State: Connecticut
Volume: 303
Term: 2011-2012
Jurisdiction(s): Connecticut
Source: https://static.case.law/conn/303.pdf

ROBERT MURTHA »v. CITY OF HARTFORD
(SC 18751)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js.

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Argued September 22—officially released November 29, 2011

Nathalie Feola-Guerrieri, senior assistant corpora-
tion counsel, with whom was Helen Apostolidis, for
the appellant (defendant).

Donn. Swift, with whom, on the brief, were Hugh F.
Keefe, Benjamin D. Gettinger and Michael A. Georgetti,
for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion
EVELEIGH, J. The defendant, the city of Hartford,
appeals! from the judgment of the trial court awarding
the plaintiff, Robert Murtha, $562,277.50 in an indemnifi-
cation action brought pursuant to General Statutes
(Rev. to 2009) § 53-39a.? On appeal, the defendant claims

‘The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
General Statutes § 51-199 (¢) and Practice Book § 65-1.

®* General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 58-39a provides in relevant part: “When-
ever, in any prosecution of an officer of . . . a local police department for
a crime allegedly committed by such officer in the course of his duty as
such, the charge is dismissed or the officer found not guilty, such officer
shall be indemnified by his employing governmental unit for economic loss
sustained by him as a result of such prosecution, including the payment of
any legal fees necessarily incurred. Such officer may bring an action in the
Superior Court against such employing governmental unit to enforce the
provisions of this section.”

Section 53-89a was amended by No. 10-68 of the 2010 Public Acts, effective
October 1, 2010, which deleted the phrase “any legal fees necessarily

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that the judgment of the trial court ordering the defen-
dant to reimburse the plaintiff $460,613.40 in attorney’s
fees was improper because the fees were not actually
incurred by the plaintiff and were excessive. In
response, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court prop-
erly ordered the defendant to reimburse him his attor-
ney’s fees because he had incurred those fees and the
fees were reasonable. The defendant further claims that
the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) the plain-
tiff was not required to exhaust his administrative reme-
dies under the collective bargaining agreement prior to
seeking indemnification under § 53-39a; (2) the plain-
tiffs employment claims were cognizable under § 53-
39a; (3) the plaintiff had standing to assert his employ-
ment claims under § 53-39a; (4) lost wages and lost
employment benefits constitute “economic loss” within
the meaning of § 53-39a; and (5) the plaintiff could
recover under § 53-39a when his suspension resulted
from the defendant’s administrative proceedings. The
plaintiff responds that our recent decision in Nyenhuis
v. Metropolitan District Commission, 300 Conn. 708,
22 A.3d 1181 (2011), controls these claims and that the
trial court’s award for economic loss was proper. We
agree with the plaintiff, and accordingly, affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. On January 26, 2003, the plaintiff,
while in the course of his employment as a uniformed
police officer of the defendant’s police department, was
involved in a shooting. On February 25, 2003, the plain-

incurred,” and inserted language that such economic loss “includ{es] the
payment of attorney's fees and costs incurred during the prosecution and
the enforcement of this section.” This amendment superseded our holding
in Link v. Shelton, 186 Conn. 623, 632, 443 A.2d 902 (1982), wherein we
concluded that § 68-392 did not provide for “recovery of attorney's fees
sustained as a result of a separate action to enforce the right to indemnifica-
tion under § 53-39a.” All references to § 53-39a are to the 2009 revision
unless otherwise noted.

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tiff was arrested and charged in connection with the
shooting with assault in the first degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5), one count of falsely
reporting an incident in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-180c (a) (3), and one count of fabricating physical
evidence in violation of General Statutes § 58a-155 (a)
(2). On that same day, the chief of police of the defen-
dant’s police department forwarded a letter to the plain-
tiff, referencing the date of the plaintiff's arrest and the
criminal charges against the plaintiff and suspending
him without pay “pending the outcome of this matter
through administrative procedures.”

Subsequently, the plaintiff retained two attorneys,
Hugh F. Keefe and Michael A. Georgetti, to represent
him with regard to the criminal charges. The plaintiff
entered into separate fee agreements with each attor-
ney. After a trial, the plaintiff was acquitted of all
charges.

Thereafter, pursuant to § 53-39a, the plaintiff brought
this action against the defendant seeking reimburse-
ment for legal fees, lost wages and lost employment
benefits. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's claims, asserting that: (1) the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
claims for lost wages and lost employment benefits
because recovery under § 53-39a is limited to legal fees;
and (2) the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies under the collective bargaining agreement
prior to filing the action. The trial court denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Subsequently, the defendant contended that the
plaintiff's claims for lost wages and lost employment
benefits were not cognizable under § 53-39a because
they were breach of contract claims, not indemnifica-
tion claims. The defendant further asserted that, even.
if cognizable under § 53-39a, the plaintiff could not

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recover under that provision because his suspension
resulted from the defendant’s administrative proceed-
ings, not the plaintiffs arrest or criminal prosecution.
The trial court rejected these jurisdictional claims and
awarded the plaintiff damages of $62,243.05 for lost
base salary, $25,020 for lost overtime, and $14,401.05
for lost accrued time.

The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff was not
entitled to the entire amount of attorney’s fees sought.
First, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff was only
obligated to pay the attorney's fees for which he had
been billed, and that, therefore, the defendant was not
obligated to indemnify the plaintiff for any amount in
excess of those fees. Specifically, the defendant
asserted that the plaintiff was not entitled to reimburse-
ment for any of Keefe’s fees beyond the $20,000 retainer
he had paid because Keefe had not billed the plaintiff
for any amount in excess of the retainer. The defendant
also asserted that the plaintiff was not entitled to the
total amount of both attorney’s fees sought because
these fees were excessive. The trial court found that
the fee agreement between the plaintiff and Keefe was
ambiguous and, therefore, heard evidence regarding the
parties’ understanding of the agreement. On the basis
of that evidence, the trial court determined that the
plaintiff was obligated to pay Keefe for the legal services
rendered beyond the $20,000 retainer. The trial court
further found that the agreement between the plaintiff
and Georgetti was clear in that the plaintiff was obli-
gated to pay Georgetti legal fees beyond the initial $2500
retainer. The trial court also found that the attorney’s
fees charged were necessarily incurred because there
was no duplication of effort and the attorneys appeared
to have very different roles in the plaintiff's representa-
tion. Accordingly, the trial court awarded the plaintiff
additional damages of $207,307.03 for Keefe’s attorney's

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fees and $253,306.37 for Georgetti’s attorney's fees.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court’s
judgment ordering the defendant to reimburse the plain-
tiff $460,613.40 in attorney’s fees was improper. Specifi-
cally, the defendant asserts that the trial court
improperly: (1) awarded fees beyond those actually
incurred by the plaintiff; (2) used parol evidence to
interpret the agreement between the plaintiff and Keefe;
and (3) awarded attorney’s fees that were not “necessar-
ily incurred” as required by § 53-39a. In response, the
plaintiff asserts that the trial court properly concluded
that the terms of the contract between the plaintiff
and Keefe were ambiguous, that the parol evidence
established that the plaintiff actually incurred the attor-
ney’s fees and that the attorney's fees were reasonable.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable
standard of review and guiding principles. The resolu-
tion of this appeal requires us to interpret the language
of a contract, in this case the agreement between the
plaintiff and Keefe. “A contract must be construed to
effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined.
from the language used interpreted in the light of the
situation of the parties and the circumstances con-
nected with the transaction.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Remillard v. Remillard, 297 Conn. 345, 355,
999 A.2d 713 (2010).

“[T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a
fair and reasonable construction of the written words
and... the language used must be accorded its com-
mon, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where
it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the
[writing]. . . . Where the language of the [writing] is
clear and unambiguous, the [writing] is to be given
effect according to its terms. A court will not torture

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words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning
leaves no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any

ambiguity in a [written instrument] must emanate from
the language used in the [writing] rather than from one
party’s subjective perception of the terms.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) 19 Perry Street, LLC v.
Unionville Water Co., 294 Conn. 611, 623, 987 A.2d 1009
(2010). “If a contract is unambiguous within its four
corners, the determination of what the parties intended
by their contractual commitments is a question of law.
. . . When the language of a contract is ambiguous,
[however] the determination of the parties’ intent is a
question of fact, and the trial court’s interpretation is
subject to reversal on appeal only if it is clearly errone-
ous.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Remillard v. Remillard, supra, 297 Conn. 355.

General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53-39a provides in
relevant part: “Whenever, in any prosecution of an offi-
cer of . . . a local police department for a crime alleg-
edly committed by such officer in the course of his duty
as such, the charge is dismissed or the officer found
not guilty, such officer shall be indemnified by his
employing governmental unit for economic loss sus-
tained by him as a result of such prosecution, including
the payment of any legal fees necessarily incurred.
Such officer may bring an action in the Superior Court
against such employing governmental unit to enforce
the provisions of this section.” (Emphasis added.)

A

The defendant first asserts that, under the clear lan-
guage of the agreement between the plaintiff and Keefe,
the plaintiff was obligated to pay only the $20,000
retainer, and that the trial court improperly concluded
that the language of the agreement was ambiguous and
improperly considered parol evidence regarding the
parties’ intent under the contract. In response, the plain-

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tiff claims that the trial court properly concluded that
the language of this agreement was ambiguous as to
whether, under the terms of the contract, the plaintiff
was obligated to pay only the $20,000 retainer or if he
was obligated to pay more. Furthermore, the plaintiff
asserts that, after finding that the language of the
agreement was ambiguous, the trial court properly con-
sidered evidence regarding the parties’ intent under the
contract. We agree with the plaintiff.

“A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear
and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . The
court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where
ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . .
Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance differ-
ent interpretations of the language in question does not.
necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambigu-
ous. . . . In contrast, a contract is ambiguous if the
intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the
language of the contract itself... . [A]Jny ambiguity in
a contract must emanate from the language used by
the parties. . . . The contract must be viewed in its
entirety, with each provision read in light of the other
provisions . . . and every provision must be given
effect if it is possible to do so. . . . If the language of
the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, the contract is ambiguous.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Cantonbury Heights Condo-
minium Assn., Inc. v. Local Land Development, LLC,
273 Conn. 724, 735, 873 A.2d 898 (2005).

In the present case, the contract between the plaintiff
and Keefe provides in relevant part: “This will confirm
our conversation in my office on [December 2, 2005]
in the above-captioned case in which you are charged
with [a]ssault [in the first degree], [fabricating [p]hysi-
cal [e]vidence and [flalsely [r]eporting an [i]ncident. I
indicated to you [I] would agree to represent you in the
trial of this case along with Attorney Michael Georgetti

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of Hartford. That agreement is subject to the following
terms and conditions:

“1. As I understand it, it is agreed that I would be
the lead lawyer at trial. . . .

“3, Fee. As you know, if you are acquitted of the
charges or dismissed, the [defendant] is responsible for
your legal fees. If you are convicted of anything, the
[defendant] is not responsible. Even if [the defendant
pays], itis usually at areduced fee. Accordingly, I would
charge you a $20,000 non-refundable retainer. . . .”°

In determining that the agreement was ambiguous,
the trial court found that the agreement was clear that
the plaintiff assumed an obligation to Keefe to pay him
for legal fees, but that the agreement was not clear as
to the amount of the fees that the plaintiff agreed to
pay Keefe. We agree with the trial court's conclusion
that the agreement was ambiguous. The agreement uses
the terms “retainer” and “legal fees,” without a defini-
tion of either term. We begin our examination of the
parties’ written agreement by determining the common
understanding of the terms “retainer” and “legal fees.”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines retainer as “[a] lump-
sum fee paid by the client to engage a lawyer at the
outset of a matter” or “[aJn advance payment of fees
for work that the lawyer will perform in the future.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009). The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th Ed.
2006) defines “legal fees” as a “fee paid for legal ser-
vices.” Therefore, the use of these two terms together
does not clarify whether the plaintiff was obligated to
pay fees beyond the retainer. Moreover, the agreement
explains that if the plaintiff was acquitted or the charges
were dismissed, the defendant would be responsible

°We note that the plaintiff has not challenged the sufficiency of the
agreement. Nevertheless, the plaintiff acknowledges that it would have been
preferable if the retainer agreement had been clearer and more complete.

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for his legal fees, at a reduced rate without any explana-
tion of what rate Keefe would charge the plaintiff or
what would constitute the reduced rate. We conclude,
therefore, that the trial court properly found that the
agreement was ambiguous.

The defendant further asserts that the trial court
improperly considered parol evidence to interpret the
terms of the contract between the plaintiff and Keefe.
In response, the plaintiff contends that the trial court
properly considered such evidence because the
agreement was ambiguous. We agree with the plaintiff.

The following additional facts are necessary to our
resolution of the plaintiff's claim. After the trial court
concluded that the terms of the agreement between the
plaintiff and Keefe were ambiguous as to whether the
plaintiff incurred legal fees beyond the retainer, it con-
sidered testimony of the plaintiff and Keefe regarding
their understanding of the agreement.

Keefe testified that he never sent a bill to the plaintiff
for his legal fees during the pendency of the case. He
did not do so because he did not think that the plaintiff
would have been able to pay any bills sent to him on
the basis of his limited salary as a police officer and
the fact that he had been suspended without pay on
the day of his arrest. Nevertheless, Keefe further testi-
fied that he considered the plaintiff obligated to pay
Keefe’s legal fees, but understood that he realistically
could not pay them at that time. Keefe also testified
that he sent a request to the defendant to be paid his
legal fees pursuant to § 53-39a.

The plaintiff also testified that he understood that he
was accruing bills for Keefe’s legal fees, but knew he
would likely not be able to pay those bills. The plaintiff
further testified that he was confident in the strength
of his case and the fact that § 53-39a provided that
the bills would be paid. The plaintiff testified that he

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understood that if he lost the case and went to prison,
he would be responsible for the legal bills. On the basis
of this parol evidence, the trial court determined that
the plaintiff incurred legal fees to Keefe beyond the
retainer.

The rule regarding the use of parol evidence in con-
tract interpretation is well established. “[W]Jhen the par-
ties have deliberately put their engagements into
writing, in such terms as import a legal obligation, with-
out any uncertainty as to the object or extent of such
engagement, it is conclusively presumed, that the whole
engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner
of their understanding, was reduced to writing. After
this, to permit oral testimony, or prior or contemporane-
ous conversations, or circumstances, or usages [etc.],
in order to learn what was intended, or to contradict
what is written, would be dangerous and unjust in the
extreme. . . . If the writing is ambiguous or does not
set forth the entire agreement, however, the court may
look to parol evidence to explain the ambiguity or add
a missing term.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ziotas v. Reardon Law Firm, P.C., 111
Conn. App. 287, 293-94, 959 A.2d 1013 (2008), rev'd in
part, 296 Conn. 579, 997 A.2d 453 (2010).

“When a writing, on its face, does not set forth the
entire agreement of the parties, the court may look
to parol evidence to add missing terms. . . . In such
circumstances, the parties’ intent is a question of fact,
and the trial court examines the evidence adduced at
trial to determine that intent. . . . The factual determi-
nation of the parties’ intent is to be garnered in light
of the situation of the parties and the circumstances
surrounding the contract, along with the primary pur-
pose of the contract. . . . Questions of fact are subject
to the clearly erroneous standard of review. ... A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no
evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

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court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
. . . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh
the evidence and determine credibility, we give great
deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual find-
ings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine
whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion
other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make
every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the trial
court’s ruling.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 300.

Parol evidence is admissible to supply terms that are
missing from a contract. TIE Communications, Ine. v.
Kopp, 218 Conn. 281, 288-89, 589 A.2d 329 (1991). In
this case, the total amount of attorney’s fees and the
manner of billing was missing from the contract. Our
review of the record in the present case reveals ade-
quate support for the trial court’s findings in the testi-
mony presented at trial, which that court credited. In
light of the situation of the parties at the time, the trial
court reasonably inferred that the agreement contem-
plated that the plaintiff would continue to accrue legal
fees beyond the retainer. Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court's finding of a contract between the plain-
tiff and Keefe in which the plaintiff incurred legal fees
beyond the retainer was not clearly erroneous.

B

The defendant further contends that the trial court
improperly ordered it to pay attorney’s fees that were
not “necessarily incurred.”* Specifically, the defendant

“Tt is important to note that the language of § 53-392 was amended by
No. 10-68 of the 2010 Public Acts, effective October 1, 2010, which deleted
the phrase “any legal fees necessarily incurred,” and inserted language that,
such economic loss “includ[es] the payment of attorney's fees and costs
incurred during the prosecution and the enforcement of this section.” See
footnote 2 of this opinion. Because the award of attorney's fees in this
action occurred in February, 2010, the 2009 revision of § 58-39a is controlling
in the present case.

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claims that the trial court improperly awarded attor-
ney’s fees that were excessive because the efforts of
Keefe and Georgetti were duplicative. In response, the
plaintiff contends that the trial court's award of attor-
ney’s fees was neither unnecessary nor excessive. We
agree with the plaintiff.

The trial court made the following findings regarding
the attorney's fees: “Each lawyer has provided the [trial
court] with a detailed listing of all the hours they spent
on the case prior to and during the trial. No evidence
or argument was raised that any of these claimed hours
or services were in fact not performed. The trial lasted
six weeks and there were [twenty-seven] witnesses who
testified. The documents setting forth the time spent on
each task are detailed, thorough and appear reasonable.
None of these representations are challenged.
[Georgetti] testified he interviewed witnesses, reviewed.
perhaps thousands of documents and organized them
for [Keefe].” The trial court also heard testimony from
an expert witness, who opined that the attorney’s fees
were reasonable.

Section 53-39a does not indicate what constitutes
“necessarily incurred” attorney’s fees. “No one can
state the reasonable value of legal services as a fact.
He can only express his opinion. The value is based
upon many considerations.” Hoenig v. Lubetkin, 137
Conn. 516, 524, 79 A.2d 278 (1951). “A court has few
duties of a more delicate nature than that of fixing
counsel fees. The degree of delicacy increases when
the matter becomes one of review on appeal. The princi-
ple of law, which is easy to state but difficult at times
to apply, is that only in case of a clear abuse of discretion
by the trier may we interfere. . . . The trier is always
inamore advantageous position to evaluate the services
of counsel than are we.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 525.

Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the
trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was excessive.

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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding damages to the plaintiff
for the attorney's fees of Keefe and Georgetti.

I

The defendant further claims that the trial court
improperly awarded the plaintiff damages for economic
loss. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the trial
court improperly determined that: (1) the plaintiff was
not required to exhaust his administrative remedies
under the collective bargaining agreement prior to seek-
ing indemnification under § 53-39a; (2) the plaintiff's
employment claims were cognizable under § 53-39a; (3)
the plaintiff had standing to assert his employment
claims under § 53-39a; (4) lost wages and lost employ-
ment benefits constitute “economic loss” within the
meaning of § 53-39a; and (5) the plaintiff could recover
under § 53-39a when his suspension resulted from the
defendant’s administrative proceedings.

After the parties submitted their briefs in this appeal,
this court issued its decision in Nyenhuis v. Metropoli-
tan District Commission, supra, 300 Conn. 708. The
plaintiff asserts that Nyenhuis controls the defendant’s
claims regarding the trial court’s award of damages
for economic loss and that the trial court's award for
economic loss was proper. We agree with the plaintiff.

In Nyenhuis v. Metropolitan District Commission,
supra, 300 Conn. 708, this court considered an appeal
by the defendant, the metropolitan district commission
(commission), from the judgment of the trial court
awarding the plaintiff, Gabrielle Nyenhuis, who was a
police officer of the commission, damages of $73,072.50
in an indemnification action brought pursuant to § 53-
39a. On appeal, the commission claimed that “the trial
court improperly concluded that the plaintiff: (1) did
not need to exhaust administrative remedies under the
applicable collective bargaining agreement (agreement)

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before bringing this action; (2) was entitled to indemni-
fication for economic loss starting on the date of the
incident that led to the underlying criminal charges,
rather than the date when she was arrested; and (8)
was entitled to indemnification under § 53-39a for sick
time, earned time and vacation time (collectively, leave
time) that she used during the course of the prosecu-
tion, and lost overtime pay that she would have received
but for the prosecution.” Id., 711-12. We concluded that
“the plaintiff was not required to exhaust her adminis-
trative remedies under the agreement and that she is
entitled to indemnification for leave time used and over-
time pay lost as a result of the prosecution . . . [but]
that the plaintiff is entitled to indemnification under
§ 53-39a only for those economic losses, prearrest and
postarrest, that have a clear nexus to the criminal prose-
cution ... .” Id., 712.

The claims for lost wages and employment benefits
raised by the plaintiff in the present case are controlled
by our decision in Nyenhuis. First, contrary to the
defendant's claim that the plaintiff was required to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement in this case, in Nyenhuis, we
concluded that a plaintiff is not required to exhaust the
administrative remedies under a collective bargaining
agreement prior to filing an action under § 53-39a. Sec-
ond, the defendant claims that the plaintiff's claims for
economic loss were not cognizable under § 53-39a, that
the plaintiff did not have standing to assert these claims
under § 53-39a, and that lost wages and lost employment
benefits do not constitute “economic loss” within the
meaning of § 53-39a. These claims also are contrary to
our decision in Nyenhuis, in which we concluded that
a plaintiff is entitled to indemnification for leave time
used and overtime pay lost as a result of the prosecu-
tion, and that a plaintiff is entitled to indemnification
under § 53-39a for those economic losses, prearrest and
postarrest, that have a clear nexus to the criminal prose-

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cution. Third, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff
should not have been able to recover damages for eco-
nomic loss under § 53-39a because his suspension
resulted from the defendant's administrative proceed-
ings. In Nyenhuis, we concluded that a plaintiff is enti-
tled to indemnification under § 53-39a for those
economic losses that have a clear nexus to the criminal
prosecution. In the present case, the trial court explic-
itly found that “[i]t seems clear . . . that the plaintiff
was being suspended because of his arrest.” Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the plaintiff was entitled to
damages for economic loss during his entire suspension
and that the trial court’s award of damages for economic
loss in the present case was proper.’

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

5 "The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly awarded the
plaintiff damages for lost wages for the first six months of his suspension
despite the plaintiff's failure to mitigate his damages for that period. “We
have often said in the contracts and torts contexts that the party receiving
a damage award has a duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages.
. . . What constitutes a reasonable effort under the circumstances of a
particular case is a question of fact for the trier. . . . Furthermore, we have
concluded that the breaching party bears the burden of proving that the
nonbreaching party has failed to mitigate damages.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Ann Howard’s Apricots Restaurant, Inc.
v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 237 Conn. 209, 229,
676 A.2d 844 (1996). In the present case, the trial court determined that the
defendant had not met its burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to make
reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages. On the basis of the record in
the present case, we cannot conclude that the trial court's findings of fact
on this issue were clearly erroneous.

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MAURICE M.*
(SC 18454)

Rogers, C. J, and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the
victims or others through whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained.
See General Statutes § 54-86e.

19

Argued March 23—officially released November 29, 2011

Kirstin B. Coffin, special public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).

 — ie

Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Matthew C.
Gedansky, state’s attorney, and Nicole I. Christie, assis-
tant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J. The defendant, Maurice M., appeals,
upon our grant of his petition for certification,’ from
the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial

court’s judgment revoking his probation pursuant to
General Statutes § 53a-32,? on the basis of the trial

1 We granted the defendant’s petition for certification limited to the follow-
ing issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly hold that there was sufficient
evidence that the defendant violated his probation by committing the offense
of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1)?”
State v. Maurice M., 293 Conn. 926, 980 A.2d 918 (2009).

2 General Statutes § 53a-82 provides in relevant part: “(a) At any time
during the period of probation or conditional discharge, the court or any
judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation
of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, or may issue
a notice to appear to answer to a charge of such violation, which notice
shall be personally served upon the defendant. Any such warrant shall
authorize all officers named therein to return the defendant to the custody
of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. . . .

“@ If such violation is established, the court may: (1) Continue the
sentence of probation or conditional discharge; (2) modify or enlarge the
conditions of probation or conditional discharge; (3) extend the period of
probation or conditional discharge, provided the original period with any
extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 58a-29; or (4)
revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge. If such sentence
is revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve the sentence
imposed or impose any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may
include a term of imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended
entirely or after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation
with such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall
be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such
violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence
and by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Although § 53a-32 was amended since the time of the defendant's proba-
tion revocation proceedings; see Public Acts 2008, No. 08-102, § 7; Public
‘Acts 2010, No. 10-43, § 20; the changes, including the redesignation of certain
subsections, are not relevant to this appeal. For purposes of clarity, we
refer herein to the current revision of the statute.

Pe 21
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court’s finding that the defendant had committed the
crime of risk of injury to a child in violation of General
Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1).3 State v. Maurice M., 116 Conn.
App. 1, 3, 975 A.2d 90 (2009). On appeal, the defendant
claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded
that there was sufficient evidence that he violated his
probation by committing the crime of risk of injury to
a child when he failed to supervise a two year old child
who was in his care and able to exit the home. We
agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the
judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the
following relevant undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory. “On February 4, 2004, the defendant was convicted
of assault in the third degree and sentenced to one year
incarceration, execution suspended, and three years
probation. The standard conditions of the defendant's
probation included that he refrain from violating ‘any
criminal law of the United States, this state or any other
state or territory.’ On November 26, 2006, the defendant
was arrested and charged with risk of injury to a child
and, subsequently, with violation of probation.

“The record reveals that the following events led to
the defendant’s arrest on November 26, 2006. At approx-
imately 11 am., Joseph Mortari was driving east on
Main Street in East Windsor when he saw a pair of
brown children’s shoes in the roadway near the center
divider line. In an attempt to avoid running over the

3 General Statutes § 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any person who
(1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of
sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such
child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the
morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to
impair the health or morals of any such child . . . shall be guilty of a class
Cfelony ....”

Although § 53-21 was amended by No. 07-143, § 4, of the 2007 Public Acts,
those amendments have no bearing on this appeal. For convenience, we
refer herein to the current version of the statute.

22 Po
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shoes, Mortari maneuvered his vehicle slightly to the
right. As he did, he caught a glimpse of something white
near the curb and, turning his full attention to it, realized
that it was a small child dressed in a diaper climbing
from the street to the curb. He slammed on his brakes,
stopping his vehicle about three feet from the child. As
this transpired, another vehicle traveling in the opposite
direction also stopped. Donna Caldon exited that vehi-
cle, driven by her husband, Peter Caldon, and retrieved
both shoes from the street and the child, who was then
on the curb. Mortari left his vehicle in the street, and
he and Donna Caldon conversed momentarily. Mortari
retrieved his vehicle, doubled back and met the Caldons
in a parking lot. The three attempted to persuade the
child to tell them his name or where he lived. The
child would not respond. The three then decided to call
the police.

“Sergeant Michael Hannaford of the East Windsor
police department arrived at the scene. After speaking
with Mortari and the Caldons, Hannaford started going
from house to house on Main Street in an attempt to
locate the child’s home. Soon after, Hannaford was
motioned back to the parking lot by Donna Caldon.
Hannaford, after seeing the defendant walking toward
Donna Caldon and the child, made his way back to the
parking lot. It was ten to fifteen minutes after Hannaford
arrived at the scene that the defendant emerged from
his home and retrieved the child. After speaking briefly
with the defendant, Hannaford directed him to take the
child home, so the officer could interview Mortari and
the Caldons. After conducting the interview, Hannaford
went to the defendant’s home. There, he questioned the
defendant concerning how the child could have gotten
from the home to the street.

“The defendant reported that the child was two years
old. The defendant told Hannaford that he was the sole
caretaker present in the home for the child and the

Po 23

child’s eight year old brother.’ The defendant told him

. that the child was playing with his eight year old brother
in the house while the defendant was in the living room
lying on the couch watching television. The living room
was adjacent to the kitchen, where the back door was
located, from which, the defendant concluded, the child
had apparently exited the house. Hannaford observed
that there were no child safety devices on the door-
knobs on the back door. The defendant told Hannaford
that at some point, the older child informed him that
the two year old was missing. The defendant reported
to Hannaford that he then searched the house for the
missing child and eventually made his way outside
where he and the child were reunited. During Hanna-
ford’s interview with the defendant, the children’s
grandparents arrived at the home. Soon after, Hanna-
ford arrested the defendant on a charge of having vio-
lated § 53-21.

“On October 19, 2007, the court, T. Sullivan, J., held
aviolation of probation hearing. Following the hearing,
the court rendered judgment, finding that the defendant
had violated his probation. The court further noted that
the defendant was aware of the conditions of his proba-
tion, having acknowledged them in writing and
reviewed them on three separate occasions with his
probation officer. The court further found that the bene-
ficial aspects of probation were no longer being served
in the defendant’s case. Accordingly, the court revoked
the defendant’s probation and committed him to the
custody of the commissioner of correction for the unex-
ecuted portion of his original one year sentence.” Id.,
3-6.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of revoca-
tion to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia,> that

+ As the state notes, although both the trial court and the Appellate Court
referred to the older child as the two year old child’s brother, the record
does not establish the relationship between the two children.

5 On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant also claimed that: (1)
§ 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague; State v. Maurice M., supra, 116

2 es
el

the trial court had improperly concluded that the state
had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that.
the defendant had violated his probation. Id., 19. Ina
divided opinion, the Appellate Court concluded that the
trial court’s conclusion was not clearly erroneous and
affirmed the judgment of revocation. Id.; see id., 23
(West, J., dissenting). The Appellate Court majority rea-
soned that the testimony presented at the revocation
hearing sufficiently established that the defendant had
acted with “reckless disregard for a situation that was
inimical to the physical welfare of his child.” Id., 18-19.
Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that “[t]he
evidence was sufficient to show that the [defendant
failed] to supervise his children adequately, despite his
knowledge that the back door of his home was unse-
cured... .” Id.

In dissent, Judge West concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that
the defendant had violated his probation. Id., 26-28.
Judge West first observed that, “[e]ssentially, there are
two main factual components supporting the [trial]
court’s ruling: (1) the ‘accessibility’ of the back door®

Conn. App. 6; (2) the trial court applied the incorrect mens rea standard to
§ 53-21; id., 12; and (8) the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his
probation, Id., 19, He does not pursue those claims in this certified appeal.

©The trial court specifically stated: “[T]hat’s not [the eight year old child’s]
responsibility to take care of the two year old child and to make sure that
the two year old child doesn’t get hurt or doesn’t leave the house or eat
something that he’s not supposed to eat. It’s the adult's responsibility. And
by not fulfilling that responsibility, in this particular instance, a risk of harm
to the child existed. That is, a back door was accessible. He wasn’t being
watched by the adult. The adult was doing something totally different.”
(Emphasis added.)

Although both the trial court and Judge West in the Appellate Court
dissent both referred to the “ ‘accessibility of the back door’ ”; State v.
Maurice M., supra, 116 Conn. App. 26; we note that the real concern is not
so much the accessibility of the back door itself as it is the accessibility of
the exterior of the home through the back door. Because the basic claim
is that the young child was able to access the exterior of the home through
aback door that was somehow not secured in a manner that would prevent
him from exiting, we will continue to refer to this factual component as the
accessibility of the back door, which properly focuses our analysis on the
condition of the back door.

es 25°
Lee

and (2) the lack of supervision of the child.” Id., 26.
Judge West then concluded that the trial court’s finding
that the back door to the defendant's home was without
a “lock” was clearly erroneous, given the complete lack
of testimony by any witness at the revocation hearing
relative to a lock on the back door. Id., 26-27. Judge
West further concluded that there was no other evi-
dence in the record to sustain the trial court’s conclu-
sion that the defendant had committed the crime of
risk of injury to a child. Id., 27-28.

On appeal, the defendant argues only that the Appel-
late Court improperly concluded that there was suffi-
cient evidence that he violated his probation by
committing the crime of risk of injury to a child. Specifi-
cally, the defendant claims that he did not act with
reckless disregard for the child’s safety or physical wel-
fare because, in the absence of any evidence of the
back door’s accessibility, and in light of testimony
establishing that his child had never escaped the house
in this manner before, it was not reasonably foreseeable
that the child would exit the home. The state, in
response, contends that the Appellate Court properly
concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the
defendant committed the offense of risk of injury to a
child, and specifically argues, inter alia, that the lack
of any past similar incident or evidence of a lock does
not preclude the trial court’s conclusion. We agree with
the defendant and conclude that the Appellate Court
improperly determined that, under the facts and circum-
stances of this case, there was sufficient evidence that
the defendant had committed the crime of risk of injury
to a child.

We begin with the applicable legal principles. First,
we note “that revocation of probation hearings, pursu-
ant to § 53a-82, are comprised of two distinct phases,
each with a distinct purpose. . . . In the evidentiary
phase, [a] factual determination by a trial court as to

26 Po
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whether a probationer has violated a condition of proba-
tion must first be made. . . . In the dispositional phase,
[iJf a violation is found, a court must next determine
whether probation should be revoked because the bene-
ficial aspects of probation are no longer being served.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367, 375-76, 944 A.2d 276
(2008). “Since there are two distinct components of
the revocation hearing, our standard of review differs
depending on which part of the hearing we are
reviewing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 185, 842 A.2d 567 (2004).

Because the present case concerns the evidentiary
phase and the trial court’s factual finding that the defen-
dant violated his probation, we are guided by the stan-
dard of review applicable to that phase. “The law
governing the standard of proof for a violation of proba-
tion is well settled. . . . [A] that is required in a proba-
tion violation proceeding is enough to satisfy the court
within its sound judicial discretion that the probationer
has not met the terms of his probation. . . . It is also
well settled that a trial court may not find a violation
of probation unless it finds that the predicate facts
underlying the violation have been established by a
preponderance of the evidence at the hearing—that is,
the evidence must induce a reasonable belief that it is
more probable than not that the defendant has violated
a condition of his or her probation. . . . In making its
factual determination, the trial court is entitled to draw
reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.
. .. Accordingly, [a] challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is based on the court’s factual findings. The
proper standard of review is whether the court’s find-
ings were clearly erroneous based on the evidence. . . .
A court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous and its
conclusions drawn from that finding lack sufficient evi-
dence when there is no evidence in the record to sup-

Po 27
Lee

port [the court’s finding of fact] . . . or when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Benjamin, 299 Conn. 228, 235-36, 9 A.3d 338 (2010).
“In making this determination, every reasonable pre-
sumption must be given in favor of the trial court’s
ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Hill, 256 Conn. 412, 425-26, 773 A.2d 981 (2001).

Further, we note that the state charged the defendant
with violating the “ ‘situation’” prong of § 53-21. “In
order to establish the crime of risk of injury to a child
under the situation prong of § 53-21 (a) (1), the state
must prove that the defendant wilfully or unlawfully
caused or permitted a child under the age of sixteen
years to be placed in a situation where the life or limb
of the child was endangered, the health of the child
was likely to be injured, or the morals of the child

7 The dissent spends much time focused on what it perceives to be our
consideration of the evidence in light of a more rigorous standard of proof
than that called for in probation revocation hearings. Specifically, the dissent
states that we “actually [employ] the far more demanding criminal standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The dissent’s argument, however,
conflates two separate and distinct concepts: the quantum of proof that the
state is required to present to establish the existence of any given fact, and
the existence of the predicate facts necessary to prove the commission of
the underlying crime as a matter of law. As previously stated, it is well
established “that a trial court may not find a violation of probation unless
it finds that the predicate facts underlying the violation have been estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing . . . .” Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Benjamén, supra, 299
Conn. 236. Put differently, those predicate facts proved by the state in this
case are insufficient, either individually or in the aggregate, to establish a
violation of § 53-21 (a) (1), which, in this case, served as the foundation for
the trial court's finding of a violation of probation. In other words, even
assuming that the facts in this case have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, they still do not support the trial court’s finding because, as a matter
of law, we decline to hold that a parent or guardian has violated § 53-21
solely based on evidence showing his or her failure to supervise his young
child inside the home. See also footnote 18 of this opinion.

28 Po
ae

were likely to be impaired. Conduct is wilful when done
purposefully and with knowledge of [its] likely conse-
quences. . . . A defendant’s failure to act when under
a duty to do so, which causes a dangerous situation
to exist or continue, may be sufficient to support a
conviction under § 53-21 (a) (1).” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Na’im B.,
288 Conn. 290, 297, 952 A.2d 755 (2008). Moreover,
“[s]pecific intent is not a necessary requirement of the
statute. Rather, the intent to do some act coupled with
areckless disregard of the consequences . . . of that
act is sufficient to [establish] a violation of the statute.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sorabella,
277 Conn. 155, 173, 891 A.2d 897, cert. denied, 549 U.S.
821, 127 S. Ct. 131, 166 L. Ed. 2d 36 (2006).

Furthermore, as this court has recognized, “§ 53-21
(a) (1) is broadly drafted and was intended to apply to
any conduct, illegal or not, that foreseeably could result
in injury to the health of a child.” (Emphasis added.)
State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698, 724-25, 905 A.2d 24
(2006). Although no Connecticut appellate court has
directly addressed a sufficiency challenge to a finding
of risk of injury to a child under these facts—namely,
inadequate supervision by a parent in the home as a
basis for finding a probation violation—the determina-
tion of the foreseeability of the dangerous result neces-
sarily must be fact specific. In Barnes v.
Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 105, 622 S.E.2d 278 (2005),
the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in affirming the defen-
dant’s conviction of criminal negligence for leaving her
two young children home alone unsupervised; id., 109;
noted that “the sufficiency analysis on appeal depends
entirely on the specific circumstances of each case: the
gravity and character of the possible risks of harm; the
degree of accessibility of the parent; the length of time
of the abandonment; the age and maturity of the chil-
dren; the protective measures, if any, taken by the par-

Po 29

ent; and any other circumstance that would inform the
factfinder on the question whether the defendant’s con-
duct was criminally negligent.” Id., 113. This fact spe-
cific approach, and the attendant requirement to
consider the totality of the circumstances of each case,
is consistent with the foreseeability element of § 53-21
(a) (1), and provides the necessary guidance to deter-
mine whether a given defendant has committed the
crime of risk of injury to a child by failing to supervise
that child adequately. Accordingly, we adopt this nonex-
clusive list of factors to be considered in risk of injury
cases where the primary charge is inadequate supervi-
sion by a parent in the home.

Against this legal backdrop, we turn to the defen-
dant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced at the revocation hearing. At the outset, we
note that it is undisputed that the defendant was not
supervising the child inside the home, and the trial court
so found. Evidence of the defendant’s wilful failure to
supervise his child inside the home, however, does not,
on its own, establish the defendant’s commission of the
crime of risk of injury to a child; the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s actions
must color the character of the defendant's conduct.
“To convict a defendant of risk of injury to a child, a
court must find that the defendant acted wilfully and
that he either intended the resulting injury to the victim,
or he knew that the injury would occur, or that his
conduct was of such a character that it demonstrated
a reckless disregard of the consequences.” (Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gui-
tard, 61 Conn. App. 531, 548, 765 A.2d 30, cert. denied,
255 Conn. 952, 770 A.2d 32 (2001); see also State v.
Cutro, 37 Conn. App. 534, 539-40, 657 A.2d 239 (1995);
State v. Torrice, 20 Conn. App. 75, 81, 564 A.2d 330,
cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 794 (1989).

30 Po
Lr

Thus, because the state did not allege that the defen-
dant intended to injure the child or knew that injury
would occur, we are left with the question of whether
there was sufficient evidence that the defendant's “con-
duct was of such a character that it demonstrated a
reckless disregard of the consequences.” State v. Cutro,
supra, 37 Conn. App. 540. “Recklessness involves a sub-
jective realization of [a] risk and a conscious decision
to ignore it. . . . It does not involve intentional con-
duct because one who acts recklessly does not have a
conscious objective to cause a particular result.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 289 Conn.
742, 756, 961 A.2d 322 (2008). Accordingly, we review
the trial court’s findings with respect to the foreseeabil-
ity factors for clear error, drawing every reasonable
presumption in favor of that court’s rulings. State v.
Hill, supra, 256 Conn. 425-26.

The trial court could have found the following facts
relevant to the “gravity and character of the possible
risks of harm,” and “the length of time of the abandon-
ment... .” Barnes v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va.
App. 113. The defendant lived 100 feet from a narrow,
small town road that, at times, was heavily traveled.
On November 26, 2006, the defendant’s two year old
son exited the defendant’s home through the back door,
which was not equipped with a child safety device,
wearing only a diaper, and maybe a shirt. Between
twenty and twenty-five minutes may have passed from
the time that witnesses first saw the child outside the
home to the time that the defendant appeared to retrieve
his child, and the eight year old child, with whom the
two year old child had been playing, spent at least a
few minutes searching for the child before alerting the
defendant that the two year old was missing. From this
information, the trial court could have concluded that
the defendant’s two year old son was without adult
supervision for at least twenty-five to thirty minutes,

Pe 3
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and that the proximity of the defendant’s home to a
busy street presented a dangerous condition.

Although we acknowledge that serious harm or death
could have befallen the young child, the mere existence
of a dangerous outcome does not necessarily dictate
that there was an unsafe condition that caused it. Nor
can the foreseeability of an event be presumed simply
from the actual occurrence of that event; instead, the
severity of the risk is but one factor to consider in the
foreseeability inquiry. See State v. Scruggs, supra, 279
Conn. 722 (“[a]s we have suggested, actual effects are
not necessarily foreseeable effects”). Moreover, there
is no evidence in the record indicating the amount of
time that the child was without adult supervision inside
the home before exiting. The testimony at the revoca-
tion hearing addressed only the length of time between
the time that the child was determined to be missing
and the time that the defendant emerged from his home.
Nor is there any evidence as to the length of time
between when the defendant became aware of the
child’s absence and when he arrived outside where the
child was located. Indeed, the state did not establish
how long the defendant looked for the child inside
the house before looking outside, or the lapse of time
between the child’s exit from the house and the com-
mencement of the defendant’s search for the child.
Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusions relative to
the dangerous condition and the length of time during
which the child was without adult supervision were
derived from the result of the child’s escape and, alone,
could not have established that the child’s escape
was foreseeable.®

® Although not ideal, it is by no means unusual for a parent to leave his
or her young child unsupervised for a short period of time, often in front
ofa television. See, ¢.g., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “The Media
Family: Electronic Media in the Lives of Infants, Toddlers, Preschoolers and
Their Parents,” (2006) p. 4 (“{plarents use TV or DVDs as a ‘safe’ activity
their kids can enjoy while the grownups get dressed for work, make a meal,
or do the household chores”); id., p. 14 (“[mlany parents speak of the

22 Po
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With respect to “the age and maturity of the [child]”;
Barnes v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 113; we
also acknowledge that the alleged victim in the present
case was only two years old. We note, however, that
although younger children, like the child in the present
case, require heightened supervision, given their pro-
clivity for exploration, any deficit in that supervision
can be mitigated by other factors that would tend to
reduce the potential risk to which the child may be
exposed, including the existence of protective mea-
sures, the accessibility of a parent, the presence of an
older child, and the history of the child’s behavior. As
discussed later, these factors effectively mitigated the
two year old child’s young age.

With respect to the “protective measures . . . taken
by the [defendant]”; id.; although the trial court
expressly concluded that the back door was accessible,
facts pertinent to the risk of the child exiting through
the back door were not established by the record. This
evidentiary gap, acknowledged by both parties, is
underscored by the trial court’s repeated references to
the absence of a lock on the back door, a finding that,
as Judge West noted in his dissenting opinion in the
Appellate Court, has no factual support in the record.?

numerous demands on their time and of their strong need to keep their
kids occupied while they get their chores done”); id., p. 88 (82 percent of
parents of six month to six year old children surveyed reported that parent
was in room watching television, DVD or videos with child about one half
of time or less that child was watching); F. Zimmerman, “Television and
DVD/Video Viewing in Children Younger than 2 Years,” 161 Archives of
Pediatrics & Adolescent Med. 473, 475, 476-78 (2007) (20.5 percent of parents
surveyed reporting need to “get things done” as “most important reason”
for children watching television). Indeed, it is hard to imagine how a single
parent might otherwise shower and prepare for work in the morning, cook
dinner, or do laundry, without leaving his young child or children unsuper-
vised for a short period of time.

In its oral decision, the trial court stated, in the context of describing
the risks to young children in a house, that, in the present case, “there was
no lock on that back door or screen. There was no lock. There was nothing
to prevent {the child] from going out. . . . There was no lock on the door.”
In response to the defendant’s motion for articulation, the trial court

po 38
ee

The only evidence offered relative to the back door or
doors of the defendant’s home, however, was Hanna-
ford’s testimony “that there [were] no safety devices
on the doorknobs or such that, you know, one would
normally do with young children to prevent them from
opening the doors, etcetera.” (Emphasis added.)
Indeed, there is no indication as to what exactly the
missing “safety device” was; i.e., whether Hannaford
was referring to a circular plastic device that covers
metallic doorknobs, a hook and eye mechanism to keep
an exterior screen door from opening, or some other
device.” On the basis of the lack of evidence supporting
the trial court’s finding that the back door lacked a lock,
we conclude that the finding was clearly erroneous."

Moreover, we further conclude that the conclusion
drawn from that erroneous finding—that is, that the
back door was accessible to a two year old child—
cannot be sustained by the evidence in the record. With
the exception of Hannaford’s testimony that the back
door did not have any “safety devices,” the record is
devoid of any other evidence relative to the nature of

expanded this finding to include the absence of a child safety device, but
reiterated its finding that there was no lock on the back door: “neither the
back door nor the back screen door of his house had a lock or child safety
device thus permitting the child to be able to exit the house.”

™ We recognize that the trial court’s statement in its articulation that the
back door did not have a “child safety device” is consistent with Hannaford’s
testimony “that there [were] no safety devices on the doorknobs or such
that, you know, one would normally do with young children to prevent them
from opening the doors . . . .” Nevertheless, we conclude that Hannaford’s
testimony is too vague and ambiguous in its bare reference of a lack of
safety devices to sustain the trial court's conclusion that the back door was
accessible to the young child.

11 Although the trial court and the Appellate Court may have, in part,
based their conclusions that the back door was accessible by virtue of the
young child’s actual exit from the home; see State v. Maurice M., supra,
116 Conn. App. 16 n.4 (noting “child’s unimpeded access to the street”); a
point that the state advances, as previously stated, the ease with which the
child exited the home cannot be presumed by the child's actual presence
outside the home.

34 Po
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the back door, which undoubtedly is material to the
ease with which a two year old child could have
accessed the exterior of the home. For example, there
is no clear indication in the record as to how many doors
separated the interior of the home from the exterior, i.e.,
whether there was both an interior door and an exterior
screen or glass door, or only one door.” There is also
no indication as to whether the back door or doors
were ajar or shut at the time the child exited the home.”
Moreover, there is no indication as to the method by
which one would open the back door or doors, ie.,
whether one must turn a doorknob and pull open the
door; whether one must grasp a handle, depress athumb
lever and pull open the door; or whether one must press
a small push latch and push open the door to exit (as
is common with screen doors). Any of these factors
could be relevant to determining whether the defendant
reasonably would not have thought that his two year
old child possessed the strength and manual dexterity
to manipulate the door or doors open. Indeed, there is
no indication whether the two year old child left on his
own or whether the eight year old child opened the
door for him. These unanswered questions demonstrate
the lack of evidence before the trial court relative to
the ease with which a young toddler may have exited
the home. We thus conclude that the state failed to

# We note that Hannaford referred to both the “back door,” in the singular,
and to the “doorknobs” and “doors,” in the plural. Moreover, the trial court
referenced both a “back door” and “screen” or “back screen door” in both
its oral memorandum of decision and its articulation. The Appellate Court
also noted that “fiJt is unclear from the record whether the defendant's
back door had locks or a screen door.” State v. Maurice M., supra, 116
Conn. App. 16 n.4.

® Although there was no direct evidence stating that the back door or
doors were closed, the defendant's statement to Hannaford, as described
in Hannaford’s testimony, that the two year old child “must have opened
the back door” suggests that the back door or doors were closed. Hannaford
also later testified that the defendant “should (have heard] the door close

Po 35
a

establish with sufficient evidence the accessibility of
the back door.

Finally, with respect to “other circumstance[s] that
would inform the factfinder on the question [of]
whether the defendant’s conduct was [reckless]”;
Barnes v. Commonwealth, supra, 47 Va. App. 113; we
also conclude that it was improper for the trial court
to fail to give proper weight to the accessibility of the
defendant, the age of the child with whom the two
year old was playing, and the lack of any prior similar
incident. Hannaford testified that the defendant should
have heard the back door close because of his proximity
to the kitchen where, presumably, the back door was
located. The defendant’s proximity and accessibility to
the child mitigates the child’s young age and reduces
the foreseeability of the child’s escape. Hannaford also
testified that the two year old child was playing with
an eight year old child. Although we recognize that an
eight year old child lacks the maturity and responsibility
of an adult, we note that his presence alone carries
some weight; the two year old child was not wandering
around the home completely unattended. Moreover, we
also note that the eight year old child demonstrated at
least some minimal level of responsibility by notifying
the defendant that the child was missing. Further, Han-
naford’s testimony established that the child had never
left the house before under these circumstances.
Though we certainly recognize that the state need not
wait for “catastrophic harm” to occur first before prose-
cuting an individual for violating § 53-21; State v.
Scruggs, supra, 279 Conn. 722 n.10; as a general proposi-
tion, the history, or lack thereof, of past occurrences
provides evidence of the foreseeability of a given harm.
See, e.g., Monk v. Temple George Associates, LLC, 273
Conn. 108, 115-16, 869 A.2d 179 (2005) (reasonably
foreseeable that assault would occur on premises given
history of criminal activity in area). Finally, there is no

36 Pe

evidence regarding the temperament or attitude of the
two year old child that might suggest that he often
misbehaved, was less prone to follow instructions, or
otherwise would have been more at risk for escaping
from the home. Thus, we conclude that the evidence
was insufficient to establish that the child’s escape to
the exterior of the house was a reasonably foresee-
able result.

Accordingly, we likewise conclude that the evidence
was insufficient to establish that the defendant's failure
to supervise the child while at home evinced a reckless
disregard for the consequences of that conduct in viola-
tion of § 53-21 (a) (1). Moreover, notwithstanding the
evidence relative to the severity of the possible harm,

“ The state nevertheless contends that the trial court properly relied on
additional “undisputed facts” to support its conclusion that the defendant
violated § 53-21, including: (1) “the defendant was responsible for the child’s
safety at the time”; (2) “the defendant was the only adult in the house”; (3)
“the older child was not responsible for the younger child”; (4) “the defen-
dant was lying on the couch watching television”; (5) “the defendant was
doing something totally different than watching the child”; (6) “the defendant
had no idea that the child had left the house”; (7) “the defendant had no
idea where the child was”; and (8) “the defendant learned of the child's
absence because the older child told him . . . .” Each of these “undisputed
facts,” however, goes to the defendant's lack of supervision over the child
inside the home, a factual predicate that is both uncontested and insufficient,
by itself, to sustain the trial court’s conclusion. We also note that there was
no evidence presented relative to the eight year old child and his relationship
to the parties in this case. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

The state also claims that the facts that “the back door was accessible
and unsecured” and “the child was in the middle of the highway” support
the trial court’s conclusion. We disagree. As discussed earlier, the evidence
is insufficient to sustain the conclusion that the back door was accessible,
and the mere fact that the child was in a dangerous situation does not mean
that an unsafe condition caused it.

Finally, we conclude that additional facts cited by the state, which were
not specifically found by the trial court—including the defendant's knowl-
edge “that he lived on a busy main street, that the yard was not fenced . . .
that the house had no baby-gates or other barriers to prevent roaming, that
the defendant did not take any care whatsoever for the welfare of the child
. . . did not pay any attention to the fact that the older child spent several
minutes looking for the younger child, would not have known of the child’s
absence but for the older child, and upon retrieving the child, evidenced
unnatural annoyance at the child and lack of concern for his condition or

Po 37
a

the length of time during which the child was outside,
the age of the child and the absence of a safety device
on the doorknob, on the basis of the mitigating factors
detailed previously, we are “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Benjamin,
supra, 299 Conn. 236; cf. Wesley v. Schaller Subaru,
Inc., 277 Conn. 526, 544, 557, 893 A.2d 389 (2006) (judg-
ment of trial court reversed on basis of court’s “definite
and firm conviction that a mistake was committed”);
Socci v. Pasiak, 116 Conn. App. 685, 689, 978 A.2d 96
(2009) (same).¥

return of his desire for affection”—are either reinterpretations of previously
mentioned facts, inferences without evidence in the record, or evidence
that does not support a finding that the defendant acted with reckless
disregard for the consequences. Accordingly, we conclude that these facts
do not support the trial court’s decision.

18 We disagree with the dissent’s claim that we have engaged in fact finding,
and note that, in contrast, it is the dissent that has embraced that role.
In particular, we disagree with the dissent’s emphasis on the trial court's
observations as to the apparent lack of any fence surrounding the defendant's
home. At no point during the evidentiary phase of the proceeding did the
state ever establish that the defendant’s home did not have a fence around
the yard. Although the trial court apparently concluded, during the disposi-
tional phase, that the defendant “Imew that there was no fence around [the
back door], as evidenced by the fact that there is now a fence around the
back door,” the dispositional phase is a distinct phase of the revocation
hearing during which the trial court determines “whether probation should
be revoked because the beneficial aspects of probation are no longer being
served.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Preston, supra, 286
Conn. 376. It is during the evidentiary phase, however, that the trial court
determines whether the defendant has violated a condition of his probation.
Id., 375. Accordingly, because this appeal only challenges the trial court’s
findings during the evidentiary phase, any consideration in this appeal of
evidence presented during the dispositional phase is improper.

Moreover, we note that the dissent’s conclusions that the defendant
“placed himself in a position from which he personally was unable to react to
an emergency or some other problem in a timely fashion”; and the defendant.
“made no effort to . . . otherwise . . . child proof the house,” lack support
in the record. Indeed, contrary to the dissent’s assertion that the defendant
“placed himself in a position from which he personally was unable to react
to an emergency or some other problem in a timely fashion,” it is undisputed
that, upon learning from the eight year old boy that the two year old son
was missing, the defendant reacted by searching the home for the child.

Finally, we note that, to the extent that the dissent relies on the demeanor
of the defendant when he came outside to retrieve his child, such reliance is

38 Po
ee

Further, the state’s reliance on State v. Branham, 56
Conn. App. 395, 743 A.2d 635, cert. denied, 252 Conn.
937, 747 A.2d 3 (2000), is misplaced. In Branham, the
defendant was convicted of risk of injury to a child in
violation of § 53-21 for leaving his three children, all
under the age of four, alone and unattended in an apart-
ment. Id., 396-97. The mother of the children testified
that the children had been left home alone for up to
one hour. Id., 398. Additional testimony established that
the children had, on previous occasions, left the apart-
ment to look for their mother when she left to use the
downstairs telephone, and that drug dealers were in
the hallway of the apartment building. Id., 399 n.2. The
Appellate Court rejected the defendant’s sufficiency
claim and affirmed the conviction, concluding that: (1)
the jury was entitled to credit the mother’s testimony
relative to the amount of time that the children were
left home alone; and (2) the jury could reasonably infer
that leaving three young children home alone placed
them in “a dangerous situation . . . thereby exposing
them to injury.” Id., 398-99.

Branham is readily distinguishable from this case.
Most notably, the defendant in Branham left the three
young children at home, alone and unsupervised, for
up to one hour; id., 398; whereas in the present case,
the defendant was present in the home throughout the
period in question. In addition, the oldest of the three
children in Branham was three and one-half years old,
and the other two children were ages two and one. Id.
In contrast, the two year old child in the present case

misplaced, Putting aside the subjective matter that one person's nonchalance
may well be another's stoicism, what occurred after the defendant emerged
from the home and, indeed, after the child found his way outside, is irrelevant
to the factual predicates necessary to prove a violation of § 58-21 (a) (1).
Put differently, although it may well have looked better for the defendant
to have approached Hannaford appearing frantic and despondent, his failure
to do so does not make the manner in which he had supervised his son any
more or less dangerous.

Po 39
Lene

was playing with an eight year old child, who in fact
demonstrated at least a minimal level of responsibility
by notifying the defendant that the two year old was
missing, after which the defendant proceeded to search
for the child. Finally, we note that evidence presented
in Branham establishing foreseeability, namely, the tes-
timony that the children had previously left the apart-
ment when left alone, further distinguishes it from the
present case wherein, as we have noted, the testimony
indicated that the two year old had never left the home
before under these circumstances."

We note that several other Connecticut cases, cited
by both parties, finding sufficient evidence to affirm
the conviction under the “situation” prong of § 53-21
(a) (1), are all distinguishable from the present case in
terms of the plainly and obviously dangerous situation
that the defendant had actively created or helped to
create. See State v. Na’im B., supra, 288 Conn. 292-94
(defendant did not take child with third degree burns
to hospital); State v. Sorabella, supra, 277 Conn. 163-67
(defendant attempted to engage fictitious thirteen year
old girl in sexual activities); State v. Padua, 273 Conn.
138, 158-59, 869 A.2d 192 (2005) (defendant allowed

16-The dissent also cites State v. Fields, 302 Conn. 236, 24 A.3d 1243 (2011),
and State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388, 390, 656 A.2d 232 (1995), for the
proposition “that leaving young children at home alone for any appreciable
period of time will support a conviction under § 53-21 (a) (1).” (Emphasis
in original.) These two cases are likewise distinguishable from this case. In
Fields, we rejected the defendant’s vagueness challenge to § 53-21 (a) (1),
where the defendant had forcibly removed at gunpoint from her home the
babysitter of a one year old child, thereby leaving the child unattended in
the crib and alone in the home for twenty-five minutes. State v. Fields,
supra, 242-43. Similarly, in George, we rejected the defendant's vagueness
challenge to § 53-21 (a) (1), where the defendant had left a seventeen month
old child home alone while at a bar, after the police, earlier that very same
day after the child was previously found unattended in his car, had warned
him that such actions could subject him to arrest. State v. George, supra,
389-90. Thus, these two cases are inapposite to this case, where the defen-
dant was present in the home.

40 Pe
Td

children to have access to marijuana); State v. Davila,
75 Conn. App. 432, 435, 816 A.2d 673 (defendant fired
gun into home wherein children were located), cert.
denied, 264 Conn. 909, 826 A.2d 180 (2003), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 897, 125 S. Ct. 92, 160 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2004);
see also State v. Cutro, supra, 37 Conn. App. 536-37
(defendant masturbated in car in mall parking lot).
Here, in contrast, the lone claim against the defendant,
in the absence of sufficient evidence showing the ready
accessibility of the back door, is his lack of supervision
of the child who was present in the house with him.
Given the dearth of evidence relative to any other poten-
tially dangerous situation that the defendant helped to
create or failed to remedy, we decline to conclude that.
the defendant's failure to supervise the child inside the
home, by itself, represents a reckless disregard of the
consequences, sufficient to substantiate a conviction
under § 53-21 (a) (1).””

"The defendant cites several out-of-state cases in support of the proposi-
tion that a parent who is “accessible” to the child or in the home with the
child is less culpable for injuries sustained by an unsupervised child. Com-
pare State v. Bennett, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 68039, 1995 WL 415193,
*1-2 (Ohio App. July 13, 1995) (defendant, who was in upstairs bathroom
when unsupervised four year old child bumed herself using defendant's
lighter, did not “recklessly [create] a substantial risk of harm”; court also
noted protective measures defendant took and lack of any similar prior
incident), and Ellis v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 548, 551-52, 556-57, 513
S.E.2d 453 (1999) (defendant, who left two year old and four year old home
alone while she went to building next door, not criminally negligent when
gas stove, which was accidentally left on, caused fixe that injured both
children), with State v. Fretas, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 07AP-1046,
2008 WL 4238928, *1, *4 (Ohio App. September 16, 2008) (defendant, who
left three year old son at home alone while he went to rent movie, “created
a substantial risk of harm for his son”), and Barnes v. Commonwealth,
supra, 47 Va. App. 109, 118 (defendant, who left two year old and four year
old home alone while she went shopping, found criminally negligent).

In response, the state relies on State v. Schaffer, 127 Ohio App. 8d 501,
713 N.E.2d 460 (1998), In re D.J., Court of Appeals, Docket No. 49405-0803-
JV-180, 2008 WL 4149822 (Ind. App. September 10, 2008), People v. Delapaz,
Court of Appeals, Docket No. C045971, 2005 WL 1824850 (Cal. App. June
6, 2005), and Reyes v. State, 242 Ga. App. 170, 629 S.E.2d 192 (2000), for
the proposition that a parent can be liable for reckless endangerment of

Pe 41

Although the defendant here does not challenge § 53-
21 (a) (1) as unconstitutionally vague, we also find
helpful our analysis in State v. Scruggs, supra, 279 Conn.
698. In Scruggs, we reversed the conviction of a defen-
dant who had been convicted of risk of injury to a child,
in relation to the death of her twelve year old son who
had committed suicide in their home. Id., 700-701. The
defendant had been convicted on the charge that she
had maintained an “ ‘unhealthy and unsafe’” home,

the child even when the parent is home and available to the child. In Reyes,
although the defendant mother was home, the child was outside, playing
in the street and with dogs; additionally, the mother had previously been
known to let her children play outside alone. Reyes v. State, supra, 171-72.
Inre D.J. was a parental termination case, wherein the parents had demon-
strated a “continued pattem of neglect,” including an incident where the
two young children were left in the living room with the “front door wide
open... .” Jn re D.J., supra, *6, In Delapaz, a one year old child escaped
from a home where both the front and back doors were open. People v.
Delapaz, supra, *1. These three cases are thus each distinguishable from
the present case, where the two year old was playing inside the home, and
there was no evidence that this had ever happened before or that the doors
were left open.

In Schaffer, a police officer discovered the two year old son of the defen-
dant on a street curb approximately 100 yards from the defendant’s home.
State v. Schaffer, supra, 127 Ohio App. 8d 502. The defendant testified that
she had lost sight of her child for five to ten minutes, during which the
defendant apparently believed that another six year old girl was watching
her child upstairs. Id. The defendant's home was located near “two frequently
traveled streets” and apond. Id., 503. The Court of Appeals of Ohio concluded
that “such circumstances manifest that [the defendant], in a manner that is
not right or good, disregarded the risk that her son could have left the home
and walked into the street. Therefore, [the defendant] recklessly created a
substantial risk to her son’s health by violating her duty of care and/or
protection to the child.” Id. One judge dissented, concluding that the evi-
dence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict, and stating, “[iJf the facts
in the record before us amounted to child endangering, then all parents,
including myself, have been guilty of this criminal offense at one time or
another.” Id., 504 (Christley, J., dissenting). We agree with the dissent’s well
taken observations and, to the extent that the facts of Schaffer mirror the
facts in this case, we decline to adopt the majority’s reasoning in that case.

Moreover, although we agree with the defendant that a parent’s availability
is a factor, we note that there are several other factors to consider, as
discussed earlier in this opinion. See Barnes v. Commonwealth, supra, 47
Va. App. 113.

42 Po
ee

which harmed the health of the child. Id., 702-703.
Although the defendant had challenged on appeal both
the constitutionality of § 53-21 (a) (1) and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence under which she was convicted,
we determined that “these claims [were] inextricably
intertwined”; id., 708; and ultimately concluded that as
applied to the defendant, § 53-21 (a) (1) was unconstitu-
tionally vague. Id., 719. Although we do not engage in
the constitutional vagueness analysis in this case; see
footnote 5 of this opinion; we do note that here, as in
Scruggs, the defendant must be afforded some leeway
in the maintenance of his home and supervision of his
child. “Not all conduct that poses a risk to the mental
or physical health of a child is unlawful. Rather, there
is an acceptable range of risk.” (Emphasis in original.)
State v. Scruggs, supra, 720; cf. State v. George, 37
Conn. App. 388, 389-92, 656 A.2d 232 (1995) (rejecting
vagueness challenge and upholding conviction of defen-
dant who left seventeen month old child home alone
while at bar, after police warned him earlier that same
day after child was previously found unattended in
defendant’s car).

Under the facts of the present case, we cannot con-
clude that the defendant’s decision to leave his two
year old child unsupervised in another room with an
eight year old child falls outside the acceptable range
of risk. To conclude otherwise would be to hold a par-
ent, who is home alone and solely responsible for the
care and supervision of one or more young children,
criminally responsible under what would essentially be
atheory of strict liability for leaving his or her children
unsupervised inside the home for a short period of
time, an illogical and impracticable result." In this case,

® The dissent, criticizing us for apparently utilizing the reasonable doubt
standard to assess the evidence in this case while “purport{ing]” to utilize
the applicable preponderance of the evidence standard, contends that “our
resolution of this appeal simply has no bearing on how we would resolve
the defendant's insufficiency claim if this had been a criminal case.” We
disagree. The state in this case sought to establish that the defendant had

po 43
a

the record merely establishes that the defendant exhib-
ited less than ideal parenting, and, as the Court of
Appeals of Ohio aptly stated in reversing a defendant's
conviction for child endangerment, “[t]he failure to real-
ize an ideal level of supervisory attention to a child
does not equate to acting with heedless indifference
to the consequences . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. McLeod, 165 Ohio App. 3d 434, 438,
846 N.E.2d 915 (2006). Accordingly, we conclude that
the evidence does not sufficiently establish that the
defendant violated his probation by committing the
crime of risk of injury to a child, and we have the
requisite confidence that the trial court’s finding to the
contrary was a mistake.”

violated his probation based on his commission of a crime, and the trial
court expressly found that the state had proven “by a fair preponderance
of the evidence that [the defendant] did, in fact, commit a crime of placing
the child at risk under [§ 53-21].” (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the trial
court’s conclusion that the defendant violated his probation was based on
its determination that the defendant had committed a crime, a wholly permis-
sible basis, in theory, for finding a defendant guilty of violating his probation.
See State v. Benjamin, supra, 299 Conn. 235 (“revocation may be based
upon criminal conduct”). Thus, our disposition of this appeal necessarily
carries with it an evaluation of the trial court’s interpretation of what, as a
matter of law, constitutes a violation of § 53-21, regardless of the standard
of proof required to establish the factual predicate for such a violation. It
is quite obvious, then, that our resolution of this appeal would indeed
have at least some precedential value for future cases, both in probation
revocation hearings and criminal trials, involving facts similar to those in
this case. See also footnote 7 of this opinion.

19 We stress that we do not conclude in the present case that a parent or
guardian who fails to supervise his or her child inside the home is immunized
from liability solely by virtue of his or her presence in the home. Indeed,
there may be any number of factual circumstances, established through
adequate evidence, which, when considered in conjunction with an individu-
al’s failure to supervise a young child in the home, would subject him or
her to criminal liability. See, e.g., Reyes v. State, 242 Ga. App. 170, 171-72,
529 S.E.2d 192 (2000) (evidence presented that mother previously let child
play outside alone); People v. Delapaz, Court of Appeals, Docket No.
0045971, 2005 WL 1824850, *1 (Cal. App. June 6, 2005) (child escaped from
home where evidence showed front and back doors were open). The record
in the present case, however, is devoid of any such evidence.

44 Po
Lt
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand
the case to the trial court with direction to render judg-
ment for the defendant.

In this opinion ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH
and HARPER, Js., concurred.

PALMER, J., with whom ROGERS, C. J., joins, dis-
senting. The undisputed evidence reveals that, in the
late morning of November 26, 2006, the defendant, Mau-
rice M., while watching television on his living room
couch at his East Windsor home, intentionally left his
two year old son in the exclusive care and supervision.
of asecond child, an eight year old boy, for an extended,
if not indefinite, period of time. Oblivious both with
respect to the whereabouts of the two children in the
house and what they were doing, the defendant also
had failed to secure the back door or child proof the
house and yard, circumstances that prompted the trial
court reasonably to conclude that the defendant “knew
or should have known that a child could easily get out
[of the house] . . . .” This evidence fully supported the
trial court’s determination that it was entirely foresee-
able that an eight year old child would not recognize
the substantial risk that a two year old child, if left
unsupervised for any appreciable period of time, would
open an unsecured back door and wander away. I there-
fore agree with the Appellate Court that the trial court
reasonably found, by a mere preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the defendant’s extremely irresponsible
conduct—conduct that culminated in the two year old
leaving the home, unaccompanied and in his diaper,
only to be found in a nearby thoroughfare by a motorist.
who fortunately saw and rescued him—created a situa-

Po 45
Cd

tion inimical to the well-being of the child, in violation
of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1).'

It is clear that the defendant would have violated
§ 53-21 (a) (1) if he had left his two year old son alone
and completely unsupervised for one-half hour or more
while he watched television in another part of the
house, especially in light of the fact that he knew or
should have known that the child had easy access to
the yard via the back door. In the majority’s view, how-
ever, the fact that the defendant enlisted an eight year
old child to look after the two year old child radically
alters that conclusion. According to the majority, the
presence of the eight year old necessarily is sufficient
to take the defendant’s conduct out of the purview of
§ 53-21 (a) (1). I disagree with the majority because, in
my view, the trial court reasonably concluded that an
eight year old child lacks the experience, concentration
and mature judgment to appreciate the significant risk
that a two year old, if afforded even the slightest oppor-
tunity, will find an unsecured door, open it and walk
away.

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority fails
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the trial court’s finding, as it is required to
do. Instead, the majority substitutes its own view of
the facts for that of the trial court, thereby usurping
the fact-finding role of the trial court. Moreover, as I
explain more fully hereinafter, each and every one of
the factors that the majority identifies as relevant to
the determination of whether the evidence presented.
at the defendant’s probation revocation hearing was
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding—the grav-
ity and character of the possible risks of harm, the

As this court repeatedly has explained, § 53-21 (a) (1) prohibits, inter
alia, “the creation of situations inimical to [a child’s] moral or physical
welfare... .” (internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nathan J., 294
Conn, 248, 251, 982 A.2d 1067 (2009).

46 PO
ee

degree of accessibility of the parent, the length of time
of the abandonment, and the age and maturity of the
child—militates in favor of the trial court’s conclusion.
Finally, the majority purports to assess the validity of
the trial court’s determination under the civil prepon-
derance of the evidence standard of proof, the standard
applicable to probation violation cases, but actually
employs the far more demanding criminal standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore dissent.

Although the majority opinion sets forth most of the
relevant facts, certain of them bear emphasis. The
defendant was charged with violating the terms of his
probation after his two year old child was found wan-
dering alone on a main thoroughfare in the town of
East Windsor, clad only in a diaper. As the opinion of
the Appellate Court explains, the evidence adduced at
the defendant’s probation revocation hearing estab-
lished that, on the day in question, “the defendant was
solely responsible for the care of his [two year old son
and an eight year old boy] and that during this time,
the defendant was watching television on the couch in
the living room while [the two boys] played ina different
part of the house. The defendant was aware that the
back door of his home was not secured so as to prevent
egress by a toddler. The defendant left the children
unsupervised long enough for the two year old child to
exit the home without the defendant’s knowledge and
to walk at least 100 feet away from the home into a
busy street where he was nearly struck by a vehicle.”
The defendant was . . . made aware that the two year
old child was missing [only] when the eight year old
child notified the defendant that he could not find [the
two year old child]. The [two year old] child was outside
for [at least twenty-five to thirty minutes] before the

In fact, that vehicle came within three feet of the child before the driver
swerved to avoid running him over.

Po 47
Leer

defendant came to retrieve him.” State v. Maurice M.,
116 Conn. App. 1, 8-9, 975 A.2d 90 (2009).

According to Sergeant Michael Hannaford of the East
Windsor police department, when the defendant finally
appeared, he exhibited no visible signs of concern for
the child. Hannaford stated that the defendant acted
“noncaring [and] nonchalant,” like it “wasn’t . . . that
big of a deal [that] the child got out . . . .” Indeed,
when the child reached his arms out to his father for
comfort, the defendant “just . . . turned away” and
“Ggnor[ed] the child.” To Hannaford, the defendant
appeared “upset” and “[a]ngry,” not because the child
could have been seriously injured but because “the child
had left . . . the house.” When Hannaford asked the
defendant how the child had gotten out, the defendant
responded that “he must have opened the back door”
while the defendant “was on the couch watching [the
television] or otherwise not paying attention to the chil-
dren... .”

In the course of his investigation, Hannaford visited
the defendant’s home and observed that there were no
child safety devices on the doorknob on the back door
to prevent a young child from opening the door. Hanna-
ford also learned that the defendant had left the two
year old in the care of another child. Hannaford testified
that he arrested the defendant for risk of injury to a
child because the defendant’s failure to supervise his
children had created a situation in which the two year
old was able to leave the house unnoticed and nearly
get struck by a car.

At the conclusion of the state’s case, defense counsel
argued that the state’s evidence was insufficient to
establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant had created a situation inimical to the
safety or well-being of his child in violation of § 53-21
(a) (1) because it was not reasonably foreseeable “that

—— |
letting his child play in the house with an older child
was placing his child’s life or limb in danger.” Defense
counsel further contended that unsupervised “indoor
domestic playing” does not amount to a total lack of
supervision, and, therefore, the defendant’s case was
distinguishable from those in which a parent was found
guilty of risk of injury to a child for leaving a child at
home without any supervision. Defense counsel also
argued that the defendant’s conduct was not reckless
because, as soon as the defendant became aware that
the child was missing, he immediately began to look
for him.

The trial court was not persuaded by counsel’s argu-
ments and found that the state had proven by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had
committed the crime of risk of injury to a child in
violation of his probationary condition barring any crim-
inal conduct. The trial court explained that parents are
required by law to protect their children from known
risks. Specifically, the court stated: “There are risks in
the house. . . . [T]hat’s why [people] . . . baby
[proof] houses. In this case, the child didn’t fall out [of]
the second story window, but he also didn’t stay in the
house. . . . [The child left the property by himself,
exiting the house through the unsecured back door.]
There was nothing to prevent [the child] from going
out. [The defendant] lives in that house. . . . It’s his
responsibility [as the parent] to make sure that [certain
dangers] don’t exist . . . . Toddlers migrate. They go
everywhere. . . . [It] wasn’t . . . [the eight year old
child’s] responsibility to take care of the two year old
child and to make sure that the two year old . . .
doesn’t get hurt or doesn’t leave the house or eat some-
thing that he’s not supposed to eat. It’s the adult’s
responsibility. And by not fulfilling that responsibility,
in this particular instance, a risk of harm to the [two
year old] child existed. That is, a back door was accessi-

Po 49
Ld

ble. . . . The [defendant] had no idea where [the child]
was in the house . . . . [He] [hJad no idea that [the
child] had left the house. [The child] left the house
because he was able to do so. . . . And he managed
to get himself into the middle of a highway as [a] result.
. . . And it’s not the [two year old] child’s fault. And
it’s not the [eight] year old’s fault. It’s [the defendant’s]
fault. It’s [the defendant's] responsibility as a father and
as a caregiver to make sure that [his] child is protected
. . . [and] that the child does not leave the house and
go wandering . . . down the street... .”

Having concluded that the defendant violated his pro-
bation, the trial court proceeded to the dispositional
phase of the hearing. At that time, the court noted that
the defendant had an extensive criminal history, which
included multiple probation violations. The court fur-
ther noted, with respect to the probation violation that
is the subject of this appeal, that it was not simply poor
parenting that had led to the defendant’s arrest but,
rather, a reckless disregard for a dangerous condition
that the defendant knew or should have known existed.
Specifically, the court stated: “He knew that there was
no lock on the door. He knew that there was no fence
around [his yard] . . . . And he knew or should have
known that a child could easily get out [of the house]
under those circumstances. It wasn’t simply that the
child left the premises. He left the premises, and nobody
knew about it. [The defendant] didn’t know about it
because he wasn’t supervising [the child]. He left him
in the care or supervision of another child and that
created a risk of injury to this child, a risk of severe
injury. . . . [The child] had to walk across the highway
to leave his shoes in the middle of the highway. He had
to go right across that road under circumstances that
should never have been allowed to exist. And that was
a dangerous situation. It’s not just a parenting skill. It’s
almost as though it’s a lack of care whatsoever for the

50 Pe
Deel

. . . welfare of the child.” The court thus concluded,
on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, that
the beneficial aspects of probation no longer were being
served in the defendant’s case and, accordingly,
revoked the defendant’s probation. The Appellate Court
thereafter affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

_ Inreversing the judgment of the Appellate Court, the
majority recognizes, as this court previously stated in
State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698, 724-25, 905 A.2d 24
(2006), that “§ 53-21 (a) (1) is broadly drafted and was
intended to apply to any conduct, illegal or not, that
foreseeably could result in injury to the health of a
child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The majority
then identifies several nonexclusive factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether a particular risk was
foreseeable for purposes of a case, such as the present
one, involving a claim that a parent or other adult
responsible for a child’s supervision has violated the
law by failing to uphold his or her responsibility. These
factors include the age and maturity of the child, the
gravity of the risk, the length of time of the abandon-
ment, the degree of the parent’s accessibility, and the
protective measures that the parent has taken to mini-
mize the risk. The majority concludes, and I agree, that
“[t]his fact specific approach, and the attendant require-
ment to consider the totality of the circumstances of
each case, is consistent with the foreseeability element
of § 53-21 (a) (1), and provides the necessary guidance
to determine whether a given defendant has committed
the crime of risk of injury to a child,” in this case, by
a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. I
disagree with the majority, however, insofar as it deter-
mines that, upon application of those factors, no trier
of fact rationally could find, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the defendant had violated § 53-21 (a)
(1) by creating a situation inimical to the two year old
child’s physical well-being.

Po 5

Before considering the facts in light of the relevant
factors, I first set forth several principles that govern
this court’s analysis. Because a probation revocation
proceeding is akin to a civil, rather than a criminal,
proceeding, “a trial court may . . . find a violation of
probation [if] it finds that the predicate facts underlying
the violation have been established by a preponderance
of the evidence at the hearing—that is, the evidence
must induce a reasonable belief that it is more probable
than not that the defendant has violated a condition of
his or her probation.” State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285,
302, 641 A.2d 370 (1994). Thus, the burden on the state
to establish a probation violation “is substantially lower
than that for conviction”; State v. Roberson, 165 Conn.
78, 80, 327 A.2d 556 (1973); which, of course, is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, whether the
evidence in the present case is sufficient to support a
criminal conviction of the offense of risk of injury to
a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) “simply has no
relevance whatsoever to an independent determination
on the same facts made in a revocation of probation
hearing”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v.
Benjamin, 299 Conn, 223, 236, 9 A.3d 338 (2010);
because of the much lower standard of proof applicable
to probation violation cases. Furthermore, it is well
established that, “[ijn making its factual determination
[whether a condition of probation has been violated],
the trial court is entitled to draw reasonable and logical
inferences from the evidence. . . . [This court’s]
review is limited to whether such a finding was clearly
erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been.
committed. . . . [E]very reasonable presumption must
be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal

62 Po

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday, 268 Conn.
174, 185, 842 A.2d 567 (2004).

In addition, “[uJnder Connecticut law, parents have
a common-law duty to protect their children... . A
defendant’s failure to act when under a duty to do so,
thereby permitting a dangerous situation to exist or
continue, or a defendant’s deliberate indifference to a
dangerous situation that poses a risk of injury to a child,
may be sufficient to support a conviction under the
situation prong of § 53-21 (a) (1).” (Citation omitted.)
State v. Maurice M., supra, 116 Conn. App. 17. Thus,
“a defendant who knowingly fails to provide for the
protection of a child when that child is under [his or
her] care . . . creates a situation that endangers the
physical well-being of the child and, thus, [such failure]
falls with the ambit of [§ 53-21 (a)].” State v. Branham,
56 Conn. App. 395, 402, 743 A.2d 635, cert. denied, 252
Conn. 937, 747 A.2d 3 (2000); see also State v. Sorabella,
277 Conn. 155, 173, 891 A.2d 897 (“[I]t is not necessary,
to support a conviction under § 53-21, that the [accused]
be aware that his conduct is likely to impact a child
younger than the age of sixteen years. Specific intent
is not a necessary requirement of the statute. Rather,
the intent to do some act coupled with a reckless disre-
gard of the consequences . . . of that act is sufficient
to [establish] a violation of the statute.” [Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.]), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 821, 12758.
Ct. 131, 166 L. Ed. 2d 36 (2006). “This duty to protect
logically includes a duty to supervise one’s [two year
old] child, especially [when] there are known dangers
that pose a risk of injury to that child.” State v. Maurice
M., supra, 11.

With these principles in mind, I turn to the various
factors that bear on the determination of whether the
defendant's conceded failure to supervise his two year
old child inside the home gave rise to a foreseeable
risk of harm to that child. The first factor, the age and

Po 53
ee

maturity of the child, clearly supports the trial court’s
decision. “Common sense and experience inform us
that young children are inquisitive and impulsive.” State
v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 159, 869 A.2d 192 (2005).
Indeed, as one court observed in the context of a case
involving a three year old, “[a] child may be so young
as to be manifestly and utterly incapable of exercising
any of those qualities of attention, perception, knowl-
edge, experience, intelligence, and judgment which are
necessary to enable the child to perceive a risk and to
realize its unreasonable character.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Brown v. Smalls, 325 S.C. 547, 556,
481 S.E.2d 444 (App. 1997). Thus, in a case involving a
child just one month shy of his second birthday, the
Florida Supreme Court aptly noted that “i]t is a matter
of common knowledge that small children are erratic
and unpredictable, [and] that they are liable to take
off at any time and in any direction with no concern
whatever for their own safety.” Miami Paper Co. v.
Johnston, 58 So. 2d 869, 870 (Fla. 1952). This is espe-
cially true of two year old children, who, as every parent.
knows, have no sense of their own limitations and are
prone to all manner of impulsive and reckless behavior.
Among other things, they open doors, climb up and
down stairs, place objects in their mouths and other-
wise test the limits of their newly acquired motor skills,
wholly without regard for the consequences. The trial
court reasonably found, therefore, that the defendant’s
wilful failure to supervise his two year old child inside
the home was particularly egregious because it was
readily foreseeable that the child, if left unsupervised
even for a very short period of time, might open the
back door and wander away.

The evidence pertaining to the second factor, the
gravity of the risk, also supports the trial court’s deci-
sion. The state adduced testimony establishing that the
defendant’s home is located near one of East Windsor’s

54 Po
Lee

busiest thoroughfares, which, according to Sergeant
Hannaford, is heavily traveled both on weekdays and
weekends. On the day of the incident, the yard sur-
rounding the house was unfenced, and the back door
leading to the exterior of the house was not equipped
with any type of lock or child safety device capable of
preventing a two year old from opening it.’ On the
basis of this uncontroverted evidence, the trial court
reasonably found that the proximity of the defendant’s
house to a busy thoroughfare and the existence of an
inadequately secured back door posed a serious risk
of harm to the unsupervised two year old child.

The third consideration is the length of time of the
parental abandonment. Although there is no evidence
either as to how long the two year old child was unsu-
pervised inside the house before he exited through the
back door or the total length of time that the child
wandered around outside before he was found by a
passing motorist, it is undisputed that approximately
one-half hour had elapsed from the time that the child
was found until the defendant appeared to retrieve him.
Thus, even if it is assumed that the defendant spent up
to ten full minutes searching for his son inside the house
upon learning that the eight year old could not find
him—it is highly unlikely that such a search would have
taken any longer than ten minutes—the two year old

8 Although the trial court observed during the dispositional phase of the
proceeding that the defendant's yard was unfenced, common sense dictates
that, if the defendant had placed a fence around the yard for his son’s
protection, the child never would have been able to reach the street on
which he was found. Moreover, there was no evidence adduced during the
adjudicatory phase of the probation revocation proceeding to suggest that
there was a fence around the yard and that, somehow, the child was able
to scale or otherwise circumvent it. The defendant certainly would have
adduced evidence of a fence, if there had been one, because that evidence
would have seriously undermined the state’s case. Consequently, itis hardly
unreasonable to presume that the trial court knew, at the time of the adjudica-
tory phase of the proceeding, that there was no fence securing the defen-
dant’s yard.

Po 55
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child would have been left:alone, unsupervised, for
about twenty minutes. It is beyond dispute that it is
extremely dangerous to leave a two year old child with-
out adult supervision for that extended period of time.
Accordingly, the third factor strongly supports the trial
court’s decision.

Before addressing the remaining considerations, it is
important to note that the majority itself does not dis-
pute the fact that the three foregoing factors clearly
support the trial court’s determination. Indeed, with
respect to those three factors, the majority expressly
acknowledges that the defendant wilfully “fail[ed] to
supervise his child inside the home,” instead, leaving
that task to an eight year old, even though “the back
door . . . was not equipped with a child safety device”
and even though the home was located only “100 feet
from a narrow, small town road that, at times, was
heavily traveled. . . . Between twenty and twenty-five
minutes may have passed from the time that witnesses
first saw the child outside the home to the time that
the defendant appeared to retrieve his child . . .
From this information, the trial court could have con-
cluded that the defendant’s two year old son was with-
out adult supervision for at least twenty-five to thirty
minutes, and that the proximity of the defendant’s home
to a busy street presented a dangerous condition.”

With respect to the fourth factor, the degree of paren-
tal accessibility, several cases of this court and the
Appellate Court make clear that leaving young children
at home alone for any appreciable period of time will
support a conviction under § 53-21 (a) (1). See, eg.,
State v. Fields, 302 Conn. 236, 261, 24 A.3d 1243 (2011)
(leaving one year old child alone at home for any appre-
ciable period of time is both dangerous and unsafe);
State v. Branham, supra, 56 Conn. App. 398-99 (jury
reasonably could have concluded that leaving three chil-
dren, all under four years of age, unsupervised in house

56 Po
a

even for short period of time posed serious risk of harm.
to those children); State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388,
390, 656 A.2d 232 (1995) (leaving seventeen month child
home alone led to conviction under risk of injury stat-
ute). Although the defendant in the present case did
not leave his two year old child alone, common sense
and experience dictate that a parent may be physically
present in the home but not “accessible” to his or her
children in any meaningful sense of the term for pur-
poses of providing them with the care and supervision
necessary under the circumstances. Furthermore, the
degree to which a parent is accessible to a child inside
the home necessarily depends on the age and maturity
level of the child, and the vigilance or lack thereof of
the parent. In the present case, the evidence indicated
that the defendant completely abrogated his parental
responsibility by leaving his child in the exclusive care
and control of a second child, who himself was only
eight years of age. The trial court reasonably found that
this arrangement was entirely inadequate because the
defendant, having placed himself in a position from
which he personally was unable to react to an emer-
gency or some other problem in a timely fashion, opted
to rely on the limited skill and immature judgment of
an eight year old. As this court expressly has stated, it
is unreasonable to expect that an eight year old child
will react responsibly to a potentially dangerous situa-
tion because of “the lack of judgment natural to so
young a child . . . .” Cote v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321,
326, 16 A.2d 595 (1940). It is no surprise, therefore, that
the defendant did not learn that his two year old child
had gone missing until being made aware of that fact
by the eight year old a considerable period of time after
the two year old actually had left the house. In such
circumstances, the trial court reasonably found that,
although the defendant was physically present in a dif-
ferent part of the house, his personal inattentiveness,

Pe 87
Pd

coupled with his obvious failure to make appropriate

arrangements for the care and supervision of the two

year old in his absence, rendered him functionally inac-

cessible for a sufficient period of time so as to subject

the child to a serious risk of harm.

The fifth and final factor, the protective measures
taken by the defendant to minimize the risk of harm,
also militates in favor of a finding that the defendant
had placed the two year old in a potentially dangerous
situation with foreseeably disastrous consequences.
Although the defendant made no effort to secure the
back door and otherwise failed to child proof the house,
he nevertheless saw fit to leave his son in the care and

.custody of an eight year old. It is readily apparent that
an eight year old child is likely to be, and in the present.
case clearly was, too immature and too easily distracted
to properly care for a younger child, particularly a child
who is only two years of age. Indeed, the fact that the
eight year old in the present case lost track of the two
year old for a considerable period of time before alerting
the defendant that he was missing is ample proof of this
fact. Consequently, the trial court reasonably concluded.
that the only real protective measure that the defendant,
had taken, namely, enlisting an eight year old to super-
vise his two year old child, was so clearly inadequate as
to render the defendant’s conduct highly irresponsible.

Thus, the foregoing factors unquestionably support
the trial court’s findings, especially when those findings
are viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the
trial court’s determination. To conclude otherwise is
simply to second guess the reasoned judgment of the
trial court and to ignore the fact that the court’s judg-
ment was predicated on the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard of proof. Although it undoubtedly is
true that different fact finders might reasonably draw
different inferences from the evidence in the present
case, it simply cannot be said that no reasonable fact

58 po
ee

Jinder could draw the inferences that the trial court
did. The majority’s reasons for its contrary conclusion
do not withstand scrutiny.‘

The majority posits two primary reasons why the
evidence provides an insufficient basis for the trial
court’s judgment. First, the majority asserts that the
evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that
the exterior of the defendant's home was accessible to
his two year old child through the unlocked back door.
Second, the majority contends that the trial court
“fail[ed] to give proper weight” to certain facts that, in
the majority's view, reduced the foreseeability of the
risk in this case, in particular, the defendant’s accessibil-
ity to his children, the fact that the defendant left the
two year old in the care of the eight year old, and
the lack of evidence establishing that the two year old
previously had left the house on his own.

With respect to the accessibility of the back door,
the majority states that “[t]he only evidence offered
relative to the back door . . . was [Sergeant] Hanna-
ford’s testimony ‘that there [were] no safety devices on
the doorknobs or such that . . . one would normally
do with young children to prevent them from opening

‘I note that, under the majority's analysis, despite the gravity of the risk
and the fact that the defendant left his two year old child in the exclusive
care of an eight year old child for an extended period of time, the trial court
could not have found that it was more likely than not that the defendant.
had engaged in conduct inimical to the welfare of his two year old child
under § 53-21 (a) (1) even if the child had been killed by a passing motorist.
In my view, such a result hardly would be dictated by the facts.

5 As the majority notes, although the trial court repeatedly referred to the
“accessibility” of the back door, the “real concern” was “not so much the
accessibility of the back door itself [but] . . . the accessibility of the exte-
rior of the home through the back door.” (Emphasis in original.) Footnote
6 of the majority opinion. “Because the basic claim is that the [two year
old] child was able to access the exterior of the home through a back door
that was somehow not secured in a manner that would prevent him from
exiting”; id.; I also “refer to this factual component as the accessibility of
the back door . . . .” Id.

Po 59
Lee

the doors ... .’” The majority asserts, however, “that
Hannaford’s testimony [was] too vague and ambiguous
in its bare reference [to] a lack of safety devices to
sustain the trial court's conclusion that the back door
was accessible to the [two year old] child.” Footnote
10 of the majority opinion. Specifically, the majority
argues that, “[w]ith the exception of Hannaford’s testi-
mony that the back door did not have any ‘safety
devices,’ the record is devoid of any other evidence
relative to the nature of the back door, which undoubt-
edly is material to the ease with which a two year old
child could have accessed the exterior of the home.
For example, there is no clear indication in the record
as to how many doors separated the interior of the home
from the exterior . . . . There is also no indication as
to whether the back door or doors were ajar or shut
at the time the child exited the home. Moreover, there
is no indication as to the method by which one would
open the back door or doors, i.e., whether one must
turn a doorknob and pull open the door; whether one
must grasp a handle, depress a thumb lever and pull
open the door; or whether one must press a small push
latch and push open the door to exit (as is common with
screen doors).” The majority also notes that, although
Hannaford testified “ ‘that there [were] no [child] safety
devices on the doorknobs’ . . . there [was] no indica-
tion as to what exactly the missing ‘safety device’ was,
i.e., whether Hannaford was referring to a circular plas-
tic device that covers metallic doorknobs, a hook and
eye mechanism to keep an exterior screen door from
opening, or some other device.” Text accompanying
footnote 10 of the majority opinion. The majority con-
cludes that “[a]ny of these factors could be relevant to
determining whether the defendant reasonably would
not have thought that his two year old child possessed
the strength and manual dexterity to manipulate the
door or doors open.”

60 Po
ee

Contrary to the majority’s assertions, there was over-
whelming evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that, consistent with Hannaford’s express testimony,
the back door was not adequately secured to prevent.
a two year old from exiting, including, most obviously,
evidence that the child was found wandering in the
street outside his home. See Goldstar Medical Services,
Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 834, 955
A.2d 15 (2008) (“[T]here is no distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence [insofar] as probative force
is concerned . . . . In fact, circumstantial evidence.
may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than
direct evidence.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]);
Stein v. Tong, 117 Conn. App. 19, 24, 979 A.2d 494 (2009)
((Triers of fact must often rely on circumstantial evi-
dence and draw inferences from it. . . . Proof of a
material fact by inference need not be so conclusive
as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if
the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reason-
able belief in the probability of the existence of the
material fact.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). Put
simply, when a two year old disappears and subse-
quently is found outside his home, it is hardly unreason-
able to conclude, in the absence of any other plausible
explanation, that the child was able to leave the home
though an unsecured door while the person or persons
responsible for supervising the child were not paying
attention. Indeed, in the normal course of events, it
would be impossible to reach any other conclusion,
especially in view of Hannaford’s testimony that the
door had not been secured.

The majority nevertheless maintains that the trial
court could not reasonably have inferred from the
child’s presence outside the home that the exterior of
the home was accessible to him through the back door.
In support of this contention, the majority asserts that
“the ease with which the child exited the home cannot

es 61
eee

be presumed by the child’s actual presence outside the
home”; footnote 11 of the majority opinion; “the mere
existence of a dangerous outcome does not necessarily
dictate that there was an unsafe condition that caused
it,” and “the evidence is insufficient to sustain the con-
clusion that the back door was accessible, and the mere
fact that the child was in a dangerous situation does
not mean that an unsafe condition caused it.” Footnote
14 of the majority opinion. Apart from these conclusory
assertions, however, the majority offers no explanation
whatsoever as to why the child’s presence outside the
home, coupled with Hannaford’s testimony that the
back door had not been adequately secured and the
defendant’s acknowledgment that the child “must have
exited through the back door,” is not probative of the
accessibility of the back door, as well as the ease with
which the child was able to leave the house. Although
itis theoretically possible that the child exited the house
in some other unexpected and unforeseeable manner,
the trial court’s conclusion that the child was able to
leave the house because there were no safety measures
in place to prevent him from doing so is hardly unrea-
sonable. In fact, as I have indicated, in light of all of
the possible explanations for the child being outside
the house, an open or unlocked door is the most logical
explanation, if not the only logical explanation, in view
of the child’s age and Hannaford’s description of the
back door as not having been child proofed or other-
wise secured.

The majority also contends that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court’s findings concern-
ing the accessibility of the back door because there
was nothing in the record to indicate whether the child
had to go through one door or two doors upon exiting,
and because Hannaford did not describe the type of
child safety devices that were missing from the doors.
This parsing of the evidence by the majority is mani-

62 Po
ee

festly inconsistent with the proper role of an appellate
tribunal, which is not to substitute its view of the evi-
dence for that of the trial court but, rather, to consider
the trial court’s factual findings in the light most favor-
able to sustaining that court’s judgment. For purposes
of the present case, it hardly matters what type of child
safety device was missing from the back door or
whether there were two doors (ascreen door in addition
to an interior door) or one. Hannaford’s unchallenged
testimony that there were “no safety devices on the
doorknobs or such that . . . one would normally [use]
with young children to prevent them from opening . . .
doors” was more than sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that the door was not adequately secured
to prevent egress by a two year old child. (Emphasis
added.) The mere fact that Hannaford was not asked
to describe in detail the various possible devices that
were not installed on the back door neither detracts
from the highly probative nature of his testimony with
respect to the condition and accessibility of the door
nor undermines in any way the trial court’s finding that
the two year old child was able to gain access to the
exterior of the home through the door. To conclude
otherwise, as the majority does, is to ignore the princi-
ple that a reviewing court must consider the evidence
adduced in the light most favorable to sustaining the
trial court’s judgment; it is not this court’s function to
attempt to discredit that evidence by identifying poten-
tial factual issues that the parties did not explore but
that possibly “could be relevant” to a contested issue
in the case.

°'Dhe majority asserts that the trial court’s finding that the back door was
inadequately secured is clearly erroneous because, according to the majority,
that finding was predicated on the trial court's predicate finding that there
was no lock on the back door, whereas the testimony indicated only that
there were no child safety devices on the back door. The majority's conclu-
sion is untenable because it is apparent that the trial court’s finding that
the back door had not been secured is supported by, and predicated on,
certain undisputed facts, namely, that (1) there were no child safety devices
‘on the door, (2) the two year old child was able to exit via the door, and

Po 63

Furthermore, although the defendant bore no burden
of proof at the probation revocation hearing, there was
nothing to prevent the defense from presenting evi-
dence concerning the condition of the back door for
the purpose of rebutting Hannaford’s testimony that it
was not properly secured. Indeed, in his brief to this
court, the defendant concedes that he did not argue in
the trial court or in the Appellate Court that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding that the door was
unlocked. His sole contention, rather, was that his con-
duct was not culpable, first, because it was not reason-
ably foreseeable that the child would leave the house
while playing with his eight year old companion and,
second, because “he [had taken] appropriate measures
to address the danger by searching for the [two year
old child]” upon learning that he had gone missing.
Accordingly, in light of defense counsel’s argument at
the revocation hearing and the complete absence of
any conflicting evidence regarding the accessibility of
the door, there simply was no reason for the trial court
not to credit Hannaford’s testimony that the door was
not secured so as to prevent a two year old from exiting
through it. The trial court also reasonably could have
inferred from the defendant's statement to Hannaford
that the child “must have opened the back door” that
the defendant was aware that the door was accessible
to the two year old child. Although additional evidence
establishing the degree or extent of the door’s accessi-
bility, in the form of a photograph or other testimonial
evidence, might have strengthened the state’s already
convincing case, it cannot seriously be maintained that
the evidence was devoid of facts from which the trial
court reasonably could have found that the back door
was accessible to the two year old child. See, e.g., Wolk

(®) the defendant himself observed that the child “must have opened the
back door,” a comment that the court reasonably could have understood
as reflecting the defendant's Inowledge that the child could and did open
the inadequately secured back door.

64 Pe

bere

v. Wolk, 191 Conn. 328, 330, 464 A.2d 780 (1983)
(“[ulnless there were no facts [on] which the [trial]
court could base its finding, we as an appellate body
cannot retry the case or substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court”). In reaching its contrary conclu-
sion, the majority violates the bedrock principle that,
on appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable
view of the evidence that would result in a finding
favorable to the defendant; rather, we ask whether there
is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the
finding of the trier of fact. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 283
Conn. 280, 330, 929 A.2d 278 (2007). In the present case,
the evidence was more than sufficient to support the
trial court’s finding.

The majority also concludes that the trial court failed
to give proper weight to the fact that the defendant was
accessible to his children, that the defendant left the
two year old child in the care of the eight year old, and
that the two year old previously had never left the
house on his own. Specifically, the majority states: “The
defendant’s proximity and accessibility to the [two year
old] child mitigates the child’s young age and reduces
the foreseeability of the child’s escape. Hannaford also
testified that the two year old child was playing with
an eight year old child. Although we recognize that an
eight year old child lacks the maturity and responsibility
of an adult, we note that his presence alone carries
some weight; the two year old child was not wandering
around the home completely unattended. . . . Further,
Hannaford’s testimony established that the child had
never left the house before under these circumstances.
Though we certainly recognize that the state need not
wait for catastrophic harm to occur . . . before prose-
cuting an individual for violating § 53-21. . . as a gen-
eral proposition, the history, or lack thereof, of past
occurrences provides evidence of the foreseeability of

Pe 665
Cd

a given harm.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation.
marks omitted.)

Although it is true that the presence of the defendant
and the eight year old child carries some weight, the
trial court’s failure to ascribe to those facts the same
weight as the majority does not render the trial court’s
conclusions unreasonable. Indeed, it is perfectly clear
from the record that the trial court considered all of
the factors identified by the majority but simply viewed

. the evidence in a different light. For example, the trial
court reasonably concluded that the defendant’s pres-
ence in the home did not militate significantly against
the foreseeability of the risk because the defendant
knew or should have known that he could not safely
and prudently place his two year old child within the
exclusive supervision of an eight year old for an
extended time period. Simply stated, the trial court’s
conclusion in this regard is logically unassailable.

No less reasonable is the trial court’s unwillingness
to give significant weight to the age of the child whom
the defendant tasked with the responsibility of supervis-
ing his two year old son. Nevertheless, the majority
seeks to undermine the trial court’s finding in this
regard, stating: “Although we recognize that an eight
year old child lacks the maturity and responsibility of
an adult, we note that his presence alone carries some
weight; the two year old child was not wandering
around the home completely unattended. Moreover, we
also note that the eight year old child demonstrated at
least some minimal level of responsibility by notifying

7] again note that the majority casts its argument in terms expressly
calculated to convey the impression that the present case involves “prosecut-
ing an individual for violating § 53-21 . . . .” Contrary to the misleading
implication of the majority, this case does notinvolve a criminal prosecution,
which would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the only
issue presented by this case is whether, for purposes of the defendant's
probation revocation hearing, the trial court reasonably concluded that the
state had established a violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) by a preponderance of
the evidence.

66 PO

the defendant that the child was missing.” What weight
or import to give to the fact that the two year old child
was not left completely unsupervised but, rather, was
placed in the care of an eight year old, is a quintessential
issue of fact for resolution by the trier of fact, and, as
such, that determination is entitled to great deference.
See, e.g., Hartford Electric Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley
Co., 250 Conn. 334, 346, 736 A.2d 824 (1999) (“we give
great deference to the findings of the trial court because
of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence
before it and to pass [on] the credibility of witnesses”
[internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, to the
extent that the majority suggests that the trial court
was required to give at least “some weight” to the fact
that the two year old child was being supervised by
an eight year old and had not been left completely
unattended, there is nothing in the record to suggest
that the trial court did not give that fact due weight
and consideration. Thus, the argument that the majority
advances in support of its contention that the trial
court’s findings are unsupported by the evidence or
otherwise mistaken is, in reality, a classic example of
prohibited appellate fact-finding.

With respect to the fact that the child previously had.
not left the house unaccompanied, as the majority itself
acknowledges, there is no rule that caregivers are enti-
tled to one bite at the apple before it may be determined
that their conduct created a situation inimical to the
well-being of the child. Indeed, if that were the case,
the protections of § 53-21 would be largely illusory.
Accordingly, the trial court was under no obligation to
conclude that the primary risk of harm in this case,
that is, that the two year old child would open the back
door and go outside, was unforeseeable because the
child never had done so beforehand. To the contrary,
itis common knowledge that two year old children often
attempt new feats without regard for the consequences.

Po 87
a

Indeed, that a two year old might one day attempt to
open a door is perhaps one of the most foreseeable
risks a parent faces, which is why, as the trial court
explained, parents child proof their homes well in
advance of the time that the risk presents itself. The
trial court also reasonably could have concluded that,
although this risk was readily foreseeable to an adult,
it was not foreseeable to an eight year old child, who
lacks the experience, judgment and maturity to antici-
pate such dangers. Because the trial court’s findings
with respect to all of the relevant factors are fully sup-
ported by the evidence, this court lacks the authority
to reverse the trial court’s judgment merely because it
would have drawn different inferences from that evi-
dence if it had been the-fact finder.’ See, e.g., Gaudio
v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 534,
733 A.2d 197 (1999) (“[i]f the [trier] could reasonably
have reached its conclusion, the verdict must stand,

note that the majority also states that, “notwithstanding the evidence
relative to the severity of the possible harm, the length of time during which
the child was outside, the age of the child and the absence of a safety device
‘on the doorknob, on the basis of the mitigating factors detailed previously,
we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In relying on this second
prong of the clearly erroneous test; see State v. Benjamin, supra, 299 Conn.
236 (“{a] court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous and its conclusions
drawn from that finding of fact lack sufficient evidence when there is no
evidence in the record to support [the court’s finding of fact] . . . or when
alihough there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed” [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]); the
majority appears to concede that there was evidence adduced at the defen-
dant’s probation revocation hearing that was sufficient to support the trial
court’s conclusion. With respect to the majority's assertion that it harbors
a definite and firm conviction that the trial court nevertheless was mistaken
in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had
violated his probation, I disagree with that conclusion because, for the
reasons set forth in this opinion, the evidence amply demonstrated that the
defendant acted with a reckless disregard for the consequences of leaving
his two year old child under the exclusive care and supervision of an eight,
year old child for approximately one-half hour.

68 Po
Leer

even if this court disagrees with it” [internal quotation

marks omitted]).

Ialso disagree with the majority’s contention that to
affirm the judgment of the trial court “would be to hold
a parent, who is home alone and solely responsible for
the care and supervision of one or more young children,
criminally responsible under what would essentially be
a theory of strict liability for leaving his or her children
unsupervised inside the home for a short period of time,
an illogical and impracticable result. In this case, the
record merely establishes that the defendant exhibited
less than ideal parenting . . . .” This assertion is wrong
for several fundamental reasons. First, the trial court
manifestly did not hold the defendant “criminally
responsible” under a “theory of strict liability .. . .”
Despite the majority's concerted effort to suggest other-
wise, this is not a criminal case, and the majority's
assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, our resolu-
tion of this appeal simply has no bearing on how we
would resolve the defendant’s insufficiency claim if this
had been a criminal case. As we repeatedly have
observed, a probation violation case is a civil case,
with the state bearing the burden of persuasion by a
preponderance of the evidence.’ In such cases, the state

®“{A] probation revocation involves an individual who has already
[pleaded] guilty to a crime or been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
This offender has subsequently entered into a probation agreement that is
essentially a contract with the court: the court agrees to stay part or all of
the statutory sentence, and the probationer in turn agrees to perform or
abstain from performing certain acts.” State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 278
(Utah App. 1990); see also State v. Davis, supra, 229 Conn. 296 (observing
that burden of proof in probation violation case must be predicated on
nature of probation conditions, which are analogous to contract). Thus,
probation revocation hearings “are not concerned with punishment or retri-
bution. . . . Rather, probation seeks to normalize the probationer into soci-
ety as soon as reasonably possible, and the revocation hearing presents the
ultimate question whether the probationer is still a good risk to be continued
in that status. . . . [Moreover], any punishment involved is attributable to
the crime for which [the defendant] was originally convicted and sentenced,
rather than to the changes on which the violation of probation is based.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McDowell,
242 Conn. 648, 658, 699 A.2d 987 (1997).

Po 69

Lee
and the defendant “share the risk of error in roughly
equal fashion. . . . [B]ecause we . . . assign the risk

of error almost equally, we require only a modicum of
subjective certitude on the part of the fact finder: [as]
long as the [court] is persuaded that the [state’s] asser-
tions are probably more true . . . the [state] has met
[its] burden of persuasion.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 210, 833 A.2d
363 (2003). Thus, in the present case, the state was
required to prove the elements of § 53-21 (a) (1) by a
mere preponderance of the evidence. In other words,
the state bore the burden of persuading the trial court
only that it was more likely than not that the defendant’s
conduct in placing his two year old child under the
exclusive supervision of an eight year old child, without
having undertaken efforts to secure the back door, was
inimical to the well-being of the two year old child, in
violation of § 53-21 (a) (1). In criminal cases, by con-
trast, “because . . . we impose almost all of the risk
of error on the state, we require the fact finder to have
avery high degree of subjective certitude: no reasonable
doubt about the defendant's guilt.” Id., 211. In view of
the significant difference in the two legal standards, a
finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated his probation by engaging in conduct
detrimental to the safety of a child has no bearing on
whether that same conduct constitutes a criminal vio-
lation of that statute. See State v. Benjamin, supra, 299
Conn. 236 (outcome of criminal proceeding irrelevant
to determination on same facts made in probation revo-
cation hearing).

Furthermore, the trial court manifestly did not find
the defendant strictly liable for his two year old child’s
conduct in exiting through the back door. In fact, the
trial court’s reasoned decision contains a thorough and
thoughtful explanation—an explanation fully supported
by the evidence—detailing the reasons why the defen-

70 Po
ee

dant, in placing his son under the exclusive care and
custody of another child for an extended period of
time, knowingly had created a situation inimical to the
physical well-being of his child, in violation of § 53-21
(a) (1). Thus, the majority's alarmist rhetoric regarding
the potential impact of this case on future criminal
prosecutions is wholly unwarranted.

Finally, I take issue with the majority’s characteriza-
tion of the present case as one in which the defendant
“merely . . . exhibited less than ideal parenting” by
leaving his child “unsupervised inside the home for a
short period of time . . . .” This assertion exemplifies
the majority’s approach of substituting its own view of
the evidence for that of the trial court, which expressly
found that this is not simply a case of poor parenting.
Furthermore, although there was no evidence as to
exactly how long the two year old child was unsuper-
vised inside the house or how long he wandered around
outside the house before he was found, we do know
that approximately one-half hour had passed from the
time that he was found until the defendant appeared
to retrieve him. Contrary to the contention of the major-
ity, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that
thirty minutes is not a short period for a two year old
child to be without adult supervision. Indeed, experi-
ence and common sense dictate that that is the only
reasonable conclusion that may be drawn.° Because

©The majority also is wrong that the trial court reasonably could not
have considered the defendant's nonchalant and detached demeanor when
the defendant went outside to retrieve his child. In particular, the majority
asserts that “such reliance is misplaced” because “what occurred after the
defendant emerged from the home and, indeed, after the child found his
way outside, is irrelevant to the factual predicates necessary to prove a
violation of § 58-21 (a) (1).” Footnote 15 of the majority opinion. To the
extent that the defendant’s demeanor reasonably could be interpreted as
having a bearing on his conduct prior to the child’s leaving the house, that
demeanor és relevant. Thus, in the present case, the court reasonably could
have considered the fact that the defendant appeared to be wholly uncon-
cerned about what had just occurred, areaction that reflects the defendant's
indifference to the welfare of his child. This, in turn, supports an inference

Po a
Tt

the evidence supports the trial court’s finding, and
because the evidence also supports the trial court’s
ultimate determination that the defendant wilfully
placed his child in a situation that created an undue
risk of serious harm—the very harm that would have
befallen the child but for the attentiveness of the motor-
ist who rescued him—there is no lawful basis for dis-
turbing the judgment of the trial court. I therefore agree
with the Appellate Court that the trial court’s judgment
revoking the defendant’s probation should be affirmed.
Accordingly, I dissent.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TODD RIZZO
(SC 17527)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Vertefeuille and
DiPentima, Js.*

that the defendant also was unconcerned about the risks associated with
leaving his two year old child under the exclusive supervision of an eight
year old and about the necessity of taking appropriate measures both to
child proof his home and to obtain appropriate supervision for his child in
the defendant's absence.

* This appeal originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting
of Chief Justice Rogers, Justices Norcott, Katz, Palmer, McLachlan and
Vertefeuille and Chief Judge DiPentima. Thereafter, Justice Katz resigned
from this court and did not participate in the consideration or decision of
the case, and Justice Zarella was added to the panel. Justice Zarella has
read the record and briefs, listened to a recording of the oral argument and
participated in the resolution of this case.

72

73

Argued October 22, 2010—officially released November 29, 2011

Judith L. Borman and Ann M. Parrent, assistant
public defenders, with whom, on the brief, was Jennifer
L. Bourn, deputy assistant. public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, with
whom was John A. Connelly, former state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).

Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The defendant, Todd Rizzo, appeals
from the judgment rendered by a three judge panel,
following a penalty phase hearing held pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a,! sentencing him
to death for the murder of a thirteen year old victim,
Stanley G. Edwards. The defendant claims on appeal
that: (1) his waiver of a jury for the penalty phase
hearing was constitutionally invalid; (2) the presiding
judge at the penalty phase hearing should have disquali-

1 General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 68a-46a provides in relevant part: “(b)
Forthe purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed when a defendant
is convicted of or pleads guilty to a capital felony, the judge or judges who
presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered shall conduct
a separate hearing to determine the existence of any mitigating factor con-
ceming the defendant's character, background and history, or the nature
and circumstances of the crime, and any aggravating factor set forth in
subsection (i). . . . Such hearing shall be conducted . . . before [a] jury
... OF... before the court, on motion of the defendant and with the
approval of the court and the consent of the state. . . .”

Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to § 58a-46a are to the
1997 revision of the statute.

76 Po
Ll

fied himself due to bias; (8) the absence of a specific
intent requirement in the aggravating factor found by
the panel renders his death sentence unconstitutional;
(4) the panel’s finding of an aggravating factor lacks
evidentiary support; (5) the method of establishing miti-
gating factors pursuant to § 53a-46a (d) violates the
eighth amendment to the United States constitution;
(6) the panel’s finding of a single cumulative mitigating
factor but no individual mitigating factors was
improper; (7) the panel improperly weighed aggravating
and mitigating factors and determined that death was
the appropriate punishment; (8) the death sentence was
the product of passion, prejudice and other arbitrary
factors; and (9) the death penalty is a per se violation
of the state constitution. We disagree with each of these
claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment sentencing
the defendant to death.

The basic facts and procedural history of the case
are as follows. In the early evening hours of September
30, 1997,.the defendant lured the young victim into
the defendant’s backyard under false pretenses and,
thereafter, bludgeoned the victim to death with a small
sledgehammer. The defendant initially attempted to.
conceal his crime, but the following day, when con-
fronted with powerful evidence of his guilt, he con-
fessed to murdering the victim. The defendant pleaded
guilty to murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
54a (a) and capital felony in violation of General Stat-
utes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54b (9) and, following a § 53a-
46a penalty phase that was tried to a jury, he was sen-
tenced to death. State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 175-76,
833 A.2d 363 (2003). On appeal, this court reversed the
judgment as to the death sentence after concluding that
the jury had not been instructed properly as to a legal
standard to be employed in its imposition;? id., 243; and

2 We clarified the appropriate burden of persuasion applicable to the fact
finder’s weighing of aggravating factors against mitigating factors pursuant
to § 58a-46a (e) and (f). State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn, 224-43.

PO 7
—

that the prosecutor had engaged in serious impropriety
during his closing argument. Id., 243-44. The case was
remanded for a new penalty phase hearing, during
which the defendant waived his right to have a jury
determine his sentence, instead opting for sentencing
by a three judge panel. After the penalty phase hearing,
the panel again sentenced the defendant to death. This
appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural his-
tory will be provided where pertinent to the claims
raised.

I

The defendant claims first that his waiver of a jury
for the penalty phase proceedings was constitutionally
invalid.’ He argues specifically that his decision to forgo
a jury determination of whether death was the appro-
priate penalty, and to opt instead for sentencing by a
three judge panel; see General Statutes (Rev. to 1997)
§ 53a-46a (b) (3); General Statutes §§ 58a-45 and 54-82;4

° The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in rele-
vant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” The sixth amendment
right to a jury trial is made applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149, 88 S. Ct, 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968), Article first, § 8, of the
Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall have a right . . . to a speedy, public trial by an
impartial jury. . . .” Article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution, as
amended by article four of the amendments, provides in relevant part: “The
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, the number of such jurors, which
shall not be less than six, to be established by law; but no person shall, for
a capital offense, be tried by a jury of less than twelve jurors without his
consent. . . .” Because the defendant does not contend that he is afforded
greater jury trial rights under the constitution of Connecticut, we assume
for purposes of this appeal that the rights arising from the state and federal
constitutions are coextensive. See State v. Gore, 288 Comn. 770, 7762.7, 955
A.2d 1 (2008); see also State v. Marino, 190 Conn. 639, 646, 462 A.2d 1021
(1983) (state constitution does not demand more elaborate procedure for
waiver of right to jury than that required under federal constitution).

+General Statutes § 582-45 provides in relevant part: “(b) If a person
indicted for murder or held to answer for murder after a hearing conducted
in accordance with the provisions of section 54-46a waives his right to a

—

was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. According
to the defendant, an examination of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding his waiver leads to the con-
clusion that it was ineffective. We disagree.

The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to this claim. Jury selection for the defendant’s
penalty phase proceedings began on March 15, 2005.
During jury selection and throughout the penalty phase
proceedings, the defendant was represented by Ronald
Gold and David Channing, both of whom were experi-
enced public defenders. As of April 15, 2005, the twenti-
eth day of voir dire proceedings and a Friday, eight
jurors had been chosen. Late that day, after the trial
court, O’Keefe, J., had dismissed the current panel of
prospective jurors and while the court was preparing
to adjourn the proceedings until the following Monday,
the defendant requested permission to waive his right
to a sentencing jury. Initially, Gold indicated to the trial
court that some issue had arisen, and requested a recess
to confer with the defendant. The trial court granted

jury trial and elects to be tried by a court, the court shall be composed of
three judges designated by the Chief Court Administrator or his designee,
who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial. Such judges, or a
majority of them, shall have power to decide all questions of law and fact
arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly. . . .”

General Statutes § 54-82 provides: “(a) In any criminal case, prosecution
or proceeding, the party accused may, if he so elects when called upon to
plead, be tried by the court instead of by the jury; and, in such case, the
court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try such case and render judgment
and sentence thereon.

“(b) If the accused is charged with a crime punishable by death or impris-
onment for life and elects to be tried by the court, the court shall be
composed of three judges to be designated by the Chief Court Administrator,
or his designee, who shall name one such judge to preside over the trial.
Such judges, or a majority of them, shall have power to decide all questions
of law and fact arising upon the trial and render judgment accordingly.

“(c) If the party accused does not elect to be tried by the court, he shall
be tried by a jury of six except that no person, charged with an offense
which is punishable by death or life imprisonment, shall be tried by a jury
of less than twelve without his consent.”

EE

Gold’s request, encouraging him to “[t]ake [his] time.”
When the defendant and Gold returned, the following
discussion ensued:

“{Gold]: Your Honor, [the defendant] wanted to
address the court about something.

“The Court: I don’t have any problem with that. What
do you want to tellme ...?

“The Defendant: Your Honor, over the past few weeks
since we've begun selecting a jury, my mind has
changed from back in [1999] when I elected a three
judge panel, it might have been during the probable
cause hearing or the arraignment or my guilty plea,
when I originally elected—

“The Court: A jury.
“The Defendant: A jury.
“The Court: You elected a jury.

“The Defendant: A jury. I reviewed the law and my
lawyers presented me with a lot of information that
showed that while ’'m, you know, if you're arrested for
acrime, you're guaranteed a jury trial by jury. But there
are conditions, if a defendant wants to elect a three
judge panel, and I understand that it is the consent of
the state and the approval .of the court, and in this
situation I haven’t prepared any motion and I just
wanted to put on the record that I wanted to—

“The Court: You are thinking about changing your
election to a three judge panel?

“The Defendant: I have—right. I have no right to do
so, but what I—

“The Court: You are thinking about it.
“The Defendant: Yes. I wanted to find out if—
“The Court: If it could be done.

——

“The Defendant: If it can be done only in the sense,
if the state opposes, it’s a dead issue. I fully accept a
jury. I had a jury before. A jury can be fair, but I feel

it’s in my best interest this time around to have three
judges review the evidence for what it is.

“The Court: Okay. That’s a surprise to me, what you
said. I’ll consider it. There’s nothing before me. There’s
nothing formal before me. So you think about it over
the weekend, talk to your lawyers. Tell me how you
feel on Monday. And, [state’s attorney].

“{State’s Attorney]: This is the first. I’m also surprised,
Your Honor, but I will think about it over the weekend.

“The Court: Yeah, how’s that?

“[State’s Attorney]: Just to let [the defendant] know,
that the state is not foreclosed to the possibility of a
three judge panel.

“The Court: Given my involvement so far in the case,
I would not be part of the—I wouldn’t be one of the
three judges. That probably wouldn't be a good idea,
would it?

“{Gold]: I haven’t thought about that, Your Honor.

“The Court: We don’t need to cross that bridge right
at this point. But—okay. You heard what [the state’s
attorney] said.

“The Defendant: I appreciate you taking the time to
hear my request.

“The Court: No problem.
“The Defendant: Thank you, sir.
“The Court: Okay. We're adjourned.”

Before court reconvened the following Monday, the
defendant and his two attorneys met and discussed the

CC

defendant’s options for the penalty phase proceedings.°
Upon returning to the courtroom, defense counsel indi-
cated that they disagreed with the defendant’s decision
to waive a jury, but had been unable to dissuade him
from doing so. After the state consented to the defen-
dant’s election of a three judge panel, the trial court
asked the defendant if he had any questions, to which
the defendant replied: “I just wanted to put on the
record, Your Honor, that the law has been explained.
to me by both of my lawyers, very thoroughly.” The
trial court then referred the defendant to a different
judge to be canvassed as to his jury waiver.

At the outset of the canvass proceedings, defense
counsel notified the trial court that they both had
“explained the various ramifications of the decision [to
the defendant] and [had] recommended against it.” The
trial court, Jannotti, J., proceeded to canvass the
defendant:

“The Court: Now . . . it’s my understanding that
since some time on Friday afternoon or Friday morning,
up until now, that you had indicated to your attorneys
that you were contemplating changing your election
from a [twelve] person jury and electing a three judge
court—a three judge court, three judge panel. Is that
correct?

“[The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

“The Court: Now, have you had enough time to talk
to your lawyers about that change, sir?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir. Judge O’Keefe granted us
much time this morning to—

“The Court: Okay.

° The transcript indicates that court did not reconvene until 11:20 a.m. on
Monday and that, prior to that time, defense counsel had spoken with the
defendant twice.

— |

“(The Defendant]: —discuss it.

“The Court: And you’re obviously, sir, aware that
your lawyers are recommending to you not to do this?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir. They've thoroughly
explained the differences between a jury trial and a
court trial and—

“The Court: Tell me what they explained to you

“(The Defendant]: Well, they explained to me how
selecting a jury, considering the evidence, and it’s differ-
ent, it’s different. It’s different for the defense to put
on a case for [twelve] people compared to [twelve]
experienced judges.

“The Court: Three experienced judges.

“The Defendant]: Did I say [twelve]?

“The Court: Yes, sir.

“(The Defendant]: I meant three, sir.

“The Court: Yes, sir.

“(The Defendant]: And they would prefer and I don’t
really—I’m not sure how much I’m allowed to say.

“The Court: Well, you don’t have to say anything
about the conversations you have with your lawyers. I
just wanted to know the understanding, that you under-
stand what you're doing.

“TThe Defendant]: Right. They understand—they—if
they are putting on this trial and to put on my best
defense, they feel that a—

“The Court: They feel they can do it better with a
[twelve] person jury than they can with a three judge
panel.

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

“The Court: Is that what they told you?

“TThe Defendant]: Yes, sir.

—E CC

“The Court: Now, here’s the important part. Okay?
Once you change this election here today, okay, from
a jury to a three judge panel, you can’t change your
mind back again. Okay?

“That election ends here and today, and the only
thing that will occur after today is phone calls will be
made and the chief [court administrator] of this state
will appoint a three judge panel to your case, and your
matter will be heard in front of that three judge panel.
Do you understand that?

“The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

. “The Court: So once that begins, once that process
begins or actually not even once that process begins.
As soon as I accept your election here today, you can’t
go into the back room and talk to [defense counsel]
and say, you know, geez, maybe I, maybe I should have
the jury. Okay? You cannot change your mind back
again. Do you understand that?

“{The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

“The Court: If you had originally elected a—the other .
way, you could have changed—once you elect a court
trial, it’s over. Do you understand that?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

“The Court: You can go from a jury to a court, you
can’t go from a court to a jury.

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir. That’s exactly what they
explained to me this morning, very thoroughly.

“The Court: All right. And I'm sure what they also
explained to you is that when you have a [twelve] person
jury in a death penalty phase case like this, is that
it would have to be unanimous with those [twelve]
people. Right?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

“The Court: And my guess is that their thought pro-
cess was, you know, they probably said to you. . .

—

we think we have a better chance with a [twelve] person
jury here than we do with a three judge panel because
with a three judge panel of experienced judges, it’s the
three of them versus the [twelve] person jury that they
would have to convince. Do you understand that?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir. I was told that it’s not
unanimous with three judges, it’s—it could be—

“The Court: Two out of three would be enough. But
not—obviously, with the jury it has to be unanimous.
Do you understand that?

“The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

“The Court: All right. So they’ve explained all of that
to you thoroughly.

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

“The Court: Right, Mr. Gold?
“[Gold]: Yes.

“The Court: Right, Mr. Channing?

“{Channing]: May I have one moment with him,
Your Honor?

“The Court: Sure.

“Channing]: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, we
explained what he said we explained.

“The Court: Is that right?

“TThe Defendant]: Yes, sir. In writing and verbally
they told me.

“The Court: All right. And knowing all that, it is still
your decision here today that you want to change from
a jury to a three judge panel?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir. I do understand their posi-
tion, but I’m certain that I prefer a court trial.

——

“The Court: Do you have any other questions of
your lawyer[s]?

“(The Defendant]: I feel very satisfied that I've been
given every bit of information to make this decision,
and I have no further questions to my lawyers at this
time that’s going to change my mind tomorrow.”

The trial court thereafter asked the defendant
whether he had had enough time to make his decision,
and the defendant replied, “Yes, sir. Plenty of time.”
When the court asked him-again whether he needed.
more time, the defendant responded, “No, sir. I feel
very satisfied.” The colloquy continued:

“The Court: So you're confident that this is the way
you want to go, and you're confident you've discussed
everything you need [to] discuss with your attorneys?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

“The Court: And you're confident that you don’t need
any additional time to make this decision. Is that
correct?

“TThe Defendant]: That is correct.”

After some discussion with the state’s attorney
regarding the fact that the defendant, in an earlier pen-
alty phase proceeding, had elected to be tried by a jury,
the trial court queried the defendant further:

“The Court: . . . [S]o you have been through this
process before, and you have had a jury on this before,
so you have a complete understanding how that works.
Is that a fair statement .. . ?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

“The Court: And another good point actually brought
up by [the state’s attorney] is that you’ve had a lot of
time to think about this, you’ve had a lot of time to talk
to your lawyers, but is this your own decision based

——
on your own free will? Are you doing this knowingly?
Are you doing this voluntarily? Did anybody pressure
you, and I don’t mean your lawyers because clearly
they have not, but anybody pressure you from without
to change your election here? Is there any influence
upon you other than your own decision-making process
that has led you to make this decision today?

“{The Defendant]: No, Your Honor. This has been
knowingly and it’s definitely been voluntary because
there’s—

“The Court: Were you coerced by anybody?

“(The Defendant]: No, not even in the prison. I’ve
had no discussions with this, with even any of the
escort officers.

“The Court: Did anybody suggest it to you?

“TThe Defendant]: No, sir. I thought this was my deci-
sion over the past few weeks and I voiced my opinion
last week to my lawyers.

“The Court: All right. So there [were] no outside influ-
ences to change your mind from a jury to a court elec-
tion whatsoever. It was thought up by yourself, it was
brought to your lawyers’ attention by yourself, was thor-
oughly discussed with your lawyers by yourself, and
again, your lawyers told you not to do this, but regard-
less of that after having fully talked it out with your
lawyers, you have remained adamant that this is a deci-
sion that you knowingly, voluntarily, and in complete
knowledge wish to make?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir. I initiated this.”
The trial court continued to inquire:

“The Court: . . . [A]t this time or throughout this
decision-making process, as of right now, today, are

A

you under the influence of any alcohol, medication, or
drugs of any kind?

“[The Defendant]: I take no medication, Your Honor,
and no alcohol, nothing.

“The Court: All right. So your decision making is
clear of any outside influences whatsoever with regard
to that?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir.”

The trial court then found that the defendant’s deci-
sion to revoke his jury election and to proceed before
athree judge panel was knowingly and voluntarily made
with the assistance of his attorneys. The court further
found that the defendant was not under the influence
of any alcohol, drugs or medication of any kind and
that he had had at least seventy-two hours to contem-
plate his decision. Accordingly, the trial court accepted.
and approved the defendant’s waiver of his right to a
jury and his election to be sentenced by a three judge
panel. Following the penalty phase hearing, the three
judge panel sentenced the defendant to death.

The defendant now claims that his waiver of a jury
for the sentencing proceedings was constitutionally
inadequate because the trial court failed to ensure that
it was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. According to
the defendant, the totality of the circumstances demon-
strates that his waiver of the constitutional right to have
ajury decide his fate was invalid. Specifically, he points
to the timing and nature of his incarceration and the
atmosphere during the voir dire proceedings preceding
his waiver. The defendant also claims that his waiver
was defective in the absence of specific advice from
the trial court as to the differences between court and
jury proceedings, and that the court should have

— |

inquired further about his reasons for waiving a jury.
We are not persuaded.®

Because the defendant did not raise this claim during
the penalty phase proceedings, it is not preserved for
purposes of appellate review.’ Nevertheless, a claim
that a trial court has failed to ensure a proper waiver
of the right to a jury is of constitutional magnitude and
alleges a violation of fundamental rights. See State v.
Woods, 297 Conn. 569, 578, 4 A.3d 236 (2010); State v.
Ouellette, 271 Conn. 740, 748 n.14, 859 A.2d 907 (2004).
Because there is an adequate record of the defendant’s
waiver, we review his claim within the framework of
State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).®
We conclude, however, that the defendant has failed

The defendant also draws our attention to Judge O’Keefe’s statement,
when the defendant first proposed waiving a jury, that the judge would not
be part of the three judge panel “[g]iven [his] involvement so far in the case
.. . "Because Judge O'Keefe ultimately was chosen to serve on that panel,
the defendant argues that his waiver was based on prejudicial misinforma-
tion. Because, as we hold in part II of this opinion, a reasonable person
would not conclude that a judge’s pretrial involvement in a case and the
Imowledge thereby gained necessarily impairs his or her impartiality, this
claim is meritless.

7’ We disagree that the defendant's claim is preserved simply because his
waiver of his right to a jury was made contrary to his counsels’ advice.
Counsel raised no formal objections to the waiver during the colloquy.
Furthermore, at no time during the penalty phase proceedings that followed
the waiver did the defendant or his counsel move to revoke that waiver, or
attempt to introduce any evidence that might have called its effectiveness
into question. Finally, after the panel’s imposition of sentence, the defendant
did not file a motion to vacate the judgment and cause the proceedings to
be set for a jury trial on the ground that he “was not fully cognizant of his
rights” at the time of his jury waiver or because “the proper administration
of justice require[d]” such a result. General Statutes § 54-82b (b); see also
State v. Ouellette, 271 Conn, 740, 751 n.16, 859 A.2d 907 (2004) (§ 54-82b [b}
applicable after commencement of trial “to remedy any [jury] waiver that
was invalid”).

8 Pursuant to State v. Golding, supra, 218 Conn, 239-40, “a defendant can
prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all
of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review
the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude
alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (8) the alleged constitutional
violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and

EE

to establish that a constitutional violation exists and
deprived him of a fair trial.®

We begin with general principles. A defendant
charged with a felony possesses a constitutional right
to be tried by a jury, and that right extends to the
determination of aggravating factors in the sentencing
phase of a death penalty prosecution. See Ring v. Ari-
zona, 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d
556 (2002). Nevertheless, the right to a jury trial, like
many important constitutional rights held by an
accused, properly may be waived.” See Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 63 S.
Ct. 236, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942) (approving waiver of jury
trial by unrepresented felony defendant, “in the exer-
cise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the consid-
ered approval of the court”); Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930)
(permitting waiver of jury for trial of felony charges
upon, inter alia, defendant’s “express and intelligent
consent”). Likewise, a defendant who has pleaded guilty
to, or has been found guilty of, a capital offense in

(4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate
harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant's claim
‘will fail.” (Emphasis in original.)

"In addition to seeking Golding review, the defendant argues that the
trial court committed plain error in accepting his jury waiver. Because we
conclude that the defendant validly waived his right to a jury, it necessarily
follows that the trial court did not commit plain error. See State v. Woods,
supra, 297 Conn, 589 n.5; see also State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75,
794 A.2d B66, cert. denied, 260 Conn, 935, 802 A.2d 88 (2002).

“The most basic rights of criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver
.... Acriminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of
the most fundamental protections afforded by the [cJonstitution. See, e.g,
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 USS. 1, 10 [107 S. Ct. 2680, 97 L. Ed. 2d 1] (1987)
(double jeopardy defense waivable by pretrial agreement); Boyivin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 [89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Bd. 2d 274] (1969) (knowing and
voluntary guilty plea waives privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
right to jury trial, and right to confront one’s accusers); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 465 [58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Bd. 1461] (1988) ([s}ixth [almendment
right to counsel may be waived).” United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 US.
196, 201, 115 S. Ct. 797, 180 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1995).

—

Connecticut may choose to relinquish his right to have
a jury determine his punishment, with the consent of
the prosecution and approval of the trial court. See
General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a (b) (8); see
also General Statutes §§ 53a-45 and 54-82.1!

4 Connecticut is not alone in permitting defendants to waive jury rights
in capital sentencing proceedings, provided the waiver is knowing, voluntary
and intelligent; see, e.g., Peraita v. State, 807 So. 2d 1161, 1195-96 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2003); Winkles v. State, 21 So. 3d 19, 23 (Fla. 2009); People v.
Maswell, 173 I. 2d 102, 119, 670 N.E.2d 679 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1174, 117 8. Ct. 1445, 187 L. Ed, 2d 551 (1997); Baker v. State, 367 Md. 648,
690, 790 A.2d 629, cert. denied, 585 U.S. 1050, 122 S. Ct. 1814, 152 L. Bd. 2d
817 (2002); Bishop v. State, 812 So. 2d 934, 945 (Miss.), cert. denied, 537
US. 976, 123 S. Ct. 468, 164 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002); Mack v. State, 119 Nev.
421, 427, 75 P.3d 803 (2008); State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St. 8d 70, 72, 855
N.E.2d 48 (2006); and the defendant does not contest generally the propriety
of jury waiver in the capital punishment context. We agree with the defen-
dant, however, that a trial court should be particularly cautious when consid-
ering whether to permit a capital defendant to waive a sentencing jury. See
Patton v. United States, supra, 281 U.S. 312-18 (observing that caution
exercised by court, in accepting jury waiver, should “increas{e] in degree
as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity”); cf. California v. Ramos,
468 U.S. 992, 998-99, 108 S, Ct, 8446, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1171 (1983) (“the qualitative
difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly
greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination”).

Although some of the foregoing cases and other capital cases cited in
this opinion predate Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 609, which established
that there is a constitutional, and not merely a statutory, right to have a
jury find aggravating factors in the penalty phase of a capital trial, the
standard for determining whether a jury waiver is valid is the same regardless
of whether the right is constitutional or statutory in origin. See People v.
Robertson, 48 Cal. 84 18, 36, 767 P.2d 1109, 265 Cal. Rptr. 631 (applying
knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right,
prior to Réng, to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879, 110
S. Ct. 216, 107 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1989); People v. Mamwell, supra, 173 IH. 24
117 (“[dlespite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right
to ajury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior
to Ring] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either
right to a jury must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”); Jones v. State,
310 Mad. 569, 597, 530 A.2d 743 (1987) (to be effective, waiver of statutory
right, prior to Ring, to capital sentencing jury must be Inowing and volun-
tary), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1050, 108 S. Ct. 2815, 100 L. Ed.
2d 916 (1988); Commonwealth v. O'Donnell, 559 Pa, 820, 845, 740 A.2d 198
(1999) (finding, prior to Ring, “‘that a capital defendant's waiver [of] his
statutory right to a penalty-phase jury must be knowing, voluntary and
intelligent”); see also United States v. Mezeanatto, 513 US. 196, 210-11,
115 8. Ct. 797, 180 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1995) (upholding criminal defendant's

CT

The question to be answered, as in other instances
of waiver, is whether the defendant’s choice to forsake
sentencing by a jury, and to opt for a penalty phase
proceeding before a three judge panel, was knowing,
voluntary and intelligent. State v. Gore, 288 Conn. 770,
776, 955 A.2d 1 (2008). “Relying on the standard articu-
lated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct.
1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938) [for waiver of the right to
the assistance of counsel], we have adopted the defini-
tion of a valid waiver of a constitutional right as the
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known.
right. . . . This strict standard precludes a court from.
presuming a waiver of the right to a trial by jury from
asilent record. . . . In determining whether this strict
standard has been met, a court must inquire into the
totality of the circumstances of each case.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gore, supra, 776. We
must review the entire record and determine whether
it “furnishes sufficient assurance of a constitutionally
valid waiver of the right to a jury trial.” Id., 776-77.
Our inquiry is flexible, with the result turning on “the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding [each]
case, including the background, experience, and con-
duct of the accused.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id. 777. Finally, we indulge all reasonable
presumptions against the waiver of fundamental consti-
tutional rights and, if the record is silent, will not pre-
sume acquiescence in their loss.” Id. “[W]hether a

waiver of protections afforded by court rule where defendant had conferred
with counsel prior to waiver and “has never complained that he entered
into the waiver agreement at issue unknowingly or involuntarily”).

” We emphasize that, because the defendant never sought to withdraw
his jury waiver as invalidly effected; see footnote 7 of this opinion; the
question presented by his unpreserved claim “is not in full measure whether
[he] acted knowingly and intelligently in waiving a jury trial, as in cases
where an evidentiary hearing upon that subject has been held.” State v.
Marino, 190 Conn. 639, 643, 462 A.2d 1021 (1983). Rather, “[w]e must decide
whether the bare appellate record before us furnishes sufficient assurance
of an effective waiver at least to satisfy constitutional requirements for the
disclosure of such a waiver on the record.” Id., 644. Our focus is on “the
adequacy of the record to show a waiver of a jury trial when its effectiveness

—
defendant has effectively waived his federal constitu-
tional [jury] rights in a proceeding is ultimately [a] legal
question” subject to de novo review, although we defer
to the trial court’s subsidiary factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) United States v. Carmenate, 544 F.3d 105,
107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1019, 129 S. Ct. 586,
172 L, Ed. 2d 442 (2008).

Our review of the record and careful consideration
of the totality of the circumstances convince us that.
the defendant’s waiver of a sentencing jury must be
upheld. To begin, “there is no evidence to suggest that
the defendant was not of ordinary intelligence or educa-
tional background”; (internal quotation marks omitted)
Statev. Ouellette, supra, 271 Conn. 758; or that he lacked
meaningful life experience. To the contrary, the defen-
dant’s personal characteristics suggest a valid waiver.
At the time of the sentencing proceedings, the defen-
dant was twenty-six years old, a high school graduate,
and had several years of steady employment history.”
Compare, e.g., State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 372, 743
A.2d 1 (1999) (upholding validity of jury waiver where,
inter alia, defendant was twenty-nine years old, high
school graduate, had some military training and was
employed at time of arrest), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841,
1215. Ct. 106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000), State v. Shockley,
188 Conn. 697, 707-708, 453 A.2d 441 (1982) (upholding
validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant was
twenty-three years old at time of trial and had com-
pleted two years of high school), and State v. Smith, 100
Conn. App. 313, 324, 917 A.2d 1017 (upholding validity of
jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had received

is first questioned on appeal without the benefit of a factual exploration of
that issue at some evidentiary proceeding.” Id., 646.

® The record indicates that the defendant had worked even prior to reach-
ing the minimum age for employment, beginning when he was fourteen
years old.

* been sentenced to death by

general equivalency diploma while incarcerated), cert.
denied, 282 Conn. 920, 925 A.2d 1102 (2007).

Additionally, because the.\defendant previously had

Pony, he had particularly
relevant personal experience with the criminal justice
system, which the trial court properly considered in
assessing his waiver. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,
87, 113 S. Ct. 517, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992) (“evidence of
a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice
system [is] relevant to.the question whether he know-
ingly waived constitutional rights”); see also State v.
Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. 372 (upholding validity of jury
waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised
of right to jury trial in connection with other charges);
People v. Smith, 176 Il. 2d 217, 227, 680 N.E.2d 291
(finding it “significant,” for purposes of finding valid
jury waiver in second capital sentencing hearing, that
“defendant had originally been convicted of murder and
sentenced to death by a jury, and thus was familiar with
the jury’s function in a capital sentencing hearing”),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 920, 118 S. Ct. 311, 139 L. Ed. 2d
241 (1997); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 536, 473
N.E.2d 1246 (1984) (noting, in upholding jury waiver
for capital sentencing hearing, that defendant recently
“had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death
by another jury . . . on a related indictment and so
became familiar with the jury’s function at the sentenc-
ing hearing”), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1044, 10558. Ct. 2061,
85 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1985). Here, the defendant responded
affirmatively to the trial court’s query: “[S]o you have
been through this process before, and you have had a
[penalty phase] jury . . . before, so you have a com-
plete understanding [of] how that works. Is that a fair
statement . . . ?” The trial court properly relied on the
defendant’s assurance.

Next, the record clearly reveals that the defendant,
in waiving his right to a sentencing jury, acted of his
own volition after considerable reflection and after he

eo

had ample time to confer with defense counsel and
to evaluate his decision. As a result, he possessed an
informed awareness of the nature of the right he was
waiving, and he expressed his desire to proceed with
athree judge panel repeatedly and emphatically. Specif-
ically, the defendant himself initiated waiver proceed-
ings after pondering the option for a “few weeks

.. .”!4 At that time, he stated that he had reviewed
the relevant law, and he demonstrated an accurate
understanding of the statutory requirements for a
waiver, namely, the consent of the state and the
approval of the court. See General Statutes (Rev. to
1997) § 53a-46a (b) (3). The trial court gave the defen-
dant an additional weekend to mull over the decision
and most of Monday morning to confer with defense
counsel. Before and during his canvass, the defendant
repeatedly stated that the differences between a court
trial and a jury trial had been explained to him thor-
oughly by his counsel, citing some examples, and he
confirmed numerous times that he had had adequate
time in which to consult with his attorneys and make his
decision. Additionally, the trial court explicitly advised

4 We disagree with the defendant's assertion that his counsel’s opposition
to his jury waiver “is a factor . . . showing that the waiver was not intelli-
gently entered.” A waiver of jury rights made contrary to the advice of
counsel is not necessarily unknowing or unintelligent; see, e.g., State v.
Smith, supra, 100 Conn. App. 313; even in a capital case. See Peraita v.
‘State, 897 So. 2d 1161, 1196-97 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), aff'd, 897 So. 24 1227
(Ala, 2004); Thanos v. State, 380 Md. 77, 91-94, 622 2d 727 (1998). In fact,
the right to a jury is personal to a criminal defendant, and it is his decision
alone whether to waive it. See State v. Gore, supra, 288 Conn. 777; see also
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2 (a). Moreover, as a logical matter, we
expect that counsel opposed to a defendant's proposed waiver would provide
every piece of information possible as to the perceived advantages of a jury
trial in attempting to dissuade the defendant from waiving a jury. Even if
disregarded, such advice would lead to a more informed, and therefore
more intelligent, waiver. We note that “a decision [to waive a jury] need
not be wise to be legally ‘intelligent.’ ” Thanos v. State, supra, 94.

"In this regard, the defendant's assertions on appeal that he acted “impul-
sively . . . with minimal consultation with his attorneys” and that he “knew
very little about what he was doing” are directly contradicted by the record.

the defendant that a twelve person jury would need to
agree unanimously to impose the death penalty,
whereas only two votes from a three judge panel would
suffice. Both of the defendant’s counsel also stated on
the record that they had explained the relevant law to
the defendant. The defendant stated variously that he
was “certain that [he] prefer[red] a court trial,” that he
was “confident” that was the way he wished to proceed
and that he was “adamant” about his decision.

Under analogous circumstances, we regularly have
rejected claims of invalid jury waivers. See, e.g., State
v. Woods, supra, 297 Conn. 586 (defendant’s statements
“were appropriate and demonstrated that he under-
stood his rights and the court’s questions,” he “con-
firmed that he wished to be tried by a three judge court,
that he had spoken with defense counsel to discuss this
decision, and had an adequate opportunity to do so,
that defense counsel had spoken with him about all the
issues and possibilities associated with his decision,
and that he was sure of his decision to be tried by a
three judge court” and defense counsel agreed with
defendant’s statements); State v. Ouellette, supra, 271
Conn. 758 (defendant represented by counsel, advised
twice of right to jury in open court and both times
affirmatively stated that he understood he was giving
. up right to trial by jury); State v. Williams, 205 Conn.
456, 462, 5384 A.2d 230 (1987) (after consulting with
counsel, defendant “vigorously and knowingly per-
sisted in articulating a preference for a court trial”);
State v. Marino, 190 Conn. 639, 645, 462 A.2d 1021
(1983) (concluding it is reasonable to infer jury waiver
“from the free expression by a defendant of his election
of a nonjury trial especially where he is represented by
counsel”); see also State v. Tocco, 120 Conn. App. 768,
780-81, 993 A.2d 989 (defendant responded to court in
“intelligent and courteous manner,” indicated that “he
carefully had considered the issue and that he was

— |

certain of his decision” and gave “immediate and
unequivocal replies to the court’s inquiries”), cert.
denied, 297 Conn. 917, 996 A.2d 279 (2010). In sum, in
the present case, it cannot “fairly be said that the record
presents a picture of a defendant bewildered by court
processes strange and unfamiliar to him”; (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) State v. Shockley, supra, 188
Conn. 708; or one “intimidated [or] confused by the
process.” State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. 373.

Finally, in response to the trial court’s questioning,
the defendant confirmed unequivocally that he was act-
ing of his own free will, that he was not under the
influence of any intoxicating substances and that his
waiver of his right to a jury was not a product of coer-
cion or pressure from any outside influences. Despite
these assurances, the defendant on appeal urges us to
conclude that a variety of circumstances existing prior
to his jury waiver effectively had rendered him despon-
dent, desperate to reach the conclusion of the penalty
phase proceedings and indifferent to his fate, thereby
making his waiver the involuntary product of irrational
thinking. Our careful review of the record compels us,
however, to reject this argument as unsupported and
entirely speculative." In short, because this claim is not

© The defendant argues that the following are among the circumstances
that contributed to the involuntariness of his decision to waive his right to
a jury: Due to the defendant's incarceration since the age of eighteen, his
psychological development was not that of anormal adult; the transportation
of the defendant each day from prison to voir dire proceedings and the
restraints that he wore during those proceedings left him feeling despondent;
the trial court employed a lighthearted, humorous or sarcastic tone in over-
seeing the voir dire proceedings, lessening their seriousness and making
the defendant feel that his life was unimportant; the trial court remarked
unevenly on prospective jurors’ views of capital punishment, speaking more
positively to those who favored it than to those who opposed it; and the
appearance that jury selection would continue indefinitely.

We have reviewed carefully the entire record of the proceedings prior to
the defendant's jury waiver. As to some of the assertions, we conclude that
they simply are contrary to the record. For example, we disagree with the
defendant's characterization of the trial court's demeanor. A review of the
voir dire transcripts reveals an overall concern with fairness and seriousness

preserved, there simply is no evidence in the record

that permeated the entire proceedings, no palpable sarcasm, and only iso-
lated examples of brief and mildly humorous quips that occurred with
minimal frequency.

Moreover, we discern no pattern of more positive comments by the court
to jurors who favored capital punishment. First, very few prospective jurors
expressed definitive views on capital punishment. Rather, in response to
the multiple similar questions posed by counsel, most panel members’
answers best can be described as nuanced, internally inconsistent and/or
equivocal. Likewise, the trial court's comments to prospective jurors, while
generally positive and encouraging, also vary and defy neat categorization.
Finally, the specific comments that the defendant deems more favorable
were directed at times to potential jurors that the defendant had dismissed,
and at other times to potential jurors that the state had dismissed. In short,
the defendant's characterization of the pattern of the court's comments is
highly subjective and not verifiable.

‘The record is also contrary to the defendant's assertion that it appeared
that voir dire would drag out for another ten weeks. On April 13, 2005, the
eighteenth day of jury selection and two days before the defendant's initia-
tion of a jury waiver, an on the record discussion between the court and
counsel at the close of the day indicated that jury selection was proceeding
at a typical rate for a capital case. On April 14, 2005, the nineteenth day of
jury selection and one day prior to the defendant's waiver, the courtindicated
that seven of twelve jurors had been chosen. The court thereafter indicated,
as it had repeatedly throughout the voir dire proceedings, that it expected
to have a jury chosen and to begin the penalty phase proceedings on May
9, 2005, in other words, within three to four weeks. On the morning of the
day the defendant chose to waive a jury, an eighth juror was chosen. In
sum, it was clear that jury selection would not continue much longer.

Tuming to the remaining circumstances cited by the defendant as allegedly
contributing to the involuntariness of his jury waiver, because the defendant
never complained about those circumstances during the penalty phase pro-
ceedings and his counsel never raised any question as to his competence
generally or his ability to validly waive his rights, the record is completely
silent as to what effect, if any, the conditions of his incarceration, transport
and restraint might have had on the defendant’s personal development or
his decision to waive his right to a jury. This court cannot, as the defendant
requests, rely on excerpts from social science texts or journal articles that
were not recognized as authoritative by an expert and admitted into evidence
during the penalty phase proceedings; see Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (8); see
also Pestey v. Cushman, 259 Conn. 345, 367, 788 A.2d 496 (2002); to make
factual findings regarding the defendant's state of mind for the first time
on direct appeal. It is axiomatic that this court does not find facts. State v.
Joyce, 229 Conn. 10, 27 n.19, 639 A.2d 1007 (1994). Moreover, although we
understand the defendant's desire to supplement the factual record with new
materials supportive of his unpreserved claim, “well established principles

—

that the defendant felt as he now claims he did or
that his jury waiver was motivated by those purported
feelings. In fact, as we have explained, the record is
decidedly to the contrary. See Spann v. State, 985 So.
2d 1059, 1072 (Fla. 2008) (rejecting capital defendant's
claim that his depression rendered his penalty phase
jury waiver invalid where record contained no contem-
poraneous evidence of depression); State v. Eley, 77
Ohio St. 3d 174, 182, 672 N.E.2d 640 (1996) (rejecting

governing appellate review of factual decisions preclude us from utilizing
this material to find facts on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Dillard, 66 Conn.
App. 238, 248 n.11, 784 A.2d 38 (that information was not before the trial
court, and, on appeal, we do not take new evidence), cert. denied, 258
Conn, 943, 786 A.2d 431 (2001); C. Tait & E. Prescott, Connecticut Appellate
Practice and Procedure (8d Ed. 2000) § 8.8 (2), pp. 305-306 (an appellate
court does not retry a case, admit new evidence or weigh the evidence).”
(internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ovechka, 202 Conn. 583, 547
1.19, 975 A.2d 1 (2009); see also Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 122, 376
‘A.2d 1085 (1977) (adjudicative facts, ie., those concerning parties and events
of particular case, are not subject to judicial notice, without affording parties
opportunity to be heard); E. Margolis, “Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the
Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs,” 34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 197, 216
(2000) ("it is clear that non-legal information introduced for the purpose of
assessing adjudicative facts should be presented to the trial court, and not
on appeal”).

If the defendant possesses compelling evidence in support of this claim,
the claim is better pursued in a collateral proceeding where a hearing can
be held and the evidence evaluated by a trier of fact. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Commissioner of Correction, 117 Conn. App. 120, 123-24, 977 A2d 772
(considering invalid jury waiver claim as part of ineffectiveness of counsel
claim in habeas corpus proceeding; evidence was developed regarding what
counsel told defendant and whether defendant felt pressured to waive jury),
cert. denied, 204 Conn, 904, 982 A.2d 647 (2009); see also Jells v. Mitchell,
588 F.3d 478, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2008) (considering, in habeas proceeding,
evidence outside trial record, including affidavits from defendant and coun-
sel, to evaluate claim that counsel was ineffective in advising defendant to
waive jury for capital sentencing proceeding); Moreland. v. Bradshaw, 636
F. Sup. 2d 680, 698-705 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (considering, in habeas proceeding,
testimony from defense counsel and prosecutors to determine whether
defendant's jury waiver was invalid because he was under influence of
sodium pentothal); Ciwmmei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 511-14, 392
N.E.2d 1186 (1979) (considering, in writ of error proceeding, evidence out-
side trial record in support of claim that defendant's jury waiver was not
Imowing and voluntary).

TC

capital defendant's “bald assertion that he is so mentally
challenged as to be incapable of giving a valid [jury]
waiver” because it was “not supported in the record”),
cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124, 117 S. Ct. 2522, 138 L. Ed.
2d 1023 (1997); see also People v. McLaurin, 184 Ill. 2d
58, 95, 703 N.E.2d 11 (1998) (rejecting as “speculation”
capital defendant’s claim that he was forced to waive
jury to obtain continuance where record did not support
claim and neither counsel nor defendant had com-
plained of coercion), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1091, 119 S.
Ct. 1506, 143 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1999).

The defendant also argues that the trial court’s can-
vass, although extensive, was insufficient to ensure a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent jury waiver. Specifi-
cally, he complains that the court was required to advise
him that juries are better equipped than judges to make
moral judgments; about the various possibilities that
could ensue in the event of a hung jury;!” and that a
panel of judges, unlike a jury, would be aware of his
previous death sentence, this court’s opinion in State
v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. 171, and the results of a brain
imaging test that the court earlier had permitted the
defendant to pursue.®

The United States Supreme Court has never held that
a defendant, when waiving the right to a jury, constitu-
tionally is entitled to be canvassed by the trial court,

‘Tin the event of a hung jury in the penalty phase of a capital trial, the
trial court has three options: “it may declare a mistrial; it may make factual
findings ‘acquitting’ the defendant of the death penalty; or it may exercise
its discretion, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56, to dismiss the death
penalty proceeding.” State v. Daniels, 209 Conn. 225, 231, 550 A.2d 885
(1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1069, 109 S. Ct. 1849, 108 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1989).
Accordingly, it is possible that a hung jury will lead to the imposition of a
sentence of less than death either with, or without, the necessity of a retrial.

Apparently, the brain imaging test produced no mitigating evidence.

100

let alone to require a specifically formulated canvass.
See United States v. Carmenate, supra, 544 F.3d 108.
Nevertheless, lower courts, both state and federal, and
commentators wisely have deemed a canvass to be the
better practice for ensuring the validity of a waiver.”
See State v. Gore, supra, 288 Conn. 784-87 and nn.14,
16 and 17. Recently, this court agreed. In State v. Gore,
supra, 777-78, in which we held, for the first time, that
a criminal defendant personally and affirmatively must
waive his right to a jury trial on the record, we also took
the opportunity to exercise our supervisory authority
prospectively to require that trial courts, in cases in
which there is no written waiver of that right, canvass

» Rule 28 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reflects
the holding of Patton v. United States, supra, 281 U.S. 312, requires that:
(A) the defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to
a jury; (2) the prosecution consent to any waiver; (8) the trial court accept
the waiver, and (4) the waiver be written. These requirements have “fre-
quently been held constitutionally adequate . . . .” State v. Ouellette, supra,
271 Conn. 756.

Corresponding Connecticut provisions similarly do not mandate a can-
vass, General Statutes § 54-82b (b) requires only that the defendant, at the
time he is put to plea, be “advise{d] . . . of his right to trial by jury...”
Similarly, Practice Book § 42-1 directs that upon election of a court trial,
“the judicial authority shall advise the defendant of his or her right to a
trial by jury and that a failure to elect a jury trial . . . may constitute a
waiver of that right.” As noted in this opinion, a capital defendant's waiver
of a sentencing jury requires both the consent of the state and the approval
of the court. General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a (b). Additionally,
like the Connecticut and the federal rules, the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice do not provide for a canvass. See AB.A.,
Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury (3d Ed. 1996)
standard 15-12

* The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has “recom-
mended that a district court go beyond a written waiver and individually
inform each defendant, on the record, of the fundamental attributes of a
jury trial before accepting a waiver.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
United States v. Carmenate, supra, 544 F.3d 107; see also United States v.
Lilly, 586 F.3d 190, 197 (8d Cir. 2008) (noting that Courts of Appeal for
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits
all have endorsed “[s]ome form of waiver colloquy” in order to build record
that defendant's waiver of his right to jury trial is knowing, voluntary and
intelligent).

101

the defendant to ensure that his choice is made know-
ingly, intelligently and voluntarily.“ After surveying
extensively the requirements for valid jury waivers in
other jurisdictions, we concluded that, “in the absence
of a signed written waiver by the defendant, the trial
court should engage in a brief canvass of the defendant,
. .. .” (Emphasis added.) Id., 787-88. “This canvass
need not be overly detailed or extensive, but it should
be sufficient to allow the trial court to obtain assurance
that the defendant: (1) understands that he or she per-
sonally has the right to a jury trial; (2) understands that,
he or she possesses the authority to give up or waive
the right to a jury trial; and (8) voluntarily has chosen
to waive the right to a jury trial and to elect a court
trial.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 788-89. Moreover, we
emphasized, “[i]Jt is not necessary that the canvass
required for a jury trial waiver be as extensive as the
canvass constitutionally required for a valid guilty plea,”
because the latter necessarily involves the forfeiture of
a greater number of constitutional rights.” Id., 789 n.18.

2 This court long ago observed that “personal interrogation of the defen-
dant to determine his understanding of the significance of his execution of
the [jury] waiver form” was the preferable approach, although it was not
constitutionally required. State v. Marino, supra, 190 Conn. 644. “Undoubt-
edly,” we opined, “a more comprehensive colloquy [than the minimal one
at issue in Marino] is generally desirable where a defendant elects trial
without a jury.” Id., 646; see id., 641-42 n.1. Consistent with that suggestion,
canvassing a defendant who wishes to waive his jury rights appears to have
been standard practice in Connecticut even prior to our decision in Gore.

2 “Waiver of a jury, although certainly an important election, still leaves
in place another form of fact finding; it has not as much weight or conse-
quence as a guilty plea, which is tantamount to a conviction and involves
implicitly . . . the waiver of three constitutional rights—to confront
adverse witnesses, to be free of compulsion to testify against oneself, and
to be tried by [a] jury . . . .” Ciwmmei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504,
508, 392 N.E.2d 1186 (1979); cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733,
113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993) (“[w]hether a particular right is
waivable; whether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver,
whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defen-
dant’s choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the
right at stake”).

102

Although this holding is to be applied prospectively
only,” we consider it useful in determining whether the
canvass provided to the defendant was adequately
detailed.

Because the United States Supreme Court never has
held that a canvass is required for a valid waiver of the
right to a jury, it necessarily has not prescribed the
contents of a canvass. In other contexts, however, that
court has explained: “the law ordinarily considers a
waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if
the defendant fully understands the nature of the right
and how it would likely apply in general in the circum-
stances—even though the defendant may not know the
specific detailed consequences of invoking it.” (Empha-
sis in original.) United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629,
122 S. Ct. 2450, 153 L. Ed. 2d 586 (2002); id. (waiver of
rights attendant to guilty plea). Thus, the United States
Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected challenges to
the validity of guilty pleas, with the concomitant waiver
of multiple constitutional rights, based on claims that
defendants harbored “various forms of misapprehen-

® Our opinion in Gore was released on September 23, 2008. The defendant
was canvassed as to his waiver of his right to a jury on April 18, 2005.

2 We also remain cognizant that this case, unlike Gore, involves the death
penalty, and we reiterate that in capital cases, courts should be particularly
cautious in accepting a jury waiver, in part by canvassing the defendant
thoroughly to ensure the waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, At
the same time, “although capital cases do require a more extensive colloquy
than other types of cases, the simple fact that the case is capital does not
mandate an exhaustive colloquy.” Sowell v. Bradshaaw, 872 F.3d 821, 834
(6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 US. 925, 125 S. Ct. 1645, 161 L. Ed. 24 485
(2005); see also State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St. 3d 70, 75, 855 N.E.2d 48 (2006)
(in death penalty case, defendant “need not have a complete or technical
understanding of the jury trial right in order to knowingly and intelligently
waive it” nor is “trial court required to inform the defendant of all the
possible implications of waiver” [internal quotation marks omitted]). This
is because the trial court may rely not just on the colloquy, but on the
totality of the circumstances, when determining whether the defendant's
choice is constitutionally sound. State v. Gore, supra, 288 Conn. 776.

103

sion... .”% Id., 630. In short, constitutional require-
ments may be satisfied even though a defendant “lacked
a full and complete appreciation of all of the conse-
quences flowing from his waiver . . . .” (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92,
124 S. Ct. 1379, 158 L. Ed. 2d 209 (2004) (right to coun-
sel); see also Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 294,
108 S. Ct. 2389, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1988) (same).

Consistent with the foregoing, this court and others
have rejected claims that an otherwise valid waiver of
the right to a jury is undermined by the trial court’s
failure to include a specific item of information in its
canvass. For example, in State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn.
374-75, we rejected the defendant’s claim that the trial
court’s failure to inquire about his understanding of the
process of juror selection and voir dire, or its failure
to advise him that a three judge panel, unlike a jury,
likely would become aware of inadmissible and prejudi-

* cial information about the defendant, rendered his
waiver unknowing and involuntary. We reasoned that
such information, which relates to “the strategic advan-
tages and disadvantages . . . of a jury trial, as opposed
to a trial to a panel of judges”; id., 374; was more prop-
erly the province of counsel to explain to the defendant
and was not a required part of the trial court’s canvass.”

_ 8 "See Brady v. United States, 397 US. [742, 757, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L.
Ed. 2d 747 (1970)] (defendant misapprehended the quality of the [s]tate’s
case); [id.] (defendant misapprehended the likely penalties); [id.] (defendant
failed to anticipate a change in the law regarding relevant punishments);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 70 [90 S. Ct. 1441, 26 L. Ed. 2d 763]
(1970) (counsel misjudged the admissibility of a confession); United States
v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 [109 S. Ct. 757, 102 L. Ed. 2d 927] (1989) (counsel
failed to point out a potential defense); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
267 [98 8. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235] (1973) (counsel failed to find a potential
constitutional infirmity in grand jury proceedings).” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) United States v. Ruiz, supra, 536 U.S. 630-31.

% The defendant argues that this court cannot assume that his counsel
advised him of the various consequences of his jury waiver “[iJn the absence
of any evidence that counsel did so,” and where there is “no suggestion on
the record to support that presumption.” The current record, however, offers
many such suggestions. Prior to being canvassed by the trial court, the

104

Similarly, in State v. Ells, 39 Conn. App. 702, 707-708,
667 A.2d 556 (1995), cert. denied, 235 Conn. 940, 669
A.2d 577 (1996), the Appellate Court rejected a defen-
dant’s claim that his jury waiver was rendered constitu-
tionally deficient because he was not advised that the
trial judge likely would be aware of his previously with-

defendant met twice with his counsel for a period he described variously
as “much time” and “[pJlenty of time,” and, thereafter, he repeatedly refused
the court’s offers of more time in which to confer. After meeting with his
counsel, the defendant stated that “the law has been explained to me by
both of my lawyers, very thoroughly”; that counsel “thoroughly explained
the differences between a jury trial and a court trial”; and that counsel had
provided explanations both “in writing and verbally . . . .” The defendant
stated further that he “fe[It] very satisfied that [he had] been given every bit
of information to make this decision, and [that he had] no further questions to
fhis] lawyers . . . .” Defense counsel confirmed on the record that they
had “explained the various ramifications of the [waiver] decision” to the
defendant and that they had “explained what [the defendant] said [they]
explained.”

When a defendant indicates that he has been advised by counsel and is
satisfied with the advice received, the trial court is entitled to rely on
that representation in determining whether a jury waiver is knowing and
intelligent. See State v. Woods, supra, 297 Conn. 686 (“[tJhe fact that the
defendant was represented by counsel and that he conferred with counsel
concerning waiver of his right to a jury trial supports a conclusion that his
waiver was constitutionally sound”); State v. Ouellette, supra, 271 Conn.
‘758 (“[W]e cannot assume thatin performing his duty of competent represen-
tation [defense] counsel did not advise the defendant of the consequences
of his choice, even to the extent of the refinements the defendant now
demands. . . . In addition, we will not assume that the defendant did not
fully discuss the decision to forgo a jury trial with defense counsel.” {Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn.
378 (“although the presence of counsel does not by itself mean that the
defendant's interests and rights are protected . . . [tJhe fact of counsel
being present and having advised the defendant [concerning jury waiver]
is a factor to be considered in determining the question of the need for or
sufficiency of any admonition given by the court” [internal quotation marks
omitted]); cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183, 125 S. Ct. 2398, 162
L, Ed. 2d 143 (2005) (guilty plea is constitutionally invalid if defendant has
not been advised of elements of crime, but court need not advise defendant
personally; “the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied
where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and
the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own,
competent counsel”).

105

* drawn Alford” plea. See also People v. Robertson, 48
Cal. 3d 18, 38, 767 P.2d 1109, 255 Cal. Rptr. 631 (court's
failure to advise capital defendant that it statutorily was
required to review automatically any verdict of death
returned by jury did not vitiate otherwise valid waiver),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1004, 111 S. Ct. 568, 112 L. Ed.

. 24.575 (1990); People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 512,
588 N.E.2d 1159 (court’s failure to admonish capital
defendant that sentencing jury would be unaware of
his prior death sentence for same murders did not
undermine otherwise valid waiver), cert. denied, 506
US. 942, 118 S. Ct. 381, 121 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1992); State
v. Foust, 105 Ohio St. 3d 137, 145-46, 823 N.E.2d 836
(2004) (rejecting claim, in capital case, that defendant’s

” waiver of right to jury was invalid because he was not
informed of, inter alia, jury unanimity requirement for
death sentence).¥ In sum, courts have declined to
require any formulaic canvass and instead, consistent
with the mandate of Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S.
464, have looked to the totality of the circumstances
of a particular case to determine the validity of a jury
waiver. This approach recognizes that “[t]he defen-
dant’s rights are not protected only by adhering to a
predetermined ritualistic form of making the record.
Matters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be con-

™ See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed.
2d 162 (1970) (defendant pleading under Alford doctrine neither admits guilt
nor protests innocence, but merely acknowledges that state has evidence
sufficient to obtain conviction).

% But see Commonwealth v. O'Donnell, 659 Pa. 320, 346-47, 740 A.2d 198
(1999) (finding invalid waiver of capital sentencing jury where trial court,
in addition to failing to advise defendant of unanimity requirement for death
sentence, failed to engage in any two-way dialogue to ensure that defendant
knew what right she was waiving, that she had discussed it with her counsel
or that she in fact had chosen to waive it; in short, “there was no meaningful
colloquy of {the defendant] and no indication that she understood the signifi-
cance of her decision”); see also State v. Martinez, 182 N.M. 82, 89, 43 P.3d
1042 (2002) (holding, without considering totality of circumstances, that
trial court's failure to advise capital defendant of unanimity requirement
for death sentence “rendered his jury waiver unknowing and unintelligent”).

106

trolling.” (internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Shockley, supra, 188 Conn. 712.

Applying these principles, we conclude that the trial
court’s canvass was sufficiently detailed, and that the
omissions cited by the defendant do not render his
otherwise valid waiver of his right to a jury constitution-
ally deficient. Clearly, consistent with the requirements
that we prescribed in Gore, the trial court verified that
the defendant understood that he had the right to a
jury, but that he could waive that right and elect to be
sentenced by a court, subject to the requirements of
§ 58a-46a (b) (8) for capital cases, and that the defen-
dant’s choice to waive his right to a jury and to opt
instead for a three judge panel was a voluntary choice
free of outside pressures or the effect of intoxicating
substances. Beyond that, the court advised the defen-
dant that his choice could not be readily undone, differ-
entiated between the unanimity and majority
requirements for twelve person juries and three judge
panels, respectively, to render sentences of death, and
inquired repeatedly whether the defendant had had suf-
ficient time to confer with defense counsel and whether
he was satisfied with their advice. In declining to pro-
vide more specific information as to the consequences
of a waiver, the trial court properly relied on the defen-
dant’s prior experience with a capital sentencing jury
and his multiple assurances that he had received ade-
quate advice from his counsel.”

In support of his argument that the trial court was required to explain
to him the possible consequences of a hung jury, the defendant cites Harris
v. State, 295 Md. 329, 339-40, 455 A.2d 979 (1983). We have reviewed carefully
that decision, as well as additional relevant case law, and conclude that
the authority favoring the defendant’s position is either distinguishable or
unpersuasively reasoned. In Harris, the Maryland Supreme Court concluded
that a capital defendant's jury waiver was invalid because the trial court
had failed to advise him that, in the event of a hung jury, the court statutorily
was required to impose a life sentence. Id.; see also Trimble v. State, 321
Ma. 248, 261, 582 A.2d 794 (1990) (applying Harris to conclude similarly
where trial court had misadvised defendant that its decision to impose life
sentence in event of hung jury was discretionary rather than mandatory);
Piperv. Weber, 771 N.W.2d 352, 356-60 (S.D. 2009) (citing Harris to conclude

107

similarly where trial court, in addition to failing to advise defendant that
statute required sentence of life imprisonment in event of hung jury, had
misadvised him that jury would have to agree unanimously to either life
imprisonment or death sentence and, further, defense counsel had misad-
vised him that, if he pleaded guilty, he had no right to penalty phase jury).

‘In other cases, the reviewing courts have held, contrary to Harris, that
an otherwise valid waiver was not undermined by a trial court's failure to
advise a capital defendant that, pursuant to statute, a life sentence automati-
cally would result if the jury did not agree unanimously to a death sentence.
See Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708, 732 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that Illinois
courts previously have reached that conclusion, and also have declined to
require that defendant be informed that jury's decision to impose death
penalty must be unanimous), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1116, 122 S. Ct. 927, 151
L, Ed. 2d 890 (2002); see also People v. Shatner, 174 I. 2d 183, 154, 673
N.E.2d 258 (1996) (Iilinois courts repeatedly have held that defendant need
not be expressly advised that vote of single juror may preclude imposition
of death penalty).

In People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal. 3d 36-38, the Supreme Court of
California rejected the defendant's claim that his waiver of his right to a
jury was invalid because the trial court failed to advise him of the statutory
requirement that life imprisonment be imposed in the event of a jury dead-
Jock. The court examined the totality of the circumstances before upholding
the validity of the waiver, and noted specifically: that the defendant was
represented by two apparently competent counsel who, over the course of
several days, had discussed with him “‘at length’” the nature and conse-
quences of the waiver; that counsel had expressed on the record their sound
tactical reasons for recommending a jury waiver; and that the trial court,
before accepting the waiver, engaged in an extensive colloquy with the
defendant to determine that his waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelli-
gent. Id. That court concluded that the rule sought by the defendant was
“too stringent for any situation,” because “no waiver requires the court to
explain every single conceivable benefit and burden of the choice being
made.” Id., 38. The court explicitly declined to follow the reasoning of
Harris as “unpersuasive .. . .” Id., 38 n.6.

All of the preceding decisions, regardless of whether they tend to support
or favor the defendant's position, are distinguishable because they involved
statutory mandates that life sentences be imposed in the event of jury
deadlock, whereas in Connecticut, that result is but one of three discretion-
ary options available to the trial court. State v. Daniels, 209 Conn. 225, 231,
550 A.2d 885 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1069, 109 S. Ct. 149, 103 L. Ed.
2d 817 (1989). Moreover, we agree with the Supreme Court of California
that Harris is contrary to the law governing jury waivers and, like that court,
‘we decline to follow it. When determining in Harris that the defendant's jury
waiver was invalid, the Court of Appeals of Maryland cited no authority,
conducted no analysis of the totality of the circumstances and instead
reasoned simply that the information omitted from the canvass “may very
well [have been] significant” to one facing a possible death sentence. Harris
vy, State, supra, 295 Md. 340. Although this statement may be true, it is not,
as we have explained herein, the test for a constitutionally valid waiver.

108

The defendant argues finally that the court should
have questioned him more thoroughly about his reasons
for waiving his right to a jury, in light of his counsel’s
representation that the defendant would not state to
counsel, in response to counsel’s entreaty, that he
wanted a sentence of life without the possibility of
release, but did say that he wanted “justice.” In
response to defense counsel’s expressed concern, the
trial court asked the defendant whether he was under
the influence of any intoxicating substances, and the
defendant confirmed that he was not. The court also
asked the defendant whether there was anything else
he wished to say in response to his counsel’s remarks,
and the defendant declined that offer. The defendant
now argues that defense counsel's stated concern sug-
gested that the defendant was suicidal and was seeking,
through his waiver of his right to a jury, to ensure

See Iowa v. Tovar, supra, 541 U.S. 92 (defendant need not have full and
complete appreciation of all consequences flowing from waiver); United
States v. Ruiz, supra, 536 US. 629 (defendant need not know specific detailed
consequences of invoking waived right); Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 US.
464 (court must consider totality of circumstances in assessing validity of
waiver); State v. Gore, supra, 288 Conn. 776-77 (same); see also Harris v.
State, supra, 341 (Murphy, C. J., dissenting) (describing majority analysis
as “badly strained and totally at odds with the governing law”). Because
Trimble and Piper rely on Harris, and also because they are factually
distinguishable, we similarly consider them to be unpersuasive.

® Channing explained his concern to the trial court as follows: “I know
that posited the question [of whether the defendant wanted a life sentence
without the possibility of release or to be executed] . . . to him, and he
said he wanted justice, and I described the adversarial—you know, process
to him that requires us to pull hard for our side, and I couldn't get him to
say, well, you know, I want to live, you know, I want—I want a sentence
of life without the possibility of release.

“[mean, I understand he trusts—he trusts the judiciary and I'm not saying
he shouldn't, I'm just saying that we prepared this case for a unanimous
verdict for [twelve] people, for [twelve] different kinds of people, people
that I don’t—I don’t think that will necessarily—we won't have any input
into choosing for a three judge panel, and I think his chances are much
better for the jury, and I couldn’t get him to say that that’s what he wants,
he wants—that he wants the best chance as possible. He just says he
wants justice.”

109

that he received a sentence of death. According to the
defendant, therefore, the trial court was obligated to
conduct a more searching inquiry into his reasons for
waiving his right to a jury. We are not persuaded.

First, we disagree with the basic premise of the defen-
dant’s argument, namely, that by choosing to forgo a
sentencing jury, he necessarily wanted the least favor-
able possible result and, therefore, that he had a “death
wish .. . .” “[A]t the time when an accused defendant
must choose between a trial before the jury and a trial
to the court, it simply cannot be said which is more
likely to result in the imposition of death.” Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 634, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d
978 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
Moreover, it is not unusual for a criminal defendant to
expect greater leniency from a court than from a jury,
and there are several logical justifications for opting to
waive the right to a jury. See 5 W. LaFave et al., Criminal
Procedure (2d Ed. 1999) § 22.1 (h), pp. 264-65. Although
the defendant now asserts that, at the time of his waiver,
he believed his counsel’s advice that he would fare
better with a jury but nevertheless chose to be sen-

 tenced by the court, the record indicates otherwise.
Specifically, in explaining his concerns to the trial court,
Channing stated that the defendant “trusts the judiciary
....” Additionally, prior to being canvassed by Judge
Jannotti, the defendant stated to Judge O’Keefe that he
had “had a jury before,” and understood that “[a] jury
can be fair, but [he felt it was] in [his] best interest this
time around to have three judges review the evidence
for what it is.”*' Viewed in conjunction with the fact

5\The defendant's claim that he actively sought a death sentence also is
belied by the record of the proceedings subsequent to his jury waiver.
Specifically, there is no indication that the defendant in any way prevented
his counsel from putting forth the best case possible on his behalf. Rather,
the defendant permitted his counsel to file two separate motions to impose
allife sentence, to introduce extensive evidence and to submit a list of forty-
five suggested mitigating factors for the panel’s consideration. In this regard,
the present case is readily distinguishable from those cited by the defendant

110

that the defendant previously was sentenced to death
by a jury, the preceding comments suggest that the
defendant's decision was a strategic one, specifically,
that he believed he would fare better with a three judge
panel and, accordingly, disregarded his counsels’
advice.

Furthermore, although the essence of the defendant’s
argument is that his waiver was involuntary due to his
impaired mental state, he has never raised a formal
challenge to his competence in either the trial court or
this court; see, e.g., State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 873
A.2d 131 (2005); there is no evidence in the record that
he suffers from any mental illness and he does not claim
that the trial court, sua sponte, should have ordered
a competency evaluation. Accordingly, the defendant
presumptively was competent to stand trial; see General
Statutes § 54-56d (b); and, consequently, competent to
waive his right to a sentencing jury. See Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398-99, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L.
Ed. 2d 321 (1993); State v. Ouellette, supra, 271 Conn.
752-53. This court repeatedly has determined that, even.
when a defendant has a history of mental illness and/
or incompetency, if he presently is competent, the trial
judge need not engage in a more searching canvass than
typically is required before accepting the defendant's
waiver of his right to a jury. State v. Woods, supra, 297
Conn. 584; State v. Ouellette, supra, 752. Here, there was
nothing to suggest that the defendant was incompetent,
and the trial court clearly was not required to inquire
in that regard.

Finally, as a general matter, the law imposes no obli-
gation on a trial court to explore a defendant's tactical
reasons for waiving a jury. People v. Diaz, 3 Cal. 4th
495, 571, 834 P.2d 1171, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353 (1992),

involving defendants’ refusals to present mitigating evidence, to pursue
appeals or to challenge obviously unconstitutional statutes.

lil

cert. denied, 508 U.S. 916, 113 S. Ct. 2356, 124 L. Ed.
2d 264 (1993); State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Minn.
1991). We reject the defendant’s contention, which is
not supported by any legal authority, that his simply
expressed desire for “justice,” in the absence of any
other evidence of incompetence, misconception, coer-
cion or improper influence and in the face of every
indication to the contrary, raises a question as to the
voluntariness of his decision that would trigger an
exception necessitating further inquiry by the trial
court. Cf. State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 611, 863 A.2d
654 (2005) (rejecting, as having no basis in logic, experi-.
ence or law, proposition that “defendant’s decision to
take control of his fate by forgoing further legal chal-
lenges to his death sentences and his ambivalent feel-
ings over the consequences of that decision are, in and
of themselves, evidence of his incompetence” [empha-
sis added]).

A person seeking to set aside a judgment rendered
following a jury waiver must make a “plain showing
that such waiver was not freely and intelligently made”;
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, supra, 317 U.S.
281; and has the “burden of showing essential
unfairness . . . not as a matter of speculation but as
a demonstrable reality. Simply because a result that
was insistently invited, namely, a verdict by a court
without a jury, disappointed the hopes of the accused,
ought not to be sufficient for rejecting it.” Id.; see also
Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d 821, 835 (6th Cir. 2004)
(when defendant waived jury for capital sentencing pro-
ceeding, knowing death sentence was possible, he “took
a litigation risk and lost; these facts alone do not create
a constitutional violation”), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 925,
125 S. Ct. 1645, 161 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2005). On the basis of
the foregoing analysis, the defendant's first claim fails.

112

It

The defendant claims next that Judge O’Keefe should
have disqualified himself, sua sponte, from serving on
the three judge panel that the defendant requested for
the penalty phase proceedings. According to the defen-
dant, Judge O’Keefe’s involvement in the case prior to
the defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury—specifi-
cally, his ruling on a pretrial motion, reading of this
court’s decision in Rizzo and presiding over voir dire—
gave rise to an improper appearance of partiality or
risk of bias against the defendant such that he was
required to disqualify himself. Additionally, the defen-
dant argues that comments made by Judge O’Keefe
during an unrelated proceeding that took place approxi-
mately one year after the defendant was sentenced
prove that, during the defendant's penalty phase pro-
ceeding, Judge O’Keefe actually harbored a bias that
impaired his impartiality. We are not persuaded.

The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant. On March 3, 2005, prior to the start of voir dire,
the defendant filed a motion requesting that he be trans-
ported to a medical facility for certain brain imaging
tests necessary to prepare his defense for the penalty
phase hearing. Judge O’Keefe granted the defendant’s
motion. Apparently, the brain imaging tests were con-
ducted but failed to result in any mitigating evidence
useful to the defense, because no such evidence was
offered during the penalty phase hearing.

During a March 9, 2005 hearing, just prior to the
commencement of voir dire, Judge O’Keefe asked a
clerk for the citation to this court’s decision in Rizzo.
Various comments made by Judge O’Keefe during voir
dire suggest that he had obtained and read the opinion.

Over the course of voir dire, prospective panel mem-
bers were questioned about their views on the death
penalty generally and whether they had opinions about

113

the appropriate punishment for someone who had com-
mitted the crime the defendant had admitted commit-
ting. Some panel members expressed beliefs that the
death penalty was appropriate both generally and in a
case such as the present one.

On April 18, 2005, the trial court accepted the defen-
dant’s waiver of his right to a jury. On the following
day, the defendant, his counsel and the state’s attorney
appeared briefly in court to discuss scheduling matters.
At that time, Judge Iannotti informed the parties that
he had proposed a three judge panel consisting of Judge
O’Keefe as the presiding judge, along with Judge Wil-
liam Cremins and Judge Salvatore Agati. The defendant
did not object to the composition of the panel or other-
wise express any concerns. The proposed panel subse-
quently was approved by the office of the chief court
administrator. At no time during the penalty phase pro-
ceedings that followed did the defendant move to dis-
qualify Judge O’Keefe pursuant to Practice Book §§ 1-
22 and 1-23.” Additionally, the defendant did not file
any posttrial motions raising the issue of the possible
partiality of Judge O’Keefe.

On appeal, the defendant now argues for the first
time that Judge O’Keefe should have disqualified him-

® Practice Book § 1-22 provides in relevant part: “(a) A judicial authority
shall, upon motion of either party or upon its own motion, be disqualified
from acting in a matter if such judicial authority is disqualified from acting
therein pursuant to Rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct or because
the judicial authority previously tried the same matter and a new trial was
granted therein or because the judgment was reversed on appeal. A judicial
authority may not preside at the hearing of any motion attacking the validity
or sufficiency of any warrant the judicial authority issued nor may the
judicial authority sit in appellate review of a judgment or order originally
rendered by such authority. . . .”

Practice Book § 1-23 provides: “A motion to disqualify a judicial authority
shall be in writing and shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth
the facts relied upon to show the grounds for disqualification and a certificate
of the counsel of record that the motion is made in good faith. The motion
shall be filed no less than ten days before the time the case is called for trial
or hearing, unless good cause is shown for failure to file within such time.”

114

self from participating on the three judge panel because
his pretrial involvement in the case created an appear-
ance or risk of partiality. Specifically, the defendant
claims that Judge O’Keefe’s awareness that the defen-
dant had undergone brain imaging testing suggests that
the judge possessed improper knowledge of facts out-
side of evidence, namely, that the testing had failed
to establish that the defendant had a developmental
problem. Additionally, the defendant argues that Judge
O’Keefe’s exposure, during voir dire, to inflammatory
community views of the defendant, the crime he com-
mitted and the death penalty in general put the judge’s
impartiality at risk. Finally, according to the defen-
dant, Judge O’Keefe’s reading of this court’s opinion in
Rizzo prior to the commencement of voir dire might
have caused him to form prejudicial opinions about the
evidence, rendering him predisposed toward finding the
aggravating factor proven and imposing the same death.
sentence that the defendant had received after his first
penalty phase hearing. Because the defendant did not
preserve this claim, he seeks review pursuant to State
v. Golding, supra, 218 Conn. 239-40, arguing that his
right to due process” was violated by the appearance

® There is no indication in the record as to what, precisely, the brain
imaging tests revealed. The defendant argues, however, that because Judge
O'Keefe knew that the testing had been done and, thereafter, no evidence
derived from the testing was introduced at the penalty phase hearing, the
judge “could not avoid concluding that the results were not favorable to
the defendant and did not establish a developmental problem.”

“The defendant also claims that Judge O’Keefe’s more favorable com-
ments toward jurors who spoke positively about capital punishment and
his failure to maintain the seriousness of the proceedings exacerbated the
appearance of impropriety created by his having presided over voir dire.
Because we concluded in part Il of this opinion that the defendant's charac-
terization of Judge O'Keefe’s comments and the voir dire proceedings is
inapt, we need not address this argument.

% Although the defendant cites the due process clauses of both the state
and federal constitutions, he has not provided an independent analysis of
the state claim as required by State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d
1225 (1992). Accordingly, we will consider the due process argument only
pursuant to § 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitu-

115

or risk of Judge O’Keefe’s partiality. He argues, alterna-
tively, that Judge O’Keefe’s failure to recuse himself
constitutes plain error warranting reversal of the
judgment.

Normally, Connecticut's appellate courts do not
review judicial disqualification claims raised for the
first time on appeal because the parties, by failing to
object, are deemed to have consented to the participa-
tion of the allegedly disqualified judge. Nevertheless,
because the record is adequate for review and the defen-
dant’s claim implicates his constitutional right to a fair
penalty phase proceeding; see State v. McDougal, 241
Conn. 502, 523-24, 699 A.2d 872 (1997); we will address
the claim. We conclude, however, that the defendant
has not shown that a constitutional violation clearly
exists and clearly deprived him of a fair proceeding.

Judicial disqualification claims rarely raise due pro-
cess questions; more typically, they invoke statutes,
rules or common law imposing much stricter standards
than are required constitutionally. Bracy v. Gramley,
520 U.S. 899, 904, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 188 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1997)
C“[mlJost questions concerning a judge’s qualifications
to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the
[d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the [flourteenth [a]mend-
ment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform

tion, which provides in relevant part: “No State shall . . . deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property, without due process of law . . . .” See State
v. Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 592-98 n.12, 916 A.2d 767 (2007).

® Pursuant to General Statutes § 51-39 (c), “[wJhen any judge . . . is
disqualified to act in any proceeding before him, he may act if the parties
thereto consent in open court.” We repeatedly have held that a party's failure
to object to a particular judge or to move for his recusal prior to or during
trial is the functional equivalent of consent. See, e.g., State v. Fitagerald,
257 Conn. 106, 117, 777 A.2d 580 (2001); Timm v. Timm, 195 Conn. 202,
205, 487 A.2d 191 (1985); State v. Kohifuss, 152 Conn. 626, 630-31, 211 A2d
143 (1965). The reason is that “[iJt would be inequitable to permit the
defendant to notice the purported bias, proceed to trial, hoping to prevail
onthe merits, and then, after losing at trial, request a reversal for the alleged
bias not objected to earlier.” State v. Fitzgerald, supra, 117.

116

standard”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 818,
828, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 89 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1986) (“[t]he [d]ue
[p]rocess [c]lause demarks only the outer boundaries
of judicial disqualifications”); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927) (“All ques-
tions of judicial disqualification may not involve consti-
tutional validity. Thus matters of . . . personal bias
. .. would seem generally to be matters merely of leg-
islative discretion.”).

The United States Supreme Court has found judicial
bias claims to be due process violations only in egre-
gious cases involving actual bias or unusual circum-
stances creating an intolerably high risk thereof,
typically, when the judge had a pecuniary interest or
some other personal stake in the outcome of the case.”
See, e.g., Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S.
868, 886, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009)
(due process clause violated by newly elected appellate
judge’s participation in appeal that was pending during
his campaign after receiving most of his campaign
financing from prevailing party); Bracy v. Gramley,
supra, 520 U.S. 905 (if proven, corrupt judge’s prosecu-
tion orientation in some criminal cases, affected to
deflect attention from other cases in which he had been

* One commentator explains: “The United States Supreme Courthas never
held that an appearance of bias on the part of a state trial court judge,
alone, violates the [cJonstitution; that is, there is no Supreme Court decision
which clearly establishes that an appearance of bias or partiality, where
there is no actual bias, violates the [djue {p]rocess [cJlause or any other
constitutional provision. While the [cJourt has occasionally suggested, in
dicta, that something less than actual bias could result in a due process
violation, such references appear to be limited to situations in which the
circumstances were such as to give rise to a strong probability of actual
bias.” R. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of
Judges (2010 Sup.) § 2.5.2, pp. 22-24. In short, “an appearance of bias, in
and of itself, will never offend the [djue [p]rocess [cJlause.” Id., p. 25; see
also State v. Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 595-96, 916 A.2d 767 (2007) (declining
to find due process violation for judge’s failure to recuse where defendant
claimed no actual bias).

P| u7
Le

bribed by defendants, would violate due process
clause); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, supra, 475 U.S.
824-25 (by authoring appellate decision creating law
which applied to pending actions in which he was party,
judge essentially acted as judge in his own cases in
violation of due process clause); Mayberry v. Pennsyl-
vania, 400 U.S. 455, 465-66, 91 S. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d
532 (1971) (where judge became involved in “running,
bitter controversy” with pro se defendants due to their
repeated insults and defiance of court orders, due pro-
cess required that different judge adjudicate resulting
criminal contempt charges); In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
183, 135, 139, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955) (when.
judge tried perjury and contempt charges that he had
lodged against witnesses in grand jury proceeding he
had conducted, judge violated due process clause by
acting in same case as complainant, indictor, prosecutor
and judge); Tumey v. Ohio, supra, 273 U.S. 523 (due
process violated by system that compensated judge for
hearing cases by providing him portion of fines levied
on those whom he convicted and providing him no
compensation in event of acquittal). The defendant has
not directed us to any authority holding that an appear-
ance or risk of bias arising from ajudge’s mere exposure
to information or opinions about a party during his
earlier participation in the proceedings is a due process
violation, and our research has not uncovered any. To
the contrary, a judge’s pretrial involvement in a criminal
case has not “been thought to raise any constitutional
barrier against [his] presiding over the criminal trial
and, if the trial is without a jury, against making the
necessary determination of guilt or innocence.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Canales, 281
Conn. 572, 596 n.15, 916 A.2d 767 (2007), quoting
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 56, 95 S. Ct. 1456,
43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). Accordingly, we reject the
defendant's constitutional claim.

118 Po
—

Because the defendant has not established a constitu-
tional violation, we may disturb the judgment only if
Judge O’Keefe’s failure to disqualify himself, sua sponte,
on the basis of his pretrial involvement in the case
amounts to plain error. State v. D’Antonio, 274 Conn.
658, 669, 877 A.2d 696 (2005). “[T]he plain error doctrine
. . . has been codified at Practice Book § 60-5, which
provides in relevant part that [t]he court may reverse
or modify the decision of the trial court if it determines
. . . that the decision is . . . erroneous in law. . . .
The plain error doctrine is not . . . arule of reviewabil-
ity. It is a rule of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine
that this court invokes in order to rectify a trial court
ruling that, although either not properly preserved or
never raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires
reversal of the trial court’s judgment, for reasons of
policy. . . . The plain error doctrine is reserved for
truly extraordinary situations where the existence of
the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and
integrity of and public confidence in the judicial pro-
ceedings. . . . A party cannot prevail under plain error
unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief
will result in manifest injustice.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.

Pursuant to our rules of practice; see Practice Book
§ 1-22; a judge should disqualify himself from acting in
a matter if it is required by rule 2.11 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides in relevant part that
“Ta] judge shall disqualify himself . . . in any proceed-
ing in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned including, but not limited to, the following
circumstances . . . [t]he judge has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or
personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the
proceeding.” Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11 (a) (1). In
applying this rule, “[t]he reasonableness standard is an
objective one. Thus, the question is not only whether

Bite

Po u9
L eereeeee!
the particular judge is, in fact, impartial but whether a
reasonable person would question the judge’s impartial-
ity on the basis of all the ciicumstances. . . . More-
over, it is well established that [e]ven in the absence
of actual bias, a judge must disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably

_ be questioned, because the appearance and the exis-

tence of impartiality are both essential elements of a
fair exercise of judicial authority.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Ajadi v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 280 Conn. 514, 527-28, 911 A.2d
712 (2006). Nevertheless, because the law presumes
that duly elected or appointed judges, consistent with
their oaths of office, will perform their duties impar-
tially; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, supra, 475 U.S. 820;
and that they are able to put aside personal impressions
regarding a party; Fair v. Warden, 211 Conn. 398, 414,
559 A.2d 1094, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 981, 110 S. Ct. 512,
107 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1989); the burden rests with the party
urging disqualification to show that it is warranted. See
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges § 129 (2006).

With certain well-defined exceptions not at issue
here,® a judge’s participation in the preliminary stages

% See, e.g., General Statutes § 51-183c (requiring different judge, in case
of court trial, after new trial is granted or judgment is reversed on appeal
and, in case of jury trial, after new trial is granted); General Statutes § 51-
188h (disallowing judge from hearing motion attacking validity or sufficiency
of arrest warrant that he or she signed); Practice Book § 1-19 (requiring,
for trial of ronsummary contempt charges, different judge than judge who
issued order that was disobeyed or who oversaw proceedings during which
contempt was committed); Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11 (a) (5) (A) (requir-
ing disqualification when judge previously acted as attomey in same matter);
see State v. Niblack, 220 Conn. 270, 280, 596 A.2d 407 (1991) (judge who
participates in negotiation of plea agreement between state and criminal
defendant should not preside at trial and sentencing if negotiations are
unsuccessful); Timm v. Timm, 195 Conn. 202, 204, 487 A.2d 191 (1985)
Gudge who engages in pretrial settlement discussion in court case should
disqualify himself or herself from presiding over case, although disqualifica-
tion may be waived by parties).

120 PO
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of a case, and the knowledge he or she thereby gains,
will not ordinarily preclude his or her continued partici-
pation in the same case thereafter.” See, e.g., State v.
Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 581-82, 18 A.2d 895 (1941)
Gudge’s ordering of grand jury, presiding over grand
jury proceedings and ruling on numerous preliminary
motions did not disqualify him from presiding over
trial), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in State v. Burns, 194 Conn. 469, 472-73, 481 A.2d 1077
(1984); see also State v. Ortiz, 83 Conn. App. 142, 152-
58, 848 A.2d 1246 Gudge’s knowledge of defendant’s
repeated inculpatory admissions during pretrial pro-
ceedings did not require recusal), cert. denied, 270
Conn. 915, 853 A.2d 530 (2004); R. Flamm, Judicial Dis-
qualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges
(2d Ed. 2007) § 13.1, pp. 343-44 (“fact that a judge may
know something to the discredit of a criminal defendant.
does not, in and of itself, establish that she is biased
against him”).

Although a judge, by participating in pretrial or other
proceedings, may be exposed to inadmissible evidence
about a party, the standard assumption is that he or
she is able to disregard it; see Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 562, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[tJhe acquired skill
and capacity to disregard extraneous matters is one of
the requisites of judicial office”); State v. Santangelo,
205 Conn. 578, 602, 534 A.2d 1175 (1987) (judge not
required to disqualify self from sentencing upon receipt
of letter containing unsubstantiated and inflammatory

® Similarly, courts routinely hold that a judge’s familiarity with a criminal
defendant and his or her prior offenses through participation jn a separate,
eatlier trial of the defendant; see, e.g., State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 461,
680 A.2d 147 (1996); see also annot., 85 A.L.R.S5th 560, § 2 [a] (2001); or with
his or her current offenses through participation in the trial of a codefendant;
see, eg, Boyd v. State, 821 Md. 69, 78-80, 581 A.2d 1 (1990); see also
annot., 72 A.L.R.4th 657-61, § 2 [a] and [b] (1989); does not create grounds
for disqualification.

Po wa
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comments concerning defendant); even if he or she
subsequently is to act as fact finder. See State v. Bebb,
99 Haw. 213, 215~16, 53 P.3d 1198 (App. 2001) (judge not
required to recuse self from bench trial for defendant’s
charge of driving under influence after granting defen-
dant’s motion to suppress results of breath test), over-
ruled on other grounds by State v. Maldonado, 108 Haw.
436, 445 n.13, 121 P.3d 901 (2005); R. Flamm, supra,
§ 12.9, pp. 330, 334; cf. State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn.
375 (rejecting claim that three judge panel trying capital
murder charge improperly read nonpanel member’s ear-
lier ruling on motion to suppress; no merit to claim that
defendant, during canvass regarding waiver of right to
jury trial, should have been advised of likelihood that
panel “ ‘would become aware of inadmissible and preju-
dicial information about [the] defendant’ ”).

Likewise, opinions that judges may form as a result
of what they learn in earlier proceedings in the same
case “rarely” constitute the type of bias, or appearance
of bias, that requires recusal. See Liteky v. United
States, supra, 510 U.S. 554.“ To do so, an opinion must
be “so extreme as to display clear inability to render
fair judgment.” Id., 551. In the absence of unusual cir-
cumstances, therefore, equating knowledge or opinions
acquired during the course of an adjudication with an
appearance of impropriety or bias requiring recusal
“finds no support in law, ethics or sound policy.” People
v. Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403, 407, 516 N.E.2d 200, 521
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1987).

In Litekocv. United States, supra, 510 U.S. 541, the United States Supreme
Court was é onsidering whether a judge’s recusal was warranted under 28
U.S.C. § 455 (a), which contains disqualification guidelines similar to those
found in rule 2.11 (a) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

4“'The primary reason for the rule permitting judges who have presided
over earlier proceedings in a case to continue to sit in later proceedings in
the same matter is simple and straightforward: Were the rule otherwise, a
judge could never reach the end of a case without being disqualified through
exposure to it during its earlier stages. Litigation, moreover, frequently
unveils uncomplimentary facts about individuals and their cases. Should
disqualification result merely because such facts were learned during the

122

The plain error doctrine exists “to prevent the occur-
rence of manifest injustice[s] as the result of particu-
larly extraordinary trial errors.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. D'Antonio, supra, 274 Conn.
671. Given the foregoing law governing judicial disquali-
fication, the defendant’s claim that Judge O’Keefe’s ear-
lier participation in the case created an improper
appearance or risk of bias, requiring him to recuse him-
self, falls well short of this threshold and, consequently,
must fail. Because, consistent with that law, a reason-
able person would not conclude that Judge O’Keefe’s
knowledge of the brain imaging tests, his awareness of
community views regarding the defendant and/or the
death penalty or his reading of Rizzo would cause him
to be partial, or lead him to form an opinion so extreme
that he clearly was unable to render fair judgment;
Liteky v. United States, supra, 510 U.S. 551; self-recusal
‘was not warranted.

The defendant also argues that comments made by
Judge O’Keefe at an unrelated, noncapital proceeding
that took place approximately one year after the defen-
dant was sentenced demonstrate that the judge, when
participating in the penalty phase hearing, possessed
an actual bias that prevented him from properly consid-
ering the mitigation evidence presented by the defen-
dant.” Because the defendant could not have been
aware of this claimed basis for disqualification at the
time of the penalty phase proceedings, he cannot be
faulted for his failure to raise it in an objection. See
Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 280 Conn.

course of litigation—or because conclusions were ultimately reached on
the basis of those facts—the law of judicial disqualification would likely
cause the judicial system to grind to a halt.” R. Flaram, supra, § 12.7, p. 322.

Tn support of this claim, the defendant has submitted a transcript from
the later proceeding. We agree with the defendant that this court may take
judicial notice of files or records of the Superior Court in the same or other
cases. See, e.g,, Ajadi v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 280 Conn. 522
n.13. Accordingly, we have reviewed the transcript.

P| 123
a

5380-31 (party did not consent to participation of dis-

qualified judge when unaware of basis for disqualifica-

tion at time of trial); see also 46 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 205.

The following additional facts are relevant. At an
August 14, 2006 hearing, Judge O’Keefe sentenced Keith
M. Foster to a total effective sentence of 110 years
following his conviction of multiple crimes, including
felony murder, assault, kidnapping and sexual assault,
in connection with the torture, gang rape and killing of
a thirteen year old girl. The facts of the case were
particularly disturbing; see State v. Foster, 293 Conn.
327, 330-31, 977 A.2d 199 (2009); and, despite over-
whelming evidence to the contrary, Foster refused to
admit his involvement in the crimes. When sentencing
Foster, Judge O’Keefe referenced previous cases in
which he had taken part to put Foster’s crimes into per-
spective.

The defendant directs our attention to the following
comments. First, Judge O’Keefe listed anumber of other
individuals whom he previously had sentenced, includ-
ing the defendant, stated that it was “like a murderers’
hall of fame,” and concluded that he was “going to have
to add . . . Foster’s name to that list.” Next, Judge
O'Keefe referred to murderers generally as “not human
....”8 Finally, directing his comments toward Foster,
Judge O’Keefe stated the following, again referencing
the defendant and others whom the judge previously

“The following provides further context for that conument. In the course
of criticizing Foster for not admitting his crimes, Judge O'Keefe explained
that he considered the testimony of Foster's incarcerated coconspirators,
who had implicated Foster, to be credible. He then stated: “When you arrest
murderers, get them under control in proper settings like maximum security
penitentiaries, they start to act close to human beings. They're not human,
but they come close. What you had was these individuals coming in and
attempting to do something decent. They are still murderers. They still
deserve to be punished for this. But many had no motive for false testi-
mony... .”

124

had sentenced: “Sometimes in life, just like Diego Vas,“
Mark Chicano,“ Eric Steiger, Todd Rizzo, Adrian
Peeler,’ you’re defined by one incident, one episode.
That's it. Everything else is irrelevant. That applies to
you. I don’t care about your background. I don’t care
about your upbringing. I don’t care about your future.
I don’t care about your daughter. I care about where
you're going to spend the rest of your life. And it should
be in prison. I can’t explain why you did this. Nobody
can. I don’t care. It’s not important now. By this act
you've defined yourself for the rest of your life.”
(Emphasis added.)

The defendant argues that Judge O’Keefe’s remarks
at Foster’s sentencing hearing prove that, at the time
of the defendant’s penalty phase hearing, he was biased
in such a way that he was not capable of considering
the defendant’s mitigating evidence, as is constitution-
ally and statutorily required, because he believed that
evidence to be irrelevant. According to the defendant,
the comments indicate that, in murder cases such as
the defendant's, Judge O’Keefe categorically rejects evi-
dence as to background and upbringing, thereby making
it impossible for him to find that such factors are miti-
gating in nature or to weigh them against aggravating
factors in an impartial manner. The defendant claims
that the judge’s comments prove that he did not care

“ Diego Vas was convicted of, inter alia, murder in connection with the
shooting death of his six year old daughter. State v. Vas, 44 Conn. App. 70,
71, 687 A.2d 1295, cert. denied, 240 Conn. 910, 689 A.2d 474 (1997).

Mark Chicano was convicted of, inter alia, felony murder in connection
with the beating and strangulation deaths of two adults and an eleven year
old child. State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 703-704, 584 A2d 425 (1990),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S. Ct. 2898, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1062 (1991).

© Bric Steiger was convicted of, inter alia, murder in connection with the
shooting deaths of two men. State v. Steiger, 218 Conn. 349, 350-51, 355,
590 A.2d 408 (1991).

Adrian Peeler was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in connec-
tion with the shooting deaths of a woman and her young son. State v. Peeler,
267 Conn. 611, 614, 619, 841 A.2d 181 (2004).

Pe 125
Ld

about, and did not consider, the defendant’s upbringing
, or background before sentencing him to death. We are
{ not persuaded.

The concept of impermissible judicial “bias or preju-
dice” contemplates the “formation of a fixed anticipa-
tory judgment on the part of the judge, as
contradistinguished from an open state of mind which
will be governed by the law and the facts.” (Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cleveland
Bar Assn. v. Cleary, 93 Ohio St. 3d 191, 201, 754 N.E.2d
235, reconsideration denied, 93 Ohio St. 3d 1477, 757
N.E.2d 774 (2001); see also 46 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 128,
p. 248 (“{p]rejudice,” in disqualification context, means
judge’s “prejudgment or forming of an opinion without
sufficient knowledge or examination” or “[a] decision
in [a] matter . . . based on grounds other than the
evidence placed before him or her” [emphasis added]).

In contrast, there is nothing impermissible about an.
opinion formed by a judge ajter a trial has concluded,
on the basis of the evidence and arguments that have
been presented and the judge’s evaluation of them.
Rather, “a trial judge will normally and properly form
opinions on the law, the evidence and the witnesses,
from the presentation of the case. These opinions and
expressions thereof may be critical or disparaging to
one party’s position, but they are reached after a hearing
in the performance of the judicial duty to decide the
case, and do not constitute a ground for disqualifica-
tion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Haldane v.
Haldane, 232 Cal. App. 2d 393, 395, 42 Cal. Rptr. 828
(1965). Thus, “[t]he judge who presides at a trial may,
upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill
disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown
to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge
is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since
his knowledge and the opinion it produced were prop-
erly and necessarily acquired in the course of the pro-

6 Pe
Deere

ceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench
trial) necessary to completion of the judge’s task.”
(Emphasis added.) Liteky v. United States, supra, 510
U.S. 550~-51; see also Phillips v. State, 275 Ga. 595,
600, 571 S.E.2d 361 (2002) (purportedly disqualifying
remarks made by judge about defendant postsentencing
did not demonstrate improper bias because they “were
based entirely upon what she learned of [him] and his
crimes during the course of trial”); 46 Am. Jur. 2d, supra,
§ 127, p. 247 (“[t]he fact that the trial judge has become
biased against a party after the trial is over does not
have any bearing on the [fairness of the] previously
conducted trial”).

We believe that Judge O’Keefe’s comments here, inso-
far as they reference the defendant, properly reflect the
judge’s posijudgment assessment that, given the cruel,
heinous and depraved manner in which the defendant
killed the victim; see part IV of this opinion; the cumula-
tive mitigating factor of his character, background and
history did not weigh heavily enough to offset the aggra-
vating factor in order to result in a life sentence. See
part VII of this opinion. The panel was bound, statutorily
and constitutionally, to consider factors weighing in
favor of leniency, but once judgment imposing death
‘was rendered, those factors, much like the presumption
of innocence following a criminal conviction, effec- .
tively were removed from the case. Although the defen-
dant urges us to conclude that Judge O’Keefe’s
comments, made more than one year after the defen-
dant was sentenced, are evidence of Judge O’Keefe’s
mindset prior to the defendant’s penalty phase proceed-
ing and demonstrate prejudgment, that argument is
entirely speculative.* First, the defendant has not

“8 Because there is a strong presumption that judges perform their duties
impartially, a claim that a judge was required to recuse himself or herself
on the basis of bias must be supported by more than mere speculation;
State v. Shabazz, 246 Conn. 746, 769, 719 A.2d 440 (1998), cert. denied, 525
US. 1179, 119 S. Ct. 1116, 143 L, Ed. 24 111 (1999); conclusory opinion;
State v. Ortiz, supra, 83 Conn. App. 151; or representations of counsel. State

Po 127
De

directed us to any real evidence of actual bias predating
the proceeding, but only to unsupported allegations
regarding Judge O’Keefe’s purported inclination in favor
of the death penalty.” See footnotes 16 and 34 of this

- opinion; compare Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596
F.2d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1979) (court’s reference to corpo-
rate party as “bunch of villains . . . interested only in
feathering their own nests at the expense of everyone
they can,” when made at hearing on preliminary injunc-
tion, indicated prejudgment of case [internal quotation
marks omitted]). Instead, Judge O’Keefe’s comments at
Foster’s sentencing indicate that he was expressing his
current opinion about the defendant and the outcome
of his case, rather than an opinion that he had formed
before hearing the evidence and the arguments of coun-
sel. Compare United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573,
576 (3d Cir. 1995) (judge’s comment at sentencing, that
“ImJy object in this case from day one has always been
to get back to the public that which was taken from it
as aresult of the fraudulent activities of this defendant,”
when considered along with other circumstances, indic-
ative of improper prejudgment requiring disqualifica-
tion [emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted]), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Berg,
247 F.3d 532, 534 (3d Cir. 2001).

Second, the record reflects clearly that Judge O’Keefe
properly considered and weighed the defendant’s miti-
gating evidence. Specifically, in a unanimous memoran-
dum of decision, the three judge panel, after stating
explicitly that it was required to consider constitution-
ally relevant mitigating evidence and citing extensive

v. Weber, 6 Conn. App. 407, 413, 505 A.2d 1266, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 810,
508 A.2d 771 (1986).

® Tt is axiomatic that a trial court's rulings adverse to a defendant cannot
in themselves demonstrate bias. See Liteky v. United States, supra, 510 U.S.
555; State v. Santangelo, supra, 205 Conn. 602. Accordingly, in the absence
of something more, Judge O’Keefe’s determination that death was the appro-
priate sentence does not lend support to the defendant's claim.

128 PO
—

law to that effect, found “by a preponderance of the
evidence that the cumulative effect of all the evidence
presented concerning the defendant’s character, back-
ground and history is mitigating in nature, considering
all the facts and circumstances of the case and, there-
fore, should in fairness and mercy be considered by
the court in the weighing process under § 53a-46a (f).”
(nternal quotation marks omitted.) The panel acknow]-
edged its duty to weigh that evidence against the proven
aggravating factor and outlined the applicable burdens
of proof, then concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating
factor. In the absence of any other evidence to the
contrary, we must reject the defendant’s claim that
Judge O'Keefe did not properly consider and weigh
the evidence of the defendant's character, background
and history.

In evaluating the propriety of Judge O’Keefe’s refer-
ences to a “murderers’ hall of fame” and to its members
as being “not human,” we are mindful of the context
in which they were made, namely, during the sentencing
of an unrepentant defendant for indisputably horrific
crimes. That defendant, Foster, as well as all of the
other defendants to whom the judge referred, already
had been convicted for the murders of multiple victims
and/or child victims. See footnotes 44 through 47 of this
opinion. Because a sentencing judge ordinarily must
explain the reasons for imposing the sentence he or
she has chosen,” his or her explanatory comments,
even if “harsh and unkind . . . will rarely give rise to
a cognizable basis for disqualification . . . .” R.
Flamm, supra, § 16.4, pp. 462-63. Indeed, “[i]t is the
court's prerogative, if not its duty, to assess the defen-

See Practice Book § 43-10 (6) (“{iJn cases where sentence review is
available [those involving sentences of three years or more; General Statutes
§ 61-195}, the judicial authority shall state on the record, in the presence of
the defendant, the reasons for the sentence imposed”).

Po 129
Lt

dant’s character and crimes at sentencing, after...
guilt has been decided.” United States v. Pearson, 203
F.3d 1243, 1278 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1268,
120 S. Ct. 2734, 147 L. Ed. 2d 995 (2000). Furthermore,
“{t]o a considerable extent a sentencing judge is the
embodiment of public condemnation and . . . [a]s the
community's spokesperson . . . can lecture a defen-
dant as a lesson to that defendant and as a deterrent
to others.” (Citation omitted.) United States v. Bakker,
925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a court’s
derogatory statements to a defendant during his sen-
tencing ordinarily do not constitute a basis for recusal;
indeed, “[iJt is a rare occurrence when [a court] . . .
flatters a defendant for his criminal actions.” United
States v. Gaertner, 519 F. Sup. 585, 588 (E.D. Wis. 1981),
aff'd, 705 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1983); see, e.g., State v.
Dumas, 54 Conn. App. 780, 791, 739 A.2d 1251 (court’s
postsentencing characterization of defendant as
“‘marauder’” not indicative of improper bias), cert.
denied, 252 Conn. 903, 743 A.2d 616 (1999); State v.
Ortiz, 91 Haw. 181, 195, 981 P.2d 1127 (1999) (no
grounds for recusal where sentencing court referred to
defendant as “menace to society” and “menace to the
community” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Although the comments at issue were not made
directly to the defendant at his own sentencing, we
consider that to be a distinction without a difference
for purposes of applying the law. Specifically, if the
comments would not have indicated improper bias had
they been delivered at the defendant’s sentencing, it is
difficult to see how they could become improper simply
because they were subsequently expressed to a third
party at that party’s sentencing. Because a sentencing
judge enjoys wide latitude when addressing a convicted
criminal, Judge O’Keefe’s comments, insofar as they
referenced the defendant, fall well short of remarks

BO

Leerssen!
that would warrant recusal. In sum, we reject the defen-
dant’s claims relating to judicial disqualification.
mm

Connecticut's statutory aggravating factors are enu-
merated in § 58a-46a (i). The sole aggravating factor
that the three judge panel found proven was that the
defendant had committed his offense “in an especially
heinous, cruel or depraved manner . . . .” General
Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a (i) (4). The defendant
claims that this court’s limiting construction of that
aggravating factor; see State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258,
270-71, 562 A.2d 1060 (1989); is unconstitutionally
vague in violation of the eighth amendment to the
United States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and
9, of the constitution of Connecticut.” The defendant
argues specifically that our formulation of the mental
state associated with that aggravating factor provides
inadequate guidance to the sentencer and fails to distin-
guish adequately between offenders and offenses that
are death eligible and those that are not. According to
the defendant, therefore, the panel’s imposition of the
death penalty in this case, which was premised on the
existence of the aggravating factor, must be reversed.
We disagree.

The defendant did not raise this claim in the trial
court and now seeks review pursuant to State v. Gold-

® The eighth amendment to the United States constitution prohibits, inter
alia, the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments . . . .”

® Article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut provides in relevant
part that in all criminal prosecutions: “No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law... .”

Article first, § 9, of the constitution of Connecticut provides in relevant
part: “No person shall be . . . punished, except in cases clearly warranted
by law.”

We previously have held that these provisions, Connecticut’s due process
clauses, impliedly prohibit punishment that is cruel and unusual. State v.
Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 246-47, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 US.
1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1996).

Po 181
|

ing, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40. Because the record is
adequate for review and the defendant’s claim is of
constitutional magnitude, we will address the claim.
We conclude, however, that the third prong of Golding
is not satisfied because the defendant has failed to
establish a constitutional violation.

“Because the death penalty is exacted with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes [there
must be a] meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313,
92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, reh. denied sub nom.
Jackson v. Georgia, 409 U.S. 902, 93 S. Ct. 89, 34 L.
Ed. 2d 164 (1972) (White, J., concurring).” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Breton, supra, 212
Conn. 262-63. Accordingly, “if a [s]tate wishes to autho-
rize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsi-
bility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids
the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death pen-
alty. Part of a [s]tate’s responsibility in this regard is
to define the crimes for which death may be the sen-
tence in a way that obviates standardless [sentencing]
discretion. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100
S. Ct. 1759, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980). Thus, where discre-
tion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave
as the determination of whether a human life should
be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
US. 153, 189, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, Js.).” internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn.
1, 62, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908,
124 S. Ct. 1614, 158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004).

Relevant to the present matter, “a state must avoid
defining aggravating factors in an open-ended, subjec-
tive manner that would allow the trier unfettered discre-

182 Po

tion in levying a death sentence and thus create a
substantial risk that the trier will inflict punishment
arbitrarily or capriciously. California v. Brown, 479
US. 538, 541, 107 S. Ct. 837, 93 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1987). A
capital sentencing system could have standards so
vague that they would fail adequately to channel the
sentencing decision patterns of [triers] with the result
that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing
. . . could occur. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, [428 U.S.]
195 n.46.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Breton, supra, 212 Conn. 264. To prevent that result, “an
aggravating [factor] must genuinely narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reason-
ably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S. Ct.
2733, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983).” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Reynolds, supra, 264 Conn. 62. Never-
theless, because the requisite degree of definition of an
aggravating factor “is not susceptible of mathematical ~
precision,” we are guided by the “basic principle that
a factor is not unconstitutional if it has some common-
sense core of meaning . . . that criminal [sentencers]
should be capable of understanding . . . .” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuilaepa
v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973, 1148. Ct. 2630, 129 L.
Ed. 2d 750 (1994).

Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 538a-
46a (i) (4), a defendant who has committed one of the
capital felonies enumerated in General Statutes (Rev.
to 1997) § 58a-54b is eligible for the death penalty if he
or she “committed the offense in an especially heinous,
cruel or depraved manner . . . .” Because the United
States Supreme Court held that similar phraseology was
unconstitutionally vague in the absence of a narrowing
construction by the state court; see Maynard v. Cart-
wright, 486 U.S. 356, 364-65, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 100 L. Ed.

po 133
—

2d 372 (1988) (“ ‘heinous, atrocious, or cruel’”); see
also Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, 446 U.S. 428-32 (“ ‘out-
rageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman’ ”);
this court adopted a limiting construction of § 53a-46a
@ ( to cure that vagueness and to create a standard
that complies with the eighth amendment to the United
States constitution. State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 242,
646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115
S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995); State v. Breton,
supra, 212 Conn. 270-71.

We initially provided a core construction of § 53a-
46a (i) (4), concluding that it included a defendant's
“intentional infliction of extreme pain or torture above
and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underly-
ing killing.” State v. Breton, supra, 212 Conn. 270. We
thereafter elaborated that the pain or torture contem-
plated by that definition could be either physical or
psychological. State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 260. We
explained further that, “with respect to the requisite
state of mind and consequences thereof, either of the
following will suffice [to satisfy § 58a-46a (i) (4)]: (1) the

- defendant intended to, and in fact did, inflict extreme
physical or psychological pain, suffering or torture on
the victim; or (2) the defendant was callous or indiffer-
ent to the extreme physical or psychological pain, suf-
fering or torture that his intentional conduct in fact
inflicted on the victim.” State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn.
445; see also State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 262.8

® As part of the present claim, the defendant argues that this court improp-
erly changed the meaning of § 58a-46a (i) (4) in Ross, after defining the
factor in Breton. We previously rejected a similar claim. State v. Cobb, supra,
251 Conn. 445-46. The defendant argues further that applying the limiting

_ construction of § 58a-46a ({) (4) set forth in State v. Cobb, supra, 445, to his

case amounts to a retroactive application of a substantive change in the
law that violates his right to due process because the opinion in Cobb
postdates the defendant's criminal conduct. See, e.g., Bowie v. Columbia,
878 U.S. 347, 352, 84 S, Ct, 1697, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1964) (unforeseeable and
retroactive expansion of scope of criminal statute by judicial construction
violates due process). We disagree because this construction appeared first
in Ross, which predates the defendant's criminal conduct. See State v. Cobb,

14 Po

In finding § 53a-46a (i) (4) proven in the present case,
the three judge panel relied on the second option, con-
cluding that the defendant had been callous or indiffer-
ent to the extreme physical and psychological pain and
suffering that he had inflicted on the victim through his
intentional conduct. The defendant now argues that this
finding was improper because the panel, even with the
benefit of this court’s limiting construction of § 58a-46a
(@ (4), was guided by a standard that failed to limit its
discretion and to narrow the class of death eligible
offenders sufficient to comport with the eighth amend-
ment. He claims, in essence, that to pass constitutional
muster, the aggravating factor, as construed, must
require a specific intent to inflict extreme physical or
psychological torture beyond that necessarily accompa-
nying the underlying killing and that permitting proof
of the aggravating factor by callousness or indifference
renders application of that factor unacceptably arbi-
trary. We disagree because decisions of the United
States Supreme Court are decidedly to the contrary.

We begin by emphasizing that the aggravating factor
is not proven by demonstrating merely that a defendant
was callous or indifferent to the death of his or her
victim, as the defendant repeatedly implies, but rather,
the state must show that the defendant caused addi-
tional pain, suffering or torture to be inflicted on his
victim and that he either specifically intended that addi-
tional pain, suffering or torture or was callous or indif-
ferent to it. The United States Supreme Court has
upheld against an eighth amendment vagueness chal-

supra, 443, In addition, because the core construction in Breton was not
intended to be comprehensive; see id., 444-46; the subsequent elaboration
cannot reasonably be characterized as “unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which’had been expressed prior to the [defendant's
criminal] conduct”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Courchesne,
296 Conn. 622, 724, 998 A.2d 1 (2010); or as “a marked and unpredictable
departure from prior precedent . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id, 725.

Po 135
—

lenge the Supreme Court of Florida’s functionally identi-
cal limiting construction of that state’s “especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor, namely,
that the factor was directed at “the conscienceless or
pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the
victim.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56, 96
S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913, reh. denied, 429 U.S. 875,
97 S. Ct. 197, 50 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1976); see also Bell v.
Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 457-58, 125 S. Ct. 847, 160 L. Ed.
2d 881 (reaffirming holding of Proffitt in concluding
that Tennessee Supreme Court’s identical limiting con-
struction was not unconstitutionally vague), reh.
denied, 544 U.S. 944, 125 S. Ct. 1655, 161 L. Ed. 2d 512
(2005); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-55, 110 S.
Ct. 3047, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511 (approving Arizona Supreme
Court’s construction of “especially cruel” as “inflic-
t[ion] [of] mental anguish or physical abuse before the
victim’s death,” when “the suffering of the victim was
intended by or foreseeable to the killer” [emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted]), reh. denied,
497 U.S, 1050, 111 S. Ct. 14, 111 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1990).
These limiting constructions essentially are indistin-
guishable from this court’s construction of § 58a-46a
@ @, in that they require the imposition of pain and
suffering beyond that necessary to kill a victim, but do
not necessarily require the specific intent to cause that
pain and suffering. Consequently, the defendant's fed-
eral constitutional claim must fail.

The defendant argues alternatively that this court’s
limiting construction of § 53a-46a (i) (4) is impermissi-
bly vague in contravention of the constitution of Con-
necticut. We are not persuaded. “[I]t is settled
constitutional doctrine that, independently of federal
constitutional requirements, our due process clauses,
because they prohibit cruel and unusual punishment,
impose constitutional limits on the imposition of the

136 Po

death penalty. . . . Specifically, our due process
clauses require, as a constitutional minimum, that a
death penalty statute . . . must channel the discretion
of the sentencing judge or jury so as to assure that the
death penalty is being imposed consistently and reliably
-” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. 206.

It further “is well established that federal constitu-
tional and statutory law establishes a minimum national
standard for the exercise of individual rights and does
not inhibit state governments from affording higher lev-
els of protection for such rights.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. In some instances, we have found
greater protections for citizens of Connecticut in our
own constitution than those provided by the federal
constitution, and we have acknowledged that “[o]ur
state constitutional inquiry may proceed independently
from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 207.

“The analytical framework by which we determine
whether, in any given instance, our state constitution
affords broader protection to our citizens than the fed-
eral constitutional minimum is well settled. In State v.
Geisler [222 Conn. 672, 684-86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992)],
we enumerated the following six factors to be consid-
ered in determining that issue: (1) persuasive relevant
federal precedents; (2) the text of the operative consti-
tutional provisions; (3) historical insights into the intent
of our constitutional forebears; (4) related Connecticut
precedents; (5) persuasive precedents of other state
courts; and (6) contemporary understandings of appli-
cable economic and sociological norms, or as otherwise
described, relevant public policies.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn.
207-208.

i

Pe 137
Lt

We begin with the second Geisler factor, the opera-
tive constitutional text. The defendant directs our atten-
tion to article first, § 9, which precludes “punish[ment],
except in cases clearly warranted by law,” and he argues
that use of the word “clearly” indicates that Connecticut
should interpret its aggravating factor to encompass
only conduct which can be proven consistently and
reliably. The defendant’s argument, however, presup-
poses its conclusion, namely, that only intentionally
inflicted pain and suffering can be so proven. We dis-
agree, however, that a callous or indifferent mind-set
is less susceptible of proof than a specific intent to
cause pain and suffering; either finding typically
requires the sentencer to draw inferences from circum-
stantial evidence. Moreover, regardless of whether the
state opts to prove that a capital defendant inflicted
gratuitous pain or suffering on his murder victim inten-
tionally, or with callous indifference, it must provide
proof that convinces the trier beyond a reasonable
doubt. Plainly read, the phrase “clearly warranted by
law” contemplates arequirement that the legal prerequi-
sites for imposing a particular punishment be defini-
tively established before punishment is imposed; it does
not speak to the question of what those prerequisites
shall be. In short, the second Geisler factor does not
aid the defendant in his claim.

We next turn to the first and fifth Geisler factors,
relevant federal and sister state decisions. Controlling
precedent from the United States Supreme Court is
contrary to the defendant’s claim, and lower federal
courts have applied those holdings to reject eighth
amendment challenges similar to the present one. See,
e.g., Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1175-76 (10th Cir.
1999) (applying Walton to reject vagueness challenge

& Article first, § 8, of the state constitution, which provides generally for
due process in criminal prosecutions, supplies no particular guidance to
the question at hand.

138 PO
—

to Oklahoma court’s jury instruction “that the phrase
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel is direct[ed] to
those crimes where the death of the victim was pre-
ceded by torture of the victim or serious physical
abuse,” with no specified mental state [internal quota-
tion marks omitted]), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1208, 120
S. Ct. 2206, 147 L. Ed. 2d 239 (2000); Bertolotti v. Dugger,
883 F.2d 1503, 1526 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Proffitt
to reaffirm constitutionality of Florida court’s construc-
tion of “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” factor).®

With regard to sister state jurisprudence, our
research has disclosed a dearth of cases raising state
constitutional challenges to factors akin to our heinous,
cruel or depraved aggravator. A survey of the limiting
constructions used in other states is pertinent, however,
because those constructions were supplied by those
states’ highest courts. Several states, like Connecticut,
employ constructions that require the infliction of gratu-
itous pain, suffering or torture on the victim, coupled
with a mental state akin to callousness or indifference.
See, e.g., McCray v. State, 88 So. 3d 1, 74-75 (Ala. Crim.

% The defendant directs our attention to United States v. Hall, 152 F.8d
881, 414 (6th Cir, 1998), a decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit that rejected a vagueness challenge to the heinous,
cruel or depraved aggravating factor contained in the Federal Death Penalty
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (c) (6). In Hall, the jury was instructed, consistently
with the statutory language, that the government was required to “prove
that the killing involved either torture or serious physical abuse to the
victim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The jury was instructed
further that the infliction of torture, i.e., severe mental or physical pain or
suffering, or serious physical abuse, must be specifically intended by the
defendant, Id. In sustaining the constitutionality of this construction, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals did not indicate that its holding was dependent
onthe inclusion of the specific intent language. Indeed, such reasoning would
have been inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Proffitt and Walton.

The only such decision of which we are aware is People v. Superior
Court, 31 Cal. 8d 797, 657 P.2d 76, 188 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982) (concluding,
under state constitutional due process analysis, that limiting construction
approved in Proffitt is impermissibly vague).

Po 139
—

"App. 2010) (“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel”
contemplates “those conscienceless or pitiless homi-
cides that are unnecessarily torturous to the victim”);
State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560, 566, 242 P.3d 159 (2010)
(“especially cruel” requires jury to find that victim “con-
sciously suffered physical or mental pain, distress or
anguish prior to death” and defendant “kn[e]w or
should have known that the victim would suffer”
[emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]),
cert. denied, US. — , 181 S. Ct. 1796, 179 L. Ed.
2d 665 (2011); Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473, 478 (Fla.
1993) (“‘heinous, atrocious, or cruel” means “accompa-
nied by additional acts that show that the crime was
conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily tortur-
ous to the victim” [internal quotation marks omitted]),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 834, 114 S. Ct. 109, 126 L. Ed. 2d
74 (1993); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 418, 631 P.2d
187 (1981) (“heinous, atrocious or cruel” means
“accompanied by such additional acts as to set the
crime apart from the norm of capital felonies—the con-
scienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily tor-
turous to the victim” [internal quotation marks
omitted]); State v. Anderson, 996 So. 2d 978, 1006 (La.
2008) (“‘heinous, atrocious, and cruel” requires “torture
or pitiless infliction of unnecessary pain”), cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1165, 129 S. Ct. 1906, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (2009);
Bennett v. State, 933 So. 2d 930, 955 (Miss. 2006) (“‘hei-
nous, atrocious or cruel” means “the conscienceless or
pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the
victim,” e.g., “the defendant inflicted physical or mental
pain before death” [internal quotation marks omitted]),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1133, 127 S. Ct. 976, 166 L. Ed.
2d 740 (2007); State v. Syriant, 333 N.C. 350, 390, 428
§.E.2d 118 (“heinous, atrocious, or cruel” is “directed
atthe conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unneces-
sarily torturous to the victim”; “where the level of bru-
tality involved exceeds that normally present in first-

Mo Pe
Dee

degree murder” [internal quotation marks omitted]),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 114 S. Ct. 392, 126 L. Ed. 2d
341 (1998).

Several other states use more broadly formulated
limiting constructions, which, like the preceding juris-
dictions, require the infliction of gratuitous pain, suffer-
ing or torture on the victim, but unlike those
jurisdictions, do not specify a particular accompanying
mind-set. See, e.g., People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289,
314-15, 680 N.E.2d 357 (“exceptionally brutal or hei-
nous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty” means
“involv[ing] prolonged pain, torture or premeditation”
[internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 522
US. 999, 118 S. Ct. 568, 139 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1997); State
v. Kleypas, 282 Kan. 560, 570, 147 P.3d 1058 (2006)
(‘heinous, atrocious or cruel” means that victim suf-
fered “serious physical abuse or mental anguish before
death” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v.
Moore, 210 Neb. 457, 470, 316 N.W.2d 33 (“especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel” is “directed to the pitiless
crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim
and to cases where torture, sadism, or the imposition
of extreme suffering exists” [emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984,
102 S. Ct. 2260, 72 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1982); Le v. State,
947 P.2d 535, 552 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (“especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel” is “directed to those crimes
where the death of the victim was preceded by torture of
the victim or serious physical abuse” [internal quotation
marks omitted]), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 930, 118 S. Ct.
2329, 141 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1998); State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d
18, 26 (Tenn. 1996) (“heinous, atrocious, or cruel” is
act involving “torture or serious physical abuse beyond
that necessary to produce death” [internal quotation
marks omitted]); State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019, 1036 (Utah
2002) (“especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or excep-
tionally depraved” involves serious physical abuse or

PT M1
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bodily injury before death that is “qualitatively and
quantitatively different and more culpable than that
necessary to accomplish the murder” [internal quota-
tion marks omitted]); Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va.
373, 387, 484 S.E.2d 898 (“ ‘vileness’” means conduct
involving “ ‘torture’ ” or “ ‘aggravated battery’ ” to vic-
tim), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1018, 118 S. Ct. 608, 139 L.
Ed. 2d 495 (1997).

Although our research discloses some states that join
aspecific intent requirement with the infliction of gratu-
itous pain, suffering or torture, those jurisdictions are
decidedly in the minority. See Echols v. State, 326 Ark.
917, 987, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996) (“cruel” requires intent
to inflict mental anguish, serious physical abuse or tor-
ture upon victim prior to death), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1244, 117 S. Ct. 1858, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1997); State
v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 172, 590 A.2d 624 (1991) (“ ‘tor-
ture’ or ‘aggravated battery’ ” requires intent to cause
extreme physical or mental suffering in addition to
intent to cause death); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 559
Pa. 171, 201-202, 739 A.2d 507 (1999) (same, as to “tor-
ture”); State v. Moeller, 616 N.W.2d 424, 454 (S.D. 2000)
(approving limiting construction of aggravating factor
of torture to require: “[1] the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of severe pain, agony, or anguish; and [2] the
intent to inflict such pain, agony, or anguish”); Olsen
v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 581 (Wyo. 2003) (construing “espe-
cially atrocious and cruel, being unnecessarily tortur-
ous to the victim” to require that physical or mental
torture be intentionally inflicted); cf. People v. Superior
Court, 31 Cal. 3d 797, 801-803, 647 P.2d 76, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 800 (1982) (concluding, under state constitutional
due process analysis, that limiting construction
approved by United States Supreme Court in Proffitt
is impermissibly vague). In sum, because the number
of other jurisdictions that utilize the construction
advanced by the defendant is significantly outnumbered

142 Po
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by the number of jurisdictions that do not, we conclude

that the first and fifth Geisler factors do not support

the defendant's claim.

As to the fourth Geisler factor, related Connecticut
precedents, we have recognized that our due process
clauses, like the eighth amendment, prohibit cruel and
‘unusual punishment, and that they may impose limits
on the imposition of the death penalty independent of
any federal requirements. State v. Rizzo, supra, 266
Conn. 206. Although we have been willing, therefore,
to consider claims that the Connecticut constitution
provides greater protection to capital defendants than
does the federal constitution, those claims rarely have
been successful. See State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 319,
864 A.2d 666 (2004) (rejecting claim that state constitu-
tion provides for right of allocution at capital sentencing
hearing), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S. Ct. 102, 163
L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005); State v. Rizzo, supra, 223-24
(rejecting claim that state constitution requires jury
instruction that, to impose penalty of death, aggravating
factors must outweigh mitigating factors beyond rea-
sonable doubt); State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 247-51
(rejecting claim that state constitution forbids imposi-
tion of death penalty under any circumstances); State
v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 252-56 (rejecting several facial
challenges to death penalty statutes as violative of state
constitution); but see State v. Rizzo, supra, 233-34 (con-
cluding, with reference to state constitution, that jury,
to impose death penalty, must be instructed that it must
be persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that aggravating
factors outweigh mitigating factors, by any degree).
Because our prior jurisprudence in this area almost
uniformly has held that, with respect to the specific
claims at issue, federal and state constitutional rights
are coextensive, the fourth Geisler factor does not assist
the defendant.

Pe 3
;

As for policy considerations, the sixth Geisler factor,
the defendant is correct that our legislature intended.
for the death penalty to apply only to the most culpable
offenders, and the statutorily enumerated aggravating
factors are a means for effectuating that intent. We
disagree with his argument, however, that the legisla-
ture’s intent is frustrated by a limiting construction of
§ 58a-46a (i) (4) that includes those who are callous
and indifferent to the gratuitous pain and suffering they
cause their victims. Review of our capital jurisprudence
discloses that, in the seventeen years since we first
articulated that construction, only a handful of offend-
ers have been convicted, and have had their death sen-
tences upheld, on the basis of the callousness/
indifference option, and, more importantly, we are hard
pressed to conclude that those individuals do not fall
within the class of the most culpable offenders.” See,
e.g., State v. Colon, supra, 272 Conn. 337-38 (defendant
killed two year old victim, upon whom he previously
had inflicted severe physical abuse, by dragging her
into bathroom and repeatedly thrusting her head against
shower wall, lifting her by hair with force sufficient to
cause clumps of hair to detach from her scalp); State
v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. 448-50 (defendant abducted
victim from parking lot, forced her to drive to secluded
place where he sexually assaulted, bound and gagged
her, threw her off twenty-three foot dam into freezing
water, then held her head under water to drown her
after she attempted to escape); State v. Webb, 238 Conn.
389, 486-87, 680 A.2d 147 (1996) (defendant abducted

Tn all of these cases, both prongs of the intent element of § 53a-46a (i)
(4) were determined to apply, i., the evidence was sufficient to show that
each defendant intended to cause his victim additional pain or suffering,
and that he was callous and indifferent to that pain or suffering. Accordingly,
experience does not substantiate the defendant's argument that our con-
struction of § 582-46a (i) (4) encompasses vastly more capital murderers
than would a construction requiring a specific intent to cause gratuitous
pain and suffering. Rather, the two groups overlap considerably.

4 Po
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victim from parking garage, drove her to remote loca-
tion and attempted to sexually assault her, then shot
her repeatedly in back, chest and face as she cried for
help and attempted to escape).

Moreover, in the two cases in which this court has
concluded that the jury improperly applied § 53a-46a (i)
(4), this court did not hesitate to reverse their findings.
Notably, however, those reversals did not concern
improper findings as to the defendant's callousness or
indifference, but rather, they concerned improper find-
ings as to the extent of the victim’s pain and suffering;
State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 75, 76-77, 751 A.2d 298
(2000) (evidence insufficient to establish that victim,
who was ambushed and fatally shot through heart while
driving, experienced extreme physical or psychological
pain or suffering beyond that necessarily accompanying
killing); and whether the defendant intentionally had
inflicted psychological torture; State v. Reynolds, supra,
264 Conn. 95-97 (evidence insufficient to establish that
defendant, by continuing to fire shots at victim after
shooting him in head from close range, intended to
psychologically torture victim rather than to kill him);
namely, the portions of our limiting construction that,
according to the defendant, provide clearer limits than
the portion he contests. In sum, the policy factor also
does not support the defendant's claim.

We address last the third Geisler factor, historical
considerations. As the state points out, the jurispruden-
tial underpinnings of the defendant’s vagueness claim
are of relatively recent vintage. See Godfrey v. Georgia,
supra, 446 U.S. 427-28; Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428
U.S. 189-95; Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. 239.
Historically, the death penalty was available for a much
broader range of offenses than under our present consti-
tutional and statutory scheme; see State v. Ross, supra,
230 Conn. 250 n.31,; id., 293 n.8 (Berdon, J., dissenting);
and considerably more discretion was permitted in its

Po us
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imposition. Consequently, this factor does not aid the
defendant.

In sum, we conclude that consideration of the Geisler
factors counsels against a holding that our state consti-
tution requires a more restrictive limiting construction
of § 58a-46a (i) (4) that would exclude murderers who,
with callousness and indifference, impose upon their
victims physical or psychological pain, suffering or tor-
ture beyond that necessary to the underlying killing.
Consequently, the defendant's third claim fails.

Iv

The defendant claims next that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that he committed his offense in
an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. He
argues specifically that the state failed to prove both
that the victim experienced extreme physical or psycho-
logical pain or suffering beyond that necessarily accom-
panying his death and that the defendant was callous
or indifferent to that pain or suffering.® We disagree.

“(W]e have interpreted the aggravating factor set
forth in § 53a-46a (i) (4) to require proof that the defen-
dant engaged in intentional conduct that inflicted
extreme physical or psychological pain [suffering] or
torture on the victim above and beyond that necessarily
accompanying the underlying killing, and that the defen-
dant specifically intended to inflict such extreme pain
[suffering or] torture ... or . . . the defendant was
callous or indifferent to the extreme physical or psycho-
logical pain, suffering or torture that his intentional
conduct in fact inflicted on the victim. . . .

“In reviewing a claim that the evidence fail[ed] to
support the finding of an aggravating factor specified

® The defendant does not dispute that his conduct in striking the victim
repeatedly with a sledgehammer was intentional, and that he engaged in
that conduct with the intent to kill the victim.

M6 Po
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in [§ 53a-46a (i)] . . . we subject that finding to the
same independent and scrupulous examination of the
entire record that we employ in our review of constitu-
tional fact-finding, such as the voluntariness of a confes-
sion . . . or the seizure of a defendant. . . . In such
circumstances, we are required to determine whether
the factual findings are supported by substantial evi-
dence. ...

“Even with the heightened appellate scrutiny appro-
priate for a death penalty case, the defendant's chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of aggravating
circumstances must be reviewed, in the final analysis,
[first] by considering the evidence presented at the
defendant’s penalty [phase] hearing in the light most
favorable to sustaining the facts . . . found by the
[panel]. . . . Second, we determine whether upon the
facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn.
therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have
concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence
established [the existence of the aggravating factor]
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . This court cannot
substitute its own judgment for that of the [panel] if
there is sufficient evidence to support the [panel’s] ver-
dict... .

“Furthermore, [iJn viewing evidence [that] could
yield contrary inferences, the [panel] is not barred from
drawing those inferences consistent with [the existence
of the aggravating factor] and is not required to draw
only those inferences consistent with [its nonexis-
tence]. The rule is that the [panel’s] function is to draw
whatever inferences from the evidence or facts estab-
lished by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and
logical. . . .

“[Finally], [ijn [our] process of review, it does not
diminish the probative force of the evidence that it
consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circum-

po M7
—

stantial rather than direct. . . . It is not one fact, but
the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts [that]
establishes [the existence of an aggravating factor] in
a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.
. . . Indeed, direct evidence of the defendant’s state
of mind is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent [or
callousness or indifference] is often inferred from con-
duct . . . and from the cumulative effect of the circum-
stantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn
therefrom.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 777-78, 998 A.2d 1 (2010).

The three judge panel produced a written memoran-
dum of decision explaining its determination that the
aggravating factor had been proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. The panel summarized the relevant evi-
dence and its findings as follows: “During the evening
of September 30, 1997, the defendant murdered [the
victim] . . . at the defendant’s home in Waterbury. He
did this by luring the victim into the backyard of the
defendant’s home, where he bludgeoned the victim to
death by repeated blows to the head with a three pound
sledgehammer. . . .

“On September 30, 1997, the victim was thirteen years
old. He lived with his mother and his sister in the Bunker
Hill section of Waterbury. At approximately 6:30 p.m.,
the victim left his house and got onto his bicycle.

“Meanwhile, the defendant had left his job at Arett
Sales in Cheshire and, at approximately 5 p.m., returned
to his house in the Bunker Hill section, where he lived
with his mother, his older brother and his younger
sister.

“At approximately 7:45 p.m., the defendant encoun-
tered the victim as the victim rode his bicycle up to the
front of the defendant’s home.

“The defendant recognized the victim because he
had spent time at the video store where the defendant

us Po
Del

previously had worked. The defendant asked the victim.
if his mother or anyone else knew where he was that
evening, and the victim replied in the negative. When
the defendant heard this, he decided to kill the victim.

“The defendant decided to lure the victim to a
secluded place where he could kill him unobserved.
Believing that the victim would be interested in snakes,
the defendant told him that there were snakes in his
backyard, and he asked the victim if he wanted to see
them. When the victim agreed, the defendant told him
that they would need a flashlight to see the snakes in
the darkness, and that he would get one from his car.
The defendant went to his car and retrieved a flashlight
and a three pound sledgehammer. The defendant
slipped the sledgehammer down the front of his pants,
rejoined the victim and took him into the backyard of
the defendant’s home.

“The defendant handed the flashlight to the victim
so that he could look for snakes. As the victim was
doing so, the defendant took the sledgehammer from
his pants, approached the victim from behind, raised
the sledgehammer over his head, held it there for a
moment, and then hit the victim on the side of the head
with the flat surface of the side of the sledgehammer.
The victim rolled over and implored the defendant to
stop hitting him, but the defendant straddled him ‘like
ahorse,’ and began to hit him in the head ‘because [he]
didn’t want [the victim] to scream out and alert the
neighbors.’ After the defendant had delivered a number
of blows with the sledgehammer, the victim made a
gurgling sound. The defendant then delivered another
one or two blows to ensure that the victim was dead.

“Tn all, the defendant delivered approximately twelve
blows to the victim—four to the head, then eight others
on the back and shoulders. The blows to the back and
shoulders were not fatal, and did not result in bleeding.

Po 49
Ld
[N]one of these blows to the back and shoulders would
have rendered the victim unconscious. Any of the blows
to the head, however, could have been fatal, fracturing
the victim’s skull and causing numerous lacerations that
bled profusely. Moreover, although any of the blows to
the head could have rendered the victim unconscious,
none of them necessarily did so.

“During the attack, the victim attempted to protect
himself. One of the blows punched out a large fragment
of the victim's skull, creating a gaping hole.

“At some point, two dogs in a neighbor’s yard began
to bark, and the dogs’ owner came out of his house to
quiet them down. The defendant stopped the beating,
and held the flashlight against his body so that the
neighbor would not see light coming from his yard.
After the neighbor returned to his house, the defendant
shone the flashlight on the victim’s body, and saw that
he was covered in blood and had a large hole in his skull.

“The defendant then decided to dump the victim’s
body on Fulkerson Drive in Waterbury, which [is]
located a short distance from the defendant’s house.
Realizing that his car was too small to carry both the
victim’s body and his bicycle in one trip, the defendant
took the bicycle to Fulkerson Drive and left it next to
a dumpster. He then returned to his house, put garbage
bags over the victim’s head and lower part of his body,
dragged the body to his car, and opened the hatchback.
He then removed the rug that covered the rear portion
of his car to ensure that it would not be stained with
blood, placed the victim’s body into the rear portion of
the car, and drove to Fulkerson Drive.

“At approximately 8:30 p.m., the defendant drove into
a condominium complex on Fulkerson Drive, looking
for aplace to dispose of the body. Eventually, he located
a dark, secluded area, where he stopped the car and
threw the victim’s body onto the pavement.

150 Po
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“The defendant then drove back to his house. He
put the sledgehammer and his blood soaked shirt into
plastic bags. The next morning, the defendant took the
plastic bags containing the sledgehammer and his shirt
with him to work, and he threw them into his employer’s
trash compactor.

“The victim’s body was discovered on Fulkerson
Drive at approximately 8:45 p.m. that same night.

“By the next day the defendant had become the focus
of the investigation. At 5 p.m., the defendant was
approached by members of the Waterbury police
department who asked him if he would be willing to
go to the police station and answer some questions. The
defendant agreed. During the course of his presence at.
the police station the defendant denied that he knew
the victim and claimed no knowledge of the murder.
The defendant was allowed to return to his home with
the police.

“Pursuant to consent by the defendant, the police
subsequently searched the defendant's car. That search
produced smears in the spare tire wheel well area that
appeared to be blood. When confronted with the blood
smears in his car, the defendant said, ‘I feel sick’ and
‘I did it.’ The defendant further explained that, as he
spoke to the victim, he ‘had an urge.’ He also stated
[that] he ‘was interested in serial killings and Jeffrey
Dahmer’ and that, when he saw the victim, the urge to
commit murder ‘just came over him... .’ The next
day, while being transported to court for his arraign-
ment, the defendant told a police detective that he had
murdered the victim because he just wanted to know
what it was like to kill somebody.

“Additional evidence presented by the state estab-
lished that the defendant had served in the United States
Marine Corps from November, 1996, to September,
1997. While the defendant was stationed in Hawaii, his

Pe 61
LT

sergeant had asked the members of his platoon to make
a list of their ten goals in life and to post the list in the
barracks. The second goal on the defendant’s list was
to ‘kill a man.’

“The panel unanimously finds that the state has
proven the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable
doubt. The panel unanimously finds that the murder
of [the victim] was committed in an especially cruel,
heinous and depraved manner.

“The panel further unanimously finds, based on the
evidence and beyond areasonable doubt, that the defen-
dant engaged in intentional conduct that inflicted
extreme physical pain and psychological pain (suffer-
ing) on the victim above and beyond that necessarily
accompanying the underlying killing and [that] the
defendant was callous and indifferent to the extreme
physical pain and psychological pain and suffering that
his intentional conduct in fact inflicted on the victim.

“The panel’s findings of intentional conduct that
inflicted extreme physical pain and psychological pain
and suffering beyond that. necessarily accompanying
the underlying killing is based upon: the type of weapon
used by the defendant; the manner in which the defen-
dant utilized the sledgehammer; the defendant’s obses-
sion with violent deaths and serial killers; [and] the
defendant's preexisting desire to kill.

“The finding that the victim experienced extreme
physical pain and psychological pain and suffering as
the result of the defendant’s intentional conduct is sup-
ported by: the number and nature of sledgehammer
blows to the head and torso of the victim; the victim’s
attempt to protect himself; the profuse bleeding from
the victim’s wounds; the nature and circumstances of
a nighttime attack in a dark and secluded location; and
the victim’s last words, imploring the defendant to stop
hitting him.

152 es
Lee

“The finding that the defendant was callous or indif-
ferent to the extreme physical pain and psychological
pain and suffering that his intentional conduct in fact
inflicted on the victim is supported by: the defendant’s
emphasis in his postarrest statements on his own feel-
ings at the time of the murder; the type of weapon used.
by the defendant; the manner in which the defendant
utilized the weapon; and the defendant’s lack of
remorse immediately following the murder.” (Cita-
tions omitted.)

The defendant argues, in short, that the evidence did
not establish the heinousness, cruelty and depravity of
his acts in murdering the victim because the attack was
unanticipated, the victim’s death likely was swift and,
accordingly, the victim simply did not suffer enough
either physically or psychologically. We are not per-
suaded. Courts frequently have concluded that aggra-

vating circumstances similar to Connecticut's cruel,
heinous and depraved factor were sufficiently proven
in cases in which a victim was killed by beating or
bludgeoning, even when the attack is not especially
prolonged and the victim’s loss of consciousness and
death occur rather quickly. See, e.g., State v. Colon,

© Compare State v. Johnson, supra, 253 Conn. 78 (concluding that cruel,
heinous and depraved aggravating factor was unproven in case in which
victim, while seated in his police cruiser, was killed quickly by single gunshot
wound to lung and heart that was inflicted from distance during 6.6 second
fusillade of bullets). In Johnson, we reasoned that “the absence of extreme
pain or torture above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the killing
. . « [was] attributable both to the instrument of death and the rapidity
with which unconsciousness and death ensued.” (Citation omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 70. We acknowledged that,
“[gliven the manner in which [the victim] was murdered and the speed
with which he died, as reprehensible as the attack was,” it did not rise to
the level of cruel, heinous and depraved, a category which is reserved for
only the most “horrible” and “noxious” of killings. (Emphasis added.) Id.,
72, In contrast, implicit in the cases cited in the main text is a recognition
that a victim's conscious experience in being beaten or bludgeoned to death
is likely to be especially painful and horrific, even when the murder is
accomplished relatively efficiently.

Po 153
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supra, 272 Conn. 337-88 (defendant repeatedly
slammed two year old victim’s head into shower wall);
see also United States v. Agofsky, 458 F.3d 369, 374-75
(5th Cir. 2006) (defendant stomped fellow inmate’s head
and neck into concrete floor approximately eleven
times), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1182, 127 S. Ct. 1149, 166
L. Ed. 2d 998 (2007); United States v. Battle, 264 F. Sup.
2d 1088, 1199-1200 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (defendant struck
victim in head three times with hammer); McGowan v.
State, 990 So. 2d 931 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (defendant
bludgeoned elderly couple with hammer), cert. denied,
555 U.S. 861, 129 S. Ct. 136, 172 L. Ed. 2d 104 (2008);
State v. Kiles, 222 Ariz. 25, 30, 39, 213 P.3d 174 (2009)
(defendant beat female victim with tire jack), cert.
denied, 560 U.S. 907, 180 S. Ct. 3274, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1188
(2010); Roberts v. State, 510 So. 2d 885, 894 (Fla. 1987)
(defendant killed victim by numerous blows to back of
head with baseball bat), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 943, 108
S. Ct. 1123, 99 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988); Atkins v. State, 497
So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 1986) (defendant beat six year
old child in head and neck with steel rod); Salvatore
v. State, 366 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1978) (defendant
bludgeoned victim in head and face with pipe), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S. Ct. 177, 62 L. Ed. 2d 115
(1979); State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 486, 496 (Mo.
1997) (defendant beat child victim in head with bed.
slat), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 957, 118 S. Ct. 2379, 141 L.
Ed. 2d 746 (1998); State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 371-72,
572 S.E.2d 108 (2002) (defendant beat victim in head
fourteen times with small sledgehammer and other
weapon), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040, 123 S. Ct. 2087,
155 L, Ed. 2d 1074 (2003); Willingham v. State, 947 P.2d
1074, 1085 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (defendant punched
and kicked female victim in face and slammed her head
into wall). In such cases, given the extremely violent
and brutal nature of the defendant’s chosen method of
killing, relatively brief periods of intense physical and

154 es
Te

psychological suffering generally are sufficient to estab-
lish the gratuitous cruelty contemplated by the statu-
tory aggravator.

Consequently, if the state can establish that the victim
remained conscious for some part of the defendant’s
attack, and experienced extreme physical or psycholog-
ical pain or suffering while conscious, the evidence may
be sufficient to prove the aggravator. Evidence that the
victim continued to move around during the attack is
relevant in this regard. See, e.g., McGowan v. State,
supra, 990 So. 2d 1004-1005 (evidence that victim was
on hands and knees during part of hammer attack dem-
onstrated that he was conscious and suffered before
dying); State v. Barden, supra, 356 N.C. 371 (defendant’s
statement that victim, following initial blows, reached
for his pocket, suggested that victim did not die immedi-
ately); Hizember v. State, 164 P.3d 208, 242 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2007) (evidence that victim attempted to get up
after being struck with butt of shotgun sufficient to
demonstrate conscious suffering), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
1269, 128 S. Ct. 1676, 170 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2008); cf. State
v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 222-24, 663 A.2d 1026 (1995)
(evidence that victim moved around room during beat-
ing and stabbing attack supports conclusion that she
was conscious and suffered extreme physical pain).

Additionally, evidence that a victim attempted to pro-
tect himself from the blows inflicted by his attacker
demonstrates that the victim remained alive and con-
scious while being assaulted and, therefore, endured
physical and psychological pain and suffering. See Wil-
tiams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 200 (Fla. 2010) (“[t]he
existence of a defensive wound is relevant to the [hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel] analysis—this [c]ourt has
affirmed findings of [the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
factor] where defensive wounds revealed awareness of
impending death” [internal quotation marks omitted]);
see also State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 790, 948 P.2d

Pe 155

=
127 (1997) (numerous bruises on victim’s forearms
appeared defensive and indicative of premortem suffer-
ing), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1126, 118 S, Ct. 1813, 140 L.
Ed. 2d 951 (1998); Young v. State, 992 P.2d 332, 344, 348
(Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (defensive fractures to victim’s
finger, hand and elbow proved her consciousness and.
awareness of attack with baseball bat), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 837, 120S. Ct. 100, 145 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1999); State
v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 367 (Tenn. 1982) (defensive
injuries to arms and hands of victim, who was killed
with ball peen hammer, proved “that there was time
for her to realize what was happening, to feel fear, and
to try to protect herself”), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137,
103 S. Ct. 770, 74 L. Ed. 2d 983 (1983).

Finally, evidence that a victim spoke after the attack
began clearly is indicative of consciousness and, there-
fore, pain and suffering. See State v. Kiles, supra, 222
Ariz. 30 (defendant admitted that, following initial blow,
victim asked him, ““[W]hy did [you] do this?’ ”); Salva-
tore v. State, supra, 366 So. 2d 747 (victim bludgeoned
as he cried for help); compare Herzog v. State, 439
So. 2d 1372, 1380 (Fla. 1983) (where victim was under
“heavy influence” of drugs and neither spoke nor
resisted during fatal attack, it could be inferred that
she was only semiconscious; murder, therefore, was
not unnecessarily torturous).

In the present case, evidence on which the panel
relied, in particular, the defendant’s own sworn state-
ment to the police,” established that the victim
remained conscious beyond the first blow to his head.
that the defendant inflicted with the sledgehammer and,
therefore, experienced physical and psychological pain
and suffering while some or all of the remaining blows
were delivered. Specifically, the defendant stated that,

“The quoted portions of the panel's memorandum of decision correspond
to language in the defendant's statement.

156 Po

after a second swing of the hammer missed the victim,
the victim rolled over and told the defendant to stop
hitting him. Despite the victim’s request, the defendant
continued to hit the victim in the head and torso,
“approximately twelve” times,” causing profuse bleed-
ing that would have caused the victim to experience
psychological distress. The panel also cited the victim’s
attempt to protect himself as evidence of his suffering.
That finding is supported by the evidence.”

5\'The defendant takes issue with the court's finding as to the number of
blows he inflicted on the victim, arguing that the fact that the victim suffered
twelve injuries does not prove that he endured twelve direct hits from the
sledgehammer. The panel’s memorandum of decision states the number of
blows as approximate, however, and does not attempt to distinguish between
direct and indirect strikes, ie., those that might have been inflicted after
the hammer was deflected off of the victim’s skull. In any event, after
reviewing the jurisprudence governing this claim, we conclude that the
distinction the defendant attempts to draw is not determinative of the
outcome.

Specifically, Joy Reho, a criminologist in the forensic biology unit of
the state forensic science laboratory, testified that both the front and back
sides of the victim’s bicycle gloves were “[hJeavily saturated” with blood
and that they had been “in contact with a bloody source for a period of
time.” Although she could not say so with complete certainty, Malka Shah,
an associate medical examiner from the office of the chief medical examiner,
testified that the blood could have gotten on the gloves when the victim
raised his hands to his head in an attempt to protect his head. Shah testified
further that the victim had no bleeding injuries to his limbs or torso. On
the basis of this testimony, we disagree with the defendant that the inference
drawn by the panel, that the victim had attempted to protect himself, was
an unreasonable one. Compare Williams v. State, supra, 37 So. 8d 199-200
(mere presence of blood on victim’s jeans, with no evidence as to how
blood likely got there or what pattern of blood indicated, did not establish
that victim was standing, and hence was conscious, when blows to head
‘were delivered).

Although the defendant argues that the panel should have drawn a differ-
ent inference as to the source of the blood on the victim's gloves, we do
notagree. We reiterate that, “[ijn viewing evidence [that] could yield contrary
inferences, the [panel] is not barred from drawing those inferences consis-
tent with [the existence of the aggravating factor] and is not required to
draw only those inferences consistent with [its nonexistence]. The rule is
that the [panel's] function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence
or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.”
nternal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, supra, 296 Conn.

Po 157
a

Regarding the panel’s finding that the defendant was
callous and indifferent to the pain and suffering he
caused the victim, we disagree with the defendant that
the panel made improper inferences from the evidence
presented. The defendant’s choice of a sledgehammer
as a weapon with which to beat the victim repeatedly
on his head, causing profuse bleeding and dislodging a
portion of the victim’s skull, reasonably suggests that
the defendant was not concerned with the victim’s pain
and suffering. See State v. Call, 353 N.C. 400, 425, 545
S.E.2d 190 (defendant lured victim to isolated area and
beat him to death with shovel handle and tire iron with
no provocation, supporting inference that murder was
conscienceless and pitiless), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046,
122 S. Ct. 628, 151 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2001). Moreover, the
defendant’s statements that he killed the victim because
he “had an urge” and “just wanted to know what it was
like to kill somebody,” as well as his general failure at
the time to show any remorse for murdering an innocent
child,® are competent evidence of the defendant’s cal-

778. Moreover, “[p]roof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial
evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis.
. . . Thus, in determining whether the evidence supports a particular infer-
ence, we ask whether that inference is so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable.
. . . In other words, an inference need not be compelled by the evidence;
rather, the evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an infer-
ence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, supra, 264
Conn. 97. Here, the bloody gloves and the testimony of Reho and Shah
reasonably and logically suggest that the victim attempted to protect his
head with his hands.

‘The defendant argues additionally that the defendant’s interest in serial
killings does not reasonably indicate that the victim experienced pain and
suffering beyond that necessary to cause his death. We agree. The trial
court cited that circumstance, however, in support of its finding that the
defendant's conduct was intentional, not in support of its finding that the
victim experienced extreme physical and psychological pain and suffering
as a result of the defendant's intentional conduct.

® Again, contrary to the defendant's argument, there was evidence suffi-
cient to show that the defendant lacked remorse. Sergeant Eugene Coyle,
who took the defendant's statement and interacted with him both prior and
subsequent to his arrest, testified that the defendant, throughout that period
of time, never exhibited any remorse or regret for killing the victim, nor

158 Po
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lousness and indifference to the pain and suffering he
caused the victim to endure. See State v. Rizzo, supra,
266 Conn. 278 (“[iJt is reasonable for a jury to infer,
based on a defendant’s subsequent lack of remorse,
that the defendant was callous or indifferent to the
victim’s suffering at the time of the offense”); see also
Herzog v. State, supra, 439 So. 2d 1379 (defendant’s
“lack of remorse can be offered to the jury and judge
as a factor which goes into the equation of whether
or not the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Oli-
ver, 309 N.C. 326, 346-47, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983) (defen-
dant’s boasting to fellow inmates that he had enjoyed
killing victim, who had begged for his life, was evidence
of “conscienceless and pitiless murder inflicting psy-
chological torture”); cf. State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn.
263 (defendant’s lack of remorse indicative of intent to
inflict suffering on victims); State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d
417, 434 (Mo. 1983) (defendant’s later letter to newspa-
per, in which he described his reasons for killing victim,
evidenced his intent to cause victim’s suffering before
death), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L.
Ed. 2d 246 (1983).

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the panel’s findings that the defendant inflicted
extreme physical and psychological pain and suffering
on the victim beyond that necessarily accompanying

indicated that he was sorry for what he had done. According to Coyle,
the defendant’s demeanor—when directing police to the victim’s body and
bicycle, giving his statement, recounting the killing, drawing a map of his
yard and reporting why he had killed the victim—consistently remained
“stoic” or “matter of fact.”

‘The defendant cites extensively to extra-record nonlegal materials to
argue that the trial court's factual finding as to his lack of remorse was
erroneous, and to request that this court draw different factual inferences
from his behavior. For the reasons explained in footnote 16 of this opinion,
the defendant's citation to material that was not admitted into evidence is
not properly used to attack the trial court's factual findings on appeal, and,
therefore, we do not consider it.

Po 159
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his death and that the defendant was callous or indiffer-
ent to that pain and suffering. Consequently, the defen-
dant’s fourth claim is without merit.

Vv

The defendant’s next claim is that General Statutes
(Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a (d), which directs a capital
penalty phase fact finder to determine whether a partic-
ular mitigating factor, having been established by the
evidence, “is mitigating in nature, considering all the
facts and circumstances of the case,” is unconstitu-
tional. According to the defendant, requiring the fact
finder to make this determination as a prerequisite to
the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, the
final step in the statutory process for determining
whether death is the appropriate penalty; see General
Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a (f); improperly pre-
vents mitigating evidence offered by the defendant from
being given full consideration and effect in violation of
the eighth amendment to the United States constitution.

The defendant acknowledges that this claim already
was raised, and rejected, in his first appeal; see State
v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. 290-91; but argues that this
court decided it incorrectly. We disagree. We have
reviewed the authority cited by the defendant, including
the authorities that arose after our decision in Rizzo,"
and we conclude that our previous holding, that the
defendant had failed to establish that § 53a-46a (d) was
unconstitutional, is not in error.

The defendant cites Abdul-Kabir v. Quarierman, 550 U.S. 233, 127 S.
Ct. 1654, 167 L. Ed. 2d 585 (2007), which involved a federal habeas petition
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because the United States Supreme
Court’s task in Abdul-Kabir was to determine whether the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals had misapplied the law as clearly established by decisions
of the United States Supreme Court as of the date of the Texas court’s
decision, which was November 24, 1999; id., 237-88; Abdul-Kabir necessarily
did not create new law, not existing at the time of our decision in Rizzo,
that might warrant revisiting this issue.

160 es
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VI

The defendant claims next that the panel’s findings
as to mitigation were improper. According to the defen-
dant, it was error for the panel to find proven only one
of the mitigating factors that he proposed and to reject
all of the others. We disagree.

The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to this claim. The defendant submitted a list of
forty-five proposed mitigating factors to the panel for
its consideration, arguing that the factors were both
factually proven and mitigating in nature. Generally, the
proposed mitigating factors concerned the defendant’s
age at the time of his crime, his deplorable home envi-
ronment and neglectful upbringing, his small stature as
a child and the resulting bullying and harassment he
endured, his positive attributes, talents and contribu-
tions to his family and community, his steady employ-
ment history, his military service, his cooperation with
the police in their investigation of the victim’s murder
and his eventual remorse for his crime.® The final pro-
posed mitigating factor submitted by the defendant was
“t]he cumulative or combined effect of all the evidence
concerning [the defendant’s] character, background or
history or the nature [or] circumstances of the crime

% The specific list of suggested mitigating factors submitted by the defen-
dant was as follows:

“I, [The defendant] was an eighteen year old adolescent, not having
reached full physiological or emotional maturity, when he murdered [the

ictim].

wo. [The defendant’s] parents were so physically and emotionally absent
from [the defendant] during his formative years that they provided deficient
nurturance, guidance, support, protection, supervision or discipline for his
normal emotional and social development,

“3, [The defendant's] parents were unwilling and/or unable to communi-
cate with [the defendant] about the most emotionally damaging and/or
stressful events in his life (e.g., his parents’ divorce, the incident at Kaynor
{Regional Vocational-Technical School (Kaynor)] . . . and {the defendant's]
post school career plans).

e defendant's parents] did not provide {the defendant] with clear
expectations for behavior and they failed to supervise and monitor [the
defendant] as a child and teen.

“5, [The defendant] was neglected as defined by [General Statutes] § 46b-
120 [8] in that he had been denied proper care and attention, physically,
emotionally or morally, or was permitted to live under conditions, circum-
stances or associations injurious to his well-being.

es 161
bere

“6, (The defendant] suffered significant emotional distress as a result of
his parents’ volatile conflicts, repeated separations, eventual divorce and
his father moving away from

“7. The [defendant's] family was characterized by conflict and negative
family relationships that adversely affected [the defendant's] emotional
development.

“g, (The defendant] suffered neglect as a result of his mother’s persistent
depression and anger over the divorce.

"9. After the divorce of his parents, [the defendant’s] family home at 15
Marion Avenue, Waterbury, fell into such complete disrepair that it was
nearly impossible for anyone to perform household tasks like cooking,
bathing, or laundering bedding and clothing. The house was in such an
extremely unhealthy state that it was unfit for human habitation or normal
child development.

“10. [The defendant] and his siblings suffered poor living conditions
fespite the fact that his parents had the financial resources to provide

for them.

“11, The absence of responsible, caring and interested adults in [the
defendant's] home was so extreme that [the defendant] was forced to seek
basic necessities such as food, shelter, assistance with laundry, and nurturing
from friends and neighbors (maternal and paternal figures) in the com-
munity.

“12. After the divorce, [the defendant's] mother did not secure any respon-
sible child care for her children and left [them] alone and unattended.

“13, [The defendant] was too young to understand the potential danger
of seeking out inappropriate altemative maternal and paternal figure[s]
outside his home.

“14, [The defendant's] mother deprived her son of normal social peer
interaction by continually refusing to allow any nonfamily members into
the family home.

“15, [The defendant's mother] inappropriately exposed her young son [the
defendant] to excessive media violence during his childhood and did not
provide the appropriate guidance and supervision to prevent his continuing
exposure to the potentially damaging violent content.

“16, [The defendant's] parents did not seek mental health counseling for
their son during the most emotionally damaging and stressful events in his
life (e.g., his parents’ divorce and the incidents at Kaynor . . . ).

“17, ‘The defendant's father] knew of the deplorable physical and emo-
tional conditions that [the defendant] was living in, but did nothing to take
physical custody or otherwise rescue his son from neglect.

“18, [The defendant's father] moved out of state and became less involved
with [the defendant] despite being aware of the deplorable conditions that
[the defendant] was enduring.

“19. [The defendant's father] consistently chose his own happiness over
the emotional and physical well-being of his son.

“20. [The defendant's] plans to attend the Johnson and Wales culinary
program were thwarted by his parents’ failure to fill out the basic financial
aid paperwork necessary for him to attend.

“1, [The defendant] was physically small, underweight, and a chronic
bed wetter into his teenage years, resulting in humiliation and ridicule from
family members and peers.

“92. (The defendant's Es} experiences of having been humiliated and bullied

were significant enough to damage his emotional well-being.

“23, [The defendant], while a freshman and sophomore at . . . Kaynor

_ was subjected to repeated acts of physical hazing and sexual harass-
ment by upper-class students.

“24, [The defendant] demonstrated remarkable perseverance and resil-
ience despite living under conditions of extreme neglect which shows his
potential to learn from his mistakes.

“25. [The defendant] was a good grammar and middle school student.
resulting in his acceptance into Kaynor . . . .

162 PO

which the court, in fairness and mercy, finds is mitigat-
ing in nature and constitutes a basis for a sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of release.”

The panel, in its written memorandum of decision,
outlined the law governing the finding of statutory and

“26. [The defendant] had a genuine interest in and talent for cooking and
baking, and graduated from the culinary program in the middle of his class
in 1996 from Kaynor . .

“97. [The defendant] was accepted as a student into the culinary program
at Johnson and Wales University in South Carolina.

nat 3. [The defendant] displayed kindness in helping to provide for his

er, family, and friends by purchasing necessities and gifts for them.
moe [The defendant] reached out to the church as a positive influence in
his life; he attended church throughout his childhood and teenage years,
often bringing his sister . . . with him, and he continued to be actively
involved in church activities even after his parents stopped attending.

“30, (The defendant] maintained a steady history of employment from the
age of fourteen until the time of his arrest.

“31, [The defendant] joined the United States Marine Corps at the age
of seventeen.

anes [The defendant] successfully completed boot camp at Parris Island

\d infantry training at Camp Geiger.

3, [The defendant] volunteered to serve as the lay reader for the Marine
recruits in his boot camp platoon and delivered the prayer during the gradua-
tion ceremony.

“34, [The defendant] took responsibility for his actions when he cooper-
ated with the police and confessed to the murder of [the victim].

“35, [The defendant] took responsibility for his actions when he cooper-
ated with the police and consented to the searches of his home and his car.

“36. [The defendant] took responsibility for his actions when he cooper-
ated with the police when he disclosed to them the location in the rear yard
at 15 Marion Avenue where he murdered [the victim].

“37, [The defendant] took responsibility for his actions when he cooper-
ated with the police when he disclosed to them the location of the mur-
der weapon.

“38. the defendant] cooperated with the police when he disclosed the
location of where he placed [the victim’s] body.

“39, [The defendant's] cooperation saved the Waterbury police department
a toe of time and effort.

“40. [The defendant] cooperated with resolution of this case by voluntarily
pleading guilty to the murder of [the victim], thereby taking both personal
and legal responsibility for the murder.

“41. (The defendant] has shown remorse for the murder of [the victim].

“42. [The defendant's] act of murdering {the victim] was a tragic behavioral
aberration considering that he has no prior juvenile or criminal record.

“43, Life imprisonment without the possibility of release is the appropriate
sentence for (the defendant].

“4d, Any other factor concerning [the defendant's] character, background,
or history or the nature and circumstances of the crime that has not been
specifically suggested which the court may, in fairness and mercy, find is
mitigating in nature and constitutes a basis for a sentence of life imprison-
ment without the possibility of release.

“45. The cumulative or combined effect of all the evidence concerning
[the defendant’s] character, background or history or the nature [or] circum-
stances of the crime which the court, in fairness and mercy, finds is mitigating
in nature and constitutes a basis for a sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of release.”

Po 163
Tt

nonstatutory mitigating factors, and observed that, pur-
suant to state and federal death penalty jurisprudence,
a capital “sentencer may not be precluded from consid-
ering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitution-
ally relevant mitigating evidence . . . .” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) After noting
that no statutory mitigating factors® were at issue in
this case, the panel found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the cumulative factor recited previously
had been proven factually and, further, that it was miti-
gating in nature considering all of the facts and circum-
stances of the case. Conversely, the panel did not find
that any of the individual factors proposed by the defen-
dant were proven mitigating factors. The defendant
argues that, given the evidence presented, no fact finder
reasonably could have failed to find that these individ-
ual factors were mitigating in nature.” We are not per-
suaded.®

Under our death penalty scheme, once the state establishes the existence
of an aggravating factor, specified in § 53a-46a (i), beyond a reasonable
doubt, the burden shifts to the defendant “to establish the existence of a
mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . In this regard,
the statutory scheme sets out two types of mitigating factors: (1) statutory
mitigating factors, as defined in § 58a-46a (h), which, if found, preclude the
imposition of the death penalty under any circumstances; and (2) nonstatu-
tory mitigating factors, as defined in § 53a-46a (d).” (Citation omitted.) State
v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. 180.

The panel was not required to make explicit findings as to the remaining
forty-four proposed mitigating factors; see State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn.
310; and, accordingly, it did not do so. We agree with the defendant, however,
that, because the panel found the cumulative factor factually proven, it
necessarily found at least some of the proposed individual factors factually
proven, but concluded that they were not mitigating in nature, considering
all of the facts and circumstances of the case.

©The defendant also claims that, because the panel necessarily found
some individual proposed mitigating factors factually proven; see footnote
87 of this opinion; he statutorily and constitutionally was entitled to have
them weighed as individual mitigating factors, and not merely as part of the
cumulative mitigating factor found by the panel. According to the defendant,
because the panel found no individual mitigating factors proven while simul-
taneously finding the cumulative mitigating factor proven, his statutory and
constitutional rights have been violated. The defendant is incorrect.

164 Po

Our review of this claim is thorough, yet deferential
to the panel. “We previously have recognized that,
[ulnder our death penalty statute, the defendant must
convince the [sentencer] not only of the facts underlying
an alleged nonstatutory mitigating factor, but also that
the factor is mitigating in nature, considering all the
facts and circumstances of the case, such that in fair-
ness and mercy, [it] may be considered as tending either
to extenuate or reduce the degree of his culpability or

Pursuant to Connecticut's death penalty scheme, the defendant bears the
burden of proving, “by a preponderance of the evidence . . . both the
underlying factual basis of a mitigating factor and its mitigating nature.”
Gmphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rizzo,
supra, 266 Conn. 239; see also General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a (c).
‘Thus, the statute clearly contemplates the outcome present in this case—
proposed mitigating factors being proven as a factual matter, yet not found
to be mitigating in nature. State v. Rizzo, supra, 296-97. Furthermore, as
explained in part V of this opinion and Rizzo, we repeatedly have upheld
the constitutionality of this provision. In short, “the mere establishment of
the factual bases of mitigating evidence does not compel a conclusion, as
a matter of law, that a defendant has proved the existence of mitigation.”
Id, 295.

The defendant argues, nevertheless, that because the panel concluded
that the proven individual factors, viewed cumulatively, were mitigating in
nature, it also must have found that those individual factors had some,
however minimal, mitigating quality and, therefore, they were entitled to
independent consideration in the final determination whether to impose the
death penalty. We are not persuaded. Although each proven factor might
have established something good or sympathetic about the defendant, the
panel apparently found that the factors were not mitigating in nature until
they were viewed collectively. As we have explained, § 58a-46a (d) “does
not require a capital sentencer to give mitigating force to any particular
proven factor solely because that factor establishes something good about
the defendant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 295-96; see also
State v. Reynolds, supra, 264 Conn. 135 (§ 53a-46a [d] does not require panel
to find existence of mitigation if defendant establishes “anything positive—
no matter how slight” about himself). In any event, the cumulative mitigating
factor, which a capital defendant has a right to submit for consideration;
see State v. Reynolds, supra, 139; provides a mechanism for the sentencer
to consider all constitutionally relevant information about the defendant
and the case when making its final sentencing determination, even though
that information, when viewed piecemeal, is not found to be mitigating in
nature. The panel acknowledged its constitutional duty to consider all rele-
vant mitigating evidence, and we are convinced that it did.

Po 165
—

blame for the offense or to otherwise constitute a basis
for a sentence less than death. General Statutes [Rev.
to 1997] § 58a-46a (d). . . . We also have recognized
that, [a]lthough our review of the evidence in mitigation.
of the death penalty is a heightened one . . . we will
not substitute our judgment or opinions for that of a
reasonable [sentencer]. . . . Instead, we must deter-
mine whether the defendant’s proof of a mitigating fac-
tor was so clear and so compelling that the [sentencer],
in the exercise of reasoned judgment, could not have
rejected it.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Breton, 264 Conn. 327, 366-67, 824
A.2d 778, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1055, 124 S. Ct. 819, 157
L. Ed. 2d 708 (2003). This standard of review applies
to both aspects of the sentencer’s determination as to
mitigating factors. Id., 369-70.

We now turn to the evidence presented by the defen-
dant in support of mitigation. Ellen Knight, an investiga-
tor for the division of public defender services, testified
as to the state of the defendant’s home at 15 Marion
Avenue shortly after his arrest. Knight described the
condition of the property as unlike anything she had
ever seen. In short, the house had fallen into severe
disrepair, was filthy and overrun with clutter and gar-
bage, and reeked from the presence of several cats and
their accumulated waste. The washing machine, oven,
a refrigerator and one bathroom were not functional.
The kitchen subfloor long had been exposed due to
removal, without subsequent replacement, of the lino-
leum covering, and part of a downstairs ceiling had
collapsed from a leak in an upstairs bathroom. The
surrounding yard was poorly maintained and overrun
with vegetation. Extensive photographic and video-
taped evidence showing the condition of the property
was submitted into the record after being identified and
described by Knight.

166 Po

Next, the defendant offered testimony from his
mother, Joyce Moffatt, his father, Peter Rizzo, his older
brother, Brandon Rizzo, and his younger sister, Chelsea
Rizzo. Brandon Rizzo is approximately two years older
than the defendant and Chelsea Rizzo is approximately
three years younger than the defendant. The whole fam-
ily spoke of the parents’ unhappy marriage, their fre-
quent arguments and their eventual divorce in 1988,
when the defendant was about ten years old. The
divorce was upsetting to the children, particularly to
the defendant. Following the divorce, Moffatt began to
work long hours at multiple jobs and, due to ongoing
financial pressures, was forced to leave the children
unattended and unsupervised, often into the evening
hours. Also following the divorce, the family home grad-
ually fell into disrepair, ultimately reaching the state
previously described. At times, the heat was turned off
for nonpayment. Eventually, the washing machine and
refrigerator broke and were not repaired. At some point,
the attic became inaccessible because raccoons were
living in it. The house became very cluttered and dirty,
and, because Moffatt consistently was tired, depressed.
and overwhelmed, she failed to remedy that situation.

There was evidence showing that Peter Rizzo some-
times had failed to abide by the parties’ biweekly visita-
tion schedule by picking up his children as planned.
Additionally, he sometimes fell behind on his child sup-
port payments, although he eventually caught up. On
one occasion, after having the children with him for
the Thanksgiving holiday, he dropped them off early at
home while Moffatt was out of state visiting relatives.
Although Peter Rizzo generally lived nearby in Cheshire
following the divorce, he moved out of state for aperiod
beginning in 1995, when the defendant was about six-
teen years old.

Testimony from the Rizzo family, as well as other
documentary evidence, established that the defendant

167
De

had been a small boy who suffered from a nervous
stomach, and he remained substantially smaller than
his peers throughout childhood and adolescence. Addi-
tionally, the defendant had a problem with bedwetting
that lasted into his teens, and his brother teased him
about this problem. Because of his diminutive stature,
he also was picked on at school.

Two of the defendant's neighbors, Barbara Voglesong
and Paula Delage, also testified. They confirmed that
the defendant and his siblings often were unsupervised
and outside alone after dark, and that their house was
disheveled and smelled strongly of cat urine. The defen-
dant and his sister played with Voglesong’s children
often, and Voglesong testified that the defendant
seemed to be looking for a mother. A middle school
friend of the defendant confirmed that he was unsuper-
vised and “had [a lot of] freedom... .”

Several witnesses testified as to the defendant’s
strong interest in violent, gory “slasher films” and hor-
ror themed books, an interest he was able to pursue
freely due to lack of supervision. Moffatt was either
unable or unwilling to prevent the defendant from view-
ing these materials.

The defendant was an avid and talented cook. At
home, he prepared meals for himself and his siblings.
While in high school, he received an award for creativity
in culinary arts.

Evidence was submitted to show that the defendant
‘was an involved churchgoer. The defendant and his
sister continued to attend church by themselves follow-
ing their parents’ divorce, when the rest of the family
ceased to go. The defendant brought homemade baked
goods to church events and he participated in a Christ-
mas pageant one year.

Testimony from several witnesses, both young and
adult, tended to show that the defendant had good rela-

168 PO
—

tionships with people who thought well of him and
enjoyed his company. His parents described him as a
giving child who was funny, thoughtful and helpful to
other people. Chelsea Rizzo stated that she was close
to the defendant and still loved him. Kenneth Sweet, a
high school classmate of the defendant’s, considered
the defendant to be his best friend. The two had social-
ized and spoke on the telephone a lot. Sweet described
the defendant as a “class clown,” outgoing and funny.
Sean Baranowsky, another high school classmate, also
described the defendant as a “clown,” who made people
laugh. Perrin Markay, a friend of the defendant’s during
middle school and high school, also described him as
a “best friend,” as well as a really good person who
took care of his sister.

Lynn Connolly managed a video store at which the
defendant once had worked, and she lived in an apart-
ment above the store. Connolly testified that the defen-
dant spent much time at her apartment and also at a
neighbor’s apartment, that she permitted the defendant
to baby-sit her children and that she never had any
concerns about him. Violet Boisvert also lived in the
vicinity of the video store and met the defendant when
he was about fifteen years old. She testified that the
defendant often visited her home and that she never
had any problem with him. Boisvert testified that her
family loved the defendant, that he always was welcome
in her home and that she trusted him with her children.
Mary Sweet McKeown, Kenneth Sweet’s mother, testi-
fied that the defendant visited her home a few times a

. month, that he stayed overnight sometimes and that
she would wash his clothes for him. McKeown stated
that the defendant was like a second son to her, that
she trusted him and that she had no concerns about
him. Daisy DeJesus, the mother of another high school
friend of the defendant, testified that the defendant was
welcome at her home, that he ate meals there and that

po 169
—

he addressed her as a second mother. DeJesus stated
that she was there for the defendant, that she showed
him affection and that he seemed like a happy kid.

The defendant demonstrated that he had been a
decent student with no disciplinary problems. He was
admitted to the culinary arts program at Warren F.
Kaynor Regional Vocational-Technical School (Kaynor)
after being highly recommended on the basis of his
good middle school grades, a strong interview and other
considerations. While attending Kaynor, the defendant
maintained an average class rank, and he graduated in
1996 in the middle of his class. In his senior year, he
was accepted into a culinary school in South Carolina,
but ultimately did not attend. Testimony from the defen-
dant’s parents suggested that one or both of them had
failed to complete paperwork necessary for him to
receive financial aid. Following graduation, instead of
attending culinary school, the defendant joined the
Marine Corps. While in the Marines, the defendant com-
pleted boot camp and infantry training, and received a
certificate of appreciation for service he had performed
as a recruit religious lay reader. During the additional,
highly rigorous training that followed, the defendant
became demoralized and caused himself to be dis-
charged from service, apparently by eating marijuana
and subsequently failing a drug test.

Evidence was presented about hazing activities, some
of asexual nature, to which the defendant, and approxi-
mately five to seven other classmates, were subjected
in their sophomore year at Kaynor. Senior classmates,
typically within the confines of a locker room, engaged
in activities such as throwing the younger boys into
lockers, pulling their pants down and “goos[ing]” them.
At times, an upperclassman would shove a younger
boy’s face into the upperclassman’s crotch, or the
upperclassman would sit on the younger boy’s face or
on his chest facing his head, when the upperclassman

170 Po

either was clothed or undressed with his private parts
exposed. There were rumors that the defendant had
been a victim of sexual assault. Although the younger
boys complained, their teacher failed to address the
matter. Eventually, after an investigation by police and
school officials, the upperclassmen were suspended
and the teacher resigned, but no criminal charges were
brought. With the help of his father, the defendant par-
ticipated in a civil action against Kaynor, which ulti-
mately was settled. The defendant received about $7500
as a settlement payment, which he kept and spent
himself.

The defendant introduced evidence showing that he
had been employed consistently for many years, begin-
ning when he was in middle school. He had worked at.
a video store, several restaurants and a bakery, for the
local newspaper and as a telemarketer. At the video
store, he was trusted and given a lot of responsibility.
When he returned home after being discharged from
the Marine Corps, he immediately secured employment,
through a temporary agency.

Finally, the defendant presented the expert testimony
of James Garbarino, a developmental psychologist who
specializes in childhood and adolescence, for the stated
purpose of providing context to the panel for its evalua-
tion of the other evidence offered in mitigation. Garbar-
ino testified that the years encompassing adolescence
are not subject to fixed definition, and that brain matu-
ration typically continues into the early twenties. He
opined that, during adolescence, a person is more prone
to impulsive acts. Garbarino also spoke of the impor-
tance of adults, particularly parents, being present in
a child’s life to teach and influence moral behavior, and
about the negative effects of abuse and neglect on a
child’s development. He explained how shame could
lead to rage, possibly resulting in violent responses to
relatively minor problems. Garbarino also testified that

Pe 7
{Le

chronic trauma or assaults could lead to “emotional
numbing” as an adaptation, making a person appear
cold and emotionless. Additionally, he discussed the
potential outcomes of “toxic environment{s],” which
could be physical or social, and opined that televised
violence could affect a child’s aggressive behavior.
Finally, Garbarino explained how the path of a particu-
Jar individual’s development is determined both by the
various risk factors to which he is exposed and the
individual’s personal characteristics, in particular his
resilience. He added that a child’s having at least one -
person in his life who is “crazy about” him can add to
the child’s resilience.

To rebut the defendant’s case in mitigation, the state
relied on its cross-examination of defense witnesses.
With regard to the condition of the defendant’s home,
the state’s attorney established that, despite the deplor-
able state of the property, the defendant’s family mem-
bers lived there for years, both before and after his
arrest, and essentially chose to live that way. Several
witnesses confirmed that, although they were aware
that children lived in the house they considered unin-
habitable, they never thought to report the situation to
the department of children and families.

The defendant's family members verified that their
house did not always appear as it did at the time of the
defendant's arrest. Rather, prior to the parents’ divorce,
it was well kept and clean. Additionally, the house was
located in a nice neighborhood with many other chil-
dren and a park. Prior to the divorce, the family cele-
brated holidays together, attended church and went on
camping trips. Moffatt testified that, after the divorce,
there was no money available for home repairs, but
that her children were her number one concern, she
tried to maintain a stable home for them and she sacri-
ficed herself for them. Although she often was absent,
no physical harm to the children ever resulted.

72 Pe
Ld

According to Moffatt, the children were fed, clothed
and received presents at holidays, and they attended
school and were told they were loved. Nobody ever
complained about the children to Moffatt or told her
that she had to take better care of them. Moffatt testified
that she expressed her love for her children and was
physically affectionate with them.

Peter Rizzo testified that he never abused his chil-
dren, physically or psychologically, and that he loved
them very much. He stated that, during his marriage to
Moffatt, the house was neat and the children were
happy and wanted for nothing. Following the divorce,
he supported the children as best he could, and they
always had health insurance. Peter Rizzo testified that
he has never stopped loving the defendant and has
always been in contact with him.

Although both Chelsea Rizzo and Brandon Rizzo
found deficiencies in their upbringing, they neverthe-
less agreed that their parents loved them. Both of them
confirmed that, despite their troubled and neglectful
childhood experience, they had completed their high
school educations, had never been arrested and had
maintained steady employment. Brandon Rizzo testified
that, although he did not feel close to his parents when
growing up, they were available to give him advice if
he wanted it.

When cross-examining Garbarino, the state’s attor-
ney elicited that Garbarino had not interviewed or eval-
uated the defendant, nor had he prepared a report
specific to the facts of this case. Particularly, Garbarino
agreed that he knew “very little” about the case and
had read no reports about it other than “one very brief
summary ... .” During his questioning of Garbarino,
the state’s attorney effectively highlighted that many of
the risk factors or characteristics of troubled youth
about which Garbarino generally had spoken did not

Po 173
Dee

apply to the defendant. Specifically, the defendant was
academically average, had no prior arrests and no
apparent neurological problems and was not involved
in a gang. Moreover, there was no indication that the
defendant had been physically abused, and neither he
nor his family members had issues with criminal vio-
lence, drugs or alcohol.

After our careful review of the evidence presented
by the defendant in support of mitigation, we disagree
that, as to each proposed individual factor, the evi-
dence, viewed within the context of all of the facts
and circumstances of the case, “was so clear and so
compelling that the [panel], in the exercise of reasoned
judgment, could not have rejected it”; (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) State v. Breton, supra, 264 Conn.
367; or that the evidence necessarily “compel[led] a
finding that [the established] facts extenuate[d] or
reduce[d] the degree of [the defendant’s] culpability or
blame for the offense or . . . otherwise constitute[d]
abasis for a sentence less than death.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 379. The panel reasonably
could have concluded that the defendant’s childhood,
although severely lacking in some respects, was posi-
tive in others. The panel might have reasoned that, prior
to his parents’ divorce, the defendant’s home life was
fairly normal, despite his parents’ unhappiness.
Although following the divorce, parental presence and
involvement in the defendant’s life clearly was deficient,

In Rizzo, the penalty phase was tried to a jury, and the jury did not
specify which of the proposed nonstatutory mitigating factors it had found
proven. Consequently, in discussing the mitigating factors, we allowed that
the jury reasonably could have found any of the proposed factors proven
and, therefore, we drew all inferences in the defendant's favor when we
outlined the evidence presented and facts potentially found. State v. Rizzo,
supra, 266 Conn. 192-201 and 193 n.16. Here, because it is clear that the
panel found only the cumulative factor proven, we view the evidence with
an eye toward sustaining the panel’s determinations unless they are unrea-
sonable. State v. Breton, supra, 264 Conn, 866-67.

174 Po
Le

the defendant was able to develop close relationships
with other adults and peers who loved and supported
him and welcomed him into their homes. The panel
might also have credited the testimony of the defen-
dant’s family that the parents, although clearly neglect-
ful, nevertheless loved their children. As we previously
have explained, “it is not inconsistent or arbitrary for
asentencer to acknowledge, and even to have compas-
sion for, a defendant's past suffering and, nevertheless,
to conclude that that suffering does not mitigate the
commission of a horrific offense. . . . Put another
way, in considering whether certain proved facts are
mitigating, the pertinent question is not whether the
defendant has established some general ground for sym-
pathy, but whether he has established a reason to hold
him less than fully responsible for the conduct with
which he is charged.” (Citation omitted.) Id. In short,
proven facts such as childhood abuse and/or neglect,
or divorced and/or otherwise struggling parents, do not
invariably result in proven mitigating factors. See, e.g.,
id., 340-43, 371-73, 379.

Additionally, the panel reasonably could have found
uncompelling the argument that the defendant’s youth,
and the traumatizing aspects of it, were mitigating in
nature in light of the substantial achievements the
defendant was able to realize despite his tender age
and unfortunate circumstances. Specifically, the panel
might have questioned how a person could possess the
maturity and discipline to complete high school and
military training, to maintain several years of steady
employment; see footnote 13 of this opinion; and to
refrain from abusing drugs or alcohol, but nevertheless
lack the awareness and self-control that would have
prevented him from murdering an innocent child with-
out reason or provocation.”

® The panel also might have questioned the defendant's suggestion that
his murdering the victim was an impulsive “behavioral aberration”; see
footnote 65 of this opinion; in light of a statement he made to a television

po 175
—

Moreover, the panel reasonably could have con-
cluded that the testimony of Garbarino was of limited
value in establishing mitigation. Because Garbarino had
not interviewed or evaluated the defendant, and had
only slight familiarity with the facts of the case, he
necessarily spoke in generalities. Compare, e.g., State
v. Carrasquillo, 290 Conn. 209, 214-15, 962 A.2d 772
(2009) (defendant adduced psychiatric testimony
regarding development of adolescent brain generally
and defendant’s cognitive development in particular,
after examining defendant on three occasions). Accord-
ingly, the panel might have reasoned that the defen-
dant’s claims regarding his emotional state and the
causes of his criminal behavior simply were unproven.
Additionally, any mitigating value that the panel might
have assigned to the defendant’s cooperation with the
police could have been undercut by its timing, in that
the defendant initially denied any knowledge of the
victim’s murder and began cooperating only after he
was confronted with powerful evidence of his guilt.
Similarly, it would not be unreasonable for the panel
to have concluded that the defendant’s expression of
remorse several years after his arrest rang hollow when
viewed in conjunction with statements he made shortly
after murdering the victim.”

reporter during a jailhouse interview conducted by telephone in April, 2000.
The taped statement was introduced into evidence as part of the state’s
case to prove the aggravating factor. In the course of the interview, the
defendant stated: “I had planned to kill someone back when I was [about]
fourteen [years old], and it went all through my teens, and there [were]
certain kids I'd pick out in the neighborhood. And I'd say, you know, that’s
the perfect victim. I watch{ed] from my bedroom window. And I could time
it when they're going by, when there's nobody around.” The defendant
explained further: “I wanted to Kill all through the teenage years, being
obsessed with all these people that did it and got away [with it] and these
crazy ways that they did it.”

™ There was evidence in the record of the defendant's eventual remorse,
specifically, his April, 2000 interview with a television reporter, which was
introduced as part of the state's case. In that interview, the defendant stated
that remorse recently had started to set in after he had “met somebody”
and, perhaps because of experiencing love, he had begun to “have feelings

176 Po
a

“(T]he sentencer, in determining whether a proposed,
factually proven mitigating factor is actually mitigating
in nature, in light of all the facts and circumstances of
the case, must make a value judgment about that factor
in light of those facts and circumstances.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rizzo, supra, 266
Conn. 295. In the present matter, the mitigating evi-
dence submitted by the defendant was not so clear and
compelling that the panel could not reasonably have
determined that, when considered as discrete, individ-
ual factors, it was not mitigating in nature. Conse-
quently, we must defer to the panel’s value judgment.
We conclude that the panel's finding of a single cumula-
tive mitigating factor, and its rejection of the remaining

back.” According to the defendant, he was “sincerely sorry about killing
[the victim] . . . .” Moreover, he expressed empathy for the victim's family,
imagining what it would feel like if the victim were his brother.

The panel reasonably could have found that the defendant's statements of
remorse in 2000 lacked mitigating quality in light of their belated expression,
particularly when contrasted against other words of the defendant, written
shortly after the commission of his crime, that charitably can be described as
boastful, callous and lacking in remorse. On October 10, 1997, the defendant
wrote to John Fleischer, a friend he had made while undergoing traitiing
in the Marine Corps. Like the interview with the television reporter, that
letter was introduced into evidence as part of the state's case. The letter
stated in relevant part: “Well [let's] just say, you might be reading about me
one day. Just add me on to your long’ list of famous killers, like Jeffrey
Dahmer, John Gacy, Henry Lucas, and so on.

“Yes, from the news article [eJnclosed [you'll have] learned, I've been
arrested for murdering a [thirteen year] old boy. I beat the backside of his
skull in with a sledgehammer in my backyard and dropped his body on a
side road [with] his head wrapped in a plastic bag. So way back in July,
when me you Jones and Sims talked about the truth if we could actually
dll another person? Well I did. That Imocks off number two on my goal list!

“{ probably [won't] go to trial until early [1999] maybe late [1998]. But I
will keep you informed if you continue to write me. I suppose you can let
everyone know, [there's] no secret. If I can get my hands on a better article,
Til mail it to you. You [should've] seen it, I was on the entire front page of
my paper and many [other] papers and all over the news! I am sorry for
what I've done, because my life is now over, [I'm] either facing life in prison
with no [parole] or the death sentence, which in [Connecticut] is lethal
injection. Anyway, now that my life is through, [how's] yours doing?”

Pe rr
|

proposed individual mitigating factors, was not unrea-
sonable or otherwise improper.

Vil

The defendant claims next that the panel improperly
determined that the proven aggravating factor out-
weighed the proven mitigating factor.” According to
the defendant, the panel’s determination was not a rea-
soned moral judgment based on the evidence, and the
sentence of death that the panel imposed was excessive
and disproportionate. The state argues alternatively
that the defendant’s claim is‘not reviewable or, even if it
is, the panel reasonably concluded that the aggravating
factor outweighed the mitigating factor. We agree with
the state that the panel’s determination was reasonable.

Pursuant to our death penalty scheme, if the state
proves the existence of one or more aggravating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant fails to
prove any statutory mitigating factors but proves one
or more nonstatutory mitigating factors by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the sentencer then weighs the
established aggravating factor or factors against the
established nonstatutory mitigating factor or factors.
If the sentencer finds that the nonstatutory mitigating
factor or factors are outweighed by the aggravating
factor or factors, the defendant shall be sentenced to
death. General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a (f).
Although the statutory language does not supply a stan-
dard for the sentencer to employ in making the weighing
determination, we concluded in Rizzo that the sen-
tencer must be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the aggravating factor or factors outweigh, by any

In the course of his argument on this claim, the defendant repeatedly

-_ refers to “the mitigating factors,” as if the panel had found multiple proposed

factors both proven factually and mitigating in nature. As explained in part
VI of this opinion, the panel found proven the cumulative mitigating factor
only, and we have concluded that that finding was not improper.

178 Po

degree or amount, the nonstatutory mitigating factor
or factors. State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. 224-25.
We required the exacting, beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, in part, to ensure reliability and certainty in
the ultimate decision-making process. Id., 237. We
acknowledged the reality that, once a sentencer arrives
at the decision that death is the appropriate penalty,
“that decision would be, for all practical purposes, unre-
viewable on appeal save for evidentiary insufficiency
of the aggravating factor... .”" Id.

In State v. Courchesne, supra, 296 Conn. 784, we
assumed, without deciding, that a claim of improper
weighing was reviewable, and we concluded, on the
basis of the evidence presented, that the jury reasonably
could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
proven aggravating factor outweighed the alleged non-
statutory mitigating factors.“ We conclude similarly
today.

The evidence established, and the panel found, that
the defendant murdered the thirteen year old victim in
a cruel, heinous and depraved manner. The defendant
lured the victim into a secluded backyard under the
pretense of looking for snakes, then murdered the vic-
tim by beating him in the head repeatedly with a sledge-
hammer. The defendant’s conduct was intentional, and
the victim survived long enough to experience extreme

® As we concluded in part IV of this opinion, there was sufficient evidence
to support the panel's finding of the cruel, heinous and depraved aggravating
factor. Moreover, as we concluded in part VI of this opinion, the panel’s
findings as to mitigation were not improper. To the extent the defendant,
in arguing this issue, has repeated his attacks on the propriety of the panel’s
findings on aggravation and mitigation, we will not respond to those
attacks anew.

™ Because the penalty phase in Courchesne was tried to a jury, there were
no findings, as there are in the present case, as to the specific mitigating
factor or factors found. Accordingly, we evaluated the defendant's claim .
with reference to all of the mitigating factors alleged. State v. Courchesne,
supra, 296 Conn. 629.

po 179
—

physical and psychological pain and suffering beyond
that which was necessary to cause his death, as evi-
denced by his attempt to protect himself and his request.
for the defendant to stop hitting him. The defendant’s
choice and use of a sledgehammer as his murder
weapon, his postarrest statements and his lack of
remorse established that he was callous and indifferent
to the victim’s pain and suffering. The defendant pre-
sented substantial constitutionally relevant mitigating
evidence regarding his relative youth, his troubled
upbringing and his positive character traits, and he
argued that those circumstances extenuated or reduced
his culpability and constituted a basis for a sentence
less than death. The panel concluded that this evidence,
viewed cumulatively, was mitigating in nature. The
panel acknowledged the high level of certainty applica-
ble to the task of weighing mitigating and aggravating
factors, pursuant to our decision in Rizzo, and deter-
mined that the proven aggravator was a weightier sen-
tencing consideration than the proven mitigator.
Considering all of the foregoing, we are unable to con-
clude that the defendant’s age,” troubled background

*S In advancing this claim, the defendant emphasizes the fact that he was
Just shy of his nineteenth birthday when he murdered the victim. He argues
that that factor, as a general matter, strongly diminishes culpability and,
therefore, carries heavy weight to offset the aggravating factor and, further,
renders the punishment of death disproportionate. Although the defendant's
age undoubtedly was a consideration; see, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 US.
350, 367, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 125 L. Ed. 2d 290 (“[tJhere is no dispute that a
defendant’s youth is a relevant mitigating circumstance”), reh. denied, 509
US. 941, 1148. Ct. 15, 125 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1993); the specific weight to assign
to it in the weighing process was a matter for the panel to decide in its
discretion, just as with any other nonstatutory mitigating factor. As the
defendant acknowledges, statutory and constitutional eligibility for the death
penalty begins at age eighteen. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-
46a (h) (1); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 125 8. Ct. 1183,
161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). Consequently, the cases from which he quotes that
concer juveniles are inapposite. See Roper v. Simmons, supra, 568-69; see
also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16, 102 S. Ot. 869, 71 L. Ed.
2d 1 (1982). To the extent that the defendant suggests the line between
eligibility for, and categorical exclusion from, capital punishment has been
drawn in the wrong place, that argument is best directed at the legislature.

180

and other aspects of his person were of such a compel-
ling character that the panel could not have reasonably
concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they were
outweighed, by any amount or degree, by the cruelty,
heinousness and depravity of the defendant’s crime.”
Accordingly, the defendant’s seventh claim is not
availing.
VII

The defendant argues next that his death sentence
was imposed arbitrarily and capriciously in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-46b (b) (1)” and the eighth
amendment and contrary to federal guarantees of due
process and equal protection because there are no uni-
form standards in Connecticut guiding prosecutors’
decisions to seek the death penalty.” According to the

See State v. Allen, 289 Conn. 550, 585, 958 A.2d 1214 (2008) (declining to
strike, as violative of eighth amendment, statute mandating life imprison-
ment without possibility of release for those who commit capital felonies
while under age eighteen because “[tJhe delineation between juveniles and
adults for purposes of prosecution and punishmentis a public policy determi-
nation reserved to the legislative branch of government, except where consti-
tutional principles apply”); State v. Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281, 310, 920
A.2d 278 (2007) (declining to hold that sixteen year old was entitled to jury
instruction that would have directed jury to consider his age when evaluating
his defense of duress, with aim of accounting for differences in how adoles-
cents evaluate risks, because doing so “would usurp the legislature’s role
and require this court to vitiate what is an inherently legislative determina-
tion that sixteen year olds are to be treated like adults for purposes of
criminal liability”).

%® The defendant requests that this court consider extra-record social sci-
ence reference materials to evaluate the reasonableness of the panel's
weighing determination. For the reasons previously explained; see footnote
16 of this opinion; we cannot rely on evidence not introduced at trial to
second-guess the panel’s determination. Cf. State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn.
582, 588 n.4, 953 A.2d 630 (2008) (declining to consider similar materials,
first introduced on appeal, in deciding whether trial court abused discretion
when ordering defendant to register as sex offender).

™ General Statutes § 5a-46b (b) requires this court to review all death
sentences to determine whether they are “the product of passion, prejudice
or any other arbitrary factor... .”

The defendant also claims state constitutional violations, but the only
argument he provides in support of those claims is a conclusory reference
to Geisler analyses in different portions of his brief that are directed at

Po 181
a

defendant, due to prosecutors’ unbridled discretion and
disparate charging practices throughout the state, there
is a disproportionately greater likelihood of being sen-
tenced to death in the judicial district of Waterbury. He
observes that more of Connecticut's death row inmates
have been prosecuted in that judicial district than in
any of the others.” We disagree that the defendant has
established a constitutional violation, or that his sen-
tence otherwise was a product of passion, prejudice or
any other arbitrary factor.”

In advancing this claim, the defendant cites no
authority that directly supports it, and completely
ignores extensive federal and state jurisprudence that
rejects it. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 307,
311-12, 313-14 n.37, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262
(1987); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274, 96 S. Ct. 2950,
49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, supra, 428
US. 254; Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 198-99 and
n.50, 224-26; United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931,
982 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1094, 128 S.
Ct. 2902, 171 L. Ed. 2d 848 (2008); United States v.
Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 553 U.S. 1035, 128 S. Ct. 2424, 171 L. Ed. 2d 234
(2008); Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 963 (6th Cir.
2004), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. Bradshaw,
544 U.S. 1003, 125 S. Ct. 1939, 161 L. Ed. 2d 779 (2005);
Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1248 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1029, 116 S. Ct. 2574, 135 L. Ed. 2d
1090 (1996); Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134, 1144 (7th

different issues. Accordingly, we deem any state constitutional claim regard-
ing the present issue to be abandoned due to inadequate briefing.

® According to the defendant, at the time he was sentenced, six of Connect-
icut’s ten death row inmates had been prosecuted in the judicial district of
Waterbury and, at the time his brief was filed, six of thirteen.

® As part of this claim, the defendant also argues that his sentence was an
improper product of the presiding judge's bias regarding mitigating evidence.
Because we disagree that the defendant has established the factual predicate
of this argument; see part II of this opinion; we do not address it further.

182 Pe
Ld

Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 933, 115 S. Ct. 328, 130 L.
Ed. 2d 287 (1994); Hawkins v. Wong, United States
District Court, Docket No. CIV 8-96-1155 MCE EFB DP
(E.D. Cal. September 2, 2010); Duckett v. McDonough,
701 F. Sup. 2d 1245, 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Kerr v.
Thaler, United States District Court, Docket No. 4:06-
CV-372-Y (N.D. Tex. September 17, 2009); Moeller v.
Weber, 635 F. Sup. 2d 1036, 104445 (D.S.D. 2009);
Moreland v. Bradshaw, 635 F. Sup. 2d 680, 725-26 (S.D.
Ohio 2009); United States v. Tisdale, United States Dis-
trict Court, Docket No. 07-10142-05-JTM (D. Kan.
December 8, 2008); Hamilton v. Ayers, 458 F. Sup. 2d
1075, 1144-45 (E.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 583 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2009); Crowe v. Terry,
426 F. Sup. 2d 1310, 1855 (N.D. Ga. 2005), aff'd sub
nom. Crowe v. Hall, 490 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 553 U.S. 1007, 128 S. Ct. 2053, 170 L. Ed. 2d 798
(2008); Middleton v. Roper, United States District Court,
Docket No. 4:03CV543 CDP (E.D. Mo. September 21,
2005); Madrigal v. Bagley, 276 F. Sup. 2d 744, 805 (N.D.
Ohio 2003), aff'd, 413 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith
v. Anderson, 104 F. Sup. 2d 773, 846-47 (S.D. Ohio
2000), aff'd, Smith v. Mitchell, 348 F.3d 177 (6th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 841, 125 S. Ct. 278, 160 L.
Ed. 2d 65, reh. denied, 543 U.S. 1016, 125 S. Ct. 646,
160 L. Ed. 2d 488 (2004); United States v. Davis, 904
F. Sup. 554, 559-60 (E.D. La. 1995); United States v.
Cooper, 754 F. Sup. 617, 625 (N.D. Il. 1990); Phillips
v. State, 650 So. 3d 971, 1037-38 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010);
State v. Smith, 193 Ariz. 452, 463, 974 P.2d 431, cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 880, 120 S. Ct. 191, 145 L. Ed. 2d 161
(1999); Simpson v. State, 339 Ark. 467, 470-71, 6 S.W.3d
104 (1999); People v. Vines, 51 Cal. 4th 830, 889-90, 251
P.3d 943, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830 (2011); Dawson v. State,
581 A.2d 1078, 1099-1100 (Del. 1990), vacated on other
grounds, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 117 L. Ed. 2d
309 (1992); Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 874-76 (Fla.

Po 183

2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1183, 131 S. Ct. 1004, 178
L. Ed. 2d 835 (2011); Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335,
337, 687 S.E.2d 438 (2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 853,
18158. Ct. 112, 178 L. Ed. 2d 69 (2010); People v. Thomp-
son, 222 Tl. 2d 1, 54, 853 N.E.2d 378 (2006), cert. denied,
549 USS. 1254, 127 S. Ct. 1393, 167 L. Ed. 2d 163 (2007);
Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1258 (Ind. 1995);
Hunt v. Commonwealth, 304 S.W.3d 15, 55 (Ky. 2009),
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 882, 131 S. Ct. 203, 178 L. Ed. 2d
122 (2010); Johnson v. State, 333 S.W.3d 459, 471 (Mo.
2011); State v. Gales, 269 Neb. 443, 461-62, 694 N.W.2d
124, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 947, 126 S. Ct. 449, 163 L.
Ed. 2d 341 (2005); State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225,
250-57, 548 A.2d 939 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017,
109 S. Ct. 813, 102 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1989); State v. Clark,
128 N.M. 119, 142-48, 990 P.2d 793 (1999); State v. Bla-
keney, 352 N.C. 287, 312-18, 531 S.E.2d 799 (2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1117, 121 S. Ct. 868, 148 L. Ed. 2d 780
(2001); Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 392-93 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1993), aff'd, 512 U.S. 1, 114 8. Ct. 2004, 129
L. Ed. 2d 1 (1994); State v. Longo, 341 Or. 580, 602-603,
148 P.3d 892 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 835, 128 S.
Ct. 65, 169 L. Ed. 2d 53 (2007); Commonwealth v. Crews,
552 Pa. 659, 663-64, 717 A.2d 487 (1998); State v. Moeller,
supra, 616 N.W.2d 463; State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90,
154-55 (Tenn. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1156, 129 S.
Ct. 1677, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (2009); Whitaker v. State,
286 S.W.3d 355, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); State v.
Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 379 (Utah 2001), cert. denied, 534
US. 1018, 122 S. Ct. 542, 151 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2001); State
v. Harris, 106 Wn. 2d 784, 793-94, 725 P.2d 975 (1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 1592, 94 L. Ed. 2d
781 (1987).

These cases recognize, in sum, that prosecutorial dis-
cretion is an essential component of the criminal justice
system in general, and of a constitutional death penalty
system in particular, and it often results in leniency.
Additionally, prosecutorial discretion is not truly unbri-

184 Pe
Ld

dled or standardless; rather, it is constrained by statutes
defining capital crimes and aggravating and mitigating
factors, our highly detailed capital punishment jurispru-
dence, ethical codes governing charging decisions and
the strength of the evidence available in any given case
to support a potential capital prosecution. Finally, the
trial process and mandatory appellate review provide
further checks against potentially improper pursuit and
imposition of the death penalty. Because the defen-
dant’s claim is contradicted by overwhelming authority
with sound reasoning, we are compelled to reject it.

x

The defendant’s final claim is that the death penalty,
in general, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the state constitution. Although we pre-
viously have rejected this claim; see State v. Ross, supra,
230 Conn. 249-52; see also State v. Webb, supra, 238
Conn. 406; the defendant requests that we reconsider
it in light of subsequent developments in law and pol-
icy.*! We accept the defendant’s invitation to revisit this
issue, but again disagree that the death penalty violates
the state constitution.”

‘In advancing this claim, the defendant cites to extra-record reference
materials as evidence of contemporary societal norms to advocate for a
new constitutional rule rather than, as in parts I, IV and VII of his brief, to
attempt to readjudicate this particular case on appeal. See footnotes 16, 63
and 76 of this opinion. We have in the past permitted citation to such
evidence in this context. See Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education
Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 310-11 n.56, 990 A.2d 206 (2010)
(considering scientific studies in context of sixth Geisler factor, although
not part of trial court record); see also Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 122,
376 A.2d 1085 (1977) (egislative facts, that is, facts that “help determine
the content of law and policy,” are subject to judicial notice); E. Margolis,
“Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate
Briefs,” 34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 214 (2000) (opining that it is appropriate to intro-
duce nonlegal material in support of policy arguments at appellate stage
of litigation).

© The defendant also argues that the death penalty, per se, constitutes a
violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution. Clearly,
we are bound by precedents of the United States Supreme Court holding
to the contrary. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 168-87. It is the

Po 185
|

In Ross, the defendant, like the defendant here, raised
a general challenge pursuant to the state constitution
to the validity of the death penalty under any and all
circumstances. After acknowledging that article first,
§§ 8 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut protects
against cruel and unusual punishment independently
of the eighth amendment to the United States constitu-
tion, we conducted an analysis pursuant to the six factor
framework of State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. 684-86,
to determine whether the death penalty, per se, was
offensive to those state constitutional provisions. We
concluded that it was not.” State v. Ross, supra, 230
Conn. 249-52.

We initially determined that five of the Geisler fac-
tors—(1) the text of the constitutional provisions; (2)
related Connecticut precedents; (3) persuasive federal
precedents; (4) persuasive precedents of other state
courts; and (5) historical insights into the intent of our
constitutional forbears—did not support the defen-
dant’s claim that the death penalty should be declared
unconstitutionally unacceptable on its face. Id., 249. We
explained: “In article first, § 8, and article first, § 19, our
state constitution makes repeated textual references to
capital offenses and thus expressly sustains the consti-
tutional validity of such a penalty in appropriate circum-
stances. Connecticut case law has recognized the facial
constitutionality of the death penalty under the eighth
and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution.
See, e.g., State v. Davis, 158 Conn. 341, 358, 260 A.2d
587 (1969), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
[Davis v. Connecticut] 408 U.S. 935, 92 S. Ct. 2856, 33

prerogative of that court alone to overrule its own precedents, even if
subsequent decisions or developments may appear to have significantly
undermined the rationale for an earlier holding. See United States v. Hatter,
582 U.S. 557, 567, 121 S. Ct. 1782, 149 L. Ed. 2d $20 (2001).

® In State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 183, 286, four members of a five judge
panel voted to sustain the constitutionality of the death penalty, with Justice
Berdon in dissent.

186 Po
—

L. Ed. 2d 750 (1972). Federal constitutional law does
not forbid such a statute outright. Gregg v. Georgia,
supra, 428 U.S. 153. Courts in the overwhelming major-
ity of our sister states have rejected facial challenges
to the death penalty under their state constitutions.
Finally, Connecticut’s history has included a death pen-
alty since 1650, when it was incorporated into Ludlow’s
Code . . . and such a penalty was considered constitu-
tional at the time of the adoption of the constitution
of 1818.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Ross, supra, 230
Conn. 249-50.

We thereafter considered the sixth Geisler factor,
contemporary understandings of applicable economic
and sociological norms, and we disagreed with the
defendant’s argument “that the death penalty is so
inherently cruel and so Jacking in moral and sociological
justification that it is unconstitutional on its face

because it is fundamentally offensive to evolving stan-
dards of human decency.” Id., 251. We reasoned that
community standards of acceptable legislative policy
choices necessarily were reflected in our constitutional
text, our history and the teachings of the jurisprudence
of other state and federal courts. Id. We found particu-
larly compelling the fact that, in the ten years following
the United States Supreme Court’s invalidation of all
of the states’ capital punishment schemes due to their
failure to channel properly the sentencer’s discretion,
thirty-seven states had passed new death penalty legis-
lation designed to comply with the court’s constitu-
tional directives. Id. We concluded that, given that
circumstance, “the probability that the legislature of
each state accurately reflects its community’s standards
approaches certainty.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id.

We then emphasized that, although the death penalty
itself is not cruel and unusual punishment contrary to
the state constitution, the imposition of the penalty

Po 187

must conform to constitutional constraints. Specifi-
cally, we held that “the due process clauses of our state
constitution incorporate the principles underlying a
constitutionally permissible death penalty statute that
the United States Supreme Court has articulated in [its
capital punishment jurisprudence] . . . . These princi-
ples require, as a constitutional minimum, that a death
penalty statute, on the one hand, must channel the
discretion of the sentencing judge or jury so as to assure
that the death penalty is being imposed consistently
and reliably and, on the other hand, must permit the
sentencing judge or jury to consider, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of the individual defendant’s charac-
ter or record as well as the circumstances of the particu-
lar offense.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 252. We concluded
that “[o]ur death penalty statute, § 53a-46a, meets these
minimum state constitutional law requirements.” Id.

Two years later, in State v. Webb, supra, 238 Conn.
406, an en banc panel comprised entirely of members
of this court™ reaffirmed the holding of Ross recited
herein,® and we since have repeated the holding on
several occasions without elaboration. See State v.
Colon, supra, 272 Conn. 382-83; State v. Breton, supra,
264 Conn. 417-18; State v. Reynolds, supra, 264 Conn.
236-87; State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. 496-97. The
defendant asks that we reconsider these holdings in
light of the current legal and sociological landscape.

We agree with the defendant that, in determining
whether a particular punishment is cruel and unusual
in violation of constitutional standards, we must “look
beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards

In contrast, in State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 183, the five judge panel
that decided the appeal had been comprised of three members of this court
and two Appellate Court judges sitting by designation.

% Tn State v. Webb, supra, 238 Conn, 551, the vote sustaining the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty was four to three, with Justices Berdon, Norcott
and Katz in dissent.

188 Po
—

of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
. .. This is because [t]he standard of extreme cruelty
is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a
moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same,
but its applicability must change as the basic mores of
society change.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58,
180 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010). Thus, it is
appropriate to revisit our earlier holdings to examine
what since has transpired. In so doing, however, we
remain cognizant that our constitution contains explicit
references to capital punishment; see Conn. Const., art.
I, §§ 8 and 19; and, therefore, “expressly sustains the
constitutional validity of such a penalty in appropriate
circumstances.” State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 249-50.
The defendant's claim must be evaluated against this
clear textual backdrop.

We first consider developments in the capital punish-
ment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court. In the years since Ross and Webb were decided,
the United States Supreme Court has held that the death
penalty is constitutionally impermissible for nonhomi-
cide crimes against individuals; see Kennedy v. Lowisi-
ana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 171 L. Ed. 2d
525 (2008); and it has adopted categorical rules prohib-
iting the imposition of the death penalty for defendants
who committed their crimes prior to the age of eighteen;
see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-71, 125 S.
Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005); or whose intellectual
functioning is in a low range. See Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 318-21, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335
(2002). It remains settled federal law, however, that the

% We undertake, in essence, a partial Geisler analysis regarding what has
occurred since 1994, because our constitutional text and history remain the
same, and this court repeatedly has sustained the constitutionality of the
death penalty generally and our death penalty statutes in particular. Accord-
ingly, our focus is on recent federal and state jurisprudence and contempo-
rary economic and sociological norms.

P| 189

death penalty in general is constitutionally permissible.
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47, 61, 62 n.7, 128 S. Ct. 1520,
170 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2008); see also Gregg v. Georgia,
supra, 428 U.S. 177-78.

Notably, these federal constitutional developments
did not change the law in Connecticut, because our
legislature had acted ahead of the United States
Supreme Court to prohibit executions of persons with
mental retardation. See General Statutes § 53a-46a (h)
(2), as amended by Public Acts 2001, No. 01-151, § 2.
Moreover, from the time they were adopted in 1973,
our modern death penalty statutes barred executions
of those who committed their capital crimes when they
were under eighteen years old; see Public Acts 1973,
No. 73-187, § 4; and did not authorize the death penalty
for any crime not involving the death of a victim.’ See
Public Act 73-137, § 3. We are not convinced, therefore,
that the recent jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court suggests that Connecticut, by retaining
the death penalty, is out of step with national societal
mores. To the contrary, over time, the national land-
scape has become more closely aligned with Connecti-
cut. Additionally, we do not discern a fundamental
disapproval of the death penalty in general from that
court’s ongoing shaping of the categories of offenses
or offenders to which it should apply. Rather, such
refinements are consistent with the long-standing prin-
ciple espoused by the United States Supreme Court that
society’s ultimate sanction ought to be reserved for the
most egregious and culpable of offenders.

5 When originally enacted, § 68a-54b authorized a.capital felony conviction
for a nonhomicide offense that, nevertheless, contributed to the death of a
person, See Public Act 73-187, § 3 (6) (identifying as capital felony illegal
sale, for economic gain, of cocaine, heroin or methadone to person who
dies as direct result of use of such cocaine, heroin or methadone). This
provision was eliminated in 2001. See Public Act 01-151, § 3. Since then,
Connecticut's statutorily enumerated capital felonies have included only
various types of murders.

190 Po
Ll

We turn to our sister states. It is true that, in the
intervening years since our decisions in Ross and Webb,
the number of states in which the death penalty is
an available punishment has declined slightly from the
thirty-seven that authorized it in 1994. Specifically, the
legislatures of three states—lIllinois, New Jersey and
New Mexico—have voted to abolish the death penalty.®
Although it is significant that these states have chosen.
to abandon capital punishment, the decision to do so
in each instance was based on a variety of public policy
determinations made by legislators and governors, and
did not result from the constitutional command of a
court. See, e.g., State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 167-97,
524 A.2d 188 (1987) (rejecting claim that death penalty
per se was violative of state constitution); State v. Ron-
deau, 89 N.M. 408, 412, 553 P.2d 688 (1976) (same).

More importantly, at this point in time, astrong major-
ity of jurisdictions—thirty-four states, the federal gov-
ernment and the military—still authorize the death
penalty, while only sixteen states do not. See Death
Penalty Information Center, “Facts about the Death
Penalty,” (updated November 17, 2011), p. 1, available
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/Fact
Sheet.pdf (last visited November 18, 2011) (copy con-
tained in the file of this case in the Supreme Court

® Moreover, in People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 120, 817 N.E.2d 841, 783
N.Y.S.2d 485 (2004), the New York Court of Appeals held that a jury deadlock
instruction prescribed by New York’s death penalty statute violated that
state’s constitution. Because state legislators have not cured the statutory
defect, New York effectively has been without a death penalty since 2004.

Notably, the New Mexico ban is prospective only and no clemency has
been granted to convicted capital offenders, leaving that state's existing
death row intact. Given that circumstance, itis unlikely that the New Mexico
legislature was convinced that the death penalty is intolerable under any
and all circumstances. See Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 586 U.S. 342 (Scalia,
J, dissenting) (legislation that abolished death penalty for persons with
mental retardation prospectively only “is not a statement of absolute moral
repugnance, but one of current: preference between two [constitutionally]
tolerable approaches”).

Po 191
—

clerk’s office). Simply put, the recent actions of a hand-
ful of states cannot reasonably be characterized as the
type of “dramatic shift in the state legislative land-
scape”; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 310; that
would call our decisions in Ross and Webb into question.
Compare id., 318-15 (holding unconstitutional execu-
tions of persons with mental retardation, when thirty
states had disallowed them); Kennedy v. Louisiana,
supra, 554 U.S. 423 (same, for crime of child rape, when.
forty-four states had disallowed them); Roper v. Sim-
mons, supra, 543 U.S. 564-65 (same, as to executions
of juveniles, when thirty states, including five over prior
fifteen years, had disallowed them); Enmund v. Flor-
ida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-92, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d.
1140 (1982) (same, as to executions of codefendants
who did not kill, attempt to kill or intend to kill, when
forty-two states had disallowed them); Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 53 L. Ed. 2d
982 (1977) (same, for rape of adult woman, where forty-
nine jurisdictions had disallowed them).

Although “the clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
enacted by the country’s legislatures”; (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S.
312; in assessing whether a punishment is constitution-
ally sound, it also is appropriate for us to consider what
is occurring in actual practice. For example, in Graham
v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. 64, in holding that the sen-
tence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole was cruel and unusual punishment for a juvenile
who had committed a nonhomicide offense, the United
States Supreme Court considered, inter alia, that nation-
wide, only 123 people were serving such sentences in
only eleven jurisdictions. In contrast, as to the death
penalty generally, as of January 1, 2011, there were 3251
inmates held on death row nationwide by thirty-six

192 Po
—

states,” the federal government and the military. See
Death Penalty Information Center, “Facts about the
Death Penalty,” supra, p. 2. Unlike the United States
Supreme Court in Graham, therefore, we cannot con-
clude that the punishment of death has become a rarity
imposed only in limited portions of the nation.

The defendant directs us to the fact that, despite the
large number of inmates on death row, the number of
executions actually carried out over the past decade
generally has declined gradually, hitting a low point in
2008 before rising again.® The numbers remain substan-
tially higher, however, than those in the ten years pre-
ceding our decision in Ross.°' In addition, the decrease
in 2007 and 2008 likely was attributable in part to mora-
toria imposed in 2007 following the United States
Supreme Court’s grant of certification in Baze v. Rees,
supra, 553 U.S. 41, an appeal in which it was argued,
unsuccessfully, that the risk of error in administration
of lethal injection, the method of execution utilized by
most death penalty states, rendered that form of capital
punishment unconstitutional. Also a factor impeding
executions in recent years is a shortage of thiopental
sodium, which is used in lethal injections, as well as

® This statistic includes two inmates in New Mexico who remain on death
row despite that state’s repeal of the death penalty because the repeal, by
its terms, is prospective only. It also includes sixteen Ilinois inmates who
were on death row in January of 2011, but were subsequently granted
clemency by that state’s governor when the repeal of the death penalty in
Ilinois took effect on July 1, 2011, bringing the number of inmates held on
death row nationwide to 3235 in thirty-five states.

© The numbers of executions carried out, nationwide, over the previous
sixteen years, are as follows: 1994-31; 1995-56; 1996-45; 1997-74; 1998-68;
1999-98; 2000-85; 2001-66; 2002-71; 2003-65; 2004-59; 2005-60; 2006-53;
2007-42; 2008-37; 2009-52; 2010-46. See Death Penalty Information Center,
“Facts about the Death Penalty,” supra, p. 1. As of October 21, 2011, 38
‘executions have taken place. See id.

*\'The numbers of executions carried out, nationwide, in the decade pre-
ceding Ross were, as follows: 1983-5; 1984-21; 1985-18; 1986-18; 1987-25;
1988-11; 1989-16; 1990-23; 1991-14; 1992-31; 1993-38. See Death Penalty
Information Center, “Facts about the Death Penalty,” supra, p. 1.

po 193
—

moratoria imposed in various states while new lethal
injection procedures are promulgated and challenged.
See Death Penalty Information Center, “Death Penalty
in Flux,” available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
death-penalty-flux (last visited November 18, 2011)
(copy contained in the file of this case in the Supreme
Court clerk’s office); Death Penalty Information Center,
“Lethal Injection,” (2011), available at http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-morato-
rium-executions-ends-after-supreme-court-decision
ast visited November 18, 2011) (copy contained in the
file of this case in the Supreme Court clerk’s office).
In light of the foregoing, we.are hesitant to assume, as
the defendant invites us to do, that declines in actual
execution rates are attributable to decreased public
support for the death penalty.

We recognize that imposition of new death sentences
also has declined substantially over the past decade,
from 224 in 2000 to 112 in 2010. Death Penalty Informa-
tion Center, “Facts about the Death Penalty,” supra, p.
3. Various reasons have been posited for the decline,
however, including: the high costs of the death penalty
at a time when state budgets are strained from a weak
economy; publicity about convictions overturned due
to DNA evidence; a significant drop in rates of violent
crime and murder; improved legal representation for
capital defendants, including the greater use of mitiga-
tion specialists; and the increasingly available option

® Moreover, although the pace of executions has slowed in recent years,
they still occur at a rate substantially higher than that typically considered
by the United States Supreme Court to evidence a dearth of public support
for a particular punishment. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Lowisiana, supra, 554
U.S. 438 (no executions of child rapists since 1964, or for any nonhomicide
offense since 1963); Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 564-65 (only three
executions of juvenile offenders in ten year period); Atiins v. Virginia,
supra, 586 U.S. 316 (only five executions of defendants with mental retarda-
tion in thirteen year period); Znmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. 794 (only
six executions of nontriggerman felony murderers between 1954 and 1982).

194 Po
—

for prosecutors to seek life sentences without the possi-
pility of parole.” Although some of these explanations
suggest declining public support for the death penalty
because it offends contemporary standards of decency
and morality, others decidedly do not. Because of the
ambiguity underlying the decline in new death senten-
ces, that circumstance does not provide compelling sup-
port for abandoning our decisions in Ross and Webb.

The defendant points to public opinion polls as sup-
port for his claim of waning societal support for the
death penalty. The most recent polling data indicate,
however, that public support for the death penalty in
Connecticut remains strong. According to a Quinnip-
iac University poll released in March, 2011, 67 percent of
Connecticut voters supported the death penalty, while
only 28 percent were opposed to it. D. Schwartz, Quin-

® See Death Penalty Information Center, “The Death Penalty in 2010: Year
End Report,” (December, 2010), available at http:/Avww.deathpenalty
info.org/documents/2010YearEnd-Final.pdf (last visited November 18, 2011)
(copy contained in the file of this case in the Supreme Court clerk’s office);
N. Lewis, “Death Sentences Decline, And Experts Offer Reasons,” N.Y.
‘Times, December 15, 2006, p. A28.

“Indeed, declining imposition of capital punishment may indicate that
the death penalty is being employed precisely as was intended, to punish
only the very worst of society’s criminals, and only after a vigorous legal
process has ensured that the defendant has been found guilty after a fair
trial with demanding procedural safeguards. As the United States Supreme
Court has observed, “the relative infrequency of jury verdicts imposing the
death sentence does not indicate rejection of capital punishment per se.
Rather, [it] . . . may well reflect the humane feeling that this most irrevoca-
ble of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.”
Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 182.

* The defendant filed his initial brief in this appeal in 2008, when support
for the penalty appeared somewhat weaker, and he referred to an earlier
Quinnipiac University poll reflecting that circumstance.

® The views of Connecticut residents are consistent with those held nation-
ally. A 2010 Gallup poll showed 64 percent of Americans in favor of the
death penalty and 29 percent in opposition to it. See Gallup, “In U.S., 64%
Support Death Penalty in Cases of Murder,” (November 8, 2010), available
at http://www. gallup.com/poll/144284/Support-Death-Penalty-Cases-
Murder.aspx (last visited November 18, 2011) (copy contained in the file of
this case in the Supreme Court clerk’s office).

Po 195
—

nipiac University Poll (March 10, 2011), available at
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/ct/
ct03102011.doc (last visited November 18, 2011) (copy
contained in the file of this case in the Supreme Court
clerk’s office). When asked to choose between alterna-
tive penalties for first degree murder, 48 percent opted
for the death penalty, while 43 percent chose life in
prison with no chance for parole. Id. On both measures,
the percentages favoring the death penalty have
increased each year since 2007. Id. Although we recog-
nize the weaknesses inherent in public opinion polls as
objective measures of the popular psyche, we mention
this data to refute the defendant’s contention that it
lends support to his constitutional claim.

The defendant also argues that this court should look
to practices in some other nations, or to a resolution
of the United Nations calling for the abolition of capital
punishment, to determine whether the death penalty
offends contemporary sociological norms in Connecti-
cut. In its eighth amendment jurisprudence, the United
States Supreme Court at times has referenced interna-
tional norms as support for its own determinations,
while at the same time making clear that the opinions
prevalent in other nations could never control over a
domestic legislative climate running decidedly counter
to such opinions. See Graham v. Florida, supra, 560
U.S. 80 (noting that punishment at issue had been
rejected in all other nations, but emphasizing that “[t]his
observation does not control our decision [and that]
judgments of other nations and the international com-
munity are not dispositive as to the meaning of the
[elighth [a]Jmendment”); Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543
US. 578 (“[t]he opinion of the world community [which
universally” had ceased to give official sanction to the

® Unlike the punishments at issue in Graham and Roper, capital punish-
ment in general has not lost the support of the entire world community.
According to Amnesty International, ninety-six countries have abolished the
death penalty for all crimes and nine have abolished it for all but “exceptional
crimes,” thirty-four countries retain the death penalty but have not executed

196 PT

juvenile death penalty], while not controlling our out-
come, does provide respected and significant confirma-
tion for our own conclusions” [emphasis added]).

In State v. Allen, 289 Conn. 550, 585, 958 A.2d 1214
(2008), we took a similar view of the relevance of inter-
national norms in a case involving a claim of an uncon-
stitutional sentence. In rejecting the defendant’s
argument that life in prison with no possibility of release
for a juvenile convicted of capital felony and murder
was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment, we recognized that the overwhelm-
ing majority of countries-around the world had rejected
that approach and that that circumstance was constitu-
tionally relevant. We agreed, moreover, that the large
number of juveniles serving life sentences in the United
States raised troubling questions. Id. We ultimately con-
cluded, however, that the overwhelming weight of
authority from courts in this country that the practice
was constitutionally sound, strong indications of
approval from the United States Supreme Court and no
evident trend away from imposing serious adult crimi-
nal liability upon juvenile offenders compelled us to
defer to the legislative process on what ultimately is a
public policy determination. Id., 585-86. We conclude
similarly today that international norms cannot take
precedence over a domestic legal climate in which capi-
tal punishment retains strong legislative and judicial
support.

As part of his constitutional claim, the defendant
argues that capital punishment is not serving legitimate
penological goals of deterrence, incapacitation or reha-

anyone in the last ten years, and fifty-eight countries retain the death penalty
and, apparently, have employed itrecently. See Amnesty International, “Abo-
litionist and Retentionist Countries,” available at http:/Awww.amnesty.org/
en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Novem-
ber 18, 2011) (copy contained in the file of this case in the Supreme Court
clerk's office).

Po 197
Pe

bilitation.* In support of this argument, he cites to
reports and recommendations of various commissions
and interest groups and the opinions of certain current.
or past public officials.” The state, in reply, directs us
to similar material purporting to show the contrary.
We recognize that assessing the propriety of the death
penalty is not exclusively the domain of the legislature,
and that this court has an independent duty to deter-
mine that the penalty remains constitutionally viable
as the sensibilities of our citizens evolve. See Atkins v.
Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 312-13; State v. Ross, supra,
230 Conn. 249. In so doing, however, we must “exercise
our authority with great restraint”; State v. Ross, supra,
230 Conn. 249; and refrain from interfering with demo-
cratic processes unless there is compelling “reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry
and its legislatures.” Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 313.
Moreover, it is clear that “[r]easonable people of good.
faith disagree on the morality and efficacy of capital
punishment”; Baze v. Rees, supra, 553 U.S. 61; and that
“the value of [that sanction], and its contribution to
acceptable penological goals, typically is a complex
factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with
the legislatures . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S. 441; see
also Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 571 (“fiJn gen-

© The defendant deemphasizes retribution, which is recognized as a.consti-
tutionally legitimate purpose of punishment. Graham v. Florida, supra, 560
US. 71-72, In explaining her veto of legislation intended to repeal the death
penalty, then Governor M. Jodi Rell relied expressly on this justification,
among others, See Governor's Veto Message for Public Act 09-107 Bill Notifi-
cation Release No. 19 (June 5, 2009), available at http:/www.ct.gov/
governorrell/ewp/view.asp?A=1716&Q=441210 (last visited November 18,
2011) (copy contained in the file of this case in the Supreme Court
clerk's office).

© The defendant also includes lengthy quotes from the opinions of dis-
senting justices in capital cases, which express views similar to those
reflected in the commission and interest group reports. He further observes
that death row inmates have been exonerated in other jurisdictions, but
makes no suggestion that any person on Connecticut's death row, presently
or previously, was convicted wrongfully.

198 Po
—

eral we leave to legislatures the assessment of the effi-
cacy of various criminal penalty schemes”); Gregg v.
Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. 175 (“[iJn a democratic society
legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to
the will and consequently the moral values of the peo-
ple” [internal quotation marks omitted]); cf. Baze v.
Rees, supra, 69 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[p]Jublic policy
on the death penalty, an issue that stirs deep emotions,
cannot be dictated by the testimony of an expert or
two or by judicial findings of fact based on such testi-
mony”). We therefore conclude that, as long as there
remains powerful evidence of strong public support for
the death penalty in the form of long-standing laws
enacted by the democratically elected representatives
of this state and other jurisdictions within the United
States, we will not attempt to discern a contrary view
of the public will, orto answer complex policy questions
best answered by the legislative process, by choosing
among the competing opinions of interest groups and
individuals whose views are not necessarily in accord.
with those of the general population.”

One final matter raised by the defendant merits our
consideration. In May, 2009, following the filing of the
defendant’s initial brief, the General Assembly passed
No. 09-107 of the 2009 Public Acts (P.A. 09-107), which
was intended to repeal the death penalty for crimes
committed after the passage of the act. On June 5, 2009,
however, P.A. 09-107 was vetoed by the governor, and
the legislature did not thereafter muster the two-thirds
vote necessary to override the governor's veto.!%

1 As the Supreme Court of New Jersey observed when upholding that
state’s death penalty against a general constitutional challenge, “[t]he ‘con-
temporary standard of decency’ against which the death penalty must be
tested . . . is that of the community, not that of its scientists, penologists,
or jurists.” State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. 171.

°° The repeal legislation originally had passed in the House of Representa
tives with ninety members voting in favor of it, fifty-six members voting
against it and five members absent. The vote had been closer in the Senate,
with nineteen members voting in favor of the legislation and seventeen
voting against it.

Po 199
—

Accordingly, P.A. 09-107 failed to become law. Similar
legislation was introduced in 2011 and voted out of the
judiciary committee, but was not taken up for a full
vote in either chamber. Substitute Senate Bill No. 1035,
2011 Sess.

Following the aborted passage of P.A. 09-107, the
defendant submitted his reply brief. He argues that the
legislative repeal of the death penalty, although subse-
quently vetoed by the governor, evidences a powerful
societal repudiation of capital punishment in Connecti-
cut that should compel this court to conclude that such
punishment violates the state constitution. We are
not persuaded.!”

The governor, like our legislators, is an elected repre-
sentative of the people of the state. Additionally, execu-
tive approval or veto of legislation is an integral part
of the legislative process; see Conn. Const., art. IV, § 15;

In support of this claim, the defendant cites extensively, but selectively,
to the portions of the legislative history of P.A. 09-107 in which some support-
ers of repeal expressed their beliefs that the death penalty is morally wrong,
arbitrarily imposed or penologically ineffective. He ignores or discounts
other portions of the legislative history that suggest that the attempted
repeal was motivated by practical rather than moral concerns, as well as
the portions reflecting substantial opposition to the repeal.

1 The defendant also argues that the unsuccessful repeal attempt deprives
the death penalty of the legislative authorization necessary for its constitu-
tionality, and that “[t)he state constitution does not empower the [gjovernor
to authorize the death penalty after its repudiation by the General Assembly
.. ..” Obviously, all of our current death penalty legislation was enacted
via the process specified in our constitution, which requires both legislative
and gubernatorial approval, and subsequently has been upheld by this court
against numerous constitutional challenges. The defendant provides no
direct support for the proposition that a legislature’s unsuccessful repeal
attempt somehow vitiates a law that was enacted constitutionally by a
previous legislature and governor, and we are not aware of any. Moreover,
to the extent the defendant raises a new claim as to purported constitutional
limitations on the governor's authority to veto death penalty legislation, a
claim to which the state has had no opportunity to reply, we need not
address his arguments. SS-II, LLC v. Bridge Street Associates, 293 Conn.
287, 302, 977 A.2d 189 (2009) (parties may not raise new claims in reply
brief). In any event, the defendant’s arguments in this regard are meritless.

200 PO
—

and it is axiomatic that when the governor exercises
this power, he or she is acting in a substantive legislative
role. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55, 118 S.
Ct. 966, 140 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1998); Bagley v. Blagojevich,
646 F.3d 378, 393 (7th Cir. 2011); Baraka v. McGreevey,
481 F.3d 187, 197 (8d Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1021,
128 S. Ct. 612, 169 L. Ed. 2d 393 (2007); Torres-Rivera
v. Calderon-Serra, 412 F.3d 205, 213 (1st Cir. 2005);
Butts v. Dept. of Housing Preservation & Development,
990 F.2d 1397, 1406 (2d Cir. 1993); see also 1 N. Singer &
J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construc-
tion (7th Ed. 2010) § 16:1, p. 729 (“All American [c]onsti-
tutions give to the chief executive a formal and official
role in the legislative process, in addition to the
important influence he or she usually wields over the
legislative process by reason of political power and
leadership. The [constitutions of the United States and
of nearly every state require as an essential step in
enactment that bills which have passed both houses
shall be presented to the executive.” [Emphasis
added.]); 73 Am. Jur. 2d 254, Statutes § 32 (2001) (“in
passing on laws that are submitted for approval, the
executive is regarded as a component part of the law-
making body, and as engaged in the performance of a
legislative, rather than an executive duty” [emphasis
added]). Thus, just as a governor’s approval of legisla-
tion may provide evidence of the motivations underly-
ing that legislation; Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 186
N.J. 188, 215, 892 A.2d 1255 (2006) (crediting governor's
signing statement as evidence of statute’s meaning),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1115, 127 S. Ct. 984, 166 L. Ed.
2d 710 (2007); Rangolan v. Nassau, 96 N.Y.2d 42, 49,
749 N.E.2d 178, 725 N.Y.S.2d 611 (2001) (same); the
absence of approval, which the legislature thereafter is
unable to override, signifies that public support for the
failed legislation was tenuous.

Accordingly, we are unable to accept the premise
underlying all of the defendant’s various arguments as

Po 201
fe

to the import of P.A. 09-107, which, generally stated, is
that the legislature’s vote establishes definitively a lack
of public support for the death penalty and, therefore,
the governor’s veto of that act thwarted the public will.
Rather, a more plausible view is that “[t]he [governor]
is a representative of the people just as the members
_ of the Senate and of the House are, and it may be,
at some times, on some subjects, that the [governor]
elected by all the people is rather more representative
of them all than are the members of either body of
the [llegislature whose constituencies are local and not
[statewide] . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462
US. 919, 948, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 77 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1983).

In light of the foregoing, we disagree that we properly
may discern contemporary community standards on
the basis of a “truncated [product] of the legislative
process”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Wilson v.
Eu, 1 Cal. 4th 707, 727, 823 P.2d 545, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
379 (1992); that ultimately failed to gain all of the consti-
tutional approvals necessary to become the binding law
of this state. Cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U.S.
431 (declining to discern contemporary norms based
on proposed legislation). Simply put, “[t]he [glovernor
is a part of the legislative process and a veto renders a
legislative action as if it had not occurred.” Washington
State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wn. 2d 309, 330, 931
P.2d 135 (1997).

We conclude that the death penalty, as a general
matter, does not violate the state constitution. Accord-
ingly, we reaffirm our earlier holdings to that effect in
State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 249-52, and State v.
Webb, supra, 238 Conn. 406.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion PALMER, McLACHLAN, VERTE-
FEUILLE and DiPENTIMA, Js., concurred.

202 Po

ZARELLA, J., concurring. I concur in all respects
with the well reasoned opinion of the majority. I write
separately only to express my continued reservations
about the efficacy of our application of the Geisler
test to claims raised by a party under the Connecticut
constitution. See State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-86,
610 A.2d 1225 (1992). The present case, however, is not
the appropriate vehicle to expand on those reserva-
tions, and, accordingly, I defer my views on Geisler for
the present.

NORCOTT, J., dissenting. I continue to “maintain my
position that the death penalty has no place in the
jurisprudence of the state of Connecticut.”! State v.
Ross, 269 Conn. 213, 392-93, 849 A.2d 648 (2004) (Nor-
cott, J., dissenting). Thus, I disagree with the majority’s
analysis in part IX of its opinion, rejecting the arguments
of the defendant, Todd Rizzo, in support of reconsidera-
tion of this court’s previous decisions’ upholding the
constitutionality of the death penalty under article first,
§§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. I therefore

* See State v. Ross, 273 Conn, 684, 721, 873 A.2d 181 (2005) (Norcott, J.,
concurring and dissenting); State v. Peeler, 271 Conn. 338, 464, 857 A.2d 808
(2004) (Kate, J., with whom Norcott, J., joins, dissenting), cert. denied, 546
USS. 845, 126 8. Ct. 94, 1683 L, Ed. 2d 110 (2005); State v. Ross, supra, 269
Conn. 392-98 (Noreott, J., dissenting); State v. Breton, 264 Conn. 327, 446-49,
824 A.2d 778 (Norcott, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1055, 124 S. Ct.
819, 187 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2008); State v. Webb, 252 Conn. 128, 147, 750 A.2d
448 (Norcott, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 631 U.S. 836, 121 S. Ct. 93, 148 L.
Ed. 2d 53 (2000); State v. Griffin, 251 Conn. 671, 742-48, 741 A.2d 918 (1999)
Worcott, J., dissenting); State v. Ross, 251 Conn. 579, 597, 742 A.2d 312
(1999) (Noreott, J., dissenting); State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 543-52, 743
A.2d 1 (1999) WNorcott, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841, 121 S. Ct.
106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000); State v. Webb, 238 Conn, 389, 586-70, 680 A.2d
147 (1996) (oreott, J., dissenting); see also State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577,
613, 863 A.2d 654 (2005) (Norcott, J., concurring); State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn.
171, 813-14, 888 A.2d 363 (2003) (Norcott, J., concurring); State v. Courch-
esne, 262 Conn, 537, 583-84, 816 A.2d 562 (2003) (Vorcott, J., concurring).

*See, e.g,, State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 405-406, 680 A.2d 147 (1996);
State v. Ross, 280 Conn. 183, 249-52, 646 A.2d 1818 (1994), cert. denied, 513
US. 1165, 115 S, Ct. 1183, 180 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995).

Po 208
—

respectfully dissent from the judgment of this court
affirming the judgment of the trial court sentencing the
defendant to death by lethal injection.

As in my past dissenting opinions; see footnote 1 of
this dissenting opinion; I do not intend to reiterate in
full the reasoning behind my belief that the death pen-
alty “per se is wrong,” “violates the state constitution’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment . . .
[and] that our statutory scheme for the imposition of the
death penalty cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny
because it allows for arbitrariness and racial discrimina-
tion in the determination of who shall live or die at the
hands of the state.” State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 543,
743 A.2d 1 (1999) (WNorcott, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 841, 121 S. Ct. 106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000).
Rather, I pause to reflect on my previously expressed
“optimis[m] that very early in the twenty-first century
we will all witness the abolition of [the death penalty]
by Connecticut as a state and the United States as a
country.” State v. Webb, 252 Conn. 128, 147, 750 A.2d
448 (Norcott, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 835,
121 S. Ct. 93, 148 L. Ed. 2d 53 (2000); see also State v.
Cobb, supra, 552 (Norcott, J., dissenting) (“with the
alternative of life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole as a penalty, the continuation of the death
penalty simply makes no sense as we approach a hope-
fully more enlightened new millennium”). Recent his-
tory has, however, shown that my predictive abilities
are no better than those of any other court. Indeed,
my optimism waned significantly six years ago, when
I found myself questioning, on the eve of an execution,
whether “our thirst for this ultimate penalty [has] now
been slaked, or do we, the people of Connecticut, con-
tinue down this increasingly lonesome road?” State v.
Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 723, 873 A.2d 131 (2005) (Norcott,
J., concurring and dissenting).

204 Po
Leer

Part IX of the majority’s opinion in the present case,
coupled with the subsequent failures of two legislative
measures that would have repealed the death penalty,®
has, to my regret, answered the rhetorical question that
Iasked in 2005. Although the scholarship and drafting of
the majority's opinion is beyond reproach as a technical
matter, it nevertheless leaves Connecticut in step with
much of the United States,* which, in 2010, trailed only
China, Iran, North Korea and Yemen with respect to
the number of reported executions.® See Amnesty Inter-
national, Report: Death Sentences and Executions 2010
(2011), p. 41, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/ACT50/001/2011/en/ealb6b25-a62a-4074-
927d-ba5le88df2e9/act50001201len.pdf (last visited
November 17, 2011). Given this company;' see State v.
Allen, 289 Conn. 550, 585, 958 A.2d 1214 (2008) (interna-
tional practices relevant to constitutional question of
whether particular penalty constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment); I therefore remain disappointed
that a majority of this court continues to decline to
declare the death penalty unconstitutional under the
Connecticut constitution, and continue to respectfully
dissent from its failure to do so.

* See Substitute Senate Bill No. 1035, 2011 Sess., “An Act Revising the
Penalty for Capital Felonies” (not taken up for full vote in either chamber);
Public Acts 2009, No. 09-107 (legislation vetoed by former Govemor M.
Jodi Rell).

“As the majority notes, thirty-four states, plus the federal government
and military, have the death penalty. Connecticut and New Hampshire are
the only states in the New England region with the death penalty. See
generally Death Penalty Information Center, “Facts About the Death Pen-
alty,” available at _http/www-.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/Fact
Sheet-pdf (last visited November 17, 2011).

® The remainder of the top ten countries with respect to the number of
reported executions in 2010 consists of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, Bangla-
desh and Somalia. See Amnesty International, Report: Death Sentences
and Executions 2010 (2011), p. 41, available at http://www-amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/ACT50/001/201 Ven/ealb6b25-a62a-4074-927d-bab le88dt2e9/
act500012011en.pdf (last visited November 17, 2011).

® Cf, Aesop's Fables, “The Ass and His Purchaser” (“[a] man is known by
the company he keeps”), available at http://etext.virginia.edwtoc/modeng/
public/AesFabl.html (ast visited November 17, 2011).

Po 205
PoC

I would reverse the judgment of the trial court sen-
tencing the defendant to death by lethal injection, and
remand the case to the trial court with direction to
impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of release.

BRIDGEPORT HARBOUR PLACE I, LLC v.
JOSEPH P. GANIM ET AL.
(SC 18290)

Palmer, Zarella, DiPentima, Lavine and Beach, Js.

Argued March 15—officially released December 13, 2011

206

William F. Gallagher, with whom were William J.
Sweeney and, on the brief, Hugh D. Hughes and R.
Bartley Halloran, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Jeffrey J. Mirman, with whom were John F. Droney,
Jr., and, on the brief, Kurt F. Zimmerman and Leonard
K. Atkinson, for the appellee (named defendant).

Po 207
Po

Jeffrey J. White, with whom were Craig A. Raabe
and, on the brief, Edward J. Heath and Jamie M.
Landry, for the appellee (defendant city of Bridgeport).

Ira B. Grudberg, with whom were Christian Young
and, on the brief, Trisha M. Morris, for the appellees
(defendant Crescent Avenue Development Company,
LLC, et al.).

Hubert J. Santos, with whom were Jeffrey R. Hell-
man and, on the brief, Sandra Snaden Kuwaye, for
the appellees (defendant Charles J. Willinger, Jr., et al.).

Opinion

PALMER, J. The plaintiff, Bridgeport Harbour Place
I, LLC, brought this action against the defendants,
Joseph P. Ganim, the city of Bridgeport (city), Alfred
Lenoci, Sr., Alfred Lenoci, Jr., United Properties, Ltd.,
Eight Hundred Fifteen Lafayette Centre, LLC, United
Investments, LLC, United Environmental Redevelop-
ment, LLC, Crescent Avenue Development Company,
LLC, Charles J. Willinger, Jr., Willinger, Willinger and
Bucci, P.C., Joseph T. Kasper, Jr., Kasper Group, Inc.,
and Michael Schinella,' alleging that the defendants had
violated General Statutes § 35-26? of the Connecticut
Antitrust Act (antitrust act) by engaging in an illegal
conspiracy in restraint of trade. The trial court granted
the defendants’ motions to strike the plaintiff's
amended complaint on the ground that the complaint
failed to allege an antitrust injury. The plaintiff appealed
to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s
judgment. Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim,
111 Conn. App. 197, 210, 958 A.2d 210 (2008). We granted

1 Harbor Communications, Inc., and HNTB Corporation also were named
as defendants. The plaintiff subsequently withdrew its complaint against
Harbor Communications, Inc., and the action subsequently was withdrawn
as against HNTB Corporation.

2 General Statutes § 35-26 provides: “Every contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of any part of trade or commerce is unlawful.”

208 PO
Po
the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal limited
to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly
affirm the trial court’s granting of the defendants’
motion{s] to strike?” Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC
v. Ganim, 290 Conn. 906, 962 A.2d 793 (2009). We
answer that question in the affirmative and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following relevant procedural and factual back-
ground is set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court.
“In May, 1997, the city . . . requested proposals for
the site development of asection of waterfront property
known as Steel Point. A development proposal submit-
ted by Bridgeport Renaissance Center, later renamed
Harbour Place Limited Partnership and subsequently
acquired by the plaintiff, was chosen by the city for the
project. On November 18, 1998, the city and the plaintiff
signed a development agreement. The plaintiff could
not fulfill its obligations under the contract, however,
due to the successive withdrawals of several financing
partners, and the city terminated the contract in
March, 2001.

“According to the plaintiff, it was prevented from
completing the development activities specified in the
contract by the unlawful conduct of the defendants.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the city’s mayor,
Ganim, engaged in a contract steering scheme in which
his coconspirators, Leonard Grimaldi and Paul Pinto,
demanded bribes and kickbacks from businesses seek-
ing city contracts and then divided the proceeds of
those illegal payments with Ganim. After the contract
had been awarded to the plaintiff, the plaintiff refused
to participate in the scheme. Thereafter, Ganim and
the other defendants allegedly conspired to deprive the
plaintiff of its development rights, through corrupt and
illegal means, for their own benefit. Because of the
unreasonable delays, conditions and demands imposed
on the plaintiff, its three financial partners withdrew

Pe 209
Pot

from the project, and the plaintiff was unable to fulfill
its contractual obligations. From the date it was chosen.
until it was discharged in March, 2001, the plaintiff had
expended millions of dollars in its attempt to complete
the project.

“The plaintiff filed a one count complaint on October
19, 2004, claiming that the defendants [had] violated
the [antitrust act] by engaging in an illegal conspiracy in
restraint of trade. [The plaintiff] sought treble damages
pursuant to General Statutes § 35-35.? Several of the
defendants filed motions to strike the complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a legally sufficient antitrust
claim. The [trial] court, Alander, J., granted the motions,
concluding that the plaintiff's original complaint failed
to allege facts that would establish an actual adverse
effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market
and failed to allege facts that would constitute price
discrimination in violation of General Statutes § 35-45.

“The plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint. See
Practice Book § 10-44. The amended complaint added
one paragraph, alleging, in part, that ‘[t]he defendants’
conduct had an actual adverse effect on competition
as a whole in the relevant market of undertaking and
completing commercial development in the [c]ity . . .
inatimely, cost efficient manner.” The other allegations

® General Statutes § 35-85 provides: “The state, or any person, including,
but not limited to, a consumer, injured in its business or property by any
violation of the provisions of this chapter shall recover treble damages,
together with a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.”

“The added paragraph . . . [provides]: ‘The defendants’ conduct had an
actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market of
undertaking and completing commercial development in the [cJity . . . in
a timely, cost efficient manner. The defendants’ conduct as alleged added
the extra cost of corrupt paying as demanded. The corruption and payback
system of Ganim, Grimaldi and Pinto, which operated with the cooperation
of . . . [city] officials under . . . Ganim, including . . . corporation coun-
sel, leaders of the [cJity [clouneil, its economic director, finance director,
zoning officials, comptroller and others caused the market for the commer-
cial development as a whole to be adversely affected.’ ” Bridgeport Harbour
Place I, LLC v. Ganim, supra, 111 Conn. App. 201 n.3.

210 Po
PT

in the amended complaint were the same as in the

original complaint, and the plaintiff did not amend its

allegations with respect to [its claim of] price discrimi-

nation.

“Six of the defendants filed motions to strike the
plaintiff's amended complaint, claiming that the plain-
tiff [had] failed to allege any additional facts that could
constitute a cognizable antitrust claim. The court, Ste-
vens, J., heard argument and issued its decision on
March 5, 2007, granting the motions of those defen-
dants. In its decision, the court concluded that the alle-
gations in the added paragraph contained only legal or
conclusory claims and did not provide a factual basis
for an antitrust violation. Further, the court stated that,
even if it is assumed that the relevant market was as
alleged in the added paragraph, the plaintiff neverthe-
less failed to allege any facts of a specific nature that
demonstrated that the defendants’ conduct had an
adverse effect on competition in that market. The court
noted: ‘When taken as true, the facts set forth in the
. . . amended complaint establish that the plaintiff lost
its ability to develop a single property, Steel Point, due
to the improper conduct of the various defendants. The
plaintiff has not alleged any particular facts, however,
that would indicate that this action prevented other
competitors from developing Steel Point or other prop-
erties in [the city] under government contracts with the
city . . . or otherwise hindered competitors in such
pursuits.’

“Subsequently, the [remaining] defendants filed
motions to strike the amended complaint on identical
grounds. The court granted the motions and . . . ren-
dered judgment in favor of all of the defendants.”
Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, supra, 111
Conn. App. 200-203.

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from
the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that

Po 211

Po
the trial court improperly had determined that the
amended complaint failed to allege an antitrust injury.
Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the allegations
in the amended complaint “that the defendants con-
spired to exclude competition in connection with eight
different city projects through commercial bribery and
other unlawful acts were sufficient to support the legal
conclusion that the defendants engaged in anticompeti-
tive behavior in commercial development in [the city].”
Id., 207. The Appellate Court disagreed, concluding that
the amended complaint was “devoid of factual allega-
tions that would support the legal conclusion that the
defendants’ conduct had an adverse effect on competi-
tion as a whole in the relevant market. The plaintiff
[did] not allege how the challenged actions decreased
competition among developers or how the alleged pay-
back scheme actually affected the marketplace, which
allegations are necessary to support a . . . violation
[of § 35-26] under a rule of reason analysis. The plaintiff
appears to claim that the very fact that the defendants
allegedly required anyone who wanted a city contract
in [the city] to pay bribes, i.e., they had to ‘pay to play,’
automatically results in an anticompetitive effect on
the market. The plaintiff can cite no case law in support
of such a position.” Id., 208. The Appellate Court also
noted that “the case law suggest[ed] otherwise.” Id. In
reaching its conclusion, the court relied on three cases,
namely, Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone County, 440
F.3d 336, 348 (6th Cir. 2006), Comet Mechanical Con-
tractors, Inc. v. E. A. Cowen Construction, Inc., 609
F.2d 404, 406 (10th Cir. 1980), and Federal Paper Board
Co. v. Amata, 693 F. Sup. 1376, 1383 (D. Conn. 1988),
that had held that commercial bribery, standing alone,
does not constitute anticompetitive behavior under fed-
eral antitrust law.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff contends that
the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the

212 Po

{fT

amended complaint fails to allege a cognizable antitrust
injury. The plaintiff claims that the complaint, when
construed in the light most favorable to sustaining its
legal sufficiency, alleges such an injury because it
asserts that the defendants “controlled the relevant
market to such an extent that they excluded competi-
tors at will through their bribery and kickback scheme.”
In particular, the plaintiff contends that “[t]he restraint
alleged [in the complaint] is that of a general contractor,
the Lenocis and their cronies, conspiring with the mayor
[Ganim] who controlled the city . . . .” The plaintiff
further contends that “the Lenocis’ control over
[Ganim] effectively precluded competition among gen-
eral contractors.” According to the plaintiff, “[b]ecause
so many publicly bid projects were controlled by the
Lenocis and involved kickbacks and bribes, this had
the effect of stifling competition for these kinds of proj-
ects.” Finally, the plaintiff contends that paragraph
twenty-seven of the amended complaint,® which identi-
fies eight city contracts that the Lenocis allegedly
obtained as a result of corrupt payments, supports the
claim that the defendants’ conduct had an anticompeti-
tive effect on the market as a whole. We are not per-
suaded by the plaintiff's claim.

The following legal principles guide our analysis. “A
motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a

® Paragraph twenty-seven of the plaintiff's amended complaint provides
inrelevant part: “Ganim, acting through his office and through and in cooper-
ation with various municipal officials and employees he influenced through
corrupt payments of extraordinary benefits, appointments, awards of city
contracts to relatives, was engaged in a massive, hidden conspiracy with
the defendants and others, Willinger, Lenoci Sr., Lenoci Jr., Pinto, Grimaldi,
Kasper and Schinella to illegally profit from the awarding and completion
of contracts with the [clity . . . . The corrupt agreements included but
were not limited to those involving the sewer treatment facility, the baseball
park, the hockey stadium, the removal of asbestos, the public relations
campaign for [the city], the clean and green program for the removal of
distressed buildings, the redevelopment of Father Panik [V]illage, the rede-
velopment of Steel Point and the awarding of contracts for legal services,
all in the restraint of trade... .”

Po 213
Po

pleading . . . and, consequently, requires no factual
findings by the trial court. As a result, our review of
the court’s ruling is plenary. . . . We take the facts to
be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken
and we construe the complaint in the manner most
favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus,
[i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a
cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 260 Conn. 59, 64-65, 793 A.2d
1048 (2002). “A motion to strike is properly granted if
the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are
unsupported by the facts alleged.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v.
Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).

Furthermore, General Statutes § 35-44b provides
that, in construing the antitrust act, “the courts of this
state shall be guided by interpretations given by the
federal courts to federal antitrust statutes.”® With
respect to the allegations necessary to state a cogniza-
ble antitrust claim, the United States Supreme Court has
explained that, in pleading such a claim, “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”” (Cita-
tions omitted.) Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007); see
also Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir.

° See Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 235 Conn.
1, 15-16, 664 A.2d 719 (1995) (“we follow federal precedent when we inter-
pret the [antitrust] act unless the text of our antitrust statutes, or other
pertinent state law, requires us to interpret it differently”); see also Brown &
Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 297 Conn. 710, 727, 1 A.3d 21 (2010) (“[t]he
antitrust act intentionally was patterned after federal antitrust law”).

7 We note, moreover, that, because Connecticut is a fact pleading state;
see, €.g., Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 147, 913 A.2d 415 (2007); see
also Practice Book § 10-1; this point has particular pertinence to cases, like
the present one, involving claims under this state’s antitrust laws.

214 es

{_____|
2001) Gn deciding motion to dismiss for failure to state
claim, “[iJt is . . . improper [for the court] to assume

that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged
or that the [defendant has] violated the antitrust laws
in ways that have not been alleged” [internal quotation
marks omitted]); Furlong v. Long Island College Hospi-
tal, 710 F.2d 922, 927 (2d Cir. 1983) (conclusory allega-
tions cannot “substitute for minimally sufficient
factual allegations”).

“Section 35-26 is substantially identical to § 1 of the
Sherman Act; 15 U.S.C. § 1;8 and applies to contracts,
combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade or
commerce.” Shea v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. of New Haven, 184 Conn. 285, 305, 489 A.2d 997
(1981). It is well settled that “Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription.”
(internal quotation marks omitted.) Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 60 L. Ed. 2d 931
(1979). “Consumer welfare is maximized when eco-
nomic resources are allocated to their best use . . .
and when consumers are assured competitive price and
quality.” (Citation omitted.) Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 987, 116 S. Ct. 515, 133 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1995).
“Accordingly, an act is deemed anticompetitive under

“the Sherman Act only when it harms both allocative
efficiency and raises the prices of goods above competi-
tive levels or diminishes their quality.” (Emphasis in
original.) Id.

“A violation of [§] 1 [of the Sherman Act] generally
requires a combination or other form of concerted
action between two legally distinct entities resulting in
an unreasonable restraint on trade. . . . If a restraint

® Title 15 of the 2006 edition of the United States Code, § 1, provides in
relevant part: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . .”

es a5

alleged is among that small class of actions that courts
have deemed to have such predictable and pernicious
anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for
procompetitive benefit, it will be unreasonable per se

. . . Most antitrust claims, however, [like those
asserted in the present case] are analyzed under arule of
reason analysis which seeks to determine if the alleged.
restraint is unreasonable because its anticompetitive
effects outweigh its procompetitive effects.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) E & L Con-
sulting, Ltd. v. Doman Industries Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 29
(2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816, 128 S. Ct. 97,
169 L. Ed. 2d 22 (2007).

In order to establish an anticompetitive effect suffi-
cient to avoid dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim, it is not enough to allege an injury to a
competitor. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488, 97 8. Ct. 690, 50 L. Ed.
2d 701 (1977) (antitrust laws were designed “for the
protection of competition, not competitors” [internal
quotation marks omitted]). Rather, “the inquiry under
the rule of reason is directed at the challenged
restraint’s overall impact on competitive conditions,
rather than whether a particular party has been
restrained by the conduct at issue.” Berman Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Local 333, United Marine Division, 644
F.2d 930, 937 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965, 102
S. Ct. 506, 70 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1981). Accordingly, “[u]nder
the rule of reason, the [plaintiff bears] an initial burden
to demonstrate [that] the [defendant’s] challenged
behavior had an actual adverse effect on competition
as a whole in the relevant market.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Major League Baseball Properties, Inc.
v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 317 (2d Cir. 2008). “Anti-
competitive effects, more commonly referred to as
‘injury to competition’ or ‘harm to the competitive pro-
cess,’ are usually measured by a reduction in output and

216 Pe

Po
an increase in prices in the relevant market.” Sullivan v.
National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1096-97 (1st
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190, 115 S. Ct. 1252,
131 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1995); see also Virgin Atlantic Air-
ways Lid. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 264
(2d Cir. 2001) (“whether an actual adverse effect has
occurred is determined by examining factors like
reduced output, increased prices and decreased
quality”).

Upon review of the plaintiff's amended complaint,
we conclude that the Appellate Court properly upheld
the trial court’s decision to grant the defendants’
motions to strike because the complaint is devoid of
facts demonstrating that the defendants’ alleged bribery
scheme actually had an adverse effect on competition.
Almost every paragraph of the thirty-three page
amended complaint focuses on the various ways in
which the defendants’ conduct injured the plaintiff
individually by preventing it from completing the Steel
Point project.’ There is not a single allegation in the

* The following allegations of the amended complaint are representative
of the entire complaint: “40, On or about January 27, 1999, as a result of
the illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade by the defendants, the [plaintiff's]
development partner . . . withdrew from the Steel Point project.”

“46. In April of 1999, less than one month after the known extension of
the development agreement with the plaintiff, Pinto and the defendants
Lenoci Sr., Lenoci Jr., and Ganim agreed to select and cause other officials
and employees to sabotage the [plaintiff's] plan to develop the Steel Point
site, in direct derogation of the [plaintiff's] rights under the development
agreement.”

“51. The defendant . . . Willinger intentionally . . . and in bad faith
inserted commercially unreasonable terms and conditions into the [Steel
Point] agreement, intentionally delayed the completion of the agreements,
participated in a scheme to steer [city contracts on the project to entities
‘who would pay fees to [the] conspirators, and who would act to further delay
and interpose unfair development conditions [on] the Steel Point project.”

“53, From May of 1999 through January of 2000, while the plaintiff was
attempting in good faith to complete the transaction, [certain of the defen-
dants] were engaged in a conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce to
deprive the plaintiff of its rights.”

“66. Unaware of the fact that the mayor [Ganim] . . . had entered into a
corrupt agreementto block and [to] interfere with [the plaintiff's] contractual

Po BG

complaint explaining how the bribery scheme reduced
output or raised prices, the sine qua non of an antitrust
injury. Furthermore, although the plaintiff argues that
the Lenocis’ control over Ganim effectively precluded
general contractors from competing for projects open
to public bidding, the amended complaint itself contains
no such allegation. As the defendants note, the amended
complaint does not even identify a general contractor,
other than the plaintiff, that was adversely affected by
the defendants’ scheme. Much less does the amended
complaint allege facts demonstrating that general con-
tractors as a group were precluded from competing for
city contracts. The thrust of the amended complaint,
rather, is that any general contractor that wanted to do
business with the city could do so but had to pay to
play.” As the District Court explained in Federal Paper

rights, the plaintiff continued to try to complete the Steel Point [pjroject,
spending large sums of money on all of the various components of the
project... .”

“65. The defendants . . . Lenoci Sr... . Lenoci [Jr] . . . Schinella, and
the related Lenoci [cJorporations . . . engaged in an illegal conspiracy in

restraint of trade in one or more of the following ways:
rs

“) by engaging in a myriad of illegal schemes to enrich the mayor (Ganim]
and other [city] officials . . . in order to obtain the cooperation of those
officials in frustrating the development attempts of the [p]laintiff, [and]

“e) by providing the chief elected official of the [cJity . . . with items of
value in order to secure his cooperation in frustrating the development
attempts of the plaintiff.”

“67, The defendant{s] . . . Kasper and Kasper Group [Inc.] engaged in a
conspiracy in restraint of trade in one or more of the following ways

“a) by attempting to insert the Lenoci defendants into the Steel Point
project;

“b) by paying bribes to the mayor [Ganim] . . .

“c) by conspiring with the Lenocis and the Lenoci controlled entities to
steal the [plaintiff's] development project

“@) by deceiving the plaintiff and hiding from the plaintiff the illegal
conspiracy [and]

“e) by paying sums of money to other conspirators in support of the
conspiracy... .”

» For example, paragraph twenty-eight of the amended complaint provides
in relevant part: “At all times mentioned herein, and for a long time prior
to the incidents described in this complaint, Pinto and Grimaldi received

21g Po

|__|

Board Co. v. Amata, supra, 693 F. Sup. 1876, however,
“Tt}he payment of bribes by suppliers to a purchasing
agent does not by itself establish an anticompetitive
effect. Although the bribes may have been illegal and
unfair methods of competition, their illegality and
unfairness [do] not support an inference that the bribes
restrained competition. On the contrary, bribery could
have been consistent with intense competition among
the suppliers—some of which resorted to illegal mea-
sures to gain an advantage.” Id., 1383.

As the Appellate Court noted, moreover, even if the
plaintiff adequately alleged in its amended complaint
an anticompetitive impact on the market, federal courts
have concluded that commercial bribery does not con-
stitute a restraint of trade within the meaning of the
Sherman Act. See Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v.
Ganim, supra, 111 Conn. App. 208. We are aware of
no case in which governmental corruption was found
to fall within the purview of federal antitrust law.

Recently, in Coll v. First American Title Ins. Co.,
642 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 2011), the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals engaged in a comprehensive review of the
governing case law in explaining why commercial brib-
ery of government officials does not constitute a

payments from businesses seeking to do business with the [cJity . . . and
then shared the proceeds of these payments with . . . Ganim.”

Paragraph thirty-three of the amended complaint provides in relevant
part: “Unlike other businesses in the [c]ity . . . the plaintiff refused to pay
- . . of associate itself with the members of the conspiracy, in order to
complete [the Steel Point] development project. As a result, the [dJefendant
. . . Ganim, through the members of his administration, paid consultants
. .. Willinger and the Willinger firm prevented [the] [p]laintiff from complet-
ing the [Steel Point] transaction.”

Paragraph thirty-six provides in relevant part: “During the period of the
plaintiff's development of Steel Point, the defendant Willinger represented
the defendants Lenoci Sr., Lenoci Jr., and their related companies, and Pinto,
Grimaldi, Kasper and related companies, and Ganim . . . received from
the defendants [money] extorted from persons seeking to do business with
the [elity ....”

po 219
EE

restraint of trade for purposes of the Sherman Act. The
analysis of the court in Coll, with which we agree, bears
repeating. “In Parker [v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct.
307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1943)], the [United States] Supreme
Court held that the . . . Sherman Act’s proscription of
anti-competitive conduct did not apply to government
action. See [id., 350-52]. Later in [Eastern R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
815. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1961) (Noerr)], the [clourt
addressed the other side of the same coin, [Columbia
v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383,
111 S. Ct. 1344, 113 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1991)], concluding
that the Sherman Act also did not proscribe private
citizens’ conduct undertaken to influence government
action. See [Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., supra, 135-37]. That is so because
the purpose of the Sherman Act is to regulate business,
not political activity. See [id 137]. This was true,
according to Noerr, even if the conduct by which citi-
zens attempted to influence governmental regulation
was undertaken for the sole purpose of destroying com-
petition, involved unethical business practices, or was
specifically intended to hurt competitors. See [id., 138—
45]. In fact, Noerr addressed claims of egregious private
conduct, including assertions that a number of railroads
conspired to engage in a publicity campaign against
their competitors in the trucking industry designed to
foster the adoption and retention of laws and law
enforcement practices destructive of the trucking busi-
ness, to create an atmosphere of distaste for the truck-
ers among the general public, and to impair the
relationships existing between the truckers and their
customers. [Id., 129-30]... .

“Notwithstanding this deceptive and unethical busi-
ness conduct, the [c]ourt held that the Sherman Act
did not apply to proscribe it. See [id., 140-41]. [The
court in Noerr stated that] [iJnsofar as [the Sherman]

220 Po
Po
Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that
condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and
. a publicity campaign to influence governmental
action falls clearly into the category of political activity.
The proscriptions of the [Sherman] Act, tailored as they
are for the business world, are not at all appropriate
for application in the political arena. [Id.]

“In conclusion, [the court in] Noerr noted that the
fight between the railroads and the truckers appears
to have been conducted along lines normally accepted.
in our political system, except to the extent that each
group has deliberately deceived the public and public
officials. And that deception, reprehensible as it is, can
be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is
concerned. [Id., 144-45].

ae He oe

“More recently, the [United States] Supreme Court,
relying on its reasoning in Noerr, held that the Sherman.
Act did not proscribe private citizens’ conduct under-
taken to influence government action, even if that con-
duct involved conspiracy or bribery. In [Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., supra, 499 U.S. 365],
a jury found that a billboard company conspired with
city officials to obtain legislation that protected the
billboard company’s monopolization of the billboard
market within the city [of Columbia, South Carolina]
and that restrained the business of a competitor bill-
board company. See [id., 368-69]. Nevertheless, the
. . . [cJourt held that the Sherman Act did not apply
to such conduct, which was undertaken to influence
governmental action. See [id., 384]. In reaching this
conclusion, the [clourt first rejected a conspiracy
exception to Parker state-action immunity. See [id.,
374-75]. Since it is both inevitable and desirable that
public officials often agree to do what one or another
group of private citizens urges upon them, such an

Pe 221
j$_ TT

exception would virtually swallow up the Parker rule:
All anticompetitive regulation would be vulnerable to
a conspiracy charge. [Id., 375]. The [c]ourt applied this
same reasoning to reject a conspiracy exception to
Noerr immunity, too: The same factors [that] . . .
make it impracticable or beyond the purpose of the
antitrust laws to identify and invalidate lawmaking that
has been infected by selfishly motivated agreement with
private interests likewise make it impracticable or
beyond that scope to identify and invalidate lobbying
that has produced selfishly motivated agreement with
public officials. It would be unlikely that any effort to
influence legislative action could succeed unless one
or more members of the legislative body became . . .
co-conspirators in some sense with the private party
urging such action. [Id., 383-84]... .

“[Columbia] went further, rejecting exceptions to
Parker and Noerr immunity even for conspiracies
involving corruption. See [id., 376-79]. A conspiracy
exception narrowed along such vague lines is similarly
impractical. Few governmental actions are immune
from the charge that they are not in the public interest
or in some sense corrupt. . . . The fact is that virtually
all regulation benefits some segments of . . . society
and harms others; and that it is not universally consid-
ered contrary to public good if the net economic loss
to the losers exceeds the net economic gain to the
winners. [Id., 377]... .

“{To] carve out a special exclusion to [the] Noerr-
Pennington" [doctrine] when the corruption involves
some ill-defined and open-ended concept of bribery or
other acts that might violate state or federal law . . .
would, of course, vitiate [the] Noerr-Pennington [doc-
trine] almost entirely because there is hardly any lob-

" United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S, 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L.
Ed. 2d 626 (1965).

222 Po
PF CY
bying effort that is not open to at least a charge of some
illegal dealings when important economic interests are
at stake. . . . The Supreme Court in [Columbia] under-
stood that risk and held that corruption—and even brib-
ery explicitly—would not vitiate a claim of Noerr-
Pennington immunity. The [clourt said: Such unlawful
activity has no necessary relationship to whether the
governmental action is in the public interest. A mayor
is guilty of accepting a bribe even if he would and should
have taken, in the public interest, the same action for
which the bribe was paid . . . . To use unlawful politi-
cal influence as the test of legality of state regulation
undoubtedly vindicates (in a rather blunt way) princi-
ples of good government. But the [Sherman Act] .. .
is not directed to that end. Congress has passed other
laws aimed at combating corruption in state and local
governments. Insofar as the Sherman Act sets up a
code of ethics at all, it is a code that condemns trade
restraints not political activity. [Id., 378-79].” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Coll v. First
American Title Ins. Co., supra, 642 F.3d 896-98; see also
Armstrong Surgical Center, Inc. v. Armstrong County
Memorial Hospital, 185 F.3d 154, 162 (8d Cir. 1999)
(“Liability for [anticompetitive] injuries caused by . . .
state action is precluded [under the Sherman Act] even
[when] it is alleged that a private party urging the action
did so by bribery, deceit or other wrongful conduct that
may have affected the decision making process. The
remedy for such conduct rests with laws addressed to
it and not with courts looking behind sovereign state
action at the behest of antitrust plaintiffs. Federalism
requires this result both with respect to state actors
and with respect to private parties who have urged the
state action.”), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261, 120 S. Ct.
2716, 147 L. Ed. 2d 982 (2000); Comet Mechanical Con-
tractors, Inc. v. E. A. Cowen Construction, Inc., supra,
609 F.2d 406-407 (plaintiff's allegation that it was

Po 228
P|

denied government contract because it refused to pay
bribe to government official did not establish antitrust.
violation); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 582 F.2d 674, 687 (9th Cir.) (“commercial bribery,
standing alone, does not constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940, 97 S. Ct. 355,
50 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1976).

As the foregoing case law makes clear, the plaintiff's
allegation that the defendants took bribes and kick-
backs in exchange for steering public contracts does
not state a cognizable antitrust claim.” Accordingly,
‘we agree with the Appellate Court that the trial court
properly granted the defendants’ motions to strike the
plaintiff's amended complaint.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.
|

2 This does not mean that there can be no remedy for the plaintiff's
injuries. Indeed, the plaintiff brought a separate action against several of
the defendants for, among other wrongful acts, breach of contract, tortious
interference with contractual relations, and violation of the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. See
Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 131 Conn. App. 99, 104, 30 A.8d
703 (2011). The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on several
counts and awarded the plaintiff $366,524 in damages. Id., 111-12. Thereafter,
the court awarded the plaintiff punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs
in accordance with the jury's findings on the CUTPA claim. Id., 113. The
Appellate Court recently affirmed the judgment in that case. Id., 178. Federal
authorities also successfully prosecuted several of the defendants for brib-
ery, mail fraud and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq, (1994), in addition to other crimes.

8
Esq

RMS RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES, LLC
v. ANNA M. MILLER ET AL.
(SC 18746)

Rogers, ©. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Eveleigh, Js.*

* This case was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court
consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Norcott, Palmer, Zarella,
McLachlan and Eveleigh. Although Justice Norcott was not present when
the case was argued before the court, he read the record, briefs and transcript
of oral argument prior to participating in this decision.

225

Argued September 19—officially released December 13, 2011

Christopher G. Brown, for the appellant (named
defendant).

Jeffrey M. Knickerbocker, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Robert M. Brochin, pro hac vice, with whom, on the
brief, was Michael A. Leone, for the appellee (interven-
ing plaintiff).

226 Po
Po

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The principal issue in this appeal is
whether General Statutes § 49-17! confers standing on
a holder of a promissory note to foreclose a mortgage.
The named defendant, Anna M. Miller,’ appeals’ from
the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by the trial
court following the granting of a motion for summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, RMS Residential Prop-
erties, LLC (RMS).* On appeal, the defendant contends
that RMS lacked standing to commence the foreclosure
action because it was not the owner of the promissory
note at the time it commenced the foreclosure action
and there is no statutory authority that confers standing
on a mere holder of a note to foreclose a mortgage.
Accordingly, the defendant further claims that the trial
court improperly concluded that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that RMS was entitled
to judgment of foreclosure by sale as a matter of law.
The defendant next contends that (1) the mortgage was
void, ab initio, and (2) that the court improperly relied
upon a fatally infirm affidavit. In response, the plaintiffs,

1 General Statutes § 49-17 provides: “When any mortgage is foreclosed by
the person entitled to receive the money secured thereby but to whom the
legal title to the mortgaged premises has never been conveyed, the title to
such premises shall, upon the expiration of the time limited for redemption
and on failure of redemption, vest in him in the same manner and to the
same extent as such title would have vested in the mortgagee if he had
foreclosed, provided the person so foreclosing shall forthwith cause the
decree of foreclosure to be recorded in the land records in the town in
which the land lies.”

? The defendants Citibank South Dakota, N.A., and the Internal Revenue
Service, are not parties to this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer
to the named defendant, Anna M. Miller, also known as Anna K. Miller, as
the defendant throughout this opinion.

*'The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

4 Both RMS and the intervening plaintiff, Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (MERS), are parties to this appeal. We refer to them individually
by name when necessary, and collectively as the plaintiffs, for convenience.

Pe 227

ee
RMS and the intervening plaintiff, Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), contend that
because possession of a note raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a holder of anote is the owner of the debt,
§ 49-17 may confer standing to foreclose a mortgage on
a holder of a note, and that the mortgage was not void,
ab initio, nor the affidavit fatally infirm. We agree with
the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

“Because this appeal arises from the granting of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the [plaintiff], our review
proceeds from a view of the facts in the light most
favorable to the [defendant].” Gupta v. New Britain
General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 576, 687 A.2d 111
(1996). The record reveals the following facts and pro-
cedural history. The defendant executed a promissory
note in the principal amount of $637,500 to Finance
America, LLC. As security for the note, the defendant
conveyed by way of mortgage deed her interest in real
property located at 32 Overshore Drive in the town of
Madison to MERS, as nominee for Finance America,
LLC. The defendant failed to make even a single mort-
gage payment and, thus, the balance due on her promis-
sory note was accelerated. The defendant’s mortgage
was thereafter assigned to RMS, and the assignment
was recorded in the town of Madison land records. RMS
became the holder of the note prior to the commence-
ment of the present foreclosure action, which was com-
menced by service of the summons and complaint.
Thereafter, the defendant filed an answer, special
defenses and a counterclaim. RMS next filed the affida-
vit of Thomas Gilmore, vice president with Specialized
Loan Servicing, LLC, attorney in fact of RMS, alleging
that, “prior to the commencement of this action, [RMS],
through its attorney . . . became the holder of the
note.”® The affidavit accompanied a motion for sum-

® The affidavit in the trial court record appears to be missing a page, on
which the affiant swears that RMS is not only the holder, but the owner of

228 PO

Po
mary judgment seeking judgment as to the complaint
and the defendant's counterclaim. The defendant filed
across motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
mortgage was void ab initio, and a motion to dismiss,
claiming that even if the mortgage was not void, RMS
lacked standing to institute the foreclosure action
because (a) it was not the rightful owner of the note
at the time the action was commenced, and (b) the
Gilmore affidavit was fatally infirm. Subsequently, the
trial court denied the motions for summary judgment
filed by RMS and the defendant, as well as the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, RMS moved to
reargue the denial of its motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted the motion to reargue, and after
ahearing, granted RMS’ motion for summary judgment
and theréafter rendered judgment of foreclosure by
sale. This appeal followed.

I

We begin with the defendant’s claim that RMS lacked
standing to commence this foreclosure action because
it presents a question as to the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., New Hartford v. Connecti-
cut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 511, 518,
970 A.2d 583 (2009). The defendant specifically argues
that even if RMS’ affidavit is admissible and the mort-
gage was not void ab initio, RMS did not have standing
to bring this foreclosure action because it did not own
the underlying debt when it commenced the action and
no statutory authority confers standing to foreclose on
a mere holder of the note. In response, the plaintiffs
argue that a holder of the note is presumed to be the
owner of the debt, and unless the defendant rebuts that
presumption, a holder of the note is entitled to foreclose

the debt. We note that had this missing page been included in the affidavit,
as apparently intended, the defendant’s primary argument would be ren-
dered moot.

Pe 229
PoC

the mortgage. We conclude that RMS had standing to
commence this action.

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery
in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the cause
of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest
in the subject matter of the controversy.” (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Bysiewicz v. DiNardo, 298
Conn. 748, 758, 6 A.3d 726 (2010). “Standing is estab-
lished by showing that the party claiming it is authorized
by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Paul Travelers
Cos. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 809, 12 A.3d 852 (2011).
“Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not
by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case.
In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, par-
ticular legislation grants standing to those who claim
injury to an interest protected by that legislation.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) Andross v. West
Hartford, 285 Conn. 309, 322, 939 A.2d 1146 (2008).
“Where a party is found to lack standing, the court
is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to
determine the cause.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Monroe v. Horwitch, 215 Conn. 469, 473, 576 A.2d
1280 (1990). “We have long held that because [a] deter-
mination regarding a trial court’s subject matter juris-
diction is a question of law, our review is plenary.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Tabone,
301 Conn. 708, 713-14, 23 A.3d 689 (2011).

Whether § 49-17 provides a holder of a note secured
by a mortgage with standing to bring a foreclosure
action is an issue of first impression for this court. The
Appellate Court has, however, consistently answered
this question in the affirmative. See, e.g., HSBC Bank
USA, N.A. v. Navin, 129 Conn. App. 707, 22 A.38d 647
(2011). We agree. Section 49-17 permits the “person

230 Pe
PO

entitled to receive the money secured” by a mortgage
to foreclose on the mortgage, even when the mortgage
has not yet been assigned to him. The defendant con-
tends that only the owner of the debt, not a mere holder
of the note, is entitled to foreclose on a mortgage. The
plaintiffs agree, but further contend that a holder of
the note is presumed to be the owner of the debt, and
unless the defendant rebuts that presumption, a holder
of the note is entitled to foreclose the mortgage. We
agree with the plaintiffs.

Section 49-17 codifies the well established common-
law principle that the mortgage follows the note, pursu-
ant to which only the rightful owner of the note has
the right to enforce the mortgage. See New Milford
Savings Bank v. Jajer, 244 Conn. 251, 266, 708 A.2d
1378 (1998); Restatement (Third), Property, Mortgages
§ 5.4, p. 380 (1997). Our legislature, by adopting § 49-
17, created a statutory right for the rightful owner of
a note to foreclose on real property regardless of
whether the mortgage has been assigned to him. See,
e.g., HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Navin, supra, 129 Conn.
App. 711; Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere, 119
Conn. App. 570, 576-77, 989 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 295
Conn. 922, 991 A.2d 564 (2010); Bankers Trust Co. of
California, N.A. v. Vaneck, 95 Conn. App. 390, 391, 899
A.2d 41, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 908, 901 A.2d 1225
(2006); Fleet National Bank v. Nazareth, 75 Conn. App.
791, 795, 818 A.2d 69 (2003).

Although the defendant challenges the existence of
amortgage on her property; see part II B of this opinion,
she also challenges the application of § 49-17 to RMS,
a mere holder of the promissory note. The defendant
contends that RMS’ affidavit amounts to an admission
that it is not the rightful owner of the underlying debt
and, as a matter of law, a mere holder of the note
lacks standing to foreclose unless that holder is also
the owner of the underlying debt. We disagree. RMS’

Pe 231

Po
standing to enforce the promissory note is provided by
the Uniform Commercial Code,’ pursuant to which only
a holder of an instrument, or someone who has the
rights of a holder, is a “ ‘[p]erson entitled to enforce’
an instrument ... .” General Statutes § 42a-3-301.7 A
holder is the entity, or person, in possession of the
instrument if the instrument is payable to the bearer.
General Statutes § 42a-1-201 (b) (21) (A). An instrument.
endorsed in blank “becomes payable to bearer and may
be negotiated by transfer of possession alone . . . .”
General Statutes § 42a-3-205 (b). In the present matter,
Finance America, LLC, endorsed the promissory note
in blank. Accordingly, “[RMS], by way of its possession
ofan instrument payable to [the] bearer, is a valid holder
of the instrument and, therefore, is entitled to enforce
it.” Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere, supra, 119
Conn. App. 577. ,

The defendant contends, however, that the holder of
the note’s power to enforce is merely at law (ie., the
right to enforce personal liability), and that a note
holder must demonstrate ownership of the underlying
debt to exercise the equitable power of foreclosure.
New England Savings Bank v. Bedford Realty Corp.,
238 Conn. 745, 759-60, 680 A.2d 301 (1996) (mere holder
of promissory note, if not owner of underlying debt,
cannot exercise equitable power of foreclosure). We
agree. We also, however, agree with the plaintiffs’ con-
tention that a holder of a note is presumed to be the
owner of the debt, and unless the presumption is rebut-

® The Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted by the Connecticut legisla-
ture, is codified at General Statutes § 42a-1-101 et seq.

7 General Statutes § 42a-8-301 provides: “ ‘Person entitled to enforce’ an
instrument means (j) the holder of the instrument, (Ji) anonholder in posses-
sion of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not
in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument
pursuant to section 42a-8-309 or 42a-3-418(d). A person may be a person
entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner
of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.”

282 Pe
Po

ted, may foreclose the mortgage under § 49-17. “The
possession by the bearer of a note indorsed in blank
imports prima facie that he acquired the note in good
faith for value and in the course of business, before
maturity and without notice of any circumstances
impeaching its validity. The production of the note
establishes his case prima facie against the makers and
he may rest there. . . . It [is] for the defendant to set up
and prove the facts which limit or change the plaintiff's
rights.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Garris v. Calechman, 118 Conn. 112, 115,
170 A. 789 (1934). Accordingly, because the defendant
offered no evidence to impeach the validity of RMS’
evidence that it possessed the note at the time that it
commenced the present action or to rebut the presump-
tion that RMS owns the underlying debt, and as a matter
of law the mortgage follows the note, we conclude
that RMS was authorized by statute to commence this
foreclosure action. Accordingly, the trial court properly
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
standing to bring the foreclosure action.

af

Having determined that RMS had standing to bring
the foreclosure action, we now address the defendant’s
secondary claims. The defendant contends that the
court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor
of RMS because (a) the power to foreclose a mortgage
is in the rightful owner of the debt, not a mere holder
of the note, and (b) in relying solely on business records,
RMS’ affidavit is inadmissible, and therefore there is
no evidence that RMS was the holder of the note when
it commenced the action. The defendant next contends
that the trial court improperly granted RMS’ motion for
summary judgment on its foreclosure complaint and
the defendant’s counterclaim because the mortgage
purports to convey legal title to MERS, an entity that
did not make the underlying loan and never had any

Po 233”
es

interest in the underlying debt, rendering the mortgage
void ab initio.

“The principles that govern our review of a trial
court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment are
well established. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that
summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The
party moving for summary judgment has the burden of
showing the absence of any genuine issue of material
fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment
as a matter of law... .

“In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
court’s function is not to decide issues of material fact
. . . but rather to determine whether any such issues
exist. . . . The courts hold the movant to a strict stan-
dard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a
showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that
excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any
genuine issue of material fact. . . . Once the moving
party has met its burden [of production] . . . the
opposing party must present evidence that demon-
strates the existence of some disputed factual issue.
. . . [I]t [is] incumbent [on] the party opposing sum-
mary judgment to establish a factual predicate from
which it can be determined, as a matter of law, that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. . . . The presence

. of an alleged adverse claim is not sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment... . :

“On appeal, the reviewing court must determine
whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court
are legally and logically correct and whether they find

234 Po

ee
support in the facts set out in the memorandum of
decision of the trial court. . . . [Rleview of the trial
court’s decision to grant [a party’s] motion for summary
judgment is plenary.” (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Episcopal Church in the Diocese
of Connecticut v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408, 421-22, 28 A.3d
302 (2011).

A

For the reasons stated in our analysis of the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude that, on
the issue of RMS’ power to foreclose given the evidence
introduced that it was the holder of the note, the court
properly found that there was no genuine issue of mate-
vial fact and rendered summary judgment for RMS.
“(T]he party seeking summary judgment has the burden
of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] mate-
rial facts which, under applicable principles of substan-
tive law, entitle him to . . . judgment as a matter of
Jaw ... and the party opposing such a motion must
provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact... .”
(nternal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Podi-
atric Medical Assn. v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc.,
302 Conn. 464, 486, 28 A.3d 958 (2011). RMS offered a
sworn affidavit stating that it was the holder of the
promissory note at the time it commenced this foreclo-
sure action. No evidence was offered by the defendant
to counter that evidence or the presumption that arises
from it. As previously stated, RMS need only prove
that it was the holder of the note when it initiated the
foreclosure action, and that the note was secured by a
mortgage. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Navin, supra, 129
Conn. App. 713. It is for the maker of the note to rebut
the presumption that a holder of the note is also the
owner of it. Garris v. Calechman, supra, 118 Conn.
115. Therefore, having failed to present any evidence
rebutting the presumption that RMS was the rightful

Po 235

owner of the debt at the time that it commenced the
foreclosure action, the defendant has failed to satisfy
her burden of providing any evidentiary foundation to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly
granted RMS’ motion for summary judgment and denied
the defendant's cross motion.

The defendant next contends that RMS’ affiant lacked
personal knowledge of necessary facts, and therefore
his reliance on a review of business records rendered
the affidavit fatally infirm under Practice Book § 17-
46.5 If the defendant is correct, the trial court improperly
rendered summary judgment in favor of RMS on its
foreclosure complaint because there is no admissible
evidence that RMS was holder of the note when it com-
menced the foreclosure action. The plaintiffs contend
in response that the affiant properly relied on business
records and that the affidavit is admissible. We agree
with the plaintiffs.

The defendant provides no authority, and we know
of none, that precludes affiants from obtaining personal
knowledge of underlying transactions by review of busi-
ness records. Under General Statutes § 52-180,° to be

® Practice Book § 17-46 provides in relevant part: “Supporting and oppos-
ing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. . . .”

° General Statutes § 52-180 provides in relevant part: “(a) Any writing or
record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a
memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall
be admissible as evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, if
the trial judge finds that it was made in the regular course of any business,
and that it was the regular course of the business to make the writing or
record at the time of the act, transaction, or occurrence or event or within
a reasonable time thereafter.

“(b) The writing or record shall not be rendered inadmissible by (1) a
party's failure to produce as witnesses the person or persons who made the
writing or record, or who have personal knowledge of the act, transaction,
occurrence or event recorded or (2) the party's failure to show that such
persons are unavailable as witnesses. Either of such facts and all other

236 Po
Po

competent to testify, the affiant need only have personal
knowledge of the relevant business records. See, e.g.,
Zbras v. St. Vincent’s Medical Center, 91 Conn. App.
289, 294, 880 A.2d 999 (affidavit admissible despite affi-
ant’s reliance on business records rather than personal
involvement with act, transaction or occurrence
recounted therein), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 910, 886
A.2d 424 (2005). We find the defendant's reliance on
Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239
Conn. 574, to be misplaced." Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court properly found that the affidavit
supplied an evidentiary basis for summary judgment in.
favor of the plaintiffs.

B

Second, the defendant contends that the mortgage
was void, ab initio, because it was not granted to the
owner of the debt. The defendant posits that, if the
mortgage was void ab initio, the debt was not secured
by any real property and therefore no party may fore-
close on the defendant’s property regardless of her
default on the promissory note. Accordingly, the defen-
dant claims that the mortgage should be discharged
and title quieted in her name. The plaintiffs contend,
in response, that a lender may designate a third party

circumstances of the making of the writing or record, including lack of
personal Inowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect the
weight of the evidence, but not to affect its admissibility. . . .”

Tn Gupta, the plaintiff testified by affidavit that the defendant hospital's
decision to terminate his participation in its residency program resulted
from conduct of the hospital that was arbitrary, capricious and in bad faith.
Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, supra, 239 Com. 594. The plaintiff
claimed that in light of his performance records, a reasonable fact finder
could have inferred that the defendant dismissed him due to improper
motivations. Id., 596-97. We declined “to construct such inferential bridges
or to substitute the plaintiffs appraisal of his performance for that of the
hospital,” concluding that a difference in judgment with regard to the plain-
tiff's performance was not evidence of any material fact. Id., 597. In the
present matter, the affidavit does not suggest inferences, but provides evi-
dence of facts that give rise to a legal presumption.

Po 237
PO

to serve as mortgagee from the very inception of the
mortgage. We agree with the plaintiffs.

“The general rule of law in this jurisdiction, having
in mind the purpose and effect of our recording system,
undoubtedly is . . . that valid and enforceable mort-
gages, so far as the rights of subsequent claimants are
concerned, must show by their record with reasonable
certainty the real nature of the transaction involved so
far as it can be disclosed, so that such claimants may
be able to determine the real facts or may be so
informed that they can by common prudence and by
the exercise of ordinary diligence, ascertain the extent
of the incumbrance.” First National Bank of Bridge-
port v. National Grain Corp., 103 Conn. 657, 662-63,
131 A. 404 (1925). “In the absence of fraud, a mortgage
may be held for the security of the real creditor, whether
he is the party named as [the] mortgagee or some other
party, for the provisions of a mortgage are not necessar-
ily personal to the mortgagee named. The real party
in interest may be an assignee of the mortgagee or
[someone] subrogated to his rights under the mortgage,
or even a third person not answering either of these
descriptions. . . . So, it has been held that where a
mortgage is given to the cashier of a bank in his individ-
ual name, for the purpose of securing a debt due from
the mortgagor to the bank, the mortgage is a good and
valid security in the favor of the bank . . . and a mort-
gage given to the administrator of an estate enures to
the estate of which he is the representative.” (Citations
omitted.) Id., 663-64.

The defendant contends that MERS, because it was
not the original lender, was not the party secured by the
mortgage, and accordingly could not validly be named.
mortgagee. The mortgage, however, plainly discloses
that MERS was named mortgagee as nominee for the
original lender, Finance America, LLC. Accordingly, the
real nature of the transaction was properly and suffi-

238 PO
Po

ciently disclosed. The defendant does not contest that
the original lender could create the mortgage interest
to secure the debt, and then assign it to MERS. Accord-
ingly, the defendant’s contention is that the lender may
not accomplish in one recorded transaction that which
it could undisputedly achieve in two. The mortgage
makes clear that MERS is named mortgagee by the
lender. MERS holds mortgages, given in good faith for
the purpose of securing a debt, for the security of credi-
tors." To hold such mortgages void would be to frus-
trate the intentions of both mortgagors and mortgagees.
Accordingly, we conclude that a mortgage is not void,
ab initio, by virtue of the naming of a nominee of the
disclosed lender as mortgagee.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.
De

JEAN O'CONNOR v. MED-CENTER HOME
HEALTH CARE, ING., ET AL.
(SC 18382)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js.

4 For a critical discussion of the origin and role of MERS in real estate
transactions, see C. Peterson, “Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending,
and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System,” 78 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1359 (2010).

239

Argued September 8—officially released December 13, 2011

Robert K. Jahn, for the appellants (defendants).
Jean O’Connor, pro se, the appellee (plaintiff).

240 Po
Pot
Opinion

PALMER, J. In this certified appeal, the defendants,
Med-Center Home Health Care, Inc., and AIG Claims
Service, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the Appellate
Court, which dismissed their appeal from the decision
of the compensation review board (board) upholding
the decision of the workers’ compensation commis-
sioner for the fifth district (commissioner) awarding
the plaintiff, Jean O’Connor, total disability benefits
and reimbursement for certain prescription medication
payments and mileage under the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. The
board affirmed the commissioner’s decision in all
respects but remanded the case to the commissioner
for a determination of the specific amounts to be reim-
bursed to the plaintiff. The commissioner subsequently
issued supplemental findings and an award specifying
those amounts, and the defendants appealed to the
Appellate Court, claiming that the board improperly
had upheld the commissioner’s finding of total disabil-
ity. The Appellate Court, sua sponte, dismissed the
appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, conclud-
ing, in reliance on Fantasia v. Tony Pantano Mason
Contractors, Inc., 54 Conn. App. 194, 732 A.2d 822, cert.
denied, 250 Conn. 927, 738 A.2d 655 (1999), that General
Statutes § 31-301 (a)! required the defendants to appeal
to the board from the commissioner’s supplemental
findings and award and, further, that their failure to
do so deprived the Appellate Court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the appeal. We granted the defendants’
petition for certification to appeal limited to the follow-

1 General Statutes § 31-301 (a) provides in relevant part: “At any time
within twenty days after entry of an award by the commissioner, after
a decision of the commissioner upon a motion or after an order by the
commissioner according to the provisions of section 31-299b, either party
may appeal therefrom to the Compensation Review Board by filing in the
office of the commissioner from which the award or the decision on a
motion originated an appeal petition and five copies thereof. . . .”

Po 24

Po
ing issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly determine
that it lacked jurisdiction over the present appeal?”
O’Connor v. Med-Center Home Health Care, Inc., 292
Conn. 910, 973 A.2d 107 (2009). We conclude that the
Appellate Court has jurisdiction over the appeal and,
accordingly, reverse its judgment.

The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our disposition of this appeal. The plaintiff filed
a claim for workers’ compensation benefits for injuries
that she had sustained while employed by Med-Center
Home Health Care, Inc. The commissioner found that
the plaintiff's injuries were’ compensable under the act
and awarded the plaintiff total disability benefits. The
commissioner also ordered the defendants to reimburse
the plaintiff for certain mileage and prescription medi-
cation costs related to her covered injuries. The defen-
dants appealed from the commissioner's decision to
the board, which upheld the commissioner's findings
and award but remanded the case to the commissioner
for a determination of the specific amounts to be reim-
bursed to the plaintiff. Prior to the commencement of
the proceedings on remand, the defendants appealed
from the decision of the board to the Appellate Court,
which, sua sponte, dismissed the appeal for lack of a
final judgment due to the fact that the board had
remanded the case to the commissioner for a determina-
tion of the specific amounts to be reimbursed. The
Appellate Court concluded that the board’s decision
was not a final judgment because the proceedings on
remand would require the commissioner to take addi-
tional evidence and exercise independent judgment
or discretion.”

2 We note that the defendants contend that the board’s remand order did
not require the commissioner to take additional evidence because, during
the original hearing on the plaintiff's claims for reimbursement for the
cost of prescription medication and for mileage, the plaintiff already had
submitted documentary evidence detailing the full extent of those costs,
which the commissioner had accepted as full exhibits.

242 Po
PTT

Following the commissioner's issuance of his supple-
mental findings and award specifying the amounts to
be reimbursed to the plaintiff, the defendants brought
a second appeal to the Appellate Court, claiming that
the board improperly had upheld the commissioner’s
finding that the plaintiff is totally disabled. After the
parties filed their briefs, the Appellate Court, again, on
its own motion, ordered the parties “to appear and give
reasons, if any, why the appeal should not be dismissed
because [the defendants’] failure to appeal to the
[board] following the commissioner’s [supplemental]
award deprives the Appellate Court of jurisdiction over
the appeal. See Fantasia v. Tony Pantano Mason Con-
tractors, Inc., [supra, 54 Conn. App. 194].”

At oral argument before the Appellate Court on that
court's order to show cause, both the defendants and
the plaintiff maintained that the Appellate Court had
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to General Stat-
utes (Rev. to 2009) § 31-301b’ because the defendants
were not challenging or aggrieved by the commission-
er’s supplemental findings and award specifying the
amounts to be reimbursed to the plaintiff, only the
board’s earlier decision upholding the commissioner's
finding of total disability. The defendants maintained
that, because they were not aggrieved by the supple-
mental findings and award, there was no reason for
them to appeal to the board from those findings and

® General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 31-301b provides: “Any party aggrieved
by the decision of the Compensation Review Board upon any question or
questions of law arising in the proceedings may appeal the decision of the
Compensation Review Board to the Appellate Court.”

All references in this opinion to § 31-01b are to the 2009 revision.

We note that, subsequent to our granting of certification in this case, the
legislature enacted Public Acts 2009, No. 09-178, § 1 (P.A. 09-178), which
amended § 31-301b to permit appeals from decisions of the board to the
Appellate Court “whether or not the decision is a final decision within the
meaning of [General Statutes §] 4-183 or a final judgment within the meaning
of [General Statutes §] 52-263.” The parties do not claim that P.A. 09-178,
§ 1, applies to the board’s decision in the present case.

PO 243
Po

award. Indeed, the defendants asserted that such an
appeal likely would be viewed by the board as unneces-
sary and a waste of time and resources. Additionally,
the defendants argued that, because the commissioner
had performed a purely ministerial act in determining
the amounts to be reimbursed to the plaintiff, the
board’s decision to uphold the commissioner's initial
findings and award was an appealable final judgment.
Finally, the defendants claimed that Fantasia v. Tony
Pantano Mason Contractors, Inc., supra, 54 Conn. App.
194, was factually distinguishable and therefore not
controlling with respect to the jurisdictional issue
raised by the court. The Appellate Court was not per-
suaded by these arguments and dismissed the appeal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the Appellate Court denied. This appeal followed.

On appeal to this court, the defendants claim that the
Appellate Court improperly concluded that Fantasia v.
Tony Pantano Mason Contractors, Inc., supra, 54 Conn.
App. 194, required them to appeal to the board from
the commissioner’s supplemental findings and award,
and that their failure to do so deprived the Appellate
Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.
The defendants contend that the jurisdictional require-
ments of § 31-301b, which governs appeals from the
board to the Appellate Court, were fully satisfied in this
case and that the Appellate Court’s conclusion to the
contrary is incorrect. We agree.

General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 31-301b provides
that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the decision of the [board]
upon any question or questions of law arising in the
proceedings may appeal the decision of the [board] to
the Appellate Court.” Despite the broad language of
§ 31-801b, for more than eighteen years, we interpreted
that statute as imposing a final judgment requirement
on appeals from the board to the Appellate Court such

244 Po
Pe

that, “[w]hen the board remand[ed] a case to the com-
missioner for further proceedings in connection with
the challenged award, the finality of the board’s deci-
sion [was] called into question . . . . In such circum-
stances, [t]he test that determine[d] whether such a
decision [was] a final judgment turn[ed] on the scope of
the proceedings on remand: if such further proceedings
[were] merely ministerial, the decision [was] an appeal-
able final judgment, but if further proceedings [would]
require the exercise of independent judgment or discre-
tion and the taking of additional evidence, the appeal
[was] premature and [had to] be dismissed.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hummel v.
Marten Transport, Lid., 282 Conn. 477, 485, 923 A.2d
657 (2007). “The policy concerns underlying the final
judgment rule are to discourage piecemeal appeals and
to facilitate the speedy and orderly disposition of cases
at the trial court level.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Mazurek v. Great American Ins. Co., 284 Conn.
16, 33, 930 A.2d 682 (2007).

This case clearly does not implicate the policies that
animated the final judgment requirement of § 31-301b
prior to its amendment in 2009. See footnote 3 of this
opinion. Moreover, the Appellate Court did not dismiss
the defendants’ second appeal for lack of a final judg-
ment. Indeed, the board’s decision upholding the com-
missioner’s initial findings and award was a final
judgment when the defendants filed their second
appeal. Even if that decision had not been a final judg-
ment at the time of its issuance because the proceedings
on remand were not purely ministerial, the decision
certainly would have become a final one upon the termi-
nation of those proceedings, at which time no party
‘was aggrieved by the supplemental findings and award.
We therefore agree with the defendants that the jurisdic-
tional requirements of § 31-301b were fully satisfied
when they filed their second appeal.

Pp __| 245
Po

We also agree with the defendants that the Appellate
Court improperly concluded, on the basis of Fantasia
v. Tony Pantano Mason Contractors, Inc., supra, 54
Conn. App. 195, 200-201, that § 31-301 (a) required them
to appeal to the board from the commissioner’s supple-
mental findings and award, and that their failure to
do so deprived the Appellate Court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the appeal. General Statutes § 31-301
(a) simply provides that an aggrieved party “may”
appeal to the board “[a]t any time within twenty days
after entry of an award by the commissioner . . . .”
There is nothing in the language of that provision to
suggest that a party must appeal to the board when an
award is issued after a remand for further proceedings
in connection with a challenged award if the party is not
aggrieved by the subsequent award. In fact, requiring an
appeal to the board in such circumstances would
impose a wholly unnecessary burden on the parties and
the board by forcing them to participate in an unwanted
and meaningless appellate proceeding, the result of
which would be both uncontested and preordained.
This completely untenable result cannot be mandated

- by § 31-301 (a). To the extent that Fantasia v. Tony
Pantano Mason Contractors, Inc., supra, 195, 200-201,
holds to the contrary, it is hereby overruled.

4 Although the defendants have contended, both in this court and in the
Appellate Court, that Fantasia v. Tony Pantano Mason Contractors, Inc.,
supra, 54 Conn. App. 194, is factually distinguishable from the present case
and therefore not controlling with respect to the jurisdictional issue pre-
sented by this appeal, we see no material difference between that case and
the present case. In Fantasia, the Appellate Court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction over an appeal because the appellant had failed to appeal to
the board from a supplemental finding and award issued after a remand by
the board for further proceedings in connection with a challenged award,
even though the appellant was not aggrieved by the supplemental finding
and award. 1d., 196-97, 200-201. Although the reasoning of the Appellate
Court in Fantasia is not entirely clear, it appears that the court based its
decision on the belief that the board had a right or obligation to determine
“whether the proceedings of the commissioner [on remand] were consistent
with [the board’s] opinion”; id., 200; even though no party was aggrieved
by those proceedings. The Appellate Court did not cite any statutory or

246

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court for further proceed-
ings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ARNOLD BELL
(SC 18715)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan,
Eveleigh and Harper, Js.

other authority for this conclusion, however, and we are aware of none.
Indeed, we can think of no reason why an appeal to the board should be
required under such circumstances, and, as we have discussed, there is

compelling reason why such a requirement should not be engrafted onto
the statute.

OO

Argued April 25—officially released December 27, 2011

Po 249
—
|

Jeffrey C. Kestenband, special public defender, with
whom was William H. Paetzold, for the appellant
(defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington,
state’s attorney, Gary Nicholson, senior assistant state’s
attorney, and Kevin Doyle, assistant state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).

Opinion

PALMER, J. The defendant, Arnold Bell, was con-
victed, following a jury trial, of assault in the first degree
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5), carrying
apistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2001) § 29-35 (a), and criminal possession of
a pistol in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2001)
§ 58a-217c (a) (1). After further findings by the jury
on a second part of the information and a subsequent
hearing by the court, the trial court enhanced the defen-
dant’s sentence for being a persistent dangerous felony
offender in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2001)
§ 53a-40,! and for committing a class A, B or C felony

1 General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 58a-40 provides in relevant part: “(a)
A persistent dangerous felony offender is a person who:

“(2 (A) Stands convicted of manslaughter, arson, kidnapping, robbery in
the fixst or second degree, or assault in the first degree, and (B) has been,
prior to the commission of the present crime, convicted of and imprisoned
under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of
death, in this state or in any other state or ina federal correctional institution,

250 Po

with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53-
202k. The defendant appealed directly to this court from
the judgment of conviction, claiming, inter alia, that the
trial court had violated his constitutional rights to due
process and a jury trial because the court, rather than
the jury, found that the state had established the neces-
sary factual predicate for his sentence enhancement
under § 53a-40 (h). See State v. Bell, 283 Conn. 748,
752-53, 931 A.2d 198 (2007). This court concluded that
§ 53a-40 (h) was unconstitutional to the extent that it
required the trial court to make the requisite finding,
that is, that the defendant’s extended incarceration
would best serve the public interest. See id., 810. We
further determined that the legislature would have
intended that the remainder of the statute continue to
operate independently with the jury as the fact finder
on the issue of whether extended incarceration would
best serve the public interest. See id., 811-12. Accord-
ingly, we reversed that portion of the judgment and
remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentenc-
ing proceeding at which the jury would make the requi-
site finding. Id., 812-13. On remand, the jury found that

for any of the following crimes: (i) The crimes enumerated in subparagraph
(A) of this subdivision or an attempt to commit any of said crimes... .
ee

“(h) When any person has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony
offender, and the court is of the opinion that such person's history and
character and the nature and circumstances of such person's criminal con-
duct indicate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best
serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of
imprisonment authorized by section 53a-35 for the crime of which such
person presently stands convicted, or authorized by section 58a-35a if the
crime of which such person presently stands convicted was committed on
or after July 1, 1981, shall sentence such person to a term of imprisonment
of not more than forty years... .”

Although General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a-40 (d) was amended in
2001; see Public Acts 2001, No. 01-84, § 18; that particular subsection is not
relevant to this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, all references in this
opinion to § 53a-40 are to the 2001 revision, unless otherwise noted.

Po 251
—

extended incarceration of the defendant would best
serve the public interest, and the trial court again
imposed an enhanced sentence pursuant to § 53a-40
(h). The defendant then filed this appeal, claiming that
the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to dis-
miss the second part of the information on the ground
that the retroactive application to him of the constitu-
tional gloss that this court placed on § 53a-40 (h) in
Bell violated the ex post facto clause of the United
States constitution,’ (2) construed the term “public
interest,” as used in § 53a-40 (h), to exclude considera-
tions of the costs of incarceration, (8) precluded the
defendant from introducing expert testimony about his
anticipated release date from a concurrent federal sen-
tence, and (4) admitted evidence of the details of the
victim’s injuries. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts
and procedural history. The defendant was convicted
of assault in the first degree, carrying a pistol without.
a permit, and criminal possession of a pistol in connec-
tion with the shooting of Robert Fumiatti, a New Haven
police officer, on June 13, 2002. Id., 751-52, 755. After
the jury returned its guilty verdict, the state presented
its evidence on the second part of the information, in
which the state charged the defendant with being a
persistent dangerous felony offender because, prior to
his conviction in the present case of assault in the first
degree, he had been convicted of robbery in the first
degree. Id., 786. The jury found that the state had proved
the two convictions and that the defendant was a persis-
tent offender within the meaning of § 53a-40. See id.,

2 The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of
the trial court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

*-The constitution of the United States, article one, § 10, provides in rele-
‘vant part: “No State shall... pass any . . . ex post facto Law... .”

252 Po

786-87. Thereafter, the trial court, Devlin, J., conducted
a hearing on the question of whether the defendant's
“history and character and the nature and circum-
stances of [his] criminal conduct indicate that extended
incarceration and lifetime supervision will best serve
the public interest . . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to
2001) § 53a-40 (h). The trial court concluded that
extended incarceration of the defendant would best
serve the public interest and imposed a sentence of
forty years on the assault charge, effectively doubling
the otherwise prescribed maximum term of imprison-
ment of twenty years.’ State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn.
787-88; see General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 58a-35a
(6).

On appeal to this court, the defendant challenged the
propriety of his enhanced sentence pursuant to § 53a-
40 (h), claiming that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 1208. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and
its progeny, the jury, not the trial court, was required to
decide whether the defendant’s extended incarceration
would best serve the public interest. See State v. Bell,
supra, 283 Conn. 753. This court agreed with the defen-
dant that § 53a-40 (h) was unconstitutional under
Apprendi insofar as the statute does not provide that
a defendant is entitled to have the jury consider the
question of whether an enhanced sentence is warranted
under § 58a-40 (h). See id., 810. After concluding that
“the legislature would have adopted [§ 53a-40 (h)] with-
out the requirement that the court make the requisite
public interest finding”; (emphasis in original) id., 812;
we remedied the constitutional infirmity by excising
from § 53a-40 (h) the language “ ‘the court is of the

“The trial court also imposed a five year concurrent term of imprisonment
for the conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit, a five year concurrent
term of imprisonment for the conviction of criminal possession of a pistol,
and five year consecutive term of imprisonment.as asentence enhancement
for committing a class A, B or C felony with a firearm, for a total effective
term of imprisonment of forty-five years.

PO 258
—

opinion that’ ”; id., 811-12; and remanded the case to
the trial court for “a new sentencing proceeding [at
which] the jury [would] make the determination,
beyond a reasonable doubt, whether, upon consider-
ation of the relevant factors [in] § 53a-40 (h), extended
incarceration [would] best serve the public interest.”
Id., 812-13.

On remand, a trial on the public interest issue was
held before the court, Licari, J. When the jury was
unable to agree unanimously on a verdict, the trial court
declared a mistrial, and a new trial was ordered. Before
retrial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the sec-
ond part of the information on the ground that this
court in State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn. 810, had con-
cluded § 53a-40 (h) was unconstitutional and that “[t]he
retroactive application of an unconstitutional statute
to [the defendant] violates his right to due process and
[is] against the imposition of ex post facto laws.” The
trial court, Blue, J., denied the motion.

At trial, the state presented evidence from which the
jury reasonably could have found that the defendant
committed the offenses in the manner described in our
opinion in State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn. 753-58. The
state also presented evidence that, between 1983 and
2002, the year of his arrest in the present case, the
defendant had been convicted of first degree robbery,
third degree robbery, possession of narcotics, posses-
sion of narcotics with intent to sell, conspiracy to sell
narcotics, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
and third degree assault, and had spent extended peri-
ods in prison. The defendant committed a number of
these crimes while he was in prison, on furlough or on
probation. Indeed, the defendant was on supervised
release from federal prison, where he was serving a
sentence for a federal firearms violation, when he
shot Fumiatti.

254 Po
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The defendant presented evidence that the area of
the city of New Haven where he lived was dangerous
and that drive-by shootings were common.’ A childhood
friend of the defendant, Penny Toney, testified that,
despite having grown up in this dangerous neighbor-
hood, the defendant was friendly and respectful; he
would ensure that she arrived home safely after block
parties and dances that they had attended when they
were younger; he would help neighbors carry groceries;
he married his pregnant girlfriend; and he took care of
their daughter, Ahmia Bell. Ahmia Bell testified that the
defendant was a good father when he was not in prison.
The defendant also presented evidence that he was
employed when he committed the offenses at issue in
the present case and that he was a good employee.
Finally, the defendant adduced evidence that, while
he was in prison, he had been mature, responsible,
cooperative and industrious, and that, during one period
of incarceration, he had attended a daily school pro-
gram and had volunteered to assist other inmates.

The jury found that the state had proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s history and
character and the nature and circumstances of his crimi-
nal conduct indicated that his extended incarceration
would best serve the public interest pursuant to § 53a-
40 (h), and the trial court, Blue, J., imposed the same
sentence for the assault conviction that the court, Dev-
lin, J., had imposed after the first trial, that is, forty
years imprisonment.’ This appeal followed.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial
court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the sec-

® The defendant apparently introduced this evidence to raise an inference
that he had shot Fumiatti because he did not know that Fumiatti was a
police officer but believed that Fumiatti and other police officers were
engaged in a drive-by shooting.

® Accordingly, the defendant's effective term of imprisonment after
remand again totaled forty-five years. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

Po 255
—

ond part of the information because the retroactive
application of this court’s ruling in State v. Bell, supra,
283 Conn. 810, to the defendant violates the ex post
facto clause. Specifically, the defendant contends that
§ 58a-40 (h), as modified by this court in Bell, is inopera-
ble because it does not provide for any fact finder on
the issue of public interest,’ and the retroactive applica-
tion of this court’s conclusion in Bell that the jury must
act as the fact finder on that issue violates the ex post
facto clause. The defendant further argues that, even
if the application of § 53a-40 (h) to him does not violate
the ex post facto clause, this court’s determination in
Bell that the portion of the statute that we did not excise
is severable and should continue to operate as modified
was incorrect as a matter of statutory interpretation.®
We disagree with both claims.°

After this court in State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn. 811-12, excised the
phrase “ ‘the court is of the opinion that’ ” from General Statutes (Rev. to
2001) § 532-40 (h), that subsection provided in relevant part: “When any
person has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender, and
. . . such person’s history and character and the nature and circumstances
of such person’s criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and
lifetime supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of
imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by . . . section 53a-35a
. . . shall sentence such person to ‘a term of imprisonment of not more
than forty years... .”

® Although the defendant's claim implicates the principles embodied in
the ex post facto clause, the claim is more properly characterized as arising
under the due process clause. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 582 US. 451,
456, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 149 L. Ed. 24 697 (2001) (“As the text of the [ex
post facto] [clause makes clear, it is a limitation [on] the powers of the
[legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the [jJudicial [bJranch
of government . . . . [Hjowever, [the] limitations on ex post facto judicial
decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process.” [Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.]).

® We note, at the outset, that our review of the defendant's claim is de
novo, See, eg, State v. Thomas, 296 Conn. 375, 383, 995 A.2d 65 (2010)
(“[bJecause a motion to dismiss effectively challenges the jurisdiction of
the court, asserting that the state, as a matter of law and fact, cannot state
a proper cause of action against the defendant, our review of the court's
legal conclusions and resulting denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss
is de novo” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

256 Po
—

“The ex post facto prohibition forbids . . . the
[s]tates [from] enact[ing] any law [that] imposes a pun-
ishment for an act [that] was not punishable at the time
it was committed . . . or imposes additional punish-
ment to that then prescribed. . . . Through this prohi-
bition, the [fJramers sought to assure that legislative
[a]cts give fair warning of their effect and permit individ-
uals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.
. . . [T]wo critical elements must be present for a crim-
inal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retro-
spective, thatis, it must apply to events occurring before
its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender
affected by it.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622,
727, 998 A.2d 1 (2010). Similarly, under the due process
clause, if a court’s constitutional gloss on a statute was
unforeseeable and disadvantaged a defendant, it cannot
be given retroactive effect. Id., 728 (“limitations on ex
post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the
notion of due process” [internal quotation marks
omitted]).

“Tt is . . . well settled . . . that [t]he inhibition
upon the passage of ex post facto laws does not give
a criminal a right to be tried, in all respects, by the law
in force when the crime charged was committed. . . .
[T]he constitutional provision was intended to secure
substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppres-
sive legislation . . . and not to limit the legislative con-
trol of remedies and modes of procedure [that] do not
affect matters of substance.” (Citations omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Dobbert v. Florida, 432
US. 282, 293, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977).
“Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a
defendant, a procedural change is not ex post facto.”
Id.; see also Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital, 215 Conn.
675, 683, 578 A.2d 1025 (1990) (“changes in procedural

Po 257

law do not ordinarily give rise to violations of the prohi-
bition against ex post facto laws”).

In the present case, the statutory modification that
was achieved by this court’s excision of the language,
“‘the court is of the opinion that,’” from § 53a-40 (h)
in State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn. 811-12, coupled with
our conclusion that the jury must make the finding that
extended incarceration of the defendant will best serve
the public interest, resulted in an ameliorative change
to the provision that is merely procedural. See Dobbert
v. Florida, supra, 432 U.S. 289-94 (when capital felony
statute providing that person convicted of capital felony
would be sentenced to death unless majority of jury
recommended mercy was found unconstitutional, and
statute then was amended by legislature to require that,
jury render advisory decision on basis of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and that trial court then
weigh those circumstances before imposing death sen-
tence, change was “procedural” and “ameliorative,” and
application of amended statute to defendant who com-
mitted crime when original statute was in effect did
not violate ex post facto clause); see also id., 294
(amendment was procedural and did not implicate ex
post facto clause when “[t]he crime for which the . . .
defendant was indicted, the punishment prescribed
therefor, and the quantity or the degree of proof neces-
sary to establish his guilt, all remained unaffected by
the subsequent statute” [internal quotation marks omit-
ted]). Thus, the change that we directed in Bell did not
make the punishment under § 53a-40 (h) more onerous.
See, e.g., United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 323 (2d
Cir.) (“[a]n ex post facto problem arises [only] if the
version [of the statute] in effect at the time of sentencing
makes more onerous the punishment for crimes com-
mitted before its enactment” [internal quotation marks
omitted]), cert. denied sub nom. Herzog v. United
States, 522 U.S. 983, 118 S. Ct. 445, 139 L. Ed. 2d 381

258 Po
Le

(1997), and cert. denied sub nom. Shay v. United States,
522 U.S. 988, 118 S. Ct. 455, 189 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1997).
Rather, it affected only the procedure pursuant to which
a defendant is tried under the provision. In such circum-
stances, it cannot be said that the defendant was disad-
vantaged retroactively by the statutory modification.
See California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S.
499, 506-507 n.3, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 131 L. Ed. 2d 588
(1995) (“the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on
whether a [statutory] change produces some ambiguous
sort of ‘disadvantage’ . . . but on whether any such
change alters the definition of criminal conduct or
increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable”
[citation omitted]). Accordingly, we conclude that the
retroactive application to the defendant of § 53a-40 (h),
as modified by the constitutional gloss that this court
placed on it in Bell, does not violate ex post facto princi-
ples embodied in the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.

The defendant also contends, however, that the
excised statute does not apply to him because, at the
time that he committed the offenses, no constitutionally
sound persistent dangerous felony offender statute was
in effect. In Dobbert v. Florida, supra, 432 U.S. 282, the
United States Supreme Court rejected a similar argu-
ment. The petitioner in Dobbert had claimed that,
because the death penalty statute in effect at the time
that he committed the capital offenses was later deter-
mined to be unconstitutional, “there was no death pen-
alty ‘in effect’ ” at the time of the offenses. Id., 297. The
court concluded that “this sophistic argument mocks
the substance of the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause. Whether
or not the old statute would, in the future, withstand
constitutional attack, it clearly indicated [the state’s]
view of the severity of murder and of the degree of
punishment [that] the legislature wished to impose [on]
murderers. The statute was intended to provide maxi-

Po 259
—

mum deterrence, and its existence on the statute books
provided fair warning as to the degree of culpability
[that] the [s]tate ascribed to the act of murder.” Id. The
court thus concluded that the existence of the unconsti-
tutional statute at the time of the offense “was sufficient
compliance with the ex post facto provision of the
United States [clonstitution.” Id., 298. Similarly, for pur-
poses of the present case, § 53a-40 (h) clearly reflected
the legislature’s negative view of persistent dangerous
felony offenders and the degree of punishment that it
wished to impose on them at the time that the defendant
committed the offenses. Consequently, the defendant
was on fair notice that the substantive provisions of
the persistent dangerous felony offender statute would
apply to him even if certain procedural provisions were
later found to be unconstitutional.

We next address the defendant’s claim that this court
improperly concluded in Bell that the legislature would
have intended the constitutional portion of § 53a-40 (h)
that this court did not excise to remain operational,
with the jury acting as the fact finder on the question
of whether extended incarceration of the defendant
would best serve the public interest. Essentially, the
defendant claims that it was speculative for this court
to conclude that the legislature would have enacted
§ 53a-40 (h) in precisely the same form as the statute
as modified by this court in Bell if it had known that
the trial court constitutionally could not make the find-
ing that extended incarceration would best serve the
public interest. In support of this claim, the defendant
notes that, after this court’s decision in Bell, the legisla-
ture amended § 53a-40 (h) to eliminate entirely the
requirement of a finding that’ extended incarceration is
in the public interest. See Public Acts 2008, No. 08-51,
§ 1 (@.A. 08-51), codified at General Statutes (Rev. to
2009) § 58a-40 (h).”

General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 58a-40 (h) provides: “When any person
has been found to be a persistent dangerous felony offender, the court, in

260 Po
—

As this court stated in Bell, in determining the appro-
priate remedy when a portion of a statute has been
found unconstitutional, “[w]e seek to determine what
[the legislature] would have intended in light of the
[c]ourt’s constitutional holding. . . . United States v.
Booker, [543 U.S. 220, 246, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d
621 (2005)]. Thus, [g]uiding the solution is the maxim
that this court will strive to interpret a statute so as to
sustain its validity . . . and [to] give effect to the inten-
tion of the legislature. . . . [In enacting] General Stat-
utes § 1-3" the legislature has shown its intention that
there is to be a presumption of separability of the provi-
sions and of the applications of statutes. . . . With
regard to the separability of provisions, to overcome
the presumption it must be shown that the portion
declared invalid is so mutually connected and depen-
dent on the remainder of the statute as to indicate an
intent that they should stand or fall together . . . and
this interdependence would warrant a belief that the
legislature would not have adopted the remainder of the

lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by the general
statutes for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted,
shall (1) sentence such person to a term of imprisonment that is not (A)
less than twice the minimum term of imprisonment authorized for such
crime of (B) more than twice the maximum term of imprisonment authorized
for such crime or forty years, whichever is greater, provided, if a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment is authorized for such crime, such sentence
shall include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that is twice
such authorized mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, and (2) if such
person has, at separate times prior to the commission of the present crime,
been twice convicted of and imprisoned for any of the crimes enumerated
in subsection (a) of this section, sentence such person to a term of imprison-
ment that is not less than three times the minimum term of imprisonment
authorized for such crime or more than life, provided, if a mandatory mini-
mum term of imprisonment is authorized for such crime, such sentence
shall include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that is three
times such authorized mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.”

4 General Statutes § 1-3 provides: “If any provision of any act passed by
the General Assembly or its application to any person or circumstances is
held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications
of such act.”

Pe 261
Le

statute independently of the invalid portion.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn.
810-11. We further observed, with respect to the enact-
ment of § 53a-40 (h) specifically, that, “[g]iven the over-
whelming evidence in the [pertinent] legislative history
. . . [of] § 53a-40 that the legislature’s intent was to
keep those violent, persistent offenders who were most
likely to reoffend and put the public at risk off the
streets for an extended period . . . the . . . portion
of the statute [that remains following the excision of
the requirement that the court make the requisite public
interest finding] can operate independently and effec-
tively to achieve that intent.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 812.

Contrary to the defendant’s suggestion in the present.
case, upon finding a portion of a statute to be unconsti-
tutional, this court does not ask whether, if the legisla-
ture had known about the constitutional flaw at the
time of enactment, it might have preferred some other
form of legislation over the remaining constitutional
portion of the statute, a question that might well engage
the court in speculation. Rather, this court asks the
much narrower question of whether the legislature, at
the time that the statute is invalidated, would prefer
the continued operation of the constitutional portion
of the statute or the complete invalidation of the stat-
ute.” See United States v. Booker, supra, 543 U.S. 246

® As we indicated, we stated in Bell that the constitutional portion of a
statute cannot operate independently if “the legislature would not have
adopted [the valid portion] of the statute independently of the invalid por-
tion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bell, supra, 283 Conn.
811. This does not mean, however, that the constitutional portion of the
statute cannot continue to operate independently unless this court deter-
mines that the legislature would have enacted it in precisely the same form
if it had known of the constitutional flaw at the time of enactment. Because
this court would seldom be able to make that determination, any such
conclusion would be inconsistent with the statutory presumption of sever-
ability set forth in § 1-3 and with the principle that courts must endeavor
to give effect to the intent of the legislature to the maximum extent possible.

In the present case, for example, it is quite possible that, if the legislature
had known about the constitutional flaw in § 68a-40 (h) at the time of

262 Po
—

(“[w]e seek to determine what [the legislature] would
have intended in light of the [clourt’s constitutional
holding” [emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted]); id., 249 (when portion of statute is deter-
mined to be unconstitutional, question that court must
determine is what remedy legislature would prefer at
that time); see also id., 247 (in crafting appropriate
remedy when portion of statute is found unconstitu-
tional, court must determine whether it “would deviate
less radically” from legislative intent by superimposing
constitutional requirements or excising unconstitu-
tional provisions); id. (“severability questions . . . can
arise when a legislatively unforeseen constitutional
problem requires modification of a statutory provision
as applied”).

The defendant in the present case has pointed to no
evidence that the legislature would have preferred for
this court, upon invalidating the requirement that the
trial court make the public interest finding, to have
invalidated § 53a-40 (h) in its entirety instead of excising
the unconstitutional portion of the statute and requiring
the jury to make the requisite finding. In light of the
statutory presumption that unconstitutional provisions
of a statute are severable; see General Statutes § 1-3;
and. given the clear legislative purpose of § 53a-40 (h)
to promote the extended incarceration of those violent,
persistent offenders who are most likely to place the
public at risk by reoffending; State v. Bell, supra, 283

enactment, it would have enacted a persistent dangerous felony offender
statute without any requirement of a finding that extended incarceration
would best serve the public interest, as it did after this court's decision in
Bell. See footnote 10 of this opinion and accompanying text. Such a statute,
however, would be substantively similar to § 582-40 (h). Because we remain
wholly unpersuaded that the legislature would have enacted no persistent
dangerous felony offender statute if it had known about the constitutional
flaw in § 532-40 (h), or a substantively different statute, we see no reason
to reconsider our determination that the constitutional portion of § 53a-40
(h) may continue to operate.

Pe 268
Lee

Conn. 812; we reaffirm our conclusion that the legisla-

ture would prefer the remedy of allowing the continued

operation of the constitutional portion of § 53a-40 (h)

instead of the remedy of invalidating the statute in

its entirety.

I

The defendant next contends that the trial court
improperly denied his motion in limine to introduce
evidence of the costs of his incarceration in support of
his argument that his extended incarceration would not
best serve the public interest. We reject the defen-
dant’s claim.

At trial before the court, Blue, J., the defendant filed
a motion in limine to introduce evidence of the costs
of his incarceration.” He argued that the term “public
interest,” as used in § 53a-40 (h), “includes considera-
tions of the general welfare of the public, including
financial costs to the taxpayers of incarcerating an indi-
vidual.” The trial court denied the motion upon conclud-
ing that the term “public interest,” as used in § 53a-40
(h), means the interest of the public in protecting itself
from dangerous individuals and does not include the
public interest in minimizing public expenditures. On
appeal, the defendant renews the argument that he
made in the trial court concerning the meaning of the
term “public interest.” The state maintains that the trial
court was correct in its conclusion with respect to the
meaning of that term for purposes of § 53a-40 (h).

® In addition to filing the motion in limine, the defendant submitted two
requests to charge that defined the term “public interest” as “ ‘the general
welfare and rights of the public that are to be recognized, protected and
advanced.'” The trial court denied the requests to charge and instructed
the jury that “[t]he term ‘public interest’ means the interest of the public
in protecting itself from dangerous individuals combined with the responsi-
bility shared by every public tribunal of dealing with the defendant fairly
and justly... .”

264 Po
—

The meaning of the term “public interest,” as used
in § 58a-40 (h), is a question of statutory interpretation
over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 152, 947 A.2d 282
(2008). “In making such determinations, we are guided
by fundamental principles of statutory construction.”
In re Matthew F., 297 Conn. 673, 688, 4 A.3d 248 (2010);
see General Statutes § 1-2z."* “[OJur fundamental objec-
tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
of the legislature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Testa v. Geressy, 286 Conn. 291, 308, 943 A.2d 1075
(2008).

We begin with the language of the statute. General
Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a-40 (h) provides in relevant.
part: “When any person has been found to be a persis-
tent dangerous felony offender, and . . . such person’s
history and character and the nature and circumstances
of such person’s criminal conduct indicate that
extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will
best serve the public interest, the court . . . shall sen-
tence such person to a term of imprisonment of not
more than forty years... .”

The term “public interest,” as used in § 53a-40 (h),
is not statutorily defined. Moreover, the parties do not
claim that the term plainly and unambiguously either
includes or excludes the public interest in minimizing
the costs of incarceration, and we agree that it does
not. Accordingly, in determining the meaning of the
term, “we . . . look for interpretive guidance to the
legislative history and circumstances surrounding its
enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to

¥ General Statutes § 1-2z provides: “The meaning of a statute shall, in the
first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”

Po 265
—

implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation.
and common law principles governing the same general
subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re Jan Carlos D., 297 Conn. 16, 21, 997 A.2d
471 (2010).

The fact that General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a-
40 (h) directs the fact finder to determine whether the
defendant's “history and character and the nature and
circumstances of such person’s criminal conduct indi-
cate that extended incarceration and lifetime supervi-
sion will best serve the public interest” strongly
supports the statutory construction adopted by the trial
court and urged by the state. Under the doctrine of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression
of one thing is the exclusion of another—we may infer
from this language that the legislature intended that the
fact finder shall focus exclusively on the defendant's
history and character and the nature and circumstances
of his criminal conduct in deciding whether extended
incarceration would best serve the public interest. See
Honulik v. Greenwich, 293 Conn, 641, 694 n.5, 980 A.2d
845 (2009) (Zarella, J., dissenting) (“[w]hen the items
expressed are members of an associated group or
series, we may invoke the canon of statutory construc-
tion known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius . . .
and infer that the item not mentioned . . . was
excluded by deliberate choice” [internal quotation
marks omitted]). If the legislature had intended for the
fact finder also to consider the costs of incarceration
in determining whether a sentence enhancement is
appropriate under § 53a-40 (h), it easily could have
made that intention clear by so providing.

This conclusion is consistent with sentencing princi-
ples generally, which, broadly stated, require the court
“Tto] fashion a sentence that fits the crime and the
criminal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Wade, 297 Conn. 262, 274, 998 A.2d 1114 (2010); see
State v. Garvin, 43 Conn. App. 142, 152, 682 A.2d 562

266 PO
—

(1996) (“fflor the determination of sentences, justice
generally requires consideration of more than the par-
ticular acts for which the crime was committed and
that there be taken into account the circumstances of
the offense together with the character and propensities
of the offender” [internal quotation marks omitted]),
aff'd, 242 Conn. 296, 699 A.2d 921 (1997); State v. Pat-
terson, 37 Conn. App. 801, 819, 658 A.2d 121 (1995)
(court ordinarily imposes sentence on basis of “presen-
tence inquiry into the circumstances of the offenses,
the attitude of the victim or his [or her] immediate
family, the criminal record, social history and present
condition of the defendant, and, if desirable, the mental
and physical state of the defendant” [internal quotation
marks omitted]), rev'd on other grounds, 236 Conn. 561,
674 A.2d 416 (1996); see also General Statutes § 54-
91a (c) (“[w]henever [a presentence] investigation is
required, the probation officer shall promptly inquire
into the circumstances of the offense, the attitude of
the complainant or victim, or of the immediate family
where possible in cases of homicide, and the criminal
record, social history and present condition of the
defendant”). The defendant has referred to no authority
for the proposition that a sentencing court, in determin-
ing an appropriate sentence, ordinarily may consider
the costs of incarceration as a factor, in addition to the
traditional sentencing goals of retribution, rehabilita-
tion and specific and general deterrence. Rather, it

8 See, e.g., Bwing v. California, 538 US. 11, 27, 123 8. Ct. 1179, 155 L.
Ed. 2d 108 (2008) (primary goal of recidivist statutes is to deter repeat
offenders and to isolate dangerous criminals from society); Rhodes v. Chap-
‘man, 452 U.S. 887, 352, 101 S. Ct, 2392, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981) (“the goals
of the penal function in the criminal justice system [are] to punish justly,
to deter future crime, and to return imprisoned persons to society with an
improved chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens"); United States v.
Terry, 427 F. Sup. 2d 1182, 1187 (MLD. Ala. 2006) (“{t]he primary goal of
sentencing is to impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to punish the offender, protect the public from further crimes
by the defendant, rehabilitate the defendant, and deter other people from
committing similar crimes”).

Fe 267
Leerssen
appears that, as a general matter, to the extent that
the economic costs of incarceration are a factor in
determining an appropriate sentence, they are to be
considered not by the sentencing authority but by the
legislature when it is enacting sentencing provisions."
See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 127 F.3d 725, 728 (8th
Cir. 1997) (because “[t]he decision whether tax dollars
should be used to pay for lengthy sentences is a congres-
sional determination, not one to be made by federal
courts,” and because “[tJhe [federal] [s]entencing
[g]uidelines do not mention the expenses of imprison-
ment as a factor a court may use in deciding whether
to depart from the [g]uidelines,” District Court should
not have considered that factor in imposing sentence).

Indeed, the legislative history of § 53a-40 (h) demon-
strates that, during the debate on the 1994 amendment
that changed the punishment for being a persistent dan-
gerous felony offender from the sentence authorized
for a class A felony to a term of imprisonment of not
more than forty years; see Public Acts 1994, No. 94-37,
§ 1, codified at General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 538a-40
(f); the legislature considered and rejected objections to
the extended incarceration of repeat dangerous felony
offenders based on economic considerations." It would

18 We do not mean to suggest that a sentencing court may never, under
any circumstances, properly consider the costs of incarceration in determin-
ing the appropriate sentence. Indeed, we express no opinion on the issue
generally; for purposes of the present case, it suffices to say that that
consideration is not contemplated under § 58a-40 (h). It bears emphasis,
however, that, to the extent that such a consideration arguably might be
proper as one of many factors to be weighed in some other case, it is a
factor that is even less germane to a sentencing decision involving a violent,
repeat offender whom the legislature expressly has identified as one requir-
ing an extraordinary, extended period of incarceration for the protection
of society.

1 See HLR. Proc., Pt. 8, 1994 Sess., pp. 2929-30, remarks of Representative
William R. Dyson (arguing that enactment of legislation would “increase
the demand for prison beds” and greatly increase expenditures for prisons,
requiring state to reduce spending for other programs); id., pp. 2930-83,
remarks of Representative Jefferson B. Davis (arguing that enactment of
legislation would require taking “limited [state] resources” away from other

268 Pp __|
—

be incongruous to conclude that the legislature, having
rejected the argument that extended incarceration of
repeat offenders would be too costly to the state, would
have intended for the fact finder to consider the costs
of incarceration in determining whether extended incar-
ceration best serves the public interest. We conclude,
therefore, that the trial court properly construed the
term “public interest,” as used in § 53a-40 (h), to mean
the public’s interest in protecting itself from dangerous
criminals and in imposing a fair sentence on the basis
of the defendant's history and character and the nature
and circumstances of his criminal conduct, and to pre-
clude any consideration of the costs of incarceration.
Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defen-
dant’s motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence
of the costs of his incarceration.

Il

We next address the defendant's claim that the trial
court improperly precluded him from introducing
expert testimony on the anticipated length of his federal
sentence. The defendant contends that this evidence
was relevant to the question of whether extended incar-
ceration would best serve the public interest because
it demonstrated that he would be incarcerated for his
federal conviction until he was approximately seventy-
eight years old regardless of whether the trial court
imposed an extended sentence pursuant to § 58a-40 (h).
We disagree.

The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of this claim. As a
result of the incident that formed the basis of the

programs and would not be appropriate response to crime problem); cf. id.,
pp. 2938-41, remarks of Representative James A. Tavegia (arguing that
protecting citizens from criminals justifies increased expenditures for pris-
ons); id., p. 2947, remarks of Representative Arthur J. O'Neill (arguing that
economic cost of imprisoning career criminals is less than cost to society
of not imprisoning them).

es 269
[eel

charges in the present case, the defendant was con-
victed of the federal offense of being a felon in posses-
sion of a firearm and was sentenced to forty-seven years
imprisonment, to be served concurrently with his origi-
nal forty-five year state sentence. During the trial before
the court, Blue, J., in the present case, the defendant
filed a motion in limine to introduce evidence that he
was serving the federal sentence. He also sought per-
mission to introduce expert testimony by Todd A. Bus-
sert, an attorney, that his federal sentence would expire
at the end of 2043, when the defendant would be almost
seventy-eight years old. The defendant argued that this
evidence was relevant to establish that an extended
sentence on the state charges would not best serve
the public interest because he already was going to be
serving a lengthy sentence in connection with his fed-
eral conviction. The trial court excluded Bussert’s testi-
mony on the ground that it was speculative because
the actual length of the defendant's incarceration for
his federal conviction might be affected by changes in
federal policy or the defendant’s behavior in prison.
Specifically, the trial court concluded that it was “not
the jury’s job” to determine when the defendant would
be released from federal prison; rather, “[t]he jury’s job
. . . is to weigh the statutory factors.” The trial court
allowed the defendant, however, to inform the jury of
the fact of his federal sentence, because the sentence
was part of the defendant’s history, which was a statu-
tory factor. The court also instructed the jury that the
defendant was appealing from the federal sentence and
that the jury was barred from speculating as to whether
the sentence would be altered in the future.

We agree with the state that the trial court reasonably
concluded that Bussert’s testimony was inadmissible
because it was speculative. Although Bussert may

‘8 Our standard of review for evidentiary claims is well settled. “To the
extent [that] a trial court’s admission of evidence is based on an interpreta-
tion of the [Connecticut] Code of Evidence, our standard of review is plenary.

270 P___

have been qualified to testify about the probable dura-
tion of the defendant’s incarceration in connection with
his federal conviction, the defendant did not establish
that Bussert was qualified or prepared to testify about
the likelihood that the defendant would prevail in his
appeal of his federal conviction, the effect that the
defendant’s behavior in federal prison could have on
the amount of time that he actually would serve or
the probability that federal sentencing law would not
change within the next forty years. Thus, Bussert’s pro-
posed testimony on the anticipated length of the defen-
dant’s federal sentence would have been based on the
hypothetical possibility that these factors would have
no effect on the duration of the defendant’s incar-
ceration.

More-fundamentally, we also conclude that Bussert’s
testimony was inadmissible because it was irrelevant.
Although the fact of the defendant’s federal sentence
was relevant to show that the United States District

For example, whether a challenged statement properly may be classified
as hearsay and whether a hearsay exception properly is identified are legal
questions demanding plenary review.” State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218,
926 A.2d 683 (2007). “We review the trial court's decision to admit [or
exclude] evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law, however, for
an abuse of discretion.” Id. We apply the latter standard to the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling in the present case.

In addition, “[t]he law defining the relevance of evidence is well settled.
Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier
in the determination of an issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Johnson, 289 Conn. 437, 462, 958 A2d 713 (2008). “One fact is relevant
to another if in the common course of events the existence of one, alone
or with other facts, renders the existence of the other either more certain
or more probable. . . . Evidence is irrelevant or too remote if there is such
a want of open and visible connection between the evidentiary and principal
facts that, all things considered, the former is not worthy or safe to be
admitted in the proof of the latter. . . . Evidence is not rendered inadmissi-
ble because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that the evidence
tend to support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, [as] long as it is
not [unfairly] prejudicial or merely cumulative.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 462-63.

Po 271
—

Court viewed the defendant’s conduct in a very negative
light, the actual length of time that the defendant would
serve under the federal sentence had no particular rele-
vance to the defendant’s “history and character and the
nature and circumstances of such person’s criminal
conduct .. . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a-
40 (h). In other words, even if the jury reasonably could
conclude that an extended period of incarceration pur-
suant to § 53a-40 (h) would not necessarily mean that
the defendant actually would spend more time in prison
than he otherwise would, that would not be a proper
reason to conclude that his extended incarceration pur-
suant to the dictates of § 53a-40 (h) would not best
serve the public interest. Accordingly, the trial court
properly excluded Bussert’s testimony.

Iv

Finally, we address the defendant’s claim that the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
of the details of Fumiatti’s injuries because the evidence
‘was more prejudicial than probative. We need not
decide whether the trial court abused its discretion
because, even if we assume that it did, any such impro-
priety was harmless.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine
to exclude any evidence about the details of the injuries
that Fumiatti had sustained as the result of the shooting.
The defendant stated that he was willing to stipulate
that he shot Fumiatti and that Fumiatti sustained seri-
ous physical injury, but argued that evidence of the
specific details of the injuries and their long-term effect
on Fumiatti was not relevant to the defendant’s “history
and character and the nature and circumstances of [his]
criminal conduct”; General Statutes (Rev. to 2001)
§ 58a-40 (h); and was prejudicial. The court, Blue, J.,
concluded that the details of Fumiatti’s injuries were

22 Pe
Lt

relevant to the nature and circumstances of the crime
and denied the motion on that basis.

At trial, Franklin Quicksly, a firefighter and para-
medic with the New Haven fire department, testified
that, when he arrived at the scene of the shooting,
Fumiatti had no pulse and was not breathing. Juan
Bartolomei, a neurosurgeon, testified that he was on
duty at Yale-New Haven Hospital when Fumiatti arrived
by ambulance. Bartolomei testified that Fumiatti was
“technically dead” when he arrived at the hospital and
that hospital personnel were required to “electrocute”
his heart and to inject him with adrenaline in order to
reestablish a pulse. After stabilizing Fumiatti, Bartolo-
mei determined that Fumiatti had been shot in the face
near his right nostril. The bullet had traveled through
the back of his mouth, where it shattered a tooth, and
ultimately lodged in his first cervical vertebra (C-1),
which supports the skull. Bartolomei performed sur-
gery to repair the wound, during which he removed
the shattered tooth from Fumiatti’s esophagus, but he
elected to leave the bullet in place. To stabilize Fumi-
atti’s skull, Bartolomei fitted him with a “halo,” which
is a device comprised of a ring around the head, bolted
into the skull and attached by way of bars to a chest
vest. Fumiatti wore the halo for approximately five and
one-half months after the shooting. By that time, the
area around the bullet had calcified and become part
of the bone.

As a result of Fumiatti’s injuries, he suffered short
term paralysis from which he recovered in a matter of
weeks. He continued to suffer, however, from weakness
and lack of coordination in his right arm and shoulder.
After eighteen months of rehabilitation, he regained
some gross motor function but still had very little fine
motor coordination. He also was unable to move his
head from side to side.

Po 278
—

“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded by the
trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial
effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.

. Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to
one’s case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue
prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be
admitted. . . . The test for determining whether evi-
dence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging
to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse
the emotions of the jurfors]. . . . The trial court .. .
must determine whether the adverse impact of the chal-
lenged evidence outweighs its probative value. . . .
Finally, [t]he trial court’s discretionary determination
that the probative value of evidence is not outweighed
by its prejudicial effect will not be disturbed on appeal
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. . .
[B]ecause of the difficulties inherent in this balancing
process . . . every reasonable presumption should be
given in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . Reversal
is required only [when] an abuse of discretion is mani-
fest or [when] injustice appears to have been done.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson,
supra, 289 Conn. 463.

“When an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitu-
tional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of dem-
onstrating that the [impropriety] was harmful. . . . [A]
nonconstitutional [impropriety] is harmless when an
appellate court has a fair assurance that the [impropri-
ety] did not substantially affect the verdict.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Orr,
291 Conn, 642, 663, 969 A.2d 750 (2009).

In the present case, we conclude that, even if the
trial court improperly admitted evidence of the details
of Fumiatti’s injuries and their long-term effects on him
because the evidence was prejudicial and only margin-
ally probative, we have “a fair assurance” that the evi-
dence did not substantially affect the verdict and,

274 PO
—

therefore, conclude that its admission was harmless. Id.
Insupport of its claim that the extended incarceration of
the defendant would best serve the public interest, the
state presented strong evidence that the defendant had
engaged in a lengthy and escalating pattern of criminal
activity, and that he was unable or unwilling to refrain
from such activity even while under the supervision of
the prison system. Moreover, the defendant conceded
that the evidence that he shot Fumiatti in the face and
that Fumiatti was seriously injured was admissible. If
the additional evidence relating to the treatment of the
injuries and their long-term effects on Fumiatti was only
marginally relevant to the “nature and circumstances of
[the defendant’s] criminal conduct”; General Statutes
(Rev. to 2001) § 53a-40 (h); it also caused only incremen-
tal prejudice to the defendant. Accordingly, we con-
clude that the admission of the evidence was not
reversible error.

The defendant’s reliance on Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S. Ct. 644, 186 L. Ed. 2d 574
(1997), in support of his claim to the contrary is mis-
placed. In that case, the petitioner, Johnny Lynn Old
Chief, had been charged pursuant to a federal statute
that made it a crime for any person who had been
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year to possess a firearm. Id., 174. Old
Chief offered to stipulate that he previously had been
convicted of such a crime, but the assistant United
States attorney (prosecutor) declined to stipulate, and
the District Court ruled that he was not required to do
so. Id., 177. At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence
that Old Chief previously had been convicted of assault
and that such assault resulted in serious bodily injury
to the victim. Id. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that, because, under the relevant stat-
ute, “[t]he most the jury need[ed] to know [was] that

Po 275

Leer

the conviction admitted by [Old Chief fell] within the
class of crimes that Congress thought should bar a
convict from possessing a gun, and this point may be
made readily in a defendant's admission”; id., 190-91;
“the general presumption that the prosecution may
choose its evidence” did not apply. Id., 191. Accordingly,
the court concluded that, because Old Chief had offered.
to stipulate to the prior conviction, the admission of
the record of conviction of assault was unduly prejudi-
cial and was an abuse of discretion. See id., 191-92.

Unlike the statute at issue in Old Chief, however,
§ 58a-40 (h) requires the fact finder to consider, not
just the bare fact that the defendant has been convicted.
of acrime but also the defendant’s “history and charac-
ter and the nature and circumstances of [his] criminal
conduct ... .” General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a-
40 (h). Under these circumstances, the “standard rule
that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by
evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, that a
criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way
out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the [glov-
ernment chooses to present it” clearly applies. Old
Chief v. United States, supra, 519 U.S. 186-87. Accord-
ingly, although we have assumed in the present case
that the evidence regarding the treatment of Fumiatti’s
injuries and their long-term effect on him was only
marginally relevant to establish the nature and circum-
stances of the defendant's criminal conduct, we reject
the defendant’s suggestion that the state was not enti-
tled to present any evidence of the nature and circum-
stances of his criminal conduct because he had offered
to stipulate that the state had proved the elements of
the crime of first degree assault.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

276

GHASSAN SALEH ». RIBEIRO TRUCKING, LLC, ET AL.
(SC 18515)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.

Argued September 7—officially released December 27, 2011

Po art
Li

Michael Feldman, with whom was Kasey Procko
Burchman, for the appellant (named defendant).

Stephanie S. Baier, with whom, on the brief, was

Richard C. Mahoney, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

McLACHLAN, J. In this certified appeal, we must
examine the delicate balance between two of the most
basic principles of our law: the constitutional right of
litigants to have the jury determine the amount of dam-
ages awarded; and the trial court’s broad authority to
supervise the trial process. The defendant Ribeiro
Trucking, LLC,' appeals from the judgment of the Appel-
late Court,? which reversed the judgment of the trial
court granting the defendant's motion for remittitur

+ Also named as defendants were Cabbage Transport, Inc., Vincente Virola-
Rodriguez and Oscar Quezada. For ease of discussion, we refer to Ribeiro
Trucking, LLC, as the defendant in this opinion.

2 We granted the defendant's petition for certification, limited to the follow-
ing issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the remittitur and setting aside the verdict?”
Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 294 Conn. 922, 984 A.2d 1083 (2009).

278 Po

Po
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-216a.’ Saleh v. Ribeiro
Trucking, LLC, 117 Conn. App. 821, 829, 982 A.2d 178
(2009). The defendant argues that the Appellate Court
improperly concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering the remittitur. We affirm the judg-
ment of the Appellate Court.

Because we discuss the evidence in considerable
detail later in this opinion, our initial summary of the
factual background is brief. On the morning of March
28, 2003, the plaintiff, Ghassan Saleh, was driving on
Interstate 91 in Hartford, when his Nissan Altima was
rear-ended by a van that had been rear-ended by a
tractor trailer truck owned by the defendant. The plain-
tiff, who complained of neck, back and shoulder pain
at the scene of the accident, was brought to Hartford
Hospital by ambulance. He subsequently has been
treated by numerous physicians, each of whom has
assigned a permanency rating, assessing various per-
centages of permanent impairment to each injured body
part. At the time of trial five years later, the plaintiff
testified that he still experienced pain in connection
with his injuries from the accident. The parties “stipu-
lated [at trial] that the plaintiff's life expectancy is 15.8
years. The defendant admitted liability for the accident.
The jury returned with a verdict of $12,132.31 in eco-
nomic damages and $687,868 in noneconomic damages
for a total of $700,000.31 in damages.” Id., 824.

The defendant subsequently filed posttrial motions
seeking a new trial, an order setting aside the verdict
and an order of remittitur as to the noneconomic dam-
ages. Following a hearing on the defendant’s motions,
the court issued a memorandum of decision, finding

2 General Statutes § 52-216a provides in relevant part: “If the court at the
conclusion of the trial concludes that the verdict is excessive as a matter
of law, it shall order a remittitur and, upon failure of the party so ordered
to remit the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict, and
order a new trial...”

Pe 29
{id

that the noneconomic damages awarded were exces-
sive and ordering a remittitur of $508,608. The court
found that the jury reasonably could have awarded the
plaintiff $74,260 for permanent injury, and $110,000 for
pain and suffering from:the date of the accident on
March 28, 2003 until October 2, 2006, when the plaintiff
was given his permanency rating. The total award, after
remittitur, was $191,392.31. Pursuant to § 52-216a, the
court further ordered that if the plaintiff failed to remit
the amount ordered by the court, the court would set
aside the verdict and order a new trial.* After the plain-
tiff refused to accept the remittitur, the court set aside
the verdict and ordered a new trial.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial
court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial
court “improperly ordered the remittitur in the absence
of any reason to determine that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence, shocked the sense of justice
or was based on partiality, prejudice, mistake or corrup-
tion.” Id., 822. The Appellate Court reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting the remittitur. That
court concluded that the trial court improperly

“The court denied the defendant's motions for anew trial and to set aside
the verdict.

‘The remittitur of $508,608 included a $5000 reduction of the economic
damages in accordance with the stipulation of the parties that the medical
bills totaling $12,182.31 should be reduced to $7132.31 because of a collateral
source in the amount of $5000.

5In response to the defendant's motion for rectification or articulation,
the court added the following language to its memorandum of decision:
“Should the plaintiff agree to the remittitur ordered by this court, a judgment
will enter in the amount of $191,392.81. If the remittitur is not accepted by
the plaintiff, the [defendant's] motion to set aside the verdict will be granted,
the jury award will be set aside and a new trial will be ordered.”

8 We observe that the trial court used the phrase “shocks the conscience,”
rather than the phrase we most commonly have used in our decisions,
“shocks the sense of justice.” See, e.g, Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc.,
284 Conn. 645, 661, 935 A.2d 1004 (2007). We view the phrases as having
the same meaning and use them interchangeably.

280 Po

“attempted to attach a mathematical formula to what
should have been awarded” and “refus[ed] to allow the
plaintiff any compensation for his pain and suffering
that occurred after he was given a permanency rating
and for his future life expectancy.” Id., 828. This
appeal followed.

The defendant claims that the Appellate Court did
not accord proper deference to the trial court’s determi-
nation that exceptional circumstances justified the
remittitur. Specifically, the defendant contends that the
Appellate Court, by failing to employ every reasonable
presumption in favor of affirming the decision of the
trial court, did not properly apply the abuse of discre-
tion standard. The plaintiff responds that the Appellate
Court properly “examin[ed] the evidential basis of the
verdict itself’ to determine whether the trial court
reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the jury verdict. (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. We agree with the plaintiff.

Our review of the trial court’s grant of remittitur is
dictated by, on the one hand, the high bar that must
be met before a trial judge may set aside a jury verdict,
and, on the other hand, the necessarily broad authority
that the trial judge has to oversee the trial process. “The
right of trial by jury is of ancient origin, characterized by
Blackstone as the glory of the English law and the most
transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy
....” Unternal quotation marks omitted.) Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485, 55 S. Ct. 296, 79 L. Ed. 603
(1935). We repeatedly have stated that the award of
damages, in particular, “is a matter peculiarly within
the province of the trier of facts.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 284
Conn. 645, 661, 935 A.2d 1004 (2007). For that reason,
we consistently have held that a court should exercise
its authority to order a remittitur rarely—only in the
most exceptional of circumstances. See, e.g., Waters v.

Po 281
i

Bristol, 26 Conn. 398, 405 (1857) (declining to set aside
verdict on basis of excessive damages, despite this
court’s view that “[t]he damages assessed are consider-
able, we are rather inclined to think too large”); Clark
v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495, 509 (1850) (observing that,
although damages were higher than this court would
have awarded, verdict should not be disturbed and
court’s authority to order remittitur should be exer-
cised rarely).

In determining whether to order remittitur, the trial
court is required to review the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the verdict. Wochek v. Foley, 193
Conn. 582, 587, 477 A.2d 1015 (1984). Upon completing
that review, “the court should not interfere with the
jury’s determination except when the verdict is plainly
excessive or exorbitant. . . . The ultimate test which
must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is
whether the jury’s award falls somewhere within the
necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether
the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice
as to compel the conclusion that the jury [was] influ-
enced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.
. . . The court’s broad power to order a remittitur
should be exercised only when it is manifest that the
jury [has] included items of damage which are contrary
to law, not supported by proof, or contrary to the court’s
explicit and unchallenged instructions.” (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg.,
Inc., supra, 284 Conn. 661-62.

“Furthermore, [t]he decision whether to reduce a jury
verdict because it is excessive as a matter of law [within
the meaning of § 52-216a] rests solely within the discre-
tion of the trial court . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 662. We have explained the reason under-
lying the great breadth of the trial court’s discretion
over such matters: “There are, to be sure, sometimes,
verdicts of this kind, when the trial judge is required

282 Po

by the interests of justice to set them aside. That such
verdicts are infrequent is a tribute to the general intelli-
gence, fairness and integrity of juries. This power of
supervision and correction which the judge has over
the verdict is an essential part of the jury system. It
tends to make jurors more careful in reaching their
conclusions, and gives confidence to all suitors that the
finding of a jury will not be affected by any improper
motives. Trial by jury, in the primary and usual sense
of the term at the common law and in the American
constitutions, is not merely a trial by a jury of twelve
[persons] before an officer vested with authority to
cause them to be summoned and empanelled, to admin-

* ister oaths to them and to the constable in charge, and
to enter judgment and issue execution on their verdict;
but it is a trial by a jury of twelve [persons], in the
presence and under the superintendence of a judge
empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise
them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal
charge) to set aside their verdict, if in his opinion it is
against the law or the evidence.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Howe v. Raymond, 74 Conn. 68, 71-72,
49 A. 854 (1901). Although Howe involved a trial court’s
decision to set aside a verdict as against the evidence,
the same general principles apply to a trial court’s deci-
sion to order a remittitur. “[Consequently], the proper
standard of review of a trial court’s decision to grant
or deny a motion to set aside a verdict as excessive as a
matter of law is that of an abuse of discretion.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mjg.,
Inc., supra, 284 Conn. 662. Accordingly, “the ruling of
the trial court on the motion to set aside the verdict as
excessive is entitled to great weight and every reason-
able presumption should be given in favor of its correct-
ness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We acknowledge that the “shocks the sense of jus-
tice” standard provides vague guidance at best—due,

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in part, to the uncertain limits of noneconomic damages.
The language is intended to convey the extraordinary
departure from reasonableness that is required before
a court properly may exercise its authority to set aside
the jury’s award of damages. We have in the past stated
what will not be sufficient to support a trial court’s
decision to set aside the jury’s damages award and order
a remittitur: “The fact that the jury returns a verdict in
excess of what the trial judge would have awarded does
not alone establish that the verdict was excessive.”
Campbell v. Gould, 194 Conn. 35, 41, 478 A.2d 596
(1984). Regarding what will be sufficient to support an
order of remittitur, we have stated that a trial court
should exercise its discretion to order remittitur only
in cases “where very clear, definite and satisfactory
reasons can be given for such interference.” Clark v.
Pendleton, supra, 20 Conn. 509. For a trial court’s
remittitur order to be justified, and upheld by this court,
we have stated that “we must have laid before us a
very clear and striking case of indubitable wrong, so
clear and striking as to indicate the influence of undue
sympathy, prejudice or corruption on the verdict.”
Waters v. Bristol, supra, 26 Conn. 405. Although the
trial court’s memorandum of decision in the present
case did not set forth the specific reasons that led it to
conclude that the jury verdict shocked its conscience,
we acknowledge that, despite our case law recognizing
that such clear, definite and satisfactory reasons must.
exist to justify remittitur, we have never required that
a trial court expressly set forth those reasons in the
memorandum of decision. Today we exercise our super-
visory authority to require expressly what already has
been implicit in our law. In all future cases, a trial court
ordering a remittitur must set forth in the memorandum
of decision clear, definite and satisfactory reasons for
so ordering. Merely stating that an award shocks the
conscience or the sense of justice of the court or that

284 Po
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the award does not fall within the necessarily uncertain
limits of fair and reasonable compensation will not be
sufficient. The recitation of these generalities does little
to aid appellate review of the trial court’s decision,
a review that is complicated by the requirement that
appellate tribunals must give deference to that decision,
which itself was required to give deference to the jury's
verdict. In order for us to determine whether the trial
court properly reviewed the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the verdict, and did not merely
substitute its own judgment for that of the jury, a trial
court ordering a remittitur must set forth the evidence,
viewed in that light, and explain the specific reasons
that led the court to conclude that the award shocked
the conscience of the court. We set forth this require-
ment, not to discourage the trial court from granting
remittitur in those cases where it is warranted, but
rather to aid the reviewing court in its determination of
whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion.

In its memorandum of decision, the trial court found
that the jury’s award of damages did not “fall within
the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable
compensation” and was excessive. The court further
stated that the verdict so shocked the conscience that
it compelled the conclusion that the award was due to
partiality, prejudice or mistake. In summarizing the
facts that the jury reasonably could have found, the
court identified two time periods. The first time period
began on the date of the accident and ended on the
date that the plaintiff was given a permanency rating.
The second time period began on the date that the
plaintiff was given a permanency rating and continued
for the remainder of the plaintiff's life, in light of the
parties’ stipulation that the plaintiff had a life expec-
tancy of 15.8 years. With respect to the first time period,
which began on March 28, 2003, and ended on October
2, 2006, a period of approximately forty-two months,

PO 285
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the trial court concluded that the jury reasonably could
have awarded the plaintiff damages for pain and suffer-
ing totaling $110,000. This amount was based on the
court's determination that the jury reasonably could
have awarded the plaintiff $5000 per month for the first
two months, and $2500 per month for the remaining
forty months. With respect to the second time period,
from October 2, 2006, onward, the court found that
the jury reasonably could have awarded the plaintiff
$74,260. The court stated that this amount was based
on the plaintiff's life expectancy and the percentages
of permanent partial disability assigned to the injured
body parts. Although the court did not indicate whether
damages for pain and suffering were included in the sum
of $74,260, the court noted that the plaintiff continued to
experience pain during the second time period as a
result of his permanent disabilities.

As we have stated in this opinion, our review of the
trial court’s decision requires careful balancing. We
have the thorny task of deferentially reviewing a deci-
sion that itself was required to employ deferential
review, where the primary challenge is that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to accord proper
deference to the jury’s verdict. In a sense, we must
retrace the steps of the trial court. That is, we must
begin by reviewing the evidence, construed in the light
most favorable to sustaining the verdict, just as the trial
court was required to do. We then must examine the
trial court’s decision in such a way that we employ
every reasonable presumption in favor of its cor-
rectness.

Describing the accident, the plaintiff stated that the
impact was “very, very hard.” When his car, the rear
of which had sustained heavy damage, stopped moving,
he realized immediately that his shoulder had been
injured and that he could not move his right arm, or
-even turn around to see what was behind him. He was

286 Po

fT
placed on a stretcher and taken to Hartford Hospital
in an ambulance. Emergency room staff took X rays of
the plaintiff's shoulder, back and neck, which revealed
that the plaintiff did not have any broken bones. They
gave the plaintiff anti-inflammatory and pain medica-
tions, advised him to follow up with his physician and
released him later that day. The next day, the plaintiff
called the office of his general practitioner, William
Spector, and took the first available appointment, for
April 7, 2003, ten days following the accident. Spector
prescribed anti-inflammatory and pain medications and
referred him to an orthopedist, Paul Filippini. The medi-
cations provided the plaintiff only short-term relief from
his pain.

The plaintiff subsequently was treated by a number
of different physicians. Following Spector’s referral,
the plaintiff first saw Filippini on April 29, 2003. At
Filippini’s recommendation, the plaintiff began receiv-
ing physical therapy for his neck and back.’ He partici-
pated in physical therapy for almost seven weeks, but
ultimately discontinued the sessions because the treat-
ments offered him no relief, and, in fact, worsened his
pain. He last saw Filippini for treatment in March, 2004.
For the next ten months, although the plaintiff did not
seek any further treatment for his injuries, he continued
to receive pain medications prescribed by Filippini.

In January, 2005, the plaintiff began seeing another
orthopedist, Anthony Spinella. In June, 2006, Spinella
gave him a cortisone shot in his shoulder. The plaintiff
experienced some relief—about 20 to 30 percent—from
his shoulder pain for a period of about six months
following the shot. When questioned as to why he did

7 The plaintiff testified that the physical therapists were unable to perform
therapy on his shoulder because the plaintiff's shoulder pain was too great
to allow them to touch it.

Po 287

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not receive a second shot for his shoulder, the plaintiff
first stated that he wanted to “stretch . . . out” his

shots and later testified that he was afraid of needles.
When Spinella examined the plaintiff on October 2,
2006, the plaintiff had 50 percent normal cervical
motion with pain and 75 percent abduction of the right
shoulder with mild discomfort. Straight left leg raises
to thirty degrees resulted in low back pain. Based on
his examination of the plaintiff during that visit, Spinella
rated the plaintiff's permanent injuries as follows: 10
percent injury to the shoulder; 15 percent injury to
the neck, 10 percent of which was preexisting; and 15
percent injury to the back, 10 percent of which was
preexisting. Filippini assigned a permanency rating of
7.5 to 10 percent with respect to the plaintiffs shoulder
injury and 7.5 percent with respect to the plaintiff's
back injury.

Spinella referred the plaintiff to a physician at the
pain management center at Saint Francis Hospital and
Medical Center, Qassem Kishawi, who examined the
plaintiff on October 30, 2006. Kishawi recommended
that the plaintiff receive cortisone shots in his neck and
back, but the plaintiff refused because of his fear of
needles. Kishawi twice mentioned in his consultation
notes that the plaintiff expressed anxiety at the prospect.
of receiving shots. Kishawi observed that the plaintiff
experienced “severe tenderness” over the lumbar facet.
joints and tenderness over the sacroiliac joints. On Kis-
hawi’s advice, the plaintiff received a magnetic reso-
nance image (MRI) of his lumbar spine, which revealed
degeneration, some of it extensive, at various points in
the plaintiff's spine. The MRI also revealed disc bulging,
herniation and spinal stenosis.

Kishawi then referred the plaintiff to a neurosurgeon,
Stephan Lange, who examined the plaintiff on January

288 Po
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11, 2007, and found that he had no tenderness in his
cervical, thoracic and lumbar spines. Lange observed
that the plaintiff had a normal gait and full range of
motion in the cervical neck. The plaintiff had slight
tenderness with deep palpation of muscles in the neck,
specifically the right sternocleidomastoid. Lange
informed the plaintiff that he needed to see the plain-
tiffs MRI to make a final recommendation, but, based
on the MRI report and his physical examination, he
recommended that the plaintiff continue with conserva-
tive treatment and not pursue surgery.

With respect to the limitations that the plaintiff's
injuries placed on him, evidence at trial revealed that
he returned to work two days following the accident
and was able to perform his usual duties, but only with
great discomfort and with the aid of his pain medica-
tions. That is, in order to function, the plaintiff had to
take pain medication when he woke up in the morning,
followed by an additional dose with lunch, another dose
in the afternoon, and a final dose at night. Outside of
work, the plaintiff found himself unable to engage in
certain activities that he previously had enjoyed. For
example, prior to the accident, the plaintiff had worked
in his yard every day, but after the accident he had to
hire people to do the work. He had tried to rake leaves,
but found himself “on [his] knees from the pain” in his
back. He also used to be able to clean the pool and
play with his children, but has been unable to engage
in either of these activities since the accident. Finally,
the plaintiff testified that he was no longer able to
exercise.

The plaintiff testified extensively regarding the level
of pain that he had experienced subsequent to the acci-
dent. Although he had some preexisting injuries, he
testified that prior to the accident, he was experiencing
little to no pain—and only infrequently—from those

Po 289
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injuries. At the time of trial—five years after the acci-
dent—he testified that without pain medication he was
unable to sleep, and even with medication he woke up
frequently. He testified that he was seeing his physician
every two weeks in order to manage his pain medication
and that he took medication on a daily basis, multiple
times a day. When asked to describe how his injuries
affected him on an average day, the plaintiff stated that
because of the pain, each day was a “miserable day.”
He had headaches every day, and, on a scale of one to
ten, the plaintiff rated his average daily pain at an eight.
The plaintiff emphasized that the pain was with him
every moment of every day, explaining that “it’s giving
me discomfort when I’m walking, when I’m sleeping,
when I’m working, twenty-four hours a day.”®

In reviewing the trial court’s determination to order
a remittitur on the basis of these facts, we must be
mindful that “[iJn such a matter, a large discretion is
of necessity vested in the trial court, and only in cases
where that discretion is unreasonably exercised”
should this court reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Gray v. Fanning, 73 Conn. 115, 117, 46 A. 831 (1900).
The question, then, is not whether we would have
ordered a remittitur on this evidence. Rather, our

8 We observe that the plaintiff's submission of medical expenses shows
that Filippini’s last charge to the plaintiff for pain medications was on August
20, 2004. The plaintiff was not charged for medications again until Spector
charged him on December 2, 2004. Additionally, the plaintiff does not appear
to have been charged for any pain medications between June, 2005, and
November, 2005. Between November, 2006, and June, 2007, the only prescrip-
tion for which the plaintiff was charged was ninety tablets of ibuprofen.

Although these gaps might indicate either that the plaintiff did not have,
and therefore did not take, any medication during those time periods, or
that the prescriptions covered those time periods, the plaintiff was not
questioned regarding their significance. The issue was not argued to the
Jury and in any event, in construing the evidence in the light most favorable
to sustaining the verdict, any credibility determination must be resolved in
favor of the jury's verdict.

290 Pe

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inquiry is whether the trial court reasonably could have
concluded that, even viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to sustaining the verdict, the evidence
fell so far short of supporting the jury’s award of dam-
ages that the award shocked the conscience of the
court.

We emphasize that, in reviewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, the trial
court, and the reviewing court, are bound by the jury's
credibility determinations and all reasonable inferences
the jury could have drawn from the evidence. The evi-
dence in the present case, when viewed in that light,
reveals that the plaintiff has suffered permanent disabil-
ities as a result of the accident. Due to his injuries, he
suffers considerable pain every day, at a level of eight
out of ten. Testimony at trial revealed that he had suf-
fered that level of pain continuously for five years.
There was no evidence presented that the plaintiff's
pain had lessened significantly since the accident, and
every form of treatment that he had tried had failed to
yield an improvement. The parties stipulated that the
plaintiff had a life expectancy of 15.8 years—meaning
that the plaintiff could expect to suffer significant pain
every day for almost sixteen more years following trial.
The plaintiff is required to take substantial amounts of
medication just to make it through each day, and even
with medication, he is now unable to engage in activities
that he once enjoyed: playing with his children; exercis-
ing; and working around the house. Even employing
every reasonable presumption in favor of the correct-
ness of the decision of the trial court, we cannot agree
with the court’s conclusion that the jury’s award fell
outside the necessarily uncertain limits of what is fair
and reasonable compensation. The trial court’s broad
discretion over the decision to award remittitur does
not extend to a reduction of an award that is within the

Po 291

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range of reasonable compensation, however generous
that award may be. Accordingly, because the evidence
supports the jury’s award of damages, the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering remittitur.®

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

® Because we conclude that the evidence supports the jury's verdict, and,
therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering remittitur, it
is unnecessary for us to reach the plaintiff's additional claim that the trial
court improperly failed to award any damages for future pain and suffering.
We observe, however, that it is unclear whether the court considered the
award of $74,260 to include damages for pain and suffering. Although the
court did not expressly state that the award did include those damages,
the memorandum of decision specifically acknowledges that the plaintiff
continued to experience pain and suffering.

Although it is also unnecessary for us to address the plaintiff's claim that
the trial court improperly applied a mathematical formula in calculating
reasonable damages, we note our disagreement with the Appellate Court’s
conclusion that the trial court improperly estimated reasonable monthly
damages, then multiplied that amount by the number of months during
which the plaintiff was entitled to recover. See Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking,
LLG, supra, 117 Conn. App. 828. There is nothing inherently wrong with
estimating damages by that method, so long as that estimation does not run
afoul of the requirement that the jury’s award must be sustained if it is
supported by the evidence viewed in its most favorable light. Our references
to the impropriety of using a mathematical formula to calculate reasonable
damages have focused on the inappropriateness of requiring a specific pro-
portion between the economic and noneconomic damages. See, e.g., Camp-
bell v. Gould, supra, 194 Conn. 40 (concluding that trial court improperly
ordered remittitur on basis of “ ‘very low’” special damages, and stating
that “{w]e have in the past . . . discountenanced using the special damages
as a yardstick by which to measure the general damages”); Wochel v. Foley,
supra, 193 Conn. 585 (trial court improperly ordered remittitur on basis that
“only [$300] in special damages was shown”).

‘The distinction between the mathematical formula in the present case
and the type of calculation that we have stated is improper is this: The trial
court in the present case did not use a mathematical formula to calculate
the reasonableness of the damages. It arrived at a determination of what
would constitute reasonable damages—without explaining its methodology
in arriving at that amount—for a period of one month, and then simply
allowed recovery of that amount for the duration of the recovery period.
In both Campbell and Wochek, by contrast, the trial court required a certain
proportionality between the economic and noneconomic damages, and
determined that the jury award was excessive because the proportion
between the two was too high.

— |
ERNEST FRANCIS v. JOHN W. FONFARA ET AL.
(SC 18480)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.

Ys
Argued October 21, 2011—officially released January 8, 2012

Po 298
Lee

Michael S. Taylor,.with whom were Brendon P. Lev-
esque and, on the brief, Dana M. Hrelic, for the plaintiff
in error.

Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, former
attorney general, for the defendant in error.

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The sole issue in this writ of error is
whether the plaintiff in error, State Marshal Lisa H.
Stevenson (plaintiff), was entitled to a fee for copies
of a complaint handled in connection with her service
of process in a civil action pursuant to General Statutes
§ 52-261 (a) (2), despite the fact that she did not person-

1 General Statutes § 52-261 (a) provides in relevant part: “[EJach officer
or person who serves process, summons or attachments shall receive a fee
of not more than thirty dollars for each process served and an additional
fee of thirty dollars for the second and each subsequent service of such
process, except that such officer or person shall receive an additional fee
of ten dollars for each subsequent service of such process at the same
address . . . . Each such officer or person shall also receive the fee set
by the Department of Administrative Services for state employees for each
mile of travel, to be computed from the place where such officer or person
received the process to the place of service, and thence in the case of civil
process to the place of return. If more than one process is served on one
person at one time by any such officer or person, the total cost of travel
for the service shall be the same as for the service of one process only.
. . . The following fees shall be allowed and paid: (1) For taking bail or
bail bond, one dollar; (2) for copies of writs and complaints, exclusive of
endorsements, one dollar per page, not to exceed a total amount of nine
hundred dollars in any particular matter; (3) for endorsements, forty cents
per page or fraction thereof; (4) for service of a warrant for the seizure of
intoxicating liquors . . . twenty dollars; (5) for the removal and custody
of such liquors so seized, reasonable expenses, and twenty dollars; (6) for
the levy of an execution . . . fifteen per cent on the amount of the execu-
tion, provided the minimum fee for such execution shall be thirty dollars; (7)
on the levy of an execution on real property . . . reasonable and customary
expenses; (8) for causing an execution levied on real property to be recorded,
fees for travel, twenty dollars and costs; (9) for services on an application
for the sale of personal property attached, or in selling mortgaged property
foreclosed under a decree of court, the same fees as for similar services
on executions; (10) for committing any person to a community correctional
center, in civil actions, twenty-one cents a mile for travel, from the place

204 Po
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ally make the copies. We conclude that the defendant

in error, the trial court, improperly denied the plaintiff's

request for fees and, accordingly, we grant the writ

of error.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The named plaintiff in the underly-
ing action, Ernest Francis, brought a declaratory judg-
ment action in the judicial district of Hartford against
all 185 members of the Connecticut General Assembly,
including the named defendant, John W. Fonfara. Fran-
cis sought and received a waiver of the entry fee and
the process server's service fees pursuant to Practice
Book § 8-2,” including a fee for copies pursuant to § 52-
261 (a) (2). As the result of this waiver, the state, pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 52-259b,? was responsible for
paying the process server’s fees. After receiving a box
from Francis with a sufficient quantity of copies to
serve all 185 defendants, the plaintiff inquired with the

of the court to the community correctional center, in lieu of all other
expenses; and (11) for summoning and attending a jury for reassessing
damages or benefits on a highway, three dollars a day. The court shall tax
as costs a reasonable amount for the care of property held by any officer
under attachment or execution. The officer serving any attachment or execu-
tion may claim compensation for time and expenses of any person, in
Keeping, securing or removing property taken thereon, provided such officer
shall make out a bill. The bill shall specify the labor done, and by whom,
the time spent, the travel, the money paid, if any, and to whom and for
what. The compensation for the services shall be reasonable and customary
and the amount of expenses and shall be taxed by the court with the costs.”
Gmphasis added.)

2 Practice Book § 8-2 provides in relevant part: “(a) Prior to the commence-
ment of an action, or at any time during its pendency, a party may file with
the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, or in which the party
intends to return a writ, summons and complaint, an application for waiver
of fees payable to the court and for payment by the state of the costs of
service of process. . . .”

8 General Statutes § 52-259b (a) provides: “In any civil or criminal matter,
if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees
payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall
waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by
the state.”

po 295
as

office of the attorney general and received direction on
how to address the service of process. Thereafter, the
plaintiff properly effectuated service on all 185 defen-
dants by leaving process for each with an associate
attorney general, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-64.
The plaintiff did not make the copies; Francis’ son had
them made at his expense. The copies complied, how-
ever, with the requirements of § 52-64 in that the plain-
tiff confirmed that each was exactly the same as the
original, and thereon endorsed her attestation that each
was a true copy of the original. Subsequently, the plain-
tiff submitted an invoice claiming fees of, inter alia,
$900 for copies of the complaint.

Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on its
own motion to review the fees charged by the plaintiff.
The trial court subsequently issued a memorandum of
decision in which it allowed the plaintiff's requested
service, mileage, and endorsement fees, but disallowed
the $900 fee for copies. This writ of error followed.*

4 General Statutes § 52-64 provides: “Service of civil process in any civil
action or proceeding maintainable against or in any appeal authorized from
the actions of, or service of any foreign attachment or garnishment author-
ized against, the state or against any institution, board, commission, depart-
ment or administrative tribunal thereof, or against any officer, servant, agent
‘or employee of the state or of any such institution, board, commission,
department or administrative tribunal, as such, may be made by a proper
officer (1) leaving a true and attested copy of the process, including the
declaration or complaint, with the Attorney General at the Attorney General’s
office in Hartford, or (2) sending a true and attested copy of the process,
including the summons and complaint, by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the Attorney General at the Attorney General’s office in
Hartford.”

® It is uncontested that if the plaintiff is due the fee for copies she handled
and confirmed to be accurate, even if she did not make them, the $900 fee
was correctly calculated. More than 900 pages of copies, the maximum
number for which the $1 fee for copies applies under § 52-261 (a) (2), were
handled and confirmed by the plaintiff in order to serve individual copies
of the original seven page complaint on the 185 defendants.

® After the deadline to file an appeal expired pursuant to Practice Book
§ 63-1, the plaintiff filed with this court a motion pursuant to Practice Book
§§ 60-2 and 60-3 for permission to file a late writ of error and a writ of error.
We granted the motion for permission to file, and the plaintiff's writ was
thereafter filed.

296 Po
a

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly
disallowed the fee for copies because, although the trial
court properly determined that § 52-261 (a) (2) was
ambiguous, it failed to consider relevant and compelling
legislative history when it considered extratextual evi-
dence of the meaning of the statute. The plaintiff con-
tends that the legislative history demonstrates a clearly
expressed intent for process servers to be paid the fee
for copies, regardless of whether they actually make
the copies. The trial court now contends, contrary to
its memorandum of decision, that § 52-261 (a) (2) is
plain and unambiguous when read in context.
According to the trial court, § 52-261 (a) requires pay-
ment only for services actually performed, including
the making of copies. Therefore, the trial court further
contends that, pursuant to General Statutes § 1-22,” we
may not consider extratextual sources to determine
legislative intent, but must enforce the plain meaning
of the statute. The trial court further responds that,
even if we find that the language of § 52-261 (a) (2) is
not plain and unambiguous, it nevertheless properly
exercised its discretion in refusing to grant the
requested fee for copies. We agree with the plaintiff
and conclude that the fee for copies is not contingent
upon the process server personally making the copies.®

7 General Statutes § 1-2z provides: “The meaning of a statute shall, in the
first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”

* The plaintiff further contends that if we agree with the trial court that
§ 52-261 (a) (2) clearly and unambiguously indicates that a process server
may not charge a fee for copies she did not make, and, accordingly, that § 1-
2z precludes this court from referring to extratextual evidence of statutory
meaning, § 1-22 is unconstitutional as violative of the doctrine of separation
of powers. The trial court responds that § 1-2z.is constitutional because the
power to establish rules of statutory construction does not lie exclusively
within the control of the judicial branch or significantly interfere with the
orderly conduct of the court’s judicial functions. In light of our conclusion
that § 52-261 (a) (2) is ambiguous, we need not, and in fact, cannot, resolve

Be

Pe 297
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Whether § 52-261 (a) (2) entitles a process server to
the fee for copies, even if she has not personally made
the copies, is a question of statutory interpretation
“over which we exercise plenary review. . . . The prin-
ciples that govern statutory construction are well estab-
lished. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental
objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent
intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek
to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning
. . . §1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the
statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If,
after examining such text and considering such relation-
ship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous
and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extra-
textual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not
be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and
unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance
to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding
its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation
and common law principles governing the same general
subject matter . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 332-33, 984 A.2d
684 (2009). “The test to determine ambiguity is whether
the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning
Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 679, 986 A.3d 290 (2010).

the plaintiff's claim that § 1-2z is unconstitutional as violative of the doctrine
of separation of powers. To do so would result in nothing more than an
advisory opinion, and “[w]e have consistently held that we do not render
advisory opinions. . . . [W]here the question presented is purely academic,
‘we must refuse to entertain the appeal.” (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Domestic Violence Services of Greater New Haven,
Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 240 Conn. 1, 6-7, 688 A.2d
314 (1997).

298 PO
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Section 52-261 (a) provides in relevant part: “The
following fees shall be allowed and paid . . . (2) for
copies of writs and complaints, exclusive of endorse-
ments, one dollar per page, not to exceed atotal amount
of nine hundred dollars in any particular matter... .”
The trial court now contends that the only reasonable
interpretation of the statute is that the process server
claiming the statutory fee for copies personally must
make the copies in order to be paid, because to con-
clude otherwise would lead to the absurd result that
the fee could be paid for doing absolutely nothing. The
plaintiff contends that it would be reasonable to con-
clude that the fee is due regardless of who makes the
copies, because the fee for copies also compensates
the process server for handling and reviewing the copies
to ensure accuracy. We find both interpretations rea-
sonable, and, accordingly, we conclude that the statute
is ambiguous.

It is significant that this subdivision of the statute
does not employ a gerund, as other subdivisions of the
statute do, to specify for which act, if any, compensation
shall be paid. For example, almost all of the other subdi-
visions of § 52-261 (a) suggest a necessary action to
qualify for the fee, such as “taking,” “service,”
“removal,” “levy,” “causing,” “committing,” and “sum-
moning and attending . . . .”° Subdivision (2) of § 52-
261 (a) does not provide a fee “for making copies,” “for
copying” or “for ensuring the accuracy of copies,” nor
does it expressly reference expense reimbursement, as
do subdivisions (5), (7), (8) and (10) of the statute."
Only one other subdivision is similarly silent as to
action; General Statutes § 52-261 (a) (3); and provides
fees “for endorsements, forty cents per page or fraction
thereof . . . .” General Statutes § 52-261 (a) (8).

* See footnote 1 of this opinion.
19 See footnote 1 of this opinion.

po 299

In accordance with the requirements of § 1-22, we
also look to related statutes in construing § 52-261,
which provide for payment for fees and expenses of
persons serving civil process. Chapter 896, General Stat-
utes § 52-45a et seq., governs civil process. Chapter 896
requires that “a proper officer” must serve on each
defendant a “true and attested copy” of process." See,
e.g., General Statutes §§ 52-57, 52-59b, 52-59c, 52-63 and
52-64. Nowhere in that chapter, however, is there a
requirement that copies be made by the process server.
Because it is clear that a copy of the complaint must
be “true and attested,” but the statutes are silent as
to any requirement of who must make a copy, it is
reasonable to conclude that the statutory fee for copies
is intended to compensate the process server for han-
dling and reviewing each copy to ensure that it is a true
copy of the original, regardless of whether the copy
was made by the process server. Contrary to the trial
court’s contention that making the copy is the only
plausible task related to the service of copies of com-
plaints and writs, handling and ensuring that a copy is
true are acts required of the process server for each
copy, regardless of whether the process server makes
the copy.

Although this analysis strongly indicates that the fee
for copies is compensation for handling and ensuring
copies of complaints and writs are true, whatever that
may entail, and therefore in compliance with chapter
896, we nevertheless acknowledge that the interpreta-
tion advanced by the trial court is reasonable, as well.
Because it is clear that the legislature can indicate a
necessary action, or condition payment on the showing

“Under General Statutes § 52-50, a “proper officer” means a “state mar-
shal, a constable or other proper officer authorized by statute, or, subject
to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section, to an indifferent person.”
For clarity and convenience, in this opinion we refer to anyone authorized
to serve process under § 52-50 as a process server.

300 Po
a

of incurred expenses, it is reasonable to conclude, as
the plaintiff now contends, that the fee for copies is to
compensate the process server for handling copies of
writs and complaints, regardless of whether the copies
‘were made by the process server. Because the fee is
calculated per page of each copy, it is also reasonable
to conclude, as the trial court contends, that it is not
a fee for handling and delivery, but compensation for
expenses incurred in creation of each copy. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the statute is subject to multiple
competing reasonable interpretations, and accordingly
is ambiguous. Therefore, in accordance with § 1-2z, we
review the legislative history of § 52-261.

In 1981, the legislature adopted an amendment to
§ 52-261 that, inter alia, increased the fee for copies
from sixty cents per page to $1 per page. See Public
Acts 1981, No. 81-80, § 1. The role of the process server
and the fee for copies were expressly discussed, first
at ajudiciary committee hearing,” and later on the floor
of the House of Representatives.” In both sessions,

1 The following exchange took place in the judiciary committee between
Representative Antonina Parker and Senator Joseph Flynn:

“(Representative Parker]: . . . Do [process servers] know . . . [wJhat
they are serving?

“[Senator Flynn]: Yes, they do know what papers they are serving and
the reason why they have to know is that on the paper that is actually
served on the defend[aJnt, they must make an endorsement on the back of
it stating that this is a true copy of the original. Their job is to serve an
exact copy of whatever the original writ or process is the subject of the
lawsuit. So they would know what the particular kind of process they were
serving even if they might not understand all the implications of it, they'd
at least have to know that the copy served on the defend[ajnt met in every
particular the exact text of the original document.” (Emphasis added.) Conn.
Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary Committee, Pt. 3, 1981 Sess.,
p. 811.

8 The following exchange occurred on the floor of the House of Represen-
tatives between Representative R. E. Van Norstrand and Representative
Richard Tulisano:

Representative Van Norstrand asked: “If the plaintiff, or presumably the
plaintiff's attorney, supplies the copies is there to be a charge under this
[s]tatute?” 24 H.R. Proc., Pt. 5, 1981 Sess., p. 1668.

Representative Tulisano responded: “I believe they charge the same no
matter who provides the copies. I think that’s the custom that exists now

po 301

there was a clear legislative intent expressed that, in
accordance with the custom and practice then existing,
the fee for copies be paid regardless of who actually
makes the copies, and as compensation for the process
server's job of ensuring the.accuracy of the copies. Our
review of the remaining legislative history and geneal-
ogy of the statute has revealed no evidence to support
acontrary interpretation. Such clear evidence of legis-
lative intent, particularly when considered in concert
with the weight of the textual evidence supplied by
chapter 896, leaves no doubt that the fee for copies
under § 52-261 (a) (2) is not contingent upon the process
server’s making the copies.

The trial court contends, however, that it retains dis-
cretion in awarding fees for service of process and
urges us to affirm its refusal to order the fee for copies
as an exercise of that discretion. The plaintiff responds
that the trial court’s interpretation of § 52-261 (a) (2)
was a misapplication of the law and thereby constitutes
an abuse of discretion. We agree with the plaintiff. There
is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court’s
decision to deny the requested fee for copies was an
exercise of discretion, rather than a misapplication of
the law. :

In determining whether a trial court may exercise its
discretion in determining the fee for copies, or whether

and they charge it no matter who provides it. So I anticipate that would
continue.” (Emphasis added.) Id., pp. 1668-69.

4 Indeed, counsel for the trial court conceded at oral argument before
this court that, prior to rendering its decision, it did not review either the
1981 legislative history nor similarly compelling 1961 legislative history. See
Public Acts 1961, No. 811 (removing language added earlier in session;
Public Acts 1961, No. 122; that permitted fee for copies only “if prepared
by the sheriff or person making such service”). To its credit, the trial court
does not now argue that the legislative history of § 52-261 plausibly indicates
that the legislature intended for the fee for copies to be allowed only if the
process server makes copies.

302 Pe
_

our interpretation of the statute compels the court to
award the fee for copies, we note that § 52-261 (a)
provides in relevant part that “[t]he following fees shall
be allowed and paid . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
“[A]lthough we have often stated [that] [d]efinitive
words, such as must or shall, ordinarily express legisla-
tive mandates of a nondirectory nature . . . we also
have noted that the use of the word shall, though signifi-
cant, does not invariably establish a mandatory duty.
. . . Furthermore, a requirement stated in affirmative
terms unaccompanied by negative words, as in the pres-
ent case, generally is not viewed as mandatory.” (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 744, 865 A.2d 428
(2005). “While we generally will not look for interpreta-
tive guidance beyond the language of the statute when
the words of that statute are plain and unambiguous
. . . our past decisions have indicated that the use of
the word shall, though significant, does not invariably
create a mandatory duty. . . . The test we have
adopted for determining whether such a statutory
requirement is mandatory or directory is whether the
prescribed mode of action is of the essence of the thing
to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates
to matter material or immaterial—to matters of conve-
nience or of substance. . . . If it is a matter of conve-
nience, the statutory provision is directory; if it is a
matter of substance, the statutory provision is manda-
tory. . . . A statutory provision that is directory pre-
scribes what shall be done but does not invalidate action
upon a failure to comply.” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Hall Manor Owner's Assn.
v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 152-53, 561 A.2d 1373
(1989).

In light of our preceding analysis, the use of the word.
shall in § 52-261 is sufficiently plain and unambiguous
that further analysis to determine the nature of the duty

Po 308
Leer

is unnecessary. The statute provides for payment of
specific fees for the service of process and, where the
court has discretion in determining the amount to be
paid, the court’s discretion is expressed clearly in the
statutory text. For example, § 52-261 (a) provides in
relevant part: “[F]or summoning grand jurors, such
[process server] shall receive only such [process
server's] actual expenses and such reasonable sum for
services as are taxed by the court. . . .” (Emphasis
added.) Section 52-261 (a) provides in relevant part:
“The following fees shall be allowed and paid . . . (5)
for the removal and custody of such liquors so seized,
reasonable expenses, and twenty dollars . . .
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it is plain that the legis-
lature intended that a process server has a right to be
paid a specified fee for all pages of copies of writs and
complaints served, but that the court has discretion to
determine a reasonable fee for a variety of other
services.

We have previously held that a trial court had abused
its discretion, in the context of an equitable action, by
awarding excessive process server mileage fees under
§ 52-261 (a). Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249
Conn. 1, 29-30, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999)." Danbury is dis-

In Danbury, the trial court awarded the plaintiff approximately $170,000

” in sheriff's fees for the service of 111 writs and 111 lis pendens. In. order
to arrive at this amount, the court agreed to charge the defendant, for each
of the 111 foreclosure actions, the mileage for delivery of all 111 writs and
all 111 lis pendens as if each had been separately delivered. Danbury v.
Dana Investment Corp., supra, 249 Conn. 8, 10-11. Unsurprisingly, we found
that awarding such costs against the defendant was an abuse of the trial
court's equitable discretion. Id., 21-22. In the present matter, the plaintiff
properly billed a mere $10.09 for mileage, despite delivering separate com-
plaints on 185 defendants in one trip. Regardless of her ability to economize
on travel by making a single trip to serve all defendants, it remains a fact
that in order to serve all 185 defendants in the underlying matter, the plaintiff
‘was required to handle and ensure all 185 copies of the complaint that were
served were true copies. It is not unfair to observe that, a process server's
job is more burdensome, rather than less, when she does not personally
make the copies of a complaint or writ. Accordingly, she earned her fee for
each one. Although there may be a compelling policy argument that where

304 PO
{|

tinguishable because in equitable actions the court must
exercise its discretion in awarding costs.'* Not only is
the present matter at law rather than in equity, but the
issue is not the awarding of costs, but the calculation
of them. In Danbury, we did not examine the court’s
calculation of the fee to determine whether it con-
formed with § 52-261. Accordingly, any reliance upon
our analysis of the § 52-261 (a) mileage fee in Danbury
for the proposition that the calculation of fees for copies
under § 52-261 (a) (2) is discretionary, is misplaced.

The writ of error is granted, the judgment is reversed
and the case is remanded with direction to award the
plaintiff the requested fee for copies of $900.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

|

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALIA K. ALTAJIR
(SC 18706)

Rogers, ©. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Harper, Js.

multiple defendants are served through the office of the attorney general
that the statutory fee charged for copies is too high, or that separate copies
of complaints are not necessary, or that the fee for copies should be due
only to precess servers who make the copies, those arguments must be
addressed to the legislature, not the courts. “[T]his court is precluded from
substituting its own ideas of what might be a wise provision in place of a
clear expression of legislative will.” (internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, 275 Conn. 105, 161, 881 A.2d 937 (2005), cert.
denied, 547 USS. L111, 126 S. Ct. 1913, 164 L. Bd. 2d 664 (2006).
8 See Practice Book § 18-15.

es 306

Argued October 19, 2011—officially released January 3, 2012

Moira L. Buckley, with whom was Morgan P. Rueck-
ert, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, was David Shepack, state’s attor-
ney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

HARPER, J. In this certified appeal, the defendant,
Alia K. Altajir, appeals from the judgment of the Appel-
late Court affirming the judgment of the trial court
revoking the defendant’s probation and sentencing her
to three years incarceration. See State v. Altajir, 123
Conn. App. 674, 689, 2 A.3d 1024 (2010). On appeal to
the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the trial
court had violated her right to due process under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution
and article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut
by improperly admitting, during the dispositional phase
of a probation revocation proceeding, a number of
undated photographs gathered from Facebook, a social
network website on which the defendant maintained a
profile.! The Appellate Court concluded that this claim

‘Bach [Facebook] user maintains a ‘profile, which is a webpage con-
taining basic information such as the individual's year of graduation and
home town, as well as personal information, such as his or her name and
whether he or she is single or in a relationship (i.e, ‘relationship status’).
Users may inform others about what they are doing by changing the ‘current
status’ message that appears at the top of the profile. . . .

“Facebook allows users to designate ‘friends.’ An individual who is invited
to be a member's Facebook friend may either accept or reject the offer,
thus providing individual control over one’s list of friends. The user can

Po 307
i

was unpreserved and that it-did not merit review pursu-
ant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d
823 (1989). We assume, without deciding, that the claim
was preserved and we affirm the Appellate Court’s judg-
ment on the ground that the photographs satisfied the
minimum standard of reliability constitutionally
required to admit evidence at the dispositional phase
of a probation revocation hearing.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts
and procedural history. In July, 2004, the then nineteen
year old defendant operated an automobile while under
the influence of alcohol. She lost control of her vehicle,
which was carrying two passengers, and inadvertently
drove off the road, down an embankment and into a
river. One of the passengers drowned as a result of the
accident. In October, 2006, the defendant pleaded nolo
contendere to charges of misconduct with a motor vehi-
cle in violation of General Statutes § 53a-57 and

control how much information to post and who can view this information
by editing their privacy settings. Specific groups of people (a network or
friends) may be granted limited access to specific parts of the profile.

“Facebook members can upload digital pictures into virtual photo albums.
A user can be ‘tagged’ in these pictures so that his or her name appears in
the caption as a link to his or her profile. If the individual does not want
to be associated with the picture, he or she can ‘untag’ it, thereby removing
the name and the link (though this does not remove the picture). Members
are able to post comments on photos, which appear as messages below the
picture.” T, Pempek etal., “College Students’ Social Networking Experiences
‘on Facebook,” 30 J. Applied Developmental Psychol. 227, 230 (2009). Addi-
tional details regarding aspects of Facebook directly relevant to this appeal
will be provided as necessary. .

Due to the dynamic nature of Facebook and other such social network
sites, these details, as well as basic structural features of the social network,
are subject to frequent modification. Care should therefore be taken to
assess information relating to social network sites on a case-by-case basis,
with due attention to the nature of the site at the time relevant to the case.
‘Up-to-date information regarding Facebook may be found in the “help”
section of the Facebook website, http:/www.facebook.com/help/?page=
260815770650470. Further explanations of Facebook related terminology
may be found in the website’s glossary, http:/www.facebook.convhelp/
glossary.

308 Po
i

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence by
a person under twenty-one years of age in violation of
General Statutes § 14-227g. In accordance with a plea
agreement, the trial court, Brunetti, J., imposed a sen-
tence of five years of incarceration, suspended after
one year, and five years of probation. The trial court also
imposed a number of special conditions of probation,
including that the defendant install an ignition interlock
device on any vehicle she owned or operated and that
she not operate a motor vehicle without a valid license.
The trial court at sentencing “stress[ed] to this defen-
dant that the treatment conditions, postincarceration,
are very important and will certainly be enforced as
aggressively as possible by the state.” The court further
specified that “[i]f you do ten out of eleven [special
conditions of probation] that is not good enough. If you
violate one of those conditions you could be violated
and wind up serving the balance of the four years.”

The defendant was released from prison in 2008, after
serving the nonsuspended year of her sentence. While
on probation in 2009, she was involved in a minor motor
vehicle accident. The accident did not involve alcohol
use; police determined, however, that she was operating
avehicle without the requisite ignition interlock device
and that she had not restored her driver's license follow-
ing its temporary suspension. The defendant subse-
quently admitted to violating the special conditions of
probation that prohibited her from engaging in that
conduct.

At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the state rec-
ommended that the court revoke the defendant’s proba-
tion and impose the remaining four years left to serve
on her underlying sentence. The state characterized the
defendant as a “marginal probationer” who had failed to
obtain a job, further her education or provide sufficient
evidence of community service while on probation. The
state proceeded to emphasize that the defendant is

Pe 309
|

“maintaining [a] Facebook site, and this is put out on
the public domain for people to see. And when one
looks at the Facebook site . . . [one sees] that there
were multiple, multiple, multiple occasions where this
defendant had left the state of Connecticut without
permission during that period of time between the start
of probation and the violation of probation. We see
evidence that she’s in Florida . . . [and] in New York
City... .

“But the other thing we see, Your Honor, in all of
these pictures is again [the defendant] worshipping at.
the altar of alcohol and debauchery and lewd behavior.
And why is that significant? It’s significant because the
message didn’t get sent, and this individual refused to
accept it.”

Defense counsel in turn suggested that the court look
to the severity of the offenses underlying the defen-
dant’s probation violations, arguing that the commis-
sion of an infraction (driving without restoring her
license) and a class C misdemeanor (driving without
the ignition interlock device), neither of which involved
alcohol, warranted a more lenient sentence. In response
to the state’s argument regarding information gleaned
from the defendant’s Facebook page, defense counsel
countered that the alcohol related behavior evident on
the defendant’s Facebook profile was reflective of pre-
vailing social norms, that the images were not represen-
tative of the way the defendant spent most of her time
and that the photographs were undated. Defense coun-
sel also contested the state’s basis for asserting that
the defendant had been to New York or Florida but
noted that she had been granted permission from a
probation officer to travel to New York.

The trial court, Ginocchio, J., noted that photographs
on Facebook of the defendant consuming alcohol had
played an aggravating role at the defendant’s sentencing

310 po
i

for the underlying offense and that “now after she’s
done her time and she’s come back before the court
now, she still has the audacity to go back on Facebook
and show herself in the condition of being intoxicated.
. .. [W]hy would someone, knowing what was at stake
here, do that again? It’s baffling . . . but maybe she'll
address it, or [counsel] can address it, but it doesn’t
make any sense.”

Shortly thereafter, the defendant took the opportu-
nity to address the court, at which point she apologized
for “everything that has taken place” and asserted that
she no longer drove after drinking. She acknowledged
through counsel, however, that she did continue to con-
sume alcohol, and she did not contest the state’s charac-
terization of the photographs viewable on her Facebook
profile. When the court later offered the defendant the
opportunity to say more, she replied, “No.”

Subsequent to the defendant’s allocution, the state
sought to introduce printed copies of approximately
seventy photographs, along with associated captions
and comments, purportedly viewable on the defen-
dant’s Facebook page. The state presented no evidence
regarding how these photographs had been acquired,
who could view the defendant’s Facebook profile or
how Facebook's features governing publicity and pri-
vacy functioned during the relevant time period. In
support of the images’ admission, the state argued that
“the court has the authority to consider a wide range
of information as long as there is some indicia of reliabil-
ity, and it seems to me that all parties have talked about
this. It informs everyone’s position . . . .” Defense

® As we note elsewhere; see footnotes 1, 3 and 7 of this opinion; customiza-
ble privacy settings allow individual Facebook users to exercise considerable
control over the availability of information associated with their profiles.
Moreover, the social network's general infrastructure, including these pri-
vacy settings, is highly dynamic and in many cases may be accurately
assessed only with reference to a limited time period.

Po BLL
i_|

counsel objected, stating that “I don’t think any of that
provides a foundation for the violation of probation,
which is at issue here, and so I think it sets up a due
process issue with the court considering collateral and
extraneous matters with this proceeding.” The court
overruled the defendant’s objection and allowed the
images to be marked as a full exhibit, reasoning that it
could consider any evidence in a sentencing hearing as
long as the evidence was found to be reliable.

The court then stated that it would give defense coun-
sel an opportunity to review the images, captions, and
commentary. In response to defense counsel’s com-
ments that “I’m kind of put on the spot. I’m trying to
look at all of these before they’re submitted to the
court,” the court granted the defendant a ten minute
recess. After the recess, the state represented that the
parties had agreed to eliminate approximately one half
of the photographs, so the proffered exhibit now
included only “pictures that border on the issue of alco-
hol or [the defendant] being out of the state.” At this
point, defense counsel interjected, “[a]nd I would just
note, Judge, that none of the photos appear to be dated.
They’re undated. And I’m not sure there is any way to
prove that that was during the period of probation.”
Defense counsel further indicated that the defendant's
Facebook page was designed to be viewed by a limited
number of people, that the photographs were not neces-
sarily posted by the defendant herself, that the defen-
dant was of legal drinking age and that drinking alcohol
was not itself a violation of probation. The state
responded that the images depicted alcohol related
behavior, that this depiction “certainly leads to a rea-
sonable inference, if you're drinking, that you may very
well be drinking and driving” and that several of the
photographs show the defendant in locations outside
of Connecticut. With respect to dating the photographs,
the state noted that the printed pages indicate when
the images were posted to Facebook. The state further

312 Po
i_i

noted, apparently in reference to the fact that the defen-

dant appears to have light colored hair in some photo-

graphs and darker hair in others, that the defendant’s

hair became darker after her incarceration.

Thirty-six images were ultimately admitted into evi-
dence. They depict the defendant and/or the defendant’s
friends in various social settings; many demonstrate or
suggest alcohol consumption by the defendant. Seven
of the images are from a Facebook album associated
with the defendant’s account entitled “random old
pics,” and another five are from the defendant’s album
entitled “this is why im hot.” These twelve photographs
were posted on Facebook in 2009. Two of these photo-
graphs, both from the “random old pics” album, depict
the defendant with alcohol. Another two, from the same
album, appear to be taken at Yankee Stadium in New
York. The remaining twenty-four images, uploaded
between 2007 and 2009, were posted by other Facebook

users to their own albums. The defendant was “tagged”
as appearing in these photographs; see footnote 1 of
this opinion; and these tagged photographs were then
viewable on a page of the defendant’s Facebook profile
displaying all of the photographs in which she
appeared.’ A number of these photographs show the

* Of these twenty-four photographs, sixteen appear to have been accessed
by viewing this page of the defendant’s Facebook profile; the remaining
eight photographs appear to have been gathered from albums on other
Facebook users’ pages rather than from the defendant's own profile. It is
possible to infer that all but one of those eight photographs could be viewed
on the defendant's profile because a hyperlink “tag” bearing her name
accompanies each photograph. The one photograph that bears no such tag
depicts the defendant but appears otherwise not to have been associated
at all with her Facebook profile.

As we previously have noted; see footnote 1 of this opinion; Facebook
is constantly changing. At the time of sentencing, a Facebook user could
place restrictions on who could “untag” a photograph, removing the link
between the user’s album and one’s own profile; a user was not able, how-
ever, to delete the photograph from the other user’s album to which it was
originally posted. See T. Pempek et al., “College Students’ Social Networking
Experiences on Facebook,” 30 J. Applied Developmental Psychol. 227,
230 (2009).

po 318
i

defendant consuming alcohol in social settings, includ-
ing on a boat in photographs from an album entitled
“Boca Bashhhhh” posted in 2009.

After receiving this evidence and hearing statements
from the victim’s father and from a friend of the defen-
dant, the court indicated that it would have imposed
the full four year sentence had the defendant committed
an alcohol related violation of probation, but that the
limited severity of the infraction in this case made the
decision more difficult. The court then proceeded to
explain why a three year sentence was nonetheless
appropriate: “I’m looking at these pictures again and
all I can think of is where is the remorse? . . . [In]
every one of these pictures you look like a person that’s
completely forgotten about what has happened and
what led you to this situation today. . . . [WJhere [the]
death of a young person is involved and you bring
unspeakable grief to his family, you don’t get a second
chance in my opinion. You had to do it right the first
time... .

“T sat here all morning and I still at times did not
know what to do. I had to listen to everything to get a
whole picture. It’s difficult. I do believe that the benefi-
cial purposes of probation are no longer being served.
She is not an appropriate candidate for probation. She
went about her life consuming a large amount of alco-
hol, and if she was drinking like this as seen in the
pictures, and she was driving, she was driving. I’m not
saying she was driving while intoxicated . . . . Her not
doing two conditions of probation is egregious. I was
thinking about continuing her on probation with a jail
sentence, but I'm going to end this today.” The court
then terminated probation and sentenced the defendant
to three years of incarceration.

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, rais-
ing several due process claims. The Appellate Court

34 Po
|__|

affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding, inter
alia, that the defendant’s claim that the Facebook photo-
graphs were unreliable was unpreserved and did not
merit review under Golding because the claimed viola-
tion was not of constitutional magnitude. State v.
Altajir, supra, 123 Conn. App. 687. This court thereafter
granted the defendant's petition for certification to
appeal limited to the following questions: “Did the
Appellate Court properly decline to review the defen-
dant’s claim that she was deprived of due process
because the sentencing court allowed the state to intro-
duce allegedly unreliable Facebook material into evi-
dence, which the court relied upon at sentencing, and
if so, whether the defendant was in fact deprived of
her due process rights?” State v. Altajir, 299 Conn. 902,
10 A.3d 520 (2010). We assume, without deciding, that
the defendant preserved her claim that the photographs
were unreliable because it is evident from the facts of
the present case that the defendant cannot establish
that the admission of the photographs deprived her of
due process. See State v. Cator, 256 Conn. 785, 791-92,
781 A.2d 285 (2001) (assuming, without deciding, pres-
ervation issue); State v. Haase, 243 Conn. 324, 338 n.12,
702 A.2d 1187 (1997) (same), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1111,
118 8. Ct. 1685, 140 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1998).

We begin by addressing the standards under which
we review the defendant’s due process claim.‘ “A revo-
cation of probation hearing has two distinct compo-
nents ... . A factual determination by a trial court as
to whether a probationer has violated a condition of
probation must first be made. If a violation is found, a

4“Although we note that [tJhe due process provisions of the state and
federal constitutions generally have the same meaning and impose similar
constitutional limitations . . . in this case, [t]he defendant has not offered
any independent and adequate analysis under the state constitution. We
therefore confine our analysis to [her] claims under the federal constitution.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andresen, 256
Conn. 313, 818 1.5, 773 A.2d 328 (2001).

Po 315
i

court must next determine whether probation should
be revoked because the beneficial aspects of probation
are no longer being served. . . . Since there are two
distinct components of the revocation hearing, our stan-
dard of review differs depending on which part of the
hearing we are reviewing.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 104, 905 A.2d
1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S. Ct. 1491,
167 L. Ed. 2d 286 (2007).

In the present case, the defendant has admitted to
violations of the conditions of her probation and con-
tests only the trial court’s decision to revoke probation.
and reimpose three years of her original prison sen-
tence. “The standard of review of the trial court’s deci-
sion at the [dispositional] phase of the revocation of
probation hearing is whether the trial court exercised its
discretion properly by reinstating the original sentence
and ordering incarceration. . . . In determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the
correctness of the court's ruling. . . . Reversal is
required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest
or where injustice appears to have been done.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Preston, 286 Conn.
367, 377, 944 A.2d 276 (2008).

In this exercise of broad discretion, however, the trial
court must continue to comport with the requirements
of due process. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that “[b]oth the probationer . . . and the
[s]tate have interests in the accurate finding of fact and
the informed use of discretion—the probationer . . .
to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away
and the [s]tate to make certain that it is neither unneces-
sarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation
nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the commu-
nity.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785, 93 S. Ct.
1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973); id., 781-82 (applying due

316 Po

process principles to probation revocation proceeding).
Our review of whether the trial court engaged in such
an “informed use of discretion”; id., 785; is in turn gov-
erned by the well established standards for reviewing
a trial court’s exercise of similarly broad discretion at
sentencing in a criminal trial.’

It is a fundamental sentencing principle that a sen-
tencing “judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry
broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind
of information he may consider or the source from
which it may come.” United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443, 446, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972). In
keeping with this principle, we have recognized that
“{a] sentencing judge has very broad discretion in
imposing any sentence within the statutory limits and
inexercising that discretion he may and should consider
matters that would not be admissible at trial. . . . Gen-
erally, due process does not require that information
considered by the trial judge prior to sentencing meet.
the same high procedural standard as evidence intro-
duced at trial. Rather, judges may consider a wide vari-

® This court has indicated that ‘the disposition phase of approbation revoca-
tion proceeding is, in substance, largely indistinguishable from the sentenc-
ing that follows a criminal prosecution”; State v. Strickland, 243 Conn. 339,
349, 708 A.2d 109 (1997); and the Appellate Court has applied this court’s
standard for reviewing discretionary consideration of evidence at sentenc-
ing, articulated in State v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 505 A.2d 1242 (1986), to
probation revocation proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Young, 63 Conn. App.
794, 800, 778 A.2d 1016 (““The [probation revocation] process, however, is
not so flexible as to be completely unrestrained; there must be some indica-
tion that the information presented to the court is responsible and has some
minimal indicia of reliability. State v. Huey, supra, [127].”), cert. denied,
258 Conn. 903, 782 A2d 140 (2001). Although this court has not yet had
occasion to consider this issue, the parties in the present case agree that
the criminal sentencing standard applies. We note, however, that, although
the due process requirements for criminal sentencing hearings and probation
revocation dispositional hearings are generally indistinguishable, the non-
criminal nature of probation proceedings does not give rise to identical
constitutional protections. See footnote 6 of this opinion (discussing self-
incrimination privilege in context of revocation of probation).

Pe 317
|__|

ety of information.” (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bletsch, 281 Conn.

5, 20, 912 A.2d 992 (2007).

We have cautioned, however, that “[tJhe trial court’s
discretion . . . is not completely unfettered. As a mat-
ter of due process, information may be considered as
a basis for a sentence only if it has some minimal indic-
ium of reliability.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Eric M., 271 Conn. 641, 650, 858 A.2d 767 (2004).
As we have long recognized, in keeping with due pro-
cess, a defendant “may not be sentenced on the basis
of improper factors or erroneous information.” State v.
Thompson, 197 Conn. 67, 77, 495 A.2d 1054 (1985).
Further, “courts must be concerned not merely when
a sentencing judge has relied on demonstrably false
information, but [also] when the sentencing process
created a significant possibility that misinformation
infected the decision.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 933 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, “[a]s long as the sentencing
judge has a reasonable, persuasive basis for relying on
the information which he uses to fashion his ultimate
sentence, an appellate court should not interfere with
his discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Bletsch, supra, 281 Conn. 21.

In considering a claim that the trial court relied on
unreliable information at sentencing, we therefore con-
duct a two-pronged inquiry: first, did the information
at issue contain some minimal indicium of reliability;
second, if it did not, did the trial court substantially rely
on this improper information in fashioning its ultimate
sentence? See State v. Collette, 199 Conn. 308, 321, 507
A.2d 99 (1986) (“the mere reference [by the sentencing
court] to information outside of the record does not
require a sentence to be set aside unless the defendant.
shows: [1] that the information was materially false or

318 Po
i_|

unreliable; and [2] that the trial court substantially
relied on the information in determining the sentence”).

With respect to the threshold inquiry into reliability,
we note that “[t]here is no simple formula for determin-
ing what information considered by a sentencing judge
is sufficiently reliable to meet the requirements of due
process. The question must be answered on a case by
case basis.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Eric M., supra, 271 Conn. 651. We have repeatedly
affirmed, however, a general principle relevant to this
case, namely, that “the absence of a denial itself pro-
vides an important [indicium] of reliability.” (Emphasis
added.) United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (“[T]his appellant did not dispute the truthful-
ness of the allegations at sentencing. . . . We see no
reason to bar sentencing judges from considering rele-
vant information whose accuracy is not disputed.”). In
State v. Anderson, 212 Conn. 31, 49-50, 561 A.2d 897
(1989), we highlighted the fact that “the defendant had
an opportunity to speak at the sentencing hearing where
he could have disputed the court’s observations; how-
ever, he declined to do so. The absence of a denial itself
provides an important indicium of reliability.” Similarly,
in State v. Eric M., supra, 653, we commented: “In the
present case, the defendant has not established that.
the statements in the article attributed to him were
materially false or unreliable. Significantly, he never
disputed having made the statements to the author, nor
did he take the opportunity to quarrel with the author’s
construal of his remarks. See United States v. Bass,
[supra, 121] (absence of denial itself provides important
indicium of reliability). Nor did he seek a continuance
to afford himself the opportunity to address the article.”
See also State v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121, 131-32, 505 A.2d
1242 (1986) (Healey, J., concurring) (suggesting that,
where sentencing court considered evidence of conduct
that defendant persistently denied and had not pleaded.

Po ai9

i___i«i

guilty to, “[oJne might also argue that his denial may
have attenuated somewhat the offered indicium of relia-
bility of otherwise inadmissible evidence”). This
approach is in accord with a presumption applied under
the general rules of evidence: “When a statement, accu-
satory in nature, made in the presence and hearing of
an accused, is not denied or explained by him, it may
be received into evidence as an admission on his part.
. . . Although evidence of silence in the face of an
accusation may be admissible under the ancient maxim
that silence gives consent the inference of assent may
be made only when no other explanation is consistent
with silence.”® (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 522-23,
504 A.2d 480 (1986).

With these considerations in mind, we turn to the
particular facts of the present case. The evidence of
reliability proffered by the state here is, at best, limited,
and certainly would not be sufficient under the rules
of evidence at a trial. The state contends that under
the much less stringent standard for admissibility at
probation proceedings its uncontested representation.
to the court that the defendant had darker colored hair

® We recognize that the United States Supreme Court has held with respect
to criminal trials: “The [gjovernment retains the burden of proving facts
relevant to the crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant
in this process at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege. . . . By
holding [the] petitioner's silence against her in determining the facts of the
offense at the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed an impermissi-
ble burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against compelled
selfincrimination.” (Citation omitted.) Mitchell v. United States, 526 US.
314, 330, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 143 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1999). This concern over self-
incrimination is not present, however, in the context of probation revocation:
“Although a revocation proceeding must comport with the requirements of
due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. . . . Just as there is no right
to a jury trial before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination available to a probationer.” (Citation
omitted.) Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.1, 104 8. Ct. 1136, 79
L. Bd. 2d 409 (1984).

320. Po
i_|

after her incarceration, consistent with her appearance
in some of the photographs, coupled with the presence
of upload dates on the photographs, provided an ade-
quate basis for the court to rely on the photographs as
depictions of the defendant’s behavior during proba-
tion.” In refutation, however, the defendant has offered
even less. At no point did the defendant deny the state’s
clear and repeated assertion that these photographs
represented her behavior while on probation. Strikingly,
in her allocution the defendant made no attempt to
counter the state’s accusation that she appeared in
these photographs “again . . . worshipping at the altar
of alcohol and debauchery and lewd behavior” or to
respond to the court's expressed bafflement that “she
still has the audacity to go back on Facebook and show
herself in a condition of being intoxicated.” Instead,
the defendant admitted, partially through counsel, that
she continued to drink alcohol and denied only the
suggestion that she ever drove after drinking.

7The state also contended at oral argument before this court that the
mere fact that during her period of probation the defendant's limited access
Facebook profile displayed images of her consuming alcohol, regardless of
when the photographs were taken, provided adequate warrant for consider-
ing those images. We reject this contention for several reasons. The state
offered no evidence that the images were viewable by the public at large,
and the defendant expressly declared that they were not public in this
manner. More, upon closer examination, it is clear that only two of the
alcohol related images at issue were uploaded by the defendant herself and
that a number of the other relevant images were accessed and printed not
by visiting the defendant's own Facebook profile but by visiting the profiles
of other Facebook users. It is therefore only by inference, unsubstantiated
by evidence presented by the state, that the court could have gleaned that
these images likely appeared on the defendant's profile as well as on the
profiles on which they were posted. Given the state's complete failure to
substantiate its controverted characterization of the defendant's Facebook
profile and the fragmentary nature of the evidence presented, the court
could not, as an “informed use of discretion”; Gagnon v. Scarpellé, supra, 411
U.S. 785; reasonably have determined, solely on the basis of the photographs
submitted to it, that the defendant's Facebook profile represented a “shrine
to alcohol and celebrated consumption of alcohol and partying,” as the state

argues on appeal.

Pe 82
|

Subsequent to the defendant’s allocution, the state
moved to admit the Facebook photographs at issue,
and again the defendant failed to deny that the behavior
in the photographs took place while she was on proba-
tion. In arguing that “I’m not sure there’s any way to
prove that [the behavior depicted in the photographs]
was during the period of probation,” the defendant
merely challenged the probative force of the evidence
itself, not the underlying truth to which the evidence
purportedly speaks. Neither before the trial court nor
in her appellate brief has the defendant claimed that
the Facebook photographs in fact depict her activities
exclusively prior to probation. See State v. Eric M.,
supra, 271 Conn. 658 (“[s]ignificantly, [the defendant]
never disputed having made the statements to the
author, nor did he take the opportunity to quarrel with
the author’s construal of his remarks”). The defendant
further failed to challenge the state’s characterization
of her hair color as a reliable basis for distinguishing
between photographs taken of her while on probation
and those taken prior to her incarceration. Finally,
although the defendant perhaps would not have had
sufficient time to fully assess each individual photo-
graph at the sentencing hearing, her failure to seek a
continuance in order to conduct such an analysis merely
reinforces the inference that the accuracy and timing
of the photographs were not subject to challenge. See
id. (“[nJor did [the defendant] seek a continuance to
afford himself the opportunity to address the article”).

Under these circumstances, because the state has
articulated an uncontradicted basis for determining
whether each of the challenged images depicted the
defendant before or during probation and because the
defendant has failed to contest that the photographs
do in fact depict her while on probation,’ we hold that

*It is apparent that the defendant has light colored hair in a number of

the photographs submitted to the court, that some photographs in which
the defendant has dark colored hair are catalogued as “random old pics”

322 po
—

the photographs contained the minimal indicia of relia-
bility necessary to pass constitutional muster in the
context of a probation revocation hearing.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.
es

ROBERT GRIMM v. JOHN WAYNE FOX ET AL.
(SC 18814)

Rogers, ©. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Vertefeuille, Js.

and that the defendant does not appear in some of the photographs at all.
‘The defendant, however, does not renew on appeal her initial objection
that the court should have refrained from considering some or all of the
photographs because they are extraneous to the issue of the defendant's
behavior on probation.

323

Argued September 20, 2011—officially released January 10, 2012

ee .
Robert Grimm, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

Frederick L. Murolo, with whom was Karen T. Mur-
olo, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J. The plaintiff, Robert Grimm, appeals!
from the trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment
in favor of the defendants, John Wayne Fox and Curtis,
Brinckerhoff and Barrett, P.C., in this legal malpractice
action. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court
improperly: (1) granted the defendants’ motion for judg-
ment, determining that the critical statements concern-
ing the defendants made by this court in its opinion in
Grimm v. Grimm, 276 Conn. 377, 886 A.2d 391 (2005),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148, 126 S. Ct. 2296, 164 L. Ed.
2d 815 (2006), were not sufficient “evidence of an expert
nature” (expert evidence) of the defendants’ malprac-
tice; and (2) heard the defendants’ motion for judgment
one day after the motion was filed, and on the same
day that trial was scheduled to begin. We disagree with
the plaintiff and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving plaintiff, reveals the following relevant facts
and procedural history. The defendants represented the
plaintiff serving as local counsel in an action to dissolve
his marriage. In January, 2003, the trial court rendered
judgment dissolving the plaintiff's marriage to his for-
mer wife and issued various financial orders. Grimm

1 The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate
Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

Pe 325
Lt

v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 380-81. The trial court
determined, among myriad other issues, that the plain-
tiff had diminished the marital estate by $2.9 million
and also ordered him to pay $100,000 of the attorney’s
fees incurred by his former wife. Id., 381. The plaintiff
raised both of these issues along with four other issues
in an appeal from the dissolution judgment to the Appel-
late Court,? which concluded that the trial court had
improperly determined that the plaintiff had diminished
the marital estate by $2.9 million, but that this incorrect
finding was harmless and did not require reversal.
Grimm v. Grimm, 82 Conn. App. 41, 52-53, 844 A.2d
855 (2004). That court also concluded that the trial
court had abused its discretion in ordering the plaintiff
to pay his wife’s attorney’s fees. Id., 55.

This court granted the plaintiff's petition for certifica-
tion to appeal limited to the following issue: “Did the
Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court’s
improper findings in support of its financial award were
harmless?” Grimm v. Grimm, 270 Conn. 902, 908, 853
A.2d 519 (2004). We also granted his former wife’s con-

2 In his appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff claimed that: (1) the
inretrievable breakdown provision of General Statutes § 46b-40 (c) (1) vio-
lates the free exercise of religion clauses of the federal and state constitu-
tions; (2) the trial court improperly concluded that the parties’ marriage had
irretrievably broken down and precluded expert testimony on the subject; (3)
the trial court abused its discretion in making financial orders that lacked
evidentiary support; (4) the trial court improperly denied his motion to open
the evidence prior to judgment for the purpose of offering certain evidence
regarding the valuation of stock options; and (6) the court improperly denied
his motion to dismiss or to transfer the matter to another judicial district.
See Grimm. v. Grimm, 82 Conn. App. 41, 43, 844 A.2d 855 (2004).

31n addition to the question that this court certified, the plaintiff also
sought review of three additional questions, namely: (1) whether attorney's
fee awards that are improperly rendered as part of a judgment are severable
from the overall financial award; (2) whether the Appellate Court properly
declined to address his claim of prejudice from the trial court's denial
of his pretrial motions; and (3) whether the Appellate Court improperly
determined that the no-fault divorce statute did not violate his rights to
exercise his religious beliefs,

326 Po
—

ditional cross petition limited to the following question:
“Did the Appellate Court improperly reverse the trial
court’s award of counsel fees?” Grimm v. Grimm, 270
Conn. 903, 853 A.2d 519 (2004). In that certified appeal,
we determined that the award of attorney's fees was
not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and reversed
the judgment of the Appellate Court on that issue.
Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 399. We affirmed
the judgment of the Appellate Court with regard to the
financial orders, however, determining that the plaintiff
had abandoned his claims with respect to the $2.9 mil-
lion because: (1) he had failed to move for an articula-
tion or rectification of the trial court’s factual findings
on this point; and (2) he had failed to raise this issue
‘until oral argument before the Appellate Court and only
addressed that issue in the statement of facts section,
rather than the argument section of his brief. Id., 386-
87, 390-91.

Thereafter, the plaintiff brought this legal malpractice
action, relying solely on certain language from this
court’s opinion deciding his divorce appeal! to establish
the defendants’ breach of the standard of care. The
plaintiff did not, however, disclose an expert witness,
as is generally required to sustain an action for legal
malpractice.® The parties filed cross motions for sum-

“The language on which the plaintiff most heavily relies as evidence of
the defendants’ breach of the standard of care includes our statement that
“two separate, but related, breakdowns of basic appellate procedure require
that the trial court’s judgment be affirmed because this intensely factual
issue is incapable of evaluation by any reviewing court”; Grimm v. Grimm,
supra, 276 Conn. 886; our statement that the Appellate Court brief “violently
disregards Practice Book § 67-4, which is the rule governing the organization
of appellate briefs”, id, 301 n.14; and the several instances in which we
stated that the record was inadequate for review and that: the plaintiff's
claim on appeal was abandoned due to his failure to adequately brief the
issue. See id., 379, 390, 391 n.14, 393.

*See, e.g, Davis v. Margolis, 215 Conn. 408, 416, 576 A.2d 489 (1990)
(“als a general rule, for a plaintiff to prevail in a legal malpractice case in
Connecticut, he must present expert testimony to establish the standard of
proper professional skill or care”).

po 327
—

mary judgment and responsive objections by the dead-
Ime specified in the court’s scheduling order. Although
the motions and objections were heard by the trial
court, neither of these motions was decided prior to
the scheduled start of the trial. The day before the trial
was scheduled to begin in this case, the defendants
filed four motions in limine, including one to preclude
the plaintiff from making any mention, argument or
claim at trial that the defendants had breached the
standard of care in their representation of the plaintiff,
as well as the motion for judgment that is the subject
of this appeal. On the day of trial, prior to the start of
jury selection, the trial court held a hearing on the
motions before it, and granted the defendants’ motion in
limine precluding the plaintiff from presenting evidence
that the defendants had breached the standard of care
in their representation of him because the plaintiff had
failed to disclose an expert witness. The trial court then
granted the defendants’ motion for judgment* because
the plaintiff had not disclosed an expert when one was
required and, therefore, could not establish a prima
facie case for legal malpractice as to the defendants’
breach of the standard of care. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that certain statements
made by this court in its opinion on his divorce case, in
which we indicated our disapproval of the defendants’
actions in failing to provide an adequate record for
review and in inadequately briefing the plaintiff's
claims,’ are sufficient evidence upon which the jury
could reasonably have found that the defendants
breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff.

© Although the defendants relied on Practice Book §§ 15-1, 16-9 and 17-1
in support of their “Motion for Judgment,” these sections appear inapposite.
We therefore understand the defendants’ “Motion for Judgment” to be, in
essence, a renewed motion for summary judgment, since a stand-alone
motion for judgment does not exist under our rules of practice.

1 For the specific language on which the plaintiff relies, see footnote 4 of
this opinion.

328 PO
Le
The plaintiff argues, therefore, that an expert witness
was not required to establish his claim for legal malprac-
tice.’ The defendants contend, however, that the lan-
guage of this court’s opinion is not sufficient, on its
own, to establish that they breached the applicable stan-
dard of care.’ We address the plaintiff's claims in turn.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improp-
erly granted the defendants’ motion for judgment
because the language from our opinion in Grimm v.
Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, was sufficient expert

8 At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff, for the first time, also
claimed that if the defendants had not decided to file the petition for certifica-
tion in the first place, his former wife would not have filed her conditional
cross petition, which provided this court the opportunity to reverse the
Appellate Court’s determination that the trial court’s award of attorney's
fees was an abuse of discretion. In other words, if the petition for certification
had not been filed, the Appellate Court's decision that the trial court had
abused its discretion in ordering the plaintiff to pay the attorney's fees
incurred by his former wife would have been the last word on the issue,
and he would not have been required to pay those fees. Because the claim
regarding the propriety of the defendants’ conduct in filing the petition for
certification in the first place and the consequences of such conduct was
raised for the first time during oral argument before this court, and, therefore,
has not been properly briefed, we decline to consider it. See, e.g., State v.
Wright, 197 Conn. 588, 595, 500 A.2d 647 (1985).

° The defendants also argue, alternatively, that, even if the court’s language
in the opinion were sufficient to establish a breach of the standard of care,
such language, alone, is not sufficient to establish another required element
of the cause of action, namely, that such breach actually caused the plaintiff
harm. The plaintiff, however, argues that expert testimony similarly would
have been unnecessary to prove the causation of damages because the
Appellate Court's conclusion that the trial court’s miscalculation of the
amount to which the plaintiff had dissipated the marital assets was harmless
was obviously, clearly, and egregiously incorrect such that a jury would not
need expert testimony to understand the error. Given that we conclude that
the trial courtproperly rendered judgment in favor of the defendants because
the plaintiff was precluded from presenting any evidence regarding the
defendants’ alleged breach of the standard of care, and thus, could not
establish a prima facie case for legal malpractice, we need not reach the
alternative causation issue.

Pe 329

evidence to support the plaintiff's action for legal mal-
practice. We disagree.

To begin, we set forth the applicable standard of
review. “The determination of whether expert testi-
mony is needed to support a claim of legal malpractice
presents a question of law. . . . Accordingly, our
review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Moore v. Crone, 114 Conn. App. 443, 446, 970 A.2d 757
(2009). Inasmuch as the defendants’ motion for judg-
ment is, in essence, a renewed motion for summary
judgment; see footnote 6 of this opinion; we note that
“Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judg-
ment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affida-
vits and any other proof submitted show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for
summary judgment has the burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that
the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to
grant [the defendants’] motion for summary judgment
is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks
v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).

“Tn general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice
action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-
client relationship; (2) the attorney’s wrongful act or
omission; (8) causation; and (4) damages.” Mayer v.
Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 92, 713 A.2d
1267 (1998). “As a general rule, for the plaintiff to prevail
in a legal malpractice case in Connecticut, he must
present expert testimony to establish the standard of
proper professional skill or care. . . . The requirement
of expert testimony in malpractice cases serves to assist
lay people, such as members of the jury .-. . to under-

330 Po
—

stand the applicable standard of care and to evaluate the
defendant’s actions in light of that standard.” (Citations
omitted.) Davis v. Margolis, 215 Conn. 408, 416, 576
A.2d 489 (1990).

“There is an exception to this rule, however, where
there is such an obvious and gross want of care and
skill that neglect is clear even to a lay person.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Paul v. Gordon, 58 Conn.
App. 724, 727, 754 A.2d 851 (2000). Nevertheless, “[t]he
exception to the need for expert testimony is limited
to situations in which the defendant attorney essentially
has done nothing whatsoever to represent his or her
client’s interests . . . .” Pagan v. Gonzalez, 113 Conn.
App. 135, 141, 965 A.2d 582 (2009). Finally, “summary
judgment [is] proper when [a] plaintiff alleging legal
malpractice fails to establish [his] claim by expert testi-
mony.” Moore v. Crone, supra, 114 Conn. App. 446.

Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not retain
or disclose an expert witness to testify concerning the
standard of care to which the defendants’ legal repre-
sentation should be held. Instead, the plaintiff contends
that expert testimony in this case is unnecessary
because the language of our opinion in Grimm v.
Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, is sufficient expert evi-
dence regarding the standard of care and the breach
of that standard to establish that element of his claim.
Relying on Dubreuil v. Witt, 80 Conn. App. 410, 421-22,
835 A.2d 477 (2003), aff'd, 271 Conn. 782, 860 A.2d
698 (2004), in which the Appellate Court indicated that
“there may be no expert who knows more about the
practice of law before the Superior Court than a judge
of that court,” the plaintiff contends that, logically, no
expert knows more about the practice of law before
the appellate courts than the justices of the Supreme
Court. Therefore, he argues that the statements this
court made regarding the inadequate record and the
inadequate briefing of the divorce appeal clearly indi-

Po 331
Leen

cate an obvious and gross want of care such that a

layperson could reasonably and logically conclude that

the defendants breached the standard of care. We are

not persuaded.

Initially, we note that Dubreuil is inapposite to the
disposition of the present case. In Dubreuil, the Appel-
late Court observed, and this court agreed, that when
a legal malpractice case is tried before a judge, rather
than a jury, the trial judge need not require the aid of
expert testimony to understand the requisite standard
of care or the reasonableness of the attorney’s actions
in the context of that standard. Id., 422. It is possible
to infer from this statement that no expert knows more
about appellate practice than this court, but the present
case was scheduled to go forward as a jury trial rather
than a bench trial. Had this case proceeded to trial, the
jury would have required the aid of expert testimony
to understand the applicable standard of care and the
reasonableness of the defendants’ actions in that con-
text. The jury—not this court or even the trial judge—
would have been required to assess whether the defen-
dants’ actions in the underlying divorce case breached
the standard of care such that they would be liable for
legal malpractice.”

Furthermore, the language we used in our opinion
in Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, expressed
our dissatisfaction with the state of the record and the
briefing of the issues in that case. This court did not,
however, set forth the standard of care that is required

The concurrence correctly notes that the jury would be required to
accept our observation that the defendants had violated basic rules of appel-
late procedure as a definitive statement on that issue in evaluating the
defendants’ performance on behalf of the plaintiff. See footnote 10 of the
concurring opinion. As explained hereinafter, however, this does not obviate
the need for expert testimony to elucidate whether such violations were,
infact, abreach of the requisite standard of care in the specific circumstances
of the plaintifi’s divorce appeal. See footnote 13 of this opinion.

382 Po
—

of attorneys in similar situations, nor did it address the
reasonableness of the defendants’ actions within the
context of the factual circumstances of that case. The
statements, although critical in tone and content, were
based upon nothing more than the materials we had
before us in the record of that case. We did not, nor
could we, on the basis of the record before us, opine
as to the reasonableness of the defendants’ strategic
process or their ultimate decisions throughout the litiga-
tion of that case." Although the specific language we
used can certainly be characterized as critical of the
materials that the defendants submitted to this court,
it did not delve into whether the activities in preparing
those materials satisfied the requisite standard of care
or whether other attorneys would have performed simi-
larly ina comparable situation.” Ultimately, our opinion

“The concurrence states that it “ha{s] difficulty with [this] assertion . . .
because the plaintiff does not claim that the defendants were negligent in
their handling of the . . . case generally . . . [but rather] in connection
with a particular claim on appeal . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Footnote 12 of the concurring opinion. The reasonableness of the defendants’
conduct with regard to the one claim before this court cannot be assessed
inavacuum. Rather, whether the defendants breached the requisite standard
of care with regard to this one claim must be determined given the entire
context of the plaintiff's divorce appeal.

" The lack of certainty as to the standard of care is demonstrated by the
fact that, at present, the advisory committee on appellate rules has before
it a proposed amendment to Practice Book § 61-10, which currently places
the burden for providing an adequate record for review wholly on the
appellant. See Practice Book § 61-10 (“[iJt is the responsibility of the appel-
lant to provide an adequate record for review"). The amendment proposes
“that the existing articulation system should be overhauled because it often
results in an unfair and inequitable finding that a party has forfeited a right
to obtain appellate review for failure to seek an articulation from the trial
court, there is a lack of certainty as to when articulation is needed, and the
current system encourages trial judges to withhold the grounds for their
decisions unless an articulation is requested.” Advisory Committee on Appel-
Jate Rules, Meeting Minutes, p. 2 (May 11, 2011), available at http://www jud.
ct.gow/Committees/ap_rules/aprules_min_051111.pdf (last visited December
23, 2011). Indeed, there are multitudinous cases, in virtually all areas of the
Jaw, in which both the Appellate Court and this court have determined that
the claims would not receive appellate review because the appellant, by
failing to move for an articulation, had not presented the court with an

po 333
P|
does not indicate that we had determined that the defen-

adequate record to support the factual underpinnings of the claims. See
Connecticut Bar Association's Appellate Advocacy Committee, The Articula-
tion Process in Connecticut Appellate Practice: A Proposal for Change, pp.
6, 21-27 (January 2011) Gdentifying 152 appellate cases from 2007 to 2010
in which appellate review was forfeited for failure to seek articulation).
“The proposed amendment to § 61-10 states that the failure to seek articula-
tion shall not be grounds for the court to decline to review any issue or
claim on appeal.” Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, Meeting Minutes,
supra, p. 2.

Providing this court with an adequate record for review is a basic rule
of appellate procedure in that this court is incapable of meaningful review
of a claim without an adequate record. That providing an adequate record
for review is a basic rule, however, does not necessarily mean that what is
required to provide an adequate record in a specific case is entirely clear
at the start of the appeal. The statement by the concurrence that “we made
it clear that (1) the plaintiff was required to file a motion for articulation
or rectification, (2) the requirement to do so was a basic one, (8) without
a motion for articulation or rectification, the plaintiff's claim was unreview-
able, and (4) if the plaintiff had filed the motion, [the plaintiff] would have
obtained appellate review of his claim,” is nothing more than twenty-twenty
hindsight, Given that the efficacy of the current articulation system is cur-
rently under review and given the frequency with which the appellate courts
refuse to engage in review of claims when the appellant has failed to comply
with Practice Book § 61-10, our mention of the defendants’ failure to do so
in this case is hardly consequential to the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim.

Furthermore, our statement that the defendants failed to adequately brief
the financial order issue does not account for the off-the-record interactions
between the defendants and the plaintiff or the extent to which the plaintiff
or his cocounsel directed the content of the brief on appeal. For example,
the plaintiff's main goal in bringing the appeal from his divorce decree was
to remain married to his wife. It is possible that the appeal regarding the
trial court's financial orders was sought merely as a consolation if he could
not remain married to his wife. Had that been the motivation—and tellingly,
we must surmise as to what the specific goals were on appeal because the
record did not include such information—the question becomes whether
the emphasis on the claims that would result in the reversal of the divorce
decree altogether, with the resulting de-emphasis on the financial arguments,
was a professionally sound strategic decision. Simply stating that the one
claim certified for appeal before this court, out of the five claims presented on
appeal to the Appellate Court, was inadequately briefed does not necessarily
indicate a breach of the requisite standard of care. Such a statement does
not address whether it was reasonable for the defendants to emphasize
certain issues and necessarily de-emphasize other issues, or whether another
attorney would have presented the issues differently in similar circum-
stances. Finally, similar to the treatment of the failure to provide an adequate

384 es
Ld

dants had definitively breached the requisite standard
of care with regard to ensuring an adequate record for
review or with regard to adequately briefing the issue
on appeal because we did not consider whether their
failure to move for an articulation was reasonable
within the circumstances of that case and we were not
privy to the interactions with the client or the ultimate
strategic decisions regarding which issues to emphasize
on appeal. As such, a jury would still require the aid of
an expert to explain the standard of care regarding the
decision to move for an articulation and preparing a
brief, and whether by failing to move for an articulation
and de-emphasizing the financial claim in the specific
circumstances of the divorce appeal, the defendants
failed to satisfy that standard of care.”

Thus, we find persuasive Dixon v. Bromson & Reiner,
95 Conn. App. 294, 298-99, 898 A.2d 193 (2006), wherein.
the Appellate Court noted that “an observation by a
trial judge . . . that evidence was not produced to sup-
port a contention does not mean that the failure to
produce that evidence was the result of professional

record for review, both this court and the Appellate Court frequently refuse
to address the merits of claims because they have been inadequately briefed.
See, e.g, Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Arnold
v. Forvil, 302 Conn. 263, 279, 25 A.3d 632 (2011); Bokonnon Law Firm,
LLG v. Baxter, 181 Conn. App. 371, 383, 27 A.3d 384 (2011). As such, our
mention of the inadequate briefing of one of the five claims in the plaintiff's
divorce appeal is not necessarily noteworthy without additional context.

® In stating that “our determination that the defendants had violated
certain basic rules of appellate procedure and that we would have enter-
tained the plaintiff's claim but for those violations, may be adequate, without
more, to support the conclusion that the defendants’ representation of the
plaintiff with respect to that claim was not acceptable under any fair standard
of reasonableness,” the concurrence essentially states that a violation of
the rules of practice is negligence per se. We decline to go that far. As
explained previously, without a review of or an explanation as to why
counsel acted as they did, and particularly without a statement regarding
whether violating rules of practice was reasonable in aspecific circumstance,
the observation that the defendants had violated even basic rules of practice
is not, alone, sufficient to establish a prima facie case for legal malpractice.

Pe 385
;

negligence by trial counsel.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Similarly, in the present case, our observation
that the defendants had provided this court with an
inadequate record and inadequately briefed issues, even.
though such actions amounted to technical violations
of rules of appellate practice, does not, standing alone,
indicate that those failures were necessarily the result
of professional negligence by the defendants. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the critical language from
Grimmv. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, is not sufficient
expert evidence of the standard of care that the defen-
dants owed to the plaintiff, nor is it sufficient expert
evidence to inform the jury as to whether the defendants
breached their duty to the plaintiff.

Moreover, this case is also not one that falls within
the exception to the expert testimony requirement set
forth in Paul v. Gordon, supra, 58 Conn. App. 727. The
cases that have defined the extent of the exception to
the expert testimony requirement have made clear that
the exception is limited to “situations in which the . . .
attorney essentially has done nothing whatsoever to
represent his or her client’s interests . . . .” Pagan v.
Gonzalez, supra, 118 Conn. App. 141." Thus, the Appel-

“The concurrence takes issue with our reference to Pagan because there
could be a circumstance in which “an attorney who has represented a client
competently over a period of time might thereafter engage in professional
misconduct that so clearly falls below the standard of care that a juror
readily would recognize the inadequacy of the attorney’s performance.” In
support of its disagreement with the exception to the requirement for expert
testimony in legal malpractice cases articulated in Pagan, the concurrence
cites to a medical malpractice case in which the court indicated that the
exception to the requirement for expert testimony was applicable only in
situations similar to when a surgeon leaves a foreign object inside a patient
following an otherwise successful surgery. See footnote 14 of the concurring
opinion; see Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 568, 864
A.2d 1 (2005). Leaving a foreign object inside a surgical patient, however,
could only be attributed to a lack of the requisite care by the surgeon. In
that case, there is no possibility that the surgeon exercised some level of
professionally sound judgment in deciding to leave a foreign object inside
a patient, which makes such a case inapposite to legal malpractice cases
involving a question as to whether an attorney’s violation of a rule of proce-

336 Po

late Court has upheld grants of summary judgment in
favor of attorneys when disgruntled clients have sued
for legal malpractice on the basis of an omission by
their attorneys, but have failed to retain or disclose an
expert witness to testify that such omissions breached
the standard of care the attorneys owed to their clients.
See Moore v. Crone, supra, 114 Conn. App. 44748
(attorney failed to raise certain issues on appeal, failed
to notice portion of trial transcript was missing, and
Jailed to adequately brief issues on appeal); see also
Byrne v. Grasso, 118 Conn. App. 444, 450, 985 A.2d
1064 (2009) (attorney failed to appear at hearing at
which award of fees was made against client and failed
to explain right to appeal fees ordered), cert. denied,
294 Conn. 934, 987 A.2d 1028 (2010); Pagan v. Gonzalez,
supra, 138 n.4 (criminal defense attorney failed to
object, at sentencing, to representation by prosecutor
as to amount of heroin in client’s possession at time
of his arrest). Although Moore, Byrne and Pagan all
involved omissions and failures by the attorneys
therein, the Appellate Court consistently has required
a more significant failure or omission to warrant the
application of the exception to the expert testimony
requirement in legal malpractice cases.

Here, the defendants represented the plaintiff in his
divorce case throughout a lengthy trial and appeal that.

dure was attributable to a legitimate professional decision. There very well
may be instances in which an attorney, after a period of competent represen-
tation, engages in conduct that clearly falls below the requisite standard of
care, and in such a circumstance the jury may not require the aid of expert
testimony to understand the applicable standard. Nevertheless, this is not
such a case. As discussed previously, it cannot be said that our recognition
that the defendants failed to move for an articulation or to adequately brief
one of the issues presented on appeal to the Appellate Court indicated that
such conduct could have no justifiable, professionally sound explanation.
We therefore disagree that “this court’s characterization of the defendants’
representation of the plaintiff on appeal as violating several basic rules of
appellate procedure arguably was sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of negligence, even though there is no claim that the defendants did ‘nothing
whatsoever’ to represent the plaintiff's interests . . . .”

Ce 937
|

took place over the course of several years. This is not
a case wherein the attorneys essentially did “nothing
whatsoever” in their representation of their client;
Pagan v. Gonzalez, supra, 113 Conn. App. 141; but
rather one in which the plaintiff claims that the activities
that the defendants undertook on his behalf failed to
satisfy the requisite professional standard of care.
Although the language we used in our opinion in Grimm
expressing our dissatisfaction with the record and the
briefing before us was critical, such language does not
by itself clearly indicate such an obvious and gross
want of care and skill so as to render expert testimony
unnecessary. Accordingly, in the absence of expert tes-
timony regarding the professional standard of care
owed and whether the defendants breached their duty
in the circumstances of this case, both of which are
required to establish a prima facie case of legal malprac-
tice under Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, supra,
245 Conn. 88, the defendants were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

Ir

The plaintiff also contends that it was improper for
the trial court to grant the defendants’ motion for judg-
ment the day after the motion was filed. We disagree.

“The summary judgment procedure is designed to
eliminate the delay and expense incident to a trial where
there is no real issue to be tried. . . . It is an attempt
to dispose of cases involving sham or frivolous issues
in a manner which is speedier and less expensive for
all concerned than a full-dress trial.” (Citations omitted,
internal quotation marks omitted.) Mac’s Car City, Inc.
v. American National Bank, 205 Conn. 255, 261, 532
A.2d 1302 (1987). Furthermore, “[a] trial court has the
authority to manage cases before it as is necessary.”
Krevis v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813, 819, 817 A.2d
628 (2002).

388 Po
Ld

This court has determined that “it is within the trial
court’s discretion to consider a renewed motion for
summary judgment that has previously been denied
where . . . additional or new evidence has been sub-
mitted . . . .” Mac’s Car City, Inc. v. American
National Bank, supra, 205 Conn. 262. “We have
declared that, although a judge should not lightly depart.
from a prior ruling on a motion before the same or a
different judge, the prior ruling is not binding. ‘From
the vantage point of an appellate court it would hardly
be sensible to reverse a correct ruling by a second judge
on the simplistic ground that it departed from the law
of the case established by an earlier ruling.’” Barnes
v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732, 734, 473 A.2d 1221 (1984).
“Because this determination is within the trial court’s
discretion, it may be overturned on appeal only if the
court abused that discretion.” Chadha v. Charlotte
Hungerford Hospital, 97 Conn. App. 527, 533, 906 A.2d
14 (2006).

Here, because the previous motions for summary
judgment had not been acted upon and jury selection
‘was set to begin as soon as the motions in limine and
the motion for judgment before the court had been
decided, those initial motions for summary judgment.
had been effectively denied by virtue of the trial court’s
inaction. In that context, the trial court then granted
the defendants’ pending motion in limine, which pre-
cluded the plaintiff from making any mention, argument
or claim at trial that the defendants had breached the
standard of care in their representation of him.
Although that ruling is not the “new evidence” that is
often referred to in cases addressing renewed motions
for summary judgment; see, e.g., Johnson v. Atkinson,
283 Conn, 243, 250, 926 A.2d 656 (2007) (outstanding
factual disputes present during first motion for sum-
mary judgment were resolved by parties’ stipulation of
facts prior to renewed motion), overruled in part on

po 339

other grounds by Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323,
348, 948 A.2d 955 (2008); it is nonetheless equivalent.

Prior to the start of the trial, the defendants obtained
aruling from the trial court precluding the plaintiff from
presenting any evidence, including the language that
this court used in Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn.
377, as to the standard of care that the defendants owed
to the plaintiff or their alleged breach of the duty owed
to him. Without the ability to present any evidence
showing that the defendants were negligent in their
representation of him, the plaintiff's legal malpractice
claim could not go forward. Because the plaintiff could
not establish a prima facie case for legal malpractice
without evidence of the defendants’ alleged negligence,
it was well within the trial court’s discretion to consider
the renewed motion filed the day before jury selection
began in order to avoid the delay and expense of a trial
in which the plaintiff could not present any evidence
to support his claim.

Furthermore, the Appellate Court recently has
emphasized the trial court's ample discretion in
determining whether to address a motion for summary
judgment filed on the eve of trial. In Kervick v. Silver
Hill Hospital, 128 Conn. App. 341, 354, 18 A.3d 622,
cert. granted on other grounds, 301 Conn. 922, 22 A.3d
1279 (2011), the Appellate Court affirmed the trial
court’s determination that a motion for summary judg-
ment was untimely because it had not given the defen-
dants adequate notice regarding the plaintiff's claim.
Id., 353. That is not the case-here. In their initial motion
for summary judgment, the defendants argued that the
plaintiff had failed to disclose an expert. witness to
testify as to the relevant standard of care and the reason-
ableness of the defendants’ actions under that standard
of care, and thus could not establish a prima facie case
for legal malpractice. The plaintiff had the opportunity,
and did in fact offer specific arguments to counter the

340 PO
Lt

defendants’ claims in his opposition to their initial
motion for summary judgment and during the five hour
hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment.
Moreover, when the defendants renewed their motion
for judgment, they specifically referred back to their
initial motion for summary judgment and the accompa-
nying memorandum of law in support of that motion.
The trial court also held a hearing on the defendants’
renewed motion in which it gave the plaintiff another
opportunity to argue against the motion. The renewed
motion did not present any new arguments of which
the plaintiff did not have notice or an opportunity to
refute. It simply renewed the defendants’ claim that the
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of legal
malpractice without presenting an expert witness, an
issue upon which the trial court had not yet ruled.

Inasmuch as the trial court’s grant of the defendants’
motion in limine solidified the defendants’ position that
the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of
legal malpractice, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in hearing and deciding the
defendants’ motion for judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and ZARELLA,
McLACHLAN and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

PALMER, J., concurring. I agree with the majority
that the trial court properly granted the pretrial motion
of the defendants, John Wayne Fox and Curtis, Brinck-
erhoff and Barrett, P.C., for judgment in their favor!
because the plaintiff, Robert Grimm,’ failed to disclose
an expert witness to support his claim of legal malprac-

Like the majority, I treat the defendants’ pretrial motion for judgment
as a motion for summary judgment. See footnote 6 of the majority opinion.

*'The plaintiff represented himself in the trial court and also represents
himself on appeal.

Pe 3a
Lt

tice. I therefore also agree with the majority that the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. In con-
trast to the majority, however, which concludes that
expert testimony was necessary to establish that the
defendants’ representation of the plaintiff violated the
applicable standard of care, I would reject the plaintiff's
appeal on the alternative ground that expert testimony
was necessary to establish that the defendants’ alleged
breach of the standard of care was the proximate cause
of the damages that the plaintiff allegedly sustained.’ I
would resolve this appeal on that alternative ground
because it is beyond dispute that the plaintiff was
required to adduce expert testimony on the issue of
proximate cause;* whether such testimony was neces-
sary to establish a breach of the standard of care is a
far closer and, therefore, more difficult question.

The plaintiff's claim stems from the allegedly negli-
gent manner in which the defendants handled certain
aspects of his marital dissolution case, in particular,
his appeal from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court. See Grimm v. Grimm, 82 Conn. App.
41, 844 A.2d 855 (2004), rev'd in part, 276 Conn. 377,
886 A.2d 391 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1148, 126 S.
Ct. 2296, 164 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2006). Although the litigation
that spawned the present case is both factually and
procedurally tortuous; see Grimm v. Grimm, supra,
276 Conn. 379, 386 (characterizing parties’ litigation as

*The majority addresses this issue in part I of its opinion, I agree with
part II of the majority opinion, in which the majority concludes that the
plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly granted
the defendants’ motion for judgment one day after that motion was filed.

4 Although the plaintiff asserts in conclusory fashion that expert testimony
was not necessary to prove causation, he provides no explanation whatso-
ever to support his contention. As I discuss more fully hereinafter, there is
no question that expert testimony is required to establish thatthe defendants’
alleged legal malpractice actually resulted in harm to the plaintiff because
no lay juror possibly could be expected to determine whether the plaintiff
would have prevailed on his legal claim but for the defendants’ alleged
negligence in prosecuting the claim.

34a Po

Lt

“procedurally dysfunctional” and “involving an unnec-
essarily complicated and voluminous record”); the fac-
tual and procedural background relevant to the
plaintiff's claim is relatively straightforward. Beginning
in 1998, the defendants served as local counsel to the
plaintiff in the trial court proceedings that, in January,
2003, culminated in a judgment dissolving the plaintiff's
marriage to his former wife. As part of that judgment,
the trial court made a number of findings and issued
various financial orders. Among the court's factual find-
ings was its determination that the plaintiff wrongfully
had reduced the value of the marital estate by $2.9
million.’ See Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 82 Conn. App.
51. The trial court also ordered the plaintiff to pay
$100,000 of the attorney’s fees that his former wife had
incurred. Id., 53-54.

Following the dissolution judgment, the plaintiff
retained the defendants to represent him in his appeal to
the Appellate Court. In that appeal, the plaintiff claimed,
inter alia, that the trial court’s finding that he had
unjustly diminished the marital estate by $2.9 million
was clearly erroneous. See id., 51. The Appellate Court
agreed with the plaintiff but concluded that the errone-
ous finding was harmless.’ Id., 52-53. The Appellate
Court also concluded that the trial court had abused
its discretion in ordering the plaintiff to pay $100,000
of his former wife’s attorney's fees. Id., 55.

* The plaintiff contends that, because of the nature and magnitude of this
finding, it necessarily had a bearing on all of the court’s financial orders.

® Judge Flynn dissented from this portion of the Appellate Court opinion.
See Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 82 Conn. App. 56-58 (Flynn, J., dissenting).
Although Judge Flynn agreed with the Appellate Court majority that the
trial court improperly found that the plaintiff wrongfully had diminished
the marital estate by $2.9 million, he disagreed that the finding was harmless.
Id., 56-57. Accordingly, Judge Flynn would have reversed the portion of the
trial court's judgment pertaining to the financial orders and remanded the
case for a new hearing on the financial issues. Id., 58.

Po 348
a

Thereafter, we granted the plaintiff's petition for cer-
tification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the
Appellate Court properly had concluded that the trial
court’s improper finding with respect to the $2.9 million
reduction of the marital estate was harmless. Grimm
v. Grimm, 270 Conn. 902, 903, 853 A.2d 519 (2004). We
also granted his former wife's conditional cross petition
for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of
whether the Appellate Court properly had reversed the
award of attorney's fees. Grimm v. Grimm, 270 Conn.
903, 853 A.2d 519 (2004). With respect to the plaintiff's
appeal, we concluded that the plaintiff had abandoned
his claim concerning the $2.9 million reduction in the
marital estate because (1) he did not file a motion for
an articulation or rectification of the trial court’s factual
findings on that issue, and (2) the claim was not raised.
until oral argument before the Appellate Court, in part
because the briefing of that claim was both inadequate
and set forth in the wrong section of his Appellate
Court brief. Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 386-87,
390-91 and n.14. The defendants continued to represent
the plaintiff throughout the pendency of his appeal to
this court.

The plaintiff subsequently commenced the present
legal malpractice action. Although not artfully drawn,
the plaintiff's pro se complaint alleges, in essence, that
the defendants were negligent in their representation
of the plaintiff in the Appellate Court because their
efforts to challenge the propriety of the trial court’s
finding that the plaintiff wrongfully had diminished the
marital estate by $2.9 million fell below the applicable
standard of care.’ In support of his claim of negligence,
the plaintiff relies exclusively on certain statements in

As this court recently has reiterated, “we should be solicitous to pro se
[parties] and construe their pleadings liberally in light of the limited legal
Imowledge [that] they possess,” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley
v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 66, 74, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).

344 Po

Lt
this court’s opinion in Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276
Conn. 377, in which we declined to review the plaintiff's
contention that the Appellate Court improperly had con-
cluded that the trial court’s improper finding concerning
the $2.9 million diminution of the marital estate was
harmless.

Specifically, the plaintiff notes that, in Grimm v.
Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, we determined that he
was not entitled to review of his claim concerning the
$2.9 million because of what we characterized as “two
separate, but related, breakdowns of basic appellate
procedure” that had rendered the claim “incapable of
meaningful evaluation by any reviewing court.” Id., 386.
We observed that the “first procedural shortfall” was
the plaintiff's “failure to move for articulation or rectifi-
cation of the underpinnings of the trial court’s factual
findings in a case involving an unnecessarily compli-
cated and voluminous record.” Id. With respect to this
procedural default, we explained that the plaintiff bore
the burden of seeking such an articulation or rectifica-
tion because “without [an] . . . articulation or rectifi-
cation, there [was] no way short of a crystal ball for a
reviewing court to ascertain the precise basis for the
trial court’s decision in this voluminous record.” Id.,
389. We further stated that “[a]n articulation or rectifica-
tion by the trial court would have, at the very least,
aided the reviewing courts in determining the basis or
lack thereof in the record for the trial court’s decision

. and also would have afforded the trial court, as
the finder of fact, the opportunity to correct any miscal-
culations.” Id. Thus, we made it clear that (1) the plain-
tiff was required to file a motion for articulation or
rectification, (2) the requirement to do so was a basic
one, (3) without a motion for articulation or rectifica-
tion, the plaintiffs claim was unreviewable, and (4) if
the plaintiff had filed the motion, he would have
obtained appellate review of his claim.

po 345
—

We then explained that, even if the plaintiff had pro-
vided the court with an adequate record, his claim con-
cerning the $2.9 million diminution of the marital estate
was unreviewable because he had abandoned the claim.
We reached this conclusion for two reasons, the first
of which was that he had not adequately raised the
claim in the Appellate Court. In fact, we observed that
“[t]he only mention of the $2.9 million in the [plaintiff's]
Appellate Court brief is contained not in the argument
section... but . . . in the nature of proceedings
and statement of facts.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.,
390-91. We then observed that the limited discussion
of the issue in the statement of facts was inadequate; see
id., 390-93 and n.14; and, in addition, that “it violently
disregard[ed] . . . the rule [of practice] governing the
organization of appellate briefs.” Id., 391 n.14. Finally,
we explained that the plaintiff had abandoned his claim
for a second reason, namely, because such a claim
was not raised until oral argument before the Appellate
Court. Id., 393. We further explained that it is well
established that a reviewing court will not consider a
claim first made at oral argument, and, therefore, the
Appellate Court should not have considered the plain-
tiff's claim. Id.

Thus, as we stated in summarizing our reasons for
declining to address the merits of the plaintiffs claim
on appeal to this court, “the [plaintiff's claim] with
respect to the $2.9 million [was] both abandoned and
rendered unreviewable by his failure to follow certain
basic principles of appellate procedure.” Id., 382. More-
over, our detailed explanation as to why the plaintiff
was not entitled to this court’s review of his claim makes
it clear that he would have received such review if the
defendants had performed in the manner expected—
indeed, required—of attorneys appearing before the
Appellate Court and this court. See generally id., 386-94.

346 Po

Under the circumstances, expert testimony may not
have been required to make out a prima facie case that
the defendants’ representation of the plaintiff on appeal
fell below the applicable standard of care.’ “Malpractice
is commonly defined as the failure of one rendering
professional services to exercise that degree of skill
and learning commonly applied under all the circum-
stances in the community by the average prudent repu-
table member of the profession with the result of injury,
loss, or damage to the recipient of those services

. . “* nternal quotation marks omitted.) Updike,
Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 649,
850 A.2d 145 (2004). Thus, “[t]he general rule is that
[when an attorney's] exercise of proper professional
skill and care is in issue, expert testimony tending to
establish the want of such skill and care is essential to
recovery. . . . The rationale underlying that rule is that
in most cases, the determination of an attorney’s stan-
dard of care, which depends on the particular circum-
stances of the attorney’s representation, is beyond the
experience of the average layperson, including mem-
bers of the jury and perhaps even the presiding judge.”

*T note, preliminarily, that the present action is not predicated on the
contention that the defendants negligently failed to assert a claim—in this
case, a claim challenging the trial court’s finding with respect to the $2.9
million diminution of the marital estate—that they should have asserted.
Rather, the present action involves a scenario in which the claim was raised
but not competently pursued. In view of the fact that the defendants raised
the claim—presumably because they had decided, in the exercise of their
professional judgment, that it was appropriate to do so—the issue presented
by this appeal is not whether the claim should have been raised but whether
the defendants, having done so, were negligent in failing to pursue it compe-
tently. Put differently, by raising the claim, the defendants relieved the
plaintiff of the burden of demonstrating that the claim should have been
raised; his burden, instead, is to establish that the defendants prosecuted
the claim negligently and that he suffered harm by virtue of that negligence.

"In general, therefore, “the plaintiff in [a legal] malpractice action must
establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attor-
ney's wrongful act or omission; (8) causation; and (4) damages.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269
Conn. 613, 649, 850 A.2d 145 (2004).

Pe 3a

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Celentano v. Grudberg, 76 Conn. App. 119, 126, 818
A.2d 841, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1220
(2003). Although expert evidence is required in most
cases, it is not always necessary. E.g., St. Onge, Stewart,
Johnson & Reens, LLC v. Media Group, Inc., 84 Conn.
App. 88, 95, 851 A.2d 1242, cert. denied, 271 Conn.
918, 859 A.2d 570 (2004). In particular, the general rule
requiring expert testimony does not apply to cases in
which “there is present such an obvious and gross want
of care and skill that the neglect is clear even to a
layperson.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis
v. Margolis, 215 Conn. 408, 416 n.6, 576 A.2d 489 (1990).
In such cases, the evidence is deemed “sufficiently
transparent to obviate the need for the testimony of
experts.” St. Onge, Stewart, Johnson & Reens, LLC
v. Media Group, Inc., supra, 96; see also id., 95-96
(explaining that this “flexible approach to jury compe-
tence to make reasoned decisions about legal perfor-
mance has worked well in legal malpractice cases”).
This court’s discussion in Grimm v. Grimm, supra,
276 Conn. 382, 386, in which we explained that the
defendants’ violation of several “basic” rules of appel-
late procedure had resulted in our refusal to entertain.
the plaintiff's claim concerning the $2.9 million diminu-
tion of the marital estate may well be sufficient to obvi-
ate the need for expert testimony on the issue of
negligence.” Of course, in that case, we had no occasion
to speak in terms of the standard of care because that
specific issue was not before the court. Nevertheless,
our determination that the defendants had violated cer-
tain basic rules of appellate procedure and that we
would have entertained the plaintiff's claim but for

¥ Because this courts the ultimate arbiter of such matters, our conclusion
in Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 382, 386, that basic rules of appellate
procedure were violated represents a definitive statement on that issue, and
a juror evaluating the defendants’ performance on behalf of the plaintiff
would be required to accept this court’s observation in that regard.

348 PO

those violations, may be adequate, without more, to
support the conclusion that the defendants’ representa-
tion of the plaintiff with respect to that claim was not
acceptable under any fair standard of reasonableness.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how a juror with knowledge
of our analysis and conclusion in Grimm v. Grimm,
supra, 276 Conn. 377, could reach any other result, at
least without countervailing evidence from the defen-
dants, because an attorney’s failure to follow basic rules
of appellate procedure relative to a claim that the attor-
ney believed to be meritorious also constitutes a failure
to meet minimal standards of appellate advocacy. This
is especially true with respect to the defendants’ failure
to assert their claim in the proper section of the Appel-
late Court brief.

The majority asserts, however, that, although in
Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, we “expressed.
our dissatisfaction with the state of the record and the
briefing of the issues” in language that was “critical in
tone and content . . . [w]e did not, nor could we, on
the basis of the record before us, opine as to the reason-
ableness of the defendants’ strategic process or their
ultimate decisions throughout the litigation of that
case.” The majority further states that “our observation
that the defendants had provided [the Appellate Court
and] this court with an inadequate record and inade-
quately briefed issues . . . does not, standing alone,
indicate that those failures were necessarily the result
of professional negligence by the defendants.” These
assertions ignore the fact that we also stated in Grimm
v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 382, 386, that the defen-
dants had violated several basic rules of appellate pro-
cedure. That observation is critical. Although attorney
negligence might not be the only possible explanation
for an inadequacy in the record or briefing in other
cases, in Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, this
court expressly attributed those failings to the fact that

Po 349
—

the defendants had violated certain rudimentary proce-
dural rules." The majority does not persuasively explain
how the defendants’ failure to follow basic rules of
appellate procedure reasonably could be attributed to
their “strategic process or their ultimate decisions
throughout the litigation of [the] case.”

For this reason, the majority’s reliance on Dixon v.
Bromson & Reiner, 95 Conn. App. 294, 298-99, 898 A.2d
193 (2006), a legal malpractice case, is misplaced. The
majority finds support in Dixon for the proposition that.
“an observation by [the court] . . . that evidence was
not produced to support a contention does not mean

4-Thus, the majority is incorrect in asserting that I am “essentially stat[ing]
that a violation of the rules of practice is negligence per se.” Footnote 13
of the majority opinion, As I have explained, the issue that the majority
addresses is whether expert testimony is necessary to prove the defendants’
negligence under the unusual facts of the present case, facts that include
this court's extended discussion and evaluation, in Grimm v. Grimm, supra,
276 Conn. 377, of the defendants’ performance in representing the plaintiff
in his appeal to the Appellate Court. In fact, because I would not reach the
issue, I need not decide whether the majority is correct in concluding that
the plaintiff was required to present expert testimony for the purpose of
establishing negligence. I do believe, however, that the question is close
enough that this court would be well advised to avoid it and to decide the
case on the alternative ground for affirming the trial court's judgment.

21 also have difficulty with the majority's assertion insofar as it pertains
to the defendants’ decisions “throughout the litigation of [the] case” because
the plaintiff does not claim that the defendants were negligent in their
handling of the plaintiff's case generally. Rather, the plaintiff's legal malprac-
tice action is predicated solely on the defendants’ representation of the
plaintiff in connection with a particular claim on appeal that, the plaintiff
contends, would have resulted in a favorable outcome, saving him hundreds
of thousands of dollars, if the defendants had followed the various rules of
appellate procedure that we identified in Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276
Conn. 377. The plaintiff, however, was required to adduce expert testimony
to support his contention that he would have prevailed on that appellate
claim, and his failure to do so cleazly entitles the defendants to judgment
in their favor. That is because, without such expert testimony, the plaintiff
cannot establish that the defendants’ negligence was a proximate cause of
his alleged damages, and not because he necessarily has failed to demon-
strate that the defendants were negligent in the manner in which they
litigated the claim on appeal.

350 Pe

that the failure to produce that evidence was the result
of professional negligence by . . . counsel.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In Dixon, however, there
was nothing to suggest that counsel’s failure to provide
a record adequate to support a particular contention
was the product of counsel’s negligence. By contrast,
in Grimm v. Grimm, supra, 276 Conn. 377, this court
declined to review the plaintiffs claim because the
defendants had failed to follow certain basic rules of
appellate procedure. The other cases cited by the major-
ity for the same principle are similarly inapposite
because they, like Dixon, also do not involve a situation
in which this court—or, for that matter, any other
court—indicated that counsel’s failure or omission was
the result of a violation of the rules of procedure or
some other neglect. See, e.g., Byrne v. Grasso, 118
Conn. App. 444, 449-50, 985 A.2d 1064 (2009) (client
alleging legal malpractice by former attorney could not
establish attorney’s negligence without expert testi-
mony when record did not establish that counsel’s fail-
ure to take certain action was due to neglect or other
impropriety), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 934, 987 A.2d 1028
(2010); Moore v. Crone, 114 Conn. App. 443, 447-48,
970 A.2d 757 (2009) (same); Pagan v. Gonzalez, 113
Conn. App. 135, 138 n.4, 140-41, 965 A.2d 582 (2009)
(same)."

1 note that the majority states that, “[allthough [the foregoing cases,
namely] Moore, Byrne and Pagan all involved omissions and failures by the
attorneys therein, the Appellate Court consistently has required a more
significant failure or omission to warrant the application of the exception
to the expert testimony requirement in legal malpractice cases.” In fact, the
requirement of expert testimony is not strictly reserved for cases involving
“a more significant failure or omission” than the failures or omissions that
occurred in Moore, Byrne and Pagan because, in each of those cases, the
reason for the failure or omission never was addressed. If the Appellate
Court had concluded in those cases, as this court did in Grimm v. Grimm,
supra, 276 Conn. 377, that the failures or omissions had been due to violations
of basic rules of appellate procedure, then expert testimony might not have
been necessary to establish negligence.

po 351
—

Ialso disagree with the majority's statement, quoted.
verbatim from the opinion of the Appellate Court in
Pagan v. Gonzalez, supra, 118 Conn. App. 141, that “the
exception to the expert testimony requirement [in a
legal malpractice case] . . . is limited to situations in
which the . . . attorney essentially has done nothing
whatsoever to represent his or her client’s interests

-” nternal quotation marks omitted.) Like the
court i in Pagan, the majority fails to explain the logic
of this assertion, and I am unable to discern any such
logic. In fact, it is perfectly possible that an attorney
who has represented a client competently over a period.
of time might thereafter engage in professional miscon-
duct that so clearly falls below the standard of care
that a juror readily would recognize the inadequacy of
the attorney’s performance. Although, in such circum-
stances, it cannot be said that the attorney essentially
did nothing whatsoever on behalf of the client, no
expert testimony would be necessary to establish the
attorney’s negligence." In the present case, this court’s
characterization of the defendants’ representation of
the plaintiff on appeal as violating several basic rules
of appellate procedure arguably was sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case of negligence, even though there
is no claim that the defendants did “nothing whatso-

4] note that the same exception to the general rule requiring expert
testimony applies in cases involving claims of medical malpractice. See,
eg, Kalams v. Giacchetto, 268 Conn. 244, 248 n.4, 842 A.2d 1100 (2004)
(“{elxpert [medical] opinion [evidence] may . . . be excused in those cases
[in which] the professional negligence is so gross as to be clear even to a
lay person” [internal quotation marks omitted]). In those cases, as well, there
is no reason for requiring expert medical testimony unless the defendant
physician “essentially has done nothing whatsoever” on behalf of his or her
patient. Thus, for example, a surgeon who successfully performs surgery
on a patient also may leave a foreign object inside the patient’s body. In
those cases, although the vast majority of the surgeon’s work was competent,
expert testimony may not be needed to establish the surgeon’s negligence
in failing to remove the foreign object. See, e.g., Boone v. William W. Backus
Hospital, 272. Conn. 561, 567-68, 864 A.2d 1 (2005) (discussing exceptions
to requirement of expert testimony in medical malpractice cases).

352 Po
Leet

ever” to represent the plaintiff's interests or that their

performance otherwise was deficient “throughout” the

lengthy trial and appeal of the case.

For the foregoing reasons, I would not reach the
issue of whether the defendants were negligent in their
representation of the plaintiff on appeal. Rather, I would
decide this case on the basis of the defendants’ alterna-
tive ground for affirmance, namely, that the plaintiff
was required to present expert testimony to establish
that the defendants’ negligence was the proximate
cause of the damages that he has alleged. As this court
previously has observed, “[i]n legal malpractice actions,
the plaintiff typically proves that the defendant attor-
ney’s professional negligence caused injury . . . by
presenting evidence of what would have happened in
the underlying action had the defendant not been negli-
gent. This traditional method of presenting the merits
of the underlying action is often called the case-within-
a-case. 5 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice (5th
Ed. 2000) § 33.8, pp. 69-70.” (internal quotation marks
omitted.) Margolin v. Kleban & Samor, P.C., 275 Conn.
765, 775 n.9, 882 A.2d 653 (2005). Thus, to prevail on
his claim against the defendants, the plaintiff would be
required to prove not only that the defendants were
negligent in their handling of his appeal, but also that
that appeal would have been successful if the defen-
dants had represented him competently. In the absence
of such proof, the plaintiff could not establish that his
alleged damages—all of which stemmed from the trial
court’s financial orders—were the result of the defen-
dants’ negligence and not from the trial court’s reason-
able exercise of discretion in entering those orders.
Even if we assume that the defendants were negligent
in their representation of the plaintiff, it is clear that
expert testimony was necessary for a proper resolution
of the proximate cause issue because a jury could not
possibly be expected to reach a reasoned conclusion

Po 358
|
about the merits of the plaintiff's appeal without the
aid of such testimony. Indeed, as I previously noted,
the plaintiff makes no argument as to why expert testi-
mony on causation would not have been necessary,
presumably because there simply is no such argument
to be made. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of
the trial court but on this alternative ground. I therefore
concur in the result that the majority reaches.
ee

STATE OF CONNECTICUT ». DARRYL W.
(SC 18396)

Rogers, ©. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Harper and
Vertefeuille, Js.*

“This case was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court
consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Norcott, Palmer, Zarella,
McLachlan, Harper and Vertefeuille. Although Justice Norcott was not pres-
ent when the case was argued before the court, he read the record, briefs
and transcript of oral argument prior to participating in this decision.

355

Argued September 21, 2011—officially released January 10, 2012

Annacarina Jacob, senior assistant public defender,
for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa L. Streeto, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, was John A. Connelly, former
state’s attorney, Maureen Platt, state’s attorney, and
John Davenport, senior assistant state’s attorney, for
the appellee (state).

356 Po
|

Opinion

HARPER, J. The defendant, Darryl W.,! appeals
directly to this court, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-
199 (b) (8), from the judgment of conviction, rendered
after a jury trial, of criminal attempt to commit aggra-
vated sexual assault in the first degree in violation of
General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-70a (a) (1),?
sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-72a (a) (1) (B) and kidnapping in the first
degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes
§ 58a-92a.2 The defendant also appeals from the trial
court’s judgment finding him guilty of violation of pro-
bation based on his conviction of the aforementioned
criminal offenses. The defendant raises two issues on
appeal. He claims first that the trial court improperly
instructed the jury regarding the elements of §§ 53a-
70a (a) (1) and 58a-92a and regarding his affirmative
defense to § 58a-92a under General Statutes § 58a-16a.*
This claim specifically concerns the legal standards for

1Jn accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of
victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

2 General Statutes § 582-70 (4) provides in relevant part: “A person is
guilty of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree when such person
commits sexual assault in the first degree as provided in section 53a-70,
and in the commission of such offense (1) such person uses or is armed
with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's
words or conduct that such person possesses a deadly weapon . . . .” See
footnote 12 of this opinion for the definition of deadly weapon.

* General Statutes § 53a-92a (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is
guilty of kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm when he commits
kidnapping in the first degree as provided in section 53a-92, and in the
commission of said crime he uses or is armed with and threatens the use
of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a
pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. . . .” See
footnote 12 of this opinion for the definitions of pistol and firearm.

4 General Statutes § 58a-16a provides in relevant part: “In any prosecution
for an offense under section . . . 58a-92a . . . it shall be an affirmative
defense that the pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm.
‘was not a weapon from which a shot could be discharged . . . .”

Po 367
|

determining whether a weapon may be considered oper-
able under these statutes.’ The defendant also claims
that certain improper comments by the senior assistant
state’s attorney during closing argument deprived him
of his right to a fair trial. We conclude that the defendant
failed to preserve his jury instruction claim and is not
entitled to review on any basis asserted. We further
conclude that there was no prosecutorial impropriety.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

The record reveals the following procedural history
and facts as the jury reasonably could have found them.
The defendant is married to the sister of the victim, D.
Following the loss of her house due to foreclosure, D,
along with her husband and two children, resided with
the defendant, his wife and their four children for sev-
eral months. D and her family then moved out of the
defendant’s house to live with her parents and subse-
quently began looking for a house to buy. On the day
of the incident, the defendant tricked D, whom he had
offered to help find a house, into meeting him alone at.
a commuter parking lot in Waterbury and driving with
him to his house. When they arrived, the defendant
asked D to help carry a box into the house. Once inside,
he held D at gunpoint, handcuffed her and brought her
to abedroom. There, he removed her pants, placed duct.
tape over her mouth, kissed her breasts, touched her
vagina, briefly tied her feet to a bed, removed his pants
and climbed on top of her. The defendant stopped short

8 We note that although the trial court and the parties use variations of
the term “operable” as a generic shorthand device for framing the question
of whether the weapon in the present case was capable of discharging a
shot for purposes of §§ 58a-16a, 582-70 (a) (1) and/or 58a-92a, this language
does not appear in the relevant statutory texts. These shorthand terms,
while useful, risk masking subtle but potentially significant differences
expressed by the actual language of the several statutes to which the terms
variously refer. Although we use variations of the term operable in this
opinion to be consistent with the arguments made, we have taken care in
each instance to use the term with reference to aspecific statutory provision.

358 Po
|_

of intercourse, saying he “couldn't do this,” and subse-
quently agreed to let D leave after she brought him back
to his vehicle in the commuter lot.

The gun that the defendant used was an air pistol
that the police later seized in a search of a vehicle
belonging to the defendant. The pistol was designed to
shoot BBs propelled by compressed carbon dioxide, or
CO,, At the time the police seized it, the pistol contained
neither BBs nor a CO, cartridge, but a later test con-
firmed that it was capable of firing when equipped with
BBs and a cartridge.

At trial, the defendant testified that he and D had
previous romantic encounters and that on the day in
question they engaged in consensual intimate activity
but stopped after deciding that doing so was wrong.
The defendant also sought to show that the seized air
pistol was not on his person at the time of the incident
but had in fact been stored in his vehicle for several
months. In the alternative, for purposes of the charge
of kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm, he
asserted an affirmative defense that, even if he had
been armed with the air pistol, it was inoperable.

Pursuant to the amended information that the state
filed after the close of its case, the trial court instructed
the jury that it did not need to find that the defendant
actually possessed an operable pistol to convict him on
the kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault charges,
which required only that he represented by words or
conduct that he possessed such a weapon. The court
further instructed the jury, pursuant to the defendant’s
affirmative defense, that it should acquit him of the
kidnapping charge if it found that he proved the air
pistol was not operable.® The jury returned a verdict

° Regarding the issue of operability under § 63a-92a, the court instructed
the jury: “The third essential element is that, during the abduction, the
defendant represented by his words or conduct that he possessed a pistol.
A\pistol is defined by statute as any firearm having a barrel less than twelve
inches. A ‘firearm’ is defined by statute to mean in relevant part a weapon,

Po 359
|__|

convicting the defendant on all counts.’ This appeal
followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant raises two related claims with respect
to the jury instructions regarding the pistol’s operability
for purposes of aggravated sexual assault in the first
degree under § 53a-70a (a) (1) and kidnapping in the
first degree with a firearm under § 53a-92a. First, he
claims that the trial court improperly failed to instruct
the jury that the state bore the burden of proving opera-
bility as an element of each of these offenses. Second,
he claims that the trial court improperly failed to

whether loaded or unloaded, from which a shot may be discharged. ‘Repre-
sented by words or conduct’ means that the defendant did or said something
to indicate to the complainant [D] that he possessed a pistol. It is not
necessary that the state prove that the defendant actually possessed such
a weapon or that the weapon was actually capable of discharging a shot,

“With respect to this charge, the defendant has asserted an affirmative
defense under [§ 58a-16a] that any pistol displayed by him was not a weapon
from which a shot could be discharged. Section 58a-16a provides in relevant
part that it shall be an affirmative defense that the pistol was not a weapon
from which a shot could be discharged. In this case, such an affirmative
defense, if proven, is a complete bar to a conviction for the offense of
Kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm.”

Regarding operability for purposes of attempted aggravated sexual assault
in the first degree under § 58a-70a (a) (1), the court stated: “The third
essential element which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
is that the defendant, while attempting to commit the sexual assault, repre-
sented by words or conduct that he possessed a deadly weapon. For purposes
of this case, the term ‘deadly weapon’ means any weapon, whether loaded
or unloaded, from which a shot may be discharged. ‘Represented by words
or conduct’ means that the defendant did or said something to indicate to
the complainant [D] that he had a deadly weapon in his possession. It is
not necessary that the state ‘prove that the defendant actually possessed
such a weapon or that the weapon was actually capable of discharging
a shot.”

7 On the basis of these offenses, the trial court further found that the
defendant was in violation of probation. The defendant does not raise any
claims on appeal relating to this finding. Accordingly, our determination
with respect to the defendant's appeal from the judgment of conviction on
the criminal charges provides an adequate basis to affirm the trial court's
Judgment convicting the defendant of violation of probation.

360 Po
|

instruct the jury that he could prove inoperability for
purposes of his affirmative defense to § 53a-92a by
showing either that the pistol did not contain BBs and
therefore was not loaded or that it did not contain
a CO, cartridge and, therefore, lacked a component
necessary for discharging a shot.

To support this claim, the defendant proposes a statu-
tory gloss that relies on mutually reinforcing interpreta-
tions of the offenses and of the affirmative defense to
§ 58a-92a. He contends that the language of the two
substantive offenses, though ambiguous, should be read
to require the state to prove that the defendant actually
was armed with a pistol and that he therefore could
not properly be convicted for only representing that he
possessed one.’ He suggests that allowing conviction

® The defendant emphasizes parallel language and punctuation in the two
statutes. Section 53a-70a (a) (1) applies if a person who commits sexual
assault in the first degree “uses or is armed with and threatens the use of
or displays or represents by such person’s words or conduct that such
person possesses a deadly weapon . . . .” Section 58a-92a (a) contains a
comparable condition: “and in the commission of said crime he uses or is
armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words
or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle
or other firearm.” Unlike some similarly worded statutes; see, e.g., General
Statutes §§ 53-202k and 53a-134 (a); these provisions do not employ commas
to delineate the several scenarios that satisfy their respective elements. The
defendant contends that the statutes therefore should be read such that
these elements would be met only if the state proved that the defendant
(1) used a pistol or (2) was armed with a pistol and either (a) threatened
the use of or (b) displayed or (c) represented by his words or conduct that
he possessed a pistol. Per this construction, the state would invariably have
to prove that a defendant either used or was armed with an operable pistol.

The state contends that the defendant has waived this claim and, alterna-
tively, that the statutes would be satisfied if the defendant (1) used or (2)
was armed with and threatened the use of or (3) displayed or (4) represented
by his words or conduct that he possessed a pistol. Because we agree with
the state that the defendant has waived this claim, we express no opinion
as to the proper construction of § 53a-70a (a) (1) or § 59a-92a.

‘That said, we feel compelled to note that in the section of her appellate
brief addressing this issue the state’s appellate counsel, Assistant State's
Attorney Melissa L. Streeto, purported to provide quotations of §§ 53a-70a (a)
(1) and 58a-92a but inserted commas supporting her statutory construction
without any indication that alterations had been made. In response to ques-

po 361
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merely for claiming to have a gun would produce the
absurd result that § 58a-16a would potentially provide
an affirmative defense against § 53a-92a for a defendant
armed with a nonfunctional pistol but not for one with
no pistol at all. The defendant further contends that
the affirmative defense under § 53a-16a, the text of
which he claims is also ambiguous, should be interpre-
ted in this statutory scheme to preclude conviction—
even once the statutory definition of “firearm” has been
met—if a defendant can show that the firearm was
not loaded and, therefore, not capable of discharging
a shot.

The defendant contends that he preserved both objec-
tions but, in the alternative, he seeks Golding review”

tions at oral argument regarding the accuracy of these quotations, she
explained, in justification of the improper insertions, that “I put those there
because that is how the statute should be read.” No matter how a statute
should be read, it is for the legislature—and not counsel—to determine how
the statute should be written. We strongly disapprove of the tactic employed
here, which was at the very least misleading, and we remind counsel that
they are obligated to indicate, through the use of brackets or explanatory
parentheticals or otherwise, any modification to quoted materials. Contrary
to Assistant State's Attorney Streeto’s suggestion at oral argument, and
notwithstanding her apology for misleading the court, this obligation is not
met by including unmodified copies of the relevant texts in an appendix.

®The defendant points out that the Penal Code defines “ ‘{flirearm’” as
“any sawed-off shotgun, machine gun, rifle, shotgun, pistol, revolver or other
weapon, whether loaded or unloaded from which a shot may be discharged”;
(emphasis added) General Statutes § 53a-3 (19); while § 58a-16a provides
that “it shall be an affirmative defense that the pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun,
machine gun or other firearm was not a weapon from which a shot could
be discharged,” with no mention of whether the gun is loaded. The defendant
contends that operability for purposes of the affirmative defense may be
defeated by removing ammunition, whereas an unloaded weapon may still
be a firearm for purposes of the substantive offense. The state, which does
not assert that the defendant waived this claim, counters that § 53a-16a
implicitly incorporates the “whether loaded or unloaded” language of the
definition of a firearm into the affirmative defense. Beyond concluding that
the instruction was not plain error, we express no opinion as to this issue.
We also express no opinion as to the defendant's claim that a CO, cartridge
is a component of an air pistol rather than an element of the ammunition,
as it appears the jury may have concluded.

© State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

362 Po
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as to the first claim and plain error review as to the

second claim. We conclude that the defendant has pre-

served neither claim, that his first claim cannot succeed

under Golding because it has been waived and that the

second claim does not merit reversal for plain error.

The record reveals the following additional facts and
procedural history relevant to these claims. After the
close of its case, the state sought to amend the informa-
tion with respect to § 53a-92a, kidnapping in the first
degree with a firearm. The proposed substitute informa-
tion replaced an allegation that “during the commission.
of said crime [the defendant] was armed with and rep-
resented by his words or conduct that he possessed a
pistol”; (emphasis added); with the narrower charge
that “during the commission of said crime he repre-
sented by his words or conduct that he possessed a
pistol,” thereby avoiding the need to prove the defen-
dant was armed with an operable pistol. The defendant
objected, arguing that the amended count would preju-
dicially preclude him from raising an affirmative
defense under § 53a-16a that any pistol he may have
possessed was “not a weapon from which a shot could
be discharged . . . .” The trial court, citing this court’s
decision in State v. Hawthorne, 175 Conn. 569, 402 A.2d
759 (1978), ruled that the defendant still could raise
this affirmative defense even though the state did not
allege that he was armed with a pistol."! On the basis

“This court held in State v. Hawthorne, supra, 175 Conn. 573-74, that
“the operability of a firearm is not an essential element of robbery in the
first degree under subsection (a) (4) of [General Statutes] § 68a-184. We
also recognize{d] that this subsection, by its terms, makes the inoperability
of a firearm an affirmative defense by means of which a defendant, who
chooses to avail himself of this defense, may reduce the crime from robbery
in the first degree to robbery in the second degree.” In light of our conclusion
that the defendant is not entitled to Golding or plain error review, we
express no opinion regarding the applicability of our holding in Hawthorne
to the statutes at issue in the present case. Cf. State v. Nieves, 89 Conn.
App. 410, 423-24, 873 A.2d 1066 (holding that defendant was not entitled
to benefit of inoperability defense against § 53a-134 [a] [4] where charging
language alleged only that defendant represented that he had firearm), cert.
denied, 275 Conn. 906, 882 A.2d 679 (2005).

po 368

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of this ruling, the defendant withdrew his objection. The
court then confirmed that, with respect to the charge of
attempted aggravated sexual assault in the first degree
under § 53a-70a (a) (1), the state was “also simply claim-
ing that [the defendant] represented by his words or
conduct that he had a deadly weapon.” The defendant
raised no objection and acknowledged that no affirma-
tive defense applied to this count.

Shortly thereafter, while discussing a motion for a
judgment of acquittal filed by the defendant, the trial
court expressed its understanding that under the
amended charges “the state no longer has the burden
to show operability.” The defendant replied, “I would
not disagree with that.” He argued instead that because
there was no evidence that the pistol contained a CO,
cartridge, his own burden of showing inoperability for
purposes of his affirmative defense under § 53a-16a had
been met. The court denied his motion.

Following the conclusion of evidence, the trial court
provided counsel with copies of a draft jury charge.
Per the defendant’s request, that charge included an
affirmative defense to the kidnapping charge and defini-
tions of the terms “firearm,” “deadly weapon” and “pis-
tol,” which the trial court drew from the relevant
statutory text and Penal Code definitions.” The next
morning, the court held a charging conference. The
defendant expressed his satisfaction with the pro-
posed instructions.

# As we have noted previously; see footnotes 2, 3 and 4 of this opinion;
§ 53a-70a (a) (1) refers to a “deadly weapon,” whereas §§ 53a-92a and 58a
16a refer to a “firearm.” General Statutes § 58a-3 provides in relevant part:
“Except where different meanings are expressly specified, the following
terms have the following meanings when used in this title . . .

“() ‘Deadly weapon’ means any weapon, whether loaded or unloaded,
from which a shot may be discharged . . . .

“(8) ‘Pistol’ or ‘revolver’ means any firearm having a barrel less than
‘twelve inches;

“(19) ‘Firearm’ means any . . . weapon, whether loaded or unloaded
from which a shot may be discharged . . . .”

364 Po
|

In his closing argument, the defendant contended
that for the pistol to be operable, it required both BBs
and a CO, cartridge. He then distinguished between
the BBs and the cartridge, arguing that the BBs were
ammunition, whereas the cartridge was an essential
component of the gun itself.

As we previously have noted, following the close of
evidence the trial court instructed the jury, in accor-
dance with the amended information, that for purposes
of kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm and
attempted aggravated sexual assault in the first degree
it was not necessary for the state to prove that the
defendant actually possessed a firearm or deadly
weapon or that such a weapon was actually capable of
discharging a shot. See footnote 6 of this opinion. The
court also instructed the jury that the defendant had
asserted, as an affirmative defense to the charge of
kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm, that any
pistol displayed by him was not a weapon from which
a shot could be discharged. Both the state and the
defendant indicated, upon the court’s inquiry, that they
took no exception to these instructions.

During the course of deliberations, the jury submitted
a note asking, “[dJoes the gun need to be theoretically
operable or actually operable at the time the crime
was committed?” In the discussion that ensued, the
defendant opined that “I think you would have to
answer that question in my opinion, no, to both of
those,” reasoning that the pistol was not actually opera-
ble without BBs and a CO, cartridge and that it was
not theoretically operable because it could not have
fired even if a BB were present. The court responded
that the defendant’s argument was unsupported
because, under the statutory definition of a firearm, it
was irrelevant whether the gun was loaded. The defen-
dant replied, “[o]kay.” The court then expressed its
view that the legislature clearly intended operability

po 365

not to turn on whether the pistol contained ammunition.
but that the case involved a reasonable dispute over
whether the CO, cartridge should be construed as
ammunition or a component of the pistol. The court
then characterized this as a question of fact for the jury
and asked if either party wished to be heard further;
the defendant responded, “[nJo, Your Honor.”

Ultimately, the court decided to reread the statutory
definition of a firearm that it previously had given the
jury. The defendant expressed concern that doing so
might cause the jury to fail to consider the definition
in the context of the facts and argument made in the
present case, but the court indicated that such an
instruction was unnecessary because its previous
instruction had made that point clear and the jury’s
question was seeking a clarification on the law. There-
after, the court proceeded to reinstruct the jury that a
firearm is “any weapon, whether loaded or unloaded,
from which a shot may be discharged.”

At the sentencing hearing, the defendant moved for
a judgment of acquittal with respect to the charge of
kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm, arguing
that evidence that the pistol contained no CO, cartridge
demonstrated that it was inoperable for purposes of
his affirmative defense under § 53a-16a. He made no
express claim at this time that the absence of BBs
rendered the weapon inoperable. The defendant also

© The defendant presented his concern by stating: “Your Honor, I guess,
the only thing—other thing I would suggest is if the court was going to give
them that instruction that that's the definition that they keep, that they use
that definition in the context of it and in addition to the arguments that
were made, I mean, I think you can take that as a matter of law, they still
have to use the facts of the case to decide whether or not the arguments
fit into the law that you're giving them to look at so. . . .” The defendant
later elaborated, stating that “I'm thinking that by them getting that vanilla
boilerplate definition that they're just gonna look at that within—and not
take it in the context that they maybe would have, having that definition
and hearing the argument so... .”

366 Po

moved for a new trial on the ground that the court
had not appropriately responded to the jury’s question
regarding whether the weapon needed to be theoreti-
cally or actually operable. The court denied the defen-
dant’s motions. With these facts in mind, we turn to
the defendant's specific contentions.

A

The defendant first claims that the court improperly
instructed the jury regarding the elements of aggravated
sexual assault in the first degree under § 53a-70a (a)
(1) and kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm
under § 53a-92a by telling the jury that it need not find
that the defendant actually possessed a “weapon,
whether loaded or unloaded, from which a shot may
be discharged” to convict him on these counts. The
defendant suggests that this claim is preserved by his
repeated references to inoperability as an affirmative
defense; in the alternative he asks for Golding review."
We conclude that this claim is unpreserved and that
the defendant cannot prevail under Golding.

“{A] fundamental element of due process of law is the
right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a
defense. . . . Where, as here, the challenged jury
instructions involve a constitutional right, the applica-
ble standard of review is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the jury was misled in reaching its ver-
dict. . . . A challenge to the validity of jury instruc-

4 Pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Comn. 233, 230-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),
“a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved
at trial only if ail of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is
adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional
magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged
constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of
a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed
to demonstrate hamlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond
a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the
defendant's claim will fail.” (Emphasis in original.)

Pe 367
|

tions presents a question of law over which [we have]
plenary review.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567, 598-99,
10 A.3d 1005 (2011).

As the rules of practice make clear, however, “[ajn
appellate court shall not be bound to consider error as
to the giving of, or the failure to give, an instruction
unless the matter is covered by a written request to
charge or an exception has been taken by the party
appealing immediately after the charge is delivered.
Counsel taking the exception shall state distinctly the
matter objected to and the ground of objection.” Prac-
tice Book § 16-20. In the present case, the defendant
did not submit a request to charge addressing the ele-
ments of these offenses, nor did he take exception to
the jury instructions either at the charging conference
or after the charges were read to the jury. At no time
thereafter did the defendant indicate that the jury must
be instructed on operability as an element of §§ 53a-
70a (a) (1) and 58a-92a rather than as a condition of
the affirmative defense under § 53a-16a. Accordingly,
the defendant has not preserved this claim.

In reviewing unpreserved claims under Golding, we
have held that “[a] defendant in a criminal prosecution
may waive one or more of his or her fundamental
rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Fabricatore, 281 Conn. 469, 478, 915 A.2d 872 (2007).
“[A] constitutional claim that has been waived does not

8 The defendant's contrary claim that the right to proper instruction on
the elements of an offense is fundamental and therefore not waivable by
counsel is unavailing. “It is well settled that counsel has the authority to
waive such a right and that the court can rely on counsel's representations
regarding the propriety of the instructions at any stage of the proceeding.
. .. [T]he requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant
himself is inapplicable when . . . counsel has waived a potential constitu-
tional claim in the exercise of his or her professional judgment.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mungroo, 299 Conn.
667, 677, 11 A.3d 182 (2011).

368 PO
i__|

satisfy the third prong of the Golding test because, in
such circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that
injustice [has been] done to either party . . . or that
the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and
clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial... .”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holness,
289 Conn. 535, 543, 958 A.2d 754 (2008).

We conclude that the defendant's claim fails to satisfy
the third prong of Golding because we agree with the
state that it was waived at trial. As we recently observed,
in addition to express waiver, implicit waiver of a claim
of instructional error may properly be found where “the
defense expressly acknowledged and agreed by words
or conduct to the instruction challenged on appeal.”
State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 475, 10 A.3d 942 (2011);
State v. Holness, supra, 289 Conn. 543 (denying Golding
review where “defense counsel clearly and unequivo-
cally agreed to the limiting instruction that the trial
court gave to the jury”).

The defendant cannot prevail under Golding with
respect to the aggravated sexual assault charge under
§ 53a-70a (a) (1) because he impliedly waived this claim.
The defendant raised no objection when the state con-
firmed that, for that charge, it was “also simply claiming
that [the defendant] represented by his words or con-
duct that he had a deadly weapon.” The defendant later
expressly assented to the jury instructions, both before
and after they were read, after having ample opportu-
nity for review. See State v. Kitchens, supra, 299 Conn.
475. He also argued the issue of operability at length
during his closing argument, presenting it explicitly and
exclusively as an affirmative defense to § 53a-92a.
Accordingly, when the issue of operability with respect.
to § 53a-70a (a) (1) was squarely before the defendant.
on several occasions, the defendant’s conduct mani-
fested a clear relinquishment of his present claim.

Po 369
{__

With regard to the kidnapping charge under § 53a-
92a, the defendant not only satisfied the conditions of
implied waiver under Kitchens by indicating his satis-
faction with the jury charge, but he also expressly
waived the claim by explicitly assenting to the amended.
information, which eliminated the state’s burden of
proving he was armed with an operable firearm, and
requesting an affirmative defense under which he would
bear the burden of proving that the air pistol was not
a weapon from which a shot could be discharged. See
State v. Fabricatore, supra, 281 Conn. 481 (Golding
review was denied when “defense counsel not only
failed to object to the instruction as given or to the
state’s original request to charge the jury with the duty
to retreat, but clearly expressed his satisfaction with
that instruction, and in fact subsequently argued that
the instruction as given was proper. Indeed, defense
counsel himself addressed the duty to retreat in his
own summation.”). During his closing argument, the
defendant argued that “operability is an affirmative
defense to the charge of kidnapping in the first degree
with a firearm” and later contended that “I think I can
meet my burden of preponderance of the evidence with
regard to the operability of that gun.” With the benefit.
of hindsight, the defendant attempts to amend this
unsuccessful trial strategy by arguing that § 53a-92a
invariably requires the state to bear the burden of prov-
ing the defendant was armed with a firearm. Regardless
of whether the defendant’s proposed statutory con-
struction has any merit, it is flatly at odds with his own.
express position at trial. Under these circumstances,
‘we cannot conclude that a clear constitutional violation.
clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial. See State
v. Holness, supra, 289 Conn. 543.

B

The defendant claims additionally that the court
improperly instructed the jury regarding inoperability

370 PO
i________|

as an affirmative defense to kidnapping in the first
degree with a firearm under § 53a-92a. Specifically, he
contends that the affirmative defense under § 53a-16a,
that the firearm was not one “from which a shot could
be discharged,” should be construed as a matter of law
to provide an affirmative defense when a defendant is
armed either with an unloaded firearm or with a firearm
that is mechanically incapable of being fired even if it
is loaded. The defendant concedes that the term “fire-
arm” is used in both the substantive offense and affirma-
tive defense and that this term is defined in such a way
as to make the question of whether the weapon is loaded
irrelevant. He nevertheless contends that in order to
make the statutory scheme coherent, the affirmative
defense must be construed to allow a defendant to
prevail if he establishes that the weapon is unloaded.
The trial court’s failure to give an instruction endorsing
the “unloaded” prong of this construction was there-
fore, the defendant reasons, improper. The defendant
further contends that the court’s response to the jury’s
subsequent question regarding whether the air pistol
needed to be actually or theoretically operable was
inadequate because it did not clarify that either lack of
ammunition (BBs) or a missing mechanical component,
(CO, cartridge) would be sufficient to establish inopera-
bility for purposes of the affirmative defense."* We con-
clude that this claim is unpreserved and that it does
not warrant reversal for plain error.

To preserve an exception to a jury instruction for
further review under Practice Book § 16-20, a party
must either submit a written request to charge or “state
distinctly the matter objected to and the ground of
objection.” Although the defendant did present in his
closing argument to the jury, albeit in an inarticulate
and undeveloped manner, the theory that he advances
on appeal, none of his representations or arguments to

16 See footnote 9 of this opinion.

po 371
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the court foreshadowed or subsequently reiterated this
claim to the jury. The defendant never asked the court
to instruct the jury that, should it find the pistol was
unloaded, it must consequently find that the pistol “was
not a weapon from which a shot could be discharged”
pursuant to § 53a-16a. Nor did the defendant make a
distinct request or objection during the discussion of the
jury’s request for clarification regarding “theoretical” or
“actual” operability. Although the defendant opined
that the evidence satisfied both theories, he immedi-
ately acceded to the trial court’s summary response
that the argument made in his closing argument was
legally unsupportable. Furthermore, in both his motion
for acquittal after the close of the state’s case and his
motion for a new trial following the verdict, the defen-
dant emphasized the lack of a CO, cartridge as a basis
for finding the pistol inoperable. It is our long-standing
position that “[t]o review [a] claim, which has been
articulated for the first time on appeal and not before
the trial court, would result in a trial by ambuscade of
the trial judge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Boyd, 295 Conn. 707, 758, 992 A.2d 1071 (2010),
cert. denied, US. —, 181 S. Ct. 1474, 179 L. Ed. 2d
314 (2011). Accordingly, to the extent that the defendant
identified the significance of the pistol being unloaded
at all, his “imprecise reference did not reasonably alert
the court to the deficiencies in the charge now
advanced. Counsel thus failed to state distinctly the
matter objected to and the ground of objection as
required . . . for appellate review.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 816,
614 A.2d 414 (1992).

Because this claim is unpreserved and the defendant
has not requested review of the claim under Golding,
we turn to the defendant’s alternate request to prevail
by demonstrating plain error."’ “[T]he plain error doc-

¥ We recognize that there appears to be some tension in our appellate
case law as to whether reversal on the basis of plain error could be available

372 PO

trine ... isnot... arule of reviewability. It is a rule
of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that this court
invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling that,
although either not properly preserved or never raised
at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal
of the trial court’s judgment, for reasons of policy. . . .

in cases where the alleged error is causally connected to the defendant's
own behavior. In Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 70,
967 A.2d 41 (2009), this court held that where the defendant, personally and
through counsel, had expressly waived his right to trial, reversal for plain
error was not appropriate because “if there has been a valid waiver, there
is no error for us to correct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also
‘Statev. Kitchens, supra, 299 Conn. 474 n.18 (citing Mozell for this proposition
in case in which defendant did not claim plain error). In other cases, this
court has addressed a claim of plain error despite a finding of waiver or
induced error, but nonetheless has relied in part on the defendant's action
as a basis for concluding that the defendant had not demonstrated the
manifest injustice or prejudice required to prevail under the plain error
doctrine. See State v. Coward, 292 Conn. 296, 306, 310, 972 A.2d 691 (2009)
(refusing to grant Golding review for induced jury instruction but still analyz-
ing claim under plain error doctrine); State v. Alston, 272 Conn. 432, 456,
862 A.2d 817 (2005) (holding that defendant could not show manifest injus-
tice under plain error doctrine “because he induced the trial court to take
the very actions he now criticizes as erroneous, and he has failed to demon-
strate any prejudice resulting therefrom”); see also State v. Santiago, 100
Conn. App. 236, 254 n.10, 917 A.2d 1051 (concluding that defendant's request
for instruction using terminology later challenged resulted in induced error
that precluded Golding review, but [t]o the extent that the claim is amenable
to review under the plain error doctrine, we are not persuaded that an error
exists that is so obvious that it affects the faimess and integrity of and the
public confidence in the judicial proceedings or that the court’s use of the
term victim caused the defendant to suffer manifest injustice”), cert. denied,
284 Conn. 933, 935 A.2d 152, 158 (2007); State v. Maskell, 100 Conn. App.
507, 521, 918 A.2d 298 (The court concluded that the defendant could not
seek reversal on the basis of plain error for one claim due to induced
error, but with respect to another claim also deemed to be induced error,
concluded: “On the basis of our review of the record, the acquittee has not
demonstrated that an error exists that is so obvious that it affects the fairness
and integrity of and the public confidence in the judicial proceedings or
that he has been made to suffer manifest injustice. To the extent that we
consider the claim under the plain error doctrine, we are not persuaded
that such error exists.”), cert. denied, 282 Conn. 922, 925 A.2d 1105 (2007).
Because we conclude that the defendant has failed to make a claim that,
even if meritorious, could constitute plain error, and because the state has
not specifically contended that the defendant waived this claim, we express
no opinion regarding the nature and effect of any causal connection between
the defendant's conduct and the claimed error.

po 378

In addition, the plain error doctrine is reserved for truly
extraordinary situations where the existence of the
error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integ-
rity of and public confidence in the judicial proceed-

“[W]e recently clarified the two step framework
under which we review claims of plain error. First, we
must determine whether the trial court in fact commit-
ted an error and, if it did, whether that error was indeed
plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily discernable
on the face of a factually adequate record, [and] also

. Obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . . We
made clear . . . that this inquiry entails a relatively
high standard, under which it is not enough for the
defendant simply to demonstrate that his position is
correct. Rather, the party seeking plain error review
must demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was
so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the
extraordinary remedy of reversal.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 204-205, 982
A.2d 620 (2009).

It is manifest from the defendant’s own exposition of
his claim that he cannot “demonstrate that the claimed
impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisputable as
to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.”
(nternal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 205. With
respect to the court’s initial instruction on the affirma-
tive defense, which verbatim reiterated the language of
§ 58a-16a (using the term “pistol,” which the court had
defined for purposes of the kidnapping charge pursuant
to General Statutes § 53a-3 [18]), the defendant con-
cedes that “the reading of the statutes was technically
correct” and points to no case law compelling his pro-
posed explication of the text. Instead, the defendant
essentially proposes a judicial gloss of the statutory
scheme that relies heavily on isolated statements in the

374 Po
i_______|

legislative history of the statutes. As we recently have
noted, “[i]t is axiomatic that the trial court’s proper
application of the law existing at the time of trial cannot
constitute reversible error under the plain error doc-
trine.” State v. Diaz, 302 Conn. 93, 104 n.8, 25 A.3d 594
(2011). Under these circumstances, we conclude that
the defendant has failed to allege a clear, obvious and
indisputable error requiring reversal, and we therefore
decline to reverse the judgment on the basis of plain
error.

For parallel reasons, the defendant’s complaint
regarding the court’s response to the jury’s question
must also fail. The defendant frames this aspect of his
claim by way of another concession: “Rereading the
firearm definition—although it was correct—would be
of little help to a perplexed jury.” Again, regardless of
whether the defendant has suffered any prejudice from
a genuine error, he has failed to point to an indisputable
or obvious one. The trial court’s reiteration of its previ-
ous “technically correct” instruction is a remedy for
juror confusion specifically endorsed in Practice Book
§ 42-27. More significantly, the defendant points to no
undeniably compelling alternative instruction the court
should have given; as we discussed previously herein,
the defendant’s preferred instruction, never clearly
voiced to the trial court, is far from indisputably correct.
As a matter of plain error, we therefore cannot fault
the trial court for failing to embrace it.

I

The defendant also claims that the senior assistant
state’s attorney improperly asserted facts not in evi-

+8 Contrary to the defendant's suggestion, rereading a portion of the initial
instruction is not an inherently improper response to a request for clarifica-
tion. Practice Book § 42-27 (“il the jury, after retiring for deliberations,
requests additional instructions, the judicial authority . . . shall . . . give
additional instructions necessary to respond properly to the request or
to direct the jury’s attention to a portion of the original instructions”
[emphasis added).

Pe 375
{__

dence and vouched for D’s credibility during its closing

argument, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair

trial as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the

United States constitution. We disagree and determine

that the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper.

“Tn analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we
engage in a two step analytical process. . . . The two
steps are separate and distinct. . . . We first examine
whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred. . . . Sec-
ond, if an impropriety exists, we then examine whether
it deprived the defendant of his due process right to a
fair trial.’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Fauci, 282
Conn. 23, 32, 917 A.2d 978 (2007).

We begin, therefore, by considering the relevant stan-
dards of prosecutorial conduct. “[A]s the state’s advo-
cate, a prosecutor may argue the state’s case forcefully,
[provided the argument is] fair and based upon the facts
in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom. . . . Moreover, [i]t does not follow .. .
that every use of rhetorical language or device [by the
prosecutor] is improper. . . . Nevertheless, the prose-
cutor has a heightened duty to avoid argument that
strays from the evidence or diverts the jury’s attention
from the facts of the case. . . . By reason of his office,
he usually exercises great influence upon jurors. . . .

The defendant concedes that he did not object to the remarks by the
senior assistant state's attorney or otherwise take measures to preserve his
claim. Under settled law, “a defendant who fails to preserve claims of
prosecutorial misconduct need not seek to prevail under the specific require-
ments of State v. Golding, [supra, 213 Conn. 239-40] . . . . The reason for
this is that the defendant in a claim of prosecutorial misconduct must
establish that the prosecutorial misconduct was so serious as to amount to
a denial of due process . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Warhotic, 278 Conn. 354, 360, 897 A.2d 569 (2006). Because
we hold that there was no misconduct in the present case, we do not
reach the question of whether any misconduct rose to the level of a due
process violation.

376 Po

“A prosecutor may invite the jury to draw reasonable
inferences from the evidence; however, he or she may
not invite sheer speculation unconnected to evidence.
. . » Moreover, when a prosecutor suggests a fact not
in evidence, there is a risk that the jury may conclude
that he or she has independent knowledge of facts that.

could not be presented to the jury. . . . In addition,
[a] prosecutor may not appeal to the emotions, passions
and prejudices of the jurors. . . . [S]uch appeals

should be avoided because they have the effect of
diverting the [jurors’] attention from their duty to decide
the case on the evidence.” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Skakel, 276 Conn.
633, 745-46, 888 A.2d 985, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030,
127 S. Ct. 578, 166 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2006).

The defendant points to eight comments over the
course of the state’s closing argument that he contends
either asserted facts not in evidence or vouched for D’s
credibility as a witness. Of these comments, only one
stands out as a potential source of concern.” With
respect to attempted aggravated sexual assault in the
first degree, the senior assistant state’s attorney argued:
“The question is whether or not [the defendant] took
a substantial step in the course of conduct that was on
its way [to intercourse and penetration]. In other words
in laymen’s terms, and not to be vulgar, had he had an
erection, he would have done it. It’s as simple as that.

® The seven other allegedly problematic statements that the defendant
points to can readily be identified as viable inferences from the evidence
and/or proper appeals to the jury’s common sense and are therefore not
improper. See State v. Warholic, supra, 278 Conn. 365 (“This court previously
has concluded that the state may argue that its witnesses testified credibly,
if such an argument is based on reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence. . . . In addition, jurors, in deciding cases, are not expected to
lay aside matters of common Imowledge or their own observations and
experiences, but rather, to apply them to the facts as presented to arrive
at an intelligent and correct conclusion. . . . Therefore, itis entirely proper
for counsel to appeal to ajury’s common sense in closing remarks.” [Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted,]).

Po 377
|

He had her tied up on the bed spread eagle because he
wanted to have intercourse with her. And that was the
entire focus of the intention, it was the sole intent.”
(Emphasis added.) Because this comment bore directly
on the mens rea requisite for the offense, was not sup-
ported by direct testimony regarding whether the defen-
dant had an erection or was capable of achieving one
and potentially resonated emotionally with the jury, it
merits scrutiny.

After a review of the record, we conclude that in the
context of the present case the comment by the senior
assistant state’s attorney was not improper. Although
colored by rhetorical embellishment, the statement did
not stray beyond the bounds of reasonable induction.
Evidence of the defendant’s actions, which included
binding D, removing her pants as well as his own and
climbing on top of her, provided grounds for the jury
reasonably to believe that the defendant intended to
complete the aggravated sexual assault. The defen-
dant’s statement that he “couldn’t do this” could in this
context plausibly be interpreted as an acknowledgment
of temporary physical incapacity. Accordingly, the
senior assistant state’s attorney's comment did not hint
at knowledge of facts not in evidence but, rather, pre-
sented an alternate, if hyperbolic, articulation of what
the state was required to show to prove the elements
of attempt.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.
De

378

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HERMAN
VASQUEZ APODACA
(SC 18170)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Harper and Vertefeuille, Js.

379

Argued October 20, 2011—officially released January 10, 2012

Pamela S. Nagy, special public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).

Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, was Scott J. Murphy, state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

HARPER, J. Following a jury trial, the defendant,
Herman Vasquez Apodaca, was convicted of felony mur-
der in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, conspir-
acy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134, and two
counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-
134 (a) (1) and (8). The defendant appealed directly to
this court, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b)
(8), raising four claims. The defendant first claims that,
the trial court improperly dismissed a juror midtrial
without adequate cause because its conclusion that it
could not reconsider its decision to excuse the juror
‘was incorrect as a matter of fact and law. The defendant
also claims that his felony murder conviction must be
reversed because the trial court’s instructions permitted
the jury to find him vicariously liable for the underlying
felony (robbery in the first degree) and in turn improp-
erly permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of
felony murder when he did not actually commit the
underlying felony. Finally, the defendant contends, with

381

respect to the trial court’s instructions on the conspir-
acy charge, that the court improperly failed to address
the jury’s request to restate the instruction in layper-
sons’ terms and that the instruction was otherwise mis-
leading as to which crime formed the basis of the
conspiracy. We disagree with each of these claims and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment.

The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. In August, 2005, the defendant, a New York resi-
dent, met John Ortiz, a New Britain barber. The defen-
dant asked Ortiz to let him know whether he knew
anyone in Connecticut who might be interested in buy-
ing large quantities of drugs. Some time after that meet-
ing, Ortiz contacted the defendant and relayed
information that a friend, Luis Bruno, was interested
in making such a purchase.

On September 22, 2005, the defendant and two of his
acquaintances, Eduardo Davila and Rodney Hankerson,
went to New Britain, where Ortiz introduced them to
Bruno. An agreement was reached to sell Bruno four
kilograms of cocaine at a price of $19,000 per kilogram,
with the sale to take place two days later. The defen-
dant, Davila and Hankerson decided to use the sale as
a pretext to steal Bruno’s money.

On September 24, 2005, Bruno called Davila on the
defendant’s cell phone to express reservations about
the sale, and they ultimately agreed that Bruno could
purchase two, rather than four, kilograms of cocaine.
Later that same day, the defendant, Hankerson and
Davila drove to New Britain, where they met Ortiz in
a store parking lot. Davila and Hankerson carried guns
on them as directed by the defendant; the defendant
gave Davila a larger gun so “it would look more intim-
idating” and directed Davila to give his own smaller
gun to Hankerson. Hankerson brought with him a duffle
bag containing rolls of duct tape and bricks of fake

382

cocaine made out of sheetrock. The defendant, driving
one vehicle, with Hankerson as his passenger, and Dav-
ila, driving a second vehicle, followed Ortiz’ car to
Bruno’s apartment in New Britain. Davila went to
Bruno’s apartment and entered through the rear door.
Davila saw stacks of money piled on the kitchen table
and drew his gun on Bruno. Davila then relayed a mes-
sage to the defendant's cell phone indicating that every-
thing was under control. The defendant entered the
apartment, along with Hankerson who was carrying the
bag containing the duct tape and fake cocaine. A fight
ensued between Hankerson, Davila and Bruno. The
defendant filled a grocery bag with the cash that was
piled on the kitchen table and returned with it to his
car, leaving Hankerson and Davila to deal with Bruno.
During the struggle with Bruno, in which Hankerson
and Davila tried to bind his mouth, arms and legs with
the duct tape, Bruno was beaten and fatally stabbed.

Hankerson and Davila fled the apartment and drove
to arest stop, where they met the defendant. The two
men had blood on their clothes, and the defendant
directed them to get back into their vehicle and to follow
him. The defendant led them back to his girlfriend’s
apartment in New York, where he gave them a change
of clothes. The three men split the money taken from
Bruno’s apartment.

Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and charged
with felony murder, two counts of robbery in the first
degree and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery
in the first degree. At trial, the defendant did not dispute
that he had been involved in a scheme to sell Bruno
drugs, but disclaimed any knowledge of the robbery
or murder.

On the fifth day of evidence, a juror, A.S., called in
sick, and the court thereafter excused her, over the
defendant’s objection, and replaced her with an alter-

383

nate. At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed
the jury that the defendant could be found guilty on
the two counts of robbery in the first degree as either
a principal, an accessory, or, alternatively, under a the-
ory of vicarious liability. The court further instructed
the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of
felony murder if it found that he, alone or acting with
others, had committed a robbery and, in the course of
or in furtherance of that crime or flight therefrom, he
or another participant had caused Bruno’s death.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four counts.
The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with
the verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of
sixty years imprisonment. This direct appeal followed.

I

We begin with the defendant’s claim that the trial
court improperly excused A.S. without the requisite
finding of adequate cause. Specifically, the defendant.
contends that the trial court improperly determined
that it could not reconsider its decision to excuse A.S.,
even though the initial reason for the excusal, illness,
no longer existed. He further contends that such an
impropriety entitles him to a new trial because it is
structural in nature and not amenable to harmless error
review. We conclude that the trial court’s decision was
proper and, therefore, we need not consider the defen-
dant’s claim of structural error.

The record reveals the following additional undis-
puted facts. On the fifth day of evidence in the state’s
case-in-chief, at 10:25 a.m., the court informed the par-
ties that A.S. had called in to the caseflow coordinator
to report that she was ill with some type of flu bug that
was causing vomiting. The court asked the parties for
their opinions as to whether A.S. should be dismissed.
Defense counsel objected, arguing that the defendant
felt strongly about keeping this particular juror on the

—

jury. Defense counsel requested that the court wait at
least one day to allow A.S. to recover from her illness
and, due to the limited availability of the state’s witness
set to testify that day, videotape the testimony of that
witness to play to the jury upon A.S.’s return. The state
disagreed, offering several reasons why A.S. should be
excused. The trial court announced that it would defer
its decision until 11:30 a.m.

When court reconvened, the trial court informed the
parties that it had asked the caseflow coordinator to
call A.S. during the recess to determine when she first
had gotten sick, the status of her condition, and how
she thought she might feel in a few hours, as well as
the next day. The caseflow coordinator then reported
the content of her telephone conversation to the court.
AS. indicated that she had begun to feel ill the previous
afternoon, had gotten physically ill that evening and
still was vomiting on the morning she called in. AS.
was not sure whether she would feel well enough by
that afternoon or the next day to resume jury duty.
In response to this report, the parties reiterated their
previous positions as to whether A.S. should be
excused.

In light of the defendant’s objection, the trial court
weighed the alternatives that the defendant had
advanced. The court first rejected the option of video-
taping the state’s witness, reasoning that the limited
authority for such a procedure did not extend to the
present circumstances. The court then considered the
options of delaying the trial until the following day or,
alternatively, until 2 p.m. that afternoon, by which time
the caseflow coordinator could obtain an update from
AS. on her condition. The court ultimately rejected
those options, reasoning that A.S. presently was ill, that
the court was not optimistic that she would be well
enough by 2 p.m. to resume her duties and that, even
if she did return, A.S. might spread her illness to other

385

jurors due to the close proximity that they shared. The
court further reasoned that a delay could result in the
loss of other jurors because the trial already had
exceeded the estimated time frame that had been given
to the jury and protracted testimony still lay ahead.
Accordingly, the court ruled that it was excusing A.S.
for the aforementioned reasons and that an alternate
juror would be selected by lot.

After other court business had been conducted and
a brief recess had been called, the court put on the
record that the caseflow coordinator had spoken with
A.S., who had indicated that she felt better and could
be in court by 2 p.m. Because the alternate juror had
not yet been sworn in, the court announced that it
would stay its previous order until 2 p.m. to ascertain
whether A.S. could resume her duties. At that time, in
response to the court’s inquiries, A.S. reported that she
felt better and would “fight through the pain” because
she wanted to continue her jury duties. After the court
pressed A.S. to state with specificity the communication
that she had received from the caseflow coordinator,
AS. stated that the caseflow coordinator had told her
that the trial court was “thinking about excusing [her],”
and that A.S. had requested that the caseflow coordina-
tor ask the court to change its mind. When further
pressed, A.S. acknowledged that she was not sure
whether the caseflow coordinator had said that the
court “was thinking of excusing” her or that the court
had excused her.

The trial court then called in the caseflow coordinator
and asked her to provide her account of the conversa-
tion that she had had with A.S. that morning. The
caseflow coordinator stated: “I told her that I had just
come from a meeting between the judge and all of the
attorneys and they discussed her situation and the judge
asked that I call to tell her that her jury service has
been completed . . . and we understand and that’s

386

when she became agitated because she really wanted
to be here.” Following these accounts, the state argued
that A.S. could not continue to serve as a juror after
having been excused. Defense counsel disagreed,
asserting that A.S. had not actually been excused
because the court’s decision to excuse her had not been
implemented and A.S. did not recall being told that she
had been excused. Ultimately, the court concluded that
AS. had been excused, pointing to the facts that the
court had made a ruling excusing her, it had articulated
the basis for that decision, and the caseflow coordinator
had informed A.S. that her service had ended. The trial
court further concluded that, consistent with principles
articulated by this court in cases addressing analogous
circumstances, once A.S. had been excused, she could
not continue to serve as a juror.

With these facts in mind, we turn to the defendant’s
claim that the trial court improperly dismissed A.S. This
claim requires us to examine the trial court’s decisions
at two points in time: first, when the court decided to
excuse A.S., and, second, when the court determined
that its earlier decision barred A.S.’s continued service.

Under settled principles, “[a] court may excuse a
regular juror if that juror, for any reason, becomes
unable to perform his or her duty. General Statutes
§ 54-82h (c). The power to excuse a juror under this
section is expressly premised on a finding of cause.
. . . Whether in the circumstances just cause exists to
excuse a juror is a matter within the discretion of the
. . . court.” internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Banks, 117 Conn. App. 102, 111-12, 978 A.2d 519,
cert. denied, 294 Conn. 905, 982 A.2d 1081 (2009).

The trial court articulated the basis of its initial deci-
sion to excuse A.S.: she was ill; unable to confirm when
she would be well enough to return, and still potentially
infectious; and a delay risked the loss of other jurors

387

due to the trial having already exceeded its projected
completion date. We conclude that this decision was
well founded, and therefore cannot be deemed an abuse
of discretion.

As the defendant properly points out, however, the
trial court initially was willing to reconsider that deci-
sion once A.S. indicated that she was well enough to
continue but ultimately determined that it could not do
so because A.S.’s legal status as a juror had terminated
after a decision to excuse her had been made and com-
municated to her. Whether that conclusion was proper
presents a question of law subject to plenary review.
Cf. State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 282, 864 A.2d 666
(2004) (‘the authority of the trial court to reassemble
the jury and the determination of whether the jury was
discharged present questions of law over which our
review is plenary”), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S.
Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005). Although this specific
issue is one of first impression, we are not writing
entirely on a blank slate. Our case law addressing the
dismissal of alternate jurors and the discharge of a jury
substantially informs our conclusion.

In State v. Murray, 254 Conn. 472, 483-84, 757 A.2d
578 (2000), this court addressed the question of whether
the version of § 54-82h (c) then in effect, which provided
that an alternate juror “shall be dismissed from further
service on said case” when the case is given to the
regular panel for deliberation; General Statutes (Rev.
to 1999) § 54-82h (c); allowed the substitution of an
alternate juror once deliberations had commenced.
Although the analysis centered on the question of legis-
lative intent; State v. Murray, supra, 487-95; this court
also considered the facts that render a juror dismissed
and the legal effect of such an action. Specifically, the
court noted: “Our conclusion that § 54-82h (c) does not
permit the mid-deliberation substitution of an alternate
juror is consistent with our recent holding in State v.

—— =—s
Pare, [253 Conn. 611, 627-34, 755 A.2d 180 (2000),
wherein we discussed the formal status of a jury in the
course of construing the term ‘discharge’ as used in
Practice Book § 42-31. In that case, we held that mem-
bers of ajury are not necessarily relieved of their official
obligations after they have departed from the court-
room and therefore, under certain circumstances, may
be recalled for the purpose of submitting to a jury poll.
Id., 629. In other words, Pare stands for the proposition
that mere departure from the courtroom does not, in
and of itself, discharge a jury from its obligation to
render continued service in a particular case. In Pare,
‘we went on to discuss when the obligations accompa-
nying jury service are deemed complete, such that a
jury is no longer subject to the authority of the court.
We concluded that ajury completes its task, and thereby
relinquishes its status as a judicial body, upon the sepa-
ration and dispersal of its individual members. Id., 634.
‘When a jury remains as an undispersed unit within the
control of the court and with no opportunity to mingle
with or discuss the case with others, it is undischarged
and may be recalled.’ . .. Id. 630... . After sepa-
rating and dispersing, however, individual jurors may
‘come into contact with outside influences’ . . . [id.],
632-33; thereby tarnishing the deliberations that might
take place thereafter. At that point, individual jurors
effectively relinquish their status as jurors because
they are no longer eligible to be recalled. See id. Simi-
larly, absent some statutory authority to the contrary;
see [Public Acts 2000, No. 00-116, § 6];! an alternate
Juror who has been discharged is, simply stated, no
longer a juror. Because that individual is no longer
subject to the supervisory authority of the trial court,
having been dismissed from service, he or she is sus-

1 Public Act 00-116, § 6, amended § 54-82h (c) to provide, inter alia, that,
once deliberations have begun, alternate jurors either may be dismissed from
further service or “may remain in service under the direction of the court.”

CT

ceptible to contact with improper outside influences,
and therefore, is no longer capable of serving in an
official capacity. . . . At that point, the alternate can
no longer replace a regular juror who, for whatever
reason, has been excused from the case.” (Citations
omitted; emphasis added.) State v. Murray, supra,
495-96.

We conclude that this reasoning applies to the present
case. Because the trial court properly excused A.S. for
adequate cause, once the trial court communicated that
decision to her at her home, A.S. “lost her status as a
juror [and] it necessarily follows that [she] was no
longer qualified to participate in the remainder of the
proceedings.” Id., 498.

The defendant attempts to distinguish the present
case from Murray and Pare by emphasizing the fact
that A.S. indicated that she was uncertain whether the
court only was “thinking about” excusing her and there-
fore would have believed that she still was under the
direction and control of the court. Thus, in the defen-
dant’s view, not only was A.S. not excused, but, because
she still believed that she might continue serving as a
juror, she was not subject to the risks articulated in
Murray and Pare.

We disagree with the defendant’s reasoning as both
a matter of fact and law. The trial court made a finding
that A.S. had been excused after crediting the caseflow
coordinator’s representation that she had told A.S. that.
the court “asked that I call to tell her that her jury
service has been completed.” (Emphasis added.) Once
that final decision had been communicated to A.S., she
no longer was a juror. We are not inclined to adopt
the essentially case-by-case approach advocated by the
defendant wherein the courts would consider the sub-
jective belief of the excused juror or conduct an inquiry
to determine whether, following communication excus-

390

ing her, the juror had had contact with improper outside
influences. Indeed, in Murray, this court determined
that the alternate jurors no longer were eligible to serve
despite the fact that the trial court had not formally
dismissed them, but merely had sent them home; State
v. Murray, supra, 254 Conn. 484 and n.6; and the court
had questioned them to ensure that they had not dis-
cussed the case with anyone.’ Id., 485; id., 502 (McDon-
ald, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
accord State v. Cummings, 67 Conn. App. 734, 736-37,
789 A.2d 1063 (2002) (relying on holding in Murray
without giving any weight to fact that alternate juror
had been instructed upon dismissal that there was pos-
sibility that alternates could be called back to court,
had been cautioned not to discuss case until verdict
had been rendered and had been substituted later that
same day). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
properly excused A.S. for cause.

IL

The defendant’s remaining claims relate to the propri-
ety of certain jury instructions or responses to questions
relating to those instructions. We address each claim
in turn, mindful of the following standard of review.

“The pertinent test is whether the charge, read in its
entirety, fairly presents the case to the jury in such a

2To the extent that the defendant relies on State v. Colon, supra, 272
Conn. 106, that case is not to the contrary. In Colon, this court concluded
that the trial court properly could recall the jury to correct the verdict after
it was excused and retired to the deliberations room following the verdict.
Id., 285-86. In that case, this court relied on the principle that “{w]hen a
jury remains as an undispersed unit within the control of the court and
with no opportunity to mingle with or discuss the case with others, it is
undischarged and may be recalled.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 282. Notably, it was the lack of opportunity for outside
influences to taint the process that was the essential point, not whether
such outside influences actually had been exerted. Itis clear that an objective
examination of the facts in the present case yields a different conclusion—
AS. had been excused and was in her home.

391

way that injustice is not done to either party under the
established rules of law. . . . Thus, [t]he whole charge
must be considered from the standpoint of its effect
on the [jurors] in guiding them to the proper verdict
. . and not critically dissected in a microscopic
search for possible error. . . . Accordingly, [i]n
reviewing a constitutional challenge to the trial court's
instruction, we must consider the jury charge as a whole
to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the
instruction misled the jury. . . . In other words, we
must consider whether the instructions [in totality] are
sufficiently correct in law, adapted to the issues and
ample for the guidance of the jury.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peeler, 271
Conn. 338, 360-61, 857 A.2d 808 (2004), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 845, 126 S. Ct. 94, 163 L. Ed. 2d 110 (2005).

A

The defendant first contends that his conviction for
felony murder must be reversed because the trial court’s
instructions improperly permitted the jury to find him
guilty of that charge if he was vicariously liable for
the underlying felony, robbery in the first degree. The
defendant does not claim that the trial court improperly
instructed the jury that he could be found guilty of the
robbery charge as either a principal, accessory or on
the basis of vicarious liability in accordance with the
Pinkerton doctrine.’ Rather, he claims that the felony
murder statute, § 53a-54c, contemplates that a defen-
dant “commits” the underlying felony only when acting
as a principal or accessory. The defendant concedes
that he did not object to the charge and therefore seeks
to prevail under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), or the plain error doctrine.! We

* See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90
L. Ed. 1489 (1946); see also State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 45-46, 630 A.2d
990 (1993) (adopting Pinkerton doctrine as matter of state law).

“The state does not contend that the defendant waived this, or any other,
unpreserved claim of instructional error.

392

agree that the defendant’s unpreserved claim is of con-
stitutional magnitude and therefore he is entitled to
Golding review; see State v. Coltherst, 263 Conn. 478,
490, 820 A.2d 1024 (2003); but we conclude that the
claim fails on the merits.

This claim largely is controlled by our conclusion in
Coltherst. In that case, this court held that, because
Pinkerton liability could be applied to a charge of inten-
tional murder when the defendant had no intent to kill ©
and because intentional murder was a predicate felony
to capital felony, a conviction for intentional murder
under a theory of Pinkerton liability could serve as
the predicate to capital felony. Id., 501-502. This court
explained: “There is no dispute that the legislature
intended that intentional murder would be a predicate
for capital felony under [General Statutes § 53a-54b].
Instead, the question before us is whether, as authorized
by [General Statutes] § 53a-4, ‘the [Pinkerton] principle
should be recognized as a matter of policy’; State v.
Walton, [227 Conn. 32, 45, 630 A.2d 990 (1993)]; in cases
involving intentional murder in which the defendant
had no intent to kill. We have concluded in . . . this
opinion that it should be, and constitutionally may be,
recognized and, therefore, that the defendant properly
was convicted of intentional murder. Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court properly instructed the
jury that its verdict of guilty on that charge would pro-
vide the predicate for criminal liability under § 53a-54b
(5).” State v. Coltherst, supra, 263 Conn. 501-502.

The same logic applies in the present case. Under
settled—and undisputed—law, a defendant may be
found guilty of robbery on the basis of Pinkerton liabil-
ity. See, e.g., State v. Kerr, 107 Conn. App. 418, 427-29,
945 A.2d 1004 (robbery in first degree), cert. denied,
287 Conn. 914, 950 A.2d 1290 (2008); State v. Leggett,
94 Conn. App. 392, 405-407, 892 A.2d 1000 (robbery in
second degree), cert. denied, 278 Conn. 911, 899 A.2d

393

89 (2006). Moreover, there can be no question that the
legislature intended robbery to be a predicate felony
for purposes of felony murder. Section 53a-54c provides
in relevant part: “A person is guilty of murder when,
acting either alone or with one or more persons, he
comunits or attempts to commit robbery [or other speci-
fied crimes] . . . and, in the course of and in further-
ance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or another
participant, if any, causes the death of a person other
than one of the participants . . . .” Therefore, the trial
court properly could instruct the jury that a verdict of
guilty of robbery in the first degree can provide the
predicate for criminal liability under § 53a-54c.

Indeed, convicting the defendant of felony murder
on the basis of his vicarious liability for the underlying
robbery is consistent with the legislature’s intent as
expressed in § 53a-54c and the principles underlying
the Pinkerton doctrine. Section 53a-54c reflects a legis-
lative determination that certain crimes, such as rob-
bery, create a foreseeable risk of death to a victim of,
or bystander to, the crime and, accordingly, imposes
criminal liability not only on the person who caused
the death, but also on any other participant to the under-
lying felony. See State v. Rossi, 132 Conn. 39, 44, 42
A.2d 354 (1945) (“crimes against the person like robbery

. . are, in common experience, likely to involve dan-
ger to life in the event of resistance by the victim or
the attempt of the perpetrator to make good his escape
and conceal his identity”), overruled in part on other
grounds by State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 123, 75
A.2d 67 (1950). Similarly, the Pinkerton doctrine
embodies this principle of liability for foreseeable con-
sequences of criminal acts. “Under the Pinkerton doc-
trine . . . a conspirator may be held liable for criminal
offenses committed by a coconspirator that are within
the scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it,
and are reasonably foreseeable as anecessary or natural

_ ia

consequence of the conspiracy. . . . The rationale for
the principle is that, when the conspirator [has] played
a necessary part in setting in motion a discrete course
of criminal conduct, he should be held responsible,
within appropriate limits, for the crimes committed as
anatural and probable result of that course of conduct.”
Qnternal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coward,
292 Conn. 296, 307-308, 972 A.2d 691 (2009).

“We also have concluded, however, that there may
be occasions when it would be unreasonable to hold a
defendant criminally liable for offenses committed by
his coconspirators even though the state has demon-
strated technical compliance with the Pinkerton rule.
... For example, a factual scenario may be envisioned
in which the nexus between the defendant’s role in the
conspiracy and the illegal conduct of a coconspirator
is so attenuated or remote, notwithstanding the fact
that the latter’s actions were a natural consequence of
the unlawful agreement, that it would be unjust to hold
the defendant responsible for the criminal conduct of
his coconspirator. In such a case, a Pinkerton charge
would not be appropriate.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 309.

In the present case, the defendant does not contend
that the evidence precluded the jury from finding that
the robbery and murder of Bruno was reasonably fore-
seeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the
conspiracy to rob him. Nor does the defendant contend
that the evidence established that his role in the robbery
was so attenuated from the murder that it would be
unjust to hold him criminally responsible for the actions
of Hankerson and Davila in causing Bruno’s death.
Indeed, the jury reasonably could have credited testi-
mony asserting that the defendant had given Davila the
gun that Davila brandished during the robbery and that
the defendant did not intervene when Hankerson and
Davila struggled with Bruno. Thus, “[w]hen the defen-

395

dant has played a necessary part in setting in motion
a discrete course of criminal conduct . . . he cannot
reasonably complain that it is unfair to hold him vicari-
ously liable, under the Pinkerton doctrine, for the natu-
ral and probable results of that conduct that, although
he did not intend, he should have foreseen.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Col-
therst, supra, 263 Conn. 499.

The defendant's contention that a person “commits”
robbery for purposes of felony murder only if that per-
son is a principal or accomplice to the robbery lacks
any legal or textual support. Notably, General Statutes
§ 58a-133 uses that very term when defining robbery:
“A person commits robbery when, in the course of
committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immedi-
ate use of physical force upon another person for the
purpose of: (1) Preventing or overcoming resistance to
the taking of the property or to the retention thereof
immediately after the taking; or (2) compelling the
owner of such property or another person to deliver
up the property or to engage in other conduct which
aids in the commission of the larceny.” (Emphasis
added.) As we previously have noted, a defendant may
be found guilty of robbery under a Pinkerton theory of
vicarious liability. Therefore, a guilty verdict on that
charge, under whatever theory, means that the defen-
dant has “commit[ted]” robbery, which in turn is a pred-
icate felony for purposes of § 53a-54c.

To the extent that the defendant relies on our reason-
ing in State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 886 A.2d 777
(2005), to yield a different result, his reliance is mis-
placed. In Patterson, the defendant had claimed that
the trial court improperly concluded that he was subject
to a mandatory five year sentence enhancement pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 53-202k because the jury had
failed to make the requisite finding under that statute
that he had “used” a firearm during the commission of

396

the crime of conspiracy to commit murder. Id., 473-74.
The state had conceded that the jury made no such
finding but had argued that the facts that the jury actu-
ally found, namely, that one of the defendant’s cocon-
spirators had used a firearm during the commission of
the offense, were sufficient to warrant the imposition
of a sentence enhancement under § 53-202k. Id., 474.
Because this court previously had determined that an
unarmed accomplice to a class A, B or C felony may
be found to have violated § 53-202k on the basis of his
or her accomplice’s use of a firearm, the state had
argued that this principle should be extended to cocon-
spirators under the Pinkerton doctrine. Id., 482. In
rejecting that argument, this court principally relied on
the fact that, “at the time § 53-202k was enacted in 1993;
see Public Acts 1993, No. 93-306, § 9; the Pinkerton
doctrine of vicarious liability was not well established
in our state criminal law. Indeed, this court did not
expressly adopt the Pinkerton doctrine for purposes
of our state criminal law until 1993 . . . the very year
that § 53-202k was enacted. Thus, unlike accessorial
liability, which, as a common-law and statutory rule,
was firmly rooted in this state’s criminal jurisprudence
prior to the enactment of § 53-202k, Pinkerton liability
was not an acknowledged part of that body of law when.
§ 53-202k was enacted. Consequently, there is no reason
to presume that the legislature contemplated that the
Pinkerton principle of vicarious liability would apply
to § 53-202k.” State v. Patterson, supra, 482-83,

Whatever the merits of this reasoning might be as
applied to a sentence enhancement statute, it plainly
does not categorically bar the application of Pinkerton
liability to any substantive offense enacted prior to
1993, such as § 53a-54c. Under such reasoning, Pinker-
ton liability would not apply to our Penal Code, which
‘was codified in 1969; see Public Acts 1969, No. 828; and
our case law clearly is to the contrary. See State v.

397

Walion, supra, 227 Conn. 44-45 (“Although the Pinker-
ton principle does not appear in haec verba in the
[P]enal [C]ode, that lacuna is not determinative in this
case, because [General Statutes] § 53a-4 of the code
provides: ‘The provisions of this chapter shall not be
construed as precluding any court from recognizing
other principles of criminal liability or other defenses
not inconsistent with such provisions.’ .. . The issue,
therefore, is whether the principle should be recognized
as a, matter of policy under the circumstances of this
case.” [Citation omitted.]). Moreover, this court has
recognized that “application of the Pinkerton principle
to ahomicide committed in furtherance of a conspiracy
has long been part of our jurisprudence. See, e.g., State
v. Young, 191 Conn. 636, 642, 469 A.2d 1189 (1983);
State v. McCarthy, 133 Conn. 171, 173, 49 A.2d 594
(1946); State v. Rossi, [supra, 132 Conn. 44]. State v.
Walton, supra, [50-51]. Indeed, even prior to Pinkerton,
we had employed a rule of vicarious criminal liability
under which a coconspirator could be held liable for
a murder if that crime was the natural and probable
consequence of a common plan and was committed
while acting in pursuance of, or in furtherance of, the
common design. . . . State v. Cots, 126 Conn. 48, 59,
9 A.2d 138 (1939).” Gnternal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 528-29, 679 A.2d 902
(1996). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
properly instructed the jury on the felony murder count.

B

The defendant next claims that he was deprived of
a fair trial due to the trial court’s failure to respond
adequately to the jury’s request for further instructions
on conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree.
Specifically, the defendant contends that, because the
trial court merely restated its initial instruction, it failed
to comply with Practice Book § 42-27. The defendant
concedes that this claim is unpreserved, but seeks Gold-

398

ing review or to prevail under the plain error doctrine.
We agree that the defendant is entitled to review, but
conclude that the record does not establish that the
trial court’s actions deprived him of a fair trial.

The record reveals the following additional undis-
puted facts. The trial court provided a written copy of
its instructions to the jury. Sixteen pages pertained to
count four of the information, conspiracy to commit
robbery in the first degree—seven pages specifically
related to the elements of conspiracy, and nine pages
related to the elements of robbery in the first degree
as the crime that was the alleged objective of the con-
spiracy. On the third day of deliberations, the jury sent
out a note that provided: “We are divided on one charge,
count [four]. Could you please clarify in [lJayman’s
terms [c]onspiracy charge count [four]. If we are dead-
locked on one charge, [c]an we still proceed on the
other three?”

After discussing the matter with the parties, the court
noted on the record that, although this particular
instruction was lengthy, the court was “not going to
get into what’s layman’s terms, what’s not layman’s
terms.” The court brought the jury in and stated in
pertinent part as follows: “I realize that the conspiracy,
basically, count four, is a fairly lengthy instruction, but
I want to remind you, and you have the jury instructions
with you, that § 53a-48a [a] of our statutes provides as
follows: A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with
intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed,
he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or
cause the performance of such conduct, and any one
of them commits an overt act in pursuance to such con-
spiracy.

“Now, the state must prove the following elements
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant
intended to commit the crime of robbery in the first

399

degree, as will be defined and was defined in the instruc-
tions; and (2) an agreement with one or more persons
to engage in or cause the performance of the crime of
robbery in the first degree; and (8) the commission of
an overt act in pursuance of the agreement by any one
or more of the persons who made the agreement; and
obviously, the court further instructed you, explaining
in detail not only the elements, but other instructions
within count four of the instructions .. . .

“Now, if there is a specific term or section of the
instruction that you would want clarified, please write
me a note as to what that specific section or part is
and I'll do my best, if I can, to respond to that inquiry,
that note... .

“So, I'm giving you two requests. One is a clarification
on what you mean by ‘proceed’ and then a second
clarification or request, if you need it, on what specific
section of the count four instruction you would want,
me to explain or clarify, if I can.”

Shortly thereafter, the jury submitted a note to the
court in response to what it meant by “proceed” but
did not make a request for a specific clarification on
the conspiracy count. Later that afternoon, the jury
reached its verdict.

Practice Book § 42-27 provides: “If the jury, after
retiring for deliberations, requests additional instruc-
tions, the judicial authority, after providing notice to
the parties and an opportunity for suggestions by coun-
sel, shall recall the jury to the courtroom and give addi-
tional instructions necessary to respond properly to the
request or to direct the jury’s attention to a portion of
the original instructions.” Although this court has held
that “[c]larification of the instructions when the jury
or one of its members manifests confusion about the
law is mandatory”; (internal quotation marks omitted)
State v. Fletcher, 207 Conn. 191, 193, 540 A.2d. 370 (1988);

400

as § 42-27 clearly indicates, not every such request will
require the court to explain its initial instructions in
different terms.

We conclude that the trial court did not violate its
obligations by declining to rephrase the entire conspir-
acy instruction in laypersons’ terms. Given the length
of the instructions, the trial court properly summarized.
the essential elements of the crime as provided by stat-
ute to focus the jury’s attention on the appropriate
framework for its deliberations and encouraged the jury
to submit a note indicating any particular aspect or
aspects of the instructions that it wanted clarified. The
jury declined to do so, and nothing subsequent to the
jury’s submission of the note indicates that it was con-
fused about the law. Indeed, the defendant never has
contended that these instructions were improper or
inherently ambiguous; in fact, the defendant declined
to take advantage of § 42-27, which afforded him the
opportunity to make specific suggestions in response to
the jury’s request for additional instructions. Moreover,
this is not a case in which the jury sought clarification
on a specific legal issue, as in the cases from other
jurisdictions on which the defendant relies. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nunez, 889 F.2d 1564, 1568 (6th Cir.
1989) (The Court of Appeals concluded that it was
improper for the trial court to reiterate the entire con-
spiracy instruction when the jury sought a clarification
as to the specific issue of whether a law enforcement
officer could be a coconspirator: “When a jury seeks
clarification of particular issues . . . the judge should
clear away its difficulties with concrete accuracy. . . .
When a jury indicates confusion about an important
legal issue, it is not sufficient for the court to rely on
more general statements in its prior charge.” [Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]); State v.
Bryant, 5 Kan. App. 2d 114, 115, 612 P.2d 1255 (1980)
(concluding that it was improper for trial court to

401

restate cursory definition of self-defense in response
to jury’s question as to whether self-defense instruction
applied to only defendant, or plaintiff, or both because,
“Tw]hile [the instruction] accurately states the law of
self-defense, standing alone it gives the jury no guidance
as to how it is to be applied”). Under the facts of the
present case, in the absence of further communication
from the jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in responding to the jury’s request.

Cc

Finally, we briefly address the defendant’s claim that
his due process rights were violated because the trial
court’s instructions on conspiracy to commit robbery
in the first degree were misleading. The defendant con-
tends that the instructions improperly permitted the
jury to find him guilty on that count if it determined
that he had committed either conspiracy to commit
robbery in the first degree, a class B felony, or the lesser
included offense of conspiracy to commit robbery in
the third degree, a class D felony. Compare General
Statutes § 53a-134 with General Statutes § 53a-136. He
did not take exception to this instruction, but seeks
Golding review of his claim. We conclude that the
defendant cannot prevail on this claim.

As we previously have noted, “the applicable stan-
dard of review is whether there is a reasonable possibil-
ity that the jury was misled in reaching its verdict.”
Cauternal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montanez,
277 Conn. 735, 742, 894 A.2d 928 (2006). We agree with
the defendant that the specific language that he has
highlighted, read in isolation, suggested that the jury
could find him guilty on count four on the basis of
robbery in either the first degree or third degree. It is
well settled, however, that “[t]he whole charge must
be considered from the standpoint of its effect on the
[jurors] in guiding them to the proper verdict . . . and

402

not critically dissected in a microscopic search for pos-
sible error.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Peeler, supra, 271 Conn. 360-61; accord State v.
Heinemann, 282 Conn. 281, 300, 920 A.2d 278 (2007)
C[t]he charge is to be read as a whole and individual
instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation
from the overall charge” [internal quotation marks omit-
ted]). When considering the instructions in their
entirety, it is evident that the court repeatedly directed
the jury to return a verdict of guilty on count four
only if it concluded that the state had proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had conspired
to commit robbery in the first degree. The jury was to
consider conspiracy to commit robbery in the third
degree only if it concluded that the defendant was not
guilty on count four, conspiracy to commit robbery in
the first degree. The jury’s affirmative responses to the
clerk’s question, the collective jury poll and the individ-
ual poll, each of which inquired as to the jury's verdict
on count four “charging the defendant with conspiracy
to commit robbery in the first degree”; (emphasis
added); further underscore that the jury reasonably
could not have found the defendant guilty on that count
on the basis of conspiracy to commit robbery in the
third degree.

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., ET AL. v.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ET AL.
(SC 18525)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan,
Eveleigh and Harper, Js.

403

Argued September 6, 2011—officially released January 17, 2012

405

Steven B. Kaplan, with whom was Paul R. Fitzgerald,
for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Darren P. Cunningham, assistant attorney general,
with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal,
former attorney general, for the appellees (named
defendant et al.).

Frank G. Usseglio and John T. Fussell, with whom
were Karen K. Clark and Glenn A. Duhl, and, on the
brief, Robert M. Cheverie and Gary F. Sheldon, for the
appellees (defendant city of Hartford et al.).

Opinion

ZARELLA, J. The principal issue in this appeal is
whether the nonunion plaintiffs, Electrical Contractors,
Inc. (ECD, and six of its individual employees, have
standing to challenge prebid specifications requiring
the successful bidder on two state financed school con-
struction projects? in the city of Hartford to perform
all project work with union labor under the terms of a
project labor agreement (PLA). The plaintiffs claim that
the trial court incorrectly concluded that (1) ECI lacked
standing, pursuant to this court’s decision in Connecti-
cut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, 251
Conn. 169, 740 A.2d 813 (1999) (Associated Builders &
Contractors), to challenge the PLA requirement and the
rejection of its lowest, responsible, qualified bids on
the two construction projects after ECI refused to sign
and be bound by the mandatory PLA, (2) the PLA
requirement did not violate the applicable competitive
bidding laws, General Statutes §§ 4a-100, 4b-91, 4b-92

1 The six individual plaintiffs, none-of whom wish to join, pay dues or be
required to support the political activities of the local electrical workers
union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, are Jose L.
Gonzalez, Jose G. Maldonado, Dan Czyzewski, Bradley Wheaton, Craig Busca
and Sean Smith.

*"The two Hartford schools are Capital Preparatory Magnet School and
Annie Fisher Magnet School.

406

and 10-287, (8) the individual plaintiffs did not have
standing under article first, §§ 1, 4, 5 and 20, of the
Connecticut constitution to challenge the PLA require-
ment, and (4) ECI did not have standing to prosecute
its claim that the PLA requirement was in violation of
the Connecticut Antitrust Act, General Statutes § 35-
24 et seq. The defendants, the city of Hartford (city),
Morganti Group, Inc., Downes Construction Company,
LLC, Custom Electric, Inc.,? the state department of
education (department), and Mark K. McQuillan, the
commissioner of education,’ who allegedly approved
the challenged contracts on behalf of the state,® disagree
with the plaintiffs and raise two alternative grounds for
affirmance, namely, that the plaintiffs’ claims are (1)
preempted by federal labor law, and (2) barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. We affirm in part and
reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

I
FACTS

The following relevant facts are set forth in the trial
court's memorandum of decision. “A PLA is a prehire
collective bargaining agreement which requires all con-
tractors and subcontractors on a construction project

® The city imposed the specifications and enforced the PLA requirement
against ECI in rejecting its low bids. Morganti Group, Inc., and Downes
Construction Company, LLC, served as the city’s construction managers on
the projects.

Werefer to the city, Morganti Group, Inc., Downes Construction Company,
LLC, and Custom Electric, Inc., collectively as the nonstate defendants.

‘We refer to the department and McQuillan collectively as the state
defendants.

Dicin Electric Company also was named as a defendant. The plaintiffs,
however, subsequently withdrew their claims against Dicin Electric
Company.

5 The state provided 90 percent of the financing for the school construc-
tion projects.

® The federal preemption claim is raised by the nonstate defendants. The
sovereign immunity claim is raised by the state defendants.

407

to comply with the terms of all existing collective bar-
gaining agreements with unions representing workers
from the trades performing work on the project and
requires all project workers to join the unions for their
respective trades, to remain members in good standing
of such unions, and not to strike while the project is
under construction.’ The PLAs . . . at issue share
these essential features, although they set aside 15 per-
cent of all work on each project for minority-owned
. . . and/or women-owned . . . business enterprises,
which are not bound by the PLAs.®. . .

7 See Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra,
251 Conn. 176 (describing PLA in that case as prehire agreement signed by
construction manager, local unions and contractors for purpose of enhancing
timely completion of project without interruption or delay through establish-
ment of framework for labor-management cooperation and stability, with
terms remaining in full force and effect throughout project, contractors
agreeing to abide by collective bargaining agreements of trade unions, includ-
ing making contributions to employee benefit trust funds and recognizing
trade unions as sole collective bargaining representatives of employees
working on project, and unions agreeing not to engage in any strike, slow-
down or other disruption of work, but not requiring all project workers to
be members of union); cf. New York State Chapter, Inc., Associated General
Contractors of America v. New York State Thruway Authority, 88 N.Y.2d
56, 65, 666 N.E.2d 185, 643 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1996) (“{A] PLA is a prebid contract
between a construction project owner and a labor union [or unions] estab-
lishing the union as the collective bargaining representative for all persons
who will perform work on the project. The PLA provides that only contrac-
tors and subcontractors who sign a prenegotiated agreement with the union
can perform project work, A PLA thus generally requires all bidders on the
project to hire workers through the union hiring halls; follow specified
dispute resolution procedures; comply with union wage, benefit, seniority,
apprenticeship and other rules; and contribute to the union benefit funds.
In retum for a project owner's promise to insist in its specifications that
all successful bidders agree to be covered by a PLA, the union promises
labor peace through the life of the contract . . . .” [Citation omitted.]).

® The challenged PLAs in the present case, which are described in detail in
paragraphs twenty-eight through thirty-six of the plaintiffs’ second amended
complaint, required that the successful bidder on each project “draw all of
its field labor through referrals from a designated trade union, or that its
{nonunion] employees must first join a designated trade union, as a prerequi-
site to executing a contract and performing the subject work.” The PLAs
also required, inter alia, that the successful bidder (1) abide by the “ ‘Project
Work Rules for the Greater Hartford-New Britain Building and Construction
‘Trade Council and its affiliated [uJnions and the [cJity of Hartford, Hartford
Public Schools Construction, Renovations and Additions Program’ dated
[April 14, 2004],” (2) ensure that all of its field employees working on each
project remain members in good standing of the relevant union during the
term of the applicable PLA, (3) agree to participate in a “Labor Management

“In their complaint, the plaintiffs [sought] several
types of declaratory, injunctive and other extraordinary
relief? in connection with the projects . . . at issue
based upon the common underlying claim that the city’s
imposition of mandatory PLAs upon successful bidders
on those and similar state-financed construction proj-
ects is illegal. . . .

Cooperative Committee” and “submit to and comply with all rulings promul-
gated by [that committee and by] the PLA’s Joint Administrative Council,”
(4) pay wages and fringe benefits to all workers on the project in accordance
with the prevailing union scale, (5) recognize the building trades council
andits affiliated local unions as the sole and exclusive bargaining representa-
tives for building trades mechanics and laborers employed on the projects
and covered by their respective PLAs, (6) pay any person referred by the
union whom it rejected for work on the project, as was its right, for
“ Seporting time’ ” even though the rejected person had performed no work
‘on the project, and (7) deduct union dues from each field employee's pay
and send it to the union on a monthly basis.

* The trial court described the requested relief as follows: “In particular,
[the plaintiffs sought] (1) [a declaration] that the imposition of mandatory
PLAS, by or on behalf of the city, on projects approved and funded by
the state defendants is illegal and improper insofar as PLAs restrict the
performance of work on the projects, in whole or in part, to union member
employees, union-referred employees, union contractors or PLA signatory
contractors, (2) a [declaration] that the imposition of a mandatory PLA, by
or on behalf of a public owner, that restricts the performance of work to
union member employees, union-referred employees, union contractors or
PLA signatory contractors for any municipal school construction project
that is funded, in whole or in part, with state funds, [under] . . . § 10-287,
is illegal, (8) [a declaration] that ECI’s bids on the two projects were the
lowest qualified responsible bids, and thus that the city’s rejection of those
bids, based upon ECT’s refusal to agree to PLAs, was illegal and improper,
(4) writs of mandamus ordering the city to award and execute contracts
for the electrical work on each of the two projects to ECI, (5) an injunction
ordering the city and its construction managers not to execute any contract
to perform electrical work on either of the two projects with any other
contractor than ECI, (6) an injunction ordering the state defendants not to
provide any funds in furtherance of the work on the two projects by any
other electrical contractor than ECI, (7) a writ of mandamus ordering the
state defendants to withhold funds in furtherance of the work on the two
projects by any electrical contractor other than ECI, and (8) a writ of
mandamus ordering the state defendants to withhold any funds in further-
ance of work performed on any school construction project that is funded,
in whole or in part, with state funds, [pursuant to] . . . § 10-287, for which
a mandatory PLA of the type . . . at issue has been imposed. In addition
to the foregoing, the plaintiffs [sought] the following types of monetary
relief: (1) from the . . . city, damages under General Statutes § 35-34 for
ECI’s lost profits and bid preparation costs on the two projects and for the
individual plaintiffs’ lost wages and benefits, plus treble damages, reasonable
attorney's fees and costs under General Statutes § 95-35, and (2) from all
but the state defendants, such other monetary relief as is allowable by law,

409

“After this case was filed in [the trial] court, the
defendants successfully petitioned for its removal to
the United States District Court [for the District of Con-
necticut] so that [the] federal constitutional claims . . .
could be adjudicated in a federal forum. Upon its
removal, the case was assigned to [Judge] Stefan
Underhill, before whom the parties presented oral argu-
ments after submitting extensive briefs on comprehen-
sive motions to dismiss” all counts of the plaintiffs’
then operative first amended complaint." At the conclu-
sion of oral argument, Judge Underhill dismissed all
of the plaintiffs’ federal claims, declined to exercise
jurisdiction over their pendent state claims, and ordered
that the case be remanded to [the trial] court for further
proceedings. Left undecided in this process, with the
express intention that [the trial] court should decide
them on remand, were the defendants’ jurisdictional
challenges to the plaintiffs’ state law claims.

“After the case was remanded, the [trial] court met
with counsel to establish a procedure for identifying
those jurisdictional challenges that remained to be adju-
dicated, claiming such challenges for a hearing, and
filing supplemental briefs thereon. Upon receipt of the
parties’ claims for hearing and supplemental briefs,
which incorporated by reference all relevant portions
of the briefs they had previously filed in federal court,
the [trial] court heard oral argument on all challenges

including but not limited to lost profits, bid preparation costs, reasonable
attorney's fees and costs.”

“These included the motion to dismiss, dated March 27, 2009, filed by
the city, Downes Construction Company, LLC, and Morganti Group, Inc.,
the motion to dismiss, dated March 27, 2009, filed by Dicin Electric Company
and Custom Electric, Inc., and the motion to dismiss, dated April 17, 2009,
filed by the department before McQuillan was joined as a defendant on June
15, 2009. Two separate stipulations of facts, one entered into by the city
and the plaintiffs and another entered into by the department and the plain-
tiffs also were filed with the United States District Court on February 27,
2009, in connection with this action.

"The plaintiffs filed the currently operative second amended complaint
on May 20, 2009, following remand by Judge Underhill to the Connecticut
Superior Court.

410

claimed for hearing on July 3, 2009. For the purpose of
that hearing, the parties agreed that all documents and.
materials submitted by any party could be considered
parts of the evidentiary record upon which to decide
the contested issues presented on the pending motions.

“The defendants, in their motions [to dismiss] . . .
challenged [the trial] court’s subject matter jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs’ state law claims on three separate
grounds. First, they claim[ed] that the plaintiffs lack[ed]
standing to bring a bid protest under settled principles
of Connecticut common law, as most recently applied
. . . in [Associated Builders & Contractors] ....
Second, the state defendants argue[d] that the plaintiffs’
claims against them [were] barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity because such claims do not rest
upon allegations which, if proved, would establish that
their conduct in this case was clearly in excess of their
statutory authority. Third, all defendants join[ed] in
claiming that the plaintiffs’ general challenge to the use
of PLAs in state funded municipal school construction.
projects [was] preempted by federal labor law, which
has long approved of their use [in] public construc-
tion projects.”

Following the hearing, the trial court agreed with the
defendants that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that
the action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. In its memorandum of decision, the court
concluded that ECI had failed to make a colorable claim
that the PLA requirement effectuated fraud, corruption,
favoritism or otherwise undermined the objective or
integrity of the competitive bidding process under the
common-law principles articulated in Associated Build-
ers & Contractors. The court also concluded that the
individual plaintiffs did not have standing because they
were not prequalified electrical contractors and had
“neither bid on either project nor could have done so
....” Accordingly, the trial court granted the defen-

411

dants’ motions to dismiss without reaching or deciding
the alternative grounds advanced in support of their
motions. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed to the
Appellate Court from the trial court’s judgment, and
the appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to
General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.

I
STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery
in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the cause
of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest.
in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . When
standing is put in issue, the question is whether the
person whose standing is challenged is a proper party
to request an adjudication of the issue . . . . Standing
requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a
[party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing by allega-
tions of injury. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to
vindicate arguably protected interests. . . .

“Standing is established by showing that the party
claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is
classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for
determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled
twofold determination: first, the party claiming
aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific,
personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of
the challenged action], as distinguished from a general
interest, such as is the concern of all members of the
community as a whole. Second, the party claiming
aggrievement must successfully establish that this spe-
cific personal and legal interest has been specially and
injuriously affected by the [challenged action]. . . .
Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as
distinguished from a certainty, that some legally pro-

412

tected interest . . . has been adversely affected.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) May v. Coffey, 291
Conn. 106, 112, 967 A.2d 495 (2009).

In the context of competitive bidding, it is well estab-
lished that an unsuccessful bidder on a state or munici-
pal contract has no contractual right under the common
law that would afford standing to challenge the award
of a contract. Connecticut Associated Builders & Con-
tractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 178. “[A] bid,
even the lowest responsible one, submitted in response
to an invitation for bids is only an offer which, until
accepted by the municipality, does not give rise to a
contract between the parties. . . . An unsuccessful
bidder, therefore, has no legal or equitable right in the
contract. Not unlike any other person whose offer has
been rejected, the disappointed bidder has no right to
judicial intervention. . . .

“Moreover, no statute grants unsuccessful bidders
standing to challenge the award of a state contract.
. . . In particular, state and local competitive bidding
laws have not been enacted in order to protect bidders.
These laws serve to guard against abuses in the award
of contracts such as favoritism, fraud or corruption and
are enacted solely for the benefit of the public and in no
sense create any rights in those who submit bids. . . .

‘Despite these substantial constraints, we have rec-
ognized a limited exception to the rules of standing in
order to provide a means of protecting the public’s
interest in properly implemented competitive bidding
processes. . . . Under this exception, unsuccessful
bidders have standing to challenge the award of a public
contract where fraud, corruption or acts undermining
the objective and integrity of the bidding process
existed .. . . [S]uch a suit is brought by one who suf-
fers injury as a result of the illegal activity, but the suit
itself is brought in the public interest by one acting

413

essentially as a private attorney general.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 178-80.

“Our policy to limit standing so as to deny some
claims brought by unsuccessful and precluded bidders
is designed to protect twin goals that serve the public
interest in various, sometimes conflicting, ways. The
standing rules aim to strike the proper balance between
fulfilling the purposes of the competitive bidding stat-
utes and preventing frequent litigation that might result
in extensive delay in the commencement and comple-
tion of government projects to the detriment of the
public.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 180.

Finally, because the issue of standing implicates sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, it may be a proper basis for
granting a motion to dismiss. E.g., May v. Coffey, supra,
291 Conn. 113; see Practice Book § 10-31 (a) (1). “The
standard of review for a court's decision on a motion
to dismiss is well settled. A motion to dismiss tests,
inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court
is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the court’s
ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination]
of the motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . When
a... court decides a jurisdictional question raised
by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the
allegations of the complaint in their most favorable
light. . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts
to be those alleged in the complaint, including those
facts necessarily implied from the allegations, constru-
ing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.
. .. The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which
are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must
be decided upon that alone.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 200-201, 994
A.2d 106 (2010). “[I]t is the burden of the party who
seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . .
clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper

414

party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.””
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) May v. Coffey,
supra, 113. Mindful of these principles, we address each
of the plaintiffs’ claims in turn.

tl
ANALYSIS
A
Standing of ECI

ECI first claims that the trial court incorrectly con-
cluded that it lacked standing to challenge the imposi-
tion of the PLA requirement and the rejection of its
lowest, responsible, qualified bids for the school con-
struction projects. ECI specifically claims that the trial
court misapplied this court’s narrow holding in Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors that the plaintiffs did not
have standing because they had not bid on the project,
as ECI had done in the present case. In addition, ECI
claims that the court in Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors never considered the cost effects on the public
bidding process of disqualifying nonunion contractors
and workers, who constitute 90 percent of the local
electrical workforce and 80 percent of the overall con-
struction workforce, and never ruled on the discrimina-
tory effects of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the PLA
requirement. ECI further claims that the trial court in
the present case disregarded the extensive factual
record before it, including “overwhelming evidence”
that the effect of the PLA requirement was to exclude
nonunion contractors and employees from working on
the projects, and did not properly consider that ECI
was the lowest, responsible qualified bidder. In this
regard, ECI maintains that the complaint and accompa-
nying affidavits set forth numerous ways in which the

"Tn the present case, additional facts also were entered into evidence.
See part I of this opinion; see also footnote 17 of this opinion.

415

PLA requirement discriminated against ECI and other
nonunion contractors and caused them to suffer spe-
cific, actionable harm by effectively barring them from
working on the projects.

The nonstate defendants respond” that ECI’s claim
as to the validity of the PLA requirement is virtually
identical to the claim that was unsuccessfully raised by
the plaintiffs in Associated Builders & Contractors and
that ECI’s attempt to distinguish the present case from
that and other Connecticut precedent is without merit.
In particular, the nonstate defendants argue that Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors determined that cost is
not a factor to be considered in deciding whether the
competitive bidding laws are undermined. They further
argue that neither ECI nor other nonunion contractors
presented evidence that the PLA requirement prevented
nonunion contractors from bidding or working on the
projects by making it economically unfeasible for them
to do so. The nonstate defendants thus contend that
ECI has failed to prove that it has standing because it
did not establish that the PLA requirement was used
to perpetuate fraud, corruption, favoritism or conduct
that undermines the objective and integrity of the com-
petitive bidding process. We agree with ECI that the
trial court incorrectly concluded that it did not have
standing.

Because our analysis of this claim requires us to
consider how the trial court interpreted and applied
Associated Builders & Contractors, we divide the fol-
lowing discussion into three parts. In the first part, we
review the reasoning in Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors. We next consider how the trial court applied Asso-
ciated Builders & Contractors in the present case and
explain why we disagree with the trial court’s conclu-
sions. We finally examine the sufficiency of the plain-

8 The state defendants did not respond to this claim.

416

tiffs’ allegations that the PLA requirement was used to
perpetuate fraud, corruption, favoritism or other con-
duct that undermined the objective and integrity of the
competitive bidding process.

1
Associated Builders & Contractors

We begin with the reasoning in Associated Builders &
Contractors. The trial court’s decision was based
almost entirely on its interpretation of that case, in
which this court concluded that the plaintiffs did not
have standing. The plaintiffs were a trade association
of contractors and subcontractors (association) and
two individual subcontractors who sought to enjoin
the defendant, the city of Hartford, from awarding a
contract for the construction of a municipal parking
garage. Connecticut Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 171. The association
claimed that, but for a PLA requirement in the bid speci-
fications, some of its contractor members would have
submitted bids on the project. Id., 177. The defendant
subsequently sought to dismiss the complaint on juris-
dictional grounds, alleging that the plaintiffs lacked
standing. Id., 174.

At the outset of its decision, the court described the
principal issue as “whether nonbidding contractors and
subcontractors“ ha[d] standing to challenge a bid speci-
fication for a municipal project that require[d] the suc-
cessful bidder to agree to abide by a [PLA].” Id., 170-71.
It then determined that the nonbidding general contrac-
tors, who were represented by the association, did not
have standing to file the complaint. Id., 185, 186. The
court explained: “In order to have standing, a general
contractor member would have had to establish a color-

4 We note that one of the plaintiffs in Associated Builders & Contractors
was ECL See Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford,
supra, 251 Conn. 171.

417

able claim that: (1) either it bid on the project, or it
would have submitted an equivalent bid, but for the
[PLA] requirement; and (2) inclusion of the [PLA]
requirement effectuated fraud, corruption, favoritism
or other acts undermining the objective and integrity
of the bidding process.” Id., 186. The court stated that.
the plaintiffs had not established that the general con-
tractor members of the association had met either part
of the test because, “[w]ith respect to the first part,
the association did not show that any of its general
contractor members had bid on the project or would
have bid on the project. . . . The association cannot,
therefore, invoke the standing of its general contractor
members as a basis for its own standing to pursue its
challenge to the validity of the [PLA] requirement.” Id.
After concluding that the association had not satisfied
this foundational, or threshold, element, the court deter-
mined that, “[e]ven if this foundational element had
been met by testimony of the association’s general con-
tractor members that they would have bid, but for the
[PLA] specification, the association still cannot prevail
under the second part of the standing test.” Id., 186-87.

With respect to the second part of the test, the associ-
ation had claimed that the PLA requirement “arbitrarily
and anticompetitively limit[ed] access to the bidding
process” because it “imposed costs [on] nonunion gen-
eral contracts that made it economically unfeasible for
them to bid,” and, therefore, it violated “the integrity
of competitive bidding . . . [and] injur[ed] the general
public by driving up the cost of government funded
projects.” Id., 187. The court disagreed, explaining that,
“[e]ven assuming that the [PLA] requirement might
increase the project’s cost, we know of no requirement
in the competitive bidding statutes that propels cost
considerations to the top of the list of appropriate con-
siderations for public contract specifications. If cost
alone were the determinative factor of appropriate bid

418

criteria, disappointed bidders or nonbidders would
have virtually unlimited opportunities to litigate project
specifications on the ground of alternate designs, mate-
rials, safety requirements and so on. Such litigation
would involve courts in comparative cost assessments
that would severely impair the discretion of governmen-
tal bodies entrusted with the responsibility for govern-
mental construction projects. It is neither unusual nor
unfair for project specifications to give some potential
bidders an economic advantage over others because of
factors such as the bidder’s expertise, specialization
and reliability.” Id., 187-88.

The court elaborated that the record failed to show
that cost considerations had precluded nonunion gen-
eral contractors from participating in the bidding pro-
cess, stating in a footnote that “the plaintiffs ha[d]
provided no explanation as to how the alleged increased
expense to some potential bidders would raise the costs
of the overall project. An increase in costs in one aspect
of a project can equally well result in overall cost sav-
ings for the project. By avoiding labor disruption and
maintaining a supply of skilled workers, as the project
construction manager testified the [PLA] was designed
to do, the [PLA] could reduce overall costs. The record
. . . does not, in fact, support the association’s claim
that cost considerations precluded nonunion general
contractors from participating in the bidding process.
Two of the five bidders were nonunion contractors.
The association presented no testimony to support its
claim that government projects using [PLAs] had higher
total costs than other similar projects without [a PLA].”
Id., 187 n.12. The court thus concluded that the associa-
tion had failed to make “a colorable factual showing”
to support its claim of economic disadvantage. Id., 187.
The court stated that the “the record . . . demon-
strates a nondiscriminatory decision by the [defendant]
to use a [PLA]”; id., 188; and that the “determinative

419

factor” in a bidding challenge was “whether the require-
ments in that process had been applied consistently
and in good faith.” Id., 189.

2

Trial Court’s Application of Associated
Builders & Contractors

In relying on Associated Builders & Contractors
when granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss ECI’s
claim with respect to the competitive bidding statutes,
the trial court initially acknowledged that none of the
plaintiffs in that case had satisfied the threshold require-
ment of demonstrating that they had bid on the project
or would have bid on the project but for the PLA require-
ment. The trial court then concluded that the court in
Associated Builders & Contractors had reached the
merits of the plaintiffs’ claim by considering whether
inclusion of the PLA requirement in the prebid specifica-
tions had “ ‘effectuated fraud, corruption, favoritism or
other acts undermining the objective and integrity of
the bidding process’” through the imposition of costs
on nonunion contractors that made it economically
unfeasible for them to bid. Referring to the statements
in Associated Builders & Contractors that cost consid-
erations were not “ ‘[at] the top of the list of appropriate
considerations for public contract specifications’ ” and
that the defendant’s decision to use a PLA was nondis-
criminatory and within its discretion, the trial court
determined that, because ECI had raised a “virtually
identical” claim, the analysis of the claim on the merits
in Associated Builders & Contractors was applicable
and dispositive of the nonstate defendants’ motions to
dismiss in the present case.° We disagree with the trial

© The trial court concluded, on the basis of Associated Builders & Con-
tractors, that (1) “a differential cost impact on union and nonunion contrac-
tors . . . affords the latter no basis for challenging [a PLA] requirement”
and, therefore, “an unsuccessful bidder . . . lacks standing to complain of
it. . . ina court of law,” (2) “the ultimate issue to be decided on any proper
bid challenge is whether the public authority gave fair and evenhanded

_ iii

court’s interpretation of Associated Builders & Con-
tractors and the nonstate defendants’ claim that the
holding in that case is dispositive of their motions to
dismiss.

As previously discussed, the principal issue in Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors was “whether nonbidding
contractors and subcontractors ha[d] standing to chal-
lenge a bid specification for a municipal project that
require[d] the successful bidder to agree to abide by
a [PLA].” (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn.
170-71. The court ultimately determined that the plain-
tiffs had not shown that any of the association’s general
contractor members had bid on the project or would
have bid on the project under the first part of the test,
and, therefore, it could not “invoke the standing of
its general contractor members as a basis for its own
standing to pursue its challenge to the validity of the
[PLA] requirement.” Id., 186. The court nonetheless pro-
ceeded to consider whether the plaintiffs could have
prevailed under the second part of the test. See id.,
186-87. It is that portion of the analysis on which the
trial court in the present case relied to resolve the
standing issue. Its reliance, however, was misplaced for
the following reasons.

First, any consideration of the second part of the test
in Associated Builders & Contractors was unnecessary

consideration to each bidder instead of treating different bidders differently,”
(8) the commonJaw principle denying standing to disappointed bidders
remains intact unless abrogated by a statute that expressly confers standing,
(@) Connecticut's competitive bidding statutes on their face do not identify
overall project cost for special protection, (5) the prequalification statute,
§ 4a-100, which was enacted subsequent to Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors, doesnot “occup|y] the field” or preempt public officials from exercising
their discretion and imposing other, or different, bid specifications, such as
PLAS, as a precondition for the award of contracts on public works projects,
and neither do any other related statutes; see General Statutes §§ 4b-91, 4b-
92 and 10-287; and (6) there was no evidence that the use of PLAs for the
projects in the present case was the result of fraud, corruption or favoritism.

421

following the court’s dispositive holding that the associ-
ation lacked standing under the first part of the test.
Accordingly, the court’s conclusion in Connecticut
Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra,
251 Conn. 186-87, that the plaintiffs could not prevail
under the second part of the test and the reasoning on
which its conclusion was based were nothing more than.
dicta.° See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v.
Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 246, 558 A.2d 986 (1989)
(“Once it becomes clear that the trial court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ complaint,
any further discussion of the merits is pure dict[um].
. .. When the trial court concluded . . . that subject
matter jurisdiction was missing, the remainder of its
[ruling was] merely advisory . . . .” [Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.]).

Second, we disagree with the trial court and the non-
state defendants that the court in Associated Builders &

6 “[DJictum is an observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing
an opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of
law, or the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not
necessarily involved in the case or essential to its determination . . . .
Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or
legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of
the case . . . are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 738 1.79,
998 A2d 1 2010).

Justice Harper's assertion, in his concurrence and dissent, that the court's
analysis under the second part of the test did not constitute dictum disre-
gards our well established precedent and flies in the face of the court’s own
reasoning, The court made absolutely clear that it did not regard both parts
of the test as threshold jurisdictional requirements when it referred to the
first part of the test as its “foundational element”; Connecticut Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 186; and further
explained that, even if that part of the test had been satisfied, the association
“still” could not prevail under the second part of the test. Id., 187. Moreover,
to the extent Justice Harper cites twelve other cases as “weighty authority”
for the proposition that the two parts of the test serve as independent
grounds to support a judgment on standing, all but one are unpersuasive
because they are from other jurisdictions, and the remaining Connecticut
case lacks the dispositive language in Associated Builders & Contractors
describing the first part of the test that was applied in that case as a
threshold requirement.

422

Contractors considered the merits of the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint or ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to establish
that the PLA requirement had a potentially discrimina-
tory effect on nonunion contractors due to increased
costs. Although the court’s reference to whether the
plaintiffs had produced sufficient evidence of fraud,
corruption or favoritism may have suggested that it was
considering the merits of the defendant’s decision to
impose a PLA requirement, the court itself rejected
such a notion when it stated that “[t]he general rule of
standing . . . is not inconsistent with the particular
standard applicable to disappointed and would-be bid-
ders: By requiring [the plaintiffs] to produce evidence
that the bidding process was undermined by fraud, cor-
ruption or favoritism, the court is simply forcing the
party challenging the competitive bidding process to
make a colorable claim of injury that it is within the
zone of interests protected by the competitive bidding
laws . . Although the plaintiffs were not required
to prove the merits of their claim, they did have the
lesser burden of establishing a colorable claim.’

" The trial court in the present case heard argument by counsel but took
no testimony on all challenges the parties had claimed for a hearing on July
8, 2009. The parties also agreed that all documents and materials filed by
either side could be considered parts of the evidentiary record on which
to decide the issues presented on the pending motions. This included docu-
mentation the parties previously had filed in federal court, including their
briefs, stipulations of fact and supporting and supplemental affidavits.

Although the parties raise no issues pertaining to the hearing in this case,
we note that such a hearing is not typically required or held when the court
is considering a motion to dismiss. As we explained in Conboy v. State, 292
Conn. 642, 974 A.2d 669 (2009), trial courts addressing motions to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction apply different rules and procedures
depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed: “When
a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to
dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations
of the complaint in their most favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court
must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those
facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner
most favorable to the pleader. . . .

“In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts estab-
lished by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other
types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial

423

(Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v.
Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 181-82. Consistent with this
view, the dissent in Associated Builders & Contractors
observed multiple times that the majority had not
reached the merits, stating that “[t]he court, in a hyper-
technical ruling on standing, avoids a substantive issue
that . . . we should review”; id., 193 (Berdon, J., dis-
senting); “[t]he public interest should compel this court

notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional
issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not
conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . .
If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's
motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the
plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or
other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further pro-
ceedings. . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut
the plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that fails to
call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply count-
eraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint . . . but may rest
on the jurisdictional allegations therein. . . .

“Finally, [when] a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolu-
tion of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss
in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts.
. . . Likewise, if the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits
of the case, a court cannot resolve the jurisdictional question without a
hearing to evaluate those merits. . . . An evidentiary hearing is necessary
because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based
‘onmemoranda and documents submitted by the parties.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651-54.

To the extent this court stated in Associated Builders & Contractors that
“the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide
whether the plaintiffs had established a colorable claim that the [PLA]
requirement had undermined the integrity or objective of the competitive
bidding process”; (emphasis added) Connecticut Associated Builders &
Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 182; or declared in the companion
case of Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Anson, 251 Comn.
202, 740 A.2d 804 (1999), that “the evidentiary showing for standing . . .
was [the association’s] burden to make”; id, 214; we now clarify that, in
most cases involving competitive bidding on public contracts, the allegations
alone should provide a sufficient factual basis for deciding the jurisdictional
issue of whether the plaintiff made a colorable claim of injury. Because the
parties in the present case agreed, however, that the trial court could con-
sider the materials and documents they had filed in federal court, all future
references to the record in this case include that documentation as well as
the facts alleged in the complaint.

— ae

to address this issue”; id. (Berdon, J., dissenting); “[t]he
majority avoids [the plaintiffs’] substantive claims by
narrowly ruling that the plaintiffs have no standing”;
id., 194 (Berdon, J., dissenting); and that, “[b]y declining
to afford the plaintiffs standing, the majority . . . sim-
ply ducks the issue of whether [PLA] requirements for
a public construction contract violate state and local
competitive bidding statutes.” Id., 201 (Berdon, J., dis-
senting). In addition, the court stated on several occa-
sions that its conclusion that the association lacked
standing was based on deficiencies in the record; see
id., 187 n.12, 188, 189; and that the plaintiffs had failed
to make “a colorable factual showing” in support of
their claim. Id., 187. Thus, neither the majority nor the
dissent in Associated Builders & Contractors believed
that the plaintiffs’ claim had been decided on its merits,
and the trial court in the present case should not have
applied the so-called holding in Associated Builders &
Contractors under the second part of the test to decide
the issues in the present case.

Third, to the extent the trial court and the nonstate
defendants regard the court’s discussion of cost in Asso-
ciated Builders & Contractors as resolving the issue
of whether a PLA requirement is discriminatory, and
thus dispositive of the standing issue in the present
case, they misconstrue the court’s analysis and fail to
consider the subsequent evolution of Connecticut’s
competitive bidding laws. Associated Builders & Con-
tractors did not conclude that cost was not a factor
to be considered in deciding whether the competitive
bidding laws were undermined, nor did it evaluate or
reach any conclusions regarding the broader question
of whether the PLA requirement in that case contra-
vened the competitive bidding laws. The court merely
stated that it “[knew] of no requirement in the competi-
tive bidding statutes that propels cost considerations
to the top of the list of appropriate considerations for

425

public contract specifications” and that “cost alone”
should not be “the determinative factor”; (emphasis
added) id., 187-88; a statement with which ECT’s attor-
ney in the present case agreed during oral argument
before this court. The court also noted that “[aJn
increase in costs in one aspect of a project can equally
well result in overall cost savings for the project. By
avoiding labor disruption and maintaining a supply of
skilled workers, as the project construction manager
testified the [PLA] was designed to do, the requirement
could reduce overall costs. The record . . . does not,
in fact, support the association’s claim that cost consid-
erations precluded nonunion general contractors from
participating in the bidding process.” Id., 187 n.12.
Accordingly, the court in Associated Builders & Con-
tractors did not conclude, as the trial court concluded
and the nonstate defendants claim, that a PLA require-
ment has no effect on competitive bidding because of
increased costs to nonunion contractors and workers.
It merely concluded that the “determinative factor” is
whether the requirements of the bidding process have
been applied consistently and in good faith, and that
the plaintiffs had not made a “colorable factual show-
ing” that the integrity of the bidding process had been
affected by the additional costs allegedly imposed on
nonunion contractors and workers by the PLA require-
ment. Id., 187-89.

Moreover, following the decision in Associated
Builders & Contractors, the legislature enacted General
Statutes § 4a-100, also known as the “prequalification
statute,” which requires all bidders on public construc-
tion projects to satisfy certain minimum standards in
order to bid or perform work on such projects.” Thus,

*® General Statutes § 4a-100 provides in relevant part: “(a) As used in this
section: (1) ‘Prequalification’ means prequalification issued by the Commis-
sioner of Administrative Services to bid on a contract or perform work
pursuant to a contract for the construction, reconstruction, alteration,
remodeling, repair or demolition of any public building or any other public
work by the state or a municipality, except a public highway or bridge

426

given that the competitive bidding laws provide that a

project or any other construction project administered by the Department
of Transportation, or to perform work under such a contract as a substantial
subcontractor... .

wee

“(¢) The application form shall, at a minimum, require the applicant to
supply information concerning:

“(1) The applicant's form of organization;

“() The applicant’s principals and key personnel and any names under
which the applicant, principals or key personnel conducted business during
the past five years;

“(8) Any legal or administrative proceedings pending or concluded
adversely against the applicant or any of the applicant’s principals or key
personnel within the past five years which relate to the procurement or
performance of any public or private construction contract and whether
the applicant is aware of any investigation pending against the applicant or
any principal or key personnel;

“(4) The nature of any financial, personal or familial relationship between
the applicant and any public or private construction project owner listed
on the application as constituting construction experience;

“(5) A statement of whether (A) the applicant has been disqualified pursu-
antto section 4b-95, this section or section 81-57c or 31-574, (B) the applicant
is on the list distributed by the Labor Commissioner pursuant to section
31-57a, (C) the applicant is disqualified or prohibited from being awarded
acontract pursuant to section 31-57b, (D) the applicant has been disqualified
by another state, (E) the applicant has been disqualified by a federal agency
or pursuant to federal Jaw, (F) the applicant’s registration has been sus-
pended or revoked by the Department of Consumer Protection pursuant to
section 20-341gg, (G) the applicant has been disqualified by a municipality,
and (H) the matters that gave rise to any such disqualification, suspension
or revocation have been eliminated or remedied; and

“(6) Other information as the commissioner deems relevant to the determi-
nation of the applicant's qualifications and responsibilities.

“(d) The applicant shall include a statement of financial condition pre-
pared by a certified public accountant which includes information concern-
ing the applicant's assets and liabilities, plant and equipment, bank and
credit references, bonding company and maximum bonding capacity, and
other information as the commissioner deems relevant to an evaluation of
the applicant’s financial capacity and responsibility.

“(¢) Information contained in the application shall be current as of the
time of filing except that the statement of financial condition shall pertain
to the applicant’s most recently-completed fiscal year.

“(@ The commissioner shall determine whether to prequalify an applicant
on the basis of the application and on relevant past performance according
to procedures and criteria set forth in regulations which the commissioner
shall adopt on or before October 1, 2005, in accordance with chapter 54.

427

contract shall be awarded to the “lowest responsible

Such criteria shall include, at a minimum, the record of the applicant’s
performance, including, but not limited to, written evaluations of the appli-
cant’s performance on public or private projects, the applicant's past experi-
ence on projects of various size and type, the skill, ability and integrity of
the applicant and any subcontractors used by the applicant, the experience
and qualifications of supervisory personnel employed by the applicant, the
maximum amount of work the applicant is capable of undertaking as demon-
strated by the applicant's financial condition, bonding capacity, size of past
projects and present and anticipated work commitments, and any other
relevant criteria that the commissioner prescribes. Such regulations shall
also (1) provide that the criteria considered shall be assigned separate
designated numerical values and weights and that the applicant shall be
assigned an overall numerical rating on the basis of all criteria, and (2)
establish prequalification classifications, aggregate work capacity ratings
and single project limits. Such prequalification classifications shall be used
to establish the types of work a contractor or substantial subcontractor is
qualified to perform and the aggregate work capacity ratings shall be used
to establish the maximum amount of work a contractor or substantial sub-
contractor is capable of undertaking.

“(g) (1) The applicant shall indicate the prequalification classifications,
aggregate work capacity ratings and single project limits that are sought.
The commissioner may issue a certificate of prequalification to any applicant
who meets the requirements of this section. Such certificate shall be effective
for one year from the date issued and shall indicate the contractor's or
substantial subcontractor’s prequalification classifications, aggregate work
capacity ratings and single project limits.

ea

“(@) The commissioner may notissue or renew a prequalification certificate
to any contractor or substantial subcontractor (1) who is disqualified pursu-
ant to section 31-57c or 31-574, or (2) who has a principal or key personnel
who, within the past five years, has a conviction or has entered a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere for or has admitted to commission of an act or
omission that reasonably could have resulted in disqualification pursuant
to any provision of subdivisions (1) to (8), inclusive, of subsection (d) of
section 81-57¢ or subdivisions (1) to (8), inclusive, of subsection (d) of
section 31-57d, as determined by the commissioner.

“@) The commissioner may revoke a contractor's or substantial subcon-
tractor’s prequalification or reduce the contractor's or substantial subcon-
tractor's prequalification classification or aggregate work capacity ratings,
after an opportunity for a hearing, if the commissioner receives additional
information that supports such revocation or reduction. During the course
‘of such hearing process, the commissioner may suspend a contractor's or
substantial subcontractor’s prequalification certificate if the commissioner
determines that there is probable cause to believe that such contractor or
substantial subcontractor engaged in conduct that significantly undermines

428

qualified bidder”; General Statutes § 10-287 (b) (1); the
prequalification statute ensures that bidders are both
responsible and qualified, and cost necessarily rises to

the skill, ability or integrity of such contractor or substantial subcontractor.
Any such suspension shall not exceed a period of three months and shall
be accompanied by a written decision of the commissioner that sets forth
the reasons for and duration of such suspension. The commissioner shall
send notification of any such suspension to such contractor or substantial
subcontractor by certified mail, return receipt requested. Such contractor
or substantial subcontractor may file a response, in writing, not later than
thirty days after receipt of such notice. The commissioner shall review any
such response submitted by a contractor or substantial subcontractor within
such thirty-day period.

“e) (1) Any substantial evidence of fraud in obtaining or maintaining
prequalification or any materially false statement in the application, update
‘statement or update bid statement may, in the discretion of the awarding
authority, result in termination of any contract awarded the contractor by
the awarding authority. .

“(2) The commissioner shall deny or revoke the prequalification of any
contractor or substantial subcontractor if the commissioner finds that the
contractor or substantial subcontractor, or a principal or key personnel of
such contractor or substantial contractor, within the past five years (A) has
included any materially false statement in a prequalification application,
update statement or update bid statement, (B) has been convicted of, entered
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for, or admitted to, a crime related
to the procurement or performance of any public or private construction
contract, or (C) has otherwise engaged in fraud in obtaining or maintaining
prequalification. Any revocation made pursuant to this subsection shall be
made only after an opportunity for a hearing. Any contractor or substantial
subcontractor whose prequalification has been revoked pursuant to this
subsection shall be disqualified for a period of two years after which the
contractor or substantial subcontractor may reapply for prequalification,
except that a contractor or substantial subcontractor whose prequalification
has been revoked on the basis of conviction of a crime or engaging in fraud
shall be disqualified for a period of five years after which the contractor or
substantial subcontractor may reapply for prequalification. The commis-
sioner shall not prequalify a contractor or substantial subcontractor whose
prequalification has been revoked pursuant to this subdivision until the
expiration of said two-year, five-year, or other applicable disqualification
period and the commissioner is satisfied that the matters that gave rise to
the revocation have been eliminated or remedied.

“@ The commissioner shall provide written notice of any revocation,
disqualification, reduction in classification or capacity rating or reinstated
prequalification to the Commissioner of Public Works, the Commissioner
of Consumer Protection and the President of The University of Connecticut
not later than thirty days after any final determination. . . .”

429

the “top of the list””® of appropriate considerations for
public contract specifications.” Connecticut Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251
Conn. 187.

Finally, the statement in Associated Builders & Con-
tractors that “[t]he trial court’s determination that the

We nonetheless agree with Associated Builders & Contractors that
“cost alone” may not always be “the determinative factor” in awarding a
public construction contract. Connecticut Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors v. Harlford, supra, 251 Conn. 187-88.

® Justice Harper asserts that “[tJhe majority's approach to cost appears
to conflate two distinct levels of cost consideration,” specifically, project
costs associated with items such as the building’s location and size, construc-
tion materials, remediation activities and time to completion, and the cost
of the project as determined by the winning bid in the competitive bidding
process. Footnote 4 of the concurring and dissenting opinion. Thus, Justice
Harper essentially contends that, because the PLA requirement is a bid
specification, it cannot be challenged under the competitive bidding statutes
or Connecticut precedent as effectuating fraud, corruption, favoritism or
acts undermining the objective or integrity of the bidding process. See id.
Justice Harper, however, ignores our holding in Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of
Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 694-95, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991), that “a plaintiff who
ha{s] not submitted a proposal on a public project has] standing to challenge
a specification contained in the bid documents if that specification pre-
clude[s] the plaintiff's participation in a manner that impair(s] the fairness of
the bidding process.” (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Associated Builders &
Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 180. Likewise, Justice Harper
ignores the fact that Associated Builders & Contractors, which cited Unisys
Corp. with approval; see id.; did not reject the association’s claim because
it was an improper challenge to the bidding specifications but because
the association had failed to make a “colorable factual showing,” through.
allegations or other evidence, that “limiting the number of potential bidders
violates not only the integrity of competitive bidding but also injures the
general public by driving up the cost of government funded projects.” Id.,
187. To the extent Justice Harper suggests otherwise, we emphasize that
Associated Builders & Contractors did not preclude any future claim that
abid specification with substantial cost effects on a large group of potential
bidders violates the competitive bidding statutes, which were enacted for
the public benefit “to secure the best product at the lowest price”; Spiniello
Construction Co. v. Manchester, 189 Conn. 539, 543, 456 A.2d 1199 (1983);
and the decision in Associated Builders & Contractors is not dispositive of
ECT's claim that the PLA bid specification affects the fairness and integrity
of the bidding process by imposing additional costs solely on bidders who
are not union members.

—_

decision to adhere to a [PLA] was within the defendant's
discretion and the bounds of the competitive bidding
statutes [and], therefore, did not exceed the limits of
our case law”; id., 182; did not mean that a PLA require-
ment may never affect the integrity of the competitive
bidding process. The court made the foregoing com-
ment in response to the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial
court improperly had reached the merits of whether
the defendant’s decision to use a PLA was a proper
exercise of its discretion. See id., 181-82. In that con-
text, the court merely was observing that the defen-
dant’s decision to use a PLA was discretionary and that
the trial court had consulted our case law and properly
determined that, in order to challenge the PLA require-
ment, the plaintiffs were required to make a colorable
claim of injury by producing evidence that the bidding
process had been undermined by fraud, favoritism or
corruption.”* See id., 182. The court made a similar

The court stated, with respect to this issue: “The plaintiffs argue that
the trial court's analysis of standing was improper because it reached the
merits of the plaintiffs’ claims in evaluating whether the [defendant's] deci-
sion to use a [PLA] was a proper exercise of its discretion. We disagree.

“The plaintiffs observe . . . that standing concems . . . the question
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question and does not involve an inquiry into
the merits of the claim. According to the plaintiffs, whether adoption of the
[PLA] requirement was within the [defendant's] discretion was a question
separate and apart from the question of their standing to challenge the
[defendant's] action.

“The general rule of standing cited by the plaintiffs is not contested. As
the trial courtnoted, however, that rule is not inconsistent with the particular
standard applicable to disappointed and would-be bidders: By requiring [the
association] to produce evidence that the bidding process was undermined
by fraud, corruption or favoritism, the court is simply forcing the party
challenging the competitive bidding process to make a colorable claim of
injury that it is within the zone of interests protected by the competitive
bidding laws . . . . Although the plaintiffs were not required to prove the
merits of their claim, they did have the lesser burden of establishing a
colorable claim. See Maloney v. Pac, [183 Conn, 313, 821, 439 A.2d 349
(1981)]. . . . The trial court’s determination that the decision to adhere to
a [PLA] was within the [defendant's] discretion and the bounds of the

| rti“‘a<‘a‘SeS.hUWT;.

observation in Connecticut Associated Builders & Con-
tractors v. Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 213-14, 740 A.2d 804
(1999),” a companion case released on the same day
as Associated Builders & Contractors. In other words,
the court in both Associated Builders & Contractors
and Anson was referring to the fact that a public

competitive bidding statutes, therefore, did not exceed the limits of our
case law.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford,
supra, 261 Conn. 181-82. .

2 In Anson, the court summarized the trial court’s reasoning in granting
the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that the PLA require-
ment in the bid specifications infringed on the plaintiffs’ rights of free speech
and association as follows: “The [trial] court . . . stated that inclusion of a
[PLA] requirementin the project specifications was justified by the legitimate
public interest in completion of a public works project within time and
financial constraints. The nonstrike clause contained in [PLAs] would further
that interest. The [defendant's] decision to use a [PLA] was not based on
any improper motive. The court determined that [t]he state has a legitimate
interest in completing a public works project within time and financial
constraints. Evidence showed that the commissioner decided to use the
[PLA] on this project based on knowledge of the use of [PLAs] by other
public entities. The plaintiffs did not present any evidence that the [PLA]
‘was a means to exclude nonunion contractors or amounted to such an
exclusion. The purpose of the competitive bidding statutes is not to aid the
contractors by making it economically feasible for all to bid . . . but to
promote the public interest in the efficient completion of public works
projects. . . . The state’s interest in its own finances when undertaking
public works projects takes precedence over the finances or business meth-
ods of individual contractors. . . . The [defendant's] decision to try a [PLA]
on this project was a legitimate exercise of his discretion to find a way to
achieve the state’s goal while remaining within the bounds of the competitive
bidding statutes. . . .

“{t is impossible to reconcile these findings with any conclusion other
than that the association failed to establish that the use of a [PLA], under the
circumstances of [the] case, constituted an infringement of the constitutional
rights of its members. The constitution is not violated simply because a
public agency adopts a legitimate public policy that runs counter to the
philosophical views or business practices espoused by the membership of
the association. The association did not make the evidentiary showing for
standing that was its burden to make.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Anson,
supra, 251 Conn. 213-14. We reiterate that the court’s reference to an eviden-
tiary showing must be understood in light of our analysis in Conboy. See
footnote 17 of this opinion.

—

agency’s discretion to require a PLA in any given circum-
stance is not unfettered. A balance must be struck
between the potentially desirable effects of a PLA, such
as the completion of a public project within time and
financial constraints, and the public’s interest in the
fairness and economy associated with the competitive
bidding process. Viewed through this lens, the court in
Associated Builders & Contractors was attempting to
determine whether the plaintiffs’ allegations and other
evidence in the record were sufficient to support a
colorable claim that the integrity of the competitive
bidding process would be seriously undermined by the
imposition of the PLA requirement. See Connecticut
Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra,
251 Conn. 187-89 and n.12; see also footnote 17 of this
opinion. Similarly, the court in Anson was attempting to
determine whether the allegations and other evidence in
the record concerning deprivation of the plaintiffs’
rights of free speech and association were sufficient
to support a colorable claim that the integrity of the
competitive bidding process would be seriously under-
mined by the imposition of the PLA requirement. See
Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v.
Anson, supra, 251 Conn. 213-14. In neither case was
the court considering the claims on their merits. Conse-
quently, for all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude
that, to the extent the trial court in the present case
treated the analysis of the PLA requirement in Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors under the second part of
the standing test as a decision on the merits, it misun-
derstood and misapplied that decision.

3
Sufficiency of the Allegations

We also agree with ECI that the trial court failed
to conduct an in-depth examination of the plaintiffs’
allegations to determine whether they were sufficient

A

to support a colorable claim of injury. See footnote 23
of this opinion. As previously noted, “[w]hen a . .

court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pre-
trial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations
of the complaint in their most favorable light. . . . In
this regard, a court must take the facts to be those
alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessar-
ily implied from the allegations, construing them in a
manner most favorable to the pleader. . . . The motion
to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded,
invokes the existing record and must be decided upon.
that alone.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gold
v. Rowland, supra, 296 Conn. 200-201. The record
includes “supporting affidavits that contain undisputed
facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) May v. Cof-
Sey, supra, 291 Conn. 108. In the present case, we con-
clude, upon an examination of the allegations in the
underlying complaint,” together with the affidavits and

3 RCI alleged, inter alia, that (1) it was a nonunion electrical contractor
with extensive experience in public construction projects, (2) bid packages
for the two school construction projects were put out for competitive bidding
by the city pursuant to the competitive bidding laws for the purpose of
determining the lowest, responsible, qualified bidder and entering into a
contract for the required work with the successful bidder, (8) ECI’s bid
‘was the lowest, responsible, qualified bid for each project, (4) the state is
providing 90 percent of the funding for both projects, (5) state law provides
that “{aJll orders and contracts for school building construction receiving
state assistance . . . shall be awarded to the lowest responsible qualified
bidder . . . after a public invitation to bid”; General Statutes § 10-287 (b)
(1); and that “the words ‘lowest responsible and qualified bidder’ shall mean
the bidder who is prequalified pursuant to section 4a-100, and whose bid
is the lowest of those bidders possessing the skill, ability and integrity
necessary to faithful performance of the work based on objective criteria
considering past performance and information”; General Statutes § 4b-92;
(6) ECI is prequalified under the applicable statutory provisions to bid and
perform the work on both projects, (7) ECI fully meets the statutory defini-
tion of “lowest responsible and qualified bidder,” (8) none of the statutory
requirements that define lowest responsible qualified bidder and none of
the other public bidding statutes suggest that a bidder must execute a PLA
and must agree to draw all of its field labor through referrals from a desig-
nated trade union, or that its nonunion employees must first join a designated
trade union as a prerequisite to execution of a contract and performance

—

stipulations of fact provided in support thereof, that ECI

of the subject work, (9) based on the foregoing statutory requirements and
regulations adopted thereto, it was illegal and beyond the city’s authority
to impose as a mandatory condition for the award of the two bid packages
that the successful bidder execute a PLA and agree to draw alll of its field
labor through referrals from a designated trade union, or that its nonunion
employees must fixst join a designated trade union before execution of a
contract and performance of the subject work could commence, (10) the
city stated in the bid documents for both projects that all bidders would
have to comply with a PLA requiring the successful bidder, among other
things, to draw all of its field labor through referrals from a designated
trade union, or that its nonunion employees must first join a designated
trade union as a prerequisite to execution of a contract and performance
of the subject work, (11) there is no provision in the PLAs that an employee
of ECI who wants to join the designated trade union solely for the purpose
of working on the project would be granted membership, would be assigned
to work on the project by the designated trade union at the request of the
ECI employee, would be allowed to work on other non-PLA projects while
a member of the union for the purpose of working on the project, would
have any right to be reimbursed or enjoy the benefit of contributions made
on his behalf to the union pension funds or to withhold funds or to be
reimbursed for contributions designated for the union’s political or social
activities with which the employee disagreed, (12) ECI, as a nonunion con-
tractor, would incur significant and duplicative costs, as described in detail
in the complaint, for providing the labor necessary to construct the projects
under the required PLAs, which would severely impair ECI’s ability success-
fully to perform the work on the projects and would place ECI at a severe
competitive disadvantage relative to the union contractors bidding for the
work, (18) in light of these issues, ECI requested a waiver of the PLA
requirement for purposes of the subject bid on the electrical work for the
projects but received no response, (14) ECI thereafter submitted its lowest
responsible qualified bid with a second request for a waiver of the PLA
requirement and a statement that it would not perform the work pursuant
to the PLA requirement in the bid documents, (15) ECI subsequently was
informed at a meeting with city officials and representatives that they
intended to reject ECI’s bids on the basis of ECI's refusal to agree to the
PLA requirement, (16) ECI received no further written communication from
the city in this regard, (17) on the basis of all information available to ECI,
its bids for the projects were rejected due to its refusal to agree to the
mandatory PLA requirement, and the contract for electrical work was
awarded to and a contract executed with a union contractor that was the
third lowest bidder, (18) the city's actions and stated intent to bar any
contractor from projects if it does not agree to a PLA constitute blatant
favoritism for union contractors and union workers, which provides union
contractors and construction trade unions with an unfair and illegal competi-
tive advantage over nonunion contractors and nonunion construction work-

435

made the colorable factual showing that was missing in
Associated Builders & Contractors. See footnote 17 of
this opinion.

It is undisputed that ECI submitted a bid on both
construction projects, thus satisfying the first part of
the standing test. ECI also sustained its burden under
the second part of the test because the complaint, the
supporting affidavits and other evidence, considered in
their most favorable light, contained detailed allega-
tions as to the discriminatory effect of the PLA require-
ment on ECI and other nonunion contractors.

Specifically, paragraph thirty-seven of the complaint
alleges twelve ways in which the PLA requirement
would “severely impair” ECI’s ability as a nonunion
contractor to successfully perform work on the projects
and place ECI at a competitive disadvantage relative
to union contractors bidding on the same projects. Simi-
larly, in his affidavit dated March 25, 2009, William J.
Flynn, Jr., ECI’s vice president for nearly fifteen years,
describes how the PLA requirement would penalize
ECI, or any other nonunion contractor, their field

ers, (19) as demonstrated by ECI's significantly lower bid, as well as by
other objective data, the imposition of PLAs in the context of public school
construction diminishes competition and increases the cost of construction
by 10 to 20 percent, (20) nonunion construction contractors and workers
comprise over 80 percent of the construction industry in Connecticut, and
the imposition of PLAs severely discourages and often eliminates their
bidding on those contracts, thus decreasing competition, (21) the imposition
of mandatory PLAs undermines the objective and integrity of the public
competitive bidding process and exhibits patent favoritism to the trade
unions and union contractors, to the unfair and severe disadvantage of
nonunion contractors such as EC] and its nonunion employees in this action,
and (22) ECI would have been the successful bidder on both projects if it
had not been for the mandatory PLA requirement, and because a significant
amount of ECI’s work is in public construction in Connecticut, the PLA
requirement will severely and irreparably harm ECI’s ongoing business oper-
ations as well as the employment opportunities of its individual employees,
and will harm ECI's reputation and future ability to obtain work by causing
future employers to raise questions about ECI’s inability to obtain past work
involving PLA requirements.

436

employees and taxpayers by significantly increasing
labor costs and how the alleged harm would be ongoing.
Finally, in their joint affidavit dated March 23, 2009,
which draws on four studies conducted by the Beacon
Hill Institute at Suffolk University in Boston, Massachu-
setts, concerning PLAs and the cost of public school
construction in Connecticut, Massachusetts and New
York, David G. Tuerck™ and Paul Bachman” apply the
studies’ findings to the PLA requirement in the present
case and describe how it would drive up project con-
struction costs by limiting competition and imposing
costly work and hiring rules on nonunion contractors.
In their affidavit, Tuerck and Bachman also describe
how the area labor market analysis for the Hartford
public school system, produced by the Fluor Corpora-
tion in March, 2003, for the purpose of recommending
the most appropriate labor posture for the public works
projects under consideration, recommended the use of
PLAs without any analysis of cost, schedule, or quality
impacts from imposing a mandatory PLA in Hartford
and without any evidence that actual union disruptions
of previous school construction projects had led to
delays or increased costs in Connecticut such that PLAs
were necessary to foster school construction in a more
economical and efficient manner.” Accordingly, we
conclude that ECT's allegations, as supplemented by the
supporting affidavits and evidence in the record that
the PLA requirement would have a discriminatory effect
on ECI and other nonunion contractors, were sufficient

% Tuerck is a professor of economics, chairman of the economics depart-
ment and executive director of the Beacon Hill Institute.

% Bachman is the director of research at the Beacon Hill Institute.

%In their joint supplemental affidavit dated April 27, 2009, Tuerck and
Bachman address the “Kotler paper”; see F. Kotler, School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, Cornell University, “Project Labor Agreements in New York
State: In the Public Interest” (March, 2009); which was attached as an exhibit
to the city's reply brief on its motion to dismiss, and point out what they
regard as significant errors in Fred B. Kotler’s critique of the methodology
used in the Beacon Hill Institute studies.

A

to satisfy the second part of the standing test, which
requires a colorable claim that fraud, corruption, favor-
itism or other conduct has seriously undermined the
objective and integrity of the competitive bidding
process.

Insofar as the nonstate defendants insist that ECI
provided insufficient evidence to establish that it has
standing, we disagree. One need only examine the rea-
sons why the court in Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors concluded that the -association did not have
standing to understand why ECI in the present case
does. In Associated Builders & Contractors, this court
explained that the association had failed to make a
colorable factual showing under the second part of the
standing test because it had “provided no explanation as
to how the alleged increased expense to some potential
bidders would raise the costs of the overall project,”
the record did not “support the association’s claim that
cost considerations [had] precluded nonunion general
contractors from participating in the bidding process,”
and “[t]he association [had] presented no testimony
. . . that government projects using [PLAs] had higher
total costs than other similar projects without such a
requirement.” Connecticut Associated Builders & Con-
tractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 187 n.12. In other
words, the complaint in Associated Builders & Con-
tractors alleged a violation of the competitive bidding
laws in the most general, conclusory terms, without.
any allegations as to the specific effects of the PLA
requirement on the association and other nonunion con-
tractors.” In the present case, the lengthy allegations

% The plaintiffs claimed in count one of their complaint, in which they
alleged a violation of the competitive bidding statutes, that the PLA require-
ment imposed conditions that they would not otherwise have included in
their bids unrelated to a bidder’s status as the lowest qualified bidder and
that the PLA requirement was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of
the competitive bidding statutes because the city (1) did not consider or

analyze any data as to the effect of PLAs on the projects, including cost,
timeliness or efficiency, (2) did not consider or analyze the effect of PLA

_

in the complaint and the supporting affidavits of Flynn,
Tuerck and Bachman provided such information.
Accordingly, we conclude that ECI made a colorable
claim of injury® and that the trial court has subject
matter jurisdiction in this matter.”

on competition for work on the projects, on nonunion workers and their
right not to become members of a union, on nonunion workers’ health
insurance coverage and pension benefits, on safety, and on public policy
objectives relating to employment opportunities for minorities, women and
the economically disadvantaged, and (3) had no reason to believe the proj-
ects would be subject to delays because of strikes or labor unrest or that
PLAs would ensure more timely completion of the projects or would relate
in any way to the provisions or purposes of the competitive bidding require-
ments. The plaintiffs also alleged in count one that the city, by requiring
bidders to agree to the terms of a PLA, was exceeding the scope of its
authority under the applicable bidding statutes, favored union over nonunion
contractors and subcontractors and, by failing to inform bidders of the terms
of the PLA, had made it impossible for a bidder to prepare a responsive
bid. The plaintiffs thus alleged that the foregoing conduct caused them
irreparable harm as potential bidders, interested parties, citizens and tax-
payers.

% We do not consider ECI's claim that the trial court failed to discuss the
criteria that a court should employ in determining the validity of a PLA bid
specification for a publicly funded construction project because that claim
would involve consideration of the merits, rather than the issue of the
plaintiffs’ standing. For the same reason, we do not consider the plaintiffs’
claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the PLA requirement
imposed by the city for the school construction projects did not violate the
provisions of the applicable competitive bidding laws.

® Justice Harper contends that the majority expands the court's subject
matter jurisdiction by “depart{ing] from the narrowly circumscribed doctrine
of standing established by our past cases dealing with [the competitive
bidding] statutes,” particularly this court's holding in Associated Builders &
Contractors, and “disregards . . . the lawmaking authority of the legisla-
ture.” Citing Spiniello Construction Co. v. Manchester, supra, 189 Conn.
545, Ardmare Construction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn, 497, 499, 505, 467
A.2d 674 (1983), and Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, supra, 220 Conn. 696,
Justice Harper specifically contends that the second part of the standing
test, namely, that “the alleged illegalities amounted to fraud, corruption,
favoritism or acts undermining the objective and integrity of the competitive
bidding process”; Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hart-
ford, supra, 251 Conn. 181; is satisfied only when a plaintiff makes “a
colorable claim that the bidding process—from the development of project
specifications and bidding rules to the application of these to bidders—was
tainted by procedural impropriety.” We disagree. Although it is true that

A

B

Standing of the Individual Plaintiffs

The six individual plaintiffs claim that the trial court
incorrectly concluded that they do not have standing
to challenge the imposition of the mandatory PLAs for
the school construction projects under article first,

the alleged violations in Spiniello and Ardmare, respectively, involved irreg-
ular bids because of an oral rule addendum communicated to only one
bidder and an improper signature on a bidding form, both of which flaws
may be characterized as strictly procedural in nature; see Ardmare Con-
struction Co. v. Freedman, supra, 499-500; Spiniello Construction Co. v.
Manchester, supra, 544-45; the alleged violation in Unisys Corp. was that
the single source bid specifications favored a particular vendor. Unisys
Conp. v. Dept. of Labor, supra, 691. Although the plaintiff in Unisys Corp.
also alleged favoritism on the ground that the bid specifications had been
prepared with the assistance of the vendor in question; see id; the court
ultimately held that the plaintiff would have standing if it could show that
the restrictions imposed by the single source specifications alone precluded
it from participating in a manner that impaired the fairness of the bidding
process; see id., 695; see also Connecticut Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 180; and that the plaintiff was entitled
to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the specifications had caused
such an impairment. Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, supra, 695, 698. The
court did not qualify its holding by adding that the plaintiff also would be
required to show that the drafting of the specifications had been tainted by
procedural impropriety. Thereafter, the court in Associated Builders &
Contractors determined under the second part of the standing test that the
plaintiffs in that case had “failed to make even a colorable factual showing”
in support of their claim that the use of a PLA illegally had resulted in the
absence of a level playing field for union and nonunion contractors and
subcontractors interested in participating in a government building project.
Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251
Conn. 187. The court did not conclude, as Justice Harper suggests, that the
inclusion of a PLA bid specification never can be challenged on the ground
that it favors union over nonunion bidders unless accompanied by a drafting
impropriety, but only that the plaintifis had failed to assert a colorable claim
of injury in that case, which accounts for the court’s repeated references
to deficiencies in the record as the reason for its decision. Id., 187 n.12,
188-89, Accordingly, Associated Builders & Contractors cannot dictate the
result here, as Justice Harper contends, because the record in the present
case, unlike the record in Associated Builders & Contractors, is sufficient
to support the conclusion that ECI had standing.

440

§8§ 4° and 5,°! of the Connecticut constitution, which
guarantee freedom of speech and association, and arti-
cle first, §§ 1° and 20,® of the Connecticut constitution,
which guarantee equal protection under the law. They
specifically claim that the PLA requirement violates
their rights to freedom of speech and association
because it mandates that they join a union in order
to work on the projects and requires them to make
payments to the union that will be used to further social
and political goals that they may not support and that.
are unrelated to collective bargaining. They also claim
that the PLA requirement violates their equal protection
rights because it would severely restrict, or effectively
bar, nonunion contractors such as ECI and nonunion
licensed journeymen and apprentices like themselves
from working on the projects, thus conferring illegal
benefits, advantages and privileges on union contrac-
tors and union journeymen and apprentices. The non-
state defendants respond that the trial court properly
concluded that the individual plaintiffs do not have
standing to pursue their state constitutional claims
because they are not prequalified electrical contractors,

® Article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “Every citizen
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”

3 Article first, § 5, of the Connecticut: constitution provides: “No law shall
ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press.”

® Article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “All men
when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of
men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the com-

® Article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution provides: “No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segrega-
tion or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political
rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.”

Although article first, §20, of the Connecticut constitution has been
amended by articles five and twenty-one of the amendments to the Connecti-
cut constitution, the classes of persons to which protection was extended
under these amendments are not relevant for purposes of the individual
plaintiffs’ claims in this case.

| rti“‘a$P' TT!’

and, therefore, they did not, and could not have, bid
onthe projects. We agree with the nonstate defendants
that the trial court properly concluded that the individ-
ual plaintiffs lacked standing.®

Asimilar issue was raised in Connecticut Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Anson, supra, 251 Conn. 204.
In that case, the plaintiffs included two subcontractors
and one of their employees, who was suing in his capac-
ity as an individual and a taxpayer. Id., 204 and n.1. The
trial court concluded that the individual plaintiff lacked
standing to challenge the bidding process on the ground
that it impaired his federal and state constitutional
rights to freedom of speech and association. See id.,
205-206. This court agreed, stating that the individual
plaintiff and the plaintiff subcontractors had “no stand-
ing to pursue a challenge to general bid specifications
because, in their own capacity, they never can bid
directly for government projects. Their preclusion from
the bidding process has no relationship to whether they
operate union shops, or whether they are opposed
philosophically to union shops. Their preclusion stems
from the nondiscriminatory and uncontested industry
practice of limiting bidding to general contractors. If
general contractors were indeed to incur higher costs
because of [PLA] contract specifications . . . the pos-
sible economic consequences of increased costs attrib-
utable to potential subcontractors [and individual
employees] are too speculative and too attenuated to
constitute ‘some direct injury’ for the purposes of con-
ferring standing on such subcontractors [and individual

™ The state defendants did not respond to this claim.

*In their complaint, the individual plaintiffs made similar claims under
the federal constitution. The District Court concluded that they had standing
to bring those claims on the basis of its determination that the plaintiffs
had made a prima facie showing that jurisdiction existed by way of their
pleadings and affidavits but dismissed the claims on their merits. We adopt
a different view as to the individual plaintiffs’ standing to bring their state
constitutional claims for the reasons discussed hereinafter.

_ ee

employees]. See Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320-21,
439 A.2d 349 (1981).” Connecticut Associated Build-
ers & Contractors v. Anson, supra, 208-209; see also
id., 208 n.8.

In the present case, we agree with the trial court that
the six individual plaintiffs have not suffered the direct
or actual injury required under Connecticut law to
establish standing because they are not prequalified
electrical contractors, and, accordingly, they did not
bid, nor could they have bid, on the school construction
projects. Moreover, due to the fact that ECI was not
the winning bidder, the individual plaintiffs never were
compelled to make payments to the union or directly
barred from working on the projects. We therefore con-
clude that they lacked standing to bring their state con-
stitutional claims because the claims were too remote
and speculative.

The individual plaintiffs rely on Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 212-13, 236-37, 97
S. Ct. 1782, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1977), in which the United
States Supreme Court held that the general allegations
in a complaint filed by a group of teachers who were
unwilling to join a union, refused to pay dues and
opposed collective bargaining in the public sector were,
“if proved,” sufficient to establish a cause of action
under the first and fourteenth amendments to the
United States constitution. Abood is distinguishable
from the present case, however, because the teachers
were compelled to pay, as a condition of their employ-
ment, a service fee equal in amount to union dues even
if the teacher was not a union member, and any teacher
who failed to meet that obligation was subject to dis-
charge. Id., 212. In the present case, the individual plain-
tiffs were not required to comply with a condition of
employment they opposed, such as payments to the
union, nor were they subject to consequences for not
joining a union, such as being barred from working on

A

the projects, because ECI was not the winning bidder,
and, thus, they had no opportunity to work on the proj-
ects. Consequently, unlike the teachers in Abood, the
individual plaintiffs in the present case were only indi-
rectly affected by the city’s rejection of ECI’s low bid,
and they did not have standing to bring their claims.

Cc
Antitrust Claims

ECT’ final claim is that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that it did not have standing to prosecute
its claim against the city for violation of the Connecticut
Antitrust Act. It specifically contends that the PLA
requirement in this case violates General Statutes §§ 35-
26,6 35-28*" and 35-29" because, inter alia, it (1) bars
ECI and other nonunion contractors and subcontrac-
tors from executing contracts and performing work on
the projects without signing the PLA and abiding by its
restrictive terms, and (2) resulted in the city’s refusal

% General Statutes § 35-26 provides: “Every contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of any part of trade or commerce is unlawful.”

* General Statutes § 35-28 provides: “Without limiting section 35-26, every
contract, combination, or conspiracy is unlawful when the same are for the
purpose, or have the effect, of: (a) Fixing, controlling, or maintaining prices,
rates, quotations, or fees in any part of trade or commerce; (b) fixing,
controlling, maintaining, limiting, or discontinuing the production, manufac-
ture, mining, sale, or supply of any part of trade or commerce; (¢) allocating
or dividing customers or markets, either functional or geographical, in any
part of trade or commerce; or (d) refusing to deal, or coercing, persuading,
or inducing third parties to refuse to deal with another person.”

% General Statutes § 35-29 provides: “Every lease, sale or contract for the
furnishing of services or for the sale of commodities, or for the fixing of
ptices charged therefor, or for the giving or selling of a discount or rebate
therefrom, on the condition or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
shall not deal in the services or the commodities of a competitor or competi-
tors of the lessor or seller, shall be unlawful where the effect of such lease
or sale or contract for sale or such condition or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any part
of trade or commerce and where such goods or services are for the use,
consumption or resale in this state.”

eee

to award and execute the subject contracts with ECI,
the lowest responsible qualified bidder, due to ECI’s
refusal to execute and abide by the PLA requirement.
The nonstate defendants respond that ECI did not have
standing to pursue its antitrust claim because it was
inadequately briefed, and, even if it was adequately
briefed, ECI failed to establish proof of a public injury
to competition.” The trial court did not directly address
ECT’s antitrust claim but concluded more generally that.
the plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute their “pend-
ing claims . . . .” We conclude that ECI had standing
to bring its antitrust claim.

We first consider the nonstate defendants’ contention
that ECI’s antitrust claim was inadequately briefed. It is
well established that “[w]e are not obligated to consider
issues that are not adequately briefed. . . . Whe[n] an
issue is merely mentioned, but not briefed beyond a
bare assertion of the claim, it is deemed to have been
waived. . . . In addition, mere conclusory assertions
regarding a claim, with no mention of relevant authority
and minimal or no citations from the record, will not
suffice.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v.
Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57, 87, 942 A.2d
345 (2008).

In its brief, ECI addresses the standard of review,
the statutory provisions allegedly violated, the portions
of the complaint containing the antitrust allegations,
the manner in which the antitrust statutes were violated
and the relevant legal precedent. Accordingly, we con-
clude that the claim was adequately briefed.”

® The state defendants did not respond to this claim.

* We reject Justice Harper’s contention to the contrary. Claims are inade-
quately briefed when they are merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a
bare assertion. See, e.g., Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371,
378 n.6, 3 A.3d 892 (2010). Claims are also inadequately briefed when they
are raised for the first time in a reply brief; e.g., id.; or consist of “conclusory
assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no
citations from the record . . . .” Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone

445

We next consider whether ECI has standing to bring
its antitrust claim. In Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Hartford, 270 Conn. 619, 622-23, 854 A.2d 1066 (2004)
(Cheryl Terry Enterprises), the nonunion plaintiff
school bus company claimed an antitrust violation after
the defendant, the city of Hartford, rejected its lowest.
bid on a contract subject to competitive bidding and
awarded the contract to a union bidder who had submit-
ted a higher bid. We concluded that “the legislature
expressly has conferred standing on a broad range of
individuals under the [Connecticut Antitrust] [A]ct,
including unsuccessful bidders in a municipal bidding
process.” Id., 632. In the present case, ECI, like the
plaintiff in Cheryl Terry Enterprises, also had its low
bids rejected on contracts subject to competitive bid-
ding. We therefore conclude, as we did in that case,
that ECI, as an unsuccessful bidder, has the statutory
right to bring an antitrust claim against the city.

The nonstate defendants argue that the holding in
Cheryl Terry Enterprises does not apply because that
case involved allegations regarding a purported anti-
competitive conspiracy, not the anticompetitive effects
of a PLA, and that the PLA issue falls within the con-
struction industry exception to antitrust legislation cre-
ated under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seq. (2006). See Building & Construction
Trades Council of the Metropolitan District v. Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode
Island, Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 230, 113 S. Ct. 1190, 122 L.
Ed. 2d 565 (1993) (explaining that 29 U.S.C. § 158 [£]
“explicitly permits employers in the construction indus-

v. Connecticut Siting Council, supra, 286 Conn. 87, In the present case,
ECI makes arguments based on persuasive authority to which the nonstate
defendants have responded. See Hasychak v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206
Conn. 434, 439, 994 A.2d 1270 (2010) (issue decided because all parties
addressed it in their briefs and at oral argument). Accordingly, we disagree
with Justice Harper that ECI’s antitrust claim in the present case was inade-
quately briefed.

— ie
try—but no other employers—to enter into prehire
[PLAs]”). The nonstate defendants also argue that a
validly bargained for PLA is not subject to antitrust
scrutiny pursuant to General Statutes § 35-31 (b), which
provides qualified immunity for anticompetitive con-
duct specifically required or directed by state or federal
statutes, and that, in order to avoid this exception, the
plaintiffs had to plead and prove that the PLA was not
the result of a valid collective bargaining process, which
they failed to do. We disagree.

The holding in Cheryl Terry Enterprises applies to
“unsuccessful bidders in a municipal bidding process”
and is not limited in the manner suggested by the non-
state defendants. Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Hartford, supra, 270 Conn. 632. Moreover, to the extent
the nonstate defendants contend that the PLA issue
falls within the construction industry exception, the
plaintiffs do not challenge the legality of the PLA or
the process by which it was negotiated but, rather, the
fact that it was included in the mandatory bid specifica-
tions with which all prospective bidders, union and
nonunion alike, were required to comply. Finally, with
respect to the applicability of § 35-31 (b), because the
city and the state were acting in a proprietary rather
than a regulatory capacity; see part IV A of this opinion;
they are not subject, under the present facts, to qualified
immunity under that statute. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court improperly determined that ECI
lacked standing to prosecute its antitrust claim.

IV
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMANCE
A
Federal Preemption

The nonstate defendants contend that the trial court’s
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing
can be affirmed on the alternative ground that their

447

claims are preempted by federal labor law. They argue
that the PLA is a prehire collective bargaining agree-
ment within the primary jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and that the state has
no jurisdiction to resolve the plaintiffs’ claims under
the principles articulated in San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed.
2d 775 (1959), and Lodge 76, International Assn. of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132,
96 S. Ct. 2548, 49 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1976) (Machinists). The
plaintiffs respond that their claims are not preempted by
federal labor law and that the nonstate defendants not
only misconstrue the claims but misapply well devel-
oped federal and state precedent. We agree with the
plaintiffs.

The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this issue. During the proceedings in the
District Court on the defendants’ motions to dismiss,
certain of the nonstate defendants argued, inter alia,
that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by federal
labor law, namely, § 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the preemption
doctrines articulated in Garmon and Machinists. The
District Court concluded, however, that § 301 did not
preempt the plaintiff's claims“! and that it was not neces-

“1 The court explained: “Although claims under § 301 . . . in fact, are
claims that are completely preempted and must be heard in a federal forum,
there are no such claims in this case, as I understand it. . . .

“Section 301 [provides that] . . . ‘state law is preempted insofar as resolu-
tion of the state law claim requires the interpretation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement.’ . . . Section 301 preemption does not apply for at least
two reasons.

“First, I do not believe that interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement or other labor agreement is required in this case. Referral to that,
agreement, reference to it, reading it, understanding what it says is required.
It is not required that the judge hearing this case interpret . . . a labor
agreement.

“Moreover, § 301 preemption occurs in a case where parties to a collective
bargaining agreement disagree about their rights or obligations under that

—_— TTT
sary to rule on whether the Garmon or Machinists
doctrines applied because “neither of those types of
preemption require[s] that the preempted claim be
heard in federal court. Rather, those types of preemp-
tion are requirements that federal law govern but . . .
state judges are fully able and often do apply federal
Jaw ... . And it seems to me, therefore, that the argu-
ments made about whether some of these claims are
or are not preempted by federal law are claims that or
arguments that must be made in state court following
remand.” On remand, the trial court stated in its memo-
randum of decision that it would “not reach and decide
the alternative grounds advanced in support of the
defendants’ motions to dismiss” in light of its conclu-
sion that the plaintiffs lacked standing to prosecute the
action on other grounds.

We begin with a brief explanation of the principles
set forth in Garmon and Machinists. “Although the
[National Labor Relations Act] itself contains no
express pre-emption provision, [the United States
Supreme Court has] held that Congress implicitly man-
dated two types of pre-emption as necessary to imple-
ment federal labor policy. The first, known as Garmon
pre-emption . . . is intended to preclude state interfer-
ence with the [NLRB’s] interpretation and active
enforcement of the integrated scheme of regulation
established by the [National Labor Relations Act]... .
To this end, Garmon pre-emption forbids [s]tates to
regulate activity that the [National Labor Relations Act]
protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.
. . . The second, known as Machinists pre-emption,
forbids both the [NLRB] and [s]tates to regulate conduct.

agreement, and that is simply not what we have in this case. We don’t have
aunion or union member suing an employer or vice versa. Rather, we have
a disappointed bidder suing a number of parties and claiming that the
obligation in the bid documents to use union labor is unlawful. That simply
is not the type of claim that § 301 reaches.”

449

that Congress intended be unregulated because left to
be controlled by the free play of economic forces. . . .
Machinists pre-emption is based on the premise that
Congress struck a balance of protection, prohibition,
and laissez-faire in respect to union organization, collec-
tive bargaining, and labor disputes.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America v. Brown, 554
USS. 60, 65, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 171 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2008).

The nonstate defendants’ first six arguments rely on
their interpretation and application of Garmon. They
contend that the state has no jurisdiction (1) to resolve
the plaintiffs’ claims that the PLA is “illegal,” (2) to
regulate or preclude utilization of a PLA on a publicly
funded project, (8) to apply state law to regulate an
employee's right to join or not to join a union, (4) to
regulate the use or application of construction prehire
contracts, (5) to apply state law to regulate the use or
application of construction subcontracting clauses, and
(6) to apply state law to regulate union security provi-
sions. All of the foregoing arguments share the common.
premise that the imposition of a mandatory PLA bid
specification is within the category of activities that
the National Labor Relations Act protects, prohibits, or
arguably protects or prohibits. See Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America v. Brown, supra,
554 U.S. 65. The nonstate defendants also argue that
the plaintiffs’ claims are barred under Machinists.

The plaintiffs respond that they are not asking the
court to interpret the PLA requirement or to apply it
in any manner that affects labor relations between
employers and their employees but are merely asking
the court to take full cognizance of the disparate effects
of the PLA, to understand its provisions, and to deem
its mandatory application to all contractors, subcon-
tractors and field labor working on the projects a viola-
tion of the competitive bidding laws and state con-

— TT
stitutional provisions. The plaintiffs thus argue that nei-
ther Garmon nor Machinists operates to preclude their
claims and that the state has jurisdiction under the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Building &
Construction Trades Council of the Metropolitan Dis-
trict v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Massa-
chusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., supra, 507 U.S. 233 (Boston
Harbor), that a similar PLA bid specification was not
preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. We
agree with the plaintiffs. _

In Boston Harbor, an association of nonunion con-
tractors sought to enjoin the enforcement of a manda-
tory bid specification that required all successful
bidders and subcontractors to agree to abide by a PLA
negotiated by the Massachusetts Water Resources
Authority (MWRA) and the local trade unions. Id., 221-
22. The association had challenged the bid specification
on multiple grounds, including preemption under the
National Labor Relations Act. Id., 223. After summariz-
ing the preemption doctrines articulated in Garmon
and Machinists, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded: “When we say that the [National Labor Rela-
tions Act] pre-empts state law, we mean that [it]
prevents a [s]tate from regulating within a protected
zone, whether it be a zone protected and reserved for
market freedom, see Machinists, or for NLRB jurisdic-
tion, see Garmon. A [s]tate does not regulate, however,
simply by acting within one of these protected areas.
When a [s]tate owns and manages property, for exam-
ple, it must interact with private participants in the
marketplace. In so doing, the [s]tate is not subject to
pre-emption by the [National Labor Relations Act],
because pre-emption doctrines apply only to state regu-
lation.

“Our decisions in this area support the distinction
between government as regulator and government as
proprietor. We have held consistently that the [National

451

Labor Relations Act] was intended to supplant state
labor regulation, not all legitimate state activity that
affects labor.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 226-27. In
light of this precedent, the court held that the PLA bid
specification did not constitute government regulation,
and, therefore, it was not subject to preemption under
Garmon or Machinists. Id., 232. The court further
explained: “[The PLA bid specification] constitutes pro-
prietary conduct on the part of the [clommonwealth of
Massachusetts, which legally has enforced a valid
[PLA]. As Chief Judge [Stephen] Breyer aptly noted in
his dissent in the [First Circuit] Court of Appeals, ‘when
the MWRA, acting in the role of purchaser of construc-
tion services, acts just like a private contractor would
act, and conditions its purchasing [on] the very sort of
labor agreement that Congress explicitly authorized and.
expected frequently to find, it does not “regulate” the
workings of the market forces that Congress expected
to find; it exemplifies them.’ .. .

“Because . . . [the PLA bid specification] is not pre-
empted by the [National Labor Relations Act], it follows
that a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
this bid specification was improper.” (Citation omit-
ted.) Id., 232-33.

Although the issue in Boston Harbor was limited to
whether federal preemption applied to the enforcement
of an otherwise lawful PLA; see id., 220; the same logic
applies to the plaintiffs’ state law claims in the present
case. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs’
claims are not preempted by federal labor law under

The First Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the mandatory PLA
bid specification was invalid due to federal preemption under the National
Labor Relations Act. See Associated Builders & Contractors of Massachu-
setts/Rhode Island, Inc. v. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, 985
F.2d 345, 355 (1st Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Building & Construction Trades
Council of the Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders & Contractors
of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., supra, 607 U.S. 218.

452

Garmon or Machinists because the city was acting in
a proprietary capacity as a purchaser of construction
services, rather than as a regulator, when it entered
into the agreement with the local unions and imposed
the mandatory PLA bid specification on successful bid-
ders for the two school construction projects.® The
District Court made the same observation when it noted
that, “in this situation, the [city] is acting like a private
purchaser of construction services and is permitted

. . to state a preference for union or, if it were to
choose to do so, nonunion labor, just as any other buyer
of construction services in the market could. I believe
that view is supported by the [United States] Supreme
Court's decision in . . . Boston Harbor.”

Moreover, this is not the only court that has reached
such a conclusion. In George Harms Construction Co.
v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 137 N.J. 8, 644 A.2d
76 (1994), the New Jersey Supreme Court, in consider-
ing whether New Jersey law prohibited PLAs, observed:
“TU|nder Boston Harbor, federal labor law does not
prohibit a state entering the construction market from
using the same construction-industry exception regard-
ing [PLAs] that private purchasers of construction labor
use. However, a state’s laws may prohibit a [PLA] speci-
fication in public contracts without running afoul of
the [National Labor Relations Act]. Garmon preemption
does not apply because a state-law prohibition of [PLAs]
on public projects is merely one way in which a state
may choose to act as a market participant in the con-
struction industry. In other words, a state may choose

# We are not persuaded by the contrary view in any of the supplemental
authorities urged by the nonstate defendants. See Tri-M Group, LLC v.
Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 418-26 (8d Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Rancho Santiago
Community College District, 623 F.3d 1011, 1023-29 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied sub nom. Bertalan v. Rancho Santiago Community College District,

US. _, 181 S. Ct, 2096, 179 L. Ed. 2d 891 (2011); Building Industry
Electrical Contractors Assn. v. New York, Docket No. 10 Civ. 8002 (RPP),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86759, *17-*35 (S.D.NY. August 5, 2011).

453

to enter or not to enter a [PLA] just like any other
purchaser of construction services. Machinists pre-
emption also does not apply because a state-law prohi-
bition of [PLAs] on public projects does not constitute
impermissible regulation of an area that the [National
Labor Relations Act] contemplated would be left to
the free play of economic forces. Such a prohibition
amounts to nothing more than the public equivalent
of a corporation’s [bylaw] regarding the purchase of
construction services. In short, when astate uses [PLAs]
on public projects, it is not acting as a regulator of
private actors; rather, it is merely defining its role as a
proprietor/purchaser of labor in the construction indus-
try. Thus, because the [National Labor Relations Act]
does not preempt the field, [it] must [be] determine[d]
whether New Jersey law prohibits [PLAs].” Id., 26-27.

The nonstate defendants argue that the plaintiffs in
the present case asked the trial court to apply state law
to preclude a public entity’s right to utilize a PLA ona
publicly funded construction project but that the United
States Supreme Court has noted that denying a public
entity the option to utilize a PLA, such as one available
to a private owner or developer, places restrictions on.
Congress’ intended free play of economic forces that the
court identified in Machinists. The nonstate defendants
thus argue that such a regulatory effort arguably falls
within the Machinists doctrine and that the lower court
lacks jurisdiction to hold the PLA “ ‘illegal,’” as the
plaintiffs have urged. The nonstate defendants, how-
ever, misconstrue the plaintiffs’ claim. The plaintiffs
are not claiming that a public entity should be precluded
from utilizing a PLA on a publicly funded construction
project but that the mandatory application of a PLA
requirement to all contractors, subcontractors and field
labor working on the school construction projects in
this case and on other public school construction proj-
ects in Connecticut is a violation of the competitive

454

bidding laws and state antitrust law. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs’ claim does not fall within the purview of
Machinists, as the nonstate defendants contend, and
we conclude that federal law does not preempt their
state law claims. For this reason, we reject the nonstate
defendants’ alternative ground for affirmance of the
trial court’s judgment.

B
Sovereign Immunity

The state defendants claim that the trial court’s dis-
missal of the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing
can be affirmed in part on the alternative ground that
the plaintiffs’ claims against them“ are barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs respond
that the state defendants’ sovereign immunity claim
cannot be considered because of their failure to file
a timely preliminary statement of issues pursuant to
Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1) or a cross appeal pursuant
to Practice Book § 61-8. The plaintiffs further argue
that, even if this defect is overlooked, sovereign immu-
nity does not protect the state defendants because they
clearly intruded on the plaintiffs’ constitutionally pro-
tected interests and acted in excess of their statutory
authority. We conclude that the state defendants’ sover-
eign immunity claim is not barred by the untimely filing
of their preliminary statement and that their claim suc-
ceeds on its merits.

The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. As previously noted, the trial
court stated in its memorandum of decision that it
would “not reach and decide the alternative grounds
advanced in support of the defendants’ motions to dis-
miss because . . . the plaintiffs lack[ed] sufficient

“ Counts one, four, five, six, nine and ten of the ten count second amended
complaint apply to the state defendants as well as certain of the nonstate
defendants.

455

interest in the outcome of [the] controversy to justify
deciding the issues thereby presented on the basis of
their advocacy.” Thereafter, the state defendants did
not file a preliminary statement of issues within the
required twenty days of the plaintiffs’ filing of their
preliminary statement of issues but waited more than
seven months before filing a document entitled, “Defen-
dants’ Amended Preliminary Statement of the Issues,”
in which they identified as the sole issue whether the
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity. They also did not file a cross appeal.

We first consider the plaintiffs’ claim that the untime-
liness of the state defendants’ preliminary statement of
issues and their failure to file a cross appeal are fatal
procedural flaws. Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1) provides
in relevant part: “If any appellee wishes to (A) present
for review alternate grounds upon which the judgment
may be affirmed . . . that appellee shall file a prelimi-
nary statement of issues within twenty days from the
filing of the appellant’s preliminary statement of the
issues.

“Whenever the failure to identify an issue in a prelimi-
nary statement of issues prejudices an opposing party,
the court may refuse to consider such issue.”

Practice Book § 61-8 provides: “Any appellee or
appellees aggrieved by the judgment or decision from
which the appellant has appealed may jointly or sever-
ally file a cross appeal within ten days from the filing
of the appeal. Except where otherwise provided, the
filing and form of cross appeals, extensions of time for
filing them, and all subsequent proceedings shall be the
same as though the cross appeal were an original
appeal. No entry or record fee need be paid.” We con-
clude that neither rule of practice precludes this court’s
consideration of the state defendants’ sovereign immu-
nity claim.

—_—

With respect to the untimely filing of the preliminary
statement of issues, we concluded in Mickey v. Mickey,
292 Conn. 597, 603 n.9, 974 A.2d 641 (2009), in which the
procedural issues raised by the appellee as alternative
grounds for affirmance had not been identified in the
required preliminary statement, that, although the
record did not indicate that the appellee had filed a
preliminary statement, we nonetheless would review
the issues because the appellant had not been preju-
diced by the lack of such a statement. In the present,
case, the state defendants filed the required preliminary
statement but the filing was merely untimely. Moreover,
the plaintiffs have not argued that the untimely filing
was prejudicial, and we see no reason why they would
be prejudiced by our review of the state defendants’
claim. See Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1) (“[w]Jhenever
the failure to identify an issue in a preliminary statement
of issues prejudices an opposing party, the court may
refuse to consider such issue”). Accordingly, we con-
clude that the untimely filing of the state defendants’
preliminary statement of issues does not bar review of
their sovereign immunity claim.

With respect to the state defendants’ failure to file a
cross appeal, there would have been no reason for them
to do so because they were not aggrieved by the trial
court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action. We thus pro-
ceed to consider the merits of the sovereign immu-
nity claim.

We begin with the governing legal principles. “Sover-
eign immunity relates to a court’s subject matter juris-
diction over a case . . . and therefore presents a
question of law over which we exercise de novo review.
... The principle that the state cannot be sued without
its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established
under our case law. . . . It has deep roots in this state
and our legal system in general, finding its origin in
ancient common law. . . . Not only have we recog-

457

nized the state’s immunity as an entity, but [w]e have
also recognized that because the state can act only
through its officers and agents, a suit against a state
officer concerning a matter in which the officer repre-
sents the state is, in effect, against the state. . . .
Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly con-
strued under our jurisprudence.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284
Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007). The presumption
of sovereign immunity is not absolute and may be over-
come “(1) when the legislature, either expressly or by
force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the
state’s sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an action
seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a
substantial claim that the state or one of its officers
has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights . . .
and (8) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive
relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful
conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the
officer’s statutory authority.” (Citations omitted.) Id.,
720. “In making this determination, this court has recog-
nized the well established principle that statutes in dero-
gation of sovereign immunity should be strictly
construed. . . . [When] there is any doubt about their
meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes
the least rather than the most change in sovereign
immunity.” (internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 712.

In light of our conclusion in part III B of this opinion
that the individual plaintiffs lack standing, and because
the plaintiffs do not challenge the state defendants’
sovereign immunity claim on the ground of legislative
waiver, the only remaining issue is whether the state
defendants fall within the sovereign immunity excep-
tion that they acted in excess of their statutory authority
on the basis of the allegations in counts one and six
of the plaintiffs’ complaint. In this regard, the state
defendants argue that they have not waived sovereign

—

immunity because § 10-287 imposes a mandate on
municipalities, not on the state defendants, to select
the lowest responsible qualified bidder. Given the
state’s lack of participation in the bid selection process,
the state defendants contend that there is no statutory
duty that they exceeded with respect to the school
construction projects. They argue that their conduct,
as alleged in the complaint, is far too attenuated, remote
and unrelated to the underlying issues to strip them of
their sovereign immunity. They further point out that,
on its face, the complaint alleges only that the state
defendants “allow[ed]” the PLA to be implemented and
applied to the school construction projects and, conse-
quently, that the complaint falls short of alleging that
they acted in excess of their statutory authority.

The plaintiffs respond that the state defendants were
not insignificant participants in the bidding process
because § 10-287" requires the department to oversee

General Statutes § 10-287 provides in relevant part: “(b) (1) All orders
and contracts for school building construction receiving state assistance
under this chapter, except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection,
shall be awarded to the lowest responsible qualified bidder only after a
public invitation to bid... .

“(2) All orders and contracts for architectural or construction management
services shall be awarded from a pool of not more than the four most
responsible qualified proposers after a public selection process. Such pro-
cess shall, at a minimum, involve requests for qualifications, followed by
requests for proposals, including fees, from the proposers meeting the qualifi-
cations criteria of the request for qualifications process. . . . Following the
qualification process, the awarding authority shall evaluate the proposals
to determine the four most responsible qualified proposers using those
criteria previously listed in the requests for qualifications and requests for
proposals for selecting architectural or construction management services
specific to the project or school district. Such evaluation criteria shall include
due consideration of the proposer's pricing for the project, experience with
work of similar size and scope as required for the order or contract, organiza-
tional and team structure for the order or contract, past performance data,
including, but not limited to, adherence to project schedules and project
budgets and the number of change orders for projects, the approach to the
work required for the contract and documented contract oversight capabili-
ties, and may include criteria specific to the project. Final selection by the
awarding authority is limited to the pool of the four most responsible quali-

459

and administer reimbursement funding for 95 percent
of the city’s school construction costs. The plaintiffs
note that the department must approve project plans
and specifications as well as the bidding procedures and
that, if the department had determined that mandatory
PLAs were impermissible, PLAs would have been elimi-
nated from all taxpayer funded municipal school con-
struction projects. Instead, the plaintiffs argue that the
department issued a “letter opinion” in 1997 via the
state office of the attorney general providing that PLAs
on state funded, municipal school construction projects
do not violate § 10-287 and that the department has
adopted that policy. The plaintiffs thus contend that,
because the state defendants have determined that
PLAs are permissible, they have in effect refused to
enforce the statutory prescription requiring that awards
shall go to the lowest, responsible, qualified bidder. We
agree with the state defendants.

fied proposers and shalll include consideration of all criteria included within
the request for proposals. As used in this subdivision, ‘most responsible
qualified proposer’ means the proposer who is qualified by the awarding
authority when considering price and the factors necessary for faithful
performance of the work based on the criteria and scope of work included
in the request for proposals.

“(¢) If the commissioner determines that a building project has not met
the approved conditions of the original application, the State Board of
Education may withhold subsequent state grant payments for said project
until appropriate action, as determined by the commissioner, is taken to
cause the building project to be in compliance with the approved conditions
or may require repayment of all state grant payments for said project when
such appropriate action is not undertaken within a reasonable time.

“(a@) Each town or regional school district shall submit a final grant
application to the Department of Education within one year from the date
of completion and acceptance of the building project by the town or regional
school district, If a town or regional school district fails to submit a final
grant application within said period of time, the commissioner may withhold
ten per cent of the state reimbursement for such project.”

‘The plaintiffs also refer to the state defendants’ authority pursuant to
General Statutes § 49-41, which requires that contractors provide to the
state or municipality performance bonds for contracts to construct, modify
or repair public buildings and public works.

460

“For a claim under the third exception [to sovereign
immunity], the plaintiffs must do more than allege that
the defendants’ conduct was in excess of their statutory
authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish
facts that reasonably support those allegations. . . . In
the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint
to support the applicability of these exceptions, the
granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity
grounds is proper.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, supra,
284 Conn. 721.

We conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to allege
facts that reasonably support their claims against the
state defendants. The principal allegations against the
state defendants in the second amended complaint are
that “the . . . [department] is providing 90 [percent]
of the funding for the entire [p]roject, including the
{e]lectrical [bid [p]ackage, through money paid by Con-
necticut taxpayers and allocated by the [s]tate [I]egisla-
ture” pursuant to §§ 10-287 (b) and 4b-91 (c), which
require that contracts shall be awarded to the lowest
responsible qualified bidder prequalified under § 4a-
100, “[a]t all times relevant hereto, the [department],
acting by its [c]Jommissioner or his agents, has been
aware of [the] [city’s . . . actions in imposing [the]
mandatory PLA, and has continued to fund the [p]roject
nonetheless,” and “[b]y implementing [the] PLA, or
allowing its implementation, for a public school con-
struction project funded almost entirely by the taxpay-
ers of the [s]tate of Connecticut and also the taxpayers
of the [city of Hartford, the [c]ity, the [department]
and the [c]ommissioner are undermining the very object
and integrity of the public competitive bidding process,
and are exhibiting patent favoritism to the trade unions
and to union contractors, all to the unfair and severe
disadvantage of [nonunion] contractors, such as ECI
and its individual plaintiff . . . [nonunion] employees

461

in this particular instance.” Other paragraphs allege
that the city imposed the PLA requirement, was the
“awarding authority” and acted beyond its delegated
authority in not awarding the contracts at issue to the
lowest, responsible, qualified bidder. These allegations
are insufficient to support a.claim that the state defen-
dants acted in excess of their statutory authority.

The judgment is reversed insofar as the trial court
dismissed the claims of the named plaintiff, Electrical
Contractors, Inc., against the defendants city of Hart-
ford, Morganti Group, Inc., Downes Construction Com-
pany, LLC, and Custom Electric, Inc., and the case is
remanded with direction to deny the motions to dismiss
as to those claims and for further proceedings according
to law; the judgment is affirmed insofar as the trial court
dismissed the claims of the named plaintiff, Electrical
Contractors, Inc., against the named defendant, the
department of education, and the defendant Mark K.
McQuillan, the commissioner of education, and insofar
as the trial court dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs
Jose L. Gonzalez, Jose G. Maldonado, Dan Czyzewski,
Bradley Wheaton, Craig Busca and Sean Smith.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and NORCOTT,
PALMER, McLACHLAN and EVELEIGH, Js., concurred.

HARPER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In determining that the named plaintiff, Electrical Con-
tractors, Inc. (ECD)! has standing under Connecticut’s
competitive bidding statutes, the majority opinion
departs from the narrowly circumscribed doctrine of
standing established by our past cases dealing with
these statutes. Our subject matter jurisdiction in this
area is inherently limited, and the majority’s expansion
of that jurisdiction disregards both our own precedent,

1 See footnote 1 of the majority opinion for a listing of the individual
plaintiffs named in this case,

462

particularly this court's clear and controlling holding
in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v.
Hartford, 251 Conn. 169, 181, 740 A.2d 813 (1999), and
the lawmaking authority of the legislature. I further
disagree that ECI has adequately briefed its claim under
the Connecticut Antitrust Act. General Statutes § 35-24
et seq. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from these
holdings.

I

lagree with the majority that, under settled case law,
the question of whether ECI has standing to allege a
violation of the competitive bidding statutes turns on
whether its claim meets the following standard: ECI
“had to establish a colorable claim that: (1) [it] either
(a) had submitted a bid or (b) would have submitted
a bid but for the alleged illegalities in the bidding pro-
cess and the precluded bid was functionally equivalent
to the project specifications; and (2) the alleged illegali-
ties amounted to fraud, corruption, favoritism or acts
undermining the objective and integrity of the compet-
itive bidding process.” (Emphasis added.) Connecticut
Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hariford, supra,
251 Conn. 181.

As our case law demonstrates, to fulfill this test’s
second prong, a plaintiff must make a colorable claim
that the bidding process—from the development of
project specifications and bidding rules to the applica-
tion of these to bidders—was tainted by procedural
impropriety. The court held that standing was appro-
priate in Spiniello Construction Co. v. Manchester, 189
Conn. 539, 545, 456 A.2d 1199 (1983), for example,
because the defendant allegedly had accepted an irregu-
Jar bid based on an oral rule addendum communicated
only to one bidder, precluding other bidders from com-
peting on equal terms. Conversely, in Ardmare Con-
struction Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 499, 505, 467

463

A.2d 674 (1983), this court concluded that the plaintiff
lacked standing to challenge the rejection of its lowest
bid for failure to include a handwritten signature on
the bid document because the signature requirement—
however arbitrary or detrimental to the plaintiff—was
uniformly applied and there was no showing of fraud
or favoritism. This court reiterated the decisive signifi-
cance of procedural irregularity in Unisys Corp. v. Dept.
af Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 696, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991),
when it determined that an evidentiary hearing was
required to determine whether the plaintiffs claim
implicated such irregularities. There, the plaintiff had
alleged that the state favored one vendor over others
by using information it received from that vendor to
draft requests for proposals that could be fulfilled only
by that vendor and by providing information relevant
to the requests exclusively to that vendor. Id., 691. The
court concluded that this result—a single source bid
specification—was not inherently illegal but that it
would be invalid if it were intended to benefit the spe-
cific vendor rather than the public. We held that the
plaintiff was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether it had standing under this standard. Id.,
695-96. In Connecticut Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 169, the court con-
cluded that unsuccessful bidders lacked standing to
challenge the legality of a project labor agreement. The
court concluded, inter alia, that the issue of standing
turned not on whether some bidders were effectively
excluded but on whether the bidding process was
applied consistently and in good faith. Id., 189.

Here, ECT’s long list of grievances; see footnote 23
of the majority opinion; fails to allege any of the features
of procedural impropriety we previously have consid-
ered significant. There is no claim of informational
asymmetry such that some bidders knew more than
others, no claim that the defendants, the city of Hart-

464.

ford, the state department of education and its commis-
sioner, and four other entities,? engaged in secret
communications with any bidders, no suggestion that
the defendants applied rules differently to some bidders
than to others, no claim that officials acted in bad faith.
Instead, ECI premises its complaint on the fact that all
bidders, “union” and “nonunion” alike, were subjected
equally to the same bidding terms and requirements
and that the defendants did not exempt ECI from that
process. Rather than procedural irregularity, which ECI
effectively requests rather than protests, ECI’s central
complaint appears to be based on the ultimate eco-
nomic harm it allegedly will sustain because the project
labor agreement requirements put it at a competitive
disadvantage, effectively precluding it from being a suc-
cessful bidder on public contracts. To tether this com-
plaint to the purposes of the competitive bidding
statutes, ECI further alleges that by requiring bidders
to perform all project work with union labor under the
terms of a project labor agreement, nonunion contrac-
tors, whose business models are based on maintaining
a labor supply outside of the union system, are disad-
vantaged in their ability to successfully bid and there-
after perform. As a result, ECI argues, the project labor
agreement decreases competition for the project and
increases the project’s costs to the public.

As the trial court properly recognized, this claim is
essentially identical to one this court rejected in Con-
necticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hart-
ford, supra, 251 Conn. 169, a case in which ECI also
was a plaintiff as a subcontractor to the named plaintiff.
In that case, we explained: “The crux of the associa-
tion’s claim is that its general contractor members were
precluded from participation in the bid process because
the project labor agreement requirement imposed costs

? See footnotes 3 and 4 of the majority opinion for a complete listing of
the defendants in this case.

A

upon nonunion general contractors that made it eco-
nomically unfeasible for them to bid. As a result, the
association argues, general contractors and the associa-
tion have standing to challenge the project labor
agreement as a specification that . . . arbitrarily and
anticompetitively limits access to the bidding process.
The association contends that limiting the number of
potential bidders violates not only the integrity of com-
petitive bidding but also injures the general public by
driving up the cost of government funded projects.”
Id., 187. .

Our reasoning in that case for concluding that such
a claim did not provide a basis for standing bears
repeating, as it applies with equal force to the present
case: “Even assuming that the project labor agreement
requirement might increase the project’s cost, we know
of no requirement in the competitive bidding statutes
that propels cost considerations to the top of the list
of appropriate considerations for public contract speci-
fications. If cost alone were the determinative factor
of appropriate bid criteria, disappointed bidders or non-
bidders would have virtually unlimited opportunities to
litigate project specifications on the ground of alternate
designs, materials, safety requirements and so on. Such
litigation would involve courts in comparative cost
assessments that would severely impair the discretion
of governmental bodies entrusted with the responsibil-
ity for governmental construction projects. It is neither
unusual nor unfair for project specifications to give
some potential bidders an economic advantage over
others because of factors such as the bidder’s expertise,
specialization and reliability.

“The claim made by the [named plaintiff] .. . is
much more sweeping than the one that we recognized
in Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, supra, 220 Conn.
690-91. The objection to the specification in Unisys
Corp. was not that [equipment from the defendant Inter-

—_

national Business Machines Corporation] would be
more expensive, but that vendors of functionally equiva-
lent hardware or software had been excluded from the
bidding process. Id., 691, 695. Our focus was not on the
possibility that a particular specification might limit the
number of eligible bidders, but on whether the specifi-
cation necessarily had an adverse impact on the integ-
rity of the bidding process. See id., 696.

“As the trial court observed, the record . . . demon-
strates a nondiscriminatory decision by the city to use
a project labor agreement, in the public interest, to
avoid delays in the project and to recruit and maintain.
the necessary workforce. The court reasonably deter-
mined that the city’s legitimate business decision fell
within the bounds of the discretion afforded to the city
by our competitive bidding statutes?

“In conclusion, we reiterate our adherence to the
boundaries of the standing principles established in
our existing competitive bidding case law. . . . The
determinative factor [under that case law] . . . was
not whether some bidders had been precluded from
the bidding process but whether the requirements in
that process had been applied consistently and in good.
faith. . . . That, essentially, is what has occurred in
the present case as well.” (Citations omitted; emphasis
added.) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contrac-
tors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 187-89.

The reasoning and conclusions articulated in Con-
necticut Associated Builders & Contractors dictate the
result here, and I am unconvinced by the majority's

In the present case, there is evidence in the record supporting the legiti-
macy of this decision. The record reflects that project labor agreements
had yielded successful results in other projects in the state. Moreover,
regardless of whether conditions are such that this particular project labor
agreement will yield the same result, it cannot be said that the objective of
the defendant city of Hartford in requiring this project labor agreement is
antithetical to the purpose of the competitive bidding statutes.

467

attempts to distinguish the present case from it and to
diminish its precedential effect. The majority empha-
sizes that the court in Connecticut Associated Build-
ers & Contractors did not reach the merits of the
plaintiffs’ claim, but that fact is irrelevant; the court in
that case properly did not reach the merits because it
lacked jurisdiction. The court articulated at length the
reasons why it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the merits given the limited basis for standing
in this area, and these reasons equally should preclude
reaching the merits of the claim in the present case.
Like the plaintiffs in Connecticut Associated Builders &
Contractors, ECI has failed to make any colorable fac-
tual showing of procedural impropriety. Although ECI
has proffered arguably relevant evidence regarding the
ultimate financial consequences of the project labor
agreement, as the plaintiffs in Connecticut Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn.
187 n.12, apparently did not, evidence of a problematic
outcome is alone inadequate for purposes of showing
procedural impropriety under our settled case law and
under the reasoning of that case.

The subsequent enactment of prequalification
requirements under General Statutes § 4a-100, more-
over, does nothing to disturb the court’s reasoning in
Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors. That
statute has absolutely no bearing on what may be
included in the specifications of a public project, such
as a project labor agreement,* and it creates no new

‘The majority's approach to cost appears to conflate two distinct levels
of cost consideration: first, the specifications of a project—a building's
location, its size, the specific construction materials, the time to completion,
permissible levels of noise or pollution, etc.—dictate in broad terms what
aproject will cost. After those specifications are set, the competitive bidding
process allows a public entity to find the contractor who will satisfactorily
perform the prespecified project at the lowest price. Section 4a-100 plays
a role in determining who may participate in this second level bidding

_ Process, but it is wholly unrelated to the initial development of project
specifications at the first level. ECI here seeks to challenge not the process
of submitting bids but the legitimacy of a mandated specification of the

—

basis for standing in relation to the competitive bidding
laws. Indeed, to the extent this statute relates to stand-
ing at all, it would seem to limit the field of prospective
bidders who could satisfy the first prong of the standing
test to those who are prequalified for the project, not
to expand the scope of the second prong of that test.

project itself, namely, that contractors abide by a project labor agreement.
ECI expressly refused to comply with this specification, and consequently
it was by definition not the lowest bidder on the project specified by the
defendants. ECI’s claim in the present case essentially asks us to nullify
that specification in order to render its low bid compliant on the ground
that the specification increases the project's cost. Not only is this claim
unrelated to § 4a-100, but the court in Connecticut Associated Builders &
Contractors already has spoken directly to this issue: “[W]e know of no
requirement in the competitive bidding statutes that propels cost considera-
tions to the top of the list of appropriate considerations for public contract
specifications. If cost alone were the determinative factor of appropriate bid
criteria, disappointed bidders or nonbidders would have virtually unlimited
opportunities to litigate project specifications on the ground of alternate
designs, materials, safety requirements and so on.” (Emphasis added.)
Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251
Conn. 187-88.

‘The potentially absurd results invited by the majority's undifferentiated
emphasis on cost may be illustrated by considering a hypothetical challenge
under the competitive bidding statutes to a public project based on material,
rather than labor, costs. Suppose a public entity solicits bids to construct
abuilding with a slate roof, rather than an asphalt shingled roof. The decision
to specify the roofing materials is made on the basis of desired longevity,
aesthetic preference, or arbitrary whim. Slate is much more difficult to work
with than asphalt, and only a subset of contractors possess the skill and
access to materials needed to work with slate efficiently. Other contractors,
who out of habit, aesthetic preference, or chance do not typically work
with slate, are therefore, as ECI here complains, placed at a significant
competitive disadvantage because of the specified material input. Under
the logic of the majority opinion, if a “non-slate” contractor were to submit
a low bid, conditional on being allowed to construct the roof from asphalt,
and the bid were rejected, the disappointed noncompliant bidder would
have standing to bring an action based on a claimed violation of competitive
bidding laws by asserting that requiring slate roofs would decrease competi-
tion and increase the costs to the public. This is plainly nonsensical and
inconsistent with the limited grounds of standing permitted under existing
Connecticut legislation. There might be reason to doubt the wisdom of
insisting on a slate roof, particularly if the decision is the product of arbitrary
whim, and there may be cause for questioning the mandated use of arguably
more expensive union labor. But under the present constitutional division

| rrt“‘a‘aGCSeS.UhUFT;.

I further disagree with the majority's characterization
of the comprehensive discussion of this issue in Con-
necticut Associated Builders & Contractors, which
constituted one of the two grounds on which the court
in that case concluded that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, as “nothing more than dicta.” The court
declared at the outset of its analysis that “the plaintiffs
did not establish that the general contractor members
of the association had met either part of this test.”
(Emphasis added.) Connecticut Associated Builders &
Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 186. The two
prongs of our test in Connecticut Associated Builders &
Contractors are both threshold jurisdictional require-
ments that must be met for a plaintiff to have standing
to pursue a hearing on the merits, and the trial court in
the present case plainly held that neither was satisfied.>
Sensible jurisprudence and weighty authority strongly
support the proposition, consistent with this court’s
past practice,® that “when two independent reasons are
given to support a judgment, the ruling on neither is
obiter [dictum], but each is the judgment of the court
and of equal validity with the other.” ’ (Internal quota-

of power, in the absence of a colorable claim of procedural corruption,
these are judgments to be made by the legislature, not by this court.

* For this reason, I am not swayed by the majority's citation to Statewide
Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 558 A.2d 986 (1989). In the
present case, both prongs of the test in Connecticut Associated Builders &
Contractors speak equally to subject matter jurisdiction, whereas Rozbicki
refers to a discussion of the merits following a finding that jurisdiction
was lacking.

® See, e.g., Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 789 A.2d 431 (2002) (announcing
two-pronged jurisdictional test and concluding, after thorough analysis, that
neither prong was met in that case).

7 See also, e.g., Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537, 69 S.
Ct. 1235, 93 L. Ed. 1524 (1949) (“where a decision rests on two or more
grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum”); United
States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486, 44 S. Ct. 621, 68 L. Ed.
1110 (1924) (“where there are two grounds, upon either of which an appellate
court may rest its decision, and it adopts both, the ruling on neither is obiter
[dictum], but each is the judgment of the court and of equal validity with
the other” [internal quotation marks omitted]); United States v. Bueno, 585
F.3d 847, 850 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[t]his circuit follows the rule that alternative

470

tion marks omitted.) California v. United States, 438
USS. 645, 689 n.10, 98 S. Ct. 2985, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1018 (1978).

Nonetheless, even if this discussion were dicta, the
reasoning expressed therein would retain its persuasive
force. The claim dealt with in Connecticut Associated
Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn.

holdings are binding precedent and not obiter dicta” {internal quotation
marks omitted]); Bravo v. United States, 582 F.3d 1154, 1162 (11th Cir. 2008)
(providing “[tJhat fan] alternative holding counts because in this circuit
additional or alternative holdings are not dicta, but instead are as binding
as solitary holdings”); Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building Co., 498 F.3d 88, 93
(2d Cir. 2007) (“{a]n alternative conclusion in an earlier case that is directly
relevant to a later case is not dicta; it is an entirely appropriate basis for a
holding in the later case”); United States v. Fulks, 454 F.3d 410, 434-35 (4th
Cir. 2006) (stating that alternative conclusion in prior case that bears directly
‘on subsequent case cannot be dismissed as dicta); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 216 F.3d 1180,
1189 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“where there are two grounds, upon either of which
an appellate court may rest its decision, and it adopts both, the ruling on
neither is obiter [dictum], but each is the judgment of the court, and of
‘equal validity with the other” [internal quotation marks omitted]); United
States v. Rohde, 159 F.3d 1298, 1302 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[The] alternate
holding [was] not dicta. . . . Were this panel inclined to engage in the
business of labeling as dicta one of the two alternative grounds . . . it
would then confront [the] defendant’s failure to demonstrate why that label
ought not adhere to the alternative which is innocuous to her theory, rather
than to the altemative which undermines it.”); Parsons v. Federal Realty
Corp., 148 So. 912, 920 (Fla. 1932) (“‘A ruling in a case fully considered and
decided by an appellate court is not dictum merely because it was not
necessary, on account of one conclusion reached upon one question, to
consider another question the decision of which would have controlled the
judgment. Two or more questions properly arising in a case under the
pleadings and proof may be determined, even though either one would
dispose of the entire case upon its merits, and neither holding is a dictum,
so long as it is properly raised, considered, and determined.”); QOS Net-
works, Ltd. v. Warburg, Pincus & Co., 294 Ga. App. 528, 532-33, 669 S.E.2d
536 (2008) (“A ruling is not dictum merely because the disposition of the
case is or might have been made on some other ground. Where a case
presents two or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine
the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case
is an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such
points can be regarded as having merely the status of a dictum.”); State v.
Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 461, 609 A2d 1280 (1992) (“{rlather than treating
that discussion of the merits as dicta, we consider it an alternative holding”).

471

178, “raise[d] no new issues of principle with respect
to the requirements of standing, either in general or in
the particular context of competitive bidding.” Rather,
the court simply applied ‘established principles devel-
oped in previous cases.’ As I discuss in greater detail
in the following discussion, these prior cases carved
out an exceptional basis for standing as a vehicle for
challenging fraudulent or corrupt official actions, but
they also placed strict limits on that standing. The
majority exceeds these limits, contravening not only
our own precedent but legislative authority as well. The
majority’s concern with advancing the cost saving goals
of competitive bidding laws may be well founded, but
it is for the legislature—not the courts—to determine
who may enforce those statutes and how. The following
outline of the constitutional framework of standing in
general and the historical development of our unusual
standing jurisprudence with respect to competitive bid-
ding illustrates how the majority’s conclusion runs afoul
of these significant principles.

The question of standing deals not only with a party’s
right to seek relief, but also with the fundamental
authority of the court to consider an issue: “[i]f a party
is found to lack standing, the court is without subject
matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn.

® Even while dismissing the reasoning of Connecticut Associated Build-
ers & Contractors as mere dicta, the majority invokes that case to justify
its holding in the present case: “One need only examine the reasons why
the court in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors concluded that
the [named plaintiff] did not have standing to understand why ECI in the
present case does.” (Emphasis in original.) While the majority's assertion
nicely demonstrates that it really is possible to have one’s cake and eat it
too, the argument suffers.from a fundamental logical flaw: simply because
one set of reasons leads to a particular result, it does not follow that the
absence of this reasoning compels a different result, Indeed, it is only by
ignoring all past precedent that the majority is able to suggest that the
specific reasoning articulated in Connecticut Associated Builders & Con-
tractors represents the only basis on which standing is properly denied.

472,

186, 207-208, 994 A.2d 106 (2010). This limit on judicial
authority is, as the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, “a constitutional principle that prevents
courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the
political branches.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349,
116 S. Ct. 2174, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1996). We similarly
have noted that “subject matter jurisdiction is, with
certain constitutional exceptions . . . a matter of stat-
ute, not judicial rule making.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public
Health, 281 Conn. 277, 286, 914 A.2d 996 (2007); see
Conn. Const., amend. XVIII (“[t]he powers of govern-
ment shall be divided into three distinct departments,
and each of them confided to a separate magistracy”).

In keeping with these principles, we have ordinarily
recognized two grounds upon which a plaintiff may
properly have standing to challenge government action:
classical, or common-law, aggrievement and statutory
aggrievement—standing conferred by statute. As the
majority recognizes, ECI plainly does not have standing
on either of these grounds. With respect to competitive
bidding statutes, however, this court has taken the
unusual step of establishing a quasi-statutory basis for
standing that invokes the public oriented goals of com-
petitive bidding laws but that is not specifically
grounded in the statutory text. For many years prior
to creating this new source of standing, this court had
recognized that the competitive bidding statutes “are
for the purpose of inviting competition, to guard against
favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and cor-
ruption in the awarding of municipal contracts, and to
secure the best work or supplies at the lowest price
practicable, and are enacted for the benefit of property
holders and taxpayers, and not for the benefit or enrich-
ment of bidders, and should be so construed and admin-
istered as to accomplish such purpose fairly and
reasonably with sole reference to the public interest.”

473

(nternal quotation marks omitted.) Austin v. Housing
Authority, 143 Conn. 338, 345, 122 A.2d 399 (1956).
Under this traditional rubric, this court determined that
disappointed bidders did not inherently have statutory
standing; Joseph Rugo, Inc: v. Henson, 148 Conn. 430,
435, 171 A.2d 409 (1961); and in doing so the court
noted that “[clourts will only intervene to prevent the
rejection of a bid when the obvious purpose of the
rejection is to defeat the object and integrity of competi-
tive bidding.” Id., 434.

In Spiniello Construction Co. v. Manchester, supra,
189 Conn. 543-45, this court held for the first time that
even though public bidding laws create no cause of
action for disappointed bidders, such a bidder had
standing to pursue a claim that a town had violated
these laws by accepting a conditional combined dis-
count bid based on an oral addendum known only to
one bidder, precluding other bidders from competing
on equal terms. In so holding, we reasoned that “[t]here
is a growing trend for courts to permit one who has
been aggrieved by a refusal to award a public contract
pursuant to lowest responsible bidder provisions to
also vindicate the public interest by challenging such
arbitrary or capricious action by governmental offi-
cials.”® Id., 545. The court later emphasized the limits of

®This court’s decision in Spiniello Construction Co. appears to have been
influenced by the adoption of an “injury in fact” basis for standing in the
federal courts following the enactment of the federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq., which in turn was applied to claims challeng-
ing federal bidding statutes. Our decision cited several federal court
decisions in support of our conclusion. See, e.g, Scanwell Laboratories,
Ine. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (explaining in case
addressing public bidding statute, “{t]he law of standing was greatly modified
by the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act”); id., 872 (“the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act applies to all situations in which a party who is in
fact aggrieved seeks review, regardless of a lack of legal right or specific
statutory language”). This court has long recognized, however, that “{t]he
Connecticut counterpart to [the relevant provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act] . . . is much more limited in scope.” Ardmare Construction
Co. v. Freedman, supra, 191 Conn, 503. The narrower language of our own
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act; General Statutes § 4166 et seq;

ATA

this holding, explaining that: “In Spiniello Construction
Co. v. Manchester, [supra, 539], we recognized that our
prior decisions had the effect of preventing judicial
review of potentially meritorious claims concerning the
implementation and execution of competitive bidding
statutes. We also acknowledged the fact that the group
most benefited by the statute—the public—had no
effective means of protecting their interests.

Thus, we held that where fraud, corruption or acts
undermining the objective and integrity of the bidding
process existed, an unsuccessful bidder did have stand-
ing under the public bidding statute. We limited the
scope of our holding in order to strike the proper bal-
ance between fulfilling the purposes of the competitive
bidding statutes and preventing frequent litigation that
might result in extensive delay in the commencement
and completion of government projects to the detriment
of the public.” (Citations omitted.) Ardmare Construc-
tion Co. v. Freedman, supra, 191 Conn. 504-505.

Iam uncertain of the source of authority underlying
the court’s decision in Spiniello Construction Co.”
Nonetheless, there and in subsequent cases we properly
have cleaved to the long-standing principle that
“{cJourts will only intervene to prevent the rejection of
a bid when the obvious purpose of the rejection is to
defeat the object and integrity of competitive bidding.”
(Emphasis added.) Joseph Rugo, Inc. v. Henson, supra,
148 Conn. 434. Thus, in denying standing in Ardmare
Construction Co. v. Freedman, supra, 191 Conn. 497,
the court explained the factors that led to a different

plainly does not confer on courts the authority to adopt an “injury in fact”
standing analysis, and we have not adopted a similarly expansive standard
for standing to bring claims under any other statutory scheme.

© This court has held that as a matter of formal authority, where “subject
matter jurisdiction is created by statute . . . we have no power to enlarge
or circumnscribe it.” Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn.
757, 763, 628 A.2d 1303 (1998); id. (time window for statutorily created right
of appeal not subject to judicial modification).

475

result than in Spiniello Construction Co.: “There, the
municipality had imparted information to one bidder
that it had not provided other bidders. . . . Thus, par-
ity of information no longer existed among the bidders
as envisioned by the statute. In this case . . . [t]he
construction company which received the contract
award was not given any special advantage over the
plaintiff in submitting its bid, nor was it privy to any
secret information. . . . The [commissioner of admin-
istrative services (commissioner)] did not apply its
requirement inconsistently or in a discriminatory fash-
ion. Nor was there any proof that the commissioner
was acting in bad faith.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 505-506.
The question of whether standing was appropriate, the
court concluded, turned not on the inherent logic or
illogic of the underlying bidding terms but on the pres-
ence of inconsistency or discrimination in the process
of crafting and applying those terms.

In Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, supra, 220 Conn.
696, the court reiterated the significance of procedural
irregularities, noting that “[requests for proposals] are
not necessarily illegal merely because the specifications
of the [requests] can be met by only one vendor. . . .
[M]ore must appear in order to render the specifications
and the contract based thereon illegal . . . . [A]Jn
objectionable and invalidating element is introduced
when specifications are drawn to the advantage of one
manufacturer not for any reason in the public interest
but, rather, to insure the award of the contract to that
particular manufacturer.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. As this court later underscored in Connect-
icut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford,
supra, 251 Conn. 188, “[o]ur focus [in Unisys Corp.]
was not on the possibility that a particular specification
might limit the number of eligible bidders, but on
whether the specification necessarily had an adverse
impact on the integrity of the bidding process.” The

A476

court in Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, supra, 695-96,
drew no ultimate conclusion as to standing, holding
only that these allegations raising specific claims of
information disparity involving one particular competi-
tor.were sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing.”

As Ipreviously have noted, in Connecticut Associated °
Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn.
169, this court reaffirmed these limits on jurisdiction.
The court announced: “In conclusion, we reiterate our
adherence to the boundaries of the standing principles
established in our existing competitive bidding case
law. . . . The determinative factor, we held [in Ard-
mare Construction Co.], was not whether some bidders
had been precluded from the bidding process but
whether the requirements in that process had been
applied consistently and in good faith. . . . That,
essentially, is what has occurred in the present case as
well.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 188-89.

I find troubling the majority’s abandonment of these
“boundaries of the standing principles established in
our existing competitive bidding case law”; id., 188; that
plainly underlie the reasoning of Connecticut Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors and its predecessors. ECI
complains not about procedural corruption but, rather,
about discriminatory effect. As we explicitly held in

1 The majority, in footnote 17 of its opinion, notes that evidentiary hearings
are atypical in motions to dismiss and expresses some doubt regarding
whether a hearing was appropriate here. While I agree with the majority's
general statement of law, this court has stated with respect to competitive
bidding statutes: “Although the plaintif’s were not required to prove the
merits of their claim, they did have the lesser burden of establishing a
colorable claim. . . . Under the test for standing set forth in Unisys Corp.,
Ardmare Construction Co. and Spiniello Construction Co., the trial court
was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide whether the
plaintiffs had established a colorable claim that the project labor agreement
requirement had undermined the integrity or objectives of the competitive
bidding process.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Connecticut Associ-
ated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 182.

ATT

Unisys Corp., however, even the most extreme form
of discriminatory effect—a purchase order designed to -
be fulfilled only by a single possible bidder—does not
alone create a basis for standing. ECI has failed to allege
anything more than an unequal effect of an evenhanded
process, and to permit standing on that basis would be
an exercise of power we do not properly possess. Iam
mindful that cost control undoubtedly is an important
goal of the competitive bidding statutes. But it is for
the legislature to determine which costs are subject to
challenge under the statutes and by whom.

0

ECT’s claim to standing under Connecticut's antitrust
statutes does not suffer from the significant statutory
and jurisprudential barriers discussed in part I of this
concurring and dissenting opinion. In sharp distinction
to the plain absence of a private cause of action under
the competitive bidding statutes, “the legislature
expressly has conferred standing on a broad range of
individuals under the [Connecticut Antitrust Act (act)],
including unsuccessful bidders in a municipal bidding
process.” Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Lid. v. Hartford,
270 Conn. 619, 632, 854 A.2d 1066 (2004). Moreover,
General Statutes § 35-28 explicitly forbids every “con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy . . . [that] are for
the purpose, or have the effect, of” violating the act.
(Emphasis added.) The act thus clearly confers standing
on disappointed bidders to pursue a theory of liability
based on harmful effects.

Nonetheless, I would conclude that ECI’s claim is
inadequately briefed and that we should withhold judg-
ment on this complex issue until it is properly presented

General Statutes § 35-35, for example, provides in relevant part that
“any person . . . injured in its business or property by any violation of
the provisions of this chapter shall recover treble damages . . . .” (Empha-
sis added.)

478

to us. The act implicates both state and federal legisla-
tive schemes; see Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 260 Conn.
59, 72-78, 793 A2d 1048 (2002) (“[tJhe legislature
amended the [act] in 1992 to make explicit its intent
that the judiciary shall interpret the [act] in accordance
with the federal courts’ interpretation of federal anti-
trust law”); and it contains important exceptions per-
taining to, among other things, organized labor. See
General Statutes § 35-31. The trial court’s memorandum
of decision did not articulate that court’s reasons for
denying standing on this claim, and ECT’s appellate brief
does little more than identify the relevant statutes and
point to three unilateral acts by the defendant city of
Hartford: imposing the project labor agreement on all
bidders for the project, imposing the project labor
agreement on nonunion workers and refusing to award
the contract to ECI. ECI also identifies this court’s hold-
ing in Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v. Hartford, supra,
270 Conn. 623, in which we accorded standing to a
disappointed low bidder who claimed that “it was not
awarded the contract due to a conspiratorial agreement
between a [labor] union and the defendant [city], with
the purpose of obtaining a union contract.” ECI, how-
ever, does not point to any such conspiratorial
agreement either in its complaint at the trial court or
in its brief on this issue. “It is well-settled that an
individual or corporation cannot alone contract, com-
bine, or conspire to violate the antitrust laws. Thus, ‘a
violation of [§] 35-28 . . . requires a plurality of actors.’
Shea v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of

Tn its complaint, ECI does allege that “[{ujnlike its union contractor
competitors, ECI never participated in the collective bargaining agreements
and negotiations that resulted in . . . the [project labor agreement] . . . .”
It is unclear, however, what significance this allegation has for purposes of
the antitrust claim. As the majority notes, ECI “[does] not challenge the
legality of the [project labor agreement] or the process by which it was
negotiated but, rather, the fact that it was included in the mandatory bid
specifications with which alll prospective bidders, union and nonunion alike,
were required to comply.” 7

479

New Havens 184 Conn. 285, 306, [489 A.2d 997] (1981)

.” (Citations omitted.) McKeown Distributors,
Ino. v. ‘Gyp- Crete Corp., 618 F. Sup. 632, 645 (D. Conn.
1985). Although a number of contracts and agreements
are likely relevant to this litigation, it is unclear which,
if any, we should consider as the basis for ECI’s claim.

While I would leave open the question of whether a
colorable claim of an antitrust violation could be made
out from the allegations in ECI’s complaint, nonetheless
it is improvident to reach any such conclusion on the
basis of the underdeveloped record and the lack of
adequate attention to this issue by the parties.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from these
holdings.
|

BONNIE DUART v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
(SC 18476)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh, Vertefeuille and
Bear, Js.*

* This case originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting of
Chief Justice Rogers, and Justices Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Eveleigh.
‘Thereafter, Justice Vertefeuille and Judge Bear were added to the panel,
and they have read the record and briefs and listened to the recording of
oral argument.

Argued April 26, 2011—officially released January 24, 2012

Leon M. Rosenblatt, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Gregory T. D’Auria, solicitor general, with whom
were Antoria D. Howard, assistant attorney general,

481

and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, Rich-
ard Blumenthal, former attorney general, Margaret Q.
Chapple, assistant attorney general, and Jane B.
Emons, former assistant attorney general, for the appel-
lee (defendant).

Kathleen Eldergiil filed a brief for the Connecticut
Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Charles Krich filed a brief for the commission on

human rights and opportunities as amicus curiae.
Opinion

McLACHLAN, J. The issue before us in this certified
appeal is whether a party seeking a new trial on the
basis of alleged knowing and deliberate discovery mis-
conduct must show that the result at a new trial would
likely be different.‘ The plaintiff, Bonnie Duart, appeals,
upon our grant of her petition for certification, from
the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial
court’s denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
She claims that the rule that we set forth in Varley v.
Varley, 180 Conn. 1, 428 A.2d 317 (1980), to determine
whether a new trial should be granted on the basis
of allegations that the judgment was obtained through
fraud—which requires, inter alia, that the movant dem-
onstrate a substantial likelihood that the result of anew
trial will be different—does not apply to a motion for
anew trial on the basis of alleged discovery misconduct,
by the nonmoving party.’ She claims, therefore, that

''The issue certified stated: “Whether the rule of Varley v. Varley, 180
Conn. 1, 428 A.2d 817 (1980), which requires a movant to demonstrate that
the results at trial would have been different, applies to posttrial motions
alleging knowing and deliberate discovery misconduct.” Duart v. Dept. of
Correction, 298 Conn. 937, 981 A.2d 1078 (2009). We now rephrase the issue
for ease of discussion.

2 Varley requires the movant to establish the following: “(1) There must
have been no laches or unreasonable delay by the injured party after the
fraud was discovered. (2) There must have been diligence in the original
action, thatis, diligence in trying to discover and expose the fraud. (8) There
must be clear proof of the perjury or fraud. (4) There must be a substantial
likelihood that the result of the new trial will be different.” Varley v. Varley,

482

the Appellate Court improperly applied the standard
set forth in Varley in affirming the judgment of the trial
court. We conclude that the Varley rule as reframed in
this decision applies to motions for a new trial based
on the discovery misconduct of the nonmoving party.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate
Court.

The Appellate Court set forth the following relevant
facts and procedural history. “This case arises out of an
employment dispute between the plaintiff, a lieutenant
with the department of correction, and the defendant,
[the department of correction]. On May 28, 2002, the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the defen-
dant. In count one, she alleged that the defendant dis-
criminated against her on the basis of her gender and
sexual orientation. In count two, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant retaliated against her after she filed
a complaint of discrimination with the commission on.
human rights and opportunities (commission).°

“The plaintiff alleged the following facts in support
of her claims. On October 7, 1999, the plaintiff's supervi-
sor, Duane Kelley, wrote an incident report in which
he alleged that the plaintiff was dating another female
correction officer, Cynthia Bruner, who was in the same
chain of command as the plaintiff.‘ Kelley published
this incident report to the warden, Gurukaur Khalsa.
Following the publication of the incident report, both
Kelley and Khalsa began making false or grossly exag-
gerated allegations against the plaintiff. They harassed
her about her hair, despite her continual compliance

supra, 180 Conn. 4. Only the fourth prong, requiring a different result, is at
issue in this appeal.

*'The plaintiff also had alleged that she was discriminated against because
of her physical disability, namely, endometriosis, but withdrew that claim
prior to trial.

‘Romantic relationships between two people in the same chain of com-
mand are forbidden pursuantto the defendant's administrative directive 2.17.

483

with the rules governing hair length, and, at one point,
Khalsa stated to the plaintiff that if she did not know
how to put her hair up properly, she should get one
of her many women friends to help her. The plaintiff
understood this statement to be in reference to her
sexual orientation. In addition, the plaintiff was accused
falsely of being disrespectful to Kelley and was trans-
ferred to the third shift despite a medical condition that
prevented her from working that particular shift.

“On April 24, 2000, the plaintiff filed her first com-
plaint of discrimination with the commission and the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
After she filed the complaint, the discrimination and
harassment by Kelley and Khalsa became even more
severe, as evidenced by the following events: (1) the
plaintiff was suspended for five days under the pretext
of not complying with the hair regulations and for sup-
posed disrespectful behavior to Kelley; (2) the plaintiff
received her first unsatisfactory evaluation and her pay
raise was taken away; (3) the plaintiff was accused
falsely of failing to follow procedures regarding sick
days, scheduling training and storing facility keys; (4)
the plaintiff was denied vacation time; (5) the plaintiff
was demoted from her position of lieutenant; and (6) the
plaintiff was transferred by another supervisor, Wayne
Valade, to a different correctional facility, which
resulted in a decrease in pay, authority and prestige.
The plaintiff also alleged that both Valade and Kelley
had a practice of harassing female officers.” Duart v.
Dept. of Correction, 116 Conn. App. 758, 760-62, 977
A.2d 670 (2009).5

A jury trial commenced on July 14, 2004. On July 27,
2004, the jury issued a verdict denying the plaintiff's
claims of discrimination on the basis of gender, race

® In July of 2001, the plaintiff filed a second complaint with the commission
asserting retaliation. In April of 2002, she elected to proceed in a civil action.

—

and sexual orientation. On August 6, 2004, the plaintiff
filed a motion in arrest of judgment for extrinsic causes,
to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. In support
of her motion, the plaintiff relied on the defendant's
failure to disclose an anonymous note accusing the
plaintiff of being in a relationship with Bruner, develop-
ments in the defendant’s investigation of a complaint
by Lieutenant Catherine Osten that Kelley and Valade
had retaliated against her, and a 2002 discrimination
complaint filed by Lieutenant Lisa Jackson against
Osten and Kelley.® Assuming, without deciding, that the
defendant had engaged in discovery misconduct, the
trial court concluded that the evidence at issue was
“merely cumulative” of evidence presented at trial and,
as such, “would not have produced a different result.”
The court applied the “result altering” standard as set
forth in Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transporta-
tion Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) (Teamsters),
which requires the movant to show that it “possesses
a potentially meritorious claim or defense which, if
proven, will bring success in its wake,” and denied the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial
court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the defen-
dant’s discovery misconduct had “so perverted the pro-
cess” that it had deprived her of the opportunity to fully
and fairly discover evidence, and that consequently she
was entitled to a new trial. She argued that the trial
court improperly applied the “result altering” standard
set forth in Teamsters, and should have applied the
“substantial interference” test set forth in Anderson v.

°The plaintiff's initial ground for seeking a new trial included newly
discovered evidence. She filed a supplemental memorandum on June 5,
2007, adding discovery misconduct as an additional justification for a new
trial. In this certified appeal, she advances only her claim of discovery mis-
conduct.

EC

Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 926 (1st Cir. 1988), which
requires the movant to show that “the misconduct sub-
stantially interfered with its ability fully and fairly to
prepare for, and proceed at, trial.”

The Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision
by applying the “result altering” standard as articulated
in Varley for a motion for a new trial grounded upon
evidence of fraud, rather than by applying First Circuit
case law. The Appellate Court held that, although the
trial court’s memorandum of decision did not expressly
set out the standard established in Varley, it had “effec-
tively applied the correct standard” in determining that,
even if the defendant had disclosed the evidence at
issue, the evidence was unlikely to produce a different.
result. Duart v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 116 Conn.
App. 772-78. This certified appeal followed.

The plaintiff argues that the Varley rule is inapposite
because discovery misconduct is distinct from miscon-
duct at trial, and she should not be required to prove
that the result of a new trial will be different. Instead,
she suggests that the court should adopt the standard
articulated by the First Circuit in Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc., supra, 862 F.2d 926, or by this court in Ramin v.
Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 915 A.2d 790 (2007). In response,
the defendant contends that the Appellate Court prop-
erly concluded that the “result altering” standard in
Varley applies to both claims of fraud and discovery
misconduct. We agree with the defendant.

Practice Book § 16-35 authorizes motions for a new
trial.” Historically, this court has recognized the diffi-
culty of articulating a “precise rule” applicable to all

Practice Book § 16-35 provides in relevant part: “[M]otions for new trials

. . must be filed with the clerk within ten days after the day the verdict
is accepted; provided that for good cause the judicial authority may extend
this time. The clerk shall notify the trial judge of such filing. Such motions
shall state the specific grounds upon which counsel relies.”

486

motions for new trials for verdicts against the evidence.
Laflin v. Pomeroy, 11 Conn. 440, 445 (1836). In Laflin,
‘we stated that while the court must not interfere with
the “appropriate province of the jury,” it was clear that
it may exercise its authority to grant a new trial when
necessary to serve the “great end of all trials, a fair
and impartial administration of justice.” Id. We further
concluded that the “substantial ends of justice” would
not require a new trial when it did not clearly appear
that “the result would or ought to be different... .”
Id.; see also Wooster v. Glover, 37 Conn. 315, 316 (1870)
(denying petition for new trial when petitioner failed
to show that injustice had been done, even though his
default of appearance was not negligent, because “the
result of a new trial would not probably be different”
[internal quotation marks omitted]).

Over time and in a variety of contexts, this court
consistently has required parties to demonstrate the
likelihood of a different result to show that justice
requires a new trial. For example, we have stated that
the discovery of new evidence warrants a new trial if
“upon all the evidence an injustice had been done,”
but that a new trial will not be granted upon newly
discovered evidence “unless . . . a new trial would
probably produce a different result.” Turner v. Scanlon,
146 Conn. 149, 163, 148 A.2d 334 (1959).' Likewise, if
the court improperly admitted evidence, we will not
disturb the judgment without a showing that the ruling

$ although a motion for a new trial is at issue in this case, the same
showing is required for a petition for anew trial pursuant to General Statutes
§ 52-270 in both civil and criminal cases. See Kubeck v. Foremost Foods
Co., 190 Conn. 667, 670, 461 A.2d 1380 (1983) (civil litigant seeking new
trial based on newly discovered evidence bears burden of proving that
evidence “is likely to produce a different result in a new trial”); see also
‘Skakel v, State, 295 Conn. 447, 467, 991 A.2d 414 (2010) (criminal defendant
seeking new trial based on newly discovered evidence has burden of proving
new trial “is likely to produce a different result”); Shabazz v. State, 259
Conn, 811, 821, 792 A.2d 797 (2002) (same).

487

was “so harmful as to require a new trial,” or, in other
words, that the “ruling [likely affected] the result.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut
Light & Power Co. v. Gilmore, 289 Conn. 88, 128, 956
A.2d 1145 (2008).

This court has also granted motions for new trials
“fw]here an unsuccessful party has been prevented, by
fraud or deception, from exhibiting fully his case and
shows that there never has been a real contest in the
trial or hearing of the case . . . .” Varley v. Varley,
supra, 180 Conn. 2; see also Chapman Lumber, Inc. v.
Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 107, 952 A.2d 1 (2008) (applying
Varley standard to motion to open when new evidence
allegedly showed that judgment was tainted by fraud).
In Varley, we set forth a four factor test to determine
when fraud during the trial process warrants relief from
the judgment. The fourth factor of this test requires the
moving party to demonstrate “a substantial likelihood
that the result of the new trial will be different.” Varley
v. Varley, supra, 4.

Finally, the “different result” requirement also
applies outside of the civil context. The United States
Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor's failure to
disclose evidence material to guilt or punishment vio-
lates due process, thereby entitling the defendant to a
new trial. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct.
1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Relief will not be granted,
however, unless there is “a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct.
3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985). A “ ‘reasonable probabil-
ity,’” in turn, means “a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also State v.
Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 700, 888 A.2d 985, cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1030, 127 S. Ct. 578, 166 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2006)
(“the prejudice that the defendant suffered as a result

488

of the impropriety must have been material to the case,
such that the favorable evidence could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict” [internal
quotation marks omitted]), quoting Kyles v. Whitley,
514 USS. 419, 435, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490
(1995). Brady conditions relief on the “different result”
requirement regardless of whether the failure to dis-
close was intentional or merely negligent, and regard-
less of the timing of the failure to disclose. Brady v.
Maryland, supra, 87 (applying rule for first time to
prosecutor’s failure to disclose requested materials
prior to trial, “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution”); see also United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 8. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976)
C‘[nJor do we believe the constitutional obligation is
measured by moral culpability, or the willfulness, of
the prosecutor”).

Requiring a movant to demonstrate that there is a
reasonable probability that a new trial likely would
yield a different result is consistent with the “equitable
principle that once a judgment is rendered it is to be
considered final . . . .” Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co.
v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 713, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983).
The principle of finality requires that judgments be “left
undisturbed by post-trial motions except for a good
and compelling reason.” Id. The United States Supreme
Court has emphasized that relief may be granted when.
the underlying judgment was founded on fraud, but that
such an exception to the “deep-rooted policy in favor
of the repose of judgments” must be reserved for excep-
tional circumstances, such as when enforcement of the
judgment is “ ‘manifestly unconscionable ... .’”
(Citation omitted.) Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-45, 64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L.
Ed. 1250 (1944). Otherwise, there might “never be an
end to litigation.” Turner v. Scanlon, supra, 146 Conn.

ESC

163. Thus, the presumption of finality is necessary to
promote stability, protect reliance interests, and pre-
vent overly burdensome and duplicative litigation.

Although this is the first time that this court has
directly considered what showing is required for a new
trial when there is claimed discovery misconduct, we
believe that the “different result” criterion best com-
ports with the “deep-rooted policy in favor of the repose
of judgments”; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., supra, 322 U.S. 244; and properly balances
the burdens on both parties. Not requiring the movant
to prove a different result would invite endless litigation
and deplete judicial resources. Given the breadth of
discovery in modern trial practice, it is inevitable that
the movant could find some fault with the other party’s
compliance with broadly phrased discovery requests.
If we obliged the nondisclosing party to prove harm-
lessness every time the moving party claimed that the
nondisclosure constituted misconduct, we would
impose an insupportable burden on the nonmoving
party to disprove amorphous assertions, as in the pres-
ent case, that the “entire case would have gone differ-
ently .. . .” Requiring a showing of a different result
serves as ameans of differentiating those cases in which
the nonmoving party’s alleged misconduct materially
affected the resolution of the underlying case—and in
which, accordingly, the increased burden and expense
is thereby warranted—from those cases in which reliti-
gation would be a pointless exercise.

Nor do we believe that requiring some showing of a
different result would set too high of a hurdle for the
movant such that parties who wrongfully withhold doc-
uments would evade penalty. If it is self-evident that the
withheld document may reasonably lead to a different
result, the content of the document alone is sufficient
to meet the Varley test. If prejudice to the movant is
not clear from the document itself, the burden of proof

—
is best shouldered by the movant, as she is in the best
position to know how the nonmoving party’s nondisclo-
sure impaired her case, how the information might have

altered her trial strategy, and what avenues might have
been pursued.

And, finally, any suggestion that this standard invites
noncompliance ignores the fact that discovery compli-
ance is already regulated by the rules of practice. Prac-
tice Book §§ 13-7 and 13-10 make responses to
interrogatories and requests for production mandatory,
while Practice Book § 13-14 (a), in relevant part, permits
the judicial authority, on motion, to “make such order
as the ends of justice require” if a party fails to comply
fully ‘with its discovery obligations. Under § 13-14, the
trial court has broad discretion “to fashion and impose
sanctions for failure to comply with the rules of discov-
ery” to meet the individual circumstances of each case.
Northeast Savings, F.A. v. Plymouth Commons Realty
Corp., 229 Conn. 634, 638, 642 A.2d 1194 (1994). In
addition, rule 3.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
provides in relevant part that “[a] lawyer shall not . . .
(1) [uJnlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evi-
dence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a docu-
ment or other material having potential evidentiary
value ... [or] (4) . . . fail to make reasonably dili-
gent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery
request by an opposing party . . . .” An attorney who

* For example, in Doe v. Saint Francis Hospital, Superior Court, judicial
district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-08-5008551-S (August 1, 2011), the
court granted the plaintiff's motion for sanctions after the defendant failed
to produce documents in response to the plaintiff's discovery requests. The
trial court awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees and costs related to the
motion and ordered the defendant to review all prior discovery requests to
determine whether it withheld any additional documents. The trial court
also granted a joint motion for sanctions that had been filed by all of the
plaintiffs with matters pending under the master case of Roe v. Saint Francis
Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-08-
5008330-S (August 1, 2011), awarding the plaintiff's the opportunity to take
additional depositions at the defendant's cost.

491

violates these rules will be subject to discipline. Rules
of Professional Conduct 8.4, commentary. Together,
these provisions serve to secure fair competition in the
trial process by deterring deliberate discovery miscon-
duct and by providing a remedy if misconduct neverthe-
less occurs.

We therefore conclude that a motion for a new trial
based on discovery misconduct, like fraud, will not be
granted unless the movant satisfies the test set forth
in Varley v. Varley, supra, 180 Conn. 4. We take this
opportunity, however, to rephrase the movant’s burden
in establishing the fourth prong of the Varley test with
respect to all claims for relief that fall within the pur-
view of Varley, including fraud and misconduct. Pre-
viously in this opinion, we described a variety of
circumstances in which a movant may seek a new trial,
and we set forth the differing linguistic formulations for
the “different result” criterion corresponding to each
context. For instance, Varley indicates that a movant
must show “a substantial likelihood that the result of
the new trial will be different.” (Emphasis added.) Var-
ley v. Varley, supra, 4. This articulation differs from the
phrasing in Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 87,
and its progeny, which requires a criminal defendant
to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” (Emphasis
added.) United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. 682.

-Upon consideration, we see no reason why the victim.
of fraud or discovery misconduct in a civil case should
be treated more or less favorably than the victim of
nondisclosure in a criminal case. Therefore, we disavow
the phrasing employed in Varley and rephrase the
fourth prong to require a movant to demonstrate a rea-
sonable probability, rather than a substantial likelihood,
that the result of a new trial will be different. Further-
more and consistent with Brady, we interpret “ ‘reason-

—

able probability’ ” to mean “a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome”; id.; or, in other
words, that “the favorable evidence could reasonably
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v.
Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. 435. We recognize that this
test may impose a somewhat less onerous burden on
the movant than the “substantial likelihood” test in
Varley. Varley v. Varley, supra, 180 Conn. 4. Neverthe-
less, we adopt this linguistic formulation because we
believe that Brady articulates a more appropriate test."!

Although the trial court analyzed the plaintiff's
motion for a new trial according to the standard set
forth in Teamsters, rather than the Varley test as
rephrased in this opinion, our review of the court’s
findings leads us to conclude that, even if the court had
required a showing of a reasonable probability that the
result of a new trial will be different, the plaintiff's

“This new formulation of the fourth prong of Varley brings the standard
for new trials on grounds of fraud or misconduct into closer alignment with
the standard for a petition for a new trial on grounds of newly discovered
evidence in civil and criminal cases, although the two tests remain different.
See Kubeck v. Foremost Foods Co., 190 Conn. 667, 670, 461 A.2d 1380 (1983)
(civil litigant seeking new trial based on newly discovered evidence bears
burden of proving that evidence “is likely to produce a different result in
anew trial” {emphasis added]); Shabaze v. State, 269 Conn. 811, 821, 792
A2d 797 (2002) (holding that criminal defendant seeking new trial based
on newly discovered evidence has burden of proving new trial “is likely to
produce a different result” {emphasis added]).

4 Although Justice Bveleigh in his dissent would employ a “burden shift-
ing” framework in all cases of fraud and misconduct, we have repeatedly
observed that “the only fact-finding efforts that actually tum on the alloca~
tion of {the] burden [of proof] are those in which the fact finder, after
weighing the evidence, finds its mind in perfect equipoise. . . . In such a
rare case, the allocation of the burden of persuasion to the party asserting
the truth of the proposition at issue means that that party cannot prevail.”
(Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 508,
680 A.2d 147 (1996), aff'd after remand, 252 Conn. 128, 750 A.2d 448, cert.
denied, 531 U.S, 835, 121 S. Ct. 98, 148 L. Ed. 24 58 (2000).

493

motion for a new trial could not have prevailed.” The
plaintiff's motion for a new trial alleged that the follow-
ing items had been withheld during discovery: (1) the
anonymous note received by Kelley in October, 1999;
(2) documents regarding Osten’s retaliation complaint
against Kelley and Valade; and (3) Jackson’s discrimina-
tion complaint against Osten and Kelley. According to
the trial court, “[t]here is no question that these docu-
ments were germane to the case and requested in dis-
covery. There is also no question that none of these
documents were produced by the defendant, although
they should have been.” The trial court carefully ana-
lyzed the undisclosed evidence and concluded that the
withheld items were “merely cumulative to other evi-
dence introduced at trial and would not have produced
a different result.”

In finding that the undisclosed evidence was merely
cumulative, the trial court concluded that the withhold-
ing of these three items made little, if any, difference
to the outcome of the case. With respect to the note,
the trial court concluded that the late disclosure “did
not so taint the process as to in all equity warrant
a new trial.” The court reasoned that the note was
cumulative of other evidence because “[m]ost of what
the actual note had to contribute to the outcome was
already before the jury, just not its exact language.”
Indeed, although the plaintiff argues that the “entire
case would have gone differently, both in discovery and
at trial,” if the note had been disclosed sooner, the trial
court found that both parties were aware of the note,
had a rough idea of its contents for a considerable time
prior to trial, and the plaintiff called the jury’s attention

” Although the plaintiff in fact conceded that she could not establish that
the results of anew trial would be different absent the discovery misconduct,
we observe that she drew this conclusion on the basis of the unmodified
Varley test and not as we have rephrased it in this opinion.

® In analyzing the undisclosed evidence, the court “assume|d] that there
was discovery misconduct, even though none has yet been demonstrated.”

— |
to the note numerous times to support her claim of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The
plaintiff also examined Kelley, who testified that he had
known of the plaintiff's sexual orientation before he
received the note. Additionally, although the plaintiff
states that she would have changed her strategy and
theory of the case to focus on discrimination due to
.sexual orientation, she asserted discrimination based
on sexual orientation in the first count of her amended
complaint, and the trial court found that it was “at the
core of the trial and articulated by counsel at the start.”
Further, to the extent that the plaintiff was surprised
by the production of the actual note, she was granted
a recess to consider what actions to take.

Similarly, with respect to the undisclosed results of
the Osten investigation and the Jackson complaint, the
trial court stated: “After reviewing the evidence at trial
and the complaints in question, the court finds that
these documents are cumulative of other evidence that
‘was presented at trial.” The trial court’s finding that
both items were cumulative is supported by the fact
that Osten herself testified as to the contents of the
complaint and the investigation at trial. The trial court
pointed out that the discriminatory conduct Osten
described to the jury was “the most salient part of the
complaint and the most telling, had the jury concluded
that it was a pattern of discriminatory conduct that

. Kelley regularly engaged in.” The subsequent.
actions that the defendant took to address Osten’s alle-
gations were, in contrast, merely “secondary ... .”
Lastly, the court found that neither the Osten investiga-
tion materials nor the Jackson complaint “discredit[ed]
the testimony of [Kelley and Valade].” These findings
compel the conclusion that the trial court believed that
the withheld items could not reasonably be taken to
put the plaintiff's whole case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.

495

In addition to our review of the trial court’s findings,
we have examined the record as supplied to us, includ-
ing the portions of the transcript filed. We note, how-
ever, that the plaintiff failed to file a complete copy of
the trial transcript.'* We are therefore limited in our
review to the record presented and we are unable to
find any evidence from which we can conclude that
there is a reasonable probability that the result of a
new trial would be different. Consequently, the plaintiff
could not have prevailed even under our rearticulation
of the proper standard.

Notwithstanding the fact that in virtually all other
contexts—including cases in which the state intention-
ally violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional right
to exculpatory material—we have required a movant
to meet the “different result” requirement, the plaintiff
argues that a motion for a new trial on the basis of
discovery misconduct implicates different policy con-
cerns that outweigh the interest in finality, and, conse-
quently, that she should not have to prove that the result
of a new trial would be different. The plaintiff urges us
instead to adopt the rule set forth in Anderson v. Cryo-
vac, Inc., supra, 862 F.2d 926.

According to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, “in motions for a new trial under the
misconduct prong of [rule 60 (b) (8) [of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure], the movant must show the
opponent's misconduct by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Next, the moving party must show that the mis-
conduct substantially interfered with its ability fully
and fairly to prepare for, and proceed at, trial.” Id.®

“The rules of practice place the burden on the appellant to file a transcript
of the proceedings not already on file “which the appellant deems necessary
for the proper presentation of the appeal. . . .” Practice Book § 63-8 (a).

© ven if this court adopted the Anderson test, the trial court expressly
stated that “the facts in this case do not support . . . a conclusion [that
the nondisclosure substantially interfered with the plaintiff's ability to fully
and fairly prepare for and proceed at trial].”

496

Alternatively, a showing by the movant that the miscon-
duct was “knowing or deliberate” gives rise to a pre-
sumption of substantial interference. Id. The opposing
party then bears the burden to rebut that presumption
by a “clear and convincing demonstration that the con-
sequences of the misconduct were nugacious.” Id.

We decline the plaintiff's invitation to adopt the
Anderson test for three reasons. First and foremost,
this court is guided by Connecticut common law in
resolving issues of state law. In contrast, Anderson is
founded on federal procedural law. In particular, the
court in Anderson relied on the text of rule 60 (b) (8)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal
decisional authority interpreting the same. Because the
procedure for granting a new trial in Connecticut state
courts is governed by Connecticut’s rules of practice,
relying on federal case law that construes an analogous,
but not identical, federal rule would impinge on the
carefully demarcated bounds of the relationship
between state courts and federal courts that this coun-
try has preserved since the time of the founding.
Accordingly, we have stated that “[i]t is axiomatic that
courts in Connecticut adjudicating matters of state law
are not bound by a test that a federal court must apply.
In Connecticut, the rules of practice and procedure are
defined in our Practice Book and controlling case law.”
Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,
292 Conn. 1, 53, 970 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub nom.
Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New
York Times Co., 558 U.S. 991, 130 S. Ct. 500, 175 L. Ed.
2d 348 (2009). More particularly, “the federal rules of
civil procedure and the federal court’s interpretations
thereon are not binding upon the state courts .

Mac’s Car City, Inc. v. American National Bank, 205
Conn. 255, 260, 582 A.2d 1302 (1987). The federal test
¥ While it is true that a state court may look to federal law for guidance

in the absence of Connecticut law; see Bristol v. Tilcon Minerals, Inc., 284
Conn. 55, 88, 931 A.2d 237 (2007); that is not necessary in the present

497

for a rule 60 (b) (3) motion is, simply put, irrelevant to
this case. The plaintiff has not cited any persuasive
rationale for overruling this state’s controlling case law
in the context of discovery misconduct uncovered dur-
ing or after trial by engrafting decisional authority from
another jurisdiction onto our rules of practice. Thus,
we adhere to the common law of this state.

Second, we disagree with the plaintiff's attempt to
distinguish Varley in her claim that misconduct by a
party before trial is distinct from fraud at trial such that
we must adopt a different test for misconduct claims.
The plaintiff's claim draws two distinctions: the timing
of the misconduct and the type of misconduct; i.e., fraud.
or discovery misconduct. The plaintiff's suggestion that
fraud and discovery misconduct may neatly be distin-
guished by their timing is puzzling. We easily can envi-
sion either type of misconduct commencing before or
during trial. Moreover, although the timing of the mis-
conduct will have some bearing on the degree of harm
suffered by the movant, the plaintiff offers no explana-
tion as to why a different rule should apply based on
timing alone.

As for the plaintiff's suggestion that we should apply a
different rule to discovery misconduct as distinguished
from fraud, the plaintiff offers no explanation as to
what differences between the two types of misconduct
would justify the application of different rules to each.
Indeed, the fraud at issue in Varley does not appear
significantly distinguishable from the misconduct
alleged by the plaintiff in the present action. In Varley,
the alleged fraud, which pertained to a “subject on
which both parties presented evidence”; Varley v. Var-
ley, supra, 180 Conn. 3; included false testimony, brib-

action, This court has already supplied a rule in Varley. The plaintiff has
not petitioned this courtto overrule Varley, nor do we find sufficient justifica-
tion to distinguish it.

498

ery, misconduct of counsel, and misconduct of the state
referee during the trial proceeding in which the movant
was “present and participated at every stage... .”
Id., 2-3 and 2 n.1. In the present action, the alleged
misconduct consisted of the defendant’s knowing and
deliberate failure to disclose three separate sets of doc-
uments in violation of its duty to respond to the plain-
tiff’s requests for production. The plaintiff has made no
attempt to draw any meaningful distinction—nor do we
discern any—between the fraud at issue in Varley and
the discovery misconduct that forms the basis of her
motion for a new trial.!”

Furthermore, Anderson does not support the plain-
tiff’s claim that we should apply different rules to fraud
and discovery misconduct. As the court in Anderson
explained, “fraud” and “misconduct” are related and
overlapping types of wrong. See Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc., supra, 862 F.2d 923. Given their similar nature, it
is appropriate that rule 60 (b) (3) of the Federal Rules

"In fact, the plaintiff's motion appears to set forth the functional equiva-
lent of a claim that the defendant engaged in fraudulent nondisclosure, a
species of fraud. “Mere nondisclosure . . . does not ordinarily amount to
fraud”; Egan v. Hudson Nut Products, Inc., 142 Conn. 344, 347, 114 A2d
218 (1955); however, fraudulent nondisclosure or suppression arises from
a “failure to disclose known facts, and, as well, a request or an occasion
or circumstance which imposes a duty to speak.” Ceferatti v. Boisvert, 187
Conn. 280, 283, 77 A.2d 82 (1950); see also Billington v. Billington, 220
Conn, 212, 215, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991) (where alleged fraud consisted of
defendant's failure to disclose value of asset that defendant was obligated
to disclose pursuant to rules of practice). The rules on discovery practice
furnish such an occasion when a party is under a duty to speak. Practice
Book § 13-7 (a) provides in relevant part that “interrogatories shall be
answered” and Practice Book § 13-10 (a) provides in relevant part that a
party receiving a request for production “shall serve” a response. It is clear
from this language alone that compliance is mandatory, but the obligatory
nature of discovery requests is further emphasized by the availability of
sanctions for a party's failure to comply. See Practice Book § 13-14. It follows
that when the plaintiff alleges that the defendant knowingly and deliberately
concealed documents in the face of a duty to disclose the same, she in
effect alleges the elements of fraudulent nondisclosure, and the Varley rule
for fraud should therefore govern.

SC

of Civil Procedure couples fraud and misconduct within
the same subsection, and that the prevailing test for
granting new trials under rule 60 (b) (8) among the
federal courts applies equally to motions based on mis-
conduct and to motions based on fraud. Id. (“the moving
party must demonstrate misconduct—like fraud or mis-
representation—by clear and convincing evidence, and
must then show that the misconduct foreclosed full and
fair preparation or presentation of its case”). Thus, the
federal rules provide the same test for relief regardless
of whether the movant seeks a new trial on the basis
of fraud or discovery misconduct. Anderson, therefore,
supports our determination that we should apply a sin-
gle test to both fraud and discovery misconduct.

Third, we believe that the rephrased Varley standard
together with the availability of discovery sanctions
strikes the proper balance between the burdens on the
parties in the context of discovery misconduct claims.
In Anderson, the court distinguished between inten-
tional withholding of discovery, destruction of docu-
ments sought in discovery, and unintentional failure to
disclose. While we have in many contexts addressed
the difficulty of proving the intent of an actor, in this
context it is not necessary to do so because it is the
result of the nondisclosure-rather than the intent that
is important."* Having said that, there is no doubt that
the intentional destruction or withholding of informa-
tion, if shown, would aid the movant in showing the
importance of the undisclosed information. In addition
to the “smoking gun” document, the import of which
is self-evident, obvious machinations surrounding the
undisclosed information will permit an inference, not

In his dissent, Justice Eveleigh’s analogy of the present case to the
interests at issue in spoliation cases conflates intentional destruction of
evidence with mere nondisclosure, harms that differ vastly in nature and
related policy concerns. Like subornation of perjury, not only is the nature
of the harm different, but the nature of the act itself is more egregious.

500

unlike consciousness of guilt, that the nondisclosing
party believed the information might lead to a differ-
ent result.

Ultimately, a comparison of the Anderson and Varley
tests leads to the conclusion that our standard in Varley,
as restated with regard to the fourth prong, is the more
appropriate. It is more likely that the ends of justice
could be served consistently with our finality of judg-
ments jurisprudence by granting the extraordinary
relief of a new trial to a movant who can show a reason-
able probability that the result of that new trial would
be different, rather than to a movant who merely shows
that the misconduct “substantially interfered with its
ability fully and fairly to prepare for, and proceed at,
trial.” Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., supra, 862 F.2d 926.
Consequently, we decline to follow Anderson, which
follows the federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it is
unnecessary. We instead look to our common law,
which provides adequate relief both in the instance of
fraud and its closely related wrong, discovery mis-
conduct.

The plaintiff also argues that if state law controls,
the governing precedent is not Varley, but rather this
court’s decision in Ramin v. Ramin, supra, 281 Conn.
349. Ramin, however, is distinguishable from the pres-
ent case. First, although Ramin involved discovery mis-
conduct, the issue arose in a direct appeal and not a
motion for new trial attacking a final judgment. Second,
we relied heavily on the heightened duty to disclose in
marital cases. See Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn.
212, 222, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991). Third, we expressly
recognized in Ramin that the unique circumstances of
that case, that is the defendant’s egregious misconduct,
which included repeated flouting of orders compelling
discovery, required a departure from the general rule
that “ordinarily the burden to establish harm is borne
by the party who claims the error . . . .” Ramin v.

501

Ramin, supra, 348. A conclusion that Ramin estab-
lished a general rule that whenever a party alleges dis-
covery misconduct, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to demonstrate harmlessness is simply a misread-
ing of that decision.

First, the plaintiff in Ramin appealed from the judg-
ment of the trial court dissolving her marriage; she did
not file a motion for a new trial. Id., 326. Her appeal
claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion
when it refused to consider her motion for contempt
and sanctions based on the defendant’s failure to com-
ply with discovery orders. Id., 327. Critical to our deci-
sion was our conclusion that the trial court’s improper
ruling deprived the plaintiff of discovery. We stated that
it would be “grossly unfair” to require the plaintiff to
establish how she was harmed by not having access to
requested documents “to which she never gained access
solely as a result of the court's refusal to consider her
motion.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 348. In the present case,
the plaintiff has not alleged that the trial court bears
any fault in the defendant's nondisclosure, nor does the
record suggest any.

Additionally, our decision to shift the burden to the
defendant to prove that his breach did not harm the
plaintiff relied on the heightened duty to disclose in
marital cases, set forth in Billington. Id., 349. In Bill-
ington, we recognized that “the settlement of a marital
dissolution case is not like the settlement of an accident
case”; Billington v. Billington, supra, 220 Conn. 221;
and that considerations particular to the marital litiga-
tion context may outweigh the interests of finality and
stability. Id., 222. Unlike civil litigants who stand at
arm’s length from one another, marital litigants have a
duty of “full and frank disclosure” analogous to the
“relationship of fiduciary to beneficiary . . . .” Id., 220;
id., 221 (“[c]ourts simply should not countenance either
party to such a unique human relationship dealing with

502

each other at arms’ length”), quoting Grayson v. Gray-
son, 4 Conn. App. 275, 299-300, 494 A.2d 576 (1985)
(Borden, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 202 Conn.
221, 520 A.2d 225 (1987). As the “special relationship
between fiduciary and beneficiary” in a fraud action
compels “full disclosure by the fiduciary,” marital liti-
gants bear “no less” of a duty to disclose in a dissolution
action. Billington v. Billington, supra, 221. Thus, in
Ramin, the “fiduciary-like obligations of discovery” in
the marital context formed the foundation for our deci-
sion to shift the burden of establishing harmlessness
to the defendant. Ramin v. Ramin, supra, 281 Conn.
349-50. In the civil context, we have not held parties
to such a heightened standard, and we decline to do
so now.

Finally, even in the marital dissolution context,
Ramin does not establish a general rule. Over the
course of the proceedings in Ramin, the plaintiff filed
five motions for contempt in response to which the
court issued orders to comply, sanctions and attorney’s
fees against the defendant. Id., 330-31. The defendant's
persistent failure to produce specifically requested doc-
uments prompted this court to describe his conduct as
“egregious litigation misconduct . . . .” Id., 351. We
expressly recognized that the particular facts of Ramin,
because of the defendant’s egregious misconduct,
required a departure from the ordinary rule. Ramin,
therefore, represents a narrow exception to the general
rule that the party claiming error bears the burden to
demonstrate harm." By contrast, in the present case,
the defendant's failure to disclose the anonymous note,
the Osten investigation developments and the Jackson
complaint do not rise to the level of egregiousness war-
ranting a departure from our general rule, particularly

"For the same reasons, Justice Eveleigh’s attempt, in his dissent, to
extract general jurisprudential principles from Ramén can result only in a
misapplication of our law.

503

when the trial court found that the plaintiff was gener-
ally aware of the contents of these documents. We
therefore disagree with the plaintiff's suggestion that
Ramin is controlling and conclude that itis inapplicable
to the present case.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and PALMER, ZARE-
LLA and BEAR, Js., concurred.

EVELEIGH, J., with whom VERTEFEUILLE, J., joins,
dissenting. Irespectfully dissent. I agree with the major-
ity that the test set forth in Varley v. Varley, 180 Conn.
1, 428 A.2d 317 (1980), requires alteration. I disagree,
however, with the majority’s decision only to change
the fourth prong of the test in Varley as applied to
“motions for a new trial based on the discovery miscon-
duct of the nonmoving party.” I would overrule Varley
in its entirety as it applies to all cases of this nature.
For that reason, I disagree with the majority’s resulting
conclusion that a motion for anew trial based on discov-
ery misconduct by the nonmoving party should not be
granted unless the movant “demonstrate[s] a reason-
able probability, rather than a substantial likelihood,
that the result of a new trial will be different.” In my
view, the majority’s placement of the burden on the
party that was denied full disclosure during discovery
to demonstrate a reasonable probability that unpro-
duced or undisclosed information would alter the result
at a new trial excuses, if not rewards, noncompliant
behavior on the part of the opposing party, whether
the plaintiff or the defendant, runs counter to the mod-
ern trend of requiring wrongdoers to shoulder the bur-
den of establishing that their conduct did not aggrieve
the innocent party, and fails to hold counsel to the high
ethical standards set forth in our rules of practice.

—

Contrary to the majority, I would instead conclude
that, when a party moves for a new trial on the basis
of discovery noncompliance, that party must first estab-
lish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that there
has been substantial noncompliance with a discovery
request or order (i.e., nonproduction of one photograph
in automobile accident case when other, similar photo-
graphs were produced would not be substantial), and
that the noncompliance was relevant to the trial court’s
ultimate determination (i.e., defendant’s noncompli-
ance regarding plaintiffs question on damages would
not be relevant to defendant’s verdict on liability). Once
this showing is satisfied, a rebuttable presumption
should arise in favor of the movant that the unproduced
or undisclosed information was material to the issues
at trial, including the movant’s full and fair preparation
therefor. I would define materiality to mean, in this
context, that if produced there was a reasonable possi-
bility that the result of the trial could have been differ-
ent. The burden would then fall on the allegedly
noncompliant party to rebut the presumption and to
demonstrate that the unproduced or undisclosed infor-
mation was not material to the case (i.e., that if pro-
duced there was no reasonable possibility that the result
of the trial could have been different). If the court finds
that the presumption is not rebutted, the motion for a
new trial should be granted. Accordingly, I would
reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and remand
the case to that court with direction to remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with this framework.

I begin by noting that I agree with the underlying
facts and procedural history recited by the majority. I
briefly highlight, however, the following relevant facts
as either set forth in the majority opinion, in the trial
court's memorandum of decision, or contained in the
record. On March 31, 2003, the plaintiff, Bonnie Duart,

505

served requests for production on her employer, the
defendant, the department of correction, seeking the
plaintiff's “personnel file,”! as well as the personnel files
of her supervisors, Duane Kelley and Wayne Valade, in
connection with the plaintiff's claims of discrimination
on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. The plain-
tiff also sought “all documents relating to complaints
filed by [employees of the defendant] against [Kelley
and Valade].” In response to these specific requests
and others, the defendant disclosed information and
produced various materials except for the three items
that formed the basis of the plaintiff's motion for anew
trial and prompted the subsequent appeals. First, the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant did not disclose
until the end of trial a so-called “anonymous note” alleg-
ing that the plaintiff was involved in a romantic relation-
ship with another female officer in the same line of
command. Second, the plaintiff claimed that the defen-
dant failed to disclose developments in its investigation
of a sexual discrimination complaint filed by Catherine
Osten, a lieutenant of the defendant, in September, 2002,
regarding alleged sexual harassment by Kelley and
Valade. Third, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant
failed to disclose the existence of a harassment com-
plaint filed by Lisa Jackson, another lieutenant of the

The plaintiff's discovery requests stated that “personnel file” was to be
defined pursuant to General Statutes § 31-128a, which provides in relevant
part: “(5) ‘Personnel file’ means papers, documents and reports, including
electronic mail and facsimiles, pertaining to a particular employee that are
used or have been used by an employer to determine such employee’s
eligibility for employment, promotion, additional compensation, transfer,
termination, disciplinary or other adverse personnel action including
employee evaluations or reports relating to such employee's character, credit
and work habits. ‘Personnel file’ does not mean stock option or management
bonus plan records, medical records, letters of reference or recommenda-
tions from third parties including former employers, materials that are used
by the employer to plan for future operations, information contained in
separately maintained security files, test information, the disclosure of which
would invalidate the test, or documents which are being developed or pre-
pared for use in civil, criminal or grievance procedures . . . .”

— iS

defendant, who was homosexual, against Kelley and
Osten in September, 2002.

The trial court, in its memorandum of decision deny-
ing the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, concluded that
the defendants failure timely to disclose a copy of the
actual anonymous note “did not so taint the process
as to in all equity warrant a new trial” on the basis of
the court’s determination that, even if the defendant
had disclosed the anonymous note to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the note would have
brought “ ‘success in its wake,’” or, in other words,
would have resulted in a favorable verdict.’ Although
the trial court acknowledged that, “[a]dmittedly, [the]
case had as its main focus discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation,” it reasoned that the “general
contents [of the note] alleging a romantic relationship
with another female correctional officer was pointed
out to the jury numerous times,” “[t]he existence of the
note was not hidden, [and] the central thrust of its
contents had been known during the entire pendency
of the case.”

Regarding the defendant’s failure to disclose the
developments in the Osten complaint and the existence
of the Jackson complaint, the trial court found that
“Tt]here is no question that these documents were ger-
mane to the case and requested in discovery. There is
also no question that none of these documents were
produced by the defendant, although they should have
been. Certainly the details of the complaints could have
been used to test the credibility of [Valade and Kelley]
at trial.” The trial court later “conclude[d] from

?In determining whether to grant the plaintiff's motion, the trial court
relied on the test set forth in Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers Union, Local 59 v. Supertine Transportation Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21
(ist Cir. 1992), pursuant to which the movant “must at least establish that
it possesses a potentially meritorious claim or defense which, if proven,
will bring success in its wake.”

507

reviewing this after-discovered evidence that it, too,
should have been produced during the discovery phase
(except for the outcome of [Osten’s] complaint, which
only became known later) and had been properly
requested.” Thus, according to the trial court’s express
findings, the first prong of the test that I propose would
have been satisfied. The trial court also noted that “the
plaintiff was not dilatory in her efforts to secure all
information she needed for the trial.” As to the Osten
complaint, the trial court concluded, however, that the
undisclosed materials were cumulative because Osten
had testified at trial and, therefore, the jury had before
it the facts relating to her complaint against Valade
and Kelley. The trial court noted, however, that the
“gravamen of the after-discovered [Osten complaint]
evidence . . . was not the complaint itself, but [rather]
the action that the [defendant] took after [the Osten]
investigation.” Specifically, the defendant’s investiga-
tion initially concluded that there was discriminatory
conduct on the part of Kelley, although the trial court
noted that this conclusion was eventually “overridden
....” The trial court reasoned, however, that because
the final outcome of the Osten complaint was not
known until after the trial in the present matter had
concluded, this final outcome could not have been dis-
closed because it was not known. With regard to the
undisclosed Jackson complaint, the trial court simply
concluded that the “complaint filed by [Jackson] is also
cumulative of other evidence at trial.”

Motions for a new trial pursuant to Practice Book
§ 16-35° are “addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court and will never be granted except on substan-

® Practice Book § 16-36 provides in relevant part: “[MJotions for new trials

. . must be filed with the clerk within ten days after the day the verdict
is accepted; provided that for good cause the judicial authority may extend
this time. The clerk shall notify the trial judge of such filing. Such motions
shall state the specific grounds upon which counsel relies.”

508

tial grounds.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ber-
nier v. National Fence Co., 176 Conn. 622, 628, 410 A.2d
1007 (1979). Practice Book § 13-14 (a), which governs
failures to comply with interrogatories and requests for
production, provides in relevant part: “If any party has
failed to answer interrogatories or to answer them
fairly, or has intentionally answered them falsely or in
amanner calculated to mislead, or has failed to respond
to requests for production . . . or has failed to comply
with the provisions of Section 13-15 . . . or has failed
otherwise substantially to comply with any other dis-
covery order made pursuant to Sections 13-6 through
13-11, the judicial authority may, on motion, make such
order as the ends of justice require.” I note that the
Practice Book provides for these sanctions, regardless
of whether the failure to disclose was deemed to be
intentional.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 16-35, I would conclude
that “substantial grounds” exist warranting the granting
of a motion for a new trial due to noncompliance under
the following circumstances. First, the movant must
demonstrate that the nonmoving party failed to comply
with its obligations under Practice Book § 13-14 when
the allegedly noncompliant party failed to disclose or
produce information requested in discovery. This show-
ing would require the movant to demonstrate that the

4 Practice Book § 13-14 (b) provides in relevant part that such orders may
include: “(1) The entry of a nonsuit or default against the party failing
to comply;

“(2) The award to the discovering party of the costs of the motion, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee;

“(8) The entry of an order that the matters regarding which the discovery
was sought or other designated facts shall be taken to be established for
the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining
the order;

“(4) The entry of an order prohibiting the party who has failed to comply
from introducing designated matters in evidence;

“(6) If the party failing to comply is the plaintiff, the entry of a judgment
of dismissal.”

rc e§LCU PS

nonmoving party’s substantial noncompliance was not
a result of the discovery requests being susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation. Second, the
alleged substantial noncompliance must be relevant to
the trial court’s ultimate determination. Additionally,
and consistent with the language of Practice Book § 13-
14, I would conclude that whether the noncompliant
party’s failure to produce information in response to a
discovery request was intentional, negligent or acciden-
tal is immaterial to the analysis of whether that party
was, in fact, substantially noncompliant with the mov-
ant’s discovery requests.’ The manner of substantial
noncompliance—for example, intentional miscon-
duct—may subject the offending attorney to a grievance
procedure. The effect on the innocent party, however,
is the same: the material requested in discovery was
not received and available for use in trial preparation
and, if admissible, at trial. Upon a successful showing
of relevant substantial noncompliance, a rebuttable pre-
sumption would arise in favor of the movant that the
unproduced information was material to its case,
including the movant’s full and fair preparation there-
fore, in that there is a reasonable possibility that had
the unproduced material or information been provided,
the result of the trial could have been different. There-
after, the noncompliant party would have the burden
of rebutting the aforementioned presumption. Specifi-
cally, if the noncompliant party fails to demonstrate
that the unproduced or undisclosed information was
immaterial to the movant’s case (i.e., that there is no

®1 note that Practice Book § 18-14 has a new subsection (4), effective
January 1, 2012, which provides: “The failure to comply as described in this
section shall be excused and the judicial authority may not impose sanctions
on a party for failure to provide information, including electronically stored
information, lost as the result of the routine, good-faith operation of asystem
or process in the absence of a showing of intentional actions designed to
avoid known preservation obligations.” Obviously, the rule I propose does
not apply to any failure to provide information excused under this new sub-
section.

510

reasonable possibility that the result of the trial could
have been different), the motion for a new trial should

be granted.

In devising this standard, I would explicitly overrule
Varley v. Varley, supra, 180 Conn. 4,° as it relates to
discovery noncompliance, whether intentional, negli-
gent or accidental.’ I believe that the concerns
expressed in Varley are adequately addressed by the
Practice Book, time limitations on motions for a new
trial, and the new test that I have proposed. In my view,
this framework places both an appropriate onus on the
movant—namely, by requiring that party to demon-
strate relevant substantial noncompliance by the non-
moving party—while also properly placing the burden
on the nonmoving party to rebut the presumption that
its noncompliance prejudiced the movant by denying
that party information or evidence material to the issues
at trial or the movant’s preparation thereof. I feel that
the standard of a “reasonable probability . . . that the
result of a new trial will be different,” now adopted by
the majority, is much too onerous a standard for the
moving party for three reasons. First, who can prove
such a future outcome in a trial? The vagaries of both
the jury system and court trials defy predictability, so
the focus should be on the impact of the discovery
noncompliance on the trial that has just occurred. Sec-

®Under Varley, relief, such as in the form of a new trial, “will only be
granted if the unsuccessful party is not barred by any of the following
restrictions: (1) There must have been no laches or unreasonable delay by
the injured party after the fraud was discovered. (2) There must have been
diligence in the original action, that is, diligence in trying to discover and
expose the fraud. (3) There must be clear proof of the perjury or fraud. (4)
There must be a substantial likelihood that the result of the new trial will
be different.” Varley v. Varley, supra, 180 Conn. 4. Within the context of
marital dissolution, this court has abandoned the second requirement. See
Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 218, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991).

‘The test set forth in Varley also applies to newly discovered evidence.
I would retain the test insofar as it applies to newly discovered evidence,
since that issue is not before us at this time.

511

ond, as a reasonable probability suggests the necessary
showing is more likely than not, I believe the burden
is too high and improperly denies the movant a new
trial where he or she has a plausible chance of prevail-
ing. Third, I believe that the placement of a threshold
burden on the aggrieved party and a rebuttal burden
on the noncompliant party is more equitable to the
parties and the trial court making the final decision. In
my view, “[a]s between guilty and innocent parties, the
difficulties created by the absence of evidence should
fall squarely upon the former.” Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 925 (1st Cir. 1988).’ My proposed
standard accomplishes this, while the majority's frame-
work does not.

I find instructive other recent decisions of this court
in which we have concluded that, as between an inno-
cent party and a wrongdoer, the latter should bear the
burden of establishing that their wrongful conduct did
not prejudice the innocent party. Thus, for instance, in
creating the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence,
this court devised a burden shifting scheme under
which the plaintiff first “must prove that the [defen-
dant’s] intentional, bad faith destruction of evidence
rendered the plaintiff unable to establish a prima facie
case in the underlying litigation.” Rizzuto v. Davidson
Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 246, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006).
“Once the plaintiff satisfies this burden, there arises
a rebuttable presumption that but for the fact of the
spoliation of evidence the plaintiff would have recov-
ered in the pending or potential litigation . . . .” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 247. “The defendant
may rebut this presumption by producing evidence
showing that the plaintiff would not have prevailed

*] agree with the majority that we should not adopt the rule set forth in
Anderson. Although I agree with part of the test in Anderson, I disagree
with its requirement that parties must show deliberate misconduct by clear

and convincing evidence. In this regard, I believe that Anderson sets too
high a burden for an innocent party.

512

in the underlying action even if the lost or destroyed
evidence had been available.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 247-48. This burden shifting framework
acknowledged “the difficulties of proof inherent in the
tort of intentional spoliation of evidence”; id., 246; and,
as with the creation of the cause of action itself,
stemmed from “[t]he most elementary conceptions of
justice and public policy [requiring] that the wrongdoer
shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own
‘wrong has created.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 245.

Similarly, in Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 348,
915 A.2d 790 (2007), this court was presented with the
question of which party should bear “the burden of
establishing the harm flowing from the trial court’s
error,” namely, that court’s improper refusal to consider
the plaintiff's motion for contempt and sanctions
against the defendant regarding his repeated failure to
comply with the court’s discovery orders. In electing
to place the burden on the wrongdoer, rather than the
party claiming error, we reasoned that “it would be
grossly unfair to the plaintiff to require her to establish
precisely how she was harmed in proving her case by
not having access” to the withheld materials when the
plaintiff never had access to that information because
the trial court refused to consider her motion regarding
the defendant’s discovery conduct. Id. Additionally,
because “the defendant remained in total control of all
of the materials sought by the plaintiff and ordered to
be disclosed to her by the court . . . [the defendant]
reasonably could be expected to be able to establish
that the materials would not have helped the plaintiff
prove her case.” Id., 349. Thus, the court in Ramin held

*T note that the Ramin case was specifically limited on its facts to family
cases. Ramin v. Ramin, supra, 281 Conn. 349. I cite the case, however, for
the philosophical principle that the burden to show immateriality should
be placed on the wrongdoer, a position that this court has endorsed in
certain circumstances over the past several years. I would extend this policy
to all civil cases.

513

that the party who committed discovery misconduct

The rules of practice on disclosure apply equally to both civil and family
matters. Practice Book § 25-31 provides: “The provisions of Sections 13-1
through13-11 inclusive, 13-18 through 13-16 inclusive, and 13-17 through 13-
82 of the rules of practice inclusive, shalll apply to family matters as defined
in Section 26-1.” All of the aforementioned sections refer to the disclosure
procedures in civil matters. I also note that Practice Book § 13-14, which
deals with sanctions for nondisclosure, is also incorporated in Practice Book
§ 25-81 of the family discovery section.

I note that although the majority emphasizes the role in our Ramin
decision of the “heightened duty to disclose in marital cases,” the issues of
what makes a party a wrongdoer, and whether the wrongdoer or innocent
party bears the burden of showing imumateriality, are entirely distinct. The
question that I pose to the majority is, if the rules of practice apply equally
to both civil and family matters, why should our test regarding the burdens
of discovery noncompliance be different? I note further that in Ramin the
plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking sanctions pursuant to Practice
Book § 13-14, which is contained in the civil section. I fail to see, as the
majority suggests, that the extraction of “general jurisprudential principles
from Ramin can result only in a misapplication of our law.” See footnote
19 of the majority opinion. Although the majority does not explain this
conclusion, I would maintain that the general jurisprudential principles in
Ramin are sound. Although contained in our case law, the Practice Book
does not promulgate a higher standard of disclosure in family as opposed
to civil matters. I would suggest that all counsel, practicing in any area of
the law, have a duty to comply with our mules of practice and provide the
other side with full disclosure.

I also dispute the majority's contention that it is relevant that, “[ujnlike
civil litigants who stand at arm’s length from one another, marital litigants
have a duty of full and frank disclosure analogous to the relationship of
fiduciary to beneficiary . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Our
holding in Ramin that a special duty of “full and frank mutual disclosure”
may arise out of the marital relationship may be correct; Ramin v. Ramin,
supra, 281 Conn. 349; but it is irrelevant to the fact that all civil litigants
have a duty of full disclosure arising out of our policy, expressed in our
rules of practice, mandating full and accurate disclosure and production of
materials requested during discovery as an essential component of a fair
trial. Full disclosure may or may not be frank, but the claim in the present
case is that the defendant did not provide full disclosure.

Likewise, the role of independence of interests implied by the majority's
embrace of the “arm’s length” aspect of civil litigation in contrast to marital
litigation, is a red herring. This aspect of our holding in Ranvin is relevant
to a marital litigant’s duty of frankness of disclosure—not fullness—in the
discovery process, and therefore goes to determination of when discovery
noncompliance occurs in the marital litigation context. The choice of which
party bears the burden of noncompliance is unrelated, and is based on our

514

should bear the burden of proving its misconduct was

reasoning that it would be “grossly unfair” to require the victim of discovery
misconduct to have the burden of proving harm.

The majority suggests that my “analogy of the present case to the interests
at issue in spoliation cases conflates intentional destruction of evidence
with mere nondisclosure, harms that differ vastly in nature and related
policy concerns. Like subornation of perjury, not only is the nature of the
harm different, but the nature of the act itself is more egregious.” See
footnote 18 of the majority opinion. This reasoning is similar to the majority's
opinion that Ramin presents a unique set of facts upon which to carve an
exception. While I agree that intentional spoliation is more egregious than
negligent nondisclosure, it may be the equivalent of intentional nondisclo-
sure. I am of the opinion, however, that the failure to comply with our
discovery rules, whether intentional, negligent or accidental, has a similar
impact on the innocent party's opportunity for a fair trial, and therefore
warrants the burden shifting approach. The egregiousness of the act impli-
cates the separate but related issue of attomey discipline. It is too difficult
for the innocent party to prove fraud or intentional misconduct, and it is a
bizarre standard to set when the impact on the innocent party’s opportunity
for a fair trial has no necessary connection with the mens rea underlying
the discovery noncompliance. The more appropriate standard, in my view,
is substantial noncompliance of relevant material under the test which
I propose.

‘The majority further suggests that our holding in Ramin is narrower than
Isuggest because it involved a trial court’s error in refusing to hear a motion
duly filed. In my view, the problem with embracing general jurisprudential
principles in the context of “exceptional circumstances” only is that they
do not provide any real guidance to Superior Court judges regarding when
the burden shifting will occur. For instance, we know that burden shifting
occurs for the intentional spoliation of evidence. When, however, does
nondisclosure occur in the family setting? Is it only when a court refuses
to hear a motion duly filed? Does it only occur when a party is required to
file five motions for contempt based upon discovery noncompliance? Does
it occur when individual judges find that the acts are egregious? I propose
a new rule because I believe that it both promotes compliance with our
Practice Book and supports the principle of fairness that is inherent in our
rules of practice. I believe that it also provides the necessary guidance to
the trial court regarding both the time and the manner in which the rule
should be followed.

Further, this court has suggested potential burden shifting, albeit in dicta,
in other types of cases. Thus, in Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202
Conn. 660, 668, 522 A.2d 812 (1987), which involved a potential error in the
disqualification of an attorney, we stated that “[allthough we decline to set
forth at this time the standard of review in an appeal from a final judgment
where error is claimed in the granting of a disqualification order, we do

~ recognize the problems inherent in requiring a litigant to establish prejudice

515

harmless. Id., 348-49. That court reasoned that it was
“grossly unfair” to require the victim of discovery mis-
conduct to have the burden of proving harm. Id., 348.
In my view, this is another way of saying that the victim
of discovery noncompliance (I prefer to use the term
noncompliance rather than misconduct because I
believe that intent is irrelevant to the harm suffered)
should not have to show that the noncompliance was
result altering. Indeed, how does a party make such a
showing when its claim is that the discovery noncompli-
ance prevented it from having the materials or informa-
tion necessary to carry that burden? I believe that the
test that I have offered presents a more equitable
approach to the problem.

I would conclude that these and other policy consid-
erations support the principle that the allegedly non-
compliant party should bear the burden of rebutting
the presumption that its substantial noncompliance
with the movant’s discovery requests was material to
the issues at trial, including the movant’s full and fair
preparation thereof. First, the nonmoving party, as the
noncompliant party, should bear the risk of uncertainty,
including the potential for a new trial, which follows

on appeal. Demonstrating that the outcome of a trial has been affected by
an erroneous disqualification of counsel rather than by the other myriad
variables present in civil litigation concededly would impose a difficult,
burden on a losing litigant. . . . This factor, coupled with the fact that the
right to counsel of one’s choice, although not absolute, is a fundamental
premise of our adversary system . . . may well require us to place the
burden of disproving prejudice on the party who has been advantaged by
an erroneous disqualification.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Likewise, once the threshold burden has been met by the movant,
I propose to place the burden of rebuttal on the party advantaged by the
noncompliance. I have suggested the aforesaid test because I believe that
our rules become weakened and, at times, meaningless, unless there are
consequencés for noncompliance. Although the majority suggests, appropri-
ately, that the Practice Book provides for sanctions in the event of noncom-
Ppliance, I maintain that our test for a new trial should conform to the
rules of practice to provide additional elements of both consistency and
enforcement power to the rules of practice.

516

in the wake of its noncompliant conduct. As between
the noncompliant party, which operates under obliga-
tions imposed by our rules of practice to produce and
disclose requested information; see Practice Book
§§ 13-7, 13-10 and 13-15; and the movant adversely
affected by incomplete discovery production, I would
conclude, as this court did in Rizzuto, that “[t]he most
elementary conceptions of justice and public policy
require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the
uncertainty which his own wrong has created.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Rizzuto v. Davidson Lad-
ders, Inc., supra, 280 Conn. 245.

Second, placing the burden on the noncompliant
party to demonstrate that its substantial noncompliance
was not material to the issues at trial is, under the
circumstances, more likely to assist the trial court in
evaluating the impact that the unproduced information
would have had, either on the trial, or on the movant’s
preparation in support thereof. This is true because
the noncompliant party, as the party continuously in
possession of the unproduced information, would be
in the best position to articulate and “establish that the
{requested but unproduced or undisclosed] materials
would not have helped the [movant] prove her case.”
Ramin v. Ramin, supra, 281 Conn. 349. Similarly, “it
would be grossly unfair to the [movant] to require her
to establish precisely how she was harmed in proving
her case” when the movant never had access to, or
possibly an awareness of, information undisclosed or
unproduced during trial but thereafter discovered.
Id., 348.

Third, shifting the burden onto the noncompliant
party to disprove the adverse presumption promotes
the policy of full compliance with discovery requests
set forth in our rules of practice. See Practice Book

517

§§ 13-7, 18-10 and 13-15." The disapproval of incomplete
or noncompliant discovery is expressed in Practice
Book § 13-14, which provides an aggrieved party with
various remedies for nondisclosure uncovered in the
period leading up to and including trial. Our policy
mandating full and accurate disclosure and production
of materials requested during discovery as an essential
component of a fair trial is, in my view, equally valid
when noncompliance that occurs before or during trial
is discovered afterward. This renders the proceeding
amenable to a motion for a new trial on the basis of
discovery noncompliance because the fairness of that
proceeding is called into question when the movant
was denied full and complete discovery disclosure and
production. Such disclosure and production may have
been helpful to the movant’s case at trial, may have
been helpful in settlement negotiations, or may have
Jed the movant to other relevant information, through
depositions or additional discovery requests.

Fourth, I believe that the aforementioned framework
comports with the ethical obligations of counsel per-
taining to discovery. Rule 3.4 (1) of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct provides that an attorney shall not
“Tujnlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evi-
dence,” and rule 3.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct provides that counsel shall not, “[iJn pretrial
procedure . . . fail to make reasonably diligent effort
to comply with a legally proper discovery request by
an opposing party . . . .” As the commentary to the
rule makes clear: “The procedure of the adversary sys-
tem contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be
marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair

¥ Practice Book § 13-7 (a) provides that a party's answers to interrogato-
ries “shall be answered under oath,” and in the present case the defendant
swore that its responses to the plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for
production were, to the best of its knowledge and belief, “true, accurate
and complete... .”

518

competition in the adversary system is secured by prohi-
ditions against destruction or concealment of evi-
dence....

“Documents and other items of evidence are often
essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to
evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party
. . . to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena
is an important procedural right. The exercise of that
right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered,
concealed or destroyed,” or, in my view, simply not
produced to the requesting party. Rules of Professional
Conduct 3.4, commentary.

In its decision to modify the fourth prong of Varley,
the majority offers several reasons why any rule other
than the one it sets forth should not be adopted. First,
the majority notes that its requirement that there exist
for civil litigants a “reasonable probability . . . that

the result of a new trial will be different,” is akin to
the burden placed on a criminal defendant, alleging that
the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence material
to guilt or punishment violated his due process rights,
to show “areasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985); see also
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 8. Ct. 1194, 10
L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Second, the majority claims that
their rule comports with our interest in finality of judg-
ments and that any rule disturbing the repose of judg-
ments should be reserved for exceptional
circumstances. Third, the majority states that a rule
other than theirs “would invite endless litigation and
deplete judicial resources.” Fourth, the majority claims
that, “[gliven the breadth of discovery in modern trial
practice, it is inevitable that the movant could find some
fault with the other party’s compliance with broadly

519

phrased discovery requests,” and that requiring the non-
compliant party to prove its actions were harmless
“would impose an insupportable burden on the non-
moving party to disprove amorphous assertions . ”
For the reasons that follow, I disagree with each of the
majority’s assertions.

First, although in the criminal context it is the defen-
dant who bears the burden of establishing that he is
entitled to a new trial on the basis of a violation of his
right under Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 87, to
disclosure of material evidence," I would conclude that
under our civil rules of practice, it is the noncompliant
party, as the wrongdoer, that should bear the burden
of establishing that its failure to disclose information
or produce evidence did not aggrieve the otherwise
innocent movant. Whereas the considerations underly-
ing Brady include questions of federal constitutional
law, and procedural and substantive due process rights
of criminal defendants,” the present case involves ques-
tions of state civil procedure and whether this court
wishes to adopt a change, consistent with our rules of
practice, on the basis of policy considerations.”

J note that the majority opinion does not contain a complete quotation
of the test set forth in Bagley for when a defendant will receive a new trial
‘on the basis of a violation of his Brady right. Although the test references
whether the result of the trial would have been different, the focus of the
test is whether the evidence that the prosecution failed to disclose was
material. The full formulation of the test is as follows: “The evidence is
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. 682.

+2] note that, similar to the framework that I propose, the test governing
whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial on the basis of a prosecutor's
nondisclosure of material evidence applies regardless of whether the failure
to disclose was intentional or merely negligent. See United States v. Bagley,
supra, 473 U.S. 682 (test “sufficiently flexible to cover the ‘no request,’
‘general request,’ and ‘specific request’ cases”).

% Relevant differences between criminal and civil cases are myriad. At a
minimum, the following three differences are relevant to our policy consider-
ations: (1) the prosecutor in a criminal case must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, while the plaintiff in a civil case must establish her claim

520

Although sparingly employed, this court certainly has
the power to adopt rules, tests or orders that it deems
appropriate to enhance the fair administration of justice
in this state. See In re Joseph W., 301 Conn. 245, 268,
21 A8d 723 (2011); State v. Garcia, 299 Conn. 39, 61
n.13, 7 A.3d 355 (2010); State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn.
537, 576, 4.A.3d 1176 (2010). Further, the majority offers
no explanation why its test focuses on the likelihood
of a different result at a new trial, rather than, as in
Brady, whether the result of the original proceeding
would have been different had the evidence been dis-
closed to the defense. Accordingly, I do not find the
federal criminal standard instructive in this matter or
in conflict with the framework that I propose.

Second, as to finality, I initially note that, under our
rules of practice, a motion for a new trial must be filed
within ten days after a verdict is accepted. Practice
Book § 16-35. In this short span of time, reliance on the
judgment would likely have been minimal and, there-
fore, a possibly improperly obtained verdict in favor of
the allegedly noncompliant party should not be upheld
in favor of repose. For the same reason, although the
verdict may be “final,” we must balance the admittedly
strong interests underpinning the principles of finality
and repose of judgments with the equally strong princi-
ple that parties must comply with our rules of practice
in order to ensure that both sides are afforded the fair
trial to which all sides are entitled. According to the
majority’s reasoning, if a movant satisfies its test by
demonstrating a reasonable probability that the undis-
closed or unproduced information would yield a differ-
ent result in a new trial, then a “good and compelling

by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) the defendant in a criminal case
may have liberty at stake, while the defendant in a civil case risks only the
loss of property, a lesser interest; and (8) a prevailing plaintiff in a civil
case may be aggrieved by discovery noncompliance where the recovery is
less than it might otherwise have been, while a prevailing criminal defendant,
found not guilty, could not be so aggrieved.

521

reason’ exists; Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakon-
chick, 190 Conn. 707, 718, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983); war-
ranting the disturbing of finality through the granting
of a motion for a new trial. I, too, would conclude
that undisclosed or unproduced information that would.
have been substantially responsive to discovery
requests and was found to be material to the issues at
trial, unrebutted by the noncompliant party, constitutes
a“good and compelling reason” warranting the granting
of a motion for a new trial. Id. My disagreement with
the majority instead concerns, first, on which trial the
impact of the noncompliance is measured, second, the
likelihood that the result was affected by the noncompli-
ance, and third, which party, in supporting or opposing
a motion for a new trial, should bear the burden of
disproving the presumption, either the present pre-
sumption in favor of finality and upholding the judg-
ment, or my proposed presumption in favor of a new
trial on the basis of relevant substantial discovery non-
compliance. In my view, creating a presumption that
discovery noncompliance was material to the issues at.
trial and placing the burden on the noncompliant party
to marshal arguments in favor of upholding the result
of the trial, rather than placing the onus on the innocent
movant who may have been denied a full and fair pro-
ceeding to show a reasonable probability of success
at a hypothetical new trial, does not undermine the
interests in favor of finality or the repose of judgments.
To the extent that the framework that I propose is
contrary to these considerations, the importance of
assuring disappointed litigants that an unfavorable ver-
dict results from a full and fair trial wherein all of the
material information was disclosed, evidence produced
and facts and witnesses marshaled, should trump our
normal deference to finality when substantial discovery
noncompliance has occurred.

Third, I disagree that adopting a rule other than the
one established in Varley, and modified today, will

522

“invite endless litigation and deplete judicial
resources,” an assertion essentially making a “flood-
gates” claim. If we balance, on the one hand, the right
of any party to full disclosure and production, which
is essential to ensuring a fair trial, versus, on the other
hand, the claim that expresses fear that a new rule will
lead to numerous motions for a new trial on the basis
of discovery noncompliance, the right of a party to full
disclosure and a fair trial must, in my opinion, prevail.
Indeed, because a motion for a new trial must be filed
within ten days in the absence of an extension for good
cause; Practice Book § 16-35; the likelihood that the
innocent party will discover the noncompliance on the
part of the wrongdoer within that time period is remote.
To the extent that the framework I propose may result
in the filing and granting of additional motions for a
new trial, this result should be welcomed as the proper
outcome, in that justice is served when a verdict tainted
by the nonmoving party’s substantial noncompliance is
purged and that party is required to bear “the difficulties
created by the absence of evidence” resulting from its
noncompliance. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., supra, 862
F.2d 925. Moreover, although the standard I set forth
creates a presumption in favor of the movant as the
innocent party, the framework still places an onus on
the movant to demonstrate that the undisclosed or
unproduced evidence was both substantially non-
compliant to its discovery requests and relevant to the
trier of fact’s ultimate determination. Once the innocent
party has made this prima facie showing to the satisfac-
tion of the trial court and the presumption of materiality
is established, the nonmoving party then has the oppor-
tunity to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that
the evidence, although responsive, was not material
to the case if it had been disclosed or produced, by
establishing that there is no reasonable possibility that
the result of the trial could have been different. I there-

523

fore reject the notion that replacing the Varley test, in
its entirety, will result in the opening of the floodgates
to improper motions for a new trial.

Fourth, I reject the claim that no standard other than
that set forth by the majority is proper because, “[g]iven
the breadth of discovery in modern trial practice, it is
inevitable that the movant could find some fault with the
other party’s compliance with broadly phased discovery
requests,” and because requiring the nonmoving party
to prove that its noncompliance was not material
“would impose an insupportable burden on [that] party
to disprove amorphous assertions . . . .” Although I
disagree that in modern discovery practice it is “inevita-
ble” that fault can be found, even if such a fact were
true, that inevitability should not excuse either the non-
compliant party’s conduct or its failure to abide by our
rules of practice governing compliance with discovery
requests. Indeed, a rule stating otherwise would reward
such practices during discovery in the hope that, follow-
ing an unfavorable verdict, the innocent party would
be unable to demonstrate precisely that there was a
“reasonable probability . . . that the result of a new
trial will be different.” Such an outcome would seem
to grant the noncompliant party two bites at the apple—
once during trial and once during the movant’s motion
for a new trial—as an incentive to reward the noncom-
pliance.

Additionally, under the framework that I propose,
the burden placed on the noncompliant party is far from
“Snsupportable,” and that party would not be required to
disprove “amorphous” assertions.“ Instead, the movant

“The focus of the majority's new test on the potential impact of remedying
the discovery noncompliance at a new trial belies its concern for the bur-
dened party's difficulty in disproving “amorphous” assertions. Whatever
the challenges of evaluating the impact of a discovery violation on a past
proceeding, the prognostication of a different result at a new trial is unavoid-
ably additionally complicated by the unpredictability of any new jury and
any revised trial strategy of both parties, but particularly that of the party
disappointed with its results in the first trial. In the context of any close

524

would first be required to demonstrate specifically how
the undisclosed or unproduced information was sub-
stantially nonresponsive to its discovery requests, and
also must establish that such material was relevant to
the trial court’s ultimate determination. The require-
ment that the noncompliance be substantial, in my view,
responds to the majority’s concerns that in view of
modern trial practice’s “broadly phrased discovery
requests,” it is inevitable that some items will be missed
in discovery. The noncompliant party could disagree
by seeking to demonstrate that the undisclosed or
unproduced information was not requested in the dis-
covery requests, or that the discovery requests were
too vague for it to have known that the information
produced was not responsive. Further, the noncompli-
ant party could assert that the noncompliance was not
substantial. The noncompliant party could also argue
that the request was not relevant to the trial court’s
ultimate determination. It would then fall to the trial
court to determine whether, in fact, the movant’s claim
‘was true that the undisclosed or unproduced informa-
tion should have been produced, or whether the non-
compliant party successfully demonstrated that the
production was substantially responsive to the discov-
ery requests, or that the requests themselves were too
vague. I therefore disagree with the notion that any test,
other than that set forth by the majority, is unworkable

case, who is to say that there does not exist a reasonable probability of a
different result at any new trial?

This concer is further belied by the majority's claim that the framework
that I propose would only affect the result in the “rare case” where “the
fact finder, after weighing the evidence, finds its mind in perfect equipoise.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) See footnote 11 of the majority opinion.
Hither the burdened party faces difficulty disproving an “amorphous” asser-
tion that there is a reasonable probability or possibility that discovery non-
compliance did or did not, could or could not, or will or will not, affect the
result at the past or future trial, or the evidence is easily presented and
weighed by a fact finder capable of discerning “perfect equipoise.” The
majority claims to have it both ways.

525

because of the “breadth of discovery in modern trial
practice,” or that it would place an insupportable bur-
den on the noncompliant party." I believe that the test
that I propose comports with the Practice Book in that
the Practice Book: first, does not require intentional
misconduct for the imposition of sanctions; and second,
requires a failure to comply substantially with any dis-
covery order made pursuant to §§ 13-6 through 13-11
to impose sanctions. See Practice Book § 13-14."°

In light of the fact that I would substitute the afore- ~
mentioned framework for the existing test set forth in
Varley, I would remand the case to the Appellate Court
with direction to remand the case to the trial court in
order to permit the parties to present additional argu-
ments before that court tailored to this new standard.
See State v. Winot, 294 Conn. 753, 762 n.7, 988 A.2d
188 (2010) (noting that cases appealed subsequent to
prior decision of this court establishing new rule
required reversal and remand for new trials in order to
have correct instruction read to jury and to permit party
opportunity to present evidence and arguments under
new rule). Specifically, a remand in this case is proper
because the framework I propose sets forth a threshold
burden on the movant to create a presumption that the
undisclosed or unproduced information was material
to the issues at trial, and places a burden on the non-
compliant party to rebut that presumption.”” A remand

*T note that attorneys have the right to object to discovery requests
considered vague or confusing. See Practice Book §§ 18-8 and 13-10 (b). If
the parties cannot agree as to the merits of the objection, the trial court
can determine, in the first instance, the appropriateness of the request.
Practice Book § 13-10 (¢).

¥T note that the majority has cited certain provisions of the rules of
practice as a suggestion that its standard does not invite noncompliance. I
believe, however, that the standard that I have proposed is more likely
to encourage a more consistent approach to the remedies for discovery
noncompliance in line with the intent of the rules of practice.

Although the trial court concluded that the anonymous note would not
have resulted in a different outcome and that the two undisclosed complaints
were cumulative, the trial court made these conclusions and the predicate

526

would allow the trial court to review the parties’ new
arguments and to reconsider the plaintiff's motion for
a new trial under the aforementioned framework.

For all of the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the
judgment of the Appellate Court and remand the case
to that court with direction to remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings in accordance with
the aforementioned framework.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

findings pursuant to Varley, under which the plaintiff bore the burden of
demonstrating a substantial likelihood that the result of the new trial would
be different. The framework that I propose, by reducing the threshold burden
‘on the movant and creating a presumption of materiality once that threshold
burden is met, thus creating a burden to rebut for the noncompliant party,
changes the trial court’s considerations and, in a close case, these new
considerations could weigh in favor of granting the motion for a new trial.
‘The trial court itself found that “(tJhere is no question that [the Osten and
Jackson complaints] were germane to the case and requested in discovery.
‘There is also no question that none of these documents were produced by
the defendant, although they should have been. Certainly the details of the
complaints could have been used to test the credibility of [Valade and Kelley]
at trial.”

Talso note that the trial court held that the items were “merely cumulative
to other evidence introduced at trial and would not have produced a different
result.” Although the court engaged in some discussion regarding the note
and the Osten investigation, there was no discussion regarding the Jackson
complaint, other than the conclusory statement that it was cumulative. We
are left to speculate why it was cumulative. The fact that, after the note
was produced, the plaintiff “was granted a recess to consider what actions
to take,” contrary to the majority’s position, in my view, is of little conse-
quence. In my opinion, the important point is that had these documents
been produced in the normal course, as they should have been, the plaintiff
could have performed more discovery, taken depositions, and potentially
prepared her trial strategy in a different manner. This opportunity was lost
by the defendant’s noncompliance. In my view, this court, through the use
of the test it employs, should not countenance such neglect when it affects
the ability of one party to receive a full and fair trial on the merits. Accord-
ingly, I am disinclined to apply the majority’s framework to the existing
record and the trial court's memorandum of decision. I note, however, that
the framework that I propose would be amenable to appellate application
as a matter of law in future appeals wherein an appellate court was called
upon to review a trial court’s decision under the framework.

527

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. OSIBISA HALL
(SC 18621)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Harper and
Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued October 26, 2011—officially released January 24, 2012

Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy,
state’s attorney, and Anthony J. Spinella, assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

Erin M. Field, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J. The issue in the present case is
whether, in conducting a plea canvass of the defendant,
Osibisa Hall, the trial court substantially complied with
General Statutes § 54-1j,! which seeks to ensure that
defendants understand the potential immigration con-
sequences of their guilty pleas. The state appeals, fol-

‘General Statutes § 54-1j provides: “(a) The court shall not accept a plea
of guilty or nolo contendre from any defendant in any criminal proceeding
unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and determines
that the defendant fully understands that if the defendant is not a citizen
of the United States, conviction of the offense for which the defendant has
been charged may have the consequences of deportation or removal from
the United States, exclusion from readmission to the United States or denial
of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States. If the defendant
has not discussed these possible consequences with the defendant's attor-
ney, the court shall permit the defendant to do so prior to accepting the
defendant's plea.

“(p) The defendant shall not be required at the time of the plea to disclose
the defendant's legal status in the United States to the court.

“(© If the court fails to address the defendant personally and determine
that the defendant fully understands the possible consequences of the defen-
dant’s plea, as required in subsection (a) of this section, and the defendant
not later than three years after the acceptance of the plea shows that the
defendant's plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated conse-
quences, the court, on the defendant's motion, shall vacate the judgment,
and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
and enter a plea of not guilty.”

530

lowing our grant of certification,’ from the judgment
of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court’s denial
of the defendant’s motion to vacate and withdraw his
guilty pleas to one count of possession of marijuana
with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-
277 (b) and two counts of violation of a protective order
in violation of General Statutes § 58a-223. On appeal,
the state claims that the Appellate Court improperly
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the defendant’s motion because it failed to
address the defendant personally and to determine that
he fully understood the potential immigration conse-
quences of his plea pursuant to § 54-1j. We agree with
the state, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the Appellate Court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court.
“On May 22, 2007, the defendant pleaded guilty, pursu-
ant to the Alford doctrine,’ to one count of possession
of marijuana with intent to sell and two counts of viola-
tion of a protective order. During the plea hearing, the
court questioned the defendant as to his understanding
of the rights he was waiving, the meaning of his Alford
plea and the agreed upon sentence. The court then
addressed defense counsel and the following collo-
quy ensued:

“The Court: Any immigration issues here, [defense
counsel]?

“ {Defense Counsel]: Yes, there are, Your Honor.
“The Court: Have you talked to [the defendant]?
“ {Defense Counsel]: Yes, I have.

2 We granted the state's petition for certification, limited to the following
issue: “Did the Appellate Court improperly reverse the trial court’s denial
of the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea based on the trial court's
failure to properly address the defendant regarding the possible consequence
of deportation?” State v. Hall, 297 Conn. 910, 910-11, 995 A.2d 638 (2010).

® See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35, 91 S. Ct. 160, 21 L. Bd. 24
162 (1970).

EE

“The Court: All right. And he understands the possi-
ble consequences of his pleas?

“‘TDefense Counsel]: Yes.’

“The court then accepted the defendant’s pleas and
found that they were made voluntarily. The court also
made a finding that the defendant ‘has been advised by
his counsel of the immigration consequences of his
acts.’ The discussion then turned to the start date of
the defendant’s sentence, and the court asked again
about immigration as follows:

“The Court: Is there an immigration sticker on him?

“ {Defense Counsel]: There is no immigration sticker
as [far as] I know of. But I know that—

“The Prosecutor]: He’s going to be deported. I
looked into it when we did the . . . [and] we talked
and then when we did the [violation of probation] hear-
ing that’s what they told us.

“The Court: All right.’

“After further discussion, the court sentenced the
defendant to forty months incarceration.

“On January 18, 2009, the defendant filed a motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas and vacate the judgments
of conviction, claiming that the court did not fulfill
its obligation pursuant to § 54-1j (a) to address him
personally and determine that he understood the immi-
gration consequences of his pleas. On January 27, 2009,
the [trial] court denied the defendant’s motion, stating,
‘{ijn reading the transcript of the sentence, the issue of
immigration was directly addressed to counsel for the
defendant in which he indicates he discussed the immi-
gration issues with his client and that the client under-
stood the immigration consequence of his plea[s]. Along
in the canvass . . . the state brought up the fact that

532

the defendant is going to be deported.’ ” State v. Hall,
120 Conn. App. 489, 490-92, 992 A.2d 343 (2010).

Following the trial court’s denial of his motion, the
defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgments to
the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court abused
its discretion when it concluded that § 54-1j (a) had
been satisfied. The Appellate Court agreed with the
défendant, concluding that the trial court had failed to
comply substantially with the statute when it neglected
to personally address the defendant regarding the
potential immigration consequences of his pleas. Id.,
494-95. The Appellate Court therefore reversed the
judgments of the trial court and its decision denying
the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; id.,
497; the state’s certified appeal to this court followed.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The state claims on appeal that the Appellate Court
improperly reversed the trial court’s denial of the defen-
dant’s motion to vacate and withdraw his guilty pleas.
The state argues that, pursuant to our rule in State v.
Malcolm, 257 Conn. 653, 778 A.2d 134 (2001), substantial
compliance with § 54-1j (a) was sufficient and contends
that the trial court in the present case substantially
complied with the statute. Specifically, the state con-
tends that, although the Appellate Court cited the
proper standard for substantial compliance with § 54-
Ij (a), it in effect required literal compliance with that
statute. The defendant responds that the requirements
of § 54-1j (a) were not fulfilled in the present case in
any way. We agree with the state, and conclude that
the trial court substantially complied with the basic
tenets of § 54-1j (a).

Before addressing the merits of the state’s claim, we
set forth our standard of review. “[A guilty] plea, once
accepted, may be withdrawn only with the permission
of the court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

EE

v. Stocking, 131 Conn. App. 81, 86, 26 A.3d 117 (2011).
Section 54-1j (c)‘ permits the defendant, not later than
three years after the acceptance of his guilty plea, to
move to withdraw his plea if he can show that the court
failed to comply with the requirements of § 54-1j (a).
“The burden is always on the defendant to show a
plausible reason for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.
. . . Whether such proof is made is a question for the
court in its sound discretion, and a denial of permission
to withdraw is reversible only if that discretion has been
abused.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Carmelo T., 110 Conn. App. 543, 549,
955 A.2d 687, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 950, 960 A.2d
1037 (2008).

We first addressed the issue of substantial compli-
ance with § 54-1j in State v. Malcolm, supra, 257 Conn.
653. In that case, the trial court failed to mention specifi-
cally all three of the immigration and naturalization
consequences set forth in § 54-1j (a) during the defen-
dant’s plea canvass. We concluded that “it was not
necessary for the trial court to read the statute verbatim
oe [and, instead] only substantial compliance with
the statute [was] required to validate a defendant's
guilty plea.” Id., 662. In reaching that conclusion, we
took note of the rule under which “substantial compli-
ance is required when warning the defendant of the
direct consequences of a guilty plea pursuant to Prac-
tice Book § 39-19° in order to ensure that the plea is

4 See footnote 1 of this opinion.

® Practice Book § 39-19 provides in relevant part: “The judicial authority
shall not accept the plea without first addressing the defendant personally
and determining that he or she fully understands:

“(2) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;

“(2) The mandatory minimum sentence, if any;

“(8) The fact that the statute for the particular offense does not permit
the sentence to be suspended;

“(4) The maximum possible sentence on the charge . . . and

“() The fact that he or she has the right to plead not guilty or to persist
in that plea if it has already been made . . . .”

“ —_ ia

voluntary pursuant to Practice Book § 39-20.” (Empha-
sis added.) Id. Therefore, we reasoned that it would be
illogical to “require stricter compliance with regard to
the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.” (Emphasis
added.) Id., 663.

Notwithstanding our conclusion in Malcolm, the
defendant in the present case claims that an amendment
to § 54-1j (a) subsequent to our decision in Malcolm
requires us to revisit the substantial compliance stan-
dard. Prior to the 2003 amendment; see Public Act 2003,
No. 03-81, § 1 (a); the statute provided that “[t]he court
shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
from any defendant in any criminal proceeding unless
the court advises him of the following: ‘If you are not
a citizen of the United States, you are hereby advised
that conviction of the offense for which you have been
charged may have the consequences of deportation,
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial
of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United
States.’” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to
2003) § 54-1j (a). As a result of the amendment, rather
than requiring the court to advise the defendant of the
potential immigration consequences of his plea, the
statute requires the court to “[address] the defendant
personally and [determine] that the defendant fully
understands [those potential consequences] . . . .”
General Statutes § 54-1j (a). That change, the defendant
contends, requires the court in all circumstances “to
direct its immigration inquiry to the defendant himself,
not his attorney . . . .” Although we do not disagree
that § 54-1j, as amended, places an additional burden
on the court to ascertain the defendant’s understanding

6 Practice Book § 39-20 provides in relevant part: “The judicial authority
shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first determining,
by addressing the defendant personally in open court, that the plea is volun-
tary and is not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a
plea agreement. . . .”

ET

of the potential consequences of his plea, we do not
agree that substantial compliance can be established
only if the court addresses the defendant personally.

We find that our reasoning in Malcolm still applies
today despite the 2003 statutory amendment, because
the purpose of the statute remains the same—to warn
a defendant of possible immigration consequences from
a guilty plea.’ “{Section] 54-1j, rather than demanding
that trial courts instruct defendants on the intricacies
of immigration law, seeks only to put defendants on
notice that their resident status could be implicated by
the plea.” State v. Malcolm, supra, 257 Conn. 663-64.
Thus, “[a]lthough it would have been better practice
for the trial court to have read the statute verbatim,
strict compliance was not necessary to put the defen-
dant on notice that a conviction could have implications
beyond the state criminal justice system.” Id., 664.

Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that.
§ 54-1j was amended in such a way that it now employs
the same exact wording as the Practice Book section
upon which we relied heavily in Malcolm. Practice Book
§ 39-19® provides that the judicial authority, prior to
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, must “first
[address] the defendant personally and [determine] that
he or she fully understands [the nature and conse-
quences of the plea] . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It is well
established that substantial compliance with Practice
Book § 39-19 is sufficient; State v. Malcolm, supra, 257

It bears mention that an alternative characterization of Public Act 03-
81, § 1, is that it memorializes the decisions of the Appellate Court in State
v. Webb, 62 Conn. App. 805, 813-14, 772 A.2d 690 (2001), and State v. Irala,
68 Conn. App. 499, 518-21, 792 A.2d 109, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923, 797
A.2d 519, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 887, 128 S. Ct. 182, 164 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2002),
that trial courts have no duty to advise defendants on the intricacies of
immigration law. Rather, as Public Act 03-81, § 1, clarifies, § 54-1j merely
requires trial courts to put defendants on notice that there cowld be immigra-
tion consequences of their pleas.

* See footnote 5 of this opinion.

— ii

Conn. 662; and we see no reason to depart from that
reasoning in light of the fact that § 54-1j (a) now has
identical terminology. We thus conclude again that, in
amending the statute, “[t]he legislature [still] did not
intend to create a loophole for defendants to use as
grounds for vacating guilty pleas, years after they have
been entered, once evidence is destroyed or witnesses
become unavailable.” Id., 665.

In the present case, the record reveals that the defen-
dant was adequately warned that his immigration status
could be implicated by his guilty pleas. In response to
the court’s inquiry, defense counsel stated on the record
that he had informed his client about potential immigra-
tion issues and that the defendant understood the possi-
ble consequences of his pleas. The trial court properly
relied upon these representations by defense counsel.
“Absent some indication to the contrary, a court is
entitled to rely on counsel’s representations on behalf
of his or her client.” State v. Stewart, 64 Conn. App.
340, 349-50, 780 A.2d 209, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 909,
782 A.2d 1250 (2001).

We find these representations by defense counsel
particularly pertinent because the statute, on its face,
turns on communication between the defendant and
his attorney about immigration consequences. Pursuant
to § 54-1j (a), if the court finds that the defendant has
not discussed the possible immigratiori consequences
with his attorney, the appropriate remedy is for the
court to “permit the defendant to do so prior to
accepting the defendant’s plea.” Clearly, then, based on
the text of the statute, the legislature was primarily
concerned with ensuring that defendants engage in a
conversation with their counsel, not the court, regard-
ing the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.

We further note that there is nothing in the record
to indicate that the defendant, upon hearing these repre-

537

sentations by his attorney, objected to them, demon-
strated surprise, or in any way gave the court reason
to doubt their accuracy. See State v. Henry, 117 Conn.
App. 478, 484, 979 A.2d 572, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 910,
982 A.2d 1083 (2009) (denial of defendant’s motion to
correct illegal sentence when defendant and counsel
“did not indicate that [sentence] contradicted their
understanding of the terms”); State v. Cazzetta, 97
Conn. App. 56, 60-61, 903 A.2d 659 (2006) (defendant
cannot claim surprise regarding sentence when he had
opportunity to indicate sentence was inconsistent but
failed to do so). In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, then, we conclude that the defendant had been
informed by his attorney of the potential immigration
consequences he faced.

Next, we find additional support for our conclusion
in facts occurring prior to the date of the defendant’s
plea canvass. Specifically, at a violation of probation
hearing approximately six months prior to the date
on which the defendant entered his guilty pleas, the
defendant’s testimony demonstrated that he under-
stood that he was at risk for deportation.’ Furthermore,
immediately after the defendant’s pleas were accepted
by the trial court, the prosecutor clearly stated on the
record that the defendant was “going to be deported.”
Again, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the defendant or his counsel expressed surprise, ques-

®°-The defendant testified at his violation of probation hearing as follows:

“(Defense Counsel]: And are you deportable?

“(The Defendant]: Yes, sir.”

©The discussion at the defendant’s plea canvass occurred as follows:

“The Court: Is there an immigration sticker on him?

“[Defense Counsel]: There is no immigration sticker as [far as] I know
of. But I know that—

“[The Prosecutor]: He’s going to be deported. I looked into it when we
did the . . . [and] we talked and then when we did the [violation of proba-
tion] hearing that’s what they told us.

“The Court: AD right.”

538

tioned the prosecutor’s statement, objected to it, or
otherwise expressed any reservation.

“Tt is often said that common sense does not take
flight at the courtroom door.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lederle v. Spivey, 113 Conn. App. 177, 194,
965 A.2d 621, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 916, 970 A.2d 728
(2009). A commonsense analysis of the record in the
present case reveals that the defendant had notice of
the potential immigration consequences that he faced
as a result of his guilty pleas, and the purpose of § 54-
1j therefore was effectuated. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial
court's judgments on the basis of its failure to substan-
tially comply with § 54-1j.

We underscore that our conclusion that the trial court
substantially complied with § 54-1j in the present case
is not intended to suggest that we expect anything less
than full and literal compliance with the statute. The
statutory requirements of § 54-1j and similar statutes
serve an important function in safeguarding fundamen-
tal rights, and we expect that trial courts will follow the
better practice of complying closely with all applicable
requirements concerning plea canvasses.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LEOTIS PAYNE
(SC 17965)

Rogers, ©. J., and Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Bveleigh, Harper and
Vertefeuille, Js.*

* This case was originally argued before a panel of this court consisting
of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Palmer, McLachlan and Eveleigh and

Senior Justice Vertefeuille. Thereafter, Justices Zarella and Harper were
added to the panel and they have read the record, briefs and transcript of
oral argument.

Argued September 21, 2011—officially released January 24, 2012

G. Douglas Nash, special public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s
attorney, Kevin C. Doyle, senior assistant state’s attor-
ney, and Stacey M. Haupt, assistant state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).

Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The defendant, Leotis Payne, appeals!
from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of felony murder in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), larceny in the second
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a)
(8), carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of
General Statutes § 29-35, criminal possession of a fire-
arm in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-
217, attempt to tamper with a juror in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 58a-154, and conspir-
acy to tamper with a juror in violation of General
Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-154. On appeal, the defen-
dant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) joined
the two cases against the defendant for trial; (2) admit-
ted the testimony of one of the state’s witnesses regard-
ing an alleged threat made by the defendant; and (3)
denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the
basis of prosecutorial impropriety. In affirming the judg-
ments of the trial court, we also take this opportunity
to overrule State v. King, 187 Conn. 292, 445 A.2d 901

1 The defendant appealed from the judgments directly to this court pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (8).

—_ ii

(1982), and its progeny, which recognized a presump-
tion in favor of joinder in criminal cases.

The following factual and procedural history is rele-
vant to this appeal. In connection with a deadly shooting
in New Haven in 1994, the defendant was charged by
information with felony murder, robbery in the first
degree, larceny in the second degree, carrying a pistol
without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of
all charges. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed
the judgment of conviction; State v. Payne, 63 Conn.
App. 583, 596, 777 A.2d 731 (2001); and this court there-
after reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and
remanded the case for a new trial after finding that
certain prosecutorial improprieties had deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. State v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446,
466, 797 A.2d 1088 (2002).

During jury selection on remand in 2006, the trial
court declared a mistrial after the defendant was
charged in a separate information with attempt to tam-
per with a juror, and conspiracy to tamper with a juror.
Following the mistrial, the state sought to retry the
defendant on the charges in the felony murder case,
and filed a motion to join that case with the jury tamper-
ing case for trial. The motion was granted and the cases
were consolidated for trial. The defendant was con-
victed of all of the charged offenses, and the court
imposed a total effective sentence of sixty-seven years
incarceration. Additional facts will be set forth as nec-
essary.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial
court improperly joined the felony murder and jury
tampering cases for trial. The defendant claims that
joinder was improper under the test articulated by this
court in State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 722-24, 529

SC
A.2d 1260 (1987).’ The state responds that the trial court
properly examined the factors set forth in that opinion?
After reviewing the evidence presented at the joint trial,

we conclude that the cases were improperly joined, but
the impropriety was harmless.

“The principles that govern our review of a trial
court’s ruling on a motion for joinder or a motion for
severance are well established. Practice Book § 41-19

"In State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 723, this court applied three
factors to determine whether joinder was proper: (1) whether the “factual
similarities . . . [although] insufficient to make the evidence in each case
substantively admissible at the trial of the others, were significant enough
to impair the defendant's right to the jury’s fair and independent consider-
ation of the evidence in each case”; (2) whether “(t]he prejudicial impact
of joinder in these cases was exacerbated by the violent nature of the crimes
with which the defendant was charged . . . [giving] the state the opportu-
nity to present the jury with the intimate details of each of these offenses,
an opportunity that would have been unavailable if the cases had been tried
separately”; and (3) whether “[t]he duration and complexity of the trial also
enhanced the likelihood that the jury would weigh the evidence against the
defendant cumulatively, rather than independently in each case.”

5 The state also claims that the joinder of the cases can be affirmed because
the evidence in the two cases was cross admissible. Specifically, the state
asserts that evidence of jury tampering was admissible to show conscious-
ness of guilt in the felony murder case. We disagree with the state, and
conclude that it would be inappropriate to affirm on the basis of cross
admissibility where, as here, the trial court did not admit the evidence
for consciousness of guilt, and neglected to instruct the jurors regarding
impermissible inferences that could be drawn from joinder of the two cases,
such as inferring the defendant's propensity to commit crime. If the parties
had been permitted to use the evidence for cross admissible purposes at
trial, the trial court would have needed to instruct the jury regarding infer-
ences that could not be drawn from such evidence. See J. Pellegrino, Con-
necticut Selected Jury Instructions: Criminal (8d Ed. 2001) § 2.25, p. 68
(when evidence of prior misconduct is admitted, jury “may not consider
such evidence as establishing a predisposition on the part of the defendant to
commit any of the crimes charged or to demonstrate a criminal propensity”).

In addition, if the cases had been joined due to cross admissibility, the
defendant should have been given an opportunity to negate the inference
of consciousness of guilt in the felony murder case when he testified at
trial, an opportunity that the defendant in the present case was denied. See
‘State v. Lugo, 266 Conn. 674, 692, 835 A.2d 451 (2003) (evidence of defen-
dant’s state of mind is relevant and admissible to rebut state’s claim of
consciousness of guilt).

544

provides that, [t]he judicial authority may, upon its own
motion or the motion of any party, order that two or
more informations, whether against the same defendant
or different defendants, be tried together. . . . In
deciding whether to [join informations] for trial, the trial
court enjoys broad discretion, which, in the absence of
manifest abuse, an appellate court may not disturb.
. . . The defendant bears a heavy burden of showing
that [joinder] resulted in substantial injustice, and that
any resulting prejudice was beyond the curative power
of the court’s instructions. . . .

“Substantial prejudice does not necessarily result
from [joinder] even [if the] evidence of one offense
would not have been admissible at a separate trial
involving the second offense. . . . Consolidation
under such circumstances, however, may expose the
defendant to potential prejudice for three reasons: First,
when several charges have been made against the defen-
dant, the jury may consider that a person charged with
doing so many things is a bad [person] who must have
done something, and may cumulate evidence against
him . . Second, the jury may have used the evi-
dence of one case to convict the defendant in another
case even though that evidence would have been inad-
missible at a separate trial. . . . [Third] joinder of
cases that are factually similar but legally unconnected

. present[s] the . . . danger that a defendant will
be subjected to the omnipresent risk . . . that
although so much [of the evidence] as would be admissi-
ble upon any one of the charges might not [persuade
the jury] of the accused’s guilt, the sum of it will con-
vince them as to all... .

“Despite the existence of these risks, this court con-
sistently has recognized a clear presumption in favor
of joinder and against severance . . . and, therefore,
absent an abuse of discretion . . . will not second

545

guess the considered judgment of the trial court as to
the joinder or severance of two or more charges. . . .

“The court’s discretion regarding joinder, however,
is not unlimited; rather, that discretion must be exer-
cised in a manner consistent with the defendant’s right
to a fair trial. Consequently, we have identified several
factors that a trial court should consider in deciding
whether a severance may be necessary to avoid undue
prejudice resulting from consolidation of multiple
charges for trial. These factors include: (1) whether the
charges involve discrete, easily distinguishable factual
scenarios; (2) whether the crimes were of a violent
nature or concerned brutal or shocking conduct on the
defendant’s part; and (8) the duration and complexity of
the trial. . . . If any or all of these factors are present, a
reviewing court must decide whether the trial court’s
jury instructions cured any prejudice that might have
occurred.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Davis, 286 Conn. 17, 27-29, 942 A.2d
373 (2008).

In the present case, the defendant contends that the
trial court improperly concluded that joinder was
proper under Boscarino. The defendant also urges us
to overrule this court’s decision in State v. King, supra,
187 Conn. 299, which established the foundation for
the presumption in favor of joinder. Because the pre-
sumption presents a threshold issue in our discussion
of joinder, we first address the defendant’s claim regard-
ing King.

In King, the defendant claimed that pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes § 54-57,‘ only offenses of the “same charac-
ter” may be joined for trial. State v. King, supra, 187

“General Statutes § 54-57 provides: “Whenever two or more cases are
pending at the same time against the same party in the same court for
offenses of the same character, counts for such offenses may be joined in
one information unless the court orders otherwise.”

“—_ iii

Conn. 298. In resolving this claim, this court noted that
the rule of practice on joinder, now codified at Practice
Book § 41-19,5 had been amended to omit “reference
to the requirement that the offenses joined be of the
‘same character.” Id., 296. This court therefore con-
cluded that Practice Book § 41-19 “intentionally broad-
ened the circumstances under which two or more
indictments or informations could be joined [for trial],”°
and that “whether the offenses are of the ‘same charac-
ter’ [was] no longer essential.” Id. This court then con-
cluded that §54-57 and Practice Book § 41-19
conflicted, stating: “We must therefore determine
whether joinder is controlled by the statute or the rule.”
Id., 297. We ultimately concluded that, because Practice
Book § 41-19 was “arule which regulate[d] court proce-

5 For clarity, when discussing the relevant rule of practice, we refer exclu-
sively to Practice Book § 41-19, which provides: “The judicial authority may,
upon its own motion or the motion of any party, order that two or more
informations, whether against the same defendant or different defendants,
be tried together.”

When King was decided, Practice Book § 41-19 was codified at Practice
Book (1978-97) § 829. In King, we were asked to compare Practice Book
(1978-97) § 829 with its predecessor, Practice Book (1963) § 492. A brief
history of the rule reveals that “[§] 492 of the 1963 Practice Book . . .
provided: Whenever two or more cases are pending at the same time against
the same party in the same court for offenses of the same character, counts
for such offenses may be joined in one information unless the court orders
otherwise. . . . In 1976, the rule . . . was amended to read as follows: The
judicial authority may, upon his own motion or the motion of any party,
order that two or more indictments or informations or both, whether against
the same defendant or different defendants, be tried together.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. King, supra, 187 Conn. 296. Practice
Book (1978-97) § 829 was then renumbered Practice Book § 41-19 in 1998,
but remained substantively unchanged.

6 although we did not use the words “for trial” in King, that case involved
Joinder of multiple informations for trial, rather than joinder of multiple
charges in an. information. See State v. King, supra, 187 Conn. 293-95

(“The defendant was charged with burglary . . . and larceny... . Ina
separate information, the defendant was also charged with possession of
heroin and cocaine . . . . Prior to trial, the state was granted . . . a motion

for joinder of the two informations, pursuant to Practice Book [§ 41-19],
and the matters were tried together.” [Emphasis added ]).

547

dure and facilitate[d] the administration of justice and
[did] not infringe on any substantive right,” the rule of
practice, rather than § 54-57, governed the trial court’s
decision on a motion for joinder. Id., 298.

The defendant contends that this court’s conclusion
in King that Practice Book § 41-19 prevailed over § 54-
57 is untenable because the rule of practice is substan-
tive, not procedural, in nature. Even if Practice Book
§ 41-19 is procedural, the defendant further claims that.
General Statutes § 51-14 “did not empower the courts
to overrule a constitutional statute purely for proce-
dural or facilitative reasons.” In the alternative, the
defendant urges us to overrule King to the extent that
it laid the foundation for a presumption in favor of
joinder, to which we have adhered in the years since
that decision.” After considering these arguments, we
agree that King should be overruled to the extent that.
it is inconsistent with the plain language of the provi-
sions at issue. We therefore will no longer adhere to
the blanket presumption in favor of joinder.

Although we conclude that Practice Book § 41-19
applies to the joinder of cases for trial, it is now clear
to us that, contrary to our conclusion in King, § 54-57
and Practice Book § 41-19 do not conflict with one
another. Rather, the plain language of these provisions
indicates that they apply to two different situations.
Section 54-57 is directed at prosecutors, and governs
the circumstances under which they may join multiple
charges in a single information. Practice Book § 41-19,
onthe other hand, is directed at trial courts, and governs
the joinder of multiple informations for trial. Conse-
quently, Practice Book § 41-19 applied in King, not

Although this court did not specifically employ the term “presumption”
in King, subsequent case law consistently employed this terminology. See,
eg., State v. Gupta, 297 Conn. 211, 223, 998 A.2d 1085 (2010); State v.
Johnson, 289 Conn. 437, 451, 958 A.2d 713 (2008); State v. Davis, supra, 286
Conn. 29.

—_ ia

because it trumped the statute, but because King
involved the trial court’s joinder of multiple informa-
tions for trial, rather than the prosecutor's joinder of
multiple charges in a single information. State v. King,
supra, 187 Conn. 293-95.

Moreover, we conclude that the blanket presumption.
in favor of joinder that developed in King’s wake; see,
e.g., State v. Johnson, 289 Conn. 437, 451, 958 A.2d 713
(2008); State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608, 628, 949
A.2d 1156 (2008), overruled in part on other grounds
by State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 437, 953 A.2d 45
(2008), superseded in part after reconsideration by
State v. Sanseverino, 291 Conn. 574, 969 A.2d 710
(2009); State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 521,
915 A.2d 822, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888, 128 S. Ct. 248,
169 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2007); is inappropriate and should
no longer be employed. King laid the foundation for
this presumption by stating, “[t]he discretion of a court
to order separate trials should be exercised only when
a joint trial will be substantially prejudicial to the rights
of the defendant, and this means something more than
that a joint trial will be less advantageous to the defen-
dant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. King,
supra, 187 Conn. 299. In cases where the evidence can-
not be used for cross admissible purposes, however,
the blanket presumption in favor of joinder is inconsis-
tent with the well established evidentiary principle
restricting the admission of character evidence. As Jus-
tice Katz argued in her concurring opinion in State v.
Davis, supra, 286 Conn. 38, the presentation of evidence
of a defendant’s previous crimes or misconduct is
“inherently prejudicial unless that evidence would be
legally relevant to the case on some other basis.”*

*In Davis, the majority disagreed with the concurrence’s repudiation of
the liberal presumption in favor of joinder on the basis of this court's decision.
in King. State v. Davis, supra, 286 Conn. 26-27 n.6. Because the defendant
in Davis did not ask the court to overrule King, we did not have occasion
to address these arguments until now. Id.

549

The concurrence in Davis also noted that the blanket
presumption failed to acknowledge that the interest in
judicial economy weighs differently, depending upon
whether the evidence in the cases joined for trial is
cross admissible. Id., 43. “The argument for joinder is
most persuasive when the offenses are based upon the
same act or criminal transaction, since it seems unduly
inefficient to require the state to resolve the same issues
at numerous trials.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 483-44 (Katz, J., concurring). In contrast, when the
cases are not of the same character, the argument for
joinder is far less compelling because the state must
“prove each offense with separate evidence and wit-
nesses [thus] eliminat[ing] any real savings in time or
efficiency which might otherwise be provided by a sin-
gle trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 44
(Katz, J., concurring).

Accordingly, we now reject the blanket presumption
in favor of joinder and establish the burden of proof
concerning joinder at trial as follows: In the trial court,
when multiple charges have already been joined in a
single information by the state pursuant to § 54-57, and
the defendant has filed a motion to sever the charges
for trial pursuant to Practice Book § 41-18, the defen-
dant bears the burden of proving that the offenses are
not of the “same character”; General Statutes § 54-57;
and therefore that the charges should be tried sepa-
rately.” On the other hand, when charges are set forth
in separate informations, presumably because they are
not of the same character, and the state has moved in
the trial court to join the multiple informations for trial,
the state bears the burden of proving that the defendant
will not be substantially prejudiced by joinder pursuant.

* Because § 54-57 restricts prosecutors to joining multiple charges in a
single information only when, in good faith, they find that the offenses were
“of the same character,” we are not concerned that prosecutors will do so
in all cases in order to pass the burden on to the defendant,

— Ss

to Practice Book § 41-19." The state may satisfy this
burden by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
either that the evidence in the cases is cross admissible
or that the defendant will not be unfairly prejudiced
pursuant to the Boscarino factors.

We now apply these principles to the present case,
in which the defendant claims that joinder of the two
cases against him was improper under Boscarino." Spe-
cifically, he claims that: (1) the charges did not involve
discrete, easily distinguishable factual scenarios; (2) the
felony murder case involved crimes of a violent nature
and brutal conduct by the defendant when compared.
to the jury tampering case; and (8) the consolidated
trial was too lengthy and complex to justify joinder.”
The state responds that the trial court properly applied
Boscarino. We agree with the state regarding the first
and third Boscarino factors, and further conclude that,
although the trial court improperly determined that the
second factor was not present, joinder could not have
substantially affected the verdict and therefore was
harmless.

With respect to the first factor, the defendant claims
that the jury tampering case was an “upsetting distrac-

¥ Because this rule of law pertains to the party bearing the burden of
proof, it is procedural, and not substantive, and therefore will not apply
retroactively in habeas proceedings. See Luurtsema v. Commissioner of
Correction, 209 Conn. 740, 768-54, 12 A.3d 817 (2011); see also Bousley v.
United States, 523 US. 614, 620, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998)
unless a new rule of criminal procedure is of such a nature that without
[it] the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished . . .
there is no reason to apply the rule retroactively on habeas review” [citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]).

4 Despite our reallocation of the burden when the trial court is faced
with the question of joinder of cases for trial, the defendant's burden of
proving error on appeal when we review the trial court's order of joinder
remains the same. See State v. Bilis, 270 Conn. 337, 376, 852 A.2d 676 (2004)
(“lijtis the defendant's burden on appeal to show that joinder was improper
by proving substantial prejudice that could not be cured by the trial court's
instructions to the jury” [emphasis added)).

See footnote 2 of this opinion.

551

tion” to the jurors and that the events in the two cases
were too intertwined for them to be joined. We disagree.
The felony murder case involved the defendant's partici-
pation in a street crime in October, 1994. The jury tam-
pering case, on the other hand, involved the defendant's
attempt to tamper with jurors during his trial in Decem-
ber, 2006. Because the two cases were factually and
temporally distinct, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion with respect to its conclusion
regarding the first Boscarino factor. See State v. Her-
ring, 210 Conn. 78, 96, 554 A.2d 686 (two killings that
were not “strikingly similar” involved discrete factual
scenarios), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912, 109 S. Ct. 3232,
106 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1989); State v. Barnes, 127 Conn.
App. 24, 41, 15 A.3d 170 (sales charge and possession
charge stemming from conduct that occurred months
apart were factually discrete), cert. granted, 300 Conn.
938, 17 A.3d 472 (2011).

The defendant next claims that the trial court improp-
erly determined that the conduct alleged in the felony
murder case was not so brutal or shocking as to require
separate trials. We agree, and conclude that the trial
court, even if adhering to the presumption in favor of
joinder, abused its discretion with respect to its ruling
on this factor. “Whether one or more offenses involved
brutal or shocking conduct likely to arouse the passions
of the jurors must be ascertained by comparing the
relative levels of violence used to perpetrate the
offenses charged in each information.” State v. Davis,
supra, 286 Conn. 29-30. In the felony murder case, the
victim died after being shot at close range. In the jury
tampering case, on the other hand, the defendant unsuc-
cessfully attempted to contact several jurors in an effort
to avoid conviction; no violence was involved. We
would be hard pressed to find cases that, when joined,
raise a more significant concern regarding the relative

552

levels of violence than the cases at issue here."® Because
the defendant’s conduct in killing the victim in the fel-
ony murder case was significantly more brutal and
shocking than his conduct in attempting to tamper with
the jurors, we conclude that the second Boscarino fac-
tor was present, and that the evidence from the felony
murder case was prejudicial to the defendant with
regard to the jury tampering case.

Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court
abused its discretion in determining that the joint trial
was neither unduly long nor complex. We disagree. The
trial in this case lasted only two weeks, consisting of
merely eight days of testimony and twenty-one wit-
nesses. In State v. Herring, supra, 210 Conn. 97-98, we
rejected a claim that a trial with eight days of testimony
and twenty-three witnesses was unduly complex. Cf.
State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 723 (finding high
likelihood that jury would weigh evidence cumulatively
when trial lasted ten weeks); id., 723-24 (fifty-five wit-
ness trial too complex). We therefore conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
the joint trial was not unduly lengthy or complex.

Despite our conclusion that the cases were improp-

erly joined for trial pursuant to the second Boscarino
factor, we conclude that the error was harmless."* When

® The second Boscarino factor was present despite the defendant's admis-
sion that he was guilty of the jury tampering charges. The defendant's
strategy at trial, in light of the joinder of the cases, was to confess to the
jury tampering crimes in an effort to prove that he was testifying honestly
when he denied committing the other crimes. Arguably then, the defendant
might not have employed this strategy and confessed to the jury tampering
charges if the two cases had been tried separately.

4The presence of only one Boscarino factor is necessary to prove preju-
dice. State v. Davis, supra, 286 Conn. 29 (“[i]f any or all of these factors
are present, a reviewing court must decide whether the trial court's jury
instructions cured any prejudice that might have occurred” [emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Randolph, 284 Conn. 828, 338,
933 A.2d 1158 (2007) (same); State v. Ellis, 270 Conn. 337, 375, 852 A.2d
676 (2004) (same); State v. Cassidy, 236 Conn. 112, 133, 672 A.2d 899 (same),
cert, denied, 519 U.S. 910, 117 S. Ct. 278, 136 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1996), overruled

553

reviewing claims of error, we examine first whether
the trial court abused its discretion, and, if so, we next
inquire whether the error was harmless." See State v.
Beavers, 290 Conn. 386, 396-97, 963 A.2d 956 (2009).
When an error is not of constitutional magnitude, the
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
error was harmful. State v. Osimanti, 299 Conn. 1, 18,
6 A.3d 790 (2010). The proper standard for review of a
defendant’s claim of harm is “whether the jury’s verdict
was substantially swayed by the error. . . . Accord-
ingly, a nonconstitutional error is harmless when an
appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did
not substantially affect the verdict.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 18-19. We conclude that the defen-
dant did not prove harm in the present case.

The record reveals that, during voir dire, the trial
court instructed the potential jurors that, although the
cases had been joined for judicial economy, the jurors,
if called upon to serve, must “treat each and every case

on other grounds by State v. Alewander, 254 Conn. 290, 296, 755 A.2d 868
(2000). Accordingly, a defendant may challenge his conviction based on the
presence of only one of the factors. See State v. Davis, supra, 29 and n.7
(challenging propriety of Appellate Court's conclusion on basis of second
Boscarino factor only); State v. Ellis, supra, 376 (limiting analysis to second,
and only, Boscarino factor addressed by defendant); State v. Virgo, 115
Conn. App. 786, 796, 974 A2d 752 (2009) (defendant did not argue that
second or third Boscarino factors were not satisfied, and, therefore, court
addressed them onlybriefly), cert. denied, 298 Conn. 923, 980 A.2d914 (2009).

Prior cases involving joinder have neither expressly renounced nor
invoked this two step inquiry. Having rejected the presumption in favor of
joinder and reallocated the burden of proof to the state, however, it is now
necessary for us specify that our usual inquiry for review of nonconstitutional
claims of error applies in cases involving joinder. See, e.g., State v. Osimanti,
supra, 299 Conn. 18 (“[w]hether [the improper admission of a witness’
testimony] is harmless in a particular case depends upon anumber of factors,
such as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution's case,
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material
points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course,
the overall strength of the prosecution's case” [internal quotation marks
omitted]).

554

separately . . . .” The court expanded upon this warn-
ing multiple times throughout the trial, including after
the jury was impaneled," during the state’s presentation
of evidence,” and in its final charge. These instructions
helped to cure the error by informing the jurors that
the brutal nature of the conduct alleged in the felony
murder case could not be used to infer the defendant’s
guilt in the jury tampering case.”

In addition, we conclude that the defendant failed to
demonstrate that the error substantially affected the
verdict in light of the strength of the state’s evidence in
the jury tampering case. Even excluding the defendant's
confession to jury tampering; see footnote 13 of this
opinion; the state’s evidence included prison tape
recordings of telephone conversations between the
defendant and Carol Evans, with whom the defendant
conspired in the jury tampering case. In those telephone
conversations, the defendant discussed his plan to tam-
per with the jury, and asked Evans about her attempts
to do so on his behalf. On this basis, we conclude that
the error regarding the second Boscarino factor was
ultimately harmless.

Ir

We next review the defendant's claim that the trial
court abused its discretion when, during redirect exami-

'S Prior to presentment of any evidence, the trial judge stated: “I told you
upon voir dire that I have joined two cases for trial, two informations, and
the fact that there are two cases here as opposed to one has absolutely no
bearing whatsoever again on whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.”

1 When the state presented its evidence in the felony murder case and
began to introduce its evidence in the jury tampering case, the court reiter-
ated that the cases had been joined for judicial economy.

18In its final jury charge, the trial court reminded the jurors that the
cases were joined for judicial economy and that they “should not make any
inference about the joinder of these two cases.”

The presence of the second Boscarino factor in this case prejudiced
the defendant's trial only with respect to the charges in the jury tampering
case, which involved no brutal and shocking conduct, and did not prejudice
the defendant with respect to the charges in the felony murder case.

555

nation, it admitted a statement made by the defendant.
to one of the state’s witnesses. The defendant argues
that he was unfairly prejudiced by admission of the
evidence, and that his request to open his cross-exami-
nation and to withdraw the offending questions should
have been granted. The state responds that the defen-
dant “opened the door” to such testimony during cross-
examination. After reviewing the record, we conclude
that admission of the testimony, although improper,
was harmless.

The following additional facts are relevant to our -
review of the defendant’s claim. The challenged testi-
mony was given by Steven Thomas, who was present
on the night of the shooting. Thomas testified that,
earlier in the evening, the defendant had asked Thomas
to allow the defendant and the defendant’s friend, Henry
Jones, to borrow Thomas’ van. During direct examina-
tion, the state asked Thomas whether there came “a
point in time where something happened to [his] van?”
Thomas began to reply, “I was threatened that if I didn’t
give somebody a ride—and I didn’t . . . .” The defen-
dant objected, and the trial court sustained the objec-
tion and ordered that the answer be stricken from
the record.

The state then asked, “Did there come a point in time
while you were standing out near your van that [the
defendant] said something to you?” Thomas responded
in the affirmative, and the state inquired, “And what
was that?” The defendant again objected.” Outside the
presence of the jury, Thomas indicated to the court that
the defendant had said to him “that if . . . Jones didn’t
drive the van, no one would drive the van, and it would
be busted up so nobody could drive it.” After a lengthy

* The record reveals that defense counsel objected, asserting that Thomas’

testimony was inadmissible hearsay, irrelevant, and inadmissible charac-
ter evidence.

556

colloquy between defense counsel and the prosecutor,
the trial court sustained the defendant’s objection with-
out explanation, stating simply that the evidence “was
out for the time being, unless it finds its way back in
through some other way... .”

During cross-examination, defense counsel asked
Thomas whether he was concerned about his van after
he heard about the shooting.” Specifically, defense
counsel asked, “You were concerned [about your van]
because you were afraid that the police might have it
tied up in the shooting; is that correct?” Thomas replied,
“Not at that time, no.”

After cross-examination, the state argued to the trial
court that the defendant had opened the door to ques-
tions regarding his statement to Thomas by inquiring
into Thomas’ concern about his van. The defendant
countered that he had not opened the door to such
questioning, and, in the alternative, he requested that
the court allow him to open his cross-examination so
that he could withdraw the offending questions. The
court denied the defendant’s request to withdraw the
questions and permitted Thomas to testify as to the

41 With respect to the van, the colloquy between defense counsel and
Thomas proceeded, in full, as follows:

“Q. Following . . . Jones coming to the apartment, you remained in
the apartment?

“A. Yes, sir.

“Q. And you remained in there and you were nervous; is that fair to say?

“A. Yes.

“Q. You were concerned you might somehow be implicated in the

“Q. You were also concerned about your van, were you not?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And you were—I believe you referred to it as your beautiful van. You
were concemed because you were afraid that the police might have it tied
up in the shooting; is that correct?

“A. Not at that time, no.”

557

defendant’s threat that the van would be “bust[ed] up

222,

Generally, “a party who delves into a particular sub-
ject during the examination of a witness cannot object
if the opposing party later questions the witness on the
same subject. . . . The party who initiates discussion
on the issue is said to have opened the door to rebuttal
by the opposing party. Even though the rebuttal evi-
dence would ordinarily be imadmissible on other
grounds, the court may, in its discretion, allow it [when]
the party initiating inquiry has made unfair use of the
evidence. . . . [T]his rule operates to prevent a defen-
dant from successfully excluding inadmissible prosecu-
tion evidence and then selectively introducing pieces
of this evidence for his own advantage, without allowing
the prosecution to place the evidence in its proper con-
text.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vic-
tor O., 301 Conn. 163, 189, 20 A.3d 669, cert. denied,

US. —, 182 S. Ct. 583, 181 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2011).

“In determining whether otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence should be admitted to rebut evidence offered by
an opposing party, the trial court must carefully con-
sider whether the circumstances of the case warrant
further inquiry into the subject matter . . . and should
permit it only to the extent necessary to remove any
unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued
from the original evidence . . . . Accordingly, the trial
court should balance the harm to the state in restricting
the inquiry with the prejudice suffered by the defendant
in allowing the rebuttal. . . . We will not overturn the
trial court’s decision unless the trial court has abused
its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

® Although the trial court did not expressly state its finding that the
defendant had opened the door during cross-examination, we assume, in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that this was the basis for the
court's admission of the defendant's statement on redirect.

—

Upon review of the evidence in the present case,
we conclude that the trial court improperly admitted
Thomas’ testimony concerning the defendant’s state-
ment. A defendant’s questions on cross-examination do
not open the door to inquiry into unrelated matters.
Rather, “the opening the door doctrine is expressly
intended to prevent a defendant from successfully
excluding inadmissible prosecution evidence and then
selectively introducing pieces of this evidence for his
own advantage, without allowing the prosecution to
place the evidence in its proper context.” (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. Powell, 93 Conn. App.
592, 600, 889 A.2d 885, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 924, 895
A.2d 797 (2006), quoting State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106,
187, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126
S. Ct. 102, 163 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2005). Accordingly, even
if Thomas was concerned that he would be implicated
in the crime, as suggested by defense counsel's question.
during cross-examination, this fact would have no bear-
ing on Thomas’ separate concern that the defendant
was going to damage his van. It was improper, therefore,
for the trial court to conclude that the defendant had
opened the door to Thomas’ testimony that the defen-
dant had threatened to damage Thomas’ van.

Despite our conclusion that the evidence was improp-
erly admitted, however, we further determine that the
impropriety was harmless. “[W]hen an improper eviden-
tiary ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant.
bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was
harmful. . . . [W]hether [the improper admission of a
witness’ testimony] is harmless in a particular case
depends upon a number of factors, such as the impor-
tance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the pres-
ence or absence of evidence corroborating or contra-
dicting the testimony of the witness on material points,
the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted,

559

and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s
case. . . . Most importantly, we must examine the
impact of the [improperly admitted] evidence on the
trier of fact and the result of the trial. . . . [T]he proper
standard for determining whether an erroneous eviden-
tiary ruling is harmless should be whether the jury’s
verdict was substantially swayed by the error. . . .
Accordingly, a nonconstitutional error is harmless
when an appellate court has a fair assurance that the
error did not substantially affect the verdict.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osimanti, supra,
299 Conn. 18-19.

The present record reveals fair assurance that the
improper admission of the defendant’s statement did
not substantially affect the defendant’s conviction.
First, the state’s cases against the defendant were par-
ticularly strong in light of the defendant’s confession
in the jury tampering case and the testimony of two
eyewitnesses in the felony murder case. Additionally,
despite the defendant’s claim that Thomas’ testimony
showed a violent tendency, the statement at issue
involved potential property damage, rather than bodily
injury. The statement was therefore unlikely to inflame
the jury and was irrelevant to the crimes at issue in the
present case.

Finally, even if the defendant had opened the door
to such questions, the trial court was under no obliga-
tion to allow him to open his cross-examination and
withdraw the offending questions. At that point in the
proceedings, the questions had already been asked and
answered, and cross-examination was complete. Cf.
State v. Caracoglia, 95 Conn. App. 95, 105 n.7, 895
A.2d 810 (during preliminary hearing, trial court warned
defendant that proposed line of questioning would
“open the door” to significant prejudice on cross-exami-
nation), cert. denied, 278 Conn. 922, 901 A.2d 1222
(2006). For these reasons, we conclude that the

560

improper admission of the defendant’s statement to
Thomas was harmless.

Il

The final issue presented by the defendant’s appeal
is whether he was entitled to a new trial due to alleged
prosecutorial improprieties. The defendant claims that
three statements by the prosecutor during closing and
rebuttal arguments were improper, and that those
improprieties deprived him of a fair trial. The state
responds that only one instance of impropriety
occurred, and that none of the statements so infected
the trial as to make the defendant’s conviction a denial
of due process. We conclude that all three remarks
were improper, but that the defendant failed to prove
that they amounted to a denial of his right to a fair trial.

As an initial matter, we set forth the governing legal
principles. We begin by noting that, although the defen-
dant preserved one of his claims of impropriety at trial,
he did not preserve the other two that he now raises
on appeal. Nevertheless, we review all three because,
under settled law, “a defendant who fails to preserve
claims of prosecutorial misconduct need not seek to
prevail under the specific requirements of State v. Gold-
ing, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and,
similarly, it is unnecessary for a reviewing court to
apply the four-pronged Golding test.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Warholic, 278 Conn. 354,
360, 897 A.2d 569 (2006).

“Mn analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we
engage in a two step analytical process. . . . The two
steps are separate and distinct. . . . We first examine
whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred. . . . Sec-
ond, if an impropriety exists, we then examine whether
it deprived the defendant of his due process right to
a fair trial. . . . In other words, an impropriety is an
impropriety, regardless of its ultimate effect on the fair-

561

ness of the trial. Whether that impropriety was harmful
and thus caused or contributed to a due process viola-
tion involves a separate and distinct inquiry.” (Citations
omitted.) State v. Fauci, 282 Conn. 23, 32, 917 A.2d
978 (2007).

“TOjur determination of whether any improper con-
duct by the state’s attorney violated the defendants fair
trial rights is predicated on the factors set forth in State
v. Williams, [204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987)],
with due consideration of whether that misconduct was
objected to at trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Warholic, supra, 278 Conn. 362. These factors
include: “the extent to which the [impropriety] was
invited by defense conduct or argument . . . the sever-
ity of the [impropriety] . . . the frequency of the
[impropriety] . . . the centrality of the [impropriety]
to the critical issues in the case . . . the strength of
the curative measures adopted . . . and the strength
of the state’s case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Fauci, supra, 282 Conn. 34. In Williams, how-
ever, we did not specify the party that bears the burden
of proof with respect to these factors, which has
resulted in confusion in subsequent case law. See State
v. Gibson, 114 Conn. App. 295, 320 n.2, 969 A.2d 784
(2009) (Bishop, J., dissenting) (discussing possible
interpretations of case law as to burden of proof), rev'd
in part, 302 Conn. 653, 31 A.3d 346 (2011); see also State
v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 288 n.21, 973 A.2d 1207
(2009) (our case law “does not . . . indicate which
party bears the burden of proving the harmlessness
of the prosecutorial impropriety”). Accordingly, before
addressing the substance of the defendant’s claim in
this case, we take this opportunity to review relevant
case law and clarify the burden of proof.

In State v. Cassidy, 236 Conn. 112, 129, 672 A.2d 899,
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 910, 117 S. Ct. 273, 136 L. Ed. 2d
196 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds by State

562

v. Alexander, 254 Conn. 290, 296, 755 A.2d 868 (2000),
this court stated that, because the prosecutorial impro-
priety at issue in that case “impermissibly infringed
upon [the defendant’s] rights guaranteed under the con-
frontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions,
he is entitled to a new trial on those counts unless the
state can establish that the objectionable comments
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” In contrast,
in State v. Alexander, supra, 302 n.11, we found that
the Appellate Court had improperly placed the burden
on the state to prove harmless error in a case of prosecu-
torial impropriety, and that, “[t]o prove prosecutorial
[impropriety], the defendant must demonstrate sub-
stantial prejudice.” Id., 303.

Next, in State v. Warholic, supra, 278 Conn. 405 n.29,
the burden was placed upon the defendant to prove
that he was harmed by the prosecutorial impropriety,
and we expressly rejected the defendant’s request that
we adopt “a new standard under which, once the defen-
dant establishes that prosecutorial misconduct
occurred, the burden would shift to the state to prove
that the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” In State v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 288 n.21,
however, we concluded, “fiJnasmuch as the fourth
prong of Golding requires the state to prove that the
constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt . . . the state bears the burden of demon-
strating, beyond a reasonable doubt, the harmlessness
of the prosecutorial impropriety in a given case.” (Cita-
tion omitted.) Finally, in State v. Tomas D., 296 Conn.
476, 513-14, 995 A.2d 583 (2010), we applied the Wil-
liams factors “to determine whether the state ha[d]
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the prose-
cutorial impropriety . . . did not deprive the defen-
dant of a fair trial.”

We now clarify that, when a defendant raises on
appeal a claim that improper remarks by the prosecutor

SC

deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a
fair trial, the burden is on the defendant to show, not
only that the remarks were improper, but also that,
considered in light of the whole trial, the improprieties
were so egregious that they amounted to a denial of
due process. See State v. Gibson, supra, 114 Conn. App.
321 n.2 (Bishop, J., dissenting) (“when the claim of
impropriety does not directly bear on a specific consti-
tutional right but, rather, implicates due process gener-
ally, the defendant retains the burden of demonstrating
both the impropriety and the attendant denial of due
process”). On the other hand, consistent with our deci-
sions in Cassidy and Angel T., if the defendant raises
a claim that the prosecutorial improprieties infringed
a specifically enumerated constitutional right, such as
the fifth amendment right to remain silent or the sixth
amendment right to confront one’s accusers, and the
defendant meets his burden of establishing the constitu-
tional violation, the burden is then on the state to prove
that the impropriety was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., State v. Cassidy, supra, 236 Conn. 129
(“[b]ecause the prosecutor’s argument impermissibly
infringed upon his rights guaranteed under the confron-
tation clauses of the federal and state constitutions, he
is entitled to a new trial on those counts unless the
state can establish that the objectionable comments
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); see also
State v. Gibson, supra, 321 n.2 (Bishop, J., dissenting)
(“fw]hen the claimed prosecutorial impropriety directly
implicates a specific constitutional right, such as .. .
the right of confrontation, or to present a defense, or
to remain silent, the burden of harmlessness will still
shift to the state”).

This allocation of the burden of proof is appropriate
because, when a defendant raises a general due process
claim, there can be no constitutional violation in the
absence of harm to the defendant caused by denial of

_ iia

his right to a fair trial. The constitutional analysis and
the harm analysis in such cases are one and the same.
With the exception of State v. Tomas D., supra, 296
Conn. 513-17, our cases are in harmony regarding this
rule.¥ To the extent that our decision in Tomas D. is
inconsistent with this conclusion, itis hereby overruled.
Having clarified the burden of proof, we now turn to
the question of whether the prosecutor’s remarks were
improper in this case.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of
the defendant’s claim. With respect to the first alleged
impropriety, the two cases against the defendant,
although joined for trial, were treated as legally unre-
lated when presented to the jury. The trial court
declined to instruct the jury that it could consider the
evidence of the jury tampering charges as evidence of
the defendant’s consciousness of guilt in the felony
murder case. Nevertheless, at the end of his closing
argument, the prosecutor stated, “You decide if he tried
to tamper with jurors, and you decide why he would
try to do that.” (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel did
not object to this remark.

Next, during the defendant’s closing argument,
defense counsel repeatedly stated that the defendant
was “honest,” and that he “told the truth’ when he
testified. In response to these comments, at the begin-
ning of the state’s rebuttal, the prosecutor stated:
“[Y]ou’ve heard defense counsel tell you her client was

® We reject any assertion that both Angel T. and Tomas D. stand for
the proposition that the state should bear the burden of proving that the
impropriety did not amount to a denial of due process. As we recognized
in State v. Coccomo, 302 Conn. 664, 675~76, 31 A.3d 1012 (2011), because
Angel T. involved a claim of prosecutorial impropriety amounting to a viola-
tion of the defendant's right to counsel, the state properly bore the burden
in that case. Tomas D., on the other hand, involved a general due process
claim, rather than a claim asserting a denial of one of the defendant's
specifically enumerated constitutional rights. Thus, in that case, the burden
of proof should have been placed upon the defendant.

565

honest. It’s your decision and your duty to decide who
is being honest. In fact, attorneys aren't even ethically
allowed to say a particular witness is honest or not.
That’s for the jury . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The defen-
dant objected to this remark as a personal attack, but.
the objection was overruled.

The last alleged impropriety occurred during the
state’s rebuttal, when the prosecutor told jurors: “[Y]ou
have to consider, if the defendant is willing to contact
particular jurors seated on his case and get . . . Evans
to reach out to them, someone he hardly met, and [he
was] able to manipulate her, what else is he capable of
doing?” (Emphasis added.) The defendant did not
object to this remark.

The defendant claims on appeal that all three of these
statements were improper. The state responds that the
first and third statements were not improper, and that,
with respect to the second statement, the defendant
failed to satisfy his burden of proving that he was denied
due process. We conclude that all three remarks were
improper. We further conclude, however, that the
remarks were minor and isolated, and therefore did not
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

We conclude that the prosecutor’s first remark vio-
lated the trial court’s order that the parties separate
the evidence in the two cases before the jury. See State
v. Ubaldi, 190 Conn. 559, 567-68, 462 A.2d 1001, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 916, 104 S. Ct. 280, 78 L. Ed. 2d 259
(1983). Prior to closing arguments, the trial court
announced its decision not to provide a consciousness
of guilt instruction with respect to the defendant’s
attempt to tamper with the jury, or to indicate to the
jury that the two cases were legally related in any way.
Indeed, defense counsel argued to the court, “if Your
Honor is not instructing that [the jury tampering] is
consciousness of guilt, [the state] should be prohibited

—

from arguing that it’s consciousness of guilt,” to which
the court responded, “they are not going to argue that.”
The prosecutor’s subsequent statement linking the two
cases violated the court’s order by referencing evidence
outside the record in the felony murder case. See State
v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364, 400, 832 A.2d 14 (2003) (“a
prosecutor, in fulfilling his duties, must confine himself
to the evidence in the record”). This statement, there-
fore, was improper.

Next, the prosecutor’s second statement, although
in response to defense counsel’s improper statements
bolstering the defendant’s credibility, was improper
because it impugned defense counsel by characterizing
her as unethical. “It has been held improper for the
prosecutor to impugn the role of defense counsel. . . .
In particular, [i]t is improper for a prosecutor to tell a
jury, explicitly or implicitly, that defense counsel is
employing standard tactics used in all trials, because
such an argument relies on facts not in evidence and
has no bearing on the issue before the jury, namely, the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.” (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Luster, 279
Conn. 414, 433-34, 902 A.2d 636 (2006); see also State
v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34, 82, 3 A.3d 1 (2010) (“[t]he
prosecutor is expected to refrain from impugning,
directly or through implication, the integrity or institu-
tional role of defense counsel”), cert. denied, 562 U.S.
1225, 131 S. Ct. 1479, 179 L. Ed. 2d 316 (2011). By
distracting the jury from the ultimate question of the
defendant’s guilt, therefore, the prosecutor acted
improperly.

Finally, like the first challenged statement, the prose-
cutor’s third statement improperly linked the cases in
violation of the court’s order to keep them separate
and therefore relied upon evidence outside the record
in the two cases. By highlighting the defendant’s manip-
ulation of Evans in the jury tampering case, and asking
jurors “what else [the defendant was] capable of doing”

567

in light of this manipulation, the prosecutor asked jurors
to infer that the defendant was also guilty in the felony
murder case. See State v. Ceballos, supra, 266 Conn.
400 (“a prosecutor, in fulfilling his duties, must confine
himself to the evidence in the record”).

Having determined that all three of the prosecutor's
statements were improper, we now turn to whether the
defendant has proven that the improprieties, cumula-
tively, “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make
the conviction[s] a denial of due process.” (internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Singh, 259 Conn.
693, 723, 793 A.2d 226 (2002). We conclude that he has
not. Under the first Williams factor, comments made
by defense counsel during closing argument invited the
state’s comment regarding her ethics in rebuttal. Cf.
State v. Alexander, supra, 254 Conn. 308 (when
improper comments were made during prosecutor's ini-
tial summation and later rebuttal argument, defendant’s
comments during closing argument could not have
invited comments in response). Further, the comment
regarding defense counsel’s ethics also did not pertain
to critical issues in the case, but instead focused upon.
the professional conduct of defense counsel.

With respect to the second and third Williams fac-
tors, all three of the contested statements by the prose-
cutor were isolated and occurred within the state’s
lengthy closing argument. Additionally, the trial court
cured any harm by instructing the jury that the argu-
ments of counsel were not evidence on which the jurors
could rely,“ and reiterating that the cases had been
joined merely for judicial economy, rather than cross

™ Specifically, the trial court explained: “Closing arguments, you heard
them this afternoon from each counsel . . . . They are intended to advance
to you their respective positions, and again, it is not evidence. It is for you
to decide. And if any of the evidence stated by any of the lawyers, and
indeed me, differs from your recollection of the evidence, who controls?
You. You are the triers of the facts.”

568

admissibility purposes. State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567,
590, 10 A.3d 1005 (“[w]e presume the jury . . . fol-
lowed [the court's] instruction in the absence of any
indication to the contrary”), cert. denied, US. ,
132 S. Ct. 314, 181 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2011). Lastly, pursuant
to the final Williams factor, the state’s case against
the defendant was strong, including the defendant’s
confession in the jury tampering case and the testimony
of two eyewitnesses in the felony murder case.

Finally, it bears mention that only one of the impropri-
eties was so glaring that it was objected to at trial by
defense counsel. When no objection is raised at trial,
we infer that defense counsel did not regard the remarks
as “seriously prejudicial” at the time the statements
were made. State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 575, 849
A.2d 626 (2004) (“[T]he determination of whether anew
trial or proceeding is warranted depends, in part, on
whether defense counsel has made a timely objection to
any [incident] of the prosecutor’s improper [conduct].
When defense counsel does not object, request a cura-
tive instruction or move for a mistrial, he presumably
does not view the alleged impropriety as prejudicial
enough to jeopardize seriously the defendant's right to
a fair trial.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). Based
on our review of the Williams factors, we conclude
that the prosecutorial improprieties did not deprive the
defendant of his right to a fair trial.

The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

569

IN RE JOSE B.*
(SC 18753)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Harper, Js.

Argued October 18, 2011—officially released January 31, 2012

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79-3, the names of the parties involved in this appeal
are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for
inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order
of the Appellate Court.

Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Sarah Eagan
and, on the brief, Stacey Violante Cote, for the appel-
lant (petitioner).

Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, with.
whom were Mary-Anne Ziewacz Mulholland, assistant
attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attor-
ney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney
general, for the appellee (intervenor).

Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The petitioner, Jose B., appealed to
the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court
dismissing his petition seeking to have himself adjudi-
cated as neglected and as an uncared-for youth, filed
pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (a). In re Jose

1 General Statutes § 46b-129 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any selectman,
town manager, or town, city or borough welfare department, any probation
officer, or the Commissioner of Social Services, the Commissioner of Chil-
dren and Families or any child-caring institution or agency approved by the
Commissioner of Children and Families, achild or such child’s representative
or attorney or a foster parent of a child, having information that a child or
youth is neglected, uncared-for or dependent, may file with the Superior
Court that has venue over such matter a. verified petition plainly stating
such facts as bring the child or youth within the jurisdiction of the court
as neglected, uncared-for or dependent, within the meaning of section 46b-
120..."

571

B., 125 Conn. App. 572, 11 A.3d 682 (2010). On appeal,
the petitioner claimed that the trial court improperly
dismissed the petition as moot because, two days after
he filed it, he reached his eighteenth birthday. Id., 573—
74. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of dis-
missal. Id., 584. We then granted the petitioner's petition
for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue:
“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
neglect petition?” In re Jose B., 300 Conn. 916, 13 A.3d
1103 (2011). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate
Court.

The Appellate Court’s opinion sets forth the following
facts and procedural history, “On July 15, 2009, two days
before his eighteenth birthday, [the petitioner] filed two
ex parte motions with the Superior Court for Juvenile
Matters in Hartford seeking an order of temporary cus-
tody and an order of emergency commitment to the
department of children and families (department). On
the same date, the petitioner filed the petition seeking
to have himself adjudicated as neglected and uncared.
for. [The petitioner] alleged that his mother was a resi-
dent of Puerto Rico and that his father’s identity and
whereabouts were unknown. He further alleged that he
had been living with his uncle, having been placed there
by his mother approximately four years earlier. Follow-
ing his uncle’s incarceration, [the petitioner] becam
homeless. :

“That same day, the [trial] court denied [the petition-
er’s] ex parte motions. On or about August 18, 2009,
the department moved to intervene for the limited pur-
pose of moving to dismiss the neglect and uncared-for
petition. The department also filed a motion to dismiss
and an accompanying memorandum of law. On Septem-
ber 4, 2009, the court, concluding that the department
was a necessary party, granted the motion to intervene.

572

“The [trial] court heard oral argument on the depart-
ment’s motion to dismiss and, following supplemental
briefing, issued its memorandum of decision on January
14, 2010. The court concluded that it lacked the statu-
tory authority to commit an individual who was eigh-
teen years of age or older on a retroactive basis. As a
result, it determined that, because it could not afford
[the petitioner] any direct practical relief, the case was
moot. It further determined that neither the collateral
consequences nor the capable of repetition yet evading
review exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied.
Accordingly, the court granted the department’s motion
to dismiss.” In re Jose B., supra, 125 Conn. App. 574-75.

Before we address the merits of the petitioner’s claim,
we first take this opportunity to address the ongoing
confusion as to whether the failure to plead or prove
an essential fact to obtain relief under § 46b-129 (a)
implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction
or its statutory authority. This issue arose in In re Mat-
thew F., 297 Conn. 673, 700, 4 A.3d 248 (2010), in which
the question was whether the petitioner was entitled
to relief under § 46b-129 (a) when he had failed to allege
that, after reaching the age of eighteen, he was enrolled
full-time in secondary school, technical school, college
or a state-accredited job training program, as required
by § 46b-129 (j). A majority of this court concluded that
his failure to establish this factual predicate deprived
the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The
majority acknowledged, however, that “there exists a
line of cases that suggests that [this question] should
be framed as whether the trial court had the authority
to decide this case. See, e.g., Amodio v. Amodio, [247
Conn. 724, 728, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999)]; Gurliacci v.
Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). The
discrepancy between those cases and the cases we fol-
low, holding that the question is jurisdictional; see, e.g.,
Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., [292 Conn. 381, 386, 973

573

A.2d 1229 (2009)]; Figueroa v. C & S Ball Bearing, [237
Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996)]; is troubling.” (Emphasis
in original.) In re Matthew F., supra, 699 n.19. The
majority ultimately concluded in In re Matthew F. that
that case was “not the proper occasion to reconcile
this discrepancy because neither party primarily frames
its claims as implicating the authority of the Superior
Court.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rogers argued
that, to the extent that the cases were inconsistent, the
better rule was set forth in Gurliacci, and, therefore,
the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction,
but merely lacked statutory authority. Id., 708-709 (Rog-
ers, C. J., concurring). Although the parties in the pres-
ent case also have not briefed the question of whether
the failure to allege an essential fact under § 46b-129 (a)
implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction or
its statutory authority, neither party will be prejudiced
if we address the question, and we conclude that the
time has come to resolve the issue.

“This court previously has recognized the recurrent
difficulty of distinguishing between two kinds of chal-
lenges to a tribunal’s exercise of its statutory authority.
On the one hand, a challenge may allege that a tribunal’s
action exceeds its statutory authority. Such a challenge
raises a jurisdictional claim. On the other hand, a chal-
lenge may allege that a tribunal’s action misconstrues
its statutory authority. Such a challenge raises a claim
of statutory construction that is not jurisdictional. Can-
toni v. Xerox Corp., 251 Conn. 153, 162, 740 A.2d 796
(1999). Thus, [aJlthough related, the court’s authority
to act pursuant to a statute is different from its subject
matter jurisdiction. The power of the court to hear and
determine, which is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be
confused with the way in which that power must be
exercised in order to comply with the terms of the

574

statute. . . . Amodio v. Amodio, [supra, 247 Conn.
728).

“As this court suggested in Cantoni, the distinction
between challenges to the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and challenges to the exercise of its statu-
tory authority is not always clear. As aresult, this court’s
cases addressing the distinction have not always been
consistent. In Amodio, for example, the parties had
entered into a child support agreement that precluded
modification unless the defendant earned more than
$900 per week. Id., 727. The agreement was approved as
an order of the trial court. Id., 726. When the defendant
sought a modification order pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 46b-86 (a), the trial court granted the modifica-
tion even though the defendant's weekly income did
not exceed $900. Id. On appeal, the Appellate Court
determined, sua sponte, that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to modify the support order because the
dissolution decree foreclosed such a modification. Id.,
727. On appeal, this court concluded that [a] court does
not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has compe-
tence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once it is
determined that a tribunal has authority or competence
to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs,
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in
favor of entertaining the action. . . . Id., 728. This
court noted that § 46b-86 (a) confers jurisdiction on the
trial court to modify support orders [uJnless and to the
extent that the decree precludes modification . . . but
concluded that, because support orders can be modified
despite such preclusion provisions when they are
ambiguous or do not adequately protect the parties, the
trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to
modify the order. Id., 730-31. This court further con-
cluded that [s]eparate and distinct from the question
of whether a court has jurisdictional power to hear and
determine a support matter . . . is the question of

575

whether a trial court properly applies § 46b-86 (a), that
is, properly exercises its statutory authority to act... .
Id., 730. This court remanded the case to the Appellate
Court for consideration of that issue. Id., 732; see also
New England Retail Properties, Inc. v. Maturo, 102
Conn. App. 476, 482, 925 A.2d 1151 (under statute pro-
hibiting commencement of action against estate unless
legal claim has been rejected by estate, claim that estate
had not rejected legal claim did not implicate court’s
subject matter jurisdiction but was question of statutory
authority), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912, 931 A.2d 932
(2007).

“In Kennedy v. Kennedy, 177 Conn. 47, 49, 411 A.2d
25 (1979), this court reached a different result. The
issue in that case was whether the Superior Court has
the authority to make and enforce support orders per-
taining to children over the age of eighteen. Id. The
court concluded that, because the statutes relating to
support orders applied only to minor children, and
because the legislature had lowered the age of majority
from twenty-one years of age to eighteen years of age,
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter such orders.”
Id., 52-53. In Kennedy, the court did not discuss the
distinction between the trial court’s subject matter juris-
diction and its statutory authority. In a later case, how-
ever, Justice Peters, who was on the panel that decided
Kennedy, stated that she was not persuaded that we
should invariably characterize as an absence of subject
matter jurisdiction every failure of a trial court to
observe every statutory limitation on its authority to
act; but it is clear that in this instance I am bound
by our holding to the contrary in Kennedy. Broaca v.

2 See also State v. Welwood, 258 Conn. 425, 435, 780 A.2d 924 (2001)
(relying on Kennedy to support conclusion that trial courtlacked jurisdiction
to require defendant to enter into agreement that he would have no contact
with victims until they reached age of twenty-one when period of agreement
extended beyond maximum period of probation allowed by statute).” In re
Matthew F., supra, 297 Conn. 704 n.8 (Rogers, C. J., concurring.)

576

Broaca, 181 Conn. 463, 471, 435 A.2d 1016 (1980)
(eters, J., dissenting).

“This court’s cases addressing the distinction
between motions to dismiss and motions to strike are
also instructive on the distinction between claims impli-
cating the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and
claims implicating the proper exercise of its authority.
In Gurliacci v. Mayer, [supra, 218 Conn. 541-42], this
court considered whether the trial court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim that she
had been injured as the result of a fellow employee’s
negligence. The named defendant in that case argued
that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the action because, under the fellow employee
immunity rule of General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 7-
465 and the Workers Compensation Act, General Stat-
utes § 31-275 et seq., the workers’ compensation com-
mission has exclusive jurisdiction over intra-workplace
claims unless they fall into one of two statutory excep-
tions. Id., 548-44. Because the plaintiff had not alleged
either exception in her complaint, the defendant filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. Id.,
541-42. On appeal, this court noted that it previously
had held that if a pleading . . . on its face is legally
insufficient, although facts may indeed exist which, if
properly pleaded, would establish a cause of action
upon which relief could be granted, a motion to strike
is required. . . . Id., 544. In contrast, [a] motion to dis-
miss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court,
essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter
of law and fact state a cause of action that should be
heard by the court. . . . Id. This court concluded that.
the fact that the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege
facts that would have removed it from the operation
of the fellow employee immunity rule merely reflects
that the complaint failed to state a legally sufficient

577

cause of action. Id. Accordingly, this court concluded
that the complaint properly was subject to a motion to
strike, not a motion to dismiss. Id.

“This court reasoned in Gurliacci that [i]nterpreting
the [statutory] language . . . [setting forth the excep-
tions to the fellow employee immunity rule] as subject
matter jurisdictional, taken to its logical conclusion,
would require a trial court, .after trial, to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction a complaint that at
the outset properly alleged an exception to the fellow
employee immunity rule if the fact finder ultimately
concluded that neither exception applied. Id. Thus, the
court would be compelled to conclude that it had no
subject matter jurisdiction over the case that it had
tried solely because the plaintiff failed to establish an
essential element of his cause of action. Id., 545. This
court declined to adopt such a bizarre interpretation
of [the statute]. Id; see also Egri v. Foisie, 83 Conn.
App. 243, 246-51, 848 A.2d 1266 (trial court improperly
granted motion to dismiss complaint under doctrine
of sovereign immunity when plaintiff failed to allege
negligent operation of state owned and insured motor
vehicle as required by statute waiving sovereign immu-
nity; because plaintiff could potentially state claim
under statute, motion to strike was proper procedural
vehicle for challenging legal sufficiency of complaint),
cert. denied, 271 Conn. 931, 859 A.2d 930 (2004).

“This court reached a different conclusion in Amore
v. Frankel, 228 Conn. 358, 362, 636 A.2d 786 (1994), in
which the plaintiffs sought to recover from the defen-
dant, the commissioner of transportation, for injuries

2 “The court in Egri v. Foiste, supra, 88 Conn. App. 247, stated that [t]here
is a significant difference between asserting that a plaintiff cannot state a
cause of action and asserting that a plaintiff has not stated a cause of action,
and therein lies the distinction between the motion to dismiss and the motion
to strike.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Matthew F., supra, 297
Conn. 706 n.4 (Rogers, C. J., concurring).

578

that one of the plaintiffs had sustained in a fall on a
driveway on the campus of the University of Connecti-
cut. The plaintiffs alleged that their claims came within
astatutory exception to the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity for injuries that are caused by the commissioner’s
negligence in carrying out his legal duty to maintain a
road. Id., 363-64. The commissioner filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint in which he argued that the claim
did not fall within the exception because he did not have
the legal duty to maintain the roads on the university
campus. Id., 362. In support of his motion, he submitted
two supporting affidavits. Id., 362-63. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss. Id., 363. On appeal, the
Appellate Court reversed the judgment. Id. On appeal
to this court, this court concluded that [t]he factual
underpinnings of the allegations in the affidavits were
sufficient to defeat any presumption of truth in the

. assertion of a legal obligation on the part of the

commissioner to maintain the driveway. Id., 368. It fur-
ther concluded that, because the plaintiff[s] had not
disputed the facts contained in the affidavit, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction and had properly dismissed
the . . . complaint. Id., 369.

“This court in Amore distinguished Gurliacci, on the
ground that the motion to dismiss in that case had not
been accompanied by supporting affidavits that demon-
strated by uncontroverted facts that the plaintiff could
not as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action
that should be heard by the court. Id., 367 n. 8.4 In his
dissenting opinion in Amore, Justice Berdon disagreed
with the majority’s conclusion that Gurliacci was dis-
tinguishable and stated that [t]he question here is not

‘©The court in Amore did not address the reasoning of the court in
Gurtiaccé that treating the failure to allege an element of a claim as subject
matter jurisdictional leads to the bizarre result that the trial courts would
be required to dismiss claims after trial when they find that an element of
the claim had not been proven.” In re Matthew F., supra, 297 Conn. 707 n.5
Rogers, C. J., concurring).

579

whether the commissioner had the responsibility to
maintain the drive that would make him liable for
defects, but whether the trial court has the power to
hear and determine an action brought against him pur-
suant to [General Statutes] § 13a-144. And, of course,
the answer is yes. Id., 373. Justice Berdon argued that,
because the failure to allege that the commissioner had
alegal duty to maintain the road at issue merely affected
the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the validity of
the complaint should have been tested by way of a
motion to strike. Id., 372-73.” (Citation omitted; empha-
sis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Matthew F., supra, 297 Conn. 702-708 (Rogers, C.
J., concurring).

We now agree with the concurring justice in In re
Matthew F. that, “to the extent that these cases are
inconstant, the better rule is set forth in Gurliacci.”
Id., 708. Accordingly, we conclude that the failure to
allege an essential fact under a particular statute goes
to the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not to the
subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. Id., 710.
This conclusion “is consistent with the rule that every
presumption is to be indulged in favor of jurisdiction”;
(internal quotation marks omitted) id., 708; is “consis-
tent with the judicial policy preference to bring about
atrial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and
to secure for the litigant his day in court”; (internal
quotation marks omitted) id., 709; by allowing the liti-
gant, if possible, “to amend the complaint to correct
the defect”; id.; and avoids the bizarre result that the
failure to prove an essential fact at trial deprives the
court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Moreover, as
the present case shows, the purported distinction
between “a tribunal’s action [that] exceeds its statutory
authority,” which we have treated as implicating the
tribunal’s jurisdiction, and “a tribunal’s action [that]
misconsirues its statutory authority,” which we have

— |

treated as involving the proper construction of the stat-
ute; Cantoni v. Xerox Corp., supra, 251 Conn. 162; has
proven illusory in practice.

Thus, the question in the present case is whether the
trial court has statutory authority pursuant to § 46b-
129 (a) to adjudicate a person who has reached the age
of eighteen years as neglected or uncared-for, and to
commit such a person to the care of the department
pursuant to § 46b-129 (j).° This is a question of statutory
interpretation over which our review is plenary. See
State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 152, 947
A.2d 282 (2008). “In making such determination, we are
guided by fundamental principles of statutory construc-
tion. See General Statutes § 1-22; Testa v. Geressy, 286
Conn. 291, 308, 948 A.2d 1075 (2008) ({o]ur fundamental
objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent
intent of the legislature . . . ).” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Matthew F., supra, 297 Conn. 688.

We begin with a review of the relevant statutes. Sec-
tion 46b-129 (a) provides in relevant part that certain
enumerated parties “having information that a child or
youth is neglected, uncared-for or dependent, may file
with the Superior Court . . . a verified petition plainly

5 General Statutes § 46b-129 (j) provides in relevant part: “Upon finding
and adjudging that any child or youth is uncared-for, neglected or dependent,
the court may commit such child or youth to the Commissioner of Children
and Families. . . . The commissioner shall be the guardian of such child
or youth for the duration of the commitment, provided the child or youth
has not reached the age of eighteen years or, in the case of a child or youth
in full-time attendance in a secondary school, a technical school, a college
or a state-accredited job training program, provided such child or youth has
not reached the age of twenty-one years, by consent of such youth, or until
another guardian has been legally appointed . . . .”

® General Statutes § 1-2z provides: “The meaning of a statute shall, in the
first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and
does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”

581

stating such facts as bring the child or youth within the
jurisdiction of the court as neglected, uncared-for or
dependent, within the meaning of section 46b-120
. ...” General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 46b-120 (9),
provides in relevant part that “a child or youth may be
found ‘neglected’ . . . .” (Emphasis added.) General
Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 46b-120 (10), provides in rele-
vant part that “a child or youth may be found ‘uncared
for’... .” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev.
to 2009) § 46b-120 (1) provides in relevant part: “ ‘Child’
means any person under sixteen years of age... .”
General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 46b-120 (2) provides
in relevant part: “‘[Y]outh’ means any person sixteen
or seventeen years of age .:. .”

Reading these statutory provisions together, itis clear
that the legislature intended that the trial court would
have statutory authority to adjudicate a person
neglected or uncared-for only if the person is a child
or youth, i.e., the person is under the age of eighteen
years. There is no indication in the statutory scheme
that the legislature contemplated that, as long as the
petition was filed before the subject of the petition
reached his eighteenth birthday, the trial court could
render a “retroactive” adjudication after that date. As
the current revision of § 46b-120 (1) indicates, when
the legislature intends that a person will be considered
achild for certain purposes after the person has reached
the age of eighteen years, it knows how to make that
intention clear. See General Statutes § 46b-120 (1)
(defining “‘[cJhild’” differently for different circum-
stances).” Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court

7 General Statutes § 46b-120 (1) provides in relevant part: “ ‘Child’ means
any person under eighteen years of age who has not been legally emanci-
pated, except that (A) for purposes of delinquency matters and proceedings,
‘child’ means any person (i) under seventeen years of age who has not been
legally emancipated, or (ii) seventeen years of age or older who, prior to.
attaining seventeen years of age, has committed a delinquent act or, subse-
quent to attaining seventeen years of age, (1) violates any order of the
Superior Court or any condition of probation ordered by the Superior Court

582

lacked statutory authority to adjudicate the petitioner
neglected or uncared-for after his eighteenth birthday. It
necessarily follows that the trial court lacked statutory
authority to provide the petitioner with dispositional
relief pursuant to § 46b-129 (j) (“[u]lpon finding and
adjudging that any child or youth is uncared-for,
neglected or dependent, the court may commit such
child or youth to the Commissioner of Children and
Families” [emphasis added]).

Finally, we conclude that, because the trial court
Jacked such statutory authority, that court properly con-
cluded that the petitioner’s petition was rendered moot
when he reached his eighteenth birthday.’ See Connect-
icut Coalition Against Millstone v. Rocque, 267 Conn.

with respect to a delinquency proceeding, or (I) wilfully fails to appear in
response to a summons under section 46b-133 or at any other court hearing
in a delinquency proceeding of which the child had notice . . . .”

8 We acknowledge that it is somewhat anomalous to conclude that, on
the one hand, the failure to allege an essential fact under a statute at the
outset does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim, while concluding, on the other hand, that the trial court loses subject
matter jurisdiction under the mootness doctrine if an event occurs during
the pendency of the action that makes it impossible for the plaintiff to
establish that same fact. This anomaly arises from our historic practice of
treating the issue of justiciability, ie., the court's continuing ability to grant
relief, as implicating the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, even though
the court's inability to grant practical relief as the result of intervening
circurnstances does not remove a claim from the class of cases that the
court is competent to decide. See, e.g, State v. T.D., 286 Conn. 358, 361,
944 A.2d 288 (2008) (mootness implicates court's subject matter jurisdiction
and case becomes moot when events occur that deprive court of ability to
grant relief). Itis arguable that justiciability is not truly a question of subject
matter jurisdiction, For example, while a court can never entertain an action
when the court lacks “competence to decide the class of cases to which
the action belongs”; In re Mathew F., supra, 297 Conn. 703 (Rogers, C. J.,
concurring); courts are not categorically prohibited from adjudicating moot
questions, See New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority,
291 Conn, 502, 507, 970 A.2d 578 (2009) (discussing capable of repetition
but evading review exception to mootness doctrine). Although we acknowl-
edge that there may be reasons to conclude that mootness does not truly
implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we leave that question for
another day.

CC

116, 126-27, 836 A.2d 414 (2003) (case is moot when
“fiIntervening circumstances have changed the legal
Jandscape . . . and the court cannot grant the [peti-
tioner] any practical relief”); see also Dept. of Public
Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 103
Conn. App. 571, 589, 930 A.2d 739 (because Freedom
of Information Commission lacks statutory authority
to issue final decision on matter that is not contested,
question of whether certain documents were subject to
Freedom of Information Act was rendered moot when
party making request for disclosure notified commis-
sion that requested records had been disclosed and
asked that no further action be taken on complaint),
cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930, 934 A.2d 245 (2007); Rug-
giero v. Ruggiero, 76 Conn. App. 338, 347, 819 A.2d
864 (2003) (because trial court no longer had statutory
authority to order plaintiff to submit to psychiatric eval-
uation after custody order was issued, claim that trial
court improperly ordered psychiatric evaluation was
moot). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
properly granted the department’s motion to dismiss
and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on this
alternative ground.?

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

°‘The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court Jacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition because the petitioner “failed to establish the
factual predicate required for jurisdiction under [§ 46b-129 ()] . . . .” In
re Jose B., supra, 125 Conn. App. 583. We have concluded in the present
case, however, that the failure to establish an essential fact for obtaining
relief under that statute does not implicate the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, but rather, implicates its statutory authority.

IN RE JESSICA M.*
(SC 18752)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella and Harper, Js.

Argued October 18, 2011—officially released January 31, 2012

*In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(p) and Practice Book § 79-3, the names of the parties involved in this appeal
are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for
inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order
of the Appellate Court.

Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Sarah Eagan
and, on the brief, Stacey Violante Cote, for the appel-
lant (petitioner).

Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Mary-Anne Ziewacz Mulholland, assistant
attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attor-
ney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney
general, for the appellee (intervenor).

Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The petitioner, Jessica M., appealed
to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial
court dismissing her petition seeking to have herself
adjudicated as neglected and as an uncared-for youth,
filed pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (a).' In re
Jessica M., 125 Conn. App. 584, 11 A.3d 689 (2010).
On appeal, the petitioner claimed that the trial court
improperly dismissed the petition as moot because, two
and one-half months after she filed it, she reached her
eighteenth birthday. Id., 586-87. The Appellate Court
affirmed the judgment of dismissal. Id., 588. We then
granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to

1 General Statutes § 46b-129 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any selectman,
town manager, or town, city or borough welfare department, any probation
officer, or the Commissioner of Social Services, the Commissioner of Chil-
dren and Families or any child-caring institution or agency approved by the
Commissioner of Children and Families, a child or such child's representative
or attorney or a foster parent of a child, having information that a child or
youth is neglected, uncared-for or dependent, may file with the Superior
Court that has venue over such matter a verified petition plainly stating
such facts as bring the child or youth within the jurisdiction of the court
as neglected, uncared-for or dependent, within the meaning of section 46b-
120...”

‘“—_ oo
appeal, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate
Court properly conclude that the trial court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition?” In

re Jessica M., 300 Conn. 917, 13 A.3d 1102 (2011). We
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court’s opinion sets forth the following
facts and procedural history. “On November 5, 2009,
[the] then seventeen year old [petitioner] filed a petition
in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Hartford,
alleging that she was neglected and uncared for as
defined by General Statutes § 46b-120. On December
17, 2009, the department of children and families
(department) successfully moved to intervene in the
proceedings. The court also set a trial date of January
4, 2010, which was prior to [the petitioner’s] eigh-
teenth birthday.

“On that date, the court continued the matter due to
(A) [the petitioner’s] failure to arrange for interpreters
for two witnesses and (2) its granting of a motion in
limine filed by the department. The court, on its own
motion, transferred the case to the Child Protection
Session in Middletown. Although a second trial date
before [the petitioner’s] eighteenth birthday was
offered, counsel for [the petitioner’s] mother was
unavailable for that day. A trial date was scheduled for
February 26, 2010, approximately five weeks after [the
petitioner] had reached the age of eighteen.

“On February 5, 2010, the department filed a motion.
to dismiss the petition. It argued that the court, specifi-
cally, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, lacked
jurisdiction over adults, individuals over the age of sev-
enteen. The department further claimed that the court
lacked statutory authority to adjudicate an individual
over the age of seventeen as neglected or uncared for,
even if the petition had been filed prior to the individu-

EC

al’s eighteenth birthday. Last, the department argued
that [the petitioner's] petition was moot.

“The court heard oral argument on the motion to
dismiss and issued its memorandum of decision on
March 16, 2010. The court concluded that it lost subject
matter jurisdiction and that the matter had become
moot as of [the petitioner’s] ‘ceasing to be a child or
youth.’ Additionally, it stated that because the court was
unable to issue any order committing [the petitioner] to
the custody of the department, or transferring guardian-
ship over her to another person, the case was moot
and no exception to that doctrine applied. Accordingly,
the court granted the department’s motion to dismiss
the neglect and uncared-for petition.” In re Jessica M.,
supra, 125 Conn. App. 586-87.

In In re Jose B., 303 Conn. 569, 34 A.3d 975 (2012),
which was released on the same date as this opinion,
we concluded that the trial court lacks statutory author-
ity to adjudicate a person neglected or uncared-for pur-
suant to § 46b-129 (a) after the person reaches the age
of eighteen years and, therefore, the court necessarily
lacks statutory authority to provide dispositional relief
to such a person pursuant to § 46b-129 (j).?2 We adopt
the reasoning and result of that opinion herein. We
conclude, therefore, that, in the present case, the trial
court lacked statutory authority both to adjudicate the
petitioner neglected or uncared-for after she reached
the age of eighteen years and to provide her with dispo-

2 General Statutes § 46b-129 (j) provides in relevant part: “Upon finding
and adjudging that any child or youth is uncared-for, neglected or dependent,
the court may commit such child or youth to the Commissioner of Children
and Families. . . . The commissioner shall be the guardian of such child
or youth for the duration of the commitment, provided the child or youth
has not reached the age of eighteen years or, in the case of a child or youth
in full-time attendance in a secondary school, a technical school, a college
or a state-accredited job training program, provided such child or youth has
not reached the age of twenty-one years, by consent of such youth, or until
another guardian has been legally appointed . . . .”

588

sitional relief. We further conclude that, because the
trial court lacked such statutory authority, that court
properly concluded that the petition was rendered moot
when the petitioner reached her eighteenth birthday.
See Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Rocque,
267 Conn. 116, 126-27, 836 A.2d 414 (2003) (case is
moot when “[iJntervening circumstances have changed
the legal landscape . . . and the court cannot grant
the [petitioner] any practical relief”). Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on this alter-
native ground.’

This conclusion disposes of the petitioner’s claim
that the Appellate Court improperly declined to address
her claim that her petition was not moot because it
falls within the collateral consequences exception to
the mootness doctrine. See Williams v. Ragaglia, 261
Conn. 219, 226, 802 A.2d 778 (2002) (“despite develop-
ments during the pendency of an appeal that would
otherwise render a claim moot, the court may retain
jurisdiction when a litigant shows that there is a reason-
able possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences
will occur” [internal quotation marks omitted]). Specifi-
cally, she claims that, because an adjudication of
neglect pursuant to § 46b-129 (a) would enable her to
seek special immigrant juvenile status from the federal
government, her claim for an adjudication of neglect
‘was not moot even if the trial court could not grant
dispositional relief pursuant to § 46b-129 (j). We have
concluded, however, that, not only did the trial court
lack statutory authority to provide dispositional relief
to the petitioner after she reached her eighteenth birth-

* The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition because the petitioner “failed to establish the
factual predicate required for jurisdiction under [§ 46b-129 ()] . . . .” In
re Jessica M., supra, 125 Conn. App. 588. We concluded in In re Jose B.,
however, that the failure to establish an essential fact for obtaining relief
under that statute does not implicate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion, but rather, implicates its statutory authority. In re Jose B., supra, 303
Conn. 579.

589

day, it also lacked statutory authority to adjudicate the
petitioner neglected or uncared for. The collateral con-
sequences doctrine cannot confer statutory authority
on the trial court that is otherwise lacking. Accordingly,
we reject this claim.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAFAEL CRESPO, JR.
(SC 18403)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan,
Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js.*

* This case was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court
consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Norcott, Palmer, Zarella,
McLachlan, Eveleigh and Vertefeuille. Although Justice Palmer was not
present when the case was argued before the court, he read the record,
briefs and transcript of oral argument prior to participating in this decision.

590

Argued September 7, 2011—officially released January 31, 2012

591

Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).

Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington,
state’s attorney, and James G. Clark, former senior
assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

ZARELLA, J. The defendant, Rafael Crespo, Jr.,
appeals, following our grant of certification,! from the
judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the
defendant’s conviction of assault in the third degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1)? and two
counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes § 58a-70 (a) (1).° The defendant's
conviction stemmed from allegations that he had forc-
ibly engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim and
physically assaulted her on several occasions during
their relationship.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the Appellate
Court’s conclusion that his constitutional rights to con-
frontation and to present a defense were not violated

‘This court granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal
limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the
trial court's preclusion of impeachment evidence regarding the [victim’s]
prior sexual conduct?” State v. Crespo, 292 Conn. 917, 978 A.2d 1276 (2009).

* General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is
guilty of assault in the third degree when: (1) With intent to cause physical
injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third
person... .”

* General Statutes § 58a-70 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is
guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels
another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against
such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against
such other person or against a third person which reasonably causes such
person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person . . . .”

592

when the trial court excluded impeachment evidence
regarding the victim’s prior sexual conduct. We con-
clude that the trial court properly excluded the evidence
on the grounds offered by the defendant and that the
exclusion of this evidence did not violate the defen-
dant’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. “The defendant met the victim dur-
ing the summer of 2002, and the two began dating. At
[all relevant] times . . . the defendant was a police
officer and the victim was a college graduate student.
In the months prior to December, 2002, the two engaged
in sexual activities together, but this conduct did not
include vaginal or anal intercourse.” State v. Crespo,
114 Conn. App. 346, 348-49, 969 A.2d 231 (2009). At
trial, the victim testified that, in December, 2002, the
defendant “penetrated” her vaginally against her will
and that, prior to that time, she had been a virgin who
never had had a boyfriend. The victim initially did not
report this incident to the police or any medical person-
nel‘ but testified that she felt that a part of her had
been “murdered” or “killed.” “On February 4, 2003,
the victim sought medical attention at a college health
clinic. Although the victim reported to a nurse that she
had been [sexually assaulted], the victim declined to
report the incident to the police. The victim believed
that if she were to report the incident, the defendant's
status as a police officer would protect him and that he
would retaliate against her.” State v. Crespo, supra, 349.

“Following this incident, the victim’s physical and
psychological well-being suffered. The victim took

4 The victim later reported this incident to the police, and the state charged
the defendant with one count of sexual assault in the first degree in connec-
tion with this incident, but the jury returned a not guilty verdict as to
this count.

steps to distance herself from the defendant. . . .
Nonetheless, the victim’s relationship with the defen-
dant continued, and she accepted favors and gifts from
the defendant and, on occasion, accepted his invitations
to dinner and the like.” Id. The victim testified at trial
that, during this period of time, the defendant was prone
to violent outbursts, both verbal, such as threatening
remarks directed at the victim, and physical, such as
pulling the victim’s hair.’ “The defendant told the victim
that he wanted to end their relationship, yet the defen-
dant thereafter contacted the victim. . . . Although the
victim feared the defendant, she continued to spend
time with him, often in public settings, and did not
report any incidents of abuse to law enforcement per-
sonnel.” Id., 349-50.

Around this time, in June, 2003, the victim traveled
without the defendant to Colorado to visit her family
and to attend a funeral. Although the victim was out
of the state for only a few days, the defendant had
requested that the victim call him while she was away.
The victim called the defendant when she arrived in
Colorado but did not speak to him for the remainder
of her trip. When the victim returned to Connecticut,
the defendant surprised her by meeting her at the air-
port gate. The victim testified that the defendant
appeared cold and unhappy, and remained silent as he
drove the victim back to her apartment. The defendant
accompanied the victim into her apartment and, once
inside, proceeded to play the messages stored on the
victim’s answering machine. The victim testified that
the messages were primarily from men who had met
the victim’s sister and were interested in seeing her
again, as well as from one. of the victim’s friends who
wanted to “get together” with the victim. The victim
further testified that the defendant, upon hearing these
messages, became angry and started verbally and physi-

5 No charges were brought in connection with these incidents.

594

cally assaulting the victim. The victim testified that,
soon thereafter, the incident escalated, and the defen-
dant forced her to the ground, ripped off her clothes,
and engaged in vaginal intercourse with her against her
will.® The defendant then left the victim’s apartment.
“The victim reported this assault to her mother but not
the police. Shortly after this incident, the defendant
sent the victim an e-mail in which he expressed his
intent to stop interacting with the victim. Nevertheless,
the defendant later resumed having contact with the
victim.” Id., 351.

“On May 15, 2004, the defendant drove to the victim's
place of employment, and the victim permitted the
defendant to take her shopping and to a movie. The
defendant drove the victim to a shopping mall, where
he purchased undergarments for her. Later, while the
two were watching a movie, the defendant became
upset with the victim and hastily left the movie theater.
The victim left the theater with the defendant in his
automobile. Following a dispute over the victim’s sun-
glasses, the defendant became more and more agitated
while driving the victim home. He began striking his
steering wheel and was brandishing [his] gun. The
defendant drove his automobile into a parking lot where
he began to [assault] the victim. The victim exited the
automobile, but the defendant pursued her and contin-
ued to strike her. The defendant kicked the victim,
causing her to fall to the ground. Among her injuries,
the victim sustained a significant elbow injury. When
the victim was unable to rise from the pavement, the
defendant drove away from the scene. Several minutes
later, the defendant returned and forced the victim into

*In connection with this incident, the state charged the defendant with
one count of assault in the third degree and one count of sexual assault in
the first degree. Following the jury's guilty verdict on both counts, the court
dismissed the third degree assault count as being beyond the statute of
limitations; the defendant was convicted of the first degree sexual assault
count.

595

the automobile by pulling her hair and pushing her into
the passenger seat.” Id.

“In the following days, the victim sought treatment

for her injuries from medical personnel . . . . The vic-
tim told a nurse and a physician that her boyfriend
had beaten and sexually assaulted her. . . . Despite

discussing her claims of abuse with these individuals
. .. the victim declined to report the incidents of abuse
to the police.” Id., 352.

“In mid-June 2004, on the victim’s birthday, the defen-
dant called the victim at her place of employment
approximately fifty times. The victim agreed to go to
dinner with the defendant. After dinner, the two
returned to the victim’s residence.” Id. The victim testi-
fied that, as soon as she and the defendant entered
her apartment, the defendant disrobed and accused the
victim of staining his clothes with juice during dinner.
The victim responded that she did not believe that she
had caused any stain, at which point the defendant
became agitated and eventually forced the victim to
have vaginal intercourse. The victim testified that she
did not resist him initially; however, the defendant then
turned the victim on her stomach and forced her to
engage in anal intercourse, which the victim attempted
to resist to no avail. The defendant then left the victim’s
apartment while she was showering.®

7’ The defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree in connection
with this incident. Immediately following this incident, the defendant
returned to the spot where he had left the victim and drove her back to his
parents’ home in accordance with the victim's wishes. “The victim claimed
that the defendant forcibly engaged in anal intercourse with her during her
stay at his parents’ home. The state charged the defendant with sexual
assault in the first degree in connection, with this claim, but the jury returned
a verdict of not guilty as to this charge. Additionally, the victim claimed
that the defendant kept her at his parents’ home against her will. The state
charged the defendant with kidnapping in the second degree in connection
with this claim, but the jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to this charge.”
State v. Orespo, supra, 114 Conn. App. 352 n.6.

*The defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree in
connection with this incident.

596

Following this incident, the victim limited her interac-
tion with the defendant. The victim and the defendant
did not spend much time with each other, but the defen-
dant continued to send the victim e-mails, which she
responded to occasionally. The victim also would call
the defendant frequently, in part to keep apprised of
his whereabouts. In December, 2004, the victim met
with police for the first time to report the incidents of
abuse. The defendant was arrested soon thereafter.

“At trial, the defendant acknowledged that he and
the victim had been in a stormy romantic relationship
but denied that he had threatened or assaulted her. The
defendant testified that he and the victim had engaged in
consensual sexual intercourse shortly after they began
dating in June, 2002. With regard to the injury to the
victim’s elbow, for which she had received medical
attention, the defendant testified that it occurred acci-
dentally, not during a physical assault. The defendant
testified that he had given the victim numerous types of
assistance, including financial assistance, during their
relationship but that she was possessive, jealous and,
at times, irrational during her interactions with him. He
testified that he voluntarily had ended his relationship
with the victim in November, 2004.” Id., 353.

After the trial court rendered judgment of conviction
on two counts of first degree sexual assault and one
count of third degree assault, the defendant appealed
to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court
improperly excluded, in accordance with General Stat-
utes § 54-86f,° certain evidence relating to the victim’s

° General Statutes § 54-86f provides in relevant part: “In any prosecution
for sexual assault under sections 532-70, 68a-70a, and 582-71 to 58a-78a,
inclusive, no evidence of the sexual conduct of the victim may be admissible
unless such evidence is . . . (2) offered by the defendant on the issue of
credibility of the victim, provided the victim has testified on direct examina-
tion as to his or her sexual conduct . . . or (4) otherwise so relevant and
material to a critical issue in the case that excluding it would violate the
defendant’s constitutional rights. Such evidence shall be admissible only
after a hearing on a motion to offer such evidence containing an offer of

597

prior sexual history, in violation of his constitutional
rights to confrontation and to present a defense.”

The Appellate Court rejected the defendant’s claim
and concluded that the trial court properly excluded
evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct in accor-
dance with § 54-86f. See id., 363. Specifically, the Appel-
late Court agreed with the trial court’s ruling that this
evidence was not relevant to any material issue in the
case and thus was properly precluded on that ground.
Id. With regard to the defendant's constitutional claims,
the Appellate Court concluded that, because the evi-
dence was not relevant, its exclusion did not implicate
any constitutional concerns: “[T]he defendant fully
availed himself of his right to present evidence from
which the jury could evaluate the victim’s credibility.”
Id., 364. “The record reflects that, during the trial, the
defendant vigorously cross-examined the state’s wit-
nesses and presented much evidence in support of his
theory of defense.” Id., 365. Finally, the Appellate Court
addressed the defendant's claim that the state’s elicita-
tion of testimony from the victim that she was a virgin
triggered the defendant's right to introduce evidence
of the victim’s prior sexual conduct to refute her credi-
bility under § 54-86f (2). Id. Because the defendant had
not raised this specific argument at trial, the Appellate
Court reviewed this unpreserved claim, in conjunction
with the defendant's broader claim that exclusion of
the proffered evidence violated his constitutional rights,
proof. . . . If the proceeding is a trial with a jury, such hearing shall be
held in the absence of the jury. If, after hearing, the court finds that the
evidence meets the requirements of this section and that the probative value
of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on the victim, the court may
grant the motion. . . .”

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant also advanced two
additional claims as grounds for reversing the judgment of conviction. See
‘State v. Grespo, supra, 114 Conn. App. 368, 376. The Appellate Court rejected

those claims; see id; and the defendant has not appealed the Appellate
Court's rejection of those claims.

598

under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d
823 (1989). The court concluded, however, that the
defendant’s claim failed under the third prong of Gold-
ing" because “the preclusion of irrelevant evidence
does not infringe on a defendant's right to confrontation
or his right to present a defense.” State v. Crespo, supra,
114 Conn. App. 367. The Appellate Court further con-
cluded that the evidence proffered by the defense “did
not contradict the victim’s testimony regarding . . .
her virginity” and, therefore, rejected the defendant’s
claim that “the proffered evidence was relevant to the
issue of the victim’s credibility.” Id., 368. The Appellate
Court accordingly affirmed the judgment of conviction,
and this certified appeal followed.

Il

The defendant claims that the Appellate Court incor-
rectly upheld the trial court’s preclusion of impeach-
ment evidence regarding the victim’s prior sexual
conduct, following the victim’s testimony on direct
examination that she was a virgin and never had a
boyfriend before the first sexual assault. The defendant
argues that the trial court abused its discretion when
it excluded evidence of the victim’s prior sexual con-
duct and her relationship with another man before,
and perhaps during, the victim’s relationship with the
defendant, and that this ruling violated his constitu-
tional rights to confrontation and to present a defense
by preventing the defendant from impeaching the vic-
tim. Specifically, the defendant contends that the evi-
dence was relevant and admissible under § 54-86f (4)
to establish her bias or motive to falsely accuse the
defendant of sexual assault, and under § 54-86f (2) as
evidence impeaching her credibility after the victim

"ty order to prevail on an unpreserved claim of constitutional error, a
defendant must establish under the third prong of Golding that the alleged
constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of
a fair trial. State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 240.

599

testified regarding her sexual conduct on direct exami-
nation. The defendant further argues that, because the
victim was the sole witness to the charged crimes and
because there was no other direct evidence of the sex-
ual assaults that would substantiate the victim's testi-
mony, his inability to impeach the victim violated his
rights to confrontation and to present a defense, and,
accordingly, the preclusion of this evidence warrants
reversal of his conviction on all counts.

The state claims that the trial court properly exer-
cised its discretion when it excluded the proffered evi-
dence on the ground that it was irrelevant and otherwise
barred by § 54-86f. The state contends that the Appellate
Court correctly determined that the defendant's consti-
tutional rights were not violated and that defense coun-
sel’s cross-examination of the victim was sufficient to
protect the defendant’s constitutional rights. The state
further notes, as did the Appellate Court; see id., 365;
that the defense never raised § 54-86f (2) in the trial
court as a ground for admitting the proffered evidence.
Therefore, the state contends, the Appellate Court cor-
rectly determined that the unpreserved claim did not
satisfy the third prong of Golding because the evidence
was irrelevant, and, therefore, its exclusion did not
implicate the defendant’s sixth amendment rights. We
agree with the state that the trial court properly
excluded the proffered evidence and that its exclusion
did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights.

The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this issue. Before the start of the trial,
the state filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude
evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct in accor-
dance with § 54-86f. The state sought to prevent the
admission of this evidence unless the procedure set
forth in § 54-86f was followed, namely, that an offer of
proof be made initially outside the presence of the jury
and that a ruling be issued prior to any evidence being

— |
admitted.” The court issued a preliminary ruling that
any evidence of prior sexual conduct between the vic-
tim and persons other than the defendant would be

considered for admission only if the procedures of § 54-
86f were followed.

During the presentation of the state’s case-in-chief,
the state called the victim to testify. On direct examina-
tion, the state questioned the victim regarding her prior
sexual experience. The victim testified that, in the initial
phase of her relationship with the defendant, the two
engaged in “sexual activity,” but not of the type that
the victim considered “real sex,” that is, there was no
“actual penetration . . . .” The state then elicited testi-
mony from the victim that, prior to meeting the defen-
dant, she had had no boyfriends, was physically a virgin
and never had had intercourse with anyone.”

On cross-examination, the victim testified regarding
her relationship with Gordon Anic. She described Anic
as a relative of her aunt who was a pastor in Colorado.
During the victim’s undergraduate studies, Anic helped
pay for her tuition and other educational costs; he also
provided the victim with personal spending money. At
this point in the examination, defense counsel asked
the court to excuse the jury and then presented the
court with an offer of proof to introduce into evidence
the victim’s prior sexual conduct, specifically, the vic-

® Specifically, the assistant state’s attorney stated that “the only thing
that I'm asking is if any evidence of [other sexual conduct] is going to be
offered that it be—follow the procedures that are in that section, that the
jury be excused, the offer be made, and we have a chance to argue and get
the court to rule on it before it comes out before the jury... .

“[T)here is no question that prior sexual activity between the defendant
and the victim is all a part of this process. So we're not raising that portion
asabar... . But anything beyond activity between [the] defendant and
the victim—I think we should just follow the procedures that are outlined.”

® The victim later testified, on cross-examination, that she wanted to
maintain her virginity until marriage and did not want to have sex until she
was married or at least engaged to be married.

601

tim’s sexual relationship with and possible engagement
to Anic. Defense counsel advanced two grounds for
admitting the evidence: (1) to show the victim’s bias,
motive and interest in fabricating allegations of sexual
assault; and (2) to demonstrate that she was deceptive
throughout her relationship with the defendant. The
court rejected both of these claims, stating: “[The vic-
tim’s] engagement to another person simultaneously
with her relationship with the defendant is admissible
as an area for cross-examination. Her acceptance of
money during these times from another man is—the
same person—is admissible. But, I mean, unless you
have a good faith basis to ask questions which [under-
mine] her claim in front of this jury that she was a
virgin prior to June, 2002, I see [§ 54-86f] as precluding
inquiry into those areas.”

After recommencing cross-examination, defense
counsel questioned the victim about additional details
of her relationship with Anic when the victim was in a
relationship with the defendant. The state objected to
this line of questioning and asked that the jury again
be excused from the courtroom. In the discussion that
followed, defense counsel made clear that he sought to
introduce police reports in which the victim discussed
details of her relationship with Anic that she may not
have disclosed to the defendant. Defense counsel
asserted that the evidence was relevant to determining
the nature of her relationship with Anic. The court ruled
that the evidence was inadmissible “as an area that’s
not going to be probative for the jury’s point of view
in terms of assessing [the victim’s] credibility [because]
it is necessarily going to get into [the victim’s sexual
conduct] which I’ve ruled out of the case.” Defense
counsel raised no further objections or arguments
regarding this evidence at trial.

As we stated previously, the defendant claims that
these rulings, pursuant to which the court excluded

602

evidence of the victim’s prior, and perhaps continuing,
relationship with a person other than the defendant,
violated the defendant's constitutional rights to con-
frontation and to present a defense. The defendant’s
claim is premised on the proper application of § 54-86f.
The defendant contends that the evidence should have
been admitted under one of the exceptions set forth in
§ 54-86f.

“Section 54-86f provides for a two step process before
evidence proffered by a defendant as falling under one
of the statute’s exceptions may be admitted. First, if
the defendant has satisfied his preliminary burden in
his offer of proof to show that the evidence is potentially
relevant, pursuant to the statute the trial court must
conduct a hearing to determine the admissibility of the
evidence. Second, [i]f, after hearing, the court finds that
the evidence meets the requirements of this section and
that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect on the victim, the court may grant the
motion. . . .

“In the first step of this two part process, the defen-
dant bears the burden of showing that the proffered
evidence overcomes the presumption, inherent in § 54-
86f, that evidence of the sexual conduct of a [sexual
assault] victim is inadmissible and satisfies the statute’s
requirement that only evidence relevant to the case,
rather than evidence relevant merely to demonstrate the
unchaste character of the victim, be admissible. . . .

“If the trial court determines that the evidence is
relevant and admissible under one of the exceptions
enumerated in § 54-86f, the trial court must proceed to
the second part of the two part process outlined in the
statute. That is, the evidence is admissible only if its
probative value outweighs the prejudicial impact on the

603

“Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical ten-
dency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue.
. . . One fact is relevant to another if in the common
course of events the existence of one, alone or with
other facts, renders the existence of the other either
more certain or more probable. . . . Evidence is irrele-
vant or too remote if there is such a want of open and
visible connection between the evidentiary and princi-
pal facts that, all things considered, the former is not
worthy or safe to be admitted in the proof of the latter.
. . . In considering whether evidence was sufficiently
relevant to fall under one of the exceptions enumerated
in § 54-86f, we have drawn a distinction between, on
the one hand, evidence that is relevant to establish some
portion of the theory of defense or rebut some portion
of the state’s case, which is admissible if the court
determines that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial impact on the victim, and, on
the other hand, evidence that is offered as an impermis-
sible attempt to establish the victim’s general unchaste
character as prohibited by [§ 54-86f].” (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith,
280 Conn. 285, 295-97, 907 A.2d 73 (2006).

We first review the defendant’s preserved claim of
evidentiary error under § 54-86f (4). In the present case,
defense counsel proffered two grounds of relevance at
trial for introducing evidence of the victim’s prior sexual
conduct with a person other than the defendant: (1) to
demonstrate that the victim had a motive, bias or inter-
est in fabricating her allegations of sexual assault; and
(2) to undermine the victim’s credibility by demonstra-
ting that she was deceptive in how she portrayed herself
to the defendant. Defense counsel asserted that both
of these grounds fit within the exception under § 54-
86f (4), allowing the defense to introduce otherwise
inadmissible evidence of the victim’s prior sexual
conduct."

4 On appeal, the defendant claims that both subdivisions (2) and (4) of
§ 54-86f provide bases for admitting the proffered evidence at trial. As the

— i

General Statutes § 54-86f (4) provides that a defen-
dant may introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence of
avictim’s sexual conduct if that evidence is “otherwise
so relevant and material to a critical issue in the case
that excluding it would violate the defendant’s constitu-
tional rights.” (Emphasis added.) “Whenever [§ 54-
86f's] preclusion of prior sexual conduct is invoked, a
question of relevancy arises. If the evidence is proba-
tive, the statute’s protection yields to constitutional
rights that assure a full and fair defense. . . . When
the trial court excludes defense evidence that provides
the defendant with a basis for cross-examination of the
state’s witnesses, [despite what might be considered a
sufficient offer of proof] such exclusion may give rise
to a claim of denial of the right[s] to confrontation
and to present a defense.” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rolon, 257 Conn.
156, 177-78, 777 A.2d 604 (2001).

We conclude, with regard to the defendant’s claim
of relevance raised at trial under § 54-86f (4), that the
trial court properly excluded the proffered evidence as
irrelevant for the purpose of establishing the victim’s
bias, motive or interest. At trial, defense counsel argued.
that the proffered evidence of the victim’s prior sexual
conduct was relevant and admissible under § 54-86f (4),
specifically because “she engaged in conduct [with the
defendant] which is exactly similar with . . . Anic as
she was getting money and . . . financial support and
aid; in that, if [the defendant] broke up with her, she
Appellate Court noted, however, the defense failed to raise any claim relating
to § 54-86f (2) at trial, relying solely on § 54-86f (4) as the relevant exception.
We therefore limit our review in part IL of this opinion to the grounds
that were raised at trial under § 54-86f (4). To the extent that they require
additional analysis, we further review those grounds in part III of this opin-
ion, as well as the additional grounds raised on appeal in connection with
the defendant's unpreserved claim that his constitutional rights were violated
as a result of the preclusion of the proffered evidence.

605

would have a reason to be upset with him.” As we
previously noted, the trial court allowed defense coun-
sel to question the victim about’ whether she was
engaged to and accepted money from Anic before or
while she was in a relationship with the defendant.
Nevertheless, it excluded evidence regarding her prior
sexual activity with Anic. The trial court reasoned that
her prior sexual acts were irrelevant to understanding
the victim’s motive, reason or bias and that, unless
the defense could produce evidence contradicting the
victim’s claim of virginity, § 54-86f precluded inquiry
into those acts. It was not an abuse of the court's discre-
tion to limit the scope of defense counsel's cross-exami-
nation in light of the proffered grounds of relevance
under § 54-86f (4). As the Appellate Court noted, “[w]e
fail to see how evidence that the victim and Anic had
engaged in sexual activities would have strengthened
to any degree the defendant’s argument that the victim
was motivated to fabricate claims of sexual assault
because the defendant had ended his relationship with
her. . . . [T]his argument is too far attenuated from
any material issue in the case to justify the admission
of this evidence.” State v. Crespo, supra, 114 Conn.
App. 363.

I.

The defendant further contends that the proffered
evidence also was relevant to impeach the victim and
to cast doubt generally on the victim’s credibility. The
defendant also claims that the state, in eliciting testi-
mony from the victim about her virginity on direct
examination, “opened the door to her prior sexual his-
tory” under § 54-86f (2). Contrary to the defendant's
assertions, the record is devoid of any such claims of
relevance in the trial court. The record clearly demon-
strates that the sole ground for admission offered by
the defense at trial was under § 54-86f (4). At no time
did defense counsel explicitly or implicitly claim that

—

the proffered evidence was admissible under § 54-86f
(2) or that the evidence was admissible because the
state opened the door to it on direct examination.

The defendant nevertheless seeks to have this claim
reviewed under Golding, arguing that, because the evi-
dence was relevant to the victim's credibility, the trial
court’s exclusion of the evidence violated the defen-
dant’s rights to confrontation and to present a defense.
Under Golding, “a defendant can prevail on a claim of
constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all
of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is
adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the
claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the viola-
tion of a fundamental right; (8) the alleged constitu-
tional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the
defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless
error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harm-
lessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond
a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these
conditions, the defendant's claim will fail. The appellate
tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s
claim by focusing on whichever condition is most rele-
vant in the particular circumstances.” State v. Golding,
supra, 213 Conn. 239-40.

The first prong of Golding is satisfied in the present
case. The arguments of defense counsel at trial regard-
ing the admissibility of this evidence to show the vic-
tim’s motive, bias and interest; see part II of this opinion;
provide an adequate record for review of the defen-
dant’s constitutional claim. With regard to the second
prong, although the defendant’s unpreserved claim is
evidentiary in nature, the issues implicated in this case
are of constitutional magnitude. See, e.g., State v. Cal-
vin N., 122 Conn. App. 216, 224-25, 998 A.2d 810
(“although the claim centers around the court's preclu-
sion of evidence, it is not merely evidentiary in nature,
but fundamentally implicates the defendant’s sixth

607

amendment right to confront his accuser and, therefore,
satisfies Golding’s second prong”), cert. denied, 298
Conn. 909, 4 A.3d 834 (2010). Put differently, it does
not appear that the defendant is simply trying to “put
a constitutional tag on a nonconstitutional evidentiary
ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Toccaline, 258 Conn. 542, 550, 783 A.2d 450 (2001).
Rather, the defendant argues that the inability of
defense counsel to fully cross-examine the sole com-
plaining victim in a legitimate area of inquiry deprived
the defendant of his constitutional right to confronta-
tion. He maintains that, because the defense was not
allowed to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sex-
ual acts, the state was able to portray the victim to the
jury in an unfair manner. See, e.g., State v. Cavell, 235
Conn. 711, 720, 670 A.2d 261 (1996) (“under particular
circumstances, the unjustified exclusion of a witness’
testimony can amount to'a deprivation of the defen-
dant’s right to present a defense”).

To be sure, our Golding jurisprudence with regard
to unpreserved evidentiary claims has not always been
entirely clear or consistent as to when such claims
are truly of constitutional magnitude. Often, we have
rejected, without further review, claims of evidentiary
error under the second prong of Golding as patently
failing to demonstrate constitutional error, particularly
when the constitutional claim involves an alleged, gen-
eralized due process violation. See, e.g., State v. Bow-
man, 289 Conn 809, 819-21, 960 A2d 1027 (2008)
(defendant’s unpreserved claim of improperly admitted
photographic evidence failed under second prong of
Golding because claim was matter of evidentiary law
and not of constitutional magnitude); see also State v.
Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 374 n.14, 952 A.2d 784 (2008)
(defendant’s unpreserved claim regarding improper
application of evidentiary privilege failed under second
prong of Golding because “it [was] not of constitutional
dimension”). In some instances, however, although we

608 Po
{|

have purported to deem a defendant’s unpreserved evi-
dentiary claim unreviewable under the second prong
of Golding, we reached that conclusion only after
engaging in a review of the record, otherwise akin to
our analysis under the third prong of Golding. See, e.g.,
State v. Carpenter, 275 Conn. 785, 813-14, 820-21, 882
A.2d 604 (2005) (defendant’s claim that admission of
certain hearsay evidence violated her right to confronta-
tion was evidentiary in nature and thus failed under
second prong of Golding, but court engaged in three
page review of record to reach its conclusion), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1025, 126 S. Ct. 1578, 164 L. Ed. 2d
309 (2006); State v. Toccaline, supra, 258 Conn. 547-51
(defendant’s unpreserved claim regarding improper
admission of expert testimony was unreviewable under
Golding’s second prong, but thoroughly reviewing
record to reach this determination); State v. Whipper,
258 Conn. 229, 277-79, 780 A.2d 53 (2001) (defendant’s
unpreserved claim regarding improperly admitted testi-
mony failed under second prong of Golding, but court
reviewed record to reach that determination), overruled
in part on other grounds by State v. Cruz, 269 Conn.
97, 848 A.2d 445 (2004). In a third category of cases,
we have summarily decided that the defendant’s eviden-
tiary claim on its face was one of constitutional magni-
tude, satisfying the second prong of Golding, but
concluded, after reviewing the record, that the claim
failed under the third prong because the alleged consti-
tutional violation did not clearly exist. See, e.g., State
v. Estrella, 277 Conn. 458, 468-76, 893 A.2d 348 (2006)
(reviewing defendant’s unpreserved claim regarding
admission of probable cause hearing testimony because
it implicated defendant’s right to confrontation but con-
cluding that defendant could not prevail under Gold-
ing). Finally, we have decided that a defendant’s
unpreserved evidentiary claim fails under Golding
without stating explicitly the specific prong that was
not satisfied; see, e.g., State v. King, 249 Conn. 645,

c ClEPaa

676-80 and n.39, 735 A.2d 267 (1999) (noting that defen-
dant sought to prevail under Golding but concluding
that defendant’s claim of improper restriction on cross-
examination was evidentiary, not constitutional); State
v. Pratt, 235 Conn. 595, 602-606, 669 A.2d 562 (1995)
(same); and, on at least one occasion, we have held
that the defendant's claim fails under both the second
and third prongs of Golding. State v. Schiappa, 248
Conn. 132, 164-65, 728 A.2d 466, cert. denied, 528 U.S.
862, 120 S. Ct. 152, 145 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1999).

We need not decide the most appropriate approach
at this juncture." In the present case, the state concedes
that the defendant has satisfied the first two prongs of
Golding and relies on the reasoning of the Appellate
Court, namely, that his claim fails under the third prong.
See State v. Crespo, supra, 114 Conn. 366-67 (“[t]he
record is adequate to review this aspect of the defen-
dani’s claim, and it is of constitutional magnitude” but
“fw]e conclude . . . that the claim fails under Gold-
ing’s third prong”); see also State v. Golding, supra,

Indeed, as neither party has raised or briefed this issue, it would be
imprudent for this court to answer it in the present case. Nevertheless, we
perceive a problem in our Golding jurisprudence, with regard to review
of unpreserved evidentiary rulings that a party claims have resulted in a
generalized due process violation, that is, the right to a fair trial, as opposed
to a violation of a specific right such as the right of confrontation. This
stems from confusion over the proper application of the second and third
prongs. The confusion results from the following. With regard to preserved
claims of evidentiary error, the erroneous evidentiary ruling will be reversed
on appeal only when the magnitude of the error is so severe that it rendered
the trial unfair. For that reason, any claim of evidentiary error—preserved
or not—premised on a generalized violation of a party's due process right
is constitutional in nature if the harm resulting from the error is sufficient
to require a new trial. Thus, any unpreserved claim of evidentiary error
premised on a generalized due procéss violation will necessitate a review
of the full record—in effect, the analysis required by Golding's third prong—
to determine whether the claim is indeed constitutional in nature in order
to satisfy Golding’s second prong. This seemingly will lead to the actual
review of virtually all unpreserved evidentiary claims, even in cases in which
we have held that the claim is unreviewable because it fails under Goldings
second prong, See, e.g., State v. Carpenter, supra, 275 Conn. 813-14, 820-21.

610

213 Conn. 240 (“[t}]he appellate tribunal is free...
to respond to the defendant’s claim by focusing on
whichever condition is most relevant in the particular
circumstances”). We agree with the state.

The defendant has not demonstrated that the alleged
constitutional violation—premised on his constitu-
tional right to confrontation’“—clearly exists. “The
sixth amendment to the [United States] constitution
guarantees the right of an accused in a. criminal prosecu-
tion to confront the witnesses against him . . . . None-
theless . . . [t]he defendant’s right to confront
witnesses against him is not absolute, but must bow to
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 54-55, 644 A.2d 887
(1994).

“In order to comport with the constitutional stan-
dards embodied in the confrontation clause, the trial
court must allow a defendant to expose to the jury facts
from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and
credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating
to the reliability of the witness.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Valentine, 255 Conn. 61, 71, 762
A.2d 1278 (2000). “We have emphasized in numerous
decisions, however, that the confrontation clause does
not give the defendant the right to engage in
unrestricted cross-examination. . . . A defendant may

We analyze the defendant’s claim under the federal constitution.
Although the defendant also attempts to claim that his rights to confrontation
and to present a defense were violated under the state constitution; see
Conn. Const., art. I, § 8; he has not adequately briefed this claim, instead
relying almost solely on federal precedent or Connecticut precedent analyz-
ing the federal constitutional rights. We will not review inadequately briefed
state constitutional claims and, therefore, decline to address this aspect of
the defendant's claim. See Barton v. Ducci Electrical Contractors, Inc., 248
Conn. 798, 812-13 n.15, 730 A.2d 1149 (1999) (“{iJf a party does not provide
an independent analysis asserting the existence of greater protection under
the state constitutional provision than its federal counterpart . . . we will
not of our own initiative address that question”).

611

elicit, only relevant evidence through cross-examina-
tion. . . . The court determines whether the evidence
sought on cross-examination is relevant by determining
whether that evidence renders the existence of [other
facts] either certain or more probable.” (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We assume without deciding, for the purposes of
this appeal, that the proffered evidence may have been.
relevant for the purpose of impeaching the victim, or,
at the very least, undermining her credibility and por-
traying her more fairly to the jury. We find such an
assumption acceptable particularly in light of the fact
that the state elicited from the victim on direct examina-
tion testimony of her prior sexual history and relation-
ships.” Cf. State v. Ritrovato, 280 Conn. 36, 53-54, 905
A.2d 1079 (2006) (“The state introduced evidence dur-
ing its case-in-chief that [the victim] was a virgin at the
time of the first sexual assault. Such testimony was not
necessary to prove an element of the crime but, upon.
repetition, became inextricably bound with the state’s
narrative, thus injecting an emotional element into the
trial that made the contemptible act with which the
defendant was charged seem even more offensive. . . .
[T]he proffered testimony did not constitute inadmissi-
ble extrinsic evidence of a collateral matter . . . but
was highly [relevant and] probative on the issue of [the
victim’s] credibility . . . .” [Citation omitted.]). Our
analysis of the defendant’s constitutional argument
does not end here, however.

"To that end, we underscore that the state proceeds down a potentially
dangerous testimonial path in a sexual assault case any time it questions
the victim about his or her prior sexual activity. When the state elicits
testimony from the victim “on direct examination as to his or her sexual
conduct,” it opens the door to inquiry regarding the victim's sexual conduct
“offered by the defendant on the issue of credibility of the victim .. . .”
(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 54-86f (2). Put differently, the state
should not expect to rely on § 54-86f as both a prosecutorial sword and a
vietim’s shield.

612

“In determining whether the cross-examination of
[the victim] was unduly restricted it is the entire cross-
examination which we must examine.” (Emphasis
added.) State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 721, 478 A.2d
227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S. Ct. 1749,
84 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1985). “[W]e consider the nature of
the excluded inquiry, whether the field of inquiry was
adequately covered by other questions that were
allowed, and the overall quality of the cross-examina-
tion viewed in relation to the issues actually litigated
at trial.” (ternal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Brown, 273 Conn. 330, 340, 869 A.2d 1224 (2005).
Viewed in light of these considerations, we cannot con-
clude that the defendant was deprived of his constitu-
tional right to confront the victim when the court
excluded evidence of her alleged prior sexual activity
with Anic. As we noted in part II of this opinion, during
cross-examination of the victim, the court specifically
allowed defense counsel to inquire into virtually all
areas of the victim’s relationship with Anic. The only
evidence the court precluded concerned the specific
sexual acts that the victim allegedly engaged in with
Anic during the course of their relationship. The court
specifically allowed defense counsel to question the
victim about any prior or continuing engagement to
Anic. Further, even assuming that the state opened the
door by questioning the victim about her virginity on
direct examination, thereby making relevant the issue
of the victim’s sexual past, we cannot reasonably con-
clude that the inability of the defense to pursue this
narrow line of questioning violated the defendant's right
to confrontation.

Indeed, nothing in the record demonstrates that the
trial court restricted defense counsel’s ability to cross-
examine the victim in order to impeach or otherwise
to discredit her. The defendant’s failure to raise this
ground of relevance prevented the trial court from rul-
ing on its admissibility on that ground. We previously

613

have explained that “[a] clear statement of the defen-
dant’s theory of relevance is all important in determin-
ing whether the evidence is offered for a permissible
purpose.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Cecil J., 291 Conn. 813, 825, 970 A.2d 710 (2009); see also
id., 825-30 (upholding trial court’s decision to exclude
evidence under § 54-86f and concluding that such exclu-
sion did not violate defendant’s right to confrontation
because defendant “had failed to make the necessary
offer of proof... and... the evidence . . . was
not relevant”); State v. Banks, 117 Conn. App. 102, 111,
978 A.2d 519 (“[t]here was no specific ruling on [the]
issue [of whether defense counsel could question the
witness regarding certain pending criminal charges to
establish motive, bias or interest], and therefore . . .
[the] claim fail[ed] under the third prong of Golding
because the defendant [did not show] that a constitu-
tional violation clearly exist[ed]”), cert. denied, 294
Conn. 905, 982 A.2d 1081 (2009); cf. State v. Samuels,
273 Conn. 541, 570, 871 A.2d 1005 (2005) (“If defense
counsel was concerned, he could have cross-examined
[the witnesses] or objected to their testimony on sixth
amendment grounds. He did neither. Accordingly . . .
the defendant’s confrontation clause claim must fail

For this reason, the defendant’s reliance on Ritrovato
is misplaced. In that case, the trial court excluded evi-
dence, under § 54-86f, offered by the defendant to con-
tradict testimony of the victim that she had been a
virgin prior to her contact with the defendant. See State
v. Ritrovato, supra, 280 Conn. 44. The trial court rea-
soned that such testimony was barred because the wit-
nesses offered by the defense were not credible and
because the proffered evidence was more prejudicial
than probative. Id., 49-50. We concluded that the vic-
tim’s “description of her two conversations with the
defendant, in which she told him that she was a virgin,
her testimony that the defendant took her virginity and

614

her testimony regarding the notation on her calendar
[that her first sexual encounter was with the defendant],
clearly meet the threshold requirement for the admis-
sion of impeachment evidence under § 54-86f (2).” Id.,
51. Notwithstanding these similar considerations in the
present case, the defense chose to pursue a line of
argument at trial based wholly on trying to address the
victim’s motive, bias or interest rather than on
impeaching or discrediting her testimony. Ritrovato is
thus distinguishable and inapplicable to the defendant’s
claim on appeal.

There is nothing in the record that states or suggests
that the trial court otherwise limited cross-examination
of the victim or prevented defense counsel from chal-
lenging her credibility. The defendant has failed to show
a clear violation of his constitutional rights and, there-
fore, is not entitled to prevail under Golding.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

HUDSON VALLEY BANK v. ANDREW M.
KISSEL ET AL.
(SC 18547)

Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh, Harper and Vertefeuille, Js.

615

Argued October 20, 2011—officially released February 7, 2012

James R. Fogarty, for the appellant (substitute defen-
dant Stewart Title Guaranty Company).

Thomas J. Donlon, with whom was Edward V.
O’Hanlan, for the appellee (defendant First American
Title Insurance Company).

Opinion

McLACHLAN, J. This appeal concerns the distribu-
tion of the surplus proceeds from a foreclosure sale of
property encumbered by multiple successive mortgages
obtained through fraud. The defendant Stewart Title
Guaranty Company (Stewart Title) appeals' from the
judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the
defendant First American Title Insurance Company

' Stewart Title appealed from the decision of the trial court to the Appellate
Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

617

(First American),? and ordering that the remaining pro-
ceeds of a foreclosure sale, which were on deposit with
the clerk of the Superior Court, be distributed to First
American. Stewart Title claims that the trial court: (1)
improperly granted First American’s motion to inter-
vene in the action; (2) applied an improper standard of
review in granting relief pursuant to First American’s
motion to reargue the trial court’s decision determining
the priorities of the parties; and (8) improperly con-
cluded, pursuant to an equitable distribution theory,
that First American was entitled to receive all of the
remaining funds from the foreclosure sale. First Ameri-
can argues that the trial court’s judgment may be upheld
on the alternate ground that, because First American’s
mortgage was recorded prior in time to Stewart Title’s
mortgage, it was entitled to all of the surplus proceeds
on deposit pursuant to the first in time, first in right
rule. We agree with First American, and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court set forth the following relevant factual
and procedural background in its memorandum of deci-
sion. This foreclosure action concerns real property at
43 Burning Tree Road, Greenwich (property), pur-
chased by the named defendant, Andrew M. Kissel, on
July 27, 2004. At the time of purchase, Kissel obtained
a first mortgage from Washington Mutual Bank (Wash-
ington Mutual) in the amount of $1,620,800. The mort-

2-The plaintiff, Hudson Valley Bank, is not a party to this appeal. In its
complaint, Hudson Valley Bank named the following defendants: Andrew
M Kissel; Independence Community Bank; Ridgefield Bank Mortgage Corpo-
ration; Sabia Landscaping, Inc., Hayley Kissel, R.S. Granoff Architects, P.C.,
and Robert Rozmus Plumbing and Heating, Inc. After Andrew Kissel died
on April 3, 2006, Patrick Gil, the administrator of Andrew Kissel’s estate,
was substituted as a defendant. Subsequently, Stewart Title was substituted
as a defendant in place of Independence Community Bank, First American
was added as a defendant, and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company
‘was substituted asa defendant.in place of Ridgefield Bank Mortgage Corpora-
tion. Stewart Title and First American are the only parties involved in the
present appeal.

618

gage was recorded in the Greenwich land records
immediately after the recording of the warranty deed
with which Kissel took title to the property. Kissel later
recorded a forged release of the Washington Mutual
mortgage, and then obtained a loan from the plaintiff,
Hudson Valley Bank (Hudson Valley) in the amount of
$4,500,000, secured by a mortgage deed on the property
that was recorded in the Greenwich land records on
March 22, 2005. Thereafter, Kissel used the same
scheme to obtain two additional mortgages on the prop-
erty. Relying on a forged, recorded release of the Hud-
son Valley mortgage, he obtained a loan of $1,000,000
from the defendant Independence Community Bank
(independence), secured by a mortgage deed on the
property that was recorded in the Greenwich land
records on May 25, 2005. Then, in June, 2005, he relied
ona forged, recorded release of the Independence mort-
gage to obtain a mortgage loan on the property of
$4,525,000 from Fairfield County Bank Corporation,
which was assigned to the defendant Ridgefield Bank
Mortgage Corporation (Ridgefield Bank). The Ridge-
field Bank mortgage was recorded in the Greenwich
Jand records on June 3, 2005. Kissel subsequently
defaulted on all four mortgages.

Hudson Valley commenced the present foreclosure
action against Kissel on August 2, 2005, also naming
Independence and Ridgefield Bank as defendants. See
footnote 2 of this opinion. The court rendered a judg-
ment of foreclosure by sale on January 29, 2007, at
which time it found the fair market value of the property
to be $2,200,000. The property sold for $2,300,000 at
the foreclosure sale on March 31, 2007. After payment
of the costs of the sale and distribution of the balance
remaining on the Hudson Valley mortgage loan, the
surplus proceeds of approximately $404,000, which are
the subject of this appeal, were deposited with the clerk
of the Superior Court. Stewart Title and First American,

619

both title insurance companies, each claimed entitle-
ment to all or part of the surplus proceeds.

Stewart Title, which had provided title insurance for
Independence’s mortgage from Kissel, received and
recorded an assignment to Stewart Title of that mort-
gage from Independence. On May 8, 2006, the trial court
granted Stewart Title’s motion to be made a party defen-
dant to this action. First American had provided title
insurance for both the Washington Mutual and the Hud-
son Valley mortgages on the property. On March 30,
2007, First American recorded in the Greenwich land
records an assignment to First American of the Wash-
ington Mutual mortgage and an agreement subordinat-
ing the Washington Mutual mortgage to that of Hudson
Valley. The trial court subsequently granted First Ameri-
can’s motion to be added as a party defendant in this
action.

On September 6, 2008, First American filed a motion
for determination of priorities and further supplemental
judgment, seeking a determination that its interest was
prior to that of all other lien holders in the action,
and, consequently, that First American was entitled to
receive the full amount of the surplus proceeds. Stewart
Title filed an objection to the motion and sought equita-
ble apportionment of the surplus proceeds between
Stewart Title and First American on a pro rata basis.
The matter appeared on the nonarguable short calendar
list for January 5, 2009, and the court, Downey, J.,
sustained Stewart Title’s objection and apportioned the
surplus proceeds as Stewart Title had requested. In
calculating Stewart Title’s pro rata share of the surplus
proceeds, the court considered the amount remaining
on Stewart Title’s mortgage on the property and the
amount that Kissel’s estate owed to Stewart Title in
connection with a judgment that Stewart Title had been
awarded in a separate foreclosure action, concerning
a different property, at 58 Quaker Lane, Greenwich.

620

Judge Downey stated in a brief, handwritten order: “The
court, having considered the respective positions of
Stewart Title and First American, recognizing also the
underlying fraud of . . . Kissel, and further consider-
ing the overall equities, orders that the remaining
amount of $404,277.71 be distributed as proposed by
Stewart Title, namely $288,896.85 (71.46 [percent]) to
Stewart Title, and $115,380.86 (28.54 [percent]) to First
American.” First American subsequently filed a motion
to reargue, which the trial court, Tierney, J., granted.
The court then ruled in favor of First American, relying
onan equitable distribution theory known as pari passu,
and ordered the clerk of the Superior Court to distribute
to First American the entirety of the surplus proceeds,
along with any accrued interest. This appeal followed.

I

We begin with Stewart Title’s claim that the trial court
improperly granted First American’s motion to be made
a party defendant in the foreclosure action, thus
allowing First American to intervene in the action. The
sole basis of Stewart Title’s claim is that the motion to
intervene was not timely in that it was not filed until
after the foreclosure sale had occurred. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. The foreclosure action underly-
ing this appeal commenced in a complaint dated August
1, 2005. The court rendered judgment of foreclosure by
sale on January 29, 2007, resulting in a foreclosure sale
on March 31, 2007. On March 29, 2007, First American
received an assignment of the Washington Mutual mort-
gage, which was recorded in the Greenwich land
records. The next day, First American subordinated its
mortgage to that of Hudson Valley, in an agreement
that was recorded in the Greenwich land records on

® When First American's motion to reargue was assigned for a hearing,
Judge Downey was no longer a judge of the Superior Court.

621

that day. On April 13, 2007, First American filed a motion
to be added as a party defendant in this action. In the
motion, First American expressly stated that it did not
intend to assert any defenses to the court’s judgment
of foreclosure by sale, and that the purpose of its inter-
vention was limited to protecting its interest in the
surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. On April
23, 2007, the court granted the motion to approve the
committee sale and deed. The foreclosure sale was con-
firmed by the trial:court on June 25, 2007.

“[A]ny motion for intervention, whether permissive
or of right, must be timely. See Fed. R. Civ. [P.] 24. The
timeliness of a motion for intervention, however, must
be judged by all of the circumstances of the case. . . .
In any event, an untimely motion for intervention of
right is not transformed automatically thereby into a
motion for permissive intervention. The right to inter-
vene is lost, not merely weakened, if it is not exercised
in a timely fashion. . . . As a general matter, the timeli-
ness requirement is applied more leniently for interven-
tion of right than for permissive intervention because
of the greater likelihood that serious prejudice will
result.‘ . . . In making this determination of timeliness
with respect to motions to intervene as a matter of
right, courts must take into consideration the nature
of the interest and for what purpose the intervenor is
seeking to be brought into the action.” (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington
Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 Conn. 734, 744-45, 699 A.2d 73
(1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Kerrigan

‘First American did not expressly seek to intervene as of right in its
motion to be added as a party defendant and does not claim on appeal that
it was entitled to intervene as of right. It is unnecessary for us to determine
whether First American would have been allowed to intervene as of right,
however, because even without the benefit of the more lenient application
of the timeliness analysis, we conclude that First American moved to inter-
vene in a timely manner.

622

v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 455,
904 A.2d 187 (2006).°

Washington Trust Co. v. Smith, supra, 241 Conn.
738, involved two motions to intervene, both of which
were filed after the foreclosure sale had been held, but
before the confirmation of the sale by the court. In
evaluating whether the motions to intervene were ren-

- dered untimely by virtue of being made after the foreclo-
sure sale, we examined the nature of the interest
asserted by each of the intervenors—both relied on an
asserted right of redemption—and whether those rights
survived the foreclosure sale. Id., 741-42. Because a
foreclosure sale is not absolute until it is confirmed by
the court, we concluded that the right of redemption
survives the foreclosure sale, and, therefore, that a
motion to intervene to protect the right of redemption
is timely when filed before confirmation of the sale.

Id., 742-43.

° The standard of review of a trial court’s decision regarding the timeliness
of a motion to intervene is less than clear. Although Washington Trust Co.
v. Smith, supra, 241 Conn. 744-45, refers to the trial court's broad discretion
in ruling on a motion to intervene, we later overruled Washington Trust
Co. in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 279 Conn, 454-65,
on the sole issue of the applicable standard of review. In Kerrigan, we
concluded that we are required “to review de novo the trial court's determina-
tion as to the nature and extent of the interests at issue in a motion for
intervention as a matter of right.” Id., 454. Because the timeliness of the
motion in Kerrigan was not at issue in that appeal, however, we specifically
declined to reconsider the “standard of review applicable to the trial court's
initial determination of timeliness”; id., 455 n.11; and reserved for the future
any possible reconsideration of that standard. In the present case, the parties
have not briefed the issue of the proper standard of review of the trial
court’s timeliness determination. Stewart Title simply has asserted in a title
heading, with no support or argument, that the standard of review is plenary.
First American has recognized the uncertainty of the applicable standard
of review, but declined to brief the issue on the basis that even under the
broader, de novo level of review, the trial court’s timeliness determination
withstands scrutiny. We agree with First American's assessment and review
the court’s timeliness determination de novo, reserving for a future case
the question of whether we will reconsider the application, in Washington
Trust Co., of the abuse of discretion standard of review.

ES

Similarly, in the present case, First American’s only
asserted interest in the foreclosure action was in receiv-
ing the surplus proceeds. Because the foreclosure sale
did not extinguish that interest, we conclude that the
filing of the motion to intervene following the sale and
prior to the confirmation of the sale was timely. More-
over, First American did not have an interest in the
property until it received the assignment of mortgage
on March 29, 2007, and it filed its motion to intervene
reasonably promptly, only fifteen days later, on April
18, 2007.6

IL

Stewart Title next claims that the trial court applied
an improper scope of review in addressing the merits
of First American’s motion to reargue.” Specifically,
Stewart Title contends that Judge Tierney was required
to review Judge Downey’s decision apportioning the
surplus proceeds between First American and Stewart.
Title for abuse of discretion. We disagree.

° Stewart Title appears to suggest that because First American provided
no explanation as to why it waited until March 29, 2007, to receive the
assignment of mortgage from Washington Mutual, we should measure timeli-
ness from an earlier stage in the proceedings. Stewart Title’s brief does not
clarify precisely what that earlier stage should be, and instead vaguely
suggests that First American was obligated to receive the assignment of the
mortgage from Washington Mutual “sooner.” As Stewart Title has cited to
no authority in support of its claim, we do not address it.

* Stewart Title also points out that in seeking reargument, First American.
incorrectly cited to Practice Book § 11-12, which govems motions to reargue
an interlocutory order, rather than Practice Book § 11-11, which governs
motions to reargue a decision that constitutes a final judgment for purposes
of appeal, and requires that the moving party “shall indicate on the bottom
of the first page of the motion that such motion is a Section 11-11 motion.”
It is unclear what inference Stewart Title is asking the court to draw from
the failure to comply with Practice Book § 11-11. Although Stewart Title
seems to imply that the procedural error precluded Judge Tiemey from
permitting reargument, Stewart Title concedes that the standards governing
the two rules of practice are not distinguishable, and admits that several
decisions of the Superior Court have overlooked the same error, and permit-
ted reargument. To the extent that Stewart Title’s brief could be interpreted
to challenge Judge Tierney’s decision to grant reargument on the basis of

624

The question of whether Judge Tierney was required
to give deference to Judge Downey’s decision in consid-
ering First American’s motion to reargue presents a
question of law, over which we exercise plenary review.
“(T]he purpose of a reargument is . . . to demonstrate
to the court that there is some decision or some princi-
ple of law which would have a controlling effect, and
which has been overlooked, or that there has been a
misapprehension of facts. . . . It also may be used to
address . . . claims of law that the [movant] claimed
were not addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to
reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity
to have a second bite of the apple . . . .” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v.
Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 94 n.28, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). More-
over, we have stated that “[a] judge is not bound to
follow the decisions of another judge made at an earlier
stage of the proceedings, and if the same point is again
raised he has the same right to reconsider the question
as if he had himself made the original decision.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Kirshner, 225
Conn. 185, 192, 621 A.2d 1326 (1993).° We reject the

First American’s failure to comply with Practice Book § 11-11, we deem
that claim to be abandoned.

5In support of its claim that a judge may not consider an issue de novo
on reargument, Stewart Title cites to several of our decisions indicating
that we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny reargument for abuse
of discretion. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 705, 882. A.2d
58 (2005). Stewart Title also relies on our decision in Miko v. Commission.
on Human Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192, 201-202, 596 A.2d 396
(1991), in which we concluded that the trial court improperly failed to apply
substantial evidence review of the agency's decision, as required by the
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. Nei-
ther a trial couxt’s review of an agency's decision nor our review of a trial
court’s discretionary decision is analogous to the decision of a trial court
in deciding the merits of a motion to reargue, where the trial court makes
its ruling as a matter of law.

Stewart Title also states in its brief that Judge Tierney needed its consent
in order to afford plenary consideration to the question of the proper alloca-
tion of the surplus proceeds, and further suggests that Judge Tierney shared
this belief. The fact that Judge Tierney may or may not have mistakenly
believed that he needed the consent of the parties in order to consider the
issue de novo is immaterial.

625

notion that a trial judge who determines that a legal
error has occurred must allow the error to be memorial-
ized until it can be corrected by appellate review.

First American relied on the motion to reargue for a
proper purpose—to call to the attention of the court
the controlling principle of law that Judge Downey had
failed to apply. In its motion for determination of priori-
ties, First American relied on the well established
first in time, first in right rule in arguing that it was
entitled to receive distribution of all of the surplus pro-
ceeds because its mortgage had been recorded prior to
those of the other remaining lien holders. In its objec-
tion to First American’s motion, Stewart Title instead
requested that the court equitably apportion the surplus
proceeds, arguing that its pro rata share should be deter-
mined on the basis of the mortgage it held on the prop-
erty and the award it had recovered in relation to a
foreclosure action on a different property. Judge Dow-
ney apportioned the proceeds according to the ratios
that Stewart Title proposed, calculating Stewart Title’s
share on the basis of its interests in the two properties.
In an instance such as this, where the court not only
failed to apply the controlling law under which First
American would be entitled to receive all of the surplus
proceeds, but took the extra, inexplicable step of
allowing Stewart Title to recover on the basis of an
award that was made in connection with an entirely
different property in a different proceeding, Judge Tier-
ney properly granted reargument and gave plenary con-
sideration to the merits.®

‘Additionally, the parties’ various disagreements—as to whether First
American did or did not request oral argument when it initially filed the
motion, whether Judge Downey was obligated to hear oral argument and
whether Judge Tierney based his decision in part on a belief that Judge
Downey's judgment was defective because he decided the motion without
hearing oral argument—have no bearing on our analysis.

® Additionally, Stewart Title suggests that because a foreclosure action is
one in equity, the abuse of discretion standard must apply. Even when a
court sits in equity, however, its resolution of a question of law, such as the
determination of the applicable legal principle, is subject to de novo review.

Il

Finally, we address Stewart Title’s claim that the trial
court improperly concluded that First American was
entitled to recover all of the surplus proceeds. The trial
court arrived at its conclusion by applying the doctrine
of pari passu. First American argues that the trial court’s
decision may be affirmed on the alternate ground that,
pursuant to the first in time, first in right principle, First
American was entitled to recover all of the surplus
proceeds because its mortgage was executed and
recorded prior to that of Stewart Title. We agree with
First American that the judgment of the trial court may
be affirmed on this alternate ground.

“The law relating to the priority of interests has its
roots in early Connecticut jurisprudence. A fundamen-
tal principle is that a mortgage that is recorded first is
entitled to priority over subsequently recorded mort-
gages provided that every grantee has a reasonable time
to get his deed recorded.” Independence One Mortgage
Corp. v. Katsaros, 43 Conn. App. 71, 78, 681 A.2d 1005
(1996); accord Brown v. General Laundry Service, Inc.,
139 Conn. 363, 372, 94 A.2d 10 (1952), vacated on other
grounds, 347 U.S. 81, 74S. Ct. 367, 98 L. Ed. 520 (1954);
Beers v. Hawley, 2 Conn. 467, 469 (1818). It is undis-
puted that the Washington Mutual mortgage now held
by First American was recorded before the Indepen-
dence mortgage now held by Stewart Title. That mort-
gage originally was the first mortgage on the property,
and was subordinated only to Hudson Valley’s mort-
gage, making it, for practical purposes, the second mort-
gage on the property. Stewart Title’s mortgage was
recorded after Hudson Valley's mortgage, making it the
third mortgage on the property. Accordingly, First
American’s mortgage is prior to Stewart Title’s and First

627

American is entitled to recover the entire surplus pro-
ceeds on deposit in the clerk’s office."

Stewart Title’s arguments to the contrary are unper-
suasive. Its primary substantive argument appears to
be that the present case is governed by this court’s
decision in Bryson v. Newtown Real Estate & Develop-
ment Corp., 153 Conn. 267, 271, 216 A.2d 176 (1965),
in which we upheld the trial court’s application of equi-
table apportionment to the surplus proceeds from a
foreclosure sale. Bryson, however, is distinguishable
from the present case, and does not suggest that the
“first in time” rule does not apply to surplus proceeds.
Bryson involved a parcel consisting of four contiguous
tracts of land. There were three mortgages at issue in
the case, given and recorded in the following order: (1)
the defendant owner gave a first mortgage to the plain-
tiff on all four tracts; (2) the defendant owner next gave
a mortgage to the defendant Paul Pellegrino on only
one of the four tracts; and (8) the defendant owner
gave a mortgage on all four tracts to the defendant
Edward M. Derman. Id., 268. Both the plaintiff and Pelle-
grino subsequently brought foreclosure actions, which
were consolidated and resulted in ajudgment of foreclo-
sure by sale." Id., 269. After the plaintiff's claim and

¥ Stewart Title claims that, because neither Judge Downey nor Judge
Tierney applied the fixst in time, first in right rule, First American may not
rely on that theory as an alternate ground for affirmance. Additionally,
although Stewart Title concedes that First American raised this issue as an
alternate ground for affirmance in its preliminary statement of the issues,
it contends that, because First American failed in its brief to use the phrase
“alternate ground for affirmance” in setting forth this issue, First American
may not rely on the first in time, first in right principle as an alternate
ground for affirming the decision of the trial court. None of Stewart Title's
claims have any merit. First American raised the issue to the trial court in its
original motion and in the motion to reargue, identified it in the preliminary
statement as an alternate ground, and has argued the issue to this court.
The issue is properly before us as an alternate ground for affirmance.

4 Originally, the court rendered two judgments of foreclosure by sale,
one in each case. The Pellegrino judgment subsequently was vacated. Bryson
v. Newtown Real Estate & Development Corp., supra, 153 Conn. 269.

628 Po
i
the costs of the sale were paid, the trial court appor-
tioned the surplus proceeds between Pellegrino and
Derman, arriving at the pro rata shares on the basis of
its finding that the single tract of land on which Pelle-
grino held a second mortgage had a value of $35,000
and that the three tracts of land on which Derman held
a second mortgage had a value of $69,000. Id., 270.
Accordingly, the court determined that Derman was
entitled to a pro rata share of 66.35 percent of the
surplus proceeds. Because that amount exceeded the
amount claimed by Derman, the court awarded the
remainder to Pellegrino, in addition to his pro rata share
of 33.65 percent of the surplus proceeds. Id. On appeal
to this court, Pellegrino claimed that the court properly
should have distributed the surplus proceeds according
to the “first in time” rule rather than apportioning the
proceeds. See id., 271. We disagreed, observing that
Pellegrino’s only interest was in the single tract of land
on which he was a second mortgagee. Accordingly, his
equity in that tract of land “was limited to a claim on
that portion of the value of the property remaining after
the first mortgage had been satisfied.” Id. Our holding
specifically was limited to circumstances in which sub-
sequent encumbrancers have been given security inter-
ests on separate estates. In such a circumstance, we
concluded, the subsequent mortgagees each “should
share the burden of the first mortgage according to the
proportionate value of their security interests.” Id., 272.
Moreover, in rejecting Pellegrino’s claim that a rule of
priority should have been applied, we observed that
the trial court had treated two second mortgages
equally—the second mortgage held by Pellegrino on
the single tract of land and the second mortgage held
by Derman on the remaining three tracts. Id., 273.
Accordingly, we concluded that “it was proper for the
court to apportion the surplus between them according
to the respective values of their security.” Id. Bryson,

po 629
[fT

therefore, does not govern the present appeal, which
involves First American’s second mortgage and Stewart
Title’s third mortgage on the identical piece of property.
Equitable apportionment among the subsequent mort-
gagees would be improper under these facts.

Finally, although we have resolved this appeal on the
alternate ground for affirmance, we take the opportu-
nity to clarify that the doctrine of pari passu, which the
trial court stated it was applying in reaching the same
conclusion, does not apply under the facts of the pres-
ent case, and, in fact, represents a significant departure
from our established precedent. “Pari passu” as
explained by the trial court, is a Latin phrase that means
with “ ‘equal step.’” Black’s Dictionary explains that
the phrase is “[u]sed especially of creditors who, in
marshalling assets, are entitled to receive out of the
same fund without any precedence over each other.”
Blacks Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990), p. 1115. “Marshal-
ling assets” refers to “an equitable doctrine requiring
a senior creditor, having two funds to satisfy his debt,
to resort first to the one fund which is not subject to
the demand of a junior creditor of the common debtor,
to avoid the inequity which would result from an elec-
tion of the senior creditor to satisfy its demand out of
the only fund available to the junior creditor, thereby
excluding the junior creditor from any satisfaction.” Id.,
pp. 973-74. The doctrine of pari passu ordinarily is
applied in the context of bankruptcy proceedings as
opposed to foreclosure proceedings, in which we apply
the principle of first in time, first in right. Compare
Robinson v. Security Co., 87 Conn. 268, 270, 87 A. 879
(1913) (applying doctrine of pari passu in bankruptcy
proceedings), with Independence One Mortgage Corp.
v. Katsaros, supra, 43 Conn. App. 73 (applying first in
time, first in right principle in foreclosure proceedings).

A close reading of the trial court’s memorandum of
decision reveals that the court implicitly recognized

630 Po
ee

the incompatibility of the doctrine of pari passu to the
distribution of assets in a foreclosure action.” In its
purported application of the doctrine of pari passu, the
court recognized that, following the foreclosure sale,
there remained three levels, or classes, of claimants. In
the first level was First American, by virtue of holding
the first recorded mortgage. Hudson Valley and Inde-
pendence occupied the second and third levels respec-
tively, by virtue of the dates on which their respective
mortgages were recorded. After determining that First
American alone occupied the first level, and that its
claim exceeded the amount of the surplus proceeds,
the court “distributed” all of the surplus proceeds to
First American as the sole creditor in that level, suppos-
edly pursuant to the doctrine of pari passu. This was
nothing more than an implicit application of the first
in time, first in right doctrine to the distribution of the
surplus proceeds, which we emphasize is the applicable
doctrine to determine the distribution of surplus pro-
ceeds following a foreclosure sale.

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

KRISTY WILCOX ET AL. v. DANIEL 8.
SCHWARTZ ET AL.
(SC 18607)

Rogers, ©. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan,
Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js.

8 As we already have explained, the present case does not involve facts
that are analogous to Bryson, in which it was possible to marshall the assets.

631

Argued March 17, 2011—officially released February 7, 2012

632 Pe
Dee

Frank H. Santoro, with whom, on the brief, was Jona-
than A. Kocienda, for the appellants (defendants).

Steven J. Errante, with whom, on the brief, was Mar-

isa A. Bellair, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

PALMER, J. This certified appeal arises out of amedi-
cal malpractice action brought by the plaintiffs, Kristy
Wilcox and Timothy Wilcox,! against the defendants,
Daniel S. Schwartz, a general surgeon, and his employer,
CBS Surgical Group, P.C., alleging that Schwartz negli-
gently performed laparoscopic gallbladder surgery on
Kristy Wilcox (Wilcox). The trial court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the writ-
ten opinion of a “similar health care provider” that
accompanied the certificate of good faith, as mandated.
by General Statutes § 52-190a (a),? did not satisfy the

1We refer to Kristy Wilcox and Timothy Wilcox collectively as the
plaintiffs.

2 General Statutes § 52-190a provides in relevant part: “(a) No civil action
or apportionment complaint shall be filed to recover damages resulting from
personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987,
whether in tort or in contract, in which it is alleged that such injury or death
resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, unless the attorney
or party filing the action or apportionment complaint has made a reasonable
inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine that there are
grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the care or
treatment of the claimant. The complaint, initial pleading or apportionment
complaint shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party filing the action
or apportionment complaint that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good
faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each named defendant
or for an apportionment complaint against each named apportionment defen-
dant. To show the existence of such good faith, the claimant or the claimant's
attorney, and any apportionment complainant or the apportionment com-
plainant’s attorney, shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar
health care provider, as defined in section 52-184c, which similar health
care provider shall be selected pursuant to the provisions of said section,

Po 633
a

“detailed basis” requirement of § 52-190a (a) because
it failed to explain the particular manner in which
Schwartz had breached the standard of care. The plain-
tiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed
the judgment of the trial court. Wilcox v. Schwartz, 119
Conn. App. 808, 817, 990 A.2d 366 (2010). We granted the
defendants’ petition for certification to appeal limited to
the following question: “Did the Appellate Court prop-
erly reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the present
case for failure to comply with the ‘detailed basis’
requirement of . . . §52-190a (a)?” Wilcox v.
Schwartz, 296 Conn. 908, 909, 993 A.2d 469 (2010). We
answer that question in the affirmative and, accordingly,
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.’

that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a
detailed basis for the formation of such opinion. Such written opinion shall
not be subject to discovery by any party except for questioning the validity
of the certificate. The claimant or the claimant's attorney, and any apportion-
ment complainant or apportionment complainant's attorney, shalll retain the
original written opinion and shall attach a copy of such written opinion,
with the name and signature of the similar health care provider expunged,
to such certificate. The similar health care provider who provides such
written opinion shalll not, without a showing of malice, be personally liable
for any damages to the defendant health care provider by reason of having
provided such written opinion. In addition to such written opinion, the court
may consider other factors with regard to the existence of good faith. If
the court determines, after the completion of discovery, that such certificate
was not made in good faith and that no justiciable issue was presented
against a health care provider that fully cooperated in providing informal
discovery, the court upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose
upon the person who signed such certificate or a represented party, or both,
an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee. The court may also submit the matter to the appropriate
authority for disciplinary review of the attorney if the claimant's attorney
or the apportionment complainant's attorney submitted the certificate.
eee

“(c) The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsec-
tion (@) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action.”

® Because we conclude that the written opinion attached to the complaint
in accordance with § 52-190a (a) was sufficiently detailed to satisfy the
requirements of that statutory provision, we do not reach the defendants’

634 Po
ee

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the
following relevant facts and procedural history. “The
[plaintiffs] alleged that on March 12, 2006, Wilcox under-
went a laparoscopic cholecystectomy performed by
Schwartz for treatment of gallbladder disease. The
[plaintiffs] further alleged that Schwartz performed the
procedure negligently, causing Wilcox to suffer ‘severe,
painful and permanent injuries.’ The plaintiffs claimed
that Schwartz breached the applicable standard of care
in that he . . . (1) ‘failed to [ensure] the adequate and
accurate identification of [Wilcox’s] internal anatomy
prior to proceeding with the laparoscopic cholecystec-
tomy,’ (2) ‘failed to prevent injury to [Wilcox’s] biliary
structures during the laparoscopic cholecystectomy’
and (8) ‘failed to accurately document the surgical pro-
cedure... .’” Wilcox v. Schwartz, supra, 119 Conn.
App. 810-11.

“The [plaintiffs’] two count complaint stated claims
sounding in medical negligence and loss of spousal
consortium, respectively. Attached to the complaint
was a certificate of reasonable inquiry, executed by the
plaintiffs’ attorney, and a written and signed medical
opinion [by a physician]. The body of the opinion [pro-
vides in relevant part]: ‘I have reviewed the relevant
records and information that were provided to me with
regard to . . . Wilcox.

“JT can conclude that, to a reasonable degree of medi-
cal probability, there are deviations from the applicable
standards of care pertaining to the care and treatment
of . . . Wilcox provided by [Schwartz] and that the
care and treatment provided by [him] was not provided
in a manner consistent with the standards of care that
existed among general surgeons at the time of the
alleged incident.

second claim, namely, that § 52-190a. (c) requires dismissal of a complaint
when the opinion is insufficiently detailed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

ee 635
Leerssen!

“ ‘Specifically [Schwartz] failed to prevent injury to
. . . Wilcox’s biliary structures during laparoscopic
[gallbladder] surgery and failed to accurately document
the surgical procedure of March 12, 2006. As a result of
[Schwartz’] negligent treatment . . . Wilcox sustained
severe, painful and permanent injuries.

“My opinions are based [on] my education, training
and experience as a physician, and my examination of
. . . Wilcox’s medical records.’ ” Id., 811-12.

“[T]he defendants filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint . . . [on the ground] that the plaintiffs’ written
opinion was not detailed enough to satisfy the require-
ments of § 52-190a (a). Specifically, the defendants
argued that ‘the opining physician simply provides a
conclusory statement of negligence, and fail[ed] to pro-
vide an opinion as to how [Schwartz was] negligent in
[his] care of [Wilcox], [that is], how [Schwartz] deviated
from the standard of care.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id.,
812. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss; see General Statutes § 52-190a (c);* concluding
that the “detailed basis” requirement of § 52-190a (a)
requires a written opinion to include “some particulars
as to what the defendant did that he was not supposed
to do or failed to do that he was supposed to do.” In
its view, although the written opinion submitted by the
plaintiffs in the present case asserts that Schwartz “was
supposed to do something ‘to prevent injury to... .
Wilcox’s biliary structures’ . . . [that] he did not,” it
failed to identify the negligent act or omission with
sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of
§ 52-190a (a).

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiffs
claimed that the trial court incorrectly had concluded
that the written opinion was insufficiently detailed to
meet the requirements of §52-190a. See Wilcox v.

4 See footnote 2 of this opinion.

636 Po
Le

Schwartz, supra, 119 Conn. App. 810. The Appellate
Court agreed with that claim and reversed the judgment
of the trial court. Id., 810, 817. In reaching its determina-
tion, the Appellate Court relied on this court’s decision
in Dias v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350, 359-60, 972 A.2d 715
(2009), in which we rejected a claim that the written
opinion required by § 52-190a (a) must state that the
defendant’s deviation from the standard of care was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See Wilcox v.
Schwartz, supra, 814-15. In Dias, we concluded, rather,
on the basis of our examination of the language and
legislative history of § 52-190a, that the written opinion
need only provide an opinion as to the breach of the
standard of care. See Dias v. Grady, supra, 355-60.
Because the written opinion in the present case satisfied
that requirement, the Appellate Court concluded that
it was sufficient for purposes of § 52-190a (a). See Wil-
cou v. Schwartz, supra, 815. Specifically, the Appellate
Court stated: “The [written] opinion first states the
author's conclusion, ‘to a reasonable degree of medical
probability,’ that there were ‘deviations from the appli-
cable [standard] of care’ by Schwartz and that the care
and treatment provided to Wilcox by Schwartz ‘was not
provided in a manner consistent with the [standard] of
care that existed among general surgeons at the time
of the alleged incident.’ The opinion continues: ‘Specifi-
cally, [Schwartz] failed to prevent injury to . . . Wil-
cox’s biliary structures during laparoscopic [gall-
bladder] surgery and failed to accurately document the
surgical procedure of March 12, 2006.’ Thus, the struc-
ture of the [written opinion] reveals the author's state-
ment of the prevailing standard of care: protecting the
biliary structures during laparoscopic gallbladder sur-
gery. It is this standard of care, the author opines, that
Schwartz breached in performing the surgery on Wil-
cox.” Id.

The Appellate Court concluded that “the [written]
opinion [was] sufficiently detailed to satisfy the require-

Po 637

ments of § 52-190a (a). It suffices to notify the reader
that a similar health care provider is of the opinion that
the medical negligence consisted of a failure to protect
Wilcox’s bile ducts from injury during surgery. . . .
The ultimate purpose of [the] requirement [of a written
opinion] is to [discourage frivolous lawsuits by] demon-
strat[ing] the existence of the claimant’s good faith in
bringing the complaint by having a witness, qualified
under General Statutes § 52-184c, state in written form
that there appears to be evidence of a breach of the
applicable standard of care. [As] long as the good faith
opinion sufficiently addresses the allegations of negli-
gence pleaded in the complaint, as [the written] opinion
[in the present case] does, the basis of the opinion is
detailed enough to satisfy the statute and the statute’s
purpose.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 815-16. The Appellate
Court further concluded that the plaintiffs’ “complaint
allege[d] only one specification of negligence pertaining
to the actual performance of the surgery: that Schwartz
‘failed to prevent injury to [Wilcox’s] biliary structures
during the laparoscopic cholecystectomy.’ The defen-
dants have been given sufficient notice that a similar
health care provider is willing to state his opinion that
the standard of care was breached during this surgical
procedure. The defendants will have the opportunity
to gather more information during discovery of any
medical expert [that] the plaintiffs plan to use at trial.”
Id., 817. This appeal followed.

On appeal to this court following our granting of
certification, the defendants challenge the determina-
tion of the Appellate Court that the plaintiffs’ written
opinion contains sufficient detail to pass muster under
§ 52-190a (a) on the ground that the opinion fails to
identify the particular negligent act or acts that caused
the damage to Wilcox’s biliary structures. The defen-
dants also assert that the written opinion is legally inad-
equate because it asserts only that Schwartz was

688 Pe
Le

negligent in failing to prevent injury to Wilcox’s biliary
structures but does not expressly identify the standard
of care. The defendants’ contention concerning the
scope of the written opinion requirement of § 52-190a
(a) is predicated on their claim that the requirement
was intended, first, to make medical “malpractice cases
more difficult to file” and, second, to “ ‘narrow down’
the basis of a plaintiff's claim” in the interest of expedit-
ing an ultimate resolution of the action.

The plaintiffs maintain that the Appellate Court cor-
rectly concluded that the purpose of the written opinion
requirement is to discourage frivolous medical malprac-
tice actions by placing the burden on the person bring-
ing the action to identify a qualified medical pro-
fessional who is willing to attest to the fact that there
appears to be evidence of medical negligence as alleged
in the complaint. The plaintiffs further contend that
interpreting § 52-190a (a) to require that a written opin-
ion provide an explanation of the precise manner in
which the defendant was negligent prior to any discov-
ery in the case would lead to the untenable result that
many potentially meritorious claims never would be
commenced. In accordance with their view of the mean-
ing of § 52-190a (a), the plaintiffs maintain that the
Appellate Court properly reversed the judgment of the
trial court because the assertion in the written opinion
that Schwartz negligently failed to protect Wilcox’s bili-
ary structures is all that was necessary to satisfy § 52-_
190a (a). We agree with the plaintiffs.

The question of whether the statements contained in
the written opinion satisfy the “detailed basis” require-
ment of § 52-190a (a) is one of statutory construction.®

5“Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, over which we
exercise plenary review. . . . The principles that govern statutory construc-
tion are well established. When construing a statute, [oJur fundamental
objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legisla-
ture. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the
meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . .

Po 639
a

See, e.g., Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. State,
278 Conn. 77, 82, 896 A.2d 747 (2006) (application of
particular statutory provision to undisputed facts gives
rise to issue of statutory construction). We therefore
begin our analysis with the language of the statute,
which provides in relevant part: “No [medical malprac-
tice] action . . . shall be filed . . . unless the... .
party filing the action . . . has made a reasonable
inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to determine
that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there
has been negligence in the care or treatment of the
claimant. The complaint . . . shall contain a certificate
of the . . . party filing the action . . . that such rea-
sonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief that
grounds exist for an action against each named defen-
dant . . . . To show the existence of such good faith,
the claimant . . . shall obtain a written and signed
opinion of a similar health care provider . . . that there
appears to be evidence of medical negligence and
includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opin-
ion. . . .” General Statutes § 52-190a (a). Because this
language offers no specific guidance with respect to
the level of detail that a written opinion must contain,
we look to extratextual sources to ascertain the mean-
ing of the “detailed basis” requirement of the statute,
as applied to the facts of the present case.

In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-22 directs us
first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship,
the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd
or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute
shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous,
we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and cixcum-
stances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed
to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common
law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities
ex rel. Arnold v. Forvil, 302 Conn. 263, 278, 25 A.3d 632 (2011).

640 Po
ee

As we explained in Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn.
350, “[§] 52-190a originally was enacted as part of the
Tort Reform Act of 1986. See Public Acts 1986, No. 86-
338, § 12. The original version of the statute required the
plaintiff in any medical malpractice action to conduct ‘a
reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances
to determine that there are grounds for a good faith
belief that there has been negligence in the care or
treatment of the [plaintiff]’ and to file a certificate ‘that
such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a good faith belief
that grounds exist for an action against each named
defendant.’ General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 52-190a
(a). The original statute did not require the plaintiff
to obtain the written opinion of a similar health care
provider that there appeared to be evidence of medical
negligence . . . but permitted the plaintiff to rely on
such an opinion to support his good faith belief. . . .
[T]he purpose of the original version of § 52-190a was
to prevent frivolous medical malpractice actions. See
Bruttomesso v. Northeastern Connecticut Sexual
Assault Crisis Services, Inc., 242 Conn. 1, 15, 698 A.2d
795 (1997) (‘[t]he purpose of the legislation is to inhibit
a plaintiff from bringing an inadequately investigated
cause of action, whether in tort or in contract, claiming
negligence by a health care provider’).

“Tn 2005, the legislature amended § 52-190a (a) to
include a provision requiring the plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action to [‘show the existence of the claim-
ant’s good faith’ belief that grounds exist for an action
by] obtain[ing] the written opinion of a similar health
care provider that ‘there appears to be evidence of
medical negligence’ . . . . See Public Acts 2005, No.
05-275, §2... .” Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 357.
The 2005 legislation was part of “a comprehensive effort
to control significant and continued increases in mal-
practice insurance premiums by reforming aspects of
tort law, the insurance system and the public health

Po 641
a

regulatory system.” Bennett v. New Milford Hospital,
Ine., 300 Conn. 1, 18, 12 A.3d 865 (2011).

As we also observed in Dias with regard to the legisla-
tive history of the 2005 legislation, Michael D. Neubert,
an attorney representing the Connecticut State Medical
Society at a hearing before the judiciary committee,
“stated that the [written opinion requirement] was
intended to ‘ensure that there’s a reasonable basis for
filing a medical malpractice action under the circum-
stances. It would help eliminate some of the more ques-
tionable and meritless claims filed under the present
statutory scheme.’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee
Hearings, [Judiciary, Pt. 18, 2005 Sess.], p. 5539. [Neub-
ert] also stated that the [requirement ‘obviously’ was
not ‘going to impact the majority of cases’ and] was
targeting [only ‘the cases on the margins’] . . . ‘where
attorneys, based on their own judgment and maybe in
good faith have misread what an [expert has] told them
. ... Very often you hear what you want to hear as
an attorney, or interpret [what has] been told to you
as you want to interpret it. . . . [I]f the [physician is]
not willing to sign on the dotted line, maybe [that is]
a good indication that this [is not] a good case to bring.
. .. If part of what [we are] trying to do here is elimi-
nate those cases [that] should not be in the system then.
I think this serves to do it.’ Id., p. 5553; see also Conn.
Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 19,
2005 Sess., p. 5748, written testimony of Neubert (‘the
present statutory scheme does not adequately [e]nsure
that an attorney filing a medical malpractice action has
a reasonable basis to believe that the defendants have
violated the standard of care in causing the plaintiff
injury’).” Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 358 n.7.

Two legislators echoed Neubert’s view that the writ-
ten opinion requirement was intended primarily to
reduce the number of frivolous medical malpractice
actions by requiring a plaintiff to obtain an opinion

642 Po

from a similar health care provider substantiating the
plaintiff's good faith belief that there had been negli-
gence in the plaintiff's care and treatment. See Conn.
Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 18,
2005 Sess., p. 5545, remarks of Senator John A. Kissel
(stating that written opinion requirement would greatly
improve on then current practice of “[the plaintiff's]
attorney just sort of signing off in good faith”); see also
485. Proc., Pt. 14, 2005 Sess., p. 4433, remarks of Senator
Edward Meyer (observing that written opinion require-
ment would deal “with . . . [the] bad cases”). Relying
in large measure on Neubert’s testimony,’ we concluded
in Dias that the legislative history “indicates that [the
written opinion requirement] was intended to address
the problem that some attorneys, either intentionally
or innocently, were misrepresenting in the certificate
of good faith the information that they had obtained
from experts.” Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 357-58.

A review of the pertinent judiciary committee debate
on the 2005 legislation, however, reveals no discussion.
or testimony directly addressing the question of what
specific kind of information concerning the defendant’s
alleged negligence is necessary to satisfy the “detailed
basis” requirement. During floor debate in the House
of Representatives, however, Representative Michael
P. Lawlor described the written opinion as a “threshold
opinion that, in fact, this is medical malpractice.” 48
FLR. Proc., Pt. 31, 2005 Sess., p. 9502. During discussion
of the 2005 legislation on the Senate floor, Senator Kis-
sel observed that the written opinion requirement was
consistent with the legislative goal of expediting medi-
cal malpractice actions because the opinion, which is

° “This court repeatedly has recognized that testimony before legislative
committees regarding proposed legislation sheds light on the problem or
issue that the legislature sought to resolve, and the purpose it sought to
serve, in enacting a statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dias v.
Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 358 n.7.

Pe 6s

appended to the good faith certificate, would inform
the defendant, at the commencement of the action, of
the basis of the plaintiff's good faith belief that the
defendant had performed negligently. See 48 S. Proc.,
supra, p. 4428. Senator Kissel explained that, under the
prior version of the statute, it could take months, or
“even over [one] year, until [the defendant’s] counsel
and their clients could really narrow down” the basis
for the complaint. Id. Senator Kissel also observed that,
by allowing the defendant’s counsel to start gathering
information about the claim “right of[f] the bat,” the
written opinion requirement would reduce the length
of the discovery process and better enable the defen-
dant to assess any settlement offers early in the litiga-
tion process. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
Judiciary, Pt. 18, 2005 Sess., pp. 5545-46.

Upon consideration of the statutory language in light
of this legislative history, we agree with the Appellate
Court that a written opinion satisfies the “detailed
basis” requirement of § 52-190a (a) if it sets forth the
basis of the similar health care provider’s opinion that
there appears to be evidence of medical negligence by
express reference to what the defendant did or failed
to do to breach the applicable standard of care. In other
words, the written opinion must state the similar health
care provider’s opinion as to the applicable standard
of care, the fact that the standard of care was breached,
and the factual basis of the similar health care provider’s
conclusion concerning the breach of the standard of
care.’ This level of detail is sufficient because it satisfies

7 We note that the dissent reaches the same essential conclusion predi-
cated on the “plain meaning” of the terms “detailed” and “basis” as set forth
in Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983). Specifically, the dissent
states that, when the “terms [‘detailed’ and ‘basis’ are read] together [in
light of their dictionary definitions and] in the context of the statute . . . the
author [of the written opinion] should elaborate on the particular standard of
care involved in the medical treatment at issue, the manner in which he
or she believes it likely was breached and the facts that led to his or
her conclusion.”

64 es

the requirement of § 52-190a (a) that the written opinion
shall include both the opinion of the similar health care
provider that “there appears to be evidence of medical
negligence” and a “detailed basis for the formation of
such opinion,” that is, a statement setting forth the facts
then known to the health care provider on which that
opinion of medical negligence is predicated. General
Statutes § 52-190a (a).

The foregoing interpretation of § 52-190a (a) also rep-
resents an appropriate balance between the two pri-
mary competing considerations identified by the leg-
islature, namely, the need for enough specificity to sup-
port a good faith belief of the existence of medical
negligence, on the one hand, and the fact that, at the
time the written opinion is issued, the plaintiff will not
yet have had the opportunity to engage in any formal
discovery into the alleged malpractice, on the other.
Although, in some cases, a more comprehensive expla-
nation of the defendant’s alleged negligence will be
possible, a blanket requirement mandating a more oner-
ous or stringent standard would serve to deter not only
frivolous lawsuits but some meritorious ones, as well,
a result that the legislature did not intend to achieve.’

Our conclusion finds support in Dias, in which we
explained that, because “the phrase ‘medical negli-
gence,’ as used in § 52-190a (a), means breach of the
standard of care and was not intended to encompass
all of the elements of a cause of action for negligence”;
Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 359; the provision does
not require the additional opinion that the medical negli-
gence was the cause of the injury. See id., 359-60. In

8 Our conclusion also finds support in the fact that, in the view of the
trial court and the defendants, a written opinion that does not satisfy the
requirements of § 52-190a (a) renders the plaintiff's action subject to dis-
missal under § 52-190a (c). As we previously noted, however; see footnote
8 of this opinion; we need not decide that issue for purposes of the pres-
ent case.

Po 645
Le

reaching that determination, we emphasized that,
“{allthough the language and history of § 52-190a (a)
indicate that the statute was intended to bar meritless
medical malpractice actions, [there is] no evidence that
the legislature intended to bar meritorious claims
merely because a similar health care provider is not
qualified to provide an opinion as to both the applicable
standard of care and proximate causation. In the
absence of any such evidence, we must presume that
the legislature had no such intent.” Id. Consistent with
the analysis and conclusion in Dias, we are persuaded
that the legislature did not intend to bar a potentially
meritorious claim merely because a similar health care
provider, although able to determine that there appears
to be evidence of a breach of the standard of care, is
unable to identify the specific negligent act or omis-
sion involved.

We also agree with the Appellate Court that the writ-
ten opinion in the present case meets this standard.
See Wilcox v. Schwartz, supra, 119 Conn. App. 815-16.
The written opinion provides that its author had “con-
clude[d] . . . to areasonable degree of medical proba-
bility” that, on the basis of his “education, training and
experience as a physician, and [an] examination of . . .
Wilcox’s medical records,” Schwartz had “deviat[ed]
from the applicable [standard] of care” and, therefore,
was “negligent” in his treatment of Wilcox in “fail[ing]
to prevent injury to . . . Wilcox’s biliary structures
during laparoscopic [gallbladder] surgery . . . .” In
other words, the written opinion sets forth the author’s
professional medical judgment that, consistent with the
allegations of the complaint, the applicable standard of
care required Schwartz to protect the biliary structures
during surgery and that his failure to do so constituted
a breach of that standard of care. This explanation,
although concise, constitutes a sufficiently clear and

646 Po
a

detailed explication of what Schwartz did or failed to
do in breaching the applicable standard of care.®

The defendants make several arguments in support
of their claim that the written opinion in the present
case is insufficiently detailed to satisfy § 52-190a (a).
In particular, they contend that the opinion does not
set forth the applicable standard of care. The defen-
dants also contend that the statement in the opinion that
Schwartz failed to protect Wilcox’s biliary structures

°The defendants and the dissent contend that it was improper for the
Appellate Court to conclude that the written opinion indicated that the
“negligence consisted of [Schwartz’] failure to protect Wilcox’s bile ducts
from injury during surgery”; (emphasis added) Wilcow v. Schwartz, supra,
119 Conn. App. 815-16; because the written opinion provides only that
Schwartz “failed to prevent injury to... Wilcox’s biliary structures during

. . surgery .. . .” (Emphasis added.) Although acknowledging that this
isa“subtle” distinction, the defendants maintain thatiitis significant because
the phrase “failed to prevent injury to . . . Wilcox’s biliary structures”
indicates only that the biliary structures were injured and does not state
explicitly that the standard of care required Schwartz to take measures to
“protect” the biliary structures. We agree with the Appellate Court that the
language of the written opinion, when read in proper context, expresses
the view of its author that the standard of care required Schwartz to take
appropriate measures to protect Wilcox’s biliary structures from injury dur-
ing the surgery and, further, that he failed to do so. See Wilcox v. Schwartz,
supra, 815-16, Indeed, we discern no material difference between a failure
to protect the biliary structures and a failure to prevent injury to those
structures, and neither the defendants nor the dissent identifies any such dis-
tinction.

‘The defendants also assert that the Appellate Court improperly relied on
the fact that the written opinion addresses the allegations of negligence
pleaded in the complaint in assessing the sufficiency of that opinion under
§ 52-190a (a). They maintain that a written opinion must “be judged on its
own contents rather than the fact that it [mimics] the complaint.” ‘The
defendants have identified no reason, and we are aware of none, why the
written opinion must be read in isolation from the complaint. Indeed, to
comply with § 52-190a (a), the written opinion necessarily will mizror at
least some of the allegations in the complaint; if it does not, it will not fulfill
its purpose of substantiating the plaintiff's good faith belief that reasonable
grounds exist for the action. Moreover, to the extent that a complaint alleges
facts sufficient to support a claim of medical malpractice, a written opinion
that tracks those allegations ordinarily will suffice for purposes of § 52-
190a (a).

Po oar
Ld

is tantamount to a res ipsa loquitur claim because it
suggests that negligence can be inferred from the injury
alone. The defendants further argue that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was not pleaded in the present case,
and, even if it had been, it is rarely relied on in medical
malpractice actions. In addition, the defendants assert
that a written opinion that Schwartz was negligent in
failing to prevent injury is inadequate under § 52-190a
(a) because the purpose of the statutory “detailed basis”
requirement is to notify a defendant not only of the
standard of care that was breached but also the specific
manner in which it was breached. We are not persuaded
by these arguments.

First, we disagree with the defendants that the writ-
ten opinion in the present case fails to identify the
applicable standard of care and a breach of that stan-
dard of care. As we previously stated, the opinion pro-
vides that the standard of care required Schwartz to
protect Wilcox’s biliary structures during the laparos-
copic gallbladder surgery and that his failure to do so
caused injury to those structures. Although the defen-
dants may disagree with the standard of care identified
in the written opinion and with the author's assertion
that Schwartz had deviated from it, that disagreement
does not render the opinion insufficient under § 52-

“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, literally the thing speaks for itself,
permits a jury to infer negligence when no direct evidence of negligence
has been introduced. . . . The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only
‘when two prerequisites are satisfied. First, the situation, condition or appara-
tus causing the injury must be such that in the ordinary course of events
no injury would have occurred unless someone had been negligent. Second,
at the time of the injury, both inspection and operation must have been in
the control of the party charged with neglect. . . . When both of these
prerequisites are satisfied, a fact finder properly may conclude that it is
more likely than not that the injury in question was caused by the defendant’s
negligence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Godwin
v. Danbury Eye Physicians & Surgeons, P.C., 254 Conn. 131, 140, 757 A.2d
516 (2000).

648 Po
ee

190a (a) when the information contained therein was
sufficient to place the defendants on notice of the nature
of the alleged medical negligence.

We also agree with the plaintiffs that an opinion by
a similar health care provider that there appears to be
evidence of medical negligence properly may be based
on evidence of an injury or outcome that the medical
professional believes is highly unlikely to have occurred.
in the absence of negligence. Such a conclusion may
be reasonable when, for example, an injury occurs to
an organ that is rarely, if ever, injured during a particular
procedure, and the plaintiffs medical records do not
reveal an explanation for the injury that does not involve
negligence. In such circumstances, the plaintiff's mal-
practice claim is predicated not on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur but, rather, on the considered opinion of
a medical professional that the injury would not have
occurred but for the defendant's negligence.

We therefore disagree with the defendants and the
dissent that a written opinion always must identify the
precise manner in which the standard of care was
breached to satisfy the requirements of § 52-190a (a).
The opinion necessarily is obtained prior to the com-
mencement of the action, before the plaintiff will have
had the opportunity to engage in pretrial discovery
under the rules of practice governing such discovery.
When, as in the present case, a health care professional
has opined that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff
would not have occurred but for the defendant’s breach
of the standard of care, that opinion is sufficient to
satisfy § 52-190a (a). Of course, the plaintiff may be
able to obtain more particularized information about
the alleged negligence during the course of pretrial dis-
covery. But, at least in a case like the present one, in
which a similar health care provider opines that, in
essence, the injury would not have occurred in the

Po 649
ee

absence of medical negligence, § 52-190a (a) does not
require such specificity." This is particularly true when,

" The dissent asserts that we are “attempting to rehabilitate” the otherwise
“inadequate written opinion . . . by paraphrasing it, speculating as what
is implied and supplying additional explanation that the opinion simply does
not contain.” Footnote 7 of the dissenting opinion. In particular, the dissent
claims that it is unreasonable to read the opinion as stating that Schwartz
would not have damaged Wilcox’s biliary structures unless he had been
negligent in performing the laparoscopic gallbladder surgery. See id. We
disagree with the dissent’s assertion because we cannot perceive how the
written opinion reasonably may be read to connote anything else. The opin-
ion expresses the author's belief, based on “a reasonable degree of medical
probability,” that Schwartz “deviat(ed] from the applicable [standard] of
care” in that he “failed to prevent injury to . . . Wilcox’s biliary structures
during laparoscopic [gallbladder] surgery,” and, that, “[a]s a result of [this]
negligent treatment . . . Wilcox suffered severe, painful and permanent
injuries.” Thus, the written opinion states that, in the author’s view, Schwartz
was negligent because Schwartz caused injury to—that is, he failed to pro-
tect—Wilcox’s biliary structures. In other words, it is the author's opinion
that, but for Schwartz’ negligence, the biliary structures would not have been
injured. The dissent, however, asserts that this constitutes an insufficient
statement of negligence because it fails to indicate “what . . . led the author
to reach [his or her] conclusion.” On the contrary, the explanation that
Schwartz was negligent because he failed to prevent injury to Wilcox’s
biliary structures necessarily reflects the author's view that the standard of
care governing the performance of laparoscopic gallbladder surgery requires
that the patient’s biliary structures remain free from injury during the sur-
gery. Although the author might have expressed this opinion in more direct
or explicit terms, there is no need to “rehabilitate” the opinion or to speculate
about its conclusion in order to understand the author’s professional opinion
as to why Schwartz was negligent: the opinion is sufficient for purposes of
§ 52-190a (a) because it conveys the author's opinion that Schwartz was
negligent due to the fact that he performed the surgery without protecting
Wilcox’s biliary structures from injury.

‘The dissent further contends that the written opinion is inadequate, first,
because “i]t is axiomatic that the fact of a bad result, standing alone, does
not prove wrongdoing by a physician” and, second, because “inadvertent
injury to a patient during surgery may, or may not, constitute negligence,”
and “[iJt may be the case that the injury at issue is a necessary risk accompa-
nying the surgical procedure during which the injury occurred, in which
case there is no malpractice.” We have no quarrel with these general proposi-
tions, for they merely reflect the uncontroversial principle that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, which permits the jury to infer negligence although no
direct evidence of negligence has been adduced, ordinarily does not apply
tomedical malpractice claims. Contrary to the dissent’s contention, however,
the inapplicability of that doctrine to the present case does not support the
contention that the written opinion in the present case is inadequate because
it expressly provides that Schwartz was negligent in performing the laparos-
copic gallbladder surgery on Wilcox.

650 Po

as in the present case, the similar health care provider
reports that the defendant negligently failed to docu-
ment adequately the surgical procedure.” In such cir-
cumstances, we do not believe that the legislature
intended to bar potentially meritorious medical mal-
practice claims simply because it is impossible for the
plaintiff to identify, prior to discovery, the particular
act or omission that caused the injury.

Indeed, in certain cases, it may be impossible to deter-
mine the precise cause of the injury even after extensive
discovery. In those cases, the plaintiffs expert neverthe-
less may be able to opine, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, that the injury would not have
occurred in the absence of medical negligence. As a
general matter, there is no reason why that opinion
evidence would not be sufficient to survive a motion
for a directed verdict. If such expert testimony is suffi-

# The dissent ignores the fact that, according to the author of the written
opinion, Schwartz also was negligent because he “failed to accurately docu-
ment the surgical procedure” that he performed on Wilcox. In evaluating
the sufficiency of the written opinion in the present case, we consider the
fact that when, as is alleged in the present case, the surgical procedure is
inadequately documented, it may be difficult or even impossible for a similar
health care provider to ascertain the precise cause of the patient's injuries.
‘Thus, we disagree with the dissent that the written opinion in the present
case is deficient because it contains no statement “specifying which, if any,
precautions Schwartz apparently failed to take . . . .” Under the circum-
stances, it is perfectly understandable that the author of the opinion could
not discern, at this stage of the case, which precaution or precautions
Schwartz negligently failed to take. We also disagree with the dissent that,
because § 52-190a (a) “seems to allow for some measure of speculation”
by the similar health care provider who authors the written opinion; footnote
5 of the dissenting opinion; the author in the present case was required to
engage in such conjecture with respect to the precautions that Schwartz
did not take. We see no reason why the written opinion is rendered insutfi-
cient under § 52-190a (a) merely because it does not speculate as to the
precautions that Schwartz failed to take, especially when, as in the present
case, the opinion states that Schwartz didnot document the surgery properly.
Put differently, for present purposes, we do not believe that conjectural
observations about what might or might nothave occurred during the surgery
are necessary to satisfy the “detailed basis” requirement of § 52-190a (a).

Po 661

cient to permit the case to go to the jury at the conclu-
sion of the plaintiff's evidence, it would be unrea-
sonable—indeed, it would be bizarre—to conclude that
the same expert opinion nevertheless is insufficient to
satisfy the “detailed basis” requirement of § 52-190a (a)
at the very inception of the litigation.

Finally, the defendants take issue with our interpreta-
tion of the pertinent legislative history as supporting
the conclusion that the written opinion in the present
case is sufficient under § 52-190a (a). In support of
their contention that the opinion was insufficient, the
defendants maintain that the requirement of a written
opinion was intended to reduce médical malpractice
insurance premiums by making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to bring medical malpractice cases and to
expedite the resolution of medical malpractice actions
by notifying the defendant or defendants of the basis
for the plaintiff's claim when the action is commenced.
We do not agree that the legislative history supports
the defendants’ claim.

With respect to their first contention, the defendants
rely on a statement by Representative Lawlor, who, in
discussing the 2005 legislation on the floor of the House
of Representatives, remarked that the written opinion
requirement would make “it much more difficult to
bring a medical malpractice action in court.” 48 H.R.
Proc., supra, p. 9445. Our review of Representative
Lawlor’s remarks, however, reveals that the foregoing
comment was not addressed to the “detailed basis”
language of the legislation but, rather, to the fact that
the written opinion would have to be attached to the
complaint. See id., p. 9501, remarks of Representative
Lawlor. In Representative Lawlor’s view, requiring
plaintiffs to attach the full text of the opinion to the
complaint would make it more difficult to obtain such
an opinion because similar health care providers
“would be reluctant to render an opinion that another

652 Po
Leen

physician had . . . engaged in malpractice . . . [due
to] the likelihood that there would be some backlash
against [them] from other physicians when it comes
to referrals [and the like].” Id., p. 9502. Accordingly,
Representative Lawlor’s remarks do not support the
defendants’ interpretation of the statute.

Indeed, as we previously indicated, although the legis-
lative history makes clear that the written opinion
requirement was intended to reduce the number of friv-
olous lawsuits, there is nothing in that history to suggest
that the legislature intended to achieve this salutary
result through the “detailed basis” requirement of the
statute. To the contrary, as we previously noted, the
legislative history strongly suggests that the written
opinion requirement was not intended to impose any
additional burden on those plaintiffs seeking redress for
reasonably investigated, potentially meritorious claims.
The purpose of the requirement, rather, was to eliminate
those claims that are so lacking in merit that no similar
health care provider would be willing to express even
a preliminary opinion that the plaintiff's injuries were
the result of medical negligence.

With respect to their second contention, the defen-
dants rely on Senator Kissel’s statement that the written.
opinion would expedite the resolution of a medical
malpractice case by notifying the defendant, at the
inception of the case, of the exact basis for the plaintiff's
claim. See 48 S. Proc., supra, pp. 4428-29. The defen-
dants contend that the written opinion in this case,
which merely provides that Schwartz negligently failed
to prevent injury to Wilcox’s biliary structures, “hardly
seems consistent with this legislative purpose.” We dis-
agree. For the reasons previously identified, we believe
that the written opinion in the present case satisfies
the requirements of § 52-190a (a) because it sets forth
asimilar health care provider's opinion that the applica-
ble standard of care required Schwartz to prevent injury

Po 653

to Wilcox’s biliary structures during surgery and that
he failed to do so.

Finally, the defendants contend that the failure of
the legislature, in 2010, to pass a bill entitled, “An Act
Concerning Certificates of Merit,” supports their claim
that the “detailed basis” language of § 52-190a (a)
requires greater detail than that which is contained in
the written opinion in the present case. See House Bill
No. 5537, 2010 Sess. According to the defendants, that
bill would have amended § 52-190a (a) by replacing the
phrase “includes a detailed basis for the formation of
such opinion” with the phrase “which states one or
more specific breaches of the prevailing professional
standard of care.” Id. In the defendants’ view, because
this bill “would have watered down the ‘detail’ require-
ment” of the present statute, it is apparent that the
written opinion in the present case does not satisfy
§ 52-190a (a). We are not persuaded.

“Although we have relied on the failure to amend a
statute as an indication of legislative intent regarding
that statute or statutes within the same legislative
scheme; see, e.g., Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545,
555, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); cf. State v. McVeigh, 224 Conn.
593, 619-21, 620 A.2d 133 (1993) (subsequent amend-
ments held not relevant to legislative intent at time of
enactment of underlying statute); we hesitate unilater-
ally to assign motives to the legislature [when] it has
failed to enact a statute other than the one whose inter-
pretation is before us.” State v. Miranda, 245 Conn.
209, 230-31 n.24, 715 A.2d 680 (1998), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Miranda, 274 Conn. 727, 878
A.2d 1118 (2005). “[W]hen we have drawn on legislative
rejection of proposed statutory amendments as the
basis for an inference of legislative intent, ordinarily
we have viewed those failures as indicative of legislative
approval of an existing interpretation of substantive
law. . . . [Because, however] [t]here is no authorita-

654 Po
Learner!

tive prior judicial interpretation with respect to which

the legislature could have been expressing its approval

in this case”; (citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted]) State v. McVeigh, supra, 621-22; we are

unwilling to draw such an inference.”

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the writ-
ten opinion in the present case satisfies the “detailed
basis” requirement of § 52-190a (a). We therefore agree
with the Appellate Court that the judgment of the trial
court must be reversed.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VER-
TEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

ROGERS, C. J., with whom NORCOTT and ZARELLA,
Js., join, dissenting. General Statutes § 52-190a (a)
requires a party filing a medical malpractice action to
conduct a reasonable inquiry to ensure that there are
grounds for a good faith belief that the party has
received negligent care or treatment, to append to his
or her complaint “a certificate of the attorney or party
filing the action . . . that such reasonable inquiry gave
rise to [that] good faith belief,” and finally, to “obtain
a written and signed opinion of a similar health care
provider . . . that there appears to be evidence of med-
ical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the
formation of such opinion. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Failure to obtain and file the written opinion required
by this provision “shall be grounds for the dismissal of
the action.” General Statutes § 52-190a (c). I disagree

® Furthermore, although the bill would have eliminated the “detailed
basis” language from § 52-190a (a), the bill would have amended the statute
to require that a written opinion identify “specific breaches of the prevailing
professional standard of care.” House Bill No. 5587, 2010 Sess. It is not clear
whether this language was intended to ease or liberalize the written opinion
requirement or merely to clarify the meaning of the “detailed basis” require-
ment. For that reason, as well, we refrain from attaching any significance
to the fact that the bill ultimately was not passed.

Po 655
es

with the majority that a bare statement that the named
defendant, Daniel S. Schwartz, “failed to prevent injury
to [the] . . . biliary structures [of the named plaintiff,
Kristy Wilcox]' during laparoscopic [gallbladder] sur-
gery” satisfies the “detailed basis” requirement of the
statute. ~

After examining the legislative history and purpose
of § 52-190a (a), the majority explains that the “detailed
basis” requirement of the statute may be satisfied by a
written opinion that “sets forth the basis of the similar
health care provider’s opinion that there appears to be
evidence of medical negligence by express reference
to what the defendant did or failed to do to breach the
applicable standard of care. In other words, the written
opinion must state the similar health care provider’s
opinion as to the applicable standard of care, the fact
that the standard of care was breached, and the factual
basis of the similar health care provider's conclusion
concerning the breach of the standard of care.” That
is areasonable explanation of what the statute requires,
with which I have no quarrel. The majority concludes,
however, that the written opinion provided in this case,
which is little more than an unadorned statement that
Schwartz failed to prevent injury to Wilcox, satisfies
the foregoing standard. Because I am unconvinced by
the majority’s analysis and find its conclusion to be
contrary to the legislative intent underlying the
“detailed basis” requirement of § 52-190a (a), I respect-
fully dissent.

Ibegin with the key statutory phrase, “detailed basis,”
by considering the plain meaning of the terms that com-
prise it.’ “Basis” is defined, most pertinently, as “some-

1 See footnote 1 of the majority opinion.

2 In the absence of statutory guidance regarding the definition of a word
used in a statute, we “may appropriately look to the meaning of the . . .
[word] as commonly expressed in the law and in dictionaries.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Silas S., 301 Conn. 684, 698, 22 A3d
622 (2011).

656 Pe

thing on which something else [here, the similar health
care provider's opinion that there appears to be evi-
dence of medical negligence] is established or based

. . .” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
(1983), p. 134. “Detail” means “extended treatment of
or attention to particular items,” while something
“detailed” is “marked by abundant detail or by thor-
oughness in treating small items or parts . . . .” Id., p.
345. Reading these terms together in the context of the
statute suggests that the author of the written opinion
must explain, in thorough fashion and with particular-
ity, the foundation for his or her assessment of apparent
negligence. More specifically, the author should elabo-
rate on the particular standard of care involved in the
medical treatment at issue, the manner in which he or
she believes it likely was breached and the facts that
led to his or her conclusion.

To the extent that ambiguity remains as to the degree
of detail required, the legislative history of § 52-190a (a)
indicates that our lawmakers intended that the written
opinion provide a clear and complete explanation of
the standard of care and its apparent breach, rather
than a conclusory statement that the defendant was
negligent. As we have explained, when § 52-190a origi-
nally was enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of
1986; see Public Acts 1986, No. 86-338, § 12; it required
a medical malpractice plaintiff to conduct a reasonable
inquiry into his or her allegations of negligence and to
file a certificate attesting to his or her good faith belief
that there were grounds for the action, but did not
require the plaintiff to obtain and file a supporting,
written opinion of a similar health care provider. Dias
v. Grady, 292 Conn. 350, 357, 972 A.2d 715 (2009). “[T}he
purpose of the original version of § 52-190a was to pre-
vent frivolous medical malpractice actions” by mandat-
ing an adequate investigation prior to the filing of an
action. Id.

Po 657
a

In 2005, the requirement of filing the written opinion
of a similar health care provider was added to § 52-
190a (a) as part of Public Acts 2005, No. 05-275 (P.A.
05-275), which included a comprehensive array of mea-
sures aimed at the overall goal of lowering medical
malpractice insurance premiums. See id., 358-59 n.7. As
the majority explains in the present case, one purpose of
the written opinion requirement was to reinforce the
statute’s original purpose of dissuading frivolous mal-
practice actions by “ ‘address[ing] the problem that [had
developed whereby] some attorneys, either intention-
ally or innocently, were misrepresenting in the certifi-
cate of good faith the information that they had obtained
from experts.’ [Id., 358].” Requiring a similar health
care provider to vouch directly for the allegations of
negligence would provide a check against such misrep-
resentations.

Closer examination of the legislative history underly-
ing P.A. 05-275 reveals that the amendment to § 52-190a
(a) had a secondary purpose that further would help
lower malpractice insurance premiums, namely, to pro-
mote the more efficient resolution of potentially merito-
rious claims by requiring a plaintiff to disclose as much
as possible about the nature of his or her claim at the
very outset of the action.’ To that end, when introducing
the legislation, Representative Michael P. Lawlor
explained that a similar health care provider “would
have to state, in explicit detail, his or her opinion that
this is a meritorious claim”; (emphasis added) 48 H.R.
Proc., Pt. 31, 2005 Sess., p. 9446; and that “the entire
opinion would be there attached to the complaint.”
(Emphasis added.) Id., p. 9501. Senator Andrew J.

* This requirement complemented §§ 3 and 4 of P.A. 05-275, which also
were aimed at promoting speedier resolution of medical malpractice claims
by, respectively, providing a mechanism to have certain claims transferred
in timely fashion to the complex litigation docket and adding provisions to
foster early settlement of cases.

658 Po
Lee

McDonald used language suggesting that the opinion
should have real substance, referring to it repeatedly
as a “report,” and explaining that it was required to be
“presented in a detailed fashion . . . .” 48S. Proc., Pt.
14, 2005 Sess., p. 4411. Senator John A. Kissel, who had
worked on the legislation, stated that appending the
written opinion to the complaint would “help . . .
defense counsel and their clients right into the ballpark,
right at the inception of the medical malpractice case,”
and address the preexisting problem that “months could
go by, even over a year, until defense counsel and their
clients could really narrow down exactly what was the
basis for . . . the plaintiff's claim that there was medi-
cal malpractice and why they had brought that case.”
Id., pp. 4428-29. By requiring the inclusion of the written
opinion with the complaint, Senator Kissel explained,
“We're trying to speed it up. We're trying to expedite
it.” Id., p. 4429. At the judiciary committee hearing on
the amendments, Senator Kissel stated that having “the
substance of the report appended to the complaint”
would enable defense counsel to “review the nuts and
bolts of what's in there and make a reasonable determi-
nation” regarding the claim. Conn. Joint Standing Com-
mittee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 18, 2005 Sess., p. 5545.
Michael D. Neubert, an attorney testifying on behalf of
the Connecticut State Medical Society at the committee
hearing, agreed with Senator Kissel that appending the
“doctor's written statement . . . just makes good
sense. Clearly that’s going to help defendants accept
cases earlier . . . [and] perhaps lead to a quicker reso-
lution in many cases.” Id., p. 5548.

The wording of § 52-190a (a), as amended by P.A. 05-
275, is consistent with the legislature’s dual purpose of
eliminating frivolous lawsuits and hastening potentially
meritorious ones. The relevant portion of § 52-190a (a)
begins by stating that, “[t]o show the existence of . . .
good faith, the claimant or the claimant’s attorney . . .

PO 659
ee

shall obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar
health care provider . . . that there appears to be evi-
dence of medical negligence . . . .” If that were all the
statute required, it would be sufficient to accomplish
the purpose of deterring frivolous actions by mandating
that a medical professional vouch for the certification
by the claimant or the claimant’s attorney that there is
a good faith basis for bringing the action. Section 52-
190a (a) was amended further, however, to require that
the opinion include “a detailed basis for [its] formation
....” P.A. 05-275, § 2 (a). Unless this language is to
be regarded as superfluous,‘ the legislature must have
had a reason for including it. I believe that reason was
articulated clearly by the sponsors of the legislation as
quoted in this dissent, namely, to provide defendants
with specific information about the claim at the outset
of the litigation so as to reduce the time necessary to
resolve it.’

4When interpreting statutes, we presume that “the legislature did not
intend to enact meaningless provisions. . . . [S]tatutes must be construed,
if possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous,
void or insignificant . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic
Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 303, 21
ASd 759 (2011).

° Irecognize that the information available to a similar health care provider
who provides a written opinion pursuant to § 52-190a (a) necessarily is
limited in comparison to the information that becomes available once discov-
ery is completed. It is important to recognize, however, that § 52-190a (a)
requires the author to opine only that there “appears to be evidence of
medical negligence”; (emphasis added); and, in so doing, seems to allow
for some measure of speculation given the timing of the requirement. Thus,
an opinion need notinclude every detail that later might emerge via discovery
or establish negligence definitively, but at the same time, it should be ade-
quate to put a defendant on notice of the nature of the plaintiff's claims
and, thereby, facilitate discovery or settlement. If a similar health care
provider is unable to articulate the foundation for his or her theory that
there apparently was negligent treatment or care, the existence of a good
faith basis for the action is questionable, and the action begins to resemble
a fishing expedition. Notably, without a showing of malice, § 52-190a (a)
exempts the author of a written opinion from personal liability for damages
to a defendant by reason of having provided an opinion that later proves
to be incorrect.

660 Pe
Del

In light of the foregoing, I am unable to conclude, as
does the majority, that a bare statement that Schwartz
“failed to prevent injury to . . . Wilcox’s biliary struc-
tures during laparoscopic [gallbladder] surgery” satis-
fies the “detailed basis” requirement of § 52-190a (a).
The written opinion does not explain with any particu-
larity the standard of care, namely, what precautions
normally are taken by physicians skilled in laparoscopic
gallbladder surgery to prevent injuries to nearby ana-
tomical structures. Nor does the written opinion pur-
port to assess how the standard was breached by
specifying which, if any, precautions Schwartz appar-
ently failed to take,° and what, in the available informa-
tion, led the author to reach this conclusion.”

“IT]o prevail in a medical malpractice action, the
plaintiff must prove (1) the requisite standard of care

® Compare, e.g., Landi v. Wertheim, Superior Court, judicial district of
Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-06-5001608-S (October 2, 2006). In Landi,
‘the trial court held the following written opinion to be sufficiently detailed
under § 52-190a (a): “On [June 16, 2004] [the plaintiff] underwent a total
abdominal hysterectomy plus bilateral [salpingo-oophorectomy]. On review
of the notes associated with this procedure, I find that the injury suffered
by [the plaintiff] is directly related to the lack of appropriate caution prac-
ticed by the operating surgeon. The absence of uteral stents being placed
prior [to] the surgery, as well as the inadequate evaluation once an injury
was suspected, resulted in the unfortunate outcome.” (Emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted.)

"It appears that the majority is attempting to rehabilitate the inadequate
written opinion supplied by the plaintiffs by paraphrasing it, speculating as
to what is implied and supplying additional explanation that the opinion
simply doesnot contain. For instance, the majority changes “failed to prevent
injury” to “failed to protect,” and avers that a similar health care provider
in the present case “opine[d] that, in essence, the injury would not have
occurred in the absence of medical negligence . . . .” As I have explained,
our legislators when mandating attachment of a written opinion envisioned
thatit be “explicit”; 48 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 9446; and “presented ina detailed
fashion”; 48 S. Proc., supra, p. 4411; and that it would enable a defendant
to “narrow down exactly what was the basis for the determination of . . .
the plaintiff's claim that there was medical malpractice and why they had
brought that case.” Id., pp. 4428-29. If the written opinion in the present
case complied with these requirements, it would obviate the need for any
judicial reconstruction.

Po 661
Ld

for treatment, (2) a deviation from that standard of
care, and (3) a causal connection between the deviation
and the claimed injury.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 279 Conn.
622, 656, 904 A.2d 149 (2006). We have made clear that
a § 52-190a (a) written opinion must address the first
two elements only, and is not required to speak to the
third. Dias v. Grady, supra, 292 Conn. 359. Here, the
written opinion, in essence, has identified an injury and
suggested that Schwartz caused it by failing to do some
unarticulated thing. In short, the written opinion omits
entirely the required information, and includes only
information that we have deemed to be unnecessary.
It is axiomatic that the fact of a bad result, standing
alone, does not prove wrongdoing by a physician; Boone
v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 576, 864
A.2d 1 (2005); and that inadvertent injury to a patient
during surgery may, or may not, constitute negligence.
See generally annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 464 (1971). It may be
the case that the injury at issue is a necessary risk
accompanying the surgical procedure during which the
injury occurred, in which case there is no malpractice.
Id., § 3 [b], p. 472.

For the reasons explained herein, I respectfully
dissent.

De
ERIC FISCHER v. RICHARD ZOLLINO
(SC 18654)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh, Harper and
Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued October 25, 2011—officially released February 7, 2012

Gerald S. Sack, with whom, on the brief, was Jona-
than A. Eisner, law student intern, for the appellant
(plaintiff).

Abram J. Heisler, with whom, on the brief, was
Gabrielle A. Sheinfeld, certified legal intern, for the
appellee (defendant).

po 663

Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. This case raises the question of
whether the putative father of a child, upon learning
that he was deceived by his wife, the child’s mother, and
the child’s biological father as to the child’s paternity, is
estopped from recovering from the biological father
funds that the putative father expended to raise the
child while believing her to be his offspring. The plain-
tiff, Eric Fischer, appeals from the judgment of the
trial court! rendered in favor of the defendant, Richard
Zollino, after the trial court concluded that the doctrine
of equitable estoppel and public policy concerns pre-
cluded the plaintiff from denying his financial responsi-
bility for the child and pursuing his claims for
reimbursement, which were based on theories of non-
disclosure, misrepresentation and unjust enrichment.
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly con-
cluded that equitable estoppel barred this action and
that, as a public policy matter, permitting him to recover
damages from the defendant would be adverse to the
child’s best interests. We agree, and reverse the judg-
ment of the trial court.

At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence to prove the
following facts, and the defendant did not present evi-
dence to the contrary.” The plaintiff and Pamela Tour-
nier were married on April 26, 1986. Tournier gave birth

''The plaintiff appealed from the trial court to the Appellate Court, and
we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-
199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

2 Because the trial court found that the plaintiff was estopped from pursu-
ing his claims, it did not make detailed factual findings relevant to those
claims, aside from finding that the defendant is the biological father of the
younger daughter. Accordingly, we recite the facts in terms of the evidence
presented. See State v. Rizzo, 303 Conn, 71, 97-98 n.16, 31 A.3d 1094 (2011)
(this court does not find facts). It appears from the record, however, that
the relevant facts were largely undisputed. In particular, the parties did not,
dispute that Pamela Tournier and the defendant never told the plaintiff that
it was possible that he was not the younger daughter's father.

664 Po

to two daughters during the marriage, the elder daugh-
ter in 1986, and the younger daughter in 1992. Questions
relating to the younger daughter’s paternity gave rise
to this litigation.

The plaintiff, Tournier and the defendant worked
together in the late 1980s. In 1993, Tournier and the
defendant started their own business. They remained
business partners at the time of trial. Around the time
Tournier’s younger daughter was conceived, Tournier
and the defendant had engaged in an extramarital affair.
There is no evidence in the record that the plaintiff was
aware of the affair, which ended in 1993.

The plaintiff testified that over time, he developed
suspicions, based on a number of circumstances and
occurrences, that the defendant was the father of the
younger daughter. For example, when the younger
daughter was born, the defendant accompanied Tour-
nier and the plaintiff when they brought the younger
daughter home from the hospital in a limousine. Addi-
tionally, the defendant attended many of the younger
daughter's musical recitals and her eighth grade gradua-
tion, but did not attend activities of the elder daughter.
The younger daughter, but not the elder daughter, also
spent increasing amounts of time at Tournier’s and the
defendant’s place of business. Finally, the younger
daughter did not resemble the elder daughter or the
plaintiff's daughter from a previous marriage.

In the spring of 2006, the plaintiff decided to investi-
gate his suspicions. He surreptitiously obtained a hair
sample from the younger daughter and mailed it to a
laboratory, along with a sample from himself, for DNA
analysis and comparison. In October, 2006, he received
areport from the laboratory on the results of the testing,
which had excluded the possibility that he was the
younger daughter’s father. The plaintiff thereafter con-

Po 665
Le

fronted Tournier and, in February, 2007, he moved out.
of the family residence and filed for divorce.

The plaintiff and Tournier were divorced on Novem-
ber 19, 2007. In their separation agreement, which was
incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, only the
elder daughter is listed as issue of the marriage, and
an order of child support concerns only that daughter.
During the dissolution proceedings, Tournier testified
that she agreed to the agreement as fair and equitable,
that she believed the defendant was the younger daugh-
ter’s father and that he had provided the younger daugh-
ter with support since and would continue to do so.
During the course of the proceedings in the present
matter, the court ordered that the defendant submit a
DNA sample to compare against the one the plaintiff
had obtained from the younger daughter, and further
testing confirmed that the defendant was her father.’
When testifying in the present matter, the defendant
conceded that, if the testing were accurate, he was the
father of the younger daughter. At no time prior to the
DNA testing did Tournier or the defendant disclose to
the plaintiff that they had had an affair or that it was
possible that the younger daughter was the product of
that affair, although the defendant testified that he had
suspected that he was her father.

In a complaint dated June 18, 2008, the plaintiff
brought the present action against the defendant seek-
ing damages on claims of nondisclosure, misrepresenta-
tion and unjust enrichment. Specifically, the plaintiff
sought reimbursement from the defendant for the costs
he had expended in raising the younger daughter from
her birth until the dissolution of his marriage to Tour-
nier, when the younger daughter was almost fifteen

® Because the defendant did not object to the admission of the DNA test
establishing his paternity in the manner that statutorily is required, the trial
court admitted it into evidence without requiring foundational evidence as
to the test’s authenticity or accuracy. See General Statutes § 46b-168 (a).

666 Pe

years old. A trial to the court was held on July 7, 2009, at
which the plaintiff, Tournier and the defendant testified,
and an expert witness provided an opinion as to the
amount of the plaintiff's damages. Thereafter, the trial
court, relying on Connecticut jurisprudence concerning
issues of paternity and child support, concluded that
although the defendant was the younger daughter’s bio-
logical father, the plaintiff was equitably estopped from
denying his paternity and financial responsibility for
her and pursuing his claims for reimbursement.

The trial court reasoned that the plaintiff long had
held himself out to be the younger daughter's father,
that he had caused her to rely on him to meet her
financial and emotional needs, and that revealing her
true parentage, after she had been led to believe for
her whole life that the plaintiff was her father, would
be detrimental to her emotional well-being. According
to the trial court, it “place[d] the utmost importance
on the best interests of the child and, as such, it would
be contrary to public policy to permit the plaintiff in
this case to dispute his paternity of [her] at such a late
date.” The trial court also reviewed cases from other
jurisdictions that rejected plaintiffs’ claims for reim-
bursement of funds they had expended to raise children
whom they had not fathered. The court gleaned from
those cases a “public policy that the best interests of
the child in receiving the support that he or she needs
is more important than making a grown man financially
whole for expenses that he incurred under a mistaken
belief that he was a child’s biological father, when doing
so could potentially harm the child.” According to the
trial court, the cases stood for the proposition that “the
best interests of the child trump the financial interests
of a former putative father.” This appeal followed.

‘The trial court also concluded that the plaintiff could not pursue an
action for child support pursuant to either General Statutes § 46b-215 (a)
(B) or § 46b-160 (a) (1) (A). The plaintiff, however, did not rely on either
statute as authorization for his claims, which did not seek an order of
support, but rather, sounded in nondisclosure, misrepresentation and
unjust enrichment.

P| 667
Le

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly
concluded that he was precluded by the doctrine of
equitable estoppel and public policy from denying his
paternity of the younger daughter and pursuing his
claims for reimbursement. He argues that the court
improperly focused on potential emotional harm to the
younger daughter rather than whether she would suffer
financial detriment, as required by the law governing
claims of equitable estoppel. Moreover, the plaintiff
contends, there was no evidence at trial to support the
trial court’s finding that the younger daughter would
be harmed either emotionally or financially by an order
requiring the defendant to reimburse him for the costs
of her upbringing, or that the younger daughter and
Tournier relied to their detriment on his voluntary
assumption of parenthood. Finally, the plaintiff argues
that the trial court improperly relied on a public policy
rationale that prioritized the child’s best interests when
disallowing his action for damages because, given the
facts of the present case, permitting reimbursement
would not harm the younger daughter and disallowing
it would not prevent such harm. We agree with the
plaintiff that there was no evidence at trial of financial
detriment to the younger daughter, which we have con-
cluded to be necessary in equitable estoppel cases
involving denials of paternity, and further, that the trial
court improperly determined that his claims were
barred by public policy concerns.>

We begin with the standard of review applicable to
claims of equitable estoppel. The party claiming estop-
pel—here, the defendant—has the burden of proof. W.

©The plaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly relied on cases
involving the contesting of paternity because in the present case, his lack
of paternity is merely a predicate fact necessary for recovery of damages
and establishing it is not the main object of his action, We conclude that
similar policy concerns are implicated, nevertheless, and that the trial court
appropriately looked to case law concerning patemity disputes.

668 Po

v. W., 248 Conn. 487, 495, 728 A.2d 1076 (1999). “Whether
that burden has been met is a question of fact that will
not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. . . .
A court’s determination is clearly erroneous only in
cases in which the record contains no evidence to sup-
port it, or in cases in which there is evidence, but
the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. . . . The
legal conclusions of the trial court will stand, however,
only if they are legally and logically correct and are
consistent with the facts of the case. . . . Accordingly,
we will reverse the trial court’s legal conclusions regard-
ing estoppel only if they involve an erroneous applica-
tion of the law. . . .

“Strong public policies have long formed the basis
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The office of an
equitable estoppel is to show what equity and good
conscience require, under the particular circumstances
of the case, irrespective of what might otherwise be
the legal rights of the parties. . . . No one is ever
estopped from asserting what would otherwise be his
right, unless to allow its assertion would enable him to
do awrong....

“There are two essential elements to an estoppel:
the party [against whom it is asserted] must do or say
something which is intended or calculated to induce
another to believe in the existence of certain facts and
to act upon that belief; and the other party, influenced
thereby, must actually change his position or do some-
thing to his injury which he otherwise would not have
done. Estoppel rests on the misleading conduct of one
party to the prejudice of the other. In the absence of
prejudice, estoppel does not exist.” (Citations omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 495-97; see also Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 445, 710
A.2d 1297 (1998) (“estoppel requires proof of two facts:
[1] misleading conduct by one party; and [2] detrimental

Po 669

reliance thereon by the other party”), overruled in part
on other grounds by In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182,
202 n.17, 796 A.2d 1141 (2002).

In W. v. W., supra, 248 Conn. 498, a case addressing
a putative father’s liability for child support following
his divorce from the child’s mother, we recognized that
a party may be equitably estopped from denying his
parentage and evading parental responsibilities “under
appropriate circumstances . . . .” Consistent with the
test for equitable estoppel generally, we explained that,
“Tin the context of parental responsibilities, the duty
to support the child is placed fairly on the nonparental
party, not solely because of his voluntary assumption
of a parental role, but, also because of the misleading
course of conduct that induced the child,’ and the bio-
logical parent as the child’s guardian, to rely detrimen-
tally on the nonparental party’s emotional and financial
support of the child.”” Id., 497-98.

® Estoppel cases involving parentage are anomalous in that the reliance
interest at issue is not merely that of the party advocating that estoppel be
imposed, typically a parent, but also that of a nonparty, namely, the child.

T although our discussion examines whether the detrimental reliance ele-
ment of equitable estoppel was proven here, because that is the element
on which the plaintiff has chosen to focus, our review of the record reveals
that the defendant similarly failed to establish that the plaintiff engaged in
misrepresentation or a misleading course of conduct. It is well established
that “the party against whom estoppel is claimed (here, the plaintiff] must
do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to
believe that certain facts exist”, (internal quotation marks omitted) In re
Michaela Lee R., 253 Conn. 70, 604, 756 A.2d 214 (2000); when in reality
the facts are otherwise. Importantly, however, the party subject to estoppel
must have had actual or constructive knowledge of the true facts and,
therefore, an awareness that the inconsistent representations he or she
made were false. See 28 Am. Jur. 2d 511-12, Estoppel and Waiver § 44
(2011). Thus, ina case involving the denial of paternity, for equitable estoppel
to apply, the putative father must have induced detrimental reliance by his
words or conduct implying his paternity while he knew or should have
known that he was not, in fact, the child’s biological father. Mougey v.
Salzwedel, 401 N.W.2d 509, 512-18 (N.D. 1987). Conversely, when the puta-
tive father himself has been deceived as to the child’s patemity, he is not
estopped by equity from refuting paternity once he discovers the truth. See
Dews v. Dews, 632 A2d 1160, 1168 (D.C. 1993); Clevinger v. Clevinger, 189
Cal. App. 2d 658, 673, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961).

670 Po
ee

In delineating the contours of equitable estoppel doc-
trine in this context, we examined competing
approaches from other jurisdictions. We observed that
some jurisdictions permit estoppel when the detrimen-
tal reliance of the child or the mother on the putative
father’s conduct in assuming the role of parent causes
harm that is either financial or emotional in nature.
See, e.g., Clevinger v. Clevinger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658,
671-72, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961). In the former instance,
the mother, in reliance on the putative father’s assur-
ances that he will support the child, declines to identify
the child’s biological father, establish his paternity and
hold him responsible for the costs of the child’s upbring-
ing. Id., 671. In the latter instance, the child is encour-
aged to develop an affectionate and loving relationship
with the putative father and to hold himself or herself
out to the community as the putative father’s child,
and is later threatened with having that status abruptly
revoked. Id., 671-72.

In the majority of jurisdictions, however, potential
emotional harm alone provides insufficient grounds for
imposing estoppel, and an additional showing of finan-

In the present case, there was no evidence that the plaintiff, prior to
securing DNA testing, knew or should have known that he was not the
younger daughter's father. The plaintiff testified that, at most, he had suspi-
cions, which grew over time and were not based on any one fact. No
other party testified to the contrary. Our common law long has contained
arebuttable presumption that a child born to amarried couple is the offspring
of that couple. See Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 234 Conn. 51, 69, 661 A.2d 988
(1995). In the absence of strong indications suggesting otherwise, the plain-
tiff reasonably presumed the same and was under no duty to act on his
suspicions. Mougey v. Salzwedel, supra, 401 N.W.2d 613. Those suspicions,
standing alone, do not constitute the type of actual or constructive know!-
edge necessary to invoke estoppel. See NPA v. WBA, 8 Va. App. 246, 253,
380 S.E.2d 178 (1989) (putative father not estopped from denying paternity
‘where he assumed paternal role “under the mistaken belief that he was the
child’s natural father”; his “question or doubt as to his paternity at the child's
birth does not establish an intent to falsely represent himself to the child
as the child’s natural father”).

Po 671
a

cial harm is required. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J.
154, 168, 478 A.2d 351 (1984). Thus, the party seeking
to invoke estoppel must show that, if the putative father
is permitted to contest his paternity, the child “will
suffer future financial detriment as a result of the [puta-
tive father’s] past active interference with the financial
support by the child’s natural parent. . . . It is impera-
tive for the [putative father] to have taken positive steps
of interference with the natural parent’s support obliga-
tions . . . .” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.)
W. v. W., supra, 248 Conn. 502. “Future economic detri-
ment is established, for instance, whenever a custodial
natural parent . . . (1) does not know the whereabouts
of the natural parent; (2) cannot locate the other natural
parent; or (8) cannot secure jurisdiction over the natural
parent for valid legal reasons, and . . . the natural par-
ent’s unavailability is due to the actions of the [putative
father] . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.

Upon concluding that requiring a showing of financial
detriment was the better approach to equitable estoppel
claims concerning parentage and child support, we
adopted it as the law in Connecticut. Id., 502. We rea-
soned that permitting estoppel when there was the
potential for emotional detriment alone would create
policy difficulties by discouraging the bonding of chil-
dren and stepparents. Id., 503. We recognized further
that the emotional harm to children that can result
from a repudiation of paternity, “while very real, cannot
necessarily be prevented by equitable estoppel, which
is naturally confined to a party’s legal obligations.” Id.
We noted, “[flor example, [that] although a court can
estop a party from legally denying paternity, and, there-
fore, require him to support a child financially, it cannot
prevent a party from telling that child that he is not the
child’s biological father or from ceasing to emotionally
support the child.” Id., 503 n.16. Additionally, “a rule

672 po

requiring only emotional detriment could be very diffi-
cult for courts to apply. Hence, while emotional detri-
ment should be a factor, it should not be the sole basis
upon which to determine whether to apply the equitable
estoppel doctrine.” Id., 503.

Applying the foregoing rule in W. v. W., supra, 248
Conn. 505, and concluding that the requisite financial
detriment had been proven, we upheld the trial court’s
determinations that the defendant in a dissolution
action was estopped from denying his paternity of a
child whom he had not fathered and that he was
required to pay child support. In that case, the mother
of the child had become pregnant while the parties
were dating but not married, and the defendant was
aware that he might not be the child’s father. Id., 490.
When the mother applied for public assistance, naming
her former boyfriend as the father, the defendant
destroyed the application documents and persuaded
the mother not to obtain blood tests to establish the
child’s paternity. Id. Consequently, the mother did not
seek public assistance or child support from the former
boyfriend. Id.

The parties subsequently married, but the mother
filed for divorce when the child was approximately ten
years old. Although a paternity test ordered during the
dissolution proceedings confirmed that the defendant
was not the child’s father, the trial court held that he
was estopped from denying paternity and required him
to pay child support. Id., 491-92. The court found that,
at the time of the hearing, the whereabouts and financial
wherewithal of the biological father were unknown,
and the mother’s current ability to obtain child support
from him was uncertain. Id., 492. In light of the foregoing
facts, we concluded that the trial court properly had

® Moreover, in this age of advanced medical science, it may be in the best
interest of a child to know, in fact, the identity of his or her parents.

Po 673
a

found that the defendant was estopped from denying
paternity because “[h]is actions [had] frustrated the
creation of the child’s right to any financial support
from her natural father.” Id., 505.

Our review of the record in the present case reveals
circumstances that are diametrically opposed to those
in W. v. W, supra, 248 Conn. 489-92, and convinces us
that, unlike the mother in that case, the defendant in
the present case failed to sustain his burden of proving
that the plaintiff should be estopped from denying his
parental responsibilities. To begin, nothing in the record
shows that the plaintiff frustrated Tournier’s efforts to
establish the younger daughter’s true parentage, or to
pursue child support payments from the defendant. To
the contrary, the evidence showed that the defendant's
whereabouts were well known throughout the younger
daughter’s upbringing, in that he regularly attended her
activities and worked with Tournier, and his participa-
tion in the present case makes clear that his where-
abouts remain well known. There are no indications
that Tournier sought to determine conclusively the
younger daughter’s paternity or that the plaintiff dis-
suaded her from doing so. Furthermore, at the dissolu-
tion proceedings, Tournier testified that she believed
the defendant was the younger daughter's father, that
he had provided her support and that he would continue
to do so. On that basis, the dissolution decree did not
list the younger daughter as issue of the marriage and
did not require the plaintiff to provide future support
for her. Finally, nothing in the record suggests that the
passage of time has hampered the defendant’s ability
to support the younger daughter, or that requiring the
defendant to reimburse the plaintiff would have a nega-
tive impact on his continued ability to do so.

In sum, the record is devoid of any evidence that the
plaintiff's actions in supporting the younger daughter
during the marriage caused her or Tournier to rely on

er Pe

him to their financial detriment. In light of this lack of
evidentiary support, we conclude that the trial court’s
finding that the plaintiff was equitably estopped from
denying his paternity and seeking reimbursement from.
the defendant was clearly erroneous. See K.A.T. v.
C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573 (D.C. 1994) (child’s emotional
dependency alone insufficient to invoke estoppel with-
out showing that natural father could not be located
or otherwise was unavailable to fulfill legal support
obligation); Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 537, 510 A.2d
546 (1986) (putative father not equitably estopped from
contesting support order when evidence showed that
biological father was at all times available for service
of process and financially able to support child, and
there was no evidence that mother had attempted to
secure support from biological father or that putative
father discouraged her from doing so); Weise v. Weise,
699 P.2d 700, 702-703 (Utah 1985) (putative father not
equitably estopped from denying paternity by permit-
ting his name to be put on child’s birth certificate and
assuming parental role when there was no evidence
that mother had sought child support from biological
father, her first husband).

We disagree further with the trial court’s reasoning
that public policy, namely, the elevation of a child’s
best interests over the interest of a putative father in
being made financially whole, requires that the plaintiff
be precluded from pursuing his claims, particularly on
the facts of the present case. As we have explained,
there was no evidence at trial to suggest that permitting
the plaintiff to seek reimbursement from the defendant
will leave the younger daughter without financial sup-
port. Accordingly, if we were to sustain the trial court’s
judgment on its public policy rationale—that preventing
potential emotional harm to the younger daughter nec-
essarily outweighs the plaintiff's interest in being made
financially whole—we would be sanctioning an end run

PO 675
Ll

around the requirement of W. v. W., supra, 248 Conn.

502, that a showing of financial detriment, and not

merely potential emotional detriment, is a necessary

predicate for estopping a party from denying parental

responsibility.

In addition, given what already has transpired within
this family, we question whether allowing the plaintiff's
action will harm the younger daughter emotionally, or
whether disallowing it will protect her. Cf. Weiden-
bacher v. Duclos, 234 Conn. 51, 76-77, 661 A.2d 988
(1995) (adopting fact specific analysis, which considers
interests of child born to married couple, child’s
existing family and alleged biological father, to deter-
mine whether alleged biological father should be per-
mitted to contest child’s paternity and rebut
presumption of legitimacy). We are constrained to rec-
ognize that the plaintiff and Tournier, in the course of
uncontested dissolution proceedings in 2007, already
have stated in public documents that the defendant,
and not the plaintiff, is the younger daughter's father,
and further, that at no point in the present proceedings
did either party seek to have any portion of the case
record sealed. The disclosure of the younger daughter’s
true father, therefore, is not really at issue.? Even were
this not the case, preventing the plaintiff from pursuing
reimbursement from the defendant cannot ensure that
the younger daughter will not eventually learn the cir-
cumstances of her birth if the knowledgeable parties
are inclined to tell her, nor can it force the plaintiff to
continue to support her emotionally. See W. v. W., supra,

* We acknowledge that the plaintiff's refutation of his paternity necessarily
identifies the younger daughter as a child born to unmarried parents, ie.,
one who is “illegitimate,” and that allowing this action in a sense reinforces
that. For some time now, however, society has “recognize[d] that discrimina-
tion against illegitimate children is not justified. . . . The social stigma of
being branded illegitimate, if indeed it remains at all, no longer carries the
same sting that it once did.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Weidenbacher v. Duclos, supra, 234 Conn. 70.

676 |__|
es

248 Conn. 503 n.16. In light of these circumstances,
denying the plaintiff a right to seek reimbursement in
order to protect the younger daughter from emotional
harm likely would be an exercise in futility.

Insum, the trial court improperly found that the plain-
tiff was equitably estopped from pursuing his claims of
misrepresentation, nondisclosure and unjust enrich-
ment because there was insufficient evidence of finan-
cial harm, which is required to establish the element
of detrimental reliance in a case involving a denial of
paternity.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

TOWN OF BOZRAH ET AL. v. ANNE D.
CHMURYNSKI ET AL.
(SC 18424)
(SC 18354)
(SC 18855)
(SC 18356)

Rogers, ©. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.

677

Argued October 17, 2011—officially released February 14, 2012

Richard S. Cody, with whom, on the brief, were Jon
B. Chase and Adrienne Maciulewski, for the appellants
and the plaintiffs in error (Anne D. Chmurynski et al.).

Russell N. Jarem, with whom, on the brief, were
Dana B. Lee and Michael C. Conroy, for the appellees
and the defendants in error (town of Bozrah et al.).

Christopher J. Smith and Beth Bryan Critton filed
a brief for the Connecticut Chapter of the American
Planning Association et al. as amici curiae.

Opinion

McLACHLAN, J. In this consolidated appeal, we must
balance the public interest in allowing municipalities
to inspect residential property for zoning violations
against the individual’s constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches. The defendants appeal!

1 The defendants, Anne D. Chmurynski and Walter Chmurynski, appealed
from the order of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred
the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice
Book § 65-2. Subsequently, the plaintiffs in error, Michael Chmurynski, Dale

Bishop and Laura Alligood, each brought a writ of error to this court, and
‘we consolidated the appeal and the three writs of error. For simplicity, we

es 679
|

from the temporary injunction granted by the trial court
requiring them to allow the plaintiffs, the town of Boz-
rah (town) and Thomas Weber, the town’s zoning
enforcement officer, to inspect their property for zoning
violations. The defendants claim that the trial court’s
order violates their right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. We agree with the defendants,
and, accordingly, reverse the order of the trial court.?

The record discloses the following facts and proce-
dural history, either as found by the trial court or undis-

refer to Anne Chmurynski, Walter Chmurynski, Michael Chmurynski, Bishop
and Alligood collectively as the defendants.

2 The defendants advance the following additional arguments in this con-
solidated appeal. First, the defendants argue that if we construe General
Statutes § 8-12 to authorize zoning officials to inspect private property for
zoning violations without a warrant issued upon a showing of probable
cause pursuant to General Statutes § 54.33a, we must conclude that § 8-
12 is unconstitutional under the fourth amendment to the United States
constitution and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. Second,
the defendants argue that the extension of the injunction to the “agents”
of Anne Chmurynski and Walter Chmurynski, thatis, to Michael Chmurynski,
Dale Bishop and Laura Alligood, violates the right of cotenants to withhold
their consent to a search of the property without a warrant. Third, the
defendants contend that §§ 2.20 and 10.4 of the Bozrah zoning regulations
are unconstitutionally vague. Fourth, the defendants claim that the trial
court abused its discretion in concluding that the plaintiffs’ had established
that they were entitled to injunctive relief. Fifth, the defendants assert
that the plaintiffs are barred from equitable relief under the doctrine of
unclean hands.

Because we resolve this appeal in the defendants’ favor on the ground
that the trial court's order violated the fourth amendment, we need notreach
the foregoing claims. We do address, however, the defendants’ collateral
estoppel claim to the extent that we find that the claim lacks merit. “Collat-
eral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue when
that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action.”
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 296, 596 A.2d 414
(1991). A prior case involving Anne Chmurynski and the town zoning board
of appeals, concerned a request to search the property for dogs in conjunc-
tion with a cease and desist order issued by the town zoning enforcement
officer. Chmurynski v. Zoning Board of Appeals, Superior Court, judicial
district of New London, Docket No. CV-84-007132 (July 16, 1996). There is
no identity of issues with the present action, which involves a search of
the property for unregistered cars pursuant to a court-issued injunction.
Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that collateral estoppel did
not bar the court’s consideration of the present action.

680 pT
PT

puted. In August, 2007, Weber received an e-mail from
the town’s first selectman, stating: “ ‘Please do an
inspection of 135 Scott Hill Road for unregistered motor
vehicles and other junk.’ ” Weber traveled to 135 Scott
Hill Road (property), where the five defendants reside.
As Weber testified, he intended to inspect the property
for “junk,” including unregistered cars, in violation of
§§ 2.20 and 10.4 of the Bozrah zoning regulations.

Upon Weber’s arrival at the property, he first encoun-
tered Dale Bishop. Bishop referred him to Michael
Chmurynski, who expressly refused to consent to an
inspection of the property. Michael Chmurynski
instructed Weber to seek an inspection through the
town attorney. Although Weber did not search the prop-
erty during this visit, he did observe approximately six
vehicles by the driveway. He testified that the vehicles
did not appear to be in disrepair and that they had
license plates, but he was unable to determine from
his vantage point whether the plates contained a valid
registration date.

After a discussion with the town attorney, Weber
returned to the property on September 1, 2007. Again,
Michael Chmurynski refused to let Weber inspect the
property. Sometime after the second meeting, a fence
was erected on the property, preventing Weber from
viewing certain portions of the property from the street.
The plaintiffs then brought the present action seeking
a temporary and permanent injunction to enjoin Anne
D. Chmurynski and Walter Chmurynski, as owners and
residents of the property,’ from refusing to consent to
an inspection of the property.

Following a hearing on the plaintiffs’ request for a
temporary injunction, the trial court issued a memoran-

® The complaint refers to Anne Chmurynski and Walter Chmurynski as
owners of the property. Michael Chmurynski, however, testified that Anne
Chmurynski is the sole owner.

po 681
ee

dum of decision, authorizing Weber to inspect the prop-
erty and ordering the defendants to “desist and refrain
from interfering with or hindering in any way the [zon-
ing enforcement officer] in the conduct of his inspec-
tion.” The court observed that state and local zoning
regulations authorize a zoning enforcement officer to
inspect and remedy any zoning violations. Further, the
trial court stated that the only way a zoning enforcement
officer can execute these duties when a property owner
has refused to consent to a search is to conduct an
inspection of the property pursuant to a judicial order.
Although General Statutes § 54-33c (a), the statute that
sets forth the procedure for applying for search war-
rants, does not appear to apply outside the criminal
context, the court found that the apparent lack of an
adequate remedy at law buttressed its equitable power
to issue an injunction to effect the same result as a
warrant. Recognizing that an inspection pursuant to
such an injunction must comply with the fourth amend-
ment to the United States constitution, the court cited
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 930 (1967), for the proposition that inspections
in nonemergency circumstances are reasonable within
the meaning of the fourth amendment when a reason-
able governmental interest in such a search exists. The
court then concluded that the reasonable governmental
interest in stabilizing property values and promoting
the general welfare justified an inspection in the present
action, and granted the temporary injunction preventing
the defendants from refusing to allow the inspection.
The defendants subsequently moved for a stay of execu-
tion, which the trial court granted. This consolidated
appeal followed.

Preliminarily, we observe that the order being
appealed is labeled a temporary injunction. As a general
rule, a decision either granting or denying a temporary

682 p __
Tt

injunction is not a final judgment and, therefore, is not
immediately appealable. Massachusetts Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Blumenthal, 281 Conn. 805, 811, 917 A.2d
951 (2007). Insubstance, however, the trial court’s order
functioned as a permanent injunction. The purpose of
a temporary injunction is to “[maintain] the status quo
while the rights of the parties are being determined,”
while “a permanent injunction effects a final determina-
tion of [those] rights.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id. In the present case, the order was not issued as
atemporary measure until the court could permanently
determine the rights of the parties. Instead, the court
made a final determination that the town could search
the property over the objection of the defendants.
Therefore, notwithstanding the trial court’s character-
ization of its order as a temporary injunction, we view
the order as an appealable final judgment.

The defendants claim that the trial court’s order
authorizing the zoning inspection of their property vio-
lates their fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, the
defendants claim that, before conducting an inspection.
of their property, the plaintiffs were required to obtain.
a warrant supported by a finding of probable cause.
Because the defendants’ claim presents a question of
law, our review is plenary. State v. Brown, 299 Conn.
640, 650, 11 A.3d 663 (2011). In order for us to resolve
this issue, we must consider whether the trial court
properly concluded that: (1) the reasonableness
requirement of the fourth amendment applies to zoning
inspections; (2) that requirement is satisfied if the gov-
ernment can demonstrate that the search furthers a
reasonable governmental interest; and (8) the proper
procedural vehicle by which to determine whether such
an inspection should be authorized is by seeking a court-
ordered injunction. When, as here, the proposed search
is not part of a periodic or area inspection program,

Pe 683
| i

we conclude that the reasonableness requirement of
the fourth amendment applies and is satisfied when
a judicial officer orders a search upon a showing by
municipal authorities that probable cause exists to
believe that a zoning violation will be discovered upon
inspection of the premises. We further conclude that an
injunction is an appropriate procedural vehicle through
which a municipality may seek judicial authorization
to conduct a zoning inspection. Because the trial court
did not apply the correct standard in making its finding
of probable cause, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

We first turn to the relevance of the fourth amend-
ment to zoning inspections under General Statutes § 8-
12, which authorizes a zoning official “to cause any
building, structure, place or premises to be inspected
and examined and to order in writing the remedying
of any condition found to exist therein or thereon in
violation of any provision of the regulations made under
authority of the provisions of this chapter . . . .” The

“The defendants claim that the trial court's order also violates article
first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, which provides that “[t]he people
shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unrea-
sonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to
seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly
as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”
It is well established that “{flederal law, whether based upon statute or
constitution, establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of
individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording
higher levels of protection for such rights.” Cologne v. Westfarms Associates,
192 Conn. 48, 57, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984). Although the defendants briefly
discuss the six factors this court considers to determine the contours of
state constitutional provisions; State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684, 610
A.2d 1225 (1992); the defendants do not argue that article first, § 7, of the
Connecticut constitution affords greater protection than the fourth amend-
ment in this context. Moreover, we conclude that the procedure followed in
the present action failed to ensure even the minimum standard of protection.
Therefore, we need not decide here whether an individual subject to an
inspection for zoning violations should be afforded greater protection under
the state constitution than under the federal constitution, and we limit our
review of the parties’ claims to the federal constitution. See State v. Batts,
281 Conn, 682, 690 n.6, 916 A.2d 788, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1048, 128 S. Ct.
667, 169 L. Ed. 2d 524 2007).

684 Po

fourth amendment to the United States constitution,
which is made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655,
81S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961); provides that
“TtJhe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. “A ‘search’ for
purposes of the [flourth [a]Jmendment occurs when a
reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed.” Segura
v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 820, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 599 (1984). Although “the [flourth [a]Jmendment
protects people, not places”; Katz v. United States, 389
US. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967); the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
“curtilage area immediately surrounding a private
house has long been given protection as a place where
the occupants have a reasonable and legitimate expec-
tation of privacy that society is prepared to accept.”
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235,
106 S. Ct. 1819, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1986); see also State
v. Ryder, 301 Conn. 810, 822, 23 A.3d 694 (2011).

The primary purpose of the fourth amendment is
to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S. 528. In
Camara, the United States Supreme Court held that
the fourth amendment applies to searches and seizures
in the civil as well as the criminal context. Id., 534; see
also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 486 U.S. 307, 312, 98 S.
Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978). Rejecting the notion
that an individual’s fourth amendment protections are
“merely ‘peripheral’” in the context of a regulatory
inspection, the Supreme Court stated, “[i]t is surely

Po 685
fo

anomalous to say that the individual and his private

property are fully protected by the [fJourth [a]mend-

ment only when the individual is suspected of criminal

behavior.” Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 530.

Therefore, administrative searches of residences must
comply with the fourth amendment. Id., 534.

In the present case, the parties do not dispute that
Camara compels the conclusion that a zoning inspec-
tion pursuant to § 8-12 of areas in which an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a “search”
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Further,
it is undisputed that once the defendants built a fence
around their property, the area within the confines of
the fence comprised the curtilage of the home. Because
the trial court’s order permitted inspection of the curti-
lage, the proposed inspection is a search subject to the
protections of the fourth amendment.

A conclusion that the fourth amendment applies
merely begins our inquiry, however, for in order to
determine whether the investigation in fact violated
the fourth amendment, we must review whether the
proposed search would be “unreasonable .. . .”> U.S.
Const., amend. IV. It is well established that “a search
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable
cause is per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated excep-

®The defendants argue that § 8-12 is unconstitutional on its face if it
provides substantive authority to conduct a search outside the warrant
scheme. This court will “indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's
constitutionality . . . and, when called upon to interpret a statute, we will
search for an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably
accords with the legislature's underlying intent.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 79, 584 A.2d 1157
(1991). Accordingly, we interpret the language in § 8-12 that permits an
official “to cause” a search to authorize that official to take enforcement
action through available methods at law. We do not interpret § 8-12 to
authorize the designated official to circumvent the requirements of the
fourth amendment.

686 Po
Td

tions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Ryder, supra, 301 Conn. 825; see, e.g., Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685
(1969) (upholding warrantless search incident to arrest
for weapons or evidence in immediate area); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18
L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967) (upholding warrantless search in
exigent circumstances). Thus, although a warrant and
probable cause finding are presumptively mandatory,
we keep in mind that “the ultimate touchstone of the
[flourth [almendment is ‘reasonableness’ . . . .” Brig-
ham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943,
164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006).

Traditionally, probable cause requires some showing
of individualized suspicion beyond mere “common
rumor or report, suspicion, or even ‘strong reason to
suspect’ .” Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
101, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959). For instance,
in the criminal context, a judicial officer may issue a
warrant upon a finding of “probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the items
sought are likely to be found at the place specified in
the warrant.” State v. Browne, 291 Conn. 720, 750, 970
A.2d 81 (2009). Anything less than a finding that “the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the sei-
zure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that the action taken was appropriate . . .
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaran-
teed rights based on nothing more substantial than inar-
ticulate hunches . . . . And simple good faith on the
part of the arresting officer is not enough. . . . If sub-
jective good faith alone were the test, the protections
of the [flourth [a]Jmendment would evaporate, and the
people would be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, only in the discretion of the police.”
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

S| 687
ee

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889 (1968).

In the administrative context, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court held in Camara v. Municipal Court,
supra, 387 U.S. 538-39, that inspections that are part
of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of
a statutory scheme are reasonable within the meaning
of the fourth amendment if “reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspec-
tion” demonstrate “a valid public interest.” (Emphasis
added.) Particularized suspicion for choosing an indi-
vidual residence within the area searched is unneces-
sary. Id., 536, 588. In other words, probable cause to
inspect a particular location may be based on a showing
that the premises was chosen pursuant to a general
administrative plan for the enforcement of a statute
derived from neutral sources. Marshall v. Barlow’s,
Inc., supra, 436 U.S. 320-21.

In the present action, the trial court noted that deci-
sional authority on the precise showing of probable
cause required to justify the proposed search is largely
absent. The court nevertheless concluded that
Camara’s relaxed showing of “ ‘a valid public interest’ ”
for area searches was controlling in this case. We dis-
agree. In determining what showing of probable cause
is required, we follow the approach applied in Camara
of “balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.” Camara v. Municipal Court,
supra, 387 U.S. 537. Here, as in Camara, we consider:
(1) the type of search proposed; id., 588-39; (2) the
nature of the premises to be searched; id., 530-31; and
(8) the public policies on which the government relies
to justify the search. Id., 537.

First, key among the Supreme Court’s considerations
in Camara in arriving at its diluted probable cause
standard for administrative searches was the type of

688 Pe

search contemplated. In that case, the search at issue
was a routine inspection of an area. See id., 526, 536;
id., 530, 588 (“routine inspection of the physical condi-
tion of private property”; “routine inspection”; “area
inspection”); see also See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.
Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967) (“routine, periodic
city-wide canvass”). Indeed, the search sought in
Camara consisted of a routine inspection pursuant to a
municipal code provision that required the city housing
inspector to inspect for violations “‘at least once a
year... .’” Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387
U.S. 526 n.1. The fact that the impetus for the search
consisted of neutral statutory guidelines “based upon
legislative or administrative assessment of broad fac-
tors such as the area’s age and condition”; id., 532;
ensured that the subsequent search was general and
impersonal. Id., 537. Measuring the privacy interest at
stake against the character of the search, the Supreme
Court concluded in Camara that the risk of harm to
an individual's privacy was low “because the inspec-
tions are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime . . . .” Id. This reason-
ing indicates that the relaxed showing of probable cause
was limited to routine and area wide inspections and
does not necessarily extend to all administrative
searches, including those prompted by individual com-
plaints singling out a particular dwelling.

The type of search contemplated in the present action
differs from the type of search considered in Camara.
The search contemplated here is not in conformance
with any general routine or area inspection scheme.
Rather, the proposed search targets a single dwelling
as the object of suspicion in response to a complaint
regarding that property. In this sense, the proposed
search of the property looking for specific zoning viola-
tions more closely resembles a search for specific evi-
dence of a crime in a criminal investigation. Without a

Po 689
|

requirement of probable cause to believe that the search.
of the targeted property will uncover evidence of a
specific administrative violation, the risk that a particu-
lar dwelling has been singled out arbitrarily as the object
of suspicion remains high. Indeed, adopting the proba-
ble cause standard of Camara as urged by the plaintiffs
would be contrary to the justifications behind the fourth
amendment probable cause requirement because it
would authorize, in effect, suspicionless searches of
individual homes. Presuming that all statutes and regu-
lations embody a valid public interest, so long as an
officer could point to a potentially relevant statute or
regulation, the officer would have sufficient justifica-
tion to intrude on the privacy of any home at any time,
thereby leaving citizens at the mercy of an officer’s
unbridled discretion.

Second, Camara and the decisions that follow it
review the privacy interest at stake in relation to the
nature of the premises to be searched. In Camara, as
well as the present case, the proposed search targeted
residential property. In Camara, the Supreme Court
observed that “even the most law-abiding citizen has a
very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances
under which the sanctity of his home may be broken
by official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry
under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat
to personal and family security.” Id., 530-31; see also
See v. Seattle, supra, 387 U.S. 543 (“[t]he businessman,
like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional
right to go about his business free from unreasonable
official entries upon his private commercial property”).
In contrast, the Supreme Court has found that
“Tb]ecause the owner or operator of commercial prem-
ises in a ‘closely regulated’ industry has a reduced
expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause
requirements, which fulfill the traditional [flourth
[a]mendment standard of reasonableness for a govern-

690 ;__
Ty

ment search . . . have lessened application [in
searches of pervasively regulated businesses].” (Cita-
tion omitted.) New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702,
107 S. Ct. 2636, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1987); see Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77, 90 S.
Ct. 774, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1970) (government inspector
need not obtain warrant to search business engaged in
sale of liquor); see also United States v. Biswell, 406
US. 311, 317, 92 S. Ct. 1593, 32 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1972)
(upholding warrantless search of business engaged in
sale of firearms). In other words, inspections of closely
regulated businesses are presumptively reasonable due
to the nature of the activity conducted on the premises.
These cases, however, represent limited exceptions to
the traditional requirements of the fourth amendment
and have not been extended outside of inspections of
commercial premises engaged in certain types of busi-
ness. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, 436 U.S. 312-13.
These cases do not contradict the principle that
“InJowhere are expectations of privacy greater than in
the home . . . [as] physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the [flourth
[a]mendment is directed.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Segura v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. 820.
Thus, the privacy interest at stake is at its peak when
a search of the home, or its curtilage, for zoning viola-
tions is contemplated.

Finally, the foregoing privacy interesis must be
weighed against the municipality’s interest in searching
residential property for administrative violations. “[An]
agency’s particular demand for access will . . . be
measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant,
against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes
into account the public need for effective enforcement
of the particular regulation involved.” See v. Seattle,
supra, 387 U.S. 545. In Camara, the Supreme Court
observed that “the public interest demands that all dan-

P| 691
P|

gerous conditions be prevented or abated . . .

Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S. 537. Find-

ing that area inspections were necessary to accomplish

this goal, the Supreme Court reasoned that such
searches were reasonable.° Id., 537-38.

”

With respect to zoning inspections, a municipality
has an interest in adopting and enforcing zoning ordi-
nances to “promote health and the general welfare
....” General Statutes § 8-2 (a). In addition, the plain-
tiffs have asserted that municipalities have an interest
in protecting property values and ensuring conformity
with zoning regulations. Although we recognize that
these interests are legitimate and perhaps as important.
as the interests at stake in Camara, they are one factor
among several in our consideration. Taking into
account the three factors we have considered, the key
distinction between the zoning inspection at issue pres-
ently and the inspection contemplated in Camara, in
our view, is the targeted nature of the search. When a
zoning inspection is aimed at a particular property, we
find that the government's interest does not sufficiently
outweigh the threat to individual privacy to warrant
suspension of the fourth amendment requirement of
particularized suspicion.

In limited circumstances, the United States Supreme Court also has held
that “[a] search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional . . .
when special needs [of the government], beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica-
ble.” (internal quotation marks omitted.) Vernonia School District 427 v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 661, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995); id.,
657-65 (upholding drug testing of student athletes because state's interest
in preventing drug addiction among students outweighed invasion of pri-
vacy); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602,
621, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L, Ed. 2d 639 (1989) (upholding drug and alcohol
testing of railway employees because government interest in ensuring safety
of traveling public justified privacy intrusion). The parties have not argued
that the zoning context presents an additional instance of “special needs,”
nor do we discern any reason for so concluding.

692 Po
P|

We recognize that a traditional standard of probable
cause presents a higher burden for municipal authori-
ties to meet than the Camara showing, and, conse-
quently, that the stricter standard may hinder municipal
officials in achieving compliance. We do not believe,
however, that a preliminary showing of probable cause
to believe a zoning violation will be discovered would
create an undue burden on local governments, espe-
cially since, as the amici’ note, most homeowners con-
sent to inspection. See also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,
supra, 436 U.S. 316 (observing that great majority of
business owners consent to inspection without war-
rant); Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S. 539
(observing that most citizens consent to inspections
of property without warrant). Furthermore, in certain
cases, the complaint itself may contain sufficient infor-
mation to establish reason to believe that a zoning viola-
tion or threatened violation exists on a particular
property.

Insummary, we conclude that the traditional showing
of individualized suspicion best fulfills the purposes of
the fourth amendment. We believe a targeted adminis-
trative search demands a more particularized showing
of probable cause than the relaxed version in Camara
in order to properly “safeguard citizens from rash and
unreasonable interferences with privacy and from
unfounded charges” while simultaneously providing
“fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s
protection.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949). We hold that
before a court may issue an order permitting a zoning
enforcement officer to enter and search a particular
property, there must be a preliminary showing of facts
within the knowledge of the zoning officer and of which

7 We granted the requests of the Connecticut Chapter of the American

Planning Association and the Connecticut Association of Zoning Enforce-
ment Officials to appear as amicus curiae and to submit briefs.

PT 693
Pd

that officer has reasonably trustworthy information that.
are sufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe
that conditions constituting a violation of the zoning
ordinances are present on the subject property.
Because the trial court in the present action did not
apply the proper standard in issuing its order, the judg-
ment of the trial court must be reversed.*

Turning next to the presumption that “searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreason-
able under the [fJourth [aJmendment . . . subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions”; Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 357;
we observe that neither party contends that any of the
well established exceptions to the warrant requirement.
applies to the proposed inspection. Instead, we are pre-
sented with the question of whether the trial court’s
order was the functional equivalent of a warrant, such
that the resulting search would be reasonable neverthe-
less. We conclude that it is.

First, an order authorizing a search and enjoining an.
individual from interfering with or hindering a search
functions as a search warrant. The result in both cases
is the same: once a judicial officer sanctions a search,
the property owner’s right to withhold consent to the
search disappears. Additionally, the burden of proof is
the same under either procedural vehicle: as we find
in this opinion, probable cause is necessary to justify
any § 8-12 search for zoning violations that targets a
single residence.

Furthermore, although a party seeking an injunction
must normally prove: (1) lack of an adequate remedy

® If the court had reviewed the evidence for proof of probable cause under
the proper standard, we do not believe that the mere fact that six vehicles,
none of which appeared to be in disrepair, were parked on the property of
a home where five adults resided provides sufficient reason to suspect a
violation of the Bozrah zoning regulations.

694 Po
fj
at law; (2) irreparable harm without an injunction, (3)
alikelihood of success on the merits; and (4) afavorable
balancing of the equities; Agleh v. Cadlerock Joint Ven-
ture II, L.P., 299 Conn. 84, 97, 10 A.3d 498 (2010); once
a judicial officer finds that probable cause exists, these
requirements become superfluous.’ A showing of proba-
ble cause, in effect, demonstrates irreparable harm and
a favorable balancing of the equities. For instance, if
probable cause were shown and the injunctive relief
were nevertheless denied, the municipality would be
unable to enforce its zoning ordinances in spite of suffi-
cient evidence that a zoning violation or threatened
violation existed on a particular property. Additionally,
a finding of probable cause assumes that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the municipality will prevail
on the merits. Finally, when a proposed search does
not assert the existence of criminal violations, a zoning
officer always lacks an alternative remedy at law. As the
trial court found, “there are no statutory or regulatory
provisions for the issuance of search warrants to facili-
tate regulatory searches” because General Statutes
§ 54-33a does not appear to contemplate the issuance
of civil warrants.” Indeed, § 54-33a (b) authorizes the
issuance of a search warrant upon a showing of “proba-
ble cause to believe that any property (1) possessed,
controlled, designed or intended for use or which is or
has been used or which may be used as the means

° As already mentioned in this opinion, we view the trial court's order to
function as a permanent injunction, even though the plaintifis utilized the
expedited procedure for a temporary injunction. Unlike a temporary injunc-
tion, a permanent injunction does not require a showing of the likelihood
of success on the merits. Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, 282 Conn. 209, 236,
919 A.2d 421 (2007).

® Additionally, § 54-88a (c) does not authorize the issuance of a warrant
to a zoning officer, as that statute provides in relevant part that a warrant
“shall be directed to any police officer of a regularly organized police depart-
ment or any state police officer, to an inspector in the Division of Criminal
Justice or to a conservation officer, special conservation officer or patrolman
acting pursuant, to section 26-6. . . .”

pe 695
Td

of committing any criminal offense . . . or (8) which
constitutes evidence of an offense” exists in the area to
be searched. Therefore, if a search for zoning violations
does not anticipate the discovery of evidence of a crimi-
nal offense, § 54-33a does not appear to apply and no
other alternative remedy exists." In sum, like a search
warrant, a judicial officer may grant an injunction upon
proof of probable cause in this context.

Second, an injunction issued upon a finding of proba-
ble cause adequately serves the purposes of the warrant
requirement. The warrant requirement embodies two
basic protections guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. 703; Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 621-22,
109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989). It “protect[s]
privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to asearch
or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or
arbitrary acts of government agents. A warrant assures
the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and
that it is narrowly limited in its objectives and scope.”
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., supra,
621-22. It also “provides the detached scrutiny of a

There may be circumstances in which a zoning officer may involve the
criminal justice system in enforcing zoning regulations. For instance, § 8-
12 makes available upon conviction criminal sanctions of up to ten days
imprisonment for each day a zoning violation continues “if the offense is
wilful . . . .” Furthermore, § 8-12 expressly contemplates simultaneous
criminal and civil proceedings, as it delineates the circumstances under
which a defendant in a criminal prosecution brought under § 8-12 may plead
in abatement on the ground that the zoning violation at issue is the subject
of a pending civil action. Because, however, the complaint in the present
action does not allege that the suspected violation was wilful and does not
specifically seek criminal remedies, the availability of a warrant to search
for evidence of zoning offenses pursuant to § 54-33a is not before us. We
therefore express no opinion on the appropriate procedure for conducting
inspections for zoning violations in cases in which a prosecutor would be
authorized to act pursuant to § 54-38a. Furthermore, whether a statutory
procedure akin to § 54-88a should be enacted to authorize ex parte judicial
orders in the circumstances presented by this case is an issue appropriately
addressed by the General Assembly, rather than this court.

696 Po
| Cd

neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective deter-
mination whether an intrusion is justified in any given
case.” Id., 622. “The scheme of the [flourth [a]mend-
ment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that
at some point the conduct of those charged with enforc-
ing the laws can be subjected to the more detached,
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the rea-
sonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of
the particular circumstances.” Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392
US, 21.

An injunction hearing in which a preliminary finding
of probable cause is made performs both of these func-
tions. For instance, the order granting the injunction
informs the property owner that the inspection is
authorized by law, that the search is limited to the
discovery of particular things, and that the search is
limited to certain times and places. The order likewise
limits the government official’s discretion by defining
the scope of his authority. The injunction process fur-
ther protects against arbitrary invasion by interposing
the objective review of a neutral judicial authority. In
fact, it is difficult to see what additional procedural
protection the warrant requirement would provide an
individual because an injunction hearing offers greater
safeguards. While a warrant hearing may occur ex parte,
an injunction hearing is an adversary proceeding that
affords both parties the opportunity to be heard.” Addi-
tionally, while a judicial officer may issue a warrant
solely on the basis of sworn affidavits provided by the
complainant, an injunction hearing allows both parties
to present evidence.

We recognize that the heightened protection to an
individual corresponds to increased difficulty on the

™ Because the present action concerns only the propriety of an injunction
to search for zoning violations, we express no opinion on whether an ex
parte judicial order may be employed to conduct a search in the absence
of statutory authority.

Pp 697
P|

government official’s part in seeking to obtain permis-
sion to search. Although an adversary proceeding may
cause more delay to a zoning officer than an ex parte
warrant hearing would, we observe that the conditions
that constitute zoning violations are, in general, continu-
ing conditions, thereby rendering an immediate ex parte
hearing unnecessary. Moreover, the availability of a civil
remedy such as an injunction decreases the burden on.
the criminal docket with respect to zoning cases in
which the threat of criminal sanctions arises only in
limited circumstances. See footnote 11 of this opinion.
Thus, insofar as the burden of prevailing in a request for
an injunction is incrementally higher than the burden of
obtaining a warrant, we do not believe that this balance
is inappropriate, nor do we believe that the govern-
ment’s ability to inspect for zoning violations and to
enforce its regulations will be impeded unduly.

In conclusion, we hold that a zoning official may
inspect a single property—not part of a routine or area
wide search—pursuant to § 8-12 if the zoning official
first obtains an injunction issued upon probable cause
by a judicial officer as articulated in this opinion.
Because the trial court failed to make a preliminary
determination of probable cause to believe that a zoning
violation existed on the property, its order permitting
a search of the defendants’ property violates the
fourth amendment.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to render judgment setting aside the
injunction.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

698 po
Te

NELSON E. ARRIAGA v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION
(SC 18659)
Rogers, ©. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.
Argued January 9—officially released February 21, 2012

: ||
a
David J. Reich, special public defender, for the appel-
lant (petitioner).

Sarah Hanna, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney,
and James R. Turcotte, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The habeas court dismissed the peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner,
Nelson E. Arriaga, on the ground that it lacked jurisdic-
tion over the matter because the petitioner was not in
the custody of the respondent, the commissioner of
correction (commissioner), when he filed the petition.
Upon the habeas court’s granting of his petition for
certification to appeal, the petitioner appealed from the
dismissal to the Appellate Court claiming that he was
in the custody of the commissioner when he filed the
petition because he was still on probation pursuant to

Po 699
ee

his sentence for the challenged conviction. Arriaga v.
Commissioner of Correction, 120 Conn. App. 258, 260,
990 A.2d 910 (2010). He further claimed that he had
failed to allege in his petition that he was in custody
because he had represented himself, and the Appellate
Court should take judicial notice of his criminal records
reflecting his custodial status. Id., 261. The Appellate
Court affirmed the judgment of the habeas court dis-
missing the petition. Id., 265. This court then granted
the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal to
this court, limited to the following question: “Did the
Appellate Court properly affirm the judgment of the
[habeas] court in dismissing the petitioner’s habeas cor-
pus petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction?”

After examining the entire record on appeal and con-
sidering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties,
we have determined that the appeal in this case should

be dismissed on the ground that certification was
improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.
—

VIRGINIA STEWART v. TOWN OF
WATERTOWN ET AL.
(SC 18499)

Rogers, ©. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.

1 The certified question originally provided: “Did the Appellate Court prop-
erly dismiss the petitioner's habeas corpus petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction”; Arriaga v. Commissioner of Correction, 297 Conn. 928, 998
‘A.2d 1195 (2010); but we rephrased the certified question in an amended
order on the petition for certification dated January 4, 2011.

701

Argued October 19, 2011—officially released February 21, 2012

702 Po
CC ]

Joseph B. Summa, with whom was Mary Jane Ryan,
for the appellants-appellees (defendants).

William T. Blake, Jr., for the appellee-appellant
(plaintiff).

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The principal issue in this appeal is
whether a town clerk is entitled to receive continued.
salary payments as a matter of law while he or she is
not performing his or her statutory duties as town clerk,
but has not been removed from office pursuant to stat-
ute. The defendants, the town of Watertown (town),
and certain of its duly elected or appointed officials,
appeal’ from the judgment of the trial court, rendered
after a hearing in damages, awarding damages to the
plaintiff, Virginia Stewart, the former town clerk of the
town. The plaintiff cross appeals from the judgment of
the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, denying her
claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal,
the defendants claim that the trial court, Upson, J.,
improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment because the town’s duty to pay the
plaintiff's salary is not limited solely to circumstances
in which the town successfully has pursued recourse
under the removal provision, General Statutes § 7-22.°

1 The defendants in this case are: the town; the duly elected members of
the town council, Joseph Pawlak, Paul Rinaldi, Carl Mancini, Antonio Guerra,
Suzan Plowman, Jack Walton, Elaine Adams, Robert Kane and Raymond
Primini (town council); Charles Frigon, as the duly appointed town manager
of the town; and Shirley Dorazio, as the duly appointed town treasurer of
the town.

‘The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court, the plaintiff cross appealed, and we transferred the appeals
to this court pursuant General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

5 General Statutes § 7-22 provides: “Whenever complaint in writing ismade
to the state's attorney for any judicial district that the town clerk of any
town in such judicial district is guilty of misconduct, wilful and material
neglect of duty or incompetence in the conduct of such town clerk’s office,
such state’s attorney shall make such investigation of the charges as such
state's attorney deems proper and shall, if such state’s attorney is of the
opinion that the evidence obtained warrants such action, prepare astatement

Po 703

The defendants contend that our common law and those
statutes that govern the office of town clerk and the
powers of municipalities with respect to their employ-
ees and public officers do not compel the conclusion
that the town clerk’s salary must be paid under any and
all circumstances, regardless of whether she attends to
and performs the established duties of her office, unless
and until her term expires or she is removed under § 7-
22, The defendants additionally contend that genuine
issues of material fact exist as to, inter alia, the plain-
tiff's claims that the town hall was an environmentally
unhealthy place for her to work and that her medical
condition arising from her exposure to this unhealthy
environment prevented her from performing her duties

in writing of the charges against such town clerk, together with a citation
in the name of the state, commanding such town clerk to appear before a
judge of the Superior Court at a date named in the citation and show cause,
if any, why such town clerk should not be removed from office as provided
in this section, Such state’s attorney shall cause a copy of such statement
and citation to be served by some proper officer upon the defendant town
clerk at least ten days before the date of appearance named in such citation,
and the original statement and citation, with the retum of the officer thereon,
shall be returned to the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district
within which such town is situated. To carry into effect the proceedings
authorized by this section, the state’s attorney of any judicial district shall
have power to summon witnesses, require the production of necessary
books, papers and other documents and administer oaths to witnesses; and
upon the date named in such citation for the appearance of such town
clerk, or upon any adjourned date fixed by the judge before whom such
proceedings are pending, the state’s attorney shall appear and conduct the
hearing on behalf of the state. If, after a full hearing of all the evidence
offered by the state’s attorney and by and on behalf of the defendant, such
judge is of the opinion that the evidence presented warrants the removal
of such town clerk from office, the judge shall cause to be prepared a written
order to that effect, which order shall be signed by the judge and lodged
with the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district in which such
defendant resides. Such clerk of the superior court shall cause a certified
copy of such order to be served forthwith upon such town clerk, and upon
such service the office held by such town clerk shall become vacant and
the vacancy thereby created shall be filled at once in the manner provided
in section 9-220. Any witnesses summoned and any officer making service
under the provisions of this section shall be allowed and paid by the state
the same fees as are allowed by law in criminal prosecutions.”

704 Pp ___

at the town hall or at any other alternative worksite
that had been proposed to her. Further, the defendants
argue that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff was
required to follow the procedures for short-term or
long-term disability that had been established pursuant
to statute for the position by the town. The plaintiff
responds that, as a public officer, she has a clear legal
right to payment of compensation during her term of
office, unless and until she is removed under § 7-22. We
agree with the defendants’ principal claim and conclude
that there remain genuine issues of material fact. In her
cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court,
Sheedy, J., improperly refused to charge the jury as to
the existence of facts already found by a previous trial
court, Upson, J., thereby allowing the jury to improperly
consider and reach a contrary conclusion in its delibera-
tions. The defendants contend that the requested jury
instructions were extraneous and contained irrelevant
facts and erroneous dicta. We agree with the defen-
dants. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court in part, reverse the judgment of the trial court in
part and remand the matter to that court for further
proceedings on counts one and three of the plaintiff's
complaint.

The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. The
plaintiff was elected to the position of town clerk of
the town in the general election held in November, 2001.
The town clerk’s office is located in the town hall.
Thereafter, the plaintiff was reelected town clerk in the
November, 2005 election, to aterm of office that expired
in January, 2010. On October 18, 2005, indoor air quality
testing was performed in the town hall in response to
concerns about the work environment raised by the
plaintiff at a meeting held on April 6, 2005. Subse-
quently, on January 20, 2006, in response to a complaint
filed by the plaintiff, an inspection of the town hall was

es 705
Leer

performed by the state department of labor's division
of occupational safety and health. On February 22, 2006,
the plaintiff did not report for work. She wrote to the
defendant Joseph Pawlak, chairman of the town coun-
cil, on March 1, 2006, to inform the town council that
she was suffering health problems that she attributed
to environmental conditions in the town hall, and to
demand action to protect town employees, the public
and public records.

The plaintiff did not thereafter return to work at the
town hall, or agree to alternative worksite arrangements
offered by the defendants. The defendants notified the
plaintiff of the procedures involved for requesting an

» unpaid leave. On April 17, 2006, the plaintiff, through
her attorney, notified the defendants of her belief that
the town clerk was exempt from time record require-
ments and that the defendants’ handling of the situation
raised concerns of retaliation and disparate treatment.
On May 17, 2006, the defendants, through their attorney,
notified the plaintiff that she would be paid until she
exhausted her accumulated sick days, and that her com-
pensation is controlled by town ordinance. The plaintiff
was paid her salary through June 19, 2006, after which
payments ceased. Subsequently, multiple indoor air
quality and surface tests were performed at the town
hall, as well as two occupational safety and health
inspections. On or about June 26, 2006, the plaintiff
filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

On November 20, 2006, the town council unanimously
adopted a resolution authorizing the town manager to
initiate removal of the plaintiff from the office of town.
clerk pursuant to § 7-22. Thereafter, the defendant town
manager, Charles Frigon, wrote to the state’s attorney
for the judicial district of Waterbury requesting action.
pursuant to § 7-22. On January 31, 2007, the state’s attor-
ney notified the town council that he had determined.

706 Pe
Ld

that good cause did not exist to file an action against
the plaintiff under § 7-22.

Subsequently, on November 28, 2006, the plaintiff
commenced this action against the defendants. In the
first count of her complaint, the plaintiff sought a writ
of mandamus ordering the defendants to restore all her
salary and benefits from June 19, 2006, and to continue
such payments for the duration of her term as the town
clerk. In support of this claim, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendants illegally had terminated without cause
payment of the salary to which she had a clear legal
right. The plaintiff claimed in the second count of the
complaint that the town, town council and Frigon had
violated her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,* alleging that the defendants had denied her
constitutional due process right to a hearing. Finally,
in the third count of the complaint the plaintiff sought
recovery of her lost salary. .

On July 30, 2007, the plaintiff moved for partial sum-
mary judgment as to her nonconstitutional claims
advanced in counts one and three of her complaint.
She asserted that, as a public officer, she was entitled
to receive her salary as an incident to her office, without.
regard to any services she performed. She further
asserted that the town’s sole alternative to payment
of her salary was to resort to the statutory removal

‘Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, provides: “Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken
in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a stafute of the District
of Columbia.”

Pe 707
Lt

procedure set forth in § 7-22 that requires a complaint
alleging good cause and an investigation by the state’s
attorney determining that there is evidence that such
cause exists. The plaintiff argued that, as she was not
removed from office by the procedure set forth in § 7-
22, she must be paid as the holder of the public office
of town clerk. The defendants objected to the motion
on the basis of three grounds: (1) there were material
facts in dispute; (2) the plaintiff was not entitled, as a
matter of law, to salary during the period in which she
refused to perform the duties of her office; and (8)
to the extent that the plaintiff may be entitled to any
compensation during her absence from performing the
duties of her office, the defendants provided the plain-
tiff with all the compensation due to her. :

The trial court, Upson, J., granted the plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment on December 6,
2007, concluding that: (1) “[a]s to count one in the
present case, mandamus is warranted because the
plaintiff has met the burden required for the issuance
of mandamus. The town’s duty to pay this salary is
clear, because the plaintiff, still functioning as the cur-
rent town clerk, is a public official and as such her
salary is incident to her office and does not depend
upon services performed by her”,’ and (2) “[a]s to count
three in the present case, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover unpaid salary until the payment of salary
resumes. Because the town may only act within the
scope of express grants . . . the defendants in the
present case did not have the discretion to suspend or
terminate the plaintiff's salary. Suspending or terminat-
ing salary falls outside of the scope of § 7-22, which is
the only apparent legislative remedy available to the
town in the event of the town clerk’s failure to properly
fulfill the duties incident to her position. The defen-
dants, therefore, acted improperly in terminating the

® The trial court relied on a purported common-law rule, enunciated in
Sibley v. State, 89 Conn. 682, 96 A. 161 (1915), to establish this duty.

708 Pe

plaintiff's clear legal right to salary by treating her as
a regular employee as opposed to an elected official
and the plaintiff is entitled to payment of her salary.”
(Citation omitted.)

Therefore, the trial court granted the motion for par-
tial summary judgment on the writ of mandamus. In
light of this conclusion, that court rejected the defen-
dants’ claim that the plaintiff was limited to the leave
benefits provided by the town to its officials. Subse-
quently, after a hearing in damages before a jury that
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff on her nonconstitu-
tional claims, and pursuant to a stipulation of the parties
as to the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was
entitled, the trial court, Sheedy, J., rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $243,264.87
for lost wages. The court, however, rendered judgment
in favor of the defendants on count two of the complaint
based upon the jury's finding that there had not been
a “constitutional violation of due process.” This appeal
followed. Additional facts and procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court
improperly concluded as a matter of law that: (1) the
principle regarding salary as an incident of public office
that was cited by this court in Sibley v. State, 89 Conn.
682, 96 A. 161 (1915), is applicable to the plaintiff, and
specific state statutes regarding the office of town clerk
do not apply; and (2) chapter 2, article II, § 2-82 of
the Watertown code of ordinances® (town ordinance),

® Chapter 2, article II, § 2-82 of the Watertown code of ordinances pro-
vides: “Salary and benefits. (a) The compensation of the town clerk shall
be on an annual salary basis in lieu of the fees provided by the General
Statutes of the state.

“(p) Such salary and the time and method of payment shall be determined
by the town council.

“(o) All fees collected by the town clerk in the performance of the duties
of the office of the town clerk shall become the property of the town and
shall be paid by the town clerk, monthly, to the treasurer.

“(@) The town shall pay all of the expenses of the office of the town clerk,
including the salaries of the clerk and assistants, and the cost of materials
and supplies required by the office.

Po 709

which provides the compensation and fringe benefits
due to the town clerk, including limits on paid leave,
does not apply to the plaintiff. We conclude, first, that
even under the language in Sibley cited by the trial
court, a public officer is not due her compensation if
she wrongfully neglects her duties. We further conclude
that, although the town had established a compensation
schedule that provided paid time off and a disability
pay plan, as permitted by statute, the plaintiff would
not be limited to the leave provided under that schedule
if she was willing to work but prevented from doing so
by the defendants’ conduct. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment as to liability.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment in part and remand.
the case for further proceedings on counts one and
three in view of the fact that genuine issues of material
fact remain, primarily regarding compliance with the
compensation schedule and the reasons for the plain-
tiffs failure to perform the duties of her office.

I

We first address the defendants’ claim that the trial
court improperly concluded, as a matter of law, that
Sibley v. State, supra, 89 Conn. 682, established the
plaintiff's clear right to her salary and controlled the
decision in this case, rather than the applicable state
statutes. We agree.

The following legal principles guide our analysis of
the plaintiff's claim. “Practice Book § 17-49 provides
that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted

“(e) The town will pay certain fringe benefits to the town clerk. The town
clerk shall be eligible for fringe benefits in accordance with the fringe
benefits provided to the town department heads, provided, however, the
town clerk shall not be eligible for pension benefits or any benefits after
leaving office.”

710 Po

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The
party moving for summary judgment has the burden of
showing the absence of any genuine issue of material
fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. . . . On appeal, we must determine
whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court
are legally and logically correct and whether they find
support in the facts set out in the memorandum of
decision of the trial court. . . . Our review of the trial
court’s decision to grant [a party’s] motion for summary
judgment is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Southwick at Milford Condominium Assn., Inc.
v. 523 Wheelers Farm Road, Milford, LLC, 294 Conn.
311, 318, 984 A.2d 676 (2009).

The defendants’ contentions also present questions
of statutory construction, which constitute questions
of law over which the court’s review is plenary. “The
process of statutory interpretation involves the determi-
nation of the meaning of the statutory language as
applied to the facts of the case, including the question
of whether the language does so apply. . . . When con-
struing a statute, [the court’s] fundamental objective is
to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of
the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to deter-
mine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statu-
tory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
including the question of whether the language actually
does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

Po 7d
ee

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Testa v. Geressy, 286 Conn. 291, 308,
943 A.2d 1075 (2008). “It is an elementary rule of statu-
tory construction that we must read the legislative
scheme as a whole in order to give effect to and harmo-
nize all of the parts.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 194 Conn.
312, 320, 481 A.2d 31 (1984). “[S]tatutes in derogation
of common law should receive a strict construction
and [should not] be extended, modified, repealed or
enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of construction.”
(internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams Ford, Inc.
v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 581, 657 A.2d
212 (1995).

Finally, “[iJn deciding the propriety of a writ of man-
damus, the trial court exercises discretion rooted in
the principles of equity. . . . In determining whether
the trial court abused its discretion, this court must
make every reasonable presumption in favor of its
action.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Sewer Com-
mission, 270 Conn. 409, 417, 853 A.2d 497 (2004). “Man-
damus, a cause of action with deep roots in the
American legal tradition, is the proper remedy for rein-
statement of a public officer who, despite a clear legal
right to remain in office, has been wrongfully ousted
from that position. . . . Furthermore, [m]andamus nei-
ther gives nor defines rights which one does not already
have. It enforces, it commands, performance of a duty.
It acts at the instance of one having a complete and
immediate legal right; it cannot and it does not act upon
a doubtful or a contested right... .

“A party seeking a writ of mandamus must establish:
(4) that the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the perfor-
mance of a duty by the defendant; (2) that the defendant
has no discretion with respect to the performance of
that duty; and (3) that the plaintiff has no adequate

72 Po
ee

remedy at law.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Hennessey v. Bridgeport, 213 Conn.
656, 658-59, 569 A.2d 1122 (1990). Because we conclude
that the plaintiff did not have a clear legal right to
receive her salary without performing her duties, the
trial court’s issuance of the mandamus was in error.

Both the plaintiff and the trial court place great
emphasis on the following language from Sibley v.
State, supra, 89 Conn. 685-86, in which this court denied
a claim for workers’ compensation benefits because
the claimant was a public officer, a sheriff, and not a
contracted employee: “The relation between an officer
and the public is not the creature of contract, nor is
the office itself a contract. So his right to compensation
is not the creature of contract. It exists, if it exist[s] at
all, as the creation of the law, and, when it so exists,
it belongs to him not by force of any contract, but
because the law attaches it to the office. . . . Unless

. compensation is by law attached to the office,
none can be recovered. Compensation to a public offi-
cer is a matter of statute and not of contract and it does
not depend upon the amount or value of the services
performed, but is incidental to the office.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.’ The plaintiff argues that
the common-law principle enunciated in Sibley is clear
to the effect that a public officer is paid for the office,
and neither the amount of time on the job nor the quality
of the service is relevant. The plaintiff further urges us
to construe narrowly chapter 92 of the General Statutes,
which applies to town clerks, because it is a statutory
scheme, the plaintiff argues, enacted in derogation of

T'The statement that “{clompensation to a public officer is . . . incidental
to the office”; Sibley v. State, supra, 89 Conn. 685-86; may be considered
dicta, since it was not a central element of our determination that the office
of sheriff did not fall within the definition of an employee for workers’
compensation purposes. Two facts were central to the court's decision:
first, that the public officer's salary was set by statute; and second, that a
public officer is not involved in a master servant relationship. See id., 686-88.

Po 718
LO

the common law as expressed in Sibley. We conclude,

however, that our common law does not establish a

public officer’s clear legal right to salary under all cir-
cumstances.

Sibley is not a case in which a public officer refused
to work, without just cause. Instead, in Sibley, the dis-
tinction between an employee working for pay and a
public officer being paid his salary for exercising his
duty to the state, was critical to the determination of
whether workers’ compensation was the exclusive rem-
edy for the plaintiffs claim. But nowhere in Sibley is
it said that a public officer’s salary is due even if he
fails to fulfill his duty to the state or abandons his office.
It is undisputed in the present matter that the payment.
of the plaintiff's salary was halted only after she failed
to perform the duties of her office. In Sibley, we stated:
“TT}he salary which was attached to the office was not
given in payment for his services, but . . . to enable
him to perform his statutory duty as one of the public
functionaries of the [s]tate exercising a portion of its
sovereign powers.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 687.

Our case law is replete with statements indicating
that payment for public office requires the official to
be available to perform his or her duties if called upon
to do so. Indeed, in Farreil v. Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 191,
195 (1877), this court stated: “[A] policeman of the city
of Bridgeport is an arm of the law; he holds an office
as a trust from the state; he is a preserver of the public
peace; he is not the hired servant of a master; no con-
tract relation exists between him and the city by which
he is bound to its service; he can lay down his trust at
any time according to his pleasure without exposing
himself to an action for damages for breach of contract.

“As a rule, so far forth as public officers are con-
cerned, those only are entitled to the salary who both
obtain and exercise their offices. Payment follows the

m4 Po
Lt

actual discharge of duty, and not the formal offer to
do it, no matter how honestly or persistently made.”
(Emphasis added.)

Later, in Keegan v. Thompson, 103 Conn. 418, 421,
180 A. 707 (1925), this court stated: “It is well settled
that public officers occupying positions created by stat-
ute hold their offices by appointment and not by con-
tract, and are obligated to perform the duties of their
respective offices without other compensation than
such, if any, as is attached by law to the office itself.”
(Emphasis added.)

Additionally, in McDermott v. New Haven, 107 Conn.
451, 453, 140 A. 826 (1928), this court stated: “The salary
provided by law for a public officer does not arise out
of contract and is not dependent on the amount and
value of the services rendered, but it belongs to him
because the law attaches it to the office he holds. . . .
It is generally held that where a public officer is wrong-
fully suspended or expelled, he is entitled to recover the
salary accruing during the period he is thus unlawfully
removed from his office. . . . The contention of the
defendant that the plaintiff abandoned his office is
answered by the finding that he did not do so.” (Cita-
tions omitted; emphasis added.)

More recently, this court noted in Murach v. Plan-
ning & Zoning Commission, 196 Conn. 192, 196, 491
A.2d 1058 (1985): “A public office is a position in a
governmental system created, or at least recognized,
by applicable law to which position certain permanent
duties are assigned, either by the law itself or by regula-
tions adopted under the law by an agency created by
it and acting in pursuance of it. . . . We have said that
a public office is a trust conferred by public authority
for a public purpose, and involving the exercise of the
powers and duties of some portion of the sovereign

Po 715

power.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)

Therefore, it is well settled that, in our common law
relating to public officers, there is a relationship
between payment and performance of duty. In Sibley
v. State, supra, 89 Conn. 685-86, this court held that a
public officer’s pay is a creature of statute and not a
negotiated contract and, therefore, he is neither paid
for overtime nor is his pay reduced if his performance
is questioned. Sibley, however, does not stand for the
proposition that a public officer can, without good rea-
son, fail completely to perform the duties of that office
and still be paid. This very notion is contrary to the
ideals of holding the office as a public trust, and exercis-
ing the office in order to be paid—ideals that were
expressed in the Farrell, Keegan and Murach decisions.
In McDermott v. New Haven, supra, 107 Conn. 453, this
court made clear that a public officer’s right to a salary
under these circumstances depends upon a factual
determination that the officer was wrongfully sus-
pended or expelled.

The decisions of other states are also instructive in
this regard. In St. Lowis v. Whitley, 283 S.W.2d 490,
493 (Mo. 1955), the Missouri Supreme Court noted that
“[plublic officials are entitled to the compensation inci-
dent to the offices to which they are elected or
appointed; and it may be that they are entitled to the
emoluments of the offices even though they perform
no services. . . . But this rule and the public policy
upon which it is based does not affect and is not to be
confused with the equally and obviously well-estab-
lished principle that public funds are trust funds .. .
and public officers entrusted with their expenditure are
trustees of all such funds. . . . A fortiori, it is indeed
a plainer fundamental, when the office is a sham and
no services have been performed, that the payment or
acceptance of payment from such trust funds is an

716 Po
Le
unfaithful discharge of duty.” (Citations omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) See also Maryland Casu-
alty Co. v. Kansas City, 128 F.2d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.
1942); 67 C.J.S., Officers §§ 207, 271 and 273 (2002); 4
E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev. 2011)
§ 12.230, pp. 176-79. Further, excluding temporary
absences, if unequivocal overt acts or a continued
course of conduct fairly establishes that the incumbent.
intended to resign or abandon her office and such inten-
tion so expressed is acted upon by the proper authority,
an irrevocable vacancy is created, which may be filled
pursuant to law. See People v. Hanifan, 96 Ill. 420, 422
(1880); State v. Harmon, 115 Me. 268, 271, 98 A. 804
(1916); Vanderbach v. Board of Taxation, 133 N.J.L.
126, 128, 42 A.2d 848 (1945); 67 CJ.S., supra, §§ 102
and 103; 3 E. McQuillin, supra, § 12.100, pp. 512-18; see
also Doris v. Heroux, 71 R.1. 491, 494, 47 A.2d 633 (1946).

Thus, we reject the plaintiffs argument that the com-
mon law establishes a public officer’s absolute right to
payment for the office. Therefore, whether the plain-
tiff’s refusal to work constitutes an unwarranted refusal
to perform her duties, or whether the working condi-
tions at the town hall or other sites proposed by the
defendants excused the nonperformance, remains a.fac-
tual issue for the trial court to consider on remand.
Because the common law does not establish the abso-
lute right to compensation, we also reject the plaintiff's
contention that either the removal procedures under
§ 7-22 or any of the other statutes in the statutory
scheme of town clerk compensation must be construed
strictly because they are in derogation of the com-
mon law.

Next, we briefly review the governing statutory
scheme. General Statutes § 7-34a reveals essentially a
fee or payment schedule based upon both the amount
and length of documents filed at the town clerk’s office.
The total amounts payable to the town clerk depend

po 77
a

upon the volume of work. For instance, the town clerk
receives $10 for recording the first page of any docu-
ment and $5 for each subsequent page. In addition, § 7-
34a (c) provides: “Compensation for all services other
than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section
which town clerks are required by the general statutes
to perform and for which compensation is not fixed by
statute shall be fixed and paid by the selectmen or
other governing body of the town or city in which such
services are performed.” General Statutes § 7-34b (b),
however, authorizes any town, by ordinance, to provide
that the town clerk shall receive a salary in lieu of all
fees and other compensation provided for in the Gen-
eral Statutes and permits the legislative body of such
town to fix a salary. Thus, the legislature has clearly
empowered the local municipality to determine the
compensation for its town clerk.’ Pursuant to § 7-34b

® General Statutes § 7-19 provides that an assistant town clerk, who, having
taken the oath provided for town clerks, shall have all the powers and shall
perform all the duties of the town clerk in the absence or inability of the
town clerk. General Statutes § 7-20 provides that when any town clerk is
unable to discharge the duties of his or her office and no assistant town
clerk has been appointed, then the selectmen may appoint an acting town
clerk, who, once swom in, shall act as town clerk during such inability. The
defendants maintain that when someone replaces the town clerk and acts
in her place, that person is compensated in the same manner as the town
clerk is compensated. They argue that if this court were to interpret the
statutory scheme to require both the former town clerk and a new town
clerk to be paid the town clerk's salary, it would lead to an absurd result.
Because we conclude that the town clerk must adhere to the town compensa-
tion package, we need not address this specific argument, We note, however,
that the wording of the two statutes suggests that the legislature has contem-
plated a situation wherein a town clerk may not be able to work, but may
not have been removed pursuant to § 7-22. The presence of these statutes
would seem to negate the plaintiff's argument and the trial court’s conclusion
to the effect that, if the town clerk is not removed pursuant to § 7-22, she
must be paid regardless of whether she performs her duties. Indeed, § 7-22
does not indicate what happens to the town clerk’s salary if she is not
removed. The statute only deals with the grounds for removal. Further, and
contrary to the plaintiff's argument and the trial court’s decision, there is
nothing contained in the wording of § 7-22 that would suggest that it is the
exclusive method by which the town could properly stop paying the plaintiff.
Certainly, §§ 7-19 and 7-20 contemplated situations wherein the town clerk
could be absent from work yet not removed from office.

718 Po

(b), the town in the present case enacted § 2-82 of the
town ordinance.

Therefore, in view of the fact that the legislature has
determined that local municipalities may establish the
salary of the town clerk, and the town in the present
case has established both a salary and compensation
package, we conclude that the plaintiff must follow the
terms of that compensation package regarding her pay
unless the working conditions provided by the defen-
dants excused the nonperformance of her duties. See
Watertown Code of Ordinances, c. 2, art. III, § 2-82. The
plaintiff has already availed herself of the compensation
package in the form of her salary and sick days. In the
absence of an excuse, it was incumbent upon her to
follow the town procedures regarding any additional
compensation to which she may have been entitled.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court improperly
determined that Sibley controlled this matter, and that
the plaintiff had a clear legal right to be paid for the
balance of her elected term, unless or until she was
removed from office pursuant to § 7-22.

0

We next address the defendants’ claim that they are
entitled to judgment in their favor because the plaintiff
has been paid all compensation to which she was enti-
tled. The defendants claim that, pursuant to General

* The town passed § 2-82 of the town ordinance pursuant to the mandate
from the state and, in 1995, specifically amended the ordinance to address
the issue of sick days, vacation days and insurance by providing that the
town clerk would have the same salary and benefit scheme as department.
heads. The town council clearly intended that this was a total compensation
scheme that provided for vacation, sick days, and short-term and long-term
disability during periods of absence. See footnote 6 of this opinion for the
text of § 2-82 of the town ordinance.

ee 719
Le

Statutes § 7-148 (c),"° the town was empowered to cre-
ate a benefit package for the plaintiff with which she
was obligated to comply. Because the defendants have
paid the plaintiff the maximum sick leave and vacation
time to which she could have been entitled under the
package adopted by the town, the defendants now claim
that they are entitled to prevail. We disagree.

Even if we assume, arguendo, that the defendants’
representations as to the benefit payments are accurate,
they are not entitled to judgment in light of other dis-
puted issues of material fact. Specifically, in light of
the facts alleged, our resolution of the common-law
issue in part I of this opinion does not dispose of the
question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to her salary
during the period in which she failed to perform her
duties. Although the plaintiff is not entitled to such
payment during a period in which she wrongfully
refuses to perform her duties, she essentially has
alleged that she was willing to perform her duties, but
that the defendants effectively prevented her from
doing so as a result of their failure to remedy unhealthy
conditions at the town hall or to provide a reasonable
alternative worksite. Thus, the plaintiff still may be able

® General Statutes § 7-148 (c) provides in relevant part: “Any municipality
shall have the power to do any of the following, in addition to all powers
granted to municipalities under the Constitution and general statutes . . . .

“@) . . . (© Provide for the employment of and prescribe the salaries,
compensation and hours of employment of all officers and employees of
the municipality and the duties of such officers and employees not expressly
defined by the Constitution of the state, the general statutes, charter or
special act... .”

4 For example, and not as a declaration of limitation: (1) Was the town
hall an environmentally unhealthy place for the plaintiff to work? (2) Was
the plaintiff's medical condition caused by the conditions in the workplace?
(8) Did the plaintiff's medical condition prevent her from performing her
job duties at the town hall, or at any other alternative worksite that had
been proposed to her? (4) Did the plaintiff's medical condition entitle her
to either the short-term disability plan or the long-term disability plan offered
by the town?

720 Po
a

to prevail if she can prove these allegations. Accord-
ingly, rendering judgment for the defendants would
be improper.

It

Turning to the plaintiff's cross appeal, the plaintiff
claims that the trial court improperly refused to charge
the jury, as to count two of her complaint alleging that
the defendants had denied her constitutional due pro-
cess right to a hearing, that “a previous court had
already determined that: (1) the plaintiff is a public
official, not an employee, and she is not governed by
the [town] rules and regulations and grievance proce-
dures . . . (2) the state’s attorney refused to conduct
a removal proceeding, and as a result, the plaintiff had
a clear legal right to receive her salary . . . and (8)
the defendants did not have the discretion or authority

to terminate the plaintiff's salary payments.” In part I
of this opinion we concluded that these determinations
were improper for summary judgment: the plaintiff's
first two requested instructions are improper as a mat-
ter of law, and the third is a legal question that requires
a finding of dependent facts. Accordingly, we cannot
grant the plaintiff the relief she is seeking.

Moreover, the plaintiff's requested jury instructions
go to her right to a hearing, which was undisputed by
the defendant. Our review of the record reveals that
the findings that we determined were improper in part
I of this opinion were not relevant to the jury’s determi-
nation as to count two of the plaintiff's complaint. The
issue before the jury in that count was whether the
plaintiff was denied notice and an opportunity to be
heard, not whether she had a right to such notice and
opportunity. With respect to that count, the trial court
charged the jury in relevant part: “I instruct you that
generally due process requires that before this plaintiff
was deprived of the right to her property interest—her

es 21
| Cd

continued salary payments, the defendant town council
must have afforded her written or oral notice of the
public hearing on May 15, 2006, and an opportunity to
be heard—to tell her side of the story. [The plaintiff's]
claim in count two—is that she was not provided a
hearing to tell the town council—on May 15, 2006—her
side of the story. The defendants dispute this claim;
they assert both she and her attorney were provided.
notice and had the opportunity—if they so chose—to
be present and to be heard. That dispute is the center-
piece of count two—that is, did the defendants deprive
the plaintiff of due process before terminating her sal-
ary? That is the dispute you must resolve.” Accordingly,
the plaintiff's claim on her cross appeal must fail.

The judgment is reversed with respect to the trial
court’s granting of partial summary judgment for the
plaintiff and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings according to law; the judgment is affirmed in all
other respects.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

|
SOVEREIGN BANK v. JAMES LICATA ET AL.
(SC 18477)

Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued January 11—officially released February 21, 2012

722 pT
Te

Kenneth A. Votre, with whom, on the brief, was
Michele D. Sensale, for the appellant (substitute

plaintiff).

Ridgely Whitmore Brown, for the appellee (defen-
dant Cynthia Licata).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. A jury awarded the defendant Cynthia
Licata! $500,000 on her counterclaim, which alleged,
inter alia, that the substitute plaintiff, Seven Oaks Part-
ners, L.P. (plaintiff), had made certain negligent misrep-
resentations to the defendant following an oral for-
pearance agreement? that the plaintiff had entered into
with the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment
in accordance with the $500,000 jury award, and the
plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, maintaining,
inter alia, that the trial court improperly had denied its

‘Although other defendants were named in the complaint filed by the
original plaintiff, Sovereign Bank, Cynthia Licata is the only remaining defen-
dant. We therefore refer to her as the defendant throughout this opinion.

2 Pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff agreed not to foreclose a mort-
gage on certain of the defendant's real property.

Po 723
|

motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
to set aside the verdict with respect to the defendant’s
negligent misrepresentation claim because that claim
was based on the oral forbearance agreement and,
therefore, was barred by the statute of frauds, General
Statutes § 52-550 (a) (4). Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 116
Conn. App. 483, 495, 977 A.2d 228 (2009). The Appellate
Court rejected the plaintiff's contention, concluding
that the defendant’s negligent misrepresentation claim
did not rest solely on the oral forbearance agreement.
Id., 497. The Appellate Court determined, rather, that
the defendant’s claim rested on allegations that the
plaintiff had made certain misrepresentations to the
defendant during the period of foreclosure on which
the defendant had relied to her detriment, and, conse-
quently, her claim sounded in tort and was not barred
by the statute of frauds. Id., 497, 502. The Appellate
Court therefore affirmed that part of the trial court’s
judgment awarding the defendant damages on her negli-
gent misrepresentation claim.’ See id., 502, 505, 510.
This court then granted the plaintiff's petition for certifi-
cation to appeal to this court, limited to the following
issue: “Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded
that the statute of frauds . . . does not bar an action
brought in tort [that] relies in whole or in part [on]
terms of an agreement that is barred specifically by
§ 52-550 (a) (4)?” Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 293 Conn.
935, 981 A.2d 1080 (2009).

After examining the entire record on appeal and con-
sidering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties,
we have determined that the appeal in this case should
be dismissed on the ground that certification was
improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.

®The Appellate Court addressed certain additional claims concerning
other issues that had been raised in and decided by the trial court. None
of those issues, however, is relevant to this certified appeal, and we therefore
need not address them.

72 es
it

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT v. FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.
(SC 18772)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.

725

Argued December 5, 2011—officially released February 21, 2012

726 Po

PTT

Clifton A. Leonhardt, with whom, on the brief, were
Gregory F. Daniels, commission counsel, and Colleen
M. Murphy, general counsel, for the appellant
(named defendant).

Michael Sullivan, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney gen-
eral, and Henry Salton, assistant attorney general, for
the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

HARPER, J. This appeal concerns the issue of
whether a public agency can create and maintain trade
secrets that are exempt from disclosure under General
Statutes § 1-210 (b) (5) (A)! of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. The
named defendant, the freedom of information commis-
sion (commission), appeals” from the trial court's judg-
ment sustaining the administrative appeal of the
plaintiff, the University of Connecticut (university),
from the commission’s decision ordering the university
to disclose databases identifying persons who had paid
to attend, donated to, inquired about or participated
in certain educational, cultural or athletic activities of
institutions within the university. The commission con-
tends that, in light of the public policy favoring disclo-
sure of public records, the trial court improperly
rejected the commission’s determination that none of
the databases at issue could be trade secrets because
the university is not principally engaged in a trade.’ We
affirm the trial court’s judgment.

‘The full text of this provision is set forth later in this opinion.

2 "The commission appealed from the trial court’s judgment.to the Appellate
Court, and we thereafter transferred the appeal to this court. See General
Statutes § 51-199 (c); Practice Book § 65-1.

3 As we explain later; see footnote 6 of this opinion; the commission
asserted an additional claim before this court that we do not reach in
this appeal.

Po cu

PO

The record reflects the following undisputed facts.
In April, 2008, the defendant Jonathan Pelto submitted
a freedom of information request to the university seek-
ing disclosure of eleven databases that Pelto believed
institutions within the university were maintaining. The
information sought by Pelto included the names, street
addresses, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of
individuals from the following four university databases
that are the subject of this appeal: the athletics depart-
ment’s database of season ticket purchasers;‘ Jorgensen
Auditorium’s database of subscribers, individual event
ticket buyers and prospects; the Center for Continuing
Studies’ (center) database of persons having an interest
in its programs and course offerings; and the library’s
database of donors and friends. Pelto purported to seek
this information on behalf of a group of university
alumni and friends for the purpose of creating an advo-
cacy organization to help persuade legislators, public
officials and the university's board of trustees to provide
the university with proper support. The university
declined to provide Pelto with the four databases,
asserting that all of them are exempt from disclosure
under § 1-210 (b) (5) (A) as trade secrets in the form
of customer lists and that the center’s database also is
exempt under § 1-210 (b) (11) and (17) “as contact and/
or other information related to students .. . .”

Thereafter, Pelto filed a complaint with the commis-
sion, contending that the university’s failure to disclose
the information violated the act. At a hearing on the
matter, Pelto acknowledged that he owns a public rela-
tions company that, inter alia, develops mailing data-
bases for its clients, which include an Indian casino,
nonprofit organizations and political leaders, but denied

‘Pelto also sought a list of individual game ticket purchasers, but the
commission found that the university does not maintain records of such pur-
chases.

728 PO

ee
seeking the university’s databases to further the inter-
ests of his clients.>

In its final decision, the commission concluded that,
with a limited exception, the university had violated
the act by failing to disclose the databases. In rejecting
the university’s claim that the databases are customer
lists protected by the act’s trade secret exemption, the
commission first noted that it previously had not deter-
mined whether that exemption applies to a public
agency’s own trade secrets, rather than only to a private
entity’s trade secrets submitted or filed with such an
agency. Turning to that question as applied specifically
to the university, the commission found that the data-
bases contained information consistent with the defini-
tion of trade secrets in that they could be of economic
value to others and that the university maintained them
in such a way as to avoid disclosure. Nonetheless, it
concluded that the university could not assert the act’s
trade secret exemption because none of the databases
‘were maintained by an entity engaged in a trade. Specifi-
cally, the commission reasoned that public agencies are
generally engaged in governance, not trade. It noted that
the principal function of the university was education, a
traditional government function. With respect to the
databases of the athletics department and Jorgensen
Auditorium relating to the marketing and selling of tick-
ets for events, the commission found that, “unlike a
private business entity engaged in ‘trade’ where profits
are closely linked to such entities’ existence and eco-
nomic advantage, the cultural and athletic activities of
the [university] are incidental to its primary governmen-
tal function of education. . . . [The university] is

® As the trial court properly noted, disclosure under the act does not tum
‘on the motive for the request. Nonetheless, we agree with the university
that the question of whether Pelto, or other persons similarly situated, could
obtain economic value from the disclosure would be relevant in assessing
whether the information constitutes a trade secret.

Pe 729
PO
largely subsidized by public funding, unlike a private
business engaged in a trade that depends on earned
income for its continued existence.” With respect to
the library’s database, the commission found that,
“Tw]hile the patronage of . . . donors often provides
financial assistance to the programs and projects of
the library, the [c]Jommission is not persuaded that the
library is engaged in trade with such donors... .”
The commission nevertheless concluded that it would
exercise its discretion and not compel the library to
disclose the names of those persons who had requested
anonymity in exchange for their donations. With respect
to the center’s database, the commission similarly
found that the center’s mission of providing education
was not a trade, and, therefore, this database also did
not contain trade secrets. The commission did, how-
ever, agree with the university insofar as whatever infor-
mation in the center’s database that would personally
identify students was protected under the education
records exemption under § 1-210 (b) (17). In accor-
dance with the foregoing reasoning, the commission
ordered the university to disclose to Pelto all of the
information he had sought, with the limited exceptions
identified for anonymous library donors and educa-

tion records.

The university appealed from the commission's deci-
sion to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes
§§ 1-206 (d) and 4-183 (i), and the court sustained the
appeal. The court first answered in the affirmative the
question of whether the university could, as a matter
of law, create a trade secret entitled to the exemption
under the act. The court rejected the commission’s
determination that the exemption’s application turns
on whether the public agency is engaged in a trade
and instead concluded that the exemption’s application
turns on whether the government has engaged in activi-
ties that create qualifying intellectual property. With

730 Pe

ee
respect to customer lists as a type of trade secret under
§ 1-210 (b) (5) (A), the court reasoned that a governmen-
tal entity that sells things would have customers, as
that term commonly is understood.

In light of its conclusion that the university could
create a trade secret customer list, the court considered
evidence presented to the commission regarding each
database to determine whether it met the statutory defi-
nition of a trade secret under the act. The court exam-
ined the nature of the information in the databases, the
purposes for which such information was used, whether
there were potential competitors with respect to such
purposes, and the economic benefit that such informa-
tion might confer on competitors. Ultimately, the court
concluded that the evidence established that the data-
bases for the athletics department, Jorgensen Audito-
rium and the center met the criteria for customer list
trade secrets. With respect to the library database, the
court rejected the reason stated in the commission’s
decision for concluding that the trade secret exemption.
was inapplicable—that the library was not engaged in
atrade—but nonetheless agreed with the commission’s
ultimate conclusion under the reasoning that this data-
base is not a customer list because the library’s donors
and friends are not customers. Although the court deter-
mined that this database might fall into the broader
class of trade secret “information,” it questioned
whether this database satisfied one requirement of
trade secrets generally—that the information was “not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascer-
tainable by proper means by, other persons . . .
General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (5) (A). In the absence of
any findings by the commission as to this issue, the
court concluded that it should remand the matter back
to the commission for further determinations as to this
issue and “any other related points that might be raised
on remand.” This appeal followed.

Pe 731
POT

At the outset, it is necessary to make clear what
claims properly are before us in light of changes in the
commission’s position since it filed its appellate brief.
At oral argument before this court, the commission
disavowed the sweeping position that it had advanced
both before the trial court and in its appellate brief,
namely, that public agencies cannot create trade secrets
protected from disclosure under the act. Instead, it
advanced the slightly narrower position that it had
stated in its decision—that, in light of the policies
favoring disclosure underlying the act, the trade secrets
exemption must be construed to apply to public agen-
cies only when they are engaged in a trade. The commis-
sion conceded that the athletics department’s database
of season ticket holders satisfied this requirement, but
argued that the other databases did not. The commis-
sion also contended that the trial court’s judgment
should be reversed on the ground that the university
had failed to produce evidence to the commission to
establish an essential element of a trade secret—that
the information was “not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by . . . other persons . . . .” Gen-
eral Statutes § 1-210 (b) (5) (A).

Upon questioning from this court, however, the com-
mission conceded that there was nothing in the record
to indicate that it had asserted its evidentiary claim
before the trial court. The commission’s appellate brief
also does not advance this claim; the only statements
remotely bearing on this issue are generalized asser-
tions that a plaintiff bears the burden of proving entitle-
ment to an exemption. Accordingly, the commission is
not entitled to review of its evidentiary claim in light
of the settled principle of waiver, as well as this court’s
policy not to consider arguments inadequately briefed
and raised substantively for the first time at oral argu-
ment. See Alexandre v. Commissioner of Revenue Ser-
vices, 300 Conn. 566, 585, 586 n.17, 22 A.3d 518 (2011).

732 Fe

We therefore turn to the sole issue in the commis-
sion’s appeal properly before us. Specifically, we con-
sider whether a public agency that creates and
maintains information that would constitute a trade
secret if created by a private entity must engage in a
“trade” in order to shield such information from disclo-
sure under the act. We answer that question in the
negative.®

® We note that the commission’s appellate brief also asserts a claim that
the trial court improperly expanded the issues in the case by considering
whether the library database is trade secret information after agreeing with
the commission that the database is not a trade secret customer list. It is
unclear from representations that the commission made at oral argument
before this court regarding the claims that it intends to advance whether it
has abandoned this claim. Nevertheless, we note that the only case that the
commission cited in support of this position is an Appellate Court case
wherein the trial court had addressed a distinct exemption from the one
considered by the commission. See Hartford v. Freedom of Information
Commission, 41 Conn. App. 67, 73, 674 A.2d 462 (1996) (“The trial court
needlessly enlarged the issue on appeal by analyzing the question of whether
the relevant records are engineering documents, an argument not found in
the record. In doing so, the court seemingly ignored the city's argument
that the records were exempt because they were feasibility estimates.”). In
the exemption at issue in the present case, a customer list is not a distinct
category, but a description of a type of “information” that can be a trade
secret, See General Statutes § 1-210 (b) (5) (A) (exempting “[t]rade secrets,
which for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act, are defined as
information, including formulas, patterns, compilations, programs,
devices, methods, techniques, processes, drawings, cost data, customer lists,
film or television scripts or detailed production budgets that [meet specified
criteria]” [emphasis added]). Thus, the Appellate Court case is distinguish-
able. More fundamentally, it is ironic that the commission asserts this argu-
ment, given that the trial court reached this issue only after rejecting the
sole ground stated in the commission’s decision for concluding that the
library database was not a trade secret customer list and then sua sponte
raising the issue of whether the database lacked the requisite customers.

We also note that, in light of our conclusion affirming the trial court’s
judgment, we need not address an argument asserted in the university’s
brief that the commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. We further
note, however, that the university did not file a preliminary statement of
alternative grounds for affirmance; see Practice Book § 84-11; nor did it file
a cross appeal from the trial court’s decision insofar as it remanded the
matter to the commission for further proceedings regarding the library
database.

Pe 733
Pi

The present appeal turns on the scope and meaning
of the definition of a trade secret under the act. “It is
well established that an administrative agency’s deci-
sion under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act,
General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., with respect to the
construction of a statute is not entitled to special defer-
ence when [as in the present case] that determination
has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny
[or to] . . . a governmental agency’s time-tested inter-
pretation . . . . Instead, [w]ell settled principles of
statutory interpretation govern our review.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commis-
sioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Com-
mission, 301 Conn. 323, 336-38, 21 A.3d 737 (2011).
Under those principles, “we seek to determine, in a
reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language
as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the ques-
tion of whether the language actually does apply.”
Qnternal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 338. The
sources to which we may look to make this determina-
tion are limited by the legislature’s plain meaning rule.
See General Statutes § 1-2z (“The meaning of a statute
shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text.
of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.
If, after examining such text and considering such rela-
tionship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambig-
uous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall
not be considered.”).

The university is a public agency within the meaning
of § 1-200 (1) and is, therefore, required under the act
to disclose public records unless disclosure is otherwise
limited or prohibited by law. The disclosure exception
at issue provides in relevant part: “Nothing in the Free-
dom of Information. Act shall be construed to require
disclosure of . . . (5) (A) Trade secrets, which for pur-
poses of the Freedom of Information Act, are defined

734 Po

PTT
as information, including formulas, patterns, compila-
tions, programs, devices, methods, techniques, pro-
cesses, drawings, cost data, customer lists, film or
television scripts or detailed production budgets that (i)
derive independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being ©
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from their disclosure or
use, and (ii) are the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain secrecy... .”
General Statutes § 1-210 (b).

This definition, on its face, focuses exclusively on
the nature and accessibility of the information, not on
the status or characteristics of the entity creating and
maintaining that information. More particularly, there
is no requirement, express or implied, that the entity
generally must be engaged in a “trade,” however one
might define that term. In the absence of any such
limitation, it is self-evident that there cannot be any
basis to apply that limitation to public, but not private,
entities. Ifthe information meets the statutory criteria, it
is a trade secret and the entity creating that information
would be engaged in a trade for purposes of the act even
if it was not so engaged for all purposes. Accordingly,
nothing in the act indicates an intention to exclude
public agencies from the exemption to disclosure for
trade secrets they have created if the agencies generally
do not engage in a “trade.”

Related statutes further confirm this interpretation.
The definition of a trade secret under § 1-210 (b) (5)
(A) mirrors the definition under Connecticut’s Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (trade secrets act), General Statutes
§§ 35-50 through 35-58, which penalizes the misappro-
priation of trade secrets. See General Statutes § 35-51."

7 General Statutes § 35-51 provides in relevant part: “As used in this chap-
ter, unless the context requires otherwise . . . .

“(b) ‘Misappropriation’ means: (1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another
by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was

Pe 735
eee

Significantly, that act expressly applies to both public
and private entities and clearly does not impose any
requirement that either type of entity principally be
engaged in a trade. See General Statutes § 35-51 (c)
(defining “‘[p]erson’” under trade secret act expan-
sively as “a natural person, corporation, limited liability
company, business trust, estate, trust, partnership,
association, joint venture, government, governmental
subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commer-
cial entity” [emphasis added]). Although the trade
secret act provides that its definition applies “[n]otwith-
standing the provisions of sections 1-210 [and certain
other statutes]”; General Statutes § 35-51 (d); we can
infer two reasonable interpretations of this proviso,
neither of which indicate an intention to provide more
limited protections to public agencies that are not prin-
cipally engaged in a trade. First, this proviso may be
intended to make clear that the commission is not
divested of jurisdiction to decide whether information

acquired by improper means; or (2) disclosure or use of a trade secret of
another without express or implied consent by a person who (A) used
improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time
of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of
the trade secret was (i) derived from or through a person who had utilized
improper means to acquire it; (ii) acquired under circumstances giving rise
to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use, including but not limited
to disclosures made under section 1-210, sections 31-40j to 31-40p, inclusive,
or subsection (c) of section 12-62; or (ji) derived from or through a person
who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or (C) before a material change of his position, knew or had
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake. . . .

“(@ Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1-210, 31-40j to 31-40p,
inclusive, and subsection (c) of section 12-62, ‘trade secret’ means informa-
tion, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, process, drawing, cost data or customer list that: (1) Derives
‘independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
Imown to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(2) és the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.” (Emphasis added.)

736 Ee
PT

is subject to disclosure, or an exemption to disclosure,
under the act. Second, this proviso simply may be an
outdated reflection of a time when the act used a differ-
ent definition of trade secrets; see General Statutes
(Rev. to 1999) § 1-210 (b) (5); as the trade secrets act
has not been amended since the definition of trade
secret under § 1-210 (b) was changed to conform with
the definition under § 35-51 (d).’ See Public Acts 2000,
No. 00-136, § 2. Perhaps most fundamentally, it makes
no sense to construe the scope of the two acts differ-
ently. Once information is ordered disclosed under the
Freedom of Information Act, it no longer meets the
secrecy requirements of a trade secret and no subse-
quent use can be a proper basis for a claim of misappro-
priation. See General Statutes § 35-51 (d). In effect, the
protection to government trade secrets would be ren-
dered a nullity. -

Such a result could not have been intended. The uni-
versity exemplifies a prime example of why that is so.
It cannot reasonably be questioned that the university
expends considerable resources of the state, on its own
orin partnership with others, for the research and devel-
opment of intellectual property. The state’s ability to
recoup costs or reap the financial benefits for such
efforts would be seriously undermined if any member
of the public could obtain such information simply by
filing a request under the act. Indeed, the legislature
has created a statutory scheme to recognize and facili-
tate the university's ownership of, and control over,
information relating to research and development of

®Prior to the 2000 amendment; Public Acts 2000, No. 00-136, § 2; trade
secrets were defined under the act as “unpatented, secret, commercially
valuable plans, appliances, formulas or processes, which are used for the
making, preparing, compounding, treating or processing of articles or materi-
als which are trade commodities obtained from a person and which are
recognized by law as confidential, and commercial or financial information
given in confidence, not required by statute . . . .” General Statutes (Rev.
to 1999) § 1-210 (b) (6).

Po 737
Pe

various products, formulas and technologies. See Gen-

eral Statutes §§ 10a-110 through 10a-110g; see also Gen-

eral Statutes § 4-6la (ownership rights of state with

respect to inventions and discoveries by state

employees).

In sum, all of the textual evidence unambiguously
demonstrates the legislature’s intention to afford trade
secret protection to the university under the act, as
long as the information meets the statutory criteria for
a trade secret. Although the act embodies a public pol-
icy in favor of disclosure, that presumption is subject
to clear limits within which the university may claim
an exemption.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

NEW LONDON COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY ». MARIA V. NANTES ET AL.
(SC 18758)

(SC 18759)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan,
Eveleigh and Harper, Js.

738

739

Argued September 19, 2011—officially released February 21, 2012

Edwin L. Doernberger, with whom was David G.
Jordan, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Allan B. Taylor, with whom were Martin J. Magnus-
son and, on the brief, James H. Rotondo, for the appel-
lee (plaintiff).

Opinion

PALMER, J. Two houseguests suffered serious injur-
ies after their host left her car running overnight in
an attached garage and the house filled with carbon
monoxide. The principal issue in this appeal is whether

the guests’ injuries are covered by a homeowner's insur-
ance policy issued by the plaintiff, New London County

740 po

Mutual Insurance Company, to the named defendant,
Maria V. Nantes, that excludes coverage for injuries
“fajrising out of . . . [t]he . . . use” of a motor vehi-
cle. The plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment
action against Nantes, the homeowner, her guests, Arm-
enui Dzhgalian and Aida Melikyan, and Nantes’ automo-
bile insurer, Government Employees Insurance Com-
pany (GEICO),! seeking a declaration that Nantes’
homeowner's policy does not cover the injuries suffered
by Dzhgalian and Melikyan. The plaintiff filed a motion
for summary judgment, claiming that the policy does
not cover these injuries because they fall within the
policy exclusion for injuries “[a]rising out of . . . [t]he
. . . use” of a motor vehicle. The trial court granted
the plaintiff's motion and rendered judgment for the
plaintiff, and the defendants appealed.” We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our disposition of this appeal.
Dzhgalian and Melikyan are medical school graduates
and residents of California. In February, 2007, they trav-
eled to Connecticut to participate in a month long,
unpaid internship at Griffin Hospital (hospital) in the
town of Derby. During their internships, Dzhgalian and
Melikyan lived with Nantes, a hospital employee, at her
home in the town of Ansonia. As part of the living
arrangement, Nantes drove Dzhgalian and Melikyan to
and from the hospital each day. Dzhgalian and Melikyan
each agreed to pay Nantes $460 to cover their share of
utilities and car expenses.

‘Although a defendant, GEICO did not participate in this appeal. We
hereinafter refer to Nantes, Dzhgalian and Melikyan collectively as the
defendants.

* The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of
the trial court, and the appeal was transferred to this court pursuant to
General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.

‘The defendants also filed a separate appeal, which raises no new issues and
which was consolidated with their first appeal and transferred to this court.

Po “AL
Po

At the end of the work day on February 12, 2007,
Nantes drove Dzhgalian and Melikyan to her house and
parked her car in the attached garage. Nantes exited
the car without turning off the engine, closed the garage
door, and went into the living quarters of the house,
which did not contain a carbon monoxide detector. The
car’s engine continued to run overnight, and the house
filled with carbon monoxide. Dzhgalian and Melikyan
suffered serious neurological injuries from carbon mon-
oxide poisoning. They suffered additional injuries when
Nantes dragged them, unconscious, out of the house.?

Several days later, the plaintiff received claims from
Nantes for Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s medical
expenses. The plaintiff promptly disclaimed coverage,
relying mainly on the fact that Nantes’ homeowner’s
policy contained the following exclusion: “[cloverage
[for] [p]ersonal [liability and . . . [mJedical [p]ay-
ments to [o]thers do[es] not apply to ‘bodily injury’ or
‘property damage’. . . [a]rising out of . . . [t]he own-
ership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of motor
vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances,
including trailers, owned or operated by or rented or
loaned to an ‘insured’ . . . .” Soon thereafter, Dzhgal-
ian and Melikyan returned to California. Nantes subse-
quently relocated to California as well.

Dzhgalian and Melikyan then brought an action
against Nantes in California state court to recover for
their injuries. In February, 2008, they reached a settle-
ment pursuant to which Nantes assigned Dzhgalian and
Melikyan her rights under the homeowner’s policy for
the amount of any damages that Dzhgalian and Melikyan

® We note that, although the defendants alleged in their motion to strike
and in their brief to this court that Melikyan also sustained bodily injuries
due to being dragged out of the house, the record is unclear as to whether
Melikyan sustained such injuries or whether she had been dragged out of
the house. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that Melikyan sustained
injuries as a result of being dragged out of the house by Nantes.

742 es

PO

might recover against her. Nantes also assigned Dzhgal-
ian and Melikyan her right to recover for the plaintiff's
alleged bad faith in declining to settle within the policy
limits. Nantes retained the right to recover nonassign-
able benefits under the policy, including her right to
recover for emotional distress and punitive damages
against the plaintiff. All parties agreed to waive their
right to a jury trial on the issue of Dzhgalian’s and
Melikyan’s damages and to submit that issue instead to
binding arbitration in California, a proceeding in which
Nantes would have the right but not the obligation to
testify and present evidence. Nantes also agreed not to
oppose Dzhgalian and Melikyan’s application to confirm
the arbitration award. In return, Dzhgalian and Melikyan
agreed that they would not execute on any judgment
against Nantes personally and would seek to recover
only from the plaintiff. Pursuant to the settlement
agreement, the defendants stipulated that, after the arbi-
tration award was confirmed and judgment was ren-
dered thereon, Dzhgalian and Melikyan would file a
direct action against the plaintiff in California to enforce
their rights as Nantes’ assignees. Nantes agreed that
she would testify in the action. The settlement agree-
ment also provided that Nantes would have the right
to join the action “to prosecute her rights to recover
on her nonassignable rights under the homeowner's
policy, such as damages for emotional distress and for
punitive damages against [the plaintiff].”*

In June, 2008, before arbitration had commenced, the
plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action against
the defendants. Relying primarily on the motor vehicle
exclusion, the plaintiff sought a declaration that Nantes’
homeowner's policy does not cover Dzhgalian’s and
Melikyan’s injuries. On August 4, 2008, the defendants

«GEICO, which also was a party to the settlement, agreed to pay Dzhgalian
and Melikyan each $100,000, the policy limit on Nantes’ automobile insurance
policy with GEICO.

Pp 743
PFT

filed a motion to dismiss the action, claiming, inter
alia, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over
Dzhgalian and Melikyan under Connecticut's long arm
statute, General Statutes § 52-59b.° The trial court, Hon.
George W. Ripley II, judge trial referee, denied the
motion to dismiss in part, concluding that Dzhgalian
and Melikyan had transacted business in Connecticut
and therefore were subject to the court's jurisdiction.’

5 General Statutes § 62-59b provides in relevant part: “(a) As to a cause

of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual . . .
who in person or through an agent: (1) [t]ransacts any business within the
state... .”
6 The trial court concluded that, although Melikyan was subject to personal
jurisdiction in Connecticut, she nevertheless was not properly served
because the summons contained an incorrect address. The trial court thus
dismissed the action as to Melikyan without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
The court subsequently granted the plaintiff's request for leave to amend
the summons.

On August 8, 2008, counsel for Dzhgalian and Melikyan notified the plaintiff
that arbitration would begin on August 13, 2008. On August 13, 2008, the
plaintiff's attorney notified the arbitrator by letter that the plaintiff would
not appear at the hearing. In the letter, the plaintiff's attorney denied that
‘the plaintiff had received “adequate notice” of the arbitration and reaffirmed
the plaintiff's position that it was not obligated to provide Nantes with a
defense or indemnification. The plaintiff's attorney also noted that “[iJt .
is questionable whether [the] arbitration is intended to resolve matters
among adversarial parties. Instead, it appears to be designed to achieve a
collusive judgment against . . . Nantes in an effort to enforce it against
[the plaintiff] in a California court, notwithstanding the pending declaratory
judgment action in . . . Connecticut.” The arbitration proceeded without
the plaintiff, and the arbitrator awarded Dzhgalian and Melikyan more than
$11 million each. Following the arbitration, Nantes, Dzhgalian, and Melikyan
brought an action in California seeking “to make [the plaintiff] perform its
alleged obligation to cover for [Nantes’] liability. [The defendants] assert[ed]
that [the plaintiff's] refusal to provide coverage for Nantes constituted breach
of its duty of good faith and fair dealing to Nantes.” Nantes v. New London
County Mutual Ins. Co., United States District Court, Docket No. 2:09-cv-
07161-RGK-JC (C.D. Cal. February 3, 2010). The United States District Court
for the Central District of California dismissed the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the plaintiff; id; and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Nantes v. New London County
Mutual Ins. Co., United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 10-55357 (9th
Cir. July 5, 2011).

744 Po

Po
In November, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to
strike the plaintiff's complaint, contending, inter alia,
that the complaint constituted a misuse of the declara-
tory judgment statute, General Statutes § 52-29 (a).’ The
trial court, Radcliffe, J., denied the motion to strike,
concluding that the plaintiff's complaint “set forth a
proper claim for declaratory relief . . . .” The plaintiff
then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that
Nantes’ homeowner's policy does not cover Dzhgalian’s
and Melikyan’s injuries because they fall within the
policy’s motor vehicle exclusion. The trial court, Bellis,
J., agreed with the plaintiff, granted the motion for
summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon for
the plaintiff. Additional procedural history will be set
forth as necessary.

On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court
incorrectly concluded that it had personal jurisdiction
over Dzhgalian and Melikyan, that the plaintiff's com-
plaint constituted a proper use of the declaratory judg-
ment statute and that Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s
injuries are not covered by Nantes’ homeowner's insur-
ance policy. We reject each claim.

I

We first address the defendants’ contention that the
trial court, Hon. George W. Ripley, judge trial referee,
incorrectly determined that it had personal jurisdiction.
over Dzhgalian and Melikyan under § 52-59b (a) (1)
upon concluding that they had transacted business in
Connecticut and that the plaintiff's cause of action
against them arose out of this transaction. Specifically,
the defendants challenge the trial court’s determination
that it had jurisdiction over Dzhgalian and Melikyan

7 General Statutes § 52-29 (a) provides: “The Superior Court in any action
or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for
such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The
declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.”

Po 745
TT

because, before entering the state, they had arranged
for paid lodging and transportation with Nantes, a
stranger to them, and because their one month medical
internship with the hospital, “while unpaid, conferred
substantial benefits to their careers by providing valu-
able experience and by fulfilling a prerequisite to their
medical licensing . . . .” We conclude that the trial
court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over
Dzhgalian and Melikyan.

“TA] challenge to the jurisdiction of the court presents
a question of law over which our review is plenary.”
Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 118, 918 A.2d 867 (2007).
This court previously has explained that § 52-59b (a) (1)
“authorizes jurisdiction over nonresidents who transact
any business within the state provided that the cause
of action arises out of such transaction.” Bank of Baby-
lon v. Quirk, 192 Conn. 447, 449, 472 A.2d 21 (1984).
An individual “[t]ransacts . . . business” in Connecti-
cut under § 52-59b (a) (1) if he or she engages in “a
single purposeful business transaction.” (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Ryan v. Cerullo, supra, 119.

We agree with the trial court that Dzhgalian and Meli-
kyan’s lodging and transportation arrangement with
Nantes constituted a purposeful business transaction
within the meaning of § 52-59b (a) (1) and that the
plaintiff's cause of action against Dzhgalian and Meli-
kyan arose out of this transaction. Nantes allowed
Dzhgalian and Melikyan, two people whom she did not
know, to stay in her house for several weeks, and she
drove them to and from the hospital each day. In
exchange, they each agreed to pay her $460. As a general
matter, if a host agrees to provide lodging and transpor-
tation to guests previously unknown to her, and the
guests agree to provide money in return, the resulting
axrangement constitutes a purposeful business transac-
tion. Furthermore, the plaintiff's cause of action against
Dzhgalian and Melikyan unquestionably arose from

746 Po
Po

their participation in the lodging and transportation
arrangement. The plaintiff's action seeks a declaration
regarding the legal rights that Dzhgalian and Melikyan
possess as assignees under Nantes’ homeowner's insur-
ance policy. If Dzhgalian and Melikyan possess any such.
rights, they possess them because of the injuries that
they sustained while staying at Nantes’ house in Con-
necticut. Because Dzhgalian and Melikyan were staying
at Nantes’ house pursuant to the lodging and transporta-
tion arrangement, and because the arrangement consti-
tuted a business transaction, the plaintiff's cause of
action arose from business that Dzhgalian and Melikyan
had transacted in Connecticut.’ We therefore conclude
that the trial court correctly determined that it had
personal jurisdiction over Dzhgalian and Melikyan.

I

We next address the defendants’ claim that the trial
court, Radcliffe, J., improperly denied their motion to
strike the plaintiff's complaint. In support of their
motion, the defendants claimed that the plaintiff's
action was a misuse of the declaratory judgment statute
because the complaint did not seek a declaration of the
parties’ future rights or obligations but instead sought
legal vindication of the plaintiff's refusal to provide
Nantes with a defense and indemnification in the Cali-
fornia arbitration proceeding.® The defendants also

® The defendants assert that the plaintiff's action did not arise out of the
lodging and transportation agreement because Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan's
injuries did not arise out of a breach of the terms or conditions of that
agreement. The defendants cite no authority, and we are aware of none, to
support their contention that a cause of action cannot be deemed to arise
out of a particular business transaction unless the cause of action involves
aclaim that a party to the transaction failed to comply with the transaction’s
contractual terms. Moreover, we sce no justification for imposing such a
jurisdictional limitation. Accordingly, we reject the defendants’ argument.

* We note that the plaintiff filed the present declaratory judgment action
several months before commencement of the arbitration proceeding in Cali-
fornia.

Po TAT

Po

claimed that the plaintiff's action was an improper
attempt to deprive the defendants of their choice of
forum for a future breach of contract action against
the plaintiff. The trial court rejected these arguments,
concluding that a bona fide dispute existed between the
parties that properly could be resolved by a declaratory
judgment. On appeal, the defendants renew the claims
that they raised in the trial court. We conclude that
the trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion
to strike.

The standard of review in an appeal of a trial court’s
ruling on a motion to strike is well established. “A
motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a
pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual find-
ings by the trial court. As a result, our review of the
court’s ruling is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be
those alleged in the [complaint] . . . and we construe
the [complaint] in the manner most favorable to sus-
taining its legal sufficiency.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lestorti v. DeLeo, 298 Conn. 466, 472, 4 A.3d
269 (2010).

“The purpose of a declaratory judgment action, as
authorized by General Statutes § 52-29 and Practice
Book § [17-55], is to secure an adjudication of rights
[when] there is a substantial question in dispute or a
substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the
parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bysiewicz
v. DiNardo, 298 Conn. 748, 756, 6 A.3d 726 (2010). Subdi-
visions (1) and (2) of Practice Book § 17-55 respectively
require that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment
action have “an interest, legal or equitable, by reason
of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to the party’s
rights or other jural relations” and that there be “an
actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in
dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations
which requires settlement between the parties... .”
This court previously has observed that our declaratory

748 PO

judgment statute “provides a valuable tool by which
litigants may resolve uncertainty of legal obligations.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 812,
967 A.2d 1 (2009).

We also have recognized that our declaratory judg-
ment statute is unusually liberal. “An action for declara-
tory judgment . . . is a statutory action as broad as it
well could be made.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Beccia v. Waterbury, 185 Conn. 445, 453, 441 A.2d
131 (1981); accord Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 301,
158 A. 891 (1932). Indeed, our declaratory judgment
statute “is broader in scope than . . . the statutes in
most, if not all, other jurisdictions . . . and [w]e have
consistently construed our statute and the rules under
it in a liberal spirit, in the belief that they serve a sound
social purpose. . . . [Although] the declaratory judg-
ment procedure may not be utilized merely to secure
advice on the law . . . it may be employed in a justicia-
ble controversy where the interests are adverse, where
there is an actual bona fide and substantial question
or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal
relations which requires settlement, and where all per-
sons having an interest in the subject matter of the
complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable
notice thereof.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation.
marks omitted.) Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 627,
376 A.2d 359 (1977).

One type of controversy to which our declaratory
judgment statute often has been applied is a dispute
over rights and liabilities under an insurance policy.
E.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries,
Ine., supra, 290 Conn. 772-73 (declaratory judgment
action to determine rights under insurance policy); Ver-
mont Mutual Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, 290 Conn. 582,
584, 966 A.2d 672 (2009) (same); see also St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 22 Conn. App. 377, 380,

Po 749

577 A.2d 1093 (1990) (“[t]here is no question that a
declaratory judgment action is a suitable vehicle to test
the rights and liabilities under an insurance policy”).

In the present case, the plaintiff sought an adjudica-
tion of its rights with respect to an unsettled question
of law pertaining to its liability under the homeowner's
insurance policy that it had issued to Nantes. See, e.g.,
Bysiewicz v. DiNardo, supra, 298 Conn. 756. By its
terms, the complaint sought to resolve uncertainty con-
cerning the issue of whether the plaintiff owed Nantes
and her assignees a legal duty under that policy, an
issue about which the complaint alleged ample dispute.
Indeed, on the basis of an express provision in the
defendants’ settlement agreement, the complaint
alleged that the defendants intended to bring an action
against the plaintiff in California on the theory that the
plaintiff owed Nantes and her assignees a legal duty
under Nantes’ policy. As the defendants acknowledged
in their brief to this court, the settlement agreement
“demonstrated the intent of . . . Melikyan and Dzhgal-
ian to pursue legal action against [the plaintiff], upon
the anticipated attainment of an award in arbitration.”
A clearer case of an actual bona fide issue in dispute
would be difficult to imagine.

We therefore find no merit in the defendants’ asser-
tion that the complaint was improper because it sought
an “advisory . . . ruling” rather than remedial or pro-
spective relief.!° As we explained, the plaintiff sought
a declaration that it owed no continuing contractual
duty to Nantes or her assignees. Such a declaration

In support of their contention that the plaintiff's complaint improperly
had sought an advisory opinion, the defendants appear to suggest that
an insurer properly may bring a declaratory judgment action to ascertain
coverage under an insurance policy only if the insurer seeks to determine
whether the policy obligates the insurer to provide a defense in an ongoing
or imminent legal action against the policyholder. This supposition is without
any basis in Connecticut law.

750 Po
Po

represents the kind of prospective relief contemplated
by our declaratory judgment statute because it would
insulate the plaintiff against future liability under
Nantes’ homeowner's insurance policy. It also would
protect the plaintiff in the event that Nantes brought an
action to recover for bad faith, an action the settlement
agreement expressly contemplated that Nantes might
bring.

For similar reasons, we also reject the defendants’
related contention that the plaintiff's complaint contra-
vened the “traditional function” of a legal action,
namely, “to provide a day in court to the party allegedly
harmed.” In support of this contention, the defendants
assert that the plaintiff “has not proclaimed any injury
that it has suffered as a consequence of actions under-
taken by the defendants, nor has it sought guidance
regarding the uncertainty of legal relations with any of
the defendants.” This assertion lacks merit because, as
we explained, the complaint sought expressly to resolve
the uncertainty surrounding the plaintiff's contractual
obligations to the defendants.

Finally, the defendants contend that the complaint
was an “[a]busive” attempt to deprive the “ ‘true plain-
tiffs’ ” of their chosen forum.” The defendants assert

The defendants further assert that, “[t]o permit the adjudication of a
declaratory action, such as [the present action], would be to enable an
insurer to file a declaratory judgment action any time it decide[s] to deny
coverage to an insured, thereby creating a cause of action in Connecticut
for nonbreach of contract (with the potential of forcing insureds into court to
defend actions unnecessarily).” We believe that this assertion is unfounded.
Despite the breadth of our declaratory judgment statute, there is no reason
to presume that insurance companies would undertake the cost of bringing
an action against every policyholder to whom they deny coverage solely
for the purpose of preempting future breach of contract actions, and the
limited set of Connecticut cases addressing such claims belies the defen-
dants’ assertion.

® We note that the defendants do not truly challenge the legal sufficiency
of the plaintiff’s complaint when they contend that the complaint was an
“[aJbusive” attempt to deprive the “ ‘true plaintiffs’ ” of their chosen forum.
It is therefore unclear that the proper procedural vehicle for this contention

po 751
Pd

that the real purpose behind the plaintiffs declaratory
judgment action was to avoid defending a breach of
contract action in the defendants’ preferred forum. This
purpose, the defendants maintain, “has been admon-
ished by courts across the country.”

The defendants fail to cite a single Connecticut case
in support of this argument. Even if there were such a
case, we would not be persuaded that the present action
is an instance of impermissible forum shopping. The
action was brought by a Connecticut insurance com-
pany to determine whether a Connecticut homeowner’s
insurance policy covers injuries that occurred in a Con-
necticut home. These facts belie the defendants’ con-
tention that Connecticut is an inappropriate forum for
resolution of the issue presented by the plaintiff's
action. Under our law, a forum does not become inap-
propriate simply because the defendants would prefer
to litigate elsewhere or because they would prefer to
be the plaintiffs.

Il

We now address the defendants’ principal claim,
namely, that the trial court, Bellis, J., improperly
granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
We reject this claim as well.

The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to our resolution of the defendants’ claim. In grant-
ing the plaintiff's summary judgment motion and
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court concluded
that all of Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s injuries, including
the bodily injuries that they sustained while being
dragged from the house, arose out of the use of a motor
vehicle and therefore fell within the motor vehicle
exclusion of Nantes’ homeowner's insurance policy.

is amotion to strike. We need not resolve this procedural question, however,
because the plaintiff does not raise the question and because the defendants’
contention lacks merit by any standard.

752 | T_T

The trial court reasoned: “Connecticut precedent dem-
onstrates that the link between bodily injury and the
use of a motor vehicle in the language of the policy lies in
the words arising out of. Our courts have consistently
interpreted ‘arising out of to mean ‘was connected
with,’ ‘had its origins in,’ ‘grew out of,’ ‘flowed from,’
or ‘was incident to,’ even in the context of motor vehicle
exclusions. [Although] Nantes may not have been
‘using’ the motor vehicle at the time that the injuries
were sustained, the court finds that the injuries ‘arose
out of the use of the motor vehicle’ because they were
‘connected with,’ ‘had their origins in,’ ‘grew out of,
‘flowed from,’ or ‘were incident to’ Nantes’ use of the
vehicle when she drove the vehicle home.” (Emphasis
in original.) The trial court also rejected the defendants’
alternative contention that, even if Dzhgalian’s and Meli-
kyan’s injuries did arise out of the use of a motor vehicle,
the doctrine of concurrent causes” brings their injuries
within the scope of coverage. The court rejected this
contention on the ground that the common law of this
state does not recognize the doctrine of concurrent
causes.

On appeal, the defendants advance three arguments
in support of their claim that Nantes’ policy covers
Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s injuries. First, they argue
that the injuries that Dzhgalian and Melikyan suffered
as a result of the carbon monoxide poisoning do not
fall under the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion because
the injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor
vehicle. Second, they contend that, even if those injuries
did arise out of the use of a motor vehicle, they fall
within the scope of coverage under the doctrine of

® As we explain more fully hereinafter, under the independent concurrent
cause rule, when an insurance policy insures against loss caused by one
risk but excludes loss caused by another risk, coverage is extended to a
loss caused by the insured risk even though the excluded risk is a contribu-
tory cause.

Po 758

eee
concurrent causes. Finally, the defendants maintain
that the additional injuries that Dzhgalian and Melikyan
sustained as a result of being dragged out of the house
did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle and,
therefore, do not fall within the motor vehicle exclusion.
We reject all of these contentions, which we address
in turn.

We first set forth certain well established principles
that govern our review of the defendants’ arguments.
If an insurance policy’s words are clear and unambigu-
ous, we must accord them their “natural and ordinary
meaning.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Galgano
v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 267 Conn.
512, 519, 838 A.2d 993 (2004). If, instead, the policy's
words are ambiguous, we adopt an interpretation that
expands the range of coverage over one that restricts
it. See, e.g., id. We note, however, that “words do not
become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen
contend for different meanings.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 273 Conn. 448, 463, 870 A.2d 1048 (2005).
Words also do not become ambiguous simply because
a contract fails to define them; even when undefined,
words are not ambiguous if common usage or our case
law gives them a single meaning. See Budris v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 44 Conn. App. 53, 57, 686 A.2d 533 (1996).
Finally, the interpretation of an insurance policy pre-
sents a question of law that we review de novo. See,
e.g., Auto Glass Express, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 293
Conn. 218, 231, 975 A.2d 1266 (2009).

In the present case, we are called on to ascertain the
meaning of the phrase, “[a]rising out of’ the “use” of
“motor vehicles,” a phrase that is clear and unambigu-
ous because our case law explicitly defines it. As we
observed in Hogle v. Hogle, 167 Conn. 572, 356 A.2d
172 (1975), “it is generally understood that for liability
for an accident or an injury to be said to ‘arise out of the

754 Po
Po

‘use’ of an automobile for the purpose of determining
coverage under the appropriate provisions of a liability
insurance policy, it is sufficient to show only that the
accident or injury ‘was connected with,’ ‘had its origins
in,’ ‘grew out of,’ ‘flowed from,’ or ‘was incident to’ the
use of the automobile, in order to meet the requirement
that there be a causal relationship between the accident
or injury and the use of the automobile.” (Emphasis
added.) Id., 577; see also Board of Education v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 261 Conn. 37, 47-49, 801 A.2d
752 (2002) (relying on Hogle in construing phrase in
insurance policy providing coverage for injury that
results from “use of a covered automobile” [internal
quotation marks omitted]). Our case law also imparts
asingle meaning to the phrase “use of an automobile”:
“* “Use” is to be given its ordinary meaning. It denotes
the employment of the automobile for some purpose of
the user.’ . . . ‘One may “use” an automobile without
personally operating it, as the term use is broader than
operation.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Aetna Life & Casualty
Co. v. Bulaong, 218 Conn. 51, 63, 588 A.2d 138 (1991);
see also id., 60-63 (construing term “use” in insurance
policy). Because our case law gives each relevant term
a single meaning—albeit an expansive one—there is
no ambiguity in a policy exclusion that provides that
“[cloverage [for] [p]ersonal [liability and . . . [mJedi-
cal [p]ayments to [o]thers do[es] not apply to ‘bodily
injury’ or ‘property damage’. . . [aJrising out of . . .
[t]he . .. use . . . of motor vehicles ... .”

The foregoing provision being unambiguous, we must
construe it according to its natural and ordinary mean-
ing and determine whether the provision so construed
encompasses the injuries that Dzhgalian and Melikyan.
sustained as a result of their prolonged exposure to
carbon monoxide while guests at Nantes’ home. At
issue, then, is whether those injuries were connected
with, had their origins in, grew out of, flowed from, or

Po 755
Pp O__

were incident to the employment of the automobile for
some purpose of its user. See Aetna Life & Casualty
Co. v. Bulaong, supra, 218 Conn. 63; Hogle v. Hogle,
supra, 167 Conn. 577.

The defendants do not seriously dispute that Dzhgali-
an’s and Melikyan’s injuries arose out of Nantes’ act of
leaving her car running in the garage because those
injuries obviously were connected with that act. The
defendants claim, rather, that leaving a car in one’s
garage does not constitute the use of a motor vehicle.
We disagree. When Nantes drove into the garage, exited
the car and left it there upon entering the house, she
was parking the car. Parking is plainly an employment
of a car for some purpose of the user. Moreover, the
act of parking does not fail to be an employment of a
car for some purpose of the user merely because the
user performs the act negligently, as Nantes did by
exiting the car without turning it off.

The defendants urge us to adopt a narrower construc-
tion of the term “use” for the purpose of determining
what constitutes the use of a car. Specifically, the defen-
dants assert that a motor vehicle is in use only when
“transport[ing] persons and objects from point A to
point B,” not when parked in a garage. In support of
this limited construction, the defendants rely on several
principles, namely, that insurance policy exclusions
should be read narrowly; e.g., Heyman Associates No.
lv. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 770, 653
A.2d 122 (1995); that insurance policies should be con-
strued in favor of the insured; e.g., Dickinson v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 101 Conn. 369, 378-79, 125 A. 866
(1924); and that policy language must be interpreted so
as to reflect the understanding of an ordinary policy-
holder. See, e.g., Cody v. Remington Electric Shavers,
179 Conn. 494, 497, 427 A.2d 810 (1980). The foregoing
cases establish that these principles of insurance law,
although sound, apply only when a policy is ambigu-

756 Po
Po

ous." Because the language at issue in Nantes’ policy
is not ambiguous, we do not construe the phrase “use
. . . of motor vehicles” narrowly. Instead, we construe
the phrase according to its natural and ordinary mean-
ing, as revealed by common usage and by our case
law. As we explained, this meaning is not limited to
transportation. Rather, it encompasses any employment
of the motor vehicle for some purpose of the user.
Transportation is one purpose for which a user might
employ a motor vehicle, and parking is another.®

Alternatively, the defendants contend that, even if
the injuries that Dzhgalian and Melikyan sustained as
aresult of their exposure to carbon monoxide did arise
out of the use of a motor vehicle within the meaning
of the motor vehicle exclusion of Nantes’ homeowner’s
insurance policy, the doctrine of concurrent causes
brings their injuries within the scope of coverage. As
one court has explained, “[t]he independent concurrent
cause rule operates to extend coverage to a loss caused
by the insured risk even though the excluded risk is a
contributory cause, [when] a policy expressly insures
against loss caused by one risk but excludes loss caused
by another risk. . . . The independent concurrent
cause must provide the basis for a cause of action in
and of itself and must not require the occurrence of the
excluded risk to make it actionable.” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Estate of Jones v.
Smith, 320 Wis. 2d 470, 475-76, 768 N.W.2d 245 (App.),
review denied, 321 Wis. 2d 49, 775 N.W.2d 255 (2009).
The defendants maintain that, because a concurrent

“The defendants also propound the principle that language in an insur
ance policy exclusion must be interpreted more narrowly than identical
language in a grant of coverage. The defendants cite no Connecticut authority
in support of this principle. More important, they cite no authority indicating
that the principle applies even when the language at issue is unambiguous.

Tn this connection, we note that the defendants offer no persuasive
explanation why an ordinary policyholder would understand the phrase
“ase of a motor vehicle” to apply only to transportation and not to parking.

P| 787
P|

cause of Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s injuries was

Nantes’ act of closing the garage door, and because this

act was a covered event, the injuries are covered by

the policy.

We need not resolve the question of whether Nantes’
closing of the garage door was a concurrent cause of
Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s injuries. Indeed, for present
purposes, we also need not resolve the more fundamen-
tal question of whether the doctrine of concurrent
causes is a doctrine recognized under this state’s com-
mon law. We need not reach these questions because
this case is controlled by our holding in Hogle v. Hogle,
supra, 167 Conn. 572."

In Hogle, we interpreted a homeowner’s insurance
policy that contained a motor vehicle exclusion sub-
stantially identical to the exclusion at issue here. See
id., 575. We concluded that the policy did not cover
injuries that a passenger in a motor vehicle sustained
when the driver's dog leaped from the rear seat to the
front seat and caused the driver to lose control of the
vehicle. Id., 574, 576-79. We reasoned that the insurer's
“obligation to pay the judgment rendered in favor of
[the passenger] does not depend on whether it was [the
driver’s] negligent operation of the car, or the activities
of his dog inside the car, which constituted the ‘proxi-
mate cause’ of the accident, and, consequently, of [the
passenger’s] injuries, as [the driver] contends. Such
obligation, rather, depends . . . on another fact,
namely, whether [the driver’s] ‘use’ of his car was con-

We note that the defendants do not ask us in their brief to this court
to overrule Hogle. Although the defendants suggested at oral argument that
‘we might overrule a. portion of this court’s holding in Hogle, we decline to
consider whether to overrule Hogle or any portion thereof, in accordance
‘with our practice of declining to consider claims raised for the first time
at oral argument, See, e.g., Rapoport v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 301 Conn.
22, 40 n.16, 19 A.3d 622 (2011) (“{ilt is well settled that claims on appeal
must be adequately briefed . . . and cannot be raised for the first time at
oral argument before the reviewing court” [internal quotation marks
omitted].

758 Po

nected with the accident or the creation of a condition
that caused the accident.” Id., 578.

The present case, like Hogle, involves injuries that
stem from two causes, one falling within the exclusion,
that is, Nantes’ act of leaving her car running in the
garage, and the other arguably falling outside the exclu-
sion, that is, Nantes’ act of closing the garage door. If
we were to accept the defendants’ argument and extend
coverage to Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s injuries on the
ground that a contributing cause of those injuries falls
outside the exclusion, we would be required to repudi-
ate our reasoning in Hogle, in which we deemed it
dispositive that the driver’s “ ‘use’ of his car was con-
nected with the [injury] or the creation of a condition
that caused [it].” Id. We deemed it irrelevant that a
covered event—the dog’s leaping into the front seat—
was a contributing cause of the passenger's injury. Here,
too, it is irrelevant that an arguably covered event—
Nantes’ closing of the garage door—was a contributing
cause of Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s injuries. Consistent.
with our reasoning in Hogle, the fact that Nantes’ use
of her motor vehicle was connected to or created a
condition that caused Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s injur-
ies is enough to bring them within the motor vehicle
exclusion.

Finally, the defendants contend that the bodily injur-
ies that Dzhgalian and Melikyan sustained when Nantes
dragged them out of the house (dragging injuries) do not
fall within the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion because
they neither arose out of nor were causally connected
to the use of a motor vehicle. The defendants contend,
rather, that Nantes’ act of dragging Melikyan and
Dzhgalian out of the house was an act “separate and
independent from the carbon monoxide incident.”

Contrary to the defendants’ claim, Dzhgalian’s and
Melikyan’s dragging injuries arose out of the use of a
motor vehicle because Nantes’ negligent act of leaving

Pp 759
Po

her car running in the garage was the proximate cause of
those injuries. Ordinarily, if an actor’s negligent conduct
puts another person in peril, that conduct is deemed.
to be the proximate cause of any injuries negligently
inflicted by a foreseeable rescuer. See 2 Restatement
(Second), Torts §§ 445, 447 (1965); W. Prosser & W.
Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 44, pp. 307-308. This is
true whether the rescuer is a third person or the actor
herself. In the present case, it was eminently foresee-
able that Nantes or a third person might attempt to
extricate Dzhgalian and Melikyan from the peril created
by Nantes’ negligent act of leaving her car running in
the garage. Accordingly, Nantes’ negligent act was the
proximate cause of Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s dragging
injuries. Because Nantes’ negligent act of leaving her
car running in the garage was the proximate cause of
Dzhgalian’s and Melikyan’s dragging injuries, it follows
that those injuries arose out of her use of the car. As
we explained in Hogle, for “an injury to be said to ‘arise
out of’ the ‘use’ of an automobile . . . it is sufficient
to show only that the . . . injury ‘was connected with,’
‘had its origins in,’ ‘grew out of,’ ‘flowed from,’ or ‘was
incident to’ the use of the automobile, in order to meet
the requirement that there be a causal relationship
between the . . . injury and the use of the automobile.”
Hogle v. Hogle, supra, 167 Conn. 577. “Under this
[expansive] standard of causation, it need not be shown
that the incident in question was proximately caused
by the vehicle . . . .” Board of Education v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra, 261 Conn. 48. Because
the dragging injuries are linked to Nantes’ use of her
vehicle under the more demanding standard of proxi-
mate causation, those injuries necessarily also meet.
the less stringent standard of mere “connect[ion] with”
Nantes’ use of her vehicle. Hogle v. Hogle, supra, 577.

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

xn
2
fo)

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DEMETRICE L. LEWIS
(SC 18369)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Vertefeuille, Js.*

* This case was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court
consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Norcott, Palmer, Zarella,
McLachlan, Eveleigh and Vertefeuille. Although Justice Palmer was not
present when the case was argued before the court, he read the record and
briefs and listened to the recording of oral argument prior to participating
in this decision.

Argued September 7, 2011—officially released February 28, 2012

x

Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington,
state’s attorney, and Brian Leslie, assistant state’s attor-
ney, for the appellant (state).

Pamela S. Nagy, special public defender, for the

appellee (defendant).
Opinion

McLACHLAN, J. A jury found the defendant guilty of
the following four crimes: (1) possession of narcotics
with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-depen-
dent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b); (2)
possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500
feet of a school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-
278a (b); (8) possession of drug paraphernalia with
intent to use in violation of General Statutes § 21a-267
(a); and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia with intent
to use within 1500 feet of a school in violation of § 21a-
267 (c). The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of
conviction as to all four charges due to the trial court’s
failure to instruct the jury on specific intent. State v.
Lewis, 113 Conn. App. 731, 740, 749, 967 A.2d 618 (2009).
Additionally, concluding that the record contained
insufficient evidence to support the conviction of the
second and fourth charges and, as a result, that a new
trial would violate the double jeopardy clause, the
Appellate Court remanded the case for a new trial on
the first and third charges, but directed the trial court
to render judgment of not guilty of the second and
fourth charges. Id. In this certified appeal, the state
challenges only the Appellate Court’s insufficiency
determination and remand order with respect to the
second and fourth charges. To determine whether the

Po 763
a

defendant should be subject to retrial for violating
§§ 21a-278a (b) and 21a-267 (c), and, thus, whether the
remand order was proper, we must review: (1) whether
the evidence of the defendant’s intent to sell narcotics
within the prohibited area was sufficient to convict the
defendant under § 21a-278a (b); and (2) whether there
was sufficient evidence in the record to classify the
school in question, the Timothy Dwight School, as an
elementary or secondary school under § 21a-267 (c).!
We conclude that the Appellate Court properly held
that there was insufficient evidence to support the
defendant’s conviction under § 21a-278a (b), but
improperly held that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction under § 21a-267 (c). Accordingly,
we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of
the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the
following facts that the jury reasonably could have

1 We granted certification to appeal limited to the following questions: (1)
“Whether, for the purposes of proof of . . . § 21a-278a (b), a majority of
the Appellate Court panel properly held that there was insufficient evidence
of the defendant's intent to sell the narcotics that he possessed at the
specific location where he was apprehended, which was within 1500 feet of
a school?”; and (2) “Whether, for purposes of proof of both . . . § 21a.278a
(®), possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school,
and . . . § 21a-267 (c), possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use
within 1500 feet of a school, a majority of the Appellate Court panel properly
held that there was insufficient evidence that the school in question was
an elementary or secondary school?” State v. Lewis, 292 Conn. 906, 973
A.2d 105 (2009).

Although the second certified question addresses whether the evidence
was sufficient to satisfy both §§ 21a-278a (b) and 212-267 (c), we observe
that the double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial if the state failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt on any one element of an offense. See, e.g, State v. Padua, 273
Conn. 138, 178, 869 A.2d 192 (2005) (retrial barred and defendant entitled
to acquittal when evidence was insufficient to support conviction). Because
we conclude that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence of the defen-
dant’s intent to sell narcotics in the place where he was arrested, thus
precluding retrial, we need not determine whether the record contained
sufficient evidence of the additional element that the Timothy Dwight School
was an elementary or secondary school.

764 Po
a

found. “On June 3, 2005, at approximately 8:24 p.m.,
officers of the New Haven police department, including
Luis Rivera, were dispatched to the intersection of
North Frontage Road and Orchard Street after having
received complaints of a robbery with a weapon at that
location. The robbery suspects were described as three
seventeen to eighteen year old men, one wearing a gray
hooded sweatshirt and white ‘uptown’ sneakers, and
the other two wearing black hooded sweatshirts and
blue jeans. In the area of 49 Waverly Street, Rivera and
another officer stopped and detained the defendant,
who was riding a bicycle and wearing dark clothing,
and Joshua Williams, who was walking and wearing a
gray hooded sweatshirt. Rivera stopped Williams and
the other officer stopped the defendant, who had
started to pedal his bicycle away as Williams was
being detained.

“Rivera conducted a warrant check on the defendant
and found that there was an active warrant for his
arrest. Rivera placed the defendant under arrest and
conducted a thorough [pat down] of his person. Rivera
discovered a clear sandwich bag in the defendant’s
pocket within which there were nineteen Ziploc bags,
each containing a white, rock like substance, which a
field test revealed to be crack cocaine. Rivera also found
$116 in the defendant's front pocket, $160 in another
pocket within the front pocket and $600 in his rear
pocket. The money was in denominations of twenty,
ten, five and one dollar bills. In the defendant’s rear
pocket, Rivera also found a razor blade and a paper
bag containing medium and small Ziploc bags. There-
after, the defendant was charged with possession of
narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not
drug-dependent, possession of narcotics with intent to
sell within 1500 feet of a school, possession of drug
paraphernalia with intent to use and possession of drug

Po 765

paraphernalia with intent to use within 1500 feet of
a school,

“At trial, Michael Wuchek, a detective with the New
Haven police department, testified as an expert witness
on the street level sale of narcotics. He opined that the
quantity of narcotics, the packaging of the narcotics,
the empty bags, the razor blade and the small denomina-
tions of money found in the defendant’s pockets were
consistent with the street level sale of $10 bags of crack
cocaine. Wuchek also testified that street level dealers
often work in teams at a specific location, that alookout
riding on a bicycle commonly would be employed dur-
ing a street level sale to identify customers or the police
and that street level dealers typically would attempt to
run away to avoid the police.

“Anwar Houwari, a civil engineer and projects man-
ager and record keeper in the engineering department.
of the city of New Haven, also testified. After examining
an engineering map of the city of New Haven, Houwari
determined that the distance between the Timothy
Dwight School and 49 Waverly Street, where the defen-
dant was stopped, was 1050 feet.” Id., 733-35.

In his appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant
challenged his conviction, claiming that: (1) the trial
court improperly failed to instruct the jury on specific
intent, which was relevant to all four charges; (2) there
was insufficient evidence of the defendant’s specific
intent to sell narcotics at any particular location as
required by § 21a-278a (b); and (8) there was insufficient
evidence of whether the Timothy Dwight School was
a “public or private elementary or secondary school”
as required by both §§ 21a-267 (c) and 21a-278a (b). With
respect to the defendant’s first argument, the Appellate
Court concluded that the trial court instructed the jury
on general intent but did not define specific intent, even
though all of the crimes at issue were specific intent

766 Po

Le
crimes. State v. Lewis, supra, 113 Conn. App. 739. Con-
sequently, the failure to instruct the jury on specific
intent constituted reversible error. Id., 740.

The Appellate Court then reviewed the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction
of §§ 21a-278a (b) and 21a-267 (c) to determine whether
retrial on those counts would violate the prohibition
against double jeopardy.” Upon review of the record, the
Appellate Court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence that the defendant intended to sell narcotics
at a location that was within 1500 feet of a school. Id.,
749. Because intent to sell at a particular location is an
element of the crime of possession of narcotics with
intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school in violation
of § 21a-278a (b), retrial on that charge was barred. Id.,
745. A majority of the court additionally concluded that
the defendant could not be retried on that charge or
on the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia with
intent to use within 1500 feet of a school in violation
of § 21a-267 (c) because there was insufficient evidence
that the Timothy Dwight School was an elementary
or secondary school, an element of both offenses. Id.
Consequently, the Appellate Court directed the trial
court to render judgment of not guilty of violating
§§ 21a-267 (c) and 21a-278a (b).° This certified appeal
followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

2'The defendant did not appeal his conviction of possession of narcotics
with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent and possession
of drug paraphernalia with intent to use in violation of §§ 21a-278 (b) and
21a-267 (a) on the ground of insufficient evidence. Consequently, the double
jeopardy clause does not prevent the defendant's retrial on either charge.

8 Judge Bishop concurred in the majority's reversal on the basis of the
trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on specific intent, but dissented from
the majority's resolution of the defendant's insufficiency claims. State v.
Lewis, supra, 118 Conn. App. 749. Judge Bishop would have found sufficient
evidence in the record to support the defendant’s conviction under both
§§ 21a-267 (c) and 21a-278a (b), and, as a result, would have remanded the
case for a new trial on all four charges, Id., 757.

Po 767
Dee

The state argues that the Appellate Court improperly
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support
the defendant’s conviction under §§ 21a-278a (b) and
21a-267 (c) because the record establishes: (1) that the
defendant intended to sell the narcotics in his posses-
sion at the particular location where he was appre-
hended; and (2) that this location was within 1500 feet
of an elementary or.secondary school. We address each
of the state’s claims in turn.

The two part test this court applies in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal con-
viction is well established.‘ “First, we construe the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts
so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded
that the cumulative force of the evidence established
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Grant, 219 Conn. 596, 599-600,
594 A.2d 459 (1991).

“In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not
required to accept as dispositive those inferences that
are consistent with the defendant’s innocence.” State
v. Delgado, 247 Conn. 616, 620, 725 A.2d 306 (1999).
“[I]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary infer-
ences, the jury is not barred from drawing those infer-
ences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw
only those inferences consistent with innocence. The
rule is that the jury’s function is to draw whatever

“To the extent that the defendant's sufficiency claims were unpreserved,
we observe that “any defendant found guilty on the basis of insufficient
evidence has been deprived of a constitutional right, and would therefore
necessarily meet the four prongs of [State v. Golding, 213 Conn, 233, 239-40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989)]. There being no practical significance, therefore, for
engaging in a Golding analysis of an insufficiency of the evidence claim,
we will review the defendant's challenge to his conviction . . . as we do
any properly preserved claim.” State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270, 276 n.8, 623
A.2d 42 (1993).

768 Po
Ll

inferences from the evidence or facts established by
the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grant,
supra, 219 Conn. 604. The rule does not require that.
“each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred
from evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Crafts, 226 Conn.
237, 244, 627 A.2d 877 (1993). As we have observed,
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof
beyond all possible doubt . . . . On appeal, we do not
ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence
that would support a reasonable hypothesis of inno-
cence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable
view of the evidence that supports the jury’s verdict of
guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Aloi, 280 Conn. 824, 842, 911 A.2d 1086 (2007).

Although “[t]here is no distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence as far as probative force
is concerned”; State v. Perez, 183 Conn. 225, 227, 439
A.2d 305 (1981); “[bJecause [t]he only kind of an infer-
ence recognized by the law is a reasonable one . . .
any such inference cannot be based on possibilities,
surmise or conjecture. . . . It is axiomatic, therefore,
that [a]ny [inference] drawn must be rational and
founded upon the evidence. . . . However, [t]he line
between permissible inference and impermissible spec-
ulation is not always easy to discern. When we infer,
we derive a conclusion from proven facts because such
considerations as experience, or history, or science
have demonstrated that there is a likely correlation
between those facts and the conclusion. If that correla-
tion is sufficiently compelling, the inference is reason-
able. But if the correlation between the facts and the
conclusion is slight, or if a different conclusion is more
closely correlated with the facts than the chosen conclu-
sion, the inference is less reasonable. At some point,
the link between the facts and the conclusion becomes

po 769
Lt

so tenuous that we call it speculation. When that point

is reached is, frankly, a matter of judgment.” (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Copas, 252 Conn. 318, 338-39, 746 A.2d 761 (2000).

I

We first address the state’s claim that the record
contains sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s
conviction of possession of narcotics with intent to sell
within 1500 feet of a school under § 21a-278a (b). The
state maintains that the evidence it presented at trial
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended to sell narcotics at the particular place where
he was stopped by the police, 49 Waverly Street, which
was within 1500 feet of a school. In response, the defen-
dant argues that although the state presented sufficient
evidence whereby the jury reasonably could have
inferred that he had intended to sell drugs, it failed to
carry its burden of proving that he intended to sell drugs
at 49 Waverly Street. We agree with the defendant.

Section 21a-278a (b) provides in relevant part: “To
constitute a violation of this subsection, an act of trans-
porting or possessing a controlled substance shall be
with inient to sell or dispense in or on, or within
one thousand five hundred feet of, the real property
comprising a public or private elementary or secondary
school . . . .” (Emphasis added.) In State v. Denby,
235 Conn. 477, 483, 668 A.2d 682 (1995), we interpreted
§ 21a-278a (b) to require the state to prove not only that
a defendant possessed narcotics within the statutory
distance from a school with the intent to sell the narcot-
ics somewhere, but also that the defendant “intended
to sell or dispense those drugs in his or her possession
at a specific location, which location happens to be
within [1500] feet of an elementary or secondary

770 Po
—

school.” More recently, we reaffirmed this interpreta-
tion, stating that “[mJere possession of narcotics with
an intent to sell at some unspecified point in the future,
at some unspecified place, is not enough [to prove a
violation of § 21a-278a (b)].” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 659-60, 1 A.3d
1051 (2010), quoting State v. Lewis, supra, 113 Conn.
App. 747. Accordingly, we review the sufficiency of the
state’s evidence under § 21a-278a (b) mindful that the
state bears the burden of proving that the defendant
intended to sell or dispense narcotics at a particular
place. Further, because the defendant's intent is an
element of the crime, the state must establish that intent
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether a defendant possesses the requisite intent
is a question of fact. State v. Hedge, supra, 297 Conn.
658. “[D]irect evidence of the accused’s state of mind
is rarely available. . . . Therefore, intent is often
inferred from conduct . . . and from the cumulative
effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational
inferences drawn therefrom.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Aloi, supra, 280 Conn. 843. Although
the trier of fact may consider the cumulative impact of
circumstantial evidence, and may draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom, we emphasize that those infer-
ences “cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or
conjecture.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Copas, supra, 252 Conn. 338.

In applying this standard, the lower courts have gen-
erally found that evidence of an actual or attempted
sale is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that a defendant intended to sell narcotics at a particular
location. See, e.g., State v. Cohens, 62 Conn. App. 345,

®In 1992, the General Assembly amended the statute to increase the
distance to school property from 1000 to 1500 feet. See Public Acts 1992,
No. 92-82.

Po 77
—

355, 773 A.2d 363 (finding sufficient evidence of intent to
sell in proscribed area when officer observed defendant
engage in transaction in area known for drug activity),
cert. denied, 256 Conn. 918; 774 A.2d 139 (2001); State
v. Knight, 56 Conn. App. 845, 848, 852-53, 747 A.2d 13
(2000) (finding sufficient evidence of intent to sell in
proscribed area when officer asked for “‘ten’” and
defendant showed officer marijuana and cocaine).

Without evidence of an actual or attempted sale, it
is of course more challenging, but not impossible, for
the state to establish intent to sell at a particular loca-
tion. We recently clarified that our focus in determining
whether there is sufficient evidence to support a convic-
tion under § 21a-278a (b) is whether the state produced
“evidence that the defendant engaged in conduct
reflecting an intent to sell drugs at some location within
the proscribed area . . . .” State v. Hedge, supra, 297
Conn. 661. In Hedge, we considered the defendant’s
possession of 88 Ziploc bags of cocaine, 100 “ ‘slabs’ ”
of cocaine, 15 “folds” of heroin and $59 in cash. The
state also presented testimony that when the arresting
officers stopped the defendant for failing to use a turn
signal, the defendant was in an area “known for heavy
narcotics trafficking,” that money was “ ‘strewn’ ”
within the defendant’s vehicle, and that the defendant
had been “ ‘on his supposed mission to buy milk for [two
and one-half] hours.’ ” Id., 659. Viewing this evidence in
the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we
stated that “the large quantity of drugs . . . sup-
port[ed] an inference that the defendant had intended.
to sell the drugs somewhere.” (Emphasis in original.)
Id. The other evidence presented by the state, however,
did not provide an adequate basis for concluding that
the place the defendant intended to sell the narcotics
was the place of his arrest. Id., 661. Consequently, we
held that the evidence was insufficient to support the
defendant’s conviction for violating § 21a-278a (b). Id.

772 Po

The facts of the present case are analogous to the
facts in Hedge. Here, as in Hedge, the jury was presented
with evidence from which it reasonably could have
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant intended to sell the drugs in his possession. For
example, upon the defendant’s arrest, the police seized
nineteen Ziploc bags containing crack cocaine, a razor
blade and $876 in small denominations of money distrib-
uted among the defendant’s pockets. Wuchek testified
that the possession of these items suggested an intent
to sell drugs, as opposed to an intent to retain them
for personal use. He explained that crack cocaine is
usually packaged in small Ziploc bags, referred to as
“dimes,” and that a razor blade is used to break up
pieces of cocaine into smaller pieces for sale. Finally,
he testified that street level sellers typically possess
small denominations of money to facilitate quick sales
and that they distribute this money in various places
on their body to reduce monetary losses if robbed.

Although the defendant’s possession of drugs and
drug paraphernalia is probative of his intent to sell
drugs somewhere, as we stated in Hedge, such evidence
on its own is insufficient to establish that the defendant
intended to sell drugs within the proscribed area. In
the present case, the state presented no evidence of an
actual or attempted sale. Additionally, as in Hedge, the
stop of the defendant at that particular location was
merely fortuitous for two reasons. First, the arresting
officers detained the defendant because Williams
resembled the description of a robbery suspect, not
because they had any reason to suspect that the defen-
dant intended to sell drugs at that location. Second, the
evidence suggests that the defendant was in transit,
moving through the area. For example, according to
Rivera’s testimony, the defendant was in motion, riding
his bicycle, when Rivera arrived. According to the testi-
mony of defense witness Shirley Warren, a neighbor of

Po 773
—

the defendant’s, the defendant was riding his bicycle but
pulled over briefly when he recognized his neighbors.
Unlike in State v. Reid, 123 Conn. App. 383, 398, 1 A.3d
1204, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 929, 5 A.3d 490 (2010), in
which the Appellate Court found sufficient evidence of
the defendant's intent to sell in the proscribed area
when he was in a known drug area for an “extended
period of time” with drugs and drug paraphernalia in
his possession, there is no indication in the record that
the defendant was in the area for an amount of time
sufficient to imply that he was doing more than passing
through when the police detained him. Finally, we
observe that 49 Waverly Street was approximately one
block away from the defendant’s home. Thus, the defen-
dant was apprehended within his neighborhood—the
area he necessarily would pass through every time he
left or returned to his home. As we stated in State v.
Hedge, supra, 297 Conn. 660, quoting State v. Lewis,
supra, 113 Conn. App. 747: “ ‘Quite obviously, if [a per-
son] is apprehended while coincidentally passing
through a location, there is no logical inference that he
intended to sell at the location of apprehension.’ ”®

The state points to other evidence in the record in
an attempt to distinguish the present case from Hedge
and to support its argument that the record contains
an adequate basis for concluding that the defendant
intended to sell narcotics at 49 Waverly Street. We find

©The state contends that the present case is distinguishable from Hedge
because the defendant here was accessible and open to approach on a
bicycle, unlike the defendant in Hedge, who was driving an automobile. We
question whether the difference between these two vehicles supports the
state’s conclusion. Nevertheless, we recognize that under certain factual
circumstances, different modes of transportation and the speed thereof may
bolster other evidence that supports or contradicts an inference of intent
to sell in a certain location. This is not such a case. Without further evidence
of the defendant's intent to sell drugs at 49 Waverly Street, the alleged
accessibility of a bicyclist as opposed to a driver does not lend the state's
case the cumulative force it needs to sustain its burden.

774 es

that the additional evidence fails both to distinguish
the present case from Hedge and to tie the defendant’s
intent to sell drugs to 49 Waverly Street. Specifically,
evidence of Williams’ presence, the defendant’s bicycle,
the defendant’s preparations, and his location in his
own neighborhood, as elucidated by Wuchek’s testi-
mony, is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intended to sell crack cocaine
at 49 Waverly Street.

First, contrary to the state’s argument, evidence that
the defendant was riding a bicycle next to Williams fails
to raise a logical inference of immediate drug trafficking
at that location. The parties presented testimony that
when the officers arrived, the defendant was on his
bicycle next to Williams, who was walking. Wuchek
testified that street level sellers of narcotics often work
in teams, with one person handling the drugs on foot
and another person on a bicycle or standing.at a corner
as a lookout. Despite their juxtaposition, evidence of
any complicity or communication between the defen-
dant and Williams, suggesting that their proximity was
more than mere chance, is entirely absent. The state,
in fact, admits that it did not offer evidence of any
communication or interaction between the defendant
and Williams. Besides the coincidence that the defen-
dant was on a bicycle and Williams was on foot, there
is no indication that the kind of teamwork Wuchek
described was occurring in this particular case. In fact,
if the defendant and Williams were operating together
in the way Wuchek testified street level sellers often
do, one would expect that the defendant, as the lookout
on a bicycle, would not also be the person holding the
drugs, money and drug paraphernalia. Moreover, the
officers at the scene evidently did not suspect Williams
of any wrongdoing to justify further detention, because
they released him once they verified that he was not
the robbery suspect they were seeking. At most, if the

Pe 776

jury credited Warren’s testimony, one could conclude
that the defendant engaged in innocent social conversa-
tion for a few minutes with Williams, Warren and War-
ren’s sister. For the jury to infer complicity between
Williams and the defendant without evidence of any
connection between Williams and the defendant’s drug
activities, they would have to engage in pure specu-
lation.

Second, even if the defendant and Williams were con-
federates, the evidence suggests that the defendant was
in transit. To support its contention that the defendant
‘was not merely coincidentally passing through the pro-
hibited area but, rather, was actively selling drugs, the
state presented Wuchek’s testimony that drug dealers
often take certain preparations and defensive measures
when selling drugs, such as layering their money like
the defendant did in the present case. The state, how-
ever, did not present any evidence that dealers would
not institute these same precautions before or after a
sale when drugs and money would also be on their
person. A conclusion that the defendant intended to
sell at 49 Waverly Street—as opposed to being en route
to or from a different place where he intended to peddle
narcotics, when he would be just as vulnerable to
attack—would require the jury to speculate among
equally likely possibilities. Consequently, although such
preparations and protective measures are probative of
an intent to sell, we conclude that they fail to raise a
permissible inference of an intent to sell at a particu-
lar location.

Finally, while we recognized in Hedge that evidence
of an area’s reputation as a heavy drug trafficking area
might make it more likely that a defendant intended
to sell drugs in that location, we concluded that such
evidence was insufficient to raise an inference of intent
out of the realm of speculation. State v. Hedge, supra,
297 Conn. 660-61 (“although the fact that Marina Village

776 PO

is a place where drugs frequently are sold might make
it more likely that the defendant was planning to sell
drugs there as opposed to some other discrete location,
one can only speculate as to whether the defendant
intended to sell drugs at or within 1500 feet of [the
prohibited area]”). Regardless, the state’s evidence of
the character of the neighborhood consisted only of
Wuchek’s statement that he “probably” had made more
than twenty arrests in the area during the ten years
that he has been a New Haven police officer.’ More
importantly, the Waverly Street area was where the
defendant lived. Wuchek testified that street level deal-
ers typically restrict their activities to places where they
or their family live because of their familiarity with the
residents and terrain; however, one’s neighborhood is
also one’s home, the place where one relaxes, socializes
and engages in an untold number of other legitimate
activities. Given the tremendous range of possible law-
ful reasons the defendant could have had for being
near his home, the evidence presented by the state
attempting to correlate the facts with its chosen conclu-
sion appears so tenuous that it shades into pure specula-
tion. Accordingly, we conclude, like the Appellate
Court, that Wuchek’s testimony, alone and cumula-
tively, is “too slender a reed on which to draw the
inference of intent to sell at the precise location of

apprehension . . . .” State v. Lewis, supra, 113 Conn.
App. 749 n.11.
7 Wuchek testified as follows:

“[The Prosecutor]: Specifically, have you conducted surveillance of street
level drug deals in the area of George and Waverly Streets in the past?

“[Wuchek]: Yes. I have made arrests there.

“[The Prosecutor]: How many times?

“[Wuchek]: I couldn't tell—I couldn't even give you an honest answer,

many.
“(The Prosecutor]: More than ten?
“[Wuachek}; Yes.
“[The Prosecutor]: More than twenty?
“[Wuchek]: Probably.”

Po 17

In sum, in the present case, as in Hedge, we conclude
that, without the application of surmise or conjecture,
the state failed to prove that the defendant had engaged
in any activity, suspicious or otherwise, that would give
rise to a reasonable inference that he planned to sell
drugs at or within 1500 feet of the Timothy Dwight
School. See State v. Hedge, supra, 297 Conn. 660. The
cumulative force of the state’s evidence, even when
viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict, was insufficient to establish beyond a reason-
able doubt the defendant’s intent to sell narcotics at
49 Waverly Street. Accordingly, the Appellate Court
properly concluded that the defendant’s conviction of
sale of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of
aschool in violation of § 21a-278a (b) was not supported
by sufficient evidence and must be reversed. Moreover,
because the prohibition against double jeopardy bars
retrial of that offense, the Appellate Court properly
remanded the case with direction to render judgment
of not guilty as to that charge.

I

We now turn to the state’s claim that the Appellate
Court improperly concluded that the record contained
insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convic-
tion of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to
use within 1500 feet of a school under § 21a-267 (c).
Specifically, the state argues that the evidence con-
tained in the record is sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Timothy Dwight School was
an elementary or secondary school. Section 21a-267 (c)
provides in relevant part: “Any person who violates
subsection (a) or (b) of this section’ in or on, or within
one thousand five hundred feet of, the real property

®The defendant was charged under subsection (a) of § 21a-267, which

* provides in relevant part: “No person shall . . . possess with intent to use

drug paraphernalia... .”

778 Po

comprising a public or private elementary or secondary
school and who is not enrolled as a student in such
school shall be imprisoned for a term of one year
....” Thus, the classification of the school in question
as an elementary or secondary school is an element
of the offense that the state must establish beyond a
reasonable doubt.®

The following facts are relevant to the resolution of
this claim. Clifford Daniels, the district supervisor of
the board of education of the city of New Haven, testi-
fied that the Timothy Dwight School is a school in his
district. Daniels also testified that the Timothy Dwight
School is a public school. Lastly, the jury heard Daniels’
partial response to the prosecutor’s query regarding
what grades were taught at the Timothy Dwight School.

® Although §§ 21a-278a (b) and 21a-267 (c) both provide an enhanced
penalty if a specified drug violation occurs within a school zone, the intent
requirements of the two statutes differ. As discussed in part I of this opinion,
§ 2la-278a (b) requires proof of a defendant's specific intent to sell in a
particular area, which happens to be within 1500 feet of an elementary or
secondary school. In contrast, § 212-267 (c) does not require proof of a
defendant’s specific intent to engage in a prohibited act in a particular
location. Unlike § 21a-278a (b), § 212-267 (c) does not contain the term
“intent,” or any other mental state, and we decline to read such an intent
requirement into § 212-267 (c). Thus, with respect to § 21a-267 (c), the mere
fact that the defendant was within a school zone when he violated § 21a-
267 (a) is sufficient, and the state is not required to show additionally
that the defendant intended to be in that particular area when he violated
subsection (a). Consequently, we review the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the defendant's conviction under § 212-267 (c) only for proof
that the defendant's violation of § 212-267 (a) occurred within 1500 feet of
an elementary or secondary school.

Although § 214-267 (c) does not articulate a specific intent requirement,
itincorporates § 212-267 (a), which does require a showing of specific intent.
Therefore, because the violation of § 214-267 (a) was a necessary element
of § 21a-267 (c), the Appellate Court's reversal of the defendant's conviction
under § 21a-267 (a) for instructional error required the reversal of § 212-267
(©). We review the sufficiency of the evidence as to the violation of § 21a-
267 (c) in order to determine whether the defendant may be retried on that,
charge, or whether a judgment of acquittal is required. Because we conclude
that the evidence was sufficient as to that charge, the case must be remanded
for a new trial.

Po 779
—

Daniels stated, “The grades are from . . .” before
defense counsel objected on the basis of relevance and
potential prejudice to the defendant. The trial court
then excused the jury, and defense counsel expressed
concern that it would prejudice the defendant if the
jury heard that young children attended the school. The
state responded that the question was necessary for it to
prove that the defendant was not enrolled as astudent at
that school, as required by § 21a-267 (c). The trial court
appears to have partially sustained the objection by
stating that the state could not elicit the range of grades
present at the school, but that the state could ask the
witness to name the highest grade level at the school.
The parties resolved their dispute by stipulating that
the defendant was not enrolled as a student at the
Timothy Dwight School at the time of the offense. It is
clear from this conversation that the parties’ disagree-
ment concerned the revelation to the jury of the young
age of the students, which would become apparent from
testimony concerning the lowest grade, but would not
be evident from the fact that the school contained
grade levels.

The defendant argues that Daniels’ partial statement,
“The grades are from . . .” is not part of the evidentiary
record because the court’s refusal to allow the state to
ask the grade range was “tantamount to sustaining the
objection.” If the objection had been sustained, the
question and the partial response could not be consid-
ered, even in the absence of a motion to strike. See
Hackenson v. Waterbury, 124 Conn. 679, 684, 2 A.2d
215 (1938). Even assuming that the trial court partially
sustained the defendant’s objection, however, the par-
ties’ discussion with the trial court occurred while the
jury was excused. When the jury returned, the state
resumed questioning on a different subject. The court
did not state on the record that the objection was sus-
tained, nor did the defendant seek to strike the question

780 Po
—

and partial response from the record. The jury was
not informed explicitly or implicitly that the court had
sustained the objection." Indeed, even if the jury had
been privy to the trial court’s discussion with counsel,
it would have been aware, at most, that the defendant
had argued, and the court had agreed, that testimony
on the grade range should be excluded, but that the
defendant did not object to the fact that the school
contained grades. Consequently, when the trial court
instructed the jury that it could consider only evidence
that was admitted and not evidence that had been
stricken from the record or offered and refused," the
jury was not informed that it could not consider the
state’s question or the witness’ partial response. Thus,
the jury could properly draw reasonable inferences
from Daniels’ statement “The grades are from . . .”
including the inference that the Timothy Dwight School
contained more than one grade.

We believe that it is within the common understand-
ing that a public school with more than one grade level
is an elementary or secondary school. “Jurors are not
expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge

Tn support of his argument that the court implicitly sustained the objec-
tion, the defendant cites Young v. State, 254 Ind. 379, 886, 260 N.E.2d 572
(1970). In Young, the Indiana Supreme Court found that the trial court had
sustained an objection to testimony when it admonished the jury not to
consider the witness’ testimony. Id. Young is clearly distinguishable from
the present action where the trial court gave no indication to the jury of
having made any ruling on the objection. Similarly, we disagree with the
defendant's argument that this court's decision in State v. Bausman, 162
Conn. 308, 204 A.2d 812 (1972), compels us to find that the partial response
was excluded from the evidentiary record. In Bausman, the court sustained
the objection in the jury's presence, even though it did not rule on the
motion to strike. Id., 313. In contrast, the jury here was not aware of any
ruling on the objection.

"The court instructed the jury as follows: “[Y]ou are to consider only
such evidence as was admitted, and if some evidence was given but stricken
from the record, or, if some evidence was offered and refused, you must
not consider it and you must dismiss it from your minds. Nor should you
draw any inference from any question whose answer was stricken.”

Po 781
Ld

or their own observation and experience of the affairs
of life, but, on the contrary, to apply them to the evi-
dence or facts in hand, to the end that their action may
be intelligent and their conclusions correct.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Padua, 273 Conn.
188, 157, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). Further, “the definition
of words in our standard dictionaries is taken as a
matter of common knowledge which the jury is sup-
posed to possess.” State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695,
737, 478 A.2d 227, cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.
Ct. 1749, 84 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1984). The dictionary defines .
“public school” as “a school, [usually] for primary or
secondary grades, that is maintained at public expense.”
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001;
see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(1961) (“a tax-supported school controlled by a local
governmental authority [specifically] an elementary or
secondary school in the [United States] providing free
education for the children of residents of a specified
area”). Similarly, it defines “grade school” as “elemen-
tary school,” and describes “elementary school,” “sec-
ondary school” and “high school” in terms of their
respective grade levels.” Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary, supra. The definition of grade, in fact,
specifically refers to these types of schools, stating: “a
position or level in a course of advancement or decline

®“E]lementary school” is defined as “a school giving instructions in
rudimentary subjects in six to eight grades, often with a kindergarten.”
Random House Webster's College Dictionary, supra. “[S]econdary schoo!”
is defined as “a high school or a school of corresponding grade ranking
between a primary school and a college or university.” Id. “[H]igh school”
is defined as “a school attended after elementary school or junior high
school and [usually] consisting of grades 9 or 10 through 12.” Id. Similarly,
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra, defines “elementary
school” as “a school in which elementary subjects . . . are taught to chil-
dren from about six to about twelve years of age which in the (United
States] covers the first six or eight grades—compare secondary school” and
“secondary school” as “a school more advanced in grade than an elementary
school... .”

782 Po
—

or in a scale of ranks, qualities, or orders . . . as .

one of the successive levels of a [usually] elementary
or secondary school course that [usually] represents a
year’s work . . . .” Id. Therefore, based upon the com-
mon understanding of these terms, a juror could reason-
ably infer that a public school with more than one grade
would include elementary and secondary schools.

The Appellate Court, on the other hand, found that
there are public schools that are neither elementary
nor secondary schools, such as preschools and adult
education schools. State v. Lewis, supra, 113 Conn. App.
743. While we agree that public freestanding preschools
and adult education schools exist, we disagree that it
is within the common knowledge of ajuror that a graded
public school encompasses preschools and adult educa-
tion schools in addition to elementary and secondary
schools. Significantly, the definitions of “public school”
and “grade,” as already cited, do not refer to preschool
or adult education classes. Nor does the dictionary
define preschool or adult education in terms of grades
or grade levels."® The present case presents a slightly
more nuanced inference for a jury than in State v. King,
289 Conn. 496, 522, 958 A.2d 731 (2008) (finding suffi-
cient evidence that school in question was secondary
school where witnesses testified that school was called
“Kolbe Cathedral High School”), because an indicative
word such as “high school” is not part of the school’s
name. Nevertheless, we find that case instructive for
the proposition that the jury may apply its “common
knowledge about the familiar topic of school” to the
evidence. Id. Construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the verdict, we presume that

® Random House Webster's College Dictionary, supra, defines “preschool”
as “a school or nursery for preschool children” and “of, for, or concerning
achild between infancy and kindergarten age.” Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary, supra, defines “adult education” as “lecture or correspon-
dence courses for adults [usually] not otherwise engaged in formal study.”

ee 783
Le

the jury understood the meaning of the words “public
school” and “grade” according to their common usage,
as found in the dictionary. We conclude that the state
presented sufficient evidence to establish that the Timo-
thy Dwight School was a public elementary or second-
ary school within the meaning of § 21a-267 (c).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
Appellate Court properly determined that the record
contained insufficient evidence of the defendant's
intent to sell narcotics at the location of his arrest as
required by § 21a-278a (b), and properly ordered that
the trial court render judgment of not guilty as to the
charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell
within 1500 feet of a school; however, we conclude that
the Appellate Court improperly determined that there
was insufficient evidence that the Timothy Dwight
School was an elementary or secondary school, as
required by § 21a-267 (c), and improperly ordered the
trial court to render judgment of not guilty as to the
charge of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent
to use within 1500 feet of a school. Because of the
instructional error, however, a new trial is required.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed only
as to the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia
with the intent to use within 1500 feet of a school and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
reverse the judgment of the trial court as to that charge
and to remand the case to the trial court for a new trial
on that charge; the judgment of the Appellate Court is
affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and NORCOTT,
PALMER and ZARELLA, Js., concurred.

EVELEIGH, J., with whom VERTEFEUILLE, J., joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with
the majority’s conclusion that “the state failed to prove

784 Po

that the defendant [Demetrice L. Lewis] had engaged
in any activity, suspicious or otherwise, that would give
rise to a reasonable inference that he planned to sell
drugs at or within 1500 feet of [the proscribed area].”
Therefore, I agree with part I of the opinion in which
the majority affirms “the Appellate [Court’s] . . . con-
clu[sion] that the defendant’s conviction of sale of nar-
cotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a school
in violation of [General Statutes] § 21a-278a (b) was not
supported by sufficient evidence and must be reversed.”
I disagree, however, with part II of the opinion, in which
the majority concludes “that the state presented suffi-
cient evidence to establish that the Timothy Dwight
School was a public elementary or secondary school
within the meaning of [General Statutes] § 21a-267 (c).”
Therefore, I respectfully dissent with respect to part II
of the majority opinion and concur in part I of the
opinion.

lagree with the majority that “[§] 21a-267 (c) provides
in relevant part: ‘Any person who violates subsection
(a) or (b) of this section in or on, or within one thousand
five hundred feet of, the real property comprising a
public or private elementary or secondary school and
who is not enrolled as a student in such school shall
be imprisoned for a term of one year . . . .’ Thus, the
classification of the school in question as an elementary
or secondary school is an element of the offense that
the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In my view, however, the evidence was insufficient to
prove a violation pursuant to this section. It is for this
reason that I disagree with part II of the majority
opinion.

Clifford Daniels, the district supervisor for the board.
of education of the city of New Haven, testified that
the Timothy Dwight School is a school in his district.
He also testified that it was a public school. He did not
testify, however, that the school was either an elemen-

Pe 785
{|

tary or a secondary school, as is required by §§ 21a-267
(c) and 21a-278a (b). Further, he failed to testify that
the school was not a public preschool. A preschool
does not come within the definition of an elementary
or secondary school under the statutes. It is important.
to present a portion of Daniels’ testimony in order to
set the context of the majority's reliance on his testi-
mony. The following exchange occurred between Dan-
iels, the defendant, counsel and the court:

“(The Prosecutor]: On June 3, 2005, was the Timothy
Dwight School a New Haven public school?

“{Daniels]: Yes.

“(The Prosecutor]: What are the grades or the ages
of the children who attend the Timothy Dwight School?

“(Defense Counsel]: Objection, relevance. The ages
of the children who attend the school, there’s no rele-
vance to that, Your Honor, the charges that this incident
occurred within 1500 feet of the property of a school
and they’ve had a witness from the city engineer’s—

“The Court: How is it relevant, counsel?

“(The Prosecutor]: I'd like to be heard outside the
presence of the jury, please.

“The Court: I don’t think that’s necessary. Sustained.
“[The Prosecutor]: Well, then I would like to respond.
“The Court: Sustained. Ask the next question.
“{The Prosecutor]: What grades?

“TDaniels]: The grades are from—

“(Defense Counsel]: Objection, again, relevance. It’s
a public—

“(The Prosecutor]: It’s a necessary element, Your
Honor, [of] § 21a-267 (c).

786 Pe

“The Court: The jury can be removed, please. The
necessary element to § 21a-267 (c) is what?

“(The Prosecutor]: ‘The real property comprising of
public or private, elementary, secondary school and
who is not enrolled as a student in such school.’ The
grades are not only relevant, but necessary for the state
to be able to prove its count four.

“The Court: Well, how are they going to know how
old? You mean that the defendant is not a student there.

“(The Prosecutor]: Yes.

“(Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, this took place on
June 3, 2005. I think there’s a foundational question as
to whether the school was either in session and if—

“The Court: It doesn’t matter if it’s in session.

“(Defense Counsel]: If the state wants to ask what's
the highest grade level of astudent there and that they—
that’s a necessary element and I can see it being rele-
vant, but not the ages of all who attend the school.

“(The Prosecutor]: And the last question that I asked,
I did not ask the age. I asked the grade levels.

“(Defense Counsel]: The grade levels. But what’s the
highest grade? If the highest grade is fifth grade, it
doesn’t you know, they can see that [the defendant]
probably isn’t in the fifth [grade] enrolled at that school.
Tm just worried about—I understand the state’s burden
of proof and I'm not going to try to prevent the state
nor can I prevent the state from trying to prove its case.
However, it is . . . prejudicial to my client if it comes
in that we've got eight year old kids attending this school
and I think it’s unfair and its prejudice to his right to
a fair trial. So, if they need to ask it, I don’t see any
objection to asking what the highest grade level is at
that school. But to ask the age of all the children who
attend that school, I think that’s prejudicial.

Po 787
—

“{The Prosecutor]: And I’ve withdrawn that part of my
question, Your Honor, I’m asking for the grade levels.

“[Defense Counsel]: All the grade levels. Why not the
highest grade? The same result because it’s the highest
grade level.

“The Court: So then, you know, how are you going
to make the proof that he’s not a student there? Simply
by saying that it goes up to the eighth grade and that’s
the oldest child that might be there? Is that what you—

“[The Prosecutor]: That’s the inference that the jury
can draw, Your Honor.

“The Court: Okay, I'm not saying that they can’t.
Tm just—

“(The Prosecutor]: I might as well address it right
now, while the jury is not here. Assuming that Your
Honor allows the witness to answer that question, what
the grade levels are at the Timothy Dwight School, my
next question will be whether this witness knows if the
defendant is a student enrolled or was a student
enrolled at that school on June 3, 2005.

“The Court: Well, does he know that?

“{The Prosecutor]: He does not. But I’m willing to
ask that question anyway. He can answer truthfully, the
way that he can answer the question.

“The Court: Is that an issue here?

Defense Counsel]: Your Honor—

“The Court: I mean are you willing to stipulate that
he’s not a student at Timothy Dwight School?

“TThe Prosecutor]: I would accept the stipulation.

“TDefense Counsel]: Let me talk to [the prosecutor].

788 Po
—

“The Court: The issue is not whether the school was
open or closed. That makes no difference. The issue
is: Are you a student at Timothy Dwight [School] or
not? Are you willing to say, you know, the question is—
you're not required to stipulate that he’s a student at
Timothy Dwight [School]. The state can go about prov-
ing that element however they think is necessary to
prove that element. But I think that the prosecutor does
bring up a point, if he’s going to go about proving it
that way, then I think the necessary bit of information
he needs to glean is: What’s the highest grade level?
You can’t say the oldest student because you don’t
know. But I will allow the question as to what the
highest grade level is.

“(The Prosecutor]: Just the highest grade level or can
I ask the grade ranges?

“The Court: No, what’s the point in the ranges. It’s
the highest grade level, you know.

“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I prefer to stipulate.
I understand the state’s got its burden, but . . . it’s still
prejudicial to hear there are, you know, its fifth grade
to sixth grade—

“The Court: I'm not letting that in. I’m letting in the
highest grade level.

“TDefense Counsel]: Right. I understand that. But if
we stipulate that [the defendant] was not a student at
the school at the time, June 3rd—

“The Court: Then none of this is necessary.
“(Defense Counsel]: I’m willing to stipulate to that.
“The Defendant: I don’t have a choice?

“(Defense Counsel]: No, you do have a choice.

“The Court: You have a choice, but, you know.

Po 789
De

“The Defendant: My attorney said he could do it for
me and I’m doing it. I'll stipulate.

“The Court: Well—
“The Defendant: I'll stipulate.

“(Defense Counsel]: You don’t need to do anything.
We'll stipulate. Do you understand ... ?

“The Defendant: I'll stipulate.
“The Court: Well, let’s draw up the stipulation now.
“(Defense Counsel]: Okay.

“The Court: Okay . . . [the] prosecutor and the
defendant’s counsel agree that . . . the defense stipu-
late[s] to the fact that the defendant was not a student
at Timothy Dwight School on June 3, 2005.

“(Defense Counsel]: Fine. Acceptable to the
defendant.

“TThe Prosecutor]: Acceptable.

“The Court: Okay. So, let’s write out the stipulation
and let’s enter it as an exhibit.

“TThe Prosecutor]: Do you want defense counsel or
do you want the defendant?

“The Court: [The] [d]efendant through his counsel
and the state agree and stipulate that [the defendant]
was not a student at Timothy Dwight School on June
8, 2005. Can you read it, please?

“{The Prosecutor]: February 7, 2005, the defendant
through his counsel—

“The Court: Agree and stipulate that—

“(Defense Counsel]: Was not a student enrolled at
the Timothy Dwight School.

“The Court: On June 3, 2005.

790 Po

Lene
“(The Prosecutor]: Was not a student enrolled at the
Timothy Dwight School. ‘The defendant through his
counsel agree and stipulate that the defendant .. .
was not a student enrolled at the Timothy Dwight
School on June 3, 2005.’ ’'m going to add, ‘[t]hat the
state of Connecticut joins in this stipulation.’

“The Court: Let's see did you write one too,
[defense counsel]?

“(Defense Counsel]: I did. ‘The defendant through
his counsel and the state agree and stipulate that [the
defendant] was not a student enrolled at the Timothy
Dwight School on June 3, 2005.’

“The Court: That would do it. So, sign—both sign
on that.

“{Defense Counsel]: I just want to make sure you can
read it. Can you read that?

“The Court: That is the stipulation. That is what you're
agreeing to. That’s what will be entered as a stipulation,
however, subject to being—we'll keep that exhibit.
Retype it word for word and you know we'll make it a
more proper exhibit tomorrow. May I see it please?

“{Defense Counsel]: May I approach, Your Honor. I
think the language is fine. I agree with the court.

“The Court: All right, I’m holding in my hand, it’s a
yellow piece of paper signed stipulation and it has, ‘The
defendant,’ and then it has an arrow pointing ‘through
his counsel and the state agree and stipulate that [the
defendant] was not a student enrolled at the Timothy
Dwight School . . . on June 3, 2005.’ Is that your stipu-
lation, Mr. Prosecutor?

“TThe Prosecutor]: It is, Your Honor.
“The Court: Is that yours, Mr. Defense Attorney?

“{Defense Counsel]: Yes, it is Your Honor.

PT 791
Lee

“The Court: All right. This will be marked as court’s
exhibit. Is this our first?

“The Clerk: Yep.

“The Court: Court’s exhibit 1. And it will be subject
to retyping it, and re-signing so that it’s not written in
someone’s hand and the jury can read it, although they'll
be apprised of it.

“(The Prosecutor]: No objection, Your Honor.
“[Defense Counsel]: No objection, Your Honor.

“TThe Prosecutor]: Before you bring the jury out, I
can’t remember and I don’t want to re-ask the question
if I've already asked it. Did I ask whether the Timothy
Dwight School is a public school? I can’t remember
that I did that or not.

“The Court: I believe that you did, but you can ask
it again.

“{The Prosecutor]: Thank you.

“The Court: That’s all right, you can ask it again.

“(The Prosecutor]: Thank you.

“The Court: That’s all right. You can ask it again.
Because you don’t have anything else to ask him; is
that right?

“The Prosecutor]: No, I don’t know if Your Honor
is willing to inform the jury that we’ve entered into
a stipulation.

“The Court: I don’t need to now. They don’t need to
know that. You know if at the end of the trial, I instruct,
you know, we can deal with it. Okay. Bring the jury
back in.

“(Whereupon, jury panel enters the courtroom.)

792 Pe

“The Court: Counsel stipulate to the presence of all
the jurors.

“[The Prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor.
“(Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
“The Court: Any further questions?
“TThe Prosecutor]: One more question.

“{The Prosecutor]: Is the Timothy Dwight School a
public school in the city of New Haven?

“{Daniels]: Yes.
“tThe Prosecutor]: Thank you.”

The majority indicates that “the jury could properly
draw reasonable inferences from Daniels’ statement
‘The grades are from... .’” I disagree. In my view,
the record is clear that the court, in the absence of the
jury, indicated to counsel that it would allow the state
to inquire as to the highest grade level at the school,
but would not permit a question about the range of
grades or the ages of the children. The fact that the
partial response was not stricken from the record and
the jury was not instructed to disregard the partial
answer does not change the fact that the court would
not allow the answer to this question. The initial ques-
tion posed by the prosecutor, in the presence of the
jury was: “What are the grades or the ages of the chil-
dren who attend the Timothy Dwight School?” Defense
counsel objected and the court entered the following
ruling:

“(The Prosecutor]: I'd like to be heard outside the
presence of the jury, please.

“The Court: I don’t think that’s necessary. Sustained.
“(The Prosecutor]: Well, then I would like to respond.
“The Court: Sustained. Ask the next question.

Pe 798
as
“(The Prosecutor]: What grades?

“(Daniels]: The grades are from—

“{Defense Counsel]: Objection, again, relevance. . . .
RE

“The Court: . . . But I will allow the question as to
what the highest grade level is.

“IThe Prosecutor]: Just the highest grade level or can
I ask the grade ranges?

“The Court: No, what’s the point in the ranges. It’s
the highest grade level, you know.

“{Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I prefer to stipulate.
I understand the state’s got its burden, but . . . it’s still
prejudicial to hear there are, you know, it’s fifth grade
to sixth grade—

“The Court: I’m not letting that in. I’m letting in the
highest grade level.”

Clearly, this is part of the same question to which
the objection was previously sustained. Even though
the state is well aware of the court’s ruling on the
record, it still argues that the answer should stand on
appeal. The majority accepts this proposition and uses
it as a basis for reversing the judgment of the Appellate
Court. It seems more than a bit incongruous to me that,
once a court’s ruling sustaining an objection is made
on the record, we should now use part of the answer
that was incomplete before the jury, as a basis for our
opinion. Although the court did not sustain the objec-
tion to the question in front of the jury, it is likely that
the jurors realized that the objection was sustained,
since the question was similar to the prior question to
which an objection was sustained, and the prosecutor
asked a new question when the jury returned. See State
v. Lyons, 43 Conn. App. 704, 713, 686 A.2d 128 (1996)

794 PO
Leen

(noting court implicitly sustained certain objections),
cert. denied, 240 Conn. 906, 688 A.2d 335 (1997). Thus,
in a case wherein the plaintiff gave a partial answer to
a question before defense counsel could object, the
Supreme Court did not require counsel to move to strike
the answer after the objection was sustained. “The only
basis upon which the plaintiff can claim error in the
ruling of the trial court in setting aside the verdict is
that the jury could, in the absence of a motion to strike
out, properly consider the testimony. That is not the
law in this jurisdiction.” Hackenson v. Waterbury, 124
Conn. 679, 684, 2 A.2d 215 (1938). In the present case,
the fact that the court’s ruling did not entirely occur in
the presence of the jury, under the circumstances of
this case, should not make a difference. We should
follow the precedent established in Hackenson.

In my view, this partial testimony is not only inade-
quate, but also suggests an approach to appellate review
to which we should not subscribe. Further, the court
charged the jury as follows: “You are to consider only
such evidence as was admitted. And if some evidence
‘was given but stricken from the record or if some evi-
dence was offered and refused, you must not consider
it and you must dismiss it from your minds.” I would
place the partial answer “[t]he grades are from,” in
light of the court’s explicit rulings, in the category of
evidence offered and refused. It should not, pursuant.
to the court’s instructions, have been considered by the
jury, and we should not consider it on appeal.

There is yet another basis to reject this partial answer
as providing sufficient evidence of the nature of the
school. We are left to speculate what the entire answer
may have been. Was it: the grades are from ten to
twelve? Was it: the grades are from one to six? Certainly,
either of these answers would have satisfied the state’s
burden of proof. To the contrary, however, if the answer
was, “the grades are from preschool age three to pre-

Po 795
—

school age five,” such an answer would not have satis-
fied the state’s burden of proof. We are left to speculate
regarding the full answer that Daniels would have
supplied.

General Statutes § 10-4 (a) provides that the state
board of education has general supervision and control
over “preschool, elementary and secondary education,
special education, vocational education and adult edu-
cation . . . .” In other statutes, as explained by the
Appellate Court, “the legislature includes kindergarten
when discussing elementary education but does not
include preschool. See General Statutes § 10-145d (f)
(under state board regulations for teacher certification,
endorsement to teach elementary education valid for
kindergarten through grade six, inclusive); General Stat-
utes § 10-273a (town transporting children to elemen-
tary school including kindergarten may seek
reimbursement for transportation cost). Because public
schools exist that are neither elementary schools nor
secondary schools, Daniels’ testimony that the Timothy
Dwight School was a public school was not sufficient
to support a finding that the conduct occurred within
1500 feet of an elementary or secondary school.” State
v. Lewis, 113 Conn. App. 731, 743-44, 967 A.2d 618
(2009). I agree with the Appellate Court.

The state does not dispute the Appellate Court’s opin-
ion that there are other public schools that do not come
within the definition of elementary or secondary
schools, such as preschools. Instead, the state argues,
and the majority accepts, that the evidence in this case
was sufficient because the jury could infer from Daniels’
partial answer “[t]he grades are from,” that he had to
be referring to a school with grades, which would not
include preschools or schools devoted solely to adult
education. As indicated previously, in my view, we
should not be considering this phrase in light of the
trial court’s express ruling that it would not allow it.

796 Pe

Even if we should consider it, however, I agree with the
defendant’s contention that “neither [General Statutes]
§ 10-220 (a) nor the partial answer supplied any evi-
dence as to what type of school Timothy Dwight School
was and the state’s claim to the contrary is utterly
without merit.” Section 10-220 (a) requires local boards
of education to maintain elementary and secondary
schools. Daniels, however, never testified that the only
schools that fell within his supervision were elementary
and secondary schools. A juror would not be expected
to have knowledge of this particular statute. See United
States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 410 (5th Cir. 1998) (juror
is not expected to know law). Further, as indicated
by the Appellate Court, there are public preschools in
Connecticut that do not come within the definition of
an elementary school. In many educational statutes,
the legislature refers to preschool education separately
from elementary and secondary education. See General
Statutes § 10-4 (a) (state board of education supervises
educational interests of state, including “preschool, ele-
mentary and secondary education”). Thus, in my view,
§§ 21a-278a (b) and 21a-267 (c) are violated only if the
prohibited acts occur within 1500 feet of an elementary
or secondary school, and not a preschool. The clear
language of § 21a-267 (c) refers to “real property com-
prising a public or private elementary or secondary
school... .”

The jury was left with an incomplete answer prior
to the recess. When court reconvened, the prosecutor
asked a different question. The jury was later instructed
in the court’s final charge that “if some evidence was
offered and refused, you must not consider it and you
must dismiss it from your minds.” The jury is presumed
to follow the court’s instructions; State v. Bausman,
162 Conn. 308, 314, 294 A.2d 312 (1972); but since the
court precluded the jury from considering the unfin-
ished answer, and because it is not properly considered.

Po 797

as “evidence” (because it was offered and refused), it
cannot be the basis for concluding that the state met
its burden of proof. Further, because Daniels did not
finish his answer and did not affirmatively state that
there were actually grades at the school, it is unknown
what his complete answer would have been, or if he
would have verified that the school had grades. In my
view, the majority’s conclusion that the jury could infer
that the school was an elementary or secondary school
on the basis of Daniels’ incomplete answers crosses
the boundary between reasonable inferences and sheer
speculation. The prosecutor never asked the question
that would have established the state’s burden of proof.
If the prosecutor had asked the question that the court
would have allowed regarding the highest grade in the
school, in my view, it might have been sufficient for
the jury to have found whether the school was an ele-
mentary or secondary school. The incomplete answer
“Tt]he grades are from” should not form the basis for
reversing the Appellate Court’s decision.

The majority indicates that, “[e]ven assuming that the
trial court partially sustained the defendant’s objection,
however, the parties’ discussion with the trial court
occurred while the jury was excused.” I respectfully
disagree. The first question, in the presence of the jury,
incorporated the inquiry regarding the grades at the
school. The court twice sustained the objection to this
question and instructed the prosecutor to move on. The
next question was “[w]hat grades?” Daniels then started.
his answer and defense counsel objected. This sequence
of events occurred in the presence of the jury. In the
absence of the jury, the court indicated that it would
not allow the question when it stated: “No, what’s the
point in the ranges. It’s the highest grade level, you
know. . . . I’m not letting that in.” When the jury
returned, a different question was asked. Therefore, in

798 Po
PoCsC“(_Cdt

my view, part of the court's ruling did occur in the
presence of the jury.

Accordingly, in my view, we should not consider a
partial answer, made in response to a question to which
the court had sustained an objection, as a basis for our
decision. There was insufficient evidence in the record
of the defendant’s intent to sell narcotics at the location
of his arrest, as is required under § 21a-278a (b). Fur-
ther, there was insufficient evidence that the Timothy
Dwight School was an elementary or secondary school,
as required by § 21a-267 (c). Therefore, I concur with
the majority as to part I of its opinion affirming the
judgment of the Appellate Court that the state failed to
carry its burden to support a conviction under § 21a-
2778a (b). Irespectfully dissent from part II of the major-
ity opinion, however, because I would also affirm the
judgment of the Appellate Court that there was insuffi-
cient evidence presented that the Timothy Dwight
School was an elementary or secondary school, as is
required to support a conviction under § 21a-267 (c).

IN RE PETITION OF REAPPORTIONMENT
COMMISSION, EX REL.
(SC 18907)
Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.
Argued February 6—officially released February 10, 2012*

* February 10, 2012, the date that this order was issued, is the operative
date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

Po 799
Ee

Ross Garber, with whom, on the brief, was Charles
L. Howard, for the Republican Members of the Connect-
icut Reapportionment Commission.

Aaron S. Bayer, with whom were Bradley W. Moore
and Thomas Clauss, Jr., for the Democratic Members
of the Connecticut Reapportionment Commission.

David N. Rosen, with whom were Jeremy Golubcow-
Teglasi and, on the brief, William M. Bloss, for the
Coalition for Minority Representation Statewide.

Andrew J. McDonald, for the Governor of the state
of Connecticut, Dannel P. Malloy.

George Jepsen, attorney general, Gregory T. D’Auria,
solicitor general, and Maura Murphy Osborne, assistant
attorney general, filed a brief for the state of Con-
necticut.

Opinion

PER CURIAM. Pursuant to the authority conferred
by Article third, § 6 (d), of the Constitution of Connecti-
cut, as amended by Articles XII, XVI and XXVI of the
Amendments, the Court hereby adopts as the estab-
lished plan of congressional districting the plan
depicted and described in Exhibits 1 and 4 of the Draft
Report and Plan of the Special Master, Nathaniel Per-
sily, dated January 13, 2012, designated by the Special
Master to be his final report and plan on January 19,
2012. The plan complies in every respect with our Janu-
ary 3, 2012 Order Directing Special Master.

800 Po
Cd

Appended hereto is the Draft Report and Plan of
the Special Master and its supporting Appendix.' The
foregoing materials, along with the census block equiva-
lency file(s) that provide the details of the plan, will be
filed today with the Secretary of the State for publica-
tion. Upon publication, the plan of congressional dis-
tricting shall have the full force of law.

The Special Master has submitted to the Court an
itemization of the fees incurred in producing the report
and plan. Those fees total $36,400, an amount which
we find to be reasonable. Pursuant to this Court’s
December 27, 2011 order, the fees of the Special Master
are to be assessed against the Reapportionment Com-
mission. The Commission shall remit full payment
directly to Special Master Persily.

COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION v.
WILLIAM B. COLEMAN
(SC 18721)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and
Harper, Js.

‘The Draft Report and Plan of the Special Master and its supporting
Appendix are contained in the file of this case in the Supreme Court clerk’s
office and are provided on the Secretary of the State’s Web site, available
at hitp:/cga.ct. gov/red20L1/.

801

Argued October 25, 2011—officially released March 13, 2012

PO 803
Cd

William E. Murray, with whom were David McGuire
and, on the brief, Aubrey FE. Ruta and Michael T. Grant,
for the appellant (defendant).

Lynn D. Wittenbrink, assistant attorney general, with
whom were Ann E. Lynch, assistant attorney general,
and, on the brief, Neil Parille, assistant attorney gen-
eral, George Jepsen, attorney general, and Richard
Blumenthal, former attorney general, for the appel-
lee (plaintiff).

Martha F. Davis and Hope R. Metcalf filed a brief
for Professors of Law, Human Rights and Bioethics as
amici curiae.

Opinion

NORCOTT, J. Broadly stated, the issue raised in this
appeal’ is whether the state of Connecticut may force-
feed an inmate who is engaged in a hunger strike as a
form of protest. The defendant, William B. Coleman,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting
the application of the plaintiff, Theresa C. Lantz, the
former commissioner of correction (commissioner),”
for a permanent injunction permitting the department
of correction (department) to forcibly restrain and feed
the defendant to prevent life-threatening dehydration
and malnutrition. On appeal, the defendant contends
that the trial court improperly determined that: (1) the
state’s interests outweigh the defendant’s common-law
right to bodily integrity; (2) the forcible administration
of artificial nutrition and hydration to the defendant
does not violate his right to free speech and privacy
under the first and fourteenth amendments to the
United States constitution; and (8) international law

' The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

2 When this action commenced, the named plaintiff, Theresa C. Lantz, was
the commissioner of correction. The current commissioner is Leo C. Arnone.

804 Po
Cc

does not prohibit the force-feeding of the defendant.
We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The defendant currently is serving
a fifteen year sentence, execution suspended after eight
years, with a maximum discharge date of December 30,
2012, at the McDougall-Walker correctional institution
following his convictions on charges pertaining to his
relationship with his ex-wife. On September 17, 2007,
approximately two weeks after the Appellate Court
issued its decision affirming his convictions, the defen-
dant began a hunger strike. At that time, he weighed
approximately 237 pounds. On January 9, 2008, by
which time the defendant’s weight had dropped to 162
pounds, the commissioner sought both a temporary and
a permanent injunction authorizing the department to
restrain and force-feed the defendant if it became medi-
cally necessary given the health risks associated with
hunger strikes. In response, the defendant asserted sev-
eral special defenses, including the common law, consti-
tutional and international law grounds raised in this
appeal.’ On January 23, 2008, the trial court granted the
temporary injunction, with a trial set to follow on the
permanent injunction.

Following a trial to the court, the trial court granted
the commissioner’s application for a permanent injunc-
tion. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court
found the following facts. “[The defendant] has been
determined to be mentally competent every time he has
been evaluated during his incarceration. [He] has never
been diagnosed as suicidal. He is presently engaged in

® The defendant’s special defenses also included claims that force-feeding
is legally impermissible because of his living will and that force-feeding
him constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment to the United States constitution. The defendant has not pursued
these claims on appeal.

Po 805
es

a protest, taking the form of a hunger strike . . . pro-
testing what he claims to be a broken family and crimi-
nal judicial system that led to his wrongful conviction.
[The defendant] maintains that he is innocent of the
crimes of which he was convicted. [He] also insists that
his conviction is a form of ongoing abuse to his two
sons . . . with whom he has had no contact since his
conviction in 2005, and who are in the sole custody of
his ex-wife. Through his protest, [the defendant] wants
to raise awareness of what he perceives to be the misuse
and abuse of the criminal and family judicial system;
in particular, the assertion of false criminal allegations
in the context of divorce proceedings.

“The defendant clearly knows about the dangers of
organ failure and death that could result from the
refusal of nutrition, having had many discussions about
such problems with [the department’s] health staff and
having heard the testimony at the temporary injunction
hearing. [The defendant] insists that the termination of
his protest does not depend on receiving anything from
the [department], or the outcome of his habeas corpus
proceedings' or the outcome of this case. He is clearly
willing to continue this protest with no goal, other than
the vague one of publicizing his perception of defects
in the justice system.”

The trial court also noted the following events that
had ensued subsequent to its order granting the tempo-
rary injunction. Throughout the course of his hunger
strike, the defendant’s voluntary ingestion of nutrients
and liquids has varied: at some points, the defendant
has voluntarily consumed ice chips, milk, orange juice,
coffee and tea, or a liquid nutritional supplement; at
other points, he has refused to ingest food or liquids
in any form. Approximately one year after his hunger
strike began, the defendant stated that the strike

‘The defendant failed to prevail on his habeas petition.

806 Po
Cd

“need[ed] to be cranked up again,” at which point he
ceased all oral intake, including fluids. As a result of
increasing signs of dehydration, on September 22, 2008,
when the defendant’s weight was just 139 pounds,
Edward Blanchette, a physician and the clinical director
of the department, determined that forced intravenous
hydration was necessary to prevent death or irrevers-
ible harm.

“On October 16, 2008, [the defendant] said ‘I lost
another [eight] pounds. I didn’t think I would be going
much longer,’ and ‘I don’t want to go to church but I’d
like to see a priest.’ Beginning that day, the defendant
showed low values of potassium, which is an important
electrolyte to regulate certain bodily processes, putting
the defendant at risk for heart irritability and cardiac
[arrhythmias]. The defendant weighed 129 pounds on
October 17, 2008. On October 23, 2008, Blanchette deter-
mined that the defendant was at an ever increasing risk
of sudden death or irreversible complications because
of his hunger strike. Blanchette determined that it was
necessary to place a nasogastric . . . tube through
which liquid nutritional supplement would be given
unless the defendant would agree to voluntarily accept
at least some liquid nourishment. The defendant
declined, so a [nasogastric] tube was placed for the
first time on October 23, 2008.

“lThe defendant] had been told on a number of occa-
sions that if he was to be force-fed, it would be through
a [nasogastric] tube, which would be inserted through
his nose and threaded down into his stomach. This is
the simplest, safest method and the preferred procedure
to provide artificial nutrition. The [nasogastric] tube
utilizes the gastrointestinal system, and, in general, has
fewer risks of complication than any other artificial
nutrition method. Placing [a nasogastric] tube does not
usually cause pain and is normally well tolerated.

Po 807
Cd

“[Suzanne] Ducate [a physician and director of psy-
chiatric services of the department] has never had any
patient experience . . . great pain with the placement
of a [nasogastric] tube. That includes patients of smaller
stature than the defendant, as well as persons receiving
a larger diameter [nasogastric] tube. The placement of
a [nasogastric] tube is neither a difficult nor a risky
procedure; doctors are trained in the placement of such
tubes in their first year as medical students by practicing
on each other. Serious complications from the place-
ment of a [nasogastric] tube are rare.

“On October 27, 2008, a second [nasogastric] feeding
was done. [The defendant] claims he suffered excruciat-
ing pain on each occasion. He refused to sip water,
however, to facilitate the insertion of the tube into his
large nasal cavities and down his throat. On each occa-
sion, he twisted during the procedure and the [nasogas-
tric] tube kinked on the first attempt but was
successfully placed on the second attempt. Contrary to
his assertion, he did not vomit. There was no perforation
of his mucosa. A liquid nutritional supplement was
inserted directly into [the defendant’s] stomach via the
[nasogastric] tube on each occasion.

“After the second feeding, [the defendant] resumed
taking liquid nutritional supplements. . . . By Decem-
ber 1, 2008, he weighed 154 pounds. For the next two
months, his weight was relatively stable. . . . Since the
time he started taking nutritional supplements in late
October of 2008, his health and appearance [had]
improved markedly. But it is clear that [the defendant]
may resume his fasting at any time and that, but for
the [intravenous fluid] and [nasogastric] intervention,
he would have died long before [the] trial [on the perma-
nent injunction]. It is also clear that if the [department]
lacked the legal means to force-feed him during his
incarceration, he would starve to death before his sen-
tence is completed.

808 Po
Ee

“Tnmates outnumber staff in Connecticut prisons and
[the] staff carry no weapons inside the prison. Behav-
ioral protests in a prison setting are not allowed by
the [department] because of their negative impact on
security and safety, having led to disturbances and riots
in Connecticut prisons in the past. When there is a
death in a correctional facility, the facility is locked
down, meaning that all normal activities such as show-
ers, work, school assignments, religious services, recre-
ational activities, visits and substance abuse programs
cease, and often inmates are fed in their cells.

“Inmates expect [the department] staff to intervene
and protect them and other inmates from harm and
become upset when that does not happen. If correc-
tional staff does not intervene when another inmate is
harming himself, the staff will have difficulty with the
inmates. It is [then Deputy Director Brian] Murphy’s
opinion that allowing [the defendant] to die via his
hunger strike would adversely affect [the department]
staff's ability to do their job safely and securely.

“Suicides and suicide attempts are considered secu-
rity risks in prison, both to the life of the self-harming
inmate as well as [to] other inmates. Inmates react when
there is a suicide attempt or a suicide. When an inmate
either attempts or commits suicide or other self-injuri-
ous behavior, other inmates require higher levels of
counseling, and sometimes engage in the same types
of behavior. Ducate is of the opinion that there is a
greater than 70 percent likelihood that if [the defendant]
were permitted to starve to death, there would be simi-
lar reactions as to other inmate suicides. Inmates would
be distressed, would go on [hunger strikes] themselves,
and would attempt suicide. She is also of the opinion.
that, with the media attention surrounding [the defen-
dant’s] protest, inmates would quickly find out [about
the defendant's] death, regardless [of] whether it
occurred at a prison or at a hospital, and the impact

Fe 809
Lt

on other inmates in correctional facilities would be the
same. She is of the opinion that if [the defendant] were
permitted to starve himself, other inmates would mimic
or copycat his behavior.

“Permitting the defendant in this case to die would
also adversely impact staff morale. Inmate deaths upset.
[department] staff members, and allowing a healthy
inmate to die would certainly lower staff morale. It is
probable that some staff would require time off, would
have to visit the employee assistance program for state
employees, and would require counseling. Staff morale
impacts security within correctional facilities.

“Even an inmate in just a generally weakened condi-
tion from [a] lack of nutrition presents a security issue
in a correctional setting. Staff can be required to inter-
vene for a variety of reasons, including increased vul-
nerability to other inmates. Monitoring a hunger striker
requires a significant commitment of limited resources
in a prison setting, causing additional security and
order concerns.

“TAdditionally] since September, 2007, a significant
amount of medical and custodial staff time, and
resources ha[ve] been dedicated to caring for the defen-
dant because of his self-induced hunger strike. He has
taken an inordinate amount of Blanchette’s and
Ducaie’s time. Staff has been utilized to restrain or
monitor the defendant on a frequent basis, impacting
their ability to respond to another emergency in the
prison. In addition, [the defendant] has been occupying,
for much of the time since September, 2007, 1 of only
124 prison infirmary beds available in a correctional
setting for approximately 20,000 inmates and needed.
for patients with mental health or physical ailments.”

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the trial court
determined that the commissioner had met the burden
of proof as to the application and that the defendant

810 Po

could not prevail on his special defenses. Accordingly,
that court granted the commissioner’s application for
a permanent injunction. The trial court authorized the
commissioner to treat the defendant by means of hospi-
talization, intravenous fluids and nourishment, nasogas-
tric feeding, and any other health care measures
medically necessary to preserve his life and health, by
use of reasonable force if necessary. The court ordered
the commissioner, however, to first inquire whether the
defendant intends to physically resist and, until and
unless he did so on any one occasion, not to restrain him
for such procedures. This appeal followed. Additional
facts will be set forth as necessary.

We begin our analysis by reviewing the standard of
review following the grant of a permanent injunction.
“A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of
alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an
adequate remedy at law. . . . A prayer for injunctive
relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
and the court’s ruling can be reviewed only for the
purpose of determining whether the decision was based
on an erroneous statement of law or an abuse of discre-
tion. . . . Therefore, unless the trial court has abused
its discretion . . . the trial court’s decision must
stand.” (internal quotation marks omitted.) Maritime
Ventures, LLC v. Norwalk, 277 Conn. 800, 807-808, 894
A.2d 946 (2006). “How a court balances the equities is
discretionary but if, in balancing those equities, a trial
court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Breed Logis-
tics, Inc. v. CT INDY NH TT, LLC, 129 Conn. App. 563,
571, 19 A3d 1275 (2011). For the reasons set forth
hereinafter, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in granting the commissioner’s
application for a permanent injunction and, accord-
ingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pe sil
es
I

The defendant first claims that the permanent injunc-
tion violates his state common-law right to bodily integ-
rity. Specifically, he contends that the trial court
improperly determined that this right is outweighed by
the commissioner's claimed interests in preserving life,
preventing suicide, protecting innocent third parties
and preserving the security and orderly administration
of Connecticut prisons. We disagree.

This court has recognized that “‘[nJo right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the com-
mon law, than the right of every individual to the posses-
sion and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.’ . . . In the context
of a medical malpractice action based on the doctrine
of informed consent, we stated: ‘Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient’s con-
sent commits an assault, for which he is liable in dam-
ages.’ . . . Schmeltz v. Tracy, 119 Conn. 492, [495-96],
177 A. 520 (1935); see also Logan v. Greenwich Hospital
Assn., 191 Conn. 282, 288-89, 465 A.2d 294 (1983). In
yet another closely related context, the United States
Supreme Court has . . . reiterated that the ‘notion of
bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement
that informed consent is generally required for medical
treatment’; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 111 L. Ed. 2d
224 (1990); and that ‘[t]he logical corollary of the doc-
trine of informed consent is that the patient generally
possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse
treatment.’ Id., 270; see also id., 277 (‘the common law
doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally
encompassing the right of a competent individual to
refuse medical treatment’).” (Citation omitted.) Stam-

812 PO

ford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 664-65, 674 A.2d
821 (1996). Accordingly, a competent adult has the right
to embark voluntarily on a hunger strike wherein he
may refuse to eat or to accept artificial nutrition and
hydration, even when such artificial sustenance would
be necessary to prevent his death or irreversible
bodily harm.

Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has
explained that when considering the related constitu-
tional right to bodily integrity,> “[lJawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system.” Price v.

® We note that, at trial, the defendant contended that granting the injunc-
tion would violate: (1) his right to privacy and bodily self-determination
under both Connecticut common law and article first, § 7, of the constitution
‘of Connecticut; and (2) his right to privacy and bodily self-determination
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. On
appeal, the defendant has limited his bodily integrity claim to one arising
solely from the common law. Although we limit our analysis in accordance
with the claims as stated on appeal, as we explain in part II of this opinion,
there is substantial overlap in the analysis under the common law and the
analysis that generally applies for analyzing these constitutional claims. This
relationship is unsurprising in light of the historical roots of substantive
due process. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21, 117 S.
Ct, 2258, 188 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997) (“Our established method of substantive-
due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly
observed that the [dJue [p]rocess [c]lause specially protects those fundamen-
tal rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this [n]ation’s
history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed
.... Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a careful
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. . . . Our [nlation’s
history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking . . . that direct and restrain our exposition
of the [dJue [p]rocess [c}lause.” [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted, ]); see also State v. Garcia, 233 Conn. 44, 79-80, 658 A.2d 947 (1995)
(rejecting claim that state common Jaw provided defendant with “liberty
interest broader or more absolute than arises as a matter of substantive
due process under the federal constitution, in freedom from involuntary
treatment to restore him to competency”). Therefore, we look to state and
federal constitutional cases where relevant.

Po 818
Cd

Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S. Ct. 1049, 92 L. Ed.
1356 (1948). This court has stated: “It is true that, in
general, where state action impinges upon a fundamen-
tal right, that action will be sustained only upon the
showing of a compelling state interest that can only
thus be protected. . . . Such analysis is not appro-
priate, however, in weighing the constitutionality of the
conduct of state prison officials. . . . Restrictions on
personal liberties that would be considered unaccept-
able where the general public is concerned are often
essential within the strictures of the prison community.
. . » The [United States] Supreme Court has indicated
that in the prison environment a less demanding balanc-
ing test, instead, is to be applied. . . . [A] prison inmate
retains those . . . rights that are not inconsistent with
his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penologi-
cal objectives of the corrections system.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Roque v.
Warden, 181 Conn. 85, 97, 434 A.2d 348 (1980). Thus, we
must determine whether the commissioner's interests
outweigh the incarcerated defendant's common-law
right to refuse nutrition and liquids without inter-
ference.

Although the question of whether a prison inmate
may be force-fed during a hunger strike is a matter of
first impression for this court, courts in other jurisdic-
tions addressing this issue generally consider five fac-
tors when balancing the state’s interests against the
interest of the hunger striking prisoner. Those factors
include the state’s interest in: (1) the preservation of
life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third
parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; (4) the mainte-
nance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession;
and (5) the maintenance of security and the day-to-
day order of the prison. See, e.g., McNabb v. Dept. of
Corrections, 163 Wash. 2d 393, 403, 405, 180 P.3d 1257
(2008). The parties in the present case agree that these

814 Po

bere
factors apply to the defendant’s common-law bodily
integrity claim. Our resolution of this claim, therefore, is
guided by the jurisprudence of these other jurisdictions.

In applying these factors, courts often determine that
the states’ interests outweigh those of the hunger strik-
ing inmates. For example, in McNabb v. Dept. of Correc-
tions, supra, 163 Wash. 2d 393, the Washington Supreme
Court concluded that the state’s interests in applying the
force-feeding policy of the defendant, the department of
corrections, to the plaintiff, an inmate who had not
eaten voluntarily for over five months, outweighed the
inmate’s right to refuse artificial means of nutrition and
hydration. Id., 394-95, 411. Specifically, the court in
McNabb concluded that the state had a compelling inter-
est in maintaining security and orderly administration
in its prison system and that “an inmate’s slow death by
starvation would have an unpredictable and deleterious
effect on both prison staff and the prison population.”
Id., 408. The court disagreed with the inmate’s argument
that the state’s interest in preserving his life is meaning-
less if it “denigrates” that life by imposing such an
invasive procedure, including force-feeding the defen-
dant against his will, and concluded that the force-
feeding policy did not merely temporarily relieve a
chronic condition, but rather restored the inmate to a
naturally healthy condition. Id. The court further deter-
mined that the inmate’s hunger strike implicated the
state’s interest in preventing suicide because the inmate
would die by starvation if he were allowed to continue
to refuse food, which the court determined was a force
he had set in motion that, if unchecked, would lead to
his death. Id., 409. Finally, the court “decline[d] to place
medical professionals in the ethically tenuous position
of fulfilling the death order of an otherwise healthy
incarcerated individual,” and concluded that the state
had a compelling interest in maintaining the ethical
integrity of the medical profession. Id., 410.

Po 815
Sr

Similarly, in In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 228-29, 480
A.2d 93 (1984), the New Hampshire Supreme Court
concluded that the state’s interests in maintaining an
effective criminal justice system and in preserving life
and preventing suicide prevailed over the privacy rights
of a prisoner who refused to consume nourishment in
an attempt to “die with dignity.” The court determined
that “prison officials will lose much of their ability to
enforce institutional order if any inmate can shield him-
self from the administration’s control and authority by
announcing that he is on a starvation diet. Prisoners
are not permitted to live in accordance with their own
desires, nor may they be permitted to die on their own
terms without adversely and impermissibly affecting
the [s]tate’s legitimate authority over inmates.” Id., 231.
The court also rejected the inmate’s contention that he
was simply allowing himself to die rather than affirma-
tively committing suicide, and determined that the
state’s interest in preserving life and preventing suicide
dominated. Id., 232.

In other cases allowing the state to force-feed hunger
striking inmates, courts have determined that the state’s
interest in prison administration, on its own, is a con-
trolling factor. For example, in People ex rel. Dept. of
Corrections v. Millard, 335 Il. App. 3d 1066, 1068, 782
N.E.2d 966, cert. denied, 204 IIL. 2d 682, 792 N.E.2d 313
(2003), the Appellate Court of Illinois upheld the grant
of an injunction allowing the department of corrections
to force-feed an inmate serving a three year sentence
who began a hunger strike to protest his transfer to a
certain prison facility. The court held that the depart-
ment of corrections may “force-feed a hunger-striking
inmate, whose only purpose is to attempt to manipulate
the system so as to avoid disruptive or otherwise detri-
mental effects to the orderly administration of [the]
prison system.” Id., 1074.

816 Po

Indeed, in those cases in which courts have rejected
the state’s request to force-feed inmates, the state typi-
cally had failed to present evidence regarding one or
more of the factors to establish a sufficient state interest
to outweigh the inmate’s right to be free from unwanted
bodily intrusion. For example, in Singletary v. Costello,
665 So. 2d 1099, 1109-10 (Fla. App. 1996), the Florida’s
Fourth District Court of Appeal determined that,
because the defendant inmate did not desire that his
hunger strike produce his death, and because he had
no minor children dependent upon him, the state’s inter-
ests in preventing suicide and protecting innocent third
parties were not implicated. The court emphasized that
the state had failed to present any evidence regarding
the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession or the undermining of security, safety or
welfare within the prison as a result of the inmate’s
hunger strike. Id., 1109. Accordingly, that court con-
cluded, under the factual circumstances before it, that
“the state’s interest in the preservation of life, in and
of itself, cannot overcome [a defendant's] fundamental
right to [forgo] life-sustaining medical intervention.” Id.
The court expressly noted, however, that it might reach
a different result in another case wherein the state
provides evidence sufficient to establish more of the
factors to balance against an inmate’s privacy right to
refuse medical intervention. Id., 1110. Similarly, in Zant
v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982), the
Supreme Court of Georgia determined that, because
the hunger striking inmate therein was not mentally
incompetent, did not have dependents who relied on
him for a means of livelihood, and the issue of religious
freedom was not present, the state had failed to show
“such a compelling interest in preserving [the inmate’s]
life, as would override his right to refuse medical treat-
ment.” Id., 834

Courts have also rejected states’ requests to force-
feed inmates when the state’s interest in preserving the

Po 817
es

inmate’s life is diminished. For example, in Hill v. Dept.
of Corrections, 992 A.2d 933, 939 (Pa. Commw. 2010),
the trial court determined that a permanent injunction
allowing the department of corrections to force-feed
an inmate who had engaged in a series of hunger strikes
was inappropriate where the state had not presented
evidence to establish that the inmate’s health was in
imminent danger. The court did, however, invite the
state to proceed with a permanent injunction action in
the event that the inmate continued his hunger strike
and his health became imminently threatened. Id., 940.

In Thor v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 725, 855 P.2d
875, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357 (1993), the California Supreme
Court determined that the state’s interests did not out-
weigh the rights of a quadriplegic inmate deemed com-
petent who had refused sustenance specifically with
the purpose of ending his life. The court reasoned that,
“Tals the quality of life diminishes because of physical
deterioration, the [s]tate’s interest in preserving life may
correspondingly decrease.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 740. The court noted that the state had
expressed a limited interest in the prevention of suicide
because it “imposes no criminal or civil sanction for
intentional acts of self-destruction.” Id., 741. The court
also drew a distinction between one who sets in motion
a course of events aimed at one’s own demise, and
one who simply rejects medical intervention that only
prolongs, but never cures, a serious life-threatening or
debilitating affliction. Id., 742. The court determined
that there was no threat to the state’s interest in main-
taining the ethical integrity of the medical profession
because respecting a patient’s choice to forgo recom-
mended—and even necessary—treatment does not den-
igrate professional standards of care. Id., 743. The
state’s interest in protecting innocent third parties was
not implicated because the defendant did not have
minor children. Id., 744. Finally, the court determined

818 Po

that the state had offered no evidence to suggest that
allowing the defendant to exercise his fundamental
right to self-determination in medical decisions under-
mined prison integrity or endangered the public. Id.,
745. Accordingly, the court refused to allow the state
to force-feed the inmate. Id. The court acknowledged,
however, that the “custodial environment is uniquely
susceptible to the catalytic effect of disruptive conduct”
and that in another case, if a change of circumstances
warranted intervention to prevent disruption, the state
may be able to establish a need to override an inmate’s
choice to decline medical intervention. Id., 745-46.

Turning to the present case, the trial court specifically
found that the commissioner had presented evidence
sufficient to establish the state’s interests in: (1) pre-
serving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) protecting inno-
cent third parties; and (4) maintaining the orderly
administration of the prison system, and that such inter-
ests outweighed the defendant’s right to refuse medical
intervention.’ We examine, in turn, the defendant's
claims as to each of the state’s interests.

A

The defendant claims that there is no evidence dem-
onstrating the commissioner’s actual interest in pre-
serving his life and that any such interest is weakened
by the high degree of bodily invasion required to force-
feed him. Specifically, the defendant contends that the
commissioner's interest in preserving life is diminished
because “the life that the [commissioner] is seeking to
protect is the life of the same person who has compe-
tently decided to [forgo] the medical intervention.” Sin-

©The trial court found that the commissioner had not established a suffi-
cient interest in the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession because there was conflicting evidence concerning the ethical
requirements of the defendant's treating physicians. Because the commis-
sioner has not challenged that determination on appeal, we do not considerit.

si9
De

gletary v. Costello, supra, 665 So. 2d 1109. The defendant
further contends that “[t]he duty of the [s]tate to pre-
serve life must encompass a recognition of an individu-
al’s right to avoid circumstances in which the individual
himself would feel that efforts to sustain life demean or
degrade his humanity.” Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hospital, Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
We disagree that the principles cited in these cases
necessitate a determination that the commissioner has
not established an interest in preserving the defendant’s
life in the present case.

Connecticut has a policy of preserving life. Indeed,
“doctors are trained . . . in order to provide care and
treatment for sick and dying patients. The preservation
of life is not only a laudable goal for . . . the physicians
. .. to aspire to, it is a compelling one.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Stamford Hospital v. Vega, supra,
236 Conn. 665. In accordance with this principle, the
legislature has directed the department to “provide for
the relief of any sick or infirm prisoner . . . .” General
Statutes § 18-7. Thus, the commissioner has not only a
compelling interest in preserving the life and health of
the inmates in the custody of the department, but also
a statutorily mandated duty to do so.

This court also has recognized the state’s interest in
preserving life when such life and health are at risk,
including situations wherein the preservation of life
required other constitutional rights to be subject to
state intrusion. For example, the right to be free from
unwarranted searches pursuant to the fourth amend-
ment to the United States constitution is tempered by
the recognition of an emergency exception wherein
police officers may “enter a home without a warrant
when they have an objectively reasonable basis for
believing that an occupant is seriously injured or immi-
nently threatened with such injury. . . . The need to
protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justifi-

820 Po

cation for what would be otherwise illegal absent an
exigency or emergency.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fausel, 295 Conn.
785, 794, 993 A.2d 455 (2010).

In the present case, the defendant is an otherwise
healthy individual with no life-threatening conditions,
nor does he suffer from any chronic, debilitating afflic-
tions. Thus, administering artificial hydration and nutri-
tion when it becomes medically necessary serves to
restore the defendant to a naturally healthy condition.
Compare McNabb v. Dept. of Corrections, supra, 163
Wash. 2d 408 (prison’s force-feeding policy restored
inmate to healthy condition), with Thor v. Superior
Court, supra, 5 Cal. 4th 742 (court refused to allow
state to force-feed quadriplegic inmate because, inter
alia, state’s interest in preserving life may decrease as
inmate’s quality of life diminishes due to physical deteri-
oration, and because state had expressed limited inter-
est in prevention of suicide), and Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hospital, Inc., supra, 398 Mass. 419
(state’s interest in preservation of life via artificial main-
tenance of nutrition and hydration for person hospital-
ized in persistent vegetative state did not overcome
patient’s right to discontinue treatment).

The trial court in the present case found that the
defendant's four year hunger strike had caused him to
lose over 100 pounds—nearly one half of his starting
body weight—at the height of his fasting. Prior to
administering intravenous fluids or the nasogastric
tube, Blanchette determined that the defendant was at
an ever increasing risk of sudden death or irreversible
complications because of his hunger strike, and that
such measures were necessary to prevent imminent,
permanent damage or death. Therefore, the defendant’s
hunger strike triggered the department’s duty to pre-
serve his life when it became clear that the hunger
strike put his health in imminent danger. Indeed, given

Po 82
Del

that the defendant has declared that there is no specific

event or accomplishment that will cause him to end his

hunger strike, and that he is willing to continue the

hunger strike until his death,” his life and health are in

danger as long as his hunger strike persists.

7 When asked about the reasons for his protest, the defendant testified:
“The system in the state of Connecticut is broken and corrupt. . . . It is
beyond repair at this point. It’s hideously broken and hideously corrupt.
. . . The criminal and family courts, are just not capable of deciphering the
truth or willing to consider the truth.” We also note the following colloquy
between the defendant and his counsel:

“Q. Have you made any specific demands of the [department], which, if
they were met, would cause you to end your protest?

“A. Demands, no. Absolutely, no.

“Q. And is your protest—the continuation of your protest dependent upon
the outcome of your habeas corpus proceeding?

“A. No.

“Q. Is it dependent upon the outcome of these proceedings right here?

“A. No.

“Q. Do you want to die, Mr. Coleman?

“A. No, I do not.

“Q. And is the goal of your protest to die?

“A. The goal is not to die, no. [have a willing—I am willing to take thatrisk.”

When asked by the commissioner's counsel whether he was currently
willing to die on his hunger strike, the defendant replied: “Willing to, yes.”
The defendant also engaged in the following colloquy with the court:

“The Court: . . . [It’s been—there’s been testimony that you're not sui-
cidal, but that you are sincere in your belief, that you will continue your
protest until your death. Do you agree with that?

“(The Defendant]: I'm willing to take the risk. I do not want to die, Your
Honor, but there’s more people that are affected by this than just me. And
I won't be the last.

“The Court: . . . [BJut you’e telling me, I want to understand this, that
you're willing—that you are willing to continue your protest up to and
including your death. Is that accurate?

“(The Defendant]: That's accurate.

“The Court: And there’s no particular goal that you're seeking during
this protest?

“(The Defendant]: None, other than to say this is what it is and whoever
wants to view that, can view that.

“The Court: And so logically, what would stop your protest, short of death,
if there’s no goal you're seeking?

“(The Defendant]: . . . For instance, somebody said to me, well, what if
[you are] vindicated? Well, if I'm vindicated, there’s no protest. II start
to eat food, albeit very slowly, obviously.”

822 Po
Cd

With respect to the defendant’s claim that the method.
that the state employs diminishes its interest, we note
that force-feeding is less invasive than other forced
medical treatments this court previously has condoned
because it is not designed to alter the defendant’s mind
or will. See State v. Seekins, 299 Conn. 141, 166-67, 8
A.3d 491 (2010) (allowing order of involuntary medica-
tion to render defendant competent to stand trial). Addi-
tionally, the state presented evidence that the
nasogastric tube is the simplest, safest and least inva-
sive method of administering artificial nutrition. A
nasogastric tube does not require puncturing the defen-
dant’s skin or blood vessels, and it utilizes the defen-
dant’s normal digestive system to process the nutrients
administered. Indeed, Blanchette testified. that every
other option for providing artificial nutrition is more
complicated, more risky and, most importantly, more
invasive. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that granting
the injunction is consistent with Connecticut's public
policy in favor of, and the commissioner’s interest in,
preserving the defendant's life.

B

The defendant next claims that the commissioner's
interest in preventing suicide is not implicated because
the goal of his hunger strike is not to cause his own
death, but rather to draw attention to the unfairness
he perceives in the judicial process. We agree with the
commissioner’s contention that the trial court appropri-
ately rejected the defendant’s argument that starving
himself to death is not suicide because it yields the
same result as suicide: self-inflicted death.

The legislature has made clear the state’s interest in
preventing suicide by determining that assisting in a
suicide is a criminal offense. See General Statutes
§§ 58a-54a and 53a-56 (a). In fact, the legislature has

PT 823
PO

resisted several attempts to amend § 53a-56 (a) to
decriminalize physician assisted suicide, even for termi-
nally ill patients.’ Moreover, the legislature has estab-
lished involuntary commitment proceedings to provide
immediate care and treatment for suicidal individuals;
see General Statutes § 17a-502 (a);° as well as excep-
tions to criminal liability for using force against another
person in order to thwart a suicide attempt. See General
Statutes § 53a-18 (4).

Specifically with respect to inmate suicide, courts
have recognized that “incarceration can place a person
‘under unusual psychological strain and the jail or prison
under a commensurate duty to prevent the prisoner
from giving way to the strain. The analysis is applicable
when suicide takes the form of starving oneself to
death.” Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir.
2006). In order to fulfill its duty to prevent inmates
within its care from committing suicide, the department
has a set of policies, procedures and administrative
directives, and department officers and staff undergo
extensive training specifically to facilitate the preven-
tion of suicide. The department, therefore, has a right
and a duty to intervene to prevent prisoners from setting
in motion forces that will cause their own deaths.

*See, eg, Senate Bill 361, “An Act Concerning Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide,” (1994); House Bill 6928, “An Act Concerning Death With Dignity,”
(1995); Senate Bill 334, “An Act Concerning Physician Assisted Suicide,”
(1995); Senate Bill 1138, “An Act Concerning Death With Dignity,” (2009).

® General Statutes § 172-502 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any person
who a physician concludes has psychiatric disabilities and is dangerous to
himself or others . . . and is in need of immediate care and treatment in
a hospital for psychiatric disabilities, may be confined in such a hospital
. . . for not more than fifteen days without order of any court .. . .”

¥ General Statutes § 53a-18 provides in relevant part: “The use of physical
force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is
justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances . . .

“(4) A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is
about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself
may use reasonable physical force upon such person to the extent that he
reasonably believes such to be necessary to thwart such result. . . .”

824 PO
es

Although death may not be the defendant's professed
goal, he has stated that he is willing to die in order to
continue his protest, and the trial court found that his
death inevitably would be the result if he were allowed
to continue his hunger strike without intervention.
Unlike other cases in which courts have determined
that the hunger striker’s actions did not implicate the
state’s interest in preventing suicide because the goal
of the protest was limited to a specific desired outcome;
see, e.g., Singletary v. Costello, supra, 665 So. 2d 1109
(‘purpose of the hunger strike was to bring about
change, not death”); there is no specific goal or occur-
rence—other than his eventual death—that will termi-
nate the defendant’s hunger strike while he remains in
prison. See footnote 7 of this opinion. Although the
defendant did testify that “vindicat{ion]” would cause
him to end his hunger strike, he has provided no indica-
tion as to what event or occurrence would provide such.
vindication. Thus, the trial court properly could have
concluded that the defendant will continue his hunger
strike until he has completed his sentence and is
released from prison, or until he effectuates his own
death, whichever occurs first. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
permanent injunction was consistent with the state’s
interest in preventing suicide.

Cc

The defendant further contends that, because there
‘was no evidence presented either that he will be respon-
sible for any child support upon his release, or that his
minor children, from whom he is estranged, will suffer
emotional harm should he be allowed to continue his
hunger strike until his death, the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that the commissioner had estab-

Pe 825

Lee
lished its interest in protecting innocent third parties."
We disagree.

“Generally . . . concern [for the protection of inno-
cent third parties] arises when the refusal of medical
treatment endangers public health or implicates the
emotional or financial welfare of the [inmate’s] minor
children.” Thor v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal. 4th 744.
In Polk County Sheriff v. District Court, 594 N.W.2d
421, 428 (lowa 1999), although the defendant inmate
refusing medical treatment had stated that he had no
concern regarding how his death might affect his minor
children, the Iowa Supreme Court determined: “[W]e
can still consider the emotional impact upon them.
Additionally, we cannot presume that [the defendant]
would never be in a position to provide financial support
to them.” Although that court did not deem the interest,
in protecting innocent third parties to be controlling,
it stated that “we must still weigh this factor in the
balance, and we do so in favor of compelling treat-
ment.” Id.

We conclude that a similar treatment by the trial
court was appropriate in the present case. “[FJederal
and state policies . . . indisputably mandate that, in
all but the most extreme cases, children should be main-
tained and supported by their parents. [BJoth state and
national policy has been, and continues to be, to ensure

4 We note that this court has determined that, in some circumstances,
the interest in protecting innocent third party children is not sufficient to
outweigh a parent's interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. See
Stamford Hospital v. Vega, supra, 236 Conn. 663-64 (“whether [the patient's]
child grows up with one, rather than two, parents or, for that matter, with
no parent at all, was simply not an issue sufficiently within the scope of
the hospital's legitimate interest”). Because the defendanthas not challenged
the relevancy of this factor in the present case, or contested the fact that
the department has an interest in protecting innocent third parties, generally,
we need only address whether the evidence presented was sufficient to
establish that the department had a legitimate interest in protecting the
defendant's minor children given the facts of the present case.

826 PO
Ce

that all parents support their children and that children
who do not live with their parents benefit from adequate
and enforceable orders of child support.” (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194,
209, 662 A.2d 107 (1995). Therefore, it was not an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to rest its decision
regarding this factor on the possibility that the defen-
dant could be held responsible for child support upon
his release.

Accordingly, we conclude that the undisputed evi-
dence that the defendant has minor children is sufficient
to implicate the state’s interest in protecting innocent
third parties. Although this interest is not controlling,
it was appropriate for the trial court to weigh it in the
balance, and to do so in favor of allowing the commis-
sioner to provide life sustaining nutrition to the defen-
dant. See Polk County Sheriff v. District Court, supra,
504 N.W.2d 428,

D

Finally, with regard to the commissioner’s interest
in preserving security and order within the prison sys-
tem, the defendant claims that, because there has not
yet been a death as a result of an inmate’s hunger strike
in Connecticut, the commissioner’s evidence as to this
factor was based on mere conjecture regarding the pos-
sible effects of the defendant’s continued hunger strike.
_ Thetrial court’s reliance on such speculation, the defen-
dant claims, was an abuse of discretion. We disagree
with the defendant’s view of the record.

The commissioner presented an abundance of evi-
dence regarding the likely deleterious effect on safety,
security and the orderly administration of the prison
should the defendant be allowed to starve himself to
death. For example, Murphy, the deputy director, and
Ducate, the director of psychiatric services, both testi-
fied that the department does not allow inmates to

Pe 27
es

engage in behavioral protests because such protests
both interfere significantly with safety and security
within the facility, and would encourage inmates to
ignore the proper grievance procedures. They also testi-
fied that the death of an inmate, particularly asuccessful
suicide, evokes a strong reaction from the other inmates
and creates a serious safety and security concern
because the other inmates may believe that the depart-
ment staff contributed to, or did not do enough to pre-
vent the inmate’s death. Indeed, courts have recognized
that, “[iJf prisoners were allowed to kill themselves,
prisons would find it even more difficult than they do
to maintain discipline, because of the effect of a suicide
in agitating the other prisoners.” Freeman v. Berge,
supra, 441 F.3d 547; accord McNabb v. Dept. of Correc-
tions, supra, 163 Wash. 2d 408 (‘an inmate’s slow death
by starvation would have an unpredictable and deleteri-
ous effect on both prison staff and the prison popu-
lation”).

Furthermore, Murphy and Ducate testified that, not
only has one inmate already sought to copy the defen-
dant’s hunger striking behavior to draw attention to his
own grievance, but there is also a very high likelihood
that other inmates would copy the defendant’s actions
if the commissioner was not allowed to intervene and
the defendant was allowed to die. Murphy and Ducate
testified that preventing the commissioner from
intervening in the defendant’s case would present oth-
ers potentially committed to ending their own lives an
avenue through which to make such an attempt.

Finally, Murphy and Ducate testified to the adverse
impact the defendant’s hunger strike has had on the
department’s health care resources, which would con-
tinue, and perhaps worsen, should the defendant be
allowed to die. Murphy testified that the defendant's
hunger strike taxes the department’s health care
resources because he requires ongoing monitoring and

828 Po

is housed in a medical setting rather than with the
general population of the prison. Ducate further indi-
cated that the defendant’s self-imposed death would be
very likely to have an adverse effect on staff morale, and
that lower morale would in turn increase absenteeism,
which would affect the department’s ability to provide
care and security.

The defendant nonetheless argues that, because the
commissioner's evidence does not indicate with abso-
lute certainty what will occur within the prison system
should he be allowed to carry out his hunger strike to
its inevitable conclusion, the trial court’s finding of a
probable negative impact on safety, security and order
was based on speculation and conjecture and, there-
fore, was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. Both
Murphy and Ducate, in testifying as to the likely effects
of the defendant's self-imposed death, should the
department allow it, relied on their many years of expe-
rience in working within prison systems and in observ-
ing the behavior and reactions of the inmates committed

‘ to their care and custody, including inmates’ reactions
to suicides that actually had occurred in the past.
Although the defendant’s expert, Daniel B. Vasquez, a
consultant on correctional issues, testified that he did
not believe that allowing the defendant to die as a result
of his hunger strike would encourage or lead to “copy-
cat” hunger strikes, he did not refute the other safety
related testimony presented by the commissioner. In
fact, Vasquez agreed that hunger striking inmates
require additional resources from department staff, that
inmates expect the department to take action when an
inmate is engaging in self harming behavior, and that
it is unacceptable to allow an inmate to cause his
own death.

Finally, we note that the judgment of the department
officials in the context of assessing the seriousness of
a threat to institutional security inherently “turns

Po 829
fe

largely on purely subjective evaluations and on predic-
tions of future behavior . . . . Indeed, the administra-
tors must predict not just one inmate’s future actions
. .. but those of the entire population.” (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 474, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983),
overruled on other grounds by Buckhannon Board &
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health &
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S. Ct. 1835, 149
L. Ed. 2d 855 (2001). Accordingly, the trial court, in its
role as fact finder, was free to, and did in fact, credit
the professional judgment of the department officials
charged with maintaining the safety, security and order
within the prison system in determining whether the
defendant’s conduct posed an unacceptable risk.

We therefore conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the defendant's
hunger strike—and its inevitable conclusion should it
be allowed to continue—presented an unacceptable
risk to the safety, security and orderly administration.
of the prison system such that this factor weighs in
favor of allowing the commissioner to intervene to pre-
vent the defendant’s death.

In sum, we underscore that, although the defendant
argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that
the commissioner’s interests outweigh his right to
bodily integrity, he does not argue that, if the trial court
properly concluded that the commissioner had success-
fully established its interests in protecting life, pre-
venting suicide, protecting innocent third parties and
maintaining prison order and security, the trial court
abused its discretion in determining that those estab-
lished interests do, in fact, collectively outweigh the
defendant’s common-law right to bodily integrity.
Essentially, the defendant’s argument is based on
attacking each of the department’s stated interests, in
isolation, as unsupported by sufficient evidence or as

830 Pei
Ed
individually insufficient to outweigh his right to bodily
integrity. As our foregoing analysis makes clear, how-
ever, these challenges lack merit. Therefore, in light of
our determination that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the commissioner had
established interests in: (1) preserving the defendant’s
life; (2) preventing the defendant’s suicide; (8) pro-
tecting the defendant's children as innocent third par-
ties; and (4) maintaining safety, security and order
within the prison system, and that the defendant does
not claim that the trial court improperly balanced these
collective, established interests against his right to
bodily integrity, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in determining that the commis-
sioner’s interests outweigh the defendant’s common-

law right to bodily integrity.

IL

The defendant’s second claim rests on the argument
that the forcible administration of artificial nutrition
and hydration violates his first amendment right to free
speech and his fourteenth amendment privacy or liberty
interests in being free from unwanted medical treat-
ment under the United States constitution.” The com-
missioner contends that the trial court appropriately
balanced the state’s interests against the defendant’s
constitutional rights in determining that force-feeding
the defendant, when it becomes medically necessary,

* In his appellate brief, the defendant limited his analysis to the federal
constitution. At oral argument before this court, however, the defendant
stated that this court may construe state constitutional rights more broadly
than their federal constitution counterparts. We decline to consider a claim
raised for the first time at oral argument; see Alesandre v. Commissioner
of Revenue Services, 300 Conn. 566, 586 n.17, 22 A.Sd 518 (2011); and we
similarly decline to consider a claim that the Connecticut constitution pro-
vides greater rights than does the United States constitution where such
claims have not been separately briefed. See, e.g, State v. Higgins, 265
Conn. 35, 39 n.9, 826 A.2d 1126 (2008).

po 831

does not violate his constitutional rights. We agree with
the commissioner.

It is undisputed that the defendant possesses rights
grounded in the first and fourteenth amendments to the
United States constitution. “[W]hether [an individual's]
constitutional rights have been violated must be deter-
mined by balancing his . . . interests against the rele-
vant state interests.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health,
supra, 497 U.S. 279; see also Roque v. Warden, supra,
181 Conn. 96-97. In considering whether force-feeding
the defendant to prevent irreversible damage to his
health, or his death, impinges on his constitutional
rights, the trial court applied the four part test set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987),
under which the ultimate question is whether the prison
action is “reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.” Under that test, the court must evaluate: (1)
whether there is “a ‘valid, rational connection’ between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it”; id.; (2) “whether there
are alternative means of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates”; id., 90; (3) “the impact accom-
modation of the asserted constitutional right will have
on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of
prison resources generally”; id.; and (4) whether there
is an “absence of ready alternatives .. . .” Id.

Before turning to these factors, we note that, although
the parties agreed in the proceedings before the trial
court that the test set forth in Turner applies to the
defendant’s constitutional claims, in his brief to this
court, the defendant now asserts that it is unclear
whether this standard or some unspecified “height-
ened” standard governs. In light of this question, the
defendant now contends that “consideration of the
Turner factors alone should not be outcome determina-

832 Pe

tive.” Other than this cursory statement, the defendant
does not indicate what other factors would be relevant,
and his brief is limited to an application of the four
factors in Turner. Therefore, in addition to the fact that
the defendant belatedly has raised this claim, he has
failed to adequately brief it. Accordingly, although we
acknowledge that whether the test in Turner applies
when evaluating the validity of a particular prison
action, rather than the facial validity of a prison regula-
tion, as was the case in Turner, is the subject of some
debate among jurists, we analyze the defendant’s claim.
consistent with his theory at the trial court and in his
brief." See State v. Erickson, 297 Conn. 164, 171 n.7,
997 A.2d 480 (2010); see also State v. Bruno, 293 Conn.
127, 143 n.13, 975 A.2d 1253 (2009) (“[b]ecause the law
on this issue is unsettled, and the defendant’s claim is
inadequately briefed, we decline to review it”). Accord-
ingly, for the reasons set forth hereinafter, we conclude
that the trial court appropriately determined that the
commissioner's action in seeking an injunction to force-

Some courts specifically have considered this question and have deter-
mined that Turner also governs unwritten prison policies and other prison
actions. See, e.g., Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147, 1158 n.13 (10th
Cir. 2007) (unwritten prison policy); Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 562
(10th Gir. 1990) (transfer order of individual inmate), Others have applied
the test in Turner in situations similar to the present case, apparently
assuming without discussion the applicability of the test in “as applied”
challenges. See, e.g., In re Soliman, 134 F. Sup. 2d 1238, 1258 (N.D. Ala.
2001) (applying Twrner in evaluating whether force-feeding violated hunger
striking prisoner's first amendment rights), appeal dismissed, Soliman v.
United States ex rel. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 296 F.3d 1237
(1ith Cir. 2002). Some courts, however, have held that Turner applies only
‘when evaluating whether a prison regulation is facially valid, and does not
apply when evaluating a challenge to the constitutionality of a prison policy
as applied to a specific prisoner. See, e.g., Stouffer v. Reid, 413 Md. 491,
512, 998 A.2d 104 (2010); McNabb v. Dept. of Corrections, supra, 163 Wash.
2d 405; Dept. of Corrections v. Saenz, 299 Wis. 2d 486, 498, 728 N.W.2d 765
(2007). In this latter group of cases, the courts have balanced the prisoner’s
rights against the state’s interest in maintaining security and orderly adminis-
tration of its prison system, requiring the state to demonstrate that such
interest is compelling.

Po 833
bt

feed the defendant was reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests sufficient to satisfy Turner, and

that the permanent injunction does not violate the

defendant’s constitutional rights."

To begin, we observe that two of the factors in
Turner, whether there is “a ‘valid, rational connection’
between the prison regulation and the legitimate gov-
ernmental interest put forward to justify it”; Turner v.
Safley, supra, 482 U.S. 89; and the “impact accommoda-
tion of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of
prison resources generally”; id., 90; essentially have
been disposed of in light of our analysis in part I of
this opinion. As we discussed in part I D of this opinion,
the commissioner established a valid, rational connec-
tion between the force-feeding of the defendant and the
legitimate governmental interest of maintaining safety,
security and the orderly administration of the prison
system, and that, if the defendant were allowed to starve
himself to death, it likely would have a negative impact
on the staff, the other inmates and prison resources
generally. See id., 89-90. Although the defendant argues
that allowing him to proceed with his hunger strike,
without intervention, would reduce the impact of his
ongoing care on the department’s resources, this argu-
ment fails to acknowledge the adverse impact his
resulting death would have on those resources. Depart-
ment officials did testify regarding the costs associated
with monitoring the defendant’s health due to the physi-
cal and mental effects of his ongoing hunger strike,
but these are not the only costs associated with the
defendant’s purported exercise of his rights. The depart-
ment presented evidence that an inmate death, particu-
larly by means of suicide, increases both the demand

“The test set forth in Turner applies to the defendant's claims under
both the first and fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution.
Accordingly, we address these claims together.

834 Po
ee

for supportive services for the inmates and the prison
staff, as well as the likelihood that other inmates will
cause disturbances requiring more staff attention. See
part ID of this opinion. The trial court, therefore, appro-
priately considered the costs of addressing the reper-
cussions of the inevitable culmination of the
defendant's hunger strike, should he be allowed to con-
tinue without interference.

The goal of preventing the defendant’s death by way
of his hunger strike in order to maintain safety, security
and order is not arbitrary or irrational. Additionally, it
was proper to defer to the judgment of the department
officials in order to prevent the likely disturbance—
and the costs associated with such disturbance—his
death would cause within the prison. See Turner v.
Safley, supra, 482 U.S. 90. Accordingly, we conclude
that the commissioner has sufficiently satisfied the first
and third factors of the test in Turner. See id., 89-90.

The commissioner has also presented sufficient evi-
dence to establish that alternative means of exercising
the defendant's rights remain open to him to satisfy
the second factor of Turner. See id., 90. First, the

Regarding the defendant's fourteenth amendment claim that it was
improper for the trial court to determine that he had a sufficient alternative
to the invasion of his privacy right in the choice to consume sustaining
fluids, we note that the factor analysis in Turner concerning “alternative
means of expression” proves difficult as it relates to “passive” rights, such
as the right to be free from unwanted medical treatment. In fact, other
courts have noted that analysis of this factor is, rather, more appropriate
within the context of first amendment rights, which allow for a spectrum
of expression. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224, 110 S. Ct.
1028, 108 L, Ed. 2d 178 (1990) (second Turner factor is irrelevant to four-
teenth amendment challenge to administration of unwanted antipsychotic
drugs); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1517 (11th Cir. 1991) (application
of second Turner factor to inmate's privacy right in medical records is
“problematic” because “it is difficult to talk of ‘alternative means’ of pro-
tecting such a right, since, unlike the first amendment context, there is no
range or continuum of other affirmative activity against which to measure
encroachment of a given prison restriction”); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860
F.2d 828, 831 n.1 (Bth Cir. 1988) (“the second Turner factor . . . is much
more meaningful in the first amendment context than the fourth or eighth,
where the right is to be free from a particular wrong”).

Po 835
ee

defendant testified that he has corresponded with
friends and family members to discuss what he per-
ceives as his unjust treatment within the Connecticut
criminal justice system and to ask them to disseminate
his story to national media outlets. The defendant also
testified that family and friends have set up various

To the extent that we can coherently apply this factor to the defendant's
fourteenth amendment claim, given the facts of this case, however, we
see no reason to treat the analysis of a fourteenth amendment challenge
differently than a first amendment challenge. As with his first amendment
right, the altemative available to the defendant need not be one that the
defendant perceives as the most desirable or the most effective means of
exercising his rights. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 589 U.S. 126, 185, 123 S. Ct.
2162, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2003) (“[aJlternatives . . . need not be ideal . . .
they need only be available”). It is, therefore, sufficient that the defendant
has an option that affords him the opportunity to avoid the intrusion upon
his rights; cf. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1536 (9th Cir. 1993) (Rein-
hardt, J., concurring) (noting that policy of suspicionless cross-gender
inmate searches failed to satisfy second factor of Turner because female
inmates could do nothing to avoid being searched by male guards, and
“elven an inmate who stays in her cell and behaves impeccably can be
forced to submit to a male guard’s search of her body in an offensive,
invasive, and intimate way”). In the present case, department officials not
only waited until it was medically necessary to administer artificial hydration
or nutrition to prevent irreversible harm or death, but also met with the
defendant on numerous occasions in an attempt to seek ways through which
they could convince him to consume voluntarily at least minimal sustenance.
Blanchette also testified that, immediately prior to administering the nasog-
astric tube, and at various points during the procedure, he gave the defendant
the opportunity to accept voluntarily some fluids instead of using the naso-
gastric tube.

This is not a situation in which department officials decided to pursue
force-feeding regardless of any future action taken by the defendant that
might obviate the need for such treatment. Indeed, Blanchette testified that
he saw no need to pursue force-feeding or forced intravenous hydration if
the defendant was going to be compliant. Therefore, it is clear that, had the
defendant opted to consume voluntarily at least a minimal amount of fluids
to reduce the risk that his health was in imminent danger, department
officials would not have proceeded with the forced intravenous hydration
or the nasogastric procedure. Accordingly, to the extent that this factor
applies to the defendant's fourteenth amendment claim, the trial court appro-
priately determined that the defendant had the alternative option of consum-
ing sustaining fluids sufficient to preserve his life and health, and continuing
his protest simply by means of refusing solid nutrition.

836 Po

publicly available websites providing information about
the defendant and the reasons for his hunger strike,
and that his attorneys had issued several press releases
on his behalf. Furthermore, the defendant has pursued,
although unsuccessfully, the various judicial avenues
through which an inmate may contest the validity of
his conviction and prison sentence, appealing his con-
viction and petitioning for habeas corpus relief.

The defendant contends that the evidence presented.
demonstrates that the alternative means of expression
sufficient to satisfy his first amendment rights are, in
fact, unavailable to him. This is because he has no
further judicial avenues through which to challenge his
conviction and incarceration. In addition, he argues that
he did not draw media attention until four months after
his protest began, and that the trial court improperly
considered the existence of a website advancing his
claims. As the commissioner pointed out, however, the
defendant has not cited, nor has this court’s research
revealed, any case law requiring that alternative means
of expression successfully effect change in order for
such avenues to satisfy first amendment rights. Rather,
it is sufficient that the defendant had the opportunity
to contest the validity of his conviction and continued
incarceration via his appeal and his habeas corpus peti-
tion, and that he has had the opportunity to correspond
with friends and family to discuss his perceived plight
and to request that they set up websites on his behalf
with the aim of drawing media attention, if that is his
wish. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135, 123
S. Ct. 2162, 156 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2003) (“[allternatives
.. . need not be ideal . . . they need only be avail-
able”). Thus, it is clear that the defendant not only has
access to, but also has utilized, numerous alternative
means of first amendment expression. Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court appropriately determined
that the second factor in Turner was satisfied.

Pe 837
De

Finally, the commissioner sufficiently established the
absence of ready alternatives to the forced administra-
tion of fluids and nutrition, thus supporting the reason-
ableness of the action. Turner v. Safley, supra, 482 U.S.
90. It is not disputed that, although there are myriad
means of providing sustaining nutrients and hydration
for someone who refuses to, or cannot voluntarily con-
sume food, the nasogastric procedure carries the fewest
risks, and is the easiest to perform. This court need not
evaluate the potential appeal of every possible proce-
dure available to maintain the life and health of the
defendant while he persists in his hunger strike. “This
is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials
do not have to set up and then shoot down every con-
ceivable alternative method of accommodating the
[inmate’s] constitutional complaint. . . . But if an
inmate . . . can point to an alternative that fully
accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimus cost
to valid penological interest, a court may consider that
as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the
reasonable relationship standard.” (Citation omitted.)
Id., 90-91.

Nor are we willing to dictate a course of medical
treatment in contravention to the professional decisions
made by the physicians involved with the defendant’s
care on an ongoing basis. Although the defendant points
to possible alternative medical procedures through
which nutrition may be administered, he, undoubtedly,
would still believe that such procedures violate his
rights to engage in his hunger strike as a means of
exercising his freedom of speech and to refuse a per-
ceived invasion of his privacy or liberty through
unwanted medical treatment. Thus, we agree with the
commissioner that the only alternatives are either to
intervene to prevent the defendant’s death or to refrain
from intervening and allow the defendant to starve him-
self to death and accept the resulting disturbance to

838 Po

the safety, security and order to the prison system.
Accordingly, we conclude that there is an absence of
ready alternatives to the intervention into the defen-
dant’s hunger strike to prevent his death, and that the
fourth factor in Turner is satisfied in the present case.

In sum, the commissioner has established, with suffi-
cient certainty, that force-feeding the defendant when
it becomes medically necessary to avert permanent
damage or death is rationally related to legitimate peno-
logical interests. We therefore conclude that the perma-
nent injunction allowing the commissioner to force-
feed the defendant in order to sustain his life and health
did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.

mm

Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court
improperly determined that international law does not
prohibit force-feeding him. The defendant and the amici
curiae argue that the weight of international authority
condemns force-feeding inmates—even when neces-
sary to prevent death or permanent damage—as medi-
cally unethical. In response, the commissioner
maintains that international law is not binding on this
court, and the body of law presented by the defendant
and the amici curiae do not represent a consensus of
international opinion on this issue. We agree with the
commissioner.

Initially, we note that other courts have determined
that international law is not binding on the courts of
the United States unless it has reached the status of
customary international law, meaning that it reflects a
wide acceptance among the states and it appears that
the states follow the practice from a sense of legal
obligation. See Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,
414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003), citing Chubb & Son,
Ine. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 307-308 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 928, 121 S. Ct. 2549, 150

839
ee

L. Ed. 2d 716 (2001), Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
239 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005, 116 S.
Ct. 2524, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1048 (1996), and Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980); see also 1
Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 102 (2), pp. 30-32 (1987). Furthermore,
“customary international law is a diffuse and often
highly uncertain body of norms whose force and
enforceability vary greatly even in the international
sphere; and its status in our domestic courts is even
more qualified.” Igartua-De la Rosa v. United States,
417 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2005), citing Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 159 L. Ed. 2d
718 (2004). Even if international law has not reached the
level of universal acceptance, however, United States
courts have looked to sources of international law to
inform interpretations of certain state and federal con-
stitutional rights. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 80, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (interna-
tional law used to support interpretation of meaning of
“cruel and unusual” under eighth amendment); Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (same). Nevertheless, given our conclu-
sion, set forth fully hereinafter, that there is no interna-
tional consensus prohibiting force-feeding prison
inmates when it becomes medically necessary, which
might prohibit us from allowing the commissioner to
force-feed the defendant in the present case, we need.
not address the relative merits or persuasiveness of
policy justifications presented by those countries that
prohibit force-feeding competent inmates in all circum-
stances, or whether international law is relevant at all.

The defendant and the amici argue that the weight
of international authority suggests that force-feeding a
competent inmate amounts to a violation of interna-
tional human rights, and thus may not be condoned by
this court. In support of their contention that interna-

840 |__|
Co

tional law establishes a per se ban on force-feeding a
competent inmate who has voluntarily embarked on a
hunger strike, the defendant and the amici cite to the
‘Declaration of Tokyo—Guidelines for Physicians Con-
cerning Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and
Imprisonment” (Declaration of Tokyo), and the “Decla-
ration of Malta on Hunger Strikers” (Declaration of
Malta), promulgated by the World Medical Association,
which prohibit force-feeding competent prisoners who
have refused nourishment. According to its own hand-
book, the voice of the World Medical Association is
“authoritative, being the considered opinion of many
medical experts from every region of the world,” and
the World Medical Association declarations “have car-
ried great weight in national and international debates.”

¥ Declaration six of the “Declaration of Tokyo” provides: “Where a pris-
oner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as capable of
forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning the consequences
of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she shall not be fed
artificially. The decision as to the capacity of the prisoner to form such a
judgment should be confirmed by at least one other independent physician.
The consequences of the refusal of nourishment shall be explained by the
physician to the prisoner.” World Medical Association, “Declaration of
Tokyo—Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention
and Imprisonment,” (Rev. 2006), available at http:/www-wma.net/en/30pub
lications/L0policies/c18/index.html (last visited February 28, 2012) (copy
contained in the file of this case in Supreme Court clerk’s office). Guideline
eleven of the “Guidelines for the Management of Hunger Strikers,” as set
forth in the “Declaration of Malta,” provides in relevant part: “It is ethical
to allow a determined hunger striker to die in dignity rather than submit
that person to repeated interventions against his or her will.” World Medical
Association, “Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikers,” (Rev. 2006), avail-
able at http:/www.wma.neV/en/30publications/10policies/h31/index.html
ast visited February 28, 2012) (copy contained in the file of this case in
Supreme Court clerk's office). Guideline thirteen of the “Guidelines for the
Management of Hunger Strikers,” as set forth in the “Declaration of Malta”
provides in relevant part: “Forcible feeding is never ethically acceptable.
Even if intended to benefit, feeding accompanied by threats, coercion, force
or use of physical restraints is a form of inhuman and degrading treatment.
2 ld

es sat
PO

World Medical Association, “Handbook of Declara-
tions,” available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publica
tions/10policies/10about/index.html (last visited Febru-
ary 28, 2012) (copy contained in the record of this case
in Supreme Court clerk’s office). The World Medical
Association nonetheless concedes that it has no actual
powers, nor does it seek to have any actual powers in
relation to lawmaking, and only hopes to “provide use-
ful guidance to doctors when the right course of action
is in doubt.” Id.

The defendant and the amici also cite to a handful
of domestic opinions in which judges have relied on
the “Declaration of Tokyo” and the “Declaration of
Malta” in support of a conclusion that the government’s
interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medi-
cal profession does not weigh in favor of force-feeding
hunger striking inmates. See Hill v. Dept. of Correc-
tions, supra, 922 A.2d 941-42 (McCullough, J., concur-
ring) (“Declaration of Tokyo” and “Declaration of
Malta” offer insight into ethical concerns of medical
profession in dealing with hunger striker); In re Lilly,
Case No. 07CV392 (Wis. Cir. May 19, 2009) (state’s inter-
est in safeguarding medical integrity under “Declaration
of Malta” proscribes forcible feeding of inmate
patients), rev'd, 337 Wis. 2d 185, 804 N.W.2d 489 (2011);
McNabb v. Dept. of Corrections, supra, 163 Wash. 2d
425 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (“Declaration of Malta”
indicates government interest in maintaining medical
ethics did not weigh in favor of force-feeding). The
defendant and the amici argue that these opinions dem-
onstrate a consensus against force-feeding as expressed
by the World Medical Association declarations. This
statement misses the mark, however, because it fails
to acknowledge that the opinions cited—a concurring
opinion, a dissenting opinion and an unreported trial
court opinion that was later reversed by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals—not only fail to carry the precedential

842 Po
Ce

weight of a majority opinion, but also reveal an absence
of consensus concerning how United States courts view
the import of the “Declaration of Tokyo” and the “Decla-
ration of Malta.”

In addition, although the defendant and the amici
have pointed to some countries that, as a rule, do not
allow force-feeding competent inmates who voluntarily
refuse to accept nutrition or hydration; see Correctional
Service of Canada, Corrections and Conditional Release
Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, § 89, available at http:/aws-lois.jus
tice.gc.ca/PDF/C-44.6.pdf (last visited February 28,
2012) (copy contained in the file of this case in the
Supreme Court clerk’s office) (“[t]he [correctional ser-
vice] shall not direct the force-feeding, by any method,
of an inmate who had the capacity to understand the
consequences of fasting at the time the inmate made
the decision to fast”); cf. Secretary of State for the Home
Dept. v. Robb, [1995] Fam. 127, 131-32, [1995] 2 W.L.R.
722 (in United Kingdom, right to self-determination is
not absolute, but state must establish countervailing
interest to outweigh prisoner’s right to refuse food);
there appear to be anumber of other nations that specif-
ically allow for the force-feeding of inmates in some
instances. See also Council of Europe, “Report on the
Organisation of Health Care Services in Prisons in Euro-
pean Member States,” § 4.6 (1998), available at http://
www.coe.int/t/dg3/health/Prisonsreport_en.asp (last
visited February 28, 2012) (copy contained in the file
of this case in the Supreme Court clerk’s office).!”

Furthermore, the amici acknowledge that the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (European Court) has not

™ The Council of Europe's report indicates that Finland follows the World
Medical Association's “Declaration of Tokyo,” Spain and Sweden allow
involuntary feeding if there is immediate danger to the life or health of the
hunger striker, and Italy prohibits involuntary feeding unless the hunger
striker is no longer aware of the consequences of continued food refusal.
Council of Europe, supra, § 4.6.

Pe 343
ee

barred force-feeding in all contexts. Indeed, as the trial
court in the present case noted, it appears that the
European Court specifically permits the force-feeding
of inmates when such measures are medically neces-
sary to prevent death or permanent damage and the
measures used are not severe. In Ciorap v. Moldova,
App. 12066/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 77 (2007), the Euro-
pean Court stated that “a measure which is of therapeu-
tic necessity from the point of view of established
principles of medicine cannot in principle be regarded
as inhuman and degrading . . . . The same can be said
about force-feeding that is aimed at saving the life of
a particular detainee who consciously refuses to take
food.” (Citation omitted.) The court further noted that
medical necessity must be “convincingly shown to
exist” and that the “manner in which the applicant is
subjected to force-feeding during the hunger-strike
must not trespass the threshold of the minimum level
of severity envisaged by the [c]ourt’s case law under
[a]rticle [two] of the [cJonvention.” Id.;8 see also Herc-
zegfalvy v. Austria, App. 10533/83, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras.
83 and 84 (September 24, 1992) (when force-feeding
and restraints are medically necessary, no violation of
article three of convention). Thus, it appears that the
European Court has determined that force-feeding hun-
ger striking inmates not only is allowed when medically
necessary and performed with a minimum level of
severity, but also that such a procedure is specifically
not, as the defendant contends, inhuman or degrading.
Therefore, it appears that there is no international con-
sensus regarding whether states may force-feed
inmates, and as a result, states may make individual
determinations regarding whether, and under what set

18 The European Court ultimately decided that force-feeding an inmate
amounted to torture, in violation of article three of the convention, because
the government did not demonstrate a medical necessity for force-feeding
him, and the manner in which it was carried out was unnecessarily painful
and humiliating. Ciorap v. Moldova, supra, App. 12066/02, para. 89.

844 Po
Ce

of circumstances, to allow the force-feeding of prison
inmates.

If this case involved a question regarding the propri-
ety of the methods used, or the motivation for force-
feeding the defendant, it is possible that international
law proscribing force-feeding as a means of punish-
ment—such as when it is intended to humiliate or is
carried out with excess force—would, perhaps, carry
more weight. We are not, however, dealing with a case
wherein the department used unreasonable or unneces-
sary force or performed the nasogastric procedure in
such a way that it exceeded a minimum level of severity.
Nor are we dealing with a case wherein the department
officials were motivated by any objective other than
preserving the defendant’s health in the face of immi-
nent permanent damage or death. In fact, the record
clearly indicates that force-feeding the defendant was
a last resort considered only when the health care pro-
fessionals believed the risk to the defendant's health
by his continued refusal to ingest fluids and nutrition—
despite their best efforts to convince the defendant to
voluntarily accept at least a minimal amount of fluids
or nutrition—became unacceptable. Furthermore, the
record is replete with evidence that the nasogastric
procedure is both the least complicated and least risky
means of providing artificial nutrition.

It is clear that the commissioner appropriately sought
to preserve the defendant's life using the safest, simplest
procedure available, rather than improperly seeking to
punish the defendant for engaging in his hunger strike.
We therefore conclude that the trial court properly
determined that the weight of international authority
does not prohibit medically necessary force-feeding
under such circumstances.

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

Po 845
a

JOHN A. CURRAN II, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE
OF LEEANN CURRAN), ET AL. 0.
SHERRY L. KROLL ET AL.

(SC 18585)

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan and Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued December 8, 2011—officially released March 13, 2012

Po 847

Michael G. Rigg, with whom was Donna R. Zito, for
the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Kathleen L. Nastri, with whom was Cynthia C. Bott,
for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).

Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J. The substitute plaintiff, Ryan P.
Curran (plaintiff), the successor administrator of the
estate of Leeann Curran (decedent), brought this medi-
cal malpractice action against the defendants, Sherry L.
Kroll, a physician, and the Medical Center of Northeast
Connecticut, LLP,? claiming, inter alia, that Kroll had
failed to warn the decedent adequately of certain risks
associated with the use of birth control pills and the
symptoms of those risks. The trial court directed a
verdict in favor of the defendants and rendered judg-
ment accordingly. The plaintiff then appealed to the
Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of the
trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. Cur-
ran v. Kroll, 118 Conn. App. 401, 417, 984 A.2d 763
(2009). Thereafter, this court granted the defendants’

' This action originally was brought by the named plaintiff, John A. Curran
II, the husband of the decedent, Leeann Curran, and the initial administrator
of her estate. During the pendency of the action, John A. Curran III, died,
and Ryan P. Curran, the decedent’s son, was substituted as the plaintiff.

In addition to Kroll and the Medical Center of Northeast Connecticut,
LLP, the original complaint also named Saul Ahola, Jane Doyle, William
Johnson, Marie Livigni, Paul Matty and Lee Wesler as defendants. The com-
plaint was withdrawn as to these defendants before trial. References herein
to the defendants are to Kroll and the Medical Center of Northeast Connecti-
cut, LLP, jointly.

84s Pe

petition for certification to appeal, limited to the follow-
ing issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly reverse the
trial court’s granting of a directed verdict in favor of
the defendants?” Curran v. Kroll, 295 Conn. 915, 990
A.2d 866 (2010). We affirm the judgment of the Appel-
late Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the
following facts, construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, and procedural history.’ “The decedent
died on June 8, 2002, as a result of blood clots in her
lungs that likely originated in her left thigh, traveled
through her venous system and her heart and lodged
in her lungs. The official cause of her death was deter-
mined to be bilateral pulmonary emboli caused by deep
vein thrombosis.‘

“On May 6, 2002, approximately one month before
her death, the decedent, a forty-five year old woman,
attended a scheduled office visit with her primary care
physician . . . Kroll, at which time the decedent com-
plained of menopausal symptoms, including mood
swings, hot flashes, dysmenorrhea (painful periods),
and menometrorrhagia (irregular and heavy periods).
To help alleviate those symptoms . . . Kroll pre-
scribed Desogen, an oral contraceptive or birth control
pill, which was dispensed to the decedent in one of its
generic forms, Apri, by her pharmacy. Both medications
substantially are the same. Near the end of May, the
decedent told her mother, Kathy Stilwell, that she ‘felt
terrible’ and did not want to continue taking the pills

3 We have supplemented the Appellate Court's recitation of the facts with
additional relevant facts supported by the evidence produced at trial.

4A deep vein thrombosis is a ‘blood clot in the deep [vein] system of
the legs,’ which occurs primarily in the thigh and the calf. If one of the clots
breaks off from the vein where it has formed and travels through the venous
system, through the heart, lodging in the pulmonary artery, it causes what
is known as a pulmonary embolism, or a blood clot in the lung. ‘Bilateral
pulmonary emboli’ refers to blood clots in both lungs.” Curran v. Kroll,
supra, 118 Conn. App. 403-404 n.2.

Po 849
a

because she was feeling worse than before she started
taking them. The decedent also told Stilwell that she
had telephoned . . . Kroll about this, but [Kroll] told
her to continue on the medication, which she did. . . .
Kroll’s office had no record of the decedent having
made this telephone call, however. At some point in
time after the decedent’s May 6, 2002 office visit, the
defendants lost or misplaced her medical chart, which
later was re-created, in part, from a computer file in
preparation for trial. Writings, such as some handwrit-
ten notations from . . . Kroll, the decedent’s self-pre-
pared patient information sheet, reports from other
[physicians], handwritten notations from nurses or
assistants in . . . Kroll’s office and other items, how-
ever, could not be reproduced and were lost. . . . Kroll
did testify, however, that it was her practice to dictate
the results of a patient’s examination and her recom-
mendations, which then were stored electronically.

“On June 6, 2002, the decedent and Stilwell attended
a meeting together. The decedent had considerable leg
pain, however, and had to leave the meeting because
of her discomfort. The decedent had no idea what was
causing her pain. Although she went to work the next
day, she had to leave work early due to continuing,
significant leg pain. She speculated to Stilwell that per-
haps she had done something to herself such as pull a
muscle, but ‘she truly had no idea what was wrong with
her.’ The decedent also told her husband [the named
plaintiff, John A. Curran II; see footnote 1 of this opin-
ion] that she had pain in her groin and that she could
not figure out why. She speculated to him that perhaps
she had pulled a muscle. She continued to complain
about the pain through the evening of June 7, 2002. She
and her husband were babysitting their two grandchil-
dren that weekend. During the night, [the plaintiff]
heard [the decedent] grunting in pain as the decedent’s
husband helped her get from their bedroom down the

850 Po

stairs. She was continuing to experience leg pain. [The
plaintiff] asked if they needed help, but the decedent’s
husband declined, explaining that he was taking the
decedent downstairs so that she could elevate her leg.
The decedent stayed on the couch because of the pain.
[The plaintiff] left for work at approximately 4 a.m. and
kissed the decedent goodbye as she lay on the couch.
The decedent reassured him that she was okay.

“At approximately 6 a.m. on the morning of June 8,
2002, the decedent’s seven year old granddaughter
woke the decedent’s husband to tell him that the dece-
dent had fallen; the granddaughter was quite upset. The
decedent had fallen and hit her head in the bathroom.
Her husband helped the decedent get onto the couch,
and he telephoned 911. The decedent complained to
her husband that she was unable to breathe. The
Plainfield fire department responded quickly, as did the
Canterbury fire department. Members thereof began
providing assistance to the decedent, but she lost con-
sciousness and stopped breathing. They continued in
their attempts to revive her while she was taken by
ambulance to a hospital. The decedent never regained
consciousness. The cause of the decedent’s death was
bilateral pulmonary emboli caused by deep vein throm-
bosis.” Curran v. Kroll, supra, 118 Conn. App. 403-406.

After the decedent’s death, the plaintiff brought this
action alleging, inter alia, that Kroll negligently had
failed to warn the decedent of the signs and symptoms
of deep vein thrombosis. “[At trial] Kroll testified that
her training included information about the risks and
side effects of birth control pills. She further testified
that the risks of ‘blood clots are associated with the
older formulations of birth control pills. The newer
[formulation] of pills were designed specifically to try
to reduce the risk. So, the data that is available is unclear
to the degree that the risk was still present.’ [Kroll] then
acknowledged that ‘one of the risks associated with

Po 851
a

birth control pills can be blood clots,’ but she also stated
that she did not know if that same risk was associated
with Desogen because the studies citing an increased
risk were based on the older formulations of birth con-
trol pills.

“Despite stating that she did not know if the risks
were associated with Desogen . . . Kroll later testified.
that she ‘[d]efinitely’ would have advised the decedent
of the risk associated with Desogen and deep vein
thrombosis and that she also would have discussed
with the decedent all side effects and the symptoms
associated therewith before prescribing the medication.
The decedent's patient file, which was a computer gen-
erated file created to replace the file lost by the defen-
dants, had no indication that . . . Kroll had given an
advisement to the decedent or the content of such an
advisement, despite . . . Kroll’s testimony that it was
her practice to dictate the results of a patient’s examina-
tion and her recommendations, which then were stored
electronically. Nevertheless . . . Kroll testified that
she told the decedent and all her patients for whom
she prescribed birth control pills that there is an
increased risk of blood clots, that blood clots are poten-
tially life threatening, and that the symptoms of blood
clots are pain, as a result of leg swelling, and redness.°
Counsel for the plaintiff then pointed out to . . . Kroll
that when . . . Kroll was questioned in a deposition
on March 2, 2005, she had never mentioned telling the
decedent to watch for pain but only that she should
watch for swelling . . . Kroll then stated that she stood
by her deposition testimony. Counsel for the plaintiff
then asked: ‘And standing by your deposition . . .
would mean that when you counsel the patient about
warning signs, the warning sign that you counsel is

5 Kroll testified that she could not recall her discussion with the decedent
“word for word,” but that her discussions regarding the risks and side effects
of oral contraceptives “doesn’t differ greatly amongst patients.”

852

swelling. Right?’ . . . Kroll answered: ‘Swelling. Yes.”

° Before testifying that she stood by her deposition testimony, the follow-
ing colloquy occurred between the plaintiff's counsel and Kroll:

“Q. And do you in the course of this discussion [with patients regarding
the symptoms of deep vein thrombosis] . . . in addition to swelling, talk
about pain?

“A. Yes.

“Q. Pain and swelling are two different things.

“A. Pain and swelling are two different things. But you can get. . .
swelling without pain, you can get pain without swelling, but more com-
monly, they both occur together with redness.

“Q, Would a good, careful practitioner, who was seeing patients in May
of 2002, also address the issue of leg pain with your patient?

“A. That is what I do, yes.

“Q. And when I asked you . . . on page thirty-seven of your deposition,
what the conversation would consist of with your patients, did you mention
pain? Leg pain?

“A. During my deposition, I did not mention leg pain.

“Q. And by the way, the question I asked you was what warning signs
would you tell them to look out for. Right?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And you did not include in your answer at that time leg pain. Right?

“A. At that time I did not include [leg pain] in my answer, no.

“Q. And no other time in your deposition, did you?

“A. Not during my deposition, no.

“Q. And you understood . . . when I took your deposition, that was my
opportunity on behalf of [the decedent] to find out what you knew, what
you recalled, and what your testimony was going to be here today. Right?

“A. Yes, and I answered the questions to the best of my ability at that time.

“Q. Okay. You agree today that leg pain is something [that] should be
addressed with the patient?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And specifically . . . what kind of pain are we talking about?

“A. It’s usually local pain in the calf or thigh, wherever the swelling is.

“Q. Do you tell patients to watch for burning pain, sharp pain, cramping
pain, dull pain, constant pain, intermittent pain? Do you specify?

“A. There is a lot that we need to go through with birth control pills so
T usually just say pain. There’s too many other things to talk about.

“Q. Too many other things to talk about because there are a lot of things
that are involved and a lot of issues that are involved in a prescription of
birth control pills?

“A. Absolutely. I mean, generally in an exam that lasts forty-five minutes
or a twenty minute office visit, by the time you go through the symptoms,
and the indications and the benefits and the contraindications and they
consent {to] them, it takes a lot of time.

“Q. So what you would say is watch for pain?

Pe 858

... Kroll also stated that she would expect a patient,
who has been properly counseled by her physician, to
seek medical treatment when symptoms develop.

“The plaintiff's expert, Kenneth R. Ackerman, a board
certified physician in internal medicine, testified that
patients ‘put on birth control pills . . . have a statisti-
cally increased risk of forming blood clots.’ He also
stated that his opinion would not change on the basis
of the name of the birth control pill, whether it was

“A. Among other things.

“Q, And do you agree . . . that a good, careful physician, practicing in
May of 2002, would have this discussion with a patient not just in medical
terms, but to put it in lay terms so the patient can understand what
you're saying?

“A. Definitely.

“Q. All right, So you wouldn't just say [deep vein thrombosis]. You'd say,
look, a [deep vein thrombosis] is a blood clot in your leg. And that’s one
of the things that you need to watch out for. Right?

“A. Yilusually say, watch out for calf or thigh pain or swelling, shortness of
breath, pain with taking a deep inspiration, headaches, chest pain, abdominal
pain. These could represent cardiac conditions such as a heart attack, a
pulmonary embolus or a blood clot in the leg—a pulmonary embolus is a
blood clot to the lugs—or a migraine headache. So I tell them both in
simple terms [what] to watch out for as far as their symptoms, I tell them
the simple terms as far as the complications, and I also tell them some of
the more technical terms.

“Q. Okay. And those simple terms that you use, should be terms that
describe to the patient in words that she can understand, the symptoms,
the seriousness of a potential condition, and what to do if they occur. Right?

“A. Yes.

“Q. Because the patient needs to have the right information from the
doctor so the patient can make the right decisions about what to do if those
symptoms occur. Right?

“A. Yes.”

After Kroll testified that she stood by her deposition testimony, the defen-
dants’ attomey asked Kroll, “[iJs there any doubt in your mind—I think
we've established in the deposition in that particular answer you didn’t
mention pain. Any doubt in your mind you mentioned leg pain to [the
decedent] on May 6, 20022” Kroll responded, “no, because it comes after
swelling, and redness, and pain, they come together.” On redirect, the plain-
tiffs counsel asked, “I just want to clear up the issue of the deposition. Do
you stand by your deposition testimony?” Kroll responded, “I stand by what
I said that day.”

854 Po

Desogen, Apri or some other formulation. . . . Acker-
man also stated that ‘[a]n internist would expect that
a reasonable patient, who has been advised properly,
will recognize the appropriate side effects of the medi-
cation . . . and receive medical attention . . . should
those symptoms or signs appear.’

“The deposition testimony of the decedent’s husband
was read for the jury. In relevant part, her husband had
testified that the decedent had told him that she had
pain in her groin but that she could not figure out why.
She speculated to him that perhaps she had pulled a
muscle. Stilwell, the decedent’s mother, testified at trial
that the decedent told her when she started taking the
prescribed birth control pills and that the decedent also
told her that she telephoned . . . Kroll’s office near
the end of May because she was not feeling well taking
the medication, and she wanted to stop but that . . .
Kroll asked her to continue taking it. [Stilwell] further
testified that she and the decedent attended a meeting
the Thursday evening before the decedent died but that
the decedent had to leave the meeting because she
was experiencing considerable leg pain of an unknown
cause. Further, Stilwell testified that the decedent went
to work the following day but had to leave work early
because of significant and continued leg pain. The dece-
dent then speculated to Stilwell that maybe she had
pulled a muscle; Stilwell said that the decedent ‘truly
had no idea what was wrong with her.’” Id., 411-13.

In addition to the foregoing, the evidence presented.
at trial established that the decedent had received a
bachelor of arts degree in human development from
Connecticut College in 2001, graduating magna cum
laude as amember of the Phi Beta Kappa honor society,
and that she had taken graduate level courses at Saint
Joseph’s College in the 2001-2002 academic year.

“Tn his third amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged
a claim of medical malpractice against the defendants,

Po 855
a

claiming that . . . Kroll was negligent in failing to
advise the decedent of the risks of her recommended
treatment of birth control pills and in failing to inform
the decedent of the signs and symptoms associated with.
such risks. The parties agreed that the standard of care
requires a treating physician to provide such warnings
and instruction to a patient. After the plaintiff presented
his evidence, the defendants moved for a directed ver-
dict. . . . Following argument on the motion, the court
concluded that there was no evidence that . . . Kroll
had breached the standard of care and that a failure to
warn claim could not be based solely on an inference
that might be drawn from the decedent’s failure to seek
help. Accordingly, the court directed a verdict in favor
of the defendants and rendered judgment accordingly.”
Id., 406.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial
court to the Appellate Court. Id. The Appellate Court
concluded that, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion,
the evidence presented by the plaintiff at trial would
support a reasonable inference that Kroll had failed to
warn the decedent adequately of the signs and symp-
toms associated with the risks of taking birth control
pills. Id., 417. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of
the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial.
Id. This appeal followed. The defendants claim that: (1)
the Appellate Court’s decision was based on specula-
tion; and (2) the Appellate Court improperly decided the
appeal on grounds that were not raised by the plaintiff in
the trial court.

We begin our analysis with the standard of review
of atrial court’s decision to grant a motion for a directed
verdict. Whether the evidence presented by the plaintiff
was sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed
verdict is a question of law, over which our review is
plenary. DiStefano v. Milardo, 276 Conn. 416, 422, 886
A.2d 415 (2005) (“[w]hether the plaintiff has established

8656 Pe
ft

a prima facie case entitling the plaintiff to submit a
claim to a trier of fact is a question of law over which
our review is plenary”). “Directed verdicts are not
favored. . . . A trial court should direct a verdict only
when a jury could not reasonably and legally have
reached any other conclusion. . . . In reviewing the
trial court's decision to direct a verdict in favor of a
defendant we must consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. . . . Although it is the
jury’s right to draw logical deductions and make reason-
able inferences from the facts proven . . . it may not
resort to mere conjecture and speculation. ... A
directed verdict is justified if . . . the evidence is so
weak that it would be proper for the court to set aside
a verdict rendered for the other party.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Moizer v. Haberli, 300 Conn. 733,
743, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011). This court has emphasized
two additional points with respect to motions to set
aside a verdict that are equally applicable to motions
fora directed verdict: “First, the plaintiff in a civil matter
is not required to prove his case beyond a reasonable
doubt; a mere preponderance of the evidence is suffi-
cient. Second, the well established standards compel-
ling great deference to the historical function of the
jury find their roots in the constitutional right to a trial
by jury.” Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249
Conn. 523, 5384-35, 733 A.2d 197 (1999).

“TI]t is [the] function of the jury to draw whatever
inferences from the evidence or facts established by
the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .
Because [t]he only kind of an inference recognized by
the law is a reasonable one . . . any such inference

‘Of course, when determining whether a trial court properly granted a
motion for a directed verdict, we do not defer to the jury's verdict, as the
jury has not been permitted to reach a verdict. We do give great weight,
however, to the plaintiff's constitutional right to have his or her case pre-
sented to a jury.

857

cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or conjecture.
. . . It is axiomatic, therefore, that [aJny [inference]
drawn must be rational and founded upon the evidence.
. . . However, [t]he line between permissible inference
and impermissible speculation is not always easy to
discern. When we infer, we derive a conclusion from
proven facts because such considerations as experi-
ence, or history, or science have demonstrated that
there is a likely correlation between those facts and the
conclusion. If that correlation is sufficiently compelling,
the inference is reasonable. But if the correlation
between the facts and the conclusion is slight, or if a
different conclusion is more closely correlated with the
facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference is less
reasonable. At some point, the link between the facts
and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it
speculation. When that point is reached is, frankly, a
matter of judgment... .

“(Proof of a material fact by inference from circum-
stantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to
exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the
evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable
belief in the probability of the existence of the material
fact. . . . Thus, in determining whether the evidence
supports a particular inference, we ask whether that
inference is so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. . . .
In other words, an inference need not be compelled by
the evidence; rather, the evidence need only be reason-
ably susceptible of such an inference. Equally well
established is our holding that a jury may draw factual
inferences on the basis of already inferred facts.” (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Copas, 252 Conn. 318, 338-40, 746 A.2d 761 (2000).
Finally, it is well established that a plaintiff “has the
same right to submit a weak case as he has to submit
astrong one.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle

858 Pe

Co. v. D'Addario, 268 Conn. 441, 462, 844 A.2d 836
(2004).

The parties in the present case agree that the plain-
tiff’s claim that the defendants negligently failed to warn
the decedent of the signs and symptoms of the risks
associated with taking oral contraceptives is akin to a
cause of action for lack of informed consent. “In order
to prevail on a cause of action for lack of informed
consent, a plaintiff must prove both that there was a
failure to disclose a known material risk of a proposed
procedure and that such failure was a proximate cause
of his injury. Unlike a medical malpractice claim, a
claim for lack of informed consent is determined by a
lay standard of materiality, rather than an expert medi-
cal standard of care which guides the trier of fact in
its determination.” Shortell v. Cavanagh, 300 Conn.
383, 388, 15 A.3d 1042 (2011). Under this “lay standard
of disclosure,” a physician is obligated “to provide the
patient with that information which a reasonable
patient would have found material for making a decision.
whether to embark upon a contemplated course of ther-
apy.” Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 191 Conn.
282, 292-93, 465 A.2d 294 (1983). Thus, by analogy to
these cases involving claims of lack of informed con-
sent, to establish a prima facie case in the present case,
the plaintiff was required to present evidence that Kroll
failed to provide the decedent with advice regarding any
symptoms and risks associated with oral contraceptives
that would enable a reasonable patient to recognize
the development of, and seek treatment for, such a
symptom or risk, and that Kroll’s failure to advise the
decedent adequately was the proximate cause of her

* The defendants concede that Kroll had a duty to advise the decedent of
the symptoms and risks associated with the use of oral contraceptives, and
that, in general, the purpose of providing such advice is to enable patients
to seek medical treatment if and when the symptoms appear, although they
do not always do so.

Pe 859
Le

With these principles in mind, we turn to the defen-
dants’ claim in the present case that the Appellate Court
improperly determined that the evidence produced by
the plaintiff would support a reasonable inference that
Kroll failed to advise the decedent that leg pain was a
symptom of deep vein thrombosis. We disagree. The
evidence showed that the decedent's office visit with
Kroll was on May 6, 2002, and that she was suffering
menopausal symptoms that caused her significant dis-
comfort at that time. Kroll prescribed oral contracep-
tives to alleviate the symptoms. A few weeks later, in
late May, the decedent told her mother that she wanted
to discontinue the use of the oral contraceptives
because she felt worse than before she started taking
them. The decedent also indicated that she had tele-
phoned Kroll and told her that she felt worse, but Kroll
had advised her to continue taking the medication. On
June 6, 2002, only one month after she began taking the
oral contraceptives, the decedent began to experience
significant leg pain. The pain continued the next day,
and the decedent indicated to both her mother and her
husband that she “had no idea” what could be causing
it. The pain was significant and persistent and caused.
the decedent to leave an evening meeting early and
then leave her employment early the following day. The
evidence also showed that the decedent was intelligent
and well educated. Finally, Kroll’s testimony regarding
the advice that she gave to the decedent was equivocal.
Although Kroll stated a number of times that it was
her standard practice to warn patients for whom she
prescribed oral contraceptives that they should watch
for leg pain, she also stated repeatedly that she “stood
by” her deposition testimony that she warned such
patients to watch for swelling.

On the basis of this evidence, areasonable juror could
have found that, during May of 2006, the decedent was
actively engaged in seeking medical treatment for her

860

menopausal symptoms. A reasonable juror also could
have inferred from the fact that the decedent had called
Kroll to report that the oral contraceptives appeared
to be making her feel worse that the decedent was
aware that the pills could have side effects, that she
was actively monitoring her physical response to the
pills in the relevant time period, and that she was willing
and able to seek medical advice and treatment when
she believed that adverse side effects might be devel-
oping. In addition, a reasonable juror could have con-
cluded that the decedent was fully capable of
understanding, remembering and following any advice
provided by Kroll regarding adverse side effects and
their potential symptoms. The evidence also amply sup-
ported a reasonable inference that the decedent simply
did not know what was causing her severe leg pain and
that she drew no connection between it and her use
of the oral contraceptives. Finally, the jury reasonably
could have believed Kroll’s repeated testimony that she
“stood by” her deposition testimony that she warned
her patients for whom she prescribed oral contracep-
tives to look out for swelling in the leg as a symptom
of deep vein thrombosis, and discredited her equivocal
and inconsistent testimony that she usually warned
patients to look out for leg pain.®

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, we conclude that it reasonably could have

* The defendants contend that the jury's disbelief of Kroll’s testimony that
she had warned the decedent about leg pain could not support an inference
that she had not given such a warning. See Paige v. St. Andrew's Roman
Cathotie Chewch Conp., 250 Conn. 14, 18, 734 A.2d 85 (1999) (“although the
jury is entitled to disbelieve any evidence, it may not draw a contrary
inference on the basis of that disbelief”). As we have indicated, however,
Kroll testified at her deposition that she had warned the decedent about
leg swelling. She did not testify at that time that she had warned the decedent
aboutleg pain. At trial, she “stood by” her deposition testimony. Accordingly,
there was affirmative evidence from which the jury reasonably could have
inferred that Kroll had warned the decedent only about swelling.

861

supported an inference that Kroll had failed to advise
the decedent that leg pain was a symptom of deep vein
thrombosis. Although the evidence cannot be character-
ized as overwhelming, and it would not necessarily have
compelled a finding that Kroll failed to warn the dece-
dent about leg pain, it was sufficient to have produced
“in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the
probability of the existence of the material fact.”
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Copas, supra, 252 Conn. 339-40. We therefore
reject the defendants’ claim that the Appellate Court’s
conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to present
the case to the jury was based, not on reasonable infer-
ences, but on speculation.

The defendants also contend that the Appellate Court
improperly decided the appeal on the basis of claims
that the plaintiff did not raise in the trial court. Specifi-
cally, the defendants contend that the plaintiff never
made the express claims that: (1) Kroll’s alleged failure
to document in the decedent’s medical file any warning
about the signs and symptoms of the risks associated
with oral contraceptives would support an inference
that Kroll had breached the standard of care; and (2)
the decedent’s telephone call to Kroll reporting that she
was feeling worse after taking the pills would support
an inference that the decedent would have sought
immediate medical attention for her leg pain if Kroll
had warned her that such pain can be a symptom of
deep vein thrombosis.

With respect to the defendants’ first claim, regarding
Kroll’s alleged failure to document her warning to the
decedent, we agree with the defendants that, in the
absence of any claim or testimony that the relevant
standard of care required Kroll to document any warn-
ing given to the decedent in her medical file or of any
evidence that that was her regular practice, Kroll’s
alleged failure to do so, standing alone, did not consti-

862

tute affirmative evidence that she gave no such warning.
As we have indicated, however, there was other affirma-
tive evidence from which the jury reasonably could
have made this inference.” Accordingly, even if the
Appellate Court improperly relied on the absence of
documentation as affirmative proof that Kroll had not
warned the decedent of leg pain, its conclusion that
the evidence, considered .in its entirety, was sufficient
for the case to have been presented to the jury was
independently supported.

With respect to the defendants’ second claim, regard-
ing the decedent’s telephone call to Kroll reporting that
she felt worse after taking the prescribed pills, we dis-
agree that the plaintiff was required to argue specifically
to the trial court that this evidence supported an infer-
ence that the decedent was monitoring her physical
response to the contraceptive pills and was willing to
seek medical attention for any symptoms that she
believed were related to the pills. In determining
whether the trial court properly granted the defendants’
motion for a directed verdict, the Appellate Court was
entitled—indeed, it was required—to consider all rele-
vant evidence in the record, not just the evidence that
the plaintiff expressly identified in his opposition to the
defendants’ motion for a directed verdict." See Larsen

Although the absence of any documentation in the decedent's medical
file, in and of itself, would not support a reasonable inference that Kroll
had not provided an adequate warning, the plaintiff was entitled to establish
that nothing in the medical file was inconsistent with the other affirmative
evidence supporting that inference, a fact about which the jury naturally
would have been curious.

" We note that, at argument on the defendants’ motion for a directed
verdict, the plaintiff's attorney argued that “I rely on what [the decedent]
did and didn’t do, and the nature of her personality and her intellect and
her education and her responsibility and her attention to detail as part of
my case, as part of my proof that she wasn't advised.” (Emphasis added.)
‘The evidence that the decedent had called Kroll to report that she felt worse
was evidence of what the decedent “did” and of her responsibility and
“attention to detail with respect to her treatment.

Po 863
a

Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 500, 656
A.2d 1009 (1995) (“[iJn reviewing the trial court’s deci-
sion to direct a verdict . . . this court considers all the
evidence, including reasonable inferences, in the light
most favorable to the [plaintiff]” [emphasis added]).”

We also are not persuaded by the defendants’ argu-
ment that the Appellate Court improperly concluded

® In support of their claim to the contrary, the defendants rely on Sequen-
zia v. Guerrieri Masonry, Inc., 298 Conn. 816, 821, 9 A.3d 322 (2010)
(“Appellate Court may not reach out and decide a case before it on a basis
that the parties never have raised or briefed” [internal quotation marks
omitted]), Sabrowski v. Sabrowski, 282 Conn. 556, 561, 923 A.2d 686 (2007)
(same), and Lynch v. Granby Holdings, Inc., 230 Conn. 95, 97-98, 644 A.2d
325 (1994) (in absence of challenge to subject matter jurisdiction or claim
of plain error, Appellate Court cannot address claim that was not raised in
trial court or on appeal). In none of these cases, however, did this court
conclude that the Appellate Court had improperly reversed a directed verdict
in favor of a party because the other party had not expressly relied on a
specific piece of probative evidence in opposing the directed verdict, Rather,
in each case, this court concluded that the Appellate Court improperly
resolved the appeal on the basis of a claim that the appellant had not raised
in the trial court. See Sequenzia v. Guerrieri Masonry, Inc., supra, 821
(defendant had abandoned instructional propriety claim); Sabrowski v.
Sabrowski, supra, 560 (defendant had never claimed that trial court improp-
exly had modified alimony award on basis of decrease in certain income of
plaintiff); Lynch v. Granby Holdings, Inc., supra, 97 (plaintiff had never
claimed that damage award should be set aside because it manifested juror
confusion). In the present case, the plaintiff's claim was that the trial court
improperly had concluded that the evidence presented at trial was insuffi-
cient to present the case to the jury, and the Appellate Court did not go
beyond that claim in resolving the appeal.

‘The defendants also rely on the principle that “iJt is not the responsibility
of the trial judge, without some specific request from a petitioner, to search
arecord, often, in a habeas case, involving hundreds of pages of transcript,
in order to find some basis for relief for a petitioner.” Solek v. Commissioner
of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 473, 480, 946 A.2d 239, cert, denied, 289 Conn.
902, 957 A.2d 873 (2008). The court in Solek merely held, however, that a
habeas court is not required to search the transcript of the underlying
criménal trial for support for a petitioner’s claim. See id. (“[tJhe responsibil-
ity of a habeas court, in confronting an often voluminous trial court record,
is to respond to those claims fairly advanced by the petitioner” [emphasis
added]). Solek does not support the proposition that the trial court is not
required to consider alll of the evidence presented to that court in ruling on.
a motion for directed verdict.

864 PO
a

that evidence of the decedent’s telephone call to Kroll
would support an inference that the decedent would
have called Kroll about her leg pain if she had been
warned about it because the evidence was not pre-
sented for that purpose, but only to establish that the
decedent had begun taking the oral contraceptives
when she developed the deep vein thrombosis. This
evidence was admitted in full, without limitation. In the
absence of any limiting instruction, the jury was entitled
to draw any inferences from the evidence that it reason-
ably would support. State v. Copas, supra, 252 Conn.
338 (“it is [the] function of the jury to draw whatever
inferences from the evidence or facts established by
the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical”
[internal quotation marks omitted]); cf. O'Hara v. Hart-
ford Oil Heating Co., 106 Conn. 468, 473, 138 A. 438
(1927) (“[elvidence which is offered and admitted for
a limited purpose only . . . cannot be used for

another and totally different purpose” [emphasis
added]).

The defendants further claim that the evidence
regarding the decedent’s telephone call to Kroll was
inadmissible to raise an inference that she would have
sought treatment for her leg pain if she had been prop-
erly warned under § 4-4 (a) of the Connecticut Code of
Evidence, which provides that “[e]vidence of a trait of
character of a person is inadmissible for the purpose
of proving that the person acted in conformity with the
character trait on a particular occasion . . . .”2

The defendants also claim that the Appellate Court improperly held that
the testimony of various witnesses that “persons generally seek to follow
instructions of amedical nature concerning the serious symptoms associated
with the side effects of medication”; Curran v. Kroll, supra, 118 Conn. App.
417; could support an inference that the decedent failed to seek medical
treatment for her leg pain because she had not been warmed that it was a
symptom of deep vein thrombosis. The Appellate Court concluded that the
evidence would support this inference “based on the same rationale that
justifies the introduction of statements made for the purpose of obtaining
medical treatment, namely that the patient has an interest in preserving her
own health. See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (6).” Curran v. Kroll, supra, 417

Pe 865
Dee

Because the defendants did not object to the introduc-
tion of the evidence or ask for a limiting instruction on
this ground at trial, however, this claim is unreviewable.
Moreover, even if the claim were reviewable, it is mer-
itless. The evidence does not support an inference that,
because the decedent had a general “character trait,”
namely, willingness and the ability to seek medical
advice and treatment for symptoms about which she
had been warned, she would have acted in conformity
with that character trait if she had been adequately
warned about leg pain. Rather, it shows that the dece-
dent was actively monitoring and reporting to Kroll the
effects of a specific treatment for a specific medical
condition and, therefore, it raises the reasonable infer-
ence that, if she had been warned that leg pain was a
symptom of a dangerous side effect of the treatment,
she would have sought medical advice and treatment
for her leg pain.

Finally, for all of the foregoing reasons, we reject the
defendants’ claim that the Appellate Court’s conclusion
that the evidence was sufficient to present the case to
the jury violated the principle that “[t]he fact that...

n.b. As the Appellate Court suggested, the rule that a patient’s hearsay
statement to a medical provider is admissible is premised on the presumption
that a patient will not lie when seeking medical treatment, There are many
reasons, however, why a patient who presumptively has an interest in pre-
serving her own health might not seek treatment if a symptom of a risk
arises, even though the patient has been wamed of the symptoms: the patient
may have misunderstood or forgotten the warning; she may have downplayed
the risk; she may be uncertain whether she is experiencing a symptom; or
she may simply be unable or unwilling to seek medical treatment. Accord-
ingly, we agree with the defendants that the mere fact that a patient did
not seek treatment when a symptom arose, standing alone, does not imply
that the patient was not properly warned about the symptom. As we have
indicated, however, there was other evidence in the present case from which
the jury reasonably could have inferred that the decedent was aware at the
time that she experienced leg pain that the oral contraceptives could have
negative side effects, that she was fully capable of understanding any warning
given to her, that her leg pain was severe, and that she was willing and able
to seek medical advice and treatment for any negative side effects.

866 Po

treatment has resulted unfavorably does not, of itself,
raise any presumption of want of proper care or skill.”
Cnternal quotation marks omitted.) Boone v. William
W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 576, 864 A.2d 1
(2005). In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Court
did not rely solely on the facts that the decedent failed
to seek timely medical treatment for her leg pain and,
ultimately, died. Rather, as we have indicated, that court
relied on affirmative evidence that reasonably sup-
ported the inferences that the decedent was actively
monitoring her response to the oral contraceptives in
the relevant time period, that she was willing and able
to seek medical advice and treatment if she experienced
adverse effects, and, most significantly, that she did not
know that her significant leg pain might be a symptom
of a dangerous side effect of oral contraceptives.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court
properly determined that the plaintiff produced suffi-
cient evidence to present the case to the jury and
reversed the trial court’s ruling granting a directed ver-
dict in favor of the defendants.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

BILL ROY HENDERSON v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Bill Roy Henderson’s petition for certi-
fication for appeal from the Appellate Court, 129 Conn.
App. 188 (AC 32039), is denied.

Wayne A. Francis, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state’s
attorney, in opposition.

Decided November 8, 2011

HENRY J. MARTOCCHIO v. STEPHANIE
SAVOIR ET AL.

The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 130 Conn. App. 626 (AC
31363), is denied.

Henry J. Martocchio, pro se, in support of the
petition.
Decided November 8, 2011

MARIA F. MCKEON v. WILLIAM P. LENNON

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 181 Conn. App. 585 (AC
30068), is denied.

Proloy K. Das and Debra C. Ruel, in support of the
petition.

Campbell D. Barrett and Jon T. Kukucka, in oppo-
sition.

Decided November 8, 2011

901

902 Le

RYAN THOMPSON v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Ryan Thompson’s petition for certifi-
cation for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn.
App. 671 (AC 32044), is denied.

Adele V. Patterson, senior assistant public defender,
in support of the petition.

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided November 8, 2011

BOHONNON LAW FIRM, LLC v. JOHN H. BAXTER

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 371 (AC
32115), is denied.

NORCOTT and PALMER, Js., did not participate in
the consideration of or decision on this petition.

Kenneth A. Votre, in support of the petition.

Decided November 8, 2011

CRAIG POYSER v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Craig Poyser’s petition for certification
for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App.
902 (AC 32322), is denied.

Joseph Visone, assigned counsel, in support of the
petition.
Decided November 8, 2011

EE 903

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROBERT S. BUIE

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 129 Conn. App. 777 (AC
31049), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that, in
the context of a search of a private home, the apparent
authority doctrine does not violate article Srst, § 7, of
the constitution of Connecticut?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18887.

Neal Cone, senior assistant public defender, in sup-
port of the petition.

Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided November 17, 2011

ROBERT JOHN WHITE v. ESTATE OF
MICHAEL A. WHITE

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 129 Conn. App. 902 (AC
32835), is denied.

McLACHLAN and EVELEIGH, Js., did not participate
in the consideration of or decision on this petition.

Robert John White, pro se, in support of the petition.
Decided November 17, 2011

RHONDA M. MARCHESI v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN
OF THE TOWN OF LYME ET AL.

The petition by the defendants board of selectmen
of the town of Lyme and the town of Lyme for certifica-

904 Le Le

tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App.
24 (AC 29999), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the
trial court correctly determined that the parties were
entitled to a trial de novo in the Superior Court from
an appeal taken from the board of selectmen of the
town of Lyme pursuant to General Statutes § 13a-40?”

ROGERS, C. J., and HARPER, J., did not participate
in the consideration of or decision on this petition.

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18890.
Kenneth M. McKeever, town attorney, in support of
the petition.
Harry B. Heller, in opposition.
Decided November 17, 2011

BRIDGEPORT HARBOUR PLACE I, LLC v. JOSEPH P.
GANIM ET AL.*

The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 99 (AC 30549),
is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial
court’s exclusion of evidence of lost profits?”

ROGERS, C. J., and NORCOTT and EVELEIGH, Js.,
did not participate in the consideration of or decision
on this petition.

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18889.

William F. Gallagher, Hugh D. Hughes, William J.
Sweeney and R. Bartley Halloran, in support of the
petition.

Jeffrey J. Mirman and John F. Droney, in opposition.

Decided November 17, 2011

* The appeal was withdrawn January 27, 2012.

Le) 905

BRIDGEPORT HARBOUR PLACE I, LLC v. JOSEPH P.
GANIM ET AL.*

The named defendant's petition for certification for
appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 99
(AC 30549), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“Did the Appellate Court properly refrain from con-
sidering the issue raised by the named defendant regard-
ing the award of punitive damages because of the named
defendant’s failure to seek an articulation of the trial
court’s decision? If the answer is ‘no,’ did the trial court .
properly award punitive damages in this case?”

ROGERS, C. J., and NORCOTT and EVELEIGH, Js.,
did not participate in the consideration of or decision
on this petition.

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18888.

Jeffrey J. Mirman and John F. Droney, in support
of the petition.

William F. Gallagher, Hugh D. Hughes, William J.
Sweeney and R. Bartley Halloran, in opposition.

Decided November 17, 2011
Le
MICHAEL BROWN v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Michael Brown’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn.
App. 497 (AC 31707), is denied.

Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided November 17, 2011

* The appeal was withdrawn January 26, 2012.

ROBERT B. BARTON v. CITY OF NORWALK

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 719 (AC
31118), is denied.

Linda M. Guliuzza, assistant corporation counsel,
and Robert F. Masian, Jr., corporation counsel, in sup-
port of the petition.

Elliott B. Pollack and Megan Youngling Carannante,
in opposition.

Decided November 17, 2011

CITIBANK, N.A., TRUSTEE (SACO 2007-2) v. DEBRA
LINDLAND, EXECUTRIX (ESTATE OF MADLYN
LANDIN), ET AL.

The petition by the defendants Robert Olsen and 17
Ridge Road, LLC, for certification for appeal from the
Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 653 (AC 32723), is
granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the
trial court lacked the equitable authority to open a judg-
ment of foreclosure by sale under the circumstances
of this case?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18885.

David A. Ball, Barbara M. Schellenberg and Philip
C. Pires, in support of the petition.

Peter A. Ventre, in opposition.

Decided November 17, 2011

fd 907

WILLIAM SMITH v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner William Smith’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 32884)
is denied.

William Smith, pro se, in support of the petition.

Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided November 17, 2011

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EMANUEL
LOVELL WEBB

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 128 Conn. App. 846 (AC
31710), is denied.

HARPER, J., did not participate in the consideration
of or decision on this petition.

Neal Cone, senior assistant public defender, in sup-
port of the petition.

Adam E. Mattei, special deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, in opposition.

Decided December 1, 2011

CLEAVEN A. JOHNSON, JR. v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE CITY
OF NEW HAVEN ET AL.

The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 130 Conn. App. 191 (AC
31239), is granted, limited to the following issue:

908 Le

“Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial
court’s exclusion of the recall provision in the plaintiff's
employment contract as irrelevant?”

NORCOTT, J., did not participate in the consideration
of or decision on this petition.

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18893.
Max F. Brunswick, in support of the petition.
Warren L. Holcomb, in opposition.

Decided December 1, 2011

AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC. v. INLAND
WETLANDS AND WATERCOURSES AGENCY
OF THE TOWN OF STRATFORD

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 130 Conn. App. 69 (AC 31937),
is denied.

ROGERS, C. J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

Brian M. Stone, in support of the petition.

Timothy S. Hollister and Gian-Matthew Ranelli, in
opposition.

Decided December 1, 2011

AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC. v. INLAND
WETLANDS AND WATERCOURSES AGENCY
OF THE TOWN OF STRATFORD

The petition by the defendant Stratford town council
for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court,
130 Conn. App. 69 (AC 31937), is denied.

Le 909

ROGERS, C. J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

Kevin C. Kelly and David W. Colwick, in support of
the petition.

Timothy S. Hollister and Gian-Matthew Ranelli, in
opposition.

Decided December 1, 2011

AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC. v. ZONING
COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF
STRATFORD ET AL.

The named defendant's petition for certification for
appeal from the Appellate Court, 130 Conn. App. 36
(AC 31982/AC 31983), is denied.

ROGERS, C. J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

Timothy D. Bates, Joel C. Norwood and Lauren M.
Vinokur, in support of the petition.

Timothy S. Hollister and Gian-Matthew Ranelli, in
opposition.
Decided December 1, 2011

AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES, INC. v. ZONING
COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF
STRATFORD ET AL.

The petition by the defendant Stratford town council
for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court,
180 Conn. App. 36 (AC 31982/AC 31983), is denied.

ROGERS, C. J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

910 Le

Kevin C. Kelly and David W. Colwick, in support of
the petition.

Timothy S. Hollister and Gian-Matthew Ranelli, in
opposition.

Decided December 1, 2011

JEFFREY NAIER ET AL. v. ROZ-LYNN
BECKENSTEIN ET AL.

The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 638 (AC
30148), is denied.

NORCOTT, J., did not participate in the consideration.
of or decision on this petition.

Douglas M. Evans and David A. Lavenburg, in sup-
port of the petition.

Michael P. Berman, Suzanne LaPlante, Jeffrey J.
Mirman and John F. Droney, in opposition.

Decided December 1, 2011

DARIYON DRAKE ET AL. v. ANNE S. BINGHAM ET AL.

The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 701 (AC
30265), is denied.

David J. Robertson, in support of the petition.
Carey B. Reilly and Kathleen L. Nastri, in opposition.

Decided December 1, 2011
—

ere! 911

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES F.

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 798 (AC
31821), is denied.

EVELEIGH, J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

Carlos E. Candal, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Sarah Hanna, assistant state’s attorney, in oppo-
sition.
Decided December 1, 2011
a
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALFRED REA

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 903 (AC
31867), is denied.

Heather Margaret Wood, assistant public defender,
in support of the petition.

Adam E. Mattei, special deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, in opposition.

Decided December 1, 2011
|
RICHARD BUEHLER v. LILACH BUEHLER

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court (AC 33356A01) is denied.

Campbell D. Barrett and Jon T. Kukucka, in support
of the petition.

Charles W. Fleischmann, in opposition.

Decided December 1, 2011

912 Ls

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HECTOR ALONZO

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 1 (AC 30725),
is denied.

EVELEIGH, J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

Neal Cone, senior assistant public defender, in sup-
port of the petition.

Raheem L. Mullins, assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided December 8, 2011

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAFAEL MEDRANO

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 528 (AC
31271), is granted, limited to the following issues:

“1, Did the Appellate Court properly determine that
the defendant was not deprived of his due process right
to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial improprieties?

“2. Was the defendant deprived of his due process
right to a fair trial by the trial court's ‘defendant's inter-
est’ charge to the jury?

“3. If the answer to question two is in the negative,
should the court overrule the holding in State v. Wil-
liams, 220 Conn. 385, 397, 599 A.2d 1053 (1991), as it
relates to the ‘defendant’s interest’ charge to the jury?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18895.

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, in sup-
port of the petition.

Lee) 913

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided December 8, 2011
[|
CLAUDE L. PERRY v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Claude L. Perry’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn.
App. 792 (AC 31764), is denied.

Daniel C. Ford, assigned counsel, in support of the
petition.
Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.
Decided December 8, 2011
[|
DOMINIC CACIOPOLI v. JEFFREY LEBOWITZ

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 306 (AC
32108), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Does General Statutes § 52-560 preempt the com-
mon-law rule of damages for cutting down trees located
on another person’s property?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18894.
Frank B. Cochran, in support of the petition.
David S. Doyle, in opposition.
Decided December 8, 2011
a

ANTHONY T. GRANT v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Anthony T. Grant’s petition for certifi-
cation for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn.
App. 901 (AC 32757), is denied.

914 Lee

Sarah F. Summons, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.
Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.
Decided December 8, 2011
Le
KHALID IBRAHIM v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION
The petitioner Khalid Ibrahim’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 902 (AC 31963), is denied.
Mary H. Trainer, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.
Toni M. Smith-Rosario, senior assistant state’s attor-
ney, in opposition.
Decided December 8, 2011
Pe
MINERVA LACHIRA v. SUTTON LAND, LLC, ET AL.
The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court (AC 33449) is denied.
Minerva Lachira, pro se, in support of the petition.

Decided December 8, 2011
be
US BANK, N.A. v. MONICA L. SULLENDER ET AL.
The petition by the defendant Ethan Book, Jr., for
certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC
33508) is denied.
ROGERS, C. J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.
Ethan Book, Jr., pro se, in support of the petition.
Robert J. Wichowski, in opposition.

Decided December 8, 2011

reese 915

MONTERAL MORRIS v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Monteral Morris’ petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn.
App. 839 (AC 32085), is denied.

Justine F. Miller, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Rocco A. Chiarenza, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided December 15, 2011
PC
JAMES D. COHEN ET AL. v. ROLL-A-COVER,
LLC, ET AL.

The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 443 (AC
32430), is denied.

HARPER, J., did not participate in the consideration
of or decision on this petition.

Joseph L. Rini and Michael P. Morris, pro se, in
support of the petition.

Michael T. Bologna and James D. Cohen, pro se,
in opposition.
Decided December 15, 2011
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. VANCE SOLMAN

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 846 (AC
32617), is denied.

Damon A. R. Kirschbaum, in support of the petition.
Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided December 15, 2011

916

IN RE KALEB H.

The petition by the respondent mother for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn.
App. 829 (AC 33293), is granted, limited to the follow-
ing issues:

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly determine that
the respondent mother failed to present sufficient fac-
tual allegations to raise reasonable doubt as to her com-
petence?

“2. Tf the answer to question one is in the negative,
does the same due process right to a competency evalu-
ation that exists in termination of parental rights pro-
ceedings also attach to commitment proceedings?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18902.

Dana M. Hrelic, Michael S. Taylor and Brendon P.
Levesque, in support of the petition.

Stephen G. Vitelli, assistant attorney general, in oppo-
sition.
Decided December 15, 2011
be}
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD D. READ

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 17 (AC 32972),
is denied.

NORCOTT, J., did not participate in the consideration
of or decision on this petition.

G. Douglas Nash, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided December 15, 2011

Le 917

KEVIN VERTEFEUILLE v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Kevin Vertefeuille’s petition for certifi-
cation for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn.
App. 904 (AC 32491), is denied.

Martha Hansen, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Decided December 20, 2011
|

RUTH REALTY, LLC v. LEO D’ADDONA ET AL.

The named defendant's petition for certification for
appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 906
(AC 32938), is denied.

Leo D’Addona, pro se, in support of the petition.

Decided December 20, 2011

Le}
FELIPE MULERO v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Felipe Mulero’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 901 (AC 32392), is denied.

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

James M. Ralls, senior assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided December 20, 2011

HABIB J. GASTON v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Habib J. Gaston’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 902 (AC 32214), is denied.

Justine F. Miller, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided January 5, 2012
|
WIACEK FARMS, LLC v. CITY OF SHELTON ET AL.

The defendant Mark A. Lauretti’s petition for certifi-
cation for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 163 (AC 32260), is denied.

Jon Berk and Dana B. Lee, in support of the petition.
Decided January 5, 2012
as
JASON MANN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Jason Mann’s petition for certification
for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App.
904 (AC 32287), is denied.

Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Rita M. Shatr, senior assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided January 5, 2012

Ler 919

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARTYN D. BRUNO

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn. App. 172 (AC
327737), is denied.

EVELEIGH, J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

Brian J. Woolf, in support of the petition.

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided January 5, 2012

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DENNIS J. MOORE

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 905 (AC
32741), is denied.

Laljeebhai R. Patel, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.
Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state’s
attorney, in opposition.
Decided January 5, 2012

TYEHIMBA ADEYEMI v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Tyehimba Adeyemi’s petition for certi-
fication for appeal from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn.
App. 903 (AC 33020), is denied.

Laljeebhai R. Patel, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

920 Le

Sarah Hanna, assistant state’s attorney, in oppo-
sition.
Decided January 5, 2012

Le
JERMAINE D. DEAS v. ENRIQUE C. DIAZ ET AL.

The petition by the defendant Transportation Gen-
eral, Inc., doing business as Metro Taxi, for certification
for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App.
146 (AC 33030), is denied.

Kevin W. Smith, in support of the petition.
John W. Mills, in opposition.

Decided January 5, 2012

Le
IN RE JUSTIN F. ET AL.

The petition by the respondent parents for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 33747/AC
33752) is dismissed.

Anthony L., pro se, and Kimberly L., pro se, in sup-
port of the petition.

Decided January 5, 2012

be}
JOAN LAFRANCE v. DEAN W. LODMELL

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court (AC 33862) is denied.

Wesley W. Horton and Daniel J. Krisch, in support
of the petition.

Mark R. Soboslai, in opposition.

Decided January 5, 2012

ee 921

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DEREK
RICHARD BEEBE

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 485 (AC
31585), is denied.

Neal Cone, senior assistant public defender, in sup-
port of the petition.

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.
Decided January 12, 2012

EDMUND H. LOHNES v. HOSPITAL OF SAINT
RAPHAEL ET AL.

The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 68 (AC 32170),
is denied.

NORCOTT, J., did not participate in the consideration
of or decision on this petition.
Albert J. Oneto IV, in support of the petition.

Frederick J. Trotta, Eric J. Stockman and Vimala
B. Ruszkowski, in opposition.

Decided January 12, 2012

INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES v. SUMMIT
ASSOCIATES, INC., ET AL.

The petition by the defendant Joseph D. Lancia for
certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132
Conn. App. 192 (AC 32227), is granted, limited to the
following issues:

922 Le

“1. Did the Appellate Court properly determine that
General Statutes § 52-598 (c) is procedural in nature,
and, therefore, may be applied retroactively?

“2. Did the Appellate Court properly determine that
the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's 2009 motion to revive?

“3, Did the Appellate Court properly determine that
the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant for purposes of adjudicating the plaintiff's 2009
motion to revive?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18910.

Proloy K. Das and Bernard F. Gaffney, in support
of the petition.

Pasquale Young, in opposition.
Decided January 12, 2012
Pe
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTWON BROWN

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn. App. 251 (AC
32397), is denied.

Joseph A. Jaumann, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided January 12, 2012
a
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JASON FREEMAN

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 438 (AC
32422), is granted, limited to the following issue:

es 923

‘Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reopened
a pretrial suppression hearing and permitted the state
to present additional evidence?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18909.

Lisa A. Vanderhoof, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.
Linda Currie-Zeffiro, assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.
Decided January 12, 2012
P|
BLUMBERG ASSOCIATES WORLDWIDE, INC. v.

BROWN AND BROWN OF CONNECTICUT,
INC., ET AL.

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn. App. 85 (AC 32539),
is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial
court’s granting of the defendants’ motion for sum-
mary judgment?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18911.

Daniel J. Klau, in support of the petition.

Mark D. Alexander and John M. Tanski, in oppo-
sition.

Decided January 12, 2012

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSE O. GUERRA

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 62 (AC 32686),
is denied.

924 Le

EVELEIGH, J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

A. Manuel Nieves and Kai W. De Graaf, in support
of the petition.

Decided January 12, 2012
| |
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RANDALL SAUNDERS

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 268 (AC
32758), is denied.

Randall Saunders, pro se, in support of the petition.

Raheem L. Mullins, assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided January 12, 2012
a
JACK TYNDALL v. JOY BANACH ET AL.

The named defendant’s petition for certification for
appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 33648) is denied.

John F. Morris, in support of the petition.
Steven R. Dembo, in opposition.
Decided January 12, 2012
a
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM CONNELLY

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 129 Conn. App. 373 (AC
27988), is denied.

William Connelly, pro se, in support of the petition.

Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided January 20, 2012

Ee 925

KEENAN CORLEY v. COMMISSIONER,
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Keenan Corley’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 905 (AC 31767), is denied.

Mary Boehlert, assigned counsel, in support of the
petition.

Adam E. Mattei, special deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, in opposition.

Decided January 20, 2012

TROY THOMAS v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Troy Thomas’ petition for certification
for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App.
906 (AC 31871), is denied.

Michael Zariphes, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided January 20, 2012

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SAID KENDRICK

The petition by the state of Connecticut for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 473 (AC 31896), is granted, limited to the follow-
ing issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the
trial court improperly denied the defendant’s motion

926 Le

to suppress based upon the exigent circumstances of
a warrantless entry?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18914.

Marjorie Allen Dauster, senior assistant state’s attor-
ney, in support of the petition.

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, in oppo-
sition.
Decided January 20, 2012

REID AND RIEGE, P.C. v. BARRY L. BULAKITES

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 209 (AC
32497), is denied.

EVELEIGH, J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

John Q. Gale, in support of the petition.
Paul E. Pollock, in opposition.
Decided January 20, 2012
De
KEVIN ALLDRED v. ELIZABETH ALLDRED

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 430 (AC
32933), is dismissed.

Erich H. Gaston, in support of the petition.

Decided January 20, 2012

Le 927

JASON L’MINGGIO v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Jason L’Minggio’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 906 (AC 33315), is denied.

Kirsten Coffin, assigned counsel, in support of the
petition.

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided January 20, 2012

BETTY SULLIVAN, CONSERVATRIX (ESTATE OF
EDITH FRYER) v. ANTHONY LAZZARI ET AL.

The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court (AC 32616) is denied.

Kimberly Albright-Lazzari, pro se, and Anthony
Lazzari, pro se, in support of the petition.

Decided January 20, 2012
Le
CORNFIELD ASSOCIATES, L.P. v. DAVID CUMMINGS

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court (AC 33574) is denied.

David Cummings, pro se, in support of the petition.

Decided January 20, 2012

928 Le

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EARL THOMPSON

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 128 Conn. App. 296 (AC
32040), is denied.

Francisco A. Cardona and Gerald M. Beaudoin, in
support of the petition.

Linda Currie-Zeffiro, assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided January 25, 2012
|
FAIRCHILD HEIGHTS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION,
INC. v. FAIRCHILD HEIGHTS, INC.

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 567 (AC
31661), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly reverse and
remand with direction to dismiss the action based on
a determination that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies and lacked associational
standing?”

HARPER, J., did not participate in the consideration
of or decision on this petition.

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18917.

Douglas J. Varga, in support of the petition.

Thomas T. Lonardo, in opposition.

Decided January 25, 2012
De

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOSEPH STEPHENSON

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 181 Conn. App. 510 (AC
31829), is denied.

Le 929

John Timbers, in support of the petition.

Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided January 25, 2012

PATRICIA ROBINSON v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL
HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES ET AL.

The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 906 (AC
32920), is denied.

Patricia Robinson, pro se, in support of the petition.

Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, in
opposition.

Decided January 25, 2012
be
EMIL D. ANGHEL v. SAINT FRANCIS HOSPITAL
AND MEDICAL CENTER

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn. App. 823 (AC
33004), is denied.

Emil D. Anghel, pro se, in support of the petition.
Jessica D. Meerbergen, in opposition.

Decided January 25, 2012

BRIAN NIBLACK v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Brian Niblack’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 505 (AC 31352), is denied.

930 ee

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, in sup-
port of the petition.

Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.
Decided January 25, 2012

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD 8. TAYLOR

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 357 (AC
31740), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly determine that in
aconspiracy case it is sufficient for the court to instruct
the jury that, with respect to the first essential element
that there was an agreement, ‘i]t is sufficient to show
that the parties knowingly engaged in a mutual plan to
do a criminal act?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18916.

Daniel J. Krisch, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.
Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.
Decided January 25, 2012

MISITI, LLC, ET AL. v. TRAVELERS PROPERTY
CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA ET AL,

The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn. App. 629 (AC
33243), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the
trial court improperly granted the plaintiffs’ motion for

Ee 931

summary judgment and denied the named defendant’s
motion for summary judgment?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18915.
Jack G. Steigelfest, in support of the petition.
Paul G. Roche, in opposition.
Decided January 25, 2012
PC
CARLOS ASHE v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Carlos Ashe’s petition for certification.
for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 32990) is
denied.

Robert J. Sullivan, Jr., assigned counsel, in support
of the petition.

Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state’s attor-
ney, in opposition.

Decided January 25, 2012
Le
SYLVESTER TRAYLOR v. BASSAM AWWA ET AL.

The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court (AC 33038) is denied.

McLACHLAN, J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

Sylvester Traylor, pro se, in support of the petition.
John B. Farley, in opposition.

Decided January 25, 2012
be

932 Le

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN INGRAM

The defendant's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 385 (AC
31396), is denied.

Annacarina Jacob, senior assistant public defender,
in support of the petition.

Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state’s attor-
ney, in opposition.

Decided February 8, 2012
a
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN MCCORMACK

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 490 (AC
31584), is denied.

Alan Jay Black, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided February 3, 2012
[|
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GARY DILLARD

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn. App. 414 (AC
31732), is denied.

Alice Osedach, assistant public defender, in support
of the petition.

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided February 3, 2012

see 933

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. FERDINAND R.

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 594 (AC
31878), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly determine that
General Statutes § 53a-70b requires that the defendant
have a general intent to commit the act that constituted
a violation of the statute?”

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18918.
Martin Zeldis, public defender, in support of the
petition.
Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.
Decided February 8, 2012

CHRISTOPHER HASFAL v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Christopher Hasfal’s petition for certi-
fication for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 24 (AC 32098), is denied.

Edward G. McAnaney, assigned counsel, in support
of the petition.

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant
state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided February 3, 2012
[|
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES MARSHALL
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD MARSHALL

The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn. App. 718 (AC
32399/AC 32403), is denied.

934 Le

Kirstin B. Coffin, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided February 3, 2012

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TYRONESHA MILES

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 550 (AC
32421), is denied.

Evizabeth M. Inkster, senior assistant public
defender, in support of the petition.

Linda F. Currie-Zeffiro, assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided February 8, 2012

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. STEVEN ROSE

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn. App. 563 (AC
33014), is denied.

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, in sup-
port of the petition.

Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided February 3, 2012

Lee 935

ROSHUN C. JONES v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Roshun C. Jones’ petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 907 (AC 33021), is denied.

Justine F. Miller, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Melissa L. Streeto, assistant state’s attorney, in oppo-
sition.
Decided February 3, 2012
a
US BANK, N.A. v. MONICA L. SULLENDER ET AL.

The petition by the defendant Ethan Book for certifi-
cation for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 33508)
is denied.

ROGERS, C. J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

Ethan Book, pro se, in support of the petition.

Decided February 8, 2012

COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION ET AL. v.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
COMMISSION ET AL.

COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION v. FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.

The defendant David P. Taylor’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 129 Conn.
App. 425 (AC 32409), is denied.

David P. Taylor, pro se, in support of the petition.
J. William Gagne, Jr., in opposition.

Decided February 10, 2012

936 Lee

ERIC J. GREENE v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Eric J. Greene’s petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn.
App. 820 (AC 31365), is denied.

Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.
Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.
Decided February 10, 2012

JEREMIAH PEREZ v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Jeremiah Perez’ petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 906 (AC 32159), is denied.

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.
Adam E. Mattei, special deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, in opposition.
Decided February 10, 2012
as

CHRISTOPHER NORTON v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Christopher Norton’s petition for certi-
fication for appeal from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn.
App. 850 (AC 32434), is denied.

Robert T. Rimmer, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

| 937

Kathryn Ward Bare, assistant state’s attorney, in
opposition.

Decided February 10, 2012

LUCAS BETANCOURT v. COMMISSIONER OF
CORRECTION

The petitioner Lucas Betancourt’s petition for certifi-
cation for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 806 (AC 32696), is denied.

Joseph Visone, assigned counsel, in support of the
petition.

Decided February 10, 2012

KAREN FRANDY v. COMMISSIONER OF
TRANSPORTATION ET AL.

The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 182 Conn. App. 750 (AC
32979), is denied.

EVELEIGH, J., did not participate in the consider-
ation of or decision on this petition.

Dennis W. Gillooly and Christopher D. DePalma, in
support of the petition.

Ronald D. Williams, Jr., in opposition.

Decided February 10, 2012

IN RE VALERIE G.

The petition by the intervenor for certification for
appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 652
(AC 33353), is denied.

938 ee

Erich H. Gaston, in support of the petition.
John E. Tucker, assistant attorney general, in oppo-
sition.
Decided February 10, 2012
|
MICHAEL DARCY v. PETURA BILLIE

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court (AC 33750) is denied.

Petura Billie, pro se, in support of the petition.

Decided February 10, 2012

RICHARD GILLAND, JR., ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE
OF JENNIFER MAGNANO), ET AL. v. SPORTSMEN’S
OUTPOST, INC., ET AL.

The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court (AC 33926) is denied.

Robert D. Laurie, Katherine A. Scanion and Crystal
L. Fraser, in support of the petition.

Christopher Runzulli and Scott C. Allan, in oppo-
sition.
Decided February 10, 2012

ANTHONY CARTER v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Anthony Carter's petition for certifica-
tion for appeal from the Appellate Court, 131 Conn.
App. 905 (AC 32035), is denied.

Anthony Carter, pro se, in support of the petition.

Le! 939

Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant
state’s attorney, in opposition.

Decided February 21, 2012

MICHAEL BRAHAM v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Michael Braham’s petition for certifi-
cation for appeal from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn.
App. 57 (AC 31657), is denied.

Michael Braham, pro se, in support of the petition.

Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.
Decided February 21, 2012
a
ELECTRICAL WHOLESALERS, INC. v. V.P.
ELECTRIC, INC., ET AL.

The defendants’ petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 843 (AC
32466), is denied.

Timothy J. Lee, in support of the petition.
Charles I. Miller, in opposition.
Decided February 21, 2012

DONNA K. BARON, EXECUTRIX (ESTATE OF
ANDREW E. BARON) ». GENLYTE
THOMAS GROUP, LLC, ET AL.

The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 794 (AC
32636), is denied.

940 Le

Guy L. DePaul, in support of the petition.
Jason M. Dodge, in opposition.
Decided February 21, 2012

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.
DOMINICK O. MAGGIORE

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 908 (AC
32934), is denied.

Frank P. Cannatelli, in support of the petition.
Decided February 21, 2012
a
ELOISE MARINOS ET AL. v. DAVID POIROT ET AL.

The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court, 132 Conn. App. 693 (AC
33193), is granted, limited to the following issue:

“Did the Appellate Court properly determine that,
on a Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA)
claim for damages, the trial court properly entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants because the
plaintiff ‘failed to produce an itemization of her claimed
CUTPA damages?’ ”

PALMER, McLACHLAN and HARPER, Js., did not
participate in the consideration of or decision on this
petition.

The Supreme Court docket number is SC 18924.

John R. Williams, in support of the petition.

David M. Poirot, in opposition.

Decided February 21, 2012

Ee 941

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION

The petitioner Christopher Williams’ petition for cer-
tification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 133 Conn.
App. 96 (AC 82965), is denied.

Laljeebhai R. Patel, assigned counsel, in support of
the petition.

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state’s attorney,
in opposition.

Decided February 21, 2012

MELVIN THOMPSON v. VERNON J.
LEFTRIDGE, JR., ET AL.

The defendant’s petition for certification for appeal
from the Appellate Court (AC 33271) is denied.

Vernon J. Leftridge, Jr., pro se, in support of the
petition.
Decided February 21, 2012
_
US BANK, N.A. v. MARY ELEANOR O’BRIEN ET AL.

The petition by the defendant Daniel E. O’Brien for
certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC
33728) is denied.

Daniel E. O’Brien, pro se, in support of the petition.

Decided February 21, 2012