executor or THs Estarr or DENNIS ANDERSON, CHANDLER WORLEY,
HAROLD WRIGHT, anv OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED

ve
FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOPERATIVE STABILIZATION CORPORATION

No, 874A14
Filed 21 December 2016

Appeal and Error—appealability—class action certification
granted—interlocutory—public interest—appeal heard

Although defendant’s appeal in a class action from the certifi-
cation of the class was interlocutory (denying certification affects
a substantial right by not allowing certification), the subject mat-
ter of the this class action (assets held by the Flue-Cured Tobacco
Cooperative Stabilization Corporation) implicated the public inter-
est to such a degree that the Supreme Court invoked its supervisory
authority.

Class Actions—certification—alleged derivative action

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a class action
suit against the Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization
Corporation by allowing a motion for class certification notwith-
standing defendant's contention that plaintiffs’ action was deriva-
tive in nature. Whether or not plaintiffs’ claims are derivative in
nature, nothing in N.C.G.S. § 55-7-42 precludes class certification
in this case.
Class Actions—certification—class representatives—no con-
flict of interest

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by certifying the class
where defendant argued that there was a conflict of interest between.
one of the class representatives and other members of the plaintiff
class, a director of the organization. Because plaintiffs’ claims were
against defendant and not against individual directors, there was no
sense in which the director was “inculpating, if not suing, himself”
by participating in this case as a class representative.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 203

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C. 202 (2016)]

4, Class Actions—certification—recovery—capable of fair
determination
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when certifying
a class action involving assets held by the Flue-Cured Tobacco
Cooperative Stabilization Corporation by concluding that each
class member's share of any recovery could be determined fairly
based upon that member's patronage interests in defendant and
that a class action would preserve the rights of numerous absent,
unnamed class members.

5. Class Actions—certification—class | members—common
issues of law and fact
The trial court did not err when certifying a class in an
action against the Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization
Corporation by finding that the class members shared numerous
common issues of law and fact. The same basic questions of fact and
law would determine whether defendant was liable for its actions in
retaining surplus money as reserve funds and attempting to remove
all the members who would not agree to enter into a current exclu-
sive marketing agreement.

6. Class Actions—certification—class action—preferable to
individual litigation
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that a
class action was superior to individual litigation in a case involv-
ing assets held by the Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization
Corporation. Although defendant argued that the class was unman-
ageable simply because of its size, the trial court stated that the
only pragmatically effective way to provide relief under the circum-
stances was through certification of a class and, given the extremely
large number of similarly situated class members and the imprac-
ticality of requiring them to protect their rights through filing hun-
dreds of thousands of individual lawsuits, it could not be concluded
that the trial court abused its discretion.

Chief Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b) from an amended order on
motion for class certification entered on 24 February 2014 by Judge John
R. Jolly, Jr. in Superior Court, Wake County. On 10 October 2014, pursu-
ant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31(a) and (b)(2), and Rule 15(e)(2) of the North

IN THE SUPREME COURT

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C. 202 (2016)]

Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme Court on its own
initiative certified the case for review prior to determination in the Court
of Appeals. Heard in the Supreme Court on 20 April 2015.

Blanchard, Miller, Lewis & Isley, PA., by Philip R. Isley; Speights
& Runyan, by C. Alan Runyan, pro hac vice; and Richardson,
Patrick, Westbrook & Brickman, LLC, by James L. Ward, Jr., for
plaintiff-appellees.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, by John B. Quinn, pro
hac vice, and Derek L. Shaffer, pro hac vice; and Wyrick Robbins
Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Hampson,
Sor defendant-appellant n/k/a U.S. Tobacco Cooperative, Inc.

Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, PA., by John R. Wester, for NC
Chamber, amicus curiae.

JACKSON, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the trial court erred by allow-
ing plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class of current and former fiue-
cured tobacco producers who were members of defendant Flue-Cured
Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation between 1946 and 2004.
Because we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion,
we affirm and remand. :

This appeal arises from two cases that were consolidated for pre-
trial purposes. These two cases began with the filing of complaints on
6 January 2005 and 11 February 2005. Plaintiffs are current and former
tobacco producers and members of defendant, a nonprofit cooperative
that administered the federal tobacco price support program (the Price
Support Program) for flue-cured tobacco from 1946 through 2004.

According to the allegations in plaintiffs’ third amended and con-
solidated complaint, flue-cured tobacco producers participating in the
Price Support Program were required to be members of defendant. To
become a member, a producer paid five dollars to defendant in exchange
for one share of defendant's stock. The complaint asserted that each
member entered into a contract with defendant that stated:

The undersigned grower of fiue-cured tobacco (hereinaf-
ter “grower”) applies for membership in the Flue-Cured
Tobacco Co-operative Stabilization Corporation, a non-
profit co-operative . . . and herewith makes payment of

IN THE SUPREME COURT 205

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C. 202 (2016)]

$5.00 to the undersigned agent for one (1) share of com-
mon stock.

The grower hereby appoints the Association as his agent
to receive, handle and market all or such portion of the
flue-cured tobacco . . . as the grower may elect or choose
to deliver to the Association for disposition in accordance
with the terms of this contract and the Association accepts
such appointment. ...

The Stabilization Corporation agrees (1) to receive, handle
and sell... .such tobacco as the grower may elect to deliver
to the Stabilization Corporation, and (2) that in addition to
the amount of [sic] paid to the grower upon delivery of
tobacco, it will distribute to him his pro rata share of any
net gains remaining after payment of operating and main-
tenance costs and expenses and a reasonable deduction
for reserves as determined by the Board of Directors.

The complaint asserts that each member “was guaranteed a life-
time membership in [defendant] that could not be cancelled without
a hearing.”

According to the complaint, the process of participating in the Price
Support Program involved tobacco producers delivering their product to
a warehouse, where defendant then graded the tobacco and attempted
to sell it at auction. The auction was subject to a minimum price estab-
lished annually by the United States Department of Agriculture, and the
tobacco would not be sold for less than that price. If the tobacco could
not be sold, then defendant would process and store it, while advancing
the minimum price less an administrative fee to the tobacco producer.
Defendant paid the tobacco producers using loans from the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC), a corporation owned and operated by the
federal government that helped administer the Price Support Program.
The unsold tobacco served as collateral for the loans issued by the CCC.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that until 1982, these loans “were com-
pletely non-recourse, meaning that all losses or defaults incurred under
the program were borne by the CCC and the taxpayers of the United
States.” At the same time, if tobacco from a given crop year eventually
was sold at a price higher than necessary to pay that year’s loans, then
“these gains were to be allocated pro-rata among [ ] the [tobacco pro-
ducers] who participated in the program that year.” This system of allo-
cating losses and gains remained in effect until 1982, when Congress
enacted the No Net Cost Tobacco Program Act (the NNC Act). Pursuant

IN THE SUPREME COURT

FISHER v, FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP, STABILIZATION CORP.
[869 N.C. 202 (2016)}

to the NNC Act, defendant began collecting an additional payment (the
NNC Assessment) from tobacco producers when they delivered their
tobacco to defendant. These funds served as additional collateral for the
loans issued to defendant by the CCC, limiting losses borne by the fed-
eral government. If any funds remained after the loans were repaid, the
surplus funds belonged to the tobacco producers who had participated
in the Price Support Program. Ultimately, the Price Support Program
came to an end in 2004.

Plaintiffs asserted claims related to funds accumulated by defendant
throughout the lifetime of the Price Support Program and held by defen-
dant as reserve funds. According to the allegations in the complaint, the
money in defendant’s reserve funds came primarily from a few specific
sources. First, defendant received and stored tobacco from 1967 to 1973
and eventually sold the tobacco at a price higher than necessary to repay
the loans from the CCC for those crop years. Some of this surplus money
was distributed to the tobacco producers, and some was retained by
defendant as reserve funds. Defendant issued certificates of interest to
the tobacco producers whose tobacco had created the surplus during
this time period. The certificates of interest showing that the tobacco
producers had an interest in the reserve funds were issued on a pro rata
basis. Second, after 1982 defendant used surplus funds collected from
NNC Assessments to redeem unsold tobacco that had been held as col-
lateral for loans from the CCC. Defendant sold that tobacco for a sub-
stantial amount and retained the money as reserve funds. Third, when
the Price Support Program came to an end in 2004, defendant satisfied
its remaining loans, and the CCC returned to defendant approximately
eighty-three million pounds of processed tobacco that had been held as
collateral. Defendant sold this tobacco and again retained the revenue.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that in 2004, defendant notified all its
members that unless they entered into new contracts to sell tobacco
exclusively to defendant in 2005, they would lose their memberships—
thus “forc[ing] Plaintiffs to either enter into that contract, at reduced
prices and quantities, or lose their substantial investment in [defendant],
including their share of the reserves, retained earnings, and margins.”
Plaintiffs contended that defendant “expelled hundreds of thousands”
of members and took control of the reserve funds in an “attempt[ ] to
create a ‘last man standing’ scenario in which a few hundred remaining
member[s] potentially have the benefit of hundreds of millions of dollars
in assets which have been created through the efforts of all member[s],
including Plaintiffs.” Plaintiffs sought, inter alia, money damages, par-
tial distribution of defendant’s assets, and a declaratory judgment that

IN THE SUPREME COURT

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C, 202 (2016)]

207

plaintiffs are members of defendant and are “entitled to all rights, privi- :
leges, and benefits resulting” from their membership.

Plaintiffs also filed a motion for class certification. The trial court
allowed the motion, stating that the certified class shall include:

All individuals, proprietorships, partnerships, corpora-
tions, or their heirs, representatives, executors or assigns,
and other proper entities that have been members/
shareholders of the Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative
Stabilization Corporation... at any time from its inception
through the end of crop year 2004, and any heirs, represen-
tatives, executors, successors or assigns, and;

(a) had not requested cancellation of their membership
and whose membership was cancelled by Stabilization
without a hearing, and/or

(b) were issued a certificate of interest in capital reserve
by Stabilization for any of the tobacco crop years
between and including 1967-1973, and/or

(c) delivered, consigned for sale, or sold fiue-cured
tobacco and paid an assessment for deposit into the
No Net Cost Tobacco Fund or No Net Cost Tobacco
Account during any tobacco crop years between and
including 1982-2004.

Defendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. This Court
on its own initiative certified the case for discretionary review prior to a
determination by the Court of Appeals.

[1] As an initial matter, we note that defendant’s appeal is interlocu-
tory. “Ordinarily, an appeal from an interlocutory order will be dismissed
as fragmentary and premature unless the order affects some substan-
tial right and will work injury to [the] appellant if not corrected before
appeal from final judgment.” Oestreicher v. Am. Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290
N.C. 118, 125, 225 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1976) (quoting Stanback v. Stanback,
287 N.C. 448, 453, 215 S.H.2d 30, 34 (1975)). “A substantial right is ‘a legal
right affecting or involving a matter of substance as distinguished from
matters of form: a right materially affecting those interests which [one]
is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material right.’ ”
Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar, 363 N.C. 70, 75, 678 S.E.2d 602, 605 (2009)
(alteration in original) (quoting Oestreicher, 290 N.C. at 180, 225 S.E.2d
at 805). “We consider whether a right is substantial on a case-by-case
basis.” Id. at 75, 678 S.E.2d at 605.

208 IN THE SUPREME COURT

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C. 202 (2016)]

“The denial of class certification has been held to affect a substan-
tial right because it determines the action as to the unnamed plaintiffs.”
Frost v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 353 N.C. 188, 193, 540 S.E.2d 324,
327 (2000) (citing, inter alia, Perry v. Cullipher, 69 N.C. App. 761, 762,
318 S.E.2d 854, 356 (1984)). “[H]owever, no order allowing class certi-
fication has been held to similarly affect a substantial right such that
interlocutory appeal would be permitted.” Id. at 193, 540 S.E.2d at 328.
In Frost we stated that a trial court’s order allowing class certification
does not affect a substantial right and is not immediately appealable. Id.
at 194, 540 S.E.2d at 328. Nevertheless, we concluded that the underly-
ing subject matter of Frost was important enough to justify invocation
of our supervisory authority over the courts of this state to consider
the merits of the appeal. Id. at 195, 540 S.B.2d at 329 (citing N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-32(b) (1999).

The case sub judice involves “a class of producers of flue-cured
tobacco who were members/shareholders of Defendant at times mate-
rial and signed marketing agreements with Defendant pursuant to which
the putative class members delivered tobacco to Defendant that was
either sold or otherwise used in the [Price Support] program.” The class
includes the tobacco producers, “proprietorships, partnerships, [and]
corporations,” and their “heirs, representatives, executors, successors
or assigns.” The trial court stated that, according to defendant's records,
“for each year between 1967 and 1978 certificates were issued to between
40,768 and 149,483 members,” and “[t]here were 209,186 members who
paid [NNC] assessments between 1982 and 2004.” The parties agree that
the total number of past and present members of defendant exceeds:
eight hundred thousand. Consequently, after careful consideration,
we conclude that the subject matter of this case implicates the public
interest to such a degree that invocation of our supervisory authority is
appropriate. N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) (2015). Accordingly, we consider the
merits of defendant’s appeal notwithstanding that the appeal is inter-
Jocutory and ordinarily would not be immediately appealable.

[2] Rule 23 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
class action lawsuits, stating: “If persons constituting a class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representa-
tion of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued.” N.C.G.S. § 14-1, Rule
23(a) (2015). “The party seeking to bring a class action under Rule 23(a)
has the burden of showing that the prerequisites to utilizing the class
action procedure are present.” Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 319
N.C. 274, 282, 354 S.E.2d 459, 465 (1987) (footnote and citation omitted).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 209

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C. 202 (2016)]

As an initial matter, the class representatives must demonstrate the exis-
tence of a class. Id. at 277, 280-81, 354 S.E.2d at 462, 464. “Whether a
proper ‘class’ under Rule 23(a) has been alleged is a question of law.”
Id. at 280, 354 S,E.2d at 464. A proper class exists “when the named and
unnamed members each have an interest in either the same issue of law
or of fact, and that issue predominates over issues affecting only individ-
ual class members.” Id. at 280, 354 S.B.2d at 464. In addition to establishing
the existence of a proper class, the class representatives must show: (1)
that “they will fairly and adequately represent the interests of all mem-
bers of the class;” (2) that they have “no conflict of interest” with the class
members; (3) that they “have a genuine personal interest, not a mere tech-
nical interest, in the outcome of the case;” (4) that they “will adequately
represent members outside the state;” (5) that “class members are so
numerous that it is impractical to bring them all before the court;” and
(6) that “adequate notice” is given to all class members. Faulkenbury
v. Teachers & State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 345 N.C. 683, 697, 483 S.E.2d 422,
431 (1997) (citing Crow, 319 N.C. at 282-84, 354 S.E.2d at 465-66).

“When all the prerequisites are met, it is left to the trial court's dis-
cretion ‘whether a class action is superior to other available methods for
the adjudication of th[e] controversy.’ ” Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of
Transp., 367 N.C. 333, 337, 757 S.E.2d 466, 470 (2014) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Crow, 319 N.C. at 284, 354 S.E.2d at 466). The trial court
has “broad discretion” to allow or deny class certification. Frost, 353
N.C. at 198, 540 S.E.2d at 331. Accordingly, we review the trial court’s
order allowing class certification for abuse of discretion. See Beroth
Oil, 367 N.C. at 387, 757 S.E.2d at 470 (citing Faulkenbury, 345 N.C, at
699, 483 S.E.2d at 432). In Beroth Oil we further refined the standard of
review applicable to the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
class certification order, concluding that although “the general standard
of review is abuse of discretion,” the trial court’s conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo. Id. at 338, 757 S.E.2d at 471 (quoting Blitz v. Agean,
Ine., 197 N.C. App. 296, 300, 677 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2009), disc. rev. denied and
cert. denied, 363 N.C. 800, 690 S.E.2d 530 (2010)). The trial court’s find-
ings of fact are binding on the appellate court if supported by competent
evidence. Jd. at 338, 757 S.E.2d at 471.

In this appeal defendant argues that class certification is improper.
Defendant contends that the trial court found that the “central issue
common to all Plaintiffs is whether they are entitled to share in the accu-
mulated assets held by Defendant, which Defendant contends is held as
a reasonable reserve.” Defendant asserts that this issue involves a chal-
lenge to its business judgment and therefore “constitutes a prototypical

IN THE SUPREME COURT

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C. 202 (2016)}

derivative claim.” Defendant states that plaintiffs are barred from bring-
ing a derivative proceeding because they failed to make a written demand.
upon defendant in compliance with section 55-7-42, which states:

No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding

until:

() A written demand has been made upon the corpora-
tion to take suitable action; and

(2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was
made unless, prior to the expiration of the 90 days, the
shareholder was notified that the corporation rejected
the demand, or unless irreparable injury to the corpo-
ration would result by waiting for the expiration of the
90-day period.

N.C.G.S. § 55-7-42 (2015). We disagree with defendant's assertion.

A derivative proceeding is defined in pertinent part as “a civil suit in
the right of a domestic corporation.” Id. § 55-7-40.1(1) (2015). Derivative
claims belong to the corporation itself, rather than to the plaintiffs,
meaning that the rights to be vindicated are those of the corporation,
not those of plaintiffs suing derivatively on the corporation's behalf. See,
e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). “[Alny
damages flow back to the corporation, not to the individual sharehold-
ers bringing the [derivative] action.” Green v. Freeman, 367 N.C. 136,
142, 749 S.E.2d 262, 268 (2018) (citing, inter alia, Rivers v. Wachovia
Corp., 665 F.3d 610, 614-15 (4th Cir. 2011).

Defendant’s appeal arises from the class certification order and seeks
reversal of that order. Defendant does not argue that section 55-7-42
requires dismissal of any specific claims for relief alleged in the com-
plaint, but contends that section 55-7-42 precludes class certification.
Yet, section 55-7-42 establishes when a shareholder “may commence a
derivative proceeding,” but does not set forth any requirements for class
certification. In addition, neither Rule 23 nor this Court’s precedents
require a court evaluating a motion for class certification to consider
whether any claims raised by a putative class action are derivative in
nature. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 23 (2015); see also, e.g., Crow, 319 N.C. at
282-84, 354 S.E.2d at 465-66 (describing the prerequisites for class certi-
fication). We conclude that whether or not plaintiffs’ claims are deriva-
tive in nature, nothing in section 55-7-42 precludes class certification in
the case sub judice. We express no opinion whether any of these claims
are derivative claims and note that defendant may argue that specific

IN THE SUPREME COURT. 211

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C. 202 (2016)]

claims are barred by section 55-7-42 in a properly raised motion to dis-
miss. See, e.g., Allen ex rel. Allen & Brock Constr. Co. v. Ferrera, 141
N.C. App. 284, 289, 540 S.E.2d 761, 766 (2000) (concluding that the trial
court did not err by dismissing the plaintiff's derivative claims pursuant
to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6)). We hold only that defendant has not
shown that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the motion
for class certification notwithstanding defendant’s contention that plain-
tiffs’ action is derivative in nature.

[3] Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
certifying the class because there is a conflict of interest between one
of the class representatives and other members of the plaintiff class.
Specifically, defendant contends that one named plaintiff and class
representative, Richard Renegar, is on defendant’s Board of Directors.
Defendant asserts that allowing Renegar to represent the class essen-
tially amounts to Renegar “inculpating, if not suing, himself” because, by
arguing that the Board's recent and current actions are unreasonable or
improper, Renegar “effectively” contradicts Board decisions for which
he “consistently voted in favor.” We disagree.

We explained in Crow that one of the prerequisites for class certi-
fication is that the class representatives not have a conflict of interest
with the other class members. “The named representatives must show
that there is no conflict of interest between them and the members of
the class who are not named parties, so that the interests of the unnamed
class members will be adequately and fairly protected.” Crow, 319 N.C.
at 282, 354 S.E.2d at 465 (citing Thompson v. Humphrey, 179 N.C. 44, 58,
101 S.E. 788, 746 (1919).

The trial court found that Renegar, like other class representatives,
was a producer of flue-cured tobacco, was a member of defendant,
had signed a marketing agreement with defendant, and had delivered
tobacco to defendant. In evaluating whether there were any conflicts
between the class representatives and the class members, the trial court
noted that plaintiffs had not raised any claims alleging that any individ-
ual member of defendant's Board of Directors had engaged in miscon-
duct. In addition, the trial court stated that all “claims against individual
directors were voluntarily dismissed” by plaintiffs. The trial court also
observed that “the named Plaintiffs have continually exhibited an inter-
est in the outcome of this civil action and have been diligent in their
involvement, such that the court is satisfied that the Class representa-
tives will protect the interests of all Class members.” The trial court con-
cluded that plaintiffs are adequate class representatives.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[869 N.C. 202 (2016)]

Because plaintiffs’ claims are against defendant and not against indi-
vidual directors, there is no sense in which Renegar is “inculpating, if
not suing, himself” by participating in this case as a class representative.
Although a trial court might review a class representative's other activi-
ties and find that these activities create a conflict of interest with class
members, here the trial court exercised its discretion and determined
that Renegar is capable of representing the interests of class members.
We are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
certifying the class notwithstanding this alleged conflict.

[4] Next, defendant argues that “[t]he trial court erred as a matter of law
by disregarding fundamental conflicts that divide the class.” Specifically,
defendant identifies the following alleged conflicts of interest between
the class members: (1) some class members still sell tobacco to defen-
dant, while other class members no longer sell tobacco; (2) some class
members have filed a separate action in federal district court stating that
their interests are not represented by the current action; and (8) some
class members who sold tobacco during years when tobacco was sold
at a profit may have claims that other class members lack. Defendant
asserts that the class certification order must be reversed because of
these conflicts.

We did not state in Crow that there can be no conflicts of interest
between class members. See id. at 282, 354 S.E.2d at 465. Nevertheless,
we “caution[ed]” that the list of prerequisites identified in Crow should
not “be viewed as all-inclusive.” Id. at 282 n.2, 354 S.E.2d at 465 n.2.
The trial court has “broad discretion” in “all matters pertaining to class
certification.” Frost, 353 N.C. at 198, 540 S.E.2d at 331. The court “is not
limited to consideration of matters expressly set forth in Rule 23 or in
[Crow].” Crow, 319 N.C. at 284, 354 S.E.2d at 466. Accordingly, noth-
ing prevents the trial court from evaluating potential conflicts of inter-
est between class members and weighing any potential conflicts when
exercising its discretion to allow or deny class certification. See, ¢.g.,
Harrison v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 170 N.C. App. 545, 554, 618 S.E.2d
322, 329 (2005) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion when it concluded in pertinent part that it could not “certify a
class in which some putative class members assert that other putative
class members caused or contributed to the wrongs asserted and the
latter deny the assertion”). The trial court may be in the best position to
determine whether any conflicts among class members warrant denial
of class certification.

In the case sub judice the trial court considered defendant’s argu-
ments and rejected them. The trial court concluded that “[a]ll Class

IN THE SUPREME COURT 213

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C. 202 (2016)]

members and representatives have a common unified interest in the
determination of whether Defendant is retaining more than a reason-
able reserve to the detriment of the current and former members.” The
court noted that plaintiffs are not seeking dissolution of defendant and
explained that “[vlarying interests among Class members arising from
when and how much tobacco a Class member delivered do not create a
conflict concerning Defendant's liability.” Instead, the court stated that
class members’ relative interests could be determined based upon each
member's patronage interests.

The court noted that class members who received certificates of
interest for participation in the profitable crop years from 1967 to 1973
“would receive only that portion of the net gains for each year that
is attributable to the tobacco they delivered for that year.” The court
stated that “[t]hese amounts have been separately accounted for and
maintained in Defendant's records.” The court therefore concluded that
these members’ interests do not conflict with those of other members.

For class members “in the 1982-2004 group,” who paid the NNC
Assessments that in some years helped to create the surplus money that
defendant retained as reserve funds, the trial court noted that “there are
no material conflicts . . . because their tobacco and [NNC] assessments
are proportionally taken into consideration during the entire period
that they are common contributors.” Although the court acknowledged
that some class members may be entitled to a larger or lesser amount
of damages than others depending upon the amount of tobacco deliv-
ered and NNC Assessments paid by each individual class member, the
court, quoting Pitts v. American Security Insurance Co., 144 N.C. App.
1, 15, 550 S.E.2d 179, 190 (2002), stated that “[a] difference in the amount
of damages does not create a material conflict of interest between
[a plaintiff] and the other proposed class members.”

‘The trial court did not find that conflicts of interest divide the mem-
bers of the class. Instead, the court concluded that each class member's
share of recovery could be determined fairly based upon that mem-
ber’s patronage interests in defendant. Moreover, the court stated that
a class action “will preserve the rights of numerous absent, unnamed
Class members.” We are unable to conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion.

[5] Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by finding that the
classmembers share numerous common issues of law and fact. Defendant
contends that each class member's recovery will depend upon different
factors, such as whether the class member still actively sells tobacco to

IN THE SUPREME COURT

FISHER v, FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[369 N.C, 202 (2016)]

defendant, the communications the class member received from defen-
dant, the crop years during which the class member produced and sold
tobacco, and whether the class member has already redeemed a certifi-
cate of interest or received other payments from defendant. Defendant
asserts that in Beroth Oil, 367 N.C. at 346, 757 S.E.2d at 476, this Court
stated that certifying a class of eight hundred property owners would
require a trial with “far too many individualized, fact-intensive determi-
nations for class certification to be proper.” Defendant argues that here
the class is larger and requires determination of a greater number of
diverse issues than those referenced in Beroth Oil. We disagree.

Beroth Oii involved a class of property owners raising inverse
condemnation claims against the North Carolina Department of
Transportation. 367 N.C. at 333, 757 S.E.2d at 468. The inverse condem-
nation claims arose from the deleterious effect on their properties of the
Transportation Corridor Official Map Act, which imposed certain limits
on obtaining a building permit or approving a subdivision plat. Id. at
334, 757 S.B.2d at 468. The trial court denied class certification. Id.
at 336, 757 S.E.2d at 470. In concluding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion, we explained that different parcels of land necessarily
were affected differently by the restrictions imposed by the Act. Id. at
343, 757 S.E.2d at 474. We observed that “[nJot all of these 800 prop-
erty owners have the same property interests and expectations. As the
trial court correctly noted, the properties . . . are diverse: ‘Some... are
improved and some are not. Some are residential and others are com-
mercial.’ ” Id. at 348, 757 S.B.2d at 474 (second ellipsis in original). Our
decision was based upon the “discrete fact-specific inquiry” necessary
to decide inverse condemnation claims related to the particular restric-
tions of the Act on numerous different properties with different uses and
purposes. Id. at 343, 757 S.E.2d at 474.

By contrast, in the case sub judice the trial court identified many
issues of law and fact that are common to the class. The trial court stated
that “all members paid $5 for their stock,” that “the material language of
the stock certificates is uniform,” and that “all members signed a mar-
keting agreement,” with the text of the agreements used from 1946 to
1984 being “substantially identical” and the text of the agreements used
from 1985 to 2004 also being “substantially identical.” The trial court
explained that “Defendant's relationship with all members was gov-
erned by uniform agreements with the [CCC] and uniform agreements
with the auction warehouses.” The court noted that the terms of all the
certificates of interest were identical. For members who participated in
the 1967 to 1973 crop years, each member's “gains . . . were allocated

IN THE SUPREME COURT 215

FISHER v. FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOP. STABILIZATION CORP.
[869 N.C. 202 (2016)}

pro rata by year based upon each member’s percentage of the consigned
pounds of tobacco.” For members who paid NNC Assessments, the pay-
ments were assessed, kept, transferred, and used in the same way for
each member. The court stated that defendant had maintained records
showing the proceeds from crop years that created a surplus, including
the surplus money retained by defendant from 1967 to 1973, from 1982
to 1984, and from tobacco redeemed after the Price Support Program
ended in 2004. :

The trial court also identified common legal issues shared by the
class, including whether defendant “was required to allocate and iden-
tify its total equity to the members on a yearly basis,” “breached a fidu-
ciary duty to Plaintiffs,” or “breached Plaintiffs’ contractual rights.” The
court stated that all plaintiffs share a common interest in determining
whether defendant's reserve funds were and are reasonable. The court
concluded that plaintiffs had shown sufficient commonality of inter-
ests among the class members. The trial court found that no individual
inquiry is necessary to determine whether defendant may terminate the
membership of members who do not agree to enter into a current mar-
keting agreement with defendant.

Unlike Beroth Oil, in which even the question of whether a specific
property owner could raise an inverse condemnation claim required a
“discrete fact-specific inquiry,” id. at 343, 757 S.E.2d at 474, here the
same basic questions of fact and law will determine whether defendant
is liable to plaintiffs for its actions in retaining surplus money as reserve
funds and attempting to remove all the members who would not agree
to enter into a current exclusive marketing agreement with defendant.
In addition, here the trial court exercised its broad discretion to allow,
rather than deny, class certification. We are unable to conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in determining that plaintiffs have
demonstrated the existence of a class with a shared interest in common
questions of fact and law.

[6] Finally, defendant argues that this class is unmanageable simply
because of the large number of tobacco producers who were members
of defendant and will be members of the class. But the large number of
individuals whose interests are affected by defendant's actions is a key
reason cited by the trial court in ruling that a class action is superior to
individual litigation. The trial court stated that “the only pragmatically
effective way to provide relief under the circumstances of this matter is
through certification of a class because each individual class member’s
damages suffered may be relatively small while the burden and expense

IN THE SUPREME COURT

HANESBRANDS INC. v. FOWLER
{369 N.C. 216 (2016)]

of individual litigation would be very high.” The trial court noted that
a class action “will avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits,” prevent inconsis-
tent results, reduce plaintiffs’ transaction costs in bringing the action,
and “preserve the rights of numerous absent, unnamed Class members.”
“Class actions should be permitted where they are likely to serve use-
ful purposes such as preventing a multiplicity of suits or inconsistent
results.” Crow, 319 N.C. at 284, 354 S.E.2d at 466. Given the extremely
large number of similarly situated class members and the impractical-
ity of requiring them to protect their rights through filing hundreds of
thousands of individual lawsuits, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by ruling that a class action is superior to individ-
ual litigation in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order
allowing the motion for class certification and remand this case to the
trial court for additional proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Chief Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

HANESBRANDS INC.
v.
KATHLEEN FOWLER

No, 438A15
Filed 21 December 2016

Appeal and Error—appealability—Business Court designation—
opposition overruled—interlocutory
In an action involving stock grant agreements and a designation.
of the case as a mandatory complex business case, an interlocu-
tory order of the North Carolina Business Court overruling defen-
dant’s opposition to the designation of the case was not immediately
appealable. Defendant argued that she was denied the substantial
right to have the matter heard in the same manner as ordinary dis-
putes involving ordinary citizens, but she did not explain how she
was prejudiced. Although defendant contended that the Business
Court's decision was akin to the denial of a motion for a change
of venue, merely asserting a preference for a forum other than the
Business Court absent a specific, legal entitlement to an exclusion
from designation was insufficient.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 217

HANESBRANDS INC. v. FOWLER
[369 N.C. 216 (2016)]

Chief Justice MARTIN and Justice EDMUNDS did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(a) and 7A-45.4(e) from an
order entered on 5 November 2015 by Judge James L. Gale, Chief Special
Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases appointed by the
Chief Justice pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4, in Superior Court, Forsyth
County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 31 August 2016.

Constangy, Brooks, Smith, & Prophete, LLP, by Robin E. Shea and
Jill 8. Stricklin, for plaintiff-appellee.

Law Office of David Pishko, PA, by David Pishko, for
defendant-appellant.

JACKSON, Justice.

In this case we consider whether defendant Kathleen Fowler may
appeal an interlocutory order of the North Carolina Business Court
overruling her opposition to designation of this case as a mandatory
complex business case. We conclude that defendant has failed to show
that this order affects a substantial right as required for appeal of an
interlocutory order pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a). Accordingly, we dis-
miss defendant's appeal.

On 20 August 2015, plaintiff Hanesbrands Inc. filed a complaint
in Superior Court, Forsyth County alleging that defendant breached
five different stock grant agreements that she entered into during her
employment with plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages
of $462,366—the alleged value of certain of its stock units and options
granted to defendant pursuant to those agreements. That same day,
plaintiff filed a Notice of Designation of its case as a mandatory com-
plex business case pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(a) on the basis that
the case involved both “the law governing corporations” and a dispute
“‘§nvolving securities.” The designation received preliminary approval
from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina on
21 August 2015. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4(f) (2015).

Defendant filed an opposition to the designation on 23 September
2015, which was overruled by order of Judge James L. Gale, Chief Special
Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases, who was assigned to
the case. On 12 November 2015, after filing an answer to plaintiff's orig-
inal complaint, defendant appealed the Business Court’s order to this
Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-45.4(e) and 7A-27(a). Plaintiff argues

IN THE SUPREME COURT

HANESBRANDS INC. v, FOWLER
[369 N.C. 216 (2016))

that this Court should dismiss defendant’s appeal because the Business
Court’s order is interlocutory and defendant failed to show that the
order affects a substantial right. We agree.

When a party disagrees with a Business Court Judge's ruling on an.
opposition to the designation of a case as a mandatory complex business
case, “the party may appeal in accordance with G.S. 7A-27(a).” N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-45.4(e) (2015). According to section 7A-27(a):

Appeal lies of right directly to the Supreme Court in any of
the following cases: .. .

(8) From any interlocutory order of a Business Court
Judge that does any of the following:

a. Affects a substantial right.

b. In effect determines the action and prevents a
judgment from which an appeal might be taken.

c. Discontinues the action.
d. Grants or refuses a new trial.
Id. § TA-27(a) (2015).

“An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an
action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further
action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire con-
troversy.” Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377,
881 (1950) (citing Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194, 88 S.E. 231 (1916)).
To appeal from an interlocutory order, the appellant must show that the
order affects a “substantial right which he might lose if the order is not
reviewed before final judgment.” City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C.
528, 530, 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951) (citations omitted). “[AJn appeal from
an interlocutory order will be dismissed as fragmentary and premature
unless the order affects some substantial right and will work injury to
appellant if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.” Goldston
v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 728, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990) (quot-
ing Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 453, 215 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1975).

“Itis the appellant’s burden to present appropriate grounds
for... acceptance of an interlocutory appeal, . . . and not
the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find
support for appellant's right to appeal[.]” Where the appel-
lant fails to carry the burden of making such a showing to
the court, the appeal will be dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

HANESBRANDS INC. v. FOWLER:
[369 N.C. 216 (2016)}

Johnson v. Lucas, 168 N.C. App. 515, 518, 608 S.E.2d 336, 338 (citation
omitted) (quoting Thompson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 140 N.C. App. 115,
121, 535 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2000) (second and third alterations in origi-
nal), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 58, 619 S.E.2d 502 (2005). Similarly, in
appeals from interlocutory orders, the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure require that the appellant’s brief contain a “statement of the
grounds for appellate review,” which must allege “sufficient facts and
argument to support appellate review on the ground that the challenged
order affects a substantial right.” N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4). “The appel-
Jants must present more than a bare assertion that the order affects a
substantial right; they must demonstrate why the order affects a sub-
stantial right.” Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 198 N.C. App. 274, 277-78,
679 S.E.2d 512, 516 (2009) (discussing N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)).1

We have determined that a “substantial right is ‘a legal right affect-
ing or involving a matter of substance as distinguished from matters of
form: a right materially affecting those interests which [one] is entitled
to have preserved and protected by law: a material right.’ ” Gilbert
v. N.C. State Bar, 363 N.C. 70, 75, 678 S.E.2d 602, 605 (2009) (alteration
in original) (quoting Oestreicher v. Am. Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118,
180, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976)). Recognizing that “the ‘substantial right’
test for appealability of interlocutory orders is more easily stated than
applied,” we have determined that it is “usually necessary to resolve the
question in each case by considering the particular facts of that case
and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is
sought was entered.” Waters v. Qualified Pers., Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208,
240 S.E.2d 838, 343 (1978).

In her appeal from the Business Court’s interlocutory order in this
case, defendant alleges that the designation of her case as a mandatory
complex business case affects a substantial right. Specifically, defen-
dant argues that requiring her “to defend a case filed against her by a
large, public corporation in a special court established primarily for dis-
putes between businesses” denies her the substantial right to “have this
matter heard in the same manner as ordinary disputes involving ordi-
nary citizens.” Defendant also argues that the “Business Court Judge’s
decision in this action is akin to the denial of a motion for change of
venue.” Although defendant appears to suggest that she may suffer some
unspecified prejudice from this case being tried in Business Court, she

1, Although opinions of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court, the wider
scope of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction has allowed it to develop a more robust body of
case law regarding interlocutory appeals.

220 IN THE SUPREME COURT

HANESBRANDS INC. v. FOWLER
[869 N.C. 216 (2016)]

has not explained how she would be prejudiced. She has not identified a
specific “material right” that she would lose if the order is not reviewed
before final judgment nor explained how the order in question would
“work injury” to her if not immediately reviewed. See Gilbert, 363 N.C.
at 75, 678 S.H.2d at 605; Goldston, 326 N.C. at 726, 392 S.E.2d at 736.
Furthermore, the General Statutes provide that if a case is not “desig-
nated a mandatory complex business case” it may still be designated
as “a discretionary complex business case pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the
General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.” N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-45.4(f). Rule 2.1 affords the Chief Justice wide latitude to designate
a case as a complex business case. Specifically,

[t]he Chief Justice may designate any case or group of
cases as (a) “exceptional” or (b) “complex business.” A
senior resident superior court judge, chief district court
judge, or presiding superior court judge may ex mero
motu, or on motion of any party, recommend to the Chief
Justice that a case or cases be designated as exceptional
or complex business.

Gen. R. Pract. Super. & Dist. Cts. 2.1(a), 2016 Ann. R. N.C. 3 (emphasis
added). We note that in Delaware, another state having a specialized
business court, the Administrative Directive establishing that state’s
Complex Commercial Litigation Division specifically excludes certain
types of cases from designation, including “any case involving an exclu-
sive choice of court agreement . . . where the agreement relates to an
individual or collective contract of employment.” James T. Vaughn, Jr.,
President J., Del. Super. Ct., Administrative Directive of the President
Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware No. 2010-3:
Complex Commercial Litigation Division 1-2 (2010). In contrast,
neither our statute nor Rule 2.1 create any such exclusions for cases
involving individuals or for specific classes of cases. Merely asserting a
preference for a forum other than the Business Court absent a specific,
legal entitlement to an exclusion from designation is insufficient to sup-
port defendant's contention that this matter was analogous to a venue
change and is therefore immediately appealable. Consequently, we con-
clude that defendant has not demonstrated that the Business Court's
interlocutory order is immediately appealable. Accordingly, we dismiss
defendant's appeal.

DISMISSED.

Chief Justice MARTIN and Justice EDMUNDS did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 221

IN RE FORECLOSURE OF BEASLEY
[369 N.C. 221 (2016)]

IN THE MATTER OF FORECLOSURE sy Rocers Townsenp & Taomas, PC, Susstirurs
‘Truster, OF A DEED OF TRUST EXECUTED BY JULIA WESKETT BEASLEY paren
Fepruary 12, 2007 AND RECORDED ON Fepruary 16, 2007 in Boox 1211, Pace 169 or THE
Carteret County Recistry, NortH CAROLINA

No. 276PA15
Filed 21 December 2016

Mortgages—non-judicial foreclosure hearing—trustee’s with-
drawal of notice
The order of the superior court clerk of court, the order of the
superior court, and the opinion of the Court of Appeals in a fore-
closure case all were vacated where the trustee effectively with-
drew its notice of non-judicial foreclosure hearing, thus terminating
the hearing.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 773 S.E.2d
101 (2015), reversing an order entered on 25 September 2013 by Judge
Phyllis M. Gorham in Superior Court, Carteret County. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 11 October 2016.

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P, by Donald R. Pocock
and D. Martin Warf, for petitioner-appellee FV-I, Inc. in trust for
Morgan Stanley Morigage Capital Holdings, LLC.

Shipman & Wright, LLP, by Gregory M. Katzman, W. Cory Reiss,
and Gary K. Shipman, for respondent-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Because the trustee effectively withdrew its notice of non-judicial
foreclosure hearing, thus terminating the proceeding, there was no
pending case on which the clerk of court could act. See In re Foreclosure
of Lucks, __ N.C. , __ 8.B.2d (ee. 21, 2016) (No.
162A16). As a result, we hereby vacate the clerk of court’s order and
that of the superior court, as well as the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

VACATED.

222

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LUCKS
[369 N.C. 222 (2016)]

IN THE MATTER OF FORECLOSURE OF A DEED OF TRUST EXECUTED BY
GORDON F. LUCKS paren Juny 14, 2006 anp recorpEp IN Boox 4254, Pace 96
iN Tae Buncomps County Pusiic Recistry
No. 162A16
Filed 21 December 2016

Mortgages and Deeds of Trust—foreclosure—substitute

trustee—authority

The trial court properly refused to authorize a creditor to proceed
with a foreclosure where the creditor failed to establish the substitute
trustee’s authority to foreclose under the deed of trust. However, the
trial court erred by entering a “dismissal with prejudice.” The refusal
to authorize the creditor to proceed was not a “dismissal” and did not
implicate res judicata or collateral estoppel in the traditional sense.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit a lim-
ited power of attorney appointing a service company, which, in turn,
was relied upon to appoint a substitute trustee. The excluded limited
power of attorney was not internally consistent.

Justice HUDSON concurring in result.
Justices BEASLEY and ERVIN join in this concurring opinion.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the unpublished deci-

sion of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 785

S.E.

.2d 185 (2016), reversing an order entered on 30 December 2014 by

Judge Bradley B. Letts in Superior Court, Buncombe County. Heard in

the

Supreme Court on 10 October 2016.

Troutman Sanders LLP, by D. Kyle Deak, for petitioner-appellee
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee.

Ferguson, Hayes, Hawkins & DeMay, PLLC, by James R. DeMay,
Sor respondent-appellant.

NEWBY, Justice.

The contractual right of foreclosure by power of sale under a

deed of trust is a non-judicial proceeding. In the comprehensive stat-
utory framework governing non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale

set

forth in Chapter 45 of our General Statutes, the General Assembly

IN THE SUPREME COURT 223

IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LUCKS
[369 N.C, 222 (2016)]

has prescribed certain minimal judicial procedures, including requir-
ing notice and a hearing designed to protect the debtor's interest. The
hearing official then authorizes the foreclosure to proceed or refuses to
do so. In this informal setting, a creditor must establish, among other
things, the existence of a debt, default, and its right to foreclose, and a
debtor may raise evidentiary challenges. The Rules of Civil Procedure
applicable to formal judicial actions do not apply. The debtor has the
option to file a separate judicial action to enjoin the foreclosure.

Here, because the creditor failed to establish the substitute trust-
ee’s authority to foreclose under the deed of trust, the trial court prop-
erly refused to authorize the creditor to proceed with the foreclosure.
Nonetheless, the trial court erroneously entered a “dismissal with preju-
dice.” The refusal to authorize the creditor to proceed is not a “dismissal”;
it does not implicate res judicata or collateral estoppel in the traditional
sense. While the creditor may not proceed with non-judicial foreclosure
on the same default, it may proceed on the same default through fore-
closure by judicial action. The creditor may also proceed non-judicially
under power of sale based upon a different default. Because the Court
of Appeals erred by finding that the creditor established the successor
trustee’s authority to proceed under the deed of trust, we reverse the
decision of that court, which reversed the trial court’s evidentiary ruling.

In July 2006, Gordon F. Lucks (borrower) executed a promissory
note with IndyMac Bank, FS.B. (the Note) in the principal amount of
$225,000 to purchase real property situated in Buncombe County. The
debt is repayable through monthly installments, with each payment
due on the first of the month, and matures on 1 August 2036. The Note
includes default and acceleration provisions.

At the same time, borrower executed a deed of trust on the prop-
erty, naming Robert P. Tucker II as trustee, which was recorded with
the Buncombe County Register of Deeds. The deed of trust provides for
non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale. Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company (Deutsche Bank)! currently holds the Note and asserts that
borrower “has not paid any amount due and owing under the Note since
October 1, 2010.”

1. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company acts as Trustee of the Home Equity
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Trust Series INABS 2006-D, Home Equity Mortgage Loan
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series INABS 2006-D, under the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement dated September 1, 2006, the purported beneficiary under the deed of trust.

224 IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LUCKS
[869 N.C. 222 (2016)

In September 2013, the Ford Firm, acting as substitute trustee
under the deed of trust, initiated a hearing for non-judicial foreclosure
under N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16 for borrower's failure to make payments. The
Assistant Clerk of Superior Court, Buncombe County “dismissed” the
case for failure to present documentation appointing the Ford Firm as
substitute trustee.

In June 2014, Cornish Law, PLLC, now acting as substitute trustee,
initiated a new hearing for non-judicial foreclosure based on borrower's
failure to make payments.” The Assistant Clerk found proper documen-
tation established that “The Ford Firm was the Trustee at the time of
the [prior] dismissal,” and since “Cornish Law, PLLC is in privity with
The Ford Firm,” the “action is barred by Res Judicata” and again “dis-
missed” the case. Deutsche Bank appealed the matter to superior court.
See N.C.GS. § 45-21.16(d1) (2015).

At the de novo hearing in superior court, Deutsche Bank tendered a
series of documents to establish the substitute trustee’s right to proceed
with non-judicial foreclosure, which included various copies of powers
of attorney. One such document, marked “Exhibit 4,” is the crucial docu-
ment at issue in this appeal, without which the substitute trustee lacks
authority to act under the deed of trust. The document is purported to
be a limited power of attorney appointing a service company to act on
Deutsche Bank’s behalf, which, in turn, was relied upon to appoint the
substitute trustee.?

Deutsche Bank called a witness who testified that she was
“employed by” the service company, but Deutsche Bank did not estab-
lish her position, role, or duties in the handling of records. Regarding the
document marked Exhibit 4, the employee stated that a different firm
“prepared the power of attorney,” that “normally we record the power
of attorneys,” and that, “[i]Jn this case we try to record it to the state...
where the headquarters would be,” which she “believe[d] ... would be
Charlotte.” The City of Charlotte is located in Mecklenburg County.

2. Itis unclear from the record if the new substitute trustee was proceeding under a
different default.

3, Deutsche Bank tendered, inter alia, an exhibit appointing Cornish Law, PLLC, as
substitute trustee, which was executed by a representative of the service company, acting

on the Bank's behalf, See N.C.G.S. § 45-10(a) (2015) (allowing the noteholder to appoint a
successor trustee). Because a break in any one link in the chain leading to the appointment
of the substitute trustee deprives the creditor of the authority to foreclose under the deed,
of trust, we need not analyze the other alleged deficiencies. See Smith v. Allen, 112 N.C.

223, 225-26, 16 S.H. 982, 982 (1893) (citing Hill v. Wilton, 6 N.C. (2 Mur) 14, 18 (1811)).

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[369 N.C, 222 (2016)]

Deutsche Bank tendered Exhibit 4, which is a photocopy, fourteen
pages in length, signed by a Bank officer on 21 November 2013 and nota-
rized. The last page revealed a recording stamp from the Register of
Deeds in Montgomery County, not Mecklenburg County, which states
the document was recorded in 2010, three years before the purported
execution, and that the document is eleven pages in length, not four-
teen. Borrower objected to the Exhibit’s admission into evidence, not-
ing the “recording information appears to precede the date of signatory
on that instrument.” Counsel for Deutsche Bank stated that she “believe[d]
that was an error in stapling the exhibit.” Nonetheless, no witness testified
about the discrepancy. Deutsche Bank did not request the trial court take
judicial notice of any recorded version of Exhibit 4 or make other argu-
ments for the admission of Exhibit 4.

The trial court sustained borrower's objection to the admission of
Exhibit 4 for “failure to provide a proper foundation and hearsay,” not-
ing that “the document is internally inconsistent” and “has inconsistent
dates.” Because Exhibit 4 is essential in establishing the substitute trust-
ee’s authority to proceed with the foreclosure, the trial court “dismissed
with prejudice” the case for insufficient evidence. Deutsche Bank timely
appealed the matter to the Court of Appeals.

In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
dismissal. In re Foreclosure of Lucks, ___N.C. App. __, 785 S.E.2d 185,
2016 WL 1321155 (2016) (unpublished). The majority noted that “the
evidentiary rules are slightly more relaxed in the context of a foreclo-
sure hearing than in normal litigation,” id., 2016 WL 1321155, at *2, and
concluded that the trial court erred by sustaining borrower's objection
to Exhibit 4 “on the basis of lack of ‘proper foundation and hearsay,’ ”
id. at *3. The dissent opined that any relaxation of the evidentiary rules
“is not supported by citation or case law,” id. at *4 (Hunter, J., dissent-
ing), and, noting borrower failed to establish alternative means to admit.
Exhibit 4, concluded the trial court properly excluded the Exhibit, id. at
*7. Borrower appeals as a matter of right.

Non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale arises under contract and
is not a judicial proceeding. See In re Foreclosure of Michael Weinman _
Assocs. Gen. P’ship, 333 N.C. 221, 227, 424 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1998) (A
power of sale is contractual and allows the creditor to sell the mortgaged
property “without any order of court in the event of a default.” (quot-
ing James A. Webster, Jr., Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina
§ 281, at 331 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 3d ed.

226 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 222 (2016)]

1988))). Though states have adopted differing views,4 by at least 1830,
North Carolina had allowed power of sale foreclosures under deed of
trust. See Harrison v. Battle, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 537, 542 (1830).

The General Assembly has crafted Chapter 45 to be the compre-
hensive and exclusive statutory framework governing non-judicial fore-
closures by power of sale. E.g., N.C.G.S. §§ 45-21.16 (2015) (notice and
hearing requirements), -21.26 (2015) (reporting of sale), -21.27 (2015)
(upset bid), -21.29 (2015) (orders for possession); see also Durant
M. Glover, Comment, Real Property—Changes in North Carolina's
Foreclosure Law, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 903, 913-15 (1976) (discussing the evo-
lution of non-judicial foreclosure statutes). The Rules of Civil Procedure
do not apply unless explicitly engrafted into the statute. E.g., N.C.G.S.
§ 45-21.16(a) (requiring service as “provided by the Rules”); see also In
re Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612, 620, 694 S.E.2d 151, 156 (2009)
(holding that N.C.G.S. § 105-258(a) (2007) prescribed “its own special-
ized procedure that supplants the Rules”). By establishing an exclu-
sive procedure, non-judicial foreclosure does not require the filing
of an action.5 Nonetheless, Chapter 45 does require a minimal degree of
judicial oversight for the sole purpose of requiring a creditor to estab-
lish its right to proceed with the foreclosure. See N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(d).
The creditor must give notice of a hearing. Id. § 45-21.16(a). Given the
fluid nature of the debtor-creditor relationship and the state and federal
oversight of foreclosure proceedings,® there are multiple reasons why a
creditor might choose not to proceed with the hearing. For example, a
debtor may seek to remit late mortgage payments, or changes in law may
alter foreclosure requirements, thus affecting the creditor's ability to

4, See 1 Grant S, Nelson et al., Real Bstate Finance Law § 7:20, at 944 & nn.1, 2 (6th
ed. 2014) (noting that thirty-five jurisdictions allow non-judicial foreclosure by power of
sale, of which North Carolina and Colorado are the only states requiring an “opportu-
nity for a hearing before the foreclosure sale”); compare, e.9., Bx parte GMAC Mortg.,
LLG, 176 So. 34 845, 848-49 (Ala. 2018) (no judicial oversight), with Handler Constr, Inc.
v. CoreStates Bank, N.A., 633 A.2d 356, 362-63 (Del. 1993) (foreclosure only available by
judicial action).

5. “Any notice, order, or other papers required by this Article to be filed in the office
of the clerk of superior court shall be filed in the same manner as a special proceeding,”
N.C.GS. § 45-21.16(g).

6. See, ¢.g., Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751-3768 (2012)
(governing non-judicial power of sale foreclosure of mortgages held by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development on single-family homes, thereby preempting state law);
see also 12 CER. § 1024.41(g) (2016) (prohibiting foreclosure sale under certain circum-
stances “[i]f a borrower submits a complete loss mitigation application”).

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IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LUCKS
[369 N.C. 222 (2016)]

proceed. Such a decision to refrain from proceeding is not a “dismissal”
but simply a withdrawal of the notice and has no collateral consequence.

Section 45-21.16 requires a creditor to give the debtor adequate
notice of a hearing, which initially occurs before the clerk of court. See id.
§ 45-21.16(a), (d); see also In re Foreclosure of Goforth Props., Inc., 334
N.C. 369, 374, 432 S.E.2d 855, 858 (1993) (Section 45-21.16 does not “alter
the essentially contractual nature of the remedy, but rather [ ] satisf[ies]
the minimum due process requirements.” (quoting In re Foreclosure of
Burgess, 47 N.C. App. 599, 603, 267 S.E.2d 915, 918, appeal dismissed,
301 N.C. 90 (1980))). The statute provides for a relaxation in the formal
rules of evidence at the hearing. See N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(d) (“The clerk
. .. may consider, in addition to other forms of evidence required or
permitted by law, affidavits and certified copies of documents.”). The
creditor must show the existence of (i) a valid debt, (ii) default, (iii)
the right to foreclose, (iv) notice, and (v) “home loan” classification and
applicable pre-foreclosure notice, and (vi) that the sale is not barred
by the debtor's military service. Jd. The evidentiary rules are the same
when the trial court conducts a de novo hearing on an appeal from the

clerk’s decision. See id. § 45-21.16(d1).”

At the hearing the debtor is free to raise evidentiary objections
“tending to negate any of the [ ] findings required under N.C.G.S.
§ 45-21.16,” In re Goforth Props., 334 N.C. at 374-75, 432 S.E.2d at 859,
or the debtor may seek to enjoin the foreclosure in a separate judicial
action, N.C.G.S. § 45-21.34 (2015); see also id. § 45-21.17A(H, (g) (2015)
(setting requirements for bringing actions to set aside the sale for failure
to provide notice). Once the creditor has established the various ele-
ments of N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(d), “the clerk shall authorize the [creditor]
to proceed under the instrument.” Jd. § 45-21.16(d).

If the clerk or trial court does not find the evidence presented to be
adequate to “authorize” the foreclosure sale, this finding does not impli-
cate res judicata or collateral estoppel in the traditional sense. See Note,
The Model Power of Sale Mortgage Foreclosure Act—An Appraisal,
27 Va. L. Rev. 926, 929 (1941) (“[T]he principle of res adjudicata is
therefore not applicable to” the “extra-judicial method of foreclosure.”).
While the creditor is prohibited from proceeding again with a non-
judicial foreclosure on the same default, the creditor can proceed with
a judicial foreclosure. See N.C.G.S. § 45-21.2 (2015) (“This Article does

7. “The act of the clerk in so finding or refusing to so find is a judicial act and may be
appealed to” the appropriate trial court. N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(a1).

228 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 222 (2016)}

not affect any right to foreclosure by action in court... .”). Likewise, the
creditor may proceed non-judicially on another default.

. “The competency, admissibility, and sufficiency of the evidence is a
matter for the [trial] court to determine.” Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee,
218 N.C. 320, 323, 11 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1940). We review the trial court’s
exclusion of documentary evidence under the hearsay rule for abuse of
discretion. See State v. Blake, 317 N.C. 632, 637-38, 346 S.E.2d 399, 402
(1986); accord Horne v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 4 F.3d 276,
283-84 (4th Cir. 1993). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discre-
tion only upon a showing that its ruling was manifestly unsupported by
reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State
v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 756, 340 S.E.2d 55, 59 (1986) (citing, inter alia,
White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)).

The precise question before this Court is whether the trial court
abused its discretion by finding Deutsche Bank failed to establish the
appointment of the substitute trustee, a prerequisite to its right to pro-
ceed with non-judicial foreclosure, and if so, what is the effect of that
decision. Exhibit 4 is essential to the substitute trustee’s appointment.
Though the Court of Appeals majority was correct in noting that the evi-
dentiary rules are more relaxed in the non-judicial foreclosure setting,
given the significant internal inconsistencies in the power of attorney
at issue and Deutsche Bank's failure to present alternative grounds for
admissibility, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to admit Exhibit 4 into evidence.

Exhibit 4 is plainly internally inconsistent. See 5 John Henry
Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §§ 1421, 1422, at 253-54
Games H. Chabourn ed., 1974) (Trustworthiness and necessity are the
hallmarks of admissibility.) Deutsche Bank tendered the Exhibit as a
photocopy, fourteen pages in length, executed in 2013. The last page,
which contains a recording stamp from the “Montgomery County, NC”
Register of Deeds, indicates the Exhibit is only eleven pages in length
and was recorded in 2010. Gf. id. § 1557, at 481 (explaining that “spe-
cific errors” undermine a record’s trustworthiness (emphasis omitted)).
While there were ways to overcome the inconsistency, none were effec-
tuated here. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 45-10(a) (2015) (allowing noteholder to
appoint substitute trustee directly); id. § 45-21.16(d) (allowing “affida-
vits and certified copies”); see also id. § 8C-1, Rule 201(d) (2015) (judi-
cial notice); id., Rule 803(6) (2015) (business records). Deutsche Bank
could have provided a photocopy of the recorded document from the
proper county register of deeds, but did not do so. See id. § 47-28(a)

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IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LUCKS
[369 N.C. 222 (2016)]

(2015) (“[P]owers of attorney affecting real property . . . shall be reg-
istered in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the
principal is domiciled or where the real property lies.”).

Though the superior court correctly refused to authorize the substi-
tute trustee to proceed, the court erroneously entered a “dismissal with
prejudice.” Non-judicial foreclosure is not a judicial action; the Rules
of Civil Procedure and traditional doctrines of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel applicable to judicial actions do not apply. To the extent
that prior case law implies otherwise, such cases are hereby overruled.
While it is true that Deutsche Bank is barred from proceeding again with
non-judicial foreclosure based on the same default, the Bank may none-
theless proceed with foreclosure by judicial action.8 The Bank may also
proceed with non-judicial foreclosure based upon a different default.
The trial court’s order is to be interpreted consistent with this analysis.

Though the evidentiary requirements under non-judicial foreclosure
proceedings are relaxed and there were ways to overcome the Exhibit’s
inconsistencies, we cannot conclude the trial court had no reasonable
basis to exclude Exhibit 4. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the evidentiary ruling of the trial court.

REVERSED.
HUDSON, J. concurring in result.

T agree that this Court should reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of this attempt to foreclose
by power of sale. I would focus, however, on the primary argument of
the parties, which addresses whether the trial court properly excluded
exhibits that were necessary to establish the right to foreclose. I agree
with the majority that Exhibit 4 “is the crucial document at issue in this
appeal.” Thus, we should review the trial court’s decision to exclude
Exhibit 4 “based upon a failure to provide a proper foundation and hear-
say.” I conclude that the trial court acted appropriately in excluding

- Exhibit 4.

In addition, I would explain more fully and precisely the statutory
basis for the proper scope of thé applicability of the Rules of Evidence
and Rules of Civil Procedure in power-of-sale foreclosures. First, the

8. The Note indicates payments are due in monthly installments on the first day of
the month, maturing on 1 August 2036.

230 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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majority agrees with the Court of Appeals majority's broad statement
that the evidentiary rules are more relaxed in the non-judicial foreclo-
sure setting. I would clarify that the Rules of Evidence are relaxed only in
the hearing before the clerk and only to the extent specifically provided
for in N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(d). In the de novo hearing in the trial court,
however, the statute does not specifically provide for any relaxation of
the rules, so the Rules of Evidence apply fully, as in any court proceed-
ing, per Rules of Evidence 101 and 1101. N.C. R. Evid. 101 (These rules
govern proceedings in the courts of this State to the extent and with
the exceptions stated in Rule 1101.”); id. R. 1101 (“Except as otherwise
provided in subdivision (b) or by statute, these rules apply to all actions
and proceedings in the courts of this State.”).

Second, the majority announces that the “Rules of Civil Procedure
do not apply unless explicitly engrafted into the statute.” I do not agree.
The very first sentence of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which are them-
selves a statutory enactment, provides: “These rules shall govern the pro-
cedure in the superior and district courts of the State of North Carolina
in all actions and proceedings of a civil nature except when a differing
procedure is prescribed by statute.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added)
(titled “Scope of Rules”). I do not agree with the majority's assertion
that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply “unless they are engrafted
into the statute”; the Rules themselves presume they apply in all pro-
ceedings in the courts unless a different procedure is prescribed. I con-
clude this creates a presumption that these rules apply; the majority has
turned this presumption around, citing no authority.

Additionally, the statute distinguishes between the proceeding
before the clerk and the de novo hearing in the trial court, although
the majority does not. I would clarify that since N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16
prescribes a different procedure for the hearing before the clerk, see
N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(c)-(d1) (2015), the Rules of Civil Procedure do
not apply; however, because the statute does not prescribe any such
alternate procedure for the de novo hearing in the trial court, see id.
§ 45-21.16(e) (2015), I would conclude that the Rules of Civil Procedure
apply there, as in any court proceeding, per Rule 1. As such, I concur in
the result. :

“When an appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court sitting
without a jury, ‘findings of fact have the force and effect of a verdict by
a jury and are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them
....” In re Foreclosure of Bass, 366 N.C. 464, 467, 738 S.E.2d 173, 175
(2013) (quoting Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 359, 160 S.E.2d 29, 33
(1968) (citations omitted)). Conclusions of law are reviewable by the

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IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LUCKS
[869 N.C. 222 (2016)}

appellate court de novo. Id. at 467, 738 S.E.2d at 175 (citing Carolina
Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 517, 597 S.E.2d
717, 721 (2004).

It does not appear that this Court has addressed the standard of
review of a trial court’s evidentiary determination in this particular
context. The cases from the Court of Appeals are in conflict regarding
whether an abuse of discretion or de novo standard of review is appropri-
ate in the context of authentication of documentary evidence. Compare
State v. Watlington, 234 N.C. App. 580, 590, 759 S.E.2d 116, 124 (review-
ing a trial court’s determination as to authentication of text messages de
novo), disc. rev. denied, 367 N.C. 791, 766 S.E.2d 644 (2014), and State
v. Crawley, 217 N.C. App. 509, 515, 719 S.E.2d 632, 637 (2011) (reviewing
a trial court’s determination as to authentication of cell phone records
de novo), disc. rev. denied, 365 N.C. 553, 722 S.E.2d 607 (2012), with
In re Foreclosure by Goddard & Peterson, PLLC, ___ N.C. App. __,
_—» 789 S.E.2d 835, 842 (2016) (reviewing evidentiary determinations
by a trial court in a power-of-sale foreclosure proceeding for abuse of
discretion), and Brown v. City of Winston-Salem, 176 N.C. App. 497,
505, 626 S.E.2d 747, 753 (using an abuse of discretion standard to review
a trial court’s determination as to authentication of spreadsheets with.
data under Rule 901), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 575, 635 S.E.2d 429 (2006).
In this concurring opinion, I need not make a determination about which
standard of review should apply because the result would be the same
under either standard.

1. The majority opinion announces an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing
“the trial court’s exclusion of documentary evidence under the hearsay rule” and cites this
Court's decision in State v. Blake, 31'7 N.C. 632, 637-38, 346 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1986). First,
Blake does not support this statement. Blake states that “[rjulings on questions arguably
leading rest in the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed in the absence of an
abuse of discretion.” Blake, 317 N.C. at 637, 346 8.E.2d at 402. In support of this statement,
Blake cites State v. Young, 312, N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985), which states that “[rjulings
by the trial court on leading questions are discretionary and reversible only for abuse of
discretion.” Young, 312 N.C. at 678, 325 S.E.2d at 187. Both cases specifically address the
standard of review relating to leading questions. Neither case articulates a standard of
review for evidentiary determinations under the hearsay rule. In fact, when Blake does
discuss the hearsay issue, it seems to employ, although without specifically saying, a de
novo review. See Blake, 317 N.C, at 638, 346 S.E.2d'at 402.

Additionally, there are several cases from the Court of Appeals that explicitly utilize
ade novo standard for reviewing trial court determinations regarding hearsay. See, ¢.g.,
State. Hicks, N.C. App.__,_,7778.E.24 341, 348 (2015) (“This Court reviews a trial
court's ruling on the admission of evidence over a party's hearsay objection de novo.” (cit-
ing State v. Miller, 197 N.C. App. 78, 87-88, 676 S.E.2d 546, 552, disc. rev. denied, 363 N.C.
586, 683 S.E.2d 216 (2009))), disc. rev. denied, 368 N.C. 686, 781 S.E.2d 606 (2016); State
v. Castaneda, 215 N.C. App. 144, 147, 715 S.E.2d 290, 293 (“The trial court’s determination

232° IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LUCKS
[369 N.C. 222 (2016)]

Here the trial court concluded that Deutsche Bank (the Bank)
“failed to offer sufficient evidence . . . to proceed with the foreclosure.”
The trial court found that the Bank “failed to prove [it] possessed the
Right to Foreclose” after excluding several exhibits including Exhibit 4,
which was essential to establishing the substitute trustee’s appointment.
The trial court excluded Exhibit 4 “based upon a failure to provide a
proper foundation and hearsay.” During the de novo hearing before the
trial court, the trial court specifically noted, as to Exhibit 4, that “[t]he
Court would determine this is not only a— taken no exception to hearsay
rule, but also the document is internally inconsistent. I would further
note this document is presented to the Court from counsel which has
inconsistent dates.” Thus, the precise issue before this Court is whether
the trial court acted appropriately in excluding Exhibit 4.

Subsection 45-21.16(d) specifically explains that in the hearing
before the clerk, “the clerk shall consider the evidence of the parties
and may consider, in addition to other forms of evidence required or per-
mitted by law, affidavits and certified copies of documents.” N.C.G.S.
§ 45-21.16(d) (emphasis added). This provision allows affidavits to be
used in place of live testimony when “the ‘necessity for expeditious
procedure’ substantially outweighs any concerns about the efficacy
of allowing [the witness] to testify by affidavit.” In re Foreclosure of
Brown, 156 N.C. App. 477, 486, 577 S.E.2d 398, 404-05 (2003) (quoting In
re Custody of Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 875, 378, 170 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1969)). The
statute also allows clerks to consider “certified copies of documents,”
presumably in place of originals. N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(d). The statute
allows for these particular forms of evidence “in addition to other forms
of evidence required or permitted by law.” Id. (emphasis added). This
means that aside from this narrow exception for affidavits and certified
copies of documents, the other evidence that the “clerk shall consider,”
id., must generally conform to the Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, I con-
clude that the Rules of Evidence are relaxed in power-of-sale foreclo-
sure hearings before the clerk only to the extent specifically provided
for in N.C.G:S. § 45-21.16(d).

as to whether an out-of-court statement constitutes hearsay is reviewed de novo on
appeal.” (quoting State v. Miller, 197 N.C. App. 78, 87-88, 676 S.E.2d 546, 552, disc. rev.
denied, 363 N.C. 586, 683 S.E.2d 216 (2009), appeal dismissed and dise. rev. denied, 365
N.C. 354, 718 S.B.2d 148 (2011).

Seconé, it is not clear why the majority announces a specific, possibly new standard
of review relating to hearsay when it does not analyze whether Exhibit 4 is hearsay or fits
within a hearsay exception here. The majority simply concludes that because Exhibit 4
is “plainly internally inconsistent,” the majority “cannot conclude the trial court had no
reasonable basis to exclude” it.

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[369 N.C. 222 (2016)]

I further conclude that in a de novo hearing before the trial court,
the Rules of Evidence apply fully, as in any court proceeding, per Rules
of Evidence 101 and 1101. N.C. R. Evid. 101 (Thése rules govern pro-
ceedings in the courts of this State-to the extent and with the exceptions
stated in Rule 1101.”), id. R. 1101 (“Except as otherwise provided in
subdivision (b) or by statute, these rules apply to all actions and pro-
ceedings in the courts of this State.”). Subsection 45-21.16(e) does not
specifically provide for any relaxation of the rules of evidence for the
court proceeding, as it does in subsection 45-21.16(d), for the hearing
before the clerk.

The Bank sought to introduce Exhibit 4, which is a photocopy “of a
document purporting to be a Limited Power of Attorney granting certain
powers to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.” There is no stamp on Exhibit 4
certifying the exhibit as a true and accurate copy; thus, it is an uncerti-
fied copy. .

The trial court specifically noted that the document has internal
inconsistencies, particularly with dates and numbers of pages. The trial
court also noted the lack of a “proper foundation.” I conclude that the
trial court acted appropriately in excluding the document on this basis,”
regardless of the applicable standard of review.

As noted above, I conclude that once this matter reached the supe-
rior court, the Rules of Evidence applied. Under the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence, “[e]very writing sought to be admitted must be prop-
erly authenticated” in order to establish the foundation for the docu-
ment’s admissibility. Inv’rs Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig, 330 N.C. 681, 693,
418 S.E.2d 268, 274 (1992) (citations omitted). Rule 901 states that “[t]he
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent
to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” N.C. R. Evid.
901(a). Rule 901 provides a nonexclusive list of ways evidence may be
authenticated, including “Testimony of Witness with Knowledge” and’
“Public Records or Reports.” Id. R. 901(b)(1), (7.3

2, Because this matter can be resolved based upon the trial court's exclusion of
Exhibit 4 for failure to provide a proper foundation, in my view this Court need not reach
the alternate ground for inadmissibility noted by the trial court, ie., hearsay.

3. Rule 901 reads in pertinent part:
(b) lustrations.— By way of illustration only, and not by way of

limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identifi-
cation conforming with the requirements of this rule:

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IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LUCKS
[369 N.C, 222 (2016)]

Rule 902 provides for methods of self-authentication. of evidence.
Specifically, “[e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity . . . is not required with
respect to the following: . . . (4) Certified Copies of Public Records . . .
[and] (8) Acknowledged Documents.” Id. R. 902.4

The Bank’s attorney here did question a live witness (Ms. Lyew) but
in so doing, failed to lay enough of a foundation to establish the authen-
ticity of Exhibit 4. Counsel did not elicit testimony regarding the wit-
ness’s job responsibilities, work experience, time of employment with
Ocwen, or any other details showing her personal knowledge of the
documents and loan in question. This testimony failed to satisfy minimal
authentication requirements. Additionally, while evidence that a public

(1) Testimony of Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that
a matter is what it is claimed to be.

(1 Public Records or Reports Evidence that a writing
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact
recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported pub-
lic record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any
form, is from the public office where items of this nature
are kept.

N.C. R. Evid. 901(6)(1), (7).
4, Rule 902 reads in pertinent part:

Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to
admissibility is not required with respect to the following:

@) Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an offi-
cial record or report or entry therein, or of a document
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually
recorded or filed in a public office, including data compi-
Jations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian
or other person authorized to make the certification, by
certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (8) or
complying with any law of the United States or of this
State.

(8) Acknowledged Documents. Documents accompanied by ,
a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner
provided by law by a notary public or other officer autho-
rized by law to take acknowledgments.

Id. R. 902.

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IN RE FORECLOSURE OF LUCKS
[369 N.C. 222 (2016)]

record or report “is from the public office where items of this nature
are kept” could serve to authenticate this document to the extent this
document may qualify as a public record or report, id. R. 901(b)(7), the
recording stamp included with Exhibit 4 contradicts the document itself
and indicates that it was recorded in “Montgomery County, NC,” and not
“Charlotte” (Mecklenburg County), as the witness testified should be the
case here. As such, there is no indication that this document was in fact
recorded or, if so, where. Thus, Exhibit 4 does not satisfy the require-
ments of Rule 901. Finally, any argument under Rule 902 fails because
the parties did not present that argument before the trial court.

In addition to not being authenticated, Exhibit 4 is internally incon-
sistent. As the majority notes, the recording stamp on Exhibit 4 indicates
that the document is eleven pages in length and was recorded in 2010 in
Montgomery County, North Carolina. In fact, the actual Exhibit 4 docu-
ment is fourteen pages in length, was executed in 2013, and should have
been recorded in Mecklenburg County, according to the witness.

Because Exhibit 4 is not a certified copy and it contained internal
inconsistencies, and because no witness testified to personal knowl-
edge about it, the trial court acted appropriately in excluding Exhibit 4,
regardless of the applicable standard of review. Without Exhibit 4, the
Bank failed to offer sufficient evidence of the right to proceed with a
power-of-sale foreclosure. The trial court’s conclusion is supported by
the findings of fact and by the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court's
dismissal on this basis was entirely appropriate.

In addition, I agree with the majority that the Bank “is barred from
proceeding again with non-judicial foreclosure based on the same
default, [and that] the Bank may nonetheless proceed with foreclosure
by judicial action.” To reach that conclusion, however, I do not think it
necessary or consistent with applicable statutory authority to deem the
Rules of Civil Procedure inapplicable.

Turing to the foreclosure procedure at issue here, it is clear to me
that in N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16 (codified in “Part 2. Procedure for Sale [Under
Power of Sale]”), the General Assembly has prescribed by statute a dif-
ferent procedure for the hearing before the clerk. The details of that
procedure are explained in subsections (c) through (dl) of N.C.G.S.
§ 45-21.16. If and when the matter is “appealed to the judge of the district
or superior court,” it is to be reviewed in a de novo hearing. N.C.G.S.
§ 45-21.16(d1). Once the case has moved into the district or superior
court for the de novo hearing before a judge “who shall be authorized to
hear the appeal,” no further procedure is prescribed for that stage of the

236 IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE MACK
[369 N.C. 286 (2016)

litigation. Id. § 45-21.16(e). Subsection (e) requires only that “[a] certi-
fied copy of any order entered as a result of the appeal shall be filed in all
counties where the notice of hearing has been filed.” Id. Because no dif-
fering procedure is prescribed in N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(e) for the proceed-
ing in the district or superior court, I conclude that the Rules of Civil
procedure apply there, in accordance with Rule 1. See N.C. R. Civ. P. L.

Upon appeal from the clerk’s determination, the trial court excluded
Exhibit 4 and properly concluded that the Bank failed to establish its right
to foreclose by power of sale. Dismissal of the matter, under the Rules
of Civil Procedure, was the proper ruling at that point. Nonetheless, as
to the claim based on this default, the Bank may still proceed with fore-
closure by judicial action. See N.C.G.S. § 45-21.2 (2015) (“This Article
[“Article 2A. Sales Under Power of Sale”] does not affect any right to
foreclosure by action in court, and is not applicable to any such action.”).

For the reasons set forth herein, I concur in the result.

Justices BEASLEY and ERVIN join in this concurring opinion.

IN RE INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 14-126B
PETER MACK, JR., Responpent

No. 250A16
Filed 21 December 2016

Judges—gross rental income not reported—hearing criminal
matter involving tenant—restitution
A district court judge was publically reprimanded for not
reporting gross rental income and for accepting restitution from a
tenant while presiding over a criminal matter involving the tenant
that the judge had initiated as the complaining witness. The Judicial
Standard Commission’s findings of fact, including the dispositional
determinations, were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence in the record. Additionally, the Commission's findings of
fact supported its conclusions of law. The Commission’s findings
and conclusions were adopted by the Supreme Court.

This matter is before the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 74-376 and
-877 upon a recommendation by the Judicial Standards Commission
entered 16 June 2016 that Respondent Peter Mack, Jr., a Judge of the

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE MACK
[869 N.C. 236 (2016)]

General Court of Justice, District Court Division 3B, State of North
Carolina, be publicly reprimanded for conduct in violation of Canons 1,
2A, and 6C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and consti-
tuting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. This matter
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 10 October 2016,
but determined on the record without briefs or oral argument pursuant
to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and
Rule 2(c) of the Rules for Supreme Court Review of Recommendations
of the Judicial Standards Commission.

No counsel for Judicial Standards Commission or Respondent.

ORDER

The issue before the Court in this case is whether Judge Peter Mack,
Jr. (Respondent) should be publicly reprimanded for violations of Canons
1, 2A, and 6C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct amount-
ing to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings

the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b).
Respondent has not challenged the findings of fact made by-the Judicial
Standards Commission or opposed the Commission’s recommendation
that he be publicly reprimanded before this Court.

On 20 July 2015, the Commission counsel filed a Statement of
Charges against Respondent alleging that he had failed to report certain
income from extra-judicial sources as required by Canon 6 and the State
Government Ethics Act. In addition, the Commission counsel alleged
that Respondent had

engaged in conduct inappropriate to his judicial office

"by presiding over a session of district court in which a
criminal defendant appeared on the [judge’s] calendar
for criminal charges which the [judge] ha[d] initiated as
the complaining witness, and which the [judge] agreed
should be dismissed after [he] was paid restitution by
the criminal defendant in the amount of $3,000 cash in the
[judge’s] chambers.

According to the allegations contained in the statement of charges,
Respondent's failure to report his annual outside income as required by
law during specified years is “in violation of Canons 1, 2A, and 6C of the
North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct,” and Respondent’s actions in
presiding over a criminal case that he had initiated and agreeing to the
dismissal of the case after receiving restitution in chambers constituted

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE MACK
[369 N.C, 236 (2016))

violations of “Canons 1, 2A, and 2B of the North Carolina Code of
Judicial Conduct.” As a result, the Commission counsel asserted that
Respondent's actions “constitute[d] conduct prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation
of N.C.G.S. §[ ]7A-376(b) and §[ ]7A-377.”

On 1 September 2015; Respondent filed an answer in which he alleged.
that his failure to report outside rental income during the years in ques-
tion constituted an unintentional oversight and that the handling of the
case in which he received restitution was not “against normal protocol,”
with all the transactions in the case having been “handled through [his]
de facto attorney in the proceeding and the District Attorney's Office.”
On 16 November 2015, Respondent and the Commission counsel filed
a number of joint evidentiary, factual, and disciplinary stipulations as
permitted by Commission Rule 22 that tended to support a decision to
publicly reprimand Respondent. On 11 May 2016, a hearing concerning
this matter was held before the Commission.

On 16 June 2016, the Commission filed a Recommendation of
Judicial Discipline, in which it made the following findings of fact:

1. Respondent has resided in Craven County, North
Carolina for more than thirty years.

2. Respondent owns two residential properties in Craven
County, North Carolina which he has rented to various
tenants over the last ten (10) years. Specifically, from
approximately May 2013 until February 2014, Respondent
rented a home in New Bern, North Carolina to a tenant
for approximately $800 per month (the New Bern home).
Respondent began renting the New Bern home to a new
tenant in 2014 for approximately $700 per month. From
approximately 2007 until August of 2011, Respondent also
rented a home in Havelock, North Carolina to an individual
for approximately $600 per month (the Havelock home).
From approximately October 2011 until the present date,
Respondent rented the Havelock home to another individ-
ual for approximately $550-600 per month.

3. With respect to the Havelock home, in 2011
Respondent’s former tenant vacated the home without
notice, was several months behind on rent and left signifi-
cant damage to the property including knocked out dry-
walls, missing light fixtures, soiled carpets, and more.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE MACK
[869 N.C. 236 (2016))

4, Respondent incurred significant costs as a result of

the damage done to the Havelock home. Respondent con- -

tacted the former tenant seeking compensation for the
damages, which the former tenant did not pay.

[5]. On 3 May 2013, Respondent sought criminal charges
against the former tenant and a criminal summons was
issued for injury to real property. On the criminal sum-
mons, Respondent is listed as the complainant and his
address is listed as 300 Broad St., New Bern, NC 28560,
the address of the Craven County Courthouse.

[6]. The former tenant’s criminal charge, Craven County
File No. 13CR51808, was first set for 30 May 2013. The
criminal case was continued a number of times and
remained pending for over a year for various reasons. The
former tenant had difficulty finding a defense attorney
to represent him when Respondent was the prosecuting
witness. Eventually, the former tenant applied for a court-
appointed attorney and an Assistant Public Defender from
outside Respondent's judicial district was assigned by the
Office of Indigent Defense Services..

[7]. In an effort to bring all the parties together to settle
the criminal matter, the Assistant District Attorney (ADA)
assigned to prosecute the former tenant’s charge calen-
dared the matter in Respondent's courtroom. Respondent
did not set the case on his own calendar or exercise undue
judicial authority to have the former tenant’s charge heard
in his court.

[8]. On 25 April 2014, Respondent presided over Criminal
District Court in Craven County, and Craven County
File No. 183CR51808 appeared on line number 28 of that
court calendar, with Respondent's name listed as the
complainant.

[9]. During the 25 April 2014 court session, Respondent
provided the ADA with photographs of the damaged
rental property, which were also shared with the Assistant
Public Defender, who then consulted with the former ten-
ant. The parties reached an agreement that Respondent
and the ADA would not pursue the criminal charge against
the former tenant if he paid Respondent restitution for the
property damages. This is a common means of resolution

239

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IN RE MACK
[869 N.C. 236 (2016)]

in similar criminal cases in Craven County. All parties
agreed on the amount of restitution and the case was con-
tinued to allow the former tenant time to raise the neces-
sary funds to pay Respondent.

[10]. On 18 July 2014, the ADA again scheduled Craven
County File No. 13CR51808 on Respondent’s docket, and
the case appeared on line number 18 of the court calendar,
with Respondent’s name listed as the complainant. During
this court session, Respondent recessed court and was
joined in an office behind the courtroom by the ADA and
the former tenant. The Assistant Public Defender repre-
senting the former tenant was not present as per an agree-
ment with the ADA. During this meeting, Respondent left
the office temporarily, and when he returned, the ADA had
received $3000 in cash as restitution from the former ten-
ant, and the ADA handed it to Respondent. After restitu-
tion was made to Respondent, the ADA filled out a form
dismissing the criminal charge against the former tenant.
There is no dispute that Respondent was entitled to the
restitution from the former tenant.

[11]. With respect to the rental properties as a whole,
while Respondent stipulates he has had little to no annual
net income from the rental properties, he admits he has
grossed in excess of $5,000 annually in rent as reportable
extra-judicial income.

[12]. Notwithstanding Respondent’s income from his
rental properties, Respondent admits that he didnot report
* this income on his annual income reports required under
Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Specifically,
Respondent did not file a Canon 6 report with the Craven
County Clerk of Superior Court for 2011, 2012, or 2013.
The only Canon 6 report on file for Respondent in Craven
County was from the 2010 calendar year and under the
column for “name of source/activity,” he stated “(NONE).”

[18]. After receiving notification of the Commission's
investigation into this matter, Respondent filed an
“Amended” Canon 6 report on 3 November 2014, listing his
two (2) rental properties (described herein), but for the
calendar year for which the “Amended” report was filed,
he indicated “2010 - 2014.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE MACK
[369 N.C. 236 (2016)]

14]. Respondent's failure to file the required Canon 6
reports was the result of his own negligence, but it was not
an attempt to willfully conceal his extra-judicial income
and neither the Respondent nor any party appearing before
him benefitted from his failure to file the required reports.

15]. In addition to the obligation to file an annual gift
and income report under Canon 6, District Court judges
are “covered persons” under the State Government Ethics
Act, which requires all covered persons to annually file
a Statement of Economic Interest (SEI form). SEI forms
must be filed with the State Ethics Commission each year.

16]. Respondent reported his rental income from the
New Bern home and the Havelock home as required on
his SEI forms from 2007 until 2010. However, Respondent
failed to report the rental income on his 2011 SEI form. On
his 2011 SEI form, Respondent affirmed “the information
provided in this Statement of Economic Interest and any
attachments hereto are true, complete, and accurate to the
best of my knowledge and belief.”

[17]. Respondent's failure to report his rental income on
his SEI forms continued in 2012, 2018, and 2014, when
Respondent filed No-Change SEI forms with the State
Ethics Commission. These SEI forms declared that he had
no changes from his 2011 SEI form to report, and thus he
failed to report the income for these successive years. On
each of his 2012, 2013, and 2014 SEI No-Change Forms,
Respondent confirmed he had reviewed the previous
year’s SEI form and affirmed “my responses continue to be
true, correct, and complete to the best of my knowledge
and belief.”

[18]. All SEI forms signed and filed by Respondent spe-
cifically instructed covered persons to list all sources of
income of more than $5,000, including “rental income.”

[19]. Respondent's failure to properly report his rental
income to the State Ethics Commission was not a willful
or intentional attempt to conceal sources of income, nor
did Respondent or any party appearing before him benefit
in any way from his failure to report the income. However,
Respondent's affirmation, acknowledgment, and previous
reporting of extra-judicial income on SEI reports from

241

242, . IN THE SUPREME COURT
IN RE MACK
[869 N.C. 236 (2016)]
2007-2010, show Respondent should have known to report
this income.

(Citations omitted.) Based upon these findings of fact, the Commission.
concluded as matters of law that:

A. Failure to Report Rental Income on Canon 6
Reports, 2010-2013

1. Canon 6 of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct requires judges to “report the name and nature of
any source or activity from which the judge received more
than $2,000 income during the calendar year for which the
report is filed.” N.C. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 6C.

2. Canon 6 further requires District Court judges to file
such reports with the Clerk of Superior Court in the county
in which the District Court judge resides by 15 May of the
year following the year in which the income was received.
N.C. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 6C.

3. Canon 6 serves the important purpose of ensuring
transparency in a judge’s financial and remunerative activ-
ities outside of the judicial office to ascertain potential
conflicts of interest, avoid corruption and maintain public
confidence in the impartiality, integrity and independence
of the state’s judiciary.

4, Where a judge acts as a landlord and personally rents
real property and directly receives gross rental income
exceeding $2000 in a calendar year, such activity must be
reported on the annual Canon 6 report.

5. By repeatedly failing to report the rental income on his
Canon 6 reports filed from 2010-2013, Respondent violated
Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

6. By repeatedly failing to report the rental income on his
Canon 6 reports filed from 2010-2013, Respondent failed
to personally observe appropriate standards of conduct to
ensure that the integrity and independence of the judiciary
is preserved, in violation of Canon 1 of the North Carolina
Code of Judicial Conduct and failed to comply with the
law and to conduct himself in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE MACK
[369 N.C. 236 (2016)]

judiciary, in violation of Canon 2A of the North Carolina
Code of Judicial Conduct.

7. Respondent's failure to properly file annual Canon 6
financial disclosures was the result of his own negligence,
and was not an attempt to willfully conceal his extra-
judicial income. Although Respondent's failure to report
did not: benefit him in any way, the continuing and recur-
ring nature of this negligence year after year, distinguish-
able from an isolated incident or single occurrence,
aggravates this misconduct to a level warranting more
than a private letter of caution.

8. Respondent’s violations of Canons 1, 2A and 6 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct also amount to conduct preju-
dicial to the administration of justice that brings the judi-
cial office into disrepute, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat.
[$ 7A-] 376(b).

B. Failure to Disclose Rental Income on Statement of
Economic Interest, 2011-2014

9. The State Government Ethics Act requires all cov-
ered persons to annually file a Statement of Economic
Interest (SEI form). As a judicial officer and judge of the
General Court of Justice, Respondent is a “covered person”

- under the State Government Ethics Act. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 138A-3(10) & (19).

10. Among other things, covered persons are required to
report the source of income of more than $5000 received
by the covered person, his/her spouse, or members of
his/her immediate family during the filing year. The State

Ethics Commission has interpreted “income” to mean the -

covered person’s gross income, not net income.

11. Pursuant to the State Government Ethics Act, income
includes “salary, wages, professional fees, honoraria, inter-
est, dividends, rental income, and business income from
any source other than capital gains, federal government.
retirement, military retirement, or social security income.”
(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 138A-24(a)(3)). The SEI form pro-
vided by the State Ethics Commission also includes simi-
Jar language.

243

244

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IN RE MACK
[369 N.C. 286 (2016)}

12. By his failure to file SEI forms that accurately dis-
closed his extra-judicial income for the years of 2011-2014,
Respondent failed to observe appropriate standards of con-
duct to ensure that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary shall be preserved, in violation of Canon 1 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.

13. By his failure to file SEI forms that accurately dis-
closed his extra-judicial income for the years of 2011-2014,
Respondent failed to respect and comply with the law and
conduct himself in a manner that promotes public confi-
dence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, in
violation of Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

14. Respondent’s failure to properly file SEI forms that
accurately disclosed his extra-judicial income for the
years of 2011[ ]to 2014 was the result of his own negli-
gence, and was not an attempt to willfully conceal his
extra-judicial income or benefit any party appearing before
him. Though not the result of ill motive, Respondent knew
or should have known to accurately include his extra-
judicial income in these reports and that his failure to do so
could be considered a violation of the State Government
Ethics Act, which Respondent acknowledged by his sig-
nature on the SEI forms signed each year. The potential
statutory violations associated with this action aggravates
this misconduct to a level warranting more than a private
letter of caution. The Commission further concludes, as
with Respondent's failure to properly file Canon 6 finan-
cial disclosures, that the continuing and recurring nature
of Respondent's admitted negligence year after year with
respect to his SEI forms, as distinguished from an isolated
incident or single occurrence, aggravates this misconduct
to a level warranting more than a private letter of caution.

15. Based on the foregoing, Respondent’s violations of
Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct with
respect to his failure to file accurate SEI forms from 2011
to 2014 amounts to conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute,
in violation of N.C.G.S. [§ 7A- ]876(b).

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IN RE MACK
[869 N.C. 286 (2016)}

C. Acceptance of Restitution in a Criminal Matter
i sidi ver Ci Session

16. Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct sets forth the
broad principle that “[a] judge should uphold the integ-
rity and independence of the judiciary.” To do so, Canon
1 requires that a “judge should participate in establish-
ing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should personally
observe, appropriate standards of conduct to ensure that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary shall be
preserved.”

17. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct generally
mandates that “[a] judge should avoid impropriety in all
the judge's activities.” Canon 2A specifies that “[a] judge
should respect and comply with the law and should con-
duct himself/herself at all times in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.” These principles embody the requirement that a

judge should not use the prestige and benefits of the office
to advance his own private and personal interests.

18.The Commission accepts Respondent's contention,
as set forth in the Stipulations, that for both the April
and July 2014 criminal court sessions, the ADA assigned
to prosecute the former tenant calendared the matter in
Respondent's courtroom for the purpose of achieving res-
titution or other settlement of the matter. The Commission
further accepts that Respondent did not exercise undue
judicial authority to have his criminal case against his
former tenant heard in his court. The Commission also
accepts Respondent's contention, as set forth in the

, Stipulations, that the State’s dismissal of the charge in
exchange for payment of restitution was routine practice
in Craven County.

19. The touchstone of an inquiry under the Code of Judicial
Conduct is not whether the conduct was motivated by
malice or ill-intent, although that can be a relevant con-
sideration, but whether the conduct in issue threatens to
undermine public confidence in the independence, impar-
tiality and integrity of the judiciary. As such, regardless of
whether the restitution and dismissal practice in Craven
County is routine in criminal cases, and without taking

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IN RE MACK
[869 N.C. 236 (2016)]

a position on the propriety of such practice, and regard-
less of who calendared the matter on Respondent's crimi-
nal docket, sitting judges are not similarly situated with
respect to resolving their personal legal matters as other
criminal complainants or civil litigants.

20.In these circumstances, public confidence in the
independence, impartiality and integrity of the judiciary
depends on conduct, especially in the courtroom, that
objectively and reasonably conveys a clear separation of
the judge’s private interests from his judicial duties. As the
presiding judge in criminal district court on 25 April 2014
and 18 July 2014, it was incumbent upon Respondent to
independently evaluate the propriety of his personal crimi-
nal matter being calendared before him as presiding judge,
and further, to recognize the obvious conflict of interest
and the potential for public concern as to his influence
over the outcome of a matter in which he had a personal
financial interest. As a criminal complainant, it was also
incumbent upon Respondent to maintain a clear separa-
tion of his personal life from his judicial duties, including
ensuring that his personal address rather than the Craven
County Courthouse address was indicated as his address
on the criminal summons, and settling and accepting cash
restitution at a time when he was not also exercising his
judicial duties as presiding judge.

21.The Commission notes that at the disciplinary rec-
ommendation hearing held on 11 May 2016, Respondent
requested that the Commission reject and dismiss his stip-
ulation that his conduct relating to the acceptance of resti-
tution warranted discipline as set forth in the Stipulations.
The Commission denies Respondent’s request. In addi-
tion, as noted previously, Respondent indicated on the
record that he has no objections to the facts contained
in the Stipulations as they relate to this issue[, stating,] “I
know I stipulated to all the facts, and I still stipulate that
those are the facts[].” The facts relating to the restitution
issue were also admitted in Respondent's Verified Answer.

22.The Commission concludes, therefore, that based
upon the clear, cogent and convincing evidence support-
ing its findings of fact on this issue, Respondent (1) failed

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE MACK
[369 N.C, 236 (2016)]

to personally observe standards of conduct to ensure the
integrity and independence of the judiciary is preserved, in
violation of Canon 1 of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct; and (2) failed to conduct himself at all times in
amanner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Canon 2A
of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.

23. The Commission further concludes that the facts and
circumstances relating to the restitution issue aggravate
this misconduct to a level warranting more than a private
letter of caution. Accordingly, Respondent's violations of
Canon 1 and Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct
also amount to conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in
violation of N.C, Gen. Stat. § N.C.G.S. § 7A-31[-]876(b).

(Citations omitted.) Based upon these findings of fact and conclusions
of law, the Commission recommended that this Court “issue a public
reprimand to Respondent” for “failing to report rental income on Canon
6 gift and income reports from 2010 to 2018,” “failing to report rental
income as required on annual Statements of Economic Interest filed
with the State Ethics Commission from 2011 to 2014,” and “settling and
accepting cash restitution in a criminal matter initiated by Respondent
while presiding over the court session in which the criminal matter was
docketed,” with this recommendation resting upon the Commission’s
earlier findings and conclusions and the following additional disposi-
tional determinations:

1. Respondent has been fully cooperative with the
Cornmission’s investigation, voluntarily providing infor-
mation about the underlying matter.

2. Respondent agreed to enter into the Stipulations to
bring closure to this matter and because of his concern for
protecting the integrity of the court system.

3. With respect to filing accurate Canon 6 and SEI
reports, Respondent agreed to accept a recommendation
of public reprimand from the Commission and acknow]l-
edges that the conduct set out in the Stipulations estab-
lishes by clear and convincing evidence that this conduct
is in violation of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct and is prejudicial to the administration of justice

248

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IN RE MACK
[369 N.C. 236 (2016)}

that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of
GS. § 7A-376((b]).

4. Respondent has an exemplary record of public ser-
vice having served honorably with the United States Army
where he was awarded the Army Commendation Medal
for service above and beyond the call of duty. Respondent.
also worked for the United States Navy as a civilian and
served as a law enforcement office for over 5 years in
North Carolina before beginning a career in law.

5. Respondent is also strongly dedicated to his commu-
nity, volunteering his time with numerous organizations.
Respondent has served as a volunteer fire fighter and EMT,
President of the Judicial District 3B Bar Association, and
trustee on the Board of Trustees for Craven Community
College. Respondent was a Havelock Rotary Club mem-
ber, has been a Master Mason in the Cherry Point Masonic
Lodge for over 30 years and is a member of the Ancient
and Accepted Scottish Rite.

6. Respondent has already taken remedial measures by
filing an amended Canon 6 disclosure form and is taking
similar steps to supplement his SEI forms from 2011-2014.
Respondent now understands the necessity of reporting
his extra-judicial income and will comply each year as set
forth in Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
State Government Ethics Act.

7. Respondent also acknowledges the potential for con-
flicts of interest to arise in his role as a landlord. If he were
to encounter another incident which would require tak-
ing out criminal charges against a current or former ten-
ant, Respondent understands and agrees that the matter
must be kept separate from any of his judicial duties and
he must make reasonable efforts to ensure his role and
schedule as a judge will not conflict with any criminal
action where he is the prosecuting witness. Respondent
has already shown initiative to comply with the Code by
recusing himself when the former tenant obtained a new
unrelated criminal charge which was scheduled before
Respondent. When Respondent realized the matter was
on his calendar, he properly recused himself.

(Citations omitted.)

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IN RE MACK
[369 N.C. 236 (2016)]

When reviewing a recommendation from the Commission, the
Supreme Court “acts as a court of original jurisdiction, rather than in
its typical capacity as an appellate court.” In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C.
418, 428, 722 S.E.2d 496, 503 (2012) (order) (quoting In re Badgett, 362
N.C. 202, 207, 657 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2008) (order)). We have discretion to
“adopt the Commission’s findings of fact if they are supported by clear
and convincing evidence, or [we] may make [our] own findings.” Id. at
428, 722 §.E.2d at 503 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Badgett,
362 N.C. at 206, 657 S.E.2d at 349). The scope of our review is to “first
determine if the Commission’s findings of fact are adequately supported
by clear and convincing evidence, and in turn, whether those findings
support its conclusions of law.” Id. at 429, 722 S.E.2d at 503 (quoting In
re Badgett, 362 N.C. at 207, 657 S.E.2d at 349).

After careful review, this Court concludes that the Commission’s
findings of fact, including the dispositional determinations set out above,
are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record.
In addition, we conclude that the Commission’s findings of fact support
its conclusions of law. As a result, we accept the Commission’s findings
and conclusions and adopt them as our own. Based upon those find-
ings and conclusions and the recommendation of the Commission, we
conclude and adjudge that Respondent should be publicly reprimanded.

Therefore, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376(b) and-377(a5), itis ordered
that Respondent Peter Mack, Jr. be PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED for con-
duct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b) and that violates
Canons 1, 2A, and 6C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.

By order of the Court in Conference, this the 20th day of December,
2016.

s/Ervin, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 21st day of December, 2016.

Clerk of the Supreme Court.

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk

250

IN THE SUPREME COURT

MIDREX TECHS., INC. v. N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE
[369 N.C. 250 (2016)}

MIDREX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

ve
N.C. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

No. 5A16
Filed 21 December 2016

Taxation—franchise and income tax—excluded corporation—

building or construction contractor

The trial court did not err by concluding that Midrex
Technologies, Inc. was not entitled to a franchise and income tax
refund where the issue in the case was whether the corporation was
entitled to utilize the single-factor tax allocation formula authorized
by N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(r) and made available to exempt corpora-
tions engaged in business as a building or construction contrac-
tor. Although the record did contain evidence tending to show that.
Midrex employees engaged in construction management. activities
and performed a limited amount of hands-on construction activ-
ity, that evidence was not enough to support a decision to classify
Midrex as an “excluded corporation” on the grounds that it is a
“building or construction contractor.”

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(a) and 7A-45.4 from an Opinion

and Order on Petition for Judicial Review entered on 21 October 2015
by Judge Gregory P. McGuire, Special Superior Court Judge for Complex
Business Cases appointed by the Chief Justice pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 74-45.4, in Superior Court, Wake County, upholding a Final Decision
and Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment
entered by Administrative Law Judge Craig Croom on 13 October 2014.
Heard in the Supreme Court on 30 August 2016.

Inc.

Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, PA., by Thomas Holderness, for
petitioner-appellant.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Tenisha S. Jacobs, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for respondent-appellee North Carolina
Department of Revenue.

ERVIN, Justice.

The issue in this case is whether petitioner Midrex Technologies,
(Midrex) is entitled to utilize the single-factor tax allocation formula

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[369 N.C. 250 (2016)]

authorized by N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(r) and made available to exempt cor-
porations “engaged in business as a building or construction contractor”
by N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm
the trial court’s decision to uphold the administrative law judge’s deter-
mination that Midrex was not an “excluded corporation” for purposes of
N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4) during the relevant time period.

Midrex, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Charlotte, was
formed to develop and market the Midrex Direct Reduction Process.
The Midrex Process, which has been patented by Midrex and is forty
years old, is used in a facility known as a Midrex Plant to convert
iron ore into direct reduced iron (DRI), a premium iron ore that is, in
turn, used as an alternative feed in connection with the production of
steel. Although Midrex engages in three primary business activities,
Engineering Services and Procurement Services, Midrex Plant Sales,
and After Market Sales, the ultimate focus of its business is the sale of
Midrex Plants.

- Engineering and Procurement Services employees design Midrex
Plants, with their work including, but not limited to:

1. Designing refractory linings for gas based equipment,
furnaces, ductwork, and heating exchange equipment;

2. Designing gas based equipment, furnaces, ductwork,
and heating exchange equipment; and

3. Designing systems and equipment associated with the
design and construction of DRI plants and new technology.

Engineering and Procurement Services houses employees who work
in various engineering disciplines, such as mechanical, civil, process,
and electrical engineering. Engineering and Procurement Services
also houses employees responsible for obtaining proprietary and non-
proprietary equipment needed for a Midrex Plant. Finally, Engineering
and Procurement Services houses a site manager and a construction
manager,! with the site manager being responsible for handling the rela-
tionship between Midrex and the purchaser of a Midrex Plant, including
keeping the client apprised of any ongoing plant-related issues, help-
ing coordinate activities at the plant site, recommending any neces-
sary corrective measures, communicating with persons involved in the

1. At the time that this case was heard before the administrative law judge,
Construction Manager was also its Site Manager.

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[869 N.C. 250 (2016)]

construction process, and providing advice and assistance relating to
any issues that might arise during the construction of a Midrex Plant
and with the construction manager being responsible for all activities
involved in the construction of both foreign and domestic plants.

The terms and conditions under which Midrex designs and sells a
Midrex Plant are set out in certain contracts that are entered into between
Midrex and the client. The plant sale contracts that Midrex enters into
with its clients outline the relevant technical specifications, the terms
under which the client makes payment to Midrex, and the nature and
extent of the work to be performed by the client and by Midrex. The
work that Midrex is required to perform under these plant sale contracts
does not include the construction, erection, and installation of the sys-
tems and components utilized in a Midrex plant, with the client or some
other entity being required to hire construction contractors and laborers
in order to ensure the performance of those tasks. Consistent with this
understanding of the contractual relationship between Midrex and its
client, Midrex is required to provide engineering, equipment procure-
ment, and advisory and field services needed in connection with the
construction of a Midrex Plant, with these contractually required field
services including:

1. Interpreting and explaining of plans, materials, and
other technical data;

2. Advising the Client in developing and updating a con-
struction schedule;

8. Inspecting material, equipment, and workmanship;

4. Providing advice related to the commissioning of a
Midrex Plant.

Although Midrex field service employees do, on occasion, provide
hands-on assistance to clients, the performance of this work does not
change the fact that, under Midrex’s plant sales contracts, the client
retains ultimate responsibility for directly supervising and obtaining the
performance of all on-site construction work in accordance with the rel-
evant plans and specifications.

Finally, After Market Sales is responsible for addressing issues that
arise following the construction of a Midrex Plant. For example, After
Market Sales employees are involved in providing additional equip-
ment and parts needed to permit the continued operation of an existing
Midrex plant after construction has been completed.

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[869 N.C. 250 (2016)]

In the years between 2005 and 2008, Midrex entered into contracts
with various clients at different locations around the world for the sale
of Midrex Plants. As a result, Midrex filed North Carolina C Corporation.
Tax Returns with the Department of Revenue that apportioned its
income using the standard three-factor formula provided for in N.C.G.S.
§ 105-130.4G).2 Subsequently, Midrex filed a set of amended returns
for the relevant period in which it calculated its tax liability using the
single-factor formula applicable to “excluded corporations” authorized.
by N.C.G.S. § 150-130.4(), with Midrex’s claim to be an “excluded cor-
poration” resting on a contention that it was “engaged in business as a
building or construction contractor.” N.C.G.S. §105-130.4(a)(4) (2016).
In these amended returns, Midrex sought a $3,303,703 refund.

Midrex admitted that, during the relevant period, its “primary busi-
ness [wa]s selling . . . plants.” In all of the tax returns that it filed relat-
ing to this period, Midrex assigned itself a North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) code of 541330 based upon a review of
the business services that it provides, including the field services upon
which its present refund request depends. NAICS code 541330 falls
within the engineering, rather than the construction, sector.

After the filmg of Midrex’s amended returns, respondent North
Carolina Department of Revenue determined that Midrex should not
be classified as an “excluded corporation” on the grounds that it “was
not engaged in business as a building or construction contractor.”
Referencing the Franchise Tax, Corporate Income Tax, Privilege Tax,
Insurance Premium Tax [and] Excise Tax Rules and Bulletins for
Taxable Years 2005 and 2006 and 2007 and 2008, the Department of
Revenue determined that an entity should be treated as an “excluded
corporation” depending upon whether it was classified as a “building
or construction contractor” on the basis of the NAICS system, which
focuses upon whether an entity's primary business activity involves erect-
ing buildings and other structures. As a result of the fact that Midrex was
not primarily engaged in the business of constructing buildings or other
engineering projects and was, instead, “primarily a technology company

2. Initially, Midrex filed tax returns for the 2005, 2006, and 2007 tax years that did
not attempt to apportion revenue between North Carolina and other jurisdictions. In 2009
Midrex filed a return for the 2008 tax year utilizing the three-factor apportionment for-
mula and filed amended returns seeking refunds for the 2005, 2006, and 2007 tax years.
Subsequently, Midrex filed a second set of amended returns relating to the 2005, 2006,
and 2007 tax years in which it sought a further refund based upon use of the single-factor
formula. The present case arises from the Department's decision to reject the second set
of refund requests relating to the 2005, 2006, and 2007 tax years.

254 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 250 (2016)]

that supplies technology relating to the production of DRI” that “is not
responsible for the actual construction or installation of the purchased.
technology,” the Department of Revenue determined that Midrex “was
not engaged in business as a building or construction contractor” and
rejected Midrex’s refund request.

On 25 October 2013, Midrex filed a Petition for a Contested Tax Case
Hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings in which it sought to
have the denial of its refund request by the Department of Revenue over-
turned. On 12 June 2014 and 27 June 2014, respectively, Midrex and the
Department of Revenue filed motions seeking entry of summary judg-
ment in their favor. On 10 October 2014, the administrative law judge
entered a Final Decision and Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for
Summary Judgment in which he determined that there was no genu-
ine issue of material fact, that judgment should be entered in favor of
the Department of Revenue, and that Midrex’s refund request should
be denied.

On 23 October 2014, Midrex filed a Petition for Judicial Review
in the Superior Court, Wake County. After this case was designated a
mandatory complex business case as defined by N.C.G.S. § 7A-45.4 and
assigned to a trial judge for decision, the Department of Revenue filed a
response to Midrex’s petition. On 21 October 2015, the trial court entered
an Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review determining that
“Midrex was not an excluded corporation during the tax years at issue”
and affirming “the Final Decision entered in this matter on October 10,
2014,” denying Midrex’s summary judgment motion, and granting the
Department of Revenue’s summary judgment motion.

Although Midrex acknowledged that no disputed issues of material
fact existed in this case, it argued before the trial court that the admin-
istrative law judge had failed to properly apply the statutory provisions
set out in N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4) to the facts established by the pres-
ent record. More specifically, Midrex asserted that the administrative
law judge had erred by concluding that Midrex was not a “building or
construction contractor” or “engaged in [the construction] business”
and by construing the relevant statutory language to require a showing
that construction-related activities constituted Midrex’s “primary” busi-
ness activity as a prerequisite for a finding that Midrex was an “excluded
corporation.” In reaching a contrary conclusion, the trial court began by
attempting to determine the plain meaning of “building or construction
contractor” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4) and reasoning
that “only if Midrex’s work qualifies as building or construction contract-
ing will [this] Court need to address the meaning of the statutory term

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MIDREX TECHS., INC. v. N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE
[869 N.C. 250 (2016)}

‘engaged in business.’ ” Midrex Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No.
14 CVS 13996, slip op. at 13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake County Oct. 21, 2015)
(unpublished). Although Midrex asserted that the field service work
that it performed under its Plant sale contracts constituted construction
management and that it was involved in “construction contracting” for
that reason, the Department of Revenue asserted that Midrex was “not a
building or construction contractor” because “Midrex’s contracts do not
place responsibility on Midrex to build or erect the plant” and because
“Midrex is not significantly involved in the physical labor of building the
plant.” Id.

After concluding that a determination of the extent to which Midrex
was properly classified as an “excluded corporation” involved an issue
of statutory construction requiring an analysis of the plain meaning of
the relevant statutory language and, potentially, the utilization.of vari-
ous principles of statutory construction, Midrex, slip op. at 10-18 (citing
inter alia, Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d, 518, 517
(2001)), the trial court noted that “Merriam-Webster defines ‘building’ as
‘the art or business of assembling materials into a structure,’ ” defines
“ construction’ as ‘the process, art, or manner or constructing some-
thing,’ ” and defines “contractor as ‘one that contracts or is a party to
a contract: as (a) one that contracts to perform work or provide sup-
plies[; or] (b) one that contracts to erect buildings.’ ” Id. at 15 (brackets
in original). In addition, the trial court sought guidance from language
appearing in other relevant statutory provisions, noting that the
“statutory definition [of “construction contractor” contained in N.C.G.S.
§ 105-273(6a)] is consistent with the dictionary definitions and empha-
sizes the physical work of ‘building’ and ‘installing’ as the critical ele-
ments of construction contracting, and does not suggest that it excludes
subcontractors or other contractors.” Id. According to the trial court,
the dictionary and statutory definitions of the relevant terms “accurately
reflect the common understanding [of the terms], as they include a
broader range of activity.” Id. at 16.

Although Midrex argued that NAICS treats construction managers
providing scheduling and oversight services as contractors, the trial
court pointed out that “NAICS recognizes that where an establishment’s
primary business is providing oversight and scheduling for construc-
tion projects it may properly be classified for purposes of the NAICS
system as a ‘general contractor-type establishment’ ” and indicated that
the quoted language “does not suggest that any establishment which.
performs any amount of construction oversight and scheduling as some
part of its services is a ‘building or construction contractor.’ ” Id. As a

256 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 250 (2016)]

result, the trial court concluded that the term “building or construction
contractor” as used in N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4) did not apply to the
provision of “construction management that involves only oversight or
scheduling, but does not include responsibility for performance or direc-
tion of the actual building, erection, or assembly of a structure;” there-
fore, Midrex construction management activities “do[ ] not fit within the
plain meaning of the term ‘building or construction contractor’ as used
in [N.C.] G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4). ” Id. at 18.

Although the agreements between Midrex and its clients obligated
Midrex to provide technical advice, including “interpreting and explain-
ing drawings and specifications,” “advising the client in development of
the construction sequence,” and “inspecting the material, equipment,
and workmanship of the plant,” and to “direct and supervise the com-
missioning (start-up) of the Midrex Plant once it was constructed,”
these contracts clearly made the client responsible for procuring the
performance of the actual erection of the plant. Jd. at 18-19. In light of
these contractual provisions, the trial court determined that the fact
that Midrex performed field advisory services for its clients did not
render Midrex a “building or construction contractor” for purposes of
N.C.GS. § 105-130.4(a)(4). Id. at 19. Having made that determination,
the trial court deemed it “unnecessary . . . to address the parties’ argu-
ments regarding the meaning of the term ‘engaged in business,’ ” and
affirmed the administrative law judge's order. Id. at 19-20. Midrex noted
an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s order.

As we have already noted, the issue before the trial court in this
case was whether the administrative law judge properly granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Department of Revenue and against
Midrex. Subsection 150B-51(d) of our General Statutes provides that
“fijn reviewing a final decision allowing judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the court may enter any order allowed by G.S. 1A-1,
Rule 12(c) or Rule 56,” with the reviewing court having the authority
to “remand the case to the administrative law judge for such further
proceedings as are just” in the event that “the order of the court does
not fully adjudicate the case.” N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(d) (2015). Similarly, in
reviewing an order from a superior court acting in an appellate capacity,
an appellate court must “determine whether the trial court exercised
the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate[,] ... decide whether
the court did so properly.” In re Denial of NC IDEA’s Refund, 196 N.C.
App. 426, 434, 675 S.E.2d 88, 95 (2009) (quoting County of Wake v. N.C.
Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res., 155 N.C. App. 225, 233-34, 573 S.E. 2d 572, 579
(2002), disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 386-87 (2003)).

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[369 N.C. 260 (2016)]

According to well-established North Carolina law, summary judg-
ment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1,
Rule 56(c) (2015). Appeals arising from summary judgment orders are
decided using a de novo standard of review. Dallaire v. Bank of Am., 367
N.C. 363, 367, 760 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2014) (citation omitted). “Under the
de novo standard of review, the [Court] ‘consider[s] the matter anew[ ]
and freely substitute[es] its own judgment for’ [that of the lower court].”
N.C. Dep't of Env't & Nat. Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 660, 599 S.E.2d
888, 895 (2004) (quoting Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning
Ba., 356 N.C. 1, 13-14, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002) (second, third, and fourth
alterations in original)). As a result, our task on appeal from the trial
court's order is to make a de novo determination of whether the admin-
istrative law judge correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the
Department of Revenue and against Midrex.

C corporations like Midrex doing business within North Carolina
are subject to various forms of taxation “to raise and provide revenue”
for the State. See N.C.G.S. § 105-1 (2015). A corporation’s franchise tax
obligation is computed based upon the “total amount of [the corpora-
tion’s] issued and outstanding capital stock, surplus, and undivided prof-
its,” id. § 105-122(b) (2016), while a C corporation's income tax liability
is imposed upon the corporation's “net income.” Id. § 105-130.3 (2015).
As a result of the fact that a corporation may earn income both inside
and outside of North Carolina and the fact that there are limitations on
the extent to which North Carolina has the constitutional authority to
tax income earned outside North Carolina, a corporation that does busi-
ness both inside and outside North Carolina must use the allocation and
apportionment process delineated in N.C.G.S. §§ 105-122(c1)(1) and
105-130.4 in order to determine its liability for the payment of North
Carolina franchise and income taxes.

According to the statutory provisions governing the allocation
and apportionment process during the relevant time period, corpora-
tions other than those defined as “excluded corporations” in N.C.G.S.
§ 105-130.4(a)(4) are required to utilize a three-factor apportionment
formula that focuses upon property, payroll, and sales in order to
determine their North Carolina franchise and income tax liability, id.
§§ 105-122(c1)(1), 180-4(i) (2015),while “excluded corporations” are
entitled to utilize a single-factor formula that focuses exclusively upon
sales. Id. § 105-130.4(r) (2015). Thus, the extent to which Midrex is

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[369 N.C. 250 (2016)]

entitled to utilize the single-factor formula in lieu of the three-factor
formula depends entirely upon whether it is properly categorized as
an “excluded corporation.”

An “excluded corporation” is defined as “any corporation engaged
in business as a building or construction contractor, a securities
dealer, or a loan company or a corporation that receives more than fifty
percent (50%) of its ordinary gross income from intangible property.” Id.
§ 105-130.4(a)(4) (emphasis added). In view of the fact that there is no
definition of “building or construction contractor” in the relevant statu-
tory provisions, we are required, as a first step, to determine the mean-
ing of that statutory phrase in order to ascertain whether Midrex should
be deemed an “excluded corporation” entitled to utilize the single-
factor formula for the purpose of determining its franchise and income
tax liability.

“Legislative intent controls the meaning of a statute.” Brown
v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1998) (quoting Shelton
v. Morehead Mem’ Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 81, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986)).

The intent of the General Assembly may be found first
from the plain language of the statute, then from the legis-
lative history, ‘the spirit of the act and what the act seeks
to accomplish.’ If the language of a statute is clear, the
court must implement the statute according to the plain
meaning of its terms so long as it is reasonable to do so.

Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. at 664, 548 S.E.2d at 517 (citations omit-
ted). Courts should “give effect to the words actually used in a statute”
and should neither “delete words used” nor “insert words not used” in
the relevant statutory language during the statutory construction pro-
cess. Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 623, 766 S.E.2d 297, 301 (2014)
(citations omitted). “[U]ndefined words are accorded their plain mean-
ing so long as it is reasonable to do so.” Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman,
349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1098
(1999), disavowed in part by Lenox, 353 N.C. at 663, 548 S.E.2d at 517.
In determining the plain meaning of undefined terms, “this Court has
used ‘standard, nonlegal dictionaries’ as a guide.” C.D. Spangler Constr.
Co. v. Indus. Crankshift & Eng’g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 152, 388 S.E.2d
557, 568 (1990) (quoting Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 438, 146 S.E.2d 410, 416 (1966). Finally, statutes
should be construed so that the resulting construction “harmonizes with
the underlying reason and purpose of the statute.” Elec. Supply Co. of

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[869 N.C. 250 (2016)]

Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991)
(citations omitted).

According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, “building”
means “the process or business of constructing something,” such as
“the building of highways”; “construction” means “the building of some-
thing, typically a large structure”; and “contractor” means “a person or
company that undertakes a contract to provide materials or labor to
perform a service or do a job.” New Oxford American Dictionary 228,
373, 377 (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds. 3d ed. 2010).
As the administrative law judge and the trial court reasoned, these defi-
nitions tend to focus upon the act of physically constructing or erect-
ing a structure or improvement to real property. Thus, the validity of
Midrex’s claim to be a “building or construction contractor” depends upon
the extent to which the work performed by Midrex employees involves
the act of building or constructing a physical asset, such as a Midrex Plant.

An examination of the relevant statutory language in wider context
reinforces this conclusion. As the relevant statutory provisions clearly
indicate, the single-factor formula and three-factor formula are utilized
to determine the affected entity’s entire North Carolina tax liability. In
other words, an “excluded” corporation is treated for tax allocation
and apportionment purposes as if it was involved in nothing other than
the activity that caused it to be classified as “excluded.” In light of that
fact, we have difficulty in seeing why the General Assembly would have
intended for N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4) to have been construed in such a
manner as to classify an entity engaged in only a relatively small amount
of construction-related activity as if it was a “building or construction
contractor.” Instead, it is far more likely, given that a taxpayer is treated
as “excluded” or not “excluded” on a whole entity basis, that N.C.G.S.
§ 105-130.4(a)(4) should be understood as describing the entire entity
rather than a small portion of the entity's overall business.

The interpretation of the relevant statutory language that we believe
to be appropriate is further buttressed by the fact that the Department of
Revenue has traditionally read N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4) in just this way.
Inan attempt to provide guidance to taxpayers and others attempting to
ensure compliance with North Carolina’s revenue laws, the Secretary of
Revenue publishes Bulletins that set out his or her interpretation of vari-
ous statutory provisions.

It is the duty of the Secretary [of Revenue] to interpret
all laws administered by the Secretary. The Secretary's
interpretation of these laws shall be consistent with the

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applicable rules. An interpretation by the Secretary is
prima facie correct. When the Secretary interprets a law
by adopting a rule or publishing a bulletin or directive on.
the law, the interpretation is a protection to the officers
and taxpayers affected by the interpretation, and taxpay-
ers are entitled to rely upon the interpretation.

N.C.G.S. § 105-264(a) (2016). “The construction adopted by the admin-
istrators who execute and administer a law in question is one consid-
eration where an issue of statutory construction arises,” Polaroid, 349
N.C. at 301-02, 507 S.E.2d at 293 (quoting John R. Seaton & Co. v. Justus,
342 N.C. 374, 380, 464 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1995)), because such interpreta-
tion is “ ‘strongly persuasive’ ” and “entitled to due consideration,” id. at
302, 507 S.E.2d at 293 (quoting and citing Shealy v. Associated Transp.,
Inc., 252 N.C. 738, 742, 114 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1960)). Contra Morris
Comme’ns Corp. v. City of Bessemer City Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
365 N.C. 152, 156, 712 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2011) (stating “courts consider,
but are not bound by, the interpretations of administrative agencies and
boards”). Thus, the manner in which the Secretary of Revenue has inter-
preted the relevant statutory language is important and must be given
“due consideration.” .

The relevant Bulletin language clearly states that a “building or con-
struction contractor,” as that term is used in N.C.G.S. 105-130.4(a)(4), “is
a business so classified in the [NAICS] published by the Federal Office
of Management and Budget.” Corp., Excise & Insur. Tax Div., N.C. Dep't
of Revenue, Franchise Tax[,] Corporate Income Tax[,] Privilege Tasx[,]
Insurance Premium Tax[,] Excise Tax: Rules and Bulletins: Taxable
Years 2005 & 2006, at 46; id., Years 2007 & 2008, at 54-55. NAICS clas-
sifies establishments as belonging to particular industries based on the
nature of the entity’s primary business activity. According to NAICS,
the construction sector is comprised of establishments that are primarily
engaged in the construction of buildings or engineering projects, includ-
ing erecting buildings and other structures, heavy construction, altera-
tions, reconstruction, and installation. Thus, under the interpretation
of N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4) deemed appropriate by the Secretary of
Revenue, an entity is not a “building or construction contractor” unless
that entity is primarily engaged in the actual construction or erection of
physical assets.

A careful review of the undisputed evidence contained the evi-
dentiary record presented for the administrative law judge’s consider-
cation indicates that Midrex has only limited involvement in the actual,
physical construction of a Midrex Plant. Instead, the undisputed record

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[369 N.C. 250 (2016)]

evidence tends to show that the client, rather than Midrex, has ultimate
responsibility for obtaining the physical construction of a Midrex Plant,
with Midrex being responsible for providing scheduling, oversight,
and other sorts of technical assistance and advice. For that reason, we
agree with the trial court and the administrative law judge that Midrex
is not a “building or construction contractor” for purposes of N.C.G.S.
§ 105-130.4(a)(4). Our determination to this effect is buttressed by the
fact that the undisputed record evidence reflects that Midrex has classi-
fied itself as an engineering company rather than a building or construc-
tion company for purposes of the NAICS system. In view of the fact
that an entity is not entitled to classify itself as a construction company
utilizing NAICS unless it is primarily engaged in activities involved the
building or erection of structures, the fact that Midrex concedes that
it is not primarily engaged in such activities, and the fact that Midrex
has assigned an engineering-related NAICS code rather than a construc-
tion-related NAICS code, it is clear that Midrex is not entitled to claim
“pbuilding or construction contractor” status for purposes of N.C.G.S.
§ 105-130.4(a)(4) utilizing the test for identifying “excluded corpora-
tions” that the Department of Revenue has deemed appropriate either.
As a result, when considering the record evidence concerning Midrex’s
role in the construction of a Midrex Plant on the basis of either the
literal language of N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4) or the method for iden-
tifying “excluded corporations” deemed appropriate by the Secretary,
we agree that the Department of Revenue correctly rejected Midrex’s
refund request. .

In seeking to persuade us that it should be treated as a “building
or construction contractor” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4),
Midrex emphasizes that it provides construction management services
and performs hands-on construction activities. Although the record
does contain evidence tending to show that Midrex employees engage
in construction managernent activities and perform a limited amount of
hands-on construction activity, this evidence is not enough to support a
decision to classify Midrex as an “excluded corporation” on the grounds
that it is a “building or construction contractor.”

As Midrex notes, construction management activities are included
within the NAICS construction classification. In light of that fact, Midrex
argues that it should be deemed a construction company for NAICS-
related purposes given that it performs what amounts to construction
management services for its clients and that it should be deemed to be
a “building or construction contractor” for that reason. Midrex’s argu-
ment to this effect fails, however, because an NAICS classification

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[369 N.C. 250 (2016)}

determination is supposed to be premised upon the identification of an
entity’s primary business activity. Although the record does contain evi-
dence tending to show that Midrex performs‘a certain amount of con-
struction management work, the record does not provide any support
for an assertion that the provision of such services constitutes Midrex’s
primary business activity. For that reason, Midrex could not properly be
classified as a construction manager for purpases of the NAICS classifi-
cation system given that construction management was not its primary
line of business during the relevant time period. As a result, the fact that
Midrex performs a certain amount of construction management work
does not justify a decision in Midrex’s favor in this case.

Similarly, while Midrex employees do, apparently, perform a very
limited amount of hands-on construction, such work is not provided for
in the Plant construction contracts, appears to involve an attempt on the
part of Midrex’s employees to demonstrate to the employees of other
entities employed by the client for the purpose of physically construct-
ing a Midrex Plant how certain jobs should be performed, and seems to
represent a very small fraction of the work that Midrex performs for its
clients in connection with the design, construction, and commissioning
of a Midrex Plant. In other words, the hands-on construction work that
is performed by Midrex’s employees appears to be incidental to the obli-
gations imposed upon it under the contracts that are intended to result
in the construction of a Midrex Plant. Thus, Midrex cannot be treated
as a “building or construction contractor” for purposes of N.C.G.S.
§ 105-130.4(a)(4) based on its hands-on construction activities either.

In an attempt to persuade us of the correctness of its position,
Midrex argues that, because N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4 is a tax statute, it
should be construed in favor of Midrex as the taxpayer. See Lenox,
353 N.C. at 664, 548 S.E.2d at 517 (2001). However, as the Department
of Revenue notes, this Court has held that tax statutes providing for
exceptions to otherwise-applicable general rules, such as N.C.G.S.
§§ 105-130.4(a)(4) and 105-130.4(r), should be treated as statutes provid-
ing for an exemption from taxation that should be construed against the
taxpayer. See Hatteras Yacht Co. v. High, 265 N.C. 653, 656, 144 S.E.2d
821, 824 (1965) (finding that exemptions from taxation are “to be strictly
construed against the claim of such special or preferred treatment”). As
the record clearly reflects, the vast majority of C Corporations subject
to North Carolina taxation apportioned their income utilizing the three-
factor formula specified in N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(i) during the tax years
at issue in this case. For that reason, any claim that a taxpayer has the
right to utilize the single-factor formula set out in N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(r)

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should be strictly construed against, rather than in favor of, the taxpay-
er’s contention, a proposition that further reinforces our determination
that Midrex is not entitled to be treated as an “excluded corporation” as
defined in N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)(4).

Reduced to its essence, the argument that Midrex has advanced in
support of its refund request rests on an assertion that entities seek-
ing to be classified as “excluded corporations” based on their status as
a “building or construction contractor” are entitled to be categorized
in that manner as long so as they are engaged in any non-incidental
amount of “building or construction” work. In other words, acceptance
of Midrex’s argument hinges on the proposition that the company is not
required to be primarily “engaged in business as a building or construc-
tion contractor.” Admittedly, as Midrex notes, the word “primarily” does
not appear in the relevant statutory language. See N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(a)
(4). The absence of the word “primarily” from N.C.G.S. § 105-180.4(a)(4),
while relevant, is not, however, dispositive in light of the rule of statu-
tory construction to the effect that the fact “[t]hat a legislature declined
to enact a statute with specific language does not indicate the legislature
intended the exact opposite.” N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363
N.C, 189, 202, 675 S.E.2d 641, 650 (2009) (citation omitted). Thus, the
ultimate issue for our consideration remains what the relevant statutory
language, when read in context and in its entirety, should be understood
to mean.

As we have already demonstrated, the position espoused by the
Department of Revenue and upheld by the administrative law judge and
the trial court is fully consistent with both the literal language in which
the relevant statutory provision is couched and long-standing adminis-
trative practice. Acceptance of the construction of the relevant statutory
language contended for by Midrex would have the effect of allowing
any corporation that performed some building or construction work to
take advantage of the single-factor formula made available by N.C.G.S.
§ 105-130.4(x), despite the fact that the General Assembly clearly
intended that the single-factor formula was only to be made available
to a limited class of corporate taxpayers, with the remaining corporate
taxpayers being required to use the three-factor formula. Any decision

3. Admittedly, the General Assembly has amended N.C.G.S. § 105-180.4 so as to
allow all corporations to utilize the single-factor formula effective for tax years beginning
with 1 January 2018. However, Midrex’s liability for franchise and income taxation associ-
ated with the 2005, 2006, and 2007 tax years must, of course, be determined in light of the
statutory provisions in effect as of that time.

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that would have the effect of vastly expanding the number of entities
entitled to use the single-factor test would appear to conflict with the
apparent legislative intent. See Elec. Supply Co., 328 N.C. at 656, 403
S.E.2d at 294 (“In matters of statutory construction, our primary task
is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent is
accomplished”). As a result, adoption of the construction of the relevant
statutory language contended for by Midrex would appear to be inap-
propriate for this reason as well.

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the admin-
istrative law judge and the trial court properly determined that Midrex
was not a “building or construction contractor” for purposes of N.C.G.S.
§ 105-130.4(a)(4). In light of that fact, we need not determine whether
Midrex satisfied the “engaged in business” criterion contained in N.C.G.S.
§ 105-130.4(a)(4) in order to properly resolve this case. Accordingly,
we hold that the trial court did not err by concluding that Midrex is
not entitled to a franchise and income tax refund based upon the argu-
ment that it has advanced before this Court and we thus affirm the trial
court's decision.

AFFIRMED.
——
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR

v.
JERRY R. TILLETT

No. 208PAL5
Filed 21 December 2016

Judges—discipline—sitting judges—misconduct while in
office—jurisdiction
Where a sitting judge engaged in misconduct while in office,
the North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission
lacked the authority to investigate and discipline him. Pursuant to
the state constitution and the General Statutes, jurisdiction to dis-
cipline sitting judges for their conduct while in office rests solely
with the Judicial Standards Commission and the Supreme Court of
North Carolina.

Chief Justice MARTIN concurring.

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N.C. STATE BAR v. TILLETT
[369 N.C. 264 (2016)]

Justice EDMUNDS joins in this concurring opinion.
Justice ERVIN concurring in the result.
Justices HUDSON and BEASLEY join in this concurring opinion.

On writ of certiorari to review the question presented in defen-
dant’s petition for discretionary review. Heard in the Supreme Court on
30 August 2016.

Katherine Jean, Counsel, and David R. Johnson, Jennifer A.
Porter, and G. Patrick Murphy, Deputy Counsels, North Carolina
State Bar, for plaintiff-appellee.

Vandeventer Black LLP, by Norman W. Shearin, David P. Ferrell,
and Kevin A. Rust, for defendant-appellant.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Melissa L. Trippe, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for North Carolina Judicial Standards
Commission, amicus curiae.

JACKSON, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the North Carolina State Bar
Disciplinary Hearing Commission (DHC) has the authority to investigate
and discipline sitting Judge Jerry R. Tillett (defendant) for his conduct.
while in office. Because we conclude that the DHC lacks this author-
ity, we reverse the DHC’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss and
remand this case to the DHC to dismiss with prejudice the complaint of
the North Carolina State Bar (State Bar) against defendant.

Defendant has served continuously as a judge in Judicial District
One of the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, from the
time of the circumstances giving rise to this case until the present. On
16 February 2012, the Judicial Standards Commission (JSC) commenced
a formal investigation into defendant’s “interactions with employees
and officials of the Town of Kill Devil Hills, including his involvement in
orders entered against the town, and regarding his interactions with the
District Attorney's office of the 1* Prosecutorial District including pres-
suring that office to pursue certain legal actions.” Based on its findings
and conclusions, the JSC imposed a public reprimand on defendant.

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According to the public reprimand, on 4 April 2010, Kill Devil Hills
Police detained defendant's adult son for an unspecified reason. Eleven.
days later, on 15 April, defendant arranged a meeting with officials from
the Town of Kill Devil Hills and its police department in defendant’s
chambers. Defendant complained about his son’s detention “as part of a
series of other complaints about incidents of misconduct involving” the
police department. According to those who participated in the meeting,
defendant then became agitated and confrontational in his warnings to
town officials to address the complaints and engaged in “discussion of
a superior court judge’s ability to remove officials from office,” causing
some individuals to feel “threatened.”

The public reprimand also states that throughout 2011 defen-
dant received “communications from Kill Devil Hills police officers
with grievances against Chief of Police Gary Britt and Assistant Town
Manager Shawn Murphy related to personnel issues.” During this
period, defendant also received “complaints about the performance of
the District Attorney of the 1* Prosecutorial District.” Concluding from
the complaints “that Chief Britt was guilty of professional malfeasance,”
defendant attempted to convince the District Attorney and members
of his staff “that it was their duty to file a petition for the removal of
Chief Britt.” The District Attorney and his staff “ultimately concluded
that there was insufficient evidence to support such a petition.” On
24 June 2011, defendant then sent a letter to Chief Britt notifying him
about complaints of his professional misconduct and further warning
Chief Britt that “to the extent that allegations involve conduct preju-
dicial to the administration of justice, conduct violative of public pol-
icy, and/or violations of criminal law including obstruction of justice,
oppression by official, misconduct in public office and/or substantial
offense, this office will act appropriately in accord with statutory and/
or inherent authority.” This letter was printed on defendant’s judicial
stationery and defendant signed it “in his capacity as Senior Resident.
Superior Court Judge.”

In addition, the public reprimand notes that on 19 September 2011
defendant drafted and executed an order for production of copies of the
private personnel records of several town employees, including Chief
Britt and Murphy, to be delivered to him “for an in camera review, for the
protection of integrity of information, to prevent alteration, spoliation,
for evidentiary purposes and or [sic] for disclosure to other appropriate
persons as directed by the Court.” Defendant issued this order on his
own initiative without a request from any employee of the town, anyone
in the District Attorney's office, or any of the complainants who previ-
ously had contacted defendant.

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The public reprimand further notes that on 5 January 2012, defen-
dant sent a letter to Murphy, also on judicial stationery “and signed in
his capacity as Senior Resident Superior Court Judge,” alleging receipt
of “complaints of professional misconduct” against Murphy and warning
Murphy that “to the extent that allegations involve conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice, conduct violative of public policy, and/
or violations of criminal law including obstruction of justice, oppres-
sion by official, misconduct in public office and/or substantial offense,
this office will act appropriately in accord with statutory and/or inher-
ent authority.” That same day defendant met with the District Attorney
and a member of the District Attorney’s staff “in reference to complaints
lodged against the District Attorney’s office and the office’s failure to
file a petition against Chief Britt.” A sheriff's deputy was present at this
meeting in defendant's chambers, which, in conjunction with defen-
dant’s “critical and aggressive comments, had the effect of intimidating
the officials from the District Attorney's office.”

Finally, the reprimand states that even though defendant later
recused himself from matters involving complaints against the Kill Devil

Hills Police Department and the District Attorney’s office, he continued
to involve himself in the adjudication of the complaints by communi-
cating with judges who were involved in the matter “through suggested
orders, and his appellate filings in defense of such suggested orders.”

Based on these findings of fact, the JSC determined that both defen-
dant’s initial confrontation with town officials in his chambers and later
in his capacity as Chief Resident Superior Court Judge “created a rea-
sonable and objective perception of conflict that tainted his subsequent
use of the powers of his judicial office in matters adversarial to these
officials.” The JSC also determined that defendant's attempts to address
complaints against Chief Britt, Murphy, and the District Attorney were
“overly aggressive,” drove him to become “embroiled in a public feud with
these individuals,” and caused him to engage in “actions that fell outside
of the legitimate exercise of the powers of his office.” Furthermore, the
JSC found that defendant’s “communication with other judges through
suggested orders, and his appellate filings in defense of such suggested
orders” after he had recused himself, “created a public perception of a
conflict of interest which threatens the public’s faith and confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of [defendant's] actions in these matters.”
The public reprimand of defendant concluded:

The above-referenced actions by [defendant] consti-
tute a significant violation of the principles of personal
conduct embodied in the North Carolina Code of Judicial

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Conduct... . [Defendant’s] overly aggressive conduct dis-
played toward the District Attorney's office and certain
employees of the Town of Kill Devil Hills, and his misuse
of the powers of his judicial office in connection thereto,
resulted in the public perception of a conflict of interest
between [defendant] and the District Attomey’s office and
the town of Kill Devil Hills, which brought the judiciary
into disrepute and threatened public faith and confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Defendant accepted the reprimand as indicated by his 6 March 2013 sig-
nature, and its official filing on 8 March 2013 constituted the JSC’s final
action on the matter.

On 6 March 2015, exactly two years after defendant accepted the
JSC’s public reprimand, the State Bar commenced a disciplinary action
against defendant by filing a complaint with the DHC. The State Bar
alleged that defendant’s conduct constituted seventeen separate vio-
lations of North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d)! and
requested that the DHC take disciplinary action against defendant in
accordance with N.C.G.S. § 84-28(a) and section B.0114 of the Discipline
and Disability Rules of the North Carolina State Bar. Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the State Bar’s complaint dated 16 March 2015 and an
answer to the complaint on 30 March 2015. The DHC denied defendant’s
motion to dismiss on 30 April 2015, and defendant filed a petition for
discretionary review with this Court, which was denied and certified to
the North Carolina Court of Appeals by order entered on 28 January
2016. Upon reconsideration, this Court issued an order ex mero motu on
27 May 2016 deeming “the question presented by this case to be of such
importance that the invocation of our supervisory jurisdiction is war-
ranted.” We issued a writ of certiorari to review the following question:

Do the North Carolina State Bar Council and the
Disciplinary Hearing Commission have the jurisdictional
authority to discipline ajudge of the General Court of Justice
for conduct as a judge for which the judge has already been
disciplined by the Judicial Standards Commission?

This Court stayed all proceedings before the DHC “pending full briefing
by the parties in this Court and our determination of this question.”

1. Rule 84 states, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (d) engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” N.C. St. B. Rev. R. Prof'l
Conduct 8.4(d), 2016 Ann. R. N.C. 1261, 1261-62.

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Defendant argues that Article IV, Section 17(2) of the North Carolina
Constitution and Chapter 7A, Article 30 of the General Statutes convey
to this Court exclusive, original jurisdiction over the discipline of mem-
bers of the General Court of Justice. Consequently, defendant contends
that the DHC infringes upon this Court’s jurisdiction by initiating attor-
ney disciplinary proceedings against a sitting member of the General
Court of Justice for conduct while in office, Defendant therefore asserts
that the DHC erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss the State
Bar's complaint against him. We agree.

The North Carolina State Bar was created by the General Assembly
in 1933 “as an agency of the State of North Carolina.” Act of Apr. 3, 1933,
ch. 210, sec. 1, 1933 N.C. Pub. [Sess.] Laws 313, 318 (codified at N.C.G.S.
§ 84-15 (2015)). “Subject to the superior authority of the General
Assembly to legislate thereon by general laws,” the State Bar Council
was “vested, as an agency of the State, with control of the discipline and
disbarment of attorneys practicing law in this State.” Id., sec. 9, at 319
(codified at N.C.G.S. § 215(9) (Supp. 1933)). We have recognized that
the “purpose of the statute creating the North Carolina State Bar was to
enable the bar to render more effective service in improving the admin-
istration of justice, particularly in dealing with the problem .. . of dis-
cipling [sic] and disbarring attorneys at law.” Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C.
260, 267, 82 S.E.2d 90, 95-96 (1954). The General Assembly enhanced the
disciplinary function of the State Bar in 1975 by creating the DHC and
authorizing it to “hold hearings in discipline, incapacity and disability
matters, to make findings of fact and conclusions of law after such hear-
ings, and to enter orders necessary to carry out the duties delegated to
it by the council.” Act of June 13, 1975, ch. 582, sec. 6, 1975 N.C. Sess.
Laws 656, 658-59 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 84-28.1 (Supp. 1975)). The DHC,
as a committee of the Council, see N.C.G.S. § 84-23(b) (2015), maintains
broad jurisdiction to exercise these powers because “[a]ny attorney
admitted to practice law in this State is subject to the disciplinary juris-
diction of the Council,” id. § 84-28(a) (2015).

Notwithstanding the well-established statutory authority of the State
Barto discipline attorneys, in 1971 the North Carolina Courts Commission
(the Commission) submitted a report to the General Assembly outlining,
inter alia, the need for a new, formal method to address misconduct by
members of the state judiciary. See State of N.C. Courts Comm’n, Report
of the Courts Commission to the North Carolina General Assembly
19-30 (1971) [hereinafter Courts Commission Report]. The Commission
noted that at that time, there was “no formal means for disciplining any
judge, short of removal, and impeachment [was] the sole means for

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removing an appellate or superior court judge for misconduct.” Id. at
19. The Commission concluded that these measures were entirely inad-
equate to regulate the judiciary, noting the inefficiency, expense, and
partisan nature of impeachment proceedings, as well as the fact that
no judge had been removed by impeachment in North Carolina since
1868. Id. at 19-20. In addition, the Commission determined that the type
of behavior potentially requiring impeachment and removal of a judge
is extremely rare, thereby justifying the need for discipline proportion-
ate to “a kind of judicial misbehavior for which removal is too severe, a
kind that can usually be corrected by action within the judicial system
without sacrificing the judge.” Id. at 21. The Commission concluded that
a “flexible machinery that can handle minor cases as well as major ones
is an urgent and widely felt need.” Id.

In determining the form and procedure of a potential system for judi-
cial discipline, the Commission recognized “[t}he need for a truly effec-
tive mechanism for disciplining or removing judges” that would account
for both “the tradition of [judicial] independence’ and the “larger public
interest in the efficient and untainted administration of justice.” Jd. at 20.
The Commission noted that several other states had attempted to satisfy
these interests by establishing independent judicial qualifications com-
missions. Id. at 22-25. The Commission concluded that through such
disciplinary bodies:

[t]he public is assured of an honest, able, efficient bench,
while at the same time the independence of the judiciary
is fully protected. And since the system permits the judi-
ciary to police its own ranks, with any decision to censure,
remove or retire coming from the supreme court, temp-
tation of the executive or legislative branches to involve
themselves in these matters is minimized.

Id. at 26. Therefore, the Commission recommended an amendment to
the North Carolina Constitution “authorizing an additional procedure
for discipline and removal of judges for misconduct or disability” and
the creation of the JSC.2 Id. at 27. Although the Commission ultimately
left the procedures and composition of the JSC “to the wisdom of the
General Assembly,” id., it recommended, inter alia, that JSC proceed-
ings should be “confidential until such time as [the JSC] ma{kes] its final
recommendations to the Supreme Court” so as to protect judges from

2. The Commission noted its preference for the name “Judicial Standards
Commission” over “Judicial Qualifications Commission”—the moniker used in several
other states. Courts Commission Report at 26.

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groundless accusations, ensure “[p]ublic confidence in the integrity of
the courts,” and “protect complainants and witnesses, many of whom
would be reluctant to complain or testify for fear of publicity or repri-
sal.” Id. at 29-30. The Commission also recommended that the “majority
of all members of the Supreme Court must concur in any censure or
removal order, or in an order to take no action (dismiss) the proceed-
ings,” highlighting its intention that the Supreme Court have exclusive
jurisdiction over judicial discipline. Id. at 30. Notably, the Commission
stated that the JSC “would be analogous to the censure and disbarment
machinery of the organized bar — machinery long ago recognized as
essential to protect the image of the legal profession.” Id. at 21. This
statement illustrates the Commission’s view that the State Bar’s disci-
plinary proceedings did not extend to the judiciary and that amending
the Constitution and creating the JSC was intended to fill that void.

In June 1971 the General Assembly enacted the Judicial Standards
Commission Act and proposed an amendment to the North Carolina
Constitution authorizing the statute.? In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 163,
250 S.E.2d 890, 921 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979). The amend-
ment was adopted by the voters in 1972 and became Article IV, Section
17(2), which provides:

The General Assembly shall prescribe a procedure . . .
for the censure and removal of a Justice or Judge of the
General Court of Justice for wilful misconduct in office,
wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual
intemperance, conviction of a crime involving moral tw
pitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.

N.C. Const. art. IV, § 17(2); Thad Eure, Sec’y of State, North Carolina
Manual 1973, at 432 (John L. Cheney, Jr. ed.) (noting date of amend-
ment adoption). .

The General Assembly fulfilled this constitutional mandate when the
corresponding legislation became effective on 1 January 1978 as Article
30 of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes. Act of June 17, 1971, ch. 590,
1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 517 (codified at N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-375 to -377 (Supp.

3. Although the statute was passed before adoption of the constitutional amend-
ment, “[iJhe General Assembly has power to enact a statute not authorized by the present
Constitution where the statute is passed in anticipation of a constitutional amendment
authorizing it or provides that it shall take effect upon the adoption of such constitutional
amendment.” In re Nowell, 203 N.C. 235, 242, 237 $.B.2d 246, 251 (1977) (quoting Fullam
v. Brock, 271 N.C. 145, 149, 155 S.E.2d 737, 739-40 (1967)).

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1971)). The stated purpose of Article 30 “is to provide for the investiga-
tion and resolution of inquiries concerning the qualification or conduct
of any judge or justice of the General Court of Justice. The procedure
for discipline of any judge or justice of the General Court of Justice
shall be in accordance with this Article.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-374.1 (2015).
Accordingly, section 74-375 of Article 30 provides for the formation
of the thirteen-member JSC, with five of those members, including the
Court of Appeals judge who serves as chair of the JSC, being appointed
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Id. § 7A-375(a) (2015). The
statute then conveys authority to the JSC to adopt and amend its own
procedural rules “subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.” Id.
§ 7A-375(g) (2015).

Disciplinary proceedings against a judge* begin when a citizen of
the State files “a written complaint with the Commission concerning the
qualifications or conduct of any justice or judge of the General Court of
Justice,” or when the JSC initiates an investigation on its own motion.
Id. § 7A-877(a) (2015). If the JSC concludes from its investigation that
disciplinary proceedings are warranted, it will issue a “notice and state-
ment of charges.” Id. § 7A-377(a5) (2015). An answer, additional filings,
and a hearing generally will follow. See id. Viewing the entire framework
of Article 30, we have concluded that the role of the JSC is to “serve[ ]
‘as an arm of the Court to conduct hearings for the purpose of aiding the
Supreme Court in determining whether a judge is unfit or unsuitable.’ ”
In re Hayes, 356 N.C. 389, 398, 584 S.E.2d 260, 266 (2002) (quoting In re
Tucker, 348 N.C. 677, 679, 501 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1998)).

As for the actual administration of judicial discipline, presently the
JSC has the exclusive authority only to issue an offending judge “a private
letter of caution” for violations of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct that are “not of such a nature as would warrant a recommen-
dation of public reprimand, censure, suspension, or removal.” N.C.G.S.
§ 74-376(a) (2015). Imposition of those more serious forms of disci-
pline now falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
“fujpon recommendation of the Commission.” Id. § 74-376(b) (2015).5 In

4, Article 80 states that “ ‘Judge’ means any justice or judge of the General Court
of Justice of North Carolina, including any retired justice or judge who is recalled for
service as an emergency judge of any division of the General Court of Justice.” N.C.G.8.
§ 7A-374,2(5) (2015).

5. Prior to the 2013 revisions to Article 30, section 74-376 permitted the JSC to inde-
pendently issue public reprimands. See Act of July 26, 2013, ch. 404, sec. 2, 2013 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1681, 1682 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 74-376(a) (2013). Defendant was disciplined by
the JSC pursuant to this earlier version of the statute.

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those “proceedings authorized by G.S. 7A-376” we have determined that
“this Court sits not as an appellate court but rather as a court of original
jurisdiction,” In re Peoples, 296 N.C. at 147, 250 S.E.2d at 912 (citation
omitted), and that “original jurisdiction to discipline judges lies solely
within the Supreme Court by virtue of statutory authority,” In re Renfer,
345 N.C. 632, 635, 482 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1997) (citing In re Peoples, 296
N.C. at 147, 250 S.E.2d at 912). Therefore, we have concluded that the
“final authority to discipline judges lies solely with the Supreme Court.”
In re Hayes, 356 N.C. at 398, 584 S.E.2d at 266 (citing In re Peoples, 296
N.C. at 146-47, 250 S.E.2d at 911-12).

“In obedience to” Article IV, Section 17(2), the legislature enacted
Article 30, thus fulfilling “the intent of the General Assembly to provide
the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the censure and removal
of justices and judges for wilful misconduct in office, or conduct preju-
dicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute.” In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 96, 240 S.E.2d 367, 372 (1978). We
have upheld the General Assembly's plan, noting that “[i]t seems both
appropriate and in accordance with the constitutional plan that the
Supreme Court... should [ ] have final jurisdiction over the censure and
removal of the judges and justices.” In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 299-300,
245 S.E.2d 766, 771 (1978).

Aside from the section 7A-375 requirement that four members of
the JSC be “members of the State Bar who have actively practiced in the
courts of the State for at least 10 years,” N.C.G.S. § 7A-875(a), Article
30 makes no other provision for the involvement of the State Bar in the
discipline of judges. Furthermore, although the JSC has existed for more
than forty years, the State Bar can cite to no previous instances of the
DHC’s claiming concurrent jurisdiction to discipline a sitting judge for
conduct while in office. Instead, the DHC has pursued disciplinary action
against a judge for his conduct as an attorney before becoming a judge,
see N.C. State Bar v. Ethridge, 188 N.C. App. 653, 657 S.E.2d 378 (2008),
and against an attorney who was no longer a member of the General
Court of Justice, see N.C. State Bar v. Badgett, 212 N.C. App. 420, 713
S.E.2d 791, 2011 WL 2226426 (2011) (unpublished) (Badgett ITD).

Ethridge involved an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the deci-
sion of the DHC to disbar Judge James B. Ethridge. 188 N.C. App. at 655,
657 S.E.2d at 380. Judge Ethridge was elected to the district court in
2004. Id. at 655, 657 S.E.2d at 380. Several years before taking the bench,
Judge Ethridge had represented a sixty-nine-year-old woman named
Rosalind Sweet, who suffered from dementia. Id. at 655, 657 S.E.2d at
380. Judge Ethridge was investigated and ultimately disbarred by the

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DHC for depositing funds entrusted to him by Sweet into his own per-
sonal checking account, disbursing those funds for the benefit of him-
self and third parties, preparing and recording a deed conveying Sweet's
real estate to himself without her approval, and “falsely representing on
the public record that he had given Ms. Sweet $48,000 in consideration
for the property she deeded to him.” Jd. at 657-58, 657 S.E.2d at 381-82.
Finding “adequate and substantial evidence supporting the DHC’s find-
ings and [that] those findings support{ed] its conclusions,” the Court of
Appeals upheld the DHC’s decision to disbar Judge Ethridge. Id. at 670,
657 S.E.2d at 388-89.

In Badgeti III the Court of Appeals considered the decision of the
DHC to disbar former judge Mark H. Badgett after his removal from
office. 2011 WL 2226426, at *1. Judge Badgett had been censured and
suspended from office for sixty days by this Court in March 2008 based
upon the JSC’s findings that he had failed, inter alia, to disclose to inter-
ested parties his business relationship with an attorney who appeared
before him in several matters and had failed to disqualify himself from
those matters. In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 203-04, 210, 657 S.E.2d 346,
347-48, 351 (2008) (Badgett D. In addition, the JSC had determined
that Judge Badgett coerced a guilty plea from a criminal defendant
and attempted to do so with another criminal defendant. Jd. at 203, 657
S.E.2d at 347. In a proceeding arising from a separate incident, Judge
Badgett was found to have engaged in additional misconduct and subse-
quently was censured, removed from office, and barred from ever hold-
ing another judicial office by this Court. In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 482,
483-87, 491, 666 S.E.2d 743, 744-46, 749 (2008) (Badgett II). After Judge
Badgett’s removal from office, the DHC exercised its authority to disci-
pline him as a private attorney, utilizing the misconduct that served as
the basis for his judicial discipline. Badgett IIT, 2011 WL 2226426, at *1.
The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the DHC’s decision to dis-
bar Judge Badgett. Id. at *13.

As an initial matter, we note that Ethridge and Badgett III are
decisions of the Court of Appeals that are not binding on this Court.
Furthermore, both cases are distinguishable from the present case.
Neither Ethridge nor Badgett IIT conflicts with the General Assembly's
statutory scheme for the discipline of judges in Article 30. In Ethridge,
although Judge Ethridge was a member of the General Court of Justice
when disbarred, the conduct at issue occurred while he was still an
attorney engaged in the private practice of law. See Ethridge, 188 N.C.
App. at 655, 657 S.E.2d at 380. By contrast, the conduct in question
here occurred while defendant was a member of the General Court of

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Justice. Similarly, Badgett IIT is distinguishable because the DHC dis-
barred Judge Badgett for his conduct while a judge once he was no lon-
ger a member of the General Court of Justice. See Badgett III, 2011 WL
2226426, at *3 (“On 10 June 2009, the Bar filed an amended complaint
seeking disciplinary action for the misconduct that led to Badgett I and
Badgett II.”). The DHC did not attempt to discipline Judge Badgett for
his judicial conduct while he was still in office, as the DHC is attempting
to do in the present case. Ethridge and Badgett III illustrate only that
the DHC has disciplined a sitting judge for conduct as an attorney before
becoming a judge, and has disciplined an attorney who was no longer a
judge for conduct that occurred while on the bench.

In the instant case the State Bar contends that N.C.G.S. § 7A-410
implies the statutory authority of the DHC to discipline defendant.
Section 7A-410 states in pertinent part:

When a judge of the district court, judge of the
superior court, judge of the Court of Appeals, justice of
the Supreme Court, or a district attorney is no longer
authorized to practice law in the courts of this State, the
Governor shall declare the office vacant. . . . For pur-
poses of this Article, the term ‘no longer authorized to
practice law’ means that the person has been disbarred
or suspended and all appeals under G.S. 84-28 have
been exhausted.

N.C.G.S. § 7A-410 (2015). The State Bar argues that this statute “would
simply have no meaning if the General Assembly intended that the
Council and the DHC should have no jurisdiction to discipline a lawyer
who was also sitting as a judge.” We disagree. Contrary to the State Bar’s
analysis, section 7A-410 simply explains what should occur when, as
in Ethridge, a judge is disbarred for conduct that occurred before he
became a judge.

The State Bar asserts that a judge is still a lawyer after taking office
and therefore, must comply with both the Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Rules of Professional Conduct as required by section 84-28.6
Therefore, the State Bar contends that the DHC may discipline a sitting
judge because “[jjudicial discipline concerns the fitness of a judge to
serve as a judge. Attorney discipline concerns the fitness of a lawyer

6. “Any attorney admitted to practice law in this State is subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Council under such rules and procedures as the Council shall adopt...”
N.C.GS. § 84-28(a).

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to be a lawyer. The same conduct may implicate both fitness to be a
judge and fitness to be a lawyer.” We agree that a judge’s conduct may
affect his or her fitness to be a lawyer. In Badgett III the DHC disbarred
the defendant once he was removed from judicial office; however, while
a judge remains in office, only this Court or the JSC may impose disci-
pline for his or her conduct as a judge.

In the present case defendant was a member of the General Court of
Justice when he engaged in the misconduct set forth above. As a result, he
was investigated and disciplined by the JSC pursuant to sections 7A-376
and 74-377. Having accepted the JSC’s public reprimand, defendant
remains a sitting member of the General Court of Justice. Based upon the
history and language of Article 30 of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes,
we conclude that jurisdiction to discipline sitting judges for their con-
duct while in office rests solely with the JSC and this Court, and not with
the DHC.’ Consequently, we hold that the DHC does not have jurisdic-
tion to discipline defendant as a sitting member of the General Court of
Justice for his conduct while a member of the General Court of Justice.
Accordingly, we reverse the DHC’s denial of defendant's motion to dis-
miss the State Bar’s complaint against him and remand this case to the
DHC with instructions to dismiss with prejudice the State Bar's complaint.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Chief Justice MARTIN concurring.

I fully join the majority opinion. The Constitution of North Carolina
requires that the General Assembly “prescribe a procedure, in addition
to impeachment and address set forth in this section . . . for the cen-
sure and removal of a Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice.”
N.C. Const. art. IV, § 17(2). The constitution thus provides for only three
methods to discipline sitting judges: impeachment, address, and “a pro-
cedure” prescribed by the General Assembly.

The procedure that the General Assembly has, in fact, prescribed
establishes the Judicial Standards Commission (JSC) as the sole mech-
anism by which sitting judges may be disciplined or removed. See
N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-374.1 to -377 (2015). Indeed, the statutory text specifically

7. Because defendant's appeal is resolved on these grounds, we donot decide whether
the State Bar is estopped from prosecuting conduct for which defendant has already been
subject to a binding and final order of discipline by the JSC. We also do not decide whether
the DHC violated defendant's procedural and substantive due process rights.

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mandates that “[t]he procedure for discipline of any judge or justice of
the General Court of Justice shall be in accordance with this Article.”
Id. § TA-374.1. Judges therefore cannot be disciplined or removed in any
way other than impeachment, address, or the statutory procedure that
the General Assembly has devised.

By initiating disciplinary proceedings against a sitting judge for
conduct that the judge engaged in while on the bench, the State Bar is
trying to circumvent both the constitution and the prescribed statutory
procedure. I write separately to note the wisdom of the overall scheme
that the General Assembly has prescribed, and to elucidate why the law
should not expose sitting judges to discipline by the State Bar for actions
that they take while they are members of the General Court of Justice.

The General Assembly's procedure places recommendations for
judicial discipline and removal in the hands of the JSC and final deci-
sions on discipline and removal in the hands of this Court. Other than
the JSC’s power to issue private letters of caution, see id. § 7A-377(a3),
the JSC functions solely “as an arm of the Court” that “conduct{[s]
hearings for the purpose of aiding the Supreme Court in determining
whether a judge” should be disciplined or removed from the bench. In
re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 97, 240 S.E.2d 367, 372 (1978).1 This procedure
is sound because it preserves judicial independence. In the words of
United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, judicial indepen-
dence is important because the justice that stems from proper adjudica-
tion “is only attainable . . . if judges actually decide according to law, and
are perceived by everyone around them to be deciding according to law,
rather than according to their own whim or in compliance with the will
of powerful political actors.” Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence
in the United States, 40 St. Louis U. L.J. 989, 996 (1996). For society to
be governed by the rule of law, judges must be able to apply the law
dispassionately, “without fear of retribution or the need to curry favor.”
See Charles Gardner Geyh et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 1.04, at
1-10 (6th ed. 2018). If a judge is fearful that a lawyer or group of lawyers
who appear before her will attempt to expose her to discipline, then she

1. Before 2013, the JSC could issue public letters of reprimand without this Court's
permission. See, ¢.g., N.C.G.S. § 7A-377(a4) (2011); of: id. § 74-377(a4) (2018). But it has
always been within this Court’s sole discretion whether to accept the JSC’s recommenda-
tion to censure or remove a judge. See In re Hardy, 294 N.C. at 97, 240 S.B.2d at 372 (not-
ing as of 1978 that the JSC’s “recommendations are not binding upon the Supreme Court,
which will consider the evidence on both sides and exercise its independent judgment as
to whether it should censure, removel,] or decline to do either” (quoting In re Nowell, 293
N.C, 285, 244, 237 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1977) (per curiam))).

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may not be able to act according to her best legal judgment in the cases
that come before her. This is just one example of why judges must, to
the greatest extent possible, be free from all outside pressures—politi-
cal, financial, and personal—that could affect their ability to act with
fairness and impartiality.

Judges, of course, need to be held accountable when they act in
ways that do not befit a judge. Otherwise, public trust and confidence
in the courts would erode. Judges cannot be above the law, and that is
why the JSC exists. The JSC arose out of the Courts Commission of 1971’s
recommendation that a disciplinary process be created that would, as
the majority notes, balance the need for judicial independence with the
need for judicial accountability. See State of N.C. Courts Comm’n, Report
of the Courts Commission to the North Carolina General Assembly
19-30 (1971) [hereinafter Cowrts Commission Report]. The JSC’s sole
mission is to ensure that judges conduct themselves in accordance with
the Code of Judicial Conduct. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. Because this mis-
sion is the one goal that unites all of the members of the JSC—which
has a diverse set of members culled from the bench, the bar, and citizens
who are laypeople in the law, see id. § 7A-875(a)—the JSC is far less
prone to being influenced by outside motives than other bodies may be.
The JSC, with the help of this Court’s oversight, is therefore uniquely
positioned to balance judicial independence and judicial accountability.

Furthermore, because the JSC is duty-bound to enforce North
Carolina's Code of Judicial Conduct, it is duty-bound to uphold judicial
independence by the very terms of the Code. The very first words of the
Code’s Preamble state that “[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is
indispensable to justice in our society,” and the Code’s first canon states
that “[a] judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judi-
ciary.” Code Jud. Conduct pmbl., Canon 1, 2016 N.C. R. Ct. (State) 509,
509. The Code that the JSC enforces thus places judicial independence
at the very center of the values that the JSC must uphold.

Other state supreme courts have long since concluded that a system
in which attorneys discipline judges is inconsistent with the goal of judi-
cial independence and is contrary to good public policy. For instance,
at the mid-point of the twentieth century, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that lawyer disciplinary bodies cannot discipline members of the
judiciary because it “would result in nothing more than discord, and
could result in confusion, pernicious partisan political activity concern-
ing the judiciary, and other results not beneficial to the administration
of justice.” Chambers v. Cent. Comm. of Okla. Bar Ass'n, 1950 OK 287,
16, 208 Okla. 583, 586, 224 P.2d 583, 586-87 (1950). Some years later,

ee

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the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that, “regardless of how honor-
able the motives of the would-be prosecutors may be,” it is proper to
shield judges from discipline by lawyers acting through the State Bar
so that judges “may remain free to function without fear or favor.” Ala.
State Bar ex rel. Steiner v. Moore, 282 Ala. 562, 566, 218 So.2d 404, 408
(1968). Indeed, mindful of the need to “maintain and restore public con-
fidence in the integrity, independence, and impartiality of [its] judiciary,”
every state “has established a judicial conduct organization charged
with investigating and prosecuting complaints against judicial officers.”
Cynthia Gray, How Judicial Conduct Commissions Work, 28 Just. Sys.
J. 405, 405 (2007). And in all but two states, “the state supreme court has
the final word” on the appropriate disciplinary measure to impose on.
a sitting judge. Cynthia Gray, State Supreme Courts Play Key Role in
Judicial Discipline, 86 Judicature 267, 267 (2003). The JSC as it exists
in North Carolina thus mirrors the national trend.

For all of these reasons, the best way to ensure judicial indepen-
dence is to place the JSC and this Court—and no other individual or
entity—at the helm of non-impeachment proceedings to discipline or
remove judges.

Additionally, there would be practical problems if both the JSC and
the State Bar had the power to discipline sitting judges for acts that they
perform while they are on the bench. For example, a judge may be loath
to enter into a stipulated disposition with the JSC—even though those
dispositions are an effective way to resolve disciplinary disputes in a
manner that both does justice in individual proceedings and preserves
the public’s trust and confidence in the judicial system as a whole—
because doing so could adversely affect the judge’s ability to defend
against a disciplinary proceeding by the State Bar.

Placing the State Bar at the helm of proceedings to discipline
judges would also undermine the judiciary’s inherent authority to dis-
cipline the attorneys that appear in the General Court of Justice. Part
of a judge’s role is to “take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
may become aware.” Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3B(8), 2016 N.C. R.
Ct. (State) at 510; see also N.C.G.S. § 84-36 (2015) (clarifying that the
creation of the State Bar does not “disabl[e] or abridg[e] the inherent
powers of the court to deal with its attorneys”); Sisk v. Transylvania
Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 364 N.C. 172, 182, 695 S.E.2d 429, 436 (2010)
(‘[A] court possesses inherent authority to discipline attorneys.”).
This Court has characterized this power as one of “two methods for
enforcing attorney discipline.” Sisk, 364 N.C. at 182, 695 S.E.2d at 436

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(citing In re Delk, 386 N.C. 543, 550, 444 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1994)). If the
State Bar also had the power to discipline judges, judges might be hesi-
tant to exercise their power to discipline attorneys because of the fear
of a disciplinary counterattack.

Asystem in which the State Bar assumes the authority to discipline
judges would therefore inevitably impair a judge's ability to perform
an important judicial function. It could also place the members of the
bench in a no-win scenario because, if a judge were afraid to exercise
her inherent powers over attorneys who had engaged in unprofessional
conduct, she would be guilty of violating Canon 3B—and then she her-
self would need to be disciplined. The disciplinary process envisioned
by the State Bar would be like having the batter critique the umpire’s
ball and strike calls, rather than letting the umpire call pitches as he sees
them. Under the State Bar’s process, a judge would not be free to follow
the law as she sees it when considering matters of attorney discipline.
The result would be that the justice system would lose a key component
of the very public trust that both the State Bar and the JSC are designed
to protect and promote.

Furthermore, the State Bar’s investigative process could dramati-
cally interfere with the performance of a judge’s duties. Under the
JSC’s process, the matter remains confidential until this Court issues an
order of “public reprimand, censure, suspension, or removal.” N.C.G.S.
§ 74-877(a6). This ensures that a judge wrongly accused of misconduct
is protected against “unjustified public attack.” Courts Commission
Report at 25. But the State Bar’s process does not preserve confidential-
ity once the State Bar’s Grievance Committee has found “probable cause
to believe that the attorney is guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary
action” and has directed counsel “to prepare and file a complaint against
the respondent.” 27 NCAC 1B .0113(a), (h) (Oct. 8, 2009); 27 NCAC 1B
.0133(a)(1) (Sept. 22, 2016). If a judge were subjected to this process,
and an unjustified public attack became public knowledge before the
judge was actually found to have committed misconduct, a judge might
want to steer clear of even the possibility that someone would bring a
grievance against her. That, in turn, could affect how she decided the
cases before her and compromise her ability to faithfully follow the law.
This practical difference in the State Bar’s process would, once again, be
inconsistent with the very notion of judicial independence.

In sum, the comprehensive and well-designed scheme prescribed
by the General Assembly preserves judicial independence and avoids
practical concerns that could result from a process involving a greater
number of disciplinary bodies. The scheme envisioned by the State Bar,

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by contrast, would undermine judicial independence and would pres-
ent a number of practical problems. Judges must decide according to
the law, not based on outside pressures. When judges are free to do so,
this in turn increases public confidence in the courts. The current con-
stitutional and statutory scheme, which establishes the JSC process as
the sole means to discipline sitting judges for conduct committed while
an incumbent judge, thus maximizes the public’s trust in the courts and
enables judges to do justice in every case that comes before them. These
are goals of both the judiciary specifically and the legal profession as a,
whole. And the General Assembly has wisely borne these goals in mind
in its statutory procedure for disciplining sitting judges. I therefore con-
cur fully in the majority opinion.

Justice EDMUNDS joins in this concurring opinion.
Justice ERVIN concurring in the result.

Although I agree with my colleagues’ decision that the State Bar
Jacks the authority to seek the imposition of attorney discipline against
defendant in this case, I am unable to agree with the Court’s apparent
determination that the State Bar has no authority to sanction a sitting
judge for any reason during the time that the judge remains in office. I
would be the first to concede that the constitutional and statutory provi-
sions that we are called upon to construe in this case are in tension, if
not in actual conflict.! However, when the relevant constitutional and
statutory provisions are carefully examined in light of the differing pur-
poses served by the disciplinary systems administered by the Judicial
Standards Commission? and the State Bar, I believe that there is a way to
preserve the core jurisdiction of each agency without any undue friction
between or interference with the essential function of each disciplinary

1. The lack of obvious interaction between the various provisions: of the General
Statutes applicable to attorney and judicial discipline suggests the appropriateness of
action by the General Assembly for the purpose of clarifying the roles that it wishes for
the agencies in question to play.

2. As the majority explains, this Courts the ultimate disciplinary authority under the
statutory scheme for judicial discipline set out in Article 30 of Chapter 7A of the General
Statutes. Although I will refer to the disciplinary system administered by the Judicial
Standards Commission throughout the remainder of this separate opinion, I do so only
for purposes of convenience and do not wish to be understood by using that phraseol-
ogy as overlooking or minimizing the fact that this Court has ultimate responsibility for
the more serious disciplinary decisions made in the process administered by the Judicial -
Standards Coramission.

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system. After construing the relevant constitutional and statutory provi-
sions in the manner that I believe to be appropriate, I agree with the
Court that the State Bar lacks the authority to proceed against defendant
on the basis of the theory outlined in its complaint, albeit for different
reasons than those advanced in the Court’s opinion.

According to Article IV, Section 22 of the North Carolina Constitution,
“[oJnly persons duly authorized to practice law in the courts of this State
shall be eligible for election or appointment as a Justice of the Supreme
Court, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Judge of the Superior Court, or
Judge of [the] District Court.” N.C. Const. art. IV, § 22. “Except as oth-
erwise permitted by law, it shall be unlawful for any person or associa-
tion of persons, except active members of the Bar of the State of North
Carolina,” to practice law in this state. N.C.G.S. § 84-4 (2015). In order to
regulate the practice of law in North Carolina, the General Assembly has
“created as an agency of the State of North Carolina, for the purposes
and with the powers hereinafter set forth, the North Carolina State Bar,”
id. § 84-15 (2015), with the State Bar Council having “the authority to
regulate the professional conduct of licensed lawyers and State Bar
certified paralegals,” id. § 84-23(a) (2015). The active membership of
the State Bar “shall be all persons who have obtained a license or cer-
tificate, entitling them to practice law in the State of North Carolina,
who have paid the membership dues specified, and who have satisfied
all other obligations of membership.” Id. § 84-16 (2015). “Any attorney
admitted to practice law in this State is subject to the disciplinary juris-
diction of the Council under such rules and procedures as the Council
shall adopt,” éd. § 84-28(a) (2015), with attorneys being subject to disci-
pline in the event that they are “[cJonvict{ed] of, or. . . [have] tender[ed]
and accept[ed] . . . a plea of guilty or no contest to, a criminal offense
showing professional unfitness,” id. § 84-28(b)(1) (2015); found to have
committed a “violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted
and promulgated by the Council in effect at the time of the act,” id.
§ 84-28(b)(2) (2015); or made a “[k]nowing misrepresentation of any
facts or circumstances surrounding any complaint, allegation or charge
of misconduct; fail{ed] to answer any formal inquiry or complaint issued
by or in the name of the North Carolina State Bar in any disciplinary
matter; or [engaged in] contempt of the Council or any committee of the
North Carolina State Bar,” id. § 84-28(b)(8) (2015). According to Rule 8.4
of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been adopted
pursuant to the State Bar’s rulemaking authority, id. § 84-21 (2015), “[i]t
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:”

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(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another
to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a law-
yer in other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the admin-
istration of justice;

(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a
government agency or official;

(@ Imowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in
conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial
conduct or other law; or

(g) intentionally prejudice or damage his or her client
during the course of the professional relationship, except
as may be required by Rule 3.3.

N.C. St. B. Rev. R. Prof’l Conduct 8.4, 2016 Ann. R. N.C. 1187, 1260.
“When a judge of the district court, judge of the superior court, judge of
the Court of Appeals, justice of the Supreme Court, or a district attorney
is no longer authorized to practice law in the courts of this State, the
Governor shall declare the office vacant,” with “no longer authorized
to practice law” being defined as a situation in which “the person has
been disbarred or suspended and all appeals under G.S. 84-28 have been
exhausted.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-410 (2015).

Similarly, Article IV, Section 17(2) of the North Carolina Constitution
provides that

[t]he General Assembly shall prescribe a procedure, in
addition to impeachment and address set forth in this sec-
tion, for the removal of a Justice or Judge of the General
Court of Justice for mental or physical incapacity interfer-
ing with the performance of his duties which is, or is likely
to become, permanent, and for the censure and removal
of a Justice or Judge of the General Court of Justice for
wilful misconduct in office, wilful and persistent failure
to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, conviction

284 IN THE SUPREME COURT

N.C. STATE BAR v. TILLETT
[369 N.C. 264 (2016)}

of a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute.

N.C. Const. art. IV, § 17(2).

Upon recommendation of the [Judicial Standards]
Commission, the Supreme Court may issue a public rep-
rimand, censure, suspend, or remove any judge for will-
ful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to
perform the judge’s duties, habitual intemperance, con-
viction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute.

N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b) (2015). A violation of the “Code of Judicial Conduct.
may be deemed conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
that brings the judicial office into disrepute, or willful misconduct in
office, or otherwise as grounds for disciplinary proceedings.” Code Jud.
Conduct pmbl., 2016 Ann. R. N.C. 863, 863.

The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions do not, when
read literally, directly address the problem that we face in this case,
which stems from the fact that both the Judicial Standards Commission
and the State Bar have attempted to sanction defendant based upon
the same conduct and a very similar, if not identical, legal theory. As I
read the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, there does not
appear to be any obvious bar to the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction
by both agencies given that the Judicial Standards Commission has clear
responsibility for the discipline of judges and that the State Bar has clear
responsibility for the discipline of attorneys, a group of which judicial
officials are, of necessity, a subset. The relevant constitutional provisions
provide that judges must be lawyers and that the General Assembly must.
establish a process for addressing judicial incapacity and misconduct
without in any way explicitly stating that the rules governing the profes-

* sional discipline of attorneys do not apply to judges or explicitly pro-
viding that the constitutionally required process for disciplining judges
overrides the legal obligations otherwise imposed upon members of the
State Bar. Similarly, the relevant statutory provisions, including the rules
adopted in accordance with the State Bar's rulemaking authority, simply
identify the circumstances under which each agency has the authority to
seek to discipline individuals subject to its jurisdiction without acknowl-
edging any limitations on either body's authority arising from the exis-
tence of the other. As a result, the language of the relevant constitutional

IN THE SUPREME COURT 285,

N.C. STATE BAR v. TILLETT
[369 N.C. 264 (2016)}

and statutory provisions provides little direct guidance as to how the
issue that confronts us in this case should be resolved and certainly does
not suggest that authority granted to either body is exclusive.

Upon stepping back, examining the issue that we have before us on
amore global level, and giving thought to the relevant rules of consti-
tutional and statutory construction in context, the proper resolution of
this case becomes clearer. Although I may be belaboring the obvious,
the fact that Article IV, Section 22 requires members of the judiciary
to be authorized to practice law in North Carolina necessarily suggests
that the State Bar has, and retains, jurisdiction over members of the judi-
ciary even after they assume judicial office.? Allowing judges to remain
licensed attorneys for any length of time after they have committed seri-
ous acts of professional misconduct undermines public confidence in
both the judiciary and the legal profession. The strength of this infer-
ence is further reinforced by the fact that the General Assembly pro-
vided in N.C.G.S. § 74-410 for the removal from office of judicial officials
who have been disbarred without in any way limiting the grounds upon
which the judge in question was subject to disbarment. As a result, these
constitutional and statutory provisions suggest that the State Bar did
not, in fact, lose all authority to discipline lawyers following their eleva-
tion to the bench.

On the other hand, there can be little question that the Judicial
Standards Commission has primary responsibility for addressing allega-
tions of judicial misconduct. Any other conclusion would constitute a

- failure to recognize that the process of judicial discipline administered
by the Judicial Standards Commission postdates the creation of the pro-
cess of attorney discipline administered by the State Bar. As the Court
notes, had the process for disciplining attorneys been deemed adequate
to address issues arising from allegations of judicial misconduct, there
would have been little reason for the adoption of Article IV, Section
17(2) of the North Carolina Constitution and the enactment of Article 30

3. Admittedly, the language of Article IV, Section 22 directly addresses the need for
individuals elected or appointed to judicial office to be licensed attorneys. However, this
Court has long held that {constitutional provisions should be construed in consonance
with the objects and purposes in contemplation at the time of their adoption,” Perry
v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 444, 75 S.B.2d 512, 514 (1953). In view of the fact that the clear
purpose of Article lV, Section 22 was to ensure that members of the judiciary were licensed
attorneys, it makes little sense to read that constitutional provision as allowing individuals
who were licensed at the time of their election and appointment, but who have been dis-
barred or otherwise lost their licenses to practice law, to remain in judicial office. In fact,
N.C.GS. § 7A-410 might be subject to constitutional challenge in the event that Article IV,
Section 22 was to be read in this manner.

286 IN THE SUPREME COURT

N.C. STATE BAR v. TILLETT
[369 N.C. 264 (2016)}

of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes. In addition, the justification for
the creation of a system of judicial discipline separate and apart from.
impeachment by the General Assembly and the imposition of sanctions
by the State Bar discussed in the Court’s opinion, and the other policy-
based justifications advanced in the Chief Justice’s concurring opinion,
including the necessity for preserving the independence of the judiciary,
provide further support for the proposition that the disciplinary system
administered by the Judicial Standards Commission, rather than the dis-
ciplinary system administered by the State Bar, should be the primary
means for addressing issues of judicial misconduct.

A decision to construe the relevant constitutional and statu-
tory provisions so as to treat the State Bar and the Judicial Standards
Commission as having fully concurrent jurisdiction over every con-
ceivable instance of judicial misconduct poses both legal and practical
difficulties. As the facts contained in the present record reveal, there
will undoubtedly be instances in which the State Bar and the Judicial
Standards Commission have differing views as to the manner in which
particular allegations of judicial misconduct should be addressed.
The State Bar's assertion that it has unlimited authority, regardless of
the position taken by the Judicial Standards Commission, to address alle-
gations of judicial misconduct could well put a sitting judge in the posi-
tion of questioning whether he is entitled to rely on advice provided by
the Judicial Standards Commission in resolving particular ethics-related
issues, despite the fact that the relevant constitutional and statutory pro-
visions give the Judicial Standards Commission primary responsibility
for addressing allegations of judicial misconduct. Similarly, a decision
by the State Bar to seek the imposition of professional discipline upon
a judicial official who has already been sanctioned by the judicial disci-
plinary process raises possible collateral estoppel or res judicata issues,
not to mention basic questions of fundamental fairness. As a result, given
the risk of conflict stemming from the fact that the Judicial Standards
Commission and the State Bar appear to have concurrent jurisdiction
over sitting judges and the fact that requiring sitting judges to satisfy
multiple regulatory agencies that could take differing views of the man-
ner in which the same issue should be resolved poses obvious legal and
practical problems, I believe that it would be appropriate to attempt to
determine whether there is any way to read the relevant constitutional
and statutory provisions so as to reconcile the State Bar’s concurrent
jurisdiction over judicial officials in their capacity as lawyers with the
Judicial Standards Commission’s primary responsibility for addressing
issues relating to judicial misconduct.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 287

N.C. STATE BAR v. TILLETT .
[369 N.C. 264 (2016)]

As an initial matter, I note that the purpose of the process for
addressing allegations of judicial misconduct administered by the
Judicial Standards Commission is to protect the public against
improper judicial actions, while the purpose of the attorney discipline
process administered by the State Bar is to protect the public against
misconduct by practicing attorneys. For that reason, it is not surprising
that the disciplinary authority exercised by each agency focuses on
its core function. For example, as has already been noted, the State
Bar has the authority to discipline members of the Bar for violating
a Rule of Professional Conduct, engaging in criminal conduct or acts
of dishonesty, engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
Justice, claiming the ability to improperly influence a judicial official,
assisting a judicial officer in unlawful conduct, or damaging his or her
client. For the most part, members of the judiciary are unlikely to violate
a Rule of Professional Conduct while acting in a judicial capacity or by
claiming the ability to improperly influence a judicial official, assisting
a judicial official in improper conduct, or damaging a client. However, a
judicial official could, in some instances, be guilty of criminal conduct,
acts of dishonesty, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Similarly, the disciplinary authority of the Judicial Standards
Commission is available when the judicial official engages in willful
misconduct in office, persistently fails to perform his or her duties, is
habitually intemperate, is convicted of acrime involving moral turpitude,
or engages in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute. As should be obvious, a judicial
official could be guilty of any of these types of misconduct. Thus, given
the primary responsibility for judicial discipline assigned to the process
administered by the Judicial Standards Commission, the ultimate
question before us in this case is the extent, if any, to which the State
Bar is entitled to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over judicial officials
who engage in the limited range of conduct that could make them liable
to attorney discipline.

As a general proposition, I have no difficulty in concluding that the
State Bar ought to be able to sanction a judicial official for violating any
Rule of Professional Conduct that would have been applicable to the
judge at the time that the alleged violation occurred, for committing a
criminal act, or for engaging in dishonest or fraudulent conduct. In my
opinion, the members of the public should not be subjected to the unfet-
tered risk that individuals who have engaged in such conduct would be
allowed to provide them with legal services regardless of their current
eligibility to do so. On the other hand, given the risk of conflicting deci-
sions and the other legal and practical problems that I have outlined

288 IN THE SUPREME COURT

N.C. STATE BAR v. TILLETT
[869 N.C. 264 (2016)]

above, I have trouble understanding why a judicial official should be
subject to discipline by both the Judicial Standards Commission and the
State Bar for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, par-
ticularly when the conduct in question involved actions taken by the
judge in the course of carrying out his or her perceived judicial respon-
sibilities. Allowing such a result seems to me to be inconsistent with the
principle of statutory construction that, when possible, statutes should
be construed in such a manner as to avoid producing an absurd out-
come. Frye Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 45, 510 S.E.2d 159,
163 (1999) (stating that, “where a literal interpretation of the language of
astatute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose
of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of
the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded”
(quoting Mazda Motors of Am., Inc. v. Sw. Motors, Inc., 296 N.C. 357,
361, 250 S.E.2d 250, 258 (1979))). In addition, it would be consistent with
the canon of statutory construction that, “[w]here there is one statute
dealing with a subject in general and comprehensive terms, and another
dealing with a part of the same subject in a more minute and definite
way, the two should be read together and harmonized . . . ; but, to the
extent of any necessary repugnancy between them, the special statute
... will prevail over the general statute.” Krauss v. Wayne Cty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 347 N.C. 871, 378, 493 S.E.2d 428, 433 (1997) (second and
third alterations in original) (quoting McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C.
629, 631, 461 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1995)). As a result, in order to avoid incon-
sistent outcomes, the risk of conflicting advice, the potential for claim
or issue preclusion questions to arise, undue confusion, and other dif-
ficulties, I believe that the Court should construe the relevant constitu-.
tional and statutory provisions in such a way as to preclude the State
Bar from proceeding against an attorney on the basis of alleged conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice arising from activities under-
taken by a judicial official in the conduct of his or her judicial duties
that do not involve a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
a criminal act, dishonest or fraudulent conduct, claiming the ability to
improperly influence another public official, or assisting another judicial
official in committing an act of judicial misconduct! and to hold that the

4. Admittedly, conduct that violates these specific rule provisions would be “preju-
dicial to the administration of justice.” However, because the relevant phrase is so broad
that it could encompass judicial misconduct committed by a sitting judge arising only
from his or her judicial duties, which is outside the purview of the State Bar's jurisdic-
tion, the State Bar may not proceed on that legal theory alone and must, instead, specify
how the conduct of a sitting judge violated his or her obligations and responsibilities
as an attorney.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 289

N.C. STATE BAR v. TILLETT
(369 N.C. 264 (2016)]

Judicial Standards Commission has exclusive responsibility for address-
ing such allegations.®

The Judicial Standards Commission disciplined defendant based
upon determinations that his actions involved violations of Canon 1
(requiring a judge to “participate in establishing, maintaining, and
enforcing” and to “personally observe[ ] appropriate standards of con-
duct to ensure that the integrity and independence of the judiciary
[are] preserved”), Code Jud. Conduct Canon 1, 2016 Ann. R. N.C. 863,
863; Canon 2A (requiring a judge to “respect and comply with the law”
and to “conduct himself/herself at all times in a mamner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”), id.
Canon 2A, 2016 Ann. R. N.C. at 865; and Canon 3A(8) (requiring a judge
to “be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,
Jawyers and others with whom the judge deals in the judge’s official
capacity” and obligating a judge to “require similar conduct of lawyers,
and of the judge’s staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s
direction and control”), id. Canon 3A(8), 2016 Ann. R. N.C. at 869, of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, with these violations having (1) “created
a public perception of a conflict of interest which threatens the pub-
lic’s faith and confidence in [his] integrity and impartiality,” (2) been
“reasonably perceived as coercive and retaliatory,” and (3) constituted
“conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Similarly, the State
Bar alleged in the complaint that it filed in this case that defendant had
“engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice
in violation of Rule 8.4(d) [of the Rules of Professional Conduct],” as evi-
denced by a number of specific actions that he took in what he believed
to be the performance of his judicial duties during his controversy with
the Kill Devil Hills Police Department and the District Attorney's Office.
In other words, both the Judicial Standards Commission and the State
Bar sought to sanction defendant based upon their authority to disci-
pline covered individuals for conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice based upon conduct arising from defendant’s performance
of his judicial duties. In view of my belief that the State Bar does not
have the authority to seek the imposition of discipline based upon an

5. ‘The validity of this approach is bolstered, at least in my opinion, by the fact that
the State Bar's jurisdiction to sanction individuals for conduct prejudicial to the admin-
istration of justice is rule-based, while the Judicial Standards Commission's ability to do
so stems from the language of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, which
should not be negated if at all possible. Sessions v. Columbus County, 214 N.C. 634, 638,
200 S.E. 418, 420 (1939) (stating that “[rJeconciliation is a postulate of constitutional as
well as of statutory construction” (citing Parvin v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 177 N.C. 508, 99 S.E.
432 (1919))).

290 IN THE SUPREME COURT

O'NEAL v. INLINE FLUID POWER, INC.
[369 N.C. 290 (2016)]

allegation that the attorney in question engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice stemming from acts committed while he
or she was a member of the judiciary and those acts did not also violate
specific obligations and responsibilities imposed upon attorneys, I do
not believe that the State Bar has the authority to seek the imposition of
attorney discipline upon defendant on the basis of the allegations set out
in its complaint. As a result, because I believe that the State Bar’s com-
plaint against defendant should be dismissed for this reason, I concur in
the result reached by the Court without joining its opinion.

Justices HUDSON and BEASLEY join in this concurring opinion.

RICHARD O'NEAL, Emptover
ve
INLINE FLUID POWER, INC. & AUTOMOTIVE PARTS CO., INC., EMPLoyER,
AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier

No. 261PA15
Filed 21 December 2016

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App.
__, 773 S.E.2d 574 (2015), affirming an opinion and award filed on
4 June 2014 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 10 October 2016.

Jernigan Law Firm, by Leonard T: Jernigan, Jr., Anthony L.
Lucas, and Kristina B. Thompson, for plaintiff-appellant.

McAngus Goudelock & Courie, by Viral V. Mehta and Carl M. Short
II, for defendant-appellees.

Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P, by M. Duane

Jones, for North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys,
amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 291

PIRO v. McKEEVER
[369 N.C. 291 (2016)}

MICHAEL C. PIRO

ve
REBECCA HADDEN McKEEVER, L.C.S.W.; CYNTHIA L. SAPP, Pa.D.; KAREN BARRY,
M.ET., LMFT; ano DAVIDSON COUNSELING ASSOCIATES

No. 93A16
Filed 21 December 2016

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 782 S.E.2d 367
(2016), affirming an order entered on 3 November 2014 by Judge Robert
C. Ervin in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Supreme
Court on 11 October 2016.

Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by Tobias S. Hampson and
Michelle D. Connell, for plaintiff-appellant.

Epstein Law Firm, PLLC, by Andrew J. Epstein, for defendant-
appellee Rebecca Hadden McKeever, L.C.S.W.

McGuireWoods LLP, by Mark E. Anderson and Monica E. Webb, for
National Association of Social Workers, amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

- In this case we consider whether plaintiff's complaint sufficiently
alleged claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Because the members of the Court
are equally divided as to both issues, the holding of the Court of Appeals
is left undisturbed and stands affirmed without precedential value. See,
e.g., State v. Long, 365 N.C. 5, 705 S.E.2d 735 (2011) (per curiam); State
v. Greene, 298 N.C. 268, 258 S.E.2d 71 (1979) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.

292 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ALLMAN
[369 N.C, 292 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
ve.
BRITTANY TAYLOR ALLMAN

No. 25A16
Filed 21 December 2016

Search and Seizure—warrant to search house—probable cause

In a prosecution for drug offenses, the facts alleged in a detec-
tive’s affidavit were sufficient to support probable cause to issue
a warrant to search defendant's house where two half-brothers
were stopped in a car, drugs were found in the car, an investiga-
tion revealed that they lived in defendant's house, the warrant was
issued, and more drugs and paraphernalia were found in the house.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a sub-
stantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to search
defendant's home.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. __, 781 S.E.2d
311 (2016), affirming an order entered on 2 October 2014 by Judge Jack
Jenkins in Superior Court, New Hanover County. Heard in the Supreme
Court on 30 August 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz, Special Deputy
Attorney General, for the State-appellant. .

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Paul M. Green, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

The sole issue before us is whether the trial court properly granted
defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s ruling. We hold that the magistrate in this case had a sub-
stantial basis to find that probable cause existed to issue the challenged
search warrant, and we therefore reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

Defendant lived with Sean Whitehead and Jeremy Black, who were
half-brothers, at 4844 Acres Drive in Wilmington, North Carolina. The
police stopped a car that Black was driving. Whitehead was a passenger.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 293

STATE v. ALLMAN
[369 N.C. 292 (2016)]

Inside the car, the police found 8.1 ounces of marijuana and over $1600
in cash. This stop ultimately led to the issuance of a warrant to search
defendant's home. Based on evidence found there, defendant was
charged with six offenses pertaining to the manufacture, possession,
and sale or delivery of illegal drugs.

Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during the search of
her home, arguing that the warrant to conduct the search was not sup-
ported by probable cause. After a hearing, the trial court granted defen-
dant’s motion, and the State appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s ruling, with one judge dissenting. State v. Allman, __
N.C. App. __, __, 781 S.E.2d 311, 318 (2016); id. at ___, 781 S.E.2d at
318-20 (Dillon, J., dissenting). The State then filed a notice of appeal with
this Court.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the people from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Absent exigent circumstances, the police need a warrant
to conduct a search of or seizure in a home, see Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), and a warrant may be issued only on a show-
ing of probable cause, U.S. Const. amend. IV. Article I, Section 20 of
the Constitution of North Carolina likewise prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures and requires that warrants be issued only on prob-
able cause. See State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 648, 319 S.E.2d 254,
260-61 (1984),

The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted the totality
of the circumstances test to determine whether probable cause exists
under the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 218, 230-31
(1983). This Court has adopted the same totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether probable cause exists under Article I, Section
20 of the state constitution. See Arrington, 311 N.C. at 643, 319 S.E.2d at
260-61. And because the text of Article I, Section 20 does not “call[ ] for
broader protection than that of the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Miller,
367 N.C. 702, 706, 766 S.B.2d 289, 292 (2014), the probable cause analysis
under the federal and state constitutions is identical.

1. In State v, Carter, this Court declined to adopt a good faith exception to the
state constitution’s exclusionary rule. Compare State v. Carter, 822 N.C. 709, 724, 370
S.E.2d, 568, 562 (1988), with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (adopting
a good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule). But the holding in
Carter, which concems the proper remedy for an unreasonable search or seizure, does
not affect the scope of our probable cause analysis, which concerns whether an unrea-
sonable search or seizure happened in the first place.

294 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ALLMAN
[369 N.C. 292 (2016)]

In general, “a neutral and detached magistrate,” not an “officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,”
must determine whether probable cause exists. Gates, 462 U.S. at 240
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). To determine
whether probable cause exists under the totality of the circumstances, a
magistrate may draw “[rJeasonable inferences from the available obser-
vations.” State v. Riggs, 328 N.C. 213, 221, 400 S.E.2d 429, 434 (1991). A
single piece of evidence may not necessarily be conclusive; as long as
the pieces fit together well and yield a fair probability that a police offi-
cer executing the warrant will find contraband or evidence of a crime at
the place to be searched, a magistrate has probable cause to issue a war-
rant. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733 (1984) (per curiam);
see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.

Reviewing “courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting
affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.”
Riggs, 328 N.C. at 222, 400 S.E.2d at 434-35 (alterations in original) (quot-
ing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). Because “ ‘[a] grudging or negative attitude
by reviewing courts toward warrants’ is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant,” a reviewing court should not subject the issuing magistrate’s
probable cause determination to de novo review. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108
(1965)). The magistrate’s probable cause determination should instead
be given “great deference.” Jd. (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393
US. 410, 419 (1969)). In practice, the reviewing court gives deference
to the magistrate’s determination by “ensur[ing] that the magistrate had
a substantial basis for. . . conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.”
Arrington, 311 N.C. at 638, 319 S.H.2d at 258 (emphasis added) (second
and third alterations in original) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39).

Under North Carolina law, an application for a search warrant “must
be supported by one or more affidavits particularly setting forth the facts
and circumstances establishing probable cause to believe that the items
[subject to seizure] are in the place[ ] . . . to be searched.” N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-244(8) (2015). A supporting affidavit is sufficient when it gives the
magistrate “reasonable cause to believe that the search will reveal the
presence of the [items] sought on the premises described in the [warrant]
application,” and that those items “will aid in the apprehension or convic-
tion of the offender.” State v. Bright, 301 N.C. 243, 249, 271 S.E.2d 368, 372
(1980). But a magistrate cannot lawfully issue a search warrant based on
an affidavit that is “purely conclusory” and that does not state the underly-
ing circumstances allegedly giving rise to probable cause. Id.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ALLMAN
[369 N.C. 292 (2016)]

The affidavit in this case, which was submitted by Detective Anthony
E. Bacon Jr. of the New Hanover County Sheriff's Office, contained all of
the following allegations:

Agent Joe Cherry of the Brunswick County Sheriff's Office stopped a
car that Jeremy Black was driving. Black’s half-brother Sean Whitehead.
was a passenger in the car. Agent Cherry used a K-9 unit to conduct an
exterior sniff of the car, and the dog “alerted on the vehicle for illegal
controlled substances.” Agent Cherry then searched the car and found
8.1 ounces of marijuana packaged in a Ziploc bag, which was inside of
avacuum sealed bag, which in turn was inside of a manila envelope. He
also found over $1600 in cash.

Detective Bacon checked both Black’s and Whitehead’s criminal his-
tories. He discovered that Whitehead had previously been charged on
several occasions with “crimes relating to the illegal sale and distribu-
tion of marijuana” and had been convicted of possession with the intent
to sell and deliver marijuana. Detective Bacon also discovered that
Black had pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and had been charged.
with cocaine distribution and possession of marijuana. During the vehi-
cle stop, Whitehead maintained that he and Black lived at 30 Twin Oaks
Drive in Castle Hayne, North Carolina. Whitehead said that he and Black
had been on their way back there before they were stopped.

On the same day as the vehicle stop, Detective Bacon went to 30
Twin Oaks Drive. When he got there, he discovered that neither half-
brother lived at that address but that Whitehead’s and Black’s mother,
Elsie Black, did. Ms. Black told Detective Bacon that the two men lived
at 4844 Acres Drive in Wilmington and had not lived at 30 Twin Oaks
Drive for about three years.2 She described the Acres Drive property
as a small one-story residence that had “a big, tall privacy fence in the
backyard” and said that “there should be an old red truck and an old
white truck at the house.” At that point, another detective went to
4844 Acres Drive. The property matched the description given by Ms.
Black, and one of the two trucks outside of the house was registered
to Jeremy Black.

In addition to stating all of these allegations, the affidavit recited
Detective Bacon’s extensive training in law enforcement and extensive
experience with drug investigations and trials. The affidavit also stated,
based on Detective Bacon’s training and experience, that drug dealers

2. Here and elsewhere, the affidavit mistakenly listed the Acres Drive address as
4814, not 4844.

296 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ALLMAN
[869 N.C. 292 (2016)}

typically keep evidence of drug dealing at their homes, including but
not limited to the drugs themselves, records of drug dealing activities,
tools and materials used to weigh and package drugs, large amounts of
cash, and expensive things purchased with drug money.

Supported by his affidavit, Detective Bacon applied for a warrant
to search the property at 4844 Acres Drive, and the magistrate issued
it.3 When detectives searched the Acres Drive house (several hours
after Detective Bacon went to 30 Twin Oaks Drive), they found vary-
ing amounts of marijuana throughout the living room and a shotgun
in defendant's bedroom. According to a police inventory sheet, the
detectives also found, among other things, digital scales, plastic pack-
aging material, sandwich bags, smoking pipes, and rolling papers in the
house. In addition, the detectives discovered a wall safe that contained
syringes filled with a liquid later identified as psilocybin mushrooms, a.
controlled substance.

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we
analyze whether the trial court’s “underlying findings of fact are sup-
ported by competent evidence . . . and whether those factual findings
in turn support the [trial court’s] ultimate conclusions of law.” State
v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 182, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). The trial court
found virtually all of the facts that we have just recounted, and its findings
were supported by competent evidence—namely, by the affidavit itself.

But the trial court erred in its conclusion of law that the facts
alleged in Detective Bacon’s affidavit were insufficient to support a find-
ing of probable cause to issue the search warrant. Based on the quantity
of marijuana and the amount of cash found in the car, the fact that
the marijuana appeared to be packaged for sale, and Whitehead’s and
Black’s criminal histories, it was reasonable for the magistrate to infer
that the half-brothers were drug dealers. Based on the mother's state-
ment that Whitehead and Black really lived at 4844 Acres Drive, the fact
that her description of 4844 Acres Drive matched the appearance of the
actual premises, and the fact that one of the trucks there was registered
to Black, it was reasonable for the magistrate to infer that Whitehead
and Black lived there. And based on the insight from Detective Bacon's
training and experience that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be
found at a drug dealer's home, and the fact that Whitehead lied about
where he and Black lived, it was reasonable for the magistrate to infer

3. Because the warrant replicated the error in the affidavit, it listed the property's
address as 4814 Acres Drive. Defendant does not argue that this error makes the war-
rant invalid.

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STATE v. ALLMAN,
[369 N.C. 292 (2016)}

that there could be evidence of drug dealing at 4844 Acres Drive. These
are just the sort of common-sense inferences that a magistrate is permit-
ted to make when determining whether probable cause exists.

We acknowledge that nothing in Detective Bacon’s affidavit directly
linked defendant’s home with evidence of drug dealing. But federal cir-
cuit courts have addressed this precise situation and held that a sus-
pected drug dealer's lie about his address, in combination with other
evidence of drug dealing, can give rise to probable cause to search his
home. In United States v. Whitner, for example, the Third Circuit noted
that “direct evidence linking the crime to the location to be searched
is not required to support a search warrant,” 219 F.3d 289, 297 (3d Cir.
2000), and that a suspected drug dealer's lie to federal agents about
where he lived was an “important piece of evidence linking the crime
to” the suspect’s apartment, id. at 298. “[W]hen combined with . . . other

. information” from the attesting officer's affidavit, the Third Circuit ruled,
the suspect's lie “logically suggests that [he] was storing some evidence
of illegal activity at [his] apartment which he did not want the agents to
discover.” Id. at 299. And in United States v. Caicedo, the Sixth Circuit
held that probable cause existed to search a suspected drug dealer’s
home because, among other reasons, the suspect “had lied about his
address in statements” that he made after his arrest. 85 F.3d 1184, 1193
(6th Cir. 1996).

The Court of Appeals maintained that the facts here were “materi-
ally indistinguishable” from those in State v. Campbell. See Allman, __
N.C. App. at __, 781 S.E.2d at 316. In Campbell, we held that the facts
alleged in the affidavit in that case were too conclusory to support a
finding of probable cause to search the home of suspected drug dealers.
State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 129-82, 191 S.E.2d 752, 756-57 (1972).
But the facts of Campbell can be distinguished from the facts here
in two ways. First, in contrast to the affidavit supporting the warrant in
this case, there is no indication that the affidavit in Campbell mentioned
any insights from the affiant’s training and experience, or used them to
link evidence of drug dealing with the home of the suspected dealers.
See id. at 130-31, 191 S.E.2d at 756; see also State v. McKinney, 368 N.C.
161, 164, 775 S.E.2d 821, 825 (2015) (stating that evidence supporting
a warrant application is “viewed from the perspective of a police offi-
cer with the affiant’s training and experience”). Second, while a suspect
in this case lied to Agent Cherry about his true address, nothing in the
Campbell opinion indicates that any of the subjects of that search lied
to the authorities about their home address. So Campbell does not alter
our conclusion.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BARNETT
[369 N.C. 298 (2016)]

Defendant has argued that N.C.G.S. § 154-244(8) provides an inde-
pendent basis for granting her motion to suppress. As we have noted
above, subsection 15A-244(3) specifies that a warrant application must
be supported by at least one affidavit that states with particularity the
facts and circumstances that establish probable cause. Although defen-
dant suggests that this provision limits the scope of what qualifies
as probable cause, she is mistaken. The provision does not change the
probable cause standard at all; it just specifies the type of evidence that
the police have to produce to meet the standard.

In sum, under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate in
this case had a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed
to search defendant's home. We therefore reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for fur-
ther remand to the trial court for additional proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
—————
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
_ JAMES ANTHONY BARNETT, JR.

No. 36PA16
Filed 21 December 2016

Sexual Offenders—no contact order—third parties—victim’s
minor children
Ina case arising from convictions for attempted second-degree
rape and other offenses, the trial court had the authority under
the catch-all provision of N.C.G.S. § 15A4-1340.50 to enter a no con-
tact order specifically including the victim and her minor children.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50 protects the victim of the sex offense, not
third parties, and the catch-all provision cannot be read to expand
the reach of the statute. However, the victim can be protected from
indirect contact by the defendant through the victim's family or
friends when appropriate findings are made by the trial court.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 784 S.E.2d 188

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STATE v. BARNETT
[369 N.C. 298 (2016)}

(2016), finding no error at trial after appeal from judgments entered on 16
July 2014 by Judge Edwin G. Wilson, Jr. in Superior Court, Rockingham
County, but reversing, reversing and remanding, and vacating in part
and remanding three related orders entered the same day. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 10 October 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Anne M. Middleton, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Jennifer Harjo, Public Defender, New Hanover County, by Brendan
O'Donnell, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant-appellee.

HUDSON, Justice.

Defendant James Anthony Barnett, Jr. was convicted by a jury on
16 July 2014 of anumber of offenses, including attempted second-degree
rape. At sentencing, the trial court entered a “Convicted Sex Offender
Permanent No Contact Order” under N.C.G.S. § 154-1840.50, prohibiting
defendant from any interaction with the victim. Here we must decide
whether the trial court has authority to include in such an order the
names of individuals other than the original victim, and if so, under what
circumstances. We conclude that the court does have that authority, if
supported by appropriate findings as required by the statute.

The order entered here contains the following language under the
final section, entitled “Restrictions”: “This order includes the following
- individuals: [three named individuals who are minor children of the vic-
tim].” On appeal the Court of Appeals vacated the no contact order and
remanded for the trial court to “remove mention of any individuals other
than the victim,” concluding that “the trial court did not have author
ity under the catch-all provision to enter a no contact order specifically
including persons who were not ‘victims’ of the ‘sex offense’ committed
by Defendant.” State v. Barnett, ___ N.C. App. __, __, 784 S.E.2d 188,
200 (2016); see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50(f)(7) (2015). We allowed the
State’s petition for discretionary review.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50
protects the victim of the sex offense, and not third parties, and that
the catch-all provision in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50(1)(7) cannot be read
to expand the reach of the statute. Barnett, ____ N.C. App. at __, 784
S.E.2d at 199-200. But, because we hold that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50 can.
authorize protection for the victim from indirect contact by the defen-
dant through the victim’s family or friends when appropriate findings are

300 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BARNETT
[869 N.C. 298 (2016)]

made by the trial court, we reverse in part the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case for entry of a new permanent no contact
order not inconsistent with this opinion.

The evidence presented at trial revealed that from late January
until late April 2013, defendant dated the victim. During the last two
months of the relationship, defendant stayed in the victim’s apartment
with her and her three daughters, ages thirteen years, eleven years, and
eleven months.

On or about 22 April 2013, defendant left the apartment to meet
with his probation officer. That same day, while defendant was away,
the victim communicated with him over the telephone to terminate
their relationship. On 22 May 2013, defendant showed up at the victim's
apartment to retrieve his clothes while the victim was at home with her
youngest child. The victim asked defendant to wait in the living room
while she gathered his belongings. Defendant asked the victim for a
hug, and the victim obliged. Then defendant asked the victim to engage
in sexual intercourse with him. The victim repeatedly refused, asking
defendant to leave her apartment.

When defendant refused to leave, the victim entered the bathroom
“to sort of kill time.” Defendant followed her and stood outside the
bathroom door, blocking her way when she attempted to exit the room.
Defendant pulled the victim into her children’s bedroom, threw her onto
the floor and then onto a bed, and began attempting to engage in sexual
intercourse with her. During this process, defendant repeatedly struck
the victim in the head and face.

The victim stated that before defendant left the apartment, he told
her he would kill her if she called the police. Nonetheless, she asked a
neighbor to call for emergency assistance. The responding officer found
the victim crying, in a disheveled condition, and with “severe bruises” on
her face and body and “a lot of swollen . . . lumps on her head.”

After being released from the hospital, the victim began receiving
text messages from defendant, stating that he would come back and “fin-
ish the job,” and that he was “coming back to the neighborhood” to kill
her. From 31 May to 4 August 2013, while defendant was incarcerated,
he wrote at least eight threatening letters to the victim or one of her
daughters. Barnett, __ N.C. App. at ____, 784 S.E.2d at 192. On 31 May
2018, defendant wrote:

What did I tell you, would happen if you took charges; out
on me? You remember, what I told you. And I’ma stand by

,

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STATE v. BARNETT
[869 N.C. 298 (2016)}

my word. Because you knew not to press charges or go
to the hospital. You knew better then that. ... I miss you
deeply and love you like crazy. You are not just going to
walk, away from me this easily. Because before you do so,
T will kill you or have you killed.

In a later letter to the victim, defendant reminded the victim of his
earlier threats and referred to “order[ing] a hit.” Defendant also wrote:

So I'ma put you below, before you can put me away for X
amout of yrs. . . . Pll send my lil CAP homies at you and
your family. . . . I will orcastrate some shit, from in here
behind these walls and make it happen ASAP. If ’'ma go
back to prison it’s going to be for some real serious shit.
Not some bullshit or some bullshit lies, that you done told
on me. It is going to be for, accessory to 1 degree murder
and mastermind 1* degree murder. Not just one body, but
3 more precious bodies. (4 counts 1** Degree murder and
4 counts mastermind 1st Degree Murder) You understand
me and feel what I’m getting at?

Additionally, defendant sent a letter to one of the victim’s daugh-
ters in which he stated that, if the victim failed to “drop[ }” the charges
against him, he would “order.some things to happen which means [he]
will never, get out of prison again,” that he “will never see, the court-
room,” and that the same would be true of the victim, who would “be
dead, because of [his] orders.” Finally, on 4 August 2013, defendant
wrote to the victim, “I done told you before, I have people watching
your apartment. . . . But just know, if God spares my life and I’m able to
get out and walk the streets again one day. I’m coming to get you and my
family back.”

On 8 July 2013, defendant was indicted in Rockingham County
for: (1) attempted second-degree rape, second-degree kidnapping,
and assault on a female on 22 May 2013; (2) two counts of deterring
an appearance by a witness on 4 and 20 June 2013 in that defendant
attempted to prevent the alleged victim from attending court to testify
regarding the 22 May events “by threatening to kill her and have her
killed if she appeared”; and (8) habitual misdemeanor assault under
N.C.G.S. § 14-33.2. A separate undated indictment charged defendant
as an habitual felon, listing convictions dated between September 1999
and June 2009, and showed offense dates of 22 May, 4 June, and 20 June
2013. All offenses were later joined for trial, plus a charge of assault
inflicting serious injury, also alleged to have occurred on 22 May 2013.

302 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BARNETT
[369 N.C. 298 (2016)]

Defendant was tried during the criminal session of Superior Court,
Rockingham County that began on 14 July 2014 before Judge Edwin
G. Wilson, Jr. Defendant entered into a plea arrangement in which he
pleaded guilty to habitual misdemeanor assault based on the prior con-
victions set out in the indictment. Two days later a jury found defendant
guilty of attempted second-degree rape, assault on a female, and both
counts of deterring appearance by a witness. Defendant then pleaded
guilty to having attained habitual felon status.

On 16 July 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 110
to 144 months for attempted second-degree rape, and ordered that he
register as a sex offender and enroll in satellite-based monitoring for life
upon his release from prison. The trial court also entered a “Convicted
Sex Offender Permanent No Contact Order” (using Form AOC-CR-620,
Rev. 12/11), which includes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

4. The following grounds exist for the victim to fear any
future contact with the defendant:

DUE TO THE AGGRAVATED NATURE OF THE
OFFENSE AND THE DEFENDANT'S HISOTRY [sic] OF
VIOLENCE AS WELL AS THE DEFENDANT'S PERONAL
KNOWLEGED [sic] OF THE VICTIM AND HER FAMILY.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that.
(select one):

[Checked Box] 1. reasonable grounds exist for the victim
to fear any future contact with the defendant.

ORDER

[Checked Box] . . . It is hereby Ordered that the defendant
is prohibited from having any contact with ____[ ]___
(name of victim) during the remainder of the defendant's
natural life as specified in the Restrictions below. This no
contact order is incorporated into the judgment imposing
sentence in this case.

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STATE v. BARNETT
[869 N.C. 298 (2016)]

RESTRICTIONS

The following restrictions apply under the no contact
order entered on above (check all that apply):

Checked Box] 1. The defendant shall not threaten, visit,
assault, molest, or otherwise interfere with the victim.

Checked Box] 2. The defendant shall not follow the vic-
tim, including at, the victim’s workplace.

Checked Box] 3. The defendant shall not harass the
victim.
Checked Box] 4. The defendant shall not abuse or injure
the victim.
Checked Box] 5. The defendant shall not contact the vic-

tim by telephone, written communication, or electronic
means.

Checked Box] 6. The defendant shall refrain from enter-
ing or remaining present at the victim’s residence, school,
place of employment, and (specify other place(s)) __._
empty blank]____ at times when the victim is present.

Checked Box] 7. Additional necessary and appropriate

restriction(s):

THIS ORDER INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING
INDIVIDUALS:

[three named individuals who are minor children of the
victim]

The trial court entered a separate judgment on the consolidated convic-
tions for deterring appearance by a witness, assault on a female, and
habitual misdemeanor assault in which the court sentenced defendant
to asecond term of 110 to 144 months, to be served consecutively.

Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, where he argued, inter
alia, that the trial court erred in extending the permanent no contact
order to the victim's children. Barnett, __N.C. App. at ____, 784 S.E.2d
at 198. In a unanimous opinion filed on 19 January 2016, the Court of
Appeals agreed with defendant’s argument on that issue, vacated the
order because of the language relating to the children, and remanded
for entry of a new order. Id. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 200. Specifically, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s authority to enter an

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BARNETT
[369 N.C. 298 (2016)]

order under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50 “is limited to prohibiting actions by
the defendant against ‘the victim’ based on the plain language of the
statute.” Id. at___, 784 S.E.2d at 200. As a result, the trial court lacked
“authority under the catch-all provision to enter a no contact order spe-
cifically including persons who were not ‘victims’ of the ‘sex offense’
committed by Defendant.” Id. at ___, 784 S.E.2d at 200. The State filed
a petition for discretionary review, which we allowed on 13 April 2016.

The State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
trial court was without statutory authority to include prohibitions on
contact with the victim’s minor children as a term of the permanent no
contact order. We conclude that the trial court had authority to enter
such prohibitions if supported by appropriate findings, and thus reverse
that portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion holding otherwise. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50 protects
the victim of the sex offense, and not third parties, and that the catch-
all provision in N.C.G.S. § 154-1340.50(£)(7) cannot be read to expand
the reach of the statute to protect individuals other than the victim. Id.
at ___, 784 S.E.2d at 199-200. But we also conclude that a trial court
may enter a no contact order prohibiting indirect contact with the vic-
tim through her children or others who may be specified in the section
entitled “Restrictions” under subdivisions (f)(1) through (£)(6), as well
as (f)(7) of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50, if supported by appropriate findings.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50 (2015). By “appropriate findings,” we mean find-
ings indicating that the defendant’s contact with specific individuals
would constitute indirect engagement in any of the actions prohibited in
subdivisions (f)(1) through ()(7).

This Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals to deter-
mine whether the decision contains an error of law. N.C. R. App. P. 16(a);
State v. Mumford, 364 N.C. 394, 398, 699 S.E.2d 911, 914 (2010). This
case presents a question of statutory interpretation, which is an issue
of law. “The intent of the Legislature controls the interpretation of a
statute.” State v. Joyner, 329 N.C. 211, 217, 404 $.E.2d 653, 657 (1991)
(quoting State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 235, 287 S.E.2d 810, 816 (1982),
overruled by Mumford, 364 N.C. at 402, 699 S.E.2d at 916). “In ascer-
taining the legislative intent, courts should consider the language of the
statute, the spirit of the statute, and what it seeks to accomplish.” State
ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Pub. Staff, 309 N.C. 195, 210, 306 S.E.2d 435, 444
(1983) (citation omitted). “When a statute is unambiguous, this Court
‘will give effect to the plain meaning of the words without resorting to
judicial construction.’ ” State v. Davis, 364 N.C. 297, 302, 698 S.E.2d 65,
68 (2010) (quoting State v. Byrd, 363 N.C. 214, 219, 675 S.E.2d 328, 325

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BARNETT
[369 N.C. 298 (2016)}

305

(2009)). “However, when the language of a statute is ambiguous, this
Court will determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the leg-
islature in its enactment.” Byrd, 363 N.C. at 219, 675 S.E.2d at 325 (quot-
ing Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006).

The statute at issue here, N.C.G.S. § 154-1340.50, reads in pertinent

part:

(a) The following definitions apply in this Article:

(1 Permanent no contact order.— A permanent
injunction that prohibits any contact by a
defendant with the victim of the sex offense
for which the defendant is convicted. The
duration of the injunction is the lifetime of
the defendant.

(2) Sex offense—— Any criminal offense that
requires registration under Article 27A of
Chapter 14 of the General Statutes.

(8) Victim.— The person against whom the sex
offense was committed.

(e) At the conclusion of the show cause hearing the
judge shall enter a finding for or against the defendant.
If the judge determines that reasonable grounds exist for
the victim to fear any future contact with the defendant,
the judge shall issue the permanent no contact order. The
judge shall enter written findings of fact and the grounds
on which the permanent no contact order is issued. The
no contact order shall be incorporated into the judgment
imposing the sentence on the defendant for the convic-
tion of the sex offense.

( The court may grant one or more of the following
forms of relief in a permanent no contact order under this
Article:

(1) Order the defendant not to threaten, visit,
assault, molest, or otherwise interfere with
the victim.

(2) Order the defendant not to follow the victim,
including at the victim’s workplace.

306 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BARNETT
[869 N.C. 298 (2016)]

(8) Order the defendant not to harass the victim.

(4) Order the defendant not to abuse or injure
the victim.

(6) Order the defendant not to contact the vic-
tim by telephone, written communication, or
electronic means.

(6) Order the defendant to refrain from enter-
ing or remaining present at the victim’s resi-
dence, school, place of employment, or other
specified places at times when the victim
is present.

(7) Order other relief deemed necessary and
appropriate by the court.

N.C.GS. § 154-1340.50(a), (e), (0.

The paramount purpose of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50 is to protect a vic-
tim of a sex offense from further contact, harm, or molestation by his or
her assailant. See id. § 15A-1340.50 (titled “Permanent no contact order
prohibiting future contact by convicted sex offender with crime victim.”);
Act of July 21, 2009, ch. 380, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 721 (captioned in part:
“An act to provide that when sentencing a defendant convicted of a sex
offense and upon request of the district attorney, the court may enter a
permanent no contact order prohibiting any future contact of a convicted
sex offender with the crime victim .. . .”); see also State v. Hunt, 221
N.C. App. 48, 55, 727 S.E.2d 584, 590 (“[T]he legislative purpose . . . [is]
to protect an individual who fears contact with the defendant from being
contacted or harmed, either mentally or physically, by the convicted sex
offender who purportedly victimized him or her.”), appeal dismissed
and disc. rev. denied, 366 N.C. 390, 732 S.E.2d 581 (2012).

The statute provides that when “reasonable grounds exist for the
victim [of a sex offense] to fear any future contact with the defen-
dant, the judge shall issue [a] permanent no contact order.” N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1340.50(e). A permanent no contact. order is defined as “[a] per-
manent injunction that prohibits any contact by a defendant with the
victim of the sex offense for which the defendant is convicted.” Id.
§ 15A-1340.50(a)(1). The “victim” is “[t]he person against whom the sex
offense was committed.” Id. § 15A-1340.50(a)(8). The trial court must
“enter written findings of fact and the grounds on which the permanent
no contact order is issued,” and “[t]he no contact order shall be incorpo-
rated into the judgment.” Id. § 15A-1340.50(e).

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[869 N.C. 298 (2016)]

In the no contact order the trial court may impose various forms
of relief specifically enumerated in the statute, as well as “other relief
deemed necessary and appropriate by the court.” Jd. § 15A-1340.50().
Each of the specifically enumerated forms of relief involves an order
to the defendant not to engage in certain conduct towards the victim.
See id. § 15A-1340.50(£)(1)-(6). The catch-all provision in subdivision
(C7), however, does not specify whom the “other relief” may protect,
and thus, can be viewed as ambiguous. Id. § 15A-1340.50(£)(7).

The title of the statute, the definition of “permanent no contact order”
in subdivision (a)(1), and the specifically enumerated forms of relief in
subdivisions (£)(1) through (£)(6) all unambiguously contemplate pro-
tection of the particular victim. Accordingly, because the purpose of the
statute and the intent of the legislature appear to be to protect the par-
ticular victim of the sex offense, the catch-all provision in subdivision
((Z should similarly be limited to “other relief” for the protection of the
victim of the sex offense only. Cf. State v. Elder, 368 N.C. 70, 72-73, 773
§.E.2d 51, 53 (2015) (concluding that the catch-all provision in N.C.G.S,
§ 50B-3(a)(13), which reads “any additional prohibitions or require-
ments the court deems necessary” and follows a list of twelve other
prohibitions or requirements that the judge may impose on a party to a
DVPO, “limits the court to ordering a party to act or refrain from acting”
and “does not authorize the court to order law enforcement, which is
not a party to the civil DVPO, to proactively search defendant’s person,
vehicle, or residence,” as the trial court sought to do (emphasis added)).

Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50
protects the victim of the sex offense, and not third parties, and that
the catch-all provision in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50(f)(7) cannot be read
to expand the reach of the statute to protect individuals other than
the victim of the sex offense. Barnett, __ N.C. App. at ____, 784 S.H.2d
at 199-200.

Nonetheless, we also hold that under,the statute, the trial court may
prohibit a convicted sex offender from engaging in any of these forms
of contact indirectly with the victim through the victim’s family, friends,
or acquaintances. Nearly all the enumerated options for relief are pro-
hibitions against actions that can be taken indirectly as well as directly
against the victim; the catch-all provision in ()(7) permits additional
restrictions if “necessary and appropriate.” See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50(f).
Accordingly, to the extent that a defendant’s contact with other individu-
als constitutes indirect engagement in any of the actions prohibited in
subdivisions (f)(1) through (f)(7), such indirect contact is inherently

308 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BARNETT
[369 N.C. 298 (2016)}

within the scope of the conduct that the trial court is authorized to pro-
hibit under the statute. To specifically prohibit such conduct, however,
the trial court must make appropriate findings.

Additionally, because the catch-all provision in subdivision (f)(7)
allows the trial court to “[oJrder other relief deemed necessary and
appropriate,” it is within the scope of the trial court’s authority to spe-
cifically list people whom the defendant may not contact when the trial
court has concluded that such contact would constitute a violation of
the specific restrictions imposed upon the defendant under subdivisions
((1) through (£)(6). Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that,
“the trial court did not have authority under the catch-all provision to
enter a no contact order specifically including persons who were not
‘victims’ of the ‘sex offense’ committed by Defendant.” Barnett, __ N.C.
App. at __, 784 S.E.2d at 200.

Here both parties agree that N.C.G.S. § 154-1340.50 authorizes a
permanent no contact order for the protection of the victim only, and
not for third parties. The parties differ, however, with respect to how
to interpret the trial court’s no contact order. The State argues that to
be consistent with the statute, we must interpret the order to mean that
the children were listed by the trial court to protect the victim, rather
than the children themselves. Defendant, on the other hand, interprets
the no contact order as protecting the children directly from any and all
contact by him to the same extent as the victim, regardless of whether
the contact is related to the victim. Defendant argues that his interpre-
tation conflicts with the statute because the statute does not authorize
protection for third parties. This disparity arises here because the trial
court failed to make appropriate findings in support of the restrictions
on defendant's indirect contact with the victim through third parties.

In essentially adopting defendant’s interpretation of the order, the
Court of Appeals erred. We do not agree that inclusion of the children’s
names under the (£)(7) catch-all provision comprehensively extends the
protections of the entire order to the children too, as if they were
the victims of the original assault. As discussed earlier, the trial court is
not authorized to prohibit contact with third parties for the protection
of those individuals; however, the trial court can prohibit indirect con-
tact with the victim through specifically identified third parties if such a
prohibition is supported by appropriate findings in the no contact order.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision by the Court of Appeals on the

issue upon which we allowed review, and remand this case to that court
for further remand to the trial court for entry of a permanent no contact

IN THE SUPREME COURT 309

STATE v. CARVALHO
[369 N.C. 309 (2016)}

order containing appropriate findings to support any “Restrictions” on
indirect contact with the victim through third parties. The other issues
addressed by the Court of Appeals are not before this Court, and the
Court of Appeals’ decision on those matters remains undisturbed.

REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
——

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
ve
JOHN JOSEPH CARVALHO, II

No, 369A15
Filed 21 December 2016

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 777 S.E.2d 78
(2015), finding no error after appeal from a judgment entered on 7 April
2014 by Judge Christopher W. Bragg in Superior Court, Union County.
On 17 March 2016, the Supreme Court allowed defendant's petition for
discretionary review of additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court
on 12 October 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Mary Carla Babb, Assistant
Attorney General, and Derrick C. Mertz, Special Deputy Attorney
General, for the State.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Anne M. Gomez, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

As to the issue before this Court under N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2), the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Further, we conclude that the
petition for discretionary review as to the additional issue was improvi-
dently allowed.

AFFIRMED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.

310 IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE v. CURTIS
[369 N.C. 310 (2016)}

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
ve
DONALD LEE CURTIS
No. 122416
Filed 21 December 2016

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 782 S.E.2d 522 (2016),
finding no error after appeal from judgments entered on 12 March 2014
by Judge Ronald E. Spivey in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in
the Supreme Court on 11 October 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Sherri Horner Lawrence,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Narendra K. Ghosh for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 311

STATE v. DALTON.
{869 N.C. 311 (2016)}

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v.
MELISSA AMBER DALTON

No. 336PAI5
Filed 21 December 2016

1. Appeal and Error—two jury arguments —one objection—
arguments not separate
In a murder prosecution in which defendant raised the insanity
defense, two statements by the prosecutor about defendant's likeli-
hood of release, viewed in context, were not separate and distinct.
The second was a summary of the first, so that defendant's objection
to the first was sufficient.

2. Criminal Law—insanity defense—closing argument—defen-
dant’s likelihood of release
The evidence in a first-degree murder prosecution in which
defendant claimed insanity did not support the assertions made by
the prosecutor during closing arguments about defendant's likeli-
hood of release. The prosecutor's argument was that it was very pos-
sible that defendant would be released in fifty days if she was found
not guilty by reason of insanity. The level of possibility or probability
of release was not the salient issue; rather, it was the evidence and
all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from that evidence
which should have governed counsel’s arguments in closing. The
only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence presented
at trial was that it was highly unlikely that defendant would be able
to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence within fifty days
that she was no longer dangerous to others.

3. Criminal Law—insanity defense—closing argument—
prejudicial
In a first-degree murder prosecution in which defendant
claimed insanity, there was prejudicial error where the prosecutor
argued to the jury that it was “very possible” that defendant would
be released in fifty days when the overwhelming evidence was
that defendant had committed the violent acts and that she had a
longstanding history of substance abuse and mental illness. It was
unlikely that defendant could demonstrate within fifty days that she
was no longer dangerous to others. A reasonable possibility existed
that the jury would have found defendant not guilty by reason of

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 311 (2016))

insanity if the prosecutor had not made the improper remarks during
closing arguments.

Justice JACKSON concurring.

Justices EDMUNDS and ERVIN join in this concurring opinion.
Chief Justice MARTIN dissenting.

Justice NEWBY joins in this dissenting opinion.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ____, 776 S.E.2d 545
(2015), finding prejudicial error after appeal from judgments entered on.
14 April 2014 by Judge Marvin P. Pope, Jr. in Superior Court, Transylvania
County, and ordering that defendant receive a new trial. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 11 October 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Jess D. Mekeel, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Ann B. Petersen for defendant-appellee.
BEASLEY, Justice.

We consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
prosecutor's closing arguments exaggerating a defendant's likelihood of
being released from civil commitment upon a finding of not guilty by rea-
son of insanity constituted prejudicial error. We hold that the statements
at issue were improper and prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals granting defendant a new trial.

Melissa Amber Dalton (defendant) has a long history of substance
abuse and mental illness, including bipolar disorder and borderline
personality disorder. On or about 29 July 2009, defendant received
inpatient treatment for mental health and addiction issues at the Neil
Dobbins Center, a crisis treatment facility. At that time Daniel Johnson,
M.D. diagnosed defendant with cocaine dependence, cannabis abuse
and substance induced mood disorder, borderline personality disor-
der, and intrauterine pregnancy. Dr. Johnson prescribed Lexapro, a
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRD. Unbeknownst to Dr.
Johnson, defendant had previously reacted negatively to another

IN THE SUPREME COURT 313

STATE v. DALTON
[869 N.C. 311 (2016)}

SSRI, Prozac. Defendant was discharged from the facility approxi-
mately three days later.

After defendant returned home from Neil Dobbins, she continued
taking Lexapro. Defendant's boyfriend noticed that defendant was acting
unpredictably, and he removed their infant daughter from defendant’s
apartment. On the night of 20 August 2009, defendant’s boyfriend called.
defendant’s mother and asked her to check on defendant because he
noticed that defendant seemed depressed. After observing defendant’s
strange behavior, defendant’s mother went to the magistrate’s office and
“tried to have [defendant] committed.” The magistrate told her to speak
with a social worker and return the next day. That evening defendant
exchanged some electronics for a gram of crack cocaine.

Defendant lived in an apartment in Brevard, North Carolina, where
Naomi Jean Barker (Barker) and Richard Holden (Holden) were her
neighbors. Early in the morning of 21 August 2009, defendant knocked
on Barker and Holden’s front door claiming to have money she previ-
ously borrowed from them. When Holden opened the door, defendant
pushed him against the wall and stabbed him repeatedly. Defendant then
approached Barker, calling her by the wrong name, and stabbed her six
times. Defendant removed five dollars from Holden's wallet and left the
apartment. Barker called 911. The police arrived to find Holden dead at
the scene and Barker suffering from serious injuries.

Shortly after the incident, a rescue squad member saw defendant,
who was still wearing bloody clothes, trying to catch a ride at a nearby
church. An officer located defendant at the church and brought her
to the police station, where she was interviewed by an S.B.I. agent. When.
the agent recited defendant's Miranda rights, she refused to speak fur-
ther and requested an attorney.

On 5 October 2009, defendant was indicted for first-degree murder,
first-degree burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill inflicting serious injury. Defendant indicated her intent to plead
the defense of insanity and was subsequently evaluated by David
Bartholomew, M.D. regarding her capacity to proceed and her mental
condition at the time of the offense.

At trial the defense offered two expert witnesses to testify as to
defendant’s mental state. Wilkie Wilson, Ph.D., an expert in neurophar-
macology, testified about the effects of drugs on defendant’s behavior at
the time of the crime. He opined that SSRIs, such as Lexapro, should not
be prescribed to people with bipolar disorder because this class of drugs

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 811 (2016)]

“can greatly disturb their mental function and push them over from a
controlled state into mania.” Dr. Wilson also opined that at the time of
the homicide defendant was in a manic state.

George Corvin, M.D., a psychiatrist, testified about defendant's past
history of mental illness and her state of mind at the time of the homi-
cide. He opined that defendant’s mental illness, her negative reactions
to SSRIs, and her drug use affected her mental state at the time of the
homicide. Ultimately, Dr. Corvin testified that defendant was manic at
the time of the homicide. He also opined that, although treatable, defen-
dant’s mental illness cannot be cured and she will always be an addict,
and added that if “[defendant] were not in treatment at all and were ina
highly unstable, chaotic, abusive environment again and were to resume
use of illicit substances, [then] her danger and her risk of recidivism .. .
would go up substantially.” The State did not present any expert wit-
nesses to testify regarding defendant’s mental condition.

At the charge conference, the prosecutor asked if he could com-
ment on the civil commitment procedures that would apply if defen-
dant was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court agreed
to permit the comment, but cautioned the prosecutor not to exagger-
ate defendant’s chance of being released after fifty days. During closing
arguments, the prosecutor made the following statements:

[Prosecutor]: . [Defendant] doesn’t remember, so
she says you can’t hold me accountable, so find me not
guilty by reason of insanity.

And that way, as one of the lawyers mentioned, then
she can be committed to a hospital if you find that verdict.
And it is very possible that in 50 days, if she shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that she is not a threat to
anyone else or herself, she will be back home.

[Defense counsel]: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.

[Prosecutor]: She very well could be back home in
less than two months.

(Emphasis added.) The prosecutor also argued, without objection, that
defendant's request for a lawyer during the police interview was evi-
dence of her sanity at the time of the homicide.

On 14 April 2014, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree mur-
der under a theory of felony murder, first-degree burglary, and assault,

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 311 (2016)]

with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. The jury declined to find
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity for all offenses. The trial court
sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole and a consecu-
tive term of twenty-six to forty-one months’ of imprisonment. The trial
court arrested judgment on the first-degree burglary conviction.

Defendant appealed her convictions to the Court of Appeals, argu-
ing: (1) The trial court erred in overruling her objection to the State’s
argument that if she was found not guilty by reason of insanity, it was
“very possible” that she could be released from civil commitment in
fifty days; and (2) The trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero
‘motu when the State argued that her request for counsel during a police
interview showed that she was sane. In a unanimous opinion filed on
15 September 2015, the Court of Appeals found prejudicial error in the
prosecutor's closing arguments regarding defendant's likelihood of
release if found not guilty by reason of insanity and held that defendant
was entitled to a new trial. The Court of Appeals did not address defen-
dant’s argument regarding invocation of her Miranda rights as evidence
of sanity.

On 17-March 2016, this Court allowed the State’s petition for discre-
tionary review on the issue of “[w]hether the Court of Appeals erred in
distorting the transcript, applying an incorrect standard of review, and
finding prejudicial error based upon the prosecutor's statements in clos-
ing argument regarding the potential for defendant’s release from civil
commitment if found not guilty by reason of insanity.”

[1] First, the State contends that the Court of Appeals applied the incor-
rect standard of review because the court improperly read the prosecu-
tor’s two separate statements as one. Specifically, the State argues that
the second statement should be reviewed for gross impropriety, not
abuse of discretion, because defendant did not object to that statement
at trial. We disagree.

When a defendant objects at trial, this Court reviews closing argu-
ments to determine “whether the trial court abused its discretion by fail-
ing to sustain the objection.” State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d
97, 106 (2002) (citations omitted). In reviewing closing arguments for
an abuse of discretion, this Court must “first determine[ ] if the remarks
were improper.” Jd. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106. If so, this Court must then
“determine if the remarks were of such a magnitude that their inclusion
prejudiced defendant, and thus should have been excluded by the trial
court.” Id. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106 (citing Coble v. Coble, 79 N.C. 589
(1878); and State v. Tyson, 133 N.C. 692, 698, 45 S.E. 838, 840 (1903)).

316 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 811 (2016)

Conversely, when a defendant fails to object at closing, this Court must
determine if the argument was “so grossly improper that the trial court
erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu.” State v. Barden, 356 N.C.
316, 358, 572 S.E.2d 108, 135 (2002) (quoting State v. Trull, 849 N.C. 428,
451, 509 S.E.2d 178, 193 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 145 L. Ed. 2d.
80 (1999)), cert. denied, 588 U.S. 1040, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (2003).

Here the issue is whether the prosecutor's closing arguments men-
tioning defendant’s likelihood of release upon a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity were prejudicial. The State asserts that the prosecu-
tor’s arguments should be reviewed as two separate and distinct state-
ments, the first to which defense counsel objected! and the second to
which counsel did not.2 “[S}tatements made during closing arguments,”
however, “will not be examined in isolation. ‘Instead, on appeal we must
give consideration to the context in which the remarks were made and.
the overall factual circumstances to which they referred.’ ” State v. Ward,
354 N.C. 231, 265, 555 S.E.2d 251, 273 (2001) (citing and quoting State
v. Guevara, 349 N.C. 243, 257, 506 S.E.2d 711, 721 (1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1133, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1999)). When viewed in context, espe-
cially considering the conversation that took place during the charge
conference,3 the second statement is not separate and distinct from
the first. It was made immediately after the trial court overruled the
defense’s objection and is a summary of the first statement.

1. “And it is very possible that in 50 days, if she shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that she is not a threat to anyone else or herself, she will be back home.”

2. “She very well could be back home in Jess than two months.”
3, The following discussion took place during the charge conference:

[Prosecutor}: Judge, I would just ask the Court to allow me in
closing argument to comment on [the civil commitment instruction].

‘THE COURT. . . . I would have to limit — I mean, if you would
make a statement like, well, she'll be out on the street in 50 days,
that’s not correct according to the law, so I would have to give them.
an instruction to disregard that statement, to correct that statement.

[Prosecutor]: But she could be. Or she could be in five days.
THE COURT: She could —
[Prosecutor]: I think these people need to know that.

THE COURT: Okay. Just be careful what you say is all I'm say-
ing. Be cautious about it.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 317

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 311 (2016)]

{2] Next, the State contends that the Court of Appeals’ analysis regard-
ing the propriety of the prosecutor's closing arguments was flawed.
Specifically, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in relying
on State v. Millsaps, 169 N.C. App. 340, 610 S.E.2d 437 (2005), and distin-
guishing State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 367 S.E.2d 626 (1988). We disagree.

Closing arguments must “(1) be devoid of counsel's personal opin-
ion; (2) avoid name-calling and/or references to matters beyond the
record; (3) be premised on logical deductions, not on appeals to passion
or prejudice; and (4) be constructed from fair inferences drawn only
from evidence properly admitted at trial.” Jones, 355 N.C. at 135, 558
§.E.2d at 108; see State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 318, 327-28, 226 S.E.2d
629, 640 (1976) (stating that counsel “may argue to the jury the facts in
evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom together
with the relevant law so as to present his side of the case” (citations
omitted)). “Improper remarks are those calculated to lead the jury
astray,” such as “references to matters outside the record.” Jones, 355
N.C. at 133, 558 S.E.2d at 108. Additionally, “[iJncorrect statements of
Jaw in closing arguments are improper.” State v. Ratliff, 341 N.C. 610,
616, 461 S.E.2d 325, 328 (1995).

Pursuant to section 15A-1321, if a jury finds a defendant not guilty
by reason of insanity, the trial court must order that the defendant be
civilly committed. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1321 (2015). Within fifty days of com-
mitment, the trial court must provide the defendant with a hearing, id.
§ 122C-268.1(a) (2015), and if, at that time, the defendant shows “by a
preponderance of the evidence” that she “(i) no longer has a mental ill-
ness” or “(ii) is no longer dangerous to others,” the court will release
the defendant, id. § 122C-268.1(i) (2015). A defendant is “dangerous to
others” when

within the relevant past, the individual has inflicted or
attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily
harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to cre-
ate a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or
has engaged in extreme destruction of property; and that
there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be
repeated. Previous episodes of dangerousness to others,
when applicable, may be considered when determining
reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct. Clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that an individual has
committed a homicide in the relevant past is prima facie
evidence of dangerousness to others.

Id. § 122C-3(11)(b) (2015) (emphasis added).

318 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON
{369 N.C. 311 (2016)]

“During closing arguments, attorneys are given wide latitude to
pursue their case.” State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 237, 570 S.E.2d 440,
472 (2002) (citing State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 318, 343, 471 S.E.2d 605, 623
(1996)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986, 155 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2003). These argu-
ments, however, “must be viewed in context and in light of the overall
factual circumstances to which they refer.” State v. Locklear, 363 N.C.
438, 477, 681 S.B.2d 293, 320 (2009) (Brady, J., dissenting) (quoting State
v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 626, 651 S.E.2d 867, 877 (2007), cert. denied, 555
U.S. 835, 172 L. Ed. 2d 58 (2008)). If a prosecutor's argument regarding
a defendant's release after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity
is not supported by a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence
presented at trial, then such an argument is improper. See Millsaps, 169
N.C. App. 340, 610 S.E.2d 437.

In Millsaps the defendant raised an insanity defense to first-degree
murder and other related charges. Id. at 341, 610 S.E.2d at 438. Evidence
presented at trial indicated that the defendant's mental illness could be
treated, but not cured, and that the defendant would probably always
need to be hospitalized. Id. at 348, 610 S.E.2d at 442. During closing argu-
ments, the prosecutor said, “We submit it’s 99 percent certain that [a
judge] someday can and will say that, oh that conviction was six or eight
or ten years ago, that’s irrelevant, release him.” Id. at 345, 610 S.E.2d at,

_441. Using an abuse of discretion standard, the court in Millsaps deter-
mined that the prosecutor's statements constituted error because they
were outside the evidence presented at trial and held that they were
“impermissibly prejudicial.” Id. at 348, 610 S.B.2d at 442-43.

Here, as in Millsaps, the evidence presented at trial does not sup-
port the assertions made by the prosecutor during closing arguments.
Specifically, the evidence does not support the conclusion that if defen-
dant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, it is “very possible” that
she would be released in fifty days. Instead, the evidence demonstrated.
that defendant will suffer from mental illness and addiction “for the
rest of her life,” and that “defendant's risk of recidivism would signifi-
cantly increase if she were untreated and resumed her highly unstable
lifestyle.” State v. Dalton, ___ N.C. App. __, __, 776 S.E.2d 545, 551
(2015) (discussing Dr. Corvin’s testimony). The State did not present
any expert evidence at trial to rebut these conclusions. Additionally, the
homicide for which defendant was convicted is prima facie evidence of
dangerousness to others. N.C.G.S. § 122C-3(11)(b). Therefore, the only
reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence presented at trial is
that it is highly unlikely that defendant would be able to demonstrate by
a preponderance of the evidence within fifty days that she is no longer
dangerous to others.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 319

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 311 (2016)

We reject the State’s contention that Millsaps is distinguishable from
the facts of this case. In essence, Millsaps stands for the proposition
that counsel's argument regarding the likelihood of a defendant's release
after being found not guilty by reason of insanity must be supported by
the evidence. The level of possibility or probability of release is not the
salient issue; rather, it is the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from that evidence which govern counsel's arguments in
closing. This Court’s prior decisions do not support the State’s possibil-
ity versus probability dichotomy, and we decline to recognize such a
dichotomy at this time.

This Court also disagrees with the State’s argument that Allen gov-
erns the disposition of this case. In Allen the defendant raised the defense
of insanity to charges of first-degree murder and first-degree arson. 322
N.C. at 180-82, 367 S.E.2d at 628-29. During closing arguments, the prose-
cutor contended that if the jury found the defendant not guilty by reason
of insanity, then the defendant “might be released within ninety days.” Id.
at 194, 367 S.E.2d at 636. This Court found that the prosecutor erred by
“misstat[ing] the maximum recommitment period,” but concluded that
such “misstatement did not rise to the level of prejudicial error.” Id. at
195, 367 S.E.2d at 637. This Court did not, however, address whether the
evidence presented at trial supported the argument. Despite the State’s
contention, this Court's silence on the issue of likelihood of release
does not support a conclusion that this Court condoned the statement.
Because Allen only addressed a misstatement of law made during clos-
ing arguments and not a misapplication of the facts, it is distinguishable
from the instant case.

[8] Finally, the State contends that the Court of Appeals’ analysis regard-
ing prejudice was flawed because defendant cannot show “a reason-
able possibility” that a different result would have been reached at trial
had the error not been committed. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1448(a) (2015).
We disagree.

“Improper remarks may be prejudicial either because of their indi-
vidual stigma or because of the general tenor of the argument as a
whole.” Jones, 355 N.C. at 133, 558 S.E.2d at 108. Here the overwhelming
evidence demonstrated that defendant committed the violent acts for
which she was convicted and that she had a long-standing history of

4. The closing arguments at issue in Allen were reviewed for gross impropriety.
Allen, 322 N.C. at 195, 867 8.H.2d at 636-37.

320 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 311 (2016)]

substance abuse and mental illness. By improperly presenting to the jury
that it was “very possible” that defendant would be released in fifty days,
the prosecutor prejudiced defendant by persuading the jury against a
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Therefore, a reasonable pos-
sibility exists that the jury would have found defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity if the prosecutor had not made the improper remarks
during closing arguments.

We hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals correctly applied the
abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the prosecutor's closing
arguments. The prosecutor's arguments exaggerating the likelihood of
defendant's release if found not guilty by reason of insanity constituted
prejudicial error because they were not supported by the evidence. For
the reasons stated, we affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

AFFIRMED.
Justice JACKSON concurring.

Although I concur in the majority opinion, I write separately to
emphasize the impropriety of the prosecutor's jury argument discourag-
ing a potential verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

In any case in which a criminal defendant pleads not guilty by rea-
son of insanity, evidence necessarily will be presented that the defen-
dant has mental illness and that the mental illness had a causal role in
the defendant’s criminal behavior. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 293 N.C. 413,
425, 238 S.E.2d 482, 490 (1977) (“[T]he test of insanity as a defense to a
criminal charge is whether the accused, at the time of the alleged act,
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease or deficiency
of the mind, as to be incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the
act, or, if he does know this, was, by reason of such defect of reason,
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to such
act.” (citing, inter alia, State v. Humphrey, 283 N.C. 570, 196 S.E.2d
516, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1042 (1978))). Because the defendant has the
burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity, State v. Wetmore,
298 N.C. 743, 746-47, 259 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1979), even the defendant's
own attorney may provide evidence that the defendant's mental ilIness
caused him or her to engage in conduct that a jury might find shocking
or reprehensible. Consequently, this Court has acknowledged that juries
may feel “fear for the safety of the community” in cases involving the
insanity defense. See State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 15, 224 S.E.2d 595,
604 (1976).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 321

STATE v. DALTON,
[369 N.C. 811 (2016)}

In Hammonds, a case decided before contemporary procedures
dealing with a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity were put in place,
this Court explained that “fear for the safety of the community” could
motivate a jury to “insure that [a] defendant will be incarcerated for his
own safety and the safety of the community at large.” Jd. at 15, 224 S.B.2d
at 603-04. We noted that “[t]here was considerable evidence that [the]
defendant was incapable of knowing right from wrong at the time [of the
crime], and also evidence that his mental condition would worsen with
age.” Id. at 15, 224 S.E.2d at 603. We explained:

[A]lthough the jury understands that a verdict of guilty
means the defendant will be punished by a prison sen-
tence or fine, and that a verdict of not guilty means the
defendant will go free, the average jury does not know
what a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity will mean
to the defendant. This uncertainty may lead the jury to
convict the accused in a mistaken belief that he will be set
free if an insanity verdict is returned.

Id. at 14, 224 S.E.2d at 603. In Hammonds the district attorney had
stated during closing arguments that a finding of not guilty by reason
of insanity would result in the defendant's “walk[ing] out of this court-
room not guilty, returned to this community.” Id. at 11, 224 S.E.2d at
601. Although the trial court sustained the defendant’s objection to
the State’s argument, the court refused the defendant’s request for an
instruction explaining the statutory procedure for commitment follow-
ing a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Jd. at 11, 224 S.E.2d at
601. We concluded that “the fate of [the] defendant, should he be acquit-
ted by reason of insanity, became a central and confusing issue in the
arguments of counsel.” Jd. at 13, 224 S.E.2d at 602. Emphasizing “[t]he
atmosphere . . . of confusion and of uncertainty” that pervaded the trial,
we granted the defendant a new trial and held “that, upon request, a
defendant who interposes a defense of insanity to a criminal charge is
entitled to an instruction by the trial judge setting out in substance the
commitment procedures . . . applicable to acquittal by reason of mental
illness.” Jd. at 15, 224 S.E.2d at 604.

Here, in accordance with Hammonds, the trial court instructed the
jury on the relevant commitment procedures. The trial court stated:

The defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity
shall immediately be committed to a State mental facil-
ity. After the defendant has been automatically commit-
ted, the defendant shall be provided a hearing within 50

322 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON.
[369 N.C. 811 (2016)]

days. At this hearing the defendant shall have the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant no longer has a mental illness or is no longer
dangerous to others. If the court is so satisfied, it shall
order the defendant discharged and released. If the court
finds that the defendant has not met the defendant’s bur
den of proof, then it shall order that inpatient commit-
ment continue for a period not to exceed 90 days. This
involuntary commitment will continue subject to periodic
review until the court finds that the defendant no longer
has a mental illness or is no longer dangerous to others.

Neverthless, even with the additional instructions required by
Hammonds, uncertainty remains as to how long a defendant will be
committed if acquitted by reason of insanity. A juror has no way to esti-
mate the likelihood that the defendant could be released at the hearing
that must be provided “before the expiration of 50 days from the date of
his commitment.” N.C.G.S. § 122C-268.1(a) (2015). As in Hammonds, a
juror who believes the evidence of insanity might nevertheless be moti-
vated to find the defendant guilty based on fear for the safety of the com-
munity. In light of the unique uncertainty involved in a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity, it is inappropriately inflammatory for a prosecutor
to speculate about the possibility that a defendant who was found not
guilty by reason of insanity could be released after a short period of time.

Other courts have considered this issue and have shed light on its
unique nature. See, e.g., Dunn v. State, 277 Ala. 39, 43, 166 So. 2d 878,
882 (1964) (reversing the defendant's murder conviction after the solici-
tor argued that “if [the jury] sent this defendant as an insane man up to
Tuscaloosa, the State mental institution, he wouldn’t stay up there more
than ten days”); People v. Castro, 5 Cal. Rptr. 906, 908-09, 182 Cal. App.
2d 255, 259-60 (1960) (evaluating the district attorney's remarks that
“[ilf your verdict comes back legally [in]sane . . . just as soon as he regains
his sanity, he is released” and that “he will be snubbing his nose at the
Court, the jury and the Police Department,” and concluding that these
remarks “were patently misconduct” and constituted “a direct appeal to
passion and prejudice”); see also Durham v. United States, 237 F.2d 760,
762 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (“The judge’s statement that the defendant would
‘be released very shortly’ was highly prejudicial, for it implied a warning
that dire consequences might result from a finding that the defendant
was not guilty by reason of insanity.”). In State v. Johnson, 267 S.W.2d
642 (Mo. 1954), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 957 (1956), and cert. denied, 357
U.S. 922 (1958), the prosecutor argued in pertinent part that if the jury

IN THE SUPREME COURT 323

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 311 (2016)]

found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, “he would be out
in two months.” Jd. at 645. The Missouri Supreme Court concluded
that the prosecutor “was attempting to engender in the minds of the
jurors the fear that if [the] defendant were acquitted on his defense of
insanity, [he] would be soon discharged to rape again.” Id. The court
stated that the effect of the argument was “to incite the jury”-and to
urge the jury to make a decision “without reference to . . . the evidence
tending to prove or disprove that [the] defendant was insane.” Jd. The
court reversed the defendant's convictions. Id. at 646.

In People v. Stack, 244 Ill. App. 3d 166, 618 N.E.2d 1175, appeal
denied, 151 Ill. 2d 574, 616 N.E.2d 345 (1993), the prosecutor stated that
a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity would allow the defendant
to “beat this case” and “get[ ] out the door.” Jd. at 170, 613 N.E.2d at
1178. The Illinois appellate court stated that “[t]hese types of comments
could only play on an insanity jury's inherent fear that its verdict might
set a dangerous man free.” Id. at 171-72, 613 N.E.2d at 1179. The court
explained that regardless of whether a prosecutor’s-comments suggest.
“an automatic release, an immediate release in the near future, or one
sometime down the road,” “[aJll such comments have the same prejudi-
cial effect in insanity cases, and all are not to be tolerated.” Id. at 177,
613 N.E.2d at 1182.

In the case sub judice the prosecutor told the jury it was “very
possible” that defendant could be released within fifty days if the jury
returned such a verdict. While the prosecutor accurately also mentioned
the finding that would have to be made before such a release became
possible, the argument implied that such a finding was routine.

Instead, history shows that few who are acquitted of murder or
another serious crime on the grounds of insanity are released shortly
after their acquittal. One need look no further than the case of John
Hinkley, Jr., who was acquitted in 1982 on the basis of insanity of shoot-
ing President Ronald Reagan and three others, but was not released
from institutional psychiatric care until 2016. Gardiner Harris, John
Hinckley, Who Tried to Kill Reagan, Will Be Released, N.Y. Times (July
27, 2016), http://;www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/hinckley-who-tried-
to-kill-reagan-to-be-released.html. Closer to home, Michael Hayes was
not released completely until 2012 following his 1989 acquittal on the _
basis of insanity of four murders in Forsyth County. Michael Hewlett,
For first time in 20 years, Michael Hayes is free of court supervision,
Winston-Salem J. (Mar. 1, 2012) http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/
for-first-time-in-years-michael-hayes-is-free-of/article_d5514c21-a980-
5bf3-934e-53b3e76e8c05.html.

824 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 311 (2016)]

A prosecutor may aptly oppose a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity, but the argument should neither distort the process that follows
such a verdict nor pander to the emotions of the jurors. The suggestion
here that defendant could “very well” soon walk scot-free was inaccu-
rate, misleading, and prejudicial. Accordingly, I join in the majority's
conclusion that the prosecutor's argument in this case was improper.

Justices EDMUNDS and ERVIN join in this concurring opinion.
Chief Justice MARTIN dissenting.

Defendant entered her neighbors’ home early one morning and
repeatedly stabbed one person, who lived, and another person, who
died. At trial, a jury rejected defendant's insanity defense and convicted
her of first-degree murder and other offenses. The majority grants defen-
dant a new trial because it misreads a statement by the prosecutor that
actually had no prejudicial effect. And the concurring opinion adds to
the confusion by injecting a legal concept (preventing prosecutors from
leading the jury away from the evidence and appealing to its passions)
that has little or no bearing on this case.

When the prosecutor made the statement at issue here during his
closing argwment, he was discussing what could happen if the jury found
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. The prosecutor said: “And
it is very possible that in 50 days, if she shows by a preponderance of
the evidence that she is not a threat to anyone else or herself, she will
be back home. . . . She very well could be back home in less than two
months.”! This statement was nearly correct, but it did slightly misstate
the law. When a defendant who has allegedly inflicted or attempted to
inflict serious physical injury or death is found not guilty by reason of
insanity, state law requires that she be committed to civil confinement,
see N.C.G.S. § 15A-1321(b) (2015), and that, once committed, the now-
respondent will have a hearing within fifty days, id. § 122C-268.1(a)
(2015). At this hearing, if the respondent proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that (1) she “no longer has a mental illness” or (2) she “is
no longer dangerous to others,” the court “shall order the respondent

1. _Ascan be seen in the majority's quotation from the record, in the language omitted
by the ellipsis, defense counsel made an objection that the trial court overruled. Defendant
did not object to the portion of the statement that the prosecutor made after the ellipsis.
Both defendant and the majority maintain that the objection should carry over to that por-
tion for the purposes of the standard of review. I am inclined to agree, but it follows that,
the statement needs to be reviewed as a whole.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 325

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 811 (2016)]

discharged and released.” Jd. § 122C-268.1(i) (2015). So one way for a
respondent to be released from civil confinement is to show that she
is no longer dangerous to others. Had the prosecutor merely said that,
it would have been a correct statement of law. But the addition of the
words “or herself” made his statement incorrect. A respondent in a civil
commitment hearing does not have to prove that she is not dangerous to
herself—only that she is not dangerous to others. Because “[iJncorrect.
statements of law in closing arguments are improper,” State v. Ratliff,
841 N.C. 610, 616, 461 S.E.2d 325, 328 (1995), the prosecutor’s statement
‘was improper.

The trial court’s decision not to sustain defendant’s objection to this
statement, however, is reversible only if the statement was prejudicial.
See id. at 616-18, 461 S.E.2d at 328-29. Prejudice exists when a state-
ment creates “a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not
been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial
.... The burden of showing such prejudice . . . is upon the defendant.”
Id. at 617, 461 S.E.2d at 329 (alterations in original) (quoting N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-1448(a) (1988), which has not been amended since then). The
statement that the prosecutor made here was not prejudicial at all, for
two reasons.

First, the prosecutor's statement was nearly accurate, and to the
extent that it was inaccurate, the inaccuracy cut against the very argu-
ment that the prosecutor was making. The prosecutor was trying to argue
that defendant could be free within fifty days after being acquitted by rea-
son of insanity, if she proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she

, Was no longer dangerous to others (which, by law, is true). The prosecu-
tor’s only error was to add an extra hurdle for defendant to prove, which
made it sound to the jury like she had to prove more than she really did.
Because this error could only have hurt the prosecutor's argument, there
is not a reasonable possibility that, in the error’s absence, the trial would
have resulted in something other than a guilty verdict.

Second, we have repeatedly held, “as a general rule, [that] a trial
court cures any prejudice resulting from a prosecutor's misstatements
of law by giving a proper instruction” about that area of the law “to the
jury.” State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 626, 651 S.E.2d 867, 877 (2007) (citing
‘State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 452, 509 S.E.2d 178, 194 (1998), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 835 (1999), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 835 (2008); see also, ¢.g.,
State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 238, 464 S.E.2d 414, 437 (1995); State
v. Harris, 290 N.C. 681, 695-96, 228 S.E.2d 437, 445 (1976). In this case,
the trial court followed the pattern jury instruction and instructed the
jury as follows:

326 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON:
[369 N.C. 811 (2016)]

The defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity
shall immediately be committed to a State mental facil-
ity. After the defendant has been automatically commit-
ted, the defendant shall be provided a hearing within 50
days. At this hearing the defendant shall have the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant no longer has a mental illness or is no longer
dangerous to others. If the [hearing] court is so satisfied,
it shall order the defendant discharged and released.

Thus, the trial court correctly instructed the jury about what defen-
dant would have to prove at her civil commitment hearing if the jury
found her not guilty by reason of insanity. So even if the prosecutor's
minor misstatement of law about what defendant would have had to
show at her hearing had been at all harmful to her (which, as I have
shown, it was not), it would have been cured by the trial court's proper
jury instruction.

Based on these two reasons, this Court should reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings. But by misreading the prosecutor's statement, the
majority is effectively analyzing the facts of a case that does not exist.

First of all, when framing the issue in this case, the majority refers
to “the prosecutor's closing arguments exaggerating a defendant's likeli-
hood of being released from civil confinement” after being acquitted by
reason of insanity. Later in its opinion, it refers to “[t]he prosecutor's
arguments exaggerating the likelihood of defendant's release if found
not guilty by reason of insanity.” The majority thus seems to interpret
the phrase “very possible” to mean something like “probable” or “likely.”
But this misunderstands what the phrase means. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “possibility” as “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being con-
ceivable in theory or in practice.” Possibility, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014). And the word “very” is simply a word of emphasis; when
combined with “possible,” it is essentially a synonym of “actually,” as in
“actually possible” or “very well could be.”2 Nowhere does the prosecu-
tor say that anything is “probable” or “likely.”3

2, Indeed, the prosecutor followed up his “very possible” statement with the state-
ment that defendant “very well could be back home in less than two months” if she could
prove her case.

3. The concurring opinion claims that the prosecutor's statement “implied that... a
finding {resulting in release from civil confinement in 50 days] was routine.” But I see no
basis for this inference, and the concurrence does not provide any.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 327

STATE v. DALTON
(369 N.C. 311 (2016)]

That gets to an even more basic problem with the majority’s reading
of the prosecutor's statement: it incorrectly identifies what the prosecu-
tor said was “very possible.” The majority paraphrases the prosecutor as
saying that, “if defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity, it is
‘very possible’ that defendant would be released in fifty days,” and that
“it is ‘very possible’ that defendant will be able to show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in fifty days that she is no longer dangerous to oth-
ers.” (Emphases added.) But as it is plain to see, the prosecutor actually
said nothing about the likelihood that defendant would win her hearing.
He merely said that she would win her hearing if she proved her case.
And except in the one particular that I have already discussed, the state-
ment of law that followed the words “very possible that” was not only
possible, but certain.4 To the extent that this statement was improper,
it was because the prosecutor got the law wrong, not because he said
anything at all about the likelihood of defendant’s release.

Given the certainty of the statute (“shall order the respondent . . .
released,” N.C.G.S. § 1220-268.1()), one might wonder why the pros-
ecutor would have limited his statement of law with the words “very
possible.” On the record before us, the most likely reason for his use
of those words is that he was responding to the trial judge’s instruction
at the charge conference. During that conference, when the prosecutor
asked whether he could comment on the commitment procedures that
follow a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,® the trial judge said,
“Okay.” But he then instructed the prosecutor, “Just be careful what you
say is all ’'m saying. Be cautious about it.” By hedging his statement with
the words “very possible,” the prosecutor appears to have been trying to
heed what the trial judge said.

Once one recognizes where the majority has gone wrong, it becomes
clear why the majority mistakenly asks whether the prosecution’s

4. The concurring opinion says that “it is inappropriately inflammatory for a pros-
ecutor to speculate about the possibility that a defendant who was found not guilty by
reason of insanity could be released after a short period of time.” Of course, if what the
prosecutor said was an inflammatory “appeal| } to [the] jury's passions,” State v. Jones, 355
N.C. 117, 129, 558 S.E.2d 97, 105 (2002), then the pattern jury instruction about insanity
verdicts, and indeed the law itself in this area, is inflammatory as well.

5. Under this Court's holding in State v. Hammonds, when a defendant requests an
instruction on the commitment procedure and proceedings that follow a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity, and has presented evidence to support that verdict, the trial
court must provide the appropriate instruction. 290 N.C. 1, 15, 224 S.E.2d 595, 604 (1976).
Defendant did so here, and the trial court complied with Hammonds by agreeing to issue
and then properly issuing the instruction.

328 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. DALTON
[369 N.C. 311 (2016))

(slightly inaccurate) statement of law is a reasonable inference from the
evidence presented at trial—namely, because the majority has misun-
derstood what the prosecutor said. The prosecutor's statement did not
draw any inference from the evidence; setting aside the words “or her-
self,” the prosecutor made a statement of law that could be made about
any defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity.

Proceeding from the premise that the prosecutor said something
he did not say, the majority comments that “the only reasonable infer-
ence to be drawn from the evidence presented at trial is that it is highly
unlikely that defendant would be able to demonstrate by a preponder-
ance of the evidence within fifty days that she is no longer dangerous
to others.” Even this conclusion is likely mistaken. There are arguably
no reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence pro-
duced at trial about the results of defendant's future civil commitment
hearing. The body of evidence produced at the two proceedings may
not be—indeed, likely will not be—very similar. For instance, the major-
ity discusses the testimony of Dr. Corvin, one of defendant's experts.
But defendant would not have to tender Dr. Corvin as an expert in a
future hearing. She could retain a new expert to evaluate her condition,
who might reach different conclusions from Dr. Corvin. In fact, because
defendant's goal at her civil commitment hearing would be to show that,
she was not insane, or at least that she was no longer dangerous to oth-
ers in spite of her insanity, she would likely seek to offer different evi-
dence at her hearing than she did at her trial. To be sure, it is concerning
when either a defendant or the State engages in speculation as to the
outcome of a future hearing, as the majority (incorrectly) accuses the
State of doing in this case—and I fear that Hammonds instructions may
invite this behavior.

The concurring opinion, meanwhile, does not accuse the prosecu-
tor of speculation. Under its logic, though, a defendant can request and
receive a Hammonds instruction, but the prosecutor cannot discuss
that instruction in his closing statement. That ruling would prohibit the
prosecutor from arguing the whole case—the law as well as the facts—
even though he is legally entitled to do so. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-97 (2015)
(‘In jury trials the whole case as well of law as of fact may be argued
to the jury.”). Ironically, the concurrence does not seem to be con-
cerned when the defense counsel argues the whole case, including the
Hammonds instruction, which defense counsel did here. What is good
for the goose should be good for the gander.

Finally, the majority wrongly invokes the Court of Appeals’ decision
in State v. Millsaps, 169 N.C. App. 340, 610 S.E.2d 437 (2005), to support

IN THE SUPREME COURT 329

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 329 (2016))

its argument. The prosecutor's statement during his closing argument
in Millsaps could hardly be more different from the prosecutor's state-
ment here. In Millsaps, the prosecutor said that “it’s 99 percent certain
that [a] [j]udge someday can and will say that, oh that conviction was six
or eight or ten years ago, that’s irrelevant, release him.” Id. at 345, 610
§.E.2d at 441. That statement forecast a very high likelihood of release
as the result of a hearing many years in the future. Here, by contrast, the
prosecutor did not predict defendant's likelihood of release at all. Saying
that it is very possible a defendant will be released if she proves her case
is not comparable to saying that it is nearly certain a defendant will be
released in six to ten years without any conditions attached. One state-
ment is a comment on what the law purportedly requires; the other i isa
prediction about the outcome of a future proceeding.

Both the majority opinion and the concurring opinion have inad-
vertently distorted this case. The majority has created imaginary facts,
while the concurrence has reimagined the law. In reality, the statement
that defendant challenges was not prejudicial. I respectfully dissent.

Justice NEWBY joins in this dissenting opinion.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
COREY DEON FLOYD

No. 474PA14
Filed 21 December 2016

1, Assault—attempted—recognized in N.C.

Reversing a portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the offense of attempted assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury is recognized in North
Carolina. Although there was precedent that an attempted assault
was an attempt of an attempt for which one may not be indicted,
there were two common law rules under which a person could be
prosecuted for assault. The second, the show-of-violence rule, did
not involve an attempt to cause injury to another person. Because
the attempted assault offense is recognized offense, defendant's
2005 conviction was valid, and the trial court did not err by denying
defendant's motion to dismiss the charges of possession of a firearm
by a felon and attaining habitual felon status.

330 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C, 329 (2016)]

2. Constitutional Law—effective assistance of counsel—dis-
agreement over tactics
A prosecution was remanded to the Court of Appeals with entry
of an order dismissing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
without prejudice to assert in a motion for appropriate relief where
defendant told the trial court that his attorney was not asking the
questions defendant wanted him to ask of a detective, the record did
not shed light on the nature and substance of the questions, defen-
dant was generally disruptive throughout trial, and it could not be
ascertained whether defendant had a serious disagreement with his
attorney regarding trial strategy or whether he simply sought to hin-
der the proceedings.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.

Justice NEWBY concurring.
Justice BEASLEY concurring in part and dissenting in part.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 74-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, 238 N.C. App. 110, 766 S.E.2d 361
(2014), vacating in part judgments entered on 30 October 2013 by Judge
Jack W. Jenkins in Superior Court, Lenoir County, finding error in defen- *
dant’s conviction for possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and
remanding for a new trial on that charge. Heard in the Supreme Court
on 31 August 2015.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Marilyn G. Ozer for defendant-appellee.
JACKSON, Justice.

In this case we consider whether a prior conviction for “attempted
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury” can support later
charges for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and attaining
habitual felon status. We also consider whether defendant is entitled
to anew trial on the basis that the trial court failed to act appropriately to
address an impasse between defendant and his attorney concerning the
questioning of a prosecution witness on cross-examination. We answer

IN THE SUPREME COURT 331

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 329 (2016)]

the first inquiry in the affirmative. As to the second, we vacate the Court
of Appeals’ opinion and remand for entry of an order dismissing defen-
dant’s appeal without prejudice to his right to file a motion for appropri-
ate relief.

On. 16 October 2008, Kinston police received information that a
man was “hanging” in a specific area of town while “carrying around”
a“sawed-off shotgun. ..in his pants.” Upon reaching the scene and seeing
the man—whom one of the officers recognized as defendant—officers
began chasing him. Detective Robbie Braswell, who was directly behind
defendant, observed defendant pull a shotgun from the waistband of his
pants and throw it over a fence into a yard. Detective Braswell stopped
chasing defendant and secured the weapon.

Defendant was arrested approximately two years later. On 31
January 2011, defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and attain-
ing habitual felon status. The indictment for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon listed the underlying felony as “N.C.G.S. 14[-]82(a)
Attempted Assault With a Deadly Weapon Inflicting Serious Injury,”
with defendant having “pled guilty on December 5, 2005,” for which
he was “sentenced to 25-30 months in the North Carolina Department
of Corrections.”! This conviction also was listed in the habitual felon
indictment as one of the three prior felony offenses required to sup-
port a finding of habitual felon status. Defendant pleaded not guilty to
all charges.

The case proceeded to trial in October 2013. The State submitted
a copy of the 5 December 2005 judgment showing the prior conviction

1. Section 14-82 describes three different types of felonious assault with a deadly
‘weapon and assigns varying punishment levels to each as follows:

(@) Any person who assaults another person with a deadly
weapon with intent to ldll and inflicts serious injury shall be punished
asa Class C felon.

(6) Any person who assaults another person with a deadly
weapon and inflicts serious injury shall be punished as a Class E felon.

(© Any person who assaults another person with a deadly
‘weapon with intent to kill shall be punished as a Class E felon.

N.C.GS. § 14-82 (2015). Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with

intent to kill inflicting serious injury pursuant to section 14-32(a), but ultimately pleaded

no contest to “attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.” He was
+ punished as a Class F felon.

332 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[869 N.C. 329 (2016)]

for attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.
At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge for insufficiency of
the evidence on grounds that the underlying felony conviction listed
in the indictment as the basis for this charge, attempted assault with a
deadly weapon, is not a recognized crime in North Carolina. In addition
to the 5 December 2005 judgment, the State submitted copies of two
other prior felony conviction judgments in support of the habitual felon
charge. Defendant moved to dismiss the habitual felon charge on the
same grounds, asserting that the 5 December 2005 felony conviction is
invalid. The trial court denied both motions. The jury found defendant
guilty of possession of a weapon of mass destruction, possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, and attaining habitual felon status. The
trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of 151 to 191
months of imprisonment.

Defendant appealed. In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals
concluded that “attempted assault is not a recognized criminal offense
in North Carolina” and therefore that defendant's 2005 conviction for
attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury could
not support the convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon and attaining habitual felon status. Floyd, 238 N.C. App. at 115, 766
S.E.2d at 366. In pertinent part, the court reasoned:

In State v. Currence, 14 N.C. App. 263, 188 S.E.2d 10, cert.
denied, 281 N.C. 315, 188 S.E.2d 898-99, we . . . not[ed]
that an assault consists of “an overt act or attempt, or the
unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force and vio-
lence, to do some immediate physical injury to the per
son of another.” Id. at 265, 188 S.E.2d at 12 (quoting State
v. Roberts, 270 N.C. 655, 658, 155 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1967)).
As aresult, since the effect of an attempted assault verdict.
was to find the defendant guilty of an “attempt to attempt”
and since “[o]ne cannot be indicted for an attempt to com-
mit a crime where the crime attempted is in its very nature
an attempt,” id., we held that an attempted assault is sim-
ply not a recognized criminal offense in this jurisdiction.

Floyd, 238 N.C. App. at 114, 766 S.E.2d at 366 (second alteration in origi-
nal). Accordingly, the court held that the trial court erred by denying
defendant’s motions to dismiss the charges of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon and attaining habitual felon status. Id. at 127, 766
§.E.2d at 374.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[869 N.C. 829 (2016)}

Turning to the remaining charge of possession of a weapon of mass
destruction, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court failed to
identify and properly address an impasse that arose between defendant
and his trial counsel. The Court of Appeals determined that this fail-
ure violated defendant’s constitutional right to control the nature of his
defense and therefore granted defendant a new trial on this charge. Id.
at 127-28, 766 S.E.2d at 374. The State filed a petition for discretionary
review, which we allowed on 9 April 2015.

[1] In its appeal the State argues that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion
that attempted assault is not a recognized criminal offense in North’
Carolina was based upon an overly narrow definition of assault. As a
result, the State contends that the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that
defendant’s 2005 conviction for attempted assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury could not support the convictions for posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon and attaining habitual felon status.
We agree.

The offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon has
two essential elements: (1) the defendant has been convicted of a fel-
ony, and (2) the defendant subsequently possessed a firearm. N.C.G.S.
§ 14-415.1(a) (2015). A person may be charged with attaining habitual
felon status when he or she “has been convicted or pled guilty to three
felony offenses in any federal court or state court in the United States
or combination thereof.” Jd. § 14-7.1 (2015). In this case the State relied
upon defendant's 2005 conviction for attempted assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury to support charges against him pursu-
ant to these statutes. Accordingly, the validity of defendant's convictions
depends upon whether attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflict-
ing serious injury is recognized as a criminal offense pursuant to our
current law.

“The two elements of an attempt to commit a crime are: (1) An
intent to commit it, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose, going
beyond mere preparation, but falling short of the completed offense.”
State v. Powell, 277 N.C. 672, 678, 178 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1971) (citations
omitted). An attempt crime “is punishable under the next lower classifi-
cation as the offense which the offender attempted to commit.” N.C.G.S.
§ 14-2.5 (2015). As a logical matter, these principles may be applied to
the offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury in
a straightforward fashion. A person who intends to “assault[ ] another
person with a deadly weapon and inflict[ ] serious injury,” and who does
an overt act for that purpose going beyond mere preparation, but who

334 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 829 (2016)}

ultimately fails to complete all the elements of this offense—for exam-
ple, by failing to inflict a serious injury—would be guilty of the attempt
rather than the completed offense. N.C.G.S. § 14-32(b).

In Currence our Court of Appeals highlighted a different con-
sideration: this Court has indicated that a person “cannot be indicted
for an attempt to commit a crime where the crime attempted is in its
very nature an attempt.” 14 N.C. App. at 265, 188 S.E.2d at 12 (quoting
State v. Hewett, 158 N.C. 627, 629, 74 S.E. 356, 357 (1912)). The court
stated that

assault is generally defined as “an overt act or an attempt,
or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force
and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to the
person of another, which show of force or menace of vio-
lence must be sufficient to put a person of reasonable firm-
ness in fear of immediate bodily harm.”

Id. at 265, 188 S.E.2d at 12 (quoting Roberts, 270 N.C. at 658, 155 S.E.2d
at 305). The court then reasoned that attempted assault amounted
to “an attempt to attempt.” Id. at 265, 188 S.E.2d at 12 (quotation
marks omitted).

Initially, we note that reliance upon Hewett may be questionable
in this context because Hewett involved a substantially different legal
issue. The defendant in Hewett was charged in an indictment that failed
to allege his criminal intent. 158 N.C. at 628, 74 S.E. at 357. Nevertheless,
this Court concluded that by alleging that the defendant attempted to
commit rape, the indictment necessarily included the intent element. Id.
at 629, 74 S.E. at 357. As support for this conclusion, the Court stated:

practically all definitions of an attempt to commit a crime,
when applied to the particular crime of rape, necessarily
imply and include “an intent” to commit it.

There may be offenses when in their application
to them there is a distinction between “attempt” and
“intent,” but that cannot be true as applied to the crime of
rape. There is no such criminal offense as an “attempt to
commit rape.” It is embraced and covered by the offense
of “an assault with intent to commit rape,” and punished
as such.

As held by the Supreme Court of California, one can-
not be indicted for an attempt to commit a crime where
the crime attempted is in its very nature an attempt.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 335

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 329 (2016)]

Id. at 629, 74 S.E. at 357 (citing, inter alia, People v. Thomas, 63 Cal.
482, 482 (1883) (per curiam)).2 Since Hewett did not involve a defendant
who was “indicted for an attempt to commit a crime where the crime
attempted is in its very nature an attempt,” id. at 629, 74 S.E. at 357, this
statement is apparently dictum. In any event, because we conclude that,
attempted assault is not an attempt of an attempt, and thus does not
implicate the dicta in Hewett, we do not address the extent to which
Hewett may apply to other criminal offenses not at issue in the case
sub judice.

Specifically, we observe that by stating that attempted assault
amounts to “an attempt to attempt,” 14 N.C. App. at 265, 188 S.E.2d at
12, the court in Currence overlooked an important aspect of the law of
assault in North Carolina. Although our statutes criminalize the act
of assault, see, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 14-32.4(a) (2015), “[t]here is no statutory
definition of assault in North Carolina, and the crime of assault is gov-
erned by common law rules,” Roberts, 270 N.C. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305.
In Roberts we explained that our common law encompasses “two rules
under which a person may be prosecuted for assault in North Carolina.”
Id. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305 (citation omitted).

First, as Currence recognized, we noted that assault may be defined
as “an overt act or attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt,
with force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to the per-
son of another, which show of force or menace of violence must be suf-
ficient to put a person of reasonable firmness in fear of immediate bodily
harm.” Roberts, id. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305 (citations omitted) (quoting
1 Strong’s North Carolina Index: Assault and Battery § 4 (1957)). We
stated that this definition of assault “places emphasis on the intent or
state of mind of the person accused.” Id. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305.

Second, we described another definition of assault, which the Court
of Appeals did not acknowledge in Currence. Compare id. at 658, 155
S.E.2d at 305, with Currence, 14 N.C. App. at 265, 188 S.E.2d at 12.
We explained:

The decisions of the Court have, in effect, brought forth
another rule known as the “show of violence rule,” which

2. Although the 1912 decision in Hewett stated that “[iJhere is no such criminal
offense as an ‘attempt to commit rape,’ ” the offense of attempted rape is recognized in
our law today. See, e.g., State v. Wortham, 318 N.C. 669, 671, 351 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1987)
[T]he elements of attempted rape are (1) ‘the intent to commit the rape and [2] an overt
act done for that purpose... .’”) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Freeman, 307
N.C. 445, 449, 298 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1983))).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 829 (2016)]

places the emphasis on the reasonable apprehension
of the person assailed. The “show of violence rule” con-
sists of a show of violence accompanied by reasonable
apprehension of immediate bodily harm or injury on the
part of the person assailed which causes him to engage
in a course of conduct which he would not otherwise
have followed.

Roberts, 270 N.C. at 658, 155 S.H.2d at 305. Our jurisprudence regarding
the show-of-violence rule appears to have evolved from early cases in
which a person caused another to flee, leave a place sooner than desired,
or otherwise alter course through the threatened use of a weapon. See
State v. Rawles, 65 N.C. 334 (1871); State v. Church, 63 N.C. 15 (1868);
State v. Hampton, 63 N.C. 13 (1868). In State v. Shipman, 81 N.C. 513
(1879), one of the earliest cases in which this Court articulated the
show-of-violence rule, the evidence showed that the defendant had used
threatening language against another man and walked with a knife in his
hand to within six feet of where the other man was standing. Jd. at 514.
Upon seeing this threatening display, the other man became “alarmed”
and “left immediately.” Id. at 516. In concluding that the defendant's
behavior constituted assault, this Court explained that the definition of
assault encompasses a. situation in which “persons having in their pos-
session dangerous weapons, by following and threatening [the victim],
put him in fear and induce him to go home sooner than he would have
done, or by a different road from that he was wont to go.” Id. at 515 (cit-
ing Ravwles, 65 N.C. 334).

As defined in Roberts, and as illustrated by Shipman, the show-of-
violence rule does not involve an attempt to cause injury to another per-
son, but is based upon a violent act or threat that causes fear in another
person. Accordingly, although North Carolina law provides one defini-
tion of assault that describes the offense in terms of “an overt act or an
attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt,” our common
law also provides a second definition that does not include any refer-
ence to attempt. Roberts, 270 N.C. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305. Attempted
assault is not an attempt of an attempt because assault may be defined
by the show-of-violence rule. Cf. State v. May, 137 Ariz. 183, 186, 669
P2d 616, 619 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that because the defendant
was charged pursuant to an Arizona statute that defines assault in terms
of “an act complete in itself and not an attempt to commit a different
crime,” “the academic arguments of whether criminal sanctions should
attach to an attempt to commit an attempt are inapplicable”); State
v. Music, 40 Wash. App. 423, 432, 698 P.2d 1087, 1093 (1985) (“ ‘Attempt

IN THE SUPREME COURT 337

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 329 (2016)]

to attempt’ problems may arise with respect to the first type of assault
because the attempt to commit a battery is an element of that type of
assault. . . . However, since there is no attempt element in the second
type of assault, a charge of attempted assault within that definition is not
an ‘attempt to attempt.’ ” (internal citation omitted)). We note that there
is substantial overlap between the two definitions of assault because an
overt act or attempt to do immediate physical injury to another person.
is likely to constitute a show of violence that causes fear and a change
of behavior. As a result, relying upon the show-of-violence rule to define
attempted assault does not create a significant limitation on the conduct
covered by this offense.

For these reasons, we hold that the offense of attempted assault
with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury is recognized in North
Carolina. We therefore reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opin-
ion concluding that attempted assault is not recognized in this state, that
defendant's 2005 conviction is a nullity, and that as a result, the trial
court erred by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charges of pos-
session of a firearm by a felon and attaining habitual felon status.?

[2] Next, the State argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly deter-
mined that defendant was entitled to a new trial based upon the trial
court’s alleged failure to recognize and address an impasse between
defendant and his attorney during the trial. At the conclusion of defense
counsel's cross-examination of Detective Braswell, defendant became
agitated because he did not believe defense counsel was asking the right
questions. Defendant stated, “I need to say something to the witness,”
began interrupting the trial judge, and then attempted to speak again,
at which point the judge directed the jury to step out of the courtroom.
After the jury had left the courtroom, this exchange took place:

[Defendant]: You won't ask him what I need to
ask him.

The Court: Thank you. All right, let the record reflect
that the twelve members of the jury and the alternate
juror have left the courtroom. Let the record reflect that
while the jurors were in here, [defendant] started asking
questions. I called [defense] counsel to the bench, asked

3. The State alternatively argues that even if attempted assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury is not a recognized offense, defendant cannot raise that challenge
at this stage in this proceeding because doing so would constitute an impermissible col-
lateral attack. Because we conclude that this offense is recognized in this state, we do not
reach the State's alternative argument.

338 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[869 N.C. 829 (2016)]

counsel .. . to go back and talk to [defendant], privately,
to determine what [defendant’s] questions were or what
[defendant] wanted to present to the jury. [Defense coun-
sel] attempted to do so. In the meantime, [defendant]
began speaking out on his own volition in the presence of
the jury, and so the Court immediately sent the jury out
of the courtroom.

And, [defendant], I can’t let you disrupt this trial, and
T've already warned you —

[Defendant]: Imean, I can --I can question the witness.

The Court: Your lawyer questions the witness. You
don’t ~

. Defendant]: Then I'll represent myself. I’m firing my
lawyer.

The Court: No. No, you can’t do that, I'm sorry.
Defendant]: See, I can represent myself.

The Court: No, I’m sorry. In my discretion, 'm not
allowing you to do that.

[Defendant]: I can represent myself. I can represent
myself. It ain’t — ain’t no kind of mess like that, because
he ain’t questioned him what I'm going to question him.

The Court: Well, you ask [defense counsel] what you
want him to ask the ~

[Defendant]: I done told him, and ain’t none of that.
stuff been done, and I’m going for the ~

The Court: You ask [defense counsel] what questions
you want to present to the witnesses in front of the jury.

The State then requested a determination regarding whether defendant
should be held in contempt and removed from the courtroom for mak-
ing repeated statements in front of the jury. The trial court instructed
defendant to wait his turn before speaking and admonished him to cease
engaging in disruptive behavior. Defendant made additional comments
regarding the questions he desired to pose to Detective Braswell:

[Defendant]: . . . I waited till it was our turn to ques-
-tion this witness, and now I ain’t even questioned him.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 339

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 329 (2016)]

The Court: Well, but the way the process works, you
don’t ask the questions, your attorney asks the questions.

[Defendant]: He didn’t ask -- I told him to ask him.
Things wasn’t stated. It was things I needed — I needed to
[sic] them to hear.

The Court: He is a professional. He is —
[Defendant]: The truth be told about —

The Court: -- very experienced. He knows what he’s
doing. The rnanner in which he asks questions is part of
the expertise provided by counsel. It’s part of the assis-
tance of counsel that’s provided. And you are not an attor-
ney, and you are relying on his assistan[ce].

[Defendant]: I know the law. I know the law.

The Court: ~ and you can talk to him and confer with
him and let him know what questions you think should be
asked, but he asks the questions, not you.

[Defendant]: He got - he got to ask them, then, and
put things out. That’s the thing, I'll represent myself. I
don’t even need a counsel.

The trial court again denied defendant’s request to represent himself and
ordered that he be removed from the courtroom in light of his disrup-
tive behavior throughout the trial, but stated that defense counsel would
be given frequent opportunities to consult with his client. Nonetheless,
before his removal, defendant continued to challenge his counsel's ques:
tioning of Detective Braswell:

[Defendant]: Well, see, I'll tell him the question, to ask
him something, and he don’t do it. Come on, man.

The Court: Sir, you're doing it now, and I have not
held you in contempt. In my discretion, I have not done
that. The State has not brought any obstruction charges —

[Defendant]: Well, I’m — I’m gonna give him — I'm
gonna have ~ I’m gonna talk to him so he can say what I
would say?

The Court: That’s how it works, sir.

[Defendant]: Exactly. And he didn’t do it. That’s what
Tm talking about.

340 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 829 (2016)]

The Court: Well, that’s between you and [your trial
counsel] —

[Defendant]: I’m gonna get another attorney.
The Court: — that’s not for me to interject.

The Court: I've given you ample opportunity to not
be disruptive, to assist in your defense while in the court-
room. It’s readily apparent to the Court that you're not
willing to do that.

The record does not disclose the nature of the questions defendant
wanted his attorney to ask Detective Braswell.

Defendant argues that the trial court’s failure to adequately address
the impasse between defendant and his counsel regarding the questions
to be asked of Detective Braswell, and the court’s failure to instruct
counsel to comply with defendant’s wishes at that time, amounted to
a denial of his constitutional rights to control his defense and confront
witnesses. Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that the
trial court's actions violated this Court's opinion in State v. Ali, 329 N.C.
304, 407 S.B.2d 183 (1991).

In Ali we recognized that tactical decisions, including how to con-
duct cross-examination, which jurors to strike, and the motions to be
made at trial are within the province of the attorney. Id. at 404, 407
S.E.2d at 189 (citation omitted). The defendant in Ali argued that “the
trial court denied him his right to assistance of counsel by allowing him,
rather than his lawyers, to make the final decision regarding whether [a
particular individual] would be seated as a juror.” Id. at 402, 407 S.E.2d
at 189. We stated that

when counsel and a fully informed criminal defendant
client reach an absolute impasse as to such tactical deci-
sions, the client's wishes must control; this rule is in
accord with the principal-agent nature of the attorney-
client relationship. In such situations, however, defense
counsel should make a record of the circumstances, her
advice to the defendant, the reasons for the advice, the
defendant's decision and the conclusion reached.

Id. at 404, 407 S.E.2d at 189. Because defense counsel in Ali made such a
record, we concluded that the defendant was not denied effective assis-
tance of counsel. Id. at 404, 407 S.E.2d at 189-90.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 341

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 829 (2016)]

We have stated that

[ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC)] claims brought
on direct review will be decided on the merits when
the cold record reveals that no further investigation is
required, i.e., claims that may be developed and argued
without such ancillary procedures as the appointment of
investigators or an evidentiary hearing. .. .

Accordingly, should the reviewing court determine
that IAC claims have been prematurely asserted on direct
appeal, it shall dismiss those claims without prejudice to
the defendant's right to reassert them during a subsequent
{motion for appropriate relief (MAR)] proceeding.

State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166-67, 557 S.E.2d 500, 524-25 (2001) (cita-
tions omitted), cert. denied, 585 U.S. 1114 (2002). Here, defendant told
the trial court that his attorney was not asking the questions defendant
told him to ask Detective Braswell; however, the record does not shed
any light on the nature or the substance of those desired questions. We
note that defendant was generally disruptive throughout trial, was forced
to leave the courtroom when this behavior escalated while Detective
Braswell was on the witness stand, and had to consult with his attorney
outside of court thereafter. In light of defendant’s disruptive behavior,
‘we cannot ascertain, without engaging in conjecture, whether defendant.
had a serious disagreement with his attorney regarding trial strategy or
whether he simply sought to hinder the proceedings. As a result, it can-
not be determined from the cold record whether an absolute impasse
existed as described in Ali. Accordingly, we vacate this portion of the
Court of Appeals’ opinion and remand this case to that court for entry of
an order dismissing defendant's IAC claim without prejudice to his right
to assert it in a motion for appropriate relief.

REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.

Justice NEWBY concurring.

I fully agree with the majority opinion. I write separately simply
to emphasize another way to understand the validity of the attempt

342, IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 829 (2016)]

crime at issue. It seems confusion has arisen because the term “assault”
sometimes refers to an attempted battery, but often in our criminal
code “assault” refers to a completed battery. Here the disputed crime
is attempted felonious assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury under N.C.G.S. § 14-32. In this context, the term “assault” does not
mean an attempted battery but requires a completed battery.

Section 14-32 describes three different types of felonious assault
with a deadly weapon and assigns varying punishment levels to each:

(a) Any person who assaults another person with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill and inflicts serious injury
shall be punished as a Class C felon.

(b) Any person who assaults another person with a deadly
weapon and inflicts serious injury shall be punished as
a Class E felon.

(c) Any person who assaults another person with a deadly
‘weapon with intent to kill shall be punished as a Class
E felon.

N.C.G.S. § 14-32 (2015).

In State v. Birchfield we recognized that the statutory definition of
“assault” under N.C.G.S. § 14-32 requires a completed battery:

To warrant the conviction of an accused of a feloni-
ous assault and battery under G.S. 14-32 . . . the State
must produce evidence sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that he did these four things: (1) That
he committed an assault and battery upon another; (2)
that he committed the assault and battery with a deadly
weapon; (8) that he committed the assault and battery
with intent to kill the victim of his violence; and (4) that
he thus inflicted on the person of his victim serious injury
not resulting in death.

235 N.C. 410, 418, 70 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1952) (emphases added) (citations omit-
ted) (upholding conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious bodily injury). Thus, while the statute uses the term “assault,”
it means “assault and battery” or a completed battery. See Williams
v. United States, No. 1:11CR408-1, 2014 WL 1608268, at *1 (M.D.N.C.
Apr. 22, 2014) (unpublished) (noting that “while other... cases suggest.
a definition of misdemeanor assault under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33... the
Birchfield definition of felony assault highlights the presence of a bat-
tery element”).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 343,

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 329 (2016)]

Assault and battery is commonly defined as “the act of threatening
to attack someone physically and then actually doing it.” Assault and
Battery, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). One who intends to
commit felonious assault and battery with a deadly weapon, and who
does an overt act for that purpose going beyond mere preparation, but
who ultimately fails to complete all the elements of this offense, would
be guilty of attempted felonious assault and battery under N.C.G.S.
§ 14-32 rather than the completed offense. See State v. Powell, 277 N.C.
672, 678, 178 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1971) (Proving “attempt” requires the State
to show that a defendant intended to commit the underlying crime and
committed “an overt act done for that purpose, going beyond mere prep-
aration, but falling short of the completed offense.”).

The record reflects that defendant, represented by counsel, pled
guilty to the offense of attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflict-
ing serious injury in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-32. Nevertheless, defen-
dant suggests that he should not be held accountable for a conviction.
based upon his own admissions and plea agreement and further asks
us to speculate.as to which of the elements under N.C.G.S. § 14-32 were
satisfied. Since we are dealing with a theoretical issue, the question is
simply whether under any scenario a defendant could be convicted of
attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury in viola-
tion of N.C.G.S. § 14-32. Because the statutory definition of “assault” as
used in N.C.G.S. § 14-32 requires a completed battery, one can be con-
victed of attempting to commit the offense.

Justice BEASLEY concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the judgment of the Court as to defendant’s challenge
to the right to control his defense in the cross-examination of Detective
Braswell. But, because I would conclude that attempted assault with
a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury is not a cognizable offense in
North Carolina, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on
this issue, and therefore, I respectfully dissent.

The issue before this Court is whether “attempted assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury” describes a cognizable felony
offense that can serve as an underlying felony conviction in a charge for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and for attaining habitual
felon status. I would hold that it is not for several reasons. First, the
statutory framework laid out by our General Assembly in Chapter 14,
Article 8 of the North Carolina General Statutes evidences the legis-
lature’s determination that one cannot be convicted of attempting an

344 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 829 (2016)]

“assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.” Second, I would
hold that the show-of-violence definition of assault is not applicable to
the term “assault” in “assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury.” Finally, I would conclude that the show-of-violence theory of
assault cannot be logically extended to include an inchoate crime—
namely, an attempt.

First, the statutory framework laid out in Chapter 14, Article 8 dem-
onstrates a legislative decision that attempted “assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury” is not a crime for which a defendant
may be convicted. Chapter 14, Article 8 was enacted to provide dif-
ferent punishments for varying degrees of the common law crime of
assault and not as an endeavor to “create separate and distinct crimi-
nal offenses.” State v. Lefler, 202 N.C. 700, 701, 163 S.E. 873, 874 (1932)
(‘The Legislature did not mean to create separate and distinct criminal
offenses, such as assault with [a] deadly weapon, assault with serious
damage, assault upon a woman when the man is over eighteen years of
age, or any other kind of assault which is aggravated in its circumstances
or [of] serious and lasting damage in its consequences.” (quoting State
v. Smith, 157 N.C. 578, 584, 72 S.E. 853, 855 (1911))). “There is but one
offense, the crime of assault, and the varying degrees of aggravation were
mentioned only for the purpose of graduating the punishment.” Id. at
701, 168 S.E. at 874 (quoting Smith, 157 N.C. at 584, 72 8.E. at 855 (1911)).

For example, subsection 14-32(b) states that “[aJny person who
assaults another person with a deadly weapon and inflicts serious injury
shall be punished as a Class E felon,” N.C.G.S. § 14-32(b) (2015) (empha-
sis added), and subdivision 14-33(c)(1) states that any person who com-
mits an assault and “[iJnflicts serious injury upon another person or uses
a deadly weapon” is “guilty of a Class Al misdemeanor,” id. § 14-33(c)
(1) (2015) (emphasis added). Under either statute a defendant would be
guilty of assault but, based on how the assault was carried out, would
be punished differently.

Here defendant was convicted in 2005 of attempted assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.! See id. § 14-32(b) (“Any person

1. Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to Kill
inflicting serious injury pursuant to subsection 14-32(a), but ultimately pleaded no contest
to “attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury” and was punished as
a Class F felon. Though the indictment against defendant in the present action states that
his previous felony conviction was under subsection 14-32(a), it appears defendant's 2005,
conviction was actually under subsection 14-32(b), as indicated by the language of what

IN THE SUPREME COURT 345,

STATE v. FLOYD
[869 N.C. 329 (2016)]

who assaults another person with a deadly weapon and inflicts seri-
ous injury shall be punished as a Class E felon.”). According to section
14-2.5, “[ulnless a different classification is expressly stated, an attempt
to commit a misdemeanor or a felony is punishable under the next
lower classification as the offense which the offender attempted to com-
mit.” Id. § 14-2.5 (2015). As such, defendant was punished as a Class F
felon. The conduct that would constitute an “attempt” to “assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury” is, however, subject to a differ-
ent classification covered by another assault statute, namely subdivision
14-33(c)(1). Therefore, defendant should not have been punished under
the provisions of N.C.G.S. §§ 14-32(b) and 14-2.5.

As the majority reiterates, an attempt is (1) an intent to commit an
act, and (2) “an overt act done for that purpose, going beyond mere prep-
aration, but falling short of the completed offense.” State v. Powell, 277
N.C. 672, 678, 178 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1971) (citations omitted). Because an
attempt occurs when the defendant's actions “fall[ ] short of the com-
pleted offense,” it follows that attempt necessitates that some element
of the crime is not complete. As applied to the crime of “assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious injury,”? the majority states:

As a logical matter, these principles may be applied to the
offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury in a straightforward fashion. A person who intends
to “assault[ ] another person with a deadly weapon and
inflict[ ] serious injury,” and who does an overt act for that,
purpose going beyond mere preparation, but who ulti-
mately fails to complete all the elements of this offense—
for example, by failing to inflict a serious injury—would
be guilty of the attempt rather than the complete offense.

Contrary to the majority's assertion, if a person “fails to complete
all of the elements of the offense—for example, by failing to inflict a
serious injury” or failing to use a deadly weapon—that person is guilty

he pleaded to as well as how he was punished. Thus, I use subsection 14-32(b), as does
the majority, as an illustration. However, the same rationale that follows can be applied to.
subsection 14-32(a), namely that any uncompleted element of that assault puts the offense
under another enumerated statute, and is not properly classified as an attempt to violate
that particular statute.

2. The elements of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury are “(1) an
assault (2) with a deadly weapon (3) inflicting serious injury (4) not resulting in death.”
State v. Wilson, 203 N.C. App. 110, 114, 689 $.B.2d 917, 920 (2010) (quoting State v. Woods,
126 N.C. App. 581, 592, 486 8.B.2d 256, 261 (1997).

346 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[869 N.C. 829 (2016)}

of the type of assault described in N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c)(1),? which is
an assault inflicting serious injury upon another person or by use of a
deadly weapon, and not an attempt to violate subsection 14-32(b).

The primary distinction between felonious assault under
G.S. § 1432 and misdemeanor assault under G.S. § 14-33
is that a conviction of felonious assault requires a showing
that a deadly weapon was used and serious injury resulted,
while if the evidence shows that only one of the two ele-
ments was present, ie., that either a deadly weapon was
used or serious injury resulted, the offense is punishable
only as a misdemeanor.

State v. Lowe, 150 N.C. App. 682, 685, 564 S.E.2d 313, 316 (2002) (quot-
ing State v. Owens, 65 N.C. App. 107, 110-11, 308 S.E.2d 494, 498 (1983))
(holding that it was plain error for the trial court not to instruct on mis-
demeanor assault inflicting serious injury under N.C.G.S. § 14-33 when
it was questionable whether fists and a toilet seat or lid were used as
deadly weapons).* Any “attempt” to “assault[ ] another person with
a deadly weapon and inflict{ ] serious injury” that “fall[s] short of the
completed offense” is, per the legislature’s determination, an assault
as described in another statute, such as misdemeanor assault. Thus, in
such a situation, a defendant should be convicted under the appropriate
assault statute and not under a theory of “attempt” of a different statute.

That a defendant should be convicted under the appropriate assault
statute is especially important given the legislature’s classifications of
various types of assault and their corresponding punishments. As stated
above, a person who violates subsection 14-32(b) is guilty of a Class E
felony and a person who violates subdivision 14-33(c)(1) is guilty of a
Class Al misdemeanor. If a person commits a subdivision 14-33(c)(1)
misdemeanor assault by either inflicting serious injury on another person
or by use of a deadly weapon, but is convicted for an attempted assault
under section 14-32(b) instead, then that person would be punished for a
Class F felony instead of a misdemeanor. See N.C.G.S. § 14-2.5.

3. “Unless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing
greater punishment, any person who comunits any assault, assault and battery, or affray
is guilty of a Class Al misdemeanor if, in the course of the assault, assault and battery, or
affray, he or she: (1) Inflicts serious injury upon another person or uses a deadly weapon|.]”
N.C.GS. § 1483(¢)(1).

4, In Owens the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge should have submitted a
jury instruction on misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon under N.C.G.S. § 14-33 as
well as on felonious assault under section 14-32 when there was evidence that the victim’s
injury was not serious. 65 N.C. App. at 111, 308 S.E2d at 498.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 347

STATE v. FLOYD
[869 N.C. 329 (2016)]

The majority’s holding here undermines. the legislature’s determi-
nation of how to differentiate and punish different types of assault by
sanctioning charging and convicting defendants of a felony when these
defendants would otherwise be facing a misdemeanor charge or convic-
tion under the statutes as written.

Therefore, given the statutory scheme for assaults laid out by the
General Assembly in Chapter 14, Article 8 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, I would conclude that one cannot be convicted of attempting
an “assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.”

Second, attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury is not cognizable under the show-of-violence theory of assault.
“There is no statutory definition of assault in North Carolina, and the
crime of assault is governed by common law rules.” State v. Roberts, 270
N.C. 655, 658, 155 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1967). Citing Roberts, the majority
notes that this Court has defined two theories of assault. A person com-
mits assault by

an overt act or an attempt, or the unequivocal appearance
of an attempt, with force and violence, to do some immedi-
ate physical injury to the person of another, which show of
force or menace of violence must be sufficient to put a per-
son of reasonable firmness in fear of immediate bodily harm.

Id. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305 (quoting 1 Strong’s North Carolina Index:
Assault and Battery § 4 (1957)). A person also commits assault by “a
show of violence accompanied by reasonable apprehension of immedi-
ate bodily harm or injury on the part of the person assailed which causes
him to engage in a course of conduct which he would not otherwise
have followed.” Id. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305.

In determining that attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflict-
ing serious injury is a recognized offense in North Carolina, the majority
holds that this attempted assault is possible under this Court’s “show-of-
violence” theory of assault.5 Nonetheless, at the end of its analysis, the
majority does not explain how an assault under the show-of-violence

5. The majority seems to acknowledge without explicitly stating that there is no
such crime as an attempted “attempted battery” type of assault. I agree. Though the major-
ity calls into question this Court’s statement to that effect in State v. Hewett, 158 N.C. 627,
629, 74 S.B, 356, 857 (1912) by labeling it dicta, “[i]t is universally agreed that there is no
such crime as an attempt to commit an assault of the attempted battery variety.” Dabney
v. State, 150 Md. App. 225, 246, 858 A.2d 1084, 1096 (2004) (noting other states’ stances on
attempt of “attempted battery” assault as discussed in Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation,
Attempt to Commit Assault as Criminal Offenses, 98.A.LR. 5th 683 (2004).

348 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[869 N.C. 329 (2016)

theory would apply in the context of an attempted assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury.

The majority states that

[T]here is a substantial overlap between the two defini-
tions of assault because an overt act or attempt to do
immediate physical injury to another person is likely to
constitute a show of violence that causes fear and change
of behavior. As a result, relying upon the show-of-violence
rule to define attempted assault does not create a signifi-
cant limitation on the conduct covered by this offense.

I disagree. The majority's combination or “substantial overlap” of the
two definitions of assault is essentially a reiteration of one definition of
assault, specifically the “attempted battery” definition of assault: “[Ajn
overt act or an attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt,
with force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to the
person of another, which show of force or menace of violence must be
sufficient to put a person of reasonable firmness in fear of immedi-
ate bodily harm.” Roberts, 270 N.C. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305 (empha-
sis added) (citations omitted) (quoting 1 Strong’s North Carolina Index:
Assault and Battery § 4 (1957)). This definition of assault already takes
into account that an overt act of violence or attempt to do immediate
physical injury to another person is likely to cause fear and probably a
change of behavior in another person. The show-of-violence theory then
must be something different.

As noted by the majority in this case and this Court in Roberts, the
show-of-violence rule developed from early decisions by this Court in
which a person “offered to strike” another person, without yet “attempt-
ing to strike,” but still the offer to strike—or show of violence—was
such that it caused the other person to reasonably fear that immediate
bodily harm would ensue if he or she did not take a different course
of conduct. See State v. Shipman, 81 N.C. 513 (1879) (holding that the
defendant committed assault when he used threatening language and
walked within six feet of the victim with a knife in hand, which alarmed
the victim and caused him to immediately leave in order to avoid immi-
nent danger); State v. Rawles, 65 N.C. 334, 336-37 (1871) (holding that
the defendants committed assault—an offer to strike—when they
approached the victim with weapons while using threatening language,
which caused the victim to fear imminent bodily injury and take a dif-
ferent path home, though none of the weapons were “taken, from the
[bearer’s] shoulder” and they did not get nearer to the victim than about

IN THE SUPREME COURT 349

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 29 (2016)]

seventy-five yards); State v. Church, 63 N.C. 15 (1868) (holding that the
defendant committed assault—an offer of violence—when he drew a
pistol from its sheath but did not cock or point it and walked within ten
steps of the victim using threatening language causing the victim to fear
bodily harm and leave); State v. Hampton, 63 N.C. 13 (1868) (holding
that the defendant committed assault—an offer of violence—when he
threatened to hit the victim and made a fist, but did not draw his arm
back to hit him, causing the victim to fear bodily harm and take another
course). As these early cases demonstrate, a show of violence—or an
offer of violence as it was previously termed—is something less than
an attempted violent act. Hampton, 63 N.C. 14 (“An assault is usually
defined to be an offer, or attempt to strike another. An attempt means
something more than an offer.”). As such, one cannot attempt to “show
violence” because by its nature a “show of violence” is something less
than an attempt of violence.

Based on the observation that a show of violence is less than an
attempt, I would conclude that the show-of-violence definition is not
applicable to the statutory offense of “assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury,” much less an attempt of such action. As the
majority notes in its opinion, “the show-of-violence rule does not involve
an attempt to cause injury to another person, but is based upon a violent
act or threat that causes fear in another person.” And, as just described
above, this show of violence is something less than or precedes an
attempt to physically harm another. Thus, the show-of-violence defini-
tion of assault is inapposite to the type of assault described in subsec-
tion 14-32(b), in which infliction of a serious injury is an element. As
such, only the common law definition that defines assault as “an overt
act or an attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with
force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to the person
of another” is applicable to this assault statute.® For this reason as well,
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that one can attempt an assault.
with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury under a show-of-violence
theory of assault.

6. Admittedly, it would be helpful if the legislature included a definition of assault in
the felony assault statute as the statute does seem to envision a battery as the concurrence
asserts. While State v. Birchfield describes the elements of section 14-82 to include a bat-
tery, 235 N.C. 410, 413, 70 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1952), this Court has recognized on numerous other
occasions that the elements of the offense do not require a completed battery. See, ¢.g.,
State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 85-36, 468 S.B.2d 232, 237 (1996) (“The essential elements of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury are: ‘(1) an assault,
(2) with a deadly weapon, (3) with intent to lall, (4) inflicting serious injury, (5) not result-
ing in death.’ ” (quoting State v. Reid, 335 N.C. 647, 654, 440 S.E.2d 776, 780 (1994))), State
v. Reid, 335 N.C. 647, 654, 440 S.E.2d 776, 780 (1994) (“The essential elements of the crime

350 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. FLOYD
[369 N.C. 329 (2016)]

Lastly, I disagree with the majority that North Carolina law recog-
nizes any type of attempted assault. As this Court noted in Roberts, the
difference between the two theories of assault is where the emphasis
is placed. The common law rule “places emphasis on the intent or state
of mind of the person accused,” whereas the show-of-violence rule
“places the emphasis on the reasonable apprehension of the person
assailed.” Roberts, 270 N.C. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305. Thus, assault is
either an attempt to cause injury or a show of violence that would put a
reasonable person in fear imminent injury. The majority concludes that
attempted assault is a cognizable offense in North Carolina under the
show-of-violence theory of assault but does not explain how one may
attempt to show violence, except to say that the definition of a show-
of-violence assault “does not include any reference to attempt,” and
thus by definition, because it is not an attempt to attempt, it may be
attempted. As explained above, relying upon the show-of-violence rule
to describe attempted assault is not logical because a show of violence
causing someone to reasonably fear an injury is something less than
even attempting to injure.

Therefore, I would conclude that attempted assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury is not a crime in North Carolina.”
Because I would hold that attempted assault with a deadly weapon is
not a cognizable offense in North Carolina and therefore cannot serve
as an underlying coriviction for possession of a firearm by a felon or
for attaining habitual felon status, these judgments should be vacated.
For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the Court of Appeals on
this issue and conclude that attempted assault is not a crime in North
Carolina under our common law definition of assault. Thus, I respect-
fully dissent from the majority's holding on this issue.

are (1) an assault, (2) with a deadly weapon, (3) with intent to kill, (4) inflicting serious
injury, (5) not resulting in death.”), State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 331, 158 S.B.2d 638,
640 (1968) (“The crime of felonious assault, created and defined by G.S. s 14-82, consists
of these essential elements: (1) An assault, (2) with a deadly weapon, (8) with intent to kill,
(4) inflicting serious injury, (5) Not resulting in death.”); State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 91, 128
$.B.2d 1, 3 (1962) (“The statutory offense embodies (1) assault, (2) with a deadly weapon,
(B) the use of the weapon must be with intent to Jill, (4) the result of the use must be the
infliction of serious injury, and (5) which falls short of causing death.”).

7. The State argued in its brief that the defendant could not challenge his convic-
tion of attempted assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury because such a
challenge would be an impermissible collateral attack, At oral arguments, however, the
State conceded that an indictment that alleges an offense that does not exist would not
create jurisdiction in the trial court, The trial court does not have jurisdiction to enter judg-
ment on a nonexistent crime and thus defendant's attempted assault conviction would be
anullity.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 351

STATE v. JUAREZ
[369 N.C. 351 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JORGE JUAREZ

No. 360PA15
Filed 21 December 2016

1. Homicide—instructions—felony murder—instructions—lesser

included offenses
The trial court correctly denied defendant’s request for instruc-

tions on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter in a fel-
ony murder prosecution where there was no conflict in the evidence
regarding whether defendant committed the underlying felony of
discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle while it was in opera-
tion. The conflicting evidence must relate to whether defendant
committed the crime charged, not whether defendant was legally
justified in committing the crime.

2. Homicide—felony murder—instructions—aggressor doc-
trine—no plain error

There was no plain error where the trial instructed the jury

on the aggressor doctrine of self-defense in a felony murder pros-
ecution. The State did not solely rely on the theory that defendant -
was the aggressor but also offered evidence that tended to contra-
dict defendant's evidence as to each of the other elements of self-
defense. Defendant failed to establish that, absent an instruction
on the aggressor doctrine, the jury would have credited his account
of the night’s events over other contrary testimony.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 74-31 of a unanimous
decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 777 S.B.2 325 (2015),
finding no error in part and reversing in part and remanding a judgment
entered on 6 June 2014 by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Superior Court,
Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 30 August 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by I. Faison Hicks, Special Deputy
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Emily H. Davis, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

BEASLEY, Justice.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. JUAREZ
[369 N.C. 351 (2016)}

We consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
trial court’s judgment based upon defendant’s conviction for first-degree
felony murder and remanding this case to the trial court for a new trial.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible
error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of
second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, and that the trial
court committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the aggressor
doctrine of self-defense. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the jury's verdict and
the trial court’s judgment.

This case involves events surrounding the death of Alfonzo Canjay
(Canjay) in the early morning hours of 31 October 2012. On the eve-
ning of 30 October 2012, Jorge Juarez (defendant) and four acquain-
tances—Marcos Chaparro (Chaparro), Karen Gonzalez (Gonzalez),
Erick Martinez (Martinez), and Karina Rodriguez (Rodriguez)—were
drinking beer and smoking marijuana at Chaparro’s Durham residence.
Around 11:30 p.m., the group left Durham in Chaparro’s Acura to drive
Rodriguez home to Foxhall Village in Raleigh. The group arrived at
Rodriguez’s residence at around 12:00 a.m. on 31 October. After drop-
ping off Rodriguez, Chaparro and Martinez decided to steal car stereos
from vehicles parked at Foxhall Village, while Gonzales and defendant
waited in the Acura.

As Chaparro and Martinez searched for car stereos to steal, the
noises awoke Canjay and his wife, who looked outside and saw the two
men peering into the family’s car and trying to steal things. Upon being
discovered, Chaparro and Martinez ran away to find Gonzalez and
defendant. Once the four reunited, either Chaparro or Martinez insisted
Gonzales drive back toward Canjay’s house to retrieve a stereo they had
hidden nearby before leaving Foxhall Village.

Meanwhile, Canjay got in his car and began searching for the men,
while his wife and daughter unsuccessfully tried to call the police.
Canjay saw the Acura as it neared the main office at the complex, and
he drove toward it from the opposite direction such that Gonzalez had
to swerve to go around his vehicle. Canjay twned his vehicle around to
pursue the Acura and pulled up to its passenger side, making two sepa-
rate sideswipe contacts with the Acura. After the second impact, defen-
dant fired one shot from his handgun into the driver's side of Canjay’s
vehicle. The shot struck Canjay in the heart, killing him. Gonzales then
drove the group back to Durham.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 353

STATE v. JUAREZ
(369 N.C. 351 (2016)]

On 8 April 2013, defendant was indicted for the first-degree mur-
der of Alfonzo Canjay. The State proceeded against defendant on the
theory of felony murder based on the underlying felony of discharging
a firearm into an occupied vehicle while it was in operation. The trial
court denied defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s
evidence and again at the close of all of the evidence. The trial court
also denied defendant's request for instructions on the lesser-included.
offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The trial
court instructed the jury on perfect self-defense including the aggressor
doctrine; defendant did not object to this instruction. The jury found
defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder, and the trial court sen-
tenced him to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appealed.

On appeal defendant argued that the trial court (i) erred in denying
his motion to dismiss; (ii) erred in denying his request for instructions
on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and volun-
tary manslaughter; and (iii) erred in instructing the jury that perfect
self-defense was unavailable if defendant was the initial aggressor. The
Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss, State v. Juarez, ___ N.C. App. __, __, 777
S.E.2d 325, 328 (2015), but did err by not instructing the jury on the
lesser-included offenses and also erred by instructing on the aggressor
doctrine of self-defense, id. at__, __, 777 S.E.2d at 330, 331.

We allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review of the Court
of Appeals’ decision regarding the trial court's two alleged errors. Before
this Court the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that the trial court should have given jury instructions on second-degree
murder and voluntary manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of first-
degree murder. The State also argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that the trial court’s instruction on the aggressor doctrine
amounts to plain error. We agree on both counts.

[1] First, we consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded
that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser-included
offenses. The court held that it was error not to instruct on the lesser-
included offenses because the evidence was conflicting as to whether
defendant acted in self-defense when he shot into Canjay’s vehicle,
which could render him not guilty of first-degree felony murder, and
there was sufficient evidence to support a lesser-included offense. Jd. at
__» 777 S.E.2d at 331. The Court of Appeals’ reasoning was incorrect.

Felony murder is a murder “committed in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery,

354 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. JUAREZ
[369 N.C. 361 (2016)]

kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the
use of a deadly weapon.” N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (2015). This statute expresses
the legislature’s deliberate policy choice to hold individuals accountable
“for deaths occurring during the commission of felonies,” regardless of
whether the murder was intentional or unintentional. State v. Bell, 338
N.C. 363, 386, 450 S.E.2d 710, 723 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1163, 115
S. Ct. 2619 (1995). Because “the purpose of the felony murder rule is to
deter even accidental killings from occurring during the commission of
a dangerous felony,” self-defense is not a defense to felony murder. State
v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 658, 668, 462 S.E.2d 492, 499 (1995).

Perfect self-defense, however, may be a defense to the underlying
felony, which would thereby defeat the felony murder charge, id. at 668-
69, 462 S.E.2d at 499, as well as any other homicide charge, see, e.g.,
State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 158, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1982) (“Perfect self-
defense excuses a killing altogether. . . .”). Perfect self-defense is a right
that “rests upon necessity” to save one’s self and is “only available to a
person who is without fault,” thus excusing a defendant altogether. State
v. Marsh, 293 N.C. 358, 354, 237 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1977). fa person cannot
establish perfect self-defense, but can establish imperfect self-defense,
that person's actions are not excused and he is still at fault, though to
a lesser degree. See State v. Crisp, 170 N.C. 785, 792, 87 S.E. 511, 514-
15 (1916) (explaining that perfect self-defense is only available “where
the party... was wholly free from wrong or blame,” whereas if a party
“was in the wrong . . . then the law justly limits his right of self-defense,

1, Perfect self-defense requires the existence of all four of the following elements:

(1) [It appeared to defendant and he believed it to be neces-
sary to kdll the deceased in order to save himself from death or great
bodily harm; and

(2) [DJefendant’s belief was reasonable in that the circum-
stances as they appeared to him at the time were sufficient to create
such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness; and

(8) [DJefendant was not the aggressor in bringing on the affray,
ie,, he did not aggressively and willingly enter into the fight without
legal excuse or provocation; and

(4) [Dlefendant did not use excessive force, ie., did not use
more force than was necessary or reasonably appeared to him to be
necessary under the circumstances to protect himself from death or
great bodily harm.

Bush, 307 N.G. at 158-59, 297 8.E.2d at 568 (quoting State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 530, 279
§.E.2d 570, 572-73 (1981) (italics omitted)). Imperfect self-defense is available when ele-
ments (1) and (2) listed above are met, but either the defendant “was the aggressor or used
excessive force.” Id, at 159, 297 S.B.2d at 568.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 355

STATE v. JUAREZ
[369 N.C. 351 (2016)]

and regulates it according to the magnitude of his own wrong” (quoting
Reed v. State, 11 Tex. Ct. App. 509, 517-18 (1882))). Therefore, imper-
fect self-defense is not available as a defense to the underlying felony
utilized to support a felony murder charge because allowing for such a
defense, when the defendant is in some manner at fault, would defeat
the purpose of the felony murder rule. Richardson, 341 N.C. at 668, 462
S.E.2d at 499.

Here, if defendant acted in perfect self-defense when he shot into
Canjay’s vehicle, the killing would be excused and defendant absolved
of any fault. Bush, 307 N.C. at 158, 297 S.E.2d at 568. Only under a
theory of imperfect self-defense could defendant be found guilty of
alesser degree of homicide. See id. at 159, 297 S.E.2d at 568 (stating that
when a defendant shows “only that he exercised the imperfect right of
self-defense,” instead of perfect self-defense, he “remain[s] guilty of at
least voluntary manslaughter”). Allowing jury instructions on the lesser-
included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter
would permit the jury to find defendant not guilty of felony murder while
at the same time finding defendant was, in some manner, at fault for
shooting into Canjay’s vehicle—the underlying felony in question. This
outcome would undermine the imperfect self-defense limitation set out
in Richardson and the purpose of the felony murder rule. Therefore, the
trial court was correct to deny defendant's request for instructions on
second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.

The Court of Appeals’ and defendant's reliance on State v. Millsaps,
356 N.C. 556, 572 S.E.2d 767 (2002), is misguided, as is defendant’s fur-
ther reliance on State v. Thomas, 325 N.C. 583, 386 S.E.2d 555 (1989),
and State v. Camacho, 337 N.C. 224, 446 S.E.2d 8 (1994). In State
v. Millsaps this Court explained that when the State prosecutes a defen-
dant for first-degree murder solely on a felony murder theory, a trial
court must instruct on lesser-included offenses when the evidence of the
underlying felony is in conflict and the evidence would support a lesser-
included offense. 356 N.C. at 565, 572 S.B.2d at 778 (citing Thomas, 325
N.C. 583, 386 S.E.2d 555). The trial court is not required to instruct on
lesser-included offenses if the evidence of the underlying felony is not
in conflict and all the evidence supports felony murder. Jd. at 565, 572
§.E.2d at 774 (citing State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 318, 226 S.E.2d 629
(1976)). Here evidence of the underlying felony is not in conflict and the
evidence does not rationally support the lesser-included offenses.

In Thomas the State prosecuted the defendant for first-degree mur-
der on the theory of felony murder, which rested on the theory that the

356 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. JUAREZ
[369 N.C. 351 (2016)]

defendant acted in concert with the passenger in her car. 325 N.C. at
504-95, 386 S.E.2d at 561.

In order to convict defendant . . . of first degree fel-
ony murder the State was required to offer evidence that,
among other things, defendant did act in concert with
[her passenger] when he committed the underlying felony
of discharging a firearm into the [victim's] residence. If
there is conflicting evidence on this aspect of the case,
i.e., evidence that defendant did not act in concert with
{her passenger] and, therefore, did not commit the under-
lying felony, then defendant is entitled to an instruction
on whatever degree of homicide less than first degree
murder the evidence supports.

Id. at, 595, 386 S.E.2d at 562 (citing State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 199
S.E.2d 409 (1973)). This Court determined that there was conflicting evi-
dence regarding whether the defendant shared a common purpose or
plan with her passenger. Id. at 596-98, 386 S.E.2d at 562-63. The State’s
evidence tended to show that she was acting in concert with the pas-
senger, while other evidence indicated that the defendant did not know
that her passenger had a gun or was going to shoot it. Id. at 597, 386
S.E.2d at 563. Thus, “the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the
lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter” when the evidence
would support such a conviction was reversible error. Id. at 599, 386
S.E.2d at 564.

Similarly, in Camacho the State prosecuted the defendant for first-
degree murder on the theory that the defendant was lying in wait for
the victim. 337 N.C. at 227, 446 S.E.2d at 9. This Court determined that
the evidence was conflicting regarding whether the crime was commit-
ted by means of lying in wait. Jd. at 231, 446 S.E.2d at 12. The State’s
evidence tended to show that the defendant was lying in wait, while the
defendant's evidence tended to show that he was in the victim's room
only to retrieve personal belongings. Id. at 232, 446 S.E.2d at 12. Thus,
the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on second-degree murder and
involuntary manslaughter when the evidence would support such a con-
viction was error. Id. at 234-35, 446 S.E.2d at 14.

As these cases demonstrate, the conflicting evidence must relate to
whether defendant committed the crime charged, not whether defen-
dant was legally justified in committing the crime. See Camacho, 337
N.C. at 231-32, 446 S.E.2d at 12; Thomas, 325 N.C. at 598, 386 S.E.2d at
563; see also State v. Gause, 227 N.C. 26, 30, 40 S.H.2d 463, 466 (1946)

IN THE SUPREME COURT 357

STATE v. JUAREZ
[369 N.C. 351 (2016)]

Ginding that the evidence conflicted as to whether the defendant was
lying in wait; therefore, the trial court erred by not instructing the jury
on second-degree murder).

Here there is no conflict in the evidence regarding whether
defendant committed the underlying felony of discharging a firearm into
an occupied vehicle while it was in operation.2 The Court of Appeals
aptly notes that “[tJhere is no question that this transpired. Defendant
fired a gun into Canjay’s vehicle while Canjay was driving it.” Juarez,
__N.C. App. at___, 777 S.E.2d at 331. Defendant does not dispute that
he committed this crime. Rather, defendant claims that his conduct
was justified because he was acting in self-defense. While the evidence
regarding whether defendant acted in self-defense is in conflict, there is no
conflict in the evidence regarding whether defendant discharged a firearm.
into Canjay’s vehicle while Canjay was driving it. Thus, the evidence that
defendant committed the underlying felony is not in conflict.

Moreover, in Millsaps this Court reiterated that “[aJn instruction on
a lesser-included offense must be given only if the evidence would per-
mit the jury rationally to find defendant guilty of the lesser offense and
to acquit him of the greater.” 356 N.C. at 561, 572 S.H.2d at 771 (citing
State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 514, 453 S.E.2d 824, 841, cert. denied,
516 U.S. 884, 116 S. Ct. 223 (1995)). Here the jury could not rationally
find defendant guilty of the lesser-included offenses of second-degree
murder or voluntary manslaughter and acquit him of the greater offense
of first-degree murder. As discussed above, because defendant was pros-
ecuted on the basis of a felony murder theory, he could only be acquitted.
of first-degree murder if the jury found he acted in perfect self-defense
regarding the underlying felony. If defendant acted in perfect self-
defense, a jury could not find him guilty of the lesser-included offenses
of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter because “[p]erfect
self-defense excuses a killing altogether.” Bush, 307 N.C. at 158, 297
§.E.2d at 568. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
the trial court should have instructed on the lesser-included offenses.

[2] Next, we consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded
that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the aggressor doc-
trine of self-defense. Because defendant did not object to the instruction
as given at trial, we consider whether this instruction constitutes plain

2. The elements of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle while in operation
are (1) willfully and wantonly discharging (2) a firearm (3) into an occupied vehicle (4)
that is in operation. N.C.G.S. § 14-34.1(b) 2015).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. JUAREZ
[369 N.C. 361 (2016)}

error. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4); see also State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C.
506, 512, 723 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2012).

The plain error standard requires a defendant to “demonstrate that
a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was funda-
mental, a defendant must establish prejudice—that, after examination of
the entire record, the error ‘had a probable impact on the jury's finding
that the defendant was guilty.’ ” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at
334 (internal citation omitted) (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660,
300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)). “[P]lain error is to be ‘applied cautiously and
only in the exceptional case’ ” in which a defendant can show that the
prejudicial error is “one that ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” Id. at 518, 723 S.B.2d at,
334 (alteration in original) (quoting Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d
at 378). For plain error to be found, it must be probable, not just pos-
sible, that absent the instructional error the jury would have returned a
different verdict. Id. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334.

Here, when the trial court instructed the jury on perfect self-defense,
it included instructions on the aggressor doctrine—that a defendant
is not entitled to the benefit of self-defense if he was the aggressor
in the situation. See Marsh, 293 N.C. at 354, 237 S.E.2d at 747 (describing
the aggressor element of self-defense). When there is no evidence that
a defendant was the initial aggressor, it is reversible error for the trial
court to instruct the jury on the aggressor doctrine of self-defense. See
State v. Washington, 234 N.C. 531, 535, 67 S.E.2d 498, 501 (1951); see
also State v. Jenkins, 202 N.C. App. 291, 297, 688 S.B.2d 101, 105-06 (cita-
tions omitted), disc. rev. denied, 364 N.C. 245, 698 S.E.2d 665 (2010).
On appeal the Court of Appeals determined there was no evidence that
defendant was the aggressor in the situation, and thus, it was error
to instruct on the aggressor doctrine. The Court of Appeals, however,
failed to analyze whether such error had the type of prejudicial impact
that “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
[the] judicial proceeding.” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334
(quoting Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378). Therefore, the court’s
analysis was insufficient to conclude that the alleged error rose to the
level of plain error.

On review, it is not necessary for this Court to decide whether an
instruction on the aggressor doctrine was improper, because defen-
dant failed to show that the alleged error was so fundamentally prej-
udicial as to constitute plain error. For defendant to meet his burden
under Lawrence, he would have to show that, absent the erroneous
instruction, it is probable that the jury would have found that he acted

IN THE SUPREME COURT 359

STATE v. JUAREZ
[369 N.C. 351 (2016)]

in perfect self-defense. To find that defendant acted in perfect self-
defense, the jury would have to find that defendant honestly believed
his actions of shooting into an occupied car were necessary to protect
himself from the threat of death or serious bodily harm, that defendant's
belief was reasonable, and that defendant did not use excessive force or
more force than necessary to protect himself from death or great bodily
harm.3 See State v. Moore, 363 N.C. 793, 796-97, 688 S.E.2d 447, 449-50
(2010). Defendant failed to sufficiently demonstrate that, absent instruc-
tions on the aggressor doctrine, the jury would not have rejected his
claim of self-defense for other reasons.

On appeal defendant mainly focused on the evidence that tended to
show he was not the aggressor. The jury, however, could have rejected
defendant's claim of self-defense for other reasons. The State did not
solely rely on the theory that defendant was the aggressor, but offered
evidence that tended to contradict defendant’s evidence as to each
of the other elements of self-defense as well. Defendant has failed to
establish that, absent an instruction on the aggressor doctrine, the jury
would have credited his account of the night’s unfolding over other con-
trary testimony.

Defendant has not shown that “the jury probably would have
returned a different verdict” if the trial court had not instructed the
jury on the aggressor doctrine. Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 519, 732 S.E.2d
at 335. Therefore, assuming, without deciding, that the trial’ court’s
instruction on the aggressor doctrine was erroneous, we hold that the
error does not rise to the level of such fundamental error as to consti-
tute plain error.

For the reasons stated herein, we find no reversible error in the
trial court’s instructions to the jury and thus reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals. The remaining issue determined by the Court
of Appeals is not before us, and the court’s decision on that matter
remains undisturbed.

REVERSED.

3. Perfect self-defense also requires that the defendant not be the aggressor in the
fray, see State v. Moore, 363 N.C. 798, 796-97, 688 S.B.2d 447, 449-50 (2010); however, as
explained above, if there is no evidence that the defendant was the aggressor, the trial
court should not instruct on that element. Here, if the trial court had not instructed on the
aggressor doctrine, the jury would have had to find the other three elements exist to make
a finding of perfect self-defense.

360

1.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. LOWE
[869 N.C. 360 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v.
DAVID MATTHEW LOWE

No. 278PA15
Filed 21 December 2016

Search and Seizure—search warrant—house—probable cause

Where there was an anonymous tip that the resident (Michael
Turner, with whom defendant was staying) was “selling, using and
storing narcotics at” his house, and where a detective’s affidavit in
support of the search warrant listed his training and experience,
Turner's history of drug-related arrests, and the detective’s discov-
ery of both marijuana residue and correspondence addressed to
Turner in trash from Turner’s residence, under the totality of the
circumstances there was probable cause for issue of a search war-
rant for the house.

Search and Seizure—search warrant for house—rental car in

* curtilage—nature of items to be seized

A rental car parked in the curtilage of a residence was within
the scope of a search warrant and could be searched pursuant to the
warrant to search the house. It was undisputed that when. officers
arrived at the target residence to execute the warrant, the rental car
parked in the driveway was within the curtilage of the home and the
nature of the items to be seized was such that the items could be
easily stored in a vehicle.

On discretionary review upon separate petitions by the State and

defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the
Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 774 S.E.2d 893 (2015), reversing
judgments entered on 8 July 2014 by Judge Reuben F. Young in Superior
Court, Wake County, and remanding for further proceedings. Heard in
the Supreme Court on 31 August 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz, Special Deputy
Attorney General, for the State-appellant/appellee.

M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr. for defendant-appellant/appellee.

HUDSON, Justice.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 361

STATE v. LOWE
[369 N.C. 360 (2016)]

Here we are asked to consider the validity of a search warrant autho-
rizing a search of the premises on which defendant was arrested, and
whether the search of a vehicle located on those premises was within
the scope of the warrant. We conclude that the warrant was supported
by probable cause and therefore affirm that part of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. However, we conclude that the search of the subject
rental car did not exceed the scope of the warrant and thus reverse that
part of the decision below.

Defendant David Matthew Lowe was indicted on 2 December 2013
in Wake County for two counts of trafficking in MDMA under N.C.G.S.
§ 90-95(h)(4) and one count of possession of LSD with intent to sell
or deliver under N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(1). The trial court denied defen-
dant’s pretrial motions to quash the search warrant for a residence
where defendant was a visitor at the time the warrant was executed,
and to suppress evidence seized from the residence and from a rental
car used by defendant and his girlfriend that was parked in the drive-
way of the target residence at the time of the search. On 8 July 2014,
defendant pleaded guilty to the controlled substances violations while
reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motions. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the search of the
residence, holding that the warrant was supported by probable cause,
but reversed the search of the rental car on the basis that the vehicle
search exceeded the scope of the warrant. State v. Lowe, ___ N.C. App.
___, 774 S.E.2d 893 (2015).

Background

On 24 September 2013, Detective K.J. Barber of the Raleigh Police
Department obtained a search warrant from the local magistrate for 529
Ashebrook Drive in Raleigh. Detective Barber filed an affidavit in sup-
port of the search warrant in which he swore to the following facts:

In September of 2013, I received information that a subject
that goes by the name “Mike T” was selling, using and stor-
ing narcotics at 529 Ashbrooke [sic] Dr. Through investiga-
tive means, I was able to identify Terrence Michael Turner
as a possible suspect.

Terrence Michael [T]urner, AKA: Michael Cooper
Turner has been charged with PWISD Methylenedioxy-
methamphetamine, Possess Dimethyltryptamine, PWISD
Psylocybin, PWISD Cocaine, Possess Heroin, PWIMSD
Schedule I, Maintain a Vehicle/Dwelling, Trafficking in

362 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. LOWE
[369 N.C. 360 (2016)]

MDMA, Conspire to sell Schedule I and other drug viola-
tions dating back to 2001.

On 9/24/2013 I conducted a refuse investigation at 529
Ashebrook Dr. St [sic] Raleigh, NC 27609. The 96 gallon
City of Raleigh refuse container was at the curb line in
front of 529 Ashebrook Dr.

Detective Ladd removed one bag of refuse from the 96
gallon container and we took it to a secured location
for further inspection. Inside the bag of refuse, I located
correspondence to Michael Turner of 529 Ashebrook Dr.
Raleigh, NC 27600 [sic], also in this bag of refuse, I located
a small amount of marijuana residue in a fast food bag,
which tested positive as marijuana utilizing a Sirche # 8
field test kit.

Based on the above stated facts coupled with my training
and experience it is my reasonable belief that illegal nar-
cotics are being used and/or sold from inside this location.
Based on the above, I respectfully request this warrant
be issued.

The warrant authorized the search of the “premises, vehicle, person and
other place or item described in the application for the property
and person in question.” On the following day, 25 September 2013,
Detective Barber and other officers executed a search of the residence.

When the officers arrived on scene, they observed a Volkswagen
rental car parked in the driveway. Detective Barber was aware that Mr.
Turner had an Infinity registered in his name, as well as an outdated
registration for a Toyota, but neither of those vehicles was present at.
the scene. Detective Barber had never seen the Volkswagen rental car
before. Inside the residence officers encountered defendant and his girl-
friend, Margaret Doctors, who were overnight guests of Mr. Tummer. A
search of the residence revealed 853 grams of marijuana in the home,
as well as 14 grams of crushed MDMA in the room that had been occu-
pied by defendant and Ms. Doctors. Detective Barber testified, without
further elaboration, that “once we entered the house on the search war-
rant, we were able to determine that the vehicle was being operated
by [defendant] and Ms. Doctors.” After searching the house, officers
searched the rental car and discovered in the trunk defendant's book
bag and identifying documents, 360 dosage units of MDMA, 10 strips of
LSD, and $6000 in U.S. currency.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 363

STATE v. LOWE
[369 N.C. 360 (2016)}

On 11 April 2014, defendant filed pretrial motions to quash the
search warrant and to suppress the evidence seized from the residence
and the rental car, as well as incriminating statements he made after-
wards. After hearing the motions on 7 and 8 July 2014, the trial cowt
denied defendant's motions on 8 July 2014. Defendant pleaded guilty to
all charges but reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence. The trial court sentenced defendant to
two concurrent terms of thirty-five to fifty-one months of imprisonment
for trafficking in MDMA by possession, and a consecutive term of seven
to eighteen months for possession of LSD with intent to sell or deliver.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

At the Court of Appeals, defendant first argued that the search war-
rant was not supported by probable cause and that any evidence seized
from the ensuing search should have been suppressed. Lowe, ___ N.C.
App. at __, 774 S.E.2d at 896. The court disagreed, holding that the
totality of the circumstances—the marijuana discovered in the trash, in
conjunction with Turner's history of drug-related arrests and the anony-
mous tip that Turner was “selling, using and storing” narcotics in his
home—“formed a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause
existed to search his home for the presence of contraband or other evi-
dence.” Id. at__, 774. S.E.2d at 898-99.

Defendant next argued that the search of the rental car parked
in Turner's driveway exceeded the scope of the warrant issued to search
Turner's residence. Id. at ___, 774 S.E.2d at 899. The Court of Appeals
agreed. The court recognized that “[t]here is long-standing precedent
in North Carolina and other jurisdictions that, ‘a]s a general rule, “if
a search warrant validly describes the premises to be searched, a car
on the premises may be searched even though the warrant contains no
description of the car.”’” Id. at___, 774 S.E.2d at 899 (second alteration
in original) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Courtright, 60 N.C. App.
247, 249, 298 S.E.2d 740, 742, appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied,
308 N.C. 192, 302 S.E.2d 245 (1983)). Nonetheless, the court stated that
“(t]he crucial fact distinguishing this case . . . relates to law enforcement
officers’ knowledge about the ownership and control of the vehicle.” Jd.
at ___, 774 S.E.2d at 899. On that basis, and in reliance on the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Ybarra v. Illinois, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the search of the rental car exceeded the scope
of the warrant issued for Turner’s residence and that the evidence seized

364 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. LOWE
[369 N.C. 360 (2016)}

from the car should have been suppressed.! Id. at ___, 774 S.E.2d at
899-901.

Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that that the record did not make
clear which portion of contraband attributable to defendant was found
in the home as opposed to the rental car, and therefore which portion
of contraband was subject to suppression. Jd. at ____, 774 S.E.2d at 901.
Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant's
motion to suppress evidence obtained from the vehicle and remanded
with instructions to determine which portion of the contraband attrib-
utable to defendant was seized from the home? Id. at __, 774 S.E.2d
at 901. Defendant and the State both filed petitions for discretionary
review on 25 August and 8 September 2015, respectively. We allowed
both petitions on 28 January 2016.

I_Probable Cause

. [1] Here defendant again contends that the search warrant was not
supported by probable cause, and therefore, any evidence seized in the
ensuing search should have been suppressed. We do not agree.

The United States and North Carolina Constitutions both protect
against unreasonable searches and seizures of private property. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; N.C. Const. art. I, § 20. The Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides that “no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In addressing whether a search warrant.
is supported by probable cause, we employ the “totality of the circum-
stances” test, under which we must determine “whether the evidence as
a whole provides a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
exists.” State v. Beam, 325 N.C. 217, 221, 381 S.E.2d 827, 329 (1989).
“The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress
is whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of
fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.”

1. The Court of Appeals also rejected an argument by the State that the evidence
seized from the rental car should be admissible under the “good faith exception” to the
exclusionary rule. Lowe, N.C. App. at _, 774 S.E.2d at 901. The court held that the
exception did not apply because the error lay with the police executing the warrant, not
with the warrant itself. Jd. at __, 774 SE.2d af 901. The State has abandoned this argu-
ment on review here.

2, Because we are reversing the suppression of items from the vehicle, this determi-
nation is no longer necessary.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. LOWE
[369 N.C. 360 (2016)]

State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 $.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citing State
v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994).

Defendant asserts that this case is analogous to State v. Benters,
in which we held that a lack of sufficient independent corroboration
precluded a finding of probable cause. 367 N.C. 660, 673, 766 S.E.2d 593,
603 (2014). We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that defendant's
reliance upon Benters is misplaced.

In Benters, we addressed the probable cause determination in a
case involving an anonymous tip, as opposed to a case in which a tip is
received from a confidential informant, and we stated, “An anonymous
tip, standing alone, is rarely sufficient, but ‘the tip combined with cor-
roboration by the police could show indicia of reliability that would be
sufficient to [pass constitutional muster].’” Id. at 666, 766 S.B.2d at 598-
99 (brackets in original) (quoting State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 205,
539 S.E.2d 625, 629 (2000)). The anonymous tip in Benters was that the
defendant was growing marijuana. Id. at 661-62, 669, 766 S.E.2d at 596,
600. The corroborating evidence proffered by the police consisted of:
()) utility records of power consumption for the target residence; (2)
gardening equipment observed at the target residence (coupled with the
apparent absence of significant gardening activity); and (8) the investi-
gating officer’s expertise and knowledge of the defendant. Id. at 661-62,
669, 766 S.E.2d at 596, 600-01. We held that these allegations were not
“sufficiently corroborative of the anonymous tip or otherwise sufficient
to establish probable cause.” Id. at 673, 766 S.E.2d at 603.

The distinctions between the two cases are apparent. Here the
anonymous tip was that Michael Turner was “selling, using and storing
narcotics at” his house. Detective Barber's affidavit in support of the
warrant listed his training and experience, as well as Michael Turner's
history of drug-related arrests, and stated that Detective Barber had
discovered marijuana residue in trash from Michael Turner's residence,
along with correspondence addressed to Michael Turner. As the Court
of Appeals stated, “Although there were many reasons the gardening
equipment may have been outside the defendant’s house in Benters,
the presence of marijuana residue in defendant’s trash offers far fewer
innocent explanations.” Lowe, __ N.C. App. at __, 774 S.E.2d at 898.
Furthermore, in the description of crimes for which evidence was
sought, Detective Barber listed possession of controlled substances in
violation of N.C.G.S. § 90-95 in the affidavit. Thus, unlike in Benters, the
affidavit presented the magistrate with “direct evidence of the crime for
which the officers sought to collect evidence.” Id. at ___, 774 S.E.2d at

366 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. LOWE
[369 N.C. 360 (2016)]

898; see also State v. Williams, 149 N.C. App. 795, 798-99, 561 S.E.2d.
925, 927 (“[A] residue quantity of a controlled substance, despite its not
being weighed, is sufficient to convict a defendant of possession of the
controlled substance ....”), disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 757, 566 S.E.2d
481, cert. denied, 587 U.S. 1035, 1235 S. Ct. 553, 154 L. Ed. 2d. 455 (2002).

Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals and hold that under
the totality of the circumstances there was a substantial basis for the
issuing magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed.

I. Search of the Vehicle

[2] The State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
rental car parked in the curtilage of the residence could not be searched
pursuant to the warrant. We conclude that the search of the vehicle here
was within the permissible scope of the search conducted under the
valid warrant.

The authorized scope of a valid warrant can depend upon the nature
of the object of the search because “[a] lawful search of fixed premises
generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search
may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts
of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.” United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2170-71, 72 L. Ed. 2d
572, 591 (1982). “Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a
home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests,
drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found. A warrant
to open a footlocker to search for marihuana would also authorize the
opening of packages found inside.” Jd. at 821, 102 S. Ct. at 2171, 72 L. Ed.
2d at 591.

We previously addressed the scope of a search warrant with regard
to vehicles in State v. Reid, in which we held:

The authority to search described premises would include
personal property located thereon. Authority to search a
house gives officers the right to search cabinets, bureau
drawers, trunks, and suitcases therein, though they were
not described. “It has been held that if a search warrant
validly describes the premises to be searched, a car on
the premises may be searched even though the warrant
contains no description of the car.”

286 N.C. 323, 326, 210 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1974) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). In the case of a private residence, “the premises” by necessity

IN THE SUPREME COURT 367

STATE v. LOWE
[869 N.C. 360 (2016)]

encompasses the curtilage of the home. This is because “the curtilage is
the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanc-
tity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’ and therefore has been
considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.”
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742, 80 L. Ed.
2d 214, 225 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6
S. Ct. 524, 532, 29 L. Ed. 746, 751 (1886)); see also Courtright, 60 N.C.
App. at 250, 298 S.E.2d at 742 (explaining that the curtilage “is an area
within which the owner or possessor assumes the responsibilities and
pleasures of ownership or possession”).

Here Detective Barber obtained a valid search warrant based on
probable cause for 529 Ashebiook Drive authorizing the search of “prem-
ises, vehicle, person and other place or item described in the applica-
tion for the property and person in question.” It is undisputed that when
Detective Barber and other officers arrived at the target residence to
execute the warrant, the rental car parked in the driveway was within
the curtilage of the home. The nature of the items to be seized (includ-
ing, inter alia, controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and any evi-
dence relating to the use or sale of controlled substances) was such that
the items could be easily stored in a vehicle. Because the rental car was
within the curtilage of the residence targeted by the search warrant, and
because the rental car was a proper place “in which the object of the
search may be found,” we conclude that the search of the rental car was
authorized by the warrant. Ross, 456 U.S. at 820, 102 S. Ct. at 2170, 72
L. Ed. 2d at 591. Accordingly, we hold that the search of the rental car
did not exceed the scope of the warrant and that the trial court properly
denied defendant's motion to suppress.

In departing from the general rule of Reid, the Court of Appeals
erred. The court determined that “law enforcement officers’ knowledge
about the ownership and control of the vehicle” constituted a “crucial
fact distinguishing this case” from Reid and its progeny. Lowe, __ N.C.
App. at __, 774 S.E.2d at 899. As an initial matter, it is unclear from the
record precisely what knowledge about the ownership and control of
the vehicle the officers acquired, as well as when and how they acquired
it. The trial court entered no written findings of fact or conclusions of
law, although the trial judge did make oral findings at the time of his rul-
ings. The sole witness to testify, Detective Barber, gave sparing and pos-
sibly contradictory testimony on the subject.3 Nonetheless, regardless of

3. Detective Barber testified that “once we entered the house on the search warrant,
we were able to determine that that vehicle was being operated by [defendant] and Ms.
Doctors.” Yet, he later testified that the vehicle was registered to “Hertz Rental,” and that

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. LOWE
[369 N.C, 360 (2016)}

whether the officers knew the car was a rental, we hold that the search
was within the scope of the warrant.

The Court of Appeals, noting that that our appellate courts had not
yet addressed the specific issue here, namely whether “a vehicle rented.
and operated by an overnight guest at a residence described in a search
‘warrant may be validly searched under the scope of that warrant,” id.
at __, 774. S.E.2d at 899-900, looked to cases addressing the somewhat
analogous situation of a search of an individual present at a premises
described in a warrant. To that end, the court relied on the seminal case
of Ybarra v. Illinois, in which the Supreme Court held that when officers
obtained a warrant to search a tavern at which the defendant happened
to be a patron, the search of the defendant, in the absence of additional
facts, was unconstitutional. 444 U.S. 85, 88-92, 100 S. Ct. 338, 340-43, 62
L. Ed. 2d 288, 243-46 (1979). There the Court held that “a person’s mere
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does
not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. . . .
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the ‘legitimate expec-
tations of privacy’ of persons, not places.” Id. at 91, 100 S, Ct. at 342, 62
L. Ed. 2d at 245 (citations omitted). Applying the reasoning of Ybarra
here, the Court of Appeals was persuaded “that a warrant authorizing
the search of a house or business does not automatically cover: the
search of a vehicle owned, operated, or controlled by a stranger to
the investigation.” Lowe, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 774 S.E.2d at 900 (cita-
tions omitted). On that basis, and in light of the knowledge purportedly
acquired by the officers about the vehicle, the court concluded that the
search of the rental car exceeded the scope of the search warrant. Id.
at ___, 774 S.E.2d at 899-901.

The reasoning proffered by the Court in Ybarra, sound as it is in the
context of a search of an individual present at a tavern open to the public,
is not similarly applicable to the search of a vehicle on the premises of a
private residence that is the target of a warrant. The owner or possessor
of a premises cannot exercise possession, control, or dominion over an
individual located on the premises in the same manner that he can do
so over items of personal property, such as a vehicle. The two are inher-
ently different and carry with them separate privacy considerations. See

the information he obtained from defendant and Ms. Doctors regarding the operation and
rental of the vehicle was obtained during interviews “at the police station,” at which point
“the vehicle in the driveway had already been searched.” As a result, it is unclear if the
officers obtained information about the rental car prior to the search of the car, and if so,
whether it was obtained verbally from the individuals in the residence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 369

STATE v. LOWE
[869 N.C. 360 (2016)}

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 555, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1976, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 525, 535 (1978) (“Search warrants are not directed at persons; they
authorize the search of ‘place[s]’ and the seizure of ‘things,’ . .. .” (brack-
ets in original) (quoting United States v. Kahn, 415 US. 148, 155.15, 94
S. Ct. 977, 984 n.15, 39 L. Ed. 2d 225, 237 n.15 (1974))); Yoarra, 444 U.S.
at 91, 100 S. Ct. at 342, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 245 (“[A] search or seizure of a
person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect
to that person. .. . The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the
‘legitimate expectations of privacy’ of persons, not places.”). Moreover,
a commercial patron at a tavern open to the public can, in the absence
of additional facts, be fairly characterized as being in “mere propinquity”
to the suspected criminal activity targeted by the warrant. Yoarra, 444
US. at 91, 100 S. Ct. at 342, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 245. But, the same cannot be
said of personal property, like a vehicle located within a dwelling’s cur-
tilage, over which the “owner or possessor assumes the responsibilities
and pleasures of ownership or possession,” and which has presumably
been permitted, if not invited, onto the premises. Courtright, 60 N.C.
App. at 250, 298 S.E.2d at 742. Accordingly, we conclude that Ybarra
is inapposite.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals erred in construing the officers’
purported knowledge of the rental car as support for a conclusion that.
the car was unrelated to the target of the search warrant. To the con-
trary, defendant was not on the premises by accident, but rather was an
overnight guest at a residence targeted for suspected drug trafficking.
The officers were informed about defendant’s operation of the rental
car only after they entered the home, in which they discovered defen-
dant, along with 853 grams of marijuana, as well as 14 grams of crushed.
MDMA in the room that defendant had been occupying. Far from estab-
lishing that defendant was “a stranger to the investigation,” Lowe, ___
N.C. App. at ____, 774 S.E.2d at 900, the officers’ knowledge of the rental
car only served to further connect the car to the suspected criminal
activity targeted by the warrant. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of
Appeals’ holding that the search of the rental car exceeded the scope
of the warrant.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

370 - IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MOIR
[869 N.C, 370 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

ve
JAMES KEVIN MOIR

No. 49PA14
Filed 21 December 2016

Sentencing—sex offender registration—petition to terminate

In a case involving the trial court’s denial of defendant's peti-
tion to terminate his sex offender registration, the North Carolina
Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for application of the
“modified categorical approach” to determine whether defendant

was eligible for termination of the registration requirement. Federal

statutory provisions governing termination of sex offender regis-
tration, which involve tier levels for different categories of sexual
offenses, interact with state law. Defendant's eligibility for termina-
tion of registration depended upon the extent to which his convic-
tions for indecent liberties were comparable to or more severe than.

convictions for abusive sexual conduct under the federal statute.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, 231 N.C. App. 628, 753 S.B.2d 195
(2014), vacating an order entered on 18 February 2013 by Judge Richard
D. Boner in Superior Court, Catawba County, and remanding this case
to the Superior Court, Catawba County, for further proceedings. Heard

in the Supreme Court on 16 February 2015.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by William P. Hart, Jr., Assistant

Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Crowe & Davis, P.A., by H. Kent Crowe; and LeCroy Law Firm,

PLLC, by M. Alan LeCroy, for defendant-appelice.1

ERVIN, Justice.

In this case, we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by
vacating and remanding the trial court’s order denying a petition filed
by defendant James Kevin Moir seeking termination of the requirement

1. H. Kent Crowe filed an appellee's brief on defendant's behalf before unexpectedly
dying prior to the holding of oral argument. On 29 January 2015, this Court allowed defen-

dant’s motion to substitute M. Alan LeCroy as defendant's counsel.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 371

STATE v. MOIR
[369 N.C. 370 (2016)]

that he register as a sex offender on the grounds that the trial court
had erroneously determined that defendant was.not eligible to have his
registration terminated in light of certain provisions of federal law. After
careful consideration of the State’s challenges to the Court of Appeals’
decision, we conclude that the Court of Appeals’ decision should be
modified and affirmed and that this case should be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for additional pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

On 9 January 2001, the Catawba County grand jury returned bills
of indictment charging defendant with having committed two counts of
first-degree statutory sexual offense and two counts of taking indecent
liberties with a child.2 On 28 November 2001, defendant entered a plea
of guilty to two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. Based
upon defendant's guilty plea, Judge James W. Morgan consolidated
defendant’s convictions for judgment and entered a judgment sentenc-
ing defendant to a term of sixteen to twenty months of imprisonment,
with that sentence being suspended and with defendant being placed
on supervised probation for five years on the condition that defendant
serve an active sentence of one hundred ten days imprisonment, pay the
costs, comply with the usual terms and conditions of probation and
the special terms and conditions of probation applicable to sex offend-
ers, and have no contact with the victim except to the extent that such
contact is allowed by the victim’s mother. In the course of entering judg-
ment, Judge Morgan ordered defendant to “[iJmmediately register” as a
sex offender as required by N.C.G.S. § 14-208.7, a mandate with which
defendant complied on 15 March 2002. After defendant received an
extension of the probationary period in October 2006 for the purpose
of allowing defendant to complete the sex offender treatment program,
Judge Timothy S. Kincaid entered an order on 25 June 2007 terminating
defendant's probation. On 22 May 2012, defendant filed a petition pursu-
ant to N.C.G.S. § 14-208.12A seeking to have the requirement that he
register as a sex offender pursuant to Part 2 of Article 27A of Chapter
14 of the North Carolina General Statutes terminated on the grounds
that he had “been subject to the North Carolina registration require-
ments .. . for at least ten (10) years beginning with the” date of initial
registration; that he had “not been convicted of any subsequent offense

2. Although the record on appeal only contains a single indictment charging defen-
dant with one count of first-degree statutory sexual offense and one count of taking inde-
cent liberties with a child, the remaining documents contained in the record on appeal and
the briefs that the parties submitted to both the Court of Appeals and this Court indicate
that defendant was actually charged with two counts of both offenses.

372 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MOIR:
(869 N.C, 370 (2016)]

requiring registration” since the date of his conviction; that he had “not
been arrested for any offense that would require registration” since the
completion of his sentence; and that proper notice of his request for
relief from his sex offender registration requirement had been provided
to the appropriate entities.

Defendant's petition came on for hearing before the trial court at
the 11 February 2013 criminal session of the Superior Court, Catawba
County. On 18 February 2018, the trial court entered an order denying
defendant's petition. In its order, the trial court found as fact that:

1. On November 28, 2001, the defendant entered
pleas of guilty to two counts of taking indecent liberties
with a minor child as part of a plea agreement.

2. Prior to the court’s sentencing of the defendant,
the State gave a statement of facts in support of the plea
during which it was stated that the defendant had engaged
in improper touching of the defendant's daughter, a child
of the age of 4 years, and that he had masturbated in the
presence of the child.

3. The State’s statement of facts indicated that the
improper touching had occurred in the vaginal area of the
child.

4, The defendant was required to register as a sex
offender under Part 2 of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the
General Statutes as a result of his guilty pleas.

5. The defendant has been subject to the North
Carolina registration requirements of Part 2 of Article 27A
for at least 10 years beginning with the date of the initial
North Carolina registration.

6. Since the date of conviction, the defendant has
not been convicted of any subsequent offenses requiring
registration under Article 27A, Chapter 14.

7. Since the completion of his sentence for the
indecent liberties offenses, the defendant has not been
arrested for any offense that would require registration
under Article 27A, Chapter 14.

8. The defendant served his petition on the Office of
the District Attorney for Catawba County at least three
weeks prior to the hearing held in this matter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 373

STATE v. MOIR
[369 N.C. 370 (2016)]

9. The risk of the defendant re-offending is low.

10. The defendant is not a current or potential threat
to public safety.

11. Touching of the genital area of a minor with the
intent to gratify sexual desire is considered “sexual con-
tact” under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2246(8), and sex-
ual contact is classified as “abusive sexual contact” under
18 U.S.C. § 2244.

12. Abusive sexual contact is considered to be a Tier II
offense under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8)(A)(iv).

13. The registration for Tier Il offenses under the pro-
visions of the Jacob Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071, and
the provisions of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16911, et seq., is 25 years.
This registration period cannot be reduced.

14. The defendant has not been registered as a sex
offender for at least 25 years.

Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a matter
of law:

1. That the termination of defendant's obligation to
register as a sex offender would not comply with the cur-
rent provisions of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006, which are applicable to the termina-
tion of a registration requirement and are required to be
met as for the receipt of federal funding by the State of
North Carolina.

2. [That t]he defendant is not entitled to termination
of the registration requirement.

As a result, the trial court determined that defendant’s “request to ter
minate the sex offender registration is denied” and that “defendant shall
continue to maintain a current registration under Part 2 of Article 27A
of Chapter 14.” Defendant noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from
the trial court's order.

On 7 January 2014, the Court of Appeals filed an opinion vacating
the trial court's order and remanding this case to the Superior Court,
Catawba County, for further proceedings on the grounds that the trial
court had erred by determining that defendant was a Tier II sex offender

374 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MOIR:
[869 N.C. 370 (2016)]

who was ineligible to obtain relief from the sex offender registration
requirement. State v. Moir, 231 N.C. App. 628, 631-32, 753 S.E.2d 195,
196-97 (2014). According to the Court of Appeals, the trial court reached.
this erroneous conclusion based upon an incorrect understanding of
the relevant provisions of federal law. Id. at 631, 753 S.E.2d at 197. In the
Court of Appeals’ view, the extent to which an individual should be clas-
sified as a Tier I, Tier Il, or Tier Il offender hinges upon the nature of
“the offense charged” rather than upon “the facts underlying the case,”
as the trial court appeared to believe. Jd. at 631, 753 S.E.2d at 197. As a
result, because the crime of taking indecent liberties with a child did not
inherently involve the type of conduct required to make defendant a Tier
Il offender, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant should be
treated as a Tier I, rather than a Tier II, offender. Id. at 631-32, 753 S.E.2d
at 197 (citing In re Hamilton, 220 N.C. App. 350, 358, 725 S.E.2d 393, 399
(2012), and In re McClain, 226 N.C. App. 465, 469, 741 S.E.2d 893, 896,
disc. rev. denied, 366 N.C. 600, 743 S.E.2d 188 (2013)). However, because
“the ultimate decision of whether to terminate a sex offender's registra-
tion requirement still lies in the trial court’s discretion,” id. at 362, 753
S.E.2d at 197 (quoting In re Hamilton, 220 N.C. App. at 359, 725 S.E.2d
at 399 (citing N.C.G.S. § 14-208.12A(al) (2012))), the Court of Appeals
vacated the trial court’s order and remanded this case to the trial court
for the entry of a new order containing appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law based upon a correct understanding of the applicable
Jaw and, in the event that the trial court determined that defendant was
eligible to be relieved from his existing obligation to comply with the sex
offender registration program, the making of a discretionary decision
concerning the extent to which defendant's petition should be allowed
or denied, id. at 632, 753 S.E.2d at 197. We granted the State’s request for
discretionary review on 19 August 2014.

Section 14 208.12A of our General Statutes, which governs requests
for relief from the sex offender registration requirement, provides in
pertinent part that:

(a) Ten years from the date of initial county regis-
tration, a person required to register under this Part may
petition the superior court to terminate the 30 year regis-
tration requirement if the person has not been convicted
of a subsequent offense requiring registration under
this Article.

If the reportable conviction is for an offense that
occurred in North Carolina, the petition shall be filed in
the district where the person was convicted of the offense.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 375

STATE v. MOIR
[369 N.C. 370 (2016)}

(al) The court may grant the relief if:

() The petitioner demonstrates to the court
that he or she has not been arrested for any
crime that would require registration under
this Article since completing the sentence,

(2) The requested relief complies with the pro-
visions of the federal Jacob Wetterling Act,
as amended, and any other federal stan-
dards applicable to the termination of a
registration requirement or required to be
met as a condition for the receipt of federal
funds by the State, and

(3) The court is’ otherwise satisfied that the
petitioner is not a current or potential
threat to public safety.

N.C.G.S. § 14-208.12A (2015). As a result, given that the trial court's find-
ings of fact, which have not been challenged on appeal, establish that
defendant “has not been arrested for any offense that would require reg-
istration” since completing his sentence and “is not a current or poten-
tial threat to public safety,” the extent to which defendant is eligible to
be removed from the sex offender registration program depends upon
whether “[t]he requested relief complies with the provisions of the fed-
eral Jacob Wetterling Act, as amended, and any other federal standards
applicable to the termination of a registration requirement or required
to be met as a condition for the receipt of federal funds by the State.” Id.
§ 14-208.12A(a1)(2).

The currenily effective federal statutory provisions governing the
extent to which an individual required to register as a sex offender is
entitled to have his or her registration obligation terminated are found
in the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which is
also known as the Adam Walsh Act.? Adam Walsh Child Protection and

3. The federal statutory provisions governing removal from a state’s sex offender
registry have been amended on a number of occasions, The relevant provisions were, as
N.C.GS. § 14-208.12A(a1)(2) suggests, originally contained in the Jacob Wetterling Act,
14 US.C. § 14071 (1994), which was amended by the “Pam Lychner Sexual Offender
‘Tracking and Identification Act of 1996.” See Pub. L. No. 104-236, §§ 1-2, 110 Stat. 3093,
8093-96. In 2006, portions of both the Lychner Act and the Wetterling Act were repealed
following enactment of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, which currently

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MOIR
(369 N.C. 370 (2016)}

Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, Title I, §§ 102, 113, 120 Stat. 590,
593-94.4 According to SORNA, sex offenders subject to a registration
requirement are classified on the basis of three tier levels, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 16911(2)-(4) (2012), with sex offenders being treated differently based
upon the exact tier to which they are assigned, see id. § 16915. Among
other things, 42 U.S.C. § 16915 provides that “[a] sex offender shall
keep the registration current for the full registration period (exclud-
ing any time the sex offender is in custody or civilly committed) unless
the offender is allowed a reduction under” 42 U.S.C. § 16915(b), with
“(t]he full registration period” being “15 years, if the offender is a tier
I sex offender,” “25 years, if the offender is a tier II sex offender,” and
“the life of the offender, if the offender is a tier III sex offender.” Id.
§ 16915(a). However, a Tier I sex offender may have his or her required
registration period reduced to ten years, id. § 16915(b)(8)(A), and a Tier
Il offender may have his or her required registration period reduced to
twenty-five years, id. § 16915(b)(8)(B), in the event that he or she is not
“convicted of any offense for which imprisonment for more than 1 year
may be imposed,” is not “convicted of any sex offense,” “successfully
complete[s Jany periods of supervised release, probation, and parole,”
and “successfully complete[s] . .. an appropriate sex offender treatment
program,” id. § 16915(b). As a result, defendant would not have been
eligible to have his obligation to register as a sex offender terminated at
the conclusion of a ten year registration period unless he satisfied the
requirements for being a Tier I offender.

The exact contours of the tier system upon which 42 U.S.C. § 16915
depends are spelled out in 42 U.S.C. § 16911. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1) defines
a “sex offender” as “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.”
Id. § 16911(1). According to 42 U.S.C. § 16911(2), a Tier I sex offender
is “a sex offender other than a [Tlier II or [Tlier II sex offender.” Id.
§ 16911(2). A Tier II sex offender is

a sex offender other than a [T]ier III sex offender whose
offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1
year and—

(A) is comparable to or more severe than the follow-
ing offenses, when committed against a minor, or

governs removal from North Carolina's sex offender registry for purposes of N.C.G.S.
§ 14-208.12A(al)(2).

4, SORNA is codified, for the most part, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16962 (2012).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 377
STATE v. MOIR
1369 N.C. 370 (2016)}
an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense
against a minor:

@_ sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of
title 18);

Gi) coercion and enticement (as described in section
2422(b) of title 18);

Gii) transportation with intent to engage in criminal
sexual activity (as described in section 2423(a)[ ]
of title 181];

(iv) abusive sexual contact (as described in section
2244 of title 18);

(B) involves—
@ use of a minor in a sexual performance;
Gi) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; or

iit) production or distribution of child pornography;
or

(C) occurs after the offender becomes a [T]ier I sex
offender.

Id. § 16911(8). Finally, a Tier III sex offender is

a sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprison-
ment for more than 1 year and—

(A) is comparable to or more severe than the following
offenses, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such
an offense:

@ aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as
described in sections 2241 and 2242 of title 18); or

Gi) abusive sexual contact (as described in section
2244 of title 18) against a minor who has not
attained the age of 13 years;

(B) involves kidnapping of a minor (unless committed by
aparent or guardian); or

(C) occurs after the offender becomes a [T]ier II sex
offender.

378 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MOIR.
[369 N.C. 370 (2016)}

Id. § 16911(4). As a result of the fact that the State seeks to have defen-
dant categorized as a Tier II offender on the grounds that his “offense”
was “comparable to or more severe than” “abusive sexual contact” as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2244, the extent to which defendant is or is not
eligible to have his obligation to register as a sex offender terminated
depends upon the extent, if any, to which his convictions for taking inde-
cent liberties with a child in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1 are compa-
rable to or more severe than convictions for “abusive sexual contact” in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244.5

According to N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1,

(a) A person is guilty of taking indecent liberties
with children if, being 16 years of age or more and at least
five years older than the child in question, he either:

(1) Willfully takes or attempts to take any
immoral, improper, or indecent liberties
with any child of either sex under the age
of 16 years for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying sexual desire; or

(2) Willfully commits or attempts to commit any
lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body
or any part or member of the body of any
child of either sex under the age of 16 years.

N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) (2015). On the other hand, a defendant is guilty
of abusive sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244 if he or she
“mowingly engages in or causes sexual contact with or by another per-
son, if so to do would violate” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) or (b), 2242, 2243(a)
or (b), or 2241(c), or if he or she “knowingly engages in sexual contact
with another person without that other person’s permission,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2244(a)-(b) (2012), with “sexual contact” for purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2244 defined as “the intentional touching, either directly or through the
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of
any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse

5. Asaresult of the fact that the same analysis we have utilized to address the State's
contention that defendant should be categorized as a Tier II offender would be appropriate
in the event that the State were to contend that defendant should be categorized as a Tier
I offender, our discussion of the merits of the contention that the State has actually made
in this case suffices to permit an appropriate disposition in this case. We do not, however,
wish for the discussion contained in the text of this opinion to be understood as limiting
the extent to which the Superior Court, Catawba County, is entitled to classify defendant
asa Tier I, a Tier I, or a Tier Ill offender on remand.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 379

STATE v. MOIR
[369 N.C. 370 (2016)]

or gratify the sexual desire of any person,” id. § 2246(3).6 The extent to
which the crime of taking indecent liberties with a child is comparable
to or more severe than the crime of abusive sexual contact for purposes
of 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8)(A)(iv) is, of course, a question of federal, rather
than state, law.

The federal courts have described three approaches for making
determinations like ascertaining the tier to which a defendant should be
assigned for the purpose of determining whether he is eligible to have
his sex offender registration obligation reduced pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 16915(b): (1) the “categorical approach,” (2) the “circumstance-spe-
cific approach,” and (3) the “modified categorical, approach.”? United
States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1130 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that “courts
employ two main approaches, . . . the categorical approach and the cir
cumstance-specific approach”); see Descamps v. United States, __ U.S.
__, __, __, 186 L. Ed. 2d 438, 449, 451-53 (2013) (explaining that the
“modified categorical approach” is solely a “variant” of the “categorical
approach”); see also United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 195-96 (4th
Cir. 2016); United States v. Price, 777 F3d 700, 704-05 (4th Cir), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 192 L. Ed. 2d 941 (2015). The applicability of each
approach depends upon whether the statute under which a defendant.

6. A careful examination of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2241(b), 2242, 2243(a), 2243(b),
and 2241(c) reveals that guilt of the offenses delineated in each of these statutory provi-
sions requires proof that the offender “engage{d] in or cause{d] sexual contact with or
by another person,” 18 U.S.C. § 2244, in such a manner as to result in the commission of
a “sexual act,” which is defined as “contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis
and the anus,” with “contact involving the penis occur{ring] upon penetration, however
slight;” “contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth
and the anus;” “the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another
by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person;” or “the intentional touching, not
through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16
years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person,” id. § 2246(2)(A)-(D). However, given that the offense set out in 18
U.S.C. § 2244(b) does not require proof that the offender committed a “sexual act” and
given that conviction for an offense “comparable to or more severe” than that defined in
18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) would suffice to render the person in question a ‘Tier II offender even
if that offense was not also “comparable to or more severe than” the offenses delineated
in 18 USC. § 2244(a), see 42 US.C. § 16911(8)(A)(iv), we need not address the extent, if
any, to which defendant's conviction for taking indecent liberties with a child would be
“comparable to or more severe than” a conviction for the offenses requiring proof of the
commission of a “sexual act” delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a).

7. The “circumstance-specific approach” is also known as the “non-categorical
approach.” See United States v. Price, 777 F3d 700, 705 (4th Ci), cert. denied, _ U.S.
__, 192 L. Ba. 24 941 (2015).

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was convicted refers to a “generic crime” or to a “defendant's specific
conduct.” White, 782 F.3d at 1130. In the event that Congress intended
for the relevant statutory provision to refer to a generic crime rather
than a defendant's specific conduct, the “categorical approach,” in
which courts compare the elements of the offense for which the defen-
dant was convicted with the “elements of the generic offense identified
in the federal statute,” is used in making the necessary comparison.
Price, 777 F.3d at 704; see White, 782 F.3d at 1130-31; see also Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607, 629 (1990). A defen-
dant’s state conviction is comparable to the relevant federal offense for
purposes of the “categorical approach” when the elements composing
the statute of conviction “are the same as, or narrower than, those of
the generic offense.” Descamps, ___ U.S. at ___, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 449;
Price, 777 F.3d at 704 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 629).
Accordingly, if a state statute “sweeps more broadly than the generic
crime,” there is no categorical match. Descamps, __ U.S. at ___, 186 L.
Ed. 2d at 451 (stating that “[t]he key, we emphasize[ ], is elements, not
facts.”) In other words, if there is “ ‘a realistic probability . . . that the
State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic
definition of a crime,’ there is no categorical match and the prior convic-
tion cannot be for an offense under the federal statute.” Price, 777 F3d.
at 704 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas—Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 166 L.
Ed. 2d 683, 692-93 (2007)).

On the other hand, in the event that Congress intended to refer
to a defendant’s specific conduct instead of to the elements of the
offense involved in the underlying criminal conviction, courts apply
the “circumstance-specific approach.” Id. at 705 (citing Nijhawan
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34, 174 L. Ed. 2d 22, 27 (2009)). In applying the
“circumstance-specific approach,” the court is required to compare
the actual conduct that led to the defendant’s conviction for the relevant
state offense with the elements .of the offenses as defined in federal
law. Id.; see Descamps, ___ U.S. at ____, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 456. In other
words, when the facts underlying the defendant’s prior conviction
would support a conviction under the federal statute, the defendant's
prior offense is comparable to the federal offense for categorization
purposes. Price, 777 F.3d at 705 (citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34, 174
L. Ed. 2d at 27); see Descamps, ___ U.S. at __, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 456.
Thus, the “broader framework” made possible through the use of the
“circumstance-specific approach” is available “when the federal statute
refers ‘to the specific way in which an offender committed the crime on
a specific occasion,’ rather than to the generic crime.” Price, 777 F.3d at
705 (quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34, 174 L, Ed. 2d at 27).

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In the event that the court is required to address issues arising
under a divisible statute, which exists when the relevant provision sets
out multiple offenses rather than a single offense, a pure categorical
approach cannot be utilized in any meaningful way. See Descamps, ___
US. at __, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 449 (noting that the “modified categorical
approach” applies “when a prior conviction is for violating a so-called
‘divisible statute’ ”). In order to resolve cases involving divisible stat-
utes, courts have developed the “modified categorical approach.” Under
that approach, “[g]eneral divisibility, however, is not enough” to permit
a finding of comparability. United States v. Montes—Flores, 736 F.3d 357,
365 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d
347, 352 (4th Cir. 2013)). Instead, the “modified categorical approach”
only permits a finding of comparability in the event that the elements of
at least one of the alternative offenses set out in the statute defining the
offense of which the defendant was previously convicted categorically
match the generic federal offense. Descamps,_ U.S. at__, 186 L. Ed.
2d at 453 (stating that “[aJll the modified [categorical] approach adds is
amechanism for making that comparison when a statute lists multiple,
alternative elements, and so effectively creates ‘several different . . .
crimes’ ” on the theory that, “[i]f at least one, but not all of those crimes
matches the generic version, a court needs a way to find out which the
defendant was convicted of’ having committed) (ellipsis in original)
(quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 32).8 In using the
“modified categorical approach,” the court is permitted to examine a
limited number of contemporaneously generated documents described.
in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 161 L. Ed. 2d 205, 214 (2005),
“such as the indictment, the plea agreement, and jury instructions, to
‘determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant's prior
conviction.’ ” Berry, 814 F.3d at 196 (quoting Descamps, ___ U.S. at
__, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 449). “The modified [categorical] approach does
not authorize a... court to substitute such a facts-based inquiry for
an elements-based one.” Descamps, ___ U.S. at __, 186 L. Ed. 2d at

8. The greater flexibility allowed through the use of the “modified categorical
approach” is not available in the event that the relevant state statute specifies several
alternative means of committing a crime, one of which would bring the statute of convic-
tion within the definition of the generic crime, instead of setting out alternative offenses
made up of differing elements. Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S.__, _, 195 L. Ed. 24604,
616-18 (2016); see also id. at___, 195 L. Ed. 2d at 610 (defining “elements” as “the ‘constitu-
ent parts’ of a crime's legal definition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain a
conviction’ ” (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014)) and defining “facts” as
“mere real-world things—extraneous to the crime’s legal requirements” that “need neither
be found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant” (citing Black's Law Dictionary 709)).

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462. Instead, the only reason that a court is allowed to consider certain
extra-statutory information in the “modified categorical approach” is “to
assess whether the plea was to the version of the crime” in the state
statute that “correspond[s] to the generic offense.” Id. at__, 186 L. Ed.
2d at 452 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25-26, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 217 (plurality
opinion)). If none of the alternative offenses set out in a “divisible” stat-
ute is determined to be comparable to the generic offense on the basis
of a “categorical” analysis, no “match| ]” exists and “[t]he modified [cat-
egorical] approach . . . has no role to play” in the analysis. Id. at__, 186
L. Ed. 2d at 453-54; accord Montes—Flores, 736 F.3d at 365 (stating that
“[g]eneral divisibility, however, is not enough; a statute is divisible for
purposes of applying the modified categorical approach only if at least
one of the categories into which the statute may be divided constitutes,
by its elements, [the generic offense]” (quoting Cabrera-Umanzor, 728
F3d at 352)). Thus, “[o]nce the elements of the offense of conviction
have been identified, the examination of any Shepard documents ends,
and the court proceeds with employing the categorical approach, com-
paring the elements of the offense of conviction with the elements of the
offense identified in the federal statute.” Berry, 814 F.3d at 196 (citing
Descamps, ___ U.S. at ___, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 449). As a result, we must
now determine whether 42 U.S.C. § 16911, when properly construed,
requires use of the “categorical approach,” the “circumstancé-specific
approach,” or the “modified-categorical approach.”

Although the United States Supreme Court has pointed out that the
word “offense” in statutes can refer to either a generic offense or spe-
cific conduct, Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34-35, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 27-28, an
analysis of the language in which 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8)(A)(iv) is couched
and various equitable and practical considerations persuade us that
Congress intended for the required comparability analysis to focus on a
generic offense rather than the defendant's individual conduct. As an ini-
tial matter, when taken in context, the references to “offense” contained
throughout 42 U.S.C. § 16911 tend, for the most part, to refer to spe-
cific criminal offenses as defined in state law rather than to the specific
conduct in which the defendant engaged. For example, as the Court of
Appeals noted, the fact that a “sex offender” is defined as “an individual
who was convicted of a sex offense,” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1), the fact that
a Tier II offender is defined as a “sex offender whose offense is punish-
able by imprisonment for more than 1 year,” Moir, 231 N.C. App. at 630,
753 S.E.2d at 196 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (2006)), and the fact that
the statute contains “lists of elements of the offense” tend to suggest
that Congress was referring to the identity of the generic offense for

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which a defendant was convicted rather than to a description of each
individual defendant's conduct, id. at 631, 753 S.E.2d at 197. In addi-
tion, we note that 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8)(A) refers to offenses described
in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b), 2423(a), and 2244. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8)(A);
White, 782 F.3d at 1133 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8)(A)). As the United
States Supreme Court has stated, cross-references to other federal stat-
utory provisions tend to suggest that Congress intended to refer to a
generic offense instead of the specific conduct in which the defendant
engaged. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 36-38, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 28-30 (explain-
ing that the references in the Armed Career Criminal Act to specific
federal crimes support use of the “categorical approach”); ¢f. United
States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1353-56 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (explain-
ing that a “circumstance-specific approach” is appropriate as applied
to the phrase “against a minor” as found in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)Gi)
and (7)() given that these phrases do not include a cross-reference to
another federal penal section), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 961, 178 L. Ed. 2d
287 (2010)). Thus, our reading of the relevant statutory language tends
to suggest that Congress intended to refer to a generic offense rather
than to the defendant’s underlying conduct in the relevant portion of 42
US.C. § 16911.

In addition, in making this determination, we must consider

the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of apply-
ing a circumstance-specific approach, including the bur
den on the trial courts of sifting through records from
prior cases, the impact of unresolved evidentiary issues,
and the potential inequity of imposing consequences
based on unproven factual allegations where the defen-
dant has pleaded guilty to a lesser offense.

White, 782 F.3d at 1132 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02, 109 L. Ed. 2d
at 628-29). In conducting that inquiry, we note that a trial judge required
to make the necessary categorization determination long after the date
of a defendant's conviction may lack access to relevant factual informa-
tion concerning the defendant's conduct, particularly in cases involv-
ing convictions resulting from a guilty plea rather than a jury verdict.
See Descamps, __ U.S. at ___, 186 L. Ed. 2d at 457 (noting that the use
of the “circumstance-specific approach” would require trial courts “to
expend resources examining (often aged) documents for evidence that
a defendant admitted in a plea colloquy, or a prosecutor showed at trial,
facts that, although unnecessary to the crime of conviction, satisfy an
element of the relevant generic offense”; that “[t]he meaning of those
documents will often be uncertain”; and that “the statements of fact in

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them may be downright wrong”). In addition, use of the “circumstance-
specific approach” would, in some instances, force trial courts to base
their decisions on “unresolved evidentiary issues” and “unproven fac-
tual allegations,” White, 782 F:3d at 1132, 1135 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at
600-02, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 628-29), and result in what amounts to a mini-trial
concerning the exact nature of a defendant's earlier conduct in which
the defendant might be unable to effectively defend himself or herself
due to the passage of time and other factors. Thus, the interpretation.
of the literal statutory language that we believe to be appropriate has
the added benefit of avoiding a number of practical and equitable prob-
Jems that would arise from reliance upon the “circumstance-specific
approach” for the purpose of determining whether defendant is a Tier I
or a Tier II offender.

The reading of the relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. § 16911 that we
believe to be appropriate is also consistent with the approach adopted
by various federal courts and agencies in the course of resolving this
issue. For example, the Fourth Circuit stated in Berry that “SORNA’s text
... Suggests that the categorical approach should be used to determine
whether a prior conviction is comparable to or more severe than the
generic crimes listed in Section 16911(4)(A).” 814 F.3d at 197. The Tenth
Circuit has reached the same conclusion. White, 782 F.3d at 1135 (con-
cluding that “Congress intended courts to apply a categorical approach
to sex offender tier classifications designated by reference to a specific
criminal statute”). In fact, no federal circuit, to our knowledge, has con-
strued the exact statutory provision at issue here differently than we
do. Finally, the National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and
Notification promulgated by the United States Department of Justice
provide that, “in assessing whether the offense satisfies the criteria for
tier II or tier III classification, jurisdictions generally may premise the
determination on the elements of the offense, and are not required to
look to underlying conduct that is not reflected in the offense of con-
viction.” The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and
Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38053 (July 2, 2008). As a result, for
all of these reasons, we conclude that, in determining whether defen-
dant’s convictions for taking indecent liberties with a child suffice to
make him a Tier II offender as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8)(A)(Giv), we
are required to utilize the categorical approach, as supplemented by the
“modified categorical approach” in the event that defendant was con-
victed of violating a divisible statute.9

9. Anumber of courts that utilize the “categorical approach’ for other purposes have
adopted the “circumstance-specific” method for the purpose of applying the statutory

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STATE v. MOIR
[869 N.C. 370 (2016)]

As we have already noted, N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1 prohibits “[w]illfully
tak[ing] or attempt[ing] to take any immoral, improper, or indecent lib-
erties with any child of either sex under the age of 16 years for the pur-
pose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire,” id. § 14-202.1(a)(1), and
“(willfully commit[ting] or attempt[ing] to commit any lewd or lascivi-
ous act upon or with the body or any part or member of the body of any
child of either sex under the age of 16 years,” id. § 14-202.1(a)(2). As of
the present date, this Court has not had the opportunity to determine
whether N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) is or is not a divisible statute, particularly
in the aftermath of the amendment to that statutory provision worked by
Chapter 779 of the 1975 North Carolina Session Laws, which removed the
requirement that the defendant act “with intent to commit an unnatural
sexual act,” N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1 (1969), from the crime of taking indecent
liberties with children, and amended the remaining statutory language
so as to create the two subdivisions, N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) and (a)
(2), that have been contained in all versions of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)
since the 1 October 1975 effective date of the amendment. Act of June
24, 1975, ch. 779, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1105. Thus, given our willingness
to authorize the use of the “modified categorical approach” in appropri-
ate cases, a determination of whether N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) is a divisible
statute must be made in order to properly determine whether defendant
is eligible to seek relief from the existing requirement that he register as
asex offender. .

An analysis of the literal language of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) provides
a basis for arguing that N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1 is a divisible statute, with

reference to the commission of a crime “against a minor” contained in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8).
See generally Berry, 814 F.3d at 197 (stating that “the language of Section 16911(3)(A), like
the language of Section 16911(4)(A), instructs courts to apply the categorical approach
when comparing prior convictions with the generic offenses listed except when it comes
to the specific circumstance of the victims’ ages” (citations omitted); Gonzalee-Medina,
‘187 F.3d at 429 (concluding “that Congress contemplated a non-categorical approach to
the age-differential determination in the § 16911(6)(C) exception”); Dodge, 597 F'3d at
1356 (“hold[ing] that courts may employ a noncategorical approach to examine the under-
lying facts of a defendant's offense, to determine whether a defendant has committed a
‘specified offense against a minor’ and is thus a ‘sex offender’ subject to SORNAS regis-
tration requirement”); United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F'3d 982, 990-94 (9th Cir.)
(determining that the phrase “a specified offense against a minor” contained in 42 U.S.C.
§ 16911(5)(A)(ii) and (7) allows for a “circumstance-specific approach”), cert. denied,
555 U.S. 1088, 172 L. Ed. 2d 761 (2008). We agree with the approach to age-related issues
deemed appropriate in the cases and hold that North Carolina courts should use the non-
categorical or “circumstance-specific approach” in addressing any age-related issues that
may arise in the course of determining whether an individual seeking the termination of
an existing sex offender registration requirement should be categorized as a Tier I, a Tier
Il, or a Tier Ill offender.

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N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) and N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2) being understood
to state separate offenses. The Tenth Circuit read N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)
in just that manner. White, 782 F.3d at 1136. However, there is a rea-
sonable and rational basis for taking the opposite position as well. For
example, the Court of Appeals rejected a defendant's fatal variance claim
even though the trial court instructed the jury concerning the issue of
defendant's guilt of taking indecent liberties with a child by using the lan-
guage “for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire” as found
in N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) when the indictment was couched solely in
terms of the “lewd and lascivious act” language contained in N.C.G.S.
§ 14-202. 1(a)(2). State v. Wilson, 87 N.C. App. 399, 400-01, 361 S.E.2d 105,
106-07 (1987), disc. rev. denied, 321 N.C. 479, 364 S.E.2d 670 (1988). In
addition, this Court and the Court of Appeals have upheld indecent liber-
ties convictions under both subdivisions of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) based
upon essentially identical conduct. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 322 N.C. 753,
767, 370 S.E.2d 398, 407 (1988) (concluding that the act of inserting an
adult's tongue into a child’s mouth constituted an “immoral, improper,
or indecent” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) and a
“lewd or lascivious” act within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2));
State v. Hammett, 182 N.C. App. 316, 328, 642 S.B.2d 454, 459 (conclud-
ing that masturbating in a child’s presence constituted an offense pun-
ishable pursuant to N.C.G.S. 14-202.1(a)(2)), appeal dismissed and disc.
rev. denied, 361 N.C. 572, 651 S.E.2d 227 (2007); State v. Turman, 52
N.C. App. 876, 377, 278 S.B.2d 574, 575 (1981) (concluding that mastur-
bating in a child’s presence constituted an offense pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 14-202.1(a)(1)); of: State v. Jones, 172 N.C. App. 308, 314-16, 616 S.E.2d
15, 19-20 (2005) (holding that a single act cannot support two convic-
tions under both N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) and N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)
(2), respectively). In light of these decisions, at least four members of
an en banc panel of the Fourth Circuit have determined that N.C.G.S.
§ 14-202.1(a) is not a divisible statute. United States v. Vann, 660 F:3d 771,
782-83 (4th Cir. 2011) (King, J., concurring, with Motz, Gregory, & Davis,
JJ.). Thus, the extent to which N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) is a divisible statute
remains an open question about which reasonable minds can differ.

Assuming, without in any way deciding, that N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)
is a divisible statute, additional questions of North Carolina law must
be resolved before defendant's eligibility to seek the termination of his
obligation to continue to register as a sex offender can be determined.
Although this Court has held that proof that a touching occurred is not
necessary for a finding of guilt for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)
(1), see State v. Hartness, 326 N.C. 561, 567, 391 S.E.2d 177, 180 (stat-
ing that N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) does not require “the State [to] prove

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STATE v. MOIR
[869 N.C. 370 (2016)]

that a touching occurred”), and while the Court of Appeals has held that.
proof of a touching is not necessary for a finding of guilt under N.C.G.S.
§ 14-202.1(a)(2), see Hammett, 182 N.C. App. at 323, 642 S.B.2d at 459
(holding that the defendant did not need to have physically touched the
victim in order to be convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child
in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2)); State v. Every, 157 N.C. App.
200, 207, 578 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2003) (stating that “[i]t is not necessary
that an actual touching of the victim by defendant occur in order for
the defendant to be ‘with’ a child for purposes of taking indecent liber-
ties under [N.C.G.S.] § 14-202.1(a)(1)” (citation omitted)), this Court has
never addressed, much less decided, whether a physical touching of the
victim is necessary for a defendant to be convicted of taking indecent
liberties with a child in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2). For that
reason, this Court has also never determined whether any such physical
touching requirement applicable to N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2) is limited
to an “intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person.”
18 U.S.C. § 2246(8). As a result, our existing precedent simply does not
permit the making of certain preliminary determinations required for a
showing that defendant's conviction for taking indecent liberties with
achild is “comparable to or more severe than” “abusive sexual contact,”
Berry, 814 F3d at 200 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A)), or,
alternatively, whether there is “a realistic probability . . . that the State
would apply [N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2)] to conduct that falls outside
the generic definition of” abusive sexual contact, Price, 777 F.3d at 704
(quoting Duenas—Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193, 166 L. Ed. 2d at 693).

Even if N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2) is interpreted in such a manner
as to make it comparable to abusive sexual contact in violation of
18U.S.C. § 2244, the present record does not permit us to determine, using
the limited range of docunients delineated in Shepard, whether defen-
dant was convicted of the offense spelled out in N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)
(2) rather than the offense spelled out in N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1). As an
initial matter, we note that the indictments returned against defendant
for the purpose of charging him with taking indecent liberties with a
child allege, in conjunction with a citation to N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1, that:

the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully, and felo-
niously did take and attempt to take immoral, improper,
and indecent liberties with the child named below for the
purpose of arousing and gratifying sexual desire and did
commit and attempt to commit a lewd and lascivious act
upon the body of the child named below. At the time of

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this offense, the child named below was under the age
of 16 years and the defendant named above was over 16
years of age and at least five years older than the child.

Similarly, the transcript of plea indicates that defendant had agreed to
plead guilty to “two counts of indecent liberties”; the Felony Judgment
Findings of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors describe defendant’s
“offense” as “indecent liberties student”; and the trial court’s judg-
ment indicates that defendant had been convicted of “indecent liber-
ties with a child,” with an accompanying statutory reference to N.C.G.S.
§ 14-202.4(A).10 As a result, the materials contained in the present record
that the trial court is authorized to consider pursuant to Shepard simply
do not permit a determination that defendant was convicted of com-
mitting the offense made punishable by N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2) to the
exclusion of the offense made punishable by N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1)
or to a generic offense made punishable by N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1.11 See
Vann, 660 F:3d at 773-76 (per curiam) (holding that an indictment like
that returned against defendant in this case did not suffice to permit a
court to determine, for purposes of the “modified categorical approach,”
that the defendant was convicted of the offense made punishable by
N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2)).

10. Although the State filed a motion seeking to have the statutory reference con-
tained in the judgment changed from N.C.G.S. § 14-202.4(A) to N.C.GS. § 14-202.1, the
record contains no indication that this amendment request was ever approved.

LL. As we noted earlier, the trial court did find that, “[p}rior to the court's sentencing
of the defendant, the State gave a statement of facts in support of the plea during which it
‘was stated that the defendant had engaged in improper touching of the defendant's daugh-
ter, a child of the age of 4 years, and that he had masturbated in the presence of the child,”
with this “improper touching [having] occurred in the vaginal area of the child.” Although
defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support this finding on
appeal, the exact basis for this finding and the extent to which the trial court was entitled
to consider the information upon which this finding was based pursuant to Shepard is
unclear given that we have not been provided with a transcript of the hearing held before
the trial court for the purpose of considering defendant's request for the termination of his
obligation to register as a sex offender. However, the State did indicate in its brief before
this Court that, “[t]hough no transcript from the formal plea proceedings was introduced
as an exhibit, the State's description of its stated factual basis was not disputed by [defen-
dant)” and was “corroborated by the testimony from [defendant's] witness.” As a result,
the trial court's finding concerning the conduct underlying defendant's conviction for tak-
ing indecent liberties with a child appears to rest, at most, upon a subsequent reconstruc-
tion of a factual basis statement offered in support of defendant's guilty plea rather than
any sort of contemporaneously generated document of the type contemplated by Shepard.
We need not determine whether the trial court was entitled to consider this information
at this point given the disposition that we have deemed appropriate in this case and leave
the determination of whether the information upon which the trial court relied in its initial
order could be considered in determining defendant's eligibility to have his sex offender
registration obligation terminated consistent with Shepard for consideration on remand.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 389

STATE v. MOIR
[869 N.C. 370 (2016)}

Although this Court has the authority to make a number of the
determinations listed above without the necessity for further proceed-
ings in the trial court, we believe, after careful consideration, that we
should refrain from doing so at this point. As the record clearly reflects,
neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court considered the extent,
if any, to which the necessary categorization decision could be made
using the “modified categorical approach.” For that reason, we have not
had the benefit of briefing and argument concerning the numerous legal
questions of first impression which must be resolved in order to deter-
mine defendant's eligibility for removal from the sex offender registry.
In light of its misapprehension of the applicable law, which was entirely
understandable given that many of the decisions upon which we have
relied in this opinion had not been handed down by the date upon which
it entered its order, the trial court failed to determine whether N.C.G.S.
§ 14-202.1(a) constitutes a divisible statute, whether a conviction for the
offense made punishable by N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2) requires proof that
the defendant “intentional|ly] touch[ed], either directly or through the
clothing, . . . the [victim’s] genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks,” 18 U.S.C. § 2246(8), and the extent, if any, to which the infor-
mation that could be appropriately considered under Shepard that was
contained in the record tended to show that defendant's indecent liber-
ties conviction rested solely upon a violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2).
Consistent with the well-established legal principle that “[flacts found
under misapprehension of the law will be set aside on the theory that
the evidence should be considered in its true legal light,” Helms v. Rea,
282 N.C. 610, 620, 194 S.E.2d 1, 8 (1973) (brackets in original) (quot-
ing McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N.C. 752, 754, 3 S.B.2d 324, 326
(1939), and citing Davis v. Davis, 269 N.C. 120, 127, 152 S.E.2d 306, 312
(1967); Owens v. Voncannon, 251 N.C. 351, 355, 111 S.E.2d 700, 703
(1959); and In re Gibbons, 247 N.C. 273, 283, 101 S.E.2d 16, 23-24 (1957),
we believe that the most appropriate manner in which to resolve the
issues that remain to be addressed in this case is for this Court to affirm
the Court of Appeals’ decision that the trial court erred by applying the
“circumstance-specific approach” in determining whether defendant
should be deemed eligible to have the requirement that he register as
a sex offender terminated. However, we modify the Court of Appeals’
decision in order to require use of the “modified categorical approach”
rather than the pure “categorical approach” in cases involving divisible
statutes, and remand this case to the Superior Court, Catawba County,
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. On remand,
the trial court should consider whether N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1 is a divis-
ible statute. If the trial court deems N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1 to be divisible,’

390 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. PERRY
[869 N.C, 390 (2016)]

it must then consider whether guilt of any separate offense set out in
N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2) requires proof of a physical touching and
whether any such physical touching requirement necessitates proof
that the defendant “intentional[ly] touch[ed], either directly or through
the clothing, [ ] the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or but-
tocks of” the victim. Finally, if guilt of any separate offense set out in
N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2) requires proof that defendant “intentionalfly]
touchfed], either directly or through the clothing, [| ] the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of” the victim, the trial court must
determine whether any document that the trial court is authorized to
consider under Shepard permits a determination that defendant was
convicted of violating N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(2) rather than any specific
offense set out iri N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1) or any generic offense made
punishable pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a). Finally, if necessary, the
trial court should consider, in the exercise of its discretion, whether it
should terminate defendant's obligation to register as a sex offender.

MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED, AND REMANDED.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
DOMINIQUE JEVON PERRY

No, 81A14
Filed 21 December 2016

Constitutional Law—cruel and unusual punishment—juvenile
sentence—life without parole
A trial court order denying defendant’s motion for appropriate
relief was reversed where defendant had received a sentence of life
without parole as a seventeen-year-old. The State’s sole argument in
defense of the denial of the motion was that Miller v. Alabama, ___
US. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), was not to be applied retroactively,
but Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. __, 186 S. Ct. 718 (2016),
held that Miller was entitled to retroactive application.

On writ of certiorari to review an order denying a motion for appro-
priate relief entered on 3 June 2013 by Judge R. Stuart Albright in Superior
Court, Guilford County. On 29 July 2013, the Court of Appeals allowed
defendant’s petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing

IN THE SUPREME COURT 391

STATE v. PERRY
[369 N.C. 390 (2016)]

review of the trial court’s order pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c). On
11 March 2014, the Supreme Court, on its own initiative, certified this
case for review prior to determination in the Court of Appeals. Following
oral argument on 6 May 2014, the Court ordered supplemental briefing
on 28 January 2016. Heard in the Supreme Court on 12 October 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Robert C. Montgomery, Senior
Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Barbara S. Blackman
and Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for
defendant-appellant.

ERVIN, Justice

On 21 May 2007, the Guilford County grand jury returned bills of
indictment charging defendant with robbery with a dangerous weapon
and first-degree murder, with these charges having arisen from an inci-
dent that allegedly occurred on 18 April 2007, when defendant was
seventeen years old. On 27 August 2008, the jury returned verdicts con-
victing defendant of robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree
murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and on
the basis of the felony murder rule. Based upon the jury's verdict, Judge
Stafford G. Bullock! entered judgments sentencing defendant to a term
of fifty-one to seventy-one months imprisonment based upon his convic-
tion for robbery with a dangerous weapon and to a consecutive term of
life imprisonment without parole based upon his conviction for first-
degree murder. The Court of Appeals filed an opinion on 8 December
2009 finding no error in the proceedings that led to the entry of Judge
Bullock’s judgments. State v. Perry, 201 N.C. App. 448, 688 S.E.2d 551,
2009 WL 4576081 (2009) (unpublished).

On 12 April 2013, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief in
which he requested that the life without parole sentence that had been
imposed upon him based upon his conviction for first-degree murder
be vacated and that a constitutionally permissible sentence be imposed
upon him instead. In support of this request, defendant pointed out that.
the United States Supreme Court had held in Miller v. Alabama, ___U.S.
__, _, 182 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 414-15 (2012), that the

1. Although the trial court’s judgments indicate that they were entered by Judge
Stanford G. Buliock, the statement of the entering judge’s name appears to have been a
clerical error arising from a misspelling of former Judge Bullock’s name.

392 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. PERRY
[369 N.C. 390 (2016))

imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole upon a juvenile like defendant violates the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment and that the “rule” enunciated in Miller should be applied
retroactively to defendant. On 28 May 2013, the State filed an answer to
defendant's motion for appropriate relief in which the State asserted that
the defendant was not entitled to have the life without parole sentence
that had been imposed upon him based upon his conviction for first-
degree murder vacated. In support of this contention, the State argued
that Miller should not be retroactively applied in cases that had become
final before the date upon which it had been decided because the pro-
hibition against the imposition of life without parole sentences upon
juveniles announced in Miller was a new.rule that did not fall within the
scope of either exception to the principle that such new rules were not
entitled to retroactive application that was set out in Teague v. Lane, 489
US. 288, 311, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075-76, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 356 (1989) (plu-
rality opinion), and made applicable in North Carolina state postconvic-
tion proceedings in State v. Zuniga, 336 N.C. 508, 513-14, 444 S.E.2d 443,
446-47 (1994). On 3 June 2013, the trial court entered an order denying
defendant’s motion for appropriate relief, with this decision having been
predicated on a determination that “Miller does not apply retroactively
to [d]efendant’s case.”

On 12 July 2013, defendant filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
seeking the issuance of a writ of certiorari authorizing review of the trial
court’s order denying his motion for appropriate relief. On 29 July 2013,
the Court of Appeals entered an order allowing defendant's certiorari peti-
tion. After the filing of the parties’ briefs, this Court entered an order on
its own motion on 11 March 2014 certifying this case for review prior to
determination by the Court of Appeals, with the parties being entitled
to rely upon the briefs that had already been filed in the Court of Appeals
in seeking to persuade this Court of the merits of their respective posi-
tions. Subsequently, we heard oral argument in this case on 6 May 2014.
On 28 January 2016, this Court ordered supplemental briefing for the
purpose of allowing the parties to address the effect of the decision
in Montgomery v. Lousiana, __ U.S. __, __, 186 S. Ct. 718, 736, 193
L. Ed. 2d 599, 622 (2016), in which the United States Supreme Court held
that Miller announced a substantive rule of law entitled to retroactive
application in state postconviction proceedings, on the proper disposi-
tion of this case. After the filing of supplemental briefs by defendant and
the State, this Court entered an order on 18 August 2016 providing for
the holding of a consolidated supplemental oral argument in this case
and the related cases of State v. Seam (No. 82A14), and State v. Young

IN THE SUPREME COURT 393

STATE v. ROSS
[369 N.C. 393 (2016)]

(No. 80A14). Supplemental oral argument was heard in this case on
12 October 2016.

The State’s sole argument in defense of the trial court’s decision
to deny defendant's motion for appropriate relief on appeal has been
a contention that defendant was not entitled to have Miller retroac-
tively applied in his case. As it candidly conceded in its supplemental
brief, however, the State’s non-retroactivity argument does not survive
Montgomery. In light of that fact, the State concedes, and we agree, that
defendant is entitled to be resentenced in the case in which he was con-
victed of first-degree murder pursuant to Part 2A of Article 81B of Chapter
15A of the North Carolina General Statutes. As a result, the trial court’s
order denying defendant's motion for appropriate relief is reversed and
this case is remanded to the Superior Court, Guilford County, for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including the imposition
of anew sentence in the case in which defendant was convicted of first-
degree murder pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1340.19A to -1340.19D.

REVERSED AND REMANDED
——

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v.
TERRANCE JAVARR ROSS

No. 297PA15
Filed 21 December 2016

1. Criminal Law—guilty pleas—voluntariness
The Court of Appeals erred by vacating defendant's guilty plea
to possession of a firearm by a felon where defendant pleaded guilty
knowingly and voluntarily. Considered in its entirety, the transcript
of the plea hearing did not demonstrate that defendant believed
his plea was conditioned on the right to seek review of any pre-
trial motion (defendant contended that the State violated N.C.G.S.
§ 15A-711).
2. Appeal and Error—writ of certiorari—issues not accepted
The Court of Appeals’ decision to issue a writ of certiorari is dis-
cretionary and that Court may choose to grant such a writ to review
some issues but not others. Two issues that defendant raised in his

394 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v, ROSS
(869 N.C. 398 (2016)]

petition for writ of certiorari did not survive that Court’s decision to
allow the writ for the limited purpose of considering the voluntari-
ness of his guilty plea.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. __,
776 S.E.2d 897 (2015), vacating a judgment entered on 5 August 2014
by Judge James W. Morgan in Superior Court, Cleveland County, and
remanding for further proceedings. Heard in the Supreme Court on
17 May 2016 in session in the Old Burke County Courthouse in the City
of Morganton pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-10(a).

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kathleen N. Bolton, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Peter Wood, for defendant-appellee.

BEASLEY, Justice.

We consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by vacating the
judgment entered by the trial court—which was entered according to
the terms of the parties’ plea agreement—on grounds that defendant's
plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. For the reasons stated
herein, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

On 22 September 2008, a grand jury indicted defendant on two
counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant alleges that on
14 October 2010, while he was incarcerated in another county on unre-
lated charges, he filed a motion under N.C.G.S. § 15A-711(c)! in Superior
Court, Cleveland County, to proceed with the possession of firearms
charges. Defendant also alleges that in April 2013 he filed a pretrial
motion to dismiss due to the State's failure to request that defendant
be produced for trial within the six months after defendant’s motion to

1. Defendant filed this alleged motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-711(c). Section
15A-711 delineates the procedures for securing attendance at hearings and trials of crimi-
nal defendants who are incarcerated in institutions within the State. Subsection 15A-711(c)
provides that “[a] defendant who is confined in an institution in this State pursuant to a
criminal proceeding and who has other criminal charges pending against him” may file
a written request “with the clerk of the court where the other charges are pending” to
“zequire the prosecutor prosecuting such charges to proceed pursuant to this section.” A
copy of defendant's request must be served upon the prosecutor, and “[ijé the prosecutor
does not proceed pursuant to subsection (a) within six months from the date the request
is filed with the clerk, the charges must be dismissed.” N.C.G.S, § 15A-711(c) (2015).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 395

STATE v. ROSS
[369 N.C. 393 (2016)]

proceed.2 On 5 August 2014, the matter came on for hearing in Superior
Court, Cleveland County. Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty
to two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At that
time, the State and defendant agreed to the following terms of the plea
arrangement:

In exchange for pleas of guilty to two counts of pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State agrees
to consolidate the charges into one Class G felony for sen-
tencing with the defendant receiving an active sentence
of 24 - 29 months[.]

The State further agrees to dismiss all remaining
charges pending against the defendant in Cleveland
County.

The sentence in these cases will run at the expiration
of any sentence being served.

After defendant tendered his guilty plea before the trial court, the
following colloquy occurred among defendant, defense counsel, and
the trial court:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:. . . You can see from the tran-
script [defendant] has a lot of irons in the fire over here in
Cleveland County, Your Honor. That’s why we chose to go
forward today. He feels that given all he has going on, even
though there may be some holes in this case that would
have benefited him at trial, the big picture he feels it’s in
his best interest to resolve these matters in this fashion
even though he’s serving a lengthy sentence, and this will
add time to that. He’s prepared to accept that responsibil-
ity to get the benefit of clearing all these cases up. We’d
ask you to accept the plea based on that, Your Honor... .

2. The record does not contain any file stamped copy of defendant's alleged section
15A-711 motion or motion to dismiss, and thus it is unclear whether any pretrial motions
were ever filed. The record does include two documents addressed to Mr. Rick Beam
regarding defendant's purported motion to dismiss, which are dated 10 September 2013
and 16 September 2013, respectively. Neither document is file stamped by the Clerk of
Superior Court's office and neither appears to have been filed. An internet search shows
that Rick Beam is an attorney practicing in Gaston, Cleveland, and Lincoln Counties,
North Carolina. The record does not indicate the nature of Mr. Beam’s relationship
with defendant.

396

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ROSS
[369 N.C, 393 (2016)]

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I just want to go on
record saying that I had previously filed a 15-7 - 15A-711
request, and then I followed up with a motion that was
never answered with the Court, and I feel like due to that
fact, it’s in my best interest to plead guilty today.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The motion was never heard,
Your Honor. I think that’s what he’s saying. Given the
uncertainty of it, he feels it’s in his best interest to go for-
ward in this fashion, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So you're abandoning whatever was —

THE DEFENDANT: No. I just want to put on record
that it was made for appeal purposes. They can’t say that
I abandoned the whole issue with the motion. I'm say-
ing that I filed it previously, then I brought it up with the
motion that was never answered by the Court.

THE COURT: What are you talking about? A speedy
trial motion?

THE DEFENDANT: No. It’s just a motion to proceed.
THE COURT: Oh, I see what you're saying.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE DEFENDANT: I had filed them previously within
180 days, and they didn’t comply so I filed a motion to dis-
miss which was never heard. So after it’s been so long — at
this time, that’s my best option to just go on and plead-
guilty. Til pursue that later on. I just want to leave that.

THE COURT: Well, I don’t know for certain, but the
fact that you’re proceeding now, you may not be able to
proceed on that issue.

THE DEFENDANT: [f that’s the choice, Ijust want to
have it on record. If that’s the choice -- if I can’t later on,
I just wanted to put it on there just in case later on in
the process, they don’t say that I didn’t bring it up before
Iwas sentenced.

THE COURT: Okay.

ee

IN THE SUPREME COURT 397

STATE v. ROSS
[369 N.C. 393 (2016)] !

{DEFENSE COUNSEL): I explained that to him as
well, Your Honor, take whatever, if anything happens, it
happens. If it doesn’t, it doesn’t.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. With all that, it’s still
your choice to go ahead?

[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes. Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. I just wanted to make sure
that was clear.

(Emphases added). The trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea
and sentenced him to twenty-four to twenty-nine months in prison.
Defendant gave notice of appeal the same day he entered his guilty plea.?

On 15 August 2014, defendant filed a pro se motion for appropri-
ate relief in the trial court arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdic-
tion over defendant and the subject matter of the case. Specifically,
defendant argued that because the State failed to proceed as required
by N.C.G.S. § 15A-711(c) after his written request to do so, the charges
against him should have been dismissed. In its 18 August 2014 written
order, which was entered on 20 August 2014, the trial court denied defen-
dant’s motion for appropriate relief, concluding that defendant waived
all claims he may have had under:section 15A-711 when he entered his
guilty plea; that it had jurisdiction over defendant; and that defendant's
constitutional and statutory rights were not violated by the entry and
acceptance of his guilty plea. The record does not indicate that defen-
dant noted an appeal from the denial of his motion for appropriate relief.

On 27 February 2015, defendant petitioned for writ of certiorari to
the Court of Appeals. In his petition defendant argued that: (1) there
was an insufficient factual basis to support a plea of guilty on one of his
charges; and (2) the trial court should have dismissed the charges on the
basis that the State violated N.C.G.S. § 154-711 and erred in its denial

3. The State filed a Motion to Dismiss defendant's appeal. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal because defendant had no right of appeal from the trial court's
acceptance of his guilty plea. See N.C.GS. § 154-1444 (2015) (enumerating the limited
circumstances in which a defendant who pleads guilty has a right to appeal).

In support of his purported appeal as of right, defendant asserted before the Court of
Appeals that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it accepted his guilty plea to
two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon because the evidence only supported one
conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon. Additionally, he asserted that the trial court
committed prejudicial error when it failed to dismiss the charges against him after the State
failed to writ him to Cleveland County within six months of his section 154-711 motion.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ROSS
[869 N.C. 393 (2016)]

of his post-conviction motion for appropriate relief based on the State’s
violation of section 154-711.

The Court of Appeals allowed defendant's petition for writ of certio-
rari to review the question of whether defendant entered his guilty plea
voluntarily and knowingly. State v. Ross,__ N.C. App. __, 776 S.E.2d
897, 2015 WL 4620517 (2015) (unpublished). Although the parties did
not brief the issue of whether defendant's plea was entered knowingly
and voluntarily, the Court of Appeals reasoned that it is proper to issue
this extraordinary writ when the voluntariness of a defendant's plea is
in question and the defendant made a motion for appropriate relief in an
effort to preserve matters to be heard after trial.

[1] In its opinion the Court of Appeals cited its previous holding that
“a guilty plea entered pursuant to a transcript of plea which purports
to reserve the right to seek appellate review” of an issue not subject to
review after the entry and acceptance of the plea “does not result in
the entry of a plea which ‘is a product of informed choice.’” Ross, 2015
WL 4620517, at *1 (quoting State v. Tinney, 229 N.C. App. 616, 624, 748
§.E.2d 730, 736 (2013) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1022(b))). The Court of
Appeals further explained that “the entry of a plea conditioned on the
appealability of non-appealable matters does not result in the entry of a
voluntary plea.” Id. (citing State v. Demaio, 216 N.C. App. 558, 562, 716
S.E.2d 863, 866 (2011)). After reviewing the plea hearing transcript, the
Court of Appeals held that defendant conditioned his plea on the appeal-
ability of the failure to grant his section 15A-711 motion; therefore, the
plea “was not entered knowingly and voluntarily.” Jd. at 2. The Court of
Appeals, accordingly, vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded
for further proceedings. Id. This Court allowed discretionary review on
28 January 2016.

In its brief to this Court, the State requested that we review whether
the Court of Appeals erred when it vacated the trial court’s judgment.
on the grounds that defendant’s plea was not entered knowingly and
voluntarily. This Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals to
determine whether the decision contains any error of law. E.9., State
v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 149, 446 S.E.2d 579, 590 (1994) (citations omitted).

The exchange among defendant, defense counsel, and the trial court
during the plea colloquy—a portion of which is set out above—does not
indicate that defendant's guilty plea was conditionally entered so as to
preserve the right for pretrial motions to be heard at a later time. When
considered in its entirety, the transcript of the plea hearing does not
demonstrate that defendant believed his plea was conditioned on the

IN THE SUPREME COURT 399 -

STATE v. ROSS
[369 N.C. 393 (2016)}

right to seek review of any pretrial motion. Defendant pleaded guilty
understanding that the right to appeal any claims he may have raised
before the trial court was not preserved and was therefore waived. The
trial court warned defendant that he “may not be able to proceed on
[the motions],” thereby waiving certain rights by entering his guilty plea.
Defendant indicated multiple times that he understood the trial court’s
explanation regarding the waiver of certain rights. Defendant also
signed the transcript of plea form, which indicated that there were limi-
_tations on his right to appeal. See State v. Agnew, 361 N.C. 333, 335, 643
S.E.2d 581, 583 (2007) (“Because a guilty plea waives certain fundamen-
tal constitutional rights such as the right to a trial by jury, our legislature
has enacted laws to ensure guilty pleas are informed and voluntary.”);
see also State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 395, 259 S.B.2d 843, 852 (1979)
(‘When a criminal defendant has solernly admitted in open court that
he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of consti-
tutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” (quot-
ing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243 (1973))),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941, 64 L. Ed. 24 795 (1980).

Furthermore, defendant acknowledged that the plea arrangement
as set forth in the transcript of plea was his “full plea arrangement.”
Unlike Demaio, on which the Court of Appeals relied, the terms and
conditions of the parties’ plea agreement in this case did not attempt
to preserve the right to appellate review of a non-appealable matter. In
Demaio the defendant’s plea agreement expressly provided that he pre-
served the right to appeal the denial of certain pretrial motions. 216 N.C.
App. at 560-61, 716 S.E.2d at 865. But the defendant had no appeal as of
right as a result of his guilty plea and waived the right to seek review
of these claims at a later time by pleading guilty. Thus, the defendant had
no means to take advantage of the plea arrangement to which he agreed.
Id. at 561-65, 716 S.E.2d at 865-68. In that case the Court of Appeals
explained that because the defendant entered a guilty plea on the condi-
tion that he preserved the right to appeal a non-appealable matter, his
plea was not voluntary. Id. at 564-65, 716 S.E.2d at 867-68. Here, how-
ever, defendant's plea agreement was not conditioned on the right to
appeal a non-appealable matter. The only terms and conditions set forth
in the parties’ plea agreement are the following:

In exchange for pleas of guilty to two counts of pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State agrees
to consolidate the charges into one Class G felony for sen-
tencing with the defendant receiving an active sentence
of 24 - 29 months[.]

400 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ROSS.
[869 N.C. 393 (2016)]

The State further agrees to dismiss all remaining
charges pending against the defendant in Cleveland County.

The sentence in these cases will run at the expiration
of any sentence being served.

Defendant’s plea agreement was not conditioned on anything else.
Additionally, unlike Demaio, in which the defendant was never advised
that a provision in his plea agreement was invalid, the trial court here
informed defendant that he may not be able to seek appellate review of
any failure to grant certain pretrial motions, and defendant indicated.
to the trial court that he understood he waived his rights. See Tinney,
229 N.C. App. at 622, 748 S.E.2d at 735 (holding that the defendant was
“not entitled to relief from the trial court's judgment on the basis of the
principle enunciated in Demaio” because the defendant “had ample
notice” that if he proceeded with the guilty plea it was not likely that he
could obtain review of an order transferring his case from district court
to superior court). Defendant does not allege that he conditioned his
guilty plea on the right to appeal the failure to grant his section 15A-711
motion, and at the hearing defendant and defense counsel specifically
told the trial court that defendant wanted to move forward with the plea
agreement because it was in defendant's best interest. Accordingly, we
hold that defendant entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.

[2] Further, the Court of Appeals found it appropriate to grant
defendant's petition for writ of certiorari only on the issue of whether
defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, and not on the two issues
raised by defendant in his petition for writ of certiorari. The decision
concerning whether to issue a writ of certiorari is discretionary, and
thus, the Court of Appeals may choose to grant such a writ to review
some issues that are meritorious but not others for which a defendant
has failed to show good or sufficient cause. See Womble v. Moncure Mill
& Gin Co., 194. N.C. 577, 579, 140 S.E. 230, 231 (1927) (“Certiorari is a
discretionary writ, to be issued only for good or sufficient cause shown,
and it is not one to which the moving party is entitled as a matter of
right.” (citations omitted)). As such, the two issues that defendant raised
in his petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals have not.
survived that court’s decision to allow the writ for the limited purpose of
considering the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Specifically, defendant
did not appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for appropriate relief;
he is not entitled to appeal his guilty plea; if he did file a section 15A-711
motion, any challenge to the failure to grant it did not survive his guilty
plea; and defendant cannot now challenge the sufficiency of the factual
basis for his plea deal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 401
STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C. 401 (2016)]

Because we conclude that defendant pleaded guilty knowingly and
voluntarily, we therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
vacating defendant's guilty plea and the resulting judgment.

REVERSED.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.
FELIX RICARDO SALDIERNA

No. 271PA15
Filed 21 December 2016

1. Juveniles—breaking and entering investigation—interview—
request for parent—ambiguous
In a prosecution for felonious breaking and entering and other
charges in which a sixteen-and-one-half-year-old defendant was
interviewed by investigators, his statement, “Um, can I call my
mom?” was not a clear and unambiguous invocation of his right to
have his parent or guardian present during questioning. Defendant
never gave any indication that he wanted to have his mother present
for his interrogation, did not condition his interview on first speak-
ing with her, and had just signed the juvenile rights form express-
ing his desire to proceed on this own. The purpose of the call was
never established and law enforcement officers had no duty to ask
clarifying questions or to cease questioning. Defendant's statutory
juvenile rights, which included the equivalent of the Miranda warn-
ings, were not violated.

2. Juveniles—confession—two-pronged review

A breaking and entering case involving a sixteen-and-one-half-
year-old defendant was remanded where defendant asked during an
interview with an investigator if he could call his mom, did so, and
confessed after the conversation with the investigator resumed. The
admissibility of a juvenile defendant’s confession is a two-pronged
inquiry. Even though defendant’s N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)(8) right
was not violated, defendant’s confession is not admissible unless
he knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his rights. The
Court of Appeals did not reach this question.

402 IN THE SUPREME COURT.

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C. 401 (2016)]

Justice BEASLEY dissenting.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 775 S.E.2d
326 (2015), reversing an order denying defendant's motion to suppress
entered on 20 February 2014 by Judge Forrest D. Bridges, vacating a
judgment entered on 4 June 2014 by Judge Jesse B. Caldwell, both in
Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, and remanding the case for fur-
ther proceedings. Heard in the Supreme Court on 16 February 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Goodman Carr, PLLC, by W. Rob Heroy, for defendant-appellee.
EDMUNDS, Justice.

Defendant, a juvenile, asked to telephone his mother while undergo-
ing custodial questioning by police investigators. The call was allowed,
after which the interrogation continued. The trial court denied defen-
dant’s motion to suppress the statements he made following the call.
We conclude that defendant’s request to call his mother was not a clear
invocation of his right to consult a parent or guardian before proceed-
ing with the questioning. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals that reversed the trial court’s order denying the motion
to suppress.

After several homes around Charlotte were broken into on 17
and 18 December 2012, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police arrested defen-
dant on 9 January 2013. At the time, defendant was sixteen and one-
half years old. The arresting officers took defendant to a local police
station where Detective Kelly (Kelly) interrogated him. Before begin-
ning her interrogation, Kelly provided defendant with both English
and Spanish versions of the Juvenile Waiver of Rights Form routinely
used by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department to explain the
protections afforded juveniles under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101. These forms
advised defendant that he had the right to remain silent; that anything
he said could be used against him; that he had the right to have a par-
ent, guardian, or custodian present during the interview; that he had the
right to speak to a lawyer and to have a lawyer present to help him dur-
ing questioning; and that a lawyer would be provided at no cost prior
to questioning if he so desired. Kelly also read these rights in English to
defendant, pausing after each to ask if defendant understood. Defendant

ST

IN THE SUPREME COURT 403

STATE v. SALDIERNA
(369 N.C. 401 (2016))

initialed the English form beside each enumerated right and the section

that noted:
A ye: or more and I understand my rights
d_by /Detective Kely [sic]. 1 DO wish
Wwe sti yw, WITHOUT a lawyer, parent, d=

ian, or custodian here with me. My decision to answer
questions now is made freely and is my own choice. No
one has threatened me in any way or promised me special
treatment. Because I have decided to answer questions
now, I am signing my name below.

The words “I DO wish to answer questions now” on the form are cir-
cled. Only after defendant signed the form did Detective Kelly begin
the interrogation.

Kelly had gone no further than noting the time and date for the audio
recording when defendant asked, “Um, can I call my mom?” Detective
Kelly offered her cellular telephone to defendant and allowed him to
step out of the booking room to make the call. Detective Kelly could hear
defendant but was not sure if he placed one call or two. Defendant did
not reach his mother but did speak to someone else. However, because
defendant spoke Spanish while on the phone, Kelly could not provide
any details concerning the nature of the conversation. Upon defendant's
return to the booking area, Kelly resumed her questioning. Defendant
did not object and made no further request to contact anyone. During
the ensuing interview, defendant confessed that he had been involved
in the break-ins.

Defendant was indicted, inter alia, for two counts of felony break-
ing and entering, conspiracy to commit breaking and entering, and con-
spiracy to commit common law larceny after breaking and entering. On
9 October 2013, defendant moved to suppress his confession, arguing
that it was illegally obtained in violation both of his rights as a juve-
nile under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 and of his rights under the United States
Constitution. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the motion in an order entered on 20 February 2014, finding as
facts that defendant was advised of his juvenile rights and, after receiv-
ing forms setting out these rights both in English and Spanish and having
the rights read to him in English by Kelly, indicated that he understood
them. In addition, the trial court found that defendant informed Kelly
that he wished to waive his juvenile rights and signed the form memo-
rializing that wish. Although defendant then unsuccessfully sought to
contact his mother, the court found:

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C. 401 (2016)]

. That Defendant did not at that time or any other time
indicate that he changed his mind regarding his desire
to speak to Detective Kelly. That Defendant did not at
that time or any other time indicate that he revoked
his waiver.

18. That Defendant only asked to speak to his mother.

19. That Defendant did not make his interview condi-
tional on having his mother present or conditional on.
speaking to his mother.

20. That Defendant did not ask to have his mother present
at the interview site.

21. That, upon review of the totality of the circumstances,
the Court finds that Defendant’s request to speak to
his mother was at best an ambiguous request to speak.
to his mother.

22. That at no time did Defendant make an unambiguous
request to have his mother present during questioning.

23. That Defendant never indicated that his mother was
on the way or could be present during questioning.

24, That Defendant made no request for a delay of
questioning.

Based on those findings, the trial court determined that the inter-
view was conducted in a manner consistent with N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 and
did not violate any of defendant's state or federal rights. The court con-
cluded as a matter of law that the State met its burden of establishing by
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant “knowingly, willingly,
and understandingly waived his juvenile rights.”

On 4 June 2014, defendant entered pleas of guilty to two counts
of felony breaking and entering and two counts of conspiracy to com-
mit breaking and entering, while reserving his right to appeal from the
denial of his motion to suppress. The court sentenced defendant to a
term of six to seventeen months, suspended for thirty-six months sub-
ject to supervised probation.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying
defendant’s motion to suppress, vacated the judgments entered upon
defendant’s guilty pleas, and remanded the case to the trial court for fur-
ther proceedings. State v. Saldierna, __ N.C. App. __, ___, 775 S.E.2d

IN THE SUPREME COURT 405

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C. 401 (2016)]

326, 334 (2015). The Court of Appeals recognized that the trial court cor-
rectly found that defendant's statement asking to telephone his mother
was ambiguous at best. Id. at__, 775 S.E.2d at 331. However, it went
on to conclude that, unlike the invocation of Miranda rights by an adult,
a juvenile need not make a clear and unequivocal request in order to
exercise his or her right to have a parent present during questioning.
Id. at ___, 775 S.E.2d at 333-34. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that
when a juvenile between the ages of fourteen and eighteen! makes an
ambiguous statement that potentially pertains to the right to have a par-
ent present, an interviewing officer must clarify the juvenile’s meaning
before proceeding with questioning. Id. at ____, 775 S.E.2d at 334. The
Court of Appeals based this distinction on the fact that Miranda rights
are rooted in the United States Constitution, while the right to have a
parent present during custodial interrogations is an additional statutory
protection for juveniles who, by virtue of their age, lack the life experi-
ence and judgment of an adult. Id. at__, 775 S.B.2d at 333.

This Court granted the State’s petition for discretionary review. We
review an opinion of the Court of Appeals for errors of law. N.C. R. App.
P. (16)(a). “The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion
to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s
findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions
of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011)
(citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 182, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)).
Findings of fact are binding on appeal if supported by competent evi-
dence, State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 182, 184, 291 S.B.2d 618, 619 (1982) (cita-
tions omitted), while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, State
v. Ortie—Zape, 367 N.C. 1, 5, 743 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2018) (citing Biber, 365
N.C. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878), cert. denied, __ U.S. ___, 184 S. Ct. 2660,
189 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2014).

[1] In evaluating whether the trial court correctly denied defendant’s
motion to suppress, we first must consider the threshold question of
whether defendant invoked his right to have his mother present dur-
ing the custodial interview. We must also consider whether defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under section 7B-2101 of the

1. Before 2015, the pertinent part of the statute read: “When the juvenile is less than

L4years of age, no in-custody admission or confession resulting from interrogation may be
adinitted into evidence unless the confession or admission was made in the presence of the
Juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney.” N.C.G.S, § 7B-2101(b) (2013). In 2015,
the General Assembly amended subsection 7B-2101(b) to raise the relevant age limit to “less
than 16 years of age.” Act of May 26, 2015, ch. 58, sec. 1.1, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 126, 126.

406 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v, SALDIERNA
[369 N.C, 401 (2016)]

North Carolina General Statutes and under the constitutions of North
Carolina and the United States, thus making his confession admissible.
We begin with the former inquiry.

The State argues that defendant’s request to call his mother was
not an invocation of his right to have a parent present under N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-2101(a)(8). The State points out that defendant simply asked to
call his mother, which the detective readily permitted. He never
requested his mother’s presence or indicated that he wished to suspend
the interview until he could reach her. The State contends that when
a juvenile’s statement is ambiguous, law enforcement officers have no
additional duty to ascertain whether the juvenile is invoking his statu-
tory rights or whether they may continue questioning the minor.

In response, defendant argues that, according to the plain language
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101, the interview should have ceased until defendant
spoke with his mother or indicated his desire to proceed without her,
even though the precise import of his question to the detective was
unclear. Should we disagree with this statutory interpretation, defendant
makes an argument under the United States Constitution that we should
extend the rationale in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264-65,
1815S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310, 318-19 (2011), which held that,
the age of a juvenile is a factor in determining whether he or she was in
police custody for purposes of Miranda, and hold that reviewing courts
must take into account the juvenile’s age and maturity level when deter-
mining the admissibility of juvenile confessions.

As to defendant's statutory argument, N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a) estab-
lishes that juveniles must be advised of certain rights prior to a custodial
interrogation. The statute codifies the juvenile’s Miranda rights and adds
the additional protection that the juvenile has the right to have a parent,
guardian, or custodian present during questioning. N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)
(2015). A statement made during custodial interrogation is admissible

- only if the juvenile knowingly, willingly, and understandingly has waived
his constitutional and statutory rights. Id. § 7B-2101(d) (2015).

This Court has recognized that a juvenile’s statutory right to have a
parent present during custodial interrogation is analogous to the consti-
tutional right to counsel and therefore is entitled to the same protection.
State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 106, 343 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1986), abrogated
im part on other grounds by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 382, 543 $.B.2d
823 (2001). In Smith, we noted that the Supreme Court of the United
States held in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L.
Ed. 2d 378 (1981), that after a defendant expresses a desire to deal with

IN THE SUPREME COURT 407

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C. 401 (2016))

police only through counsel, he or she may not be questioned further
until counsel is present or the defendant reinitiates communication with
Jaw enforcement. 317 N.C. at 106, 343 S.E.2d at 521. This Court in Smith
applied that same principle in the context of juvenile law to hold that,
when a juvenile unambiguously requested that his mother be brought
to the police station, officers were required to cease all questioning until
the mother arrived or the juvenile reinitiated discussions. Id. at 107, 343
§.E.2d at 522. These cases leave no doubt that a juvenile’s constitutional
rights under Miranda and statutory rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)
are of equal weight and given equal consideration.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States also has
held that, when an individual under interrogation mentions an attorney
with such vagueness that law enforcement investigators are left unsure
whether the comment is an invocation of the right to counsel, police
have no duty to ask clarifying questions and may continue with the inter-
rogation. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355,
129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371 (1994) (holding that invocation of the right to
counsel “requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably
be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an
attorney” (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S. Ct.
2204, 2209, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 169 (1991))). In other words, the objective
test set out in Davis considers whether a reasonable officer under the
circumstances would have understood the defendant's statement to be
an invocation of his or her right to have an attorney present. Davis, id.
at 459, 114 S. Ct, at 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 871.

This Court has adopted the analytical framework found in Davis
when determining whether a defendant has invoked his or her constitu-
tional rights. For instance, in State v. Boggess, 358 N.C. 676, 600 S.E.2d
453 (2004), we held that the defendant’s statement to police that “[i]f
yall going to treat me this way, then I probably would want a lawyer” did
not constitute an invocation of the defendant's right to an attorney. Jd. at
687, 600 S.E.2d at 460; see also State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 655-56, 566
§.E.2d 61, 70-71 (2002) (holding that the defendant did not invoke his
right to counsel when a nearby officer “could have heard” the defendant
whisper to his father that “I want you to get me a lawyer”), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1133, 123 S. Ct. 916, 154 L, Ed. 2d 823 (2003). Similarly, in State
v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 701 S.E.2d 615 (2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S.
832, 182 S. Ct. 132, 181 L. Ed. 2d 53 (2011), we held that the defendant's
statement that he “was not going to snitch” when questioned about his
accomplice’s name was not an unambiguous invocation of his right to
remain silent. Id. at 473, 701 S.B.2d at 635.

408 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[869 N.C, 401 (2016)}

We have also applied Davis when the suspect under interrogation.
is a juvenile. State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 533 S.E.2d 168 (2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S, 931, 121 S. Ct. 1379, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001). In Golphin,
the juvenile defendant was apprehended after he and his brother com-
mitted an armed robbery, stole a vehicle, and murdered two police offi-
cers. Id. at 380, 386-87, 533 S.E.2d at 183, 187. After he was detained, the
defendant waived his juvenile rights under section 7B-2101 and gave a
statement to an agent of the State Bureau of Investigation. Id. at 449, 533
§.E.2d at 224. When the agent specifically asked the defendant whether he
was aware of an incident involving a Jeep, the defendant responded that
“he didn’t want to say anything about the [JJeep. He did not know who it
was or he would have told us.” Jd. at 451, 588 S.E.2d at 225. Upon further
questioning, however, the defendant admitted that his brother shot at a
Jeep that was following them. Jd. at 387, 449, 533 S.E.2d at 187, 224.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the agent violated his consti-
tutional right to silence by continuing to question him after he requested
not to discuss the Jeep. Id. at 448-49, 533 S.E.2d at 224. In rejecting the
defendant's argument, we applied the Davis analysis and concluded that
the defendant’s statement was not an unambiguous request to remain
silent. Id. at 450-51, 533 S.E.2d at 225. Instead, the statement appeared to
be an acknowledgment that, had he known who was involved, the defen-
dant would have shared that information freely. Jd. at 451, 533 S.B.2d at
225. As a result, it was reasonable for the agent to continue the question-
ing because the defendant failed clearly to invoke any of his rights. Id.
at 451-52, 533 S.E.2d at 225. In reaching this conclusion, we confirmed
both that the Davis analysis applies when evaluating whether a juvenile
defendant has invoked his or her juvenile rights during a custodial inter-
rogation and that law enforcement officers are not required to seek clar-
ification of ambiguous statements made by juvenile defendants under
interrogation. See id. at 451, 533 S.E.2d at 225.

Because a juvenile’s statutory right to have a parent or guardian
present during questioning is entitled to the same protection as the con-
stitutional right to counsel, we must apply Davis in determining whether
defendant's statement—“Um, can I call my mom?”—was a clear and
unambiguous invocation of his right to have his parent or guardian pres-
ent during questioning. We conclude that it was not.

Although defendant asked to call his mother, he never gave any indi-
cation that he wanted to have her present for his interrogation, nor did
he condition his interview on first speaking with her. Instead, defendant
simply asked to call her. When the request was made, Kelly immediately

IN THE SUPREME COURT 409

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C. 401 (2016)]

loaned defendant her personal cellular telephone so that he could make
the call. Defendant's purpose for making the call was never established.
Whatever his reasons, defendant did not “articulate his desire to have
[a parent] present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in
the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for
[a parent],” especially in light of the fact that defendant had just signed
the portion of the juvenile rights form expressing his desire to proceed
on his own. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d at
371. As the trial court pointed out, defendant’s statement was at best
an ambiguous invocation of his right to have his mother present. As in
Davis, without an unambiguous, unequivocal invocation of defendant's
right under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)(3), law enforcement officers had no
duty to ask clarifying questions or to cease questioning. Because defen-
dant’s juvenile statutory rights were not violated, we reverse the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals to the contrary.

[2] Nevertheless, the admissibility of defendant’s confession is a two-
pronged inquiry, as noted above. Even though we have determined
that defendant's N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)(3) right was not violated, defen-
dant's confession is not admissible unless he knowingly, willingly, and
understandingly waived his rights. N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(d). The Court of
Appeals did not reach this question and instead erroneously resolved
the case upon the first prong. Saldierna,___ N.C. App. at___, 775 S.E.2d
at 334. Because we have concluded that defendant's right under subdivi-
sion 7B-2101(a)(8) was not violated, we remand this case to the Court
of Appeals for consideration of the validity of defendant's waiver of his
statutory and constitutional rights.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Justice BEASLEY dissenting.

I disagree with the majority and would hold that defendant's state-
ment, “Um, Can I call my mom?” was an unambiguous invocation of his
statutory right to have a parent present during custodial interrogation.
Assuming arguendo that defendant’s statement was ambiguous, I also
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that because defendant’s request
was ambiguous his statutory rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101 were not
violated. Because I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that law
enforcement officers are required to ask questions to clarify the desire
and intent of a juvenile who makes an ambiguous statement relating to
his statutory right to have a parent present, I respectfully dissent.

ALO IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[869 N.C. 401 (2016)]

Subsection 7B-2101(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes
provides that juveniles must be advised of certain enumerated rights
before being subjected to custodial interrogation. As explained by the
majority, “The statute codifies the juvenile’s Miranda rights and adds
the additional protection that the juvenile has the right to have a par-
ent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning.” See N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-2101(a) (2015).! As such, the right to have a parent, guardian, or
custodian present, id. § 7B-2101(a)(3), “is not the codification of a fed-
eral constitutional right, but rather our General Assembly's grant to the
juveniles of North Carolina of a purely statutory protection in addition
to those identified in Miranda.” State v. Saldierna, ____ N.C. App. __,
__, 775 S.E.2d 326, 332 (2015) (citing, inter alia, State v. Fincher, 309
N.C. 1, 12, 305 S.E.2d 685, 692 (1983) (stating, for purposes of deter-
mining the appropriate prejudice standard, that “[t]he failure to advise
[a juvenile] defendant of his right to have a parent, custodian or guard-
ian present during questioning is not an error of constitutional magni-
tude because this privilege is statutory in origin and does not emanate
from the Constitution”)). The statute also establishes that a juvenile’s
statement cannot be admitted into evidence unless the court “find[s]
that the juvenile knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived” his
constitutional and statutory rights. N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(d) (2015).

As the Court of Appeals stated, “[W]ith regard to a defendant’s
Miranda rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during
a custodial interrogation, the law is clear.” Saldierna, ___ N.C. App. at
__, 775 §.E.2d at 332. A defendant must unambiguously invoke his or
her Miranda rights, and law enforcement officers have no obligation to
clarify a defendant's ambiguous statements. See Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 459, 461-62, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355-56 (1994) (“[T]he suspect

1. Subsection 7B-2101(a) states that prior to being questioned “[aJny juvenile in cus-
tody must be advised”:

(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;

(2) That any statement the juvenile does make can be and may be used
against the juvenile;

(8) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian
present during questioning; and

(4) That the juvenile has aright to consult with an attorney and that one
will be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented
and wants representation.

N.C.GS. § 7B-2101(a) (2015).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 411

STATE v. SALDIERNA.
[869 N.C. 401 (2016)}

must unambiguously request counsel,” and law enforcement officers
are not required to ask clarifying questions when a suspect's state-
ment regarding counsel is ambiguous); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
ATT, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1885 (1981) (holding that law enforcement
officers must immediately cease questioning upon a suspect's unambig-
uous request for counsel and cannot reinitiate interrogation until coun-
sel arrives or the suspect “initiates further communication”). In State
v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 533 S.E.2d 168 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
931, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001), this Court extended this rule to juveniles,
holding that a juvenile defendant’s right to remain silent must be unam-
biguously invoked.? Id. at 451-52, 533 S.E.2d at 225.

To determine whether a defendant unambiguously invoked his
Miranda rights, this Court applies the standard set forth in Davis:
“Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum,
some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of
a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’ ” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114
S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S. Ct.
2204, 2209 (1991)). The Court goes on to say that the inquiry is based on
what a “reasonable officer in light of the circumstances” would believe
the statement to mean. Id. at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (citations omitted).
Here defendant asked to speak to his mother prior to questioning.? I
agree with the Court of Appeals that Detective Kelly’s question, “You
want to call her now before we talk?” is telling. See Saldierna, __N.C.
App. at ___n.6, 775 S.E.2d at 334 n.6 (“Kelly’s question indicates that she
believed [defendant] might be asking to delay the interview, at least until
he had a chance to speak to his mother.”). Implicit in the protections
afforded by subdivision 7B-2101(a)(8) is that law enforcement officers
understand whether a juvenile intends to invoke the statutory rights. The

2. Golpkin did not address a juvenile defendant's right to have a parent present
under N.C.GS. § 7B-2101(a)(3).

3. The following conversation occurred after Detective Kelly advised defendant of
his rights:

[Defendant]: Um, Can I call my mom?
[Det. Kelly]: Call your mom now?
[Defendant]: She's on her um. I think she is on her lunch now.
[Det. Kelly]: You want to call her now before we talk?
[Det. Kelly to other officers]: He wants to call his mom.
(Emphases added.)

412 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[869 N.C. 401 (2016)]

majority states that defendant “never gave any indication that he wanted
to have [his mom] present for his interrogation . Instead, defendant
simply asked to call her.” Thus, according to the majority, “Defendant's
purpose for making the call was never established.” Despite the major-
ity’s contention, the reasonable conclusion under the circumstances is
that defendant wanted his mother present. Why else would defendant
want to call his mom “now before [he] talked” if not to seek her advice
and protection? The majority and the Court of Appeals agree that defen-
dant’s statement was not an unambiguous invocation of his statutory
right to have a parent present.4 However, defendant’s statement was
“sufficiently clear[ } that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would understand the statement to be a request” to have his mother
present before questioning. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355. In
light of this unambiguous request, all questions should have immediately
ceased until defendant’s mother was present or defendant reinitiated the
conversation. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885.

The cases discussed above only address a defendant's constitutional
Miranda rights, not his statutory rights. In regard to a juvenile’s statu-
tory right to have a parent present, this Court has only addressed a juve-
nile’s unambiguous invocation of the right. See State v. Smith, 317 N.C.
100, 343 S.E.2d 518 (1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by State
v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 340, 543 $.E.2d 823, 828 (2001). In Smith
this Court stated that law enforcement officers must cease questioning
when a juvenile unambiguously invokes his statutory right to have a par-
ent present. Jd. at 108, 343 S.E.2d at 522; see State v. Branham, 153
N.C. App. 91, 95, 569 S.E.2d 24, 27 (2002). This Court has not, however,
“considered the implications of a juvenile’s ambiguous reference” to his
statutory right to have a parent present. Saldierna, __ N.C. App. at__,
775 S.E.2d at 333. The legislature intended to afford juveniles greater

4, Under the law as it currently stands, I understand how the majority and the Court
of Appeals reached the conclusion that defendant's statement was ambiguous. See State
v. Branham, 153 N.C. App. 91, 98-99, 569 S.E.2d 24, 28-29 (2002) (concluding that
the juvenile defendant unambiguously invoked his right when he had officers write on the
juvenile rights form that he wanted his mother present before questioning); see also State
». Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 106, 343 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1986) (finding that the juvenile defen-
dant unambiguously invoked his right when he requested that his mom be brought to the
station), abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543
S.E.2d 823 (2001). But see State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 558-59, 648 S.E.2d 819, 824 (2007)
(Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (stating, in regards to a juvenile defendant's request to
call his aunt, that “it is uncontested that . . . the juvenile’s confession in this case would
be inadmissible if the individual requested had fallen into the requisite category”). For the
reasons stated more thoroughly below, however, juvenile defendants are provided greater
protections than their adult counterparts, especially.in regards to a juvenile’s statutory
right and protection to have a parent present.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 413

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[869 N.C. 401 (2016)]

protection in subdivision (a)(3) than those afforded by a juvenile’s con-
stitutional Miranda rights codified in N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)(1), (2), and
(4). See The Final Report of the Juvenile Code Revision Committee
183 (Jan. 1979) (commenting that the Committee added “[subdivision]
(3) ... to assure that the juvenile may have his parent present during
questioning if he desires and [stating that subdivision (8)] is an addi-
tion to case law requirements” found in N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)(1), (2),
and (4)). Moreover, when viewed in its entirety, section 7B-2101 dem-
onstrates our General Assembly's acknowledgement that juveniles are
especially vulnerable when subjected to custodial interrogation. See
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(b) (providing that, in essence, a juvenile under the
age of sixteen cannot waive his right to have a parent or attorney pres-
ent); see also Act of May 26, 2015, ch. 58, sec. 1.1, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws
126, 126 (increasing the age of juveniles protected by subsection (b)
from less than fourteen to less than sixteen years).

According to the majority, this Court’s decision in Smith—applying
the Miranda framework set forth in Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct.
at 2355, to a juvenile’s wnambiguous invocation of his right to have a
parent present—indicates that a juvenile’s statutory right under sub-
division (a)(3) can only be afforded as much protection as a juvenile’s
constitutional Miranda rights. As such, the majority concludes that
the Miranda rules also apply to juveniles who make ambiguous state-
ments regarding their right to have a parent present. I disagree. I agree
with the Court of Appeals that. by enacting N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)(3), the
legislature demonstrated its intent to afford a juvenile greater protec-
tion when attempting to invoke his or her right to have a parent present
than when attempting to invoke his or her Miranda rights. Saldierna,
___N.C. App. at ____, 775 S.E.2d at 333 (“[R]éeview of the provisions of
section 7B-2101 reveals an understanding by our General Assembly that
the special right guaranteed by subsection (a)(8) is different from those
rights discussed in Miranda and, in turn, reflects the legislature’s intent
that law enforcement officers proceed with great caution in determin-
ing whether a juvenile is attempting to invoke this right.”).

Although this Court has held that a “juvenile’s right . . . to have a par-
ent present during custodial interrogation| ] is entitled to similar protec-
tion [as an adult’s right to have an attorney present],” Smith, 317 N.C. at
106, 348 S.E.2d at 521, it does not follow that the protections afforded to
juveniles under subdivision 7B-2101(a)(3) are capped at, and therefore
camot exceed, those provided under Miranda. As previously discussed,
Smith involved a situation in which a juvenile defendant unambiguously
requested that his mother be brought to the police station before he was

414 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C. 401 (2016)}

questioned. Jd. at 102, 343 S.E.2d at 519. This Court held that in such
circumstances, the Miranda framework of Davis applied and required
law enforcement officers to immediately cease questioning. Id. at 106-
07, 343 S.E.2d at 521-22. This Court applied principles established under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the “resumption of custodial inter-
rogation” under section 7B-2101.5 Id. at 106, 343 S.E.2d at 521 (noting
that the Miranda cases “are not controlling”). The “resumption of cus-
todial interrogation” principles apply in the context of an unambiguous
invocation of rights. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459-61, 114 S. Ct. at 2355-
56 (holding that law enforcement officers must cease questioning after
an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel and cannot resume
questioning until counsel is present or the defendant reinitiates com-
munication). This Court did not address ambiguous statements, nor
did it affirmatively hold that the protections afforded by subdivision (a)
(8) are capped at those afforded to adults under Miranda. Therefore, I
agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the “case law regarding
invocation of the Miranda rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution
and codified in subsections 7B-2101(a)(1), (2), and (4) does not control
_ our analysis of a juvenile’s ambiguous statement possibly invoking the
purely statutory right granted by our State’s General Assembly in section
7B-2101(a)(8).” Saldierna, ___N.C. App. at ___, 775 S.E.2d at 332.

It is well established that juveniles differ from adults in significant
ways and that these differences are especially relevant in the context of
custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
835, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2699 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“Inexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate
the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or
she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pres-
sure than is an adult.”); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 82 S. Ct.
1209, 1212 (1962) (stating that juveniles are “not equal to the police in
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and
answers being recorded and . . . [are] unable to know how to protect
[their] own interests or how to get the benefits of [their] constitutional
rights” (emphasis added)); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600, 68 S.
Ct. 302, 304 (1948) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e cannot believe that a lad
of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest [as custodial

5. Smith discussed a juvenile’s rights under to N.C.G.S. § 7A-595, which is the origi-
nal codification of the rights afforded to juveniles in section 7B-2101. Section 74-595 was
repealed in 1999 and recodified as part of the Juvenile Code. See Act of Oct. 22, 1998, ch.
202, secs. 5, 6, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 1998) 695, 742, 809. The two sections are
substantively the same.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 415

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C. 401 (2016)]

interrogation]. . .. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpow-
ering presence of the law, as he knows it, crush him.”). As discussed by
the United States Supreme Court

[a] child’s age is far more than a chronological fact. It
is a fact that generates commonsense conclusions about.
behavior and perception. Such conclusions apply broadly
to children as a class. And, they are self-evident to anyone
who was a child once himself, ineluding any police officer
or judge. .

Time and again, this Court has drawn these com-
monsense conclusions for itself. We lave observed that
children generally are less mature and responsible than
adults, that they often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could
be detrimental to them, that they are more vulnerable or
susceptible to . .. outside pressures than adults, and so on.
Addressing the specific context of police interrogation,
we have observed that events that would leave aman cold
and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his
early teens. Describing no one child in particular, these
observations restate what any parent knows—indeed,
what any person knows—about children generally.

Our various statements to this effect are far from
unique. The law has historically reflected the same
assumption that children characteristically lack the
capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess only an
incomplete ability to understand the world around them.

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272-78, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403
(2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

North Carolina courts have also acknowledged that “[j]uveniles
are awarded special consideration in light of their youth and limited
life experience.” State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 557, 648 S.E.2d 819, 823
(2007) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (citing In re Stallings, 318
N.C. 565, 576, 350 S.E.2d 327, 333 (1986) (Martin, J., dissenting)); see In
re K.D.L., 207 N.C. App. 453, 459, 700 S.E.2d 766, 771 (2010) (“[W]e can-
not forget that police interrogation is inherently coercive—particularly
for young people.” (citations omitted)), disc. rev. denied, 365 N.C. 90,
706 S.E.2d 478 (2011). As discussed by Justice Harry C. Martin in his
dissent to this Court’s decision in In re Stallings, “Juveniles are not,
after all miniature adults. Our criminal justice system recognizes that

416 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C. 401 (2016)]

their immaturity and vulnerability sometimes warrant protections well
beyond those afforded adults. It is primarily for that reason that a sepa-
rate juvenile code with separate juvenile procedures exists.” 318 N.C. at
576, 350 S.E.2d at 333 (Martin, J., dissenting). Justice H. Martin goes on
to explain that the Juvenile Code demonstrates “legislative intent to pro-
vide broader protections to juveniles.” See id. at 577, 350 S.E.2d at 333.
Furthermore, “at least two empirical studies show that ‘the vast major-
ity of juveniles are simply incapable of understanding their Miranda
rights and the meaning of waiving those rights.’ ” Oglesby, 361 N.C. at
559 n.3, 648 S.E.2d at 824 n.3 (citation omitted); see-Cara A. Gardner,
Recent Developments, Failing to Serve and Protect: A Proposal for an
Amendment to a Juvenile’s Right to a Parent, Guardian, or Custodian
During a Police Interrogation after State v. Oglesby, 86 N.C. L. Rev.
1685, 1698-99 (2008) [hereinafter Failing to Serve and Protect] (“[R]
esearch has revealed that only 20.9% of juveniles understand the stan-
dard Miranda warnings . . . . [and] many d[o] not understand that [their
right to an attorney means that] the attorney could actually be present
during police questioning rather than at some later time. . . . This may
indicate that juveniles in North Carolina also have difficulty understand-
ing that they have the right to have a parent... present during an interro-
gation rather than at some later time.” (footnotes omitted)). Therefore,
it is reasonable to believe that juveniles should be afforded greater pro-
tections when seeking to have a parent present. See Failing to Serve
and Protect at 1695 (“The reason a juvenile in a custodial interrogation
has aright to the presence of a parent, guardian, or custodian is presum-
ably so that the adult may assist in protecting the juvenile’s rights.”).

For these reasons, I would hold that when a juvenile makes an
ambiguous statement relating to his or her statutory right to have a
parent present during a custodial interrogation, law enforcement offi-
cers are required to ask clarifying questions to determine whether the
juvenile desires to have his or her parent present before the juvenile
answers any questions. Specifically, Miranda precedent is not bind-
ing on a juvenile’s statutory rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2101(a)(3), and
I believe that a juvenile can be afforded greater protection than that
afforded under Miranda when attempting to invoke his or her statu-
tory right. Additionally, as discussed above, juveniles are not able to
fully understand the consequences of their actions and are more likely
to submit to pressure. Most adults are nervous and apprehensive when
stopped by a uniformed officer even in relatively trivial situations such
as routine traffic stops. Imagine then the apprehension, fear, and con-
fusion of a teenager who finds himself under the power and author-
ity of a law enforcement officer. Faced with this pressure, it stands to

IN THE SUPREME COURT 417

STATE v. SALDIERNA
[369 N.C, 401 (2016)]

reason that many juveniles will be unable to unequivocally and unam-
biguously articulate their desire to have a parent present before police
interrogation begins and will certainly lack the ability to appreciate the
legal significance of this statutory protection. According to the major-
ity, defendant “never gave any indication that he wanted to have [his
mother] present for his interrogation, nor did he condition his inter-
view on first speaking with her. Instead, defendant simply asked to
call her.” This standard expects far too much of the typical juvenile
being held in police custody and does not comport with our legislature’s
intent to protect juveniles’ rights.

lalso disagree with the State’s argument that requiring law enforce-
ment officers to ask clarifying questions would place an unreason-
able burden on them. The burden, if any, would be slight. In this case,
Detective Kelly could have asked a simple question to clarify defendant’s
intent when he said, “Um, Can I call my mom?” or to ascertain his desire
after he was unable to contact her, such as “Do you want your mother
present before I ask you any questions?” Defendant’s response of “no”
would leave the detective free to continue the custodial interrogation,
whereas the response of “yes” would be considered an unambiguous
invocation of his right, and the interrogation must therefore immediately
cease. Regardless, “the structure of the juvenile code” is “persuasive
evidence . . . that the legislature intended to favor juvenile protections
over law enforcement expediency.” In re Stallings, 318 N.C. at 576, 350
S.E.2d at 333 (emphasis added). Thus, because the majority's holding
fails to take into account the significant differences between juveniles
and adults and improperly caps the protection of juveniles’ statutory
rights under section 7B-2101, I respectfully dissent.

418 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. SEAM
[369 N.C. 418 (2016)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
SETHY TONY SEAM

No. 82A14
Filed 21 December 2016

On writ of certiorari to review an order on a motion for appropri-
ate relief entered on 8 August 2013 by Judge Theodore S. Royster, Jr. in
Superior Court, Davidson County. On 4 September 2013, the Court of
Appeals allowed the State’s petition for writ of certiorari to review the
order pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c). On 11 March 2014, the Supreme
Court on its own initiative certified the case for review prior to determi-
nation in the Court of Appeals. Following oral argument on 6 May 2014,
the Court on 28 January 2016 ordered supplemental briefing. Heard
in the Supreme Court on 12 October 2016.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Robert C. Montgomery, Senior
Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Barbara S. Blackman
and Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for
defendant-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

For the reasons stated in State v. Young, __N.C.__,__ S.E.2d___
(ec. 21, 2016) (No. 80A14), the trial court’s order is affirmed, and this
case is remanded for resentencing.

AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 419

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

KIRK ALAN TURNER
vw
SPECIAL AGENT GERALD R. THOMAS, wv iis INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
IN HIS OFFICIAL caracity; SPECIAL AGENT DUANE DEAVER, 1N ls INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
AND, IN THE ALTERNANIVE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CaPaciTy; ROBIN PENDERGRAFT, 1v Hee INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IN HER OFFICIAL GaPacrTY; AND JOHN anv JANE DOE SBI
SUPERVISORS, 1n TiiE1R INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES

No, 319PA14
Filed 21 December 2016

1. Malicious Prosecution—first-degree murder—SBI blood ana-
lyst—acts after indictment
The trial court properly concluded that plaintiff's malicious
prosecution claim against defendants should be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Based on the facts known to the investiga-
tors at the time of the grand jury proceedings, a reasonable and pru-
dent person would believe there was probable cause sufficient to
prosecute plaintiff for first-degree murder. The continuation theory
was not before the Supreme Court on this appeal.

2. Emotional Distress—first-degree murder prosecution—
extreme and outrageous conduct
Plaintiff sufficiently alleged extreme and outrageous conduct
in an intentional infliction of emotional distress action against an
SBI blood analyst following plaintiff's first-degree murder acquittal
where his allegations painted a picture of law enforcement officials
deliberately abusing their authority as public officials to manipulate
evidence and distort a case for the purpose of reaching a foreor-
dained conclusion of guilt.

3. Emotional Distress—intent—first-degree murder prosecution

In a an intentional infliction of emotional distress action, plain-

tiff sufficiently alleged intent to inflict emotional distress. While

standing trial for first-degree murder is unquestionably stressful for

anyone, plaintiff's complaint did not allege that defendants were

merely negligent or that their investigation was inadequate; instead,

the complaint alleged sinister motives and conduct by defendants

specifically aimed toward the improper purpose of wrongfully con-
victing plaintiff of murder.

420 IN THE SUPREME COURT

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)

4. Emotional Distress—allegations of severe distress—suffi-

ciency of allegations
The plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional distress -

action sufficiently alleged severe emotional distress where the com-
plaint stated that plaintiff's severe emotional distress manifested
itself in diagnosable form, including depression, anxiety, loss of
sleep, loss of appetite, lack of concentration, difficulty remember-
ing things, feelings of alienation from loved ones, shame, and loss
of respect with the community and co-workers, and damages “in
excess of $10,000.00.”

Justice ERVIN concurring, in part, and concurring in the result,
in part.

Justice HUDSON concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
Justice BEASLEY joins in this opinion.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, 235 N.C. App. 520, 762 S.B.2d
252 (2014), affirming in part and reversing in part an order entered on
11 April 2013 by Judge Stuart Albright in Superior Court, Forsyth County.
Heard in the Supreme Court on 18 May 2015.

Morrow Porter Vermitsky Fowler & Taylor, PLLC, by John C.
Vermitsky, for plaintiff-appellee.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Tammera Hill and J. Joy
Strickland, Assistant Attorneys General, for defendant-appellants
Thomas and Deaver.

EDMUNDS, Justice.

In this case, we consider the tort liability of law enforcement agents
when their criminal investigation went awry. Defendants Thomas and
Deaver are or were at the time of the events in question agents of the
State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) who participated in the investigation
and prosecution of plaintiff for the murder of his wife. The remaining
defendants are or were SBI policymakers responsible for supervising
SBI agents, including Thomas and Deaver. After plaintiff was acquit-
ted on grounds of self-defense, he filed a civil complaint against defen-
dants alleging numerous claims, including malicious prosecution and

eT

IN THE SUPREME COURT 421

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted
motions to dismiss filed by all defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, but the Court of Appeals
reversed as to these two claims against Thomas and Deaver, reinstating
the claims. We conclude that, because probable cause existed for the
State to indict plaintiff for first-degree murder, plaintiff's suit for mali-
cious prosecution necessarily would have failed. Accordingly, we reverse
the holding of the Court of Appeals as to this claim. However, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that, taken in the light most favorable to plain-
tiff, the complaint alleges elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Consequently, we
affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals as to this claim.

On 12 September 2007, Kirk Alan Turner (plaintiff) and his friend
Gregory Adam Smithson (Smithson) met at plaintiff’s marital residence
so Smithson could retrieve some property stored there. While at the
home, plaintiff discussed personal matters with his wife Jennifer. During
the conversation, Jennifer attacked plaintiff with a large spear, stab-
bing him multiple times in the thigh and groin area. In reaction, plaintiff
pulled a pocketknife from his right front pocket and cut Jennifer twice
in the neck, inflicting fatal injuries.

Smithson called 911 and performed CPR on Jennifer until emer-
gency personnel arrived. The Davie County Sheriff's Office responded
to the call and requested the assistance of the SBI. SBI Special Agent.
E.R. Wall arrived and notified SBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge K.A.
Cline that a blood spatter expert would be needed to analyze the scene.
Several hours later, Agent Wall called Agent Cline again to suggest that a
blood spatter expert might not be needed after all because closer exami-
nation indicated that the blood spatter most likely was caused by arte-
rial spurting from Jennifer's throat wound.

Two days later, Special Agent Gerald R. Thomas (defendant Thomas)
arrived at plaintiff's home to conduct a blood spatter analysis of the
scene. Later that day, he conducted a bloodstain analysis of various arti-
cles of clothing collected during the course of the investigation, includ-
ing a gray T-shirt worn by plaintiff during the incident. Before beginning
his examinations, defendant Thomas was informed by SBI Special Agent
D.J. Smith that Jennifer apparently stabbed plaintiff with a spear and, in
response, plaintiff cut her throat with a pocketknife. Defendant Thomas
completed his examinations that same day and about two weeks later
presented a written report documenting his findings. The report stated
that a large bloodstain on plaintiff's gray T-shirt “was consistent with a
transfer bloodstain pattern” resulting from a bloody hand being wiped

422, IN THE SUPREME COURT

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

on the shirt. The report further noted several smaller bloodstains that
were consistent with blood dripping onto the shirt.

On 13 December 2007, plaintiff was indicted for the first-degree
murder of Jennifer. He was initially denied bond and detained for one
month before being released on a bond of one million dollars. Plaintiff
had to borrow money from family and friends to post his bond and retain
defense counsel.

The following allegations are taken from plaintiff's complaint. After
plaintiff was indicted, defendant Thomas met on 15 January 2008 with
SBI Special Agent Duane Deaver (defendant Deaver); Captain Jerry
Hartman, lead investigator for the Davie County Sheriff's Office; a law-
yer from the district attorney’s office; and another individual identified in
the pleadings only as “Mr. Marks” to discuss both the feasibility of plain-
tiffs version of the events and their own theory of the case. During this
meeting, defendants Thomas and Deaver and their colleagues theorized
that plaintiff killed Jennifer for the purpose of carrying out a scheme to
avoid a divorce and subsequent equitable distribution proceeding. They
additionally theorized that plaintiff stabbed himself with the spear and
staged the scene to make the killing look like self-defense.

Plaintiff further alleged that, to prove their theory, defendants
Thomas and Deaver needed to show that the bloodstain on plaintiff's
T-shirt was not a mirror image stain from plaintiff's hand but was instead
a transfer pattern consistent with plaintiff having wiped a knife on the
shirt, With the alleged approval of defendant Pendergraft, their supervi-
sor, defendants Thomas and Deaver conducted tests for the purpose of
“shor[ing] up” this new theory. Defendant Thomas again took samples
from various evidentiary items for a second examination but failed prop-
erly to label his work in such a way that someone reviewing the evi-
dence would be able to determine the source of each sample. Defendant
Thomas also failed to make any record of the new theory. Defendants
Thomas and Deaver videotaped their numerous attempts to duplicate
with a knife the blood smear on the plaintiff's T-shirt. After a success,
defendant Deaver can be heard on the video saying: “Oh, even better!
Holy cow, that was a good one!” and “Beautiful! That’s a wrap, baby!”

Plaintiff further alleged that, following the knife smear test and a
second review of the evidence, defendant Thomas created a second
written report that altered his initial report by replacing the words “con-
sistent with a bloody hand being wiped on the shirt” with “consistent
with a pointed object being wiped on the shirt.” This second report pur-
ported to convey results of the “examination of clothing for bloodstain

IN THE SUPREME COURT 423

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

patterns on Friday, September 14, 2007,” even though the true date of the
second examination was 15 January 2008. Defendant Thomas’s second
report failed to indicate either that it was based on a second review of
the evidence or that it was not the original report. Plaintiff alleged that
defendants Thomas and Deaver conducted these tests not only to prove
their theory that plaintiff did not act in self-defense, but “to maintain the
appearance of probable cause where none existed and to obtain a first-
degree murder conviction of [plaintiff] despite evidence to the contrary.”

In his report, defendant Thomas stated that Captain Hartman told
him “he was present when emergency services cut the gray T-shirt from
Mr. Turner's body and that the question [sic] blood stain was observed
present in its current condition on the shirt.” The report further stated
that “Hartman said that he took the shirt from Emergency Medical
Services and placed it in a secure area [an adjacent room], laying flat on
the floor to dry.”!

At plaintiff's trial for Jennifer's murder, defendant Thomas gave
testimony about plaintiff's T-shirt that was consistent with his report.
However, Captain Hartman testified that he did not arrive at the crime
scene until two hours after plaintiff was taken to the hospital and that
he was not present when plaintiff's T-shirt was removed, contradict-
ing defendant Thomas's account. In addition, crime scene photographs
showed plaintiff's T-shirt “crumpled on the floor, inside out.” Plaintiff's
defense expert Stuart James disagreed with defendants’ bloodstain
analysis, giving opinion testimony that the bloodstain was most likely
a “mirror stain” created either when the shirt was folded as emergency
medical service technicians cut off the shirt or when they tossed it onto
the floor. On 21 August 2009, the jury found plaintiff not guilty of the
first-degree murder of his wife, by reason of self-defense.

On 14 November 2011, plaintiff filed his original complaint in
Superior Court, Forsyth County. On 4 April 2012, plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed that complaint and immediately refiled a complaint making
the same substantive allegations against the same defendants. In addi-
tion to defendants Thomas and Deaver, plaintiff named former SBI
Director Robin Pendergraft and SBI supervisors John and Jane Doe as
defendants in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff's com-
plaint alleged four causes of action against defendants Thomas and
Deaver in their individual capacities: (1) intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, (2) abuse of process, (3) malicious prosecution, and

1. The complaint does not specify whether defendant Thomas included this informa-
tion in his initial report or added it following his second examination of the evidence.

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(4) false imprisonment. The complaint also alleged negligence claims
against defendants Pendergraft and John and Jane Doe. Finally, plain-
tiff alleged federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against.
all defendants in their individual and official capacities, and claims
under the North Carolina Constitution against all defendants in their
official capacities.

In response, all defendants filed motions to dismiss all charges. At
a hearing on the motions, plaintiff conceded that dismissal was appro-
priate for the section 1983 claims against all defendants in their official
capacities, for the negligence claims, and for all claims against supervi-
sors John and Jane Doe. On 11 April 2018, the trial court granted defen-
dants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff's remaining claims pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal of all claims against defendants Pendergraft and John
and Jane Doe. Turner v. Thomas, 235 N.C. App. 520, 524, 762 S.E.2d
252, 257-58 (2014). In addition, that court affirmed the trial court’s dis-
missal of all claims against defendants Thomas and Deaver except for
the claims for malicious prosecution, id. at 530, 762 S.E.2d at 261, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. at 537, 762 S.E.2d at 265.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing these
two claims, concluding plaintiff had alleged sufficient elements of both
torts to survive a motion to dismiss. Jd. at 540, 762 S.E.2d at 267. On
22 January 2015, we allowed petitions for discretionary review filed by
defendants Thomas and Deaver (hereinafter, defendants).

In determining whether the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's
claims against defendants for malicious prosecution and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, we consider “whether, as a matter of
Jaw, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Newberne v. Dep’t of
Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 784, 618 S.E.2d 201, 203
(2005) (quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 111, 489 S.E.2d 880, 888
(1997)). “This Court treats factual allegations in a complaint as true
when reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Fussell v. N.C. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 364 N.C. 222, 225, 695 S.E.2d 437, 440 (2010)

2, It appears from the record that the citation to Rule 12(b)(1), lack of subject mat- -
ter jurisdiction, refers to constitutional claims brought against defendants. None of those
constitutional claims are before us now and the parties have made no arguments relating
to jurisdiction. Accordingly, we will address the trial court's Rule 12(b)(6) rulings only.

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(citing Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 360 N.C. 321, 325, 626 S.B.2d
263, 266 (2006)).

[1] To establish malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant (1) initiated or participated in the earlier proceeding, (2) did
so maliciously, (3) without probable cause, and (4) the earlier proceed-
ing ended in favor of the plaintiff. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Cully’s Motorcross Park, Inc., 366 N.C. 505, 512, 742 S.E.2d 781, 786
(2013) (citations omitted). Defendants contend that the Court of Appeals
correctly identified the elements of a malicious prosecution claim but
erred in concluding that plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged that
probable cause was lacking to pursue a first-degree murder case against
him. Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to
the other elements of malicious prosecution. Accordingly, we begin by
considering plaintiff's allegations that defendants did not have probable
cause to initiate criminal proceedings against plaintiff.

“Where the claim is one for malicious prosecution, ‘[p]robable
cause . . . has been properly defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances, known to [the defendant] at the time, as would induce
a reasonable man to commence a prosecution.’ ” Best v. Duke Univ.,
337 N.C. 742, 750, 448 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1994) (alterations in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Cook v. Lanier, 267 N.C. 166, 170, 147 S.E.2d
910, 914 (1966)). We have consistently held that whether or not prob-
able cause exists is determined at the time prosecution begins. Williams
v. Boylan—Pearce, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 315, 318-19, 317 S.E.2d 17, 19 (1984),
aff'd per curiam, 313 N.C. 321, 327 S.E.2d 870 (1985); see also Cook, 267
N.C. at 170, 147 S.E.2d at 914 (“In order to give a cause of action for
malicious prosecution, such prosecution must have been maliciously
instituted.” (citing Wingate v. Causey, 196 N.C. 71, 144 S.E. 530 (1928));
Taylor v. Hodge, 229 N.C. 558, 560, 50 S.E. 307, 309 (1948) (establishing
that malicious prosecution claims hinge on whether a defendant “laid
the charge” regardless of facts that should have convinced him of plain-
tiff’s innocence); Morgan v. Stewart, 144 N.C. 424, 430, 57 S.E. 149, 151
(1907) (“Probable cause, in cases of this kind, has been properly defined
as the existence of such facts and circumstances, known to him at the
time, as would induce a reasonable man to commence a prosecution.”
(citation omitted)). The subsequent acquittal of a defendant does not, as
a matter of law, automatically negate the existence of probable cause at
the time prosecution was commenced. Bell v. Pearcy, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.)
233, 234 (1850).

The grand jury indicted plaintiff for first-degree murder on
13 December 2007. Plaintiff argues correctly that a grand jury’s action

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in returning an indictment is only prima facie evidence of probable
cause and that, as a result, the return of an indictment does not as a mat-
ter of law bar a later claim for malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Hodge, 229 N.C. 558, 50 S.E.2d 307 (1948) (holding that even though a
magistrate initially found probable cause, the defendant in a malicious
prosecution suit was not entitled to dismissal as a matter of law after
the suit concluded in the plaintiff's favor). However, cases cited to us
by both parties and referenced in the opinion of the Court of Appeals
involve conduct by defendants that occurred before the return of an
indictment. See Williams v. Kuppenheimer Mfg. Co., 105 N.C. App. 198,
201, 412 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1992) (concluding that criminal prosecution of
the plaintiff would have been unlikely if the defendant had not provided
virtually all the evidence to investigators prior to indictment); see also
Jones v. Gwynne, 312 N.C. 393, 403, 323 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1984) (noting that
the malicious prosecution claim was based on the issuance of arrest
warrants that the prosecutor voluntarily dismissed, not on subsequent
grand jury indictments that initiated new proceedings against the defen-
dant); Stanford v. Grocery Co., 143 N.C. 419, 425, 55 S.E. 815, 817 (1906)
(explaining that the action triggering the malicious prosecution claim
was “taking out the warrant and causing the plaintiff's arrest”). Here,
in contrast, plaintiff's suit focuses on actions defendants took after the
grand jury returned indictments against him. Accordingly, to determine
whether probable cause existed, we must consider the evidence that
was available to the investigators and presented to the grand jury in
December 2007.

That evidence indicated that plaintiff inflicted two lethal slashes to
his wife’s neck, resulting in her death. This evidence was supported by
defendants’ original forensic report, which stated that the bloodstain
on plaintiff's T-shirt was consistent with a bloody hand being wiped on
the shirt. Based on this and other evidence, the grand jury returned an
indictment for first-degree murder. This independent determination by
the grand jury established prima facie the existence of probable cause.
See Stanford, 143 N.C. at 426, 55 S.E. at 817. Although plaintiff was sub-
sequently acquitted on the basis of self-defense, that defense was pre-
sented at trial and does not necessarily negate the existence of probable
cause at the time the case was brought to the grand jury. Plaintiff's com-
plaint alleges that defendants failed to investigate the incident properly
and generated incorrect and inaccurate information for presentation to
the grand jury. However, the critical actions complained of took place
after the indictment was returned. Based on the facts known to the
investigators at the time of the grand jury proceedings, we are satisfied

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that a reasonable and prudent person would believe there was probable
cause sufficient to prosecute plaintiff for first-degree murder.

The concurring opinions argue that this Court should recognize that
a malicious prosecution case can arise after a magistrate or grand jury
finds probable cause if that probable cause later evaporates but the pros-
ecution nevertheless continues in bad faith (the “continuation theory”).
We need not address that theory here for, assuming arguendo that this
Court would adopt it under the proper circumstances, it is not before
us now. Plaintiff's complaint is not that the original probable cause dis-
sipated. Instead, the gravamen of plaintiff's argument is that probable
cause never existed and that defendants’ investigation following indict-
ment was corrupt and shoddy. However, we have determined that the
grand jury correctly found probable cause, and nothing in the subse-
quent investigation revealed facts that disproved that probable cause. As
aresult, we are not faced with facts that invoke the continuation theory.

Therefore, the trial court properly concluded that plaintiff's mali-
cious prosecution claim against defendants should be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. We reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals to
the contrary.

We next address plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Elements of this tort are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct
[by the defendant], (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3)
severe emotional distress to another.” Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437,
452, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (1981). The tort also may be established when
a “defendant's actions indicate a reckless indifference to the likelihood
that they will cause severe emotional distress.” Id. at 452, 276 S.E.2d
at 335. Conduct constituting this cause of action may be found in “an
abuse by the actor of a position . .. which gives him . . . power to affect”
the interests of another. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. e (Am.
Law Inst. 1965). We have held that extreme and outrageous conduct is
that which “exceeds all bounds of decency tolerated by society.” West
v. King’s Dep't Store, Inc., 321 N.C. 698, 704, 365 S.E.2d 621, 625 (1988)
(citing Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979), abro-
gated in part by Dickens, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325), and is “regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” Briggs
v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App. 672, 677, 327 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1985). Our state
has set a “high threshold” to satisfy this element. Dobson v. Harris, 134
N.C. App. 573, 578, 521 S.E.2d 710, 715 (1999), rev’d on other grounds,
352 N.C. 77, 530 S.E.2d 829 (2000). Foreseeability of injury, while not an

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element of the tort, is a factor to consider in assessing the outrageous-
ness of a defendant’s conduct. West, 321 N.C. at 705, 365 S.E.2d at 625
(citing Dickens, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325).

[2] We begin by considering the first element of the tort, whether defen-
dants’ conduct as alleged was extreme and outrageous. According to
plaintiff, defendants concocted a motive for plaintiff to murder his wife
and a theory to explain how that murder was carried out. Defendants
then made a calculated decision to conduct and repeat experiments
until they achieved a bloodstain pattern that supported their theory.
When they achieved results they deemed satisfactory, defendant Thomas
then rewrote the conclusion of his earlier blood spatter and bloodstain
report without stating that he was presenting a new or amended version
of the original report. To the contrary, defendant Thomas's report indi-
cated the conclusion reached resulted from the original analysis of the
evidence conducted on 14 September 2007.

Plaintiff's allegations do not portray agents vigorously pursuing
an investigation with a determination to find the truth, a practice law-
abiding citizens not only endorse but expect. Instead, plaintiff's allega-
tions paint a picture of law enforcement officials deliberately abusing
their authority as public officials to manipulate evidence and distort a
case for the purpose of reaching a foreordained conclusion of guilt. We
do not doubt that plaintiff's complaint alleged extreme and outrageous
conduct by these defendants sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.

[3] As to the second element of the tort, plaintiff alleged that defen-
dants acted with intent to inflict emotional distress. While standing trial
for first-degree murder is unquestionably stressful for anyone, plaintiff's
complaint does not allege that defendants were merely negligent or
‘that their investigation was inadequate. Instead, the complaint alleges
sinister motives and conduct by defendants specifically aimed toward
the improper purpose of wrongfully convicting plaintiff of murder. See
Needham v. Price, ___N.C. __, 780 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2015) (holding that
the “defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of willful and malicious
conduct” in the context of parent-child immunity because the evidence
did not show the defendant’s “conduct was directed towards the [injured
children”). Specifically, the complaint, which we read in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, alleges that defendants “wantonly and maliciously
conducted unscientific tests to ‘shore up’ ” their theory of the case,
“wantonly failed to label [their] work properly,” altered and manipu-
Jated evidence, and acted “to maintain the appearance of probable cause
where none existed and to obtain a first-degree murder conviction of

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[plaintiff] despite evidence to the contrary.” These allegations do not
describe an investigation that was incompetent or incomplete, or one
that skeptically explored the validity of plaintiff's self-defense claim.
Instead, the complaint contends that defendants knew the results they
wanted before they began and disregarded all evidence to the contrary.
That plaintiff would suffer mental anguish as a result of defendants’ con-
duct is readily foreseeable. Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations indicated
that defendants were recklessly indifferent to the consequences of their
actions. Accordingly, plaintiff's allegation of the intent element of his
claim is sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

[4] Finally, we consider whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he
suffered severe emotional distress. The complaint states, among other
things, that severe emotional distress manifested itself “in diagnosable
form... including, inter alia: a. Depression; b. Anxiety; c. Loss of sleep;
d. Loss of appetite; e. Lack of concentration; f. Difficulty remembering
things; g. Feeling alienated from loved ones; h. Shame; and i. Loss of
respect with the community and co-workers.” Plaintiff further alleged
that defendants’ conduct caused him damages “in excess of $10,000.00.”
We find that these are sufficient allegations of severe emotional distress.

Taking all of plaintiff's allegations in the light most favorable to him,
as we must at the pleading stage, we hold plaintiff has alleged elements
of intentional infliction of emotional distress sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). As this case moves
forward to summary judgment or trial, plaintiff will have to prove that
his allegations are true, including that defendants’ conduct amounted to
more than substandard police work and was, instead, directed at plain-
tiff for an improper purpose. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals holding the trial court erred in dismissing this claim.
This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the
trial court for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED.

Justice ERVIN concurring, in part, and concurring in the result,
in part.

Although I concur in the Court’s decision with respect to plaintiff's
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and in the Court’s deter-
mination that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state a malicious prose-
cution claim in his complaint, I am unable to agree with the logic that the
Court has employed in upholding the dismissal of plaintiff's malicious

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prosecution claim. As a result, I concur in the Court’s opinion, in part,
and concur in the result reached by the Court, in part.

In determining that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a malicious
prosecution claim, the Court begins by stating that “[w]hether or not
probable cause exists is determined at the time prosecution begins.”!
After noting that “plaintiff's suit focuses on actions defendants took
after the grand jury returned indictments against him” and stating that,
“to determine whether probable cause existed, we must consider the
evidence that was available to the investigators and presented to
the grand jury in December 2007,” the Court points out that the fact
that the Davie County grand. jury returned a bill of indictment charg-
ing plaintiff with first-degree murder in connection with the death of
his wife “established prima facie the existence of probable cause.” In
addition, after acknowledging that plaintiff has alleged “that defendants
failed to investigate the incident properly and generated incorrect and
inaccurate information for presentation to the grand jury,” the Court
notes that “the critical actions complained of took place after the indict-
ment was returned” and holds that, “[b]ased on the facts known to the
investigators at the time of the grand jury proceedings,” “a reasonable
and prudent person would believe there was probable cause sufficient
to prosecute plaintiff for first-degree murder.”

The Court's focus upon the necessity for plaintiff to establish the
absence of probable cause at the time that criminal charges were ini-
tially lodged against him takes an unduly narrow view of the scope of
the malicious prosecution claim that plaintiff has attempted to assert in
his complaint. Simply put, the Court reads plaintiff's malicious prosecu-
tion claim as being focused entirely upon the fact that he was indicted
for murdering his wife. I do not, however, believe that plaintiff's claim is
limited in the manner described by the Court.2 A significant component

1. Although the majority relies on Williams v. Boylan-Pearce, Inc., 69 N.C. App.
815, 818-19, 317 S.E.2d 17, 19 (1984), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 313 N.C. 821, 327
S.E.2d 870 (1985), in support of this proposition, I do not view the opinion in that case as
holding that the issue of probable cause in a malicious prosecution case must be resolved
based solely upon an analysis of the facts in existence during a window of time between
the commission of the underlying criminal act and the point at which the prosecution of
the plaintiff began. Moreover, the only issue before this Court in that matter, which came
to us by way of a partial dissenting opinion, related to the availability of punitive damages
rather than the sufficiency of the plaintiff's showing of a want of probable cause. Id. at
322-23, 317 S.E.2d at 21-22 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2. In fact, a careful study of the brief that plaintiff filed before this Court causes
me to question the extent to which plaintiff attempted to state a malicious prosecution
claim against either defendant arising from the Davie County grand jury's initial decision
to charge him with murdering his wife. However, I do not believe that we need to make a

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of plaintiff's allegations against defendants? consists of a description of
their conduct in concocting and performing a supplemental blood smear
“test” for the purpose of producing results that validated the State’s
decision to proceed against plaintiff. According to plaintiff's complaint,
“[t]his evidence was crucial to maintain probable cause for a first-degree
murder charge,” with the underlying “test” having been conducted in
order “to maintain the appearance of probable cause where none
existed.” In addition, plaintiff has alleged that both defendants should
be found liable to plaintiff for malicious prosecution on the grounds that.
they “participated in and caused the institution of criminal proceedings
against” plaintiff, with their misconduct having included, among other
things, a failure “to properly investigate the circumstances of” the death
of plaintiff's wife and plaintiff's “claim of self-defense”; the inclusion of
“false and misleading information in investigative reports”; and a fail-
ure to “remain fair, neutral and truthful prior to and after the institution
of criminal proceedings against” plaintiff. As a result, I am inclined to
believe that plaintiff seeks to obtain a malicious prosecution recovery
from defendants based upon claims that criminal charges were both
initially instituted against him and continued against him without prob-
able cause and cannot, for that reason, agree with the Court’s decision
to limit its analysis to a determination of the sufficiency of the allega-
tions that defendants participated in the institution of criminal charges
against plaintiff despite the absence of probable cause to believe that
he was guilty of the offense with which he was charged and conclude,
for that reason, that we must evaluate the validity of plaintiff's effort to
plead a “continuation” claim in order to fully resolve the issues that have
been properly presented for our consideration in this case.

“To make out a case of malicious prosecution [based upon a prior
criminal prosecution,] the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defen-
dant instituted, or procured, or participated in, a criminal prosecu-
tion against him maliciously, without probable cause, which ended in

definitive determination of the exact nature of the malicious prosecution claim that plain-
tiff has attempted to state in his complaint given his failure to allege a viable malicious
prosecution claim against defendants on the basis of either of the two theories discussed
in the text of this separate opinion.

8. Special Agent Deaver did not become involved in the prosecution of plaintiff until
sometime after the Davie County grand jury charged plaintiff with murdering his wife.
For that reason, the fact that plaintiff sought to obtain a malicious prosecution recovery
against Special Agent Deaver clearly indicates that plaintiff's claim rested upon more than
an assertion that he was initially indicted for murdering his wife in the absence of prob-
able cause.

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failure.” Cook v. Lanier, 267 N.C. 166, 169, 147 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1966)
(citing Greer v. Skyway Broad. Co., 256 N.C. 382, 124 S.E.2d 98 (1962);
Carson v. Doggett, 231 N.C. 629, 58 S.E.2d 609 (1950); and Dickerson
v. Atl. Ref. Co., 201 N.C. 90, 159 S.E. 446 (1931). Consistently with this
Court’s reference to the possibility of malicious prosecution liability for
“participation” in a wrong prosecution, a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals upheld the sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial court
judgment awarding the plaintiff $12,500 in damages in a malicious pros-
ecution case in which the defendant continued to pursue a criminal cita-
tion charging the plaintiff with shoplifting several packs of cigarettes
despite the fact that the plaintiff, on the day after the issuance of the
shoplifting citation, presented the defendant with a receipt indicating
that he had purchased the cigarettes that he had been charged with
concealing. Allison v. Food Lion, Inc., 84 N.C. App. 251, 252-55, 352
S.E.2d 256, 256-58 (1987). Although then-Judge Parker dissented from
the court’s decision on the grounds that, “[a]t the critical time, ie., the
moment at which [the] plaintiff was apprehended in [the] defendant's
store, the undisputed evidence” tended to support a determination that
the plaintiff had shoplifted the cigarettes in question, id. at 256, 352
S.E.2d at 258 (Parker, J., dissenting), and that “[t]he pertinent inquiry
is not whether [the] defendant's store manager should have believed
[the] plaintiff, but rather whether under the circumstances existing at
the time the criminal action was instituted, the store manager acted as a
person of reasonable prudence in concluding that the crime charged had.
been committed,” id. at 256, 352 S.E.2d at 259, this Court was apparently
never asked to examine the correctness of the majority's decision. As a
result, the Court of Appeals’ determination that a malicious prosecution
action could properly be maintained in the event that the plaintiff demon-
strated, based upon events occurring after the institution of the underly-
ing criminal case, that the defendant persisted in pursuing a prosecution
that had become groundless, has been an established and unquestioned
part of North Carolina malicious prosecution jurisprudence since 1987.4
See 2 N.C.PI. — Civ. 801.00 (gen. civ. vol. June 2014) (“Malicious
Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding”), at 1 & n.2 (allowing a finding of
liability in the event that the jury determines, among other things, that

4, Before the trial court, plaintiff's counsel argued that defendants lacked “a very
good answer” for Allison, which he described as holding that “[mJalicious prosecution is
either the initiation of a criminal proceeding without probable cause or the continuation
of a proceeding when it is discovered that probable case no longer exists,” and stated
that plaintiff's complaint “clearly alleged” a claim stemming from defendants’ involvement
in the continuation of the criminal charges that had earlier been lodged against plaintiff in
the absence of the necessary probable cause.

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the defendant “[caused a criminal proceeding to be continued] against
the plaintiff without probable cause” (citing Allison, 84 N.C. App. at 254,
352 S.E.2d at 257) (majority opinion)));> see also Charles E. Day & Mark
W. Morris, North Carolina Law of Torts § 9.40, at 105 (3d ed. 2012) (stat-
ing that, in light of Allison, “it can be suggested that a continuation of
. prosecution after probable cause is known not to exist may be a basis
for a malicious prosecution action, notwithstanding that probable cause
might have existed when the prosecution was initiated”); 1 William S.
Haynes, North Carolina Tort Law § 14-3(A), at 513-14 (1989) (stating
that “[t]he gist of an action for malicious prosecution is the wrongful ini-
tiation, encouragement or continuation, of a prior valid process or pro-
ceeding” (citation omitted), and that “[a] defendant may also be found
liable for the tort of malicious prosecution, notwithstanding the fact that
he initially had probable cause to instigate a criminal prosecution, if he
afterwards secures knowledge that the charge is not well founded and
thereafter fails to intervene for the purpose of having the criminal pros-
ecution discontinued or to do all that is reasonably possible to do to
sever his connection with the prosecution”).

Aside from the well-established nature of the “continuation” theory
for purposes of North Carolina law, the logic underlying that theory
has been consistently recognized by leading encyclopedias and trea-
tises addressing American tort law. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 655 (Am. Law. Inst. 1977) (stating that “[a] private person who takes
an active part in continuing or procuring the continuation of criminal
proceedings initiated by himself or by another is subject to the same lia-
bility for malicious prosecution as if he had then initiated the proceed-
ings”); id. § 655 cmt. b (pointing out that “[tJhe rule stated in this Section
applies when the defendant has himself initiated criminal proceedings
against another or procured their institution, upon probable cause and
for a proper purpose, and thereafter takes an active part in pressing the
proceedings after he’has discovered that there is no probable cause for
them,” and “applies also when the proceedings are initiated by a third
person, and the defendant, knowing that there is no probable cause for
them, thereafter takes an active part in procuring their continuation”);
52 Am. Jur. 2d Malicious Prosecution § 21, at 207-08 (2011) (stating that
a malicious prosecution action can be maintained in the event that “the

5. Although the “Pattern Jury Instructions are not binding on this Court,” Stark
v. Ford Motor Co., 365 N.C. 468, 478, 723 S.E.2d 753, 760 (2012) (citation omitted), they do
express ‘the long-standing, published understanding’ of . . . case law and statutes,” State
v. Walston, 367 N.C. 721, 731, 766 8.B.2d 312, 319 (2014) (quoting Stark, 865 N.C. at 478,
723 SE.2d at 760). .

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defendant instigated or encouraged, commenced or continued, initi-
* ated or procured, or caused or assisted in causing the prosecution com-
plained of, or advised, aided, cooperated, or assisted in the prosecution
of the case” and that “[a] person who had no part in the commencement,
of the action, but who participated in it at a later time, may be held
liable for malicious prosecution” (footnotes omitted)); id. § 26, at 211-
12 (stating that “[a] person who plays an active role in continuing an
unfounded criminal proceeding is liable for malicious prosecution, and
even if there was probable cause for the commencement of an action,
if the person afterwards acquires the means of asserting the charge was
not well founded, his or her failure to intervene and have the prosecu-
tion discontinued or to sever his or her connection with it subjects that
person to malicious prosecution liability” (footnotes omitted)); id. § 54,
at 236 (stating that, although “the critical time” in some jurisdictions “for
determining whether probable cause existed . . . is when the prosecution
was initiated or began,” in other jurisdictions, “liability for malicious
prosecution may arise, even though the lawsuit was commenced with
probable cause, if the suit is prosecuted after it later appears there is no
probable cause” (citations omitted)); 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution
§ 13, at 747 (2010) (stating that “[a] cause of action for malicious prosecu-
tion is not limited to the situation where the present defendant initiated
the prior proceeding, and one who plays an active role in continuing an
unfounded criminal proceeding when otherwise it would have been ter-
minated may be liable for malicious prosecution” (footnotes omitted));
id. § 18, at 751 (stating that, even if “the defendant is granted immu-
nity for complying with a statute governing disclosure of information
to a prosecutorial officer, the defendant may nevertheless be liable for
malicious prosecution where he or she fails to request termination of
the proceeding after learning facts regarding [the] accused’s innocence
subsequent to swearing out a complaint leading to the accused’s arrest”
(citation omitted)); id. § 29, at '762 (stating that “[c]ontinuation of a pros-
ecution in the face of facts that undermine probable cause can support a
malicious prosecution claim” (citation omitted)); 3 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul
T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 587, at 389 (2d ed.
2011) (stating that “[mJalicious prosecution can be established only if [ ]
the defendant has instigated or continued to pursue a criminal proceed-
ing”); id. § 588, at 396 (stating that, “[w]hen liability is based upon con-
tinuance rather than initiation of the prosecution, probable cause must
be judged on appearances at the time the accuser acts to continue the
prosecution, as where he refuses to withdraw his complaint even after
he has learned of the accused’s innocence’ (citation omitted)); 1 Fowler
V. Harper et al., Harper, James and Gray on Torts § 4.3, at 467-68 (8d ed.

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2006) (stating that “continuing to prosecute [criminal] proceedings mali-
ciously after learning of their groundless nature will result in liability,
although they had been begun in good faith and with probable cause,”
since “it is as much a wrong against the victim, and as socially or mor
ally unjustifiable to take an active part in a prosecution after knowledge
that there is no factual foundation for it, as to instigate such proceed-
ings in the first place” (citations omitted)); id. § 4.5, at 481 (stating that
“only facts known at the time the defendant initiated the prosecution
or wrongfully continued an action are pertinent”.in the probable cause
determination (citations omitted)); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 119, at 872 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that “[t]he
defendant may be liable either for initiating or for continuing a criminal
prosecution without probable cause” (footnote omitted). As a result, a
wide variety of recognized secondary authorities in the field of tort law
uphold the validity of the “continuation” theory adopted in Allison.

An analysis of the reported decisions concerning this issue clearly
indicates that the vast majority of American jurisdictions that have con-
sidered the viability of the “continuation” theory have recognized its
existence. As the Supreme Court of California stated in Zamos v. Stroud,
32 Cal. 4th 958, 87 P.3d 802 (2004), “the rule in every other state that
ha[d] addressed the question [at the time the Supreme Court of California
rendered its decision was], and in many states has long been, that the
tort of malicious prosecution does include continuing to prosecute a
lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause,” id. at 966, 87 P.3d at 807, that
“(t]he Restatement’s position on this question has been adopted or was
anticipated by the courts of a substantial number of states,” id. at 967, 87
P3d at 808 (citations omitted), and that the defendants had not pre-
sented, nor had the Court as of that point found, “a single state that has
declined to adopt the Restatement’s view in this regard,” id. at 967, 87
P3d at 808. The states noted in Zamos include Alabama, Laney
v. Glidden Co., 239 Ala. 396, 399, 194 So. 849, 851 (1940) (stating that “[a]
suit for malicious prosecution may lie, not only for the commencement
of the original proceeding, but for its continuance as well” (citations
omitted)); Arizona, Smith v. Lucia, 178 Ariz. 290, 294, 295, 842 P.2d 1303,

6. To be sure, the authors of the same treatise also state that “[p]robable cause
is judged by appearances to the defendant at the time he initiates prosecution, not by
facts discovered later,” with such subsequently discovered facts being “relevant only to
show the entirely different defense based on the accused's guilt in fact.” Id. § 119, at 876
(footnote omitted). However, I do not believe that this statement undercuts the argument
advanced in the text of this separate opinion given that, when read literally, it only applies
to situations involving the initiation of the underlying criminal proceeding rather than to
its continuation.

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1307, 1308 (Ct. App. 1992) (defining the tort of malicious prosecution
without making any reference to the continuation rule, noting that “com-
ment c to Restatement [Second of Torts] section 674 recognizes that an
attorney who has properly commenced a, civil action may be liable for
continuing it without probable cause” and stating that “that rule is not
applicable here” for the reasons stated in the court’s opinion); Arkansas,
Harold McLaughlin Reliable Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Cox, 324 Ark. 361,
368, 922 S.W.2d 327, 331 (1996) (stating that “the essential elements of
malicious prosecution are: ‘(1) [a] proceeding instituted or continued by
the defendant against the plaintiff[;] (2) [t]ermination of the proceeding
in favor of the plaintiff[;] (8) [a]bsence of probable cause for the pro-
ceedings|;] (4) [mlJalice on the part of the defendant[;] (5) [djamages’ ”
(alterations in original) (quoting Farm Serv. Coop. v. Goshen Farms,
267 Ark. 324, 331-82, 590 S.W.2d 861, 865 (1979))); Colorado, Slee
v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 465, 15 P2d 1084, 1085 (1982) (stating that
“one of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution is the com-
mencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial pro-
ceeding” (citations omitted)); Idaho, Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,
102-04, 765 P.2d 126, 127-29 (1988) (defining the tort of malicious prose-
cution without making any reference to the continuation rule, noting
that “the Restatement [Second of Torts] speaks in terms of initiating or
continuing the proceeding” and “affirm[ing] the trial court's ruling that
[the defendant] possessed probable cause, as a matter of law, to initiate
and carry forward the malpractice action against” the plaintiff (citation
omitted)); Iowa, Wilson v. Hayes, 464 N.W.2d 250, 259-61, 264 (lowa
1990) (defining the tort of malicious prosecution without making any
reference to the continuation rule, and stating that, “[t]o subject a per-
. son to liability for wrongful civil proceedings, the proceedings must
have been initiated or continued primarily for a purpose other than that
of securing the proper adjudication of the claim on which they are
based” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 676); that “under the
Restatement rule as expressed in comment d [to section 674], an attor-
ney would only be liable if the attorney knowingly initiated or continued.
a suit for a clearly improper purpose”; and that “[e]ven though a lawsuit
is commenced with probable cause, if the suit is prosecuted after it later
appears there is in fact no probable cause, liability may arise” (citation
omitted)); Kansas, Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 276, 607 P.2d 438, 443
(1980) (stating that “[t]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution of
a civil action the plaintiff must prove,” among other things, “[t]hat the
defendant initiated, continued, or procured civil [proceedings] against
the plaintiff,” with it being “sufficient if it is shown that the defendant
continued or procured the filing of the action” on the grounds that “[a]

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TURNER v. THOMAS
[869 N.C. 419 (2016)]

person may also be held liable for the wrongful continuance of the origi-
nal proceeding” (citations omitted)); Mississippi, Benjamin v. Hooper
Elec. Supply Co., 568 So. 2d 1182, 1188, 1189 n.6 (Miss. 1990) (stating
that the tort of malicious prosecution requires proof, among other
things, of the “institution [or continuation] of a criminal proceeding”
since, “[w]ithout doubt, it is as much a wrong against the victim and as
socially or morally unjustifiable to take an active part in a prosecution
after knowledge that there is no factual foundation for it, as to instigate
such proceedings in the first place” (first alteration in original) (citations
omitted)); New York, Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 457, 335 N.E.2d
310, 314, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 94 (stating that “[t]he elements of the tort of
malicious prosecution” include “the commencement or continuation
of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff” (citation
omitted)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929, 46 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1975); Ohio, Siegel
v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 73 Ohio App. 347, 351, 56 N.E.2d 345, 346-47
(1943) (stating that “[t]he general rule is that to maintain an action for
malicious prosecution,” the plaintiff must show, among other things,
“t]he institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either
civil or criminal,” with “the continuation of an original judicial proceed-
ing. . . after acquiring means of ascertaining that the charge is not well
founded” being sufficient to support a finding of liability (citations omit-
ted)); Oregon, Wroten v. Lenske, 114 Or. App. 305, 308-09, 835 P.2d 931,
933-34 (defining the tort of malicious prosecution without making any
reference to the continuation rule and holding that the trial court had
erred by directing a verdict in favor of the defendant on the grounds that
“there is evidence that continuation of the action was without probable
cause” given that, after “plaintiff's counsel wrote to defendant and
informed him that plaintiff's letter had not been published, a question
was raised whether a reasonable person would have investigated to ver-
ify the accuracy of that statement” (footnote omitted) and that “[t]here
is an issue of fact regarding whether defendant should have investigated
before continuing with the action” (citing Lampos v. Bazar, Inc., 270 Or.
256, 268, 527 P.2d 376, 381-82 (1974) (en banc), and Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 674 cmt. ¢ (1977))), rev. denied, 314 Or. 574, 840 P.2d 1296
(1992); Pennsylvania, Wenger v. Phillips, 195 Pa. 214, 219, 45 A. 927, 927
(Pa. 1900) (stating that the fact “[t]hat the binding over was after the
prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations did not make
the defendant liable unless it appeared that he had persisted in the pros-
ecution after he knew it was barred”); and Washington, Banks
v. Nordstrom, Inc., 57 Wash. App. 251, 255, 787 P.2d 953, 956 (stating that
“to maintain an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must
establish,” among other things, “ ‘that the prosecution claimed to have

438 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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been malicious was instituted or continued by the defendant’ ” (quoting
Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co. 13 Wash. 2d 485, 497, 125 P.2d
681, 687 (1942))), rev. denied, 115 Wash. 2d 1008, 797 P.2d 511 (1990). In
addition to the decisions from the thirteen states referenced in Zamos,
the continuation rule also appears to have been recognized in Alaska,
Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska 2007) (stating that
“[t]he following elements are required to maintain a cause of action for
the tort of malicious prosecution” and include, but are not limited to, “‘a
criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the
plaintiff’ ” (citations omitted)); Florida, Fischer v. Debrincat, 169 So. 3d
1204, 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that “[t]o prevail in a mali-
cious prosecution action, a plaintiff must establish,” among other things,
that “ ‘an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding against the pres-
ent plaintiff was commenced or continued’ ” (quoting Alamo Rent—A—
Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Fla. 1994)));” Georgia,
Horne v. J.H. Harvey Co., 274 Ga. App. 444, 446, 448, 617 S.E.2d 648,
650, 652 (2005) (defining the tort of malicious prosecution without mak-
ing any reference to the continuation rule, stating that “even if a defen-
dant has probable cause to initiate a criminal proceeding, if afterward,
the defendant ‘acquired knowledge, or the reasonable means Of knowl-
edge, that the charge was not well founded, his continuation of the pros-
ecution is evidence of the want of probable cause, requiring that the
question be submitted to the jury’ ” (quoting Fuller v. Jennings, 2138 Ga.
App. 773, 776-77, 445 S.E.2d 796, 799, cert. denied, Ga. LEXIS 1114 (Ga.
Oct. 17, 1994)), and holding that while the defendant “could have formed
a reasonable belief that probable cause existed to initiate the prosecu-
tion . . . an issue arises as to whether [the defendant] could reasonably
believe that probable cause existed to pursue the prosecution”); Hawaii,
Arquette v. State, 128 Haw. 423, 433, 290 P.3d 493, 503 (2012) (holding
that “the tort of the continuation of a malicious prosecution is not an
unwarranted enlargement of the current doctrine but, rather, logically
stems from the policies underlying the tort”); Illinois, Grundhoefer
v. Sorin, 2014 IL App (1st) 131276, § 11, 20 N.E.3d 775, 780 (2014) (stat-
ing that “[t]he elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution”
include “the commencement or continuance by the defendant of an orig-
inal judicial proceeding against the plaintiff” (citing Miller v. Rosenberg,
196 Ill. 2d 50, 58, 749 N.E.2d 946, 952 (2001))); Maine, Trask v. Devlin,
2002 ME 10, { 11, 788 A.2d 179, 182 (2002) (stating that “[t]o prevail in a
malicious prosecution action, a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance

7. The Supreme Court of Florida has “accepted jurisdiction” over Debrincat, but has
not yet decided it. 182 So. 8d 631 (2015).

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of the evidence, that,” among other things, “[t]he defendant initiated,
procured or continued a criminal action without probable cause” (cita-
tions omitted)); Maryland, Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168,
173, 122 A.2d 457, 460 (1956) (stating that “[t]he necessary elements of a
case for malicious prosecution of a criminal charge are well established”
and include, among other things, that there was “a criminal proceeding
instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff” (citations
omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Montgomery Ward v. Wilson,
339 Md. 701, 732-36, 664 A.2d 916, 931-33 (1995); Michigan, Fort Wayne
Mortg. Co. v. Carletos, 95 Mich. App. 752, 757, 291 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1980)
(stating that “[t]he elements of malicious prosecution are,” among other
things, “‘a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant
against the plaintiff’ ” (quoting Wilson v. Yono, 65 Mich. App. 441, 448,

237 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1975))); Montana, Plouffe v. Mont. Dep't of Pub.
Health & Human Servs., 2002 MT 64, { 16, 309 Mont. 184, 190, 45 P.3d
10, 14 (2002) (stating that, “[ijn a civil action for malicious prosecution,
the plaintiff's burden at trial is to introduce proof sufficient to allow rea-
sonable jurors to find each of the six following elements,” including that
“a judicial proceeding was commenced and prosecuted against the
plaintiff” and that “the defendant was responsible for instigating, prose-
cuting or continuing such proceeding” (citations omitted)); Nebraska,
McKinney v. Okoye, 287 Neb. 261, 271-72, 842 N.W.2d 581, 591 (2014)
(stating that “[iJn a malicious prosecution case, the conjunctive ele-
ments for the plaintiff to establish” include, among other things, “the
commencement or prosecution of the proceeding against the plaintiff”
(citation omitted)); Nevada, LaMantia v. Redisi, 118 Nev. 27, 30, 38 P.3d
877, 879-80 (2002) (stating that “[a] malicious prosecution claim requires
that the defendant initiated, procured the institution of, or actively par-
ticipated in the continuation of a criminal proceeding against the plain-
tiff” (citations omitted)); New Jersey, LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62,
89, 90, 970 A.2d 1007, 1022 (2009) (stating that “[mJalicious prosecution
provides a remedy for harm caused by the institution or continuation of
acriminal action that is baseless” before stating the elements of the tort
without mentioning the continuation rule (citation omitted));8 North
Dakota, Richmond v. Haney, 480 N.W.2d 751, 755 (N.D. 1992) (stating

8. Inits earlier decision in Lind v. Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court defined
the tort of malicious prosecution without making any mention of the continuation rule. 67
N.J. 255, 262, 337 A.2d 365, 368 (1975). Aside from the fact that Lind preceded LoBiondo,
nothing in Lind expressly rejects the validity of the continuation rule and some of the
Court’s language may tend to show its validity. Lind, 67 N.J. at 263, 337 A.2d at 368 (stating
that “[tJhe fallacy of this rationale is that it fails to recognize that the concept of probable
cause in malicious prosecution is not fixed from one frame of reference”). As a result, it
appears to me that New Jersey does, in fact, accept the validity of the continuation rule.

440 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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that “{ijn order to maintain an action for malicious prosecution one must
establish,” among other things, that “ ‘[a] criminal proceeding [was]
instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff’ ” (quoting
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 119, at
871 (6th ed. 1984))); Oklahoma, Empire Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 1938
OK 654, ¥ 5, 184 Okla. 172, 178, 86 P.2d 291, 292 (1938) (stating that
“[t]he essential elements in a cause of action for malicious prosecution”
include, but are not limited to, “[t]he commencement or continuance of
an original criminal or civil proceeding” (citing Sawyer v. Shick, 1911
OK 475, § 4, 30 Okla. 353, 354, 120 P. 581, 582 (1911)));9 South Carolina,
Eaves v. Broad River Elec. Coop., 277 8.C. 475, 477, 289 S.E.2d 414, 415
(1982) (stating that “[t]o maintain an action for malicious prosecution, a
plaintiff must establish,” among other things, “the institution or continu-
ation of original judicial proceedings . . . by or at the instance of the
defendant” (citation omitted)); Tennessee, Pera v. Kroger Co., 674
S.W.2d 715, 722 (Tenn. 1984) (stating that “[i]t is well settled in the law of
torts that even though one has probable cause to initiate criminal
charges, there can be liability for the malicious continuation of a crimi-
nal proceeding”);!° Texas, Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 8.W.2d 203,

9. In two decisions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court omitted any reference to the
continuation rule in stating the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution. Greenberg
wv. Wolfberg, 1994 OK 147, {ff 13-15, 890 P2d 895, 901-92 (1994); Imo Oil & Gas Co. v. Know,
1931 OK 440, 9, 154 Okla. 100, 102, 6 P2d 1062, 1064 (1981). I do not believe that a failure
to expressly incorporate the continuation rule into the definition of the tort of malicious
prosecution in those cases can be understood as a refusal to recognize the existence of
the continuation rule. Greenberg, 1994 OK 147, { 14 0.22, 890 P2d at 902 n.22, expressly
relies upon Sawyer v. Shick, in which the continuation rule is expressly recognized, 1911
OK 476, { 4, 30 Okla. 353, 354, 120 P. 581, 582 (1911). Similarly, the omission of any refer-
ence to the continuation rule in /mo Oil, 1931 OK 440, 9, 154 Okla. at 102, 6 P2d at 1064,
appears to be an anomaly given that one of the two cases cited in support of the defini-
tion of malicious prosecution utilized in that decision incorporates the continuation rule,
Sawyer, 1911 OK 475, { 4, 30 Olda, at 354, 120 P. at 582, and the other case does not define
the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution at all, Robberson v. Gibson, 1917 OK 131,
62 Okda. 306, 162 P. 1120 (1917).

10. To be sure, there is no reference to the continuation rule in the definition of the
tort of malicious prosecution set out in Roberts v. Federal Hepress Corp., 842, S.W.2d 246,
247-48 (Tenn, 1992). However, the fact that Roberts does not question Pera and the fact
that the Tennessee Court of Appeals has reiterated the validity of the continuation rule in
reliance upon Pera within the past five years, Bovat v. Nissan N. Am., No. M2013-00502-
COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 6021458, at *8 (Tenn, Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2018) (stating that, despite the
absence of any reference to the continuation rule in the definition of malicious prosecu-
tion set out in Roberts, 842 $.W.2d at 248, and Christian v. Lapidus, 883 S.W2d Tl, 73
(Tenn, 1992), and “even though one has probable cause to initiate criminal charges, there
can be liability for the malicious continuation of a criminal proceeding” (quoting Pera, 674
S.W.2d at 722), I believe that Tennessee recognizes the viability of the continuation rule.

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207 (Tex. 1996) (stating that “[t]o prevail in a suit alleging malicious
prosecution of a civil claim, the plaintiff must establish,” among other
things, “the institution or continuation of civil proceedings against the
plaintiff” (citation omitted));1! Utah, Cline v. State, 2005 UT App 498,
30, 142 P.3d 127, 137 (2005) (stating that the first element of a malicious
prosecution claim “requires a plaintiff to establish that there is ‘[a] crimi-
nal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the
plaintiff’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Amica Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)), cert. denied, 133
P.3d 437 (Utah 2006);2 Wisconsin, Elmer v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 257
Wis. 228, 231, 43 N.W.2d 244, 246 (1950) (stating that “[t]he six essential
elements in an action for malicious prosecution” include, but are not
limited to, “a prior institution or continuation of some regular judicial
proceedings against the plaintiff” (citations omitted)); and Wyoming,
Toliec Watershed Improvement Dist. v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808, 811
(Wyo. 1986) (stating that “the following elements [are] necessary to sus-
tain a cause of action for malicious prosecution,” including “ ‘[t]he insti-
tution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or
civil’ ” (quoting Consumers Filling Station Co. v. Durante, 79 Wyo. 237,
248, 333 P.2d 691, 694 (1958))). Admittedly, a number of states have
defined the tort of malicious prosecution without making reference to
the continuation docirine. See Bhatia v. Debek, 287 Conn. 397, 404, 948
A.2d 1009, 1017 (2008);8 Grosson v. Berry, 829 N.E.2d 184, 189 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005); Williamson v. Gueuntzel, 584 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998); DeVaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 1998-NMSC-001, J 17, 124
N.M. 512, 518, 953 P.2d 277, 283 (1997), overruled in part by Durham
v. Guest, 2009-NMSC-007, 7 29, 145 N.M. 694, 701, 204 P3d 19, 26

Ll. In Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 8.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex, 1997), the tort of
malicious prosecution was defined without reference to the continuation rule. However,
since Richey did not overrule Texas Beef Cattle and focused upon an issue other than the
viability of the continuation rule, I do not believe that Richey can properly be understood
as holding that Texas has rejected the validity of the continuation rule.

12. The Utah Supreme Court made no mention of the continuation rule in reciting
the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution in Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, 62, 247 P3d
380, 394 (2011), but did not overrule either Cline or Schettler.

13, The Connecticut Court of Appeals did hold in Diamond. 67, LLG ». Oatis, 167
Conn. App. 659, 681, 144 A.3d 1055, 1069 (2016), that the related tort of vexatious litiga-
tion permitted a finding of liability predicated on a defendant's “initiation, continuation,
and/or procurement” of a prior civil action, while suggesting that the continuation rule
did not apply in malicious prosecution cases, id. at 683, 144 A.3d at 1070-71, which, in
Connecticut, are limited to claims for relief based upon the initiation of baseless criminal
charges, see Bhatia, 287 Conn. at 404-05, 948 A.2d at 1017.

442 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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(2009);!4Henshaw-v. Doherty, 881 A.2d909, 915 (R.I. 2005); Czechorowski
v. State, 2005 VT 40, { 30, 178 Vt. 524, 533, 872 A.2d 883, 895 (2005);
Hudson v. Lanier, 255 Va. 330, 333, 497 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1998); Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. Higginbotham, 228 W. Va. 522, 526-27, 721 S.E.2d 541, 545-
46 (2011). However, I am not convinced that the failure of these deci-
sions to mention the continuation rule in the course of defining the tort
of malicious prosecution necessarily means that the courts in question
would refuse to recognize the continuation rule in the event that the
issue of its viability was squarely presented to them, as is evidenced by
the fact that the continuation rule was recognized in Smith, 178 Aviz. at
294-95, 842 P.2d at 1308; Badell, 115 Idaho at 102-04, 765 P.2d at 127-29;
Wilson, 464 N.W.2d at 259-64; and Wroten, 114 Or. App. at 308-09, 835
P2d at 933-34, despite the fact that the tort of malicious prosecution was
defined in each of those cases without making any reference to the con-
tinuation rule and the fact that two other courts have refused to decide
whether to accept or reject the continuation rule given the absence of
any need to do so in order to resolve the case under consideration,
Maynard v. 84 Lumber Co., 657 N.E.2d 406, 408 (ind. Ct. App. 1995);
Williamson, 584 N.W.2d at 24-2515 As far as I have been able to

14. The New Mexico Supreme Court has consolidated what are, in most jurisdic-
tions, the separate torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process into the tort of
malicious abuse of process. Durhann, 2009-NMSC-007, { 18, 145 N.M. at 698, 204 P.3d at
23. Although the New Mexico Supreme Court initially held in DeVaney that the elements
of the tort of malicious abuse of process of process are “the initiation of judicial proceed-
ings against the plaintiff by the defendant,” “an act by the defendant in the use of process
other than such as would be proper in the regular prosecution of the claim,” “a primary
motive by the defendant in misusing the process to accomplish an illegitimate end,” and*
damages,” 1998-NMSC-001, { 17, 124 N.M. at 518, 953 P.2d at 283, that court subsequently
overruled its prior decision in DeVaney and modified the definition of the first element of
the consolidated tort so as to delete the requirement that “the defendant... . have initiated
a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff,” Durham, 2009-NMSC-007, { 29, 145 N.M. at701,
204 P3d at 26, and to replace it with “the use of process in a judicial proceeding that would
be improper in the regular prosecution or defense of a claim or charge,” with this improper
use of process consisting of either the “filing [of] a complaint without probable cause,” or “
‘an irregularity or impropriety suggesting extortion, delay, or harassment’ or other conduct,
formerly actionable under the tort of abuse of process,” éd. at ¥ 29, 145 N.M. at 701, 204
P8d at 26 (quoting Fleetwood Retail Corp. of N.M. v. LeDouz, 2007-NMSC-047, § 12, 142
N.M. 150, 154, 164 P3d 31, 35 (2007)). Although one could argue that this restatement of the
elements of the tort of malicious abuse of process suffices to recognize something akin to
the continuation rule for malicious abuse of process claims, the validity of that argument
has not, to my Inowledge, been tested.

15. 1 do not wish to be understood as making any claim that the discussion of the
decisions made by other jurisdictions with respect to the validity of the continuation
rule set out in the text of this separate opinion is complete. I merely offer it in support
of my general belief that the validity of the continuation rule is well recognized across the
United States.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 443

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

determine, only Delaware appears to have explicitly rejected the “con-
tinuation” theory. See Blue Hen Mech., Inc. v. Christian Bros. Risk
Pooling Tr., 117 A.3d 549, 557 (Del. 2015) (rejecting a request for recog-
nition of a claim for malicious prosecution “based on the wrongful con-
tinuation of proceedings after probable cause no longer exists” because
the Court could see “no reason to extend the tort of malicious prosecu-
tion beyond the limited scope given to it by long-standing Delaware case
law, and many reasons” for declining to do so (footnote omitted)). At an
absolute minimum, these decisions make it clear to me that the over-
whelming majority of American jurisdictions recognize the viability of
the continuation rule in malicious prosecution cases.

In spite of the well-established nature of the “continuation” theory
both nationally and in North Carolina, the Court refrains from comment-
ing upon its viability on the grounds that, since “[p]laintiff’s complaint
is not that the original probable cause dissipated” and focuses, instead,
upon a claim that “probable cause never existed,” “[w]e need not address
[the viability of] that theory in this jurisdiction. I am not, given my belief
that plaintiff has, in fact, attempted to assert a valid “continuation” claim;
the breadth of the authorities that recognize the validity of the “continu-
ation” theory; the fact that neither party has openly questioned the valid-
ity of that theory in their briefs or during oral argument; and the fact that
the logic underlying the “continuation” theory strikes me as fully consis-
tent with this Court’s malicious prosecution jurisprudence, comfortable
with such a result, which seems to cast the validity of the “continuation”
theory in North Carolina into unnecessary doubt. As a result, in light of
my understanding of the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint,
I believe that our analysis of the “lack of probable cause” allegations
contained in plaintiff's complaint must necessarily focus upon both the
allegations concerning the time at which plaintiff was originally charged
with the murder of his estranged wife by the Davie County grand jury
and the time at which the decision was made to continue proceeding
against plaintiff on the charge of murdering his wife following the addi-
tional blood smear “tests” conducted by defendants.

According to well-established North Carolina law,

[a] pleading complies with [N.C. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a)())]
if it gives sufficient notice of the events or transactions
which produced the claim to enable the adverse party to
understand the nature of it and the basis for it, to file a
responsive pleading, and—by using the rules provided for
obtaining pretrial discovery—to get any additional infor-
mation he may need to prepare for trial.

444 IN THE SUPREME COURT

‘TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016))

Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 104, 176 S.E.2d 161, 167 (1970). Although
notice pleading pursuant to Rule 8(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure does not require “detailed fact-pleading,” id. at 104,
176 S.E.2d at 167, it does “manifest the legislative intent to require a
more specific statement, or notice in more detail, than Federal Rule
8(a)(2) requires,” id. at 100, 176 S.E.2d at 164, so that “no amount of
liberalization should seduce the pleader into failing to state enough to
give the substantive elements of his claim or of his defense,” id. at 105,
176 S.E.2d at 167 (quoting William C. Myers & James E. Humphreys, Jr.,
Pleadings and Motions, 5 Wake Forest Intramural L. Rev. 70, 73 (1969)).
As a result, our precedent suggests that at least some allegations sup-
plying a factual basis for a malicious prosecution claim are necessary
to preclude dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief can be
granted. See Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 204, 254 S.E.2d 611,
626 (1979) (stating that “a complaint must nonetheless state enough to
give the substantive elements of at least some legally recognized claim”
to preclude dismissal for failure to state a claim for which relief can be
granted), disapproved on other grounds by Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C.
437, 447-48, 276 S.E.2d 825, 331-32 (1981). In view of the fact that “the
well-pleaded material allegations of the complaint are taken as admit-
ted” while the “conclusions of law or unwarranted deductions of fact[ ]
are not admitted,” Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 427, 251 S.E.2d 843, 851
(1979) (quoting Sutton, 277 N.C. at 98, 176 S.E.2d at 163), “it is our task
to determine whether” plaintiff's factual “allegations as a matter of law
demonstrate the adequacy, or lack thereof, of” plaintiff's claim” id. at
4277, 251 S.E.2d at 851. Thus,

[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when one of the

following three conditions is satisfied: (1) the complaint

on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff's

claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence

of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the com-

plaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the

plaintiff's claim.
Wood v. Guilford County, 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002)
(citing Oates v. JAG, Inc., 314 N.C. 276, 278, 333 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1985).
When considered in light of the applicable legal standard, I believe plain-
tiff’s complaint fails to allege a valid claim for malicious prosecution
against defendants arising from either the initiation of criminal charges
against plaintiff or the decision to continue prosecuting him following
the performance of the unscientific blood smear “tests.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT 445

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

“It is certainly the general rule, applicable to [malicious prosecution
cases], that when a comunitting magistrate has bound the party over or
a grand jury has found a true bill against him, such action prima facie
makes out a case of probable cause, and the jury should be directed to
consider the evidence as affected by this principle.” Stanford v. Grocery
Co., 143 N.C. 419, 426, 55 S.E. 815, 817 (1906) (citations omitted). In
view of plaintiff's acknowledgement that the Davie County grand jury
returned a bill of indictment charging him with murder, he has, in effect,
pleaded a fact that serves to defeat his malicious prosecution claim in
the absence of an allegation providing some basis for overcoming the
prima facie case of probable cause that he has set out in his complaint.
Although plaintiff asserts that he acted in self-defense at the time that
he killed his wife and that defendants “fail[ed] to properly investigate
the circumstances of [Mrs.] Turner’s death” and plaintiff's “claim of self-
defense,” these conclusory allegations provide no support for the legal
conclusion stated in his complaint to the effect that “there was a lack of
probable cause to sustain an indictment on first-degree murder and but
for the malicious, intentional acts of [defendants, plaintiff] would not
have been indicted and tried for first-degree murder.” See Carson, 231
N.C. at 633, 58 S.E.2d at 612 (stating that, “when the facts are admitted or
established, the question of probable cause is one of law for the court”
(citing Rawls v. Bennett, 221 N.C. 127, 180, 19 S.E.2d 126, 128 (1942);
Morgan v. Stewart, 144 N.C. 424, 425, 57 S.E. 149, 149 (1907)). For exam-
ple, plaintiff failed to allege that defendants unreasonably declined to
believe his protestations of innocence, that he did nothing to provoke
the attack that he claimed that his wife had made upon him, or that
defendants had no basis whatsoever for failing to accept plaintiff's asser-
tion that he acted in perfect self-defense. As a result, given that plaintiff
has failed to allege any factual support for his assertion that, despite
the grand jury’s decision to charge him with murdering his wife, there
‘was no probable cause to believe that he was guilty of murder, plain-
tiffs complaint fails to give defendants sufficient notice of the events
or transactions which produced the claim so as to enable defendants to
understand the nature of plaintiff's claim and the basis for it, and conse-
quently, plaintiff's complaint must be deemed fatally defective.

Similarly, I do not believe that plaintiff has stated a malicious pros-
ecution claim against defendants arising from the unlawful continuation
of the underlying murder prosecution without probable cause stemming
from the actions taken in the aftermath of the 15 January 2008 meet-
ing. In essence, plaintiff alleges that, following this meeting, defendants
“wantonly and maliciously conducted unscientific tests to ‘shore up’ the
new theory that [plaintiff's] wounds were self-inflicted and therefore,

446 IN THE SUPREME COURT

‘TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

not a result of self-defense.” Although the allegations set forth in plain-
tiff’s complaint clearly describe a highly unethical attempt to manufac-
ture evidence in support of the State’s attempt to convict plaintiff of
first-degree murder, the complaint provides no indication whatsoever
that the machinations in which defendants allegedly engaged had any
effect beyond bolstering the State’s existing case against plaintiff. Put
another way, the existence of additional, albeit manufactured, evidence,
while certainly enhancing the likelihood that plaintiff would be wrongly
convicted of murdering his wife, could not have done anything to detract
from the existing evidence that had resulted in the Davie County grand
jury’s decision to charge plaintiff with murder.!6 Thus, I do not believe
that plaintiff has stated a claim for relief sounding in malicious prosecu-
tion arising from the additional “unscientific” blood smear testing that
defendants performed in early 2008.

In summary, while I am unable to agree with the manner in which
the Court has analyzed the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint to allege a
malicious prosecution claim against defendants, I do agree that plaintiff
failed to state a malicious prosecution claim against them in his com-
plaint. Despite the presence of an allegation that makes out a prima facie
showing that probable cause was not lacking, plaintiff has completely
failed to provide any factual support for his conclusory allegation that
plaintiff's prosecution was initiated and continued in the absence of the
requisite probable cause. As a result, I concur in the Court's opinion
with respect to the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint to state a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and concur in the result
that the Court has reached with respect to the sufficiency of plaintiff's
complaint to state a malicious prosecution claim against defendants.

16. Although plaintiff has argued that he had alleged that defendants had “a collat-
eral purpose in initiating or continuing the proceedings” against him and that this fact pro-
vides “prima facie evidence of a lack of probable cause,” citing Taylor v. Hodge, 229 N.C.
558, 50 S.E.2d 807 (1948) and Wilson v. Pearce, 105 N.C. App. 107, 412 S.E.2d 148, disc.
rev. denied, 831 N.C. 291, 417 S.E.2d 72 (1992), that logic does not suffice to resuscitate
plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim in this case given that defendants’ desire “to secure
a conviction [in] a high publicity murder case regardless of guilt to further [defendants’]
careers” and “to assist the District Attorney in winning a very public case for political
purposes” does not seem to me to rise to the level of personal malice and effort to obtain
personal gain present in the cases upon which plaintiff relies.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 447

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

Justice HUDSON concurring in part, and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority’s disposition of the claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, which affirms the Court of Appeals’ rever-
sal of the dismissal of these claims as to defendants Thomas and Deaver.
I disagree with the majority's analytical framework for malicious pros-
ecution claims; therefore, I agree with Justice Ervin’s analysis in his con-
curring opinion, which recognizes that North Carolina has long allowed
malicious prosecution claims under a “continuation theory.” Even under
the majority's theory of malicious prosecution, in my view, plaintiff has
sufficiently stated claims for malicious prosecution to survive dismissal
under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) and proceed with his claim against
Thomas. I also conclude that under the law previous to this opinion, as
well as under the framework explained by Justice Ervin, the complaint
sufficiently states a claim for malicious prosecution against Deaver as
well. Therefore, as to the malicious prosecution claims against Thomas
and Deaver, I respectfully dissent.

As the majority states, a claim for malicious prosecution requires a
showing that “the defendant (1) initiated or participated in the earlier
proceeding, (2) did so maliciously, (3) without probable cause, and (4)
the earlier proceeding ended in favor of the plaintiff.” (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, I agree with the majority's discussion of the applicable
principles regarding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The rel-
evant inquiry is “whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the com-
plaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.” Newberne v. Dep’t of Crime Control & Pub. Safety,
359 N.C. 782, 784, 618 S.E.2d 201, 203 (2005) (quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347
N.C. 97, 111, 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997)).

As noted in the concurring opinion, North Carolina adopted notice
pleading many years ago. Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(1) does not require
“detailed fact-pleading,” but rather requires only that a pleading give “suf-
ficient notice of the events or transactions which produced the claim to
enable the adverse party to understand the nature of it and the basis for
it.” Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 104, 176 S.E.2d 161, 167 (1970); see Pyco
Supply Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 321 N.C. 435, 442, 364 S.E.2d 380,
384 (1988) (“Through [Rule 8(a)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure], the General Assembly of North Carolina adopted the con-
cept of notice pleading.”) Although there is some precedent for requiring
that allegations supply a factual basis for extreme conduct in a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Chidnese v. Chidnese,
210 N.C. App. 299, 317, 708 S.E.2d 725, 738 (2011) (“Plaintiff's complaint

448 IN THE SUPREME COURT

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

and brief simply state that defendants’ previously discussed behavior .
was extreme and outrageous, without providing any support or case for
this assertion. However, ‘this Court has set a high threshold for a finding
that conduct meets the standard’ of extreme and outrageous condu
(quoting Dobson v. Harris, 134 N.C. App. 578, 578, 521 S.E.2d 710, 715
(1999), rev'd on other grounds, 352 N.C. 77, 580 S.E.2d 829 (2000), a
claim of malicious prosecution must satisfy only the basic requirements
of notice pleading. To the extent that the majority goes beyond treating
the allegations as true and analyzing evidence of probable cause, I con-
clude it has gone too far.

The majority also states that “plaintiffs suit focuses on actions
defendants took after” the grand jury indicted him. I do not accept
this characterization because a number of specific allegations against
Thomas address what he knew and did before plaintiff was indicted. As
to Deaver, specific allegations address his “participation” in the continu-
ing prosecution after plaintiff's indictment.!

Turning to the complaint, the allegations that in my view adequately
state a claim for malicious prosecution include the following:

14. Acting in self-defense, Dr. Kirk Turner grabbed a pock-
etknife from his right front pocket and made two cuts
in rapid succession to Jennifer Turner’s neck area
which resulted in her death.

26. Prior to examining any evidence for bloodstains or
bloodstain patterns, SA Thomas was informed by
Special Agent D. J. Smith that Jennifer Turner had
apparently stabbed Dr. Kirk Turner with the spear
and in response Dr. Kirk Turner reached into his right
front pocket of his pants and retrieved a knife which
Dr. Kirk Turner used to cut Jennifer Tuer causing
her death.

1. Although the majority correctly states that a claim for malicious prosecution may
be based on participation in a proceeding, it then (improperly, as noted in the concurring
opinion) limits that participation to pre-indictment activities. Defendant Deaver's alleged
involvement in these events, which began after the indictment, nonetheless can constitute
malicious prosecution by participation, both under existing law and as discussed in the
concurring opinion.

43:

67.

68.

69.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

Upon information and belief, SA Thomas and SA
Deaver conducted these additional tests in an effort to
prove the new theory that Dr. Kirk Turner had planned
the murder of Jennifer Turner, to maintain the appear-
ance of probable cause where none existed and to
obtain a first-degree murder conviction of Dr. Kirk
Turner despite evidence to the contrary.

SA Thomas and SA Deaver, acting in their individual
capacities, participated in and caused the institution
of criminal proceedings against Dr. Kirk Turner for the
murder of his wife Jennifer Turner by, inter alia:

a. Failing to properly investigate the circumstances
of Jennifer Turner's death;

b. Failing to properly investigate Dr. Kirk Turner's
claim of self-defense;

c. Hiding and/or attempting to hide pertinent infor
mation about evidence collected at the scene;

d. Failing to adhere to the administrative practices
of SBI report writing;

e. Including false and misleading information in
investigative reports; and

f. Otherwise failing to remain fair, neutral and truth-
ful prior to and after the institution of criminal
proceedings against Dr. Kirk Turner.

Inan effort to secure a first-degree murder indictment
and conviction, SA Thomas and SA Deaver intention-
ally, maliciously, and without just cause, failed to take
the appropriate measures described above.

At all times relevant to the investigation and prosecu-
tion of Dr. Kirk Turner, there was a lack of probable
cause to sustain an indictment on first-degree mur
der and but for the malicious, intentional acts of SA
Thomas and SA Deaver, Dr. Kirk Turner would not
have been indicted and tried for first-degree murder.

449

450 IN THE SUPREME COURT

TURNER v. THOMAS
[369 N.C. 419 (2016)]

In my view, these allegations are sufficient to state claims for mali-
cious prosecution against Thomas and Deaver under existing North
Carolina law. The allegations set forth in the last two paragraphs, when
taken together with the complaint as a whole and particularly those in
paragraph 67(a)-(e), allege a lack of probable cause and knowledge of
the same on the part of defendants, and also provide “sufficient notice
of the events or transactions which produced the claim.” Sutton, 277
N.C. at 104, 176 S.E.2d at 167.

The majority asserts that it “must consider the evidence that
was available to the investigators and presented to the grand jury in
December 2007” and concludes, “/b/ased on the facts known to the
investigators at the time of the grand jury proceedings, we are satisfied
that a reasonable and prudent person would believe there was probable
cause.” (Emphases added.) The majority further states that the grand
jury properly found probable cause and that “nothing in the subsequent -
investigation revealed facts that disproved that.” Again, the focus of
our review should be on the allegations in the complaint, taken as true.
In considering whether the complaint has adequately stated claims for
malicious prosecution, I do not think we need to consider the evidence
or subsequent investigation at all. Instead, we must look at the allega-
tions of the complaint and, taking them as true, determine if they have
stated the elements of-the claims. I express no opinion concerning the
sufficiency of the evidence or the potential merits of plaintiff's claims at
trial. Rather, looking solely at the allegations in the complaint, and tak-
ing them as true, I conclude that plaintiff has sufficiently stated claims
for malicious prosecution against Thomas and Deaver. Accordingly, I
would affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding reversing dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) of these claims, as well as the claims for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. I would allow plaintiff's claims for malicious
prosecution to proceed as to Thomas and Deaver.

As such, I respectfully dissent as to these two claims but concur in
the majority's decision regarding plaintiff's claims for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.

Justice BEASLEY joins in this opinion.

IN THE SUPREME COURT . 451

KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 (2017)]

ROBERT E. KING anp wire, JO ANN O’NEAL
v.
MICHAEL S. BRYANT, M.D. anp VILLAGE SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.A.
No. 294PA14
Filed 27 January 2017

Arbitration and Mediation—doctor’s form—handed to patient

with other forms—fiduciary relationship

An arbitration agreement between a doctor (Dr. Bryant) and
patient (Mr. King) that was obtained as the result of a breach of fidu-
ciary duty from which defendants benefitted was not enforceable.
The agreement was one of several forms given to Mr. King to sign,
when he first arrived at Dr. Bryant’s office. Mr. King reposed trust and
confidence in Dr. Bryant and provided confidential information even
before seeing Dr. Bryant, so that a fiduciary relationship existed at
the time that Mr. King signed the arbitration agreement. Defendants
violated their fiduciary duty to Mr. King by failing to make full dis-
closure of the nature and import of the arbitration agreement at or
before the time that it was presented for Mr. King’s signature.

Justice MORGAN did not participate in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case.

Chief Justice MARTIN dissenting.
Justice NEWBY dissenting.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-81 of a unani-

mous decision of the Court of Appeals, 235 N.C. App. 218, 763 S.E.2d
338 (2014), affirming an order entered on 10 May 2018 by Judge Lucy N.
Inman in Superior Court, Cumberland County. After hearing oral argu-
ment on 18 May 2015 and receiving additional findings of fact following
the entry of a remand order on 19 February 2016, the Court ordered
the parties to submit supplemental briefs. Additional issues raised in the
supplemental briefs heard on 31 August 2016.

Beaver, Courie, Sternlicht, Hearp & Broadfoot, PA., by Mark A.
Sternlicht, for plaintiff-appellees.

452 IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 (2017)]

Walker, Allen, Grice, Ammons & Foy, L.L.P, by Robert D.
Walker, Jr., O. Drew Grice, Jr, and Alexandra L. Couch, for
defendant-appellants.

Zaytoun Law Firm, PLLC, by Matthew D. Ballew, and Patterson
Harkavy LLP, by Burton Craige, for North Carolina Advocates for
Justice, amicus curiae. .

ERVIN, Justice.

This case arises out of a medical malpractice action that plaintiffs,
Robert E. King and his wife, Jo Ann O’Neal, brought against defendants,
Michael S. Bryant, M.D., and Village Surgical Associates, P.A. According
to the allegations contained in plaintiffs’ complaint, Mr. King was sched-
uled to undergo a bilateral inguinal hernia repair to be performed by Dr.
Bryant at the Fayetteville Ambulatory Surgery Center on 14 May 2009.
At the time of his initial appointment with Dr. Bryant, Mr. King was pre-
sented with an Agreement to Alternative Dispute Resolution (arbitration
agreement) that defendants routinely presented to new patients along
with other documents prior to the first occasion on which a patient
met with a physician. The arbitration agreement provided that:

In accordance with the terms of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 USC 1-16, I agree that any dispute
arising out of or related to the provision of health-
care services by me, by Village Surgical Associates,
PA, or its employees, physician members, and agents
shall be subject to final and binding resolution
through private arbitration.

The parties to this Agreement shall agree upon three
Arbitrators and at least one arbitrator of the three shall
be a physician licensed to practice medicine and shall be
board certified in the same specialty as the physician
party. The remaining Arbitrators either shall be licensed.
to practice law in NC or licensed to practice medicine in
NC. The parties shall agree upon all rules that shall gov-
ern the arbitration, but may be guided by the Health Care
Claim Settlement Procedures of the American Arbitration
Association, a copy of which is available to me upon
request. I understand that this agreement includes all
health care [sic] services which previously have been
or will in the future be provided to me, and that this

IN THE SUPREME COURT 453

KING v. BRYANT
[369 N.C. 451 (2017)]

agreement is not restricted to those health care [sic] ser-
vices rendered in connection with any particular treat-
ment, office or hospital admission. I understand that this
agreement is also binding on any individual or entity and
not a precondition to receiving health care [sic] services.

Mr. King, a witness, and Dr. Bryant each signed the arbitration agree-
ment on 29 April 2009.

According to the unchallenged findings of fact, a front desk
employee at Village Surgical Associates provided Mr. King with several
intake forms to complete and sign while he waited to meet Dr. Bryant.
The initial intake forms asked Mr. King to provide personal and medical
history information and to sign the signature lines on all of the forms,
including the arbitration agreement. Mr. King stated in his affidavit that
he was then provided with a second set of documents, which addressed
insurance and payment-related issues, after he had met with Dr. Bryant.
Mr. King acknowledged that he did not read any of the documents that
he signed after his initial meeting with Dr. Bryant and stated that he had
believed them to be “just a formality.” Mr. King denied having received
a copy of the arbitration agreement on the day that it was signed and
asserted that the contents of the agreement were not clear to him even
after he had read it. Mr. King contended that, “[i]f the agreement had
been brought to my attention and I had been told signing it was optional,
I would not have signed it.”

In the course of the performance of the hernia repair procedure, Dr.
Bryant injured Mr. King’s distal abdominal aorta, resulting in abdominal
bleeding. Although Dr. Bryant was able to repair Mr. King’s injury, the
necessary remedial procedures led to occlusion of an artery, a thrombo-
embolism to Mr. King’s right lower leg, and acute ischemia in Mr. King’s
right foot. After undergoing the performance of an immediate revascu-
larization at Cape Fear Valley Health Systems for the purpose of salvag-
ing his right leg, Mr. King remained hospitalized until 26 May 2009. At
the time of his discharge, Mr. King continued to suffer from complica-
tions related to his abdominal aortic injury and needed additional treat-
ment. As a result of the injury that he sustained during the hernia repair
procedure, Mr. King incurred unexpected medical expenses, abdominal
scarring, lost wages, numbness, and a limited ability to use his right leg
and foot.

1, Plaintiffs have not complained about, much less challenged the validity of, any of
the other documents that Mr. King signed during his visit to the Village Surgical Center on
29 April 2009. The identity and contents of these documents are not clear from the record.

454 IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[369 N.C. 451 (2017)]

| On 28 September 2011, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defen-
| dants in the Superior Court, Cumberland County, seeking damages for
medical malpractice. On 7 November 2011, defendants filed a motion
seeking to have further litigation in this action stayed and the arbitration
agreement that had been entered into between Mr. King and cefendants
enforced and an answer in which defendants denied the material allega-
tions of plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs responded to defendants’ motion
to stay and enforce the arbitration agreement by arguing that:

[T]he purported agreement is not enforceable for reasons
that include but are not limited to the undue, prohibitive
financial burden that enforcement of the agreement would
have on plaintiffs by requiring the hiring of three arbitra-
tors, one who must be a board certified physician in the
same specialty as the defendant, Michael S. Bryant, M.D.,
and two who must be attorneys or physicians licensed in
North Carolina; the inherent unfairness of requiring one
arbitrator be a member of the same profession and medi-
cal specialty as the defendant, .. . especially in light of the
absence of any comparable requirement for an arbitrator
to be similarly affiliated with the plaintiffs ....

On 13 February 2012, defendants filed a motion seeking the entry of an
order compelling arbitration. On 23 March 2012, the trial court entered
an order denying defendants’ motion to enforce the arbitration agree-
ment on the basis of conclusions that:

4, The Agreement to Alternative Dispute Resolution
leaves material portions open to future agreements by
providing, inter alia, that the parties shall agree upon
three arbitrators and that the parties shall agree upon all
rules that shall govern the arbitration.

5. At most, the Agreement to Alternative Dispute
Resolution is an “agreement to agree” that is indefinite
and depends on one or more future agreements. Searwell
v. Continental Cas. Co., 84.N.C. App. 277, 281, 352 S.E.2d
263, 265 (1987).

6. The Agreement to Alternative Dispute Resolution
is not a binding contract and is not enforceable.

Defendants noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial
court's order.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 455

KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 (2017)]

On 5 February 2013, the Court of Appeals filed an opinion revers-
ing the March 2012 order and remanding this case for further proceed-
ings, King v. Bryant, 225 N.C. App. 340, 737 S.E.2d 802 (2013) (King D,
on the grounds “that the trial court erred in concluding the Agreement
between the parties was too indefinite to be enforced,” id. at 345, 737
S.E.2d at 807. According to the Court of Appeals, “there was clearly an.
offer to arbitrate any dispute which arose out of Defendants’ provision
of medical care, as well as an acceptance of that offer by Mr. King.” Jd.
at 346, 737 S.E.2d at 807. Although plaintiffs had argued before the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the arbitration agreement was unen-
forceable on unconscionability grounds, the Court of Appeals declined
to address that issue given that the trial judge in the March 2012 order
had not made the necessary factual findings. Id. at 347, 737 S.E.2d at 808.
According to the Court of Appeals, “the trial court is the appropriate body
to determine whether the agreement is unconscionable,” id. at 347-48,
737 S.E.2d at 808 (citation omitted), with the needed unconscionability
analysis to “be undertaken with an understanding of the unique nature
of the physician/patient relationship,” id. at 348, 737 S.E.2d at 808. In
addition, the Court of Appeals noted that, “[uJnder North Carolina law,
fiduciary relationships create a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff
put his trust and confidence in the defendant as a matter of law.” Id. at
349, 737 S.E.2d at 809. As a result, the Court of Appeals required that
these issues be addressed on remand. Id. at 350, 737 S.E.2d at 809.

On 10 May 2013, the trial court entered an order on remand deter-
mining that, given the nature of the fiduciary relationship that existed
between Mr. King and defendants, defendant Bryant “had a fiduciary
duty to disclose to his patient all facts material to their transaction.”
More specifically, the trial court's May 2018 order found as a fact that:

2. Mr. King, now 68, has no educational degree
beyond high school and his job requires little reading. He
has minimal experience reading legal documents.

3. Defendant Village Surgical Associates, P.A.
(‘Village Surgical”) has experience in managing patient
complaints, responding to claims of medical negli-
gence made by patients, and resolving disputes through
arbitration.

4, On April 29, 2009, Plaintiffs visited Defendant's
office for the first time to consult with Defendant Bryant
about performing laparoscopic surgery on Plaintiff King

456

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KING v. BRYANT
[369 N.C. 451 (2017)]

to repair a hernia. Plaintiff King had been referred to
Defendants by his primary care physician.

5. While Plaintiffs were waiting to meet Defendant
Bryant and consult with him about performing surgery,
Defendant's receptionist provided Plaintiff King with sev-
eral intake forms to complete and sign. Plaintiff King con-
sidered the forms to be a formality.

6. Neither the receptionist, nor Defendant Bryant,
nor any agent of Defendants called to Plaintiff King’s
attention the fact that one of the forms he was asked to
sign, the Agreement, differed from all of the other forms
because it did not concern medical information, insur
ance information, or payment for the surgery, all routine
for a new patient. Nor did anyone disclose to Plaintiff
King that the Agreement sought to foreclose his access to
the judicial process in the event that any dispute arose out
of or related to the surgery to be performed by Defendant.
Bryant.

8. The Agreement does not provide that by sign-
ing it, the patient waives his or her right to a trial. The
Agreement does not include the word “jury” or “judge” or
“trial.” The Agreement does not provide that the patient
can consult an attorney before signing it.

9. There is no evidence that the physician or any
agent of Defendants discussed with the patient, Plaintiff
King, any provision of the Agreement.

11. At the time Plaintiff King signed the Agreement
and provided his medical information on intake forms,
even though he had not yet met Defendant Bryant, he was
already placing his confidence and trust in Defendants, as
demonstrated by his willingness to share his confidential
medical information.

14. The first, bold-faced paragraph of the Agreement
is poorly drafted, confusing, and nonsensical. For

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KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 (2017)]

example, it refers to the “provision of healthcare services
by me,” suggesting that “me” refers to the physician rather
than the patient.

15. The Agreement repeatedly refers to arbitration
without defining the term. The Agreement includes no
mention whatsoever of the judicial process, a trial, or a
jury. The Agreement does not disclose Defendants’ intent
for Plaintiff King to waive his rights to the judicial pro-
cess, including his right to a jury trial, in the event of any
claim arising from or related to the surgery. A person of
Plaintiff King’s education and experience should not rea-
sonably have been expected to know from the language
of the Agreement, or from any information provided to

_him by Defendants, that he had a right to a jury trial
to resolve any potential dispute with his surgeon. Nor
should he have been expected to understand from the
language of the Agreement or other information provided
to him by Defendants that by signing the Agreement, he
would waive his right to a jury trial.

16. The last sentence of the second paragraph in the
Agreement starts with complex but complete clauses...
and ends with an incomplete clause .... A person of
Plaintiff King’s education and experience should not rea-
sonably be expected to understand the last, tacked on,
incomplete clause to mean that he did not need to sign the
Agreement in order for Defendant Bryant to perform
the surgery.

17. Plaintiff King read the Agreement after a copy
was provided to him by his attorney, and he still did not
understand its contents or the intended consequence of
signing it.

18. Unlike arbitration agreements which have been
upheld and enforced in medical negligence cases, the
Agreement includes no provision allowing or recom-
mending that the patient consult with an attorney regard-
ing the Agreement prior to signing it.

19. Defendants sought Plaintiffs signature on the
Agreement to benefit themselves.

457

IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 2017)]

20. The Agreement’s provision requiring at least one
physician arbitrator, and its provision allowing all three
arbitration panelists to be a physician, confers a benefit
to Defendants and detriment to Plaintiffs.

23. Ms. Ramos, a receptionist at Defendant Village
Surgical, states in a sworn affidavit that the form arbitra-
tion agreement is included in “registration paperwork”
presented to each new patient when he or she visits
the practice for an initial appointment, prior to meeting
with a physician. . . . It is reasonable to infer from Ms.
Ramos’ sworn statement that, in fact, it is the practice of
Defendants to obscure the form arbitration agreement by
presenting it among a pile of other documents without
pointing it out or explaining its contents.

Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a matter
of law in the May 2013 order that:

8. Defendants were fiduciaries of Plaintiff King as
the result of the physician-patient relationship.

4, Defendant Bryant and other agents of Defendants
breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff King by failing
to disclose to him all material terms of the Agreement
and failing to deal with him openly, fairly, honestly, and
without imposition, oppression, or fraud in procuring his
signature on the Agreement.

6.. The Agreement is the product of constructive
fraud and is therefore unenforceable.

7. The Agreement is unconscionable and is therefore
unenforceable.

Defendants noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial court’s
May 2013 remand order declining to enforce the arbitration agreement.

On 15 July 2014, the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished opin-
ion affirming the May 2013 remand order on unconscionability grounds.
King v. Bryant, 235 N.C. App. 218, 763 S.B.2d 338, 2014 WL 3510481
(2014) (unpublished) (King ID). Although defendants had argued on
appeal that the arbitration agreement was “not a product of constructive

IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[369 N.C. 451 (2017)]

fraud and not unconscionable” and that the trial court had “erred by
denying their motion to compel arbitration,” King II, 2014 WL 3510481
at *2, the Court of Appeals noted that “[d]efendants do not argue that
the trial court’s findings of fact are not based on competent evidence,”
id. at *6, making the trial court’s findings “binding on appeal,” id. at *6
n.1. In addition, the Court of Appeals declined to address defendants’
contention that “a fiduciary relationship did not exist at the time that Mr.
King signed the arbitration agreement because [Dr. Bryant] had not yet
accepted King as a patient,” id. at *6, given that the Court had already
decided in King I “that a fiduciary relationship existed between the par-
ties and directed the trial court to consider that fact on remand,” id.
(citing N.C. Natl Bank v. Va. Carolina Builders, 307 N.C. 563, 567, 299
§.E.2d 629, 631 (1983) (concluding that, “once a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question in a given case that decision becomes
the law of the case and governs other panels which may thereafter con-
sider the case”)).

Upon reaching the unconscionability issue, the Court of Appeals
noted this Court's holding in Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc.,
to the effect that, although

[arbitration is favored in North Carolina. .. . “equity may
require invalidation of an arbitration agreement that is
unconscionable.” A court will find a contract to be uncon-
scionable “only when the inequity of the bargain is so
manifest as to shock the judgment of a person of common.
sense, and where the terms are so oppressive that no rea-
sonable person would make them on the one hand, and no
honest and fair person would accept them on the other.”

362 N.C. 93, 101-02, 655 S.E.2d 362, 369-70 (2008) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l
Union, 289 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2002), and Brenner v. Little Red Sch.
House Ltd., 302 N.C. 207, 218, 274 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1981)). “A party
asserting that a contract is unconscionable must prove both procedural
and substantive unconscionability.” Id. at 102, 655 S.E.2d at 370 (cita-
tions omitted). However,

[slince Tillman, the United States Supreme Court has
issued two important opinions on the use of state law to
set aside an arbitration agreement when that agreement
is governed by the FAA: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
__US. __, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) (determining that the
FAA preempted California’s judicial rule prohibiting class

460 IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[369 N.C. 451 (2017)]

waivers in consumer arbitration agreements contained
within contracts of adhesion) and American Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Rest.,__ U.S. ___, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 (2018)
(holding that the FAA does not permit courts to invalidate
an arbitration agreement on the grounds that it does not
permit class arbitration).

King II, 2014 WL 3510481, at *8. The Court of Appeals had addressed
the impact of Concepcion and Italian Colors on Tillman in. Torrence
v. Nationwide Budget Finance, 232 N.C. App. 306, 753 S.E.2d 802, disc.
rev. denied and cert. denied, 367 N.C. 505, 759 S.E.2d 88 (2014), and
stated that, “[w]hile both Concepcion and Italian Colors dealt with class
action waivers, underlying those decisions was a broader theme that
unconscionability attacks that are directed at the arbitration process
itself will no longer be tolerated.” Torrence, 232 N.C. App. at 321, 753
§.E.2d at 811 (citation omitted). As a result, in Torrence, the Court of
Appeals held that “(1) the ‘prohibitively high’ cost factor is no longer
applicable to an unconscionability analysis; (2) an agreement's lack
of mutuality, alone, is not sufficient to justify a finding of substantive
unconscionability; and (3) the prohibition of joinder of claims and class
actions does not render an arbitration agreement unconscionable.”
King II, 2014 WL 3510481 *8 (citing Torrence, 232 N.C. App. at 322, 753
S.E.2d at 811-12).

In spite of the limitations on the use of state law to preclude enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements noted in Torrence, the Court of Appeals
concluded that “the trial court correctly determined that the arbitration
agreement here is unconscionable,” id., given defendant's failure to take
“any active steps, in accordance with their fiduciary duty, to make a full,
open disclosure of material facts to King before he signed the arbitration
agreement,” id. at *9 (internal quotations marks omitted). The Court
of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement is procedurally
unconscionable because,

[gliven (1) the fact that we analyze the agreement here in
the context of the fiduciary duty Defendants owed King,
(2) the disparate levels of sophistication between the par-
ties, (8) the nature of the delivery of the agreement, and
(4) Defendants’ burden because of their fiduciary duty to
King to provide full and open disclosure of the material
facts surrounding the transaction between the parties,
we hold that the arbitration agreement suffered from sig-
nificant procedural unconscionability. King did not have a

ee

IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[369 N.C. 451 (2017)

meaningful choice between whether to sign the agreement.
or not. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument is overruled.

Id. at *10. Similarly, the Court of Appeals found the arbitration agree-
ment to be substantively unconscionable because it is “a harsh, one-
sided and oppressive instrument.” Jd. As a result, after concluding that
“this agreement is unconscionable because of Defendants’ failure to
properly prepare and present the arbitration agreement to King in the
context of their confidential, physician-patient, fiduciary relationship,”
id. at *11, the Court of Appeals affirmed the remand order, id.

On 18 August 2014, defendants filed a petition for discretionary
review requesting this Court to grant further review of the Court of
Appeals’ decision in King II. On 18 December 2014, this Court granted
defendants’ discretionary review petition. After briefing and oral argu-
ment, this Court entered an order on 21 August 2015 remanding this case
to the Superior Court, Cumberland County, for the making of further
findings of fact relating to the issue of whether a physician-patient rela-
tionship existed at the time that Mr. King signed the arbitration agree-
ment on the grounds that both the trial court's May 2018 remand order
and the Court of Appeals decision in King I had “assumed the exis-
tence of such a relationship” and that the record was devoid of sufficient
findings to permit the proper resolution of this case in the absence of
such findings.

On 6 November 2015, Judge Mary Ann Tally entered an order on
remand making the factual findings requested in this Court's remand
order. In the November 2015 order, the trial court found as fact that:

5. When Mr. King completed the forms by provid-
ing his confidential medical history, symptoms, personal
identifying information, and health insurance [ ] informa-
tion, and signing the arbitration agreement, he trusted
Dr. Bryant as his doctor, Dr. Bryant’s practice, and its
employees, particularly because of the referral from his
family doctor. Mr. King would not have provided private
and confidential information and signed the documents,
including the arbitration agreement, if he had not consid-
ered Dr. Bryant to be his doctor and trusted him.

6. Patient trust is fundamental to the physician-
patient relationship. The requirements of that relation-
ship include adequate communication between the
physician and patient; there be no conflict of interest

IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
{869 N.C. 451 (2017)}

between the patient and the physician; personal details
of the patient[’]s life shared with the physician be held in
confidence; there be respect for the patient's autonomy;
patient primacy; and selflessness. These requirements are
described in the North Carolina Medical Board Position
Statement, The physician-patient relationship. Each of
these requirements applied to the relationship between
defendants and Mr. King.

7. Each of those requirements arose because a physi-
cian-patient relationship existed between defendants and
Mr. King. . . . [A] physician-patient relationship can exist
before a physician meets a patient, particularly when
the physician delegates to others certain duties that are
involved in the relationship, even though this may “not
fit traditional notions of the doctor-patient relationship.”
Mozingo v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., Inc., 331 N.C. 182, 188,
415 S.E.2d 341, 344-45 (1992). These cases support the
fact that a physician-patient relationship can exist when
a physician has fewer than all of the duties that attach
to the relationship after the duty to treat arises or when
a physician, in today’s modern health care environment,
relies on others to participate in activities necessary for
patient care.

8. By analogy, the [a]ttorney-client privilege protects
“not only the giving of professional advice to those who
can act on it but also the giving of information to the law-
yer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.”
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390, 394 (1981).

9. The physician-patient relationship began before
Mr. King signed the arbitration agreement and was in exis-
tence at the time he signed the arbitration agreement.

After receiving these additional findings of fact concerning the physi-
cian-patient relationship issue, this Court ordered supplemental briefing
and argument. In their supplemental brief, defendants urge us to “disre-
gard the findings of fact entered by the trial court, find that no physician-
patient relationship existed at the time Mr. King signed the arbitration
agreement, and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the trial court’s order on the grounds that the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable.” Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the findings
contained in the November 2015 order establish that a physician-patient

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KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 (2017)]

relationship existed when Mr. King signed the arbitration agreement, so
that “this Court should affirm the holdings that the Agreement is unen-
forceable due to constructive fraud and unconscionability.”

Although they have vigorously challenged the legal effect of the
factual findings contained in the May 2013 and November 2015 orders,
defendants have not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port any of those findings. According to well-established North Carolina
Jaw, “[w]here no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court,
the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is
binding on appeal.” Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d
729, 731 (1991) (citing, inter alia, Schloss v. Jamison, 258 N.C. 271,
275, 128 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1962)). However, defendants do argue that the
findings of fact fail to support the conclusions of law to the effect that
“[d]efendants were fiduciaries of Plaintiff King as the result of the phy-
sician-patient relationship” and that “[t]he Agreement is unconscionable
and is therefore unenforceable.” Unlike findings of fact, “[c]onclusions
of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de
novo on appeal.” Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358
N.C. 512, 517, 597 S.E.2d 717, 721 (2004) (citations omitted). As a result,
we will review defendants’ challenges to these conclusions of law using
ade novo standard of review.

After carefully considering the record and the briefs and arguments
submitted by the parties, we believe that the proper resolution of this
case hinges upon the nature of the relationship that existed between
Mr. King and Dr. Bryant at the time that the arbitration agreement was
signed. Although the parties, especially in their supplemental briefs,
have placed particular emphasis upon the issue of whether a physi-
cian-patient relationship could have existed between Mr. King and Dr.
Bryant before Dr. Bryant met with and accepted Mr. King as a patient,
‘we are not, after extensive reflection, convinced that this case is prop-
erly viewed through a physician-patient relationship lens. Instead, we
believe that this case is most properly understood as revolving around
the issue of whether a fiduciary relationship existed between Mr. King
and Dr. Bryant independent of the existence of a physician-patient rela-
tionship at the time that Mr. King signed the arbitration agreement.2

2. Defendants have never contended at any point in this litigation that the
breach of fiduciary duty issue, which was clearly discussed in the trial court and
raised before the Court of Appeals during the proceedings that led to King II, is
not properly before the Court.

464 IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[369 N.C, 451 (2017)]

“For a breach of fiduciary duty to exist, there must first be a fidu-
ciary relationship between the parties.” Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647,
651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001) (citing Curl v. Key, 311 N.C. 259, 264, 316
S8.E.2d 272, 275 (1984), and Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 192, 179 S.B.2d
697, 704 (1971)). “The courts generally have declined to define the term
‘fiduciary relation’ and thereby exclude from this broad term any rela-
tion that may exist between two or more persons with respect to the
rights of persons or property of either.” Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N.C. 577,
598, 160 S.E. 896, 906 (1931). “In general terms, a fiduciary relation is
said to exist [w]herever confidence on one side results in superiority
and influence on the other side; where a special confidence is reposed in
one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and
with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence.” Vail
v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 114, 63 S.E.2d 202, 206 (1951) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

Anumber of relationships have been held to be inherently fiduciary,
including the relationships between spouses, attorney and client, trustee
and beneficiary, members of a partnership, Dallaire v. Bank of America,
N.A., 367 N.C. 363, 367, 760 S.E.2d 263 266, and physician and patient,
Watts v. Cumberland County Hospital System Inc., 317 N.C. 110, 116,
843 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1986). However,

[t]he relation may exist under a variety of circumstances;
it exists in all cases where there has been a special confi-
dence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience
is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the
interests of the one reposing confidence... . . Courts of
equity have carefully refrained from defining the particular
instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner that other
and perhaps new cases might be excluded. It is settled by
an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle
extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation
exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on
one side and the resulting superiority and influence on the
other. The relation and the duties involved in it need not be
legal; it may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.

Abbitt, 201 N.C. at 598, 160 S.E. at 906-07 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Dallaire, 367 N.C. at 367, 760 S.E.2d at 266 (conclud-
ing that fiduciary relationships are characterized by “a heightened level
of trust and the duty of the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the
other party”).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 (2017)]

If a fiduciary relationship is found to exist, the fiduciary is “held to a
standard ‘stricter than the morals of the market place’ . . . ‘{nlot honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is [then] the stan-
dard of behavior.’” Dallaire, 367 N.C. at 367, 760 S.E.2d at 266 (second
alteration in original) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464,
164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)). Liability for breach of fiduciary duty “is based
on [the taking advantage of] a confidential relationship rather than a
specific misrepresentation.” Barger v. McCoy Hillard Parks, 346 N.C.
650, 666, 488 S.E.2d 215, 224 (1997) (quoting Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77,
85, 273 S.E.2d 674, 678-79 (1981)); Priddy v. Kernersville Lumber Co.,
258 N.C., 653, 658, 129 S.E.2d 256, 261 (1963) (stating that liability for
breach of fiduciary duty “may exist without any fraudulent intent”). As
a result, “[w]here a relation of trust and confidence exists between the
parties, there is a duty to disclose all material facts and failure to do so
constitutes” a breach of fiduciary duty. Vail, 233 N.C. at 114, 63 S.E.2d
at 206 (internal quotation marks omitted).3 However, before liability for
breach of fiduciary duty can exist, it must be shown that the defendant
sought to benefit himself at the expense of the other party. Barger, 346
N.C. at 666-67, 488 S.E.2d at 224,

The record evidence, as reflected in the factual findings contained
in the May 2013 and November 2015 orders, demonstrates that Mr. King
was referred to Dr. Bryant by his family practitioner for the purpose
of having a hernia repair procedure performed. Individuals consult
with surgeons, like they do with other physicians, because such per-
sons possess “special knowledge and skill in diagnosing and treating
diseases and injuries, which the patient lacks;” accordingly, “the patient
has sought and obtained the services of the physician because of such
special knowledge and skill.” Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 646, 325
S.E.2d 469, 482 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon arrival
at defendants’ office, Mr. King was presented with a collection of docu-
ments, including the arbitration agreement, and asked to complete
them. The majority of the documents that Mr. King was requested to

3. The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary relationship are the same as those
for constructive fraud. See Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 192, 179 S.E.2d 697, 704 (1971)
(stating that, “[w]here a transferee of property stands in a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tionship to the transferor, it is the duty of the transferee to exercise the utmost good faith
in the transaction and to disclose to the transferor all material facts relating thereto and
his failure to do so constitutes fraud” (citing Vail, 283 N.C, 109, 63 S.B.2d 202)); Rhodes
1», Jones, 232 N.C. 547, 548, 61 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1950) (stating that “[clonstructive fraud
often exists where the parties to a transaction have a special confidential or fiduciary
relation which affords the power and means to one to take undue advantage of, or exer-
cise undue influence over the other.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McNeill
, MeNeill, 223 N.C. 178, 25 S.E.2d 615 (1943).

466 IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[369 N.C. 451 (2017)]

complete and sign involved the provision of medical information, which
is inherently sensitive and confidential in nature, for Dr. Bryant’s use in
determining whether to accept Mr. King as a patient and in determining
how he should be treated. No one directed Mr. King’s attention to the
arbitration agreement, which was only one of a number of documents
presented to him on that occasion, or made any attempt to explain the
ramifications that would result from any decision on his part to sign
it. After Mr. King completed and signed these documents and met with
Dr. Bryant, Dr. Bryant agreed to assume responsibility for providing Mr.
King with medical care and treatment.

A careful examination of the information contained in the findings
of fact made in the May 2013 and November 2015 orders persuades
us that, regardless of whether a physician-patient relationship existed
between Mr. King and Dr. Bryant at the time that the arbitration agree-
ment was signed, there was a confidential relationship between them at
that point. It is difficult for us to see how one could reach any conclusion.
other than that Mr. King reposed trust and confidence in Dr. Bryant, to
whom he had been referred by his family physician for the purpose of
receiving surgical treatment. As we have already noted, the fact that Mr.
King decided to consult Dr. Bryant constituted recognition on Mr. King’s
part that Dr. Bryant possessed “special knowledge and skill in diagnos-
ing and-treating diseases and injuries, which the patient lacks.” Black,
812 N.C. at 646, 325 S.E.2d at 482. Before he even saw Dr. Bryant, Mr.
King demonstrated sufficient trust and confidence in him to provide Dr.
Bryant with confidential medical information. Finally, unlike Dr. Bryant,
Mr. King had received a limited education and had little to no experience
interpreting legal documents. As a result, we conclude that a fiduciary
relationship existed between Mr. King and Dr. Bryant at the time that Mr.
King signed the arbitration agreement.

Similarly, we conclude that defendants violated their fiduciary duty
to Mr. King by failing to make full disclosure of the nature and import
of the arbitration agreement to him at or before the time that it was pre-
sented for his signature. Instead of specifically bringing this agreement,
which substantially affected his legal rights in the event that an untow-
ard event occurred during the course of the treatment that he received
from defendants, to Mr. King’s attention and explaining it to him, defen-
dants presented Mr. King with the arbitration agreement, which, at a
minimum, could have been worded more clearly, in a collection of docu-
ments, thereby creating the understandable impression that the arbi-
tration agreement was simply another routine document that Mr. King
needed to sign in order to become a patient. Moreover, consistent with

IN THE SUPREME COURT AGT

KING v. BRYANT
[369 N.C. 451 (2017))

the unchallenged findings of fact, defendants benefitted from Mr. King’s
action in signing the arbitration agreement by ensuring that any subse-
quent dispute between the parties would be resolved using the forum,
procedures, and decision makers of their choice. As a result, the findings
of fact contained in the May 2013 and November 2015 orders establish
that defendants failed to act consistently with their fiduciary duty to Mr.
King by requesting that he sign a document with substantial legal rami-
fications and which they believed to be of benefit to themselves without
making full disclosure to Mr. King.

Aside from the fact that defendants have failed to clearly advance a
federal preemption argument in reliance upon Concepcion and related
decisions in the briefs that they filed before this Court, State v. Garcell,
363 N.C. 10, 41, 678 S.E.2d 618, 638 (stating that, “[d]espite citing due
process concerns to the trial court, defendant fails to adequately
develop a constitutional claim on appeal and has thus abandoned any
such argument”) (citing N.C. R. App. P. 28(a), (b)(6))), cert. denied,
558 U.S. 999, 130 S. Ct. 510, 175 L. Ed. 2d 362 (2009), and the fact that
defendants have made no attempt to show that the present arbitration
agreement is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act,4 we do not believe
that our decision in this case is in any way inconsistent with the federal
preemption principles enunciated in Concepcion and related cases. As
those decisions clearly recognize, arbitration agreements are subject
to invalidation based upon “ ‘generally applicable contract defenses,
such as fraud,[5] duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that

4, Any federal preemption claim advanced in this case pursuant to Concepcion and
related decisions must rest upon 9 U.S.C. § 2, which applies to “contract{s] evidencing a
transaction involving commerce.” The necessary nexus between the relevant transaction
and “interstate commerce” exists in the event that “the ‘transaction’ in fact ‘involv{e][s}’
interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce con-
nection.” Allied~Bruce Terminis Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281, 115 8, Ct. 834, 848, 130
L, Ed. 2d 753, 769 (1995) (first set of brackets in original). Given that the present record
contains no indication that the agreement between the parties constitutes a “transaction
involving commerce,” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), and given that the burden of demonstrating the
applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act rests upon defendants, Siltins v. Ness, 164 N.C.
App. 755, 760, 596 S.E.2d 874, 877-78 (2004) (observing that “defendants were required
to submit sufficient evidence in support of their motion to compel arbitration to establish
that plaintiff's contract evidenced a transaction involving interstate commerce” and revers-
ing and remanding for additional findings an order denying arbitration, while noting that
“defendants offered no evidence in support of their motion to compel arbitration apart
from the employment agreement” itself), a necessary precondition to federal preemption
under Concepcion and related cases simply does not appear to exist in this case.

5. According to well-established North Carolina law, a breach of fiduciary duty “con-
stitutes fraud.” Link, 278 N.C. at 192, 179 S.E.2d at 704,

468 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that
an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”° Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339,
131 S. Ct. at 1746, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 751 (quoting Doctor's Assocs., Inc.
v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902,
909 (1996)) (other citations omitted). A decision to refrain from enforc-
ing the agreement on breach of fiduciary duty grounds does not rest
upon the fact that it provides for the arbitration of medical negligence
claims, does not treat arbitration agreements differently than other con-
tracts, and does not make the enforcement of arbitration agreements
more difficult than the enforcement of any other contract. On the con-
trary, we would have reached the same result on these facts with respect
to any agreement that substantially affected Mr. King’s substantive legal
rights, such as an agreement absolving defendants from the necessity
for compliance with otherwise applicable confidentiality requirements,
providing for the transfer of items of real or personal property from Mr.
King to defendants, or waiving any tort or contract-based claims that
Mr. King might have had against either or both defendants. Thus, since
the breach of fiduciary duty defense to enforcement of the agreement
that we uphold in this case does not apply “only to arbitration” or
“derive [its] meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at
issue,” id. at 339, 131 S. Ct. at 1746, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 759, a refusal to
enforce an arbitration agreement on that basis does not “stand[ ] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress,” id. at 352, 131 S. Ct. at 1753, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 759
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 581, 587 (1941)). Instead, consistently with Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04, 87 S. Ct.
1801, 1806, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1270, 1277 (1967), our decision simply recog-
nizes that a “claim [of] fraud in the inducement of the arbitration [agree-
ment] itself—an issue which goes to the ‘making’ of the agreement to
. arbitrate—[is one that a] court may proceed to adjudicate.”” As a result,

6. As the language quoted in the text of this opinion clearly recognizes, a party is
entitled to challenge the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on recognized state
law grounds in addition to unconscionability.

7. Given that judicial consideration of fraud-based challenges to the enforceability
of arbitration agreements is limited, by virtue of Prima Paint, to instances in which the
arbitration agreement, rather than the entire contract between the parties, was induced by
fraud, the fact that the “benefit” that defendants derived from the existence of the arbitration
agreement in this case was the right to litigate any dispute between the parties in an arbitral
rather than a judicial forum has no bearing on a proper analysis of any federal preemption
issue that might be before us in this case. Any other result, given the limitations that Prima
Paint places upon judicial challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements predi-
cated on fraud or some similar defense, would effectively eliminate the of a party to
assert such a defense despite Concepcion’s recognition of its continued viability.

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our decision to refrain from enforcing the arbitration agreement at issue
in this case is not precluded by the doctrine of federal preemption.

Thus, for all of these reasons, we hold that the arbitration agree-
ment at issue in this case was obtained as a result of defendants’ breach
of a fiduciary duty that they owed to Mr. King.’ In light of that determi-
nation, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err by upholding the
trial court’s decision to deny defendants’ motion to enforce the arbitra-
tion agreement.? We do, however, wish to make clear that nothing in
our decision in this case should be understood to cast any doubt upon
the ability of physicians and patients, assuming that proper disclosure is
made, to enter into appropriately drafted agreements providing for the
arbitration of disputes like the one that underlies this case. However,
given our determination that Mr. King had entered into a fiduciary rela-
tionship with Dr. Bryant at the time that the arbitration agreement was
signed and the fact that defendants did not make full disclosure to Mr.
King before presenting the agreement at issue in this case for his signa-
ture, we hold that the arbitration agreement was obtained as the result
of a breach of fiduciary duty from which defendants benefitted and is,
for that reason, unenforceable. Thus, we modify and affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals in King II by holding the arbitration agreement
unenforceable on breach of fiduciary duty, as opposed to unconsciona-
bility, grounds. .

MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

Justice MORGAN did not participate in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case.

8. In view of our determination that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable on
breach of fiduciary duty grounds, we need not address plaintiff's unconscionability claim,
Vail, 233 N.C. at 114, 63 S.E.2d 206 (stating that, in the event of a breach of fiduciary duty,
“ ‘the transaction will be set aside even though it could not have been impeached had
no such relation existed, whether the unconscionable advantage was obtained by mis-
representation, concealment or suppression of material facts, artifice, or undue’ advan-
tage” (quoting 23 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit § 14 (1939))), even if there is no finding of
unconscionability.

9. The decision of the Court of Appeals in Westmoreland v. High Point Healthcare,
Inc., 218 N.C. App. 76, 721 S.E.2d 712 (2012), has no bearing upon the proper resolution of
this case given the absence of a claim that the contract at issue in that case was allegedly
procured as the result of a breach of fiduciary duty.

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Chief Justice MARTIN dissenting.

In Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., this Court applied
common Jaw unconscionability doctrine to invalidate an arbitration
clause in the plaintiffs’ loan agreements. 362 N.C. 93, 103-09, 655 S.E.2d
362, 370-74 (2008) (plurality opinion); id. at 110-11, 655 S.E.2d at 374-75
(Edmunds, J., concurring in result only). Three years later, the Supreme
Court of the United States decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
which clarified the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act’s preemptive
effect when state law might otherwise make an arbitration agreement
unenforceable. See 563 U.S. 333, 340, 352 (2011). Because Concepcion’s
rationale extends to a case like this one, in which a broadly applicable
state law defense (constructive fraud) purportedly requires non-enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement specifically because it is an arbitration
agreement, I respectfully dissent.

Before I turn to the preemption issue, a few observations are in
order about the majority's parsing of state law fiduciary duty princi-
ples. Because it asserts that Dr. Bryant committed constructive fraud
by failing to adequately disclose certain contractual terms to Mr. King,
the majority first has to find that a fiduciary relationship between Mr.
King and Dr. Bryant existed when Mr. King filled out the paperwork
that included the arbitration agreement—paperwork that Mr. King filled
out at Dr. Bryant’s office before Dr. Bryant had met him or accepted
him as a patient. As the majority correctly notes, certain relationships
automatically “give[ ] rise to a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law.”
CommScope Credit Union v. Butler & Burke, LLP,___ N.C. __, __,
790 S.E.2d 657, 660 (2016). Curiously, though, the majority does not
decide whether a physician-patient relationship had been formed by
the time Mr. King signed the arbitration agreement. The majority thus
does not determine whether, as a matter of law, a fiduciary duty existed
at that time. Instead, the majority decides only that, at the time that Mr.
King signed the arbitration agreement, Dr. Bryant owed Mr. King a fidu-
ciary duty in fact.

But, although the majority finds that a fiduciary relationship existed
here only as a matter of fact, it effectively determines that a physician-
patient relationship existed here in all but name. A fiduciary relationship
exists as a matter of fact “whenever ‘there is confidence reposed on one
side, and resulting domination and influence on the other.’ ” Id. at __,
790 S.E.2d at 661 (quoting Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N.C. 577, 598, 160 S.E.
896, 906 (1931)). Pointing to specific findings of fact by the trial court, the
majority maintains that a fiduciary relationship existed between Mr. King

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and Dr. Bryant primarily because Mr. King placed his trust in Dr. Bryant
as a doctor.! In addition, the majority quotes Black v. Littlejohn to sug-
gest that Mr. King sought Dr. Bryant’s services because of Dr. Bryant’s
“special knowledge and skill,” Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 646, 325
S.E.2d 469, 482 (1985) (quoting 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons,
and Other Healers § 167 (1981)), and later quotes Black to assert that
Dr. Bryant possessed “special knowledge and skill in diagnosing and
treating diseases and injuries, which the patient lacks,” id. (quoting 61
Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 167 (1981)).
Both of these quotes come from a passage in Black that discusses the
characteristics of a fiduciary relationship that exists between a physi-
cian and his patient. See id. Thus, the majority determines, in effect,
that the fiduciary relationship existed because Dr. Bryant was Mr. King’s
doctor—even though the majority claims that its conclusion is reached
“independent of the existence of a physician-patient relationship.”

So the majority tries to have its cake and eat it too. It purports not
to take a position on whether a physician-patient relationship exists,
but then rests its analysis on the characteristics of the physician-patient
relationship. More particularly, the majority does not indicate whether
a physician-patient relationship exists at the moment that a prospec-
tive patient fills out his preliminary paperwork, even when (as here)
the doctor has never met the patient or accepted him as a patient.
Yet the majority uses the characteristics of a physician-patient relation-
ship, and the things that a prospective patient thinks and does, to find a
fiduciary relationship in fact. By relying almost exclusively on aspects of
a physician-patient relationship but then finding a fiduciary duty that is
“independent” of that kind of relationship, the majority has muddied the
waters in this area of the law. This legal sleight of hand is especially trou-
bling for our fiduciary duty jurisprudence and for doctors and patients,
who necessarily rely on us to provide clear and predictable rules to
guide their daily interactions.

What's more, the majority’s muddled parsing of state law, however
well intentioned, must yield to principles of federal preemption. Section
2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that an arbitration pro-
vision “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such

1. On the other hand, the majority also finds a fiduciary duty here at least in part
because Mr. King “provide(d] Dr. Bryant with confidential medical information,” which is
not exactly based on Dr. Bryant's status as a doctor. (A patient may, for instance, provide
confidential medical information to a health insurance company.) But the majority's rea-
soning confuses a duty of confidentiality—a more limited duty that can arise even when
no fiduciary duty exists—with a full-fledged fiduciary duty.

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grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).2 In cases that it handed down before this Court
decided Tillman, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
Section 2 of the FAA preempted state law provisions that “set[ ] out a
precise, arbitration-specific limitation.” Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto,
517 US. 681, 688 n.3 (1996). In Perry v. Thomas, for example, the
Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the FAA preempted a California
statute that allowed actions for the collection of wages to be maintained
even in the face of a private arbitration agreement. See 482 U.S. 483, 484,
490-91 (1987). And in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the Court
held that Section 2 preempted a Montana statute that imposed special
notice requirements “specifically and solely” on “contracts ‘subject to
arbitration.’ ” 517 U.S. at 683 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(4)
(1995)); id. at 688. Both of these cases addressed state statutory pro-
visions that applied specifically to arbitration agreements, but did not
apply to contracts that did not have arbitration agreements.

After Tillman, however, the Supreme Court of the United States
issued its decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. In Concepcion, the
Court squarely held that the use of even a doctrine like unconscionabil-
ity—which can be applied to any contract, even one that does not con-
tain an arbitration clause—can be preempted by Section 2 of the FAA
when the doctrine “ha[s] been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitra-
tion.” 563 U.S. at 341. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Concepcion

2. The majority expresses considerable doubt that Section 2 of the FAA applies to
the arbitration agreement at issue in this case. But it is unclear why the majority thinks
that this is such an uphill battle. By its terms, Section 2 applies to any contract to arbitrate
a transaction that is either specified in the contract or referred to by the contract, as long
as the contract “evidenc[es] a transaction involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2's
phrase “involving commerce” has the same meaning as the phrase “affecting commerce,”
Altied-Bruce Terminia Cos. v. Dobson, 518 US. 265, 273-74 (1995), and Section 2's reach
thus “extendjs] .. to the limits of Congress’ Commerce Clause power,” id. at 268. The arbi-
tration agreement that Mr. King signed pertained to “any dispute arising out of or related
to the provision of healthcare services,” and clearly falls within both the commerce power
and, by extension, the terms of Section 2. The provision of healthcare services is a form
of commerce, see Nat'l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, _US._, _, 1828. Ct. 2566,
2587-88 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at__, _, 1828. Ct. at 2617, 2621 (Ginsburg,
J, concurring in part and dissenting in part), and contracting for those services is an eco-
nomic activity that, when aggregated with other economic activities of its kind, is bound
to substantially affect interstate commerce, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005);
see also Natt Fed'n of Indep. Bus., U.S. at___n.7, 182 8. Ct, at 2622 n.7. The only quirk
in this case is that the arbitration agreement was made separately from any agreement to
provide the services themselves. But Section 2, which applies to “a contract... . to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,” 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (emphasis added), clearly covers this scenario.

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KING v. BRYANT
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two years later. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __ U.S.
___, __, 183 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). Concepcion’s holding and rationale
apply directly to the majority's approach and make the majority’s hold-
ing untenable.

The majority claims that, because Dr. Bryant owed a fiduciary duty
to Mr. King, Dr. Bryant committed constructive fraud “by failing to make
full disclosure of the nature and import of the arbitration agreement to”
Mr. King. But this conclusion requires the majority to find that defendant
sought to benefit himself at Mr. King’s expense. See Barger v. McCoy
Hillard & Parks, 346 N.C. 650, 666-67, 488 S.E.2d 215, 224 (1997). The
majority does so by finding that the arbitration agreement “ensur[ed]
that any subsequent dispute between the parties would be resolved
using the forum, procedures, and decision[-]makers of their choice.”4
Of course, that is precisely what arbitration clauses in contracts of
adhesion do. And that gets to the heart of the matter: the majority
takes issue with the arbitration agreement in this case because it is an
arbitration agreement.

In doing so, the majority runs headlong into the FAA's prohibition of
state law defenses that specifically target arbitration agreements. State
Jaw cannot address the concerns presented by contracts of adhesion in
a way that “conflict[s] with the FAA or frustrate[s] its purpose to ensure
that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347 n.6. Nor can state courts apply a
doctrine like constructive fraud “in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.”

3. The majority asserts that “defendants have failed to clearly advance a fed-
eral preemption argument” but then proceeds to address that argument at length. That
is likely because defendants did cite to Concepcion. Quoting Torrence v. Nationwide
Budget Finance, a recent case from our Court of Appeals, defendants raised the fact that
Concepcion “dismiss[ed] ... . the idea that an arbitration agreement, apart from any other
form of contract, could be found substantively unconscionable based solely upon its adhe-
sive nature.” 232 N.C. App. 306, 322, 753 S.E.2d 802, 812, disc. rev. denied and cert. denied,
367 N.C. 505, 759 S.E.2d 88 (2014). Although defendants’ reference to this sentence is not
the clearest articulation of Concepcion’s preemption principle, it is notable that the very
next sentence in Torrence states that the dismissal of this unconscionability argument
“was an explicit part of the Supreme Court’s reasoning” in holding that the FAA preempted
astate unconscionability rule. Jd. at 322, 753 S.E.2d at 812.

4, The majority refers to the trial court’s “unchallenged findings of fact” that Dr.
Bryant benefitted from the arbitration agreement in this way. But the majority is making
a legal argument that the arbitration agreement benefitted Dr. Bryant, and that Dr. Bryant
may therefore be liable for the breach of his purported fiduciary duty to Mr. King. We
review all conclusions of law de novo, even those that the trial court has characterized as
findings of fact.

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KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 (2017)]

Id. at 341. Because the majority does exactly that, its holding is pre-
empted by Section 2 of the FAA.

The majority maintains that its rationale does not single out arbitra-
tion agreements for negative treatment because the majority would treat
“any agreement that substantially affected Mr. King’s substantive legal
rights” in the same way. The majority gives examples of other agree-
ments that it thinks would substantially affect a person’s legal rights in
ways that have nothing to do with arbitration. But the fact that the major-
ity might find other contractual provisions to be problematic for other
reasons does not change the fact that the majority finds this arbitration
agreement to be problematic because it is an arbitration agreement.®

In sum, if a state court cannot say that an arbitration agreement
is unconscionable for arbitration-specific reasons, it likewise cannot
say that the same agreement gives rise to a constructive fraud claim for
arbitration-specific reasons. By declining to reach the unconscionability
issue and focusing on constructive fraud instead, the majority artfully
tries to evade federal preemption. But in our post-Concepcion legal land-
scape, federal law cannot be so easily evaded. Because the majority has
applied the constructive fraud doctrine in a way that disfavors arbitra-
tion, and because the FAA clearly prohibits applying that doctrine in that
way, I respectfully dissent.

Justice NEWBY dissenting.

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that arbitration
agreements may not be invalidated by state-law defenses arising from
the fact that an arbitration agreement is at issue. Congress has explicitly
indicated that arbitration is to be favored. Despite these mandates, the
majority invents a new defense to enforcement of an arbitration agree-
ment, not raised by plaintiff below, to mask their disparate treatment
of and continued hostility towards arbitration, thereby attempting to

5. The majority quotes Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.'s
statement that, “if [a] claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself,” then
a “court may proceed to adjudicate it.” 888 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967). But this invocation of
Prima Paint is a red herring because Prima Paint is not about preemption at all. It is
simply about whether a certain kind of claim arising under Section 2 of the FAA—namely,
a “claim{ ] of fraud in the inducement of [a] contract generally,” id. at 404—should be
resolved by an arbitrator or by a court, id. at 396-97. Thus, Prima Paint’s holding that an
arbitrator, not a court, should resolve this claim, see id. at 404—and its related assertion
that a court may resolve a claim about fraud in the inducement of an arbitration clause
specifically, see id. at 403-04—does not provide any grist-for the majority's mill.

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[369 N.C. 451 (2017)]

circumvent an unconscionability analysis. Startlingly, without argument
or findings, the majority baldly asserts that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) does not apply. This jiggery-pokery is precisely the type of imper-
missible “rationalization” admonished by the United States Supreme
Court. Such a tortured attempt to obviate the FAA fails. Because the
arbitration agreement at issue here is not unconscionable and is other-
wise enforceable at law, I respectfully dissent.

The majority seeks to avoid an unconscionability analysis by fabri-
cating a contract defense not raised by plaintiff, namely the breach of
a fiduciary duty.! Based solely on the fact that the contract in question
is an arbitration agreement, which the majority contends “substantially
affected [plaintiff's] legal rights,” the majority holds that “defendants
violated their fiduciary duty to [plaintiff] by failing to make full dis-
closure of the nature and import of the arbitration agreement to him.”
In their view, this breach of fiduciary duty would void the arbitration
agreement ab initio. The majority asserts that “defendants benefitted
by [plaintiff's] action in signing the arbitration agreement,” and states
that the language “could have been worded more clearly” and was pre-
sented “in a collection of documents, thereby creating the [ ] impression
that the arbitration agreement was simply another rowtine document.”
(Emphasis added.)

Since 1925 Congress has established that arbitration agreements are
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), ch. 218, § 2, 43 Stat. 883, 883 (1925) (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). The FAA “reverse[d] the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and place[s them] upon the same
footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 24, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26, 36 (1991). The

1. Though plaintiffs are Robert E. King and wife Jo Ann O'Neal, the record reflects
Mr. King was the primary actor in the following events, and I refer to him in the singular
as “plaintif.”

Plaintiff never raised a “breach of fiduciary duty” defense to enforcement of the
agreement. At the trial court, plaintiff opposed defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
on three grounds: that the arbitration agreement was (1) “not a contract” but an unenforce-
able “agreement to agree,” (2) ineffective as to co-plaintiff’s consortium claim for lack of
her signature, and (8) unconscionable. The trial court denied defendants’ motion on the
first ground. Only on interlocutory appeal did the Court of Appeals, not plaintiff, men-
tion “fiduciary relationship” as a procedural consideration for plaintiff's burden of proof
under his unconscionability defense on remand. King v. Bryant, 225 N.C. App. 340, 349,
737 S.B.2d 802, 809 (2013).

476 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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preemptive effect of the FAA may “extend even to grounds traditionally
thought to exist ‘at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ ”
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
1747, 179 L. Ed. 2d 742, 752 (2011) (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483, 492 n.9, 107 S. Ct. 2520, 2527 n.9, 96 L. Ed. 2d 426, 437 n.9 (1987)
(emphasis omitted)).

Arbitration agreements may “be invalidated by ‘generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not
by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” Id. at 339, 131
S. Ct. at 1746, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 751 (quoting Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902, 909 (1996)). A
court may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a,
basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.”
Perry, 482 US. at 493 n.9, 107 S. Ct. at 2527 n.9, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 437 n.9.

Contract defenses cannot be “applied in a fashion that disfavors
arbitration.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341, 131 S. Ct. at 1747, 179 L. Ed. 2d
at 752. Such an application is not justified by state-law “rationalizations,”
even when the defense could apply to other contracts. Id. at 342, 131 S.

* Ct. at 1747, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 752 (“In practice, of course, the [defense]
- would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements; but

it would presumably apply to [nonarbitration] contracts . . . as well.”);
see also id. at 342, 181 S. Ct. at 1747, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 753 (“Such [ratio-
nalizations] are not fanciful, since the judicial hostility towards arbi-
tration that prompted the FAA had manifested itself in ‘a great variety’
of ‘devices and formulas’ declaring arbitration against public policy.”
(quoting Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,
406 (2d Cir. 1959))).

Contrary to well-settled law, the majority impermissibly targets
arbitration agreements for disparate treatment, attempting to ignore
plaintiff's claim of unconscionability and cloaking their disfavor of arbi-
tration under the guise of newly constructed fiduciary-relationship prin-
ciples, This sort of manufactured state-law justification is a facade and
cannot displace the preemptive effect of the FAA.

The purported breach of a fiduciary duty described by the major-
ity is a procedural consideration in an unconscionability analysis. As
such, any concerns arising from the circumstances under which plain-
tiff signed the arbitration agreement are squarely contemplated by his
assertion of unconscionability, yet the majority refuses to address this
defense at all. See Rite Color Chem. Co. v. Velvet Textile Co., 105 N.C.

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KING v. BRYANT
(369 N.C. 451 (2017)]

App. 14, 20, 411 S.B.2d 645, 648 (1992) (“Procedural unconscionability
involves ‘bargaining naughtiness,’ ” which encompasses the use of sharp
practices and unequal bargaining power. (citations omitted)). Instead,
the majority has taken the extraordinary step of crafting a new legal
theory for plaintiff, attempting to bypass the obligation to address his
unconscionability defense. Though plaintiff “should not be allowed to
change his position with respect to a material matter in the course of
litigation,” Ussery v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 368 N.C. 825, 340, 777
S.E.2d 272, 282 (2015) (quoting Whitacre P’ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358
N.C. 1, 26, 591 S.E.2d 870, 886 (2004)), and “[i]t is not the role of the
appellate court[ ] . . . to create [his] appeal,” Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp.,
359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005) (per curiam), it seems this
Court is more than willing to do so for him when arbitration is involved.

Our case law is clear that a fiduciary relationship raises a proce-
dural hurdle, not a requirement to void the transaction. Only when a
complainant alleges and establishes that a fiduciary relationship arose
and that the offending party benefitted from the transaction to the detri-
ment of the complainant, does the burden shift from the complainant
to the offending party to prove that “no fraud was committed, and no
undue influence or moral duress exerted.” Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co.
v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 711, 153 S.E.2d 449, 457 (1967) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C. 178, 181, 25 S.E.2d 615,
616-17 (1943)); see Watts v. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 317 N.C.
110, 116, 343 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1986). The majority fails to identify any
such detriment to plaintiff and instead relies on the unlawful presump-
tion that arbitration itself is harmful. The majority's speculation that
“defendants benefitted from [plaintiff's] action in signing the arbitration
agreement by ensuring that any subsequent dispute between the par-
ties would be resolved using the forum, procedures, and decision mak-
ers of their choice” falls well short of establishing the requisite benefit
and harm. Such a “state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely
from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport
with” the FAA. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n.9, 107 S. Ct. at 2527 n.9, 96 L. Ed.
2d at 437 n.9.

Assuming without deciding that the alleged breach of fiduciary
duty results in procedural unconscionability, the agreement is plainly
not substantively unconscionable, and plaintiff's defense therefore
fails. The agreement contains none of the “harsh, oppressive, and ‘one-
sided terms’ ” that are the hallmarks of substantive unconscionability,
Rite Color Chem. Co., 105 N.C. App. at 20, 411 S.E.2d at 648-49 (citations
omitted), and follows the “Health Care Claim Settlement Procedures

478 IN THE SUPREME COURT

KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 2017)

of the American Arbitration Association,” governed by the FAA.
Furthermore, this analysis comports with recent comprehensive appel-
late review of arbitration agreements. See Westmoreland v. High Point
Healthcare Inc., 218 N.C. App. 76, 77-78, 721 S.E.2d 712, 715 (2012) (con-
cluding that an arbitration agreement was valid and not unconscionable
when signed among a stack of other patient intake forms for a nursing
home facility). By skirting such an analysis, see id. at 79, 721 S.E.2d at
716, the majority’s new breach of fiduciary duty defense seems without
limit, deprived of the traditional constraints of the unconscionability
doctrine.”

Irrespective of whether‘a fiduciary relationship arose, the majority
justifies handling plaintiff's arbitration agreement differently than other
“routine [contract] documents” because the agreement “substantially
affected [plaintiff's] legal rights.” Isolating arbitration agreements in this
way plainly subjects them to impermissible scrutiny. See Concepcion,
563 U.S. at 342, 131 S. Ct. at 1747, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 752. All contracts affect
legal rights; the contract at issue here designates dispute resolution
through arbitration. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., ___
US. __, __, 188 S. Ct. 2304, 2309, 186 L. Ed. 2d 417, 424 (2018) (“[A]rbi-
tration is a matter of contract” and “courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbi-
tration agreements.” (citations omitted) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 218, 221, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1242, 84 L. Ed. 2d 158, 165
(1985)); see also Ussery, 368 N.C. at 336, 777 S.E.2d at 279 (“One who
executes a written instrument is ordinarily charged with knowledge of
its contents, .. . and he may not base his action on ignorance of the legal
effect of its provisions in the absence of considerations such as fraud or
mistake.” (citations omitted)); accord Westmoreland, 218 N.C. App. at
83, 721 S.E.2d at 718 (citation omitted). Either arbitration agreements
are on equal footing with other “routine” contracts or they are not. The
United States Supreme Court has directed that a court cannot construe
arbitration “agreement(s] in a manner different from that in which it oth-
erwise construes nonarbitration agreements.” Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n.9,
107 S. Ct. at 2527 n.9, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 437 n.9.

In a strained effort to add more window dressing, the majority bra-
zenly claims that the FAA does not apply “[g]iven the record contains no
indication that the agreement between the parties constitutes a ‘trans-
action involving commerce,’ 9 U.S.C. § 2.” Not only have the parties
not argued this point, nor has the trial court made any accompanying

2, For example, is there always a breach of fiduciary duty by a professional who
does not adequately explain arbitration, and is the required result that the agreement is
void ab initio?

: |

IN THE SUPREME COURT 479

KING v. BRYANT
[869 N.C. 451 (2017)]

findings, but the first line of plaintiff's arbitration agreement expressly
incorporates the FAA by stating: “In accordance with the terms of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC 1-16... .” See Johnston County v. R.N.
Rouse & Co., Inc., 331 N.C. 88, 92-93, 414 S.E.2d 30, 33 (1992) (discuss-
ing the incorporation of law into contracts); Pike v. Wachovia Bank &
Tr. Co., 274 N.C. 1, 16, 161 S.E.2d 453, 465 (1968) (“[L]aws in force at the
time of the execution of a contract become a part of the contract.”); see
also Perry, 482 U.S. at 490, 107 S. Ct. at 2526, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 486 (The
FAAs ambit is expansive and “embodies Congress’ intent to provide for
the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the
Commerce Clause.”). Moreover, such professional service contracts
generally “involve commerce” under the broad purview of the FAA.2

In sum, plaintiff raised his contract defenses and received the ben-
efit of asserting them. The arbitration agreement is not substantively
unconscionable, and plaintiff's defense therefore fails. Apparently
unsatisfied with this result, the majority, once again, impermissibly tar-
gets arbitration agreements. E.g., Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans,
Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 114, 655 S.E.2d 362, 377 (2008) (Newby, J., dissent-
ing) (“The majority finds the agreement unconscionable based on provi-
sions that would only exist in an arbitration agreement.” (emphasis
added)); see also Torrence v. Nationwide Budget Fin., 232 N.C. App.
306, 321, 753 S.E.2d 802, 811 (concluding that Tillman conflicts with
United States Supreme Court precedent), disc. rev. denied and cert.
denied, 367 N.C. 505, 759 S.E.2d 88 (2014). Such a policy decision is not
for this Court to determine. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n.9, 107 S. Ct. at
2527 n.9, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 437 n.9 (A court may not construe arbitration
agreements differently or “rely on the[ir] uniqueness . . . as a basis” for a
contract defense, “for this would enable the court to effect what... the
state legislature cannot.”). Instead of pursuing its relentless assault on
the FAA, the majority should follow the principles clearly expressed by
the United States Supreme Court. Because the majority has concocted
anew contract defense in a fashion that disfavors arbitration in contra-
vention of the FAA and binding United States Supreme Court precedent,
T respectfully dissent.

3. See, @.g., Morrison v. Colo. Permanente Med. Grp., 983 F. Supp. 987, 948-44 (D.
Colo. 1997) (finding a patient-physician “medical services agreement” evidenced a “trans-
action involving commerce”); Er parte Lorance, 669 So. 24 890, 892 (Ala. 1995) (finding a
physician's professional services contract “involve[es] commerce”); Vicksburg Partners,
LP. v, Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507, 615-16 (Miss. 2005) (same for patient’s “nursing home
admissions agreement”), overruled in part on other grounds by Covenant Health &
Rehab., LP v. Estate of Moulds, 14 So. 84 695, 706 (Miss. 2009).

4, Plaintiffs remaining contract defenses are not before the Court at this time.

480 IN THE SUPREME COURT
‘Disposition oF Petitions ror Discreionary Review Unpsr G.S. 7A-31.
26 January 2017
002P17 * State v. Juan 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Antonia Miller 01/04/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ 2
of Supersedeas
004P17 State v. Leonard 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Paul Schalow (COA16-330) 01/6/2017
2. State's Petition for Writ, 2
of Supersedeas
8. State's PDR under N.C.G.S. §7A-31_ | 3.
007P17 In the Matter of 1, Petitioner's PDR Under G.S. 74-31 L
JAM. (COAI6-563)
2. Petitioner's Motion for 2. Allowed
‘Temporary Stay OV/10/2017
8. Petitioner's Petition for Writ 3.
of Supersedeas
O14A17 State v. Barry 1. Def’s Motion to Abate Proceeding 1. Allowed
Randall Revels Based on Defendant’s Death 01/25/2017
2. Def's Motion for Extension of Time to | 2. Dismissed
File Brief as moot
01/25/2017
020P17 State v. Melvin Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Emanuel Goodwin | of Habeas Corpus 01/12/2017
O25PL7 State v. Jesus 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Martinez (COAI6-374) 01/19/2017
2. State's Petition for Writ 2
of Supersedeas
8, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A31_ | 3.
038P06-2 State v. Omeako Def’s Petition for Writ of Certioraré Denied
Lavon Brisbon to Review Order of Superior Court,
Cumberland County
042P04.9 State v. Lamy 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Formal 1, Dismissed
MeLeod Pulley * Complaint Against the Office of the
Clerk
2 Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR 2. Dismissed
082A14 State v. Sethy Tony | Def's Motion to Expedite Mandate Denied
Seam 12/29/2016
Ervin, J.,
recused

481

IN THE SUPREME COURT

481

Disposition or Perrrions ror Discreionary Review Unper G.S. 74-31

26 January 2017

088P15-5

‘Mason White Hyde
v. Katie Poole

Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus

Denied
12/12/2016

Exvin, J.,
recused

123P16

State of North
Carolina, ew

rel. William G.
Ross, Secretary,
North Carolina
Department of
Environmental and
Natural Resources,
Division of Waste
‘Management v, Jay
Carter, a/k/a, William
Joseph Carter, a/k/a,
William Joseph
Carter, IV, a/lva
William Joseph
Carter, Sr.

1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upon a
Constitutional Question (COA15-629)

2, Def's PDR Under N.C.G:S. § 7A-31

1. Dismissed
ex mero motu
2, Denied

201P16-2

State v, Timothy
Wiley, Jr.

Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR
(COA06-451)

Dismissed

252A16

Michael Krawiec,
Jennifer Krawiec,
and Happy Dance,
Inc/CMT Dance,
Inc. (Wb/a Fred
Astaire Franchised
Dance Studios) v.
Jim Manly, Monette
Manly, Metropolitan
Ballroom, LLC,
Ranko Bogosavac,
and Darinka Divijak

Defs’ Motion to Appear on Behalf of
All Defendants

Allowed

254P16

Dawn Weideman
v. Erin Atalie
Shelton v. Annette
Wise, Intervenor

Intervenor's PDR Under N.C.G.S.
§ TA-31 (COAL5-772)

Denied

260P16-2

Archie David
Powell, Jr. v. State
of NC

1. Plt's Pro Se Motion for PDR.

2, Pit’s Pro Se Motion to Proceed In.
Forma Pauperis

1. Dismissed
2. Allowed

482 IN THE SUPREME COURT 482
Disposition of Pemirions ror Discretionary Review Unoer G.S. 7A-31
26 January 2017
281P06-9 | Joseph E. Teague, _| Pit's Pro Se Motion for Petition for Dismissed
Jc, PE, CM. Properly Hearing 281P06-8 to .
v. The North Dismiss Underlying Case of Martin, C.J.,
Carolina ‘Wrongful Termination recused
Department of
‘Transportation,
etal.
B01P162 Michael Anthony | 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Notice | 1. Dismissed
Taylor v. OlaMae —_| of Appeal (COAP16-462) ex mero motu
Lewis, Senior 12/29/2016
Resident Superior ” .
Court Judge of 2. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for PDR —_| 2. Denied
Brunswick County 12/20/2016
8, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Proceed | 8. Allowed
In Forma Pauperis 12/29/2016
S18P16 Statev. Lawrence | Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § TA-SL Denied
Henry Dawson (COA15-1399)
S26P 15-4 Burl Anderson Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Dismissed
Howell v. North Reconsideration
Carolina Wayne
County Department
of Health and
Human Services, by
and through, Reese
Phelps; Lou Jones
32016 State v. Travis 1. Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § TA-31 1. Denied
Lamont Daughtridge | (COA15-1160)
2, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A31 | 2. Denied
8, State's Conditional PDR Under 3, Dismissed
NGS. § 7A31 as moot
4, Def's Conditional PDR Under N.C.GS. | 4. Dismissed
§ TAS1 as moot
384P16 ACTS Retirement- | Pit's PDR Under N.C.GS. § TA-31 Allowed
Life Communities, | (COA15-1333)
Inc. v. Town of
Columbus, North
Carolina
387P16 State v. Brian Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-BL Denied
Haneock (COAI15-1311)

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Petitions For Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31.

26 January 2017

347P16

Cape Hatteras
Bleetric
Membership
Corporation,

An Electric
Membership
Corporation
Organized and
Existing Pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat.
Chapter 117 v. Gina
L. Stevenson and
Joseph F Noce

Plt’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-81
(COA15-1102)

Denied

‘357P16

State v. Robert
Lee Nichols

Def’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to Review Order of Superior Court,
Mecklenburg County

Dismissed

361P16

North Carolina
Department of
‘Transportation

v. Mission
Battleground
Park, DST; Mission
Battleground Park
Leaseco, LLC,
Lessee; Lasalle
Bank National
Association, as
‘Trustee for the
Registered Holders
‘of CD 2006-CD3
Commercial
Mortgage
Pass-Through
Certificates; and
LAT Battleground
Parl, LLG

1. Defs’ PDR Pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 74-31 (COA16-125)

2. James F. Collins’ Conditional Motion
for Leave to File Amicus Brief

1, Allowed

2. Allowed

370P04-16

State v. Anthony
Leon Hoover

Def's Pro Se Motion for Mandamus
Mandate Mandatory Injunction Appeal

Dismissed

Hudson, J.,
recused

881P16

State v. Rickey
Harding Wagner, Jr.

Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-B1
(COA15-1111)

Denied

S85P16

State v. Matthew
Devon Fields

1. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-BL
(COA15-1086)

2. State's Motion to Deem Response
‘Timely Filed

1. Denied
2. Allowed

484 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disrosirion or Pentions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
26 January 2017
390P16 State v. Linda, 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Beth Chekanow (COA15-1294) 10/19/2016
Site David | ». staves Petition for Writ 2, Allowed
of Supersedeas
3, State's PDR Under N.C.GS.§7A31 | 3. Allowed
S91A16 Next Advisor Court Order Appeal
Continued, Ine. Dismissed ex
v. Lendingliree, Ine. ‘mero motu
etal. 12/14/2016
402PA15.2 | Statev. Donna 1. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Helms Ledbetter | (COA15-414-2) 12/22/2016
2. Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2.
407P03.2 State v. Phillip 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Notice of 1. Dismissed
Vance Smith, Ti Appeal (COA16-847) emi
2, Dismissed
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Appoint as moot
Counsel
AOTPIL4 State v. Dwain Def’s Pro Se Motion for PDR Dismissed
Comelius Fexrell | (COAP16-627)
409PA15 Gregory P. Nies Court Order Appeal
and Diane 8. Nies Dismissed ex
v. Town of ‘mero motu
Emerald Isle 12/14/2016
409P16 IReN.GE,ALE | Respondent-Father’s PDR Under Denied
N.C.GS. § 7A-31 (COA16-297)
41116 Union County v. 1. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Denied
‘Town of Marshville 41/15/2016
2. Def’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2. Denied
Ervin, J.,
recused
412P16 Campbell, et al. Petitioner's PDR Under N.C.G.S. Denied
v. The City of § 7A-31 (COAI6-101)
Statesville, et al.
414P 16 State v. Brenda Def's PDR Pursuant to N.C.G.S. §7A-31 | Denied
Sanders Lanclos (COAI6-122)
A1SP16 Curtis L. Sangster | Pit’'s Pro Se Motion for Appeal of Dismissed
v. Deborah Decision of the North Carolina State Bar
Shandles, Attomey

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Perrrions For Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

26 January 2017

485

419P16

Willowmere
Community
Association, Ine.,
‘ANorth Carolina
Non-Profit
Corporation and
Nottingham Owners
Association, Inc., A
North Carolina Non-
Profit Corporation
v. City of Charlotte,
ANorth Carolina
Body Politic

and Corporate,

and Charlotte-
Mecklenburg
Housing
Partnership, Inc., A
North Carolina Non-
Profit Corporation

Plaintiffs’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31
(COAI5-977)

Allowed

422P16

State v. Drayton
Lamar Thompson

1. Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upon a
Constitutional Question

2. Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31
(COA16-406)

8. State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal

2. Denied

8, Allowed

424P16-2

Corey D. Greene
v. Susan White

Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for PDR

Denied
12/09/2016

425P16

State v. Ronald
Michael Thomas

Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of
Certiorart to Review Order of COA
(COAPI6-826)

Dismissed

486 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposition oF Prririons ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S, 7A-31
26 January 2017
427A16 Abrons Family 1. Def's (Computer Sciences L-
Practice and Urgent | Corporation) Notice of Appeal Based
Care, PA; Nash Upon a Dissent (COAI5-1197)
OB-GYN Associ
PA; Higitand "| 2.Def's (Computer Sciences 2. Allowed
Obstetrical. Corporation) PDR as to Additional
Gynecological Issues
Clinic, PAs 8. Def’s (NCDHHS) Notice of Appeal | 3. —
Children’s Health | 5 7
Stenrotina Pat Based Upon a Dissent
Capital Nephrology | 4, Def’s (NCDHHS) PDR as to 4. Allowed
Associates, PA; ‘Additional Issues
Biickory Allergy &
‘Asthma Clinic, PA;
Halifax Medical
Specialists, PA;
and Westside OB-
GYN Center, PA;
Individually and on
Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated
v. NC Department
of Health and
Human Services and
Computer Sciences
Corporation
429P16 Denise Catanese —_| Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-81 Denied
Chafin v. Stephen | (COAI5-1152)
Robert Chafin
431P16 State v. Edward 1. Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upon a | 1.—
Roy Frye Constitutional Question (COA16-362)
2. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A-31 | 2, Denied
8, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 3. Allowed
432P16 State v. Robert Leon | Def's Pro Se Motion for Return of Dismissed
Gray, II Property
483P16 Steven James Plt's Pro Se Motion for Court Review _| Dismissed
Hall v. Attorney
Fredilyn Sison
434P16 State v. Seyi Odueso | Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorart. | Denied
to Review Order of Superior Court,
Mecklenburg County
435P16 State v. Stephen Def’s Pro Se PDR Under N.C.GS. Denied
Lamont Ward § 7A-31 (COAI6-52)

IN THE SUPREME COURT 487
Disposition oF Petrrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 74-31
26 January 2017
438P16 State v. Darryl 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1, Dismissed
A. McPhaul Certiorari to Review Order of N.C.
Court of Appeals (COA16-799)
2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed in —_| 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
3. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Appoint 8, Dismissed
Counsel as moot
439P16 State v. Twyan 1, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7-31 1
Kenneth Coleman | (COA16-305)
2, Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 2, Allowed
12/09/2016
8, Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 3.
442P16 State v. Calvin Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7-31 Denied
Denard Brown (coa16-84)
443P16 State v. Ronnie 1, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A31 1. Allowed
Paul Godbey (COA15-877)
2, State's Motion to Amend Response —_| 2. Allowed
to PDR
444P 16 ‘Susan Hedden 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upon a_| 1. Dismissed
v. Ann Isbell Constitutional Question ex mero motu
2, Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorart | 2. Denied
to Review Decision of COA (COA16-406)
446P 16 In the Matter of Respondent-Mother’s PDR Under Denied
AIP. N.C.GS. § 74-81 (COAI6-473)
448P16 State v. Timothy Def's Pro Se PDR Under N.C.GS. Denied
Devon King § 7A-31 (COAI6-261)
449P16 Patrick A. Merrill | Pits PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A31 Denied
v. Winston-Salem | (COAI6-232) -
Forsyth County
Board of Education
45216 State v. John 1. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 1, Allowed
Eddie Mangum (COAI6-B44) 12/16/2016
2. Def’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2.
454016 State v. Andrew 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Robert Holloway | (COA16-381) 12/20/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas

488

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposrrion or Perrrions ror Discrevionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

26 January 2017
455P16 State v. William L. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Sheldon Howell (COAI6-308) 12/20/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2
of Supersedeas
458P 16 State v. Danny Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Wayne Powell (COA16-499)
459P 16 State v. James 1. Def’s PDR Under N..G.S. § 7A-31 L
Howard Killian (COAI6-268)
2. Def’s Motion for Temporary Stay 2. Allowed
12/22/2016
8. Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 3.
464P16 State v. Tersil 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Courtney Battle (COAI6-855) 12/22/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ of 2.
Supersedeas
465P16 State v. Christopher | 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Angelo Whitehead | (COA16-294) 12/22/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
482P 13-2 State v. Carl Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR Denied
Tyan Williams (COAP16-823)
499P10-2 State v. Damien 1, Def’s Pro Se Motion for Review of 1. Dismissed
Lanel Gabriel the Appellate Court's Decision
(COAP16-535) _.
2, Dismissed
2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint as moot
Counsel

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE HUGHES
[369 N.C. 489 (2017)]

IN THE MATTER OF MARY LUCILLE HUGHES, sy ano ‘aroucH VIRGINIA HUGHES
INGRAM, Apmmusrrarerx oF tae Estare or Mary Lucnue Hucues, Camm ror
Compensation Unprr THE NortH CarotiNa EUGENICS ASEXUALIZATION AND.
‘Sreritization COMPENSATION PROGRAM

No. 87A16
Filed 17 March 2017

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016),
dismissing an appeal from an amended decision and order filed on
28 April 2015 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission and remand-
ing the matter to the Commission for transfer to the Superior Court,
Wake County, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1(al). On 9 June 2016, the
Supreme Court allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review of
additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 February 2017.

UNC Center for Civil Rights, by Elizabeth Haddix and Mark
Dorosin; and Pressly, Thomas & Conley, PA, by Edwin A. Pressly,
Sor claimant-appellant/appellee.

Joshua. Stein, Attorney General, by Elizabeth. Fisher, Assistant
Solicitor General, and Amar Majmundar, Special Deputy Attorney
General, for defendant-appellant/appellee State of North Carolina.

PER CURIAM.

For the reasons stated in In re Redmond, __ N.C. __, ___ S.E.2d
___ (Mar. 17, 2017) (No. 86A16), the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and this case is remanded to the Court of. Appeals.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

490 IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE REDMOND
[369 N.C. 490 (2017)]

IN THE MATTER OF KAY FRANCES REDMOND, sy AND tHROucH LINDA NICHOLS,
Apmmisrraraix or THE Estar or Kay Frances Repmonn, Ciaim ror Compensation UNDER THE,
Norra Carouina EucENics ASEXUALIZATION AND STERILIZATION COMPENSATION PROGRAM

No. 86A16
Filed 17 March 2017

Constitutional Law—Eugenics Board compensation—Court of
Appeals jurisdiction
In a matter arising from the Eugenics Board and the resulting
compensation program, heard first before the Industrial Commission,
the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider claimant’s con-
stitutional challenge to N.C.G.S. § 143B-426.50(1). The Industrial
Commission had no authority to decide constitutional questions.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § .7A-30(2) from the decision of a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 785 S.E.2d
111 (2016), dismissing an appeal from a decision and order filed on
27 April 2015 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission and remand-
ing the matter to the Commission for transfer to the Superior Court,
Wake County, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1(al). On 9 June 2016, the
Supreme Court allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review of
additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 February 2017.

UNC Center for Civil Rights, by Elizabeth Haddix and Mark
Dorosin; and Pressly, Thomas & Conley, PA, by Edwin A. Pressly,
for claimant-appellant/appellee.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Elizabeth A. Fisher, Assistant
Solicitor General, and Amar Majmundar, Special Deputy Attorney
General, for defendant-appellant/appellee State of North Carolina.

JACKSON, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the North Carolina Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to consider claimant's constitutional challenge
to an act of the General Assembly on appeal from a final decision and
order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Because we con-
clude that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to reach the merits of
claimant's constitutional challenge, we reverse the Court of Appeals’
dismissal of claimant's appeal and remand this case to that court to con-
sider the merits of claimant’s constitutional challenge.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE REDMOND
[869 N.C. 490 (2017)]

In 1956 claimant Kay Frances Redmond was sterilized involun-
tarily at the age of fourteen by order of the now-dismantled Eugenics
Board of North Carolina pursuant to Chapter 224 of the Public Laws
of North Carolina of 1933. See N.C.G.S. § 35-39 (1950) (repealed 2003).
Claimant passed away in 2010. In 2013 the General Assembly established
the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program
(Compensation Program) to provide “lump-sum compensation” to any
“claimant determined to be a qualified recipient.” Id. § 143B-426.51
(2013). A qualified recipient was “[a]n individual who was asexual-
ized involuntarily or sterilized involuntarily under the authority of the
Eugenics Board of North Carolina in accordance with Chapter 224 of
the Public Laws of 1933 or Chapter 221 of the Public Laws of 1937.”
Id. § 143B-426.50(5) (2013). More relevant to this case, a claimant was
defined as “[a]n individual on whose behalf a claim is made for compen-
sation as a qualified recipient” who was “alive on June 30, 2013.”! Id.
§ 143B-426.50(1) (2018).

Claimant’s estate filed a claim pursuant to the Compensation
Program to the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the Commission);
however, the claim initially was determined to be ineligible because
claimant was not alive on 30 June 2013, as required by subsection
143B-426.50(1). That conclusion was upheld following an eviden-
tiary hearing before a deputy commissioner. On appeal to the full
Commission, claimant raised a constitutional challenge to subsec-
tion 143B-426.50(1), arguing that the requirement that a claimant be
alive on 30 June 2013 violates the guarantees of equal protection and
due process in Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The full Commission denied the claim for not meeting the subsection
143B-426.50(1) criteria, but certified the constitutional question to the
Court of Appeals. In certifying the question, the Commission noted
the lack of an explicit statutory framework for doing so. In contrast to
N.C.G.S. § 97-86, which gives the Commission statutory authority to cer-
tify questions of law to the Court of Appeals in workers’ compensation

1. The Compensation Program expired as provided in the 2013 enabling act, as
amended in 2014. See [The] Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations
Act of 2013, ch. 360, secs. 6.18(a)-(g), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1019-23 (making pertinent
provisions of the statutes creating the Program effective July 1, 2013, and setting an expi-
ration date of June 30, 2015, except for final adjudication of any claims still pending on that
date), as amended by The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations
Act of 2014, ch. 100, secs. 6.13(a)-(f), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 2014) 328, 346-48
(adding, inter atia, a provision stating that the Office of Justice for Sterilization Victims
also expired on June 30, 2015).

492 IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE REDMOND
[369 N.C. 490 (2017)]

cases, the Commission observed that the statutes providing adjudica-
tory authority to the Commission here pursuant to the Compensation
Program contain no such provision. Claimant appealed the final deci-
sion of the full Commission to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals did not reach the constitutional question
raised in claimant’s appeal. In re Hughes, ___ N.C. App. __, __, 785
§.E.2d 111, 116 (2016).? Instead, the Court of Appeals held that it did not
have jurisdiction to consider claimant’s appeal from the full Commission.
because any challenge to the constitutionality of an act of the General
Assembly first must be submitted to a three-judge panel of the Superior
Court of Wake County pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1(al). Id. at__, 785
S.E.2d at 116. Consequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed claimant’s
appeal and remanded the case to the Commission to transfer “those por-
tions of the action[ ] challenging the constitutional validity of N.C. Gen.
[ ]Stat. § 143B-426.50(1)” to Wake County for resolution by a three-judge
panel. Id. at __, 785 S.E.2d at 116. Both claimant and the State have
appealed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the appeal to this Court and
argue that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider claimant's
constitutional challenge to subsection 143B-426.50(1). We agree.

Eligibility for compensation pursuant to the Compensation Program
is determined by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. N.C.G.S.
§ 143B-426.52(c) (2013). “(Initial determinations of eligibility for com-
pensation” are made by a deputy commissioner upon review of “the
claim and supporting documentation submitted on behalf of a claimant.”
Id. § 143B-426.53(b) (2013). In determining eligibility, the Commission
has “all powers and authority granted under Article 31 of Chapter 143 of
the General Statutes.” Id. § 143B-426.53(a) (2013). Article 31, Chapter
148, commonly referred to as the Tort Claims Act, states that the
Commission is “constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and pass-
ing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board
of Transportation, and all other departments.” Id. § 143-291(a) (2015).
Section 143B-426.53 of the Compensation Program statutes provides
for multiple stages of review within the Commission and an ultimate
appeal as of right from a decision of the full Commission to the Court
of Appeals “in accordance with the procedures set forth in G.S. 143-293
and G.S. 143-294.” Id. § 143B-426.53(d)-(f) (2013).

2. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, claimant's case was combined with those of
two other claimants—one being Mary Lucille Hughes—who were also deemed ineligible
for the Compensation Program by the Commission pursuant to subsection 143B-426.50(1).
‘See In re Hughes, N.C. App. at___, 785 S.B.2d at 112.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 493

IN RE REDMOND
[869 N.C. 490 (2017)]

Although the Commission acts as a court for purposes of the Tort
Claims Act and for determining eligibility of claimants pursuant to the
Compensation Program, see id. § 143B-426.53(a), the Commission’s
judicial power is limited, or quasi-judicial. We have determined that the
Commission “is not a court with general implied jurisdiction” but “pri-
marily is an administrative agency of the state” granted judicial power
“as is necessary to perform the duties required of it by the law which it
administers.” Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 187, 837 S.E.2d
477, 483 (1985) (citation omitted). That judicial power clearly does not
extend to consideration of constitutional questions, as it is a “well-
settled rule that a statute’s constitutionality shall be determined by the
judiciary, not an administrative board.” Meads v. N.C. Dep’t of Agric.,
349 N.C. 656, 670, 509 S.E.2d 165, 174 (1998); see also State ex rel. Utils.
Comm'n v. Carolina Util. Customers Ass'n, 336 N.C. 657, 678-74, 446
S.E.2d 882, 341-42 (1994); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clayton, 267 N.C. 15, 20,
147 S.E.2d 522, 526 (1966); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C. 168,
178, 118 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Smith
v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).

Similar to the limited judicial power of the Industrial Commission,
the North Carolina Utilities Commission is “deemed to exercise functions
judicial in nature and [to] have all the powers and jurisdiction of a court
of general jurisdiction as to all subjects over which the Commission has
or may hereafter be given jurisdiction by law.” Carolina Util. Customers
Ass'n, 336 N.C. at 678, 446 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 62-60 (1989)).
Such power is properly exercised “[flor the purpose of conducting hear-
ings, making decisions and issuing orders, and in formal investigations
where a record is made of testimony under oath.” Id. at 673, 446 S.E.2d.
at 342 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 62-60). When an interested party argued that
this judicial power authorized the Utilities Commission to determine the
constitutionality of a statute falling within the Utilities Commission’s
administrative purview, we concluded that “[aJs an administrative
agency created by the legislature, the Commission has not been given
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of legislative enactments.”
Id. at 674, 446 S,E.2d at 342.

Although not controlling on this Court, we note with approval
the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in a similar case. When the Industrial
Commission determined in its opinion and award that certain changes
to the Workers’ Compensation Act violated the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution, the Court of Appeals vacated the opinion
and award, citing the “well-settled rule that a statute’s constitutional-
ity shall be determined by the judiciary, not an administrative board.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE REDMOND
[369 N.C. 490 (2017))

Carolinas Med. Ctr. v. Emp’rs & Carriers, 172 N.C. App. 549, 553, 616
§.E.2d 588, 591 (2005) (quoting Meads, 349 N.C. at 670, 509 S.E.2d at
174). In reaching this holding, the court reasoned that a party has at least
two avenues to challenge the constitutionality of a statute. Id. at 553,
616 S.E.2d at 591. First, the party asserting the constitutional challenge
may bring “an action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-258 et seq. (2004).” Id. at 553, 616 S.B.2d at 591 (“A peti-
tion for a declaratory judgment is particularly appropriate to determine
the constitutionality of a statute when the parties desire and the pub-
lic need requires a speedy determination of important public interests
involved therein.” (quoting Woodard v. Carteret County, 270 N.C. 55, 60,
153 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1967))). “Alternatively, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 97-86 the Industrial Commission of its own motion could have certified
the question of the constitutionality of the statute to this Court before
making its final decision.” Jd. at 553, 616 S.E.2d at 591.

Section 97-86 states: “The Industrial Commission of its own motion
may certify questions of law to the Court of Appeals for decision and.
determination by said Court.” N.C.G.5. § 97-86 (2015). Although this pro-
vision is part of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and is not implicated
in the statutes creating the Compensation Program, it is instructive as
to the limitations of the Commission’s judicial authority. Correctly rec-
ognizing that it did not have authority to rule on claimant’s constitu-
tional challenge in this case, but acting in accord with its status as an
administrative agency with a process of appeal to the Court of Appeals
encompassing a broad spectrum of subject matters, see id. § 97-86 (pro-
viding for appeals to the Court of Appeals from final awards of the full
Commission pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act); id. § 143-293
(2015) (providing for appeals to the Court of Appeals from decisions
and orders of the full Commission pursuant to the Tort Claims Act); id.
§ 148B-426.53(£) (providing for appeals to the Court of Appeals from deci-
sions of the full Commission pursuant to the Compensation Program),
the Industrial Commission certified the question to the Court of Appeals
for judicial determination.

In addition, the North Carolina Constitution states that “[t]he Court
of Appeals shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the General Assembly
may prescribe.” N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12(2). The General Assembly has
conferred upon the Court of Appeals “jurisdiction to review upon appeal
decisions . . . of administrative agencies, upon matters of law or legal
inference.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-26 (2015). There is no doubt that a question
as to the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is a “mat-
ter[ ] of law or legal inference.” This Court also has recognized that.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 495

IN RE REDMOND
[869 N.C. 490 (20179)

“[ijn ‘double appeal’ states, including North Carolina... , cases involving
a substantial constitutional question are appealable in the first instance
to the intermediate appellate court.” State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 302-
03, 163 S.E.2d 376, 381 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087 (1969). The
General Assembly has provided specifically that “appeal as of right lies
directly to the Court of Appeals” from “any final order or decision of
... the North Carolina Industrial Commission.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-29 (2015).
The appeal in this case arises from a “decision and order” of the full
Commission denying claimant’s claim based on the application of sub-
section 143B-426.50(1)—the statutory provision that is the subject of
claimant's constitutional question.

In its opinion below, the Court of Appeals relied on N. S.
§ 1-267.1(al) to conclude that its appellate jurisdiction has been limited
by the General Assembly in the context of this case. See In re Hughes,
___N.C. App. at ___, 785 S.E.2d at 116. Subsection 1-267.1(a1) provides
in part that “any facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General
Assembly shall be transferred pursuant to G.S. 14-1, Rule 42(b)(4), to
the Superior Court of Wake County and shall be heard and determined
by a three-judge panel.” N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1(a1) (2015). According to
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)(4), when “a claimant raises
such a challenge in the claimant’s complaint or amended complaint in
any court in this State .... the court shall, on its own motion, trans-
fer that portion of the action challenging the validity of the act of the
General Assembly to the Superior Court of Wake County for resolution
by a three-judge panel.” Id. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(4) (2015).

“Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is
no room for judicial construction[,] and the courts must give [the stat-
ute] its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpo-
late, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.”
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 575, 573 $.E.2d 118,
121 (2002) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148,
152, 209 S.B.2d 754, 756 (1974). By the plain language of subsection
1-267.1(al), the General Assembly confined the scope of the statute to
the requirements of Rule 42(b)(4). In this case claimant filed a claim with
the Commission pursuant to section 143B-426.52 of the Compensation
Program, and not a “complaint or amended complaint in any court in this
State.” See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 42(b)(4). Moreover, the Commission
“is not a court” as contemplated in Rule 42(b)(4), but “primarily is an
administrative agency of the state.” Hogan, 315 N.C. at 187, 337 S.E.2d
at 483. Consequently, subsection 1-267.1(al), read in conjunction with
Rule 42(b)(4), does not require that claimant’s constitutional challenge

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE REDMOND
- [869 N.C. 490 2017)}

be heard by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Wake County.
Therefore, subsection 1-267.1(a1) does not limit the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Appeals with respect to this matter.

That the Commission is not a court, but an administrative agency
of the State with statutorily limited judicial authority, also makes distin-
guishable our prior reasoning in cases like City of Durham v. Manson,
285 N.C. 741, 748, 208 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1974) (“[I]Jn conformity with the
well established rule of appellate courts, we will not pass upon a consti-
tutional question unless it affirmatively appears that such question was
raised and passed upon in the court below.” (italics omitted) (quoting
State v. Jones, 242 N.C. 563, 564, 89 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1955))), and State
v. Cumber, 280 N.C. 127, 132, 185 8.B.2d 141, 144 (1971) (“Having failed
to show involvement of a substantial constitutional question which was
raised and passed upon in the trial court and properly brought forward
for consideration by the Court of Appeals, no legal basis exists for this
appeal to the Supreme Court, and it must therefore be dismissed.”). As
we have established already, the Commission has no authority to decide
constitutional questions, making the rule announced in these cases inap-
plicable to whether the Court of Appeals may,consider the constitutional
question raised in this case.

Inasmuch as our prior decision in State ex rel. Commissioner of
Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau applied cases like Manson,
Cumber, and Jones in the context of an appeal from an administrative
agency, see 300 N.C. 381, 428, 269 S.E.2d 547, 577 (1980), that case is
distinguishable from the present case because it involved an appeal
from the Commissioner of Insurance's denial of a rate increase that was
subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), see id. at 394-96, 269 S.E.2d at 559. Although petitions for judi-
cial review of final agency decisions governed by the APA ordinarily are
“filed in the superior court of the county where the person aggrieved
by the administrative decision resides,” N.C.G.S. § 150B-45(a) (2015),
in Rate Bureau, appeal was taken directly from the Commissioner of
Insurance to the Court of Appeals. 300 N.C. at 392, 269 S.E.2d at 557. In
that case, no constitutional challenge regarding rate-making was consid-
ered by the Court of Appeals. See generally State ex rel. Comm’r of Ins.
v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 41 N.C. App. 310, 255 S.E.2d 557 (1979). Moreover,
in Rate Bureau, this Court reasoned:

[T]he Commissioner's original order denying the
Reinsurance Facility rate increase stated only that such
rates are “unfairly discriminatory’ presumably in the
statutory sense. He never held that any of the statutes or

IN THE SUPREME COURT 497

IN RE REDMOND
[869 N.C. 490 (2017)]

actions were unconstitutional. In his brief, however, he
does make vague assertions that it would be “constitu-
tionally suspect” to interpret the statutes contrary to his
findings and conclusions. He states, “The governing stat-
utes should be construed so as to avoid serious doubts as
to constitutionality.”

300 N.C. at 429, 269 S.E.2d at 577.

Citing a holding by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Shavers
v. Attorney General Kelley, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72, cert. denied,
442 U.S, 934, 99 S, Ct. 2869 (1978), the Commissioner argued that “cer-
tain ratemaking mechanisms were constitutionally deficient in failing to
provide due process.” Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. at 429, 269 S.E.2d at 578.
This Court noted:

However, the Michigan court’ unquestionably based its
holding on constitutional due process considerations.
Indeed, the Michigan action was a declaratory judgment
action specifically brought to determine the constitution-
ality of the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act. The constitu-
tional question was the basis for the action from trial court
to final appellate adjudication. This is completely unlike
the case before us where the record discloses no constitu-
tional question presented or passed in the Commissioner's
original order.

Id. at 429, 269 8.E.2d at 578.

We believe that the decision regarding the issue of a constitutional
challenge before this Court in Rate Bureau was incorrect. When an
appeal lies directly to the Appellate Division from an administrative tri-
bunal, in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, see, e.g.,
N.C.G.S. § 150B-45(a), a constitutional challenge may be raised for the
first time in the Appellate Division as it is the first destination for
the dispute in the General Court of Justice. As in this case, a claim made
pursuant to the Compensation Program is appealed from a final deci-
sion of the Commission directly to the Court of Appeals without judicial
review by a trial court. See id. § 143B-426.53(f).

Here, the Commission necessarily deemed claimant ineligible for
the Compensation Program pursuant to subsection 143B-426.50(1), as
required by the General Assembly. Claimant ultimately appealed the
Comumission’s decision to the Court of Appeals on the basis that denial of
her claim pursuant to 143B-426.50(1) was unconstitutional—a question

498 IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE REDMOND
[369 N.C. 490 (2017)]

of law outside the scope of the Commission’s limited judicial authority
but within the purview of the General Court of Justice. Furthermore,
subsection 1-267.1(al) does not modify the Court of Appeals’ jurisdic-
tion to review decisions of the Commission on “matters of law or legal
inference” pursuant to section 7A-26, final decisions of the Commission
pursuant to section 7A-29, or final decisions of the full Commission
regarding eligibility for the Compensation Program pursuant to subsec-
tion 143B-426.53(f). Consequently, we hold that claimant’s appeal based
on a constitutional challenge was properly before the Court of Appeals
and that the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over claimant's
appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and remand this case to that court to consider the merits of claimant's
constitutional challenge to subsection 143B-426.50(1).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE SMITH
[869 N.C. 499 (2017)]

IN THE MATTER OF TOMMIE JUNIOR SMITH, Camm ror Compensation Unprr Tas Norra
Carouina Eucentcs ASEXUALIZATION AND STERILIZATION COMPENSATION PROGRAM

No. 88A16
Filed 17 March 2017

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016),
dismissing an appeal from a decision and order filed on 7 May 2015 by
the North Carolina Industrial Commission and remanding the matter
to the Commission for transfer to the Superior Court, Wake County,
under N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1(a1). On 9 June 2016, the Supreme Court allowed
the State’s petition for discretionary review of additional issues. Heard
in the Supreme Court on 13 February 2017.

UNC Center for Civil Rights, by Elizabeth Haddix and Mark
Dorosin; and Pressly, Thomas & Conley, PA, by Edwin A. Pressly,
Sor claimant-appellant/appellee.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Elizabeth A. Fisher, Assistant
Solicitor General, and Amar Majmundar, Special Deputy Attorney
General, for defendant-appellant/appellee State of North Carolina.

PER CURIAM.

For the reasons stated in In re Redmond, ___ N.C. __, ___ S.E.2d
__. Mar. 17, 2017) (No. 86A16), the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

500 IN THE SUPREME COURT

OLD REPUBLIC NAT’L TITLE INS. CO. v. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.
[369 N.C. 500 (2017)]

OLD REPUBLIC NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY anp UNITED BANK &
TRUST COMPANY, VERSAILLES, KY., 1/x/a FARMERS BANK & TRUST COMPANY
(GEORGETOWN, KY) .
v
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, SHRIJEE LLC, HELM BUILDERS, LLC, ano
MICHAEL D. ANDREWS, in nts oFrician caractry as Sueur or Durniam County,
Nori Carouina

No. 155A16
Filed 17 March 2017

Estoppel—judicial—collateral attack—inconsistent position

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by invoking the doc-
trine of judicial estoppel to dismiss counterclaims arising from a
failed hotel development project. In a prior related case, defense
counsel had assured a federal court that defendant would not col-
laterally attack the federal judgment by relitigating claims from the
same facts. The trial court found that defendant essentially took
the action which defense counsel had stated it would not take,
thereby adopting an inconsistent position.

Justice ERVIN dissenting.
Justices HUDSON and BEASLEY join in this dissenting opinion.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the unpublished deci-
sion of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 785
§.E.2d 185 (2016), affirming an order on summary judgment entered
on 30 September 2014 by Judge Henry W. Hight, Jr., and reversing and
remanding an order granting judgment on the pleadings entered on
14 August 2014 by Judge G. Wayne Abernathy, both in Superior Court,
Durham County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 14 February 2017.

Manning Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Judson A. Welborn, J. Whitfield
Gibson, and Natalie M. Rice, for plaintiff-appellant United Bank
& Trust Company.

Lewis & Roberts, PLLC, by James A. Roberts, IIT and Jessica E.
Bowers, for defendant-appellee Hartford Fire Insurance Company.

NEWBY, Justice.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 501

OLD REPUBLIC NAT'L TITLE INS. CO. v. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.
[369 N.C. 500 (2017)]

The doctrine of judicial estoppel preserves the integrity of judicial
proceedings by preventing a party from taking inconsistent positions
before the court, thus safeguarding the rule of law and securing pub-
lic confidence in the court system. Here the trial court found that, in a
prior related case, defense counsel assured a federal court that defen-
dant Hartford Fire Insurance Company (defendant or Hartford) would
not collaterally attack the federal judgment post hoc by relitigating its
related claims arising from the same facts. Defendant declined to join
that federal litigation, but nonetheless raises substantially similar tort
claims here. As such, the trial court found that defendant essentially
takes the action which defense counsel stated it would not take, thereby
adopting an inconsistent position. Affording the appropriate deference
to the trial court, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar defendant
from proceeding with its tort counterclaims. Accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

This case arises from a bonding dispute, which stems from a
failed hotel development project. Four suits involving various parties,
including the property owner, general contractor, lender, and bonding
company, ensued, the last of which is before this Court. The third suit
arose in federal court, which Hartford, the bonding company, declined
to join, and during which the bonding company’s counsel made decla-
rations to the federal court, which may reasonably be interpreted as
contravening the bonding company’s actions sub judice.

On 14 November 2007, Shrijee LLC (owner and developer) contracted
with Helm Builders, LLC (general contractor) for the construction of a
Durham hotel project, known as Hotel Indigo. Under the contract Helm
agreed to furnish labor and materials for a total cost of $13,050,000, and
Helm was required to obtain a payment and performance bond.

On 20 December 2007, United Bank & Trust Company (lender)
issued a construction loan to Shrijee in the amount of $13,600,000 for
use on the project,! and Shrijee executed a “deed of trust, assignment
and security agreement” on the underlying hotel real property for the
benefit of the Bank, which was recorded on 21 December 2007 with the
Durham County Register of Deeds. At Helm’s request, on 22 February
2008, United Bank sent a letter (the 2008 Letter) to Helm “confirm{ing]
that the financing is available for the Hotel Indigo,” that “[t]he minimum

1. Farmers Bank & Trust was the original issuer of the loan and merged with United
Bank in November 2008. For purposes of this opinion, actions by Farmers Bank before the
merger are referred to as those of United Bank, its undisputed successor in interest.

bo

502 IN THE SUPREME COURT

OLD REPUBLIC NAT'L TITLE INS. CO. v. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.
[869 N.C. 500 2017)]

of $13,050,000 has been allocated for the contract amount to Helm
Builders, LLC for the construction of the project,” and that “payment.
authorizations will be determined and conducted by a third-party archi-
tect.” The Bank further stated: “We understand this letter is to be used
to release the Payment and Performance bonds for the construction of
this project.”

On 8 July 2008, Hartford issued a labor and material payment bond
and a performance bond “to guarantee HELM’s faithful performance of
HELM’s obligations under the Contract.” Helm had executed various
general indemnity agreements beforehand, dating back to 15 August
2005, which assigned to Hartford all of its rights under the construction
contract, including tort claims, and which also gave Hartford the discre-
tion to “assert and pursue all of the assigned . . . rights, actions, causes
of action, claims, and/or demands.”

Over the next two years, Helm substantially completed the Hotel
Indigo project, which received a conditional certificate of occupancy in
August of 2009, but Shrijee withheld payment for certain work. Hartford
subsequently made payments under the bonds to various subcontractors
whom Helm had failed to pay. On 28 January 2010, Helm sued Shrijee
in Superior Court, Durham County (Helm J), and ultimately obtained a
judgment for the unpaid work in the amount of $1,074,163.20, plus inter-
est of $352,796.40 and $278,287.05 in attorneys’ fees, on 20 October 2011
(the Shrijee Judgment).

During the pendency of the Helm I suit, on 31 January 2011, Helm
sued United Bank in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina (the federal action), alleging that the 2008
Letter, which “confirmed in writing . . . that financing was being made
available,” contained fraudulent “misrepresentations made by the Bank,”
namely, that the monies were not actually allocated to pay Helm. Helm
asserted claims of, inter alia, fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent
misrepresentation, and unfair and deceptive trade practices, all of which
relied upon the alleged misrepresentations in the 2008 Letter.

On 14 November 2012, counsel for Hartford contacted United
Bank to “reaffirm” that “Hartford was the lawful owner of the Shrijee
Judgment” under its previous general indemnity agreements. On
20 November 2012, Helm re-memorialized the agreement by executing
an “Assignment of Judgment,” filed with the Durham County Clerk of
Superior Court, which stated that “HIELM Builders, LLC does hereby fur-
ther assign, transfer and grant to Hartford all of its rights to sue... and
all other legal processes necessary to the enforcement of the [Shrijee]

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Judgment and all proceeds recovered,” and that “the [previous indem-
nity agreements] shall remain in full force and effect.”

Nonetheless, on 4 June 2013, Helm filed a complaint in Superior
Court, New Hanover County, against Hartford (Helm ID seeking, inter
alia, a declaratory judgment that Helm’s “Assignment is null and void,”
that Hartford “has no rights or interest in the [federal action],” and that.
“Helm’s claims asserted in the [federal action] are not subject to the
assignment provisions of the Hartford Indemnity Agreements.”

In light of Helm’s apparent assignment to Hartford of the Shrijee
Judgment and tort claims, United Bank became “concern[ed] over the
possibility of inconsistent verdicts should United Bank be forced to liti-
gate the same issues against Helm and Hartford in separate actions.”
Furthermore, faced with “Hartford’s alleged ownership of all claims
arising from or related to the [Hotel Indigo] Project,” the Bank became
concerned about not only the claims arising in Helm’s name, but those
arising in the name of Hartford. Ultimately, on 7 June 2013, the Bank
moved the federal court to substitute Hartford as the plaintiff or, in the
alternative, to join Hartford as a necessary party, noting that “it is undis-
puted that Hartford claims an interest in the subject of this [federal]
action,” and thus any related claims arising therefrom.

On 21 June 2013, in the action sub judice United Bank filed its com-
plaint in Superior Court, Durham County, against Hartford seeking, inter
alia, a declaratory judgment that the Bank's deed of trust securing the
construction loan has priority over Helm’s lien against Shrijee for “labor
performed or materials furnished.”?

On3July 2013, counsel for Helm, United Bank, and Hartford appeared
before the federal court regarding the Bank’s motion to include Hartford
as a plaintiff or necessary party in the federal action. Noting the recently
filed state court litigation, the Helm II suit and the suit sub judice, the
court inquired about the “purported dispute between the plaintiff here
[Helm] and Hartford with regard to what rights Hartford may or may not
have in this litigation.” The court expressed concerned about

who would be the real party in interest in this case, who
owns this action, and whether or not if Helm pursues
this case, Hartford would have some right to come along
at a later time and say we’re not bound by that, we own
this, and we think Helm should have pursued a different

2. Old Republic National Title Insurance Company, as the title insurer for the deed of
trust, is a co-plaintiff.

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course, we don’t think they waived anything that would
effect [sic] us. That bothers me. So my question to you is,
are Helm and Hartford on the same page with regard to
our proceeding ahead with this lawsuit?

Counsel for Hartford responded: “Hartford has no objection with
this case moving forward without Hartford... , and that Hartford does
not—will not seek to collaterally attack any judgment entered in this
action with Hartford not as a named party.” Counsel acknowledged
concerns regarding the possible estoppel of its claims in the related
actions, stating to the court: “To the extent there are—there is evidence
brought to the Court’s attention in this case, it would be Hartford’s
position that there would be no issue preclusion as to Hartford in that
related litigation.”

The court responded: “I don’t know that I can make any ruling with
regard to issue preclusion that would be applied by the state court, . . .
[and] anything I say or do would be only advisory with regard to what
the state court may find to be precluded.” In other words, if Hartford
declined to join the federal action, it would assume the risk that its
claims may be estopped in the related state court litigation.

Counsel for Hartford acquiesced, stating:

[I]t is clear from Hartford’s perspective that it is not anec-
essary party to this litigation. To the extent Your Honor
does have concerns as to any purported assignments of
the general agreements indemnity as they are brought
to the Court’s attention, or issues of equitable subrogation,
I think that that could be essentially be handled post-litiga-
tion through interpleader action.

The court agreed. Hartford ultimately declined to join the
federal action.

After extensive discovery and deposition testimony, Helm’s claims
arising from the 2008 Letter were tried before a jury in the federal
action. As described by United Bank, “Counsel for Hartford sat through
the majority of the trial and never advised the court of any reason to
add Hartford to the case.” On the verdict sheet the jury expressly con-
cluded that the February 2008 Letter did not contain “false information”
and that Helm did not suffer harm therefrom. Following adjudication
of Helm’s claims, on 16 July 2013, the federal court ordered that Helm
“have and recover nothing from [United Bank]” and dismissed the case
with prejudice.

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On 17 October 2013, Hartford answered United Bank’s complaint
sub judice and filed, inter alia, tort counterclaims based on the alleged
falsity of the 2008 Letter, which are the only claims at issue before this
Court.? Based on that alleged falsity, Hartford raises strikingly similar
tort counterclaims as those raised by Helm in the federal action, consist-
ing of fraud, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and
unfair and deceptive trade practices. Hartford alleges that United Bank
acted fraudulently by “ma[king] false and misleading representations”
in the 2008 Letter and that “Hartford would not have issued both the
Payment and Performance Bonds absent the Bank’s express represen-
tations” therein. In response, United Bank points to the related federal
action and raises affirmative defenses of “res judicata and/or collateral
estoppel” because the same tort claims “were litigated to final judg-
ment” by Hartford's assignor Helm. The Bank asserted other defenses
as well, including waiver, unclean hands, and “judicial estoppel/estoppel
by inconsistent positions” based on Hartford’s counsel's declarations to
the federal court.

On 25 February 2014, United Bank successfully moved for judgment
on the pleadings as to the tort counterclaims. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule
12(c) (2016). The trial court found that “Hartford is in privity with Helm”
due to Helm’s prior assignment. Given “Hartford’s counsel's representa-
tions to [the federal court]” and “Hartford’s decision not to participate in
the [federal action],” which would have afforded Hartford “a full and fair
opportunity to litigate its claims,” the trial court found that “Hartford is
bound by the judgment entered in the [federal action].” Citing Whitacre
Partnership v. BioSignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 591 S.E.2d 870 (2004), the
trial court concluded that “Hartford is judicially estopped from asserting
the counterclaims against United Bank.” In addition to finding judicial
estoppel, the trial court found that Hartford’s counterclaims were also
barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata because
the “central issue to the Counterclaims all revolves around the truth or
falsity of the statements in the February 2008 Letter,” which statements
the federal jury had already determined “to be true.” Hartford appealed
to the Court of Appeals.

In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal
of Hartford's tort counterclaims. Old Republic Natl Title Ins. Co.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,___ N.C. App. __, 785 S.E.2d 185, 2016 WL
1321139 (2016) (unpublished). The majority concluded that, though

3. On 13 October 2014, the trial court entered a consent judgment, which the parties
concede resolved all other remaining claims.

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506

“Hartford was in privity with respect to [Helm’s] claims in the federal
action,” Old Republic, 2016 WL 1321139, at *4, such participation “only
bars any claim Hartford might otherwise have (as assignee of [Helm’s]
claims) to recover for [Helm’s] damages based on [Helin’s] reasonable
reliance on representations made by United Bank,” id. The dissent.
opined that Hartford had “numerous opportunities” to join the federal
action and that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar
its tort counterclaims. Jd. at *12 (Hunter, Jr., J., dissenting). Neither the
majority nor the dissent, however, addressed the trial court’s imple-.
mentation of judicial estoppel, despite arguments made by the parties.
United Bank appeals as a matter of right.

North Carolina has long recognized the importance of candor with
the trial court. See Whitacre P’ship, 358 N.C. at 12, 591 S.E.2d at 878
(citing Kannan v. Assad, 182 N.C. 77, 78, 108 S.E. 383, 384 (1921)). The
doctrine of “judicial estoppel seeks to protect the integrity of the judicial
process,” id. at 16, 591 S.E.2d at 880, “which ‘lies at the foundation of all
fair dealing .. . and without which, it would be impossible to administer
law as asystem,’” id. at 27, 591 S.E.2d at 887 (quoting Armfield v. Moore,
44.N.C. (Busb.) 157, 161 (1852)). :

A party is generally not “allowed to change his position with respect
to a material matter, during the course of litigation, nor should he be
allowed to ‘blow hot and cold in the same breath.’ ” Id. at 12, 591 S.E.2d
at 878 (quoting Kannan, 182 N.C. at 78, 108 S.E. at 384); see id. at 29,
591 S.E.2d at 888 (Judicial estoppel is proper when “a party’s subsequent
position . . . [is] ‘ “clearly inconsistent” with its earlier position.’ ” (quot-
ing New Hampshire v. Maine, 582 U.S. 742, 750, 121 S. Ct. 1808, 1815,
149 L. Ed 2d 968, 978 (2001))). Unlike its “closely related” cousins, the
doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, judicial estoppel is “dis-
similar in critical respects.” Id. at 16, 591 S.E.2d at 880 (quoting Allen
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)). Judicial estop-
pel seeks to protect the judicial process itself and does not require “
‘mutuality’ of the parties,” detrimental reliance, or that an issue have
been “actually litigated in a prior proceeding.” Id. at 16-18, 591 S.E.2d at
880-82 (citations omitted).

As a “discretionary equitable doctrine,” id. at 26, 591 S.E.2d at 887,
judicial estoppel empowers the court with the necessary “means to
protect the integrity of judicial proceedings where [other] doctrines . . .
might not adequately serve that role,” id. at 26, 591 S.E.2d at 887 (cita-
tions omitted). Because judicial estoppel “protect[s] the courts rather
than the litigants, ... a court, even an appellate court, may raise [judicial]

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estoppel on its own motion.” Matter of Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th
Cir.) (footnote omitted) (citing Allen, 667 F.2d at 1168 n.5)), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 812, 111 S. Ct. 48, 112 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1990).

We review de novo the trial court’s order granting judgment on the
pleadings. See CommScope Credit Union v. Butler & Burke, LLP, __
N.C.__,__, 790 S.E.2d 657, 659 (2016). The trial court's implementation
of judicial estoppel as a basis to grant the order, however, is reviewed
for abuse of discretion, Whitacre P’ship, 358 N.C. at 38, 591 S.E.2d at 894
(citing New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750, 121 S. Ct. at 1814-15, 149 L. Ed
2d at 977-78), and will only be overturned “upon a showing that its rul-
ing was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision,” In re Foreclosure of Lucks, N.C. _3
—_, 794 S.E.2d 501, 506 (2016) (quoting State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749,
756, 340 S.B.2d 55, 59 (1986)).

Though the parties have primarily focused their briefing on the com-
panion doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, we proceed no
further than judicial estoppel. Hartford argues that it is not prosecuting
its “Assigned Claims” from Helm but rather “its own, independent Tort
Claims.” Such a factual inquiry, however, reaches beyond the appropri-
ate standard of review for judicial estoppel. Presented with Hartford's
counsel's apparently contradictory declarations before the federal court
and the substantial similarities of its tort claims to those of Helm, as
revealed in the pleadings, the trial court reasonably invoked judicial
estoppel to prevent Hartford from taking an inconsistent position, and
therefore, did not abuse its discretion.

By filing its similar tort counterclaims, the trial court could reason-
ably conclude that Hartford takes the action that it stated to the federal
court it would not take. See Whitacre P’ship, 358 N.C. at 29, 591 S.E.2d
at 888. The federal court expressed concerns that Hartford might “come
along at a later time and say we're not bound by [the federal action]”
and further advised Hartford that it could not rule regarding its state-
court estoppel concerns. Despite knowing of the estoppel risk, Hartford
declined to join the federal action and stated that it “will not seek to
collaterally attack any judgment entered in this action with Hartford not

‘as a named party.” See Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed)
39, 47-48 (1857) (“The law .. . will not... suffer a man to contradict or
gainsay, what, under particular circumstances, he may have previously
said or done.”); see also Collateral Attack, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014) (“[AIn attempt to undermine a judgment through a judicial pro-
ceeding in which the ground . . . is that the judgment is ineffective.”).

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Nonetheless, Hartford seeks to raise similar fraud claims to those of its
assignor Helm, all of which contest the same adjudicated facts in the fed-
eral action—the very situation about which the federal court expressed
concern. Moreover, United Bank moved to join Hartford as a necessary
party in that action, seeking to avoid such relitigation.

Allowing Hartford to proceed in the face of its own contravening
assertions made.before the federal court poses a significant threat of
inconsistent court determinations. See Whitacre P’ship, 358 N.C. at
18-14, 591 S.E.2d at 879; Jones v. Sasser, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 452,
464 (1836) (Estoppel is “founded upon the great principles of morality
and public policy . . . to prevent that which deals in duplicity and incon-
sistency.”); see also Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1, 18, 361 S.E.2d 734, 744
(1987) (Mitchell, J., concurring in result) (“A lawsuit is not a parlor game
....”). Permitting such a conflicting position and inconsistency would
serve to undermine public confidence in the judicial process.

In sum, Hartford had ample opportunity to litigate all of its related
claims, including those attributable to its assignor Helm and to Hartford
individually, by joining the federal action. Hartford elected not to do
so. Given the statements made by Hartford's counsel before the federal
court and the substantial similarity of its counterclaims, which contest
prior adjudicated facts, we conclude that the trial court reasonably
invoked judicial estoppel to restrain Hartford from adopting an incon-
sistent position. See Whitacre P’ship, 358 N.C. at 26-27, 591 S.E.2d at 887
Gudicial estoppel serves “as a gap-filler” and is appropriate “where the
technical requirements of” its companion estoppel doctrines may not be
met.). The trial court did not abuse its discretion and therefore, prop-
erly dismissed Hartford’s tort counterclaims. Accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s
dismissal of the tort counterclaims.

REVERSED.
Justice ERVIN dissenting.

The majority has resolved this case based upon judicial estoppel
considerations instead of the collateral estoppel and res judicata prin-
ciples upon which the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals relied
in determining that the trial court's order should be upheld. Moreover,
in holding that Hartford is judicially estopped from seeking relief from
United Bank separate and apart from Helm, the majority assumes, with-
out demonstrating, that (1) Hartford “collaterally attack[ed] the federal

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judgment post hoc” and (2) attempted to “re-litigat[e] its related claims
arising from the same facts.” On the contrary, the fact that two differ-
ent parties have asserted that the same defendant committed the same
torts in connection with the same overall transaction does not, at least
in my opinion, mean that these parties have asserted identical claims in
the event that those claims are supported by different facts. As a result,
given that the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, which pro-
vides the basis for our jurisdiction over this case, did not rely on judicial
estoppel principles in upholding the trial court’s decision and my belief
that the claims that Hartford seeks to assert against United Bank are
fundamentally different from the claims that Helm asserted against that
financial institution, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision with
respect to the judicial estoppel issue.

Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in the Court of
Appeals make any mention of judicial estoppel. Old Republic Natl. Title
Ins. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., ~N.C. App. —, 785 S.E.2d 185 (2016).
“When the sole ground of the appeal of right is the existence of a dis-
sent in the Court of Appeals, review by the Supreme Court is limited
to a consideration of those issues that are (1) specifically set out in the
dissenting opinion as the basis for that dissent, (2) stated in the notice
of appeal, and (3) properly presented in the new briefs required by Rule
14(d)(1)..... N.C. R. App. P. 16(b). Although “ ‘{tJhis Court will not hesi-
tate to exercise its rarely used general supervisory authority when nec-
essary to promote the expeditious administration of justice,’ and may do
so to ‘consider questions which are not properly presented according to
[its] rules,’ ” State v. Ellis, 361 N.C. 200, 205, 639 S.E.2d 425, 428 (2007)
(brackets in original) (quoting State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 26, 215
§.E.2d 589, 594 (1975)), I am not persuaded that we should do so in this
case given the limited extent to which the parties addressed this subject
in their briefs. As I read the record, United Bank mentioned the subject
of judicial estoppel in an eight line footnote found on the last page of its
principal brief in which it made the conclusory assertion that Hartford
was not entitled to “represent to the court in the Prior Action that it was
not a necessary party and would not collaterally attack the judgment.
entered in that action and then — three months after the jury verdict
— assert identical claims premised on the same facts and issues actu-
ally litigated to a final judgment in the Prior Action.” (Citing Whitacre
Pship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 21, 591 S.E.2d 870, 884 (2004)).
Although Hartford addressed the judicial estoppel issue in more detail,
it did little more than point out that the judicial estoppel issue had not
been addressed in the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals and
was not, for that reason, properly before the Court and to assert that,

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since it was “prosecuting its own, independent Tort Claims,” it was not
judicially estopped from pursuing those claims in this case. (Citing Price
v. Price, 169 N.C. App. 187, 191, 609 S.E.2d 450, 452 (2005), and Whitacre
P’ship, 358 N.C. at 29, 591 S.E.2d at 888-89)). As a general proposition,
deciding an issue that has not been fully briefed and argued by the par-
ties involves risks that I see no reason for the Court to take in this case.
In addition, I am not persuaded, and the majority has not demonstrated,
that a decision to address and resolve the judicial estoppel issue when
it is not properly before us promotes the “expeditious administration
of justice.” Ellis, 361 N.C. at 205, 639 S.E.2d at 428. As a result, I do
not believe that we should deviate from our usual practice of refraining
from deciding issues that are not properly before us. However, in light
of the fact that I disagree with the majority’s decision with respect to
the judicial estoppel issue as well, I will discuss the merits of the Court's
determination that Hartford is judicially estopped from pursuing the
claims that it has asserted against United Bank.

The matter before the Court stems from the trial court’s decision to
grant United Bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. “A motion for
judgment on the pleadings is the proper procedure when all the material
allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions oflaw
remain. When the pleadings do not resolve all the factual issues, judg-
ment on the pleadings is generally inappropriate.” Ragsdale v. Kennedy,
286 N.C. 180, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974) (citation omitted). “The
trial court is required to view the facts and permissible inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. All well pleaded factual
allegations in the nonmoving party’s pleadings are taken as true and all
contravening assertions in the movant’s pleadings are taken as false.” Id.
at 187, 209 S.E.2d at 499 (citing, inter alia, Beal v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Corp.,
312 U.S. 45, 61S. Ct. 418, 85 L. Ed. 577 (1941); Austad v. United States,
386 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1967)). A trial court order granting a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is reviewed de novo. See CommScope Credit
Union v. Butler & Burke, LLP, __N.C. __, __, 790 S.E.2d 657, 659 (2016)
(citation omitted). “Under the de novo standard of review, the [Court]
‘consider[s] the matter anew[ ] and freely substitut[es] its own judg-
ment for’ [that of the lower court].” Midrex Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of
Revenue, __N.C._, _, 794 S.E.2d 785, 791 (2016) (brackets in original)
(quoting N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 660, 599
$.E.2d 888, 895 (2004)).

Judicial estoppel is “customarily used to promote the fairness and
integrity of judicial proceedings.” Whitacre P’ship, 358 N.C. at 13, 591
S.E.2d at 879. “A party is not permitted to take a position in a subsequent

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judicial proceeding which conflicts with a position taken by him in a
former judicial proceeding, where the latter position disadvantages his
adversary.” Id. at 21, 591 S.E.2d at 884 (quoting Rand v. Gillette, 199 N.C.
462, 463, 154 S.E. 746, 747 (1930)). However, “a party may not be judi-
cially estopped to assert ‘inconsistent positions with respect to issues
that are only superficially similar.’ ” Id. at 16, 591 S.E.2d at 880 (quoting
18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.30, at 134-69
(8d ed. 1997)). In other words, “judicial estoppel is limited to the con-
text of inconsistent factual assertions.” Id. at 32, 591 S.E.2d at 890. For
that reason, in order to invoke judicial estoppel, a party must show that
(1) the opposing party “advanced an inconsistent factual position in a
prior proceeding, and (2) the prior inconsistent position was adopted
by the first court in some manner.” AXA Marine & Aviation Ins. (UK)
Lid. v. Seajet Indus. Inc., 84 F.3d 622, 628 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Wight
v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). In other
words, “there must be a true inconsistency between the statements in
the two proceedings”; “[i]f the statements can be reconciled there is
no occasion to apply an estoppel.” Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128
EF3d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing, inter alia, AXA Marine & Aviation,
84 F.3d at 628). As a general proposition, “a trial court’s application of
judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Whitacre P’ship,
358 N.C. at 38, 591 S.E.2d at 894 (citation omitted). “Where the essential
element of inconsistent positions is not present, it is an abuse of discre-
tion to bar plaintiff's claim on the basis of judicial estoppel.” Estate of
Means ex rel. Means v. Scott Elec. Co. Inc., 207 N.C. App. 718, 719, 701
S.E.2d 294, 299 (2010) (citation omitted). Thus, the issues before us in
this instance are: (1) whether the allegations and admissions in the par-
ties’ pleadings, considered in the light most favorable to Hartford, dem-
onstrate that Hartford took inconsistent positions in the related federal
case and in this case; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion
in invoking judicial estoppel to bar the assertion of Hartford’s claims. In
view of my belief, after reviewing the allegations and admissions in the
pleadings in the light most favorable to Hartford, that Hartford has not
made inconsistent assertions in the related federal case and this case,
I believe that the trial court erred by dismissing Hartford's claims on
judicial estoppel grounds.

In the related federal action, Helm asserted claims against United
Bank for (1) fraudulent and deceptive conduct, including the intentional
misrepresentation and concealment of material facts from Helm, that
constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices; (2) fraud, based upon
representations made to Helm by Michael Schornick in a February 2008
letter, by Judy Tackett in July 2009 telephone conversations, and by

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Kermin Fleming in both a voice mail and telephone conference in July
2009; (8) fraud in the inducement based upon these same representa-
tions to Helm; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) negligent misrepresenta-
tion based upon these same representations to Helm.

On 7 June 2018, United Bank filed a motion in the related federal
action seeking to have Hartford substituted for Helm as the party plain-
tiff on the grounds that Hartford, which owned any judgment that Helm
might obtain, was the real party in interest. At a hearing held for the
purpose of considering various pretrial motions held on 3 July 2013,
United States District Judge N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., expressed concern
that “Hartford would have some right to come along at a later time and
say we're not bound by [the federal court judgment], we own this, and
we think Helm should have pursued a different course, we don’t think
they waived anything that would [a]ffect us.” In response, counsel for
Hartford informed the federal district court that: (1) “Hartford has no
objection with this case moving forward without Hartford as a named
party to this litigation”; and (2) “Hartford . . . will not seek to collaterally
attack any judgment entered in this action.” (Emphases added.) In other
words, as the italicized statements make clear, the representations made
by Hartford’s counsel to the federal district court were strictly limited
to the issues currently before that forum. Shortly thereafter, Hartford’s
counsel told United Bank’s counsel in an e-mail that the representa-
tions that she had made to the district court in the federal proceeding
did not include any separate claims that Hartford might have against
United Bank. More specifically, Hartford’s counsel informed counsel
for United Bank that, while it “will not seek to re-litigate those claims
brought by HELM Builders in” the federal action, “Hartford did not rep-
resent to the [federal district court] that it was waiving and/or in any
way releasing any claim that it may possess against United Bank from
this date until the end of time, whether known or unknown.”

About three months after the conclusion of the federal trial, in which
the jury returned a verdict in United Bank’s favor, Hartford asserted
claims against United Bank for (1) fraud, based upon a contention that
the 22 February 2008 letter contained representations and omitted mate-
rial facts that had the effect of making that letter false and misleading
so as to deceive Hartford; (2) fraud in the inducement, based upon a
contention that United Bank had induced Hartford to provide bonding
services for the Hotel Indigo project based upon misleading representa-
tions and omissions to Hartford associated with the 22 February 2008
letter; (8) unfair trade practices, based upon the misleading representa-
tions and omissions to Hartford associated with the 22 February 2008

IN THE SUPREME COURT 513

OLD REPUBLIC NAT’L TITLE INS. CO. v. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.
[369 N.C. 500 (2017)]

letter; and (4) negligent misrepresentation, based upon a contention that
United Bank had failed to exercise ordinary care in its communications
with Hartford. In determining that Hartford is judicially estopped from
asserting these claims based upon the representations that it had made
to the district court during the related federal case, the majority has
failed to analyze the claims that Hartford has asserted against United
Bank in order to ascertain whether they are the same as those that Helm
asserted against United Bank. When such an analysis is undertaken, it is
clear to me that the claims that Hartford seeks to assert against United
Bank in this case are not identical to the claims that Helm asserted
against United Bank in the related federal action.

In seeking relief from United Bank, Hartford alleged that, “[p]rior to
the issuance of the performance and payment bond,” it “required verifi-
cation and written assurance from the Bank that the Bank had allocated
funds from the Construction Loan sufficient to cover and pay to HELM
Builders the base scope of the Shrijee Contract—i.e. $13,050,000.00” and
that, “prior to February 22, 2008, the Bank knew and understood that
HELM Builders’ surety had refused to issue the performance and pay-
ment bond in the amount of $13,050,000.00 for the Hotel Indigo Project
based solely upon the Bank’s issuance of the Bank Commitment Letter”
and that Hartford ‘required the Bank to provide assurances that it had
allocated funds from the Construction Loan sufficient to cover the base
scope of the Shrijee Contract—i.e., $13,050,000.00 in order for Hartford
to issue the performance and payment bond.” In light of that under-
standing, United Bank provided a letter from Michael E. Schornick, Jr.,
an Executive Vice President, to Scott McAllister, who served as Helm’s
President, dated 22 February 2008 in which Mr. Schornick stated that:

This letter is to confirm that the financing is available for
the Hotel Indigo, Durham, NC project. The minimum of
$13,050,000 has been allocated for the contract amount
to Helm Builders, LLC for the construction of the proj-
ect. Direct funding to Helm Builders LLC is contingent
upon Shrijee LLC authorization, draw percentages must.
be commensurate with completion percentage and
the standard lien waivers from both Helm and all sub-
contractors including vendors. Inspections & payment
authorizations willbedeterminedandconductedbyathird-
party architect.

We understand this letter is to be used to release the
Payment and Performance bonds for the construction of
this project.

514 IN THE SUPREME COURT

OLD REPUBLIC NAT'L TITLE INS. CO. v. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.
[369 N.C. 500 (2017)]

According to Hartford, United Bank “provided the February 2008 Bank
Letter to Har[t]ford, in care of HELM Builders, to obtain Hartford’s issu-
ance of the requested performance and payment bonds for the construc-
tion of the Hotel Indigo Project.” However, as Hartford discovered during
the trial of the related federal action, United “Bank had not allocated
at least $13,050,000 of the Construction Loan for the Shrijee Contract;”
“never intended to allocate at least $13,050,000.00 of the Construction
Loan for the Shrijee Contract;” and did not “include within the February
2008 Bank Letter sufficient information to put Hartford on notice that
the Bank was not financing one hundred percent (100%) of the construc-
tion costs for the Hotel Indigo Project” or “to put Hartford on notice that
the Bank had not allocated at least $18,050,000 of the Construction Loan.
for the Shrijee Contract.” Hartford contended that it “would not have
issued both the Payment and Performance Bonds absent the Bank’s
express representations to Hartford, set forth in the February 2008 Bank
Letter.” As a result, Hartford alleged that it was entitled to recover dam-
ages from United Bank for fraud, fraud in the inducement, unfair and
deceptive trade practices, and negligent misrepresentation.

The essence of the claim that Hartford seeks to assert against
United Bank is that Hartford could have reasonably understood the
statements contained in the 22 February 2008 letter to indicate that the
bank had committed sufficient funds from the construction loan to pay
for the construction of the Hotel Indigo project; that no such commit-
ment had, in fact, been made; and that Hartford would not have pro-
vided bonding services for the project had it understood that the bank
had not allocated sufficient funds from the construction loan to pay
for the construction of the Hotel Indigo. Although Helm had asserted that
the 22 February 2008 letter contained misrepresentations as to Helm
and that Helm would not have commenced construction had it known
that sufficient funds had not been committed from the construction loan
to pay the costs that Helm anticipated occurring in connection with the
construction of the Hotel Indigo, I do not believe that there is any incon-
sistency between arepresentation to a federal district court that Hartford
did not intend to collaterally attack or otherwise seek to relitigate claims
based upon representations that were allegedly false as to Helm, which
Hartford owned by virtue of an assignment that it had received from
Helm, and the assertion of claims based upon misrepresentations that
were alleged to have been made directly to Hartford, particularly given
that this issue is being resolved at the pleading stage without the benefit
of further factual development. As a result, given that the statements
made by Hartford to the federal district judge prior to the federal trial

IN THE SUPREME COURT 515

OLD REPUBLIC NAT'L TITLE INS. CO. v. HARTFORD FIRE INS. CO.
[369 N.C. 500 (2017)]

were limited to a commitment that Hartford would not attempt to reliti-
gate the claims that Helm had asserted against United Bank and given.
that the claims that Hartford has asserted against United Bank rest upon.
alleged misrepresentations made to Hartford rather than to Helm, I do
not believe that the undisputed information in the present record pro-
vides any basis for a determination that Hartford’s representations to
the federal district court conflict with the position that Hartford has
taken in this case. As a result, since the allegations set out in the parties’
pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to Hartford, provide ample
justification for a determination that Hartford did not make inconsistent
representations in the related federal case and in this case, I respectfully
dissent from the Court's decision to uphold the dismissal of Hartford’s
claims against United Bank on judicial estoppel grounds.1

Justices HUDSON and BEASLEY join in this dissenting opinion. |

1. In view of the fact that the Court has not reached the issue of whether Hartford
is precluded from asserting its claims against United Bank on collateral estoppel or res
judicata grounds, I express no opinion concerning the manner in which that issue should
be decided.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. STITH.
[369 N.C. 516 (2017)}

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v.
MORRIS LEAVETT STITH

No. 173A16
Filed 17 March 2017
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. __, 787 S.E.2d 40 (2016),
finding no error after appeal from a judgment entered on 24 September

2014 by Judge Claire V. Hill in Superior Court, Johnston County. Heard
in the Supreme Court on 15 February 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Charles G. Whitehead,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Kimberly P. Hoppin for defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 517

WALKER v. N.C. STATE BD. OF DENTAL EXAM'RS.
[369 N.C. 517 (2017)]
CYNTHIA WALKER, D.D.S,, Permrionzr

v
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS, Responpant

No. 95PA16
Filed 17 March 2017

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 782 S.E.2d 518
(2016), affirming an order entered on 23 October 2014 by Judge Elaine
Bushfan in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court
on 13 February 2017.

Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Elizabeth Brooks Scherer and
Ryan McKaig, for petitioner-appellant.

Ellis & Winters LLP, by Matthew W. Sawchak, Stephen D. Feldman,
Troy D. Shelton, and Paul M. Cox; and Carolin Bakewell for
respondent-appellee.

Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Clinton
R. Pinyan, for North Carolina Board of Pharmacy, amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.

518 IN THE SUPREME COURT

DOSS v. ADAMS:
[369 N.C. 518 (2017)

REGINA RADFORD DOSS ano )
AMY RADFORD BARRETT, as Tae )
Co-Apuinistrators oF THe ESTATE 5)
OF TONY MARIE PRIDGEN RADFORD)
)
Vv. ) From Nash County

)
BRENTON D. ADAMS, BRENT )d
ADAMS LAW OFFICES, PC, p/b/a y
BRENT ADAMS & ASSOCIATES y

No. IP17

ORDER.

The petition for discretionary review is allowed for the purpose of
addressing the issues set forth in the petition and the following addi-
tional issue: “Is plaintiffs’ second claim for relief (‘Breach of Fiduciary
Duty and Constructive Fraud’) barred by the statute of limitations or
statute of repose?”

By Order of the Court in Conference, this 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Michael R. Morgan
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 17th day of March, 2017.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk, Supreme Court of
North Carolina

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk, Supreme
Court of North Carolina

Be

IN THE SUPREME COURT 519

STATE v. GANN
[869 N.C. 519 2017)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )
)
v. 5) From Buncombe County
3 :
JIMMY LEE GANN 5)
No. 248P16
ORDER

The Court allows the State’s petition for discretionary review for
the limited purpose of remanding this case to the Court of Appeals in
order to consider any of the challenges to the trial court’s judgments
advanced in defendant's brief before that Court that the Court did not
address in its original opinion and, in the event that the Court of Appeals
determines that none of defendant's additional challenges to the trial
court's judgments have any merit, to modify its original decision so as
to provide for a further remand to the trial court for entry of judgment
and resentencing on the lesser included offense of second degree arson.

By order of the Court, this the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Morgan, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 17th day of March, 2017.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk, Supreme Court of
North Carolina

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk, Supreme
Court of North Carolina

520 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MARTINEZ
[369 N.C. 520 (2017)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )
vw } From Mecklenburg County
JESUS MARTINEZ }
No. 25P17
ORDER

Upon consideration of the Petition for Discretionary Review filed
by the State of North Carolina on 19 January 2017, the Court enters the
following order:

“The Court allows the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review for
the limited purpose of remanding this case to the Court of Appeals
for the purpose of determining whether the trial court’s instruction held
to have been erroneous by the Court of Appeals constituted plain error
as required by State v. Boyd, 222 N.C. App. 160, 730 S.E.2d 193 (2012),
rev'd for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion, 366 N.C. 548, 742
S.E.2d 798 (2013).”

By order of the Court, this the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Morgan, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 17th day of March, 2017.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk, Supreme Court of
North Carolina

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk, Supreme
Court of North Carolina

IN THE SUPREME COURT 521
Disposrrion oF Peririons For Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
16 Maron 2017
oo1Pi7 Regina Radford Pits’ PDR Under N.G.G.S. § 74-31 Special Order
Doss and Amy (COA16-446)
Radford Barrett,
as the Co-
Administrators of
the Estate of Tony
Marie Pridgen
Radford v. Brenton
D. Adams, Brent
‘Adams Law Offices,
PO, d/b/a Brent
Adams & Associates
ooaPi7 State v. Leonard, 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Paul Schalow (COA16-380) 01/6/2017
2. State's Petition for Writ of 2. Allowed
Supersedeas
8, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A-31 | 8, Allowed
005P17 Gary Warren Def’s (Westfield Insurance Company) | Denied
Spruill v. Westfield | PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-3L
Insurance Company, | (COA15-1829)
Allstate Property
and Casualty
Insurance Company
oosP17 ‘Mina Kompani 1. Def’s Pro Se Notice of Appeal 1. Dismissed
Hashemi v. Ali Reza | Based Upon a Constitutional Question | ex mero motu
Hashemi-Nejad (COA16-358)
2, Def's Pro Se PDR Under 2. Denied
N.G.GS. § TASL
009P17 State v. Eliazar Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Juan Mendoza (Coa16-224)
opi7 State v. Royal Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Spencer Robinson | (COA16-567)
o12P17 Eli Global, LLC and _| 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based on a Ls
Greg Lindberg v. Constitutional Question (COA16-186)
James A. Heas
ames net | 9, Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § TA-SL 2. Allowed
8, Plts’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal 3. Allowed

IN THE SUPREME COURT

‘Disposition or Petimions ror Discremionary Review Unper G.S, 7A-31

16 Marcu 2017

O15P17

‘Marlow Williams v.
Franke L, Perry, in
His Official Capacity
as Secretary,

North Carolina
Department of
Public Safety, and
Paul G. Butler, Jr.,in
His Official Capacity
as Chairman of

the North Carolina
Post-Release
Supervision and
Parole Commission

1. Pit’s Pro Se Notice of Appeal Based
Upon a Constitutional Question
(Coal6-372)

2. Plt’s Pro Se PDR Under
N.C.G.S. § 74-81

1. Dismissed
ex mero motu

2. Denied

O16P17

‘Timothy R. Poole
¥. State of North
Carolina

Pit's Pro Se Motion for Writ of
Mandamus ~

Denied

017P17

Settlers Bdge
Holding Company,
LLC; Mountain

‘Air Development
Corporation;
Virginia A. Banks;
William R. Banks;
Jeani H. Banks;
Michael R. Watson;
Sheree B. Watson;
Virginia A. Banks,
William R, Banks,
and Sheree B.
Watson in Their
Capacity as
‘Trustees of William
A. Banks Revocable
‘Trust; Morris Atkins
in His Capacity as
‘Trustee of William
Banks Family
Irrevocable Trust
Number 1; and
Morris Atlins in His
Capacity as Trustee
of William Banks
Family Irrevocable
‘Trust Number 2

v. RESNC Settlers
Edge, LLC

1. Pits’ PDR Under N.C.G.
(COA15-1055)

2. Def's Conditional PDR Under
NCGS. § TA31

3. § TABL

1, Denied

2. Dismissed
as moot

O1sP17

State v. Daniel
Edward Palacios

Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorart to
Review Order of COA

Dismissed

Ol9P17

State v. Susan
Annette Allen

Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31

Denied

IN THE SUPREME COURT 523
Disposition or Petrmions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
16 Marcs 2017
o2iP17 James Townsend —_| Pits’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § TAS1 Denied
and Lucretia (COA16-478)
‘Townsend v. N.C.
Department of
‘Transportation
023P15.2 State v. Jackie 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Emmitt Moorehead | Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Halifax County
2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In 2. Allowed
Forma Poasperis
8. Def's Pro Se Motion to 3, Dismissed
Appoint Counsel as moot
o2aPi7 State v. Calvin Def’s Pro Se PDR Under Denied
Lamar Adams N.C.GS. § 74-81 (COAI6-1884)
025P17 State v. Jesus 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Martinez (Coa16-374) 011972017
Dissolved
08/16/2017
2. State's Petition for Writ, 2. Dismissed
of Supersedeas as moot
8, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S8.§7A-81 | 8, Special
Order
o27A17 Karen Head 1. Defs’ Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1.—
v. Gould Killian CPA | Dissent (COA16-525)
Group, PA,
G. Baward Towson, | 2: Pit's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31 2. Allowed
1, CPA
o29P17 Hany A. Wiley and | 1. Pits’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-81 1. Denied
Gerald D. Gilman v. | (COAI6-460)
18 Communicatior
Vertex Aerospace, | 2M. Nan Alessandra's Motion for 2. Allowed
LLC "| Admission Pro Hac Vice
0B1P17 State v. Jarvis Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7-31 Denied
Montrale Bell (COA16-326)
0s3P17 State v. William Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7-31 Denied
Davis Whitaker (COA16-521)
o37P17 State v. Kevin Def’s Pro Se PDR Under Denied
John Kirlanan N.C.GS. § 781 (COAI6-407)

524, IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposirion oF Penrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
16 Marca 2017
088P17 State v. Anton L. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Christen Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Wake County
2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In _| 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
8. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Appoint 8. Dismissed
Counsel ‘as moot
041PI6 E. Brooks Wilkins | Plt's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A31 Denied
Family Medicine, | (COA15-217)
PA. v. WakeMed;
WakeMed d/b/a
Falls Pointe
Medical Group;
Inam Rashid, MD;
Michele Casey,
MD; Monica Oei,
MD; and Leslie
Robinson, MD
042P17 Maria Vaughan 1. Pit’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A81 1. Allowed
v. Lindsey (COA15-1230)
Mashburn, M.D. and ji
Lakeshore Women’s | 2. Defs' Conditional PDR Under 2, Denied
Specialists, PC N.O.GS. § 74-31
048P17 State v. John Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to | Denied
Phillip Locklear Review Decision of COA (COA16-179)
oa7p17 Statev. AveryJoe | 1. Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7AS1 1. Denied
Lal, Jr. (COA16-608)
2, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 2, Dismissed
‘as moot
060P17 State v. Robert Def's Pro Se Motion to the Denial of Denied
Wayne Smith Writ of Mandamus .
Ervin, J.,
recused
Hudson, J.,
reeused
O51P17 In the Matter of Appellant's Petition for Writ of Denied
Mary Ellen Brannon | Certiorari to Review Decision of COA

Thompson

(COA15-1380)

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Petirions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

16 Marcu 2017
052P17 Roy A. Cooper, 1. Pl’s Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
IM, in His Official | (COAP17-101) 02/13/2017
Capacity as . ‘
Governor of the | 2-Plt's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2. Dismissed
State of North ‘9s moot
Sean 8, Plt's Petition for Writ of Gertéorari to | 8. Dismissed
Sica Gapecity | Review Order of Coa as moot
as President Pro
‘Tempore of the
North Carolina
Senate; and Timothy
K. Moore, in His
Official Capacity
as Speaker
of the North
Carolina House of
Representatives
058P17 State v. Billy Det’s Pro Se Motion fox Writ of Dismissed
Joe Edwards Supervisory Control 03/03/2017
O54P17 State v. David 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
Felton Gertiorari to Review Order of COA
2,Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In _| 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
8, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 3. Dismissed
Counsel ‘as moot
Ervin, J.,
recused
056P17 Dr Robert Corwin | 1. Def’s British American Tobacco, 1. Allowed
as Trustee forthe | PLC) Motion for Temporary Stay 02/20/2017
Beatrice Corwin | (GOA16-1884)
Living Irrevocable . mi, .
‘Trust, on Behalf of || 2.Def's @ritish American Tobacco, 2
aClass of Those. | PLC) Petition for Writ of Supersedeas
Similarly Situated | 5, pet's (British American Tobacco, 8
v. British American 2 .
Toba os PLC) PDR Under N.C.GS. § 731
Reynolds American, | 4, Gary A. Bornstein’s Motion to be 4,
Ine; Susan M. Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Cameron; John
P Daly; Neil R.
Withington; Lue
Jobin; Sit Nicholas
Scheele; Martin D.
Feinstein; Ronald
S. Rolfe; Richard B.
‘Thornburgh; Holly
K. Koeppel; Nana
Mensahy Lionel L.
Nowell, IN John J.
Zillmer; and Thomas

©, Wajnet

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disrosrrion or Peririons ror Discretionary Review Unver G.S. 7A-31

16 Marcu 2017
06317 Statev, Antwarn | 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Lee Rogers 02/23/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ of 2. Allowed
‘Supersedeas 03/15/2017
08517 Slate v. Jefirey 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Robert Parisi 02/24/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
ossP17 State v. Rocky 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Kurt Williamson | (COA16-631) 02/27/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ of 2
‘Supersedeas
3, State's PDR Under N.G.GS.§7A31 | 3.
4. State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. | 4.
to Review Order of GOA
0ssP17 Arkeem Hakim 1. Petitioner's Pro Se Motion for Notice | 1. Dismissed
Jordan. State of | of Appeal
North Caroli
‘orth Carolina 2. Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | 2. Denied
Habeas Corpus
3, Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Proceed | 3. Allowed
as a Man Without Proper Funds
Exvin, J.,
recused
o74P17 Nathaniel Bryant | 1. Plt’s (Nathaniel Bryant) Pro Se Motion | 1. Denied
and Joseph L. for Temporary Stay 03/13/2017
Gillespie v. Char
Wilbur Bryant and | 2-Ples (Nathaniel Bryant) Pro Se 2. Denied
Carl Bryant Petition for Writ of Supersedeas 03/14/2017
078P17 Inthe Matter of | 1. Appellant's Motion for Temporary _| 1. Allowed
the Foreclosure _| Stay (COAI6-658) 03/13/2017
ofa Deed of Trust .
Executed by Bruce | 2: Appellants Petition for Writ af 2
5. Adams Dated Supersedeas
December 28, 2004
and Recorded in
Book 18194 at
Page 266 in the
Mecklenburg
County Public
Registry, North
Carolina
0siPi7 State. Gregory __| Def’s Pro Se Motion to Stay and Legal
Alan Adams, Jr Notice (COAI6-397)

IN THE SUPREME COURT 527
Disposition of Petitions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
16 Mares 2017
082P15-2 | Inthe Matter Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Allowed
of ABC. Certiorari to Review Order of COA
(COA16-495)
ossP17 State v. Thomas Def’s Pro Se Motion for Petition for Writ | Denied
Stout, Jr of Prohibition 03/14/2017
O8sP17-2 State v. Thomas Def's Pro Se Motion for Petition for Writ | Denied
Stout, Jr. of Prohibition 08/16/2017
084P15-5 State v. Curtis Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Louis Sangster Mandamus
181Pi6-4 Statev.Somchai | Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Denied
Noonsab Habeas Corpus 02/23/2017
1B1P16-5 State v. Somchai Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Default —_ | Denied
Noonsab in the Matters of Denied Writ of 03/10/2017
Habeas Corpus
152PA16 Catawba County, | Pit's Motion to Allow Amicus Curiae to | Allowed
by and through Participate in Oral Argument, 08/09/2017
its Child Support
Agency, ex rel.
Shawna Rackley
v. Jason Loggins
158P0610 | State v. Derrick 1. Def's Pro Se Motion for Tort Claim | 1. Dismissed
. D.B
oger 2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In 2, Allowed
Forma Pauperis
164P 162 State v. David 1, Def’s Pro Se Motion for Notice of 1. Dismissed
‘Michael Wilson Appeal (COAP15-759)
2, Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR 2, Dismissed
190P16-2 Joseph Earl Clark, | Petitioner’s Pro Se Motion for PDR Dismissed
Iv, North Carolina
Department of
Public Safety

528 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposirion or Perrrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.8. 7A-31
16 Marci 2017
211PA16 SED Holdings, 1. Defs’ Motion to Appear 1. Allowed
LLGv. 8 Star 11/01/2016
aceon 2, Plt’s Motion to Stay Proceedings 2. Special Order
TMPSLLC, Mark | Against 3 Star Properties, LLC Due to | 11/01/2016
Hyland, and Home | Bankruptey 8, Special Order
Servicing, LLC 8, Pits Motion that Plaintiff be 11/01/2016
Permitted to Proceed Now in the
‘Trial Court Against the Remaining
Defendants
4, Pls Motion to Lift Stay Order 4
5, Defs’ Motion to Allow Time to 5. Allowed
Respond to Motion of Plaintiff to 02/02/2017
Dissolve the PDR Allowed by this Court
21216 Brian Blue Plt's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
v.Mountaire Farms, | (COA15-791)
Inc., Mountaire
Farms of North
Carolina. Corp.,
Mountaire Farms,
LLC, Charles
Branton, Daniel
Pate, James Lanier,
Robert Garroutte,
alida Robert
Garroutte, Jr,
Christopher Smith,
Halley Ondona,
‘Thomas Saufley,
Detra Swain, as
Executrix of the
Estate of Clifton
‘Swain, the Estate
of Clifton Swain,
and Bradford Scott
Hancox, Public
Administrator of
Cumberland County,
North Carolina, and
as Successor or
Substitute Personal
Representative and/
or Administrator
and/or Collector of
the Estate of
Clifton Swain
237P16-2 | AveryM. Riggsbee | Employees Plt’s Pro Se Motion for Dismissed
v. W. Baine Jones, Jr, | Enforcement Orders
Judge Government
240P16 Mary Ponder 1, Pit’s Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1. Dismissed
v. Mark Ponder Constitutional Question (COAI5-1277) | ex mero mots
2. Pit’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-B1 2. Denied

IN THE SUPREME COURT 529

Disposrrion or Perrrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

16 Marcs 2017
243P16 State v. Jimmy 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1 Allowed
Lee Gann (COA16-1344) 06/27/2016
Dissolved
03/16/2017
2. State's Petition for Writ 2. Dismissed
of Supersedeas as moot
8, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A31 | 3. Special
Order
4, Def's Conditional PDR Under N.C.GS. | 4. Dismissed
§7AB1 as moot
245A08-2 | Statev. Terrance _| 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Lowell Hyman (COA16-98) 03/10/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ, 2.
of Supersedeas
247P162 Jonathan Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | Denied
Eugene Brunson | Habeas Corpus . 02/15/2017
v. North Carolina
Department of
Public Safety's
Superintendent
Felix Taylor
of Pasquotank
Correctional
Institution and State
of North Carolina,
etal,
247P 163 Jonathan Eugene _| Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ of | Denied
Brunson Habeas Corpus 03/10/2017
v. North Carolina
Department of
Public Safety's
Superintendent
Felix Taylor
of Pasquotank *
Correctional
Institution and State
of North Carolina,
etal.
297P 16 Inthe Matter of the | Petitioners’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 | Allowed
Adoption of CHM. | (COA16-1057)
aminor child

530

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disrosrrion or Petirions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

16 Marcu 2017

SiPI6

Davidson County
Broadcasting
Company, Inc.,
Larry W. Edwards,
and Wife, Shirley
Edwards v. Iredell
County v. Wayne
‘McConnell, Rusty
N. McConnell, Ann
and Don Scott, Bill
Mitchell, and David
Lowery, intervening
Respondents

1. Petitioners’ PDR Under
NA § 7A-B1 (COAI5-959)

2. N.C. Association of Broadcasters’
Conditional Motion for Leave to File
Amicus Brief

1 Denied

2. Dismissed
as moot

824416

State v. Antwan
Anthony (DEATH)

Def’s Motion for Stay of Appellate
Proceedings in Light of Pending Racial
Justice Act Motion

Allowed
02/01/2017

826P15-5

Bunl Anderson
Howell v. North
Carolina Wayne
County Department
of Health and
‘Human Services, by
and through, Reese
Phelps; Lou Jones

Petitioner's Pro Se Motion to Proceed Jn
Forma Pauperis

Dismissed

S30A16

Allscripts
Healthcare, LLG
v. Etransmedia
‘Technology, Inc.

‘W. Swain Wood's Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel for Petitioner-Appellant

Allowed

833P16-2

State of North
Carolina ex rel.
Commissioner of
Insurance v. North
Carolina Rate
Bureau

In the Matter of
the Filing Dated
January 3, 2014

by the North
Carolina Rate
Bureau for Revised
Homeowners’
Insurance Rates
and Homeowners’
Insurance Territory
Definitions

North Carolina Rate Bureav’s Petition
for Reconsideration

Denied
02/14/2017

835P16

State v. Gyrell
Shavonta Lee

Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-B1
(COA15-1852)

Allowed

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Petirions ror Discretionary Review Unver G.S. 74-31

16 Marcu 2017

531

S41P12-4

State v. Donald
Durrant Farrow

1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for PDR
(COAP16-888)

2. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to Review Order of COA

1. Dismissed

2. Dismissed

Exvin, J.,
recused

349P16

KB Aircraft
Acquisition, LLC

v. Jack M. Berry, Jr,
and Goforth

Road, LLC

Pits PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7-31
(COA15-823)

Allowed

352P16

State v. Jeral
Thomas Ore, Jr.

1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay
(COA16-100)

2, State's Petition for Writ
of Supersedeas

8. State's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1, Allowed
09/29/2016
Dissolved
03/16/2017

2. Denied

3. Denied

363A14-2

Sandhill
Amusements, Ine.
and Gift Surplus,
LLG v. Sheriff of
Onslow County,
North Carolina,
Hans J. Miller, in His
Official Capacity;
State of North
Carolina, Governor
Patrick Lloyd (Pat)
McCrory, in His
Official Capacity;
Secretary of the
North Carolina
Department of
Public Safety,
Frank Perry, in His
Official Capacity;
Director of the
North Carolina
State Bureau of
Investigation,
Bernard W. (B.W.)
Collier, If, in His
Official Capacity;
Director or Branch
Head of the Alcohol
Law Enforcement
Branch of the
State Bureau of
Investigation, Mark
J. Senter, in His
Official Capacity

1. Def’s (Sheriff of Onslow County) PDR
Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31 (COAL6-390)

2. Def’s (Sheriff of Onslow County)
Motion for Leave to Withdraw PDR

L-

2. Allowed

Ervin, J.,
recused

532, IN THE SUPREME COURT
‘Disrostrion or Perimions ror Discrerionary Review Unpur G.S. 7A-31
16 Marcu 2017
B68P142 State v. Kirk 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ 1. Denied
James Keller of Mandamus 02/17/2017
2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In, 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis 02/17/2017
8, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 3, Dismissed
Counsel as moot
02/17/2017
368P16 Animaw Azige, 1. Pits! Notice of Appeal Based on a 1. Dismissed
Tewodros Constitutional Question (COA15-760) | ax mero motu
Abebe, Meseret .
‘Tefera’ Zenash 2. Pts’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-B1 2. Denied
Raeernet: awit | 5:Def's (Kassahun) Motion to Dismiss | 8. Dismissed
Getahan Edom A. | Pisintiff Azige’s Claims Against All as moot
Gora. Aromarenre | Defendants Without Prejudice
Getaneh, Tsige 4, Def's (Kassahun) Motion to Dismiss. 4. Dismissed
Kibret, Tewodrose | Pits’ Claims Against Defendant as moot
G. Tirfe, Hailu Afro, | Kassahun Without Prejudice
Mequanint Tsegaw, Ervin, J.,
Zebene Mesele, recused
Meaza Jembere,
‘Nigatu Kassa,
‘Almaz Mekonen,
Aster Mles, Addisu
Fentahum Ayalwe,
Askele Yeshanew,
and Haimonot
Gedamu v. Holy
‘Trinity Ethiopian
Orthodox Tewahdo
Church, Solomon
-Gugsa, Luleseged
Deribe, Tesfa
Gashareba, Samuel
Agonafer, Samson
Kassaye, Gedewon
Kassa, Yohannes
‘Assefa, ‘Tassew
Kassahun, and
Eyoel Mulugeta
S75P09-7 State v. Avenger 1, Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ 1. Denied
Ridgeway of Mandamus
2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Supplement —_| 2. Dismissed
as moot

8. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Amend

3. Dismissed as
moot

Exvin, J.
recused

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposirion oF Petitions ror Discrenonary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

16 Marcu 2017
887P05-4 State v. Earl 1. Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 1, Dismissed
James Watson ‘to Review Order of COA (COAP16-688)
2. Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 2. Dismissed
to Review Order of Superior Court,
Catawba County
8. State's Motion to Strike Reply to 3. Dismissed
State’s Response to Petition for Writ as moot
of Certiorari
Ervin, J.,
recused
388P16 Tawoos Bazargani, 1. Plt's Pro Se Motion for Notice of 1. Dismissed ex
MD v. Dr. David Appeal (COA16-176) ‘mero motu
Morris Marks, Duke : _. . :
‘University Hospital, 2. Plt’s Pro Se Petition for Rehearing 2. Dismissed
Dake university; | 3, Pits Pro Se Motion to Supplement | 8. Allowed
Disease Control Notice of Appeal,
Association
395P13-2 State v. John 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Lewis Wray, Jr. Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Cleveland County
2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
8, Def's Pro Se Motion to 3, Dismissed
Appoint Counsel. as moot
401P16 State v. Gary Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Arthur Metzger (COA15-1093)
402P14-2 State v. Bobby 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Lee Rawlings Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Wayne County
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Proceed In 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
3. Def's Pro Se Motion to 8. Dismissed
Appoint Counsel as moot
407P13-3 ‘State v. Shawn Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Denied
Germaine Fraley Habeas Corpus 08/14/2017
Ervin, J.,
recused
407P14-5 State v. Dwain 1. Def's Pro Se Motion for Notice of 1. Dismissed
Cornelius Ferrell Appeal (COA16-627) ex mero motu
2. Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR 2. Dismissed
411A94-6 State v. Marcus Def's Motion for Extension of Time to Allowed
Reymond Robinson | File Petition for Writ of Certiorart

534 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposrrion or Pevirions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
16 Marcu 2017 *
421P16 State v. Kendra Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-81 Denied
Potts Smith (COAL6-236)
426416 ‘The North Carolina | 1. Def’s Pro Se Notice of Appeal
State Bar v. David C. | Based Upon a Constitutional Question
Sutton, Attorney | (COA15-1198)
2, Plt's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 2, Allowed
8. Def’s Motion to Amend Notice 8, Denied
of Appeal
427816 Abrons Family 1. Motion to Admit Bryant C. Boren, Jr. | 1. Allowed
Practice and Urgent | Pro Hac Vice 01/31/2017
PA,
oan see os, 2, Motion to Admit Van H. Beckwith 2. Allowed
PA; Highland Pro Hae Vice OU/s1/2017
Obstetrical-
Gynecological
Clinic, PAS
Children’s Health
of Carolina, PA;
Capital Nephrology
Associates, P.A.;
Hickory Allergy &
Asthma Clinic, PA;
Halifax Medical
Specialists, PA.
and Westside OB-
GYN Center, PA,
Individually and on
Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated
¥ North Carolina
Department of
Health and Human
Services and
Computer
Sciences Corp.
428P16 State v. Ottis McGill | 1. Def's PDR Under N.0.G.S. § 74-31 1. Denied
(COA16-296)
2, State's Motion to Deem Response 2. Allowed
‘Timely Filed
436P16 State v. Howard 1. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Frandin Eubanks | (COAI6-251) 12/05/2016
Dissolved
08/16/2017
2. Def’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2. Denied
8. Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-B1 8. Denied
437P16 Johnnie M, Darden, | Petitioner's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-81 | Denied
Sr. v. North Carolina | (COA16-377)
Department of
Public Safety

IN THE SUPREME COURT 535
Dispossrion oF Perrrions ror Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
16 Marcu 2017
439P16 State v. Twyan 1, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31 1. Denied
Kenneth Coleman | (COA16-305)
2. Def’s Motion for Temporary Stay 2. Allowed
12/09/2016
Dissolved
03/16/2017
3. Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 3. Denied
440P16 State v. Christopher | 1. State's Motion for'Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Glenn Turner (COA16-656) 12/06/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ, 2, Allowed
of Supersedeas
8, State's PDR Under N.G.G.S. §7A-31 | 3, Allowed
441P16 State v. Marian 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Olivia Curtis (COAI6-458) 12/06/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2. Allowed
of Supersedeas
3, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A31 | 3. Allowed
445P16 Jamestown 1. Def’s (NCDOT) PDR Under N.C.@8. | 1. Denied
Pender, LP. v.NC | §7A-81 (COA15-025)
Department of
‘Transportation and | 2. Def's (Wilmington Urban Area 2. Dismissed
Wilmington Urban | Metropolitan Planning Organization) —_| as moot
Area Metropolitan | Conditional PDR Under
Planning NCGS. §7AB1
Organization 3, Def’s (Wilmington Urban Area 3. Allowed
Metropolitan Planning Organization)
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as
Counsel of Record and Notice of
Appearance of Substitute Counsel
4. Plt’s Conditional PDR Under 4. Dismissed
NCGS. § 74-31 as moot
4A7P16 SheilaMcLean+. | Pit’s Pro Se PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-81 | Denied
Bank of America, | (COA16-97)
N.A., Nationstar
Mortgage LLC, and
Wells Fargo Bank,
NA, Solely in Its
Capacity as Trustee
for the Securitized
Asset Backed
Receivables, LLC,
2005-FR5 Mortgage
Pass-Through
Certificates, Series
2005-FR5

536 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposition or Peririons ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7-31
16 Marc 2017
449pi-15 | Statev. Charles _] Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ Dismissed
Everette Hinton —_| of Mandamus Emin, J,
recused
452P16 State v. John 1, Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 1 Allowed
Eddie Mangura (Coa1e-344) 12/16/2016
Dissolved
03/16/2017
2. Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2, Denied
3, Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 3.—
Constitutional Question
4,Def's PDR Under N.C.G.8.§7A31 | 4. Denied
5, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 5, Allowed
455P16 Slate. William | -1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Sheldon Howell —_| (COA16-308) 12/20/2016
2. State's Petition for Writ of 2, Allowed
Supersedeas 3. Allowed
3. State's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A‘31
456P16 Inthe Matter of _| Respondent-Mother’s Pro Se PDR Under | Denied
WD. N.C.GS. § 74-81 (COA16-351)
487P16 State v. Bric Def's PDR Under N.G.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Scott Turner (CoA16214)
459P16 State v. James 1. Def's PDR Under N.C.GS.§ 74-31 | 1. Denied
Howard Killian (COAI6-268)
2, Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 2. Allowed
12/22/2016
Dissolved
03/16/2017
3. Def’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 3: Denied
4, State's Conditional PDR Under ,
NGS. § 74-31 4. Dismissed
as moot
463P16 Statev. Dwayne __| 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1 Dismissed
Hoyte Dockery Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Buncombe County 2, Dismissed as
2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint moot
Counsel

IN THE SUPREME COURT 537

Disposition or Petrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

16 Marcx 2017
506P082 State v. Antwan 1. Det’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Terrell Murphy Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Pitt County
2, Allowed
2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis
8, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 3, Dismissed
Counsel as moot
BIPALL2 | State v. Harry 1. Def’s Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Sharod James (COA15-684) 05/20/2016

2. Det’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2. Allowed
8. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 3.—

Constitutional Question
4, Def’s PDR Under N.C.G-S, § 7A-31 4, Allowed
5, State’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal 5. Allowed
6. State’s Conditional PDR Under 6. Allowed
N.C.G.S. § 7A-31
514P13-6 State v. Raymond —_| Def's Pro Se Motion for Notice of Dismissed ex
Dakim Harris Joiner | Appeal ‘mero motu
669P03-5 | State v. Tony Def’s Pro Se Motion for Rehearing of Dismissed
Robert Jones Motion to Dismiss

Ervin, J.,
recused

538 IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE LaBARRE
[869 N.C. 538 (2017)]

IN RE: INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 15-222

DAVID Q. LaBARRE, ResronpENt

_ No. 370A16
Filed 5 May 2017

This matter is before the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376 and
-877 upon a recommendation by the Judicial Standards Commission
entered 26 September 2016 that Respondent David Q. LaBarre, an
Emergency Judge of the General Court of Justice, be censured for con-
ductin violation of Canons 1 and 2A of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct, and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376.
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on
22 March 2017, but determined on the record without briefs or oral argu-
ment pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Rule 2(c) of the Rules for Supreme Court Review of
Recommendations of the Judicial Standards Commission (2015).

No counsel for Judicial Standards Commission or Respondent.

ORDER

The issue before this Court is whether Judge David Q. LaBarre
(Respondent) should be censured for violations of Canons 1 and 2A of
the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disre-
pute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b). Respondent has not challenged
the findings of fact made by the Judicial Standards Commission (the
Commission) or opposed the Commission’s recommendation that he be
censured by this Court.

On 25 April 2016, the Commission Counsel filed a Statement of
Charges against Respondent alleging that he had

engaged in conduct inappropriate to his judicial office
when, on December 16, 2015, he drove his vehicle reck-
lessly and while substantially impaired, putting at risk his
own life and the lives of others [and that] Respondent’s
belligerent, offensive, and denigrating behavior towards
the responding law enforcement officers and emer
gency personnel was outrageous and unbecoming of
a judicial officer, bringing into question whether it is

IN THE SUPREME COURT 539

IN RE LaBARRE
[869 N.C. 538 (2017)]

appropriate for the Respondent to continue to serve as an
Emergency Judge.

According to the allegations in the Statement of Charges, Respondent's
driving while substantially impaired and belligerent behavior towards
Jaw enforcement officers and emergency personnel violated Canons
1 and 2A of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct. As a result,
Commission Counsel asserted that Respondent’s actions “constitute[d]
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judi-
cial office into disrepute, or otherwise constitutes grounds for disciplin-
ary proceedings pursuant to Article 30 of Chapter 7A of the General
Statutes of North Carolina.”

On 3 June 2016, Respondent filed an answer in which he admit-
ted the factual allegations in the Statement of Charges and expressed
remorse “for this uncharacteristic lapse in judgment.” On 2 August 2016,
Respondent and Commission Counsel filed a number of joint eviden-
tiary, factual, and disciplinary stipulations as permitted by Commission
Rule 22 that tended to support a decision to censure Respondent. Also,
Respondent “voluntarily resigned his commission as an Emergency
Judge, and agree[d] not to seek another commission in the future.” On
12 August 2016, the Commission heard this matter.

On 26 September 2016, the Commission filed a Recommendation of
Judicial Discipline, in which it made the following findings of fact:

1. Respondent served honorably as a District Court
Judge in Durham County from 1978 until 1994. He was
appointed Chief District Court Judge on 3 January 1985
and served as Chief District Court Judge of Durham
County from 3 January 1985 through 12 January 1990.
Respondent was elected and served honorably as a
Superior Court Judge in Durham County from 1994 until
his retirement in 2002. Respondent was commissioned by
the Governor as an Emergency Superior Court Judge and.
an Emergency District Court Judge in January 2003 and
January 2004 respectively.

2. Shortly before 11:00 p.m. on 16 December 2015,
the Durham Police Department received a call from a
concemed driver reporting a suspected drunk driver. The
caller provided the license plate number and indicated
that the vehicle was driving northbound on Hillandale
Road in Durham, North Carolina. The caller also reported
that this vehicle had nearly hit four (4) other vehicles.

540

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE LaBARRE
[869 N.C. 588 (2017)]

8. After checking the license plate number provided
by the caller, Durham Police Officer J. A. Alcala deter-
mined that the vehicle was registered to Respondent,
whose address was listed as near where the vehicle had
been observed. In response, Officer Alcala drove to the
registered address for the vehicle. Upon arriving at
the apartment complex where the vehicle was registered,
Officer Alcala observed a vehicle with the license plate
number that matched the number reported to the police.

4. As Officer Alcala approached the vehicle, he
noticed that the engine was still running and noted the
only occupant, later identified as Respondent, was a
male slumped over in his seat and who appeared to be
sleeping at the wheel. The officer also noticed that the
vehicle was still in drive with Respondent's foot on
the brake. After knocking on the window and waking him,
Respondent opened the vehicle’s window, at which time
Officer Alcala detected a strong odor of alcohol emanat-
ing from Respondent. Because of Respondent's level of
impairment, another officer who arrived at the scene had
to put the car in park as Respondent was unable to do
so himself.

5. When Respondent finally exited his vehicle, he
was unable to stand on his own without leaning against
the vehicle, his speech was slurred, and he was unable
to comprehend many of the officer’s questions or follow
basic instructions necessary for the officer to perform
several field sobriety tests.

6. At approximately 11:25 p.m., at the officer’s
request, Respondent submitted to an initial portable
breath test, which registered a positive result for the pres-
ence of alcohol. When asked to provide the requisite sec-
ond sample, however, Respondent became belligerent,
used offensive and vulgar expletives towards the officer,
and refused to submit to a second test. Officer Alcala
called Durham County Emergency Medical Services
(EMS) to the scene to evaluate Respondent for a possible
medical emergency. While waiting for Durham County
EMS to arrive, Respondent continued to use vulgar lan-
guage and expletives towards the police officers at the
scene as they attempted to help him remain steady.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE LaBARRE
[869 N.C. 588 (2017)}

7. While at the scene, Officer Alcala examined
Respondent's vehicle and noticed fresh damage and paint.
transfer on the right corner of the front bumper. The
officer also observed the rear left tire rim was cracked
and the front right tire had grey marks consistent with
being scraped on a curb. While the officer was inspect-
ing the vehicle, Respondent again directed expletives and
rude statements towards the officer. Respondent’s use
of vulgar language and expletives towards law enforce-
ment officers at the scene continued as they asked him
routine questions and attempted to help him contact a
family member.

8. When EMS arrived, Respondent refused to cooper-
ate as they tried to take his vital signs, and he directed the
same vulgar language and expletives towards EMS per-
sonnel as he had towards the police officers. Respondent.
was transported by ambulance to the local hospital
after concerns were raised about his health and level of
impairment. Respondent’s offensive language continued
throughout the ride to the local hospital.

9. The ambulance carrying Respondent arrived at
the hospital at approximately 12:20 a.m. on 17 December
2015. After his admission, Respondent continued to use
vulgar language and expletives towards police officers
who were present. In addition, Respondent refused to
submit to a blood draw to determine his level of impair-
ment, forcing Officer Alcala to secure a search warrant to
obtain a sample of Respondent's blood. During the interim.

period, Respondent again continued to direct expletives’

towards other officers and workers trying to assist him.

10. Officer Alcalareturned to the hospital with asearch
warrant for Respondent’s blood, and at approximately
2:20 a.m., a sample of Respondent’s blood was taken by a
nurse and submitted to the N.C. State Crime Laboratory
for analysis. After the blood draw, Respondent was issued
a citation for driving while impaired and released into the
care of his family.

11. A true and correct copy of the Durham County
Police Report detailing this incident and Respondent's
arrest is attached to the Stipulation as Exhibit 1.

541

542 IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE LaBARRE
[369 N.C. 538 (2017)]

12. The matter of State v. David Q. LaBarre, Durham.
County file number 15CR3988, was heard on 5 February
2016. On that date, Respondent appeared with counsel,
and entered a plea of guilty to driving while impaired.
Respondent was placed on twelve (12) months of unsu-
pervised probation, ordered to obtain a substance abuse
assessment and complete any recommended education
or treatment, pay a $100.00 fine, court costs and commu-
nity service fee, to complete twenty-four (24) hours of
community service, and comply with other conditions
of probation.

13. Respondent has paid all court ordered financial
obligations, completed the court ordered substance abuse
assessment and recommended education/treatment, and
has completed the court ordered community service.

(Citations omitted.) Based upon these findings of fact, the Commission.
concluded as a matter of law that:
A. Driving While Impaired
1. Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct sets
forth the broad principle that “[a] judge sliould uphold
the integrity and independence of the judiciary.” To do so,
Canon 1 requires that a “judge should participate in estab-
lishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should personally
observe, appropriate standards of conduct to ensure that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary shall be
preserved.”

2. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct gener-
ally mandates that “[a] judge should avoid impropriety
in all the judge’s activities.” Canon 2A specifies that “[a]
judge should respect and comply with the law and should
conduct himself/herself at all times in a manner that pro-
motes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.”

3. The clear, cogent and convincing evidence sup-
porting the Commission's findings of fact show[s] that
Respondent violated the criminal laws of the State of
North Carolina by driving while impaired, thereby putting
the lives of others and himself at risk.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE LaBARRE
[869 N.C. 538 (2017)]

4. Respondent agrees that by driving while impaired
in violation of the criminal laws of the State of North
Carolina, he acted in violation of Canon 1 of the North
Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 2A of the
North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, and engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-376.

5. Based upon the agreement of Respondent and
the clear, cogent and convincing evidence supporting the
Commission’s findings of fact that Respondent violated
the laws of the State of North Carolina by driving while
impaired, the Commission concludes that Respondent:
(1) failed to personally observe standards of conduct to
ensure the integrity and independence of the judiciary is
preserved, in violation of Canon 1 of the North Carolina
Code of Judicial Conduct; and (2) failed to respect and
comply with the law and to conduct himself in a man-
ner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Canon 2A of
the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.

6. The Commission further concludes that the
facts and circumstances aggravate this misconduct to
a level warranting more than a private letter of caution.
Accordingly, Respondent's violations of Canon 1 and
Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct also amount to
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-376(b).

B. Belligerent, Offensive and Denigrating
Behavior Towards Law Enforcement and
Emergency Personnel

7. The clear, cogent and convincing evidence sup-
porting the Commission's findings of fact show[s] that
Respondent engaged in belligerent, offensive and deni-
grating behavior towards local law enforcement and
emergency personnel as they executed their official duties
and attempted to assist Respondent during the incident.
underlying these proceedings.

543

544

(Citations omitted.) Based upon these findings of fact and conclusions of
Jaw, the Commission recommended that this Court censure Respondent
for “driving while impaired in violation of the laws of the State of North
Carolina” and “engaging in belligerent, offensive and denigrating behav-
ior towards law enforcement and emergency personnel of the State of
North Carolina.” The Commission based this recommendation on the
Cornmission’s earlier findings and conclusions and the following addi-

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE LaBARRE
[369 N.C. 588 (2017)]

8. Respondent agrees that by his belligerent, offen-
sive, and denigrating behavior towards law enforcement
and emergency personnel, he acted in violation of Canon
1 and Canon 2A of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office
into disrepute in violation ‘of N.C.G.S. §[ ]7A-376.

9. Based upon the agreement of Respondent and
the clear, cogent and convincing evidence supporting
the Commission's findings of fact, the Commission con-
cludes that Respondent: (1) failed to personally observe
standards of conduct to ensure the integrity and indepen-
dence of the judiciary is preserved, in violation of Canon 1
of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and (2)
failed to conduct himself at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartial-
ity of the judiciary, in violation of Canon 2A of the North
Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.

10. The Commission further concludes that the
facts and circumstances aggravate this misconduct to
a level warranting more than a private letter of caution.
Accordingly, Respondent's violations of Canon 1 and
Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct also amount to
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-376(b).

tional dispositional determinations:

1. Respondent agreed to enter into the Stipulation to
bring closure to this matter and because of his concern for
protecting the integrity of the court system. Respondent.
understands the negative impact his actions have had on.
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Even after
an esteemed judicial career spanning thirty-seven (37)

IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE LaBARRE
[369 N.C. 588 (2017)]

years, Respondent acknowledges his behavior during this
single incident has jeopardized the public’s confidence in
his ability to continue to serve fairly and impartially.

2. Respondent has voluntarily resigned his com-
mission as an Emergency Judge, and agrees not to seek
another commission in the future, in lieu of facing a more
severe disciplinary recommendation.

3. Respondent has an excellent reputation in his
community. The actions identified by the Commission
as misconduct by Respondent appear to be isolated and
do not form any sort of recurring pattern of miscon-
duct. Respondent has been fully cooperative with the
Commission's investigation, voluntarily providing infor
mation about the incident and fully and openly admitting
error and remorse.

4, Respondent's record of service to the judiciary, the
profession and the community at large is otherwise exem-
plary. Respondent has been active in community and civic
affairs, including service as chairman of the Deacons and
chairman of the Trustees at Greystone Baptist Church.

5. Respondent agrees to accept a recommendation
of censure from the Commission and acknowledges that
the conduct set out in the stipulation establishes by clear
and convincing evidence that his conduct is in violation
of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and is
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute in violation of North Carolina
General Statute § 7A-376(b).

6. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-377(a5), which
requires that at least five members of the Commission
concur in a recommendation of public discipline to the
Supreme Court, all seven Commission members present
at the hearing of this matter concur in this recommenda-
tion to censure Respondent.

(Citations omitted.)

545

When reviewing a recommendation from the Commission in a judi-

cial discipline proceeding, “the Supreme Court ‘acts as a court of original
jurisdiction, rather than in its typical capacity as an appellate court.’ ”
Inve Mack,___N.C.___, __, 794S.B.2d 266, 273 (2016) (order) (quoting

546 IN THE SUPREME COURT

IN RE LaBARRE
[369 N.C. 588 (2017))

Inre Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 428, 722 8.E.2d 496, 503 (2012) (order). In
conducting an independent evaluation of the evidence, “[w]e have discre-
tion to ‘adopt the Commission’s findings of fact if they are supported by
clear and convincing evidence, or [we] may make [our] own findings.’ ”
Id. at___, 794 S.E.2d at 273 (quoting In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 428,
722 §.E.2d at 503 (alterations in original)). “The scope of our review is
to ‘first determine if the Commission’s findings of fact are adequately
supported by clear and convincing evidence, and in turn, whether those
findings support its conclusions of law.’ ” Id. at ___, 794 S.E.2d at 274
(quoting In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429, 722 $.B.2d at 503).

After careful review, this Court concludes that the Commission’s
findings of fact, including the dispositional determinations set out above,
are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in the record.
In addition, we conclude that the Commission’s findings of fact support
its conclusions of law. As a result, we accept the Commission’s findings and
conclusions and adopt them as our own. Based upon those findings
and conclusions and the recommendation of the Commission, we con-
clude and adjudge that Respondent should be censured.

Therefore, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-876(b) and -377(a5), it is
ordered that Respondent David Q. LaBarre be CENSURED for viola-
tions of Canons 1 and 2A of the North Caroliia Code of Judicial Conduct
and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings
the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b).

By order of the Court in Conference, this the 3rd day of May, 2017.

s/Michael R. Morgan
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 5th day of May, 2017.

Clerk of the Supreme Court.

s/J. Bryan Boyd
Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT 547

STATE v. WALSTON
[869 N.C. 547 (2017)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ROBERT TIMOTHY WALSTON, SR.

No. 392PA13-3
Filed 5 May 2017

Witnesses—expert—repressed memory and suggestibility of
memory
The trial court did not err in a prosecution for child sex offenses
by excluding the testimony of a defense expert regarding repressed
memory and the suggestibility of memory. A defense expert is not
required to examine or interview the prosecuting witness as a pre-
requisite to testifying about issues concerning the prosecuting wit-
ness at trial. Rule 702 does not mandate any particular procedural
requirements for evaluating expert testimony, and the record here
demonstrated sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s deci-
sion to exclude the testimony.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. __, 780 S.H.2d
846 (2015), reversing judgments entered on 17 February 2012 by Judge
Cy A. Grant in Superior Court, Dare County, and ordering that defendant
receive anew trial, after the Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded
the Court of Appeals’ prior unpublished decision in this case, State
v. Walston, 239 N.C. App. 468, __ S.E.2d ___, 2015 WL 680240 (2015).
Heard in the Supreme Court on 13 February 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Sherri Horner Lawrence,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Mark Montgomery for defendant-appellee.
BEASLEY, Justice.

In this case we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion
in excluding defense expert testimony regarding repressed memory and
the suggestibility of memory. We find that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion, and we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
reinstate defendant's convictions.

548 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. WALSTON
[369-N.C. 547 (2017)]

On 14 November 2011, Robert Timothy Walston, Sr. (defendant) was
indicted for a number of child sex offenses. After a trial in February
2012, the jury found defendant guilty of one count of first-degree sex-
ual offense, three counts of first-degree rape of a child, and five counts
of taking indecent liberties with a child. Defendant appealed his con-
victions arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in excluding his
expert’s testimony.! See State v. Walston, ___ N.C. App. __, ___,780
S.E.2d 846, 849-50 (2015). The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant
and granted him a new trial. Jd. at___, ___, 780 S.E.2d at 857-58, 862.
The State petitioned this Court for discretionary review, arguing that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant's proffered
expert testimony and that exclusion of the expert testimony was not
prejudicial. We agree, and thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals.

Before trial defendant notified the State that he planned to intro-
duce expert testimony from Moina Artigues, M.D. regarding repressed
memory and the suggestibility of children. The State successfully moved
to suppress Dr. Artigues’s testimony. The State argued that the testimony
was not relevant or admissible pursuant to Evidence Rules 702 and 403
because the case did not involve “repressed” or “recovered” memories;
that the expert was not qualified under Rule 702 to testify regarding
“false” memories, specifically because she had not examined or evalu-
ated the two alleged victims; and that the testimony should be excluded
under Rule 403 because its potential to prejudice or confuse the jury
would substantially outweigh its probative value

At the pretrial hearing, the trial court expressed doubt that this case
concerned repressed or recovered memories and indicated that if the
case did not concern repressed or recovered memories, Dr. Artigues’s
testimony about that subject would be irrelevant or misleading.. In
response, defense counsel contended that even if Dr. Artigues was not
permitted to testify about repressed or recovered memories, she should
be allowed to testify about the suggestibility of memory in children
based on certain statements the victims made during discovery, which

1. This case has been before this Court and the Court of Appeals a number of times
on other issues. The history of this case is detailed in the most recent Court of Appeals
opinion and is not discussed here. See State v. Walston, N.C. App. __, _, 780 S.E.2d
846, 848-49 (2015).

2. The State also requested that the court prohibit the testimony because of defen-
dant’s late disclosure of the expert witness. See N.C.G.S. § 154-910 (2016). At the pretrial
hearing, the court did notrule on the State's request to exclude Dr. Artigues's testimony on
this ground.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. WALSTON
[869 N.C. 547 (2017)]

indicated the children’s relatives may have pressured them to say they
had been abused. The State countered this argument by asserting that
the trial court should exclude the expert testimony because, inter alia,
the expert had not interviewed or examined the victims or anyone else
involved in the case. The State relied on State v. Robertson, 115 N.C.
App. 249, 260-61, 444 S.E.2d 643, 649 (1994), for this proposition. The
State noted that Robertson was similar to the case at bar in that the
defendant in Robertson sought to introduce expert testimony concern-
ing suggestibility of children; there the trial court excluded the expert

* testimony on grounds that its probative value was outweighed by the
potential to prejudice or confuse the jury because the expert had never
examined or evaluated the victims in any way. Id. at 261, 444 S.E.2d at
649. The State also argued here that defendant's expert testimony should
be excluded because there was no basis for Dr. Artigues’s opinion.

The trial court ruled that Dr. Artigues could not testify, but allowed
voir dire to preserve Dr. Artigues’s testimony for appellate review. After
the conclusion of voir dire, defense counsel requested that the court
reconsider its suppression ruling. Defense counsel asserted that Dr.
Artigues’s opinion was relevant in relation to scientific opinions regard-
ing repressed memory and suggestibility of memory, was relevant to
assist the jury in determining credibility, and was not unfairly prejudicial
to the State. The State reasserted its arguments that this case does not
involve repressed memories and that, as to suggestibility, “this type of
expert testimony does not come in when the expert has not evaluated
the victim . . . [which] didn’t take place in this case.” The court stated it
was “not inclined to change [its] ruling.”

On appeal, as to whether the trial court erred in excluding defen-
dant’s proffered expert testimony from Dr. Artigues, defendant argued
to the Court of Appeals that Rule 702 does not require that a witness
personally interview the person about whom she will testify. Defendant
cited to previous cases from this Court and the Court of Appeals in
which witnesses were allowed to testify without having interviewed
or examined the person about whom they were testifying. See State
v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 268-71, 446 S.E.2d 298, 314-15 (1994) (conclud-
ing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an expert
who had not personally interviewed a defendant to testify about that
defendant’s mental condition), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 115 S. Ct. 953,
180 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995); State v. Jones, 147 N.C. App. 527, 541-44, 556
§.E.2d 644, 653-55 (2001) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing a developmental and forensic pediatrician to
testify about her knowledge of the medical records and behavior of the

550 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. WALSTON
{869 N.C. 547 (2017)]

deceased victim), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 351,
562 S.E.2d 427 (2002). Defendant also argued that he was prejudiced
by the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Artigues’s testimony; he asserted that
there was a reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a differ-
ent result had the trial court admitted Dr. Artigues’s testimony.

The State’s argument to the Court of Appeals largely relied on the
similarities between this case and Robertson. The State argued that
Dr. Artigues did not examine or evaluate the victims or anyone else
involved but rather based her opinion only on an analysis of the discov-
ery material and defense counsel's trial notes. Thus, the State asserted
that Dr. Artigues’s testimony was properly excluded in compliance with
Robertson. Additionally, the State noted that Dr. Artigues did not gener-
ate a formal report outlining her opinion and the basis of her opinion
regarding the suggestibility of child witnesses. The State also argued
that Dr. Artigues’s testimony was irrelevant.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for a
new trial. The Court of Appeals found that “the trial court improperly
excluded Dr. Artigues’[s] testimony based upon the erroneous belief that
her testimony was inadmissible as a matter of law” under Robertson.
Walston, __ N.C. App. at ___,780 S.E.2d at 857-58. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that the discussion of Robertson during the pretrial motions
hearing implied that the trial court relied on Robertson to prohibit Dr.
Artigues’s testimony because Dr. Artigues had not interviewed the pros-
ecuting witnesses.

The Court of Appeals clarified that Robertson did not recognize or
create a “per se rule that expert opinion concerning the general suggest-
ibility of children may only be given at trial if the testifying expert has
examined the child or children in question.” Id. at ___, 780 S.E.2d at 853.
Rather, “expert opinion regarding the general reliability of children’s
statements may be admissible so long as the requirements of Rules 702
and 403... are met.” Jd. at ___, 780 S.E.2d at 853. Thus, Dr. Artigues’s
expert opinion should not be excluded as a matter of law on grounds
that she did not examine the children and may be admissible if in com-
pliance with the Rule 702 and Rule 403 requirements.

The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court didnot make “any find-
ings of fact or conclusions of law explaining the rationale” for “exclud-
ing Dr. Artigues’[s] testimony.” Id. at__, 780 S.E.2d at 857. Specifically,
there was no evidence in the record that the trial court had conducted a
Rule 702 analysis, id. at___,__, __, 780 S.E.2d at 858, 860, 862, nor did
the trial court “make any findings or conclusions related to Rule 403,” td.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 551

STATE v. WALSTON
[869 N.C. 547 (2017)]

at ___, 780 S.E.2d at 862. Therefore, the Court of Appeals panel found
itself unable to “make any determination concerning whether the trial
court would have abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Artigues’[s] tes-
timony pursuant to either Rule 702 or Rule 403.” Id. at ___, 780 S.E.2d
at 862. Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s convictions and
remanded for a new trial. Id. at__, ___, 780 S.E.2d at 858, 862.

The State petitioned this Court for discretionary review. The only
issue currently before this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred
in concluding that the trial court improperly excluded Dr. Artigues’s
testimony. We conclude that it did and hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Artigues’s testimony.

“In reviewing trial court decisions relating to the admissibility of
expert testimony evidence, this Court has long applied the deferential
standard of abuse of discretion.” State v. King, 366 N.C. 68, 75, 733
§.E.2d 535, 539-40 (2012). Trial courts act as a gatekeeper in determining
admissibility of expert testimony, and a trial court’s decision to admit or
exclude expert testimony “will not be reversed on appeal unless there
is no evidence to support it.” Id. at 75, 733 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting State
v. King, 287 N.C. 645, 658, 215 S.E.2d 540, 548-49 (1975), judgment
vacated in part per curiam, 428 U.S. 903, 96 S. Ct. 3208, 49 L. Ed. 2d
1209 (1976)).

North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702 controls the admission of
expert testimony. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (2016). Rule 702(a) states:

(a) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion,
or otherwise, if all of the following apply:

(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data.

(2) The testimony is the product of reliable princi-
ples and methods.

(3) The witness has applied the principles and meth-
ods reliably to the facts of the case.

Id. (emphases added). A Rule 702 analysis takes into consideration the
qualifications of the expert as well as the reliability and relevance of

552 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. WALSTON
[869 N.C. 547 (2017)}

the expert testimony. See State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 884-93, 787 S.E.2d
1, 5-11 (2016) (providing a thorough analysis of Rule 702 requirements).

Rule 702(a), as amended in 2011, does not mandate
particular procedural requirements for exercising the
trial court’s gatekeeping function over expert testimony.
The trial court has the discretion to determine whether
or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed
to investigate reliability. A trial court may elect to order
submission of affidavits, hear voir dire testimony, or con-
duct an in limine hearing. More complex or novel areas
of expertise may require one or more of these procedures.
In simpler cases, however, the area of testimony may be
sufficiently common or easily understood that the testi-
mony’s foundation can be laid with a few questions in the
presence of the jury. The court should use a procedure
that, given the circumstances of the case, will secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and develop-
ment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.

Id. at 898, 787 S.E.2d at 11 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quo-
tation marks omitted).3

If expert testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702, it may still
be inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 403 if the “probative value [of
the testimony] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1,

3. Here both parties made their arguments to the Court of Appeals under the former
Rule 702 standard. The Court of Appeals determined that the new 702 standard should
apply to this case based on the date of the superseding indictment. State v. Walston, 229
N.C. App. 141, 151-52, 747 S.E.2d 720, 728 (2018), rev'd, 367 N.C. 721, 766 S.E.2d 312 (2014).

Ina previous opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals determined that because the
new Rule 702 requirements are more stringent than the former requirements, defendant
was not prejudiced by the trial court's application of the incorrect standard in exclud-
ing Dr. Artigues's testimony. In making that determination, however, the Court of Appeals
failed to address the merits of defendant's argument that the exclusion of Dr. Artigues's
testimony was improper because it was based on an incorrect understanding of the law.
‘State v. Walston, 239 N.C. App. 468, 8.B.2d___, 2015 WL 680240 (2015) (unpublished).

In the most recent Court of Appeals opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals did
address the merits of defendant's argument, as discussed above, and agreed with defen-
dant that Dr. Artigues’s testimony was improperly excluded. Walston, _N.C. App. _,
780 S.E.2d 846.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 553

STATE v. WALSTON
[869 N.C. 547 (2017)]

Rule 403 (2016); see King, 366 N.C. at 75-76, 733 S.E.2d at 540. In State
v. King this Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the State’s prof-
fered expert testimony; even though Rule 702 requirements had been met,
“the expert testimony was inadmissible under Rule 403” because “the
probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”
366 N.C. at 76, 733 S.E.2d at 540. “Whether to exclude evidence under
Rule 403 is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. at
76, 733 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30, 41, 347 S.E.2d
783, 789 (1986)). “If all other tests are satisfied, the ultimate admissibil-
ity of expert testimony in each case will still depend upon the relative
weights of the prejudicial effect and the probative value of the evidence
in that case.” Id. at 76-77, 733 S.E.2d at 541. “[W]hen a judge concludes
that the possibility of prejudice from expert testimony has reached the
point where the risk of the prejudice exceeds the probative value of
the testimony, Rule 403 prevents admission of that evidence.” Id. at 77,
733 S.E.2d at 541.

Under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to this case,
our role is to decide whether the trial court’s decision to exclide Dr.
Artigues’s testimony was “so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision.” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324
S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985). Though the trial court did not explicitly state or
demonstrate its Rule 702 or Rule 403 analysis,‘ “[a] correct decision of
a lower court will not be disturbed on review simply because an insuf-
ficient or superfluous reason is assigned.” State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276,
290, 357 S.E.2d 641, 650 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 916, 108
S. Ct. 267, 98 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1987).

Here the Court of Appeals was correct to clarify that a defendanit’s
expert witness is not required to examine or interview the prosecuting
witness as a prerequisite to testifying about issues relating to the pros-
ecuting witness at trial. We agree with and affirm the Court of Appeals’
legal analysis on this issue. Such a requirement would create a trou-
bling predicament given that defendants do not have the ability to com-
pel the State’s witnesses to be evaluated by defense experts. See State
v. Fletcher, 822 N.C. 415, 419, 368 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1988).

4, When specific findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required, it is within
the trial court's discretion to make fact findings “if a party does not choose to compel a
finding through the simple mechanism of so requesting.” Wathins v. Hellings, 321 N.C. 78,
82, 361 S.E.2d 568, 571 (1987). We have previously stated that “[wJhen the trial court is not
required to find facts and make conclusions of law and does not do s0, it is presumed that
the court on proper evidence found facts to support its judgment.” Bstrada v. Burnham,
316 N.C. 318, 324, 341 S.B.2d 538, 542 (1986) (citations omitted).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. WALSTON
[869 N.C. 547 (2017)}

We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals’ determination
that the trial court based its decision to exclude defendant's proffered
expert testimony solely on an incorrect understanding of the law. Based
on the discussion of Robertson during the pretrial motions hearing, as
well as the parties’ briefs on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that
the trial court excluded Dr. Artigues’s testimony based on an errone-
ous belief that Robertson created a per se rule of exclusion when an
expert has not interviewed the victims. The trial court, however, never
stated that Robertson created such a rule nor that it based its decision to
exclude Dr. Artigues’s testimony solely on Robertson.

Furthermore, as this Court notes in McGrady, Rule 702 does not
mandate any particular procedural requirements for evaluating expert
testimony. See 368 N.C. at 893, 787 S.E.2d at 11. Here the record dem-
onstrates that the trial court heard arguments from both parties regard-
ing the subject matter of Dr. Artigues’s proffered testimony, conducted
voir dire and considered the testimony that defendant wished to elicit
from Dr. Artigues, and considered the parties’ Rule 403 balancing argu-
ments. Moreover, during voir dire the trial court at times engaged Dr.
Artigues directly concerning possible confusion over how the victims
used specific words in their deposition—such as being “grilled”> by an
adult and “flashbacks”°—and Dr. Artigues’s use of the clinical defini-
tions of these words in her evaluation. Thus, the record demonstrates
that there is evidence to support the trial court’s decision to exclude Dr.
Artigues’s testimony and that the trial court properly acted as a gate-
keeper in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Therefore,
we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

5 [PROSECUTOR] So you're assuming that this grilling was
implanting or suggesting memories to the young girls?

[DR. ARTIGUES] I don’t see how it could be otherwise.

{THE COURT] You don’t see how? You can’t think of any situation
where grilling can be otherwise?

[THE COURT] Grilling to you may be different from what grilling
means to the mother, to me or anyone else?

(DR. ARTIGUES] Right, that is true,

6. [PROSECUTOR] You would agree, would you not, that ordinary lay
people who don't live in the psychiatry world, when they use the word
flashback they're using it like what you're defining as memory cues?

[DR. ARTIGUES] That is very possible, yes.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 555

UNITED CMTY. BANK v. WOLFE
[869 N.C. 555 (2017)]

Dr. Artigues’s testimony.” We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and reinstate defendant's convictions.

REVERSED.
—
UNITED COMMUNITY BANK (GEORGIA)
v.

THOMAS L. WOLFE an BARBARA J. WOLFE, Trusroas or THE THOMAS L. WOLFE
AND BARBARA J. WOLFE IRREVOCABLE TRUST, THOMAS L. WOLFE, Inpiipuauy,
ap BARBARA J. WOLFE, Inpivipuatix

No. 289PA15
Filed 5 May 2017

Mortgages—foreclosure—anti-deficiency statute—true value of
property—evidence not sufficient
The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for
plaintiff-bank in an action under N.C.G:S. § 45-21.36, North Carolina’s
anti-deficiency statute. The borrower must show that the creditor’s
successful foreclosure bid was less that the property's true value;
merely reciting the statutory language or asserting an unsubstanti-
ated opinion is not sufficient.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 775 S.E.2d
677 (2015), reversing an order on summary judgment entered on
30 June 2014 by Judge Marvin P. Pope, Jr. in Superior Court, Transylvania
County, and remanding for further proceedings. Heard in the Supreme
Court on 20 March 2017.

Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Davis, PA., by Robert A. Mays,
Mark A. Pinkston, and Esther E. Manheimer, for plaintiff-appellant.

Donald H. Barton, P-C., by Donald H. Barton; and Matthew J.
Barton for defendant-appellees.

Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P, by
Clint S. Morse and Robert A. Singer, for North Carolina Bankers
Association, amicus curiae.

7. Because we find no abuse of discretion, it is unnecessary to conduct a prejudice
analysis and we decline to do so.

556 IN THE SUPREME COURT

UNITED CMTY. BANK v. WOLFE
[369 N.C. 555 (2017)]

NEWBY, Justice.

North Carolina’s anti-deficiency statute, N.C.G.S. § 45-21.36, affords
protection to a borrower following a nonjudicial power-of-sale fore-
closure by accounting for the “true value” of the foreclosed property,
thereby potentially reducing the borrower's remaining indebtedness. To
assert this statutory protection, however, the borrower must allege and
show that the creditor’s successful foreclosure bid was substantially
less than the property’s “true value” by presenting substantial compe-
tent evidence of such value. The borrower’s own unsupported opinion,
standing alone, is insufficient. Because defendants here failed to fore-
cast substantial competent evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to the foreclosed property's “true value,” we reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

In August 2008, shortly before the collapse of the real estate market,
plaintiff United Community Bank (Georgia) loaned defendants $350,000
to purchase certain real property situated in Transylvania County, North
Carolina. The loan was secured by a deed of trust.! Sometime later
defendants defaulted. Ultimately, in August 2013, the Bank foreclosed
by nonjudicial power of sale under the deed of trust. At the sale the
Bank bought the property for $275,000 as the highest and only bidder.

_The Bank had based its bid on an independent appraisal of the prop-
erty dated March 2013, which valued the property at $275,000. The net
proceeds realized from the foreclosure sale ($275,000 minus expenses)
failed to satisfy the outstanding debt, resulting in a deficiency of over
$50,000. The Bank then listed the property for sale at $279,000. After
receiving no suitable market response, the Bank lowered the asking
price to $244,500 in October 2013, before eventually selling the property
in December 2018 for $205,000.

The Bank filed the instant action in Superior Court, Transylvania
County, to collect the deficiency plus interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
In their answer defendants denied plaintiff's allegations and asserted the
protection of the anti-deficiency statute. The Bank moved for summary
judgment and, relying primarily on the appraisal and resale price of the
property, maintained that the price it paid for the property at foreclosure
was reasonable. Defendants’ affidavit in opposition stated:

1. The “credit agreement” indicates that defendants Thomas L. Wolfe and Barbara

J, Wolfe borrowed the money acting both individually and as trustees of the “Thomas L.
Wolfe and Barbara J. Wolfe Irrevocable Trust under the provisions of a Trust Agreement
dated June 29, 2004.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT

UNITED CMTY. BANK v. WOLFE
[369 N.C. 555 (2017)]

[A]ffiants verily believes [sic] that the residence and real
property sold that is the subject of this Complaint was at
the time of its sale fairly worth the amount of the debt it
secured and affiants believe the amount bid for the prop-
erty was substantially less than its fair market value at the
time of the sale.

While the affidavit tracks the statutory language and asserts defendants’
opinion that the property was “fairly worth the amount of the debt,”
the affidavit does not assign a specific dollar value to the property or
specify any supporting evidence. Following a hearing, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank and awarded $57,737.74
for the deficiency and accrued interest, plus attorneys’ fees and costs.
Defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that defendants’ affida-
vit created a genuine issue of material fact as to the “true value” of the
foreclosed property under section 45-21.36. United Cmty. Bank (Ga.)
v. Wolfe, ___ N.C. App. __, __, 775 S.E.2d 677, 680 (2015). Because
defendants personally knew the loan balance at the time of the foreclo-
sure sale, and their affidavit, as the property owners, stated that the fore-
closed property was “fairly worth the amount of the debt,” the Court of
Appeals reasoned that defendants were not only competent to testify but
that their unsupported opinion created a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. at__, 775 S.E.2d at 680 (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. M.M. Fowler, Inc.,
361 N.C. 1, 6, 637 S.E.2d 885, 890 (2006); N.C. State Highway Comm'n
v. Helderman, 285 N.C. 645, 652, 207 S.E.2d 720, 725 (1974)). The Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the
Bank and remanded for trial. Id. at ____, 775 S.E.2d at 681. This Court
allowed discretionary review.

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
N.C.G.S. § 14-1, Rule 56(c) (2015). Supporting affidavits and affidavits in
opposition to summary judgment

shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein. . . . [A]n adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this

IN THE SUPREME COURT

UNITED CMTY. BANK v. WOLFE
[369 N.C. 555 (2017)]

rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

Id., Rule 56(e) (2015). The nonmoving party survives a motion for sum-
mary judgment by presenting substantial evidence that creates a genu-
ine issue of material fact. Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83, 580 S.E.2d
829, 835 (2000). “ ‘Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’
and means ‘more than a scintilla or a permissible inference.’ ” Ussery
v. Branch Banking & Ty., 368 N.C. 325, 335, 777 S.E.2d 272, 278-79
(2015) (quoting Thompson v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 414,
233 S.E.2d 538, 544 (1977)). This Court reviews appeals from summary
judgment de novo. Id. at 334-35, 777 S.E.2d at 278.

Foreclosure by power of sale arises under the contract between
the borrower and the creditor, allowing the creditor to sell the mort-
gaged property upon the borrower's default. In re Foreclosure of Lucks,
__ N.C. __, __, 794 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2016). Following a foreclosure
sale, the amount of the borrower's debt is reduced by the net proceeds
from the sale. N.C.G.S. § 45-21.31(a)(4) (2015). Generally, a borrower
is liable for the deficiency. When the creditor is also the high bidder at
the nonjudicial power-of-sale foreclosure, however, the borrower may
assert the protection of section 45-21.36:

When any sale of real estate has been made by a
mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized to make
the same, at which the mortgagee, payee or other holder
of the obligation thereby secured becomes the purchaser
and takes title either directly or indirectly, and thereaf-
ter such mortgagee, payee or other holder of the secured
obligation, as aforesaid, shall sue for and undertake to
recover a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor, trus-
tor or other maker of any such obligation whose property
has been so purchased, it shall be competent and lawful
for the defendant against whom such deficiency judgment
is sought to allege and show as matter of defense and off-
set, but not by way of counterclaim, that the property sold
was fairly worth the amount of the debt secured by it at
the time and place of sale or that the amount bid was sub-
stantially less than its true value, and, upon such showing,
to defeat or offset any deficiency judgment against him,
either in whole or in part .... [T]his section shall not

IN THE SUPREME COURT

UNITED CMTY. BANK v. WOLFE
[369 N.C. 555 (2017)]

apply to foreclosure sales made pursuant to an order or
decree of court... .

Id. § 45-21.36 (2015).

In a creditor's action to collect the deficiency, this “anti-deficiency
statute” provides the method of calculating a borrower's remaining
indebtedness by deducting from the total debt owed the “true value”
of the foreclosed property, rather than the amount paid by the creditor
at the foreclosure sale. See High Point Bank & Tr. v. Highmark Props.,
LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 307, 776 S.E.2d 838, 843 (2015); see also Richmond
Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr., 210 N.C. 29, 34, 185 S.E.
482, 485 (1936) (“[The creditor] shall not recover judgment against his
debtor for any deficiency . . . without first accounting to his debtor for
the fair value of the property at the time and place of the sale. ... Insuch
case, the amount bid by the creditor at the sale, and applied by him as a
payment on the debt, is not conclusive as to the value of the property.”),
aff'd, 300 U.S. 124, 57 S. Ct. 338, 81 L. Ed. 552 (1937). When the statu-
tory protection is asserted, the “true value” of the property becomes a
material fact. Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Hous., Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 112, 232
S.E.2d 667, 679 (1977). The borrower’s remaining liability may be elimi-
nated altogether or reduced by way of “offset” if the borrower shows
that the foreclosed property “was fairly worth the amount of the debt”
or that the foreclosure bid “was substantially less than [the foreclosed
property's] true value.” N.C.G.S. § 45-21.36.

A borrower opposing summary judgment must forecast substantial
competent evidence by way of specific facts to show the property’s “true
value” is genuinely at issue. See id. (requiring the borrower to “allege
and show as matter of defense and offset” (emphasis added)); see also
N.C.G.S. § 14-1, Rule 56(e). Only “[uJpon such [a] showing” can a bor-
rower defeat or offset a deficiency judgment against him or her. Id.
§ 45-21.36; see Wachovia Realty Invs., 292 N.C. at 112-13, 232 S.H.2d
at 679 (considering resale price after foreclosure as an indication of
the true value of the property at foreclosure); Blue Ridge Savs. Bank
v. Mitchell, 218 N.C. App. 410, 412-18, 721 S.E.2d 322, 324-25 (considering
appraisal value, foreclosure price, and resale price as competent evidence
of true value), aff'd per curiam, 366 N.C. 331, 734 S.E.2d 572 (2012).

In opposing summary judgment here, defendants relied on their
status as the property owners and their joint affidavit “made on [defen-
dants’] personal knowledge,” stating that they “verily believe[ ] that the
... property sold... was at the time of [the foreclosure] sale fairly worth
the amount of the debt it secured.” Defendants’ conclusory statement

IN THE SUPREME COURT

UNITED CMTY. BANK v. WOLFE
[869 N.C. 555 (2017)

without any supporting facts is insufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (“[A]n adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”);
Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 370, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982) (“[W]hen
the moving party by affidavit or otherwise presents materials in support
of his motion, it becomes incumbent upon the opposing party to take
affirmative steps to defend his position by proof of his own. If he rests
upon the mere allegations or denial of his pleading, he does so at the risk
of having judgment entered against him.”).

Once the Bank produced substantial competent evidence of value,
Rule 56 required even the property owners to provide more than a con-
clusory statement. See Lexington State Bank v. Miller, 137 N.C. App.
748, 753-54, 529 S.E.2d 454, 457 (characterizing the defendant property
owner’s affidavit, which stated that the property “was worth substan-
tially more than the amount which was bid and paid by [the bank],” as
“unsupported allegations” rather than the “specific facts” needed to sur-
vive summary judgment), disc. rev. denied, 352 N.C. 589, 544 S.E.2d
781 (2000); see also N.C. Dep’t of Transp. v. Haywood County, 360 N.C.
849, 352, 626 S.B.2d 645, 647 (2006) Gand condemnation case exclud-
ing “experts’ testimony about [their] feelings and personal opinions”
on valuation because the trial court found the testimony “unsupported
by objective criteria,” “based on hunches and speculation,” and there-
fore “lack[ing] sufficient reliability”). Simply restating the statutory
language in affidavit form is inadequate. The Court of Appeals’ reli-
ance on the land condemnation cases Department of Transportation
v. MM. Fowler, Inc. and North Carolina State Highway Commission
v. Helderman is misplaced. Here the issue is not a landowner’s compe-
tency to testify but whether the landowners’ affidavit presented sub-
stantial competent evidence under Rule 56(c) regarding the “true value”
of the foreclosed property.

Insum, defendants failed to present substantial competent evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the “true value” of
the foreclosed property. Under Rule 56, merely reciting the statutory lan-
guage or asserting an unsubstantiated opinion regarding the foreclosed
property's value is insufficient. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Bank.

REVERSED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT . 561

WILKIE v. CITY OF BOILING SPRING LAKES
[369 N.C. 561 (2017)]

EDWARD F WILKIE AND DEBRA )
T. WILKIE )
)
v )
)
CITY OF BOILING SPRING LAKES )
No. 44P17
ORDER

From Brunswick County

Plaintiffs’ petition for discretionary review is allowed only as to the
first and third issues listed in plaintiffs’ petition. Plaintiffs’ discretionary
review petition is denied as to any remaining issues.

By order of the Court, this the 3rd day of May, 2017.

s/Morgan, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North

Carolina, this the 5th day of May, 2017.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk, Supreme Court of
North Carolina

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk, Supreme
Court of North Carolina

562 IN THE SUPREME COURT
‘Disposition of Peritions ror Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 78-31
3 May 2017
O06PI7 In the Matter of Respondent-Mother's PDR Under Denied
AHL, CH. N.C.GS. § 74-31 (COAI6-581)
.| 013P37 State. Kalmeaice | Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Kawanna Williams | (COA16-432)
O24P 172 State v. Calvin Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Lamar Adams Certiorari to Review Decision
of COA (COA15-1384)
030P17 Statev. Napoleon | Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Richard Cooper (COAL6-483)
036P17 State v. Constance | Det’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § TA-81 Denied
Michelle Sheperd | (COA16-270)
o39P12-2 State v. Ray Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to | Dismissed
Lee Ross Review Order of COA (COA17-56)
Beasley, J.,
recused
o4aP17 Edward F Wilkie | 1. Pits’ Notice of Appeal Based Upona | 1.—
and Debra'T: Willie | Constitutional Question (COA16-652)
v. City of Boiling
Spun voles © | 2. Pits! PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7431 2. Special
Order
8, Def's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 3. Allowed
o4sP17 Estate of Regina _| Plt's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Cecylia Johnson v. | (COA16-528)
Fandacja Jasmin Morgan, J., .
Reginy Elandt I recused
Normana Lloyda
Johnsonow, Ewa
Violetta Blandt-
Jankowska, and
Hanna Blandt-
Pogodzinska
o62P17 Roy A. Cooper, 1, Plt's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
I, inhis Official | (COAPI7-101) 02/13/2017
Capacity as Dissolved
Governor of the 05/03/2017
State of North
Carolina. Philip _| 2: Pls Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2, Dismissed as
B. Berger, in his moot
Oficial Capacity | 9, Pits Petition for Writ of Certiorari to | 8. Dismissed
Tempore of the Review Order of COA as moot
North Carolina 4. Plt’'s PDR Prior to a Decision of COA | 4. Denied
Senate; and Timothy
K. Moore, in his
Official Capacity
as Speaker
of the North
Carolina House of
Representatives

IN THE SUPREME COURT 563

Disposition oF Petitions For Discrenionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

3 May 2017

O55P17 Harry Williams v. Pit's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Denied
Advance Auto Parts, | (COA16-625)
Inc., and Advance

Stores Company,
Incorporated, d/b/a
Advance Auto Parts
057P17 State v. Bobby 1. State’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 1. Allowed
Johnson (COAI6-491)
2. Def’s Conditional PDR Under 2. Allowed
N.GGS.§ 7A31
058P17 Priscilla Gayle 1. Def’s (Trenton Blake Williams) Notice | 1. Dismissed
Brookbank v. of Appeal Based Upon a Constitutional ex mero motu
Heather Dikorenzo | Question (COA16.312)
Williams and
‘Trenton Blake 2. Def's (Trenton Blake Williams) PDR | 2. Denied
Williams Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31
O59P17 Southern Shores 1. Defs' PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 1. Denied

Realty Services, Inc. | (COA16-557)
‘The Miller Family | | 2- Pit's Conditional PDR Under 2, Dismissed
Limited Partnership, | N-C.GS. § 74-81 as moot

I, LLG, Old Glory
Ill, LLC, Old Glory
TV, LLG, Old Glory
V, LLG, Old Glory
VI, LLO, Old Glory
Vil, LLC, Old Glory
IX, LLG, Old Glory
XI, LLG, Old Glory
Xi, LLG, Old Glory

o60Pi7 State v. Jesse Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Williams (COA16-229)
062P17 State v. David 1. Def’s Pro Se Notice of Appeal 1. Dismissed
Campbell Sutton _| Based Upon a Constitutional Question | ex mero motu
(COA16-405)
2. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 2, Denied

Certiorari to Review Decision of COA

564 IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disrosrrion of Peririons ror Discrevionary Review Unper G.S. 74-31

3 May 2017
O69P17 Inthe Matter of the | Respondents’ PDR Under Denied
Foreclosure of Real | N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA16-655)
Property Under
a Deed of Trust
Executed by Robert
©. Collins and
Rhonda B, Collins
Dated June 20, 2006
and Recorded on
June 23, 2006 in
Book K-30 at Page
975 in the Macon
County Public
Registry, North
Carolina
O7PI7 State v. Perry Def’s Pro Se Motion for Petition for Writ | Dismissed
Iyn Dupree of Prohibition
o7api7 State v. Lequan Fox. | Def's Pro Se Motion for Petition for Writ | Dismissed
of Prohibition 03/24/2017
O7sP17 State v. Laurice 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
D. Boston Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Count, Pitt County
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Proceed In _| 2, Allowed
Forma Pauperis
8. Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 8. Dismissed
Counsel” as moot
o7vsP17 Ocwen Loan 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1, Denied

Servicing, Bank of | Certiorari to Review Order of COA
New Yorke Mellon (COAP16-927)
v. Margaret Ann

Reaves 2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Appoint 2. Dismissed
Counsel as moot
8, Def's Pro Se Motion to Extend Time | 8. Dismissed
as moot
o76PI7 George Burns, Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Mark McCann, and | (COA15-1313)
Charles Bartlett,
‘Trustees of Park's
Chapel Free Will
Baptist Church
v. Kingdom Impact
Global Ministries,

Inc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Petrrions ror Discrenionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

3 May 2017

State v. Samuel
Allen Taylor

1. Def’s Pro Se PDR Under
NCGS. § 7A-31

2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint
Counsel

8. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In.
Forma Pauperis

1. Denied

2. Dismissed
as moot

3. Allowed

State v. Michael
Sheridan

Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Wake County

O84P17 *

In the Matter of
S.CH. and J.AH,, Jr.

Respondent-Father’s PDR Under
N.C.GS. § 7A-31

O86P17

State v. Tara
‘May Frazier

State's PDR Under N,C.G.S. § 74-81
(COAI6-449)

O90P17

State v. Gregory
Monroe

Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ
of Mandamus

092P17

State v. Samuel
Baker

Def’s Pro Se PDR Under
N.C.GS. § 7A-31 (COA16-645)

093P17

State v. Hemy
Arthur Little

1. Def's Pro Se Notice of Appeal
Based Upon a Constitutional Question
(COA16-480)

2. Def’s Pro Se PDR Under N.C.G.S.
§7A31

8. State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal

2. Denied

3. Allowed

Ervin, J.,
recused

094PL7

State v. Edward
Charles Green

Def’s Pro Se Motion for Voter Fraud
Dismissal

Dismissed

096P17

State v. Darryl
Douglas Clay

1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upon a
Constitutional Question (COA16-564)

2, Def’s PDR Under N.O.GS. § TA-31
8, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal

Lo

2. Denied
8. Allowed

State v. Almedeo
Eugene Stewart

Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31
(COAI6-347)

Denied

State v. Christopher
Jason Hudson

Def’s Pro Se PDR Under
N.C.GS. § 7A-B1 (COA16-431)

Denied

101P17

State v. Caleb J.
‘Lucky, I

Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ
of Mandamus

566 IN THE SUPREME COURT
‘Disrostrion or Peririons ror Discrenionary Review Unper G.S, 7A-31
3 May 2017
108P17 State v. Earl Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for a Writ of | Denied
Wayne Flowers Habeas Corpus 04/07/2017
104P 1-9 State v. Titus Batts | Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Certiorari to Review Order of COA
(COAP16-705) Ervin, J.,
recused
105P17 State v. Jimmy Reid | Def’s Pro Se Motion for Notice of Dismissed
‘Appeal (COAP17-172) ex mero motu
Ervin, J.,
reeused
108P17 State v. Jesse 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Denied
. Santifort (COAIT-202) 04/18/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ 2. Denied
of Supersedeas 04/18/2017
3. Denied
8, State's Petition for Writ of Certioraré. | 94/18/2017
to Review Order of COA
4, State's Motion to Amend Petition for | 4, alowed
Writ of Certiorari 04/18/2017
109P17 In Re Olander Petitioner's Pro Se Petition for Writ Dismissed
R. Bynum of Mandamus
Piz Grace Justice 1. Def’s Pro Se Motion for PDR 1 Denied
Johnson v. (COAPI6-840)
Glenwood F.
‘Johnson 2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Proceed In 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
2P17 State. Anthonio | 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1 Allowed
Shontari Farrar (COA16-679) 04/10/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ of 2
Supersedeas
usP17 State v. Dean 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Michael Varner (COA16-591) 04/12/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ of 2
Supersedeas
3, State's PDR Under N.C.GS.§7A31 | 3.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 567

Disposition of Peritions For Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

3 May 2017
17PIT Yahudah Washitaw | Petitioners’ Pro Se Motion for Removal | Dismissed
of Fast Terra Indians, | from State Court
David Hopskins,
Kerklon Stackhouse,
Maurice Stackhouse
Deceased), Shawn
Singletary, and
Betty Singletary
v. PHH Mortgage
Corporation, JP
Morgan Chase BK
NA, Nations Star,
CIT Group/Sales
Financing Inc.,
and State of North
Carolina
124P17 State v. Byron 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Bernard Sadler Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Mecklenburg County
2 Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In —_ 2, Allowed
Forma Pauperis
1294962 | State v. Carlton 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Eugene Anderson | Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Jackson County
2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 2, Dismissed
Counsel as moot
182P17 State v. Eddie Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Denied
Levord Taylor Habeas Corpus 04/24/2017
185P17 Celia A. Bell, 1. Def’s Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Employee v. (COA16-1299) 04/26/2017
Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company, | 2: Def's Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2.
Employer, Liberty
‘Mutual Insurance
Company, Carrier
155A16 Old Republic Def's (Hartford Fire Insurance Denied
National ‘Title Company) Petition for Rehearing
Insurance Company,
etal. v. Hartford
Fire Insurance
Company, et al.
168P06-11 | State v. Derrick Def's Pro Se Motion for Appeal for Writ | Dismissed
D. Boger of Parole
22SPA16 North Carolina Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Appeal | Allowed
Department of 04/03/2017
Public Safety
v. Chauncey John
Ledford

568 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposition or Peririons ror Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
3 May 2017
232P014 —_| Statev. Michael Def's Pro Se Motion for PDR Dismissed
Bugene Reed, I (COAP17-68)
Hudson, J.,
recused
2377163 | AveryM. Riggsbee | Pit’s Pro S¢ Motion for Grant of Dismissed
v. W. Baine Non-Stop Payout by Defendants
Jones, Jr, Judge
Government
Employees
2450082 — | Statev. Terrance _| 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Lowell Hyman (COAL6-398) 08/10/2017
2. State's Petition for Writ 2, Allowed
of Supersedeas
8, State's Notice of Appeal Based Upon | 3. —
a Dissent
4, State's PDR as to Additional Issues | 4. Dismissed
5, State's Petition for Writ of Gertiorari | 5. ANowed
to Review Decision of COA
6. Def’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal 6. Denied
264P042 —_| Statev. Charles 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Francis Graham Gertiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Mecklenburg County
2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed n _| 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
3. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Appoint 8, Dismissed
Counsel as moot
266P162 | Statev. Timothy 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1, Dismissed
‘Terrell Crandell Certiorari to Review Decision of COA
(COAPI7-41)
2. Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In _| 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
8. Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 8, Dismissed
Counsel as moot
BI5PAI52 | Quality Built Homes | Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A31 1. Allowed
Incorporated and | (COA15-115-2) .
Stafford Land
Company, Ine. 2. N.C. Water Quality Association and | 2. Allowed
y. Town of ‘Seven Municipalities’ Conditional
Carthagel. ‘Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief
330016 Allscripts Motion to Admit Dana. Salazar Pro | Allowed
Healthcare, LLC | Hac Vice 03/24/2017
v. Btransmedia
Technology, ine.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition or Petrrions For Discremionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

3 May 2017
380A16 Allscripts Pit’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal Allowed
Healthcare, LLC 04/20/2017
v. Btransmedia
‘Technology, Inc.
844P16 State v. Richard 1, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A31 1. Denied
Pridgen (COAI6-75)
2, State's Motion for Withdrawal and —_| 2. Allowed
: Substitution of Counsel
S45P16-3 State v. Dwayne Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Denied
Demont, Haizlip Habeas Corpus 04/13/2017
Ervin, J.,
recused
S46P16 Gurney B. Harris | 1. Defs’ (Southeastern Installation, Inc. | 1. Allowed
v. Southern and Cincinnati Insurance Company) 09/20/2016
Commercial Glass, | Motion for Temporary Stay Dissolved
Auto Owners (COA15-1363) 08/16/2017
Insurance, and
‘Southeastern 2, Defs’ (Southeastern Installation, Inc. | 2. Dismissed as
Installation, and Cincinnati Insurance Company) moot
ne, Cincinnati Writ of Supersedeas
Insurance Company | 3, nefs' (Southeastern Installlation, Inc. | 3.—
and Cincinnati Insurance Company)
PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A31
4, Allowed
4, Defs' (Southeastern Installation, Ine, | 01/26/2017
and Cincinnati Insurance Company)
Motion to Hold PDR in Abeyance
5. Defs’ (Southeastern Installation, Inc. | 5. Allowed
and Cincinnati Insurance Company)
Motion for Leave to Withdraw PDR
S50PI6 ‘TD Bank, NA. Defs’ PDR Under N.C.GS. § 74-81 Allowed
v. Bagles Crest (COA15-807)
at Sharp Top,
LLG, Jotun W.
Holdsworth, and
John H. Seats
S56P16 Virginia Radcliffe | 1. Pit’s Petition for Writ of Gertiorari to | 1. Denied
v. Avenel Review Decision of COA (COA15-884)
Homeowners . 7
Association, Inc., _ | 2. Pit's Motion to ‘Treat Petition for Writ | 2. Allowed
‘Carmelo (Tony) of Certioraré as a PDR.
Buccafurri, Stephen | 3. ness’ Joint Response to Plt’s Moti 8, Denied
Murray, Thomas . at Response to Pits Motion | 8, Denies
Dinero, David Hull, to ‘Treat Petition for Gertiorart as
Richer) Progelnot? | Motion for Discretionary Review and
ao en ZaeetaR, | Bets! Motion in the Alternative to File
_ | Supplemental Response to Plt’s Petition

570 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposirion oF Perrrions vor Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7-81
3 May 2017
382P10.6 | Statev. John Lewis | Def's Pro Se Motion for Review Dismissed
Wray, Jt Beasley, J.,
recused
382P16 Desiree King by | 1. Defs' (Albemarle Hospital Authority | 1. Allowed
and through Her | d/b/a Albemarle Health/Allbemazle .
Guardian ad Litem, | Hospital and Sentara Albemarle
6. Elvin Small, Regional Medical Center, LLC, d/b/a
Ill; and Amber M. | Sentara Albemarle Medical) PDR Under
Clark, Individually, | N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COAI5-1190)
Albenarle Hospital
‘Authority dbl | 2.Defs' (Northeastern Ob/Gyn, Ltd, 2, Allowed
‘Albemarle Heatth/ | Barbara Ann Carter, M.D., and Angela
‘Albemarle Hospital; | McWalter, CNM) PDR Under N.C.C.S.
Sentara Albemarle | § 731
Regional Medical
Center, LLC d/b/a
Sentara Albemarle
Medical Center;
Northeastern Ob/
Gyn, Lid; Barbara
Ann Carter,
M.D, and Angela
MeWalter, CNM
38616 Statev. Quentin _| 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Lee Dick (COA15-1400) 10/14/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ of 2. Allowed
‘Supersedeas :
3, State's PDR UnderN.G.GS.§7A81 | 3. Allowed
305P14 Lois A. Sauls v. 1. Defs PDR UnderN.C.GS.§7AS1 | L—
Roland Gary Sauls | (COAL41)
2. Plt’s Motion for Sanctions 2-
3, Def's Motion for Issuance of Stay 3. Dismissed
as moot
4, Def's Motion to Withdraw PDR 4, Allowed
5. Plt’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw —_| 5, Allowed
. Response to PDR and Motion for
Sanctions
4077083 | State, Phillip 1. Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
Vance Smith, I Cortiorari to Review Order of COA
: 2, Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In | 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
410P16 State v, Joshua 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay | 1. Allowed
Sanchez (COA16-1401) 11/07/2016
2, State's Petition for Writ 2. Allowed
of Supersedeas
3. State's PDR UnderN.G.G.S. §7A81 | 3. Allowed

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition of PetrTions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

3 May 2017
4A9PLL-16 State v, Charles 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for 1, Dismissed .
‘Everette Hinton Writ of Mandamus !
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Full 2. Dismissed
Evidentiary Hearing and Trial De Novo
3. Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint 8. Dismissed
Counsel as moot

4, Def's Pro Se Motion for Trial De Novo | 4. Dismissed
5. Def's Pro Se Motion for Trial By Jury | 5. Dismissed

Ervin, J.,
recused

454P16 State v. Andrew 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Robert Holloway (COA16-381) 12/20/2016
Dissolved
05/03/2017

2. State's Petition for Writ 2. Denied
of Supersedeas

8. State's PDR Under N.G.G.S.§7A31 | 3. Denied

460P16 In the Matter of D.P. | Respondent-Mother’s PDR Under
and BP. N.C.G.S. § 74-31 (COA16-529) Denied
462P16 State v. DavidLee | Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-31 Denied
Applewhite (COA16-335),
505P96-3 State v. Melvin Lee | Def's Motion for Extension of Time to Allowed
White (DEATH) File Petition for Writ of Certiorari 04/13/2017
538P13-2 State v. Ronald 1. Def’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari | 1. Dismissed
Wayne Spann to Review Order of COA (COAP16-909)

2. Def's Petition for Writ of Certiorari | 2. Dismissed

to Review Order of Superior Court, A

Caldwell County Ervin, J.,
recused

572 IN THE SUPREME COURT

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[869 N.C. 572 (2017)]

KERRY RAY HARRISON, Emptoyse

ve
GEMMA POWER SYSTEMS, LLC, Emproyer,
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier

No. 216A16
Filed 9 June 2017

Workers’ Compensation—permanent partial disability—findings
and conclusions—insufficient
The Industrial Commission in a workers’ compensation case did
not carry out a 2014 mandate of the Court of Appeals on remand that
it make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
issue of plaintiff's entitlement to permanent. partial disability ben-
efits under N.C.G.S. § 97-31. The case was remanded for compliance
with the 2014 mandate. .

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the unpublished deci-
sion of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 786
§.E.2d 433 (2016), affirming an amended opinion and award filed on
4 March 2015 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 22 March 2017.

Poisson, Poisson & Bower, PLLC, by E. Stewart Poisson, for
plaintiff-appellant.

Orbock, Ruark & Dillard, P-C., by Jessica E. Lyles and Roger L.
Dillard, Jr., for defendant-appellees.

HUDSON, Justice.

In the Court of Appeals, plaintiff employee challenged the Industrial
Commission’s determination that he is not entitled to any compen-
sation for permanent partial disability under N.C.G.S. § 97-31. The
Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed the denial, and plain-
tiff appealed to this Court on the basis of the dissenting opinion. We
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for
further proceedings.

This summary of facts is based on the stipulations of the parties as
well as the forms in the record and the unchallenged findings of fact in
the most recent opinion and award filed on 4 March 2015. On 2 March

IN THE SUPREME COURT 573

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[369 N.C. 572 (2017)]

2001, plaintiff, a pipefitter, suffered a compensable accident and sus-
tained injuries to his left upper leg, neck, and other areas of his body
when a heavy valve fell on his head, while he was walking at his job
site. Defendants, his employer at the time and its workers’ compensa-
tion insurance carrier, accepted plaintiff's claim as compensable under
the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act). Plaintiff received medical treat-
ment for his injuries for a period of several years, but defendants eventu-
ally refused to authorize additional medical treatment. Defendants have
handled the claim as medical only from its onset, and plaintiff has never
received indemnity payments.

After his work-related accident, plaintiff immediately complained
of neck pain and headaches, and he received prompt treatment from
an authorized medical provider, who documented plaintiff’s complaints
of headaches and neck pain. Plaintiff was referred to chiropractor
Larry Stogner for care. Plaintiff attempted to return to work for defen-
dant employer by doing light duty tasks, but he was laid off on 22 April
2001. On 27 June 2001, Dixon Gerber, M.D., an orthopaedic surgeon,
saw plaintiff for a second opinion examination and found that plaintiff
“was at maximum medical improvement and had no permanent partial
disability.” Dr. Gerber’s medical record also reflected plaintiff’s impres-
sion that he “could probably return to work at any time.” Dr. Gerber
released plaintiff from treatment without restrictions as of 2 July 2001,
four months after plaintiff's work-related accident.

Defendant employer re-hired plaintiff but shortly thereafter termi-
nated him for missing work and tardiness. After that, plaintiff worked
for other employers, also as a pipefitter. Plaintiff testified that he had
to stop working as a pipefitter in February 2003 because of his ongoing
neck pain. Plaintiff then worked in other occupations until May 2009,
and he received unemployment benefits when he was not working dur-
ing that time. Plaintiff became a full-time community college student in
May 2009.

During the years after his work-related accident, plaintiff continued
to have neck pain, and in October 2002, defendants referred him for an
independent medical examination by Robert Lacin, M.D., at Goldsboro
Neurological Surgery. Dr. Lacin opined that he “certainly ha[d] no doubt
that [plaintiff's] symptoms are related to this incident of March 2, 2001.”

In December 2003, plaintiff began treatment with Hemanth Rao,
M.D., at Neurology Consultants of the Carolinas. An MRI in November
2006 showed that plaintiff had evidence of a continuing injury, for which
he was referred for a surgical opinion. Plaintiff received an independent

574 IN THE SUPREME COURT

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[369 N.C. 572 (2017)]

medical evaluation from Alfred Rhyne, M.D., at OrthoCarolina in April
2009, after which Dr. Rhyne recommended another MRI. Dr. Rhyne later
testified that if plaintiff had no complaints of pain or problems before
his March 2001 workplace injury, that injury “precipitated the onset
of his symptoms.” Defendants did not authorize the MRI as recom-
mended by Dr. Rhyne.

Plaintiff subsequently received an MRI at the Veterans Affairs
Medical Center in Fayetteville, North Carolina. A medical record from
that facility dated 9 August 2010 diagnosed “[mlJultilevel cervical spon-
dylosis seen in the lower cervical spine, most prominent at C5 and
C6.” Chiropractor Stogner, who had treated plaintiff since shortly after
his injury, also opined that it was “more probable than not” that the
2 March 2001 workplace accident caused plaintiff’s neck problems and
stated that he does “not expect to see any significant improvement with
[plaintiff's] injury status [as he] suspect[s] that [plaintiff's] condition
is permanent.”

Defendants’ last payment of medical compensation to plaintiff was
on 18 May 2009. Plaintiff enrolled in college full time in May 2009, gradu-
ated with an associate’s degree in May 2012, and at the time his case was
heard before the deputy commissioner, was a full-time student pursuing
a bachelor’s degree in business. Plaintiff worked part time at a desk job
while he was a student.

On 25 January 2012, plaintiff filed a Form 33 with the Industrial
Comunission, asserting that defendants “ha[d] failed to authorize plain-
tiff’s request for further treatment with Dr. Rhyne” and contending that
there was also “an issue with indemnity benefits.” In their response to
this filing, defendants stated that the claim “is barred by the statute of
limitations [in] G.S. §97-24. Plaintiff's claim is a no lost time claim. This
claim was medical only and it has been more than two years since the
last payment of medical compensation.”

On 7 February 2018, a deputy commissioner ordered that, to the
extent they had not done so, defendants provide (pay for) all medical
treatment for plaintiff's neck condition for the period between the date of
injury through 18 May 2009. The deputy denied plaintiff's claim for addi-
tional benefits under the Act. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission
(Commission), which affirmed the deputy commissioner's opinion and
award on 16 September 2013.

Plaintiff appealed the Commission’s opinion and award to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the Commission’s

IN THE SUPREME COURT 575

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[869 N.C. 572 (2017)]

findings of fact were inadequate and that the record evidence entitled
him to permanent impairment indemnity benefits. Harrison v. Gemma
Power Sys., LLC, 234 N.C. App. 664, 763 S.E.2d 17, 2014 WL 2993853
(2014) (unpublished) (Harrison I). Specifically, plaintiff argued that
Finding of Fact 22 was not supported by competent evidence and that it
irreconcilably conflicted with Finding of Fact 25. Harrison I, 2014 WL
2993853, at *10.

Finding of Fact 22 reads:

22. Dr. Rhyne testified that plaintiff's probable per-
manent partial disability would be three percent (3%), or
if plaintiff had to have surgery, the rating would be in the
range of five to fifteen percent (5-15%). The Commission.
assigns greater weight to the testimony of Dr. Gerber
regarding plaintiff's permanent partial disability rating as
Dr. Gerber was plaintiff's authorized treating physician
and Dr. Rhyne only performed a one time independent,
medical evaluation. Therefore, based on Dr. Gerber’s tes-
timony, the Commission finds plaintiff has no permanent
partial disability.
In Finding of Fact 5, the Commission noted that “Dr. Gerber found that
plaintiff was at maximum medical improvement and has no permanent
partial disability” and “released plaintiff from treatment without restric-
tions as of 2 July 2001.”

Finding of Fact 25 reads:

25. Based upon the preponderance of the evidence in
view of the entire record, the medical treatment plaintiff
received for his neck condition, on or before 18 May 2009,
was reasonable and medically necessary, and was reason-
ably calculated to effect a cure and give relief from plain-
tiff’s 2 March 2001 compensable injury by accident.

Based on these findings, the Commission reached Conclusion of Law 2,
that “[p]laintiff is entitled to the provision of medical treatment for his
neck condition for the period from 2 March 2001 through 18 May 2009.”

In a unanimous, unpublished opinion filed on 1 July 2014, the Court
of Appeals, inter alia, reversed the Commission’s denial of indemnity
benefits, concluding that the Commission’s findings and conclusions
on that issue were “inadequate.” Id. at *1. Specifically, the Court of
Appeals agreed with plaintiff that Finding of Fact 22 lacked evidentiary

576 IN THE SUPREME COURT

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[369 N.C. 572 (2017)]

support but disagreed that Findings of Fact 22 and 25 are irreconcil-
able. Jd. at *10. With respect to Findings of Fact 22 and 25, the Court of
Appeals stated:

[A] finding that Plaintiff is at maximum medical improve-
ment with no permanent partial disability denotes that
Plaintiff's compensable injury has healed and/or stabi-
lized, with no permanent functional loss to his neck and/or
back. The fact that Plaintiff has no permanent functional
impairment, however, does not mean, ipso facto, that
ongoing medical treatment will not be necessary to “effect
acure and give relief” to the underlying injury.

Id. The Court of Appeals instructed: “[I]f, on remand, the Full Commission.
again finds Plaintiff to have no permanent partial impairment, the Full
Commission is instructed to enter additional findings reconciling that
finding with Finding of Fact 25.” Id. The Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the Commission “for additional findings of fact and conclusions
of law on the issue of Plaintiff's entitlement to permanent partial impair-
ment benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31.” Id. at *11.

On 4 March 2015, the Commission filed an amended opinion and
award that made no change to its ultimate decision, including denying
all additional benefits to plaintiff under the Act. In the amended opinion
and award, however, the Commission modified Findings of Fact 22 and 25
(listed as Findings of Fact 23 and 26 in the amended opinion and award),
as well as Conclusion of Law 2. It also added Conclusion of Law 6.

In Finding of Fact 23 of the amended opinion and award (amending
Finding of Fact 22), the Commission bolstered its reasoning for assign-
ing greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Gerber over that of Dr. Rhyne
regarding the permanent partial disability rating. Finding of Fact 23
(amending Finding of Fact 22) now reads:

28. Dr. Rhyne testified that plaintiff's probable perma-
nent partial disability would be three percent (8%), or if
plaintiff had to have surgery, the rating would be in the
range of five to fifteen percent (5-15%). The Commission
assigns greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Gerber
regarding plaintiff's permanent partial disability rating as
detailed in Dr. Gerber’s 27 June 2001 medical record. The
Commission bases the decision to assign more weight
to Dr. Gerber’s opinion regarding the permanent partial
disability rating on the fact that Dr. Gerber was able to

IN THE SUPREME COURT . 577

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[869 N.C. 572 (2017)]

examine plaintiff in ‘close temporal proximity to plain-
tiff’s compensable injury and also provided his opinion _
on plaintiff's permanent partial disability at the time of his
examination. Dr. Gerber’s record noted plaintiff's state-
ment to him that plaintiff felt he could probably return
to work, and found plaintiff to be at maximum medical
improvement with no permanent disability and to have
no work restrictions. Dr. Gerber’s examination was on
27 June 2001, less than four months after plaintiff's injury,
as compared to Dr. Rhyne, who did not examine plain-
tiff until 27 April 2009, more than eight years after plain-
tiff’s injury and gave his opinion on plaintiff's permanent
partial disability rating more than three years after his
examination of plaintiff in October of 2012. Therefore,
based on Dr. Gerber’s 27 June 2001 medical record, the
Commission finds that plaintiff reached maximum medi-
cal improvement on 27 June 2001 and that plaintiff has no
permanent partial disability.

Also, the Commission reconciled Findings of Fact 22 and 25. In the
amended opinion and award, Finding of Fact 26 (amending Finding of
Fact 25) now reads:

26. Based upon the preponderance of the evidence in
view of the entire record, the medical treatment plaintiff
received for his neck condition, on or before 18 May 2009,
was reasonable and medically necessary, and was reason-
ably calculated to give relief from plaintiff's 2 March 2001
compensable injury by accident. The Commission notes
that even though plaintiff is determined to have reached
maximum medical improvement on 27 June 2001, that
determination is not inconsistent with plaintiff continuing
to receive additional medical treatment to provide relief
from his compensable injury by accident.

Conclusion of Law 2 in the amended opinion and award now reads:

2. Plaintiff is entitled to the provision of medical
treatment for his neck condition for the period from
2 March 2001 through 18 May 2009. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 97-25; 97-25.1. The Commission further concludes
that even though the medical treatment plaintiff received
subsequent to his full duty release could not lessen his
period of disability, the medical treatment he did receive

578 IN THE SUPREME COURT

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[369 N.C. 572 (2017))

provided relief. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
has instructed:

N.C.G.S. § 97-25 does not, however, limit an employ-
er’s obligation to pay future medical expenses to
those cases in which such expenses will lessen
the period of disability. The statute also requires
employers to pay the expenses of future medical
treatments even if they will not lessen the period of
disability as long as they are reasonably required to
() effect a cure or (2) give relief.

Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C. 206, 210, 345 S.E.2d
204, 207 (1986). Therefore, the Commission concludes
that plaintiff is entitled to the provision of medical treat-
ment following his full duty release through 18 May 2009
as the medical treatment he received provided relief from
his compensable injury.

Newly added Conclusion of Law 6 reads: “Based upon Dr. Gerber's
assignment of a zero percent (0%) permanent partial disability
rating, plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation for permanent
partial disability.”

These excerpts demonstrate the Commission’s attempts to bolster
its reasoning for assigning greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Gerber
over that of Dr. Rhyne regarding the permanent partial disability rat-
ing and to reconcile the determination that plaintiff is entitled to medi-
cal treatment for his neck condition for the period from 2 March 2001
through 18 May 2009 (Finding of Fact 26, Conclusion of Law 2) with
the determination that plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation for
permanent partial disability (Finding of Fact 23, Conclusion of Law 6).

In the amended opinion and award, the Commission also added
Finding of Fact 29, which reads in pertinent part: “[O]n 30 January 2009,
plaintiff was assigned work restrictions of no lifting greater than twenty
(20) pounds and no reaching overhead. Those restrictions rendered
plaintiff's pre-injury job unsuitable as it would exceed both the lifting
restriction and the prohibition on reaching overhead.”

Plaintiff again appealed the Commission’s decision to the Court
of Appeals, which, in’ an unpublished, divided opinion filed on 3 May
2016, affirmed the amended opinion and award. Harrison v. Gemma
Power Sys., LLC, ___ N.C. App. ___, 786 S.E.2d 433, 2016 WL 1744423
(2016) (unpublished) (Harrison ID). The majority considered plaintiff's

IN THE SUPREME COURT 579

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[69 N.C. 572 (2017)

argument that the Commission made an additional finding of fact in the
amended opinion and award that plaintiff was assigned work restric-
tions on 30 January 2009, and therefore, the Commission’s finding
“recogniz[ed] a loss of functional ability due to injury” that amounted
to a “ ‘functional abnormality’ after maximum medical improvement
because he can no longer perform his pre-injury job due to accident-
related restrictions.” Harrison II, 2016 WL 1744423, at *5. Therefore,
according to plaintiff, the Commission's new finding establishes that he
“has permanent partial impairment due to his injury,” which finding is
“irreconcilable with” a finding of fact and conclusion of law in the origi-
nal opinion and award of the Commission. Id.

The majority found plaintiff's arguments unconvincing. Id. at *6.
The majority concluded that although “competent record evidence . . .
support[ed] the finding that” an examining physician imposed work
restrictions on plaintiff on 30 January 2009, “the evidence does not indi-
cate whether these restrictions were related to his 2 March 2001 injury
in any way.” Id.

The majority also noted that the Commission made an amended
finding that “assigned greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Gerber regard-
ing plaintiff's permanent partial disability, as opposed to the opinion of
Dr. Rhyne.” Id. at *7. Recognizing that “[t]he Commission is the sole
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony,” the majority held that the Commission “was entitled to place
greater weight on the substance of Dr. Gerber’s opinion.” Jd. Therefore,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the amended opinion and award, hold-
ing that the Commission did not err in concluding that plaintiff is not
entitled to any compensation for permanent partial disability. Id.

In contrast, the dissenting opinion concluded that the Commission
again failed to properly determine whether plaintiff is entitled to com-
pensation under N.C.G.S. § 97-31. Id. (Geer, J., dissenting). The dissent
observed that the Commission found as fact that “as of 30 January 2009,
plaintiff had a loss of function—a substantial limitation on his ability
to lift a relatively modest weight and an inability to reach overhead.”
Id. at *8. The dissent did not agree “that the record contains no evi-
dence that the 30 January 2009 restrictions were due to the 2 March 2001
compensable neck injury.” Id. Rather, the dissent would conclude that,
when read as a whole, the Commission’s opinion and award establishes
that “the Commission understood that the restrictions . . . assigned were
due to plaintiff's compensable neck condition.” Id. The dissent agreed
with plaintiff that “the Commission's findings of fact do not support its

580 IN THE SUPREME COURT

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[869 N.C. 572 (2017)}

conclusion that plaintiff suffers no permanent partial disability within
the meaning of [section] 97-31”; therefore, the dissent would reverse the
Commission’s opinion and award on this issue and, to the extent neces-
sary, remand this case “so that the Commission can clarify its findings”
“regarding the source of the physical restrictions” placed on plaintiff.
Id. at *9. :

Plaintiff appealed based on the dissenting opinion. Plaintiff argues
that the Commission’s detailed findings of fact compel a conclusion that
he suffers from permanent partial impairment as a result of his compen-
sable injury and is therefore entitled to collect scheduled benefits under
N.C.GS. § 97-31.

We decline plaintiff's invitation to hold that the findings of fact in
the amended opinion and award compel the conclusion that plaintiff
retains permanent partial impairment as a result of his injury. “[T]he
Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence. . . . ‘Thus, on appeal, this Court does not have
the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its
weight.’ ” Hassell v. Onslow Cty. Bd. of Educ., 362 N.C. 299, 305, 661
S.E.2d 709, 714 (2008) (citations omitted) (quoting Adams v. AVX Corp.,
349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998)). But, because we conclude
that again the Commission has failed to adequately address the Court of
Appeals’ mandate that it make “additional findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law on the issue of Plaintiff's entitlement to permanent partial
impairment benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31,” Harrison I, 2014 WL
2993853, at *11, we reverse the decision currently on appeal and remand
this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Commission
to comply with the 2014 mandate of the Court of Appeals.

“In reviewing an opinion and award from the Industrial Commission,
the appellate courts are bound by the Commission’s findings of fact when
supported by any competent evidence; but the [Commission’s] legal con-
clusions are fully reviewable.” Lanning v. Fieldcrest-Cannon, Inc., 352
N.C. 98, 106, 580 S.E.2d 54, 60 (2000) (citing Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet
Co., 805 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.B.2d 682, 684 (1982)). Moreover, “[t]o enable
the appellate courts to perform their duty of determining whether the
Commission’s legal conclusions are justified, the Commission must
support its conclusions with sufficient findings of fact.” Gregory
v. WA. Brown & Sons, 363 N.C. 750, 761, 688 S.E.2d 431, 439 (2010)
(citing Pardue v. Blackburn Bros. Oil & Tire Co., 260 N.C. 413, 415-16,
182 S.E.2d 747, 748-49 (1963)). “Although the Commission need not find
facts on every issue raised by the evidence, it is ‘required to make find-
ings on crucial facts upon which the right to compensation depends.’ ”

|

- IN THE SUPREME COURT 581

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[869 N.C. 572 (2017)}

Cardwell v. Jenkins Cleaners, Inc., 365 N.C. 1, 2-3, 704 S.E.2d 898, 899
(2011) (per curiam) (quoting Watts v. Borg Warner Auto., Inc., 171 N.C.
App. 1, 5, 613 S.E.2d 715, 719 (emphasis added), aff'd per curiam, 360
N.C. 169, 622 S.E.2d 492 (2005)). “Where the findings are insufficient to
enable the court to determine the rights of the parties, the case must
be remanded to the Commission for proper findings of fact.” Watts, 171
N.C. App. at. 5, 613 S.E.2d at 719 (quoting Lawion v. County of Durham,
85 N.C. App. 589, 592, 355 S.E.2d 158, 160 (1987)).

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an injured employee who
suffers some degree of loss or permanent injury to a body part, as enu-
merated in N.C.G.S. § 97-31, is entitled to collect permanent disabil-
ity compensation for a “statutorily-prescribed period of time . . . which
begins when the healing period ends and runs for the specific number of
weeks set forth in the statute.” Knight v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 149-N.C.
App. 1, 11, 562 S.E.2d 434, 442 (2002), aff'd per curiam, 357 N.C. 44,577
S.E.2d 620 (2003); see also N.C.G.S. § 97-31 (2015). “[TJhe healing period
... ends at the point when the injury has stabilized, referred to as the
point of ‘maximum medical improvement’... .” Knight, 149 N.C. App. at.
12, 562 S.E.2d at 442 (citations omitted).

At that point, a treating or evaluating physician typically assigns to
the injured employee a “permanent partial impairment rating,” which
corresponds to the degree of permanent impairment to the body
part. See generally North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Law: A
Practical Guide to Success at Every Stage of a Claim 167-68 (Valerie
A. Johnson & Gina E. Cammarano eds., 3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter Workers’
Compensation Law]; see also N.C.G.S. § 97-31; N.C. Indus. Comm’n,
N.C. Industrial Commission Rating Guide sec. 1, http://www.ic.nc.
gov/ncic/pages/ratinggd.htm http://www.ic.nc.gov/ncic/pages/ratinggd.
htm (last updated July 8, 2016) (last visited June 3, 2017) [hereinafter
Indus. Comm’n Rating Guide] (“Permanent physical impairment is any
anatomical or functional abnormality or loss after maximum medical
rehabilitation has been achieved and which abnormality or loss the phy-
sician considers stable or non-progressive at the time the evaluation is
made.”). This rating often determines the benefits to which the injured
employee is entitled. See generally Workers’ Compensation Law 167-68;
see also N.C.G.S. § 97-31; Indus. Comm'n Rating Guide.

1, N.C.G.S. § 97-81 lists a schedule of injuries and the rate and period of compensa-
tion for each, and specifically indicates that: “In cases included by the following schedule
the compensation in each case shall be paid for disability during the healing period and in
addition the disability shall be deemed to continue for the period specified, and shall be in
lieu of all other compensation .. ..” N.C.G.S. § 97-31 (2015).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[369 N.C. 572 (2017)}

The N.C. Industrial Commission Rating Guide is an Industrial
Commission publication “made available to the physicians of the State
of North Carolina” that is intended to be used “as a guide and basic
outline for physicians making rating examinations of individuals who
have had industrial injuries.” Indus. Comm’n Rating Guide sec. 2. In
addition to the specific impairment descriptions provided in the Guide
for various body parts, the Guide recognizes that “in many cases there
are intangible factors which cannot be stereotyped but must be consid-
ered,” including but not limited to “pain, weakness, and dexterity.” Id.

Additionally, an injured employee is eligible for compensation under
N.C.G.S. § 97-31 “regardless of whether the employee has, in fact, suf-
fered a loss of wage-earning capacity,” because unlike all other types
of disability benefits, “disability is presumed from the fact of the injury
itself.” Knight, 149 N.C. App. at 11, 562 S.E.2d at 442 (citation omitted).

Thus, to receive benefits for permanent injury under N.C.G.S. § 97-31,
ordinarily, the plaintiff must establish that he or she has reached the
point of maximum medical improvement and has a permanent impaiz-
ment. A showing of maximum medical improvement indicates that
the healing period has ended, and the “permanent partial impairment
rating” indicates the degree of permanent damage or loss sustained to a
body part.

Here the findings of fact are insufficient to enable this Court to
determine the plaintiff's right to benefits under N.C.G.S. § 97-31. In
Harrison I the Court of Appeals remanded this case to the Commission,
mandating that the Commission make “additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the issue of Plaintiff's entitlement to permanent
partial impairment benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31.” Harrison I,
2014 WL 2993853, at *11. Although the Commission bolstered its rea-
soning for assigning greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Gerber over
that of Dr. Rhyne regarding the permanent partial disability rating in
Finding of Fact 23 of the amended opinion and award, we conclude that
the Commission has still failed to address adequately whether plaintiff
retains any permanent impairment compensable under N.C.G.S. § 97-31.

The record here contains indications in medical records and treat-
ment notes that plaintiff's injury may be permanent and ongoing. Various
medical providers entered these notes well past the date of Dr. Gerber’s
27 June 2001 medical’ evaluation. The record contains, inter alia, the
following: (1) in 2003 Dr. Rice indicated that “at this juncture, [he] feel[s]
[plaintiff] continues to have symptoms from his injuries which need to
be addressed through the VA”; (2) in 2004 an evaluation from Carolina

IN THE SUPREME COURT 583

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[869 N.C. 572 (2017)]

Complete Rehabilitation Center recommends therapy and indicates that
plaintiff has “decreased mobility of [the] cervical region” and “continues
to experience neck pain that increases with quick movements of [his]
head and forward bending[, with his pain] rated at 7/10 in the scale of
0-10”; (8) in 2006 a report from Neurology Consultants of the Carolinas
indicates that plaintiff “is a patient [they] have been following for head-
aches, neck pain, and painful paresthesias on the right upper extrem-
ity resulting from an accident at work,” that plaintiff has “a mild disk
bulge at the C6-77 level,” and that plaintiff “has already been treated for
this conservatively, but has not improved” so they will “refer him for a
surgical opinion”; (4) in 2009 a medical record by Dr. Rhyne indicates
that plaintiff's “MRI was conclusive for a mild broad-based disk bulge at
C6-C7 without evidence of spinal stenosis”; (5) in 2010 a progress note
from the Fayetteville, North Carolina, Veterans Affairs Medical Center
indicates that a “multilevel cervical spondylosis [is] seen in the lower
cervical spine”; and (6) in 2012 Chiropractor Stogner’s visit note indi-
cates that “it is conclusive that [plaintiff] has some serious neck issues
to consider,” that “the combination of degenerative changes and ongo-
ing restriction to movement. . . suggest that the accident is the cause of
his ongoing problems,” and that Chiropractor Stogner does “not expect
to see any significant improvement with [plaintiff's] injury status and
[he] suspect[s] that [plaintiff's] condition is permanent.”

Despite these indications, the amended opinion and award does not
contain adequate findings and conclusions on whether plaintiff has a
permanent injury, taking into account all pertinent evidence. Without
such findings, we are unable to review any determination regarding
whether plaintiff is, in fact, entitled to benefits for permanent partial
impairment under N.C.G.S. § 97-31.

Additionally, we hold that the Commission must modify Finding
of Fact 23 and Conclusion of Law 6. Finding of Fact 23 either fails to
adequately address the necessary issue, Cardwell, 365 N.C. at 2-3, 704
S.E.2d at 899, or it contains a mere recitation of the evidence rather than.
true findings. To the extent that the finding is simply a recitation of the
evidence, it does not constitute a finding of fact sufficient to comply -
with the Act. See, ¢.g., N.C.G.S. § 97-84 (2015); Lane v. Am. Natl Can
Co., 181 N.C. App. 527, 531, 640 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2007) (“This Court has
Jong held that findings of fact must be more than a mere summarization
or recitation of the evidence and the Commission must resolve the con-
flicting testimony.” (citations omitted)), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 236,
659 S.E.2d 735 (2008); Davis v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 132 N.C. App. 771,
776, 514 S.E.2d 91, 94 (1999) (“Although we ‘interpret the Commission’s

584 IN THE SUPREME COURT

HARRISON v. GEMMA POWER SYS., LLC
[369 N.C, 572 (2017)]

practice of reciting testimony to mean that it does find the recited tes-
timony to be a fact,’ Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 442 n.7,
342 S.E.2d 798, 808 n.7 (1986), it is the Commission’s duty to find the ulti-
mate determinative facts, not to merely recite evidentiary facts and the
opinions of experts.”). Further, the Commission must explain its finding
of no permanent impairment, given the nearly eight years of treatment
between Dr. Gerber’s medical opinion in June 2001 and 18 May 2009,
when the condition was found compensable (Findings of Fact 25 and 26).

We conclude that the Commission has failed to carry out the Court
of Appeals’ mandate that it make additional findings of fact and con-
clusions of law on the issue of plaintiff's entitlement to benefits under
N.C.G.S. § 97-31. For this reason, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand this matter to that court for further remand to the
Commission to comply with the 2014 mandate of the Court of Appeals
in Harrison I and enter a new opinion and award not inconsistent with
this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

MURRAY v. UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL
[869 N.C. 585 (2017)

JILLIAN MURRAY

v.
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL

No. 124A16
Filed 9 June 2017

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 782 S.E.2d 581
(2016), dismissing an appeal from an order entered on 6 November 2014
by Judge Carl R. Fox in Superior Court, Orange County, and remanding
the case for further proceedings. On 9 June 2016, the Supreme Court
allowed defendant's petition for discretionary review as to an additional
issue. Heard in the Supreme Court on 21 March 2017.

Law Firm of Henry Clay Turner, PLLC, by Henry Clay Turner, for
plaintiff-appellee.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Elizabeth A. Fisher,
Assistant Solicitor General, and Laura Howard McHenry,
Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

As to the appeal of right based on the dissenting opinion, we affirm
the majority decision of the Court of Appeals. We conclude that the
petition for discretionary review as to the additional issue was improvi-
dently allowed.

AFFIRMED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY
ALLOWED.

586 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017))

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v.
WILLIAM MILLER BAKER.

No. 35PAL6
Filed 9 June 2017

1. Rape—attempted—evidence sufficient—completed rape

i Evidence tending to show that a completed rape occurred in
| the victim’s bedroom was sufficient to support defendant’s convic-
H tion for attempted rape of a child, and the trial court did not err in
| denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the attempted rape charge
for insufficiency of the evidence.

2. Appeal and Error—preservation of issues—appeal by State
Where the State failed to advance an argument prior to filing its
discretionary review petition in the Supreme Court, the State did
not waive the right to make the argument on appeal. The question
was whether the ruling of the trial court was correct rather than
whether the reason given was sound or tenable, and the State had
consistently maintained its position.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 781 S.E.2d
1 851 (2016), vacating in part defendant's convictions after appeal from
: a judgment entered on 8 August 2014 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in
Superior Court, Wake County, and remanding for resentencing. Heard
in the Supreme Court on 22 March 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Anne M. Middleton, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Jennifer Harjo, Public Defender, New Hanover County, by Brendan
O'Donnell, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant-appellee.

ERVIN, Justice.

The issue presented for our consideration in this case is whether
the record contains sufficient evidence to support defendant's convic-
tion for attempted first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C.G.S.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 587

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017)

§ 14-27.2A(a).! In vacating defendant’s attempted rape conviction, the
Court of Appeals held that “[t]he State failed to present substantial evi-
dence of all elements of” that offense. State v. Baker, __ N.C. App. __,
__, 781 S.E.2d 851, 856 (2016). After examining the record in light of
the applicable legal standard, we conclude that the evidence adequately
supported the jury’s determination that defendant had committed the
offense of attempted first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C.G.S.
§ 14-27.2A(a) and reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to
this issue.

According to the State, defendant committed two specific sex-
ual assaults against Amanda? between the dates of 1 April 2008 and
21 October 2009, one of which allegedly occurred in Amanda's bedroom
and the other of which allegedly occurred on a couch in the family resi-
dence. At the time of these incidents, defendant, who had been born in
1981, was the boyfriend of Amanda's mother and lived in the family home
with Amanda, her mother, and Amanda's two brothers, the younger of
whom was defendant's son.

Amanda claimed that, during the summer of 2009, defendant entered
her bedroom, in which she was lying on the bed; removed his own shorts
and Amanda’s shorts and underwear; and began touching her vagina.
Although Amanda was “kicking and screaming” as he did so, defendant
“put his penis in [her] vagina.” Defendant's assaultive conduct ended
when Amanda's mother, who had been sleeping downstairs, entered the
bedroom and discovered defendant, who was unclothed, with Amanda,
whose shorts and underwear were around her knees. After making this
discovery, Amanda’s mother told Amanda to keep her door locked.

Amanda’s mother described the bedroom incident in somewhat dif-
ferent terms. While sleeping on a downstairs couch during the summer
of 2009, Amanda's mother heard what she believed to be her youngest
child falling out of bed, as he had a habit of doing. After checking on
the child and his brother, who were both asleep, Amanda’s mother opened
the door to Amanda’s bedroom, in which she found defendant, who was
asleep and clad in nothing other than his underwear, lying partially on
Amanda’s bed. Amanda's mother could not determine whether Amanda

1. The General Assembly recodified this offense as N.C.G.S. § 14-27.23(a), effective
1 December 2015. Act of July 29, 2015, ch. 181, secs. 5(a), 48, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 460,
461, 472.

2, “Amanda” is a pseudonym that we, like the Court of Appeals, have employed for
ease of reading and to protect the identity of the child.

588 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BAKER
[869 N.C. 586 (2017)]

was clothed because she was lying face down on the bed beneath a blan-
ket. According to Amanda’s mother, defendant had a history of “blood
sugar” problems and would, on occasion, get up in the night, act in an
angry or disoriented manner, and pass out. Amanda’s mother thought
that defendant’s presence in Amanda’s room on the occasion in question
resulted from just such a “low blood sugar” episode. Although Amanda
told her mother that defendant had hurt her, she understood Amanda’s
statement to be focused upon the fact that defendant had collapsed on
top of her, and she told Amanda to lock her bedroom door to prevent
the recurrence of such an injury. Defendant, on the other hand, told
Amanda’s mother that he had no memory of what had caused him to be
in Amanda’s bedroom or what had happened there.

In the autumn of 2009, Amanda arrived home from school to find
defendant in an intoxicated condition. As Amanda sat down on the
couch to do her homework, defendant began touching Amanda’s chest.
Although defendant attempted to have Amanda lie down on the couch,
she was able to move away from him after he appeared to have fallen
asleep. When defendant sat up, Amanda grabbed a phone, fled to her
bedroom, entered the closet, and telephoned her mother with a request
that her mother have someone come get her. Amanda was subsequently
picked up by her grandparents.

Amanda’s mother, on the other hand, remembered that Amanda
had called her at work in the autumn of 2009 and told her that defen-
dant’s conduct was frightening her. Although Amanda did not specify
what defendant had done to frighten her, Amanda’s mother honored her
daughter’s request that she be picked up.

Amanda claimed that, prior to the bedroom incident, defendant had
committed repeated sexual assaults against her. According to Amanda,
defendant had touched her, put his penis in her vagina, and “grabbed
{her] from [her] arms and told [her] not to tell anybody.” Although
Amanda could not recall how old she was when these earlier incidents
occurred, she knew that she “was little.”

Amanda initially disclosed that she had been sexually abused dw
ing a conversation with some school friends during the fall of 2009.
Even though a school counselor reported Amanda’s allegations to Wake
County Child Protective Services, Amanda told both Danielle Doyle, an
investigator with Wake County Child Protective Services, and Detective
Peggy Marchant of the Cary Police Department that no sexual abuse
had occurred. After receiving a new report that defendant had abused
Amanda, Ms. Doyle and Detective Marchant spoke with Amanda again.

BT

IN THE SUPREME COURT 589

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017)]

Although she was initially hesitant to discuss sexual abuse-related issues
during this interview, Amanda admitted that she was having nightmares,
that she had not been sleeping well, and that her level of nightmares,
including flashbacks about being touched, had been increasing as the
date upon which defendant was scheduled for release from prison (in
which he was serving a sentence based upon an unrelated conviction)
neared. When Amanda disclosed incidents involving attempted penile-
vaginal contact and the fondling of her breasts and genital area, Ms.
Doyle terminated the interview and made an appointment for Amanda
to be evaluated by SafeChild Advocacy Center.

On 21 November 2011, Sara Kirk, a child abuse evaluation special-
ist at the Center, interviewed Amanda. During that interview, Amanda
stated that, a couple of years earlier, defendant had touched her in an
inappropriate manner and attempted to put his penis in her vagina. In
describing the bedroom incident, Amanda replied, “I don’t think it did,”
when asked if defendant's penis had entered her private part. Amanda
did not claim that defendant's penis had penetrated her vagina at the
time of the bedroom incident until a 14 July 2013 meeting with investi-
gating officers and representatives of the District Attorney’s office.

Holly Warner, a nurse practitioner at the Center, found “no signs of
acute, meaning recent, or healed trauma to [Amanda’s] vaginal area.”
However, Ms. Warner also stated that such results were not uncommon
even if vaginal penetration had occurred.

Jeanine Bolick, a licensed clinical social worker, conducted coun-
seling sessions with Amanda from 8 May 2012 through 11 June 2013. In
light of Amanda’s reluctance to discuss sexual abuse-related issues and
her tearful affect when the subject of sexual abuse was mentioned, Ms.
Bolick diagnosed Amanda as suffering from post-traumatic stress disor-
der. On the other hand, Ms. Bolick admitted that she had not observed
specific symptoms of sexual abuse during her sessions with Amanda
and that post-traumatic stress disorder can have a number of causes.

Defendant denied that he had ever attempted to insert his penis into
Amanda’s vagina, that he had ever entered Amanda’s bedroom for that
purpose, or that he had ever touched Amanda inappropriately. In addi-
tion, defendant denied that there had ever been a time in the autumn of
2009 in which Amanda had been alone with defendant after returning
home from school. Finally, defendant denied having ever passed out in
Amanda’s bedroom for reasons relating to his diabetic condition.

On 24 January 2012, the Wake County grand jury returned a bill of
indictment charging defendant with attempted first-degree rape of a

590 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C, 586 (2017)]

child in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2(a)(1) and taking indecent liberties
with a child in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1). On 6 August 2013,
the Wake County grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging
defendant with three counts of attempted first-degree rape of a child in
violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2A(a), one count of first-degree rape of a
child in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2A(a), and three counts of taking
indecent liberties with a child in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1).
On 29 October 2013, the Wake County grand jury returned superseding
indictments charging defendant with first-degree rape of a child in viola-
tion of N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2A(a), attempted first-degree rape of a child in
violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2A(a), and taking indecent liberties with
a child in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a)(1), with all three offenses
allegedly having occurred on or about 1 April 2008 through 21 October
2009. The charges against defendant came on for trial before the trial
court and a jury at the 4 August 2014 criminal session of the Superior
Court, Wake County. At the conclusion of the State’s evidence and at
the close of all of the evidence, defendant unsuccessfully sought to have
the charges that had been lodged against him dismissed for insufficiency
of the evidence.

At the jury instruction conference, the trial court indicated, without
objection from either party, that it intended to inform the jury that, before
the jury could convict defendant of any of the three charges that had
been lodged against him, it had to find that each charge was supported
by evidence relating to a separate, discrete event and that the verdict
sheet would set forth “three counts,” with there being “no lesser-included
offenses that [the court was] aware of.” The trial court began and ended
its instructions with respect to each of the substantive offenses that
defendant had been charged with committing by stating that, in order to
find defendant guilty, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the conduct supporting the offense in question involved a discrete event
that was separate from any of the events upon which the jury relied in
convicting defendant of having committed any other offense. For exam-
ple, the trial court instructed the jury with respect to the issue of defen-
dant’s guilt of attempted first-degree rape of a child that:

The defendant has been charged with attempted
rape of a child. For you to find the defendant guilty of
attempted rape of a child the state must prove four things
beyond a reasonable doubt:

If you have found the defendant guilty of rape of
a child in count one and/or indecent liberties with a
child in count three, then the state must prove beyond

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017)

a reasonable doubt that these four things in count two
occurred on an occasion separate from the event you
found to have occurred in count one and separate from
the event you found to have occurred in count three.

The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that,
first, defendant intended to engage in vaginal intercourse
with the victim. Vaginal intercourse is penetration, how-
ever slight, of the female sex organ by the male organ.

Second, that at the time of the act alleged the victim
was a child under the age of thirteen years.

Third, that at the time of the act alleged the defendant
was at least eighteen years of age.

And fourth, the defendant performed an act that was
calculated and designed to accomplish vaginal inter-
course with the victim and that such conduct came so
close to bringing about vaginal intercourse that in the
ordinary course of events the defendant would have com-
pleted the act with the victim had he not been stopped or
prevented. Mere preparation or planning is not enough to
constitute such an act, but the act need not necessarily be
the last act required to complete the offense.

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that .. . in or about the period from April 1, 2008
through October 21, 2009 but if you have found the defen-
dant guilty of rape of a child in count one separate from
that occasion or if you have found the defendant guilty
of indecent liberties with a child in count three separate
from that occasion, the defendant intended to engage in
vaginal intercourse with the victim and that at that time
the victim was a child under the age of thirteen years
and that the defendant was at least eighteen years of age
and that the defendant performed an act... which in the
ordinary course of events would have resulted in vaginal
intercourse by the defendant with the victim ... had not
the defendant been stopped or prevented from complet-
ing this apparent course of action, it would be your duty
to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find or have
a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, it
would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

592 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017)}

On 8 August 2014, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant
guilty of attempted first-degree rape of a child and taking indecent lib-
erties with a child. In light of the jury’s inability to reach a unanimous
verdict with respect to the issue of defendant's guilt of first-degree rape
of a child, the trial court declared a mistrial with respect to that count of
the superseding indictment. After accepting the jury’s verdict, the trial
court consolidated defendant’s convictions for judgment and sentenced
defendant to a term of 240 to 297 months of imprisonment. Defendant
noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial court’s judgment.

[1] In seeking relief from the trial court’s judgment before the Court of
Appeals, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court had
erred by denying his motion to dismiss the attempted rape charge for
insufficiency of the evidence.? More specifically, defendant contended
that the evidence concerning the couch incident did not suffice to sup-
port an attempted rape conviction and that the evidence concerning the
bedroom incident, when taken in the light most favorable to the State,
showed that defendant had committed a completed, rather than an
attempted, rape. In addition, defendant argued that, to the extent that
“the trial court's instruction permitted the jury to find the defendant
guilty of attempted rape as a lesser included offense of rape,” the deliv-
ery of that instruction constituted plain error.

Although the State argued that the record contained sufficient evi-
dence to support defendant's attempted rape conviction, it appeared
to concede that the testimony regarding the various statements that
Amanda had made during the investigative process had not been admit-
ted for substantive purposes and could not be considered in analyzing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant’s attempted rape
conviction. In addition, the State acknowledged that, with respect to the
bedroom incident, Amanda “did, in fact, testify to a completed act of
vaginal intercourse.” Even so, however, the State maintained that the
record evidence concerning both the bedroom and the couch incidents
was sufficient to support defendant's attempted rape conviction. Finally,
the State argued that the trial court had not erred, much less committed
plain error, in the course of instructing the jury.

In the course of vacating defendant’s attempted rape conviction, the
Court of Appeals noted that the parties agreed that defendant’s convic-
tion could only be sustained on the basis of evidence concerning either

3. Defendant did not challenge the validity of his conviction for taking indecent
liberties with a child before the Court of Appeals.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 593

STATE v. BAKER
[869 N.C. 586 (2017)}

the bedroom incident or the couch incident. Baker, __ N.C. App. at
___, 781 S.E.2d at 855. Moreover, the Court of Appeals determined that
the substantive evidence contained in the present record concerning the
bedroom incident “could support a conviction for a completed rape”
but did not constitute “substantive evidence of attempted rape.” Id.
at __, 781 S.E.2d at 855 (citing State v. Batchelor, 190 N.C. App. 369,
373-75, 660 S.E.2d 158, 162 (2008)). Finally, the Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the evidence concerning the couch incident did not suffice to
show that defendant had “intended to rape Amanda.” Jd. at __, 781
S.E.2d at 856. As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial
court had erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the attempted
rape charge, declined to address defendant’s challenge to the trial
court’s jury instructions, vacated defendant's attempted rape conviction,
and remanded this case to the trial court for resentencing. Id. at __,
781 S.E.2d at 856. On 9 June 2016, we allowed the State’s discretionary
review petition.

In the brief that it filed before this Court, the State argues that the
Court of Appeals erred by vacating defendant’s attempted rape convic-
tion on sufficiency of the evidence grounds given that prior decisions
from both this Court and the Court of Appeals establish that evidence
reflecting a completed rape can support an attempt conviction.4 In
response, defendant argues, among other things, that the decisions upon
which the State relies “do not actually stand for the proposition that
legally sufficient evidence of a completed crime will necessarily support.
averdict of a lesser included crime” and that the State’s contention “that
evidence of the greater offense supports a verdict of guilt on the lesser
offense cannot be squared with” this Court’s decisions to the effect that,
“where the evidence of the greater offense is positive and there is no
evidence of the lesser included offense, the lesser included offense may
not be considered by the jury and the defendant may not be convicted
of it.” In addition, defendant argues that the attempted rape charge was
not submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense of rape and that
the jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict with respect to the com-
pleted rape charge shows that the jury had doubts about the veracity

4. In addition, the State argued that the non-specific evidence concerning the his-
tory of defendant's assaults upon Amanda set out in Amanda's trial testimony and the
evidence concerning the couch incident both provide independent support for defen-
dant’s attempted rape conviction. However, given our determination that the substantive
evidence concerning the bedroom incident adequately supported defendant's attempted
rape conviction, we need not address either of these additional arguments any further in
this opinion.

594 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017)]

of Amanda’s testimony. Furthermore, to the extent that the prior deci-
sions of this Court and the Court of Appeals suggest that, despite the
absence of any evidence tending to show that an attempted rape had
occurred, any error in submitting the issue of a defendant's guilt of a
lesser included offense was favorable, rather than adverse to, the defen-
dant, this Court has retreated from such statements in subsequent deci-
sions. In defendant's view, a verdict convicting defendant of a crime for
which there is no evidentiary support violates defendant’s fundamental
rights to due process and a unanimous verdict. Finally, defendant argues
that, if the attempted rape charge had not been submitted to the jury,
there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have been unable to
reach a unanimous verdict with respect to the completed rape charge or
found defendant not guilty of that offense.®

“In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need
determine only whether there is substantial evidence of
each essential element of the crime and that the defendant
is the perpetrator.” Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror
to accept a conclusion.

State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301, 560 $.E.2d 776, 781 (citations omitted)
(quoting State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 417, 508 S.E.2d 496, 518 (1998),

5. [2] In addition to the arguments discussed in the text of this opinion, defendant
has asserted, in reliance upon this Court’s decisions in North Carolina School Boards
Ass'n v. Moore, 359 N.C. 474, 614 8.E.2d 504 (2005), and Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 175
S.E. 836 (1934), that the State waived the right to argue that evidence tending to show
that a completed rape occurred sufficed to support defendant's attempted rape convic-
tion given that the State failed to advance this argument, prior to filing its discretionary
review petition, However, neither of the decisions upon which defendant relies provides
adequate support for this argument given that Weil involved a direct appeal from the trial
court to this Court in which the appellant sought to raise an argument which had not been
presented for the trial court’s consideration, 207 N.C. at 10, 175 S.B. at 838, and Moore
involved a situation in which the defendant-appellants sought to advance an argument
based upon astate constitutional provision that they had failed to present before either the
trial court or the Court of Appeals, 359 N.C. at 481, 510, 614 S.B.2d at 508, 526. In this case,
however, the State, which was the appellee before the Court of Appeals, is challenging a
decision of the Court of Appeals overturning a trial court decision in its favor. As a result of
the fact that [t]he question for review is whether the ruling of the trial court was correct”
rather than “whether the reason given therefor is sound or tenable,” State v. Austin, 320
N.C. 276, 290, 357 S..2d 641, 650 (citing State v. Blackawell, 246 N.C. 642, 644, 99 S.B.2d
867, 869 (1957)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 916, 98 L. Ed.2d 224 (1987), and the faet that the
State has consistently taken the position that the record evidence sufficed to support the
submission of the issue of defendant's guilt of attempted rape to the jury, we do not believe
that the State has waived the right to argue in support of the trial court's decision to deny
defendant's dismissal motion that evidence that defendant committed a completed rape
sufficed to support his conviction for attempted rape.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017)]

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1005, 154 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002). In making this
determination:

The evidence is to be considered in the light most
favorable to the State; the State is entitled to every rea-
sonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be
drawn therefrom; contradictions and discrepancies are
for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal; and
all of the evidence actually admitted, whether competent
or incompetent, which is favorable to the State is to be
considered by the court in ruling on the motion.

State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980) (citations
omitted).

“A person is guilty of rape of a child if the person is at least 18 years
of age and engages in vaginal intercourse with a victim who is a child
under the age of 13 years.” N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2A(a) (2018). “ ‘[VJaginal
intercourse’ . .. means the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the
female by the sexual organ of the male.” State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 417,
435, 347 S.E.2d 7, 18 (1986) (citations omitted), superseded by statute,
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b), on other grounds as recognized in State .
v. Moore, 335 N.C. 567, 594-96, 440 S.E.2d 797, 812-14, cert. denied, 513
USS. 898, 180 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1994). “The elements of an attempt to com-
mit a crime are: ‘(1) the intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2)
an overt act done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation,
but (8) falls short of the completed offense.’ ” State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448,
449, 5277 S.E.2d 45, 46 (2000) (quoting State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 667, 477
S.E.2d 915, 921 (1996), and citing State v. Ball, 344 N.C. 290, 305, 474 S.E.2d
345, 354 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1180, 137 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1997))).

In State v. Roy, defendant Roy was indicted for rape. 233 N.C. 558,
558, 64 S.E.2d 840, 840 (1951). However, the prosecutor elected to pro-
ceed against defendant Roy based solely upon a charge of assault with
intent to commit rape at the time that the case was called for trial. Id.
at 558, 64 S.E.2d at 840-41. In rejecting defendant Roy’s challenge to the
denial of his motion for nonsuit on appeal, which was predicated on
the fact that all of the evidence showed a completed rape rather than
an attempt, id. at 559, 64 S.E.2d at 841, we noted that “it is well settled
that an indictment for an offense includes all the lesser degrees of the
same crime,” id. at 559, 64 S.E.2d at 841 (citations omitted); indicated
that, “although all the evidence may point to the commission of the
graver crime charged in a. bill of indictment, thé jury’s verdict for an
offense of a lesser degree will not be disturbed, since it is favorable to

596 * IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017)]

the defendant,” id. at 559, 64 S.E.2d at 841 (citations omitted); and con-
cluded that “[tJhe evidence adduced in the trial below was ample to sup-
port the verdicts rendered,” id. at 560, 64 S.E.2d at 841. As a result, this
Court clearly held in Roy that evidence of a completed rape sufficed to
support an attempted rape conviction.

Similarly, in State v. Canup, the prosecuting witness testified at
trial that the defendant had “stuck his penis in her vagina” despite the
fact that the grand jury had indicted the defendant for attempted second-
degree rape. 117 N.C. App. 424, 426, 451 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1994). In response
to the defendant’s argument that the evidence did not suffice to sup-
port his attempted rape conviction, the Court of Appeals stated that
“[e]vidence that this defendant continued to pursue his malevolent pur-
pose and achieved penetration does not decriminalize his prior overt acts”
since “(t]he completed commission of a crime must of necessity include
an attempt to commit the crime.” Jd. at 428, 451 S.E.2d at 11. According
to the Court of Appeals, “nothing in the philosophy of juridical science
requires that an attempt must fail in order to receive recognition.” Id.
at 428, 451 S.E.2d at 11 (quoting Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce,
Criminal Law 612 (8d ed. 1982) [hereinafter Criminal Law]). However,

[a] successful attempt to commit a crime will not support
two convictions and penalties,[—]one for the attempt and
the other for the completed offense. This is for the obvious
reason that whatever is deemed the appropriate penalty
for the total misconduct can be imposed upon conviction
of the offense itself, but this does not require the unsound
conclusion that proof of the completed offense disproves
the attempt to commit it. .

Id. at 428, 451 S.E.2d at 11-12 (quoting Criminal Law 612 (emphasis
added and footnotes omitted)). As a result, the Court of Appeals deter-
mined that the record evidence “would have supported the defendant’s
being charged with either second degree rape or attempted second
degree rape and convicted of either offense.” Id. at 428, 451 S.E.2d at 12.

Approximately two decades later, the Court of Appeals held, in reli-
ance upon Canup, that the evidence sufficed to preclude allowance of
the defendant's motion to dismiss an attempted larceny charge for insuf-
ficiency of the evidence in a case in which the State had indicted the
defendant for attempted larceny while all the evidence tended to show
that a completed larceny had occurred. State v. Primus, 227 N.C. App.
428, 430-32, 742 S.E.2d 310, 312-18 (2013). In doing so, the court rejected
the defendant's argument that guilt of the crime of attempted larceny

IN THE SUPREME COURT , 597

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017)]

requires that the defendant's act supporting the attempt charge fall short
of the competed offense in order to be sufficient to support an attempt
conviction, id. at 429-32, 742 S.E.2d at 312-13, a conclusion that accords
with the modern view concerning criminal liability for attempt. 2 Wayne
R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 11.5, at 230 (2d ed. 2008) (stat-
ing that, “[a]lthough the crime of attempt is sometimes defined as if fail-
ure were an essential element, the modern view is that a defendant may
be convicted on a charge of attempt even if it is shown that the crime
was completed”). As a result, a careful review of the relevant decisions
of this Court and the Court of Appeals demonstrates that evidence of a
completed rape is sufficient to support an attempted rape conviction.

As defendant emphasizes, this Court has held that.

{w]here there is conflicting evidence as to an essential ele-
ment of the crime charged, the court should instruct the
jury with regard to any lesser included offense supported
by any version of the evidence. If the lesser included
offense is not supported by the evidence, it should not be
submitted, regardless of conflicting evidence.

State v. Jones, 304 N.C. 823, 831, 288 S.E.2d 488, 488 (1981). For that
reason, in the event that the State has elicited positive evidence of every
element of the completed crime of rape and the defendant claims that
his encounter with the alleged victim was consensual or never occurred,
the trial court should not allow the jury to consider the issue of the
defendant's guilt of the lesser included offense of attempted rape. State
v. Nelson, 341 N.C. 695, 698, 462 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1995). “The rule that
a jury can believe all, part, or none of a party’s evidence,” id. at 698,
462 S.E.2d at 226 (citing State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 388, 255 S.E.2d 366
(1979), superseded by statute, N.C.G.S. § 154-924, on other grounds as
recognized in State v. Silas, 360 N.C. 377, 627 S.E.2d 604 (2006)), “does
not apply when to let it do so could result in the jury’s finding of guilt of a
crime which is not supported by the evidence of either party,” id. at 698,
462 S.E.2d at 226. However, the decisions upon which defendant relies,
including Nelson, 341 N.C. at 698, 462 S.E.2d at 226; State v. Smith, 315
N.C. 76, 102, 337 S.E.2d 833, 850 (1985); State v. Horner, 310 N.C. 274,
283, 311 S.E.2d 281, 287-88 (1984); State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 287,
298 S.E.2d 645, 654 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by State
v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 198, 344 $.E.2d 775 (1986); and State v. Jones, 249
N.C. 134, 189, 105 S.E.2d 518, 517 (1958), address whether the defen-
dant was entitled to the submission of the issue of his or her guilt of a
lesser included offense to the jury rather than the entirely separate issue

598 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. BAKER
[369 N.C. 586 (2017)}

of whether the evidence sufficed to support the defendant’s conviction.
For that reason, the proper resolution of defendant's challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his attempted rape conviction
hinges upon cases such as Roy, Canup, and Primus rather than upon.
the decisions on which defendant relies.

Defendant’s reliance upon this Court’s opinions in State v. Ray,
299 N.C. 151, 261 S.E.2d 789 (1980), and State v. Arnold, 329 N.C. 128,
404 S.E.2d 822 (1991), which deal with the extent to which the errone-
ous submission of the issue of the defendant's guilt of a lesser included.
offense that lacked adequate evidentiary support constituted prejudicial
error, is equally misplaced. As was the case with defendant's argument
in reliance upon Nelson, Smith, Horner, Strickland, and Jones, the
present case involves the issue of whether evidence of the defendant's
guilt of the completed offense suffices to support an attempt conviction
rather than the issue of whether the jury should have been allowed to
consider the issue of the defendant's guilt of a lesser included offense
that lacked adequate evidentiary support. As if that-were not enough to
render this case distinguishable from Ray and Arnold, neither of those
decisions involved a situation in which the issue of the defendant's guilt
of attempt was erroneously submitted to the jury despite the fact that
all of the evidence showed the commission of a completed offense.
Finally, although its decision is obviously not binding upon us, the Court
of Appeals held in State v. Wade, 49 N.C. App. 257, 271 S.E.2d 77 (1980),
cert. denied, 315 N.C. 596, 341 S.E.2d 37 (1986), that the defendant was
not. entitled to relief on appeal based upon the trial court’s erroneous
decision to instruct the jury concerning the issue of the defendant's guilt
of the lesser included offense of attempted rape in a case in which all the
evidence tended to show that the defendant was guilty of a completed
rape on the grounds that, “[i]f there were error from the instruction com-
plained of, such was favorable to [the] defendant and harmless.” Jd. at
261-62, 271 S.E.2d at 80. As a result, Ray and Arnold, which address an
issue that is not before the Court in this instance, have no bearing on the
proper resolution of this case either.

Thus, for all these reasons, we conclude that the record evidence
tending to show that a completed rape had occurred in Amanda's bed-
room sufficed to support defendant's conviction for attempted rape and
that the trial court did not, for that reason, err in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss the attempted rape charge for insufficiency of the evi-
dence. In addition, given the fact that the issue of defendant's guilt of
attempted rape was not submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense
of first-degree rape of a child, there is no need for further consideration

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. CAMPBELL
[869 N.C. 599 (2017)]

of defendant's argument that the trial court committed plain error by
allowing the jury to convict him of attempted rape as a lesser included
offense of first-degree rape of a child. As a result, the Court of Appeals’
decision vacating the judgment that the trial court entered based
upon defendant's conviction for attempted first-degree rape of a child
is reversed.

REVERSED.
——a
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v
THOMAS CRAIG CAMPBELL

No. 252PA14-2
Filed 9 June 2017

Appeal and Error—Rule of Appellate Procedure 2—invoked by
Court of Appeals without discussion of merits
The Court of Appeals erred in this case (Campbell IT) by invok-
ing Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure to review defendant's
fatal variance argument. The panel in Campbell II merely noted
that a previous panel of that court had, for the same case (Campbell
D, invoked Rule 2 to review a similar fatal variance argument and
then, without further discussion or analysis regarding Rule 2, the
Campbell II panel addressed the merits of defendant’s argument.
The panel failed to exercise its discretion when it did not consider
whether defendant’s case was one of the rare instances meriting
exercise of the court's supervisory power under Rule 2. The case
was reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for an indepen-
dent determination of whether the facts and circumstances merited
the exercise of the court's discretion to review the case under Rule 2.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 777 S.E.2d
525 (2015), finding no error in part, but vacating in part and remand-
ing a judgment entered on 12 June 2013 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in
Superior Court, Cleveland County, after the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. reversed and remanded the Court of Appeals’ prior decision in
this case, State v. Campbell, 234 N.C. App. 551, 759 S.E.2d 380 (2014).
Heard in the Supreme Court on 20 March 2017.

600 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. CAMPBELL
[369 N.C. 599 (2017)

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Teresa M. Postell, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Hannah Hall Love,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

MORGAN, Justice.

This is the second time that this case has made its way to this Court,
and yet our resolution of the present appeal does not represent a final rul-
ing on the merits. Instead, for the reasons discussed herein, we reverse
and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for an independent assess-
ment of whether that court need and should invoke its discretion under
Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to
reach the merits of one of defendant’s substantive issues on appeal.

In light of the several previous opinions from this Court and the
Court of Appeals in this matter, we will not recount the factual back-
ground of this case in detail. The evidence at trial tended to show the
following: Overnight on 15 August 2012, certain sound equipment dis-
appeared from Manna Baptist Church in Shelby, North Carolina, and
defendant's wallet was found in the area of the church near where
some of the missing equipment was kept. Defendant testified that, in
the throes of a personal crisis, he entered the unlocked church seeking
comfort and sanctuary, spent the night there praying and sleeping, and
left the following morning without taking anything except some water.
After defendant left the church, he experienced symptoms that led him
to believe he was having a heart attack, so he called for emergency
services. The emergency medical technician (EMT) who responded to
defendant's call for help testified that defendant did not have any sound
equipment with him when the EMT arrived. Nonetheless, defendant was
subsequently indicted for (1) breaking or entering a place of religious
worship with intent to commit a larceny therein and (2) larceny after
breaking or entering.

The procedural history of this case warrants lengthier review. The
matter came on for trial at the 10 June 2013 session of Superior Court,
Cleveland County, the Honorable Linwood O. Foust, Judge presiding.
Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him at the close of
the State’s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence. The trial
court denied each motion, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on both
charges. Defendant appealed, making six arguments of error. The Court
of Appeals addressed only two of defendant's contentions, but vacated

“IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. CAMPBELL
[369 N.C, 599 (2017)]

his larceny conviction and reversed his conviction for breaking or enter-
ing. See State v. Campbell, 234 N.C. App. 551, 759 S.E.2d 380 (2014),
rev'd and remanded, 368 N.C. 83, 772 S.E.2d 440 (2015). The bases for
the Court of Appeals’ holdings were its determinations that: (1) when a
larceny “indictment alleges multiple owners, one of whom is not a natu-
ral person, failure to allege that such an owner has the ability to own
property is fatal to the indictment,” such that the larceny indictment was
“fatally flawed” for failing to “allege that Manna Baptist Church is a legal
entity capable of owning property;” and (2) the State presented insuf-
ficient evidence of an essential element of felony breaking or entering
a place of worship, to wit: intent to commit larceny. Id. at 555-56, 759
§.E.2d at 384. This Court allowed the State’s first petition for discretion-
ary review. See State v. Campbell, 367 N.C. 792, 766 S.E.2d 635 (2014).

In that initial appeal, this Court held

that the larceny indictment, alleging ownership of stolen
property of Manna Baptist Church sufficiently alleged
ownership in a legal entity capable of owning property[,]
.... that the State presented sufficient evidence of defen-
dant’s criminal intent to sustain a conviction for felony
breaking or entering a place of religious worship, and
[thus] the trial court properly denied defendant's motions
to dismiss.

State v. Campbell, 368 N.C. 83, 88, 772 S.E.2d 440, 444-45 (2015).
Accordingly, we reversed the decision below and remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's four remaining
issues on appeal. Jd. at 88, 772 S.E.2d at 445.

Defendant’s remaining issues were that

he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel,
because his counsel failed to object to the admission of
evidence that defendant had committed a separate break-
ing or entering offense; [that] the trial court erred in failing
to dismiss the larceny charge due to a fatal variance as to
the ownership of the property; [that] insufficient evidence
supports his larceny conviction; and [that] the trial court
violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury ver
dict with respect to the larceny charge.

See State v. Campbell, ___ N.C. App. __, 777 S.E.2d 525, 528 (2015)
(Campbell II). The court found “that the trial court committed no error
in convicting defendant of breaking or entering a place of religious

602 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. CAMPBELL
[369 N.C. 599 (2017)]

worship with intent to commit a larceny therein[,]” id. at__, 777 S.E.2d
at 534, After rejecting defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the court turned to defendant's contention that a fatal variance
existed between the allegations in the indictment and the evidence at
trial regarding who owned the sound equipment that was stolen.!

The Court of Appeals first observed that, because his trial counsel
had failed to raise the fatal variance issue in the trial court, defendant
sought review under North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 2. Id.
at ___, 777 S.E.2d at 530. Ordinarily, “to preserve an issue for appellate
review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request,
objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party
desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from
the context.” N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Nevertheless, “[t]o prevent mani-
fest injustice to a party . . . either court of the appellate division may . . .
suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any of [the appellate]
rules in a case pending before it.” Id. at R. 2. The court in Campbell II
noted that a previous panel of that court had “invoked Rule 2 to review
asimilar fatal variance argument and held that this type of error is ‘suf-
ficiently serious to justify the exercise of our authority under [Rule 2].’”
Campbell, ___N.C. App. at ____, 777 S.E.2d at 530 (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Gayton — Barbosa, 197 N.C. App. 129, 134, 676 S.E.2d
586, 590 (2009), appeal denied sub nom. Gayton — Barbosa v. Sapper,
No. 5:10-HC - 2218 BO, 2012 WL 174 299 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2012)).
Without further discussion or analysis regarding Rule 2, the court then
addressed the merits of defendant's argument, determining that a fatal
variance indeed existed between the indictment—which alleged the sto-
Jen sound equipment was owned by both the church and its pastor—
and the evidence at tria—which showed that the equipment belonged
to the church alone. Jd. at __, 777 S.E.2d at 534. Accordingly, the court
vacated defendant’s larceny conviction.” The State again petitioned this
Court for discretionary review, and on 9 June 2016, the State’s petition
was allowed “only as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in invoking
Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure under the

1. As has already been discussed, defendant previously raised, and this Court
rejected, a different challenge to the larceny indictment, to wit: whether that indictment
sufficiently alleged ownership in a legal entity capable of owning property. For clarity,
‘we refer to the current challenge to the larceny indictment as the “fatal variance” issue
or argument.

2. Inlight of this result, the court did not address defendant's final two arguments of
error in connection with the larceny conviction. Id. at __, 777 S..2d at 584.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 603

STATE v. CAMPBELL
[369 N.C. 599 (2017)]

circumstances of this case.” See State v. Campbell, 368 N.C. 904, 794
8.E.2d 800 (2016).

As this Court has repeatedly stated, “Rule 2 relates to the residual
power of our appellate courts to consider, in exceptional circumstances,
significant issues of importance in the public interest or to prevent injus-
tice which appears manifest to the Court and only in such instances.”
Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 66, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299-300 (1999)
(citing Blumenthal v. Lynch, 315 N.C. 571, 578, 340 S.E.2d 358, 362
(1986)) (emphases added); see also Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White
Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 196, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008). This
assessment—whether a particular case is one of the rare “instances”
appropriate for Rule 2 review—must necessarily be made in light of
the specific circumstances of individual cases and parties, such as
whether “substantial rights of an appellant are affected.” State v. Hart,
361 N.C. 309, 316, 644 S.B.2d 201, 205 (2007) (citing, inter alia, State v.
Sanders, 312 N.C. 318, 320, 821 $.H.2d 836, 837 (1984) (per curiam) (“In
view of the gravity of the offenses for which defendant was tried and
the penalty of death which was imposed, we choose to exercise our
supervisory powers under Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
and, in the interest of justice, vacate the judgments entered and order a
new trial.” (emphasis added)). In simple terms, precedent cannot create
an automatic right to review via Rule 2. Instead, whether an appellant
has demonstrated that his matter is the rare case meriting suspension of
our appellate rules is always a discretionary determination to be made

.on a case-by-case basis.3 See Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., 362 N.C. at
196, 657 S.E.2d at 364; Hart, 361 N.C. at 315-17, 644 S.E.2d at 204-06;
Steingress, 350 N.C. at 66, 511 S.E.2d at 299-300.

Here, the Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of defendant’s
fatal variance argument after an independent determination of whether
the specific circumstances of defendant’s case warranted invocation of
Rule 2, but rather, based upon a belief that “this type of error” automati-
cally entitles an appellant to review via Rule 2. See Campbell, __ N.C.
App. at ____, 777 S.E.2d at 530. The court thus acted under the errone-
ous belief that, because defendant presented a fatal variance argument,
the court lacked the ability to act otherwise than to reach the merits of

8. Notably, the Court of Appeals panel in Gayton-Barbosa, the case cited by the
Campbell II panel, employed exactly such an individualized analysis in deciding to invoke
Rule 2. Gayton—Barbosa, 197 N.C. App. 129, 135 & n.4, 676 8.B.2d 586, 590 & n.4 (discuss-
ing the specific circumstances and then determining that, “given the peculiar facts of
this case, it is appropriate to address [the] defendant's variance-based challenge on the
merits”(emphasis added)).

604 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. GODWIN
[369 N.C. 604 (2017)}

defendant’s contention. In doing so, the lower court failed to recognize
its discretion to refrain from undertaking such a review if it so chose.
Because the Court of Appeals proceeded under this misapprehension of
Jaw, it failed to exercise the discretion inherent in the “residual power
of our appellate courts.” See Steingress, 350 N.C. at 66, 511 S.E.2d at
299-300.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the Court of Appeals
so that it may independently and expressly determine whether, on the
facts and under the circumstances of this specific case, to exercise its
discretion to employ Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure, suspend Rule 10(a)(1), and consider the merits of defen-
dant’s fatal variance argument. The remaining issue addressed by the
Court of Appeals is not before this Court, and that court’s decision as to
that matter remains undisturbed.

REVERSED and REMANDED.
———————

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
WILLIAM EDWARD GODWIN IIL

No. 167PA16
Filed 9 June 2017

1, Witnesses—expert—officer implicitly qualified
The trial court did not err in an impaired driving prosecution *
by allowing a police officer to testify about the Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus (HGN) test and about defendant's impairment even
though the officer was not explicitly qualified as an expert. The trial
court implicitly found that the officer was qualified to give expert
testimony. Moreover, it is evident that the General Assembly envi-
sioned this scenario and made clear provision to allow testimony
from an individual who has successfully completed training in HGN
and meets the criteria set forth in Rule of Evidence 702(a).
2. Motor Vehicles—driving while impaired—instructions
The standard jury instruction on credibility was sufficient in
an impaired driving prosecution, and the trial court adequately
conveyed the substance of defendant’s requested instructions.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 605

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Defendant’s proposed instructions were meant to ensure that the
jury realized it could consider the evidence presented by defendant
of his lack of impairment, notwithstanding the evidence provided by
the chemical analysis.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 786 S.E.2d 34
(2016), finding prejudicial error in a judgment entered on 15 November
2013 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County,
and ordering that defendant receive a new trial. On 22 September 2016,
the Supreme Court allowed defendant's conditional petition for discre-
tionary review as to an additional issue. Heard in the Supreme Court on
22 March 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kristin J. Uicker, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant/appellee.

Rudolf Widenhouse, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr. for
defendant-appellant/appellee.

JACKSON, Justice.

In this appeal we consider whether North Carolina Rule of Evidence
702(a1) requires a law enforcement officer to be recognized explicitly
as an expert witness pursuant to Rule 702(a) before he may testify to
the results of a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. Because we
conclude that such explicit recognition is not required and that the trial
court implicitly recognized the law enforcement officer in this case as
an expert prior to allowing him to testify as to the issue of defendant's
impairment, we reverse that portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals that is inconsistent with this determination. Because we also
conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request
for a special jury instruction to explain that results of a chemical breath
test are not conclusive evidence of impairment, we affirm that part of the
decision of the Court of Appeals holding there was no error in the trial
court’s decision to deny defendant’s request for special jury instructions.

The State’s evidence at trial tended to show the following: On the
evening of 18 January 2011, Officer Daniel R. Kennerly of the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police Department initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle once
he confirmed by radar that the vehicle was travelling fourteen miles per
hour faster than the posted speed limit. The driver of the vehicle, defen-
dant William Edwin Godwin III, subsequently pulled over and stopped

606 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[869 N.C. 604 (2017)]

his vehicle on the side of the road. After approaching defendant, who
was still seated in his vehicle, Officer Kennerly detected an odor of
alcohol and observed that defendant’s eyes were red and glassy. Officer
Kennerly asked defendant from where he had driven and whether he
had been drinking. Defendant responded that he was coming from a res-
taurant and had consumed three beers that evening.

Based on his observations, training, and experience, Officer
Kennerly then requested that defendant exit the vehicle in order to per-
form three standardized field sobriety tests: the HGN, the walk-and-turn,
and the one-leg stand. Officer Kennerly administered the HGN test to
defendant twice in order to ascertain whether his eyes “jerked” during
the test, which is an indication of impairment. After observing four out
of six possible indicators of impairment during the HGN test, Officer
Kennerly determined that defendant might be impaired and proceeded.
with the remaining two field sobriety tests.

Officer Kennerly observed two out of four possible indicators of
impairment during the one-leg stand test and six out of eight possible
indicators during the walk-and-turn test. At the conclusion of the three
field sobriety tests, Officer Kennerly placed defendant under arrest for
driving while impaired, transported him to the police station, and admin-
istered a breathalyzer test to defendant. Defendant’s blood alcohol con-
centration (BAC) measured at 0.08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
air. Defendant was charged with driving while subject to an impairing
substance. After being convicted in district court, defendant appealed
his conviction. Defendant was then tried during the 12 November 2013
criminal session of the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.

When Officer Kennerly testified at trial regarding his administration
of the HGN test, defendant objected, arguing that pursuant to the 2011
amendment to North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702(a), the State should
not be permitted to present testimony regarding the HGN test with-
out qualifying the testifying officer as an expert. In response, the State
argued that Officer Kennerly did not need to be found explicitly to be
an expert because he was merely testifying to the administration of the
field sobriety tests and his resulting observations. The State also argued
that Officer Kennerly had completed the requisite training to administer
field sobriety tests; therefore, he was qualified to testify regarding the
subject. At the conclusion of its own voir dire of the officer and a voir
dire by both attorneys, the trial court concluded that Officer Kennerly
could testify based upon his training and experience, regarding his
administration of the three field sobriety tests as well as his observa-
tions of defendant during the tests. Officer Kennerly then testified that

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STATE v. GODWIN
[369 N.C. 604 (2017)]

he had received training as to how to administer the HGN test and how
to identify indicators of impairment based upon the test. He also testi-
fied that, after administering the three field sobriety tests to defendant,
he concluded from his training, experience, and observations that defen-
dant’s “mental and physical faculties were appreciably impaired.”

At the close of the evidence, defendant proposed two relatively sim-
ilar jury instructions concerning the results of the breathalyzer test and
how the jury should analyze those results. The proposed instructions
suggested to the jury that it was not compelled to find defendant’s BAC
to be 0.08 or more based upon the result of the chemical analysis. In
response, the State argued that such an instruction would merely draw
attention to the 0.08 BAC and confuse the jury. The State also asserted
that it would be sufficient for the trial court to instruct the jury that it
was the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses. After consideration of the applicable case law and the argu-
ments of counsel, the trial court refused to give defendant’s requested
jury instructions and gave the pattern jury instructions on credibility
and impaired driving.

On 15 November 2013, the jury convicted defendant of driving while
impaired. Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals,
arguing, inter alia, that the trial court failed to comply with the stan-
dards of Rule 702 in allowing Officer Kennerly’s testimony without
requiring the State to tender the officer as an expert witness. Defendant.
also argued that Rule 702(al) obligated the trial court to find explic-
itly that Officer Kennerly was qualified to present expert testimony as
an expert pursuant to Rule 702(a) before allowing him to testify about.
the HGN test results. Defendant further maintained that the trial court
erred in rejecting his proposed jury instructions. Defendant contended
that the proposed instructions were necessary to inform the jury that,
although the breathalyzer results were sufficient to support a finding of
driving while impaired, they did not compel a finding that defendant was
guilty of impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

In response, the State argued before the Court of Appeals that the
trial court properly limited Officer Kennerly’s testimony to the adminis-
tration of the field sobriety tests and his observations of defendant dur-
ing those tests. The State further contended that if defendant believed
that Officer Kennerly was not qualified to testify, it was defendant's
responsibility to refute the officer’s training and experience. Noting that
defendant tendered two experts to counter Officer Kennerly’s evidence
at trial, the State highlighted that the jury still determined that defen-
dant was guilty. Regarding the trial court's refusal to deliver defendant’s

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[869 N.C. 604 (2017)]

proposed jury instructions, the State argued that the requested instruc-
tions were given in substance, and that the jury was not misled or misin-
formed in receiving the pattern instructions.

Concluding that Rule 702(a1) requires that a witness explicitly be
found to be an expert before testifying to the results of an HGN test, the
Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred in failing to rec-
ognize Officer Kennerly as an expert pursuant to Rule 702(a). See State
v. Godwin, N.C. App. _, __, 786 S.E.2d 34, 37-38 (2016). In reach-
ing its decision, the Court of Appeals relied on State v. Helms, in which
this Court held that the HGN test “represents specialized knowledge
that must be presented to the jury by a qualified expert.” Id. at __, 786
§.E.2d at 36 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Helms, 348 N.C. 578,
581, 504 S.E.2d 293, 295 (1998)). The Court of Appeals also highlighted
potentially conflicting evidence regarding defendant’s performance on
the other field sobriety tests and concluded that such evidence created
“a reasonable possibility” that, “had the HGN test results not been admit-
ted, a different result would have been reached at trial.” Jd. at ____, 786
§.E.2d at 39. Based upon its holding on this issue, the Court of Appeals
awarded defendant a new trial. Id. at__, 786 S.E.2d at 40. As to the jury
instructions, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument, noting
that the pattern jury instructions given by the trial court “informed the
jury, in substance, that it was not compelled to return a guilty verdict
based simply on the chemical analysis results.” Id. at__, 786 S.E.2d at
39 (quoting State v. Beck, 233 N.C. App. 168, 171-72, 756 S.E.2d 80, 83,
disc. rev. denied, 367 N.C. 508, 759 8.B.2d 94 (2014).

On appeal to this Court, the State argues that the trial court implic-
itly found that the witness was qualified as an expert. Therefore, the
State contends that the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the expert
testimony was erroneously admitted. We agree. On conditional appeal,
defendant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court’s refusal to give his requested jury instructions. Defendant con-
tends that without his proposed instructions, the jury would feel com-
pelled to find he was impaired. We disagree. We now address these two
issues in turn.

[1] According to Rule 702(a):

If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,

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STATE v. GODWIN
[869 N.C. 604 (2017)]

may testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise,
if all of the following apply:

(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data.

(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods.

(8) The witness has applied the principles and meth-
ods reliably to the facts of the case.

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2015). The three numbered require-
ments for admission of expert testimony were added to Rule 702(a) by
amendment in 2011 to incorporate the standard from the line of United
States Supreme Court cases beginning with Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. See State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 884, 888, 787
§.E.2d 1, 5, 7-8 (2016). Also relevant to the subject matter of this case,
Rule 702(a1) provides, in relevant part:

Awitness, qualified under subsection (a) of this section and
with proper foundation, may give expert testimony solely
on the issue of impairment and not on the issue of specific
alcohol concentration level relating to the following:

() The results of a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN)
Test when the test is administrated by a person
who has successfully completed training in HGN.

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a1) (2015). Reading these subsections together,
it is evident that the General Assembly envisioned the precise scenario
we address today and made clear provision to allow testimony from an
individual “who has successfully completed training in HGN” and meets
the criteria set forth in Rule 702(a), as Officer Kennerly has done. Id.
§ 8C-1, Rule 702(a1)(1).

Tn assessing how a witness may be qualified as an expert, we have
held that when the record contains sufficient evidence upon which the
trial court could have based an explicit finding that the witness was an
expert, an appellate court may conclude that the trial court found the
witness to be an expert. Apex Tire & Rubber Co. v. Merritt Tire Co.,
270 N.C. 50, 58, 153 S.E.2d 787, 739 (1967). In Apex Tire the trial court
explicitly denied counsel’s motion to declare a witness was an expert.
Id. at 54, 153 S.E.2d at 740. The trial court then permitted the witness
to testify in detail, as well as offer an opinion in the case. Id. at 54, 153
S.E.2d at 740. We concluded that, notwithstanding the trial court’s denial

610 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 604 (2017)]

of the motion to recognize explicitly the witness as an expert, the record
contained evidence on which the trial court could have based a finding
that the witness was an expert. Id. at 54, 153 S.E.2d at 740. Accordingly,
we inferred from its actions that the trial court made an implicit finding
that the witness was an expert. Id. at 53-54, 153 S.E.2d at 739-40.

Since our decision in Apex Tire, we have reiterated the concept of
implicit recognition of expert witnesses in several opinions. We have
held:

In the absence of a request by the appellant for a find-
ing by the trial court as to the qualification of a witness
as an expert, it is not essential that the record show an
express finding on this matter, the finding, one way or the
other, being deemed implicit in the ruling admitting or
rejecting the opinion testimony of the witness.

State v. Perry, 275 N.C. 565, 572, 169 S.E.2d 839, 844 (1969) (citations
omitted). Similarly, we have held that a trial judge implicitly recognized
a witness as an expert by overruling defense counsel’s objection to the
witness's qualifications. State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 143-44, 322 S.E.2d
370, 378 (1984) (citing Perry, 275 N.C. 565, 169 S.B.2d 839). In addition,
we have determined that when a defendant interposed only general
objections to trial testimony and never requested a finding by the trial
court as to the witnesses’ qualifications as experts, the recognition that
the witnesses were qualified to testify as experts was “implicit in the
trial court's ruling admitting the opinion testimony.” State v. Aguallo,
322 N.C. 818, 821, 370 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1988) (citing State v. Phifer, 290
N.C. 208, 213-14, 225 S.E.2d 786, 793 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123
(1977)). More recently, we ruled that a “trial court's overruling of defense

_ counsel's objection to the opinion testimony constituted an implicit find-
ing that the witness was an expert.” State v. Wise, 326 N.C. 421, 480,
390 S.E.2d 142, 148 (citing Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990).

Although we decided the aforementioned cases prior to the amend-
ment to Rule 702, the 2011 amendment did not categorically overrule all
North Carolina judicial precedents interpreting that rule. See McGrady,
368 N.C. at 888, 787 S.E.2d at 8 (“Our previous cases are still good law if
they do not conflict with the Daubert standard.”). Relevant to the issue
in this case, the 2011 amendment did not change the basic structure for
atrial court’s exercise of its gatekeeping function over expert testimony.
See id. at 892, 787 S.E.2d at 10. Moreover, our precedents continue to
dictate that a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony

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[869 N.C. 604 (2017)}

“will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.”
See id. at 893, 787 S.E.2d at 11 (quoting Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Lid.,
358 N.C. 440, 458, 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004), superseded by statute,
Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 283, sec. 1.3, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1048, 1049
(codified at N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a)(1)-(8)), as stated in McGrady,
368 N.C. at 888, 787 S.E.2d at 8). Here we can detect no such abuse of
discretion by the trial court.

During both the pretrial hearing and the trial in this case, Officer
Kennerly was “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a). Officer Kennerly
testified that he had completed training on how to administer the HGN
test and other standardized field sobriety tests that he administered
to defendant. During direct examination, Officer Kennerly explained
that he attended a thirty-four hour course in standardized field sobri-
ety testing and DWI detection in 2006. Officer Kennerly’s certificate of
completion for this course was admitted into evidence. He also testified
that he attended an eight hour refresher course in 2009. Both courses
were approved by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA). Prior to the date he administered the HGN test to defendant,
Officer Kennerly had conducted approximately three hundred impaired
driving offense investigations.

The trial court also established that Officer Kennerly’s testimony
met the three-pronged test of reliability pursuant to the amended rule.
The trial court conducted its own voir dire of Officer Kennerly, which
elicited testimony that the HGN test he administered to defendant
on the day in question was given in accordance with the standards set by
the NHTSA, and that those standards were derived from the results of a
specific scientific study. Additionally, the trial court’s voir dire confirmed
that the principles and methods utilized in the HGN test were found to
be reliable indicators of impairment, and that Officer Kennerly applied
those principles and methods to defendant in this case.

Defendant objected to Officer Kennerly’s testimony on the grounds
that he was neither formally tendered as an expert witness by the State
nor recognized as such by the trial court. Yet we note that defendant
did not object to any of Officer Kennerly’s actual qualifications, even
clarifying his general objection by stating, “I'm not saying Officer
Kennerly could not be qualified, but I think the State’s going to have
to go through that.” Defendant eventually narrowed his objection by
acknowledging that if the State were to limit the officer's testimony
to his observations and the indications of impairment, then defendant

612 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 604 (2017))

had “less problem with it.” The trial court then overruled defendant's
objection; however, as the colloquy between the trial court and the
defense attorney indicates, Officer Kennerly only was permitted to offer
testimony regarding his observations of defendant's impairment as he
administered the HGN test and was not permitted to comment on the
HGN test’s reliability. These distinctions are critical.

TRIAL COURT: . . . I will allow this officer to testify
that he administered the HGN test, the walk-and-turn test,
and the one-legged test. He will be allowed to testify as to
the indicators of impairment he observed of this defen-
dant in giving these tests.

Anything else?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I'd ask the Court to note my

exception. Is the Court disqualifying him as an expert on
the HGN?

TRIAL COURT: I'm not -— he doesn’t have to be quali-
fied as an expert. I'm not going to make that requirement.
Tm just going to let him testify based on his training
and experience, what - how the HGN should be admin-
istered and what the indicators are and what indicators
he observed.

In overruling defendant's objection, the trial court implicitly found that
Officer Kennerly was qualified to testify as an expert, and as such, in
accordance with the guidance in Rule 702(al), Officer Kennerly could
“give expert testimony solely on the issue of impairment and not on
the issue of specific alcohol concentration level.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
702(al).

Although the Court of Appeals relied on our prior decision in Helms
to reach its conclusion that the expert testimony was erroneously admit-
ted, several important facts render Helms distinguishable from the pres-
ent case. At issue in Helms was the reliability of the HGN test, not the
observed impairment of the individual being subjected to the HGN test.
Helms, 348 N.C. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295. Furthermore, although the
officer in Helms testified that he had taken a forty hour training course
in the use of the HGN test, the State presented no evidence regarding—
and the court conducted no inquiry into—the reliability of the HGN test.
Id. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295. We also noted in Helms that nothing in the
record of the case indicated that the trial court took judicial notice of

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STATE v. GODWIN
[369 N.C. 604 (2017)]

the reliability of the HGN test. Id. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295. Accordingly,
we concluded that because no sufficient scientifically reliable evidence
existed as precedent to show the correlation between intoxication and
nystagmus, “it [was] improper to permit a lay person to testify as to the
meaning of HGN test results.” Id. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295. Additionally,

the trial court permitted the law enforcement officer to testify as a.

Jay person regarding the meaning of HGN test results, and there was
no evidence in the record to support a finding that the trial court had
implicitly found the officer to be an expert. Jd. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295.
This scenario plainly contrasts with the present case in which the trial
court made a finding of reliability of the HGN test and an implicit find-
ing that Officer Kennerly was qualified as an expert. Furthermore, with
the 2006 amendment to Rule 702, our General Assembly clearly signaled
that the results of the HGN test are sufficiently reliable to be admitted
into the courts of this State. See The Motor Vehicle Driver Protection
Act of 2006, ch. 253, sec. 6, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 2006) 1178,
1183 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a1) (Supp. 2006)). Based on
these distinguishing factors, our decision in Helms is not dispositive of
the present case.

Notwithstanding our decision in this case, the better practice would
have been for the trial court to refrain from stating, “[Officer Kennerly]
doesn’t have to be qualified, as an expert. I’m not going to make that
requirement.” Furthermore, in light of the aforementioned findings
regarding Officer Kennerly’s knowledge, skill, experience, and train-
ing, the appellate division’s ability to review the trial court’s oral order
would have benefited from the inclusion of additional facts supporting
its determination that Officer Kennerly was qualified to testify as an
expert regarding his observations of defendant’s performance during the
HGN test.

[2] Next, we turn to the issue of defendant’s proposed jury instructions.
When a defendant requests a special jury instruction that is correct in
Jaw and supported by the evidence, the court must give the instruction
in substance. State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 54, 229 S.E.2d 163, 174 (1976)
(citation omitted). Yet, “[e]ven if a defendant is entitled to requested
instructions, the court is not required to give them verbatim. It is suf-
ficient if they are given in substance.” State v. Howard, 274 N.C. 186,
199, 162 S.E.2d 495, 504 (1968) (citation omitted). If “[tJhe instructions
given by the trial court adequately convey[ ] the substance of defen-
dant’s proper request[,] no further instructions [are] necessary.” State
v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 477, 290 S.E.2d 625, 633 (1982) (citation omitted).

614 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 604 (2017)

Here one of defendant’s two proposed instructions stated:

A chemical analysis of defendant's breath obtained from
an EC/IR-II which shows an alcohol concentration of
0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath is
deemed sufficient to prove defendant's alcohol concentra-
tion. However, such chemical analysis does not compel
you to so find beyond a reasonable doubt. You are still at
liberty to consider the credibility and/or weight to give
such chemical analysis when considering whether defen-
dant’s guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Though worded slightly differently, the second proposed instruction
also suggested to the jury that it was not compelled to find defendant's
alcohol concentration to be 0.08 or more based on the result of the
chemical analysis.!

Defendant asserted at trial that without either of the requested
instructions, the jury would be required to presume that the reading
of 0.08 was conclusive proof of impairment. Defendant argued that the
purpose of his proposed instructions was to ensure that the jury real-
ized it could consider the evidence presented by defendant. of his lack
of impairment, notwithstanding the evidence provided by the chemical
analysis. Following the pattern jury instruction on impaired driving, the
trial court explained to the jury that impairment could be proved by an
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, and that this chemical analysis
was “deemed sufficient evidence to prove a person’s alcohol concentra-
tion.” The trial court also explained to the jurors that they were “the
sole judges of the credibility of each witness and the weight to be given
to the testimony of each witness,” and that if they decided that certain
evidence was believable, they “must then determine the importance of
that evidence in light of all other believable evidence in the case.” These
statements signaled to the jury that it was free to analyze and weigh the
effect of the breathalyzer evidence along with all the evidence presented
during the trial. Therefore, we hold that the standard jury instruction on

1. Inits entirety the second proposed instruction stated:

‘The results of the chemical analysis of the Defendant's breath do not
create a presumption that the Defendant had, at a relevant time after
driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol
per 210 liters of breath. You may find the Defendant's alcohol. con-
centration to be 0.08 or more. You may find the Defendant's alcohol
concentration to be 0.08 or more based upon the result, but you are
not compelled to do so.

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STATE v. HOLLOMAN
[869 N.C. 615 (2017)]

credibility was sufficient in this case and that the trial court adequately
conveyed the substance of defendant’s requested instructions to the
jury. Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that
the jury instructions were proper. °

For the reasons stated above, we also hold that the trial court implic-
itly found that Officer Kennerly was qualified to give expert testimony,
and therefore did not abuse its discretion by allowing Officer Kennerly
to testify as an expert regarding defendant’s impairment. The trial court
overruled defendant's objection to Officer Kennerly’s testimony, deter-
mined that his testimony was relevant and reliable, and ascertained
that he was qualified to testify as an expert. Consequently, we conclude
that the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that the trial court did
not find Officer Kennerly to be an expert pursuant to Rule 702(a).

Accordingly, as explained above, we hold that the trial court made
no error in the trial of defendant's case. Therefore, we reverse the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals awarding defendant a new trial and instruct
that court to reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.
JOSHUA EARL HOLLOMAN

No. 208PA16
Filed 9 June 2017

Criminal Law—self-defense—aggressor regaining the right

The trial court did not err, on the evidence, in its self-defense
instruction in a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon inflict-
ing serious injury in a case where both the defendant and the vic-
tim pulled guns in an argument over a woman. Historically, North
Carolina law did not allow an aggressor using deadly force to
regain the right to self-defense when the other responded by using
deadly force. However, the General Assembly, by passing N.C.G.S.
§ 14-51.4, appears to have allowed an aggressor to regain the right
to utilize defensive force under certain circumstances (use of non-
deadly force). A careful review of the record evidence in this case

616 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. HOLLOMAN
[369 N.C. 615 (2017)]

demonstrates, however, the complete absence of any evidence tend-
ing to show that defendant was the aggressor using non-deadly, as
compared to deadly, force.

Justice MORGAN did not participate in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 786 S.E.2d
328 (2016), finding prejudicial error in a judgment entered on 27 April
2015 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in Superior Court, Wake County,
and awarding defendant a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court on
11 April 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Amanda S. Zimmer,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

ERVIN, Justice.

The issue before this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred
by determining that the trial court committed prejudicial error in the
course of instructing the jury concerning the right of self-defense. After
carefully considering the record in light of the applicable law, we hold
that the trial court’s self-defense instructions were not erroneous, reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the contrary, and remand this
case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant’s remaining
challenge to the trial court’s judgment.

During the early morning hours of 1 January 2014, defendant Joshua
Earl Holloman shot Darryl Anthony Bobbitt a number of times using
a .45 caliber handgun at the corner of Rock Quarry Road and Martin
Luther King Boulevard in Raleigh. According to Mr. Bobbitt, he and
Mariah Mann, whom he believed to be his girlfriend, went to a bar
to celebrate the imminent arrival of the New Year on the evening of
31 December 2013. Shortly after midnight, Mr. Bobbitt decided to wait in
his vehicle until the time that the bar closed and Ms. Mann was ready to
leave given that relations between the two of them had become strained
during the course of the evening. After Ms. Mann left the bar, the two
of them returned to Mr. Bobbitt’s home, where they began to argue.
Eventually, Ms. Mann left Mr. Bobbitt’s home on foot. After his mother

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STATE v. HOLLOMAN
[869 N.C. 615 (2017)]

and stepfather failed to induce Ms. Mann to return to the family home,
Mr. Bobbitt began searching for Ms. Mann and eventually located her
near some woods along Martin Luther King Boulevard in Raleigh.

Upon locating Ms. Mann, Mr. Bobbitt exited his car and crossed the
road for the purpose of attempting to persuade Ms. Mann to enter his
vehicle. In view of the fact that Ms. Mann appeared to be adhering to
his request, Mr. Bobbitt reversed course and began walking back to his
vehicle. As he did so, Mr. Bobbitt heard someone say, “Oh, you put your
hands on her.” According to Mr. Bobbitt:

Once I heard that, I turned around. I looked back, saw
the gun, so of course I had my gun. I turned back around,
reached for my gun, and once I turned back around, I was
already shot.

I got shot, stumbled. Next thing I know, I’m looking at the
pavement, and I just see somebody standing over me.

Mr. Bobbitt denied having fired any shots from his own weapon. Mr.
Bobbitt sustained four gunshot wounds, two of which entered his stom-
ach, one of which entered his left leg, and one of which pierced his
right arm.

After confirming Mr. Bobbitt’s account of the events leading up to
the confrontation, Ms. Mann testified that, while Mr. Bobbitt was trying
to get her to enter his car, she was attempting to call defendant, with
whom she had also been romantically involved and with whom she had
been in contact earlier in the evening for the purpose of requesting that
he come get her. As she attempted to contact defendant, Mr. Bobbitt
took her phone out of her hand. Upon arriving at the location at which
Ms. Mann and Mr. Bobbitt were standing, defendant parked his car, got
out of his vehicle, and told Ms. Mann to get inside. After complying with
defendant’s request, Ms. Mann lowered her head and began crying. As
she wept, Ms. Mann heard defendant ask Mr. Bobbitt if “he [had] put
his hands on [Ms. Mann]” before hearing the firing of several gunshots.
After the firing of these gunshots, defendant returned to the car, told Ms.
Mann that he thought that he had shot Mr. Bobbitt, and drove away.

Anna Dajui was driving her daughter, Roxana, home from a New
Year's Eve party when a vehicle sped in front of them and stopped in the
middle of the street. At that point, the Dajuis saw the driver of the vehi-
cle get out of the car, reach for a firearm, and begin shooting at a second
individual who was standing at the intersection of Rock Quarry Road

618 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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and Martin Luther King Boulevard. After the man fired several shots, the .
Dajuis saw the second man lying in the roadway.

Fortuitously, Sergeant Jennings Bunch of the Raleigh Police
Department was patrolling in the area and happened to be at the inter-
section of Rock Quarry Road and Martin Luther King Boulevard at the
time that the shooting occurred. Like the Dajuis, Sergeant Bunch saw
the driver emerging from a vehicle that had stopped at the intersection.
After hearing angry voices and a series of gunshots, Sergeant Bunch
saw the driver of the stopped vehicle standing over and pointing a hand-
gun at a second man, who was lying on the ground. Upon making these
observations, Sergeant Bunch fired several shots into the air, an action
that caused the driver of the vehicle to leave the scene.

On the other hand, defendant testified that in the early morning
hours of 1 January 2014, he received a voice mail and a phone call from
Ms. Mann, who appeared to be in a distressed condition, asking defen-
dant to pick her up on Martin Luther King Boulevard. After arriving at
the indicated location, defendant observed Ms. Mann walking on the
sidewalk while being followed by another individual. Upon reaching Ms.
Mann’s location, defendant stopped his vehicle beside her, exited his
vehicle while holding his gun by his side, and told Ms. Mann to get into
his vehicle. When he noticed that Ms. Mann was crying and that there
was blood on her face, defendant asked the man walking behind her
whether “he [had] put his hands on her,” stepped closer to the man after
failing to hear any response, and repeated his question. By the time that
he stepped toward the man, that individual turned around towards him
and “open(ed] fire” upon defendant. In light of the fact that he feared for
his life, defendant fired his weapon “[mJaybe three to five times” in an
attempt to defend himself. After the man fell to the ground, defendant.
stood over him for a brief period of time. Upon hearing gunfire, defen-
dant left the scene and went to the residence of his mother, where he
‘was apprehended later that morning.

On 1 January 2014, an arrest warrant charging defendant with assault
with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill and inflicting serious injury
was issued. On 24 February 2014, the Wake County grand jury returned a
bill of indictment charging defendant with assault with a deadly weapon
with the intent to kill and inflicting serious injury. The charge against
defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the
20 April 2015 criminal session of the Superior Court, Wake County.

At the jury instruction conference, defendant's trial counsel
requested the trial court to instruct the jury concerning the law of

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[369 N.C. 615 (2017)]

self-defense and defense of another, among other subjects.! More spe-
cifically, defendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury that:

The defendant would be excused of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury
on the ground of self-defense if:

First, it appeared to the defendant and the defendant
believed it to be necessary to assault the victim in order to
save the defendant from death or great bodily harm.

And Second, the circumstances as they appeared to the
defendant at the time were sufficient to create such a
belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness. It is for
you the jury to determine the reasonableness of the defen-
dant’s belief from the circumstances as they appeared to
the defendant at the time.

And Third, [i]f the defendant was not the aggressor and the
defendant was at a place the defendant had a lawful right.
to be, the defendant could stand the defendant's ground
and repel force with force regardless of the character of
the assault being made upon the defendant except deadly
force unless he reasonably believed that such force was
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm
to himself or another.

However, the defendant would not be excused if the
defendant used excessive force.

The defendant would not be guilty of any assault if
the defendant acted in self-defense, and if the defendant
was not the aggressor in provoking the fight and did not
use excessive force under the circumstances.

One enters a fight voluntarily if one uses toward one’s
opponent abusive language, which, considering all of the
circumstances, is calculated and intended to provoke a

1. The trial court declined to instruct the jury concerning the right of one person to
defend another on the grounds that “[tJhere’s no evidence to suggest that this defendant
acted to defend anyone other than himself.” Defendant has not challenged the trial court’s
refusal to deliver a defense of another instruction before either the Court of Appeals or
this Court.

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fight. If the defendant voluntarily and without provoca-
tion entered the fight, the defendant would be considered
the aggressor unless the defendant thereafter attempted
to abandon the fight and gave notice to the deceased that.
the defendant was doing so. . . . A person is also justi-
fied in using defensive force when the force used by the
person who was provoked is so serious that the person
using defensive force reasonably believes that he was
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, the
person using defensive force had no reasonable means to
retreat, and the use of force likely to cause death or seri-
ous bodily harm was the only way to escape the danger.
The defendant is not entitled to the benefit of self-defense
if the defendant was the aggressor with the intent to kill
or inflict serious bodily harm upon the deceased.

Instead of delivering the exact instruction that defendant requested,
however, the trial court instructed the jury with respect to the issue
of self-defense using a modified version of the pattern jury instruction
relating to felonious assaults in which the defendant claimed to have
acted in self-defense, stating that:

If the State has satisfied you beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant assaulted Darryl Bobbitt with
a deadly weapon with intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury, then you would consider whether the defen-
dant’s actions are excused and the defendant is not guilty
because the defendant acted in lawful self-defense. . . .

If the circumstances which the defendant encoun-
tered at the time would have created a reasonable belief in
the mind of a person of ordinary firmness that an assault
upon Darryl Bobbitt with a firearm was necessary or
appeared to be necessary to protect the defendant from
imminent death or great bodily harm, and the circum-
stances did create such a belief in the defendant's mind at
the time the defendant acted, such assault with a firearm
upon Darryl Bobbitt would be justified by self-defense. . . .

A person is justified in using defensive force to defend
himself when the force used against him is so serious that.
the person using defensive force reasonably believes that.
he is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm,
the person using defensive force has no reasonable means

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[869 N.C. 615 (2017)]

to avoid the use of that force, and his use of force likely
to cause death or serious bodily harm is the only way to
escape the danger. ...

Furthermore, self-defense is justified only if the
defendant was not himself the aggressor. Justification for
lawful self-defense is not present if the person who uses
defensive force voluntarily enters into a fight with the
intent to use deadly force. In other words, if one initially
displays a firearm to his opponent, intending to engage
in a fight and intending to use deadly force in that fight
and provokes the use of deadly force against himself by
an alleged victim, he is himself an aggressor and cannot
claim he acted lawfully to defend himself.

On 24 April 2015, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty
of the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflict-
ing serious injury. Based upon the jury's verdict, the trial court entered.
a judgment sentencing defendant to a term of twenty-five to forty-two
months imprisonment. However, the trial court suspended defendant's
active sentence and placed him on supervised probation for a period of
thirty-six months on the condition that he comply with the usual terms
and conditions of probation, serve a term of ten months imprisonment
in the custody of the Division of Adult Corrections, make restitution in
the amount of $2,989.00, pay the costs, including the cost of his court-
appointed attorney, and refrain from having any contact with Mr. Bobbitt
or any member of his family. Defendant noted an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from the trial court's judgment.

In seeking relief from the trial court’s judgment before the Court of
Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court’s self-defense instruction
misstated the applicable law and deprived him of the ability to fully pres-
ent his defense.” More specifically, defendant asserted that, in light of the
enactment of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2)(a), the trial court erred by instructing
the jury that “[jlustification for lawful self-defense is not present if the
person who uses defensive force voluntarily enter[ed] into a fight with
the intent to use deadly force” and that, “if one initially displays a fire-
arm to his opponent, intending to engage in a fight and intending to use

2. In addition, defendant argued that the trial judge had unlawfully considered his
personal feelings concerning firearm possession and other subjects in passing judgment
‘upon defendant. However, we need not discuss this issue in any detail in this opinion given
that the Court of Appeals declined to reach it given its decision to award defendant a new
trial based upon the instructional error that it found the trial court to have committed.

622 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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deadly force in that fight and provokes the use of deadly force against
himself by an alleged victim, he is himself an aggressor and cannot claim
he acted lawfully to defend himself” and failing to instruct the jury that it
could find that defendant regained the right to use defensive force pur
suant to N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2)(a). In defendant’s view, the enactment of
N.C.G.S. § 14.51.4(2)(a), which allows a “person who initially provokes
the use of force against himself or herself” to utilize defensive force in
the event that “[t]he force used by the person who was provoked is so
serious that the person using defensive force reasonably believes that
he or she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, the
person using defensive force had no reasonable means to retreat, and
the use of force which is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm
to the person who was provoked [is] the only way to escape the dan-
ger,” “arguably changes the common law as it relates [to] aggressors
and the right to self-defense.” According to defendant, his own “actions
in possessing a gun and questioning [Mr.] Bobbitt over an incident that
may have just occurred could have been seen by the jury as [defendant]
initiating or seeking to provoke a fight with [Mr.] Bobbitt,” causing Mr.
Bobbitt to respond by “pulling a concealed gun from his pocket and fir-
ing at [defendant].” The amount of “force used by [Mr.] Bobbitt against
[defendant] was so serious as to lead [defendant] to reasonably believe
that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, that he
had no reasonable means to retreat, and that the use of force likely to
cause death or serious bodily harm to [Mr.] Bobbitt was the only way
to escape the danger.” However, the self-defense instruction that the
trial court actually delivered to the jury “failed to allow for the jury to
consider whether [defendant] regained his right to self-defense under
[N.C.G.S.] § 14-514 even if he had initiated or provoked the fight with
[Mr.] Bobbitt,” an error that prejudiced defendant and entitled him to a
new trial given that “there is a reasonable probability that the jury would
[have] acquitted [defendant] had they been properly instructed on the
right to use self-defense even if [defendant] was the aggressor.”

The State, on the other hand, argued that defendant had “requested
an instruction substantially identical to the one” that the trial court had
delivered, so that defendant had invited the commission of the error
upon which his challenge to the trial court’s judgment was predicated,
citing State v. Wilkinson, 344.N.C. 198, 236, 474 S.B.2d 875, 396 (1996). In
addition, the State argued that defendant had failed to demonstrate that
the enactment of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 had “changed the law with regard
to an aggressor who had the intent to kill.” On the contrary, the statu-
tory reference to a person who “ ‘initially provokes the use of force’
must mean an aggressor without murderous intent” in order to avoid

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“allow[ing] a pretextual quarrel to countenance premeditated murder.”
In the State’s view, the trial court’s instructions “adequately informed the
jury that a person may use defensive force when he reasonably believes
[that] he is in imminent danger, he has no reasonable means to avoid the
use of force, and his use of force is the only way to escape the danger.”

The Court of Appeals awarded defendant a new trial on the grounds
that “[t]he trial court’s deviations from the pattern self-defense instruc-
tion, taken as a whole, misstated the law by suggesting that an aggressor
cannot under any circumstances regain justification for using defen-
sive force.” State v. Holloman, ___ N.C. App. __, __, 786 S.E.2d 328,
334 (2016). According to the Court of Appeals, N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2)(a)
allows “the person who initially provokes the use of force . . . to “us[e]
defensive force” in the event that “[t]he force used by the person who
was provoked is so serious that the person using defensive force rea-
sonably believes that he or she was in imminent danger of death or seri-
ous bodily harm, the person using defensive force had no reasonable
means to retreat, and the use of force which is likely to cause death or
serious bodily harm to the person who was provoked was the only way
to escape the danger.” Id. at ____, 786 S.E.2d at 332 (quoting N.C.G.S.
§ 14-51.4(2)(a) (2015)). The trial court erred, in the Court of Appeals’
view, by “eliminat[ing] references to circumstances in which an aggres-
sor can lawfully defend himself” and suggesting “that[,] if jurors deter-
‘mined [d]efendant had initiated the gun fight, they could not find that
[he] acted in lawful self-defense, even if Mr. Bobbitt fired his gun first.”
Id. at ___, 786 S.E.2d at 334. As a result, after finding the trial court’s
error to be prejudicial, the Court of Appeals awarded defendant a new
trial. This Court granted the State’s request for discretionary review of
the Court of Appeals’ decision.

In seeking to persuade us to reverse the Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion, the State notes that “[t]he ‘law of self-defense in cases of homicide
applies also in cases of assault,’ ” quoting State v. Anderson, 230 N.C.
54, 55, 51 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1949). As a result, “one who brings about an
affray with the intent to take life or inflict serious bodily harm may not
claim self-defense,” citing State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 52, 340 S.E.2d 439,
442 (1986). For that reason, the State argues that, “[i]f the defendant was
the aggressor and killed with murderous intent, that is, the intent to kill
or inflict serious bodily harm, then she is not entitled to an instruction
on self-defense,” quoting the dissenting opinion in State v. Norman, 324
N.C. 258, 274, 378 S.E.2d 8, 20 (1989). Although the State acknowledges
that N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2)(a) appears to “abrogate[ ] the principle . . .
that one who wrongfully commenced a fight may not regain the right of

624 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 615 (2017)]

self-defense upon being sorely pressed by his adversary,” this apparent
statutory expansion of the right of self-defense should not, as a matter of
“common law, statutory context, and common sense,” apply to “aggres-
sors with murderous intent.” According to the State, “[tJhe legislature
simply could not have intended for one who attacks with murderous
intent to claim self-defense” given that “allow[ing] one to use defensive
force when his intended victim lawfully responds with deadly force
would legitimize both parties’ conduct.” For that reason, the challenged
trial court instruction to the effect that an aggressor using deadly force
could not regain the right to use defensive force did not misstate the
applicable law and was not, for that reason, erroneous.

Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly granted him anew trial based upon the trial court’s failure to allow
the jury to consider whether he had regained the right to use defensive
force even if he was the aggressor. Assuming that “the statute only
applies to aggressors without murderous intent,” the challenged instruc-
tion “was still erroneous” because “[t]he intent to use deadly force is not
the same as murderous intent” and “because the jury was not instructed
to consider if [defendant] was an aggressor with murderous intent.”
According to defendant, the trial court’s instructions allowed the jury to
“conclude{ ] that [defendant] was an aggressor with intent to use ‘deadly
force’ merely because he possessed a firearm and intended to use it to
defend Ms. Mann and himself, if necessary.” However, the jury failed
to find that defendant intended to kill Mr. Bobbitt when it convicted
him of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury rather than
assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill and inflicting serious
injury. In light of the conflicts in the evidence, “the jury had to determine
if [Mr.] Bobbitt had the right to use lethal force against [defendant] and
whether [defendant] had the right to use defensive force in response.”
Since the trial court’s instructions “did not tell the jury that [defendant]
could use defensive force even if the jury felt [that defendant] had pro-
voked [Mr.] Bobbitt,” those instructions “misstated the law, confused the
jury, and deprived [defendant] of his constitutional right to fully present
his defense.” As a result, given that “[tJhere is a reasonable possibility
that the trial court’s error impacted the jury’s decision,” the Court of
Appeals correctly awarded defendant a new trial.

The ultimate issue before us in this case is the extent, if any, to
which the trial court erred by instructing the jury that an individual hav-
ing the status of an aggressor using deadly force could not regain the
right to act in self-defense and by failing to instruct the jury that the
aggressor may be entitled to utilize defensive force in the event that

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[869 N.C. 615 (2017)]

the person provoked responded by using such significant force that the
aggressor was placed in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harm, the aggressor did not have a reasonable opportunity to retreat,
and the aggressor can only protect himself or herself from death or seri-
ous bodily harm by using defensive force. According to well-established
North Carolina law, a trial judge’s jury charge shall “give a clear instruc-
tion which applies the law to the evidence in such manner as to assist
the jury in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict.”
State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 346, 626 S.B.2d 258, 261 (2006) (quoting
State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.B.2d 875, 877 (1971)). For that
reason, “the judge has the duty to instruct the jury on the law arising
from all the evidence presented.” Id. at 346, 626 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting
State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 546, 331 S.E.2d 251, 253, disc. rev.
denied, 315 N.C. 188, 337 S.E.2d 862 (1985)). In instructing the jury with
respect to a defense to a criminal charge, “the facts must be interpreted
in the light most favorable to the defendant.” State v. Montague, 298
N.C. 752, 755, 259 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1979).

A defendant may request a jury instruction in writing,
and the trial court must so instruct provided the instruc-
tion is supported by the evidence. However, a trial court
is not obligated to give a defendant’s exact instruction

“so long as the instruction actually given delivers the sub-
stance of the request to the jury.

State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 304, 595 $.E.2d 381, 420 (2004) (citing
State v. McNeill, 346 N.C. 233, 239, 485 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1053, 118 S. Ct. 704, 189 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1998); State
v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 90, 505 S.E.2d 97, 115 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1147, 119 S. Ct. 2025, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1086 (1999)). Although “[ulse of the
pattern instructions is encouraged,” State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 49, 678
S.E.2d 618, 642-43 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 999, 130 S.
Ct. 510, 175 L. Ed. 2d 362 (2009), “[f]ailure to follow the pattern instruc-
tions does not automatically result in error,” State v. Bunch, 363 N.C.
841, 846, 689 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2010); see also State v. Mundy, 265 N.C.
528, 529, 144 S.E.2d 572, 578 (1967) (stating that, “[iJn giving instructions
the court is not required to follow any particular form and has wide dis-
cretion as to the manner in which the case is presented to the jury, but it
has the duty to explain, without special request therefor, each essential
element of the offense and to apply the law with respect to each ele-
ment to the evidence bearing thereon”). On the other hand, even though
“no exact formula is required” when the trial court instructs the jury,
“[o]nce it undertakes to do so, however, the [instructions] should be

626 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 615 (2017)}

given in substantial accord with those approved by this [C]ourt.” State
v. Watson, 294 N.C. 159, 167, 240 S.E.2d 440, 446 (1978) (citing State
v. Hammonds, 241 N.C. 226, 85 S.E.2d 133 (1954); see also State v. Davis,
238 N.C. 252, 258-54, 77 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1953) (stating that “[cJorrect
instruction as to the law . . . limit[s] [the trial judge’s] responsibilit[ies]”).
Thus, we must determine whether the trial court's self-defense instruc-
tions accurately stated the applicable law arising upon the evidentiary
record developed at trial.

The initial issue that must be addressed in order to determine
whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury with respect to
the self-defense issue is the extent, if any, to which North Carolina law
allows an aggressor to regain the right to utilize defensive force based
upon the nature and extent of the reaction that he or she provokes in
the other party. Historically, as the State notes, North Carolina law did
not allow an aggressor using deadly force to regain the right to exercise
the right of self-defense in the event that the person to whom his or
her aggression was directed responded by using deadly force to defend
himself or herself. State v. Wetmore, 298 N.C. 748, 750, 259 S.E.2d 870,
875 (1979) (stating that, “[i]f one takes life, though in defense of his own
life, in a quarrel which he himself has commenced with intent to take
life or inflict serious bodily harm, the jeopardy into which he has been
placed by the act of his adversary constitutes no defense whatever, but
he is guilty of murder” (quoting State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 144 n.2, 244
S.E.2d 897, 409 n.2 (1978))).3 According to N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3, however:

(a) A person is justified in using force, except deadly
force, against another when and to the extent that the per-
son reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to
defend himself or herself or another against the other’s
imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person is jus-
tified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty
to retreat in any place he or she has the lawful right to be
if either of the following applies:

3. Although defendant appears to understand the references to “murderous intent”
and “deadly force” as contained in certain of our prior decisions to refer to a specific intent
to Kill and argues that only such a specific intent to Kill obviates an aggressor’s right to
use defensive force, that understanding is simply incorrect. Instead, “[mJurderous intent
means the intent to kill or inflict serious bodily harm,” Mize, 316 N.C. at 52, 340 S.B.2d at
442, and “[dJeadly force has been defined as ‘force likely to cause death or great bodily
harm,’ ” State v. Hunter, 315 N.C. 371, 373, 338 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1986) (quoting State v. Clay,
297 N.C. 555, 568, 256 S.H.2d 176, 182 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Davis,
305 N.C. 400, 290 8.B.2d 874 (1982)).

IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 615 (2017)]

(1) He or she reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself or herself or another.

(2) Under the circumstances permitted pursuant to
IN.C.] G.S. [§] 14-51.2.4

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3 (2015). However, as has already been noted, N.C.G.S.
§ 14-51.4 provides, in pertinent part, that:

The justification described in [N.C.]G.S. [§] 1451.2 and
[N.C.]G.S. [§] 14-51.3 is not available to a person who used
defensive force and who:

(2) Initially provokes the use of force against himself or
herself. However, the person who initially provokes the
use of force against himself or herself will be justified in
using defensive force if either of the following occur:

a. The force used by the person who was provoked is
so serious that the person using defensive force rea-
sonably believes that he or she was in imminent dan-
ger of death or serious bodily harm, the person using
defensive force had no reasonable means to retreat,
and the use of force which is likely to cause death or
serious bodily harm to the person who was provoked
was the only way to escape the danger.

Id. As this language reflects and as the State acknowledges, the General
Assembly, by enacting this legislation, appears to have allowed an
aggressor to regain the right to utilize defensive force under certain cir-
cumstances. Moreover, as the State also concedes, N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2)
(a) does not, when read literally, appear to distinguish between situ-
ations in which the aggressor did or did not utilize deadly force. The
absence of such a limitation does not, as defendant appears to suggest,
necessarily resolve this issue. Instead, we can only determine whether
the right to utilize defensive force can be regained by an aggressor using
deadly force by properly construing the relevant statutory provision.

“The principal goal of statutory construction is to accomplish the
legislative intent.” Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d

4, N.C.GS. § 1451.2 addresses a person's right to use defensive force for the purpose
of protecting one’s home, workplace, or motor vehicle.

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513, 517 (2001) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297,
507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1098, 119 S. Ct. 1576,
143 L.Ed. 2d 671 (1991), abrogated in part on other grounds by Lenox,
353 N.C. at 663-64, 548 S.E.2d at 517). For that reason, “[legislative intent
controls the meaning of a statute.” Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522,
507 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1998) (quoting Shelton v. Morehead Mem’t Hosp.,
318 N.C. 76, 81, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986). “The best indicia of that
intent are the language of the statute ... , the spirit of the act and what
the act seeks to accomplish.” Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Bd. of
Comm’rs of the Town of Nags Head, 299 N.C. 620, 629, 265 S.E.2d 379,
385 (1980) (citations omitted).

If the language of a statute is free from ambiguity
and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning,
judicial interpretation is unnecessary and the plain mean-
ing of the statute controls. Conversely, “where a literal
interpretation of the language of a statute will lead to
absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the
Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and pur-
pose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof
shall be disregarded.” State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621,
[625,] 107 $.E. 505[, 507] (1921).

Mazda Motors of Am., Inc. v. Sw. Motors, Inc., 296 N.C. 357, 361, 250
§.E.2d 250, 253 (1979) (internal citations omitted).

The effect of adopting the construction of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2)(a)
espoused by defendant, which would allow an aggressor to utilize defen-
sive force in the event that his conduct caused the person provoked to
lawfully utilize deadly force in his own defense, cannot be squared with
the likely legislative intent motivating the enactment of the relevant stat-
utory provision. Simply put, the adoption of defendant's construction of
N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2)(a) would create a situation in which the aggressor
utilized deadly force in attacking the other party, the other party exer-
cised his or her right to utilize deadly force in his or her own defense,
and the initial aggressor then utilized deadly force in defense of him-
self or herself, thereby starting the self-defense merry-go-round all over
again. We are unable to believe that the General Assembly intended to
foster such a result, under which gun battles would effectively become
legal, and hold that the provisions of N.C.G.S § 14-51.4(2)(a) allowing
an aggressor to regain the right to use defensive force under certain cir-
cumstances do not apply in situations in which the aggressor initially
uses deadly force against the person provoked. See Mize, 316 N.C. at
52, 340 S.E.2d at 442 (stating that, “[i]f... one brings about an affray

IN THE SUPREME COURT . 629

STATE v. HOLLOMAN
[869 N.C. 615 (2017)]

with the intent to take life or inflict serious bodily harm, he is not enti-
tled even to the doctrine of imperfect self-defense” (quoting Wetmore,
298 N.C. at 750, 259 S.E.2d at 875)). As a result, the trial court's instruc-
tion to the effect that a defendant who was the aggressor using deadly
force had forfeited the right to use deadly force in self-defense and that
a person who displays a firearm to his opponent with the intent to use
deadly force against him or her and provokes the use of deadly force in
response is an aggressor for purposes of the law of self-defense does not
constitute an inaccurate statement of the applicable North Carolina law.

Our determination that the instructions that the trial court actually
gave with respect to the self-defense issue do not misstate the appli-
cable law does not, however, end the inquiry that we must make in order
to adequately address defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s instruc-
tions. Instead, we must also determine whether the trial court erred
by failing to instruct the jury, in accordance with defendant’s request,
that he might have regained the right to use defensive force based upon
Mr. Bobbitt’s reaction to any provocative conduct in which defendant
might have engaged. In light of the manner in which we have construed
N.C.G:S. § 14-51.4(2)(a), defendant could have only been entitled to the
delivery of such an instruction to the extent that his provocative con-
duct involved non-deadly, rather than deadly, force. A careful review
of the record evidence demonstrates, however, the complete absence of
any evidence tending to show that defendant was the aggressor using
non-deadly, as compared to deadly, force.

The evidence developed at trial presented two contrasting accounts
of the events that occurred at the time that defendant shot Mr. Bobbitt.
On the one hand, Mr. Bobbitt and the other witnesses who testified on
behalf of the State asserted that defendant approached Mr. Bobbitt
with a gun in his hand and fired at Mr. Bobbitt before Mr. Bobbitt could
retrieve his own firearm. In the event that the jury believed the testimony
offered by the State, defendant was, under the authorities discussed
above, an aggressor using deadly force. Defendant, on the other hand,
asserted, that, as he stepped toward Mr. Bobbitt with his gun at his side
for the purpose of ascertaining if Mr. Bobbitt had assaulted Ms. Mann,
Mr. Bobbitt fired at him. In the event that the jury believed defendant's
account, defendant was not an aggressor at all. State v. Spaulding, 298
N.C. 149, 155-56, 257 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1979) (stating that the fact that
the “{djefendant went out to the [prison] yard, a place where he had
a right to be”; that the defendant “did not seek [the victim] out for the
purpose of a violent encounter” and did not say “anything to provoke
[the victim]”; and that the defendant “repeatedly told [the victim that] he

630 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. HOLLOMAN
[369 N.C. 615 (2017)]

wanted no trouble” tend to show that the defendant “was free from fault
in the difficulty”); State v. Vaughn, 227 N.C. App. 198, 203, 742 S.E.2d 276,
279-80 (stating that the “[djefendant’s decision to arm herself and leave
the vehicle, while perhaps unwise, was not, in and of itself, evidence
that she brought on the difficulty”), disc. rev. denied, 367 N.C. 221, 747
S$.E.2d 526 (2013); State v. Tann, 57 N.C. App. 527, 531, 291 S.E.2d 824,
827 (1982) (stating that the fact that the “defendant, who anticipated
the confrontation, armed himself with a .38 caliber pistol, and failed to
avoid the fight” did “not in any way suggest that [he] was the provoca-
tor”). Although defendant asserts that the jury could have understood
his conduct in approaching Mr. Bobbitt with his gun by his side while
seeking an answer to his inquiry concerning whether Mr. Bobbitt had
harmed Ms. Mann to make him an aggressor without the intent to use
deadly force, any such decision on the part of the jury would have been
in conflict with established North Carolina law. Thus, the trial court did
not err by failing to allow the jury to consider whether defendant could
have regained the right to use defensive force even though he had been
the aggressor with the intent to use non-deadly force for the simple rea-
son that such ari instruction would not have constituted an accurate
statement of the law arising upon the evidence. As a result, since the
trial court’s instructions concerning the law of self-defense were not, in
light of the record evidence, erroneous, we reverse the Court of Appeals’
decision to vacate defendant’s conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury and remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for consideration of defendant’s remaining challenge to the trial
court’s judgment.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Justice MORGAN did not participate in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 631

STATE v. JONES
[869 N.C. 631 (2017)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
KEYSHAWN JONES.

No. 27PA16
Filed 9 June 2017

Larceny—mnistaken deposit—constructive possession

The State presented sufficient evidence to support defendant’s
larceny convictions where defendant, a truck driver and indepen-
dent contractor, passively but knowingly received an overpayment
by direct deposit and then proceeded to withdraw the excess funds
against the wishes of the rightful possessor. The company for which
defendant was driving (West) had the intent and capability to main-
tain control and dominion over the funds by effecting a reversal of
the deposit; the fact that the reversal order was not successful did
not indicate that West lacked constructive possession. Defendant
had no possessory interest in the funds for the same reasons.

Justice NEWBY concurring.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 781 S.E.2d 333
(2016), vacating defendant’s convictions after appeal from a judgment
entered on 29 October 2014 by Judge Kenneth F. Crow in Superior Court,
Wayne County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 14 February 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Robert C. Montgomery,
Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Derrick C. Mertz, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by John F. Carella, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

In this case, defendant was overpaid because a payroll proces-
sor accidentally typed “$120,000” instead of “$1,200” into a payment
processing system, resulting in a total payment (after deductions) of
$118,729.49. Although defendant was informed of the error and was
asked not to remove the excess funds from his bank account, he made a
series of withdrawals and transfers totaling $116,861.80. We must decide

632 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. JONES
[369 N.C. 631 (2017)]

whether the State produced sufficient evidence to support defendant’s
convictions for three counts of felonious larceny.

When the overpayment occurred, defendant Keyshawn Jones! was
a truck driver who worked as an independent contractor. At that time,
he was driving trucks for EF Corporation, which was doing business as
WEST Motor Freight (West). West gave its drivers the option to have
money withheld every payroll period and placed in a “maintenance
account” for the driver. Defendant participated in the maintenance
account program and, in July 2012, requested $1,200 from his mainte-
mance account.

But Sherry Hojecki, West’s payroll processor, made an error while
trying to type in the $1,200 payment, accidentally typing in “$120,000”
instead. The final statement indicated that, after payroll deductions,
defendant was to be given $118,729.49. Hojecki sent a report to M&T
Bank, the bank that held West's funds, directing that this $118,729.49
figure be paid by direct deposit to defendant’s account.

The next morning, Hojecki realized her error and tried to stop the
transaction. She also told defendant, through his agent, about the error
and requested that defendant not withdraw or transfer the excess funds
from his account. The stop transaction did not succeed, however, and the
deposit went through. As a result, $118,729.49 was deposited in defen-
dant’s State Employees’ Credit Union (SECU) account. West promptly
tried to initiate a reversal of the deposit.

Despite West's instructions, defendant made several withdraw-
als and transfers that removed almost all of the excess funds from his
account. Three days after being asked not to withdraw the funds, defen-
dant made seven ATM cash withdrawals of $1,000 each, totaling $7,000.
He also electronically transferred $20,000 from his checking account
to his savings account. The next day, defendant went to one of SECU’s
branch locations to withdraw more of the money. The teller who assisted
him noticed the deposit of $118,729.49 and asked defendant why such a
large amount of money had been deposited into his account. Defendant
replied that he was in business with someone else and had sold his
part of the business. Defendant requested two cashier's checks in the
amounts of $21,117.80 and $2,000. He also withdrew $66,744 from his
checking account and used a portion of that amount to purchase a third

1, Defendant states in his brief that the correct spelling of his firstname is “Keyshaun,”
not “Keyshawn.” Because the trial court's judgment used the spelling “Keyshawn,” how-
ever, that is what we use here.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. JONES
[369 N.C. 631 (2017)]

cashier's check. These three withdrawals totaled $89,861.80. Because
defendant had withdrawn or transferred virtually all of the money in
question, the reversal that West had tried to initiate was not successful.

Defendant was later indicted for three counts of larceny and
three counts of possession of stolen goods. The three larceny counts
each charged defendant with “tak[ing] and carry[ing] away” a discrete
amount of money from West—specifically, with taking and carrying
away $7,000, $20,000, and $89,861.80, respectively. At the close of the
State’s evidence, the State made a motion to dismiss the three posses-
sion-of-stolen-goods counts, which the trial court granted. After the
trial court ruled on the State’s motion, defendant moved to dismiss
the remaining charges based on insufficiency of the evidence. The trial
court denied defendant's motion. Defendant renewed his motion at
the close of all evidence, and the trial court again denied defendant's
motion. The jury found defendant guilty of all three counts of larceny.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals
vacated defendant’s convictions, finding that he had not committed a
trespassory taking. State v. Jones,___ N.C. App. __, __, 781 S.E.2d 333,

339 (2016). The State petitioned this Court for discretionary review, and
we allowed the State’s petition.

The question before us is whether the State presented sufficient evi-
dence of felonious larceny. A defendant is guilty of larceny if the State
proves that he “(a) took the property of another; (b) carried it away;
(c) without the owner's consent; and (d) with the intent to deprive the
owner of his property permanently.” State v. White, 322 N.C. 506, 518,
369 S.E.2d 813, 819 (1988) (citing State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 233, 287
§.E.2d 810, 815 (1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mumford,
364 N.C. 394, 699 S.E.2d 911 (2010)). “To survive a motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence, the State must present ‘substantial evidence of all
the material elements of the offense charged and that the defendant was
the perpetrator of the offense.’ ” State v. Campbell, 368 N.C. 83, 87, 772
S.E.2d 440, 444 (2015) (quoting State v. Myrick, 306 N.C. 110, 118-14, 291
S.E.2d 577, 579 (1982)). Whether the evidence that the State presented at,
trial was substantial “is a question of law for the court.” State v. Barnes,
345 N.C. 146, 148, 478 S.E.2d 188, 189 (1996) (citing State v. Vause, 328
N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991)). A reviewing court must evalu-
ate the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State, allowing every
reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.” State v. Davis, 340 N.C. 1,
12, 455 S.E.2d 627, 632, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 846 (1995).

634 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. JONES
[369 N.C. 681 (2017)]

Here, it is beyond dispute that defendant carried property away, and
that—assuming the property did not belong to him—he did so with the
intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property, and without
the owner's consent. Thus, the only issue in this case is whether defen-
dant “took” the property of another when he withdrew and transferred
money from his bank account.

To constitute a larceny, a taking must be wrongful. See State
v. Bowers, 273 N.C. 652, 655, 161 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1968). In other words, the
taking must be by an act of trespass. See id.; State v. Webb, 87 N.C. 558,
559 (1882). A larcenous trespass may be either actual or constructive.
Bowers, 273 N.C. at 655, 161 S.E.2d at 14. A constructive trespass occurs
“when possession of the property is fraudulently obtained by some trick
or artifice.” Id. (quoting State v. Griffin, 239 N.C. 41, 45, 79 S.E.2d 230,
232-83 (1953)). An actual trespass, on the other hand, occurs when the
taking is without the consent of the owner. See 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny
§ 22 (2017); 8 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 19.2(a),
at 63 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter Substantive Criminal Law]; Rollin M.
Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 303-04 (8d ed. 1982).

However the trespass occurs, it must be against the possession of
another. See Webb, 87 N.C. at 559 (noting that a person with an interest
in property may still be guilty of larceny if he “commit[s] a trespass upon
the possession of” another); Substantive Criminal Law § 19.1(a), at 57
(noting that larceny is “a common law crime . . . committed when one
person misappropriate[s] another’s property by means of taking it from
his possession without his consent” (emphasis added)). Possession of
property can also be actual or constructive, though the meaning of these
terms differs from their meaning in the trespass context.? See, e.g., State
v. Weaver, 359 N.C. 246, 259, 607 S.E.2d 599, 606-07 (2005). With respect to
the crime of possession of a controlled substance, this Court has stated
that “[a] person is in constructive possession of a thing when, while not
having actual possession, he has the intent and capability to maintain
control and dominion over that thing.” State v. Beaver, 317 N.C. 643,
648, 346 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1986). The Court of Appeals has adopted this
test for constructive possession in the context of other offenses as well,
including larceny. See, e.g., State v. McNair, ___ N.C. App. __, __, __
§.E.2d__, ___, No. COA16-707, 2017 WL 1381591, at *6 (Apr. 18, 2017)
(possession of burglary tools); State v. Bailey, 233 N.C. App. 688, 691,

2. In other words, while we have just discussed actual and constructive trespass,
this issue—whether a person or entity has actual or constructive possession—is a wholly
separate one.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 635

STATE v. JONES
[369 N.C. 631 (2017)]

757 S.E.2d 491, 493, disc. rev. denied, 367 N.C. 789, 766 S.E.2d 678 (2014)
(possession of a firearm by a felon); State v. Phillips, 172 N.C. App. 143,
146-47, 615 S.E.2d 880, 882-83 (2005) (possession of stolen property);
State v. Osborne, 149 N.C. App. 235, 238-39, 562 S.E.2d 528, 531, aff'd per
curiam, 356 N.C. 424, 571 S.E.2d 584 (2002) (larceny); State v. Bonner,
91 N.C. App. 424, 426, 371 S.E.2d 778, 775 (1988), disc. rev. denied, 323
N.C. 705, 377 S.E.2d 227 (1989) (embezzlement). We implicitly endorsed
applying this test to the embezzlement context in State v. Weaver, see
359 N.C. at 259, 607 S.E.2d at 606-07, and we explicitly adopt it in the
Jarceny context here.

To determine whether defendant took West’s property by trespass,
then, we must first determine whether West retained actual or construc-
tive possession of the excess funds after they had been deposited in
defendant’s SECU account. Account holders generally do not have actual
possession of funds in their bank accounts, and there is no indication in
the record that West had actual possession of the funds here, even when
they were still in its own account. See Lipe v. Guilford Nat'l Bank, 236
N.C. 328, 330-31, 72 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1952); Ann Graham, 1 Banking Law
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) § 9.05, at 9 14 (Feb. 2005) (“Absent some
special arrangement between the parties, money deposited in a bank
becomes the property of the bank and is available for use by the bank in
its business.”). Because there is no evidence that West had actual posses-
sion of the funds in its own bank account, West certainly did not retain
actual possession of the funds that were transferred to defendant's
bank account.

West did, however, retain constructive possession of the excess
funds even after they had been transferred to defendant’s account.
From the time that defendant first knew about the excess funds transfer
up until the time that defendant removed the funds from his account,
West had the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion
over the funds by effecting a reversal of the deposit. The fact that the
reversal order was not successful—because defendant had removed
the funds before the reversal could go through—does not indicate that
West lacked constructive possession when the funds were in defendant's
account. All it shows is that defendant’s removal of the funds deprived
West of constructive possession, which is consistent with all larcenies.
After all, in every larceny, the possessor loses—for at least the briefest
of moments, see State v. Green, 81 N.C. 560, 562 (1879)—the capability
to control the property. As we have seen, that is what larceny is—a tres-
pass against the rightful possessor’s possession.

636 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. JONES
[369 N.C. 681 (2017)]

Having determined that the excess funds were in West’s possession
even after they were deposited into defendant’s account, we must ascer-
tain whether defendant simultaneously had possession of the funds
once they were in his account. If he did, then he could not have commit-
ted larceny, because a defendant cannot commit larceny of goods that
he already possesses. See Substantive Criminal Law § 19.2(a), at 62 (“If
the wrongdoer fraudulently converts property already properly in his
possession, he does not take it from anyone’s possession and so cannot
be guilty of larceny.”).

We have not squarely addressed a situation like this one before, in
which a defendant passively but knowingly received an overpayment by
direct deposit and then proceeded to withdraw the excess funds against
the wishes of the rightful possessor. But this case is akin to a case in
which a person walks into a candy store and buys fifty cents’ worth of
candy. He hands the store owner a twenty dollar bill, only to be kicked
out of the store, and the store owner pockets the bill. In that case, the
store owner would be guilty of larceny because he did not have pos-
session of the. bill; the customer retained constructive possession of it,
leaving the store owner with only custody of it. See id. §§ 19.1(a), at 59,
19.2(c), at 67. Similarly, here, because West retained constructive pos-
session of the excess funds in defendant’s account, and because defen-
dant knew that West had the intent and capability to control the excess
funds through a reversal of the deposit, defendant had no possessory
interest in the funds. Like the store owner who accepts a bill that is
worth more than he is owed without returning the change, defendant
was simply the recipient of funds that he knew were supposed to be
returned in large part. He therefore had mere custody of the funds, not
possession of them.

When a person has mere custody of property, that person may be
convicted of larceny when he appropriates the property to his own use
with felonious intent. See State v. Ruffin, 164 N.C. 416, 417, 79 S.E. 417,
417 (1918). This is precisely because the property remains in the con-
structive possession of the rightful possessor, and the later appropria-
tion interferes with that property right. Id.; see also State v. Tilley, 239
N.C. 245, 249, 79 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1954) (characterizing a warehouse
custodian as having been “entrusted at most with the bare custody of
the goods, whose possession in contemplation of law remained in the
{owner] until [the defendant] feloniously took and carried them away”);
Substantive Criminal Law § 19.1(a), at 58-59. The moment that the per-
sonin custody of the property wrongfully interferes with the rightful pos-
sessor’s possessory interest is the moment that he takes that property.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 637

STATE v. JONES
(369 N.C. 631 (2017)

So, because defendant lacked possession of the excess funds
in his bank account, he “took” those funds when he removed them from
his account through transfers and withdrawals. Those acts are what
deprived West of constructive possession, by depriving West of its abil-
ity to effect a reversal of its excessive funds transfer. The State therefore
presented sufficient evidence that defendant took West’s property by an
act of trespass when he removed the excess funds from his account.

Because we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence in sup-
port of defendant's larceny convictions, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

REVERSED.
Justice NEWBY concurring.

I concur fully with the majority opinion. I write separately to
observe that this case presents an excellent example of the common
law at work today, applying age-old tangible property principles to the
modern, intangible electronic-banking context. As the Chief Justice well
notes in his opinion, it is the knowing exercise of dominion and con-
trol over property to the exclusion of the true owner that “trespasses”
on the owner's property rights and effectuates larceny. His candy store
hypothetical is a good example. I write separately to amplify this point
by taking this opportunity to answer the timeworn question arising from
the iconic film It’s a Wonderful Life: Was Old Man Potter simply morally
corrupt or was he also guilty of a crime?

The role of the Court is not to devise the common law but to recog-
nize and apply its lasting principles. See Penny v. Little, 4 Ill. (8 Scam.)
301, 304 (1841) (opinion of Stephen A. Douglas, father of Justice Robert
M. Douglas of the North Carolina Supreme Court) (“The common law
is a beautiful system; containing the wisdom and experience of ages. . .
and a]dapting itself to the condition and circumstances of the people
....”); see also Reg. v. Ramsey [1883] 48 L.T. 733 at 735 (Eng.) (Lord
Coleridge CJ) (“[Llaw grows; and . . . though the principles of the law
remain unchanged, . . . their application is to be changed with the chang-
ing circumstances of the times.”); 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*73 (The “chief corner stone of the laws . . . is general immemorial cus-
tom, or common law, from time to time declared in the decisions of
the courts of justice: which decisions are preserved among our public
records, explained in our reports, and digested for general use.”)

638 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. JONES
[369 N.C. 631 (2017)]

North Carolina law has long recognized that when an individual
finds property, and is unaware of its true owner, that individual has no
legal duty to locate and return the property to the true owner. See State
v. Roper, 14 N.C. (8 Dev.) 473, 474-75 (1832) (opinion of Daniel, J.) (A
bona fide finder of lost or abandoned property, who later “appropriate[s
the property] to his own use,” is not guilty of larceny.); see also State
v. West, 293 N.C. 18, 30, 235 S.E.2d 150, 157 (1977) (“[T]he owner of
articles of personal property may terminate his ownership by abandon-
ing it and, in that event, title passes to the first person who thereafter
takes possession.” (citation omitted)). Nonetheless, we applaud the high
morals of one who does.

On the other hand, when an individual possesses property with
the knowledge of its true owner, and exercises dominion and control
over the property for his or her own purposes, thus trespassing on the
true owner's property rights, that individual has committed larceny. See
State v. Farrow, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 161, 163 (1867). Itis not the unintentional
receipt of the property that makes the act larceny, but the knowing exer-
cise of control over it. See id.; Roper, 14 N.C. (8 Dev.) at 474-75; see also
State v. Arkle, 116 N.C. 1017, 1031, 21 S.E. 408, 408 (1895) (“[T]here must
be an original, felonious intent . . . at the time of the taking or finding of
lost property . . . to constitute larceny.”).

Here defendant knowingly exercised dominion and control over the
mistakenly deposited funds to the exclusion of West. Evidence showed
that West immediately put defendant on notice of the company’s error
and that defendant knew the money was West's as early as 12 July 2012,
well before his ATM withdrawals and electronic transfers on 15 July
2012. See Roper, 14 N.C. (8 Dev.) at 474-75. Logically, if West had lost
or abandoned its ownership interest, West would not have immediately
contacted defendant and his bank. Moreover, defendant could not have
been mistaken about the money's ownership, given both West's notice
to him and that his initial request was for only $1200. See id. at 475 (“If
money, by mistake, is sent with a bureau to be repaired, and it is taken
with felonious intent, it will be a larceny . . . .”); see also 50 Am. Jur.
2d Larceny § 32, at 42 (2006) (“Where money . . . is delivered by mis-
take, and the receiver takes it with knowledge of the mistake and with
the intent to keep it, the offense is larceny, since there is no consent
on the part of the owner to part with the excessive amount... .”). Thus,
defendant committed larceny.

While the Chief Justice’s opinion applies such long-standing com-
mon law principles to the modern banking context, the principles are

IN THE SUPREME COURT 639

STATE v. JONES
[869 N.C. 631 (2017)]

equally applicable to situations arising in the past. Thus are we able
to use them to answer the question, lingering in the minds of many,
as to the criminal culpability of Old Man Potter. See It’s a Wonderful Life
(Liberty Films 1946).

In this beloved film, on Christmas Eve morning in 1945, Uncle
Billy goes to Old Man Potter's bank to deposit $8000 in cash! for his fam-
ily’s benevolent business, the Bailey Brothers Building & Loan Company.
While Uncle Billy is preparing his deposit slip in the bank lobby, Potter
arrives with newspaper in hand. Uncle Billy turns to greet him and can-
not help but good-naturedly needle crotchety Potter, who had greedily
sought to quash the struggling Building & Loan Company for some time.
Uncle Billy grabs the newspaper from Potter and proudly points to the
picture of his nephew Harry on the front page—the war hero return-
ing home. Potter angrily snatches the newspaper back, in which Uncle
Billy had mistakenly folded the $8000 cash. At this point no crime has
occurred; Uncle Billy has misplaced his money and Potter is unaware
of his possession of it. See Roper, 14 N.C. (8 Dev.) at 475 (Though the
defendant had possession of a lost shawl, he lacked felonious intent and
was not guilty of larceny while simply returning it to the true owner.).

Back in his bank office, Potter unfolds the newspaper and discov-
ers the money. Meanwhile, Uncle Billy attempts to make the deposit
and, in horror, finds that he has misplaced the funds. Potter begins to
retum with the money to the lobby, but upon opening his office door
he observes Uncle Billy searching frantically. Potter “puts two and two
together,” realizing the loss of funds will ruin George Bailey and his
Building & Loan Company. Potter closes the door, keeping the $8000
cash. Armed with the knowledge that the money belongs to the Building
& Loan Company, Potter exercises dominion and control by keeping the
funds, and has thus committed larceny. See id. at 474-75.

That same day, the state bank examiner began auditing the Building
& Loan Company, which now faced unavoidable collapse given the
$8000 shortage. At his wits’ end, George pleads with Potter for a loan
to save the business. In response, Potter not only does not confess that
he has the Building & Loan Company’s money, but instead brazenly
inquires of George whether he had lost the money, possibly by “play-
ing the markets” or through an extramarital affair. See id. at 474 (The
finder’s “subsequent appropriation in a secret manner, or his denial

1. $8000 adjusted for inflation would be approximately $107,483 today. See U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, [Conswmer Price Indes: Inflation Calculator (2017).

640 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. KNIGHT
[369 N.C. 640 (2017)]

of any knowledge of the goods, or any other acts showing a felonious
intent, would be evidence [supporting larceny].” (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted)). Ultimately, Potter phones the police to arrest George for
“misappropriation” of company funds.

Facing certain tragedy, George attempts to take his own life. The
attempt is cleverly thwarted by Clarence, an angel looking to earn his
wings. Clarence helps George appreciate that, despite the current seem-
ingly overwhelming challenges, life is worth living. George favors life
over death. When he finally returns home to face whatever consequences
may occur, George finds that the community has rallied around him,
accumulating the necessary funds to save the Building & Loan Company
and his reputation, just in time for Christmas.

So the story ends. George has a wonderful life. Clarence gets his
wings. Old Man Potter is a morally bankrupt individual, but an unin-
dicted felon. And we continue our quest to apply ageless common law
principles to our ever-changing modern world.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

. ov
THOMAS DERUSSELL KNIGHT

No. 97A16
Filed 9 June 2017

Confessions and Incriminating Statements—Miranda rights—
knowing and voluntary waiver—by course of conduct
Under the totality of the circumstances, the State established
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant understood his
Miranda rights but knowingly and voluntarily waived them during
a police interrogation. Through his course of conduct, defendant
effected a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights: He listened.
as the detective read his Miranda rights; he spoke coherently and
‘was mature and experienced enough to understand his rights; he
did not state that he wanted to remain silent or wanted an attorney;
he emphatically denied any wrongdoing and tried to convince the
police of his innocence; and he was not threatened or coerced in any
way. An affirmative response acknowledging that defendant under-
stood his rights was not required for his waiver to be valid. Further,
even assuming defendant denied that he understood his rights, a

IN THE SUPREME COURT 641

STATE v. KNIGHT
[369 N.C. 640 (2017)]

bare statement that he did not understand, without more, would not
outweigh all of the evidence that he understood.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 785 S.E.2d 324
(2016), finding no prejudicial error after appeal from a judgment entered
on 7 February 2014 by Judge Kendra D. Hill in Superior Court, Wake
County. On 9 June 2016, the Supreme Court allowed the State’s peti-
tion for discretionary review of an additional issue. The case was calen-
dared for argument in the Supreme Court on 14 February 2017, but was
determined on the briefs without oral argument pursuant to N.C. R. App.
P. 30(d).

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Amy Kunstling Irene,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee/appellant.

Craig M. Cooley for defendant-appellant/appellee.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.

Defendant Thomas Knight allegedly raped and assaulted T:H., the
victim, at her home in October 2012. Wearing only a shirt, T.-H. eventu-
ally escaped and ran to a neighbor's house to get help. Her neighbor
gave her a pair of pants to wear and called the police. Evidence that the
police recovered from T.H.’s home was consistent with her account of
the events. The police soon apprehended defendant at a nearby gas sta-
tion. When the police found defendant, he was carrying two cell phones,
one of which belonged to T.-H.

The police took: defendant to a police station for questioning.
Detective Jeff Wenhart began questioning defendant at around 10:30
or 10:45 p.m. that evening. In the video-recorded interrogation, which
Jasted under forty minutes, defendant acknowledged spending time with
TH. at her home earlier in the evening but vehemently denied having
sexual relations with her and denied any wrongdoing.

I

Defendant was charged with common law robbery, assault on a
female, interfering with emergency communication, second-degree
rape, second-degree sexual offense, and first-degree kidnapping. He
was tried before a jury, with the Honorable Reuben F. Young presiding.
Defendant moved to suppress the custodial statements that he made _
to Detective Wenhart at the police station, claiming that the State had

642 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. KNIGHT
[369 N.C. 640 (2017)

not proved that he had understood his Miranda rights or that he had
explicitly waived them. Judge Young granted defendant's motion and
suppressed the statements. At the close of evidence, the trial court dis-
missed the common law robbery charge and the interfering-with-emer-
gency-communication charge. The jury found defendant guilty of assault
on a female but could not reach a unanimous verdict on the other three
charges that remained. As a result, the trial court sentenced defendant
for his assault-on-a-female conviction and declared a mistrial on the
other three charges.

About six months later, defendant was retried before a new jury,
with the Honorable Kendra D. Hill presiding, on those three charges—
namely, second-degree rape, second-degree sexual offense, and first-
degree kidnapping. At defendant’s second trial, defendant again moved
to suppress the custodial statements that he made to Detective Wenhart.
Judge Hill held a voir dire hearing, heard the arguments of the parties,
viewed the video recording of defendant's custodial interrogation, and
ruled that defendant's custodial statements were admissible.

In the findings of fact that supported her ruling, Judge Hill noted
that, when Detective Wenhart began to read defendant his Miranda
rights and told defendant that he had a right to remain silent, “[d]efen-
dant immediately said[,] are you arresting me?” Judge Hill also explained
that, at the time, defendant “was clearly detained, and yet the reading
of the rights triggered in the defendant's mind that this was an arrest,
which to the [trial] [c]ourt provides some indication of knowledge” and
“understanding about Miranda to some extent.” Plus, “[c]lear language
was used [by Detective Wenhart] here.” “The defendant,” moreover, was
“an adult . . . in his 30s at the time of this” interrogation and gave “no
indication to the {trial] [c]ourt” that he had “any cognitive problems.”
In addition, Judge Hill observed that “[djefendant ha[d] a prior crimi-
nal history” and thus had “some knowledge and familiarity with the
criminal justice system.” Finally, “the discussion prior to the full read-
ing of the rights made it clear that the defendant was seeking informa-
tion . .. and wanted to provide information with regard to his indication
of what had been done here.” Judge Hill concluded that the discus-
sion “indicat[ed] a willingness for the defendant to speak to” Detective
Wenhart and noted that defendant “actually sa[id] to the officer[,] I want
to be frank with you, I want to explain this to you.”

Based on these findings of fact, Judge Hill found, under the total-
ity of the circumstances, that there was “enough to determine that the
defendant understood his Miranda rights” and that, “through his con-
tinued discussion[,] . . . he voluntarily waived those rights in providing

IN THE SUPREME COURT 643

STATE v. KNIGHT
[369 N.C. 640 (2017)]

a statement to Detective Wenhart.” At the close of defendant’s second
trial, the jury found him guilty of second degree rape and first-degree
kidnapping and not guilty of second-degree sexual offense. Defendant
gave oral notice of appeal.

Before the Court of Appeals, defendant argued, among other things,
that Judge Hill erred when she denied defendant’s motion to suppress
his custodial statements. The Court of Appeals unanimously agreed that
Judge Hill had erred because the State had not shown that defendant
actually understood his Miranda rights. State v. Knight, ___ N.C. App.
1 __, __, 785 S.E.2d 324, 333-36, 338-40 (2016); id. at__, 785 S.B.2d
at 340 (Stroud, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court
of Appeals therefore concluded that defendant had not knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights. Id. at __, 785 S.E.2d at 336 (majority
opinion); id. at ____, 785 S.E.2d at 340 (Stroud, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). A majority of the panel nevertheless held that Judge
Hill’s purported error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus
found no prejudicial error in defendant’s second trial. Jd. at__, __, 785
§.E.2d at 336-38, 340 (majority opinion). A dissenting judge disagreed
and would have granted defendant a new trial. Id. at__, 785 S.B.2d at
340-41 (Stroud, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Defendant appealed to this Court based on the dissenting opin-
ion. The State filed a petition for discretionary review of an additional
issue, namely, whether the Court of Appeals’ ruling that defendant did
not understand his Miranda rights and therefore did not knowingly and
intelligently waive them was correct. We allowed the petition. By con-
sent of the parties; the case was submitted for decision on the briefs
under Rule 30(d) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

au

The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611, 615
(1965), provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself,” U.S. Const. amend. V. To protect this
right, the Supreme Court of the United States has formulated a set of
prophylactic warnings that criminal suspects must receive for any cus-
todial statements that they make to be admissible in court. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). The substance of those warnings
has not changed over the last fifty years. See Berghwis v. Thompkins,
560 U.S. 370, 380 (2010).

A defendant may, however, waive his Miranda rights as long as he
waives them voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda, 384 U.S.

644 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. KNIGHT
[869 N.C. 640 (2017)]

at 444; State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 367, 334 S.E.2d 53, 59 (1985). A
court’s waiver inquiry has two distinct dimensions. Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). First, a court must determine whether the
waiver was “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id.
Second, a court must determine that the waiver was knowing and intel-
ligent—that is, that it was “made with a full awareness of both the nature
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it.” Id.

A waiver can be either express or implied. See State v. Connley, 297
N.C. 584, 586, 256 S.E.2d 234, 235-36 (order on remand) (citing North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 954
(1979). “An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to
remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the
validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient
to establish waiver.” Id. at 586, 256 S.E.2d at 235 (quoting Butler, 441
US. at 373). A court may properly conclude that a defendant has waived.
his Miranda rights only if the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the defendant’s interrogation show both that he adequately under-
stands them and that he was not coerced into waiving them. Moran,
475 US. at 421, see also State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 19, 305 S.E.2d 685,
697 (1983). Whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived
his Miranda rights therefore “depends on the specific facts and circum-
stances of each case, including the [defendant's] background, experi-
ence, and conduct.” Simpson, 314 N.C. at 367, 334 S.E.2d at 59 (citing,
inter alia, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981)). And although
the Supreme Court has stated that the State bears a “heavy burden” in
proving waiver, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, the Court later clarified that
“the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence,”
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986), cited in Berghuis, 560
US. at 384.

More recently, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Supreme Court
addressed whether a defendant who was “[lJargely silent” during a
nearly three hour custodial interrogation had invoked his Miranda
rights, and also addressed whether he had waived them. See 560 U.S.
at 375 (brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted); id. at
380-87. After receiving his Miranda warnings, Van Chester Thompkins,
the defendant in Berghuis, gave only “a few limited verbal responses”
to the police officers’ questions, “such as ‘yeah,’ ‘no,’ or ‘I don’t know.’ ”
Id. at 375. “About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation,” one
of the interrogating police officers asked Thompkins if he believed in

IN THE SUPREME COURT 645

STATE v. KNIGHT
[869 N.C. 640 (2017)]

God. Id. at 376. He replied, “Yes,” and “his eyes welled up with tears.”
Jd. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The officer asked
Thompkins if he prayed to God, and he replied, “Yes.” Id. The officer
then asked him if he prayed to God “to forgive [him] for shooting that
boy down,” and he “answered ‘Yes’ and looked away.” Id.

The Court held that Thompkins had not invoked his right to remain
silent under Miranda. Id. at 382. It ruled that a suspect must invoke
his right to remain silent unambiguously, and that Thompkins had not
done so. See id. at 381-82 (citing, inter alia, Davis v. United States, 512
US. 452, 458-62 (1994)). The Court also held that Thompkins waived his
right to remain silent. Id. at 385, 387. It found that he had understood
his Miranda rights, that he had engaged in a course of conduct to waive
those rights, and that he had waived those rights voluntarily. See id.
at 385-87.

With respect to the waiver issue, the Court first stated that
“ft]here was more than enough evidence in the record to conclude
that Thompkins understood his Miranda rights.” Id. at 385. It noted
that “Thompkins received a written copy of the Miranda warnings”;
that one of the officers who interrogated Thompkins “determined that
Thompkins could read and understand English”; and that “Thompkins
was given time to read the warnings.” Jd. at 385-86. The Court further
noted that Thompkins read one of the Miranda warnings aloud and that
one of the officers read all of the warnings aloud. See id. at 386. Based
on these facts, the Court said that “[t]here is no basis in this case to con-
clude that [Thompkins] did not understand his rights; and . . . it follows
that he chose not to invoke or rely on those rights when he did speak.”
Id. at, 385.

Next, the Court ruled that, by responding to the officer’s questions
about praying to God for forgiveness for shooting the victim, Thompkins
engaged in a “ ‘course of conduct indicating waiver’ of the right to remain
silent.” Jd. at 386 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373). “If Thompkins wanted
to remain silent,” the Court explained, “he could have said nothing in
response to [the officer’s] questions, or he could have unambiguously
invoked his Miranda rights and ended the interrogation.” Id.

Finally, the Court stated that there was “no evidence that Thompkins’
statement was coerced.” Jd. It noted that “Thompkins d[id] not claim
that police threatened or injured him during the interrogation or that he
was in any way fearful.” Id. It also observed that, although Thompkins
seemed to have been “in a straight-backed chair for three hours, . . .
there is no authority for the proposition that an interrogation of this

646 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. KNIGHT
[369 N.C. 640 (2017)]

length is inherently coercive,” and that even when longer interrogations
had been held to be improper, the interrogations were accompanied by
other coercive factors. Id. at 386-87. The Court held that, in these cir-
cumstances, Thompkins had “knowingly and voluntarily made a state-
ment to police, so he waived his right to remain silent.” Id. at 387.

m

When a trial court makes findings of fact after a voir dire hearing
concerning the admissibility of a custodial statement, those findings are
conclusive and binding on the appellate courts if they are supported by
competent evidence. See Simpson, 314 N.C. at 368, 334 S.E.2d at 59. The
trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. See id.

The case at hand gives us our first opportunity to apply Berghuis,
and the analysis in Berghuis is particularly instructive here. Defendant
does not allege that he invoked his right to remain silent during the cus-
todial interrogation with Detective Wenhart. He instead argues that the
State did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he under-
stood his rights. He also argues that the trial court’s purported error in
admitting his custodial statements was prejudicial. We do not need to
reach the prejudice issue, though, because we hold that, as in Berghuis,
defendant understood his Miranda rights and that, through a “course of
conduct indicating waiver,” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 386 (quoting Butler,
441 US. at 373), he effected a knowing and voluntary waiver of them.

Here, as in Berghuis, defendant never said “during the interrogation
... that he wanted to remain silent, that he did not want to talk with the
police, or that he wanted an attorney.” Id. at 375. Quite the contrary. As
Judge Hill noted in her ruling on the admissibility of defendant’s custo-
dial statements, the video of defendant's interrogation—which, again,
Jasted under forty minutes—shows that defendant was willing to speak
with Detective Wenhart. After being read his rights, defendant indicated
that he wanted to tell his side of the story when he said “I'm not gonna
lie to you, man” and “I’m gonna be frank with you.” The video also shows
that defendant talked at length during the interrogation, often interrupt-
ing Detective Wenhart, and that defendant responded without hesitation
to Detective Wenhart’s questions about where he had been and what he
had been doing that evening. What’s more, the video shows that defen-
dant emphatically denied any wrongdoing; provided his account of the
evening's events in detail, including the fact that he had spent some time
at the victim’s home; and seemed to be trying to talk his way out of cus-
tody. This last point is worth emphasizing because it appears that, when

IN THE SUPREME COURT 647

STATE v. KNIGHT
[369 N.C. 640 (2017)]

faced with a choice between invoking his rights or trying to convince the
police that he was innocent, defendant chose to do the latter.

Thus, defendant's course of conduct indicating waiver was much
more pronounced than that of the defendant in Berghuis, who remained
largely silent over the course of an almost three hour interrogation and
who gave very limited responses when he did speak. See id. at 375. And
yet, in Berghuis, the Supreme Court found that the defendant had implic-
itly waived his rights through his course of conduct when he answered
the officer's question about whether he prayed to God for forgiveness
for shooting the victim. See id. at 386-87. It follows that defendant in
this case also made an implied waiver of his Miranda rights through a
course of conduct that indicated waiver when he spoke, at great length,
with Detective Wenhart.

In addition, as in Berghuis, there is no evidence here that defendant’s
statements were involuntary. The video of the interrogation shows that
defendant was not threatened in any way and that Detective Wenhart
did not make any promises, false or otherwise, to get defendant to talk.
Before reading defendant his rights, Detective Wenhart simply told him.
that “[t]his is your opportunity, should you so desire, . . . to tell your side
of the story so that we can get to the bottom of what happened.” The
interrogation was conducted in what appears to be a standard interview
room, and Detective Wenhart’s tone throughout the interrogation was
calm and conversational. And the length of defendant’s interrogation—
which, as we have already noted, was less than forty minutes—was much
shorter than the interrogation in Berghuis, which lasted almost three
hours. As we have already seen, the Supreme Court noted in Berghwis
that even interrogations longer than three hours have been held to be
improper only when they were accompanied by other coercive factors.
Id. at 387. Here, the only factor that one could even arguably claim was
coercive was the fact that defendant's arm was handcuffed to a bar on
the wall in the interrogation room. But his chair had an armrest; his arm
still had an ample range of motion; and he did not appear to be in any
discomfort during the interrogation. Thus, defendant voluntarily waived
his Miranda rights.

Although he waived his Miranda rights through a course of con-
duct that indicated waiver, and although he did so voluntarily, defen-
dant argues that the police still violated his Miranda rights because, he
says, he did not understand his rights when he waived them. But under
the totality of the circumstances, defendant here, like the defendant in
Berghuis, did understand his rights.

648 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. KNIGHT
[869 N.C. 640 (2017)]

In discussing why the defendant in Berghuis understood his rights,,
the Supreme Court noted that the defendant read and spoke English,
was given a written copy of his Miranda rights, was informed that these
rights would not dissipate after a certain amount of time, and was told
that the police would have to honor his rights, which could be asserted
at any time. Id. at 385-86. One of the officers in Berghuis also read the
defendant's Miranda rights aloud to him. Id. at 386.

Similarly, in this case, Detective Wenhart read all of defendant's
Miranda rights aloud, including his right to stop answering questions
at any time during the interrogation. The video of the interrogation
shows that Detective Wenhart spoke clearly when he read defendant
his rights, and that defendant appeared to be listening and paying atten-
tion. It is clear from the video as a whole, moreover, that defendant
speaks English fluently. And defendant was certainly mature and expe-
rienced enough to understand his rights. He repeatedly told Detective
Wenhart that he was “38 years old,” and, as the trial court found, he had
prior experience with the criminal justice system and recognized that.
his rights were being read to him, as evidenced by his statement that,
“fiJf you’re reading me my rights, I’m under arrest.” In addition, as the
trial court also found, defendant gave no indication that he had any cog-
nitive problems. Nor was there anything else that would have impaired
his understanding of his rights. Although defendant admitted during the
interrogation that he had “been drinking” and “smoking a little pot,” and
claimed at one point that he was intoxicated, the video of his interro-
gation shows that his answers to Detective Wenhart’s questions were
coherent and responsive throughout.

Defendant asserts, nevertheless, that he did not understand his
rights because he did not say that he understood them. But it is clear
from Berghuis that the State does not need to prove that a defendant
explicitly said that he understood his rights; it must simply prove under
the totality of the circumstances that he in fact understood them. In
Berghuis, the Supreme Court stated that there was conflicting evi-
dence as to whether Thompkins affirmatively said that he understood
his Miranda, rights, and he refused to sign an acknowledgement that
he understood them. Jd. at 375; id. at 399 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
But, even though it was not clear whether Thompkins had said that he
understood his rights, the Supreme Court still found that he had in fact
understood them. See id. at 385-86 (majority opinion). In this case, then,
as in Berghuis, “{t]here is no basis . . . to conclude that [defendant] did
not understand his rights; and on these facts it follows that he chose not
to invoke or rely on those rights when hé did speak.” Jd. at 385.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 649

STATE v. KNIGHT
[369 N.C. 640 (2017)]

Of course, defendant arguably indicated that he did not understand
his rights. When asked if he understood them, he said, “I ~ not really.”
Here is the exchange in context:

MR. KNIGHT: See, that’s the thing right there I just
don’t understand. What the hell am I doing in these damn
cuffs, man?

DETECTIVE: Well, if you want me to explain that, you
got to allow me to get through here. Okay?

MR. KNIGHT: I — I'm - listening —

DETECTIVE: Before I ask you any questions —
MR. KNIGHT: I’m listening (Inaudible) —
DETECTIVE: — You must understand your rights.
MR. KNIGHT: You're not talking (Inaudible) --

DETECTIVE: You have the right to remain silent and
not make any statement.

MR. KNIGHT: Like I said, I'm going to jail for no

f-ing reason.

DETECTIVE: Anything you say can and will be used
against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer
for advice and before I ask you any questions, and to have
him or anyone else with you during questioning. If you
cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you by
the court before questioning, if you wish.

If you decide to answer questions now, without alaw-
yer present, you will still have the right to stop answering
at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at
any time until you talk to a lawyer.

Do you understand each of the rights I’ve explained
to you, Mr. Knight?

MR. KNIGHT: I ~ not really. T°
DETECTIVE: Well ~

MR. KNIGHT: I’m — I'm not gonna lie to you, man. ’'m.
~-I’m~—I’m—I’m serious. See, this is where I’m at now.

DETECTIVE: Uh-huh?

650 IN THE SUrREME COURT

STATE v. KNIGHT
[869 N.C. 640 (2017)]

MR. KNIGHT: (inaudible) I'm gonna be frank with
you. This is exactly where I’m at. I haven’t did anything
‘wrong, man.

DETECTIVE: Uh-huh.

MR. KNIGHT: Not a damn thing. You see what you
see. I don’t care. But I haven’t did any damn thing wrong.
Thaven’t harmed anybody, I haven't did anything to any-
body. All I’m trying to do is go home and lay in my damn
bed so I can go to my boy’s football game tomorrow morn-
ing at 9:30. That's all I’m trying to do, man.

DETECTIVE: Okay.

MR. KNIGHT: Other than that right there, I don’t know
what the hell you talking about.

DETECTIVE: So why would this young lady say that
~ that you attacked her —

MR. KNIGHT: She’s fing drunk. That's why.
DETECTIVE: Were you drinking with her?
MR. KNIGHT: Yeah, of ~- yeah, we ~ yeah, of course.

When viewed in its proper context, therefore, defendant’s response
to Detective Wenhart’s question about understanding—‘I - not really.
T'm-—’—was a continuation of defendant's statement that he did not
understand why he was in handcuffs and, more generally, why he was
being held in custody, because—in his words—he had not done “any-
thing wrong.” So the argument that defendant denied understanding his
rights is not persuasive.

Even if defendant had been denying that he understood his rights,
this bare statement, without more, would not be enough to outweigh
all of the evidence of understanding that we have already discussed.
The totality of the circumstances analysis might have produced a dif-
ferent result had defendant also asked clarifying questions or sought
additional details about his right to remain silent or his right to counsel.
But he did not.

In other words, the fact that a defendant affirmatively denies that he
understands his rights cannot, on its own, lead to suppression. Again,
while an express written or oral statement of waiver of Miranda rights is
usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, it is neither necessary

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STATE v. KNIGHT
[369 N.C. 640 (2017)}

nor sufficient to establish waiver. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. Likewise, a
defendant’s affirmative acknowledgement that he understands his
Miranda rights is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish that a
defendant in fact understood them, because the test for a defendant's
understanding looks to the totality of the circumstances. Just because a
defendant says that he understands his rights, after all, does not mean
that he actually understands them. By the same token, just because a
defendant claims not to understand his rights does not necessarily mean.
that he does not actually understand them. In either situation, merely
stating something cannot, in and of itself, establish that the thing stated
is true. That is exactly why a trial court must analyze the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether a defendant in fact understood his
rights. As a result, even if defendant here had denied that he understood
his rights—and again, in context it appears that he did not—that would
not change our conclusion in this case.

Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the State established
by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant understood his rights
but knowingly and voluntarily waived them, and Judge Hill’s determina-
tion was correct.

The Court of Appeals’ opinion could be read to suggest that a defen-
dant must make some sort of affirmative verbal response or affirmative
gesture to acknowledge that he has understood his Miranda rights for
his waiver to be valid. See Knight, __ N.C. App. at ____, 785 S.E.2d at 335-
36. That suggestion, to the extent that it exists, is explicitly disavowed.
As we have shown, requiring that a defendant affirmatively acknowl-
edge that he understands his rights in order to validly waive them con-
flicts with the holding in Berghuis.

In sum, defendant waived his Miranda rights during his custodial
interrogation, so the statements that he made during that. interrogation
are admissible. Because we find no error in the trial court’s decision to
admit those statements, we do not need to consider whether errone-
ously admitting them would have been prejudicial. The remaining issues
addressed by the Court of Appeals are not before us, and we do not
disturb its decision on those issues.

Although the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the admission of
defendant's video-recorded interrogation violated his Miranda rights, it
correctly upheld defendant’s convictions and the judgment entered on
those convictions. We therefore modify and affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

652 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. McKIVER
[869 N.C. 652 (2017)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v
CHRISTOPHER ALLEN McKIVER

No. 213PA16
Filed 9 June 2017

Constitutional Law—Confrontation Clause—911 calls
The Confrontation Clause did not prohibit the use of infor-
mation received from an anonymous 911 caller and a reverse call
by the 911 operator where the circumstances objectively indicated
that the primary purpose for the calls was to enable Jaw enforce-
ment to meet an ongoing emergency and the statements were non-
testimonial in nature.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 786 S.B.2d 85
(2016), finding prejudicial error in a judgment entered on 29 April 2015
by Judge Benjamin G. Alford in Superior Court, New Hanover County,
and awarding defendant a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court on
11 April 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Daniel P. O’Brien, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Kimberly P. Hoppin for defendant-appellee.
NEWBY, Justice.

This case is about whether the Confrontation Clause prohibits the
use at trial of information received from an anonymous 911 caller who
informed law enforcement of a possible incident involving a firearm and
described the suspect. Because the circumstances surrounding the 911
caller’s statements objectively indicate that their primary purpose was to
enable law enforcement to meet an ongoing emergency, the statements
were nontestimonial in nature, thus not implicating the Confrontation
Clause. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
reinstate the trial court's evidentiary ruling and the resulting judgment
upon defendant's conviction.

At 9:37 p.m. on 12 April 2014, an anonymous 911 caller reported a
possible dispute involving a black man with a gun in his hand who was

IN THE SUPREME COURT 653

STATE v. McKIVER
[369 N.C. 652 (2017)]

standing outside on Penn Street in the Long Leaf Park subdivision of
Wilmington, North Carolina. In response to the dispatch, Officer Scott
Bramley of the Wilmington Police Department activated his patrol car’s
blue lights and siren on the way to the scene. Officer Bramley charac-
terized the dispatch as “a pretty serious call” that is “always dispatched
with backup.” After stopping a few blocks away to retrieve his patrol
rifle from his vehicle’s trunk, he proceeded to Penn Street, where he
parked on the side of the roadway. Penn Street was “very dark” with
“very sporadic” street lighting, and Officer Bramley turned on his high-
beam headlights “to try and light-up the area.”

Upon exiting his vehicle, Officer Bramley noticed two people stand-
ing near a black, unoccupied Mercedes, which was still running and
parked beside a vacant lot. Officer Bramley heard music “blaring” from
the car radio. Lacking a detailed description of the suspect, Officer
Bramley approached the two individuals. One of the individuals, a black
male wearing a red and white plaid shirt and jeans, walked towards
Officer Bramley. Officer Bramley “confronted him about possibly having
[a firearm], at which point he lifted his shirt to show [Officer Bramley]
he did not have a gun.” Officer Bramley conducted a pat-down to con-
firm the man was unarmed and then, having no description or location
for the suspect, continued to investigate down the block.

By this time other officers had arrived on the scene, and Officer
Bramley observed a number of onlookers watching from nearby resi-
dences and the vacant lot. Officer Bramley asked for a more detailed
description of the suspect, but the dispatcher informed him that the
anonymous 911 caller had already disconnected. Officer Bramley
requested that the dispatcher initiate a reverse call. After reconnecting
with the caller, the dispatcher informed Officer Bramley that the caller

“said it was in the field in a black car and someone said he might have
thrown the gun.”

Inresponse to Officer Bramley’s request for a more detailed descrip-
tion from the caller, the dispatcher replied: “Black Male light plaid shirt.
He was last seen by the car with a gun in his hand and then they all went
in the house because they were afraid.” Officer Bramley testified that,
upon receiving this information, he “immediately knew [the suspect] ~
was the first gentleman that [he] had come into contact with because
no one else in that area was wearing anything remotely similar to that
clothing description.” Officer Bramley relayed the suspect's description
“to other officers still en route to help search the area in an attempt to
locate him.” Officers searched the nearby vacant lot and discovered a
Sig Sauer P320 .45 caliber handgun located about ten feet away from the

654 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. McKIVER
[369 N.C. 652 (2017)]

Mercedes. The officers identified defendant as the suspect based on the
caller's description, and defendant was arrested.

Defendant was indicted, inter alia, on one count of possession
of a firearm by a felon. Before trial defendant moved to exclude evi-
dence of the initial 911 call and the dispatcher’s reverse call, contend-
ing that admitting statements made during either call without requiring
the anonymous caller to testify would allow the jury to hear inadmis-
sible testimonial statements in violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to confront the witnesses against him. The State successfully argued,
however, that the statements primarily served to enable law enforce-
ment to meet an ongoing emergency and were therefore nontestimonial
in nature. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 818, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L.
Ed. 2d 224 (2006). Along with the calls, the State introduced other evi-
dence from the scene, including the firearm, and documentation verify-
ing defendant's prior felony conviction. The jury convicted defendant of
possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, and the trial court sentenced
defendant to fourteen to twenty-six months of imprisonment, suspended
for thirty-six months of supervised probation after completion of a six-
month term. Defendant appealed.

On appeal the Court of Appeals concluded, inter alia, that the anon-
ymous 911 call and the dispatcher’s reverse call were inadmissible testi-
monial statements. State v. McKiver,___ N.C. App. __, __, 786 S.E.2d
85, 94 (2016). According to the Court of Appeals, the 911 call was not
placed in response to an “ongoing emergency” and admitting the state-
ments without requiring the anonymous caller to testify violated defen-
dant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.! Id. at
__, 786 $.E.2d at 93-94 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, 126 S. Ct. at 2277,
165 L. Ed. 2d at 240-41). Noting the anonymous 911 caller's “position of
relative safety” in her home and away from her window, the Court
of Appeals determined that the record did not objectively indicate that
an ongoing emergency existed. Id. at ___, 786 S.E.2d at 93. Even though
“the identity and location of the man with the gun were not yet known
to the officers,” according to the Court of Appeals, “ ‘this fact [alone]
does not in and of itself create an ongoing emergency.’ ” Jd. at __, 786
S.E.2d at 93 (quoting State v. Lewis, 361 N.C. 541, 549, 648 S.E.2d 824,
829 (2007)). Moreover, the court concluded that receiving evidence of
the calls could not be harmless because defendant's identification as
the suspect rested almost entirely on these statements. Jd. at ____, 786

1. The Court of Appeals first held that the incriminating circumstantial evidence
sufficiently supported a jury verdict that defendant constructively possessed the firearm.
McKiver, N.C, App. at __, 786 $.E.2d at 88-00. This issue is not before the Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. McKIVER
[369 N.C, 652 (2017)]

S.E.2d at 94. While it emphasized that its conclusion should not be read
to condemn the officers “who reacted professionally and selflessly to a
potentially dangerous situation,” the Court of Appeals ultimately held
that the trial court erred by failing to exclude evidence concerning both
the initial 911 call and the dispatcher's reverse call from evidence, and
awarded defendant a new trial. Id. at ___, 786 S.E.2d at 94. This Court
allowed discretionary review.

We review a trial court’s decisions regarding a defendant’s allega-
tions of constitutional violations de novo. State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162,
168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution declares: “In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him... .” U.S. Const. amend VI. The Confrontation
Clause prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177,
194 (2004). The Confrontation Clause does not, however, apply to non-
testimonial statements. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420, 127 S.
Ct. 1178, 1183, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1, 13 (2007).

InDavis v. Washington the United States Supreme Court defined “non-
testimonial statements” and compared them to “testimonial statements”:

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emer-
gency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emer-
gency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.

547 U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237. The Court
described an ongoing emergency as “a call for help against a bona
fide physical threat” or “speaking about events as they were actually
happening, rather than ‘describ[ing] past events.’ ” Id. at 827, 126 S.
Ct. at 2276, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 240 (brackets in original) (quoting Lilly
v. Virginia, 527 US. 116, 187, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1900, 144 L, Ed. 2d 117,
135 (1999) (plurality opinion)). Statements made during a 911 call often
describe “current circumstances requiring police assistance” rather than

656 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. McKIVER
[369 N.C. 652 (2017)]

provide a narrative of past events. Id. at 827, 126 S. Ct. at 2276, 165 L.
Ed. 2d at 240.

Moreover, the existence of an ongoing emergency and its duration
“depend on the type and scope of danger posed to the victim, the police,
and the public.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 371, 131 S. Ct. 1143,
1162, 179 L. Ed. 2d 98, 115 (2011). For example, assessing whether an
emergency is ongoing, and is therefore a continuing threat to the pub-
lic and law enforcement, “may depend in part on the type of weapon
employed.” Jd. at 364, 131 S. Ct. at 1158, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 111 (reviewing
statements made by a victim, mortally wounded during a nondomestic
dispute in an exposed public location, that described and identified the
fleeing gunman who posed a prospective threat to the general public).

“In addition to the circumstances in which an encounter occurs, the
statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators provide
objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation,” taking
into account that law enforcement officers serve as both first respond-
ers and interrogators. Id. at 367, 181 S. Ct. at 1160, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 112.
Formal statements made in the course of police interrogation suggest.
the lack of such an emergency. Jd. at 366, 131 S. Ct. at 1160, 179 L. Ed.
2d at 112; accord Lewis, 361 N.C. at 548, 648 S.E.2d at 829 (concluding
that a victim’s formal statements to police in her home after the com-
mission of a crime and her photo identification of the defendant while
she was at the hospital were testimonial). “{C]ourts should look to all
of the relevant circumstances” and objectively evaluate “the statements
and actions of all participants,” including “the parties’ perception that
an emergency is ongoing.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 369-70, 131 S. Ct. at 1162,
179 L. Ed. 2d at 114-15.

Here the trial court properly determined that, based on the objective
circumstances surrounding the 911 calls, an ongoing emergency existed.
The primary purpose of the initial 911 call was to inform law enforce-
ment of current circumstances: a possible dispute involving an uniden-
tified man brandishing a firearm outside the caller’s home on a public
street in a residential subdivision. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S. Ct.
at 2276, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 240 (A “call for help” is nontestimonial.). The
caller reacted by going into her home and staying away from the win-
dow. Likewise, the officer retrieved his patrol rifle before entering the
scene. As is evident from the precautions taken by both the 911 caller
and the officers on the scene, they believed the unidentified suspect was
still roving the subdivision with a firearm, posing a continuing threat
to the public and law enforcement. See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 370-71, 131
S. Ct. at 1162, 179 L. Ed. 2d at 115 (“[T]he existence and duration of an

IN THE SUPREME COURT 657

STATE v. McKIVER
[869 N.C. 652 (2017)

emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed to the victim,
the police, and the public.”).

To properly address the continuing threat, Officer Bramley
requested that the dispatcher place a reverse call to ask for a more com-
plete description of the individual and, once received, he quickly relayed
that information to the other officers in an effort to locate and appre-
hend the suspect. Only after receiving this additional information from
the reverse call were the officers able to find the weapon and identify
the suspect. The 911 caller's description of the suspect's clothing and
approximate location gave law enforcement the information that they
needed to address an ongoing emergency. See State v. Hewson, 182 N.C.
App. 196, 206-07, 642 S.E.2d 459, 466-67 (concluding that the victim’s 911
call was nontestimonial because it “was not designed to establish a past
fact, but ‘to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance’ ”
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 126 S. Ct. at 2276, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 240)),
disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 572, 651 S.E.2d 229 (2007); see also United
States v. Johnson, 509 F. App’x 487, 488-89, 494 (6th Cir. 2012) (conclud-
ing that an anonymous 911 caller's statement that “a black male wearing
a blue t-shirt and dark-colored shorts” was carrying a gun and walking
southbound down the street described “an ongoing situation requir-
ing police assistance” and was therefore nontestimonial), cert. denied,
__ US. __, 133 S. Ct. 2361, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1083 (2013). As a result, the
anonymous 911 caller's statements here fit squarely within the defini-
tion of nontestimonial statements as defined in Davis v. Washington.
Therefore, the statements are admissible without implicating the
Confrontation Clause.

In sum, the circumstances surrounding the initial 911 call and the
dispatcher’s reverse call objectively indicate that the primary purpose of
the dispatcher’s questions and the caller’s responses was to enable law
enforcement to meet an ongoing emergency. As such, the statements
were nontestimonial and did not trigger Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause protection. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals on this issue and reinstate the trial court’s evidentiary ruling
and resulting judgment.

REVERSED.

658 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MILLER
[869 N.C. 658 (2017)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
AUSTIN LYNN MILLER,

No. 113PA16
Filed 9 June 2017

Drugs—newly enacted statute—unlawful to possess pseudo-
ephedrine if prior conviction for methamphetamine posses-
sion or manufacture—as-applied challenge—active conduct

Where defendant was convicted of violating a newly enacted
statute, N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c), which made it unlawful for any
person with a prior conviction for the possession or manufacture of
methamphetamine to possess a pseudoephedrine product, based on
his purchase of “Allergy Congestion Relief D-ER tabs,” the Supreme
Court held that his conviction did not violate his federal constitu-
tional right to due process of law. His as-applied challenge failed
because his conviction rested upon his own active conduct rather
than a “wholly passive” failure to act.

Justice MORGAN dissenting.
Justice BEASLEY joins in this dissenting opinion.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __, 783 S.E.2d 512
(2016), vacating a judgment entered on 5 February 2015 by Judge Eric C.
Morgan in Superior Court, Watauga County. Heard in the Supreme Court
on 14 February 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Jeffrey William Gillette for defendant-appellee.
ERVIN, Justice.

On 12 June 2013, the General Assembly enacted legislation that,
effective 1 December 2013, made it “unlawful for any person” to
“[p]ossess a pseudoephedrine product if the person has a prior convic-
tion for the possession or manufacture of methamphetamine,” with any
person convicted of this offense to “be punished as a Class H felon.” Act

IN THE SUPREME COURT 659

STATE v. MILLER
[369 N.C. 658 (2017)]

of June 12, 2013, ch. 124, secs. 1, 3, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 291, 291-93 (cod-
ified at N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c)).! Prior to the enactment of N.C.G.S.
§ 90-95(d1)(1)(©), any person aged eighteen or older was entitled to pur-
chase “at retail” up to “3.6 grams of any pseudoephedrine products[2|
per calendar day” and up to “9 grams of pseudoephedrine products
within any 30-day period,” N.C.G.S. § 90-113.53 (2015), as long as the
purchaser furnished appropriate photo identification and a current valid
residential address and signed a form attesting to the validity of his or
her personal information and other information that could be accessed
by law enforcement officers, see id. §§ 90 113.52 (2015), 113.53. The
‘ultimate issue presented for our consideration in this case is whether
N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c), as applied to defendant, worked a depriva-
tion of defendant's right to due process of law under the federal con-
stitution. After careful consideration of the record evidence in light of
the applicable legal principles, we conclude that defendant’s as-applied
challenge to the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) lacks
merit and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, State v. Miller,
__N.C. App. __, __, 783 S.E.2d 512, 523-24 (2016), to the contrary.

On 8 October 2012, Judge R. Stuart Albright entered a judgment in
Ashe County File Nos. 12 CrS 248, 11 CrS 50918, 11 CrS 50919, and 11
CrS 50920 sentencing defendant to a term of sixteen to twenty months
of imprisonment, with this sentence being suspended and with defen-
dant being placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six
months, based upon defendant’s convictions for possession of a meth-
amphetamine precursor with the intent to distribute (File No. 12 CrS
248), maintaining a vehicle or dwelling for the purpose of selling or
delivering a controlled substance (File No. 11 CrS 50918), possession
of methamphetamine (File No. 11 CrS 50919), and possession of drug
paraphernalia (File No. 11 CrS 50920). On 5 January 2014, defendant
purchased “Allergy Congestion Relief D-ER tabs,” which contained 3.6
grams of pseudoephedrine, from a Walmart pharmacy in Boone. On 7
January 2014, Detective John Hollar of the Watauga County Sheriff's
Office examined the National Precursor Log Exchange, which is an
electronic database administered by the National Association of Drug

1. The Governor approved the new statutory provision on 19 June 2013.

2. A “pseudoephedrine product” is “a product containing any detectable quantity
of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine base, their salts or isomers, or salts of their isomers.”
N.C.GS. § 90-113.51(a) (2015).

3. The statutory purchase limits do not apply “if the product is dispensed under a
valid prescription.” Id. § 90-118.53(a), (b).

660 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MILLER
[869 N.C. 658 (2017)]

Diversion Investigators that tracks pseudoephedrine purchases, N.C.G.S.
§ 90-113.52A (2015), and determined that defendant had made this pseu-
doephedrine purchase. In view of the fact that Detective Hollar knew
that defendant had previously been convicted of possessing metham-
phetamine, he obtained the issuance of a warrant for defendant's arrest.
On 4 August 2014, the Watauga County grand jury returned a bill of
indictment charging defendant with “possess[ing] an immediate precur-
sor chemical, pseudoephedrine, having a prior conviction for the pos-
session of methamphetamine, to wit: The defendant was convicted of
Possession of Methamphetamine in Ashe County, File Number 11 CRS
50919, on 1 October 2012.4

On 4 February 2015, defendant filed a motion in which he requested
the trial court to declare N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) unconstitutional on.
the grounds that punishing him for violating this newly enacted statu-
tory provision contravened his federal due process rights as enunciated
in Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1957). In support
of this contention, defendant argued that N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) had
criminalized the otherwise innocent act of possessing a pseudoephed-
rine product for a subset of felons to which defendant belonged despite
the fact that the purchase of such substances by individuals like defen-
dant had been entirely lawful little more than a month earlier and that
the State’s failure to provide adequate notice of this change in law con-
stituted a federal due process violation like that identified in Lambert.
In addition, defendant asserted that federal due process principles
required that a mens rea or scienter element be imported into N.C.G.S.
§ 90-95(d1)(1)(c) in light of Lambert; Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952); and Liparota v. United States, 471
US. 419, 85 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1985). For that reason, in the event that this
case proceeded to trial, defendant argued that the trial court would be
required to instruct the jury that, in order to return a verdict of guilty, the
jury would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had
the specific intent to violate the law consisting of proof that defendant
“had knowledge that it was illegal to purchase [a pseudoephedrine prod-
uct] because he had a meth{amphetamine] conviction.”

In response, the State argued that N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) resem-
bles N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[iJt

4, Although the dates associated with defendant's conviction for methamphetamine
possession set out in the indictment and delineated in the evidence differ, defendant did not
argue in the Court of Appeals that this divergence between allegation and proof constituted
a fatal variance entitling him to dismissal of the charge that had been lodged against him.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MILLER
[369 N.C. 658 (2017)]

shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony
to purchase, own, possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any
firearm or any weapon of mass death and destruction” and which has
repeatedly been upheld by North Carolina courts. N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1(a)
(2015). More specifically, the State asserted that N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)
(c), like N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1, merely requires an “intent to act”; that the
dangers posed by methamphetamine are similar to those posed by fire-
arms in the possession of felons; and that the similarities between these
two statutes demonstrate the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)
(1)(©). Additionally, the State asserted that defendant’s specific intent
argument amounted to a claim that “ignorance of the law should be an
excuse.” At the conclusion of the pretrial hearing, the trial court denied
defendant's motion to declare N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) unconstitu-
tional “without prejudice to later arguments at the charging conference
as to jury instructions.”

At the jury instruction conference held near the conclusion of defen-
dant’s trial, defendant reiterated his request that the trial court instruct
the jury concerning the necessity for a showing that he had acted

with specific intent to violate the law using the “instruction from the
LIiparota case which tracked an earlier federal pattern jury instruction.”

" Ultimately, the State and defendant agreed that the trial court would
instruct the jury utilizing N.C.PI. Crim. 120.10, which defines intent,
1 N.C.PI-Crim. 120.10 June 2012), and N.C.PI. Crim. 261.55, which:
defines the showing that the State was required to make in order to
convict defendant of the substantive offense with which he had been
charged, 3 N.C.P.1-Crim. 261.55 (June 2014). In light of that agreement,
the trial court instructed the jury that:

Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct
evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances
from which it may be inferred. You arrive at the intent
of a person by such just and reasonable deductions from
the circumstances proven as a reasonably prudent person
would ordinarily draw therefrom.

The defendant has been charged with the possession
of a pseudoephedrine product with a prior conviction of
the possession of methamphetamine. For you to find the
defendant guilty of this offense, the State must prove two
things beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defen-
dant possessed a pseudoephedrine product. And, second,
that the defendant has a prior conviction for the posses-
sion of methamphetamine.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. MILLER
[869 N.C. 658 (2017)]

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant possessed a pseudoephedrine
product and has a prior conviction for the possession of
methamphetamine, then it would be your duty to return
a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find, or have a reason-
able doubt as to one or more of these things, then it would
be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

At the conclusion of its deliberations, the jury returned a verdict convict-
ing defendant as charged. Based upon the jury’s verdict, the trial court
entered a judgment sentencing defendant to a term of six to seventeen
months of imprisonment, with this sentence having been suspended and
with defendant having been placed on supervised probation for a period
of twenty-four months. Defendant successfully sought review of the trial
cowt’s judgment by filing a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Miller, __ N.C. App. at __, 783
S.E.2d at 516.

In seeking relief from the trial court’s judgment before the Court of
Appeals, defendant argued that N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c), as applied
to him, violated his due process rights. In support of this contention,
defendant argued that, in instances, like this one, in which a state has
rendered otherwise innocent and lawful behavior subject to significant
criminal penalties, due process considerations require either that scien-
ter or mens rea be shown in order to prove guilt oy, in the alternative,
that the State establish that defendant had fair warning that a previously
lawful act was now subject to the criminal sanction. Defendant claimed
that he reasonably believed that he had the right to lawfully purchase
pseudoephedrine products on 5 January 2014, that he reasonably lacked
any knowledge that the law had changed effective 1 December 2013, that
he did not intend to violate the law by purchasing an allergy medication,
and that punishing him as a felon for purchasing a product containing
pseudoephedrine under such circumstances was fundamentally unfair.
For that reason, defendant asserted that guilt of the offense made pun-
ishable by N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) should require proof that defen-
dant knew that his actions were unlawful or, in the absence of such a
scienter or mens rea requirement, that the State’s failure to notify him
and other similarly situated individuals that they were prohibited from.
purchasing products containing pseudoephedrine as a precondition for
subjecting them to the criminal sanction for acting in that manner ren-
dered the relevant statutory provision unconstitutional.

In response, the State argued that, since N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c)
does not fall within the narrow category of crimes for which knowledge

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that the prohibited conduct is unlawful is required, defendant's igno-
rance of the prohibited nature of his conduct does not preclude a find-
ing of criminal liability. In the State’s view, N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c)
is a straightforward: and easily understood statutory provision rather
than a “highly technical” tax or currency statute of the sort that requires
proof that the defendant knew that his or her conduct was unlawful,
citing Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194-95, 141 L. Ed. 2d 197,
207 (1998). Moreover, the State argued that the exception to the general
rule that proof that the defendant knew of the unlawfulness of his or
her conduct is not required in order to establish the defendant's guilt set
out in Lambert only applies in the event that the challenged statutory
provision criminalizes “wholly passive” conduct and that defendant's
decision to purchase pseudoephedrine cannot be characterized in that
manner. Although proof of defendant's guilt in this case does require a
showing that defendant knew that he had a prior methamphetamine pos-
session conviction and that the substance that he possessed contained
pseudoephedrine, the relevant statutory provision cannot be reasonably
construed to require proof that defendant knew that it was unlawful for
him to possess pseudoephedrine as a precondition for a finding of guilt.

The Court of Appeals began its discussion of defendant's challenges
to the trial court’s judgment by noting that the extent, if any, to which the
General Assembly intended to include a specific intent or scienter ele-
ment in N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) depends upon the manner in which
the relevant statutory language should be construed. Miller, ___ N.C.
App. at___, 783 S.E.2d at 516. Given that N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) fails
to explicitly provide for a specific intent or mens rea element and that
the General Assembly has included such language in defining the other
offenses listed under N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d)), id. at ___, 783 S.E.2d at 516-
17 (discussing N.C.G.S. §§ 90-95(d1)(1)(a)-(b) and 90-95(d1)(2)(a)-(b)),
the Court of Appeals concluded that the General Assembly had “‘ inten-
tionally and purposely’ ” excluded “an intent element” from N.C.G.S.
§ 90-95(d1)(1)(C), id. at__, 783 S.E.2d at 517 (quoting State v. Watterson,
198 N.C. App. 500, 506, 679 S.E.2d 897, 900 (2009) (quoting N.C. Dep't of

5. The exact nature of defendant's statutory construction challenge to the trial
court's judgment is not entirely clear. Although defendant could have advanced this con-
tention in support of an argument that the trial court had erred by failing to dismiss the
charge that had been lodged against him for insufficiency of the evidence, an argument
that the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury concerning the applicable law, or
an argument that N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) could only be upheld against a constitutional
challenge in the event that the relevant statutory provision was construed so as to include
such a scienter or mens rea requirement, defendant did not clearly make any one of these
three arguments.

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[869 N.C. 658 (2017)}

Revenue v. Hudson, 196 N.C. App. 765, 768, 675 S.E.2d 709, 711 (2009))).
Although “any possession of a controlled substance offense contains
an implied knowledge element, to wit, that the defendant must know
he possesses the controlled substance and must also know the iden-
tity of the substance,” id. at ____ n.3, 783 S.E.2d at 517 n.3 (citing State
v. Galaviz-Torres, 368 N.C. 44, 52, 772 S.E.2d 434, 439 (2015) (discussing
State v. Coleman, 227 N.C. App. 354, 742 S.E.2d 346, disc. rev. denied,
367 N.C. 271, 752 S.E.2d 466 (2013))), the Court of Appeals concluded
that the General Assembly intended for N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) “to be
exactly what its plain language indicates: a strict liability offense with-
out any element of intent,” id. at ___, 783 S.E.2d at 517.

After rejecting defendant’s contention that N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)
(c) should be construed to require proof that defendant knew that he
was not entitled to purchase products containing pseudoephedrine, the
Court of Appeals addressed defendant's as-applied challenge to the con-
stitutionality of that statutory provision. Id. at___, 783 S.E.2d at 517-23.
Despite its recognition “that methamphetamine manufacture and use is
asignificant law enforcement and public health problem which demands
serious criminal penalties,” id. at___, 783 S.E.2d at 519-20, the Court of
Appeals concluded that, “in light of... Lambert and Liparota,” N.C.G.S.
§ 90-95(d1)(1)(c) “is unconstitutional as applied to [defendant],” id. at
__,, 783 S.E.2d at 520, given that “[p]ossession of pseudoephedrine prod-
ucts is an innocuous and entirely legal act for the majority of people in
our State, including most convicted felons,” id. at __, 783 S.E.2d at 520,
and that “possessing allergy medications containing pseudoephedrine,”
unlike the possession of “illegal drugs,” “hand grenades,” or “dangerous
acids,” “is an act that citizens, including convicted felons, would reason-
ably assume to be legal,” id. at ____, 783 S.E.2d at 520 (citing Liparota,
471 U.S. at 426, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 440). Prior to the enactment of N.C.G.S.
§ 90-95(d1)(1)(c), the statutory provisions regulating the purchase of
products containing pseudoephedrine required the provision of notice
of the lawfulness of particular purchases at the point of sale, id. at__,
783 S.E.2d at 520; however, violations of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) can
occur without the provision of any such point of sale notice even though
such purchases would be lawful “for most people, including the vast
majority of convicted felons,” id. at___, 783 S.E.2d at 520. “Simply put,”
the Court of Appeals reasoned, “there were no ‘circumstances which
might move one to inquire as to’ a significant change in the [Controlled
Substances Act’s] requirements nor any notice to [defendant] that the
new [provision] had transformed an innocent act previously legal for
him into a felony.” Id. at ___, 783 S.E.2d at 520 (quoting Lambert, 355
US. at 229, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 232). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of

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Appeals found the decision in Wolf v. State of Oklahoma, 2012 OK CR
16, 292 P.3d 512 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 186
L. Ed. 2d 877 (2013), to be highly persuasive, Miller, __ N.C. App. at___,
783 S.E.2d at 520-21, concluding, in reliance upon Wolf, that

[tlaken together, Lambert and Liparota suggest that,
while a legislature may criminalize conduct in itself, with
no intent requirement, the legislature must make some
provision to inform a person that the conduct, as applied
to her, is criminal. This is particularly important where
the conduct in question is otherwise legal. This is pre-
cisely the circumstance here: some convicted felons are
prohibited from purchasing pseudoephedrine, while oth-
ers, along with the general population, are not.

Id. at __, 783 S.E.2d at 521 (alteration in original) (quoting Wolf, 2012
OK CR at ¥ 10, 292 P.3d at 516). As a result, the Court of Appeals held
that N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) is unconstitutional “as applied to a defen-
dant in the absence of notice to the subset of convicted felons whose
otherwise lawful conduct is criminalized thereby or proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt by the State that a particular defendant was aware that
his possession of a pseudoephedrine product was prohibited by law,”
id. at__, 783 S.E.2d at 521, and that defendant’s conviction for violat-
ing N.C.G.S. § 95-90(d1)(1)(c) should, for that reason, be vacated, id. at
___, 783 S.E.2d at 523-24. On 9 June 2016, we allowed the State’s petition
for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision that N.C.G.S.
§ 90-95(d1)(1)(c) is unconstitutional as applied to defendant on notice-
related grounds.

In seeking relief from the decision of the court below before this
Court, the State argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded the well-
established legal principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse by
misapplying the Lambert exception and misconstruing decisions such
as Liparota in order to limit the otherwise applicable maxim that mem-
bers of the public have notice of the applicable law to situations in
which a reasonable person would know the content of the law. In the
State’s view, this case is controlled by Lambert and this Court’s deci-
sion in State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 614 S.E.2d 479 (2005), in which we
described Lambert as creating “a narrow exception to the general rule”
to the effect that citizens are presumed to know the law applicable in
situations when the allegedly unlawful conduct is “ ‘wholly passive.’ ”
Id. at 566, 614 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 2 L. Ed.
2d at 231). In order to take advantage of this exception, the defendant
must establish that the statutory provision in question criminalizes a

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STATE v. MILLER
[369 N.C, 658 (2017)]

failure to act, such as the failure to register as a felon at issue in Lambert
and the failure to register as a sex offender at issue in Bryant. In the
State’s view, defendant was not prosecuted for a failure to act. On
the contrary, N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) proscribes an affirmative act,
which is the intentional possession of a prohibited substance. As defen-
dant conceded before the trial court, his conduct was “not an absence to
act like there is in Lambert.” In the event that a defendant fails to estab-
lish that his behavior is “wholly passive,” whether because the relevant
conduct does not involve a failure to act, as is the situation in this case,
or because the defendant's failure to act occurred under circumstances
that would lead a reasonable person to inquire as to his or her legal duties,
as was the case with the defendant’s duty to register as a sex offender in
North Carolina at issue in Bryant, the maxim that ignorance of the law
provides no excuse and that all citizens are presumed to know the law
remains applicable. Instead of correctly applying the narrow Lambert
exception in accordance with this Court’s decision in Bryant, the Court
of Appeals created an inappropriate notice requirement resting upon a
failure to distinguish between an affirmative action and purely passive
conduct and conflating the analysis set out in Lambert with the analysis
utilized in statutory construction cases such as Liparota.

In response, defendant contends that the proper resolution of the
critical question concerning whether an act is “wholly passive” for pur-
poses of Lambert and Bryant hinges upon whether the surrounding
circumstances would put a reasonable person on notice that he or she
should have inquired as to whether there had been a change in law rather
than upon whether the underlying conduct should be deemed active or
passive. Defendant argues that Lambert and Bryant rest upon a distinc-
tion between “active and passive notice, that is, the presence or absence
of ‘circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his
deed,’ ” rather than upon a distinction between acts of commission and
acts of omission. According to defendant, his conduct should be deemed
“wholly passive” given the absence of “circumstances that would [have]
move[d] him to inquire if the General Assembly had recently criminal-
ized his otherwise innocuous conduct.” Moreover, even if a defendant's
underlying conduct is a component of the relevant constitutional analysis,
possession, as compared to the purchase, of a substance is a passive act.

In the alternative, defendant contends that, even if we “decline[ ]
to adopt the analysis of the Court of Appeals,” we should still affirm
the result that it reached on the grounds “that an element of scienter
must be read into [N.C.G.S.] § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) to comport with tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and the State failed

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to present evidence from which a jury could infer such an element.”
According to defendant, the Court of Appeals should have held that
proof of defendant’s “awareness that a reasonable person in his shoes
would have[ known] that the purchase of pseudoephedrine was an
illegal act” constituted an essential element of the offense created by
N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c). In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals overlooked the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
read a similar requirement into various criminal statutes for the purpose
of ensuring the constitutionality of the challenged statute regardless of
any evidence concerning actual Congressional intent.

As this Court indicated in Bryant, the Lambert exception to the gen-
eral rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse is “decidedly narrow.”
859 N.C. at 568, 614 S.E.2d at 488.6 After carefully reviewing the record,
we conclude that the Lambert exception does not operate to protect.
defendant from criminal liability given the facts contained in the pres-
ent record. Moreover, defendant's alternative argument to the effect that,
guilt of the offense defined in N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) requires proof
that the defendant knew of the illegality of his conduct is not properly
before us. Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mis-
take of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply
rooted in the American legal system. Based on the notion
that the law is definite and knowable, the common law
presumed that every person knew the law. This common-
Jaw rule has been applied by the Court in numerous cases
construing criminal statutes.

Bryant, 359 N.C. at 566, 614 S.E.2d at 487 (citations omitted) (quoting
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 112 L. Ed. 2d 617, 628 (1991)).
In Lambert, the United States Supreme Court sustained an as-applied
challenge to a municipal ordinance making it unlawful for any individual
who had been convicted of an offense that was a California felony or
would have been a felony if committed in California to remain in Los
Angeles for more than five days without registering with the Chief of
Police. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 226-27, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 230-31. After noting

6. Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, “application [of
Lambert] has been limited, lending some credence to Justice Frankfurter’s colorful predic-
tion in dissent that the case would stand as ‘an isolated deviation from the strong current
of precedents—a derelict on the waters of the law.’ ” Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 US. 516,
587 n.33, 70 L. Ed. 2d 738, 756 n.33 (1982) (quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232, 2 L. Ed. 2d at
238 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

668 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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that the defendant, unlike defendant in this case, had presented proof
that she “had no actual knowledge of the [registration] requirement”
and that the relevant ordinance did not require proof of “willfulness,” id.
at 227, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 231, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
relevant issue before it was “whether a registration act of this character
violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no actual
knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the
probability of such knowledge,” id. at 227, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 231. Recognizing
that, as a general proposition, lawmakers have wide latitude in defin-
ing the scope and extent of prohibited conduct, the Court pointed out
that the defendant's “conduct [was] wholly passive—mere failure to reg-
ister” and did not constitute “the commission of acts, or the failure to
act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences
of his deed.” Jd. at 228, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 231 (citations omitted). Although
the Court acknowledged the rule that “ignorance of the law will not
excuse,” id. at 228, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 231 (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co.
v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68, 54 L. Ed. 930, 935 (1910)), and that the
police power is “one of the least limitable” powers of government, id. at
228, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 231 (quoting District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S.
138, 149, 53 L. Ed. 941, 945 (1909)), the Court pointed out that due pro-
cess conditions the exercise of governmental authority upon the exis-
tence of proper notice “where a person, wholly passive and unaware of
any criminal wrongdoing, is brought to the bar of justice for condemna-
tion in a criminal case,” id. at 228, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 231. In view of the fact
that the ordinance at issue in Lambert did not condition a finding of guilt
upon “any activity” whatsoever, id. at 229, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 232, and the fact
that there were no surrounding “circumstances which might move one
to inquire as to the necessity of registration,” id. at 229, 2 L. Ed. 2d at
232, “actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability
of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply [were] necessary
before a conviction under the ordinance [could] stand” consistently with
due process guarantees, id. at 229, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 232.

The statutory provision at issue in Bryant required individuals
convicted of certain sexual offenses in other states to register as a sex
offender with the relevant North Carolina sheriff's office within ten days
after establishing residence in North Carolina or within fifteen days after
the individual in question had entered North Carolina, whichever came
first, with any person failing to comply with these requirements to be
subject to criminal penalties. 359 N.C. at 561-63, 614 S.E.2d at 483-85. In
that case, a person who had been convicted of committing an offense
requiring registration in South Carolina and had been charged with
violating the statutory provision in question challenged the provision’s

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STATE v. MILLER
[369 N.C. 658 (2017)]

constitutionality as applied to him given the absence of any requirement
that the State “prove actual or probable notice of his duty to register
to satisfy the due process notice requirement of Lambert.” Id. at 565,
614 S.E.2d at 486. In rejecting the defendant’s argument, this Court
stated that

to be entitled to relief under the decidedly narrow Lambert
exception, a defendant must establish that his conduct
was “wholly passive” such that “circumstances which
might move one to inquire as to the necessity of regis-
tration are completely lacking” and that [the] defendant
was ignorant of his duty to register and there was no rea-
sonable probability that [the] defendant knew his conduct
was illegal.

Id. at, 568, 614 S.E.2d at 488 (quoting Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228-29, 2.L. Ed.
2d at 231-32 (emphasis added)). Defendant's assertion to the contrary
notwithstanding, this Court never indicated in Bryant that the distinc-
tion between active and passive conduct set out in Lambert revolves
around the nature and extent of the notice with which the defendant had
been provided rather than upon the nature and extent of the underly-
ing conduct that led to the imposition of the criminal sanction. Instead,
this Court simply assumed that the defendant’s conduct amounted to a
failure to act and proceeded to examine the extent to which his failure
to comply with North Carolina’s sex offender registration requirements
had occurred under circumstances suggesting that he should have reg-
istered upon moving from South Carolina to North Carolina. Id. at 566-
68, 614 S.E.2d at 486-88. After making no suggestion that the defendant
had actual notice of the necessity that he register as a sex offender in
North Carolina after moving to this state and after concluding that the
defendant's case was “rich with circumstances that would move the rea-
sonable individual to inquire of his duty to register in North Carolina
such that [the] defendant’s conduct was not wholly passive and Lambert
[was] not controlling,” id. at 568, 614 S.E.2d at 488, this Court held that
the defendant’s case did “not fall within the narrow Lambert exception
to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,” id. at 569, 614
S.E.2d at 488.

Thus, because “[g]enerally[,] a legislature need do noth-
ing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the
citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself
_ With its terms and to comply,” Texaco, [Inc. v. Short,] 454
U.S. [516,] 532, 70 L. Ed. 2d [738,] 752[ (1982), this Court

670 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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remained] bound by the rule that “[a]ll citizens are pre-
sumptively charged with knowledge of the law.” Atkins
v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130, 86 L. Ed. 2d 81, 93 (1985); see
also N. Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283,
69 L. Ed. 953, 957 (1925) (“All persons are charged with
knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take
note of the procedure adopted by them.”).

Id. at 569, 614 S.E.2d at 488-89 (first and seventh alterations in original).
As aresult, Bryant establishes that, in the event that a defendant's con-
duct is not “wholly passive,” because it arises from either the commis-
sion of an act or a failure to act under circumstances that reasonably
should alert the defendant to the likelihood that inaction would subject
him or her to criminal liability, Lambert simply does not apply.

A defendant commits the offense delineated in N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)
(1)(c) in the event that he or she has “the power and intent to control
[the] disposition or use” of the substance that the defendant is charged
with possessing, State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 12, 187 S.E.2d 706, 714
(1972), with knowledge of the identity of the substance that the defen-
dant is alleged to have possessed, Galaviz—-Torres, 368 N.C. at 49, 772
S.E.2d at 437 (citation omitted). The undisputed evidence contained in
the present record tends to show that defendant actively procured the
pseudoephedrine product that he was convicted of possessing over a
month after it had become unlawful for him to do so and almost six
months after the enactment of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c). Moreover,
defendant has not argued in either this Court or the lower courts that he
was ignorant of the fact that he possessed a pseudoephedrine product or
that he had previously been convicted of methamphetamine possession.
As defendant himself acknowledged, his conduct differs from the failure
to register at issue in Lambert and Bryant. Since defendant's conviction.
rests upon his own active conduct rather than a “wholly passive” failure
to act, there is no need for us to determine whether the surrounding
circumstances should have put defendant on notice that he needed to
make inquiry into his ability to lawfully purchase products containing
pseudoephedrine. As a result, defendant's as-applied challenge to the
constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) necessarily fails.

Liparota and other similar decisions, whether considered in con-
junction with or in addition to Lambert, do not call for a different result.
In Liparota, the United States Supreme Court considered what “mental
state, if any, that the Government” needed to show, 471 U.S. at 423, 85
L., Ed. 2d at 438, in order to establish that the defendant had violated a
federal statute making it a crime to “knowingly” use, transfer, acquire,

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alter, or possess food stamps “ ‘in any manner not authorized by [the
statute] or the regulations,’ ” id. at 423, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 438 (alteration in
original) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1977), with the specific issue
before the Court in that case being whether the term “knowingly” should
be construed so as to require the Government to prove that the defen-
dant was aware that he was acting in a manner not authorized by the
applicable law, id. at 420-21, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 487. As a result, Liparota,
like a number of the other decisions upon which defendant relies,” is a
statutory construction case rather than one, like Lambert, in which the
constitutionality of a statute was at issue. While these cases are arguably
pertinent to defendant’s statutory construction argument, they have no
bearing on the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) in the face
of defendant's Lambert-based challenge. However, since neither defen-
dant nor the State sought review of the Court of Appeals’ determination
that the offense defined in N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) does not include
any sort of scienter or specific intent requirement over and above the
knowledge requirement necessary for guilt of any possession-based
offense by either noting an appeal or filing a discretionary review peti-
tion, defendant's statutory construction argument is not properly before
us. See N.C. R. App. P. 16(a) (stating that “[r]eview by the Supreme Court
after a determination by the Court of Appeals, whether by appeal of
right or by discretionary review, is to determine whether there is error
of law in the decision of the Court of Appeals” and that, “[e]xcept when
the appeal is based solely upon the existence of a dissent in the Court
of Appeals, review in the Supreme Court is limited to consideration of
the issues stated in the notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 14(b)(2)
or the petition for discretionary review and the response thereto filed

7. For example, see Elonis v. United States, __US.__, _, __, 192 L. Bd. 24
1, 8, 17 (2015) (interpreting a federal statute making “it a crime to transmit in interstate
commerce ‘any communication containing any threat... . to injure the person of another’ ”
as requiring proof that the defendant intended to issue threats or knew that his com-
munications would be viewed as threats (ellipsis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
1994))); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68, 78, 130 L. Ed. 24 372, 378,
385 (1994) (interpreting a federal statute prohibiting persons from “knowingly” transport-
ing, shipping, receiving, distributing, or reproducing a visual depiction, if such depiction
“ nvolves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, ” to require proof
that the defendant knew of the sexually explicit nature of the material and the age of the
individuals depicted in the video (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A), -(a)(2)(A) (1988 ed.
and Supp. V))); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248, 271, 96 L. Bd. at 292, 304 (interpreting a fed-
eral statute providing that “ ‘whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts’ ”
property of the federal government shall be fined and imprisoned to require that the defen-
dant have “knowledge of the facts, though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a
conversion” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1948))).

672 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[369 N.C. 658 (2017)]

pursuant to Rule 15(c) and (d), unless further limited by the Supreme
Court, and properly presented in the new briefs required by Rules 14(d)
(1) and 15(g)(2) to be filed in the Supreme Court”); see also Estate of
Fennell v. Stephenson, 354 N.C. 327, 331-32, 554 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2001)
(stating that “this Court’s review of the Court of Appeals decision is lim-
ited to the issues raised by [the] defendants’ petition for discretionary
review” because the plaintiffs had failed to file their own discretionary
review petition or a conditional discretionary review petition). As a
result, given that defendant has failed to establish that his conduct in
possessing pseudoephedrine was “wholly passive,” Bryant, 359 N.C. at
568, 614 S.E.2d at 488, we hold that defendant's conviction for violat-
ing N.C.G.S. § 95-90(d1)(1)(c) did not result in a violation of his federal
constitutional right to due process of law and, accordingly, reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

REVERSED.
Justice MORGAN dissenting.

While I agree with my learned colleagues in the majority that
the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the applicability of Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 85 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1985) is
misplaced, nonetheless I embrace the lower court's view that the nar-
row exception to the time-honored adage “ignorance of the law will not
excuse” as articulated in Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct.
240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1957) is applicable in the instant case regarding the
properness of notice and due process. In addition, I consider the major-
ity’s interpretation of the phrase “wholly passive” as originally coined in
Lambert and applied by this Court in State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 614
S.E.2d 479 (2004), superseded by statute, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 247,
on other grounds as recognized in State v. Moore, 240 N.C. App. 465,
478, 770 S.E.2d 131, 141, disc. review denied, 368 N.C. 353, 776 S.E.2d.
854 (2015) to be rigidly restrictive, particularly in light of this Court's
own construction of this phrase in Bryant, and therefore I dissent.

In Lambert, a criminal defendant was found guilty of violating a reg-
istration provision of Los Angeles, California's Municipal Code because,
as a person who had been “convicted of an offense punishable as a
felony in the State of California,” she “remain[ed] in Los Angeles for a
period of more than five days without registering” with the city’s Chief
of Police. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 226, 78 S. Ct. at 241-42, 2 L. Ed. 2d at
280. As a resident of Los Angeles for over seven years at the time of
her arrest on suspicion of another offense, the defendant argued that

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her due process rights under the United States Constitution were vio-
lated with regard to the application of the city’s registration law to her,
because she had no actual knowledge of the requirement to register pur-
suant to the Los Angeles Municipal Code. Id. at 226, 78 S. Ct. at 241-42,
2.L. Ed. 2d at 230-31. In framing the legal issue in this case as a ques-
tion of “whether a registration act of this character violates due process
where it is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty
to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such
knowledge,” the nation’s highest court held that the Code’s registration
provision as applied to the defendant violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 227, 229-30, 78 S. Ct. at 242-44, 2 L.
Ed. 2d at 231-32.

Defendant in the case sub judice cited the Lambert case as per-
suasive authority to support his position addressed by this dissent
that his federal due process rights were violated by the application of
the statute at issue to him because of his lack of proper notice of then
newly-enacted N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c), which had taken effect barely
a month before defendant's proscribed pseudoephedrine purchase.
Pursuant to the statute, his possession of such a substance was illegal in
light of his prior methamphetamine convictions. Regarding the applica-
tion of constitutional due process principles to the operation of statutes
that create an imposition upon individuals convicted of a certain class of
offenses that does not exist for the general population, I find the defen-
dant in Lambert and the current defendant to be similarly situated. In
Lambert, the defendant was required by law to register as a convicted
felon if her stay in the city exceeded five days, which was not a registra-
tion requirement imposed on others; here, defendant was required by
law to refrain from possessing pseudoephedrine as a person convicted
of methamphetamine offenses, which was not a possession restriction
imposed on others.

also find that the defendant in the case at bar is similarly situated
to the Lambert defendant in the resolution of the legal issue in Lambert
which was ideally identified by the United States Supreme Court. The
high court found, in applying its due process analysis to the dual com-
ponents of the framed issue in Lambert, that the Los Angeles Municipal
Code registration provision violated that defendant’s due process rights
because she had no knowledge of the duty to register and there was no
showing made by the prosecution as to the probability of such know]-
edge by the defendant. Id. at 227-28, 78 S. Ct. at 242-43, 2 L. Ed. 2d at
231. While citing the phrase “ignorance of the law will not excuse,” the
United States Supreme Court conversely recognized that the exercise of

674 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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this legal axiom is limited by due process considerations. Id. at 228, 78 S.
Ct. at 248, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 231. The Court went on to explain:

Engrained in our concept of due process is the require-
ment of notice. Notice is sometimes essential so that
the citizen has the chance to defend charges. Notice is
required before property interests are disturbed, before
assessments are made, before penalties are assessed.
Notice is required in a myriad of situations where a for-
feiture might be suffered for mere failure to act. Recent
cases illustrat[e] th[is] point . . . . These cases involved
only property interests in civil litigation. But the principle
is equally appropriate where a person, wholly passive and
unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar of jus-
tice for condemnation in a criminal case.

Id. (citations omitted).

I find these observations to be pertinent and applicable to the pres-
ent case, just as the United States Supreme Court articulated them as
insightful direction in Lambert. While ignorance of the law typically
will not excuse one from criminal culpability, the operation of this rou-
tine legal paradigm must take a proverbial backseat when one’s con-
stitutional due process rights, undergirded by the concept of notice,
are otherwise sacrificed. In the instant case, as in Lambert, the defen-
dant has claimed that he had no knowledge of the law at issue when
he purchased pseudoephedrine on 5 January 2014 and was therefore
in unlawful possession of the medication which otherwise would have
been in his lanyful possession if the purchase had been made prior to the
1 December 2018 change in the law which did not apply to the general
population, nor even all convicted felons, but rather only to a particular
subset of convicted felons. Also in the present case, like Lambert, there
has been no showing made of the probability that defendant knew of
this change in the law which rendered illegal for him such activity that
was legal for him a mere 36 days prior to his arrest. The majority's fer-
vent embrace of the maxim that ignorance of the law provides no excuse
supplies an untenable compromise of defendant’s due process rights.
Indeed, the well-established existence of a law and one’s ignorance of
it is markedly different from the newly-created existence of a law and
one’s unawareness of it, especially when it is a change in the law to
make what was recently lawful suddenly unlawful and when it does not
apply to everyone.

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In my opinion, just as the majority fails to employ an appropriate
application of the Lambert principle regarding due process wherein
ignorance of the law by a criminal defendant is indisputable, the major
ity’s unfortunate position is exacerbated by its strained literal interpre-
tation of the phrase “wholly passive” in Lambert. The United States
Supreme Court christened the term in Lambert to describe the lack of
affirmative conduct by the defendant in that case—the failure to regis-
ter one’s presence—and to fit it into the framework of an individual’s
right to due process through the requirement of notice. The majority
has focused so intently upon the “wholly passive” description of the
Lambert defendant's proscribed conduct of failure to register that it is
unable to clearly view the fullness of the relationship between due pro-
cess and the required notice concerning the violation of criminal law. .

The majority's position is faulty regarding its literal application of
the phrase “wholly passive” on two fronts. Firstly, the United States
Supreme Court in Lambert used the defendant’s “wholly passive” failure
to register as an example of the broad need to correctly balance con-
stitutional due process with the “ignorarice of the law will not excuse”
axiom. The Court, in its discussion of the concept of due process
through the requirement of notice in Lambert, spoke in sweeping terms
about the importance of these legal tenets, without mentioning whether
or not the illegal conduct involved was an offense of commission of an
act or an offense of an omission to act. The high court thereupon applied.
its global look at these principles to the defendant's circumstances in
Lambert, described her Municipal Code violation of failure to register
as behavior which was “wholly passive,” continued its analysis that this
failure to register abrogated the breadth and depth of the integration
of due process and notice, and ultimately determined that the applica-
tion of the challenged registration law to the defendant's “wholly pas-
sive” failure to register was unconstitutional. In the case sub judice,
the majority’s occupation by the “wholly passive” categorization of the
Lambert defendant's criminal act of omission has prevented it from fully
grasping the wider requirement to apply constitutional due process and
notice requirements so as to protect defendant’s identical rights in the
current case.

Secondly, this Court utilized the “wholly passive” language in
Lambert to both discuss and decide our decision in Bryant. The major-
ity in the instant case heavily relies upon Bryant, a criminal action
in which a defendant, who was a convicted sex offender in the state
of South Carolina, was notified by the South Carolina Department of
Corrections prison officials of his lifelong requirement to register with

676 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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[869 N.C. 658 (2017)]

that state due to his sex offender status. Id. at 556, 614 S.E.2d at 480.
Although the defendant was notified of this duty in verbal and written
form, he failed to “provide written notice to the county sheriff where
s/he was last registered in South Carolina within 10 days of the change
of address to a new state,” when the defendant moved out of the state of
South Carolina and relocated in North Carolina. Id. at 556-57, 614 S.E.2d
at 481 (emphasis omitted). The defendant likewise was deficient in his
compliance with his South Carolina sex offender requirement that he
“must send written notice of change of address to the county Sheriff's
Office in the new county and the county where s/he previously resided
within 10 days of moving to a new residence.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
Although the defendant moved to Winston-Salem, North Carolina and
thereby established a residence in Forsyth County, nonetheless he failed
to register upon establishing residency in North Carolina and did not
notify the appropriate authorities in South Carolina of his out-of-state
move. Id. at 557-58, 614 S.E.2d at 481-82. The defendant was convicted in
this state of failing to register as a sex offender and attaining the status
of habitual felon. Id. at 558, 614 S.E.2d at 482. On appeal, the defendant
argued that North Carolina’s sex offender registration statute was uncon-
stitutional as applied to an out-of-state offender who lacked notice of his
duty to register upon moving to North Carolina. Id. at 558, 614 S.E.2d at
482. The defendant relied almost exclusively upon Lambert in arguing
his position on appeal to this Court. Id. at 564, 614 S.E.2d at 485. We
found in Bryant that the defendant was not entitled to the application
of Lambert. Id. at 568-69, 614 S.E.2d at 487-88. In this Court's decision,
we explained:

We find this case rich with circumstances that would
move the reasonable individual to inquire of his duty to
régister in North Carolina such that defendant's conduct
was not wholly passive and Lambert is not controlling.
First, defendant had actual notice of his lifelong duty to
register with the State of South Carolina as a convicted
sex offender. Second, defendant had actual notice that he
must register as a convicted sex offender in South Carolina
for “similar offenses from other jurisdictions” and had a
duty to inform South Carolina officials of a move out of
state “within 10 days of the change of address to a new
state,” which defendant failed to do. Third, defendant
himself informed law enforcement authorities that he had
been convicted of a sex offense in Florida. These circum-
stances coupled with the pervasiveness of sex offender
registration programs certainly constitute circumstances

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[869 N.C. 658 (2017)]

which would lead the reasonable individual to inquire of
a duty to register in any state upon relocation.

Id. at 568, 614 S.E.2d at 488 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
This explanation extracts pivotal terminology from the instructional
language employed by the nation’s Supreme Court in Lambert when
it established the mandatory standard, which we expressly cited in
Bryant, which I find to be the guiding rationale for adaptation in the
present case and which I determine that the defendant has satisfied:

Therefore, to be entitled to relief under the decidedly
narrow Lambert exception, a defendant must establish
that his conduct was “wholly passive” such that
“circumstances which might move one to inquire as to
the necessity of registration are completely lacking” and
that defendant was ignorant of his duty to register and
there was no reasonable probability that defendant knew
his conduct was illegal. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228-29, 78 S.
Ct. 243-44, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 231-32) (emphasis added).

Id. at 568, 614 S.E.2d at 488. This Court’s additional emphasis indicates
that it defined the crucial phrase “wholly passive” as turning on whether
the attendant circumstances could reasonably be seen as providing notice.

With the majority’s determination that Bryant is controlling author-
ity in the case at bar, it compounds the problematic analysis that it origi-
nally employs in the majority's erroneous premise that the requirement
of a “wholly passive” act automatically disqualifies the current defendant
from constitutional due process and intrinsic notice requirements where
ignorance of the law is an existing circumstance. This compounded mis-
direction is further accentuated by the recitation of the aspects that
are present in Bryant which clearly distinguish it from the case sub
Judice. While there are a litany of facts and circumstances occurring
in Bryant that render the narrow Lambert exception as inapposite to
the Bryant defendant, as this Court correctly decided, no such charac-
teristics arise here. Indeed, the defendant in the instant case is deemed
not to have had actual notice about the change in the law or the change
in his status under the new law governing his ability to legally possess
pseudoephedrine. Nor did the defendant here inform law enforcement
authorities about any matters that would demonstrate his awareness
about the change in the law or the change in his status under the new
Jaw. In summarizing the above delineation of factors quoted in Bryant
and applying them to the present case, there are no circumstances here
which would lead the reasonable individual to know, or even inquire

678 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ROMANO
[369 N.C. 678 (2017)]

about, a duty to refrain from the possession of pseudoephedrine due
to a recent change in the law which tumed defendant's heretofore legal
possession of the substance into a criminal offense.

Since I would find N.C.G.S. § 90-95(d1)(1)(c) unconstitutional as
applied to defendant under these facts and circumstances, consistent,
with my interpretation of Lambert, and the critical distinguishing fea-
tures of Bryant, I respectfully dissent.

Justice BEASLEY joins in this dissenting opinion.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
JOSEPH MARIO ROMANO

No. 199PA16
Filed 9 June 2017

1. Search and Seizure—driving while impaired—blood
draw—unconscious
In a prosecution for impaired driving, the trial court correctly
suppressed blood test results taken from a highly inebriated
defendant at a hospital without a warrant. The officer did not
attempt to obtain a warrant for defendant's blood, did not believe
any exigency existed, and instead expressly relied upon the statutory
authorization set forth in N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b), allowing the taking
and testing of blood from a person who has committed a driving
while impaired offense if the person is unconscious or otherwise
incapable of refusal. However, unlike breath tests, blood tests
require an intrusive piercing of the skin and give law enforcement
a sample that can be preserved and from which more than a blood
alcohol reading can be determined. The United States Supreme
Court has concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not permit
warrantless blood tests incident to arrest for drunk driving. The
analysis here is limited to N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) and does not address
any other provision of the implied-consent statute.

2. Motor Vehicles—driving while impaired—reasonable grounds

There was sufficient evidence in the record to show that a
police sergeant had reasonable grounds to believe defendant had

IN THE SUPREME COURT 679

STATE v. ROMANO
[369 N.C. 678 (2017)]

committed a driving while impaired offense. The record showed
that defendant stopped his vehicle at a congested intersection in the
middle of the day, left the vehicle while wearing his sweater back-
wards, stumbled across four lanes of traffic, had a bottle of rum in
his possession, and had vomited on himself and in his vehicle before
exiting the vehicle. When police arrived, defendant was incoherent
with slurred speech; his eyes were bloodshot; he smelled strongly of
alcohol; and he could not stand or sit without assistance. Reasonable
grounds in this context is equivalent to probable cause.

3. Appeal and Error—impaired driving—blood draw from
unconscious defendant—per se exception—other issues not
considered

In an impaired driving prosecution involving a blood draw at a
hospital from an unconscious defendant, whether a third party was
acting as an agent of the State or whether the independent source
exception to the exclusionary rule applied were separate determina-
tions from the statutory per se exception.

Chief Justice MARTIN dissenting.
Justices NEWBY and JACKSON join in this dissenting opinion. .
Justice NEWBY dissenting.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous decision of the Court of Appeals, ____ N.C. App. ___, 785 S.E.2d
168 (2016), affirming an order entered on 23 March 2015 by Judge R.
Gregory Horne in Superior Court, Buncombe County. On 18 August
2016, the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s conditional petition for
discretionary review as to additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court.
on 20 March 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz, Special
Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant/appellee.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Constance E. Widenhouse
and Andrew DeSimone, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for
defendant-appellant/appellee.

BEASLEY, Justice.

680 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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The issue before us in this case is whether N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b),
which authorizes law enforcement to obtain a blood sample from an
unconscious defendant who is suspected of driving while impaired with-
out first obtaining a search warrant, was unconstitutionally applied to
defendant. The trial court suppressed the results of defendant’s blood
test on Fourth Amendment grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed
that decision. We now affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals as mod-
ified herein.

On 6 October 2014, defendant was indicted for felony habitual driv-
ing while impaired and driving while his license was revoked. These
charges were based on events that occurred on 17 February 2014. On
26 January 2015, defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress all
evidence gathered after his arrest. The motion was heard on 2 and
8 February 2015.

Based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the trial
court found the following facts. On 17 February 2014, Officer Tammy
Bryson responded to a dispatch indicating that a white male wearing
his sweater backwards and carrying a liquor bottle had stopped his
SUV in the travel portion of a public road, gotten out of the vehicle, and
stumbled across the multilane highway. Officer Bryson found Joseph
Romano (defendant), who matched the description of the driver, sitting
behind a restaurant “approximately 400 feet from the abandoned SUV.”
Officer Bryson observed that defendant was making incoherent state-
ments, that his speech was slurred, that he was unable to stand due to his
obvious intoxication, and that he smelled strongly of alcohol and vomit.
Officer Bryson determined that defendant's faculties were appreciably
impaired. Defendant was arrested for driving while impaired (DW),
and, due to his extreme level of intoxication, defendant was transported
to a hospital for medical treatment. Officer Bryson requested the assis-
tance of Sergeant Ann Fowler, a Drug Recognition Expert.

Defendant was belligerent and combative throughout his encounters
with law enforcement and medical personnel. At the hospital, medical
staff and law enforcement attempted to restrain defendant. Medical per-
sonnel determined it was necessary to medicate defendant to calm him
down. Sergeant Fowler told the treating nurse “that she would likely
need a blood draw for law enforcement purposes.” Before defendant
was medicated, Sergeant Fowler did not “advise[ ] [him] of his chemi-
cal analysis rights,” “request[ ] that he submit[ ] to a blood draw,” or
obtain a warrant for a blood search. After defendant was medically sub-
dued, the treating nurse drew blood for medical treatment purposes;
however, the nurse drew more blood than was needed for treatment

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STATE v. ROMANO
[869 N.C. 678 (2017)]

purposes and’ offered the additional blood for law enforcement use.
Before accepting the blood sample, Sergeant Fowler attempted to get
defendant’s consent to the blood draw or receipt of the evidence, but
she was unable to wake him. The trial, court found as fact that “[d]ue
to his medically induced state, the Defendant was rendered unable to
meaningfully receive and consider his blood test rights, unable to give
or withhold his informed consent, and/or unable to exercise his right to
refuse the warrantless test.”

During this entire series of events, multiple officers were present to
assist with the investigation, “such that an officer could have left to drive
the relatively short distance (only a few miles) to the Buncombe County
Magistrate's Office to obtain a search warrant.” Sergeant Fowler was
familiar with the blood search warrant procedure, and search warrants
for a blood draw are fill-in-the-blank forms that are not time-consuming;
moreover, magistrates were on duty and available during the relevant
time period. Sergeant Fowler did not attempt to obtain a warrant for
defendant’s blood nor did she believe any exigency existed. Instead,
she “expressly relied upon the statutory authorization set forth in [sub-
section] 20-16.2(b),” which allows the taking and testing of blood from
a person who has committed a DWI if the person is “unconscious or
otherwise in a condition that makes the person incapable of refusal.”
After taking possession of defendant’s blood, Sergeant Fowler “drove
to the Buncombe County Magistrate’s Office and swore out warrants for
the present charges,” and then returned to the hospital and served the
warrants on defendant. The trial court found that “nothing prevent[ed]
her from obtaining a search warrant [for defendant's blood] at the same
time she [obtained the other warrants] and then subsequently seizing
the blood.”

The trial court quoted Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct.
1552 (2013), which states that “a warrantless search of the person is
reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception,” such as “when.
the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at ___, 183 S. Ct. at 1558 (citations omitted). A
court “looks to the totality of circumstances” to determine whether exi-
gent circumstances justified law enforcement in acting without a war-
rant. Id. at__, 183 S. Ct. at 1559 (citations omitted).

The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the seizure of defen-
dant’s blood “was a search subject to Fourth Amendment protection,”
and, under “a totality of the circumstances test, no exigency existed
justifying a warrantless search.” The court concluded that N.C.G.S.

682 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ROMANO
[369 N.C. 678 (2017)]

§ 20-16.2(b) “creates a per se exigency exception to the warrant require-
ment,” and as applied here violates the holding in McNeely. Therefore,
“any subsequent testing performed by law enforcement on the seized
blood must be suppressed.”

At the conclusion of the hearing on 3 February 2015, the court ruled
orally on defendant’s motions to suppress. The court then filed written
orders on 23 March 2015.! The State timely appealed the trial court’s
order suppressing the blood test results.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order suppressing
the test results of the blood that Sergeant Fowler obtained from defen-
dant at the hospital. State v. Romano, ___N.C. App. __, ___, 785 S.E.2d
168, 175 (2016). The court quoted McNeely’s holding that “ ‘the natural
metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream’ does not present a ‘per se
exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases.’ ”
Id. at ___, 785 8.E.2d at 173 (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at __, 183 S. Ct.
at 1556). The Court of Appeals determined that N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b)
could not justify a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious DWI
defendant because McNeely “sharply prohibits per se warrant excep-
tions for blood draw searches.” Id. at ___, 785 S.E.2d at: 174.

Applying N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) to the instant case, the Court of
Appeals opined that “the record suggests, but does not affirmatively
show, that [Sergeant] Fowler had ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe
Defendant . . . was intoxicated while he drove his SUV,” as opposed to
his becoming intoxicated while drinking rum after leaving his vehicle.
Id. at ___, 785 S.E.2d at 174. The court added: “More importantly, Fowler
testified that she did not attempt to obtain a search warrant at any time,
even though the magistrate’s office was ‘a couple of miles’ away from the
hospital.” Id. at___, 785 S.E.2d at 174. The court concluded that

[t]he State’s post hoc actions do not overcome the pre-
sumption that the warrantless search is unreasonable, and
it offends the Fourth Amendment, the State Constitution,
and McNeely. As the party seeking the warrant excep-
tion, the State did not carry its burden in proving “the exi-
gencies of the situation made that [warrantless] course

1. At the suppression hearing, defendant made an oral motion to suppress the car
keys and identification that were retrieved from him before he was transported to the
hospital. The trial court denied suppression of the keys and identification; that order is not
at issue in this appeal.

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[869 N.C. 678 2017]

imperative.” Coolidge [v. New Hampshire], 403 U.S.
[443,] 455, 91 S.[ ]Ct. 2022[, 2082 (1971)]. Under the total-
ity of the circumstances, considering the alleged exigen-
cies of the situation, the warrantless blood draw was not
objectively reasonable. See McNeely, ___ U.S. at __, 183
S.[ ]Ct. at 1558.

Romano, __ N.C. App at
in original).

The Court of Appeals also concluded that neither the independent
source doctrine nor the good faith exception to the warrant requirement,
applied in this case. Id. at___, 785 S.E.2d at 174-75. The court first recog-
nized that the State raised these arguments for the first time on appeal.
Then, the court noted that under a previous Court of Appeals decision,
“[t]he independent source doctrine permits the introduction of evidence
initially discovered [during], or as a consequence of, an unlawful search,
but later obtained independently from lawful activities untainted by the
initial illegality.” Id. at__, 785 S.E.2d at 174 (quoting State v. Robinson,
148 N.C. App. 422, 429, 560 S.E.2d 154, 159 (2002)). The court deter-
mined that “[t]he sequence of events in this case does not follow this
framework,” in that the attending nurse knew that defendant was going
to be arrested for DWI and that officers wanted his blood drawn. Id.
at ___, 785 S.E.2d at 174. As such, the court concluded that “the nurse
cannot be an independent lawful source.” Id. at ___, 785 S.E.2d at 174.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he good faith
exception,” which “allows police officers to objectively and reasonably
rely on amagistrate’s warrant that is later found to be invalid,” id. at__,
785 S.E.2d at 174 (citation omitted), was not applicable in this situation
because “the officers never attempted to obtain a search warrant prior
to the blood draw,” id. at___, 785 S.E.2d at 175. Thus, the officers could
not “objectively and reasonably rely on the good faith exception.” Id. at.
__., 785 S.E.2d at 175.

[1] Both parties sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision. This
Court allowed both petitions for discretionary review on 18 August 2016.

, 785 S.E.2d at 174 (second alteration

After the parties filed their petitions for discretionary review but
before they filed their briefs with this Court, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. __, 186 S.
Ct. 2160 (2016). After we granted review, in their briefs and oral argu-
ments to this Court, both parties acknowledged that the Birchfield deci-
sion challenges the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b). Both in
its brief and oral argument before this Court, the State recognized that

684 ; IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ROMANO
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Birchfield suggests that N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) is unconstitutional. The
State noted the differences between Birchfield and this case, but during
oral argument stated that it could not read Birchfield to suggest anything
other than that subsection 20-16.2(b) was unconstitutional. Defendant
argued that subsection 20-16.2(b) was unconstitutional as applied to
him because it created a per se exception to the warrant requirement in
violation of McNeely and now also Birchfield. Defendant asserted that
under McNeely and Birchfield both exigency and valid consent must be
determined by a totality of the circumstances. Defendant argued that
N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) could only be constitutional if it could be read as
allowing a blood draw from unconscious persons so long as the officer
also complied with the Fourth Amendment.

The State also argued that the Court of Appeals’ analyses of prob-
able cause, state action, the independent source doctrine, and the good
faith exception were incorrect and asked this Court to reverse or modify
the Court of Appeals’ opinion on those issues. Defendant argued that the
State was procedurally barred from raising a state action, good faith, or
independent source claim because these claims were not presented to
the trial court. .

We now address the application of the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Birchfield v. North Dakota and Missouri v. McNeely to the situa-
tion at bar, specifically, the warrantless blood draw from defendant for
purposes of determining blood alcohol content. We hold that, in light
of Birchfield and McNeely, N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) is unconstitutional as
applied to defendant because it permitted a warrantless search that vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment.” We also hold that the State’s state action,
good faith, and independent source claims are not properly before us.

Appellate courts review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress
to determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by
competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on

2. We recognize that other courts have grappled with the application of McNeely and
Birchfield to immplied-consent statutes as applied to unconscious DWI suspects and have
reached differing conclusions. Compare People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24,9 32,__P8d__,_
(holding that blood draw from an unconscious suspect was constitutional because statu-
tory implied consent satisfies the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requixement), with State v. Havatone, 241 Ariz. 506, _, 389 P3d 1251, 1253, 1255 (2017)
(holding that the “unconscious clause” of the implied-consent statute was unconstitutional
as applied to the defendant and further determining that the “unconscious clause” can be
constitutionally applied only when exigent circumstances prevent law enforcement from
obtaining a warrant). See generally Bailey v. State, 388 Ga. App. 428, 434 & n.42, 790 S.E.2d
98, 103 & n.42 (2016) (“[I]mplied consent of an unconscious suspect is insufficient to sat-
isfy the Fourth Amendment.”) (collecting cases).

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appeal, and whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclu-
sions of law. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 182, 140-41, 446 S.B.2d 579, 585
(1994) (citations omitted). Conclusions of law “are fully reviewable on
appeal.” Id. at 141, 446 S.E.2d at 585 (quoting State v. Mahaley, 332
N.C. 583, 592-98, 423 S.E.2d 58, 64 (1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089,
115 S. Ct. 749 (1995)). Whether a statute is constitutional is a question
of law that this Court reviews de novo. We review the decision of the
Court of Appeals for any errors of law. Id. at 149, 446 S.E.2d at 590
(citations omitted).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I of the North Carolina Constitution protect the rights of peo-
ple to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; N.C. Const. art. I, § 20. Our courts have held that drawing
blood from a person constitutes a search under both the Federal and
North Carolina Constitutions. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86
S. Ct. 1826 (1966); State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.B.2d 553 (1988).
A warrantless search of a person is per se unreasonable unless it falls
within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. McNeely,
569 US. at __, 183 S. Ct. at 1558; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971).

In this case Sergeant Fowler took possession of defendant's blood
from the treating nurse while defendant was unconscious without first
obtaining a warrant in reliance on N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b). Subsection
20-16.2(b) states:

(b) Unconscious Person May Be Tested. ~ If a law
enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that a person has committed an implied-consent offense,
and the person is unconscious or otherwise in a condi-
tion that makes the person incapable of refusal, the law
enforcement officer may direct the taking of a blood sam-
ple or may direct the administration of any other chemical
analysis that may be effectively performed. In this instance
the notification of rights set out in subsection (a) and the
request required by subsection (c) are not necessary.

N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) (2016). Thus, we must determine whether this war-
rantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. This Court has never
before addressed the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b). This
issue was raised, but not thoroughly discussed, in the Court of Appeals
opinion in State v. Hollingsworth, 77 N.C. App. 36, 334 S.E.2d 463
(1985). In that case the Court of Appeals considered the application of

686 IN THE SUPREME COURT

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the warrantless search exception permitted by N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) but
ultimately relied on Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S. Ct. 2000 (1973),
and Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, to affirm the constitutional-
ity of the officer's search and seizure in that case.>

In Hollingsworth a blood sample was taken from the defendant
while he was unconscious at the hospital. The State argued that the
defendant “gave implied consent to the blood test by operation of
the ‘implied consent’ statute,” N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2. 77 N.C. App. at 40, 334
§.E.2d at 466 (internal citation omitted). The Court of Appeals observed
that “[N.C.]G.S. § 20-16.2 operates to imply consent by an unconscious
driver to a blood alcohol test.” Id. at 41, 334 S.E.2d at 467. The Court
of Appeals, however, did not analyze whether the blood draw from the
unconscious defendant was constitutional based upon an implied-con-
sent rationale. Jd. at 41-42, 334 S.E.2d at 467. Instead, the court held that
the officer's actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because a
blood draw is only slightly intrusive, and probable cause and exigent
circumstances existed, which permitted the officers to draw the defen-
dant’s blood without a warrant.4 Id. at 44-45, 334 S.E.2d at 468-69. As
to the exigency of destructibility of the evidence, the Court of Appeals
relied on Schmerber in determining that “the body's breakdown of alco-
hol in the blood creates the reasonable risk that the evidence of intox-
ication will quickly be destroyed.” Id. at 44, 334 S.E.2d at 468 (citing
Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826).5

3, In State v. Garcia-Lorenzo the Court of Appeals again mentioned N.C.G.S.
§ 20-16.2(b) without specifically addressing or discussing the constitutionality of the stat-
ute. 110 N.C. App. 319, 430 S.E.2d 290 (1993). In that case the court relied on Schmerber,
384 U.S. 757, 86 S, Ct. 1826, and State v. Howren, 312.N.C. 454, 456, 323 S.E.2d 335, 387
(1984), in determining that the defendant's constitutional rights to due process and to be
free from illegal search and seizure were not violated. Garcia-Lorenzo, 110 N.C. App. at
880, 430 S.E.2d at 296. The court also concluded that the defendant's statutory rights under
N.C.G.S. 20-16.2 were not violated. Id. at 330-32, 430 S.E.2d at 296-97.

4. Though Hollingsworth has been credited with upholding N.
constitutional, in Hollingsworth the court did not rely on section 2
nale, and the constitutional analysis of the blood draw in Hollingsworth would have been
the same with or without the statute. 77 N.C. App. at 41-42, 334 S.B.2d at 467.

5. The Court of Appeals in Hollingsworth premised its decision, as did many courts
across the country, on Schmerber’s holding that indicated that all DWI cases involve exi-
gent circumstances based solely on the fact that alcohol begins to naturally dissipate in
the blood stream after a person stops drinking. See, e.g., State v. Shriner, 751 N.W2d
538 (Minn. 2008) (holding that the natural dissipation of blood alcohol evidence is per se
exigency), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1187, 129 S. Ct. 1001 (2009); State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d
529, 404 N,W.2d 399 (same), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 836, 114 S. Ct. 112 (1998); see also State
v Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P2d 1210 (1989) (same), overruled by State v. Wulff,

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In Schmerber v. California the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld a warrantless blood test of an individual arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol because the officer “might reasonably
have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threat-
ened ‘the destruction of evidence.’ ” 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S. Ct. at 1835
(quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S. Ct. 881, 883
(1964)). After the Schmerber decision, courts split over “whether the
natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se
exigency” that justifies a warrantless, nonconsensual blood test in
drunk-driving investigations. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 183 S. Ct. at
1558 & n.2. The Supreme Court settled this issue in Missouri v. McNeely,
holding that “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does
not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conduct-
ing a blood test without a warrant,” id. at __, 183 S. Ct. at 1568, and
that “[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is
reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of
the circumstances,” id. at___, 183 S. Ct. at 1563.6 Subsection 20-16.2(b),
therefore, cannot be constitutionally upheld based on a per se exigency
rationale. Here the trial court aptly noted that this case does not involve
a situation of exigency.

Though exigency did not relieve Sergeant Fowler of the require-
ment to obtain a warrant for a blood draw, the State argued that N.C.G.S.
§ 20-16.2 authorized Sergeant Fowler’s actions because a DWI is an
implied-consent offense. “[A] search conducted pursuant to a valid con-
sent is constitutionally permissible.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
US. 218, 222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045 (1973). Thus, the State argued that by
driving on the road, defendant consented to having his blood drawn for
a blood test and never withdrew this statutorily implied consent before
the blood draw. We must therefore determine whether the warrantless
seizure of defendant’s blood pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) was con-
stitutional as applied to defendant based on the rationale that the sei-
zure satisfied the consent exception to the warrant requirement.

187 Idaho 416, 337 P3d 575 (2014). The Supreme Court of the United States corrected this
interpretation of Schmerber in its analysis of McNeely as discussed below. See McNeely,
569 U.S. at__, 183 S. Ct, at 1558-63.

6. McNeely distinguishes blood-testing cases from other destruction-of-evidence
cases in which a suspect “has control over easily disposable evidence,” such as Cupp
v. Murphy, 412 US. at 296, 93 8. Ct. at 2004, in which the defendant was trying to get rid of
evidence under his fingernails. McNeely, 569 U.S. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1561. Blood alcohol
concentration, on the other hand, ‘naturally dissipates over time in a gradual and relatively
predictable manner.” Jd. at __, 188 S. Ct. at 1561.

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North Carolina’s Uniform Driver’s License Act states that “[aJny
person who drives a vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area
thereby gives consent to a chemical analysis if charged with an implied-
consent offense.”? N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(a) (2016). Impaired driving is an
implied-consent offense. Id. § 20-16.2(al) (2016). When a law enforce-
ment officer “has reasonable grounds to believe that the person-charged
has committed the implied-consent offense,” the officer “may obtain a
chemical analysis of the person.” Id. § 20-16.2(a).

Before the administration of any chemical analysis, the person
charged must be informed orally and in writing of the following:

(1) You have been charged with an implied-consent
offense. Under the implied-consent law, you can refuse
any test, but your drivers license will be revoked for
one year and could be revoked for a longer period of
time under certain circumstances, and an officer can
compel you to be tested under other laws.

(2) [Repealed.]

(8) The test results, or the fact of your refusal, will be
admissible in evidence at trial.

(4) Your driving privilege will be revoked immediately
for at least 30 days if you refuse any test or the test
result is 0.08 or more, 0.04 or more if you were driving

7. InSeders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 259 8.E.2d 544 (1979), this Court discussed the
purpose and rationale for this implied-consent statute.

By accepting his license and operating a motor vehicle on our highways,
plaintiff consented to submitting to a [chemical analysis] if arrested for
driving under the influence. .., We think the legislature wisely enacted
the statute in question. Its purpose is to provide scientific evidence of
intoxication not only for the purpose of convicting the guilty and remov-
ing them from the public highways for the safety of others, but also to
protect the innocent by eliminating mistakes from objective observation
such as a driver who has the odor of alcohol on his breath when in fact
his consumption is little or those who appear to be intoxicated but actu-
ally suffer from some unrelated cause. Public policy behind such a stat-
ute is a sound one. It ensures civil cooperation in providing scientific
evidence and avoids incidents of violence in testing by force. It gives an
arrested person a reasonable time to make up his mind about the test and
yet does not tie up officers involved for an unreasonable amount of time
which would interfere with their regular duties.

Id. at 464-65, 259 S.E.2d at 551-52.

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acommercial vehicle, or 0.01 or more if you are under
the age of 21.

(5) After you are released, you may seek your own test in
addition to this test.

(6) You may call an attorney for advice and select a wit-
ness to view the testing procedures remaining after
the witness arrives, but the testing may not be delayed
for these purposes longer than 30 minutes from the
time you are notified of these rights. You must take
the test at the end of 30 minutes even if you have not
contacted an attorney or your witness has not arrived.

Id. “If the person charged willfully refuses to submit to [the] chemical
analysis, none may be given under the provisions of this section, but the
refusal does not preclude testing under other applicable procedures.”
N.C.G:S. § 20-16.2(c) (2016). Under N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b), a DWI suspect
who is unconscious, however, does not have to be given notification of
his right to refuse any test or given the opportunity to willfully refuse the
test. Id. § 20-16.2(b).

In 2016, after this case proceeded through the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, and the parties had submitted their petitions for dis-
cretionary review to this Court, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided Birchfield v. North Dakota. In Birchfield the Supreme Court for
the first time addressed the constitutionality of a blood draw under the
rationale of statutory implied consent, as well as whether a blood draw
can be justified as a search incident to arrest.

The specific issue in Birchfield was “whether motorists lawfully
arrested for drunk driving may be convicted of a crime or otherwise
penalized for refusing to take a warrantless test measuring the alcohol in
their bloodstream.” 579 U.S. at ___, 186 S. Ct. at 2172. The Supreme Court
concluded that “the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath
tests incident to arrest for drunk driving” but does not permit warrant-
less blood tests incident to arrest for drunk driving. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct.
at 2184. Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded “that motorists can-
not be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test [by virtue of
an implied-consent statute] on pain of committing a criminal offense.”
Id. at__, 186 S. Ct. at 2186.

In Birchfield the Supreme Court first considered whether the war-
rantless “search-incident-to-arrest” doctrine applied to breath and blood

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tests. Using the analysis in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, __, 184
S. Ct. 2478, 2484 (2014)—which assessed the degree to which the search
intrudes on an individual's privacy versus the degree to which the
search is needed to promote a legitimate governmental interest—the
Court determined that a breath test is a permissible search incident to
arrest but a blood test is not. Birchfield, 579 U.S. at__, __, 186 S. Ct.
at 2176, 2184-85. The Court noted that, unlike breath tests, blood tests
require an intrusive piercing of the skin and give law enforcement a
sample that can be preserved and from which more than a blood alcohol
reading can be determined. Jd. at __, 186 S. Ct. at 2178.

" After determining that a warrantless blood test could not be justified
as asearch incident to arrest, the Court turned to whether a blood test is
permissible based on a driver's statutory implied consent to submit to it.
The Court noted that its “prior opinions have referred approvingly to the
general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and
evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply.” Jd. at
__, 186 S. Ct. at 2185. Nonetheless, “[t]here must be a limit to the conse-
quences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue
of a decision to drive on public roads,” id. at _, 186 S. Ct. at 2185, and
the Court determined that imposing a criminal penalty for refusing to
submit to a blood test exceeds such a limit, id. at___, 186 S. Ct. at 2186.

Here N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) does not impose a criminal penalty for
refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test; rather, the statute allows
police to take blood from an unconscious person suspected of driving
while intoxicated on the basis that the person has given implied consent
by choosing to drive on public roads. Thus, Birchfield does not answer
the specific question before us, namely, whether treating N.C.G.S.
§ 20-16.2(b) as a per se consent exception to the warrant requirement is
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’ Though we do not have
definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, based on the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment precedent regarding consent as well as the
rationale and language the Court employed in McNeely and Birchfield,
we conclude that the blood draw from defendant cannot be justified

8. As discussed above, there is no dispute that the constitutionality of N.C.G.S.
§ 20-16.2(b) cannot be upheld under a per se exigency rationale. In McNeely the Supreme
Court concluded that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream does not
always constitute an exigency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample. 569 US.
at __, 13S, Ct. at 1556. Exigent circumstances must be determined by the totality of the
circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Jd. at___, 133 S. Ct. at 1559.

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under N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) as a per se categorical exception to the war-
rant requirement.

Treating subsection 20-16.2(b) as an irrevocable rule of implied
consent does not comport with the consent exception to the warrant
requirement because such treatment does not require an analysis of
the voluntariness of consent based on the totality of the circumstances.
“[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ . . . is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.”
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2047-48. Further, the State has
the burden to prove that “consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily
given.” Id. at 222, 93 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968)). Consent is not voluntary if
itis “the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.” Id. at 227, 93
S. Ct. at 2048. A court’s decision regarding whether a suspect's consent
was voluntary is based on “a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances” and does not “turn[ ] on the presence or absence of a single
controlling criterion.” Id. at 226, 93 S. Ct. at 2047. “The standard for mea-
suring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is
that of ‘objective’ reasonableness ....” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
251, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04 (1991); State v. Stone, 362 N.C. 50, 53, 653
§.E.2d 414, 417 (2007).

Additionally, in McNeely, though the Supreme Court only specifically
addressed the exigency exception to the warrant requirement, McNeely,
569 U.S. at___ n.3, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 n.3, the Court spoke disapprov-
ingly of per se categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement, id. at
___, 183 S. Ct. at 1564 (“While the desire for a bright-line rule is under-
standable, the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly
broad categorical approach that would dilute the warrant requirement
in acontext where significant privacy interests are at stake. .. . [A] case-
by-case approach is hardly unique within our Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence.”). Moreover, language in Birchfield, though not specifically
on point, indicates that taking blood without a warrant is an unreason-
able search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment unless an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement applies, such as exigent circumstances
or valid consent.

It is true that a blood test, unlike a breath test, may
be administered to a person who is unconscious (per-
haps as a result of a crash) or who is unable to do what is
needed to take a breath test due to profound intoxication

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or injuries. But we have no reason to believe that such
situations are common in drunk-driving arrests, and when.
they arise, the police may apply for a warrant if need be.

Id. at__, 186 S. Ct. at 2184-85.9

Thus, while the specific issue analyzed in Birchfield does not directly
address the constitutionality of N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) as applied to defen-
dant, the reasoning and analysis in Birchfield and McNeely, as well as
other Fourth Amendment precedent, suggest that blood draws may
only be performed after either obtaining a warrant, obtaining valid con-
sent from the defendant, or under exigent circumstances with probable
cause. Here, because Sergeant Fowler relied on N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b)
to take a blood draw outside these circumstances, we conclude that
N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) was unconstitutionally applied to defendant. 10

Here there is no dispute that the officer did not get a warrant and
that there were no exigent circumstances. Regarding consent, the
State’s argument was based solely on N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) as a per se
exception to the warrant requirement. To be sure, the implied-consent
statute, as well as a person’s decision to drive on public roads, are fac-
tors to consider when analyzing whether a suspect has consented to a
blood draw, but the statute alone does not create a per se exception to
the warrant requirement. The State did not present any other evidence
of consent or argue that under the totality of the circumstances defen-
dant consented to a blood draw. Therefore, the State did not carry its
burden of proving voluntary consent. As such, the trial court correctly
suppressed the blood evidence and any subsequent testing of the blood
that was obtained without a warrant.

[2] We now turn to the State’s remaining concerns regarding the Court
_ of Appeals’ opinion below. To the extent that the Court of Appeals ques-
tioned whether Sergeant Fowler had “reasonable grounds” to believe
that defendant had committed the implied-consent offense of DWI, we
modify that portion of the opinion. The Court of Appeals stated that
“(t]he record does not affirmatively show Defendant was intoxicated
while he drove his SUV,” Romano, ___ N.C. App. at __, 785 S.E.2d at

9. This statement was made during the Court's analysis of whether a warrantless
blood draw could be justified as a search incident to arrest. We believe that that the senti-
ment is also applicable tc our analysis of implied consent.

10. Our analysis here is limited to N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) and does not address any
other provision of the implied-consent statute.

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174; however, a finding of “reasonable grounds” does not require “affir-
mative proof.” “Reasonable grounds” in this context is equivalent to
“probable cause.” See Moore v. Hodges, 116 N.C. App. 727, 729-30, 449
S.E.2d 218, 220 (1994) (citations omitted); Rock v. Hiatt, 103 N.C. App.
578, 584, 406 S.E.2d 638, 642 (1991) (citations omitted). Probable cause
for an arrest requires “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in believing the accused to be guilty”; it does not require that “the
evidence . . . amount to proof of guilt, or even to prima facie evidence
of guilt.” State v. Harris, 279 N.C. 307, 311, 182 S.B.2d 364, 367 (1971).

The record shows that defendant stopped his vehicle at a congested
intersection in the middle of the day, left the vehicle while wearing his
sweater backwards, and proceeded to stumble across four lanes of
traffic. Defendant had a bottle of rum in his possession, and had vom-
ited on himself and in his vehicle before exiting the SUV. When police
arrived, defendant was incoherent with slurred speech; his eyes were
bloodshot; he smelled strongly of alcohol; and he could not stand or sit
without assistance. Thus, there was sufficient evidence in the record to
show that Sergeant Fowler had reasonable grounds to believe defendant
had committed a DWI offense. Furthermore, defendant has never con-
tested this issue on appeal and has conceded that there were reasonable
grounds to believe he committed a DWI offense.

The State also argues that there was no state action and that the
good faith exception and the inevitable discovery and independent
source exceptions to the exclusionary rule are applicable in this case. A
review of the record reveals that the State did not advance these argu-
ments at the suppression hearing; accordingly, the issues are waived and
are not properly before this Court. N.C. R. App. P. 10; see State v. Cooke,
306 N.C. 132, 136-88, 291 S.E.2d 618, 621-22 (1982) (stating that a party
is limited to specific grounds argued to the trial court and concluding
in particular that the State cannot assert new bases to justify admissi-
bility of evidence obtained from a warrantless search for the first time
on appeal).

Here defendant argued at the suppression hearing that the statute’s
per se exception to the warrant requirement was unconstitutional under
McNeely, and the trial court specifically asked the parties for additional
research regarding “the constitutionality of the statute . . . in regard
to the unconscious defendant.” The State was aware that the statute’s
constitutionality was questionable and that Sergeant Fowler's actions
may have been illegal. The State had the opportunity at the suppression

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hearing to argue that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
should apply if the court determined that the officer’s actions were
unconstitutional, but the State failed to raise the argument. N.C. R. App.
P. 10; see, e.g., State v. Rodrigues, 67 Haw. 496, 498, 692 P.2d 1156, 1158
(1985) (per curiam) (holding that the State, when seeking reversal of a
trial court's grant of a motion to suppress, waived the argument that
a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because “the
State had never presented the issue . . . to the trial court” and observing
that “{i]t is a generally accepted rule that issues not raised at the trial
level will not be considered on appeal” (citations omitted)).

Additionally, the trial court explicitly invited the parties to make an
argument regarding whether the nurse was a third-party actor; the State
made no argument that the nurse was not a state actor, or that the sei-
zure of the blood was not an act of the State and thus, was not subject
to the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure analysis. See Cooke, 306
N.C. 132, 136, 291 S.E.2d 618, 621 (1982) (concluding that the State could
not advance the argument on appeal that “the Fourth Amendment does
not apply” when it “failed to [present this argument] at the suppression
hearing in the trial court”); see also United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d
263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the government bears the burden
to prove, as an initial matter, that a challenged search or seizure is not
unlawful (citing, inter alia, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104
S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984)), cert denied, __U.S.__, 184. Ct. 1572 (2014).

[8] Though we do not address the merits of the State’s arguments
regarding these exceptions to the exclusionary rule, we will address the
State’s concerns regarding the Court of Appeals’ statements of law per-
taining to these issues. The Court of Appeals’ opinion seems to limit
the federal good faith exception’s!! applicability to situations in which
law enforcement reasonably relies on a magistrate’s warrant that is later
found to be invalid; however, this is not the only situation in which the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule may apply. For example,
the good faith exception also applies to searches conducted in reason-
able reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes, as well as searches
conforming to appellate precedent. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S.
229, 237-41, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011); Minots v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
349-60, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1166-72 (1987). Additionally, to the extent that

LL. We specify that this is the federal good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
because in State v. Carter this Court declined to adopt a good faith exception to the state
constitution’s exclusionary rule, 332 N.C. 709, 724, 370 S.E.2d 553, 562 (1988).

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the Court of Appeals conflated the state action analysis with the inde-
pendent source and inevitable discovery analysis in concluding that “the
nurse cannot be an independent lawful source,” we clarify that whether
a third party is acting as an agent of the State and whether the inde-
pendent source exception to the exclusionary rule applies are separate
determinations.

In sum, we hold that N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) is unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment as applied to defendant in this case. We also
hold that the State’s state action, good faith, and independent source
claims are not properly before us.

For the foregoing reasons we affirm as modified herein the Court of
Appeals’ opinion affirming the trial court’s order suppressing any testing
of defendant's blood. We remand this case to the Court of Appeals for
further remand to the trial court for additional proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion.

MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED; REMANDED.
Chief Justice MARTIN dissenting.

Subsection 20-16.2(b) of our General Statutes authorizes the police
to direct the drawing of blood from an unconscious defendant who is
suspected of impaired driving in order to determine the defendant's
blood-alcohol content, based on the defendant's implied consent to a
blood test. See generally N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(a)-(b) (2015). In this case,
Sergeant Ann Fowler, a supervising sergeant in the Asheville-Buncombe
DWI task force, relied in good faith on this statutory provision when she
accepted a portion of defendant’s blood that the attending nurse drew
on the day of defendant's arrest for impaired driving. At that time, the
provision had never been held unconstitutional. It may now be unconsti-
tutional, at least as applied to defendant, but only because of a decision
that the Supreme Court of the United States issued after the State had
filed a petition for review of this case in this Court. The search that was
conducted in this case therefore falls into the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule under federal law. Because of that, and because—
contrary to what the majority says—the State preserved its good faith
exception argument for appeal, I respectfully dissent.

First, let me address the preservation issue. To understand why the
majority is wrong to say that the State failed to preserve its good faith
exception argument, it helps to look at what happened when.

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In 1998, more than two decades before this case arose, our Court
of Appeals upheld subsection 20-16.2(b) against a Fourth Amendment
challenge. In State v. Garcia-Lorenzo, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the defendant in that case, who—like defendant here—was sedated for
medical reasons and then subjected to a blood draw while unconscious,
“had no constitutional right to refuse to submit to chemical analysis.”
110N.C. App. 319, 327-30, 430 S.E.2d 290, 294-96 (1993). Citing an opinion
of this Court, the Court of Appeals indicated that the General Assembly
had simply “given the right to refuse to submit to chemical analysis as
a matter of grace.” Id. at 330, 430 S.E.2d at 296 (citing State v. Howren,
312 N.C. 454, 456, 323 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1984)). The Court of Appeals also
analyzed whether the defendant’s statutory rights had been violated and
found that they had not been. Id. at 330-32, 480 S.E.2d at 296-97. It then
held that the evidence derived from the blood draw was admissible. See
id. at 327, 332, 430 S.E.2d at 294, 297.1

Twenty years later, in 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. __, 183 S. Ct. 1552 (2018).
McNeely heid that, in drunk-driving investigations, the dissipation of
alcohol in the bloodstream through natural metabolic processes does
not create a per se exigency that would permit a warrantless blood draw
in every case. Id. at __, 183 S. Ct. at 1556. Instead, the government has
to show, on a case-by-case basis, that exigent circumstances other than
the mere dissipation of alcohol are present. See id. at___,___, 183 S. Ct.
at 1556, 1568.

In 2014, the search and arrest pertinent to this case took place.
Defendant was detained for impaired driving, taken to a hospital for
medical treatment, and subjected to a warrantless blood draw while
unconscious.

In January 2015, defendant filed his motion to suppress. At the sup-
pression hearing, which took place the next month, Sergeant Fowler
testified that she relied on subsection 20-16.2(b) when she took custody

1. The majority downplays Garcia—Lorenzo's significance by claiming that
Garcia-Lorenzo did not “specifically addressf } or discuss{ ] the constitutionality of” sub-
section 20-16.2(b). That is true in a strictly formal sense, but not in any practical sense.
In Garcia-Lorenzo, the Court of Appeals discussed whether the admission of evidence
obtained under the subsection was constitutional, but not whether the subsection itself
was constitutional. See id. at 830, 430 8.B.2d at 296. As I have just noted, however, the
Court of Appeals ruled that an unconscious defendant did not have a constitutional right
to refuse a blood draw. See id. at: 328-30, 430 8.E.2d at 295-96. It necessarily followed that,
in the Court of Appeals’ view, subsection 20-16.2(b) was constitutional.

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of defendant's blood, and the State argued that subsection 20-16.2(b)
was constitutional. Defendant responded that, under McNeely, subsec-
tion 20-16.2(b) was unconstitutional because it created a per se exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court
agreed with defendant, found that no other exigency to justify a warrant-
Jess search was present in this case, and excluded the blood test results.

The State appealed. In its brief to the Court of Appeals, the State
again argued that subsection 20-16.2(b) was constitutional. It also
argued in its brief to the Court of Appeals that, even if that subsection
were unconstitutional, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
would make the evidence in question admissible. In April 2016, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. See State v. Romano, __
N.C. App. __, ___, 785 S.E.2d 168, 175 (2016). The State filed a petition
for discretionary review with this Court.

InJune 2016, while the State’s petition was pending in this Court, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Birchfield v. North Dakota,
579 U.S. __, 186 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). Birchfield addressed whether
implied-consent laws that make it a crime for a lawfully arrested drunk-
driving suspect to refuse to take a breath test or a blood test comply with
the Fourth Amendment. Jd. at__, __, 186 S. Ct. at 2166-67, 2184. Early
in the Birchfield opinion, the Court suggested that this analysis hinged
on whether a warrantless search of breath or blood is constitutional and
said that, if it is, then refusing to submit to the search can be criminal-
ized. See id. at ____, 186 S. Ct. at 2172-73. Later on in the opinion, the
Court found that warrantless breath tests can be criminalized because
they are searches incident to arrest, but that warrantless blood tests can-
not be criminalized under either a search-incident-to-arrest theory or an
implied-consent theory. Id. at ____, 186 S. Ct. at 2184-86. Read together,
these two parts of Birchfield may indicate that it is unconstitutional to
conduct a warrantless blood draw of a suspected drunk driver based
only on the driver's statutorily inferred consent. If so, then it would be
unconstitutional to conduct a warrantless blood draw based only on
implied consent even when the suspected drunk driver is unconscious.

After Birchfield was handed down, this Court allowed the State’s
petition for discretionary review. In its briefing before this Court, the
State all but concedes that subsection 20-16.2(b) is unconstitutional
under Birchfield but also argues that it preserved its good faith argu-
ment for appeal, and it continues to argue that the good faith exception
applies here.

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It is beyond dispute that the State briefed the exclusionary rule’s
good faith exception before the Court of Appeals and again before this
Court. So the majority’s ruling that the State’s good faith argument has
not been preserved rises or falls on whether the State adequately raised
that argument before the trial court. The State’s only justification for
accepting the blood drawn by the nurse that Sergeant Fowler testified
about at the suppression hearing, and that the State argued to the trial
court at that hearing, was that Sergeant Fowler had relied on N.C.G:S. §
20-16.2(b). Because the State clearly argued that Sergeant Fowler relied
on this statutory provision, the majority can maintain that the State
failed to preserve its good faith argument only if, in the majority's view,
the State had to couch its statutory-reliance argument in the language of
the good faith exception. In other words, the majority must think that it
was wrong for the State to do what the State in fact did: argue before the
trial court that Sergeant Fowler reasonably relied on the statute and that.
the statute was constitutional.”

But why should the State have to do otherwise? As we have seen,
when the State opposed defendant's motion to suppress before the trial
court, binding precedent from our own Court of Appeals seemed to
make it clear that subsection 20-16.2(b) withstood Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. Did the State really have to make an alternative argument, in
the face of then-binding caselaw that supported its main argument, that
assumed the statute’s invalidity and that used the magic words “good
faith exception’?

Remember, it was not until Birchfield was decided—and thus not
until this case had already been appealed to this Court—that the Supreme
Court called subsection 20-16.2(b) into constitutional doubt. When this
case was still before the trial court, therefore, the State had every reason
to think that Sergeant Fowler had relied on a constitutionally permitted
statute that justified the search of defendant.

The majority suggests that McNeely changed the equation. Granted,
McNeely had already been handed down when the trial court held the
suppression hearing here. McNeely’s holding, however, was about exi-
gency—specifically, whether exigency always exists when the police

2. The majority also cites State v. Rodrigues, a 1985 case from Hawaii, to support its
argument, See 67 Haw. 496, 498, 692 P2d 1156, 1158 (1985) (per curiam). But in Rodrigues,
the State of Hawaii relied only on actual consent when arguing before the trial court
that the evidence in question there was admissible. See id. at 497-98, 692 P2d at 1157-58.
Hawaii did not “even hint{ ]” at the trial court level “that [it] was also relying... ona ‘good
faith’ exception theory.” Id, at 498, 692 P2d at 1158.

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suspect a person of driving drunk because alcohol in the bloodstream
naturally dissipates over time. McNeely, 569 U.S. at __, 183 S. Ct. at
1556. Exigency, of course, is an exception to the warrant requirement,
see, @.g., id. at__, 183 S. Ct. at 1558, meaning that an officer does not
need a warrant to conduct a search when exigent circumstances exist,
see, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011). But an officer who
has consent to conduct a search does not need a warrant either. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). In other words,
consent and exigency are two separate exceptions to the warrant
requirement. It follows that an officer with consent to conduct a search
does not need exigent circumstances to justify it.

This case has always been about consent. As the majority admits,
“Sergeant Fowler did not . . . believe any exigency existed. Instead, she
expressly relied upon the statutory authorization set forth in [subsec-
tion] 20-16.2(b) . . . .” (Brackets in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) And subsection 20-16.2(b) allows an officer to direct the
drawing of blood from an unconscious suspect based on the suspect’s
implied consent. See N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(a)-(b). McNeely’s holding thus
has no bearing on this case, which hinges on defendant’s consent or lack
thereof, not on exigent circumstances. .

So, given the state of the law as it existed at the time of the suppres-
sion hearing, the State had absolutely no reason to weaken its case by
conceding that the statute on which Sergeant Fowler relied might be
unconstitutional. Controlling caselaw from our Court of Appeals settled
the issue—at least for the purposes of any proceedings before the trial
court—and no higher court had done anything to undermine that case-
law. In that situation, the State should be allowed to oppose a suppres-
sion motion by depending exclusively on the argument that a statute
relied on for a Fourth Amendment search is in fact constitutional. By
refusing to give the State this tactical option—even when the State has
based its whole argument on an officer's good faith reliance on a facially
valid statute—the majority has effectively penalized the State for having
a strong case.

To support its anti-preservation argument, the majority cites Rule
10 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. But, far from
supporting the majority's argument, that rule only bolsters my point. It
states that, “[iJn order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party
must... stat[e] the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired
the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the
context.” N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (emphasis added). This rule squarely
applies here. When the State is exclusively arguing before the trial court

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that an officer relied on a statute to conduct a search, how could the
State not want the trial court to rule that the officer relied on the statute
in good faith? As I will discuss below, as long as the statute in question
is not clearly unconstitutional, that is all that is required for the good
faith exception to apply. So Rule 10 shows that, in this particular con-
text, the State does not even need to expressly make a good faith excep-
tion argument in order to preserve that argument. A trial court should
recognize that if the State loses on the Fourth Amendment merits, the
State will still want the trial court to rule in its favor based on the good
faith exception.

For all of these reasons, I would hold that the State has preserved its
good faith exception argument for appeal. I now turn to the substantive
constitutional question, which is governed exclusively by federal law.?

In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation
should not be excluded if, when conducting the search that led to the
evidence, the police rely in good faith on a search warrant issued by
a neutral and detached magistrate, even if the warrant is later found
to lack probable cause. See 468 U.S. 897, 900, 925-26 (1984). The Court
explained that the good faith standard is one of objective, not subjec-
tive, reasonableness. Jd. at 919 n.20. Illinois v. Krull then held, based
on the principles announced in Leon, that the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule also applies when the police rely in good faith ona
statute authorizing warrantless searches that is later found to be uncon-
stitutional. See 480 U.S. 340, 342, 349-55 (1987).

Although Krull pertained specifically to an administrative search,
id. at 342, the rationale for the good faith exception that both Leon and
Krull provide plainly extends to other kinds of searches as well. The
Court in Leon noted that “the exclusionary rule is designed to deter
police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and mag-
istrates.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. And in Krull, the Court said that “[t]he
approach used in Leon is equally applicable to the present case” because
“suppress[ing] evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively rea-
sonable reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effect” as
suppressing evidence obtained “in objectively reasonable reliance on a
warrant.” Krull, 480 U.S. at 349. Paraphrasing Leon, the Court in Krull
commented that “[p]enalizing the officer for the [legislature’s] error,

3. Defendant's written motion to suppress does not refer to the state constitution,
and his arguments at the suppression hearing were based solely on the Fourth Amendment.

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rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations.” Jd. at 350 (second brackets in original)
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921).

Other cases that the Supreme Court has handed down since Leon
reinforce the good faith exception’s broad applicability. In Arizona
v. Evans, for instance, the Court addressed whether the good faith
exception applies when a police officer reasonably relies on a police
record that indicates the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant but
that is later shown to be erroneous. 514 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1995). Noting that
an employee of a Clerk of Court's office was the source of the error
in that case, the Court held that the good faith exception applied. Id.
at 4, 14-16. More recently, the Court held that the good faith exception
applies “when the police conduct a search in compliance with bind-
ing precedent that is later overruled.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S.
229, 232 (2011). The reason that all of these cases are decided-as they
are boils down to the same core principle: that the exclusionary rule
is designed to deter police misconduct, not misconduct or mistakes by
other government actors. See id.; Evans, 514 U.S. at 14; Krull, 480 U.S.
at 349-50; Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.

In this case, although Sergeant Fowler did not exactly “direct the
taking of a blood sample,” as subsection 20-16.2(b) contemplates, she
still relied on that subsection when she took custody of excess blood
from a vial that the attending nurse had drawn for medical purposes.
After all, if subsection 20-16.2(b) permits a blood draw from an uncon-
scious defendant, it must also permit the lesser intrusion entailed by
taking custody of blood that has already been drawn for other purposes,
which is what Sergeant Fowler did here.

Sergeant Fowler's reliance on subsection 20-16.2(b) was objec-
tively reasonable, too. “Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an
officer cannot be expected to question the judgment of the legislature
that passed the law.” Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50. To reiterate, not only was
subsection 20-16.2(b) not clearly unconstitutional when defendant’s
blood was drawn; it had already been held constitutional by our Court
of Appeals.

The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies in instances
where “suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct... and
... would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety.”
Davis, 564 U.S. at 232. Because Sergeant Fowler relied in good faith
on N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) when she took custody of blood drawn by the
attending nurse, and because the State preserved its argument to this

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effect, I would hold that the good faith exception applies here. I would
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for a
trial in which the blood test results that defendant seeks to suppress are
deemed admissible under the Fourth Amendment. As a result, I respect-
fully dissent.

Justices NEWBY and JACKSON join in this dissenting opinion.
Justice NEWBY dissenting.

I fully agree with and join the dissenting opinion, which correctly
applies our waiver precedent and thoughtfully discusses the good faith
exception. I am also of the view, however, that, on the record before
us, the medical staff who drew defendant's blood were not state actors.
State action is a threshold consideration in any Fourth Amendment
analysis. Because the constitutional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures apply only to actions by governmental officials
and their agents, and defendant failed to establish that the medical per-
sonnel were such agents, the blood draw at issue was not a search con-
templated by the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant received treatment for severe intoxication at a private
hospital. Upon arrival there, defendant was belligerent and combat-
ive toward the medical staff and the officers present. Irrespective of
any criminal investigation, “medical staff determined it was necessary
to medicate” defendant and draw his blood, though they knew law
enforcement might require a blood sample for their DWI investigation.
Officers were not present when medical staff drew defendant's blood.
Importantly, nothing in the record suggests the officers coerced, enticed,
induced, or otherwise instructed medical staff to draw defendant's blood
or to draw more than was medically necessary.

The Fourth Amendment declares, in relevant part, that “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV; see also State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 506-07, 417
§.E.2d 502, 510-11 (1992) (adopting the inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule and noting that our state constitution’s limitation
against unreasonable searches and seizures does not confer protections
beyond those afforded by the Fourth Amendment). “A ‘search’ occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider rea-
sonable is infringed. A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that

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property.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118, 104 S. Ct. 1652,
1656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 94 (1984) (footnotes omitted).

Though a blood draw can constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment, ¢.9., Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, __, 183 S. Ct. 1552,
1558, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696, 704 (2013), the Fourth Amendment protects
against unreasonable searches or seizures by state actors exclusively,
e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 8. Ct. 574, 576, 65 L. Ed.
1048, 1051 (1921) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment proscribes
only unreasonable governmental action); see also State Action, Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“Anything done by a government; . . .
an intrusion on a person’s rights .. . by a governmental entity... .”). The
Fourth Amendment generally does not apply to a search or seizure, even
an unreasonable one, by a private person. See Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475,
41S. Ct. at 576, 65 L. Ed. at 1051. Thus, evidence obtained from an unrea-
sonable private search need not be excluded from a criminal trial. See
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656, 100 S. Ct. 2395, 2401, 65 L. Ed.
2d 410, 417 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“[A] wrongful search or seizure
conducted by a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment
and... does not deprive the government of the right to use evidence
that it has acquired lawfully.” (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
USS. 443, 487-90, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2048-50, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 595-96 (1971))).

In certain cases, however, the Fourth Amendment may limit private
conduct when private persons become state actors, thereby acting as “
‘nstrument[s]’ or agent[s] of the state.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487, 91S.
Ct. at 2048-49, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 595 (citations omitted). Whether a private
party becomes a state actor “turns on the degree of the Government’s
participation in the private party's activities, a question that can only
be resolved ‘in light of all the circumstances.’ ” Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.’ Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-15, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411-12, 103 L. Ed. 2d
639, 658 (1989) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S.
at 487, 91S. Ct. at 2049, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 595). Relevant factors include “the
degree of governmental involvement, such as advice, encouragement,
knowledge about the nature of the citizen's activities, and the legality of
the conduct encouraged by the police.” State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319,
334, 395 S.E.2d 412, 422 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1051, 111 S. Ct.
763, 112 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1991). The defendant, not the State, bears the
burden of establishing state action, thus triggering the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. See State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 415, 259 S.E.2d
502, 508 (1979) (“[I]t is well settled that the burden is on defendant
to establish [Fourth Amendment] standing.” (citing, inter alia, Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261, 80 S. Ct. 725, 731, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697,

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702 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980))); see, e.g., Sanders,
827 N.C. at 334, 395 S.B.2d at 422 (admitting the evidence because the
defendant “failed to show that [a private citizen’s] seizure specifically
of the topaz ring and white gold watch was” “attributable to the State”).

Though the State is on solid legal ground in making its statutory
argument, our precedent “requires that we first determine whether,
under the facts of this case, there has been a search.” State v. Reams,
277 N.C. 391, 396, 178 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840, 92
S. Ct. 138, 30 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1971), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Worsley, 336 N.C. 268, 443 S.E.2d 68 (1994); see State v. Raynor, 27
N.C. App. 538, 540, 219 S.E.2d 657, 659 (1975) (“Before the legality of
an alleged search may be questioned, it is necessary to first determine
whether there has actually been a search.”); see also Reams, 277 N.C. at
396, 178 S.E.2d at 68 (“[W]hen the evidence is delivered to a police offi-
cer upon request and without compulsion or coercion, there is no search
within the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”). Because the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unrea-
sonable searches operates only against the government and its agents,
Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475, 41 S. Ct. at 576, 65 L. Ed. at 1051, the nature of
the actor remains a threshold question.

Here the record before us does not support the existence of an
agency relationship between the medical staff of a private hospital and
law enforcement. Nothing in the record suggests the government had
anything to do with the blood draw, and defendant fails to persuasively
argue that the blood draw was the result of state action. To the contrary,
the record reflects that law enforcement never asked the medical staff to
draw defendant's blood and were not in the room during the blood draw.
Nothing suggests that law enforcement prompted, enticed, or induced
the medical staff to draw more blood than medically necessary. Instead,
medical staff drew defendant’s blood for purposes of his medical treat-
ment, irrespective of any criminal investigation. Whether medical staff
knew that law enforcement would eventually need a sample of defen-
dant’s blood is irrelevant. See State v. Kornegay, 313 N.C. 1, 10-12, 326
S.E.2d 881, 890-91 (1985) (concluding that a private citizen who copied
a defendant's records to turn over to the State Bureau of Investigation
in exchange for prosecutorial immunity was not a state agent). When
the nurse, “of her own accord,” produced the blood sample, “it was not
incumbent on the police to stop her or avert their eyes.” Coolidge, 403
US. at 489, 91S. Ct. at 2049, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 596. Accordingly, there was
nothing wrongful about the State’s “acquisition of the [vial of blood]

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or its examination of [its] contents to the extent that [the blood] had
already been examined by third parties.” Walter, 447 U.S. at 656, 100 S.
Ct. at 2401, 65 L. Ed. 2d. at 417.

The majority's puzzling attempt to avoid this issue concludes, in a
few lines of dismissive prose, that the State waived any state action argu-
ment. The purpose of the waiver rule is to “prevent... errors... that [a]
court could have corrected if brought to its attention at the proper time.”
Wall v. Stout, 310 N.C. 184, 188-89, 311 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1984). Here it is
beyond dispute that the State briefed the issue of state action before the
Court of Appeals and again before this Court.! Moreover, the trial court
recognized that “[t]he issue with regard to the blood . . . [being] drawn
by a third party” was before the court and concluded that “the blood
draw . . . [was] a part of the normal course of treatment and would have
occurred without any subsequent police action.” It is our duty as a juris-
prudential court to address state action as the threshold legal question
in any Fourth Amendment analysis.

Even assuming that a Fourth Amendment search occurred, defen-
dant fails to persuasively argue that he retained any ongoing expecta-
tion of privacy in the vial of blood. See State v. Barkley, 144 N.C. App.
514, 518-19, 551 S.E.2d 131, 184-35, appeal dismissed, 354 N.C. 221, 554
S.E.2d 646 (2001). The sample here was lawfully removed from his body,
and the State’s analysis of the blood sample did not involve any further
search and seizure of defendant’s person. See id. at 518-20, 551 S.E.2d
at 134-35; see also Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1994)
(per curiam) (concluding that once the samples were validly obtained in
one case, the State was not prohibited from using them in another case),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 946, 116 S. Ct. 387, 133 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1995); Bickley
v. State, 227 Ga. App. 413, 415, 489 S.E.2d 167, 170 (1997) (finding no
constitutional violation when the defendant’s blood was drawn pursuant
to a warrant and used in an unrelated case, noting that, “[i]n this respect,

1. Before the Court of Appeals, the State argued, inter alia, that the blood draw
was for medical purposes and was not “government action.” Before this Court, the State
argued, inter alia, that the blood draw was conducted by a third party actor, not an agent
of the police.

The State has also advanced an argument based upon the independent source excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule. This exception is distinct from the state action requirement
and permits the introduction of evidence initially discovered from an unlawful search “but,
later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial legality.” Murray
v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2588, 101 L. Bd. 2d 472, 480 (1988).
Regardless, the independent source doctrine presupposes that the invasion of privacy
involved a state actor and that a search occurred.

706 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. ROMANO
[369 N.C. 678 (2017)]

DNA results are like fingerprints which are maintained on file by law
enforcement authorities for use in further investigations” (brackets in
original)); Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001) (stating that
once a DNA profile is obtained, the owner no longer has any possessory
or ownership interest in it); Wilson v. State, 132 Md. App. 510, 550, 752
A.2d 1250, 1272 (2000) (concluding that the lawful use of the defendant's
DNA in an unrelated case did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights
because the defendant lost “[a]ny legitimate expectation of privacy that
[he] had in his blood . . . when that blood was validly seized”).

To be sure, “an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s
‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’ ” McNeely, __
US. at __, 133 S. Ct. at 1558, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 704 (quoting Winston
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1616, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662, 668
(1985)). Such an expectation should be jealously guarded from unrea-
sonable government intrusion. Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment
proscribes only unreasonable governmental action and does not apply
to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effectuated by a pri-
vate party not acting as a governmental agent.

Insum, the threshold question in any Fourth Amendment analysis is
whether a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy was invaded by a
governmental official or agent. The majority's analysis erroneously over-
looks this foundational principle. Because the constitutional protec-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures apply only to actions
by governmental officials and their agents, and defendant failed to estab-
lish that the medical staff were such agents, the blood draw at issue was
not a search contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 107

STATE v. TODD
[869 N.C. 707 (2017)]

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
PARIS JUJUAN TODD

No. 18A14-2
Filed 9 June 2017

1. Appeal and Error—Court of Appeals dissent and motion for
appropriate relief—Supreme Court supervisory authority
The Supreme Court exercised the supervisory authority granted
by Article IV, Section 12 of the North Carolina Constitution where
the case involved a dissent in the Court of Appeals and a motion
for appropriate relief. Although the plain language of N.C.G.S.
§ 74-28 precludes Supreme Court review when there is a dissent in
the Court of Appeals and the case involves a motion for appropriate
relief, a statute cannot restrict the Supreme Court’s constitutional
authority under Article IV, Section 12, Clause 1 of the Constitution
of North Carolina to exercise jurisdiction to review any decision of
the courts below.

2. Constitutional Law—effective assistance of appellate coun-
sel—failure to raise sufficiency of evidence
The record was insufficient to determine whether defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel in the Court of Appeals
where there was no determination of whether defendant’s appellate
counsel had a strategic reason to refrain from addressing the suf-
ficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction. The case was
remanded to the Court of Appeals.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. __, 790 S.E.2d
349 (2016), reversing an order denying defendant's motion for appropri-
ate relief entered on 15 January 2015 by Judge Donald W. Stephens in
Superior Court, Wake County, and remanding the case for entry of an
order granting defendant’s motion for appropriate relief and vacating his
prior conviction. Heard in the Supreme Court on 12 April 2017.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

N.C. Prisoner Legal Services, Inc., by Reid Cater, for
defendant-appellee.

708 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. TODD
[369 N.C. 707 (2017)]

BEASLEY, Justice.

In this appeal we consider whether this Court has jurisdiction to
decide an appeal taken from a divided decision of the Court of Appeals
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 74-30(2) arising from a trial court's ruling grant-
ing or denying a motion for appropriate relief (MAR) and whether the
Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court's decision that defen-
dant received effective assistance of appellate counsel. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the State presented insufficient evidence to
show that defendant committed the underlying offense and further con-
cluded that, if defendant’s appellate counsel had raised the sufficiency of
the evidence issue in the previous appeal, defendant’s conviction would
have been reversed. We hold that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this
matter and conclude that the record should be further developed before
a reviewing court can adequately address the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

On 2 April 2012, Paris Jujuan Todd (defendant) was indicted for
robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit the same
offense. After a trial beginning on 12 June 2012, defendant was convicted
of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant appealed that convic-
tion to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to continue and that he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. See State v. Todd, 229 N.C. App. 197, 749 S.E.2d 113 2013 WL
4460143 (2013) (unpublished) (odd 1). The Court of Appeals disagreed.
with defendant and held that the trial court did not err in denying defen-
dant’s motion to continue and that defendant did not receive ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Todd, 2013 WL 4460148, at *5.

On 21 October 2014, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief
(MAR) in the trial court, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction and that his appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise this claim on appeal. On.15 January 2015, the trial
court, without conducting an evidentiary hearing on defendant's ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim, entered an order denying defendant's
MAR. The trial court found that “[a] review of all the matters of record,
including the opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals . . . clearly
demonstrates that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict
and appellate counsel rendered effective assistance to Defendant in his
appeal.” Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of
Appeals seeking review of the trial court’s order denying his MAR, which
the Court of Appeals allowed on 27 March 2015.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 709

STATE v. TODD
[869 N.C. 707 (2017)]

Defendant argued to the Court of Appeals that in the first appeal his
appellate counsel performed below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness by failing to argue that the evidence was insufficient to support
defendant's conviction. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals held that
defendant received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his first
appeal and concluded that defendant likely would have been successful
had his counsel raised the sufficiency of the evidence issue in his first
appeal. State v. Todd,__N.C. App.__, __, 790 S.E.2d 349, 364 (2016)
(Todd IT). More specifically, after concluding that, “the State presented
insufficient evidence that defendant committed the underlying offense,”
the majority held.that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s MAR.
Id. at___, 790 S.E.2d at 364. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court’s order and remanded the case to. the trial court with
instructions to grant defendant's MAR and vacate his conviction. Id. at
__, 790 S.E.2d at 364.

Nonetheless, according to the dissent, defendant failed to show that
appellate counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at ___, 790 S.E.2d
at 365 (Tyson, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that “[e]ffective appel-
late advocates winnow out weaker arguments and focus on those more
likely to prevail on appeal.” Id. at ___, 790 S.E.2d at 367 (citing Jones
v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 83308, 3312 (1983)). Because “[t]his
accepted discretionary process lies within the professional judgment of
appellate counsel,” id. at ____, 790 S.E.2d at 367, the dissent concluded
that defendant could not show that his appellate counsel was deficient
in not raising a sufficiency of the evidence argument in the first appeal,
id. at___, 790 S.E.2d at 368. The State gave ‘timely notice of appeal based
upon the ‘dissenting opinion.!

[1] As a threshold matter, we must consider whether this Court has
jurisdiction to decide this appeal. Generally N.C.G.S § 74-30(2) pro-
vides an automatic right of appeal to this Court based on a dissent at the
Court of Appeals. N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2015). But, that automatic right
of appeal is limited by N.C.G.S. § 7A-28, which states that “[d]ecisions of
the Court of Appeals upon review of motions for appropriate relief listed
in G.S. 15A-1415(b) are final and not subject to further review in the
Supreme Court by appeal, motion, certification, writ, or otherwise.” Id.,

1. Additionally, on 9 December 2016, we ordered the parties to brief and argue (1)
whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and remanding the trial court’s judgment,
and (2) whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide an appeal taken from a
decision of the Court of Appeals that arose from a trial court ruling granting or denying a
motion for appropriate relief pursuant to N.C.GS. § 7A-30(2), in light of the provisions of
N.C.GS. §§ 7A-28(a) and 15A-1422(8).

710 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. TODD
[369 N.C. 707 (2017)]

§ 7A-28(a) (2015). We acknowledge that the plain language of N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-28 precludes this Court’s review of a case in which there is a dis-
sent in the Court of Appeals when the case involves review of a motion.
for appropriate relief; however, we maintain the authority granted to us
by the state constitution and recognize that “it is beyond question that a
statute cannot restrict this Court's constitutional authority under Article
IV, Section 12, Clause 1 of the Constitution of North Carolina to exercise
Surisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the courts below.’ ”
State v. Ellis, 361 N.C. 200, 205, 639 S.E.2d 425, 428 (2007) (quoting
N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12). “This Court will not hesitate to exercise its
rarely used general supervisory authority when necessary to promote
the expeditious administration of justice.” State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19,
26, 215 S.E.2d 589, 594 (1975) (citations omitted). Thus, we exercise
the supervisory authority granted by Article IV, Section 12 of the North
Carolina Constitution to decide this matter.

{2] Having determined that we have jurisdiction to hear this matter,
we next consider whether defendant received ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel. Before this Court, the State argues that defendant's
appellate counsel apparently made a strategic decision not to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the lower courts did not deter-
mine whether there was a strategic reason for defendant's appellate
counsel to refrain from addressing the sufficiency of the evidence sup-
porting defendant's conviction, we reverse and remand the decision of
the Court of Appeals.

A defendant's right to counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, includes the right to
effective assistance of counsel. State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561,
324 S.E.2d 241, 247-48 (1985) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 &n.14, 90S. Ct. 1441, 1449 & n. 14 (1970)). When challenging a
conviction on the basis that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must
show that counsel's conduct “fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064 (1984); see also Braswell, 312 N.C. at 561-62, 324 S.E.2d at 248. In
Strickland the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test.
for determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance
of counsel. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Strickland requires that a
defendant first establish that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at
687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. This first prong requires a showing that “counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘coun-
sel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Jd. at 687, 104
S. Ct. at 2064. Second, a defendant must demonstrate that the deficient,

IN THE SUPREME COURT 71

STATE v. TODD
[369 N.C. 707 (2017)]

performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that
“counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Thus,
both deficient performance and prejudice are required for a successful
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

In this case defendant's claim stems from appellate counsel's deci-
sion not to argue in his first appeal that the evidence was insufficient
to support defendant's conviction. Defendant contends that he would
have won his appeal had this dispositive issue been raised. Conversely,
the State argues that defendant's appellate counsel “apparently made a
strategic decision not to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.”

Rather than articulating specific guidelines for appropriate attorney
conduct, the Court in Strickland emphasized that “[t]he proper measure
of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevail-
ing professional norms.” Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Strickland notes
that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and
facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and
strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are rea-
sonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation.” Jd. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
Simply put, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to
make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnec-
essary.” Id. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. In considering the merits of any
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, “a particular decision not to
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the cir-
cumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judg-
ments.” Id. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

As to the first prong of the Strickland test, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged the State’s argument that defendant’s prior appellate
counsel “apparently made a strategic decision” not to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence. Todd II, ___ N.C. App. at __,; 790 S.E.2d
at 364 (majority opinion). But the Court of Appeals majority opinion
noted that the State failed to explain how the failure to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence in the first appeal could be a strategic
decision. Id. at __, 790 S.E.2d at 364. Neither of our lower courts,
however, addressed whether there was an actual strategic reason for
defendant's appellate counsel not to address the sufficiency of the
evidence issue, and if so, whether the strategic decision was reasonable.
Specifically, the trial court did not address whether this was a strategic
decision because that court summarily denied defendant's MAR without

712 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE v. TODD
[369 N.C. 707 (2017)]

a hearing. Additionally, the Court of Appeals did not fully address this
issue. While “winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing
on one central issue” is an important aspect of appellate advocacy, Jones
v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983), the determination
of whether a defendant's appellate counsel made a particular strategic
decision remains a question of fact, and is not something which can be
hypothesized, see Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1330 (11th
Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 162 F.3d 100 (11" Cir. 1998). Thus, the record
before this Court is not thoroughly developed regarding defendant's
appellate counsel’s reasonableness, or lack thereof, in choosing not to
argue sufficiency of the evidence.

We therefore hold that the record before us is insufficient to
determine whether defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel. On remand the Court of Appeals should further remand this
matter to the trial court with instructions to fully address whether
appellate counsel made a. strategic decision not to raise a sufficiency
of the evidence argument, and, if such a decision was strategic, to
determine whether that decision was a reasonable decision. Further,
if the trial court finds that defendant's appellate counsel’s performance
was deficient, that court should then determine whether counsel's
performance prejudiced defendant.

For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed, and that court is instructed to remand this matter to the trial
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

IN THE SUPREME COURT 713

STOKES v. CRUMPTON
[369 N.C. 713 (2017)}

THOMAS A. STOKES, IT
v
CATHERINE C. CRUMPTON (Formerty Stokes)

No. 168A16
Filed 9 June 2017

Divorce—equitable distribution—arbitration and settlement—
allegations of fraud—interlocutory appeal—settlement
In an action involving equitable distribution and arbitration in
which fraud in the valuation of a business was alleged after a settle-
ment, plaintiff had a right to appeal the trial court’s order denying
discovery under the substantial rights analysis of N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)
(8)(a), and a right to appeal may exist under section 7A-27 even if
the order is not appealable under the arbitration statute itself. The
trial court had discretion to award discovery because the action
was pending pursuant to sections 50-53 and 50-54 of the Family Law
Arbitration Act.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of adivided
panel of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. _, 784 S.E.2d 537 (2016),
dismissing an appeal from an order entered on 7 August 2014 by Judge
Anna E. Worley in District Court, Wake County. On 22 September 2016,
the Supreme Court allowed plaintiff’s petition for discretionary review
of additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court on 20 March 2017.

Shanahan Law Group, PLLC, by Kieran J. Shanahan, Christopher
S. Battles, and John E. Branch, II, for plaintiff-appeliant.

Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by Tobias S. Hampson, K.
Edward Greene, and Robert A. Ponton, Jr., for defendant-appellee.

BEASLEY, Justice.

This case is about whether a trial court has discretion to order post-
confirmation discovery in an action under the Family Law Arbitration
Act and a party’s right to an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s
denial of such a motion. We hold that plaintiff had a right to appeal the
trial court’s denial of his motion to engage in discovery and that
the trial court has discretion to order post-confirmation discovery in this
case. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand this case with instructions for the Court of Appeals to vacate the

714 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STOKES v. CRUMPTON
[369 N.C. 713 (2017)]

trial court’s order and remand the matter for reconsideration of plain-
tiff’s motion consistent with this opinion.

In April 2011, Thomas A. Stokes, III (plaintiff) and Catherine C.
Stokes (now Crumpton) (defendant) separated. Plaintiff filed an action
in July 2011 seeking equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets
and child support. Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to arbitrate
the action under North Carolina’s Family Law Arbitration Act (FLAA),
N.C.G.S. §§ 50-41 to 50-62. On 13 August 2011, the trial court entered a
Consent Order to Arbitrate Equitable Distribution and Child Support.
One of the main issues to be settled during arbitration was the value
of defendant's stake in Drug Safety Alliance, Inc. (DSA),! a company in
which defendant was the President, CEO, and majority shareholder.

As part of the agreed-upon pre-arbitration discovery, plaintiff's coun-
sel deposed defendant, seeking information, inter alia, on the value of
DSA. During the deposition, defendant testified that she had “no intention
of selling” DSA at that time, although she had been contacted by parties
interested in purchasing the company. In response to questions regard-
ing the possible sale, merger, or acquisition relating to DSA, defendant,
for the most part, responded that she did not know or could not answer
the question. During discovery, plaintiff's valuation expert also inter-
viewed defendant and specifically inquired about “any written or oral
offers to purchase DSA”; defendant said there were none. Plaintiff's
expert also requested production of documents from DSA, including buy-
sell agreements, written offers to purchase stock, and any major sale or
purchase contracts. No such documents were ever produced.

On 18 May 2012, plaintiff and defendant entered into an Equitable
Distribution Arbitration Award by Consent (the Award). That same day,
the trial court entered an order and judgment in District Court, Wake
County, confirming the award. The Award, inter alia, distributed to
defendant all stock held by her in DSA and any other interest claimed by
either party in the company. In return, defendant would pay plaintiff a
lump sum of $1,000,000.00, plus an additional $650,000.00 over a six year
period. The entire balance would become immediately due and payable,
however, if defendant sold her ownership interest in DSA.

Less than two months later, on 5 July 2012, defendant signed a Letter
of Intent to sell DSA to another company, United Drug, PLLC. In August.

1. DSA managed adverse event reporting for pharmaceutical, biotech, animal health,
and over-the-counter dietary supplement companies.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 715

STOKES v. CRUMPTON
[369 N.C. 713 (2017)]

2012, United Drug purchased DSA for $28,000,000.00, of which defen-
dant received approximately $14,000,000.00 for her shares. Plaintiff
claims to have learned about the sale through the media, without any
prior knowledge of it during arbitration.

On 26 November 2012, plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Arbitration
Award and Set Aside Order and Motion to Engage in Discovery.2
Plaintiff's motion was predicated on an allegation of fraud, that defen-
dant “intentionally induced [p]laintiff to settle through misrepresenta-
tion and/or concealment of material facts related to the sale, possible
sale, discussions, negotiations and existence of documents related to
the possible sale of DSA to a third party.” Specifically, plaintiff alleged
that defendant intended to sell DSA while arbitration was under way
and that she fraudulently induced plaintiff to accept a distribution of
only $1,650,000.00 for DSA based on her representations about the com-
pany during arbitration. According to plaintiff, during arbitration “the
parties were arguing over a valuation of the marital interest in DSA as
being between approximately two and five million dollars” and eventu-
ally stipulated to a value of $3,485,000.00 for DSA.3 Plaintiff contends
that he never would have agreed to DSA’s value had defendant disclosed
the sale opportunity.

As part of these motions, plaintiff requested leave “to conduct dis-
covery regarding discussions, negotiations and activity by and involving
[d]efendant and her company DSA, its agents and United Drug and its
agents that led to the July 5, 2012 Letter of Intent and subsequent sale
of DSA to United Drug.” On 7 August 2014, the trial court entered an
order denying plaintiff's motion for leave to engage in discovery. The
trial court concluded:

1. There is no pending action between Plaintiff and
Defendant in which discovery may be propounded.

2. Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award
is not a claim within which discovery may be con-
ducted. Plaintiff's [request for] written discovery is
therefore inappropriate.

2. Plaintiff amended his motion on 13 December 2013 to clarify that the motions
were brought under the FLAA.

3. As pointed out by defendant, the parties never stipulated to a value for DSA.
Plaintiff contends, however, that the parties reached a mutual understanding as to
DSA’s value prior to consenting to the Award.

716 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STOKES v. CRUMPTON
[369 N.C. 713 (2017)]

8. All of Plaintiff's Motions to Compel [Discovery] . . .
should be denied.

Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which filed a divided opinion
dismissing the appeal on 5 April 2016.

As a preliminary matter, the Court of Appeals addressed whether
the trial court’s order denying discovery was immediately appealable
as an interlocutory order. Stokes v. Crumpton, ___ N.C. App. __, __,
784 S.E.2d 537, 539 (2016). Agreeing with defendant, the majority con-
cluded that the order was not appealable under either the FLAA’s appeal
provision, N.C.G.S. § 50-60 (2015), or the substantial rights analysis of
N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(8)(a) (2015). See id. at ___, 784 S.E.2d at 540. In
regards to the FLAA, the majority held that the discovery order did not.
fall under any of the types of orders enumerated in subsection 50-60(a)
of the statute under which a right of appeal lies. Id. at ___, 784 S.E.2d
at 540. Specifically, the majority also concluded that the order at issue
here “is not a judgment” for purposes of subdivision 50-60(a)(6). Id. at
__, 784 S.E.2d at 541. The majority then rejected plaintiff's argument
that he was separately entitled to appeal from the order under N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-27, which governs interlocutory appeals. Id. at ____, 784 S.E.2d at
541-42. The majority concluded that plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that
he would be deprived of a substantial right without appellate review of
the order before a final judgment has been entered,” as required under
section 7A-27. Id. at___, 784 S.E.2d at 541-42.

The dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the dis-
covery order was not immediately appealable. Jd. at ___, 784 S.E.2d at
543 (Calabria, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent concluded that
the order denying discovery was appealable under subdivision 50-60(a)
(6), which the dissent deemed to be a “catch-all” provision that per-
mits appeal from “[a] judgment entered pursuant to provisions of this
Article.” Id. at ___, 784 S.E.2d at 543. According to the dissent, “judg-
ment” as used in this provision is not limited to “final judgments,” but
includes judgments that are interlocutory as well. Id. at ___, 784 S.E.2d
at 543-44. The dissent also concluded that plaintiff had a right to appeal
under section 7A-27 because plaintiff demonstrated that, if the order
‘was not immediately reviewed, he would be deprived of a substantial
right, consisting of any ability to prove the alleged fraud at the hearing
on his motion to vacate, without some limited discovery. Id. at __, 784
S.E.2d at 544-47.

Next, the dissent disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that
“[t]here is no pending action between Plaintiff and Defendant in which

IN THE SUPREME COURT 717

STOKES v. CRUMPTON
[869 N.C. 713 (2017)]

discovery may be propounded.” Id. at ____, 784 S.E.2d at 546. According
to the dissent, “plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and Set
Aside Order based on allegations that the arbitration award was pro-
cured by fraud is pending.” Jd. at ____, 784 S.E.2d at 546. In response,
the majority addressed the pending action issue in a footnote, disagree-
ing with the dissent’s interpretation and stating that “[i]t is correct that
Plaintiff's motion to vacate was pending, but the trial court concluded,
and we agree, that the action—the arbitration of the parties’ equitable
distribution action—had concluded, and the pending motion was ‘not
a claim within which discovery may be conducted.’ ” Id. at ____n.1, 784
§.E.2d at 539 n.1 (majority opinion).

Plaintiff filed an appeal of right based on the dissenting opinion, and
on 22 September 2016, this Court allowed plaintiff's petition for discre-
tionary review as to an additional issue. The issues before this Court are
whether plaintiff has a right to appeal the trial court’s order and whether
the trial court had discretion to award discovery in this case.

As a threshold matter we consider whether plaintiff had a right to
immediately appeal the trial court's order denying discovery. We hold
that he did. .

Plaintiff contends that the trial court’s interlocutory order may be
appealed if it affects a substantial right, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)
(8)(a), even if plaintiff has no right to appeal under the FLAA.4 We agree.
This Court has never explicitly addressed the interplay between appeals
under an arbitration statute and section 7A-27. The Court of Appeals
case law on this issue is unclear and somewhat contradictory. We take
this opportunity to clarify the relationship between N.C.G.S. §§ 50-60
and 7A-27.

In Bluffs, Inc. v. Wysocki, 68 N.C. App. 284, 314 S.E.2d 291 (1984),
the threshold issue before the court was whether there is an immedi-
ate right to appeal an order compelling arbitration under the Uniform
Arbitration Act (UAA), which the court held did not exist. 68 N.C. App.
at 286, 314 S.E.2d at 293. The court began its analysis by reviewing the
bases for appeal enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 1-567.18(a) and concluding

4. Plaintiff did not argue to this Court that he had a right to appeal under the FLAA
itself. Assuming arguendo that the majority at the Court of Appeals correcily determined
that plaintiff did not have a right to appeal under subdivision 50-60(a)(6) of the FLAA,
we hold that plaintiff had a right to appeal the interlocutory order under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27
because the order affected a substantial right. .

718 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STOKES v. CRUMPTON
[869 N.C. 718 (2017)]

that an order compelling arbitration does not fall under the statute. Id.
at 285, 314 S.E.2d at 292-93. After reaching this conclusion, the court
then addressed whether the order affected a substantial right. Id. at 285-
86, 314 S.E.2d at 293. Ultimately, the court held that an order compelling
arbitration is not appealable under either the UAA® or section 7A-27. Id.
at 285, 314 S.E.2d at 293.

Subsequent Court of Appeals cases relying on Wysocki have followed
asimilar analytical framework—conducting a substantial rights analysis
under section 7A-27 after concluding that the order at issue did not fall
under the enumerated bases for appeal set out in the relevant arbitration
statute. See, e.g., Smith v. Shipman, 153 N.C. App. 200, 569 S.E.2d 34,
2002 WL 31055991 (2002) (unpublished); N.C. Elec. Membership Corp.
v. Duke Power Co., 95 N.C. App. 123, 381 S.E.2d 896, disc. rev. denied,
825 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 461 (1989). Wysocki and its progeny do not
explicitly,address the relationship between appeals under an arbitration.
statute and interlocutory appeals under section 7A-27. Implicit in these
cases, however, is support for the conclusion that a right to appeal can
be based on section 7A-27 even if there is no right to appeal under the
arbitration statute.

In the present case the Court of Appeals majority based its deci-
sion, in part, on the fact that the FLAA appeal provision does not include
an order denying discovery as one of the enumerated bases for appeal.
Stokes, __ N.C. App. at ___, 784 S.E.2d at 540. The majority in Stokes
relied on Bullard v. Tall House Building, Co., 196 N.C. App. 627, 676
§.E.2d 96 (2009), quoting specifically the statement “that the list enu-
merated in [N.C.G.S.] § 1-569.28(a) includes the only possible routes for
appeal under the [Revised UAA].” Id. at ____, 784 S.E.2d at 540-41 (quot-
ing Bullard, 196 N.C. App. at 635, 676 S.E.2d at 102) (emphasis added)).
The court in Bullard concluded that the order was not appealable under
the Revised UAA and then conducted a substantial rights analysis under
section 7A-27. 196 N.C. App. at 635-39, 676 S.E.2d at 102-04. The court
held that an order compelling arbitration: (1) was not appealable under
the Revised UAA; and (2) did not impair a substantial right justifying
immediate appeal under section 7A-27. Id. at 635-39, 676 S.E.2d at 102-04.

Therefore, despite this quoted language, the court in Bullard fol-
lowed the same analysis used in Wysocki and its progeny, further

5, Although an order compelling arbitration is not appealable under the UAA, Wysocki,
68 N.C. App. at 285, 314 S.E.2d at 292-98, the Revised UAA does provide a basis for appeal
from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, N.C.GS. § 1-569.28(a)(1) (2018) (“An
appeal may be taken from... . [aln order denying a motion to compel arbitration . . ..”).

IN THE SUPREME COURT 719

STOKES v. CRUMPTON
[369 N.C. 713 (2017)]

supporting the inference that an appeal can lie from either statute.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals majority in this case similarly ana-
lyzed whether a substantial right was affected by the trial court’s order,
despite quoting Bullard and despite previously concluding that plaintiff
had no right to appeal under the FLAA itself. Stokes, __ N.C. App. at
___, 784 S.E.2d at 541-42. We hold that an appeal can be justified under
section 74-27 even if there is no right to appeal under the relevant arbi-
tration statute. To the extent Bullard suggests otherwise, it is abrogated.

Having determined that a substantial rights analysis under section
7A-27 may be conducted notwithstanding that no right to appeal lies
under the arbitration statute itself, we turn now to whether the trial
court’s order denying discovery to plaintiff in this case affected a sub-
stantial right justifying immediate appeal. We hold that the trial court’s
order denying discovery affected a substantial right.

An interlocutory order is generally not immediately appealable
unless the order “(affects a substantial right,” id. § 7A-27(b)(8)(a).
Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 161-62, 522 S.E.2d 577, 578-79 (1999)
(discussing two avenues for immediate appeal of an interlocutory
order, including N.C.G.S. § 7A-27). Discovery orders are “generally not
immediately appealable because [they are] interlocutory and do[ ] not
affect asubstantial right that would be lostif the ruling were not reviewed
before final judgment.” Id. at 163, 522 S.E.2d at 579 (citations omitted).
Such orders, however, are immediately appealable when “the desired
discovery would not have delayed trial or have caused the opposing
party any unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or
undue burden or expense, and if the information desired is highly
material to a determination of the critical question to be resolved in
the case.” Dworsky v. Travelers Ins., 49 N.C. App. 446, 447-48, 271 S.E.2d
522, 523 (1980) (emphasis added) (citing Tenn.-Carolina Pransp., Inc.
v. Strick Corp., 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977). In these situations,
“an order denying such discovery does affect a substantial right and is
appealable.” Jd. at 448, 271 S.E.2d at 528 (citing Tenn.-Carolina, 291
N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597).

Here there is no dispute that the trial court’s order is interlocutory,
as it was made while plaintiff's motion to vacate was still pending. See
Sharpe, 351 N.C. at 161, 522 S.E.2d at 578. As such, the interlocutory
order must be shown to affect a substantial right in order to justify
immediate appeal.

Plaintiff's motion requested limited discovery in the form of infor-
mation relating to the timeline, details, and discussions between DSA.

720 IN THE SUPREME COURT

STOKES v. CRUMPTON
[869 N.C. 713 (2017)]

and United Drug regarding the August 2012 sale. This information is
“highly material” to a determination on plaintiff's motion to vacate based.
on allegations that defendant fraudulently concealed the true value of
her shares in DSA. Generally, a motion to vacate an arbitration award
based on fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. See
MCI Constructors, LLC v. City af Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 858 (4th
Cir. 2010) (stating that vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act based
on an allegation of “undue means” requires that the fraud or corrup-
tion be established by clear and convincing evidence); Trafalgar House
Constr., Inc. v. MSL Enters., 128 N.C. App. 252, 257-59, 494 S.E.2d 613,
617 (1998) (holding that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof
that grounds existed to vacate an arbitration agreement under the FAA
on the basis of fraud). Fraud is generally defined as “[a] knowing misrep-
resentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce
another to act to his or her detriment.” Fraud, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014). Due to the concealment and deception inherent in fraud,
it is unlikely that plaintiff will be able to obtain information necessary to
support his motion to vacate without conducting some limited discov-
ery. Thus, because the limited discovery requested by plaintiff is “highly
material to a determination of the critical issue” in his motion to vacate,
the order denying discovery affects a substantial right justifying immedi-
ate appeal under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(8)(a). Dworsky, 49 N.C. App. at 448,
271 S.E.2d at 523 (citing Tenn.-Carolina, 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597).

Having determined that plaintiff had a right to immediately appeal
the trial court’s order denying discovery, we reverse the Court of Appeals
holding on this issue. We now consider whether the trial court had the
discretion to order discovery in the case at hand. We hold that it did.

Plaintiff contends that his motion to vacate the arbitration award
under the FLAA is a pending action under which discovery may be pro-
pounded. We agree. Under the FLAA, “upon a party’s application, the
court shall confirm an award, except when within time limits imposed
under G.S. 50-54 . . . grounds are urged for vacating . . . the award, in
which case the court shall proceed as provided in G.S. 50-54.” N.C.G.S.
§ 50-53(a) (2015) (emphases added). Section 50-54 sets forth various rea-
sons for which “the court shall vacate an award,” including that “[t]he
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means.” Jd.
§ 50-54(a)(1) (2015) (emphasis added). A timely motion to vacate under
section 50-54 predicated on corruption, fraud, or other undue means
“shall be made within 90 days after these grounds are known or should
have been known.” Jd. § 50-54(b) (2015). Plaintiff's motion to vacate was
timely filed, thus triggering the provisions of section 50-54.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 721

STOKES v. CRUMPTON
[369 N.C. 713 (2017)}

Contrary to defendant's contention, there is no law prohibiting the
trial court from utilizing its discretion to order discovery in this case.
The plain language of the FLAA itself provides a mechanism for vacat-
ing an arbitration award upon proof of fraud. See id. §§ 50-53, -54. As
stated above, clear and convincing evidence is needed to succeed on a
motion to vacate based on allegations of fraud. Given this high standard,
and the concealment and deception inherent in fraud, post-confirmation
discovery naturally follows. Moreover, there is no provision of the FLAA.
that prohibits post-confirmation discovery, and nothing within the stat-
ute limits section 50-54 solely to claims of fraud made pre-confirmation.

Section 50-53 explicitly provides an alternative, mandatory path for
courts to take if a timely motion to vacate is filed, in which event the
court shall proceed according to section 50-54. Here there is no debate
that plaintiff timely filed his motion to vacate based on an allegation
of fraud. Defendant argues that this alternative path only applies in the
pre-confirmation context; nothing, however, in the language of sections
50-53 or 50-54 supports this conclusion. Reading an exception into the
statute for post-confirmation motions would appear to create a right
without a remedy. We decline to limit the statute in such a manner with-
out clear indication of the General Assembly’s intent.

Under the terms of the FLAA, a motion to vacate based on allega-
tions of fraud disrupts the general process for confirming arbitration
awards and creates a vehicle by which confirmed awards can be vacated.
Accordingly, a motion to vacate under section 50-54 is pending because
it seeks a remedy made available by the FLAA related to the underlying
arbitration, to which plaintiff has availed himself. Therefore, the motion
to vacate was a pending action under which the trial court had the dis-
cretion to order discovery.

We hold, therefore, that plaintiff had a right to appeal the trial
court’s order denying discovery under the substantial rights analysis of
N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(3)(a), and that a right to appeal may exist under
section 74-27 even if the order is not appealable under the arbitration
statute itself. Additionally, we hold that the trial court had discretion
to award discovery in this case because the action was pending pursu-
ant to sections 50-53 and 50-54 of the FLAA. For the reasons stated, we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter
with instructions to the Court of Appeals to vacate the trial court's order
denying discovery and remand this case to the trial court for further
consideration of plaintiff's motion consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

722

IN THE SUPREME COURT

TOWN OF BEECH MOUNTAIN v. GENESIS WILDLIFE SANCTUARY, INC.

[869 N.C. 722 (2017)]
TOWN OF BEECH MOUNTAIN

v.
GENESIS WILDLIFE SANCTUARY, INC.

No. 230A16
Filed 9 June 2017

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 74-30(2) from the decision of a

divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 786 S.E.2d
335 (2016), affirming an order granting summary judgment to defendant
entered on 5 September 2014 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus; and finding no
error in an order entered on 30 October 2013 by Judge Mark E. Powell,
and in judgments entered on 29 September 2014 and 24 November 2014
and an order entered on 27 October 2014 by Judge J. Thomas Davis, all
in Superior Court, Watauga County. On 7 July 2016, the Supreme Court
allowed plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-32(b) to review an additional issue. Heard in the Supreme Court on
10 April 2017.

the

Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Jaye E. Bingham-Hinch and
Patrick H. Flanagan; and Eggers, Eggers, Eggers, & Eggers, PLLC,
by Stacy C. Eggers, IV, for plaintiff-appellant.

John J. Korzen, Wake Forest University School of Law; and
Clement Law Office, by Charles E. Clement and Charles A. Brady,
II, for defendant-appellee.

Morningstar Law Group, by William J. Brian, Jr., for Pacific Legal
Foundation, amicus curiae.
PER CURIAM.

As to the appeal of right based on the dissenting opinion, we affirm
majority decision of the Court of Appeals. We conclude that the

petition for writ of certiorari as to the additional issue was improvi-
dently allowed.

AFFIRMED; CERTIORARI IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 723

U.S. BANK NAT'L ASS'N v. PINKNEY
[369 N.C. 723 (2017)]

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee ror THs C-BASS MORTGAGE LOAN
ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-RP2
ve
WILLIE LEE PINKNEY, CLARA PINKNEY, SIDDCO, INC., anp POORE
SUBSTITUTE TRUSTEE, LTD

No. 229PA16
Filed 9 June 2017

Mortgages and Deeds of Trust—foreclosure—pleadings

The trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff's foreclosure claim
under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) where it applied requirements
applicable to non-judicial foreclosures by power of sale to a judi-
cial foreclosure. Foreclosure by action or “judicial foreclosure,”
unlike non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale, is an ordinary civil
action governed by the liberal standard of notice pleading. A miss-
ing indorsement at the initial notice-pleading stage did not preclude
the bank from proceeding with its civil action.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-
mous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. __,
787 S.E.2d 464 (2016), affirming an order entered on 5 March 2015 by
Judge Patrice A. Hinnant in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in
the Supreme Court on 11 April 2017.

Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, by Brian M. Rowlson, for
plaintiff-appellant.

Law Office of Benjamin D. Busch, PLLC, by Benjamin D. Busch,
Sor defendant-appellees Willie Lee Pinkney and Clara Pinkney.

NEWBY, Justice. —

Foreclosure by action or “judicial foreclosure,” unlike non-judicial
foreclosure by power of sale, is an ordinary civil action governed by the
liberal standard of notice pleading. As such, a complaint is sufficient if
it alleges a debt secured by a deed of trust, a default, and the plaintiff's
right to enforce the deed of trust. Here plaintiff's complaint adequately
states a cause of action for judicial foreclosure. The Court of Appeals
erred by applying the requirements applicable in non-judicial foreclo-
sure by power of sale to the plaintiff's judicial foreclosure action and,
accordingly, we reverse the decision of that court.

724 IN THE SUPREME COURT

U.S. BANK NAT’L ASS’N v. PINKNEY
[869 N.C, 723 (2017)}

In December 1997, defendants Willie Lee Pinkney and Clara Pinkney
(collectively borrower) executed a promissory note with Ford Consumer
Finance Company, Inc. (the Note) in the principal amount of $257,256.89
to purchase real property situated in Forsyth County. The debt is repay-
able through monthly installments due on the seventeenth of the month
and matures on 17 December 2027. The Note includes default and accel-
eration provisions. The debt is secured by a deed of trust on the underly-
ing real property, identified “as Lot No. 2,... SHERWOOD FOREST, ...
recorded in Plat Book 29, Page 22, in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Forsyth County.” U.S. Bank National Association (the Bank)! alleges
that it “is the present holder of the Note and Subject Deed of Trust and
is the party entitled to enforce the same.”

In September 2014, the Bank filed its complaint against borrower
and the substitute trustee under the deed of trust in Superior Court,
Forsyth County, seeking judicial foreclosure and judgment on the
Note.2 The Bank alleges, inter alia, that “the Note evidences a valid
debt owned [sic] by [borrower] to [the Bank],” that borrower “defaulted
under the terms of the Note for failure to make payments,” and that the
Bank “has given [borrower] written notice of default,” but that borrower
has “refused . . . to make the payments required.” The Bank claims that
the outstanding balance on the Note is $268,171.13 plus “past due inter
est” of $118,055.05.

In regard to the Bank’s authority to enforce the terms of the deed
of trust, the complaint states that the Note was “transferred” several
times, ultimately to the Bank. Ford Consumer Finance “endorsed” the
Note to Credit Based Asset Servicing and Securitization, LLC (Credit
Asset), which “assigned” the Note to the “Salomon Mortgage Loan Trust”
Indenture, which “specifically endorsed” the Note to the Bank.3

1. U.S. Bank National Association acts as Trustee for the C-BASS Mortgage Loan
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-RP2.

2. The Bank alleges that defendant Poore Substitute Trustee, LTD is substitute
trustee under the deed of trust and “is named in this action solely for notice purposes.”
‘The Bank successfully moved for default judgment against defendant Siddco, Inc, regard-
ing its priority of interest claim on a previously recorded deed of trust, which is not a
subject of this appeal.

3. Ford Consumer Finance Company, Inc. merged into Associates Home Equity’
Services, Inc., which executed the endorsement. Credit Asset assigned the Note to U.S.
Bank “as Indenture Trustee under the Indenture, dated as December 14, 2001, Between
Salomon Mortgage Loan ‘Trust 2001-CB4, and U.S. Bank National Association, C-Bass
Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Notes,” herein referred to as the “Salomon Mortgage Loan
Trust Indenture,”

IN THE SUPREME COURT 725

U.S. BANK NAT'L ASS'N v. PINKNEY
[869 N.C. 723 (2017)]

The Bank also attached exhibits to its complaint, including Exhibit
E (the Note), which includes allonges evidencing the two endorsements,
and Exhibit G (“Assignment of Mortgage/Deed of Trust”) evidencing the
assignment, which states that Credit Asset “for value received, does by
these presents grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and set over unto:
[the Salomon Mortgage Loan Trust Indenture] . . . all of [its] right, title
and beneficial interest in and to that certain Deed of Trust.”

Borrower moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure. Because the Bank “is not the original payee” under
the Note, borrower argued that the Exhibits reveal a “lack of indorse-
ment from the predecessor in the chain of title[, which] is fatal to the
Plaintiff’s claim of being holder entitled to enforce the instrument.”4 The
trial court dismissed the action with prejudice, and the Bank appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ‘trial court’s dismissal order.
U.S. Bank v. Pinkney, __ N.C. App. __, 787 S.B.2d 464, 2016 WL
2647709 (2016) (unpublished). Applying the requirements of N.C.G.S.
§ 45-21.16(d) applicable to non-judicial foreclosures by power of sale,
the Court of Appeals found that the Bank failed to establish its status as
a holder of the Note and therefore did not have the right to foreclose.
Pinkney, 2016 WL 2647709, at *3-5 (citing and quoting In re Foreclosure
of Gilbert, 211 N.C. App. 483, 490, 711 S.E.2d 165, 170 (2011) (requiring
holdership status to foreclose under subsection 45-21.16(d))). Because
the Bank “was not the original holder of the Note,” id. at *4, the court
reasoned that “each transfer required indorsement of the Note from one
holder to the next,” id. (quoting In re Foreclosure of Bass, 366 N.C. 464,
469, 738 S.E.2d 173, 176 (2013)). Though “plaintiff alleged . . . that it was
the present holder of the Note and Subject Deed of Trust,” id. at *6,
the court nonetheless concluded that the Exhibits lacked an essential
“indorsement from Credit Asset”—in other words, that the assignment
‘was an inadequate indorsement, id. at *5. Therefore, the court found
that “plaintiff cannot establish that it is the holder of the Note.” Id.5 We
allowed the Bank's petition for discretionary review.

4. Borrower also argued that Exhibit E (the Note) failed to establish a negotiable
instrument or an instrument under seal, and that the statute of limitations therefore barred
“any cause of action against the Defendants on the Note.”

5. Having so held, the Court of Appeals did not reach borrower's statute-of limitations
argument. Pinkney, 2016 WL 2647709, at *6.

726 IN THE SUPREME COURT

U.S. BANK NAT'L ASS'N v. PINKNEY
[869 N.C. 728 (2017)]

We review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, Bridges
v. Parrish, 366 N.C. 539, 541, 742 S.E.2d 794, 796 (2013), “view[ing] the
allegations as true and . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party,” Kirby v. NCDOT, 368 N.C. 847, 852, 786 S.E.2d 919, 923 (2016)
(citing Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjust., 362 N.C. 640, 644, 669 S.E.2d
279, 283 (2008)). The complaint is construed liberally, and dismissal is
appropriate “if it appears certain that plaintiffs could prove no set of
facts which would entitle them to relief under some legal theory,” Fussell
v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 364 N.C. 222, 225, 695 S.E.2d 437,
440 (2010) (citations omitted), or “no law exists to support the claim
made,” id. at 225, 695 S.E.2d at 440 (quoting Burgess v. Your House of
Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990).

The precise question presented is whether the complaint reveals
sufficient allegations to survive borrower's motion to dismiss the Bank’s
judicial foreclosure claim. Here the complaint provides adequate notice
of the claim. Because the Court of Appeals applied the requirements
applicable to non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale, not judicial
foreclosure, we conclude that the court erred and that dismissal on that
basis was improper.

North Carolina law has long recognized a creditor's right to proceed
with non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale or foreclosure by action
(judicial foreclosure). In re Foreclosure of Lucks, N.C. _, __, 794
§.E.2d 501, 504-05 (2016); ¢.g., Blackledge v. Nelson, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.)
418, 419 (1830). “Non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale arises under
contract and is not a judicial proceeding.” In re Lucks,__ N.C. at_,
794 S.E.2d at 504 (citation omitted). Judicial foreclosure, on the other
hand, is an ordinary civil action. See Shaw v. Wolf, 23 N.C. App. 73, 76,
208 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1974) (“A proceeding to foreclose a mortgage under
an order of court is a civil action.” (quoting 1 Thomas Johnston Wilson, II
& Jane Myers Wilson, McIntosh North Carolina Practice and Procedure
§ 239(4), at 151 (2d ed. 1956))); see also N.C.G.S. § 1-839.1(a)(1) (2015)
(“A judicial sale... is not. . . [a] sale made pursuant to a power of sale
. .. [clontained in a mortgage, deed of trust. . . .”).6 As such, the Rules
of Civil Procedure apply, and the parties are entitled to all the benefits

6. Generally, judicial foreclosure is favored when non-judicial foreclosure by power
of sale is impracticable, for example “where a poorly drafted mortgage or deed of trust
omits the granting of an express power of sale to the [creditor],” James A. Webster, Jr.,
Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina § 13.30[1], at 13-564 n.218 (Patrick K.
Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 6th ed. 2016), or “when alien priority is disputed,”
1 Grant §. Nelson et al., Real Estate Finance Lanw § 7:12, at 904 (6th ed. 2014), which may
obviate “title problems for the sale purchaser,” éd.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 727

U.S. BANK NAT'L ASS’N yv. PINKNEY
[869 N.C. 728 (2017)]

and procedures available in a civil action, including the opportunity for
discovery, to present and defend evidence, and to make legal arguments.
See In re Lucks,___N.C. at ___, 794 S.B.2d at 503 (The Rules are “appli-
cable to formal judicial actions [for foreclosure].”); see also N.C.G.S. §
14-1, Rule 1 (2015) (“These rules shall govern . . . all actions and pro-
ceedings of a civil nature ....”).

Procedurally, to pursue a. claim for judicial foreclosure, the creditor
files a complaint “in the county in which the subject [property] of the
action, or some part thereof, is situated,” N.C.G.S. § 1-76 (2015), “praying
that the real property be sold under judicial process and that the proceeds
be applied to the mortgage debt,” James A. Webster, Jr., Webster's Real
Estate Law in North Carolina § 13.30{1], at 13-56.4 (Patrick K. Hetrick
& James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 6th ed. 2016) [hereinafter Webster's]; see
In re Lucks, __ N.C. at ___, 794 S.E.2d at 505 (Unlike judicial foreclo-
sure, “non-judicial foreclosure does not require the filing of an action.”);
see also N.C.G.S. § 14-1, Rule 3(a) (2015) (“Commencement of action.”).
The complaint must allege, at minimum, a debt, default on the debt, a
deed of trust securing the debt, and the plaintiff's right to enforce the
deed of trust. See Webster's § 13.30[4], at 13-57 (“The complaint... must
set forth the mortgage contract, alleging facts entitling the plaintiff to a
money judgment by reason of a breach or default, identifying the mort-
gaged property, and asking for a foreclosure of the mortgage security.”).

If successful, the creditor obtains a judgment on the debt and a fore-
closure decree, culminating in judicial sale of the mortgaged property.
SeeN.C.GS. § 1-243 (2015) (“The Supreme and other courts [may] order[ ]
a judicial sale . . . .”); id. § 1-339.3A (2015) (allowing the court to order
public or private sale); id. § 1-339.4 (2015) (allowing the court to appoint
various persons, including the trustee under the deed of trust, to hold
the sale); see also Webster's § 13.30[4], at 18-57 (“The decree contains
not only an order for a sale of real property to satisfy the debt, but...
the court’s directions for conduct of the sale.”). Article 29A of Chapter 1
of our General Statutes governs judicial sale and foreclosure of the
mortgaged property. See N.C.G.S. § 1-339.1(a) (“A judicial sale is a sale
of property made pursuant to an order of [the court] ... , including a sale
pursuant to an order made in an action in court to foreclose a mortgage
or deed of trust... .”); see also A Survey of Statutory Changes in North
Carolina in 1949, 27 N.C. L. Rev. 405, 479-81 (1949) (discussing the pur-
pose of Article 29A, judicial sales, and sales under a power of sale).

As with any other civil action, a creditor seeking judicial foreclosure
is not required to prove its entire case at the initial pleading stage. See In
re Lucks,___N.C. at ___, 794 S.E.2d at 505 (Non-judicial foreclosure by

728 IN THE SUPREME COURT

U.S. BANK NAT'L ASS’N v. PINKNEY
[369 N.C. 723 (2017)]

power of sale, on the other hand, requires that the “creditor must show
the existence of” all the subsection 45-21.16(d) elements to proceed.).
The complaint need only contain “[a] short and plain statement of the
claim sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of
the transactions, occurrences, or series [thereof], intended to be proved
showing that the [creditor] is entitled to relief.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule
8(a) (2015). Thus, the complaint “is adequate if it gives sufficient notice
of the claim asserted ‘to enable the [borrower] to answer and prepare
for trial .. . and to show the type of case brought.’ ” Sutton v. Duke, 277
N.C. 94, 102, 176 S.E.2d 161, 165 (1970) (quoting 2A James Wm. Moore
et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 8.13 (2d ed. 1968)). “Such simplified
notice pleading is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery
and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules... .” Pyco
Supply Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 321 N.C. 435, 442-43, 364 S.E.2d
380, 384 (1988) (citing Sutton, 277 N.C. at 102, 176 S.E.2d at 165).

Here the Bank pled the facts and circumstances necessary to give
borrower adequate notice of the judicial foreclosure claim. The com-
plaint states that borrower “executed a Note in the principal amount of
$257,256.89,” which “evidences a valid debt owned [sic] by [borrower]
to [the Bank],” “secured by a Deed of Trust” on the underlying real prop-
erty. The Bank further alleged that it “is the holder of the Note” and
listed a series of Note transfers that ultimately ended with the Bank.
The Bank expressly requested “to foreclose its lien by way of judicial
foreclosure pursuant to the Subject Deed of Trust . . . as provided by
N.C.G.S. § 1-339 et seq.,” and prayed “that the Subject Property be sold
under and [through] judicial process.” These allegations are plainly suffi-
cient to satisfy the substantive elements for a judicial foreclosure claim.
Cf. Embree Consir. Grp. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 501, 411 S.E.2d
916, 926 (1992) (finding “under the liberal concept of notice pleading”
that the allegations gave “sufficient notice of the events” and substantive
elements of the plaintiff's tort claim).

Though the Bank elected to attach additional Exhibits in support
of its claim, the Exhibits do not deprive borrower of adequate notice of
foreclosure by judicial action. See Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181,
202, 254 S.E.2d 611, 625 (1979) (“[W]hen the allegations in the complaint
give sufficient notice of the wrong complained of an incorrect choice
of legal theory should not result in dismissal.”). The Bank is entitled to
submit and prove by evidence at trial its right to foreclose in a number

IN THE SUPREME COURT

U.S. BANK NAT'L ASS'N v. PINKNEY
[869 N.C. 723 (2017)]

of ways.’ Borrower is free to defend the action, such as by raising
evidentiary objections and testing the legal sufficiency of the Bank’s
case. See Thompson v. Osborne, 152 N.C. 408, 410, 67 S.E. 1029, 1029
(1910) (noting that the defendant was entitled to assert legal and equi-
table defenses in response to an action on the note at trial). A missing
indorsement at this initial notice-pleading stage does not preclude the
Bank from proceeding with its civil action. See In re Lucks, __ N.C. at
__, 794 S.E.2d at 506. The Court of Appeals therefore erred by applying
the statutory requirements of N.C.G.S. § 45-21.16(d) applicable to non-
judicial foreclosure by power of sale to the Bank’s judicial foreclosure
action sub judice.

In sum, the Bank adequately pled its claim for judicial foreclosure.
Because the Court of Appeals failed to analyze the complaint under the
notice-pleading standard applicable to judicial foreclosures, we reverse
the decision of that court and remand this case to the Court of Appeals
for consideration of borrower's remaining issue on appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

7. See, e.g., N.C.GS, § 253-301 (2016) (“ ‘Person entitled to enforce’ an instrument”
includes holder and nonholder in possession); id. § 25-3-309 (2015) (allowing “[a] person
not in possession” to enforce an instrument when it is lost, destroyed, or stolen); see also,
e.g., 25-3-203(b) (2015) (vesting transferee with transferor’s rights to enforce the instru-
ment); éd, § 25-3-203(c) (2016) (providing transferee for value the “enforceable right to
the unqualified indorsement of the transferor”); see also Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Corp. v. Carlyle, 242 BR. 881, 887 (Bankr. B.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he absence of an endorse-
ment does not . . . deprive a transferee of the right to enforce the instrument.”); Pierce
v. DeZeeww, 824 P24 97, 100 (Colo. App. 1991) (applying the indorsement exception under
the predecessor of U.C.C. § 3-208(c) to an assignment), cert, denied, Colo. Sup. Ct., (Feb.
18, 1992) (unpublished); Fleming v. Caras, 170 Ga. App. 579, 580, 317 S.E.2d 600, 602
(4984) (reversing dismissal because the plaintiff was “entitled to an indorsement” under
the predecessor of U.C.G. § 8-.208(0)).

730

IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[869 N.C. 730 (2017)]

JOHNNIE WILKES, Emprover

ve
CITY OF GREENVILLE, Emptover, SELF-INSURED
(PMA MANAGEMENT GROUP, Trirp-Parry ApMINIsTRATOR)

No, 368PA15
Filed 9 June 2017

Workers’ Compensation—Form 60 compensable injuries—
additional medical treatment sought—presumption in favor
of plaintiff

Where plaintiff-employee sustained ‘significant physical inju-
ries as a result of an automobile accident that occurred during the
course and scope of his employment, and defendant-employer filed
a Form 60 accepting that plaintiff had suffered compensable injuries
by accident and began paying temporary total compensation and
medical compensation for his injuries, the Industrial Commission
erred by failing to give plaintiff the benefit of a presumption that the
additional medical treatment he sought was for conditions related.
to his compensable injuries. Plaintiff was entitled to a presumption
that additional medical treatment for tinnitus, anxiety, and depres-
sion was related to his compensable conditions.

Workers’ Compensation—compensable condition—effect on
wage-earning capacity :

In a Workers’ Compensation case, the Industrial Commission
erred by failing to address the effects of plaintiff-employee’s tinni-
tus in determining whether he lost wage-earning capacity. The case
‘was remanded to the Commission for findings addressing plaintiff's
wage-earning capacity, considering plaintiff's compensable tinnitus
in the context of all the preexisting and coexisting conditions bear-
ing upon his wage-earning capacity.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unani-

mous decision of the Court of Appeals, __ N.C. App. ___, 777 S.E.2d.

282

(2015), reversing in part and vacating and remanding in part an

opinion and award filed on 9 April 2014 by the North Carolina Industrial
Commission. Heard in the Supreme Court on 15 February 2017.

Hunt Law Firm, PLLC, by Anita B. Hunt; and Patterson Harkavy
LLP, by Narendra K. Ghosh, for plaintiff-appellee.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 731

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 (2017)]

Brooks, Stevens & Pope, PA. by Matthew P. Blake, for
defendant-appellant.

Poisson, Poisson & Bower, PLLC, by E. Stewart Poisson; and
Sumwalt Law Firm, by Vernon Sumwalt, for North Carolina
Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.

Young Moore and Henderson, P.A., by Angela Farag Craddock;
and Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P, by M. Duane
Jones, for North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys, North
Carolina Chamber, North Carolina Retail Merchants Association,
North Carolina Home Builders Association, Employers Coalition
of North Carolina, Property Casualiy Insurers of America, and
American Insurance Association, amici curiae.

Lewis & Roberts, PLLC, by J. William Crone and J. Timothy
Wilson, for all amici; Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, LLP, by
Bruce Hamilton, for North Carolina Association of Self-Insurers,
and by Tracey Jones, for North Carolina Association of County
Commissioners; Allison B. Schafer, Legal Counsel, and Christine
T. Scheef, Staff Attorney, for N.C. School Boards Association;
and Kimberly S. Hibbard, General Counsel, for N.C. League of
Municipalities, amici curiae.

Law Offices of Kathleen G. Sumner, by Kathleen G. Sumner; and
Law Office of David P. Stewart, by David P. Stewart, for Workers’
Injury Law & Advocacy Group, amicus curiae.

HUDSON, Justice.

Plaintiff Johnnie Wilkes appealed the opinion and award of the
North Carolina Industrial Commission concluding that: (1) plaintiff
failed to meet his burden of establishing that, his anxiety and depres-
sion were a result of his work-related accident; and (2) plaintiff was
not entitled to disability payments made after 18 January 2011. Wilkes
v. City of Greenville, __N.C. App.__, __, __, 777 S.E.2d 282, 284-85,
289 (2015). On appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously vacated and
remanded in part, holding that on remand in reviewing plaintiff's enti-
tlement to medical treatment, the Commission should give plaintiff the
benefit of a presumption that his anxiety and depression were related
to his injuries, and reversed in part, holding that plaintiff had met his
burden of establishing disability. Id. at___, __, 777 8.E.2d at 285-91.

732 IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
(369 N.C. 780 (2017)]

Because we agree that plaintiff was entitled to a presumption of com-
pensability in regards to his continued medical treatment, we affirm that
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Because we conclude
further that the Commission failed to address the effects of plaintiff's
tinnitus in determining whether he lost wage-earning capacity, we mod-
ify and affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision, and remand
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Background

Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a landscaper for approxi-
mately nine years before 21 April 2010, when he was involved in a motor
vehicle wreck while on the job. Plaintiff was driving a truck owned by
defendant when a third party ran a red light and struck plaintiff's vehicle.
The truck then collided with a tree, causing the windshield to break and
the airbags to deploy. Plaintiff was taken to the emergency room at Pitt
County Memorial Hospital and treated for his injuries, which included
an abrasion on his head, three broken ribs, and injuries to his neck, back,
pelvis, and hip. The following day, plaintiff returned to the ER complain-
ing of dizziness; an MRI revealed that plaintiff had suffered a concussion
from the accident. Slightly over a week later, on 29 April 2010, defendant
filed a Form 60 with the North Carolina Industrial Commission, in which
defendant accepted plaintiff's claim as compensable under the Workers’
Compensation Act (Act), and described the injury as “worker involved
in MVA and had multiple injuries to ribs, neck, legs and entire left side.”
Defendant began paying plaintiff compensation for temporary total dis-
ability and provided medical compensation for plaintiff's injuries.

Plaintiff saw numerous physicians over the next year for treatment
and evaluation of continuing complaints of pain in his back and leg,
ringing in his ears (tinnitus), anxiety: and depression, and sleep loss. On
18 January 2011, defendant filed a Form 33 requesting that plaintiff's
claim be assigned for a hearing before the Commission, stating that the
“(parties disagree about the totality of plaintiff's complaints related to
his compensable injury and need for additional medical evaluations.”
On 28 January 2011, plaintiff filed a Form 33 requesting an “Expedited
Medical Motion” hearing, listing his work-related injuries as “head, back,
depression, ringing in ears [tinnitus], memory loss, speech changes,
dizziness, balance, etc.,” and stating that he was “in need of additional
medical treatment . . . specifically an evaluation by a neurosurgeon.”
After a conference call hearing on 4 February 2011, plaintiff saw Robert
Lacin, M.D., a neurosurgeon; the Commission held a subsequent con-
ference call hearing on 7 April 2011, and declined to refer plaintiff to
a neuropsychiatrist.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 733

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[869 N.C. 730 (2017)]

Eventually, the matter was heard in person beforé Deputy
Commissioner Mary C. Vilas on 21 September 2011, after which depo-
sitions of medical personnel were taken. On 1 February 2013, Deputy
Commissioner Vilas entered an opinion and award determining that
plaintiff's low back and leg pain, anxiety, depression, sleep disorder,
tinnitus, headaches, and temporomandibular joint pain were causally
related to his 21 April 2010 compensable injury. Deputy Commissioner
Vilas also determined that plaintiff had established temporary total dis-
ability by demonstrating “that he is capable of some work but that it
would be futile to seek work at this time because of preexisting condi-
tions of his age, full-scale IQ of 65, education level and reading capac-
ity at grade level 2.6, previous work history of manual labor jobs, and
his physical conditions resulting from his April 21, 2010 compensable
injury.” Accordingly, the deputy commissioner ordered defendant to pay
plaintiff temporary total disability until he returned to work or until fur-
ther order of the Commission and to pay all medical expenses reason-
ably required to effect a cure or lessen plaintiff's period of disability.
Defendant appealed to the Full Commission (Commission).

The Commission heard the case on 4 November 2013, and consid-
ered the parties’ stipulations, exhibits, testimony from multiple wit-
nesses, including plaintiff and plaintiff's wife, and depositions taken
from Doctors Albernaz, Tucci, Lacin, Schulz, Hervey, and Gualtieri. The
Cormmission found that plaintiff suffered tinnitus as a result of the 21
April 2010 accident, but that the evidence regarding his alleged anxiety
and depression was conflicting. The Commission noted, for example,
that “Dr. Schulz diagnosed Plaintiff with malingering along with possi-
ble mild depression,” and that “Dr. Gualtieri concurred with Dr. Schulz’s
diagnosis of symptom exaggeration and malingering.” On the other
hand, “Dr. Hervey disagreed with Dr. Schulz’s malingering diagnosis
.... Dr. Hervey noted ‘apparent distress’ and diagnosed Plaintiff with
depression and anxiety,” while Dr. Tucci diagnosed Plaintiff with “severe
tinnitus” and testified that the tinnitus was “wrapped up with the anxiety
or depression.” Accordingly, the Commission found, in relevant part:

34, Based on the preponderance of the evidence,
including testimony by Doctors Albernaz and Tucci,
the Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff has not
reached maximum medical improvement with regard to
his tinnitus.

35. Testimony by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's wife, and
Doctors Lacin, Schulz, Hervey, and Gualtieri is conflicting

734 IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.G. 730 (2017)]

as to whether Plaintiff is currently suffering from anxiety
and depression. Based upon a preponderance of all the
evidence of record, the Full Commission concludes that
Plaintiff's alleged anxiety and depression was not caused
by the 21 April 2010 work-related accident.

Based on these findings of fact, the Commission concluded that
while plaintiff was entitled to medical compensation for his tinnitus,
plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of establishing that he had anxiety
and depression caused by his work-related accident, and that therefore,
plaintiff was not entitled to medical compensation for those conditions.
The Commission further concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to any
disability payments made after 18 January 2011 (the date defendant filed
a Form 33 requesting a hearing on plaintiff's claims), and that defendant.
was entitled to a credit for any payments it had made after that date.
More specifically, the Commission made the following relevant conclu-
sions of law:

2. . Based upon all credible evidence, the Full
Commission concludes that Plaintiff has met his burden
of showing that on 21 April 2010 he suffered compensa-
ble injuries [to] his head and ears leading to tinnitus as
aresult of a traffic accident arising out of the course and
scope of his employment with Employer-Defendant.

4. Plaintiff is entitled to the payment of past and
future medical expenses incurred for treatment that was
reasonably required to effect a cure, provide relief or
Jessen any disability, including such further treatment for
his tinnitus that may be recommended by Doctors Tucci
and Albernaz.

5. Where depression or other emotional trauma has
been caused by a compensable accident and injury, and
such depression or trauma has caused disability, then
total disability benefits may be allowed. Here, the evi-
dence is conflicting as to whether Plaintiff has suffered
from depression and whether any depression was caused
by the 21 April 2010 work-related accident. Based upon
the preponderance of the evidence, the Full Commission
concludes that Plaintiff has not met his burden of show-
ing that his alleged depression and anxiety is a result of

IN THE SUPREME COURT 735

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 (2017)]

the 21 April 2010 work-related accident or has caused him.
any temporary disability.

6. ... The Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff
has not presented evidence of a reasonable job search
and has presented insufficient evidence that a job search
would be futile. Thus, the Full Commission concludes
that Plaintiff is entitled to temporary total disability
benefits from the 21 April 2010 work-related injury until
18 January 2011, the date that Employer-Defendant filed a
Form 33 requesting a hearing on Plaintiff's claims.

(Citations omitted.) On 9 April 2014, the Commission issued its opinion
and award, from which plaintiff appealed.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals first vacated the por-
tion of the opinion and award concerning plaintiff's request for addi-
tional medical treatment for anxiety and depression. Wilkes, ___ N.C.
App. at___, ___, 777 S.E.2d at 287-88, 292. In light of the court's previous
decisions in Parsons v. Pantry, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 540, 485 S.E.2d 867
(1997), and Perez v. American Airlines/AMR Corp., 174 N.C. App. 128,
620 S.E.2d 288 (2005), disc. rev. improvidently allowed per curiam,
360 N.C. 587, 634 S.E.2d 887 (2006), the court held that the Commission
erred by not applying the rebuttable Parsons presumption to plaintiff's
anxiety and depression, and instead placing the burden on plaintiff to
demonstrate causation of those conditions. Wilkes, __ N.C. App. at_,
777 S.E.2d at 285-88. The court remanded the matter to the Commission
to “apply the Parsons presumption and then make a new determination
as to whether Plaintiff's psychological symptoms are causally related to
the 21 April 2010 injury.” Id. at__, 777 S.E.2d at 287-88.

Additionally, the court reversed the portion of the Commission’s
opinion and award terminating plaintiff's total temporary disability ben-
efits. Id. at ___, 777 S.E.2d at 292. Noting the testimony of Kurt Voos,
M_D., who “authorized Plaintiff to return to work at sedentary duty with
permanent restrictions including lifting up to 10 lbs with occasional
walking and standing,” the court stated that based on this testimony the
Commission had found that plaintiff was “incapable of returning to his
previous job but is capable of working in sedentary employment.” Id. at
__, 777 S.E.2d at 289. The court also took note of other facts found by
the Commission:

Specifically, the Commission found that Plaintiff (1) was 60
years old at the time of the hearing; (2) had been employed
as a landscaper with Defendant since 2001; (3) had been

736 IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 (2017)]

employed in medium and heavy labor positions through-

out his entire adult life; (4) attended school until the tenth

grade; (5) was physically incapable of performing his for-

mer job as a landscaper/laborer; (6) has “difficulty reading

and comprehending” written material as evidenced during

his evaluation with Dr. Peter Schulz; and (7) has “an IQ of

65, putting him in the impaired range.”
Id. at __, T77 S.E.2d at 289. The court held that with this evidence,
plaintiff had met his initial burden of showing that a job search would
be futile so as to shift the burden to his employer to show that suitable
jobs were available. Id. at ____, 777 S.E.2d at 289-90. Because defendant
made no such showing, the court concluded that “the Commission erred
in ruling that Plaintiff was not temporarily totally disabled,” and that
the Commission’s “conclusions of law reaching the opposite result were
not supported by the findings of fact contained within its Opinion and
Award.” Id. at __, 777 S.E.2d at 291.

Defendant filed a petition for discretionary review, which this Court
allowed on 18 April 2016.

L Medical A
[1] Here defendant argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that plaintiff was entitled to a presumption that his anxiety and depres-

sion were causally related to his compensable injuries. We do not agree,
and affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue.

Our review of an order of the Commission is limited to determining
“whether any competent evidence supports the Commission’s findings
of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission’s con-
clusions of law.” Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530
§.E.2d 549, 558 (2000); see also N.C.G.S. § 97-86 (2015). But, “[w]hen the
Commission acts under a misapprehension of the law, the award must
be set aside and the case remanded for a new determination using the
correct legal standard.” Ballenger v. ITT Grinnell Indus. Piping, Inc.,
320 N.C. 155, 158, 357 S.E.2d 683, 685 (1987) (citing, inter alia, Conrad
v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266 (1930)). “When
considering a case on discretionary review from the Court of Appeals, we
review the decision for errors of law.” Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Ba. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 611, 781 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2016) (citing N.C.
R. App. P. 16(a)).

In construing the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act,
“[w]e have held in decision after decision that our Workmen’s

IN THE SUPREME COURT 737

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[869 N.C. 730 (2017)]

Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its pur
pose to provide compensation for injured employees or their depen-
dants, and its benefits should not be denied by a technical, narrow, and
strict construction.” Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159
S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968) (citing 3 Strong’s North Carolina Index: Master
and Servant § 45 (1960)). But, we are mindful that the Act “was never
intended to be a general accident and health insurance policy.” Weaver
v. Swedish Imports Maint., Inc., 319 N.C. 243, 253, 354 S.E.2d 477, 483
(1987). We have also noted that “[t]he primary purpose of legislation of
this kind is to compel industry to take care of its own wreckage.” Barber
v. Minges, 223 N.C. 218, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943); see also Deese
v. Se. Lawn & Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275, 278, 293 S.E.2d 140, 143
(1982) (“[I]n all cases of doubt, the intent of the legislature regarding
the operation or application of a particular provision is to be discerned
from a consideration of the Act as a whole—its language, purposes
and spirit.”).

A claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act “is the
right of the employee, at his election, to demand compensation for
such injuries as result from an accident.” Biddia v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237
N.C. 660, 663, 75 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1953). Under the terms of the Act, an
“injury” is compensable when it is: (1) by accident; (2) arising out of
employment; and (8) in the course of employment. N.C.G.S. § 97-2(6)
(2015); Gallimore v. Marilyn’s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529,
531 (1977).

When the employee suffers a compensable injury, “[m]edical com-
pensation shall be provided by the employer.” N.C.G.S. § 97-25(a) (2015)
(emphasis added); Mehaffey v. Burger King, 367 N.C. 120, 124, 749
S.E.2d 252, 255 (2013) (“The Act places upon an employer the respon-
sibility to furnish ‘medical compensation’ to an injured -employee.”).
“Medical Compensation” includes any treatment that “may reasonably
be required to effect a cure or give relief” or “tend to lessen the period of
disability.” N.C.G.S. § 97-2(19) (2015); see also Little v. Penn Ventilator
Co., 317 N.C. 206, 213, 345 S.E.2d 204, 209 (1986) (“In our judgment
relief embraces not only an affirmative improvement towards an injured
employee’s health, but also the prevention or mitigation of further
decline in that health due to the compensable injury.”); Parsons, 126
N.C. App. at 542, 485 S.E.2d at 869 (“ ‘Logically implicit’ in this statute
is the requirement that the future medical treatment be ‘directly related
to the original compensable injury.’ ” (quoting Pittman v. Thomas &
Howard, 122 N.C. App. 124, 130, 468 S.E.2d 283, 286, disc. rev. denied,
343 N.C. 513, 472 S.E.2d 18 (1996))). The employee's “right to medical

738 IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 (2017)]

compensation” continues until “two years after the employer's last pay-
ment of medical or indemnity compensation.” N.C.G.S. § 97-25.1 (2015)
(emphasis added). At that point, the right to medical compensation ter-
minates, unless, before the end of that period: “(i) the employee files with
the Commission an application for additional medical compensation
which is thereafter approved by the Cormmission, or (ii) the Commission
on its own motion orders additional medical compensation.” Id.

The question here concerns whether, when an injury has previously
been established as compensable, a presumption arises that additional
medical treatment is related to the compensable injury. While we have
yet to address whether a presumption arises in the context of medical
compensation, the Court of Appeals first addressed this issue in Parsons
v. Pantry, Inc.

In Parsons the plaintiff was working in the defendant’s store late at
night when two men entered. 126 N.C. App. at 540-42, 485 S.E.2d at 868.
One of the men struck the plaintiff in the forehead and shot her multiple
times with a stun gun. Jd. At a hearing before the Commission, the plain-
tiff met her burden of establishing that as a result of the incident she
suffered compensable injuries, which consisted primarily of headaches.
Id. at 540-42, 485 S.E.2d at 868-69. Accordingly, the Commission entered
an opinion and award ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff's medi-
cal expenses and to provide additional treatment “which tends to effect
a cure, give relief, or lessen the plaintiff's period of disability.” Id. at
540-41, 485 S.E.2d at 868. When the plaintiff subsequently requested
a, hearing because of the defendant's failure to pay medical expenses,
the Commission denied her any further medical treatment on the basis
that she had “not introduced any evidence of causation between her
injury and her headache complaints at the time of the hearing.” Id. at
541, 485 S.E.2d at 868-69. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that it was error to place the burden on the plaintiff
to prove causation in order to obtain additional medical treatment. Id.
at 542-43, 485 S.E.2d at 869. The court explained that the plaintiff had
met her burden at the initial hearing, and that “[t]o require plaintiff to
re-prove causation each time she seeks treatment for the very injury that
the Commission has previously determined to be the result of a com-
pensable accident is unjust and violates our duty to interpret the Act in
favor of injured employees.” Id. at 542, 485 S.E.2d at 869. This presump-
tion that additional medical treatment is directly related to the compen-
sable injury has since become known as the “Parsons presumption.”
See Wilkes, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 777 S.E.2d at 286 (“Once the employee
meets this initial burden, however, a presumption arises—often referred

IN THE SUPREME COURT 739

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 (2017)]

to as the Parsons presumption—that ‘additional medical treatment is
directly related to the compensable injury.’ ” (quoting Perez, 174 N.C.
App. at 135, 620 S.E.2d at 292)).

The Court of Appeals has since held that the Parsons presumption
applies both to agreements to pay compensation by means of a Form 21
(‘Agreement for Compensation for Disability”) and to cases involving
“direct payment” accompanied by a Form 60 (“Employer's Admission of
Employee's Right to Compensation (G.S. § 97-18(b))”). See Reinninger
v. Prestige Fabricators, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 255, 259-60, 523 S.E.2d 720,
728-24 (1999); see also Perez, 174 N.C. App. at 185-37, 620 S.B.2d at 292-
94. With the filing of a Form 21, the employer agrees after a workplace
injury to accept the claim as compensable pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 97-18
and 97-82. The statutes require the employer to file a “memorandum of
agreement” in the form prescribed by the Commission; once approved,
that document constitutes an award of the Commission. N.C.G.S.
§§ 97-82, -87(a)(2) (2015); see also Watkins v. Cent. Motor Lines, Inc.,
279 N.C. 132, 138, 181 S.E.2d 588, 593 (1971) (“The agreement between
the parties on Form 21, approved by the Commission . . . . constituted
an award by the Commission . . . .”). The statutes also permit “direct
payment” by the employer, which requires no approval either from the
Comunission or the employee, and allows the employer to promptly initi-
ate payments to the employee following an injury. N.C.G.S. § 97-18(b),
(d) (2015); id. § 97-82. In 1994, the legislature enacted direct payment by
amending subsection 97-18(b), adding subsection 97-18(d), and amend-
ing N.C.G.S. § 97-82(b). The Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 1994,
ch. 679, secs. 3.1, 3.2, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 1994) 394, 400-03.
Under the current statutory framework, when the employer proceeds
with direct payment, the employer can file with the Commission a Form
60 “admit[ting] the employee's right to compensation” under N.C.G.S.
§ 97-18(b). See, ¢.g., Clark v. Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41, 42, 619 S.E.2d 491,
492 (2005). In the alternative, the employer can file a Form 63 under
N.C.G.S. § 97-18(d), in which the employer may initiate payments without
prejudice and without admitting liability, after which the employer has
ninety days to contest or accept liability for the claim. See, ¢.g., Johnson
v. S. Tire Sales & Serv., 358 N.C. 701, 702, 599 S.E.2d 508, 510 (2004).
Notably, N.C.G.S. § 97-82(b) provides that “[p]ayment pursuant to G.S. .
97-18(b), or payment pursuant to G.S. 97-18(d) when compensability
and liability are not contested prior to expiration of the period for pay-
ment without prejudice, shall constitute an award of the Commission on
the question of compensability of and the insurer's liability for the injury
for which payment was made.”

740 IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 (2017)]

We hold that plaintiff here is entitled to a presumption that addi-
tional medical treatment is related to his compensable conditions. This
holding is consistent both with the statutory language and with cases
pointing out that “compensability” and “disability” are separate issues.
We have recognized that a presumption of ongoing disability arises only
in limited circumstances—specifically, once the disability has been
admitted or proved to the Industrial Commission. Johnson, 358 N.C.
at 706, 599 S.E.2d at 512. This judicial construction of a presumption
of ongoing disability arising based upon an “award of the Commission”
dates back to at least 1951. Tucker v. Lowdermilk, 233 N.C. 185, 189,
63 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1951) (“However, if an award is made, payable dur-
ing disability, and there is a presumption that disability lasts until the
employee returns to work, there is likewise a presumption that disability
ended when the employee returned to work.”); see also Watkins, 279
N.C. at 137, 181 S.E.2d at 592 (“If an award is made by the Industrial
Commission, payable during disability, there is a presumption that dis-
ability lasts until the employee returns to work... .”). On that basis, we
held that while the employer admits compensability by filing a Form 60,
or a Form 63 when the employer fails to contest compensability within
the ninety-day period, no presumption of disability arises in those cir-
cumstances. Clark, 360 N.C. at 48-46, 619 S.E.2d at 492-94; Johnson, 358
N.C. at 706-07, 599 S.E.2d at 512-13.

Nonetheless, on the issue of compensability in the same circum-
stances, we view the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 97-82(b) as dispositive.
Subsection 97-82(b) provides that “[p]ayment pursuant to G.S. 97-18(b),
or payment pursuant to G.S. 97-18(d) when compensability and liability
are not contested prior to expiration of the period for payment without
prejudice, shall constitute an award of the Commission on the ques-
tion of compensability of and the insurer's liability for the injury for
which payment was made.” (Emphasis added.) Continually placing the
burden on an employee to prove that his symptoms are causally related
to his admittedly compensable injury before he can receive further med-
ical treatment “ignores this prior award.” Parsons, 126 N.C. App. at 542,
485 §.E.2d at 869. Accordingly, we conclude that an admission of com-
pensability approved under N.C.G.S. § 97-82(b) entitles an employee to a
presumption that additional medical treatment is causally related to his
compensable injury. In reaching this conclusion, we note the mandatory
Janguage of N.C.G.S. § 97-25(a) (stating that “[m]Jedical compensation
shall be provided by the employer” (emphasis added)), as well as the
fact that medical compensation encompasses any treatment that “may
reasonably be required to effect a cure or give relief,” Id. § 97-2(19).

IN THE SUPREME COURT TAL

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 (2017)

Defendant contends that the “award” under N.C.G.S. § 97-82(b) is
merely an admission that the employee has suffered an accident arising
out of and in the course of employment, and that the specifics of any
injury must still be determined by an adjudication of the Commission.
We conclude otherwise. Requiring the employee to repeatedly “build
claims for medical compensation” for an admittedly compensable
injury, as argued by defendant, would be inconsistent with the language
of N.C.G.S. §§ 97-25, 97-2(19), and 97-82(b), as well as the purpose and
spirit of the Act. We decline to adopt such a narrow interpretation of
the Act.

Moreover, defendant’s proposed interpretation would allow the
employer, by “admitting” that the employee has suffered a compensa-
ble injury, to enjoy the right to direct the employee’s medical treatment
without accepting the accompanying responsibility to provide medi-
cal compensation for any treatment until the employee has proved its
relatedness to the compensable injury. We have observed that, concomi-
tant with the employer's duty under N.C.G.S. § 97-25 to provide, and
the employee's right to receive, medical compensation, is the employ-
er’s right to direct the medical treatment that it furnishes. Schofield
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 299 N.C. 582, 586-87, 264 S.E.2d 56, 60 (1980);
see N.C.G.S. § 97-25 (2015). Even before compensability is established,
when the employee claims compensation after an injury, the employer
has the right to direct the employee to submit to an independent medi-
cal examination by one of its authorized physicians. N.C.G.S. § 97-27(a)
(2015); see also Kanipe v. Lane Upholstery, 141 N.C. App. 620, 624, 540
§.E.2d 785, 788 (2000) (“One of the implicit purposes of this requirement
is to enable the employer to ascertain whether the injury is work-related
or not and thus whether the claim is indeed compensable.”), disc. rev.
denied, 356 N.C. 303, 570 S.E.2d 725 (2002).

Finally, defendant argues that applying the Parsons presumption to
a Form 60 filing will discourage direct payment, upset the framework of
the Act, and convert the Act into general health insurance. We are uncon-
vinced. Applying the rebuttable presumption merely removes from the
employee seeking medical treatment the burden of proving every time
that such treatment is for injuries or symptoms causally related to the
admittedly compensable condition. Perez, 174 N.C. App. at 135, 620
§.E.2d at 292. The employer may rebut this presumption with evidence
that the condition or treatment is not directly related to the compen-
sable injury. Id. at 135, 620 S.E.2d at 292. Defendant has not identified

742, IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 (2017)}

any marked decrease in the use of Form 60s, or any increase in related.
litigation and costs, since Perez was decided in 2004.1

Certainly, medical issues can be complex and the extent of an
employee's injuries may be difficult to determine at the time of the acci-
dent. However, with N.C.G.S. § 97-27(a) (providing that an employee
alleging a compensable injury is required to submit to a medical exami-
nation by the employer’s authorized physician) and N.C.G.S. § 97-18(d)
(authorizing payment without prejudice to later contest liability), the
legislature has wisely given employers who are uncertain about the
compensability of an employee’s injuries the methods to investigate
such injuries without admitting any liability under the Act while still
providing prompt payments to injured employees.

In addition, the legislature has provided more recently for an expe-
dited “medical motions” procedure, which was utilized here and can
quickly be used to rebut the presumption if appropriate.” In 2007 the
General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 97-78 to require the Commission
to implement a plan to expeditiously resolve disputes involving medi-
cal compensation. Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act of 2007, ch. 323, sec. 13.4A.(a), 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws
616, 787-88. And in 2018 the legislature amended N.C.G.S. § 97-25(£)
to set forth such an expedited procedure. Act of July 9, 2018, ch. 294,
sec. 4, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 802, 803-04. Thus, our holding on this
issue is consistent with both the statutory mandate to provide treat-
ment to the employee and with any employer's need to quickly rebut
the presumption.

Here, as a result of a motor vehicle crash that occurred within the
course and scope of his employment, plaintiff sustained injuries that
included an abrasion on his head, three broken ribs, and injuries to

1. To the contrary, following the enactment of direct payment and our holdings in
Johnson and Clark, Forms 60 and 63 have essentially replaced Forms 21 and 26. See North
Carolina Workers’ Compensation Law: A Practical Guide to Success at Buery Stage of
@ Claim 155-56 (Valerie A. Johnson & Gina E. Cammarano eds., 3d ed. 2016) (“The use of
[Form 21 and Form 26], however, has declined dramatically since the 1994 amendments to
the Act. Employers and insurance carriers instead use a Form 60 or Form 63 procedure
to admit liability for a claim and pay weeldy benefits, without giving rise to any presump-
tion of disability. Thus, the presumption of continuing disability, while it still exists, is
increasingly irrelevant.” (citations omitted)).

2. Here, where plaintiff utilized these expedited procedures, the matter might well
have been concluded speedily, had the presumption been properly applied.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 743

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[869 N.C. 730 (2017)]

his neck, back, pelvis, hip, and entire left side, as well as a concussion.
Defendant filed a Form 60 accepting that plaintiff suffered compensable
injuries by accident and began paying temporary total compensation
and medical compensation for plaintiff's injuries. Accordingly, when
plaintiff sought additional medical treatment for tinnitus, anxiety, and
depression, alleging that these conditions were directly related to his
compensable injuries, he was entitled to a rebuttable presumption to
that effect. It is clear from the Commission's Conclusions of Law that
did it not apply any presumption, and instead placed the initial burden
on plaintiff to prove causation for any medical compensation he sought:

2. The claimant in a workers’ compensation case
bears the initial burden of proof, and must establish “each
and every element of compensability,” including a causal
relationship between the injury and his employment.
Based upon all credible evidence, the Full Commission
concludes that Plaintiff has met his burden of showing
that on 21 April 2010 he suffered compensable injuries
[to] his head and ears leading to tinnitus as a result of a
traffic accident arising out of the course and scope of his
employment with Employer-Defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
97-2(6).

5. ... Based upon the preponderance of the evi-
dence, the Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff has
not met his burden of showing that his alleged depression
and anxiety is a result of the 21 April 2010 work-related
accident ....

(Citation omitted.) Because the Commission acted under a misappre-
hension of law, the Court of Appeals vacated the opinion and award on
this issue and remanded for application of the presumption; we affirm
this portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. See Ballenger, 320 N.C.
at 158, 357 S.E.2d at 685. We note that plaintiff was evaluated by sev-
eral physicians and that the Commission found the evidence regarding
plaintiff's anxiety and depression to be “conflicting.” Like the Court of
Appeals, “[w]e express no opinion on the question of whether the evi-
dence of record is sufficient to rebut the presumption that Plaintiff's cur-
rent complaints are directly related to his initial compensable injury.”
Wilkes, __ N.C. App. at ____, 777 S.E.2d at 288. We leave this determina-
tion to the Commission on remand.

744 IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[869 N.C. 730 (2017)}

IL_Disability

[2] On the issue of disability, the Court of Appeals, relying in part on
Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425
S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993), held that the uncontroverted evidence establish-
ing plaintiff's cognitive limitations adequately demonstrated that any
attempt by him to find other employment would be futile, and therefore,
plaintiff was entitled to total disability benefits. Defendant argues that
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Commission's termination of
plaintiff's temporary total disability benefits. We modify and affirm that
decision, and remand for further proceedings.

As we explained in Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Construction, LLC,
“disability” is defined by the Act in N.C.GS. § 97-2(9) as:

“incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which
the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the
same or any other employment.” Id. §§ 97-2(9) (2013),
-2(H) (1930). This definition, we have long and consistently
held, specifically relates to the incapacity to earn wages,
rather than only to physical infirmity. See, ¢.g., Hendrix
v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374,
378-79 (1986); Fleming v. K-Mart Corp., 312. N.C. 588, 541,
324 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1985). In Hilliard [v. Apex Cabinet
Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982)], we
articulated again the three factual elements that a plaintiff
must prove to support the legal conclusion of disability:

[“]We are of the opinion that in order to support a
conclusion of disability, the Commission must find: (1)
that plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the
same wages he had earned before his injury in the same
employment, (2) that plaintiff was incapable after his
injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his
injury in any other employment, and (8) that this individ-
ual’s incapacity to earn was caused by plaintiff's injury.[”]

367 N.C. 414, 420, 760 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2014). In 1993 the Court of

Appeals issued its decision in Russell, apparently to provide examples
of methods? by which a plaintiff could prove disability as defined above.

8. “The employee may meet this burden in one of four ways: (1) the production of
medical evidence that he is physically or mentally, as a consequence of the work related
injury, incapable of work in any employment, Peoples, 316 N.C. at 443, 342 S.E.2d at 809;
@) the production of evidence that he is capable of some work, but that he has, after a

IN THE SUPREME COURT 745

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[869 N.C. 730 (2017)]

Here we emphasize that this Court has not adopted Russell, and that the
approaches taken therein are not the only means of proving disability. See
id. at-422, 760 S.E.2d at 737 (stating that “Hilliard was grounded explicitly
in the statutory definition of disability in section 97-2; Russell expanded
upon, and perhaps diverged from, that grounding” and that the Russell
methods “are neither statutory nor exhaustive” (emphases added)). In
fact, the issue in Russell was “whether an injured employee seeking an
award of total disability under N.C.G.S. § 97-29, who is wnemployed,
medically able to work, and possesses no preexisting limitations
which would render him unemployable,” presented sufficient evidence
that he was unable to find work. Russell, 108 N.C. App. at 764-65, 425
§.E.2d at 456-57 (emphasis added). Here, where plaintiff has numerous
preexisting limitations as found by the Commission (over the age of
sixty, limited IQ of sixty-five, limited education and work experience),
Russell is inapposite. Again, we have stated that, in determining loss
of wage-earning capacity, the Commission must take into account age,
education, and prior work experience as well as other preexisting and
coexisting conditions. Litile v. Anson Cty. Sch. Food Serv., 295 N.C. 527,
532, 246 S.E.2d 743, 746 (1978). While plaintiff here bears the burden
of proof to establish disability, once plaintiff has done so, the burden
shifts to defendant “to show not only that suitable jobs are available,
but also that the plaintiff is capable of getting one, taking into account
both physical and vocational limitations.” Johnson, 358 N.C. at 706, 708,
599 S.E.2d at 512, 513 (quoting Burwell v. Winn-Dinie Raleigh, Inc., 114
N.C. App. 69, 73, 441 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1994) (emphasis omitted).

Defendant argues that, in reversing the Commission, the Court of
Appeals erroneously overruled an earlier decision of that court in Fields
v. H&E Equipment Services, LLC, 240 N.C. App. 483, 771 S.E.2d 791
(2015). It is unclear whether defendant, in relying on Fields, is arguing
that plaintiff was required to produce expert testimony to prove that
engaging in a job search would be futile under Russell. See Fields, 240
N.C. App. at 483, 771 S.E.2d at 792 (concluding that the plaintiff did
not establish futility because he “failed to provide competent evidence

reasonable effort on his part, been unsuccessful in his effort to obtain employment, id.
at 444, [842] $.B.2d at 809; 1C Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation
§ 57.61(d) (1992); (3) the production of evidence that he is capable of some work but
that it would be futile because of preexisting conditions, i.e., age, inexperience, lack of
education, to seek other employment, Peoples, 316 N.C. at 444, 342 $.E.2d at 809; or (4) the
production of evidence that he has obtained other employment at a wage less than that
eared prior to the injury[,] Tyndall v. Walter Kidde Co., 102 N.C. App. 726, 730, 403 S.B.2d
548, 550, disc. rev. denied, 329 N.C. 505, 407 S.E.2d 553 (1991).” Russell, 108 N.C. App. at
765-66, 425 S.E.2d at 457.

746 IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 2017)]

through expert testimony of his inability to find any other work as a
result of his work-related injury” (emphasis added)). Because we have
held that Russell does not apply here, this argument is misplaced; how-
ever, we have never held, and decline to do so now, that an employee
is required to produce expert testimony in order to demonstrate his
inability to earn wages. A plaintiff's own testimony, as well as that of his
lay witnesses, can be quite competent to explain how a plaintiff's injury
and any related symptoms have affected his activities. See Kennedy
v. Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., 101 N.C. App. 24, 81, 398 S.B.2d 677, 681
(1990) (“Testimony by the plaintiff him/herself has also been found to
be competent on the issue of wage earning capacity.” (citing Singleton
v. D.T. Vance Mica Co., 235 N.C. 815, 325, 69 S.E.2d 707, 714 (1952).
If plaintiff shows total incapacity for work, taking into account his
work-related conditions combined with the other factors noted above,
he is not required to also show that a job search would be futile. See
Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 444, 342 S.E.2d 798, 809 (1986)
(‘In order to prove disability, the employee need not prove he unsuc-
cessfully sought employment if the employee proves he is unable to
obtain employment.”).

We have often stated that the Commission must make specific find-
ings that address the “crucial questions of fact upon which plaintiff's
right to compensation depends.” Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co.,
241 N.C. 448, 451, 85 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1955); see also, e.g., Singleton
v. Durham Laundry Co., 213 N.C. 32, 34-35, 195 S.E. 34, 35 (1938) (“It
is the duty of the Commission to make such specific and definite find-
ings upon the evidence reported as will enable this Court to determine
whether the general finding or conclusion should stand, particularly
when there are material facts at issue.”). Here the Commission found
the evidence conflicting on whether plaintiff was actually suffering from
anxiety and depression, and as a result, the Commission determined
that plaintiff had failed to establish that his anxiety and depression were
compensable or that they affected his ability to work, thus resulting in
disability. The Commission found as fact, in relevant part that:

35. Testimony by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's wife, and
Doctors Lacin, Schulz, Hervey, and Gualtieri is conflicting
as to whether Plaintiff is currently suffering from anxiety
and depression. Based upon a preponderance of all the
evidence of record, the Full Commission concludes that
Plaintiff's alleged anxiety and depression was not caused
by the 21 April 2010 work-related accident.

IN THE SUPREME COURT TAT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[869 N.C. 730 (2017)]

The Commission concluded as a matter of law that:

5. Where depression or other emotional trauma has
been caused by a compensable accident and injury, and
such depression or trauma has caused disability, then
total disability benefits may be allowed. Here, the evi-
dence is conflicting as to whether Plaintiff has suffered
from depression and whether any depression was caused.
by the 21 April 2010 work-related accident. Based upon
the preponderance of the evidence, the Full Commission
concludes that Plaintiff has not met his burden of show-
ing that his alleged depression and anxiety is a result of
the 21 April 2010 work-related accident or has caused
him any temporary disability.

(Emphasis added and citations omitted.)

On the other hand, the Commission found credible plaintiff's evi-
dence that he was actually suffering from tinnitus, noting plaintiff's
numerous complaints dating back to May 2010, and found that he had
not reached maximum medical improvement with regard to his tinnitus
at the time of the Commission’s opinion and award in April 2014. The
Commission specifically found:

26. On 27 December 2011, Plaintiff saw Dr. Debara
Tucci, a board-certified otolaryngologist at Duke
University Medical Center, for an evaluation. Dr. Tucci
reviewed Plaintiff's previous medical records, audio-
grams and physically examined Plaintiff's head and
ears. Dr. Tucci diagnosed Plaintiff with severe tinnitus
and testified that this condition was likely caused by the
accident. Dr. Tucci further testified that the tinnitus was
“wrapped up with the anxiety or depression” diagnosed in
Dr. Hervey’s report, which she reviewed.

27. Dr. Tucci testified that Plaintiff's tinnitus was
“more likely than not” a result of the 21 April 2010 acci-
dent and was part of the “symptomatology that occurred
as a result of the accident.”

The Commission awarded plaintiff medical compensation for his tin-
nitus, including any treatment “reasonably required to effect a cure,
provide relief or lessen any disability.” (Emphasis added.) Yet, having
found credible evidence of plaintiff's “severe tinnitus,” the Commission
made no related findings on how plaintiff's compensable tinnitus and

748 IN THE SUPREME COURT

WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE
[369 N.C. 730 (2017)]

any related symptoms may have affected his ability to engage in wage-
earning activities. Accordingly, we remand this case to the Commission
to take additional evidence if necessary and to make specific findings
addressing plaintiff's wage-earning capacity, considering plaintiff's com-
pensable tinnitus in the context of all the preexisting and coexisting
conditions bearing upon his wage-earning capacity. See Medlin, 367 N.C.
at 420, 760 S.E.2d at 736; Peoples, 316 N.C. at 441, 342 S.E.2d at 808 (“If
preexisting conditions such as the employee's age, education and work
experience are such that an injury causes the employee a greater degree
of incapacity for work than the same injury would cause some other
person, the employee must be compensated for the actual incapacity
he or she suffers, and not for the degree of disability which would be
suffered by someone younger or who possesses superior education or
work experience.” (citing Little, 295 N.C. at 532, 246 S.E.2d at 746)).

Conclusion

In sum, we hold that the Commission erred in failing to give plain-
tiff the benefit of a presumption that the additional medical treatment
he sought was for conditions related to his compensable injuries. The
Commission will reevaluate its decision, applying the correct presump-
tion. As the Court of Appeals correctly addressed this error, we affirm on
this issue. On the issue of plaintiff's entitlement to additional disability
benefits, we hold that the evidence raises factual issues regarding the
effect of plaintiff's compensable tinnitus on his ability to earn wages,
and that, on remand, the Commission must find these facts. Accordingly,
on this second issue we modify and affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals. We remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further
remand to the Commission for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 749

NECKLES v. HARRIS TEETER
[369 N.C. 749 (2017)]

DAWSON F. NECKLES

ve From Wake County

HARRIS TEETER, ET AL.

No. 23P17

ORDER

Defendants’ petition for discretionary review is allowed for the lim-
ited purpose of remanding to the Court of Appeals to reconsider its hold-
ing in light of Wilkes v. City of Greenville, __N.C.__, __S.E.2d___
(2017) (868PA15).

By Order of the Court in Conference, this 8th day of June, 2017.

s/Morgan, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 9th day of June, 2017.

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk of the Supreme Court

s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk

750 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disrosition or Penrnions ror Disoretionary Review Unper GS. 7A-31
8 June 2017
o0sP17 Kelly F. Lewis, 1. Plt’s PDR Under N.C.GS, § 7-31 Le
Employee v. Transit | (COAL6-69)
wnat 2. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-81 2-
Employer, 8, Joint Motion for Leave to Withdraw | 8, Allowed.
Self Insured . for Le u .
Coonnaretion Petitions for Discretionary Review
Glaims Solutions,
‘Third-Party
Administrator)
oo7Pi7 Inthe Matter of __| 1. Petitioner's PDR Under 1. Allowed
JAM. N.C.GS. § TA-B1 (COAIE-563)
2, Petitioner's Motion for 2, Allowed
‘Temporary Stay 01/10/2017
3, Petitioner's Petition for Writ 3, Allowed
of Supersedeas
o1sp162 | Statev. Jose Luis | 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Denied
Dominguez Gertiorari to Review Decision of the
GOA (COAI6-919)
2,Def's Pro Se Motion to Proceed In —_| 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
3, Def's Pro Se Motion to Appoint a
Counsel 3, Dismissed
as moot
Jackson, J.,
recused
023P17 Dawson Neckles | Defs’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 Special Order
v. Harris Teeter (COAL6-569)
and Travelers
os4Pi7 Danny Keith 1. Petitioner's PDR Under 1. Dismissed
Hopper, Employee | N.C.G.S. § 7A-S1 (COAPI6-021)
v. Charlton L. ee peamons . ;
‘kllen, Chairman, | 2-Petitioner’s Petition in the Alternative | 2. Denied
The North for Writ of Certiorari to Review Order
Carolina Industrial | of COA
Commission 8, Petitioner's Motion for Writ 8. Denied
of Prohibition
4, Petitioner's Motion for Addendum to | 4. Dismissed
PDR, Petition for Writ of Certiorari and | as moot
Motion for Writ of Prohibition
049P17 William @.Larsen | Def’s (The Arlington Condominium Denied
and Robert Owners Association, Inc.) PDR Under
Stephen Allen N.C.GS. § TA-B1 (COA1E-618)
v. The Arlington
Condominium
‘Owners Association,
Tne. and Arlington
Residential
Holdings, LLC

IN THE SUPREME COURT 751
Disposition or Petitions ror Discrerionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
8 June 2017
056P17 Dr. Robert Corwin | 1. Def's (British American Tobacco PLC) | 1. Allowed
as Trustee forthe | Motion for Temporary Stay (COAI5- | 02/20/2017
Beatrice Corwin | 1934) :
Living lrrevocable
‘Trust on Behalf | 2-Def's (British American Tobacco PLO) | 2. Allowed
ofa Class of Petition for Writ of Supersedeas
‘Those Similarly 3, Def's British American Tobacco PLO) | 3. Allowed
Situated v. British | PpR Under N.C.G.S. § TA-SL
American Tobacco “OG
PLG; Reynolds 4. Gary A. Bornstein’s Motion to be 4, Allowed
American, Inc.; Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Susan M. Cameron; :
John P. Daly; Neil | 5. Jason M. Leviton's Motion to be 5. Allowed
R. Withington; Lue | Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Jobin; Sir Nicholas | & w. andrew Copenhaver's Consent 6. Allowed
Scheele; Martin D. 4 .
Feinstem; Ronald, | Motion for Leave to Withdraw
8. Rolf, Richard B.
Thornburgh; Holly
K. Koeppel; Nana
Mensah; Lionel L.
Nowell, I; John J.
Zillmer; and Thomas
C. Wajnet
064P17 Inrethe Appeal by | 1. Petitioners’ PDR Under 1. Denied
ToneyL. Harel —_| N.C.GS. § 7A-31 (COAI6-646)
and Harrell’s Land ;
Development 2. Respondent's (Town of Midland) 2. Dismissed
Co, Ine. v. The Conditional PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7-31 | as moot
Midland Board of
‘Adjustment and the
‘Town of Midland
O65P17 State v. Jeffrey 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay _| 1. Allowed
Robert Parisi (COAL6-685) 02/24/2017
Dissolved
06/08/2017
2. State's Petition for Writ 2.Denied
of Supersedeas
8, State's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A81 | 8. Denied
067P17 Robbie Dean Terry, | 1. Pits’ PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 1. Denied
etal. v. State of (COAI6-158) 2, Dismissed as
North Carolina, . Dis
ea 2, Defs’ Conditional PDR Under moot

N.G.GS. § TA3L

752 IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposrrion or Petitions ror DiscreTionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31

8 June 2017
o7aP17 Nathaniel Bryant | 1. Plt's (Nathaniel Bryant) Pro Se Motion | 1. Denied
and Joseph L. for Temporary Stay 03/13/2017
Gillespie v. Charles ‘i
Wilbur Bryant and | 2: Pits (Nathaniel Bryant) Pro Se 2. Denied
Carl Bryant Petition for Writ of Supersedeas 03/14/2017
8, Plt's (Nathaniel Bryant) Pro Se 3, Dismissed
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
Review Order of Superior Court,
Chatham County
O79P17 State v, Jimmy 1, Def’s Pro Se Motion for Notice of L. Dismissed ex
Allen Roberts Appeal (COAPI7-135) ‘mero motu
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion for PDR 2, Dismissed
8, Def's Pro Se Motion for 3. Dismissed
Judicial Notice as moot
Ervin, J.,
recused
ossPi7 G.S.C, Holdings, Defs’ (McCrory, Perry, Senter and Denied
LLG; T and A Craddock) PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31)
Amusements, (COAL6-160)
LLG; and Crazie
Overstock

Promotions, LLC v.
Patrick McCrory, in
his Official Capacity
as Governor of

the State of North
Carolina; Frank

L, Perry, in his
Official Capacity

as Secretary of the
North Carolina
Department of
Grime Control and
Prevention; Mark.
J. Senter, in his
Official Capacity
as Branch Head

of the Alcohol

Law Enforcement,
Division; Shannon
Craddock, in his
Official Capacity
as the Chief of
Police of the City
of Archdale, North
Carolina; and
Maynard B. Reid,
Jr, in his Official
Capacity as the
Sheriff of Randolph
County

IN THE SUPREME COURT

753

‘Disposition or Perrrions For Discrenionary Review Unver G.S. 7A-31

8 Junz 2017

O89P17

Tand A
Amusements,

LLG; and Crazie
Overstock
Promotions, LLC v.
Patrick McCrory, in
his Official Capacity
as Governor of

the State of North
Carolina; Frank

L. Perry, in his
Official Capacity

as Secretary of the
North Carolina
Department of
Public Safety; Mark
J, Senter, in his
Official Capacity

as Branch Head

of the Alcohol

Law Enforcement,
Division; Jody
Williams, in his
Official Capacity

as the Chief of
Police of the City
of Asheboro, North
Carolina; and
Maynard B. Reid,
Ie, in his Official
Capacity as the
Sheriff of Randolph
County

Defs’ (McCrory, Perry, Senter, and
Williams) PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7-31)
(COA16-161)

Denied

O91P17

Arvel Lee Gentry,
allda Arvel Lee,
Orville Gentry

v. Gary Brooks,
Steven Franklin,
Sandy McDevitt,
Van Frankdin (Life
‘Tenant), and J.C.
Gentry

Respondents’ (Brooks, Franklin,
‘McDevitt, and Franklin) PDR Under
N.C.GS. § 74-31 (COA16-614)

Denied

099P17

Mary N. Gurganus
vy. Charles M.
Gurganus

Def’s PDR Under N.C.GS. § 7A-B1
(COA16-163)

Denied

104P17

Alonza H. Ward, Jr,
and Marie W. Ward
v. Laura C. Ward

1, Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upon a.
Constitutional Question (COA16-832)

2. Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

1. Dismissed ex
‘mero motu

2. Denied

754 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disrosirion oF Perinions ror Discretionary Review Unpar G.S. 7-31
8 June 2017
106P17 ‘Tropic Leisure 1. Pits’ Notice of Appeal Based Upon a_| 1. Dismissed ex
Gorp., Magen Point | Constitutional Question (COAI5-12542) | mero motu
Tne. d/b/a Magens : ‘
Point Resort Jerry | 2-Plts' PDR Under N.C.GS. § 74-31 2. Denied
A. Hailey 8, Virgin Islands Bar Association's 8. Dismissed
Conditional Motion for Leave to File | as moot
Amicus Brief
107217 State v. Teon Jamell | Def's PDR Under N.G.GS. § 7A3IL Denied
Williams (COA16-592)
1SP17 State. LinzieLee | 1. Def’s Notice of Appeal Based Upon a
Swink Constitutional Question (COA16-89)
2.Def's PDR UnderN.C.GS.§7A31 | 2, Denied
8, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 3./Allowed
uGP17 State v. Kevin 1 Det’s Pro Se Notice of Appeal 1. Dismissed ex
Antwan Shepherd | Based Upon a Constitutional Question | mero motu
(COA16-9835)
2, Def’s Pro Se PDR Under 77, 2. Denied
u8P17 Statev.Herbert | 1, Def's Notice of Appeal Based Upona_ | 1.—
Lee Stroud Constitutional Question (COA16-59)
2,Def's PDR Under N.C.G.8.§7A31 | 2. Denled
3. State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 3, Allowed
19P17 State v. Tardra Det’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7ASL Denied
Bterell Bouknight | (COA16-544)
perota State v. Manuel Def’s PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 74-31 Denied
Enrique Santana, Jr. | (COAi6-691)
124816 Jillian Murray 1, Def's Motion for Judicial Notice 1. Allowed
v.The University | (COA15.375)
of North Carolina eu
$t Chapel Hil 2, State's Motion for Withdrawal 2. Allowed
of Counsel 12/08/2016
125P17 State v: Paul Det's Pro Se Motion for Petition for Dismissed
Anthony Ramey | Rehearing Br Bane (COA16-876)
126P17 State v. John Owen | Def's PDR Under N.C.GS. § TABI Allowed
Jacobs (COA16-464) :
12717 Plasmanv. Decca | Plt's Motion for Extension of Time to | Allowed
Furniture (WA), _| Respond to Motion to Dismiss Portions | 05/15/2017
Ine, etal. of PDR that are Untimely

IN THE SUPREME COURT 755
‘Disposition oF Petirions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
8 June 2017
127P 17 Christian G. 1. Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant's | 1. Denied
Plasman, in his PDR Prior to a Decision of COA
Individual Capaci
ser peuvatiosly fer | 2 Plaintitfand Third Party Defendants | 2, Denied
theBenefitof, on. | Motion to Consolidate Appeals
Behalf of and Right | 3 pes Motion to Dismiss Portions of | 3. Allowed
of Nominal Party | 9 ° .
Dokere Cony, | PDR that are Untimely
LLC. v. Decca
Furniture (USA),
Ine, Decea Contract
Furniture, LLC,
Richard Herbst, Wai
‘Theng Tin, Tsang
G. Hung, Decca
Fumiture, Ltd,
Decea Hospitality
Furnishings, LLC,
Dongguan Decca
Furniture Co. Ltd,
Darren Hudgins,
Decca Home, LLC
and Blan by Decca,
TLC and Bolier &
Company, LLC. v.
Chistian J. Plasman
(lida Barrett
Plasman)
128P17 In Re Alex Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ Denied
Ohara King of Mandamus
130P17 Joan A. Meinck 1, Def's PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A81 | 1. Allowed
¥. City of Gastonia, | (COA16-892)
aNorth Carolina
Municipal 2, Plt’s Conditional PDR Under 2, Allowed
Corporation NCGS. § 7A31
1s1P17 Statev. Francisco | Det’s Pro Se PDR Under N.C.G.S.§7A- | Denied
Echeverria 31 (COAI6-673)
193P17 Statev. Michael | 1. Def'sPDRUnderN.C.GS.§7A91 | 1. Denied
‘Todd Walker (COA16-109)
2, State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 2, Dismissed
‘as moot
134417 Hilldebran Heritage | Plts’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal Allowed
& Development 05/16/2017
Association, Inc, et
al, ¥. The Town of
Hildebran, et al.
139P17 State v. Mohammed ‘Se Motion for Writ of Denied
Nasser Jilani ion

756 IN THE SUPREME COURT

Disposition oF Pstrrions ror Discrenionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31.

8 June 2017
141P 17 State v. William Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Denied
Anthony Lesane, Jr. | Certiorari to Review Order of COA 05/05/2017
(COAPI7-147)
42P17 State v. Terance 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Germaine Malachi | (COA16-752) 05/04/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
14aPi7 State. Kenrick J. | 1 State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Battle (COA16-1002) 05/08/2017
Dissolved.
06/08/2017
2, Slate's Petition for Writ 2. Denied
of Supersedeas

8, State's PDR Under N.C.G.8.§7A81 | 8. Denied

MsP17 Inthe Matter of AP, | 1. Petitioner's Motion for Temporary 1. Allowed
Stay (COA16-1010) 05/09/2017
2. Petitioner's Petition for Writ 2.
of Supersedeas
1a7P IT State v. Salim Def's Pro Se Motion for Appellate Dismissed
Abdu Gould Review
49P17 State v. Mohammed | Def's Pro Se Motion for Petition for Denied
N. dilani Writ of Prohibition
152P17 Steven M. McKenzie | Pit’s Pro Se Motion for Dismissed
v. District Court Interlocutory Appeal
158P17 State. Ailkeem | 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay _| 1. Allowed
Anthony Norman 05/17/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ 2
of Supersedeas
154P17 Staley. Jermaine | Def"s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Habeas | Denied
Derrick Carson, Jr. | Corpus 05/18/2017
155P17 State v. Joe 1. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Robert Reynolds | (COA16-149) 05/19/2017

2. Def’s Petition for Writ of Supersedeas | 2.

156P17 DiCesare, etal. | Pits’ Motion for Extension of Time to Allowed
v. The Charlotte- Respond to Petition for Writ 05/26/2017
Mecklenburg of Certiorart
Hospital Authority

168P06-12 | State v. Derrick Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of Denied

D. Boger Habeas Corpus 05/12/2017

IN THE SUPREME COURT 7T
Disposrrion oF Petrrions ror Discretionary Review Unver G.S. 7A-31
8 June 2017
168P06-13 | State v. Derrick 1. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ 1. Denied
D. Boger of Mandamus
2. Def's Pro Se Motion for Writ for 2. Denied
En Banc 05/30/2017
8. Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ 8, Denied
of Mandamus
ITLAL? State v. Daryl 1, State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed,
Williams (COA16-684) 06/01/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ, 2.
of Supersedeas
173P17 State v. Melvin 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1, Allowed
Leroy Fowler 06/05/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ, 2.
of Supersedeas
17517 Inthe Matter of TK. | 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1, Allowed
(COA16-1047) 06/05/2017
2. State's Petition for Writ Es
of Supersedeas
219P16 Yili Tseng v. Harold | Plt's Pro Se PDR Under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 | Denied
Martin, Individually | (COA15-739)
and as Chancellor of
North Carolina A&T
State University,
Benjamin
Uwakweh,
Individually and
as Dean of North
Carolina A&T State
University, and
North Carolina AT
State University
264P16 In the Matter of Cabarres County's PDR Under N.C.G.S._} Denied
Appeal of Coming | § 7-81 (COA15-954)
Incorporated from
the decisions
of the Cabarrus
County Board of
Equalization and
Review concerning
the valuations of
certain real prop-
erty for tax years
2012 and 2013,

758 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposirion or Perrmions ror Discretionary Review Unpzr G.S. 7A-31
8 June 2017
2827163 | Jeremy Brunsand | 1. Pits’ Pro Se Notice of Appeal Based _—_| 1. Dismissed
Jenny Bruns v. Upon a Constitutional Question ex mero motu
Rhonda Bryant, (COA16-699)
Dalton Bryant
Be batter Bryant, | 2-Plts' Pro Se PDR Under 2. Denied
Je PatMeCroy, | | NCGS. § 7A-31
as Governor of
r 8, Def's (Dalton Bryant, Jr) Motion to | 8. Dismissed
North Carolina, Det
Pony, at Dismiss Appeal as moot
Secretary of the 4, Plts’ Motion to Reject, Dismiss, and | 4. Denied
North Carolina Strike Response to Notice of Appeal
Department of and PDR.
Public Safety,
Anthony Tata, as
Secretary of the
North Carolina
Department of
Transportation,
Veronica McClain,
USAA, and State of
North Carolina
309P152 | Statev. Reginald __| Def's Pro Se Motion for Petition for Dismissed
Underwood Fullard | Direct Review (COAP14-265)
330P183 | State v. William Def's Pro Se Motion for Appropriate Dismissed
Curtis Lowery, Jr | Relief
Snoweny oe Exvin, J.,
recused
385PA16 State v. Gyrell L. Motion to Admit llya Shapiro Pro 1, Allowed
Shavonta Lee Hac Vice 05/18/2017
2, Cato Institute's Motion for Leave to | -2. Allowed
File Amicus Brief 05/18/2017
341P142 | State v. Robert L Def's Pro Se Petition for Writ of 1. Dismissed
McPhail Certiorari to Review Order of Superior
Court, Mecklenburg County
2, Def’s Pro Se Motion to Proceed In —_| 2. Allowed
Forma Pauperis
3. Def's Pro Se Motion to 8. Dismissed
Appoint Counsel as moot
Ervin, J.,
recused
345P16-4 | State v. Dwayne L. Def’s Pro Se Motion for Petition for | 1. Denied
Demont Haizlip Rehearing 05/81/2017
2, Allowed
2. Def’s Pro Se Motion to Proceed in —_| 05/1/2017
Forma, Pauperis
OPE Ervin, J.,
recused

IN THE SUPREME COURT 759
‘Dispostrion oF Petitions ror Discretionary Review Unver G.S. 7A-31
8 June 2017
S76P026 State v. Robert 1. State's Motion for Temporary Stay 1. Allowed
Wayne Stanley (COA16-436) 11/17/2016
Dissolved
06/08/2017
2, State's Petition for Writ 2, Denied
of Supersedeas
8. State's PDR Under N.C.GS.§ 7481 | 8, Denied
4, Def’s Motion to Vacate the 4, Dismissed
‘Temporary Stay as moot
5. Def's Motion to Dismiss State's PDR | 8. Dismissed
as moot
Ervin, J,
recused
303P08-2 State v. Dewayne _ | Def’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Denied
Parker Habeas Corpus 05/17/2017
393P08-3 State v. Dewayne —_| Def’s Pro Se Motion for Writ for Denied
Parker En Bane 06/01/2017
427A16 Abrons Family Def's (Computer Sciences Corporation) | Allowed
Practice & Urgent | Motion to Withdraw Van H. Beckwith, | 05/17/2017
Care, PA, etal.v. | Bryant C. Boren, and the Firm of Baker
N.C. Department | Botts, LLP as Counsel
of Health and
Human Services and
Computer Sciences
Corporation
461P16 Bolier & Company, | Pit's (Christian G. Plasman) and Third- | Denied
LLC and Christian | Party Defendant's PDR Under
G. Plasman v. Decea | N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (COA15-1219)
Fumiture (USA),
Inc, Decea Contract,
Fumniture, LLC,
Richard Herbst, Wai
‘Theng Tin, Tsang
C. Hung, Decca
Furniture, Ltd,
Decca Hospitality
Furnishings, LLC,
Dongguan Decca
Furniture Co., Ltd.,
Darren Hudgins
and Decca Home v.
Christian J. Plasman
alla Barrett
Plasman, Third-
Party Defendant
SIAPAIL2 | Statev. Harry Motion to Admit Marsha L. Levick Allowed
Sharod James Pro Hac Vice 05/19/2017

760 IN THE SUPREME COURT
Disposition or Petrrions ror Discretionary Review Unper G.S. 7A-31
8 June 2017
597PO13 State v. Maechel Det’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Dismissed
Shawn Patterson _| Certiorari to Review Order of COA 4

(COA17-245)

recused

APPENDIXES

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
INVESTITURE OF JUSTICE MORGAN
CLIENT SECURITY FUND

JUDICIAL STANDARDS FORMAL ADVISORY
OPINION, 2016-01

JUDICIAL STANDARDS FORMAL ADVISORY
OPINION, 2017-01

ORGANIZATION OF STATE BAR
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS
BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

LEGAL SPECIALIZATION
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, RULE 7
JUDICIAL DISTRICT BARS
DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS
LEGAL SPECIALIZATION
ORGANIZATIONS PRACTICING LAW
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
PILOT CLERK MEDIATION PROGRAM

JUDICIAL STANDARDS FORMAL ADVISORY
OPINION

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 763

ORDER ADOPTING THE 2017 RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE

The Rules of Appellate Procedure are hereby amended and recodi-
fied to read as printed on the following pages.

These rules shall be effective on the lst day of January, 2017, and
shall apply to all cases appealed on or after that date.

These amendments shall be promulgated by publication in the North
Carolina Reports and posted on the Court’s web site.

Ordered by the Court in Conference, this the 20th day of December,
2016.

/s/ Ervin, J.
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 20th day of December, 2016.

/s/ J. Bryan Boyd

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk of the Supreme Court

764 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Tanvary 1, 2017

These rules are promulgated by the Court under the rule-making
authority conferred by Article IV, Section 13(2) of the Constitution of
North Carolina. They shall be effective in all appeals taken from the
courts of the trial division to the courts of the appellate division; in
appeals in civil and criminal cases from the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court; in direct appeals from administrative tribunals to the
appellate division; and in applications to the courts of the appellate divi-
sion for writs and other relief which the courts or judges thereof are
empowered to give. As to such appeals, these rules supersede the North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, 363 N.C. 902 (2009), as amended.
These rules shall be effective on the ist day of January, 2017, and shall
apply to all cases appealed on or after that date.

Appendixes are published with the rules for their helpfulness to the
profession. Although authorized to be published for this purpose, they
are not an authoritative source on parity with the rules.

Article I
Applicability of Rules

Rule 1. Title; Scope of Rules; Trial Tribunal Defined

(a) Title.

(b) Scope of Rules.

(c) Rules Do Not Affect Jurisdiction.
(d) Definition of Trial Tribunal.

Rule 2. Suspension of Rules
Article IL .
Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Superior Courts an
District Courts

Rule 3. Appeal in Civil Cases—How and When Taken

(a) Filing the Notice of Appeal.
(b) Special Provisions.
(c) Time for Faking Appeal.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 765

(d) Content of Notice of Appeal.
(e) Service of Notice of Appeal.

Rule 3.1. Appeal in Qualifying Juvenile Cases—How and When Taken;
Special Rules

(a) Filing the Notice of Appeal.
(b) Protecting the Identity of Juveniles.
(c) Expediting Filings.
(1) Transcripts.
(2) Record on Appeal.
@) Briefs.
(d) No-Merit Briefs.
(e) Calendaring Priority.

Rule 4. Appeal in Criminal Cases—How and When Taken

(a) Manner and Time.

(b) Content of Notice of Appeal.

(c) Service of Notice of Appeal.

(d) To Which Appellate Court Addressed.

(e) Protecting the Identity of Juvenile Victims of Sexual
Offenses.

Rule 5. Joinder of Parties on Appeal

(a) Appellants.
(b) Appellees.
(c) Procedure after Joinder.

Rule 6. Security for Costs on Appeal

(a) In Regular Course.

(b) In Forma Pauperis Appeals.

(c) Filed with Record on Appeal.

(d) Dismissal for Failure to File or Defect in Security.
(e) No Security for Costs in Criminal Appeals.

Rule 7. Preparation of the Transcript; Court Reporter’s Duties

(a) Ordering the Transcript.
(1) Civil Cases.
(2) Criminal Cases.
(b) Production and Delivery of Transcript.
(2) Production.
(2) Delivery.
(3) Neutral Transcriptionist.

766 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 8. Stay Pending Appeal

(a) Stay in Civil Cases.
(b) Stay in Criminal Cases.

Rule 9. The Record on Appeal

(a) Function; Notice in Cases Involving Juveniles; Compo-
sition of Record.

(1) Composition of the Record in Civil Actions and
Special Proceedings.

(2) Composition of the Record in Appeals from Supe-
rior Court Review of Administrative Boards and
Agencies.

(8) Composition of the Record in Criminal Actions.

(4) Exclusion of Social Security Numbers from Re-
cord on Appeal.

(b) Form of Record; Amendments.

(1) Order of Arrangement.

(2) Inclusion of Unnecessary Matter; Penalty.

(8) Filing Dates and Signatures on Papers.

(4) Pagination; Counsel Identified.

(5) Additions and Amendments to Record on Appeal.

(c) Presentation of Testimonial Evidence and Other

Proceedings.

(1) When Testimonial Evidence, Voir Dire, State-
ments and Events at Evidentiary and Non-Evi-
dentiary Hearings, and Other Trial Proceedings
Narrated—How Set Out in Record.

(2) Designation that Verbatim Transcript of Proceed-
ings in Trial Tribunal Will Be Used.

(8) Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings—Settlement,
Filing, Copies, Briefs.

(4) Presentation of Discovery Materials.

5) Electronic Recordings.

(d) Exhibits.

(1) Documentary Exhibits Included in the Printed
Record on Appeal.

(2) Exhibits Not Included in the Printed Record
on Appeal.

(3) Exclusion of Social Security Numbers
from Exhibits.

(4) Removal of Exhibits from Appellate Court.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 767

Rule 10. Preservation of Issues at Trial; Proposed Issues on Appeal

(a) Preserving Issues During Trial Proceedings.
(1) General.
(2) Jury Instructions.
(8) Sufficiency of the Evidence.
(4) Plain Error.
(b) Appellant’s Proposed Issues on Appeal.
(c) Appellee’s Proposed Issues on Appeal as to an Alterna-
tive Basis in Law.

Rule 11. Settling the Record on Appeal

(a) By Agreement.

(b) By Appellee’s Approval of Appellant's Proposed Re-
cord on Appeal.

(c) By Agreement, by Operation of Rule, or by Court Order
After Appellee’s Objection or Amendment.

(d) Multiple Appellants; Single Record on Appeal.

(e) Extensions of Time.

Rule 12. Filing the Record; Docketing the Appeal; Copies of the Record

(a) Time for Filing Record on Appeal.
(b) Docketing the Appeal.
(c) Copies of Record on Appeal.

Rule 13. Filing and Service of Briefs

(a) Time for Filing and Service of Briefs.
(1) Cases Other Than Death Penalty Cases.
(2) Death Penalty Cases.

(b) Copies Reproduced by Clerk.

(c) Consequence of Failure to File and Serve Briefs.

Article IL
Review by Supreme Court of Appeals Originally Docketed in the
Court of Appeals—Appeals of Right; Discretionary Review

Rule 14. Appeals of Right from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court.
under N.C.G.S. § 7A-30

(a) Notice of Appeal; Filing and Service.

(b) Content of Notice of Appeal.
(1) Appeal Based Upon Dissent in Court of Appeals.
(2) Appeal Presenting Constitutional Question.

768 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

(c) Record on Appeal.

(1) Composition.

(2) Transmission; Docketing; Copies.
(d) Briefs.

(1) Filing and Service; Copies.

(2) Failure to File or Serve.

Rule 15. Discretionary Review on Certification by Supreme Court
under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

(a) Petition of Party.
(b) Petition of Party—Filing and Service.
(c) Petition of Party—Content.
(d) Response.
(e) Certification by Supreme Court—How Determined
and Ordered.
(1) On Petition of a Party.
(2) On Initiative of the Court.
(8) Orders; Filing and Service.
(f Record on Appeal.
(1) Composition.
(2) Filing; Copies.
(g) Filing and Service of Briefs.
. (1) Cases Certified Before Determination by Court of
Appeals.
(2) Cases Certified for Review of Court of Appeals
Determinations.
(8) Copies.
(4) Failure to File or Serve.
(h) Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders.
(i) Appellant, Appellee Defined.

Rule 16. Scope of Review of Decisions of Court of Appeals

(a) How Determined.
(b) Scope of Review in Appeal Based Solely Upon Dissent.
(c) Appellant, Appellee Defined.

Rule 17. Appeal Bond in Appeals Under N.C.G.S. §§ 74-80, 7A-31

(a) Appeal of Right.

(b) Discretionary Review of Court of Appeals
Determination.

(c) Discretionary Review by Supreme Court Before Court
of Appeals Determination.

(d) Appeals In Forma Pauperis.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 769

Article IV

Direct Appeals from Administrative ‘Tribunals to

Appellate Division

Rule 18. Taking Appeal; Record on Appeal—Composition and

Settlement

(a)
(b)
(c)
@

(©)
©

General.

Time and Method for Taking Appeals.

Composition of Record on Appeal.

Settling the Record on Appeal.

()_ By Agreement.

(2) By Appellee’s Approval of Appellant’s Proposed
Record on Appeal.

(8) By Agreement, by Operation of Rule, or by Court
Order After Appellee’s Objection or Amendment.

Further Procedures and Additional Materials in the

Record on Appeal.

Extensions of Time.

Rule 19. [Reserved]

Rule 20. Miscellaneous Provisions of Law Governing Appeals from
Administrative Tribunals

Article V
Extraordinary Writs

Rule 21. Certiorari

@

)
©
(a)
(3)

®

Scope of the Writ.
(1) Review of the Judgments and Orders of

Trial Tribunals. ~
(2) Review of the Judgments and Orders of

the Court of Appeals.
Petition for Writ—to Which Appellate Court
Addressed.
Petition for Writ—Filing and Service; Content.
Response; Determination by Court.
Petition for Writ in Post-conviction Matters—to Which
Appellate Court Addressed.
Petition for Writ in Post-conviction Matters—Death
Penalty Cases...

770

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 22. Mandamus and Prohibition

@

b)
©

Petition for Writ—to Which Appellate Court Ad-
dressed.

Petition for Writ—Filing and Service; Content.
Response; Determination by Court.

Rule 23. Supersedeas

(@)

)

(c)
@
©

Pending Review of Trial Tribunal Judgments and Or-

ders.

(1) Application—When Appropriate.

(2) Application—How and to Which Appellate Court
Made. :

Pending Review by Supreme Court of Court of Appeals

Decisions.

Petition for Writ—Filing and Service; Content.

Response; Determination by Court.

Temporary Stay. -

Rule 24. Form of Papers; Copies

Article VI
General Provisions

Rule 25. Penalties for Failure to Comply with Rules

(@)
®)

Failure of Appellant to Take Timely Action.
Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Rules.

Rule 26. Filing and Service

@

(b)
(©)
@)
@)
©
@

(1) Filing by Mail.

(2) Filing by Electronic Means.

Service of All Papers Required.

Manner of Service.

Proof of Service.

Joint Appellants and Appellees.

Numerous Parties to Appeal Proceeding Separately.
Documents Filed with Appellate Courts.

(8) Form of Papers.

(4) Index Required.

(5) Closing.

(6) Protecting the Identity of Certain Juveniles.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 771

Rule 27. -Computation and Extension of Time

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®)
©

@

Computation of Time.

Additional Time After Service.

Extensions of Time; By Which Court Granted.

(2) Motions for Extension of Time in the Trial
Division.

(2) Motions for Extension of Time in the Appellate
Division.

Motions for Extension of Time; How Determined.

Rule 28. Briefs—Function and Content

(a)
)
©

@

()

(g)
q@)
@
10)

Function.

Content of Appellant's Brief.

Gontent of Appellee’s Brief; Presentation of Additional

Issues.

Appendixes to Briefs.

(1) When Appendixes to Appellant’s Brief Are Re-
quired.

(2) When Appendixes to Appellant’s Brief Are Not
Required.

(3) When Appendixes to Appellee’s Brief Are Re-
quired.

(4) Format of Appendixes.

References in Briefs to the Record.

Joinder of Multiple Parties in Briefs.

Additional Authorities.

Reply Briefs.

Amicus Curiae Briefs.

Word-Count Limitations Applicable to Briefs Filed in

the Court of Appeals.

(1) Portions of Brief Included in Word Count.

(2) Certificate of Compliance.

Rule 29. Sessions of Courts; Calendar of Hearings

@

)

Sessions of Court.

() Supreme Court.

(2) Court of Appeals.
Calendaring of Cases for Hearing.

Rule 30. Oral Argument and Unpublished Opinions

(a)
(b)

Order and Content of Argument.
Time Allowed for Argument.

772 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

(1) _InGeneral.
(2) Numerous Counsel.

(c) Non-Appearance of Parties.

(d) Submission on Written Briefs.

(e) Unpublished Opinions.

(f) Pre-Argument Review; Decision of Appeal Without
Oral Argument.

Rule 31. Petition for Rehearing

(a) Time for Filing; Content.

(b) How Addressed; Filed.

(c) How Determined.

(d) Procedure When Granted.

(e) Stay of Execution.

(Waiver by Appeal from Court of Appeals.
(g) No Petition in Criminal Cases.

Rule 32. Mandates of the Courts

(a) In General.
(b) Time of Issuance.

Rule 33. Attorneys

(a) Appearances.

(b) Signatures on Electronically-Filed Documents.
(c) Agreements.

(d) Limited Practice of Out-of-State Attorneys.

Rule 33.1. Secure-Leave Periods for Attorneys

(a) Purpose; Authorization.
(b) Length; Number.

(c) Designation; Effect.

(d) Content of Designation.
(e) Where to File Designation.
(f) When to File Designation.

Rule 34. Frivolous Appeals; Sanctions

Rule 35. Costs

(a) To Whom Allowed.

(b) Direction as to Costs in Mandate.

(c) Costs of Appeal Taxable in Trial Tribunals.

(d) Execution to Collect Costs in Appellate Courts.

Rule 36.

Rule 37.

Rule 38.

Rule 39.

Rule 40.
Rule 41.

Rule 42.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 773

Trial Judges Authorized to Enter Orders Under These Rules
(a) When Particular Judge Not Specified by Rule.
(1) Superior Court.
(2) District Court.
(b) Upon Death, Incapacity, or Absence of Particular
Judge’ Authorized.

Motions in Appellate Courts

(a) Time; Content of Motions; Response.

(b) Determination.

(ce) Protecting the Identity of Certain Juveniles.
(d) Withdrawal of Appeal in Criminal Cases.
(e) Withdrawal of Appeal in Civil Cases.

@® Effect of Withdrawal of Appeal.

Substitution of Parties

(a) Death of a Party.
(b) Substitution for Other Causes.
(c) Public Officers; Death or Separation from Office.

Duties of Clerks; When Offices Open

(a) General Provisions.
(b) Records to Be Kept.

Consolidation of Actions on Appeal
Appeal Information Statement

[Reserved]
Appendixes

Appendix A: Timetables for Appeals

Appendix B: Format and Style

Appendix C: Arrangement of Record on Appeal

Appendix D: Forms

Appendix E: Content of Briefs

Appendix F: Fees and Costs

TTA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure

Article I
Applicability of Rules

Rule 1. Title; Scope of Rules; Trial Tribunal Defined

(a) Title. The title of these rules is “North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure.” They may be so cited either in general references
or in reference to particular rules. In reference to particular rules the
abbreviated form of citation, “N.C. R. App. P. __,” is also appropriate.

(b) Scope of Rules. These rules govern procedure in all appeals
from the courts of the trial division to the courts of the appellate divi-
sion; in appeals in civil and criminal cases from the Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court; in direct appeals from administrative tribunals to
the appellate division; and in applications to the courts of the appellate
division for writs and other relief which the courts or judges thereof are
empowered to give.

(c) Rules Do Not Affect Jurisdiction. These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the appel-
late division as that is established by law.

(d) Definition of Trial Tribunal. As used in these rules, the term
“trial tribunal” includes the superior courts, the district courts, and any
administrative agencies, boards, or commissions from which appeals lie
directly to the appellate division.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 312 N.C. 803; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.
Editor’s Note.

Former Rule 41, “Title,” was renumbered as Rule 42 on 3 March
1994, 113 N.C. App. 841, and then later recodified as Rule 1(a) on 2 July
2009, 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 2. Suspension of Rules

To prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in
the public interest, either court of the appellate division may, except
as otherwise expressly provided by these rules, suspend or vary the
requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a case pending before
it upon application of a party or upon its own initiative, and may order
proceedings in accordance with its directions.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 775

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Article II
Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Superior Courts and
District Courts

Rule 3. Appeal in Civil Cases—How and When Taken

(a) Filing the Notice of Appeal. Any party entitled by law to
appeal from a judgment or order of a superior or district court rendered
in a civil action or special proceeding may take appeal by filing notice of
appeal with the clerk of superior court and serving copies thereof upon
all other parties within the time prescribed by subsection (c) of this rule.

(b) Special Provisions. Appeals in the following types of cases
shall be taken in the time and manner set out in the General Statutes and
Rules of Appellate Procedure sections noted:

(1) Juvenile matters pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-2602;
the identity of persons under the age of eighteen
at the time of the proceedings in the trial division
shail be protected pursuant to Rule 3.1(b).

(2) Appeals pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001 shall be
subject to the provisions of Rule 3.1.

(c) Time for Taking Appeal. In civil actions and special proceed-
ings, a party must file and serve a notice of appeal:

(1) within thirty days after entry of judgment if the
party has been served with a copy of the judgment
within the three-day period prescribed by Rule 58
of the Rules of Civil Procedure; or

(2) within thirty days after service upon the party of
a copy of the judgment if service was not made
within that three-day period; provided that

(8) if a timely motion is made by any party for relief
under Rules 50(b), 52(b) or 59 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the thirty-day period for taking appeal
is tolled as to all parties until entry of an order dis-
posing of the motion and then runs as to each party
from the date of entry of the order or its untimely
service upon the party, as provided in subdivisions
(1) and (2) of this subsection (c).

776 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

In computing the time for filing a notice of appeal, the provision
for additional time after service by mail in Rule 27(b) of these rules and
Rule 6(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply.

If timely notice of appeal is filed and served by a party, any other
party may file and serve a notice of appeal within ten days after the first
notice of appeal was served on such party.

(d) Content of Notice of Appeal. The notice of appeal required
to be filed and served by subsection (a) of this rule shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order
from which appeal is taken and the court to which appeal is taken; and
shall be signed by counsel of record for the party or parties taking the
appeal, or by any such party not represented by counsel of record.

(e) Service of Notice of Appeal. Service of copies of the notice
of appeal may be made as provided in Rule 26.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 92 N.C. App. 761; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 613; 337 N.C.
821; 345 N.C. 765; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 357 N.C. 665; 358 N.C. 824;
360 N.C. 661; 360 N.C. 820; 360 N.C. 852; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 3.1. Appeal in Qualifying Juvenile Cases—How and When
Taken; Special Rules

(a) Filing the Notice of Appeal. Any party entitled by law to
appeal from a trial court judgment or order rendered in a case involving
termination of parental rights and issues of juvenile dependency or juve-
nile abuse and/or neglect, appealable pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001,
may take appeal by filing notice of appeal with the clerk of superior
court and serving copies thereof upon all other parties in the time and
manner set out in Chapter 7B of the General Statutes of North Carolina.
Trial counsel or an appellant not represented by counsel shall be respon-
sible for filing and serving the notice of appeal in the time and manner
required. If the appellant is represented by counsel, both the trial coun-
sel and appellant must sign the notice of appeal, and the appellant shall
cooperate with counsel throughout the appeal. All such appeals shall
comply with the provisions set out in subsection (b) of this rule and,
except as hereinafter provided by this rule, all other existing Rules of
Appellate Procedure shall remain applicable.

(b) Protecting the Identity of Juveniles. For appeals filed pur-
suant to this rule and for extraordinary writs filed in cases to which this
rule applies, the identity of involved persons under the age of eighteen
at the time of the proceedings in the trial division (covered juveniles)

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 717

shall be referenced only by the use of initials or pseudonyms in briefs,
petitions, and all other filings, and shall be similarly redacted from all
documents, exhibits, appendixes, or arguments submitted with such
filings. If the parties desire to use pseudonyms, they shall stipulate in
the record on appeal to the pseudonym to be used for each covered
juvenile. Courts of the appellate division are not bound by the stipula-
tion, and case captions will utilize initials. Further, the addresses and
social security numbers of all covered juveniles shall be excluded from
all filings and documents, exhibits, appendixes, and arguments. In cases
subject to this rule, the first document filed in the appellate courts and
the record on appeal shall contain the notice required by Rule 9(a).

The substitution and redaction requirements of this rule shall not
apply to settled records on appeal; supplements filed pursuant to Rule
11(c); objections, amendments, or proposed alternative records on
appeal submitted pursuant to Rule 3.1(c)(2); and any verbatim tran-
scripts submitted pursuant to Rule 9(c). Pleadings and filings not subject
to substitution and redaction requirements shall include the following
notice on the first page of the document immediately underneath the
title and in uppercase typeface: FILED PURSUANT TO RULE [3(b)(1)]
[3.1(b)] [4(e)]; SUBJECT TO PUBLIC INSPECTION ONLY BY ORDER
OF A COURT OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION.

Filings in cases governed by this rule that are not subject to substi-
tution and redaction requirements will not be published on the Court’s
electronic-filing site and will be available to the public only with the per-
mission of a court of the appellate division. In addition, the juvenile’s
address and social security number shall be excluded from all filings,
documents, exhibits, or arguments with the exception of sealed verba-
tim transcripts submitted pursuant to Rule 9(c).

(c) Expediting Filings. Appeals filed pursuant to these provi-
sions shall adhere strictly to the expedited procedures set forth below:

(1) Transcripts. Within one business day after the
notice of appeal has been filed, the clerk of supe-
rior court shall notify the court-reporting coordi-
nator of the Administrative Office of the Courts
of the date the notice of appeal was filed and the
names of the parties to the appeal and their respec-
tive addresses or addresses of their counsel. Within
two business days of receipt of such notification,
the court-reporting coordinator shall assign a tran-
scriptionist to the case.

778

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RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

When there is an order establishing the indi-
gency of the appellant, the transcriptionist shall
produce and deliver a transcript of the designated
proceedings to the appellant and provide copies
to the office of the clerk of the Court of Appeals
and to the respective parties to the appeal at the
addresses provided within thirty-five days from the
date of assignment.

When there is no order establishing the indi-
gency of the appellant, the appellant shall have
ten days from the date that the transcriptionist is
assigned to make written arrangements with the
assigned transcriptionist for the production and
delivery of the transcript of the designated pro-
ceedings. If such written arrangement is made, the
transcriptionist shall produce and deliver a tran-
script of the designated proceedings to the appel-
lant and provide copies to the office of the clerk
of the Court of Appeals and to the respective par-
ties to the appeal at the addresses provided within
forty-five days from the date of assignment. The
non-indigent appellant shall bear the cost of the
appellant's copy of the transcript.

When there is no order establishing the indi-
gency of the appellee, the appellee shall bear the
cost of receiving a copy of the requested transcript.

Motions for extensions of time to produce and
deliver transcripts are disfavored and will not be
allowed by the Court of Appeals absent extraordi-
nary circumstances.

Record on Appeal. Within ten days after receipt
of the transcript, the appellant shall prepare and
serve upon all other parties a proposed record on
appeal constituted in accordance with Rule 9. Trial
counsel for the appealing party shall have a duty
to assist appellate counsel, if separate counsel is
appointed or retained for the appeal, in preparing
and serving a proposed record on appeal. Within
ten days after service of the proposed record on
appeal upon an appellee, the appellee may serve
upon all other parties:

TOC

TOC

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

(a) anotice of approval of the proposed record;

(b) specific objections or amendments to the pro-
posed record on appeal; or

(c) aproposed alternative record on appeal.

Ifthe parties agree to a settled record on appeal
within twenty days after receipt of the transcript,
the appellant shall file three legible copies of the
settled record on appeal in the office of the clerk
of the Court of Appeals within five business days
from the date the record was settled. If all appel-
lees fail within the times allowed them either to
serve notices of approval or to serve objections,
amendments, or proposed alternative records on
appeal, the appellant’s proposed record on appeal
shall constitute the settled record on appeal, and
the appellant shall file three legible copies thereof
in the office of the clerk of the Court of Appeals
within five business days from the last date upon
which any appellee could have sérved such objec-
tions, amendments, or proposed alternative record
on appeal. If an appellee timely serves amend-
ments, objections, or a proposed alternative record.
on appeal and the parties cannot agree to the set-
tled record within thirty days after receipt of the
transcript, each party shall file three legible copies
of the following documents in the office of the clerk
of the Court of Appeals within five business days
after the last day upon which the record can be
settled by agreement:

(a) the appellant shall file his or her proposed
record on appeal; and

(b) an appellee shall file his or her objections,
amendments, or proposed alternative record
on appeal.

No counsel who has appeared as trial counsel
for any party in the proceeding shall be permitted
to withdraw, nor shall such counsel be otherwise
relieved of any responsibilities imposed pursuant
to this rule, until the record on appeal has been filed
in the office of the clerk of the Court of Appeals as
provided herein.

779

780 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOG

(8) Briefs. Within thirty days after the record on
appeal has been filed with the Court of Appeals, the
appellant shall file his or her brief in the office of
the clerk of the Court of Appeals and serve cop-
ies upon all other parties of record. Within thirty
days after the appellant’s brief has been served on
an appellee, the appellee shall file his or her brief
in the office of the clerk of the Court of Appeals
and serve copies upon all other parties of record.
An appellant may file and serve a reply brief as pro-
vided in Rule 28(h). Motions for extensions of time
to file briefs will not be allowed absent extraordi-
nary circumstances.

(d) No-Merit Briefs. In an appeal taken pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1001, if, after a conscientious and thorough review of the record on
appeal, appellate counsel concludes that the record contains no issue
of merit on which to base an argument for relief and that the appeal
would be frivolous, counsel may file a no-merit brief. In the brief, coun-
sel shall identify any issues in the record on appeal that might arguably
support the appeal and shall state why those issues lack merit or would
not alter the ultimate result. Counsel shall provide the appellant with a
copy of the no-merit brief, the transcript, the record on appeal, and any
Rule 11(c) supplement or exhibits that have been filed with the appellate
court. Counsel shall also advise the appellant in writing that the appel-
lant has the option of filing a pro se brief within thirty days of the date
of the filing of the no-merit brief and shall attach to the brief evidence of
compliance with this subsection.

€e) Calendaring Priority. Appeals filed pursuant to this rule
will be given priority over other cases being considered by the Court
of Appeals and will be calendared in accordance with a schedule pro-
mulgated by the Chief Judge. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court of
Appeals, cases subject to the expedited procedures set forth in this rule
shall be disposed of on the record and briefs and without oral argument.

History Note.
360 N.C. 661; 360 N.C. 820; 360 N.C. 852; 362 N.C. 699; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 4. Appeal in Criminal Cases—How and When Taken

(a) Manner and Time. Any party entitled by law to appeal from
a judgment or order of a superior or district court rendered in a criminal
action may take appeal by:

|

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 781

(@) giving oral notice of appeal at trial, or

(2) filing notice of appeal with the clerk of superior
court and serving copies thereof upon all adverse
parties within fourteen days after entry of the judg-
ment or order or within fourteen days after a ruling
on a motion for appropriate relief made during the
fourteen-day period following entry of the judg-
ment or order. Appeals from district court to supe-
rior court are governed by N.C.G.S. §§ 154-1431
and -1432.

(b) Content of Notice of Appeal. The notice of appeal required
to be filed and served by subdivision (a)(2) of this rule shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order
from which appeal is taken and the court to which appeal is taken; and
shall be signed by counsel of record for the party or parties taking the
appeal, or by any such party not represented by counsel of record.

(c) Service of Notice of Appeal. Service of copies of the notice
of appeal may be made as provided in Rule 26.

(d) To Which Appellate Court Addressed. An appeal of right
from a judgment of a superior court by any person who has been con-
victed of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death shall be filed
in the Supreme Court. In all other criminal cases, appeal shall be filed in
the Court of Appeals.

(e) Protecting the Identity of Juvenile Victims of Sexual
Offenses. For appeals filed pursuant to this rule and for extraordinary
writs filed in cases to which this rule applies, the identities of all victims
of sexual offenses the trial court record shows were under the age of
eighteen when the trial division proceedings occurred, including docu-
ments or other materials concerning delinquency proceedings in district
court, shall be protected pursuant to Rule 3.1(b).

History Note.

_ 287 N.C. 671; 295 N.C. 741; 305 N.C. 788; 322 N.C. 844; 92 N.C. App.
761; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 613; 348 N.C. 724; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609;
357 N.C. 665; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 5. Joinder of Parties on Appeal

(a) Appellants. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from
a judgment, order, or other determination and their interests are such
as to make their joinder in appeal practicable, they may file and serve
a joint notice of appeal in accordance with Rules 3 and 4; or they may

782 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

join in appeal after having timely taken separate appeals by filing notice
of joinder in the office of the clerk of superior court and serving copies
thereof upon all other parties, or in a criminal case they may give a joint
oral notice of appeal.

(b) Appellees. Two or more appellees whose interests are such as
to make their joinder on appeal practicable may, by filing notice of join-
der in the office of the clerk of superior court and serving copies thereof
upon all other parties, so join.

(c) Procedure after Joinder. After joinder, the parties proceed
as a single appellant or appellee. Filing and service of papers by and
upon joint appellants or appellees is as provided by Rule 26(e).

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 6. Security for Costs on Appeal

(a) In Regular Course. Except in pauper appeals, an appellant
in a civil action must provide adequate security for the costs of appeal in
accordance with the provisions of N.C.G.S. §§ 1-285 and -286.

(b) In Forma Pauperis Appeals. A party in a civil action may
be allowed to prosecute an appeal in forma pauperis without provid-
ing security for costs in accordance with the provisions of N.C.G.S.
§ 1-288.

(ec) Filed with Record on Appeal. When security for costs is
required, the appellant shall file with the record on appeal a certified
copy of the appeal bond or a cash deposit made in lieu of bond.

(d) Dismissal for Failure to File or Defect in Security. For
failure of the appellant to provide security as required by subsection (a)
or to file evidence thereof as required by subsection (c), or for a substan-
tial defect or irregularity in any security provided, the appeal may on
motion of an appellee be dismissed by the appellate court where dock-
eted, unless for good cause shown the court permits the security to be
provided or the filing to be made out of time, or the defect or irregularity
to be corrected. A motion to dismiss on these grounds shall be made and
determined in accordance with Rule 37. When the motion to dismiss is
made on the grounds of a defect or irregularity, the appellant may as a.
matter of right correct the defect or irregularity by filing a proper bond
or making proper deposit with the clerk of the appellate court within
ten days after service of the motion upon appellant or before the case is
called for argument, whichever first occurs.

TOC

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

783

(a) No Security for Costs in Criminal Appeals. Pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 154-1449, no security for costs is required upon appeal of
criminal cases to the appellate division.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 312 N.C. 803; 324 N.C. 613; 327 N.C. 671; 354 N.C. 609;

363 N.C. 901.

Rule 7. Preparation of the Transcript; Court Reporter’s Duties

@

Ordering the Transcript.
(1) Civil Cases. Within fourteen days after filing the

notice of appeal the appellant shall contract for the
transcription of the proceedings or of such parts of
the proceedings not already on file, as the appellant
deems necessary, in accordance with these rules,
and shall provide the following information in writ-
ing: a designation of the parts of the proceedings to
be transcribed; the name and address of the court
reporter or other neutral person designated to pro-
duce the transcript; and, where portions of the pro-
ceedings have been designated to be transcribed,
a statement of the issues the appellant intends to
raise on appeal. The appellant shall file the writ-
ten documentation of this transcript contract with
the clerk of the trial tribunal, and serve a copy of it
upon all other parties of record and upon the person
designated to produce the transcript. If an appellee
deems a transcript of other parts of the proceed-
ings to be necessary, the appellee, within fourteen
days after the service of the written documentation
of the appellant, shall contract for the transcrip-
tion of any additional parts of the proceedings or
such parts of the proceedings not already on file,
in accordance with these rules. The appellee shall
file with the clerk of the trial tribunal, and serve
on all other parties of record, written documenta-
tion of the additional parts of the proceedings to be
transcribed and the name and address of the court
reporter or other neutral person designated to pro-
duce the transcript. In civil cases and special pro-
ceedings where there is an order establishing the
indigency of a party entitled to appointed appellate

784 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

counsel, the ordering of the transcript shall be as in
criminal cases where there is an order establishing
the indigency of the defendant as set forth in Rule
a2).

(2) Criminal Cases. In criminal cases where there is
no order establishing the indigency of the defen-
dant for the appeal, the defendant shall contract
for the transcription of the proceedings as in civil
cases.

When there is an order establishing the indi-
) gency of the defendant, unless the trial judge’s
appeal entries specify or the parties stipulate that
: parts of the proceedings need not be transcribed,
| the clerk of the trial tribunal shall order a transcript

of the proceedings by serving the following docu-
ments upon either the court reporter(s) or neu-
tral person designated to produce the transcript:
a copy of the appeal entries signed by the judge;
a copy of the trial court’s order establishing indi-
gency for the appeal; and a statement setting out
the name, address, telephone number, and e-mail
address of appellant’s counsel. The clerk shall
make an entry of record reflecting the date these
documents were served upon the court reporter(s)
or transcriptionist.

(b) Production and Delivery of Transcript.

() Production. In civil cases: from the date the
requesting party serves the written documentation
of the transcript contract on the person designated
to produce the transcript, that person shall have
sixty days to produce and electronically deliver the
transcript.

In criminal cases where there is no order
establishing the indigency of the defendant for the
appeal: from the date the requesting party serves
the written documentation of the transcript con-

‘tract on the person designated to produce the
transcript, that person shall have sixty days to pro-
duce and electronically deliver the transcript in
non-capital cases and one-hundred-twenty days to
produce and electronically deliver the transcript in
capitally-tried cases.

TOC

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RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

In criminal cases where there is an order
establishing the indigency of the defendant for the
appeal: from the date listed on the appeal entries
as the “Date order delivered to transcriptionist,”
that person shall have sixty-five days to produce
and electronically deliver the transcript in non-
capital cases and one-hundred-twenty-five days to
produce and electronically deliver the transcript in
capitally-tried cases.

The transcript format shall comply with
Appendix B of these rules.

Except in capitally-tried criminal cases which
result in the imposition of a sentence of death, the
trial tribunal, in its discretion and for good cause
shown by the appellant, may, pursuant to Rule 27(c)
(4), extend the time to produce the transcript for an
additional thirty days. Any subsequent motions for
additional time required to produce the transcript
may only be made pursuant to Rule 27(c)(2) to the
appellate court to which appeal has been-taken. All
motions for extension of time to produce the tran-
script in capitally-tried cases resulting in the impo-
sition of a sentence of death shall be made directly
to the Supreme Court by the appellant.

Delivery. The court reporter, or person desig-
nated to produce the transcript, shall electronically
deliver the completed transcript to the parties,
including the district attorney and Attorney General
of North Carolina in criminal cases, as ordered,
within the time provided by this rule, unless an
extension of time has been granted under Rule 7(b)
(4) or Rule 27(c). The court reporter or transcrip-
tionist shall certify to the clerk of the trial tribunal
that the transcript has been so delivered and shall
send a copy of such certification to the appellate
court to which the appeal is taken. The appellant.

. shall promptly notify the court reporter when the

record on appeal has been filed. Once the court
reporter, or person designated to produce the tran-
script, has been notified by the appellant that the
record on appeal has been filed with the appellate
court to which the appeal has been taken, the court,
reporter must electronically file the transcript with

785

786 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

that court using the docket number assigned by
that court.

(8) Neutral Transcriptionist. The neutral person
designated to produce the transcript shall not be
a relative or employee or attorney or counsel of
any of the parties, or a relative or employee of such
attorney or counsel, or be financially interested in
the action unless the parties agree otherwise by
stipulation.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 295 N.C. 741; 92 N.C. App. 761; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C.
613; 327 N.C. 671; 347 N.C. 679; 350 N.C. 857; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609;
356 N.C. 701; 361 N.C. 732; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 8. Stay Pending Appeal

(a) Stay in Civil Cases. When appeal is taken in a civil action
from a judgment, order, or other determination of a trial court, stay of
execution or enforcement thereof pending disposition of the appeal
must ordinarily first be sought by the deposit of security with the clerk
of the superior court in those cases for which provision is made by law
for the entry of stays upon deposit of adequate security, or by applica-
tion to the trial court for a stay order in all other cases. After a stay
order or entry has been denied or vacated by a trial court, an appellant
may apply to the appropriate appellate court for a temporary stay and a
writ of supersedeas in accordance with Rule 23. In any appeal which is
allowed by law to be taken from an administrative tribunal to the appel-
late division, application for the temporary stay and writ of supersedeas
may be made to the appellate court in the first instance. Application for
the temporary stay and writ of supersedeas may similarly be made to the
appellate court in the first instance when extraordinary circumstances
make it impracticable to obtain a stay by deposit of security or by appli-
cation to the trial court for a stay order.

(b) Stay in Criminal Cases. When a defendant has given notice
of appeal, those portions of criminal sentences which impose fines or
costs are automatically stayed pursuant to the provisions of N.C.G.S.
§ 154-1451. Stays of imprisonment or of the execution of death sen-
tences must be pursued under N.C.G.S. § 154-536 or Rule 23.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 312 N.C. 803; 324 N.C. 613; 345 N.C. 765; 354 N.C. 609;
363 N.C. 901.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 787

Rule 9. The Record on Appeal

(a) Function; Notice in Cases Involving Juveniles;
Composition of Record. In appeals from the trial division of the
General Court of Justice, review is solely upon the record on appeal, the
verbatim transcript of proceedings, if one is designated, and any other
items filed pursuant to this Rule 9. Parties may cite any of these items in
their briefs and arguments before the appellate courts.

All filings involving juveniles covered by Rules 3(b)(1), 3.1(b), or
4(e) shall include the following notice in uppercase typeface:

FILED PURSUANT TO RULE [3(b)(1)} [3.1(6)] [4(e)]; SUBJECT
TO PUBLIC INSPECTION ONLY BY ORDER OF A COURT OF THE
APPELLATE DIVISION.

() Composition of the Record in Civil Actions and
Special Proceedings. The record on appeal in
civil actions and special proceedings shall contain:

a. an index of the contents of the record, which
shall appear as the first page thereof;

b. a statement identifying the judge from whose
judgment or order appeal is taken, the session
at which the judgment or order was rendered,
or if rendered out of session, the time and place
of rendition, and the party appealing;

c. acopy of the summons with return, or of other
papers showing jurisdiction of the trial court
over persons or property, or a statement show-
ing same;

d. copies of the pleadings, and of any pretrial
order on which the case or any part thereof
‘was tried;

e. so much of the litigation, set out in the form
provided in Rule 9(c)(1), as is necessary for
an understanding of all issues presented on
appeal, or a statement specifying that the ver-
batim transcript of proceedings is being filed
with the record pursuant to Rule 9(c)(2), or
designating portions of the transcript to be
so filed;

788

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

where an issue presented on appeal relates to
the giving or omission of instructions to the
jury, a transcript of the entire charge given;
and identification of the omitted instruction
by setting out the requested instruction or its
substance in the record on appeal immediately
following the instruction given;

copies of the issues submitted and the verdict,
or of the trial court’s findings of fact and con-
clusions of law;

acopy of the judgment, order, or other determi-
nation from which appeal is taken;

a copy of the notice of appeal, of all orders
establishing time limits relative to the perfect-
ing of the appeal, of any order finding a party
to the appeal to be a civil pauper, and of any
agreement, notice of approval, or order settling
the record on appeal and settling the verbatim
transcript of proceedings if one is filed pursu-
ant to Rule 9(c)(2) and (3);

copies of all other papers filed and statements
of all other proceedings had in the trial court
which are necessary to an understanding of all
issues presented on appeal unless they appear
in the verbatim transcript of proceedings which
is being filed with the record pursuant to Rule
92);

proposed issues on appeal set out in the man-
ner provided in Rule 10;

astatement, where appropriate, that the record
of proceedings was made with an electronic
recording device;

a statement, where appropriate, that a supple-
ment compiled pursuant to Rule 11(c) is filed
with the record on appeal; and

any order (issued prior to the filing of the record
on appeal) ruling upon a motion by an attorney
who is not licensed to practice law in North
Carolina to be admitted pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 844.1 to appear in the appeal. In the event

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TOG

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

such a motion is filed prior to the filing of the
record but has not yet been ruled upon when
the record is filed, the record shall include a
statement that such a motion is pending and
the date that motion was filed.

(2) Composition of the Record in Appeals from
Superior Court Review of Administrative
Boards and Agencies. The record on appeal in
cases of appeal from judgments of the superior
court rendered upon review of the proceedings of
administrative boards or agencies, other than those
specified in Rule 18(a), shall contain:

a

an index of the contents of the record, which
shall appear as the first page thereof;

a statement identifying the judge from whose
judgment or order appeal is taken, the session
at which the judgment or order was rendered,
or if rendered out of session, the time and place
of rendition, and the party appealing;

a copy of the summons, notice of hearing, or
other papers showing jurisdiction of the board
or agency over persons or property sought to
be bound in the proceeding, or a statement.
showing same;

copies of all petitions and other pleadings filed
in the superior court;

copies of all items properly before the superior
court as are necessary for an understanding of
all issues presented on appeal;

so much of the litigation in the superior court,
set out in the form provided in Rule 9(c)(1), as
is necessary for an understanding of all issues
presented, or a statement specifying that the
verbatim transcript of proceedings is being
filed with the record pursuant to Rule 9(c)(2),
or designating portions of the transcript to be
so filed;

a copy of any findings of fact and conclusions
of law and of the judgment, order, or other

789

790

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

determination of the superior court from which
appeal is taken;

acopy of the notice of appeal from the superior
court, of all orders establishing time limits rela-
tive to the perfecting of the appeal, of any order
finding a party to the appeal to be a civil pauper,
and of any agreement, notice of approval, or
order settling the record on appeal and settling
the verbatim transcript of proceedings, if one is
filed pursuant to Rule 9(c)(2) and (8);

proposed issues on appeal relating to the
actions of the superior court, set out in the
manner provided in Rule 10; and

any order (issued prior to the filing of the
record on appeal) ruling upon any motion by
an attorney who is not licensed to practice law
in North Carolina to be admitted pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 84-4.1 to appear in the appeal. In
the event such a motion is filed prior to the
filing of the record but has not yet been ruled
upon when the record is filed, the record shall
include a statement that such a motion is pend-
ing and the date that motion was filed.

(83) Composition of the Record in Criminal
Actions. The record on appeal in criminal actions
shall contain: .

a

an index of the contents of the record, which
shall appear as the first page thereof;

a statement identifying the judge from whose
judgment or order appeal is taken, the session
at which the judgment or order was rendered,
or if rendered out of session, the time and place
of rendition, and the party appealing;

copies of all warrants, informations, present-
ments, and indictments upon which the case
has been tried in any court;

copies of docket entries or a statement show-
ing all arraignments and pleas;

so much of the litigation, set out in the form
provided in Rule 9(c)(1), as is necessary for

TOC

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

an understanding of all issues presented on
appeal, or a statement specifying that the entire
verbatim transcript of the proceedings is being
filed with the record pursuant to Rule 9(c)(2),
or designating portions of the transcript to be
so filed;

where an issue presented on appeal relates to
the giving or omission of instructions to the
jury, a transcript of the entire charge given;
and identification of the omitted instruction
by setting out the requested instruction or its
substance in the record on appeal immediately
following the instruction given;

copies of the verdict and of the judgment, order,
or other determination from which appeal is
taken; and in capitally-tried cases, a copy of the
jury verdict sheet for sentencing, showing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances sub-
mitted and found or not found;

a copy of the notice of appeal or an appropri-
ate entry or statement showing appeal taken
orally; of all orders establishing time limits rela-
tive to the perfecting of the appeal; of any order
finding defendant indigent for the purposes of
the appeal and assigning counsel; and of any
agreement, notice of approval, or order settling
the record on appeal and settling the verbatim
transcript of proceedings, if one is to be filed
pursuant to Rule 9(c)(2);

copies of all other papers filed and statements
of all other proceedings had in the trial courts
which are necessary for an understanding of all
issues presented on appeal, unless they appear
in the verbatim transcript of proceedings which
is being filed with the record pursuant to Rule
9c);

proposed issues on appeal set out in the man-
ner provided in Rule 10;

astatement, where appropriate, that the record
of proceedings was made with an electronic
recording device;

792

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(b) Form of Record; Amendments.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

1 astatement, where appropriate, that a supple-

ment compiled pursuant to Rule 11(c) is filed
with the record on appeal; and

m. any order (issued prior to the filing of the

record on appeal) ruling upon any motion by
an attorney who is not licensed to practice law
in North Carolina to be admitted pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 84-4.1 to appear in the appeal. In
the event such a motion is filed prior to the
filing of the record but has not yet been ruled
upon when the record is filed, the record ‘shall
include a statement that such a motion is pend-
ing and the date that motion was filed.

Exclusion of Social Security Numbers from
Record on Appeal. Social security numbers shall
be deleted or redacted from any document before
including the document in the record on appeal.

TOC

The record on appeal

shall be in the format prescribed by Rule 26(g) and the appendixes to

these rules.
@

@

®

Order of Arrangement. The items constituting
the record on appeal should be arranged, so far as
practicable, in the order in which they occurred or
were filed in the trial tribunal.

Inclusion of Unnecessary Matter; Penalty. It
shall be the duty of counsel for all parties to an
appeal to avoid including in the record on appeal
matter not necessary for an understanding of the
issues presented on appeal, such as social secu-
rity numbers referred to in Rule 9(a)(4). The cost
of including such matter may be charged as costs
to the party or counsel who caused or permitted
its inclusion.

Filing Dates and Signatures on Papers. Every
pleading, motion, affidavit, or other paper included
in the record on appeal shall show the date on
which it was filed and, if verified, the date of veri-
fication and the person who verified it. Every judg-
ment, order, or other determination shall show the
date on which it was entered. The typed or printed

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 793

name of the person signing a paper shall be entered.
immediately below the signature.

(4) Pagination; Counsel Identified. The pages of
the printed record on appeal shall be numbered
consecutively, be referred to as “record pages,” and
be cited as “(R p ___).” Pages of the Rule 11(c) or
Rule 18(d)(8) supplement to the record on appeal
shall be numbered consecutively with the pages of
the record on appeal, the first page of the record
supplement to bear the next consecutive number
following the number of the last page of the printed
record on appeal. These pages shall be referred
to as “record supplement pages” and be cited as
“ S p __).” Pages of the verbatim transcript
of proceedings filed under Rule 9(c)(2) shall be
referred to as “transcript pages” and be cited as
“(I p __).” At the end of the record on appeal
shall appear the names, office addresses, telephone
numbers, State Bar numbers, and e-mail addresses
of counsel of record for all parties to the appeal.

(5) Additions and Amendments to Record on
Appeal.

a. Additional Materials in the Record on
Appeal. If the record on appeal as settled is
insufficient to respond to the issues presented
in an appellant's brief or the issues presented in
an appellee's brief pursuant to Rule 10(c), the
responding party may supplement the record
on appeal with any items that could otherwise
have been included pursuant to this Rule 9. The
responding party shall serve a copy of those
items on opposing counsel and shall file three
copies of the items in a volume captioned “Rule
9(b)(5) Supplement to the Printed Record on
Appeal.” The supplement shall be filed no later
than the responsive brief or within the time
allowed for filing such a brief if none is filed.

b. Motions Pertaining to Additions to the
Record. On motion of any party or on its
own initiative, the appellate court may order
additional portions of a trial court record or

794 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

transcript sent up and added to the record on
appeal. On motion of any party, the appellate
court may order any portion of the record on
‘appeal or transcript amended to correct error
shown as to form or content. Prior to the filing
of the record on appeal in the appellate court,
such motions may be filed by any party in the
trial court.

(c) Presentation of Testimonial Evidence and Other
Proceedings. Testimonial evidence, voir dire, statements and events
at evidentiary and non-evidentiary hearings, and other trial proceed-
ings necessary to be presented for review by the appellate court may be
included either in the record on appeal in the form specified in Rule 9(c)
(A) or by designating the verbatim transcript of proceedings of the trial
tribunal as provided in Rule 9(c)(2) and (3). When an issue presented
on appeal relates to the giving or omission of instructions to the jury,
a transcript of the entire charge given shall be included in the record
on appeal. Verbatim transcripts or narration utilized in a case subject
to Rules 3(b)(1), 3.1(b), or 4(e) initiated in the trial division under the
provisions of Subchapter I of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes shall be
produced and delivered to the office of the clerk of the appellate court to
which the appeal has been taken in the manner specified by said rules.

() When Testimonial Evidence, Voir Dire,
Statements and Events at Evidentiary and
Non-Evidentiary Hearings, and Other Trial
Proceedings Narrated—How Set Out in
Record. When an issue is presented on appeal with
respect to the admission or exclusion of evidence,
the question and answer form shall be utilized in
setting out the pertinent questions and answers.
Other testimonial evidence, voir dire, statements
and events at evidentiary and non-evidentiary hear-
ings, and other trial proceedings required by Rule
9(a) to be included in the record on appeal shall
be set out in narrative form except where such
form might not fairly reflect the true sense of the
evidence received, in which case it may be set
out in question and answer form. Parties shall use
that form or combination of forms best calculated
under the circumstances to present the true sense
of the required testimonial evidence concisely and
at a minimum of expense to the litigants. Parties
may object to particular narration on the basis that

TOC

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RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

it does not accurately reflect the true sense of tes-
timony received, statements made, or events that
occurred; or to particular questions and answers
on the basis that the testimony might with no sub-
stantial loss in accuracy be summarized in narra-
tive form at substantially less expense. When a
judge or referee is required to settle the record on
appeal under Rule 11(c) and there is dispute as to

the form, the judge or referee shall settle the form °

in the course of settling the record on appeal.

Designation that Verbatim Transcript of
Proceedings in Trial Tribunal Will Be Used.
Appellant may designate in the record on appeal
that the testimonial evidence will be presented
in the verbatim transcript of the evidence of the
trial tribunal in lieu of narrating the evidence and
other trial proceedings as permitted by Rule 9(c)
(4). When a verbatim transcript of those proceed-
ings has been made, appellant may also designate
that the verbatim transcript will be used to pres-
ent voir dire, statements and events at evidentiary
and non-evidentiary hearings, or other trial pro-
ceedings when those proceedings are the basis
for one or more issues presented on appeal. Any
such designation shall refer to the page numbers
of the transcript being designated. Appellant need
not designate all of the verbatim transcript that
has been made, provided that when the verbatim
transcript is designated to show the testimonial evi-
dence, so much of the testimonial evidence must
be designated as is necessary for an understanding
of all issues presented on appeal. When appellant
has narrated the evidence and other trial proceed-
ings under Rule 9(c)(1), the appellee may designate
the verbatim transcript as a proposed alternative
record on appeal.

Verbatim Transcript of Proceedings—
Settlement, Filing, Copies, Briefs. Whenever a
verbatim transcript is designated to be used pursu-
ant to Rule 9(c)(2):

a. it shall be settled, together with the record
on appeal, according to the procedures estab-
lished by Rule 11;

795

796 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

b. appellant shall cause the settled record on
appeal and transcript to be filed pursuant to
Rule 7 with the clerk of the appellate court in
which the appeal has been docketed;

c. in criminal appeals, upon settlement of the
record on appeal, the district attorney shall
notify the Attorney General of North Carolina
that the record on appeal and transcript have
been settled; and

d. the briefs of the parties must comport with the
requirements of Rule 28 regarding complete
statement of the facts of the case and regarding
appendixes to the briefs.

(4) Presentation of Discovery Materials. Discovery
materials offered into evidence at trial shall be
brought forward, if relevant, as other evidence. In
all instances in which discovery materials are con-
sidered by the trial tribunal, other than as evidence
offered at trial, the following procedures for pre-
senting those materials to the appellate court shall

be used: Depositions shall be treated as testimonial

evidence and shall be presented by narration or
by transeript of the deposition in the manner pre-
scribed by this Rule 9(c). Other discovery materi-
als, including interrogatories and answers, requests
for admission, responses to requests, motions to
produce, and the like, pertinent to issues presented
on appeal, may be set out in the record on appeal or
may be sent up as documentary exhibits in accor-
dance with Rule 9(d)(2).

(6) Electronic Recordings. When a narrative or
transcript has been produced from an electronic
recording, the parties shall not file a copy of the
electronic recording with the appellate division
except at the direction or with the approval of the
appellate court.

(ad) Exhibits. Any exhibit filed, served, submitted for consider-
ation, admitted, or made the subject of an offer of proof may be made a
part of the record on appeal if a party believes that its inclusion is neces-
sary to understand an issue on appeal.

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4

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Documentary Exhibits Included in the Printed
Record on Appeal. A party may include a docu-
mentary exhibit in the printed record on appeal if
it is of a size and nature to make inclusion possible
without impairing the legibility or original signifi-
cance of the exhibit.

Exhibits Not Included in the Printed Record
on Appeal. A documentary exhibit that is not
included in the printed record on appeal can be
made a part of the record on appeal by filing three
copies with the clerk of the appellate court. The
three copies shall be paginated. If multiple exhibits
are filed, an index must be included in the filing.
Copies that impair the legibility or original signifi-
cance of the exhibit may not be filed. An exhibit
that is a tangible object or is an exhibit that cannot
be copied without impairing its legibility or original
significance can be made a part of the record on
appeal by having it delivered by the clerk of supe-
rior court to the clerk of the appellate court. When.
a party files a written request with the clerk of
superior court that the exhibit be delivered to the
appellate court, the clerk must promptly have the
exhibit delivered to the appellate court in a man-
ner that ensures its security and availability for use
in further trial proceedings. The party requesting
delivery of the exhibit to the appellate court shall
not be required to move in the appellate court for
delivery of the exhibit.

Exclusion of Social Security Numbers from
Exhibits. Social security numbers must be deleted
or redacted from copies of exhibits.

Removal of Exhibits from Appellate Court. All
models, diagrams, and exhibits of material placed
in the custody of the clerk of the appellate court
must be taken away by the parties within ninety
days after the mandate of the Court has issued or
the case has otherwise been closed by withdrawal,
dismissal, or other order of the Court, unless noti-
fied otherwise by the clerk. When this is not done,
the clerk shall notify counsel to remove the articles
forthwith; and if they are not removed within a

797

798. RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

reasonable time after such notice, the clerk shall
destroy them, or make such other disposition of
them as to the clerk may seem best.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 303 N.C. 715; 304 N.C. 787; 812 N.C. 803; 92.N.C. App.
761; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 613; 327 N.C. 671; 345 N.C. 765; 347 N.C. 679;
354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 358 N.C. 824; 361 N.C. 732; 363 N.C. 901; 365
N.C. 583.

Rule 10. Preservation of Issues at Trial; Proposed Issues on Appeal
(a) Preserving Issues During Trial Proceedings.

(1) General. In order to preserve an issue for appel-
late review, a party must have presented to the trial
court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating
the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired
the court to make if the specific grounds were not
apparent from the context. It is also necessary for
the complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the
party’s request, objection, or motion. Any such issue
that was properly preserved for review by action
of counsel taken during the course of proceedings
in the trial tribunal by objection noted or which by
rule or law was deemed preserved or taken with-
out any such action, including, but not limited to,
whether the judgment is supported by the verdict.
or by the findings of fact and conclusions of law,
whether the court had jurisdiction over the subject.
matter, and whether a criminal charge is sufficient
in law, may be made the basis of an issue presented
on appeal.

(2) Jury Instructions. A party may not make any
portion of the jury charge or omission therefrom
the basis of an issue presented on appeal unless
the party objects thereto before the jury retires to
consider its verdict, stating distinctly that to which
objection is made and the grounds of the objection;
provided that opportunity was given to the party to
make the objection out of the hearing of the jury,
and, on request of any party, out of the presence of
the jury.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 799

(8) Sufficiency of the Evidence. In a criminal case,
a defendant may not make insufficiency of the evi-
dence to prove the crime charged the basis of an
issue presented on appeal unless a motion to dis-
miss the action, or for judgment as in case of non-
suit, is made at trial. If a defendant makes such a
motion after the State has presented all its evidence
and has rested its case and that motion is denied
and the defendant then introduces evidence, defen-
dant’s motion for dismissal or judgment in case
of nonsuit made at the close of State’s evidence
is waived. Such a waiver precludes the defendant.
from urging the denial of such motion as a ground
for appeal.

A defendant may make a motion to dismiss
the action, or for judgment as in case of nonsuit, at
the conclusion of all the evidence, irrespective of
whether defendant made an earlier such motion. If
the motion at the close of all the evidence is denied,
the defendant may urge as ground for appeal the
denial of the motion made at the conclusion of all
the evidence. However, if a defendant fails to move
to dismiss the action, or for judgment as in case of
nonsuit, at the close of all the evidence, defendant
may not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the
evidence to prove the crime charged.

If a defendant’s motion to dismiss the action,
or for judgment as in case of nonsuit, is allowed, or
shall be sustained on appeal, it shail have the force
and effect of a verdict of “not guilty” as to such
defendant.

(4) Plain Error. In criminal cases, an issue that was
not preserved by objection noted at trial and that is
not deemed preserved by rule or law without any
such action nevertheless may be made the basis
of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial
action questioned is specifically and distinctly con-
tended to amount to plain error.

(b) Appellant’s Proposed Issues on Appeal. Proposed issues
that the appellant intends to present on appeal shall be stated without.
argument at the conclusion of the record on appeal in a numbered list.
Proposed issues on appeal are to facilitate the preparation of the record

800 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

on appeal and shall not limit the scope of the issues presented on appeal
in an appellant’s brief.

(c) Appellee’s Proposed Issues on Appeal as to an Alternative
Basis in Law. Without taking an appeal, an appellee may list proposed
issues on appeal in the record on appeal based on any action or omis-
sion of the trial court that was properly preserved for appellate review
and that deprived the appellee of an alternative basis in law for support-
ing the judgment, order, or other determination from which appeal has
been taken. An appellee’s list of proposed issues on appeal shall not
preclude an appellee from presenting arguments on other issues in its
brief. Portions of the record or transcript of proceedings necessary to
an understanding of such proposed issues on appeal as to an alternative
basis in law may be included in the record on appeal by agreement of the
parties under Rule 11(a), may be included by the appellee in a proposed.
alternative record on appeal under Rule 11(b), or may be designated for
inclusion in the verbatim transcript of proceedings, if one is filed under
Rule 9(c)(2).

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 303 N.C. 715; 309 N.C. 830; 312 N.C. 803; 92 N.C. App.
761; 824 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 11. Settling the Record on Appeal

(a) By Agreement. This rule applies to all cases except those
subject to expedited schedules in Rule 3.1.

Within thirty-five days after the court reporter or transcriptionist
certifies delivery of the transcript, if such was ordered (seventy days
in capitally-tried cases), or thirty-five days after appellant files notice of
appeal, whichever is later, the parties may by agreement entered in the
record on appeal settle a proposed record on appeal prepared by any
party in accordance with Rule 9 as the record on appeal.

(b) By Appellee’s Approval of Appellant’s Proposed Record
on Appeal. If the record on appeal is not settled by agreement under
Rule 11(a), the appellant shall, within the same times provided, serve
upon all other parties a proposed record on appeal constituted in accor-
dance with the provisions of Rule 9. Within thirty days (thirty-five days
in capitally-tried cases) after service of the proposed record on appeal
upon an appellee, that appellee may serve upon all other parties a notice
of approval of the proposed record on appeal, or objections, amend-
ments, or a proposed alternative record on appeal in accordance with
Rule 11(c). If all appellees within the times allowed them either serve

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 801

notices of approval or fail to serve either notices of approval or objec-
tions, amendments, or proposed alternative records on appeal, appel-
lant’s proposed record on appeal thereupon constitutes the record on
appeal.

(c) By Agreement, by Operation of Rule, or by Court Order
After Appellee’s Objection or Amendment. Within thirty days
(thirty-five days in capitally-tried cases) after service upon appellee of
appellant's proposed record on appeal, that appellee may serve upon all
other parties specific amendments or objections to the proposed record
on appeal, or a proposed alternative record on appeal. Amendments or
objections to the proposed record on appeal shall be set out in a sepa-
rate paper and shall specify any item(s) for which an objection is based
on the contention that the item was not filed, served, submitted for con-
sideration, admitted, or made the subject of an offer of proof, or that the
content of a statement or narration is factually inaccurate. An appellant
who objects to an appellee’s response to the proposed record on appeal
shall make the same specification in its request for judicial settlement.
The formatting of the proposed record on appeal and the order in which
items appear in it are the responsibility of the appellant.

Tf any appellee timely serves amendments, objections, or a pro-
posed alternative record on appeal, the record on appeal shall consist
of each item that is either among those items required by Rule 9(a) to be
in the record on appeal or that is requested by any party to the appeal
and agreed upon for inclusion by all other parties to the appeal. If a
party requests that an item be included in the record on appeal but not
all other parties to the appeal agree to its inclusion, then that item shall
not be included in the printed record on appeal, but shall be filed by the
appellant with the printed record on appeal in three copies of a volume
captioned “Rule 11(c) Supplement to the Printed Record on Appeal,”
along with any verbatim transcripts, narrations of proceedings, docu-
mentary exhibits, and other items that are filed pursuant to these rules;
provided that any item not filed, served, submitted for consideration,
or admitted, or for which no offer of proof was tendered, shall not be
included. Subject to the additional requirements of Rule 28(d), items
in the Rule 11(c) supplement may be cited and used by the parties as
would items in the printed record on appeal.

Ifa party does not agree to the wording of a statement or narration
required or permitted by these rules, there shall be no judicial settle-
ment to resolve the dispute unless the objection is based on a conten-
tion that the statement or narration concerns an item that was not filed,
served, submitted for consideration, admitted, or tendered in an offer of
proof, or that a statement or narration is factually inaccurate. Instead,

802 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

the objecting party is permitted to have inserted in the settled record
on appeal a concise counter-statement. Parties are strongly encouraged.
to reach agreement on the wording of statements in records on appeal.
Judicial settlement is not appropriate for disputes that concern only the
formatting of a record on appeal or the order in which items appear ina
record on appeal.

The Rule 11(c) supplement to the printed record on appeal shall
contain an index of the contents of the supplement, which shall appear
as the first page thereof. The Rule 11(c) supplement shall be paginated
as required by Rule 9(b)(4) and the contents should be arranged, so far
as practicable, in the order in which they occurred or were filed in the
trial tribunal. If a party does not agree to the inclusion or specification
of an exhibit or transcript in the printed record, the printed record shall
include a statement that such items are separately filed along with the
supplement.

If any party to the appeal contends that materials proposed for inclu-
sion in the record or for filing therewith pursuant to these rules were not
filed, served, submitted for consideration, admitted, or made the subject
of an offer of proof, or that a statement or narration permitted by these
rules is not factually accurate, then that party, within ten days after
expiration of the time within which the appellee last served with the
appellant’s proposed record on appeal might have served amendments,
objections, or a proposed alternative record on appeal, may in writing
request that the judge from whose judgment, order, or other determina-
tion appeal was taken settle the record on appeal. A copy of the request,
endorsed with a certificate showing service on the judge, shall be filed
forthwith in the office of the clerk of the superior court and served upon.
all other parties. Each party shall promptly provide to the judge a refer-
ence copy of the record items, amendments, or objections served by that
party in the case.

The functions of the judge in the settlement of the record on appeal
are to determine whether a statement permitted by these rules is not fac-
tually accurate, to settle narrations of proceedings under Rule 9(c)(1),
and to determine whether the record accurately reflects material filed,
served, submitted for consideration, admitted, or made the subject of an
offer of proof, but not to decide whether material desired in the record
by either party is relevant to the issues on appeal, non-duplicative, or
otherwise suited for inclusion in the record on appeal.

The judge shall send written notice to counsel for all parties set-
ting a place and a time for a hearing to settle the record on appeal.
The hearing shall be held not later than fifteen days after service of the

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 803

request for hearing upon the judge. The judge shall settle the record on
appeal by order entered not more than twenty days after service of the
request for hearing upon the judge. If requested, the judge shall return
the record items submitted for reference during the judicial-settlement
process with the order settling the record on appeal.

If any appellee timely serves amendments, objections, or a proposed.
alternative record on appeal, and no judicial settlement of the record
is timely sought, the record is deemed settled as of the expiration of
the ten-day period within which any party could have requested judicial
settlement of the record on appeal under this Rule 11(c).

Provided that, nothing herein shall prevent settlement of the record
on appeal by agreement of the parties at any time within the times herein
limited for settling the record by judicial order.

(d) Multiple Appellants; Single Record on Appeal. When there
are multiple appellants (two or more), whether proceeding separately or
jointly, as parties aligned in interest, or as cross-appellanis, there shall
nevertheless be but one record on appeal. The proposed issues on appeal
of the several appellants shall be set out separately in the single record
on appeal and attributed to the several appellants by any clear means of
reference. In the event multiple appellants cannot agree to the proce-
dure for constituting a proposed record on appeal, the judge from whose
judgment, order, or other determination the appeals are taken shall, on
motion of any appellant with notice to all other appellants, enter an order
settling the procedure, including the allocation of costs.

(e) Extensions of Time. The times provided in this rule for tak-
ing any action may be extended in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 27(c).

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 312 N.C. 803; 92 N.C. App. 761; 324 N.C. 613; 327 N.C.

671, 345 N.C. 765; 347 N.C. 679; 354 N.C. 609; 358 N.C. 824; 361 N.C. 732;
363 N.C. 901.

Rule 12. Filing the Record; Docketing the Appeal; Copies of
the Record

(a) Time for Filing Record on Appeal. Within fifteen days after
the record on appeal has been settled by any of the procedures provided
in Rule 11 or Rule 18, the appellant shall file the record on appeal with
the clerk of the court to which appeal is taken.

(b) Docketing the Appeal. At the time of filing the record on

804 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk the docket fee fixed pursuant
to N.C.G.S. § 7A-20(b), and the clerk shall thereupon enter the appeal
upon the docket of the appellate court. If an appellant is authorized to
appeal in forma pauperis as provided in N.C.G.S. §§ 1-288 or 7A-450 et
seq., the clerk shall docket the appeal upon timely filing of the record
on appeal. An appeal is docketed under the title given to the action in
the trial division, with the appellant identified as such. The clerk shall
forthwith give notice to all parties of the date on which the appeal was
docketed in the appellate court.

(c) Copies of Record on Appeal. The appellant shall file one
copy of the printed record on appeal, three copies of each exhibit des-
ignated pursuant to Rule 9(d), three copies of any supplement to the
record on appeal submitted pursuant to Rule 11(c) or Rule 18(d)(3),
one copy of any paper deposition or administrative hearing transcript,
and shall cause any court proceeding transcript to be filed electronically
pursuant to Rule 7. The clerk will reproduce and distribute copies of
the printed record on appeal as directed by the court, billing the parties
pursuant to these rules.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 312 N.C. 803; 92 N.C. App. 761; 324 N.C. 613; 345 N.C.
765; 354 N.C. 609; 357 N.C. 665; 361 N.C. 732; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 13. Filing and Service of Briefs
(a) Time for Filing and Service of Briefs.

(1) Cases Other Than Death Penalty Cases. Within
thirty days after the clerk of the appellate court has
mailed the printed record to the parties, the appel-
lant shall file a brief in the office of the clerk of the
appellate court and serve copies thereof upon all
other parties separately represented. The mailing
of the printed record is not service for purposes
of Rule 27(b); therefore, the provision of that rule
allowing an additional three days after service by
mail does not extend the period for the filing of an
appellant's brief. Within thirty days after appellant’s
brief has been served on an appellee, the appellee
shall similarly file and serve copies of a brief. An
appellant may file and serve a reply brief as pro-
vided in Rule 28(h).

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 805

(2) Death Penalty Cases. Within sixty days after the
clerk of the Supreme Court has mailed the printed
record to the parties, the appellant in a criminal
appeal which includes a sentence of death shall
file a brief in the office of the clerk and serve cop-
ies thereof upon all other parties separately rep-
resented. The mailing of the printed record is not
service for purposes of Rule 27(b); therefore, the
provision of that rule allowing an additional three
days after service by mail does not extend the
period for the filing of an appellant's brief. Within
sixty days after appellant's brief has been served,
the appellee shall similarly file and serve copies of
abrief. An appellant may file and serve a reply brief
as provided in Rule 28(h).

(b) Copies Reproduced by Clerk. A party need file but a single _
copy of a brief. At the time of filing the party may be required to pay to
the clerk of the appellate court a deposit fixed by the clerk to cover the
cost of reproducing copies of the brief. The clerk will reproduce and
distribute copies of briefs as directed by the court.

(c) Consequence of Failure to File and Serve Briefs. If an
appellant fails to file and serve a brief within the time allowed, the appeal
may be dismissed on motion of an appellee or on the court's own initia-
tive. If an appellee fails to file and serve its brief within the time allowed,
the appellee may not be heard in oral argument except by permission of
the court.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 301 N.C. 731; 312 N.C. 803; 322 N.C. 850; 324 N.C. 585;
324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 357 N.C. 665; 359 N.C. 883; 363 N.C. 901; 365
N.C. 583.

Article TIT
Review by Supreme Court of Appeals Originally Docketed in the
Court of Appeals—Appeals of Right; Discretionary Review

Rule 14. Appeals of Right from Court of Appeals to Supreme
Court under N.C.G.S. § 7A-30

(a) Notice of Appeal; Filing and Service. Appeals of right from
the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court are taken by filing notices
of appeal with the clerk of the Court of Appeals and with the. clerk of

806 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

the Supreme Court and serving notice of appeal upon all other parties
within fifteen days after the mandate of the Court of Appeals has been
issued to the trial tribunal. For cases which arise from the Industrial
Commission, a copy of the notice of appeal shall be served on the Chair
of the Industrial Commission. The running of the time for filing and serv-
ing a notice of appeal is tolled as to all parties by the filing by any party
‘within such time of a petition for rehearing under Rule 31 of these rules,
and the full time for appeal thereafter commences to run and is com-
puted as to all parties from the date of entry by the Court of Appeals of
an order denying the petition for rehearing. If a timely notice of appeal
is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within
ten days after the first notice of appeal was filed. A petition prepared
in accordance with Rule 15(c) for discretionary review in the event the
appeal is determined not to be of right or for issues in addition to those
set out as the basis for a dissenting opinion may be filed with or con-
tained in the notice of appeal.

(b) Content of Notice of Appeal.

() Appeal Based Upon Dissent in Court of
Appeals. In an appeal which is based upon the
existence of a dissenting opinion in the Court of
Appeals, the notice of appeal shall specify the party
or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals from which the
appeal is taken; shall state the basis upon which it
is asserted that appeal lies of right under N.C.G.S. §
74-30; and shall state the issue or issues which are
the basis of the dissenting opinion and which are to
be presented to the Supreme Court for review.

(2) Appeal Presenting Constitutional Question.
In an appeal which is asserted by the appellant to
involve a substantial constitutional question, the
notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment
of the Court of Appeals from which the appeal
is taken; shall state the issue or issues which are
the basis of the constitutional claim and which
are to be presented to the Supreme Court for
review; shall specify the articles and sections of
the Constitution asserted to be involved; shall
state with particularity how appellant’s rights
thereunder have been violated; and shall affirma-
tively state that the constitutional issue was timely

TOC

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

raised (in the trial tribunal if it could have been, in
the Court of Appeals if not) and either not deter-
mined or determined erroneously.

(c) Record on Appeal.

®

@)

Composition. The record on appeal filed in the
Court of Appeals constitutes the record on appeal
for review by the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court may note de novo any deficiencies
in the record on appeal and may take such action in
respect thereto as it deems appropriate, including
dismissal of the appeal.

‘Transmission; Docketing; Copies. Upon the fil-
ing of a notice of appeal, the clerk of the Court of
Appeals will forthwith transmit the original record
on appeal to the clerk of the Supreme Court, who
shall thereupon file the record and docket the
appeal. The clerk of the Supreme Court will pro-
cure or reproduce copies of the record on appeal
for distribution as directed by the Court, and may
require a deposit from appellant to cover the cost
of reproduction.

(d) Briefs.

®

Filing and Service; Copies. Within thirty days
after filing notice of appeal in the Supreme Court,
the appellant shall file with the clerk of the Supreme
Court and serve upon all other parties copies of a
new brief prepared in conformity with Rule 28,
presenting only those issues upon which review by
the Supreme Court is sought; provided, however,
that when the appeal is based upon the existence
of a substantial constitutional question or when
the appellant has filed a petition for discretionary
review for issues in addition to those set out as the
basis of a dissent in the Court of Appeals, the appel-
lant shall file and serve a new brief within thirty
days after entry of the order of the Supreme Court
which determines for the purpose of retaining the
appeal on the docket that a substantial constitu-
tional question does exist or allows or denies the
petition for discretionary review in an appeal based
upon a dissent. Within thirty days after service of

807

808 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

the appellant’s brief upon appellee, the appellee
shall similarly file and serve copies of a new brief.
An appellant may file and serve a reply brief as pro-
vided in Rule 28(h).

The parties need file but single copies of their
respective briefs. The clerk will reproduce and dis-
tribute copies as directed by the Court, billing the
parties pursuant to these rules.

(2) Failure to File or Serve. If an appellant fails to
file or serve its brief within the time allowed, the
appeal may be dismissed on motion of an appellee
or on the Court’s own initiative. If an appellee fails
to file and serve its brief within the time allowed, it
may not be heard in oral argument except by per-
mission of the Court.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 291 N.C. 721; 301 N.C. 731; 312 N.C. 803; 322 N.C. 850;
324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 613; 345 N.C. 765; 354 N.C, 609; 357 N.C. 665; 359
N.C. 883; 863 N.C. 901; 365 N.C. 583.

Rule 15. Discretionary Review on Certification by Supreme
Court under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31

(a) Petition of Party. Either prior to or following determination
by the Court of Appeals of an appeal docketed in that court, any party to
the appeal may in writing petition the Supreme Court upon any grounds
specified in N.C.G.S. § 74-31 to certify the cause for discretionary review
by the Supreme Court; except that a petition for discretionary review of
an appeal from the Industrial Coramission, the North Carolina State Bar,
the Property Tax Commission, the Board of State Contract Appeals, or
the Commissioner of Insurance may only be made following determina-
tion by the Court of Appeals; and except that no petition for discretion-
ary review may be filed in any post-conviction proceeding under Article
89 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes, or in valuation of exempt
property under Chapter 1C of the General Statutes.

(b) Petition of Party—Filing and Service. A petition for review
prior to determination by the Court of Appeals shall be filed with the
clerk of the Supreme Court and served on all other parties within fifteen
days after the appeal is docketed in the Court of Appeals. For cases that
arise from'the Industrial Commission, a copy of the petition shall be
served on the Chair of the Industrial Commission. A petition for review

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 809

following determination by the Court of Appeals shall be similarly filed
and served within fifteen days after the mandate of the Court of Appeals
has been issued to the trial tribunal. Such a petition may be contained in
or filed with a notice of appeal of right, to be considered by the Supreme
Court in the event the appeal is determined not to be of right, as provided
in Rule 14(a). The running of the time for filing and serving a petition for
review following determination by the Court of Appeals is terminated
as to all parties by the filing by any party within such time of a petition _
for rehearing under Rule 31 of these rules, and the full time for filing and
serving such a petition for review thereafter commences to run and is
computed as to all parties from the date of entry by the Court of Appeals
of an order denying the petition for rehearing. If a timely petition for
review is filed by a party, any other party may file a petition for review
within ten days after the first petition for review was filed.

(c) Petition of Party—Content. The petition shall designate the
petitioner or petitioners and shall set forth plainly and concisely the fac-
tual and legal basis upon which it is asserted that grounds exist under
N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 for discretionary review. The petition shall state each
issue for which review is sought and shall be accompanied by a copy of
the opinion of the Court of Appeals when filed after determination by
that court. No supporting brief is required, but supporting authorities
may be set forth briefly in the petition.

(d) Response. A response to the petition may be filed by any other
party within ten days after service of the petition upon that party. No
supporting brief is required, but supporting authorities may be set forth
briefly in the response. If, in the event that the Supreme Court certifies
the case for review, the respondent would seek to present issues in addi-
tion to those presented by the petitioner, those additional issues shall be.
stated in the response. A motion for extension of time is not permitted.

(e) Certification by Supreme Court—How Determined and
Ordered. :

() On Petition of a Party. The determination by
the Supreme Court whether to certify for review
upon petition of a party is made solely upon the
petition and any response thereto and without oral
argument.

(2) On Initiative of the Court. The determination
by the Supreme Court whether to certify for review
upon its own initiative pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31
is made without prior notice to the parties and
without oral argument.

810

@)

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Orders; Filing and Service. Any determination
to certify for review and any determination not
to certify made in response to a petition will be
recorded by the Supreme Court in a written order.
The clerk of the Supreme Court will forthwith enter
such order, deliver a copy thereof to the clerk of
the Court of Appeals, and mail copies to all parties.
The cause is docketed in the Supreme Court upon
entry of an order of certification by the clerk of the
Supreme Court.

() Record on Appeal.

@

@

Composition. The record on appeal filed in the
Court of Appeals constitutes the record on appeal
for review by the Supreme Court. However, the
Supreme Court may note de novo any deficiencies
in the record on appeal and may take such action in
respect thereto as it deems appropriate, including
dismissal of the appeal.

Filing; Copies. When an order of certification
is filed with the clerk of the Court of Appeals, he
or she will forthwith transmit the original record
on appeal to the clerk of the Supreme Court. The
clerk of the Supreme Court will procure or repro-
duce copies thereof for distribution as directed by
the Court. If it is necessary to reproduce copies,
the clerk may require a deposit by the petitioner to
cover the costs thereof.

(g) Filing and Service of Briefs.

a

Cases Certified Before Determination by
Court of Appeals. When a case is certified for
review by the Supreme Court before being deter-
mined by the Court of Appeals, the times allowed
the parties by Rule 13 to file their respective briefs
are not thereby extended. If a party has filed its
brief in the Court of Appeals and served copies
before the case is certified, the clerk of the Court
of Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the clerk of
the Supreme Court the original brief and any cop-
ies already reproduced for distribution, and if filing
was timely in the Court of Appeals this constitutes
timely filing in the Supreme Court. If a party has

TOC

TOC

@)

@®

4

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

not filed its brief in the Court of Appeals and served
copies before the case is certified, the party shall
file its brief in the Supreme Court and serve cop-
ies within the time allowed and in the manner pro-
vided by Rule 13 for filing and serving in the Court
of Appeals.

Cases Certified for Review of Court of Appeals
Determinations. When a case is certified for
review by the Supreme Court of a determination
made by the Court of Appeals, the appellant shall
file a new brief prepared in conformity with Rule
28 in the Supreme Court and serve copies upon
all other parties within thirty days after the case is
docketed in the Supreme Court by entry of its order
of certification. The appellee shall file a new brief in
the Supreme Court and serve copies upon all other
parties within thirty days after a copy of appellant’s
brief is served upon the appellee. An appellant
may file and serve a reply brief as provided in Rule

28(h).

Copies. A party need file, or the clerk of the Court
of Appeals transmit, but a single copy of any brief
required by this Rule’15 to be filed in the Supreme
Court upon certification for discretionary review.
The clerk of the Supreme Court will thereupon pro-
cure from the Court of Appeals or will reproduce
copies for distribution as directed by the Supreme
Court. The clerk may require a deposit by any party
to cover the costs of reproducing copies of its brief.
In civil appeals in forma pauperis a party need not
pay the deposit for reproducing copies, but at the
time of filing its original new brief shall also deliver
to the clerk two legible copies thereof.

Failure to File or Serve. If an appellant fails
to file and serve its brief within the time allowed.
by this Rule 15, the appeal may be dismissed on
motion of an appellee or upon the Court’s own ini-
tiative. If an appellee fails to file and serve its brief
within the time allowed by this Rule 15, it may not
be heard in oral argument except by permission of
the Court.

811

812 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOG

(h) Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders. An inter-
locutory order by the Court of Appeals, including an order for a new
trial or for further proceedings in the trial tribunal, will be certified for
review by the Supreme Court only upon a determination by the Court
that failure to certify would cause a delay in final adjudication which
would probably result in substantial harm to a party.

@ Appellant, Appellee Defined. As used in this Rule 15, the
terms “appellant” and “appellee” have the following meanings:

(1) With respect to Supreme Court review prior to
determination by the Court of Appeals, whether on
petition of a party or on the Court’sown __initia-
tive, “appellant” means a party who appealed from
the trial tribunal; “appellee” means a party who did
not appeal from the trial tribunal.

(2) With respect to Supreme Court review of a determi-
nation of the Court of Appeals, whether on petition
of a party or on the Court’s own initiative, “appel-
lant” means the party aggrieved by the determina-
tion of the Court of Appeals; “appellee” means the
opposing party; provided that, in its order of certi-
fication, the Supreme Court may designate either
party an appellant or appellee for purposes of pro-
ceeding under this Rule 15.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 301 N.C. 731; 304 N.C. 737; 322 N.C. 850; 92 N.C. App.
761; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 613; 345 N.C. 765; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609;
359 N.C. 888; 363 N.C. 901; 365 N.C. 583.

Rule 16. Scope of Review of Decisions of Court of Appeals

(a) How Determined. Review by the Supreme Court after a
determination by the Court of Appeals, whether by appeal of right or
by discretionary review, is to determine whether there is error of law in
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Except when the appeal is based
solely upon the existence of a dissent in the Court of Appeals, review
in the Supreme Court is limited to consideration of the issues stated
in the notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 14(b)(2) or the petition
for discretionary review and the response thereto filed pursuant to Rule
15(c) and (d), unless further limited by the Supreme Court, and properly
presented in the new briefs required by Rules 14(d)(1) and 15(g)(2) to be
filed in the Supreme Court.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 813

(b) Scope of Review in Appeal Based Solely Upon Dissent.
When the sole ground of the appeal of right is the existence of a dis-
sent in the Court of Appeals, review by the Supreme Court is limited
to a consideration of those issues that are (1) specifically-set out in the
dissenting opinion as the basis for that dissent, (2) stated in the notice
of appeal, and (3) properly presented in the new briefs required by Rule
14(d)(1) to be filed in the Supreme Court. Other issues in the case may
properly be presented to the Supreme Court through a petition for dis-
cretionary review pursuant to Rule 15, or by petition for writ of certio-
rari pursuant to Rule 21.

(c) Appellant, Appellee Defined. As used in this Rule 16, the
terms “appellant” and “appellee” have the following meanings when
applied to discretionary review:

(1) With respect to Supreme Court review of a deter-
mination of the Court of Appeals upon petition of a
party, “appellant” means the petitioner and “appel-
lee” means the respondent.

(2) With respect to Supreme Court review upon the
Court’s own initiative, “appellant” means the party
aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals
and “appellee” means the opposing party; provided
that, in its order of certification, the Supreme Court
may designate either party an “appellant” or “appel-
lee” for purposes of proceeding under this Rule 16.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 309 N.C. 830; 322 N.C. 850; 324 N.C. 613; 327 N.C. 671;
354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 17. Appeal Bond in Appeals Under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-30, 7A-31

(a) Appeal of Right. In all appeals of right from the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court in civil cases, the party who takes appeal
shall, upon filing the notice of appeal in the Supreme Court, file with
the clerk of that Court a written undertaking, with good and sufficient
surety in the sum of $250, or deposit cash in lieu thereof, to the effect
that all costs awarded against the appealing party on the appeal will
be paid.

(b) Discretionary Review of Court of Appeals Determination.
‘When the Supreme Court on petition of a party certifies a civil case for
review of a determination of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall
file an undertaking for costs in the form provided in subsection (a).

814 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

When the Supreme Court on its own initiative certifies a case for review
of a determination of the Court of Appeals, no undertaking for costs
shall be required of any party.

(c) Discretionary Review by Supreme Court Before Court of
Appeals Determination. When a civil case is certified for review by
the Supreme Court before being determined by the Court of Appeals, the
undertaking on appeal initially filed in the Court of Appeals shall stand
for the payment of all costs incurred in either the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court and awarded against the party appealing.

(d) Appeals In Forma Pauperis. No undertakings for costs are
required of a party appealing in forma pauperis.
History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 295 N.C. 741; 324 N.C. 613; 327 N.C. 671; 354 N.C. 609;
363 N.C. 901.

Article IV
Direct. Appeals from Administrative Tribunals
to Appellate Division

Rule 18. Taking Appeal; Record on Appeal—Composition and
Settlement

(a) General. Appeals of right from administrative agencies,
boards, commissions, or the Office of Administrative Hearings (referred
to in these rules as “administrative tribunals”) directly to the appellate
division under N.C.G.S. § 7A-29 shall be in accordance with the proce-
dures provided in these rules for appeals of right from the courts of the
trial divisions, except as provided in this Article.

(b) Time and Method for Taking Appeals.

(1) The times and methods for taking appeals from
an administrative tribunal shall be as provided in
this Rule 18 unless the General Statutes provide
otherwise, in which case the General Statutes shall
control.

(2) Any party to the proceeding may appeal from a
final decision of an administrative tribunal to the
appropriate court of the appellate division for
alleged errors of law by filing and serving a notice
of appeal within thirty days after receipt of a copy
of the final decision of the administrative tribunal.
The final decision of the administrative tribunal is

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

to be sent to the parties by Registered or Certified
Mail. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the final
administrative tribunal decision from which appeal
is taken and the court to which appeal is taken; and
shall be signed by counsel of record for the party or
parties taking the appeal, or by any such party not

represented by counsel of record.

(8) If a transcript of fact-finding proceedings is not
made as part of the process leading up to the
final administrative tribunal decision, the appeal-
ing party may contract with a court reporter for
production of such parts of the proceedings not
already on file as it deems necessary, pursuant to

the procedures prescribed in Rule 7.

815

(c) Composition of Record on Appeal. The record on appeal in

appeals from any administrative tribunal shall contain:

(1) an index of the contents of the record on appeal,
which shall appear as the first page thereof;

(2) a statement identifying the administrative tribunal
from whose judgment, order, or opinion appeal is
taken; the session at which the judgment, order,
or opinion was rendered, or if rendered out of
session, the time and place of rendition; and the

party appealing;

(8) acopy of the summons with return, notice of hear-
ing, or other papers showing jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal over persons or property
sought to be bound in the proceeding, or a state-

ment showing same;

(4) copies of all other notices, pleadings, petitions, or
other papers required by law or rule to be filed with
the administrative tribunal to present and define
the matter for determination, including a Form 44
for all workers’ compensation cases which origi-

nate from the Industrial Commission;

(5) a copy of any findings of fact and conclusions of
law and a copy of the order, award, decision, or
other determination of the administrative tribunal

from which appeal was taken;

816 . RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

(6) so much of the litigation before the administrative
tribunal or before any division, commissioner, dep-
uty commissioner, or hearing officer of the admin-
istrative tribunal, set out in the form provided in
Rule 9(c)(1), as is necessary for an understanding
of all issues presented on appeal, or a statement
specifying that the verbatim transcript of proceed-
ings is being filed with the record pursuant to Rule
9()@) and @);

(7 when the administrative tribunal has reviewed a
record of proceedings before a division or an indi-
vidual commissioner, deputy commissioner, or
hearing officer of the administrative tribunal, cop-
ies of all items included in the record filed with the
administrative tribunal which are necessary for an
understanding of all issues presented on appeal;

(8) copies of all other papers filed and statements of
all other proceedings had before the administra-
tive tribunal or any of its individual commission-
ers, deputies, or divisions which are necessary to
an understanding of all issues presented on appeal,
unless they appear in the verbatim transcript of
proceedings being filed pursuant to Rule 9(c)(2)
and (3);

(9) acopy of the notice of appeal from the administra-
tive tribunal, of all orders establishing time limits
relative to the perfecting of the appeal, of any order
finding a party to the appeal to be a civil pauper,
and of any agreement, notice of approval, or order
settling the record on appeal and settling the verba-
tim transcript of proceedings if one is filed pursu-
ant to Rule 9(c)(2) and (3);

(10) proposed issues on appeal relating to the actions of

the administrative tribunal, set out as provided in
Rule 10;

(11) a statement, when appropriate, that the record of
proceedings was made with an electronic record-
ing device;

(12) a statement, when appropriate, that a supplement
compiled pursuant to Rule 18(d)(8) is filed with the
record on appeal; and

TOC

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

(13) any order (issued prior to the filing of the record on.

appeal) ruling upon any motion by an attorney who
is not licensed to practice law in North Carolina to
be admitted pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 844.1 to appear
in the appeal. In the event such a motion is filed
prior to the filing of the record but has not yet been
ruled upon when the record is filed, the record shall
include a statement that such a motion is pending
and the date that motion was filed.

817

(d) Settling the Record on Appeal. The record on appeal may
be settled by any of the following methods:

@

@)

By Agreement. Within thirty-five days after fil-
ing of the notice of appeal, or after production of
the transcript if one is ordered pursuant to Rule
18(b)(8), the parties may by agreement entered in
the record on appeal settle a proposed record on
appeal prepared by any party in accordance with
this Rule 18 as the record on appeal.

By Appellee’s Approval of Appellant’s Proposed
Record on Appeal. If the record on appeal is
not settled by agreement under Rule 18(d)(1), the
appellant shall, within thirty-five days after filing
of the notice of appeal, or after production of the
transcript if one is ordered pursuant to Rule 18(b)
(8), serve upon all other parties a proposed record
on appeal constituted in accordance with the provi-
sions of Rule 18(c). Within thirty days after service
of the proposed record on appeal upon an appel-
lee, that appellee may serve upon all other parties a
notice of approval of the proposed record on appeal.
or objections, amendments, or a proposed alterna-
tive record on appeal. Amendments or objections
to the proposed record on appeal shall be set out
in a separate paper and shall specify any item(s)
for which an objection is based on the contention
that the item was not filed, served, submitted for
consideration, admitted, or made the subject of an
offer of proof, or that the content of a statement or
narration is factually inaccurate. An appellant who
objects to an appellee’s response to the proposed
record on appeal shall make the same specification
in its request for judicial settlement. The formatting

818

@

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

of the proposed record on appeal and the order in
which items appear in it is the responsibility of the
appellant. Judicial settlement is not appropriate
for disputes concerning only the formatting or the
order in which items appear in the settled record
on appeal. If all appellees within the times allowed
them either serve notices of approval or fail to serve
either notices of approval or objections, amend-
ments, or proposed alternative records on appeal,
appellant's proposed record on appeal thereupon
constitutes the record on appeal.

By Agreement, by Operation of Rule, or by
Court Order After Appellee’s Objection or
Amendment. If any appellee timely serves amend-
ments, objections, or a proposed alternative record
on appeal, the record on appeal shall consist of
each item that is either among those items required.
by Rule 18(c) to be in the record on appeal or
that is requested by any party to the appeal and
agreed upon for inclusion by all other parties to
the appeal, in the absence of contentions that the
item was not filed, served, or offered into evidence.
If a party requests that an item be included in the
record on appeal but not all parties to the appeal
agree to its inclusion, then that item shall not be
included in the printed record on appeal, but shall
be filed by the appellant with the record on appeal
in three copies of a volume captioned “Rule 18(d)
(8) Supplement to the Printed Record on Appeal,”
along with any verbatim transcripts, narrations
of proceedings, documentary exhibits, and other
items that are filed pursuant to these rules; pro-
vided that any item not filed, served, submitted for
consideration, admitted, or for which no offer of
proof was tendered shall not be included. Subject
to the additional requirements of Rule 28(d), items
in the Rule 18(d)(8) supplement may be cited and
used by the parties as would items in the printed
record on appeal.

If a party does not agree to the wording of a
statement or narration required or permitted by
these rules, there shall be no judicial settlement to
resolve the dispute unless the objection is based

TOC

TOC

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

on a contention that the statement or narration
concerns an item that was not filed, served, sub-
mitted for consideration, admitted, or tendered in
an offer of proof, or that a statement or narration
is factually inaccurate. Instead, the objecting party
is permitted to have inserted in the settled record
on appeal a concise counter-statement. Parties are
strongly encouraged to reach agreement on the
wording of statements in records on appeal.

The Rule 18(d)(8) supplement to the printed
record on appeal shall contain an index of the con-
tents of the supplement, which shall appear as the
first page thereof. The Rule 18(d)(3) supplement
shall be paginated consecutively with the pages of
the record on appeal, the first page of the supple-
ment to bear the next consecutive number fol-
lowing the number of the last page of the record
on appeal. These pages shall be referred to as
“record supplement pages,” and shall be cited as
“® S p __).” The contents of the supplement
should be arranged, so far as practicable, in the
order in which they occurred or were filed in the
administrative tribunal. If a party does not agree to
the inclusion or specification of an exhibit or tran-
script in the printed record, the printed record shall
include a statement that such items are separately
filed along with the supplement.

If any party to the appeal contends that mate-
rials proposed for inclusion in the record or for
filing therewith pursuant to these rules were not
filed, served, submitted for consideration, admit-
ted, or offered into evidence, or that a statement.
or narration permitted by these rules is not factu-
ally accurate, then that party, within ten days after
expiration of the time within which the appellee
last served with the appellant’s proposed record
on appeal might have served amendments, objec-
tions, or a proposed alternative record on appeal,
may in writing request that the administrative tri-
bunal convene a conference to settle the record on.
appeal. A copy of that request, endorsed with a cer-
tificate showing service on the administrative tri-
bunal, shall be served upon all other parties. Each

819

820

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

party shall promptly provide to the administra-
tive tribunal a reference copy of the record items,
amendments, or objections served by that party in
the case.

The functions of the administrative tribunal in
the settlement of the record on appeal are to deter-
mine whether a statement permitted by these rules
is not factually accurate, to settle narrations of
proceedings under Rule 18(c)(6), and to determine
whether the record accurately reflects material
filed, served, submitted for consideration, admit-
ted, or made the subject of an offer of proof, but not
to decide whether material desired in the record by
either party is relevant to the issues on appeal, non-
duplicative, or otherwise suited for inclusion in the
record on appeal.

Upon receipt of a request for settlement of the
record on appeal, the administrative tribunal shall
send written notice to counsel for all parties set-
ting a place and time for a conference to settle the
record on appeal. The conference shall be held not.
later than fifteen days after service of the request
upon the administrative tribunal. The administra-
tive tribunal or a delegate appointed in writing by
the administrative tribunal shall settle the record
on appeal by order entered not more than twenty
days after service of the request for settlement
upon the administrative tribunal. If requested, the
settling official shall return the record items sub-
mitted for reference during the settlement process
with the order settling the record on appeal.

When the administrative tribunal is a party
to the appeal, the administrative tribunal shall
forthwith request the Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
as appropriate, to appoint a referee to settle the
record on appeal. The referee so appointed shall
proceed after conference with all parties to settle
the record on appeal in accordance with the terms
of these rules and the appointing order.

If any appellee timely serves amendments,
objections, or a proposed alternative record on

TOC

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 821

appeal, and no judicial settlement of the record is
sought, the record is deemed settled as of the expi-
ration of the ten-day period within which any party
could have requested judicial settlement of the
record on appeal under this Rule 18(d)(8).

Nothing herein shall prevent settlement of the
record on appeal by agreement of the parties at any
time within the times herein limited for settling the
record by administrative tribunal decision.

(e) Further Procedures and Additional Materials in the
Record on Appeal. Further procedures for perfecting and prosecut-
ing the appeal shall be as provided by these rules for appeals from the
courts of the trial divisions.

(@ Extensions of Time. The times provided in this rule for tak-
ing any action may be extended in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 27(c).

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 292 N.C. 739; 301 N.C. 731; 318 N.C. 778; 324 N.C. 613;
327 N.C. 671; 345 N.C. 765; 347 N.C. 679; 354 N.C. 609; 358 N.C. 824; 361
N.C. 732; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 19. [Reserved]
History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 292 N.C. 739; 313 N.C. 778; 324 N.C. 618; 354 N.C. 609;
363 N.C. 901.

Rule 20. Miscellaneous Provisions of Law Governing Appeals
from Administrative Tribunals

Specific provisions of law pertaining to stays pending appeals from
any administrative tribunal to the appellate division, to pauper appeals
therein, and to the scope of review and permissible mandates of the
Court of Appeals therein shall govern the procedure in such appeals
notwithstanding any provisions of these rules that may prescribe a
different procedure.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 318 N.C. 778; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

822 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

Article V
Extraordinary Writs

Rule 21. Certiorari
(a) Scope of the Writ.

(1) Review of the Judgments and Orders of Trial
Tribunals. The writ of certiorari may be issued
in appropriate circumstances by either appel-
late court to permit review of the judgments and
orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute
an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely
action, or when no right of appeal from an inter-
Jocutory order exists, or for review pursuant to
N.C.G.S. § 15A4-1422(c)(3) of an order of the trial
court ruling on a motion for appropriate relief.

(2) Review of the Judgments and Orders of the
Court of Appeals. The writ of certiorari may be
issued by the Supreme Court in appropriate cir
cumstances to permit review of the decisions and
orders of the Court of Appeals when the right to
prosecute an appeal of right or to petition for dis-
cretionary review has been lost by failure to take
timely action, or for review of orders of the Court
of Appeals when no right of appeal exists.

(b) Petition for Writ—to Which Appellate Court Addressed.
Application for the writ of certiorari shall be made by filing a petition
therefor with the clerk of the court of the appellate division to which
appeal of right might lie from a final judgment in the cause by the tribu-
nal to which issuance of the writ is sought.

(c) Petition for Writ—Filing and Service; Content. The peti-
tion shall be filed without unreasonable delay and shall be accompanied
by proof of service upon all other parties. For cases which arise from
the Industrial Commission, a copy of the petition shall be served on the
Chair of the Industrial Commission. The petition shall contain a state-
ment of the facts necessary to an understanding of the issues presented
by the application; a statement of the reasons why the writ should issue;
and certified copies of the judgment, order, or opinion or parts of the
record which may be essential to an understanding of the matters set
forth in the petition. The petition shall be verified by counsel or the peti-
tioner. Upon receipt of the prescribed docket fee, the clerk will docket
the petition.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 823

(d) Response; Determination by Court. Within ten days after
service of the petition any party may file a response thereto with sup-
porting affidavits or certified portions of the record not filed with the
petition. Filing shall be accompanied by proof.of service upon all other -
parties. The court for good cause shown may shorten the time for filing
aresponse. Determination will be made on the basis of the petition, the
response, and any supporting papers. No briefs or oral argument will be
received or allowed unless ordered by the court upon its own initiative.

(e) Petition for Writ in Post-conviction Matters—to Which
Appellate Court Addressed. Petitions for writ of certiorari to review
orders of the trial court denying motions for appropriate relief upon
grounds listed in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1415(b) by persons who have been con-
victed of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death shall be filed
in the Supreme Court. In all other cases such petitions shall be filed in
and determined by the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court will not
entertain petitions for certiorari or petitions for further discretionary
review in these cases. In the event the petitioner unreasonably delays in
filing the petition or otherwise fails to comply with a rule of procedure,
the petition shall be dismissed by the court. If the petition is without
merit, it shall be denied by the court.

(@® Petition for Writ in Post-conviction Matters—Death
Penalty Cases. A petition for writ of certiorari to review orders of the
trial court on motions for appropriate relief in death penalty cases shall
be filed in the Supreme Court within sixty days after delivery of the tran-
script of the hearing on the motion for appropriate relief to the petition-
ing party. The responding party shall file its response within thirty days
of service of the petition.

* History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 304 N.C. 737; 312 N.C. 803; 322 N.C. 844; 92 N.C. App.
761; 324 N.C. 618; 345 N.C. 765; 354 N.C. 609; 356 N.C. 701; 363 N.C. 901;
367 N.C. 954.

Rule 22. Mandamus and Prohibition

(a) Petition for Writ—to Which Appellate Court Addressed.
Applications for the writs of mandamus or prohibition directed to a
judge, judges, commissioner, or commissioners shall be made by fil-
ing a petition therefor with the clerk of the court to which appeal of
right might lie from a final judgment entered in the cause by the judge,
judges, commissioner, or commissioners to whom issuance of the writ
is sought.

824 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

(b) Petition for Writ—Filing and Service; Content. The peti-
tion shall be filed without unreasonable delay after the judicial action
sought to be prohibited or compelled has been undertaken, or has
occurred, or has been refused, and shall be accompanied by proof of
service on the respondent judge, judges, commissioner, or commission-
ers and on all other parties to the action. The petition shall contain a
statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the issues pre-
sented by the application; a statement of the issues presented and of the
relief sought; a statement of the reasons why the writ should issue; and
certified copies of any order or opinion or parts of the record that may
be essential to an understanding of the matters set forth in the petition.
The petition shall be verified by counsel or the petitioner. Upon receipt
of the prescribed docket fee, the clerk shall docket the petition.

(c) Response; Determination by Court. Within ten days after
service of the petition the respondent or any party may file a response
thereto with supporting affidavits or certified portions of the record not
filed with the petition. Filing shall be accompanied by proof of service
upon all other parties. The court for good cause shown may shorten the
time for filing a response. Determination will be made on the basis of
the petition, the response, and any supporting papers. No briefs or oral
argument will be received or allowed unless ordered by the court upon
its own initiative.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 23. Supersedeas
(a) Pending Review of Trial Tribunal Judgments and Orders.

(2) Application—When Appropriate. Application
may be made to the appropriate appellate court
for a writ of supersedeas to stay the execution
or enforcement of any judgment, order, or other
determination of a trial tribunal which is not auto-
matically stayed by the taking of appeal when an
appeal has been taken, or a petition for mandamus,
prohibition, or certiorari has been filed to obtain
review of the judgment, order, or other determina-
tion; and (1) a stay order or entry has been sought
by the applicant by deposit of security or by motion
in the trial tribunal and such order or entry has
been denied or vacated by the trial tribunal, or (2)
extraordinary circumstances make it impracticable

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 825

to obtain a stay by deposit of security or by applica-
tion to the trial tribunal for a stay order.

(2) Application—How and to Which Appellate
Court Made. Application for the writ is by peti-
tion which shall in all cases, except those initially
docketed in the Supreme Court, be first made
to the Court of Appeals. Except when an appeal
from a superior court is initially docketed in the
Supreme Court, no petition will be entertained by
the Supreme Court unless application has been
made first to the Court of Appeals and denied by
that court.

(b) Pending Review by Supreme Court of Court of Appeals
Decisions. Application may be made in the first instance to the Supreme
Court for a writ of supersedeas to stay the execution or enforcement
of a judgment, order, or other determination mandated by the Court of
Appeals when a notice of appeal of right or a petition for discretionary
review has been or will be timely filed, or a petition for review by cer-
tiorari, mandamus, or prohibition has been filed to obtain review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. No prior motion for a stay order need
be made to the Court of Appeals.

(c) Petition for Writ—Filing and Service; Content. The peti-
tion shall be filed with the clerk of the court to which application is
being made and shall be accompanied by proof of service upon all other
parties. The petition shall be verified by counsel or the petitioner. Upon
receipt of the required docket fee, the clerk will docket the petition.

For stays of the judgments of trial tribunals, the petition shall con-
tain a statement that stay has been sought in the court to which issu-
ance of the writ is sought and denied or vacated by that court, or shall
contain facts showing that it was impracticable there to seek a stay. For
stays of any judgment, the petition shall contain: (1) a statement of any
facts necessary to an understanding of the basis upon which the writ
is sought; and (2) a statement of reasons why the writ should issue in
justice to the applicant. The petition may be accompanied by affidavits
and by any certified portions of the record pertinent to its consideration.
It may be included in a petition for discretionary review by the Supreme
Court under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31, or in a petition to either appellate court
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition.

(d) Response; Determination by Court. Within ten days after
service of the petition any party may file a response thereto with sup-
porting affidavits or certified portions of the record not filed with the

826 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

petition. Filing shall be accompanied by proof of service upon all other
parties. The court for good cause shown may shorten the time for filing
ayresponse. Determination will be made on the basis of the petition, the
response, and any supporting papers. No briefs or oral argument will be
received or allowed unless ordered by the court upon its own initiative.

(e) Temporary Stay. Upon the filing of a petition for supersedeas,
the applicant may apply, either within the petition or by separate paper,
for an order temporarily staying enforcement or execution of the judg-
ment, order, or other determination pending decision by the court upon
the petition for supersedeas. If application is made by separate paper,
it shall be filed and served in the manner provided for the petition for
supersedeas in Rule 23(c). The court for good cause shown in such a
petition for temporary stay may issue such an order ex parte. In capital
cases, such stay, if granted, shall remain in effect until the period for
filing a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has
passed without a petition being filed, or until certiorari on a timely filed
petition has been denied by that Court. At that time, the stay shall auto-
matically dissolve.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 301 N.C. 731; 324 N.C. 613; 345 N.C. 765; 354 N.C. 609;
363 N.C. 901.

Rule 24. Form of Papers; Copies

A party should file with the appellate court a single copy of any
paper required to be filed in connection with applications for extraor-
dinary writs. The court may direct that additional copies be filed. The
clerk will not reproduce copies.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Article V
General Provisions

Rule 25. Penalties for Failure to Comply with Rules

(a) Failure of Appellant to Take Timely Action. If after giv-
ing notice of appeal from any court, commission, or commissioner the
appellant shall fail within the times allowed by these rules or by order
of court to take any action required to present the appeal for decision,
the appeal may on motion of any other party be dismissed. Prior to the
filing of an appeal in an appellate court, motions to dismiss are made to

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 827

the court, commission, or commissioner from which appeal has been
taken; after an appeal has been filed in an appellate court, motions to
dismiss are made to that court. Motions to dismiss shall be supported by
affidavits or certified copies of docket entries which show the failure to
take timely action or otherwise perfect the appeal and shall be allowed
unless compliance or a waiver thereof is shown on the record, or unless
the appellee shall consent to action out of time, or unless the court for
good cause shall permit the action to be taken out of time.

Motions heard under this rule to courts of the trial divisions may be
heard and determined by any judge of the particular court specified in
Rule 36 of these rules; motions made under this rule to a commission
may be heard and determined by the chair of the commission; or if to a
commissioner, then by that commissioner. The procedure in all motions
made under this rule to trial tribunals shall be that provided for motion
practice by the Rules of Civil Procedure; in all motions made under this
rule to courts of the appellate division, the procedure shall be that pro-
vided by Rule 37 of these rules.

(b) Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Rules. A court of the
appellate division may, on its own initiative or motion of a party, impose
asanction against a party or attorney or both when the court determines
that such party or attorney or both substantially failed to comply with
these rules, including failure to pay any filing or printing fees or costs
when due. The court may impose sanctions of the type and in the man-
ner prescribed by Rule 34 for frivolous appeals.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 92 N.C. App. 761; 324 N.C. 613; 345 N.C. 765; 354 N.C.
609; 363 N.C. 901; 365 N.C. 582.

Rule 26. Filing and Service

(a) Filing. Papers required or permitted by these rules to be
filed in the trial or appellate divisions shall be filed with the clerk of the
appropriate court. Filing may be accomplished by mail or by electronic

“means as set forth in this rule.

(4) Filing by Mail. Filing may be accomplished by
mail addressed to the clerk but is not timely unless
the papers are received by the clerk within the time
fixed for filing, except that motions, responses to
petitions, the record on appeal, and briefs shall be
deemed filed on the date of mailing, as evidenced
by the proof of service.

828 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

(2) Filing by Electronic Means. Filing in the appel-
late courts may be accomplished by electronic
means by use of the electronic-filing site at https://
www.ncappellatecourts.org. Many documents may
be filed electronically through the use of this site.
The site identifies those types of documents that
may not be filed electronically. A document filed by
use of the electronic-filing site is deemed filed as of
the time that the document is received electroni-
cally. Responses and motions may be filed by fac-
simile machines, if an oral request for permission
to do so has first been tendered to and approved
by the clerk of the appropriate appellate court. In
all cases in which a document has been filed by
facsimile machine pursuant to this rule, counsel
must forward the following items by first class
mail, contemporaneously with the transmission:
the original signed document, the electronic-trans-
mission fee, and the applicable filing fee for the
document, if any. The party filing a document by
electronic means shall be responsible for all costs
of the transmission, and neither they nor the elec-
tronic transmission fee may be recovered as costs
of the appeal. When a document is filed to the elec-
tronic-filing site at https://www.ncappellatecourts.
org, counsel may either have his or her account
drafted electronically by following the procedures
described at the electronic-filing site, or counsel
must forward the applicable filing fee for the docu-
ment by first class mail, contemporaneously with
the transmission.

(b) Service of All Papers Required. Copies of all papers filed by
any party and not required by these rules to be served by the clerk shall,
at or before the time of filing, be served on all other parties to the appeal.

(c) Manner of Service. Service may be made in the manner pro-
vided for service and return of process in Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure and may be so made upon a party or upon its attorney of
record. Service may also be made upon a party or its attorney of record
by delivering a copy to either or by mailing a copy to the recipient's last
known address, or if no address is known, by filing it in the office of the
clerk with whom the original paper is filed. Delivery of a copy within this
rule means handing it to the attorney or to the party, or leaving it at the
attorney’s office with a partner or employee. Service by mail is complete

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 829

upon deposit of the paper enclosed in a postpaid, properly addressed
wrapper in a post office or official depository under the exclusive care
and custody of the United States Postal Service, or, for those having
access to such services, upon deposit with the State Courier Service or
Inter-Office Mail. When a document is filed electronically to the elec-
tronic-filing site, service also may be accomplished electronically by
use of the other counsel’s correct and current e-mail address(es), or ser-
vice may be accomplished in the manner described previously in this
subsection.

(d) Proof of Service. Papers presented for filing shall contain
an acknowledgment of servicé by the person served or proof of service
in the form of a statement of the date and manner of service and of the
names of the persons served, certified by the person who made service.
Proof of service shall appear on or be affixed to the papers filed.

(e) Joint Appellants and Appellees. Any paper required by
these rules to be served on a party is properly served upon all parties
joined in the appeal by service upon any one of them.

() Numerous Parties to Appeal Proceeding Separately.
When there are unusually large numbers of appellees or appellants pro-
ceeding separately, the trial tribunal, upon motion of any party or on its
own initiative, may order that any papers required by these rules to be
served by a party on all other parties need be served only upon parties
designated in the order, and that the filing of such a paper and service
thereof upon the parties designated constitutes due notice of it to all
other parties. A copy of every such order shall be served upon all parties
to the action in such manner and form as the court directs.

(g) Documents Filed with Appellate Courts.

(1) Form of Papers. Papers presented to either
appellate court for filing shall be letter size
(8% x 11”) with the exception of wills and exhibits.
All printed matter must appear in font no smaller
than 12-point and no larger than 14-point, using a
proportionally spaced font with serifs. Examples
of proportionally spaced fonts with serifs include,
but are not limited to, Constantia and Century type-
face as described in Appendix B to these rules.
Unglazed white paper of 16- to 20-pound substance
should be utilized so as to produce a clear, black
image, leaving a margin of approximately one inch
on each side. The body of text shall be presented
with double spacing between each line of text.
Lines of text shall be no wider than 6% inches. The

830 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

format of all papers presented for filing shall follow
the additional instructions found in the appendixes
to these rules. The format of briefs shall follow the
additional instructions found in Rule 28(j). :

(2) Index Required. All documents presented to
either appellate court other than records on appeal,
which in this respect are governed by Rule 9, shall,
unless they are less than ten pages in length, be pre-
ceded by a subject index of the matter contained
therein, with page references, and a table of author-
ities, ie, cases (alphabetically arranged), consti-
tutional provisions, statutes, and textbooks cited,
with references to the pages where they are cited.

(8) Closing. The body of the document shall at its
close bear the printed name, post office address,
telephone number, State Bar number and e-mail
address of counsel of record, and in addition, at
the appropriate place, the manuscript signature of
counsel of record. If the document has been filed
electronically by use of the electronic-filing site at
https://www.ncappellatecourts.org, the manuscript
signature of counsel of record is not required.

(4) Protecting the Identity of Certain Juveniles.
Parties shall protect the identity of juveniles cov-
ered by Rules 3(b)(1), 3.1(b), or 4(e) pursuant to
said rules.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 304 N.C. 737; 306 N.C. 757; 312 N.C. 803; 322 N.C. 850;
324 N.C. 613; 327 N.C. 671; 345 N.C. 765; 351 N.C. 659; 354 N.C. 598;
354 N.C. 609; 356 N.C. 701; 356 N.C. 706; 357 N.C. 665; 358 N.C. 824; 363
N.C. 901.

Rule 27. Computation and Extension of Time

(a) Computation of Time. In computing any period of time pre-
scribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated
period of time begins to run is not included. The last day of the period
so computed is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 831

(b) Additional Time After Service. Except as to filing of notice
of appeal pursuant to Rule 3(c), whenever a party has the right to do
some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the
service of a notice or other paper and the notice or paper is served by
mail, or by e-mail if allowed by these rules, three days shall be added to

. the prescribed period.

(c) Extensions of Time; By Which Court Granted. Except as
herein provided, courts for good cause shown may upon motion extend
any of the times prescribed by these rules, or by order of court, for doing
any act required or allowed under these rules, or may permit an act to be
done after the expiration of such time. Courts may not extend the time
for taking an appeal or for filing a petition for discretionary review or a
petition for rehearing or the responses thereto prescribed by these rules
or by law.

(1) Motions for Extension of Time in the Trial
Division. The trial tribunal for good cause shown
by the appellant may extend once, for no more than
thirty days, the time permitted by: (1) Rule 7(b)(1)
for the person designated to prepare the transcript
to produce such transcript; and (2) Rule 11 or Rule
18 for service of the proposed record on appeal.

Motions for extensions of time made to a trial
tribunal may be made orally or in writing and with-
out notice to other parties and may be determined
at any time or place within the state.

_ Motions made under this Rule 27 to a court of
the trial division may be heard and determined by
any of those judges of the particular court specified
in Rule 36 of these rules. Such motions made to a
commission may be heard and determined by the
chair of the commission; or if to a commissioner,
then by that commissioner.

(2) Motions for Extension of Time in the Appellate
Division. All motions for extensions of time other
than those specifically enumerated in Rule 27(c)(1)
may be made only to the appellate court to which
appeal has been taken.

(a) Motions for Extension of Time; How Determined. Motions
for extension of time made in any court may be determined ex parte, but
the moving party shall promptly serve on all other parties to the appeal

832 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

a copy of any order extending time; provided that motions made after
the expiration of the time allowed in these rules for the action sought to
be extended must be in writing and with notice to all other parties and
may be allowed only after all other parties have had an opportunity to
be heard.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 294 N.C. 749; 295 N.C. 741; 312 N.C. 808; 92 N.C. App.
761; 324 N.C. 613; 327 N.C. 671; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901;
365 N.C. 583.

Rule 28. Briefs—Function and Content

(a) Function. The function of all briefs required or permitted
by these rules is to define clearly the issues presented to the reviewing
court and to present the arguments and authorities upon which the par-
ties rely in support of their respective positions thereon. The scope of
review on appeal is limited to issues so presented in the several briefs.
Issues not presented and discussed in a party's brief are deemed aban-
doned. Similarly, issues properly presented for review in the Court

of Appeals, but not then stated in the notice of appeal or the petition
accepted by the Supreme Court for review and discussed in the new
briefs required by Rules 14(d)(1) and 15(g)(2) to be filed in the Supreme
Court for review by that Court, are deemed abandoned. Parties shall
protect the identity of juveniles covered by Rules 3(b)(1), 3.1(b), or 4(e)
pursuant to said rules.

(b) Content of Appellant’s Brief. An appellant's brief shall con-
tain, under appropriate headings and in the form prescribed by Rule
26(g) and the appendixes to these rules, in the following order:

() Acover page, followed by a subject index and table
of authorities as required by Rule 26(g).

(2) Astatement of the issues presented for review. The
proposed issues on appeal listed in the record on
appeal shall not limit the scope of the issues that an
appellant may argue in its brief.

A concise statement of the procedural history of
the case. This shall indicate the nature of the case
and summarize the course of proceedings up to the
taking of the appeal before the court.

A statement of the grounds for appellate review.
Such statement shall include citation of the statute

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RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

or statutes permitting appellate review. When an

_ appeal is based on Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil

Procedure, the statement shall show that there has
been a final judgment as to one or more but fewer

, than all of the claims or parties and that there has

©)

©

M
®

been a certification by the trial court that there is
no just reason for delay. When an appeal is inter-
locutory, the statement must contain sufficient
facts and argument to support appellate review on
the ground that the challenged order affects a sub-
stantial right.

A full and complete statement of the facts. This
should be a non-argumentative summary of all
material facts underlying the matter in contro-
versy which are necessary to understand all issues
presented for review, supported by references to
pages in the transcript of proceedings, the record
on appeal, or exhibits, as the case may be.

An argument, to contain the contentions of the
appellant with respect to each issue presented.
Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in support.
of which no reason or argument is stated, will be
taken as abandoned.

The argument shall contain a concise state-
ment of the applicable standard(s) of review for
each issue, which shall appear either at the begin-
ning of the discussion of each issue or under a sep-
arate heading placed before the beginning of the
discussion of all the issues.

The body of the argument and the statement
of applicable standard(s) of review shall contain
citations of the authorities upon which the appel-
lant relies. Evidence or other proceedings material
to the issue may be narrated or quoted in the body
of the argument, with appropriate reference to the
record on appeal, the transcript of proceedings,
or exhibits.

A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.

Identification of counsel by signature, typed name,
post office address, telephone number, State Bar
number, and e-mail address.

833

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

(9) The proof of service required by Rule 26(d).
(10) Any appendix required or allowed by this Rule 28.

(c) Content of Appellee’s Brief; Presentation of Additional
Issues. An appellee’s brief shall contain a subject index and table of
authorities as required by Rule 26(g), an argument, a conclusion, iden-
tification of counsel, and proof of service in the form provided in Rule
28(b) for an appellant's brief, and any appendix required or allowed by
this Rule 28. It does not need to contain a statement of the issues pre-
sented, procedural history of the case, grounds for appellate review,
the facts, or the standard(s) of review, unless the appellee disagrees
with the appellant’s statements and desires to make a restatement or
unless the appellee desires to present issues in addition to those stated
by the appellant.

Without taking an appeal, an appellee may present issues on appeal
based on any action or omission of the trial court that deprived the appel-
lee of an alternative basis in law for supporting the judgment, ordex, or
other determination from which appeal has been taken. Without having
taken appeal or listing proposed issues as permitted by Rule 10(c), an
appellee may also argue on appeal whether a new trial should be granted
to the appellee rather than a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
awarded to the appellant when the latter relief is sought on appeal by the
appellant. If the appellee presents issues in addition to those stated by
the appellant, the appellee’s brief must contain a full, non-argumentative
summary of all material facts necessary to understand the new issues
supported by references to pages in the record on appeal, the transcript
of proceedings, or the appendixes, as appropriate, as well as a statement
of the applicable standard(s) of review for those additional issues.

An appellee may supplement the record with any materials perti-
nent to the issues presented on appeal, as provided in Rule 9(b)(5).

(d) Appendixes to Briefs. Whenever the transcript of proceed-
ings is filed pursuant to Rule 9(c)(2), the parties must file verbatim por-
tions of the transcript as appendixes to their briefs, if required by this
Rule 28(d). Parties must modify verbatim portions of the transcript filed
pursuant to this rule in a manner consistent with Rules 3(b)(1), 3.1(b),
or 4(e).

() When Appendixes to Appellant’s Brief Are
Required. Except as provided in Rule 28(d)(2),
the appellant must reproduce as appendixes to
its brief:

TOC

@

7

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RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

a. those portions of the transcript of proceedings
which must be reproduced verbatim in order to
understand any issue presented in the brief;

b. those portions of the transcript showing the
pertinent questions and answers when an issue
presented in the brief involves the admission or
exclusion of evidence;

c. relevant portions of statutes, rules, or regula-
tions, the study of which is required to deter-
mine issues presented in the brief;

d. relevant items from the Rule 11(c) or Rule 18(d)
(8) supplement to the printed record on appeal,
the study of which are required to determine
issues presented in the brief.

When Appendixes to Appellant’s Brief Are
Not Required. Notwithstanding the requirements
of Rule 28(d)(1), the appellant is not required to
reproduce an appendix to its brief with respect to
an issue presented:

a. whenever the portion of the transcript neces-
sary to understand an issue presented in the
brief is reproduced verbatim in the body of the
brief;

b. to show the absence or insufficiency of evi-
dence unless there are discrete portions of the
transcript where the subject matter of the alleged
insufficiency of the evidence is located; or

c. toshow the general nature of the evidence nec-
essary to understand an issue presented in the
brief if such evidence has been fully summa-
rized as required by Rule 28(b)(4) and (5).

When Appendixes to Appellee’s Brief Are
Required. An appellee must reproduce appen-
dixes to its brief in the following circumstances:

a. Whenever the appellee believes that appel-
lant’s appendixes do not include portions of the
transcript or items from the Rule 11(c) or Rule
18(d)(8) supplement to the printed record on
appeal that are required by Rule 28(d)(1), the

835

836 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

appellee shall reproduce those portions of the
transcript or supplement it believes to be nec-
essary to understand the issue.

b. Whenever the appellee presents a new or addi-
tional issue in its brief as permitted by Rule
28(c), the appellee shall reproduce portions
of the transcript or relevant items from the
Rule 11(c) or Rule 18(d)(8) supplement to the
printed record on appeal as if it were the appel-
lant with respect to each such new or addi-
tional issue.

(4) Format of Appendixes. The appendixes to the
briefs of any party shall be in the format prescribed
by Rule 26(g) and shall consist of clear photocopies
of transcript pages that have been deemed neces-
sary for inclusion in the appendix under this Rule
28(d). The pages of the appendix shall be consecu-
tively numbered, and an index to the appendix shall
be placed at its beginning.

(e) References in Briefs to the Record. References in the
briefs to parts of the printed record on appeal and to parts of the ver-
batim transcript or parts of documentary exhibits shall be to the pages
where those portions appear.

() Joinder of Multiple Parties in Briefs. Any number of appel-
lants or appellees in a single cause or in causes consolidated for appeal
may join in a single brief even though they are not formally joined on the
appeal. Any party to any appeal may adopt by reference portions of the
briefs of others.

(g) Additional Authorities. Additional authorities discovered
by a party after filing its brief may be brought to the attention of the
court by filing a memorandum thereof with the clerk of the court and
serving copies upon all other parties. The memorandum may not be
used as a reply brief or for additional argument, but shall simply state
the issue to which the additional authority applies and provide a full
citation of the authority. Authorities not cited in the briefs or in such a
memorandum may not be cited and discussed in oral argument. Before
the Court of Appeals, the party shall file an original and three copies of
the memorandum; in the Supreme Court, the party shall file an original
and fourteen copies of the memorandum.

(h) Reply Briefs. Within fourteen days after an appellee’s brief
has been served on an appellant, the appellant may file and serve a reply

TOG RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 837

brief, subject to the length limitations set forth in Rule 28(j). Any reply
brief which an appellant elects to file shall be limited to a concise rebut-
tal of arguments set out in the appellee's brief and shall not reiterate
arguments set forth in the appellant's principal brief. Upon motion of
the appellant, the Court may extend the length limitations on such a
reply brief to permit the appellant to address new or additional issues
presented for the first time in the appellee's brief. Otherwise, motions to
extend reply brief length limitations or to extend the time to file a reply
brief are disfavored.

(@) Amicus Curiae Briefs. A brief of an amicus curiae may be
filed only by leave of the appellate court wherein the appeal is docketed
or in response to a request made by that court on its own initiative.

A person desiring to file an amicus curiae brief shall present to the
court a motion for leave to file, served upon all parties. The motion
shall state concisely the nature of the applicant’s interest, the reasons
why an amicus curiae brief is believed desirable, the issues of law to
be addressed in the amicus curiae brief, and the applicant's position on.
those issues. The proposed amicus curiae brief may be conditionally
filed with the motion for leave. Unless otherwise ordered by the court,
the application for leave will be determined solely upon the motion and
without responses thereto or oral argument.

The clerk of the appellate court will forthwith notify the applicant
and all parties of the court’s action upon the application. Unless other
time limits are set out in the order of the court permitting the brief, the
amicus curiae shall file the brief within the time allowed for the filing of
the brief of the party supported or, if in support of neither party, within
the time allowed for filing appellant's brief. Motions for leave to file an
amicus curiae brief submitted to the court after the time within which
the amicus curiae brief normally would be due are disfavored in the
absence of good cause. Reply briefs of the parties to an amicus curiae
brief will be limited to points or authorities presented in the amicus cur-
iae brief which are not presented in the main briefs of the Parties. No
reply brief of an amicus curiae will be received.

A motion of an amicus curiae to participate in oral argument will be
allowed only for extraordinary reasons.

(j)’ Word-Count Limitations Applicable to Briefs Filed in the
Court of Appeals. Each brief filed in the Court of Appeals, whether
filed by an appellant, appellee, or amicus curiae, shall be set in font as
set forth in Rule 26(g)(1) and described in Appendix B to these rules. A
principal brief may contain no more than 8,750 words. A reply brief may
contain no more than 3,750 words. An amicus curiae brief may contain
no more than 3,750 words.

838 . RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

@ Portions. of Brief Included in Word Count.
Footnotes and citations in the body of the brief
must be included in the word count. Covers, cap-
tions, indexes, tables of authorities, certificates of
service, certificates of compliance with this rule,
counsel's signature block, and appendixes do not
count against these word-count limits.

(2) Certificate of Compliance. Parties shall submit
with the brief, immediately before the certificate
of service, a certification, signed by counsel of
record, or in the case of parties filing briefs pro se,
by the party, that the brief contains no more than
the number of words allowed by this rule. For pur-
poses of this certification, counsel and parties may
rely on word counts reported by word-processing
software, as long as footnotes and citations are
included in those word counts.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 301 N.C. 731; 303 N.C. 715; 304 N.C. 737; 306 N.C. 757;
312 N.C. 808; 322 N.C. 850; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 618; 327 N.C. 671; 354
N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 356 N.C. 706; 358 N.C. 824; 359 N.C. 883; 361 N.C.
732; 363 N.C. 901; 365 N.C. 583.

Rule 29. Sessions of Courts; Calendar of Hearings
(a) Sessions of Court.

(1) Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall be
in continuous session for the transaction of busi-
ness. Unless otherwise scheduled by the Court,
hearings in appeals will be held during the months
of February through May and September through
December. Additional settings may be authorized
by the Chief Justice.*

(2) Court of Appeals. Appeals will be heard in accor-
dance with a schedule promulgated by the Chief
Judge. Panels of the Court will sit as scheduled by
the Chief Judge. For the transaction of other busi-
ness, the Court of Appeals shall be in continuous
session.

(b) Calendaring of Cases for Hearing. Each appellate court
will calendar the hearing of all appeals docketed in the court. In general,

TOC

appeals will be calendared for hearing in the order in which they are
docketed, but the court may vary the order for any cause deemed appro-
priate. On motion of any party, with notice to all other parties, the court
may determine without hearing to give an appeal peremptory setting or
otherwise to vary the normal calendar order. Except as advanced for
peremptory setting on motion of a party or the court’s own initiative, no
appeal will be calendared for hearing at a time less than thirty days after
the filing of the appellant's brief. The clerk of the appellate court will
give reasonable notice to all counsel of record of the setting of an appeal

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

for hearing by mailing a copy of the calendar.
History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 304 N.C. 737; 322 N.C. 844; 324 N.C. 613; 327 N.C. 671;
354 N.C. 609;

363 N.C. 901.

Rule 30. Oral Argument and Unpublished Opinions
(a) Order and Content of Argument.

@

@

The appellant is entitled to open and conclude the
argument. The opening argument shall include a
fair statement of the case. Oral arguments should
complement the written briefs, and counsel will
therefore not be permitted to read at length from
briefs, records, and authorities.

In cases involving juveniles covered by Rules 3(b)
(4), 3.1(b), or 4(e), counsel shall refrain from using
ajuvenile’s name in oral argument and shall refer to
the juvenile pursuant to said rules.

(b) Time Allowed for Argument.

qQ)

In General. Ordinarily a total of thirty minutes
will be allowed all appellants and a total of thirty
minutes will be allowed all appellees for oral argu-
ment. Upon written or oral application of any party,
the court for good cause shown may extend the
times limited for argument. Among other causes,
the existence of adverse interests between multi-
ple appellants or between multiple appellees may
be suggested as good cause for such an extension.
The court of its own initiative may direct argument
on specific points outside the times limited.

840

@

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Counsel is not obliged to use all the time
allowed, and should avoid unnecessary repetition;
the court may terminate argument whenever it con-
siders further argument unnecessary.

Numerous Counsel. Any number of counsel
representing individual appellants or appellees

proceeding separately or jointly may be heard in-

argument within the times herein limited or allowed
by order of court. When more than one counsel is
heard, duplication or supplementation of argument
on the same points shall be avoided unless specifi-
cally directed by the court.

TOC

(c) Non-Appearance of Parties. If counsel for any party fails
to appear to present oral argument, the court will hear argument from
opposing counsel. If counsel for no party appears, the court will decide
the case on the written briefs unless it orders otherwise.

(d) Submission on Written Briefs. By agreement of the parties,
acase may be submitted for decision on the written briefs, but the court
may nevertheless order oral argument before deciding the case.

(e) Unpublished Opinions.

a

@

®

In order to minimize the cost of publication and of
providing storage space for the published reports,
the Court of Appeals is not required to publish an
opinion in every decided case. If the panel that
hears the case determines that the appeal involves
no new legal principles and that an opinion, if pub-
lished, would have no value as a precedent, it may
direct that no opinion be published.

The text of a decision without published opinion
shall be posted on the Court’s web site at https://
appellate.nccourts.org/opinions, and reported only
by listing the case and the decision in the advance
sheets and the bound volumes of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals Reports.

An unpublished decision of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling
legal authority. Accordingly, citation of unpub-
lished opinions in briefs, memoranda, and oral
arguments in the trial and appellate divisions is
disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 841

claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or the law of
the case. If a party believes, nevertheless, that an
unpublished opinion has precedential value to a
material issue in the case and that there is no pub-
lished opinion that would serve as well, the party
may cite the unpublished opinion if that party
serves a copy thereof on all other parties in the case
and on the court to which the citation is offered.
This service may be accomplished by including the
copy of the unpublished opinion in an addendum
to a brief or memorandum. A party who cites an
unpublished opinion for the first time at a hearing
or oral argument must attach a copy of the unpub-
lished opinion relied upon pursuant to the require-
ments of Rule 28(g). When citing an unpublished
opinion, a party must indicate the opinion’s unpub-
lished status. .

(4) Counsel of record and pro se parties of record may
move for publication of an unpublished opinion,
citing reasons based on Rule 30(e)(1) and serving
a copy of the motion upon all other counsel and
pro se parties of record. The motion shall be filed
and served within ten days of the filing of the opin-
ion. Any objection to the requested publication by
counsel or pro se parties of record must be filed
within five days after service of the motion request-
ing publication. The panel that heard the case shall
determine whether to allow or deny such motion.

( Pre-Argument Review; Decision of Appeal Without Oral
Argument.

(1) At any time that the Supreme Court concludes that
oral argument in any case pending before it will not
be of assistance to the Court, it may dispose of the
case on the record and briefs. In those cases, coun-
sel will be notified not to appear for oral argument.

(2) The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals may from
time to time designate a panel to review any pend-
ing case, after all briefs are filed but before argu-
ment, for decision under this rule. If all of the judges
of the panel to which a pending appeal has been .
referred conclude that oral argument will not be of
assistance to the Court, the case may be disposed.

842 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

of on the record and briefs. Counsel will be notified
+ not to appear for oral argument.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 288 N.C. 737; 289 N.C. 731; 296 N.C. 743; 303 N.C. 715;
324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 355 N.C. 776; 356 N.C. 706; 358 N.C. 824; 359
N.C. 883; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 31. Petition for Rehearing

(a) Time for Filing; Content. A petition for rehearing may be
filed in a civil action within fifteen days after the mandate of the court
has been issued. The petition shall state with particularity the points
of fact or law that, in the opinion of the petitioner, the court has over-
looked or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support
of the petition as petitioner desires to present. It shall be accompanied
by a certificate of at least two attorneys who for periods of at least five
years, respectively, shall have been members of the bar of this State and
who have no interest in the subject of the action and have not been
counsel for any party to the action, that they have carefully examined
the appeal and the authorities cited in the decision, and that they con-
sider the decision in error on points specifically and concisely identified.
Oral argument in support of the petition will not be permitted.

(b) How Addressed; Filed. A petition for rehearing shall be
addressed to the court that issued the opinion sought to be reconsidered.

(c) How Determined. Within thirty days after the petition is
filed, the court will either grant or deny the petition. A determination
to grant or deny will be made solely upon the written petition; no writ-
ten response will be received from the opposing party and no oral argu-
ment by any party will be heard. Determination by the court is final. The
rehearing may be granted as to all or fewer than all points suggested in
the petition. When the petition is denied, the clerk shall forthwith notify
all parties. .

(d) Procedure When Granted. Upon grant of the petition the
clerk shall forthwith notify the parties that the petition has been granted.
The case will be reconsidered solely upon the record on appeal, the peti-
tion to rehear, new briefs of both parties, and the oral argument if one
has been ordered by the court. The briefs shall be addressed solely to
the points specified in the order granting the petition to rehear. The peti-
tioner’s brief shall be filed within thirty days after the case is certified
for rehearing, and the opposing party’s brief, within thirty days after
petitioner’s brief is served. Filing and service of the new briefs shall be

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE _ 848

in accordance with the requirements of Rule 13. No reply brief shall be
received on rehearing. If the court has ordered oral argument, the clerk
shall give notice of the time set therefor, which time shall be not less
than thirty days after the filing of the petitioner’s brief on rehearing.

(e) Stay of Execution. When a petition for rehearing is filed, the
petitioner may obtain a stay of execution in the trial court to which the
mandate of the appellate court has been issued. The procedure is as
provided by Rule 8 of these rules for stays pending appeal.

() Waiver by Appeal from Court of Appeals. The timely fil-
ing of a notice of appeal from, or of a petition for discretionary review
of, a determination of the Court of Appeals constitutes a waiver of any
right thereafter to petition the Court of Appeals for rehearing as to such
determination or, if a petition for rehearing has earlier been filed, an
abandonment of such petition.

(g) No Petition in Criminal Cases. The courts will not entertain
petitions for rehearing in criminal actions.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 312 N.C. 803; 322 N.C. 844; 92 N.C. App. 761; 324 N.C.
618; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 32. Mandates of the Courts

(a) In General. Unless a court of the appellate division directs
that a formal mandate shall issue, the mandate of the court consists of
certified copies of its judgment and of its opinion and any direction of its
clerk as to costs. The mandate is issued by its transmittal from the clerk
of the issuing court to the clerk or comparable officer of the tribunal
from which appeal was taken to the issuing court.

(b) Time of Issuance. Unless a court orders otherwise, its clerk
shall enter judgment and issue the mandate of the court twenty days
after the written opinion of the court has been filed with the clerk.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 312 N.C. 803; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 33. Attorneys

(a) Appearances. An attorney will not be recognized as appear-
ing in any case unless he or she is entered as counsel of record therein.
The signature of an attorney on a record on appeal, motion, brief, or

844 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

other document permitted by these rules to be filed in a court of the
appellate division constitutes entry of the attorney as counsel of record
for the parties designated and a certification that the attorney represents
such parties. The signature of a member or associate in a firm’s name
constitutes entry of the firm as counsel of record for the parties desig-
nated. Counsel of record may not withdraw from a case except by leave
of court. Only those counsel of record who have personally signed the
brief prior to oral argument may be heard in argument.

(b) Signatures on Electronically-Filed Documents. If more
than one attorney is listed as being an attorney for the party or parties on
an electronically-filed document, it is the responsibility of the attorney
actually filing the document by computer to: (1) list his or her name first
on the document, and (2) place on the document under the signature
line the following statement: “I certify that all of the attorneys listed
below have authorized me to list their names on this document as if they
had personally signed it.”

(c) Agreements. Only those agreements of counsel which appear
in the record on appeal or which are filed in the court where an appeal
is docketed will be recognized by that court.

(d) Limited Practice of Out-of-State Attorneys. Attorneys
who are not licensed to practice law in North Carolina, but desire to
appear before the appellate courts of North Carolina in a matter shall
submit a motion to the appellate court fully complying with the require-
ments set forth in N.C.G.S. § 84-4.1. This motion shall be filed prior to
or contemporaneously with the out-of-state attorney signing and filing
any motion, petition, brief, or other document in any appellate court.
Failure to comply with this provision may subject the attorney to sanc-
tions and shall result in the document being stricken, unless signed by
another attorney licensed to practice in North Carolina. If an attorney is
admitted to practice before the Court of Appeals in a matter, the attor
ney shall be required to file another motion should the case proceed to
the Supreme Court. However, if the required fee has been paid to the
Court of Appeals, another fee shall not be due at the Supreme Court.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 33.1. Secure-Leave Periods for Attorneys

(a) Purpose; Authorization. In order to secure for the parties
to actions and proceedings pending in the appellate division, and to the
public at large, the heightened level of professionalism that an attorney

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 845

is able to provide when the attorney enjoys periods of time that are free
from the urgent demands of professional responsibility and to enhance
the overall quality of the attorney's personal and family life, any attorney
may from time to time designate and enjoy one or more secure-leave
periods each year as provided in this rule.

(b) Length; Number. A secure-leave period shall consist of one
or more complete calendar weeks. During any calendar year, an attor-
ney’s secure-leave periods pursuant to this rule and to Rule 26 of the
General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts shall not
exceed, in the aggregate, three calendar weeks.

(c) Designation; Effect. To designate a secure-leave period,
an attorney shall file a written designation containing the information
required by subsection (d), with the official specified in subsection (e),
and within the time provided in subsection (f). Upon such filing, the
secure-leave period so designated shall be deemed allowed without fur-
ther action of the court, and the attorney shall not be required to appear
at any argument or other in-court proceeding in the appellate division
during that secure-leave period.

(d) Content of Designation. The designation shall contain the
following information: (1) the attorney's name, address, telephone num-
ber, State Bar number, and e-mail address; (2) the date of the Monday on
which the secure-leave period is to begin and of the Friday on which it
is to end; (8) the dates of all other secure-leave periods during the cur-
rent calendar year that have previously been designated by the attorney
pursuant to this rule and to Rule 26 of the General Rules of Practice
for the Superior and District Courts; (4) a statement that the secure-
leave period is not being designated for the purpose of delaying, hin-
dering, or interfering with the timely disposition of any matter in any
pending action or proceeding; (5) a statement that no argument or other
in-court proceeding has been scheduled during the designated secure-
leave period in any matter pending in the appellate division in which
the attorney has entered an appearance; and (6) a listing of all cases, by
caption and docket number, pending before the appellate court in which
the designation is being filed. The designation shall apply only to those
cases pending in that appellate court on the date of its filing. A separate
designation shall be filed as to any cases on appeal subsequently filed
and docketed.

(e) Where to File Designation. The designation shall be filed as
follows: (1) if the attorney has entered an appearance in the Supreme
Court, in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court, even if the desig-
nation was filed initially in the Court of Appeals; (2) if the attorney has

846 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

entered an appearance in the Court of Appeals, in the office of the clerk
of the Court of Appeals.

(@) When to File Designation. The designation shall be filed:
(1) no later than ninety days before the beginning of the secure-leave
period, and (2) before any argument or other in-court proceeding has
been scheduled for a time during the designated secure-leave period.

History Note.
350 N.C. 859; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 34. Frivolous Appeals; Sanctions

(a) A court of the appellate division may, on its own initiative or
motion of a party, impose a sanction against a party or attorney or both
when the court determines that an appeal or any proceeding in an appeal
was frivolous because of one or more of the following:

(2) the appeal was not well-grounded in fact and was
not warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law;

(2) the appeal was taken or continued for an improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;

(8) apetition, motion, brief, record, or other paper filed
in the appeal was grossly lacking in the require-
ments of propriety, grossly violated appellate court
rules, or grossly disregarded the requirements of a
fair presentation of the issues to the appellate court.

(b) A court of the appellate division may impose one or more of
the following sanctions:

() dismissal of the appeal;
(2) monetary damages including, but not limited to,
-a. single or double costs,
b. damages occasioned by delay,

¢. reasonable expenses, including reasonable
attorney fees, incurred because of the frivolous
appeal or proceeding;

(8) any other sanction deemed just and proper.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 847

(c) A court of the appellate division may remand the case to the
trial division for a hearing to determine one or more of the sanctions
under subdivisions (b)(2) or (b)(8) of this rule.

(d) Ifacourt of the appellate division remands the case to the trial
division for a hearing to determine a sanction under subsection (c) of
this rule, the person subject to sanction shall be entitled to be heard on
that determination in the trial division.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 92 N.C. App. 761; 324 N.C. 613; 350 N.C. 858; 354 N.C.
609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 35. Costs

(a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if
an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless
otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment
is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise
ordered by the court; if a judgment is reversed, costs shall be taxed
against the appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment is affirmed
in part, reversed in part, or modified in any way, costs shall be allowed
as directed by the court.

(b) Direction as to Costs in Mandate. The clerk shall include
in the mandate of the court an itemized statement of costs taxed in the
appellate court and a designation of the party against whom such costs
are taxed.

(c) Costs of Appeal Taxable in Trial Tribunals. Any costs of
an appeal that are assessable in the trial tribunal shall, upon receipt of
the mandate, be taxed as directed therein and may be collected by exe-
cution of the trial tribunal.

(@ Execution to Collect Costs in Appellate Courts. Costs
taxed in the courts of the appellate division may be made the subject of
execution issuing from the court where taxed. Such execution may be
directed by the clerk of the court to the proper officers of any county
of the state; may be issued at any time after the mandate of the court
has been issued; and may be made returnable on any day named. Any
officer to whom such execution is directed is subject to the penalties
prescribed by law for failure to make due and proper return.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

848 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

Rule 36. Trial Judges Authorized to Enter Orders Under
These Rules

(a) When Particular Judge Not Specified by Rule. When by
these rules a trial court or a judge thereof is permitted or required to
enter an order or to take some other judicial action with respect to
a pending appeal and the rule does not specify the particular judge
with authority to do so, the following judges of the respective courts
have such authority with respect to causes docketed in their respec-
tive divisions:

(1) Superior Court. The judge who entered the judg-
ment, order, or other determination from which
appeal was taken, and any regular or special supe-
rior court judge resident in the district or assigned
to hold court in the district wherein the cause
is docketed;

(2) District Court. The judge who entered the judg-
ment, order, or other determination from which
appeal was taken; the chief district court judge
of the district wherein the cause is docketed; and
any judge designated by such chief district court
judge to enter interlocutory orders under N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-192.

(b) Upon Death, Incapacity, or Absence of Particular Judge
Authorized. When by these rules the authority to enter an order or to
take other judicial action is limited to a particular judge and that judge
is unavailable by reason of death, mental or physical incapacity, or
absence from the state, the Chief Justice will, upon motion of any party,
designate another judge to act in the matter. Such designation will be by
order entered ex parte, copies of which will be mailed forthwith by the
clerk of the Supreme Court to the judge designated and to all parties.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C, 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 37. Motions in Appellate Courts

(a) Time; Content of Motions; Response. An application to a
court of the appellate division for an order or for other relief available
under these rules may be made by filing a motion for such order or other
relief with the clerk of the court, with service on all other parties. Unless
another time is expressly provided by these rules, the motion may be
filed and served at any time before the case is called for oral argument.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 849

-The motion shall contain or be accompanied by any matter required by a
specific provision of these rules governing such a motion and shall state
with particularity the grounds on which it is based and the order or relief
sought. If a motion is supported by affidavits, briefs, or other papers,
these shall be served and filed with the motion. Within ten days after a
motion is served or until the appeal is called for oral argument, which-
ever period is shorter, a party may file and serve copies of a response in
opposition to the motion, which may be supported by affidavits, briefs,
or other papers in the same manner as motions. The court may shorten.
or extend the time for responding to any motion.

(b) Determination. Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule
37(a), a motion may be acted upon at any time, despite the absence of
notice to all parties and without awaiting a response thereto. A party
who has not received actual notice of such a motion; or who has not
filed a response at the time such action is taken, and who is adversely
affected by the action may request reconsideration, vacation, or modi-
fication thereof. Motions will be determined without argument, unless
the court orders otherwise.

(c) Protecting the Identity of Certain Juveniles. Parties shall
protect the identity of juveniles covered by Rules 3(b)(1), 3.1(b), or 4(e)
pursuant to said rules.

(d) Withdrawal of Appeal in Criminal Cases. Withdrawal
of appeal in criminal cases shall be in accordance with N.C.G.S.
§ 154-1450. In addition to the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1450, after
the record on appeal in a criminal case has been filed in an appellate
court but before the filing of an opinion, the defendant shall also file a
written notice of the withdrawal with the clerk of the appropriate appel-
late court.

(e) Withdrawal of Appeal in Civil Cases.

(1) Prior to the filing of a record on appeal in the appel-
late court, an appellant or cross-appellant may,
without the consent of the other party, file a notice
of withdrawal of its appeal with the tribunal from
which appeal has been taken. Alternatively, prior to
the filing of a record on appeal, the parties may file
a signed stipulation agreeing to dismiss the appeal
with the tribunal from which the appeal has been
taken.

(2) After the record on appeal has been filed, an appel-
lant or cross-appellant or all parties jointly may
move the appellate court in which the appeal is

850 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

pending, prior to the filing of an opinion, for dis-
missal of the appeal. The motion must specify the
reasons therefor, the positions of all parties on the
motion to dismiss, and the positions of all parties
on the allocation of taxed costs. The appeal may be
dismissed by order upon such terms as agreed to by
the parties or as fixed by the appellate court.

( Effect of Withdrawal of Appeal. The withdrawal of an
appeal shall not affect the right of any other party to file or continue
such party’s appeal or cross-appeal.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 824 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 358 N.C. 824; 361 N.C. 732;
363 N.C. 901.

Rule 38. Substitution of Parties

(a) Death of a Party. No action abates by reason of the death of
aparty while an appeal may be taken or is pending, if the cause of action
survives. If a party acting in an individual capacity dies after appeal
is taken from any tribunal, the personal representative of the deceased
party in a personal action, or the successor in interest of the deceased
party in a real action may be substituted as a party on motion filed by
the representative or the successor in interest or by any other party with
the clerk of the court in which the action is then docketed. A motion to
substitute made by a party shall be served upon the personal represen-
tative or successor in interest in addition to all other parties. If such a
deceased party in a personal action has no personal representative, any
party may in writing notify the court of the death, and the court in which
the action is then docketed shall direct the proceedings to be had in
order to substitute a personal representative.

Ifa party against whom an appeal may be taken dies after entry of a
judgment or order but before appeal is taken, any party entitled to appeal
therefrom may proceed as appellant as if death had not occurred; and
after appeal is taken, substitution may then be effected in accordance
with this subdivision. If a party entitled to appeal dies before filing a
notice of appeal, appeal may be taken by the personal representative, or,
if there is no personal representative, by the attorney of record within
the time and in the manner prescribed in these rules; and after appeal
is taken, substitution may then be effected in accordance with this rule.

(b) Substitution for Other Causes. If substitution of a party
to an appeal is necessary for any reason other than death, substitution

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 851

shall be effected in accordance with the procedure prescribed in subsec-
tion (a).

(c) Public Officers; Death or Separation from Office. When
a person is a party to an appeal in an official or representative capacity
and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office,
the action does not abate and the person’s successor is automatically
substituted as a party. Prior to the qualification of a successor, the attor-
ney of record for the former party may take any action required by these
rules. An order of substitution may be made, but neither failure to enter
such an order nor any misnomer in the name of a substituted party shall
affect the substitution unless it be shown that the same affected the sub-
stantial rights of a party.
History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 39. Duties of Clerks; When Offices Open

(a) General Provisions. The clerks of the courts of the appel-
late division shall take the oaths and give the bonds required by law.
The courts shall be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any
proper paper and of making motions and issuing orders. The offices of
the clerks with the clerks or deputies in attendance shall be open during
business hours on all days except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holi-
days, but the respective courts may provide by order that the offices of
their clerks shall be open for specified hours on Saturdays or on particu-
Jar legal holidays or shall be closed on particular business days.

(b) Records to Be Kept. The clerk of each of the courts of the
appellate division shall keep and maintain the records of that court on
paper, microfilm, or electronic media, or any combination thereof. The
records kept by the clerk shall include indexed listings of all cases dock-
eted in that court, whether by appeal, petition, or motion, and a nota-
tion of the dispositions attendant thereto; a listing of final judgments on.
appeals before the court, indexed by title, docket number, and parties,
containing a brief memorandum of the judgment of the court and the
party against whom costs were adjudicated; and records of the proceed-
ings and ceremonies of the court.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 92 N.C. App. 761; 324 N.C. 618; 354 N.C. 609;
363 N.C. 901.

852 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

Rule 40. Consolidation of Actions on Appeal

Two or more actions that involve common issues of law may be con-
solidated for hearing upon motion of a party to any of the actions made
to the appellate court wherein all are docketed, or upon the initiative of
that court. Actions so consolidated will be calendared and heard as a
single case. Upon consolidation, the parties may set the course of argu-
ment, within the times permitted by Rule 30(b), by written agreement
filed with the court prior to oral argument. This agreement shall control
unless modified by the court.

History Note.
287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 41. Appeal Information Statement

(a) The Court of Appeals has adopted an Appeal Information
Statement (AIS) which will be revised from time to time. The purpose
of the AIS is to provide the Court the substance of an appeal and the
information needed by the Court for effective case management.

(b) Each appellant shall complete, file, and serve the AIS as set out
in this rule.

(1) The clerk of the Court of Appeals shall furnish an
AIS form to all parties to the appeal when the record.
on appeal is docketed in the Court of Appeals.

(2) Each appellant shall complete and file the AIS with
the clerk of the Court of Appeals at or before the
time his or her appellant’s brief is due and shall
serve a copy of the AIS upon all other parties to the
appeal pursuant to Rule 26. The AIS may be filed by
mail addressed to the clerk and, if first class mail
is utilized, is deemed filed on the date of mailing
as evidenced by the proof of service. Parties shall
protect the identity of juveniles covered by Rules
3(b)(1), 3.1(b), or 4(e) pursuant to said rules.

(8) If any party to the appeal concludes that the AIS
is in any way inaccurate or incomplete, that party
may file with the Court of Appeals a written state-
ment setting out additions or corrections within
seven days of the service of the AIS and shall serve
a copy of the written statement upon all other par-
ties to the appeal pursuant to Rule 26. The written

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 853

statement may be filed by mail addressed to the
clerk and, if first class mail is utilized, is deemed
filed on the date of mailing as evidenced by the
proof of service.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 324 N.C. 613; 113 N.C. App. 841; 354 N.C. 609; 358 N.C.
824; 363 N.C. 901.

Editor’s Note.

Former Rule 41, “Title,” was renumbered as Rule 42 on 3 March
1994, 113 N.C. App. 841, and then later recodified as Rule 1(a) on 2 July
2009, 363 N.C. 901.

Rule 42. [Reserved]
History Note.

113 N.C. App. 841; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Editor’s Note.

Former Rule 41, “Title,” was renumbered as Rule 42 on 3 March
1994, 113 N.C. App. 841, and then later recodified as Rule 1(a) on 2 July
2009, 363 N.C. 901.

854 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

APPENDIXES TO THE NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE

APPENDIX A. TIMETABLES FOR APPEALS

‘Timetable of Appeals from Trial Division and Administrative Tribunals
Under Articles II and IV of the Rules of Appellate Procedure

Action Time (Days) From date of Rule Ref.

‘Taking Appeal (Civil) 30. Entry of Judgment 3)
(Unless Tolled)

Cross-Appeal 10 Service and Filing of a Timely 3©@
Notice of Appeal

‘Taking Appeal (Administrative 80 Receipt of Final Administrative 180b)@)

‘Tribunal) ‘Tribunal Decision (Unless
Statutes Provide Otherwise)

‘Taking Appeal (Criminal) 44 Entry of Judgment 4@)
Unless Tolled)

Ordering ‘Transcript (Givil, 14 Filing Notice of Appeal ore

Administrative Tribunal) 18(6)8)

Ordering Transcript 14 Order Filed by Clerk of Ta)@

(Criminal Indigent) Superior Court

Preparing and Delivering Service of Order for ‘Transcript 70))

‘Transcript

(Civil, Non-Capital Criminal) 60

(Capital Criminal) 120

Serving Proposed Record Notice of Appeal (No 1)

on Appeal ‘Transcript) or Court Reporter's 18(4)
Certificate of Delivery of

(Civil, Non-Capital Criminal) 35 Tanscript °

(Administrative Tribunal) 35

Serving Proposed Record on 70 Court Reporter's Certificate 110)

Appeal (Capital) : of Delivery

Serving Objections or

Proposed Alternative Record

‘on Appeal

(Civil, Non-Capital Criminal) 80 Service of Proposed Record ue)

(Capital Criminal) 35

(Administrative Tribunal) 80 _ Service of Proposed Record 18(@)@)

Requesting Judicial Settlement 10 Expiration of the Last Day 1@

of Record Within, Which an Appellee Who 18(a)(3)
Has Been Served Could Serve
Objections, ete,

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 855
Judicial Settlement of Record 20 Service on Judge of Request 1)
for Settlement 18(4)(8)
Filing Record on Appeal in 15 Settlement of Record on 12(@)
Appellate Court Appeal
Filing Appellant's Brief 30. Clerk’s Mailing of Printed 18)
(or Mailing Brief Under Rule Record (60 Days in
26(a)) Death Cases)
Filing Appellee’s Brief (or 30 Service of Appellant's Brief (60 180)
Mailing Brief Under Rule Days in Death Cases)
26(@))
Filing Appellant's Reply Brief 14 Service of Appeliee's Brief 28(h)
(or Mailing Brief Under
Rule 26(a))
Oral Argument 80 Filing Appellant's Brief (Usual 29
Minimum Time)
Certification or Mandate 20 Issuance of Opinion 32
Petition for Rehearing (Civil 15 Mandate 31a)
Action Only)
Timetable of Appeals from Trial Division Under Article II, Rule 3.1,
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
Action Time (Days) From date of Rule Ref.
‘Taking Appeal 30 Entry of Judgment 3.1(a);
NCGS.
§ 78-1001
Notifying Court-Reporting 1 Business) Filing Notice of Appeal 3.1()0)
Coordinator (Clerk of
Superior Court)
Assigning Transcriptionist 2 Business) Receipt of Notification Court- 3.1)
(Court-Reporting Coordinator) Reporting Coordinator
Preparing and 85. Assignment by CourtReporting ESToven)
Delivering a Transcript of Coordinator
Designated Proceedings
Gdigent Appellant)
Preparing and Delivering 45 Assignment of Transcriptionist 3.11)
a Transcript of Designated
Proceedings (Non-Indigent
Appellant)
Serving Proposed Record on 10 Receipt of Transcript 8.1(0)@)
Appeal
Serving Notice of Approval, 10 Service of Proposed Record 3.1()@)

or Objections, or Proposed
Alternative Record on Appeal

856 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

Filing Record on Appeal When 5 (Business) Settlement of Record 3.12)
Parties Agree to a Settled

Record Within 20 Days of

Receipt of Transcript

Filing Record on Appeal if 5 Gusiness) Last Date on Which Any 3.102)
All. Appellees Fail Either to Appellee Could so Serve

Serve Notices of Approval,

or Objections, or Proposed

Alternative Records on Appeal

Appellant Files Proposed 5 (Business) Last Date on Which the Record 3.10)@)
Record on Appeal and Could be Settled by Agreement

Appellee(s) Files Objections

and Amendments or an

Alternative Proposed Record

on Appeal When Parties

Cannot Agree to a Settled

Record on Appeal Within 30

Days After Receipt of the

‘Transcript

Filing Appellant's Brief 80 Filing of Record on Appeal 3.1)

Filing Appellee’s Brief 30 Service of Appellant's Brief 3.10)@)

Filing Appellant's Reply Brief 14 Service of Appellee’s Brief 8.1)
(or Mailing Brief Under Rule @)j28(h)
26(@))

‘Timetable of Appeals to the Supreme Court from the Court of Appeals
Under Article III of the Rules of Appellate Procedure

Action Time (Days) From date of Rule Ref.
Petition for Discretionary 15 Docketing Appeal in Court of 15(b)
Review Prior to Determination Appeals
Notice of Appeal and/or 15 Mandate of Court of Appeals Me)
Petition for Discretionary (or From Order of Court of 150)
Review Appeals Denying Petition

for Rehearing)
Cross-Notice of Appeal 10 Filing of First Notice of Appeal M@)
Response to Petition for 10 Service of Petition 15(d)
Discretionary Review
Filing Appellant's Brief 80 Filing Notice of Appeal 14@)
(or Mailing Brief Under Certification of Review 15@)2)
Rule 26(a))
Filing Appellee’s Brief (or 80 Service of Appellant's Brief 14@)
‘Mailing Brief Under Rule 15(8)
26(a))
Filing Appellant's Reply 14 Service of Appellee’s Brief 28(h)
Brief (or Mailing Brief
Under Rule 26(a))
Oral Argument 30 Filing Appellee’s Brief (Usual 29

‘Minimum Time)

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 857

Certification or Mandate 20 Issuance of Opinion 32
Petition for Rehearing (Civil 15 Mandate 81(4)
‘Action Only)

All of the critical time intervals outlined here except those for taking
an appeal, petitioning for discretionary review, responding to a petition
for discretionary review, or petitioning for rehearing may be extended
by order of the court in which the appeal is docketed at the time. Note
that Rule 7(b)(1) authorizes the trial tribunal to grant only one extension
of time for production of the transcript and that the trial tribunal lacks
such authority in criminal cases in which a sentence of death has been
imposed. Note also that Rule 27 authorizes the trial tribunal to grant
only one extension of time for service of the proposed record. All other
motions for extension of the times provided in these rules must be filed
with the appellate court to which the appeal of right lies.

No time limits are prescribed for petitions for writs of certiorari
other than that they be “filed without unreasonable delay.” (Rule 21(c)).

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 306 N.C. 757; 314 N.C. 683; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 613;
327 N.C. 671; 345 N.C. 765; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 357 N.C. 665; 359
N.C. 883; 363 N.C. 901.

Editor’s Note.

The former “Appendix of Tables and Forms,” 287 N.C. 671, was
repealed and replaced with Appendixes A through F on 7 December
1982, 306 N.C. 757.

858 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

APPENDIX B. FORMAT AND STYLE

All documents for filing in either appellate court are prepared on
8% x 11”, plain, white unglazed paper of 16- to 20-pound weight. Typing
is done on one side only, although the document will be reproduced in
two-sided format. No vertical rules, law firm marginal return addresses,
or punched holes will be accepted. The papers need not be stapled; a
binder clip or rubber bands are adequate to secure them in order.

Papers shall be prepared using font no smaller than 12-point and
no larger than 14-point using a proportionally spaced font with serifs.
Examples of proportionally spaced fonts with serifs include, but are not
limited to, Constantia, Century, Century Schoolbook, and Century Old
Style typeface. To allow for binding of documents, a margin of approxi-
mately one inch shall be left on all sides of the page. The formatted page
should be approximately 64 inches wide and 9 inches long. Tabs are
located at the following distances from the left margin: 4”, 1”, 14”, 2”,
4%” (center), and 5”,

CAPTIONS OF DOCUMENTS

All documents to be filed in either appellate court shall be headed
by a caption. The caption contains: the number to be assigned the case
by the clerk; the Judicial District from which the case arises; the appel-
late court to whose attention the document is addressed; the style of
the case showing the names of all parties to the action, except as pro-
vided by Rules 3(b)(1), 3.1(b), and 4(e); the county from which the case
comes; the indictment or docket numbers of the case below (in records
on appeal and in motions and petitions in the cause filed prior to the fil-
ing of the record); and the title of the document. The caption shall be
placed beginning at the top margin of a cover page and again on the first
textual page of the document.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 859

No. (Number) DISTRICT

(SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA)
(or)
(NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS)

Johinbintibiniininiinbiniibicribininbicrvrise

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )
or p}
(Name of Plaintiff) ) From (Name) County
d
vy ) No.
)
(Name of Defendant) )

Jntihinhiehiahinhinhtihinriehinkistiniinbiniiniir

E OF DOCUMEN'

Shtinbieiieiinbiniiniinbinisbienisbinbienieirierie

The caption should reflect the title of the action (all parties named
except as provided by Rules 3(b)(1), 3.1(b), and 4(e)) as it appeared
in the trial division. The appellant or petitioner is not automatically
given topside billing; the relative positions of the plaintiff and defendant
should be retained.

The caption of a record on appeal and of a notice of appeal from the
trial division should include directly below the name of the county, the
indictment or docket numbers of the case in the trial division. Those
numbers, however, should not be included in other documents, except
a petition for writ of certiorari or other petitions and motions in which
no record on appeal has yet been created in the case. In notices of
appeal or petitions to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Court of
Appeals, the caption should show the Court of Appeals docket number
in similar fashion.

Immediately below the caption of each document, centered and
underlined, in all capital letters, should be the title of the document, e.g.,
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW UNDER N.C.G.S. § 7A-31,
or DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S BRIEF. A brief filed in the Supreme
Court in a case previously heard and decided by the Court of Appeals is
entitled NEW BRIEF.

INDEXES

A brief or petition that is ten pages or more in length and all appen-
dixes to briefs (Rule 28) must contain an index to the contents.

860 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

The index should be indented approximately 34” from each margin,
providing a5” line. The form of the index for a record on appeal should
be as follows (indexes for briefs are addressed in Appendix E):

(Record)
| INDEX
Organization of the Court .....

Complaint of Tri-Cities Mfg. ....

He ae ok

*PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE:
John Smith
Tom Jones ....
Defendant's Motion for Nonsuit

*DEFENDANT’S EVIDENCE:
John Q. Public ..
Mary J. Public
Request for Jury Instructions
Charge to the Jury ..
Jury Verdict
Order or Judgment
Appeal Entries .
Order Extending Time ...
Proposed Issues on Appeal .
Certificate of Service ..
Stipulation of Counsel
Names and Addresses of Counsel .

USE_OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE WITH RECORD
ON APPEAL

Those portions of the printed record on appeal that correspond to
the items asterisked (*) in the sample index above would be omitted
if the transcript option were selected under Rule 9(c). In their place,
counsel should insert a statement in substantially the following form:

“Per Rule 9(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the transcript
of proceedings in this case, taken by (name), court reporter, from
(date) to (date) and consisting of (# of volumes) volumes and (# of
pages) pages, numbered (1) through (last page #), is electronically
filed pursuant to Rule 7.”

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 861

Entire transcripts should not be inserted into the printed record on
appeal, but rather should be electronically filed by the court reporter
pursuant to Rule 7. Transcript pages inserted into the record on appeal
will be treated as a narration and will be printed at the standard page
charge. Counsel should note that transcripts will not be reproduced with
the record on appeal, but will be treated and used as an exhibit.

OF CASES AND Al [ES

Immediately following the index and before the inside caption, all
briefs, petitions, and motions that are ten pages or greater in length
shall contain a table of cases and authorities. Cases should be arranged
alphabetically, followed by constitutional provisions, statutes, regu-
lations, and other textbooks and authorities. The format should be
similar to that of the index. Citations should be made according to the
most recent edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation.
Citations to regional reporters shall include parallel citations to official
state reporters.

FORMAT OF BODY OF DOCUMENT

Paragraphs within the body of the record on appeal should be single-
spaced, with double spaces between paragraphs. The body of petitions,
notices of appeal, responses, motions, and briefs should be double-
spaced, with captions, headings, issues, and long quotes single-spaced.

Adherence to the margins is important because the document will
be reproduced front and back and will be bound on the side. No part of
the text should be obscured by that binding.

Quotations of more than three lines in length should be indented
% from each margin and should be single-spaced. The citation should
immediately follow the quote.

References to the record on appeal should be made using a paren-
thetical in the text: (R pp 38-40). References to the transcript, if used,
should be made in a similar manner: (T p 558, line 21).

TOPICAL HEADINGS

The various sections of the brief or petition should be separated
(and indexed) by topical headings, centered and underlined, in all capi-
tal letters.

Within the argument section, the issues presented should be set out
as a heading in all capital letters and in paragraph format from margin

862 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

to margin. Sub-issues should be presented in similar format, but block
indented %” from the left margin.

NUMBERING PAGES

The cover page containing the caption of the document (and the
index in records on appeal) is unnumbered. The index and table of
cases and authorities are on pages numbered with lowercase Roman
numerals, e.g., i, ii, iv.

While the page containing the inside caption and the beginning
of the substance of the petition or brief bears no number, it is page
1. Subsequent pages are sequentially numbered by Arabic numbers,
flanked by dashes, at the center of the top margin of the page, e.g., -4-.

An appendix to the brief should be separately numbered in the man-
ner of a brief.

SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS

Unless filed pro se, all original papers filed in a case will bear the
original signature of at least one counsel participating in the case, as in
the example below. The name, address, telephone number, State Bar
number, and e-mail address of the person signing, together with the
capacity in which that person signs the paper, will be included. When
counsel or the firm is retained, the firm name should be included above
the signature; however, if counsel is appointed in an indigent criminal
appeal, only the name of the appointed counsel should appear, without
identification of any firm affiliation. Counsel participating in argument
must have signed the brief in the case prior to that argument.

(Retained) [LAW FIRM NAME]
[Name]

[Name]

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants
P.O. Box 0000

Raleigh, NC 27600

(919) 999-9999

State Bar No.

[e-mail address]

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 863

(Appointed)
[Name]

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
P.O. Box 0000

Raleigh, NC 27600

(919) 999-9999

State Bar No.

[e-mail address]

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 306 N.C. 757; 324 N.C, 585; 324 N.C. 613; 354 N.C. 598;
354 N.C. 609; 356 N.C. 701; 356 N.C. 706; 358 N.C. 824; 359 N.C. 883; 363
N.C. 901.

Editor’s Noté.

The former “Appendix of Tables and Forms,” 287 N.C. 671, was
repealed and replaced with Appendixes A through F on 7 December
1982, 306 N.C. 757.

864

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

APPENDIX C. ARRANGEMENT OF RECORD ON APPEAL

Only those items listed in the following tables and that are required
by Rule 9(a) in the particular case should be included in the record. See
Rule 9(b)(2) for sanctions for including unnecessary items in the record.
The items marked by an asterisk (*) could be omitted from the printed
record if the transcript option of Rule 9(c) is used and a transcript of the
items exists.

Table 1

SUGGESTED ORDER IN APPEAL FROM CIVIL JURY CASE

L

*10.

*1L.
*12,

*13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

OMAR M

Title of action (all parties named) and case number in caption,
per Appendix B .

Index, per Rule 9(a)(1)a

Statement of organization of trial tribunal, per Rule 9(a)(1)b

oe of record items showing jurisdiction, per Rule 9(a)
Ic

Complaint

Pre-answer motions of defendant, with rulings thereon

Answer

Motion for summary judgment, with rulings thereon (* if oral)

Pretrial order

Plaintiff's evidence, with any evidentiary rulings that a party to
the appeal contends are erroneous

Motion for directed verdict, with ruling thereon

Defendant's evidence, with any evidentiary rulings that a party
to the appeal contends are erroneous

Plaintiff's rebuttal evidence, with any evidentiary rulings that
a party to the appeal contends are erroneous

Issues tendered by parties

Issues submitted by court

Court’s instructions to jury, per Rule 9(a)(1)f
Verdict,

Motions after verdict, with rulings thereon (* if oral)

TOC

19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

24,
25.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 865,

Judgment.
Items, including Notice of Appeal, required by Rule 9(a)(1)i

Statement of transcript option as required by Rule 9(a)(1)i and
9a)

Statement required by Rule 9(a)(1)m when a record supple-
ment will be filed

Entries showing settlement of record on appeal, extensions of
time, etc.

Proposed Issues on Appeal per Rule 9(a)(1)k

Names, office addresses, telephone numbers, State Bar
numbers, and e-mail addresses of counsel for all parties to
the appeal

Table 2

SUGGESTED ORDER IN APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT

*8,

10.
il.

12.

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISION
Title of action (all parties named) and case number in caption,
per Appendix B
Index, per Rule 9(a)2)a
Statement of organization of superior court, per Rule 9(a)(2)b

Statement of record items showing jurisdiction of the board or
agency, per Rule 9(a)(2)c

Copy of petition or other initiating pleading
Copy of answer or other responsive pleading

Copies of all pertinent items from administrative proceeding
filed for review in superior court, including evidence

Evidence taken in superior court, in order received

Copies of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of
superior court

Items required by Rule 9(a)(2)h

Entries showing settlement of record on appeal, extensions of
time, etc.

Proposed issues on appeal, per Rule 9(a)(2)i

866

18.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

Names, office addresses, telephone numbers, State Bar
numbers, and e-mail addresses of counsel for all parties to
the appeal

Table 3

SUGGESTED ORDER IN APPEAL OF CRIMINAL CASE

L

*
a
S

-
La

*12,

13.

*14,

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

CPA PF WD

Title of action (all parties named) and case number in caption,
per Appendix B

Index, per Rule 9(a)(8)a

Statement of organization of trial tribunal, per Rule 9(a)(3)b
Warrant

Judgment in district court (where applicable)

Entries showing appeal to superior court (where applicable)
Bill of indictment (if not tried on original warrant)
Arraignment and plea in superior court

Voir dire of jurors

State’s evidence, with any evidentiary rulings that a party to
the appeal contends are erroneous

Motions at close of State’s evidence, with rulings thereon (* if
oral)

Defendant's evidence, with any evidentiary rulings that a party
to the appeal contends are erroneous

Motions at close of defendant's evidence, with rulings thereon.
(* if oral)

State’s rebuttal evidence, with any evidentiary rulings that a
party to the appeal contends are erroneous

Motions at close of all evidence, with rulings thereon (* if oral)
Court’s instructions to jury, per Rules 9(a)(3)f and 10(a)(2)
Verdict

Motions after verdict, with rulings thereon (* if oral)
Judgment and order of commitment

Appeal entries

TOC

21.

22.
23.

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 867

Entries showing settlement of record on appeal, extensions of
time, etc.

Proposed issues on appeal, per Rule 9(a)(3)j

Names, office addresses, telephone numbers, State Bar
numbers, and e-mail addresses of counsel for all parties to
the appeal

Table 4
PROPOSED ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. Examples related to pretrial rulings in civil actions

1.

Did the trial court err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)?

Did the trial court err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)?

Did the trial court err in denying defendant’s motion to require
plaintiff to submit to an independent physical examination
under N.C. R. Civ. P. 35?

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment under N.C. R. Civ. P. 56?

B. Examples related to civil jury trial rulings

1.

Did the trial court err in admitting the hearsay testimony of ©

Did the trial court err in denying defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict?

Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on the doctrine of
last clear chance?

Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on the doctrine of
sudden emergency?

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for a
new trial?

Cc. Examples related to civil non-jury trials

1

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss
at the close of plaintiffs evidence?

868 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

2. Did the trial court err in its finding of fact No. 10?
8. Did the trial court err in its conclusion of law No. 3?
History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 306 N.C. 757; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 613; 327 N.C. 671;
354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

Editor's Note.

The former “Appendix of Tables and Forms,” 287 N.C. 671, was
repealed and replaced with Appendixes A through F on 7 December
1982, 306 N.C. 757.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 869

APPENDIX D. FORMS

Captions for all documents filed in the appellate division should be
in the format prescribed by Appendix B, addressed to the Court whose
review is sought.

NOTICES OF APPEAL
(1) To Court of Appeals from Trial Division
Appropriate in all appeals of right from district or superior court
except appeals from criminal judgments imposing sentences of death.
(Caption)
2sielelbivieleisiclelsioioiaicisisieisistoatctsisiek

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH
CAROLINA:

(Plaintiff)(Defendant), (Name of Party), hereby gives notice of
appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina (from the final judg-
ment)(from the order) entered on (date) in (District)(Superior) Court,

County, (describing it).

Respectfully submitted this the __ day of

s/

Attorney for (Plaintiff)
(Defendant)-Appellant
(Address, Telephone Number,
State Bar Number, and E-mail
Address)

(2) To Supreme urt from erior
Court Including a Sentence of Death
(Caption)
sfefelolnblolsoleisolaeietotelaieetstetetotsek
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA:

(Name of Defendant), Defendant, hereby gives notice of appeal to
the Supreme Court of North Carolina from the final judgment entered
by (name of Judge) in Superior Court, County, on (date),
which judgment included a conviction of murder in the first degree and
asentence of death.

870 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

Respectfully submitted this the__ day of_____——,2__.

s/

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
(Address, Telephone Number, State
Bar Number, and E-mail Address)

(3) To Supreme Court from _a Judgment of the Court of
Appeals

Appropriate in all appeals taken as of right from opinions and judg-
ments of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court under N.C.G.S.
§ 74-30. The appealing party shall enclose a clear copy of the opinion of
the Court of Appeals with the notice. To take account of the possibility
that the Supreme Court may determine that the appeal does not lie of
right, an alternative petition for discretionary review may be filed with
the notice of appeal.

(Caption)

sfolololeototstatatoleetototatalae
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA:

(Plaintiff)(Defendant), (Name of Party), hereby appeals to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina from the judgment of the Court of
Appeals (describe it), which judgment... .

(Constitutional question—N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(1)) . . . directly involves
a substantial question arising under the Constitution(s) (of the United
States)(and)(or)(of the State of North Carolina) as follows:

(Here describe the specific issues, citing constitutional provisions
under which they arise and showing how such issues were timely
raised below and are set out in the record of appeal, e.g.:

Issue 1: Said judgment directly involves a substantial question
arising under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States and under Article 1, Section
20 of the Constitution of the State of North Carolina, in that it
deprives rights secured thereunder to the defendant by over-
ruling defendant’s challenge to the denial of (his)(her) Motion
to Suppress Evidence Obtained by a Search Warrant, thereby
depriving defendant of the constitutional right to be secure in
his or her person, house, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures and violating constitutional prohi-
bitions against warrants issued without probable cause and

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 871

warrants not supported by evidence. This constitutional issue
was timely raised in the trial tribunal by defendant’s Motion to
Suppress Evidence Obtained by a Search Warrant made prior
to trial of defendant (R pp 7-10). This constitutional issue was
determined erroneously by the Court of Appeals.)

In the event the Court finds this constitutional question to be sub-
stantial, petitioner intends to present the following issues in its brief
for review:

(Here list all issues to be presented in appellant’s brief to the
Supreme Court, not limited to those which are the basis of the
constitutional question claim. An issue may not be briefed if it is
not listed in the notice of appeal.)

(Dissent—N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2)) . . . was entered with a dissent by Judge
(name), based on the following issue(s):

(Here state the issue or issues that are the basis of the dissenting
opinion in the Court of Appeals. Do not state additional issues.
Any additional issues desired to be raised in the Supreme Court
when the appeal of right is based solely on a dissenting opinion
must be presented by a petition for discretionary review as to
the additional issues.)

Respectfully submitted this the __ day of

s/

Attorney for (Plaintiff)
(Defendant)-Appellant

(Address, Telephone Number, State
Bar Number, and E-mail Address)

'E FOR DISCRETI EVIEW

7A-31

To seek review of the opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals
when petitioner contends the case involves issues of public interest or
jurisprudential significance. May also be filed as a separate paper in con-
junction with a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court when the appellant
contends that such appeal lies of right due to substantial constitutional
questions under N.C.G.S. § 7A-30, but desires to have the Court consider
discretionary review should it determine that appeal does not lie of right
in the particular case.

872 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

(Caption)
"beobinieiieiinoetasceeiet

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA:

(Plaintiff)(Defendant), (Name of Party), respectfully petitions the
Supreme Court of North Carolina to certify for discretionary review the
judgment of the Court of Appeals (describing it) on the basis that (here
set out the grounds from N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 that provide the basis for the
petition). In support of this petition, (Plaintiff)(Defendant) shows the
following:

Facts

(Here state first the procedural history of the case through the trial
division and the Court of Appeals. Then set out factual background nec-
essary for understanding the basis of the petition.)

Reasons Why Certification Should Issue

(Here set out factual and legal arguments to justify certification of
the case for full review. While some substantive argument will certainly
be helpful, the focus of the argument in the petition should show how
the opinion of the Court of Appeals conflicts with prior decisions of the
Supreme Court or how the case is significant to the jurisprudence of the
State or of significant public interest. If the Court is persuaded to take
the case, the appellant may deal thoroughly with the substantive issues
in the new brief.)

Issues to Be Briefed

In the event the Court allows this petition for discretionary review,
petitioner intends to present the following issues in its brief for review:

(Here list all issues to be presented in appellant's brief to the
Supreme Court, not limited to those that are the basis of the peti-
tion. An issue may not be briefed if it is not listed in the petition.)

Respectfully submitted this the__dayof__. ss, 2.

s/.

Attorney for (Plaintiff)
(Defendant)-Appellant

(Address, Telephone Number, State
Bar Number, and E-mail Address)

Attached to the petition shall be a certificate of service upon the
opposing parties and a clear copy of the opinion of the Court of Appeals
in the case.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 873

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To seek review: (1) by the appropriate appellate court of judgments
or orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has
been lost or when no right to appeal exists; and (2) by the Supreme
Court of decisions and orders of the Court of Appeals when no right to
appeal or to petition for discretionary review exists or when such right
has been lost by failure to take timely action.

(Caption)

Jbbbbblebbebiolesisielsiatetsiotaisfalatsiak:

TO THE HONORABLE (SUPREME COURT)(COURT OF APPEALS)
OF NORTH CAROLINA:

(Plaintiff)(Defendant), (Name of Party), respectfully petitions this
Court to issue its writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure to review the (judgment)(order)(decree) of
the [Honorable (name), Judge Presiding, (Superior)(District) Court,

County][North Carolina Court of Appeals], dated (date),
(here describe the judgment, order, or decree appealed from), and in
support of this petition shows the following: ©

Facts

(Here set out factual background necessary for understanding the
basis of the petition: e.g., failure to perfect appeal by reason of circum-
stances constituting excusable neglect; non-appealability of right of an
interlocutory order, etc.) (If circumstances are that transcript could not
be procured from court reporter, statement should include estimate of
date of availability and supporting affidavit from the court reporter.)

Reasons Why Writ Should Issue

(Here set out factual and legal arguments to justify issuance of writ:
@.g., reasons why interlocutory order makes it impracticable for peti-
tioner to proceed further in trial court, meritorious basis of petitioner's
proposed issues, etc.)

Attachments

Attached to this petition for consideration by the Court are certi-
fied copies of the (judgment)(order)(decree) sought to be reviewed, and
(here list any other certified items from the trial court record and any
affidavits attached as pertinent to consideration of the petition).

Wherefore, petitioner respectfully prays that this Court issue its
writ of certiorari to the [(Superior) (District) Court, County]

874 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

[North Carolina Court of Appeals] to permit review of the (judgment)
(order)(decree) above specified, upon issues stated as follows: (here list
the issues, in the manner provided for in the petition for discretionary
review); and that the petitioner have such other relief as to the Court
may seem proper.

Respectfully submitted this the __ day of 2.

s/

Attorney for Petitioner

(Address, Telephone Number, State
Bar Number, and E-mail Address)

(Verification by petitioner or counsel)
(Certificate of service upon opposing parties)

(Attach a clear copy of the opinion, order, etc. which is the subject
of the petition and other attachments as described in the petition.)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF SUPERSEDEAS UNDER RULE 23 AND
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY STAY

Awrit of supersedeas operates to stay the execution or enforcement
of any judgment, order, or other determination of a trial court or of the
Court of Appeals in civil cases under Rule 8 or to stay imprisonment
or execution of a sentence of death in criminal cases (other portions
of criminal sentences, e.g., fines, are stayed automatically pending an
appeal of right).

Amotion for temporary stay under Rule 23(e) is appropriate to seek
an immediate stay of execution on an ex parte basis pending the Court's
decision on the petition for supersedeas or the substantive petition in
the case.

(Caption)

TO THE HONORABLE (COURT OF APPEALS)(SUPREME COURT)
OF NORTH CAROLINA:

(Plaintiff)(Defendant), (Name of Party), respectfully petitions this
Court to issue its writ of supersedeas to stay (execution)(enforce-
ment) of the (judgment)(order)(decree) of the [Honorable 5
Judge Presiding, (Superior)(District) Court, County][North.
Carolina Court of Appeals] dated , pending review by this
Court of said (judgment)(order)(decree) which (here describe the

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 875

judgment, order, or decree and its operation if not stayed); and in sup-
port of this petition shows the following:

Facts

(Here set out factual background necessary for understanding the
basis of the petition and justifying its filing under Rule 23: e.g,, trial judge
has vacated the entry upon finding security deposited under N.C.G.S.
§ inadequate; trial judge has refused to stay execution upon
motion therefor by petitioner; circumstances make it impracticable to
apply first to trial judge for stay, etc.; and showing that review of the trial
court judgment is being sought by appeal or extraordinary writ.)

Reasons Why Writ Should Issue

(Here set out factual and legal arguments for justice of issuing the
writ; e.g., that security deemed inadequate by trial judge is adequate
under the circumstances; that irreparable harm will result to petitioner
if it is required to obey decree pending its review; that petitioner has
meritorious basis for seeking review, etc.)

Attachments

Attached to this petition for consideration by the court are certified
copies of the (judgment)(order)(decree) sought to be stayed and (here
list any other certified items from the trial court record and any affida-
vits deemed necessary to consideration of the petition).

Wherefore, petitioner respectfully prays that this Court issue its writ
of supersedeas to the [(Superior)(District) Court, County)]
[North Carolina Court of Appeals] staying (execution)(enforcement)
of its (judgment)(order)(decree) above specified, pending issuance of
the mandate to this Court following its review and determination of
the (appeal)(discretionary review)(review by extraordinary writ)(now
pending)(the petition for which will be timely filed); and that the peti-
tioner have such other relief as to the Court may seem proper.

Respectfully submitted this the __ day of 2.

s/.

Attorney for Petitioner

(Address, Telephone Number, State
Bar Number, and E-mail Address)

(Verification by petitioner or counsel)
(Certificate of Service upon opposing party)

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

Rule 23(e) provides that in conjunction with a petition for superse-
deas, either as part of it or separately, the petitioner may move for a tem-
porary stay of execution or enforcement pending the Court’s ruling on
the petition for supersedeas. The following form is illustrative of such a
motion for temporary stay, either included as part of the main petition
or filed separately.

Motion for Temporary Stay

(Plaintiff)(Defendant) respectfully applies to the Court for an order
temporarily staying (execution)(enforcement) of the (judgment)(order)
(decree) that is the subject of (this)(the accompanying) petition for writ
of supersedeas, such order to be in effect until determination by this
Court whether it shall issue its writ. In support of this Application, mov-
ant shows that (here set out the legal and factual arguments for the issu-
ance of such a temporary stay order; e.g., irreparable harm practically
threatened if petitioner must obey decree of trial court during interval
before decision by Court whether to issue writ of supersedeas).

Motion for Stay of Execution
In death cases, the Supreme Court uses an order for stay of execu-

tion of death sentence in lieu of the writ of supersedeas. Counsel should
promptly apply for such a stay after the judgment of the superior court
imposing the death sentence. The stay of execution order will provide
that it remains in effect until dissolved. The following form illustrates
the contents needed in such a motion.

(Caption)

JJbbisbbisbbbbbiebisbbisbleisbokises

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA:

Now comes the defendant, (mame), who respectfully shows the
Court:

1. That on (date of judgment), The Honorable Judge
Presiding, Superior Court, County, sentenced the defendant
to death, execution being set for (date of execution).

2. That pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(1), there is an automatic
appeal of this matter to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and defen-
dant’s notice of appeal was given (describe the circumstances and date
of notice).

3. That the record on appeal in this case cannot be served and set-
tled, the matter docketed, the briefs prepared, the arguments heard, and
a decision rendered before the date scheduled for execution.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 877

WHEREFORE, the defendant prays the Court to enter an order stay-
ing the execution pending judgment and further orders of this Court.

Respectfully submitted this the __ day of. 92

s/

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
(Address, Telephone Number, State
Bar Number, and E-mail Address)

(Certificate of Service on Attorney General, District Attorney, and
Warden of Central Prison)

ROTECTING THE IDE RT: NILES; NOTICE

In cases governed by Rules 3(b), 3.1(b), and 4(e), the notice require-
ment of Rules 3.1(b) and 9(a) is as follows:

(Caption)

Sebbioielolalslolsioloioksiolafolatefolatetotoistotak:

TO THE HONORABLE (COURT OF APPEALS)(SUPREME COURT)
OF NORTH CAROLINA:

FILED PURSUANT TO RULE [8(b)(11[3.1())[4(©)]; SUBJECT
TO PUBLIC INSPECTION ONLY BY ORDER OF A COURT OF THE
APPELLATE DIVISION.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 306 N.C. 757; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 613; 345 N.C. 765;
354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 361 N.C. 732; 363 N.C. 901.

Editor’s Note.

The former “Appendix of Tables and Forms,” 287 N.C. 671, was
repealed and replaced with Appendixes A through F on 7 December
1982, 306 N.C. 757.

878 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

APPENDIX E. CONTENT OF BRIEFS

CAPTI

Briefs should use the caption as shown in Appendix B. The title of
the document should reflect the position of the filing party both at the
trial level and on the appeal, e.g., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S BRIEF,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S BRIEF, or BRIEF FOR THE STATE. A brief
filed in the Supreme Court in a case decided by the Court of Appeals
is captioned a “New Brief” and the position of the filing party before
the Supreme Court should be reflected, e.g., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE’S
NEW BRIEF (when the State has appealed from the Court of Appeals in
a criminal matter).

The cover page should contain only the caption of the case.
Succeeding pages should present the following items, in order.

IND) FT! 134

Each brief should contain a topical index beginning at the top margin
of the first page following the cover, in substantially the following form:

INDEX
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
ISSUES PRESENTED.....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
ARGUMENT:

[STANDARD OF REVIEW [May be placed at either the begin-
ning of the discussion of each issue or under a separate
heading placed before the beginning of the discussion of
all issues 5]

I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS
INCULPATORY STATEMENT BECAUSE THAT STATEMENT
WAS THE PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL DETENTION .............66

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IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 879

FRUITS OF A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HIS APARTMENT
BECAUSE THE CONSENT GIVEN WAS THE PRODUCT OF
POLICE COERCION 18

CONCLUSION
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......
APPENDIX:

VOIR DIRE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF [NAME] .........00.005 App. 1-7
VOIR DIRE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF [NAME]...............App. 8-11

VOIR DIRE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
OFFICER [NAME] ...

VOIR DIRE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
OFFICER [NAME] ...

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‘ABLE ES AND (6)

This table should begin at the top margin of the page following the
index. Page references should be made to each citation of authority, as
shown in the example below.

Ty ES AND TES
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248,

60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979) ...
State v. Perry, 298 N.C. 502, 259 S.E.2d 496 (1979) ....
State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 259 S.E.2d 843 (1979)
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870,

64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)
4" Amendment, U.S. Constitution .
14 Amendment, U.S. Constitution.
N.C.G.S. § 154-221

N.C.G.S. § 154-222
N.C.G.S. § 15A-223 .....

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ISSUES PRESENTED

The inside caption is on page 1 of the brief, followed by the Issues
Presented. The phrasing of the issues presented need not be identical
to that set forth in the proposed issues on appeal in the record. The

880 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

appellee’s brief need not restate the issues unless the appellee desires to
present additional issues to the Court.

[SSUES PRESENTED

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS
INCULPATORY STATEMENT BECAUSE THAT STATEMENT
WAS THE PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL DETENTION?

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

If the Issues Presented carry beyond page 1, the Statement of
the Case should follow them, separated by the heading. If the Issues
Presented do not carry over, the Statement of the Case should begin at
the top of page 2 of the brief.

Set forth a concise chronology of the course of the proceedings
in the trial court and the route of appeal, including pertinent dates.
For example:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The defendant, [name], was convicted of first-degree rape at the
[date], Criminal Session of the Superior Court, County, the
Honorable [name] presiding, and received sentence for the
________ felony. The defendant gave written notice of appeal in open
court to the Supreme Court of North Carolina at the time of the entry of
judgment on [date]. The transcript was ordered on [date] and was deliv-
ered to the parties on [date].

A motion to extend the time for serving and filing the record on
appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court on [date]. The record was
filed and docketed in the Supreme Court on [date].

STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW

Set forth the statutory basis for permitting appellate review. For
example, in an appeal from a final judgment to the Court of Appeals, the
appellant might state that the ground for appellate review is a final judg-
ment of the superior court under N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b). If the appeal is
based on N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the appellant must also state that there has
been a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties and that there has been a certification by the trial court that
there is no just reason for delay. If the appeal is from an interlocutory

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 881

order or determination based on a substantial right, the appellant must.
present, in addition to the statutory authorization, facts and argument
showing the substantial right that will be lost, prejudiced, or less than
adequately protected absent immediate appellate review.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts constitute the basis of the dispute or criminal charges
and the procedural mechanics of the case if they are significant to the
issues presented. The facts should be stated objectively and concisely
and should be limited to those that are relevant to the issue or issues
presented.

Do not include verbatim portions of the record or other matters of an
evidentiary nature in the statement of the facts. Summaries and record
or transcript citations should be used instead. No appendix should be
compiled simply to support the statement of the facts.

The appellee's brief need contain no statement of the case or facts
if there is no dispute. The appellee may state additional facts where
deemed necessary, or, if there is a dispute over the facts, may restate the
facts as they appear from the appellee’s viewpoint.

ARGUMENT

Each issue will be set forth in uppercase typeface as the party's con-
tention, e.g.:

I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS
INCULPATORY STATEMENT BECAUSE THAT STATEMENT
WAS THE PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL DETENTION.

The standard of review for each issue presented shall be set out in
accordance with Rule 28(b)(6).

Parties should feel free to summarize, quote from, or cite to the
record or transcript during the presentation of argument. If the tran-
script option is selected under Rule 9(c), the appendix to the brief may
be needed, as described in Rule 28 and below.

When statutory or regulatory materials are cited, the relevant por-
tions should be quoted in the body of the argument or placed in the
appendix to the brief, as required by Rule 28(d)(1)c.

882 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

CONCLUSION

State briefly and clearly the specific objective or relief sought
in the appeal. It is not necessary to restate the party's contentions,
since they are presented both in the index and as headings to the indi-
vidual arguments.

SIGNATURE AND CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Following the conclusion, the brief must be dated and signed, with
the attorney’s typed or printed name, mailing address, telephone num-
ber, State Bar number, and e-mail address, all indented to the center of
the page.

The Certificate of Service is then shown with a centered, uppercase
heading. The certificate itself, describing the manner of service upon
the opposing party with the complete mailing address of the party or
attorney served, is followed by the date and the signature of the person
certifying the service.

APPENDIX TO TRANSCRIPT OPTION

Rules 9(c) and 28 require additional steps to be taken in the brief to
point the Court to appropriate excerpts from the transcript considered
essential to the understanding of the arguments presented.

Counsel are encouraged to cite, narrate, and quote freely within the
body of the brief. However, if because of length a verbatim quotation is
not included in the body of the brief, that portion of the transcript and
others like it shall be compiled into an appendix to the brief to be placed
at the end of the brief, following all signatures and certificates. Counsel
should not attach the entire transcript as an appendix to support issues
involving a directed verdict, sufficiency of the evidence, or the like.

The appendix should be prepared to be clear and readable, dis-
tinctly showing the transcript page or pages from which each passage
is drawn. Counsel may reproduce transcript pages themselves, clearly
indicating those portions to which attention is directed. The appen-
dix should include a table of contents, showing the items contained in
the appendix and the pages in the appendix where those items appear.
The appendix shall be paginated separately from the text of the brief.
For example:

CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

VOIR DIRE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF [NAME]
VOIR DIRE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF [NAME]..

. App. 1
App. 9

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 883

VOIR DIRE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
OFFICER [NAME] .. -

VOIR DIRE CROSS EXAMINATION OF |
OFFICER [NAME] ..

aie oe a ae

The appendix will be printed as submitted with the brief to which it
is appended. Therefore, clarity of image is extremely important.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 306 N.C. 757; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 618; 354 N.C. 598;
354 N.C. 609; 356 N.C. 701; 359 N.C. 883; 363 N.C. 901.

Editor’s Note.

The former “Appendix of Tables and Forms,” 287 N.C. 671, was
repealed and replaced with Appendixes A through F on 7 December
1982, 306 N.C. 757.

884 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE TOC

APPENDIX F. FEES AND COSTS

Fees and costs are provided by order of the Supreme Court and
apply to proceedings in either appellate court. There is no fee for filing
a motion in a cause; other fees are as follows and should be submitted
with the document to which they pertain, made payable to the clerk of
the appropriate appellate court:

Notice of Appeal, Petition for Discretionary Review, Petition
for Writ of Certiorari or other extraordinary writ, Petition for Writ of
Supersedeas—docketing fee of $10.00 for each document, i.e., docket-
ing fees for a notice of appeal and petition for discretionary review filed
jointly would be $20.00.

Petitions to rehear require a docketing fee of $20.00. (Petitions to
rehear are only entertained in civil cases.)

An appeal bond or cash deposit of $250.00 is required in civil cases
per Rules 6 and 17. The bond should be filed contemporaneously with
the record in the Court of Appeals and with the notice of appeal in the
Supreme Court. The bond will not be required in cases brought by peti-
tion for discretionary review or certiorari unless and until the court
allows the petition.

Costs for printing documents are $1.75 per printed page. The appen-
dix to a brief under the transcript option of Rules 9(c) and 28(b) and
(c) will be reproduced as is, but billed at the rate of the printing of the
brief. Both appellate courts will bill the parties for the costs of printing
their documents.

Court costs on appeal total $9.00, plus the cost of copies of the opin-
ion to each party filing a brief, and are imposed when a notice of appeal
is withdrawn or dismissed, or when the mandate is issued following the
opinion in a case.

Photocopying charges are $.20 per page. The facsimile transmission
fee for documents sent from the clerk’s office, which is in addition to
standard photocopying charges, is $5.00 for the first twenty-five pages
and §$.20 for each page thereafter.

The fee for a certified copy of an appellate court decision, in addi-
tion to photocopying charges, is $10.00.

History Note.

287 N.C. 671; 805 N.C. 757; 314 N.C. 683; 324 N.C. 585; 324 N.C. 613;
327 N.C. 671; 343 N.C. 769; 354 N.C. 598; 354 N.C. 609; 363 N.C. 901.

TOC RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 885

Editor’s Note.

The former “Appendix of Tables and Forms,” 287 N.C. 671, was
repealed and replaced with Appendixes A through F on 7 December
1982, 306 N.C. 757.

Investiture of
Michael Rivers Morgan

Associate Justice
Supreme Court of North Carolina

Law and Justice Building
Raleigh, North Carolina

January 4, 2017
2:00 p.m.

887

888 © INVESTITURE CEREMONY OF JUSTICE MORGAN

Michael Rivers Morgan was born in Cherry Point, North Carolina
to Barbara and the late Leander R. Morgan and is the eldest of five chil-
dren. The family resided in Washington, DC until young Mike was the
age of six, when the family relocated to his mother’s hometown of New
Bern, North Carolina. As an eight-year-old fifth grader in 1964, Mike was
the first black student to attend all-white Trent Park Elementary School,
becoming one of five black students that year to integrate the New
Bern public school system city-wide. In the eleventh grade, he became
the first black drum major of the marching band of New Bern Senior
High School.

Upon graduating from the New Ber public school system at the
age of sixteen, Mike earned his Bachelor of Arts Degree in both History
and Sociology from Duke University. He went on to obtain his Juris
Doctor Degree with honors from North Carolina Central University
School of Law, where he served as the student body president during
his final year of law school.

Justice Morgan served on the legal staff of the North Carolina
Department of Justice for ten years following law school, first as
a research assistant, then as an Associate Attorney General, and
Jater as an Assistant Attorney General. In 1989, he was appointed
as an Administrative Law Judge with the North Carolina Office of
Administrative Hearings. While in this capacity, he administered the
oath of office to his father, the first and only African-American to serve
as mayor of the City of New Bern. This historic event was featured
nationally in an article titled “Swearing in His Dad” in the February 19,
1990 issue of Jet Magazine. In 1994, Justice Morgan was appointed as
a Wake County District Court Judge by Governor James B. Hunt, Jr.,
and he was subsequently elected to the judgeship by the voters of Wake
County in 1996 and again in 2000. He was elected to the Superior Court
bench in 2004 for an eight-year term and was re-elected to the post in
2012. In his first statewide quest for elective office, Justice Morgan was
elected in November 2016 to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina.

Justice Morgan is married to the former Audrey Phillips of Raleigh.
Between them, they have an adult daughter, an adult son, a daughter-
in-law, and five grandchildren. Justice Morgan and his wife are active
members of Rush Metropolitan AME Zion Church in Raleigh, where he
serves as Chair of the Steward Board, a member of the Male Chorus,
and in several other capacities.

INVESTITURE CEREMONY OF JUSTICE MORGAN 889

PROGRAM
Sounding of the Gavel - Bryan Boyd
Clerk
Supreme Court of North Carolina
Invocation Reverend Dr. Maurice A. Harden
Pastor

Rush Metropolitan AME Zion Church
Raleigh, North Carolina

Welcoming Remarks Mark D. Martin
Chief Justice

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Recognition of Attorney General. Chief Justice Mark D. Martin
Presentation of Commission Joshua H. Stein
Attorney General

State of North Carolina

Administration of Oath Chief Justice Mark D. Martin
Remarks Michael Rivers Morgan
Associate Justice

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Benediction Reverend Dr. Dumas A. Harshaw, Jr.
Pastor

First Baptist Church

Raleigh, North Carolina

Adjournment, Bryan Boyd

Reception following ceremony at
The 214 East Martin in City Market, Raleigh, N.C.

890 INVESTITURE CEREMONY OF JUSTICE MORGAN

REMARKS BY JUSTICE MORGAN

Chief. Justice Martin, thank you, and I will make them from a stand-
ing position, if lmay. Thank you.

Thanks to all of you for being here today: those of you that are pres-
ent in this courtroom, those of you that are in the overflow rooms, and
those of you that are watching by way of modern technology. I thank all
of you for being present. Those of you that are in the overflow rooms:
all of you are certainly very important—it’s just a matter of limited
space here in the courtroom—but indeed I feel the presence of all of
you at this time. I also want to thank those that are associated with the
Supreme Court of North Carolina—my colleagues on this great bench,
along with the executive assistants and the research assistants—that
have all worked mightily to put all of this together to make sure that it
worked, hopefully seamlessly, in terms of having this auspicious occa-
sion to take place. Iam honored and humbled to be here, and I thank all
of those that are associated with the Court—the justices, the executive
assistants, the research assistants, the staff,.security, and all that are
involved with the Administrative Office of the Courts—for welcoming
me and my staff, my executive assistant and my law clerks as we join
this great body.

Ithank my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, from Whom all of my bless-
ings flow, and I am certainly especially appreciative of this blessing that
He is allowing me to experience. I thank my lovely wife, Audrey, for her
love and support. You’re the wind beneath my wings, and I thank you
so incredibly much. To my mother, Barbara Morgan, I thank you and
my late father, Leander Morgan, for giving me life and also instilling in
me the values that have helped me to be what I know you and Daddy
wanted me to be, and although he’s not here, Ma, I know that he is. And
to my precious daughter, Marissa, you are the apple of my eye. I do all
that I can to make you proud of your dad, and [ hope this is just another
chapter in that book today. I also thank my siblings Robbie, Lisa, Gary
and Marc for being what they've always been to me as we've grown up,
and I appreciate you in childhood and I appreciate you in adulthood.
To my mother-in-law, Rosa Rich, my father-in-law, Thomas Rich—not
being able to be here at the last minute—I thank you for welcoming me
into the family and allowing me to have the privilege of marrying your
daughter. I’m your son-in-law, Ms. Rich, but I know I can just remove
the “in-law,” because you treat me like ason and I thank you so much. I
thank also my sisters-in-law who again are like sisters, and I thank them
so much for their support of me as well. And to those nieces and that

INVESTITURE CEREMONY OF JUSTICE MORGAN 891

nephew of mine, I thank all of them for their love and for gently letting
Uncle Mike know that he’s not nearly as cool as he thinks he is and
always making sure that I stay well-grounded in terms of how I feel that
Iam. I also thank my cousins, my aunts, my uncles—many of whom
have traveled great distances to be here—and I am so thankful for their
love and support as well.

I thank all of those who have meant something to me, whether it
was in asustained relationship or whether it was just a fleeting moment,.
because indeed everyone has poured into me something that has
allowed me to be at this place at this particular juncture in my life, all
the way from that classmate of mine in the sixth grade that punched me
in the stomach for no reason because of how he saw me, all the way to
that 93-year-old woman who I had the pleasure to meet in Greensboro
this past year who told me that she needed me to get here because of
how she saw me.

I thank as well the myriad of officials who have taken time from
their busy schedules in order to be here today to share this moment
with my family and me. Governor, I thank you so much for your leader-
ship and taking time today out of your valuable schedule to be here to
enjoy this with me. Likewise, I thank the Attorney General for being
here as well and presenting the Commission and verifying that indeed I
can be here. And I thank you so much as well for your leadership.

I thank also, lest I stray too far from what I'm hoping I am able
to convey, I want to also thank those other program participants, my
pastor, Reverend Doctor Maurice Harden, for his presence today, and
those as well that belong to my church, Rush Metropolitan AME Zion
Church, here in Raleigh. I appreciate them so much in terms of their
support of me. I also appreciate those that have come from New Bern,
my hometown, who are present in one of the rooms. I thank them as
well and certainly thank those who attend St. Peter’s AME Zion Church
in New Bern, the church of my youth. I also thank those members of
Omega Psi Phi Fraternity, Incorporated and Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity,
Incorporated, organizations to which I am proud to be a member of
each. I also, in advance, thank Reverend Doctor Dumas Harshaw of
First Baptist Church, who will render the benediction, but I promise I'll
be done—finished talking—by the time he comes forward.

Also, as I look out and I see all of these leaders, I am proud to join
all of you on the statewide level as one of those who represents our
branches of government. I am proud to associate myself and to be asso-

892 INVESTITURE CEREMONY OF JUSTICE MORGAN

ciated with all of you. Indeed, North Carolina is a great state, and we're
all blessed to be a part of it. I had an opportunity to travel a great deal
over the course of the past year and during the course of that time, I
had a chance, as I was pursuing this quest to be a member of the North
Carolina Supreme Court, I had a chance to be reminded of the greatness -
of this great institution which I’m now privileged to join. I remember
being in Halifax County, holding court for Superior Court and being in
the judge’s chambers and seeing a photograph of a young justice named
Joseph Branch who was seated in the very seat that I take now. And I
hearken back to the time when I first stepped foot in the Supreme Court
and argued a case right there where I'll now be hearing lawyers pres-
ent their cases and that young Joseph Branch, by the time I got to that
podium, was then Chief Justice Branch.

Iremembered, as I passed along during the course of the past year,
attending those meetings as amember of the Susie Sharp Inn of Court—a
legal society of which I was privileged to be its president six years ago—
and as I thought about Susie Sharp being a Chief Justice here at this
court, I remembered, hearkening back to being a young lawyer, and see-
ing her and Justice Bobbitt as they would walk along Fayetteville Street.
as I was coming and going to and from my office. I remember going
to Wilson County where I held court and, after court was over, I went
around the courtroom and saw a portrait of Louis Meyer. And as I saw
that portrait and thought about how I appeared before him in this court-
room, I looked at the plate beneath his portrait that said, “Louis Meyer,
Supreme Court Justice, Superior Court Judge,” and thought about the
fact that I had that same pathway, going from Superior Court Judge now
successfully, to Supreme Court Justice. Fortuitously, Ijust happened to,
along the way, run into Justice Willis Whichard, just running an every-
day errand, but had a chance to see him along the way of the past year.
Also, on several occasions, saw Chief Justice Parker at a local eating
establishment that we both frequent, and as I thought about these folks
that I was seeing, it reminded me of the greatness of the justices that
have served on this august bench.

Added to that, while I have that kinship now with them, there’s also
that kinship that I’m proud to say that I share with Chief Justice Henry
Frye, Justice G.K. Butterfield, Justice James Wynn, Justice Patricia
Timmons-Goodson, and my colleague on the bench currently, Justice
Cheri Beasley, because as they are the only African-Americans that have
served before me on this bench, I am proud to join such an esteemed
group as African-Americans who serve on this court. And while ’'m
honored to be able to have my name uttered in the same breath with

INVESTITURE CEREMONY OF JUSTICE MORGAN 893

them, by the same token, I have much I need to do before I can rise to
the lofty standards that they have set for this bench.

And as I think overall about all those names that I have mentioned,
the men and the women from different geographic areas and being of
different races and different genders, it just reminds me of the strength
of diversity that this bench is able to enjoy and has enjoyed for the many
decades that it has been in existence. I am happy and proud and hum-
bled to be able to add to that diversity, that richness, that fullness that
this court now even more reflects, because North Carolina indeed is
stronger and greater and better because of its diversity.

During the course of the past year, I’ve had a chance to travel from
Waynesville to Wilmington, from Newland to New Bern, and in the
course of doing that I've found that North Carolinians want out of their
court system what anyone would want, no matter where they live in
this state. Whether it’s Charlotte or whether it’s Shallotte, they want
justice. Whether it is from the Crystal Coast to the Outer Banks to the
Sandhills to the Triad or the Triangle, they want fairness. Whether it is
the Coastal Plains, the Piedmont or the Mountains, they want equality.
And whether it is Salisbury or Gumberry or all those little towns remi-
niscent of Mayberry, what they want is consistency. Everybody that I
met wants the same thing, and that is to make sure that the Supreme
Court and all of the courts of North Carolina are fair, honest, respectful
and respectable in terms of making sure that justice, fairness and equal-
ity reign supreme from this high court. That was instilled and imbued
in me through all of my travels as I sought to be able to occupy a seat.
on this high court.

And I'm privileged to say that I'm here, I'm honored to be here, and
I know I’m ready to be here. I know I’m ready to be here because I’ve
served with some of the greatest state administrative law judges that
any state can produce. I’ve served with some of the greatest District
Court judges that any state can produce. I have served with the great-
est Superior Court judges that any state can produce. I’ve worked with
Court of Appeals judges that are as good and better than any state can
produce. I’ve been educated by lawyers who have argued their cases
fervently and competently and educated me in the law, such that I know
that they’re among the best ever and I know that they’ve equipped me
as well.

And finally, as I join this esteemed group of jurists, with whom I am
privileged and honored to serve, I know that they do a tremendous job,

894 INVESTITURE CEREMONY OF JUSTICE MORGAN

not merely from deciding cases on this bench, but also those that have
precedential value to lead the other courts to understand and allow the
people to understand what the law is and what the law represents in our
great state. What an honor it is to serve! I’ve enjoyed judicial service
for the last 27 years and I am privileged to be able to now, from this seat,
be broader, deeper, greater and better in service to the citizens of North
Carolina in entrusting this place to me on the North Carolina Supreme
Court. It’s a wonderful situation, and I’m thankful for it.

In closing, God bless America, God bless North Carolina, God bless
this great Supreme Court, and God bless all of you for joining me in this
great occasion today, as I pledge to you and to all that I will make this,
to the best of my ability, so help me God, a great day for justice in the
State of North Carolina.

God bless you, and thank you.

CLIENT SECURITY FUND 895

IN RE CLIENT SECURITY FUND OF )
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, )

ORDER

This matter came on to be considered before the Supreme Court
of North Carolina in conference duly assembled on the 18th day of
November 2016 upon request of the North Carolina State Bar, and it
appearing from information provided by the State Bar that the balance
of the Client Security Fund has fallen below the’ minimum balance of
$1,000,000 prescribed by the Court when the Fund was established, and
that to restore the required minimum balance and accomplish the pur-
pose of the Fund during 2017, it will be necessary to increase the amount
of the annual assessment previously imposed by the Court in its continu-
ing order of 2007 from Twenty-five ($25) to Fifty Dollars ($50);

Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that the continuing order of
2007 be superseded and that for the purposes of 2017, each active mem-
ber of the North Carolina State Bar be assessed the sum of Fifty Dollars
($50) in support of the Client Security Fund, it being understood that for
the purposes of 2018 and all succeeding years, the amount of the assess-
ment shall again be Twenty-five Dollars ($25), unless and until the Court
enters another superseding order.

"This the 18th day of November 2016.

s/Ervin, J.
JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT

WITNESS my hand and the Seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 21st day of November 2016.

s/J. Bryan Boyd
J. Bryan Boyd
Clerk of the Supreme Court

896 JUDICIAL STANDARDS

JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION: 2016-01
November 18, 2016

QUESTIONS:

The Judicial Standards Commission issues this Formal Advisory Opinion
with respect to two questions relating to ethical limits on the conduct of
district court judges presiding over certain domestic matters involving
self-represented litigants:

1) _Isit ethically permissible for a judge to question a wit-
ness regarding the statutory factors in an uncontested
divorce involving only pro se parties?

2) Isit ethically permissible for a judge to question a wit-
ness in a child custody determination involving only
‘pro se parties if necessary to allow the judge to con-
sider the relevant statutory factors to determine the
best interests of the child?

CONCLUSION:

These questions relate to the limits on a trial judge’s discretion to
question witnesses during hearings to grant an uncontested divorce
or make a child custody determination in cases involving only self-
represented (pro se) litigants. This opinion does not address what addi-
tional ethical duties may apply in cases where only one party is pro-
ceeding pro se and the other is represented. Rule 614(b) of the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence allows judges to engage in such questioning,
and provides that the “court may interrogate witnesses, whether called
by itself or by a party.” The Commission advises that a judge may ethi-
cally question witnesses under Rule 614(b) in both uncontested divorce
cases and custody determinations involving only pro se parties, so long
as it is done so (1) in order to render a full and fair decision based on
adequate, reliable and credible evidence (Canon 3A(1) and (4)); (2) the
questions and method of questioning are neutral and do not reasonably
call into question the integrity or impartiality of the judge (Canon 2A and
Canon 3); and (3) in asking the questions, the judge is “patient, dignified
and courteous” (Canon 3A(8)). In addition, and as a general matter, use
of Rule 614(b) may be beneficial to discharge the judge’s other ethical
duties to maintain order and decorum in the courtroom (Canon 3A(2))
and to dispose promptly of the business of the court (Canon 3A(5)).

JUDICIAL STANDARDS 897

DISCUSSION:

Under North Carolina law, the trial judge must at times make findings
of fact supported by the evidence in child custody determinations and
divorce cases. N.C.G.S. Section 50-13.2(a) identifies the relevant fac-
tors in custody awards and provides that “[a]n order for custody must
include written findings of fact that reflect the consideration of each of
these factors and that support the determination of what is in the best
interest of the child.” A trial judge also must make certain factual find-
ings in divorce cases under N.C.G.S. Section 50-6 (divorce after separa-
tion for one year) and N.C.G.S. Section 50-10 (requiring certain findings
by the trial judge). In divorce and custody determinations involving only
‘pro se parties, there is the risk that the evidence presented can either
be confusing or fail to address each required statutory factor that must
be considered by the trial judge. Under these circumstances, therefore, a
judge may properly use the Rule 614(b) authority to fulfill his or her obli-
gations under Canon 3A(1), which requires a judge to be faithful to the
law, and Canon 3A(4), which requires the judge to accord each litigant a
full opportunity to be heard according to law.

Despite the benefits of exercising Rule 614(b) authority to fulfill the
judge’s duties under Canon 3A in these circumstances, there are sev-
eral important limitations on questioning of witnesses in uncontested
divorce cases and child custody cases involving only pro se parties.
First, the judge in an effort to determine necessary facts should not offer
legal assistance or advocacy on behalf of any self-represented party
in violation of Canon 5F, which prohibits judges from practicing law.
Second, the judge should not ask the questions in a manner that creates
the appearance of bias in favor of a particular party in violation of Canon
2A and Canon 3, which both require the judge to conduct himself or her-
self in a manner that promotes impartiality in judicial decision-making.
When judges are engaged in questioning of witnesses in these circum-
stances, therefore, judges must be vigilant in ensuring that the questions
are neutral and fair and do not indicate a desire to provide legal assis-
tance to or otherwise benefit a particular party. An explanation to the
self-represented litigants as to why the judge must ask such questions is
also permissible.

References:

North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1, Canon 2A, Canon
3A(1)-(5), Canon 5F

North Carolina Rule of Evidence 614(b)

N.C.G.S. Section 50-6

N.C.G.S. Section 50-10

N.C.G.S. Section 50-13.2(a)

898 JUDICIAL STANDARDS

JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION: 2017-01
May 16, 2017

QUESTION:

Is a sitting judge required to resign the judge’s judicial office before
becoming a candidate in a public primary or general election for the
office of district attorney?

CONCLUSION:

Yes. Canon 7B(5) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct pro-
vides that a judge must “resign the judge's judicial office prior to becom-
ing a candidate either in a party primary or in a general election for
non-judicial office.” As the office of district attorney is a non-judicial
office, resignation is required before becoming a candidate in a public
primary or general election for such office.

DISCUSSION:

Canon 7B(5) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that a judge must “resign the judge’s judicial office prior to becoming
a candidate either in a party primary or in a general election for non-
judicial office.” This restriction serves the important purpose of further-
ing the fundamental values of impartiality, independence and integrity
that underlie the Code of Judicial Conduct in general. While a judge’s
impartiality and independence would not be threatened by a campaign
for another judicial office that requires the same impartiality and inde-
pendence, the same cannot be said for running for an elected office that
in fact depends on partiality. The Commission finds that it would be par-
ticularly concerning if a sitting judge who presides over criminal cases
was simultaneously campaigning for district attorney. Campaigning for
prosecutorial office could raise reasonable questions as to the judge’s
impartiality in cases he or she must adjudicate in accordance with the
Code of Judicial Conduct. See, e.g., Canon 2B (a judge “should conduct,
himself/herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”); Canon 3 (“A judge
should perform the duties of the judge’s office impartially and dili-
gently”); Canon 3A(1) (“A judge should be unswayed by partisan inter-
ests, public clamor, or fear of criticism”); Canon 3C(1) (“a judge should
disqualify himself/herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartial-
ity may reasonably be questioned.”).

JUDICIAL STANDARDS 899

With respect to Canon 7B(5) in particular, the Commission in Formal
Advisory Opinion No. 2009-05 advised that the office of clerk of superior
court is a judicial office of the General Court of Justice as set forth in
N.C. Const. Article IV, Section 9 and N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 7A, Article
12. In addition, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-40 provides that the “clerk of supe-
rior court in the exercise of the judicial power conferred upon him
... is a judicial officer of the Superior Court Division... .” As such,
resignation of judicial office is not required to seek election as clerk of
court. By contrast, the District Attorney exercises no judicial power and
instead prosecutes, in the name of the State of North Carolina, “all crimi-
nal actions and infractions requiring prosecution in the superior and dis-
trict courts of his prosecutorial district” and performs such other duties
as authorized pursuant to N.C. Gen Stat. § 7A-61. While the District
Attorney does possess some calendaring authority, see e.g. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7A-49.4, and is administratively assigned to the North Carolina
Administrative Office of the Courts for certain purposes, these facts do
not transform the District Attorney as an officer of the court into a judi-
cial officer who exercises judicial power in the State of North Carolina.
The District Attorney thus cannot be considered a judicial officer for
purposes of Canon 7B(5).

References:

Canons 2B, 8, 3A, 83C and 7B(5) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct

Formal Advisory Opinion No. 2009-05

N.C. Const. Art. IV, Section 9

N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 7A, Art. 12

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-40

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-49.4

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-61

900 ORGANIZATION OF STATE BAR

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES CONCERNING
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE BAR

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the-
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly

adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly

meeting on July 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning its
organization, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 1A, Section .0700, be
amended as follows (additions are underlined, deletions are interlined):

27N.C.A.C. 1A, Section .0700, Standing Committees of the Council

(a) Standing Committees. Promptly after his or her election, the presi-
dent shall appoint members to the standing committees identified below
to serve for one year beginning January 1 of the year succeeding his
or her election. Members of the committees need not be councilors,
except to the extent expressly required by these rules, and may include
non-lawyers. Unless otherwise directed by resolution of the council, all
members of a standing committee, whether councilors or non-council-
ors, shall be entitled to vote as members of the standing committee or
any subcommittee or panel thereof.

(1) Executive Committee. ...

8)_ Technology and Social Media Committee. It shall be the duty of this
committee to stay abreast_of technological developments that might
enable the North Carolina State Bar to better serve and communicate
with its members and the public, and to develop processes, procedures
and policies for the deployment and use of social media and other means
of disseminating official information.

(b) Boards...
NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on July 22, 2016.

ORGANIZATION OF STATE BAR 901

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this, the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, II
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

vin,
For the Cowt

902 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING DISCIPLINE
AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a specially
called meeting on July 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concern-
ing discipline and disability of attorneys, as particularly set forth in 27
N.C.A.C. 1B, Section .0100, be amended as follows (additions are under-
lined, deletions are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1B, Section .0100, Discipline and Disability of
Attorneys

.0114 FormalHearing Proceedings Before the Disciplinary Hearing
Commission: General Rules Applicable to All Proceedings
(a) Applicable Procedure Complaint-and Service - Except where spe-
ific proc lures are proy ided by les. anc eedins
fore a hi anel will conform. ear! icab! e
requi em of the North Carolina Rules of Civi i
of noi civil ¢: in the superi ecific edure set

out in these rules controls, and where specific procedures are set out

in these rules, the Rules of Civil Procedure will be supplemental only.

(b)€e} Continuances - The chai: n of ing panel may continu
an hearing for es) Ta. has commenced, con-

tinuances will oul be arantad pursuan it to Ru le 0116 b). Complaints

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 903

(©) Appearance By or For the Defendant Besignation-of-Hearing
Gommittee-and Date-of Hearing - The defendant may appear pro se or
may be represented by counsel. The defendant may not act pro se if
he or she i is represented by counsel . Within 20-days of the receipt of

clerk, with proof of delivery of a copy to the counsel, an address
at_whi notice or other writ ication required to
served upon the defendant may be sent, if such address differs from
the address on record with the State Bar’s membership department.

2) Notice of Aj e - When a defendant i: by an
attorney in a proceeding, the attorney will file with the clerk a written
notice of such appearance which will state his or her name, address
and telephone number, the name and address of the defendant on
whose behalf he or she appears, and the caption and docket number
of the proceeding. Any additional notice or other written communi-
cation requi e served on or furni: dant_duri
the earing will be sent ’s attorney of
record in lieu of transmission to the defendant.

(d)€e} Filin; ing’ hime imits Answer - Pleadings or other documents in for-
mal proce r permitted to be fil les must
be received for filing by the clerk of the commission within the time
limits, if any, for such filing. The date of the receipt by the clerk, and not

904 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

the date of deposit i e mail, i: rminative. --Within-20-days-after

{xe Fou of Papers Bs ers Default - All papers presented to the commission

r (8 1/2 inches) with the excep-
aa ibits. te re rk will require tox er

does ne conform to this size. Faltore to file anranswer admitting deny-

(D€s} Subpoenas Discovery - The hearing panel will have the power to
ibpoena wit1 d_comy Om]
oduction o: apers, med nec
material ‘in; u in_civi under the

‘olina ivil 1 will be issued i
i it irpers: the chairperson may
desi the secreti e North Carolina State Bar to issue such
. The plaintiff and the defend: we the vi invoke the
ywers of the ith respect Iso} wr wit

d for tion. ers, y writings and docu-

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 905

@ey Admissibility of Evidence Settlement - of Evidence Tnany hearing. admissibil.

of evidence will be ed by in

e superior court of Noth lina at e i ing. ir

erson of th he: ing panel will rul 1 issibility of evi nce,
subject to the right of any smber ane] tion th

Ifa member of the panel chal lenges aru ling re’ lating to admissibility of

evince th esti mn will deci ami vote of arin:

Defendant as Witness — The ndant_ will, yt as.
OVI LW, et compellable to give evidence for

either party.

906 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

907

908 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 909

910 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

911

912 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

115 Proceedings Before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission:
Pleadings and Prehearing Procedure

‘a) Complaint and. ice - The counsel will file the cor i ith th
clerk of the commission. The counsel will cause a summons and a copy
of i be served upon th will inform the
cler] f service. The clei i iver a copy of the com-

aint. irperson of the commissio! will inform the chair-

e! that service on the was effected. Service
of complaints and summonses and other documents or papers will be
accomplished as set forth in the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Notice Pleading - Complaints in discij actions will alle;
charges with sufficient precision to clearly apprise the defendant of the

col i ject of the complaint

c) Answer - within. 20 days after the service of the complaint, unless
the cl] erson of the commissi f the

ing panel upon good 6 wus fendant will file an answer
to the complaint with the clerk of the commission and will serve a copy
on the counsel.

(d) Designation of Hearing Panel - Within 20 days after service of the
complaint upon the defendant, the chairperson of the commission will
designate a hearin: e mg the commission members. Th
chairperson will notify the counsel and the defendant of the composi-
tion of the hearing panel.

Se i mference - The chairperson of i 1 _will

ling conference with the i ithin 2 the

filing of the answer by the defendant unless another time is set by the

chairperson of the commission. i m_of the hearing panel
will notify the cot fendant of the date, time, and vi

e.g., in pel video conference) of the scheduli a

enc conference, the parties will di ick

i its, motions, any settl liscovery.

he chairperson of the hearing panel will set dates for the completion of

discovery and depositions, for the filing of motions, for the pre-hearing

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 913

conference, for the filing of the stipulation i ar
ence, and for the hearing, and may order . The
hearing date shall not be less than 60 days from the final date for dis-
covery and depositions unless otherwise consented to by the parties.
e chairperson of the hearing panel may im) i in:
who willfully fails to participate in faith in.

conference or willfully fails to comply with a scheduling order issued
pursuant to this section. The sanctions which may be imposed include
1t limited to those enumerated in Rule 37 if the NC Ri
dure.

(£) Failure to File an Answer - Failure to file an answer admitting or

i i the complaint or asserting the grounds for
fail e specified by this rule will be ground:
for entry of the defendant's default. If the defendant fails to file an
answer to the complaint, the allegations contained in the complaint will
be deemed admitted.

(g) Default

1) The clerk will enter th: i wi t_ of
default is made to appear by motion of the counsel or otherwise.

(2) The counsel may thereupon apply to the hearing panel for
default orders as follows:

(A) For an order making findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Upon such motion, the hearing panel shall enter an order
making findings of fact and conclusions of law as established

shall then set a date for: hearing at which: the sole i issue shal T be
the discipline to be imposed.

For an order of discipline. Upon such motion the hearin;

anel shall enter an order making findi: of fe lu-
sions of law as established by the facts deemed admitted by
anel shail ent der imposi iscipline
be appropriate. The hearing panel may, in its discretion,

ahearing date and hear such additional evidence as it deems
necessary to determine appropriate discipline prior to enter-
ing the order of discipline.
(8) For good cause shown, the hearing panel may set aside’ the
entry of default.

914 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

‘4) After an order imposi i n_enteré the
hearing panel upon the defendant's default, the hearing panel may
set_aside the order in accordance with Rule 60(b) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

h) Discovery - Discovery will be available to the parties in accordance
with the N arolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Any discov rE
taken must be completed by the date set in the scheduling order unless
the ti iscovery is nded by the chairperson of the heari

anel for shown. mn _a showing of good cause, the chair
person of the hearing panel may reschedule the hearing to accommo-
date completion of reasonable discovery.

(i) Settlement - The parties may meet by mutual consent prior to the

hearing to dis the possibility of settlement of the case or the sti)
tion of issues, facts, or matters of law. roposed settleme:
the case will be subject to the approval of the hearing panel. If the panel
rejects a proposed settlement, another hearing panel must be empan-

elled to try the case, unless all parties consent to proceed with the origi-

nal panel. The parties may submit a proposed settlement to_a second
hearing panel, but the parties shall not have the right to request a third
he: anel if the settlement order is rejected by the seco!

panel. The second hearing panel shall either accept the settlement pro-
posal or hold a hearing upon the allegations of the complaint.

j) Settlement Co: - Ei hair of the
hearing panel may order, appointment of a commission member to con-
duct a settlement conference.

(1) Such request. shall be filed with the clerk of the commission
m no later than 60 days prior to the date set for
hearing.
2 on such request, the chairperson of the commission shall
select and assign a commission member not assigne :

notify the parties of the commission "member assi gn ed and. the date

whi ment conference must. be held. The settlement
mnfere m no later than 30 days prior to the date set for
hearing.
issi rT CON i nfer-
ence will set the date, time, and manner.
‘4) At the settlement conference, the parties will discuss their

ositions and desi i issi T will
ide ii i resolution.

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 915

‘he issi i input shall be advi-

nh not bindi

(6) All statements and/or admissions made at the settlement con-
ference shall be for settlement. oses only and shall not
admissible at any hearing in the case. Evidence that is otherwise
discoverable, however, shall not be excluded from admission at
hearing merely because it is presented in the co f the

ment conference.

(k) Prehearing Conference and Order

1) Unless default has been entered by the clerk, the parties shall
hol i eC ing conference shall be

arranged and held by the dates established in the scheduling order.
2) Prior to or during the prehearing conference, the parties shall:

e witness and exhibit lists; discu: ipulati if
uted facts; discuss the issues for ination the hi
anel; and exchange contested i: if ies identify differ-
ing contested issues.
3) Within five days after the date of the preheari fers

each party shall provide the other with any documents or items
identified as exhibits but not previously provided to the other party.

il memorialize the prehearin; conference ina

the parties by the clerk. By the date set in the scheduling order, the
parties shall submit the Stipulation on Prehearing Conference to
the clerk to provide to the hearing panel.
mn five days’ notice to th ies, at, iscretion of.
chairperson of the hearing panel, the chairperson may order the
parties to meet with the chairperson or any designated member
of the hearing panel for the purpose of promoting the efficiency of
the hearing. The participating member of the panel shall have the
power to issue such orders as may be appropriate. The venue (e.g.
Jepk id fi shall by the heari

panel member.

(6) The chairperson of the hearing panel may impose sanctions

against any party who willfully fails to participate i in good. faithina
wehearing conference ing o1 Mh

with a prehearing order issued pursuant to this section. The sane-
tions which may be imposed include but are not limited to those
enumerated in Rule 37(b) of the NC Rules of Procedure.

916 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

(}_Evidence or witnesses _not included in the Stipulation on
Preheari mference may be excluded from admission or con-
i ion at the hearing.

consult ing the other panel members may heat and dispose “of all pre-
hearing motions except motions the granting of which would result in
dismissal of the charges or final judgment for either party. All motions

co! d result in dis: al of the cl es or final jud; ent. for cither
The followi ' rocedures shall ar I toalli achat motions includ
motions which re in
could result in final judgment for either party on mall or any claims:

1) Parti hall file motions wit rk of ission.
Parties may submit motions by regular mail, overnight mail, or
in_person. Motions transmitted b: simile or i] will n
be ) for fili x with th i ission
of the chairperson of the heari anel. Parties shall _n« liver

motions or other communications directly to members of the hear-
ing panel unless expressly directed in writing to do so by the chair-
person of the hearing panel.

2) Motions shall be served _as provided in the NC Rules of Civil
Procedure.

3) The non-moving party shall have ten days from the filing of the
motion = respond. If the motion is s served upon the non-moving

1B days fromthe filin of ion to r |.
shown, the cl erson oftheh hearing panel may shorten or
the time period for response.

cy rehearing motion maj i mn

ies’ writ missions.

erson shall set the time, date, and m: if ors he
chairperson may order that argument on any prehearing motion
may _be heard in person or by telephone or electronic means of
5) Any motion included in or with a defendant’s answer will not
on-movi will
be due, unless and until a. fil n i i
the deadline for filing motions set in the scheduling order. The due
date for response by the non-moving party will run from the date
of the filing of the notice.

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 917

0116 Proceedings Before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission: Formal
Hearing

a i ‘ing - The defendant will a) i n before the =
ing panel at the time and place named by the chairperson. The hearing
will the public except for cause shi the chair-

SON O! heari anel may exclude i ‘ing room all per-
the ies, counsel, and th« in hearing. No
heari ill be closed to the public over jection of the defendant.

inu: Hearing Has Commenced -
commenced, n mtinuances other than an adjoi it from _day
day will be granted, ex to await the filing of a controlling decision of
an appellate court, b: 5) i ies, or where eme i
would result in ce ontinuance.

c) Burden of Proof

(1) Unless otherwise provided in these rules, the State Bar shall
haye the burden of proving by cogent, and_convincin
evidence that the defen i the Rules of Professional
Conduct.

In ci aint or other pleadin; in any trial, heari
other proceeding, the State Bar is not required to prove the non-
istenc emption or exception contained in the Rules

of Professional Conduct. The burden of proving any exemption or

e) upon the person claiming its benefit.
ist : 2 sion of any disciplinary case, the hearing panel
will der which will include the panel's findi fact. con-
clusions of law. When one or more rule violations has been established
jus tt, the order of discipline will set 1 i
material f: id. lusions of law established by virtue of si
judgment, any additional facts and conclusions of law pertaining to dis-
ipline, the disposition. All final orders will be si by \-
of the panel, or by the chairperson of the panel on behalf of the
panel, and will be filed with the clerk.

e ion of e - The clerk will ensure that a complete
re i of iden: ceived during the course of all hearings
before the issi rovii by 7A-95 for trials in the si
rior rt. The ‘k wi e and the pleadi exhibii

and briefs of the parties.

918 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS
Discipline - If f misconduct, are established,
e) will id idence relevant to the discipline to be imy .
1) Suspensio} dis is ay iate where there is_evi-
det le! it’s actions resulted in signifi. hi or
ntial significant harm to the cli ie bli inistra-
ion of justice, or the le; ‘ofessi er discipline is insuf-
ficient to adequately pr il lic. The following factors shall
considered in imposing su: ite) lisbarment:
int if fer it_to_ cause the resulting hi or
potential harm;
(B) intent of the defendant to commit acts where the harm or
C) circumstances i dc t's of hon
trustworthiness, or integrity;
‘D) elevation of the defendant's own interest above that of the
client;
tive impact of defendant's actions on client’s 0) =

lic’s perception of the profession;

(E) negative impact of the defendant's actions on the adminis-
tration of justice;

impairment of the client's ability to achieve 1
representation;
e if it’s conduct on third parties;
ts of dishon: i ion, deceit, or fabrication;
wltiple inst i to icipate in the legal pro-
ion’s self-res ion. OSS.
2) Disbarme: all Si wl e defendant is found
to engage in:
:ts of dishoy is) entation, deceit, orfabrication;
impulsive acts ishor i ion, it, or
fabrication without timely remedi: ‘orts;
C) misappropriation or co! ion a ind to
which the nd: ipient i nti whether from
aclient or any other source; or
D) commission of a felony.

In es, or all of the following factors
ed in imposing the appropriate discipline:

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 919

rior discipli offenses in this state or an er juris-
iction al thereof;
(B) remoteness of prior offenses;

dishonest or si ive abs e thereof;

od faith efforts to make restitution re
ons eS, isconduct;

indifference to making restit

a of misconduct;
G) multiple offenses;

effect of 2 or ional lems on the con-
duct in question;

effe hysical or ital disability or impairment on

interim rehabilitation;

and free disclosure to the hearing pan ive

uttit ware roceedings;

(L) delay in disciplinary proceedings through no fault of the
lefenc atto: 5

bad faith obstruction of the discipli: ceedi
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the dis-
ciplinary agency;

submission of fz idenc se ents, or other
deceptive practices during the discipli i

efusal to acknowledge wro! e of
(P) remorse;
(Q) character or reputation;
(R) vulnerability of victim;

legree of experience in the ‘ice of law;
(1) issuance of a letter of warning to the defendant within the
ee years immediately precedi e filing of the cor int;
U) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
EM factol te inent e_consider-
ation of the discipline impo:
Service of Final Orders - Th rk will thi

e final order of the_heari anel_by certifi il, re recei

920 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

requested, or by personal service. A defendant who cannot, with reason-

al iliges 13) certified mail or personal service shall
2 .d_when the clerk deposits a cs f the Cc] in
ostpaid, properly addressed er i io) or i si-
tory under the exclusive car cus' ft Inited Si Postal
ervice addressed to the defendant's 1: mn ith the
NC State Bar.
0117 Proceedings Before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission:
P jal Moti
New Trials and ndments of Judgments (N.C. R. Civ. 59
Eiths m: St. w trial o1 endment of the hear-
I's fin: r, based on any of thi unds set out in Rule
59 North lina Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) Amotion for a new trial or amendment of judgment will be filed
it] rk 2 s after service of the final order
y lefenc supporting affidavits, if any, and a memoran-
fat ing fot basis of the motion together with supportin:
thorities, will be wit tion.
3 osin: ‘will have 20 days from service of the motio:

to file a written response, any reply affidavits, and a memorandum
4 hearii 1 may rule on the motion based on the parties’
itten submissions or in its di ion,

ief from Ji ent or N.C. iv. 60

1) Ki file a motion for relief from the final j ent
or r, bases any of 1] ‘ounds set out in Rule 60 of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 ion fc ief from jus wr order will be filed
with rk no an after ice of the final order
upon the defendant. Supporting affidavits, if any, and a memoran-
fat ing fc is 01 jon. Tr wit tin:
authorities, wil filed with the motion.

3 opposin: ‘will have 20 days from service of the motion
to file a written response. reph wits, an em}

with supporting authorities.
‘4) The clerk will promptly transmit the motion and any response

to the chairperson of the commission, who will appoint a hearii

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 921

panel. The chairperson will appoint the members of the hearing
anel that origi: hi itter wherever practicable.
5) The heari 1 may rule on the motion ies’
written. issi or may, in its discretion, ent.
ct of Filing Motion - The fili otion requesting a new tri
ent of the judgment, or reli the final judgment or or
under this section will not automatically stay or otherwise affect the
effective date of an or: if ‘ission.

.0118 Proceedings Before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission: Stayed
Suspension

‘a) Pro 4 liance with Conditions - case in which
aperiod of suspension is stayed upon compliance by the defendant with
conditions, the commission will retain jurisdiction of the matter until all
conditions are satisfi lowing procedures apph i ed
suspension:

J) If, during the period the stay is in effect, the counsel receives
infc i ing to show that a condition iolated, the
counsel may, with the consent of the chairperson of the Grievance
Committee, file a motion in the cause with the clerk of the commis-

ion. ifving the violation and seekin; ifting the stay
and activating the suspension. The counsel will serve a copy of the
motion upon the defendant.

2) The clerk will promptly transmit the motion to the chairperson
of the commission. The chairperson will appoint a hearing panel to
ing, appointing the memb: i el that
origi heard ver practicable. The chai: mn
vf ission will notify the cor of the
composition of th« i e]_ and the time and for
hearing.
e hearing, the State Bar wi vi urden of provin:
the greater weight of the evi the defendant violated a
condition of the stay.

4) If the heari the greater weight of the eviden
that the defendant, violated a condition of the stay, the panel may
enter an order lifting the stay and activating the suspension, or
any portion thereof. Alternatively, the panel may allow the stay
to remain in effect for the original term of the stay, may extend
the and/or may include modified or iti

conditions for the suspension to remain stayed. If the panel finds

922 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

that the defe: iol: ndition of the si 1 may |
tax the defendant with administrative fees and costs.
(A) In any order lifting a stay and activating a suspension in
whole or in part, the panel may include a provision allow-
ing th apply for a stay of the acti en
i h terms and conditions 1 concludes are
appropriate.
(B) The panel may impose modified or additional conditions:
a) whi must satisfy to obtain asi i
vated suspension; (b) with which the defendant must comply
during the stay of an activated suspension; and/or (c) wl ‘which
must s: to be reinst ive
the end of the activated suspension period.
Cc ivated the entire period of ion,
instated at the end of iv: n=
sion, the defendant must comply with the requirements of
012: f this subchapter and with an i
imposed in previ mu the commission.

(D) If the panel activated only a portion of the suspension, in

order to be returned i end of the period
of activated sus) i fe it must file a motion. wit
the commissio i if the remainder of the origin:
term of suspension. If thé i d_a stay of the
remainder of the original term of suspension, the panel may
impose modified and/or additional conditions with which the

defendant must comply duri nsion.

5) If the panel finds that the greater weight of the evidence does
not establish that the defendant, violated a condition of the stay, it
will enter an order continuing the stay.

6) In any event, the panel will include in its order findings of fact,
and conclusions of law in support of its decision.

(b) Completion of Stayed Suspension; Continuation of Stay if Motion

Allegin: of i is Pendi

Inless there is pending a moti ing in which it is
alleged that the defendant fail ly wit e conditions of
the stay, the defendant's obligations under an order of discipline
end upon expiration of the period of the stay.

2) When the period of the stay of the suspension would otherwise
hav i motion or proceeding is endins i
i that the defendant failed nditions

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 923

of the stay, the commission retains jurisdiction to lift the stay and
activate all or any part of the suspension. The defendant’s obliga-
tion to comply with the conditions of the existing stay remains in
effect until any such pending motion or procee: is resolved.

1) The defen: file a motion for with the clerk and
TV »f the motion an: hm mn the counsel.
i filed ni alt fore the first

for . The commission will not con-

i lier fore the date of
Jigibilit for . The ission will not consider
motion unless it is delive the clerk and served upon the

supporting document sntation estab! ishing compliance with each c con-
dition. The defendant has the burden of proving compliance with

mn onvincing evidence.
(8) The counsel shall have 30 days after the motion is filed to file
aresponse.

4) The clerk shail transmit the moti: K mse
to the chairperson of the commission. Within 14 days of transmit-
tal of the motion and the response, the chairperson shall issue an
order appointing a hearing panel i i an
location for the hearing. Where’ i the chairperson
shall joint the. i ntered the

ier of discipline.
(d) Hearing on Motion for Stay
1) The defendant bears the burden of proving compliance with

all conditions for a stay by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

(2) Any hearing on a motion for stay will conform as nearly as
practicable with the requirements of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure and for tri i ivil in the supe-
rior courts.

3) The decision to grant_or deny a defendant's motion to stay a
ion is discr The panel should consider wi

the defendant has complied with Rule .0128 and Rule .0129 of this
section, and any conditions in the order of discipline, as well as

924, DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

(e) Order on the Motion for Stay - The hearing panel will determine
whether the defendant has established compliance with all conditions

enter an order including findi of fac d_conclusi f law. The
panel may impose modified and/or additional ‘conditions: ( ‘a) for the sus-
‘or_a stay ins ‘the sus-
ension; and/or (c) for reinstatement to activ vf the
ion iod. The 1 may tax costs and. administrative fees in

mnection wit moti

70445_.0119 Effect of a Finding of Guilt in Any Criminal Case

€b}(a) Conclusive Evidence of Guilt - A certified copy certifieate of the
conviction of an attorney for any crime or a certified copy certificate of
the a judgment entered against an attorney where a plea of guilty, nolo
contendre, or no contest has been accepted by a court will be conclusive
* evidence of guilt of that crime in any disciplinary proceeding instituted
against a member. For purposes of any disciplinary proceeding against
a member, such conviction or judgment shall conclusively establish all
elements of the criminal offense and shall conclusively establish all facts
set_out in the document charging the member with the criminal offense.

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 925

suspension. "Any in member who has been. con convicted “of, i) "leade « guil ty to,
pleads no contest to, or is found guilty by a jury of a criminal offense

rofessional unfitness in an r be sus-

pended from the practice of law as set out below.

1) The 1 ith the clerk of the commission and

serve upon the member a motion for interim suspension accompa-
nied by proof of icti or verdict.

(2) The member shall have ten days in which to file a response.

3) The chairperson of the commission may hold a hearing to deter-
mine whether the criminal offense is one showing professional
unfitness_and_whether, in the i m’s_di i interi
suspension is warranted. In determining whether interim suspen-
sion is warranted, the chairperson may consider harm or potential

harm to a client, the administration of justi fe
members of the public, and impact_on the public’s perception of
the profession. The parties may present additional evidence per-
taining to harm or to the circumstances surrounding the offense,
but the member may n« convictiol lea
or verdict.

4) The chairperson shall issue an order containing findi

and conclusions of law addressing whether there is a qualifying
conviction, plea, or verdi wi i i ion i
warranted, and either iting or denying the motion.

Ifthe me nt interim si =

sion, the parties may submit a consent order of interim suspension
to the chairperson of mmission.

(6) The provisions of Rule .0128(c) of this subchapter will apply to
the interim suspension.

926 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

0H .0120 Reciprocal Discipline & Disability Proceedings

[Renumbering all remaining rules and internal cross-references to rules.]

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a specially called meeting
on July 22, 2016.

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

927

. Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, IT
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

928 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING DISCIPLINE
AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on July 22, 2016.

BEIT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that the
Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning disci-
pline and disability of attorneys, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C.
1B, Section .0100 be amended as follows (additions are underlined, dele-
tions are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1B, Section .0100 Discipline and Disability of
Attorneys

.0129 Confidentiality

(a) Allegations of Misconduct or Alleged Disability - Except as otherwise
provided in this rule and G.S. 84-28(£), all proceedings involving allega-
tions of misconduct by or alleged disability of a member will remain
confidential until

(1) a complaint against a member has been filed with the secretary
after a finding by the Grievance Committee that there is probable cause
to believe that the member is guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary
action or is disabled;

(2) the member requests that the matter be made public prior to the
filing of a complaint;

(8) the investigation is predicated upon conviction of the member of
or sentencing for a crime;

(4) a petition or action is filed in the general courts of justice;
(5) the member files an affidavit of surrender of license; or

(6) a member is transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to
Rule .0118(g). In such an instance, the order transferring the member
shall be public. Any other materials, including the medical evidence sup-
porting the order, shall be kept confidential unless and until the member
petitions for reinstatement pursuant to Rule .0118(c), unless provided
otherwise in the order.

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 929

(») Disciplinary Complaints filed pursuant to Rule .0113(j)(4), 01130)
(4), or .0113(m)(4)-

The State Bar may disclose that it filed the complaint before the
Disciplinary Hearing Commission pursuant to Rule .0113())(4), 0113
4), or .0113(m)(4):

have concluded; or

2) while proceedings are pending before the Disciplinary Hearing
Commission, in order to address publicity not initiate

(o)¢b} Letter of Warning or Admonition

(d)€e} Attorney’s Response to a Grievance

NORTH CAROLINA.
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on July 22, 2016.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, II
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84, of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

930 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS : 931

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING
THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on April 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
the Board of Law Examiners, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 1C,
Section .0100, be amended as follows (additions are underlined, dele-
tions are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1C, Section .0100, Rules Governing the Board of Law
Examiners and the Training of Law Students

.0105 Approval of Law Schools

Every applicant for admission to the N-G- North Carolina State Bar must
meet the requirements set out in at least one of the numbered para-
graphs below:

@)..

4) The i .B. or J.D. d m a law school that was
approved for licensure purposes in another state of the United States or
the District of Columbia and was licensed in such state or district.,-and;

NORTH CAROLINA.
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on April 22, 2016.

BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, TI
L. Thomas Lunsford, I, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

For the Court

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE 933

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on April 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
the Administrative Committee, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C.
1D, Section .0900, be amended as follows (additions are underlined,
deletions are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1D, Section .0900, Procedures for Administrative
Committee

-0902 Reinstatement from Inactive Status
(a) Eligibility to Apply for Reinstatement.

(c) Requirements for Reinstatement.

(1) Completion of Petition.

(4) Additional CLE Requirements.

If more than 1 year has elapsed between the date of the entry of
the order transferring the member to inactive status and the date
that the petition is filed, the member must complete 12 hours of
approved CLE for each year that the member was inactive up
to a maximum of 7 years. The CLE hours must be completed
within 2 years prior to filing the petition. For each 12-hour incre-
ment, 6 hours may be taken online; and 2 hours must be earned
by attending courses in the areas of professional responsibility
and/or professionalism; and 5 hours must be eared by attending

mid during the period of
inactivity the member complied with mandatory CLE requirements
of another state where the member is licensed, those CLE credit
hours may be applied to the requirements under this provision

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE

without regard to whether they were taken during the 2 years prior
to filing the petition.
(5) Bar Exam Requirement If Inactive 7 or More Years.

(d) Service of Reinstatement Petition.

.0904 Reinstatement from Suspension

(a) Compliance Within 30 Days of Service of Suspension Order.

(d) Requirements for Reinstatement.

(1) Completion of Petition.

(8) Additional CLE Requirements.

If more than 1 year has elapsed between the effective date of the
suspension order and the date upon which the reinstatement peti-
tion is filed, the member must complete 12 hours of approved CLE
for each year that the member was suspended up to a maximum of
7 years. The CLE must be completed within 2 years prior to filing
the petition. For each 12-hour increment, 6 hours may be taken
online; and 2 hours must be earned by attending courses -in the
areas of professional responsibility and/or professionalism;-and 5
its-designee. If during the period of suspension the member com-
plied with mandatory CLE requirements of another state where the
member is licensed, those CLE credit hours may be applied to the
requirements under this provision without regard to whether they
were taken during the 2 years prior to filing the petition.

(4) Bar Exam Requirement If Suspended 7 or More Years.

(e) Procedure for Review of Reinstatement Petition.

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE 935

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on April 22, 2016.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, II
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

936 . ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on April 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar
that the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar con-
cerning the Administrative Committee, as particularly set forth in 27
N.C.A.C. 1D, Section .0900, be amended as follows (additions are under-
lined, deletions are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1D, Section .0900, Procedures for Administrative
Committee

.0905 Pro Bono Practice of Out-of-State Lawyers

(a) A lawyer licensed to practice in another state but not North Carolina
who desires to provide legal services free of charge to indigent persons
may file a petition with the secretary addressed to the council setting
forth: ...

@)...

(d) Upon receipt of a petition and other information satisfying the provi-
sions this rule, the council may, in its discretion, enter an order permit-
ting the petitioner to provide legal services to indigent persons on a pro
bono basis under the supervision of a member employed by a nonprofit
corporation qualified to render legal services pursuant to G.S. 84-5.1.
The order shall become effective immediately upon entry by the council.
A copy of the order shall be mailed to the petitioner and to the supervis-
ing member. No person permitted to practice pursuant to such an order
shall pay any membership fee to the North Carolina State Bar or any
district bar or any other charge ordinarily imposed upon active mem-
bers, nor shall any such person be required to attend continuing legal
education courses. .

(e)...

(g) Permission to practice under this rule terminates upon notice from
the member identified in the petition pursuant to Rule .0905(a)(3) above,

r from the nonprofit corporation employing such membe! t 1 fa

of-state lawyer is no longer supervised by any member employed by the

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE 937

corporation. In addition, Permission to practice under this rule being
entirely discretionary on the of il, ler granting such

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, I, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North arolina State Bar were duly adopted by the
Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting on.
April 22, 2016.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, II
L. Thomas Lunsford, I, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on July 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
continuing legal education, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 1D,
Section .1500, be amended as follows (additions are underlined, dele-
tions are interlined):

27N.C.A.C. 1D, Section .1500, Rules Governing the Administration
of the Continuing Legal Education Program

.1512 Source of Funds

(a) Funding for the program carried out by the board shall come from
sponsor's fees and attendee’s fees as provided below, as well as from
duly assessed penalties for noncompliance and from reinstatement fees.

()..
()...
c) No Refunds for Exemptions and Record Adjustments.

(1) Exemption Claimed. If a credit hour of attendance is reported to
the board, the fee for that credit hour is earned by the board regardless
of an exemption subsequently claimed by the member pursuant to Rule
.1517 of this subchapter. No paid fees will be refunded and the member
shall pay it hour r on the annual report form
for which no fee has been paid at the time of submission of the member's
annual report form.

2) Adji 1) edit Hours. When asponsor is required

to. ‘ here will be no refund to the sponsor or to the

quent adjustment, pursuant to Rule

ut i Tr, it hours.reported on the annual report,

form. When the member is required to pay the attendee’s fee, the member

shall pay the fee for any credit hour reported after any adjustment by the
member to credit hours reported on the annual report form.

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 939

NORTH CAROLINA,
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on July 22, 2016.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

Th Lunsford, II
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

940 CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on July 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
continuing legal education, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 1D,
Section .1500, be amended as follows (additions are underlined, dele-
tions are interlined):

27N.C.A.C. 1D, Section .1500, Rules Governing the Administration
of the Continuing Legal Education Program

.1517 Exemptions
(a) Notification of Board.

(b) Government Officials and Members of Armed Forces. The governor,
the lieutenant governor, and all members of the council of state, members
of the United States Senate, members of the United States House of
Representatives, members of the North Carolina General Assembly,
full-time principal chiefs and _vice-chiefs of any Indian tribe officially
recognized by the United States or North Carolina state governments,

and members of the United States Armed Forces on fulltime active duty
are exempt from the requirements of these rules for any calendar year in
which they serve some portion thereof in such capacity.

(c) Judiciary and Clerks.

(d) Nonresidents.

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 941

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, IL, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on July 22, 2016.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, II
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

942 LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING
LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on April 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
legal specialization, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 1D, Section
.1800, be amended as follows (additions are underlined, deletions are
interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1D, Section .1800 Hearing and Appeal Rules of the
Board of Legal Specialization

Rule .1804 Appeal to the Council

(a) Appealable Decisions. An appeal may be taken to the council from a
decision of the board which denies an applicant certification (i.e., when
an applicant's application has been rejected because it is not in com-
pliance with the standards for cértification or when an applicant fails
the written specialty examination), denies an applicant continued cer-
tification as a specialist, or suspends or revokes a specialist's certifica-
tion. The rejection of an application because iti is incomplete shall not
be appealable. a " €

(b) Filing the Appeal. An appeal from a decision of the board as described.
in paragraph (a) may be taken by filing with the executive director of the
North Carolina State Bar (the State Bar) a written notice of appeal not
later than 21 days after the date of the notice of the board's decision
to the applicant who is denied certification or continued certification
or to a lawyer whose certification is suspended or revoked.

LEGAL SPECIALIZATION 943

appeat The appeal to the council shall be under such rules and regula-
tions as the council may prescribe.

(d) € Scope of Review. Review by the council shall be limited to
whether the appeHant applicant was provided with procedural rights
and whether the board, or the reconsideration panel where applicable,
applied the correct procedural standards and State Bar rules in render-
ing its decision. The appeant applicant shall have the burden of making
a clear and convincing showing of arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent
denial of procedural rights or misapplication of the procedural stan-
dards or State Bar rules.

(e) €h3 Notice of the Council’s Decision. The appeHant applicant shall
receive written notice of the council's decision.

(£) Costs. The council may tax the costs attributable to the proceedirig
inst th li

NORTH CAROLINA.

WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by

944 LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on April 22, 2016.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bay,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, II ;
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84, of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

LEGAL SPECIALIZATION 945

- AMENDMENT TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING
LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

The following amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on July 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
legal specialization, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 1D, Section
.2400 be amended as follows (additions are underlined, deletions are
interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1D, Section .2400 Certification Standards for the
Family Law Specialty

.2406 Standards for Continued Certification as a Specialist

The period of certification is five years. Prior to the expiration of the
certification period, a certified specialist who desires continued cer-
tification must apply for continued certification within the time limit
described in Rule .2406(d) below. No examination will be required for
continued certification. However, each applicant for continued certifica-
tion as a specialist shall comply with the specific requirements set forth
below in addition to any general standards required by the board of all
applicants for continued certification.

(a) Substantial Involvement - The specialist must demonstrate that, for
each of the five years preceding application, he or she has had substan-
tial involvement in the specialty as defined in Rule .2405(b) of this sub-
chapter; however, for the purpose of continued certification, service as
a district court judge in North Carolina hearing a substantial number of
family law cases may be substituted, year for year, for the experience
required to meet the five-year requirement.

(b) Continuing Legal Education -...

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendment to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar was duly adopted by the

946 LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting on
July 22, 2016.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, II
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendment to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same is not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendment to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that it be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

LEGAL SPECIALIZATION 947

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING
LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on April 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
legal specialization, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 1D, Section
.2700, be amended as follows (additions are underlined, deletions
are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1D, Section .2700, Certification Standards for
Workers’ Compensation Law Specialty

.2706 Standards for Continued Certification as a Specialist

The period of certification is five years. Prior to the expiration of the
certification period, a certified specialist who desires continued cer-
tification must apply for continued certification within the time limit
described in Rule .2706(d) below. No examination will be required for
continued certification. However, each applicant for continued certifica-
tion as a specialist shall comply with the specific requirements set forth
below in addition to any general standards required by the board of all
applicants for continued certification.

(a) Substantial Involvement -...

(b) Continuing Legal Education - The specialist must earn no less
than 60 hours of accredited continuing legal education (CLE) credits in
workers’ compensation. law and related fields during the five years pre-
ceding application. Ne b ay
year. Of the 60 hours of CLE, at least 30 hours shall be i in workers” com-
pensation law, and the balance may be in the following related fields:
civil trial practice and procedure; evidence; insurance; mediation; medi-
cal injuries, medicine, or anatomy; labor and employment law; Social
Security disability law; and the law relating to long-term disability or
Medicaid/Medicare claims. Effeetive-March10--20H4, Tthe specialist
must earn not less than six credits in courses on workers’ compensation
law each year and the balance of credits may be earned in courses on
workers’ compensation law or any of the related fields previously listed.

(c) Peer Review -...

948 LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on April 22, 2016.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, If
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 949

AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR

The following amendments to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar were duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on July 22, 2016.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules of Professional Conduct of the North Carolina State Bar, as
particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 2, be amended as follows (additions
are underlined, deletions are interlined except where noted):

27 N.C.A.C. 2, Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.0, Terminology

(h) “Partner” “Principal” denotes a member of a partnership for the
practice of law, a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional
corporation, ora member of an association authorized to practice law,
orala’ ement authority over the k ent of a
company, organization, or government entity.

Rule 1.17, Sale of a Law Practice

Comment

[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients
are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to
this Rule, when a lawyer or an entire firm ceases to practice and other
lawyers or firms take over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm
may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as
may withdrawing partners principals of law firms. See Rules 5.4 and 5.6.

Rule 5.1, Responsibilities of Partners Principals, Managers, and
Supervisory Lawyers

(a) A partner principal in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or
together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority,
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm or the organization
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the
firm or the organization conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

950 PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms
to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner principal or has comparable managerial
authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or
has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows
of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided
or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action to avoid
the consequences.

Comment
[1] ...

[8] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility
prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm’s or organization’s
structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced
lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with
the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm or organi-
zation, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems fre-
quently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms,
for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make con-
fidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior
partner principal or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms and organi-
zations, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal edu-
cation in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a
firm or organization can influence the conduct of all its members and
the partners principals and managing lawyers may not assume that all
Jawyers associated with the firm or organization will inevitably conform
to the Rules. ,

[4]...

[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner principal or other
lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well
as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance
of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has such
supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of
fact. Partrers Principals and lawyers with comparable authority have

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 951

at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm,
while a partner principal or manager in charge of a particular matter
ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other
firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a
partner principal or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy
of that lawyer’s involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A
supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences
of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred.
Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a
matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the
subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.

[6]...

[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have dis-
ciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner principal, associate or
subordinate. Moreover, this Rule is not intended to establish a standard
for vicarious criminal or civil liability for the acts of another lawyer.
Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer’s
conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.

[8] ...
Rule 5.3, Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with
a lawyer: .

(a) a partner principal, and a lawyer who individually or together with
other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm
or organization shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm or
organization has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the
nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of
the lawyer;

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the nonlawyer’s conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a nonlawyer that
would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in
by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific con-
duct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

952 PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

(2) the lawyer is a partner principal or has comparable managerial
authority in the law firm or organization in which the person is
employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer,
and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be
avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action
to avoid the consequences.

Rule 5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer,
except that:

(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner
principal, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over
areasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s
estate or to one or more specified persons;

2).
()...

Rule 5.5, Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional
Practice of Law

Comment

(ll...

[2] There are occasions in which lawyers admitted to practice in another
United States jurisdiction, but not in North Carolina, and not disbarred or
suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services
on atemporary basis in North Carolina under circumstances that do not
create an unreasonable risk to the interests of their clients, the courts,
or the public. ... A lawyer not admitted to practice in North Carolina
must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer
is admitted to practice law in North Carolina. See also Rules 7.1(a) and
7.5(b). However, a lawyer admitted to practice in another jurisdiction
who is partner a_principal, shareholder, or employee of an interstate or
international law firm that is registered with the North Carolina State
Bar pursuant to 27 N.C.A.C. 1E, Section .0200, may practice, subject
to the limitations of this Rule, in the North Carolina offices of such
Jaw firm.

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 953

Rule 7.5, Firm Names and Letterheads

Comment

[1] A firm may be designated by the names of all or some of its members,
by the names of deceased or retired members where there has been a
continuing succession in the firm’s identity, or by a trade name such as
the “ABC Legal Clinic.”...A firm name that includes the surname of a
deceased or retired partner principal is, strictly speaking, a trade name.
However, the use of such names, as well as designations such as “Law
Offices of John Doe,” “Smith and Associates,” and “Jones Law Firm” are
useful means of identification and are permissible without registration
with the State Bar. However, it is misleading to use the surname of a
Jawyer not associated with the firm or a predecessor of the firm. It is
also misleading to use a designation such as “Smith and Associates” for
asolo practice. The name of a retired partner_principal may be used in
the name of a law firm only if the partner principal has ceased the prac-
tice of law.

(2)...

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on July 22, 2016.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 18th day of August, 2016.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, II
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they be
published in the forthcoming volume of the Advance Sheets as provided
by the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 22nd day of September, 2016.

s/Sam J. Ervin
For the Court

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 955

ORDER AMENDING RULE 7 OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court by Article IV of the
Constitution of North Carolina, Rule 7 of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure is amended as follows:

Rule 7. Preparation of the Transcript; Court Reporter’s Duties
(a) Ordering the Transcript.

() Civil Cases. Within fourteen days after filing the notice
of appeal the appellant shall contract for the transcrip-
tion of the proceedings or of such parts of the proceed-
ings not already on file, as the appellant deems necessary,
in accordance with these rules, and shall provide the
following information in writing: a designation of the
parts of the proceedings to be transcribed; the name and
address of the court reporter or other neutral person des-
ignated to produce the transcript; and, where portions of
the proceedings have been designated to be transcribed,
astatement of the issues the appellant intends to raise on.
appeal. The appellant shall file the written documenta-
tion of this transcript contract with the clerk of the trial
tribunal, and serve a copy of it upon all other parties of
record and upon the person designated to produce the
transcript. If an appellee deems a transcript of other
parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee,
within fourteen days after the service of the written
documentation of the appellant, shall contract for the
transcription of any additional parts of the proceedings
or such parts of the proceedings not already on file, in
accordance with these rules. The appellee shall file with
the clerk of the trial tribunal, and serve on all other par-
ties of record, written documentation of the additional
parts of the proceedings to be transcribed and the name
and address of the court reporter or other neutral person
designated to produce the transcript. In civil cases and
special proceedings where there is an order establish-
ing the indigency of a party entitled to appointed appel-
late counsel, the ordering of the transcript shall be as in
criminal cases where there is an order establishing the
indigency of the defendant as set forth in Rule 7(a)(2).

956

@)

@

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Criminal Cases. In criminal cases where there is no
order establishing the indigency of the defendant for the
appeal, the defendant shall contract for the transcription
of the proceedings as in civil cases.

When there is an order establishing the indigency
of the defendant, unless the trial judge’s appeal entries
specify or the parties stipulate that parts of the proceed-
ings need not be transcribed, the clerk of the trial tribunal
shall order a transcript of the proceedings by serving the
following documents upon either the court reporter(s)
or neutral person designated to produce the transcript:
a copy of the appeal entries signed by the judge; a copy
of the trial court’s order establishing indigency for the
appeal; and a statement setting out the name, address,
telephone number, and e-mail address of appellant’s
counsel. The clerk shall make an entry of record reflect-
ing the date these documents were served upon the court
reporter(s) or transcriptionist.

(b) Production and Delivery of Transcript.

Production. In civil cases: from the date the requesting
party serves the written documentation of the transcript
contract on the person designated to produce the tran-
script, that person shall have sixty days to produce and
electronically deliver the transcript.

In criminal cases where there is no order estab-
lishing the indigency of the defendant for the appeal:
from the date the requesting party serves the written
documentation of the transcript contract on the person
designated to produce the transcript, that person shall
have sixty days to produce and electronically deliver the
transcript in non-capital cases and one-hundred-twenty
days to produce and electronically deliver the transcript
in capitally-tried cases.

Tn criminal cases where there is an order establish-
ing the indigency of the defendant for the appeal: from
the date listed on the appeal entries as the “Date order
delivered to transcriptionist,” that person shall have
sixty-five days to produce and electronically deliver the
transcript in non-capital cases and one-hundred-twenty-
five days to produce and electronically deliver the tran-
script in capitally-tried cases.

@

@)

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

The transcript format shall comply withAppendix B
ofthese rules, standards set by the Administrative Office
of the Courts.

Except in capitally-tried criminal cases which result
in the imposition of a sentence of death, the trial tribunal,
in its discretion and for good cause shown by the appel-
lant, may, pursuant to Rule 27(c)(1), extend the time to
produce the transcript for an additional thirty days. Any
subsequent motions for additional time required to pro-
duce the transcript may only be made pursuant to Rule
27(c)(2) to the appellate court to which appeal has been
taken. All motions for extension of time to produce the
transcript in capitally-tried cases resulting in the imposi-
tion of a sentence of death shall be made directly to the
Supreme Court by the appellant.

Delivery. The court reporter, or person designated to
produce the transcript, shall electronically deliver the
completed transcript to the parties, including the district
attorney and Attorney General of North Carolina in crim-
inal cases, as ordered, within the time provided by this
rule, unless an extension of time has been granted under
Rule 7(b)(1) or Rule 27(c). The court reporter or tran-
scriptionist shall certify to the clerk of the trial tribunal
as been so delivered-andshait-senda

the appeal is taken. The appellant shall promptly notify
the court reporter when the record on appeal has been
filed. Once the court reporter, or person designated to
produce the transcript, has been notified by the appellant
that the record on appeal has been filed with the appel-
late court to which the appeal has been taken, the court
reporter must electronically file the transcript with that
court using the docket number assigned by that court.

Neutral Transcriptionist. The neutral person desig-
nated to produce the transcript shall not be a relative or
employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, or
a relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or
be financially interested in the action unless the parties
agree otherwise by stipulation.

This amendment to the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure
shall be effective immediately.

958 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

This amendment shall be promulgated by publication in the North
Carolina Reports and posted on the Court's web site.

Ordered by the Court in Conference, this the 16th day of March,
2017.

s/Michael R. Morgan
For the Court

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/J. Bryan Boyd

J. BRYAN BOYD
Clerk of the Supreme Court

JUDICIAL DISTRICT BARS 959

AMENDMENT TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING
JUDICIAL DISTRICT BARS

The following amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar was duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on January 27, 2017.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
judicial district bars, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 1A, Section
.0900, be amended as follows (additions are underlined, deletions
are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1A, Section .0900 Organization of the Judicial
District Bars

0902 Annual Membership Fee

If a judicial district bar elects to assess an annual membership fee from
its active members pursuant to N.C.G.S. §84-18.1(b), the following pro-
cedures shall apply:

(a) Notice to State Bar. The judicial district bar shall notify the North
Carolina State Bar of its election to assess an annual membership fee
each year at least thirty days prior to mailing to its members the first
invoice therefore, specifying the amount of the annual membership fee,
the date after which payment will be delinquent, and the amount of any
late fee for delinquent payment.

(b) Accounting to State Bar. ...

(c) Delinquency Date. The date upon which the annual membership fee
shall be delinquent if not paid shall be not later than ninety days after,
and not sooner than thirty days after, the date of the first invoice for
the annual membership fee. The delinquency date shall be stated on the
invoice and the invoice shall advise each member that failure to pay
the annual membership fee must be reported to the North Carolina State
Bar and may result in suspension of the member's license to practice law.

(d) Late Fee. Each judicial district bar may impose, but shall not be
required, to impose a late fee of any amount not to exceed fifteen dollars
($15.00) for non-payment of the annual membership fee on or before the
stated delinquency date. .

(e) Members Subject to Assessment. ....

960 JUDICIAL DISTRICT BARS

(© Members Exempt from Assessment.....
(g) Hardship Waivers. ....

(h) Reporting Delinquent Members to State Bar. Fwetve-Three to six
months after the delinquency date efthe-firstinveice for the annual mem-
bership fee, the judicial district bar shall report to the North Carolina
State Bar all of its members who have not paid the annual membership
fee or any late fee.

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendment to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar was duly adopted by the
Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting on
January 27, 2017.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 28th day of February, 2017.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, II
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendment to the Rules and Regulations
of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council of the North
Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same is not inconsistent with
Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing amend-
ment to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar be
spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that it be published
in the forthcoming volume of the Reports as provided by the Act incor-
porating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise directed by the
Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 17th day of March, 2017.

s/Michael R. Morgan
For the Court,

DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS 961

AMENDMENT TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING DISCIPLINE
AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

The following amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar was duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on January 27, 2017.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
the discipline and disability of attorneys, as particularly set forth in
27 N.C.A.C. 1B, Section .0100, be amended as follows (additions are
underlined, deletions are interlined):

27N.C.A.C. 1B, Section .0100, Discipline and Disability of Attorneys

.0116 Proceedings Before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission:
Formal Hearing

(a) Public Hearing

(1) The defendant will appear in person before the hearing panel
at the time and place named by the chairperson. The hearing will
be open to the public except that for good cause shown the chaix-
person of the hearing panel may exclude from the hearing room all
persons except the parties, counsel, and those engaged in the hear-
ing. No hearing will be closed to the public over the objection of
the defendant.

2) Media Coverage -- Absent a showing of good cause, the chair-
person of the hearing panel shail permit television, motion picture
and still photography cameras, broadcast microphones and record-
ers (electronic medi: and broadcast formal hearings. A
media outlet shall file a motion with the clerk of the commission
seeki ermission ili: i dia to record or broad-
cast a hearing no less than 48 hours before the hearing is scheduled

0. i irperson will rule on the motion no I 2
hours before the hearing is scheduled to begin. Any order denying a
motion to permit the use of electronic media to record or broadcast
a formal heari ll contain written findings of fact setting f
the facts constituting good cause to support that decision. Except

therwi: ided in this paragraph, the provisions of. a
of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts
i ia and Still Photography Coverage of Publi: ici
Proceedings) shall apply to electronic media coverage of hearings
before the commission.

962 DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY OF ATTORNEYS

(b) Continuance After a Hearing Has Commenced ...

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendment to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar was duly adopted by the
Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting on
January 27, 2017.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 28th day of February, 2017.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, If
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendment to the Rules and Regulations
of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council of the North
Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same is not inconsistent with
Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendment to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that it be pub-
lished in the forthcoming volume of the Reports as provided by the Act
incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise directed by
the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 17th day of March, 2017.

rs

For the Court

LEGAL SPECIALIZATION 963

AMENDMENT TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING THE PLAN OF
LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

The following: amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar was duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on January 27, 2017.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the. Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
the Plan of Legal Specialization, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C.
1D, Section .2500, be amended as follows (additions are underlined,
deletions are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 1D, Section .2500 Certification Standards for the
Criminal Law Specialty

Section .2505 Standards for Certification as a Specialist

Each applicant for certification as a specialist in criminal law or the sub-
specialty of state criminal law shall meet the minimum standards set
forth in Rule .1720 of this subchapter. In addition, each applicant shall
meet the following standards for certification:

(a) Licensure and Practice - ....
(b) ....

(Cc)...

(d) Peer Review

(1) Each applicant for certification as a specialist in criminal law
and the subspecialty of state criminal law must make a satisfactory
showing of qualification through peer review.

Q) ose

(4) Each applicant must provide for reference and independent
inquiry the names and addresses of the following: (i) ten lawyers
and judges who practice in the field of criminal law and who are
familiar with the applicant’s practice, and (ii) opposing counsel and
the judge in fast eight recent cases

easestried by the applicant to verdict or entry of order.

964 LEGAL SPECIALIZATION

(5)...

(e) Examination - ....

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendment to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar was duly adopted by the
Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting on
January 27, 2017.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 28th day of February, 2017.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, I
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendment to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same is not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendment to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that it be pub-
lished in the forthcoming volume of the Reports as provided by the Act
incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise directed by
the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 17th day of March, 2017.

s/Michael R. Morgan
For the Court

ORGANIZATIONS PRACTICING LAW 965

AMENDMENT TO THE RULES AND REGULATIONS ©
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR CONCERNING
ORGANIZATIONS PRACTICING LAW

The following amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the
Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar was duly
adopted by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at its quarterly
meeting on January 27, 2017.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar concerning
organizations practicing law, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 1E,
Section .0100, be amended as follows (additions are underlined, dele-
tions are interlined): .

27 N.C.A.C. 1E, Section .0100, Regulations for Organizations
Practicing Law

.0103 Registration with the North Carolina State Bar
(a) Registration of Professional Corporation ....
(b) Registration of a Professional Limited Liability Company ....

(e) Renewal of Certificate of Registration - The certificate of registration
for either a professional corporation or a professional limited liability
company shall be renewed on or before July 1 of each year upon the
following conditions:

(1) Renewal of Certificate of Registration for Professional
Corporation

(2) Renewal of Certificate of Registration for a Professional Limited
Liability Company ...

(8) Renewal Fee - An application for renewal of a certificate of reg-
istration for either a professional corporation or a professional lim-
ited liability company shall be accompanied by a renewal fee of $25;

(4) Refund of Renewal Fee

(6) Failure to Apply for Renewal of Certificate of Registration - In the
event a professional corporation or a professional limited liability

ORGANIZATIONS PRACTICING LAW

company shall fail to submit the appropriate application for renewal
of certificate of registration, together with the renewal fee, to the
North Carolina State Bar within 30 days following the expiration
date ofits certificate of: tregistration, the secretary shall sencanotice

the certificate of registration for the delinquent professional corpo-

ration or professional limited liability company shall be suspended

and the-issuance-of 2 notifieation-to the secretary of state will be
notified of the suspension of said certificate of registration;

(6) Reinstatement of Suspended Certificate of Registration - Upon
(a) the submission to the North Carolina State Bar of the appro-
priate application for renewal of certificate of registration, together
with all past due renewal fees and late fees; and (b) a finding by the
secretary that the representations in the application are correct, a
suspended certificate of registration of a professional corporation
or professional limited liability company shall be reinstated by the
secretary by making a notation in the records of the North Carolina
State Bar.

(7) Inactive Status Pending Dissolution

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendment to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar was duly adopted by the
Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting on
January 27, 2017.

ORGANIZATIONS PRACTICING LAW 967

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 3rd day of March, 2017.

s/L. Thomas Li
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendment to the Rules and Regulations
of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council of the North
Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same is not inconsistent with
Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 16th day of March, 2017.

Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendment to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that it be pub-
lished in the forthcoming volume of the Reports as provided by the Act
incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise directed by
the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 17th day of March, 2017.

s/Michael R. Morgan
For the Court

968 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

AMENDMENT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The following amendment to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
North Carolina State Bar was duly adopted by the Council of the North
Carolina State Bar at its quarterly meeting on January 27, 2017.

BEIT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that the
Rules of Professional Conduct, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 2,
Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, be amended as follows (addi-
tions are underlined, deletions are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 2, Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information acquired during the profes-
sional relationship with a client unless the client gives informed con-
sent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).

(b) ...
Comment

[1] This Rule governs the disclosure by a lawyer of information relating
to the representation of a client acquired during the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client. See Rule 1.18 for the lawyer’s duties with respect to
information provided to the lawyer by a prospective client, Rule 1.9(¢)
(2) for the lawyer's duty not to reveal information acquired during a law-
yer’s prior representation of a former client, and-Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)
(1) for the lawyer's duties with respect. to the use of such information
to the disadvantage of clients and former clients, and Rule wr a law-
yer's duty to disclose information to rectify a wrongful conviction.

[2] ...

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendment to the Rules of
Professional Conduct of the North Carolina State Bar was duly adopted
by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meet-
ing on January 27, 2017.

|

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 969

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 3rd day of March, 2017.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, TI
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendment to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is. my opinion that the same is not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendment to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the North Carolina
State Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that it
be published in the forthcoming volume of the Reports as provided by
the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 17th day of March, 2017.

s/Michael R. Morgan
For'the Court

970 . RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

AMENDMENTS TO THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The following amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by the Council of the North
Carolina State Bar at its quarterly meeting on January 27, 2017.

BEIT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that the
Rules of Professional Conduct, as particularly set forth in 27 N.C.A.C. 2,
Rule 3.8, Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, be amended as fol-
lows (additions are underlined, deletions are interlined):

27 N.C.A.C. 2, Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 8.8, Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(a)...

(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible evidence or r informa:
tion c) le likelihood that a convicted
it commit an_o' e for whic! defendant was convic the

prosecutor shall:
(1) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdic.

mptly disclose that evidence or rm: 0.
defendant_or defen col of rd_i if
the North Carolina of lige nse Services or, in the

of mviction, the federal public defender fc

the jurisdiction; or

(2) if the conviction was obtained in another jurisdiction,

ym] liscl that_evidence_or inft ition the

ecutor’s office in the jurisdictior th Wicti wr to (i) the
defendant or defendant's c ord if am si
the North Carolina of Indi: fense Services or, in the
case of a federal convictio: ic defender for
the jurisdiction of conviction.

who concludes in good faith evic or infor-
mation is 5 disclosure under paragraph
violate this rule even if the prosecutor's conclusion is subsequently
determined to be erroneous.

Comment

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 971

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate; the prosecutor’s duty is to seek justice,
not merely to convict or to uphold a conviction. This responsibility
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis
of sufficient evidence...

(2) ....

cutor ws of new, credible evidenc informa-
tion creating a reasonable likelihood that a defendant did not commit
an offe for whi lant was convicted in the prosecutor’
distri ires prompt disclosure to the defendant.
However, if disclosure will harm the defendant's interests or the integ-
ri 1 evi e or i ation, disclosure uld be made to the
de t's if isclosure must be made to Ni ‘oli
Indi Di rvic (CIDS) or, if appropriate, the fe ul
Ti ler, i] circumstances regardless of whether disclosur
is le lefen wr the ndant’s er. If there is a
ood faith basis for not di i idence or information to the
def discl e S or deral public defender and to
any counsel of record satisfies this rule. If the conviction was obtained
inane jurisdicti ari yh lows the prosecutor promptl
to dis the evic wr i ation e pro: r’s office in the
jurisdiction of conviction in lieu of any other disclosure. The prosecutor
in the jurisdiction of the conviction then has an independent of dis-
el ce yh |. In lie disclosure to the prosecutor's
office in the jurisdiction of iction, raph requires disclo-
sure to the defendant or to the defendant's lawyer, if any, and to NCIDS

or, if riat ic di 14

9] The word “new” in paras me: idence or infor-
ion unknown to a trial prosecutor at the time of the conviction or,
if ial prose: at the time of the conviction, never previ-
iscl 0 the dant _or defendant’s legal counsel. When
‘ing new evidence or information, the pro: itor m valuat
the substance of the information. iv it SOl dibili
of th ce, to ine w] er idence or information creates
ar le likelihood e defendant did not c it the offense.

10] Nevertheless, secutor who recei iden inform:
relative to_a conviction may disclose that evi e or i jon.
irected i ‘agraph 1) and (2) without. ination rmins
whether it is new, credible, or creates a reasonable likelihood that a con-
victes ndant di commit ‘ost who receiv
idence or i ation subject to disclosure under paragraph (g) does

972 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

not have a duty to undertake further investigation to determine whether
the defendant is in fact innoce!
FO: rs inde endent jud: i od I ith, that the

new evidence 01 yt_ of such nature as fot er th ie

ns of Ih. though st ni have been
erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule.
NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on January 27, 2017.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 28th day of February, 2017.

s/L. Thomas Lunsford, IT
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they
be published in the forthcoming volume of the Reports as provided by
the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 17th day of March, 2017.

s/Michael R. Morgan
For the Court,

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 973

AMENDMENTS TO THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

The following amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by the Council of the North
Carolina State Bar at its quarterly meeting on January 27, 2017.

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar that
the Rules of Professional Conduct be amended to include an entirely
new rule concerning a lawyer's duty upon receiving information about
a possible wrongful conviction, which will be codified as 27 N.C.A.C. 2,
Rule 8.6 and will read as follows:

27 N.C.A.C. 2, Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 8.6, Information About a Possible Wrongful Conviction

(a) Subject to paragraph (b), when a lawyer knows of credible evidence
or information, including evidence or information otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6, that creates a reasonable likelihood that a defendant did not
commit the offense for which the defendant was convicted, the lawyer
shall promptly disclose that evidence or information to the prosecuto-
rial authority for the jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted
and to North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services or, if appropri-
ate, the federal public defender for the district of conviction.

(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer shall not disclose evidence _
or information if:

(1) the evidence or information is protected from disclosure by law,
court order, or 27 N.C. Admin. Code Ch. 1B §.0129;

(2) disclosure would criminally implicate a current or former cli-
ent or otherwise substantially prejudice a current or former client's
interests; or

(8) disclosure would violate the attorney-client privilege applicable to
communications between the lawyer and a current or former client.

(c) Alawyer who in good faith concludes that information is not subject
to disclosure under this rule does not violate the rule even if that conclu-
sion is subsequently determined to be erroneous.

(d) This rule does not require disclosure if the lawyer knows an appro-
priate governmental authority, the convicted defendant, or the defen-
dant’s lawyer already possesses the information.

974 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

COMMENT

[1] The integrity of the adjudicative process faces perhaps no greater
threat than when an innocent person is wrongly convicted and incarcer-
ated. The special duties of a prosecutor with respect to disclosure of
potentially exonerating post-conviction information are set forth in Rule
8.8(g) and (h). However, as noted in the comment to Rule 3.3, Candor

. Toward the Tribunal, the special obligation to protect the integrity of
the adjudicative process applies to all lawyers. Under Rule 3.3(b), this
obligation may require a lawyer to disclose fraudulent testimony to a
tribunal even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that’
otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. Similarly, the need to rectify a
wrongful conviction and prevent or end the incarceration of an innocent
person justifies extending the duty to disclose potentially exculpatory
information to all members of the North Carolina State Bar, regardless
of practice area and limited only by paragraph (b). It also justifies the
disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. For prosecu-
tors, compliance with Rule 3.8(g) and (h) constitutes compliance with
this rule.

[2] This rule may require a lawyer to disclose credible evidence or infor-
mation, whether protected by Rule 1.6 or not, if the evidence or informa-
tion creates a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not
commit the offense for which the defendant was convicted. To deter-
mine whether disclosure is required, a lawyer must not only consider
the credibility of the evidence or information and its source but must
also evaluate the substance of the evidence or information to determine
whether it creates a reasonable likelihood that the defendant did not
commit the offense.

[3] The duty to disclose is qualified in paragraph (b) by legal obligations
and client loyalty. A lawyer may not disclose evidence or information
if prohibited by law, court order, or the administrative rule that makes
the proceedings of the State Bar’s Grievance Committee confidential
(27 N.C. Admin. Code Ch. 1B §.0129). The latter prohibition insures a
lawyer's response to a grievance does not inadvertently impose a duty
to disclose on the lawyers in the State Bar Office of Counsel or on the
State Bar Grievance Committee. In addition, paragraph (b) specifies that
a lawyer may not disclose evidence or information if doing so would
criminally implicate the lawyer's client or the evidence or information
was received in a privileged communication between the client and the
lawyer. Disclosure is also prohibited when it would result in substan-
tial prejudice the client’s interests. Substantial prejudice to a client’s

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 975

interests includes bodily harm, loss of liberty, or loss of a significant
legal right or interest such as the right to effective assistance of counsel
or the right against self-incrimination.

[4] When disclosure of information protected by Rule 1.6 is permitted,
the lawyer should counsel the client confidentially, advising the client
of the lawyer’s duty to disclose and, if possible, seeking the client's
cooperation.

NORTH CAROLINA
WAKE COUNTY

I, L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary-Treasurer of the North Carolina
State Bar, do hereby certify that the foregoing amendments to the Rules
and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar were duly adopted by
the Council of the North Carolina State Bar at a regularly called meeting
on January 27, 2017.

Given over my hand and the Seal of the North Carolina State Bar,
this the 3rd day of March, 2017.

01 Lunsford, If
L. Thomas Lunsford, II, Secretary

After examining the foregoing amendments to the Rules and
Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar as adopted by the Council
of the North Carolina State Bar, it is my opinion that the same are not
inconsistent with Article 4, Chapter 84 of the General Statutes.

This the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Mark Martin
Mark D. Martin, Chief Justice

Upon the foregoing certificate, it is ordered that the foregoing
amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State
Bar be spread upon the minutes of the Supreme Court and that they
be published in the forthcoming volume of the Reports as provided by

976 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

the Act incorporating the North Carolina State Bar, and as otherwise
directed by the Appellate Division Reporter.

This the 17th day of March, 2017.

For the Court

PILOT CLERK MEDIATION PROGRAM 977

ORDER WAIVING RULE 2A, 2B, AND 7B OF THE RULES
IMPLEMENTING MEDIATION IN MATTERS BEFORE THE
CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT DURING PILOT CLERK
MEDIATION PROGRAM

WHEREAS, on May 23, 2005, the General Assembly enacted G.S.
§ 7A-38.3B establishing a Clerk Mediation Program (Program) to provide
for mediation of matters pending before clerks of superior court, and

WHEREAS, N.C.G.S. § 7A4-38.3B(b) provided that this Court adopt
program rules and amendments to rules implementing the Program, and

WHEREAS, this Court adopted Rules Implementing Mediation In
Matters Before the Clerk of Superior Court (Rules) on January 26, 2006,
and

WHEREAS, the Program was implemented without benefit of a pilot
phase, and

WHEREAS, this Court is aware that the Program has been underuti-
lized since its inception, and

WHEREAS, in an effort to reinvigorate the Program, the NC Dispute
Resolution Commission (NCDRC) has established an Ad Hoc Clerk
Mediation Program Committee (Committee) and charged it with estab-
lishing a pilot program to evaluate the viability and potential of the
Program, and

WHEREAS, Rules 2.A and 2.B of the Rules provide that mediators
conducting mediations referred to the Program are to be certified by the
NCDRG, and

WHEREAS, Rule 7.B of the Rules provides that clerk appointed
mediators conducting mediations referred to the Program shall be com-
pensated at the rate of $150.00 per hour for mediation services, and

WHEREAS, Clerks who have agreed to participate in the pilot pro-
gram have expressed concern that Rules 2.A, 2.B, and 7.B limit their
ability to recruit mediators in whom they have the utmost confidence,
who are willing to travel to their counties, and who are willing and able
to volunteer their services, and

WHEREAS, the NCDRC has recommended that the requirements of
Rules 2.A and 2.B and 7.B be waived during the duration of the pilot in
order to permit parties and clerks in counties participating in the pilot
maximum flexibility to select and appoint mediators in whom they have
confidence, whether certified or not, and to permit those mediators to
waive their fees for the first two hours of mediation.

978 PILOT CLERK MEDIATION PROGRAM

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to G.S. § 7A-38.3B and the Rules
Implementing Mediation In Matters Before the Clerk of Superior Court,
this Court waives the requirements of Rules 2A, 2B, and 7.B of the Rules
Implementing Mediation In Matters Before the Clerk of Superior Court,
in pilot site counties for the duration of the pilot in order to permit both
certified and non-certified mediators, in the discretion of pilot site clerks
and the Commission, to serve pilot sites and to permit mediators to
waive their fees for the first two (2) hours of pilot program mediations.

Adopted by the Court in conference the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/Michael R. Morgan
For the Court

Witness my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, this the 16th day of March, 2017.

s/J. Bryan Boyd
J. Bryan Boyd
Clerk of the Supreme Court

JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION 979

JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION: 2017-02
September 13, 2017

QUESTION:
Under what circumstances can delay in convening court sessions rise to
the level of a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct?

CONCLUSION:

Ajudge has an ethical obligation under Canon 3A(4) to “dispose promptly
of the business of the court.” This obligation requires not only prompt-
ness in issuing decisions and orders, but punctuality in convening court.
In addition, judges have ethical obligations under Canon 1 and Canon 2
to observe personal standards of conduct that ensure public confidence
in the integrity, impartiality and independence of the judiciary. Canon
3A(8) further requires a judge to be “courteous to litigants, jurors, wit-
nesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in the judge’s
official capacity.” Finally, Canon 3B(1) provides that a judge should
diligently discharge the judge’s administrative responsibilities and main-
tain professional competence in judicial administration. Repeated or
unjustified tardiness of a judge in opening court sessions runs afoul of
these ethical rules and can lead to the imposition of judicial discipline.
If a recess is required to attend to other official business that must be
considered before the court session may proceed, the judge should as a
best practice open court on time and communicate either personally or
through court staff to those present in the courtroom when court will be
reconvened and the reasons for the recess.

DISCUSSION:

Delay is one of the most common complaints of judicial misconduct,
whether it arises from excessive grants of continuances, delays in ren-
dering decisions under advisement, lengthy periods of time in issuing
written orders, or the judge’s regular tardiness in appearing at sched-
uwled court times. These delays raise the costs of litigation, increase
frustration with the judicial system and diminish public confidence in
the courts. This concern was recently emphasized in the Final Report
of the Public Trust and Confidence Committee of the North Carolina
Commission on the Administration of Law and Justice, which noted .
as follows: “As stewards of public resources and individual citizens’
time, Judicial Branch officials must strive to operate a court system that
facilitates the just, timely, and economical scheduling and disposition of

980 JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION

cases.” Final Report, North Carolina Commission of the Administration
of Law and Justice, March 2017, at 69.

In the specific context of convening court sessions, ajudge’s ethical duty
under Canon 3A(5) to “dispose promptly of the business of the court”
includes the duty to be punctual and open court sessions as scheduled.
Tardiness in convening court also calls into question whether a judge is
meeting his or her obligation under Canon 3B(1) to “diligently discharge
the judge's administrative duties and maintain professional competence
in judicial administration. In addition, Canon 1 and Canon 2A of the
Code of Judicial Conduct require judges to observe personal standards
of conduct that ensure public confidence in the integrity, impartial-
ity and independence of the judiciary. Canon 3A(8) further requires a
judge to be “courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others
with whom the judge deals in the judge’s official capacity.” Repeated
or unjustified delays in convening court sessions threaten public confi-
dence in the judiciary and display a lack of courtesy towards litigants,
lawyers, victims, law enforcement, court personnel and all those who
are required to be punctual in arriving to court. A judge's tardiness also
exacerbates wait times associated with calendar calls and increases the
costs of litigation for represented litigants. Poor communication about
when the judge will arrive and the reasons for the delay heightens frus-
tration among individuals present in the courtroom, many of whom have
taken time away from work or traveled long distances to appear at the
required time under threat of sanction if late. In these circumstances,
when a judge repeatedly or unjustifiably fails to open court on time, the
attending frustration impairs public confidence in the courts.

Accordingly, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct occurs where a
judge engages in repeated or unjustified tardiness in convening court. A
judge should open court on time, and if a recess is required to attend to
other official business that must be considered before the court session
continues, the judge should as a best practice open court on time and
communicate either personally or through court staff to those present
in the courtroom when court will be reconvened and the reasons for
the recess.

References:
Canons 1, 2, 3A and 3B of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct

Final Report, North Carolina Commission of the Administration of Law
and Justice (March 2017)

HEADNOTE INDEX

TOPICS COVERED IN THIS INDEX

APPEAL AND ERROR
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION
ASSAULT

CITIES AND TOWNS

CLASS ACTIONS

CONFESSIONS AND INCRIMINATING
STATEMENTS:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CRIMINAL LAW

DIVORCE
DRUGS

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
ESTOPPEL

FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP -
HOMICIDE

JUDGES

JURISDICTION

JUVENILES

LANDLORD AND TENANT
LARCENY

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST
MOTOR VEHICLES

RAPE

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

SENTENCING

SEXUAL OFFENDERS

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
AND REPOSE

TAXATION

WITNESSES
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

ZONING

983

984

HEADNOTE INDEX

APPEAL AND ERROR

Additional issue on appeal—rendered moot by holding—Where the Court of
Appeals issued a writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s ruling on its sua sponte
motion for appropriate relief, the Supreme Court did not consider the second issue
raised by the parties on appeal: whether the decision by the Court of Appeals peti-
tion panel to issue the writ constituted a ruling on jurisdiction that bound the subse-
quent opinion panel. Because the Supreme Court addressed the underlying subject
matter jurisdiction question de novo, this issue was moot. State v. Thomsen, 22.

Appealability—Business Court designation—opposition overruled—inter-
locutory—In an action involving stock grant agreements and a designation of the
case as a mandatory complex business case, an interlocutory order of the North
Carolina Business Court overruling defendant's opposition to the designation of
the case was not immediately appealable. Defendant argued that she was denied
the substantial right to have the matter heard in the same manner as ordinary dis-
putes involving ordinary citizens, but she did not explain how she was prejudiced.
Although defendant contended that the Business Court’s decision was akin to the
denial of a motion for a change of venue, merely asserting a preference for a forum
other than the Business Court absent a specific, legal entitlement to an exclusion
from designation was insufficient. Hanesbrands Inc. v. Fowler, 216.

Appealability—class action certification granted—interlocutory—public
interest—appeal heard—Although defendant's appeal in a class action from the
certification of the class was interlocutory (denying certification affects a substan-
tial right), the subject matter of the this class action (assets held by the Fue-Cured
Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation) implicated the public interest to
such a degree that the Supreme Court invoked its supervisory authority. Fisher
v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 202.

Court of Appeals dissent and motion for appropriate relief—Supreme Court
supervisory authority—The Supreme Court exercised the supervisory authority
granted by Article IV, Section 12 of the North Carolina Constitution where the case
involved a dissent in the Court of Appeals and a motion for appropriate relief. Although
the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 7A-28 precludes Supreme Court review when there is
a dissent in the Court of Appeals and the case involves a motion for appropriate relief,
a statute cannot restrict the Supreme Court's constitutional authority under Article
IV, Section 12, Clause 1 of the Constitution of North Carolina to exercise jurisdiction
to review any decision of the courts below. State v. Todd, 707.

Evenly divided Supreme Court—Court of Appeals ruling stands—no prece-
dential authority—The decision of an evenly divided Supreme Court left intact the
ruling of the Court of Appeals on whether certain defenses were sufficiently alleged
in the complaint, although the Court of Appeals opinion was without precedential
authority. CommScope Credit Union v. Butler & Burke, LLP, 48.

Impaired driving—blood draw from unconscious defendant—per se excep-
tion—other issues not considered—In an impaired driving prosecution involving
ablood draw at a hospital from an unconscious defendant, whether a third party was
acting as an agent of the State or whether the independent source exception to the
exclusionary rule applied were separate determinations from the statutory per se
exception. State v. Romano, 678.

Preservation of issues—appeal by State—Where the State failed to advance an
argument prior to filing its discretionary review petition in the Supreme Court, the

HEADNOTE INDEX 985

APPEAL AND ERROR—Continued

State did not waive the right to make the argument on appeal. The question was
whether the ruling of the trial court was correct rather than whether the reason
given was sound or tenable, and the State had consistently maintained its position.
State v. Baker, 586.

Preservation of issues—failure to object below—failure to raise on appeal—
‘The decision of the Court of Appeals on an evidence question in a criminal prosecu-
tion was affirmed by the Supreme Court where defendant did not raise the issue at
trial and so did not preserve it for appeal. The decision of the Court of Appeals on
the remaining issue was not affected. State v. Collins, 60.

Rule of Appellate Procedure 2—invoked by Court of Appeals without discus-
sion of merits—The Court of Appeals erred in this case (Campbell ID) by invok-
ing Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure to review defendant’s fatal variance
argument. The panel in Campbell IT merely noted that a previous panel of that court
had, for the same case (Campbell 1), invoked Rule 2 to review a similar fatal vari-
ance argument and then, without further discussion or analysis regarding Rule 2, the
Campbell II panel addressed the merits of defendant's argument. The panel failed to
exercise its discretion when it did not consider whether defendant's case was one
of the rare instances meriting exercise of the court’s supervisory power under Rule
2. The case was reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for an independent
determination’ of whether the facts and circumstances merited the exercise of the
court's discretion to review the case under Rule 2. State v. Campbell, 599.

‘Two jury arguments—one objection—arguments not separate—In a murder
prosecution in which defendant raised the insanity defense, two statements by the
prosecutor about defendant's likelihood of release, viewed in context, were not sep-
arate and distinct. The second was a summary of the first, so that defendant's objec-
tion to the first was sufficient. State v. Dalton, 311.

Writ of certiorari—issues not accepted—The Court of Appeals’ decision to issue
awrit of certiorari is discretionary and that Court may choose to grant such a writ to
review some issues but not others. Two issues that defendant raised in his petition for
writ of certiorari did not survive that Court's decision to allow the writ for the limited
purpose of considering the voluntariness of his guilty plea. State v. Ross, 393.

ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION

Doctor's form—handed to patient with other forms—fiduciary relationship—
An arbitration agreement between a doctor (Dr. Bryant) and patient (Mr. King) that
was obtained as the result of a breach of fiduciary duty from which defendants ben-
efitted was not enforceable. The agreement was one of several forms given to Mr.
King to sign when he first atrived at Dr. Bryant's office. Mr. King reposed trust and
confidence in Dr. Bryant and provided confidential information even before seeing
Dr. Bryant, so that a fiduciary relationship existed at the time that Mr. King signed the
arbitration agreement. Defendants violated their fiduciary duty to Mr. King by failing
to make full disclosure of the nature and import of the arbitration agreement at or
before the time that it was presented for Mr, King’s signature. King v. Bryant, 451.

ASSAULT

Attempted—recognized in N.C.—Reversing a portion of the opinion of the Court
of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the offense of attempted assault with a

986 HEADNOTE INDEX

ASSAULT—Continued

deadly weapon inflicting serious injury is recognized in North Carolina. Although
there was precedent that an attempted assault was an attempt of an attempt for
which one may not be indicted, there were two common law rules under which a per-
son could be prosecuted for assault. The second, the show-of-violence rule, did not
involve an attempt to cause injury to another person. Because the attempted assault
offense is recognized offense, defendant's 2005 conviction was valid, and the trial
court did not err by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charges of possession
of a firearm by a felon and attaining habitual felon status. State v. Floyd, 329.

CITIES AND TOWNS

Water and sewer impact fee ordinances—for future use and expansion—
invalid—The Town of Carthage exceeded its municipal authority under the Public
Enterprise Statutes by adopting water and sewer “impact fee” ordinances that, upon
approval of any subdivision of real property, triggered immediate charges for future
water and sewer system expansion. These fees were assessed regardless of the prop-
erty owner's actual use of the systems or whether Carthage actually expanded its
systems. The plain language of the statute empowered the Town to charge for con-
temporaneous use of water and sewer services, not to collect fees for future discre-
tionary spending. Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 15.

CLASS ACTIONS.

Certification—alleged derivative action—The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in a class action suit against the Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization
Corporation by allowing a motion for class certification notwithstanding defendant's
contention that plaintiffs’ action was derivative in nature. Whether or not plaintiffs’
claims are derivative in nature, nothing in N.C.G.S. § 55-7-42 precludes class certifica-
tion in this case. Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 202.

Certification—class action—preferable to individual litigation—The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that a class action was superior to indivi
ual litigation in a case involving assets held by the Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative
Stabilization Corporation. Although defendant argued that the class was unman-
ageable simply because of its size, the trial court stated that the only pragmatically
effective way to provide relief under the circumstances was through certification of a
class and, given.the extremely large number of similarly situated class members and
the impracticality of requiring them to protect their rights through filing hundreds of
thousands of individual lawsuits, it could not be concluded that the trial court abused
its discretion. Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 202.

Certification—class representatives—no conflict of interest—The trial court
did not abuse its discretion by certifying the class where defendant argued that there
was a, conflict of interest between one of the class representatives and other mem-
bers of the plaintiff class, a director of the organization. Because plaintifis’ claims
were against defendant and not against individual directors, there was no sense in
which the director was “inculpating, if not suing, himself” by participating in this
case as a class representative. Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization
Corp., 202.

Certification—class members—common issues of law and fact—The trial
court did not err when certifying a class in an action against the Flue-Cured Tobacco

HEADNOTE INDEX 987

CLASS ACTIONS—Continued

Cooperative Stabilization Corporation by finding that the class members shared
numerous common issues of law and fact. The same basic questions of fact and law
would determine whether defendant was liable for its actions in retaining surplus
money as reserve funds and attempting to remove all the members who would not
agree to enter into a current exclusive marketing agreement. Fisher v. Flue-Cured
‘Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 202.

Certification—recovery—capable of fair determination—The trial court did
not abuse its discretion when certifying a class action involving assets held by the
Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation by concluding that each
class member's share of any recovery could be determined fairly based upon that
member's patronage interests in defendant and that a class action would preserve
the rights of numerous absent, unnamed class members. Fisher v. Flue-Cured
‘Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 202.

CONFESSIONS AND INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS

Miranda rights—knowing and voluntary waiver—by course of conduct—
Under the totality of the circumstances, the State established by a preponderance
of the evidence that defendant understood his Miranda rights but knowingly and
voluntarily waived them during a police interrogation. Through his course of con-
duct, defendant effected a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights: He listened
as the detective read his Miranda rights; he spoke coherently and was mature and
experienced enough to understand his rights; he did not state that he wanted to
remain silent or wanted an attorney; he emphatically denied any wrongdoing and
tried to convince the police of his innocence; and he was not threatened or coerced
in any way. An affirmative response acknowledging that defendant understood his
rights was not required for his waiver to be valid. Further, even assuming defendant
denied that he understood his rights, a bare statement that he did not understand,
without more, would not outweigh all of the evidence that he understood. State
v. Knight, 640.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Confrontation Clause—911 calls—The Confrontation Clause did not prohibit the
use of information received from an anonymous 911 caller and a reverse call by the
911 operator where the circumstances objectively indicated that the primary pu
pose for the calls was to enable law enforcement to meet an ongoing emergency and
the statements were nontestimonial in nature. State v. McKiver, 652.

Cruel and unusual punishment—juvenile sentence—life without parole—
A trial court order denying defendant's motion for appropriate relief was reversed
where defendant had received a sentence of life without parole as a seventeen-year-
old. The State's sole argument in defense of the denial of the motion was that Miller
v, Alabama, ___ US. _, 182 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), was not to be applied retroactively,
but Montgomery v. Louisiana, U.S. __, 136 §. Ct. 718 (2016), held that Miller
was entitled to retroactive application. State v. Perry, 390.

Cruel and unusual punishment—life without parole—defendant younger
than 18—A seventeen-year-old’s sentence of life without parole for first-degree
murder was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
as interpreted in Miller v. Alabama, U.S. __, 182 S, Ct. 2455 (2012). Although

988

HEADNOTE INDEX

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued

N.C.GS. § 15A-1380.5 might have increased the chance that defendant’s sentence
would be altered or commuted, it did not provide a sufficiently meaningful oppor-
tunity to reduce the severity of the sentence to constitute something less that life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, State v. Young, 118.

Effective assistance of counsel—disagreement over tactics—A prosecution
was remanded to the Court of Appeals with entry of an order dismissing an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim without prejudice to assert in a motion for appropri-
ate relief where defendant told the trial court that his attorney was not asking the
questions defendant wanted him to ask of a detective, the record did not shed light
on the nature and substance of the questions, defendant was generally disruptive
throughout trial, and it could not be ascertained whether defendant had a serious
disagreement with his attorney regarding trial strategy or whether he simply sought
to hinder the proceedings. State v. Floyd, 329.

Effective assistance of appellate counsel—failure to raise sufficiency of
evidence—The record was insufficient to determine whether defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel in the Court of Appeals where there was no deter-
mination of whether defendant's appellate counsel had a strategic reason to refrain
from addressing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction. The case
‘was remanded to the Court of Appeals. State v. Todd, 707.

Eugenics Board compensation—Court of Appeals jurisdiction—In a matter
arising from the Eugenics Board and the resulting compensation program, heard
first before the Industrial Commission, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to
consider claimant's constitutional challenge to N.C.G.S, § 143B-426.50(1). The
Industrial Commission had no authority to decide constitutional questions. In re
Redmond, 490.

North Carolina—prohibited local act—health and sanitation—water and
sewage system—Where the General Assembly passed legislation that, effectively
required the City of Asheville to involuntarily transfer the assets it used to operate a
public water system to anew metropolitan water and sewerage district, the Supreme
Court held that the legislation was a prohibited local act relating to health and sani-
tation, in violation of Article If, Section 24(1)(a) of the state constitution. First, the
legislation was crafted such that the involuntary transfer provision would apply only
to the City of Asheville, and this classification bore no reasonable relationship to the
stated justification of the legislation. Second, in light of its stated purpose and practi-
cal effect regarding public water and sewer services, the legislation had a material
connection to issues involving health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances.
City of Asheville v. State of N.C., 80.

CRIMINAL LAW

Guilty pleas—voluntariness—The Court of Appeals erred by vacating defen-
dant’s guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a felon where defendant pleaded
guilty knowingly and voluntarily. Considered in its entirety, the transcript of the plea
hearing did not demonstrate that defendant believed his plea was conditioned on
the right to seek review of any pretrial motion (defendant contended that the State
violated N.C.GS. § 154-711). State v. Ross, 393.

Insanity defense—closing argument—defendant’s likelihood of release—The
evidence in a first-degree murder prosecution in which defendant claimed insanity

HEADNOTE INDEX 989

CRIMINAL LAW—Continued

did not support the assertions made by the prosecutor during closing arguments
about defendant's likelihood of release. The prosecutor's argument was that it was
very possible that defendant would be released in fifty days if she was found not
guilty by reason of insanity. The level of possibility or probability of release was not
the salient:issue; rather, it was the evidence and all reasonable inferences that could
be drawn from that evidence which should have governed counsel’s arguments in
closing. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence presented at
‘rial was that it was highly unlikely that defendant would be able to demonstrate by
a preponderance of the evidence within fifty days that she was no longer dangerous
to others. State v. Dalton, 311.

Insanity defense—closing argument—prejudicial—n a first-degree murder
prosecution in which defendant claimed insanity, there was prejudicial error where
the prosecutor argued to the jury that it was “very possible” that defendant would be
released in fifty days when the overwhelming evidence was that defendant had com-
mitted the violent acts and that she had a longstanding history of substance abuse
and mental illness, It was unlikely that defendant could demonstrate within fifty days
that she was no longer dangerous to others. A reasonable possibility existed that the
jury would have found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity if the prosecutor
had not made the improper remarks during closing arguments. State v. Dalton, 311.

Self-defense—aggressor regaining the right—The trial court did not err, on the
evidence, in its self-defense instruction in a prosecution for assault with a deadly
‘weapon inflicting serious injury in a case where both the defendant and the victim
pulled guns in an argument over a woman. Historically, North Carolina law did not
allow an aggressor using deadly force to regain the right to self-defense when the
other responded by using deadly force. However, the General Assembly, by passing
N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4, appears to have allowed an aggressor to regain the right to uti-
lize defensive force under certain circumstances (use of non-deadly force). A care-
ful review of the record evidence in this case demonstrates, however, the complete
absence of any evidence tending to show that defendant was the aggressor using
non-deadly, as compared to deadly, force. State v. Holloman, 615.

DIVORCE

Equitable distribution—arbitration and settlement—allegations of fraud—
interlocutory appeal—settlement—In an action involving equitable distribution
and arbitration in which fraud in the valuation of a business was alleged after a set-
tlement, plaintiff had a right to appeal the trial court’s order denying discovery under
the substantial rights analysis of N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(8)(a), and a right to appeal may
exist under section 74-27 even if the order is not appealable under the arbitration
statute itself. The trial court had discretion to award discovery because the action
was pending pursuant to sections 50-53 and 50-54 of the Family Law Arbitration Act.
Stokes v. Crumpton, 713.

DRUGS

Newly enacted statute—unlawful to possess pseudoephedrine if prior con-
viction for methamphetamine possession or manufacture—as-applied chal-
lenge—aetive conduet—Where defendant was convicted of violating a newly
enacted statute, N.C.G.S. § 90-95(41)(1)(c), which made it unlawful for any person
with a prior conviction for the possession or manufacture of methamphetamine to

990

HEADNOTE INDEX

DRUGS—Continued

possess a pseudoephedrine product, based on his purchase of “Allergy Congestion
Relief D-ER tabs,” the Supreme Court held that his conviction did not violate his
federal constitutional right to due process of law. His as-applied challenge failed
because his conviction rested upon his own active conduct rather than a “wholly
passive” failure to act. State v. Miller, 658. .

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Allegations of severe distress—sufficiency of allegations—The plaintiff in an
intentional infliction of emotional distress action sufficiently alleged severe emo-
tional distress where the complaint stated that plaintiff's severe emotional distress
manifested itself in diagnosable form, including depression, anxiety, loss of sleep,
loss of appetite, lack of concentration, difficulty remembering things, feelings of
alienation from loved ones, shame, and loss of respect with the community and co-
workers, and damages “in excess of $10,000.00.” Turner v. Thomas, 419.

First-degree murder prosecution—extreme and outrageous conduct—
Plaintiff sufficiently alleged extreme and outrageous conduct in an intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress action against an SBI blood analyst following plaintiff's
first-degree murder acquittal where his allegations painted a picture of law enforce-
ment officials deliberately abusing their authority as public officials to manipulate
evidence and distort a case for the purpose of reaching a foreordained conclusion of
guilt. Turner v. Thomas, 419.

Intent—first-degree murder prosecution—In an intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress action, plaintiff sufficiently alleged intent to inflict emotional distress.
While standing trial for first-degree murder is unquestionably stressful for anyone,
plaintiff's complaint did not allege that defendants were merely negligent or that,
their investigation was inadequate; instead, the complaint alleged sinister motives
and conduct by defendants specifically aimed toward the improper purpose of
wrongfully convicting plaintiff of murder. Turner v. Thomas, 419.

ESTOPPEL

Judicial—collateral attack—inconsistent position—The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel to dismiss coun-
terclaims arising from a failed hotel development project. In a prior related case,
defense counsel had assured a federal court that defendant would not collaterally
attack the federal judgment by relitigating claims from the same facts. The trial court,
found that defendant essentially took the action which defense counsel had stated it
would not take, thereby adopting an inconsistent position. Old Republic Nat'l Title
Ins. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 500.

FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

Auditor—duties to third parties—not a fiduciary relationship—The trial court
erred by allowing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) in an action for breach of fiduciary duty and other claims
arising from an auditor's failure to discover that plaintiff's General Manager had not
filed required tax returns for plaintiff (which was exempt from federal tax) for sev-
eral years. Independent auditors often have significant obligations to third parties
or to the public at large that would prevent them from acting solely in their audit

HEADNOTE INDEX . 991

FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP—Continued

clients’ best interests, and a fiduciary relationship therefore does not arise as a mat-
ter of law, although it may exist in fact. CommScope Credit Union v. Butler &
Burke, LLP, 48.

HOMICIDE

Felony murder—instructions—aggressor doctrine—no plain error—There
was no plain error where the trial instructed the jury on the aggressor doctrine of
self-defense in a felony murder prosecution. The State did not solely rely on the
theory that defendant was the aggressor but also offered evidence that tended to
contradict defendant's evidence as to each of the other elements of self-defense.
Defendant failed to establish that, absent an instruction on the aggressor doctrine,
the jury would have credited his account of the night's events over other contrary
testimony. State v. Juarez, 351.

Instructions—felony murder—instructions—lesser included offenses—The
trial court correctly denied defendant's request for instructions on second-degree
murder and voluntary manslaughter in a felony murder prosecution where there was
no conflict in the evidence regarding whether defendant committed the underlying
felony of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle while it was in operation.
‘The conflicting evidence must relate to whether defendant committed the crime
charged, not whether defendant was legally justified in committing the crime. State
v. Juarez, 351.

JUDGES

Discipline—sitting judges—misconduct while in office—jurisdiction—Where
a sitting judge engaged in misconduct while in office, the North Carolina State Bar
Disciplinary Hearing Commission lacked the authority to investigate and discipline
him. Pursuant to the state constitution and the General Statutes, jurisdiction to dis-
cipline sitting judges for their conduct while in office rests solely with the Judicial
Standards Commission and the Supreme Court of North Carolina, N.C. State Bar
v. Tillett, 264.

Gross rental income not reported—hearing criminal matter involving ten-
ant—restitution—A district court judge was publically reprimanded for not report-
ing gross rental income and for accepting restitution from a tenant while presiding
over a criminal matter involving the tenant that the judge had initiated as the com-
plaining witness. The Judicial Standard Commission's findings of fact, including the
dispositional determinations, were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evi-
dence in the record. Additionally, the Commission's findings of fact supported its
conclusions of law. The Commission's findings and conclusions were adopted by the
Supreme Court. In re Mack, 236.

JURISDICTION

Subject matter—writ of certiorari—issued by Court of Appeals—review of
sua sponte motion for appropriate relief—Where the trial court accepted defen-
dant'’s guilty plea and immediately thereafter granted its own motion for appropriate
relief, vacated the judgment and the mandatory 300-month sentence, and sentenced
defendant to 144 to 238 months, the Court of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari. Pursuant to the state constitution, the General Assembly

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SJURISDICTION—Continued

has the power to define the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c)
empowers the Court of Appeals to review trial court rulings on motions for appropri-
ate relief by writ of certiorari, and this default rule controls unless a more specific
statute restricts jurisdiction. Here, if the trial court’s sua sponte motion was pursu-
ant to subsection 15A-1415(b), the holding in State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40 (2015),
controlled and the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction. And if the motion was pursuant
to subsection 15A-1420(d), the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction because nothing
in the General Statutes revoked the jurisdiction conferred by subsection 7A-32(c).
State v. Thomsen, 22.

, JUVENILES

Breaking and entering investigation—interview—request for parent—
ambiguous—In a prosecution for felonious brealcing and entering and other charges
in which a sixteen-and-one-half-year-old defendant was interviewed by investigators,
his statement, “Um, can I call my mom?” was not a clear and unambiguous invoca-
tion of his right to have his parent or guardian present during questioning. Defendant
never gave any indication that he wanted to have his mother present for his interro-
gation, did not condition his interview on first speaking with her, and had just signed
the juvenile rights form expressing his desire to proceed on this own. The purpose
of the call was never established and law enforcement officers had no duty to ask
clarifying questions or to cease questioning. Defendant's statutory juvenile rights,
which included the equivalent of the Miranda warnings, were not violated. State
v Saldierna, 401.

Confession—two-pronged review—A breaking and entering case involving a
sixteen-and-one-half-year-old defendant was remanded where defendant asked dur-
ing an interview with an investigator if he could call his mom, did so, and confessed
after the conversation with the investigator resumed. The admissibility of a juvenile
defendant's confession is a two-pronged inquiry. Even though defendant's N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-2101(a)(8) right was not violated, defendant's confession is not admissible
unless he knowingly, willingly, and understandingly waived his rights. The Court of
Appeals did not reach this question. State v. Saldierna, 401.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

Public housing—drug activity—ejectment—exercise of discretion by land-
lord—Summary ejectment was inappropriate in a case involving drug activity in
federally subsidized housing where plaintiff Housing Authority did not exercise dis-
cretion before pursuing defendant's eviction, as required by federal law. E. Carolina
Reg’l Housing Auth. v. Lofton, 8.

LARCENY

Mistaken deposit—constructive possession—The State presented sufficient evi-
dence to support defendant's larceny convictions where defendant, a truck driver
and independent contractor, passively but knowingly received an overpayment by
direct deposit and then proceeded to withdraw the excess funds against the wishes
of the rightful possessor. The company for which defendant was driving (West) had
the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the funds by efifect-
ing a reversal of the deposit; the fact that the reversal order was not successful did
not indicate that West lacked constructive possession. Defendant had no possessory
interest in the funds for the same reasons. State v. Jones, 631.

HEADNOTE INDEX 993

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

First-degree murder—SBI blood analyst—acts after indictment—The trial
court properly concluded that plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against defen-
dants should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because plaintiff failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Based on the facts known to the investi-
gators at the time of the grand jury proceedings, a reasonable and prudent person
would believe there was probable cause sufficient to prosecute plaintiff for first-
degree murder. The continuation theory was not before the Supreme Court on this
appeal. Turner v. Thomas, 419.

MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST

Foreclosure—anti-deficiency statute—true value of property—evidence not
sufficient—The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for plaintiff-
bank in an action under N.C.GS. § 45-21.36, North Carolina's anti-deficiency stat-
ute, The borrower must show that the creditor's successful foreclosure bid was less
that the property's true value; merely reciting the statutory language or asserting
an unsubstantiated opinion is not sufficient. United Cmty. Bank v. Wolfe, 555.

Foreclosure—substitute trustee—anthority—The trial court properly refused to
authorize a creditor to proceed with a foreclosure where the creditor failed to estab-
lish the substitute trustee's authority to foreclose under the deed of trust. However,
the trial court erred by entering a “dismissal with prejudice.” The refusal to authorize
the creditor to proceed was not a “dismissal” and did not implicate res judicata or
collateral estoppel in the traditional sense. The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by refusing to admit a limited power of attorney appointing a service company,
which, in turn, was relied upon to appoint a substitute trustee. The excluded limited
power of attorney was not internally consistent. In re Foreclosure of Lucks, 222.

Foreclosure—pleadings—The trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff's foreclosure
claim under N.C.G.S. § 14-1, Rule 12(b)(6) where it applied requirements applicable
to non-judicial foreclosures by power of sale to a judicial foreclosure. Foreclosure
by action or “judicial foreclosure,” unlike non-judicial foreclosure by power of sale,
is an ordinary civil action governed by the liberal standard of notice pleading. A
missing indorsement at the initial notice-pleading stage did not preclude the bank
from proceeding with its civil action. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Pinkney, 723.

Non-judicial foreclosure hearing—trustee’s withdrawal of notice—The order
of the superior court clerk of court, the order of the superior court, and the opinion
of the Court of Appeals in a foreclosure case all were vacated where the trustee
effectively withdrew its notice of non judicial foreclosure hearing, thus terminating
the hearing. In re Foreclosure of Beasley, 221.

MOTOR VEHICLES

Driving while impaired—instructions—The standard jury instruction on credibil-
ity was sufficient in an impaired driving prosecution, and the trial court adequately
conveyed the substance of defendant's requested instructions. Defendant's proposed
instructions were meant to ensure that the jury realized it could consider the evi-
dence presented by defendant of his lack of impairment, notwithstanding the evi-
dence provided by the chemical analysis. State v. Godwin, 604.

Driving while impaired—reasonable grounds—There was sufficient evidence in
the record to show that a police sergeant had reasonable grounds to believe defendant

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MOTOR VEBHICLES—Continued

had committed a driving while impaired offense. The record showed that defendant
stopped his vehicle at a congested intersection in the middle of the day, left the
vehicle while wearing his sweater backwards, stumbled across four lanes of traf-
fic, had a bottle of rum in his possession, and had vomited on himself and in his
vehicle before exiting the vehicle. When police arrived, defendant was incoherent
with slurred speech; his eyes were bloodshot; he smelled strongly of alcohol; and
he could not stand or sit without assistance. Reasonable grounds in this context is
equivalent to probable cause, State v. Romano, 678.

RAPE

Attempted—evidence sufficient—completed rape—Evidence tending to show
that a completed rape occurred in the victim's bedroom was sufficient to support
defendant's conviction for attempted rape of a child, and the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the attempted rape charge for insufficiency of
the evidence. State v. Baker, 586.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Driving while impaired—blood draw—unconscious—In a prosecution for
impaired driving, the trial court correctly suppressed blood test results taken from
a highly inebriated defendant at a hospital without a warrant. The officer did not
attempt to obtain a warrant for defendant's blood, did not believe any exigency
existed, and instead expressly relied upon the statutory authorization set forth in
N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b), allowing the taking and testing of blood from a person who has
committed a driving while impaired offense if the person is unconscious or other-
wise incapable of refusal. However, unlike breath tests, blood tests require an intru-
sive piercing of the skin and give law enforcement a sample that can be preserved
and from which more than a blood alcohol reading can be determined. The United
States Supreme Court has concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not permit
warrantless blood tests incident to arrest for drunk driving. The analysis here is lim-
ited to N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(b) and does not address any other provision of the implied-
consent statute. State v. Romano, 678.

Search warrant—house—probable cause—Where there was an anonymous tip
that the resident (Michael Turner, with whom defendant was staying) was “selling,
using and storing narcotics at” his house, and where a detective's affidavit in support
of the search warrant listed his training and experience, Turner's history of drug-
related arrests, and the detective's discovery of both marijuana residue and corre-
spondence addressed to Turner in trash from Turner's residence, under the totality
of the circumstances there was probable cause for issue of a search warrant for the
house. State v. Lowe, 360. .

Search warrant—house—rental car in curtilage—nature of items to be
seized—aA rental car parked in the curtilage of a residence was within the scope of a
search warrant and could be searched pursuant to the warrant to search the house. It
was undisputed that when officers arrived at the target residence to execute the war-
rant, the rental car parked in the driveway was within the curtilage of the home and
the nature of the items to be seized was such that the items could be easily stored in
avehicle. State v. Lowe, 360.

HEADNOTE INDEX 995

SEARCH AND SEIZURE—Continued

Warrant to search house—probable cause—In a prosecution for drug offenses,
the facts alleged in a detective’s affidavit were sufficient to support probable cause to
issue a warrant to search defendant's house where two half-brothers were stopped
in a car, drugs were found in the car, an investigation revealed that they lived in
defendant's house, the warrant was issued, and more drugs and paraphernalia were
found in the house. Under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a sub-
stantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to search defendant's home.
State v. Allman, 292.

SENTENCING

Sex offender registration—petition to terminate—In a case involving the trial
court’s denial of defendant's petition to terminate his sex offender registration, the
North Carolina Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for application of the
“modified categorical approach” to determine whether defendant was eligible for
termination of the registration requirement. Federal statutory provisions governing
termination of sex offender registration, which involve tier levels for different cat-
egories of sexual offenses, interact with state law. Defendant's eligibility for termina-
tion of registration depended upon the extent to which his convictions for indecent
liberties were comparable to or more severe than convictions for abusive sexual
conduct under the federal statute. State v. Moir, 370.

SEXUAL OFFENDERS

No contact order—third parties—victim’s minor children—In a case arising
from convictions for attempted second-degree rape and other offenses, the trial
court had the authority under the catch-all provision of N.C.G.S. § 154-1340.50 to
enter a no contact order specifically including the victim and her minor children.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.50 protects the victim of the sex offense, not third parties, and
the catch-all provision cannot be read to expand the reach of the statute. However,
the victim can be protected from indirect contact by the defendant through the vic-
tim’s family or friends when appropriate findings are made by the trial court. State
v. Barnett, 298.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE

Easement—utility—relief for encroachment—xecovery of land—In an action
by a utility to recover the use of its easement, the applicable statute of limitations
was the twenty-year statute for real estate found in N.C.G.S. § 1-40 rather than the
six-year statute of limitations for incorporeal hereditaments found in N.C.GS. §
1-60(a)(8). Although easements are incorporeal hereditaments, plaintiff was seeking
full use of its easement. Because the easement is real property, the claim is for the
recovery of real property. Pottle v. Link, 187 N.C. App. 746 (2007), was overruled
insofar as it deemed N.C.G.S. § 1-40 inapplicable to actions involving encroachments
on easements. Moreover, the state is criss-crossed with utility facilities, and their
accompanying easements are not always readily subject to routine inspection by the
owning utility. The drafters of N.C.G.S. § 1-50(a)(8) did not intend that a utility's right
to maintain such easements could be successfully challenged in a time as short as six
years. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 1.

996

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‘TAXATION

Franchise and income tax—excluded corporation—building or construction
contractox—The trial court did not err by concluding that Midrex Technologies,
Inc. was not entitled to a franchise and income tax refund where the issue in the
case was whether the corporation was entitled to utilize the single-factor tax alloca-
tion formula authorized by N.C.G.S. § 105-130.4(r) and made available to exempt
corporations engaged in business as a building or construction contractor, Although
the record did contain evidence tending to show that Midrex employees engaged in
construction management activities and performed a limited amount of hands-on
construction activity, that evidence was not enough to support a decision to classify
Midrex as an “excluded corporation” on the grounds that it is a “building or construc-
tion contractor.” Midrex Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 250.

WITNESSES

Expert—officer implicitly qualified—The trial court did not err in an impaired
driving prosecution by allowing a police officer to testify about the Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus (HGN) test and about defendant's impairment even though the officer
was not explicitly qualified as an expert. The trial court implicitly found that the
officer was qualified to give expert testimony. Moreover, it is evident that the General
Assembly envisioned this scenario and made clear provision to allow testimony from
an individual who has successfully completed training in HGN and meets the criteria
set forth in Rule of Evidence 702(a). State v. Godwin, 604.

Expert—repressed memory and suggestibility of memory—The trial court
did not err in a prosecution for child sex offenses by excluding the testimony of
a defense expert regarding repressed memory and the suggestibility of memory. A
defense expert is not required to examine or interview the prosecuting witness as
a prerequisite to testifying about issues concerning the prosecuting witness at trial.
Rule 702 does not mandate any particular procedural requirements for evaluating
expert testimony, and the record here demonstrated sufficient evidence to support
the trial court's decision to exclude the testimony. State v. Walston, 547.

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

Compensable condition—effect on wage-earning capacity—In a Workers’
Compensation case, the Industrial Commission erred by failing to address the effects
of plaintiffemployee's tinnitus in determining whether he lost wage-earning capac-
ity. The case was remanded to the Commission for findings addressing plaintiff's
wage-earning capacity, considering plaintiff's compensable tinnitus in the context of
all the preexisting and coexisting conditions bearing upon his wage-earning capac-
ity. Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 730.

Form 60 compensable injuries—additional medical treatment sought—
presumption in favor of plaintiff—Where plaintiffemployee sustained signifi-
cant physical injuries as a result of an automobile accident that occurred during
the course and scope of his employment, and defendant-employer filed a Form 60
accepting that plaintiff had suffered compensable injuries by accident and began
paying temporary total compensation and medical compensation for his injuries, the
Industrial Commission erred by failing to give plaintiff the benefit of a presumption
that the additional medical treatment he sought was for conditions related to his
compensable injuries. Plaintiff was entitled to a presumption that additional medi-
cal treatment for tinnitus, anxiety, and depression was related to his compensable
conditions. Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 730.

HEADNOTE INDEX 997

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION—Continued

Permanent, partial disability—findings and conclusions—insufficient—The
Industrial Commission in a workers’ compensation case did not carry out a 2014
mandate of the Court of Appeals on remand that it make additional findings of fact
and conclusions of law on the issue of plaintiff's entitlement to permanent partial
disability benefits under N.C.G.S. § 97-31. The case was remanded for compliance
with the 2014 mandate. Harrison v. Gemma Power Sys., LLC, 572.

ZONING

Extraterritorial jurisdiction—withdrawal by legislature—An act by the legis-
lature withdrawing extraterritorial jurisdiction from the Town of Boone was squarely
within the legislature's general power as described in the first clause of Article VI,
Section 1 of the state constitution. Local jurisdictional reorganization is precisely the
type of “organization and government and fixing of boundaries” contemplated by the
first clause of Article VI, Section 1 and historically approved by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, Town of Boone v. State of N.C., 126.