State: Mississippi
Volume: 254
Term: 1965-1966
Jurisdiction(s): Mississippi
Source: https://static.case.law/miss/254.pdf

Muir Transporters, Lirp., et al. v. Duaw
No. 43662 November 8, 1965 179 So, 2d 552

)

Daniel, Coker & Horton, Jackson, for appellants.

Joe R. Odom, Gerald Adams, Meridian, for appellee.

Brapy, Tom P., J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Cireuit
Court of Newton County reversing the order of the
Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation Commission. The
full commission affirmed the findings, opinion and or-
der of the attorney referee awarding appellee temporary
total disability payments from July 22, 1962, to August
10, 1962, but ordered no permanent disability benefits.

The circuit court in the reversal and remand also
ordered the employer carrier to pay the claimant tempo-
rary total compensation from July 22, 1962, at the es-
tablished rate of $35 per week, together with all medical
expenses and supplies, to January 24, 1964, the date of
the hearing. It directed the commission to further con-
sider the claim as to the duration of claimant’s tempo-
rary total disability and as to permanent disability as
the facts may show.

The relevant facts are as follows: Appellee had been
employed as a truck driver by the employer carrier
since approximately 1957. He was a part-time worker,
receiving furloughs during the late fall, winter and early
spring months of the years. He was furloughed by the
employer on November 25, 1961, and did not drive a
truck for the employer until May 21, 1962. During this
period of time he was under the care and treatment of
Dr. R. L. Moore, Jr., of Philadelphia, Mississippi. The
narrative report of Dr. Moore was admitted as an exhibit

—_ iii
in this case and it shows that he treated the appellee
for prostatitis and acute pyelitis from October 30, 1961,
through February 5, 1962, at which time his prostate
was still tender. The appellee resumed his work with
the employer on May 21, 1962, and drove the trucks
until July 22, 1962, at which time he became disabled
and received treatment from Dr. Austin P. Boggan of
Decatur, Mississippi.

There is no contention by either party that the ap-
pellee sustained any trauma during the period he drove
a truck after he resumed his employment on May 21,
1962. The record discloses that Dr. Boggan hospitalized
the appellee in Union, Mississippi, and treated the acute
infection, discharging appellee after three days of hos-
pitalization. Dr. Boggan made a diagnosis of prostatitis,
pyelitis, and bursitis to the shoulder.

At the hearing before the attorney referee the ap-
pellee, his wife, and Dr. Boggan testified. The narrative
report of Dr. R. L. Moore of September 2, 1963, by
agreement, was introduced. It was further stipulated
and agreed that if Mr. J. G. Morgan, Personnel Man-
ager for Miller Transporters, Ltd., testified, he would
testify that his records show that appellee was fur-
loughed on November 25, 1961, recalled on May 21, 1962,
and worked until July 22, 1962.

Based on this evidence, the attorney referee, on July
6, 1964, entered an award directing temporary total dis-
ability payments from July 22, 1962,,to August 10, 1962,
and ordered no permanent total disability payments.

On September 15, 1964, the attorney referee’s order
was affirmed by the full commission.

On December 29, 1964, the Circuit Court of Newton
County reversed the commission’s order, holding that
there was no substantial evidence to support the findings
of the commission. The time of temporary total disabili-
ty was extended from August 10, 1962, to January 24,
1964, and the case remanded for further consideration

a
by the commission, insofar as the duration of claimant’s
temporary total disability and/or permanent total dis-
ability is concerned.
The error assigned here by the appellants is simply
that the cireuit court erred in holding that there was
no substantial evidence to support the commission’s find-
ings in this case. The circuit court’s judgment provides:
Our Court has held that the employer and carrier
assumes the burden when they plead a pre-existing
physical handicap, disease or lesion. This must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The bur-
den never shifts. The Commission found that all dis-
ability of Claimant, subsequent to August 10, 1962, was
due to a prior existing physical handicap, disease or
lesion. The amendment to the Workman’s Compensa-
tion Act that provides that the award to a Claimant
may be deduced because of a pre-existing condition
that has contributed to Claimant’s inability to perform
his work is Chapter 277, Laws of 1960.
Our Court has set out the factors that must be shown
and proven in such case in the case of Cuevas vs.
Sutter Well Works, 150 So. 2d 524.
After a careful study of this record, this Court holds
that the employer and carrier have not met the burden
of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the disability of Claimant, since August
10, 1962, is due to a pre-existing condition. In fact,
there is no substantial evidence to support such find-
ing. It follows that said cause must be reversed.
The question presented to us therefore is whether or
not the full Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation Com-
mission had substantial evidence to support its affirm-
ance of the attorney referee’s findings of fact, and order.
The appellee’s pleadings show that his claim is based
upon a pre-existing condition. In describing the acci-
dent and cause of injury under paragraph (e) of the
claim form B-5, 11, the appellee alleged:

—_iiiias
(C)ontinuous minor trauma and irritation as result
of driving truck, and constant riding brought to light
and aggravated a pre-existing prostatitis condition
and acute pyelitis, resulting infection caused arthritis
and bursitis of neck and shoulders.

HEE The record discloses that no proof was made
other than to show that the truck driving irritated the
pre-existing condition. It follows, therefore, that the
appellee cannot now assert that he did not have a pre-
existing condition, when his claim is based upon an ag-
gravation of such condition.

Searching the record to determine whether or not
there is substantial evidence to support the commission’s
finding of a pre-existing condition, we find that appellee
testified on direct examination that he was treated by
Dr. R. L. Moore of Philadelphia for prostatitis and
pyelitis. He stated that he was treated from approxi-
mately October, 1961, through January, 1962, and that
he was hospitalized for eight days by Dr. Moore. The
appellee, on March 25, 1963, filed an application for hos-
pital insurance benefits with the hospital insurance car-
vier. In this application appellee lists ‘‘prostotglan and
kidneys, severe bursitis with associated trapezins’”’ as his
disease.

The appellee, on the compensation application form
B-5, 11, in answering the question of when he first knew
he had this disease, lists March or April, 1962, as the
date. Furthermore, in an attempt to collect hospital
benefits for the July, 1962, period of hospitalization,
appellee, on May 19, 1963, gave a representative of the
Travelers Insurance Company a signed statement. On
page 2 of this exhibit the appellee states that he started
having trouble back in the spring of 1962. Mrs. Myrtle
Dean, appellee’s wife, freely admitted that the appel-
lee had the difficulty during the winter of 1961 and in
1962, and that Dr. R. L. Moore, Jr., had treated him.

A

Dr. Boggan’s testimony also indicates that the appel-
ee had a pre-existing condition. Dr. Boggan testified
that pyelitis and prostatitis were infections and were
related. Moreover, he doubted that driving the trucks
caused the acute pyelitis, but felt that it contributed to
the prostatitis, and possibly to bursitis. Fairly interpret-
ing all the testimony of Dr. Boggan relating to appel-
ee’s recovery, it is apparent to us that on August 10,
1962, the infection had cleared up in his urine and the
appellee had reached a pre-aggravation condition, with
he same attendant disability.

HEE We have heretofore pointed out in Rathborne,
Hair & Ridgeway Box Co. v. Green, 237 Miss. 588, 115
So. 2d 674 (1959), that where a claimant has a pre-
existing condition and sustains an ‘‘on the job’’ aggrava-
tion and, after treatment or surgery, his condition re-
verts to the same as it was prior to the injury, though
pre-aggravated, the employer and carrier are not re-
sponsible for any compensation or medical benefits. See
Crow v. Guy Scoggins Gen’l Oilfield Contracting Co.,
248 Miss. 1, 158 So. 2d 1 (1963) ; Malone v.’ Ingalls Ship-
building Corp., 240 Miss. 319, 127 So. 2d 403 (1961).

HMB Insofar as his shoulder condition and his bur-
sitis are concerned, the testimony of Dr. Boggan does
not support appellee’s contention that the shoulder con-
dition is causally related to the prostatitis and pyelitis.
The questions propounded by appellee’s attorney related
only to whether or not there was a possibility of such
causal connection. Because of the vague and indefinite
nature of this testimony, which dealt only with possibi-
lities, we conclude that neither the referee nor the com-
mission erred in failing to find that there was a causal
connection between the shoulder condition and appel-
lee’s pre-existing prostatitis and pyelitis.

MMM It appears, therefore, that the basis of the
referee’s award of temporary total disability benefits
from July 22 through August 10, 1962, is supported by

—_ iii
substantial evidence. MI Under the well settled rule
in Mississippi that the full Mississippi Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission is the fact finding body and that
their findings will not be disturbed when based on sub-
stantial evidence, we.are compelled to reverse the judg-
ment of the circuit court and reinstate the judgment of
the full commission. See Powers v. Armstrong Tire &
Rubber Co., 252 Miss. 717, 173 So. 2d 670 (1965); Boyd
Constr. Co. v. Worthy, 234 Miss. 671, 107 So. 2d 120
(1958) ; Cowart v. Pearl River Tung Co., 218 Miss. 472,
67 So. 2d 356 (1953); Sones v. Southern Lumber Co.,
215 Miss. 148, 60 So. 2d 582 (1952).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of Newton County is reversed and the order
of the full Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation Com-
mission is reinstated.

Reversed and order of Commission reinstated.
Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

Zwere v. Zwere
November 8, 1965 179 So, 2d 821

MAME

S

fl

Thomas J. Wiltz, Biloxi, for appellant.

John A, Evans, Gulfport, for appellee.

Surrs, J.

The appellee, Janet L. Zwerg, filed her bill for sep-
arate maintenance against appellant, Ralph F. Zwerg,
in the Chancery Court of Harrison County, Mississippi.
In her bill, appellee alleged that the parties were marri-
ed and living apart because appellant had deserted her,
and asked for an award for her separate support.

Appellant answered and, among other things, set up
as a plea in bar a denial that the parties were husband
and wife, alleging that they had been lawfully divorced
by a decree of the District Court of Cleveland County,
Oklahoma. A certified copy of the Oklahoma proceed-
ings, including the decree, was made an exhibit to the
answer in support of the plea in bar.

After a hearing, the chancellor overruled the plea in
bar and granted an interlocutory appeal to this Court.

The parties were married in 1958 and have three young
children. When the present suit was filed, both parties
were residents of Harrison County, Mississippi, and the
children were with complainant in that county.

In May 1963, appellant sued appellee for divorce in
the District Court of Cleveland County of the State

——
of Oklahoma upon the ground of incompatability. In
that case, appellee answered, waived service, and ad-
mitted the material allegations of the complaint. The
case was uncontested and a decree was entered on June
24, 1963, granting appellant a divorce. The decree con-
tained this statement: ‘‘Provided, that this part of the
decree does not become absolute and take effect until
six months from the date hereof.’? The same provision
appears again in the decree immediately above the sig-
nature of the judge. This language is required by Okla-
homa Statutes, Title 12 section 1282 (1951) which reads:
‘Every decree of divorce shall recite the day and
date when the judgment was rendered in the cause,
and that the decree does not become absolute and
take effect until the expiration of six months from
said time, or as provided in case of appeal.’
Another Oklahoma statute provides that divorced per-
sons may not remarry for six months following the
date of the decree. Okla. Stat. Tit. 12, § 1280 (1951).
‘When the present case came on for trial, the chan-
cellor heard as a preliminary matter the plea in bar
interposed by appellant. Appellant introduced a certi-
fied transcript of the Oklahoma divorce proceedings, in-
cluding the divorce decree, and rested. Hviderce was
then introduced upon the part of appellee showing that
she and appellant had effected a reconciliation, had
resumed their marital relationship prior to the expira-
tion of the six month period set out in the Oklahoma
decree, and had lived together as husband and wife for
almost a year before the final separation. Proof was
made that at the time of the reconciliation, for the pur-
pose of inducing her to return to him, appellant had
assured appellee that it was not necessary that any for-
mal action be taken to vacate the Oklahoma decree, but
that their reconciliation and resumption of marital re-
lations of itself had the effect of vacating the decree,
and formal application ‘‘to take it off the books’? might

— |

be made at any time. The appellee relied upon this
representation upon the part of appellant, and there-
after they continued to live together as husband and
wife from December 20, 1963, until June 1964 when ap-
pellant deserted appellee and their children in Harrison
County, Mississippi.

The record is replete with testimony to the effect that
during the period of approximately a year following
their reconciliation the appellee and appellant openly
lived together and publicly recognized each other as
lausband and wife. As an Air Force officer, appellant
applied for and obtained the necessary identification
card and commissary card for her use as his wife; he
obtained her admission into the base hospital upon the
same representation; as his wife, she belonged to the
Officers’ Wives Club and at all social functions ap-
peared and was recognized by appellant as his wife.
Appellant’s automobile liability insurance policy showed
appellee as his wife. There was a joint checking account
in their names as husband and wife. In fact, appellant
and appellee maintained a home in which they continu-
ally lived together as husband and wife with their chil-
dren.

A fellow officer testified that during this period he
was told by appellant that he had deceived appellee
as to the divorce decree and was ‘‘in a pretty amusing
situation’? and was in ‘‘pretty good shape’’, in that he
might live with her as long as he pleased and throw
her out at any time he desired, and that he was be-
ginning to think about doing so.. This admission on
the part of appellant serves to emphasize his fraudulent
intentions and the shocking nature of his conduct in
persuading appellee to return to him, all the while with
the secret belief on his part that he might and would
discard her at will.

At the conclusion of the hearing on the plea in bar,
the chancellor delivered an oral opinion in which he

ss

found that the Oklahoma decree was not void, but by
its terms was voidable for a period of six months fol-
lowing its date of entry, and placed it within the power
of the parties to resume the marriage and thereby render
the Oklahoma District Court decree of no further ef-
fect. He found that appellant had committed a fraud’
in inducing appellee to resume the marital relationship
under the circumstances shown in the record, and that
appellant in his testimony had admitted having done
so. He found that the marital relationship had been
resumed and a complete reconciliation had been effected
within the six month period provided in the decree
during which it was not absolute. He considered that
the Oklahoma decree was not a final judgment so as
to be entitled to full faith and credit under the United
States Constitution. It was his opinion that the resump-
tion of the marital status by the parties rendered the
C¥lahoma decree nugatory, and that formal proceed-
ings to expunge it from the records might be begun at
any time.

He further held that the acts of the parties in re-
spect to the reconciliation and the inducements held out
by the appellant occurred after the rendition of the Ok-
lahoma decree and, therefore, as to them the decree was
not res judicata. He held further that because of his
conduct appellant was estopped to assert the Oklahoma
decree in bar of appellee’s suit for support.

At the time the suit was filed, the parties had been
residing in Harrison County, Mississippi, as husband
and wife for almost a year; their children were in that
county; the separation occurred there. For those rea-
sons, the chancellor considered that the public policy
of Mississippi was involved and that the Mississippi
court had jurisdiction in respect to the marital status.

HE BI The public policy of Mississippi will not allow
to stand a decree of divorce obtained by fraud, ll
and such decree may be attacked successfully at any

—_ iia
time whether the basis of the attack appears on the face
of the record or not. Watts v. Watts, 123 Miss. 812, 86
So. 353 (1920).

In 27A O.J.S. Divorce § 161(4) at 623 (1959), it is
stated:

‘‘Condonation, reconciliation, cohabitation, or resump-
tion of the marital relation after the entry of an in-
terlocutory decree destroys, or estops a party to as-
sert, the right to a final decree and justifies the court
in refusing a final decree in vacating or setting aside
the interlocutory decree, or in setting aside a final
decree, if it has been obtained by one party without
the knowledge of the other, or it makes it the duty
of the court to refuse to grant a final judgment of
divorce. Thereafter the parties are entitled to such
rights as arise from the legal relation of husband and
wife, and the grounds for divorce which led to the
grant of the interlocutory decree are not available
on subsequent proceedings between the parties.”

The Oklahoma court said in LeQlair v. Calls Him,
106 Okla. 237, 252, 233 Pac. 1087, 1092 (1925), (quoting
from Rodgers v. Nichols, 15 Okla. 579, 83 Pac. 923):

“A decree of divorce will be annulled upon the ground

of fraud and imposition practiced upon the court or

the adverse party.’’

And in Clay v. Robertson, 30 Okla. 758, 120 Pac.
1102 (1912), that Court held that if a divorce was fraud-
ulently obtained by one party, it should be set aside
at the suit of the other party, even after the wrong-
doer’s death when, the innocent party’s property rights
are affected.

In Wooden v. Wooden, 113 Okla. 81, 83, 239 Pac. 231,
233 (1925), the Oklahoma court stated (quoting from
Meldrum v. Meldrum, 15 Colo. 478, 24 Pac. 1083) :

“The relationship of husband and wife is one of spe-

cial confidence and trust, requiring the utmost good

faith and frankness in their dealings with each other;

as

and where either one is false to the other and fraudu-

lently or through coercion procures an unjust ad-

vantage, chancery may relieve against the transac-
tion, ...”” :

In 113 Okla. at 83, 239 Pac. at 233, the Court (quoting
from Young v. Young, 17 Minn. 181, Gil. 153) further
stated:

“In an action for divorce, any course of action by
plaintiff which is intended to and does prevent the
defendant.from setting up and establishing a defense
to the action is a fraud upon the administration of
justice, as well as upon the defendant, for which the
judgment thereby will be set aside.”’

HEE We accord to the Oklahoma divorce decree the
full faith and credit to which it is entitled under the
United States Constitution article 4 section 1. However,
this does not preclude this Court from giving considera-
tion to the fact that it was allowed to become effective
as a result of fraud practiced upon appellee by appel-
lant.

The precise question here presented has not been pass-
ed upon by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, but we are
constrained to believe, in view of the cases in which it
has held void divorce decrees obtained by fraud, that
under the facts in this record, if the question were pre-
sented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, it would con-
clude that the divorce decree never became effective in
view of the circumstances and of the fraud practiced
upon appellee by appellant.

HREM The state is universally held to have an interest
in the preservation of marriages and in seeing to it that
husbands discharge their obligation to support their fami-
lies. We believe that the Oklahoma legislature must have
intended, among other things, to provide a delay period
of six months following the rendition of a-divorce de-
eree before it should become effective, in order to pro-
vide a time during which the parties might have an op-

——
portunity upon more mature deliberation to become re-
conciled and to prevent a final rupture of the marriage.
So construed, this is a salutary provision, particularly
where, as in the case here, children are involved.

It is unthinkable that the Oklahoma legislature in-
tended a result so harsh and inflexible that, although
the parties may become reconciled during the six month
period, resume their marital relationship, and again live
together as husband and wife, maintain a home for
themselves and their children, that, nevertheless, upon
expiration of the six month period, the marriage shall
be finally dissolved.

In Burkdall v. Burkdall, 178 Okla. 392, 394, 62 P. 2d
1266, 1268 (1936), the Oklahoma court, quoting from the
Wooden case, supra, said:

“‘Courts of general jurisdiction have inherent power,
independent of any statutory provisions, and in di-
vorce cases, no less than in other cases, to set aside
and annul any judgment or decree procured by fraud
and deceit of the successful party, practiced upon the
complaining party to the action and the court.’? (Em-
phasis supplied)

MN In the case here, the Oklahoma decree was not
in form an interlocutory decree, but provided as re-
quired by statute that it should not become absolute
nor be in effect until six months after its date. The
reconciliation of the parties and the resumption of their
marital relationship within the six month period, and
the fraudulent representation to appellee by appellant
that this of itself was all that was necessary to be done
to restore the marriage, constituted a fraud upon ap-
pellee which estops appellant from asserting that failure
to have it formally set aside is a valid defense to ap-
pellee’s suit for support in this case.

380A Am. Jur. Judgments § 333 (1958) states: ‘The
application of the doctrine of res judicata in favor of

ss

a person may be precluded by acts constituting a waiver
or estoppel.’”

HEH Appellant is precluded by his acts after ob-
taining the Oklahoma divorce, and, therefore, estopped
from asserting that the Oklahoma divorce decree is res
judicata. See also 50 O.J.S. Judgments § 855 (1947).

HM It is said that a judgment operates as an
estoppel; that the facts merge into the judgment. How-
ever, this estoppel or res judicata characteristic of a
judgment extends only to the facts and circumstances
as they were at the time the judgment was rendered.
Here, within the six month period after the Oklahoma
decree, these material circumstances concerning the hus-
bands fraud to his wife occurred. Stevens v. McSwain,
240 Miss. 178, 126 So. 2d 263 (1961), applied this princi-
ple, and held that the judgment was not res judicata
as to the facts and circumstances subsequently occur-
ring. The court in 240 Miss. at 183, 126 So. 2d at 266,
said:

“The governing principle is stated in 50 C.J.S. Judg-

ments, § 650, p. 92: ‘‘The estoppel of a judgment ex-

tends only to the facts and conditions as they were
at the time the judgment was rendered, and to the
legal rights and relations of the parties as fixed by
the facts so determined; and when new facts or con-

ditions intervene before the second suit, furnishing a

new basis for the claims and defenses of the parties

respectively, and issues are no longer the same, and
hence the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar
in the subsequent action.’ ’’

WM In short, under these authorities, appellant is
precluded by his own acts, constituting an estoppel, from
asserting that the doctrine of res judicata should be
applied with reference to the Oklahoma decree. Fur-
ther, res judicata extends only to facts and conditions
as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered,
and does not apply where there has been a subsequent

material change of an essential condition upon which
the judgment must rest and which has occurred prior
to the date on which the judgment, by its terms,’ shall
take effect.

MMEBB As was said in the Watts case, supra, it makes
no difference whether the attack of fraud is made by
the original bill or by petition, or by motion. Hi Ml
The court will look to the substance of things rather
than mere procedure and will not permit a person prac-
ticing fraud to benefit by his or her acts.

We think the findings of the chancellor were sup-
ported by the testimony in the record; that his con-
clusions of law were correct in substance; and, that
the plea in bar was properly rejected.

Affirmed and remanded.

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Brady, JJ.,

concur.

Pray, Ducnasup, Ero. v. Hewrrr, et al.
No. 43664 November 8, 1965 179 So. 2d 842

al

Mounger & Mounger, Tylertown; Roach & Roach,
McComb, for appellants.

Gent Hutchison, Summit; Allen & Patterson, Brook-
haven, for the appellees.

Rovegrs, J.

This is a suit for specific performance of a contract
to deed land. An original bill was filed by the appellant,
Hubert E. Pray, now deceased (suit revived in the name
of his heirs) in the Chancery Court of Pike County,
Mississippi. The contract sought to be enforced was at-
tached as an exhibit to the bill. A great many persons
were named defendants because of their mineral inter-

ET

est in the land, but owners of the minerals were released
on a demurrer. The appellees, defendants in the trial
court, filed their answer denying that they should be
required to specifically perform the contract, by giving
them a deed to a one-half undivided interest in the lands
described in the bill, They pleaded, as a part of their
answer, (1) res judicata; (2) limitation of actions; and
(3) laches. The defendants filed interrogatories, which
were later answered by the original appellant. When
the case was called for trial, the attorneys stipulated
that the court file in Cause No. 5,951 of the records
of the Chancery Court of Pike County, styled Mrs. D.
Turner, et al. v. Chester A. Hewitt, et ux. might be
introduced as a part of the record, and it was agreed
that, ‘‘this cause shall be submitted to the court, on the
pleas, interrogatories, and answers thereto in the file in
Cause No. 5,951.’’ The chancellor entered an order tak-
ing the cause under advisement for decree in vacation,
and thereafter rendered his opinion, and entered a final
decree sustaining the pleas filed by defendants to the
original bill, and dismissed the suit with prejudice.

After a careful study of the facts pleaded, we are of
the opinion that the chancellor was correct in holding
that the plea of res judicata was a bar to the suit, and
that the action should have been dismissed. We do not
reach the other pleas filed by the defendants since it is
not necessary to discuss these pleas to affirm the de-
cree of the trial court.

The decree in file Cause No. 5,951 dated December
18, 1929, stated ‘‘That the defendants, Chester A. Hewitt
and his wife, Hrema Pray Hewitt, by virtue of certain
Deeds of Conveyance, appearing of record, have vested
in them, as against all other parties to this suit, the
following described lands, situated in Pike County, Mis-
sissippi.’’? The land in litigation in that suit is the same
land as is now sought to be relitigated in the instant
suit. The original complainant in the suit at bar was

—
one of the complainants in that suit. The contract sought
to be enforced in this suit was attached to the answer
in the first suit. The plea of res judicata here in issue
seeks to relitigate an issue settled by a former decree
of the chancery court in the county where the instant
cause was filed.

MBB The Latin idiom ‘‘res judicata’ means the thing
has been decided. In law, it means the same issue has
been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. (Hn 2)
Since the time of ancient Roman law, there have been
four conditions essential to establish the plea of res
judicata, They are (1) identity in the things sued for,
(2) identity of the cause of action, (3) identity of per-
sons and parties to the action, and (4) identity of the
quality or character in the person against whom the
claim is made. 50 C. J. S. Judgments, Essential Hle-
ments, § 598, at 18 (1947). All of the foregoing ele-
ments of res judicata appear in the pleading in the case
at bar. :

MMMM There is another reason why the plea of res
judicata should have been sustained as a bar to the in-
stant suit: The original contract between the parties
with reference to the land was attached to the answer
in the former suit. In that suit the answer alleged that
the Hewitts fully complied with the attached contract,
and denied fraud or false representations in obtaining
the deeds. The contract was pertinent to the issue in-
volved and was pleaded and tendered as an issue in the
former suit. Therefore all rights to enforce the contract
were settled by the former decree.

HEE It is pointed out in 50 OC. J. S. Judgments
§716, at 186 (1947) that ‘‘The rule is often broadly stated
in general terms that a judgment is conclusive not only
on the questions actually contested and determined, but
on all matters which might have been litigated and de-
termined in that suit.’? This rule has been approved
and adopted in this State. See Johnson v. Bagby, 252

Miss. 125, 171 So. 2d 827 (1965); Taylor v. Bell, 194
Miss. 112, 11 So. 2d 825 (1943); Townsend v. Beavers,
185 Miss. 312, 188 So. 1 (1939); National Life & Ace.
Ins. Co. v. Prather, 172 Miss. 567, 161 So. 117 (1935);
Lion Oil Ref. Co. v. Crystal Oil Co., 171 Miss. 36, 156
So. 593 (1934); Darrow v. Moore, 163 Miss. 705, 142
So. 447 (1932); Love v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen of
Yazoo City, 162 Miss. 65, 188 So. 600 (1932); Gaines
v. Kennedy, 53 Miss. 103 (1876).

We hold, therefore, that the chancellor was correct
in sustaining the plea of res judicata and the decree of
the chancery court dismissing the suit should be and is
affirmed.

Affirmed.

Lee, C. J., and Jones, Inzer and Smith, JJ., concur.

Nuzsrer v. State
No. 43687 November 8, 1965 179 So. 2d 565

Maurice R. Black, Carrollton, for appellant.

R. Hugo Newcomb, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson,
for appellee.

Jonns, J.

Appellant appeals to this Court from a conviction of
manslaughter and a sentence to fifteen years in the State
penitentiary by the Circuit Court of Leflore County. We
find error in the proceedings as hereinafter stated and
the case is reversed and remanded for another trial.

On or about October 1, 1961, the body of Cecil Floyd,
Jr., was found between the rails of the Illinois Central
main line about two or three miles south of Greenwood.
During the May 1964 term of circuit court, the appel-
lant, Scott Elliott and Phillip Bennett were indicted for
the murder of the said Floyd, but appellant was granted
a severance. The facts disclosed were briefly these. The
decedent was found on the said track. Highway 49 runs
generally in a northerly and southerly direction, and
insofar as we can tell from the record, is substantially
parallel to the railroad track and anywhere from 200
to 400 yards east of said line. On the west side of High-
way 49 is a place operated by Scott Elliott and known
as ‘‘Scotty’s.’? The appellant was a bouncer there;
Phillip Bennett was a customer on the night before the
body of the deceased was found; about midnight some
trouble developed between the decedent and the three
indictees. According to the State’s evidence, they took
him behind the building and proceeded to beat him; it is
not evident whether they used their fists, or their feet,
or clubs. No one saw the defendant or his co-indictees
place the decedent upon the tracks, and for the jury to
so find it had to infer same from the facts shown.

There was no evidence introduced showing blood at
the place of the fight. As best we can tell from the

TC

record, the space between ‘‘Scotty’s’’ and the railroad
was covered with weeds; there was no evidence of a car
having traveled through this space, nor any signs or
tracks of persons walking over same. It had rained early
that morning or late that night; the track had ballast of
slag, and where the body was found, although it was
mangled, there was very little blood. No proof was tend-
ered as to an inspection of the train. One of decedent’s
shoes was found south of the body.

Appellant offered a witness whose credibility was not
attacked, who was not cross-examined, and was not con-
tradicted (unless by the facts hereinbefore stated). He
testified that he knew Cecil Floyd, Jr., and about one
o’clock A.M., he saw him walking away from ‘‘Scotty’s”’
along Highway 49 about 100 yards north thereof.

HM I The theory of the State was that the three
indictees either killed the decedent in the fight or that
he was rendered unconscious or helpless and carried and
placed between the rails of the said track. A train went
north at 2:30 A.M., and another about six or seven A.M.
The appellant’s theory was that the decedent, being in-
toxicated, had left ‘‘Scotty’s’? and somehow wandered
upon the track where he was killed by a train.

One of the assignments of error is that the court
erroneously refused to the defendant what we know as
the two-theory instruction given in circumstantial cases.
The court had given the State an instruction that the
charge of murder might be proven by circumstances, but
refused the defendant the two-theory instruction. The
evidence in this case was so circumstantial as to require
the giving of the two-theory instruction and it was preju-
dicial error for the court to refuse it. Alexander, Mis-
sissippi Jury Instructions § 172 (1953).

We deem it unnecessary now to discuss the other
questions presented.

Reversed and remanded.

0

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Brady and Smith, JJ.,
concur. :

Jounson v. State
No. 43722 November 8, 1965 179 So. 2d 838

Lampkin Butts, Laurel, for appellant.

Delos H. Burks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for ap-
pellee.

Ronerrs, J.

This is an appeal in contempt proceedings. Joe Louis
Johnson, appellant, was convicted of constructive con-
tempt in the Second Judicial District of Jones County,
Mississippi, and sentenced to serve sixty days in the
county jail, and to pay a fine of $150. The jail sentence
and $50 of the fine were suspended. The prosecution
arose under the following circumstances. During the
trial of a criminal case, and at a time when few white
men and only two colored men were sitting outside the
bar in the courtroom, the county attorney questioned
a witness with reference to someone’s hiding a pistol,
apparently relevant to the case then on trial. He then
asked the witness: ‘‘Q. This boy right over here sitting

. sitting out in the courtroom on the right, he was
there at the service station with you, wasn’t he? A.
What boy? Q. This... boy that’s seated out here
in the courtroom, the one on your right? A. I didn’t
see him at the service station, Q. He wasn’t picked

Lr

up and brought to the police station that night?-A. Not
with us, he wasn’t.’? The witness was then asked: ‘‘Q.
Are you a brother to Dickey Boy Blakeley? A. No, sir,
I’m not a brother to him, not even related to him...
Q. Is Dickey Boy Blakeley in the courtroom down there?
A. ...I don’t see him any place. I know him by sight,
but I don’t know him personally.’’

In a short time after the conclusion of the interroga-
tion, the judge recessed the court, the jury left the court-
room, and the judge retired to his chambers. The county
attorney was called to the back of the courtroom to talk
to persons there waiting to see him. As he passed the
two colored men sitting in the courtroom, someone said
in a loud voice ‘‘Hey you.’’? The county attorney turned
around and the defendant said: ‘‘Which one of us were
you accusing up there awhile ago?’’ Whereupon, the
county attorney announced that he wasn’t accusing eith-
er, he was referring in his questions to one seated at
the witness’ right, and thought his name was Coleman.
It was said that the defendant then either crouched
or stood over the seat where he had been sitting and
said in a loud or angry manner: ‘‘You had better not
accuse me unless I’m sitting there behind the table.’’
In the contempt trial in answer to the question: ‘“‘By
this do you mean to infer to this Court that the man
threatened you with any physical harm at that time?’
the county attorney said: ‘‘He made no direct threat of
any physical harm, the only thing that he did was to
say in an angry manner, ‘You better not accuse me again
unless I’m sitting behind that table.’ ’’ In the conclud-
ing part of the county attorney’s testimony, he was ask-
ed: ‘‘Mr. Pickering, let me ask one other question. Was
there at the time of this occurrence any animosity be-
tween you and the defendant in this case? A. No, sir,
there was not. In fact, I had nothing to do with this
matter other than relate it to the District Attorney...
Thad nothing to do with it other than relating what had

a:

occurred.’’ He was then asked: ‘‘Now up until the time
that conversation was related to the District Attorney,
do you know of the existence of any animosity whatso-
ever between you and the defendant Johnson in this
case? A. No, I do not.’

In answer to the summons ‘‘to show cause”’, the de-
fendant filed an answer in which he said ‘That such
conversation was not in the form of a rude, hostile or
threatening exchange, nor was it so intended; that no
threat or abuse of the county prosecuting attorney oc-
curred, nor did he do anything which should be construe
as, an attempt to intimidate the county prosecuting at-
torney, or any other office of the Court, or the Cour’
itself, in the performance of any official duty. The
defendant denies that any act or omission upon his part
on the occasion in question was caleulated or intende
in a substantial or any other degree, to impede, em-
barrass, obstruct, defeat, or corrupt the administration
of this Court in the discharge by them of any official
function pertaining to the Court as a Court.’? No wit-
ness was offered to corroborate the impression gaine
by the county prosecuting attorney. Calvin Curtis Cole-
man, the colored man sitting with the defendant, testi-
fied that he did not hear defendant say ‘‘You had better
not accuse me unless I’m sitting up there behind the
table.’”? The defendant testified in his own behalf that
he was not angry, that he did not talk loud, and denie
that he said: ‘‘Well, you had better watch out who you
accuse up there. You had better not accuse me unless
I’m sitting up there behind that table.’ The defendant
explained why he asked the district attorney why the
county attorney was accusing him by saying: ‘‘Well,
it was really bringing up this murder or whatever had
happened, and a lot of people know me from running
the place, you know Johnson Grocery, they know that’s
... they often use the name of the place where Miss
Clark was killed, and I don’t want that to come up with

—

my name in it, because they are continuously talking
about it up here while they were having the trial, Cole-
man’s trial.’

Mississippi Code Annotated section 1152 (1956) puts
the burden on this Court to determine on appeal, ‘‘the
question . . . whether the appellant was guilty of con-
tempt; and the sentence or decree order of the court
below may be affirmed, reversed, annulled, or modified,
according to the judgment of the appellate court.’? In
response to this duty, therefore, and after careful con-
sideration of the evidence on appeal in this case, we
have reached the conclusion that the testimony does not
sustain the burden required to convict appellant.

MH HE The defendant was charged with constructive
contempt, which is defined as ‘‘any act calculated to
impede, embarrass, obstruct, defeat or corrupt the ad-
ministration of courts of justice, when the act is done
beyond the presence of the court.’’? Sullens v. State,
191 Miss. 856, 869, 4 So. 2d 356, 360 (1941). See also
Evers v. State, 241 Miss. 560, 181 So. 2d 653 (1961).
HE In a criminal contempt charge, the State must
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Evers v. State, supra; Brannon v. State, 202 Miss. 571,
29 So. 2d 916 (1947).

HEEB There is nothing in this record to show that
the defendant did an overt act calculated to impede,
degrade, obstruct, interrupt, defeat and corrupt the ad-
ministration of justice. The most that can be said against
the defendant in this case is that he was uncouth, tact-
less, grouchy and gruff, and although his mannerism
was embarrassing to the county attorney as an individu-
al, the evidence does not amount to the offensive con-
duct necessary to establish that defendant impeded, hind-
ered, embarrassed or obstructed the administration of
justice, nor do we believe the evidence shows that the
majesty of the court was challenged or impinged by the
untoward acts of defendant. The judgment and convic-

tion of appellant is therefore reversed, and he is dis-
charged.

Reversed and defendant discharged.

Lee, C. J., and Patterson, Inzer and Smith, JJ., concur.

Yazoo Manuracrurine Company, et al. v. Scnarrer
No. 43648 November 15, 1965 179 So. 24 784

Lipscomb, Barksdale & Steen, Jackson, for appellants.

3

|e

Binder, Bush & Selph, Pyles & Tucker, Jackson, for
appellee.

—
Roveurs, J.

This is a workmen’s compensation claim. The attor-
ney-referee and a majority of the members of the Com-
mission determined that the claim filed by the workman
on March 20, 1961, and later amended on October 31,
1962, was barred by the statute of limitations set out
in the Workmen’s Compensation law, both as to the
one-year statute, Mississippi Code Annotated section
6998-27 (1952), and the two-year statute, Mississippi
Code Annotated section 6998-18 (1952). The claim was
dismissed by the attorney-referee upon the motion of
appellee; no testimony was introduced. An appeal to
the circuit court (First Judicial District of Hinds Coun-
ty, Mississippi) was taken by the appellants, the circuit
judge reversed the order of the Commission and re-
manded the case.

The following facts are gleaned from the pleadings.
The appellee-workman filed his claim (Forms B-5, B-11)
with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission on
March 20, 1961, seeking compensation for an injury said
to have occurred on January 15, 1960. The record shows,
however, that after the injury, the employer filed a final
settlement report (Commission Form B-31) on February
18, 1960. This report was signed by the appellee-work-
man showing receipt of compensation for the temporary
total disability, including medical benefits and drug ex-
penses.

Thus it is apparent that at the time (March 20, 1961)
the appellee filed his claim for an injury which is said
to have occurred on January 15, 1960, the appellee had
made settlement for this claim. Thereafter, however, on
May 1, 1962, appellee-workman obtained an order per-
mitting him to amend his claim of March 20, 1961. The

a
amendment was not immediately filed by the workman,
and on August 10, 1962, the appellants filed a motion
to dismiss appellee’s claim. Whereupon, the workman
filed an amendment to the March 20, 1961 claim setting
out additional facts wherein appellee then claimed that
he was originally injured as the result of his work on
February 17, 1959, for which he was paid compensation,
and thereafter, returned to work March 2, 1959. On
January 15, 1960, appellee-workman again suffered an
injury to his back and was referred to the company
doctor. After having received medical treatment, he re-
turned to work on January 25, 1960. At that time the
insurance carrier paid appellee benefits for two days’
compensation. The appellee returned to work on Janu-
ary 25, 1960, but he alleged: ‘‘Claimant’s back con-
tinued to pain him and he suffered continuous trauma
to his injured back.’? He complained daily, although he
continued to work. In the last of April or the first of
May 1960, the complainant suffered another injury. Ap-
pellee is said to have reported this injury to his superior
and was sent to Dr. Gillespie. No settlement was made
with the appellee by appellants nor was a settlement
reported for this treatment, although claimant did not
work from Tuesday to Monday. During this time ap-
pellee was receiving medical treatment. On Monday, ap-
pellee attempted to work, but the condition of his back
grew worse. Appellee asked his foreman for additional
medical treatment, but his foreman then ‘‘laid him off’’,
and he has not since been called back to work.

It is argued by appellee that since the record shows
that Dr. Gillespie was paid by the carrier for treating
claimant after January 29, 1960, and since the employer
and carrier did not file a statement, Form B-31 of the
Commission, showing payment of the additional medical
benefits after the filing of Form B-31 dated February
18, 1960, appellee received no notice of settlement and
was entitled to file Forms B-5 and B-11 for the additional

—
claim. It is then contended that the claim of March 20,
1961, and the amendment of October 31, 1962, were filed
within the time allowed for reopening the previous set-
tlement award.

In the case of Shainberg’s Black & White Store v.
Prothro, 238 Miss. 444, 118 So. 2d 862 (1960), we held
that where an employee was sent to a doctor — after
his claim for injury had been closed by a signed settle-
ment, Form B-31, for a reoccurrence of a sprain and
contusion of the knee, for which medical benefits were
reported on an unsigned Form B-31 — the claim was
not barred by the one-year statute of limitation during
that period in which the case could be reopened. Miss.
Code Anno. § 6998-27 (1952). The reason is that before
the review statute, supra, begins to run against the
employee, the employer must have complied with the
provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated section 6998-
19 (g) (1952). This section of the Code not only requires
that notice be given to the Commission that a final
payment has been made, but also expressly states: ‘‘But
no case shall be closed nor any penalty assessed without
notice to all parties interested and without giving to
all such parties an opportunity to be heard.’’? Miss.
Code Anno. § 6998-19 (g) (1952).

A resume of cases in which we have held that medical
benefits authorized within the one-year allowance for
reopening of compensation cases are set out in Turnage
v. Lally’s Swimming Pool Co., 247 Miss. 718, 159 So.
2d 84 (1963).

In the case of International Paper Co. v. Evans, 244
Miss. 49, 140 So. 2d 271 (1962), the employee refused
to sign the Form B-31, and thereafter claimant filed
Form B-11 for additional medical benefits. We held
that the one-year review statute, Mississippi Code An-
notated section 6998-19 (g) (1952), did not begin to
run against the employee until he received notice by
letter on January 5, 1959, and since the employee filed

i“

his application for review within nine months from that
date, the one-year limitation of jurisdiction did not bar
the filing of the workmen’s compensation claim.

HN BE The workman in this case signed a settlement
for the January 15, 1960, injury which was filed with
the Commission on February 18, 1960. The claim for
his injury filed by the employee on March 20, 1961, was
obviously signed more than one year after the filing of
Form B-31 by the employer. The appellee-workman con-
tends he had no notice of the filing of this form with
the Commission as is required by Mississippi Code An-
notated section 6998-19 (g) (1952).

In the case of Moody v. Dedeaux, 223 Miss. 832, 844,
79 So. 2d 225, 229 (1955), we said:

“Although the Form B-31 ‘Final Report and Settle-

ment Receipt’, which was signed by appellee while

still a minor, does not constitute a contractually bind-
ing release of appellants, we think that it does con-
stitute notice to appellee that he was then receiving
his final payment of compensation, as required by

Section 6998-19 (g). An appellee had an opportunity

within the period permitted by the statute of limita-

tions to obtain a hearing on whether he was entitled
to additional compensation.’’

In the case of Shainberg’s Black & White Store v.
Prothro, supra, we referred to the filing of Form B-31
in the previous case, Moody, swpra, and said: ‘The
Form B-31 was signed by the appellee Dedeaux, and
was full notice to appellee.’? 238 Miss. at 448, 118 So.
2d at 864. .

Tn the instant case, we must conclude from the fore-
going authorities that the workman had notice that the
employer was claiming that the payments set out in
Form B-31 signed by him were final payments; there-
fore, the filing of the signed form by the appellee com-
plied with the requirement of Mississippi Code Annotat-

+. (ae

ed section 6998-19 (g) (1952) insofar as the injury (set
out in Form B-31) of January 15, 1960, is concerned.

HEE Nevertheless, the workman contends that after
the injury of January 15, 1960, sometime in the latter
part of April or the first of May 1960, he received anoth-
er injury (which was a reoccurrence of the previous in-
jury) and that he received medical benefits from the
employer as the result of this injury. Thus, it is claimed
that since the workman filed Form B-11 on March 20,
1961, he was within the one-year statutory period during
which time an application could be made to reopen the
award, because he received no notice of settlement of his
May first injury. The March 20, 1961, claim would have
been a question of fact as to an injury occurring the
first of May 1960, but the claim of March 20, 1961 was
originally filed for the January 15, 1960 injury and not
for benefits occurring thereafter. Later, on October 31,
1962, the workman amended his claim, filed March 20,
1961, so as to include the alleged medical benefits as a
payment growing out of the May 1, 1960 injury.

We are thus brought to the question of whether or
not a workman can amend a claim for previous injuries
so as to establish a claim for an injury occurring there-
after, when both injuries occurred more than one year
before the amendment.

We said in Moody v. Dedeaux, 223 Miss. 832, 840,
79 So. 2d 225, 227 (1955), that: ‘‘Commission power to
review voluntary payments of compensation is limited
by the above quoted statute of limitations, Code Section
6998-27, to a period of one year after the date of the
last payment of compensation.’? It was asserted by
the claimant that the original claim and payments of
compensation were not closed in the manner required by
Mississippi Code Annotated section 6998-19 (g) (1952).
In answer to this, however, we said:

“« Appellee asserts that it was necessary for the Com-

mission to hold a formal hearing before closing the

|

case, but we cannot agree. The above cited statute

must be read along with Section 6998-27, which pro-

vides that the one-year period runs from the date of

the last payment of compensation, ‘whether or not a

compensation order has been issued.’ The Form B-31

was full notice to appellee that the case was con-

sidered closed by appellants.’’ 223 Miss. at 844, 79

So. 2d at 229.

Applying the principle set out in the above cases, we
conclude that the final settlement, Form B-31, by the
appellant-employer on February 18, 1960, put the one-
year statute of limitation into operation so that the jur-
isdiction of the Commission to reopen the claim would
have abated one year thereafter, except for the fact (we
assume, since it was asserted in the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Form B-11, as amended October 31, 1962, and
no proof was taken by the trier of fact) that the em-
ployer voluntarily furnished workman-appellee medical
benefits to May 1960. No claim for this injury was
actually filed until more than two years after the final
medical benefits were furnished for injury said to have
occurred on the first of May 1960.

The appellee-workman, however, asserts that the
amendment of October 31, 1962, setting out the alleged
injury of the first of May 1960, should relate back to
March 20, 1961, the date when he filed Form B-11, the
claim for the January 15, 1960 injury, so that the claim
filed by amendment on October 31, 1962, should be con-
sidered as if it had been filed March 20, 1961, so as to
toll both the one-year and the two-year statutes of limi-
tations.

The pertinent part of Mississippi Code Annotated
section 6998-28 (1952) is as follows:
“‘(a) In making an investigation or inquiry or con-
ducting a hearing, the commission shall not be bound
by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by
technical or formal rules or procedure, except as pro-

—_ iia
vided by this act, but may make such investigation or
inquiry or conduct such hearing in such manner as
best to ascertain the rights of the parties. ...”
Does this statute give a workman a right to amend a

claim, Forms B-5 and B-11, in such a manner as to

bring a claim for an additional injury growing out of
the accident for which claim was originally made?

The general rule on this subject may be found in 54
OC. J. 8. Limitation of Actions section 279 (a) (1948)
at page 320, as follows:

“The amendment of a complaint does not necessarily
amount to a commencement of a new action with re-
spect to the running of the statute of limitations, and
a proper amendment will toll the statute of limitations
from the date that suit was instituted. While the
right to amend a pleading, and statutes providing
therefor, do not permit a court, under color of or-
dering an amendment, to abrogate the statute of limi-
tations, nevertheless much latitude of amendment is
properly allowed to save a cause, if possible, from the
bar of limitations, especially where there is reason-
able ground for holding the amendment to be only
an amplification and expansion of the cause of action;
and the fact that an amendment would protect a party
from the operation of the statute of limitations, in-
stead of being a reason against allowing the amend-
ment, rather favors it.’’

The textwriter points out, however, in section 280 that

the amendment must not be a new cause of action in

the following words:

‘fa, An amendment of a declaration, petition, or

complaint which sets up no new cause of action or

claim and makes no new demand relates back to the
commencement of the action, and the running of the
statute against the claim so pleaded is arrested at
that point; and this rule applies although the limita-

a
tion is by contract rather than by statute.’ 54 C. J. S.
at 327, 328,

The textwriter continues in paragraph ‘‘b.’’ at pages

328-330, as follows:

“An amendment which is merely a perfected state-

ment of the original cause of action relates back to

‘the time of the commencement of the original action.

Thus, where the original declaration states a cause

of action, but does it imperfectly, and afterward an

amended declaration is filed, correcting the defect,
the plea of the statute of limitations will relate to
the time of filing the original declaration, provided,
however, the new pleading is an amendment and not
an independent proceeding. A new suit is not institut-
ed, and the statute will not avail for the period be-
tween the original and amended pleadings where plain-
tiff by amendment sets up no new matter or claim,
but merely restates the same cause of action more
correctly and specifically or more clearly and con-
cisaly. An amendment relates back where it merely
expands or amplifies what is already alleged in sup-
port of the action, or states additional facts to strength-
en the right of recovery on the original cause of ac-
tion, or sets out further in detail the consequence
arising from the cause of action; and especially is this
true where the case made on the trial would have been
provable to the same extent had the amendment not

been filed.’”? 54 C. J. S. at 328-330.

The case of Orleans Dredging Company v. Frazie,
179 Miss. 188, 173 So. 431 (1937), is a case where the
appellee filed suit based upon the United States Seamen’s
Act, and after this Court held on one appeal that the
Seamens’ Act would not apply to the cause of action
then before the Court, the case was remanded, and upon
return to the trial court the appellee amended his dec-
laration to add two counts, one for liability under the
common law, and another claim for liability under the

—
Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation law. This Court
said:
“After the appellee was injured the appellant made
him payments therefor, which we will assume were
made under the provisions of the Louisiana statute,
but more than a year had elapsed after the cessation
of these payments, and therefore, of course, after
the appellee sustained his injury, before the appellee’s
declaration in the circuit court was amended so as to
bring his complaint within the Louisiana Workmen’s
Compensation Law. This amendment did not merely
extend the allegations of the declaration by setting
forth new incidental facts pertinent thereto but ‘chang-
ed the original picture’ portrayed therein, and for the
first time brought into the case an entirely new and
different cause of action, the ground of, and the re-
covery on, which are entirely different from those of
the original declaration. The one-year limitation in
the Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law there-
fore controls, and the appellee’s cause of action there-
under is barred.”? 179 Miss. at 199, 173 So. at 439.
In the recent case of McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v.
Coker, 222 Miss. 774, 77 So. 2d 302 (1955), where a
wholesale drug company brought suit against a partner-
ship drug store to recover for drugs sold to the part-
nership without attaching thereto an itemized account,
and thereafter filed an amendment which consisted of
a sworn itemized statement of the account, with copies
of the original invoice of merchandise, this Court held
that the three-year statute of limitations which ran after
the filing of the declaration and prior to the amendment
would not apply because
“the amendment should have been regarded as a con-
tinuation of the original suit with respect to the tolling
of the statute of limitations. The amendment related
back to the commencement of the action. ‘An amend-
ment of a declaration, petition, or complaint which

>

es

sets up no new cause of action or claim and makes

no new demand relates back to the commencement of

the action, ...’’’ quoting from 54 C.J.S., Limita-

tions of Actions, § 280a, p. 327. 222 Miss. at 779, 77

So. 2d at 304.

It is obvious, therefore, from the foregoing authori-
ties that the question as to whether or not the amend-
ment relates back to the date when appellee’s original
claim was filed, depends on whether or not the amend-
ment makes a new cause of action, and in the case at
bar that is a question of fact for the determination of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

This case resolves itself into the question of whether
or not the alleged injury of the last of April or the
first of May was a new injury or a reoccurring injury,
growing out of the original injury, of which the em-
ployer had notice; because if the amendment of October
31, 1962, was simply an amplification of the original
Form B-11 filed March 20, 1961, and not a new injury
for which a new claim was made, it will relate back to
the filing on March 20, 1961, and will toll the one-year
statute of limitations within which a claim may be re-
opened.

In the case of Thyer Manufacturing Company v. Keys,
235 Miss. 229, 108 So. 2d 876 (1959), relied upon by
the appellants in this case as a bar to the present action
under the two-year statute of limitations, Mississippi
Code Annotated section 6998-18 (1952), this Court point-
ed out that:

“Tt was for the determination of the commission,

as the trier of facts, to determine the issue as to

whether or not the claimant, as a reasonable man,
should have recognized the nature, seriousness and

probable compensable character of his injury.’’ 235

Miss. at 230, 108 So. 2d at 879.

We held in the case of Martin v. L. & A. Contracting
Company, 249 Miss. 441, 162 So. 2d 870, 872 (1964) that:

=

“First. The two-year limitation comes into effect
only upon two conditions: (1) if.no payment of com-
pensation (other than medical treatment or burial ex-
pense) is made; and (2) if no application for benefits
has been filed with the commission within two years
from the date of injury or death.’’

We also said:

“This is in accord with the analogous rule that pay-

ments of wages toll the limitation statute, if they

were made on account of a recognition of compensa-

tion liability.”? 162 So. 2d 873.

It is pointed out by the textwriter in 100 C.J.8. Work-
men’s Compensation section 440 (1958) at page 311
that:

“Under some statutes the period in which proceedings

must be brought is extended where the employee suf-

fers a new and further disability by reason of the
original injury. Where the original‘ injury immedi-
ately causes a permanent physical disability, the sub-
sequent discovery of its permanency does not con-
stitute such a new and further disability as will ex-
tend the time for the commencement of proceedings,
although, when there is a change in the condition of
the original injury from a temporary to a permanent
disability, a new and further disability is established
within the terms of this provision. The provision ex-

tending the time for proceeding in the case of a

‘further disability’ has no application where no pro-

ceeding has been instituted within the required time

for the original injury. ...

“Before an employee may institute proceedings to

recover for a new and further disability arising from

the original injury, the employee must have been fur-
nished benefits under the act. A medical treatment
is such benefit; and first aid treatment... .’’

Thus, the question, did the claimant make an applica-
tion for benefits filed within the statutory period of

— ll

two years from the date of the alleged injury, said to
have occurred the first of May 1960, is answered only
by the determination of whether or not the amendment
of October 31, 1962, relates back to the claim filed March
20, 1961, and this in turn depends on whether or not
the May first injury was a new injury or a further dis-
ability for a previous injury for which medical benefits
were alleged to have been voluntarily paid within the
one-year period during which the former award could
have been reopened ‘‘on the ground of a change in con-
dition or because of a mistake in a determination of
fact.’? Miss. Code Anno. § 6998-27 (1952). If the ap-
pellee-workman had an additional disability growing out
of the injury for which medical benefits were furnished
and of which the appellant-employer had notice, the
one-year statute did not begin to run until the employer
had filed its report, Form B-31, for the additional bene-
fits paid for the further disability occurring May 1960.
In short, if the May first injury were a new injury, the
two-year statute of limitations, Mississippi Code An-
notated section 6998-18 (1952), is applicable, and the
appellee-workman’s right to file claim has lapsed. On
the other hand, if it is not a new claim, the two-year
statute does not apply because the ‘‘application for bene-
fits (would have been) filed with the Commission with-
in two years from the date of the injury. ...’’ Miss.
Code Anno. § 6998-18 (a) (1952). In that event, the origi-
nal claim could not have been closed by the Commission
“without notice to all parties interested and without
giving to all such parties an opportunity to be heard.’
Miss. Code Anno. §6998-19 (g). The answer to this
question requires proof, and is an issue of fact to be
determined by the Commission.

HE We have heretofore pointed out that it is the
best policy for administrative agencies who are triers
of fact, acting in quasi judicial capacity, to hear the
facts and make a determination from a finding of facts.

In most cases, as here, time is lost and additional ex-
pense is incurred by dismissing proceedings without mak-
ing a full determination of the issues involved. Scott
Builders, Inc. v. Dependent of Layton, 244 Miss. 641,
145 So. 2d 165 (1962).

HE When the Workmen’s Compensation Commis-
sion dismisses a claim and proceeding without taking
testimony, we shall assume that the claimant could prove
all facts set out in his claim. 100 C. J. S., Workmen’s
Compensation § 422 (1958).

The judgment of the circuit court reversing this case
and remanding it to the Workmen’s Compensation Com-
mission for determination of fact will therefore be af-
firmed, and the case will be remanded to the Commis-
sion for determination of facts.

Affirmed and case remanded to the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission for further proceedings.

Lee, C. J., and Brady, Patterson and Ineer, JJ.,
concur.

Hivroy v. Huvrow
No, 43650 November 15, 1965 179 So. 2d 846

will!

Gray & Montague, Hattiesburg, for appellant.

Edward J. Currie, Sr., Hattiesburg, for appellee.

Gutespm, J.

Mrs. Mary Juanita Merritt Hinton, herein referred
to as complainant, filed an original bill for divorce
against her husband, Frank Sumrall Hinton, herein re-
ferred to as defendant. She sought a divorce on the
ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and
prayed for a decree adjudging her to have an equitable
interest in defendant’s real property, and reasonable
sums for alimony and attorney’s fees. Defendant denied
the material allegations of the original bill and filed a
cross-bill praying for a divorce on the ground that com-
plainant was guilty of habitual cruel and inhuman treat-
ment. The chancellor entered a final decree adjudging
“that each of said parties is entitled to an absolute di-
vorce from the other upon the ground of habitual cruel
and inhuman treatment. .”’ He awarded complainant
the sum of $2,000 for alimony and attorney’s fees with-
out designating how much of said sum was alimony and
how much was attorney’s fees. The decree denied that
complainant had any right in defendant’s real property
and cancelled her claim that she had an equitable in-
terest therein. Costs of the trial court were taxed one-
half to each party. No children are involved.

Complainant appealed to this Court and defendant
filed a cross-appeal.

— |

Complainant assigns as error the lower court’s action
in overruling her motion and request for a separate
finding of facts and conclusions of law. This request
was filed on the 16th day of November, after termi-
nation of the trial on November 5th. The final decree
was entered the same day the motion for the separate
findings was filed. The motion consisted of fourteen
requests in the nature of interrogatories, many of which
were questions involving evidentiary rather than ulti-
mate facts. In view of the nature of the questions and
the fact that the decree must be reversed for other
reasons we pretermit consideration of the merits of this
assignment.

Complainant contends in her second assignment of
error that the court erred in awarding defendant a di-
voree on the grounds of ‘‘habitual cruel and inhuman
treatment.’? On the other hand, defendant contends in
his cross-appeal that the chancellor erred in finding an
adjudging that complainant was entitled to a divorce
on the grounds of ‘‘habitual cruel and inhuman treat-
ment.’? We have carefully studied the testimony and
conclude that the chancellor could have resolved this
question in favor of either party, or he could have denie
both a divorce.

HE Bf We are of the opinion that this Court shoul
not affirm a decree granting a divorce to both parties
on the ground that both are guilty of habitual cruel and
inhuman treatment. MME In order for habitual crue
and inhuman treatment to warrant a divorce, it mus’
be the proximate cause of the separation. Bunkley an
Morse’s Amis, Divorce and Separation in Mississippi
§ 3.14(17), page 181 (1957). MM The two parties
cannot be both guilty and innocent of habitual cruel
and inhuman treatment. The divorce laws of this State
do not provide that the habitual cruel and inhuman
treatment of both parties can be concurring proximate
causes of the separation, entitling both to a divorce.

oe
as

The decree in this case is self-contradictory, and should
be reversed.

HE Complainant next complains that the $2000
awarded to her for both alimony and attorney’s fees
is grossly inadequate. In his cross-appeal defendant
contends the court erred in awarding complainant any
sum for alimony or attorney’s fees. We do not pass
on these questions except to say that any award the
court might make upon remand should designate wheth-
er it is for alimony or attorney’s fees, and if for both,
separate items should be allowed.

Hf Finally, complainant contends that the trial
court should have awarded her an equitable interest in
defendant’s property. The proof showed that at the
time of the marriage of the parties in 1948, she was
23 years old and he was 46. Defendant had saved $7900,
with part of which he purchased a small farm near
Hattiesburg about a year after their marriage. The
parties moved into an old house and defendant began
truck farming, and for about ten years got along sat-
isfactorily. Complainant did various work about the
farm as any other industrious farm wife would do. In
the meantime, defendant caused a modern house to be
built on the farm. He paid part of the money down
and subsequently paid the balance from money earned
from growing truck crops on the farm. About five years
before the divorce suit was filed, complainant decided
she wanted to be a licensed practical nurse and there-
after worked in Hattiesburg and contributed some in-
come to the family living and paid most of her own
expenses. She contends that she is entitled to an equi-
table interest in defendant’s farm, which is worth $20,-
000 to $25,000,

To hold that complainant is entitled to one-half of
the property of defendant would be tantamount to adopt-
ing to a limited extent the community property system.
We have declined to engraft on the laws of this State

TO

—e
features of that system. Brabham v. Brabham, 226 Miss.
165, 84 So. 2d 147 (1955). It would serve no purpose
to relitigate this issue on remand.

Wl I We affirm that part of the decree adjudging
that complainant is not entitled to an equitable interest
in defendant’s real property. In all other respects the
decree is reversed and the cause is remanded to the
chancellor for an appropriate decree on the record made
in the former trial, together with any other evidence
the chancellor might desire to hear and consider.

HEM The motion of the complainant for attorney’s
fees for the services of her attorney in this Court is sus-
tained, and complainant is awarded $250.00 for use of her
attorney for services rendered in this Court on appeal.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

All Justices concur.

Mississrepr Emptoymenr Sxcurrry Commission v.
Raxrstraw

No. 43669 November 15, 1965 179 So. 2d 830

H. L. Hutcherson, Jackson, for appellant.

J. E. Boone, New Albany, for appellee.

Surry, J.

This case arose out of the claim of appellee, Mildred
Rakestraw, for unemployment compensation benefits
under the Mississippi Employment Security Commission
Law, Mississippi Code Annotated sections 7368-7445
(Supp. 1964).

The claim was denied by the Commission and such
denial was affirmed by the Appeals’ Referee and the
Board of Review of the Mississippi Employment Se-
curity Commission upon the ground that appellee had
quit her job voluntarily without good cause.

Upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Union County,
the court entered a judgment which reversed the decision
of the Board of Review and directed that unemployment
compensation benefits be paid to appellee. The Mis-
sissippi Employment Security Commission has appealed.
here from that judgment.

HN MM The province of the courts in reviewing the
cases under these statutes is clearly defined and limited
to dealing with questions of law. Mississippi Code An-
notated section 7388 (Supp. 1964) reads in part as fol-
lows:

‘Ei

“Tn any judicial proceedings under this section, the

findings of the board of review as to the facts, if

supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud,
shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court
shall be confined to questions of law.’’

In Miss. Employ. Sec. Com. v. Blasingame, 237 Miss.
744, 747, 116 So. 2d 213, 214 (1959), the court said:

“The scope of review by the courts on an appeal

from an order of the Board of Review is set out in

the statute. ... The legislature has clearly provided
that judicial review of decisions of the Board of Re-
view shall be confined to questions of law.

“The question is whether the order of the Board of

Review denying benefits to appellee is supported by

evidence.’?

In the case before us, the circumstances of appellee’s
separation from her employment in the office of the
manager of a garment plant were fully developed in
the evidence which included the testimony of appellee
and of the plant manager. Based upon this evidence,
the Board of Review found as a fact that appellee had
not been discharged from her employment, but had quit
suitable employment voluntarily without good cause with-
in the meaning of Mississippi Code Annotated section
7379 (Supp. 1964). The Board concluded that this fact
disqualified her from receiving unemployment compen-
sation benefits.

MME We have reviewed the record of the evidence
upon which the Board of Review based its conclusions.
It is our opinion that this evidence amply supports the
factual finding of the Board of Review that appellee
quit suitable employment voluntarily without good cause
and was not discharged. This finding of fact by the
Board of Review is supported by evidence and in the
absence of fraud is conclusive upon the courts of this
state.

TC

HE The Board had before it the testimony of the
appellee and of the plant manager. From this testimony
the conclusion is inescapable that appellee quit her job
in a moment of pique during a brief misunderstanding
with the plant manager, at a time when she was being
asked by him to return to work. The Board of Review
was correct in its conclusion that this disqualified her
under Mississippi Code Annotated section 7376 (Supp.
1964) to receive unemployment compensation benefits.

Reversed and order of the Commission, as affirmed
by the Appeals’ Referee and the Board of Review, re-
instated.

Reversed and order of the Mississippi Employment
Security Commission reinstated.

Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Patterson and Inger, JJ.,
concur.

Cantos Fowner, Jz, Puamvawrr-AppEnnant ¥.
B. L. Kine, et al., Derenpawrs-ApPELLEEs

No. 43670 November 15, 1965 179 So. 2d 800

So

—
Roy O. Parker, Tupelo, for appellant. .
Mitchell, McNutt & Bush, Tupelo, for appellees.

Parrerson, J.

This appeal arises from the Circuit Court of Lee Coun-
ty as the result of a jury verdict in favor of the de-
fendants, Mrs. Lucille Brannon and H. L. King, and
a directed verdict for North Mississippi Community
Hospital Corporation in an action for malicious prose-
ceution.

On or about January 15, 1964, Mrs. Lucille Brannon,
an employee of the North Mississippi Community Hos-
pital Corporation, signed a criminal affidavit against
Carlos Fowler, Jr., on a check dated November 11, 1962,
in the sum of $20.00 upon which payment had been
declined. This check was payable to the North Missis-
sippi Community Hospital for services rendered to plain-
tiff’s child. The affidavit made was for false pretense
under the ‘‘bad check’’ law and Fowler was imprisoned
as a result thereof in the County Jail of Lee County
from February 12, 1964, until February 17, 1964. Sub-
sequent to the imprisonment Mrs. Brannon withdrew
the criminal affidavit against the defendant and he has
never been tried on such charges.

Fowler had previously, the 19th day of June, 1962,
been convicted and sentenced by the Circuit Court of
Lee County to serve a term of three years in the state
penitentiary for the offense of grand larceny. The exe-
eution of this sentence, however, had been suspended
and Fowler was placed on probation for a term of two
years and this suspension was on September 12, 1963,
extended an additional two years. On February 17, 1964,
this suspended sentence was revoked after hearing by

— i

the circuit court. Fowler then filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus which was denied by the trial court.
This order of denial was affirmed by this Court.

Fowler was granted bail pending the appeal of the
habeas corpus proceeding and during the interval brought
this action for malicious prosecution. He sued Mrs.
Lucille Brannon, the manager of patient accounts for
the North Mississippi Community Hospital Corporation,
E. L, King, the administrator of North Mississippi Com-
munity Hospital Corporation, and the North Mississippi
Community Hospital Corporation.

At the conclusion of the testimony the court refused
Fowler’s motion for a directed verdict as to liability as
to all of the defendants. The court then sustained a
motion for the hospital and released it from the suit.
The issues as to the remanding defendants, Mrs. Bran-
non and King, were submitted to the jury which found
in their favor.

The appellant assigns as error, among other assign-
ments, the following: (1) The court erred in directing
a verdict in favor of North Mississippi Community Hos-
pital; (2) The court erred in failing to direct a verdict
for the plaintiff after the conclusion of the evidence;
(3) The court erred in excluding the evidence in regard.
to the revocation of probation as to plaintiff’s damages;
(4) The court erred in commenting on the plaintiff’s
testimony while the plaintiff was testifying before the
jury; and (5) The court erred in suppressing the in-
terrogatories as to the financial condition of the three
defendants in this cause.

HN BM We hold that the court erred in directing
a verdict in favor of the defendant hospital at the con-
clusion of the testimony as King was the general ad-
ministrator of the hospital with the general authority
and responsibility to carry out its policies in accord
with the desires of the board of directors and as such
could have been determined from the evidence to be

their alter ego. In sustaining the motion of the hospital
for a directed verdict the court relied expressly upon
the case of Russell v. Palentine Ins. Co., 106 Miss. 290,
63 So. 644 (1913) and the case of Hudson v. Pevsner,
216 Miss. 126, 61 So. 2d 777 (1953). In Palentine supra
at page 301 we held: .

Mr. Klein was employed by the insurance company
to collect its claim against appellant, and he was au-
thorized to employ all appropriate means to accomplish

his end; and, while the agent is employing appropri-
ate means to carry out his master’s business, the mas-
er is responsible for his acts. Certainly it cannot
e said that a criminal prosecution is a means. ap-
propriate to the collection of debts. In Daily v. Young,
3 Tl. App. 39, it is said: ‘‘Where an agent institutes
a malicious prosecution of his own head, and without
he instigation or directions of his principal, the latter
will not be liable for the same, unless he adopts and
continues the same with knowledge of all the cireum-
stances.”?

Should we hold that appellee was responsible for
the acts of Klein, it would be to hold, when an au-
thority to collect a debt is shown, the law will imply
he authority to institute criminal proceedings against
the debtor in case the debtor fails or refuses to pay.
We do not believe that this is sound in reason or in
law.

The last paragraph of Palentine was cited with approval
in Hudson supra. We note in each of these cases that
the authority of the agent involved was limited and
was not general as was King’s authority in the instant
case. We have examined the cases of Fisher v. West-
moreland, 101 Miss. 180, 57 So. 563 (1911); Young v.
L. B. Price Mercantile Co., 167 Miss. 409, 148 So. 643
(1933) ; State Life Ins. Co. of Indianapolis, Ind. v. Hardy,
189 Miss. 266, 195 So. 708 (1940); and Brown v. Kisner,
192 Miss. 746, 6 So. 2d 611 (1942), each discussing the

— |

authority of an agent to instigate criminal proceedings,
and in each this Court held that the agency was limited
and that no authority by implication resulted to the
agent whereby the principal could be held liable in suits
of this character. In fact, in Young supra, the strongest
of these cases, this Court held in effect that the district
manager of a chain of stores whose district consisted
of Mississippi and ‘‘probably parts of Louisiana and.
Arkansas’’ and who had individual managers for each
store who were subservient to him, was not the alter
ego of the company and declined to hold the defendant
liable for such district manager’s action for malicious
prosecution alleged to have been instituted by such man-
ager, stating:

The evidence in this case neither showed nor tend-
ed to show that Morris was appellee’s alter ego, vest-
ed with full and complete discretionary power in re-
gard to the conduct of appellee’s business, and all
of its incidents. In such a case a different rule might
apply. We do not decide that question. (167 Miss.
at 416.)

Opposed to this line of reasoning is the case of Gandy
v. Palmer, 251 Miss. 398, 169 So. 24 819, 824 (1964),
wherein this Court held the manager and vice-president
of McCaffrey’s, Inc. to be the alter ego of the corporation
and in so doing cited with approval the following lan-
guage from 34 Am. Jur. Malicious Prosecution § 89
(1941) :

“The principles of law governing the liability of
an employer or principal for a malicious prosecution
instituted or carried on by a servant or agent are
simple, and any difficulty which may arise grows
out of their application to the facts of a particular
case. If the prosecution was previously authorized
or subsequently ratified, or if within the scope of the
servant’s or agent’s employment, the employer or
principal is liable * * *.”

a

In view of the dilemma of authorities on the question,
we are of the opinion that the above-cited quotation
properly asserts the law of this state as to such agency,
that is, that the particular facts in each case must be
analyzed to determine whether an agent is in fact the
alter ego of the principal. See also 34 Am. Jur. Malicious
Prosecution § 89 in its entirety (1941) and Grenada
Coca-Cola Co. v. Davis, 168 Miss. 826, 151 So. 743 (1934).

Neither King nor the hospital had any knowledge of
the actual signing of the criminal affidavit by Mrs.
Brannon on February 12, 1964, and the instigation of
criminal proceedings thereon until after the arrest of
Fowler, nor did either ratify or affirm this act. Here
King was the general administrator of the hospital with
full and complete authority to carry out its policies. He
reported to the board of directors once each month as
to his activities in this regard. He had the authority
to hire and fire employees with the possible exception
of key personnel. His authority included the manage-
ment of 350 employees of the hospital and the super-
vision and collection of accounts. This authority carried
with it the right to use the courts in the collection of
accounts, as the administrator testified that the hospital
had used the assistance of justices of the peace in col-
lections in the past. In considering these facts in the
light of the cited authorities, though we are not unmind-
ful of the evidence by the president of the hospital to
the effect that the authority to instigate criminal pro-
ceedings was never delegated to the administrator, and
the testimony of the administrator that such authority
was never received by him, nevertheless we are of the
opinion that this question, being one of fact, should
have been submitted to the jury for its determination.

The second assignment of error, that the court erred
in refusing to direct a verdict for the plaintiff as to
liability against all of the defendants after the conclu-
sion of the evidence, is not well taken as to the hospital

—

as it did not expressly grant authority to King to in-
stigate criminal prosecutions and neither did it ratify
either the acts of King or Mrs. Brannon. Its liability,
if any, is hinged on the role and authority of King,
its agent, in the chain of events leading to this suit
and this is a question for the jury’s determination.

HEEB This assignment of error is not well taken as
to King, the administrator of the hospital, for the rea-
sons that he did not in fact sign the criminal affidavit,
and, according to his testimony, had no knowledge there-
of until five days afterward when he was subpoenaed
to appear at a revocation of suspended sentence pro-
ceeding in regard to Fowler; nor is there ratification
on his part of the acts of Mrs. Brannon. The evidence
is in conflict as to whether he authorized Mrs. Brannon
to merely collect the account or whether he expressly
authorized her to sign the criminal affidavit. The ques-
tion thus resolves itself to an issue of fact for the jury
to determine. From the facts as reflected by the record,
the jury could find that King expressly authorized the
criminal affidavits in this case; or it could find that he
authorized Mrs. Brannon to collect accounts in such
broad terms as would carry with it by implication the
authority to institute criminal proceedings for the col-
lection; or it could find that he did neither. This de-
termination is within the province of the jury and was
properly submitted to them by the court for determina-
tion.

ME We are of the opinion, however, that the lia-
bility of Mrs. Brannon is established in law and that
the court erred in not sustaining the plaintiff’s motion
for a directed verdict against this defendant. The rec-
ord reflects that she is a competent person and that she
signed the affidavit, along with three others which were
not acted upon, for the collection of a debt. In Harvilt
v. Tabor, 240 Miss. 750, 128 So. 2d 863 (1961) we stated:

TC
Tabor did testify that he had no malice toward
appellant, but malice in fact and malice in law are
not to be confused. The ordinary and popular mean-
ing of malice is usually associated with anger, hatred,
ill will, and the like. Such malice in fact may exist
with malice in law, but malice in law may exist in-
dependently of malice in fact. And when, as here,
there is no actual malice in fact, the element of malice
is supplied by wantonly instituting the criminal pro-
ceedings to collect a debt in reckless disregard of the
rights of appellant.
When the prosecution is for the purpose of using
the criminal processes of the law to collect a debt, this
fact supplies the element of malice. Rhodes v. Rob-
erts, 223 Miss. 580, 78 So. 2d 614; Grenada Coca-Cola
Company v. Davis, 168 Miss. 826, 151 So. 748. Such
an abuse of the criminal process of a court is simply
to make the liberty of the citizen the security for the
debt. State, for use of Little v. United States Fidelity

& Guarantee Company, 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697.

(240 Miss. at 754.)

This case was cited with approval in Pullman v. Ott,
246 Miss. 739, 150 So. 2d 143 (1963) ; Kitchens v. Barlow,
250 Miss. 121, 164 So. 2d 745 (1964); and Gandy v.
Palmer, supra. The defendant’s statement that she acted.
in haste and did not sign the criminal affidavit with the
intent of having the plaintiff arrested, but only for the
collection of the debt, does not detract from the stated
law, but in fact emphasizes the reckless disregard for
the rights of the plaintiff. See Grenada Coca-Cola Co.
v. Davis, 168 Miss. 826, 151 So. 743 (1934) and Odum
v. Tally, 160 Miss. 797, 134 So. 163 (1931).

MN MM The next assignment of error, that the court
erred in excluding the evidence in regard to the revoca-
tion of probation as to damages in the cause, is not well
taken for the reason that the order of revocation indi-
cates that the probation was not suspended because of

— |

the affidavit signed by Mrs. Brannon. Rather, it was
for the following causes as found by the circuit court:
“Being before the court on numerous occasions for false
pretense, failing to report; being intoxicated, and num-
erous traffic violations.’’

HM The next assignment of error, that the court
erred in commenting on the plaintiff’s testimony, is
well taken as the remarks of the trial judge went di-
rectly to the credibility of the witness. While the plain-
tiff was testifying as to the probation hearings, the
following colloquy transpired:

“Q. And the Judge had already passed on that,
everything had already been presented to him besides
these last four checks is that right?

“A. Yes, sir.

“THE COURT:

“I am going to have to object to that remark that
I held this hearing, that is not true, that is just not
correct.

“BY MR. PARKER:

“Court Please, I am going to object to Your Honor
testifying in this case, you being the presiding officer.

“THE COURT:

“T would like that to be in the record.

“BY MR. PARKER:

“Tf Your Honor is going to take the stand I am going
to object.

“THE COURT:

‘Well that is not correct. I will add this, there has
been one or two checks and one or two hearings in which
this young man was involved, but some of these has not
been presented to me until the last hearing.’’

Shortly thereafter the court recessed and upon recon-
vening the judge withdrew these statements and ad-
monished the jury to disregard them. We conclude,
after due deliberation, that the impression produced
in the minds of the jury by the above remarks which

a

went directly to the plaintiff’s credibility was such that
it could not reasonably be expected to be removed by
an admonition or corrective statement on the part of
the court, and that the plaintiff was deprived of a fair
trial thereby, and that this was reversible error. See
Dickinson v. Koenig, 242 Miss. 17, 133 So. 2d 721 (1961) ;
Green v. State, 97 Miss. 834, 53 So. 415 (1910); and
Pearson v. State, 179 So. 2d 792 this date decided.

MME The final assignment of error, that the court
erred in suppressing the interrogatories with reference
to the financial condition of the defendants, is well
taken. In Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss.
782, 22 So. 53 (1897), this Court refused to suppress
interrogatories propounded with the view of showing
the financial condition of the defendant, the reason
being that punitive damages were sought. The plaintiff
seeks punitive damages in the case at bar. Therefore,
the interrogatories should not have been suppressed as
their admissibility into evidence would depend upon
whether or not the issue of punitive damages was suf-
ficiently established to be submitted to the jury.

‘We have considered the other assignments of error
submitted by the appellant and find no merit therein.

Reversed and remanded.
Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Inzer and Smith, JJ., concur.

Ricnarpson v. Sroxzs
No. 43676 November 15, 1965 180 So. 2d 153

en

Laurel G. Weir, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Snow, Covington, Shows & Watts, Meridian, for ap-
pellee.

Bravy, Tom P., J.

All errors assigned by the appellant have been care-
fully considered and are without merit. We note that the
appellant failed in his assignment of errors to set out
separately and particularly each error asserted and in-
tended to be urged. To the contrary, he filed a carte
blanche assignment of errors in which he urged that the
court erred in sustaining every objection made by the
appellee to evidence offered by the appellant, and in
overruling every objection made by the appellant.

Although three instructions were separately and par-
ticularly set out as being erroneous, the appellant again,
carte blanche, urged that the court erred in granting
every instruction given to the appellee and in refusing
every instruction to the appellant. This same general

ad

method of assigning errors was utilized with reference
to other errors assigned.

Hl In spite of the fact we were not required to
do so, this Court nevertheless considered all asserted
errors, irrespective of whether they were specifically as-
signed or urged in appellant’s brief. We call attention
to Rule 6 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi, which provides, among other things, as follows:

(T)he appellant shall file an assignment of errors

which shall set out separately and.particularly each

error asserted and intended to be urged... .

(b) No error not distinctly assigned shall be argued

by counsel, except upon request of the Court, but the

Court may, at its option, notice a plain error not

assigned or distinctly specified.

MM The burden is upon an attorney to properly
present his client’s cause. Attorneys should follow care-
fully the requirements of Rule 6 in the briéfing of cases.
Of course, authorities must be cited in support of any
alleged errors assigned. See Dozier v. State, 247 Miss.
850, 157 So. 2d 798 (1963); Johnson v. State, 154 Miss.
512, 122 So. 529 (1929); Bridges v. State, 154 Miss.
489, 122 So. 583 (1929).

HB We have carefully examined the record in this
cause, together with the briefs filed by counsel repre-
senting the appellant and the appellee. The basic issues
in this case were largely questions of fact relating to
negligence. The jury, under proper instructions, return-
ed a verdict in favor of appellee. The evidence is amply
sufficient to support this verdict, and the judgment in
this cause is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Inzer, JJ.,
concur,

4

|

Furorrmn-Srratrorp Furnrrure Company v. Busxirk
No. 43682 November 15, 1965 179 So. 2d 840

Wade H. Lagrone, Mitchell, McNutt & Bush, Tupelo,
for appellants.

Mitchell & Rodgers, Tupelo, for appellee.

Jonzs, J.

This is a workmen’s compensation case. The Work-
men’s Compensation Commission, on the report of the
attorney-referee and the evidence introduced before him,
found and adjudicated that while the claimant ‘‘had re-
ceived an injury in the course of his employment, that
at the same time he had an existing disability which
was aggravated by the said injury, but which had sub-
sided and that there was no disability attributable to
the accidental injury other than that from the date of
the injury, February 23, 1962, to April 14, 1962.’

The case was appealed to the Circuit Court of Chicka-
saw County and the finding of the Commission was
reversed and an order entered in favor of the claim-
ant, finding and adjudicating that the order of the Com-
mission contained error of fact and law; that the same
should be reversed and remanded to the Commission
for determining the percentage of the total and perm-

=

anent disability of the claimant caused by the pre-exist-
ing condition and the percentage caused by the injury.

On appeal to this Court it is argued there was no
substantial testimony to support the finding of the Com-
mission and the main argument is upon the allegation
that the employer had the burden of proving that the
present disability, if any, was due to a pre-existing con-
dition. To support this argument he cites the case of
Hale v. General Box Manufacturing Co., 235 Miss. 301,
108 So. 2d 844 (1959).

On the first hearing in this matter, the claimant in-
troduced as a witness his physician, Dr. R. G. Hendrick,
who diagnosed his injury as muscle sprain of the back,
also osteoarthritis and some narrowing of the dise be-
tween lumbar 5 and 8-1. Dr. Hendrick testified on that
hearing that in his opinion the muscle sprain had had
time to heal itself.and that pain in the back was probably
not due to the muscle sprain but ‘‘due to other illnesses
— other conditions.”? When asked what caused the
pain in his back in February of that year, he answered:
“Painful sprain of lumbar muscles; that is all.”’? He
further testified that in his opinion the pain from the
muscle sprain had subsided, and when asked what was
causing the present pain, he answered: ‘‘The degenerat-
ed disc disease; the osteoarthritis.”’ The first hearing
was held on August 29, 1962, and at the request of the
claimant, the claim was dismissed.

Claimant re-filed his claim and a new hearing was
had on October 23, 1963. At a subsequent continued
hearing on December 18, 1963, Dr. J. H. Swartzfager
was introduced by claimant and he testified that he
reviewed some X-rays of claimant and found that he
had osteoarthritis of his back and narrowing of the dise
space between L-5 and S-1, thought to be degenerative
disc disease. His further testimony, in response to a
hypothetical question, was that in his opinion the injury
complained of (claimant whirled to avoid some falling

|

material) accelerated, aggravated, contributed to, or
combined with his condition to bring about his present
disability.

Dr. Hendrick was again introduced and testified as
he had on the first examination.

Dr. EB. C. Schultz testified by deposition introduced
by the employer. He saw the claimant on April 5, 1962,
and was asked whether if in his opinion the condition
present at the time of his examination was due to disease
or trauma. He answered that he thought it was due to
disease. He further testified that the injury which Mr.
Buskirk related to him as of February 1962 had nothing
to do with the condition he observed at the time of his
examination.

In Hale, supra, it was held that when injury by an
accident arising out of and in the course of employment
is shown, the burden is on the employer to prove his
defense that present disability is due to some other in-
tervening cause or pre-existing condition for which he is
not responsible. The Court quoted from 100 C.J.S.
Workmen’s Compensation section 521 at 490 (1958),
to support such holding. Immediately following the por-
tion of C.J.S. quoted, it is further stated:

However, where the evidence is conflicting on the is-

sues whether the accident had occurred, and, if so,

whether the claimed injuries were the result of such
accident, the rule that when serious injury is con-
clusively shown and logical cause for it is proved the
burden is on the employer to overcome this proof by
showing that another cause of injury was more logical
is inapplicable.’? 100 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensa-

tion § 521 at 491 (1958).

In Miss. Products, Inc. v. Skipworth, 238 Miss. 312,
118 So. 2d 345 (1960), the Hale case was distinguished.

The recent case of Miller’s Transporters, Ltd. v. Dean,
254 Miss. 1, 179 So. 2d 552, also bears upon this ques-
tion.

HEE The Commission had ample evidence, based on
the testimony offered by the claimant disclosing a de-
generative disease and the testimony of two doctors
showing that the condition resulting from the injury
had subsided and that the present pain was due from
the pre-existing disease, to support its findings.

The order of the circuit court is therefore reversed,
the order of the commission reinstated, and the cause
remanded for what other proceedings, if any, are re-
quisite.

Reversed and order of Commission reinstated and
remanded.

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Brady and Inzer, JJ.,
coneur.

GeveraL Accuprance Corporation v. Horsroox, et ux.
No. 43684 November 15, 1965 179 So. 24 845

3
o

Kenneth E. Bullock, Wm. H. Odom, Laurel, for appel-
lant.

Jack Parsons, Wiggins, for appellees.

Erurmes, P. J.

General Acceptance Corporation, appellant (called
GAC), brought this suit in the Chancery Court of Jones
County, by a nonresident attachment, against Mr. ani
Mrs. Holbrook, residents of Florida. Personal service
of process was later had upon Mr. Holbrook. The bill
alleged that he owned real property in Jones County,
which was the subject of attachment; and that GAC ob-
tained -a judgment on December 4, 1963 in the ‘Court
of Record of Broward County, Florida, in the amount
of $4,235. The suit was on the judgment. A copy o:
it was attached as an exhibit to the bill of complaint.
A writ of attachment and publication process were
issued.

HEE The chancery court sustained motions to quash
the writ and to dismiss the suit, filed separately by
defendants. It was correct in quashing the writ an
dismissing as to Mrs. Holbrook, since the bill showe
on its face that the land did not belong to her. Hence
the order as to Mrs. Holbrook is affirmed.

However, the trial court erred in quashing the writ
of attachment and dismissing the bill as to-Mr. Holbrook.

pc tw!

This was done on the theory that the copy of the foreign
judgment attached to the bill of complaint as an exhibit
was not properly authenticated. The order confused a
pleading with an evidence question.

HEE Mississippi Code Annotated section 1469 (1956)
requires that in actions founded on any writing, a copy
of it shall be attached to the declaration or bill of com-
plaint. Section 1412 makes this statute applicable to
chancery courts. A copy of the Florida judgment was
attached to the bill, which alleged sufficient to withstand
demurrer. The suit was based on the judgment, and
the exhibit copy was a sufficient compliance with section
1469. Hence the trial court erred in quashing the writ
and dismissing the bill. Its order was without reserva-
tion and amounted to a dismissal with prejudice.

HBB Accordingly, we do not reach the question of
the sufficiency of the authentication of the judgment of
the Florida court. That is a question of evidence, and
GAC has not offered that document into evidence as
yet. Code section 1746 provides that copies of the record
of any writing recorded by the laws of any other state,
“shall, when certified by the officer in whose office the
record is kept, under his seal of office, he received in
evidence...’ MI Appellant may proceed either under
that statute, or under the federal act. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738
(1950); 20 Am. Jur. Evidence §§ 1014-1017 (1939); 8
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms § 378 (1957);
see Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 297-298, 12 So. 2d 425,
427-428 (1943).

In summary, the order of the chancery court dismiss-
ing the bill as to Mrs. Holbrook is affirmed. The order
as to Mr. Holbrook is reversed, and the cause is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Gillespie, Jones, Brady and Inger, JJ., concur.

Warson v. SraTe
No. 43717 November 15, 1965 179 So. 24 826

Womack & Womack, Belzoni, for appellant.

R. Hugo Newcomb, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

a

Sarrs, J.

The appellant, Joe David Watson, was indicted joint-
ly with two others for burglary of an ‘‘unoccupied
dwelling house.’’ His co-indictees entered pleas of guil-
ty and testified for the State at appellant’s trial.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty and appellant
was sentenced to serve a term in the penitentiary.

Appellant urges several grounds for reversal of his
conviction, but it is necessary to consider only one, that
is, that there was fatal variance between the crime
shown by the evidence and that charged in the indict-
ment.

Several distinct crimes are defined in the Mississippi
statutes which fall within the category of burglary.
Three of these statutes are relevant to the question
here presented.

Mississippi Code Annotated section 2036 (1956) de-
fines ‘‘Burglary — inhabited dwelling’? and makes it
a crime to burglarize a dwelling house ‘‘in which there
shall be, at the time, some human being.’’

Mississippi Code Annotated section 2038 (1956) de-
fines ‘‘Burglary — dwelling generally’? and makes it
a crime to burglarize a dwelling house without regard
to whether there is anyone in it at the time or not.

Mississippi Code Annotated section 2043 (1956) de-
fines ‘‘Burglary — elsewhere than in dwelling house’’
and makes it a crime to burglarize a building other than
a dwelling house.

The testimony for the prosecution as given by ap-
pellant’s alleged accomplices is to the effect that ap-
pellant picked them up in his automobile and drove
them to the building which they burglarized. This build-
ing was in the process of construction and was nearing
completion. Although designed and intended for occup-
ancy as a dwelling when completed, it had not yet been
occupied as a dwelling house.

It was shown that the accomplices were brothers and
that one of them was a carpenter’s helper who ,had
been working on the building. He told the others that
there was a power saw in the building and the stealing
of this saw was the specific object of the unlawful
entry upon the night in question. The proof for the
state showed that appellant told his accomplices that
he could find a market for the saw and that he drove
to the building where they got out of his car. They
testified at the trial that the appellant drove off, promis-
ing to return for them later, and that they broke a win-
dow, entered the building, and took the saw. Appellant
afterward picked them up with the saw which was then
concealed by the side of a country road.

At the conclusion of the testimony for the state, ap-
pellant moved the court to exclude the evidence upon
the ground that the indictment charged the appellant
with burglarizing a dwelling house and that the evidence
had shown that the building burglarized was not a dwell-
ing house within the meaning of the statute. This mo-
tion was overruled.

At the conclusion of all of the evidence, appellant
requested a written instruction from the court directing
the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. This instruc-
tion was refused.

HE Bf Appellant relies on Woods v. State, 186 Miss.
463, 191 So. 283 (1939). In that case, the defendant
had been indicted and convicted for burglarizing a
“dwelling house.’? The house in question, although in-
tended for a dwelling house, had been erected only re-
cently and had not been occupied as a dwelling house.
It was vacant. The court held that since no one had
ever lived in it, the house had never become and was
not a dwelling house within the meaning of the statute
defining burglary of a dwelling house.

The court held further that a request for a peremp-
tory instruction was sufficient to raise the point that

TC

the proof was not sufficient to sustain the charge as
laid in the indictment where an amendment was not
allowable to make the indictment conform to the proof.
The court in 186 Miss. at 466-467, 191 So. at 284 said:
‘And this presents the question of whether an

indictment charging the burglary of a dwelling can
be amended during the trial so as to make it charge
the burglary of some house other than a dwelling
house; and that question we must answer in the nega-
tive. An indictment cannot be amended at the trial
so as to change the identity of the offense, Blumen-
berg v. State, 55 Miss. 528, and the burglary of a
dwelling is an offense sepaate and distinct from that
of the burglary of an unoccupied house, although both
belong to the same class of felonies. They are dealt
with under separate statutes, and these statutes con-
tain separate and distinct elements to constitute the
crimes therein denounced.”’

See, also, Haynes v. State, 180 Miss. 291, 177 So.
360 (1937); O’Neal v. State, 166 Miss. 538, 542, 146
So. 634 (1933); State v. Sowell, 85 S. C. 278, 67 S. B.
316 (1910).

The essence of the distinction made by the court in
the cited cases between burglary of a dwelling and bur-
glary of a building not a dwelling is that in the former
the building must then be a place of human abode. If
a dwelling is actually occupied by a human being at the
time of the burglary, that crime is covered by section
2036. If the dwelling is not so occupied when the crime
is committed, then the burglary is a violation of section
2038. If the building is not a place where people reside,
section 2043 applies.

The case now before us is not distinguishable from
the Woods case, supra.

Appellant’s requested instruction directing the jury
to return a verdict of not guilty should have been granted.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed. The
record shows that the appellant is on bail and he is

6

required to appear before the Circuit Court of Humph-
reys County to answer according to the condition of his
bond, as provided by Mississippi Code Annotated sec-
tion 1979 (1956).

Reversed and appellant held under present bail to
await action of the Circuit Court of Humphreys County.

Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Patterson, and Ineer, JJ.,
concur,

Ruy v. Stare
No. 43269 November 22, 1965 180 So. 2d 321

as

CC
ee
po
a

Harold W. Davidson, Carthage, for appellant.

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Brapy, Tom P., J.

The appellant, Ollie Riley, was tried and convicted
in the Cireuit Court of Leake County, Mississippi on
an indictment under Chapter 281, Mississippi Laws of
1958, Mississippi Code Annotated section 2412.5, supple-
ment 1964, commonly known as the ‘‘Peeping Tom Stat-
ute.’’? Appellant was sentenced to a term of two years in
the Mississippi State Penitentiary and prosecutes this
appeal from that sentence.

The relevant facts in the case are as follows. On
the night of May 4, 1963, at approximately 10:30 P.M.,
the Brantley family, consisting of Mr. Max Brantley,
his wife, Mrs. Donna Brantley, four daughters and a
son, had retired for the night. A bird dog chained in
the yard began to bark and Mr. Brantley arose to in-
vestigate. The record discloses that on two other oc-
easions the Brantley household had been disturbed by
a Negro who had peeped into the windows of their
home three weeks before, and three months before, the
night in question.

The record discloses that Mr. Brantley seized his
pistol and ran toward the front door. As he did so,
irs. Brantley looked out their bedroom window and
saw appellant standing with his face in the window.
She called out to her husband: ‘‘Here he is, at the
window.’’ Mr. Brantley ran out the front door and
saw the appellant at the southeast corner of his house.
‘When Mr. Brantley saw him, appellant started to run
rom the house, being then approximately six feet from
the window. He told appellant to stop or he would kill
him, and the appellant promptly stopped. Mr. Brantley
caught hold of him and forced him to sit on the porch.
Appellant stated to Mr. Brantley that he had parked
his car at the foot of a hill on old Highway 61 on the
side of Mr. Brantley’s house; that he had gotten out
of the car and walked down to the creek bridge, walked

—

across, walked back across Mr. Syl Quick’s pasture, and
up to Mr. Brantley’s home.

Mr. Brantley testified that he could not tell that the
appellant had been drinking at all, nor could he tell that
there was anything abnormal or wrong with appellant’s
condition except that he was scared. Mr. Brantley tes-
tified that appellant admitted to him that he had made
the tracks in the snow around the windows of Mr. Brant-
ley’s house approximately three months before. These
tracks went from window to window of the house. The
record indicates that appellant’s car was parked some
200 yards from the side of Mr. Brantley’s home.

Mr. Brantley further testified that appellant admitted
he had brought a five gallon can up to the bathroom
window and peeped into Mr. Brantley’s bathroom ap-
proximately three weeks before the night in question.

Each of these former events had taken place on a
Saturday night, as did the event on the night in question,
May 4, 1963. Mr. Brantley’s twin daughters, Maxine
and Braxine, age twelve, were permitted to testify over
appellant’s objection.

Braxine Brantley testified that it was snowing on the
night she first saw appellant; that when she turned
on the porch light and looked out the door to see if it
was still snowing, she saw appellant outside peeping
in the window of the living room by the front porch,
and that he fled.

Maxine testified that three weeks before May 4, 1963,
at approximately 10:30 P.M., she went to the bathroom
and saw appellant looking in the bathroom window; that
she screamed and he fled.

While both of these girls knew and recognized the ap-
pellant, they were not able at the time to recall his name.
‘The record discloses that appellant lives approximately
a half mile from Mr. Max Brantley’s home. No indict-
ments were sought against appellant for these two former
alleged offenses.

a

Mrs. Donna Brantley, wife of Max Brantley, Janice
Brantley, a seventeen-year-old daughter, David Brant-
ley, a son, and Maxine and Braxine Brantley, twin daugh-
ters, testified in substance to what their father had tes-
tified with reference to what transpired on the night of
May 4, 1963. Janice Brantley also testified that she
heard the appellant tell her father that he was drunk
or had been drinking, and that he lost his head, and
lost his way; that he had to go off and leave his car
because he couldn’t drive it and that he was just on
his way home. This corroborates the statements made
by appellant.

The record discloses that, after Mr. Max Brantley
stopped and held the appellant, he sent his son, David,
to get his father-in-law, Mr. Hal Hamlin, and a neighbor,
Mr. Sylvester Quick, who came to Mr. Brantley’s home.
Mr. Tommy Roberts, city policeman of Carthage, Mis-
sissippi, accompanied by Mr. Clyde Greer, also came,
and Mr. Tommy Roberts placed the appellant under
arrest and took him off to jail.

Mr. and Mrs. Hal Hamlin, the father and step-mother
of Mrs. Donna Brantley, both testified. Mr. Hamlin
testified that he did not believe the appellant was drunk
on the night in question; that he heard him talk and
that he made good sense, as good as he could have under
the circumstances. Mrs. Hamlin stated that she could
not tell whether or not he was drunk.

Mr. Tommy Roberts testified that the appellant was
not drunk; that he could smell liquor on appellant, but
he wouldn’t say that he was drunk because he walked
good and he ‘‘wasn’t thick tongued or anything like
that.’”? He admitted that the appellant stated he had
just gotten lost and that was the reason he was there.

Mr. Sylvester Quick, who was first to arrive at the
scene after appellant was caught, testified also that ap-
pellant was not drunk but that he was drinking; that
appellant did not act as though he were scared; and

— ioe

that appellant stated, as an explanation for why he was
there, that he had gotten lost.

Mr. Clyde Geer testified that he accompanied Mr.
Tommy Roberts, and that the appellant was not drunk;
that he could ‘‘smell a little on him,’ but he was not
drunk,

The appellant, Ollie Riley, took the stand and testi-
fied in his own behalf. He denied every statement which
had been made by Mr. Brantley and his daughters with
reference to peeping in the windows on the night of May
4th. He testified that he had taken some drinks, with a
complete stranger, of something that ‘‘tasted like sweet-
ened water,’’? which hypnotized him; that he was com-
pletely lost; that his mind ‘‘would be this minute one
place, and the next minute be another,’’ and that he
did not know where he was or why he had gone to the
Brantley home. He testified that his ‘“membrance’’ came
and went, and that he did not ever look into the windows
of the Brantley home. He testified that he was not
drunk but that he had no mind and did not know where
he was; that his memory did not come back to him until
Mr. Brantley grabbed him by the arm and he looked into
Mr. Brantley’s pistol barrel.

The appellant assigns four errors, but his brief treats
the errors assigned as if they fall within two categories.
The first category is that the court erred in permitting
testimony, over objections of appellant, regarding al-
leged offenses of a similar nature to the crime with
which appellant was charged, attempting to connect ap-
pellant thereto, and in refusing to grant a motion for
a mistrial and a new trial because thereof. The second
category is that the court erred in refusing to grant
appellant’s motion for a directed verdict and in refusing
to grant a new trial because the evidence failed to show
the appellant guilty as charged, and the verdict was
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

HB Considering this second category of errors as-
signed, an objective review of this record convinces us

ET

that the appellant’s motion for a directed verdict was
not well taken for the reason that the proof is abundant
and, if believed by the jury, is amply sufficient to merit
the conviction of this appellant. For the same reason
that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict
of guilty, the verdict of the jury cannot be contrary to
the overwhelming weight of the evidence. MMM It fol-
lows, therefore, that on these issues and for these rea-
sons, the court did not commit error in not granting
a new trial, the proof in this case being sufficient and
of such character as to justify the jury in finding the
appellant guilty.

The basic question before this Court upon review is
whether or not the lower court committed error in per-
mitting the State, over the objections of appellant, to
show that appellant on two other recent occasions had
committed two similar offenses to the crime with which
he is being charged here. If the court was not in error
in permitting this testimony, then obviously the court
was not in error when it refused to enter a mistrial at
the time this testimony was objected to, and when it
refused to grant a new trial because of this testimony
after the court had entered its judgment.

HEM Addressing ourselves now to whether or not
proof of former offenses by the appellant was admis-
sible, it must be noted that appellant correctly states
the general rule, that evidence of other crimes per-
petrated by appellant are not generally admissible. Many
cases are cited by appellant, but appellant’s brief in-
dicates that he relies largely upon the following cases:
Brown v. State, 224 Miss. 498, 80 So. 2d 761 (1955);
Hawkins v. State, 224 Miss. 309, 80 So. 2d 1 (1955);
Pegram v. State, 223 Miss. 294, 78 So. 2d 153 (1955);
Patton v. State, 209 Miss. 138, 46 So. 2d 90 (1950);
Brooks v. State, 209 Miss. 150, 46 So. 2d 94 (1950);
Phillips v. City of Aberdeen, 188 Miss. 837, 196 So. 632
(1940) ; Floyd v. State, 166 Miss. 15, 148 So. 226 (1933) ;

— |

Willoughby v. State, 154 Miss. 653, 122 So. 757, 63 A.L.R.
1319 (1929). While stating good law, these cases are
distinguishable from the case at bar and do not justify
the sustaining of appellant’s basic contentions.

The appellant stated in his brief:

Of course we realize that the State in this case will

argue that there is an exception to the general rule.

However, we do not believe that a review of the evi-

dence places it in the category of one of the well

recognized exceptions as announced in Hawkins v.

State, 80 So. 2d 1, 222 Miss. 309, or at least that it

is doubtful whether such evidence falls within any

of the exceptions and should be excluded under the

case of Willoughby v. State, 82 Miss. 252, 33 So. 973,

. and other cases holding to the same principles.

In passing, 82 Miss. 252, 33 So. 973 (1903) is the citation
for Dabney v. State. The correct citation for Willoughby
v. State is shown above.

Appellant correctly points out in 20 American Juris-
prudence Evidence section 309 (1939) the general rule
regarding the inadmissibility of proof of other crimes
or offenses in the trial of a criminal case. The appellant
quotes from this section, as follows:

A person, when placed upon trial for the commission

of an offense against the criminal laws, is to be con-

victed, if at all, on evidence showing his guilt of
the particular offense charged in the indictment against
him. It is a well-established common-law rule that
in a criminal prosecution proof which shows or tends
to show that the accused is guilty of the commission
of other crimes and offenses at other times, even
though they are of the same nature as the one charged
in the indictment, is incompetent and inadmissible
for the purpose of showing the commission of the
particular crime charged, unless the other offenses
are connected with the offense for which he is on
trial. In other words, it is not competent to prove

a

that the defendant committed other crimes of a like

nature for the purpose of showing that he would be

likely to commit the crime charged in the indictment,
for ordinarily such proof will not reflect any light
upon the special crime with which the defendant stands

charged. (20 Am. Jur. at 287-88.)

HB This general rule was quoted with approval
by this Court in the case of Hawkins v. State, supra.
In that case, however, this Court went on to say that
there are several well recognized exceptions to, and limi-
tations on, the general rule, including when such evi-
dence tends directly to establish the particular crime,
the motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or acci-
dent, a common scheme or plan embracing the commis-
sion of two or more crimes so related to each other that
proof of one tends to establish the other, or the identity
of the persons charged with the commission of the crime
on trial.

HRB The basic issue in this case is actually whether
the appellant wandered there in a disoriented condition,
as is urged in appellant’s brief and as was testified to
by appellant, or whether at the time he was caught there
by Mr. Brantley he had gone there for the lewd and
licentious purpose of peeping into the window of the
Brantley home. Mrs. Brantley’s testimony that, after
retiring, she saw the appellant’s face at her bedroom
window, is uncontradicted except for appellant’s in-
consistent testimony. The basic issue therefore resolves
around whether or not the motive and intent of the ap-
pellant was to trespass upon the property of Max Brant-
ley for the lewd and indecent purpose of peering into
the window. Since the motive and intent of appellant
is in sharp issue, we hold, under the facts of this case,
that proof of identical offenses committed prior to the
offense for which the appellant was prosecuted is ad-
missible on the issue of motive and intent. One clear
statement in this regard is found in Raines v. State, 81

— i
Miss. 489, 33 So. 19 (1902), in which case this Court
held as follows:
Evidence of the conduct of the accused on other oc-
casions, though disconnected from the offense on trial,
is frequently admitted in cases of conspiracy, uttering
forged instruments and counterfeit coin, and receiv-
ing stolen goods, — not, however, for the purpose of
inducing the jury to believe the accused guilty of the
erime for which he is on trial, because he had com-
mitted another similar crime, but for the purpose
of excluding him from setting up the defense that he
did the act innocently and without knowledge of its
guilt. In such cases evidence of other similar offenses
is admissible, because the act for which the defendant
is being tried is mostly of an equivocal kind, from
which malus animus is not a necessary presuiption;
and such evidence is allowed in order to show a crimi-
nal intention... . (81 Miss. at 497, 33 So. at 20-21.)
This rule is recognized in Mississippi and in other jur-
isdictions, particularly in offenses of this nature, which
are basically a type of sex offense. HIM Nevertheless,
trial courts should exercise a high degree of caution in
admitting evidence of similar offenses, and should do
so only when, as in the case at bar, the evidence comes
clearly within the conditions constituting and permitting
the exception, and not under the prohibition of the gen-
eral rule excluding the evidence of other crimes per-
petrated by the accused.
Lee v. State, 244 Miss. 813, 146 So. 2d 736 (1962) ; Fuqua
v. State, 246 Miss. 191, 145 So. 2d 152 (1962), cert. denied,
372 U. 8. 709, 83 Sup. Ct. 1018, 10 L: Hd. 2d 125 (1963),
rehearing denied, 373 U. S. 947, 83 Sup. Ct. 1536, 10
L, Ed. 2d 703 (1963); Hawkins v. State, 224 Miss. 309,
80 So. 2d 1 (1955); Stone v. State, 210 Miss. 218, 49
So. 2d 263 (1950); May v. State, 205 Miss. 295, 38 So.
2d 726 (1949); Strong v. State, 199 Miss. 17, 23 So.
2d 750 (1945); Housley v. State, 198 Miss. 837, 23 So.

a

2d 749 (1945); Golden v. State, 183 Miss. 289, 184 So.
324 (1938); 20 Am. Jur. Evidence secs. 318, 315 n. 19,
340 & nn. 10 & 11 (1939); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law
secs. 686, 691 (29) (1961); 1 Underhill, Criminal Evi-
dence secs. 206, 208 (5th ed. 1956). Cf. Id. at secs. 789,
808 (5th ed. 1957).

HEE The recent case of Cain v. State, 253 Miss. 368,
175 So. 2d 638 (1965), has particular application to
the case at bar. The Cain case involved three men
charged with malicious mischief, and specifically with
hurling objects at another man’s house on several oc-
casions. As in the case at bar, the victim was attempting
to catch the culprit or culprits and was lying in wait
for them. We approved the admissibility of the previous
similar acts in the Cain case even though, unlike the
case at bar, it could not be shown with any certainty
that Cain and his accomplices were guilty of the previous
act. We stated in that case that the evidence was ad-
missible to show a common pattern of action whether
or not appellants were involved in any prior occurrences,
to show motive of appellants, and to explain the other-
wise dubious actions of the prosecuting witness.

Tm conclusion, we find that there is no reversible er-
ror in this case and that the guilt of the appellant has
been sufficiently established beyond every reasonable
doubt. The judgment of the lower court is therefore
affirmed.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Inger, JJ.,
concur, ~

8

Pricn v. Srara
No. 43347 November 22, 1965 180 So. 2d 446

Thomas H. Comer, Booneville, for appellant.

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

9

Inzzr, J.

Appellant, Paul Price, was convicted in the Circuit
Court of Lee County on a charge of unlawful possession
of intoxicating liquor, and was sentenced to pay a fine
and serve a jail sentence. From this judgment he ap-
peals to his Court.

The only error assigned by the appellant is that his
conviction was had at an unauthorized extended term
of the court and that his conviction at such term is wholly
void,

HE BM The record in this case reflects that appellant
was tried at the same extended term of the court as
was Murphy in the case of Murphy v. State of Missis-
sippi, 253 Miss. 644, 178 So. 2d 692 (1965). We held in
Murphy that bis trial on the first day of the extended
term was unauthorized by law. It follows that, the ex-
tension of the term being unauthorized, the trial of ap-
pellant on another day of the same extended term was
likewise unauthorized by law. For this reason this cause
must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.
Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Jones and Smith, JJ., concur.

Corsow v. Smus, et al., D. B. A. Jrewey Juneie
No. 43538 November 22, 1965 180 So, 2d 327

Roy J. Goss, Columbia, for appellant.

10:

=

Vernon H. Broom, Columbia, for appellees.

ene

Guuesrin, J.

M. P. Colson, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff,
sued EH. EH. Sims and G. E. Sanders, doing business
as Jitney Jungle, hereinafter referred to as defendants,
for personal injuries sustained when plaintiff caught
his right foot on platform scales while using a passage-
way to defendants’ store. The plaintiff introduced his
evidence and rested. The court sustained defendants’
motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment ac-
cordingly. Plaintiff appealed.

The only question involved is whether the evidence
offered by plaintiff was sufficient to make a jury issue.
We hold that it was.

HM The pleadings in this case presented the issue
whether defendants used reasonable care to keep in rea~
sonably safe condition a passageway used by customers
in going to and from the store from an alley. The es-
tablished rule of law is that when at the conclusion of
plaintiff’s case a motion is made to exclude the evidence
and direct a verdict for defendant, the court must look
solely to the evidence in behalf of plaintiff and accept
that evidence as true; and if such evidence, along with
inferences which could reasonably be drawn therefrom,
would support a verdict for the plaintiff, the directed

verdict should not be given. We state the facts in accord
with this rule,

103

Defendants operate a supermarket in the City of Co-
lumbia under the trade name of Jitney Jungle, consisting
of grocery and meat departments. The meat department
is in the rear of the store and there is a passageway
or aisle running from Honey Alley to the meat depart-
ment which the customers of defendants customarily
use in entering and leaving the store. Defendants kept
platform scales in the passageway but the scales usually
were placed about half way under a stairway leading
off from the aisle. The platform of the scales rests on
rollers and the top of the platform is eight inches off
the floor. The scales were sitting on a concrete floor
and the color of the scales and the floor blended. The
platform is about twenty inches wide and slightly over
two feet long. On the occasion of plaintiff’s injury, the
scales were out about two feet further into the aisle
than usual, leaving only two or three feet of unobstructed
passageway. There was lighting equipment in the pas-
sageway but it was turned off. The screen door leading
to Honey Alley was closed but the wooden door was
open. The passageway was somewhat dark when plain-
tiff entered from the alley and walked a distance of
twelve to fifteen feet when his right foot struck the
platform of the scales and he fell on his left knee, re-
sulting in serious personal injuries.

Plaintiff had used the passageway many times and
knew that the scales were kept therein, but failed to see
them on the occasion of his injury.

The evidence shows that plaintiff was a business in-
vitee. He had telephoned one of the owners that he was
coming to pick up some chickens to take to the church,
and defendants knew the time appellant was coming and
that he would use the Honey Alley passageway.

HEME The settled rule is that the operator of premises
is under the duty to exercise reasonable care to keep
the premises in a reasonably safe condition for use by
a business invitee. Mississippi Winn-Dixie Supermark-

104

ets v. Hughes, 247 Miss. 575, 156 So. 2d 734 (1963) ; Gulf-
port Winn-Dixie Supermarkets v. Taylor, 246 Miss. 332,
149 So. 2d 485 (1963); Patterson v. Sayers, 223 Miss.
444, 78 So. 2d 467 (1955). The first two of the cited
cases involved customers slipping on the floor of a sup-
ermarket and the third case involved injuries sustained
when the plaintiff slipped and fell in the lobby of a hotel.

HEB We are of the opinion that the jury could find
that a person exercising reasonable care for his own
safety would probably not see the scales in the passage-
way since the platform arose only eight inches off the
floor, was substantially the same color as the floor, and
there was no lighting in the passageway except what
came from the outside through the screen door, a dis-
tance of approximately fifteen feet away, and that de-
fendants failed to use reasonable care to keep the aisle
in reasonably safe condition for use by their business
invitees. The cause is reversed and remanded for a jury
trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, P. J., and Jones, Brady and Inger, JJ.,
concur.

Mowracus v. Jonzs, et al.
No, 43683 November 22, 1965 180 So. 2d 316

10:

x

Chary & Weldy, Hattiesburg; Vernon ” Brown, Colum-
bia, for appellant.

106

Hall, Callender & Damtin, Ernest Duff, Richard
Foaworth, Columbia; Lipscomb, Barksdale & Steen,
Jackson, for appellees.

107

Guuzsprs, J.

Mrs. Mable Rodgers Montague, the widow and ad-
ministratrix of the estate of Harl Brewer Montague,
deceased, sued Joe M. Jones and his employer, Dean
Griner, for the alleged wrongful death of Harl Brewer
Montague. The suit was for the use and benefit of
the administratrix and her seven children.

After the plaintiff had introduced her evidence and
rested, the court sustained a motion for a directed ver-
dict. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants
and plaintiff appealed.

Hl BH [it is a settled rule that when considering a
motion for a directed verdict all evidence in favor of
the party against whom the motion is made must be
considered as true and the evidence in contradiction
thereof must not be considered. MME If the evidence
on behalf of the party against whom the motion is made
and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn there-
from would support a verdict, the motion should be over-
ruled. Berry v. Brunt, 252 Miss. 194, 172 So. 2d 398
(1965). We state the facts in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff in accordance with this rule.

The case arose out of a collision between a truck
owned by defendant Griner and operated by defendant
Jones and an automobile belonging to Earl Brewer
Montague, deceased. The deceased had an accident on
a bridge and had gotten out of his automobile. De-
fendant’s truck collided with the Montague automobile
and drove it against Montague, inflicting injuries from
which he died a few hours later. The negligence charged
against defendant Jones was that he was operating a
heavy truck with a water-well drilling rig thereon be-
longing to defendant Griner, (1) at a reckless and dan-
gerous rate of speed approaching the Tallahala Creek
Bridge, (2) failed to keep a proper lookout, (3) failed
to keep the truck under easy and proper control, and
(4) failed to turn his vehicle to the left to avoid the

collision with the vehicle of the deceased which had
become disabled on the bridge.. The question is whether
the evidence made a jury issue. We hold it did.

The defendant Dean Griner is engaged in the water-
well drilling business and operates out of Columbia,
Mississippi. On November 11, 1964, four vehicles be-
longing to Griner were dispatched to Chatham, Alaba-
ma. These vehicles left Columbia at 4:30 A.M., traveling
east on Mississippi Highway 42. The first vehicle in
the convoy was a truck loaded with pipe, operated by
one Stampley; the second was a Plymouth automobile
operated by Dean Griner, Jr.; the third was a large
truck loaded with a water-well drilling rig weighing ap-
proximately eleven tons; the fourth was not involved
in the accident.

Shortly before 5:30 A.M., on said date, Earl Brewer
Montague, the deceased, was operating an automobile
with Jolly Matthews as a passenger. They were travel-
ing in an easterly direction across the Tallahala Creek
Bridge. Highway 42 at said point runs east and west,
and the bridge across Tallahala Creek is about 1200
feet long. The span of the bridge over the creek is about
800 to 900 feet from the western end. When Montague
drove his automobile on the bridge it was sleeting. His
speed was 30 or 85 miles per hour. The span directly
over the creek was frozen over, although no other part
of the bridge or the highways or bridges in the area
was frozen over. When the Montague automobile en-
tered upon the bridge, it began to slide and went out
of control. It struck the right side of the bridge and
bounced to the opposite side, then turned around facing
west in the eastbound lane of traffic, with one wheel
and fender a foot or a foot and a half over the center
line into the westbound lane of traffic. Matthews got
out of the automobile to see if any damage had been
done and saw and heard the convoy of vehicles belonging
to defendant Griner coming from the west, whereupon

ss

he opened the automobile door and told Montague to
turn on his bright lights and run for his life. Matthews
ran to the east and had gotten a short distance away
when the first of the convoy of vehicles passed without
striking the Montague automobile. Shortly thereafter
the second vehicle, the Plymouth automobile, passed the
disabled automobile without accident. Then the third
vehicle struck the Montague automobile and drove it
against the deceased, inflicting fatal injuries.

The headlights of Montague’s automobile had not
been damaged in the collision; it was facing west in
the eastbound lane of traffic with its headlights on
bright as the Griner vehicles approached from the west.
Visibility in the area was poor. The convoy of our
vehicles was traveling 40 to 45 miles per hour. The
truck bearing the drilling rig driven by the defendant
Jones was 100 to 200 yards behind the Plymouth auto-
mobile driven by Griner when they approached the curve
just prior to entering on the bridge. .The bridge and
highway are straight for at least 900 feet west from the
place where the collision took place. When the truck
driven by defendant Jones was approximately 150 yards
behind the Plymouth automobile, Jones saw the Plymouth
begin swerving on the bridge. Jones had not seen the
deceased’s automobile or its lights and had not slowed
down; he slacked off his gas about the time he saw
the Plymouth dodging something on the bridge, but he
did not attempt to bring the truck to a stop, although
he admitted that he could have done so. Jones realized
that the Plymouth was dodging something, but failed
to make any effort to stop his truck. Jones admitted
seeing the deceased’s automobile when he was about
300 feet away. He was unable to drive his truck through
the ten-foot space left between the northern side of the
bridge and the Montague automobile. The truck driven
by Jones ran into the Montague automobile and knocked
it against Montague.

110

The evidence in this case was sufficient to justify the
jury in finding against the defendants on at least three
charges of negligence set out in the declaration.

Wl Mf It was slecting and visibility was poor, and
while the drivers of the convoy had not encountered
any ice to the west, the exercise of reasonable care
required caution commensurate with prevailing weather
conditions. The evidence justified a finding that the
vehicles were traveling at a greater rate of speed than
was reasonable under the circumstances. Miss. Code
Ann. § 8176(b) (Supp. 1964).

HE ‘he lights of the disabled Montague automo-
bile were shining west, and the evidence justified a
finding that Jones could and should have seen these
ights for a considerable distance before he reached
he part of the bridge spanning the creek, and that he
should have brought his vehicle under control and the
failure to do so was because he did not keep a proper
. lookout. Belk v- Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So. 2d

461 (1952).

HM The evidence justified a finding that Jones
failed to keep his vehicle under proper control under
the circumstances both before and after he saw the
Plymouth automobile swerving and dodging on the
ridge; and that he should have brought his vehicle to
a stop before he reached the Montague automobile. He
admitted that he could have stopped after he saw the
Plymouth swerving.

We have carefully considered the cases from other
jurisdictions, cited by appellees, where it was held un-
der varying circumstances that motorists were not guil-
ty of negligence in skidding on icy surfaces and col-
liding with parked or disabled automobiles. Those cases
are not persuasive. Our decision in this case is not based
alone on the fact that the truck skidded on the icy bridge
and collided with the Montague vehicle. The mere fact
that the truck skidded and collided with the disabled

|

iL

|

vehicle was not negligence. The plaintiff was entitled
to have his case decided by the jury because the evi-
dence justified a finding that the negligent acts and
omissions of Jones was the proximate cause of the col-
lision. The case is reversed and remanded for jury trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, P. J., and Jones, Brady and Inger, JJ.,
concur.

Darsco, Inc. v. Ruynouns, Exucurarx, Ero., et al.
No, 43685 November 22, 1965 180 So. 2d 319

Jones & Jones, Waynesboro; K. Hayes Callicutt,
Satterfield, Shell, Williams & Buford, Jackson, for ap-

s
ion

14

Shannon Clark, Waynesboro, for appellee.

Erurmes, P. J.

This suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Wayne
County by F. W. Reynolds (now deceased), and Mrs.
Myrtle Reynolds, his wife, against Dapsco, Inc. They
sought damages to their timber, land, and livestock for

115

the negligent maintenance and repair of a dam around
a slush pit or storage reservoir serving oil wells on
their property. Dapsco appealed from a jury verdict
of $2,815. Because of errors in instructions granted
appellees, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court
and remand for a new trial.

Wl WM There were issues of fact as to (1) whether
Dapsco was the operator or company maintaining and
repairing the slush pit and dam; and if so, (2) whether
Dapsco was negligent in maintaining and repairing it.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the fol-
lowing instruction:

The Court instructs the jury for the plaintiffs that
as a matter of law the persons or corporations or
firms operating the oil wells and slush pits in question
were guilty of negligence in the operation of the
slush pit shown by the testimony to have broken and
overflowed, and if you find from a preponderance
of the evidence in this case that the oil wells and slush
pit in question was operated by the defendant, Dapsco,
Inc., then it will be your sworn duty to find for the
plaintiffs in this case... .

This was a peremptory instruction to the effect that
whoever was operating the slush pit was negligent.

L. H. Martin, vice president of Dapsco, admitted that
its employee Harper told him the pit was getting full,
he instructed him not to let it run over, to haul water
out of it if necessary, or dig another pit. A trucking
company removed some of the water. The dam broke
after a big rain. Reynolds told Harper, about three
weeks before the first break, that the pit was full. There
were three breaks, on March 6 and December 4, 1963,
and January 25, 1964. However, the slush pit was hold-
ing waste products from the wells without any trouble
until the dam broke. After the first incident, Harper
sent several men with shovels to repair it. The second
break occurred in the same place, and again they repaired

it. After the third incident, a dragline was used. When
C. F. Martin purchased the lease in 1961, the slush pit
was already constructed. From a review of all of the
evidence, we think it was a question of fact as to whether
the slush pit was improperly operated, maintained, and
repaired. It was error to give a peremptory instruction
on negligence. In addition, Miller Transporters, Ltd.
v. Espey, 253 Miss. 439, 176 So. 2d 249 (1965), condemn-
ed a peremptory for plaintiff ‘‘unless the court: can
properly designate the defendant or defendants who are
liable to the plaintiff.’’

However, the circuit court was correct in submitting
to the jury the issue of whether Dapsco in fact operated,
maintained, and repaired the dam. Dapsco contends it
was not the ‘‘operator’’ of the well and slush pit, but
only the pumper. A pumper gauges the tanks, lubri-
cates the pumping units daily, and if trouble occurs
reports it to the ‘‘operator.’? On the other hand, ap-
pellant says, an ‘‘operator’’ is a person who is in charge
of the development of the lease or operation of a pro-
ducing well, The declaration charged that Dapsco owned
or operated the three oil wells, maintained and repaired
the slush pit, and had the duty to prevent the waste from
escaping, but failed to do so.

The Reynolds leased this property in 1939, following
which there were various interim assignments. Three
oil wells produced on the 120 acres assigned in 1961 to
C.F. Martin. L. H. Martin is a brother of C. F. Martin.
Dapsco is owned by C. F. and L. H. Martin, who are,
respectively, president and vice president of Dapsco and
also of C. F. Martin, Inc. L. H. Martin claimed C. F.
Martin, Inc. was operator of the wells, and Dapsco
was only the contract pumper. Both Martins, 0. F.
Martin, Inc., and Dapsco have a common office in Laurel.
L. H. Martin admitted that Dapsco repaired the slush
pit, billed C. F. Martin, Inc. for the cost of its work
and repairs. He directed Harper as an employee of

117

Dapsco to do the repairs. Dapsco was paid $100 per
month for the pumping. There was no written agree-
ment between OC. F. Martin, Inc. and Dapsco. The latter
used its trucks in working on the wells. Reynolds said
that the repairs on the dam were done by employees of
Dapsco who arrived in trucks with ‘‘Dapsco’’ printed
on the sides.

These interrelationships between the two Martins and
their two corporations, and their methods of operation,
much of which was not in writing, plus Reynolds’ tes-
timony, made it a question for the jury as to whether
in fact Dapsco performed the functions of an operator
of the well, and whether it maintained and attempted to
repair the slush pit. If it so found, there is sufficient
evidence of negligence to make that also a jury issue.
Jett Drilling Co. v. Jones, 251 Miss. 332, 169 So. 2d 463
(1964); Central Oil Co. v. Shows, 246 Miss. 300, 149
So. 2d 306 (1963); Ginther v. Long, 227 Miss. 885, 87
So. 2d 286 (1956); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Davis, 224 Miss.
= 80 So. 2d 467 (1955).

HE MM The circuit court erred in submitting to the
punitive damages. Jett Drilling Co. v. Jones, supra.
me It also erred in refusing at Teast one of Dapsco’s
requested instructions placing the burden on the Rey-
nolds to prove that Dapsco was negligent, and such
negligence proximately contributed to their damages.

Since the case is being reversed for the foregoing
errors, we do not consider whether the verdict was
grossly excessive. However, Instructions No. 2 for plain-
tiffs and No. 2 for defendant, when read together, are
substantially correct measurements of damages, except
that plaintiffs’ No. 2, submitting loss of timber as a
special damage, should exclude it as a permanent dam-
age, in order to avoid duplication of this item.

HB There was no error in permitting Reynolds to
testify about a recent settlement with Dapsco of another
claim for damages on this same land. This was televant

on the key issue made by defendant, as to whether
Dapsco was operator of the wells and slush pit. .

Reversed and remanded.

Gillespie, Jones, Brady and Inger, JJ. concur.
be

Rozertson v. Stroup, Ero. D.B.A. Hurrz Rewr-A-Can
No. 43611 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 617

119

Schweizer & Harvey, Columbus, for appellant.

Mitchell, McNutt & Bush, Tupelo, for appellee.

Inznp, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit
Court of Lee County, wherein the court sustained a
plea in bar and a plea in abatement to the declaration
filed by appellant, R. H. Robertson, against appellee,
W. L. Stroup, Jr.

The declaration alleged that appellant, hereinafter re-
ferred to as Robertson, suffered serious and permanent
injuries in an automobile accident caused by the neg-
ligence of Ray Stokes, servant and employee of ap-
pellee, hereinafter referred to as Stroup. It was alleged
that Stokes was at the time of the accident in and about
his master’s business, and that Stroup was liable for
said injuries. Stroup answered the declaration and de-
nied liability. He incorporated in his answer a plea in
bar and a plea in abatement, and requested that the
plea be heard prior to the trial of the case on its merits.
The plea in bar alleged that Robertson was at the time
of the injury an employee of Stroup’s agent, Bill James,

d/b/a James Gulf Service Station; that James was the
agent of Stroup in the operation of his rental car busi-
ness, and at the time of the injury Robertson was an
employee of James and engaged in the furtherance of the
rental car business; that Robertson was paid workmen’s
compensation benefits by James for the injury growing
out of and in the course of his employment, and for
this reason he was estopped and barred from maintain-
ing the suit against Stroup. The effect of the plea is
to contend that at the time of the injury Robertson was
within the meaning of the Mississippi Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act an employee of Stroup, and as a result
of his injury had been paid workmen’s compensation,
and therefore Stroup was not ‘‘any other party”? within
the terms of the act.

A hearing was had on the plea in bar and plea in
abatement prior to the trial of the case on its merits.
The pleas were heard before the trial judge without the
intervention of a jury. The trial judge sustained the
plea in bar and the plea in abatement. An order was
entered dismissing the suit, and from this judgment this
appeal is prosecuted.

The facts show that Stroup had obtained a license
from Hertz Rent-A-Car Company to operate a rental
car business in Tupelo, Oxford and Columbus, Missis-
sippi. Stroup employed James to operate the rental car
business in Columbus, and as compensation for his serv-
ices James was paid ten percent of the gross receipts.
Stroup furnished the cars used in the business, and as
a part of their oral agreement these cars were serviced
by James at his filling station, and for these services
James was paid in addition to the commission, James
was the operator of a filling station at the time he was
employed by Stroup to manage the rental car business.
In the operation of his filling station, James had four
employees including Robertson. These employees per-
formed services at the filling station and also performed

services in the rental car business. They were hired by
James and paid by him. Under the arrangement with
Stroup, James kept the records for the rental car busi-
ness and rented cars at his filling station. He also
maintained an office at the Columbus airport, where
cars were kept and rented. James maintained a tele-
phone at the filling station for the rental car business
with a direct line to the airport office. Ray Stokes
worked at the airport. He performed no services in
connection with the filling station. He was employed by
James on behalf of Stroup and was paid by Stroup.
His work was performed under the supervision of
James. Robertson worked at night, and during the course
of his work he at times rented cars, checked in cars
that had been rented by someone else, and at times
would deliver a car to the airport when one was needed.
On the night he was injured he was directed by James
to drive a rental car to the airport and deliver it to
Stokes. Stokes was to return him to the filling station
in a car kept at the airport for this purpose. Instead
of returning in the car belonging to Stroup, Stokes drove
his own car, and on the way back to the filling station
he lost control of his car and had the accident in which
Robertson was injured.

James carried workmen’s compensation insurance for
his employees, and he reported the injuries to his car-
rier. Thereafter, Robertson was paid a lump sum settle-
ment in the sum of $4,156 as settlement of his workmen’s
compensation claim for his injuries. He then filed this
suit against Stroup.

The principal question that we must determine in
this case is whether Robertson was at the time of his
injury the employee of Stroup within the meaning of
the Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation Act, and if
so, would the payment of workmen’s compensation by
Stroup’s agent, James, bar him from maintaining a suit
against Stroup for the same injury. The pertinent stat-

a

utes involved are Mississippi Code Annotated sections
6998-05 and 6998-36 (1952). Section 6998-05 provides
in part:

The liability of an employer to pay compensation
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the employee, his legal represen-
tative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next-of-
kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
at common law or otherwise from such employer on
account of such injury or death, except that if an
employer fails to secure payment of compensation as
required by this act, an injuréd employee, or his legal
representative in case death results from the injury,
may elect to claim compensation under this act, or to
maintain an action at law for damages on account of
such injury or death.

Section 6998-36 provides in part:

The acceptance of compensation benefits from or
the making of a claim for compensation against an
employer or insurer for the injury or death of an
employee shall not affect the right of the employee or
his dependents to sue any other party at law for
such injury or death, but the employer or his insurer
shall be entitled to reasonable notice and opportunity
to join in any such action or may intervene therein.
WN BB The words ‘‘employer’’ and ‘‘employee’’ as

used in the Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation Act
are synonymous with the words ‘‘master’’? and ‘‘serv-
ant?’, MMM and the rules for the determination of the
existence of the relation of employer and employee are
the same rules as at common law for determination of
the relationship of master and servant. There are num-
erous decisions of this Court involving the question of
master and servant. The case of Texas Co. v. Mills, 171
Miss. 231, 156 So. 866 (1934), involved a somewhat simi-
lar factual situation. The question in that case was

—_ is
whether Mills was an employee of Texas Company at
the time he was injured. The proof showed that Mills
was employed by and paid by Duncan, who was operat-
ing a bulk sales plant under a written contract with the
Texas Company. Duncan received as compensation a
percentage of the sales of the Texas Company’s prod-
ucts. We held that Duncan was not an independent con-
tractor, and neither was Duncan merely a salesman of
Texas Company products. We further held that Mills,
although hired and paid by Duncan, was at the time of
his injury an employee of the Texas Company. We
reached that conclusion on the basis that Duncan was
a servant of Texas Company, and the relationship was
material because it affected the relation of his (Dun-
can’s) employees to the Texas Company. We concluded
that when Duncan’s employees were discharging their
duties in connection with the bulk plant they were sub-
ject to control of the Texas Company by and through
its agent Duncan. We said in that connection:

It may be true that Duncan’s employees remained
his servants, but, as hereinbefore stated, when he
placed them in the service of the appellant, they be-
came also its servants and thereby became entitled
to all the rights of a servant against the appellant
(Rest. Agency, sec. 517), except the right to payment
for their services, that obligation remaining with Dun-
can. (171 Miss. at 247, 156 So. at 870)

HEM We also held in Meridian Taxi Cab Company
v. Wood, 184 Miss. 499, 186 So. 636 (1939), that it is
well settled in this state that one may be the servant
of two masters at the same time as to one act. There
is very little doubt that if the question here involved a
claim by Robertson against Stroup for workmen’s com-
pensation for his injuries, it would be held that he was
an employee of Stroup within the meaning of the Mis-
sissippi Workmen’s Compensation Act. Reasoning from
the decisions in the cases cited, and our other decisions

125

on this point, we have reached the conclusion that at
the time of the accident and resulting injuries to Robert-
son, he was not only an employee of James, but at the
same time an employee of Stroup also. Robertson and
Stokes were at the time of the accident both servants of
Stroup. Inasmuch as Robertson was paid workmen’s
compensation for his injury, he is barred under the pro-
visions of Mississippi Code Annotated section 6998-05
(1952) from maintaining this suit against Stroup.
Stroup, through his agent James, furnished workmen’s
compensation within the meaning of the statute. Stroup
is not under the circumstances of this case ‘‘any other
party’? as designated by the statute.

Appellant contends that the decision in this case is
controlled by our decisions in the cases of Index Drilling
Co. v. Williams, 243 Miss. 75, 187 So. 2d 525 (1962),
and Clark v. Luther McGill, Inc., 240 Miss. 509, 127
So. 2d 858 (1961). These cases involved an attempt
to invoke the ‘‘lent servant’’ doctrine, and we held in
these cases that Williams and Clark were not lent serv-
ants or special employees. These cases correctly an-
nounced the law relative to the facts in those cases, and
our decision in this case in no way infringes on the law
so announced in those cases. The law relative to the
lent servant doctrine is not applicable under the facts
of this case. There is no contention here that Robertson
was a lent servant.

HB Appellant finally contends that the issue on
the plea in bar was one that was peculiarly susceptible
to being tried by a jury, and the trial court was in error
in not empaneling a jury to try the issue. The record
reflects that appellant announced in open court that he
was ready to proceed with the hearing. The hearing was
had before the judge without a jury. Appellant did not
object to the hearing without a jury and never at any
time requested that a jury be empaneled to try the issues.
We have no doubt that had he requested that the plea

126

in bar be tried to a jury that the request would have
been granted. Appellant did not raise this point in the
trial court and the trial judge had no opportunity to
pass upon the question. Therefore we will not consider
it for the first time on appeal. This has been a long
established rule of law recognized by this Court for so
long it makes citations of authorities almost unneces-
sary. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 249 Miss.
141, 161 So. 2d 604 (1964); County Bd. of Educ. of
Jones County v. Smith, 239 Miss. 58, 121 So. 2d 139
(1960) ; Hassie Hunt Trust v. Proctor, 215 Miss. 84, 60
So. 2d 551 (1952).

We hold that the circuit judge’s action in sustaining
the plea in bar was correct. This decision disposes of
this appeal, and for this reason we do not reach the
issue raised in regard to the plea in abatement. For
the reasons stated, this case must be affirmed.

Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

Harpin’s Baxnams, Iwo. v. Kenny
No. 43697 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 605

127

Snow, Covington, Shows & Watts, Meridian, for ap-

ad
e
2

iS
oO

ql

Williamson, Pigford & Hendricks, Meridian, for ap-

od
®
i=]
sy
2

129

Saarrx, J.

The appellee, Mrs. Cecil Kelly, sued appellant, Har-
din’s Bakeries, Inc., in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale
County demanding damages for personal injuries claim-

ed to have been sustained as the result of eating bread
manufactured and distributed by appellant which she
alleged contained bits of glass. A jury returned a ver-
dict for plaintiff in the amount of $10,000.00, and judg-
ment was entered accordingly. From that judgment, this
appeal has been prosecuted.

The evidence adduced in support of Mrs. Kelly’s claim
is to the effect that she took one bite of a peanut butter
sandwich prepared by her daughter from bread manu-
factured and distributed by Hardin’s which contained
glass, and that she was injured when a piece of this
glass lodged in her throat. She does not seem to have
noticed the glass in the bread immediately but desisted
from eating the sandwich after the first bite upon being
told by her daughter that glass had been discovered in
the remainder of the loaf from which it had been pre-
pared.

It appears that Mrs. Kelly had the misfortune to
suffer several ailments which required extensive and cost-
ly surgery and hospitalization during the period covered
by the evidence and which followed the above incident.
She was in and out of hospitals and under the care of
doctors for several months. By far the greater part
of this was for conditions wholly unrelated to her claim
that she swallowed the bit of glass which lodged in her
throat. Among the conditions for which she was hos-
pitalized and operated upon and for which the defendant
was in no way responsible were goiter (which she had
for thirteen years and which was removed by surgery),
a hysterectomy, and an operation for adhesions or rup-
ture. The jury was permitted to hear evidence as to
these things and as to the expenses associated with them.
The court recognized that these matters were irrelevant
to any issue in the case and were likely to mislead the
jury and at the conclusion of the trial the jury was in-
structed that under no circumstances was plaintiff en-
titled to recover any medical expenses or doctors’ bills

131

resulting from the goiter operation, the hysterectomy
operation, or for the operation for adhesions or rupture,
as there was no connection between such ailments and
the swallowing of glass alleged to have been in the bread.

‘We do not imply that an error in the admission of
prejudicial evidence may never be cured by proper in-
structions. But under the peculiar circumstances of this
case, where the medical evidence relating to the injury
charged against the defendant was so interwoven with
similar evidence touching wholly unrelated surgery and
hospitalization as to be virtually inextricable, it is doubt-
ful that instructions were wholly effective in undoing
the resulting harm.

The surgery required as a result of swallowing the
glass contained in the bread consisted of an exploration
of appellee’s throat by means of a light and by having
appellee swallow cotton in order to locate any foreign
body that might have become embedded in the throat
wall. Her throat was then X-rayed and cotton fibers
were allegedly shown by the picture to have been caught
on some protruding sharp object in the throat wall. This
exploratory ‘‘operation’’ was followed by an excision of
a small piece of tissue from the inside of plaintiff’s
throat. The doctor said this contained some hard sub-
stance which was not further identified. The jury ap-
parently inferred from the circumstantial evidence be-
fore it that this hard substance was a bit of glass which
had been in the bread. The evidence showed that Mrs.
Kelly had fully recovered at the time of the trial.

Appellant made a motion for a new trial upon several
grounds, one of which was that the amount of verdict
was so grossly excessive and contrary to the proof as
to evince bias, passion and prejudice on the part of the
jury. We have concluded that the motion should have
been sustained upon this ground and a new trial granted
upon the issue of damages alone.

132

In Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Tate, 193 Miss.
883, 11 So. 2d 695 (1943), there was a verdict for $2500.00
for the plaintiff who claimed that there was glass in a
Coca Cola which she drank. This verdict was reduced
on appeal to $1250.00.

The Court cited Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v.

Petty, 190 Miss. 631, 200 So, 128 (1941) ; Meridian Coca
Cola Bottling Company v. Illges, 187 Miss. 27, 191 So.
817 (1939) ; Biedhenharn Candy Company v. Moore, 184
Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1938) ; Wilson v. Rich, 163 Miss.
403, 141 So. 287 (1932); Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc.
v. Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479, 72 A.L.R. 143
(1930); Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Lyons, 145
Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
I The case is a close one upon: the issue of lia-
bility. But accepting as true all that the evidence proved.
or tended to prove and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn therefrom favorable to appellee’s con-
tentions, the jury was warranted in finding that there
was glass in bread manufactured and distributed by
appellant, and that appellee sustained an injury as the
result of having swallowed a particle of glass when she
took a bite from a sandwich made from it. IM How-
ever, we think the amount of the verdict was so grossly
excessive as to evince passion and prejudice on the part
of the jury and that there should be a new trial upon
the question of damages alone.

HEE Upon retrial of that issue, all evidence relating
to hospitalization and surgery for the goiter, hysterec-
tomy, adhesions or rupture and to the expenses and pain
and suffering and loss of time or earnings connected
therewith should be excluded. This evidence is peculiar-
ly prejudicial and could only serve to confuse the jury
and to excite undue sympathy for the plaintiff. It has
no relation to any issue in the case and no reference
should be made to it in the presence of the jury.

133

HEE The declaration contains a demand for hospi-
tal, doctors, and medical expenses in the amount of
a ?? alleged to have been incurred by
plaintiff as the direct result of swallowing the piece of
glass. The maximum amount of these bills should have
been stated in the declaration. Chapman v. Powers, 150
Miss. 687, 116 So. 609 (1928).

HE No motion for a bill of particulars was made,
however, and it was not error to receive evidence of
such expenses if specifically identified and proved as
required by the rules of evidence, separate and distinct
from other medical and doctors’ bills which resulted
from hospitalization, surgery and medication unrelated
to the injury for which Hardin’s was responsible.

The case is affirmed as to liability, and is reversed
and remanded for a new trial as to damages alone.

Affirmed as to liability, and reversed and remanded
for a new trial upon the question of damages alone.

Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Jones and Inzer, JJ., concur.

Eouotss v. State
No. 43710 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 630

Carsie A. Hall, Jackson; John Bodner, Jr., Patricia
M. Wald, Washington, D. C., for appellant.

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Inzun, J.

This is an appeal by Samuel choles from a judgment
of the Circuit Court of Panola County, Mississippi,
wherein the trial court dismissed the petition of appel-
lant for the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis.

The petition alleged that appellant had been indicted
by the grand jury of Panola County on September 12,
1964 for the crime of perjury. He was arrested on that
date at about 7:30 p.m. and was carried to Sardis where
he was incarcerated in jail. The following morning he
was taken to the courthouse and arraigned without bene-
fit of counsel. Upon his plea of guilty he was sentenced
to serve a term of three years in the state penitentiary,
with eighteen months of the sentence being suspended.
The petition further alleged that appellant’s plea of
guilty had been obtained by duress and misrepresenta-

i ___—

tion and that appellant had been denied his basic rights
to a jury trial, assistance of counsel, and due process of
law, all in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States and sec-
tions 14, 26 and 31 of the Mississippi Constitution.
‘When the petition was presented to the circuit judge,
he granted a hearing thereon, and the same was had
on December 5, 1964. A record was made of the pro-
ceedings, and at the conclusion of the hearing the trial
judge rendered his opinion. His opinion in part states:

The Court has attempted to resolve the testimony
offered here today, and the Court is now of the opini-
on and finds that the prayer of the petition should
be denied and the petition should be dismissed for the
reason that the Court is of the opinion that the Peti-
tioner was adequately and timely advised of his con-
stitutional rights to counsel; that Petitioner was ar-
rested at about 7:30 P.M. on the evening of Sep-
temper 28, 1964; that he was brought to the jail at
Sardis in the First District of Panola County; and
the following morning he had a conference with the
District Attorney, Mr. Finch, at which several officers
were also present.

The Court is of the opinion that he was timely
and adequately advised of his rights to counsel before
any questions were asked him with reference to the
erime or before he was interrogated in any way about
the crime for which he was being charged; that the
charges against him were stated to him by the Dis-
trict Attorney; and that the Petitioner was fully ad-
vised as to what those charges were.

The Court finds that the District Attorney did state
to the Petitioner that he could receive as much as
ten years if found guilty of the crime of perjury, but
the Court also finds that that statement of the District
Attorney was made in response to the question asked

by the Petitioner, Samuel Echoles, as to what the maxi-
mum penalty might be.
The Court is of the opinion that the Petitioner was
not denied his constitutional rights in any way at the
September, 1964, Term of the Court, and that he
entered his plea of guilty with full knowledge of what
he was doing, and that he did so freely and volun-
tarily.
The Court, also, finds from the testimony of the
Petitioner himself, Samuel Hcholes, that at the time
of his indictment, arraignment, and sentence at the
September, 1964, Term of this Court that he was not
an indigent, but that from the Petitioner’s own ad-
missions on the witness stand here today, at that
time he was possessed of property which had a net
value over and above any debts owned of several
hundred dollars, and that the Petitioner was by his
own admission financially able to employ his own
counsel had he seen fit to do so.
So, the Court finds that the Petitioner was timely
and adequately advised of all of his constitutional
rights, and has not been denied of any of those rights,
and that he was sentenced pursuant to a free and
voluntary plea of guilty. The prayer of the Petition
for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis is denied and the
Petition is dismissed.
An order will be entered accordingly, and the Pe-
titioner will have reserved to him any and all rights
he might have of appeal or any other rights which
he might have under the laws of the State of Missis-
sippi and the laws of the United States.
An order in accordance with this opinion was entered,
and the petition was dismissed. Hence this appeal was
brought.

The appellant contends that the trial court was in er-
ror in dismissing his petition for three reasons. They
are: (1) The indictment on which appellant was con-

139

victed is fatally defective because on its face it shows
no crime was committed; (2) The undisputed testimony
adduced at the hearing shows that appellant did not
knowingly or intelligently waive his rights to counsel
and to a jury trial; and (3) The compulsory pre-ar-
raignment interrogation without the advice of counsel,
under the circumstances, was both overtly and inherently
coercive,

The contention that the indictment is fatally defective
is raised for the first time on this appeal. Appellant
contends that under our decisions this question can be
raised for the first time in a collateral proceeding on
appeal. He cites in support of this contention the fol-
lowing cases: Love v. State, 211 Miss. 606, 52 So. 2d
470 (1951); Kelly v. State, 204 Miss. 79, 36 So, 2d 925
(1948) ; Taylor v. State, 74 Miss. 544, 21 So. 129 (1897) ;
Cook v. State, 72 Miss. 517, 17 So. 228 (1895). The
State correctly concedes that under our decisions the
validity of the indictment can be raised for the first time
on appeal, but insists that the indictment is valid.

We will first address ourselves to the question con-
cerning the validity of the indictment. This necessitates
a careful examination of it, and although it is lengthy,
it will be set out in full at the end of this opinion.

The indictment reveals that the perjury charged was
based upon answers given by appellant to questions con-
tained in a written application to register as an elector
of Panola County. The indictment charges that appel-
lant falsely swore that he had not been convicted of any
crime, when in truth he had been convicted of the crime
of possession of intoxicating liquor, and that he failed
to list this crime as required so to do. These were the
answers given to questions numbered 16 and 17 in the
registration form. The indictment charges that appel-
lant was under oath at the time he made these false
answers, but this allegation is contradicted by the in-
dictment itself by the inclusion therein of the registra-

— ia
tion form executed by appellant. The setting out of the
registration form in full in the indictment made it an
integral part of the indictment, and it shows that ap-
pellant was not under oath at the time he answered the
questions alleged to be false. The oath that appellant
actually signed is incorporated in paragraph 18(a) of the
registration form, and it does not refer to answers given
to prior questions. Appellant in this oath swore, among
other things, that he was not disqualified from voting
by reason of having been convicted of any crime named
in the Constitution. as a disqualification to be an elector.
The crime of possession of intoxicating liquor is not one
of the crimes listed in the Constitution. He also swore
that he would truly answer all questions propounded to
him touching his antecedents so far as they related to
his right to vote. This part of the oath clearly refers
to future questions that might be propounded, rather
than to those already answered. A careful study of the
indictment convinces us that it is clear from the indict-
ment that appellant was not under oath when he gave
false answers to these two questions. This fatal defect
is plain on the face of the indictment.

The testimony contained in the record confirms the
lack of any false swearing in regard to the questions
alleged to have been falsely answered in the registration
form. Mr. Ike Shankle, Cireuit Clerk and County Reg-
istrar, who took the oath in this .case, testified that it
was his practice to give an applicant for registration a
form. and have hin fill out the front of the form (ques-
tions 16 and 17 are on the front of the form), and when
that was done, he would turn the form over and have
them fill out the oath in paragraph 18(a). He stated
that he then had them sign the oath in his presence.
When asked the question whether he read it to them,
he said, ‘‘No. I turn it over and ask them to sign it right
there.’’? He further testified that this practice was fol-
lowed relative to appellant’s application. There was no-

141

thing that he said or did that would indicate to appellant
or anyone else filling out the form that he was under
oath when answering questions 16 and 17. Thus it is
also reflected by the testimony that appellant was not
under oath at the time he falsely answered questions
number 16 and 17, and the oath subsequently adminis-
tered did not extend to these answers.

‘We might add further that it is extremely doubtful
whether the matter alleged to have been falsified was
material to the right of the appellant to register to vote.
However, it is not necessary for us to reach this point
in this decision.

HE We are constrained to hold that the indictment
to which the appellant pleaded guilty is fatally defective
and charges no crime. For this reason his petition for
a writ of error coram nobis should be granted. How-
ever, we desire to point out that although the effect of
our decision is to reverse the holding of the learned trial
judge, this defect was not called to his attention. We are
satisfied that had it been presented to him as it is pre-
sented to us, he would have reached the same conclusion.
In view of this conclusion we do not reach the other
points raised on this appeal.

For the reasons stated this case is reversed, the writ
of error coram nobis is granted, and the appellant is
discharged.

Reversed and judgment here for appellant.

Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Patterson and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

INDICTMENT ON WHICH APPELLANT WAS
CONVICTED

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI )

)
FIRST DISTRICT OF PANOLA COUNTY)
CIRCUIT COURT, SEPTEMBER
TERM, 1964

THE GRAND JURORS of the State of Mississippi,
elected, empaneled, sworn and charged, to inquire in
and for the body of First District of Panola County, at
the September Term, A.D., 1964, of the Cireuit Cour
thereof, in the name and by the authority of the State
of Mississippi, on their oath, present that SAMUEL
ECHOLS late of the County and District aforesaid,
on the 28th day of September, 1964, in said County an
District that SAMUEL ECHOLES being an applicant
for registration as a qualified voter of Panola County,
State of Mississippi in said County on the 31st day of
August, 1964 before IKE SHANKLE, duly elected and
acting Circuit Clerk of Panola County, Mississippi ani
Panola County Registrar of Panola County, Mississippi
who was then and there duly authorized to administer
oaths and to take and administer oaths of applicants
for registration of voters of Panola County, Missis-
sippi; that thereupon it became and was a material
matter to be reported to the County Registrar and Cir-
cuit Clerk, IKE SHANKLE, the following questions
and answers as follows:

SWORN WRITTEN APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION

(By reason of the provisions of Section 241, 241-A
and 244 of the Constitution of Mississippi and rele-
vant statutes of the State of Mississippi, the appli-
cant for registration, if not physically disabled is

143

required to fill in this form in his own handwriting
in the presence of the registrar and without assistance
or suggestion of any person or memorandum.)
1. Write the date of this application August 31, 1964
2. What is your full name Samuels Echoles

(43)
3. State your age and date of birth 44 years

Nov. 24, 1921
4. What is your occupation? farmer
5. Where is your business carried on? (Give city,
town or village, and street address, if any, but if none,
post office address). If not engaged in business, so
state. Crenshaw, Miss. Rt. 1, Box 55
6. By whom are you employed? (Give name and
street address, if any, but if none, post office ad-
dress). If not employed, so state. Curtis MeMoore
Como, Miss. Rt. 2
7. Where is your place of residence in the county
and district where you propose to register? (Give
city, town or village, and street address, if any, but if
none, post office address.) Crenshaw Miss Rt. 1,
Box 55 no
8. Are you a citizen of the United States and an
inhabitant of Mississippi? Yes
9. How long have you resided in Mississippi? 44
years
10. How long have you resided in the election dis-
trict or precinct in which you propose to register? 2
years
11. State your last previous place of residence. (Give
street address, if any, but if none, post office address).
Como Miss. Rt. 2 Box 76
12. Are you a minister of the gospel in charge of
an organized church, or the wife of such a minister?
If so, what church? (Give address in each instance)

no

" #z5E

18. Check which oath you desire to take: (1) Gen-
eral x (2) Minister’s. (3) Minister’s wife
ee (4) If under 21 years at present, but will
be 21 years old by date of general election: No
14. If there is more than one person of your same
name in the precinct, by what name do you wish to
be called? Samuel Echoles
15. Have you ever been convicted of any of the fol-
lowing crimes: bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money
or goods under false pretenses, perjury, forgery, em-
bezzlement, or bigamy? no
16. Have you ever been convicted of any other crime
(excepting misdemeanors for traffic violations)? no
17. If your answer to question 15 or 16 is ‘‘yes’’,
name the crime or crimes of which you have been
convicted, and the year, court, and place of such con-
viction or convictions. no
18. Write and copy in the space below, Section 82 of
the Constitution of Mississippi:
Section 82
Legislature shall fit the amount of the penalty of
all official bonde (sic). And may, as far as prac-
ticable, provide that the whole or a part of the se-
curity required for the faithful discharge of of-
ficial duty shall be made by some guarantee com-
pany or companies.

(a) GENERAL and/or SPECIAL OATH:

T, , do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I am twenty- one years old (or I will be
before the next election in this County) and that I
will have resided in this State two years, and____.
Election District of Panola County one year next pre-
ceding the ensuing election, and am now in good faith
a resident of the same, and that I am not disqualified
from voting by reason of having been convicted of
any crime named in the Constitution of this State as

145

a disqualification to be an elector; that I will truly
answer all questions propounded to me concerning my
antecedents so far as they relate to my right to vote,
and also as to my residence before my citizenship
in this District; that I will faithfully support the
Constitution of the United States and of the State
of Mississippi, and will bear true faith and allegiance
to the same, So Help Me God.

/s/ Samuel Echoles

Applicant’s Signature to Oath
Passed
Reg Longtown
8-31-1964

/s8/ Samuel Echoles

Applicant’s Signature to Application

(The Applicant will also sign his

name here)

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
COUNTY OF PANOLA

Sworn to and subscribed before me by the within
named SAMUEL ECHOLES on this the 31 day of
Aug., 1964. :

/s/ Ike Shankle
County Registrar
(Seal)

in the said ‘“‘Sworn Written Application for Registra-
tion,’’ before the said IKE SHANKLE a duly authoriz-
ed officer to administer and take oaths as aforesaid who
was then and there duly authorized to administer said
oath as aforesaid the said SAMUEL ECHOLKES, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, corrupt-
ly and knowingly make oath and did then and there
swear and say in answer to question 16 after the ques-
tion which reads as follows ‘‘Have you ever been con-
victed of any crime (excepting misdemeanors for traf-
fic violations’? his answer was ‘‘no’’ and on question

146

17 of said sworn written application for registration
in answer to question 17 it states ‘‘if your answer to
15 or 16 is yes, name the crime or crimes of which you
have been convicted in the year, court and place of such
conviction or convictions’? and the answer to said ques-
tion by the said SAMUEL ECHOLES was ‘‘no’’ where-
as in truth and in fact, as the said SAMUEL ECHOLES
then and there well knew that he had been convicted
of a crime of possessing intoxicating liquor in Panola
County, State of Mississippi under Cause Number 2899
of the First Judicial District of Panola County, Mis-
sissippi and for said conviction was sentenced to serve
a term of three months in the County Jail and a fine
$200 and costs which said order and sentence the said
SAMUEL ECHOLES pleaded guilty to said charge,
and The Honorable Curtis M. Swango, Jr., Cireuit Judge
of Panola County entered an order and sentence on the
28th day of March, 1962 which appears in minute book
N at Page 427 in the Circuit Clerk’s office at the Court-
house of the First Judicial District of Panola County,
Mississippi, and that the said SAMUEL ECHOLES,
made said oath as aforesaid to the said IKH SHANKLE,
an officer duly authorized as Circuit Clerk and as Coun-
ty Registrar of Panola County, Mississippi to adminis-
ter oaths as aforesaid, and that thereupon the said
SAMUEL ECHOLES being sworn as aforesaid and in
the manner and form as aforesaid on the date and year
aforesaid falsely, maliciously, wickedly, knowingly, cor-
ruptly and feloniously in the manner as aforesaid did
commit wilful and corrupt perjury, Against the peace
and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

/s/ Charles 0. Finch

District Attorney
17th Judicial District of Mississippi.

147

Jounson, et al. v. Laxcasran
No. 48719 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 645

John H. Hollman, III, John H. Holloman, Columbus,
for appellants.

Threadgill & Hicks, Columbus, for appellee.

Surrz, J.

This was a suit brought in the Chancery Court of
Lowndes County by appellant, Ralph Johnson, against
appellee, James A. Lancaster, seeking to establish a
resulting trust in certain commercial property in the
City of Columbus. After the bill of complaint was filed,
Commercial Building Corporation filed a petition to be
allowed to intervene and to adopt Johnson’s bill of com-
plaint, and was granted leave to do so.

The complainant, Johnson, was engaged in the real
estate development business on a large scale, operating
in several towns and cities in Alabama and Mississippi.
His business was conducted through a number of cor-
porations which he organized for that purpose and of
which he was president and principal stockholder. Ap-
pellee, Lancaster, was engaged in the insurance and real
estate business in the City of Columbus and had enjoyed
considerable success in the real estate development and
of his business. Both were successful businessmen with
wide experience in real estate extending over a con-
siderable period of time.

For the purpose of this opinion, the facts may be
summarized as follows:

—

As president of the Eastlane Corporation and Hast-
lawn Corporation, two of Johnson’s Mississippi corpo-
rations (neither of which is a party to this suit), John-
son arranged with Lancaster to develop and sell some
houses and lots in the Columbus area.

For this purpose, Eastlane Corporation maintained
an account in a Columbus bank, known as ‘‘the Hast-
lane Corporation — Acct. No. 2’. Johnson, as presi-
dent of Eastlane Corporation, placed money in this ac-
count for Lancaster’s use in improving and developing
certain property. Lancaster wrote the checks, including
checks to himself for his commissions, but was required
to account to Johnson for each expenditure in minute
detail. Sometimes, Hastlane would owe Lancaster, and,
at least on one occasion, Lancaster deposited funds of
is own in the Eastlane account, known as ‘‘Hastlane
Corporation — Acct. No. 2”.

Lancaster had engaged successfully in the real estate
usiness for a long time before he began assisting John-
son’s corporations with certain of their projects in the
Columbus area. This business with Johnson for East-
lane and Hastlawn Corporations was only one of Lan-
caster’s real estate activities and he continued to deal
with real estate on his own as he had been doing pre-
viously. Throughout the time covered by the evidence,
Lancaster bought and developed, sold and rented com-
mercial and other property on his own account with
which neither Johnson, Hastlane, nor Hastlawn had any-
thing to do, and in which they neither had nor claimed
o have any interest.

On one of his visits to Columbus, Johnson discussed
with Lancaster a piece of commercial property for which
he owner was asking $20,000.00. They agreed that the
price was too high. ,

Jobnson testified that, on a subsequent occasion, Lan-
caster orally agreed with him (he testified that in his
dealings with Lancaster he was acting as president of

—

his corporations, Hastlane and Hastlawn) that he, Lan-
caster, would buy this property, take title in his, Lan-
caster’s, name and they would then organize a corpora-
tion, and Lancaster would convey the lot to that
corporation. None of the other terms of this alleged
agreement appear from the evidence. Sometime after-
ward, Lancaster wrote a check on the Hastlane Corpora-
tion account for $200.00 which was marked ‘‘payment
for option on commercial property’’. No details of that
transaction appear. Later, Lancaster bought the prop-
erty in question for $20,000.00, and took the deed in his
name. Lancaster borrowed the money himself to pay
for the lot, and he constructed thereon, with funds which
he also obtained through loans made to him, two build-
ings costing between $60,000.00 and $70,000.00. These
buildings have been rented by Lancaster to tenants.

Lancaster continued to handle various of the John-
son corporation projects and to account for the funds
used. The corporation known as Commercial Building
Corporation, now one of the appellants, was organized
and Johnson and Lancaster became officers and stock-
holders. Johnson called on Lancaster to deed this prop-
erty to the Commercial Building Corporation, and Lan-
caster declined to do so.

This suit resulted, in which Johnson claims that a
fiduciary relationship existed between himself and Lan-
caster by virtue of the course of their dealings with
each other, and that the act of Lancaster with respect
to the purchase of this particular commercial property
created a resulting trust therein for the benefit of the
Commercial Building Corporation (chartered after the
purchase), alleging as a basis the oral agreement which
he said he had with Lancaster to buy the lot and to

“convey it to a corporation afterward to be formed. The

bill of complaint contained a prayer that the court es-
tablish this trust and require Lancaster to convey the
propery to Commercial Building Corporation, or, in the

alternative, to convey a half interest therein to Johnson,
individually.

It was developed in the testimony that the $200 down
payment drawn from the Hastlane Corporation account
for the opinion had been repaid by Lancaster into the
account. Moreover, Johnson testified that often that
account owed Lancaster for commissions and he did not
know whether it owed him anything at the time the
$200 was drawn from it or not. It was admitted that
the financing of the purchase of the property (except
the $200 which belonged to Eastlane Corporation and
which was repaid) was done by Lancaster, and that neith-
er Johnson, individually, nor Hastlane, nor Hastlawn,
nor Commercial Building Corporation, had any money
whatever in the purchase or development of the property
in question. Johnson did not know from whom the prop-
erty had been purchased and had never seen the deed.
Neither he, nor any of his corporations, was legally
obligated financially for any part of the purchase price
or cost of development of the property.

Johnson testified at great length and in detail. The
case for the complainants was fully developed both on
direct and cross examination of the witnesses.

At the conclusion of complainants’ case, the defend-
and made a motion, upon a number of grounds, to ex-
elude the evidence and to find for the defendant. The
chancellor sustained this motion and delivered an opini-
on in which he found that (1) no fiduciary relationship
existed between Johnson and Lancaster, (2) the cir-
cumstances shown by the evidence did not reveal that
a resulting trust had been created requiring the con-
veyance of the property to Commercial Building Cor-
poration, or to Johnson himself, and, (3) Johnson’s
testimony showed only the making of an oral agree-
ment for the conveyance of real estate which was un-
enforceable under the statute of frauds.

In Bush v. Bush, 134 Miss. 523, 531, 99 So. 151, 152
(1924), this Court cited the principles relating to con-
structive trusts found in 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprud-
ence section 1037 (3d ed. 1905) as controlling:

. .. Pomeroy lays down the controlling principle
thus, ‘‘In order that this effect may be produced,
however, it is absolutely indispensable that the pay-
ment shall be actually made by the beneficiary or
that an absolute obligation to pay should be incurred
by him as a part of the original transaction of pur-
chase at or before the time of conveyance. No sub-
sequent and entirely independent conduct, interven-
tion or payment on his part would raise any result-
ing trust.’”’ ...

The Court further cited the case of Logan v. John-
son, 72 Miss. 185, 16 So. 231 (1894), which approved the
following language from 2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprud-
ence section 1040 (3d ed. 1905):

... The evidence must be clear, strong, unequivocal,

unmistakable, and must establish the fact of the pay-

ment by the beneficiary beyond a reasonable doubt. . .

134 Miss. at 532, 99 So. at 152.

In Miazza v. Yerger, 53 Miss. 135, 139, 140 (1876),
an attorney ‘‘undertook, promised and agreed, as her
agent and attorney to attend the sale and bid in one
half of said property for the complainant who had made
arrangements to obtain from Mr. Helm the money to
pay for such interests; and that Yerger, instead of do-
ing as he promised, bought the property for himself and
had title made to himself instead of the complainant.’’
In affirming the ruling of the lower court declining to
establish a resulting trust, the Supreme Court held:

... It is announced, in an equally authoritative man-

ner and with the decided emphasis, that no trust in

land can be set up by mere parol agreement, that no
trust results from the breach of a mere parol con-
tract, and that parol proof cannot be received to es-

155

tablish a resulting trust in lands purchased by an

agent, and paid for by his own funds, no money of

the principal being used for the payment; ...

Parol evidence . . . is not admissible to prove an

agreement by one to purchase land for another, for

this would be to establish an express trust founded
on contract and within the Statute of Frauds. Perry

on Trust, § 137; Gibson v. Foote, 40 Miss. 788. .. .

It is plain that the appellant’s assertion of right

against Yerger to the land bought by him rests upon

her allegation of the existence and the breach by

Yerger of a parol agreement to attend the sale and

buy the property for her. Such an agreement is not

enforceable in the Courts of this State, because it is
in the teeth of the Statute of Frauds and is not saved
by the proviso. ...

For a collection of Mississippi authorities on this
subject, see McIlwain v. Doby, 238 Miss. 839, 120 So.
9a 558 (1960).

ME Mf In reviewing the decision of the chancellor, we
accept as proved, as he did, all of the facts in evidence
favorable to appellants’ case and all favorable inferences
that reasonably may be drawn therefrom, MN I con-
clude that the chancellor decided the case correctly and
that his findings are in accord with the evidence ad-
duced viewed from that standpoint.

Affirmed.
Lee, C. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Inger, JJ., concur.

Saar v. Kiuparrick
No. 43725 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 607

156

Waller, Pritchard & Fou, Jackson, for appellant.

Lipscomb, Barksdale & Steen, Jackson, for appellee.

Smrrx, J.

This was a suit for damages for the death of Vicki
Smith, a three year old child. It was brought by her
father, William Jack Smith, in the Circuit Court of the
First Judicial District of Hinds County under the pro-
visions of Mississippi Code Annotated section 1453
(1956), against Mrs. Dorothy Kilpatrick.

At the conclusion of the evidence offered by the plain-
tiff, which included the testimony of Mrs. Kilpatrick

as an adverse witness, a motion was made to direct the
jury to return a verdict for the defendant, and this
motion was sustained by the court. A judgment was
entered accordingly and from that judgment the plain-
tiff has prosecuted this appeal.

The question presented for decision by this Court is
as follows:

Was the trial court in error in directing the jury to
return a verdict for the defendant wpon the ground that
there was not sufficient evidence that the death of the
child was the proximate result of negligence on the
part of Mrs. Kilpatrick in the operation of her automo-
bile to create a question of fact for determination by
the jury?

The evidence showed that the fatal accident occurred
on Cromwell Street, in the City of Jackson. This was
a quiet, residential street, on which children lived and
played, but apparently not in such unusually large num-
bers as to create a special hazard.

There were some vacant lots on the street, and the
Smith home was adjacent to and North of a lot on which
there was an unoccupied house. The driveway on this
lot was next to the South line of the Smith lot.

On the day of the accident in which the child was
killed, and just before it occurred, the child’s mother
looked out her kitchen window and observed her daugh-
ter and a little boy holding hands and skipping about
in the driveway of the unoccupied property next door.
She turned from the window for a moment to attend to
something on the stove, and when she looked out again,
her child was lying in the driveway.

No one saw the accident.

Mrs. Kilpatrick, placed on the stand as an adverse
witness, testified, in brief, that after she turned North
off of Ridgeway Street onto Cromwell Street, she stop-
ped her car to speak to a friend who had also stopped
his car.

From the point where she stopped her car to the
point where the child was killed is, perhaps, something
less than 200 feet. Mrs. Kilpatrick starter her automo-
bile, which was a two door, manual shift model, and
resumed her progress down Cromwell Street. She was
singing a Sunday School song with her own little daugh-
ter who was riding with her in the car, but was keeping
a proper lookout.

Mrs. Kilpatrick said that, as she passed along the
street, her right wheels were about two feet from the
curb on her right hand side. She had not shifted out of
low gear, and was traveling about five to ten miles per
hour when she heard a bump or thud on her right front
door.

She stopped her automobile, got out and went back,
and found the little Smith girl lying in the driveway.
She said she had not seen the child before the impact
on her car door, the sound of which she had heard.

A subsequent examination of Mrs. Kilpatrick’s auto-
mobile disclosed a smudged place in the mud or dirt on
the right hand door about the place where she heard
the sound. There was no physical or other evidence that
any other part of Mrs. Kilpatrick’s automobile had come
in contact with the child,

At the hospital, it developed that the little girl had
suffered a depressed skull fracture, and there was some
testimony that there were bruises and abrasions on her
body. Four days afterward the child died from this in-
jury.

A number of photographs were made and introduced
into evidence showing various views of the street and
abutting property. In some of these, bushes were shown
growing on the North side of the unoccupied premises
next to the Smith home, in the driveway of which the
children were observed playing just before the accident.

Mrs. Kilpatrick was subjected to a searching cross-
examination but her account of the occurrence did not

—

vary in any material particular. Her testimony as to
how the accident happened is uncontradicted unless cer-
tain extra-judicial statements attributed to her constitute
a contradiction.

The child’s aunt testified that in a conversation with
Mrs. Kilpatrick at the hospital ‘‘she just told me she
saw the children up by the side of the road before she
got there, and she was driving along at a moderate
speed, singing to her little girl.”

The child’s grandfather testified that he had a con-
versation with Mrs. Kilpatrick at the hospital, and that
Mrs. Kilpatrick said to him, ‘‘Well, I was going up the
road and Mr. Williams was coming down the road, and,
he stopped dead still for the children to come from the
opposite side of the road; after that I went on and I
heard a noise hit the car. I backed up to see what it
was and I saw the child lying there.’’

Accepting this testimony at face value and assuming
that one of the children referred to was Vicki Smith,
the statements do not indicate that she was in the street
when seen, or where she was with reference to the street.
There is nothing in the statements from which a rea-
sonable inference may be drawn that the child, when
seen, was in a position of such apparent peril that Mrs.
Kilpatrick should have anticipated that she would run
into the street and into the side of the slowly moving
car.

HEB We do not think this testimony raises an issue
of fact which would warrant its submission to a jury,
as to whether any negligence on Mrs. Kilpatrick’s part
proximately caused or contributed to the injury and death
of Vicki Smith.

MN In Hebert v. Lenart, 247 Miss. 494, 153 So.
2d 658 (1963), it was held that the burden of proving
the child’s position was upon the plaintiff. The Court
said in 247 Miss. at 505, 153 So. 2d at 662:

161

... the burden was on the plaintiff to show that the
child was in the street a sufficient time before the
collision, and in a place within the range of vision of
the bus driver, for the defendant, in the exercise of
ordinary care, to have seen him and avoided striking
him. But, as stated above, there is no evidence as
to when the child came into the intersection, how he
got there, or what the position of the bus was when
he got there.

The Court in 247 Miss. at 505-506, 153 So. 2d at 663
quoted with approval from Simuaskas v. Connecticut Co.,
102 Conn. 61, 65, 127 Atl. 918, 919, as follows:

. .. No witness observed any of the plaintiff’s move-
ments from the time when his brother left him stand-
ing on the South Riverside crosswalk, at which time
the trolley car was taking on passengers at a point
70 feet distant. Perhaps the jury might reasonably
have inferred that he was among the children seen
running across Bank Street by Mrs. Ficeto. Even so,
there is no evidence as to his movements with relation
to the car after it started, until Miss Brennan saw
him lying in the street.

It abundantly appears from the record that all of the
known or discoverable facts bearing upon the circum-
stances of the tragic death of this little girl were pro-
duced in evidence. The record shows exceptional dili-
gence on the part of counsel both in the preparation
and presentation of the case in the court below and in
the exhaustive and able briefs filed in this Court.

In passing upon the question here presented, we have
considered as established the facts proved, or which the
evidence tended to prove, which are favorable to ap-
pellant’s case, and have accepted as true the reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the evidence favor-
able to appellant. Even so, there is no evidence, as
distinguished from conjecture or speculation, that would
show that any negligence on the part of Mrs. Kilpatrick

162

caused or contributed to the injury and death of this
little girl. There was no factual issue and no evidence
on which a jury would have been warranted in returning
a verdict for appellant.
In Berry v. Brunt, 252 Miss. 194, 172 So. 2d 398, 401
(1965), this Court said:
In view of the fact that the burden of proof is upon
the plaintiff, such circumstances must be ample and
must appear from the evidence. Moreover, the evi-
dence must not leave the causal connection a matter
of conjecture; it must be something more consistent
with plaintiff’s theory as to how the accident occurred.
The Court further stated in 172 So. 2d at 402:
The Court has repeatedly held that in trials under the
common law, to prove a ‘possibility’ only, or to leave
the issue to surmise and conjecture, is never sufficient
to sustain a verdict in a tort action. A mere scintilla
of evidence of negligence is insufficient to make a
jury issue. The scintilla rule of evidence is not recog-
nized in this State.
The trial court was correct in directing the jury to
return a verdict for the defendant.

Affirmed.
Lee, OC. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Inzer, JJ., concur.

Kane v. Scare
No. 43652 December 17, 1965 181 So. 2d 158

16,

oO

John T. Green, Frank W. Walden, Natchez, for ap-

3
&
|

164.

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Ecuroes, P. J.

In the Circuit Court of Adams County Hershey King,
appellant, was indicted for murder, found guilty of
manslaughter, and sentenced to five years in the state
penitentiary. The defense was that the shooting was
accidental, We hold the conviction is against the great
weight of the evidence, and reverse and remand the
case.

The deceased, George Young, was shot in the head
with a .22 pistol around 10:00 p. m. on October 3, 1964.
The bullet entered his head under the nose and ranged
upward, lodging between the brain and the skull. The
parties were at Dixie Inn, a bar and poolroom in Nat-
chez. The only witness for the state who said she saw
the shooting was Effie Cobbing, a Negro woman 67
years of age. She was the mother of Young, and a
former mother-in-law to the defendant. She testified

165

hat King stated earlier, ‘‘I am going to kill me some-
body before daylight in the morning.’’ King, Young,
and Brown were talking together at the bar. There
were no harsh words and everything seemed to be
pleasant and peaceful. King aimed the pistol at Young’s
ack, and when someone walked in the door Young look-
ed around and King shot him in the face. She was
standing at the corner of the bar, with her hand under
her chin.

On the other hand, the defendant testified that when’
he left home, he put his gun in his pocket, so that he
could pawn it in order to get gas turned on at his house.
He and Young were standing sideways at the bar, talk-
ing pleasantly. There was no argument, and Brown was
near them, also engaged in the conversation. King had
the gun wrapped in a handkerchief. He reached in his
pocket to get money to pay for a beer, and, when he
pulled the money out, the handkerchief and pistol came
with it. He tried to catch the pistol, but it fell on the
floor and fired, hitting Young. He picked it up. Effie
screamed that he shot her son, and his wife asked him
whether he shot the man, to which he replied he did not.
He and his wife left and went home. King said that
he had no intention of shooting Young, they were good
friends and had no quarrel.

Effie Cobbing agreed that there was no argument,
Young and the defendant were living in the same house,
they got along well, and ‘‘never had no cross word and
I don’t see what caused it.’? She admitted that after
the shooting King denied he did it. No other witness
saw the alleged shooting. Ida Mae Covington worked
at the Dixie Inn, and testified for the state. She was
working behind the counter and heard the shot, after
which she looked around and saw Young fall. She did
not see a gun on the floor, but said that Effie was
looking toward the door, and it would have been im-
possible for her to see King at the time. Walter Brown

was talking with Young and King. There was no quar-
rel, and they were friendly. He did not see or hear the
shot, and did not observe defendant pick up a gun. Col-
lins, manager of the Dixie Inn, was in the poolroom
when the shooting occurred. His statement that Effie
Cobbing was in a position where she could see the inci-
dent thus was of little value.

Young was shot on October 3, and was sent to the
University Hospital in Jackson for possible neurosurg-
ery. None was performed, and he was discharged around
October 10, returning to his home in Natchez. Apparent-
ly he was recuperating, and because he was seen riding
in a truck and in the community. On October 22 he
began hemorraging and was admitted to a Natchez hos-
pital, where he died on October 26, over three weeks
after the incident. The cause of death was the gunshot
wound. Hospital admission records did not reflect any
gunpowder burns on Young’s face.

The verdict is against the great weight of the evi-
dence. Effie Cobbing’s testimony is contradictory and
unsatisfactory in many respects, including her position
at the time of the shooting, whether she could have or
did see it, the failure of any other witness to see a gun
in defendant’s hands, and her statement that there were
only 3-4 people in the Dixie Inn when all others said
there were 25-30. She admitted that Young and the
defendant were friendly and had no quarrel, and there
was no reason for the incident. The state’s witnesses
agreed that immediately after it, King denied that he
shot the man. Young lived for 23 days, and made no
accusations against defendant, although during most .of
this time he was able to do so. King’s version of what
happened under all of the circumstances is reasonable.
The state’s evidence, although sufficient to withstand a
peremptory instruction, is weak on the issue of whether
the shooting was deliberate or in the heat of passion.
Yet the jury was entitled to consider Hffie Cobbing’s

167

testimony, and the facts that no witnesses saw King
pick the gun off the floor, and he was packing his suit-
case when officers arrived to arrest him.

Done v. State, 202 Miss. 418, 32 So. 2d 206 (1947),
reversed a conviction of murder and discharged the de-
fendant. He turned his car into a ditch in order to avoid
cows, and this threw his wife against the windshield.
The defense was that this accident dislodged a pistol
in the glove compartment and threw it on the floor,
which caused it to discharge and kill his wife. The facts
that she was conscious for forty minutes after reaching
the hospital and made no accusation against her husband,
the relative positions of the parties in the car, and the
angle of the shot and the absence of powder burns, sup-
ported defendant’s version. In Johnson v. State, 234
Miss. 441, 107 So. 2d 91 (1958), his conviction of assault
and battery with intent to kill was reversed and the
cause remanded. Defendant and a woman were standing
by the door in a small cafe. He had his arm around her
when she was shot. His version was that the pistol in
his pocket fell on the floor, and it discharged, shooting
the woman. There was no proof of any ill will or malice
by defendant toward the woman, and the range of the
bullet and other circumstances reflected an accidental
shooting. See Bethley v. State, 13 So. 886 (Miss. 1896).

HB Bf No criminal responsibility attaches to a slaying
which is the result of accident or misadventure in the
true sense of those terms. HIM Accordingly, an accused
in a prosecution for homicide may set up accident or
misadventure as a defense. MIM However, the burden
of proving a criminal intent remains on the prosecution.
26 Am. Jur. Homicide §§ 106, 220, 221 (1940) ; 46 C. J. 8.
Homicide § 16 (1944). MIM In the instant case the
state has not sufficiently met that burden beyond a
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the great weight of
the evidence is against the verdict. Accordingly, the

ra

68

judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause
is remanded.

Reversed and remanded.
Rodgers, Brady, Jones and Smith, JJ., concur.

Carrvan Transport Company, Inc. v. Suarust
No. 43665 December 17, 1965 181 So. 2d 111

16

J.T. Drake, Jr., Port Gibson; Daniel, Coker & Horton,
Jackson, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Karl Weil, Port Gibson; Satterfield, Shell, Walliams
& Buford, Jackson, for appellee and cross-appellant.

172

Inzer, J.

This is an appeal by Capital Transport Company,
Inc. from a judgment of the Cireuit Court of Claiborne
County, wherein appellee, Oren R. Segrest, obtained
judgment for personal injuries and property damages
alleged to have resulted from an explosion and fire
caused by the negligence of appellant. The cause was
tried by a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of
appellee in the amount of $90,000. Upon a motion for
a new trial, the trial court upheld the finding of the jury
as to liability, but ordered a new trial as to damages
unless appellee would consent to a remittitur of $20,000.
A judgment was entered to this effect, and from this
judgment Capital Transport Company, Inc. has appeal-
ed. Appellee refused to enter the remittitur, and has
cross appealed.

Appellant, Capital Transport Company, Inc., here-
inafter referred to as Transport, in its assignment of
errors assigns eighteen errors on the part of the trial
court, but in its brief these are consolidated into five
points. They are: (1) Appellant was entitled to a per-
emptory instruction; (2) The court erred in submitting
the case to the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur; (3) The court erred in admitting the testimony of
Dr. Eldred W. Hough as an expert witness; (4) The
Court erred in admitting appellee’s testimony with re-
spect to loss of income attributable to his injuries; and
(5) The verdict of the jury is so excessive as to evidence
bias, prejudice and passion on the part of the jury.

Appellee and cross appellant, Oren R. Segrest, here-
inafter referred to as Segrest, in his cross appeal con-
tends the trial court was in error in entering an order
that the verdict was excessive in the amount of $20,000

173

and in ordering a new trial for assessment of damages
unless Segrest agreed to the remittitur.

The facts in this case show that Segrest was on June
18, 1963, and had been long prior thereto, the owner and
operator of a business known as Segrest Oil Company.
This business was located on the east side of Church
Street in the town of Port Gibson. In his business Segrest
operated a bulk storage plant where he sold gasoline,
motor oil, grease, and other products of Gulf Oil Cor-
poration. He also handled butane gas, tires, gas heaters,
stoves, and other related items. Segrest owned all of
the equipment located on his lot. There was an office
building, also used as a display room, that faced Church
Street. Immediately east of the office building were
located three gasoline storage tanks. Hach of these tanks
had a capacity of 14,000 gallons. They were in a line
directly east of the office building, and were placed on
three concrete cradles, one cradle being at the front, one
in the center, and one at the rear of the tanks. These
tanks are referred to in the testimony as tanks No. 1,
No. 2, and No. 3, Tank No. 1 being the tank immediately
east of the office building, and the one used for storage
of premium gasoline. Tank No, 2 was next in line, and
it was used for storage of regular gasoline. The next,
No. 3, was divided into two compartments, each with a
7,000 gallon capacity. The rear compartment was used
for the economy brand gasoline known as Gulftane. The
other compartment was used for storage of diesel fuel.
To the north, or rear, of these tanks was a tank used
for storage of kerosene. Immediately east of the
tanks was a two-story warehouse used by Segrest for
storage of appliances, tools, and other items used in his
business. Immediately east of this building was a one-
story warehouse which was used for storage of motor
oil, grease and other petroleum products.

Capital Transport Company, Inc. was on June 18,
1962, and had been for many years prior thereto, en-

gaged as an intrastate and interstate motor carrier,
transporting for hire gasoline, oil and other related prod-
ucts. Among its customers was Gulf Oil Corporation,
and it had for many years delivered Gulf’s products to
Segrest.

On the morning of June 18, 1962, Transport sent one
of its transport trucks to deliver a tank of gasoline to
Segrest. The transport used to haul the gasoline was
pulled by a 1958 International tractor, and the tank was
on a 1961 Trailmobile. The tank was loaded with 7,200
gallons of gasoline, most of which was premium gasoline,
and the balance of which was Gulftane gasoline. The
transport truck was driven by Mr. Jeter, this being the
second day he had driven this particular rig, although
he had worked for Transport for several years. He
arrived at the bulk plant of Segrest about 8:00 a.m.
He drove into the plant from Church Street and parked
at the unloading point, with the cab of his truck facing
Church Street. After he arrived his load of gasoline
was checked by Mr. Sumrall, an employee of Segrest, to
ascertain that the tank on the transport contained the
correct gallonage ordered by Segrest. After this was
done, preparation was made to unload the gasoline.

Segrest had constructed his tanks in such a manner
that they were filled by means of an underground pipe
which extended from the unloading point, located forty-
two feet south of tank No. 1. This was a two-inch pipe-
line which ran underground from the unloading point
to the north and extended to the rear of tank No. 1.
It then turned at a right angle and ran for a distance
of about seventeen feet, at which point a standpipe ex-
tended from the pipeline above the ground. This stand-
pipe was equipped with a quick coupling connection to
which a flexible rubber hose could be attached and con-
nected to any of the tanks to be filled with gasoline.
Each of the tanks had an intake pipe located very near
the bottom of the tank. On each intake pipe was a gate

|e

valve which was manually operated. The intake pipes
were not equipped with check valves to prohibit the con-
tents of the tank from flowing back through the intake
pipe when the main valve was open. This arrangement
made it necessary that the gasoline delivered by Trans-
_ port he pumped from the tank on the transport truck
into the storage tank.
At the unloading point there was a stub coming up
from the underground pipeline which did not extend
above ground level. It was enclosed in a box-like ar-
rangement similar to those used for water meters. To
the stub was attached a quick coupling connection to
which a hose could be attached that extended from the
pump on the transport to the pipeline.
"On the day in question, after Sumrall had checked the
gallonage in the transport truck, he proceeded to the
rear of the tanks. He connected the flexible hose to the
valve on the stand pipe, and to the intake pipe on tank
No. 1. While he was making these connections Jeter
connected a rubber hose which he carried on his trans-
port truck to the outlet pipe on the tank of the transport
truck to the pump located to the rear of the cab of his
tractor. He then connected another hose to the outlet
from the pump to the stub on the underground pipe-
line. He then started the pump on his truck to operating,
and Sumrall opened the valve on tank No. 1. After
Sumrall ascertained that the connections were properly
made and that the gasoline was flowing into tank No.
1, he went about his other duties. From this point on
. the unloading operation insofar as pumping the gasoline
out of the tank on the truck into the underground pipe-
line was concerned, it was under the exclusive control
of Jeter. On each of the storage tanks there was a
pressure relief valve to allow air and fumes to escape
from the tanks while they were being filled. The proof
shows that these fumes and vapors were heavier than
air and as they came out of the tank they settled to the

ground. The weather on this day was hot, humid and
cloudy.

The pump on the truck was a shaft-driven pump which
was operated by the power of the engine on the trac-
tor. This operation made it necessary that the engine
run during the entire unloading operation. The pump
was located to the rear of the cab and over the muffler
of the tractor.

To the front of the storage tanks Segrest had con-
structed a driveway which was used for placing his de-
livery trucks in order to load gasoline from the storage
tanks into the tanks on his trucks. The storage tanks
were high enough that the delivery trucks could be load-
ed by force of gravity. At the front of each of the tanks
there was an outlet pipe upon which there was a gate
valve. These outlet pipes connected into a pipe that con-
nected to a standpipe arrangement. This arrangement
was so constructed that there was an automatic valve
which when the fill pipe was lowered, it opened, and
when it was raised, it closed. On the day in question
one of the Segrest delivery trucks was parked in front
of the storage tanks when the operation began.

After Jeter had completed pumping out the premium
gasoline he signaled to Dave Brown, a colored employee

- of Segrest, to that effect. Brown then closed the gate
valve on tank No. 1 and Jeter disengaged the pump on
his truck. Brown then disconnected the hose from tank
No. 1 and connected it to the intake pipe on tank No.
3. While he was making this change Jeter, who had
walked from his truck to the rear of the tanks, watched
the change being made. Jeter then returned to his truck
and opened the valve to the compartment containing
Gulftane gasoline. He started the pump operating again
and Brown then opened the gate valve on Tank No.
8 so gasoline could enter the tank. After this operation
was started, Brown proceeded to load the tank on the
delivery truck with regular gasoline from tank No. 2.

177

In order to do this it was necessary that he open the
gate valve on tank No. 2, and open the dome hole on
top of the tank on his truck and place into the hole the
fill pipe that was used to carry the gasoline from the
standpipe into the tank on the truck. The gasoline flow-
ed into the truck by force of gravity, and this loading
method is known as the ‘‘splash’’? method. As the gaso-
ine flowed into the truck the contents were activated,
and this caused fumes and vapors to escape from the
ank through the opening on the top.

‘When all the gasoline had been pumped out of the
ransport except about fifteen gallons, an explosion oc-
curred somewhere near the rear of tank No. 3. Follow-
ing the explosion there was an intense fire. At the time
of the explosion Jeter was in the cab of his truck. The
engine on the truck was running and the pump operat-
ing. Brown was standing on the walkway of the delivery
ruck facing south, watching the gasoline run into his
truck. Segrest was in the doorway of the two-story ware-
house in a kneeling position facing south. Sumrall was
standing just outside the doorway of the warehouse facing
Segrest. They were packing an electric motor to be
shipped for repairs. When the explosion occurred the
last was so terrific that it knocked Brown from the
walkway of the delivery truck back onto the ramp. He
was burned on his left side and face. The fire from the
blast severely burned Segrest on his hands, face and
legs, and right side. Sumrall was burned on his left
side and face. The fire destroyed both warehouses with
all their contents. Tanks Nos. 2 and 3 were also destroy-
ed, along with the kerosene tank.

Just prior to the explosion, Lee Windham, an em-
ployee of Southern Bell Telephone Company, was driv-
ing north on Church Street at about 25 to 30 miles per
hour. When he reached a point on the street just about
in front of where the transport truck was parked, he
observed out of the corner of his eye a flash. When

he turned his head to look, he saw a ball of flame at
the back of the cab of the truck. He said this ball of
flame was two or three feet above the ground and travel-
ed in a northern direction, went under tank No. 1, and
then an explosion occurred.

Segrest was immediately taken to the hospital, where
he remained for forty-five days, and thereafter he was
confined to his home for forty-five additional days. He
suffered severe third and second degree burns of the
face, head, neck, both arms, both hands, both knees,
upper chest area, and right shoulder. During the time
he was in the hospital he suffered severe physical pain
-through the medical procedure or treatment called ‘‘de-
bridement,’’? whereby his physician and nurses, using
surgical knives, tweezers and scissors, cut away and
removed decaying tissue from all the burned areas of
his body. As a result of the formation of scar tissue,
the flexor tendons in both of his hands were permanent-
ly injured, so that he has only fifty percent closure of
the right hand and eighty percent closure of the left
hand. Prior to his injury Segrest had devoted his entire
time to the operation of his business, doing some of the
physical labor necessary to operate the business.

In the course of the trial it was agreed and stipulated
by the parties that Segrest’s property losses amounted
to $26,000, and that his hospital bills amounted to $1,049.

Transport in its motion for a new trial raised most of
the questions that are argued on this appeal. The trial
judge heard the motion and had counsel to submit briefs
prior to passing on the motion for a new trial. He then
rendered a written opinion which reflects that he gave
much time and study to the questions involved in this
law suit. We consider his opinion to be am excellent one,
and we deem it appropriate that it be set out in full
herein.

I have carefully examined and studied all of the
briefs and authorities cited on both sides in connection

179

with the Motion for New Trial in the above styled
cause. Permit me to thank all of you gentlemen for
the very painstaking research you have done on the
legal questions involved, as well as for your most able
oral argument.

Much could be said and quoted by this Court in
support of the conclusions it has reached, but I will
content myself more or less with some basic determina-
tions. It is the opinion of the Court that the case was
fairly and properly tried, that the evidence adduced
presented a case for determination by the jury, and
that the jury was correctly instructed as to the applica-
ble principles of law.

Obviously the central issue involves the question of
the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
and the apparently conflicting results achieved in the
many cases cited leave one aghast. It is my opinion
that in a given case one cannot necessarily say at the
outset whether this is a case for or against application
of the doctrine, but that its propriety or not must
await development of the facts. If inferences are to
arise they must arise out of proven facts; and while
the material circumstances from which an inference of
negligence is to be drawn cannot rest in guess or con-
jecture, once such material circumstances are shown
and proven the way is paved for a drawing of logical
inferences from such proven circumstances. In the
proper cases the plaintiff then is entitled to have the
jury instructed as to its right to do so, where direct
proof of the actual negligence is either impossible of
establishment or lies solely within the power of the
adversary to explain. (This is certainly no more un-
usual than the standard criminal instruction in larceny
cases that ‘‘possession of property recently stolen is
a circumstance which may be considered by the jury
and from which, in the absence of a reasonable ex-
planation, the jury may infer guilt of larceny.’’ Per-

mitting a jury to infer guilt of theft from mere pos-
session of a stolen article, where the degree of proof
must extend beyond every reasonable doubt, is cer-
tainly more unusual than permitting an inference of
negligence from proof that the fire originated at an
instrumentality solely within the control of the defend-°
ant, and where such occurence (sic) could hardly
happen in the absence of someone’s negligence, and
particularly where the degree of proof’ need only rise
to a preponderance.)

The material circumstances developed by the plain-
tiff’s proof show not only the occurence (sic) of a
fire and explosion, but also that the fire originated
in and about the defendant’s transport truck. If this
case involved mere proof of the occurrence of a fire
and explosion of undetermined origin we would surely
have a different question; for in such case there would
be no more reason to infer negligence on the part of
one than on the other. But the witness Windham tes-
tified with some positiveness that he observed the
fire to originate at the rear of the cab of defendant’s
truck, and he proceeded to detail the course of the
flame and ultimate explosion. There is additional tes-
timony of physical facts to corroborate this version,
including especially the testimony of the expert who
undertook to explain from a technical and scientific
standpoint the nature of what the witness Windham
said he saw. It is true indeed that plaintiff’s case
hinges strongly on the testimony of this witness (ac-
cording to the Court’s thinking), and defendants’
counsel urge caution against wholesale acceptance. In
fact, defendant undertook with considerable skill to
discredit the facts detailed by this witness, and to dis-
pel the implications arising therefrom.

But it is often true that major decisions by juries,
in criminal cases as well as civil, are grounded in a
reliance on the testimony of a single eyewitness; but

|

the fact of such situation constitutes no barrier to
acceptance or admissibility of the evidence. Suffice
it to say, the jury was the sole judge of the credibility
of all witnesses, and the worth of their testimony. It
may be noted that there was no impeachment of credi-
bility here; in fact, as stated, there was corroboration
in several particulars. The District Judge in the Hy-
grade case was loath to accept the eyewitness’ version
as to where the fire started, and proceeded to call upon
his own expert evaluation of the nature and rapidity
of a gasoline vapor fire. Let us assume that this was
his priviledge (sic) as a trier of fact, but let us re-
member also that his factual finding establishes no
concept of law. What might be believed on this score
in one case need not necessarily be believed in another.
Moreover, there was some other testimony, and lack
of testimony, in the Hygrade case as to actual origin
of the fire, which might account in part for the Court’s
refutation of the particular evidence.

Faced then with this evidence as to the origin of
the fire being in and around the transport truck, to-
gether with the expert’s testimony in scientific sup-
port of the version, together also with testimony of
the other witnesses negativing any idea of the fire
having started on plaintiff’s immediate premises. De-
fendant conceived it to be its duty, as does the Court,
to explain that the fire and explosion did not happen
through any negligence which might be inferred
through proof that the fire originated at its truck.
The evidence in explanation to prove defendant’s ex-
ercise of due care and freedom from negligence was
somewhat slight, and apparently was so evaluated by
the jury, it consisting principally in a broad statement
by the truck driver that his vehicle was in good me-
chanical order. Otherwise, the offer of explanation
consisted in proof of several possibilities as to how
this fire might possibly have started, these including

a spark from the compressor or the air conditioner,
a lighted cigarette, and static electricity. These were
possibilities, to be sure; but there is a failure of sub-
stantial proof of any material circumstances from
which it might be inferred that any of these factors
probably caused the fire and explosion. In fact, the
testimony fairly well negatives the existence of any
foundation facts which might give tone to a reasonable
inference of negligence arising out of those factors,
and more or less leaves them dangling in the midair
of conjecture. I think the evidence was legally suf-
ficient from the proven circumstances to justify a
finding that it was ‘‘more probable’’ than not that de-
fendants’ negligence caused the casualty, and I cannot
subscribe to an inapplicability of the res ipsa doctrine
here on any basis that this accident might have been
occasioned by one of several equally probable causes.

It is the opinion of the Court that the evidence
adduced was sufficient to warrant submission of the
case to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur;
and that under the proof the jury had a right to, and
did, act upon a reasonable inference of negligence
which arose through evidence that the fire and result-
ing explosion originated at the Defendant’s truck.

It is the Court’s further opinion that this case falls
well within the general rule permitting applicability
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, namely, that the
accident was one which ordinarily would not occur in
the absence of someone’s negligence, that it was oc-
casioned by an instrumentality within exclusive con-
trol of defendant, and that it was not due to any con-
tribution on the part of plaintiff. The existence or
non-existence of these factors is ultimately the pro-
vinee of the jury to decide, provided of course there
is a sufficiency of evidence from the legal standpoint
to justify such finding. The Court cannot say as a

183

matter of law here that the evidence was insufficient
to support the finding as made by the jury.

Counsel for plaintiff cite in their brief in support -
of the verdict some very recent cases and text material
reflecting a modern liberal evolutionary development
in connection with applicability of the res ipsa doctrine,
to the general effect that even though the proof of
circumstances may reflect that two or more relatively
separate agencies were involved in an occurrence, and
that one or more, but not all, were under control of
the person charged with negligence, the existence of
this dual factor will not preclude application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine so long as the evidence may
be sufficient to justify the jury in concluding that the
accident arose solely out of the agency under evclusive
control of the person charged with negligence. With-
out necessarily predicating this opinion on the liberali-
ty of this so-called ‘‘Modern’’ doctrine, it may none-
theless be considered as fortifying the result reached
here. :

I conclude that the Motion for New Trial on the
whole case should be overruled. ..

One of the grounds for Defendants’ Motion for New
Trial embodies the contention that the verdict is ex-
cessive, and I am of the firm opinion that it is. While
it is true that the question of the amount of damages
belongs peculiarly to the jury, and that the Court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the jury, these
basic principles are likewise counterbalanced by a rec-
ognized obligation of the trial Court to scrutinize all
verdicts to the point of assuring that a given verdict
is not the product of passion or prejudice on the part
of the jury and that it is not legally excessive.

The plaintiff’s injuries in this case are indeed se-
vere, and he is unquestionably entitled to substantial
damages. The Court is sure that this plaintiff or any
person, would not elect to undergo the ordeal of pain

184

and suffering and injury encountered here for any
sum of money, but yet the amount to be awarded must
meet the test of such modern economic standards as
have been accepted, approved, and developed in this
jurisdiction. Some of the cases reflecting the standard
for this type injury are cited in the brief of plaintiff’s
counsel, and there are others to which reference can
be had. It is the opinion of the Court that the large-
ness of the verdict here was prompted by an over-
whelming sympathy (perhaps understandably so) on
the part of the jury, but that the elements of passion
and prejudice permeate the verdict to the extent of
making it legally excessive. The verdict is excessive
to the extent of $20,000.00 and a new trial will be
awarded for a proper assessment of damages unless
within ten days the plaintiff should indicate a will-
ingness to enter a remittitur in such amount, in which
event judgment will be entered for the amount of the
verdict, less such remitted amount, being the sum of
$70,000.00. For precedent, see Case v. Y & M. V. RR.

Co., 114 Miss. 21, 74 So. 773; Thomas v. Fleming, 241

Miss. 26, 128 So. 2d 854; Five-Two Taxi Service v.

Simmons, 241 Miss. 182, 129 So. 2d 401.

Copy of Order enunciating such findings is herewith
enclosed, the Original of which is being simultaneously
sent to the clerk for entry on the minutes.

‘We will consider the first two assignments of error
together in this opinion. We think that these two con-
tentions have been clearly answered in the trial judge’s
opinion and that they really require no further comment
from us. The testimony in the record amply justifies
the conclusions that he reached as to the facts involved.
He properly applied the law to these facts. Transport
cites many cases from our jurisdiction and from other
jurisdictions in support of its argument that there was
insufficient evidence to submit this case to the jury. One
of these cases is The Hygrade No. 18, 41 F. Supp. 304

185

(D. Mass. 1941), which is referred to by the trial judge
in his opinion as Hygrade. This was a case in admiralty
and involved a claim by owners of a steamship named
Elwood against the owners of a steamship named Hy-
grade for damages as a result of a gasoline fire. The
case was tried before a district judge without a jury,
and he determined from the facts that although some
witnesses testified that the fire originated at or near the
cabin on Hygrade, such testimony was not sufficient
to show that the fire originated on Hygrade. The facts
further show that through the negligence of the crew
of Elwood a large quantity of gasoline was spilled on
the surface of waters adjacent to her, and the fumes
therefrom filled the surrounding air. There were wit-
nesses who said the fire originated on the Elwood. Oth-
ers fixed the point of origin between the Elwood and
Hygrade, while still others fixed the origin on Hygrade.
In other words, the allegation that the fire originated
on the Hygrade was contradicted by numerous witnesses.
The trial judge held that the evidence concerning the
origin or starting point of the fire left him in confusion
as to the starting point. He held that under the facts
of that case there were many places from which a spark
might have come without negligence on the part of Hy-
grade, and that plaintiff failed to exclude those as the
source of the fire. He held that it may not always be
necessary to exclude every possibility that the fire origi-
nated from causes other than negligence of the person
charged, but there must be enough evidence to remove
the probable causes from which it might have started.
His holding was to the effect that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur did not apply under the facts of that case.
As a trier of the facts, he refused to accept the testimony
of the witnesses who testified that the fire originated
on Hygrade. We have no such factual situation in ‘the
case before us. The jury in this case accepted the tes-
timony of the witnesses that the fire originated at the

186

transport truck and traveled from that point to the point
of explosion. The Hygrade case is not controlling under
the facts of this case. There is no announcement of law
in it that prevents the application of res ipsa loquitur
in the case before us.

Appellant quotes from Matthews v. Carpenter, 231
Miss. 677, 97 So. 2d 522 (1957), as follows: ‘‘Since the
damage resulted from fire, of course the burden was
on the plaintiff to show negligence.’’ (231 Miss. at 682,
97 So. 2d at 524). This is a correct quote, and we cited
in support of that statement the case of Yazoo & M.V.R.
RB. v. Hughes, 94 Miss. 242, 47 So. 622 (1908), and Black
v. Stone County Lbr. Co., 216 Miss. 844, 63 So. 2d 405
(1953). However, in the following paragraph of Mat-
thews we said:

Of course negligence may be proved by circumstanti-

al evidence. See 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Section 333,

p. 1032, in part as follows: ‘‘The law does not require

every fact and circumstance which make up a case of

negligence to be proved by direct and positive evidence
or by the testimony of eyewitnesses. Proof of the fact
of negligence may rest entirely in circumstances; in
other words, circumstantial evidence alone may au-
thorize a finding of negligence. Hence, negligence may
be inferred from all the facts and attendant cirewm-
stances in the case, and where the circumstances are
such as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture
and within the field of legitimate inference from es-
tablished facts, a prima facie case is made.’’ This
principle has been repeatedly approved by this Court.

Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, 206 Miss. 680, 40 So.

2d 582; Johnston v. Canton Flying Services, 209 Miss.

226, 46 So. 2d 533; Farish v. Canton Flying Services,

214 Miss. 370, 58 So. 2d 915; Brown-Miller Company

v. Howell, 224 Miss. 136, 79 So. 2d 818; Matthews v.

Thompson, 231 Miss. 258, 95 So. 2d 438. Besides

‘‘where a case turns upon circumstantial evidence it

|

should rarely be tak:

en from the jury.’’ Kurn v. Fond-

ern, 189 Miss. 739, 198 So. 727. (231 Miss. at 682, 97

So. 2d at 524).
We think that this p

aragraph is particularly applica-

ble to the facts in the present case and certainly sup-

ports the opinion of

ficient evidence to subi

Wl BH it really do

he trial judge that there was suf-
mit this case to the jury.
es not matter whether we apply

the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the facts in this case,
because we have held repeatedly that proof of negligence
may rest entirely upon circumstantial evidence. We said

in Palmer, supra, that:

It will be noted from the above authorities that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not in any instance
create a case of absolute liability, but simply raises a
presumption or makes out a prima facie case of neg-
ligence to the extent that the defendant is called upon
to meet it with an explanation. Aside from the stated
doctrine, and without applying the familiar Latin
phrase thereto, the same result is effected under the
general rules applying to circumstantial evidence. In
38 Am. Jur. p. 1032, Negligence, Sec. 33, these rules
are stated as follows:

“The law does not require every fact and circum-
stance which made up a case of negligence to be proved

“by direct and positive evidence or by the testimony
of eyewitnesses. Proof of the fact of negligence may
rest entirely in circumstances; in other words, cireum-
stantial evidence alone may authorize a finding of neg-
ligence. Hence, negligence may be inferred from all

~ the facts and attendant circumstances in the case, and
where the circumstances are such as to take the case
out of the realm of conjecture and within the field of
legitimate inference from established facts, a prima
facie case is made. The causal connection between an
agency and the injury complained of need not be shown

- Eo

by direct evidence.’’ (206 Miss. at 698, 40 So. 2d at

586)

HEEB We are of the opinion that there was sufficient
evidence in this case to submit the question of liability
to the jury, and that there was sufficient evidence to
support the verdict of the jury in this case.

HREM The next point raised by Transport is that the
trial court was in error in admitting testimony of Dr.
Eldred W. Hough as an expert witness. It contends
that Dr. Hough had no special knowledge of the subject
matter in this case. Dr. Hough testified as an expert
witness in the field of the sciences of physics and chem-
istry. His testimony was primarily to explain the scien-
tific principles involved in the physical phenomena that
the witness Windham testified he saw. Dr. Hough was
at the time of the trial Professor of Petroleum Engi-
neering and Chairman of that department at Mississippi
State University. Dr. Hough testified that he holds the
Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Physics, the
Master of Science degree in Physics, and the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Physics from the California In-
stitute of Technology. His Ph.D. degree was Cum Laude.
He is listed in ‘‘Who’s Who in Engineering’? and in
‘American Men of Science.’? He served as Senior Re-
search Engineer for Stanolind Oil & Gas Company and
was a Research Fellow at California School of Tech-
nology. He has served as Lecturer at Tulsa University,
Professor of Petroleum Engineering at the University
of Texas, and as Consultant for Gulf Oil Corporation
and for Humble Oil Company. He is the author of a
great number of scientific publications, several of which
deal with ignition of gasoline vapors in the vapor phase.
It may readily be seen that Dr. Hough has an impressive
background, and the trial judge determined that he was
an expert in the field about which he testified. This
ruling of the trial judge is supported by our decisions.
In the case of Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Linwood Elevator,

189

241 Miss. 400, 130 So. 2d 262 (1961), this Court, speak-
ing through Justice Rodgers, discussed the question of
the requirements of an expert witness in some detail.
HEE We pointed out in that opinion that it is generally
sufficient if a witness possesses knowledge peculiar to
the matter involved not likely to be possessed by the
ordinary layman. The trial judge certainly did not abuse
his discretion in allowing Dr. Hough to testify as an

expert witness.

=n We will consider the last two assignments of
error together since they both relate to damages. We
find from the record that Mr. Segrest was allowed to
engage in some speculation in his testimony relative to
his loss of income as a result of his injuries. Loss of
income was a proper element of damage, but such loss,
if any, was susceptible to definite proof by the records
of his business operation. We realize that it was dif-
ficult for the trial judge to determine which part of the
testimony related to loss of income and which part re-
lated to loss of earning capacity. This was due to the
type of questions propounded by counsel for Segrest.
The state of the proof on this issue could have influenced
the jury to some extent in arriving at the amount of
damages that the trial court found to be excessive.

HM We have carefully considered-the evidence in
this case relative to the injuries and other damages, in
connection with the other facts and circumstances, and
we are of the opinion that the amount of the verdict
is so large that it evidences bias, passion and prejudice
on the part of the jury. We are in agreement with the
trial judge that it is excessive to the extent of $20,000.

HEE We do not find any merit in the contention of
Segrest on cross appeal that the trial court was in error
in awarding a new trial on the question of damages
unless a remittitur of $20,000 was entered. We affirm
what we said Rayner v. Lindsey, Adm’r, 243 Miss. 824,
188 So. 2d 902 (1962), in regard to this question. We
said:

190

The trial judge not only heard the testimony of the
witnesses, including the medical evidence, but he saw
the plaintiff in court, and in addition had an oppor-
tunity to hear the history of other similar cases read
and discussed by eminent attorneys, to the end that
when it became his duty to pass upon a motion for
a new trial upon the question of excessiveness of the
verdict, he could focus not only the facts but the law
on the question of damages. It was his duty in the
first instance to determine whether or not a new trial
should be granted movant. Sec. 1536, Miss. Code 1942,
Ree.

No appeal from an order granting a new trial was
available to the parties in a damage suit on the ques-
tion of excessiveness or inadequacy of damages until
the above-mentioned Sec. 1536, supra, was amended
by Chap. 230, Laws 1956. Since that time, this Court
has followed the rule announced in Womble v. Miss.
State Highway Commission, 239 Miss. 372, 123 So. 2d
235, 236 (1960), as follows: ‘‘The rule as universally
announced in our decisions is that the action of the
trial court upon a motion for a new trial is to be fav-
orably considered upon appeal and supported unless
manifest error appears or unless the action of the trial
court in sustaining the motion shows a manifest abuse
of his discretion, and the rule is particularly applica-
ble where the new trial has been granted, since in
such cases the rights of the parties are not finally
settled as they are where a new trial is refused. Smith
v. Walsh, 63 Miss. 584; Harper, et al. v. Mississippi
State Highway Commission, 216 Miss. 321, 62 So. 2d
875; Long v. Magnolia Hotel Company, 236 Miss. 655,
111 So. 2d 645, 114 So. 2d 667.” To the same effect
is Flurry v. Dees, 241 Miss. 296, 128 So. 2d 873. (1961).
(243 Miss. at 832-33, 138 So. 2d at 905-06).

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in award-
ing a new trial on the question of damages. For this
reason this case should be affirmed on cross appeal.

191

This case is affirmed on direct appeal as to liability,
but remanded for a new trial on the question of damages
unless appellee and cross appellant shall agree to a re-
mittitur of $20,000 within fifteen days. If the remittitur
is entered, a judgment for $70,000 will be rendered here.
The case is affirmed on cross appeal and remanded
unless the remittitur is entered as herein provided.

Affirmed on direct appeal as to liability and remand-
ed for a new trial on the question of damages unless
remittitur provided for is entered. Affirmed on cross
appeal.

Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Patterson and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

Savi v. Mercoants & Farmers Bank or Merman
No. 43704 December 17, 1965 181 So. 2d 338

Robert D. Coit, Williamson, Pigford & Hendricks,
Meridian, for appellant.

Floyd, Cameron, Deen & Pritchard, Meridian, for ap-
pellee.

|

Sarrz, J.

The appellant, J. A. ‘Art’? Shaul, filed his bill of
complaint against appellee, Merchants & Farmers Bank
of Meridian, Mississippi, Individually, and as Successor
Trustee of the Estate of A. H. Cooper, Deceased, in the
Chancery Court of Lauderdale County. Shaul demand-
ed judgment against the bank for $18,388.50, alleged to
be due him as a five percent real estate broker’s com-
mission on the sale of certain land belonging to the
trust estate.

From a decree sustaining a general demurrer to the
bill, this appeal has been prosecuted.

The facts upon which appellant relies to sustain his
claim, as they are stated in the bill, and so far as they
are essential to a determination of the question pre-
sented on this appeal, may be summarized as follows:

The appellant is a licensed real estate broker. The
bill alleges that he contacted appellee and was authoriz-
ed to ‘‘obtain offers for the sale of the real property
with a five percent commission . . . on any sale con-
summated through or as a result of the efforts of com-
plainant.’? This agreement was not evidenced by any
writing.

The bill alleged further that appellant listed the land
for sale and devoted time, effort and expense toward
obtaining a purchaser.

Appellant offered the lands for sale to one Wythel
Woods. Woods considered buying the land, but finally
did not do so. ‘‘Several days or weeks later’? Wythel
‘Woods told one Edgar H. Woods of Beverly Hills, Cali-
fornia, (who is not alleged to have borne any relation-
ship to Wythel Woods) that the lands were for sale
and ‘‘showed him the general location of the lands.’’

Afterward the bank sold the land to Hdgar H. Woods.

The bill does not allege that the listing of the land
with appellant was an exclusive listing. There is no
allegation that appellant dealt with Edgar H. Woods,

personally, or that he located, procured, or found him
as a prospective purchaser. There is no allegation that
he had any connection with Edgar H. Woods whatever,
and it does not appear from the bill that appellant
knew of his existence. There is no allegation that any
privity existed between appellant and Wythel Woods,
or between appellant and Edgar H. Woods, or between
Wythel Woods and Edgar H. Woods.

The bill proceeds upon the theory that because the
purchaser, Edgar H. Woods, learned that the land was
for sale from a former prospective purchaser, to whom
appellant had unsuccessfully attempted to sell the land,
that appellant was the effective procuring cause of the
sale and entitled to commissions.

There is no allegation in the bill that Wythel Woods,
in mentioning the land to Edgar H. Woods, was acting
as the agent or representative of appellant, or acting
in any capacity for appellant.

The bill does contain a conclusion of the pleader that
Edgar H. Woods purchased the land ‘‘as the result
of the efforts of complainant who was the procuring
cause of the sale.’’ This conclusion is not in accord with
the facts stated in the bill which are to the contrary.

In Myres v. Seward, 238 Miss. 520, 118 So. 2d 864
(1960), a broker sued for commissions on the sale of
certain real estate. A demurrer to the declaration was
sustained. In affirming the lower court in sustaining the
demurrer, this Court said:

Moreover, it is not alleged that the plaintiff had any-

thing to do with the procurement of the option from

the defendants by the said Charles S. Lee and John

M. Montgomery, Jr., or that he had anything to do

with the assignment between Charles S. Lee and John

M. Montgomery, Sr. The declaration alleges that the

real estate agent’s commission of 5% of the sales price

was to be paid ‘in the event of sale of the property
to a purchaser procured by the plaintiff.’ It is true

FS

that the declaration alleges as a conclusion that the

sale of the property to John M. Montgomery, Jr.

and John M. Montgomery, Sr. was procured by the
plaintiff, but the facts alleged show that such was
not the case. (238 Miss. at 523-524, 118 So. 2d at

866)

We have examined the announcement of the rule in

12 C.J.S., Brokers, Sec. 91, b., p. 211, but we do not

think that the declaration in this case alleged sufficient

facts to show that the plaintiff was the procuring
cause of the sale of the land to the Montgomerys,
but rather that the declaration alleges facts that would
establish the contrary. (238 Miss. at 524, 118 So. 2d

at 866)

Tn the case here, appellant had nothing to do with
finding Edgar H. Woods, or with procuring the sale
of the land to him. It is true that appellant attempted
to sell the land to Wythel Woods, and that after that
sale failed to materialize, Wythel Woods, in no wise
acting for or on behalf of appellant, informed Edgar
H. Woods that the land was for sale and indicated to
him its general location. .

In Neiswender v. Campbell, 119 Cal. App. 504, 507,
6 P. 2d 584, 585 (1932), it was said:

If the efforts of the broker are the primary cause,

but the primary cause is not the effective cause, then

such efforts cannot be classified as the proximate pro-
curing cause. ...

In 12 O.J.8. Brokers section 91 at 209 (1938), it is
said:

While it is not essential that the broker’s efforts be

the sole cause of the sale or other transaction, it is

essential that they be the predominating effective
cause, and they are not sufficient to entitle him to

a commission where they are merely an indirect, in-

cidental, or contributing cause or one of the links in

a chain of causes.

In 12 C.J.S. Brokers section 91 at 211 (1938), there
appears the following:

... Where a broker contacts one person who in turn

brings the property to the attention of another per-

son who purchases it, the broker may or may not,
according to the circumstances, be deemed to be the
procuring cause of the sale so as to be entitled to
compensation. He is allowed recovery in some cases,
as where he has made progress in the negotiations
and the purchaser is an associate or coadventurer of
the person contacted or a corporation organized by
him; but he is denied recovery in other cases, as
where he has failed, or apparently failed, in his ne-
gotiations with the person contacted and the purchas-

er is not a mere conduit for the passage of title, .. .

There is no allegation that Wythel Woods did more
than inform a third party that the land was for sale
and as to its general location. Appellant had nothing
to do with either of those things and nothing to do with
the sale.

_ [iB The dill shows upon its face that appellant was
not the effective procuring cause of the sale and that
he is not entitled to commissions.

Appellant attached to his bill a number of interroga-
tories seeking information about the sale consummated
between the bank and Edgar H. Woods. As he has no
justiciable interest in the transaction, the questions pre-
sented by the interrogatories are moot, and he is not
entitled to the information sought.

The chancellor was correct in sustaining the demurrer
and dismissing the bill.

Affirmed.
Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Rodgers and Brady, JJ.,

concur.

19

a

Marsovist Cxurce or Srurets, Inc. v. Temptetow
No. 43712 December 17, 1965 181 So. 24 129

John Paul Moore, Starkville, for appellant.

198

Frank Watson, State College; Ben Hilbun, Jr., Stark-
ville, for appellee.

Brapy, Tom P., J.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Chancery
Court of Oktibbeha County, which denied the right to
probate a letter dated November 21, 1955 as the last
will and testament of Mrs. Viola T. Carter, on the basis
that the writing was a conditional will based upon a

199

contingency which did not take place. Appellant con-
tends that the alleged will is not based on any condition
and therefore was and still is subject to being probated.

The essential facts in this case are as follows. Mrs.
Merle McDonald filed a petition for the probate of the
last will and testament of Mrs. Viola T. Carter on
August 1, 1964. The petition recited that Mrs. Viola
T. Carter died on January 12, 1964, leaving at that time
a holographic will; that the estate of decedent was at
that time being administered through said chancery court
as though the decedent had died intestate and that the
administration was being conducted by Mr. Otha Tem-
pleton, as administrator, by appointment of the court.

Petitioner alleged that the will was holographic, signed
by the deceased, and that the handwriting and signature
of the deceased was well known by residents of Sturgis,
Mississippi, the home of the deceased. The petition
prayed that letters of administration with will annexed
be granted her. The will annexed was in the following
pertinent language:

Nov. 21, 1955
This is to certify that in case of death to both of us
at or about the same time we wish for our Estate
to be divided as follows, to wit:
Sturgis Cemetary (sic), two

hundred fifty dollars ($250.00)
Springhill Cemetary (sic)

two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00)
Mt. Olive Cemetary (sic)

two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00)
Sturgis Baptist Church

Seven hundred fifty-dollars ($750.00)
Spring Hill Baptist Church

Seven hundred fifty Dollars ($750.00)
Sturgis Methodist Church

Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000.00)

$12,250.00

200

(Total Twelve Thousand two hundred fifty dollars
After these specifications were noted in the writing,
there occurs the following:

One half (1/2) of the remainder of the Estate to go

to the H. L. Carter heirs as follows;

One half (1/2) to Mrs. Merle McDonald (Sister)

One half (1/2) to H. R. Carters childred (sic)

(Humlett Carter
(Howard Carter
(Sarah Nougher

and one half (1/2) of remainder of Estate to go to

The Templeton heirs, as follows Harvey Templeton,

Cheleey Templeton, John Templeton, Otha Templeton,

Nathan Templeton’s children (A. D. Templeton

(Ruby Anderson

Forest Templeton’s children

(I. O. Templeton
(Foresteen Goodwin

/s/ H.L, Carter L.W. Brown Atorney (sic)
/s/ Mrs. Viola T. Carter Small fee
Sturgis, Miss. Donate to

Methodist church

Otha D. Templeton, brother of the deceased, Viola
Templeton Carter, filed a caveat against the probate of
the alleged will, the gravamen of which is that the will
fails and is void because of the failure of the contin-
gencies stipulated in the will to ever take place. Other
grounds were also alleged as objection to the probating
of the alleged will.

The record discloses that on June 28, 1964, when Mrs.
Merle C. McDonald, Administratrix With Will Annexed,
was searching the home of her deceased sister-in-law
in Sturgis, Mississippi, she found the instrument in
question in a pocket of a hose and shoe rack, which
was hanging on the door of a closet in the den of the
deceased’s home.

On November 4, 1964, the cause was heard, and on
December 14, 1964, the chancellor rendered his opinion
and decree. The chancellor found that on November
21, 1955, H. L. Carter and his wife, Mrs. Viola T.
Carter, signed an instrument designated as their last
will and testament.

The court held that the instrument was written ‘in
the handwriting of Mrs. Viola T, Carter with the ex-
ception of the signature of her husband,’ and that the
signature of H. L. Carter would not prevent the probate
of this will as a holographic will of Mrs. Viola T. Carter.

‘With reference to the basic objection, the chancellor
pointed out in his opinion that the will recited as fol-
lows:

This is to certify that in case of death to both of

us at or about the same time we wish for our Estate

to be divided as follows, to wit: (Emphasis ours.)

The court observed further that the instrument then
made special bequests in the amount of $12,250 to certain
churches and cemeteries named therein, and provided
that the remainder of the estate be divided one-half to
the H. L. Carter heirs and one-half to the Templeton
heirs, naming the Carter and Templeton heirs referred
to.

The court adjudicated that the instrument was not
the valid will of H. L. Carter because his signature
was not witnessed and it was not written by him, and
therefore it was inoperative as his will. Mr. Carter died
in June 1963 and his wife followed him in death on
January 12, 1964, six months and nineteen days later.
The chancellor pointed out as follows:

The Contestants contend that the phrase ‘‘at or about

the same time’’ created a contingency that did not

occur since more than seven months separated the
date of death of the parties to the instrument.

The chancellor concluded, in his opinion, as follows:
It is the opinion of the Court that taking the phrase
“at or about the same time’’ and construing it in the
light of the context and attending circumstances, the
will was conditional, the condition being that Mr.
and Mrs. Carter were trying to make a disposition of
their estate provided they met death within a short
time of each other. It is the opinion of the Court that
if either survived for more than a very short period
of time, it was not the intention of Mr. and Mrs.
Carter that this instrument would operate as a will.
Mr. Templeton testified that Mrs. Carter made the
statement when she went to the hospital during her
last illness, that she did not have a will. His testi-
mony was not objected to under Section 1690 of the
Mississippi Code of 1942, and neither was an objec-
tion made under this section to the testimony of the
lady who found the will. (Emphasis ours.)

The chancellor held that the instrument was not a
will under the rulings of this Court, and did not permit
the will to be admitted to probate as the last will and
testament of Mrs. Viola T. Carter.

Appellant assigns three errors, which are as follows:

I.

That the decision of the court in failing to allow the
probate of the last will and testament of Mrs. Viola
T. Carter is error since the will was not based on a
condition.

TL.

That the court erred in holding that the letter dated
November 21, 1955, was a valid and holographic will
of Mrs. Viola T. Carter and at the same time, holding
the will would have to be republished to be a valid
and binding (sic) will since no condition was present.

|

TI.

The court erred in failing to sustain an objection to
the testimony of Otha D. Templeton at Page 62 of
the Transcript since this was an attempt to alter, vary
or modify (Revoke) by parol evidence the terms of

a valid holographic will.

It is obvious that the disposition of either of the first
two errors will dispose of both, since the basis of each
of these errors is that the court erred in not permitting
the probate of the instrument because it was not based
on a condition. The third error, which is without merit,
does not require any attention, for the reasons stated
by the chancellor.

We turn now to the principal question presented in
the first two errors assigned, namely, that the court
erred in denying the probate of the alleged holographic
will since the will was not based on a condition. We must
look directly to the words in question, which are: ‘This
is to certify that in case of death to both of us at or
about the same time... .’’

The question before us is what Mrs. Carter actually
meant when she wrote the words, ‘‘In case of death to
both of us at or about the same time.’’ Did the signers
of the instrument mean, or did they intend, that it should
apply only in cases of simultaneous or near simultaneous
death? Mr. Otha D. Templeton, testifying as to what
Mr, H. L. Carter had told him, said:

He told us that he had wrote this letter, and he said,

“Tf we get killed or die on the trip, it will give y’all

a starting point.’

Rephrasing the question, did these words constitute a
condition precedent before the application of the pur-
ported will would take effect?

In Magee v. MeNiel, 41 Miss. 17, 18, 90 Am. Dec.
354, 355 (1866), we have a case which sheds considerable
light on the issue at hand. In that case a confederate

soldier’s holographic will provided, ‘‘if I never get back
to you I want all I have to be yours.’’ He returned to
her. This Court held in that case that the will was void;
that it was dependent on the contingency of the soldier’s
not returning, which contingency did not occur.

In Davis v. Davis, 107 Miss. 245, 246, 65 So. 241, 242
(1914), the writer of the holographic will provided:
“Should I not get over this operation, I want you and
Papa to take charge of everything I’ve got... .’? We
held in that case that the writer of the will did not
intend to make an unconditional bequest, but one which
was to take effect only in the event he should not recover
from the operation. That case cited, among others, Par-
sons v. Lanoe, 1 Ves. Sen. 189, 27 Eng. Rep. 974 (Ch.
1748), wherein a purported will was written conditioned
upon the death of the writer thereof before his return
from a journey to Ireland, which condition did not occur.

In Du Sauzay v. Du Sauzay, 105 Miss. 839, 63 So.
273 (1913), the introductory clause of the alleged will
of Mrs. De Montluzin disclosed that she was making a
record of her wishes should her husband survive her,
which he did not do. We held that a contingent holo-
graphic letter was not admissible to probate,

In Meszaros v. Holsberry, 84 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla.
1956), the written instrument provided, ‘‘mindful of the
uncertainties of life and the certainty of death, and in
anticipation of death by a common disaster, do hereby
make, publish and declare ... .’? This was executed
by husband and wife who both died of natural causes
sixteen days apart. The Florida court held that the will
was not operative and not entitled to probate as it was
dependent on a condition which never occurred.

In American Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Eckhardt,
331 Tl. 261, 262-63, 162 N. HE. 843, 844 (1928), which
case is similar to the case at bar, it was provided: ‘‘In
the event that our deaths should occur simultaneously,
or approximately so, or in the same common accident or

Po

calamity, or under any circumstances causing doubt as
to which of us survived the other, then we hereby... .’’
The Illinois court held that it was a contingent or con-
ditional will and inoperative if the event did not occur.

In Wilson v. Higgason, 207 Ark. 32, 33, 178 S.W. 2d
855, 856 (1944), the will specified a condition under
which it was to be operative, namely, if the writer should
die ‘‘any time soon.’’ In that case he did not so die,
and the Arkansas court held that the will specified a
condition under which the will was to be operative, and
since the condition did not occur, the letter was not
operative as a will.

Hl Bi It is pointed out in 94 Corpus Juris Secundum
Wills section 152 (1956), as follows:

A will may be drawn to take effect only on the hap-

pening of a specified contingency, which is a condition

precedent to the operation of the will, and when so
drawn a will is denominated a contingent, or condi-
tional, will. Such a will is operative if the contingency
happens or occurs, but its operation is defeated by
failure or nonoccurrence of such contingency, except
where it is subsequently revived or republished by the

testator. (94 C.J.S. at 938-39.)

The case of Redhead v. Redhead, 83 Miss. 141, 85
So. 761 (1903), cited by the appellant, is distinguishable
and is not applicable, for the reason that in that case
the testator intended for the will to take effect without
a condition, because he expressly used the words: ‘‘Rea-
lizing the uncertainty of life at all times and the dangers
incident to travel, I leave... .’’ The validity of the
writing was not contingent upon his death abroad. It
appointed administrators and made elaborate disposi-
tion of his estate.

The case of Prather v. Prather, 97 Miss. 311, 52 So.
449 (1910), cited by appellant, likewise is not applica-
ble for the reason that in that case the letter written
did not contain any condition at all, the question there

206

being whether or not the writer intended the letter to
be a will.

Appellant cites Buffington v. Thomas, 84 Miss. 157,
158, 163, 36 So. 1039, 1040 (1904), as being in point.
In that case a letter was written by a married woman
and contained this language: ‘‘I was taken with fever,
from which I may never recover.... (I)n case that I
die see that... .”? Appellant contends that this Court
found she recovered from her illness and returned home.
Actually, this Court found as follows: ‘‘The acute at-
tack of fever was the inducement to the woman to in-
dicate her last wishes, and her dominant idea was to
express them, and to say what she wanted ‘in case I
die,’ and she gives her reason for the wish.’’

We have experienced difficulty in following the ra-
tionale in the briefs of counsel, and in reconciling the
briefs with the authorities cited. Prudence suggests that
attorneys, in paraphrasing or summarizing the evidence
or rulings in a case which is cited, should be astute and
careful to accurately do so.

No comfort can be afforded the appellant by his con-
tention that, since the deceased retained the will, this
is proof that it was revised by the mere retention of
it and that it was her avowed will. This is contrary
to the testimony in the case, because Mrs. Carter’s
brother testified that during her last illness she had
stated to him that she did not have a will, as reflected
by the following:

Q. Will you state what she said to you and what you

said to her in your conversations regarding a will?

A. Well, she told me that she didn’t have a will, which

T already knew. She had told me that before she ever

went to the hospital... .

It is possible that the deceased’s husband, or some-
one else, could have put the will in the shoe rack, but
from this testimony it appears that it was not the de-
ceased who had preserved the purported will. Further-

| ic

more, the record discloses that Mrs. Carter stated that
the letter had been torn up, which indicates that she had
not preserved or retained it and could not possibly have
sought to revive or republish it without the contingency
following her husband’s death, or before it.

‘We are not concerned with the fact that Mrs. Merle
McDonald is not a claimant in this case, nor with the
fact that the Baptist Church, through its board of dea-
cons, has renounced any claim or interest in the pro-
ceeds of this estate, a recessive characteristic rarely
found in religious sects. The fact that there will be
something left if and after the Methodist Church of
Sturgis, Inc. has been declared to be the rightful owner
of the $10,000 is of no consequence either.

HEM This Court holds that the words, ‘‘in case of
death to both of us at or about the same time,’’? mean
exactly what they say. They contemplate that both Mr.
and Mrs. Carter must have necessarily died or been kill-
ed at about the same time. We cannot say that six
months and nineteen days is at or about the same time,
“‘at?? meaning simultaneously or on the same date, and
‘about’? meaning in close proximity thereto, in this
instance meaning near in time to the same date that one
or the other died.

We have studied the well reasoned opinion and de-
cree of the learned chancellor and we are in accord
with its findings and conclusions. Conceding the writ-
ing to be a will, it was a conditional will and the deaths
of the two subscribers thereto did not occur at or about
the same time. It was obviously the intention of the
subscribers that if either survived the other for more
than a very short period of time the instrument was not
to operate as a will.

For these reasons, the decision of the lower court is
hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Rodgers and Smith, JJ.,
concur.
EE

Crry or Pasoacovta, et al. v. May, et al.
No. 48793 June 28, 1965 176 So. 2d 892

209

Merle F. Palmer, Pascagoula; Blass & Smith, Gulfport,
for appellant.

Edward J. Currie, Sr., Edward J. Currie, Jr., Hatties-
burg; Albert Sidney Johnston, III, Biloxi, for appellees.

Guuizsriz, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit
Court of Jackson County setting aside an order of the
governing authorities of the City of Pascagoula adopt-
ing and filing the report of the election commission
changing the form of government of said City from
a commission form of government to a Council-Manager
form of government. The appeal was effected by a bill
of exceptions submitted by appellees, R. T. May, Jr.,
and others, to the mayor of said city, who signed the
same in accordance with the provisions of Mississippi
Code Annotated section 1195 (1956). We affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.

The City of Pascagoula has at all times heretofore
had a commission form of government, the governing
authorities being a mayor and two commissioners (here-
in referred to as city council).

On February 10, 1965, the Clerk of the City of Pas-
cagoula presented to the city council his certificate that
there had been filed in his office petitions signed by
more than twenty percent of the qualified registered
voters of said city requesting an election to determine
whether the existing form of government should be
abandoned and the Council-Manager form of government
installed. See Miss. Code Ann. § 3825.5-02 (1956). The
city council entered an order on February 10, 1965, grant-
ing the petition of said qualified electors and ordered

210

an election to be held on March 30, 1965, and provided
that the proposition to be voted on should be ‘‘For the
present form of government’? and ‘‘For the Council-
Manager plan of government.’’

In accordance with the aforesaid order, the City Clerk
prepared a ‘‘Notice of Election”? calling for an elec-
tion to be held on March 30, 1965. The notice included
the order of the City Council dated February 10, 1965,
and a certificate of the City Clerk. The notice and order
were true and correct copies of that duly adopted by
the City Council at a regular meeting held on March
2, 1965. The notice provided that the proposition to be
voted on shall be ‘‘For the present form of govern-
ment’? and ‘‘For the Council-Manager plan of govern-
ment.’’ Said notice of election was published in a news-
paper in Pascagoula on (Friday) March 5, 1965, and
was scheduled to be published three more times on
March 12, 19, and 26, 1965.

After said publication appeared in the newspaper on
March 5, 1965, the city clerk entered on the minutes
of the city council a false and fictitious order reciting
that the matter of republishing the notice of election so
as to provide the second proposition as called for in
accordance with Mississippi Code Annotated section
8825.5-02 came on for consideration, and ordering pub-
lished in The Chronicle on March 8, 15, 22, and 29, 1965,
a ‘‘Notice of Election’’ as therein set forth in full, and
providing in the purported order that the propositions
to be voted for ‘‘shall be (1) ‘For the present form of
government’ and ‘‘F'or the Council-Manager plan of gov-
ernment’ and (2) ‘For councilmen elected at large’ and
‘For councilmen elected by wards.’ ’’

The city clerk then prepared a new ‘‘Notice of Hlec-
tion’’ providing that the propositions to be voted on
‘‘shall be (1) ‘For the present form of government’ and
‘For the Council-Manager plan of government’ and (2)
‘For councilmen elected at large’ and ‘For councilmen

elected by wards.’ ’’ The city council had not adopted
any order designating the number of councilmen or di-
viding the city into wards in the event the Council-
Manager plan of government be adopted. The notice
calling for the election on March 30, 1965, on the two
propositions above stated was published March 8, 15,
22 and 29th. The election was held and the election
commission certified that it canvassed the returns of the
election and that the vote was as follows: Proposition
No. 1: For the present form of government 1,587. For
the Council-Manager form of government 1,591. Prop-
osition No. 2: For councilmen elected at large 954. For
councilmen elected by wards 1,587. It further certified
that there were 4,678 qualified voters in the city and
1,500 of them did not vote. In its report to the city
council, the election commission pointed out that the
notice of election did not conform to the order adopted
by the city council on February 10, 1965, in that said
order provided only for Proposition No. 1 to be submitted
to the electorate, and that after the publication on March
5, 1965, the notice was changed by the city clerk to include
Proposition No. 2.

On April 6, 1965, the city council, by a two-to-one vote,
entered an order on the minutes of the city purporting
to receive and file the report of the election commission
and, in effect, adopting the Council-Manager form of
government. Pursuant to said order, the mayor certified
the results of said election to the secretary of state.
The appellees appealed from said order of April 6, 1965.

The circuit court reversed the order of April 6, 1965,
on the ground that the fictitious order, ordering the
election, was invalid and the election was void and of
no effect, and remanded the proceeding to the governing
authorities of the City of Pascagoula, with directions
to hold an election in accordance with law to determine
whether the voters desire a change to the Council-Man-
ager form of government.

212

HBB The learned trial judge was correct in setting
aside the order of the municipal authorities. The order
actually entered by the mayor and commissioners of
February 10, 1965, calling for the election submitting
the single question —- whether the form of government
should be changed — was valid. But the last four pub-
lications giving notice of the election and submitting the
additional question as to how the councilmen were to
e elected was based on a false and fictitious order. The
last order calling the election was false; the certificate
‘0 the notice of election was false; the election was in-
valid; and the order of April 6, 1965, was void. These
are not mere technicalities or irregularities in the order,
notice, and election. The defects are fundamental. We
have never known any court that held valid a proceeding
ased on false and fictitious public records. MIM The
integrity of public records and proceedings must be
assured. This Court cannot, and will not, approve a
proceeding grounded on a forged and fictitious order
and a false certificate. No end, however desirable, would
justify approval of the falsification of public records and
proceedings.

Appellants contend that the election was valid because
the original order for the submission to the electorate
of only one proposition (whether the Council-Manager
form of government should be adopted) was valid, and
the election expressed the will of a majority of the
qualified electors. But the election was not held pursuant
to the valid order of February 10, 1965. That order was
superseded by the false order entered on the minute
book after March 5, 1965, which seems to have been back-
dated to February 10, 1965. As already indicated, no
court should approve the falsification of public records.
It is true, as contended by appellants, that the sole
purpose of all elections is to fairly and honestly ascertain
the will of the voters; but this presupposes an election
held in accordance with valid proceedings and not elec-
tions based on false records and false notices.

213

It is further contended by appellants that an appeal
from municipal authorities under Mississippi Code An-
notated section 1195 (1956) lies only from a ‘‘judgment
or decision,’’ and that the order of April 6, 1965, was
not necessary for the adoption of the Council-Manager
form of government; that the effect of an affirmative
vote on the question whether the Council-Manager form
of government should be adopted is automatic without
any action of the governing authorities of the munici-
pality. In short, appellants contend that the order of
April 6, 1965, was not a ‘‘judgment or decision’? and
was not appealable.

HE We are of the opinion that the action of the
city council on April 6, 1965, was an appealable order.
In that order, the council received and approved the
certification of the report of the municipal election com-
mission and ordered officers to be elected under the
Council-Manager form of government from the city at
large. The effect of the order was to adopt the new
form of government and approve that theretofore done
in reference to the establishment of the Council-Man-
ager form of government. It is true that the statute
says the mayor ‘‘shall’’ immediately certify to the sec-
retary of state that such city has adopted the Council-
Manager form of government. Miss. Code Ann. § 3825.5-
08 (1956). But when the entire proceedings are based
on a false and fictitious order calling the election, and
a false certificate to the notice of election, there is no
duty and no power to adopt or approve such proceeding
or to certify to the secretary of state that the Council-
Manager form of government has been adopted.

An additional reason why the city council’s order of
April 6, 1965, was properly reversed by the circuit court
is that the submission of the second proposition was
misleading to the electorate. Section 3 of Chapter 548,
Miss. Laws 1962, provided for a method of designating
the number of councilmen and for dividing the city into

wards prior to the election for a change of government;
and if no such ordinance is enacted prior to the election
the number of councilmen shall be five and shall be
elected at large. Miss. Code Ann. § 3825.5-09 (Supp.
1964). Submission of the second proposition ignored
this statutory requirement, and necessarily led the elec-
tors to believe that if proposition two was carried coun-
cilmen would be elected by wards. This probably resulted
in additional votes for proposition one. No one can say
that the will of the voters has been expressed on proposi-
tion one unaffected by the misleading aspects of proposi-
tion two.

Counsel for the parties have asked this Court to an-
swer several questions which are not properly before
us. We decide one question only, and that is that the
cireuit court was correct in vacating and setting aside
the order of April 6, 1965. Nothing else is before this
Court. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court and
appellants’ supersedeas is dissolved as of this date.

Any suggestion of error or motion to correct judgment
shall be filed on or before July 5, 1965.

Affirmed.
All Justices concur.

Korurme Company v. Hypz Construction Company, Lye.
No. 43572 October 4, 1965 178 So. 2d 838

6
dd
a

182 So. 2d 580

February 7, 1966

William A. Denny, Jon F. Friedl, Milwaukee, Wis.;
Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Barnett,
Montgomery, McClintock & Cunningham, Jackson, for
appellant.

|

Cox, Dunn & Clark, Jackson, for appellee.

Rovezrs, J.

This case grew out of the following facts and cireum-
stances: On November 18, 1959, a contract was awarded
to Hyde Construction Company, Inc. in the amount of
$16,173,876.86 for the construction of a large concrete
spillway, Keystone Dam, Arkansas River, in the State
of Oklahoma. The specification of the United States
Corps of Engineers, as incorporated in the contract,
required that the contractor erect a suitable concrete
plant of sufficient capacity to satisfactorily batch, mix
and discharge two hundred cubic yards of concrete per
hour, and sixteen hundred cubic yards of concrete in
any eight-hour shift. The specifications also required
that the concrete be placed in the facility at a certain
temperature. The Hyde Construction Co., Inc. (hereinaf-
ter called Hyde) went about securing a plant and equip-
ment that would produce a concrete mix required by
the contract, and entered into negotiations with the
Koehring Company (C. 8. Johnson Company, Division,
hereinafter called Koehring) for the purchase of a plant
to manufacture the required mix. ;

Koehring proposed the installation of a cooling and
heating facility, which was to operate on a vacuum prin-
ciple. Hyde was experienced in the operation of a con-
crete mixing plant of similar make and design which
had been previously sold and offered by Koehring, but

had had no experience with the proposed vacuum cooling
system or equipment necessary to control the tempera-
ture of the mix proposed to be manufactured by
Koehring. A contract was negotiated between the ap-
pellant and appellee on February 5, 1960, in which
Koehring guaranteed that its cooling plant would op-
erate to the satisfaction of Hyde, but it is charged that
the plant failed to operate as guaranteed and as a result
of the failure of the plant and system to operate and
produce the required cement mix from the date of in-
stallation, the progress of the work on the Keystone Dam
Project was thereby greatly delayed, resulting in many
“‘shutdowns’’ and periods of loss of time and labor ef-
ficiency, resulting in great damage to Hyde in the sum
of $500,000.

On August 30, 1961, in Civil Action No. 3175, Hyde
exhibited its complaint in the Federal Court at Jackson,
Mississippi, wherein it sought a money judgment against
Koehring for the breach of the contract and warranty
set out in the sale contract for the concrete mixing
and cooling plant. This bill of complaint also made two
companies defendants by way of attachment. Dalrymple
Equipment Company was named attachment defendant
in the State and Federal Courts. It was alleged that
each of the attached defendants knew of other residents
having effects of the non-resident defendant Koehring
and others who were indebted to it. Attachment was
requested under the method set out in Mississippi Code
Annotated sections 2729 through 2734, inclusive (1956).
The complaint also charged that there was diversity of
citizenship existing between the complainant on the one
hand and Koehring (C. 8. Johnson Division) on the
other. The complaint asks that the court enter a decree
in favor of the complainant, jointly and severally, against
the non-resident defendant in the full sum of $500,000,
with legal interest and the cost of court, and that the
funds and effects in the hands of the attached defendants

225

be condemned for the satisfaction in whole or in part
of a money decree. It requests that judgment be entered
as provided by law in such cases against the attached
defendants upon a recovery of judgment. The bill of com-
plaint alleged that Koehring was a foreign corporation,
doing business in Mississippi, without having qualified
and appointed an agent for process, thereby calling into
play the statute which designated the Secretary of State
as agent for process. Koehring filed no answer in the
Federal action, but instead filed a special appearance
in the form of a motion to dismiss for want of juris-
diction.

Koehring’s motion to dismiss the Federal action for
lack of jurisdiction also included a request in the alter-
native, that the court transfer the case to the Federal
District Court of Oklahoma under section 1404 (a), Title
28, U. S. C. A. This motion was overruled; whereupon,
Koehring appealed to the Court of Appeals of the Fifth
Cireuit. Thereafter, on September 27, 1961, while the
above-mentioned suit was pending in the Federal Dis-
trict Court at Jackson, Hyde filed a suit in the State
Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds
County, Mississippi, setting out an identical cause of
action theretofore filed by Hyde in the Federal Court.

In the State Chancery Court suit, Hyde also invoked
a non-resident or attachment statute of Mississippi and
Dalrymple Equipment Company again was made a resi-
dent attachment-defendant. The State Chancery Court
action remained relatively dormant while proceedings
were had on Koehring’s appeal from the decision of
the Federal Court in Mississippi.

While the appeal in the Fifth Cireuit was pending in
the Federal Court suit, Koehring filed its answer in
the State court on January 30, 1963, thereby entering
its appearance in the Chancery Court proceedings. In
this answer, Koehring pleaded the pendency of the prior
Federal court action, and alleged that the issue in the

former Federal Court suit and the issue set out in the
State Chancery Court suit was the same, and that the
prior Federal Court suit was brought as a quasi in rem
proceeding. Koehring requested in its answer that the
Chancery Court suit should be dismissed or stayed,
pending the disposition of the earlier filed Federal Court
action. Howéver, no plea in abatement was filed and
no proof of a restraining order was made prior to the
entry of the final decree in the State Chancery Court.
On September 19, 1963, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit rendered an opinion in the Federal Court
proceeding which pretermitted the jurisdictional ques-
tion, but reversed the lower U. S. Court directing that
the Federal Court suit be transferred to the First Dis-
trict for the Northern District of Oklahoma.

After the U. 8. Fifth Cireuit Court had rendered its
opinion, Hyde requested that the State Chancery Court
suit be set for trial. Koehring requested that the state
court stay or dismiss the proceeding because of the prior
proceedings filed in the Federal Court but this motion
was overruled. The Chancery Court then set the state
case for trial to be held Monday, March 9, 1964. During
this time, Hyde had filed a petition for rehearing in the
U.S. Fifth Cireuit, and Koehring had filed in the same
court a motion for an injunction to restrain Hyde from
proceeding to trial in the State Chancery Court suit.
On January 27, 1964, this motion was overruled without
prejudice to Hyde’s right to apply to the Oklahoma Fed-
eral District Court, to which the case was remanded,
for a transfer back. February 5, 1964, the Fifth Cireuit
denied Hyde’s petition for a rehearing. On February
14, 1964, the U. S. Fifth Circuit issued its mandate
reversing the District Court’s previous judgment of
September 19, 1963, which inter alia ‘‘ordered and ad-
judged’’ that the case ‘‘be and it hereby is remanded
to the . . . Court for the Mississippi Southern District
with instructions that it be transferred to the Northern

227

District of Oklahoma. ...’? Thereupon, Hyde attempted
to dismiss his action in the Mississippi Federal Court.
After the District Court entered an order of dismissal
on February 24, 1964, Koehring petitioned the U. 8.
Fifth Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus to have
the dismissal order vacated and the action immediately
transferred to the Oklahoma Federal District Court.

The hearing on the petition for a writ of mandamus
in the U. S. Fifth Cireuit (by order dated March 6,
1964) temporarily enjoined Hyde from proceeding fur-
ther in the Mississippi Chancery Court action. On
March 10, 1964, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Federal District Court in Jackson had
committed error in allowing Hyde to dismiss the Federal
Court suit. Thereupon, the Fifth Circuit Court directed
a vacation of the order of dismissal which had been
entered by the Federal District Court in Jackson on
February 24, 1964, and ordered the Clerk of the Federal
Court in Jackson to immediately transfer the record in
that case to the Clerk of the Federal Court of the North-
ern District of Oklahoma. It further ordered that pend-
ing the physical filing of that order in the Oklahoma
Court, the Fifth Circeuit’s order would ‘‘constitute a
transfer to enable the parties to present the matter
to the District Court in Oklahoma.’’ The U. 8S. Fifth
Circuit Court found that the immediate transfer to Ok-
lahoma would protect and effectuate the order of the
Fifth Cireuit Court, and thereupon vacated the temporary
injunction restraining Hyde from proceeding further in
the Chancery Court action. The cause thus transferred
to the Oklahoma Federal District Court became Civil
Action No. 5911 on the docket of that court.

Although, as previously stated, the Mississippi Chan-
cery Court suit was set for trial on March 9, 1964, it
was continued for hearing until March 11, 1964. At a
hearing, participated in by counsel for both Hyde and
Koehring on March 11, 1964, the Federal District Court

in Oklahoma, prior to 2 P. M. and prior to the commence-
ment of the trial in the State Chancery Court suit,
issued a temporary restraining order against Hyde, its
attorneys and those in concert with them, from proceed-
ing with the trial in the State Chancery Court. Notice
of a temporary restraining order was transmitted to
Jackson by telephone and announced in open court at
the outset of the trial, and the attorneys for Koehring
requested that Koehring be granted permission to re-
frain from proceeding in the Chancery Court suit. Never-
the less, the State Court directed that the case proceed
to trial as previously ordered.

The Chancery Court proceeded with the trial of this
cause until it was completed on March 25, 1964. On
April 7, 1964, the Chancery Court rendered an opinion
in favor of Hyde, and on April 8, 1964, entered a final
decree in favor of Hyde, against Koehring, awarding a
money-judgment in the sum of $464,450.08. Thereafter,
Koehring filed a petition in the State Chancery Court
asking for a rehearing, and asking the court to vacate
its former decree. This petition set forth, among other
things, that Hyde should not have been permitted to
have proceeded in the Chancery Court suit after notice
of the various restraining orders issued by the Oklahoma
Federal District Court. A response was filed by Hyde
to this petition, and the petition was overruled. Koehring
perfected the present appeal with supersedeas from the
money-judgment of April 8, 1964. Thereafter, on Sep-
tember 1, 1964, the Oklahoma Federal District Court
rendered an opinion, ordering and adjudging in that
Court (in Civil Action No. 5911) that sanctions be im-
posed against Hyde and its attorneys for contempt of
court.

T

STATE COURT JURISDICTION

The question then to be determined in the outset is,
whether or not the Federal Court, having first acquired

229

jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, had
exclusive jurisdiction, so that the Chancery Court of
Mississippi had no jurisdiction to try the case filed in
the State Court.

The conflict in jurisdictions of the Federal and State
Courts under our system of government had given rise
to considerable controversy in the various opinions of
courts, both of the states and of the Federal jurisdictions.
It is pointed out in 21 C. J. S., Courts, section 522 (1940)
at p. 791 that:

“The courts of the United States and the courts of
the various states are independent of each other, ex-
cept as judgments of state courts are subject to re-
view by the federal supreme court, as indicated in the
C. J. 8. title Federal Courts §§ 238-271... So ordi-
narily the pendency of a suit in a federal court is
not a bar to a suit in a state court involving the same
controversy, and vice versa. However, the two courts
are not foreign to each other; they form one system
of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land,
and should be considered as courts of the same coun-
try, having jurisdiction partly different and partly
concurrent, and as a matter of comity one of such
courts will not ordinarily determine a controversy of
which another of such courts has previously obtained
jurisdiction. ...”

MMB As a general rule, the grant of jurisdiction to
the Federal Courts does not of itself imply that the jur-
isdiction is to be exclusive. MIME So, where a right of
action, given by a statute of the United States, is an
advancement of the common-law right, existing inde-
pendently of the relation of Congress in pursuance of
the powers delegated by the Constitution of the United
States, the concurrent jurisdiction of the State Court
is not taken away. MIME Also, where the State Courts
have long enjoyed jurisdiction over the subject-matter
of an action, jurisdiction is not withdrawn by federal
statute unless such an intention is distinctly manifested.

230

The author sets out in the textbook, Moore’s Federal
Practice, 1 A, 2d Edition, section 0.221 (1965) at pages
2605, 2606, the following:

“Where the federal and state courts have concurrent

jurisdiction, as, for example, in diversity and general

federal question cases, actions ix personam may pro-
ceed concurrently. In other words, as stated in some
of the cases, ‘the rule ... has become generally es-
tablished that where the action first brought is in
personam and seeks only a personal judgment, anoth-
er action for the same cause in another jurisdiction
is not precluded.’ ””
Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 230,
43 S. Ct. 79, 67 L. ed. 226, 24 A.L.R. 1077 (1922);
Equitable Life Assur. Soe. of the U. 8. v. Wert, 102
F, 2d 10 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) ; Byrd-Frost, Inc. v. Elder,
303 U. S. 647, 58S. Ct. 646, 82 L. ed. 1108 (C. C. A. 5th
1937), 93 F. 2d 30 (1938).

This textwriter also points out in section 0.222 at
pages 2607-2610, inclusive, that:

“Tn addition to the situation previously discussed,
where two in personam suits may proceed concurrent-
ly, two actions may proceed without interference
where one is in rem and the other is in personam, for
irreconcilable conflict arises only when both actions
seek to dispose of the same res. Thus, where the state
court has control of the administration of a deced-
ent’s or a ward’s estate, an action in personam may
be instituted in the federal court, the requirements
of federal jurisdiction being satisfied, to establish
the validity and amount of a claim against the estate,
since the federal court’s action in no way interferes
with the state court’s control of the res. ...

“|. . Generally, in all cases where the federal action

is im personam or partly so, even though it includes
im rem issues which partly overlap the prior jurisdic-

231

tion of state courts, ‘the federal court should proceed
to grant any relief appropriate under the pleadings
which will not interfere with the specifie properties
which have been brought within the jurisdiction of
the state courts.’

‘‘Therefore, subject to the rule that one court, federal
or state, shall not disturb the possession and control
of specific property which is within the prior jurisdic-
tion of the other court, one court may properly ad-
judicate rights in property in the possession of the
other court and may render any judgment ‘not in
conflict with that court’s authority to decide questions
within its jurisdiction and to make effective such de-
cisions by its control of the property.’

“Tn United States v. Klein, (303 U. S. 276, 281, 58 S.
Ct. 536, 82 L. ed. 840, 1938) a leading case in point,
the question was whether a judgment of a Pennsylvania
court, rendered under authority of a state statute and
affirmed by the state Supreme Court, declaring an
escheat to the state of money which had been deposited
in the Treasury of the United States, was an invasion
of federal sovereignty and the prior jurisdiction of
the federal court which had disposed of the fund. In
an earlier federal action brought by secured bond-
holders to compel payment of the bonds, plaintiffs had
obtained a decree in behalf of themselves and other
bondholders similarly situated, the money was paid
into court, and the part of the money belonging to
bondholders who had made no claim and could not
be found had eventually been (re)covered into the
federal Treasury. After the lapse of years the Penn-
sylvania courts declared the money so deposited to
be escheated to the state. It was held that there was
no conflict with federal authority; that the state de-
cree was merely an adjudication upon the title of the
absentees, which was not prohibited, and that the de-
eree was not founded on possession and did not pur-

232

port to disturb the possession of the Treasury as

depository, which it could not do, and that the ques-

tion of possession would be open for decision when-
ever application was made to the federal court for
payment over of the fund. (Citation supplied.)

‘The same principle was approved and applied by the

Supreme Court in the decision of Fischer v. Ameri-

can United Life Insurance Company.’’ (314 U. S.

549, 62 S. Ct. 380, 86 L. ed 444, 1942, re’g — C. C. A.

8th, 1941, 117 F. 2d 811) (Citation supplied.)

The appellant contends that it is well-settled that
where an action is quasi in rem, the court having juris-
diction, first attached, has jurisdiction to proceed to
the exclusion of all other courts. It is contended that
the case of Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U. 8. 408, 84 S. Ct.
1579, 12 L. ed 2d 409 (1964), and the case of Princess
Lida of Thurn v. Thompson, 305 U. 8. 456, 59 S. Ot. 275,
83 L. ed. 285 (1938), settled the issue here involved in
favor of Koehring.

The facts in the Donovan case are as follows:

The City of Dallas, Texas, owned Love Field, a mu-
nicipal airport, and forty-six citizens brought a class suit
in a Texas court to restrain the City from building an
addition to the runway to the airport, and from issuing
and selling municipal bonds for that purpose. The case
was tried and summary judgment was given for the
City. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court of Texas denied review,
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Lat-
er, one hundred and twenty Dallas citizens, including
twenty-seven of the plaintiffs in the earlier action, filed
another action in the U. S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas seeking similar relief. The com-
plainants sought an injunction against the construction
of the runway, issuance of bonds, and payment of bonds
already issued. The City filed a motion to dismiss, and

233

an answer to the complaint in the Federal Court. At
the same time, the City applied to the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals for a writ of prohibition to bar all plain-
tiffs in the case in the U. S. District Court from prose-
cuting their case in that court. The Texas Court of
Civil Appeals Denied relief, holding that it was without
power to enjoin litigants from prosecuting an action
in the Federal Court, and that the defense of res judicata
on which the City relied could be raised and adjudicated
in the United States District Court. On appeal from
the mandamus order, the Supreme Court of Texas took
a different view, however, and held it was the duty of
the Civil Court of Appeals to prohibit the litigants from
further prosecuting in the U. 8. District Court, and
stated that a writ of mandamus would issue should
the Court of Civil Appeals fail to perform the duty.
The U. S. District Court, in an unreported opinion,
dismissed the case pending there. One of the petitioners
in the Federal Court excepted to the dismissal and ap-
pealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals cited Donovan
and the other complainants for contempt. Donovan was
sentenced to twenty days in jail. Donovan served the
sentence and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the State Supreme Court’s judgment directed to
the Civil Court of Appeals to enjoin petitioners from
prosecuting their action in the Federal Court, and grant-
ed certiorari to review the Civil Court of Appeal’s
judgment conviction of contempt. The Court held that:

“We think the Texas Court of Civil Appeals was

right in its first holding that it was without power

to enjoin these litigants from prosecuting their fed-

eral-court action, and we therefore reverse the State

Supreme Court’s judgment upsetting that of the Court

of Appeals. We vacate the later contempt judgment

of the Court of Civil Appeals, which rested on the

mistaken belief that the writ prohibiting litigation by

the federal plaintiffs was ‘valid.’’? 377 U. 8. at 411-
412.

The Court then said:

“Harly in the history of our country a general rule
was established that state and federal courts would
not interfere with or try to restrain each other’s pro-
ceedings. That rule has continued substantially un-
changed to this time. An exception has been made in
cases where a court has custody of property, that is,
proceedings im rem or quasi im rem. In such cases this
Court has said that the state or federal court having
custody of such property has exclusive jurisdiction
to proceed. (Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. 8S.
456, 465-468.) In Princess Lida this Court said ‘where
the judgment sought is strictly in personam both the
state court and the federal court, have concurrent
jurisdiction, may proceed with the litigation at least
until judgment is obtained in one of them which may
be set up as res judicata in the other.’ Id. p. 466. See
also Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. 8. 226.”
3877 U.S. at 412.

The opinion of the Court then pointed out:

“But plaintiffs in the second suit chose to file that
case in the federal court. They had a right to do
this, a right which is theirs by reason of congressional
enactments passed pursuant to the congressional poli-
ey. And whether or not a plea of res judicata in the
second suit would be good is a question for the federal
court to decide. While Congress has seen fit to au-
thorize courts of the United States to restrain state-
court proceedings in some special circumstances, it
has in no way relaxed the old and well-established
judicially declared rule that state courts are complete-
ly without power to restrain federal-court proceed-
ings im personam actions like the one here. It does
not matter that the prohibition here was addressed
to the parties rather than to the federal court itself.

235

For the heart of the rule declared by this Court is
that:
‘... where the jurisdiction of a court, and the
right of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it, have
once attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken
away by proceedings in another court. ...’’? (Em-
phasis supplied.) 377 U. S. at 412.

In the case of Pennsylvania General Casualty Com-
pany v. Pennsylvania, ex rel., Schnader attorney gen-
eral, 294 U. 8. 189, 55 8. Ct. 386, 79 L. ed. 850 (1934),
the United States Supreme Court said:

‘Where the judgment sought is strictly in personam,
for the recovery of money or for an injunction com-
pelling or restraining action by the defendant, both
a state court and a federal court having concurrent
jurisdiction may proceed with the litigation, at least
until judgment is obtained in one court which may
be set up as res judicata in the other. See Buck v.
Colbath, supra, (3 Wall. 342, 18 L. ed 260); Kline v.
Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226... But if the two
suits are in rem or quasi in rem, requiring that the
court or its officer have possession or control of the
property which is the subject of the suit in order to
proceed with the cause and to grant relief sought, the
jurisdiction of one court must of necessity yield to
that of the other. To avoid unseemly and disastrous
conflicts in the administration of our dual judicial
system, see Peck v. Jennes, 7 How. 612, 625; and
to protect the judicial processes of the court first
assuming jurisdiction . . . the principle applicable
to both federal and state courts is established that
the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property
may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other. This is the settled rule with
respect to suits in equity for the control by receiver-
ship of the assets of an insolvent corporation.”? (Em-
phasis supplied.)

In the case of Wells v. Helms, 105 F. Rep. 2d 402
(1939), the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
Tenth District, pointed out that:

“Tt is well settled that where two actions involving

the same cause of action are pending in a state and

a federal court, and are within the concurrent juris-

diction of each, both actions, in so far as they seek

relief in personam, may proceed at the same time
and when one action has gone to judgment, that judg-
ment may be set up in the other action as res judicata.’”

105 F. 2d at 404.

Kline v. Burke Construction Company, 260 U. 8. 226,
230, 43 S. Ct. 79, 67 L. ed. 226, 24 A. L, R. 1077 (1922),
gives this exposition:

“«,.. a controversy is not a thing, and a controversy
over a mere question of personal liability does not
involve the possession or control of a thing, and an
action brought to enforce such a liability does not
tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court
in which a prior action for the same cause is pending.
Hach court is free to proceed in its own way and in
its own time, without reference to the proceedings in
the other court. Whenever a judgment is rendered
in one of the courts and pleaded in the other, the
effect of that judgment is to be determined by the
application of the principles of res judicata by the
court in which the action is still pending in the or-
derly exercise of its jurisdiction, as it would determine
any other question of fact or law arising in the prog-
ress of the case.”

HEEB Thus it is seen that exclusive jurisdiction vests
in the court first acquiring jurisdiction in in rem and
quasi in rem cases but not in in personam cases. The
question then resolves itself into the query as to what
is meant by the expressions ‘‘in personam’’, ‘‘in rem’’
and. ‘‘quasi in rem’’ jurisdiction. In 20 Am. Jur. 2d,

Courts, section 118 (1965), at page 473, we find the fol-

lowing language:
“The distinction between jurisdiction in personam
and jurisdiction in rem, which to some extent is cov-
ered also in other articles, runs through numerous
cases, mostly in connection with the doctrine, estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Pennoyer v. Neff, (95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed
565) that a state court can acquire jurisdiction in
personam over a defendant only if process has been
served on him in person in the state to which the
court belongs, unless he has voluntarily submitted
himself to the court’s jurisdiction, some later cases
noting a tendency to deviate from strict application
of the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, notably through
use of the ‘minimum contracts’ test.’’? (Emphasis
and citation supplied.)
Section 119, 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts (1965) at pages

473, 474, 475 states:
“A decision in personam imposes a responsibility or
liability upon a person directly and therefore binds
him personally with regard to every property he
possesses, even that over which the court bas no juris-
diction in rem, and which its decision may therefore
not directly affect. On the other hand, a decision in
rem does not impose responsibility or liability upon
a person directly, but operates directly against that
particular thing which is called the res, irrespective
of who is the owner or possessor thereof, and irrespec-
tive of whether the owner is subject to the jurisdiction
of the court im personam. ...
“«. , , Jurisdiction im rem is right where the decision
sought is of a nature to directly affect real property.
A court of one state has no jurisdiction to establish,
to pass, or to quiet title to real property situated in
another state, or to make any other decision directly

238

affecting real property located in another state, or
the title to that real property.
“A decision in personam may be rendered by the court
of a state with regard to a res which is not situated
within the state if the decision merely obliges a person
subject to its jurisdiction in personam to dispose of
the res, or to refrain from disposing of it, in the man-
ner prescribed by the decision. ...’’ (Emphasis sup-
plied.)

Section 120, 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts (1965) at pages
475, 476, states:

‘According to certain judicial opinions, the classifi-
cation of jurisdiction as in personam or in rem is not
comprehensive enough, and therefore a third category,
jurisdiction quasi in rem, has been added. The courts
seem not to be in harmony, however, as to the exact
meaning of that term and its proper application. Juris-
diction quasi in rem has been said to be neither strict-
ly in personam nor strictly in rem. The term is fre-
quently used to designate an action in personam where
ares is indirectly affected by the decision. But some-
times proceedings affecting a status or relation, for
instance a marital status, are referred to as proceed-
ings quasi in rem.’’ (Emphasis supplied.)

The facts in the case at bar on the question now
being discussed have been previously studied and a very
comprehensive opinion has been written on this subject.
See Dunn v. Stewart, 235 Federal Supplement 955 (1964).
In that case the Court said:

“The record before this Court in this case, as it re-

lates to the case in the Chancery Court of Hinds

County, Mississippi, demonstrates that the Chancery

Court action, being between a Mississippi corporation

and a Wisconsin corporation, then contending that

it was not doing business in Mississippi, was fully
removable. The presence of the attachment defend-

ants in nowise affected removability. Cramer v.

239

Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. (CA 8), 91 F. 2d 141,
cert. den. 302 U. S. 739, 58 S. Ct. 141, 82 L. Ed. 571,
rehearing den. 302 U. S. 778, 58 S. Ct. 263, 82 L. Ed.
602. Having elected not to remove or attempt to re-
move the Chancery Court action, Koehring Company
should now be estopped in equity to assert that any
irreparable injury occurred to it because discovery
procedures available in the Chancery Court of Mis-
sissippi were not as efficacious as procedures which
would have been available in the Federal forum.

“A deliberate examination of the pleadings in Civil
Action No. 5911 (formerly Civil Action No. 3175),
and in the State Chancery Court proceeding No. 60,068,
discloses that both suits, insofar as the Defendant
Koehring Company is concerned, were in personam
actions. Only a money judgment was sought as to
them. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Hd. 899; 214 Words
& Phrases, pp. 278- 287; Ravesies v. Martin, 190
Miss. 92, 199 So. 282, 285. The Chancery Court at-
tachment proceedings, appurtenant to the principal
litigation there and the Chancery attachment pro-
ceedings in the U. S. District Court, involved one
common attachment defendant, Dalrymple Equipment
Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation qualified to
do business in the State of Mississippi.
‘Attachments in Chancery in the State of Mississippi
are unique proceedings in the field of attachment law
in the sense that the service of the attachment de-
fendant does not bring any fund into the possession,
eustody or control of the Court, no monies are paid
into the registry of the Court, and no bond is re-
quired. Mississippi Code 1942, §§ 2729-2734. Garnish-
ment will not lie against the attachment defendant at
the initiation of the action. As the Supreme Court
of Mississippi pointed out in Gulf Refining Co. v.
Mauney, 191 Miss. 526, 3 So. 2d 844, the Chancery at-
tachment defendant occupies no security position at

~

all; ‘(h)e is simply a defendant with all the rights
and privileges as such and should simply be sum-
moned to answer the suit as any other defendant is
summoned.’ The distinctions between Mississippi
Chancery attachments and attachments at law are also
discussed in Mid-South Paving Co. v. Trinidad As-
phalt Mfg. Co., 197 Miss. 751, 21 So. 2d 646, 647.
Sequestration, injunction and delivery to the Plaintiff
under bond are all permissible under the Chancery at-
tachment statutes, but none of these procedures were
requested or accomplished in either suit.

“Under the laws of Mississippi, Koehring Company
could have entered a special appearance in the Chan-
cery Court to challenge the jurisdiction acquired by
attachment. It chose not to do so but defended gen-
erally, thus granting to the Court general jurisdiction
of the person. Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Swain, 164
Miss, 825, 145 So. 627. When it made this election it
made the issue of any quasi in rem proceedings as to
Dalrymple Company mainly moot. Cf. Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 725, 24 L. Hd. 565. In no sense
had any fund been taken into the hands of the U. 8.
District Court in Mississippi by making Dalrymple
an attachment defendant. When Dalrymple Company’s
answers are considered together, they disclose that
on the three separate dates on which statements of
account between Dalrymple Company and Koehring
Company were made, a different set of debt relation-
ships existed on each occasion. Obviously, no funds
were actually frozen in Dalrymple Company’s hands.
“The attachment did not create any conflict between
the concurrent State and Federal jurisdictions. Byrd-
Frost, Inc. v. Elder, supra, is completely analogous
to the proceedings here involved.

“Dalrymple Company’s answer in the Chancery Court
advances the plea to that court that it has already
been attached in the Federal Court proceedings and

a certified copy of the Complaint in the Federal Court
action is made an exhibit to Dalrymple’s answer in
the Chancery Court. Thus, if any funds had been
taken into custody by the Federal Court proceeding,
the Chancery Court, after this notice, would have been
bound not to deal with these funds. This Court, of
course, must presume that the Chancery Court of
Hinds County would take no proceedings which would
in any way affect property which was in fact already
seized under the proper processes of the U. S. Dis-
trict Court. Rather, the presumption is that the Chan-
cellor would deal correctly with any such claim when,
as and if he would take steps to possess or control
any part of the attachment subject matter. Douglas
v. New York, N. H. & H. Railroad Co., 279 U. 8. 377,
49 §. Ct, 355, 73 L. Ed. 747; Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U. S. 167, 79 S. Ct. 1025, 3 L. Hd. 2d 1152.”
Judge Griffith, in his Mississippi Chancery Practice,
original volume, section 484 (1925), at page 516 points
out: ‘‘The proceeding is one primarily in rem; and in
order to give jurisdiction in chancery by attachment
against a non-resident there must exist the following
factors: (1) The non-residence of the debtor; and, (2)
either (a) that he owns lands in this state, or (b) that
there are effects belonging to him in the hands of a
person in this state, or (¢) that there is some person
in this state indebted to the said non-resident debtor,
and (8) the issuance of the proper process against the
land, or effects, or debt, as provided by the statute, so
as to bring the res under the control of the court; and
it is well settled that when the jurisdictional facts do
not exist the proceedings must be dismissed, even though
the non-resident defendant has appeared, provided that
in his appearance he raise at the outset the defect as
to jurisdiction, and thus does not waive it. ... And
moreover, when the jurisdiction is based upon the ground
that there is a resident defendant who has in his hands
effects of, or is indebted to, the non-resident debtor, not

=
only must the resident defendant be such a person as
may be joined, but actually he must be made a co-defend-
ant to the suit. ...”

It will be noted that our attachment proceeding set
out in Mississippi Code Annotated section 2729 (1956)
ends with the following sentence: ‘‘The court shall give
a decree in personam against such nonresident, absent
or absconding debtor if summons has been personally
served upon him, or “‘if he has entered his appearance.”’
(Emphasis supplied.)

MME MM From the foregoing facts and authorities, we
have reached the conclusion that the Federal District
Court in Oklahoma only had im rem jurisdiction over
the debt owed by Dalrymple to Koehring. Thus, the
Federal Court could enjoin the attempted proceedings
in the Mississippi Chancery Court only insofar as the
dual proceedings to affect the res as to the Dalrymple
debt — allegedly within the jurisdiction of the Federal
Court. The Mississippi Chancery Court decree, how-
ever, was a personal judgment against Koehring; it in
no way affected Dalrymple’s debt to Koehring and the
res held in the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. It
appeared, therefore, the Mississippi judgment is not
affected by the Federal injunction and prior proceedings
in the Federal Court.

At this point, it should be again noted that the de-
fendant Koehring chose to answer in the State Court,
and made no effort to transfer the case to the Federal
Court, as was pointed out by Judge Mize in his opinion
in Dunn v. Stewart, swpra. In fact, no point was made
by Koehring that the complainant Hyde had filed the
case in the Federal Court (except in his answer) until
pleadings had been filed after the decree had been finally
entered by the Chancery Court. It follows that the
State Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the
issue joined between the appellant Koehring Company
and Hyde Construction Company, Inc., appellee. Par-

ticularly in view of the fact that the State Court did
not attempt to adjudicate or interfere with the res
involved in the jurisdiction of the Federal Court and
between the parties in that court. We are of the opinion,
therefore, that the assignment of error on this point is
not well-taken.

By way of emphasis, we also point out that we have
consistently held, as a matter of comity, that Mississippi
would recognize injunctions issued by another state
against its citizens to prevent them from bringing suit
in Mississippi to avoid the law of that state. Fisher
v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846;
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U. 8. v. Gex’ Estate,
184 Miss. 577, 186 So. 659. The injunctions discussed.
in these cases are, however, injunctions issued by foreign
states, and against persons and corporations subject to
their jurisdictions. Moreover, these injunctions are
against the individuals and not the courts. 43 0. J. 8.
Injunctions § 50 (1945).

HEE We recognize that the Federal Court, however,
has power to enjoin state court proceedings to protect
its jurisdiction over the res. 28 USO § 2283 (Stay of
State court proceedings) ; De Korwin v. First National
Bank of Chicago, 136 F. Supp. 720, (ND Ill. 1955),
235 F. 2d 156 (1956); Alabama Vermiculite Corp. v.
Patterson, 149 F. Supp. 534 (WD SC 1955). Ii ll
This power, however, does not warrant a Federal Court
in enjoining state proceedings, in personam or other-
wise, that do not interfere with the Federal Court’s
im rem jurisdiction. Albuquerque National Bank v. Citi-
zens National Bank of Abilene, 212 F. 2d 943 (CA 5th
1954),

HEB Although it may be said that our Mississippi
courts have historically recognized the restraining orders
of courts of other jurisdictions which have been brought
to their attention by way of proper plea, as in the instant
case, it is apparent that the trial court cannot be criticiz-
ed, and certainly not censured, for failing to have recog-

244.

nized an alleged injunction (by way of comity) since
the trial court was not properly notified of the federal
injunction until after it had rendered its final decree.
We are of the opinion that the parties herein should
not have been permitted to experiment with the court,
and that the trial court acted properly in refusing to
recognize (by way of comity) the information that an
injunction had been issued against some of the parties
in the Federal Court of Oklahoma.

Il
PLEA IN BAR

MM It is contended on appeal by the appellee Hyde
in a proper plea in bar filed and argued separately,
that Mississippi Code Annotated section 1347 (1956)
is applicable to the facts in this case with reference
to the injunction proceedings obtained during the pro-
gress of this case and effectively operates to release
all errors in the judgment of the Chancery Court and
is in effect a waiver of appellant’s right of appeal.

The plea in bar was passed by order of this Court for
determination upon final study of this case, and after
a study of the record as a whole, we have reached the
conclusion that Mississippi Code Annotated section 1347
(1956) is not applicable under the pleadings and facts
developed in this case. Moreover, the facts and pro-
ceedings involved herein are of such nature, and so
unique, as to require a study and determination of the
real issues involved. The plea in bar must therefore be
overruled.

II

ISSUES OF FACT

We are now brought to the main issues presented by
this appeal. That is to say, whether or not the appellant
violated its contractual obligation which resulted in dam-
ages to the other contracting party, the appellee, and if

245

so, whether or not the alleged damages were properly
shown.

The contract between Hyde Construction Company,
a Mississippi corporation, and C. 8. Johnson, contained
the following:

“The terms of this contract are as follows:

(6) The C. S. Johnson Company guarantees the

plant and cooling system to operate to the satisfaction

of the buyer and to produce a minimum of two hundred
cubic yards of specification concrete per hour.

“It is proposed to cool the aggregates, including sand
and the mixed water by means of a vacuum cooling
process. The plant is to provide enough cooling so
that two hundred cubic yards of concrete per hour
can be provided continuously under assumed tempera-
ture conditions herein enumerated. The concrete to
have a temperature of 47 degrees out of the mixer.

“The equipment furnished by The C. 8. Johnson Com-
pany is as follows:
“Ttem 21 N

Initial installation supervision.

“The C. S. Johnson Company will have a man follow

the job until it is operating satisfactorily.”

The contract also contained the provision for delivery
of the cooling plant, as follows:

“«(4) Delivery. After final approval of this pro-
posed contract by our executive, we estimate shipment
in approximately 100 working days from our receipt
of your written acceptance of drawings, all permits
required by law and other information necessary to
proceed with the work.’

Hyde offered testimony to show that the contract was
finally executed on February 13, 1960; that the one hun-
dred working days allowed by the contract for delivery
of the plant expired on or about July 1, 1960. Hyde

246

had scheduled August 15, 1960, when it was expected
the concrete pouring would begin. Testimony shows
that although Mr. George Holcomb was sent to the
Keystone Dam site on the 16-20th of May 1960, as a
representative of Koehring in an effort to comply with
its contract to design aggregate tanks, however, a part
of this tank did not arrive until September 12, 1960.
The plant was not put into operation until October
15, 1960. The appellant Koehring offered evidence to
show that the plans for the foundation were not sub-
mitted to them in time to permit the fabrication of the
plant by the date originally scheduled. Moreover, ap-
pellant claims that the fact that the part arrived as
late as October did not delay the erection of the plant
because (1) the ironworkers who were engaged in build-
ing the plant went on strike and refused to build it;
(2) the plant was erected by carpenters; (3) these
workers had more parts available at all times on the
job site than they could erect within the scheduled time.
Finally, it is alleged there was actually no time lost in
building the dam, since it was completed within the time
allowed.

Ml MM We are of the opinion, however, that the
record reveals sufficient evidence, actual and cireumstan-
tial, from which the chancellor could have concluded
that the cooling plant was not delivered to the appellee
Hyde within the time required by the terms of the
contract and that Hyde was damaged financially as a
result of this delay.

Iv

Appellee Hyde offered evidence to show that the ap-
pellant Koehring violated its guaranty to furnish a
cooling plant that would operate satisfactorily ; that neith-
er Hyde, the corporation, nor R. W. Hyde, Jr., its Presi-
dent, nor any of the officers or employees of Hyde
knew anything about the operation of a cooling plant,
and relied entirely upon the reputation, ability and con-

es

tractual obligation of Koehring to manufacture, deliver
and supervise the erection of a cooling plant capable of
cooling the aggregate ingredients used in the making of
concrete for the Keystone Dam project. The testimony
clearly establishes that the officers and agents of ap-
pellant Koehring fully understood why the Hyde Con-
struction Company required it to guarantee the satis-
factory operation of the cooling plant. The testimony
also shows that the cooling plant did not operate satis-
factorily until a great many changes and additions were
made to the plant, particularly the addition of a third
boiler and the installation of additional primers for the
three aggregate tanks, although it is admitted that there
were a few times when the plant operated properly for
a few hours. Testimony introduced by both parties es-
tablished the fact that Koehring had never manufactured
the type of cooling plant it guaranteed to operate sat-
isfactorily in the instant case. Moreover, the agent sent
to supervise the installation of the plant, had no pre-
vious knowledge or experience in erecting a vacuum
cooling plant. It also appeared that there were known
methods of reducing the temperature and wetting the
aggregate before it was conveyed to the cooling tank,
and which were not made known to the Hyde Construc-
tion Company by Koehring until long after the cooling
plant had failed to operate to the satisfaction of either
Koehring, the manufacturer, or Hyde, the contractor.
Koehring, while not admitting that the plant failed to
operate properly, contended that the many ‘‘break-
downs’’ and ‘‘slowdowns’”’ and periods when the plant
was inoperative were brought about by other factors,
among which were: the operating personnel were in-
experienced and inefficient, the water caused the boil-
ers to fail and it was Hyde’s duty to furnish proper
water, the aggregate was out of specification, the ag-
gregate stockpile was not promptly replenished, and
the concrete forms for holding the concrete were not

:

constructed at the proper time, so that the plant was
required to remain inoperative for a long period of time.
It also offered evidence to show that the cranes used
to lift the cement buckets from the truck were often
out of use because of ‘‘breakdowns’’; that there were
not enough ‘‘open spaces’? on the dam to permit the
continuous operation of the plant; and that Hyde did
not have sufficient trucks to promptly convey the cement
from the plant to the ‘‘hole’’? or monolith where the
concrete was actually poured.

‘We have reached the conclusion on this point, how-
ever, that all of the foregoing facts and other evidence
detailed and enumerated in this voluminous record were
issues of fact for the determination of the trial court
on the question of whether or not the manufacturer
failed to carry into effect its ‘guarantee’? expressed in
the contract between the parties. The trial judge was
of the opinion that: ‘The cooling system of the plant
never, at any time prior to the latter part of July, 1961,
was satisfactory to the complainant, and during this
time the defendant was making changes, additions and
substitutions of parts and equipment. The defendant
never at any time considered its part of the contract
fully executed.’’

Hl MM We are unable to say that the chancellor was
manifestly in error in holding that the appellant failed
to carry into effect its contractual guarantee, and must
therefore affirm the decree on his finding of fact.

v
ISSUE OF DAMAGES

The method used in determining the amount of damage
in this case has given this Court more trouble than
the issue of fact previously outlined, because some of
the testimony on damages offered by both parties bord-
ered upon guesswork and uncertainty.

Appellee Hyde offered proof to show that because
of the failure of appellant Koehring to deliver the plant

a

in the time required by the terms of the contract, Hyde
was required to expend $11,859.26 overtime expense in
erecting the plant. The proof of this item was a matter
of bookkeeping and was relatively simple. On the other
hand, the proof of the loss of production caused by the
failure of the plant to perform as ‘‘guaranteed’’ was a
problem of no mean consequence. The complainant
Hyde, in an effort to meet the required burden of proof
of damages, offered the following method. Hyde divid-
ed the operation of the construction of the Keystone
Dam into four parts. It then took two periods of time
during the erection of the Keystone Dam project, and
offered proof to show these periods were comparable
in length of time, similar in activity, effort and handi-
cap. It then offered evidence to show that after the plant
had been properly erected by Koehring, it produced
15,500 cubic yards of concrete per week, whereas prior
to the modification of the plant, it produced approxi-
mately 9,900 cubic yards of concrete per week. This was
a loss of production of approximately 5,600 cubic yards
of concrete per week for a period of nineteen weeks,
or a total of 106,400 cubic yards of concrete. It then
calculated that 9,000 over the common denominator 15,-
500 shows the loss of 36% in production. Hyde offered
proof that its fixed expenses (such as overhead de-
preciation and indirect costs), amounted to $21,100.01
per week, and that a loss of 36% production for a period
of nineteen weeks amounted to $136,728.06.

Hyde further offered proof to show that during the
period when there was-a 36% loss of production due
to inability of the plant to produce the required con-
erete, it was necessary for Hyde to expend $273,865.19
as labor costs to mix, haul and pour the concrete, and
that a loss of 36% in production resulted in the loss
of $98,588.23; that when this figure has been multiplied
by 1.12 (payroll tax and insurance) there was a total
loss of $110,318.82 for labor. The 36% loss of production

was thus used to calculate a monetary figure to show
damages suffered by Hyde on the separate items of labor
and expenses.

In reply to this method of making proof of damage,
the Koechring Company offered to show that the periods
of time selected by Hyde to show the ‘‘unsatisfactory’’
and ‘‘satisfactory’’ operations of the plant were not
comparable, because (1) the personnel in charge of op-
eration. of the plant had changed in the two periods;
(2) new roads had been built, facilitating the unloading
of the cement; (3) new trucks, cement buckets and other
equipment, including cement pouring forms, had been
purchased in addition to the equipment used during the
allegedly ‘‘unsatisfactory’’ period; and (4) more places
and spaces were provided for the reception of the con-
crete in the spillway, and during the ‘‘unsatisfactory’’
period, certain ‘‘slow-downs’’ were caused by the weath-
er and an unexpected fault discovered in the base of
the dam. Moreover, it is said, that the 36% loss of
production figure did not take into account additional
costs of material and labor expended during the ‘‘satis-
factory’’ period. Testimony was also offered to show
that the assumed 36% calculation of loss does not con-
form to generally accepted accounting practices, because
the fraction used has an erroneous denominator of 15,-
500; that this calculation is based on the assumption
that full capacity was attained in the use of the cooling
plant during the ‘‘unsatisfactory period’’ from March
1961 to July 15, 1961, as well as the ‘‘satisfactory peri-
od’’ from July 16, 1961 to December 1, 1961. Moreover,
the 36% is said to be based upon the entire cost of the
construction, rather than the cost of cement manufactur-
ing alone.

Appellee offered evidence to show additional damages
in that Hyde was required to pay $88,202.92 in addition
to the original cost of the cooling plant for labor and
modifications, and additional equipment, including a

|

third boiler which was necessary and essential and re-
quired equipment as a part of the plant before it would
operate ‘‘satisfactorily.’? The chancellor was of the
opinion that this additional payment should be recovered
as damages to Hyde. We agree that this item was clearly
shown by the testimony.

We are also of the opinion that the trial court had
ample evidence on which to base the determination that
the two periods of time were comparable and that a
production loss of 36% was fairly shown by the evidence.

MM MM Although the method used in obtaining the
measure of damages is not entirely without fault, it
may be said, as a general rule, that a party who has
broken his contract will not be permitted to escape lia-
bility because of the lack of a perfect measure of dam-
ages caused by his breach. Therefore, a reasonable basis
for computation and the best evidence which is obtain-
able under the circumstances of the case, and which
will enable the trier to arrive at a fair approximate
estimate of loss is sufficient proof. We are of the
opinion that the method used in determining the measur-
ment of damages for the breach of the contract in this
case is fair, and this Court will not set aside the judg-
ment obtained for the breach of the contract, although
it may be said the method used here is not considered
perfect. Nevertheless, except as to one item, we are
of the opinion that the proof of damages was sufficient
to sustain the judgment. See Billups Petroleum Co. v.
Hardin’s Bakeries Corp., 217 Miss. 24, 63 So. 2d 543
(1953); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hutchinson, 173
Miss. 701, 159 So. 862 (1935); Shell Petroleum Corp.
vy. Yandell, 172 Miss. 55, 158 So. 787 (1935) ; Miss. Power
& Light Co. v. Pitts, 181 Miss. 344, 179 So. 363 (1938) ;
Hawkins Hdw. Co. v. Crews, 176 Miss. 434, 169 So. 767
(1936) ; United Press Ass’ns v. McComb Broadcasting
Co., 201 Miss. 68, 28 So. 2d 575 (1947); Vicksburg, Me-
ridian R. R. v. Ragsdale, 46 Miss. 458 (1872).

252

We cannot approve one item of damage allowed by
the chancellor against the appellant because we are of
the opinion that the court was manifestly wrong in
allowing damages for ‘‘winter protection.’? Appellee
Hyde offered testimony to show that it had been dam-
aged in the sum of $51,733.71 because — it is said —
Hyde was required to make extra expenditure for the
winter protection of 138,864 cubic yards of concrete
during the period from November 1, 1961, through March
1, 1962. We have reached the conclusion from all the
testimony introduced on this item of damage that Hyde
would not have completed its pouring of concrete before
the Spring of 1962 in any event. Hyde would have
necessarily been required to have furnished winter pro-
tection during the period for which this claim is made
in some quantity of cubie yards of concrete poured.
Moreover, the proof as to how much concrete would have
been poured, and how much additional cubic yards of
concrete — if any — would have required winter pro-
tection during this period is speculative. It is unsafe
to base a judgment on conjecture. Berry v. Brunt, 252
Miss. 194, 172 So. 2d 398 (1965). The item of winter
protection and the interest thereon should not have been
allowed, and will be disallowed in the judgment of this
Court.

vi
QUESTIONS OF LAW

Since we have held in the outset, in this opinion,
that the State Chancery Court had concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the Federal Court to try and determine the
issues presented in the suit filed in that court, and since
we are of the opinion that the suit in Chancery was
im personam and not in res, the court properly proceeded
to try the cause and reach a judgment. We are now
confronted with the alleged errors of law presented for
our consideration on appeal.

i

MM MM It is argued that there was no breach of the
contract by Koehring as a matter of law because there
was no time for performance fixed in the contract, no-
tice and demand was necessary before Koehring could
be held liable, and no notice was given to Koehring.

Appellant has cited several authorities from other
jurisdictions on this proposition, including 17 Am. Jur.
2d, Contracts, section 356 (1964), in support of its con-
tention. An examination of these authorities, however,
has convinced us that they are not applicable to this
case, not only because the contract required Koehring
to supervise the erection of the cooling plant but because
appellant’s agent sent to aid appellee kept appellant in-
formed of the malfunction of the cooling plant day by
day, as the work progressed. The evidence shows that
appellant knew about the malfunction of the plant, and
was in a constant state of activity in an effort to remedy
the defects.

Ml Ml It is next contended that the contract did not
fix a time of performance when the cooling plant would
operate ‘‘to the satisfaction of the buyer’’, and that
the plant did finally operate satisfactorily, therefore
there was no breach of the contract. We are also of
the opinion that this rule is not applicable in the present
ease, because the warranty, (or ‘‘gnaranty’’, as it is
called in the contract,) like any other warranty implied
or written, took effect at the time of the consummation
of the contract, (46 Am. Jur., Sales, section 300, 1943).
At the time the contract in this case was entered into,
it was obviously intended there would be a period dur-
ing which Koehring would supervise the installation of
the equipment. It was intended that the plant should
operate after its erection in conjunction with the ope-
ration of the ‘‘batch plant,’’ for the purpose of pouring
concrete. This it never did until it was modified.

Hl Ml It is seriously contended that the provision in
the contract, whereby Hyde was to pay 25% of the list

price when the plant was operating ‘‘satisfactorily’’, and
the fact that Hyde made payment pursuant thereto,
operated as a release of all claims for damages for an
alleged breach of the contract. ‘We are not intrigued
with this argument because the testimony shows con-
clusively that the Hyde Corporation, and R. W. Hyde,
individually, made continuous efforts to get Koehring
to remedy the defects in the cooling plant. Every -ex-
periment suggested by Kochring was promptly follow-
ed, even the expensive suggestion of modification of the
plant. Moreover, the appellant Koehring continued its
efforts to remedy the defect in the cooling plant after
the notes were given. The argument that Hyde waived
any breach of the contract requiring the cooling plant
to operate satisfactorily, based upon the fact that Hyde
gave notes for the purchase price of the equipment after
he had knowledge of the defects of the plant purchased
and is thus estopped to claim damages for the breach
of the warrant, is not well-taken. Appellant has cited
the following cases as authority for this proposition:
Anderson v. First Securities Co., 185 Miss. 500, 188
So. 548 (1939); Alig v. Lackey, 114 Miss. 392, 75 So.
189 (1917); Colt v. Kelly, 142 Miss. 617, 107 So. 757
(1926) ; Brewer v. Automobile Sales Co., 147 Miss. 603,
111 So. 578 (1927) ; Cherokee Mills v. Conner, 164 Miss.
704, 145 So. 735 (1933); Memphis Automatic Music
Co. v. Chadwick, 164 Miss. 635, 146 So. 137 (1933).
These cases state the rule that the execution of a
new contract or the promise to pay the original notes
in consideration of the extension of time to pay the
purchase price — after full knowledge of defects in
the article purchased — operates to waive a defense
to an action for the purchase price on the ground of
breach of warranty. It may be pointed out that the
case at bar is not a defense to the payment of notes
based upon breach of a prior warranty known at the
time of the execution of the notes (or renewal) for

255

the purchase price of the articles sold, but the instant
action is a suit for damages for the breach of a contract
for failure to carry into the effect the ‘‘guarantee’’ set
out in the contract. The article purchased under the
contract here involved is not such as could be returned
to the seller, the contract rescinded and another ob-
tained or purchased upon the open market. The con-
tract in the case at bar involves the purchase of ma-
chinery, a plant designed to do a particular job. The
plant was massive in design and the installation alone
was a stupendous undertaking. The purchase price
and installation costs amounted to more than a million
dollars. It was designed to operate in conjunction with
a concrete ‘‘batch plant’’, and after having been erected,
time to pour concrete became a moving factor. The
purchaser’s purpose in buying the plant was to pour
concrete in the adjacent Keystone Dam. This was known
to the seller. Hyde had no alternative or opportunity
to reject the’cooling plant. The work had to proceed,
and it was necessary to do everything possible to im-
mediately get production out of the cooling plant. Hyde
made arrangements to get an ice plant but appellant
made modification to its cooling plant, and Hyde can-
celled the order for the ice plant. Both contracting
parties continued to do everything possible to make
the plant produce. Moreover, the contract required the
seller, Koehring, not only to furnish ‘‘the initial installa-
tion supervision’’, but to have a man follow the job
until it was operating ‘‘satisfactorily.’’ The obligation
to render defects in the operation of the plant was there-
fore a continuing obligation which Koehring recognized
and performed long after the buyer Hyde had given
the notes, now claimed to be a waiver of the ‘‘guaran-
tee’? set out in the contract. We are of the opinion
that the payment of the purchase price, or the giving
of the notes for the purchase price of machinery de-
signed for a particular job under the circumstances, as

shown by the testimony in this case, is not a waiver
of the warranty clause in the contract, nor is the pur-
chaser estopped to bring an action for damages growing
out of the breach of the contract.
It is pointed out by the textwriter in 46 Am. Jur,
Sales, section 730 (1943), at page 854, that:
“<Tt has been held that the fact that the buyer pays
the price after notice of defects in the goods con-
stituting a breach of the seller’s warranty does not
constitute a waiver of the breach so as to preclude
him from maintaining an action therefor. ... Whether
giving a note is a waiver is at most a question of
fact. Likewise, where the article warranted was pur-
chased on credit, the giving of renewal notes for the
price is not necessarily a waiver of the buyer’s claim
for damages. There would seem to be no ground for
a claim that the buyer has waived a breach of war-
ranty of the efficiency and quality of machinery sold
by its use of the machinery during continued attempts
of the seller to remedy defects therein.’’
See also Dancey v. Sugg, 46 Miss. 606 (1872) ; Stillwell
Bierce & Smith Vaile Co. v. Biloxi Canning Co., 78 Miss.
779, 29 So. 518 (1901) ; 77 0. J. S., Sales, §847 a., p. 1250
(1952) ; 77 C. J.8., Sales, § 366 c., p. 1287 (1952) ; Carver
Gin and Machinery Co. v. Gaddy, 62 Miss. 201 (1884) ;
Bowers v. Southern Automatic Music Co., 114 Miss.
25, 74 So. 774 (1917); Christian § Brough Co. v. Good-
man & Garrett, 132 Miss. 786, 96 So. 692 (1923) ; Morrow
v. Barron Motor Co., 229 Miss. 51, 90 So. 2d 20 (1956).
In conclusion, appellant argues that the evidence in
this case preponderates in its favor; that the delays,
‘shutdowns’? and inactivity of the concrete pouring
operation at Keystone Dam were not the result of de-
fects in the cooling plant but were brought about by
many other causes, including the fact that Hyde was
required to pour additional concrete to fill a land ‘‘fault’’

257

discovered at the base of the dam. Appellant insists
that the court overlooked the testimony of a similar
claim filed with the United States Corps of Engineers
for the same damages sought in the instant cause of
action, based upon a different reason. We feel that we
have already answered this argument under Section IV,
but again we point out that the various issues of fact
have been settled and determined by the opinion of
the Chancellor in the decree of the Chancery Court, and
with the exception of the amount allowed for winter
protection, we are unable to say the Chancery Court
was manifestly wrong in its determination of the facts.

Hl MM Finally, we are of the opinion that the decree
of the Chancery Court awarding damages to Hyde Con-
struction Company against Koehring Company, Inc.,
should be affirmed, but that the sum of $51,733.71 al-
lowed as extra costs for winter protection, and the sum
of $3,155.76 allowed as interest, totaling $54,889.47, should
be deducted from the total award shown in the decree
of the Chancery Court, against the total sum of $464,-
450.08, leaving a balance of $409,560.61. Interest of
six percent on the balance from April 1, 1963, (the final
interest date shown in the decree of the Chancery Court)
until the date of the order of this Court is hereby al-
lowed. The decree of the Chancery Court is hereby
affirmed in part (the sum of $409,560.61) and reversed
in part, (winter protection and interest, $54,889.47), and
judgment is hereby rendered against Koehring Com-
pany in favor of Hyde Construction Company in the
sum of $409,560.61, plus six percent interest thereon,
from and after April 1, 1963.

Affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and judg-
ment rendered.

All Justices concur.

ON MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT

Roperrs, J.:

The appellee, Hyde Construction Company, filed a
motion to correct the judgment heretofore entered in
the above-styled cause on the following ground: The
amount set out in the judgment of the Court in favor
of appellee is excessive since the original amount of
$468,450.08 included not only $51,733.71 for ‘‘winter pro-
tection’’, plus $3,155.76, interest to April 1, 1963, but
also $3,163.72 interest from April 1, 1963, to April 8,
1964. In the original judgment of this Court, we sub-
tracted from the original amount allowed by the chan-
cellor in the trial court, the sum of $54,889.47, the total
for winter protection and interest to April 1, 1963. How-
ever, we did not subtract the interest which was in-
eluded in the judgment, in the sum of $3,163.72 interest
from April 1, 1963, to April 8, 1964.

HE MM We are of the opinion that the judgment of
this Court should be corrected by subtracting from the
total amount allowed by the chancellor, $464,450.08 —
the total sum of the ‘‘winter protection’? $51,733.71 —
plus the two items of interest on the winter protection,
making a total sum of $58,053.19, leaving a balance of
$406,396.89 due by the appellant Koehring Company
to the appellee Hyde Construction Company, Inc. MIE
The judgment should allow six percent interest from
and after April 8, 1964, on the balance due to the ap-
pellee.

MI MM It is next contended by the appellee that the
judgment of the Court should be amended to include the
surety on appellant’s supersedeas bond, the Fidelity
and Deposit Company of Maryland. We agree that the
judgment should be amended so as to include the judg-
ment against the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Mary-
land, surety on appellant’s supersedeas bond, so as to.
make appellant and the surety jointly liable for the

PF eae

judgment in favor of Hyde Construction Company
against Koehring Company. Mississippi Code Ann. §
1973 (1956). .

HN MM The appellee contends that the judgment in
this case should be amended to apportion the cost of
appeal between appellant and appellee because this
Court affirmed eighty-seven percent of the amount al-
lowed by the judgment and decree of the chancery court,
and appellee should not be required to pay all of the
cost of appeal. We also agree with this argument, and
the judgment is amended so as to charge fifty percent
of the cost of appeal to appellant Koehring Company
and fifty percent of the cost of appeal to Hyde Con-
struction Company. Miss. Code Ann. § 1971 (1956) ; Tlli-
nois Cent. R. R. Co. v. George, 241 Miss. 233, 130 So.
2d 260 (1961); Shipman v. Lovelace, 215 Miss. 141, 60
So. 2d 559 (1952); Barry v. Wingfield, 126 So. 842
(Miss. 1930).

Hl Finally, it is claimed by appellee Hyde Con-
struction Company, Inc. that it should be allowed five
percent damages on the balance of $406,396.89, due ap-
pellee, and that the order of the Court should be amend-
ed so as to allow such damages. We are of the opinion
that this contention is not well-taken. The judgment
should not allow damages of five percent. See Miss.
Code Ann. § 1971 (1956); Illinois Cent, R. R. Co. v.
George, supra; Boyd v. Applewhite, 123 Miss. 185, 85
So. 87 (1920).

The Clerk of the Supreme Court is hereby directed
to amend the judgment of this Court entered in Minute
Book BN at page 423, dated October 8, 1965, so as to
comply with the amendinents directed to be made, as
above set out.

So ordered.

All Justices concur.

ON SUGGESTIONS OF ERROR

Surrz, Justice:

Following the affirmance of this case, as reported in
178 So. 2d 838 (Miss. 1965), both parties filed suggestions
of error, with supporting briefs. Replies from each
side, also supported by briefs, were filed in response
to a request of this Court.

‘We have now reviewed the entire case in the light of
the excellent briefs submitted by both sides and have
concluded that we should adhere to our former opinion
and that both suggestions of error should be overruled.

During the pendency of the suggestions of error, the
United States Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered
January 17, 1966, in Case No. 593 (not yet reported),
styled Koebring Co. v. Hyde Construction Co., Inc.
reversed the decision of the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals, 10th Cirenit, reported as Hyde Construc-
tion Company v. Koehring Company, 348 F. 2d 643 (10th
Cir. 1965), and held that the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma had ac-
quired jurisdiction in that case on March 11, 1964.

As we read the January 17, 1966, decision of the
United States Supreme Court, referred to above, it
does not reach the question of the jurisdiction of the
Hinds County Chancery Court to render the decree af-
firmed by this Court.

The suggestions of error filed by appellant and by
appellee are overruled.

Suggestions of Hrror overruled.

All Justices concur.

ON MOTION

- Ropesrs, J.:

The motion of appellee for leave to withdraw certain
exhibits filed in the Supreme Court in original form
is hereby overruled without prejudice to refile after ap-

26

gz

pellant’s right to make application to the Supreme Court
of the United States for writ of certiorari has lapsed.

Motion to withdraw original exhibits denied without
prejudice.

All Justices concur.
De

Famcump, D.B.A. Farronmp Morors v.
Gzyerat Morors Acceprance Core.

No. 43624 October 18, 1965 179 So, 2d 185

H. K. Van Every, Columbus, for appellants.

W. H. Jolly, Columbus, for appellee.

264

Sarra, J.

The appellant, Marion Fairchild, d/b/a Fairchild’s
Motors, employed an attorney to defend an action brought
against him by appellee, General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County.

The attorney prepared for his client and filed in the
ease a special demurrer and an answer to the declara-
tion. These pleadings became the pleadings of the de-
fendant in the case and were official records of the cir-
cuit court. :

Appellant failed to pay his attorney the fee due him
for services rendered. On the first day of the September
term the attorney wrote to the appellant and advised
him that the case was set for trial on the following day.
This letter reached appellant on the afternoon of that
day. In the letter, the attorney directed the appellant’s
attention to the fact that his fee had not been paid and
that ‘‘unless you make some arrangements to the con-
trary, I am certain he (plaintiff) will take a judgment
against you on Tuesday.’

HE When the case was called, the attorney announe-
ed to the court that his fee had not been paid him;
that he withdrew as counsel for appellant; and, that
he withdrew appellant’s answer which had been filed
previously. The appellant was not present and had not
been notified that this action was contemplated by his
attorney. Reasonable notice to the party was essential.
Blackwell v. Midland Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 132
Colo. 45, 284 P. 2d 1060 (1955); Parks v. Coyne, 156
Mo. App. 379, 187 S. W. 335 (1911).

Following this announcement, appellant was called
and having failed to answer was declared to be in default.
The next day an order was entered overruling the de-
murrer and a default judgment was entered citing the

265

default of the appellant on the previous day and the
withdrawal of appellant’s answer by his attorney.

MEBBB An attorney has charge of his client’s case, and
ordinarily his acts in respect thereto bind the client.
However, pleadings actually filed in court by a party,
although prepared by his attorney, are the pleadings
of the party. MM The pleadings are not subject to
the unrestricted discretion of the attorney so as to per-
mit their withdrawal by the attorney upon nonpayment
of his fee. MME If the attorney’s fee remains unpaid,
he has a valid cause of action against his client for the
debt. Moreover, in a proper case, with the consent of
the court and after fair warning to his client of his
intention to do so, he may withdraw and be relieved
of his obligation to defend or prosecute the case fur-
ther. Both reasonable notice to the client and permis-
sion of the court are essential. Miss. Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, No. 44 (1962), 33 Miss. L. J. 461 (1962);
7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law, 8§ 148, 144, 145, 221,
222 (1963).

HH But such withdrawal is prospective. It does
not erase those steps in the proceedings already taken.

(Hn 6) Amended pleadings may be filed, of course,
which may completely supersede or replace pleadings
previously filed; but, even so, the latter remain official
parts of the court record and are not subject to with-
drawal by an attorney.

HM In the case before the court here, the appel-
lant’s answer was on file and its withdrawal was coin-
cident with the attorney’s withdrawal from the case.
If it were conceded that so long as the attorney con-
tinued to represent his client he might withdraw his
client’s pleadings, such authority would not survive the
termination of the relationship. MBM The withdrawal
of appellant’s pleadings without his knowledge or con-
sent, when the case was set for trial and the appellant

266

was absent, had the effect of depriving appellant of
a substantial right.

HEE The attorney was without power to withdraw
his client’s pleadings under the circumstances in the
record, and such attempted withdrawal was wholly in-
effectual to remove the pleadings from the file.

49 O.J.S. Withdrawal of Appearance § 197 (1947)
states:

«| |. However, the withdrawal of the attorney’s

appearance after the filing of a plea does not with-

draw the plea so as to justify a judgment by default;
and, where an attorney abandons his client’s cause
without notice, the client should be given a reasonable
time to secure other counsel before judgment is taken
against him by default.’’
Muenster v. Tremont Nat. Bank, 92 Tex. 422, 49 S. W.
362 (1899).

Since appellant’s answer had been duly filed and had
not been stricken by an order of the court, and no
ground for striking it appearing in the record, judgment
by default should not have been entered against appel-
lant. Randall v. Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938).

Upon learning of the action taken, appellant promptly
employed another attorney and during the term duly
moved to set aside the default judgment. This motion
should have been sustained.

Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, P. J., Rodgers, Jones and Patterson, JJ.,
concur.

|
Buss Oonsrrucrion Company, et al. v. Watrurs
No. 43613 October 25, 1965 179 So. 2d 188

meee
bo

fo

cil

Melvin, Melvin & Melvin, Laurel, for appellants.

Mamwey & Clark, Laurel, for appellees.

Guxesem, J.

Mrs. Jeanette J. Walters and her minor daughter,
Kimberly Sue Walters, hereinafter referred to as plain-
tiffs, sued Bush Construction Company, a corporation,
hereinafter referred to as Bush, for the wrongful death
of John Miles Walters, deceased, husband and father
of plaintiffs, The trial court entered a judgment on a
jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs for $97,500, and Bush
appealed.

The accident in which John Miles Walters was killed
also resulted in the death, of two children of John Miles
Walters, deceased, and Mrs, Jeanette J. Walters. In
a former suit, plaintiffs sued Bush for the wrongful
death of Sherry Lynn Walters, one of the children killed
in the same collision. The jury in that case found for
the plaintiffs and Bush appealed to this Court where

the judgment was affirmed on condition of remittitur.
Bush Construction Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164
So. 2d 900 (1964). The principal question for our de-
cision in this case is whether the trial court was correct
in granting a peremptory instruction that Larry Mus-
grove, driver of the Bush truck, was guilty of negligence
proximately contributing to the collision and death of
John Miles Walters. This raises the question whether
Bush is collaterally estopped from contending that Larry
Musgrove was not guilty of negligence in the present
ease. We hold that it was error to grant a peremptory
instruction as to Musgrove’s negligence and that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply.

The evidence on behalf of plaintiffs was that the Bush
truck driven by Musgrove was travelling about sixty
miles an hour as it approached and entered the inter-
section, and that the automobile driven by John Miles
Walters entered the intersection first from the north
when the Bush vehicle was some distance to the west.

HN WB The evidence on behalf of Bush showed with-
out dispute that John Miles Walters drove his automo-
bile into said intersection without stopping at a stop
sign. The evidence tended to show that Walters drove
his vehicle into the intersection from a side road into
the through highway when the Bush truck, travelling
at a reasonable rate of speed, was so close to the in-
tersection as to create an immediate hazard. The evi-
dence was substantially the same as in the former case.
‘The weight of the evidence sustains the contentions of
Bush, but we are of the opinion that it was a jury ques-
tion whether Bush’s driver was guilty of negligence
proximately contributing to the collision.

At the conclusion of the testimony for both parties,
the court granted the following instruction for plain-
tiffs: ‘‘The court instructs the jury for the plaintiff
that the driver of the gravel truck was guilty of neg-
ligence that proximately contributed to the collision and
resulting death of Jobn Miles Walters.’’

At the time this case was tried in the circuit court,
the case of Bush Construction Company v. Walters,
supra, had been decided by this Court. The trial judge
correctly stated that the former case arose out of the
same collision, the parties were the same, and the evi-
dence substantially the same in the two cases. He was
of the opinion that the law of the case had been determin-
ed by this Court in that case and on that basis granted
the aforementioned peremptory instruction.

HBB The trial court was in error in holding that the
decision rendered by this Court in the former case be-
came the law of this case. The two cases arose out of
the same accident and parties were the same, but they
were different cases. Plaintiffs elected to file a suit for
the death of Sherry Lynn Walters and a separate suit
for the death of John Miles Walters. MIE The doctrine
of ‘the law of the case is confined in its operation to
subsequent proceedings in the same case. Continental
Turp. & Rosin Co. v. Gulf Naval Stores, 244 Miss. 465,
142 So. 24 200 (1962).

Appellees rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
They contend that the question of the negligence of the
driver of the Bush truck was an essential element in
the former case and that issue was actually determined
by the valid and final judgment in that case, and under
the collateral estoppel aspects of the doctrine of res
judicata, Bush is estopped from again relitigating the
same issue in this suit.

The collateral estoppel aspect of the doctrine of res
judicata has been given considerable attention by this
Court in the recent cases of Johnson v. Bagby, 252 Miss.
125, 171 So. 2d 327 (1965); Garraway v. Retail Credit
Co., 244 Miss. 376, 141 So. 2d 727 (1962), and Lyle Cashi-
on Co. v. MeKendrick, 227 Miss. 894, 87 So. 2d 289 (1956).
Those cases are authority for the proposition that where
a question essential to a judgment is actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment, that de-

|

termination is conclusive between the same parties or
their privies in a subsequent suit on a different cause
of action.

HEM Appellee did not plead or rely on collateral
estoppel in the trial court. That is sufficient reason to
decline the application of the doctrine in this Court,
however, we determine the applicability of the doctrine
for the guidance of the trial court on retrial.

In the first Garraway suit, the questions of malice and
bad faith and privilege were litigated and determined
by a valid final judgment, but the court held that these
issues could be relitigated under the particular cireum-
stances, The Court held that the nature and purpose of
the prior action required the narrowing of the applica-
tion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

In the prior Bush Construction Company case, supra,
the only negligence issue was whether Musgrove, driver
of the Bush truck, was guilty of some negligence proxi-
mately contributing to the collision in which Sherry Lynn
‘Walters was killed. The question of the contributory
negligence of John Miles Walters was not involved. In
this case, the issues of negligence were different in that
the negligence of John Miles Walters would require the
jury to diminish the damages in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to John Miles Walters. Miss.
Code Ann. § 1454 (1956). Only a part of the overall
negligence issue involved in the second case was litigated
in the prior case. A very similar situation was involved
in Johnson v. Bagby, supra, and this Court held that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply.

The contributory negligence of John Miles Walters
was not essential to the prior judgment and was not
litigated in that suit. The comparative negligence statute
was not involved. We are of the opinion that it would
confuse the issues to apply the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in this case. Moreover, its application would
not serve the purposes underlying the doctrine. It would

not end the litigation, for all the evidence had to be
introduced in the second case so that the jury could
properly determine the issues of negligence and dam-
ages. Vaughan v. Bollis, 221 Miss. 589, 73 So. 2d 160
(1954).

HB We conclude that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel should not be applied to this case because of
the difference between the issues of negligence in the
two cases, which differences also involve the question
of damages under the comparative negligence statute.
The cases relied on by appellees are not controlling.

HEE The court refused an instruction requested by
the defendant that John Miles Walters failed to stop
at the stop sign before entering into Highway 588, and
if the jury believed from the evidence that the failure
to stop was the sole proximate cause of the injuries and
death of the deceased, the jury should find for the de-
fendants. We are of the opinion that the defendants
were entitled to a peremptory instruction that John
Miles Walters failed to stop at the stop sign because
the evidence is uncontradicted that he did fail to stop.
Tf this was the sole cause of the accident the jury should
have found for the defendants.

MEE Appellants complain of the refusal of a request-
ed instruction appearing in the record at page 42, based.
on Mississippi Code Annotated section 8197 (1956). We
are of the opinion that the court committed no error
for the instruction is not worded in accordance with the
requirements of the statute. I We are of the opinion
that defendant was entitled to an instruction based on
said code section if it had been properly drawn.

HEE Appellants contend that the lower court erred
in granting plaintiffs the following instruction: ‘‘The
court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that under the
law of the State of Mississippi that if the driver of the
gravel truck was guilty of negligence which proximately
contributed to the collision, then your verdict will be

275

for the plaintiff’? This instruction is erroneous for
the reason that it failed to tell the jury what would con-
stitute negligence on the part of the driver of the gravel
truck. It allowed the jury to make its own law on the
question of negligence. We find no other instruction cur-
ing this error. Meridian City Lines v. Baker, 206 Miss.
58, 39 So. 24 541 (1949) ; Annot., 8 A.L.R. 2d 854 (1949).

We do not reach the question of the amount of dam-
ages. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial
on all issues. ~ .

Reversed and remanded.

Lee, C. J., and Brady, Patterson and Inzer, JJ., concur.

Prarsow v. State
No. 43651 November 15, 1965 179 So. 2d 792

SN
I |

Robertshaw & Merideth, Greenville, for appellant.

R. Hugo Newcomb, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

278

Lun, C. J.

R. B. Pearson was indicted by the grand jury of
‘Washington County for the murder of one Fred Johnson
Ellis. The trial jury found him guilty of manslaughter
and he was sentenced to the penitentiary for eight years.
From that judgment, he appealed.

Before 6:00 o’clock A.M. on Sunday, June 21, 1964,
Ellis was shot to death on the premises of Rose Oil
Company, where he worked as an employee. Otis R.
Wilson, who worked at the same place, roomed across
the street from the station, about 50 or 60 feet away.
About 5:40 that morning he heard a gun shot and a man
hollering from the station. He jumped up, opened the
door, and saw Ellis lying on the ground in front of
two gas pumps on the north end of the station. A man
was standing over him with a double barreled shotgun
pointed at his head, and was telling him ‘‘If you don’t
hush, I will shoot you again.’’ Wilson called his land-
lady, Mrs. Martin, and asked her to get a doctor, an

— ll

ambulance, and the law. By the time he dressed and
got over to the station, Pearson was walking toward
his truck, which was parked in the back of the lot. He
observed a 24 quart oil container, with the cans lying
around, and oil running out of the shot pierced cans
and from under the body of the wounded man. Ellis
was lying on his stomach hollering for somebody to
help him. A number of pictures of the scene were in-
troduced in evidence, together with the shotgun, the
death weapon.

Mrs. Christine Martin, in whose home Wilson roomed,
on the early morning in question, heard a gun shot. She
raised the curtain and looked out naturally in the direc-
tion of the oil station because it was so close. She then
went out on the porch and saw the accused, R. B. Pear-
son. He was close to the oil tanks on the front. He had
a long gun, pointed toward the ground. Otis Wilson had
called to her and she had called the ambulance, Dr. Jack
Wilson and Mrs. Glen Taylor. Pearson’s truck was
parked on the end of the street. At that time, he ap-
proached and got in it. Mrs. Martin asked him ‘‘had
he Killed the man’’. He replied, ‘‘I have shot him;’’
and ‘‘eall the law; I will learn him to not break up a
man’s family.’’ Ellis was on the ground in front of the
gas tank at the time.

R. C. Pruitt, the assistant chief of police of Hollan-
dale, was in a cafe across the street from the city jail
when he was informed that someone needed to see him.
When he walked out of the cafe, he saw Pearson across
the street, standing in front of the jail. He had a 16-
gauge double barreled shotgun in his hand. The witness
walked over and asked Pearson what the trouble was,
and he replied that he had shot Johnson Ellis, — and
“he probably needs a doctor.’? Pearson handed the
gun over. It was unbreeched, the empty shell in the right
barrel and the unfired No. 6 shot shell in the left were
both taken out. Pearson gave himself up and was put

in jail. After the lock-up, the officer went to the scene,
where he saw oil cans scattered about 5 to 10 feet from
the body, and oil was around the body and running off
on the ground. His description was in agreement with
that of the other witnesses.

Harold Shaw, chief of police, went to the scene. He
said that there were good sized holes in the cans; and
that he put them in a paper bag. He identified 2 of
the cans and exhibited a cardboard, with shot holes,
which he had cut off the case. He went back to the
police station and was there present, with officers Mat-
thews and Pruitt, when Pearson, in the jail, knocked
on the door and said he wanted to talk.

A. L. Matthews, a deputy sheriff of Washington
County, saw Shaw and Pruitt at the police station. After
talking to these officers 3 or 4 minutes, they heard a
rap onthe jail door. Pearson wanted a drink of water.
The witness told him to come in and get it. Pearson
did so. It was then about 7:00 o’clock in the morning.
Matthews asked Pearson if he had anything he wanted
to tell. Pearson asked if he had to, and Matthews ad-
vised him that he did not, that he had a right for an
attorney, and there was a telephone if he wanted to
use it; but that if he had anything to tell him, he would
listen; and if not, he had other things to do. Pearson
said that he wanted to talk and that he could see a lawyer
after he got to Greenville. He then walked over to the
desk and sat down. The officer had known him about
15 years. He appeared to be ‘‘somewhat emotionally
upset’? and ‘‘like he was a little nervous.’? At this
juncture, the evidence concerning the admissibility of
the statement by Pearson was heard in the absence of
the jury, adjudged to be free and voluntary and to
be admissible.

Succinctly stated, Pearson’s account of the transac-
tion was as follows: Ellis had been giving him trouble
with his wife for several years. He went to the station

that morning and told Ellis if he did not leave town
— he would be back — and if he had not left town, he
was going to kill him. He had been that morning over
to his sister’s home, then had come back, and had gone
to the cabin where his ex-wife, ‘‘Doll’’, was, and that
he brought her down to open the store which she had
been operating for him a few days. That was when
he got the shotgun, went back to the service station, told
Hillis that he had already asked him to leave town,
and that he had given all the trouble that he was going
to take about his wife. He said that he got to the station,
walked around it, and Ellis was coming out of the build-
ing with a case of oil in his hand. He said that he told
Ellis to put the oil down, but he would not do so. He
said that he shot him, but he was actually trying to
shoot his privates off. Then he told Ellis if he did not
stop hollering he was going to shoot him again. After
that, he went to the police station and gave up to officer
Pruitt. On cross-examination of officer Shaw, it was
brought out that Pearson also said that, several months
before, he caught his wife and Ellis together in the store,
and he told Ellis at that time to stay away from his
wife or he would kill him. Officers Pruitt and Shaw,
in their evidence, fully corroborated the statement of
Deputy Sheriff Matthews.

Drs. Jack K. Wilson and George F. Archer testified in
effect that the cause of death was the blast of a shotgun
in the abdomen about the region of the navel, fired from
a short distance, and that it was a fatal wound.

‘When the State rested, the defendant made a motion
for a directed verdict of not guilty which was denied.

Jack A. Newton, a witness for the defendant, testi-
fied that he had property near the city cemetery; and
that he knew the automobiles owned by the deceased
Ellis and Mrs. Grace Pearson. On inquiry as to whether
the witness had occasion to see Mrs. Pearson and the

deceased anywhere near his property, the same was
objected to and sustained.

The defendant then moved the court for permission
to take the stand in his behalf for the limited purpose
only of showing an overt act on the part of the deceased
toward him so as to lay a proper predicate for the ad-
missibility of the proffered testimony. This limited
appearance was to be out of the presence of the jury.
This motion was denied.

The State then made a motion to suppress and exclude
the testimony of the witness Jack A. Newton which had
already been adduced before the jury, on the ground
of irrelevancy and immateriality, but this motion was
overruled and denied.

The proffered evidence of Jack A. Newton was con-
tinued outside the presence of the jury. The witness
had observed Ellis and Mrs. Pearson parked in the ceme-
tery half a dozen times. On one occasion, about ten
days before the killing, Pearson asked him about this,
and he merely replied that this had happened.

Wash Bishop, outside the presence of the jury, tes-
tified that he was the cemetery caretaker. Pretty regu-
larly he had seen Ellis and Mrs. Pearson in the ceme-
tery, usually about 8:00 A. M. Mr. Pearson had asked
him about this and wanted to know if he had seen them
loving one another, and he told him he had not.

Alex Savannah testified that he had seen Hllis and
Mrs. Pearson together four times. Twice they were
in the same car, but the places were different. He saw
them in the store hugging and putting their arms around.
each other.

Billy Ray Allen was an employee of the Rose Oil
Company. He testified that Mrs. Pearson had brought
food to Ellis. There were frequent telephone conversa-
tions between them. He finally forbade Ellis the use
of his car in meeting with Mrs. Pearson, when he found
out about such meetings. On the day when the inventory

283

was to be taken by a representative from Vicksburg,
Ellis told him that he ‘‘had to be away’’; that Mrs.
Pearson already had the room; and that he could not
stay away. Ellis left at 2:00 P. M. and did not return
until 5:00 or 6:00 P. M. Pearson later asked Ellis
about their relations, and he told Ellis what he had
heard. He also talked to Ellis about Pearson’s inquiry
made of him. Ellis did not appear to be afraid, in fact,
he said that he was not afraid; that the ‘‘Old Bear’’
was not going to do anything; and that he was just
going to growl.
. Frank Gaines, out of the presence of the jury, merely
said that he had seen these parties together.

William Stacy Kellum, out of the presence of the
jury, testified that he had seen Ellis and Mrs. Pearson
together a number of times. One occasion was about
the last of August 1963, between 3:00 and 4:00 P. M.
He saw them rendezvous on the eastern road near Leroy
Percy Park. They parked on this road and left the
pickup truck. She got in the car with Mr. Hillis and
they drove off in the direction of the woods.

Bill Lowery, out of the presence of the jury, testified
that Pearson wanted to talk to him; that he was trying
to plant beans and keep the store open; and that he
was worried about his family. He then had a conversa-
tion with Ellis and expressed his concern for both. The
subject was this trouble between them. He said that it
kind of tickled Ellis at first — he laughed a bit. He
said ‘Did Mr. Pearson tell you he was going to kill
me? I told him ‘‘No, sir, he didn’t.’? He then said that
he knew he was talking out of turn and maybe he should
not talk, but that he was worried about what might
happen under the circumstances. Ellis’ comment was
“Don’t worry about it; if he was going to kill me he
would have killed me a long time ago.’? That was on
Saturday morning before the killing occurred the next
morning.

—

None of the evidence which was offered in the ab-
sence of the jury was admitted by the court, after mo-
tion for admission had been made.

Pearson, in his own behalf, after giving a personal
history, told about his coming from the field one day
and unexpectedly finding Ellis in the store with Mrs.
Pearson sitting in his lap. At that time, he told Hillis
that he had been running after his wife for a long time
and that he had a bellyful of it; that he had three little
girls whom he loved; that he did not want his home broken
up; and for him to stay away from her. Ellis left re-
luctantly and acted in a ‘‘belligerent manner about it.’’
He and his wife had a fuss. She told him that she liked
Ellis. She moved out and never returned to his bed-
room again. She left with the children on June 4, and
went to Vicksburg. On June 23, he had called his wife
over the telephone and asked her to bring the children
up to see him. She came that night. He had them at
his home, but she left with them about midnight, going
back to Vicksburg. He did not want to remain at his
home and so, he went out on Highway 82 to the home
of his sister, Mrs. Gilbert Weeks, where he spent the
balance of the night merely talking. He went back to
Hollandale, to the store, after leaving his sister, but
he could not stay there. He went to the house, changed
his clothes, and decided to go to Vicksburg. However,
after he had almost reached Percy, he decided that it
would be best to come back. On the return, he was
approaching the Rose Station, saw Hillis on the North
side, and stopped to talk to him about this trouble. Ellis’
reply was ‘‘I don’t have to talk to you, and I don’t
have to leave. If you want anybody to go, you go.”? With
that Ellis started toward the accused, and put his hand
in his righthand pocket like he was going to attack. Pear-
son hurried away and went to the store where he got his
shotgun, and loaded both barrels. He then went back
to the station, determined to talk to Ellis. After stopping

285

on the north side, he walked around the side of his pick-
up truck. Just then Ellis came out of the station with
the case of oil in his hands. He tried to get Hillis to put
the oil down and talk to him, as he meant to have an
agreement of some kind with Ellis that day. He asked
him the second time to put the oil down; but Ellis turned
to the left, and started toward him with the oil raised
like he was going to throw it at him. Pearson said that
he pulled the shotgun off the seat of the pickup and
fired one shot at the box of oil, not the man.

Pearson did not remember telling Mrs. Martin any-
thing except to call the law and a doctor. He did not
remember that he told officer Pruitt that he had shot
Ellis. Instead he told him that he had shot a box of oil,
and Ellis might be hit.

HE The appellant contends that the statement or
confession was not admissible; and he bases this con-
tention largely on the case of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U. S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. ed. 2d 977 (1964).
In that decision, the Supreme Court of the United States,
by a majority vote, at page 986 of 12 L. ed. 2d, laid
down the following principle:

«““We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investi-
gation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
erime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police custody, the
police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the sus-
pect has requested and been denied an opportunity to
consult with his lawyer, and the police have not ef-
fectively warned him of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied
‘the Assistance of Counsel’ in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution as ‘made obligatory
upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,’ Gide-
on v. Wainwright, 372 US, at 342, 9 L ed 2d at 804,
93 ALR 2d 733, and that no statement elicited by the

police during the interrogation may be used against

him at a criminal trial.”

In the present appeal, there was no question as to the
identity of the killer — he walked into the police station,
of his own accord, with a double barreled shotgun in
his hands. When the officer asked what was the matter,
he replied that he shot Ellis and he probably needed
a doctor. After his incarceration in the jail, about 7:00
o’clock that morning, when the officer returned from
an investigation of the scene, there was a knock on the
jail door. When an answer was returned and the ap-
pellant asked if he might have a drink of water, he
was assured that he could do so, and he was directed
to the water fountain. When the officer inquired wheth-
er he had anything to tell, and the appellant asked if
he had to do that, the officer promptly advised him
that he did not; that he was entitled to an attorney;
and that the telephone, there in the room, was available
to him. Actually there was a suggestion that he had
better wait to say anything until he had consulted with
an attorney; and that, if he did not have anything to
say, the officer had to be about his other duties. The
appellant then said that he would just go ahead and
tell and that he could see a lawyer after he got to
Greenville.

HI In the present case, the appellant was taken.
into custody on his voluntary admission that he was
the offender. There was no interrogation. It was ex-
plained to him that he did not have to make any state-
ment about the matter, that he was entitled to an at-
torney; that it would perhaps be better for him to wait
for an attorney’s advice, and his attention was called
to the telephone by which he could then get in touch
with an attorney. No pressure of any kind was brought
upon the appellant by the officers or anyone else. It
is not claimed or even suggested that he was threatened,
or that any promises of any kind were extended. If there

287

was ever a free and voluntary statement and admis-
sion by an offender, this is such a case. The admission
and confession was free and voluntary and was admis-
sible beyond the peradventure of a doubt. The Missis-
sippi cases on this subject are legion. Some of them
are Nicholson v. State, 2835 Miss. 273, 108 ‘So. 2d 842
(1959) ; Thompson v. State, 231 Miss, 624, 97 So. 2d
227 (1957); Johnson v. State, 223 Miss. 56, 76 So.
2d 841 (1955), cert. den. 349 U. S. 946, 75 Sup. Ct. 874,
99 L. ed. 1272 (1955); Holmes v. State, 56 So. 2d 815
(1952), not reported in Mississippi Reports; and au-
thorities cited in those decisions.

The appellant also contends that the court erred in
refusing to let him take the stand as a witness in the
absence of the jury in order to show an overt act toward.
him at the time of the fatal difficulty.

MED Self defense is an affirmative plea. While we
are taught that ‘‘as a man thinketh in his heart, so is
he,’’ at the same time others can judge him only by
what his acts, either in words or conduct, imply. He
can say what he intends, but it is indeed a truism that
what one does speaks so loud that others cannot hear
what he says.

In Pitts v. State, 211 Miss. 268, 290, 51 So. 2d 448,
457 (1951), this Court said:

“The right to kill in self-defense is 5 founded on neces-

sity, real or apparent. 26 Am. Jur., Homicide, Sec.

187. In order to justify or excuse the taking of human

life in self-defense, ‘the danger of peril of loss of

life or the infliction of serious bodily harm must be

or appear to be, impending and emminent ... so
urgent and pressing that it is necessary for him to
kill in order to save himself ....’ Citing C. J. S,

Homicide, Sec. 123, p. 1000.”

The above rule was followed in Denham v. State, 218
Miss. 423, 67 So. 2d 445 (1953). In that case it was
pointed out that while Denham testified that he believed

288

that Kemp, in going toward his clothes, was trying to
get a gun and that his shooting of Kemp was in self-
defense, there was no evidence whatever that he had
any fear or apprehension for his life or safety so far
as his wife was concerned.

HEM The evidence, which was proffered by the ap-
pellant and excluded by the court, dealing with the re-
lationship between the deceased and Mrs. Pearson, was
insufficient to constitute threats on the part of the de-
ceased. The illegitimate relationship between Ellis and
Mrs. Pearson did not license the killing. MM The
killer, who overtakes his mate in the act of adultery, in
the charity of the law, is still guilty of manslaughter.
Denham v. State, supra.

The case of Brown v. State, 22 Miss. 166, 40 So.
737 (1906), cited by the appellant, is not in point. In
that case, there had been a previous difficulty. In the
present case, the excluded evidence did not show a dif-
ficulty. Neither did it show threats by the deceased
against the appellant. On the contrary, that evidence -
showed a disbelief of fear on the part of Ellis that
Pearson was going to harm him.

HEME The action of the court evinced in no way the
purpose to require the appellant to present his case in
any particular way of manner. The court simply refused
to permit inadmissible and incompetent evidence to be
introduced. Consequently, the court’s action is not sub-
ject to the condemnation of Bell v. State, 66 Miss. 192,
5 So. 389 (1888), as well as other cases, cited by the
appellant.

Actually the case of Cain v. State, 135 Miss. 892, 100
So. 578 (1924), is directly in point on this question. While
the statement of facts is lengthy, the applicable part
is focused where the accused attempted to show by the
witness Irwin that he had a conversation with Holly,
the deceased, on Friday before the killing occurred on
Monday ; that he upbraided Holly for taking Cain’s wife

Tc a

away from him; that Cain was liable to hurt him; that
he should stay away; that Holly at first protested that
he was innocent and then acknowledged that he was
going to take Cain’s wife and marry her; ‘‘that Cain
was a damned cur and won’t do anything’’ and that he
was not afraid of him. The trial court excluded this
evidence, saying that it was simply an effort to inject
into the case the so-called unwritten law. That ruling
by the trial court was approved by this Court.

Manifestly, the court was correct in refusing to admit
the evidence which did not amount to threats of any
kind.

The appellant also contends that he was entitled to
have his requested peremptory instruction for the jury
to find him not guilty, on the ground that his statement
afforded complete justification. The basis of this con-
tention is the rule so clearly set out in the case of Weath-
ersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481 (1933), which
has been subsequently cited many times in the authorities
of this jurisprudence.

The facts, as stated in the foregoing summary, demon-
strate clearly that this rule has no application in the
present case.

Finally, the appellant contends that the action of
the court, based on a special bill of exceptions which
arose out of an incident during the State’s closing ar-
gument to the jury, constituted reversible error.

Both the State and the defendant secured a number
of written instructions. Several of the instructions for
the defense dwelt on the alleged peaceful purpose and
intention of the defendant to seek a settlement of the
trouble, which had arisen as a result of alleged improper
relations between the deceased and the defendant’s wife.
Those instructions were grounded upon the principle
that, if such was the approach of the defendant, and
the deceased, in turn, assumed a hostile manner toward
the defendant and evinced the intent to inflict great

bodily harm upon him, and that there was imminent
danger that such design would be accomplished, then
the defendant was not required to wait until the deceased
commenced an actual attack upon him, but had a right
to anticipate the action of the deceased and shoot him
if it reasonably appeared to be necessary to the defend-
ant for his self defense.

Counsel for the State was making a strong argument
for conviction. The record shows the statements by coun-
sel, the objections by opposite counsel, and the actions
by the court as follows:

“And, gentlemen, when you find yourselves as citizens

serving here as jurors in such a case as this, there

is only one thing for you to fall back on, and that is
the law, and it is not the law that a husband, if he
even knew, if he knew that his wife had been un-
faithful to him, if he knew that his wife had been
unfaithful to him with a particular man, had any

right or justification or authority of law to kill a

man.

MR. MERIDETH: Objection.

BY THE COURT: Let the objection be noted, and

counsel is cautioned not to pursue that line any fur-

ther, and the jury is instructed to disregard it. You
may proceed.

MR. MERIDETH: We move for a mistrial.

“BY THE COURT: That motion is DENIED.

MR. WEBB: I shall not pursue anything further

with reference to husband and wife? (MR. WEBB

CONFERS WITH THE COURT)

MR. WEBB: (To jury) The consultation has been

for clarification of the Court’s ruling, and cownsel has

been permitted to make this statement to you, and that
there is nothing im these instructions nor in the law
which would justify the defendant in killing or give
him any authority of law im killing the deceased be-
cause of any knowledge that he had of any infidelity

291

between the deceased and his wife. That is the state-

ment that we are making.

MR. MERIDETH: I would like to make an exception

of the same nature and request that the jury be in-

structed to disregard it.

BY THE COURT: That motion is DENIED.

MR. MERIDETH: We now make a motion for a

mistrial.

BY THE COURT: That motion will be DENIED.

ARGUMENT CONTINUED BY MR. WEBB:

You gentlemen have understood what I have said

to you, I have stated it twice very carefully, and the

Court has permitted me to state it to you, and if it

was not proper, the Court would not have allowed

me to do that and I would not have proceeded with
it.’’ (Emphasis supplied).

The learned trial judge, when the first statement was
objected to, evidently realized that counsel was tread-
ing on dangerous ground, for he cautioned counsel not
to pursue that line any further, and the jury was in-
structed to disregard it. Immediately, the counsel con-
ferred with the judge. This was in the presence and
sight of the jury, but the conversation between the two
was evidently not audible because the court reporter
did not report the conversation between them. Follow-
ing the consultation for clarification, as it was denomi-
nated by the counsel, the jury was informed by counsel
that he ‘‘has been permitted to make this statement to
you.’? The permitted statement was of the same scope
and character as the previous statement which had been
condemned and which the judge had instructed the jury
to disregard.

MME In the first place, circuit judges must give in-
structions in writing. Miss. Code Ann. sec. 1530 (1956).
This mandate to him can not be nullified by his per-
mitting counsel to give an oral instruction for him, or
orally alter one already given by him.

This was a very unfortunate development. Circuit
judges in this State have great power and have always
been highly honorable and respectable officers. In the
ease of Green v. State, 97 Miss. 834, 838, 53 So. 415,
416 (1910), in recognizing the great influence of these
officers and the worthiness of the occupants of this hon-
orable position, it was said:

“Tt is a matter of common knowledge that jurors, as
well as officers in attendance upon court, are very
susceptible to the influence of the judge. The sheriff
and his deputies, as a rule, are anxious to do his
bidding; and jurors watch closely his conduct, and
give attention to his language, that they may, if
possible, ascertain his leaning to one side or the other,
which, if known, often largely influences their ver-
dict. He cannot be too careful and guarded in lan-
guage and conduct in the presence of the jury to avoid
prejudice to either party. 21 Eney. P. and P. 994,
995, and notes. The court will not stop to inquire
whether the jury was actually influenced by the con-
duct of the judge. All the authorities hold that, if
they were exposed to improper influences, which might
have produced the verdict, the presumption of law
is against its purity; and testimony will not be heard
to rebut this presumption. It is a conclusive presump-
tion.’’

The above excerpt was approved and followed in Col-
lins v. State, 99 Miss. 47, 51, 54 So. 665-66 (1910). It
was again repeated in Dickinson v. Koenig, Admr., 242
Miss. 17, 183 So. 2d 721 (1961).

WME The Court has a very high regard for the
learned judge who presided over this trial, and feels
certain that it was not his purpose to become a partisan
or to influence the verdict of the jury. However, the
jury could have thought that the judge was, in fact,
telling them that the defendant was without any defense,
and was urging them to convict; and that, since they

| a

did not know just what was being said between the judge
and the attorney, the judge was throwing the weight
of his influence behind the prosecution. Judges should
not, at any time, during a trial, manifest hostility toward
a defendant; but at all times, should appear fair and
impartial.

As heretofore stated in the cited cases:

“The court will not stop to inquire whether the jury

was actually influenced by the conduct of the judge.

All the authorities hold that, if they were exposed

to improper influences, which might have produced

the verdict, the presumption of law is against its puri-

ty; and testimony will not be heard to rebut this

presumption. It is a conclusive presumption.’’ 99

Miss. 47, 51, 54 So. 665-66: (Emphasis supplied).

MEE For the error, growing out of this incident in
the closing argument, the cause must be and it is, re-
versed and remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Rogers, Brady, Patterson and Inger, JJ., concur.

a
Starz, Ex Rev. Parrurson, Use Apams County v.
‘Warren, et al.

No, 43653 November 22, 1965 180 So. 2d 293

tend
for
a

bo

96

January 31, 1966 182 So. 2d 234

Joe T. Patterson, Atty. Gen., Jackson; Matthew
Harper, Jr., Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Laurel, for ap-
pellant.

98

|

Watkins & Eager, Jackson; Laub, Adams, Forman &
Truly, Natchez, for appellees.

Erurmce, P. J.

This suit was brought in the Chancery Court of
Adams County by Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of
the State of Mississippi, and EH. B. Golding, State Audi-
tor of Public Accounts, for and on behalf of the state
for the use and benefit of Adams County. The de-
fendants were the five incumbent members of the Board
of Supervisors of Adams County; the executors of the
estate of a former member of the board; the widow and
sole devisee and legatee of a former member; two other
former members of the board; the chancery clerk and
clerk of the board; the attorney for the board; a person
who received certain engineering fees from the super-
visors; and the corporate sureties on the official bonds
of these persons. Before trial, the court dismissed the
state auditor as a party complainant, because, it thought,
the statutory demand upon defendants prior to suit was
inadequate. After a lengthy trial on the merits, the
court did not decide the factual issues, but dismissed
the attorney general as the other party complainant,
and thus dismissed the suit. It concluded the attorney
general did not have the right to bring this type of
action, because it was of local and not statewide interest.
From these decrees the state through its attorney gen-
eral and state auditor have appealed.

The issues involve (1) the sufficiency of the written
demand on defendants by the auditor; (2) the power
of the attorney general to bring this suit for the state;
and (3) whether this action by the state is a ‘‘personal
action’’ which survives against the sureties and the per-
sonal representatives, and devisees and legatees of de-
ceased members of the county board of supervisors,
charged with appropriations of county funds to objects
not authorized by law. We hold that both the auditor
and attorney general properly brought this suit, and
that the action survived. Hence the orders of the chan-
cery court are reversed, and the cause remanded for
findings of fact and a decree by that court.

The bill of complaint (filed in 1957) charged that an
audit of the books, records and financial affairs of the
Board of Supervisors of Adams County, for the years
from January 1952 through January 1957, inclusive,
disclosed certain expenditures not authorized by law for
which the members of the board of supervisors for such
period of time, the clerk of the board, and the other
named defendants became liable in various respects. In
forty-eight counts the bill charged in detail numerous
illegal appropriations and expenditures by the board
of supervisors, totaling (after settlement of one item)
the sum of $298,797.34. It prayed that after hearing
the court would render judgment against the defendants
jointly and severally for that sum, which, it alleged,
had been illegally and unlawfully expended by defend-
ants in the construction and purchase of materials and
to other objects not authorized by law.

Before the trial, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the bill on the ground that complainants had failed to
comply with the statute by making a written demand
on each and all of the defendants in a manner and form
sufficient to advise each of the amount he owed; that
certain of the defendants were members of the board
of supervisors for only a few weeks or months, and were

301

not liable for appropriations made at a time when they
were not members. In March 1959 the chancery court
dismissed the state auditor as a party complainant, on
the ground this officer made a demand not in compli-
ance with the statute. At that time it stated that, al-
though the law was not clear, the attorney general had
the right under his broad common law powers to con-
tinue prosecution of the suit for the state.

The case was tried in November 1961 with the at-
torney general continuing in the suit as party complain-
ant. There was a lengthy trial, with considerable testi-
mony and documentary evidence, following which the
chancery court took the case under advisement, with coun-
sel to furnish briefs by April 1962. However, on March
8, 1963, the court entered an order remanding the cause
to the docket for further pleadings and evidence. It
recited that the court had heard the evidence and receiv-
ed written briefs, but there was insufficient evidence to
enable it to reach a fair and equitable decree. The
cause was remanded to the docket for further proof,
particularly in the matter of apportioning liability, if
any, among the several defendants,

The defendants then entered a plea to jurisdiction,
and a motion to dismiss: the subject matter of the litiga-
tion was ‘‘purely of local interest and not of statewide
concern’’ and the attorney general was without power to
maintain an action only local in nature. The chancery
court sustained this motion and dismissed the case on
June 20, 1963. After considerable delay in getting the
record to this Court, for many reasons including the
illness of the court reporter and her absence, and after
the issuance of a writ of certiorari from this Court, the
record was filed here on February 1, 1965.

The first question involves sufficiency of the written
demand made by the state auditor on defendants. Mis-
sissippi Code Annotated section 3877-01 (being Laws of
1952, ch. 176, § 1), created a State Department of Audit

under supervision of the State Auditor. Section 3877-
05 (6) provides:
The department shall have the power and it shall be
its duty: ...
(6) To make written demand, when necessary, for
the recovery of any amounts representing public funds
improperly withheld, misappropriated, and/or other-
wise illegally expended by an officer, employee, or
administrative body of any state, county, or other pub-
lic office, and/or for the recovery of the value of any
public property disposed of in an unlawful manner
by a public officer, employee, or administrative body,
such demands to be made upon the person or persons
liable for such amounts and upon the surety on of-
ficial bond thereof, provided that each such demand
shall grant to the person or persons upon which it
is made the privilege of paying into the proper treas-
ury the amount demanded within thirty (30) days
from date thereof, together with interest thereon in
the sum of six per cent (6%) from date such amount
is shown to be due; in the event, however, such person
or persons shall refuse, neglect or otherwise fail to
pay the amount demanded and the interest due thereon.
within the allotted thirty (30) days, the department
shall have authority and it shall be its duty to institute
suit and the attorney general shall prosecute the same
in any court of the state to the end that there shall
be recovered the total of such amounts from the per-
son or persons and surety on official bond named
therein; and the amounts so recovered shall be paid
into the proper treasury of the state, county, or other
public body, through the office of the department; .. .
The written demand, dated April 27, 1957, was signed
by the State Auditor, and was addressed to the five
incumbents of the Board of Supervisors of Adams Coun-
ty, being Messrs. Warren, Longmire, Carter, Brown and
Callon. It was also addressed to Mrs. Betty Carter and

303

James Carter, executors of the estate of H. W. Carter,
former member, but this was later amended to apply
to Mrs. Carter as sole heir and devisee; to Mrs. Betty
Carter, former member of the board; to Mrs. Clara
McGehee, executrix of the estate of F. M. McGehee,
former member of the board; and Robert E. Burns,
Chancery Clerk and Clerk of the Board of Supervisors;
and to the surety companies for all these parties. The
letter stated:

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to authority vested in me under Section
5(6), Chapter 176, Laws of 1952, as head of the State
Department of Audit, I hereby make formal demand
on you for payment into the treasury of Adams Coun-
ty, Mississippi, through my office within thirty (30)
days from date thereof, of the sum of three hundred
thousand, five hundred seventy five dollars and forty
eight cents ($300,575.48) which represents in the ag-
gregate:

(1) The amount of misused county

funds by the board of supervis-
ors and the clerk of the board
during the years 1952 through
1956 $283,561.78

(2) Interest due thereon computed on
the basis of six percent (6%)
for one (1) year under Section
5(6), Chapter 176, Laws of
1962 17,018.70

otal ene $300,575.48

An itemized statement of the above demand is at-
tached thereto.

Please be advised that in event full settlement of
this demand is not made within thirty (30) days, it
is my duty under the laws of the State of Mississippi

304

to institute suit and the Attorney General shall prose-

cute same in any court of the state to the end that the

total amount thereof shall be recovered.

Attached to this letter was a ‘‘Summary of Illegal
Expenditures and Unauthorized Use of County Equip-
ment Resulting in a Loss and Waste of Adams County
Taxpayers’ Funds,’’ which contained forty-seven sep-
arate schedules referring to specific items. Following
this was an itemized, detailed specification of each of
the forty-seven schedules.

HEE BE Mississippi Constitution 1890, section 161 gives
the chancery court concurrent jurisdiction ‘‘of suits on
bonds of fiduciaries and public officers for failure to
account for money or property received, or wasted or
lost by neglect or failure to collect, ...’’ Code section
8877-05 (6) provides the state auditor may bring suits
of this nature. He must make (1) a ‘‘written demand,’
(2) for ‘“‘such amounts’’ withheld, misappropriated, or
expended, (3) to be made upon the ‘‘person or persons
liable for such amounts and upon the surety on official
bond thereof.’’ (4) The demand must ‘‘grant to the
person or persons upon whom it is made the privilege
of paying ... the amount demanded within thirty days.”

A substantial compliance with the statutory require-
ment of a written demand is sufficient. NM We think
the present one was adequate. It specified in detail
the instances in which there was alleged irregularities
and unlawful appropriations, and identified each. It
contained a summary of the alleged illegal expenditures,
and a detailed specification of each of the 47 schedules
of the asserted improper expenditures. This was a
detailed statement of the nature, source, time and amount
of each item.

HEE No particular form of demand is required by
the act, if it notifies the defendant of the alleged improper
expenditures and gives them an opportunity to perform
their duties as to them. See Truax v. Parvis, 12 Del.

305

330, 32 Atl. 227 (1886); 1 C.J.S. Actions § 27(c) (1936).
Any language intended to constitute a demand which
plainly informs the party of whom the demand is made
that he is requested to perform the duty or obligation
to which it refers is sufficient. See Mullally v. Town-
send, 119 Cal. 47, 50 Pac. 1066 (1897); 1 Am. Jur. 2d
Actions § 84 (1962).

HEM Appelices argue that section 3877-05(6) created
this right of action in the state auditor, and conditioned
it upon his first making a written demand. However,
the statute does not create a new cause of action, since
such a right of action was in existence before its en-
actment. Miss. Code Ann. § 2944 (1956); Paxton v.
Baum, 59 Miss. 531 (1882); Miller v. Tucker, 142 Miss.
146, 105 So. 774 (1925); Coleman v. Shipp, 223 Miss.
516, 78 So. 2d 778 (1955). Since the statute does not
create the right of action, it is not an integral part
of the cause of action in that sense. It is a legislative
requirement which the state auditor must follow by sub-
stantial compliance. Of. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 84
(1962).

The acts complained of were those of members of
the board of supervisors during the specified period
of time, of the chancery clerk, and of employees of the
county. They had, or should have had, personal know-
ledge of them. The statute implements an existing right,
and vests certain powers and duties in the state auditor.

Appellees argue that the demand did not advise each
of them how much money each owed; and the statute
contemplated a demand upon which the recipient could
act. However, it details every alleged unlawful appropri-
ation or irregularity, and identifies every warrant issued
by the board of supervisors. Each defendant knew the
period of his term of office or service for the county,
and thereby was sufficiently advised of the extent of
his liabilities, if any. The demand made upon each de-
fendant for the entire sum, in the letter to which the

itemization was attached, must be read along with the
itemization. When thus interpreted, it constituted a sub-
stantial compliance with the demand provision.

HE Where a party demands more than he is en-
titled to receive, that circumstance alone will not justify
the other party in refusing to deliver or pay that to
which the demandant is entitled, provided it is distinct,
well known and clearly distinguishable from that to
which the latter had no right. Colby v. Reed, 99 U. 8S.
560, 25 L. Wd. 484 (1879). Moreover, we do not see
any way in which the defendants could have been misled
by this detailed and itemized written demand sent to
them by the auditor. The purposes of the statute were
served.

I.

The chancery court also erred in sustaining the de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss the attorney general as the
remaining party complainant for the state in this action,
after trial on the merits.

HEEB The attorney general is a constitutional officer.
Miss. Const. 1890 § 173. He has the powers ‘which were
vested in him at common law, and those which have been
conferred upon him by statute. A chapter in the Code
defines his statutory powers and duties. Miss. Code Ann.
§§ 8826-3851 (1956). Code section 3840 provides: _

The attorney-general shall, at the request of the gov-
ernor or other state officer, in person or by his as-
sistant, prosecute suit on any official bond, or any
contract in which the state is interested, upon a breach
thereof, and prosecute or defend for the state all ac-
tions, civil or criminal, relating to any matter con-
nected with either of the state offices; and he may
require the service or assistant of any district attorney
in and about such matters or suits.

Further, the attorney general is given the power to
represent the state in all suits against the state, and to
act as counsel for any of the state officers, ‘‘in suits

brought by or against them in their official capacity
touching any official duty or trust,...’? Code § 3841.

HEB At common law the duties of the attorney gen-
eral, as chief law officer of a realm, were numerous and
varied. He was chief legal adviser of the crown, was
entrusted with the management of all legal affairs, and
prosecution of all suits, criminal and civil, in which the
crown was interested. He had authority to institute
proceedings to abate public nuisances, affecting public
safety and convenience, to control and manage all liti-
gation on behalf of the state, and to intervene in all
actions which were of concern to the general public. Capi-
tol Stages, Inc. v. State ex rel. Hewitt, District Attorney,
157 Miss. 576, 128 So. 759 (1930) held that the office
of district attorney was carved out of the office of at-
torney general, and made an independent one.

HEEB Accordingly, the cases have held that the pow-
ers of district attorneys are statutory, not common law,
and they cannot encroach upon the powers of the at-
orney general. A district attorney has no authority to
represent the state in litigation outside counties of their
district, or to represent the state in litigation in their
district where the subject matter is of statewide inter-
est, as distinguished from local interest. These princi-
ples have been reiterated in a number of cases. Kenning-
on-Saenger Theaters, Inc. v. State ex rel. District At-
torney, 196 Miss. 841, 18 So. 2d 483 (1944) ; Dunn Const.
Co. v. Craig, 191 Miss. 682, 2 So. 24 166 (1941) ; Graves
v. Hinds County, 166 Miss. 89, 145 So. 900 (1933) ; State
v. Key, 93 Miss. 115, 46 So. 75 (1908).

HEE Among other relevant statutes, the district at-
orney is given the power, with the approval of the
attorney general, to institute and prosecute ‘‘all per-
sons indebted to the state or any county within his
district.’’ Miss. Code Ann. § 3923 (1956). The district
attorney has the duty to appear in the circuit courts and
prosecute for the state in his district all civil cases in

which the state or any county within his district may
be interested. Code § 3920. Members of the board of
supervisors are required to execute a bond with sure-
ties, which bond is a security for any illegal act of such
member, ‘‘and recovery thereon may be had by the
county for any injury by such illegal act of such mem-
ber; ...’? Code § 2872,

The instant case includes charges covering a multi-
tude of activities, responsibilities and duties of the Board
of Supervisors of Adams County. It involves the leg-
ality of the actions of these parties under the general
statutes of the state, dealing with the authorities of
boards of supervisors. Moreover, there is no statute
prohibiting the attorney general from bringing a suit
of this nature. The fact that the district attorney, with
the consent of the attorney general, may bring a suit
of this type, does not limit or exclude the latter’s gen-
eral authority. See People v. Gibson, 53 Colo. 231, 125
Pac. 5381 (1912); 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorney General § 10,
p. 14 (1963).

The instant question pertains to the relationship be-
tween the offices of attorney general and district at-
torney, and the breadth of the former’s powers. The
attorney general, a constitutional officer, determined
that the interests of the people of the state required
him to bring this suit as one of the complainants on behalf
of the state. He apparently concluded that this was a
matter of statewide concern. We think that the issues
are of this nature, pertaining as they do to the duties
and powers of boards of supervisors, not only in Adams
County but in all of the eighty-two counties which are
subdivisions of the state. See 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorney
General § 10 (1963). The common law powers and duties
of the attorney general, as chief law officer of the state,
authorized this action. The attorney general is clothed
with all the common law powers of the office, except
insofar as they have been expressly restricted or modi-

309

fied by statute or the state constitution, and neither
limitation exists here. See Id., § 6.

Ii.

The next question is whether this cause of action sur-
vived after death of two supervisors. Mrs. Betty God-
bold Carter and James H. Carter are joint executors
of the estate of Hillary W. Carter, deceased. The suit
was based upon an audit of the books and financial af-
fairs of the Board of Supervisors of Adams County from
January 1952 through January 1957. Carter had been
a member of the board for many years, and during the
audit period was a member from January 1, 1952, until
his death on August 16, 1956. This suit was filed against
these executors and the surety on the official bond of
Carter, slightly more than a year after his death, Ad-
ministration of the estate was pending at the time the
suit was filed. The executors and the surety filed gen-
eral demurrers to the bill, which were sustained.

Fielding Merwyn McGehee had for many years been
a member of the board of supervisors, and during the
audit period was a member from January 1, 1952, until
his death on March 7, 1953. His will, duly probated,
named his wife as executrix. She administered the
estate, and it was closed by decree of the chancery court
on October 30, 1953, when the executrix delivered unto
herself, as the sole devisee and legatee of McGehee, the
remaining assets of the estate. This suit was filed more
than four years after his death, and almost four years
after his estate had been closed. The general demurrers
of Mrs. McGehee and the surety company to the bill were
sustained.

These appellees take the position that the action
against these two men is based upon a ‘‘penal statute’’
so it did not survive, but was extinguished by their
deaths. This involves the question of whether the statute
is penal, thus precluding the state’s cause of action

against the successors of these two men and their surety
companies from surviving. Mississippi Code Annotated
section 2944 (1956) states:

If a board of supervisors shall appropriate any money
to an object not authorized by law, the members of
the board who did not vote against the appropriation
shall be liable personally for such sum of money, to
be recovered by suit in the name of the county, or
in the name of any person who is a taxpayer who will
sue for the use of the county, and who shall be liable
for costs in such case.

HEME Mississippi Code Annotated section 609 (1956)
provides:

Executors, administrators, and temporary administra-

tors may commence and prosecute any personal ac-

tion whatever, at law or in equity, which the testator
or intestate might have commenced and prosecuted.

And they shall also be liable to be sued in any court

in any personal action which might have been main-

tained against the deceased.

“Any personal action’’ includes an action for recov-
ery of real or personal property, for breach of contract,
and for injury to person or property. Scott v. Munn,
245 Miss, 120, 146 So. 2d 564 (1962). It is argued that
section 609 is ‘‘in derogation of the common law’’, and
must be strictly construed. McNeely v. Natchez, 148
Miss. 268, 114 So, 484 (1927). MM However, a corol-
lary of this rule of construction is that in applying a
statute, the court will seek to determine the legislative
intent and purposes. This objective is applicable to con-
struction of section 609.

Wl MM The basis of this suit is section 2944, which
makes members of a board of supervisors personally
liable for appropriating money to an object not authoriz-
ed by law, if they did not vote against the appropriation.
We think the statute is remedial and not penal in nature,
since it creates a remedy for the state against super-

311

visors who either voted for or did not vote against an
appropriation of county funds not authorized by law.
HM MM A remedial statute is defined as one ‘‘that in-
tends to afford a private remedy to a person injured
by the wrongful act. That is designed to correct an ex-
isting law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce
regulations conducive to the public good.’’ The test is
whether it primarily seeks to impose an arbitrary, de-
terring punishment ‘‘upon any who might commit a
wrong against the public by a violation of the require-
ments of the statute, or whether the purpose is to meas-
ure and define the damages which may accrue to an
individual or class of individuals, as just and reasonable
compensation for a possible loss having a causal con-
nection with a breach of the legal obligation owing un-
der the statute to such individual or class.’’ Black’s Law
Dictionary 1457 (4th ed. 1951).

Thus remedial statutes are those made to supply de-
fects in the common law. Some are classified as en-
larging statutes, by which the common law is made more
comprehensive and extended than it was before. Id. at
1457. Beginning with Paxton v. Baum, 59 Miss. 531
(1882), the cases interpreting and applying section 2944
have indicated that the Court considers the statute as
remedial and not penal. Also relevant is Code section
2872, which requires supervisors to make a bond as se-
curity ‘‘for any illegal act of such member’’, and au-
thorizes recovery by the county or a taxpayer in suit
on the bond. See Miss. Code Ann. § 4033 (1956) (con-
ditions of bond); Cf. Paine v. Matthews, 213 Miss. 506,
57 So. 2d 148 (1952) (where alderman made no appropria-
tion, but tried to ratify it).

HB MM Public funds are a public trust. The members
of a board of supervisors manage and appropriate trust
funds belonging to the public — the county and state.
Appropriation of such moneys to an object not authorized
by law is a violation of the fiduciary responsibilities of

the board of supervisors. The legislature by enactment
of section 2944 authorized a personal action against
members of a board of supervisors who should wrong-
fully appropriate such public trust funds. No penalty
is provided by the act. The recovery is compensatory,
to the county and the state, measured by the amount
of the money appropriated to the object not authorized
by law.

Metzger v. Joseph, 111 Miss. 385, 71 So. 645 (1916)
is analogous. The directors of an insolvent bank ap-
proved and distributed a dividend. The bank’s receiver
brought a suit in equity to recover the illegal dividend,
under a statute making directors personally liable. Their
contention, that the act was penal and therefore was
barred by the one-year limitation on penal statutes, was
rejected. The Court held that the trend of modern au-
thority, and the correct view, was that the act was remedi-
al as to creditors and not penal, although it would be
strictly construed according to its terms. It was a pri-
vate obligation, imposed by the legislature, partly for
the purpose of inducing directors to perform their pre-
scribed duties. The opinion contains a careful analysis
of remedial statutes.

Metzger was followed in Wilkinson v. Goza, 165 Miss.
38, 145 So. 91 (1932). Insured sued an insurance agent
under a statute making the latter personally liable for
writing an insurance contract where the insuring com-
pany was not authorized to do business in the state. Re-
jecting a contention that the one-year limitation for suits
on penalties was applicable, the Court said that this
statute was remedial as to the insured, who had been
led by the unlawful act of the agent to make a contract
with an unqualified foreign insurance company. In ac-
cord with the reasoning of Meteger and Wilkinson is the
general rule that a cause of action against an officer
or director of a corporation may survive his death. 1
C.S.S. Abatement § 156 (1936).

313

Harbin v. O’Rear, 219 Ala. 173,.121 So. 547 (1929),
is analogous to the present case. The Alabama statute
provided for the survival of ‘‘all personal actions,’’
with exceptions. The sheriff seized the property of a
defendant in attachment, and then redelivered it to him
without receiving the required statutory bond. The in-
jured plaintiff sued the sheriff and his surety company,
and after suit was brought, the sheriff died. It was
held the cause of action survived his death, and should
have been permitted to be revived against his personal
representative. The Court said:

“It cannot be successfully maintained that the of-

ficial bond of an officer lives in liability only so long

as the official is in life. If this construction be given,
an unwritten condition is introduced into the official
bond stronger than its written conditions, and the pur-
pose and extent of the statute broadening the common-
law rule of liability of official bonds are rendered
nugatory. ... Any other construction of our statute
of revivor, and that of the duty and obligations under
official bonds, would defeat the legislative purpose in
such matters and seriously impair the security sought
to be afforded under required official bonds. (219 Ala.

at 175, 121 So. at 548)

In summary, the chancery court erred in sustaining
the demurrers to the bill of complaint of the executors
and of the sole devisee and legatee of the two deceased
supervisors. This cause of action survived their deaths.

The decrees dismissing the state auditor and attorney
general as parties complainant, and the orders sustain-
ing demurrers to the bill of complaint are reversed, and
the cause is remanded for findings of fact and a final
decree on the merits. Since the trial court did not pass
upon the factual issues, we do not consider them. On
remand the court will decide the case on the basis of

the record already made and such further pleadings and
evidence if any as may properly be presented to it.

Reversed and remanded.
All Justices concur.

ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
Brapy, J.:

HM MM The executors of the estate of Hillary W.
Carter, deceased, have filed a suggestion of error, which
we overrule. State v. Warren, 180 So. 2d 293 (Miss.
1965). Paine v. Matthews, 213 Miss. 506, 57 So. 2d 148
(1952), cited in our original opinion, does not affect the
conclusion that Mississippi Code Annotated section 2944
(1956), upon which this suit is based, is not a penal
statute. Paine simply held that the mayor and council-
men made no appropriation, but attempted to ratify
unlawful expenditures already made by employees, and
an illegal contract, being void, was not susceptible of
ratification. Thus the nature of the statute was not an
issue and was not so considered in that opinion. The
reference thereto in Paine was unnecessary to the de-
cision.

However, on a subsidiary point, we think the sugges-
tion of error by Mrs. Clara Reber McGehee should be
sustained. She was sued originally as executrix of the
estate of her husband. He died on March 7, 1953, and
his estate was administered and finally closed within
about seven and one-half months after his death, on
October 30, 1953. On February 20, 1958, by agreement
of the parties, the suit was dismissed as to Mrs. McGehee
in her capacity as executrix. The complainants’ motion
to amend was sustained, and Mrs. McGehee was made
defendant as the widow and sole devisee and legatee un-
der the will of decedent. The court thereafter sustained
her demurrer to the bill.

315

HEE MM Mississippi Code Annotated section 609 (1956)
provides that: ‘‘Hxecutors, administrators, and tempo-
rary administrators’’ are liable to be sued in any ‘‘per-
sonal action.’’ This was a personal action which sur-
vived. MMM Code section 525 recognizes the right of
a creditor to obtain administration, and the holder of
a claim against an estate is a creditor. Great Southern
Box Co. v. Barrett, 231 Miss. 101, 94 So. 2d 912 (1957).

In Powell v. Buchanan, 245 Miss. 4, 147 So. 2d 110
(1962), the petitioner, who had a claim against the estate
of a deceased for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident, filed a petition to reopen the account of the
administratrix in the estate. Previously the estate had
been closed shortly after expiration of six months from
the date of letters testamentary, during which a suit
cannot be brought against an executrix. Miss. Code
. Ann. § 612 (1956). It was held that the chancellor should
have reappointed the widow as administratrix, or some
other person as administrator, if she did not desire to
serve, under section 525. It was said that the right of
petitioner could not be defeated by an early termination
of the estate. He had the right to present his claim
against a representative of the estate.

In the instant case, the State, as an alleged creditor
of the estate, should have followed the procedure out-
lined in Powell, by requesting the trial court to appoint
either the widow, if she desired to serve, or another
person as administrator of the estate, and by making
that administrator a party defendant to its action.

Wl MB Mrs. McGehee’s liability, if any, is derivative
only to her husband’s estate, and to the maximum extent
only of the amount of her inheritance from that estate.
Code section 609, the survival statute, does not authorize
the State to sue the widow of the deceased supervisor in
her individual capacity, in a suit to establish liability
of the estate. Hill v. James, 175 So. 2d 176 (Miss. 1965).
Hence the suggestion of error is sustained in part as to

appellee, Mrs. Clara Reber McGehee, and, as to her
only, the decree of the chancery court is affirmed.

In all other respects, the suggestion of error is over-
ruled.

Suggestion of error overruled in part and sustained
in part, and decree of chancery court affirmed as to
Mrs. Clara Reber McGehee. :

All Justices concur.

Provence Lire Insurance Company v. Prisock
No. 43688 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 636

317

Watkins, Pyle, Edwards & Ludlam, Robert H. Weaver,
Jackson, for appellant.

Strong & Smith, Louisville; Barnett, Montgomery,

McClintock & Cunningham, Jackson, for appellee.

Jonns, J.

This case was tried before the Circuit Court of Win-
ston County. There was a stipulation that it should
“be heard and tried as an equity matter,’’ so it was heard.
by the Circuit Judge with no jury.

The suit was upon a health and accident policy, and
alleged total disability of appellee from January 1961
to the date of the filing of the suit and thereafter.
Payment of benefits for January, February, and part
of March 1961 was admitted. The policy provided in
the event of total disability, payments at the rate of
$400 per month subject to the provision hereinafter
shown. It also waived premiums after six months of
total disability. Appellee sought the monthly benefits,
plus $516, the amount of premiums paid by him under

protest. Further, the policy provided for certain ad-
ditional benefits in event of confinement in a hospital.
Plaintiff sought same for certain times spent in a hos-
pital.

Appellant answered admitting the issuance of the
policy, but denying total disability within the terms of
the policy for the time alleged. It admitted payments
for January, February and part of March 1961, but de-
nied that same were due and denied it was indebted to
appellee in any sum. As an affirmative defense it pled
fraud in the procurement of the policy by false answers
to questions as to appellee’s health, previous treatments,
ete., which materially affected the risk and hazard, and
that the disability was from a cause which originated
prior to the date of the policy.

The affirmative defenses were denied. Appellee
charged that the agent who took the application was his
nephew and knew all about his condition, including the
fact that he carried a drainage tube as a result of an
operation in 1942 for empyema. He also maintained that
in answering questions on the application he made full
disclosure of his condition.

After hearing the evidence, the judge found for ap-
pellee and rendered judgment for the full amount sought
except that he fixed monthly benefits at $200 rather than
$400.

From this judgment appellant appealed and appellee
cross-appealed. We affirm the case.

Appellant assigns the following as error: (1) The
finding as a matter of fact that appellee made an ade-
quate disclosure; (2) the finding of total disability with-
in the meaning of the policy from April 7, 1961 to Feb-
ruary 5, 1962; (3) the admission of the deposition of
Dr. L. H. Bounds; and (4) the finding that acceptance
of premiums after knowledge of misrepresentation waiv-
ed the right to rescind.

HB Appellee and cross-appellant assign and argue
as error the fixing of benefits at $200 per month rather
than $400.

In order to sustain appellant’s assignments of error
Nos. 1 and 2, we would be required to substitute our
judgment for that of the trier of the facts. Appellee
testified that he did make full disclosure as to matters
asked him, and that the agent was his nephew and had
lived in the same community, visited him, and knew of
his condition and previous health experiences. The agent
denied that he so knew or that disclosures were made.
It was shown without dispute that appellee gave ap-
pellant written authority to consult his family physici-
an. Appellant wrote the doctor for information. The
doctor answered, but the answer was confined to the
doctor’s records and did not include certain information
that the doctor knew outside the records. This was ex-
plained by the doctor’s statement that such requests
came by the dozens, and were delivered to a secretary
for answers, which he signed without reading. This
evidence afforded substantial proof to support the
judge’s finding.

HB On assignment No. 2, the Court had the evi-
dence of appellee, the positive testimony of the doctor,
and evidence given by neighbors to support his finding.
We cannot disturb it.

HEEB The third assignment arises from the fact that
in 1963, after the period of disability here involved,
Dr. L. H. Bounds, an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist
of Meridian, examined appellee and diagnosed one of
his ailments as Meniere’s disease. Appellee testified
that during the period for which he sued, he had suf-
fered from dizziness, nausea and other symptoms. His
doctor related complainants by appellee of such symptoms
during said time. Dr. Bounds’ deposition showed some
of these were symptoms of Meniere’s disease and he
could not give a professional opinion as to how long

323

appellee had been afflicted with this disease. He said
that it sometimes developed rapidly and sometimes slow-
ly. We think the deposition was competent in view of
the previous testimony of the appellee and his doctor.

‘What has been said makes it unnecessary to pass upon.
the fourth assignment.

Appellee and cross-appellant contend on cross-appeal,
as stated, that he should have been allowed $400 per
month rather than $200. Part VII of the policy reads:

If the total monthly amount of loss of time benefits
promised for the same loss under all valid loss of
time coverage upon the Insured, whether payable on
a weekly or monthly basis, shall exceed the monthly
earnings of the Insured at the time disability com-
menced or his average monthly earnings for a period
of two years immediately preceding a disability for
which claim is made, whichever is the greater, the
Company will be liable only for such proportionate
amount of such benefits under this policy as the amount
of such monthly earnings or such average monthly
earnings of the Insured bears to the total amount of
monthly benefits for the same loss under all such
coverage upon the Insured at the time such disability
commences and for the return of such part of the
premiums paid during such two years as shall exceed
the pro rata amount of the premiums for the benefits
actually paid hereunder; but this shall not operate
to reduce the total amount of benefits payable under
all such coverage upon the Insured below the sum of
two hundred dollars or the sum of monthly benefits
specified in such coverages, whichever is the lesser,
nor shall it operate to reduce benefits other than those
payable for loss of time.

The question here depends upon the words ‘‘earnings’’
and ‘‘depreciation.’’? Earnings is defined as follows:

—Verbal Noun. The word, usually in the plural form,

“earnings,”’? is used as a verbal noun meaning gen-

erally that which is earned.

In a broad sense, it refers to money or other compen-
sation paid for services rendered, aptly applying to
the pay received by both laborers and officials; it
usually is limited to earnings chiefly produced by
one’s persoual efforts as distinguished from the in-
come derived from a business in which the investment
of capital predominates, and has been defined as mean-
ing gains of a person derived from his services or
labor without the aid of capital; money or other com-
pensation to which one had a claim for services rend-
ered, desert, or reward; money or property gained or
merited by labor, service, or the performance of some-
thing; the price of services performed; the reward of
labor or the price of personal service performed.
In a more limited sense the term has been applied to
the labor of workmen exclusively, and has been de-
fined as wages, or the fruit or reward of labor; and
it has been said that this is the ordinary meaning at-
tached to the use of the word. 28 C.J.S. Harn at 610
(1941).
This is in accord with the great weight of authority.
See 14 Words and Phrases Earnings 31 (1952).

In 26A. O.J.S. Depreciation at 492 (1956), ‘‘deprecia-
tion”’ is defined as follows:
It has been said that, by derivation and common usage,
the word means a fall in value, or a reduction of
worth; that, in the ordinary sense, it is represented
by the number of dollars necessary to rehabilitate
the property sufficiently to place it in safe condition
for operation. The word ‘‘depreciation’’ usually means
the loss or decline in value which occurs gradually
over the useful life of a material thing due to physical
wear, tear, and decay, and generally is limited to
losses or declines in value which are not restored by
eurrent repairs and maintenance.
‘Depreciation’? has been defined as meaning an act
of depreciating; a fall or decline in worth from any

325

cause; the loss in value of some destructible property
over and above current repairs; the loss, not restored
by current maintenance, which is due to all the factors
causing the ultimate retirement of the property; the
deterioration of physical assets due to wear and tear,
decay, and age; the decline in the value of an asset
due to such causes as wear and tear, action of the
elements, obsolescence, and inadequacy; an expense
or loss occasioned by using up physical property em-
ployed as fixed capital; deterioration arising from
age and use and improvements due to better methods,
more economical and efficient designs, inventions, and
general advance in the art, notwithstanding reasonable
current repairs; a subnormal condition of physical
property such as to impair the capacity for service,
usefulness, and the intrinsic value of the investment;
and in a particular connection, realized losses by the
actual sale or exchange of property.

It is sometimes described as amounting to the sale of

property through use.

‘With these definitions in mind, we consider the error
assigned by cross-appellant. The facts were: Cross-ap-
pellant owned a large truck and trailer suitable for haul-
ing cargo. He testified that he contracted with holders
of certificates of convenience and necessity to use his
truck and trailer in connection with their business in
consideration of seventy-five percent of the charges col-
lected for such transportation by him.

There were introduced what were admittedly copies
of his income tax returns for the years 1958, 1959 and
1960. They were similar except for amounts and the
one for 1960 illustrates cross-appellant’s contention.

This report shows total collections for that year of
$9,514.93; total expenses (oil, gas and grease, repairs,
licenses, tags, claims and state tax permits, telephone,
brokerage fees, cargo insurance, Alabama mileage book
and charges, unloading charges, and depreciation) of

326

$7,476.56, leaving $2,038.37, which is shown as ‘‘profits
from business.’’? The depreciation is listed as $1,933.28.
It is contended that this amount of depreciation should
be added to the ‘‘profit’’ of $2,038.37, bringing his ‘‘earn-
ings’’ to $3,971.68, which, of course, would be more than
$200 per month.

HEE With this contention we cannot agree. Deprecia-
tion is a legitimate item, and where assets of substantial
value are used it is a necessity in order to determine the
financial status of the business and reflect its true op-
erations.

There is also involved the fact that no division of the
‘‘profits’? as between rent for the equipment and com-
pensation for services of cross-appellant was made, but
this necessitates no discussion.

Affirmed on direct and cross-appeal.
Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Inger and Smith, JJ., concur.

McWut1ams, et ux. v. Burns, et ux.
No. 43701 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 621

327

Tom 8. Lee, Roy Noble Lee, Forest, for appellants.

0. G. Idom, O. B. Triplett, Jr., Forest, for appellees.

Rovezrs, J.

This is a habeas corpus proceeding brought before
the Circuit Judge of Scott County, Mississippi, for the
custody of Linda Jean McWilliams, age six, who is
the daughter of appellants and niece of appellees. The
cireuit judge entered an order denying the writ and
awarding the custody of the child to its uncle and aunt,
Mr. and Mrs. Burley Burns, upon the ground that the
parents had abandoned the child and that it would be
to the best interest of the minor to remain in the custody
of appellees. Appellants have appealed to this Court
and assert that the facts in this case do not show abandon-
ment of their child.

The evidence shows that the appellant, Mrs. Ida Mae
McWilliams, is the sister of appellee, Mrs. Frances
Burns, and that Mrs. McWilliams went to live with her
sister, Mrs. Burns, when she was only eleven years of
age; that she lived with appellees until she married
Winford McWilliams April 6, 1957, at the age of seven-
teen. The close relationship of Mrs. Burns and Mrs.
MeWilliams was more nearly that of mother and daugh-
ter than sisters. Mr. and Mrs. Burns supported Mrs.
MeWilliams as if she had been their own daughter.
After Mrs. McWilliams had established her own home
at Forest, her sister prevailed upon her to move near
her, and Mr. and Mrs. McWilliams acquired a lot from
Mr. Burns on which to build a house, approximately
300 yards from the Burns home. In 1961, appellants

|

moved into their new home. The close relationship of
the sisters was renewed. It was — as is usual in such
eases — difficult to adjust the presence of the husband
of the bride into the former family circle. The two fami-
lies were closely associated. They lived together and
were constant visitors in the homes of each other. The
children of the McWilliams, appellants, were often in
the home of appellees and they helped rear them. Mr.
and Mrs. Burns had no children of their own, although
another child stayed with them a great deal of the time.
The good fellowship and inter-family relationship con-
tinued between these families unabated until Saturday,
January 25, 1964. The preceding Friday night appellees
ate supper with appellants and after supper a question
arose as to where Linda would spend the night, neverthe-
less Mrs. McWilliams let her daughter, Linda, go to
her sister’s. The next day, in the afternoon, appellants
went to the home of appellees to get their children,
Clifton and Linda Jean, but a dispute again arose as to
the custody of Linda. The testimony is conflicting as
to what occurred at that time. Mrs. McWilliams testi-
fied that when appellants stopped in the yard to get the
child, Burley Burns came to the car and said ‘‘we wasn’t
going to get her, and I told him I could. And he said
‘I’m just one step ahead of you, I have already seen
a lawyer. ... he told Winford that he would kill him
if he got out of the car and tried to get her.’ ”’

Mrs. McWilliams testified her sister had Linda Jean
in her arms and would not let her have the child. Both
appellants testified that they sold their home at a sacri-
fice and moved because they were afraid of Mr. Burns.
They immediately instituted habeas corpus proceedings
to obtain custody of Linda Jean.

Appellees have a different version of the episode of
January 25th. They claim appellants drove up to their
house and that Ida was cursing and Winford told Mrs.
Burns ‘I'll kill you and get her.’’ Mr. Burns said

“T told them I says ‘Go get her, yonder she is on the
porch, go get her.’ I wasn’t going to tote her out there
and put her in the car and her screaming. I told them,
I says ‘You had better get the law before you come back
to get her.’ I says ‘You might need him.’ He says ‘‘AlL
I need is a stick.’ I said ‘You had better bring two of
them along.’’’ Mr. Burns testified that he would have
let the parents have the child on the 25th but would
not do so at the time of the trial. Mrs. Burns testified
that several years before her sister, Mrs. McWilliams,
came to her and asked her to take Linda because she
was sick and had to go to the hospital to have another
baby, and Mrs. Burns said she asked her to give Linda
to her and stated that she did so and she had been with
her since that time.

The testimony shows that the court sent a Welfare
worker to both homes and he reported to the court that
both were suitable places to rear children. The testi-
mony also shows that the parents and uncle and aunt
are fit and proper persons to have the care of the minor,
although there was considerable effort made by ap-
pellees to show that Mr. McWilliams had been drunk
twice, and had on other occasions been drinking intoxi-
cants. Two colored women testified that they heard
Mrs. McWilliams say that she gave Linda to Mrs, Burns.
The attempt to take Linda from her parents by the
habeas corpus proceedings is based upon an abandon-
ment of the minor by an alleged gift of the child to Mrs.
Burns by her sister, Mrs. McWilliams.

The appellees have cited two cases that should be
discussed. The first is Governale v. Haley, 228 Miss.
271, 87 So. 2d 686 (1956). The writer of this opinion
is familiar with the Governale case since it was tried
in the Circuit Court of Grenada County at a time when
he was circuit judge in that county. The facts in the
Governale case are very different from the facts in this
case. There was really no issue in the Governale case

|

as to whether or not the sister gave her child to Mrs.
Haley, the appellee. Moreover, it was very evident that
the mother had abandoned the child in question.

HEE This Court in passing upon that case pointed
out that ordinarily in a contest over the custody of a
minor child, where others have had custody of the child
for a long time, and both parties were equally fit to
care for it, the parent is not chargeable with abandon-
ment of the child or such neglect of his parental respon-
sibility so as to forfeit his right to reclaim for himself
the custody of the child. HIME The natural right of the
parents to such custody will prevail ordinarily, and this
Court said:

“The attachment which such other person may have

acquired for the child will not be permitted to out-

weigh the natural right of the parent to its custody.

In a particular case, however, when the parent, by

agreement or otherwise, has relinquished or surrend-

ered the custody of the child to third persons and has

permitted the child to remain in their custody for a

long period of time during which the parent has con-

tributed little or nothing to the support of the child
and has evinced no special interest in the child, the
court may refuse to allow the parent to reclaim the
child from those to whom it had been surrendered;
and this is especially true in a case where the forces
of environment may be so strong that the condition
of affairs cannot be disturbed by a forced separation
without risking the happiness and best welfare of

the child.’’ 228 Miss. at 279, 87 So. 2d at 689.

The turning point in that case, however, was the testi-
mony and desire of the child. This Court said:

“It is clear from the child’s own testimony that she

wishes to remain in the home of the appellees in Gre-

nada, and that she is violently opposed to going
to the home of-her mother and stepfather in New

Orleans. The trial judge, who heard the child testify

and observed her demeanor while she was on the wit-

ness stand, was of the opinion that to compel her to

go to New Orleans against her will would be detri-
mental to her welfare and happiness.’’? 228 Miss. at

283, 87 So. 2d at 691.

Thus, the Court recognized the desire of the eleven year
old minor.

The second case cited was McAdams v. McFerron,
et ux., 180 Miss. 644, 178 So. 333 (1938), where the
maternal grandparents residing in the State were award-
ed custody of the child by a divorce decree, and the
father paid little attention to the child and contributed
nothing to its support. The Court pointed out that the
parent had abandoned the child, and, quoting from sec-
tion 216 of Amis on Divorce and Separation in Missis-
sippi, said:

“Such conduct conclusively rebuts and overthrows

the legal presumption that the welfare of the child

would, other things being equal, be best served by
the custody and control of the parent. Having once

deserted the child there is no guaranty that such a

parent might not in the future be guilty of some other

equally atrocious conduct toward it.’? 180 Miss. at

654, 655, 178 So. at 836.

In that case, however, this Court, also quoting from
Amis as above-mentioned, pointed out again:

“But if a parent, out of regard for the feelings or

affections of kindred, or for purposes of education

or training, or for any other just and reasonable
cause, permits or allows a child to remain in the cus-
tody of another person, under such circumstances as
to show that he or she did not intend to sever the
relation of parent and child, or to shirk or evade the
duty of rearing and maintaining it, and was not cal-
lous or indifferent as to its welfare, then such conduct
does not bar his or her right to reclaim its custody,
even though during such time the affections of the

ad

child and the custodian for each other may have grown

to be very great. In such a case the affections of the

custodian can not outweigh the right of the parent,
if otherwise suitable to have the eustody.’’ 180 Miss.

at 655, 178 So. at 336.

The facts in the case now before the Court are so
similar to the facts in the case of Hendrix, et ux. v.
Mrs. G. C. Hendrix, 226 Miss. 110, 83 So. 2d 805 (1955),
that we are constrained to hold that the opinion rend-
ered in that case is conclusive on the facts in the instant
case. The Court quoted from Amis, Divorce and Separa-
tion in Mississippi, section 216 (1935), which is in effect
copied from the McAdams case, and the Court pointed
out:

‘Taking together all of the undisputed facts disclosed

by the record, and analyzing them in context, it ap-

pears that appellee and her husband, and the appel-
lants and their child, lived substantially as one family
for most of the period in question. Some of the rea-
sons for this was (were) Ira’s inability to get and
hold jobs, his financial troubles, Addie’s illness, and
the fact that she was working full time both before
and after Ira went into the army.’’ 226 Miss. at 121,
83 So. 2d at 810.
The Court then concluded:

“Appellee has failed to meet her burden of proof to

clearly show by the evidence that appellants abandon-

ed their child. An abandonment is not shown within

the legal meaning of this term which would cause a

forfeiture of appellants’ right to Martha’s custody.’’

226 Miss. at 122, 83 So. 2d at 810.

HREM We are therefore of the opinion that appellees
failed to prove abandonment of the minor by the par-
ents, and that the judgment of the circuit court should
be, and is, reversed, and judgment is rendered here for

appellants, dismissing, with prejudice, appellee’s peti-
tion for custody of Linda Jean McWilliams.
Reversed and judgment here for appellants.
Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Brady and Smith, JJ.,

coneur.
WuetcHen v. Soromon, et ux.
No. 43707 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 642

335

W.W. Pierce, Jackson, for appellant.

W. E. Gore, Jr., Charles Brewer, Jackson, for appel-
lees.

Evurives, P. J.

This suit involves a purchase of homestead land from
the holder of tax deed, by a mother occupying a fiduciary
relationship to her non compos mentis daughter, who is
the wife and tenant in common with her husband. We
hold that such purchaser is disqualified to hold title
against both the non compos mentis and the latter’s

337

husband, and affirm the decree of the Chancery Court
of Hinds County.

This suit was brought by appellees, H. L. Solomon
and wife by next friend, against Mrs. Alma HE. Whelchel,
appellant, for an adjudication that the Solomons were
entitled to redeem a parcel of land which sold for de-
linquent taxes in 1939, and to cancel as a cloud on their
title the claim made by Mrs. Whelchel based on the 1939
tax sale. The defendant filed a cross bill seeking con-
firmation of her title. After a hearing, the chancery
court held that Mrs. Whelchel was in a fiduciary rela-
tionship to her non compos mentis daughter, Mrs. Solo-
mon, and when she bought the land from the second
vendee under a delinquent tax sale, she in effect re-
deemed it for the benefit of her daughter and her hus-
band.

In 1936 the Solomons purchased the lot as tenants
in common, and built a small house on it as their home-
stead. They failed to pay 1938 taxes, so on September
18, 1939 it was sold for delinquent taxes to D. Seward,
who in turn conveyed it to Ralph Landrum in 1942. There
was no redemption within two years from the date of
sale, but appellees obtained homestead exemptions for
the years 1941 through 1944, and paid taxes in their
name. In 1945 homestead exemption was disallowed,
but in subsequent years to the date of trial H. L. Solomon
paid taxes on the land as assessed to Mrs. Whelchel.
Mrs. Whelchel purchased from Landrum in April 1945.
In March 1945 H. L. Solomon was appointed by the
chancery court guardian of his wife. Mary Solomon, a
patient at the Mississippi State Hospital, was non com-
pos mentis at the time of the tax sale, and has remained
in that condition.

Mrs. Whelchel learned from a third person that Land-
rum had bought the tax title from Seward. She got it
from Landrum to protect her daughter, so that she would
have a place to live. Subsequently, she has had fire

338

and extended coverage insurance on the house. H. L.
Solomon remained in possession. He lived on the prop-
erty and received brief, periodic visits from his wife
when the hospital authorities permitted her to come
home. Mrs. Whelchel said Mr. Solomon stayed on the
property under an agreement with her that he would
keep it up and pay taxes. He denied this, contending
he had no such agreement, and there was no permissive
possession.

Mrs. Whelchel, who was devoted to her daughter, said
that she purchased the property from Landrum ‘‘to pro-
tect my daughter’s interest so she would have a roof
over her head.’? Mr. Solomon was not a good business
man, and she bought it to protect her daughter and was
“keeping it for love of her, ...I didn’t want to trust
him with the property.’? She and her daughter were
very close. Mrs. Solomon looked to her for counsel, ad-
vise, and partial support. When she was excused from
the hospital for short visits, Mrs. Solomon in her moth-
er’s care would take medicine and would behave well.
Mrs. Whelchel asserted that she did not desire so much
to own the property as to protect her daughter, and
she bought it on account of her daughter. She had no
idea of putting Mary or her husband out of the house.
She thought the title would be safer with her than with
Mr. Solomon.

MM Bf Since Mrs. Solomon was non compos mentis
at the time of the 1939 tax sale, and remained so, she
had the right to redeem her one-half interest under the
statutory saving in favor of persons under mental dis-
ability. Miss. Code Ann. § 9948 (1946). The chancery
court correctly held to that effect. It further found that,
as Mrs. Whelchel admitted, there was a confidential,
fiduciary relationship between her and daughter; and
that acting for her daughter, Mrs. Whelchel redeemed
the title for both Mary and her husband. The decree
cancelled the tax sale, confirmed title in the Solomons,

339

and directed complainants to pay defendant all taxes
due, plus interest and damages. The court found it
unnecessary to pass upon validity of the tax sale or
adverse possession.

HREM The general rule precluding the right of a tenant
in common to acquire title to the common property for
his own benefit applies where one tenant in common
purchases at a tax sale or acquires an outstanding tax
title or claim. Clausell v. Riley, 188 Miss. 647, 196 So.
245 (1940); Howard v. Wactor, 41 So. 2d 259 (Miss.
1949); see 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 64 (1954);
85 C.J.S. Tawation § 918 (1954). HEME This applies to
purchase from a stranger who purchased at a tax sale.
Griggs v. Griggs, 218 Miss. 433, 67 So. 2d 450 (1953) ;
Howard v. Wactor, supra.

HE Bf 4 fortiori, the obligations and duties of hus-
bands and wives to each other create such relations of
trust and confidence between them that neither can
acquire the property of the other by purchasing it at
a tax sale, or from a holder of a tax deed. Wofford
v. Wofford, 244 Miss. 442, 463-464, 142 So. 2d 188, 197
(1962) ; Robinson v. Lewis, 68 Miss. 69, 8 So. 258 (1891) ;
51 Am. Jur. Taxution § 1058 (1944). MM Moreover,
the rule precluding acquisition of tax title by a tenant
in common for his own benefit applies to a purchase
when made by a husband or wife of a cotenant. Robin-
son v. Lewis, supra; 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 64
(7) (1954). Robinson stated that ‘‘the rule is founded
upon considerations of public policy, and conclusively
imputes to the one, as derived from the other, knowledge
of those facts the existence of which precludes the other
from action.’’ 68 Miss. at 71, 8 So. at 259. Accordingly,
where a husband has a life estate in his wife’s interest
in the common property, a conveyance from the pur-
chaser at a tax sale of the common property to the
husband effects a redemption for the benefit of the re-
mainderman as well as the husband. Campbell v. Herod,
193 Miss. 17, 7 So. 2d 880 (1942).

i

HE HE The sum of these doctrines is that a person
who occupies a position of trust and confidence with
respect to another cannot acquire a tax title to the prop-
erty of the other which is the subject matter of the re-
lationship. Such fiduciary relationship makes it inequi-
table to allow him to take advantage of that status. In
the instant case, Mrs. Whelchel had a fiduciary relation-
ship to her mentally incompetent daughter, who was a
tenant in common with her husband. Mrs. Solomon, if
she had been mentally competent, could not have pur-
chased the tax title free of the one-half interest of her
husband. She would have purchased it for the benefit
of herself and him. Mrs. Whelchel, occupying a position
of trust with her daughter, acted on behalf of her daugh-
ter and as her alter ego in obtaining the tax title. It
therefore inured to the benefit of both Mr. and Mrs.
Solomon.

For these reasons, the decree of the chancery court
is affirmed on both the direct appeal of Mrs. Whelchel,
and on the cross appeal of the Solomons, who assert
that, if necessary, this Court should pass on the issues
of validity of the tax sale and adverse possession. Those
questions are not essential for decision here.

Affirmed on direct and cross appeals.

Gillespie, Rodgers, Brady and Smith, JJ., concur.

Srismocrarn Service Corporation, et al. v. Barnerr
No, 43723 December 6, 1965 180 So. 24 918

W. Vol Jones, Sr., and W. Vol Jones, Jr., Waynes-
boro; Wells, Thomas and Wells, Jackson, for appellants.

a

Kenneth E. Bullock, Laurel; Stanford Young,
Waynesboro, for appellee.

Jonus,

an Mrs. 8. C. Barnett, sued appellants, Seis-
mograph Service Corporation and Skelly Oil Company,
in the Cireuit Court of Wayne County, alleging damages
to her property negligently inflicted in making explora-
tory tests in an effort to learn whether oil might rea-
sonably be expected to be found under her land or in
its vicinity.
Skelly Oil Company had an oil, gas and mineral lease
which authorized such tests upon her property, and in
' making the tests, Seismograph acted under contract with
and authorization by Skelly.

343

In her declaration appellee sought $9,000 for the fol-
lowing alleged items of damages: (1) The tearing down
of three gaps and fence in several places and allowing
cattle to go in and out; (2) the shooting of explosives
near her water well causing it to go dry, making it neces-
sary to drill another well, and the inconvenience of
having to haul water about one mile, for the period
March Ist until the last of October until appellee was
financially able to have a new well drilled; (3) the de-
struction of 150 pine trees and damage to many more;
(4) the erosion of the soil; and (5) the worry from the
inconvenience and loss of her well which is alleged to
have caused serious damage to her health.

In response to a motion to be more specific, appellee
filed a bill of particulars in which it was charged:

1. The cost of the replacement of the water well dam-
aged, as aforesaid was $296.64, plus $25.75, ad-
ditional repair, as a result of the negligence of the
defendants.

2. The inconvenience and expense of having to haul
water from March until October, she charges $10.00
a day, or approximately $2,400.00.

3. The 150 pine trees that were destroyed, your plain-
tiff charges $10.00 per tree, or $1,500.00.

4. The rutting of her property, the tearing down of
her fences, the tearing down of her gaps and the
inconvenience and damage caused by letting cattle
to and fro about her property, she charges the
sum of $1,000.

5. For her damage to her health and nerves, she
charges $3,777.61.

The jury returned a verdict for $5,000. A motion for a
new trial was made. The court required a remittitur of
$2400 or the motion would be sustained. When the re-
mittitur was entered the motion was overruled and from
this judgment of $2600 this appeal arises.

On the trial the only evidence offered to show that
appellants destroyed the water well was that an explosive
was detonated below the surface about 500 feet from the
well and that thereafter the well stopped producing.

At the conclusion of the evidence, appellants request-
ed the following instruction:

The court instructs the jury for the defendants that
under the evidence in this case, you cannot find for
the plaintiff any amount for alleged injuries to the
water well, or for trouble or expense gone to by the
plaintiff in replacing the water well or for hauling
water, or for injuries alleged to have been incurred to
her health as a result of hauling water.

Hl WM All the items of damage mentioned in said
instruction were alleged to be the result of the destruc-
tion of the water well. Based upon numerous prior de-
cisions of this Court, we have held that proof as here
offered is insufficient to meet the burden placed upon
a plaintiff in an action such as this. Western Geophysi-
eal Co. v. Martin, 253 Miss. 14, 174 So. 2d 706 (1965) ;
Continental Oil Co. v. Hinton, 253 Miss. 233, 175 So.
2d 512 (1965). Therefore, the above instruction should
have been given and it was error to refuse it.

HE 0n the trial, evidence was offered to show that
appellants exceeded their privilege and needlessly and
carelessly injured and damaged gaps, fences, young pines,
and perhaps other surface items, but no effort was made
to prove the amount of such damages in accordance with
the rules of law re-announced in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Snellgrove, 253 Miss. 356, 175 So. 2d 471 (1965).

Since by its verdict the jury found the appellants had
negligently operated, we affirm as to liability and re-
verse the case for a new trial on the question of damages
only, specifically holding there was no damage shown
to have been done by appellants to appellee’s water
well and this issue and the alleged results therefrom
should not be resubmitted on the new trial.

34

,

Reversed and remanded for a new trial on question
of damages only.

Lee, C. J., and Patterson, Inzer and Smith, JJ., concur.

Wauutams v. Hm
No. 43667 December 13, 1965 181 So, 2d 121

~

4.6

Clark, Townsend & Davis, Indianola, for appellant.

Lyon & Crosthwait, Indianola, for appellee.

Inzzr, J.

This is an appeal by Frank J. Williams from a judg-
ment of the Circuit Court of Sunflower County, wherein
appellee, Arnold Ralph Hill, obtained a judgment for
personal injuries and property damages against appel-
lant and James Wylie Beard in the amount of $39,000.
Beard did not appeal, and the judgment is now final as
to him.

Appellee, Arnold Ralph Hill, hereinafter called Hill,
suffered serious and permanent personal injuries, and
his 1960 Chevrolet car was destroyed, in a collision with
a 1958 GMC pickup truck driven by Beard. The colli-
sion occurred on Highway 82 about 3:45 a.m. on October
6, 1963. Hill was proceeding east on said highway, driv-

—

ing his car with his wife and child as passengers. When
he reached a point about two and four-tenths miles west
of Indianola he met the 1958 GMC pickup truck driven
by Beard. When Beard’s vehicle was only a short dis-
tance in front of Hill’s car, it suddenly swerved to the
left into Hill’s lane of traffic. In an attempt to avoid
a collision, Hill swerved his car to the right, but in spite
of this effort, the pickup truck struck his car, knocking
it down an embankment. As a result of the accident Hill
and his wife suffered severe injuries, and their child
was killed. Beard was severely injured also.

Hill alleged in his declaration that the pickup truck
driven by Beard was the property of appellant, herein-
after referred to as Williams, and that Beard was an
employee of Williams and at the time of the accident
was driving the vehicle with the consent of Williams.
The declaration further charged that it was well known
in the community where Beard lived that he was a habitu-
ally careless, reckless and drunken driver, and that this
fact was known to Williams or in the exercise of rea-
sonable care should have been known to him.

Williams answered and denied that the pickup truck
belonged to him, or that Beard was his employee at the
time of the accident, or that the vehicle was being op-
erated with his knowledge or consent. He also denied
that he had any knowledge, actual or constructive, that
Beard was a habitually careless, reckless and drunken
driver. Beard did not answer, and was not represented
by counsel in the trial of the case.

The main contention of Williams on this appeal is
that the trial court was in error in refusing to instruct
the jury to find for him.

The evidence relative to the issue raised as to the
liability of Williams consists mainly of the testimony
of Beard and Williams elicited by Hill on cross-exami-
nation of them as adverse witnesses. Hill had no per-
sonal knowledge relative to the ownership of the pickup

349

truck. Beard testified that he had bought the pickup
truck from Williams and his partner, Hocutt, on or about
November 1, 1962. He said that at the time he bought
the truck he was working for Williams as a dragline
operator, and that he had paid $200 for the truck, paying
it by installments of $50 per month. He admitted that
he had never received any bill of sale for the truck
and that after he bought it he had never changed the
license tag that was on it at that time. He further said
that he had never driven the pickup truck prior to the
time that he purchased it. He admitted that he had
been convicted of drunken driving on two occasions prior
to the accident. One conviction was in November 1964
at Louise, and the other was some four or five years
prior to the accident in Belzoni. He denied that he was
employed by Williams at the time of the accident. He
claimed that he was working for Cohen Construction
Company at that time. He denied that he was drinking
at the time of the accident, but admitted he had a bottle
of liquor in the truck at that time.

‘Williams, as an adverse witness, testified he was in
the construction business in partnership with Hocutt. He
said Beard had worked for him as a dragline operator
off and on for several years, but was not working for
him at the time of the accident. The dragline which
Beard had operated for him had been leased to Cohen
Construction Company in October 1963, and Cohen had
employed Beard to operate the dragline. He said Beard
was paid by Cohen, and that he had nothing to do with
the work that Cohen was doing for the United States
Engineers on Quiver River. He also testified that he
had sold the truck to Beard in the fall of 1962 for $200,
which was paid at the rate of $50 per month. He ad-
mitted that he had never given Beard a bill of sale for
the truck, and that he had applied for the tag for the
truck and did not remove the tag when he sold it to
Beard. It was his opinion that the tag was issued in

350

the name of Williams and Hocutt. When asked about
his knowledge of Beard’s habit of drinking he said he
had heard that Beard drank, but no more than anyone
else. He had never seen Beard drunk and had never
seen or heard of Beard drinking while on the job. He
also denied that he had any knowledge or had ever heard.
of Beard being convicted of drunken driving or knew
that Beard did not have a driver’s license. He said
he had seen Beard about 8:00 p.m. on the evening before
the accident and had had a cup of coffee with him in
a cafe, but that if Beard was drinking at that time he
could not detect it.

There was no other evidence relative to the ownership
of the pickup truck. The only other evidence relative
to Beard’s habit of drinking was the testimony of the
highway patrolman who investigated the accident. He
testified that when he investigated the accident shortly
after it happened, in his opinion Beard was drunk. He
said he found a one-half pint bottle nearly full of liquor
on the floor of the cab of the truck and a beer can with
some of the contents still in it outside of the truck.

At the conclusion of the testimony on behalf of Hill,
a motion was made by Williams for a peremptory in-
struction, which was overruled. The only evidence in-
troduced by Williams was his own testimony, and he
testified that since being examined as an adverse wit-
ness he had found the tag receipt for the pickup truck.
It showed the tag had been issued in the name of Wil-
liams and Hocutt in October 1962. After the conclusion
of the evidence, Williams requested the court to instruct
the jury to return a verdict in his favor. This request
was denied.

Hl BI We are not concerned on this appeal with the
question of negligence of Beard relative to the accident,
but are concerned with only the question of whether
there was sufficient evidence to sustain a judgment
against Williams. In order for Hill to recover from

351

Williams in this case it was necessary for him to prove
that the vehicle involved in the accident belonged to
Williams and that it was being operated by Beard with
the consent, either expressed or implied, of Williams.
EMM In addition thereto he was also required to prove
either that Beard was a careless, reckless or drunken
driver, or that he had the reputation of being a habitually
careless, reckless or drunken driver, and that this fact
was known to Williams or that it was so notorious that
as a reasonable man it should have been known to him.
If it be conceded that under the facts and circumstances
of this case that there was sufficient evidence to submit
to the jury the question of whether the vehicle involved
in the accident was owned by Williams and was being
operated by Beard with his consent, we do not think
there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the
question of whether Williams knew or should have known
that Beard was, or had the reputation of being, a habitu-
ally careless, reckless or drunken driver. There is no
evidence to substantiate the fact that Williams knew or
as a reasonable man should have known that Beard was
an incompetent driver. The only testimony which tend-
ed to show that Beard was an incompetent driver was
his admission that he had been convicted of driving
under the influence of intoxicating liquor on two ac-
casions, and the testimony of the highway patrolman
that he was drunk on the occasion of the accident. There
is a total absence of proof that Beard had a bad repu-
tation in the community as a careless or incompetent
driver, or as a habitual drunkard, or as one who would
drive while drinking. The only testimony relative to
Williams’ knowledge of Beard’s drinking was the ad-
mission of Williams to the effect that he had heard that
Beard drank, ‘‘but no more than anyone else.’’ Williams
had never heard that Beard had been convicted of drunk-
en driving in an adjoining county, and insofar as testi-
mony in this case shows, had no knowledge that he had

352

ever driven any vehicle while drinking. The facts in
this case certainly were not sufficient to charge Wil-
liams with either actual or constructive knowledge that
Beard was a careless, reckless or incompetent driver
because of his drinking habits. This case is controlled
by our decision in the cases of Lovett Motor Co. v. Wal-
ley, 217 Miss. 384, 64 So. 2d 370 (1953) ; Gooch v. Dillard,
187 Miss. 660, 193 So. 619 (1940); Vanner v. Dalton,
172 Miss. 183, 159 So. 558 (1935).

We said in Gooch:

The appellant did not know that Brasshear was
liable to be drunk while driving the automobile and
the fact that he knew he occasionally drank intoxi-
eating liquor was insufficient to charge him with con-
structive knowledge of the fact that he was liable to
be drunk while driving an automobile. (187 Miss. at
663, 193 So. at 619 (1940).

The most the evidence in this case shows is that
Williams knew that Beard at times drank, but as he
said, ‘‘no more than anyone else.’’? He had never seen
him drunk or drinking under any circumstances that
would charge him with notice that Beard was likely to
be driving a vehicle while drinking.

MMB We hold that the evidence was insufficient to
submit to the jury the question of whether Williams
knew or should have known that Beard was an incom-
petent driver or was likely to be driving an automobile
while drinking. The trial court was in error in refusing
to instruct the jury to find for Williams, and for that
reason this case is reversed and judgment is entered
here for appellant.

Reversed and judgment here for appellant.
Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Patterson and Smith, JJ.,

concur.

35:

oo

Mus v. Baxrus
No. 43718 December 13, 1965 180 So. 2d 914

354

Rae Bryant, Thomas L. Stennis, II, Gulfport, for ap-
pellant.

Marby R. Penton, Pascagoula; Lowis Fondren, Moss
Point, for appellee.

357

Brapy, Tom P., J.

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Harrison
County, by the appellant, from a jury verdict and judg-
ment in the amount of $20,000 rendered against him in
favor of the appellee. The pertinent facts involved in
this lawsuit are as follows:

U. S. Highway 90 is a divided four lane turnpike. It
extends east and west, bordering the beautiful Gulf
Coast. In the blithe and ebullient city of Biloxi it is
intersected by Oak Street, which runs north and south.
Immediately north and south of Highway 90 are two
service roads. Both of these roads have a neutral ground
separating them from the northern and southern boun-
daries of Highway 90 as they parallel the same. The
two northern lanes of Highway 90 are used by west-
bound traffic, and the two southern lanes are used by
eastbound traffic. Hach of the service roads has two
lanes of traffic which are used by traffic going east
and west.

On May 17, 1963, Conrad Balius, appellee, was travel-
ing west on the service road south of Highway 90 in the
city of Biloxi. Edward Mills, appellant, was traveling

358

east in the north lane of the south half of Highway 90,
following an eastbound car. That car made a left turn
to go north on Oak Street at the intersection. The
vehicle driven by the appellee, upon reaching the in-
tersection of Oak Street, turned right and proceeded
north up Oak Street. The appellant swerved his car to
avoid a collision, but the left front of appellant’s car
and the left rear portion of appellee’s car collided as
both cars were proceeding east and north, respectively,
across the intersection with Oak Street. Whether or
not appellee’s automobile was moving or was stopped
at the time of the collision is in dispute, as is also the
exact point of the impact of the cars.

The jury returned a verdict of $20,000 in favor of
appellee. From this verdict this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellant assigns five errors, two of which relate to
the verdict of the jury, two of which relate to instruc-
tions, and one of which relates to evidence. If the as-
signed errors relating to the instructions are well taken,
then it is unnecessary to consider the other errors. There-
fore, turning to the errors urged which relate to the
instructions, we find that appellant simply asserted that
the trial court erred in instructing the jury in behalf of
appellee and in refusing instructions on behalf of ap-
pellant. Reviewing the instructions, we find that the
appellee was granted only three instructions. The third
was the customary nine juror and form of verdict in-
struction. The other instructions granted for the appel-
lee are as follows:

INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1 FOR PLAINTIFF

The Court instructs the jury for the Plaintiff, Conrad
Balius, that the driver of an automobile must not
merely drive his automobile so as to be able to stop
within the range of his vision, but the driver must
so drive his automobile that he can actually discover
an object, perform the manual acts necessary to stop,

359

and bring his vehicle to a complete halt, if necessary,
to avoid collision with others on or near the highways,
and, if you believe from a preponderance or greater
weight of the evidence in this case that the Defendant
taxi-cab driver, Edward Mills, was not driving the
taxi-cab so as to be able to avoid such a collision with
the automobile of Conrad Balius, then and in that
event, Edward Mills was negligent, and if you further
believe from a preponderance of the evidence that
such negligence, if any, proximately contributed to
the collision involved in this lawsuit, giving rise to
the Plaintiff’s damages, it is your sworn duty to find
for the Plaintiff, Conrad Balius, against the Defend-
ant, Hdward Mills.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2 FOR PLAINTIFF

The Court instructs the jury for the Plaintiff, Con-
rad Balius, that if you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the Defendant, Edward Mills, was
negligent and that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident, then you should award to the
Plaintiff the following:

1. The sum in damages which you believe from a
preponderance of the evidence will fairly and reason-
ably compensate him for the pain and suffering, both
mental and physical, which you believe from the evi-
dence he sustained as a direct result of the injuries,
if any, sustained in said collision.

2. The sum in damages which you believe from a
preponderance of the evidence will fairly and reason-
ably compensate him for any future pain and suffer-
ing, both mental and physical, which you believe from
the evidence that he will sustain as a direct result of
the injuries, if any, sustained in said collision.

3. Such sum as you believe from a preponderance of
the evidence will fairly and reasonably compensate the
Plaintiff for any loss of income, if any, which he

has in the past or will in the future sustain as a direct

result of the injuries, if any, sustained in said collision.

HEEB Appellant contends that Instruction No. 1 grant-
ed appellee made appellant the absolute insurer of the
safety of appellee, regardless of what appellee might
do. It should be noted that this instruction tells the
jury that appellant must not only drive his automobile
so as to be able to stop within the range of his vision
but that the appellant must so drive his automobile that
he can actually discover an object, perform manual acts
necessary to stop, and bring his vehicle to a complete
halt, if necessary, to avoid collision with others on or
near the highways. The instruction goes further and
states that if the jury believes from a preponderance
of the evidence that the appellant was not driving his
taxicab so as to be able to avoid such a collision with
the appellee, then the appellant was negligent; and that
if the jury believed that such negligence, if any, proxi-
mately contributed to the collision, then they should find
for appellee.

Substantially the same instruction was condemned in
Bryan Bros. Packing Co. v. Grubbs, 251 Miss. 52, 57,
168 So. 2d 289, 291 (1964). In that case this Court,
speaking through Judge Gillespie, said:

This instruction told the jury that the driver of a

vehicle ‘‘. . . must so drive his vehicle that he can

actually discover an object, perform the manual acts
necessary to stop, and bring his vehicle to a complete
halt, if necessary, to avoid a collision with others. ...’’

This instruction placed upon Guyton an absolute duty

to avoid a collision with others. The standard requir-

ed by the law is ordinary, or reasonable, care.

HEE Considering next Instruction No. 2, and without
deciding whether or not the proof is sufficient in this
case to justify any damages with reference to future
pain and suffering, both mental and physical, and with-
out deciding whether or not the proof is sufficient to

justify the instruction with reference to loss of income,
if any, past or in the future, as a direct result of the
injuries, we feel that Instruction No. 2 was error for
the reason that it simply instructs the jury that if it
believes from a preponderance of the evidence that ap-
pellant was negligent and his negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident, the jury should find for the
appellee.

This instruction wholly fails to designate what con-
stitutes negligence so that the jury would have the criteria
by which it could determine whether or not the appellant
was negligent.

The only other instruction sought by .appellee with
regard to negligence was the first instruction noted above.
The negligence in that instruction related solely to the
ability of the driver to stop within his range of vision
and that the driver must drive his automobile so that
he can actually discover an object and perform the neces-
sary manual acts to bring his vehicle to a complete stop
in order to avoid a collision. This instruction being
erroneous, it cannot be now urged by appellee that it
supplies the necessary elements which constitute negli-
gence on the part of the appellant.

It follows, therefore, that the second instruction is
erroneous for the reason that it merely tells the jury
if they believe the appellant was guilty of negligence,
without designating what constitutes negligence under
the circumstances, and that his negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident, appellee can recover.

It is obvious, therefore, that this case must be re-
versed and remanded for trial on these assignments of -
error,

HME BB Since this case is to be retried, it is in order
to make these suggestions with reference to the injuries
and damages which have been asserted. Injuries of any
type or degree, temporary or permanent, including any
pain and suffering, must be established by a preponder-

362

ance of the credible evidence and shown to be causally
related to the alleged negligence. Unless this is shown,
no instructions based thereon should be given. Hl ll
Additionally, any hospital, doctor, medical or other re-
lated expenses, and any loss of earnings or income sus-
tained cannot be left to conjecture, but must be spe-
cifically established.

These prerequisites must be shown so that a jury can
reasonably determine what damages should be awarded
because of the injuries, pain and suffering, together
with expenses and financial losses resultant from the
negligence proven. In support of these rules the au-
thorities are legion and do not require citation here. It
is apparent that the evidence offered is insufficient to
sustain the verdict rendered.

Insofar as the waiver of all medical privileged com-
munication between doctor and patient is concerned, this
case does not come squarely under the rule announced.
in Gatlin v. Allen, 203 Miss. 185, 33 So. 2d 304 (1948),
since the gesture of consent in that case, because the
doctor was out of town and could not be reached, did
not rise above that which is only theatrical. It is not
necessary to pass upon whether the appellant was en-
titled to a proper instruction based upon appellee’s
failure to call his physicians. Clary v. Breyer, 194 Miss.
612, 13 So. 2d 633 (1943). When this case is retried,
appellee having waived the privilege, the appellant will
have ample time to interview appellee’s doctors and
subpoena them as witnesses, if he so elects.

HEE We do not, of course, condemn the use of black-
boards, freehand drawings thereon, or on paper, minia-
ture models or other media properly utilized in the trial
of a lawsuit. Specifically, we do not impinge upon the
sound discretion accorded to the trial judges in conduct-
ing lawsuits. We do not hold in the case at bar, after
considering all the evidence, that the use of the black-
board which was not introduced in evidence, or even

for identification, constituted reversible error. It was
a hazardous procedure for the reason that had the ap-
pellee not introduced photographs which clearly showed.
the highway and roads constituting the intersection and
point of collision, this Court would have been without
any visible means of knowing what purportedly was
exhibited to the jury by the use of the blackboard. A
far safer and better procedure would be, where a black-
board is desirable or necessary in the trial of a case,
to introduce, and have marked as an exhibit, a photo-
graph, map or facsimile of what is on the blackboard,
or introduce the blackboard itself. This is common pro-
cedure in the trial of cases of negligence.

The appellant was not powerless to introduce a photo-
graph, map or diagram drawn to scale showing the
errors in the freehand blackboard drawing of the appel-
lee, which would have succinctly informed this Court of
appellee’s objectives, and errors, if any.

HEB Finally, it is obvious that before this Court can
properly determine the rights of the litigants in a case
it most certainly has to know what the evidence is which
was presented to the jury, and not be required to sur-
mize or infer what it was and if it was competent. The
motion for a new trial should have been sustained.

For these reasons, the judgment is reversed and the
cause is remanded for retrial.

Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Rodgers and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

Lanvry v. Moopy Grisamaw Aczyoy, Ivo.
No. 43720 December 13, 1965 181 So. 2d 134

at
Re)
on)

365

Thomas J. Wiltz, Charles K. Pringle, Biloxi, for ap-
pellant.

366

Wm. Joel Blass, Wiggins; Herman W. Smith, Jr.,
Gulfport, for appellee.

i. _~

Guespm, J.

Moody Grishman Agency, Inc., complainant below and
appellee here, is a corporation domiciled in Biloxi, Mis-
sissippi, engaged in the real estate and general insurance
business. It will be referred to hereinafter as the Grish-
man Agency. The Grishman Agency filed a bill of com-
plaint in chancery court against Robert Joseph Landry,
its former employee, praying for enforcement by in-
junction of a clause in an employment contract pro-
hibiting the employee from engaging in a competing
business. Upon final hearing on the merits, the relief
was granted and Robert Joseph Landry, the employee,
was enjoined from engaging in the insurance business
in competition with the Grishman Agency for a period
of five years in the counties of Harrison, Hancock and
Jackson. Landry appealed.

The essential facts are stated in the light most fav-
orable to the Grisham Agency, in whose favor the chan-
cellor made a general finding. The Grishman Agency
and Landry entered into negotiations which resulted in
a written contract of employment dated October 25, 1962,
as follows:

This Contract made and entered into by and between

MOODY GRISHMAN AGENCY, INC., hereinafter

referred to as the Employer and ROBERT JOSEPH

LANDRY, hereinafter referred to as the Employee;

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Employer is a corporation chartered
under the Laws of the State of Mississippi and op-
erates a general insurance and real estate business
from its office in Biloxi, Harrison County, Mississip-
pi, and

WHEREAS, it is the desire of the Employer to retain
the services of a skilled general insurance man and the
Employee has represented to the Employer that he
is a well-qualified and capable insurance man, and

WHEREAS, it is the desire of both parties hereto
to enter into an agreement of employment for a given
period of time, looking toward a more permanent ar-
rangement if the results of such temporary period of
employment are satisfactory to both parties hereto,
now, therefore,

In consideration of the premises, the sum of ONE
DOLLAR ($1.00) paid by the Employer to Employee,
the mutual benefits to be derived herefrom and the
further considerations passing between the parties, as
hereinafter set forth, it is agreed by and between
the parties as follows:

I. The Employer agrees to employ and the Employee
agrees to work for the Employer for a period of one
(1) year commencing January Ist, 1963, and ending
with the close of business on December 31st, 1963.
2. As compensation for his services to the Employer,
the Employee shall receive: ....

A. A salary of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per
week during the term of this Contract.

B. In addition to the salary provided in sub-para-
graph A. above, the Employee shall receive one-third
(1/3) of all the gross general insurance commissions
in excess of Fifteen Thousand Six Hundred Dollars
($15,600) for the year commencing January Ist, 1963
and ending with the close of business on December
31st, 1963, provided the employment is not terminated
sooner by one of the methods hereinafter set forth.
In the event the contract is so terminated, then the
Employee will be paid one-third (1/3) of all gross
general insurance commissions for the period of time
employed prior to date of termination in excess of
the pro rata part of the above referred to Fifteen
Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($15,600.00), based on
the relationship of the period of time worked to the
entire calendar year. For example, if the contract
is terminated after the first six months of operation,

i. _

the Employee would be entitled to one-third (1/3) of
all gross general insurance premiums in excess of
Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00).

At the close of the business year on December 31st,
1963, an accounting will be had by and between the
parties hereto and any sum or sums due by either
party to the other party will be adjusted in cash. In
the event the gross general insurance commissions
exceed, in any monthly period, three (3) times the
salary provided in subparagraph A. above, for such
period, the Employer and the Employee may consider
a drawing or drawings by the Employee against the
amount provided in this sub-paragraph B, provided,
however, the amount or amounts to be drawn are sat-
isfactory to and approved by the Employer.

8. In determining the gross general insurance com-
missions for the calendar year 1963 as a basis for
payment to Employee under the terms of this con-
tract, all gross general insurance commissions re-
ceived by the Employer during the said year shall
be considered. This shall be true even though such
collections are for insurance sold prior to January
Ast, 1963. However, premiums for insurance sold dur-
ing the calendar year 1963 but not collected on or
prior to December 31st, 1963, shall be excluded from
such figure. Any cancellations or losses during the
calendar year 1963 shall be charged against the gross
general insurance commissions as used in this para-
graph.

4, The Employee understands that it is necessary
for him to have an automobile and to use same in his
position of employment. All expense of operation,
including repairs, supplies, oils, lubricants and other
expense connected therewith, together with personal
liability insurance in an amount satisfactory to both
parties, and for the protection of both parties, with
the exception of the first Twenty Five Dollars ($25.00)

each month thereof, shall be borne by the Employee.
The Employer will reimburse the Employee for the
first Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) of such expenses
each month.

5. The Employee shall give full time to the duties
of his position and shall not accept employment of
any kind during such period from any other person
or persons.

6. All business submitted by the Employee must be
acceptable to the Employer. It is understood that
the Employer maintains a highstanding with the com-
panies which it represents and that the right to select
the risks submitted, whether such risks be of a nature
involving the credit of the person who applies for
insurance, the character of such applicant for insur-
ance, the value of the property involved, the type of
risk involved, or for any other similar reason, is
retained by the Employer. However, the Employer
will give careful consideration to any risk submitted
by the Employee. The Employer reserves the right
to fix the general policies to be followed in the op-
eration of the insurance business and the Employee
agrees to conform therewith. The Employee under-
stands that in the conduction of the general insurance
business, he must necessarily handle collections and
other items connected with any related to the insur-
ance field.

7. Employee will be entitled to hospitalization in-
surance and other similar benefits furnished to other
employees by the Employer.

8. This contract may be terminated by mutual agree-
ment of the parties hereto. It may be terminated by
either party by giving written notice to the other party
of the failure of such party to comply with the terms
and conditions of this contract. Such written notice
must be given thirty (30) days prior to the effective
date thereof. This contract will be terminated by the

death of the Employee, should such death occur during
the calendar year 1963. In the event the contract is
terminated, an accounting shall be had up to and in-
cluding the date of termination and any sum or sums
due by one party to the other will be adjusted in cash.
In the event this contract is terminated prior to De-
cember 31st, 1963, or in the event it is completely ful-
filled but the parties hereto do not enter into a contract
for further employment then, in either of such events,
the Employee agrees as a part of the consideration
hereof not to compete with the employer in Harrison,
Jackson or Hancock Counties, Mississippi, within a
period of five (5) years from the date of termination
of the contract, for whatever cause the same may be
terminated. This agreement not to compete applies
equally to the Employee acting in his own capacity or
serving as an agent or Employee of another.
Landry worked pursuant to this contract the entire
year 1963, and it is agreed that the contract was fulfilled
by the parties for its full term. On December 24, 1963,
Moody Grishman, President of the Grishman Agency,
and Landry had a discussion concerning Landry’s em-
ployment for the coming year 1964. They reviewed the
business done in 1963 and as a result of this conversation
Grishman told Landry that the contract would be re-
newed for another year in order to give him another
opportunity to bring production up to expectations.
Landry told Grishman that he needed an additional
amount as salary and Grishman offered to increase
Landry’s weekly salary from $100 to $125 and to pay
his civic club dues. Landry told Grishman that he want-
ed time to think it over and to talk to his wife and
agreed to let Moody Grishman know by December 30,
1963, whether the terms were agreeable. The various
clauses of the 1963 contract other than weekly salary
and civic club dues were not discussed. On December
80, 1963, Landry failed to let Grishman know whether

“ (ze

the terms of the contract were agreeable and about
that time Moody Grishman went to the hospital where
he remained several weeks. After January 1, 1964,
Landry continued as the employee of the Grishman Agen-
ey, performing duties as he had in 1963, until September
1, 1964. For each month from January to September of
that year the Grishman Agency accepted the services of
Landry and paid him the new salary schedule of $125
per week, plus $25 a month automobile expense, and his
civic club dues.

In April 1964, Landry asked Moody Grishman if he
was going to draw up a contract. Grishman replied that
the Grishman Agency had offered him a contract in
December 1963 and Landry had never made known wheth-
er the new contract terms were agreeable. Landry stated
that he was not aware that he had not accepted the
December 1963 offer and again asked Moody Grishman
if they were going to enter into a new contract. Grish-
man then told Landry that he did not feel disposed
to do so because Landry’s production did not give the
Grishman Agency sufficient incentive to go into a new
contract and that he, Moody Grishman, had no intention
of going into a new contract at that time. Apparently
it was Grishman’s intention that he would continue to
see if Landry would increase his production so as to
make a new contract attractive to the Grishman Agency.
On September 1, 1964, Landry resigned. His stated
reason for doing so was that he did not have any se-
curity without a written contract. Thereafter this law-
suit was filed.

The determinative question in this case is whether
the Grishman Agency and Landry entered a ‘‘contract
for further employment”? following the termination of
the written contract on December 31, 1963. It is the
contention of appellee, Grishman Agency, that since Lan-
dry failed to accept the offer made by Grishman on
December 24, 1963, and no written contract was entered

for employment after that date, that there was no con-
tract for employment during the months of January
through September 1964. Moody Grishman testified that
he continued the employment arrangement ‘‘in contem-
plation’’ of a contract being entered into but none was
ever consummated. Landry contends that the continua-
tion of the relationship of employer and employee after
January 1, 1964, for a period of eight months under a
new pay schedule on a month to month basis constituted
a “contract for further employment’’ within the mean-
ing of the contract clause. Landry contends that the
clause providing for post-employment restraints never
came into play under the terms of the contract. The
bill of complaint filed by the Grishman Agency stated
that after completion of the first year of employment
provided for in the written contract the parties did not
thereafter contract further but that ‘‘the defendant con-
tinued on a month to month basis without contract until
on or about the first day of September 1964.’’

Since the written contract was not terminated prior
to December 1, 1963, the post employment restraint clause
would not become operative if the parties entered into
“a contract for further employment.’’

HEE The written contract for the year 1963 termi-
nated at the close of business on December 31, 1963.
It is not contended that the written contract was re-
newed or extended. The services rendered by Landry
after December 31, 1963, were necessarily done so pur-
suant to a contract, express or implied. The essential
agreement or contract for employment of Landry be-
ginning January 1, 1964, was that he would draw a
salary of $125 per week, be paid $25 per month auto-
mobile expenses, and that the Grishman Agency would
pay Landry’s civic club dues. This was in accord with
the offer made by Moody Grishman on behalf of the
Grishman Agency, and while Landry did not verbally
accept this offer, he performed the services expected

3874

of him and was paid in accordance with the offer. This
was ‘‘a contract for further employment’’ following the
fulfillment of the written contract for the year 1963. It
was not written and was for no specific period of time,
but it was a contract nevertheless. It was performed
by both parties for a period of eight months. The re-
lationship of employer and employee existed between
the Grishman Agency and Landry for the eight months’
period and MMM this relationship does not exist absent
a contract, express or implied. No reasoning process
or citation of authority is necessary to support the con-
clusion that a contractual relationship existed between
the Grishman Agency and Landry from January 1st
until September 1, 1964. We are not concerned with
the formalities required to validate an executory con-
tract.

HEEB Clauses in employment contracts providing for
post employment restraints on the employees are in
restraint of trade and individual freedom and are not
favored by the law. MBM But they are valid if not
unreasonable, and when reasonable the courts will not
hesitate to hold parties to their contract. Frierson v.
Sheppard Building & Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 154
So. 2d 151 (1963). As we said in the Frierson case, it
is the contract itself and the necessity that contracts
be honored that invokes the power of the court. We
must look to the contract to determine if the clause
prohibiting Landry from competing with his former
employer became operative upon the termination of the
relationship of employer and employee on September
1, 1964. This contract is plain and unambiguous. The
restrictive clause became operative only if (1) the con-
tract was terminated before December 1, 1963, or (2)
if the parties did not enter into a contract for further
employment (after December 1, 1963). Neither of the
contingencies occurred. It could be argued with con-
siderable force that the Grishman Agency probably

375

thought the restrictive clause would become operative
in any event unless a new written contract was made
“for further employment.’? ME The Court will look
to the contract for its meaning, not what a party thereto
may have thought it meant. The standard is objective,
measured by the language of the contract, not by the
subjective intent or belief of a party which conflicts
with meaning ascertained by the objective standard.

A leading case very similar to the one before us is
Jenkins v. King, 65 N.B. 2d 121 (Ind. 1946), Annota-
tion 163 A.L.R. 397 (1946). It involved a written con-
tract between an insurance agency and an employee for
a two year period which contained a post employment
restraint clause. The written contract was fully per-
formed and the employee continued to work for nearly
two years after termination of the two year period with-
out any new written contract. The Court held in sub-
stance that the continuation of the employment under
the same terms provided in the written contract was
a new contract. See Annot., 163 A.L.R. 405-407 (1946).

HS Bf in sum, Landry was not prohibited from com-
peting with the Grishman Agency under the terms of
the contract and the undisputed facts. A restrictive
clause in a contract is not favored by the law and the
Court will not exercise power which the contract itself
does not invoke.

HEMI Appellee contends that there was no valid ‘‘con-
tract for further employment’’ for the reason that what-
ever contract, if any, existed after January 1, 1964, was
oral and involved an agreement for acquisition of stock
in the Grishman Agency over a period of five years,
and was void under the statute of frauds, Mississippi
Code Annotated section 264 (1956). This contention is
without merit. In the first place, Moody Grishman, on
behalf of the Grishman Agency, denied that any oral
agreement concerning the acquisition of stock was made
at the December 24, 1963, meeting. The Grishman Agen-

cy is hardly in a position to rely upon the terms of a
contract that it denies existed. IME Secondly, the stat-
ute of frauds has no application to a contract executed
by performance by both parties. 49 Am. Jur. Statute
of Frauds § 550 at page 853 (1943).

The decree is reversed and judgment entered here
dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill of
complaint.

Reversed and judgment here for appellant.
Lee, C. J., and Jones, Inzer and Smith, JJ., concur.

Husangs v. W. H. Hopes & Company
No. 48721 December 13, 1965 180 So. 2d 922

Jesse W. Shanks, Purvis; Robert L. Calhoun, Hatties-
burg, for appellant.

377

Wm, E. Andrews, Jr., Purvis; Stone D. Barefield,
Hattiesburg, for appellee.

378

Laz, C. J.

The bill of complaint in this cause was filed October
17, 1963 by W. H. Hodges & Company, a Louisiana
corporation, and its substituted trustee, William EH. An-
drews, Jr., in the Chancery Court of Lamar County
against P. T. Eubanks.

The grounds therefor were substantially that Eubanks,
on July 11, 1962, for a valuable consideration, executed
the promissory note and chattel deed of trust to the
trustee therein named for the use and benefit of W.
H. Hodges & Company to secure an indebtedness of $8,-
328.24, as evidenced by certified copies of the instru-
ments. One hundred and ninety-three head of cattle,
as described in the deed of trust, were conveyed to the
trustee, subject to a prior deed of trust in favor of anoth-
er mortgagee. Payment thereof was due April 1, 1963.
William E. Andrews was substituted in the place of the
original trustee. Default was made in the payment of
the indebtedness. The property was of such character

379

and class that it could not be specifically described so
as to enable the trustee to replevy it. In addition, if the
property was no longer in existence, or beyond the jur-
isdiction of the court, then the complainant was entitled
to recover a money judgment for the amount of the
note, interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum, and
attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of the indebted-
ness. There was a prayer for the establishment of a
lien, the possession of the property, and the award of
a judgment, interest, and attorney’s fees in the amount
demanded.

The answer of the defendant, in effect, denied that
the note and deed of trust represented a valid indebted-
ness. It alleged that the property had been sold and
disposed of; that the deed of trust was void and unen-
forceable; and that the complainants were entitled to
no relief whatever. The defendant made his answer a
eross bill and charged in effect that W. H. Hodges &
Company, during 1959, furnished him a number of black
angus cattle under a plan for reimbursement to the
corporation to be effected through the increase of calves;
that, when the first crop of 1960 calves began to show,
it appeared that the cattle, so sent him, were contami-
nated with liver flukes and Bang’s disease; that in
early 1961, he had the cows tested, and, at that time, a
number of cows, brought to the farm by W. H. Hodges
& Company, were reactors, and it was necessary to sell
them at a loss; and that this infection spread, and finally,
during 1962-63, it was necessary to dispose of the entire
herd at great loss. He further charged that this loss
was occasioned on account of the wilful and false rep-
resentation of the complainant regarding the condition
of the animals at the time of delivery to the farm. The
prayer was for dismissal of the original bill, the award
to him of actual damages in the sum of $23,620, less
any credits that might be due as set-off, and punitive
damages in the sum of $25,000.

To the allegations of the cross bill, the complainants
moved that the same be stricken and dismissed because,
in effect, (1) the basis of the counterclaim related to
transactions that occurred during 1959 and prior to July
11, 1962, and that the claim, involved in this cause, origi-
nated after any right, claim or defense that the defendant
could have asserted and was therefore waived; and (2)
the defendant, by his pleading, alleged and admitted
that he discovered the alleged disease in the cattle early
in the year 1961, but that thereafter on July 11, 1962
he executed the note and deed of trust, and this con-
stituted a waiver of any defense which he might assert
on the ground of fraud or lack of consideration of the
note and deed of trust.

The decree, entered thereon, recited that ‘‘after hear-
ing oral evidence, documentary testimony, and argument
by counsel’? for both parties ‘‘the counterclaim is denied,
and the defendant is granted until March 16, 1964 to
file his answer.’’

Defendant’s amended answer contained substantially
the same affirmative defense set out in the original
answer and cross bill, and also averred that he had been
charged in excess of 8% interest, thus subjecting the
complainant to a forfeiture of all interest, and, besides,
that he had not received full credits for all payments
made by him.

P. T. Eubanks, called as an adverse witness, admitted
that he signed the note in question dated July 11, 1962,
and also the deed of trust of the same date. He stated
that he did not, at that time, own a cow and has not
had one since this trouble with Bang’s disease in 1963.
The cattle are no longer in existence. He has made no
payment on the July 11, 1962 note, and he made no claim
of any payment since the suit was brought.

Ray Hodges, secretary-treasurer-general manager of
W. H. Hodges & Company, offered in evidence the
original note by Hubanks to W. H. Hodges & Company

381

of date of August 31, 1959 in the sum of $7,783.64. He
explained that New Orleans Auto Buyers, Inc., had
bought some cows for Eubanks, and that complainant
paid that firm the amount stated in the note. In other
words, the purchase of the cattle had been financed by
the complainant and the cost of such cattle was the con-
sideration for the note, which was the only evidence it
had of the indebtedness. This note was renewed a num-
ber of times, as shown by the records which were offered
by the witness. Finally, on July 11, 1962 Eubanks had
his attorney to prepare the note, dated July 11, 1962,
together with the accompanying deed of trust, executed
the same, and mailed them to the complainant in New
Orleans. The cattle were also named and described on
the back of the ledger card of the July 11, 1962 note.

When the complainants rested, the defendant pro-
posed to offer and prove by Dr. Whitfield that when
the cattle were first tested, 28 cows were infected and
the herd was quarantined. In the early part of 1963, the
herd was again tested and 48 were found to be infected
and could not be sold in interstate commerce. For that
reason, their delivery to Eubanks by W. H. Hodges &
Company constituted a fraud. There was the offer also
to show by the defendant, evidence of the same factual
situation.

HE I The complainants objected to those offers be-
cause the defendant, by his own pleading, alleged and
showed that he had knowledge of the existence of the
alleged disease in the herd as early as 1960, two years
prior to the execution of the note and deed of trust,
and such defense, as might be claimed therefrom, had
therefore been waived. This objection, on the part of
the complainants, was sustained.

At the close of the evidence, while the chancellor made
no separate finding of fact, the final decree particulariz-
ed the finding, and pointed out clearly his idea on the
issues before the court. In effect, he found that W. H.

Hodges & Company, a corporation, is the holder of a
valid, legal, and outstanding promissory note, dated July
11, 1962, bearing interest from September 1, 1962, sub-
ject to a setoff of $401.91 as an overcharge of principal,
together with credits of $1,752.33 and an offset of $276.02
on account of a finance charge, which he held was not
proper for it to receive. The court fixed the attorney’s
fee at $500. In other words, there was a decree for
$7,650.31 together with interest thereon at 8% from Sep-
tember 1, 1962 and an attorney’s fee of $500, aggregating
a total of $8,150.31.

From the decreé entered, Eubanks appealed.

Appellant contends it was error to dismiss his cross
bill because the appellee was obligated to provide healthy
and disease free cattle.

Throughout the record, it appeared that W. H. Hodges
& Company paid for the appellant the cost of the cattle
which were obtained by the appellant from New Orleans
Auto Buyers, Inc. Appellee was not the seller — it paid
for the appellant’s purchase. The cost of the cattle was
the consideration for the original note. That note was
renewed a number of times, being finally consummated
by the renewal of July 11, 1962 and the execution of the
accompanying chattel deed of trust.

The pleading of the appellant showed that he had
discovered the existence of the alleged disease in the
herd with the birth of the first calves from the 1960
crop. Besides, his knowledge of this condition of the
herd continued to extend and widen. Yet, during the
interval, he renewed the original note numerous times.
Finally, he caused his attorney to prepare the note and
chattel deed of trust of July 11, 1962, executed the same,
and mailed them to the appellee in New Orleans, Louisi-
ana, at a time when he was fully apprised of any right
or defense that he might have had thereto.

The case of Pintard v. Martin, S. & M. Ch. 126, 134
(1843), laid down and applied the following rule:

383

“The authorities fully establish the position, that if
a party, having knowledge that he has been defraud-
ed, proceeds to do acts in confirmation of his agree-
ment, by voluntarily entering into a new engagement
concerning it, he will be held thereby, to have waived
the fraud, and to have renounced that relief, which
he might otherwise have had in equity,” citing au-
thorities.

In the case of McArthur v. Fillingame, 184 Miss. 869,
875, 186 So. 828, 829, (1939), Fillingame had purchased
the car in question on August 31, 1935 and executed a
conditional sales contract. He subsequently renewed the
contract on December 11, 1935 and July 31, 1936. When
the car was finally repossessed and sold in May 1938,
and appellant sued for a deficiency judgment, Fillingame
pleaded payment and false representation at the time
of the original sale. In rejecting that defense, the opini-
on said:

“Tt is not necessary to examine, with any particulari-
ty, into the facts respecting the alleged representations
at the time of the original sale, for the reason that
between that time and the date of the last renewal,
appellee had acquired full knowledge of all the facts
which had any relation to the misrepresentations that
he now charges against appellants; and the rule is
that a renewal of the contract after such knowledge
is a waiwer of the defense which, on the grownd of
misrepresentation or the like, might have been made
to the original contract. By the renewal, the original
contract is superseded and the new contract becomes
the subsisting obligation between the parties,’’ citing
authorities. (Emphasis supplied).

See also Tallahatchie Home Bank v. Aldridge, 169
Miss. 597, 604, 153 So. 818, 820 (1934), where it was
said:

“Where a party has full knowledge of all defenses

to a note, and executes a new note payable at a future

— i

date, he then waives all his defenses and becomes

obligated to pay the new note,’’ citing many cases.

Manifestly the court was correct in dismissing the
cross bill in this case because it did not state a justici-
able controversy.

Since this litigation is governed by the principles set
out in the above mentioned and cited cases, it follows
that Morrow v. Barron Motor Co., 229 Miss. 51, 90 So.
2d 20 (1956), and Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delint-
ing Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952), cited by the
appellant, have no application here.

The appellant also contends that the court erred in
sustaining an objection by the complainants to the tes-
timony of Eubanks on direct examination, after having
been called as an adverse witness by the complainants.

To begin with, this assignment is not supported by
the record. According to the record when Eubanks, after
having been cross examined as an adverse witness, was
taken by his counsel for direct examination, his counsel
told him to go ahead and tell the court about the cir-
cumstances under which the note and deed of trust were
given. The following ensued:

“This deal started out on an agreement that Mr.

Hodges would furnish me cattle. ...

BY MR. BAREFIELD:

Now, we object to any agreement, or any testimony

as to any transaction prior to...

BY THE COURT:

Gentlemen, let’s go off the record a moment.

HERE ARGUMENT IS OFF THE RECORD

WITNESS EXCUSED.”

There is no showing that the court sustained this
objection or refused to let the witness testify. Actually
the record indicates that counsel voluntarily withdrew
the witness. No error appears in that respect.

HE Besides, the appellant contends that the court
erred in not finding that appellee had charged usurious
interest in excess of 8% per annum.

A. reading of the record discloses that Ray Hodges
was cross examined in great detail by counsel for ap-
pellant; that the various renewals of the notes were
rought to the attention of the court; and that the results
of all charges and credits in great detail was ascertained
yy the court, commencing with the inception of the
original indebtedness and extending throughout the life
of the relationship. Furthermore, it showed that the
chancellor was fully cognizant of all disclosures; that
from time to time, he asked questions himself; and that
he obtained agreements by the parties when such could
be arrived at. It is obvious that the learned trial judge
was clearly warranted in arriving at the result which
he reached; and that the appellee, under the circum-
stances, would not have deserved a forfeiture of interest.
The assignment because of the court’s refusal to per-
mit the introduction of Dr. Whitfield and the appellant,
after the appellee had closed his case, for the reasons
stated, is without merit. That action was properly taken
by the court under the Pintard, McArthur and Tallahat-
chie Home Bank cases, supra.

There is no just basis on which it can be said that
the learned chancellor misapplied charges and credits,
or that his decree is not sustained by substantial evi-
dence.

Consequently, the decree appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Gillespie, Jones, Ineer and Smith, JJ., concur.

we

86

Havuey v. Scare
No. 43740 December 13, 1965 180 So. 2d 920

Raymond Swartefager, Jr, L. Percy Quinn, Laurel,

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G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for

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Luz, C. J.

Harold Hadley was convicted, in the Circuit Court of
Jones County, of the offense of burglary, and was sen-
tenced to serve a term of three years in the state peni-
tentiary. From the judgment entered, he appealed.

Reginald Holifield, an employee of M. M. Bake Shop
in Laurel, testified that, about 2:15 A.M. on October
12, 1964, he was driving his pickup truck to work. As
he was passing the bowling alley on well-lighted Beacon
Street, his attention was attracted when a bowling ball
came out of the bowling alley, rolled across the street,
and passed under his truck. When he looked around,
he saw three Negroes standing just inside the door of
the building. He saw them walk out in the street. Im-
mediately he turned his vehicle around and followed
as they ran along the street. They were about fifty yards
from him at that time. As he pursued, the defendant
looked back over his shoulder and witness got a good
look at him. He described defendant as short, stout,
and wearing black pants and a black jacket. The de-
fendant threw down a box as he was being pursued.
‘When he last saw these parties, they were about 120
yards away. At that time he found the police patrol,
told them what he had seen, and set them to the task
of apprehending the burglars. After he had parked his
truck in front of the civie center, he again saw the de-
fendant run across the street in front of his parked
truck, just a moment after he had stopped it. One of the

other parties was with him at the time. While the police
continued to chase these parties, four or five minutes
later, he saw the defendant climbing over a fence. Fin-
ally, several minutes later, he saw the defendant in the
police car after the officers had captured him in the
canal. The witness positively identified the defendant
as one of the burglars.

Lenox Landrum, a policeman, testified that within
a minute after Holifield had reported the crime to
him, he saw three colored men in an alley. As he started
toward them, they ran. He gave pursuit and got within
15 or 20 feet of them. He saw one of them running in
front of, and one behind, the pickup truck of Reginald
Holifield which had been parked in front of the civic
center. Finally he and his aides found the defendant
lying in the bottom of the canal. Later he found certain
loot which had been taken from the bowling alley and
had been dropped by the burglars. The defendant, at
the time of his arrest, was dressed in dark clothes, just
as he had been described by Holifield.

M. E. Campbell, another policeman who participated
in the chase and apprehension of the defendant, testified
that, when they finally captured the defendant, he was
hiding in the canal, lying on his back. At the time, he
was wet, hot, had been running, and was panting for
breath. Several other officers gave corroboration to the
version of Lenox Landrum and Campbell.

The evidence showed the names of the owners of the
building and property, and also the occupant and op-
erator of the business therein. It also showed the way
and manner in which the building was broken into and
entered, and the amount and value of the money and
other property, stolen and carried away, aggregating
approximately $115.00.

Wilbur Mayfield, a seventeen year old boy, the only
witness called by the defendant, testified that he and
two other Negroes broke into the bowling alley; but

389

he did not know their names, although he had heard
one of them called ‘‘Cubie’’. He said that Harold Had-
ley had nothing whatever to do with the burglary. This
witness was cross-examined at length. From a reading
of his version, it can be readily seen that it probably
had very little weight with the jury.

Thomas A. Landrum, the Youth Court Counsellor, tes-
tifying for the state in rebuttal, said that he knew Willie
Mayfield and his general reputation for truth and vera-
city in the community where he lived, and that such
reputation was bad.

The appellant contends that he was entitled to a di-
rected verdict, and he cites James v. State, 77 Miss. 370,
26 So. 929 (1899), and Ross v. State, 42 So. 801 (Miss.
1907).

It must be remembered that the state witness, Regi-
nald Holifield, testified that he first saw the defendant
and two other parties standing just inside the door of
the bowling alley. It was shown that this was a well
lighted street, and the lights of his truck were good.
Second, the appellant looked back over his shoulder and
the witness got a good look at him. For the third time,
he saw defendant again as he crossed the street in front
of his parked truck. For the fourth time, he saw the
defendant climbing a fence. For the fifth time, he saw
the defendant after his apprehension by the officers.
In addition, the witness described the defendant’s clothes
and his build, and there was corroboration in these re-
spects by other witnesses. The appellant, when he was
arrested, was lying down in a wet canal, and his appear-
ance evinced the fact that he had been running and was
seeking to escape from the clutches of the law. Thus,
the direct evidence, together with the other corroborat-
ing circumstances, fully justified the court in refusing
to grant the peremptory instruction to the appellant.
The cases, which he cited, in no way conflict with the
decisive question in the present appeal.

390

HB The appellant also contends that the instruc-
tions for the state should have expressly required the
state’s evidence to establish the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every
other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of
the accused. To that end, he has cited Irving v. State,
100 Miss. 208, 56 So. 877 (1911), and Smith v. State,
101 Miss. 283, 57 So. 913 (1912).

In this case, it must be borne in mind that there was
direct evidence by the witness Holifield that he saw the
appellant five different times, and was able to identify
him positively as one of the participants in this burglary
of the bowling alley in question.

This Court has long since held that “It is only in
cases, as a general rule, where the evidence is entirely
circumstantial that the jury should be required to ex-
clude every other reasonable hypothesis than guilt be-
fore a conviction can be had.’’ Pettus v. State, 200 Miss.
3897, 411, 27 So. 2d 536, 540 (1946). That case was fol-
lowed and cited in Kirk v. State, 222 Miss. 187, 191,
75 So. 2d 641, 642 (1954), where it was held that the
State’s instruction was not erroneous because it did not
contain the clause ‘‘to the exclusion of every other rea-
sonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.’’ It was
there pointed out that the inclusion of the quoted phrase
is proper where the guilt of the accused is based entirely
upon circumstantial evidence; but, in that instance, there
was an admission by the appellant of the possession of
the whiskey, as charged in the trial court.

The foregoing principle, laid down in the Pettus and
Kirk cases, supra, has been repeatedly followed in Bur-
gess v. State, 245 Miss. 1, 145 So. 2d 160 (1962) ; Passons
v. State, 239 Miss. 629, 124 So. 2d 847 (1960); Smith
v. State, 233 Miss. 886, 103 So. 2d 360 (1958). Conse-
quently this assignment is untenable.

The appellant also contends that the verdict of the
jury evinced bias and prejudice and that he had not

obtained a fair and impartial trial under the state and
federal constitutions.

HM While no particular provision of either the
state or federal constitutions is called to the attention
of the Court, a consideration of this record shows con-
clusively, if human testimony and circumstantial evi-
dence can rightly be employed to establish the guilt of
a person charged with crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
that this appellant has received a fair and impartial
trial and has received every right to which he was en-
titled under both the state and the federal constitutions.
Consequently, it follows that the cause must be, and it
is, affirmed.

Affirmed.

Gillespie, Jones, Inzer and Smith, JJ., concur.

Kurexrareicx v. Munn, Apmx.*
No. 43677 December 17, 1965 181 So, 2d 150

392

B.N. Knox, Jr., New Albany, for appellant.

L. G. Fant, Jr., Holly Springs; Mitchell, McNutt &
Bush, Tupelo, for appellee.

Inzmp, J.

This appeal involves the question of whether a surety
on a supersedeas appeal bond to this Court is liable
on the bond for a judgment rendered in the circuit court,
after the case which was appealed was affirmed by
this Court as to liability but reversed and remanded for
a new trial for the assessment of damages. We hold
that the surety is not liable under such circumstances.

The facts involved were stipulated in the Circuit Court
of Marshall County and were submitted to the circuit
judge for a decision without intervention of a jury. The
facts as stipulated are:

The plaintiff, Mrs. Jane Munn, as administratrix

of the estate of M. N. Munn, deceased, recovered a

final judgment against P. O. Scott in the Cireuit

Court of Marshall County, Mississippi in cause num-

ber 5893 in the amount of $2500.00; said judgment

being of the date of November 25, 1959. Said suit
was for damages sustained by the plaintiff’s intestate
in an automobile accident.

P. O. Seott, the defendant in the above numbered
case, appealed said judgment to the Supreme Court

of Mississippi with supersedeas. W. V. Crump and
Jimmy Kirkpatrick executed the supersedeas bond as
sureties. Both W. V. Crump and Jimmy Kirkpatrick
are residents and householders in Monroe County,
Mississippi, at all times pertinent hereto.

‘When. the cause was heard by the Supreme Court
of Mississippi, being cause No. 42,445, the Supreme
Court affirmed the cause as to the liability of the
defendant, but reversed the cause on the question of
damages, and remanded the case to the Cireuit Court
of Marshall County ‘‘so that another jury may pass
upon damages due under the allegations of the dec-
laration, other than for consortium and companion-
ship.’? The Supreme Court assessed the costs of the
entire proceeding against the plaintiff, Mrs. Munn.
The appellee, Mrs. Munn, filed a motion to retax the
costs, but was unsuccessful, The mandate of the Su-
preme Court provided that all costs were assessed
against Mrs. Munn.

After remand, the cause was again submitted to
the Circuit Court of Marshall County, Mississippi,
in cause No. 5893 on the docket of said Court, and
resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiff against the
defendant, P. O. Scott, in the sum of $2250.00.

Subsequently, the plaintiff here, Mrs. Jane Munn,
filed her suit in the Circuit Court of Marshall County,
Mississippi against Jimmy Kirkpatrick and W. V.
Crump, defendants, in the cause No. 6191 on the docket
of said Court, to recover against the said defendants
the sum of $2250.00 plus interest from the date of
February 25, 1963.

The defendants, Jimmy Kirkpatrick and W. V.
Crump, moved the Court to transfer this cause to the
County of their household and residence, namely,
Monroe County, Mississippi, which motion has been
overruled by the Court.

395

It was further stipulated that neither of the sureties
was a party to the original cause of action and that
the final judgment rendered in Cause No. 5893 on the
docket of the Circuit Court of Marshall County was a
valid judgment. It was also stipulated that the original
appeal bond would be considered in evidence together
with the opinion of this Court on the former appeal.

The matter was then taken under advisement by the
circuit judge, and he later rendered a written opinion
and order. His opinion states in part:

The bond in issue is the appeal bond with super-
sedeas with the condition that the appeal be prose-
cuted with ‘‘effect, and shall satisfy the judgment
complained of and also such final judgment as may
be made in the cause and all costs, if same be affirm-
ed.”

The phrase ‘‘with effect’? means more than a mere
prosecution of the appeal to a final determination,
but requires a final determination in favor of appel-
lant.

The phrase ‘‘if affirmed,’’? obviously, on general
principles, means that the final decision determining
the rights of the parties must be deemed to have been
within the contemplation of the sureties, and they
are liable for the payment of the judgement as finally
affirmed, even though it was first reversed and then,
on a re-hearing, affirmed.

In this matter, the liability of the principal was af-
firmed and only the amount of damages was reversed
for a new trial. No appeal was taken from the judg-
ment entered by the court on the verdict of the jury
at the conclusion of the second trail (sic).

Since the matter of liability was affirmed on ap-
peal, the sureties can not now be heard to complain
because the amount of damages and judgment is low-
er.

From the judgment rendered against the sureties one
of the sureties, Jimmy Kirkpatrick, appeals to this Court.
He contends that the trial judge was in error (1) in
overruling his motion for a change of venue to the county
of his residence and household, and (2) in rendering
a judgment for appellee, Mrs. Jane Munn, Administra-
trix, We will first address ourselves to the second con-
tention.

The condition of the bond in question provides:

Now if the said P. O. Scott shall prosecute said
appeal with effect and shall satisfy the judgment com-
plained of and also such final judgment as may be
made in the cause and all costs, if the same be af-
firmed, then this obligation to be void; otherwise, to
remain in full force and effect.

The learned circuit judge construed the condition
‘with effect’? to mean more than just the prosecution
of the appeal to a successful determination. He held
that it required a final determination of the case in
favor of appellant. It appears to be his conclusion that
even though a case is reversed by this Court for a new
trial that the sureties on a supersedeas appeal bond
remain liable unless such appellant shall prevail in the
retrial of the case. With this thinking we cannot agree.
A statement of the general rule relative to recovery on
supersedeas bonds is found in 5B CJ.S. Appeal and
Error § 2042 (1958) :

Before there can be any recovery on a superse-
deas bond, a breach of the conditions of the bond
must appear. A condition merely to prosecute an
appeal, without the use of the statutory words, ‘with
effect,’ is fully performed by a prosecution which
is unsuccessful and which results in an affirmance of
the judgment appealed from. On the other hand, a

condition to prosecute an appeal with effect, as usually
construed, means to prosecute it successfully, or to
secure a reversal of the judgment appealed from. In

|

some cases, however, it has been held that prosecution

with effect does not mean to a successful issue in

favor of appellant, but merely prosecution with due
diligence to a final determination, or to a nonsuit.

Due prosecution of an appeal means its effectual

prosecution. So failure to perfect an appeal has been

regarded as a breach of the condition to prosecute
the appeal with effect, fixing the sureties with lia-
bility.

MBB We hold that the phrase ‘‘prosecute said appeal
with effect’? requires that the appeal be prosecuted suc-
cessfully. In the case of Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas,
166 Miss. 53, 146 So. 184 (1932), we discussed the ques-
tion of what constituted success upon appeal in regard
to the assessment of costs. We said:

The question then is: Is the appellant here a suc-
cessful party within the meaning of the statute? Or,
to express it differently, did he obtain here the judg-
ment sought by him on the appeal?

Under section 3378, Code 1930, the judgment to be
rendered by this court, when error appears in a judg-
ment or decree, appealed from, is to reverse the judg-
ment or decree, and (1) remand the case for a new
trial, or (2) render such judgment as the trial court
should have rendered; or, if the decree is not erroneous
in all particulars, then (3) to affirm it in so far as
it is correct, and reverse it in so far as it is erroneous,
and remand the case for a new trial on the questions
only with respect to which the judgment or decree is
erroneous, if separable. Section 3405, Code 1930; Rules
12 and 13 of this court, 104 Miss. 906.

The judgment in the Supreme Court sought by an
appellant on an appeal thereto is, therefore, one re-
versing the judgment or decree appealed from, in
whole or in part, and the rendition of one of these
three judgments. This, the appellant here succeeded
in accomplishing, for the judgment of the trial court

was reversed, and the judgment which the trial court

should have rendered was here rendered. Howie v.

Bonds, 87 Miss. 698, 40 So. 227. The appellant, there-

fore, under the statute, seems to be entitled to recover

the costs incurred on the appeal. (166 Miss. at 64,

146 So. at 135)

HE Mf It is apparent from the foregoing that Scott
prosecuted his appeal in Cause No. 42,445 successfully
when we affirmed as to liability but reversed and re-
manded for a new trial on the question of damages. He
prosecuted his appeal with the effect required by the
condition of the bond.

We have heretofore determined the meaning of the
words ‘‘if affirmed’? contrary to the finding of the
trial judge. In the case of Barry v. Winfield, 126 So.
842 (Miss. 1930), which involved an accounting relative
to partnership business and on a motion to retax costs
and to correct judgment to include a judgment against
the sureties on a supersedeas bond, we said:

As to only two items mentioned in the former opini-
on, the judgment of the lower court was reversed.
Certain it is that this court did not affirm the judg-
ment of the lower court. Section 3409, Hemingway’s
Code, 1927, Section 4928, Code of 1906, provides that
the judgment of the Supreme Court, on affirming
the judgment or decree of the court below, or on a
dismissal of. the appeal, shall be against the sureties
on the appellant’s supersedeas bond. The cause before
us does not fall within the statute.

This Court has construed a similar statute, against
the appellee in the case of Nancy J. Kibble et al. v.
Armistead L. Butler, 27 Miss. 586, where it announced
that there cannot be a judgment in the Supreme Court
against the sureties on the supersedeas bond where
a judgment could not be obtained by a regular suit
on the bond. In the Kibble Case the Supreme Court
had rendered a judgment reversing the holding of

399

the court below, and entered a judgment in another
form, but in effect the same as the judgment reversed.
Judge Fisher, as the organ of the court, held that the
judgment so rendered by this court was void — that
there was no breach of the conditions of the bond,
because the case had been reversed.
In the case now before us there has been no breach
of the bond — consequently no judgment against the
sureties thereon can be rendered. (126 So. at 843)
MMB The words ‘‘if affirmed’’ apply to the judg-
ment appealed from and do not mean that an appellant
must be successful on a retrial in order for the sureties
on_a supersedeas bond to be relieved of their obligation.

WE BM [i is clear to us that Scott prosecuted his ap-
peal, No. 42,445, with effect, and that we did not affirm
the judgment appealed from. The obligation of the
sureties on his supersedeas bond was not breached, and
it became void. For this reason this case must be re-
versed and judgment entered here for appellant.

Reversed and judgment here for appellant.

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Brady, JJ.,
concur.

Mowsanro Company, et al. v. Cocnran, et al.
No. 43692 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 624

0

TTT

George P. Hewes, III, Brunini, Everett, Grantham &
Quin, Jackson, for appellants.

Shannon Clai vie Bishop, Waynesboro, for appel-
lees.

Ropezrs, J.

This suit was brought to cancel a lease on a filling
station upon the ground of fraud, and for an accounting
for rent due, and for punitive damages. It was filed
in the Chancery Court of Wayne County, Mississippi,
by the appellees against James H. Brownlee, J. P. Thorn-

403

ton, Monsanto Company, and the Lion Oil Company.
Monsanto Company and Lion Oil Company are actually
one company, and is hereinafter called Lion Oil Com-
pany. :

A careful examination of this record reveals that this
case grows out of an unfortunate misunderstanding.
James R. and James S. Cochran, father and son, built
a filling station on a corner lot they owned in Waynes-
boro, Wayne County, Mississippi. They leased the prop-
erty to J. P. Thornton for a term of ten years, with an
option to renew. It was agreed in the lease that Mr.
Thornton would pay the owners, appellees, the sum
of $100 per month, plus one cent per gallon of gasoline
over 8,000 gallons sold at the service station. Mr. Thorn-
ton went into possession of the property and employed
Mr. J. BR. Richie to operate the station. Mr. Thornton
also owned two other filling stations, Less than a year
later, on April 15, 1964, Mr. Thornton, with the consent
of appellees, sold his entire operation to the Lion Oil
Company (except gasoline in the pumps), including an
assignment of the lease on the property belonging to
appellees. Mr. J. R. Richie continued to operate the
service station, selling Lion Oil products, instead of
‘Conoco’? products previously sold by Mr. Thornton.

The Assistant District Manager of the Lion Oil Com-
pany wrote a letter to appellees on May 1, 1964, re-
questing that the rental of one cent per gallon be com-
puted on the number of gallons delivered to the station,
rather than reading the meters on the pumps each month
to determine the amount of rent due. The Lion Oil
Company amended the contract of its agent James H.
Brownlee of Laurel, Mississippi, so as to permit him
to service the station purchased from Mr. Thornton.
Appellees received the $100 rental for May 1964, but
did not receive any rental for the gasoline sold over
8,000 gallons. They talked to Mr. Richie about the mat-
ter and discovered that Mr. Brownlee was delivering

two sets of invoices to Mr. Richie. These invoices in-
dicated a discrepancy in the number of gallons sold to
Mr. Richie. Mr. James R. Cochran called Mr. Brown-
lee’s attention to this fact and advised he had received
no rental on the excess gasoline sold. Thereafter, Mr.
Cochran received a small check ($10.27 dated July 20,
1964). Mr. Thornton learned of the situation and inform-
ed Mr. Cecil Jones, Assistant District Manager for Lion
Oil Company. The assistant manager and district sales-
man called on the Cochrans and obtained copies of the
invoices. The Lion Oil Company sent the Cochrans
checks for the full amount of the excess gasoline rental
due. Appellees were dissatisfied and wanted to have a
fixed rental of $175 or sell the Lion Oil Com-
pany the filling station. The Lion Oil Company would
not agree to renegotiate the Thornton contract; where-
upon, the appellees sued in the chancery court to cancel
the contract. The chancellor entered the decree, cancel-
ling the contract and awarding appellees a monetary
judgment against the Lion Oil Company for $304.61 rent-
al — the total sum of the checks admitted to be due by
the Oil Company — and also the sum of $1,500 punitive
damages. The decree is based upon the alleged fraud of
James H. Brownlee in not reporting the excess gallonage
sold to the station, and also upon the theory that Brown-
lee was acting as the agent of the Lion Oil Company
and it had notice, and was therefore liable for the fraudu-
lent acts.

We have reached the conclusion that the decree rend-
ered by the chancellor in the instant case was manifestly
in error and it must be reversed and rendered for the
following reasons.

MEE There seem to be few exceptions to the general
rule that the courts of equity will not assess punitive
damages. This rule is set out in 19 Am. Jur. Equity
section 125 at page 125 (1939) as follows: ‘‘Exemplary
or punitive damages will never be awarded, it seems,

the theory being that the complainant, by having ap-
plied to a court of equity, must be deemed to have waived
all claim to recover other than compensatory damages.’’
This point is annotated in 48 A. L. R. 2d section 4,
at page 953 (1956), wherein the textwriter points out
that ‘‘Some courts have based their denial of punitive
damages upon the theory that an award of such damages
is wholly incompatible with- the basic principles of equi-
ty.’ And again it is said in section 5 at page 954 that
‘Some courts have denied punitive or exemplary dam-
ages in equitable proceedings on the theory that when
a litigant seeks equitable relief, he thereby waives all
claim to such damages.’’ See also 15 Am. Jur. Damages
§ 278 (1938). Mississippi has adopted this rule in the
following cases: Capital Electric Power Ass’n v. McGuf-
fie, 226 Miss. 227, 83 So. 2d 837 (1955); Wilborn v.
Balfour, 218 Miss. 791, 67 So. 2d 857 (1953); Neal v.
Newburger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 123 So. 861 (1929) ; Hines
v. Imperial Naval Stores Co., 101 Miss. 802, 58 So. 650
(1912) ; Annot. 48 A. L. R. 2d 958 (1956).

The record in the instant case does not show any
evidence of an intentional wrong on the part of the
Lion Oil Company, nor do we find facts to justify an
inference that the acts of the Lion Oil Company were
of such a character as to show any of the essential ele-
ments necessary to establish exemplary damages, such as
willfulness, wantonness, malice, oppression, insult or
gross fraud.

MBM It is said in 15 Am. Jur. Damages section 278
at pages 718, 714, 715 (1938) that:

“While every legal wrong entitles the party injured

to recover damages sufficient to compensate for the

injury inflicted, not every legal wrong entitles the
injured party to recover exemplary damages. The
greater portion of actionable wrongs furnishes no
basis whatsoever for the recovery of such damages.
It is universally recognized that punitive or exemplary

406

damages, if recoverable at all, may be recovered only
in cases where the wrongful act complained of is
characterized by, or partakes of, some circumstances
of aggravation, such as wilfulness, wantonness, ma-
lice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, con-
tumely and indignity, outrageous conduct, insult, or
gross fraud.’
This rule is well-settled in Mississippi. See Interstate
Oil Pipeline Co. v. Valentine, 236 Miss. 400, 110 So. 2d
369 (1959); Lynn v. R. G. LeTourneau, Inc., 237 Miss.
124, 118 So. 2d 659 (1959); Bradley v. Associates Dis-
count Corp., 230 Miss. 131, 92 So. 2d 468 (1957).

It is the primary contention of the appellees that the
decree of the chancery court should be affirmed and the
lease contract cancelled, because, it is charged, the Lion
Oil Company’s distributor, James S. Brownlee, acting
as the agent of the Oil Company, attempted to defraud
them by not reporting to the Oil Company the actual
number of gallons of gasoline sold from appellee’s filling
station.

The gist of appellees’ contention is that the distribu-
tor was acting as the agent of the Oil Company, and that
it had notice of the fraud and for that reason it is liable.

Mr. Brownlee admitted that he was making two in-
voices for a period of three months, but explained this
by showing that the gasoline in the pumps at the time
the lease was transferred belonged to him because he
purchased it from Mr. Thornton, and contends that it
was necessary for him to report this gasoline to the
Lion Oil Company, as having been sold to Mr. Richie,
except as to the number of gallons sold through the
pumps. It is admitted that Mr. Brownlee paid for this
gasoline, and that nothing was due for the month of
April. He testified that there were certain people who
were working for the Shell Oil Company who were pur-
chasing gas from Mr. Richie at appellees’ service station
on the Shell courtesy card and that the Lion Oil Com-

407

pany did not honor the Shell card.. There were other
customers who were purchasing gasoline on ‘‘Conoco’”’
courtesy cards. It was therefore necessary for the dis-
tributor to collect the indebtedness directly from the
Shell Oil Company and Conoco before reporting this
cash collection to the Lion Oil Company, and for that
reason he did not make the report until he collected the
money. There were also bulk sales made by the distribu-
tor through the service station, for which Mr. Richie
did not want to pay, because he objected to paying rental
on the bulk sales to others. Mr. Brownlee also testified
that he was not familiar with some of the forms on
which he was required to report to the Oil Company,
and for that reason the rental report was delayed.

The records show that the Oil Company paid all that
was due for rentals to the appellees and Mr. R. J.
Cochran admitted that they did not charge in their
original bill of complaint that they had not received
all that was due to them as lessors under the contract
before the suit was filed.

Appellees have cited two cases on which they base
their contention that the Oil Company is liable for the
alleged fraud of James §. Brownlee. The first of these
is Billups Petroleum Company v. Hardin’s Bakeries
Corporation, 217 Miss. 24, 63 So. 2d 543 (1953). In that
case a driver of one of the bakery delivery trucks was
actually delivering less bread to the customer than he
was collecting for, and at the same time, he was paying
the bread company the proper amount for the bread
actually delivered. This Court held in that case that
the bread company was liable for the loss caused by
the fraud of its agent. We said:

“We think that the trial judge was in error in hold-

ing that the Hardin’s Bakeries Corporation was not

liable for the dishonest acts of its sales agent.

“<<Tt ig well settled that the principal is liable for

the frauds and misrepresentations of his agent within

the scope of the authority or employment of the agent,
even though he had no knowledge thereof and has
received no benefit therefrom.’ 2 Am. Jur. p. 281,
Agency, § 362.”? (217 Miss. at 33, 63 So. 2d at 546)
In Billups the Court required the bread company to
pay to the customer the amount of money overcharged
by the driver of the delivery truck, who was their agent.
The next case cited by appellees is Napp v. Liberty
National Life Insurance Company, 248 Miss. 320, 159
So. 2d 164 (1963). This is a case where an insurance
agent delivered an insurer’s check for the amount due
under a life policy and obtained part of the money due
the insured, and it was pointed out that the deliverer
of the check was an agent of the insurance company
under Mississippi Code Annotated section 5706 (1956).
In that case, the Court cited Billups and said: ‘‘In the
instant case, the agent paid less than he was supposed
to pay. If appellant’s testimony be accepted as true,
then the company has not paid its debt.’’? Thus, it is
seen, the principal in both cases was required to pay
the shortage caused by the wrongful acts of their agents.
In the instant case, the Lion Oil Company was liable
to the lessors, appellees, for the rent of $100 per month
and one cent per gallon over 8,000 under the terms of
the lease contract, regardless as to whether or not the
distributor, was the agent of Lion Oil Company, and
whether or not he was attempting to'defraud appellees.
The Oil Company paid all of the rent due appellees, and
since appellees could not recover punitive damages in
the chancery court, none was due because there were
no other damages alleged or demanded by appellees.
HEEB The general rule on this subject is found in 23
Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit section 20 at pages 771, 772
(1939) in the following language:
“The ground of the tort action based upon fraud, the
action of deceit, is fraud and damage, and when both
concur the action will lie. Moreover, both must concur

to constitute actionable fraud, a common statement

of the rule being that neither fraud without damage

nor damage without fraud is sufficient to support an
action.’?

The same textwriter, on the same subject, also points

out in section 172 at pages 985, 986, 987 that:

“Tt is a fundamental principle of law that, with the
exception of special cases recognized only in some
jurisdictions, in order to secure relief on a basis of
fraud either at law or in equity, the person seeking
redress must have been damaged, injured, or harmed
as a result of the asserted fraud, or, as the principle
is often formulated, he must thereby have been misled
to his hurt. ... Moreover, relief will not be granted
where the representations have been made good so
that the plaintiff receives no injury therefrom. Mere
intention to defraud without carrying the fraudulent
intent into effect is also not actionable.’’

The following section 173 at page 987 states:
‘‘Although the courts are in agreement upon the fun-
damental problem that in order to secure equitable
relief on the basis of fraud, some injury or damage
must be shown by the complainant, and have frequent-
ly applied this principle in cases where rescission on
the ground of fraud is sought. .. .’’

See also 37 C. J. S. Fraud § 121 (1948).

In the case of Salter v. Aviation Salvage Company,
129 Miss. 217, 91 So. 340 (1922), where certain purchas-
ers contended that under the facts and circumstances
they bargained to purchase certain property, and through
the concealment of the seller, the property was not in-
cluded in the contract and therefore they rightfully took
possession and appropriated it to their use. This Court
said:

“Tt is true appellees thought they were buying all the

property which appellant had bought, but it is not

true that they thought they were buying the flooring

410

and the oil house. Concede, for argument’s sake, that

they were led into that state of mind through the

fraud of appellant. The question is: How were they
hurt by such conduct on the part of the appellant?

‘We are unable to see.’”

The Court then pointed out that the purchasers got all
of the property that they purchased.

The case at bar resolves itself into the question as to
whether or not the failure of a distributing agent to
report the full amount of gasoline sold, resulting in the
failure of the company to pay all of the rent due on
a lease contract was so fraudulent as to cause a breach
of the lease contract. In the instant case, the contract
did not specify when the rent was payable; nor did it
contain a forfeiture clause for the failure to pay rent at
a particular time.

We have heretofore held that the failure to pay rent
at the time it was due would not result in a forfeiture
of a lease even where the lease contract contained a for-
feiture provision. In the case of Senter v. Propst, 190
Miss. 190, 197 So. 100 (1940), where the appellee Propst
brought a suit against the appellant for relief in a for-
feiture of a lease for lack of payment of rent. This
Court, quoting from Pomeroy, 1 Hq. Jur., 4th Edition,
Section 453 (1918) said:

«‘Where the lease contains a condition that the lessor

may re-enter and put an end to the lessee’s estate, or

even that the lease shall be void, upon the lessee’s
failure to pay rent at the time specified, it is well
settled that a court of equity will relieve the lessee
and set aside the forfeiture incurred by his breach
of the condition whether the lessor has or has not
entered and dispossessed the tenant. This rule is based.
upon the notion that such condition and forfeiture
are intended merely as a security for the payment of
money.’’ (190 Miss. at 206, 197 So. at 103)

411

Tt was also pointed out in that case:

“In the case of Kann v. King, 204 U. 8. 48, 87 8. Ct.

213, 216, 51 L. Ed. 360, 363, the Supreme Court of

the United States said: ‘That a court of equity, even

in the absence of special circumstances of fraud, ac-
cident, or mistake, may relieve against a forfeiture
incurred by the breach of a covenant to pay rent, on
the payment or tender of all arrears of rent and in-

terest by a defaulting lessee, is elementary.’ ’’ 190

Miss. at 206, 197 So. at 103)

In 80 ©. J. S. Equity section 56 (1965) it is pointed
out that equity ordinarily will relieve a tenant from
forfeiture of nonpayment of rent at the time it is due,
and this has been said to be the rule, even though the
breach is willful on the part of the tenant.

In 51 C. J. S. Landlord and Tenant section 104 (b)
(1947) at page 683, it is said: .

“In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a tenancy

cannot be terminated for a breach of covenant by the

lessee unless there is an express.and distinct provision
in the lease for a forfeiture or right of reentry on the

occurrence of the breach .. .

“The rule that an express provision in the lease is

necessary in order to work a forfeiture applies equally

well not only to a breach of covenant to pay rent but
also to the breach of a covenant against assigning
or subletting. ...’” ;

In the case of Clark v. Service Auto Company, 148
Miss. 602, 615, 108 So. 704, 706, (1926), Annotations
49 A. L. R. 511 (1927), this Court pointed out that
“At common law, nonpayment of rent does not operate
in the absence of a provision therefor in the lease as a
forfeiture of the term or confer upon the lessor the right
of re-entry.’’ .

In the case of Louisiana Oil Corporation v. Frye,
169 Miss. 861, 154 So. 274 (1934), this Court dealt with
the question as to whether or not a lease contract could

412

be cancelled by the lessor-employee because the lessee-
employer had to dispense with the service of the lessor-
employee, as provided in the employment contract. The
lease contained no provision for its termination in such
case. This Court said:

“‘There were no allegations of mutual mistake in

executing the lease, nor anything proven which would

justify the court in reforming the contract, and no
such relief was specifically asked for.

“We think the contract exhibited to the bill was the

exponent of their own terms, and that it was not proper

to grant the relief prayed for, or any relief; and,
consequently, the judgment of the court below must
be reversed and the cause dismissed. ...’? (169 Miss.

at 864, 154 So. at 274)

WM We are of the opinion, therefore, that since
the lease contract did not contain a forfeiture clause
for failure to pay rent on a certain day — and since the
appellees received all the rent due them and punitive
damages could not be awarded in an equity court —
appellees could not maintain an action to cancel the lease
contract for alleged fraud of the Lion Oil Company’s
distributor. MBM Equity abhors a forfeiture and is
disposed to seize on slight circumstances to avoid a
forfeiture. (30 0. J. S. Equity § 56 (a) at 888-890, 1965).

HH Moreover, from the evidence as a whole, re-
corded in this case, we are of the opinion that, although
the testimony shows a failure of the distributing agent
to report to the Lion Oil Company all of the gasoline
sold at the filling station and shows a duplicate set
of invoices to the station operator, nevertheless, when
the entire evidence, including the explanation of the
distributing agent Brownlee is considered, the facts are
not sufficient to establish fraud by clear and convincing
proof required by law. See Taft v. Taft, 252 Miss. 204,
172 So. 2d 403 (1965); Touchstone v. Bond, 223 Miss.
487, 78 So. 2d 463 (1955) ; Mayfield Motor Co. v. Parker,

413

222 Miss. 152, 75 So. 2d 435 (1954); Osborn v. Thomas,
221 Miss. 682, 74 So. 2d 757 (1954); Perkins v. Morgan,
210 Miss. 297, 49 So. 2d 383 (1950); Corley v. Myers,
198 Miss. 380, 22 So. 2d 234 (1945), Sug. of Error 198
Miss. 380, 22 So. 2d 575 (1945), Motion 198 Miss. 380,
23 So. 2d 302 (1945); Hunt v. Sherrill, 195 Miss. 688,
15 So. 2d 426 (1943); Truckers Exchange Bank v. Con-
roy, 190 Miss. 242, 199 So. 301 (1940); Grenada Auto
Oo. v. Waldrop, 188 Miss. 468, 195 So. 491 (1940) ;
Laurel Auto Supply Co. v. Sumrall, 184 Miss. 88, 185
So. 566 (1939) ; Martin v. Gill, 182 Miss. 810, 181 So. 849
(1938); 37 C. J. S. Fraud § 114 (a) (1943).

We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the decree
of the chancery court is manifestly erroneous and should
be reversed. Checks made payable to appellees James
8. Cochran and James R. Cochran by the Lion Oil
Company should be returned to them, and the original
pill should be, and is, hereby dismissed.

Reversed and rendered, with directions that the checks
made payable to appellees be turned over to them.

Lee, C. J., and Jones, Inzer and Smith, JJ., coneur.

Crarr v. Stare
No. 43640 December 17, 1965 181 So. 24 140

Pa
st

445

Mounger & Mounger, Tylertown; Dudley W. Conner,
Hattiesburg, for appellant.

R. Hugo Newcomb, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for

appellee.

Rovezrs, J.

‘We have reached the conclusion that this case must
be reversed and remanded for the reasons hereinafter
set forth. Since the case must be retried and the facts
are not appropriate for the printed page, we refrain
from reiterating the evidence shown in the record except
insofar as it is necessary to do so in order to clearly
present the ruling of the Court.

I

HM BM We hold that the introduction of the State’s
Exhibit Number One, with reference to a photograph of
an obscene writing shown on the wall of the room here in-
volved, should not have been introduced for the reason
that the obscenity is not shown to have been connected
with the facts, nor to have been a part of the crime
alleged in the instant case. This photograph was con-
demned in a companion case. Hinton O. Butler v. State,
253 Miss. 760, 179 So. 2d 184,

I

The appellant argues that the activity of the State’s
only eye-witness, the police officer, was a violation of
his constitutional right of privacy, and therefore the
officer’s testimony should have been excluded on the
ground that it was an unlawful search.

The officer testified that he went into the basement
of the Forrest Hotel without permission of the hotel
owners, looked through the grill of a ventilator into
another room where he observed the appellant commit
the crime here charged; and he immediately went into
the room where appellant was located and arrested him
for the felony alleged here to have been committed in

418

the presence of the officer. The gist of appellant’s
argument is to the effect that the police officer was
trespassing upon the property of the Forrest Hotel
at the time he looked through the ventilator and is said
to have seen the alleged crime committed. Moreover,
appellant argues he had paid ten cents to use the fa-
cilities of the hotel, and had thus purchased the right
to be private.

Appellant cites Martin v. State, 190 Miss. 898, 2 So.
2d 143 (1941), wherein the evidence shows that a police-
man entered a restaurant where he thought beer was
being sold. He proceeded toward the back of the restau-
rant but was advised by the wife of the defendant that
customers were not permitted in the back room. The
officer then went to a vantage point on a platform of
a wash rack in a nearby filling station, where he could
see persons drinking something from cans which he
believed to be beer. He was unable to see or hear a
sale being made. He then moved to another vantage
point upon the back porch of the restaurant where he
was able to observe a sale of beer, where he could see
and hear the persons engaged in the sale. The testi-
mony was rejected by this Court upon the ground that
the officer was trespassing upon the porch of the restau-
rant at the time he obtained the evidence and therefore
it was unlawfully obtained and should have been exclud-
ed. The case was reversed. Martin is therefore not ap-
plicable to the facts here shown, because, in that case
the officer was trespassing upon the property of defend-
ant and was thus committing an illegal search. In the
instant case now before the Court, the officer was not
trespassing upon property owned or controlled by de-
fendant; therefore, an illegal search of the basement
of the Forrest Hotel did not violate any constitutional
right of defendant, appellant here. Lovern v. State,
140 Miss. 635, 105 So. 759 (1925).

HEE Persons who are not owners or in control of
the premises searched by the officer alleged to be tres-

passing cannot complain of the evidence obtained against
them by an illegal search since the defendant’s con-
stitutional rights were not violated by the officer. This
rule is so well established in Mississippi, we hesitate
to cite authorities, but in view of the fact that an adverse
contention continuously comes up again and again upon
appeal, we list the following cases: Slyter v. State,
246 Miss. 402, 149 So. 24 489 (1963); Jones v. State,
230 Miss. 887, 94 So. 2d 234 (1957); Elkins v. State,
229 Miss. 323, 90 So. 2d 662 (1956); Rose v. State, 222
Miss. 699, 76 So. 2d 835 (1955); McBride v. State, 221
Miss. 508, 73 So. 2d 154 (1954); Harris v. State, 216
Miss. 895, 63 So. 2d 396 (1953); Miles v. State, 51 So.
2d 214 (Miss. 1951); Smith v. State, 198 Miss. 788, 24
So. 2d 85 (1945); Brown vy. State, 192 Miss. 314 (1941),
5 So. 2d 426 (1942); McLemore v. State, 178 Miss.
525, 172 So. 139 (1937); Polk v. State, 167 Miss. 506,
142 So. 480 (1932); Cofer v. State, 158 Miss. 493, 130
So. 511 (1930); Pickett v. State, 155 Miss. 386, 124 So.
364 (1929); Roberts v. State, 153 Miss. 622, 121 So. 279
(1929) ; Ross v. State, 140 Miss. 367, 105 So. 846 (1925) ;
Lueas v. City of Oxford, 134 Miss. 771, 99 So. 510 (1924) ;
Lee v. City of Oxford, 134 Miss. 647, 99 So. 509 (1924).
See also 79 0. J. S. Searches and Seiewres § 52 (1952).

HEE We do not agree with the contention of appel-
lant that because he paid a toll to use a public toilet,
he rented the entire toilet, and if the payment of a toll
constituted such a rental the right of possession would
not constitute a license to commit a crime unobserved.
HEEB The mere fact that the officer in the present case
looked through the ventilator into a room where the
crime is alleged to have been committed was not an
unlawful search MBM because the obtaining of infor-
mation by means of the eye — where no trespass is
committed, in order to look — does not constitute an
unlawful search. Bone v. State, 207 Miss. 868, 43 So.
Qd 571 (1949); Goodman v. State, 158 Miss. 269, 130
So. 285 (1930).

We hold, therefore, that the contention of appellant
to the effect that the testimony of the police officer
constituted an unlawful search is not well-taken, be-
cause no trespass was.made upon the property of ap-
pellant and the officer’s testimony will be admissible
in evidence on retrial.

I

HEM Appellant contends, in defense of the charge
in the indictment, that the officer was mistaken in his
identification of appellant, as being the person seen
committing the alleged crime. Appellant offered many
good citizens — ministers, doctors, a banker, public of-
ficers and other prominent persons — who testified
unequivocally that appellant bore a reputation of good
character in the community where he resided. On cross-
examination of these witnesses, the district attorney was
permitted to ask each of the witnesses in detail about
the crime for which appellant was then being tried, and
whether or not they would have a different opinion if
they were reliably informed of his guilt of the crime
for which he was then being tried. Appellant objected
in most instances to this method of interrogation, but
the witnesses were required to answer. This was a re-
versible error.

The textwriter of 71 A. L. RB. at page 1535 (1931)
under Note 6 annotates authorities concerning cross-
examination of character witnesses with reference to
the offense for which the defendant is being tried and
has this to say:

“Tt has been held to be error to permit the cross-

examination of the defendant’s character witness as

to whether he has heard that the defendant committed
the act for which he is on trial, since such cross-
examination must be confined to acts antecedent to the
commission of the offense for which the defendant is
on trial (see Subd. IL. d, 5, supra). Carney v. State

421

(1928) 109 Tex. Crim. Rep. 624, 6 S. W. (2d) 369.
And see State v. Rowell (1915) 172 Iowa 208, 154
N. W. 488 supra II. d, 5; Woodward v. State (1926)
105 Tex. Crim. Rep. 556, 289 S. W. 407, supra, II. d,
5?

See also Annot. 47 A. L. R. 2d 13803 (1956).

This Court held in Campbell v. State, 194 Miss. 360,
12 So. 2d 151 (1943), that to allow the district attorney
to cross-examine character witnesses as to events oc-
eurring subsequent to the date of the alleged crime was
error. Magee v. State, 198 Miss. 642, 22 So. 2d 245
(1945); Wilkinson v. State, 143 Miss. 324, 108 So. 711
(1926), Annot. 46 A. L. BR. 895 (1927).

MEE It is obviously unfair to try a defendant upon
one charge, and at the same time attempt to show his
guilt of other alleged crimes not related to the charge,
by way of cross-examination. We have adopted the
universal rule above set out prohibiting the cross-exami-
nation of character witnesses so as to show other crimes
alleged to have been committed subsequent to the date
of the crime for which the defendant is being tried. We
are therefore of the opinion that the foregoing cross-
examination in the present case was erroneous.

IV

We are of the opinion that the facts here shown
presented a question for the jury, and that the motion
for a directed verdict of not guilty was properly over-
ruled by the trial court.

HB Inasmuch as this case must be retried, and in
order to prevent a reoccurrence of an obvious error,
we point out that the testimony to the effect that the
codefendant, or a person who is alleged to have been a
joint actor, committed suicide after the arrest shown in
the instant case, is prejudicial to the defendant and
should not be shown in the evidence upon a new trial.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and ap-
pellant is granted a new trial in accordance with the
foregoing opinion.

Reversed and remanded.
Ethridge, P. J., and Brady, Jones and Smith, JJ.,

concur.

CowriwentaL Casuaury Company v. Lone
No, 43691 December 17, 1965 181 So. 2d 340

423

Snow, Covington, Shows & Watts, Meridian, for ap-
pellant.

Williamson, Pigford & Hendricks, Meridian, for ap-

Inzur, J.

This suit was instituted by appellee, Mrs. Virginia
Long, in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County against
appellant, Continental Casualty Company, wherein she
sued to recover benefits under an accident and health
policy. Appellee charged in her declaration that she
was the beneficiary under Policy No. 9876668 issued by
appellant and that under this policy the life of her hus-
band, Sammy D. Long, was insured. She charged that
her husband died on November 19, 1963, as the result
of severe burns over a major portion of his body while
in a building which burned. A copy of the insurance
policy was attached to the declaration under the terms
of which she alleged that she was entitled to recover
the sum of $2,000 plus $67.90 premiums paid on the
policy.

Appellant answered and admitted the policy in ques-
tion was in full force and effect when the insured died
on November 19, 1963, as the result of accidental burns.
Appellant also admitted that the proof of loss had been
furnished and that it had mailed to appellee its check
for $1,067.90 on February 5, 1964, for the amount that
it claimed was due under the policy. Appellant then
alleged that appellee acknowledged receipt of the check,
but made demand for the payment of an additional
amount of $1,000 which she claimed was due under the
policy. Appellant denied that the insured died as the
result of accidental burns occasioned by the burning of

the house in which the insured lived. Appellant alleged
that the death was the result of burns occasioned by
the bed in the house catching fire and the burning of
the bed was what burned the deceased.

Appellant in effect admitted that it was liable under
the provisions of Paragraph IV of the contract which
reads as follows:

When injury results in loss of life of the insured
within one hundred days after the date of the acci-
dent, the company will pay (a) the ‘Loss of Life Ac-
cident Indemnity’ stated in the schedule; and (b) an
amount equivalent to all premiums paid by the insured
to the company for this policy.

Appellant denied that it was liable under Part VII of
the contract which provides double loss of accident in-
demnity for specific accidents. The pertinent part of
this provision reads as follows:

Loss of Life Accident Indemnity payable under this
policy shall be doubled if injury causing the loss is
sustained in consequence of (1) the burning of a build-
ing while the Insured is therein or escaping therefrom,
provided he was therein at the commencement of the
fire...

Thus the real issue between the parties was whether
appellee was entitled to recover the double indemnity
benefits provided for in the contract.

HEB BB The trial judge submitted this issue to the jury
and instructed the jury to the effect that if they believed
from a preponderance of the evidence that the insured
suffered and sustained the loss of his life in consequence
of the burning of a building while he was therein or
escaping therefrom provided he was therein at the com-
mencement of the fire, then in such event appellee was
entitled to recover the $2,067.90 sued for. The court
instructed the jury on behalf of the appellant that if
the insured’s death was caused directly or indirectly by
the mattress on the bed burning and was not affected

in any manner by the burning of any part of the build-
ing in which he was injured, then in that event appellee
was not entitled to recover. Appellant also secured an
abstract instruction in which the court instructed the
jury as to the law relative to construction of insurance
contracts. This instruction should not have been given.
However, the trial court submitted the issue to be de-
termined squarely to the jury and they returned a ver-
dict in favor of the appellee for the amount sued for.
Appellant assigns several grounds for reversal of this
ease. Its main contention is that appellee failed to meet
he burden of proof to maintain her claim that her hus-
band was accidentally injured and killed in consequence
of the burning of a building while the insured was there-
in or escaping therefrom provided he was therein at
the commencement of the fire.

The testimony in this case reveals that Mrs. Long
and her husband, Sammy Long, lived at Lockhart, Mis-
sissippi, in a house that they rented from Mr. Herman
Brown.’ Mr. Long was 27 years of age at the time of
his death and was an employee of the Illinois Central
Railroad Company. On the day of his death he was on
vacation. Mrs. Long was employed at the Meridian Coca
Cola Plant and on the morning of November 19, 1963,
she left home to go to work at about 7:45 am. At the
time she left home her husband was on the bed in the
bedroom clad only in his underwear shorts. There was
no one else in the house when Mrs. Long left. The bed
was a metal frame with metal springs. The mattress was
a cotton innerspring. Mrs. Long testified that her hus-
band smoked and at times smoked in bed. She also said
that on occasion he drank.

From the time Mrs. Long left the house until she
returned at about 5:45 p.m. no one who testified in this
case saw Mr. Long. When Mrs. Long reached home,
she smelled smoke. The door to the bedroom was closed.
and when she opened it, she found the room filled with

smoke and it was hard for her to see. She saw flames
around the window and on the floor. She discovered that
the bed had been moved from against the wall where it
was that morning and was over next to the window.
Her husband was not on the bed, but was lying on the
floor between the bed and the wall. She said that the
floor was on fire where he was lying. It was just
beside him. Mrs. Long then ran for help and gave the
alarm. Mr. Ernie Baumgardner and Mr. Bernard Miller
were across the street at a place called the Minnow
Bucket and they answered Mrs. Long’s call for assis-
tance. They went into the house and removed Mr. Long
from the room. Baumgardner said that Mr. Long was
lying face down on the floor and that he and Mr. Miller
pulled him out. He saw small flames burning on the
floor. He said that Mr. Long was clad in his shorts
and was burned very badly on his right side. Mr. Miller
also testified that on the right side of the bed very near
to Mr. Long there were flames and that Mr. Long was
unconscious and burned ‘‘mighty bad.’? Mr. Herman
Brown, the owner of the house, reached the scene of
the fire just as Baumgardner and Miller were removing
Long from the room. He testified as a witness for ap-
pellant and said that when he got there, he saw a blaze
in the room and went to call the fire department, but
discovered that they had already been notified. He said
that there were places burned on the floor. When asked
if the boards were burned through, he answered and
said they were and that he had the man who repaired
the floor to fill the holes with plastic wood until such
time as he could replace the burned boards.

HEEB We are of the opinion that the foregoing facts
were sufficient to submit the issue involved to the jury
for their decision. The fact that there was no direct
evidence to show that the deceased was in the building
at the time the fire commenced, is not sufficient to hold
that the appellee failed to meet the burden of proof.

429

The circumstances as shown by the evidence clearly in-
dicate that he was in the building at the time the fire
started. MI We are further of the opinion that there
was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find
that the deceased was accidentally injured and killed in
consequence of a building burning while the insured was
therein or escaping therefrom. HI We do not construe
the contract to mean that the building must be complete-
ly destroyed. It was sufficient, if the proof showed, that
there was a burning of the building and that the insured
died as a consequence of this burning.

Appellant has much to say in its brief relative to the
construction given to the clause in the contract in ques-
tion by courts of other jurisdictions. There are two lines
of decisions and we do not deem it necessary to determine
at this time to which line we shall align ourselves. It
is our opinion that the theory upon which the trial judge
submitted this case to the jury was in keeping with
the terms of the contract and that there was sufficient
evidence in this case to sustain the verdict of the jury.

We have carefully considered the errors assigned, and
we are of the opinion that this case was properly pre-
sented to the jury under instructions which, when read
together, properly instructed the jury as to the law in-
volved. We find no reversible error in this record and
are of the opinion that this case should be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Jones and Smith, JJ., concur.

Inumors Cuntrau Ramroan Company v.
Pieort, Apmx., Ere.

No, 48715 December 17, 1965 181 So. 2d 144

i
oe

Robert Mitten, William F. Bunn, W. F. Cerne, Chicago,
Ill.; Stratton and Jones, Brookhaven, for appellant.

Roach & Roach, McComb; B. D. Statham, Magnolia,
for appellee.

Rovezrs, J.

A synopsis of the facts growing out of the tragedy
of January 17, 1961, in which A. M. Pigott lost his life
as the result of a collision between a northbound pas-

437

senger train and a gasoline truck driven by the deceased,
is summarized in two companion cases heretofore de-
cided by this Court. They are: Illinois Central R. RB.
Oo. v. Gwin, 246 Miss. 67, 149 So. 2d 340 (1963) ; Illinois
Central R. R. Co. v. Nelson, 245 Miss. 395, 146 So.
2d 69 (1962), 148 So. 2d 712 (1963).

The prior suits were brought to recover damages for
the loss of the lives of two bystanders who were en-
veloped in flames caused by gasoline. The present ac-
tion is brought to recover damages for the death of the
driver of the truck involved in the collision. It is brought
against the Illinois Central Railroad Company and the
Estate of the Deceased Engineer, James Livingston.
The declaration in this case, as in the prior cases, charged
many grounds of negligence, but it was amended to
add an additional charge, that the Railroad Company
continued to employ the Engineer, James Livingston,
after it had knowledge that he was incompetent. The
Railroad Company filed its answer, and filed a counter-
claim denying the allegations of negligence and asserting
in its counterclaim the affirmative charge that A. M.
Pigott was guilty of negligence which proximately caused
his death; that his negligent acts caused damage to
the equipment and property of the Railroad Company
in the sum of $51,449.49, and that the Railroad Company
was required to pay $211,562.50 to other parties for
damages caused by the alleged gross negligence of A. M.
Pigott. Thus it is claimed that a grand total of $263,011.99
is due from the Estate of the Deceased A. M. Pigott to
the Railroad Company because of the accident.

The prior companion cases were brought by way of
attachment in the Chancery Court of Pike County, Mis-
sissippi. The present suit was filed in the Circuit Court
of that county and heard before a jury. The jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of the Estate of the Deceased
A. M. Pigott, against the Illinois Central Railroad Com-
pany in the sum of $150,000. At the same time, it found

in favor of the Estate of the Deceased Engineer, James
Livingston. The Railroad Company has appealed from
the resulting judgment of the circuit court, and has al-
leged six grounds of error said to have been committed
by the trial court on which it seeks a reversal of this
case.

I

Appellant, Illinois Central Railroad Company (here-
inafter called Railroad Company), complains that two
jury instructions tendered by it were erroneously re-
fused by the court, and that the court’s failure to grant
these instructions constituted reversible error. The first
of these instructions is as follows:

“The Court instructs the jury for the defendants
that the defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company
and its train crew gave all signals of the approach
of its train to the Magnolia Street crossing as re-
quired by statute and you cannot find the defendants
guilty of negligence in not giving the required crossing
signals.’’

The appellee’s declaration charged that the Railroad
Company and the Engineer, James Livingston, failed
to give the statutory crossing warning signals required
by Mississippi Code Annotated section 7777 (1956). A
careful reading of the evidence, however, leaves no
room for conjecture. The conductor and baggage man
testified that the signals were given at the distance, in
the time and in the manner, required by the rules of the
Railroad Company in compliance with the statutory law.
All witnesses for both sides testified that the train’s
horn blew, south of the crossing as it usually did, at a
distance sufficient to meet the requirements of the stat-
ute. The engine involved in this case had no bell. The
appellee argues on the other hand that there was a
conflict in the evidence as to where the horn began to
blow, and also as to the intervals and manner of blowing,

439

whether short or long sounds, and whether or not blasts
were given, continuously up to and across the Mag-
nolia Street crossing.

Hl Bf The testimony, as we see it, not only shows a
continuous or repeated blowing of the horn of the train
through the crossing, but the testimony of one witness
indicates the short blasts of the horn were so urgent
that he realized something was on the tracks. We are
convinced from a careful reading of the printed testi-
mony that this instruction should have been granted
to the jury, under the facts here shown in this record.

Ir

The following jury Instruction Number 5 offered by
the Railroad Company was refused by the trial judge,
and it is contended that his action in so doing was fatal
error:

“The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that

there is no law fixing the rate of speed at which the

train, with which the truck driven by Mr. Pigott col-
lided, must travel at the crossing at which this ac-
cident occurred. This train therefore was violating
no statute with regard to the speed at which it might
operate. The Court further instructs the jury that
no rate of speed at the crossing in question was neg-
ligence per se.’’

HB We are of the opinion that the court was correct
in refusing this instruction, because it is erroneous in
two respects. First — under the common law, a rail-
road, like persons or individuals, is required to manipu-
late or use its property or operate its trains in such a
manner as not to injure others, or destroy or damage
their property. This rule is succinctly set out in Illinois
Central Railroad Company v. Mann, 141 Miss. 778, 106
So. 7 (1925). In that case, this Court said:

HN ‘‘ At common law ‘a railroad is bound to exer-

cise reasonable care in the operation of its trains and

—_ ie
to avoid injury to persons and animals at all cross-
ings, private as well as public; and if by reason of
peculiar or extraordinary circumstances surrounding
a crossing and known to the trainmen ordinary prud-
ence would require an alarm or signal to be given
by an approaching train, then its omission is negli-
gence. The question is one for the jury to determine
on common-law principles.’ 27 R. ©. L. 1004.” 141
Miss. at 785-86, 106 So. at 8.

HN Second — Latin idioms should never be incorpor-

ated in jury instructions. We cautioned members of

the bar against using excerpts from opinions in draw-
ing jury instructions in the case of Graves v. Hamilton,

184 Miss. 239, 184 So. 56 (1938). We again repeat this

caution here. Expressions readily understood by lawyers

may be confusing to members of the jury. This instrue-
tion should not have been granted.

Tit

The appellant complains that the instruction granted
to the appellee on the doctrine of ‘‘last clear chance’’
was erroneously granted because there was no evidence
adduced before the jury to establish the claim that the
reduction of speed of the train would bave avoided
the accident here involved. This instruction, because
of its length, is attached hereto as a Note.* In support
of this argument, the appellant points out that one of
its witnesses testified that mathematically, a collision
would have occurred, regardless of whether the speed
of the train was thirty, seventy or seventy-five miles
per hour, because of the alleged five-second interval
between the time the engineer observed the truck in
a place of danger, and the time he applied the emergency
brake; therefore it would not have taken effect in time
to have prevented the collision.

HM The testimony of the conductor was to the
effect that the train, then running forty-five seconds

ahead of time, did not slow down until after it had
collided with the truck, and the conductor’s office car
had passed the ‘‘flash’’ of flames caused by the collision.
A witness who was accustomed to having often heard
the train approach the Magnolia Street crossing testified
he heard the horn of the train giving an alarm, he said
that he recognized the short blast to be a warning that
something was on the tracks. He testified that after
he heard the warning, he moved to a position in which
he could see the truck going on the crossing. Other
witnesses testified that they could not tell whether the
train slowed down, until after the accident. The clear
inference from this testimony is that, had the engineer
attempted to slow the train at the time when he first
began to blow short blasts in such a manner as to indicate
that he saw something on the tracks, the driver of the
track would have had time to have cleared the crossing;
because the train struck the truck only a few feet from
the back end of the truck. Thus, considering all of the
testimony in the record, we are of the opinion that the
issue of the ‘‘last clear chance’? was a jury question
under the facts here presented.

HEME On the other hand — the form of the instruction
is so erroneous as to require a reversal of this case.
This instruction tells the jury that if the engineer saw
Mr. Pigott in a place of known danger and did not
stop or retard the speed of the train, the jury should
find for the plaintiff. In the first place, the testimony
showed conclusively that the train could not have been
stopped in any event, before the collision, and this in-
struction wholly disregards this fact. Second — the
instruction does not set out that if the jury believed
that had the speed of the train been retarded, the collision
could have been avoided. The instruction is peremptory
in nature. It does not require the negligence therein
set out to be a proximate or contributing cause of the
collision and resulting injury to the deceased, but sim-

“._ Di

ply says to the jury that if the engineer did not stop
or retard the speed of the train under the circumstances,
the jury was required to find for the plaintiff. In
short, the instruction requires the jury to return a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff if the jury believes that the
engineer did not slow the train down after he saw Mr.
Pigott approaching the track, without regard as to
whether or not the failure to slow the train was a proxi-
mate, contributing cause of the death of Mr. Pigott.

Iv

HMM Appellant also argues that the appellee’s in-
struction, Number Seven, permitting recovery of sup-
port and contribution to members of deceased’s family is
erroneous because, it is said, there is no specific proof
of reasonable expectation of gifts and contributions to
members of the family. It is argued that the appellee
did not meet the burden of proof necessary to establish
such damages. The appellee cites as authority for this
contention the following cases: Walker v. Polles, 248
Miss. 887, 162 So. 2d 631 (1964); Gulf, Mobile & Ohio
R. RB. Co. v. White, 219 Miss. 342, 68 So. 2d 458 (1953).
We have concluded from an examination of these cases,
under the light of the facts here involved, that they
are not controlling in the instant case; because in these
eases the plaintiff sought to recover damages based
upon voluntary contributions, gifts and gratuities to
brothers and sisters. In the present case, however, the
deceased was the head of the family, and, as such,
was under legal duty to support his family. Moreover,
we are of the opinion that the evidence amply supports
the claim of appellee. One witness testified that the
sole object of deceased’s life was to provide for his
family and educate his children. He is said to have
given his entire income to the family, and Hl I we
are of the opinion that it is not necessary to detail
gifts and gratuities moving from a father as head of

a:

the family to his wife and members of the family. Con-
tinental So. Lines, Inc. v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So.
2d 575 (1953); Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194
So. 596 (1940) ; Goodyear Yellow Pine Co, v. Anderson,
171 Miss. 530, 157 So. 700 (1934) ; 22 Am. Jur. 24 Death
§ 260 (1965).

Vv

HB During the trial of this case, the appellee in-
troduced certain pictures of the scene of the accident,
including two photographs showing the body of deceased
in the flames near the truck, taken while the body was
still afire. One of these photographs was enlarged.
The appellant strenuously objected to the introduction
of these pictures upon the ground that they were offered
to prejudice the jury, particularly since one of the pic-
tures was enlarged so that the jury could more readily
see the gruesome picture of a human body on fire. We
cannot, however, agree with the contention of the appel-
lant that these pictures had no probative value and
should not have been introduced as a part of the evi-
dence, because the record shows that the pictures were
a part of the chain of factual proof to show the identity
and location of deceased at the scene of the accident.
The proof was admissible since there were other burned
and charred bodies of human beings found by the firemen
in the flames. This question has been before this Court
on numerous occasions, and we have pointed out that
although photographs of deceased persons may be grue-
some and arouse the emotions of the jury, nevertheless,
they are admissible in evidence if they are pertinent,
material and relevant. HM Moreover, if such photo-
graphs are relevant and material, the defendant cannot
complain of such portrayal of a condition which it brought
about. Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453, 128 So. 2d 341
(1961) ; West v. State, 218 Miss. 397, 67 So. 2d 366
(1953); Price v. State, 54 So. 2d 667 (Miss. 1951);

ae
Seals v. State, 208 Miss. 236, 44 So. 2d 61 (1950); Han-
cock v. State, 209 Miss. 523, 47 So. 2d 833 (1950).

vI

The appellant argues in his final assignment of error
that the amount of the verdict is so excessive as to
show bias, passion and prejudice on the part of the
jury. It is claimed that the jury overlooked the de-
ceased’s gross negligence, and appellant quotes from
the opinion in the case of Illinois Central Railroad Com-
pany v. Nelson, 245 Miss. 395, 146 So. 2d 69 (1962),
wherein this Court said that the driver of the gasoline
truck was grossly negligent for his failure to stop in
compliance with Mississippi Code Annotated sections
7776, 8211 (a) (1956). We do not reach the question
of the excessiveness of the verdict, because we have
concluded that the case must be reversed for a new trial
because of the granting of erroneous instructions here-
tofore set out.

In passing upon the errors in the foregoing instruc-
tions, we have borne in mind our Rule No. 11, and al-
though we are reluctant to reverse the case for the mis-
direction of the jury, nevertheless we are of the opinion
from the record as a whole that the judgment in this
case has resulted in a miscarriage of justice because an
examination of the erroneous instructions here set out
leaves no doubt that they were harmful. The errors
become more apparent when viewed in the light of the
large verdict returned by the jury.

We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment
of the trial court should be, and is hereby, reversed and
remanded for a new trial in accordance with the fore-
going opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Brady and Smith, JJ.,
concur,

* Note: INSTRUCTION NO. 1 FOR PLAINTIFF

The Court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that if you
believe from a preponderance of the evidence that on the oc-
casion in question Morris Pigott was riding in and operating
the truck in question and that the said truck then and there
approached the Magnolia Street crossing as the train of the D-
linois Central Railroad Company, The City of New Orleans, ap-
proached said crossing and that the operator of said truck pro-
ceeded upon the said crossing and thereby was placed in a
position of peril and danger from the running of said train and
if you further believe from a preponderance of the evidence that
the engineer for the Illinois Central Railroad Company saw the
said truck was going upon said crossing and realized that there
was danger of a collision between said truck and said train and
that the said engineer saw, knew and appreciated the said posi-
tion of peril of said truck in time to have stopped or retarded the
speed of said train before crashing into the truck and that with
such knowledge and appreciation thereof, if any, said engineer
negligently failed to exercise reasonable care to stop or retard
the speed of said train before striking the truck and injuring and
killing Morris Pigott and that the said engineer by the exercise
of reasonable care could have stopped said train or retarded
the speed of said train before injuring and killing said Morris
Pigott after the engineer knew and appreciated the fact that a
collision was imminent and impending between said train and
truck and that said engineer thereafterwards negligently failed
to exercise reasonable care to stop said train or retard the speed
of the train before injuring and killing the said Morris Pigott,
then the jury should return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants.

Sournmry Farm Burzav Casuatry Insurance Company
v. Narionan Burzav or Casuaury Unperwerrers, et al.

No. 43828 December 17, 1965 181 So. 2d 154

Hedgepeth, Price & Hedgepeth, Jackson, for appel-
lant.

John H. Reid, New York; Watkins & Eager, Jackson,
for appellee.

Suairz, J.

As provided by Mississippi Code Annotated section
5834-10 (1956), appellant, Southern Farm Bureau Casu-
alty Insurance Company, filed its request with the Mis-
sissippi Insurance Commission for a formal, recorded
hearing for the purpose of seeking reversal of prior
orders of the Commission approving certain rate filings

|

under a private passenger automobile classification sys-
tem submitted by appellees, National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters and National Automobile Underwriters As-
sociation.

Southern Farm is a company writing automobile casu-
alty insurance and operates in six states, including Mis-
sissippi. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and
National Automobile Underwriters Association are both
non-profit membership associations organized under the
laws of New York and operating within the State of
Mississippi as rating organizations under Mississippi
Code Annotated section 5834-01 (1956), known as the
Casualty Rating Law of 1946.

National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters is a rating
organization and statistical agency for the rating and
classifying of public liability insurance on automobiles.
National Automobile Underwriters Association is a simi-
lar organization for the rating and classifying of auto-
mobile physical damage insurance. These organizations
file rates for most of the stock insurance companies in
practically every state. They are licensed in Mississippi
and act as rating organizations for most of the stock
companies in this state.

Southern Farm is an independent casualty insurance
company which is not amember of either National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters or National Automobile Un-
derwriters Association and which does not file its statis-
tical experience with either of those organizations. It
makes its own rate filings with the Commission. Their
respective filings, which are in controversy here, were
approved by the Commission on November 17, 1955,
and July 24, 1964.

This appeal involves the action of the Mississippi
Insurance Commission in approving these filings of auto-
mobile casualty insurance rates made for their respective
member and subscribing companies by appellees, Na-
tional Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and National

450

Automobile Underwriters Association. Southern Farm
is not a member or subscriber of either association.

The Commission granted the request of Southern
Farm for a formal, recorded hearing which was duly
held. Three witnesses, including two experienced actu-
aries, testified before the Commission in support of the
filings. Southern Farm offered only one witness, its
own executive vice president, who testified, upon the
basis of the experience of his company operating in six
states, to the effect that the rates were inadequate and
arbitrary.

The witnesses for each side also submitted voluminous
data in support of their respective views.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission found,
among other things, ‘‘from the evidence that the filings
of National Bureau Casualty Underwriters and National
Automobile Underwriters Association heretofore approv-
ed by the Commission as hereinabove shown are amply
supported by the proof and that same are reasonable,
adequate and not unfairly discriminatory, and that said
filings should be approved and the prior orders herein-
above mentioned should be ratified, confirmed and af-
firmed in each and every part thereof.”’

Upon that basis of factual finding, the Commission
ordered that the controverted filings of National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters and National Automobile Un-
derwriters Association be approved and the prior orders
of the Commission approving the same ‘‘were ratified,
confirmed and affirmed in each and every part thereof.”

From that final order, Southern Farm was granted
an appeal to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County.

After a ‘‘full review of the record made in this cause
before the Insurance Commission and the briefs sub-
mitted’”’, the circuit court found that there was sub-
stantial evidence supporting the Commission’s order,
and that the judgment of the reviewing court could not

be substituted for that of the Commission since there
was substantial evidence supporting the Commission’s
findings. Upon that basis, the court affirmed the order
of the Insurance Commission.

From that judgment of affirmance, Southern Farm
has appealed here.

It would serve no useful purpose to set out in detail
the evidence upon which the Commission based its find-
ings. Suffice it to say that these findings were based
upon and supported by substantial evidence.

MMM In reviewing decisions of administrative bodies,
such as the Insurance Commission, created by the leg-
islature and empowered to make factual determinations
in administering laws relating to particular specialized
fields, this Court has long adhered to the rule that the
reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the administrative body nor disturb its findings where
there is substantial evidence to support such findings
and the ruling is not capricious, arbitrary nor mani-
festly against the weight of the evidence. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm’n.,
237 Miss. 157, 113 So. 2d 622 (1959) ; Citizens of Stringer
v. G. M. & O. B. B. Co., 229 Miss. 1, 90 So. 2d 25 (1956) ;
West Bros., Inc. v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 222 Miss.
335, 75 So. 2d 723 (1954); and Cobb Bros. Const. Co.
v.G.M.& O. BR. R. Co., 213 Miss. 706, 57 So. 2d 570 (1952).

HEB We have carefully reviewed the record in the
ease now before the Court, and find that the ruling of
the Insurance Commission was supported by substantial
evidence. It is neither unconstitutional, capricious, arbi-
trary, unreasonable, nor manifestly against the weight
of the evidence, and must be affirmed under the rule
announced in the above cases.

Prior to the submission of the case, appellees filed
a motion to dismiss the appeal, or, in the alternative,
to strike appellant’s reply brief upon the ground that

452

it violated Miss. Rules No. 7(c) which provides in part
as follows:

(c) Appellant’s original and rebuttal briefs together

shall not exceed fifty (50) pages, and appellee’s brief

shall not exceed fifty (50) pages... .

Appellant’s original brief contained fifty-two num-
bered and two unnumbered pages, for a total of fifty-
four pages. Notwithstanding the fact that its original
brief contained more pages than the rule permits, a
rebuttal brief containing twenty-eight pages (fourteen
numbered pages and fourteen unnumbered pages) was
filed by appellant.

In 5 0. J. S. Appeal & Error section 1316 (1958),
it is stated:

The rules and regulations specifying the requirements

for briefs are liberally construed, and a technical vio-

lation thereof will not prevent a consideration of the
appeal. However, the rules cannot be ignored or en-
tirely disregarded, and, although a good faith attempt
and substantial compliance with the rules relative to
briefing is sufficient, such a good faith attempt and
substantial compliance is necessary to insure consid-
eration of the appeal, unless in the particular type of
case appellant is exempted by statute from the neces-
sity of filing a brief. (Id. at 239-40)

Where the brief totally or substantially fails to comply
with the rules the court is authorized, according as the
rules and statutes in the different jurisdictions per-
mit, to strike the brief and require a proper brief
to be prepared and filed, or to disregard the improper
portions of the brief, and determine the case on any
questions presented by the remaining portion thereof ;
or to refuse to consider the brief; to regard the errors
assigned as waived, or to affirm the judgment; or
to dismiss the appeal. ... (Id. at 242-43)

B

HE Of course, in a proper case, upon timely ap-
plication and a showing of a reasonable necessity there-
for, leave of the court may be obtained to file briefs
extending beyond fifty (50) pages. Here no application
was made. Although we adhere to the rule that the
requirements for briefs will be liberally construed, this
does not extend to a case, such as we have here, where
the rule has been ignored and disregarded.

The motion to strike the reply brief is sustained.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, P. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Jones, JJ.,
concur.

Part River Vatuzy Warer Suppiy Disrricr v.
Brown, Hr An.

No. 43759 January 10, 1966 181 So. 2d 631

Clifford C. Chittim, Watkins, Pyle, Edwards & Ludlam,
Jackson, for appellant.

Dan M. Lee, W. D. Coleman, Jackson; Boyd, Holifield
& Harper, Laurel, for appellees.

ON MOTION OF APPELLANT TO
CORRECT JUDGMENT

Roverrs, J.

The appellant — hereinafter designated as Pearl
River — filed a motion to correct a former judgment
of this Court entered as a result of the application of
Pearl River asking leave of this Court to dismiss its
appeal in the foregoing action. The judgment of the
circuit court, from which the appeal was perfected, recog-
nized that appellees were the owners of the land de-
scribed in the eminent domain proceeding, subject how-
ever, to certain liens in favor of the United States of
America, for the use and benefit of the Director of In-
ternal Revenue for the District of. Mississippi, and also
alien in favor of Mrs. Frances Van Landingham Stewart.
It also recognized that the payment of an award to ap-
pellees was dependent upon the payment of the respec-
tive interests of these lienholders. The former judg-
ment of this Court does not mention the lienholders,
and appellees state that they have no objection to the
amendment of the judgment heretofore entered, so as
to show the interest of the lienholders above set out as
shown by the judgment of the circuit court.

Pearl River points out that the judgment entered
allowed six percent interest on the amount of the award
from the 13th of June 1962 (date of the filing of eminent
domain proceeding) until paid, and contends by show-
ing facts, set out in the motion to amend, that Pearl
River has never obtained possession of the land in-

volved. Appellant contends therefore that it should not
be required to pay interest on the award until it obtains
possession by one of the two ways, namely: (1) The
way set out in Mississippi Code Annotated section 2766
(b) (1956), or (2) payment of the sum specified in the
judgment, A great many facts were alleged by Pearl
River so as to show why the trial was delayed in the
cireuit court. Appellees countered with other facts, in-
eluding the allegation that part of the land had been
submerged, but there is no proof of facts before the
Court on the motion here presented, except it is ad-
mitted that the judgment from which the appeal was
taken was dated June 11, 1964.

This Court expressly held in Mississippi State High-
way Commission v. Herring, 241 Miss. 729, 183 So. 2d
895 (1961), that the Court should have allowed six
percent interest on the amount of the judgment of the
cireuit court in an eminent domain proceeding, from
and after the date of the circuit court judgment. In ad-
dition to the cases set out in Herring, supra, we are of
the opinion that the case of Mississippi State Highway
Commission v. Treas, 197 Miss. 670, 20 So. 2d 475 (1945),
is also authority for the proposition that interest should
be added to the judgment, from and after its date. See
also Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Slade, 241 Miss.
721, 183 So. 24 896 (1961) ; Miss. State Highway Comm’n
v. Burwell, 206 Miss. 490, 40 So. 2d 263 (1949).

HEB We are therefore of the opinion that the former
judgment of this Court should be corrected so as to add
six percent interest to the judgment in the circuit court,
from and after the date of the judgment, June 11, 1964.

We do not agree with the contention of Pearl River
that the statutory five percent damages allowed by Mis-
sissippi Code Annotated section 1971 (1956) should not
have been awarded appellees by our former judgment.
The pertinent part of section 1971, swpra, is in the fol-
lowing language:

456

“Tn case the judgment or decree of the court below
be affirmed, or the appellant fail to prosecute his
appeal to effect the Supreme Court shall render judg-
ment against the appellant for damages, at the rate
of five per centum and costs, as follows: If the judg-
ment or decree affirmed be for a sum of money, the
damages shall be upon such sum.’

We held in the case of State Highway Commission
v. Mason, 192 Miss. 576, 4 So. 2d 345 (1941), 6 So. 2d
468 (1942), that the property owner was entitled to
five percent damages upon the amount of the affirmed
judgment in an eminent domain case.

Mississippi Code Annotated section 1965 (1956) pro-
vides that upon a voluntary dismissal of an appeal,
the appellant ‘‘shall be liable to judgment by said court
(Supreme Court) as in case of an affirmance of the
judgment or decree.’

WE MM It is therefore apparent from the foregoing
authorities that this Court was correct in allowing five
percent damages on the amount of the judgment in the
circuit court in this condemnation proceeding.

The former judgment of this Court in the foregoing
cause of action will therefore be amended so as to set
out the interest of the United States of America and
that of Mrs. Frances Van Landingham Stewart, in
accordance with the interest shown in the judgment of
the circuit court. It will also be amended so as to allow
six percent interest on the amount shown in the judg-
ment of the circuit court, from and after the date of
the judgment, June 11, 1964, and five percent statutory
damages on the amount of the circuit court judgment
will also be allowed.

So ordered.

Gillespie, P. J., and Jones, Brady and Ineer, JJ.,
coneur.

Commercian Crupir Hqurement Corporation v. SimaLLEy
No. 43632 January 24, 1966 182 So. 2d 238

Moore & Jones, Hattiesburg, for appellant.

ra 222

‘

No counsel for appellee.

Surrz, J.

This was a suit for a deficiency judgment brought in
the Circuit Court of Forrest County by Commercial
Credit Equipment Corporation, appellant, as assignee
of a conditional sales contract covering the purchase
of a tractor, against the purchaser, H. W. Smalley,
appellee. The trial resulted in a jury verdict for the
plaintiff but in an amount less than that claimed to be
due. From the judgment entered pursuant to that ver-
dict, appellant has appealed here.

The decisive facts are not in dispute.

Perry’s Tractor Company sold to appellee, H. W.
Smalley, a Ford tractor. A conditional sales contract
was executed by the seller and buyer providing for pay-
ment of the deferred balance of the purchase price over
a period of three years.

The instrument sued upon contained an unconditional
promise on the part of Smalley, the buyer, to pay to
the order of the seller the sum of $2313.15, as the pur-
cchase price of the tractor ‘‘in its present condition’’
and contains buyer’s express acknowledgment of de-
livery and acceptance. This instrument was assigned
‘in writing by the seller to appellant for value. It con-
tains no warranty against defects in the tractor nor as
to its condition,

|

Appellee kept the tractor for approximately fifteen
and one-half months and admits operating it for 346
hours. Although demand for payment was made upon
him from time to time, appellee made no payment upon
the deferred balance.

Appellant, as assignee of the contract, repossessed the
tractor with the consent of appellee, and proceeded to
sell it under a provision in the contract authorizing
either public or private sale.

The sale was openly and fairly conducted, after rea-
sonable notice. In addition to public notices, appellee
personally was given ten days’ written notice of the
time, terms and place of sale, by registered United
States mail, which he admits having received. He ad-
mits that he absented himself from the sale voluntarily.

It is undisputed that the highest, and in fact the
only, bid received was in the amount of $1550. The sum
due under the contract was admitted to be $2313.15. It
was stipulated that $200 was reasonable compensation
for the services of appellant’s attorneys as contemplated
by the contract.

It therefore follows that the amount due and which
appellant was entitled to recover was the difference
between $2313.15 and $1550 the amount received at the
sale, or $763.15, plus $200 as attorneys’ fees or a total
of $963.15.

Appellee was permitted to testify, ‘I would say if
they had fixed that lift it didn’t bring the value it was
worth,’’ and also that if the tractor had been in ‘‘op-
erating condition’’ it was worth $2200. This testimony
was incompetent and should have been excluded upon
appellant’s objection. Federal Credit Co. v. Boleware,
‘163 Miss. 830, 142 So. 1 (1932).

MM The fact that the contract, containing appel-
lee’s unconditional promise to pay, indicated that it was
given in part payment of the purchase price of a tractor,

‘did not destroy its negotiability nor deprive appellant

of its character of holder for value in due course. If
any obligation .was assumed by the seller under the
contract as to the soundness of the tractor, or to remedy
mechanical defects, and apparently none was, appellant
had no knowledge of any such defects prior to its ac-
quisition of the instrument. In fact, the instrument ex-
pressly stated that the tractor had been accepted by
appellee ‘‘in its present condition.’”? MM Defenses of
this character were not available against appellant as a
holder in due course for value and without notice. Misso
v. National Bank of Commerce, Memphis, Tenn., 231
Miss. 249, 95 So. 2d 124 (1957).

‘Appellant was entitled to recover, upon the undisputed
facts disclosed by the record, the sum of $963.15, and
appellant’s motion for a directed verdict in that amount
should have been sustained.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and judg-
ment is entered here for appellant in the amount of
$963.15.

Reversed and judgment here for appellant in the sum
of $963.15.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Robertson,
JJ., concur.

Souruwzst Mississrer1 Execrric Powzr Assy. v.
Harracity, et al.

No. 43711 January 24, 1966 182 So. 2d 220

B
~

eee

Daniel, Coker & Horton, Jackson, for appellant.

Richard T. Watson, Woodville; Stratton & Jones,
George H. Gulley, Jr., Brookhaven ‘er & Mitchell,
Jackson, for appellee:

64

|

Guuzspem, P. J.

Southwest Mississippi Electric Power Association,
plaintiff below and appellant here, sued D. B. Harra-
gill, d/b/a O. K. Welding Company, and Enlow M.
Kee, Jr., et al, d/b/a Colonial Chevrolet Company,
defendants below and appellees here, seeking common
law indemnity. The trial court sustained demurrers,
dismissed the suit, and plaintiff appealed. We affirm
because the sum paid out by plaintiff, and for which it
seeks indemnity, was a voluntary payment.

Southwest purchased a truck from Colonial Chevrolet
Company. In order to comply with Southwest’s speci-
fications that the truck be equipped with electric hold-
ing brakes, the O. K. Welding Company was engaged
by Colonial Chevrolet Company to install the electric
holding brakes on the truck. The truck was delivered
October 18, 1957, and was used thereafter until August
6, 1958, and the electric holding brakes functioned prop-
erly at all times. On August 6, 1958, an employee of
Southwest was operating the truck on behalf of South-
west along a highway in Adams County when he over-
took a vehicle driven by Mrs. Ethel G. Dunn which was
proceeding in the same direction. The driver of South-

ee ~

west’s truck attempted to apply his brakes and discov-
ered that the brakes would not function, and the brake
failure resulted in Southwest’s truck colliding with the
rear end of the automobile driven by Mrs. Dunn, who
received serious personal injuries in the collision.

Mrs. Dunn filed suit in the Circuit Court of Adams
County against Southwest and its driver in the amount
of $101,049.10. She charged that the driver of South-
west’s truck was guilty of negligence in (1) attempting
to pass the Dunn vehicle in a portion of the highway
marked with a yellow line prohibiting passing at that
place; (2) operating the truck at an illegal and exces-
sive speed; (3) failing to have the truck under proper
control; (4) failing to keep the proper lookout and (5)
operating the truck too close to the vehicle driven by
Mrs. Dunn.

Southwest employed competent counsel to defend the
suit and after a full investigation of the case, Southwest
filed its answer denying all allegations of negligence
charged in Mrs. Dunn’s declaration. It alleged as an
affirmative defense the facts concerning the purchase
of the truck and the installation of the electric holding
brakes by O. K. Welding Company; that the said O. K.
Welding Company used improper brass fittings which
were improperly assembled and failed to provide ade-
quate and sufficient contact between said brass fittings;
that Southwest had used all reasonable care and caution
to inspect and maintain said truck, but it was unable,
in the exercise of reasonable care and caution, to dis-
cover said defective fittings and the improper assembly
of said fittings until after the collision with Mrs. Dunn’s
automobile. Southwest alleged in its answer that by
reason of.the sudden failure of the said brakes, the
driver of the truck was confronted with a sudden emer-
gency and did all within his power to stop the truck
and avoid the collision.

On the advice of counsel, Southwest settled the suit
filed against it by Mrs. Dunn by paying her the sum

of $17,000.00 and incurred attorney’s fees and other
expenses in the amount of $2,211.16, making a total
amount of $19,211.16, which Southwest seeks in the pres-
ent suit to recover from Colonial Chevrolet Company
and O. K. Welding Company.

In addition to the foregoing facts, Southwest alleged
in the present suit that when its investigation of the
claim made by Mrs. Dunn revealed the improper brass
fittings in the electric holding brakes, Southwest notified
Colonial Chevrolet Company and O. K. Welding Com-
pany of this fact and demanded that said Chevrolet
Company and Welding Company assume the defense
of the action filed against Southwest by Mrs. Dunn. Both
companies refused and thereafter Southwest settled as
hereinabove stated.

Southwest alleged in its declaration that it had no
knowledge or means of knowing that the defective and
improper brake fittings would break and give way at
said time and place. Southwest alleged that Colonial
Chevrolet Company and O. K. Welding Company were
primarily liable to Mrs. Dunn and that Southwest was
secondarily liable to Mrs. Dunn and was legally obligated
in damages to her. .

HE BE Two principal questions are presented for our
determination: (1) Whether under the facts alleged by
Southwest it was legally liable to Mrs. Dunn for the
damages sustained by her in the collision between her
automobile and the truck belonging to Southwest, and
(2) if Southwest was not liable to Mrs. Dunn, was the
payment to her voluntary. We hold that according to
the allegations of the declaration filed by Southwest
there was no liability on its part to Mrs. Dunn and the
payment made to her was the act of a volunteer and
cannot be recovered in an action for indemnity.

In the modern development of common law indemnity,
the cases fall into three categories: (1) cases involving
vicarious liability, (2) cases where the indemnitee has

a

failed to discover the condition that caused the initial
injury, and (3) cases where both indemnitor and in-
demnitee have breached a duty, but as between them-
selves, the indemnitor has agreed to perform.' It is
not necessary to determine whether the present case
comes within one of these three categories. The payment
was, voluntary, and we base our decision on that issue.

Was Southwest liable to Mrs. Dunn for the injuries
sustained in the accident?

HEE This Court adheres to the rule that failure of
brakes makes only a prima facie case of liability against
a motorist ME which the driver may defend by show-
ing proper inspection and a sudden failure without
warning. Phillips v. Delta Motor Lines, 235 Miss. 1,
108 So. 2d 409 (1959); Fink v. East Miss. Elec. Power
Ass’n., 234 Miss. 221, 105 So. 2d 548 (1958). Stated
differently, the operator of a motor vehicle is liable
for injuries caused by defective brakes only if he was
negligent in failing to discover the defect. Annot., 170
A.L.R. 619 (1947). Southwest alleged in its declaration
that it used all reasonable care and caution to properly
inspect and maintain said truck, and was unable in the
exercise of reasonable care and caution to discover said
defective fittings and improper assembly of said fittings
until after the brakes failed immediately prior to the
time of the accident. It further alleged that it had no
knowledge or means of knowledge that said defective
and improper brake fittings would break and that South-
west’s driver used all reasonable care and caution in
the sudden emergency which was presented by the brake
failure, and he was unable to avoid striking Mrs. Dunn’s
automobile. In short, Southwest alleged that it was
guilty of no negligence whatsoever in connection with
the collision in which Mrs. Dunn was injured. South-
west did state that it was secondarily liable to Mrs.

1“Developments in the Law of Indemnity,” William J. McKenna
and John C. Bartler, THE FORUM, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1965).

Dunn for her damages, but the facts alleged in the
declaration did not show that Southwest was liable
under the authorities cited above.

HEEB The authorities hold that to recover indemnity
it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove that
he was legally liable to the person injured, and conse-
quently, paid under compulsion. Otherwise, the pay-
ment is a voluntary one for which there can be no
recovery. 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 25 at 603-04 (1944);
Keljikian v. Star Brewing Co., 303 Mass. 53, 20 N. E.
2d 465 (1939); McCarthy Freight Systems, Inc. v. Dur-
and, 9 A. 2d 3 (R. I. 1939).

HEB This Court has declined to extend aid to those
who make voluntary payments for which they were not
legally liable. The basic purpose of courts, as far as
civil cases are concerned, is to extend aid to those who
have not been able by lawful means to aid themselves,
and relief is not available to those who have neglected
to take care of their interests. MIME If an unjust de-
mand is made upon a party for that which he does not
owe, when he knows or ought to know all the facts, he
must avail himself of the means the law affords and
resist the demand. McDaniel Bros. Constr. Co. v. Burk-
Hallman Co., 253 Miss. 417, 175 So. 2d 603 (1965).

We hold that the facts alleged in Southwest’s dec-
laration show that it was not liable to Mrs. Dunn. The
payment made to her was the act of a volunteer, and
Southwest may not maintain an action of indemnity.
The case turns on the issue of voluntariness of the
payment, and we reach no other question.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

Ropezrs, J., specially concurring:

I concur in the results we have reached in this case
based upon the peculiar facts alleged in the pleadings,

469

together with the settlement here shown, but I do not
want it to appear that I am of the opinion indemnity
cannot be recovered in proper cases, even though a set-
tlement of an action is the basis for the suit. Union
Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, Burlington and Quinch
R. RB. Co., 196 U. 8. 217, 25 Sup. Ct. 226, 49 L. Hd. 453
(1905) ; Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd. v. Joseph
Gutradt Co. 10 F. 2d 769 (9th Cir. 1926); Mallory
S. 8. Co. v. Druhan, 17 Ala. App. 365, 84 So. 874 (1920) ;
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. American Dist. Elec.
Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932) ; Palmer
House Co. v. Otto, 347 Ill. App. 198, 106 N. B. 2d 753
(1st Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Gray v. Boston Gas Light
Oo., 114 Mass. 149 (1873); Popkin Bros., Ine. v. Volk’s
Tire Co., 20 N. J. Mise. 1, 23 A. 2d 162 (1941); Colonial
Motor Coach Corp. v. New York Cent. R. R., 228 N. Y. S.
508, 181 Mise. 891 (1928); Oceanic Steam Nav. Co.,
Ltd. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N. Y.
461, 31 N. E. 987 (1892); 1 Harper and James, Torts,
§ 10.2 (1956). ©

Lapwizr v. Srare
No. 43753 January 24, 1966 182 So. 2d 389

g

(ii

Albert Sidney Johnston, III, Pascagoula, for appel-
lant.

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

12

|

Sarre, J.

The appellant, Johnny Elwood Ladnier, was indicted
in Smith County for the crime of burglary. He was ar-
raigned upon that charge and entered a plea of not guilty.
Upon his trial, he was convicted of the crime of attempt-
ed burglary, and for that offense was sentenced to
serve a term of four years in the penitentiary.

This appeal is from the judgment of conviction en-
tered by the Circuit Court of Smith County.

Several grounds have been assigned for reversal.

It is first contended that the evidence of appellant’s
guilt was not sufficient to present a question for the
determination of the jury and that his motion for a
directed verdict of not guilty should have been sus-
tained.

MMB The evidence against appellant was circumstan-
tial and was given by a confessed accomplice. There
was no eye-witness identification of appellant as a par-
ticipant in the actual attempt to burglarize the store.
Nevertheless, we are unable to say that the testimony
of the accomplice, although in many respects unsatis-

473

factory, is so entirely unbelievable that the jury might
not be warranted in accepting it. After a careful review
and consideration of the whole record, we have concluded
that the evidence for the prosecution was sufficient to
go to the jury upon the question of appellant’s guilt or
innocence.

Appellant next cites Smith v. State, 251 Miss. 241,

169 So. 2d 451 (1964), in support of an assignment that
it was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow the
sheriff to assist the district attorney in selecting the
jury, and also permit him to provide the deputy or
bailiff to have charge of it.
. MIND It is insisted that, since Mississippi Code An-
notated section 4240 (1956) provides that the sheriff
shall be the executive officer of the court and ‘‘attend
all the sessions thereof with a sufficient number of depu-
ties or bailiffs,...’’ it must be assumed that the jury
was in charge of a deputy or bailiff selected and em-
ployed by the sheriff who had participated with the
district attorney in the selection of the jury on behalf
of the prosecution. We would not be warranted in mak-
ing the suggested assumption. The facts relating to’
this assignment are not sufficiently developed in the
record to permit its determination upon this appeal.

However, the case must be reversed upon other grounds
and remanded for a new trial.

During the course of appellant’s testimony before the
jury as a witness in his own behalf, the court repri-
manded him severely and repeatedly for demeanor ap-
parently considered to be a breach of decorum. This
action upon the part of the court has been assigned as
error.

HEM It is essential, of course, that the trial court
maintain good order and suppress unseemly conduct,
and impose appropriate punishment upon those who may
be guilty of it, where required by the circumstances.

474.

The position and prestige of the court and consequent
effect upon the jury of the court’s attitude toward the
defendant in a criminal trial, demand that the power
to reprimand and discipline, particularly when applied
to the defendant himself, be exercised with cireumspec-
tion,

‘When an incident occurs during the course of a trial
which the court considers to warrant a reprimand or
the disciplining of a defendant, by far the better practice
is to retire the jury before anything is said or done
toward that end.

As we have said, proof of the defendant’s guilt in this
case was circumstantial and rested upon the testimony
of a confessed accomplice. The question is close as to
the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand appellant’s
motion for a directed verdict of not guilty.

HEM [t would serve no useful purpose to detail the
court’s remarks addressed to the defendant. We think
it sufficient to say that the court’s palpable disapproba-
tion of the defendant was so marked and severe that it
could not have failed to make an impression upon the
jury. This was a burden that the appellant should not
have been called upon to bear. It was error for the
court to excoriate the defendant in the presence of the
jury. Pearson v. State, 254 Miss. 275, 179 So. 2d 792
(1965) ; Collins v. State, 99 Miss. 47, 54 So. 665 (1911).

HM Nor was it necessary to show that appellant
was prejudiced by this incident. It is conclusively pre-
sumed that he was. Collins v. State, supra.

During the course of the trial, the district attorney
was permitted, over the objection of the appellant, to
adduce testimony from appellant’s alleged accomplice,
testifying as a witness for the state, that appellant
previously had participated in a similar crime for which
he had been indicted. When it developed that appellant
had been tried but not convicted, the district attorney
was allowed to go into the question of whether appel-

475

lant’s former trial had resulted in an acquittal or merely
in a mistrial. Appellant had not been convicted in the
former case, it appearing that the jury had been unable
to agree.

In Floyd v. State, 166 Miss. 15, 35, 148 So. 226, 230
(1933), the Court said:

The general rule is that the issue on a criminal trial
shall be single, and that the testimony must be con-
fined to the issue, and that on the trial of a person
for one offense the prosecution cannot aid the proof
against him by showing that he committed other of-
fenses.

To the same effect, see Brown v. State, 224 Miss.
498, 80 So. 2d 761 (1955) and Pegram v. State, 223
Miss. 294, 78 So. 24 153 (1955).

HB It was error to admit testimony relating to a
previous crime alleged to have been committed by ap-
pellant, or to his trial for that crime, or to the fact
that he had been indicted but had not been acquitted.

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case
is remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Robertson,
JJ., concur.

Jouwson v. WILKINSON
No. 43756 January 24, 1966 182 So. 2d 224

wR

76

Prewitt, Bullard & Braddock, Vicksburg, for appel-
lant.

417

Dent, Ward, Martin & Terry, Vicksburg, for appellee.

Jonzs, J.

This was a suit for personal injuries received by ap-
pellant in a collision with a car driven by the appellee.
The trial jury awarded appellant $5,000.00 damages,
and he appeals. The only error assigned in the case
is the inadequacy of the verdict.

478

It is agreed that appellant was guilty of no negligence.
The two cars collided head on and the injuries and dam-
ages resulted therefrom. We agree with appellant that
the amount of the verdict is inadequate and reverse
the case and remand it for a new trial on the question of
damages only.

HM The appellant has filed here a petition for a
writ of error coram nobis. It asks for a writ, alleging
that on November 4, 1964, appellant underwent the op-
eration testified as necessary and appellant desires to
introduce evidence thereof in a new trial claiming it

_ as a new fact unknown at the time of trial. Regardless
of the availability or non-availability of the writ, the
evidence on the original trial as herein shown refutes
the allegations of such petition and same is denied.

The accident happened on August 14, 1963. Appellant
was driving a 1963 Rambler automobile. As a result
of the collision, the steering wheel was broken and the
car wrecked. Appellant, thirty-three years of age, was
thrown and tossed around in the automobile. He testi-
fied that he had pains all over, particularly in his left
ankle, back, chest and other areas of the body.

The first doctor he saw was a general practitioner,
Dr. Curtis D. Roberts of Brandon, Mississippi. Dr.
Roberts had made annual examinations of the appellant
in connection with the National Guard for whom appel-
lant worked, and said that prior to this time he presumed
the appellant was in general good health: ‘Because
he had no gross complaints or overt physical signs on
his routine physical’’. This doctor saw the plaintiff
on August 16, two days after the accident, and said that
the patient had multiple complaints, suffering all over,
aching, complaining of pain in his back, knees, left foot,
rib cage and neck. ‘‘He was just generally aching all
over, just hurting’’.

Dr. Roberts felt that on the basis of the marked spasm
the appellant had in his neck and back and all over,

479

he had a lot of ligamentous strain. The doctor said
he complained very bitterly of marked distress and dis-
comfort in his neck, shoulder, back, hip and knees. This
doctor felt that he had a separation of cartilage from
the ribs, which is not reflected ordinarily in x-rays. He
reached this conclusion because the appellant had marked
pain on breathing, movement of his left shoulder, left
arm, localized right to his anterior chest along the mar-
gins of the cartilage and rib junctions. He said that
was his number one diagnosis, and the second was acute
lumbar sacral and sacroiliac strain. He had a very pain-
ful right hip, a sprained left ankle, multiple bruises and
contusions. On August 22, a few days after his discharge
from the hospital, he came again complaining very bitter-
ly of sacroiliac distress, and when he would rotate the
doctor says you could hear a popping sound. He did
not know what the popping sound was, but felt it was
just popping the ligament. Dr. Roberts saw him again
on the 24th of August, at which time he was having
more difficulty in his back and pain on flexing or raising
his right leg. He gave him some tranquilizers, which
were not effective, and the appellant returned on the
28th of August, and was readmitted to the hospital:
“Complaining bitterly, bitterly, bitterly of pain’’. Be-
cause of the marked pain and distress Dr. Roberts elected
to have an orthopedic evaluation. The appellant saw Dr.
Nix, an orthopedic surgeon, and also continued to see
Dr. Roberts intermittantly. Dr. Roberts said he actually
got worse; That secondary to his low back distress, he
would become bloated and distended, apparently because
he felt that he could not have a satisfactory evacuation
because of pain accompaning same. This continued for
sometime. Dr. Roberts continued to see the man off
and on for about ten months prior to the giving of his
deposition. It was his opinion from his examination and
knowledge of the facts that the man would eventually
recover with no permanent affects. However, there is

480

nothing in the record except a statement by Dr. Roberts
that soon after he was examined by Dr. Nix he had a
report from Dr. Nix, which is not shown. Apparently
Dr. Roberts had no knowledge of a final diagnosis of
Dr. Nix. There seems to have been very little communi-
cation, other than the preliminary report, between the
expert and the general practitioner.

Dr. Nix was called and testified that he first saw the
appellant on August 29, 1963; that on his initial examina-
tion the x-rays were not adequate, and on the basis of
what he had at that time he reached an impression that
most likely the appellant had a strain of the low back
and the joints of the low part of his back. The x-rays
were not sufficient, however, for him to state that this
was the only problem at that time. They made more
x-rays, which were also inadequate. Finally, on No-
vember 1, 1963, x-rays then taken demonstrated a nor-
rowing of the L-5 interspace, being vertebrae of the
back. Dr. Nix’s diagnosis then was lumbo sacral in-
stability, secondary to degenerative disc disease at L-5
and changes in the lumbo sacral facet joints. When
asked the cause of this condition, the doctor answered:
“Based on the history I obtained, the findings, and the
x-rays, I believe this present condition was caused by
the accident.’’? He had noticed the spasms of the muscles
in the area injured and stated that it would probably
get worse. The doctor recommended a fusion of the
vertebrae, an operation that required approximately two
to three hours. He stated that for three weeks after
the operation the patient would have to remain on ab-
solute bed rest, after which he would be allowed to walk
in a brace. But his activities would be moderately limit-
ed for six months and he would be able to return to
unlimited activity in approximately one year. When
asked about pain subsequent to recovery from the op-
eration, the doctor said he would have pain intermittant-
ly although it would not be as severe, and that this

481

would probably continue with occasional episodes of
pains for the rest of his life. He also said he would
have some limitation of motion in his back that would
remain with him throughout his life. The doctor’s ex-
pense for the operation would be $400.00 or $500.00.
The doctor stated appellant would be in the hospital
approximately four weeks, and it would be a year before
he could return to unlimited activities. He said if the
man did not have the operation he would continue to
have backaches, but he believed he would eventually
desire to have surgery to relieve the pain. He further
said that on November 1 he had ordered a brace for
Mr. Johnson to wear. On cross examination, when asked
whether he could tell if this narrowing was a result of
the accident or whether his condition developed just
normally, the doctor said: ‘‘I cannot say definitely that
it is either one’’. On redirect examination, when again
asked the question as to the cause of the back condition,
the doctor said: ‘‘I cannot say with certainty, though
in my opinion the problem in his back now is due to
the injury he described occurring on August 14, 1963’.

The appellee argues that since Dr. Nix could not say
for sure that the injury was caused by the accident,
the verdict of $5,000.00 was justified. Dr. Nix testified
that the condition of the vertebrae could result without
strain or trauma, and he said that he could not positively
aver that the accident caused such injury. However from
the history, examination, and whatever other facts he
knew about the man’s injury and accident, he was of
the opinion that the condition was caused by the accident.
The appellant was thirty-three years of age, at that time,
and he did not have any back trouble prior to the acci-
dent.

HREM His symptoms and pains began right after the
accident and continued until the time of the trial. Dr.
Roberts, while not testifying to the narrowing of the
disc, was of the opinion that whatever injury he had

came from the accident. We think the evidence is over-
whelmingly that the appellant’s condition was the result
of the accident.

Appellant proved the following actual damages:

Damage to automobile — $1,400.00
Hospital and doctor bills to

time of trial 959.98
Lost wages’ 1,105.54
Towing charge 70.30
Rental of another automobile 75.13
A TOTAL OF _ 3,610.95

When you add to this the doctor’s bill of four or
five hundred dollars for the operation, the hospital ex-
penses for a stay of four weeks, the disability, either
total or partial, for a year after the operation, it is
obvious that the judgment of $5,000.00 would not cover
the actual losses and expenses sustained, and to be sus-
tained by the appellant as a result of the accident.

In Whatley v. Delta Brokerage & Warehouse Oo.,
248 Miss. 416, 159 So. 2d 634 (1964), this Court held
that a judgment of $15,000.00 for one who had ‘‘out
of pocket’? expenses for medical treatment and loss of
wages in excess of $8,000.00 at the time of the trial, and
who sustained permanent injury to his knee, arm, shoul-
der and chest was grossly inadequate. And in so holding
the Court said:

“We are of the opinion that the damages awarded

appellant in this case are so grossly inadequate as to

the evince prejudice and bias on the part of the jury.

A mere statement of his injuries, medical expense and

loss of earnings is sufficient basis for our conclusion’’.

248 Miss. at 430, 159 So. 2d at 639.

In Ladner v. Merchants Bank and Trust Co., 251 Miss.
804, 171 So, 2d 503 (1965), this Court held $18,000.00 so
grossly inadequate as to evidence prejudice and bias so

483

that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. The plaintiff
was thirty-six years of age, had $2,531.04 medical ex-
penses; his earnings when injured were $110.00 per

week; he lost $12,000.00 of income from employment;
was forty percent (40%) permanently, partially disabl-
ed; and in that case the Court made the same statement

as above quoted from the Whatley case.
In Dunn v. Butler, 252 Miss. 40, 172 So. 2d 430 (1965
where the jury had returned a verdict for $1,385.01

$885.00 of which was for medical bills already incurred,

and $500.00 for various other bills, and did not inclu

any compensation for pain and suffering, this Court

said:
“Tn order to insure the preservation, integrity and
vitality of the right to trial by jury, this Court has
throughout its history exercised its constitutionally
ordained duty to set aside verdicts whenever the jury
manifestly failed to respond to reason, This power
must be exercised with conscious self restraint and
caution, but it must be exercised in a proper case for
trial by a jury that will not respond to reason is a
denial of the right itself.
In the present case, it is manifest that the jury did
not respond to reason, which is the same as saying
that the verdict evinces bias and prejudice against
appellant. The jury expressly denied any recovery
for pain and suffering past and future, and at least
some permanent disability. Appellant is a working
, man whose means of earning a living is his labor.
‘We hold that the verdict is so inadequate that it
evinces bias and prejudice and should be and is re-
versed.’? 172 So. 2d at 431.
HM In order to keep the scales of justice properly

)>
0,

Le

operating, it is as much our duty to set aside a grossly
inadequate verdict as it is to reverse a grossly excessive
verdict. MMI Therefore, the petition for error coram
nobis is denied, the cause is affirmed as to liability,

)

and reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue
of damages only.

Petition for error coram nobis denied; case affirmed
as to liability and reversed and remanded for a new
trial as to damages only.

Gillespie, P. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Inger, JJ.,
concur.

Horxuvs v. Stare
No. 43777 January 24, 1966 182 So. 2d 236

John H. Shands, Vaiden; Rupert Ringold, Winona,
for appellant.

485

,

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Brapy, Tom P., J.

Appellant was indicted, tried and convicted of the
crime of grand larceny and sentenced to serve five years
in the state penitentiary by the Cireuit Court of Mont-
gomery County, Mississippi. From this conviction and
sentence, appellant prosecutes this appeal.

The facts upon which the indictment was based and
the verdict rendered are not in issue. The sole question
presented to this Court is embodied in the single assign-
ment of error, which is as follows:

The Trial Court erred in failing to sustain appellant’s

motions to quash the indictment and to quash the

venire, on the grounds that Negroes were systema-
tically excluded from the grand jury which indicted
him, and Negroes were systematically excluded from
the venire which petit jurors were drawn, all in vio-
lation of the due process and equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendments (sic) to the United

States Constitution.

Whether or not the assignment of error is well taken
depends upon whether or not the appellant’s proof is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Negroes
were systematically excluded from the grand jury which
indicted him and from the venire from which petit jurors
were drawn who convicted him, We have meticulously
reviewed the testimony and evidence in this case and
we have carefully considered the motions and briefs of
counsel. The record discloses that the appellant proved

486

by sufficient and reputable testimony that there were
no names of any Negroes in the jury box.

The circuit clerk, who is also the county registrar,
testified that she had been circuit clerk since the be-
ginning of 1950; that she was present when the venire
was drawn; that there were no Negroes drawn on the
venire for the term of court at which the appellant was
tried and convicted.

It follows, therefore, that there were no Negroes on
the grand jury or the petit jury which respectively
indicted and convicted the appellant.

The record further discloses that there have never
been any Negroes drawn for jury service in the Circuit
Court of Montgomery County for more than sixteen
years and that possibly there are thirty Negroes who
are registered in the county. The State urges, without
authority cited in support thereof, that since the circuit
clerk did not personally know the names of all those
selected for jury service, and since there was no indication.
of the race of any person whose name was drawn for
jury service, except those persons whom the clerk knew
personally, that the clerk could not tell the race of the
persons whose names were in the jury box, and thus
appellant had failed to establish by his proof that Negroes
were and had been systematically excluded from jury
service.

There is no merit in the contention of the State that
appellant did not establish a prima facie case of the
exclusion of Negroes from jury service in Montgomery
County. The State moreover did not even attempt to
meet the burden of proof and show by credible testimony
and evidence that there was not a systematic exclusion
of Negroes from the venire from which the grand jurors
and petit jurors were drawn.

HEE Numerous decisions of federal courts have con-
clusively settled this question in issue. The Congress
has enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These determi-

nants have been thoroughly and repetitiously publicized
by news media of every type and are generally known.
Furthermore, this Court has heretofore stated the rule
with reference to the question in the case at bar, as
shown by the following cases: Harper v. State, 251 Miss.
699, 171 So. 24 129 (1965) ; Gordon v. State, 160 So. 2d
73 (Miss. 1964); Gordon v. State, 243 Miss. 750, 140
So. 2d 88 (1962); Farrow v. State, 91 Miss. 509, 45
So. 619 (1907). Currently the rule is inexorable, and
wise men will take note and be governed accordingly.

It follows, therefore, that the lower court committed
fatal error in not sustaining appellant’s motion to quash
the indictment and to quash the venire because of the
systematic exclusion of Negroes therefrom.

This cause is therefore reversed and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Smith and Robertson,
JJ., concur.

Ruwy v. Scare
No. 43269 January 31, 1966 182 So. 2d 397

March 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 819

—

John H. Doyle III, R. Jess Brown, Jack H. Young,
Carsie H. Hall, Eddie Tucker, Richard E. Tuttle, Jack-
son, for appellant.

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Inzer, J.

Petitioner, Ollie Riley, was convicted in the Circuit
Court of Leake County on an indictment under Missis-
sippi Laws of 1958 Chapter 281, Mississippi Code An-
notated section 2412.5 (1956), and was sentenced to serve
aterm of two years in the Mississippi State Penitentiary.
He appealed to this Court, and the case was affirmed on
November 22, 1965.

He now has filed in this Court a motion which we
consider as an application which states that it is filed
pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 1992.5
(1956), and he seeks leave to file a petition for the writ
of error coram nobis in the trial court. The motion is
both a motion and a brief of five pages in length. It
does not comply with the requirements of the statute
or the rules of proper pleading. The petition that is
proposed to be filed in the trial court does not accom-
pany the motion. Paragraph 2 of section 1992.5 pro-
vides:

In all cases wherein a judgment of conviction in

a criminal prosecution has been affirmed on appeal

by the supreme court, no petition for the writ of error

489

coram nobis shall be allowed to be filed or entertained
in the trial court unless and until the petition for the
writ shall have first been presented to a quorum of
the justices of the supreme court, convened for said
purpose either in term time or in vacation, and an
order granted allowing the filing of such petition in
the trial court.

It is apparent that this paragraph provides that the
petition proposed to be filed in the trial court be pre-
sented to this Court in order for this Court to determine
from the same whether there would be sufficient prob-
ability that the result in the case would be changed by
the filing of the petition in the trial court.

In order for us to expeditiously and intelligently pass
upon applications for the writ of error coram nobis when
presented to this Court, we have deemed it necessary
and appropriate to adopt Rule 38 of this Court setting
out the procedure for application for leave to file peti-
tion of writ of error coram nobis in the trial court. The
rule adopted by this Court is as follows:

PROCEDURE FOR APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR
CORAM NOBIS UNDER MISSISSIPPI CODE
ANNOTATED SECTION 1992.5.

Every application for leave to file in the lower
court a petition for writ of error coram nobis shall
have attached the original and two executed counter-
parts of the petition proposed to be filed in the lower
court, which shall be sworn to by petitioner. Petition-
er’s affidavit shall designate specifically what facts,
if any, alleged in the petition are within the personal
knowledge of petitioner. When the petition contains
allegations of fact not within the personal knowledge
of petitioner, it shall have attached affidavit or af-
fidavits of some other person or persons having know-
ledge of the facts which are not within the personal
knowledge of petitioner. The failure to attach such

affidavits of persons other than petitioner may be

excused upon good cause shown. The petition shall

state when the facts relied upon for issuance of the
writ came to petitioner’s knowledge, and shall state
sufficient facts to show that there was no want of
reasonable diligence on the part of petitioner or his
counsel. The petition shall be endorsed by a statement
by petitioner’s counsel, if any, that he believes the
petition for a writ of error coram nobis is well taken,
and should be issued. The application shall be sup-
ported by a brief, and failure to file a supporting brief
may be ground for dismissal. In the event leave is
granted to file the petition, the original and one exe-
cuted counterpart of the petition shall be withdrawn
and filed in the lower court.

HEB For the reasons stated, the application for leave
to file petition for writ of error coram nobis in the cir-
cuit court must be dismissed, but without prejudice to
petitioner’s right to file a corrected application in ac-
cordance with the statute and our rule herein set out.

Motion overruled and application dismissed without
prejudice.

Ethridge, C. J., Gillespie, Jones and Brady, JJ.,
concur,

Brapy, J.:

We have carefully reviewed appellant’s application
for leave to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis,
the petition with supporting affidavits, together with
an application for stay of execution of sentence, and the
release of the appellant until such time as this Court
has ruled on his petition for writ of error coram nobis
or until final disposition of his petition.

HE We find that the appellant’s application and
affidavits recite sufficient requisite facts in compliance
with the provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated sec-
tion 1992.5 (1956), and related statutes, to justify and

|

require the granting of the application for an order
permitting the filing of a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis in the above syled and numbered cause.

It is therefore ordered that the appellant be and he
is hereby permitted to file a petition for a writ of coram
nobis in the Cireuit Court of Leake County, Mississippi.
When said writ has been duly filed in the Cireuit Court
of Leake County, Mississippi, then that court or the
judge in vacation may also consider any application for
stay of execution of sentence, and the release of the
petitioner on bond.

Application for leave to file in trial court petition
for writ of error coram nobis sustained.

All Justices concur.
a

Grier v. THomasson
No. 43767 January 31, 1966 182 So. 2d 399

H. T. Carter, Stone & McBryde, Columbus, for appel-

Burgi & Gholson, Sams and Sams, Columbus, for
appellees.

Brapy, Tom P., J.

Appellant, a minor, plaintiff below, by father and next
friend, instituted suit for injuries received when he,
while riding his bicycle, was struck by a ‘‘demonstrator’’
automobile owned by defendants below, Floyd W. Brown
and J. Ralph Brown, an automobile copartnership, and
being driven by appellee, salesman of the copartnership.

The appellant, approximately thirteen years old, at-
tempted to cross, when heavily traveled, the four-way
stop intersection of 18th Avenue, North and 7th Street
in Columbus, Mississippi. The appellant rode his bicycle
north and in front of the appellee’s car, which had
stopped and was then proceeding west when it struck
the right rear of appellant’s bicycle, knocking appellant
into a ditch. The point of impact, which appellant dis-
puted, was designated to be eighteen steps west of the
northwest corner of the intersection.

The trial court granted a peremptory instruction for
the defendants, Floyd W. Brown and J. Ralph Brown.
The jury returned a verdict for the appellant in the sum
of $7,500. Judgment for this amount was entered and
appellant appeals.

495

There are but two issues involved:.in this cause, the
first being whether or not the codefendants, Floyd W.
Brown and J. Ralph Brown, copartners in the Buick-
Cadillac automobile business in Columbus, were entitled
to a peremptory instruction, and the second being wheth-
er or not the verdict of the jury is inadequate and evinces
ias and prejudice on the part of the jury.

HM With reference to the first question, the record
wholly fails to disclose that there was any connection
etween the operation of the automobile by Thomasson
and his employers. Thomasson was on a purely per-
sonal mission and was driving his maid to his home
at the time he collided with the bicycle being operated
yy the appellant.

MBM This Court has repeatedly held that it is in-
cumbent upon the claimant under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior to show that the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment in order to hold
he employer responsible for the negligence of the ser-
vant. This appellant wholly failed to do, and the lower
court was correct in sustaining the motion of Floyd W.
Brown and J. Ralph Brown for the peremptory instruc-
tion as to the copartnership which employed the appellee.

Insofar as the second contention is concerned, that
the verdict of the jury is inadequate under the facts,
we point out that it was for the jury to say whether or
not the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence
and to what degree.

HE Under the facts in this case the jury was war-
ranted in finding that the appellant was guilty of abund-
ant contributory negligence. We are sympathetic with
the appellant because of his injuries, but we cannot hold
that the verdict of the jury is not proper under the
evidence offered in this case. The right of the jury to
estimate and fix the amount of contributory negligence
and the amount of the verdict based thereon has been
clearly determined. The questions of law involved in

‘

this case are clearly settled, as shown by the following
decisions and statutes: Winstead v. Hall, 251 Miss. 800,
171 So. 2d 354 (1965); Ramsey v. Price, 249 Miss. 192,
161 So. 2d 778 (1964) ; Herrington v. Hodges, 249 Miss.
131, 161 So. 2d 194 (1964); Whatley v. Delta Brokerage
& Warehouse Co., 248 Miss. 416, 159 So. 2d 634 (1964) ;
Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So. 2d 169 (1963) ;
Matheny v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 235 Miss. 173, 108 So.
2a 589 (1959); Thrash v. Jackson Auto Sales, Inc., 232
Miss. 845, 100 So. 2d 575 (1958); Morris v. Boleware,
228 Miss. 139, 87 So. 2d 246 (1956); City of Indianola
vy. Love, 227 Miss. 156, 85 So. 2d 812 (1956); Catchot
v. City of Ocean Springs, 218 Miss. 417, 67 So. 2d 444
(1953) ; Lovett Motor Co. v. Walley, 217 Miss. 384, 64
So. 2d 370 (1953); Gilliam v. Sykes, 216 Miss. 54, 61
So. 2d 672 (1952); Pounders v. Day, 151 Miss. 436, 118
So. 298, 299, 300 (1928); Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. v.
Hirsch, 69 Miss. 126, 138 So. 244 (1891); Miss. Code
Ann. §§ 1454, 1455 (1956).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower
court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Gillespie, P. J., and Jones, Inzer and Smith, JJ.,
coneur.

Mississipr1 Starz Hienway Commission v. Lirtin
No. 43769 January 31, 1966 182 So. 2d 392

497

John K. Keyes, Collins, for appellant.

John P. Little, Mount Olive, pro se.

498

Guizsem, P. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit
Court of Covington County in an eminent domain case.
The Mississippi State Highway Commission sought to
condemn the lands hereinafter described, for the right-
of-way in connection with the reconstruction of U. S.
Highway No. 49 in Covington County. The case was
heard in the Special Court of Eminent Domain, and the
landowners, J. P. Little and others, were awarded dam-
ages of $7,500.00. The Commission appealed to the cir-
cuit court, and the jury in that court awarded landowners
damages in the amount of $6,000.00, and from this judg-
ment, the Commission prosecuted an appeal to this Court.

The question for our decision is whether the evidence
justified the finding by the jury that the landowners
sustained damages to the extent of $6,000.00. We find
the evidence sufficient, and affirm the case.

The landowners own 20 acres of land lying just out-
side the eastern corporate limits of the town of Mt.
Olive. This 20 acres is bound on the west by a paved
road, which constitutes the eastern boundary of the town
of Mt. Olive. The right-of-way sought to be condemned
by the Commission runs from northwest to southeast
across the northern part of said 20-acre tract. The
right-of-way would cover 5.72 acres of land and would
sever .28 acres, which would be left on the northeast
corner of the 20-acre tract.

The remaining 14 acres of land would lie to the south
of the new four-lane highway, the southern edge of
the right-of-way of the new highway being about 100
feet from the residence located on the property. The
actual traveled portion of the new highway would be
246 feet from the dwelling house on the property. Land-

owners would continue to have access to the road along
the west side of their tract. The landowners were not
represented by a lawyer, but J. P. Little, one of them,
undertook to handle the case for the landowners. The
only evidence on the question of damages was offered
by the highway department, who introduced three quali-
fied appraisers. According to these witnesses, the fair
market value immediately before the taking ranged from
$12,800.00 to $16,800.00, and the fair market value of
the remaining property after the construction of the
highway, from $9,050.00 to $13,500.00. These witnesses
estimated the damages at $3,500.00, $3,300.00 and $3,-
750.00, respectively.

Landowners did not offer any witnesses on the ques-
tion of the amount of damages, but one of their number
elicited significant evidence in cross-examining the Com-
mission’s witnesses. It was shown that a large factory
is located on the adjoining 40 acres of land, that the
property is well located for building lots, and its highest
and best use in the immediate future is for development
as building lots. It was also shown by the Commission’s
witnesses that lots similarly situated with reference to
the corporate limits were selling as high as $1,500.00.
The Commission contends that the jury had no evidence
that landowners were damaged to the extent of $6,000.00
and that the jury ignored the evidence, and used their
own knowledge based on the jury’s view of the land.

The highest estimate of the before value was $16,800.00
and the lowest estimate of the after taking value was
$9,050.00. The highest and best use of the property in
the immediate future is for use as building lots. Lots
similarly situated had sold for as high as $1,500.00, The
jury could take into account all these facts and conclude
that landowners were damaged to the extent of $6,000.00.
It cannot be said that there is no substantial evidence
to support the verdict.

MME MM Since the evidence on which the jury based its
verdict consisted of the testimony of the Commission’s
witnesses, we find no basis for the argument that the
verdict is so excessive as to evince passion, prejudice
and bias on the part of the jury.

Affirmed.

Jones, Brady, Inzer and Smith, JJ., concur.
a

Provence Lirs Insurancz Company v. Wooney
No. 43771 January 31, 1966 182 So. 2d 393

Watkins, Pyle, Edwards & Ludlam, Robert H. Weaver,
Jackson, for appellant.

L. D. Pittman, Raleigh; 0. B. Triplett, Jr., Forest,
for appellee.

Jonns, J.

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Smith
County where appellee, plaintiff below, was awarded
judgment against appellant, defendant below, on a health
and accident insurance policy providing for disability.
Because of error in an instruction given to plaintiff, the
case is reversed and remanded for another trial.

On June 12, 1959, appellant issued its policy of in-
surance to appellee containing the disability clause here-
inafter quoted. On June 2, 1960, appellee suffered a
heart attack and was paid benefits for total disability
under the quoted clause from that time through June
10, 1962. No payments have been made since that time,
and appellee claimed that appellant owed him $5,260.00
as of the date of the trial. The company denied that
plaintiff was totally disabled within the meaning of the
policy on June 10, 1962, and claimed that in May, 1963,
the insured had ceased to be active in his business al-
though he was not totally disabled, and the company
had exercised its option to decline renewal of the policy
under its provisions.

The policy contained the following definition of total
disability, ‘Complete loss of business time due to the
inability of the insured to engage in his regular occupa-
tion or in any gainful occupation for which he is rea-
sonably fitted by education, training or experience.’
Appellee was fifty-four years of age and was and had
been engaged in the occupation of farming and raising
chickens. He is a high school graduate. Other than
his experience as a farmer and broiler producer, he
had worked as a carpenter, truck driver and equipment
operator on construction jobs.

Evidence by the appellee, his wife and doctors was
sufficient, though conflicting, to justify the jury’s find-

“ _
ing that he was totally disabled, and unable to perform
acts required of him in his farming and chicken produc-
ing business, but there was evidence, if believed by the
jury, to show he was not disabled from engaging ‘‘in

any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably fitted
by education, training or experience.’? The appellee re-

-quested and received an instruction which said if the
jury believed from the evidence that plaintiff was pre-

vented by his disease from performing the substantial
acts required of him in his business, he was totally
disabled within the meaning of the policy. The plaintiff’s
instruction said nothing about his ability or inability
to engage in any other occupation as described in the
policy’s definition of disability. The appellant requested.
an instruction to the effect that ‘‘total disability’? meant
not only complete loss of time due to the inability of
the insured to engage in his regular occupation, but also
in any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably
fitted by education, training or experience. This instruc-
tion was refused.

The question is therefore presented to us as to the
construction of this particular disability provision of
the policy involved.

The appellant relies upon the following cases: Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Baker, 197 Miss. 438, 19
So. 2d 739 (1944); New York Life Ins. Co. v. McGehee,
193 Miss. 549, 10 So. 2d 454 (1942); Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Nelson, 166 Miss. 671, 147 So.
661 sugg. error overr and mod., 166 Miss. 671, 148 So.
179 (1933) and Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee
v. Jones, 112 Miss. 506, 73 So. 566 (1916).

The appellee relies upon and insists that the following
cases support his instruction: Lipnick v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 211 Miss. 833, 52 So. 2d 916 (1951) ; Columbian
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Craft, 186 Miss. 234, 185 So. 225
(1939) ; Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Cassity, 173 Miss. 840,

505

163 So. 508 (1935); and Mutual Ben. Health & Acci-
dent Ass’n. v. Mathis, 169 Miss. 187, 142 So. 494 (1932).
None of these cases include the provision contained
in this policy. All of them have what is known as a ‘‘gen-
eral disability’’ clause, but not one mentions the occupa-
tion of the insured. In construing the disability defi-
nitions there, this Court several times refers to the fact
that no mention of present occupation is made.
In the case of Jones, supra, decided in 1916, it is in-
teresting to note the following statement by this Court:
“We do not think that the words ‘‘work of any kind’’
contained in the clause of the policy hereinbefore set
out can be limited ‘‘to the usual and ordinary work
which insured was engaged in at the time of his in-
jury’’ as contended by counsel for appellee, but we
will assume for the sake of the argument what seems
to be admitted by counsel for appellant, that this lan-
guage may be limited by a construction to work of
any kind for which the insured was fitted by nature,
experience, or training. Nevertheless the judgment
of the court below must be reversed; for it appears
that appellee was able to do and had applied for work,
and it does not appear that this work was not of the
character that he was fitted by nature, experience, and
training to do. In order for him to recover it must
appear that he was disabled from doing work of the
character contemplated by the policy, the burden of
proving which was upon him. That he could do light
work only is immaterial for the question, even under
this limitation upon the words of the policy, is whether
he was able to do work, either light or heavy, for
which he was fitted by nature, experience, or training.
Whether he is unable to work, within the meaning of
the policy, when he can do a portion, but not all, of
some particular character of work: for which he is
fitted, is not presented to us for decision by this
record.’’? 112 Miss. at 508, 73 So. at 566.

In 294 Am. Jur. Insurance §1518 at 622-3-4 (1960), it
is said:

“The question whether there is a total disability
when the insured, notwithstanding his injury, is able
to work in other occupations, depends largely on the
terms of the contract defining the disability. In the
ease of an ‘‘occupational disability’’ policy, inability
to perform all the substantial and material acts neces-
sary to the prosecution of the insured’s business or
occupation is sufficient to constitute total disability
of the insured.

In the case of a ‘‘general disability’’ policy, the courts
are in conflict as to the type of work which the in-
sured must be unable to perform in order to be totally
disabled within the meaning of the policy. Some courts
refuse to distinguish between policies which relate
specifically to disability in respect to a particular
occupation and those which undertake to insure against
disability from performing any sort of remunerative
labor, holding that total disability occurs in either
case if the insured becomes unable to perform the
duties of, or labor pertaining to, his particular oc-
cupation. According to this rule, recovery will not
be prevented by the fact that the insured is able to
perform all the substantial and material acts of some
other business or occupation. At the other extreme,
there is authority for the view that an insured person
may not be regarded as totally disabled within a
‘general disability’? clause until he is unable to follow
any occupation whatsoever. Under this theory the
liability of the insurer does not extend to cases where
the insured is still capable of engaging in some oc-
cupation for profit. A majority of the courts, how-
ever, take the middle ground that it is not sufficient,
in order to recover under the ‘‘general disability’’
clause, that the insured is disabled only from engaging
in his usual business or occupation, but that he must

507

also be unable to engage in any comparable occupa-
tion or employment for which he is fitted by educa-
tion, experience, and physical condition. These cases
proceed upon the theory that the term ‘total disabili-
ty’’ as used in general disability clauses is a relative
one depending in a large measure upon the character
of the occupation or employment and the capabilities
of the insured, and upon the circumstances of the
particular case. While under this rule it is not suf-
ficient, in order to recover under the disability clause,
that the insured is disabled from engaging in his usual
business or occupation, he need not be disabled from
following any occupation whatsoever regardless of its
character. The majority rule is particularly applica-
ble where the plaintiff is insured as belonging to a
particular group, such as railroad employees, and a
general policy form is used. Under the majority rule,
expressions such as ‘‘any occupation’? and ‘‘any
work,’’ in the coverage clause, are converted into
words of concrete significance and must be construed.
to mean the ordinary employment of the particular
person insured, or such other employment, if any,
approximating the same livelihood as the insured might
fairly be expected to follow, in view of his station,
circumstances, and physical and mental capabilities.”

HEEB This policy is worded so as to bring it squarely

within the rule of the majority of courts which took
the middle ground as hereinbefore shown. The thinking

of this Court was indicated by
Jones case. This provision is w!
“double-barrel provision,’’ which

the statement in the
at may be termed a
requires that disabili-

ty be shown as inability to follow his regular occupation,
or any other occupation for which insured is reasonably
fitted by education, training or experience. This pro-
vision is entirely different from any stated in the cases
cited and brings it squarely within the majority rule
announced in 29A Am. Jur., supra.

508

HM The instruction given for appellee, who was
required to prove his case, should have required a find-
ing in addition to that stated that he was disabled and
incapable of performing any gainful occupation for
which he was fitted by education, training or experi-
ence — or the substantial acts required thereby.

HEB Appellant assigns as error the admission in
evidence of written statements by doctors, who had died
since the statements were given. Appellant had contend-
ed that appellee failed to present proper claim of dis-
ability, and in answer to this contention, appellee of-
fered in evidence the statements of these doctors which
were attached to the claim as proof that notice and claims
were submitted. We do not think there was any error
in the admission of these statements. The case is re-
versed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Gillespie, P. J., and Brady, Inzeer and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

Hacerr v. Sune, et al.
No. 43807 February 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 175

J. A, White, Durant, for appellant.

King & King, Durant, for appellees.

Grutzspm, P. J.

The suit was filed by Fred Hagger, plaintiff below
and appellant here, against J. W. Self and others for
the recovery of damages done plaintiff’s truck in a col-
lision between said truck and a bull owned by defendant,
J. W. Self, on a state-designated, paved highway. The
jury found for defendants. We affirm.

The principal question in this case is whether defend-
ants met the burden of proving lack of negligence on
their part.

Appellant offered proof that his truck was damaged
as a result of a collision between the truck and a bull
belonging to defendants, and that the collision took place
on a state-designated, paved highway.

HME HI The proof established a prima facie case of
liability under the provisions of Mississippi Code An-
notated section 4876-05 (1957), which provides that:

511

The owners of livestock which through their own-
er’s negligence are found on federal or state designat-
ed paved highways or highway right-of-ways shall be
subject to any damages as a result of wrecks, loss of
life or bodily injury as a result of said livestock being
on the above designated highways. The burden shall
be on the owner of any such livestock to prove lack
of negligence.

To meet the burden placed upon them by the fore-
going statute, defendants offered testimony that the land
immediately adjacent to the highway where the accident
took place was leased by one of the defendants, and was
planted in corn. There was no fence between the corn
field and the highway. The bull was last seen within
about an hour of the time of the accident in a feed lot,
which was connected to a pasture by an open gate, so
that the bull could go from the feed lot to the pasture.
The fence surrounding the pasture, and particularly that
between the pasture and the corn field, had been repaired
about four months before the accident, by placement of
some new white oak posts and some new wire. The
proof showed that, as repaired, the fence consisted
of four strands of barbed wire stretched tight, and was
capable of holding cattle under normal conditions. At
the place where the bull escaped from the pasture, the
fence consisted of new white oak posts with four strands
of barbed wire. The bull had put his head under the
lower strand, and had pushed the fence from the ground,
and thus made his escape. The bull had never been
known to escape, except one time when he was engaged
in a fight with a neighboring bull.

MEE The case went to the jury on proper instructions,
and we are of the opinion that the jury was justified
in finding that the defendants met the burden of proving
lack of negligence on their part. It is argued that the
verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence, but with this, we cannot agree.

512

It is also contended that the court erred in granting
a peremptory instruction for one of the defendants,
Mrs. R. H. Self.

We are of the opinion that there is no merit to the
contention, for there is no proof whatever that Mrs.
Self had any interest in the bull, and the proof was
positive that she did not have any such interest.

There was no reversible error, and the case is there-
fore affirmed.

Affirmed.
Rodgers, Brady, Ineer, and Smith, JJ., concur.

Boston Insurance Company, et al. v.
Jouyess Reaury Company, Ivo.

No. 43808 February 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 180

P. D. Greaves, J. C. Seaman, Jr., Gulfport, for appel-

Geax, Gex & Phillips, Bay St. Louis; Harmon W. Broom,
Jackson, for appellee.

514

Bravy, Tom P., J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Hancock County based upon a claim or suit
by the appellee under three policies of insurance issued
one each by each of the three appellants herein. The
claim or suit was based upon a fire loss which occurred
on October 20, 1961, when a building and the contents
thereof owned by the appellee were totally destroyed
by fire. The total amount of coverage afforded by the
three policies was $6,500.00.

At the conclusion of appellee’s case, appellants made
a motion for a directed verdict which was overruled,
and the appellants then rested. The case was submitted
to the jury which returned the verdict in favor of the
appellee in the full amount sued for of $6,500. A motion
for a judgment non obstante veredicto, or, in the alter-
native, for a new trial, was overruled.

From this judgment and order of the circuit court,
this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellee concedes that the statement of pleadings
which appears in the appellants’ brief is a fair state-
ment covering the pleadings which were filed in the cir-
cuit court and which are here on appeal. These facts
tersely stated are as follows:

“This proceeding was instituted by the Appellee
herein filing his declaration in the Cireuit Court of
Hancock County, Mississippi, in the May, 1963 Term,
to recover under three policies of insurance issued
on each by each of the three named defendants. A
building owned by the Appellee and insured by two
of the Appellants and which contained furniture, fix-
tures, etc. and which was insured by the other Ap-
pellant was totally destroyed by fire on October 20,

|

1961. The Appellee sued each of the three insurance
companies on their respective policies of insurance
to recover the face amounts of all three of said poli-
cies. The defendants, the Appellants herein, each
filed its separate answer in which each admitted the
existence of its policy of insurance sued on and ad-
mitted that it had not paid the plaintiff for the loss
and affirmatively averred that its policy provided
that that insurance company should not be liable for
a loss occurring while the building was vacant or un-
occupied beyond a period of sixty (60) consecutive
days and further averred that the said building was
vacant and unoccupied beyond said period of sixty
(60) consecutive days preceding the date of the fire
and that, therefore, the said insurance coverage other-
wise provided was not in force and effect at the time
of said fire.
The record discloses the following cardinal facts:
The property in question was purchased by Johness
Realty Company, Inc. in August 1956. Insurance cov-
erage was placed on the building, together with the
contents thereof, with the Merchants Fire Assurance
Corporation agency, Katherine E. Jordy, a local agent
in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. The record disclosed that
the policies of insurance upon which the suit is based
were renewal policies. The property in question which
was insured was a restaurant and bar. Some twenty,
to fifty, to seventy-five feet away was located the keep-
er’s cottage which was also owned by the Johness Realty
Company, Inc. and was located on the same lot of land.
The building was fully equipped to be operated as a
restaurant for the purpose of serving food and was not
equipped for lodging of any type. The record does not
indicate that it was or had ever been used as a lodging.
The Johness Realty Company was operated by Mr.
Allen Johness who testified that one, Mr. Stanley Carvin,
was employed by the Johness Realty Company first at

a fixed salary of $100 for some period of time and,
subsequently, without a salary. Mr. Carvin occupied
the cottage which was situated in close proximity to
the restaurant or bar. At the time of the fire, Mr. Car-
vin was not a paid employee of appellee, receiving no
monetary consideration, but he was given free rent and
the use of the cottage. He had control of the grounds and.
the pier in front of the restaurant and bar, and he had
complete custody and control over the restaurant and
bar in that he was in charge of the keys, and he had
use of the grounds and the pier in front of the restau-
rant. The record discloses that at times he had stored
his rod and reel in the restaurant, and that he had
worked on fishing tackle therein when the weather was
bad; he had use of the pier for the purpose of renting
his boat, selling bait, and doing commercial business in
renting fishing tackle and related lines. The cottage in
which Mr. Carvin lived was not destroyed or injured
in the fire. The appellee placed two witnesses on the
stand, one was Mr. Allen Johness and the other Mr.
Stanley Carvin. Both testified in substance to the noted
facts. .

In addition to renting the pier and the selling of
bait, and renting of skiffs, Mr. Carvin sometimes launch-
ed boats off the seawall in front of the restaurant and.
bar.

At the conclusion of the two witnesses’ testimony,
appellee rested his case and appellants made the motion
for a directed verdict for the insurance companies in-
volved assigning as reasons therefor — (1) the proof
adduced on behalf of the plaintiff failed to bring the
cause of action within the provisions of the policies
of insurance sued upon, and (2) the proof is inconclusive
to the fact that for more than sixty consecutive days
prior to the fire in question the building which burned
was vacant or unoccupied.

|

The lower court overruled the motion at which time
the appellants declined to plead further or to offer any
testimony; both sides rested their case. Sufficient and .
accurate instructions were given the jury, and no com-
plaint is made here of the instructions which were grant-
ed. The case was submitted to the jury which returned
a verdict for the appellee for the full amount of the
policies of $6,500.

After appellants’ motion for a judgment non obstante
veredicto, or, in the alternative, for a new trial had been
overruled by the trial court, this appeal was prosecuted.

The errors assigned by the appellants, in substance,
are as follows:

1. The trial court erred in failing to sustain the mo-
tion of the defendants below, appellants here, for a di-
rected verdict;

2. The trial court erred in failing to sustain the
motion of the appellant, defendants below, for a judg-
ment non obstante veredicto; and,

8. The court erred in failing to grant a new trial.

It is obvious that if the first error assigned, namely,
that the trial court erred in failing to sustain a motion
for a directed verdict is well-taken, then the other er-
rors are automatically disposed of for the reason that
the second and third errors assigned are each dependent
upon the validity of the first error.

The pertinent section of the insurance policy which
applies is as follows:

“. . . Unless otherwise provided in writing added

hereto this Company shall not be liable for loss oc-

curring.

(a) while the hazard is increased by any means

within the control or knowledge of the insured; or

(b) while a described building, whether intended for

occupancy by owner or tenant, is vacant or unoccupi-

ed beyond a period of sixty consecutive days; .. .’’

The basic question for consideration here is whether
‘or not the testimony offered by the appellee is suffici-
ent to establish the fact that the terms and restrictive
conditions of the policy did not preclude recovery for
the reason that the building was not vacant or unoccupi-
ed for a period of more than sixty days.

The first question therefore resolves itself into wheth-
er or not the acts of the caretaker were such as to con-
stitute use and occupancy of the building, restaurant
and bar. The record discloses that no business had
been operated in the building that burned for several
years prior to the fire. In addition, the record also
shows that it had not been occupied during that time
by anyone for any express purpose. As a matter of
fact, Mr. Johness testified that there was no way for
anyone to occupy it; that it was not large enough; that
it was not equipped with a bed or living quarters. The
nearest it came to being occupied as a building as such
was in May or June 1960 at which time some people
were going ‘‘to open up the place’? and made some
repairs at that time, but the record shows that they
never moved in or utilized it because they relinquished
their plans to open and operate the restaurant. This
occurred many months before the fire.

My. Carvin testified that the building was entirely
vacant and unoccupied during the full time since he
went upon the premises and for many months prior to
the fire except for the men who did the work on the
building in May or June of 1960, and except for oc-
casions when he went in there himself, or let someone
else go in.

This witness testified that he did not make a habit
of keeping his fishing gear in the restaurant, but oc-
casionally he did put a rod or reel in the building and
once in a while when the weather was bad he would go
in there and work on his fishing tackle upon the tables

519

which were in the building. He further stated that that
was the only reason that he had used the building.

The appellee asserts that the building was occupied
because of the fact that there were articles of furniture,
fixtures, and other equipment incidental and necessary
to the operation of a restaurant located in the building.
It is also urged that because the caretaker lived in a
separate house or cottage hard by the building and on
the premises that this too furnished the essential oc-
eupancy of the building in question.

The record fails to show when in time these instances
to which Mr. Carvin testified took place, and there is
no proof to show that any of these instances occurred
within the sixty days immediately preceding the fire
loss. Pro arguendo, we will assume that these instances
did take place within the 60-day period of time and,
therefore, we must next consider the fundamental ques-
tion, and that is: Did these acts on the part of Carvin,
under all of the circumstances, constitute such occup-
ancy of the building as would make the appellants liable
for the loss in spite of the conditions suspending or
restricting insurance coverage under the policy?

This Court has heretofore decided three or more cases
involving substantially this same question. The decisions
in these cases are controlling here in all essential re-
spects. Those cases are: Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank
of New Albany, 244 Miss. 788, 146 So. 2d 351 (1962);
Asher v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 240 Miss. 166, 126 So. 2d
255 (1961); and, Asher v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co.
of Pa., 239 Miss. 883, 125 So. 2d 824 (1961).

In Asher v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., supra, and
Asher v. Old Colony Ins. Co., supra, we dealt with the
exact question with which we are concerned here. In
both of these cases which pertain to fire loss, the house
that burned was not occupied and the policies of insur-’
ance covering these houses, just as in the case at bar,
excluded coverage when the described property was

vacant or unoccupied beyond the period of sixty con-
secutive days. In. both of these cases, the judgments
for the insurance companies were affirmed and, in the
Asher cases, the proof appears to be stronger in behalf
of the plaintiff than it is for appellee in the case at bar.

In Asher v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., supra, it was
shown that one witness and her husband who were ten-
ants on the property lived in another house other than
the one that burned. The witness, Easter Combs, tes-
tified that there was a bed in the house; that there were
also some quilts, a couple of trunks, and other items,
but that nobody had lived in the house for several years.

In the second case, Asher v. Old Colony Ins. Co.,
supra, plaintiff’s attorneys attempted to have the chan-
cery court reopen the cause to permit the husband of
Haster Combs, one Johnny Combs, to testify to certain
personal property he had kept stored in the house and
that he and his wife had spent at least two nights there
during the 60-day period immediately before the fire;
that he was looking after the property as a caretaker
during the 60-day period; and, that he was entitled to
introduce certain documents which permitted the use
and care of the property by a caretaker. The chancery
court refused to permit this, and we pointed out that
the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in not per-
mitting a reopening of the case. We stated in that case
as follows:

“And especially in view of the fact that it appears
from the record that the testimony of this witness
would have been cumulative to that which the chan-
cellor had already heard from the wife of the witness,
who would naturally have known the same facts in
regard to their alleged occupancy of the house within
the 60 day period involved. Her testimony was un-
disputed and therefore did not need to be supple-
mented. We do not think that her testimony or the
testimony later set forth in the motion filed on No-

|

vember 5, 1959, proposed to be made by her husband

would have sustained the right of the appellant to a

recovery in this case under all the facts and circum-

stances. 240 Miss, at 175, 126 So. 2d at 256.

In that case it is apparent that there was testimony
that the house had actually been slept in for at least
two nights during the 60-day period immediately pre-
ceding the fire which would have been the same within
which the vacancy would have been applicable. In the
case at bar there is no positive testimony that anyone
had slept in the building or had lived in the building,
or had utilized the building equipped and furnished for
use as a restaurant and bar in any manner except in
the very limited degree and on the few occasions testi-
fied to by Carvin. As to when or on what dates this
sporadic use took place, the record is silent. Repairs
which were made could have been made many months
before the 60-day period of time because the record
does not disclose when they were made, but the record
does indicate that the building had not been occupied
and had been vacant for more than the 60-day period
of time.

In the Asher cases, supra, there was evidence leading
to an application for a vacancy permit which had been
requested, but the request was made subsequent to the
time of the fire. Asher also inquired of the insurance
company’s agent, a year or more before the policy was
written, with reference to a necessity for'a vacancy
permit on some Jackson property, and was advised that
such a permit was not required. The chancellor held
in the case of Asher v. Old Colony Ins. Co., supra, that
he was unable to see how appellant could have been
misled by that conversation to believe that a vacancy
permit would not be needed on the property which was
subsequently burned. In the case at bar, there is no
intimation that a vacancy permit was ever considered

>

and, finally, there is no proof that anyone could have
influenced or misled appellee in this regard.

While both briefs in this case are well prepared, the
appellee’s brief, based upon the forthright and sincere
testimony, presents a searching, thorough digest of re-
lated authorities. Appellee, in the alternative, urges
that the appellants knew through their agent, who, in
turn, must have known, that the building was unoccupi-
ed and therefore there was a waiver on the part of the
insurance company of the vacancy and wnoccupancy
clauses. This was held to be true in the Travelers case,
supra, but it is not true in this instance.

In Aetna Ins. Co. v. Lester, 170 Miss. 353, 154 So.
706 (1934), we pointed out that the evidence was suf-
ficient to have warranted the jury’s finding for the
plaintiffs. We held that where one was entrusted by
the insurer with delivery of a policy written by its agent
and delivered with knowledge that the insured property
was vacant, and who had agreed to keep the property
insured, which was relied on by the plaintiff, the in-
surance company could not escape liability in spite of
the fact that the property was vacant. The insurance
company was bound by the acts of the agent whose
knowledge and statement at the time of delivery showed
that he knew that the building was vacant and unoc-
eupied.

The cases cited in the Lester case, supra, clearly out-
line our decisions with reference to knowledge on the
part of an agent imputable to the master-insurer.

There is nothing in the policy to justify the conclusion
that since the cottage was occupied that that occupancy
would spread to or include occupancy and use of the
restaurant and bar. The terms and conditions of the
policy of insurance pertaining to the described building
are clear and unambiguous. The decisions of this Court
are also clear and distinct. We find nothing in the rec-
ord which would take this case from out the rule of

—

law which has been announced in the cases cited above.

Though at times tempting, interlineal interpretation,
which is beyond review, is taboo. We are confined strict-
ly to the record. The proof as disclosed by the record
is insufficient to establish that the appellants knew
through their agent that the building in question was
vacant at the time the policies were issued, or that i
was vacant or unoccupied at the time of the fire. It
follows, therefore, that the lower court committed fatal
error in not granting the appellants the directed verdict,
but, instead, submitted to the jury a determination of
this question of law. It follows also that having com-
mitted this error, the trial court should have grante
the appellants a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
of the jury. In failing to do this and to grant appellants
a new trial, the trial court erred.

HN WE The burden was upon the plaintiff to prove
his case by a preponderance of the evidence and this
prerequisite appellee’s proof failed to do. The recor
failed to show that the vacancy and unoceupancy of
the property was known to the agent and, therefore,
was not imputable to his master, the insurer. This
being true, there could not be any waiver on the par
of the insurer-appellants. It follows, therefore, that this
cause must be and hereby is reversed and judgment
entered for appellants.

Reversed and judgment for appellants.

Gillespie, P. J., and Rodgers, Inzer and Smith, JJ.,

concur.

Lacaze v. Sate
No, 43811 February 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 176

52:

|
es

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Brapy, Tom P., J.

This is an appeal from the Cireuit Court of the First
District of Hinds County, Mississippi, wherein the ap-
pellant was tried and convicted under Mississippi Code
Annotated section 2044 (1956) for the possession of
burglar’s tools, and sentenced to serve five years in the
State Penitentiary.

526

The essential facts in this case are briefly as follows:
McDowell Road runs east and west in southwest Jackson.
It is intersected by Dale’s Lane which runs north and
south. On the north side of McDowell Road, there is
a shopping center known as Appleridge Shopping Cen-
ter. On the south side of McDowell Road there is a
row of offices and stores, part on McDowell Road and
part on Dale’s Lane, to the south, around the corner.
At the south end of the southwest corner of the block
in which these stores and offices are located on Dale’s
Lane is a weed patch in an undeveloped area, and a
gravel road extends east.

At approximately 1:40 A. M. on Sunday, September
28, 1964, city policemen, Officers Bailey and Boggan,
were patrolling this area in their police car. Proceed-
ing west on McDowell Road, they turned into the Apple-
ridge Shopping Center, with their lights off, and made
a tour around the buildings, checking the doors. When
they came from behind the buildings at the southwest
corner of the shopping center, they looked in a south-
easterly direction across McDowell Road toward the
buildings located on the south side thereof, where they
saw two men 282 feet away, walking westwardly about
ten feet apart, in front of Holloman’s Drugstore, which
is located on the south side of McDowell Road facing
north, toward Appleridge Shopping Center. The police
officers proceeded across the parking lot of Appleridge
Shopping Center in their automobile at approximately
five miles per hour, gradually increasing their speed up
to fifteen or twenty miles per hour. Just before crossing
the parking lot to McDowell Road, they were forced to
wait for a car to pass.

As the officers approached the two men, they started
walking toward Dale’s Lane and turned and proceeded
south on Dale’s Lane. The closer the car approached
the two men, the faster the men walked. Rookie Officer
Robert Bailey drove his car between the two men, and

527

both officers jumped out of the car. Bailey caught Rich-
ard Goff, who was in front. The other man ran around
the corner into the high weeds, in spite of the fact Of-
ficer Boggan had his shotgun in his hand and had pumped
it and commanded him to halt. He escaped and was
never seen again, though Officer Boggan went to the
edge of the weed patch and looked for him. Shortly
thereafter, a car came out from the gravel road in the
vicinity of the weed patch and Officer Boggan ran out
and pointed his shotgun at the occupant of the car and
ordered him to stop. The driver of the car, who is the
appellant here, got out on the driver’s side, on order
of Boggan, and walked down and stood beside the car.

Both men were brought around on the right side of
the police car. While Officer Boggan held the shotgun
on the two prisoners, Bailey went around the back of
the buildings and investigated and found that none of
the buildings had been forcibly entered. When Bailey
returned to where Lacaze and Goff were, Boggan gave
the shotgun to Bailey, who held it on the two men while
Boggan called for help from detectives. Both men stated
to the officers that they knew each other and had come
to Jackson together, but they said they did not know
the name of the man who got away. Upon being asked
by the officers what they were doing at the shopping
center, Goff replied that he was ‘‘looking for where a
girl lived.’”? Officer Bailey could identify only Goff as
one of the men whom he had seen in front of the drug-
store.

‘Within ten minutes, Detectives Sanders and Freeman
arrived. When they arrived they found the appellant
standing in front of his car or the police car and one
of the officers had him covered with a shotgun ‘‘at port
shoulder.’’ The record discloses that the detectives were
informed by the police officers as to what they had seen.
Based on what was told them by the officers, Detective
Fred Sanders placed the appellant under arrest. The

detective at this time was
Detective Sanders testified
what the policemen had tol
pellant under arrest for im

pellant testified that he as!
the lights of his car so as
and this he was permitted
of the car were obtained

standing in front of his car.
that all he had to go on was
d him and that he placed ap-
vestigation of burglary. Ap-
ked for permission to cut off
not to run the battery down,
to do. The keys to the trunk
by the detectives, the trunk

was opened, and a search was made by them. Detective
Sanders assisted in unloading the trunk of the car, in

which the detectives found
used by doctors, and an a
small tool box in the back i

There was also a blue suit
cutting torches and gauges

an oxygen tank, such as is
cetylene torch. There was a
nm which there were wrenches.
case which contained a tube,
for the tanks. None of this

was hooked up for use or connected. Also in the car

were a wrecking bar, a key!

hole saw, a five pound sledge

or wrecking hammer and a jack, tools, wrenches, pliers,
one pair brown cloth gloves, one roll of rubber tubing,

two fusees such as are plac

ed beside stalled or wrecked

automobiles at night to warn travelers using the high-
way, and other small items.

The record discloses that the appellant was detaine

subject to being arrested;

before the officers searched his automobile. The record
shows that on cross-examination Detective Sanders firs’
stated that he arrested the

of burglary. Subsequently

burglary. The proof reveals that ultimately the appellant

was indicted for possession

The cross-examination of Detective Sanders discloses

the following:

Q. You detained him subject to being arrested. An

what you based your ar:
in the back of his car.

that appellant was arrested

appellant for investigation
he said he arrested him for

of burglar’s tools.

rest on was what you foun

A. No, sir. The man was already under arrest, as
- I said, Mr. Shelton, before that. I arrested the man

ad —

before we searched his automobile. I told him — I
pointed to him and Mr. Goff, that they was under
arrest.

Q. Yes, sir, but you had no charge to arrest him on,
did you? .

A. Under the circumstances, yes, sir.

Q. What?

A. The circumstances prevailing in the case there as
shown by Officer Bailey.

Q. You were holding him but you had made no ar-
rest. You were holding him for a charge. Is that true?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. You detained him there until you could determine
what had happened.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when you found these tools you charged him
with possession of burglary tools.

A. Yes, sir.

The cross-examination of Police Officer Robert Bailey
discloses the following facts:

Q. All right. Now, at the time Officer Boggan in
your presence stopped the Defendant with this sawed
off shotgun, what crime or misdemeanor, if any, had
the Defendant committed?

A. He hadn’t committed any at the time then.

Q. He hadn’t committed any?

A. No, sir.

Q. All right, sir. Well, did he commit any at any
time in your presence?

A. Well, he was — we found possession of burglary
tools on him, in his car.

Q. I am trying to direct you, though, Officer... .
A. Yes, sir.

Q. To the time when you stopped him. When you
stopped him, did you have any reasonable grounds
to believe that he was committing a crime or a mis-
demeanor?

A. Well, it is very suspicious of a car coming out
at that time of morning when we had seen the other
two and just as soon as Office (sic) Boggan stopped
him Goff stated he did know him.
Q. Insofar as you know at that time can you tell the
jury what offense, if any, that this Defendant had
committed to cause you to stop him?
A. Well, he was just a suspicious character. I mean,
a suspicious car... .
Q. You didn’t have any specific charge at that time
against him?
A. No, sir.
There is only one controlling issue in the case at bar,
and that is: Did the arresting policemen, Bailey and
Boggan, have reasonable grounds upon which to arrest
the appellant? It is to be noted that this appellant was
arrested, not because of any misdemeanor or felony
committed or about to be committed in the presence of
the arresting officer, Detective Sanders, but, solely on
information which had been given to him by the police-
men, Bailey and Boggan. Officers Bailey and Boggan
could not and did not testify that they had ever seen
the appellant with Goff or the other man who was in
front of Holloman’s Drugstore.
HEEB The record does not disclose that the appellant
ever ran away from the police officers. The proof wholly
fails to disclose, except subsequent to the arrest and
incarceration and during the trial of this appellant, that
he was with Richard Goff. It is clear therefore that
the probable cause which the state urges that the detec-
tive had when arresting the appellant amounted to no-
thing more than suspicion, and that this suspicion was
not based upon what was done in the presence of the
arresting officer, but what the arresting officer was ad-
vised had taken place. There was no overt act on the
part of the appellant which could furnish the detective

i _

with probable cause to arrest him until after they had
searched appellant’s automobile.

The basis upon which the officers arrested appellant
was that ‘‘at approximately 1:35 or 1:40 in the morning
aman didn’t have any business being in there where he
was.’’

We pointed out in Lewis v. State, 198 Miss. 767, 23
So. 2d 401 (1945), as follows:

The arrest of Mattie Lee Lewis was illegal for the

reason that the sheriff had no warrant therefor and

she had not committed any crime in his presence,
consequently the search of her person, by means of
which the key to the room containing the whiskey was
found, was illegal and therefore the evidence obtained
thereby should have been excluded... . (198 Miss. at

774-75, 23 So. 2d at 402.)

HEEB In Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So. 2d 593
(1947), when considering Mississippi Constitution sec-
tion 23, we said, ‘‘we must bear in mind that provisions
for search and seizure are construed strictly against the
State... .’? (202 Miss. at 76, 30 So. 2d at 597.)

This wise and ancient rule of law has been reaffirmed
many times by the decisions of this Court. See Elardo
v. State, 164 Miss. 628, 145 So. 615 (1933); Fletcher
v. State, 159 Miss. 41, 181 So. 251 (1930) ; Bird v. State,
154 Miss. 493, 122 So. 539 (1929); Burnside v. State,
144 Miss. 405, 110 So. 121 (1926).

It is unnecessary for us to consider if error was com-
mitted by the admission in evidence of a prize bar and
a pair of gloves, which were found some two hours
subsequent to appellant’s arrest, in the weed patch
through which one of the two men had fled. Neither
is it necessary for us to determine whether error was
committed in permitting detailed questioning of appel-
lant’s past convictions. °

WH Realizing that this appellant has a criminal
record, and that his testimony lacks the ring of sincerity,

532

nevertheless we cannot find from the proof in this case
that the officers had probable cause to believe that a
burglary had been committed or was about to be com-
mitted when they stopped the appellant as he slowly
drove his car down Dale’s Lane, removed him from his
car, and subsequently arrested him. It follows, there-
fore, that the search of the automobile without a search
warrant was illegal and in derogation of appellant’s con-
stitutional rights, as guaranteed by Mississippi Constitu-
tion article 3, sections 14 and 23. See One 1948 Pontiac
Automobile v. State, 221 Miss. 352, 72 So. 2d 692 (1954) ;
Gause v. State, 203 Miss. 877, 34 So. 2d 729 (1948) ;
Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So. 2d 593 (1947) ; Ful-
ton v. City of Philadelphia, 168 Miss. 30, 148 So. 346
(1933); Sellers v. Lofton, 149 Miss. 849, 116 So. 104
(1928).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the cir-
cuit court is reversed and the appellant is discharged.

Reversed and appellant discharged.

Gillespie, P. J., and Rodgers, Inzer and Smith, JJ.,
coneur. ° .

Gururin, et ux. v. ;
Tur Meromants Narionan Bawx or Mose

No. 43675 November 22, 1965 180 So. 2d 309

Lee B, Agnew, Jackson, for appellants.

535

Pat H. Scanlon, Young & Young, Jackson, for appellee.

Bravy, Tom P., J.

Two causes of action, Cause No. 39,328 against ap-
pellants, Ralph K. Guthrie and wife, Mrs. Ralph K.
Guthrie, and Cause No. 39,322 against appellant Ralph
K. Guthrie, were instituted by The Merchants National
Bank of Mobile, appellee, for deficiencies on promissory
notes executed by appellants. The two cases were con-
solidated for trial purposes and the jury rendered a
verdict in the County Court of the First Judicial District
of Hinds County, Mississippi, for appellee. The First
Cireuit Court District of Hinds County affirmed the
judgments of the county court, from which appellants
prosecute this appeal.

Stated tersely, the basic facts are as follows:

During the month of July 1958, appellants, Mr. and
Mrs. Ralph Guthrie, moved to Mobile, Alabama. They
proceeded to borrow from The Merchants National Bank
of Mobile, for brevity hereinafter designated as MNB,
the sum of $400 to help defray their moving expenses.
Several payments were made on this note.

536

On December 22, 1958, the appellants negotiated anoth-
er loan from MNB in the sum of $468, executing therefor
their promissory note payable in twelve monthly in-
stallments of $39 each, said payments beginning on
January 16, 1959. From this December 1958 loan, $299
was used to pay the balance of the July 1958 note, $147.12
went to the appellants, and the bank received $24.88
for interest.

Mr. and Mrs. Guthrie made payments on the $468
note of December 22, 1958 until August 7, 1959, at which
time they defaulted in the payments, leaving a delinquent
balance of $273 due and owing. Cause No. 39,328 was
instituted in the County Court of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County on May 21, 1964.

The record discloses that on May 15, 1959, Ralph K.
Guthrie, in order to purchase certain photographic equip-
ment from Calagaz Photo Supply, Inc., borrowed $864
from MNB, executing therefor a promissory note pay-
able in twelve monthly installments of $72 each, beginning
June 10, 1959. The appellant, Ralph K. Guthrie, secured
his note by executing a chattel mortgage to appellee on
the same date covering the photographic equipment pur-
chased by Mr. Guthrie with the money borrowed. The
bank, at the time, deducted its interest and recording fees
from the loan and, after doing so, issued a check to Mr.
Guthrie and Calagaz Photo Supply, Inc., for $800.52.
No part of the May 15, 1959 loan was applied in payment
of the December 22, 1958 note executed by Mr. and Mrs.
Ralph Guthrie. Since the December 22, 1958 note had
not been paid, the appellee bank retained possession of
the note and did not return it to the appellants.

The record discloses that appellant Ralph K. Guthrie
made one payment only on the May 15, 1959 note. This
was a payment in the sum of $72, which was made on
August 11, 1959, leaving a balance on the note of $792.

The record discloses that appellant Ralph K. Guthrie
took a large part of the equipment covered by the chattel

537

mortgage and pawned it with three pawn shops in Mo-
bile, receiving therefor only $285.50. Some of the equip-
ment was pawned on August 7, 1959, for which appellant
Guthrie received $187.50. Being contacted repeatedly by
the bank, Mr. Guthrie delivered voluntarily to the bank
the four pawn tickets totaling $285.50 which he had re-
ceived from pawning the mortgaged property.

On March 7, 1960, not having recorded the chattel
mortgage, MNB issued its checks to the three pawn shops,
totaling the sum of $285.50, and received the property
which appellant Guthrie had pawned. Appellant Guthrie
voluntarily released the remainder of the property which
was covered by the chattel mortgage he had executed.

Appellant Guthrie contended that the bank released
him from all remaining indebtedness when he voluntarily
relinquished to appellee the balance of the property which
he had in his possession. He admitted on cross-exami-
nation that he was unable to fully pay the notes; that
he made only one payment on the May 15, 1959 note.

In December 1959 appellant Guthrie filed a Wage
Earner Plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 United States Code sections 1001-1086 (1938), as
amended, and MNB perforce postponed at that time any
legal action under its chattel mortgage pending the bank-
ruptey proceeding. When appellant failed to comply with
the requirements under the Wage Harner Plan and his
petition was dismissed in September 1960 for noncom-
pliance therewith, appellee was unable to locate either
of the appellants, as they had moved from Mobile to
some unknown destination.

Ultimately in the spring of 1964, appellee received
information which disclosed that appellants were resid-
ing in Jackson, Mississippi, and immediately employed
counsel to institute suit.

On May 21, 1964, Cause No. 39,328 was filed against
appellants for the sum of $273 on the December 22, 1958
note, plus interest and reasonable attorneys’ fees. At

the trial appellee proved that interest from the maturity
date of the note, January 1960, until August 16, 1964,
at date of trial, amounted to $100, and that reasonable
attorneys’ fees for collection of the promissory note
amounted to $99.25. Appellee sought recovery in the
amount of $466.35, for which sum the jury returned
its verdict.

On May 20, 1964, appellee instituted Cause No. 39,322
against appellant Ralph K. Guthrie in the County Court
of the First Judicial District of Hinds County for $369.06,
representing the balance due on the promissory note,
plus interest from its maturity date, May 10, 1960, to
August 10, 1964, in the amount of $125.48, and reasonable
attorneys’ fees in the sum of $117.24. Appellee demanded.
judgment in the sum of $612.78, and the jury returned
a verdict for exactly this amount.

The appellants appealed both judgments to the Cir-
cuit Court of Hinds County, where they were affirmed,
and from these judgments appellants prosecute this ap-
peal.

The dominant issues in the trials below and in the
record here are questions of fact, and these issues will
be dealt with in this opinion as they appear in the as-
signment of errors urged by appellants. The major
error urged by appellants is that the trial court erred
in overruling appellants’ motion to disallow any testi-
mony by appellee in denial or avoidance of the special
matter set forth in the answer of appellee, for the reason
that appellee did not file a written replication to appel-
lants’ answer which set up affirmative defenses, which
replication the appellee was required by law to file.

This error is based upon Mississippi Code Annotated
section 1475.5 (4) (1956) which, in substance, provides
that when affirmative matters have been set up in the
answer of the defendant, the plaintiff shall ‘‘file a
written statement of any special matter which he intends
to give in evidence in denial or avoidance of such special.

539

matters so given in the answer by the defendant, and
to which it would have been necessary heretofore to
reply specially had the defendant’s defense been specially
pleaded .

This statute has been considered by this Court and
has been reported in the case of Burns v. Clarksdale
Prod. Credit Ass’n, 189 Miss. 34, 195 So. 588 (1940).
In that case Burns brought a suit to recover a sum of
money allegedly due him as a farmer under the cotton
price adjustment plant. Burns’ subsidy check from the
United States Goverment had been sent to the appellee
credit association to apply on loans made by it to Burns.
In its answer the credit association alleged two affirma-
tive defenses: (1) Burns had violated the terms of the
deed of trust with the credit association; (2) Burns had
abandoned the crop, and the credit union, as a successor
in interest, became entitled to the subsidy check. Plain-
tiff Burns filed no written answer to these affirmative
defenses. In deciding that a replication was unnecessary,
we stated:

* Appellant, as plaintiff in the court below, filed no

replication to these notices, nor was he required to

do so under section 536 of ‘the Code of 1930, insofar
as his answer thereto may have consisted of a mere

denial of the facts alleged therein. (189 Miss. at 41;

195 So. at 590.)
The language of Mississippi Code Annotated section
1475.5 (4) (1956) concerning replications is substantially
the same as that contained in Mississippi Code section
536 (1930).

‘We again construed the statutes in Motors Ins. Corp.
v. Lenoir, 218 Miss. 348, 67 So. 2d 381 (1953). In that
case the insurance company issued a policy of insurance
to Lenoir to protect him against loss of a certain truck
by fire. Later the truck burned, and Lenoir brought a
suit against the insurance company to collect on the
policy of insurance. In its answer the insurance company

540

set up, by way of defense and as affirmative matter and
avoidance, that Lenoir had procured the blasting with
dynamite and burning of the truck for the fraudulent
purpose of collecting the insurance proceeds. The plain-
tiff filed no written statement of any special matter
which he intended to give in evidence in denial or avoid-
ance of the affirmative matter set forth in the defend- !
ant’s answer. In considering whether or not a written
replication should have been filed, this Court stated:
The appellant’s contention that the court erred in re-
fusing to grant its request for a peremptory instruc-
tion is based principally upon the failure of the ap-
pellee to file any written replication to the amended
answer of appellant which set up by way of defense
and as affirmative matter in avoidance that the ap-
pellee procured the burning and destruction of the
truck for the fraudulent purpose of collecting the in-
surance thereon. It is the contention of appellant that
since no written replication was filed, no proof by
the appellee in denial and avoidance of the special
matter set wp in the amended answer was admissible,
and that, therefore, the affirmative matter set up in
the amended answer stands admitted. There are two
answers to the appellant’s contention. In the first
place, no proof of any special matter in denial and
avoidance of the affirmative matter was offered by
the appellee. He simply denied the special matter
alleged in the amended answer. He did not seek to
set up any special matter in denial and avoidance of
the affirmative defense set up in the amended answer.
He was not required to file any written replication
to the appellant’s amended answer in so far as his
answer thereto consisted of a mere denial of the facts
alleged therein. Chapter 230, Laws of 1948; Burns
v. Clarksdale Production Credit Ass’n, 189 Miss. 34,
195 So. 588. In the second place, the appellant elicited
from the appellee on cross-examination his denial of

54

the facts alleged in the amended answer. We think,

therefore, that the court committed no error in de-

nying appellant’s request for a peremptory instruc-

tion. (218 Miss. at 853-54; 67 So. 2d at 383-84.)

Considering the two causes, we find that in Cause
No. 39,328 against appellants based on the December
22, 1958 note, the only affirmative defense of appellants
was contained in paragraph IV of their answer. This
affirmative defense was that on or about June 10 ap-
pellant Ralph Guthrie made a new loan which included
the outstanding balance of the December 1958 note. It
is obvious that if an answer had been required to the
affirmative defense, the only answer appellee could have
given would have been a general denial of the allega-
tions. The appellee did not have any special matter it
intended to give in avoidance of this defense.

HEEB Appellant Guthrie testified that the second note
was used to pay the first note, while appellee’s proof
showed that no part of the May 1959 note was used to
pay the December 1958 note, and that appellants made
a payment on the December 22, 1958 note on August
7, 1959, about three months after they say it was can-
celed by the execution of the May 1959 note. It is ap-
parent, therefore, that appellee’s proof concerning the
affirmative defense in Cause No. 39,328 against appel-
lants on the December 22, 1958 note consisted merely
of a denial. A jury question was thus presented and
the jury, by returning a verdict for the exact amount
sought, including interest and attorneys’ fees, determin-
ed all issues in favor of the appellee.

In cause No. 39,322 against Ralph K. Guthrie alone,
we find that the appellant urged two factual defenses.
One is that, at the time the appellant surrendered the
pawn tickets and the remaining unpawned security, an
agent of appellee released him from all further liability
under the note. The other is that the appellee did not
deal with the security under the mortgage in an equi-

542

table manner, and sold it for less than its reasonable
value.

HEE No replication to these factual defenses of the
appellant was necessary since all the appellee could
plead would be a mere denial. On these two factual
issues, when properly submitted, the jury found for the
appellee.

The crux of this case is the final defense urged by
appellant, namely, that the indebtedness due by him
was barred by Mississippi Code Annotated section 720
(1956), This issue is again urged by this appellant in
his assignment that the court erred in not sustaining
appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, and also in
refusing to grant to appellant his instruction No. 5,
which is as follows:

The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that a
deficiency after a sale of collateral must be sued upon
within one year or will be barred by law. If you be-
lieve from the evidence that the security in the note
from Ralph Guthrie was repossessed and sold and that
more than one year passed from the sale of such
security before the filing of the suit herein then it is
your duty to find for the defendant, Ralph Guthrie.

Mississippi Code Annotated section 720 (1956) pro-
vides in part as follows:

In all cases, foreclosure of any deed of trust, mort-
gage, vendor’s lien, or other instrument, no suit or
action shall hereafter be commenced or brought upon
any installment note, or series of notes of three or
more, whether due or not, where said note or notes
are secured by mortgage, deed of trust, or otherwise,
upon any property, real or personal, unless the same
is commenced or brought within one year from the
date of the foreclosure or sale of the property pledged
as security for said note or notes.

Appellee urges in its brief, as was done in the oral
argument before this Court, that lex loci contractus con-

543

trols in the case at bar. This is an affirmative defense
and should have been specially pleaded by the appellee.
MME As a general rule, no answer is required to the
pleading of a special statute of limitations. Anderson
v. Laurel Oil & Fertilizer Co., 228 Miss. 95, 87 So. 2d
556 (1956). HIE In addition, the contention that the stat-
ute of limitations was tolled by virtue of Mississippi Code
Annotated section 740 (1956) is also special matter in
denial or avoidance and likewise should have been plead-
ed explicitly by the appellee in answer to appellant’s
defense.
HEE MM While it is true the contract was executed in
Alabama by residents of the State of Alabama, in which
state the property was located, nevertheless the rule,
long established in this state, is that lew fori controls, and
not lea loci contractus. The case of Wright v. Mordaunt,
77 Miss. 587, 27 So. 640 (1899), uncited in briefs of
counsel, has application in the case at bar. In that case
we held as follows:
The promissory note sued on was executed in Illinois,
payable in Illinois, and both parties resided in that
state at the time of its execution and maturity. Its
date is July 1, 1892, and it matured September 4,
1892. The law of Illinois does not bar actions on
promissory notes until ten years have elapsed after
maturity. In the spring of 1898 the maker, Mordaunt,
took up his residence in Mississippi, and, on June 6,
1899, he was sued on the note by the payee, Wright,
and pleaded the six years statute of limitations, and,
his demurrer to Wright’s replication setting up the
above facts being sustained, Wright appeals. (77 Miss.
at 538-39; 27 So. at 640.)
It was pointed out in that case that:
The note was barred when the action was begun. The
lew fort governs, and the law of this forum is that six
years bar an action on a promissory note, and more
than six years elapsed after the maturity of this note.

The fact that this period expired in part before the
maker became a citizen of this state makes no dif-
ference. It is the lapse of time, regardless of place,
which bars in such cases as this. Sec. 2737, code, makes
six years a bar. No statute, in a case like this, makes
any exception to deprive defendant of the right to

invoke the lapse of time as a bar. (77 Miss. at 539;

27 So. at 640.)

In Fisher v. Burk, 123 Miss. 781, 86 So. 300 (1920),
the case of Wright v. Mordaunt, supra, was cited as
being precisely in point, the only difference being that
in the former case the defendants never came into Mis-
sissippi for the purpose of residence. In that case we
pointed out that prior to the Wright case we had held
that lexi fort governed, citing Fears v. Sykes, 35 Miss.
(6 George) 633 (1858), and Hamilton v. Cooper, 1 Miss.
(Walker) 542 (1832).

Appellee in substance urges that the statute of limi-
tations was tolled by appellant’s seeking relief under
the Wage Earner Plan of Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 United States Code sections 1001-1086 (1938),
as amended, and by his leaving the State of Alabama
and his whereabouts being unknown to appellee until
May 1964, when appellee discovered he was in Missis-
sippi and promptly instituted suit.

It is obvious that the cause of action in the case at
bar accrued in Alabama when the foreclouse took place
or when the property was sold on April 11, 1960. See
Southern Wholesalers, Inc. v. Stennis Drug Co., 214 Miss.
461, 59 So. 2d 78 (1952) ; 92 CJS. Venue sec. 10 (1955),
and cases cited therein at page 682.

MN HM Under the provisions of Mississippi Code An-
notated section 720 (1956), which controls, an action for
the balance due under the note had to be brought in
Mississippi within one year from the date of sale of
the security given under the chattel mortgage. Appellee
did not institute suit until May 20, 1964, almost four

years subsequent to the date of sale of the security, and
the action was therefore barred by the provisions of
section 720. Assuming, arguendo, that appellant’s pe-
tition under the Wage Harner Plan of Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptey Act, supra, did toll the statute of limi-
tations, (I)t is of no avail to the appellee because ap-
pellant’s discharge took place over three years before
appellee instituted suit.

HEE Mississippi Code Annotated section 740 (1956)
has no application. The statute of limitations was not
tolled during the absence of the appellants from Alaba-
ma for the four year period of time when they were
found in Mississippi.

In C & L Rural Blec. Co-op. Corp. v. Kincade, 175 F.
Supp. 223 (N. D. Miss. 1959), it is pointed out that this
Court has held that section 740 applies only to causes
of action that have accrued in Mississippi, citing U. S. F.
& G. Co. v. Ransom, 192 Miss. 286, 5 So. 24 238 (1941) ;
Fisher v. Burk, supra; Wright v. Mordaunt, swpra; Le
Mieux Bros. Corp. v. Armstrong, 91 F. 2d 445 (5th Cir.
1937).

It was also pointed out in that suit that, in an action
on a contract, the statute of limitations of the state
where the suit is brought governs. The suit at bar
was brought in this state and its laws govern and control.
There was no absence from this state, and more than
a year had elapsed since the cause of action accrued;
thus the suit was barred by Mississippi’s one year limi-
tation, section 720, and appellant’s fifth instruction
should have been granted. If this be an austere rule that
is wanting in justice, then section 720 presents a problem
for legislative consideration and correction. It is beyond
the cable tow of judicial remedy.

We therefore reverse the judgment in Cause No. 39,322
against appellant Ralph K. Guthrie, and enter judgment
here for him. This case is affirmed as to Cause No.
39,828.

546

Affirmed as to Cause No. 39,328, but reversed and
judgment entered here for appellant as to Cause No.
39,322.

Ethridge, P. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Inger, JJ.,
concur.

Wiuxerson v. Ranpauy, et al.
No. 43700 November 22, 1965 180 So. 2d 303

Prewitt, Bullard & Braddock, Vicksburg, for appellant.

Dent, Ward, Martin & Terry, Vicksburg, for appel-
lees, Josh McMurray and United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Company.

55.

fa

Dent, Ward, Martin & Terry, Vicksburg, for appel-
lees, L. A. Randall and Mississippi Loan Corporation
of Vicksburg.

Roveers, J.

This is a damage suit against a justice of the peace,
his official bondsmen and the plaintiffs in a lawsuit
filed in the justice of the peace court for compensatory
and punitive damages occasioned by the alleged wrong-
ful suing out of civil process.

The action originated in the Circuit Court of Warren
County, Mississippi, and resulted in a jury verdict against
Josh McMurray in the sum of $250, and against his
official bondsmen, the United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company, — called U. 8. F. & G. Co.—surety on his
official bond in the sum of $2,000, in favor of appellant,
Charles Wilkerson.

552

The plaintiffs in the justice court — Mississippi Loan
Corporation, and its agent, L. A. Randall — were re-
leased by the circuit court upon a motion for a directed
verdict. After the verdict was reduced to a judgment,
a motion was made by appellant for a new trial, as
against all defendants. This motion was overruled.
Whereupon, Josh McMurray and his surety, U. 8. F. &
G. Co., made a motion to arrest and correct the judgment
upon the ground that the surety was liable for no more
than was due by the principal on the surety bond of
the justice of the peace. This motion was sustained by
the court and the judgment was changed so as to reduce
the surety liability to $250, the amount of the verdict
against the justice of the peace, Josh McMurray.

The evidence introduced in the trial reveals that
Charles Wilkerson was indebted to the Mississippi Loan
Corporation of Vicksburg, Mississippi, and that he was
in arrears in a payment due. L. A. Randall, an agent
of the Mississippi Loan Corporation, (hereinafter called
Loan Company), acting in the scope of his authority,
went to the justice of the peace Josh McMurray and
attempted to file a suit against appellant, by lodging
with the justice of the peace two ledger cards, and by
signing a blank open account affidavit form, as agent of
the Loan Company. A summons was issued January
8, 1964, returnable in four days, but it was never served.
The agent, L. A. Randall, then signed a blank form
suggestion of garnishment. Thereafter, on the 11th of
January 1964, a writ of garnishment was issued by the
justice of the peace and served upon appellant’s em-
ployer, the Magnolia Mobile Homes Manufacturing Com-
pany, on January 14, 1964, wherein it was shown that
the judgment had been entered against appellant for
$194.64, The Magnolia Homes Manufacturing Company
was directed to appear before the justice of the peace
court on January 24, 1964. Appellant’s employer notifi-
ed him that he would be discharged within twenty-four

553

hours unless he cleared up the garnishment. Appellant
called upon the justice of the peace, Josh McMurray.
The justice of the peace informed appellant that he
could not release the garnishment and advised him to
see the Loan Company. Appellant went to the Loan
Company and notified the manager that he would be
fired unless the garnishment was released. On January
15, 1964, appellant was fired by his employer, the Mag-
nolia Mobile Homes Manufacturing Company. On Janu-
ary 22, 1964, appellant again went to the justice of the
peace court, with an attorney, and the justice of the
peace was shown that no judgment had been obtained
against appellant, but the justice of the peace again
refused to release the garnishment. The justice of the
peace called L. A. Randall who came to the court and
finally, after having again called the Loan Company,
the justice of the peace released the garnishment, and
appellant obtained his wages from his employer. Ap-
pellant lost wages in the sum of $183.89 because he was
discharged and was unable to work from January 14,
1964, to January 22, 1964, and lost other benefits amount-
ing to the total sum of $407.29. Appellant testified that
during the time he was off from work he was financially
destitute and had to seek relief from the Salvation Army,
and was humiliated and embarrassed, and his reputation
was damaged, because of having been fired from a job
as the result of a garnishment issued by the justice of
the peace.

The appellant complains on appeal that the trial court
committed reversible error for the following reasons:
(1) the court erred in directing a verdict for L. A. Ran-
dall and Mississippi Loan Corporation; (2) the court
erred in changing the verdict of the jury and judgment
of the court; (3) appellant should have been granted
a new trial against all defendants; and (4) the amount
of the verdict was so inadequate as to require a new
trial.

554

The testimony shows that L. A. Randall was the as-
sistant manager of the Loan Company and as the agent
he filed many suits against persons indebted to the Loan
Company. He testified that ‘‘It was my job to take the
checks in. If they don’t repay or don’t — file suit in the
Justice of the Peace Court.’? The evidence shows the
agent L. A. Randall lodged two ledger sheets with the
justice of the peace and entered suit on an alleged open
account and signed a blank affidavit form to an open
account, and later he signed a suggestion of garnishment
at a time when he knew no judgment had been taken
against appellant. He said ‘‘I called Judge McMurray
on January 11th, 1964, and asked him if we had ob-
tained judgment on Mr. Wilkerson and he replied, yes,
we would have judgment on him on the 13th, which was
the following Monday. That’s the reason I signed it.’’

The writ of garnishment was issued on the 11th day
of January 1964 and served upon appellant’s employer
January 14, 1964, although appellant was never sum-
moned to court, and no judgment was taken against him.
After the garnishment was served, appellant’s employer
gave the appellant twenty-four hours to clear up the
garnishment of his wages. Appellant went to the justice
of the peace who referred him to the Loan Company.
He then went to the office of the Loan Company, and
upon the trial in the circuit court, the appellant testified
as follows: ‘Did you tell Mr. Thornton at that time
that you were going to lose your job unless you could
get that garnishment released? A. Yes, sir. Q. What
did he tell you? A. He told me that that was my hard
luck, that the best I could do was to find another source
to pay it off — to try to borrow the money — and he
would recommend the loan company.’’

I

HEB The first question then to be decided is whether
or not the court erred in directing the verdict for L. A.
Randall and the Mississippi Loan Corporation. This

555

Court has repeatedly reminded the trial courts of the
rule that upon a motion for a directed verdict, the evi-
dence must be taken more strongly in favor of the party
against whom the judgment is sought, and every ma-
terial fact shown by substantial evidence should be treat-
ed as proved in his favor. Associates Discount Corp.
v. McDade, 248 Miss. 270, 158 So. 2d 57 (1963).

The evidence shows that the agent of the Loan Com-
pany signed the suggestion of garnishment at a time
when he knew the judgment had not been entered against
appellant, and knew, or should have known by the use
of reasonable care, that such a use or process was void.
Nevertheless, after the process had been served and ap-
pellant’s wages impounded, the manager of the Loan
Company was requested to have the garnishment releas-
ed so that appellant would not lose his job, but he (Mr.
Thornton), the manager, refused to release the illegal
garnishment unless the indebtedness was paid in full
and advised appellant that it was just his ‘“‘hard luck’’.
The order sustaining the motion to release the Loan
Company and its agent is based upon the grounds that
the appellant did not prove conspiracy, and that the
agent of the Loan Company acted in good faith in filing
the suit. .

The brief of appellees, Mississippi Loan Corporation
of Vicksburg and L. A. Randall, contends that the evi-
dence fails to prove a cause of action against them for
malicious use and abuse of process. The declaration
states that it ‘‘was clearly improper and in gross vio-
lation of the Laws of the State of Mississippi and did
maliciously use and abuse the legal processes of this
Court by having process issued for your Plaintiff on
January 3, 1964, returnable to January 7, 1964’’, and
it is contended that the proof does not show a conspiracy
or the malicious use or abuse of process of the court.

HBB The answer to this proposition is that it is not
necessary to allege and prove malice in the procurement

556

of process, or that the process was maliciously sued out
as in malicious prosecution, it is only necessary to prove
that the process, after being properly sued out, was
maliciously misused or abused. The Virginia Supreme
Court in a well-reasoned opinion had this to say on this
point: “To sum up this branch of the discussion, if
process is wilfully used for a purpose not justified by
the law, it is an abuse for which an action will lie. The
abuse consists of the unlawful use. While it cannot be
wrong to do a lawful act in a lawful way, it is a wrong
to do a lawful act in an unlawful way. It is the unlawful
method by which the act is done that gives rise to the
action, and the intentional use of this method constitutes
malice in law. The malice need not be expressly charged;
but, if not, there must be an averment of facts from
which the law implies the malice.’’ Glidewell v. Murry-
Lacy & Co., 124 Va. 563, 98 S. E. 665 (1919), Annot.,
4A. L. R. 225, 229 (1919). MIME We may also point
out that the intention with which a party did an act may
be inferred from the evidence showing his subsequent
conduct. Tranchina v. Arcinas, 78 Cal. App. 2d 522, 178
P. 2d 65 (First Dist. Div. Two 1947).

In the instant case, however, the declaration expressly
sets out under paragraph six that the defendants, L. A.
Randall and the Loan Company — with full knowledge
that no judgment had been obtained against the appel-
lant — willfully, wantonly, maliciously and grossly neg-
ligent, presented a purported suggestion for writ of
garnishment in the court of the defendant Josh MeMur-
ray, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section
2783 (1956). Thus, it is seen that the declaration charges
acause of action against these appellees for the wrongful
suing out of a writ of garnishment under an express
statute requiring the officer to issue the writ.

The testimony shows beyond question that the garnish-
ment attaching the wages of appellant was wrongfully
sued out. There was no judgment on which to base the

5oT

garnishment, Mississippi Code Annotated section 2783
(1956). Ten days had not elapsed after the return of
the process upon which a judgment could have been rend-
ered. Miss. Code Anno. § 1825 (1956).

HME In 38 C. J. S. Garnishment section 310 (1943)
at page 607, it is said: ‘‘A garnishment is wrongful
where the grounds on which it is obtained do not in fact
exist, even though the person who secured the writ or
made the affidavit believed, or had reasonable cause to
believe, that the alleged facts were true. It is wrongful,
also, where the proceedings on which the property was
impounded were void, or the garnisher does not furnish
the required bond and affidavit. ...’? In the following
section 311, it is pointed out that ‘‘Eixcept in the case
of an action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process,
malice and want of probable cause are not essential
elements of an action for damages for wrongful garnish-
ment, although, as appears infra §313, they affect the
right to recover exemplary damages.’’ 38 0. J. S. 608,
609. It is then pointed out in section 313 c. that ‘‘Hixem-
plary or punitive damages are recoverable where the
garnishment was not only wrongful but also malicious
or vexatious; but they are not recoverable unless actual
damage is shown. The malice which will sustain an award
of such damages is actual malice, and not that which
is implied in law from a groundless act.’? 38 C. J. 8.
613. This rule is also applicable for the wrongful is-
suance of other process, such as an attachment and
execution when issued upon a void judgment. See 6
Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment § 615 (1963) ;
21 Am. Jur. Ewecutions § 646 (1939).

The appellee Loan Company and L. A. Randall next
argue that the action of the agent Randall was in good
faith, and for that reason they should not be held liable
for the acts of the agent in filling out a blank suggestion.
for the issuance of a garnishment, which caused the
appellant to lose his job. The issue as to whether or

558

not a defendant was acting in good faith is a question
of fact for the jury to determine. MMM It is true that
malice or willfulness in the abuse of process cannot be
inferred from a mere mistake, with the result that good
faith is the defense to the action. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse
of Process § 23 (1962). Nevertheless, good faith is a
question for the determination of the jury. Geophysical
Service, Inc. v. Thigpen, 233 Miss. 454, 102 So. 2d 423
(1958). MI Moreover ‘‘good faith’’ is not an absolute
defense to an action for damages resulting from a wrong-
ful garnishment. 38 C.J. S. Garnishment § 311 a. (1943).
HB However, good faith may be shown in defense of
a charge of malice. 38 0. J. S. Garmishment § 313 «.
(1943).

We pointed out in Davis v. Shemper, 210 Miss. 201,
49 So. 2d 258 (1950), suggestion of error 210 Miss. 201,
50 So. 2d 143 (1951), that one who causes a wrongful
attachment by garnishment of the bank account of anoth-
er is liable at least for nominal damages, although no
proof of actual damage was shown.

The Court of Appeals of Alabama in a suit for the.
issuance of a wrongful garnishment, after pointing out
the proof necessary to show the elements of a wrongful
garnishment quoted from Pounds v. Hamner, 57 Ala. 342,
346, (1876) as follows: ‘‘If either of those essential
facts be wanting, the garnishment is wrongful, and the
defendant is entitled to his action, and to a recovery
commensurate with the injury he has actually sustain-
ed.?? (22 Ala. App. 269, 270, 115 So. 74, 76 (Ct. App.
1927). The Court then pointed out that if the garnish-
ment were vexatious, a different rule would apply. (Wells
Co. v. Lane, 22 Ala. App. 269, 115 So. 76 (Ct. App.
1927). In that case exemplary damages might be re-
covered.

The motion in the trial court requesting a directed
verdict is based upon the ground that there was no con-
spiracy between the parties to maliciously and willfully

abuse the process of the justice court. This motion was
sustained. On appeal to this Court, the appellees again
contended that there was no conspiracy between the
parties in this case, and that the defendant Loan Com-
pany and its agent L. A. Randall acted without malice.
We are of the opinion, however, this contention is not
well-taken.

In the case of Jessup v. Reynolds, 208 Miss. 50, 43
So. 2d 753 (1949), the appellee filed a suit for an assault
and battery. The declaration charged that the defend-
ants ‘‘jointly conceived a violent dislike and hate of
plaintiff and conspired and set about to ambush her
physically at Gulfport, Mississippi, and in the plan and
execution thereof, as the officers and directors of their
corporate creature, the defendant corporation, they used
the monies, facilities, automobiles and agencies thereof
in assembling at said place, and did, in the nighttime,
on one of the principal streets of said city, violently
attack plaintiff and mercilessly struck and beat her; that
these acts were deliberate, wanton, and wilful, and were
planned by the group of defendants.’? On appeal to
this Court we held that the injury was caused by the
wrongful assault, and said: ‘‘Appellant’s first conten-
tion is that the declaration was based upon an alleged
conspiracy, and not upon assault and battery, that the
verdict was in favor of all the defendants except appel-
lant, that this necessarily means that the jury found
there was no conspiracy, and since it so found, no verdict
could be rendered against appellant alone. We do not
agree with the contention that the action is founded on
conspiracy and not upon assault and battery; the grava-
men of the whole complaint is assault and battery and
the charge of conspiracy is only incidental thereto; more-
over this is a civil action and not a criminal prosecution
for conspiracy, and the rule in criminal cases has no
application here.’’ 208 Miss. 55, 43 So. 2d 755.

GB The gravamen of the action in the instant case
now before the Court as against the defendant L. A.

560

Randall and the Loan Company is the injury caused
by the issuance of the void garnishment, and not a
criminal conspiracy. Moreover, the declaration states
a cause of action for the wrongful issuance of a garnish-
ment as against the Loan Company and L. A. Randall.
No objection can be raised that the form of the declara-
tion should have been different when it contains a state-
ment of facts constituting a cause of action. Miss. Code
Anno. § 1464 (1956).

HMM We hold therefore that the issue as to whether
the Loan Company and its agent L. A. Randall wrong-
fully caused the issuance of a garnishment which was
served upon the appellant’s employer, resulting in his
discharge, was a question for the jury, and should have
been submitted to it for its determination.

IL

HE HM We do not find it necessary to pass upon the
method used by the judge in correcting the verdict of
the jury so as to reduce the liability of the surety,
U.S. F.&G. Co., to that of the officer, principal on the
bond, because we have reached the conclusion that the
verdict of the jury fixing the officer’s damage at $250
and the damage against the surety at $2,000 obviously
indicates prejudice of the jury in favor of Josh MeMur-
ray, the justice of the peace. This observation becomes
more apparent when we recall that the appellant’s actual
damage resulting from the mistreatment by the officer
and those acting in concert with him amounted to more
than the verdict of the jury against the justice of the
peace. The verdict in this case is so inadequate as to
shock the enlightened conscience of this Court, and re-
quires a new trial as against the Justice of the Peace
Josh McMurray and the surety on his official bond, the
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company.

ld

Tit

HN We are of the opinion that the issues of malice
and punitive damages should have been submitted to
the jury against all of the defendants except the surety
company. MM We point out here that where punitive
damages are sought against the principal in a bond, the
verdict must necessarily show actual damages as dis-
tinguished from punitive damages. See Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Haves, 188 Miss. 872, 196 So. 518 (1940).

We said in Fowler Butane Gas Company v. Varner,
244 Miss. 130, 150, 141 So. 2d 226, 233 (1962) that: ‘‘The
kind of wrongs to which punitive damages are applicable
are those which, besides the violation of a right or the
actual damages sustained, import insult, fraud or op-
pression and not merely injuries but injuries inflicted
in the spirit of wanton disregard for the rights of others.
In order to warrant the recovery of punitive damages,
there must enter into the injury some element of ag-
gression or some coloring of insult, malice or gross
negligence, evincing ruthless disregard for the rights of
others, so as to take the case out of the ordinary rule.’’

The judgment against Josh McMurray and the United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company as to liability will
be affirmed; and the case is hereby remanded for a
new trial as against them for damages only. Appellant
will also be awarded a new trial as to the liability of
L. A. Randall and Mississippi Loan Corporation of
Vicksburg, both as to liability and damages.

Affirmed as to the liability of Josh McMurray and
the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, but
reversed as to damages. Judgment of the lower court
will be reversed and a new trial granted as to L. A.
Randall and the Mississippi Loan Corporation’ of Vicks-
burg, both as to damages and liability.

Lee, C. J., and Jones, Inzer and Smith, JJ., concur.

56

I<}

Tur Vermrans Apmrnistration, et al. v. Bunuocr, et al.

No. 43668 December 6, 1965 180 So. 2d 610

563

Watkins & Eager, Wm. HE, Suddath, Jr., G. L. Lucas,
Jackson; Walker & Dillard, Laurel, for appellants.

McFarland & McFarland, Bay Springs; Lampkin | A
Butts, Laurel, for appellees.

564

Smirz, J.

The appellants, Veterans Administration and V. L.
Miller, Trustee, filed their bill in the Chancery Court
of the Second Judicial District of Jasper County against
Neil EH. Bullock and his wife, Janie Bullock; W. B.
Bullock and his wife, Suda G. Bullock; Claude Smith;
and, Lampkin Butts, Trustee, appellees, seeking refor-
mation of certain instruments relating to a real estate
transaction which involved or affected all of the parties.

The bill alleged that a surveyor erred in stating the
location of the beginning point in his description of the
lot in controversy and that the parties had, through
mutual mistake, used this erroneous description in the
instruments sought to be reformed. The bill charged
that as a result of this mistake the lot described in these
instruments was not the lot intended to be conveyed
and encumbered, on which there was a dwelling, but was
an entirely different lot, remote therefrom, entirely
vacant and consisting of wild land.

Appellees have moved this Court to strike the notes
of the reporter and to dismiss the appeal. They assign
as the ground for this motion that notice to the court
reporter to transcribe her notes was not given within
ten days after rendition of the final decree. The circum-
stances relating to this aspect of the case are as follows.

Upon the conclusion of the trial, the case was taken
under advisement. On September 1, 1964, in vacation,
the chancellor made his detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and on September 5, 1964, this was
filed among the papers in the cause. This document
concluded, ‘‘ordered and adjudged’’, and was signed by
the chancellor. Because of these concluding words and
other language employed by the court, appellants ap-
parently considered this to be in the nature of an adverse
final decree, and on September 5, 1964, gave notice to
the court reporter to transcribe her notes for the pur-
pose of an appeal to this Court.

565

On September 16, 1964, also in vacation, the chancellor
signed a final decree which was filed on September 22,
1964, This decree was not submitted to any attorney for
appellants prior to its submission to the court for signa-
ture. No copy was sent to counsel for appellants and
no notice whatever was given to any representative of
appellants that it had been prepared and was being sub-
mitted to the chancellor. The decree was signed by the
chancellor and was filed in the cause and again no notice
was ever given by court or counsel to the appellants,
who did not learn of the existence of the decree until
on or about October 27, 1964. When it was fortuitously
discovered that.a decree had been entered, on October
30, 1964, appellants gave a supplemental notice to the
court reporter to transcribe her notes.

HEEB Reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity
to assert one’s rights are fundamental in every concept
of due process. MIM The almost universal and by far
the better practice, in cases of this kind, is to submit
proposed decrees to counsel for the opposing party prior
to submission to the chancellor for his signature. This
is required by Rule 38 of the Rules in Chancery. Grif-
fith, Mississippi Chancery Practice at page 791 (2d ed.
1950).

HEMI Here the decree was neither submitted to coun-
sel for appellants nor were they notified that it was being
submitted to the chancellor for signature. After it was
signed, they had no notice that it had been signed or
filed. It would be unreasonable to require appellants to
take notice of the entering of this decree of which they
knew absolutely nothing. Under the circumstances in
the record, appellees are estopped to question the ef-
ficacy of the notice given on September 5, 1964, fol-
lowing the entry of the chancellor’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and to assert that, as supple-
mented by the subsequent notice, it was not timely. The

566

motion to strike the reporter’s transcript and to dismiss
the appeal is overruled.

W. B. Bullock and his wife, Suda G. Bullock, owned
50 acres of land in the Second Judicial District of Jasper
County, Mississippi, described.as:

The Hast 1% of the NW% of the SW14, Section 19,

Township 10 North, Range 11 West, and the NE14

of the SW14, less the East 10 acres thereof, in Section

19, Township 10 North, Range 11 West.

Their son, Neil H. Bullock and his wife, Janie Bullock,
obtained a Veterans Administration loan in the amount
of $9,750.00 to obtain funds with which to purchase an
acre of this land on which there was a-dwelling house,
which they intended to oceupy as their home. A correct
description of this lot is as follows:

Begin at the SE corner of the NE% of the SW%

of Section 19, Township 10 North, Range 11 West,

and run thence West 330 feet, thence North 465 feet
to a point of beginning; thence West 210 feet, thence

North 210 feet, thence Hast 210 feet, thence South

210 feet to the point of beginning, containing one

acre, in the Second Judicial District of Jasper County,

Mississippi.

A. survey of the property was made, the surveyor’s
plat showing a square one acre lot with a frame house
thereon, located on a road. In writing up his description
of the lot, the surveyor stated that the beginning point
of his description was 1320 feet west of the southeast
corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quar-
ter of Section 19, Township 10 North, Range 11 West.
In this, he was in error by some 1000 feet, thereby
locating the lot embraced within the calls of the survey
description about 1000 feet from the lot on which the
house was actually situated, although still located upon
the W. B. Bullock 50 acre tract. The lot embraced within
the survey lines contained no house or building of any
kind. It was vacant, wild land, and was not located on

567

any road. However, both the house and the road were
shown on the surveyor’s plat. The testimony in the
record shows this vacant land to be worth about $100.00
per acre.

The court excluded a written contract of sale and
purchase offered by complainants to show the agree-
ment between the W. B. Bullocks as sellers and the Neil
Bullocks as purchasers, and excluded testimony offered
for the purpose of showing what was said by these parties
at the time of the transaction as to the property being
sold and purchased.

However, it was abundantly clear that the property
intended to be purchased by the Neil Bullocks and to
be conveyed by the W. B. Bullocks was the lot on the
road and on which the house was located and not a
vacant woods lot some 1000 feet distant. Beyond ques-
tion, this was also the lot which the Veterans Adminis-
tration intended to accept as security for its loan of
$9,750.00, and which the Neil Bullocks intended to en-
cumber as security for their loan.

There is no material conflict in the evidence. The
Neil Bullocks defaulted and failed to appear at the trial
at all. The W. B. Bullocks were in the courtroom when
the case was called, but immediately absented them-
selves when complainants announced that they were de-
sired as witnesses. A subpoena issued for them was
returned ‘‘not found’’, and they did not testify. There
is testimony from a surveyor, however, that W. B. Bullock
told him that the lot on which the house was situated
was the one to be surveyed, and the surveys show the
outline of this house upon all of the plats in the record,
including the plat containing the error in description.

Suda G. Bullock, wife of W. B. Bullock, also admitted
to a witness that there had been ‘‘an error in the de-
scription of the property’’. She pointed out to this wit-
ness the house as that occupied by her son Neil Bullock.
The $9,750.00 proceeds of the Veterans Administration

568

loan was paid to W. B. Bullock and his wife, Suda G.
Bullock, and covered the cost of certain repairs to the
house and the payment of the consideration for the con-
veyance of the real estate.

The error in the survey description was not discovered
and occurs in the description contained in the convey-
ance from the W. B. Bullocks to the Neil Bullocks and
in the trust deed from the Neil Bullocks to V. L. Miller,
Trustee, securing their indebtedness to the Veterans Ad-
ministration. The Neil Bullocks defaulted in the payment
of their debt and in the subsequent foreclosure, the no-
tices and trustee’s deed carried forward the error in
description. When the error was finally discovered, the
W. B. Bullocks were called upon to rectify the situation
but declined to do so. This suit was then brought for
the purpose of obtaining a reformation of the deed from
the W. B. Bullocks to the Neil Bullocks, and of the trust
deed of the Neil Bullocks to V. L. Miller, Trustee, secur-
ing the Neil Bullocks’ loan from the Veterans Adminis-
tration so as to cause these instruments to reflect cor-
rectly the description of the house and lot situated on
the road which were intended to be conveyed rather
than the one acre of vacant, wild land 1000 feet away.

MMB There can be no doubt whatever that there
was a mutual mistake in describing the property in the
conveyance and in the trust deed. In holding to the
contrary, the chancellor was manifestly wrong. The situ-
ation lends itself to no other reasonable construction.
All of the documents and all of the testimony support
that conclusion and there is nothing in the record to the
contrary except the obvious error of the surveyor in
stating the location of the beginning point in the de-
scription. Even the surveyor’s report of that survey
contains within itself and upon the face of the accom-
panying plat clear and unmistakable evidence that it
was the lot on the road and on which the house was situ-
ated which was actually surveyed and which was intended

Pa

to be described and conveyed, and not the vacant lot
with no house or other building upon it, and which was
not located anywhere near the road.

Council for appellees do not base their argument upon
the premise that the parties actually had in mind the
vacant lot of wild land or that they intended to convey
that lot rather than the lot on the road containing the
dwelling. They argue that, since they had nothing to
do with employing the surveyor who made the initial
error, the mistake was not a ‘‘mutual mistake’’ but was
“unilateral”, This position is wholly untenable here,
as there can be no doubt that the description employed
embraces a vacant lot, worth about $100, which was
never intended to be purchased or conveyed, and en-
tirely omits the house and lot, which the parties had
in mind, and for which the $9,750.00 was paid out. The
repairs were made to the house on that lot and it was
surrendered by the W. B. Bullocks to the Neil Bullocks
and occupied by the latter pursuant to the conveyance
from the W. B. Bullocks. The intention of the parties
is manifest and will be given effect since it clearly ap-
pears from the whole record what their intention was,
especially where every consideration of equity demands
it, as it does in this case.

In Hawkins v. Blair, 36 So. 246 (Miss. 1904), the Court
said:

It was the manifest intention of all parties that the

lot or parcel of approximately two acres reserved in

the deed to appellant should include the three houses
which were situated in the southeast corner of the
tract. This is proven by the conduct of the parties
when the sale to appellant was first agreed on, and
the attempt made to measure the lot which was to
be reserved; by the peculiar shape in which the reser-
vation was platted; by the difference in valuation
placed on the two parcels; by the fact that the pur-
chaser of the lot which was reserved entered into

570

possession of the three houses, and collected and ap-
propriated the rents thereof, without objection on the
part of appellant. The facts disclosed by this record
are inexplicable upon any theory consistent with the
contention of the appellant. A mutual mistake as to
the exact location of the true boundaries of the tract,
and consequent incorrectness of the measurements,
gave rise to such confusion and conflict as amply jus-
tified a court of equity in reforming the instruments,
and making them conform to the real agreement of

the contracting parties. (36 So. at 247)

And in Birchett v. Anderson, 160 Miss. 144, 150, 133
So. 129, 181 (1931), this Court said, ‘‘... it was not the
description of the land that the parties intended to write
into the Deed, but what land the parties intended to
embrace in the description they used.’’

In Miles v. Miles, 84 Miss. 624, 37 So. 112 (1904), this
Court held that the instrument involved should have
been reformed since the description of the property
which was contained in the deed did not describe the
property which the parties to the instrument intended
for it to embrace. The Court stated:

And a court of equity will like wise interpose and

correct a mistake of fact, even though the parties em-

ploy the very terms they designed to use. The rule
is not different where there is a mistake in the omis-
sion or insertion of words contrary to the intention of
the parties, and when they, ... believe it (the descrip-
tion) to correspond with the actual boundaries of the

lands intended to be conveyed and are mistaken. (84

Miss. at 638, 87 So. at 114).

WN The trust deed executed by the Neil Bullocks
securing the Veterans Administration loan, a copy of
which is exhibited with the bill of complaint, should have
been reformed so as to reflect that the property con-
veyed by the grantors to the trustee, V. L. Miller, was
the one acre lot upon which the house was situated and

Po

which was the lot intended to be conveyed by the grantors,
a correct description of which is given above. Likewise,
the description in the deed from the W. B. Bullocks to
the Neil Bullocks should have been reformed so as to
reflect that the property conveyed by that instrument
was that same lot upon which the house was situated and
the correct description of which is set out in this opinion.

The lot in question was a part of a tract of land
belonging to the W. B. Bullocks, containing 50 acres.
Following the transactions described above, the W. B.
Bullocks gave a trust deed on this land securing an
indebtedness to appellee Claude Smith. The description
in this instrument excepted the one acre vacant lot shown
by the erroneous survey, but failed to except the one
acre lot containing the house, and which is described
above,

There is a close question upon the record as to wheth-
er or not Claude Smith at the time he took his trust
deed from the W. B. Bullocks was in possession of suf-
ficient information as to the adverse occupancy of the
house and lot in question to impose upon him the duty
of following it wp and of making a reasonable effort
to determine the rights or title of the occupants, and
whether his failure to investigate and make the inquiry
demanded by ordinary prudence, constituted such neg-
ligence on his part as to charge him with notice that this
property was actually occupied under claim of owner-
ship by the Neil Bullocks.

Quoting from 20 R. C. L. 346, this Court in Stanley v.
Stanley, 201 Miss. 545, 551, 29 So. 2d 641, 644 (1947)
said:

Whatever fairly puts a person on inquiry is sufficient

notice, where the means of knowledge are at hand;

and if he omits to inquire, he is then chargeable with
all the facts which, by a proper inquiry, he might
have ascertained. This, in effect, means that notice
of the facts which would lead an ordinarily prudent

572

man to make an examination which, if made, would

disclose the existence of other facts is sufficient no-

tice of such other facts.

See, also, Adams v. Hill, 208 Miss. 341, 44 So. 2d 457
(1950).

HEB The chancellor found that Smith, in taking his
trust deed, was an innocent purchaser for value without
notice. This finding will not be disturbed in so far as it
establishes priority of Smith’s lien. It will be modified,
as required by the equities of the case, to the extent that,
in the event of sale under foreclosure of this instrument,
that portion of the encumbered 49-acre tract which is
not in dispute shall be offered at the sale first; then,
but only in case of a deficiency, the one acre lot in
controversy.

HEM Before the mistake in the description was
discovered, the Veterans Administration’s trust deed
was foreclosed and the Veterans Administration became
the purchaser at the sale. This foreclosure, in which the
notices and trustee’s deed, through error, employed a
description of an entirely different and vacant lot, can-
not be sustained. It is necessary to a valid sale under
foreclosure that prospective purchasers be informed by
the notices as to the exact property being offered in
order that bids may represent a fair price for the par-
ticular property involved.

The record shows that the debt of the Neil Bullocks,
secured by the Veterans Administration trust deed, is
in default, and if it should remain unpaid, a new fore-
closure of this trust deed, as reformed, using the above
correct description of the property, will be necessary.
Upon such foreclosure the purchaser shall acquire title
to the house and one acre lot, description of which is
set out in this opinion, free and clear of all claims of
W. B. Bullock and his wife, Suda G. Bullock, and of
Neil E. Bullock and his wife, Janie Bullock, and subject

only to the lien of the trust deed held by appellee, Claude
Smith.

The evidence in the record indicates that, exclusive
of the house and one acre lot in controversy, there are
two other houses located on the 49-acre tract which
comprises the security in the Claude Smith trust deed.
It further appears that the land itself is worth ap-
proximately $100 an acre. Smith testified that the bal-
ance owing him at the time of the trial was $3,000.00,
plus accrued interest. Apparently the real estate em-
braced in his trust deed, exclusive of the house and lot
here in question, is more than adequate to produce upon
a sale the amount of the debt with interest and reason-
able foreclosure costs. This trust deed was in default
at the time of the trial and in the event of a foreclosure,
the 49 acres shall be advertised and offered for sale in
two tracts. First, there shall be offered for sale all of
the 49-acre tract except the one acre lot described above
upon which is situated the house intended to be conveyed
by the W. B. Bullocks to the Neil Bullocks and intended
to be encumbered by them as security for their Veterans
Administration loan. If the sale of such part of the
49-acre tract shall produce an amount sufficient to pay
and discharge so much of the above $3,000.00 balance
as may then remain unpaid, together with accrued in-
terest, and reasonable foreclosure costs, then such one
acre tract shall not be sold and the trust deed of the
Veterans Administration shall become a first and para-
mount lien thereon. If the sale of the 49-acre tract,
exclusive of the one acre tract above referred to and
correctly described in this opinion, should fail to produce
an amount sufficient to pay the balance of the Claude
Smith debt, with accrued interest and reasonable fore-
closure costs, then such one acre tract shall be offered
for sale and sold and so much of the proceeds as may
be necessary shall be applied to the deficiency.

In the event that the Veterans Administration should
elect to foreclose its trust deed, as reformed, before a

foreclosure of the Claude Smith trust deed shall have
occurred, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale there-
under shall acquire title to the above described one acre
tract, free and clear of all claims of W. B. Bullock,
Suda Bullock, Neil Bullock and Janie Bullock, subject
only to the lien of the Claude Smith trust deed thereon,
which lien shall extend only to the deficiency, if any,
that may remain in satisfying the W. B. Bullock in-
debtedness to Smith, with interest and reasonable fore-
closure costs, after applying thereto the proceeds of a
sale of the 49-acre tract, exclusive of the above described
one acre tract.

Reversed and judgment here for appellants against
W. B. Bullock, Suda Bullock, Neil Bullock and Janie
Bullock; affirmed, as modified, as to Claude Smith and
Lampkin Butts, trustee.

Lee, C. J., and Rodgers, Patterson, and Ineer, JJ.,
concur.

Dennis, et al. v. Patsock
No. 43709 December 13, 1965 181 So. 2d 125

12
tS
wo

x

76

Satterfield, Shell, Williams & Buford, Jackson;
McCraine & Fox, Houston, for appellant.

578
| Po
| po

Armis E. Hawkins, James 8. Gore, Houston, for ap-

pellee.

Erurives, P. J.

This tort action for personal injuries was brought
by Mrs. Kay W. Prisock (appellee) in the Circuit Court

|

579

of Chickasaw County against Frank L. Dennis, doing
business as Dennis Brothers Contractors, and Jimmy
Rhea (appellants). The jury returned a verdict of $30,-
000,00 for Mrs. Prisock. We reverse and remand for
a new trial. The judgment is against the great weight
of the evidence, because it failed to trace the injuries
to her back with requisite certainty to an efficient cause
for which defendants are responsible. The trial court
erred in allowing plaintiff to invoke the physician-patient
privilege, since she effectively waived it; and in ad-
mitting doctor, hospital, nurse, and other medical bills,
where they were not shown to be reasonable and neces-
sary, and causally related to the defendants’ negligent
acts.

Between March 19, 1959 and January 31, 1962, Mrs.
Prisock was involved in eight accidents. That on which
this suit.was based was the second in sequence. This
action was filed on January 29, 1962, and was tried in
October 1964.

The accident for which this suit was brought occurred
on July 6, 1959. According to plaintiff’s evidence, she
was driving north in her father’s automobile 80 to 100
feet behind a truck of Dennis Brothers Contractors, on
which was located a water tank. The truck was being
used to water fresh sod placed on the sides of a highway.
The truck pulled right and stopped, Mrs. Prisock turned
left to pass, but the truck shot back across the road at
a 45 degree angle, striking the right front of her car
with its right rear wheels. Her version was supported
by testimony of a Dennis employee who said he saw the
collision, and of her father, who told about an incriminat-
ing statement made to him later by Rhea, but denied
by Rhea. On the other hand, defendants’ version, ac-
cording to Rhea, was that he stopped and waited to back
the truck to a pond to get some water, when Mrs. Prisock
ran into the rear of the vehicle. There is some dispute
as to the extent of damage to the automobile, but the

weight of the evidence indicates it was relatively slight.
Repairs were made by plaintiff’s father some time later.
Mrs. Prisock remained in Chickasaw County for a month
assisting her husband in his campaign for state treasur-
er. Dr. John D. Dyer of Houston saw Mrs. Prisock
the day after the collision, and diagnosed her trouble
as a back strain.

The great weight of the evidence indicates that the
contribution of the accident of July 6, 1959 to Mrs. Pri-
sock’s previous and subsequent back condition was rela-
tively slight.

About four months before the above accident, on
March 19, 1959, while Mrs. Prisock worked in Jackson
at Mr. Prisock’s office, she fell down a flight of stairs
and suffered a large bruise over her lower back. Dr.
Albert L. Gore ordered a back brace with metal or bone
ribs, and she wore it. She recalled talking with Lee, a
claim representative of the Jitney Jungle store, where
the steps were located, relative to her claim for this
fall, and telling him that she fell down the steps and
hurt herself. She may have advised him that she hurt
her back, since it was bruised. Lee said she stated she
fell from the top to the bottom of the stairs, about
twenty steps; and that she injured her back and also her
kidney, and Dr. Gore had told her to wear a back brace
all of the time, except in bed.

On September 1, 1959, Mrs. Prisock was involved in
a serious car wreck in Gulfport, when she was thrown
from her car on the pavement, was hospitalized there
three days, and was moved to a Jackson hospital where
she remained seven days. She admitted she struck the
pavement with her head and shoulders, since her left
ear was almost torn off, and her face, neck, shoulders
and back were injured, and her arms and legs were
skinned. She could not recall how much she was paid
by the owner of the other vehicle for that collision, but
would not deny that it was $11,870.

581

In the summer of 1960 Mrs. Prisock fell at her home.
She said she had a sprained wrist, although she ad-
mitted that she blacked out, hurt her arm, and had a
cast on it. She stated it was not uncommon for her to
faint frequently. On September 10, 1960, Mrs. Prisock
ran upon a street curb, hit a fire hydrant, and was taken
to the hospital, where she remained for three days.

On April 24, 1961, Mrs. Prisock had another fall in
the Jitney Jungle building, when her shoe heel went
through the floor and she fell, following which she was
hospitalized. She injured her lower extremities, twisted
her ankle, and fell on her knees. As a result of the fall
she suffered a miscarriage, surgery being performed.

On November 21, 1961, Mrs, Prisock fell and injured
her left elbow. Dr. Dyer x-rayed it and treated her.

On January 31, 1962, Mrs. Prisock was driving north
on North State Street in Jackson when another lady
pulled her car into traffic and there was a collision with
a substantial impact. It jolted Mrs. Prisock quite severe-
ly and threw her around against objects in the car. She
was injured in the chest, shoulder, neck and back, and,
being unable to get the local doctor she sought, she
went to her parents’ home in Chickasaw County and
was treated by Dr. Dyer. She was hospitalized for thirty-
nine days. Dr. Dyer gave her a myelogram, from which
he diagnosed a ruptured lumbar disc. He then sent her
to Jackson, where on March 13, 1962, Dr. Walter Neill
performed dise surgery.

Dr. Dyer, plaintiff’s witness, was the only doctor who
testified. Over objection, he stated as his opinion that
Mrs. Prisock sustained the disc injury to her back in
the collision involving appellant’s truck on July 6, 1959.
Yet he had no knowledge of plaintiff’s fall down a flight
of stairs on March 19, 1959, and the surrounding facts.
He did not know she fell in the summer of 1960, of the
automobile collision of September 10, 1960, and of. a
fall on April 24, 1961, or of the injuries resulting from

them. She told him about the September 1, 1959 acci-
dent, but he did not treat her for it, although he pre-
scribed some sedatives over a period of time. His reason
for concluding that the July 6, 1959 collision caused the
ruptured dise was ‘‘that the first time I saw this patient
with a back injury was at that time.’’ He thought he
was thus justified in presuming that was her original
injury. However, he did not know that she was wearing
a back brace after March 19, 1959, and it would change
his opinion considerably if the brace was for a back
injury. The first time he x-rayed Mrs. Prisock’s lower
back was in February 1962.

HB Under all of the foregoing circumstances, the
verdict of the jury is against the overwhelming weight
of the evidence. Plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to
withstand a peremptory instruction, since the jury could
find that defendants were negligent and as a proximate
cause thereof Mrs. Prisock suffered some nominal in-
juries at the most. However, her evidence failed to con-
nect or trace her back injuries with requisite certainty
to an efficient cause for which the defendants are re-
sponsible. In fact, the great weight of the evidence in-
dicates that there were at least five other accidents in
which Mrs. Prisock was involved which were of a’ con-
siderably more serious nature; and that at the most
she received in this particular accident of July 6, 1959
only nominal damages.

HEEB Recoverable damages must be reasonably cer-
tain in respect to the efficient cause from which they
proceed. MMM Plaintiff had the burden to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the persons charged,
the appellants, were the wrongful authors of all or
an apportionable part of her damages. MIM This she
failed to do. As was said in Blizzard v. Fitzsimmons,
193 Miss. 484, 10 So. 2d 343 (1942): MM ‘“A defendant
chargeable with a nonconcurrent wrong may be made
liable for damages for his part when the damages are

583

such that they may be apportioned, and a portion thereof
can be traced with reasonable certainty to the wrong
of the defendant as the cause of that portion. .. .”
193 Miss. at 493, 10 So. 2d at 345. This rule was followed
and applied in Hardin’s Bakeries, Inc. v. Mrs. Cecil
(Helen) Kelly, 254 Miss. 126, 180 So. 2d 605; Jackson
v. Swinney, 244 Miss. 117, 140 So. 2d 555 (1962); and
Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Williams, 222 Miss.
538, 76 So. 2d 365 (1954). MME The rule of certainty
should not be strictly applied, but the evidence must
support jury findings of reasonable probability. Hl
In short, some minimum standards of proof as to the
fact and extent of the loss will always be required.
Harper and James, The Law of Torts § 25.3 (1956).
Here there were multiple occasions of injury to Mrs.
Prisock’s back, preceding and subsequent to the accident
of July 6, 1959. Yet the evidence does not show with
any reasonable probability the connection between the
accident in question and her back injuries, when it is
considered with reference to her other accidents. Harper
and James, The Law of Torts § 20.3 (1956).

HEB This conclusion is further emphasized by the
errors of the trial court in admitting, over objections,
testimony by plaintiff concerning bills for doctors, hos-
pitals, nurses and other expenses, covering a period from
October 1959 through March 1962. Some of these bills
can be identified with hospitalization of appellee re-
sulting from other accidents. It was reversible error to
admit them without plaintiff proving that the services
represented thereby were necessary as a result of the
particular accident, and the charges were reasonable.
Hardin’s Bakeries, Inc. v. Kelly, supra; Bryan Bros.
Packing Co. v. Grubbs, 251 Miss. 52, 168 So. 2d 289
(1964) ; Jackson v. Swinney, swpra; and National Fire
Ins. Co. v. Slayden, 227 Miss. 285, 85 So. 2d 916 (1956).

EM It was also error to permit plaintiff to invoke
the physician-patient privilege when defendants offered

—_ ii
as their witnesses two doctors who had treated Mrs.
Prisock for her injuries. Miss. Code Ann. § 1697 (1956).
Appellee waived the privilege by not only exhibiting
to the jury the surgical scar on her back, but also by
testifying in some detail about her injuries and communi-
cations from and to those physicians and treatments
of her by them. NI Where a patient voluntarily goes
into detail regarding the nature of her injuries and either
testifies as to what the particular physician did or said
while in attendance, or relates what she communicated
to the physician, the privilege is waived, and the adverse
party may examine the physician. McCormick, Evidence
§ 106 (1954); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 310 (c) (1957); 58
Am. Jur. Witnesses § 447 (1948) ; Lipscomb, Privileged
Communications Statute — Sword and Shield, 16 Miss.
L. J. 181 (1944); ef. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Ine. v.
Matthews, 177 Miss. 103, 170 So. 686 (1936).

HE MM On the third and last day of trial, plaintiff’s
counsel attempted to waive the privilege as to five physici-
ans who had treated Mrs. Prisock, other than the two
previously tendered by defendants and excluded because
of the claimed privilege. This was not an effectual
and timely waiver by which the testimony of these physi-
cians was made reasonably and presently available to
defendants. Gatlin v. Allen, 203 Miss. 135, 33 So. 2d
304 (1948). Since the jury arguments by appellee’s coun-
sel, assigned as error, will probably not reoccur, no ruling
on them is necessary.

Reversed and remanded.
Gillespie, Rodgers, Brady and Smith, JJ., concur.

585

Fowier Burane Gas Company, Inc. v. Parise
No. 43733 December 17, 1965 181 So. 2d 157

May 3, 1965 175 So. 2d 129

Harris Sullivan, Sullivan, Sullivan & Walker, Hatties-
burg, for appellant.

Lampkin H, Butts, A. 8. Scott, Jr., Laurel, for appel-
lee.

Guiiespie, J.

The case originated in the county court where a judg-
ment was entered in favor of James Howard Parish,
plaintiff in the county court and appellee here, against
Fowler Butane Gas Company, defendant in the county
court and appellant here. Appellant perfected an appeal
from the county court to the circuit court by filing a
supersedeas bond and giving notice to the official court
reporter. In its notice to the official court reporter of
the county court, appellant designated all of the testi-
mony of the witnesses and all exhibits, rulings of the
court, and motions, being all of the notes taken by the
official court reporter at the trial. It did not designate
as a portion of the record on appeal the pleadings,
verdict, or judgment, and the clerk did not include these
documents in the record sent up to the circuit court.

The circuit court denied the petition for a writ of
certiorari and sustained a motion to docket and dismiss
the appeal. From the order of the circuit judge denying
the writ and dismissing the appeal, appellant perfected
an appeal to this Court with supersedeas.

This Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari
and ordered the writ issued and passed appellee’s motion

587

to docket and dismiss until the case was docketed for
hearing on the merits by this Court. See Fowler Butane
Gas Company v. Parish, 254 Miss. 588, 175 So. 2d 129
(1965), for a history of the case.

The clerk of the county court has complied with the
writ of certiorari and has completed the record by send-
ing up the pleadings, verdict, and judgment of the coun-
ty court. The record is now complete.

Appellant assigns as error the action of the circuit
court in dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari
filed before that court and in sustaining the motion to
docket and dismiss the appeal, The former opinion of
this Court on the petition for writ of certiorari filed in
this Court has disposed of the issues raised by the two
assignments of error of appellant. The record is now
complete and there is no basis upon which this .Court
could sustain the motion to dismiss the appeal.

Appellee contends that the Court should affirm be-
cause no error has been assigned concerning the merits.

In Schwartz v. McKay, 184 Miss. 422, 185 So. 200
(1938), 184 Miss. 422, 185 So. 811 (1939), this Court
held that if a circuit court wrongfully dismisses an
appeal to it from the county court the appellant has not
had his day in the circuit court which the statute con-
templates. The Supreme Court permitted an appeal for
the purpose of correcting the circuit court’s error in
dismissing the appeal although the case would not other-
wise have been appealable to this Court because the
case had originated in the justice of the peace court:
In the Schwartz case, supra, the Court reversed the ac-
tion of the circuit court in dismissing the appeal and
remanded the case to the circuit court.

- MR We hold that when the circuit court erroneously
dismisses an appeal from the county court and it is
necessary for the appellant to. appeal to this Court to
correct the circuit court’s error in dismissing the ap-
peal, the case should not be heard here on the merits

588

but should be remanded to the circuit court for a hearing
as contemplated by Mississippi Code Annotated section
1616 (1956).

HMM Under the posture of this case, this Court is
not concerned with the merits of the appeal but only
with whether the circuit court was in error in denying
the writ of certiorari and in dismissing the appeal. We
hold that the circuit court was in error and its action
in so doing is reversed and the case is remanded for
hearing of the appeal on the merits as contemplated by
the statute.

The motion filed in this Court to dismiss the appeal
is overruled; the case is reversed and remanded.

Motion to dismiss overruled; reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, P. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

Eruriwes, J.

Appellant, Fowler Butane Gas Company, Inc., has
filed a suggestion of diminution of record and asked
for a writ of certiorari to complete the record. Appellee
Parish obtained a judgment in the County Court of
the Second Judicial District of Jones County. There-
after Fowler gave notice to the court reporter to trans-
eribe her notes of the testimony, for an appeal to the
cireuit court, but it did not designate any of the plead-
ings, the verdict or judgment. Hence it did not comply
with the provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated sec-
tion 1640 (Supp. 1962), requiring appellant to designate
“the portions of the record, proceedings, testimony and
evidence to be contained in the record of appeal.’’ Miss.
Laws 1964, ch. 325.

The only matter in the record on appeal to the circuit
court was the transcript of testimony. On November
16, 1964 that court denied Fowler’s petition for a writ
of certiorari and dismissed its appeal, since it had not
complied with Code section 1640 in completing the rec-
ord.

|

Parish’s motion to docket and dismiss the appeal has

been passed for consideration on the merits. The only
matter now before us is Fowler’s petition for writ of
certiorari, which would direct the clerks of the circuit
court and of the county court to send to this Court all
pleadings, jury instructions, the verdict and judgment,
and any and all other papers and documents in the ree-
ord of this case. MIM We have concluded that the writ
should issue.
n Miller Transporters, Ltd. v. Johnson, 252 Miss.
244, 172 So. 2d 542, 546 (1965), it was held that the
verdict and judgment are essential parts of the record
on appeal, ‘‘which in every case the clerk should send
to this Court, whether or not designated by the parties.’’
The remainder of the papers in the record should also
be sent to this Court on the writ, under the unusual
circumstances rule of Miller Transporters. It was said
there that the purpose of rules of procedure is efficiency
and fairness in the administration of justice; and that
because of the newness in this state of this statutory
method of forming an appeal record, and pursuant to
the constitutional appellate powers of this Court, ap-
pellant was entitled to have the stated portions of the
record sent here on certiorari. Miller Transporters, Ltd.
v. Johnson, 252 Miss. 244, 172 So. 2d 542 (1965). Ac-
cordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari, with sug-
gestion of diminution of record, is sustained.

Petition for writ of certiorari sustained.

All Justices concur.

Cuark Equipment Company v. Pouurry Pacxmrs, Inc.
No. 43597 January 17, 1966 181 So. 2d 908

a .
iY)

59:

eB

O. B. Triplett, Jr., Forest, for appellant.

Huff & Huff, Forest; J. HE. Smith, Carthage, for ap-

Smirs, J.

This was an appeal from a final judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of Leake County sustaining the priority of
an attachment lien acquired by appellee, Poultry Pack-
ers, Inc., on two commercial trailers, attached as the
property of Farmers’ Cooperative Association, over the
lien of Clark Equipment Company, the appellant, seller
of the trailers, for the purchase money due it under its
conditional sales contract with Farmers’ Cooperative As-
sociation.

The case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts.

Two Brown trailers were sold by appellant, Clark
Equipment Company, of Buchanan, Michigan, to Far-
mers’ Cooperative Association, of Steele, Missouri, un-
der a conditional sale contract. The contract was exe-
cuted on April 30, 1964, at Nashville, Tennessee. The
seller delivered the trailers to the buyer at Memphis,
Tennessee. From Memphis, with the consent of the sell-
er, the purchaser removed the trialers to its principal
place of business in Missouri. From there they .were
to be used in the purchaser’s business of commercial
hauling in various states, including Mississippi. Under

the terms of the conditional sale contract, the deferred
payments were to be made at Buchanan, Michigan. On
May 4, 1964, the trailers were attached while transitorily
in Mississippi, by appellee, Poultry Packers, Inc, a
Mississippi corporation, for a debt contracted in Mis-
sissippi by Farmers’ Cooperative Association.

At the time of the attachment, the conditional sale
contract had not been recorded in Missouri, the domicile
and principal place of business of the purchaser, nor
in Mississippi where the trailers were attached.

Appellee, Poultry Packers, Inc, contends, and the
court below held, that Missouri law, the lex loci situs,
which required recording of conditional sale contracts,
should be applied, and that failure to record in Missouri,
as required by the Missouri statute, rendered the con-
tract void as to appellee, an attaching creditor of the
purchaser in Mississippi.

Appellant’s contentions are two-fold — (1) the Mis-
souri recording statute is without extraterritorial effect
and apples only to those dealings with the property
within the state of Missouri, and that recording in Mis-
sissippi was not necessary in order to protect the con-
ditional seller under the rule announced by this Court
in Russum v. Gans, 190 Miss. 584, 1 So. 2d 235 (1941),
the trailers having been in Mississippi only transitorily ;
and, (2) the laws of Tennessee apply (the lex loci con-
tractus), and did not require recording, the trailers
having been delivered to the purchaser there, and the
most significant contacts of the contract having been
in that state.

Appellee does not contend that the laws of Tennessee
required recording, as the pertinent section of the Ten-
nessee Uniform Commercial Code, Tennessee Code An-
notated, Title 47 (1963), did not become effective until
July 1, 1964, after the events here under consideration
had transpired. .

595

HE ED We have concluded that the lex loci con-
tractus (Tennessee) applies here, and that since the
trailers were in Mississippi only transitorily the lien of
the conditional seller, the appellant, is superior to that
of appellee, the attaching creditor of Farmers’ Coopera-
tive Association.

The case here does not involve any element of es-
toppel. The conditional sale was made subsequent to
the incurring of the debt by Farmers’ Cooperative As-
sociation, which formed the basis of appellee’s attach-
ment of the trailers. Neither the possession of the trail-
ers nor their ostensible ownership by the debtor played
any part in the extension of credit by appellee to Far-
mers’ Cooperative Association, and nothing in the sales
transaction encroached upon appellee’s rights or caused
a change in its position to its detriment in respect to
its claim against Farmers’ Cooperative Association.

In United States F. & G. Co. v. Northwest Engineering
Co., 146 Miss. 476, 112 So. 581 (1927), the Northwest
Engineering Company sold certain dredging machinery
to A. V. Wills & Sons, an Illinois corporation. The sale
was made in Wisconsin. The machinery was delivered
to the purchaser in Coahoma County, Mississippi. ‘The
seller, under the conditional sales contract, retained a
lien for the purchase money. This contract was executed
in Wisconsin. It expressly provided that it should be
treated as a Wisconsin contract and that the rights of
the parties should be governed by the laws of Wisconsin.
The contract was recorded neither in Wisconsin nor Mis-
sissippi. After the machinery was delivered in Missis-
sippi, it was attached in Coahoma County for a debt due
by A. V. Wills & Sons to the appellants in the case. The
Northwest Engineering Company, the seller, interposed
a claimant’s affidavit and claimed a superior lien under
its conditional sales contract. The case was tried upon
an agreed statement of.facts and resulted in a judgment
sustaining the priority of the seller’s lien under the
contract. :

The property having been removed into this state, the
Court held that the recording laws of Wisconsin would
not be applied in Mississippi, notwithstanding the pro-
visions of the contract, and upheld the priority of the
seller’s lien under the contract. The Court said that
recording laws are not set up for the protection of the
parties to recordable contracts. Such laws are to protect
third persons dealing with the property in the state where
they are in effect.

The Court declined to apply the recording law of
Wisconsin in the Mississippi attachment case, upon the
ground that such law had no extraterritorial effect, and
Mississippi law did not then require recording.

HE BES The law regulating conditional sales of
personal property is the lex loci contractus, except
where it would work an injustice to the citizens of the
forum state or would contravene its policy. Only in the
latter instance would the law of the actual situs or of
the forum prevail over the law of the place of the contract.
This was the holding in Patterson v. Universal Credit
Company, 204 Miss. 268, 87 So. 2d 306 (1948). In that
ease, the law of Alabama, where the automobile was
sold, required recordation of the contract to protect the
seller. The purchaser resided in Mississippi, and the
parties knew the automobile was to be removed into this
State. Alabama law classified the contract as a ‘‘lien’’.
The Court held that Mississippi Code Annotated sec-
tion 870 (1956) applied, requiring ‘‘liens’’ on personal
property executed out of Mississippi and removed into
this state to be recorded in this State.

HEE Mid-Continent Finance Corp. v. Grant, 213 Miss.
789, 58 So. 24 1 (1952), involved the sale of an automo-
bile in Tennessee. The Court held that the Tennessee
law governed the contract, that there was no statute
requiring recordation of motor vehicles (at that time)
in Tennessee; and, therefore, the conditional vendor re-
tained title. In short, the law of the place of the contract

|

governs its validity and priority of the seller over the
rights of third persons without recordation. The ap-
plicability of Mississippi Code Annotated section 870
(1956) depends first upon the lex loci contractus.

Another recent case from this jurisdiction, Memphis
Bank & Trust Co. v. Blount, 252 Miss, 290, 172 So, 2d
778 (1965), held that recordation of ‘a conditional sale
contract of personal property, other than motor vehicles,
is not required of the seller. In that case, the question
was whether the conditional sale contract of the automo-
bile executed in Tennessee was treated by the law of
Tennessee so as to fall within the grouping of ‘‘other
liens on personal property’’, as that phrase is used in
section 870, supra. If Tennessee so construed such con-
tract, then it was necessary that the contract be re-
corded in Mississippi, when the property was ‘‘removed
into this state’? under section 870. A 1955 Tennessee
statute required recording of conditional sale contracts
of motor vehicles. This was a ‘‘lien’’ on personal prop-
erty under section 870, and was required to be recorded
in Mississippi. In the instant case, however, we are not
dealing with a motor vehicle but with a trailer. Appellee
does not contend it was required to be recorded under
Tennessee law.

HEME Moreover, section 870 does not apply here, since
the trailers were only transitorily or temporarily passing
through the state, and had not been ‘‘removed into this
state’? See Russum v. Gans, supra.

HE EO In summary, we conclude that the lex loci
contractus (Tennessee) applies to these trailers. The
lex loci situs (Missouri) requiring recordation was with-
out extraterritorial effect; and, therefore, not controlling
in this case. Recording was not necessary under the
circumstances in this case, either under Mississippi or
Tennessee law, in order to protect appellant as condi-
tional seller of the trailers. See Minor, Conflict of Laws
section 129 (1901).

598

It does not appear that the parties to this contract
intended to contract with reference to the law of a state
other than Tennessee, which was the place of the con-
tract. The contract was consummated in Tennessee, de-
livery of the chattels was made by seller to purchaser in
Tennessee, the payments were to be made in Michigan,
and neither state required recordation to protect the
seller. Moreover, appellee concedes that its position
would require an ‘‘extension’’ of the rules, not previous-
ly stated in Mississippi jurisprudence, to require that
this contract should have been recorded in Missouri, and
that failure to do so invalidated it as to appellee. This
would be inconsistent with the reasoning and basis of
the decisions in Patterson, Grant, and Blount, supra, all
of which considered the lex loci contractus as controlling
the rights of the parties.

Reversed and judgment rendered for appellant.
Ethridge, C.J., and Rodgers, Jones and Patterson, JJ.,

concur.
a

Sr. Paun Fire ayp Maron Insuranon Co. v.
Lartorr Bank & Trusr Co.

No. 43738 January 17, 1966 181 So. 2d 913

for
for)
ire)

600

Brewer, Deaton & Evans, Greenwood, for appellant.

601

Lott & Sanders, Greenwood, for appellee.

Brapy, Tom P., J.

This is an appeal by the St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company from a judgment rendered by the
Circuit Court of Leflore County, Mississippi against it
in favor of the appellee, Leflore Bank & Trust Company,
in the sum of $15,957.92 and costs of court. The facts
in this case are prolific but the disposition of this case
does not require a detailed analysis of all the evidence
and we confine ourselves solely to those matters which
are essential.

The appellee is engaged in the banking business,
while the appellant is engaged in the business of in-
surance. In 1960 appellant sold and issued to appellee
a certain insurance policy commonly called a bankers
blanket bond, which was dated August 1, 1960. All premi-
ums required for the policy at the time of appellee’s loss
had been paid and the policy was in full force and effect.
The pertinent parts of the policy which are for considera-
tion here are as follows:

The Underwriter agrees to indemnify the Insured to

any amount not exceeding $50,000.00 from and against

any loss sustained by the Insured through having, in
good faith and in the course of business, whether for
its own account or for the account of others, in any
representative, fiduciary, agency or any other capaci-
ty, either gratuitously or otherwise, purchased or oth-
erwise acquired, accepted or received, or sold or de-
livered, or guaranteed in writing or witnessed any
signatures upon, or given any value, extended any
credit or assumed any liability, on the faith of, or
otherwise acted upon any Securities, documents or
other written instruments which prove to have been
counterfeited, forged, raised or otherwise altered or

lost or stolen... .

The record discloses that at the time of the transac-
tions involved, C. H. Holmes was engaged and had been
for many years engaged in conducting a cotton busi-
ness in Greenwood, Mississippi. The appellee was en-
gaged in lending money to Holmes, a cotton buyer, on
the security of cotton represented by cotton warehouse
receipts. These loans were made under the terms of a
written contract between the appellee and Holmes dated
November 19, 1962. This contract was the usual contract
prevailing in this area under which banks financed men
engaged in the cotton business,

Under the contract between appellee and Holmes, the
appellee paid checks and drafts drawn on it by Holmes

603

and accepted from Holmes cotton warehouse receipts
as security for the indebtedness created by appellee’s
having paid such checks and drafts. On May 2, 1963, the
indebtedness of Holmes to appellee under the above con-
tract amounted to $22,328.69, plus interest from April
29, 1963, at the rate of 514% per annum.

The record discloses that this loan had been made
y appellee to Holmes in good faith and in the regular
course of business under the written contract; that
Holmes had placed with appellee a cash margin of $3,300
and 138 negotiable warehouse receipts issued to bearer
y cotton warehouses located in Mississippi, to evidence
the ownership of cotton on storage in the warehouse
issuing the receipt. The appellee discovered that neither
Holmes nor it had any title to 122 of these warehouse
receipts. As to the remaining 16 receipts of the 138
held by the appellee, appellee had D. T. Sayle & Com-
pany, a Greenwood cotton factor, sell these bales for
the highest prices obtainable, and applied the proceeds
of these sales and Holmes’ cash margin of $3,300 to the
indebtedness due it by Holmes. After these applications
were made to Holmes’ debt, appellant claimed Holmes
owed a balance of $17,619.46, with interest at the rate
of 544% per annum from July 10, 1963, until paid. Ap-
pellee had no security for this indebtedness except the
122 warehouse receipts hereinabove mentioned.

Appellee’s immediate demand of Holmes that he pay
his indebtedness in full was of no avail and, because
of Mr. Holmes’ financial circumstances, the appellee
could not collect from him any of the balance due. Ap-
pellee thereupon made demand for the cotton in the
three compresses which had issued the 122 receipts be-
ing held by appellee. The three compresses refused to
comply with appellee’s demand.

Appellee’s investigation disclosed that the owners of
the cotton evidenced by the 122 receipts had made bond
for the receipts to the warehouses in question, obtained

new or duplicate receipts from the warehouses and had
secured the cotton from the three compresses and shipped
it away, and that the compresses no longer had the cotton.
One of the rightful owners of the receipts testified on
cross-examination and redirect that he discovered that
the man who had taken 20 receipts from his desk was
C. H. Holmes and that he caught Holmes in the collar
and shook him and told him that he had stolen said
property and that the Federal Government was going
to get him if he didn’t turn the receipts back in, and
that as a result Holmes delivered 12 of the 20 receipts
to the Itta Bena Compress for cancellation but could
not deliver the other 8 receipts because they were in
the possession of the appellee.

The procedures or methods utilized in the issuance
of new or duplicate cotton receipts, the record discloses,
are those which are customarily followed, and are in
accordance with the Federal Warehouse Act under which
the warehouses operated.

The undisputed evidence in the record establishes the
fact that the 122 receipts were lost by or stolen from
the rightful owners at various times in 1960, in No-
vember 1961, and on February 26, 1962, and that there-
after under the contract of November 19, 1962, between
appellee and Holmes, the said receipts were pledged to
appellee by Holmes. It is admitted that on June 6,
1963, appellee executed and delivered to appellant proof
of its loss on a form furnished to appellee by the appel-
lant for that purpose. Appellant denied any liability
to appellee and appellee instituted suit demanding judg-
ment against appellant in the sum of $17,427.66. Appel-
lant filed a demurrer to the declaration. The demurrer
was overruled and appellant filed its answer denying
any liability. The cause was tried and a peremptory
instruction was granted to the appellee and judgment
entered in favor of appellee in the sum of $14,692.40.
From. this judgment this appeal was taken.

605

There are two assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in overruling the demurrer
of appellant and in directing a verdict for appellee.

2. Appellee cannot recover from appellant for a loss
until there is an actual loss and the proof in the case at
ar clearly shows that the compresses or cotton ware-
houses are still liable for their original cotton warehouse
receipts.

The demurrer of the appellant assigned six grounds.
The essential parts of the two errors assigned by the
appellant overlap and are so interrelated that they can
e treated together. Moreover, the six grounds urged
in appellant’s demurrer are likewise argued under the
two errors assigned. Therefore, the errors do not have
to be discussed separately.

Appellant urges that the whole question involved is:
Can the bank as a holder of an insuring bond recover
‘rom its bonding company while it holds original negoti-
able cotton warehouse receipts that were pledged to the
ank in the due course of business? The answer to this
asic question is determined by the proper answer to
subordinate questions necessarily involved therein.

At the outset we hold that the determining provisions
of the bond specifically contemplate the coverage of the
osses occasioned in the case at bar. In substance the
appellant agreed to indemnify the appellee ‘‘to any
amount not exceeding $50,000.00 from and against any
oss sustained by the Insured (Appellee) through having,
in good faith and in the course of business .. . extended
any credit or assumed any liability, on the faith of, or
otherwise acted upon any Securities, documents or other
written instruments which prove to have been. . . lost
or stolen... .’’

The record discloses that the appellee extended credit
to C. EH. Holmes in good faith and in the course of busi-
ness, in the sum of $14,692.40, which is less than the
$50,000 limitation. The proof further conclusively shows

that the warehouse receipts, which C. E. Holmes pledged
as collateral for the loans and which the appellee bank
acted upon as security for the loans, were stolen.

Turning next to the question of whether or not the
appellant can be held responsible to the appellee for
appellee’s loss, the appellant urges that it is not re-
quired under the provisions of the aforementioned sec-
tion of the bankers blanket bond to reimburse the ap-
pellee for the stated loss for the reason that the ware-
houses did not strictly comply with the requirements
of Mississippi Code Annotated section 5025 (1956),
which reads as follows:

Where a negotiable receipt has been lost or destroyed,
a court of competent jurisdiction may order the de-
livery of the goods upon satisfactory proof of such
loss or destruction and upon the giving of a bond with
sufficient sureties to be approved by the court to pro-
tect the warehouseman from any liability or expense,
which he or any person injured by such delivery may
incur by reason of the original receipt remaining out-
standing. The court may also in its discretion order
the payment of the warehouseman’s reasonable costs
and counsel fees. The delivery of the goods under an
order of the court as provided in this section, shall
not relieve the warehouseman from liability to a per-
son to whom the negotiable receipt has been or shall
be negotiated for value without notice of the proceed-
ings or of the delivery of the goods.

HEE Mississippi Code Annotated section 5025 (1956)
does not make it mandatory upon a warehouseman to
institute suit where an original outstanding receipt has
been lost or destroyed. The statute says that a court
of competent jurisdiction may order delivery of the goods
upon satisfactory proof of such loss or destruction and
upon the giving of bond with sufficient sureties to be
approved by the court ‘‘to protect the warehouseman
from any liability or expense, which he or any person

|

injured by such delivery may incur by reason of the
original receipt remaining outstanding.’’ To hold that
this language makes it mandatory upon the warehouse-
man to institute suit in order to obtain a court order
is reading into this statute a requirement which is not
there.

The proof in this case shows that the warehouseman
required the rightful owners of the cotton to give bond
in twice the value of the cotton in order to protect the
warehouseman and any other rightful claimant because
of the issuance of new or duplicate warehouse receipts.
A suit in a court of competent jurisdiction would not
have protected the warehouseman any more than he
was protected in the case at bar and the bond which
the warehouseman required likewise protected any other
person to whom the negotiable receipt had been negoti-
ated for value without notice of the proceedings or of
the delivery of the goods represented by the receipt which
had been lost or stolen.

The duty of the warehouses to deliver the goods upon
demand is set out in Mississippi Code Annotated section
5019 (1956), as follows:

A warehouseman, in the absence of some lawful ex-

cuse provided by this article, is bound to deliver the

goods upon demand made either by the holder of a

receipt for the goods or by the depositor, if such de-

mand is accompanied with:

(a) An offer to satisfy the warehouseman’s lien.

(b) An offer to surrender the receipt if negotiable,

with such indorsements as would be necessary for the

negotiation of the receipt, and

(c) A readiness and willingness to sign, when the

goods are delivered, an acknowledgment that they have

been delivered if such signature is requested by the
warehouseman.

In case the warehouseman refuses or fails to deliver

the goods in compliance with a demand by the holder

608

or depositor so accompanied, the burden shall be upon

the warehouseman to establish the existence of a law-

ful excuse for such refusal.

The appellant urges that the appellee made absolute-
ly no effort to collect from the warehouse even though
appellee held the original negotiable cotton warehouse
receipts; that the appellee ‘‘simply flew to the Bonding
Company, demanding payment of a loss that they alleged
to have suffered.’’? Appellant urges that there is some
duty on the bank to make some efforts to obtain the
relief that they are entitled to receive in the courts
before resorting to a suit against the bonding company;
that otherwise a company that insured a bank under
what is commonly known as a bankers blanket bond
would be called upon to pay every kind of conceivable
loss that the bank imagined they had sustained.

It is conceded by appellant and appellee that no sums
can be collected from Holmes, because of his financial
condition, nor can the cotton be obtained from the ware-
houses because the rightful owners have long since ob-
tained it and disposed of it.

HEEB Appellant further urges that the provisions of
the insuring bond do not provide coverage against errors
in business judgment. We expressly hold that the
provisions of the policy commonly known as the
bankers blanket bond cover the losses sustained
here by appellant. The words ‘bankers blanket
bond’’ are used to indicate a broad and liberal construc-
tion which is placed upon the terms and conditions of
the insurance policy. The policy expressly designates
losses occasioned by the appellant ‘‘in good faith and in
the course of business’? where any credit was extended
or liability assumed ‘‘on the faith of; or otherwise acted.
upon any Securities, documents or other written instru-
ments... lost or stolen... .’

Appellant earnestly urges that Mississippi Code An-
notated section 5058 (1956) provides that the validity

of the negotiation of receipts is not impaired by the fact
that such negotiation was a breach of duty on the part
of the person making the negotiation or the fact that
the owner of the receipt was induced by fraud, mistake
or duress to entrust the possession or custody of such
person, if the person to whom the receipt was negotiated
or the person to whom the receipt was subsequently
negotiated, paid value therefor without notice of the
breach of duty or fraud, mistake or duress.

We find no error in appellant’s explanation of that
section 5058 provides, but the inference does not follow
that the appellee here had a right to sue the warehouse-
man for the cotton represented by the receipts for the
reason that the receipts in this case were not released
because of fraud, mistake or duress to entrust the pos-
session or custody of the receipts by the rightful own-
ers to Mr. C. E. Holmes. These receipts were stolen and
the law of Mississippi has constantly drawn a distinction
where the owner of the receipt was induced by fraud,
mistake or duress to entrust the possession or custody
of the receipt to some person who subsequently negotiat-
ed it and where the receipt was stolen by the person
who attempted to negotiate the same.

HM The question of title of the appellee to the
receipts that the cotton represented by the same is con-
trolled by the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act of Mis-
sissippi, appearing as Mississippi Code Annotated sec-
tions 5012 through 5070 (1956). The Act as originally
promulgated and as adopted and still in force in Missis-
sippi does not permit a receipt to be negotiated by any-
one except the owner, or a person to whom the owner
has entrusted possession of the receipt. It provides that
the negotiation of the receipt is not impaired by the
fact that the owner of the receipt was induced by fraud,
mistake, or duress to entrust the possession of the re-

- ceipt to another or that its negotiation by the person
to whom it was entrusted by the owner was a breach of

610

duty on the part of such person. MM The Act does
not, however, permit a trespasser, a finder or thief to
pass any title to the receipt. To the contrary, it provides
that the person to whom a negotiable receipt is negoti-
ated acquires thereby only ‘‘such title to the goods as
the depositor or person to whose order the goods were
to be delivered by the terms of the receipt had or had
ability to convey to a purchaser in good faith for value
. 2? (Miss. Code Ann. §5052 (1956)).

"Section 5052 is verbatim with section 41 of the Uni-
form Warehouse Receipts Act. Subsequently it was pro-
posed that the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act be
amended by two uniform amendments so as to permit
a trespasser, thief or finder to negotiate a receipt.

Section 5051 apparently is identical with the original
section 40 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. A
proposed amendment to section 40 has been adopted by
some states and provides as follows:

A negotiable receipt may be negotiated by any person

in possession of. the same, however such possession

may have been acquired, if, by the terms of the receipt,
the warehouseman undertakes to deliver the goods to

the order of such person or if at the time of negotiation *

the receipt is in such form that it may be negotiated

by delivery. As amended August, 1922.

Mississippi has not adopted the proposed amendment
of section 40.

Appellant does not deal with the amendment relating
to section 40 nor with Mississippi Code Annotated sec-
tion 5051 (1956), but appellant impliedly urges that sec-
tion 5058 authorizes a recovery by the appellee against
the warehouseman. Section 5058 is the same as section
47 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. A proposed
amendment to section 47 has been adopted by some states
and provides as follows:

The validity of the negotiation of a receipt is not

impaired by the fact that such negotiation was a breach

611

of duty on the part of the person making the nego-
tiation, or by the fact that the owner of the receipt was
deprived of the possession of the same by loss, theft,
fraud, accident, mistake, duress, or conversion, if the
person to whom the receipt was negotiated, or the
person to whom the receipt was subsequently negotiat-
ed, paid value therefor, in good faith, without notice
of the breach of duty, or loss, theft, fraud, accident,
mistake, duress or conversion. As amended August,

1922.

Mississippi has not adopted the proposed amendment of
section 47.

HEE Under the Mississippi statutes it follows that
a trespasser, a finder or a thief is not included within
the description of those persons who may negotiate a
receipt so as to give title to the receipt or other goods
represented by it to a subsequent bona fide purchaser
for value. MBM It is obvious, therefore, that the ap-
pellee received no title to the receipts in question or
to the cotton represented by them, though the appellee
acted in good faith and in the course of business.

Under Mississippi Code Annotated sections 5051 and
5058 (1956), the appellee did not have a cause of action
against the warehouseman and we do not have to decide
what the rights of the litigants would be if the legislature
of Mississippi had adopted the proposed amendments
to sections 40 and 47 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act. .

No authority was cited by appellant or appellee, and
apparently there is none in Mississippi which would
authorize the appellee, as title holder or having interest
in the receipts and the cotton represented thereby, to
compel the warehouses to pay appellee the value of the
cotton. The undisputed proof clearly shows that the
cotton was delivered by the warehouses to the rightful
owners.

The point which is in issue is determined conclusively
by sections 5051 and 5058, together with the following
cases: Commercial Nat’l Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Bank
& Trust Co., 239 U. S. 520, 36 Sup. Ct. 194, 60 L. Hid. 417
(1916); Lundy v. Greenville Bank & Trust Co., 179
Miss. 282, 174 So. 802 (1937) ; Weil Bros., Inc. v. Keenan,
180 Miss. 697, 178 So. 90 (1938); Lineburger Bros. v.
Hodge, 212 Miss. 204, 54 So. 2d 268 (1951).

It follows that it would be a futile act to require the
appellee to institute suit for the recovery of cotton
which it is impossible for him to obtain. It is pointed
out in 42 C. J. S. Indemnity §16, as follows:

Where a proceeding to establish the loss of the in-

demnitee is rendered impossible or impracticable or

facts appear showing that such proceedings would be
futile, and the loss can be otherwise established, an
action is unnecessary to establish the loss unless the
parties have by precise language stipulated therefor.

(42 0. J. S. at 593.)

HEE Having acquired no title under the Mississippi
statutes and decisions to the stolen receipts or to the
cotton represented by them, the appellee would have no
standing in any court to require the warehouses to pay it
the value of the cotton in which it never had any title
or interest.

The case at bar is clearly distinguishable from the
well-known case of Lundy v. Greenville Bank & Trust
Company, 179 Miss. 282, 174 So. 802 (1937). This Court
in that case, speaking through Justice Cook, construed
the identical warehouse receipts act now in effect in Mis-
sissippi. In that case a cotton factor had pledged and
sold cotton warehouse receipts which were in fact owned
by Lundy. Lundy contended that the factor had acquired
the receipts by theft or trespass and that therefore he
was entitled to the receipts and the cotton represented
thereby as against the banks and persons to whom the
factor had pledged and sold the receipts. These latter

|

persons contended that Lundy had entrusted the receipts
to the factor and that the negotiation of the receipts
to them was a mere breach of trust on the part-of the
factor, and that therefore they were entitled to the re-
ceipts as against the owner, Lundy.

After going into the facts in detail, this Court con-
cluded and stated in its opinion that Lundy had entrusted
the receipts to the factor. This Court examined the
facts in detail in order to note the difference between
receipts which had been entrusted to the factor and
receipts which had been acquired by him through tres-
pass or theft. Section 5058, which was construed by the
Court, permits passage of title where the receipts are
obtained through fraud, mistake or duress to entrust
the possession or custody of the receipt to a factor or
some other person. It does not permit title to pass when
the factor or such other person trespasses, finds or
steals the warehouse receipt. We pointed out in that
case:

From an analysis of the above-quoted sections, it will

be noted that negotiable warehouse receipts, payable

to bearer, may be negotiated by mere delivery, by
any person to whom the custody of such a receipt
has been intrusted by the owner, if at the time of such
intrusting the receipt is in such form as it may be
negotiated by delivery; and that a person to whom
such a receipt is negotiated acquires under it such
title to the goods as the person negotiating the re-
ceipt to him and the depositor of goods or the person
to whose order they were to be delivered by the terms
of the receipt had or had ability to convey to a pur-

chaser in good faith for value. (179 Miss. at 314, 174

So. at 811.) (Emphasis ours.)

Sections 5048, 5051, 5052, 5058, 5068 and 5069 were
likewise construed in Weil Bros., Inc. v. Keenan, 180
Miss. 697, 178 So. 90 (1938). In that case Keenan, the
grower of the cotton and the owner of the warehouse

receipts therefor, was induced by fraud by one Spencer
to give the receipts to Spencer for a specific purpose.
Instead of carrying out this purpose, Spencer sold the
cotton and delivered the receipts to Weil Brothers and
then disappeared with the money. This Court held that
Weil Brothers was entitled to the receipts and cotton,
and stated:

In Commercial National Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Bank

& Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520, 36 8. Ct. 194, 195, 60 L. Hd.

417, Chief Justice Hughes said: ‘It is a familiar rule

that one who has no title to chattels cannot transfer

title unless he has the owner’s authority or the owner
is estopped.’? The Chief Justice further said: ‘It

will be observed that ‘one who takes by trespass or a

finder is not included within the description of those

who may negotiate.’’?....

A prime purpose of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts

Act is to make the standard receipts issued by ware-

housemen for chattels documents of title so that peo-

ple who honestly purchase these documents for value
will be protected by the terms of the act as purchasers
in good faith. We are firmly convinced that Keenan
delivered the possession and custody of his ware-
house receipts to Spencer by virtue of the fraudulent
and false statement that Spencer had negotiated a
sale of Keenan’s cotton to Gooch. Spencer did not
acquire that possession by stealing the receipts; Kee-
nan voluntarily delivered the warehouse receipts and
the samples of the cotton to Spencer, and exercised
his own judgment on the truth of the statement made
to him by Spencer. ... (180 Miss. at 709-10, 178 So. at

94.) (Emphasis added.)

In Lineburger Bros. v. Hodge, 212 Miss. 204, 54 So.
2d 268 (1951), in which case the appellants were the
growers of cotton, one Carr at times would haul ap-
pellants’ cotton for them from the gin to the compress
and store it. On the occasion in question, however, Carr

took appellants’ cotton from the gin without authority,
placed it in the compress, obtained negotiable warehouse
receipts therefor and sold the receipts and cotton to
appellees.: This Court, speaking through Justice Alex-
ander, held that the cotton was not entrusted to Carr
by its owners and that since the cotton was taken by
theft the purchaser of the warehouse receipts did not,
under our Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, obtain any
title to the receipts or the cotton. We said in that case:
‘We approach, then, the rights of the appellants, the
planters and owners. As heretofore stated, they had
given Carr no authority to take and haul away any
of this cotton. Specific instructions, including the time
and identity of cotton to be so hauled, were always
given, and Carr knew this. It is immaterial whether
the warehouse knew of this limitation upon Carr’s au-
thority. It is sufficient that this limitation was under-
stood between Carr and appellants. Here there was
no dispute, and it is without question that the taking
by Carr, under all the circumstances, was larceny, and
that the receipts were fraudulently obtained. . . .
We find that the cotton was not so entrusted to Carr,
and since the cotton was in fact stolen and the receipts
fraudulently obtained, the defense of apparent authori-
ty, although available to the warehouse, does not aid
the claim of the purchasers of the receipts.
It was held in Unger v. Abbott, 92 Miss. 563, 46 So.
68, that the rule caveat emptor applies against the
claim of an innocent purchaser of warehouse receipts
who purchased them from the owner’s servant who
had been sent with cotton to a compress company with
instructions to have it weighed and to bring the re-
ceipts back to the owner, but who, contrary to his
authority and instructions, took the receipts in his
own name and sold them. (212 Miss. at 219, 220, 54
So. 2d at 270.)

We further noted:

Our statutes do not go so far as those of some other
states in protecting a bona fide purchaser of negoti-
able receipts in cases where the receipts had been
stolen. See 56 Am. Jur., Warehouses, Sec. 53. Since
such receipts were not negotiable at common law, their
negotiability is to be measured by our statutes.
‘We hold, therefore, that neither the cotton nor the
receipts had been entrusted to Carr by the owners and
that the latter are not estopped to set up their claim
to the cotton as against the several appellees who pur-
chased the receipts.

The assertion wants no support that the statutes re-
ferred to were designed to insure the negotiability of
warehouse receipts and to facilitate commerce in the
market places where cotton is brought and sold. The
innocent purchaser of a negotiable receipt is guaran-
teed an assurance without which the traffic could not
be conducted. Yet, such assurance must take into ac-
count the older principle that an owner of cotton may
not be divested of title by a trespasser or a thief. In
order to strike a just balance between these two con-
cepts the statutes were enacted. The buyer must still
beware lest he is buying receipts which have been
fraudulently obtained or cotton which has been stolen.
. +. (212 Miss. at 221-22, 54 So. 2d at 271.)
HH From the foregoing statutes and cases, it is
apparent that a finder or thief cannot transmit any title
to warehouse receipts or the goods evidenced by the
receipts, and that the appellee in the case at bar did not
and could not acquire any title to the warehouse receipts
from Holmes, or to the cotton represented by these re-
ceipts. Therefore, the warehouses were under obligation
to deliver the cotton to the rightful owners from whom
the receipts were stolen. The warehouses did what the
law of Mississippi required them to do, namely, delivered

the cotton to the rightful owners, and the fact that the
warehouses did so does not vest in appellee any right
of action against the warehouses, and the appellee could
not have maintained a successful action against the
warehouses for the value of the cotton in which appellee
had no interest. .

MMM If this Court should find in accordance with
appellant’s contentions, we would have to hold that the
warehouses are liable to appellee for the value of the
cotton represented by the original warehouse receipts,
and that the warehouseman could recover from the right-
ful owners on their bonds with the result that the ap-
pellee would derive title through a finder or thief, and
the loss would fall on the rightful owner. The con-
stitutional powers of the government of the State of
Mississippi are divided into three distinct departments,
and each of them must be confided to a separate mag-
istracy. We cannot by interpretation write the proposed
amendment to the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,
which the legislature did not adopt, into our statutes.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
was correct in sustaining the demurrer and in granting
a peremptory instruction to the appellee, and the judg-
ment of the circuit court is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Jones and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

Jones v. Ricwarps
No, 48744 January 17, 1966 181 So. 2d 923

2
a

P.L. Douglas, B Ben F. Hilbun, Jr., Starkville, for ap-

ed
eS
|

Stone & McBryde, Columbus, for appellees, Myrtis L.
Richards and Woodrow Jones.

Jack B. Carlisle, Ackerman, for appellee, William H.

w

Inzmz, J.

Appellant, Mrs. Hallie Jones, filed this suit in the Cir-
cuit Court of Oktibbeha County against appellees, Myrtis
Richards, Woodrow Jones and William H. Ray, seeking
to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by the negligence of the appellees. From
a jury verdict and judgment in favor of appellees, she
appeals to this Court.

The declaration charged that appellant was injured
on June 4, 1963, while riding as a guest in a vehicle owned
by Woodrow Jones, being driven by Myrtis Richards,
and that said vehicle was struck from the rear by a
vehicle owned and operated by William H. Ray. The
specific charge of negligence as set out in the declaration
is as follows:

That when the 1963 Oldsmobile in which the plain-
tiff was riding reached a point on Highway 12 near
the East entrance to the Natchez Trace Parkway
said defendant, Myrtis L. Richards, acting as the agent
of said Woodrow Jones did cause said vehicle to come
to a sudden stop in a negligent and reckless manner
and at a time when other traffic was in close proximi-
ty to rear of said vehicle and without warning at a
point approximately 33 feet West of the Hast entrance
to said Natchez Trace Parkway; that said defendant
failed to keep said vehicle under reasonable control;
that said defendant operated said vehicle in a care-
less and reckless manner without due care for the
safety of other persons using said highway; that said
defendant did fail to keep a reasonable and proper
lookout; that said defendant did park or stop her ve-
hicle on said Highway 12 in-violation of the law of
the State of Mississippi.

Said defendant William H. Ray drove his 1957 Mer-
eury Automobile into the rear of the 1963 Oldsmobile
mentioned above causing his vehicle to strike and vio-

CC

lently collide with said 1963 Oldsmobile. That said

‘William H. Ray did fail to keep a reasonable lookout

and did fail to keep his vehicle under control.

Miss Richards and Mr. Jones filed separate answers
and denied that they were guilty of any negligence that
caused or contributed to the accident, and affirmatively
alleged that the accident was caused by the sole negli-
gence of Ray. They alleged that Ray was guilty of neg-
ligence in failing to keep a proper lookout, not keeping
the automobile under control at all times, and following
too closely. Ray answered, and denied that he was guilty
of any negligence that caused or contributed to the ac-
cident, and alleged that the sole, proximate cause of the
collision was the negligence of Richards, as stated in the
declaration.

Appellant assigns as error three reasons for the re-
versal of this case. They are: (1) the verdict of the
jury was contrary to the law and against the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence, and the court was in error in
overruling a motion for a new trial; (2) the court erred
in admitting into evidence two photographs as Exhibits
1 and 2 to the testimony of the defendant, Woodrow
Jones; (3) the court erred in giving instructions No. 1,
No. 2, No. 4 and No. 8 for defendants, Myrtis Richards
and Woodrow Jones.

MBN We have reached the conclusion that the verdict
of the jury was against the overwhelming weight of
the evidence, and that the trial court should have grant-
ed a new trial. The proof shows without question that
the collision occurred on June 4, 1963, at a point on
Mississippi Highway No. 12, just West of the Hast en-
trance to the Natchez Trace Parkway in Attala County;
that Mrs. Jones was riding as a guest on the rear seat
of the 1963 Oldsmobile owned by Jones, and driven by
Richards under his direction; that the Oldsmobile was
struck from the rear by a 1957 Mercury owned and driven
by Ray. According to the evidence on behalf of Richards

622

and Jones, the accident was due to the negligence of
Ray, in failing to keep his vehicle under proper control
and following so close as to be unable to stop it in his
assured distance ahead. The evidence on behalf of Ray
was to the effect that the driver of Jones’ vehicle stopped
it suddenly in front of him, and in spite of his doing every-
thing he could, he was unable to avoid the collision.
HI [t is clear from the evidence that the collision
was caused by the negligence of either one or both of
the drivers of the vehicles involved. It was not an un-
avoidable accident. Appellant was not charged with any
negligence, and none is shown by the proof. Under these
circumstances, appellant was entitled to a verdict against
one or all of the appellees, provided she was injured
as a result of this accident. Mitchell-Davis Distrib. Co.
vy. McDonald, 223 Miss. 573, 78 So. 2d 597 (1955).

The proof relative to her injuries was that she was
riding on the left side of the back seat of Jones’ vehicle
at the time it was hit by the vehicle driven by Ray.
Mrs. Jones testified that when the collision occurred,
she felt her neck pop. She said she exclaimed, ‘‘Lord,
my neck is broke.’’? Richards and Jones both testified
that the car in which appellant was riding was struck a
hard blow, and it was knocked some fifteen feet forward
by the force of the blow. They both stated that it jolted
them, and they did not deny that Mrs. Jones told them
that she was hurt. They admitted that they wanted to
take her to the doctor, but Mrs. Jones thought she would
be all right in a little while. Mrs. Jones testified that
she went on to Louisiana, where she remained for two
days, and after she returned home, she did not see a
doctor until the twenty-fourth of June, 1963. She said
that after the accident her neck continued to hurt, and
instead of getting better, it got worse; that the pain
became so intense that she finally had to go to see the
doctor; that since the accident her neck has continued
to bother her, and for much of the time she was unable

623

to perform her household duties. She admitted that she
had had some trouble with her neck about two years
prior to the accident, but stated that she had completely
recovered from this trouble. She had also had an op-
eration for a thyroid condition some four months before
the accident, but she said that the operation had not
caused her any pain in her neck.

Dr. John T. Copeland testified on behalf of appellant,
and he stated that he first saw appellant on June 24,
1963, relative to her injuries. He said that she came to
his office complaining of neck pain and headaches, and
told him that she had been in an automobile accident on
June 4, 1963. He examined her and had multiple X-rays
made. He found that she had some paracerebellar muscle
strain which was a tenderness of the muscles to the right
and left of the bony structure of the neck. The X-rays
showed no bony deformity, but on the basis of the pain
she had and on the basis of the tenderness of the neck
and limitation of motion, the doctor placed her on oral
medication. She was also given local therapy such as
heat and massage and traction to her neck. The doctor
said that pain in the neck persisted to different degrees,
and eventually the picture became predominantly that
of a headache, which seemed to arise out of her neck and
ligate toward her right eye. Because of the progression
of these symptoms, he referred her to a specialist, Dr.
Charles Neal of Jackson. Dr. Neal took additional X-rays,
and suggested additional medication which Dr. Copeland
prescribed for her. Dr. Copeland was asked about his
previous treatment of Mrs. Jones, and he said that he
had treated her in relation to blood pressure and for a
thyroid condition. He said that she had had an opera-
tion about four months prior to the accident, but in
his opinion, the operation had no connection with the
results from the accident. Dr. Copeland treated Mrs.
Jones until March 30, 1964, and had not treated her
since that time prior to the date of the trial. Dr. Neal

—
was not offered as a witness, although appellant waived
the privilege as to his testimony.

HEE Mrs. Jones was corroborated by the testimony
of her husband, who testified that she had been, and
was still, unable to do much of her housework since
the accident. There was no other testimony relative to
her injuries or lack of injury. Her testimony is not con-
tradictory, and it is not incredible, improbable, unrea-
sonable or untrustworthy, and it should not be arbitrari-
ly and capriciously rejected. IE We are of the opinion
that a finding by the jury that appellant was not injured
as a result of this accident is against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. Fisher v. Daniels, 252 Miss. 662,
173 So. 2d 908 (1965); Reyer v. Pearl River Tung Co.,
219 Miss. 211, 68 So. 2d 442 (1953).

The error complained of relative to the admission
into evidence of the two photographs is not material,
and we are certain that upon the retrial of this case, the
court will require a proper identification of the photo-
graphs prior to admitting them into evidence.

The instructions complained of were instructions
granted the appellees, Myrtis Richards and Woodrow
Jones. We find no error in these instructions, except
that some of the instructions are couched in language
that does seem to imply that the jury was required to
believe that both of these defendants were guilty of
negligence before the jury would be authorized to return
a verdict against either of them. Upon the retrial of
this case, these instructions should not be given unless
they are amended to eliminate this objection.

For the reasons stated, this case must be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Gillespie, P. J., and Rodgers, Jones and Brady, JJ.,
concur.

Mississtppr Motor Frvanoz, Ivo. v. Enis
No. 43746 January 17, 1966 181 So. 2d 903

Scribner & Brewer, Tupelo, for appellant.

fon

26

Dudley R. Carr, Tupelo, for appellee.

Guesrim, P. J.

Mississippi Motor Finance, Inc. sued Bill Enis for the
balance due on a conditional sales contract payable in
installments. The issue presented to the jury was wheth-
er there was a contract of novation whereby another
person was substituted, and defendant released from lia-
bility. The jury found for defendant, and plaintiff ap-
pealed.

The question for our decision is whether the evidence
justified the jury in finding that the parties entered into
a contract of novation. We hold that the defendant failed,
to offer evidence that plaintiff agreed to release defend-

a

ant and that the evidence did not present a jury issue
as to whether there was a contract of novation.

The facts are stated in the light most favorable to
defendant in whose favor the jury found.

On June 22, 1962, defendant purchased a 1962 Rambler
from Safety Motors, a partnership composed of W. H.
Cooper and himself, used car dealers. Defendant exe-
cuted to Safety Motors a conditional sales contract for
$4,172.80, payable in twenty-four monthly installments.
Failure to pay any installment accelerated the entire
debt. The conditional sales contract was assigned by
Safety Motors, acting through W. H. Cooper, to plaintiff,
with recourse. In November, 1962, the partnership was
dissolved, and defendant was released from further re-
sponsibility as a partner. Thereafter Safety Motors
continued to operate under the sole ownership of Cooper.
In the dissolution of the partnership defendant was not
released from liability under the conditional sales con-
tract for the 1962 Rambler.

Defendant made payments on the conditional sales
contract from July, 1962, through August, 1963, totalling
$2,365.30.

On June 28, 1963, defendant purchased a 1963 Rambler
from W. H. Cooper, doing business as Safety Motors,
and executed to Safety Motors a conditional sales con-
tract for the full purchase price. The contract did not
show any trade-in or cash payment. Cooper had told a
representative of plaintiff, prior to the purchase by de-
fendant of the 1963 Rambler, that the trade would be
made and that he, Cooper, would pay off the balance
due on the 1962 Rambler when he sold it. A representa-
tive of plaintiff knew when the trade was consummated
between Cooper, doing business as Safety Motors, and
defendant, and that the 1962 Rambler was on the yard
of Safety Motors after the transaction. As between
Cooper and defendant it was agreed that Safety Motors
would pay off the balance due on the 1962 Rambler, and

628

words to that effect were written by Cooper on the in-
voice. Plaintiff did not receive this invoice.

After the trade on June 28, 1963, two payments on
the 1962 Rambler for the months of July and August,
1968, were made by defendant, but he testified that the
money was furnished him by Cooper.

Cooper, doing business as Safety Motors, became fi-
nancially involved in September, 1963, and went out
of business. He sold the 1962 Rambler and failed to
pay plaintiff. Plaintiff sued defendant Enis for the
balance due on the conditional sales contract for the
1962 Rambler.

HH A novation involving substitution of debtors
is a contract that (a) discharges immediately an exist-
ing contractual obligation, (b) creates a new contractual
obligation by, (c) including as the new obligor a party
who was not previously obligated. Greenwood Leflore
Hosp. v. Turner, 213 Miss. 200, 56 So. 2d 496 (1951) ;
Sussman, Wormser & Co. v. Sea Food Co., 127 Miss.
420, 90 So. 116 (1921) ; Turnpike Co. v. Gooch, 113 Miss.
50, 73 So. 869 (1916) ; 89 Am. Jur. Novation § 2 at 254-55
(1942); Restatement, Contracts § 424 (1932). Hl i
The contract of novation is a mutual undertaking among
all parties concerned.

In order to establish his affirmative defense of nova-
tion, it was necessary for defendant Enis to prove (a)
that he, Enis, was immediately discharged from the
obligation to pay the debt evidenced by the conditional
sales contract for the 1962 Rambler, (b) a new contrac-
tual obligation was created between plaintiff and Cooper,
whereby Cooper would become liable to plaintiff, and
(c) that Cooper was not previously obligated to plaintiff
on the conditional sales contract for the 1962 Rambler.

There was no express agreement that Enis was re-
leased from payment of the debt, evidenced by the con-
ditional sales contract, for the purchase of the 1962
Rambler. No new contractual obligation between Cooper

629

as debtor and plaintiff as creditor was created in con-
nection with the trade between Cooper and Enis, whereby
Enis turned over the 1962 Rambler to Cooper, and pur-
chased a 1963 Rambler. Cooper was already liable to
plaintiff on the 1962 contract by reason of his assign-
ment thereof with recourse. For the same reason, de-
fendant failed to prove that Cooper was not previously
obligated on the 1962 contract. We find no evidence of
an. express contract of novation.

HM It remains to be determined whether the cir-
cumstances attending the transaction between Cooper
and Enis on June 28, 1963, and the conduct of the parties,
then and thereafter, justified the jury in finding that a
novation was established by implication. This court
held in American Blakeslee Mfg. Co. v. Martin & Son,
128 Miss. 302, 91 So. 6 (1922) that novation may be
implied where the facts and circumstances demonstrate
that it was the intention of the parties to substitute one
party for another. The facts in that case are entirely
different from the present case. The circumstances re-
lied upon by Enis as establishing a novation by implica-
tion include the fact that Cooper told the manager of
plaintiff that he was going to trade with Enis and that
he, Cooper, would pay off the indebtedness on the 1962
Rambler. The manager of plaintiff knew the trade was
made, and knew the 1962 Rambler was on Safety Motors’
lot. The agreement between Cooper and Enis was that
Cooper would sell the 1962 Rambler, pay off the in-
debtedness due plaintiff, and pay over any balance to
Enis. Plaintiff’s manager talked. to Cooper a number
of times after the trade between Cooper and Enis, and
requested Cooper to pay off the balance due on the 1962
Rambler. The conditional sales contract involved in this
case was one of many Cooper had assigned to plaintiff,
and a representative regularly went over these accounts
with Cooper. The payments for the months of July and
August were made by Enis, although Cooper furnished

630

Enis the money. We are of the opinion that all that
was said and done by the parties was consistent with
Enis’ remaining liable for the indebtedness on the 1962
Rambler. The evidence did not justify a finding of no-
vation by implication. Plaintiff continued to hold the
original conditional sales contract. There was no new
document signed. The agreement between Cooper and
Enis that Cooper was to pay the balance on the contract
and plaintiff’s knowledge of it was no proof that plaintiff
intended to release Enis. We hold that the plaintiff was
entitled to a peremptory instruction and a judgment for
the amount sued for.

For the reasons stated the case is reversed, and judg-
ment entered here for the plaintiff for the balance due
on the 1962 contract, plus interest and attorneys’ fees.

Reversed and rendered.

Rodgers, Jones, Brady and Ineer, JJ., concur.

Mississtprrt Starz Hicuway Commisston v. Morean, et ux.
No. 43747 January 17, 1966 181 So. 2d 905

63:

as

Boyd, Holifield & Harper, Laurel, for appellant.

Gartin, Hester & Pickering, Laurel, for appellees.

’ DE i
Guuespre, P. J.

Ray Morgan, plaintiff below and appellee here, brought

suit against the Mississippi State Highway Commission,
defendant below and appellant here, for recovery of
attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred in success-
fully prosecuting a petition for writ of prohibition, The
case was tried before the county judge without a jury,
and judgment entered for plaintiff. Defendant appealed
to the cireuit court, and that court affirmed the county
court. The Highway Commission appealed to this Court.
The question for our decision is whether, under the
particular facts and circumstances, the plaintiff is en-
titled to recover under the terms of Mississippi Code
Annotated section 2775 (1956). We hold he was, and
affirm the case.
On May 17, 1963, the Highway Commission filed an
application in eminent domain for the condemnation of
certain property belonging to Morgan, describing it in
two separate parcels. Parcel No. 1 was a strip to be
used for the right-of-way of Interstate Highway 59.
Parcel No. 2 consisted of an easement over a strip of
land 939 feet long and 30 feet wide for the purpose of
relocating an access road so that another landowner,
Keller, could use the strip through the Morgan tract
to reach the public road.

On May 29, 1963, Morgan filed a petition for a writ
of prohibition in the circuit court to prohibit the High-
way Commission from taking the property described in
Parcel No. 2. The petition was not concerned with Parcel
No. 1. After a full hearing, the circuit court issued a
writ of prohibition permanently restraining the Highway
©ommission from condemning Parcel No. 2, being the

fn

easement above described. On appeal to this Court,
the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed without
prejudice to any other rights or remedies which the
Highway Commission might assert. Mississippi State
Highway Comm’n-v. Morgan, 248 Miss. 631, 160 So. 2d
TT (1964).

Thereafter the Highway Commission adopted a new
order for the condemnation of an easement across the
Morgan property, and filed an amended application in
the original eminent domain proceedings by amending
the description of Parcel No. 2, so as to correct the
defect which resulted in the issuance of the writ of
prohibition. This amended application was filed on
March 17, 1964, and on the seventh day of April, 1964,
Morgan filed another petition for a writ of prohibition,
seeking to restrain the Highway Commission from con-
demning Parcel No. 2, as described in the amended ap-
plication. The circuit court again issued a writ of prohi-
bition, and the Highway Commission appealed to this
Court, where the judgment of the circuit court was re-
versed, and the writ of prohibition dissolved. Missis-

’ sippi State Highway Comm’n v. Morgan, 175 So. 2d 606
(Miss. 1965).

In the meantime, the present suit was filed by Morgan
on February 25, 1964, prior to the trial of the eminent
domain suit on the amended petition.

Morgan brought this suit against the Highway Com-
mission under Mississippi Code Annotated section 2775
(1956) which provides as follows:

In case the plaintiff shall fail to pay the damages
and costs awarded to the defendant within ninety days
from the date of the rendering of the final judgment,
if such judgment is not appealed from, or within nine-
ty days after the affirmance of such final judgment
on appeal, or in case the suit shall be dismissed by
the plaintiff, or the judgment be that the plaintiff is
not entitled to a judgment condemning the property,

634

the defendant may recover of the plaintiff in an action
brought therefor, all reasonable expenses, including

attorneys’ fees, incurre:

by him in defending the suit.

This statute creates a right of action for the recovery

by a defendant in eminent
penses incurred in defen

domain of all reasonable ex-

ing the eminent domain suit

whenever (1) the plaintiff (condemnor) shall fail to
pay the damages and cost awarded to the defendant
within ninety days from the date of the judgment if the
case is not appealed, or within ninety days after affirm-
ance of such final judgment on appeal, or, (2) in case
the suit be dismissed by the plaintiff, or, (3) the judg-
ment be that the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment
condemning the property.

Morgan contends that the judgment in the first writ

of prohibition suit, which
on appeal, was a judgment

Department) was not entit!

was affirmed by this Court
that the plaintiff (Highway
ed to a judgment condemning

Parcel No. 2, as described in the Highway Department’s
original application in eminent domain. The Highway
Department contends that since this Court affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court ordering the writ of pro- *
hibition without prejudice to further proceedings by the
Highway Department against Morgan, there was no
final judgment that the Highway Department was not
entitled to condemn the property described as Parcel
No. 2.

In the original application in eminent domain, the
Highway Department sought to condemn an easement
across Morgan’s land for use as a substitute means of
access to the Keller property. The Highway Depart-
ment abused its discretion in seeking to condemn Parcel
No. 2 because it terminated in a dead end on Morgan’s
property, and would not connect Keller’s property to
the public road. Mississippi State Highway Comm’n
vy. Morgan, 248 Miss. 631, 160 So. 24 77 (1964). The
amended application of the Highway Department in-

cluded a proper description of Parcel No. 2 so that
the easement would connect the Keller property with
the public road. On appeal from the second judgment
of the circuit court ordering a writ of prohibition, this
Court reversed and held that the Highway Department
could condemn the easement as described in Parcel No.

2, along with the property described in Parcel No. 1.
Mississippi State Highway Comm’n v. Morgan, 175 So.
2d 606 (Miss. 1965).

Mississippi Code Annotated section 2775 (1956) is
a remedial statute, the purpose of which is to afford
a remedy to a defendant in an eminent domain suit to
recover expenses incurred in defending the case when-
ever the condemnor (plaintiff) does not pay damages
and cost for the reasons enumerated above. There was
a final judgment that the Highway Department was
not entitled to a judgment condemning Parcel No. 2
as described in the original eminent domain proceed-
ings. The writ of prohibition forever restrained the
Highway Department from condemning the Parcel No.
2. After another order was adopted by the Highway
Department, the eminent domain application was amend-
ed so that Parcel No. 2 included additional land in order
that the substituted easement would afford access from
Keller’s land to the public road. The subsequent pro-
ceedings did not nullify the original final order for a
writ of prohibition restraining the Highway Depart-
ment from condemning Parcel No. 2 as originally de-
scribed.

Hl BE We hold that the present case is maintainable
under Mississippi Code Annotated section 2775 (1956). -
The proceedings for a writ of prohibition resulted in
a judgment ‘‘that the plaintiff is not entitled to a judg-
ment condemning the property.’’ The expenses involved
in prosecuting these proceedings were incurred through
no fault of Morgan, and he is entitled to recover under
the plainest principles of justice. The statute was in-
tended to provide a remedy in this kind of case.

The other contentions of the Highway Department on
this appeal are without merit, and do not require dis-
cussion. :

Affirmed.
Rodgers, Jones, Brady and Inger, JJ., concur.

Yanoy v. Crry or Oxrorp, Misstssrepr
No. 43760 January 17, 1966 181 So. 2d 912

Wells, Thomas & Wells, Jackson; Armis EH. Hawkins,
Houston; Roberts & Craig, Oxford, for appellant.

mt, Jr., Holy Springs; J. W. Price, Freeland
Oxford, for appell

Roszrtson, J.

This is an appeal by George T. Yancy from an order
of the Chancery Court of Lafayette County wherein the
court on its own motion dismissed without prejudice
the bill of complaint filed by the appellant. This was
a taxpayer’s suit against the City of Oxford, Mississippi,
wherein the appellant prayed for an injunction against
the appellee enjoining the appellee from expending any
tax funds or public funds from the city treasury for
the purpose of maintaining and operating a museum,
particularly the Mary Buie Museum.

The Court, on its own motion, entered an order of
dismissal finding in the order, ‘‘That the questions in-
volved in the matter are presently moot, due to the
fact that the city now has on hand sufficient funds from
the Mary Buie Estate to pay the expenses of the museum
in the foreseeable future without the use of tax funds’’,

HEEB This dismissal is in the nature of a compulsory
non-suit which is not recognized in Mississippi. The
posture of this case at the time of dismissal was that
the appellee had moved for a separate hearing on mat-
ters contained in its answer constituting special pleas
in bar, which pleas were clearly distinct and readily
separable and, of course, the appellee was entitled to
a separate hearing on these matters. By the same token,
the appellant would be entitled to present testimony
answering the contentions of the appellee.

4

for
|

HEME The Court holds that the judgment of the lower
court dismissing without prejudice, the bill of complaint
should be reversed, and the cause remanded for a hear-
ing on the bill of complaint and the special pleas as set
up in the answer, in accordance with the Statutes of the
State of Mississippi.

The Court sympathizes with the chancellor and under-
stands how the chancellor could very well feel that the
order of dismissal was in effect being entered by agree-
ment of the parties litigant.

The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause re-
manded.

Reversed and cause remanded.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

Ee

Tun Muromants Company, et al. v. Wannacs
No. 43933 January 17, 1966 181 So, 2d 926

William G. Beanland, Brunini, Everett, Grantham &
Quin, Jackson and Vicksburg, for appellants.

oO

641

W. E. Gore, Jr., Pyles & Tucker, Jackson, for appel-
lee.

Smurz, J.

On a former day this Court sustained appellee’s mo-
tion to strike the transcript and to dismiss the appeal
for want of jurisdiction in this Court.

Now appellee has filed a motion requesting this Court
to make an allowance of fees to compensate his attorney
for services on the appeal here.

MMB Having decided that this Court never acquired
jurisdiction of the case, we are bound to take notice of
our want of jurisdiction to act upon the present motion
for attorneys’ fees. 21 0.3.8. Courts § 114 at 175 (1940).

Motion denied.

All Justices concur.

Russ v. Stare
No. 43295 February 7, 1966 182 So. 2d 214

4

rah

Laurel G. Weir, Philadelphia, for appellant.

R. Hugo Newcomb, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Ivzur, J.

Appellant, James L. Rush, was indicted, tried and
convicted in the Circuit Court of Neshoba County on a
charge of assault and battery, with the intent to kill
and murder Paul Stokes. He was sentenced to serve
a term of ten years in the state penitentiary. From
this conviction and sentence he appeals to this Court.

Appellant makes the following assignment of errors:

1. The verdict of the jury is contrary to the over-
whelming weight of the law and evidence and is
not supported by any law or evidence.

2. The Court erred in overuling (sic) the motion for
new trial.

8. The Court erred in granting every instruction
granted to the State and in refusing every in-
struction refused appellee as shown by the rec-
ord.

4, The Court erred in sustaining every objection made
by the State and in overruling every instruction

refused appellant as shown by the record.

645

5. The Court erred in refusing appellant a continu-
ance.

6. The Court erred in allowing appellant to be tried
on the indictment brought from the files without
requiring a new indictment.

7. The Court erred in not causing appellant to be
represented by an attorney and in not having
him and his attorney present at all times.

8. The judgment of the Court is erroneous for the
many other reasons apparent upon the face of the
record and to be shown on a hearing of this appeal.

The proof on behalf of the state shows that in April,

1962, appellant was living in a tenant house on the
farm of Paul Stokes in Neshoba County. Appellant
had made a crop on the farm the year before, but did
not contract to make a crop for the year 1962. He was
working for Stokes and others when needed. The house
in which appellant lived was about three-fourths of a
mile from the home of Stokes. On Sunday, April 15,
1962, Stokes went to the house where appellant lived to
see appellant about doing some work for his father-in-
law the next day. When he reached the house he knocked
on the floor of the front porch, and appellant’s wife
came to the door. Stokes asked where appellant was,
and upon being informed that he was in the house,
Stokes asked her to tell him to come out. At about
that time, appellant came out the door with a 22-caliber
rifle in his hand, and said to Stokes, according to the
testimony of Stokes, ‘‘I am going to kill you.’’ Stokes
ran around to the rear of the house, and appellant
followed him, and shot him between the shoulders. Stokes
was knocked to the ground, and appellant threw his
rifle down and ran over and jumped on Stokes, and
started hitting him. Stokes managed to get up, and
appellant picked up the rifle and went back into the
house. Stokes started home, and when he was about half
way there, appellant came up behind him and shot him

two other times. One shot hit Stokes in the right hip
and the other in the upper part of the leg. These shots
knocked Stokes to the ground, and appellant came up
to him and drew the rifle on him, and told him, ‘‘Let’s
go.’? Appellant then made Stokes go back to his house
with him. On their way to the house, a car driven by
Walter Steele drove up. Appellant pointed the gun at
Steele, and waved him back. Steele backed his car to
the main road and left. Stokes told appellant that he
had to have a doctor, and appellant agreed to go to
Stokes’ home. They started to Stokes’ house, and on
their way, they met a car in which Ross Ford and Chet
Ford were riding. Appellant waved his rifle at them
and told them to go on by. After they reached Stokes’
home, they went into the back yard, and Burnice Cook
Adam Stewart drove up into the driveway. Appel-
Tant halted them, and after about fifteen to twenty _
minutes, Cook and Stewart prevailed upon appellant to
let Stokes go to the hospital. During all this time,
appellant had the rifle drawn on Stokes. Cook then
drove Stokes to the hospital, and appellant went back
to his home. Appellant informed Cook and Stewart
that he would surrender to the sheriff when he came.
Mr. BE. G. Barnett, the Sheriff of Neshoba County, re-
ceived a call about the trouble and went to investigate.
He found appellant at his home, and appellant inform-
ed him that he had messed up and was ready to go.
The rifle was leaning on the door of the porch, and the
sheriff picked it up. He then put appellant into his
car, and carried him to jail. The sheriff then went back
to the home of appellant to make a further investiga-
tion. In back of the house he saw a place that looked
like some scrambling had taken place. He also saw some
spots of blood and found an empty rifle cartridge. He
went through the house, but saw no evidence of any
disorder therein. He did find some rifle cartridges lying
on the bed. He found no evidence of any blood or strug-
gle inside of the house.

647

Appellant remained in jail from April 15 until in
August, when he was carried to the Neshoba County
Hospital. He had at that time what is described as a
spell or seizure, and it was thought that he had spinal
meningitis; however, it developed that he did not have
this trouble. Later, on an order of the circuit judge,
he was sent to Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield
for a mental examination. He was admitted to the hos-
pital at Whitfield on August 21, 1962, and on August
24, 1962, he was operated on for a hemorrhage of one
of the blood vessels in his brain. On October 10, 1962,
it was determined by the doctors at the hospital that
appellant was insane. Appellant remained in the hos-
pital, and his condition gradually improved until he was
discharged from the hospital in November 1963 as being
cured and sane. He was returned to the Neshoba County
jail where he remained until he was tried.

At the September 1962 Term of the Circuit Court of
Neshoba County, appellant was indicted; he was in the
mental institution at that time. At the February 1963
Term of the court, appellant was still in the hospital,
and the case was continued. At the September 1963
Term of the court, an order was entered on the motion
of the district attorney to carry the case against ap-
pellant to the files.

After appellant was returned to the jail in Neshoba
County, he employed counsel to represent him. This was
done several weeks prior to the February 1964 Term
of the court at which he was tried. On Thursday of the
first week of the February 1964 Term of the court, a
motion was sustained to revive the case and restore it
to the active criminal docket. On the same date ap-
pellant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
The arraignment was in open court, and appellant’s
counsel was with him at the time he was arraigned. The
court fixed the amount of bail bond, and the case was
set for trial on Wednesday of the following week.

PO

HE On the day set for trial, counsel for appellant
filed a motion to quash the proceedings and also a mo-
tion for continuance. The basis for the motion to quash
be tried on the indictment that had been retired to the
files was taken without appellant being present and
that the action reviving the cause or restoring it to the
active docket was done in the absence of appellant an
his counsel. It was contended that appellant could not
be tried on the indictment that had been retried to the
files and that the grand jury had refused to reindict
appellant. Testimony was taken on this motion, an
the trial judge rendered an opinion which was dictate
into the record. He held that the defendant and his
attorney were present in court when the motion to re-
vive the cause was sustained, and that retiring the case
to the files did not amount to nolle prosequi of the in-
dictment. The overruling of this motion to quash is
assigned as one of the errors on this appeal. We fin
that the motion to quash was properly overruled. The
passing of an indictment to the files is not an acquittal
or a nolle prosequi of the indictment. The district at-
torney may at any future term of the court move to
withdraw the indictment from the files, and the court
is at liberty to sustain the same. When the motion is
sustained the indictment again becomes a part of the
active cases subject to trial. Byrd v. State, 179 Miss.
336, 175 So. 190 (1937) ; Gordon v. State, 127 Miss. 396,
90 So. 75 (1921).

The court then overruled the motion of the defendant
for a continuance, and this action is also assigned as
error. The motion as made is as follows:

The adult defendant in this cause, James L. Rush,
moves the court to continue this cause until a later
date and until the next regular term of this Court for
the reasons that several of his vital witnesses to prove
vital points in his defense are not present in Court.

649

The only eyewitness to the alleged crime other than
defendant and the prosecuting witness is Elmira Rush,
the wife of defendant and he desires her presence in
Court to prove that the defendant was insane at the
time of the shooting and did not know right from
wrong and that the shooting was justifiable or was
without malice aforethought or intent to kill and mur-
der because of actions of the prosecuting witness to-
wards her and that process for her appearance has
been diligently issued, but she has not been served
with said process and is not present in Court, but
she can be here to testify to said facts at the next
term of this Court and she is the only witness de-
fendant can prove said facts by.

Defendant Moves the Court to continue this cause
to a later date so his vital and necessary witnesses
can be present.

Ml WH It may be readily observed that the motion,
as made, does not comply with the provisions of Missis-
sippi Code Annotated section 1520 (1942) relative to
continuances. In none of the cases cited by appellant,
or in any that we have been able to find, has this Court
held that the trial judge abused his discretion in over-
ruling a motion for a continuance unless there had been
a substantial compliance with this statute. In this case
it was the duty of the appellant to show in his motion
the whereabouts of his wife. If she was in the county,
and if the sheriff had failed to serve her, he should have
asked for an alias subpoena, and made diligent effort
to secure her presence. The facts he expected to prove
by her should have been clearly set out so that the trial
judge would have an opportunity to ascertain whether
they were material. He should have shown that she was
not absent by the consent or procurement of appellant.
After the motion was overruled the duty was upon the
appellant to persist in his efforts to get this witness for
a hearing on the motion for a new trial. In other words,
it was the duty of the appellant to show that he was

650

diligent in his efforts to secure the presence of this wit-
ness. We have emphasized the importance of complying
with this statute when a motion for continuance has been
filed. Some of the cases reflecting our admonition in
this regard are Dean v. State, 234 Miss. 375, 106 So.
2d 501 (1958); Bone v. State, 207 Miss. 20, 41 So. 2d
847 (1949); Ogden v. State, 174 Miss. 119, 164 So. 6
(1935) ; Ware v. State, 133 Miss. 837, 98 So. 229 (1923) ;
Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265 (1885). We are constrained
to hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
when he overruled appellant’s motion for a continuance.

Appellant testified in his own behalf, and said that
in December 1962 which was some four months prior
to the date of the shooting, that he had had trouble
with his head and had blackout spells. After one of these
blackout spells, he went to Matty Hersee Hospital in
Meridian, where he remained about fifteen or sixteen
days. He said that after his release from the hospital
his condition became worse and that Stokes had started
going with his wife. He also said that about three
weeks before the shooting he had a conversation with
Stokes, and at that time, Stokes threatened to kill him.
He tried to get his wife to move away, but according
to his testimony, she refused to do so. He testified that
on April 15, 1962, he came into the back door of his
home and found Stokes on top of his wife on the floor
of the bedroom. He said that they were on the floor
between the two beds that were in the room. He first
said that he had a gun with him and that he shot Stokes.
He later said that, he did not remember anything after
he opened the back door, and that he did not remember
anything else until he was in jail. On cross-examination
he said that he remembered shooting Stokes, and that
the reason he shot him was that Stokes had threatened
his life, and that he was afraid of him. He later denied
that he shot Stokes. He did not remember going to the
hospital in Neshoba County or to the hospital at Whit-

CC

field. He said that after he could remember, he realized
that they had operated on his head.

Dr. David L. Davidson testified as a witness on behalf
of appellant. Dr. Davidson is a psychiatrist and has
been on the staff at the Mississippi State Hospital at
‘Whitfield for more than ten years prior to the trial. He
testified that appellant was admitted to the hospital at
Whitfield on August 21, and was operated on for a
hemorrhage of a blood vessel in his brain on August 24.
His first examination of appellant was on September 10,
1962, and he continued to see him after that time. On
October 11, 1962, it was determined by the staff at the
hospital that the appellant was insane. Appellant stayed
in the hospital until November 1963 during which time
his condition gradually improved, and he was discharged
as being sane. Dr. Davidson further testified as to the
effect of the bleeding of a blood vessel, and it was his
opinion that if appellant had suffered a blackout spell
prior to the shooting, it could have easily brought about
a confused state of mind, and that any stress or strain
could make his condition worse, to the extent that he
would not know right from wrong. He was unable to
express any opinion as to appellant’s mental condition
on April 15, 1962, the date of the shooting, but he said
from the history of his illness that he had received, that
it was his opinion that if appellant had started having
headaches at the age of twelve years, that this could
have been the beginning of his mental trouble. It was
his opinion that this condition would have grown gradu-
ally worse and that his sanity would come and go.

Several other witnesses testified in behalf of appel-
lant, including his father, mother and neighbors. They
testified relative to his mental condition and as to his
reputation in the community for peace and violence. The
gist of their testimony was that the appellant had a
good reputation for peace and violence, and in their
opinion, at the time of the shooting on April 15, 1962,

that appellant did not know right from wrong. One of
the witnesses said that appellant was just crazy, but
none saw him on the day of the shooting. His mother
and father did see him on the day before the shooting,
and they said that he was not acting right, and in their
opinion, he did not know right from wrong at that time.

Dr. Pete H. Rhymes also testified on behalf of ap-
pellant. He first saw him on August 4, 1962, at the
Neshoba County jail. Appellant was unconscious at that
time, having had what was described to the doctor as
an epileptic fit or a seizure. Dr. Rhymes had him ad-
mitted to the Neshoba County Hospital where appellant
remained in a partial coma until he was transferred to
the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield. He said
appellant was never completely rational during this peri-
od, and it was his opinion that if what he was told was
correct, that appellant’s trouble first started in No-
vember or December prior to the time he saw him in
August. He was unable to give any opinion as to appel-
lant’s mental condition on April 15, 1962.

Several witnesses testified on behalf of the state as
to appellant’s mental condition on April 15, 1962. All
of those who saw him on that date said that, in their
opinion, he was rational and sane. Mrs. H. V. M. Herring
who was the jailer where he was incarcerated saw him
daily from the time he was put in jail until August 4,
and she said that during this time he appeared to be
normal until he had the seizure on August 4, 1962.

HM It is apparent that the evidence on behalf of
the state and that upon behalf of the appellant made
it a jury issue as to whether appellant was sane or
insane at the time of the shooting. The court instructed
the jury on behalf of the defendant that if there was
any reasonable doubt, either from the evidence or lack
of evidence, as to whether the appellant was sane or
did not know right from wrong, when he shot Stokes,
then in that event it was their sworn duty to find the

653

defendant not guilty. The jury determined this issue,
and we cannot say that such determination is agains’
the overwhelming weight of the evidence. There was
ample evidence to support the finding of the jury, an
the trial court was not in error in overruling the motion
for a new trial.
MEM Appellant assigns as error the action of the
court in sustaining every objection made by the state,
and overruling every objection made by appellant as
shown by the record. We have heretofore commente
on and condemned this type of an assignment of error.
The rules of this Court require that error complaine
of be set out separately and pointed out with certainty.
HB We have carefully considered not only those mat-
ters particularly pointed out in appellant’s brief, bu
also the entire record in this case relative to the action
of the trial court in sustaining and overruling objection
to evidence that affected defendant’s rights. We fin
no reversible error on the part of the court. In many
instances where objections were sustained to questions
propounded to witnesses on direct examination by coun-
sel for appellant, the witness had already testified to
those facts or the same questions had already been asked
in another form. We have carefully examined the record
relative to the cross-examination of appellant, and we
find that appellant was cross-examined rather extensive-
ly, and many questions were asked relative to immaterial
matter, but these questions were for the apparent pur-
pose of testing appellant’s recollection of the things that
had happened prior to, and on the date of, the shooting.
When a defendant takes the stand and testifies in his
own behalf, he subjects himself to cross-examination. The
fact that such cross-examination is vigorous is not ob-
jectionable so long as it is not abusive, and is confined
to the proper scope. We said in Jones v. State, 222 Miss.
887, 395, 76 So. 2d 201, 202 (1954) that:
When a witness voluntarily takes the stand and tes-
tifies, he is subject to cross-examination and so long

654

as there is no abuse of the privilege of cross-examina-

tion and no prejudice results therefrom except such

prejudice as might arise from disclosing the truth,
the severity of the cross-examination is no ground
for a reversal.

HN WM Under the laws of this state, wide latitude is
allowed in cross-examining a witness, and the cross-ex-
amination is not confined to matters which the witness
has testified about on direct examination. We said in
Prewitt v. State, 156 Miss. 731, 735, 126 So. 824, 825
(1930) that: :

It is of the utmost importance in the administration.
of justice that the right of cross-examination be pre-
served unimpaired. It is the law’s most useful weapon
against fabrication and falsehood. As a test of the
accuracy, truthfulness, and credibility of testimony,
there is no other means as effective. In this state,
cross-examination is allowed coextensive with the is-
sues, Walton v. State, 87 Miss. 303, 39 So. 689; not
only, but it may proceed into the collateral cireum-
stances sourrounding, or in any way affecting, the
transaction to the full extent that they have relevant
connection by way of testing the memory, accuracy,
sincerity, interest, or bias of the witness. In all these
matters the privilege of counsel rightfully has broad
latitude, and, to make it fully effective towards the
purposes for which the law allows and favors it, the
privilege should not be interfered with or hampered
or restricted by the trial judge, except in clear case
of irrelevancy, trespass beyond admissible ground, or
extremes of continual, aimless repetition. 1 Thomp.
on Trials, sections 406, 415-419,

We find no reversible error relative to the cross-exami-
nation of appellant.

HEHE Appellant also contends that the court was in
error in refusing to allow Dr. Davidson to answer a
hypothetical question relative to when appellant’s men-

|

tal condition began. The court sustained the objection
to the hypothetical question propounded for the reason
that the question as asked did not contain all the neces-
sary facts. The objection was properly sustained; how-
ever, the doctor had already testified that if appellant
started having headaches at the age of twelve years
that this could have been the beginning of his trouble.
‘We do not think that the court unduly restricted the
doctor in his testimony.

Appellant also assigns as error the granting of every
instruction granted to the state in refusing every instruc-
tion refused the appellant. The court granted every in-
struction requested by the defendant, except an instruc-
tion directing the jury to find the defendant not guilty.
Appellant, in his brief, points to only one instruction
granted the state in which he contends there was error.
When this instruction is read, together with the other
instructions granted to the state and those granted to
the defendant, we find no reversible error. The instruc-
tions taken as a whole correctly stated the law relative
to the issues involved, and the court was liberal toward
the defendant in granting the instructions he requested.

We have carefully examined and considered the rec-
ord in this case, together with the brief on behalf of the
appellant and the state, and we find no reversible error.
For this reason, this case must be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, C. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Brady, JJ.,
concur.

CowrinentaL Sournern Liyus, Inc. v. Lum, et ux.
No. 43754 January 24, 1966 182 So. 2d 228

r, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Jackson;
Dent, Ward, Martin & Terry, Vicksburg, for appellant.

CU

Wells & Tipton, Natchez; Prewitt, Bullard & Braddock,
Vicksburg, for appellees.

661

Roverrs, J.

Clinton E. Lum and his wife, Kathleen Lum, brought
separate suits against the Continental Southern Lines,
Inc. for personal injuries, and the two suits were con-
solidated and tried jointly, resulting in a verdict in
favor of Clinton E. Lum for the sum of $51,000, and a
verdict in favor of Mrs. Kathleen Lum in the sum of
$8,500. Continental Southern Lines, Inc. has appealed
from this judgment. Mrs. Kathleen Lum has cross-ap-
pealed from the judgment rendered in her favor.

These suits arose out of an automobile accident which
occurred on U. 8. Highway 61 about four miles south
of Port Gibson, Mississippi, on August 26, 1962, at or
about 8:30 P. M.

Just prior to the accident, Clinton BE. Lum was driv-
ing his new 1962 Chevrolet pickup truck following ap-
pellant’s bus at a distance of 100 to 200 feet, and Mrs.
Lum was riding as a passenger in the truck with her
husband. The bus was driven by George W. Keys. It
had been raining. The night was dark. Mr. and Mrs.
Lum observed that the bus had no lights on the back
except clearance lights at the top of the bus. They saw
no signal lights indicating a stop. Nevertheless, the bus
came to a stop partially on the paved portion of the
highway, for the purpose of permitting a passenger to
disembark. The appellees claim the bus stopped without
warning, blocking the entire northbound traffic lane at
a time when they had reached a point within sixty feet
of the bus. They claim that they were traveling down
hill at a rate of forty to forty-five miles an hour, and
as they started out of the valley up the next hill, the
bus stopped, so that when they became aware that the
bus had stopped, Mr. Lum immediately put on his brakes
so as to prevent striking the bus. When the brakes took
effect, the truck skidded so that the front of the truck
protruded about three feet into the south traffic lane,
striking a southbound Chevrolet automobile driven by
Lamar Chisolm. Appellant insists that the bus was
stopped in a normal manner at the widest available place
on the highway for the purpose of permitting passengers
to disembark, and that all of the lights on the back of
the bus were illuminated — ‘‘lit up like a Christmas
tree’? — that the brake and signal lights were in good
order and in operation. The bus driver observed from
his rear view mirror that an accident had occurred but
thought it was a ‘‘sideswipe’’ and drove away without
further investigation.

663

Both appellees received serious personal injuries which
they claim were caused by the negligent manner in which
the bus was parked on the highway without reasonable
warning of the danger to them. On the other hand, ap-
pellant claims that the accident was caused by the neg-
ligence of Clinton HE. Lum in following the bus too close-
ly, or that Mr. Lum was in fact attempting to pass the
bus going up hill and ran into a southbound automobile;
that the driver of the bus was in no way involved in
the accident. The jury decided the issue in favor of
appellees, Appellant, however, insists that the verdict
was obtained as a result of certain erroneous instructions
to the jury, as set out in the appendix attached hereto.

The appellant, Continental Southern Lines, Inc., con-
tends that the court erred in the following respects: (1)
in granting appellees an instruction on the emergency
doctrine; (2) in granting appellees an instruction per-
mitting the jury to assess punitive damages under the
facts in this case, and at the same time refusing appel-
lant an instruction stating punitive damages should not
be allowed; (3) in granting appellees an instruction
stating it was the strict duty of appellant not to stop
et cetera, thereby requiring a higher degree of care than
ordinary care; and (4) in granting an instruction under
Mississippi Code Annotated section 8215 (a) (1957) re-
quiring the bus company to leave a twenty-foot unob-
structed width of the highway without regard as to
whether or not it was practicable.

Mrs. Kathleen Lum, appellee, cross-appealed, and con-
tends that the verdict in her favor was grossly inadequ-
ate, to such an extent that it shows that the jury was
prompted by bias and prejudice in arriving at the ver-
dict in the light of the unconditional medical proof,
with extensive and permanent injuries of the cross-ap-
pellant, Kathleen Lum.

We have reached the conclusion that this case must
be reversed.

I

The contention of Continental Southern Lines, Ine. is
that a sudden emergency instruction was erroneously
granted appellees because: First, The instruction did not
contain the three basic elements for such instruction and
was erroneous as to form. Second, It is contended that
Mr. Lum was guilty of negligence which contributed to
the emergency and was therefore not entitled to the
sudden emergency instruction.

These objections require a discussion of the history of
the sudden emergency doctrine, as shown by opinions of
this Court, first, as to the form, and, second, as to when
the instruction should be granted.

HE Bf We have constantly followed the rule that ‘If
a motorist, by his own negligence, has placed himself in
a position of peril, and being called upon in sudden
emergency to act mistakes the best course through an
error of judgment, he is not thereby relieved’? of lia-
bility. Ladner v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 251 Miss.
804, 171 So. 2d 5038, 509 (1965).

HEE This Court has repeatedly pointed out that an
instruction on the doctrine of sudden emergency in neg-
ligence cases should not be given to the jury when it
appears to the trial judges — as a matter of law — that
the person requesting the instruction, proximately caus-
ed, or contributed to the cause of the emergency by his
own negligence. Gregory v. Thompson, 248 Miss. 431,
160 So. 2d 195 (1964); Hinton v. Delcher Bros. Moving
& Storage Co., 250 Miss. 535, 160 So. 2d 694 (1964);
Fink v. Hast Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 234 Miss. 221,
105 So. 2d 548 (1958); Meeks v. McBeath, 231 Miss.
504, 95 So, 2d 791 (1957) ; Moak v. Black, 230 Miss. 337,
92 So. 2d 845 (1957) ; Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v.
Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 63 So. 2d 211, 65 So. 2d 575, 67
So. 2d 256 (1953). Cf. Peel v. Gulf Transport Co., 252
Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965); Kettle v. Musser’s
Potato Chips, Inc., 249 Miss. 215, 162 So. 24 243 (1964) ;

665

Rivers v. Turner, 223 Miss. 673, 78 So. 2d 903 (1955) ;
Miss. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Aultman, 173 Miss. 622, 160
So. 737 (1935).

MB We have held that the ‘‘emergency instruction”
should not be granted where the court can hold, as a
matter of law, that the person requesting the instruction
should have reasonably anticipated, or foreseen the
emergency from the surrounding circumstances. Peel v.
Gulf Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965) ;
Pullin v. Nabors, 240 Miss. 864, 128 So. 2d 117 (1961);
Jones v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 211 Miss. 34, 50
So. 2d 902 (1951). IMM One cannot wholly ignore con-
ditions which he knows to exist and be relieved of the
responsibility with which he is charged under the law
by asserting that the known conditions resulted in a
sudden emergency. Ladner v. Merchants Bank & Trust
Co., 251 Miss. 804, 171 So. 2d 503 (1965); Peel v. Gulf
Transport Co., 252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965).

HM On the other hand, we have held that an in-
struction on the doctrine of sudden emergency should
be given to the jury when there is an issue of fact from
the evidence, as to whether or not a sudden emergency
existed, and where the trial judge cannot say, as a matter
of law, that the actor did not proximately cause the
sudden emergency. In short, when the testimony raises
an issue of fact, as to a sudden emergency, it becomes
a jury question, Lum v. Jackson Industrial Uniform
Serv., Inc., 253 Miss. 342, 175 So. 2d 501 (1965) Rushing
v. Edwards, 244 Miss. 677, 145 So. 2d 695 (1962). See
also Vann v. Tankersly, 164 Miss 748, 145 So. 642 (1933) ;
38 Am. Jur. Negligence, § 41 (1941).

HEM When it is determined that a sudden emergency
instruction should be given to the jury, the form of the
instruction must contain the basic elements: (1) The
actor, requesting the instruction must have used rea-
sonable care before the emergency arose, the instruction.
must show that the actor did not negligently cause or

666

contribute to the cause of the emergency; (2) it must
define briefly the sudden emergency, stating the facts
from which the jury might decide to warrant a finding
of sudden emergency; and (8) after the sudden emer-
gency arose, he must have exercised such care as a
reasonably prudent (capable driver) would have used
under the unusual circumstances. Ladner v. Merchants
Bank & Trust Co., 251 Miss. 804, 171 So. 2d 503 (1965) ;
Kettle v. Musser’s Potato Chips, Inc., 249 Miss. 212,
162 So. 2d 248 (1964); Crump v. Brown, 246 Miss. 631,
151 So. 2d 822 (1963); Pullin v. Nabors, 240 Miss. 864,
128 So. 2d 117 (1961); Moore v. Taggart, 233 Miss.
889, 102 So. 2d 333 (1958); Callaway v. Haddad, 226
Miss. 177, 83 So. 2d 825 (1955).

MM A casual reading of the sudden emergency
instruction, attached hereto’ will reveal that it does
not measure up to the standard required by the fore-
going authorities, and particularly is this true since
it does not describe the emergency claimed to have sud-
denly happened to cause the plaintiff to perform the
acts caused by the sudden emergency. Moreover, there
is no other instruction offered the jury which could have
supplied the defect, and where such defect is not sup-
plied in another instruction, the case must be reversed.
Crump v. Brown, 246 Miss. 631, 151 So. 2d 822 (1963) ;
Jones v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 211 Miss. 34, 50
So. 2d 902 (1951).

In view of the defendant’s testimony that the bus did
not stop suddenly, which is not denied by the plaintiffs,
appellees here, and since the appellees followed the bus
several miles, under conditions known to them, it is
doubtful that the sudden emergency instruction should
have been granted. We do not pass upon this question
at this time.

IL

HRB The action of the court in granting an instruc-
tion to the appellees permitting the jury to assess puni-

667

tive damages against appellant,® and the instruction
which was refused the appellant,* wherein it sought
to have the court charge the jury that punitive damages
could not be assessed against it, was error, under the
facts in this case.
HMB We said in Fowler Butane Gas Company v.
Varner, 244 Miss. 130, 141 So. 2d 226 (1962) that:
“The kind of wrongs to which punitive damages are
applicable are those which, besides the violation of
aright or the actual damages sustained, import insult,
fraud or oppression and not merely injuries but in-
juries inflicted in the spirit of wanton disregard for
the rights of others. In order to warrant the recovery
of punitive damages, there must enter into the injury
some element of aggression or some coloring of insult,
malice or gross negligence, evincing ruthless disregard
for the rights of others, so as to take the case out
of the ordinary rule.’’ 244 Miss. 150, 151, 141 So. 2d
233.
See: Monsanto Co. v. Cochran, 180 So. 2d 624, 626
(Miss. 1965); Maupin v. Dennis, 175 So. 2d 180 (Miss.
1965); Morris v. Huff, 238 Miss. 111, 117 So. 24 800
(1960); Greyhound Corp. v. Townsend, 234 Miss. 839,
108 So. 2d 208 (1959); Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss.
633, 57 So. 2d 461 (1952); McDonald v. Moore, 159
Miss. 326, 131 So. 824 (1931). Cf. Bush v. Watkins, 224
Miss. 238, 80 So. 2d 19 (1955); Planters Wholesale
Grocery v. Kineade, 210 Miss. 712, 50 So. 2d 578 (1951) ;
Teche Lines, Inc. v. Pope, 175 Miss. 393, 166 So. 539
(1936); Neal v. Newburger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 123 So.
861 (1929). The fact that the bus driver drove away
from the scene of the accident, under the evidence here
presented, does not require an instruction on punitive
damages. Pelican Trucking Co. v. Rossetti, 251 Miss.
37, 167 So. 2d 924 (1964).

668

Tir

The instruction granted appellees based upon Missis-
sippi Code Annotated section 8192 (c) (1957), is in-
correctly worded. *

HB MB The word ‘‘strict’’ connotes a severe or exact-
ing requirement, closely or rigorously enforced or main-
tained, absolutely without deviation, narrowly or care-
fully limited. See: Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary. The use of the word ‘‘strict’’ requires a
greater degree of care in the operation of the bus than
is required by our statutory law. Edwards v. Murphree,
249 Miss. 78, 160 So. 2d 689 (1964); Chadwick v. Bush,
174 Miss. 75, 163 So. 823 (1935) ; 388 Am. Jur. Negligence
§§ 30, 43 (1941).

The use of the word ‘‘strict’’ in the instruction is
similar in effect to the use of the words ‘‘vigilant look-
out’? heretofore condemned. Peel v. Gulf Transp. Co.,
252 Miss. 797, 174 So. 2d 377 (1965); Harvey v. Bush,
252 Miss. 326, 173 So. 2d 125 (1965); Graves v. Hamil-
ton, 184 Miss. 239, 184 So. 56 (1938). When this case
is retried, the word “strict”? should be left out of this
instruction.

Iv

The appellee obtained an instruction ® based upon Mis-
sissippi Code Annotated section 8215 (a) (1957), in
which the jury was told.

“and in every event a clear and unobstructed width

of at least twenty (20) feet of such part of the high-

way on the left side or opposite said bus shall be left
for the free passage of other vehicles, and a clear
view of such stopped bus be available from a distance
of two hundre (200) feet in each direction upon
such highway.

HS WB This instruction is in the words of the stat-
ute, but under the rule established in Teche Lines, Inc.
v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943), we

669

are of the opinion that it is peremptory in nature and
should not have been given the jury under the facts here
involved. The opinion in Teche Lines, Inc., swpra, said:

“Tt did not permit the jury to say whether the bus

was stopped as far to the right on the highway as was

possible, and at the same time safe, considering the
high degree of care which the bus driver owed to the
passengers, including the one then about to alight.”

195 Miss. 249, 12 So. 2d 786.

There are many cases reported from other states show-
ing the great weight of authority to require a ‘‘practical’’
application of similar statutes reported in Annos, 131
A. L. R. 562 (1941).

It may be pointed out, however, that this Court has
upheld the foregoing Mississippi Code Annotated sec-
tion 8215 (a) (1956), and has applied it where the tes-
timony was sufficient to show it was ‘‘practical to stop’’
at a safe place on the highway, and a failure to do so
was negligence. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131,
16 So. 2d 765 (1944). Cf. Hankins v. Harvey, 248 Miss.
639, 160 So. 2d 63 (1964).

From a review of the foregoing authorities, we are
of the opinion that this case must be reversed and re-
manded for a new trial on direct appeal. We do not
reach the issue as to whether or not the amount of the
verdict on cross-appeal is inadequate because both cases
must be retried.

Reversed and remanded for new trial, not inconsistent
with this opinion.

Gillespie, P. J., and Jones, Brady and Inezer, JJ.,
concur,

iThe court instructs the jury, for the Plaintiff, Clinton E. Lum,
that although you may believe from the evidence in this case
that Clinton E. Lum applied the brakes of his 1962 Chevrolet
pickup truck which he was driving and skidded or turned said
pickup truck to the left immediately before the collision between
the Lum and Chisolm vehicles, this fact alone does not necessarily

mean that Clinton E. Lum was guilty of negligence which con-
tributed to the collision, for if you believe from the evidence
that the said Clinton E. Lum, while driving said pickup on the
right side or the East lane of Highway 61 in a reasonably careful
manner, was suddenly confronted with an emergency not of his
making and responded and acted as a reasonable and prudent
person thought was necessary in applying his brakes and skidding
or turning his pickup truck to the left in an effort to avoid
colliding with the rear of the Defendant’s bus, then the applying
of the brakes, and skidding or turning by the pickup to the left
was not negligence, even though it might appear now that it
might have been better to have turned his pickup truck to the
right and run off the right side of the highway.

2The Court instructs the jury for the Plaintiffs, Clinton E. Lum
and Kathleen Lum, that if, from a preponderance of the evidence,
in this case, you believe that on the occasion in question George
Keys, driver of the bus of Continental Southern Lines, Inc.,
Defendant, was guilty of gross negligence in the stopping of the
Continental Southern Lines, Inc. bus on said highway, and that
said gross negligence, if any proximately contributed to the
injuries to the Plaintiffs, Clinton E. Lum and Kathleen Lum;
that is, if the Defendant was guilty of such negligence, which,
under the circumstances, evidenced a reckless disregard for the
safety of the traveling public using said highway, including the
Plaintiffs, or which disclosed indifference to the consequences
of such negligence, then, in addition to actual damages, Plaintiffs
may have sustained, if any, as the proximate result thereof, you
may in your discretion award exemplary or punitive damages,
the amount of which is solely with your discretion.

8The Court instructs the jury for the Defendant, Continental
Southern Lines, Inc. that you may not award any punitive dam-
ages in this case but only actual damages based on medical
expenses, loss of earnings and reasonable compensation for per-
sonal injuries actually sustained by the Plaintiffs.

4The Court instructs the jury for both Plaintiffs, Clinton E. Lum
and Kathleen Lum, that the Defendant’s bus driver was under
a strict duty not to stop or suddenly decrease the speed of the
Defendant’s bus without first giving an appropriate signal, either
by hand and arm or signal device, to any vehicle immediately
to the rear when there is an opportunity to give such signal, and
if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence in this
case that the Defendant’s bus driver failed to give appropriate
signal indicating to the Plaintiff, Clinton E. Lum, that said
Defendant’s bus was going to stop, and if you believe that such
failure, if any, proximately caused or contributed to the injuries,

—— Sl

if any, of the Plaintiffs, then this Court tells you that your verdict
toust be for both Plaintiffs.

5 The Court instructs the jury for both Plaintiffs, Clinton E. Lum
and Kathleen Lum, that the driver of the Defendant's bus is not
only required to obey and comply with the statutory regulations
in stopping to discharge a passenger on the highway, which
regulations are that the bus driver shall not stop upon the paved,
or improved or main traveled part of the highway when it is
practical to stop off such part of the highway, including sound
and safe shoulders, and in every event a clear and unobstructed.
width of at least twenty (20) feet of such part of the highway
on the left side or opposite said bus shall be left for the free
passage of other vehicles, and a clear view of such stopped bus
be available from a distance of two hundred (200) feet in each
direction upon such highway, but in addition to obedience to
this statutory regulation the driver of the Defendant’s bus was
under the duty to exercise due care not to endanger the safety
of other persons using the highway; and if you believe from a
preponderance of the evidence in this case that the driver of
the Defendant’s bus failed to obey the statutory regulations ap-
plicable to stopping and discharging a passenger on the highway,
or failed to exercise due care which endangered the safety of
Plaintiffs, as users of the highway, and such failure, if any,
proximately caused or contributed to the damages or injuries,
if any, suffered by the Plaintiffs, then the Court tells you that
your verdict must be for the Plaintiffs.

Misstsstppr Tank Company, Ino. v. Roan
No. 43655 January 31, 1966 182 So. 2d 582

a
ia
Re)

Dudley W. Conner, Hattiesburg, for appellant.

Stanford Young, Waynesboro; William Coleman,

sler & Bowling, Jackson, for appellee.

Jonnus, J.

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Wayne
Couny where appellee recovered a large judgment against
Mississippi Tank Company, Inc., appellant, in an action
of tort. It was claimed that both the appellant and
Magnolia Propane Gas Company; Inc. were liable to
appellee for the burning of his house and its contents
and personal injuries received by him. The declaration
alleged that Magnolia Propane Gas Company, Ine. in-
stalled for appellee a butane gas tank which it had pur-
chased from the appellant; that the tank had a hole in
it permitting gas to escape; that the gas travelled under-
ground along the pipe extending from the tank to the
house and accumulated under the house, as a result of
which the house, with its contents, was totally destroyed
by fire when the gas exploded. The jury found that

the Magnolia Propane Gas
ligent, but rendered a jud
$62,300 on the theory that it
and sold said tank. There

Propane Gas Company, Inc.,

us as between the appellant

The record is replete wit!

fore reversing the case an
Because of the numerous
opinion to those errors her:
Appellant manufactured
retailer, purchased and lal

Company, Inc. was not neg-
igment against appellant for
had negligently manufactured
is no appeal as to Magnolia
, and the case is here before
and appellee only.

h errors, and we are there-
remanding for a new trial.
errors, we are limiting this
‘ein discussed.

the tank which Magnolia, a
er resold and installed for

676

appellee. The tank had been in place for approximately
one year when the gas explosion occurred at night on
or about December 6, 1963. According to the testimony
of appellee, there was a considerable sum of money in
the house. Appellee had gotten out of the house into a
safe place. In an attempt to return for the money while
the house was burning, he fell while trying to enter
through a window and was personally injured. The suit
seeks to recover for destruction of the house, its con-
tents, including the money, and for personal injuries
received by the appellee.

Assuming for the purpose of this opinion that ap-
pellee’s proof was sufficient to withstand a motion for
a peremptory, with the above brief statement of facts,
we pass to those matters which we find constitute error
in the trial.

HEEB The instruction for plaintiff appearing on page
758 of the record told the jury that if they believed
the defendants, Magnolia Propane Gas Company, Inc.
or Mississippi Tank Company, Inc., or either of them,
was guilty of negligence it was their sworn duty to
return a verdict for the plaintiff and assess his damages.
The jury could have inferred from this instruction that
if either of the defendants was guilty of negligence, both
were liable.

HREM The declaration herein undertook to assert num-
erous acts of appellant constituting negligence resulting
in the fire. The court gave an instruction for the plain-
tiff, appearing on page 759 of the record, reciting that
butane gas is a dangerous agency, and the defendants
were required to use the highest degree of care and
precaution suggested by exercise and the known danger
of the escape of gas. The jury was further instructed
that if they believed from the evidence that such high
degree of care and precaution was not used by said
defendants, and as the consequence thereof the plaintiff
was injured and his property destroyed, it was their

677

duty to return a verdict for the plaintiff. This instrue-
tion gave the jury no guide as to what would constitute
negligence as shown by the evidence, if any. It left the
jury wide-open to draw upon its imagination to find
that the defendants were guilty of negligence regardless
of whether the facts upon which the jury based its verdict
were, as a matter of law, acts of negligence. It also
authorized a finding of liability for the personal injuries
without necessary qualification, as hereafter shown.

The instruction appearing on page 760 is subject to
this same criticism, in that it instructs the jury ‘“‘if
they believe from the evidence the defendants were neg-
ligent,’’ and fails to give any guide as to what constitutes
negligence.

HEE The instruction on page 763 instructs the jury
that if they should find for the plaintiff, it was their
duty to render a verdict in such sum as would amply
compensate the plaintiff for all of his losses as the
result of his personal injuries. This instruction was
erroneous because it required the jury to give damages
for personal injuries if it found the house was neg-
ligently burned, regardless of whether appellee exer-
cised proper care in re-entering the house.

The instruction appearing on page 764 of the record
instructs the jury that if they should find for the plain-
tiff, it would be their duty to fix the amount of the
verdict at a sum which would be fair and reasonable
compensation for all damages sustained by the plaintiff
as shown by the testimony, if any, as a direct and proxi-
mate result of the negligence of the defendants.

HN I The instructions should have delineated those
matters for which, if any, the plaintiff was entitled to
recover. This is particularly true in view of the fact
that on the trial of the case the plaintiff was permitted
to testify that the destruction of his house resulted in
the loss of association with friends and relatives; that
it was the ‘‘old home place’? and that he was coming

678

back to be with his sisters, his home-folks; that he had
worked all his years to get back there; that it was just
a place he loved to be, and having to leave it changed
his whole plans, and he had lost the convenience and
comfort of his home; that it was something he had built
just like he wanted and there was comfort there, as he
worked in the daytime and rested at night. (He cherish-
ed it for friends to come to see him and to enjoy.) Il
He was allowed to testify that he suffered mental angu-
ish because of the loss of the house, which together with
sentimental values is incompetent. 25 O.J.S. Damages
§ 68 at 555 (1941).

When you consider this evidence as having been in
the presence of the jury, and the jury receiving an
instruction that they might consider all damages, the
error in the instruction abovementioned is manifest.

Plaintiff established, or undertook to establish, the
damages to his house by saying that the value of the
house before the fire was $35,000 and after the fire
was nil.

The rules as to the proof of damages for the de-
struction of buildings are set out in 25 O.J.8. Damages
§ 85 at 608 (1941). It will be seen that there are various
rules adopted by the different states. Our state has
heretofore, insofar as urban property is concerned,
adopted the before and after rule of the value of the
entire property. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Creekmore,
199 Miss. 48, 23 So. 2d 250 (1945), our Court said:

In case of total and tortious destruction of a house
by fire, the basis for computing damage to the owner
is a comparison of the value of the whole property
before and after the fire. 15 Am. Jur., Damages, sec.

109, p. 517; 25 C.J.S., Damages, sec. 85, p. 608. This

is and should be the general rule. Admittedly cases

arise in which other factors are found which must be
taken into account. Conceivably the lot may be worth
more without the structure than with it. See Kaw

Feed & Coal Oo. v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co., 120

Mo. App. 498, 107 S. W. 1034; Murphy v. City of

Fond Du Lae, 23 Wis. 365, 99 Am. Dec. 181. Again

the house may be an inconsequential item in the total

valuation of a large tract on which it is located so
that the value of the entire property is not substantial-
ly changed, yet there is damage in its loss. Some
authorities attempt to value the house apart from the
lot while others follow the more practical and safer
rule to consider the house and lot, at least where it
is urban residence property, as an entity. It would
not be helpful to enlarge our opinion with the au-
thorities supporting these exceptional bases. 199 Miss.

at 63, 23 So. 2d at 253.

Plaintiff had a 270-acre farm where he grew crops,
raised cattle, and turpentined his trees. The plaintiff
evidently treated it as one unit because in alleging his
damages the declaration charged:

Plaintiff was living in the home and conducting a
farming operation which he had to cease and shut
down since his home was destroyed.

HE I We believe the better rule is the before and
after rule of the whole property — particularly under
the circumstances here claimed.

Plaintiff also testified as to the difference in his
earnings in the year preceding and the year succeeding
the fire, and presumably included therein his earnings
from the farm. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 44 at 524 (1941),
under ‘‘Injury to crops’’ reads:

Profits expected to be realized from crops that
have not matured are too speculative and uncertain
to be estimated as damages, and especially is this
so where no crop has matured upon which a reasonable
estimate may be based. In some cases, however, the
courts have allowed damages for the injured crop,
based upon estimates of other crops raised in the im-
mediate neighborhood and not affected by the injury
complained of.

HEE The plaintiff was permitted to testify that the
difference in his earnings in 1963 and 1964 was the
sum of $5800. There was no explanation as to whether
this included profits from the farm, or whether it was
confined to his personal wages. We assume that in ar-
riving at this figure he considered the profits from his
farm, including the turpentining, cattle raising, crop
growing, and that it was not confined to what he earned
by his own labor. We think that the profits, if any,
from the farm in the year 1964, or the loss of profits
from the farm for the year 1964, would be highly specu-
lative, and counsel’s objection to the bare statement that
the difference in his earnings was $5800 should have
been sustained.

Furthermore, the record does not indicate that the ap-
pellee was totally disabled in the year 1964 because he
moved to Mobile and engaged in business as an automo-
bile salesman. In Standard Finance Corp. v. Breland,
249 Miss. 413, 163 So. 2d 232 (1964), it was said:

In conclusion, we believe it is wise that we should
also point out that speculative damages are not al-
lowable in reprevin suits, particularly expected profits.
See Palm v. The Ohio & Miss. BR. BR. Co., 18 TL 217;
The County of Christian v. Overholt, 18 Ill. 223. More-
over, it is a well established rule that one cannot
permit his business to be still or suffer loss of profits
and collect the damages so occasioned thereby from
another party. Brizsee v. Maybee, 21 Wend. (N.Y.)
144. 249 Miss. at 429, 163 So. 2d at 239.

The appellee also alleged in his declaration that he
received personal injuries as a result of his efforts to
save the property. In 388 Am. Jur. Negligence § 81 at
739-40 (1941), the rule is stated:

... Giving due consideration to human nature, a
prudent effort to preserve property from the danger
to which it has been subjected by negligence is such

a natural and so probable a result of the negligence,

681

that it is reasonably to be expected. According to
some authority, an owner of property owes a duty
to the person whose negligence has placed the prop-
erty in peril to prevent injury, where this may be
done without an imprudent exposure to personal dan-
ger. At any rate, the rule of many, although not all,
courts which have considered the proposition is that
a defendant who by his negligence has endangered
the property of another is liable for personal injuries
incurred by the owner, or person in charge of such
property, in an effort to save it, if the effort is im-
pelled by the necessity of the occasion, and is reason-
ably prudent under the circumstances. Thus, if one
attempting to save his property from danger by fire
caused by another’s negligence is injured in that at-
tempt, while acting with ordinary prudence, the wrong-
doer whose negligence caused the fire must respond
in damages for the injury thus suffered.

This rule has been approved by this Court in Illinois
Cent. R. BR. Co. v. Thomas, 109 Miss. 536, 68 So. 773
(1915). In that case, there is set out in full an instruction
given for the plaintiff who was injured in undertaking
to fight a fire which had allegedly negligently been set
by the railroad company. This instruction enjoined upon
the plaintiff, in fighting the fire to save his property,
the duty of exercising due care and caution, and exer-
cising such care as a reasonably prudent man would
have exercised under the circumstances. No where in
the instructions in the instant case is the duty placed
upon the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care and to
conduct himself as a reasonably prudent man under the
circumstances, and submitting to the jury the question
as to whether he so acted.

Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, C. J., and Gillespie, P. J., Brady and Smith,
JJ., concur.

fon

82

THRASH v.
Srare Farm Morvan Avromosm Insurance Company
No. 43788 January 31, 1966 182 So. 2d 586

Alford & Mars, Lawrel G. Weir, Philadelphia, for ap-

el
fa
5
-

|
Hamilion & Martin, Meridian, for appellee.

Ropeurs, J.

The appellant, Steryot D. Thrash, brought a suit
against the appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile

684,

Insurance Company, (hereinafter called Insurance Com-
pany), in the Circuit Court of Neshoba County to re-
cover property loss occasioned by the damage to a 1965
Mercury automobile, growing out of a collision. The
automobile was insured against collision damages by
the Insurance Company. The appellant contended the
automobile was damaged to such an extent it could not
be repaired satisfactorily and was thus a total loss. The
appellee contended that the automobile could be repaired
for the sum of $1,579.38, including $50 deductible under
the terms of the contract, and $25 towing charge. This
sum was tendered in the form of a check into court,
with the appellee’s answer. The circuit judge withdraw
the issue from the jury and entered judgment for ap-
pellee.

We are of the opinion that the trial court was in
error in directing a verdict for appellee, and that the
issue should have been submitted to the jury. The only
issue in this case is the amount of damage done to the

insured automobile in tl

he collision.

The uncontroverted evidence in this record shows the

appellant paid the sum
bile here involved nine

of $3,425 for the insured automo-
months before the collision. He

added a floor mat at a cost of $15, bringing the actual

cost of the automobile
that the automobile ha

to $3,440. The testimony shows
depreciated not more than $200

at the date of the accident, and this sum subtracted
from the purchase price shows the value of the automo-

bile at that date. The

Insurance Company’s own wit-

ness, Harold Stokes, testified he would not pay more

than $500 for the salv:
accident. Subtracting t!
value of the automobile

age of the automobile after the
he salvage value of $500 from the
at the time of the accident leaves

a proven property loss which the jury could have de-

termined from the evi

ence,

The Insurance Company introduced into evidence an

itemized estimate of p

arts and labor claimed by it to

685

be the necessary and reasonable repairs required to re-
pair the automobile. This estimate totaled $1,579.38, in-
cluding $25 for towing, and less the $50 deductible item
under the terms of the policy. An expert witness for
the Insurance Company testified that $200 would have
to be added to the estimate for a new frame. The trial
judge accepted the theory of the Insurance Company as
to value, and entered a judgment in favor of the appel-
lant for $1,794.38,

MM Hf In view of the conflicting evidence offered by
the appellant that the car could not be repaired, we are
of the opinion that the issue should have been submitted
to the jury. This case must therefore be reversed and
remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, C. J., and Gillespie, Jones and Inger, JJ.,
concur.

Part River Vatuey Warer Suppiy Disrrior v.
Brown, et al.

No. 48854 January 31, 1966 182 So. 2d 384

687

March 21, 1966

184 So. 2d 407

InN

John H. Stennis, Watkins, Pyle, Edwards & Ludlam,
Jackson, for appellant.

Dan M. Lee, W. D. Coleman, Jackson; Boyd, Holifield
& Harper, Laurel, for appellees.

Rovezrs, J.

The Pearl River Valley Water Supply District (here-
after called District) was organized under Chapter 197,
Mississippi Laws 1958, for the purpose of construction
and development of a water reservoir, and the authority
to acquire by eminent domain proceedings the land neces-
sary for the construction and protection of the reservoir.
On June 13, 1962, the District filed petitions in the
Special Court of Eminent Domain in Madison County,
Mississippi, to acquire for public use seven parcels of
land. Two of these parcels of land containing five acres
each designated as ‘‘Tracts I and J’? were owned by
Mrs. Amie Brown. The remaining five tracts, ‘‘A, B,
C, D and EB” composing 204.1 acres were owned by
Floyd T. Brown. It appears that originally four suits
were brought by the District, in which separate trials,
verdicts and judgments were had to acquire 630.2 acres
belonging to various members of the Brown family, but
which were operated as one farm unit, and leased by
Mrs. Amie Brown and J. Leland Brown. Appeals were
instituted in all of these suits, but judgments were en-
tered here November 22, 1965, dismissing No. 43,758
styled Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. F.
Stanton Brown, and No. 43,759 styled Pearl River Valley
Water Supply District v. J. Leland Brown and Mrs.
Amie Brown.

After the suits were filed to acquire the property
belonging to the Brown family, the appellees here filed

petitions for writs of prohibition to stay the eminent
domain proceedings. This application was settled ad-
versely to petitioners on appeal to this Court in May
1963, In the two cases now before the Court, the pro-
ceedings resulted in a judgment in the eminent domain
court in favor of Mrs. Amie Brown in the sum of $6,000
and for Floyd T. Brown in the sum of $80,000. The
District appealed to the circuit court where the cases
were consolidated and tried in October 1964, resulting
in a verdict in favor of Mrs. Amie Brown in the sum of
$8,000, and a verdict in favor of Floyd T. Brown in the
sum of $122,500.

The District has appealed from the judgments of the
cireuit court, and contends: First, that the trial court
erred in excluding from the jury all evidence of en-
hancement or diminution in the value of the land arising
after June 13, 1962, attributable to the construction of
the Reservoir Project. Second, it is said that the court
granted an erroneous instruction. Third, that the verdict
of the jury was so excessive and unreasonable, and so
contrary to the weight of the credible evidence, as to
show bias and prejudice on the part of the jury and to
shock the enlightened judicial conscience.

HM Hf The appellant argues that the District should
have been permitted to have introduced evidence show-
ing the increase in value of the land because of the
construction of the reservoir after the date when it filed
the eminent domain proceedings. The District points
out the rule that, in eminent domain proceedings, dam-
ages are assessed and compensation determined as of
the time of taking, but general benefits and injuries
resulting from the use to which the land is to be put,
and which are shared by the general public, are not to
be considered in awarding damages. MIM We agree
that this is the rule. Miss. Highway Comm’n v. Stout,
242 Miss. 208, 134 So. 2d 467 (1961); Miss. State High-
way Comm’n v. Hillman, 189 Miss. 850, 198 So. 565

693

(1940). We also agree that the time of taking for the
purpose of determining due compensation is the date
of the institution of the eminent domain suit. Pearl
River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 252 Miss.
580, 172 So. 2d 196 (1965) ; Miss. State Highway Comm’n
v. Hemphill, 253 Miss. 507, 176 So. 2d 282 (1965).

The agency exercising the extraordinary power of
eminent domain cannot complain that the property has
increased in value because of a proposed public project,
until it actually files a petition to take the land by emi-
nent domain proceedings. The problem we have encount-
ered on this point is, not so much the rule as in finding
testimony offered by appellant to show the increased
value of the land because of the construction of the reser-
voir after the date of the institution of eminent domain
proceedings.

The record shows that appellant offered testimony
of an expert witness to show that land values in the
reservoir area had increased from the time the District
had put a notice in a local newspaper on March 19, 1959;
that the witness had made a study and an analysis of
land sales of a similar block of land on Pearl River so
that he could, by comparison show the increase in value
of the land in the reservoir area month by month. This
evidence revealed a study by the witness, from January
1, 1950, through May 15, 1964, and establishes a ‘‘medi-
an’? price.

The trial court did not have the benefit of our holding
in Pearl River Valley Water Supply District v. Wood,
252 Miss. 580, 172 So. 2d 196, (1965), when the instant
case was tried in the circuit court in October 1964, The
appellant, District, contended during the trial that the
value of the land should be established at the beginning
of the project in 1959 so as to exclude the increased value
of the land since that time, which it contended, was a
benefit, or increased value, resulting from the construc-
tion of the reservoir.

694.

MBE We are of the opinion that the trial court was
not in error in refusing to permit the introduction of
this evidence, because it was based upon the valuation
of 1959, and not based upon the date of the taking on
June 13, 1962. We do not hold, however, that this meth-
od of determining market value at the time of the taking
(by the comparison of land sales in a nearby similar
area) is not admissible in evidence when it does show
the market value of the land at the time of the taking.

HEEB Neither do we think the court committed error
in refusing to permit expert land appraisal witnesses for
the appellant to give testimony on cross-examination as
to the market value of the land, ‘‘excluding therefrom
the general benefits and injuries shared by the general
public from the creation of the Pearl River Reservoir.’’
The value test does not begin from the creation of the
reservoir but rather from the date of taking. Miss. State
Highway Comm’n v. Hemphill, 253 Miss. 507, 176 So.
2d 282 (1965); Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist.
v. Wood, 252 Miss. 580, 172 So. 2d 196 (1965). En-
hancement in value of the land prior to the taking may
be shown and claimed by the landowner. Increased value
of the land after the taking may be shown by the state
agency to prove the value of the land at the date of the
filing of the eminent domain proceedings, without re-
gard to the injuries or benefits shared by the general
public resulting from the use to which the land is to be
put. Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Stout, 242 Miss.
208, 134 So. 2d 467 (1961). Of. Miss. State Highway
Comm’n v. Taylor, 237 Miss. 847, 116 So. 2d 757 (1959).

HN I The appellant complains that an instruction
granted to the defendants is erroneous because it em-
bodies the clause ‘‘and you are not to deduct there-
from anything on account of supposed benefits incident
to the public use for which the application is made.’’
It is contended that the instruction was taken from a
clause found in Mississippi Annotated Code section 2750

695

(1956), and that the clause only relates to and modifies
the phrase ‘‘but also for damages, if any, which may
result to him as a consequence of the taking.’”’ It is said
that the clause only refers to a partial taking and is
not applicable here because all of the land belonging
to defendants was acquired. A careful study of the
foregoing code section will show that the clause set out
in the instruction is applicable, whether a part or all
of the property of a landowner is acquired for public
use.

Moreover, since the date of the filing of the eminent
domain proceeding is the date when the fair market
value of the property is to be determined, the land-
owner is not entitled to the increased value of the prop-
erty after that date. He is then entitled to the value
of the land acquired.

The instruction would have been correct if the jury
had been properly informed of the date when the fair
market value was to have been determined.

HE We do not, therefore, find any merit in the
first two assignments of error above set out and pre-
sented on this appeal, but the final assignment of error
is well-taken and requires a reversal of this case. Ap-
pellant contends the verdicts of the jury were so exces-
sive as to indicate bias and prejudice on the part of
the jury.

The District offered testimony to show that the land
taken was good, ordinary rolling land, with scattered
trees. Some was used principally for cattle grazing,
some for farming, and a small part was submarginal.
The major portion of the land is below contour 298
feet above sea level, and was subject to overflowing
from Pearl River. There were a few improvements.
The property is located approximately fourteen miles
from Jackson, Mississippi near the Natchez Trace. It
is about twelve miles from the Town of Madison and
about eight miles from the courthouse in Canton. The

696

appraisal witnesses for the District testified that the
best and most valuable use to which the property is
adapted, is for farming and grazing cattle. Appellant
offered comparable sales of farm property near the
property here sought to be acquired to show the market
price of land in the area.

HE On the other hand, the appraisal witnesses for
defendants testified that the highest and best use for
the land sought to be acquired was for residential, com-
mercial or industrial purposes. They testified that the
two five-acre tracts belonging to Mrs. Amie Brown were
ideal residential sites. All of the witnesses for defend-
ants discounted the fact that six tracts of land here in-
volved had no outlet to a public road. This opinion
was based upon the theory that these defendants could
obtain right-of-way easements across lands belonging to
other members of the Brown family. This theory over-
looks the rule that the value of the land to be determined
is the fair market value others would pay for the land
without easement or right-of-way outlets across other
lands.

The appraisal witnesses offered by litigants testified
to the following valuations of the lands sought to be

acquired:

APPELLANT'S FLOYD T. BROWN MRS. AMIE BROWN
WITNESSES TRACT TRACT
Lee Henry Cotton $ 37,500.00 $ 1,400.00
W. Merle Mann * 41,500.00 38,000.00
Gus Noble 36,775.00 1,750.00
APPELLEE'S

WITNESSES

O. 0. Coats $118,000.00 $ 7,000.00
J. H. Wells 175,440.00 11,250.00
Lewis Culley 178,000.00 11,250.00

Thus it is seen that the witnesses for the landowners ©
testified the property was worth more than four times
as much as appellant’s witnesses. The jury returned

697

verdicts for almost three times the highest value placed
upon the land by appellant’s witnesses.

HB We are of the opinion that the verdicts return-
ed by the jury are excessive and unreasonable for the
following reasons. First, the entire case was submitted
to the jury on the theory that it was required to return
verdicts determining the value of the land sought to
be acquired as of the day of the trial. This was error.
The value of the land on the day of the trial necessarily
included enhanced value, growing out of the construction
of the reservoir. The jury should have been permitted
to fix the value of the land on the date when the pro-
ceedings were filed in the eminent domain court, namely
June 13, 1962, Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist.
v. Wood, 252 Miss. 580, 172 So. 2d 196 (1965); Miss.
State Highway Comm’n v. Hemphill, 253 Miss. 507, 176
So. 2d 282 (1965). Second, the testimony offered by
witnesses for the appellees to the effect that the land
sought to be acquired — located in the lowlands, adjacent
to the Pearl River swamp, many miles from municipal

“ subdivisions, without any public utilities, and without
any immediate or foreseeable need for the property as
such — should be divided into industrial and residential
lots (to say the least) is, speculative and fanciful think-
ing.

In Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Brooks,
239 Miss. 308, 316-17, 123 So. 2d 423, 427 (1960) we
said

‘the present value of land sought to be condemned

in eminent domain proceedings is not to be estimated

simply with reference to the condition in which the
owner has maintained it or for the use to which it
is at the time applied, but with reference to any use
to which it is adapted. The best or most valuable
use to which the property, which is taken for the pub-
lic use, is adapted should be considered. 29 O. J. 8.
Eminent Domain § 160, p. 1024, and cases cited. ‘Mere

speculative uses cannot be considered. There must

be some probability that the land would be used with-

in a reasonable time for the particular use to which
it is adapted. * * * There must be a present demand
for the land for such purpose or a reasonable expec-

tation of such demand in the near future.’ 29 0. J. 8.

Eminent Domain § 160, pp. 1026, 1027. See also State

Highway Commission v. Brown, 176 Miss. 23, 168

So. 277.”

In that case, however, the record revealed that the land
sought to be acquired ‘‘lies immediately adjacent to the
western boundary line of the City of Hattiesburg, a city
of approximately 34,000 population.’? 239 Miss. 317,
123 So. 2d at 427.

MB The rule of evidence that the jury may con-
sider not only the value of the land as it is presently
used by the owner, but also the possibility of its use
for other purposes is subject to the qualification that
possibilities which are so remote and speculative as to
require prospective occurrence of many extrinsic con-»
ditions and happenings that have no perceptible effect
upon the present market value of the land, should be
excluded from the jury.

It has been said:

“To warrant admission of testimony as to the value

for purposes other than that to which the land is being

put, or to which its use is limited by ordinance at the
time of the taking, the landowner must first show:

(1) that the property is adaptable to the other use,

(2) that it is reasonably probable that it will be put

to the other use within the immediate future, or with-

in a reasonable time, (3) that the market value of
the land has been enhanced by the other use for which
it is adaptable. ...”
Nichols, Eminent Domain (8rd ed.) § 12.314 at 148-52
(1962).

699

This rule was applied in the following cases: Miss.
Highway Comm’n v. Rogers, 236 Miss. 800, 112 So. 2d
250 (1959); Harper v. Miss. State Highway Comm’n,
216 Miss. 321, 62 So. 2d 375 (1953); State Highway
Comm’n v. Brown, 176 Miss. 23, 168 So. 277 (1936).

We said in Green Acres Memorial Park, Inc. v. Mis-
sissippi State Highway Commission, 246 Miss. 855, 861-
62, 153 So. 2d 286, 288-89 (1963) that

“When the whole property is taken, the damage is
the fair market value of the property. ... Market
value means the fair cash, market value as between
one who wants to purchase and one who wants to sell,
or the amount for which it would actually sell at the
time (not what it might bring or ought to bring at
some future time.)’’

We pointed out in Mississippi State Highway Com-
mission v. Pepper, 250 Miss. 347, 164 So. 2d 911 (1964),
that before testimony is admissible to show sales of
residential or commercial property comparable to the
property sought to be condemned, the testimony must
first show that the land sought to be condemned might
be reasonably expected to be in present demand for such
use.

‘We are of the opinion that the evidence did not show
an immediate need or demand for the property here
involved for use either as industrial or residential lots,
and the introduction of evidence to show the value of
the property for such use was unwarranted.

Hl MM Finally, the effort of Mr. Lewis Culley, Sr.
to persuade the jury that the landowners around the
reservoir were not obtaining sufficient damages for the
land being condemned, and his stated objection to the
reservoir, that it was taking land not necessary for the
use of the reservoir but for the purpose of leasing or
reselling the land to others, was highly prejudicial. Al-
though an objection was sustained to this evidence, we

700

are of the opinion that it goes far to show why the jury
returned verdicts which we believe are excessive.

We pointed out in Mississippi State Highway Com-
mission v. Valentine, 239 Miss. 890, 896, 124 So. 2d 690,
693 (1960), that ‘“A proper exercise of the judicial func-
tion does not require us to believe the incredible. ...’?
Cf. Miss. State Highway Comm’n vy. Taylor, 237 Miss.
847, 116 So. 2d 757 (1959).

We have reached the conclusion that the verdicts
returned by the jury in this case are so grossly ex-
cessive as to evince bias, passion and prejudice on the
part of the jury, and for that reason the judgments
entered in the trial court are reversed.

Inasmuch as the jury was not permitted to fix the
value of the property sought to be condemned, as of
the date when the proceedings were instituted, we are
unable to suggest a remittitur.

Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, C. J., and Brady, Smith and Robertson, JJ.,
concur.

ON MOTION OF APPELLEES TO RETAX COST
OF APPEAL.
Roveszrs, J.

HE MM On January 31, 1966, this Court handed down
its opinion reversing the judgment of the trial court in
an eminent domain proceeding, for the reason that the
verdict of the jury was excessive. We were precluded
from suggesting a remittitur because the jury was not
permitted to assess the value of the property as of the
date when the application was filed. Since, therefore,
the jury had not fixed the value of the property, this
Court could not suggest a reduction of the verdict in
the form of a remittitur of damages allowed appellants.

The Clerk of this Court entered a judgment against
the appellees for the cost of appeal to this Court. The
act of the Clerk was obviously based upon a previous

701

opinion of this Court, Mississippi State Highway Com-
mission v. Jacobs, 248 Miss. 476, 482, 161 So. 2d 526
(1964). In that case this Court pointed out that in Mis-
sissippi State Highway Commission v. Herring, 241 Miss.
729, 133 So. 2d 279, 895 (1961), and Mississippi State
Highway Commission v. Slade, 241 Miss. 721, 133 So.
2d 282, 896 (1961), the appellant, Mississippi State High-
way Commission, was required to pay the costs on ap-
peal where the judgments of the trial court were af-
firmed with remittiturs. In Jacobs, however, no judg-
ment was entered. The case was reversed because the
landowner introduced erroneous testimony and the cost
was taxed against him. The opinion in Jacobs is not
applicable under the facts in the instant case for the
following reasons. Jacobs was not an eminent domain
proceeding, it was a suit brought by the landowner for
damages alleged to have been inflicted upon the plaintiff
because of closing an alley. The assessment of cost in
Jacobs was governed by Mississippi Code Annotated
section 1902 (1956).

HE MM On the other hand, there is no code section
governing payment of costs of an appeal to the Supreme
Court in an eminent domain proceeding. Mississippi
Code Annotated section 2767 (1956) applies to appeals
to the circuit court, and not the Supreme Court. This
section is in the following language: ‘‘The costs in all
cases under this chapter shall be paid by the applicant;
but in case of appeal by the owner, if the amount award-
ed in the circuit court do not exceed that found in the
special court, the owner and his sureties shall pay the
costs incident to the appeal.’’

Thus it is apparent that the cost of appeal to the
Supreme Court would ordinarily be governed by the
general laws in civil cases. At this point, however, we
are confronted with a self-executing section of Missis-
sippi Constitution 1890 section 17, which requires that
“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for

public use, except on due compensation being first made
to the owner or owners. .. .’’

ME HS Lt is obvious that if the landowner is re-
quired to pay the costs of appeal to the Supreme Court
when the condemning agency has appealed, the owner
will be paid less than due compensation for his property.
Moreover, he would be required to pay costs before he
could receive any compensation for his property, and if
he could not pay the costs, he would receive nothing for
his property. The constitutional requirement would there-
by be nullified. The great weight of the general law is
to the effect that the owner should receive his just com-
pensation clear of any expense of the proceedings. He is
presumptively entitled to the amount of the first award.
His acts do not force the condemning party to appeal,
and, if such party chooses to appeal, the appeal becomes
merely another step in the process of ascertaining the
just compensation, the total expense of which it should
bear.

The textwriter in 18 Am. Jur. Eminent Domain sec-
tion 378 at page 1020 (1938) has this to say on the
subject:

“In proceedings for the appropriation of land to the

public use, the owners of the land are entitled to full

compensation, without deduction for any part of the
costs incurred in the ascertainment of the amount.

These must be borne by the party seeking to take

the property, in whatever court it institutes proceed-

ings for that purpose. If, dissatisfied with the assess-
ment, the condemner seeks to reduce the amount by

an appeal to another tribunal, such appeal is but a

continuation of his effort to have the compensation
* to be paid the owner for his property ascertained,

and his costs on such appeal are in the same category
as costs in the trial court. The usual provisions of
statutes in regard to costs on appeals to the supreme
court cannot be applied to cases of this kind, because

703

to do so would deprive the owner of his constitutional

right to full compensation for his land.”

It is said in 80 C. J. 8. Eminent Domain section 445
at page 599 (1965):

“The rules regulating costs in civil actions and pro-

ceedings in general ordinarily apply in an action or

proceeding by an owner with respect to property tak-
en or damaged under an exercise of the power of
eminent domain. It has been held that costs constitute

a part of the just compensation to which the owner

becomes entitled on obtaining a judgment against the

taker, including costs incurred by him in fruitless en-
deavors to collect his award in the condemnation pro-
ceedings.’?
See also 20 C. J. Eminent Domain section 507 at page
1133 (1920).

It is pointed out by the textwriter in Annotation, 50
A. L. RB. 2d at 1391 (1956) that Mississippi has aligned
itself with the majority rule in the case of State High-
way Commission v. Mason, 192 Miss. 576, 4 So. 2d 345
(1941), 6 So. 2d 468 (1942).

In Mason this Court leaves no room for doubt as to
who will be required to pay the costs of court on appeal
in eminent domain proceedings, wherein the Court said:

‘‘And whatever diversity of opinion there may be in

some jurisdictions, we align ourselves with those cases

which hold, in support of the text 2 Lewis Eminent

Doman, 3rd Hd. § 812, p. 1434, that as property cannot

be taken or damaged without due compensation and.

as the amount of that compensation or for its damage
must be ascertained, the duty of ascertaining the
amount is necessarily cast upon the party seeking to
condemn or who has damaged the property for public
use, and that he or it should pay all the expenses
which attach to the process; that there is not the full
measure of due compensation required by the consti-
tutional mandate if the owner is subjected to a diminu-

—

tion thereof by liability as to any part of the cost in-

curred in its ascertainment.’’ 192 Miss. at 597, 6 So.

2d at 469.

We have consistently followed Mason since the rule
was established in that case. See Miss. State Highway
Comm’n v. Peterson, 242 Miss. 202, 134 So. 2d 743
(1961); Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Herring, 241
Miss. 729, 183 So. 2d 895 (1961); Miss. State Highway
Comm’n v. Slade, 241 Miss. 721, 183 So. 2d 896 (1961).

HREM The motion of the appellees to retax the costs
is hereby sustained, and the judgment in the above-.
styled cause will be corrected go as to require the con-
demner, Pearl River Valley Water Supply District, to
pay the costs incurred in the Supreme Court on its
appeal.

Motion to correct judgment sustained.

All Justices concur.

De
Atpsy v. Lewis, Hixe. or Estate or

Kars A. Sxrewrre, Dnonasnp, et al.
No. 43761 February 7, 1966 182 So. 2d 600

pre}
Ss
i

706

Wells, Thomas & Wells, Jackson; Armis H. Hawkins,
Houston; Roberts & Craig, Oxford, for appellant.

— = =—eees

Freeland & Gafford, J. W. Price, Oxford; L. G. Fant,
Jr., Holly Springs, for appellees.

Eruriven, C. J.

This case involves the principal question of whether
the provisions of a will, dedicating funds to enlarge and

710

assist in maintaining an art and historical museum, es-
tablished a valid charitable trust. The Chancery Court
of Lafayette County held that it did, and we affirm that
decree.

I

Miss Kate A. Skipwith, a resident of Oxford, executed
her will on December 18, 1957, and on May 29, 1958 she
made a codicil. She died on May 9, 1961, having never
married. Mrs. Mary Adair Alden, a niece of the half-
blood, contested probate of the will, on the grounds of
undue influence and mental incapacity. The chancery
court’s decree finding for proponents and admitting the
will to probate was affirmed by this Court. Alden v.
Lewis, 248 Miss. 663, 160 So. 2d 181 (1964). Mrs. Alden
also sought to appeal from a decree of January 17, 1963,
instructing the executor to pay all general legacies ex-
cept that of Mrs. Alden, who had not filed an acceptance.
That interlocutory appeal was dismissed. 248 Miss. at
671, 160 So. 2d at 183.

In order to understand the trust created by Miss
Skipwith’s will, it is necessary to review earlier events
leading to the creation of the Mary Buie Museum in
Oxford. The land in question, upon which the Museum
is situated, is a small lot included in five-acre lot 57 of
the City of Oxford. It was devised by Miss Skipwith’s
brother John to her in 1915, along with a considerable
amount of other property and securities. At the time of
the death of Miss Skipworth’s sister, Mrs. M. C. Buie,
Miss Skipwith owned the land.

Mrs. Buie died in 1937, leaving a will which she exe-
cuted in 1936. The validity of this will is not in issue,
but its terms are relevant to an understanding of the
Skipwith trust. Mrs. Buie’s will made certain bequests,
and stated

... the income from any and every source to me,

I give to My sister Kate for her to spend in helping

the sick both black and white — of course, if Kate

TL

needs any of this for her living expenses, she is to use

it.

Before her death, I want her to plan a strong brick

room on lot east, called pasture now to be given to

Oxford as a beginning for a museum — Anything of

mine of any value to be put there. Would suggest

Will Lewis and David Neilson to attend to and look

into this. As the stocks and bonds I leave and all

interest in Ark. are to be put in this museum after

Kate is done with it all.

Miss Kate Skipwith, administratrix of Mrs. Buie’s
estate, filed a petition for construction of the will, and
made defendants the heirs at law of Mrs. Buie, includ-
ing Miss Mary Adair Skipwith, who is now Mrs. Alden,
and who was a small legatee. She executed a waiver of
service of process and consent to hearing in vacation on
the petition for construction. On April 1, 1938, the chan-
cellor entered a decree construing Mrs. Buie’s will, sum-
marized in this way:

The dominant purpose was to create and establish a
museum for the City of Oxford. The terms were too
indefinite to constitute a trust, but were merely preca-
tory words, and there were no restrictions upon the right
of Miss Skipwith to use the property during her lifetime
as she may see fit. She had a life interest with unlimited
power to use the property, but the City of Oxford took
a remainder interest in any property which would be left
after Miss Skipwith’s death. The devise of real estate
to the city was valid, not violative of the mortmain stat-
utes and state constitution, and the gifts came within
the municipal powers of the City of Oxford ‘‘for edu-
cational purposes and for general welfare.’? The chan-
cellor held that Miss Skipwith was required to plan the
museum before her death, ‘‘but is not required to have
it constructed before her death.’? However, it was in-
cumbent upon her to execute to the city a deed convey-
ing to it all of her interest in the pasture lot east of her

then residence, being ‘‘lot east, called pasture now,’’
since Miss Skipwith had elected to take under the will.
There was no appeal from this decree, rendered twenty-
six years ago.

After the death of her sister and the 1938 decree con-
struing Mrs. Buie’s will, Miss Skipwith proceeded to
have the Mary Buie Museum building constructed upon
“lot east, called pasture now.’’? On August 24, 1939, she
executed, individually and as administratrix with will
annexed, a deed to the City of Oxford. A significant fact
about this deed is that the title to ‘‘lot east, called pasture
now’’ was conveyed to the city by Miss Skipwith in-
dividually, since she had been owning this property since
she received it in 1915 through her brother’s will. The
lot wpon which the Museum was situated did not come
through the estate of Mrs. Buie. This deed recited the
provisions of the Buie will; that she desired to execute
a deed to the city to construct a museum; that other
bequests and devises in Mrs. Buie’s will came within
the municipal powers, for ‘‘educational purposes and
general welfare’’; and that the grantor desired to convey
the lot, ‘‘together with a museum erected thereon.’’
Hence the granting clause conveyed to the city the de-
scribed property (as well as other properties), ‘‘to-
gether with the improvements thereon, and being the
lot upon which the said museum is located... this
museum being known as the Mary C. Buie Museum.’’
The last sentence of the deed stated: ‘‘The conveyance
of the pasture lot above referred to is made with the
understanding that its use by the said City of Oxford
is subject to the provisions of the will of Mrs. M. C.
Buie, deceased, above referred to.

In short, it is manifest that this 1939 deed from Miss
Skipwith to the City of Oxford conveyed her fee title
to ‘lot east, called pasture now,’’ upon which the Museum
was then situated; and that it was made in trust to
Oxford for the benefit of the citizens and the general

public. On the same date, the Museum was opened to
the public. To this date it has continued to be operated
by the city as the Mary C. Buie Museum.

About a year and a half before Miss Skipwith’s deed
to Oxford, the Mississippi Leglislature enacted Chapter
592, Local and Private Laws of 1938. Miss. Local &
Private Laws 1938, Ch. 592 (S.B. 279, effective Feb. 21,
1938). This statute (quoted on a footnote’) authorized
the City of Oxford (1) to acquire and hold property de-
vised under the will of Mrs. Buie for ‘‘an art museum,’’
and (2) to have the museum constructed and maintained.
It was constructed before the city received it.

The Museum land did not come to Oxford directly
through the will of Mrs. Buie. Miss Skipwith owned and
deeded it directly. However, in an indirect sense the
Museum property was affected by Mrs. Buie’s will, since
the chancery court construed it to mean that in order
for Miss Skipwith to take under her sister’s will, she
was obligated to convey to Oxford the Museum site. Nev-
ertheless, the fact is that Miss Skipwith owned this prop-
erty and conveyed it individually, not as administratrix.

The Mary C. Buie Museum continued to be operated
by the City of Oxford from its dedication in 1939 until
the death of Miss Skipwith in 1961 and thereafter. Her
will consisted of 25 items and a codicil. Items 22 and
23 involved the trust in issue. Item 22 stated:

I devise and bequeath to Phil Stone, Will Lewis and

Mrs. Anna Wright Purser, as Trustees, and to their

successor or successors as Trustees, that portion of

my Estate left to the Mary Buie Museum in the Item
next following this Item. Such bequest is to set up

a trust or foundation to be known as the Adair Skip-

with Memorial Foundation. The primary purpose of

such Foundation shall be to enlarge the building of
the Mary Buie Museum in such manner and at such
time as shall be determined by majority of the Trus-
tees of said Foundation. If the bequest to said Mary

714

Buie Museum shall be more than necessary for such

purpose, then such bequest may be used to assist the

City of Oxford, Mississippi, for the support and main-

tenance of said Museum. . .’’

The will further provided that the Mayor of the City
of Oxford (and his successors in office) was also con-
stituted a member of the board of trustees, who should
operate the project from income if feasible, but this was
not mandatory. Assets of the trust should be audited
once each year, and a copy of this audit should be filed
in the mayor’s office. Item 23 left the residue of testa-
trix’s estate as follows: One-fourth to a named church,
and ‘‘three-fourths of said residue to the Mary Buie
Museum, Oxford, Mississippi, the portion devised and
bequeathed to said Mary Buie Museum to be paid and
handled as set out in the next preceding Item of this
Will.”’ :

The chancery court appointed three trustees for the
Adair Skipwith Memorial Foundation, including the
mayor.

In 1963 Mrs. Alden filed the present action to declare
void the trust in Items 22 and 23 of Miss Skipwith’s
will, This was consolidated, in effect, with her answer
to the executor’s petition for instructions and her cross-
bill to declare the trust void. She charged that the
Museum had no legal existence as a charitable trust, and
it was void; that the City of Oxford had no power to
own and operate it; that the bequest for a charitable
trust violated the mortmain statutes and the rule against
perpetuities; that the city was not authorized to operate
the Museum or to spend any public monies to maintain
it; that it was principally for heirlooms of the Skipwith
family and not for any educational, cultural or beneficial
value to the public, but was a private museum; and
that since the city had no power to own, operate and
maintain the Museum, the Skipwith trust was based upon
a nonexistent facility, and thus was void. In a thorough

715

and studious opinion, the chancellor found an effective
charitable trust.

Il.

MM HH The charitable trust created by Miss Skip-
with’s will was valid. It was instituted by a legitimate
method, a transfer by will by the owner of the property
to other persons as trustees to hold it upon a charitable
trust. The setilor properly manifested an intention to
create it, and she had the capacity to do so. The trustees
accepted the trust and were properly constituted. The
property was of such a nature as to be the subject of
a trust. Beneficiaries of the trust or the class are large
enough to make its enforcement of sufficient benefit to
the community, so that it will be charitable in nature.
1 Restatement (Second), Trusts §§ 348-351, 354, 358, 375
(1959).

HEE Moreover, the trust was for a valid charitable
purpose. The will gave three-fourths of the residuary
estate to trustees for the Mary Buie Museum. Under
Item 22, the ‘‘primary purpose ... (was) to enlarge
the building of the Mary Buie Museum,”’ and if the gift
was in an amount more than necessary for that object,
then it could be ‘‘used to assist the City of Oxford,
Mississippi, for the support and maintenance of the said
Museum.’”’ In 1957, when the will was written, and in
1961, when Miss Skipwith died, the Museum was a readi-
ly identifiable facility of educational value to the public
generally.

Appellant charged in her bill but offered no evidence
to show that the Museum was not of public interest and
did not provide any cultural or beneficial interest. Num-
erous witnesses supported the conclusion that it was of
considerable educational and cultural value. The director
testified that in 1939 through 1962 there had been 99,003
visitors to the Museum. It had a regular program with
changing exhibits each month or so. Persons of all ages

* (i

and stations in life, including those from about forty
foreign countries, had visited the place. It used numer-
ous exhibits, both permanent and temporary.

The Museum is situated about two blocks from the
campus of the University of Mississippi. A professor
of history at the University testified about the historic
value of original letters of the period of the Revolu-
tionary War, including original letters from John Han-
cock, George Washington, and others. The Chancellor
of the University described the educational value of the
Museum, as did the Chairman of the Department of
Arts at the University. Miss Clyde Lindsey, a friend
of Miss Skipwith, who had lived in the same house with
her from 1919 to 1953, told about the opening of the
Museum, her preparation of accession cards showing the
contents and other facts about the exhibits.

Thus it is undisputed that this Museum was for valid
charitable purposes, and particularly for the advance-
ment of education. Trusts to establish or maintain pub-
lic libraries, art museums, or botanical or zoological or
similar institutions, are charitable. There is another class
for miscellaneous purposes which cannot be defined un-
der a single heading, but the common element is that
the purposes are of a character sufficiently beneficial
to the community to justify permitting property to be
devoted for an indefinite time to their accomplishment.
These purposes include the advancement of education.
4 Scott, Trusts §§ 3870, 874 (1956).

HM The common element of all charitable trusts
is that they are designed to accomplish objects which
are beneficial to the community. Legitimate methods
of advancing education include trusts to establish or
maintain public libraries, art museums or other muse-
ums. 2 Restatement (Second), Trusts §§ 368, 370, 374
(1965) ; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 375 (2d ed. 1964).
And in each case the question is ‘‘whether at the time
when the question arises and in the state in which it

717

arises the purpose is one the accomplishment of which
might reasonably be held to be for the social interest
of the community.’’ Id., § 374 at 257; 15 Am. Jur. Chari-
ties § 75 (1964); Annot., 12 A.L.R. 2d 849 (1950).

HH BM [i is also significant that charities are gener-
ally favored and will be enforced, if there is some pivotal
point of definiteness by which or through which they may
be administered. The Mississippi rules governing chari-
ties are derived from the unwritten law of England prior
to the statute of Elizabeth and from the statute of Hliza-
beth itself. See National Bank of Greece v. Savarika,
167 Miss. 571, 148 So. 649 (1933) ; Statute of Charitable
Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees
§ B68 (2d ed. 1964).

With these criteria in mind, it is inescapable that this
trust, standing alone, is charitable and valid.

III.

The trust created in Miss Skipwith’s will was for the
purposes of providing an addition to the Mary OC. Buie
Museum, and if sufficient additional funds were avail-
able, to assist the City of Oxford in operating and main-
taining it. Appellant argues that the city had no power
to receive, operate and maintain the real property and
the Museum building situated upon it, and therefore the
Skipwith testamentary trust was for the illegal purpose
of adding to and maintaining a Museum unlawfully own-
ed by the municipality. Hence it is asserted the basic
purpose of the Skipwith trust is invalid, and its funds
should be inhereited by appellant.

HEE There is no merit in this contention, for two
reasons: (1) The city had the power under general stat-
utes to receive title to the Museum, in trust for the
citizens, and to operate and maintain it from its gen-
eral revenues; and (2) Chapter 592, Mississippi Local
and Private Laws of 1938, was valid, and authorized the
city to receive the Museum and maintain it for an art
museum from appropriate municipal revenue funds.

Among the other municipal powers of the City of
Oxford, a code charter municipality, are those to pur-
chase and hold real estate

... for all proper municipal purposes, including parks,

. schoolhouses, ... and other proper municipal
purposes; ... to sell and convey any real and personal
property owned by it, and make such order respecting
the same as may be deemed conducive to the best
interest of the municipality, and exercise jurisdiction
over the same; to make all contracts and do all other
acts in relation to the property and affairs of the
municipality necessary to the exercise of its govern-
mental, corporate and administrative powers; and to
exercise such other or further powers as are otherwise

conferred by law. Miss. Code Ann. § 3374-112 (1964

Supp.).

Section 3374-114 states:

The governing authorities of every municipality of

this state shall have the care, management and control

of the municipal affairs and its property and finances,
and shall have the power to enact ordinances for the
purposes provided by law, where same are not repug-
nant to the laws of the state, and shall likewise have
the power to alter, modify and repeal such ordinances.

Section 3374-125 provides:

The governing authorities of municipalities shall have

the power to appropriate the funds thereof for the

current expenses of the municipality in the manner
provided by law.

Municipalities have been expressly granted the power
to maintain libraries for public use, to appropriate stated
funds for supporting and maintaining a band or con-
cert orchestra for the amusement and entertainment of
citizens of municipalities, and to support and maintain
parks and playgrounds. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 3374-147,
8374-155, 3374-158, et seq. (1956).

Moreover, as previously stated, Miss Skipwith con-
veyed inter vivos the property to the City of Oxford by
her deed of August 24, 1939. This was expressly au-
thorized by the provisions of a 1922 statute authorizing
persons to convey to a trustee real property to promote
the public welfare by founding and maintaining ‘‘a pub-
lic library, museum, art gallery or educational institu-
tions within this State. ..’? Miss. Code Ann. §§ 6193-6199
(1956), being Miss. Laws 1922, Ch. 193. Such institu-
tions are rendered competent to receive by purchase or
gift of the property, within the objects and purposes of
the institution, and to receive by bequest such property,
if it does not violate the mortmain statutes. Id., § 6197.

This Court has utilized a broad definition of munici-
pal purposes. Municipalities are entitled to receive con-
veyances of lands for public parks, for the health and
entertainment of their citizens. Brahan v. City of Me-
ridian, 111 Miss. 30, 71 So. 170 (1916) ; Rowzee v. Pierce,
75 Miss. 846, 23 So. 207 (1898) ; Lester v. City of Jack-
son, 69 Miss. 887, 11 So. 114 (1892) (property for park
located outside of city limits). In Board of Mayor and
Aldermen of Yazoo City v. Wilson, 232 Miss. 435, 99
So. 2d 674 (1958), the closing of a portion of a street
south of a public park was held to be invalid, since it
was a subversion of a public park dedicated to public
use. It was said that ‘‘lands taken and held by a mu-
nicipality under grant, will, gift, or dedication for a
specific purpose are subject to the law of trusts. ...”
232 Miss. at 441, 99 So. 2d at 677.

(Hn 6) The general rule is that a municipality is com-
petent to administer a trust for charitable purposes, un-
less there are statutory prohibitions. Thus a municipal
corporation can administer trusts for the relief of pov-
erty, the advancement of education, the promotion of
health, ‘‘and for other purposes the accomplishment of
which is beneficial to the community.’’ 1 Scott, Trusts
§ 96.4 (1956); See Blackbourn v. Tucker, 72 Miss. 735,

720

17 So. 737 (1895); Anderson v. Gift, 156 Miss. 736,
126 So. 656 (1930) (both cases assuming trusts for ad-
vancement of education to be charitable).

Bogert on Trusts and Trustees section 130 (2d ed.
1964) states:

Municipal corporations do have power to accept and
administer trusts for purposes which are expressly or
impliedly included within the grant of powers to them
by the legislature. Whenever a trust is useful in aid-
ing a municipal corporation to carry on its legitimate
functions in promoting the welfare of its people, the
municipality may accept the trust and execute it. Many
cases are to be found where such trusts have been
examined and sustained. Such trusts generally fall
within the groups of governmental, eleemosynary, or
educational charitable trusts. See also Id., § 34; § 328
at 721.

In short, it is generally held that a municipal corpora-
tion may accept and administer a trust committed to it
for a purpose germane to the objects of the corporation.
These include civic buildings, educational facilities, li-
braries, parks, historical and art museums. Annot., 10
A.L.R. 1368 (1921) ; Scott, Trusts, § 96.4 (1956) ; 15 Am.
Jur. 2d Charities § 75 (1964).

Hence, absent any special act, the City of Oxford as
a code charter municipality had the right and power
to receive as a trustee from Miss Skipwith by the 1939
deed the Museum and the property upon which it was
situated, and to maintain and operate it from appropri-
ate municipal revenues. The aggregate of the above
statutes, and particularly the 1922 act, authorized it to
do so.

Secondly, chapter 592, Local and Private Laws of
Mississippi of 1938, authorized the City of Oxford (a)
to acquire and hold the Buie Museum property, and
(b) to construct and maintain the Museum as a trustee
for public purposes, and as a charitable trust.

| la

HEE HH Appellant argues that, since section 90(e) of
the Mississippi Constitution proscribes enactment of a
local and private law ‘‘concerning the settlement or ad-
ministration of any estate,’’ this prohibition applied to
chapter 592. We do not think so, since the act does not
pertain to the settlement or administration of an estate,
except in a very indirect sense. It authorized the city
to hold the museum property and to construct and main-
tain it for public purposes. Constitution section 89
creates a committee on local and private legislation.
HEEB Although the Court will not invalidate a statute
by ascertaining from the journals of the legislature
whether that body complied with section 89, it might
be observed that chapter 592 was processed by the
legislature in accordance with section 89. Haas v. Han-
cock County, 183 Miss. 365, 184 So. 812 (1938); Miss.
Senate Journal 1938, pp. 203, 253, 261, 302, 309, 906.

Iv.

Finally, appellants argue that the Skipwith trust is
invalid because the City of Oxford could not receive
the Museum and lot upon which it is situated under the
constitutional mortmain provisions existing prior to the
1940 amendments. Mississippi Constitution section 269,
before its repeal by the Mississippi Laws 1940, chapter
825, provided that every devise or bequest of lands or
interests therein to any religious organization ‘‘or to
any person or body politic, in trust, ... for the use and
benefit of such ... association, or for the purpose of
being given or appropriated to charitable uses or pur-
poses, shall be null and void. . .’’

HEE This constitutional prohibition was of testamen-
tary devises and bequests of land to a body politic in
trust. It did not apply to inter vivos conveyances of land
to a body politic. The city did not receive the Museum
property by a prohibited testamentary devise or be-
quest. Miss Skipwith owned the fee simple title to this

722,

land, having received it under her brother’s will in 1915.
Hence her deed to the city of August 24, 1939, executed.
individually and also as administratrix of Mrs. Buie’s
estate, operated to convey her exclusively individual fee
title to the city. Thus the conveyance was not proscribed
by the mortmain section.

In its 1938 decree construing Mrs. Buie’s will, the
chancery court properly found that the terms of her
will were too indefinite to constitute a trust, and Miss
Skipwith had an unrestricted power to use the property.
Without the will she owned the lot. She constructed
the Museum building on it, and then conveyed it to the
city. The precatory words in her sister’s will do not
diminish the fact that Miss Skipwith owned the land
and conveyed it during her lifetime to the city in trust.
Hence there was no proscribed mortmain devise involv-
ed. For that reason, we do not need to consider whether
the decree construing the will of Mrs. Buie is res judicata
as to appellant.

Affirmed.
Rodgers, Brady, Smith and Robertson, JJ., concur.
FOOTNOTE 1
Chapter 592

Senate Bill No. 279
AN ACT authorizing and empowering the city of Oxford, Mis-
sissippi, to acquire by devise and hold property willed by

Mrs. M. C. Buie, deceased.

SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF
THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI: That the city of Oxford, Mis-
sissippi, be, and is, hereby authorized and empowered to acquire
and hold certain property devised under the will of the late Mrs.
M. C. Buie for an art museum.

Sec. 2. That the said city be, and is, hereby authorized and
empowered to have said museum constructed and maintained and
for such purpose is hereby authorized and empowered to select
as trustees for such purpose any three residents who are free-
holders of said city of Oxford who, upon appointment and qualifi-
cation, shall enter into bond with any surety company authorized
to do business in the state of Mississippi as surety and in such

723

penalty as may be provided by the order of the board of mayor and
aldermen of said city of Oxford, said bond to be for the proper
performance of their duties as such trustees and to be payable to
the said city of Oxford,

Sec. 3. That said trustees serve without pay or remuneration,
and that the city of Oxford pay the premium on said bond out of
the general funds of said city.

Sec. 4. In addition to the powers hereinabove specifically
set out, the said city of Oxford shall have, with reference to said
devise above set out, all powers conferred upon a municipality by
section 2391 of the Mississippi code of 1930.

Sec. 5. This act shall be in force and effect upon its passage.

APPROVED February 21, 1938.

Bass v. Srare
No. 43641 February 7, 1966 182 So. 2d 591

aq
i

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February 28, 1966 183 So. 2d 483

R. Jess Brown, Jackson; Melvin L. Wulf, William G.
Kopit, Paul Chevigny, New York, N. Y., for appellant.

G. Garl » Asst, A Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

729

Jonns, J.

This case comes from the Circuit Court of Warren
County where the appellant was convicted of rape of
a white woman. He was sentenced to death.

‘We are compelled to reverse the case.

The victim was a white lady 54 years of age who
resided alone on Bazinsky Road in Vicksburg. She was
employed in one of the stores in the city and on Septem-
ber 9, 1964, after work, returned to her home. The city
dump is a short way beyond her house traveling from
town. About 10:15 that night she went to bed. Some-
body knocked on her front door after she had gone to
sleep. When she asked, ‘‘Who is it?’’? he replied by
asking the way to Vicksburg. She told him the direction
and went back to sleep. Later that night somebody broke
through the side door of her house. When she jumped
up, he reached in the corner, picked up the victim’s rifle
and pointed it at her. Then he told her to undress and
get in bed; there the act was committed. Afterward, he
made her put on her gown. He dragged her to the tele-
phone where he pulled the receiver off, apparently think-
ing he was pulling it from the wall, but instead he had
pulled out a lamp plug. He then took her behind the
door through which he had come, threw her to the floor
and choked her, and beat her until she was unconscious.
She did not know the time when he came nor when he
left. Later that morning, having regained conscious-

ness, she went to a neighbor’s house and reported what
happened. Doctors were called to administer necessary
treatment to her. It was about 5:30 A. M. when she went
to her neighbor’s house.

There is no question as to the commission of the act.
The only issue is the identity of its perpetrator.

The prosecutrix testified it was dark, and she could
not see the face of the person well enough to identify
him. She did know that he was a tall Negro, identifying
him as a Negro by his voice, and that he wore a narrow-
brim hat. The case was circumstantial. Among the
circumstances developed was the fact that appellant was
employed by the City, assisting in the hauling of garbage
at night. On the afternoon before, he had been in the
neighborhood of this house working upon a ditch for
another employer. On the night of the alleged assault,
he had gone on one trip to the garbage disposal dump;
but, on the next trip, he did not go. He had left the truck
at a point twenty-five or thirty minutes’ walking dis-
tance from the prosecutrix’s house, explaining to the
driver of the truck that he wanted to see his mother
and get some money from her. He left the truck. The
next time the driver saw him he told the driver that
he had not been able to get any money from his mother,
and that he had no money. Later, he told another ver-
sion of his absence from the truck — that he was going
to visit a school teacher whom he had met or seen the
day before in a grocery store, and he was expecting or
hoping to have intercourse with her.

The prosecutrix testified that when she went to bed
that night she had a dollar bill and a fifty-cent piece in
her purse. Harly that morning, one of the policemen,
while investigating the case, opened her purse and found
only a nickel and one or two pennies. The truck driver
said that, when he saw the appellant returning from one
of his absences from the truck, he asked him if he wanted
to go to town. Appellant requested him to wait until

731

he got some cigarettes. The man operating the place
where the cigarettes were secured testified that appel-
lant came in and asked for change for a fifty-cent piece
so he could get some cigarettes from the cigarette ma-
chine.

One of the policemen testified that while examining
the scene of the crime he found a leather strap, being
a part of a bootlace, on the floor just a few feet from the
door that had been broken down. When they talked to
appellant to ascertain his whereabouts the night before,
he was wearing boots.

The appellant voluntarily came to the police station
with the police that afternoon and talked with them.
When the police talked to the driver of the truck, they
ascertained differences in the statements of the appel-
ant. Because of the circumstances which they had learn-
ed, to-wit: the description of appellant; the fact that he
was in the vicinity; the fact that he was wearing boots
with leather boot straps; and the various statements by
him, the police arrested Bass at 9:30 P. M., the night
after the assault.
After the arrest of appellant, he was brought to Jack-
son for further investigation. While in Jackson, he was
asked by police officers what clothes he wore the night
efore. According to the police officers, he stated that
the pants and shirt which he wore the night before were
at his home; and, if they would contact his wife, she
would give them to the police. He and his wife were
residing at the home of his mother-in-law.

Thereupon, the police in Jackson telephoned the po-
lice in Vicksburg, and the officers there went to the home
and secured the pants and shirt.

The boots which appellant was wearing were removed
from his feet when he was arrested, and.it was discover-
ed that one of the boot straps was shorter than the other.
The broken piece had already been sent to Baton Rouge
for examination by the Louisiana State Policemen’s Lab-

oratory. After removal of the straps from the boots,
they (the straps) also were sent there.

When the shirt and pants were obtained from ap-
pellant’s wife, they together with bed clothing and the
victim’s night clothes, were forwarded to the FBI labora-
tory at Washington, where they were examined.

The FBI report stated that there was blood on the
shirt worn by appellant. When asked about this spot
on his shirt, Bass said it was fish blood; that he went
to a fish market in Vicksburg, and got the blood on
his shirt there. The FBI report showed that it was
human blood.

There was also blood found on the bed clothing on
which also was a hair of Negroid origin. The blood
stain was not sufficient to be classified, nor was the hair
sufficient to be identified as one of appellant’s.

Human semen was found on the flap of appellant’s
trousers. The school teacher whom he had told the
driver he was going to visit denied making a date with
him, and said he was not at her home that night.

The laboratory technician of the Louisiana Police
Laboratory testified regarding the shoelaces. He said
that, while it was impossible to state positively that
this fragment of a shoelace found on the floor was a
part of the shoelace in the boot, he could say that there
were no circumstances by which he could assert positive-
ly that it did not come from that shoelace. The fragment
of shoelace, when coupled with the shorter shoelace taken
from the boot, made a string approximately three inches
longer than the other shoelace. However, the technician
testified this could easily occur by reason of the strain
and pull on the shoelace at the time it broke.

These were briefly the circumstances in evidence when.
the state rested.,

The rule had been invoked. The prosecutrix had no
opportunity to hear Bass talk prior to her appearance
on the stand. She did testify that she would be able to

733

identify the voice of the man if she could hear it. When
appellant was on the stand, the prosecutrix returned to
the courtroom and listened to him testify. After the
defense rested, she was recalled by the state, and over
the strenuous objection permitted to testify that she
had now heard appellant’s voice, and that she could
identify his voice as that of the person who attacked her.

There are numerous assignments of error, the first of
which is that the lower court erred in failing to sustain
a motion to quash the indictment and the special venire
because of alleged systematic exclusion of Negroes from
the jury list.

On the hearing of this motion, it was shown that the
total white male population of Warren County over twen-
ty-one years of age was 6,274, and the total non-white
male population over twenty-one was 4,677. Thus, the
non-white male population of the county over twenty-one
years of age was 42% of the total male population over
twenty-one.

It was shown that there were 10,000 or 11,000 qualifi-
ed electors, of which number approximately 1500 were
colored. The appellant introduced evidence that the num-
ber of Negroes on the jury lists of the county from the
years 1957 to 1964, both inclusive, ran from none in
1957 to six in 1964, and, in the intervening years, the
number was less than six. The state introduced three
of the supervisors who testified they followed the law
in drawing the jury list. The circuit clerk testified to
the same effect. The only evidence to conflict in any
way with the figures for the years aforestated was a
statement by the circuit clerk that for the years 1963 and
1964 there were thirty-five or forty Negroes on the jury
list. Assuming that the full 800 jurors which the statute
provides to be drawn were drawn for each of these years
would mean there were twenty or less colored on the
list for each of those years. That would be 244% of the
total list as compared with 42% of the males over twenty-
one years of age.

HE BB Two of the supervisors did not testify, and
neither did the chancery clerk. There was no attempt by
the state to explain the failure of Negroes to be on the
list. Those officers who testified simply stated that they
drew the list in accordance with the law. This was not
sufficient to meet the burden cast upon the state by
the prima facie case made by appellant. Decisions bear-
ing upon this case could be cited and copied to make an
entire volume, but it has been said so many times that
we do not think it necessary to repeat all of these de-
cisions. We simply cite the case of Harper v. State,
251 Miss. 699, 171 So. 2d 129 (1965), where the federal
eases and many state cases are collated and described,
Our courts and officials charged with the duty of se-
lecting jurors should heed these laws, if we hope to con-
tinue to handle violations of our laws. Our courts, when-
ever facts such as these are shown, can do nothing except
reverse.

HEEB The next assignment is the failure of the lower
court to grant a peremptory instruction on the ground
hat the state did not meet its burden of proof. We
have given this question much study, and believe that
the circumstances, most of which are hereinabove men-
ioned, are sufficient to go to the jury on the question
of the appellant’s guilt, even after eliminating some of °
the evidence or circumstances which may later have to
be done under our holdings hereinafter stated.

HEEB The third assignment is the failure of the court
o sustain the objection to Mrs. Griffith’s testimony in
rebuttal after the state rested its case and after, in
violation of the rule which had been invoked, the prose-
cutrix returned to the courtroom to listen to the defendant
testify. This should not have been permitted. It was
unfair and an undue advantage of appellant. If he had
known she was going to return and listen to his voice,
he could have declined to testify. MIM Under all of
the circumstances, it was an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion to permit this testimony in rebuttal.

735

MBB The next assignment is that the court erred in
limiting defendant’s cross-examination of certain police-
men about matters regarding their actions and the way
they proceeded in the investigation. On the subject of
cross-examination, this Court said in Prewitt v. State,
156 Miss. 731, 735, 126 So. 824, 825 (1930):

It is of the utmost importance in the administra-
tion of justice that the right of cross-examination be
preserved unimpaired. It is the law’s most useful
weapon against fabrication and falsehood. As a test
of the accuracy, truthfulness, and credibility of tes-
timony, there is no other means as effective. In this
state, cross-examination is allowed coextensive with
the issues, Walton v. State, 87 Miss. 303, 39 So. 689;
not only, but it may proceed into the collateral cireum-
stances surrounding, or in any way affecting, the trans-
action to the full extent that they have relevant con-
nection by way of testing the memory, accuracy, sin-
cerity, interest, or bias of the witness. In all these
matters the privilege of counsel rightfully has broad
latitude, and, to make it fully effective towards the
purposes for which the law allows and favors it, the
privilege should not be interfered with or hampered
or restricted by the trial judge, except in clear case
of irrelevancy, trespass beyond admissible ground, or
extremes of continual, aimless repetition. 1 Thomp.
on Trials, sections 406, 415-419. In several instances
in this record, as it appears to us, the privilege was
unduly and materially embarrassed by the trial judge;
and this feature, taken together with the error first
mentioned, makes it our duty, as we view it, to reverse
the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
‘We are of the opinion that the court should have per-

mitted the cross-examination to proceed fully.

HEEB Another question pertains to the failure of the
court to allow the entire FBI written report, made to
the police department of the City of Vicksburg, to be

736

read to the jury. The state introduced two FBI labora-
tory technicians who testified as to the particular work
they had done; and, when questioned about the report,
they pointed out two or three paragraphs which includ-
ed their individual examination. There were three short
paragraphs at the end of their report which appellant
says were favorable to him. As stated, the state intro-
duced the witnesses who had made only the examinations
about which they testified. That part of the report
appellant wanted to be read to the jury was made by
other persons who were not offered as witnesses. The
state did not introduce the FBI report. It simply in-
troduced two men who had examined part of the arti-
cles. The court sustained the state’s objection to this
report, and particularly that part not made by the wit-
nesses, a8 being hearsay. We think this was correct.

A merchant testified that he sold the defendant a
pair of leather shoelaces a few days before the assault.
He did not know the exact date. He was introduced by
the defendant, whose counsel undertook to prove by him
that he talked to the police right after the occurrence and
told them that the purchase was just a couple of days
before the assault. But the witness did not remember
the time. He said he talked to the policemen, and told
them that he sold the laces to the defendant within a
few days. There was no error as to this testimony.

The police a few hours after knowledge of the crime,
requested appellant to accompany them to the police
station, which he did voluntarily. There he was not a
suspect upon whom the investigation had begun to focus.
This was a general inquiry. He was arrested about 9:30
P. M. that night and carried to Jackson for what is
commonly called a ‘‘lie detector’’ test. At Jackson, he
was asked about the clothes he wore. He, according to
the police, described the clothes he wore the night before,
and said if they would go to his home his wife would
give them the clothes.

737

At no. time was he advised of his right to counsel
or to remain silent.

Error is charged in failure to exclude statements by
Bass and other evidence taken from him without telling
him of his right to counsel, or to remain silent, and in
admitting the clothes obtained from the house as a re-
sult of the conversations in Jackson.

HN ES We hold that statements obtained from
appellant at the general inquiry at the police station
before his arrest were clearly admissible. Appellant
insists, however, that the clothes gotten at his home,
after he, according to the policemen, had consented to
their securing same, were illegally seized. That the per-
mission obtained from him was inadmissible under Hs-
cobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12
L, Hd. 2d 977 (1964).

We cannot agree with this inasmuch as we do not think
that case applies to the facts here. We are of opinion the
question is whether in truth and in fact the statements
were freely and voluntarily given. Compare Henry v.
State, 253 Miss. 263, 154 So. 2d 289 (1963).

On retrial, when and if the state offers to introduce
such testimony, we suggest the court should, in the ab-
sence of the jury, have a full and complete hearing on
the issue and determine whether the permissions and
statements were freely and voluntarily given and there-
fore admissible, together with the clothes.

HE MB [i is alleged the court committed error by ad-
mitting in evidence the boots and shoelaces which were
obtained by the police as a result of an alleged illegal
arrest. With this assignment, we cannot agree. A felony
had been committed and, as shown by the above state-
ment of facts, it is apparent that police had probable
cause to arrest defendant and, MMM after having ar-
rested him, to secure these boots, shoelaces, ete.

738

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, this case is re-
versed and remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

All Justices concur.

ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
Smrre, Justice:

This case was reversed and remanded for reasons
set out in an opinion of this Court delivered on February
7, 1966, and not yet reported.

The appellant has now suggested that the Court erred
in remanding the case for a new trial, and should have
given judgment here discharging him. The suggestion
of error is based upon a statement in the opinion that
the trial court erred in admitting, in rebuttal, testimony
by the victim identifying appellant by his voice. It is
argued that we held this testimony to be incompetent
and that without it the evidence against appellant is
wholly circumstantial, and insufficient to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.

HE MH Appellant is in error in his construction of
the Court’s opinion with respect to the testimony of-
fered. It was not decided that this testimony was in-
competent, but only that testimony identifying appellant
as the attacker was part of the prosecution’s case in
chief and that it was error to permit it to be introduced
in rebuttal.

The suggestion of error is overruled.

Suggestion of error overruled.

All Justices concur.

73:

ives

Cocuran v. Mississrppr Hosrrran any Muproan Szevice
No. 43778 February 7, 1966 182 So. 2d 597

Stanford Young, Waynesboro, for appellant.

Hedgepeth, Price & Hedgepeth, Jackson, for appellee.

' i

Ersrwen, 0. J.

Ervin Cochran, appellant, brought this suit in the
Circuit Court of Wayne County against Mississippi Hos-
pital and Medical Service (called Service), upon a hos-
pital and medical service or insurance policy. Appellee
is incorporated under a statute designating it as a ‘‘non-
profit hospital, medical and surgical service corpora-
tion.’’? Miss. Code Ann. § 5615-01 et seq. (1956). The
question is whether a clause, excluding care for an
injury provided for by a workman’s compensation law,
applies to an insured who was injured on his job. The
compensation carrier paid the medical bills, but was
later reimbursed out of a recovery by insured and carrier
in a third-party suit against the negligent tort feasor.
We hold that the exclusion clause applies, and affirm
the judgment of the circuit court.

Cochran worked for Rex Drilling Company, and in-
curred personal injuries which required hospital and
medical treatment. He filed a claim under the work-
man’s compensation act against his employer, and ob-
tained voluntary payment of all medical benefits under
the act from the employer’s workman’s compensation
insurance carrier.

Cochran brought in circuit court a third-party tort
action against Dean Griner Butane Gas Company for
his injuries resulting from this accident. Miss. Code
Ann, § 6998-36 (1956). The compensation insurance car-
rier intervened as a subrogee of the medical payments

TAL

it made to Cochran under the compensation act. Upon
settlement of the suit against the defendant, the insur-
ance carrier obtained reimbursement from that de-
fendant of the medical payments.

Cochran then filed this suit based upon the hospital
and medical service policy written by Service for his
wife and himself. The scheduled benefits in the policy,
if applicable, aggregated $689.40.

The policy written by appellee stated:

B. NO BENEFITS WILL BE PROVIDED FOR:

...2. Care for any injury or illness provided for, or

for which any award or settlement is received in any

proceeding filed under a Workmen’s Compensation or

Employer’s Liability Law; or in any case where the

employer accepts liability.

The exclusion is applicable under the plain terms of
the contract: (1) Care for the injury was ‘‘provided
for’? under a workman’s compensation law ; (2) an award
or settlement was received under a workman’s compen-
sation law; and (3) the employer accepted liability under
the workmen’s compensation law.

Other decisions interpreting a similar provision reach-
ed this same conclusion. Wenthe v. Hospital Service of
Iowa, 251 Iowa 765, 100 N. W. 2d 903 (1960); Moeller
v. Associated Hospital Service, 304 N. Y. 73, 106 N. HE. 2d
16 (1952); Cash v. American Health Insurance Corp.,
203 Va. 719, 127 8. HE. 2d 119 (1962).

HEB [n short, the provisions of the contract excluded
this coverage. Cochran did not pay his own hospital
and medical bills. Initial liability under the statute was
the employer’s, and the ultimate liability fell upon the
wrongdoer responsible for his injuries. Adoption of
Cochran’s views would give him a windfall, by collect-
ing his hospital and medical bill from the third-party
wrongdoer for his employer, as required by the statute,

a

42,

and again for himself from Service. See Annot., 81
ALR. 2d 927 (1962).

Affirmed.
Gillespie, Rodgers, Jones and Robertson, JJ., concur.

LzeBaven v. Puce
No. 43781 February 7, 1966 182 So. 2d 599

743

W. H. Jolly, Columbus, for appellant.

Martin & Brown, Macon, for appellee.

Ersrmes, 0. J.

M. M. LeBaugh brought this action in the Cireuit
Court of Noxubee County against Jack J. Pugh, Jr.,
appellee, seeking damages for personal injuries and dam-
ages to plaintiff’s automobile when it collided with de-
fendant’s truck. The jury returned a verdict for Pugh,
and this appeal is from a judgment based on it.

HB There was sufficient evidence for the jury to
‘ind that the sole, proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of LeBaugh in driving his automobile
at an excessive rate of speed, and failing to keep a look-
out and to keep his car under control. LeBaugh’s auto-
mobile was proceeding south behind Pugh’s truck. The
atter turned left into a private road leading to a pasture.
The rear wheels of the truck were off on the east side
of the pavement when LeBaugh’s automobile hit them.
Plaintiff testified that defendant did not give a left
urn signal. Defendant asserted that he did. Before
the impact plaintiff’s car skidded 62 feet, and after that
45 feet. Apparently plaintiff was trying to pass. The
ruck was a heavy vehicle, yet plaintiff’s car knocked it
40 to 50 feet. Plaintiff testified that he was going 40
miles per hour. A highway patrolman stated that plain-

fT

745

tiff said he was traveling 50 to 55 miles per hour in a
60 mile zone. However, the distance of the skid marks,
and the length the truck was knocked by the lighter auto-
mobile would justify a jury finding of excessive speed
under all of the circumstances.

HREM Pugh obtained an instruction to the general ef-
fect that the driver of a following automobile must yield
the right of way to the leading automobile traveling in
the same direction after the driver of the latter gives
the proper signal to turn left, etc. Although this in-
struction could have been drawn more precisely, when
it is read along with instructions numbers 2 and 3 given
plaintiff, there was no error. Cf. Miss. Code Ann. §§
8185, 8192 (1956). Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Fowler, 231
Miss. 72, 94 So. 2d 350 (1957), and Frizzell v. Guthrie,
222 Miss. 501, 76 So. 2d 361 (1954), dealt with different
circumstances, including different jury verdicts on the
original hearings, and do not control.

WME I The defendant, Pugh, Jr., was driving his
father’s truck. There was no reversible error in per-
mitting defendant’s counsel to cross-examine LeBaugh
as to whether he had paid Pugh, Sr., for damages to
his truck. LeBaugh stated that he did not pay the dam-
ages, but he supposed it was the ‘‘Farm Bureau.’’ On
redirect, LeBaugh said that no judgment was ever ob-
tained against him by Pugh, Sr. Under the circumstances,
we do not have to determine here whether a payment
made by the present plaintiff was privileged when of-
fered as an implied admission of liability. See MceCor-
mick, Evidence § 251 at 541 (1954); Annot., 20 A.L.R.
2d 304 (1951). Plaintiff denied that any judgment was
obtained against him and denied that he paid Pugh, Sr.
Hence the error in the admission of this evidence, if any,
was harmless.

Affirmed.

Gillespie, Rodgers, Jones and Robertson, JJ., concur.

~

46

No. 43809

CrisweLn v. CRISWELL
February 7, 1966

182 So. 2d 587

|

Robertshaw & Merideth, Greenville, for appellant.

48

“ (xz

Willard L. McIlwain, Greenville, for appellee.

Smirz, J.

The appellant, Mildred T. Criswell, has appealed from
a decree of the Chancery Court of Washington County
granting a divorce to her husband, the appellee, John
H. Criswell, and dismissing her cross-bill for separate
maintenance.

The parties were married October 14, 1932. Appellant
was seventeen years of age at the time of the marriage
and forty-nine years of age at the time of the trial. The
appellee was 72 years of age at the time of the trial. The
two children born of the marriage are adults and mar-
ried.

The bill filed by appellee on January 21, 1965, sought
a divorce from appellant upon the grounds of habitual
eruel and inhuman treatment; and, wilful, continued and
obstinate desertion for the space of one year. It has
been said that it is inconsistent to plead together these
two grounds for divorce. Amis, Divorce & Separation
in Mississippi, § 251 at 348 (1935).

In the oral argument, it was stated by counsel for ap-
pellant that the divorce was granted upon the ground

ll eS

of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. However, the
opinion of the chancellor is not in the record and since
the decree is silent as to the ground upon which the
divorce was granted, we have reviewed the evidence as
to its sufficiency to sustain the decree of divorce upon
either ground.

The bill of the appellee alleges that the parties ‘‘sep-
arated’? on January 15, 1964, slightly more than a year
before the bill was filed on January 21, 1965. It is not
charged that the separation was the fault of appellant.
The bill alleges ‘‘she (appellant) has refused to live
with complainant, and it has been more than one year
since they lived together as man and wife.’’

The proof does not establish that appellant deserted
appellee at the time of the separation as alleged in the
bill, nor that she was guilty of misconduct of that charac-
ter which would have warranted his leaving her. The fact
of desertion by the appellant, if established at all, must
rest upon appellee’s claim that he sought a reconciliation
with appellant in the fall of 1964 and again in January
1965, which appellant declined without sufficient justifi-
cation. The testimony of appellee himself shows that
these offers were conditional and, on at least one of the
occasions, he told his wife, ‘‘If I move back in, there
are going to be some changes made.’’ and, ‘‘That there
would have to be some changes made.’’ He also testi-
fied that he told her that if she ‘‘didn’t withdraw that
charge and give me a divorce, I was moving in the next
day, not later than Saturday morning.’’? (Kmphasis
added.)

These efforts at reconciliation are so hedged about
and conditional that it is doubtful that either was effec-
tive to change the character of the existing estrange-
ment from that of a mere separation into one of de-
sertion within the meaning of Mississippi Code Annotat-
ed section 2735 (1956).

750

HEM But if it could be said that appellee did make an
unconditional effort in good faith to bring about a recon-
ciliation and resumption of the marital relation, and
that appellant’s refusal so changed the character of the
separation that it became wilful and obstinate desertion
on her part, so as to set in motion the running of the one-
year period required by the statute, nevertheless, this
period could be computed only from the date of the offer
of reconciliation, the earliest of which occurred in the
fall of 1964, less than four months before the date on
which the bill was filed. Bunkley and Morse, Divorce
& Separation in Mississippi, § 3.11(14) at 104 (1957).

The evidence failed to establish that appellant was
guilty of that character of conduct which constitutes
wilful and obstinate desertion within the meaning of
the statute, continued for more than one year preceding
the date of the commencement of the suit.

It was stated by counsel in the course of the oral
argument that the divorce was granted by the chancellor
upon the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treat-
ment. Miss. Code Ann. § 2735 (1956).

As to this, the entire charge as contained in appellee’s
bill is as follows:

... During the time that complainant and defend-
and lived together as husband and wife, the defendant
was guilty of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment
of complainant and habitual gambling. The defend-
ant told complainant repeatedly that she really did
not care for him, and she began to stay away from
home, and she would frequent night clubs and gambling
parties. At times she would stay away from home until
late hours of night and sometimes all night long.
HMB Under the decisions of this Court, these allega-

tions are insufficient to form the basis of a charge of
habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Bunkley and
Morse, Divorce & Separation in Mississippi, § 314 (18)
at 132 (1957).

751

No objection was made to the insufficiency of the al-
legations of the bill and we have examined the record
of testimony submitted as supporting the charge that
appellant was guilty of a course of habitual cruel and
inhuman treatment which entitled appellee to a divorce
upon that ground.

There is no evidence and no suggestion that appellant
ever offered or threatened physical violence to appellee.

Tn the absence of proof of actual physical violence, or
a reasonable apprehension thereof, this Court has set
out what it is essential to establish before a divorce can
be granted upon the ground of habitual cruel and in-
human treatment. Taylor v. Taylor, 235 Miss. 239, 108
So. 2d 872 (1959); Hibner v. Hibner, 217 Miss. 611,
64 So. 2d 756 (1953); Sandifer v. Sandifer, 215 Miss.
414, 61 So. 2d 144 (1952); McBroom v. McBroom, 214
Miss. 360, 58 So. 2d 831 (1952) ; Cummings v. Cummings,
213 Miss. 863, 58 So. 2d 39 (1952); Hoffman v. Hoff-
man, 213 Miss. 9, 56 So. 58 (1952); Smith v. Smith, 40
So. 24 156 (Miss. 1949); Price v. Price, 181 Miss. 539,
179 So. 855 (1938); and, Russell v. Russell, 157 Miss.
425, 128 So. 270 (1980).

Appellee cites two isolated statements from the rec-
ord in support of his contention that it was proved that
appellant habitually was guilty of conduct injurious to
his health. The first of these was the statement of appel-
lee, who testified, ‘“Why should I keep a-worrying my-
self to death at the age I got on me.’’

This excerpt from the record of appellee’s testimony
is taken out of context — (Record at 56)

Q. Well, she always gambled with somebody else,

didn’t she?

A. Yeah, she might have got in the car with some

man and loped off, I don’t say she didn’t. I didn’t

see her in the motel, now.

Q. It could have been somebody else’s car that you

saw, couldn’t it?

752

A. No, no, it wasn’t nobody else’s car, no, sir.

Q. But despite that, you never said a word to her

about it?

A. That’s nothing unusual for her. Why should I

keep a-worrying myself to death, the age I’ve got on

me, trying to keep up with a woman like that.

Q. When did that happen, Mr. Criswell?

A. It happened year before last.

The second statement urged is taken from appellant’s
testimony and is that appellant’s conduct ‘‘disturbed”’
appellee. This also is taken out of context — (Record
at 76)

Would you tell him where you had been?
Yes.

What would he do then?

‘Well, sometimes he would raise - - -.
Be disturbed about it?

Be disturbed, yes — that’s the best word.

This evidence was wholly insufficient to meet the
burden resting upon appellee of establishing that appel-
lant’s conduct impaired or threatened his health, or was
so cruel or inhuman, and so habitually practiced upon
him, as to meet the requirements of the rule announced
in the cited cases.

The only other conduct on the part of appellant, urged
as tending to establish this ground for divorce, is that
she habitually engaged in gambling, both at home and
elsewhere. Appellant did not deny, and the record shows
without dispute, that she did gamble, but that she origi-
nally acquired her gambling habits in games of chance
in which appellee participated. Appellee admits that
these games often took place in their home and that he
himself would ‘‘cut the game’? — that is, take a per-
centage of the sums wagered, and that this had gone
on for many years without objection on his part. The
record shows that throughout most of the period of the
marriage appellant worked and earned substantial

iP OPOPO

753

wages. Whatever her habits may have been with re-
spect to gambling, and she admits that she was a com-
pulsive gambler, they were, to say the least, condoned by
appellee for many years. The bill was amended at the
trial to include a charge of ‘‘habitual gambling.’ I
Divorce in Mississippi is a statutory proceeding and
the legislature has not seen fit to make gambling a
ground for divorce.

HEM The burden rested upon appellee to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the conduct of the
appellant was not only cruel but that it endangered, or
adversely affected, his health or safety and, further, that
it was the proximate cause of the separation. Scott v.
Scott, 219 Miss. 214, 69 So. 2d 489 (1954); Bunkley and
Morse, Divorce & Separation in Mississippi, § 3.14(17)
(1957).

He failed to meet this burden.

MM The quarrels and disagreements between the
parties in this case were not of such gravity nor so
exclusively the fault of appellant as to warrant a finding
that she was guilty of habitual cruel and inhuman treat-
ment within the meaning of the seventh subdivision of
section 2735,

In Russell v. Russell, supra, the Court said:

Accepting the evidence of the appellee as true, it
discloses that the appellant was not without fault, and
that he indicated to the appellee he would approve
her leaving him, resulting in rendering her unhappy
and her marital bonds irksome, but for that alone the
law of this state does not sanction a divorce. Cruel
and inhuman treatment, unaccompanied by personal
violence, within the meaning of the statute, is such
conduct only as endangers life, limb, or health, or
creates a reasonable apprehension of danger thereto,
thereby rendering the continuance of the marital re-
lations unsafe for the unoffending spouse, or such un-
natural and infamous conduct as would make the mari-

tal relation revolting to the unoffending spouse and

render it impossible for him or her, as the case may

be, to discharge the duties thereof, thus defeating the

whole purpose of that relation. 157 Miss. at 430-31,

128 So. at 272.

We think the evidence was not sufficient to warrant
the granting of a divorce to appellee, and to that extent
the decree should be reversed.

HEEB Appellant filed a cross-bill demanding separate
support from appellee. The evidence was insufficient to
establish appellant’s right to the relief sought and the
chancellor was correct in dismissing the cross-bill. Bunk-
ley and Morse, Divorce & Separation in Mississippi,
§ 7.01 at 202 (1957).

The decree of the court below will be affirmed as
to the dismissal of the cross-bill, and reversed and a
final decree entered here for appellant dismissing ap-
pellee’s bill for divorce.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and a final decree
entered here dismissing appellee’s bill for divorce.

Gillespie, P. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Ineer, JJ.,
concur.

Mississippr Power Company, et al., Appeniants v. Soure
Mississippi Exzcrric Powsr Assocrarion, et al., APPELLEES

No. 43693 February 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 163

2
1
i

1
i

TST

Wise, Smith & Carter, Watkins & Eager, Jackson;
Eaton, Cottrell, Galloway & Lang, Gulfport, for appel:

S
7
Ea

Welch, Gibbes & Graves, Laurel; Hedgepeth, Price &
Hedgepeth, Jackson, for appellee,

Parrerson, J.

This is an appeal by Mississippi Power Company and
Mississippi Power & Light Company from a final decree
of the Chancery Court of Hinds County affirming an
order of the Public Service Commission which granted
a certificate of public convenience and necessity to South
Mississippi Electric Power Association. The order au-
thorized construction and operation of a steam electric
generating plant in Jones County and an electric trans-
mission system necessary to its operation in southeast
Mississippi.* The purpose of such facility and trans-
mission system is to provide a bulk supply of electricity
to four of the corporate members of South Mississippi
Electric Power Association. We affirm.

*An electric generating facility of 65-megawatt nameplate rating
to be located on a 55-acre site in Jones County, Mississippi, and
approximately 392.6 miles of transmission lines extending out
from the facility to 26 delivery points of four electric power as-
sociations in 17 counties of southeast Mississippi. It is estimated
these facilities will cost in excess of $15,000,000.

South Mississippi Electric Power Association, here-
inafter referred to as petitioner, is a Mississippi corpora-
tion organized and operated under the Electric Power
Association Act, Chapter 184, Mississippi Laws of 1936,
Mississippi Code Annotated section 5463 et seq (1956).
It has authority to engage in all types of utility opera-
tions, including the generation and transmission of elec-
tric energy. It is composed of nine corporate members,
each of which is an electric power association organized
and operated under the Hlectric Power Association Act
supra and each of which is engaged in the transmission,
distribution and sale of electricity to the public. The
corporate members of the petitioner are: Singing River
Blectric Power Association, Dixie Electric Power As-
sociation, Southern Pine Electric Power Association,
Pearl River Valley Electric Power Association, Coast
Electric Power Association, Magnolia Electric Power
Association, Southwest Mississippi Electric Power As-
sociation, Capital Electric Power Association, and Hast
Mississippi Electric Power Association. Four of these
associations, Singing River, Dixie, Southern Pine, and
Pearl River Valley, were made respondents to this pe-
tition by order of the commission. Though designated as
respondents, their position in essence is the same as that
of the petitioner as each confesses the petition.

Mississippi Power Company, one of the two protest-
ants, is a foreign corporation authorized to do business
in this state. It is a private utility engaged in the busi-
ness of generating, transmitting, and distributing elec-
tricity in the southeastern part of the state.

Mississippi Power & Light Company, the other pro-
testant, was a foreign corporation organized and operat-
ed under the laws of Florida, but it is now chartered in
Mississippi. It is also a private corporate utility engaged
in the business of generating, transmitting and distri-
buting electricity. Its service area is roughly the west-
ern part of the state.

765

These two utilities, Mississippi Power & Light Com-
pany and Mississippi Power Company, are hereinafter
referred to as the protestants except when specific ref-
erence is made to one or the other.

At the present time the electric power associations,
individually, purchase their electric power supply from
either one or the other of the protestants. These sales
by the protestants to the individual associations are
authorized by ‘grandfather certificates’? granted to the
protestants by the Public Service Commission under the
authority of Mississippi Code Annotated section 7716-05
(b) (1956). These grandfather certificates were granted
to the protestants as they sold bulk or wholesale supplies
of electric energy to these delivery points at the time
of the act. The certificate to Mississippi Power & Light
Company (Commission Docket U-44) authorizes it to
serve a specified delivery point of Southern Pine. The
certificate to Mississippi Power Company (Commission
Docket U-99) authorizes it to sell electric energy to the
power associations at specified delivery points. How-
ever, this certificate is subject to the following restric-
tive language in the commission’s order: ‘‘The com-
mission is not hereby adjudicating the legal effect of
the certificate herein granted as to service to the afore-
said associations, nor is the commission determining in
this proceeding that the certificate herein granted binds
said associations to continue receiving such service.’? At
the time this suit was instituted in 1960 these sales to
the associations comprised .32% of the total sales of
Mississippi Power & Light Company and 4.14% of the
total sales of Mississippi Power Company.

The petitioner’s application for authority to construct
a generating plant and transmission system was filed
March 31, 1960, before the commission. The order award-
ing the certificate of public convenience and necessity
was entered on March 7, 1963, upon the completion of
a hearing which comprised 78 days. The voluminous 82-

766

volume record in this case contains 478 exhibits and is
over 12,000 pages in length. The various motions, pleas,
and appeals, including one interlocutory appeal to this
Court, are so numerous and lengthy that a discussion
of them, which would not reach the merits of the suit,
would serve no useful purpose.

Subsequent to the perfection of this appeal, petitioner,
on July 20, 1965, filed a petition with the Public Service
Commission to amend the certificate theretofore granted
to it. Petitioner is now seeking, by this amended petition,
to enlarge the facility specified in the certificate. The
protestants thereupon filed a plea in bar in this Court
alleging in substance that this was an admission on the
part of the petitioner that the 65-megawatt generating
facility, the subject of this suit, is inadequate, would
in fact never be constructed, and therefore, by such ad-
mission the cause is rendered moot.

The protestants contend, in addition to the plea in
bar, that the order of the commission is not supported
by substantial and competent evidence, that the order of
the commission violates the ‘‘existing facility’? rule in
that it authorizes an unwarranted duplication of service
presently being rendered by protestants. They contend
that the order of the commission impairs previously
existing certificate rights of the protestants and they
contend that under either the ‘‘existing facility’? rule
or the ‘‘existing certificate right’’ they were not accord-
ed the opportunity to correct whatever inadequacy of
service there existed as is contemplated by Mississippi
Code Annotated section 7716-05(f) (1956), and they were
thus deprived of valuable rights without due process of
law; and finally, they contend that the commission’s
order should be reversed as it was predicated upon the
operation of facilities in violation of law.

HM I We are of the opinion that the issue raised
by the plea in bar is not well taken as more than five
years had elapsed from the time of filing the original

767

application for the generating plant and the July 20,
1965 application seeking to enlarge it. The electric in-
dustry is fluid; demands for service are constantly fluc-
tuating. These demands are closely related to economic
or business trends, the prosperity or lack of it on the
part of the consuming public, and many other factors;
the daily, weekly, monthly and yearly electrical require-
ments, though they can be reasonably estimated, are
constantly changing. We conclude, as did the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 252 S. W. 2d 885 (1952) that: ‘‘The
Public Service Commission necessarily must base its
decision and actions on the economic conditions existing
at the time a case is before it, and it is not in the public
interest that a case be prolonged indefinitely by allowing
a reconsideration whenever there is a fluctuation in
price levels.’ The issue raised by the plea in bar was
not before the commission at the time of the hearing.
Without deciding that the same is properly before us,
we hold that the conditions existing in 1965 were not
necessarily the conditions existing in 1960, the year in
which the forecasts were made as to the electrical needs,
and for this reason the plea in bar should be overruled
and this appeal restricted to the economic conditions
existing at the time the case was before the commission.
The issues raised by the amended application are issues
to be determined by the commission when properly pre-
sented to it.

HEEB The protestants next urge that there is no sub-
stantial evidence to support the order of the commission.
The ‘‘substantial evidence’’ rule is well established in
our jurisprudence both by statute and case law. Mis-
sissippi Code Annotated section 7716-26(d) (1956) in
reference to orders of the Public Service Commission
states in part:

. .. The order shall not be vacated or set aside
either in whole or in part, except for errors of law,

SS

unless the court finds that the order of the commission
is not supported by substantial evidence, is contrary
to the manifest weight of the evidence, is in excess
of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the com-
mission, or violates constitutional rights.
We find the following statement of the rule in the case
of East Mississippi Electric Power Ass’n v. Mississippi
Power Co., 251 Miss. 310, 314, 169 So. 2d 473, 474 (1964) :
The action of the Commission in granting a certificate
cannot be overturned if it is supported by substantial
evidence, and is not arbitrary or capricious, or be-
yond its power to make, and does not violate some
constitutional right.
See also Mississippi Power Co. v. East Mississippi Elec-
tric Power Ass’n, 249 Miss. 869, 164 So. 2d 479 (1964)
and Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Blake, 236 Miss.
207, 109 So. 2d 657 (1959) and numerous other Missis-
sippi cases to the same effect. MBM After a careful
reading of this record we are of the opinion there was
substantial evidence based upon competent testimony
to support the findings of the commission and that its
order was not arbitrary or capricious. We conclude,
therefore, that this assignment of error is not well taken.
HEBER The protestants next rely on the ‘‘existing facili-
ty’’ rule, sometimes in this state called the Tri-State
Transit rule. This rule as stated in Tri-State Transit
Co. of Lowisiana, Inc. v. Diaie Greyhound Lines, Inc.
197 Miss. 37, 48, 19 So. 2d 441, 444 (1944) is as follows:
... That a certificate should not be granted where
there is existing adequate service over the route ap-
plied for, and, if inadequate, unless the existing carri-
er has been given an opportunity to furnish such
additional service as may be required.
This rule has been applied to the issuance of certificates
to public electric utilities under Mississippi Laws ch. 372,
§ 5 (1956) in Capital Electric Power Ass’n v. Missis-
sippi Power & Light Co., 240 Miss. 189, 125 So. 2d 739

| si

(1961), though in fact the ‘‘existing facility’’ statute
(Miss. Code Ann. § 7642) is a part of the Motor Carrier
Act. In Keith v. Bay Springs Tel. Co., 251 Miss. 106,
114, 168 So. 2d 728, 730, 732 (1964), in applying the rule
to radio telephones we held:
However, the existing facility rule does not apply
unless the services and facilities to be rendered by
the new certificate are duplicating and result in waste.

Section 5(c) of the Public Utility Act reflects an in-

tent to ‘“‘prevent unnecessary and uneconomic dupli-

cation of such facilities as between two’’ utilities. See
also § 5(f). The rule is a limitation upon the commis-
sion’s power to issue certificates, but it is relevant
for the purpose principally of avoiding wasteful dup-
lication of the existing utility service... In short, the
existing facility rule, developed under the Motor Car-
rier Regulatory Act, has been applied to an electric
utility under the 1956 act. But it should not be used
arbitrarily or inflexibly. The Commission is given the
power to determine ‘‘that the present or future public
convenience and the necessity require or will require

the operation. of such equipment or facility.” . .
This is essentially the determination of a matter of
policy, namely, which utility in the opinion of the

agency will best serve the public convenience, neces-

sity and welfare.
The Court in Keith supra quoted with approval the con-
sideration given such problem in Utah Light & Traction
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P.
2d 683, 690 (1941), wherein it stated:

Of course the public interest may well be subserved
by preventing waste. * * * But the waste must be
such as would injure the public or interfere with its
interests, growth and development. It must not be a
prevention of waste carried to the extreme where it
prevents or interferes with progress in equipment or
methods or ways of serving the public. And the de-

770

termination as to whether waste would result, or wheth-

er the waste which did result, would be so against the

public welfare and interest that it should be prevented,
are questions for the commission to determine.

The commission in its detailed and excellent order*
found that there was no uneconomic or wasteful dupli-
cation though it did find, in a few instances, the transmis-
sion lines of petitioner’s proposed system would parallel
those of the protestants already in place. Their finding
in this and other regards is as follows:

12. For a number of years there has been a con-
stant need for additional generation and transmission
facilities in this state and this need will continue to
grow. The need for more generating capacity is great-
er than the capacity of the facilities which petitioner
proposes to construct and operate. This is true de-
spite the splendid interconnections which protestants
have with other sources and systems within their own
respective groups (Mississippi Power Company is a
member of the Southern Company group and Missis-
sippi Power & Light Company is a member of the
Middle (South) Utilities, Ine. group) and also with
systems outside these groups. There is sufficient evi-
dence to sustain this finding. It is enough to mention
that: Mississippi Power Company has found it neces-
sary to begin building immediately for operation in
1965 and 1966 approximately 200,000 to 240,000 KW
of generating capacity and a substantial quantity of
transmission facilities, not only to handle this par-
ticular output but to strengthen its transmission sys-
tem otherwise; leaving aside the benefits of inter-
connections, both protestants have already exceeded
in loads their generating capabilities with the largest

*The Public Service Commission’s order deals with every facet
of this case in an able and lucid manner, not an easy task in view
of the scientific language of the electrical engineers and of the
industry. This order would be incorporated in full in this opinion,
but we refrain from doing so due to its necessary length.

771

unit in the system down (in other words, without
interconnections their generating capabilities will not
sustain their load requirements with firm power) ; Hx-
hibit 23 shows that from 1956 to 1960 Mississippi Pow-
er Company’s sales to ultimate consumers and elec-
tric power associations increased by 49.1%. Exhibit
24 shows that for the same period Mississippi Power
& Light Company’s increased by 39.2%. Hxhibit 211
shows that in a ten year period from 1950 through
1960 the four respondents had an increase in power
sales of 260.20% and the nine members of South Mis-
sissippi Electric Power Association had an increase
of 262.43%.

13. The construction and operation of petitioner’s
proposed system would not result in uneconomic dup-
lication of facilities of other utilities. This record does
not show that any substantial duplication of trans-
mission facilities would be produced by the construc-
tion of the proposed system by the petitioner. In
virtually all instances protestants’ transmission lines
were already in place before the delivery points were
established thereon to serve the respondents. Only in
a few instances would the transmission lines of pe-
titioner’s proposed system physically parallel those
of protestants. (Rec. pp 12,377-12,378).

We have heretofore stated that the order of the com-
mission was based upon substantial evidence. The rule
announced in Tri-State Transit supra, and here repeated
in part ‘‘that a certificate should not be granted where
there is existing adequate service over the route applied
for. . .”? is urged upon us by the protestants as being
applicable here. We cannot agree with this contention.
A comparison of Tri-State with the case at bar produces
a strained analogy at best. It dealt with the right of two
common carriers (bus companies) to offer passenger
service to the public over the same route or highway.
The commission found that a certificate of public con-

venience and necessity was not warranted by the facts
before it. This order was reversed by the chancery court
on appeal and the chancery court’s order was reversed
by this Court and the commission’s order reinstated.
Though the ‘‘existing facility’? rule was announced in
the opinion, the case actually turned upon the basis of
there being substantial evidence to support the finding
of the commission. Here the issues are not directly
related to the public. Neither are they related to the
same service area, but rather the issues presented here
relate to the contested right of two corporate utilities
to serve with wholesale electricity a facility (delivery
point) or link between or adjacent to two service areas.
However, assuming but not deciding, that there is a close
analogy between the two cases, we still are of the opinion
that this assignment of error is not well taken. We
rely upon the commission’s specific finding that there
‘was no uneconomic duplication here and in so doing we
follow precisely the Court’s ruling in Tri-State as it
too relied specifically upon the finding of the commis-
sion as the basis for its decision. Compare Keith supra
wherein we stated: ‘The fatal flaw in Monroe’s argu-
ment is this: There was substantial evidence to support
the finding of the Commission. . .’? (251 Miss. at 114,
168 So. 2d at 730). We conclude this assignment of error
is not well taken.

HE HM The protestants further contend that the
order of the commission was erroneous in that it impair-
ed valuable rights existing in them by virtue of the
‘grandfather’? certificates they hold which authorize
them to sell electric energy to the power associations.
They cite Capital Electric Power Ass’n v. Mississippi
Power & Light Co., 240 Miss. 139, 150, 125 So. 2d 739,
743 (1961) wherein we held:

Having served the electrical requirements in the

Elton area for more than 17 years, Capital Electric,

under paragraph (b) of Section 5, Laws of 1956, Sec-

|

tion 7716-05, Code of 1942, acquired the right to a
certificate of convenience and necessity therein, being
in truth and in fact a franchise from the State. Such
right is indeed a valuable one.
The certificates of the protestants authorize the sale of
electricity to specified delivery points. The certificate
of Mississippi Power Company is restricted by the fol-
lowing language of the commission:

The commission is not hereby adjudicating the legal
effect of the certificate herein granted as to service
to the aforesaid associations, nor is the commission
determining in this proceeding that the certificate
herein granted binds said associations to continue re-
ceiving such service.

There can be no doubt the protestants will be affected
to some degree by the certificate granted to the petitioner
as .32% of Mississippi Power & Light Company’s 1960
business stemmed from its sales to the associations and
4.14% of the business of Mississippi Power Company
from its sales for the same period. The generating fa-
cilities of the petitioner will supplant these sales to the
associations. It is well to keep in mind that petitioner
is a federation of nine power associations, respondents
being four of them, so in essence petitioner is a corpora-
tion through which the associations will generate their
own power as they have the statutory right to do under
the Electric Power Association Act, Chapter 184, Mis-
sissippi Laws of 1936, Mississippi Code Annotated sec-
tion 5463 et seq (1956). The issue thus restricts itself
to this narrow question: Do the protestants by their
certificated rights to sell, which we have held to be valu-
able, acquire by the certificates the absolute right to
continue these sales to a utility which desires to generate
* its own electricity and which has a statutory right so
to do? An affirmative answer to this question would
indeed render the petitioners captive customers of the
protestants who are in reality their competitors. We

find no comfort in the authorities cited by counsel nor
were we able to find direct authorities by our own re-
search to answer this perplexing question. We turn
again to the commission’s finding and order as to the
results we should reach. It found:
For a number of years there has been a constant
need for additional generation and transmission fa-
cilities in this state and this need will continue to grow.
The need for more generating capacity is greater than
the capacity of the facilities which the petitioner pro-
poses to construct and operate. This is true despite
the splendid interconnections which protestants have
with other sources and systems within their own re-
spective groups. . .
In candor we should state that the commission has not
found the services of either of the protestants to be
inadequate, but rather found, as noted, there was a need
for additional generating capacity broad enough to en-
compass the 65-megawatt generating facility authorized.
Under these circumstances (a deficit of generating ca-
pacity) we are of the opinion that the commission prop-
erly held the needs of the public above the grandfather
certificates of the protestants as we are of the opinion that
it was not the legislative intent that a grandfather cer-
tificate under Section 7716-05(b) was to supersede the
Electric Power Association Act, Chapter 184, Missis-
sippi Laws of 1936, which authorized the associations
to generate their own energy. The so-called ‘‘franchise’’
doctrine, referred to in the Elton case for example, does
not apply to the issuance of a certificate of convenience
and necessity for a wholesale electric transmission line.
Such a certificate is a privilege, regulated and controlled
by the state within due process limitations. The idea
that a franchise or charter granted by the state may be
immutable and wnamendable by the state was finally
and effectively eliminated by the 1890 Constitution. Mis-
sissippi Constitution 1890 §§ 178, 179, 180, 181, 182; of.

115

Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Meridian, 241 Miss. 678,
181 So. 2d 666 (1961). In reaching this conclusion we
note that the loss of sales by the protestants, though not
insignificant, is not total as the energy may be diverted
to their own needs for which there is ample demand.

HEE Protestants contend further, however, that un-
der the provisions of Section 7716-05(f) they are en-
titled to the particulars of any inadequacy of service,
either under the ‘‘existing facility’? or ‘‘valuable fran-
chise’’ rule, and that they must be afforded a reasonable
time by the commission to correct such inadequacy. This
statute provides:

(£) The commission may, after a hearing had upon
due notice, make such findings as may be supported
by proof as to whether any utility holding a certificate
under the provisions of this act is rendering reasonably
adequate service in any area covered by such utility’s
certificate, and in the event the commission finds that
such utility is not rendering reasonably adequate
service the commission may enter an order specifying
in what particulars such utility has failed to render
reasonably adequate service and order that such fail-
ure be corrected within a reasonable time, such time
to be fixed in such order. If the utility so ordered to
correct such failure fails to comply with such order
of the commission and the commission finds that can-
cellation of its certificate would be in the best interest
of the consuming public served by the holder of the
certificate, its certificate for the area affected, may
be revoked and cancelled by the commission. (HEmpha-
sis ours.)

Protestants urge that since the petitioner did not direct+
ly follow the statutory remedy for inadequacy, that,
in effect, the petition under Section 7716-05(c) (certi-
ficate of public convenience and necessity) is a col-
lateral attack upon their valuable franchise rights and
they are deprived of due process thereby. We are of the

716

opinion this contention is not well taken as the statute
refers to a specific service area and not to a facility
(delivery point) as here, and there is no finding that
the protestants are not rendering ‘‘reasonably adequate
service’’, and by the plain terms of the statute the remedi-
al provisions thereof are not applicable until there be
such finding. We conclude that this assignment of error
is not well taken and that the protestants’ constitutional
rights were not violated by the order of the commission
in this proceeding.

Finally, protestants contend that the commission’s
order should be reversed because public convenience and
necessity cannot be predicated upon the operation of
facilities in violation of law. They urge that public
convenience and necessity fails when it is shown without
dispute that the terms of the federal statute (Title 7,
section 904, USCA), and the terms of the loan agree-
ment itself would be violated in that the loan would be
used to duplicate existing ‘‘central station service.’

In the case of Alabama Electric Cooperative v. Ala-
bama Power Co., 176 So. 2d 483, 487 (Ala. 1964), the
court made the following statement:

“It has been consistently held that the legality of a
loan approved by the Administrator of the REA is
not subject to a collateral attack in a hearing before
a public service commission or the duly constituted
state authority which, in Alabama, is the Director of
Finance. (Citing cases). In each of these decisions,
the question of the violation of the central station
service feature of the federal act was raised but, in

" each instance, the decision was in favor of the coopera-
tives. In view of the authorities cited supra, we feel
that we cannot agree with the contention of appellees
that this is a question on which we should pass.

HE MM Without deciding whether protestants have
standing to raise this question we hold, as did the Ala-

TT

bama court, but this question is not a proper one to be
raised in this proceeding.

ME MM The clectric power associations are products
of legislative enactment. They are privileged to use the
powers granted in such enactment and are of course
subject to its limitations. As such they have legal status
comparable to other utilities without this Court’s opinion
as to the underlying philosophy of the act.

‘We are of the opinion the cause should be affirmed.

Affirmed.
All Justices concur.
J

Pues v. Suropsuire, Apur., Ec.
No. 43762 February 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 158

x
Eg

Robertshaw & Merideth, Greenville, for. appellant.

0

-_. ii

Dent, Ward, Martin & Terry, Vicksburg; J. H. Hogue,
Jr., Yazoo City, for appellee, Martha H. George.

E. C. Clements, Rolling Fork, for appellees, E. D.
Shropshire and others.

Rozerrson, J.

Ellen Bodley Vick Phelps Crump, a widow, died on
November 9, 1958, leaving a holographic last will and
testament dated August 23, 1948. The executors named
therein declined to act as such, and some of her natural
heirs then filed a petition to probate her will and appoint
E. D. Shropshire, Chancery Clerk of Sharkey County,
Administrator, C. T. A. Her last will and testament
was duly admitted to probate on January 27, 1959.

Mrs. Crump had no children and her natural heirs at
the time of her death were: A nephew, Henry Vick
Phelps, Jr., son of a deceased brother of testatrix;
a nephew, Alonzo Phelps George, son of a deceased
sister of testatrix; and R. P. Caselli, Teresa Caselli
d’Ayala Valva and Mary Phelps Caselli, adult children
of a deceased sister of testatrix.

On December 9, 1963, during the course of the ad-
ministration, Alonzo Phelps George died testate, leaving
his wife, Martha H. George, as his sole devisee and lega-
tee, they having had no children.

In the will (being entirely in the handwriting of the
testatrix) she attempted to set up an elaborate and
complicated trust. The language, used by the testatrix
in her attempt to set up the trust, being vague, indefinite
and ambiguous, and there being no funds to carry oul
the will of the testatrix, the administrator on June 16,
1964, filed his petition for construction of the will and
instructions as to what he should do. The two charitable
beneficiaries of the trust, the Episcopal Church and the
Masonic Fraternity, filed their answers in September,
1964, disclaiming any interest therein and declining any

782

gift that might be intended by the testatrix, the Episcopal
Church having been authorized to file a disclaimer by
the Episcopal Diocese of Mississippi on January 20,
1960. The will contained no residuary clause.

On January 28, 1965, the chancellor held:

“That the trust provisions of the Will of the said
Testatrix are void as to the Episcopal Church and
Free Masons and the Supreme Council of the 33rd
Degree who have also declined any claim or interest
in the estate by written declination herein filed, said
trust provisions of the Will being in violation of the
rule against perpetuities, and that the beneficial own-
ers of said estate, subject to the requirements of the
Will as to constructing certain monuments therein
mentioned, are Henry Vick Phelps, Jr., son of Henry
Vick Phelps, Sr., brother of Testatrix, a one-third
interest; Martha Hicks George, widow and sole de-
visee of Alonzo Phelps George, nephew of Testatrix
and son of Nannie Phelps George, sister of Testatrix,
a one-third interest; and Renato P. Caselli, Teresa
Caselli d’Ayala Valva and Mary Phelps Caselli, being
the children of Mary Phelps Caselli, deceased sister
of Testatrix, the owners of a one-third beneficial in-
terest therein.’’
The chancellor further decreed that the land would be

sold to the said beneficial owners for $3,500.00, plus the
amount necessary to pay off tax sales, damages, interest,
and subsequently accruing advalorem taxes. The $3,500.-
00 would be used to erect and construct certain monu-
ments that the testatrix had provided for in her will,
and also to pay court costs, legal fees and commissions
of the administrator, c.t.a. Henry Vick Phelps, Jr. ap-
peals from this decree, and contends that he should be
adjudged the beneficial owner of an undivided one-half
interest in the property and the three adult Caselli chil-
dren, the beneficial owners of the other undivided one-
half interest. The appellant contends that the provisions

of the will setting up a charitable trust in the Episcopal
Church and Masonic Fraternity are separable from the
other trust provisions, and, therefore, that the charitable
trust not being subject to the rule against perpetuities
went into effect and remained in effect until the said two
charitable beneficiaries filed disclaimers.

The appellant contends further that the ‘‘family’’ or
‘(the heirs of the testatrix’’ should be determined as of
the time when the disclaimers were filed by the Episco-
pal Church and the Masonic Fraternity, the disclaimers
being executed and filed in September 1964, or in the
alternative that the ‘‘family’’ be determined at the time
of the sale of the property.

The pertinent provisions of the will are, as follows:

3.

“J pass the fee simple title to all the real property,
wherever situated that I now possess or that I may
acquire before or my estate acquire after my death,
to my Executors in Trust for the use and benefit of
the following interests.

4,

“My nieces and nephews on my mother’s side but
it is distinctly understood that no interest of Devisor
shall pass to anyone not born in lawfull wedlock (2)
The Episcopal Church (3) The Masonic Fraternity
as represented by the Supreme Council of the 33rd
degree of the Southern Jurisdiction of the United
States of which John H. Cowles is the present grand
Commander and Luther A. Smith is the Sovereign
grand Inspector general in the State of Mississippi.

16.

“That this Trust lasts as long as the Institutions
of the Episcopal Church and that of the Freemasons
or their successors. That, if they dissolve, then the

784.

whole will revert to the oldest descendant living of
Alonzo J. and Mary Vick Phelps born in lawful wed-
lock, in fee simple. Providing that the Trusteeship
has existed with the Institutions of the Episcopal
Church and the Freemasons for not less than 200
years.

21.

“The object of this will is to aid my family and
humanity in general through my church and The Free-
mason to perpetuate the fine character of my parents
in their descendants and, generally, to character build,
seeking the Truth and what is God’s will, everlastingly.
But should the Church and the Freemasons find this
contribution more of a liability than an asset, then,
I direct that everything be sold to the advantage,
giving the family the chance to buy it in, distribute
the records and heirlooms among the museums, by
sale, put the money in the monument, House of Prayer,
and, after arranging for a caretaker for the House
of Prayer, close the Trusteeship. Proceeds from the
sale of the North Carolina property to be used to place
a memorial to Dr. Crump in Lenoir, N. C., such as
a Fountain or Tablets on which are enscribed the Ten
Commandments.’?

The condition in Paragraph 16 of the will did not
occur, because the two charitable beneficiaries did not
dissolve. Thus the provisions of Paragraph 16 are not
in issue.

The pertinent condition in the will is contained in
Paragraph 21, since the Church and the Freemasons
declined the gifts to them. Upon the gifts being de-
clined, Paragraph 21 directs that all assets are to be
sold, giving the ‘‘family’’ the right to buy the property
in, on certain conditions.

HM BH Ordinarily, when there is a gift to a charity,
with a gift over to a non-charity upon a remote con-

tingency, the second gift fails. There is a condition which
may happen beyond the period of perpetuities, and the
gift to the individual is void under the rule against per-
petuities. Proprietors of the Church in Battle Square
v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855); Gray, The Rule
Against Perpetuities § 593 (4d ed. 1942); Leach, Per-
petuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 668-669
(1938).

HE BB However, if a gift is made upon a remote,
invalidating contingency, under the ‘‘possibilities’”’ aspect
of the rule against perpetuities, the gift is still valid
when the contingency actually happens within the period
of the rule. This conclusion has the effect of avoiding
the punitive and technical aspects of the rule, but at
the same time confirming its policy and purpose within
reasonable limits. It is analogous to the ‘‘wait and
see’? rule, where a gift is made upon either of two
express contingencies, one of which must occur if at all
within the period, and the other which may not, and
the gift is held valid if the first contingency occurs,
although it is invalid if the second contingency occurs.
Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss, 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962);
Merchants National Bank v. Curtis, 98 N. H. 225, 97
A. 2d 207 (1953); 6 American Law of Property § 24.54
(1952) and 67 Harv. L. Rev. 355 (1953).

HEEB Since the contingency of the two charities de-
clining their gifts actually occurred, and this was within
the period of the rule against perpetuities, the ‘gift,
consisting of the right of the family to purchase, may
be considered valid. There is no precedent in this State
which compels us to close our eyes to facts occurring
after the death of the testatrix. Refusal of the charitable
gifts actually occurred. The Church and the Freemasons
never received the gift, because they declined them. Ac-
cordingly, the gift over to the ‘‘family’’ of testatrix is
valid, since it occurred within the period of perpetuity,

and in fact occurred without the charities accepting their
gifts,

HE MN The question is when or as to what time
should the ‘‘family’’ be determined. We conclude that
under all of the circumstances it should be determined
at the date of the death of the testatrix. The word
‘family’? is to be determined by the statute governing
the intestate succession of property. 3 Restatement of
Property § 308 (1940). The general rule is that where a
class of beneficiaries is described as heirs or next of
kin of the testator, the class is determined as of the time
of the death of the testator, unless the will reflects a
contrary intention. Recognizing this general rule, Dailey
v. Houston, 246 Miss. 667, 151 So. 2d 919 (1963) held
that all relevant factors indicated a later determination
of heirs, where the testator gave the life estate to his
spouse, with the remainder to be divided equally be-
tween his heirs and wife’s heirs. The presumptive rule
of determination as of testator’s death was said to be
simply a method for ‘‘judicial assistance in ascertaining
either testator’s actual intent, or what he would have in-
tended if he had thought about it, provided the words
used permit that construction.’’? 246 Miss. at 676, 151
So. 2d at 923. These considerations also apply to a
remainder or limitation over in favor of heirs, where the
statute on intestate succession is generally applied as
of the death of the named ancestor. 3 Powell on Real
Property § 375 (1952). In either event, additional lan-
guage or circumstances can cause a time other than the
ancestor’s death, or the testatrix’s death, to be used for
ascertainment of the intended takers.

HE [othe instant case, Mrs. Crump knew that
her nephew, Alonzo P. George, was living, as he was at
her death, and, although she gave portions of her estate
to the Church and Freemasons, she expressly provided
that, if they declined the contribution, then the assets
were to be sold and the ‘‘family’’ given the right to buy

787

it in. If she had known that the charities would decline
the gifts, she would have wanted her ‘‘family’’ to take
it when she died. This would have included Alonzo P.
George. The fact that he died after her but before the
charities formally declined their gifts does not negative
this inference of testatrix’s intent. All relevant factors
support the interpretation that the ‘‘family’’ should
be determined on the date of testatrix’s death. Here
the contingency of declining the gift after the period
of the rule against perpetuities did not happen. It
actually happened that the charities declined the gift
within the period of the rule. The chancery court was,
therefore, correct in holding that appellant; the Casellis;
and Martha Hicks George, the widow of Alonzo P. George,
each owned a one-third interest. See 4 Page on Wills
§ 84.24 (3d ed. 1961).

HE MS sOOne-third of the trust in Paragraph 3
went to testatrix’s nieces and nephews. The chancery
court also erred in stating that this gift violated the
rule against perpetuities. A trust is not invalid either
in whole or in part merely because the duration of the
trust may exceed the period of the rule against perpetui-
ties, provided that the interests of all the beneficiaries
must vest within the period. 1 Restatement (Second),
Trusts § 62 at 168 (1959); 2 Restatement (Second),
Trusts § 365 (1959). The rule against perpetuities deals
with remoteness of vesting and not with the duration
of vested interests. In upholding such trusts, the courts
have frequently pointed out that there was no undue
fettering of property for too long a time, because the
beneficiaries could at any time terminate the trust. In
this instance their pleadings and actions evidence a de-
sire to terminate the one-third trust to them. 1 Scott,
Trusts, § 62.10 (2d ed. 1956).

Hl MM fp summary, the charitable trusts for the
Church and Freemasons were valid. The remote con-
tingency would have been invalid, but since the charitable

788

donees declined, we will look at what actually happened.
In that view, the gift over to the ‘‘family’’ does not in
fact violate the rule against perpetuities, and thus it is
good. Finally, the ‘‘family’’ is determined as of the
date of death of the testatrix, in view of her intent
evidenced by all of the circumstances. Under these con-
siderations, the chancery court reached the right result
and the decree is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Smith, JJ.,
concur.
Es

Layerorp v. Mzrcurro
No. 43766 February 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 150

789

Burgin & Gholson, Columbus, for appellant.

Ben Owen, Columbus, for appellee.

” (ie

Threadgill & Hicks, Columbus, for cross-appellees,
Nelson Myers and Myers Furniture Company.

Brapy, Tom P., J.

Suit was instituted in the Circuit Court of Lowndes
County by Mrs. Grace Mercurio, the appellee, against

793

Jack Langford and Nelson Myers, d/b/a Fluff-Dry
Laundercenter, and also d/b/a the Myers Furniture and
Appliance Company. A peremptory instruction was
granted to Nelson Myers, individually, and to Jack Lang-
ford and Nelson Myers, d/b/a Myers Furniture and Ap-
pliance Company. The cause was submitted to the jury
as to Jack Langford, the operator of Fluff-Dry Launder-
center, and a verdict was returned in the sum of $10,-
000 for alleged personal injuries received by the appellee.
From this judgment the appellant, Jack Langford, ap-
peals and the appellee, Mrs. Mercurio, cross-appeals
from the granting of the peremptory instruction for
Nelson Myers and the Myers Furniture and Appliance
Company, a co-partnership.

The essential facts are these: On Sunday afternoon,
August 6, 1961, between six and six-thirty, Mrs. Grace
Mercurio, who owned and operated a beauty parlor, en-
tered the Fluff-Dry Laundercenter for the purpose of
inspecting the washers, contemplating the washing of a
quilt which appellee claims her mother had given her.
The building which housed the Fluff-Dry Laundercenter
was owned by Mr. William Sanders and had been leased
by the appellant from him. One-third of this building,
at the back, was a storeroom, separated from the laun-
dry by a concrete block wall. There was a weighted,
heavy door in the wall which could be raised vertically
at the back of the laundercenter. This storeroom was
subleased by the appellant to the partnership of Myers
Furniture and Appliance Company for storage space.
Nelson Myers in turn had leased to Myers Furniture
and Appliance Company some storage space located at
his lumber company. There was no consideration other
than this mutual exchange.

At the time, appellant and Nelson Myers were en-
gaged in a partnership retail furniture and appliance
sales business operated under the trade name of Myers
Furniture and Appliance Company. This business was

794.

located in a building several blocks distant from appel-
lant’s laundry. The storeroom was used by Myers Fur-
niture and Appliance Company to store old, and also
uncrated, furniture, and used appliances. The record
discloses that this storage area was never open to the
public by the furniture partnership and was used solely
for storage purposes. The laundercenter had no interest
in, or control over, this storage space.

Mrs. Ruth Langford, wife of appellant, was employed
by Myers Furniture and Appliance Company in the ca-
pacity of a bookkeeper and secretary. Her duties were
those generally performed by such an employee. The
record fails to establish any employment of Mrs. Ruth
Langford as a general agent of the copartnership, her
duties being largely clerical. The record fails to disclose
that she had anything whatsoever to do with the ad-
vertising, sale, or the storage of the furniture or ap-
pliances owned by the Myers Furniture and Appliance
Company.

Wearing dark glasses, on the afternoon of August
6, the appellee entered the laundercenter of appellant,
and approximately thirty minutes later she fell and was
injured. She entered the laundry through the only public
door, which was well lighted and designated in large
block letters as the customers’ entrance. The record
discloses that the appellee testified she had lived across
the street from the back of this building for about ten
years prior to the time that she first entered it. She
stated that she entered the building to look at the ma-
chines and check the prices, but that she had never used
and did not use the machines or do any laundry work
on that occasion. She testified that she had a conversa-
tion with another customer who was in the building, and
that after she had been in the laundry about fifteen or
twenty minutes Mrs. Ruth Langford, the wife of the
appellant, came into the laundry for the purpose of
laundering some of her own clothes. Mrs. Langford did

795

so by depositing coins in the machines just as any other
customer would do. Mrs. Langford was subsequently
followed into the laundercenter by her husband.

While Mrs. Ruth Langford was folding her clothes
which she had dried, appellee’s husband suddenly ap-
peared outside the window of the laundry and peered
in. The appellee saw her husband and made some state-
ments to Mrs. Langford about running or hiding from
him, and asked Mrs. Langford if there was a rear exit
from the laundry. What transpired immediately there-
after is in dispute. Mrs. Langford testified she replied
that there was no such exit and that she turned around
in time and saw the appellee in the act of lifting the
heavy, weighted door sufficiently, so that she could leave
by ‘‘ducking’’ under it. She further testified that she
called out to the appellee to be careful and that the
appellee replied that she knew all about the place; that
she had lived across from it for about ten years.

On the other hand, the appellee testified that Mrs.
Langford, in response to her request, opened this door
for her, but admits that Mrs. Langford in substance
told her to be careful, and asked her if she knew her way
and she stated that she did. On direct testimony, the
appellee testified as follows:

A. Well, I said to her, I said, ‘‘Can I go out the

back???

THE COURT: All right, go ahead now.

A. All right, thank you. And so she says, ‘‘Do you

know the way back there?’’ I said, ‘‘I should, I live

in the house across the street,’’ so she goes on to the
raft and I go on up with her and she opens up this door
and lets me out of this light room into this dark out on
this concrete walkway out there and I went over and

I thought I was going to hit the ground so I went on

over, you know, out in this dark.

According to appellee’s own testimony, she ran ‘‘lickety-
split’? through the storeroom and ran off a truck load-

796

ing ramp, falling about thirty inches or three feet to
the ground.

Subsequently, on cross-examination, the appellee tes-
tified that she just nonchalantly walked through the
door and onto the concrete walk where she fell to the
ground. Appellee admitted that she knew the ramp was
there. She recalled that during the time she lived there
she had seen soft drink trucks pull into the back where
the ramp was and unload the trucks.

Although the reasons are vague as to why Mrs. Mer-
curio desired to hide from her husband when she saw
him peering in the window, she contends that the rea-
son she said to Mrs. Langford, ‘‘There is my husband,
I ought to hide from him,’’ is that she was saying it
playfully; that she loved her husband dearly and there
was no real reason why she should hide from him.

The record further discloses that when the appellee
went into the laundercenter she had never seen Mr. or
Mrs. Langford before and as far as she could tell Mrs.
Langford was just like any other customer in the launder-
center.

There are numerous errors assigned, which relate to
the trial of the case, including the granting of an er-
roneous instruction, the making of inflammatory argu-
ments by appellee’s counsel, and the failure of the court
to admonish the jury with reference thereto. The dis-
position of this case does not require our attention to
these additional errors.

The basic error urged is that the lower court erred
in failing to grant appellant’s requested peremptory in-
struction or to direct a verdict for the appellant. Wheth-
er this assignment of error is well taken depends upon
whether there was any evidence from which the jury
could make a factual determination, giving rise to legal
liability on the part of the appellant, Jack Langford,
d/b/a Fluff-Dry Laundercenter.

797

The second question for consideration is that raised
by the appellee and cross appellant, namely: Was the
copartnership of Nelson Myers and Jack Langford in
the operation of Myers Furniture and Appliance Com-
pany, and Nelson Myers, individually, liable for the
plaintiff’s injuries on the partnership property? Stating
the second matter for consideration more explicitly: Did
Myers or Myers Furniture and Appliance Company
breach any duty which it owed the appellee on account
of which she sustained the injuries complained of?

MB BE Initially we will consider the second proposition.
The record discloses that the appellee testified that she
knew the way; that she was familiar with the area; that
she had lived across from this laundercenter and behind
it for approximately ten years. The record reveals that
the exit which she took was not for use by the public.
In fact, the record fails to disclose that anyone had ever
used this exit prior to the time she voluntarily chose to
use it. She knew the condition of the ramp and she
kmew that the ramp had been used by trucks to unload
soft drinks. The record fails to disclose that there was
any defect in the premises. It follows, therefore, that
when she took the route which she took in leaving the
uilding, she assumed all risks of injury by so doing.

HEEB The record further discloses she testified that
she either nonchalantly walked out upon the ramp and
fell therefrom or she ran ‘‘lickety-split’’ on the ramp and
ell therefrom. The proof is conclusive that it was her
negligence, and her negligence alone, which caused her
to fall and incur the resultant injuries. Selby v. Wil-
iams Realty Corp., 246 Miss. 568, 151 So. 2d 596 (1963).

HMM Since there was no inherent latent defect in
the premises, it follows that neither the appellant, Myers
Furniture and Appliance Company, a copartnership, nor
Nelson Myers, individually, was required to anticipate
the unusual and improbable results of the appellee’s
acts. It would be imposing an unreasonable burden on

a defendant to expect him to anticipate that a woman,
in dark glasses, on Sunday afternoon would engage in
an alleged game of hide-and-seek with her husband in
a laundercenter.

HEEB In passing, the record fails to disclose that this
was a playful game. On the other hand, it reveals that
the appellee’s husband had sought her at her home, on
the streets, and had finally gone to the laundercenter
where he peered through the window and finally saw
her, and that she fled in fear, not in fun. It cannot be
reasonably held that Myers Furniture and Appliance
Company or Myers could anticipate that instead of leav-
ing the laundercenter as she had entered, safely by the
front door, that she, in fleeing from her husband, would
raise or procure the raising of a heavy vertical door
and proceed to leave the laundercenter by an unused
exit and go into a building which was not under the
control of Jack Langford or his wife or the Fluff-Dry
Laundercenter. Unusual and improbable results are not
required to be anticipated by the owners or lessees of
premises insofar as licensees are concerned. Sturdivant
v. Crosby Lumber & Mfg. Co., 218 Miss. 91, 65 So. 2d
291 (1953) ; Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Price,
211 Miss. 879, 53 So. 2d 21 (1951); Mauney v. Gulf
Refining Co., 193 Miss. 421, 8 So. 2d 249 (1942), 9 So.
2d 780 (1942).

In the past, as here, we have been tempted to remand
the briefs for more accurate and complete briefing as to
quotations from cited authorities, for the reason that
quotations in the briefs were improperly combined and
the citations of the quotations were not accurately given.
Under such circumstances it is time consuming and ex-
tremely difficult to locate the quotations so as to de-
termine whether or not they were taken in context. Any
attorneys who are involved in appeals should take note.

Turning to the specific question of what duty, if any,
was owed the appellee by Nelson Myers, individually,

|

or Myers Furniture and Appliance Company, we must
consider the relationship of the appellee to Nelson Myers
or to Myers Furniture and Appliance Company. It is
the contention of the appellee that Mrs. Langford was
the agent of Myers Furniture and Appliance Company,
the copartnership, and also the agent of the Fluff-Dry
Laundercenter. Assuming, pro arguendo, that Mrs. Lang-
ford was an agent under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, the appellee wholly failed to establish that Mrs.
Langford was acting within the scope of her employment
when she permitted appellee to leave from the rear of
the laundercenter. Mrs. Langford’s employment had
no relationship whatsoever to the storage room. See
Lovett Motor Co. v. Walley, 217 Miss. 384, 64 So. 2d 370
(1953); Grier v. Thomasson 254 Miss. 491, 182 So. 2d
398 (1966).

While it can be conceded that the appellee was pos-
sibly an invitee insofar as the laundercenter is concern-
ed, it cannot be logically contended that she was the
invitee of Myers Furniture and Appliance Company.
The appellee did not enter the laundercenter as a cus-
tomer of Myers Furniture and Appliance Company.
Mrs. Langford was only a bookkeeper and secretary of
Myers Furniture and Appliance Company; she had no
connection with, authority over, or direction of, the stor-
age room located behind the laundercenter. No furniture
or appliances had ever been sold in the storeroom, and
the record is silent as to any being exhibited there. In
fact, the proof is wholly lacking to show that the public
ever visited or went into the storage room, or conducted
any business therein. The appellee was not an invitee
of Myers Furniture and Appliance Company when she
entered the storeroom.

In Wright v. Caffey, 239 Miss. 470, 474, 123 So. 24
841, 842 (1960), we defined an invitee as follows:

An invitee is defined as a person who goes on the

premises of another in answer to the express or im-

800

plied invitation of the owner or occupant on the busi-

ness of the owner or occupant or for their mutual ad-

vantage.
This definition is supported also in Strand Enterprises,
Ine. v. Turner, 223 Miss. 588, 76 So. 2d 769 (1955) ;
Patterson v. Sayers, 223 Miss. 444, 78 So. 2d 467 (1955) ;
and Nowell v. Harris, 219 Miss. 363, 68 So. 2d 464 (1953).

HMM The appellee did not enter the laundercenter
as a customer of Myers Furniture and Appliance Com-
pany, and when she undertook, on her own initiative, to
go through the storage portion of this building by bend-
ing under the door which had been raised, she became
a trespasser or at most a gratuitous licensee insofar as
Myers, individually, and Myers Furniture and Appli-
ance Company are concerned. This being true, it cannot
be said that they breached any duty which they owed
her, that duty being no higher than not to injure her
willfully or wantonly. Raney v. Jennings, 248 Miss. 140,
158 So. 2d 715 (1963); Selby v. McWilliams Realty
Corp., 246 Miss. 568, 151 So. 2d 596 (1963) ; Dry v. Ford,
238 Miss. 98, 117 So. 2d 456 (1960); Graves v. Massey,
227 Miss. 848, 87 So. 2d 270 (1956); Kelley v. Sports-
men’s Speedway, Inc., 224 Miss. 632, 80 So. 2d 785 (1955) ;
38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 109 (1941).

The record establishes without dispute that Nelson
Myers and Myers Furniture and Appliance Company
did not carry on any public business at the location in-
volved in the accident; they did not invite the public
into the area, and the appellee was there without invita-
tion, permission or authority. Before Nelson Myers and
Myers Furniture and Appliance Company can be held
liable, they must have breached some legal duty which
they owed the appellee. In the case at bar the record
discloses none, and they owed no duty to the appellee
except not to willfully or wantonly injure her. The rec-
ord is equally clear that they did not do so. It follows,
therefore, that the trial court was correct in sustaining

801

the motion for a peremptory instruction insofar as Nel-
son Myers, and Myers Furniture and Appliance Com-
pany, are concerned.

Turning to the first question, whether there was any
evidence from which the jury could make a factual de-
termination giving rise to legal liability on the part of
Jack Langford, d/b/a Fluff-Dry Laundercenter, we are
faced with the primary question of whether or not Mrs.
Ruth Langford was an agent of the laundercenter. It
is the contention of the appellee that the acts or omissions
of Mrs. Langford were chargeable to the appellant since
she was the agent of the appellant. It is true that the
only possible way in which the appellant could be held
responsible to the appellee would be under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, and when this doctrine is in-
voked it is incumbent upon that party invoking it to
establish it by a preponderance of the credible testimony.

We have carefully studied this record and the briefs
of counsel, and the evidence which is offered by the
appellee, Mrs. Mercurio, in support of appellee’s con-
tention that Mrs. Langford was an agent of the launder-
center is limited as follows:

One Paul Ruffin testified that he was employed by
Myers Furniture and Appliance Company from Septem-
ber 1962 through January 1963, and that during this
time he had seen Mrs. Langford’s car at the launder-
center on several occasions, and had seen a bag of coins,
which he presumed to be laundry change, in her automo-
bile. This testimony related to a period of time more
than one year subsequent to the time of the alleged in-
juries. It is vague, indefinite, and completely inconclu-
sive in nature. Furthermore, the record discloses that
the Langfords owned two cars and that the cars were
used indiscriminately by both Mr. and Mrs. Langford;
that the car which was the easier to use was the one
which was used.

The second witness who testified with reference to
Mrs. Langford’s being the agent of the laundercenter
was the unsubpoenaed voluntary witness, Mrs. Nell Cash.
This witness testified that she had been a lifelong friend
of the appellee and that she had used the Fluff-Dry
Laundercenter facilities since 1956, and that she had
seen Mrs. Langford in the laundry on several occasions
during the earlier years. On one occasion, she testified,
Mrs. Langford made change for her in the laundercenter,
and she admitted that customers had also sometimes done
likewise for her. She stated that on one occasion she
observed Mrs. Langford sweeping up suds from a wash-
ing machine which had overflowed. These instances tes-
tified to by this witness were not related to the time of
the alleged injury to the appellee and the record does
not disclose whether they occurred long before or after
the alleged injury. The appellee admitted that she had
never seen Mrs. Langford before and that when Mrs.
Langford entered the laundercenter she thought that
she was just another customer. This testimony is en-
tirely too weak and obviously is wholly insufficient to
establish an agency.

Appellee urges that it was the duty of agent Mrs.
Ruth Langford to warn her. Assuming, pro arguendo,
that Mrs. Langford was the agent of the laundercenter,
the record discloses that she did in substance warn the
appellee when appellee started to go into the storeroom
leased by, and under the control of, Myers Furniture and
Appliance Company, when she, solicitous for her safety,
asked her if she knew the way, to which the appellee
replied: ‘‘I should, I live in the house across the street.’’
The appellee wholly failed to show or establish the scope
of authority, assuming that Mrs. Langford was an agent,
in order to make the appellant liable for any acts or
omissions on the part of Mrs. Langford.

In Prosser, Torts § 67 at 459-60 (3d ed. 1964), it is
pointed out:

803

By entering freely and voluntarily into any relation
or situation which presents obvious danger, the plain-
tiff may be taken to accept it, and to undertake to
look out for himself and relieve the defendant of re-
sponsibility... .

Furthermore, a plaintiff who has been for a substantial

length of time in the immediate vicinity of a dangerous

situation will be taken to have discovered and to un-
derstand the normal, ordinary risks involved in that
situation, such as the danger of trains in motion in

a railroad yard, or of standardized obstructions near

the track. Once the plaintiff fully understands the

risk, the fact that he has momentarily forgotten it will

not protect him. (Id. at 463.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the frightened appellee,
in her unreasonable flight from her husband into the
storeroom leased and operated by Myers Furniture and
Appliance Company, assumed any risks that were pres-
ent. These risks, of course, as admitted by her, were
known to her by her long familiarity with the premises.

While the appellee denied that her fleeing from her
husband was prompted by fear, nevertheless this testi-
mony is negatived by her statements on cross-examina-
tion in reference to her sworn bill for divorce. It is ob-
vious that the fear of her husband’s finding her in the
laundercenter and that he might do something about her
being there caused the appellee to flee through the rear
of the laundry in a moment of panic. She was either
not concerned about her safety or she temporarily forgot
about the presence of the loading ramp which was well
known to her. The evidence showing assumption of risk
by the appellee in the case at bar is as strong as that
which existed in Selby v. McWilliams Realty Corp., 246
Miss. 568, 151 So. 2d 596 (1963). In that case we pointed
out:

The appellant assigns as error that the court erred

in sustaining the demurrer to the amended declaration,

——

arguing first that the jury could have found that ap-

pellant was an invitee on the premises of appellee or

a licensee. Secondly, it is argued that the jury could

have found that appellee was guilty of negligence in

the maintenance of its premises, and that such negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the injuries.

Assuming for the purpose of argument that the ap-

pellant was an invitee of the appellee, he went far

beyond the limits of the invitation by opening the
elevator door, which was closed or fastened, as it was
alleged that he was shown by an employee how to
open the elevator door. (246 Miss. at 572, 151 So. 2d

at 597.)

In the case at bar, granting that the appellee was an
invitee as to Fluff-Dry Laundercenter, she went far
beyond the limits of the invitation when she undertook
to raise or have raised the back door and to exit over the
premises of Myers Furniture and Appliance Company.
She no longer was an invitee, but by her acts she became
either a trespasser or, at best, a mere gratuitous licensee
as to the premises over which she fled.

In the case of Dry v. Ford, 238 Miss. 98, 117 So. 2d
456 (1960), we held as follows:

When plaintiff entered the business premises of de-

fendants, he entered as an implied business invitee.

However, the undisputed evidence shows that the im-

plied invitation terminated when defendants’ foreman

advised plaintiff and his employer Brown that they
could not install the dimmer switch that day, and when

Brown asked for and received permission for him and

Dry to install the switch themselves on the premises

of the motor company. Plaintiff was acting there-

after solely for his own benefit and convenience.

Possessors of premises have the duty to use reason-

able care with reference to invitees on their business

property. That duty is coextensive with the invitation.

An inviter’s duty and corresponding liability for

a —

breach of duty are measured and limited by the nature

of the invitation held out to the invitee. If the latter

goes beyond the bounds of his invitation, as Dry did

here, he loses the status of invitee and the rights which

accompany that state. Dry became a licensee... .

(238 Miss. at 101-02, 117 So. 2d at 458.)

In Selby v. McWilliams Realty Corporation, supra,
we held as follows: .

In the case at bar, we are of the opinion that under

the allegations of the declaration the appellant was

a gratuitous licensee, and the appellee violated no

duties to him, as defined in Marlon Investment Com-

pany v. Conner, 149 So. 2d 312 (Miss. 1963).

As to the second assignment argued, we are of the

opinion that the appellant, on entering this building

at 2:30 A.M., when the building was in complete dark-
ness, and opening the elevator door and falling into
the shaft, was not exercising reasonable care for his
own safety and his negligence was the sole proximate
cause of his injuries, and the appellee was guilty of
no negligence in connection therewith. (246 Miss. at

578, 151 So. 2d at 597-98.)

In Graves v. Massey, 227 Miss. 848, 87 So. 2d 270
(1956), we pointed out that the only legal duty owed
a licensee was not to willfully and wantonly injure him.
In that case we said:

Being a mere licensee, neither of the defendants who

are appellees on this appeal owed him any duty except

not to willfully or wantonly injure him.... (227 Miss.

at 851, 87 So. 2d at 271.)

But it seems to be the contention of the plaintiff that

the trial court should have permitted the jury to de-

termine the question of whether the plaintiff was a

mere licensee or invitee on the occasion in question.

But we think that where the given and undisputed facts

disclose that the plaintiff was a mere licensee, the

court should not submit to the jury the question of

806

whether or not his status was otherwise. The court

properly decided that as a matter of law under the

given and undisputed testimony that the plaintiff was

a mere licensee on the occasion complained of, and

that there was no evidence to go to the jury to warrant

a finding that either defendant had breached the legal

duty owing to a licensee not to willfully or wantonly

injure him. (227 Miss. at 853, 87 So. 2d at 271.)
Also, see Bishop v. Stewart, 234 Miss. 409, 106 So. 2d 899
(1958).

HD From the foregoing, it follows therefore that
the lower court should not have submitted to the jury
the question of whether or not the status of the appellee
was other than that of a licensee. There was no evidence
to go to the jury to warrant a finding that this appellant
had breached any legal duty owing to this licensee, that
duty being not to willfully or wantonly injure her. There
is no proof that this appellant willfully or wantonly in-
jured her, and therefore the lower court should have
granted the peremptory instruction requested by the
appellant.

While we sympathize with the appellee because of
her injuries and resultant pain and suffering, neverthe-
less this does not grant us the right to permit recovery
in this case. The judgment of the circuit court is there-
fore reversed and judgment entered here for appellant.

Reversed and judgment here for appellant.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Smith and Robertson,

JJ., concur.

Preece v. Inunvors Centrat Ramroap Company
No. 43784 February 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 190

80'

I

Ramsay, Ramsay & Bodron, Vicksburg, for appellant.

Robert Mitten, John W. Foster, Chicago, Il; Wise,
Smith & Carter, Jackson, for appellee.

809

Guuzsem, P. J.

Complainant below and appellant here filed an original
bill of complaint for a mandatory injunction requiring
the Illinois Central Railroad Company to restore trans-
portation pass rights to appellant, and for damages for
refusal of the Railroad to recognize his lifetime pass.
A hearing was had on bill, answer and proof, after which
the court entered a decree denying the relief, and dis-
missing the bill with prejudice. This decree was entered
April 21, 1964. Court adjourned on May 2, 1964, and
no appeal was perfected within ninety days from April
21, 1964. On July 15, 1964, appellant filed a motion for
rehearing on the grounds of newly discovered evidence.
This motion was overruled on December 14, 1964, on
the following grounds: (1) it was not timely filed, and
(2) if considered as a petition for leave to file a bill of
review on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
averments were insufficient to justify granting the pe-
tition, On January 19, 1965, appellant filed an appeal
bond appealing from a judgment ‘‘recently rendered’’
by the Chancery Court of Pike County. The entire rec-
ord was sent to this Court, including the transcript of
the evidence on the hearing on the merits. The case is
argued by the parties on the merits and on the Railroad’s
motion to dismiss the appeal.

810

HEB The first question for our decision is whether
the motion for a rehearing filed on July 15, 1964, was
filed within the time allowed by law. We hold that the
decree dated April 21, 1964, became final when the court
adjourned on May 2, 1964, and the motion for rehearing
filed thereafter came too late to be considered. IME
There must be an end to litigation somewhere, and
there must be a time when the power of the court over
its final decree must come to an end. This is fixed as of
the end of the term of court at which the final decree is
rendered, and a motion for rehearing for newly discover-
ed evidence filed thereafter cannot be considered. Ed-
wards v. Peresich, 221 Miss. 788, 74 So. 2d 844 (1954);
Griffith, Miss. Chancery Practice § 633 (2d ed. 1950).

Appellant did not perfect an appeal from the final
decree of April 21, 1964, within the ninety days allowed
by law. The chancellor considered appellant’s motion
for rehearing as a petition for leave to file a bill of
review based upon newly discovered evidence. We en-
tertain this appeal as being from the decree denying
appellant’s petition for leave to file a bill of review.
This brings us to the question whether the petition for
leave to file a bill of review on the ground of newly
discovered evidence was properly dismissed. We hold
that it was for two separate and sufficient reasons.

HEMI In the first place, the chancellor correctly found
that the evidence which appellant contends was newly
discovered consisted, for the most part, of letters which
appellant received on February 16, 1964, and the final
decree was not entered until April 21, 1964. We affirm
the chancellor’s finding that the facts claimed to be
newly discovered evidence ought to have been brought
to the attention of the court before the final decree was
rendered. Griffith, Miss. Chancery Practice § 640 (2d
ed. 1950).

HB Secondly, when the facts set wp in the petition
for leave to file a bill of review are considered with all

|

the facts before the court on the original hearing, the
appellant is still not entitled to the relief prayed for in
the original bill. The lifetime pass which was awarded
appellant when he completed forty years of service and
the card accompanying the ‘‘Gold Plaque’? which was
awarded appellant after completion of fifty years of
service, and which contained the words ‘‘Gold Pass Vet-
eran,’’ were gratuities which were good for life, ‘‘unless
otherwise ordered.’’ The union contract under which ap-
pellant worked did not provide for passes.

In 1906 the Congress passed the Hepburn Act, 34
Stat. 584 (1906), 49 U. 8. C. section 1 (7) (1958), pro-
viding that common carriers shall not, directly or in-
directly, issue or give any interstate free ticket, free pass,
or free transportation for passengers, except to its em-
ployees, its officers, time inspectors, surgeons, physici-
ans, and attorneys at law, and the families of any of
the foregoing and certain other persons.

The Supreme Court of the United States has repeated-
ly held that a pass issued to a railroad employee is a
gratuity, and there is no obligation on the railroad to
issue such free passes. The pass issued to appellant
was revocable. Francis v. Southern Pac., 333 U. 8. 445
(1948) ; Kansas City So. Ry. v. Van Zant, 260 U. 8. 459
(1923); Charleston & W. Car. Ry. v. Thompson, 234
U.S. 576 (1914). See also Absher v. Illinois Cent. R. R.,
371 S. W. 2d 950 (Ky. 1963).

For the reasons stated, the case must be and is af-
firmed.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, C.J., and Rodgers, Jones and Robertson, JJ.,
concur.

feo)
ae
bo

Unrrep States Fineurry & Guaranty Oo. v.
Stars, Use or Srrinerettow, et al.

No. 43798 February 14, 1966 182 So. 2d 919

Co)
a
ao

Lester E. Wills, Meridian, for appellant.

Cumbest, Cumbest, O’Barr & Shaddock, Pascagoula;
Henley, Jones & Henley, Jackson, for appellees.

Ropexrs, J.

This case is a sequel of Bearry v. Stringfellow, 246
Miss. 123, 149 So. 2d 500 (1963) (Circuit Court Docket
No. 1028), and Bearry v. Stringfellow, 247 Miss. 683,
156 So. 2d 220, 157 So. 2d 491 (1963). The first suit
was instituted by Mrs. Betty Stringfellow, the widow,
and as Next Friend for the children, of Melvin Ira
Stringfellow, against W. D. Bearry, Sheriff of George
County, Mississippi, and his Deputy, James H. Smith,
for the wrongful death of Mr. Stringfellow. It was
charged that the Deputy Sheriff negligently shot and
killed Mr. Stringfellow, the husband and father of plain-
tiffs, while acting in his official capacity. The court
granted various instructions on negligence and submitted
the issue of punitive damages to the jury. The jury
returned a verdict for $50,000 but the trial court required
a remittitur of $25,000.

The second suit, supra, grew out of a garnishment
served upon the Chancery Clerk to attach fees and al-
lowances due by George County to the Sheriff, W. D.
Bearry. This Court held that the fees of the Sheriff
were not subject to garnishment.

In the present case, Mrs. Stringfellow filed suit in
the name of the State of Mississippi, for the use and
benefit of herself and children, against the United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company, W. D. Bearry, Sheriff,
and James H. Smith, Deputy Sheriff, of George County,
Mississippi.

The declaration is in two counts. In Count I, plaintiffs
allege a judgment in the sum of $25,000 against defend-
ant, W. D. Bearry, Sheriff, as the result of the grossly
negligent and wrongful killing of Melvin Ira Stringfellow
by James H. Smith, Deputy Sheriff. The plaintiffs fur-

815

ther allege that the Sheriff was liable for the wrongful
acts of the Deputy Sheriff while acting as agent and
deputy within the scope of his employment. The dec-
laration further alleges that the United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Company was the surety of W. D. Bearry,
Sheriff, by virtue of its bond conditioned according to
state law (Mississippi Code Annotated section 4033,
1956) in the sum of $4,000. Plaintiffs charge that it
is an absolute obligation of the bonding company to
protect the public against the acts of the Sheriff and the
acts of his Deputy. Plaintiffs’ demand judgment of the
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company for $4,000
and six per cent interest.

Count II of the declaration adopts the allegations of
Count I, and charges that United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company also issued a $10,000 Public Em-
ployees Blanket Bond to W. D. Bearry, Sheriff, insuring
him against loss caused to him through the failure of
any of his employees to perform faithfully his duties.
It is then charged that the Sheriff had sustained a loss
of more than $10,000, and that the Insurance Company
owed the Sheriff the sum of $10,000, and charged that
the plaintiffs ‘‘have an absolute right to collect said
funds directly in this joint lawsuit against the United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company and the former
sheriff and his deputy’’, for $10,000.

The declaration had attached to it the following ex-
hibits: (1) A copy of the final judgment of this Court
in the first case, above set out. (2) Photostatic copy of
‘‘Public Employees Blanket Bond issued to the Sheriff,
W. D. Bearry.’’ (3) Coroner’s return on execution show-
ing sale of Sheriff’s property for $6,950. (4) Sheriff’s
bond for $4,000 issued by United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Company. (5) Sheriff’s oath of office.

W. D. Bearry answered and moved the court to dis-
miss the action because (1) the plaintiffs are the same
parties who filed suit in Cireuit Court, Docket No. 1028

(first suit) under the wrongful death statute (Missis-
sippi Code Annotated section 1453, 1956) for the death
of Melvin Ira Stringfellow; that a judgment for $25,000
was affirmed by the Supreme Court; that all matters
were litigated between the parties and the judgment is
res judicata to all matters litigated, or could have been
litigated, and is res judicata as to the instant suit; (2)
that all issues sought to be raised were litigated, or could
have been litigated, in cause Docket No. 1028 — that
Mississippi Code Annotated section 1453 (1956) pro-
vides that there shall be but one suit for the same death;
(3) that Mississippi Code Annotated section 4234 (1956)
contemplates suit against the Sheriff and his surety in
the same suit if the surety is to be liable on the bond; (4)
there is a garnishment pending against United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company in which issue has been
joined but no final order has been entered and is now
pending, and plaintiffs are estopped to maintain litiga-
tion on the subject; and (5) that all matters which plain-
tiffs now seek to litigate were litigated, or should have
been litigated, in suit Docket No. 1028 (first suit), or
should have been raised, litigated and tried.

The Sheriff admitted he had lost by execution more
than $10,000 because of the judgment rendered against
him, but denied the suit should be maintained against
him, that the matter set out in Count I had been settled
because plaintiffs had waived their right to sue the Unit-
ed States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, his sureties,
and plaintiffs cannot maintain the suit on any ground.

The United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company
moved to strike from Counts I and II of the declaration
the charge against it on account of the judgment against
the Sheriff on the suit on the surety bond because the
judgment in that case, Docket No. 1028, included punitive
damages and the surety is not liable for such damages
on the official bond.

The appellant, United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company, contends that no proof was offered to show

817

a breach of the Sheriff’s official bond requiring ‘‘that
Bearry ... shall well and faithfully perform the duties
of his office’’, and since the judgment was not on the
bond but was a judgment in tort, the judgment did not
establish any liability on the surety under Mississippi
Code Annotated section 4234 (1956). This section is in
the following words:

“The remedy upon sheriff’s bond shall be joint and
several against all or any one or more of the obligors;
but in all suits thereon against the surety or sureties,
the liability of the sheriff shall be first fixed, except
when the sheriff is a party to a suit, has died or remov-
ed or is not found.”

The pertinent part of Mississippi Code Annotated
section 4235 (1956) is as follows: ‘‘All sheriffs shall
be liable for the acts of their deputies, and for money
collected by them.’’

HE We have held that the Sheriff’s bond is liable
for the acts of a deputy sheriff acting within the scope
of his authority. McCoy v. Key, 155 Miss. 64, 123 So.
873 (1929); Dean v. Brannon, 139 Miss. 312, 104 So. 173
(1925).

In the case of Brown v. Weaver, 76 Miss. 7, 23 So.
388 (1898) we pointed out that the sheriff’s bond is
liable for damages caused by the unjustifiable shooting
of a fleeing misdemeaneant by a deputy sheriff.

Since appellees obtained an instruction on punitive
damages in the first case, and this Court held that the
Sheriff was liable for such damages, appellant, United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, now argues that
it is not liable as surety for the amount of the judgment
which includes punitive damages.

The appellant cites Vanderslice v. Shoemake, 233 Miss.
523, 102 So. 2d 804 (1958); Maryland Casualty Com-
pany v. Haves, 188 Miss. 872, 196 So. 513 (1940) ; Lizana
v. Kelly, 109 Miss. 464, 69 So. 292 (1915).

818

MEE We agree that a surety is not liable for puni-
tive damages but we do not agree that the record in this
case shows that the appellees and cross-appellants ob-
tained a final judgment for punitive damages for the
following reason: We point out in the case of Fowler
Butane Gas Company v. Varner, 244 Miss. 130, 141 So. 2d
226 (1962) that ‘punitive damages’’, ‘‘exemplary dam-
ages’’ and ‘‘vindictive damages’”’ are in legal contem-
plation synonymous terms, and are sometimes called
‘smart money’’. Punitive damages are ‘‘added dam-
ages’’ and are ‘‘in addition to the actual or compensatory
damages due because of an injury or wrong.’’

In the first case, Bearry v. Stringfellow, 246 Miss.
123, 149 So. 2d 500 (1963), this Court pointed out that
the evidence by the widow showed the decedent’s age at
nearly twenty-two, that he was earning in excess of $2
an hour at Ingalls, and that she was entitled to damages
for love and affection for herself and the living child.
The second child was not then born. The issue was
submitted to a jury which found a verdict for the plain-
tiffs in the sum of $50,000. However, upon defendants’
motion, a new trial was granted, unless the plaintiffs
should, within ten days, enter a remittitur for $25,000.
On appeal to this Court, we held: ‘‘According to evi-
dence for the plaintiffs, there was justification for
the award of punitive damages in addition to actual
damages.’’ 246 Miss. at 132, 149 So. 2d at 504.

Assuming that appellant is correct in that punitive
damages were added to the actual damages assessed by
the jury, certainly it cannot be said that more than one-
half of the damages assessed were punitive or ‘‘added
damages”’ in this case, where a young father was wrong-
fully killed. We are unwilling to say that the small
amount of $4,000, the amount of the official surety bond,
is ‘‘added’’ or ‘‘punitive’’? damages.

HE EE We do not agree with the contention of
appellant that the appellees could not bring a suit upon

i

the Sheriff’s bond after they had proceeded to judgment
against the Sheriff and his Deputy in a previous court
action. A suit upon a surety contract may be maintained
although the liability on the contract grows out of a tort.
We hold that a suit may be maintained against the surety
bond of a sheriff in a suit separate from the suit in tort
against the sheriff. State, ex rel. Weems v. United
8. F. & G. Co., 157 Miss. 740, 128 So. 503 (1930).

MEME On the other hand — when a suit is maintained
to establish a surety’s liability growing out of statutory
conditions written in the official surety bond — the sure-
ty is entitled to defend the charge that the officer had
committed acts which established its liability. If this
were not true, a judgment against the officer would
be a judgment against the surety, although the surety
had not been a party to the suit. The surety would thus
be prevented from defending actions against bonds. It
is obvious that this would open the door to collusive fraud
between an officer and those who would sue the officer.
Moreover, it would deny due process of law.

HMM In the instant case, the appellees in their dec-
laration charged that the Deputy Sheriff, James H.
Smith, in a wrongful and grossly negligent manner,
while acting within the scope of his employment, shot
and killed Melvin Ira Stringfellow, and that such death
was the responsibility of the Sheriff of George County.
This allegation was expressly denied by the appellant.
The appellees offered no evidence to substantiate this
charge, but chose to stand upon the judgment in the
original suit to establish the liability of the appellant
as surety on the bond of the Sheriff. We are of the
opinion that unless the surety on the Sheriff’s official
bond is a party to the suit in which the original judgment
is obtained against the Sheriff, the surety has the right
to defend a charge against the officer in a suit brought
to recover under the conditions of the bond separate and
apart from the original tort action.

820

HEE We therefore hold that the trial judge properly
directed a verdict in favor of the appellant against ap-
pellees and cross-appellants, as to the official surety
bond of the officer set out in Count I of the declaration.

Count IT of the declaration is in the nature of a credi-
tor’s suit in a court of equity, brought for the purpose
of subjecting a debt of $10,000 due to the Sheriff under
the terms of an indemnity contract between the Sheriff
and the appellant, United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company. The insurer agreed to indemnify the Sheriff
for any loss caused to the insured indemnitee through
the failure of any of his employees to perform faith-
fully their duties. The record shows that a judgment
of $25,000 had been established against the Sheriff be-
cause of the failure of the Deputy Sheriff to perform
faithfully his official duties; that as a result of this judg-
ment, the Sheriff had a loss of more than $10,000 by
reason of the sale of certain of his property under an
execution. Thus it is claimed that the judgment holders,
appellees, are entitled to have the debt due to the Sheriff
by the appellant, United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company, paid to appellees under the terms of the con-
tract.

The appellant points out that the declaration was filed
in the circuit court instead of the chancery court; that
under the law of indemnity contracts, the appellant’s ob-
ligation is to the Sheriff, and not a third party; that a
suit cannot be maintained by anyone except the insured
indemnitee; that the indemnitor does not owe appellees
anything under the terms of its ‘‘Public Hmployers
Blanket Bond.’’ We agree with the general law pointed
out by the appellant, but the problem here is whether
or not this Court can reverse this case because of the
fact that the circuit court assumed jurisdiction of an
equity case.

HEEB The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of
the appellees against the appellant for the sum of $10,-

821

000, the full amount of the obligation of the indemnity
bond. His action was based upon the equitable principle
that a judgment creditor of an indemnitee may recover
for a debt due from an indemnitor to the indemnitee
under the indemnifying contract of insurance. A care-
ful examination of this very interesting record and the
briefs of counsel leaves us with the one ultimate con-
clusion, namely: This is an equity case. No other pro-
ceeding could be had because the Sheriff was a necessary
party in order to recover on the indemnifying bond.

Although Mississippi Constitution 1890 section 157
provides that suit ‘‘brought in the circuit court whereof
the chancery court has exclusive jurisdiction shall be
transferred to the chancery court,’’ no motion was made
to transfer the suit to the proper court. When the case
had been concluded, both appellant and appellees re-
quested a directed verdict. The judge entered an order
in favor of the appellant on Count I and for appellees
on Count II.

On appeal to this Court, we are confronted with Mis-
sissippi Constitution 1890 section 147, as follows:

“‘No judgment or decree in any chancery or circuit
court rendered in a civil cause shall be reversed or
annulled on the ground of want of jurisdiction to
render said judgment or decree, from any error or
mistake as to whether the cause in which it was rend-
ered was of equity or common-law jurisdiction; but if
the Supreme Court shall find error in the proceedings
other than as to jurisdiction, and it shall be necessary
to remand the case, the Supreme Court may remand
it to that court which, in its opinion, can best determine
the controversy.’’

HS BE “We «do not find any error in this record
except that this case was tried in the circuit court instead
of the chancery court. The circuit court reached the
proper solution, and this Court will not reverse the
judgment on the ground that it should have been tried

2

in a court of equity, rather than in the circuit court, The
judgment of the circuit court will therefore be affirmed.
We hold that the appellees and cross-appellant are not
entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Affirmed on direct and cross-appeal.

Gillespie, P. J., and Brady, Inzer and Smith, JJ.,

coneur.
||
GamBie v. State
No, 43802 February 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 172

82.

oe

Wilbourn, Lord & Williams, H. Wingfield Glover, Jr.,
Harry L. Hopkins, Meridian, for appellant.

R. Hugo Newcomb, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Jonss, J.

This case comes from the Cireuit Court of Lauderdale
County where appellant was convicted of murder of one
Henrietta Smith and was sentenced to life in the State
Penitentiary. We are compelled to reverse the case be-
cause of errors in admission and exclusion of evidence.

There are other assignments of error, but we consider
none of them well-taken other than those herein specifi-
cally mentioned.

The appellant and the said Henrietta Smith were living
together and occupying one side of a house, the other
side of which was occupied by one, Charlie Clark.

On or about January 17, 1965, the said Henrietta
Smith was burned to such an extent that she later died.
The appellant was charged with setting her on fire al-
legedly with kerosene. On this particular night, Charlie
Clark testified he was asleep and was awakened. He
heard Henrietta say, ‘‘Don’t come in here, you stay in
there.’? He dozed back to sleep and heard a loud noise,
and Henrietta say, ‘‘I am burnt up’’, after which he
heard Henrietta say, ‘‘Walter, you have burned me up.
Somebody get me to a doctor. Don’t let me die, I am
burnt up.’? Charlie Clark dressed and ran to the next
door neighbors’ house; and, seeing the smoke coming
out the door, he tried to get the fire department. Then
he went up the street to call the ambulance. He said he

827

talked to his neighbor awhile and appellant came there
and asked the neighbor to carry Henrietta to the doctor.
The neighbor said his car was out of order and appellant
went to another neighbor’s house to call the ambulance.

HM WT. H. Essix, the neighbor who lived next door
testified. After Charlie Clark was there, the defendant
came and asked if he would carry Henrietta Smith to
the hospital. When asked, ‘‘Why?’’ Walter said, ‘‘Well,
I done set that mother — afire.’? Later he heard Hen-
rietta say, ‘‘Oh, oh, oh, Walter, why did you burn me
up??? Walter said, ‘‘I don’t know’’, then he left to call
the ambulance. Objection was made to the testimony of
Charlie Clark as to what Henrietta Smith said and also
as to what T. H. Essix had heard Henrietta say. The
objection was that it was not part of the res gestae but
hearsay. We hold that Charlie Clark’s testimony was
admissible, as being part of the res gestae. Thompson
v. State, 220 Miss. 200, 70 So. 2d 341 (1954); Magee
v. State, 145 Miss. 227, 110 So. 500 (1926).

HEE The testimony of T. H. Essix as to the appel-
lant’s statement of what he did was, of course, admissible.
HEEB Also, T. H. Essix’s testimony as to what he heard
Henrietta say and the appellant’s response thereto was
admissible, as a declaration against interest.

Lavonne Stallings was an attendant of the ambulance
service which removed Henrietta from her home to the
hospital. At the emergency room of the hospital, in
addition to Henrietta, there were several people present
— two policemen, Mr. Harry Hughes, some other man
with the police department, Walter Gamble, and two or
three others. Stallings testified that when Mr. Hughes
came in he asked Henrietta what happened and she said
that Walter Gamble tried to burn her up. She said he
knocked her down, poured kerosene on her, struck a
match, stuck the match in her ear, and said, ‘‘I am going
to see if you will burn now, goddam you.’’

HME The witness stated Walter Gamble heard the
statement and said he did not do it, and said, ‘‘I tried to
help you.’’ The witness also testified that Walter Gamble
had kerosene on him; it was on his leg from his hip to
his knee. The whole front of his pants was wet. That
part of the witness’ evidence as to Henrietta’s accusa-
tion should not have been admitted inasmuch as appel-
lant, according to the witness’ testimony, denied immedi-
ately such accusations. 22A C. J. 8S. Criminal Law
§ 734(2) at 1080 (1961); Underhill, Criminal Evidence
§ 259 at 489 (4th ed. 1935).

Annelle L. Beard, a nurse at the hospital, was in-
troduced and testified to some statement that Henrietta
made in the presence of Walter, but she said the only
thing she heard Henrietta tell Mr. Hughes was about her
side of the story. The nurse also heard Walter Gamble
deny it. This testimony as to accusations made by Hen-
rietta and denied by appellant should not have been
admitted.

Howard Moore, a policeman, testified about statements
by Henrietta at the hospital accusing defendant of pour-
ing kerosene on her and lighting it. He said Walter
Gamble was in the room but there is no proof that he
heard the statement or whether he denied it. On retrial,
if it is not established that defendant heard these state-
ments or was in position where he should have heard
them, and did not deny same, this evidence should not
be admitted.

HEE Mr. Harry Hughes, constable, was at the hospi-
tal when the statements accusing defendant were made
by Henrietta. He said Walter was present, and when
witness asked her what happened, her reply was, ‘‘Lordy,
Mr. Harry, Walter done burned me up.’’? He said he
asked her again what happened and she later stated
she and Walter had left the house. She gave him some
money to get some whiskey and they got the whiskey,
but Walter would not pay for it. They got in an argu-

829

ment, or fight, at the house and Walter knocked her
down, poured kerosene on her, and said, ‘‘Goddam you,
let’s see if you will burn.’? And further said that he
set a match to her. He testified further that when he
was talking to her, Walter was over by the sink. Wit-
ness went to him and asked, ‘‘What about it, Walter?’
He said, ‘‘I set her on fire.”? He then sat around the
table with two other officers and asked her to repeat
what she had said, which she did. This time the witness
went over to Walter Gamble and he said, ‘‘Henrietta,
when you told Mr. Harry, you didn’t tell him the whole
truth. I was the one who called the ambulance.’’ The
witness testified that later Walter denied that he did it.
In view of the statement by the witness that the defend-
ant admitting setting her on fire and then denied it, we
hold the evidence was for the consideration of the jury.

HM HM After the state rested, defendant introduced
Dr. Gilberto Patino and Susie Glover. Susie Glover was
related to appellant, being his aunt and having reared
him. She undertook to testify to a visit to see Henrietta
Smith in the hospital, where they discussed the cause
of the burns. This was objected to; the jury retired,
and the defendant offered to show by this witness that
Henrietta had told her that she (Henrietta) didn’t know
how she got burned. The objection to this testimony
was sustained.

Dr. Gilberto Patino was also introduced by the de-
fendant. He is employed at the Matty Hersee Hospital
and was on call the night Henrietta was admitted. Dur-
ing the admission procedure and subsequent treating of
Henrietta Smith, he asked her how she was burned. The
state objected to this, and objection was sustained. The
witness was also asked about the medical history she
gave as to how she was burned. Objection was sustained
thereto. Attorneys for defendant offered to prove by
this witness that when she was admitted to the hospital,
and in the history given, Henrietta told him she did not

830

kmow she was burned. The history was given after Henri-
etta had talked to the parties that testified for the state.
Objection to this testimony was sustained.

The testimony of Susie Glover and Dr. Patino should
have been admitted because it was contradictory to the
statements shown by the other witnesses to have been
made by Henrietta and was for the consideration of the
jury in considering whether the statements were in fact
made by Henrietta and, if so, whether true.

For the errors mentioned, this case is reversed and
remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Ethridge, C. J., Gillespie, P. J., and Rodgers and
Robertson, JJ., concur.

Guir Sours Contractors, Ino. v. ANDERSON, et ux.
No. 44056 February 14, 1966 183 So. 2d 189

|

Lester C. Franklin, Jr., Pascagoula, for appellant.

Wiesenburg, McLeod, Oswald & Lockard, Pascagoula,
for appellees.

Smrrs, J.

This case is before us upon the motion of appellees,
Harmon C. Anderson, et ux, to dismiss the appeal of
Gulf South Contractors, Inc., the appellant.

Several grounds are assigned as justifying the re-
quested action.

It is necessary to discuss only one of these.

No appeal bond was filed; but, on the ninetieth day
after the entry of the decree from which the appeal was
sought, appellant deposited with the clerk of the trial
court a personal check in the amount of $150. The letter
of transmittal directed the clerk to ‘‘accept $100 of said
check as a deposit on cost of appeal ... and apply the
balance of $50 toward payment of the costs of the lower
court, retaining any excess, if any.’’

This check was deposited but was returned by the
bank because there were insufficient funds in the ac-
count upon which it was drawn to pay it. It was paid
upon redeposit at a later date.

The record as to the matters referred to in the motion,
as well as the briefs submitted, are minimal. However,
the appellant does not claim, nor does the record reflect,
that the cost of the transcript was prepaid within the
ninety-day period allowed for taking an appeal as pro-
vided by Mississippi Code Annotated section 1162 (1956).

HE Prepayment of the cost of the transcript, within
the ninety-day period, was an essential condition pre-
cedent to the right to make a $100 appeal bond or to
deposit that amount with the clerk in lieu of such bond.

HN MH In Wooten v. City of Laurel, 221 Miss. 652,
655, 74 So. 2d 752, 753 (1954), this Court said:

... There is no contention that the cost of the
transcript was prepaid within the six months period
(now 90 days) provided for an appeal to this Court.

If the cost of the transcript had been prepaid so
as to entitle the appellants to make a bond in the
sum of $100.00 or a cash deposit in that amount in
perfecting their appeal then under the former decisions
of this Court we would be justified in allowing any
defect or irregularity in the $100.00 bond to be cured
by amendment or to allow the insufficiency of the
cash deposit to be madeup, even though the defect or
irregularity in the amount of the bond or the suffici-
ency of the deposit had continued to exist beyond the
six months period allowed for perfecting the appeal.
But we are not authorized to dispense with the pro-
vision of the statute which requires the prepayment
of the cost of transcript in order to entitle the appel-
lant to appeal by making a $100.00 bond or a cash
deposit in that amount.

For the reason stated, the motion to dismiss the appeal
must be sustained.

Motion to docket and dismiss sustained.

All Justices concur.
[|

Easr Missrssrer1 Execrric Power Assn. v.
Mississrpp1 Power Oo., et al.

No. 43782 February 21, 1966 182 So. 2d 925

Floyd, Cam Z ichard, Meridian, for ap-
pellant and cro:

|
Eaton, Cottrell, Galloway & Lang, Gulfport, for ap-
pellee and cross-appellant.

Jonzs, J.

Appellant and cross-appellee, Hast Mississippi Elec-
tric Power Association, will be hereinafter called Associa-
tion, and appellee and cross-appellant, Mississippi Pow-
er Company, will be called Company.

The Association filed an application with the Public
Service Commission under Mississippi Laws 1956, Chap-
ter 372 (Miss. Code Ann. § 7716-04 (1956)), seeking a
certificate of public convenience and necessity for cer-
tain areas in Clarke and Lauderdale Counties. The Com-
pany protested.

When the petition was filed the Company had an ap-
plication pending. At the time Association’s application
was heard, certain of the areas requested by it had been
granted to the Company on said pending application.
The Commission proceeded to hear evidence as to those
areas not granted to Company, of which there were three
in Lauderdale County and five in Clarke County. All
lands in the two counties mentioned, except the areas
here involved, had previously been certificated.

The three areas in Lauderdale County were small
tracts.

The five tracts in Clarke County ran from 160 acres
to one of four sections, and one of nearly eight sections.
The Company expressly denied any present interest in
obtaining a certificate for such large acreage or for a
smaller one, but contested the Association’s right to
all the arreas. The Company filed a motion to dismiss
the application alleging that it was not prepared in ac-
cordance with the rules of the Commission.

837

The Company contended that since the application
was one to serve a rural area, in addition to describing
selected areas which in applicant’s judgment could and
should be developed as a unit, it should also comply with
Rules 6F'(5), (5a), (5b) and 6F (4).

ME Bf Association answered that it was not proposing
any rural line extension as provided by Rule 6F; that
it was seeking an area which could best be developed
as a unit in conjunction with its grandfather area, and
that therein it was not necessary to furnish the infor-
mation required by Rules 6F(5), (5a) and (5b). On ap-
peal the Commission and the Chancery Court agreed
with this contention of Association, and we also agree.

HM The Company also argued that a certificate
could not be issued unless and until there were requests
for service in the area. However, the act itself provides
for the issuance of certificates of public convenience and
necessity in case the present or future public conveni-
ence and necessity require or will require electrical op-
erations. Miss. Code Ann. §7716-05 (1956). Mississippi
Code Annotated section 7716-13 (1956) authorized the
Commission to prescribe, issue, amend, and rescind rules
and regulations to carry out the provisions of the act,
and in pursuance thereof, the Commission adopted its
Rules and Regulations. Rule 6F(4) provides for a cer-
tificate to serve a rural area and says such area shall
be one which in applicant’s judgment should be developed
as a unit. Subsection (6a) of Rule 6F makes the holder
of such a certificate responsible for as complete develop-
ment of the area as is economically feasible. Sub-section
(6b) of Rule 6F gives the holder of the certificate the
right to develop in such area.

Evidence was introduced consisting of maps and de-
tail plats of each area requested, together with oral
testimony as to each area and the general situation.

MEM After hearing and considering the evidence twice
(once on a rehearing), the Commission found and ad-
judicated :

838

The Commission finds that as to the particularly
described areas set forth hereinafter that applicant
has established by the proof that public convenience
and necessity justifies and requires the issuance of
this certificate of convenience and necessity. The evi-
dence shows that as to the areas hereinafter deserib-
ed the applicant is better able to serve said areas by
reason of the proximity of its already certificated areas
thereto and because of the close proximity of its exist-
ing electric lines and facilities to said areas. The
Commission further finds that the grant of this cer-
tificate will prevent much unnecessary and uneconomic
duplication of facilities.

None of the areas hereby certificated lie within the
boundaries of any municipality.

The Commission finds that the public convenience
and necessity justifies and requires the issuance of
this certificate of convenience and necessity to Hast
Mississippi Electric Power Association.

On appeal to the Chancery Court of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County, the chancellor was of the opini-
on the Commission should be affirmed in all respects
except as to two tracts in Lauderdale County, referred
to as areas five and six in that county. As to these tracts,
he was of the opinion that the Commission’s finding was
not supported by substantial evidence. If we had been
passing upon the facts originally we might have thought
it better to dismiss the petition as to these two tracts,
but we cannot say the Commission had no substantial
evidence before it. It had the maps of the county and
the detail maps of these two tracts, in addition to oral
evidence, and the fact that if denied as to these two tracts,
they would be the only ones in the county not certificat-
ed, and further expensive litigation would be required.
As to tract five, the south line thereof was one and one-
fourth miles long. The Association has a line which
enters the tract about 165 feet east of the northwest

Fc t;®LTLLCUM

corner, and then runs southeast to a point approximately
660 feet east of the west line, and about 500 feet north
of the south line — thence it runs easterly to the east
boundary. The Company has lines running across the
eastern-third of the tract. Both the Company and the
Association serves customers in the eastern portion.

As to tract six, it runs north and south for a mile, and
each party has a line or lines through, across or near
this tract.

We believe that the Commission, with the facts before
it and with its expertise on such matters, was more able
than we are to pass upon same, and that there was sub-
stantial evidence to support its holdings.

The cause is affirmed on cross-appeal; reversed on
direct appeal; the order of the Commission reinstated,
and remanded to the Commission.

Affirmed on cross-appeal; reversed on direct appeal;
order of Commission reinstated, and remanded to the
Commission.

Ethridge, C. J., and Gillespie, Rodgers and Ineer, JJ.,
concur.

McDaniex Broruers Cowsrrvcrion Company, Lyo. v.
JoRpy

No. 43786 February 21, 1966 183 So. 2d 501

Young & Young, Pat H. Scanlon, Jackson, for appel-
lant.

Watkins & Eager, Jackson, for appellee.

843

Rovezrs, J.

This case came to this Court from the Circuit Court
of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Missis-
sippi, where a judgment was originally entered in favor
of Walter S. Jordy in the sum of $3,000 on August 12,
1964. The appellee filed a motion to correct judgment
on August 13, 1964, but this motion was not acted upon
during the regular July term which began July 6, 1964,
and ended August 15, 1964. There was no order entered
extending the term of court. The only order appearing
on the minutes is dated August 14th and is in the fol-
lowing words: ‘‘Ordered and adjudged that the Court
do now adjourn until 9:00 A. M. Monday.’’ Thereafter,

ee
on August 19, 1964, the circuit court entered an order
setting aside the previous judgment in the instant case
and entered a final judgment for $6,004 in favor of the
appellee. The appellant, McDaniel Construction Com-
pany, Inc., has appealed from this judgment. After ap-
pellant’s brief was filed on December 15, 1965, and it
became known that they contended that the final judg-
ment for $6,004 was entered in vacation, the appellee,
Walter S. Jordy, filed a motion in this Court’on January
7, 1966, requesting this Court to permit him to supple-
ment the record on appeal to show an attached order
entered by the trial court on December 30, 1965. This
order attempted to amend and correct the minutes of
the trial court as of Friday, August 14, 1964. The ap-
pellant filed an answer to the appellee’s motion to sup-
plement the record and asserted that no hearing was
held by the trial court to determine the issue as to wheth-
er or not the failure to enter an order extending the
July 1964 term was a clerical error. The appellee filed
a response to appellant’s answer to its motion, stating
that the attorney for appellant was notified by telephone
and requested to appear at 1:30 P. M., December 30,
1965; that he did appear and examined a carbon copy of
the order, but offered no rebuttal except to say that the
court lacked the power to correct its minutes under the
circumstances.

In the outset, therefore, it is apparent we must first
determine the issue presented by the motion to supple-
ment the record of the trial court.

Mississippi Code Annotated section 1401 (1956) pro-
vides that the July term of the Circuit Court of the
First Judicial District of Hinds County begins on the
First Monday of July and runs for thirty-six days. The
July 1964 term of that court began July 6, 1964, and end-
ed August 15, 1964.

Mississippi Code Annotated section 1647 (1956) pro-
vides that the term of circuit court may be extended by

845

the trial judge. The pertinent part of this Code section
is as follows:

‘«And in all cases where, in the judgment of any judge
or chancellor, the business of any circuit or chancery
court may for any cause make it advantageous, or
proper, so to do, such judge or chancellor may con-
tinue any term of court then in session by an order
entered on the minutes of the court for such time as
such judge or chancellor may determine. ...’’

This Court has heretofore considered several cases in
which orders were entered by the trial judge after the
regular term of court had expired, and a majority of
the Members of this Court are of the opinion that the
issue has been settled, adversely to the claim of appel-
lee.

We upheld an order of the Circuit Court of Wayne
County in the case of Perry v. State, 154 Miss. 459, 122
So. 744 (1929). The order entered in that case was in
the following language:

“Tuesday January 22nd, 1929, It now appearing unto

the Honorable J. D. Fatheree, Judge of the circuit

court for the 10th Judicial District, of Mississippi,
the business of the January 1929, term of circuit court
of Wayne County, Mississippi, now being held because
of the heavy docket of said court makes it advantage-
ous and proper to continue said term for one week
longer than the regular term, that is to say said regu-
lar term in the judgment of the said J. D. Fatheree,
for the above reasons should be and is hereby ordered
extended and continued for one week from the time
fixed by law, for the expiration of the regular term,
the clerk is hereby ordered to spread this order on
the Minutes of the court, and the officers are hereby
directed to draw jurors for said week, and summons
such jurors for service January 28th, at nine o’clock
A.M.”? 154 Miss. at 463, 122 So. at 745.

The order was spread upon the minutes of the court
during the regular term, and on appeal this Court said:
“The order of January 22d, which was a day of the
regular term fixed by law, was made and entered under
the authority of the last clause of section 988, Code
of 1906. ...’? 154 Miss. at 464, 122 So. at 745.
‘The Court then said:
“An extended term of court, therefore, is not a special
term, it becomes simply a part of the regular term
fixed by law. An extended term of court must be for
a definite time; the statute so provides. The extension
here involved was for a definite time — one week. ...””
(Emphasis supplied.) 154 Miss. at 465, 122 So. at 745.
In the case of Watson v. State, 166 Miss. 194, 146
So. 122 (1933), the trial judge entered an order at a
special term of court stating that the court was then in
session and the business of the court required that it
be continued; that it was advantageous and proper to
extend the court term into a third week in order to dispose
of the volume of business. On appeal to this Court, it
was contended that the statutory law (§732, Miss. Code
1930) authorizing an extended term of court as an ex-
tension of a regular term of court had no application to
a special term of court called for a stated term. This
Court held, however, that a special term of court could
be extended as well as aregular term. On the other hand,
this Court pointed out:
“In support of the ground of objection that there
were no signed minutes of the special term showing
an order extending said term, and therefore the said
term expired at midnight, Saturday, March 5, 1932,
the appellant offered as a witness the circuit clerk, the
custodian of the minutes of the court, and by him
identified the minute book, and particularly page 239
thereof, which he identified as the purported minutes
of the court for Thursday, March 3, 1932, and as con-
taining an order of the court extending the special term

|

of court for one week. The appellant offered in evi-
dence pages 224 to 243, inclusive, of this minute book,
which purported to be the entire minutes of the special
term of two weeks, including the minutes of Thurs-
day, March 3, Friday, March 4, and Saturday, March
5, 1932, and the clerk of the court then offered to
testify that the minutes of these last-mentioned three
days were not signed by the judge. An objection was
interposed to this testimony, on the ground that the
minutes were the best evidence of the fact. This ob-
jection was sustained, and thereupon the appellant
again offered and read into the record page 243 of
the minutes contained the following recitation: ‘It is
now ordered that court adjourn until Monday morn-
ing, March 7th, 1932, at nine o’clock.’ Under this re-
citation there was a blank space under which appear-
ed the words ‘Circuit Judge,’ but no signature of the
judge appeared in the space above these words, or

on this page.’? 166 Miss. ai

208-09, 146 So. at 125-26.

The Court quoted from Mississippi Code 1930 section

750, and said:

“‘The provision of this section that ‘on the last day
of the term the minutes shall be drawn up, read, and
signed * * * before the adjournment of the court’
is mandatory, and requires that the minutes must be
drawn up and signed before the expiration of the time
fixed by law, or by the order calling a special term
shall have expired. In view of the mandatory pro-
vision of this statute, there is no right or authority in
a presiding judge to sign the minutes of his court
after the term has expired by operation of law and is
in vacation.’’ 166 Miss. at 210, 146 So. at 126.
Following the above-quotation, it was said:

“A writing or entry on a book provided for recording
the minutes of the proceedings of the courts of this
state does not become a part of the court’s minutes
until such tenative minutes are read and signed by

848

the presiding judge. The only power of a circuit judge
or chancellor to extend a term of court, regular or
special, is found in section 732, Code 1930, which au-
thorizes the extension of any term of court then in
session, by an order entered on the minutes of the
court. This necessarily means that the order extend-
ing a term of court must be entered on the minutes
while the court is still in session, that is, upon minutes
signed by the judge before the expiration of the term
proposed to be extended. So, in the case at bar, if,
in fact, no order extending the term of court was en-
tered on minutes which were signed by the presiding
judge before the expiration of the term, as fixed by
the original order calling the term, the attempted ex-
tension was ineffective, and the term of court ended
at midnight of Saturday, March 5, 1932, and the trial
of appellant during the following week was a nullity.’’
(Emphasis supplied.) 166 Miss. at 211, 146 So. at
126-27.
Hl Bf Ii is true that Mississippi Code Annotated
section 1670 (1956) permits the correction of a mistake,
miscalculation or misrecital of any sum of money, quanti-
ty of any thing, or of any names in the minutes of
the court where there shall be among the records of
the proceedings in a suit, any verdict, bond, bill, note,
or other writing of the like nature or kind, or docket
or other memoranda by the judge or chancellor, where-
by such judgment or decree may be safely amended,
the judge may correct the record. MIM But, we are
of the opinion that the judge cannot go back to a former
term of court and enter an order extending the term.
It is apparent, not only from the previous opinion, in
cases from this Court, but from the language of the
statute (Mississippi Code Annotated section 1647, 1956)
that the extended term of court and order must be spread
upon the minutes of the court ‘‘then in session’’ extend-
ing the term of the court ‘‘for such time as such judge or

849

chancellor may determine’. The term required to be
fixed by a judge must be a definite term, for a definite
time.

There are good reasons why the law requires the court
to be held at stated terms. Mississippi Constitution 1890,
section 24, requires that every person shall have a reme-
dy by due course of law without delay. The circuit court
is required to be held in each county at least twice in
each year. Mississippi Const. 1890 § 158. And the terms
of circuit court are fixed by law. See Miss. Code Ann.
§ 1394, et seg., (1956). The circuit court has ‘‘all the
powers belonging to a court of oyer and terminer and
general jail delivery.’’ Mississippi Code Ann. § 1428
(1956). The words ‘‘oyer and terminer’’ simply mean
“‘stated term’’, ‘‘periodical session.’’? They are derived
from the ancient Royal requirements that judges of the
High Court of Justice in the various counties of England
be held at stated sessions. The Royal commission to
hold a general assize were issued twice a year. (See
“assize’? Encyc. Britannica, Vol. 2 at p. 560, 14th Hd.,
1939 ; ‘‘assize’’ and ‘‘assizes’’, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary,
Vol. 1, pp. 267-68, 3rd Hd. 1914.) The reason stated terms
were important then, and now, is so that citizens may
have proper process, returnable to a stated term. An ex-
tension of a term of court, therefore, must be extended
for a stated length of time.

MM The appellee in the case now before the Court
contends that the trial court has, as of December 30,
1965, entered an order nunc pro tunc correcting the rec-
ord so as to reflect his intention to spread upon the
minutes an order extending the term of court on August
14, 1964, so as to correct the order of that date adjourn-
ing the court until nine o’clock A. M., Monday. The ap-
pellee has attached affidavits of the circuit judge and
the clerk to his motion to supplement the record. We are
of the opinion, however, that an order cannot be entered
nunc pro tunc so as to extend a term of court after the

850

regular term of court as fixed by the Legislature has
expired.

In support of this conclusion, we call attention to
the following cases which have influenced our decision.

In the case of Jackson v. Gordon, 194 Miss. 268, 11
So. 2d 901 (1943), this Court said:

‘‘Appellee argues that the action of the trial judge

in signing the minutes at the end of an invalid ex-

tended term should be considered as a correction of
the minutes nune pro tune, and as an authority which
he should be allowed to exercise in vacation. This
contention is definitely refuted in the Watson case,
supra, wherein it was said: ‘In view of the mandatory
provision of this statute (Sec. 750, Code 1930), there
is no right or authority in a presiding judge to sign
the minutes of his court after the term has expired by

operation of law and is in vacation.’ (166 Miss. 194,

146 So, 126).’? 194 Miss. at 278, 11 So. 2d at 902.

In the case of Beard v. McLain, 117 Miss. 316, 78 So.
184 (1918), where a chancellor attempted to adjourn
his special term of court called for June 1916 until
August, this Court said:

“Did the chancellor retain control and jurisdiction

over the minutes and orders of court rendered at the

special June, 1916, term of court, to the extent of au-
thorizing him to set aside, at the August meeting of
the court, a decree theretofore rendered at the June
term, dismissing this cause? This question, thus sharp-
ly and directly presented, must be answered in the
negative. Unquestionably, the decree rendered at the

June term, dismissing the amended bill and taxing the

complainant with costs, was a final decree. ... In

adjourning the special term, the chancellor undertook
to adjourn his court until the second Mondat in August,

1916. ... Itis settled law, that:

«All final decrees made in term time remain in the

breast of the chancellor until the adjournment, and

851

may be amended or vacated at any time during the
term, but not afterwards.’ Ex parte Stanfield, 98
Miss. 214, 53 South. 538.’? 117 Miss. at 319-20, 78
So, at 185.

“Tt is a matter of common observation that important
litigated cases sometimes stand for trial about the
end of a regular term of court, and that frequently
the court is in the midst of a trial of an important
murder case, or other case of importance, requiring
additional time, and the statute, as amended, confers
the power upon the circuit judge or chancellor to con-
tinue in session by an order entered on the minutes;
but it is contemplated that in this order the judge
shall designate the time, and this time may be such
length of time as the judge or chancellor may deter-
mine, In the case before us the chancellor did not en-
ter an order designating any length of time required
for completing the business of the special June term,
and, in reality, it does not appear that the court had
any further business to transact at the special June
term. It follows from what we have said that the

decree of the chancellor reinstating this cause was a

nullity; and, the reinstatement being void, there was

no cause to be tried upon the merits.’’? 117 Miss. at

322-23, 78 So. at 186.

In the case of Evans v. King-Peoples Auto Company,
135 Miss. 194, 99 So. 758 (1924), a judgment was entered
against the sureties and principal for the amount of a
debt, and an automobile was condemned to be sold to
pay the debt; the court then adjourned for the term.
Thereafter, at the March term, the surety filed a motion
to set aside and vacate the judgment rendered at the
September term, and asked the court to enter a corrected
judgment. The motion was taken under advisement by
the circuit judge, and on the 16th day of January 1923,
the circuit judge entered an order on the minutes at-

tempting to sustain the motion and cited in his order
that it was a mistake, and that the judgment actually
entered was not the judgment of the court, and should
not have been entered by the clerk, and then entered in
lieu thereof a judgment restoring the automobile to the
sheriff. Thereafter at the following September term,
the King-Peoples Auto Company filed a motion to set
aside and vacate the order by the court at the January
term, and this motion was sustained by the court, the
original judgment entered at the September term was
restored, and from this last judgment, this case was
appealed to this Court. On appeal, this Court said:

«‘There is nothing in the record to show that the court

intended to enter any other judgment at the time when

the judgment was rendered than the one it did enter.

There was no showing made of any kind that there

was any error of any kind by the court, or any mis-

understanding of the judgment to be entered by the
clerk other than the recital in the judge’s order of

January 16, 1923, about 114 years after the rendition

of the judgment, and in our opinion this is not a case

which warrants the judge in setting aside a judgment
rendered during the term, after the expiration of the
term, on the ground of mistake or error in rendering
the judgment. The record should show wherein the
judgment entered was not the judgment which was
actually pronounced by the court on the verdict of
the jury. Consequently the judge did not err in setting
aside this vacation order and reinstating the original

judgment.’’ 135 Miss. at 201, 99 So. at 759.

In the case of Rainwater v. Rainwater, 239 Miss. 154,
119 So. 2d 610 (1960), where a complainant filed a bill
to cancel clouds on the title to realty, the Chancery Court
of Wayne County entered a decree adverse to complain-
ant and complainant appealed. The Supreme Court
pointed out that where a chancery court sustained a
demurrer to a bill seeking to remove a cloud upon title

853

o land at the October 1955 term at a time when com-
plainant was in the courtroom and was represented by
an attorney, but no request was made by complainant
for leave to amend or for an extension of time therefor,
he term of court then in session adjourned. Thereafter,
the January 1956 term convened and no amendment was
filed, no counsel appeared for complainant, and for that
reason, the case was continued to the April 1956 term
without an amendment having been made. On April 30,
956, the chancery court entered a decree specifically
providing that the bill should be dismissed with preju-
dice. On September 8, 1958, complainant filed a second
bill to cancel the cloud on the title to the same land, and
on February 18, 1959, complainant filed a motion to
correct the decree in the first suit (filed October 1955)
to show that dismissal was without prejudice, instead of
with prejudice. We held that the chancery court proper-
ly refused to amend the decree, and properly held that
the decree was res judicata. Quoting from Griffith’s
Mississippi Chancery Practice, section 622, pages 670-71
(2d Ed. 1950), this Court said:
“Tf a general demurrer going to the substance and
merits of the bill be sustained and there is no pro-
vision in the decree allowing an amendment to the
pill the decree is final, the cause stands dismissed on
the merits and it is a bar to a subsequent suit, not
only on the merits as pleaded but of all that might
properly have been pleaded in that cause. It is not
the duty of the court to offer leave to amend when
a demurrer is sustained. If desired such leave must
be asked for and an order is obtained granting it, and
unless such an order is obtained during the term the
case is disposed of and the decree sustaining the de-
murrer will become a final decree dismissing the bill
although the decree does not in terms direct this to
be done.’’ 239 Miss. at 160-61, 119 So. 2d at 613.
HEB Moreover, we are of the opinion that the minutes
of the court cannot be changed by parol testimony, except

as provided for in Mississippi Code Annotated section
1670 (1956). In the case of Steverson v. McLeod Lum-
ber Company, 120 Miss. 65, 81 So. 788 (1919), a motion
was made to quash a writ of execution and vacate a
default judgment on the ground that it was rendered on
what purported to be the first day of a regular term of
the circuit court, when there could not have been a regu-
lar term begun and held on such date. The Court said:
“The parol testimony, however, attempted to be in-
troduced in evidence by the appellant was inadmissi-
ble, because it was an attempt by parol testimony to
contradict the minutes of the court, the attempt being
in this case to contradict the minutes of the court
which show that the court was begun on the 18th day
(third Monday) of November, by showing as a matter
of fact that the term was begun on the fourth day
(first Monday) of November. This exact question was
presented to the court in the case of Jones v. Williams,
62 Miss. 183. In the Jones Case the effort was to
contradict by parol testimony the minutes of the court
to show the day of the adjournment of the court, in-
stead of the day of the opening of court. In the Jones
Case the court said:
«««The settled doctrine seems to be that the evidence
proposed to vary the date shown by the record is not
admissible (citing authorities). Judicial records re-
quired by law to be kept are said to import unerring
verity, and to be conclusive evidence against all the
world as to their existence, date, and legal consequen-
ces.’ ’? 120 Miss. at 81, 81 So. 789.
This Court then said:
“‘Since the law provides that the regular November
term of the court of Forrest County must convene on
the first Monday thereof, it follows that no regular
term of this court could be convened on the third
Monday of November except as provided by section
989, Code of 1906, and that a court begun on this date

855

was not a legal court, and therefore its judgments

and orders were void, because the court was held at

an unauthorized time.’’? 120 Miss. at 82, 81 So. at 790.

MEM The general law on this subject seems to be
well-settled, as shown by the textwriter in 87 Am. Jur.,
Motions, Rules, and Orders, section 30, at pages 513-14
(1941), wherein it is said:

“Nune Pro Tune. — The power of courts to adopt

the practice of entering orders, judgments, and de-

crees, nunc pro tune is recognized in all jurisdictions.

It is many times necessary for the attainment of jus-

tice, and, when properly exercised, should be favored.

Thus, an entry nunc pro tune of an order of change

of venue at a term subsequent to that in which the

order was made is proper in a case where the omission
of the entry at the proper term was due to negligence
of the clerk. ... There can be no doubt that such an
entry may operate so as to save proceedings which
have been had before it is made, but where no pro-
ceedings have been had and the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject has been withdrawn in the mean-
time, a court has no power to make a nunc pro tune
order. If the court has omitted to make an order which
it might or ought to have made, it cannot, at a sub-
sequent term, be made nunc pro tune.’’

See also: Reynolds v. Cropsey, 241 N. Y. 389, 150 N. BE.

308 (1925) ; 21. C. J. S., Courts, § 152 at p. 236 ¢.; § 152 at

p. 240 (1940).

HM We have reached the conclusion that the order
of the circuit court dated August 14, 1964, did not ex-
tend the circuit court of the First Judicial District of
Hinds County, Mississippi, then in session, and we hold
the nunc pro tunc order entered by the trial court on
December 30, 1965, did not serve to extend the term of
court as of August 14, 1964, and the order entered on .
August 19, 1964, was entered in vacation.

856

We are now therefore confronted with the validity
of an order entered by the circuit court of August 19,
1964 (in vacation) for the sum of $6,004 in favor of the
appellee, Walter F. Jordy. What effect did this order
have upon the judgment entered at the regular term
of the court?

In the case of Hyde Construction Company, Inc. v.
Highway Materials Company, 248 Miss. 564, 159 So.
2d 170 (1963), certain suits were joined together and
default judgments were entered against Hyde Construc-
tion Company and motions were made by appellant to
set the judgments aside, but the court did not enter an
order setting the judgments aside until vacation. The
Supreme Court held that an order entered by the trial
court in vacation served to sustain the motion to set
aside a default judgment, and to grant a new trial, and
to continue the case for final hearing to the next term
of court. This ruling was based upon the amendment
to Mississippi Code Annotated section 1519 (1964), by
Chapter 297, Laws of 1962, permitting the trial court to
pass upon motions and demurrers in vacation, and that
the case then was continued by law for determination
at the next regular term of court.

Hl Wi In the instant case, the motion to set aside
the judgment was made and argued in term time, but
the order setting aside the judgment was not entered
until after the regular term. We are of the opinion that
since the court had authority to pass upon motions to
set aside the judgment in vacation that the order entered
by the court, dated August 19, 1964, served to set aside
the original judgment, but that the matter was then
continued by law until the next regular term. Thus, it
has been continued from term to term and is now a
pending matter in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County, Mississippi. The case must
therefore be reversed and remanded.

857

Reversed and remanded.

Jones, Patterson, Inger and Robertson, JJ., concur.
Ethridge, C. J., and Gillespie, Brady and Smith, JJ.,
dissent.

Smrrx, J., dissenting:

With deference, I must respectfully dissent from the
conclusions reached by the majority in this case.

The underlying and fundamental purpose of Missis-
sippi Code Annotated section 1647 (1956) is to make
provision for the continuation of a court term, with a
minimum of formality, until pending business is disposed
of. The statute first provides for proceeding with a trial
in progress ‘‘without any special order.’’ It then makes
provision for disposing of the business of the court in
other pending cases, not actually in process of trial, and
states:

... Such judge or chancellor may continue any term
of court then in session by an order entered on the
minutes of the court for such time as such judge or
chancellor may determine; ...

As I read the statute, there is nothing to indicate that
the legislature intended to require that the time for
which the term is to continue shall be stated in the order.
It would seem that efficiency and economy would be
promoted best by adjourning from day to day until all
pending business is completed. To estimate and fix in
advance, in the original order, the time deemed necessary
to complete pending business is to assume the risk that
insufficient time will be allowed to conclude it, or that
too much time will be added and during the latter part
of the extension there would be no business to occupy
the court. The words in the statute ‘‘such time as such
judge or chancellor may determine”? is a legislative grant
of discretion to the trial court to continue the term until
its business is finished.

Here, appropriate orders were entered from day to
day preserving the continuity of the extended term from

the last regularly scheduled day of the term to the con-
clusion of business on the day of final adjournment. This
was a substantial compliance with the requirements of
the statute. No one was deceived or misled, and the
intention of the court to continue the term was made
abundantly clear by its daily orders. The parties and
their counsel all participated without question or ob-
jection in the disposal of their cases during the extended
term. Two weeks of completed business of the court is
nullified by the decision of the majority, although no
objection was made at any time during the course of
the extended term, and nothing is shown to have occurred
to indicate that actual prejudice resulted.

I see no reasonable basis for a distinction between the
power of the court upon a day of the extended term, and
its power upon a day of the regularly scheduled term.
The court’s order, on the last scheduled day, adjourning
until Monday, effectively carried the term over until
that day, and on each succeeding day an appropriate
order recessing until the next day was entered. It seems
to me that the sole object of the statute, which was to
enable the court to continue in session until its business
was completed, was accomplished. It is not questioned
that this was the court’s well understood intention, and
nothing more nor less than that was done.

Gutuspm, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

The decision in this case is unfortunate insofar as
the litigants are concerned, but even more so on account
of the doubt cast on the validity of other judgments
rendered by the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Dis-
trict of Hinds County during the two weeks beginning
Monday, August 17, 1964. The results of this case, as
far as the litigants are concerned, will amount to addi-
tional trouble and expense. Undoubtedly, the trial court
will again enter the same judgment it rendered on August
19, 1964, resulting in another appeal to this Court.

859

The July term of the Cireuit Court.of the First Ju-
dicial District of Hinds County began on Monday, July
6, 1964, and was scheduled by statute for thirty-six days.
Miss. Code Ann. § 1401 (1956). Trial of this case was
begun and completed on August 6, 1964, and judgment
was entered the same day in favor of appellee for the
sum of $3,000. This judgment was not filed with the
clerk until August 12, 1964. On August 18, 1964, appellee
filed a ‘‘Motion To Correct Judgment Or For Judgment
Notwithstanding The Verdict.’? The motion stated that
the evidence established without dispute, that appellee’s
damages amounted to $6,004. On August 19, 1964, the
court sustained the motion and changed the judgment
to the sum of $6,004, instead of $3,000. In other words,
appellee’s motion to correct judgment was sustained.
Thereafter the proceedings were had to enter the order
extending the term nunc pro tunc, as stated in the ma-
jority opinion.

In my opinion the judgment entered on August 19,
1964, was a valid, final judgment. I am fortified in this
belief by the fact that appellant does not contend he was
misled in any way or that he suffered any disadvantage
whatsoever because the motion to correct judgment was
entered on August 19, 1964, rather than on the day it
was submitted to the court for consideration. In fact,
the record discloses that the able attorneys for appellant
considered the judgment dated August 19, 1964 for $6,-
004 as a final judgment and as a judgment rendered
during term time, as developed in more detail hereinafter.

L

The minutes should correctly reflect that done by the
court and stand as a permanent memorial, importing
verity. In my opinion the minutes of the court involved
in this case substantially reflect all that is necessary to
show the July 1964 term of court was extended. Dur-
ing term time and on August 14, 1964, the minutes con-

860

cluded as follows: ‘‘Ordered and adjudged that the court
do now adjourn until 9:00 A.M. Monday.’’ This order
did not contain the exact words of the statute, but could
any person doubt that the court had extended the term?
Then on Monday morning the minutes show the drawing
of the names of jurors for the seventh week of the July
term. The court minutes show the continuation of the
business of the court including the entering of the motion
to correct judgment on August 19, 1964, which is in-
volved on this appeal. On Friday, August 21, 1964, the
minutes reflect an order extending the term for an ad-
ditional week. It seems to me that when the minutes of
the court show clearly that the term was extended, and
correctly reflect all that done during the extension of
the term, and there is no suggestion of any lack of in-
tegrity or that the minutes lack absolute verity — then,
in my opinion, this Court should hold there has been
substantial compliance with the statutes respecting ex-
tending the term of court and the keeping of the minutes
of the court. No one could possibly have been misled
by the manner the minutes were entered by the trial
court. No one was misled, and no one claims to have been
misled or prejudiced in any way.
Until 1962, Mississippi Code Annotated section 1665
(1956) provided as follows:
The minutes of the proceedings of the supreme, cir-
euit, chancery and county courts shall be entered by
the clerk of each, respectively, in the minutebook of
the court, against the next sitting of the court, if prac-
ticable, when the same shall be read in open court;
and when corrected shall be signed — the minutes
of the Supreme Court by the chief justice or presiding
judge, of the circuit court by the circuit judge, of the
chancery court by the chancellor and of the county
court by the county judge; and on the last day of the
term the minutes shall be drawn up, read, and signed

861

on the same day, or before the adjournment of the

court.

The legislature recognized that this statute was too
rigid and did not allow correction of the minutes or the
signing of minutes after the term of court had ended, as
interpreted by past decisions of this Court. Chapter 307,
Mississippi Laws of 1962, was enacted amending Missis-
sippi Code Annotated section 1665 so as to add thereto
the following:

‘Whenever by inadvertence said minutes and proceed-
ings may remain unsigned or the judge of said court
dies before signing the minutes, the succeeding judge
or judges of said court may, in their discretion, ex-
amine into said unsigned minutes and ascertain as
to the correctness thereof, and after same shall have
been read in open court and, if the court is of the
opinion that same are true and correct, then the said
minutes may be signed and adopted by said judge or
judges.

This amendment liberalized the statute concerning the
minutes of the courts and undoubtedly was enacted in
order to overrule some of the former decisions of this
Court so as to allow a judge to read, correct and sign
minutes after the term of court has ended. I think this
was a mandate from the legislature that the court should
not apply highly technical rules that require the exact
letter of the statutes to be followed regarding the minutes
of the court. This legislative mandate is persuasive on
the issue before the court. It would prevent a great deal
of mischief to hold that there was compliance with the
statutes. No one would be prejudiced; nor would the
verity, integrity, or clarity of the minutes be impugned.
Both the law and justice would be served, rather than
the mere exact letter of the law.

I.

The order entered nunc pro tune was valid and cor-
rected any defect in the order of August 14, 1964, extend-

862

ing the term of court. The record shows that the circuit
judge announced on August 14, 1964, that the July term
was extended and thought the clerk entered the proper
order. This fact, and the minutes themselves show with-
out any doubt that the judge ordered the term extended.
This is a typical case for the entry of an order nunc pro
tune to supply any deficiency in the order extending the
term, The majority opinion in this case quotes approving-
ly from 37 Am. Jur., Motion, Rules and Orders section
30 at pages 513-514 (1941). The text makes it clear that
the power of courts to adopt the practice of entering
orders, judgments, and decrees, nunc pro tumc is recogniz-
ed in all jurisdictions, and that it is necessary to do so
for the attainment of justice, and, when properly exer-
cised, should be favored. This Court has recognized
the power to enter orders nunc pro tunc. In Stokes v.
Shannon, 55 Miss. 583 (1873), the Court approved the
entry by the circuit court of a judgment nunc pro tunc,
showing the action by the circuit court on a motion for
a new trial. It was done without notice because there
was enough in the record to show the action of the
court in overruling the motion for new trial. In the
case now before the court there was conclusive evidence
in the court minutes to show that the term had been
extended, and the court could have entered the order
without notice to the opposite party; however, the record
shows that appellant’s counsel was notified and appeared
before the judge. Stokes v. Shannon, supra, indicates
that when notice is given, extraneous evidence may be
admitted to aid the court in making an order nunc pro
tunc so that the minutes, as corrected, will speak the
truth,

In Oliphant v. The Carthage Bank, 224 Miss. 386, 80
So. 2d 63 (1955), a case involving an order nunc pro tune
of the State Banking Board, the Court said:

... ‘The object and office of a nunc pro tune entry

of a judgment are to exhibit correctly on the record

863

a judgment previously rendered and not carried into

the record or not properly and adequately recorded.’

And then further it is said as a part of the text of

Section 117, that: ‘In connection with judgments, the

object or purpose, and office, function, or province, of

a nune pro tune entry are to make the record speak

the truth by recording or correctly evidencing an act

done or judgment rendered by the court at a former
time and not carried into the record, or not properly
or adequately recorded. It is not the object, office,
or province of such an entry to alter a judgment actu-
ally rendered, or to correct an erroneous decision or
judgment; and, generally speaking, the object or of-
fice of the entry is only to support matters of evi-
dence or to correct clerical misprisions, and not to

supply omitted judicial action; ...’ (224 Miss. at 403,

80 So. 2d at 69)

The sole purpose of the order nunc pro tunc entered
in this case was ‘‘to exhibit correctly on the record a
judgment previously rendered and not carried into the
record or not properly and adequately recorded.’’ (Eim-
phasis added). The order nunc pro tune did exactly what
the quoted rule states is the function of an order nune
pro tune.

The statutes providing for extension of terms and
keeping of minutes are the same for the chancery and
cireuit courts. A lengthy paragraph in Griffith, Mis-
sissippi Chancery Practice section 623 (1950) discusses
mune pro tunc decrees in chancery and states in part that
“‘the entry of a decree nunc pro tunc is said to be always
permissible where the decree was definitely ordered dur-
ing term time but was omitted by the excusable inad-
vertence of counsel or by the fault of opposing counsel,
or where it was drawn and signed but the clerk failed
to enter it of record during the term, or where it was
actually and definitely ordered to be entered but by im-
advertence of the court it was not signed.’’ And further

864

««. . . it would probably be held that such a decree may
be entered upon the distinct recollection of the chancel-
lor... .’? (Emphasis added).

Til.

Appellant is not in position to contend the order cor-
recting the judgment entered August 19, 1964, was not a
final decree entered in term time. Two days after the
entry of the judgment on August 19, 1964, appellant
gave notice to the court reporter containing the follow-
ing paragraph:

McDaniel Brothers Construction Company, the de-

fendant in the above cause, feeling aggrieved by the

judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial

District of Hinds County, Mississippi, on the 13th

day of August, 1964, and the final judgment rendered

on the 19th day of August, 1964, at the regular July
term, desires an appeal to the Mississippi Supreme

Court in the manner provided by law, and you are

requested to preserve and transcribe your notes as

required by law. (Emphasis added).

In appellant’s designation of the record he referred
to the judgment entered August 19 as a final judgment,
and in his appeal bond he referred to said judgment
as a final judgment. Appellant did not file a motion in
the circuit court contending the judgment of August 19
was not final, and therefore, did not give the trial judge
an opportunity to set it aside. Thus the trial judge has
been put in error without any opportunity to correct any
mistake he may have made. This case is being reversed
on something discovered by appellant after perfecting
his appeal and without the slightest showing of any
harm from that about which he complains. All the costs
of this appeal have been incurred as a result of appellant
raising a question here that he did not raise below.

I would hold the judgment dated August 19, 1964, a
final judgment entered during an extension of the July
term.

865

Ethridge, C. J., and Brady, J., join in this dissent.
ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
Roszrrson, J.

The appellant and appellee have both filed sugges-
tions of error to the opinion of this Court in the above
styled case, reported in 254 Miss. 839, 183 So. 2d 501
(1966). After carefully considering the briefs filed, we
have determined that both suggestions of error should
be overruled.

Appellee, Walter S. Jordy, contends that the appel-
lant did not raise in the trial court the question that
the July, 1964, Term of Court had not been properly
extended and that the judgment entered by the trial
judge on August 19, 1964, was void because entered
in vacation. The appellee insists that the appellant is
now estopped from raising this question for the first
time on appeal to this Court. The cases cited by appellee
would have been applicable except for the fact that the
issue here is jurisdictional, and we are required to de-
termine whether or not we have jurisdiction, and may
do so on our own motion. See the cases cited in Hyde
Construction Co., Inc. et al. v. Highway Materials Co.
et al., 248 Miss. 564, 572, 159 So. 24 170, 173 (1963).

Appellee contends that appellant consented to the en-
tering of a judgment on the motion in vacation and that
cases may be heard in vacation under the authority of
Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated section 1523 (1956).
The record does not bear out nor support this contention.
No order appears on the Minutes of the Cireuit Court
during the July, 1964, Term taking this matter under
advisement for decision in vacation, nor does any order
appear thereon reciting that by consent of the parties the
matter could be tried and judgment entered in vacation.

The truth of the matter is that the trial judge intended
to extend the July Term, but through inadvertence, the

proper order was not entered on the Minutes during the
July, 1964, Term. When the omission was discovered, a
nunc pro tunc order extending the July, 1964, Term for
one week was prepared by the attorney for the appellee,
and signed by the trial judge on December 30, 1965.
The attorney for the appellant was notified before this
order was signed and in the Judge’s Office advised the
trial judge and the attorney for the appellee that he did
not think that the Minutes of August 14, 1964, could be
thus corrected with a nunc pro tunc order at that time.
There is thus no question of estoppel involved in this
case.

The appellant contends in his suggestion of error that
this Court should modify its opinion and direct that the
ease be retried by the Circuit Court. In reversing and
remanding this case we did not intend to bind the hands
of the trial court, nor to dictate what action the trial
court should take. We, in effect, found that the ‘‘motion
to correct judgment or for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict,’’ which motion was heard at the July, 1964, Term
but no judgment rendered thereon at the regular term,
is still undisposed of and the court upon remand of this
case is authorized to act on said motion in any way it sees
fit. Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated section 1649
(1956), provides:

If any court shall not be held at any term, or shall
not continue to sit the whole term, or during the term
shall not have heard and determined all matters stand-
ing for trial, then all suits and proceedings remaining
undecided shall stand continued of course until the next
term; ... (Emphasis added.)

This motion to correct judgment, therefore, can be
acted on by the trial court at any regular term of the
court. In our opinion, we simply held that the July,
1964, Term of court had not been properly extended by
order entered upon its minutes during the July, 1964,
Term of court, and, therefore, the trial court did not

have the power, authority or jurisdiction to enter a final
judgment on August 19, 1964, being a day in vacation.

We also held in our original opinion, that under the
authority of Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated Sec-
tion 1519 (1964 Supp.), the Circuit Judge could act on
motions, and that the Order of August 19, 1964, ‘‘served
to set aside the original judgment, but that the matter
was then continued by law until the next regular term.’’
(183 So. 2d at 508.) However, we were not inferring
nor suggesting that the Cireuit Judge must now retry
this cause. We reiterate that the trial judge is perfectly
free to render and enter any judgment that he sees fit,
provided, of course, that this be done at a regular or
properly extended term of court.

The appellee suggests that appellant should at least
be required to pay the costs of this appeal, inasmuch
as these costs have been incurred as a result of the raising
of the question of jurisdiction by the appellant for the
first time in this Court. We do not believe this conten-
tion is well taken because the appellant was not estopped
to point out to this Court that the lower court did not
have jurisdiction to enter a final order in vacation. This
Court has so found and this cause has been reversed and
remanded. The appellant, therefore, was the successful
party and the costs should be taxed against the unsuccess-
ful party in accordance with Mississippi Code of 1942
Annotated section 1579 (1956).

The suggestions of error are therefore overruled.

Rodgers, Jones, Patterson and Ineer, JJ., concur.

Ethridge, C. J., and Gillespie, Brady and Smith, JJ.,
dissent.

fo)
wo

6

West Bros. or Pascacouna, Miss., Ivo. v. Dioxens
No, 43794 February 21, 1966 183 So. 2d 480

869

P. D. Greaves, J. C. Seaman, Jr., Gulfport, for appel-
lant.

|

Pittman, King & Pittman, Hattiesburg, for appellee.

Roszzrrson, J.

Appellee, Mrs. Beatrice Dickens, sued the appellant,
West Bros. of Pascagoula, Miss., Inc., a Corp., d/b/a
Gibson’s Discount Center for damages sustained when
she tripped and fell over a flat display counter located
at the end of a gondola-type display counter. The jury
returned a verdict for $10,500.00 damages, and the ap-
pellant appeals to this Court.

The appellant assigns as errors: the refusal to grant
a peremptory instruction for the defendant, the granting
of certain instructions for the appellee, the verdict of
the jury is against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence, and the verdict of the jury is so grossly ex-
cessive as to show bias, passion and prejudice in favor
of the plaintiff.

On August 2, 1963, the appellee had gone with her
husband to Gibson’s Discount Center to look around and
to shop.

This was a brand new store having been formally
opened for business the day before, and the crowds were
large on both days. The store fronts south and the ap-
pellee, upon entering the store, had proceeded to the
right and then had proceeded north up the last aisle
lined with display counters on both sides of the aisle.

She had picked up a boxed toaster and continued to
look at the wares and merchandise displayed on the
counters. The record reflects that the gondola-type coun-
ters were filled with merchandise, and the height of
these counters was variously estimated at four to six
feet high. As the plaintiff reached the end of a long
gondola-type counter, she rounded the corner to the left
and tripped over a flat display counter, which was 8

873

inches high, 49 inches wide and 30 inches deep. By deep
is meant the distance from the gondola-type counter,
which this flat display counter adjoined, to the edge of
the flat display counter. These flat display counters
were used to display bulky items of merchandise which
would not fit on the shelves of the gondola-type counters.
The merchandise on this particular flat display counter
had all been sold either on the opening day or the
morning of the second day, and the counter was empty
at the time the plaintiff tripped over it. She was im-
mediately helped to her feet and proceeded to find her
husband, pay for the toaster and leave the store.

She went to see a doctor for the first time on August
“19, 1963, seventeen days after her injury. She visited
Dr. Herbert Robinson in Pascagoula on August 19 and
23, 1963, and shortly thereafter, she and her family mov-
ed to Hattiesburg. Dr. Robinson treated her for a soft
tissue injury — blueness of skin — beneath her right
kneecap and a small abrasion over her right knee. There
was some slight swelling around both knees, but no
fracture or dislocation of bones. The doctor suggested
physical therapy for two days, and if there was no im-
provement, he suggested that the appellee see an ortho-
paedic surgeon. The appellee was later treated by Dr.
Francis Conn, an orthopaedic surgeon, and Dr. Harry
Fridge, her family doctor, in Hattiesburg.

However, on the trial of this case in Pascagoula only
Dr. Herbert Robinson testified. He testified about the
bruise beneath the right knee, the slightly swollen con-
dition of both knees, and that the appellee did complain
of some pain in her back. He did not examine her back
because she had been complaining of back trouble for
the past four years.

All of the special expenses of the appellee, including
the bills of Dr. Conn and Dr. Fridge, drug bills, physical
therapy, and even $22.04 for taxi fares for going to and
from the doctor’s office, totalled $282.14.

The appellee testified that she was unable to do her
normal housework; that she lost a lot of sleep on ac-
count of her injuries; that she had difficulty in remain-
ing on her feet or walking for any length of time. Her
husband, who worked for Ingalls Shipbuilding and was
home only on the week-ends, and her teenage daughter,
testified that they would rub her legs with alcohol to
relieve the pain, and that she was not able to do all of
her normal housework.

HEEB We agree with the appellant that the $10,500.00
verdict of the jury is grossly excessive and evinces bias,
passion and prejudice in favor of the appellee. The
amount of the verdict is strongly indicative that the
jury was misled and confused by some of the instructions
granted the plaintiff, instructions which were in hope-
less and irreconcilable conflict with instructions granted
the defendant.

One of the instructions which we feel was not based
on the facts or the law and which confused and misled
the jury was the following:

“The Court instructs the Jury that if you find for
the Plaintiff you may consider in arriving at the
amount of the monetary sum to be awarded, the de-
creasing and decreased purchasing power of the dol-
lar, and to add additional sums to the verdict in order
to compensate the Plaintiff for her damages, if any,
for this decreasing purchasing power of the dollar.”
HE Mf This instruction is calculated to deliberately

encourage the jury to inerease or pad the damages
because of matters aliunde the record. We feel that the
granting of this instruction alone is a fatal error and
would justify the reversing and remanding of this case;
but there are other fatal errors in at least two other
instructions which were granted the plaintiff. These
two defective instructions are:

“The Court instructs the jury that the law requires
the Defendant to at all times keep its premises in a

reasonable safe condition for its patrons, and in this
ease if you believe from a preponderence of the evi-
dence that the Defendant failed in its duty and did
negligently cause to and did leave one of its movable
platforms unattended that extended partially out into
its aisle where Plaintiff was shopping thereby creat-
ing a dangerous hazard, and you further believe that
the Plaintiff stwmbled over the said platform causing
her to fall to the floor with such force and violence
that she suffered injuries and damages, if any, then
it would be your sworn duty to find and return a
verdict for the Plaintiff.’’

“The Court instructs the Jury that the Defendant
has a duty to every person entering upon its premises
for the purpose of transacting business to keep its
premises in a reasonably safe condition and to avoid
accidents and injuries to those properly entering upon
said premises on business, and in this case, if you be-
lieve from the evidence that the Plaintiff had entered
upon the Defendant’s premises on business then it
was the duty of the Defendant to keep its premises
in a reasonably safe condition so as not to expose
Plaintiff to unreasonable risks, and if you further
believe that the Defendant negligently caused to and
did leave a movable stock counter described as being
about five inches above the level of the floor and parti-
ally blocking the aisle thereby creating a dangerous ha-
eard, and as result thereof Plaintiff stumbled over said
platform or counter causing her injuries and damages,
if any, then it would be your sworn duty to find and
return a verdict for the Plaintiff assessing her all
damages allowed by law.’? (Emphasis added.)
These instructions do not correctly state the rule laid

down in many Mississippi cases defining the duty of

a storekeeper to its patrons. In Wallace v. J. OC. Penny,
Co., Inc., 236 Miss. 367, 377, 109 So. 2d 876, 880 (1959),

this Court said: ‘A store keeper owes to a customer the

876

duty to exercise ordinary care to have his building in a
reasonably safe condition. But he is not the insurer of
the safety of his customers.’’

MEM This further language in the instruction last
above quoted: ‘‘and if you further believe that De-
fendant negligently caused to and did leave a movable
stock counter described as being about five inches above
the level of the floor and partially blocking the aisle
‘thereby creating a dangerous hazard, ....’’ draws con-
clusions for the jury that are not correct statements of
the law and are calculated to mislead and confuse the
jury.

The appellee contends that the jury could harmonize
the instructions for the plaintiff and defendant, and
that any error would be thus eliminated or corrected in
the minds of the jurors. We are unable to agree with
this argument.

MIB As was said in the case of Alabama & V. Ry.
Co. v. Cox, 106 Miss. 33, 35, 63 So. 334, 335 (1913), ‘The
instructions for plaintiff are in direct conflict with the
instructions for defendant, and we cannot approve the
verdict of the jury upon the theory that conflicting in-
structions are harmless.”

It is clear to this Court from the grossly excessive
verdict brought in by the jury, that the jury was misled
and confused by these erroneous instructions. The
amount of the verdict shows bias, passion and prejudice
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant on
the part of the jury.

We are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower
court should be reversed and the cause remanded for a
new trial on all issues.

Reversed and remanded.
Ethridge, C. J., Gillespie, Rodgers and Jones JJ.,
concur.

87

a

McAuister, Ere. v. McAzister
No. 43796 February 21, 1966 183 So. 2d 513

Charles H. McCraine, Jr., Houston; W. L. McDonough,

New Albany; Scribner & Brewer, Tupelo, for appellant.

Daniel, Coker & Horton, Ruby B. Weeks, Jackson, for
appellee,

880

Brapy, Tom P., J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court
of Tippah County, Mississippi, in favor of the appellee.
From this judgment appellant prosecutes this appeal.

The record discloses the following pertinent facts.
Appellant instituted suit against appellee for personal
injuries sustained on December 4, 1958, at approximate-
ly 6:00 A. M., in a collision between a station wagon
driven by the appellee, in which the appellant was a
passenger, and a farm tractor driven by Dewitt Cook.
Both the station wagon of appellee and the farm tractor
driven by Dewitt Cook were traveling south on Highway
15 approximately three miles north of New Albany, Mis-
sissippi. Appellee’s station wagon struck the farm trac-
tor in the rear and appellant suffered serious injuries
to his body and to his brain, the latter leaving him
non compos mentis.

At the time of the accident, appellant and appellee,
as was their custom, were on their way to work at a
lumber yard in New Albany, Mississippi, which was
owned by J. H. Tabb and Company, hereinafter called
Tabb Company. It is the contention of appellee that he
was a partner of Tabb Company, while appellant con-
tends that the appellee was an employee in Tabb Com-
pany. The appellant first filed a workmen’s compensa-
tion claim against Tabb Company, which claim was fin-
ally decided by this Court and is reported in J. H. Tabb
& Company v. McAlister, 243 Miss. 271, 188 So. 2d 285
(1962). In that decision can be found a delineation of
the basic facts involved herein. Appellant drew com-
pensation benefits as a result of this accident and claim.
Appellee likewise filed a workmen’s compensation claim
against Tabb Company and drew some compensation
benefits.

The facts in the case at bar are prolix and largely
controverted, and desirable brevity in treatment proves

881

to be difficult. Appellant claims that appellee was fore-
man, manager and time inspector of Tabb Company at
its New Albany lumber yard. There was only one Tabb
Company, and it was owned solely by Mr. J. H. Tabb
of Houston, Mississippi.

At the trial of the workmen’s compensation claim of
appellant, appellee testified that he considered himself
an employee of Tabb Company rather than a partner.
The record discloses that Tabb Company paid social
security taxes on appellee for a number of years and
then decided that appellee would pay social security
on a self-employed basis. When appellee reached the
age of seventy-five and made application for social se-
curity benefits, it was then determined that appellee
would have to be considered an employee if he was to
receive social security benefits, and it became necessary
for Tabb Company to make payments for social security
on amounts earned by appellee during that time.

In the workmen’s compensation hearing the attorney-
referee found that James Hugh Tabb was the record
owner and sole proprietor of J. H. Tabb and Company
and that the appellee was manager of the New Albany,
Mississippi, operations. The finding of the attorney-
referee was affirmed by a majority vote of the Work-
men’s Compensation Commission. On appeal therefrom
it was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Tippah County,
and upon appeal to this Court the order of the attorney-
referee was again affirmed in its entirety.

An appeal was taken from the order of the Work-
men’s Compensation Commission to the Circuit Court
of Tippah County. In the circuit court the jury returned
a verdict in favor of the appellee.

Six errors are assigned by the appellant and are as
follows:

(1) The Cireuit Court of Tippah County, Mis-
sissippi, erred in overruling Appellant’s motion that

Appellee be estopped from claiming to be a partner

882

in J. H. Tabb and Company and from introducing

testimony to that effect.

(2) The Circuit Court of Tippah County, Missis-
sippi, erred in permitting the Appellee to testify over
the timely objection of Appellant.

(3) The Circuit Court of Tippah County, Mis-
sissippi, erred in allowing Instruction No. 8 for the
Defendant to be given to the jury.

(4) The Circuit Court of Tippah County, Missis-
sippi, erred in overruling Appellant’s motion for a
directed verdict.

(5) The verdict of the jury was contrary to law
and to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

(6) The verdict of the jury evinced such passion
and prejudice on the part of the jury against the Ap-
pellant as would shock the conscience of an enlighten-
ed court.

The consideration of four of the errors assigned will
dispose of this case.

In support of appellant’s proposition number one, that
the appellee should have been estopped from pleading
and introducing testimony to the effect that appellee was
a partner in Tabb Company, appellant relies heavily
upon the fact that on October 20, 1960, before Attorney-
Referee J. T. Hill of the Mississippi Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission, in the matter of John Henry
McAlister v. J. H. Tabb & Company and U. S. Fidelity
& Guaranty Company, the appellee testified under oath
that he considered himself an employee of Tabb Com-
pany and not a partner. Appellant cites as authority
for this contention the case of Bracey v. Crisler, 151
Miss. 655, 118 So. 138 (1928). In that case one Sam
Ella claimed to be the widow of Ned Bracey and en-
titled to insurance proceeds and the estate, as against
the collateral heirs of Bracey. Sam Ella had testified
as a witness in a previous suit which was brought against
the heirs of Bracey by one Cindy Bracey, who was claim-

883

ing to be the widow of Bracey. In that previous suit
Sam Ella had testified that she had lived with Bracey
but had never been married to him. This Court held
that because of Sam Hlla’s testimony in the previous
suit, she was estopped from claiming to be the widow
of Bracey in her suit.

Appellant contends that the rule in Bracey v. Crisler is
controlling in the case at bar and that, since the appel-
lant had by motion urged the trial court to rule that
appellee was stopped from claiming to be a partner in
Tabb Company, as appellant had set up in his pleadings,
the appellee was estopped from claiming to be a partner
and the trial court therefore erred in overruling appel-
lant’s motion. Appellant also points out that seven of
appellee’s fourteen instructions granted dealt with and
were based upon the defense that appellee was a partner
in Tabb Company and therefore relieved of any liability
in a tort action by virtue of the fact that workmen’s
compensation benefits were secured by appellant.

If the contention of appellant is correct, then the trial
court should have sustained appellant’s motion that ap-
pellee be estopped from pleading, and denied appellee
the right of introducing evidence to substantiate the
claim of appellee that he was a partner in Tabb Com-
pany.

In determining whether or not the operation of es-
toppel was proper as urged by appellant, we cite the
case of Day v. McCandless, 167 Miss. 832, 142 So. 486
(1932), which was an injunction proceeding. In that case
we said:

Estoppel operates only in favor of one who, in reli-

ance upon an act, representation, or silence of another,

so changes his situation as that injury would result
if the truth were shown. There must have been a rep-
resentation or concealment of material facts. The rep-
resentation must have been made with knowledge of
the facts; the party to whom it was made must have

been ignorant of the truth of the matter; it must have

been made with the intention that the other party

should act upon it. The other party must have been
induced to act upon it.... (167 Miss. at 840, 142 So. at

489.)

HB The burden of showing that the basic constitu-
ents of estoppel are present is upon the party who is
urging the operation of estoppel. MM In the case at
bar, the appellant wholly failed to show that the essential
elements as set forth in Day v. McCandless are present
here. The record does not disclose that appellant’s situa-
tion was changed by appellee’s opinion testimony given
in the hearing before the Mississippi Workmen’s Com-
pensation Commission. The appellant has failed to show
that he relied upon the testimony which was given and
that it has operated to his detriment. Appellant’s coun-
sel in the trial of the case conceded that the question
of determining a partnership is difficult, even for him.
In the final determination of appellant’s claim, as re-
flected in J. H. Tabb & Company v. McAlister, 243 Miss.
271, 138 So. 2d 285 (1962), we held as follows:

The attorney-referee was of the opinion, however, that

it was not necessary for him to determine whether

Judd T. McAlister was a partner, a coadventurer, or

a working foreman; that transportation was made

available to the employees by the employer-defendant

through Mr. McAlister; and that it appeared from
the authorities that, ‘‘where an employer provides free
transportation for his employee, the employee is deem-
ed to be on duty during transportation.’’ (243 Miss.

at 275, 138 So. 2d at 286.)

There is ample evidence in the record in the case we

‘have here to support the finding of the attorney-referee

that transportation was made available by the employ-

er-defendant through Mr. Judd T. McAlister, the man-
ager of the New Albany plant, for employees of the
plant who lived in the Cotton Plant community. ...

885

Judd T. McAlister, whether a copartner with J. H.

Tabb, or an employee, was manager of the plant and

the representative of the owner in the operation of

the business. (243 Miss. at 277-78, 138 So. 2d at 287.)
It is apparent, therefore, that this Court did not adjudi-
cate the status of appellee with J. H. Tabb, insofar as
his being a partner or an employee is concerned, and
any reliance by appellant on appellee’s testimony at
the original hearing was purely an optional one on the
part of appellant and was a risk which appellant volun-
tarily chose to assume.

In Orowe v. Fotiades, 224 Miss. 422, 80 So. 2d 478
(1955), a proceeding to determine the ownership of
mineral rights under certain lands, this Court defined
again the requirements for the operation of estoppel.
We said in that case:

The essential elements of estoppel are conduct and

acts, language or silence, amounting to a representa-

tion or concealment of material facts, with knowledge
or imputed knowledge of such facts, with the intent
that representation or silence, or concealment be re-
lied upon, with the other party’s ignorance of the true
facts, and reliance to his damage upon the representa-
tion or silence.... (224 Miss. at 443-44, 80 So. 2d at

486.)

In the hearing at which appellee stated he considered
himself an employee, Mr. James H. Tabb was examined
as to his opinion of appellee’s status in the organization.
For the determination of this question, it is necessary to
consider the actual testimony of Mr. James Hugh Tabb,
which is as follows:

A May I go into the history of our relationship
in answering that question, and I don’t think I could
answer it with one word.

Q Yes, sir.

A Mr. McAlister and I agreed back in 1931 to
handle some crossties and some lumber back in those

886

days and later on, a little pulp wood; that agreement
was this, that I would furnish the money and do the
selling and look after the sales, Mr. McAlister was
to hire all labor and superintend the buying, the manu-
facturing, in case we engaged in any manufacturing,
and the stacking and the loading of all of the materials
and for that work he was to receive 50 per cent of
the net profits of the enterprise. Now, if I may go
on, it wasn’t exactly clear in my mind what his status
would be under such an arrangement. He did not own
any interest in the general business. By the way, I
have another man working with me under the same
arrangements as Mr. McAlister and I worked under.
For awhile the business was incorporated but he held
no stock in the Company, the charter was later sur-
rendered and business continued as J. H. Tabb &
Company. We paid social security and income tax on
Mr. McAlister for a number of years and later we
decided mutually that he would pay social security
on a self-employed basis, then when Mr. McAlister
became 75 years of age he made his application to
the Social Security Division for his social security
payments. The hearings were long and decision de-
layed for quite awhile and the result of those hearings
were that the Federal Government or the Social Se-
eurity Division ruled that Mr. McAlister was an em-
ployee and then we had — the company had to go
back and pay social security tax on him for a number
of years. Now, I don’t recall the exact time, I think
Mr. McAlister had paid that tax himself for a year
or so. My memory is that they never did refund what
he had paid, so it is my opinion that it has been paid
twice. Now, I’ll come to the answer to your question,
after the Government ruled that he would have to be
regarded as an employee so far as the paying of
social security tax was concerned, then of course I
considered him as an employee.

887

On cross-examination Mr. Tabb testified as follows:

Q Allright. Now, a moment ago you stated that
your books reflected, at least for a period there, that
Mr. McAlister was an employee, is that correct?

A Well, he —it shows that we have deducted social
security tax from him just as we do from all of the
other employees on the amount that was actually paid.

Q_ Yes, sir. Well, your attorney didn’t advise you
whether or not he was an employee or partner? In
other words, you didn’t have any expert advice on
whether or not he was—

A The only expert advice I had on it was that of
the Social Security Department — the Federal Gov-
ernment, they advised us very definitely that social
security tax would have to be paid by J. H. Tabb &
Company.

Q But up until that time you had felt that he was
not an employee and was a partner?

A J didn’t know exactly what — technically I
wouldn’t know — was just a general agreement we
had, a verbal agreement and we both abided by it all
through the years since 1931 on to his retirement and
for awhile he paid social security tax on a self-employ-
ed basis.

Q. Yes, sir.

A But still there was no change in the operation.
It is clear from the foregoing that appellant was

fully acquainted with the true facts of appellee’s re-
lationship to Tabb Company and the circumstances
which gave rise to appellee’s testimony. It follows, there-
fore, that any reliance which appellant may have placed
in appellee’s testimony was done so with full compre-
hension of the admitted confusion as to appellee’s status,
and it is obvious also that it was not because appellant
was ignorant of any material facts relating to the status
of appellee with Tabb Company.

In Harris v. American Motorist Insurance Company,
240 Miss. 262, 126 So. 2d 870 (1961), in discussing the
question of the claim of estoppel, we said:
In the case of Crooker v. Hollingsworth, 210 Miss.
636, 46 So. 2d 541, 544, 50 So. 2d 355, this Court has
pointed out that in the case of Meyerkort v. Warring-
ton, Miss., 19 So. 2d 483, it was said: ‘‘* * * in the
absence of extremely persuasive circumstances, courts
will not give effect to an estoppel where the parties
are equally well informed as to the essential facts, or
where the means of knowledge were equally open to
them. 19 Am. Jur., p. 742; 31 O.J.S., Estoppel, § 71,
p. 272, and cases under note 98... .’’ (240 Miss. at
~ 274, 126 So. 2d at 875.) (Emphasis ours.)

The parties in the case at

ar were certainly equally well

informed as to the essential facts on the issue of whether
or not appellee was an employee or a partner with J. H.

Tabb.
The record in this cause

does not disclose any eatreme-

ly persuasive circwmstances. No effect because of this

factor can be given appel

ee’s claim of estoppel for the

reason that the parties were equally well informed as to
the essential facts, or they had the means of knowledge
which were equally open to both of them.

In Gullett v. Best Shell Homes, Inc. of Tennessee, 312
F. 2d 58 (5th Cir. 1963), which was based upon a per-

sonal injury action in w

ich plaintiff sought to hold

defendant liable on the grounds that the alleged tort
feasor was its servant, the United States District Court

for the Northern District
complaint. The complain:
Cireuit Court of Appeals
facts:

of Mississippi dismissed the
ant appealed, and the Fifth
found the following pertinent

Appellant argues that Burlison, a licensed electrician,
was Best’s servant at the time of the accident. Three
general contentions are made: ... (3) that Best is
“estopped’’ to deny that Burlison was an ‘‘employee’’

889

at the time of the accident because Best’s workmen’s
compensation insurer paid Burlison compensation
benefits for injuries sustained in the accident giving
rise to this action.
Appellee contends that the findings of fact of the
court below are not clearly erroneous and that estop-
pel has no place in this case, inasmuch as, inter alia,
the injured party did not, to his detriment, rely upon
the position taken by Best or its compensation insurer.
Appellee relies on the finding by the court below,
moreover, that the compensation benefits to Burlison
were paid as the result of a mistake of fact. (312 F.
2d at 60.)
Appellant’s contention that Best is now ‘‘estopped’’
to deny that Burlison was a servant on the basis of
the payment of compensation benefits to Burlison for
injuries received in this accident, was properly re-
jected by the court below. In addition to that court’s
conclusion that the elements of estoppel were not pres-
ent, it is apparent that, at most, all that was involved
in this evidence was a possible admission on Best’s
part. The report to the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission by Best’s office employee that Burlison
was an ‘‘employee’’ would seem to be a conclusion
of law on that employee’s part, which was admissible
evidence for consideration by the court in its determi-
nation as to how the parties construed the relation-
ship.
In dealing with this situation, the court below recogniz-
ed that one may be a ‘“‘statutory employee’’ for work-
men’s compensation purposes and not be a common-
law servant for other purposes. ... (312 F. 2d at
61.)
In support of the finding that there was an absence of
the elements of estoppel, in a footnote the Court quoted
Crowe v. Fotiades, supra, and cited Harris v. American
Motorist Insurance Company, swpra, and continued:

890

It is evident that even if it be assumed that there were
some false representations of fact or facts on the part
of Best, the appellant did not rely on such actions and
could not have been prejudiced thereby. The appel-
lant in this action was not in any manner affected
by the relations between Burlison, Best and the com-

pensation insurer. (312 F. 2d at 61 n. 2.)

The elements of estoppel listed in Crowe v. Fotiades,
supra, are still in effect in this state, as is shown in the
case of Wagner v. Mounger, 253 Miss. 83, 175 So. 2d 145
(Miss. 1965), which was a suit seeking cancellation of
an oil and gas lease for failure to timely pay delay rentals
or to commence drilling operations. From an order can-
celing the lease, defendants appealed, raising the issue
of estoppel, and we said in that case:

In the case of Crowe v. Fotiades, 224 Miss. 422, 443,

80 So. 2d 478, 486 (1955), we held:

‘The essential elements of estoppel are conduct and

_ acts, language or silence, amounting to a represen-

tation as concealment of material facts, with know-
ledge or imputed knowledge of such facts, with the
intent that representation or silence, or concealment
be relied upon, with the other party’s ignorance of
the true facts, and reliance to his damage upon the
representation or silence.’’

... The appellee did not intentionally relinquish or

waive any right as he did not have knowledge of the

facts, and since he did not have this knowledge per-
sonally or through his agent, there could be no intent
that the acts of his agent in accepting delay rental
payments were to be relied upon by either Waggoner
or Wagner, as both were fully informed as to the true
facts and terms of the lease both as to the authority
granted and that limited or withheld. Under the facts
and circumstances as reflected by the record here we
are of the opinion and so hold that the lessor was not

estopped to decline the fourth payment of delay rental.
(175 So. 2d at 149.)

We hold, therefore, that there was no estoppel which
arose from the appellee’s testimony in the hearing on
appellant’s claim for compensation benefits. The said
estimony is obviously and merely an opinion of his
status and we fail to see where it damaged appellant or
ed him astray. Further testimony at the same hearing
fully apprised appellant of all of the material facts
relating to appellee’s relationship with J. H. Tabb, and
this Court pretermitted any adjudication of that ques-
tion. Appellant was not in any manner affected by the
relations between appellee and Tabb; he did not rely
on the subject testimony to his detriment and could not
have been prejudiced thereby. We hold, therefore, that
the elements of estoppel are not present in this case;
that the lower court properly overruled appellant’s mo-
ion to admit appellee’s pleadings and testimony, and
granted instructions on his affirmative defense with ref-
erence to the alleged partnership in Tabb Company. Be-
cause of these facts, we hold that there is no merit in
appellant’s first proposition.

We consider next the second error assigned, which
is that the court erred in permitting appellee to testify
over timely objection of appellant. Appellant urges that
both the letter and the spirit of Mississippi Code An-
notated section 1690 (1956) were violated when appellee
was allowed to testify as a witness and that this ruling
constituted reversible error. Section 1690 provides as
follows:

A person shall not testify as a witness to establish

his own claim or defense against the estate of a de-
ceased person which originated during the lifetime
of such deceased person, or any claim he has trans-
ferred since the death of such decedent. ... Nor shall
a person testify as a witness to establish his own or
assigned claim or defense against the estate of a per-

son of unsound mind, which originated before the ward

became a non compos mentis. . . .

In Poole v. McCarty, 240 Miss. 341, 127 So. 2d 398
(1961), this Court, speaking through present Chief Jus-
tice Ethridge, succinctly outlined the basic purposes of
this section, as follows:

Although some general statements in various decisions

tend to support appellee’s all-inclusive interpretation

of Sec. 1690, this fact illustrates the need to keep in
sight the purposes of the statute and the controlling
facts in the decisions pertaining to it. Note, 6 Miss.

L, J. 409 (1934) ; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed., 1940),

See. 578.

In Shepherd v. Johnston, 1947, 201 Miss. 99, 106, 28

So. 2d 661, 663, these rules of construction of the stat-

ute were stated: ‘‘Section 1690, Code 1942, prohibit-

ing a person from testifying as a witness to establish
his own claim against the estate of a deceased per-
son, created an exception to the general rule as to the
competency of a witness; and being an exception, it
must be strictly construed in favor of the competency
of the witness. The exception must come within both
the letter and spirit of the statute... .’? (240 Miss. at

346, 127 So. 2d at 400.)

.. In the instant case, both parties to the transaction

are living and can testify. Hence the protected area

of the statute does not exist. Its object is equality
and the prevention of false swearing. The surviving
party should not have the benefit of his own testi-
mony where the adversary’s lips are closed by death.

58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 215. The object is to

prevent the living from testifying against the dead,

in order to prevent injustice where there

is no one to dispute or refute such testimony. 97

C. J. S. Witnesses §132b; Hawkins v. Rye, supra.

Accordingly, the statute was obviously not intended

to apply to a suit between the two living persons to

893

a contract who are both available to testify.... (240

Miss. at 347-48, 127 So. 2d at 401.)

In summary, the exclusion of Poole’s proffered tes-

timony would not promote any purpose intended by

the statute. Being an exception to the general rule
as to competency of witnesses, it must be strictly con-
strued in favor of competency.... He was not dis-
qualified as a witness under Code Sec. 1690. (240 Miss.

at 350, 127 So. 2d at 402.)

HEE This ruling clearly indicates that the purpose
of section 1690 is not nullified or breached by the ad-
mission of appellee’s testimony after appellant was per-
mitted to testify in his own behalf. Appellant urges
that, since the witness was not sworn, the testimony is
of no value and therefore, in substance, the appellant
did not actually testify. We cannot agree with this con-
clusion because while the jury could observe the plaintiff
in the courtroom if he was in the courtroom, and the
record does not indicate that he was, nevertheless when
the witness formally takes the stand, sworn or unsworn,
he commends himself and his testimony to the jury for
their scrutiny and evaluation. The jury heard this wit-
ness attempt to answer the questions propounded to him,
heard the mumblings and expressions of this witness as
he endeavored to answer the questions, and the appel-
lant obtained any desired benefit therefrom. It is true,
as appellant urges, that this witness was, for the most
part, an exhibit, but we cannot say that at the time he
was testifying his presence in the witness box and his
testimony did not have profound influence upon the jury.
This Court has declined to hold that the immunity and
privilege which a statute affords a claimant can be parti-
ally waived. When waived, it is waived in toto.

In Manning v. Hammond, 234 Miss. 299, 106 So. 2d
51 (1958), we held:

It has been well established by the decisions of this

Court that a party against whom a claim is asserted

894.

waives incompetency by introducing and examining

the claimant as a witness. Birchett v. Hundermark,

145 Miss. 683, 110 So. 237; Waldauer v. Parker, 141

Miss. 617, 106 So. 881; Fant v. Fant, 173 Miss. 472,

162 So. 159. We think that the chancellor was clearly

in error in sustaining the objection to the testimony

of these witnesses insofar as it pertained to transac-
tions which transpired during the lifetime of the de-
ceased and in excluding the testimony.

In the case of Birchett v. Hundermark, supra (145

Miss. 683, 110 So. 238) the Court, considering this

statute, said: ‘Moreover, the prohibition of the stat-

ute is for the protection of a party against whom a

claim against the estate of a decedent is or may be

asserted, may be waived by him, and is waived as to

a particular witness having such a claim when he

himself introduces and examines the witness.’’

In the case of Whitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61

So. 737, 741, 62 So. 432, 51 L.R.A., N.S., 187, the Court

said: ‘‘The policy of the statute is to close the mouth

of the living because death has sealed the lips of the
dead.’’ In the case at bar, the representatives of the
estate waived the right to have the lips of the living

sealed.... (234 Miss. at 307, 106 So. 2d at 56.)

In 58 American Jurisprudence Witnesses section 357
(1948), we find the following statement:

It is frequently provided in effect that the prohibition
of the statute shall not extend to a transaction or com-
munication with a deceased or incompetent person as
to which any protected person is examined on his own
behalf, or as to which the testimony of the deceased
or incompetent person shall be given in evidence.

In Coney v. Coney, 249 Miss. 561, 163 So, 2d 692 (1964),
which was a suit to establish claims to realty, the lower
court dismissed the action on the ground that the chil-
dren of decedent were allowed to testify in defense of

895

their deeds. In affirming the dismissal of this action on
these grounds, we said:

Appellant’s contention that the court erred in per-
mitting appellees, Allen, Albert and Lonnie Coney to
testify to establish their defense against the estate
of the deceased ‘‘Coney Brothers’’, Van, John L. and
James Coney is based upon § 1690, Miss. Code 1942,
the pertinent part of which is as follows: ‘‘A person
shall not testify as a witness to establish his own claim
or defense against the estate of a deceased person
which originated during the lifetime of such deceased
person, or any claim he has transferred since the death
of such decedent. **#”?

We are of the opinion, however, that the appellants
cannot raise an objection based upon the foregoing
code section for the reason that they offered two broth-
ers of the deceased M. M. Coney to prove the claim
of the ‘‘Coney Brothers’ against the alleged trust
estate said to have been wrongfully transferred by
M. M. Coney to his sons.

The rule appears to be well-established that the exami-
nation of one witness incompetent under the dead
man’s statute operates as a waiver of incompetency
of adverse witnesses, at least where the testimony of
such adverse witness is offered after the examination
of the first witness, and as to matters testified to by
such first witness. Baker v. Baker, 363 Mo. 318, 251
S. W. 2d 31, 33 A. L. R. 2d 1431; Anno. 33 A. L. R. 2d
1441. (249 Miss. at 573, 163 So. 2d at 697-98.)

In the Baker case we said as follows:

We think like reasoning applies to the disqualifica-
tion of a witness under the ‘‘Dead Man’s Statute,’’
§ 491.010, supra, and such was the stated view of the
court in Fowler v. Sone, Mo. App., 226 8.W. 995, 996
(8). To prevent the statutory disqualification from
becoming an instrument of injustice, we have held
that, if a party waives said disqualification of a wit-

896

ness, he waives it for all purposes — ‘‘he may not

limit his waiver.’’ (863 Mo. Rep. at 323, 251 S. W. 2d

at 34.)

The general rule, which appears sound to us, that the
plaintiffs cannot open the door and close it again at will,
has application here. The appellant opened the door, and
once the door is opened it remains open; the appellant
by testifying waived the incompetency of appellee’s tes-
timony. See Miss. Code Ann. § 1690 (1956).

MB The third error assigned is that the granting of
appellee’s instruction No. 8 constituted reversible error.
Instruction No. 8 reads as follows:

The Court instructs the jury for the defendant, Judd

T. McAlister, that in determining whether the defend-

ant was a partner of James H. Tabb, the relationship

is to be determined as of the time the agreement was
entered into. You are further instructed, that an
agreement of partnership need not be in writing, but
may be oral, and that it is largely a question of the
intention of the parties at that time. You are instruct-
. ed that in determining the question, you may consider
the actions of the parties after the making of the
agreement was made. You are further instructed that
in making your determination as to whether a part-
nership, in fact, existed, that the fact that the defend-
ant was to share both the profits, losses and expenses
of the operation in New Albany creates a presump-
tion of partnership, but that even so, these facts must
be considered along with the other evidence in the case.
That portion of the instruction which appellant specifi-
cally assigns as error is as follows:

You are further instructed that in making your de-

termination as to whether a partnership, in fact, ex-

isted, that the fact that the defendant was to share both
the profits, losses and expenses of the operation in

New Albany creates a presumption of partnership,

but that even so, these facts must be considered along

with the other evidence in the case.

Appellant contends that this portion of the instruction
complained of did not require the jury to find that the
appellee was to share both the profits, losses and ex-
penses of the operation before a presumption of part-
nership would exist. Appellant urges that this portion
of the instruction peremptorily told the jury that the
appellee was to share profits, losses and expenses of
the operation and that a preswmption of partnership did
exist.

Appellant further urges that the question of whether
appellee was to share in any losses of Tabb Company
was a question in issue and was for the jury to decide.
In support thereof appellant points out that in the stipu-
lation of the testimony of Mr. J. H. Tabb, Mr. Tabb
stated that he did not recall whether it was agreed
thirty years ago, when they began operations, that ap-
pellee would share in any losses. Appellant also points
out that at one time the appellee testified that he was to
make up his share of any losses out of future profits,
and that later appellee testified that there never were
any actual losses. Appellee contends that the instruction
was not erroneous because the testimony is uncontro-
verted that appellee and Mr. J. H. Tabb were operating
under an agreement whereby they shared equally in
the losses of the business and that appellant raises no
question of proof relating to sharing of profits and
expenses. Insofar as profits and expenses are concern-
ed, the record is free from material conflict. There
are, however, factual issues with reference to whether
or not the appellee was to share the losses and if ap-
pellee actually ever sustained any losses, the record
indicating, according to appellee’s own testimony, that
he never directly paid out of pocket any losses incurred;
that the agreed way he was to sustain and pay any
losses was by his overall net income being reduced
thereby. Appellee testified as follows:

Q Now, if there were any lonses, how were they
to be taken care of?
A It went back the other way.
Q What do you mean by ‘‘went back the other
way’?
A Well, Mr. Tabb went back into the kitty.

We agree that appellee’s instruction No. 8 is con-
fusing and erroneous, for the reason that there is con-
flicting testimony as to the appellee’s actually being
required to share the losses of the partnership. Appel-
lee’s contention that the testimony is uncontroverted that
he shared in the losses is not borne out by the record. We
are faced, therefore, with the subsequent question of
whether the error is fatal or is harmless. We are forced
to conclude that the jury was not misled by it and it is
therefore harmless. All instructions requested by ap-
pellant relating to the question of whether appellee was
a partner or an employee were granted. In fact, only
the peremptory instruction requested by the appellant
was denied. The appellant obtained an instruction stat-
ing to the jury that, unless the appellee proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was a partner in
J. H. Tabb & Company, they should return a verdict
for the appellant.

Appellee obtained instruction No. 9, which is as fol-
lows:

The Court instructs the jury for the Defendant, Judd

T. McAlister, that a partnership is created under the

law when two or more persons, with the intention of

creating such partnership enter into an agreement,
express or implied, whereby they place their money,
effects, labor, skill or experience in lawful commerce
or business agreeing to divide the profits or bear the
losses, if any, in certain proportions, and you are
further instructed that it is not necessary to the cre-
ation of such partnership that one of the parties may
furnish all the money with the other or others to fur-

899

nish skill, experience and labor, receiving his share

of the profits as profits and not as wages for employ-

ment.
This instruction correctly set out what facts are essential
to establish a partnership.

Appellee next obtained instruction No. 10, which is
as follows:

The Court instructs the jury for the defendant, Judd
T. McAlister, that if you believe from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the Defendant and J. H.
Tabb entered into an agreement, express or implied,
under which the said J. H. Tabb would put up the
necessary capital to manufacture cross-ties, lumber
and other products at New Albany, Miss., and would
market such products, and this defendant was to han-
dle the manufacturing of such product, contributing
his time, experience labor and skill, with this defend-
ant to share in the profits and losses, not as compensa-
tion as an employee, but acting in his own behalf and
receiving such profits as the owner thereof, and if
from all the evidence you believe the parties intended
to form a partnership for the conduct of said enter-
prise, then it is your sworn duty to return a verdict
for the defendant.

It is clear that this instruction left completely up to
the jury to determine under the facts if the appellee
did enter into a partnership with J. H. Tabb. It left
solely to the jury to decide if the appellee was to share
in the profits and losses not as compensation as an
employee, but acting in his own behalf and receiving
such profits as the owner thereof.

Reading all the instructions together, we cannot hold
that the jury was misled by instruction No. 8, which
concludes with the admonition ‘‘that even so, these facts
must be considered along with the other evidence in the
case.”’

900

We conclude that, construing all the instructions to-
gether, the error in instruction No. 8 is harmless.

- MBB BB The dominant issue in this cause is whether
the appellee was a partner of J. H. Tabb. As appellant
urges, it is an issue of fact rather than of law. It is to be
conceded that there are some conflicts in the testimony
of these two witnesses. The conflicts relate to the legal
effect of their agreement which started their business
relationship some thirty years ago, and to the procedures,
regulations and adjustments which occurred in their
subsequent operations. The conflicts relate also to their
adjudication of whether the appellee was a partner or
an employee of J. H. Tabb. Appellant’s workmen’s
compensation claim precipitated much of this conflict-
ing testimony. The record discloses that a thorough
factual presentation was made to the jury, even though
the appellee and J. H. Tabb admitted that they had at
times been confused over appellee’s true legal status with
J. H. Tabb, as revealed in appellant’s workmen’s com-
pensation claim and appellee’s application for social
security upon reaching seventy years of age.

The evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to de-
termine that the appellee was in fact operating a part-
nership with J. H. Tabb under an agreement outlining
the contributions of cach partner and the distribution of
the net profits to each as partners or principals. The
proof is ample for the jury to find that the appellee was
a joint owner of the partnership property with full
rights of management, with the right and obligation to
share equally in the profits, expenses and losses of the
partnership.

The jury having determined that appellee was a
partner with J. H. Tabb, we will not disturb their find-
ing. It follows that the circuit court did not err in over-
ruling appellant’s motion for a directed verdict and er-
rors five and six do not require consideration.

901

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the cir-
cuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Gillespie, P. J., and Rodgers, Inzer and Smith, JJ.,
concur.

Deura Construction Company or Jackson v.
Mississippr Vatiny Gas Co.

No. 43812 February 21, 1966 183 So. 2d 186

Cox, Dunn & Clark, Jackson, for appellant.

902

Overstreet, Kuykendall, Perry & Phillips, Jackson, for
appellee, .

Inzer, J.

Appellant, Delta Construction Company, filed suit in
the County Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds
County against appellee, Mississippi Valley Gas Com-
pany, seeking to recover damages for loss of personal
property by fire alleged to have been caused by the

903

negligence of appellee in supplying appellant with in-
correct information relative to the location of its gas
lines at the intersection of Mississippi and Greymont
Streets in the City of Jackson. The issues were tried
by the county judge without the intervention of a jury,
and at the conclusion of appellant’s case, a motion by
appellee requesting the court to find for it was sustained.
A judgment was entered, and a motion for a new trial
was overruled. An appeal was perfected to the Circuit
Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County,
and the circuit court affirmed; hence, this appeal.

Appellant assigns as error the action of the trial
court (1) in sustaining the motion of appellee to exclude
the evidence of appellant and entering judgment for
appellee; and (2) in overruling appellee’s motion for
a new trial, or in the alternative, to reopen for additional
evidence.

The record in this case reflects that appellant was
the subcontractor in charge of doing the utility work
in connection with the construction of the Mississippi
Coliseum in Jackson in the year 1961. As a part of its
construction, appellant was to dig a sewer ditch from a
manhole in about the center of the intersection of Mis-
sissippi and Greymont Streets in a southwest direction
to the boiler room in the coliseum. Mississippi Street
runs in an east-west direction, and Greymont Street
runs in a north-south direction, and they intersect. Mr.
Wallis J. Schutt was the superintendent for appellant
in charge of the crew that was to dig this ditch. He tes-
tified that he had been working for appellant about
one year, and had been construction superintendent for
about three months prior to the time this work was
done. About two or three days before the work was
started, he contacted a man by the name of Billy Cash,
who was working across the street from the coliseum
relative to the location of gas lines in the area where
the ditch was to be dug. Mr. Schutt did not know Mr.

904.

Cash, but only knew that he worked for the Gas Com-
pany, for the reason that he had on one of its uniforms
and that there was a Gas Company truck parked where
Mr. Cash and some other men were working. He said
that Mr. Cash was supervising some men installing a
gas line across the street from the coliseum. Mr. Schutt
testified that he walked with Cash out to the middle of
Mississippi Street and pointed down the street to the
area where the work was to be done, and told him where
the line was to run. He thought that Cash understood
what he was going to do, but that Cash did not say
anything and did not ask any further questions. Cash
told him that he did not know about the location of gas
lines in that area, but would check with his supervisor,
Mr. Bass. Cash contacted him later and told him that,
Mr. Bass said there was no gas line on the south side of
Mississippi Street. Mr. Schutt said he assumed that Cash
told him right, and about two days later he started
digging the ditch with a machine, and it hit a gas line
causing a break in it. The gas coming from the line
caught fire and burned the ditch digging machine or
back hoe, as it is called in the testimony, a pickup truck
and some small tools belonging to appellant. On cross-
examination, Mr. Schutt admitted that he was with a
crew that was digging a ditch in the street on the other
side of the coliseum a few weeks before this accident
when they struck a gas line belonging to appellee. He
said that after this accident he contacted the engineers
in charge of the construction work as to the location
of gas lines in the area where the other work was to be
done, and they informed him that it was his responsi-
bility to get the information relative to the location of
gas lines. He did not ask for any maps showing the lo-
cation of gas lines and did nothing other than to ask Mr.
Cash as to their location.

The evidence in the record shows that there is not
a gas line that runs along the south side of Mississippi

905

Street, but there is a gas line that runs along the west
side of Greymont Street and crosses through Mississippi
Street at the intersection of Mississippi and Greymont
Streets. The evidence does not reflect the point in the
intersection at which the ditch machine struck the gas
line. Neither does it reflect where the work was started
or at what point they had reached when the accident
happened.

The trial court sustained appellee’s motion for a di-
rected verdict for the reason that there had been no
actual breach of duty by appellee. It was held that
appellant failed to prove the point of explosion, and as-
suming the point of explosion to be at the intersection
of Greymont and Mississippi Streets, the only advice
given appellant by appellee’s employee was that there
was no line on the south side of Mississippi Street.
The circuit judge in a written opinion affirmed the ac-
tion of the trial judge. The circuit judge said, among
other things:

There are certain deficiencies in the proof which
justify the action of the Court in sustaining the motion
to exclude. It appears that there is no gas line running
east and west along the south side of Mississippi
Street, but there is a gas line running on the west side
of Greymont Street, which runs north and south, and
crosses Mississippi Street. As to whether or not it
could be construed to mean a gas line on the ‘south
side of Mississippi Street’ is indefinite.

Appellant contends that the information furnished it
by appellee’s employee Cash was incorrect, and appellee
was negligent in not furnishing it with correct informa-
tion. In support of this contention, it relies upon the
general rule of law set out in 65 C.J.S. Negligence sec-
tion 4 (b) (1950), relative to voluntary actions. The
section quoted deals with acts, not words. The rule rela-
tive to voluntary information is different in some re-

spects. The general rule is set out in 65 C.J.S. Negh-
gence section 20 (1950). It states:

A false statement negligently made may be the
basis of a recovery of damages for injury or loss
sustained in consequence of reliance thereon, the
American rule, in this respect, being more liberal than
the rule in England. In order that such liability may
exist, it is necessary that the relationship of the parties,
arising out of contract or otherwise, be such that one
has the right to rely on the other for information, that
the one giving the information should owe to the other
a duty to give it with care, that the person giving the
information should have, or be chargeable with, know-
ledge that the information is desired for a serious
purpose, that the person to whom such information is
given intends to rely and act on it, and that, if the
information given is erroneous, the person to whom it
is given will be likely to be injured in person or in
property as a result of acting thereon. Accordingly,
it is not every casual response, or every idle state-
ment, no matter how damaging the result, which will
give rise to a cause of action, and a false statement
cannot give rise to a cause of action in negligence
where the speaker was under no duty to the person
addressed to advise him correctly, and the facts were
equally within the observation of both, or where the
nature and extent of the transaction that will be regu-
lated by the information are not known.

See Higgins Lumber Co. v. Rosamond, 217 Miss. 1, 63
So. 2d 408 (1953).

WN BB The first question to be determined is whether
the information furnished was false. The only informa-
tion shown to have been furnished by the employee of
appellee was that there was no gas line on the south
side of Mississippi Street; this information was correct.
Appellant assumed that this statement meant that there
was no gas line running through the intersection of

907

Mississippi and Greymont Streets; however, if it was
to rely on the information furnished, it certainly had
the duty to ascertain that appellee’s employee fully
understood that the work was to be done in the inter-
section; this it did not do. Appellant’s construction
superintendent was not certain that appellee’s employee
understood where the work was to be done; he only as-
sumed that he did. This finding makes it unnecessary
for us to determine whether the proof shows such a
relationship between the parties as would render appel-
lee liable in this case if the information furnished had
been false.

‘When we examined the evidence in this case in the
light most favorable to appellant, we reached the con-
clusion that the proof has too many deficiencies to es-
tablish liability on the part of the appellant. For this
reason, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.

Affirmed.
Gillespie, P. J., and Rodgers, Brady and Smith, JJ.,
concur.
Le |

Procroz anp Depenvents v. Incarts Sarppumpmre Corr.
No, 43821 February 21, 1966 183 So. 2d 483

Alton Massey, Kosciusko, for appellant.

White & White, Gulfport, for appellees.

910

Jonss, J.

This suit by dependents for death benefits under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act on account of an alleged
injury, which it is charged later caused the death of the
husband and father, comes here from the Circuit Court
of Jackson County which affirmed an order of the Com-
mission denying benefits. We affirm.

We believe it is unnecessary to discuss any issue pre-
sented other than that of res judicata which arises from
these facts:

During 1961 Samuel A. Proctor filed claim for dis-
ability benefits because of an injury said to have been
received by him in the course and scope of his employ-
ment by Ingalls. The claim was contested and after a
full hearing the attorney referee in May 1962 entered an
order awarding compensation. On appeal to the Full
Commission, it denied compensation and dismissed the
claim, finding the overwhelming weight of the credible
testimony disclosed claimant did not sustain an accidental
injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his
employment. On appeal to the Cireuit Court of Jackson
County, after argument and consideration of the record,
the Commission’s order was affirmed.

The claim was then appealed to this Court. Before
hearing here, the parties requested this Court to dismiss
the appeal and remand the case to the Circuit Court of
Jackson County from whence it came, where, on due
petition and order, a settlement was made with claimant
and his wife. The adjudications and orders made prior
thereto remained unaltered.

When the present claim was filed, after the death
of Samuel A. Proctor, the employer and its carrier
pled the foregoing facts as res judicata of the issue here.

The attorney referee, after hearing this plea, entered
his order dismissing the claim and finding:

This claim has been heard in full and denied on its
merits. This matter was fully explored on its merits,

911

with both sides introducing numerous lay and medical
witnesses. The Full Commission, based on the record
and including the depositions, denied compensation
and such denial was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Mississippi. The claimant has not
performed any work for Ingalls Shipbuilding Corpora-
tion since August 1959. This is a claim for death
benefits on an injury which has been held to be non-
compensable under the Mississippi Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act, as amended.

From this order of the attorney referee dismissing
the present claim the matter was appealed to the Full
Commission which affirmed the attorney referee. The
order of the Commission was affirmed by the circuit
court, and the case is now here.

Our compensation law, Mississippi Code Annotated
section 6998-04 (1956), provides in part:

Compensation shall be payable for disability or
death of an employee from injury arising out of and

in the course of employment .. .

The section ‘‘Compensation for Death,’’ Mississippi
Code Annotated section 6998-13 (1956), begins:

If the injury causes death, the compensation shall

be known as death benefit .. .

HE WH It is apparent that the death must result from
an injury such as mentioned in section 6998-04 supra:
that is, one ‘‘arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment.’’

The fact that such an injury produced the disability
or death, whichever is involved, is essential to recovery.
If claimant had never presented his claim and there
had been no hearing and adjudication of whether de-
cedent’s injury had arisen out of and in the course of
his employment, the dependents here would have been
required to prove that it had. The question is whether
after such fact has been adjudicated against the em-
ployee, his dependents can re-litigate same after his

912

death. A similar issue would be presented, if this ques-
tion had, after hearing, been adjudicated in favor of
the employee and after his death, the employer and his
carrier in defending against the claim of the dependents
would seek relitigation of this fact.

In Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law section 64.10
(1952), the writer discusses the independence of the
claim of dependents from that of the employee and
states:

The most striking consequence of the independent
status or dependency rights is the rule, accepted by
the majority of jurisdictions, that an adverse de-
cision on the merits of a claim by the employee while
he was alive does not bar a dependency claim under
the doctrine of res adjudicata, since the parties and
rights involved are different, and since the dependent
is not in privity with the injured employee as to the
rights asserted by him.

HM This is a new question in Mississippi; but,
regardless of the majority of opinions, if such be true,
we are of opinion the sounder rule is to prevent re-litiga-
tion of questions already fully litigated. Certainly, all
parties are involved and necessarily so in the manner in
which the injury is received.

MEE The dependents necessarily must prove depend-
ency and that upon the injured employee, where same
is not conclusively presumed. If they are not dependent,
they do not recover. If the employee does not die as a
result of an injury arising out of and in the course of
employment, they do not recover.

We adopt the reasoning of the following cases to sus-
tain the plea and affirm the case.

In Card v. Lloyd Mfg. Co., Inc., 82 R. I. 182, 107 A. 2d
297 (1954), the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
in a case similar to this the plea of res judicata applied.
‘There the court stated and reasoned as follows:

913

The question is one of novel impression in this
state. In England it was apparently settled many
years ago, while the workmen’s compensation act there
was in its infancy, that the right to compensation there-
by given to dependents was separate from and in-
dependent of that given to the workman. Williams
v. Vauxhall Colliery Co., Ltd., (1907) 2 K. B. 483.
Thereafter the English courts appear to have uniform-
ly held that because of that fact the decision of an
issue in a workman’s proceeding for compensation
could not be pleaded as res judicata of the same issue
in a later proceeding for dependent’s compensation.
Howell v. Bradford & Co., 104 L.T. 483; Tucker v.
Oldbury Urban District Council, 5 B.W.C.C. 296; Man-
ton v. Cantwell, 13 B.W.C.C. 55; Harper v. Dick, Kerr
& Co., 13 B.W.C.C. 250.

In the United States among the courts of last re-
sort which have passed upon the question there is a
pronounced split of authority. The following cases
cited and relied upon by respondent to support the
trial justice’s decision substantially adopt the rea-
sons of the English cases and hold the doctrine of res
judicata inapplicable. Industrial Comm. v. Davis,
126 Ohio St. 593, 186 N. EH. 505, 88 A.L.R. 1175; Wray
v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen Mills Co., 205 N. C. 782,
172 8. B. 487; Laird v. State Highway Dept., 112 Vt.
67, 20 A. 2d 555. The following recent cases are relied
upon by petitioner for the contrary view. Hagerman
v. Lewis Lumber Co., 13 N. J. 315, 99 A. 2d 513; Lann-
ing v. Brie R. Co., 265 App. Div. 576, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 404,
affirmed 291 N. Y. 688, 52 N. EH. 2d 587; Bell v. Bates-
ville White Lime Co., 217 Ark. 379, 230 S. W. 2d 643.
Other cases have been cited and discussed by the
parties in their briefs but they need not be mentioned
here, since the above cases sufficiently illustrate the
division of authority and the nature of the reasons
upon which it is based.

914

After careful consideration of all the cases cited
as well as others not cited by either party, we are of
the opinion that those cases relied on by petitioner
state the better view. At least such view is more
consonant with our conception of the nature of the
rights to compensation that the legislature intended
to grant by virtue of the provisions therefor in our
act. In our opinion those rights are not so entirely
separate and distinct from each other that they may
be considered different causes of action. On the con-
trary, while the rights to receive compensation are
different they are based upon one and the same cause
of action, namely, the sustaining by the employee of
a compensable injury. So closely and intimately is a
dependent’s right to compensation tied together with
the employee’s right to compensation therefor that
each has been held to arise at the same time so that
only those who were his dependents at the time of his
injury are entitled to claim compensation for his death
therefrom. Newton v. Rhode Island Co., 42 R. I. 58,
105 A. 363.

In other words it is the injury that results in death
which gives rise to the dependent’s cause of action
and determines who are the proper parties to prose-
cute the right to compensation. In this aspect of the
matter the employee and his dependent have a com-
munity of interest. Unless and until it is established
that the employee suffered a compensable injury
neither of them is entitled to compensation. When
once that fact is established the right to compensa-
tion for the injury accrues to the employee and if he
dies of such injury it is in effect continued in favor of
his dependent. 82 R.L. at 185-87, 107 A. 2d at 298-99.
In Di Pietro v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,

179 Md. 220, 17 A. 2d 140 (1941), from the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, the syllabus is:
Workmen’s compensation

915

A judgment of Baltimore City Court affirming an
order of Industrial Accident Commission denying em-
ployee’s claim for compensation on ground that em-
ployee had not sustained an injury arising out of and
in the course of his employment was ‘res judicata’ of
employer’s liability, upon appeal to Court of Appeals
being abandoned, and precluded claim, after employee’s
death, by his widow based on same injury.

The Court in the opinion stated:

The appellee’s contention is that, it having been
first decided by the Accident Commission and on ap-
peal by the City Court that Louis Di Pietro was not
entitled to compensation for his alleged injuries, that
the question of the employer’s liability is foreclosed,
and the appellant estopped from asserting a claim
based on the same injury. In other words, the rule of
res judicata applies. There are several decisions in
other jurisdictions which support this position. Ek
v. Department of Labor and Industries, 181 Wash.
91, 41 P. 2d 1097; Besonen v. Campbell, 243 Mich. 209,
220 N. W. 301; Lewin Metals Corp. v. Indus. Comm.,
360 Ill. 371, 196 N. BE. 482; Siberry v. National Sulphur
Co., 117 N.J.L. 200, 187 A. 567; Naud v. King Sewing
Machine Co., 95 Misc. 676, 159 N.Y.S. 910; Martin v.
White Pine Lumber Co., 34 N. M. 483, 284 P. 115;
Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Dill, Tex. Civ. App., 42
8. W. 2d 1059.

On precedent and authority, we, therefore, are con-
strained to say the order appealed from should be
affirmed. 179 Md. at 223, 17 A. 2d at 141.

In Bell v. Batesville White Lime Co., 217 Ark. 379,
230 8. W. 2d 643 (1950), the Arkansas Supreme Court
held:

We believe the better reasoned cases to be those
holding that a decision rendered during the employee’s
lifetime upon his assertion of compensable disability

is binding when his dependents raise the same issue
after his death. On this point an excellent opinion was
handed down in Lanning v. Erie R. Co., 265 App. Div.
576, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 404, 405, affirmed without opinion,
291 N.Y. 688, 52 N. HE. 2d 587. There the employer
contested the employee’s claim upon the ground that
he was engaged in interstate commerce when the in-
jury took place. The Board rejected that defense and
allowed compensation. The injury led to the em-
ployee’s death, and in a proceeding brought by his
widow the employer offered the same defense. In
holding that this issue was concluded by the first
adjudication the court said: ‘The railroad was not
entitled to litigate a second time the issue of interstate
commerce. It had its day in court on that question.
‘While there is not an exact identity of parties, the
decedent’s claim for disability compensation and his
widow’s claim for death benefits both spring from the
same accident and injury and they must * * * stand
or fall upon the determination of the issue of interstate
commerce. This issue was proffered by the railroad
and determined against it on the original claim by
Lanning. * * * Close analogy to the present situation
is found in the statutory action for wrongful death.
A. judgment for or against a decedent in his lifetime
** * is a bar to a later action for his wrongful death.
Collins v. Hall, 117 Fla. 282, 157 So. 646, 99 A.L.R.
1086. The foundation in each instance is the same
wrongful act and once the underlying issues as to
such act have been determined against a party he has
no right to a second hearing on those same identical
questions.’ To the same effect, except that the first
decision had been adverse to the employee, is Hk v.
Dep’t of Labor and Industries, 181 Wash. 91, 41 P.
2d 1097.

In the case at bar the evidence upon the issues
still left open by the rule of res judicata is not in

917

conflict. It was determined in the first proceeding
that Bell suffered an accidental injury which acti-
vated his dormant heart condition. That issue is not
subject to reconsideration. ... 217 Ark. at 381-82, 230
S. W. 2d at 644-45.

This case is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Inzer and Robertson, JJ.,
concur.

Kine v. Stare
No. 43804 February 28, 1966 183 So, 2d 494

Williamson, Pigford & Hendricks, Meridian, for ap-
pellant.

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Sarrz, J.

This is an appeal by Lawrence King from a judgment
of the Cireuit Court of Lauderdale County denying his
motion for a new trial.

King was indicted for murder at the April 1960 Term
of Circuit Court of Montgomery County. Venue was
changed to Lauderdale County. In August 1960 the case
was tried, but the jury was unable to agree upon a
verdict. In September 1960, the case was brought to
trial again and a jury selected, but before the taking of
testimony began, King, agreeable to the advice of his
counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a
plea of guilty. Pursuant to his conviction upon this plea,
he was sentenced to serve a life term in the State Peni-
tentiary. Since then he has been an inmate of that in-
stitution.

On April 27, 1965, acting through counsel who rep-
resented him in the original proceedings, King filed in
the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County, Mississippi a
motion styled, ‘‘Motion for a New Trial.’’

The motion proceeds with a certain frankness, In it,
King states, in substance, that he entered his plea of
guilty because he was afraid that if he persisted in de-
nying his guilt and went to trial he would be convicted
and sentenced to death. He said that his reason for
entertaining this fear was that the jury might believe
the testimony of his accomplice rather than his own.
He asserts that the reason for his fear that the jury
would believe the testimony of his accomplice rather
than his own was that neither he nor his counsel could
discover any way to show that the accomplice was not
telling the truth. Supporting and attached fo the motion
were the affidavits of two convicts, Eugene Steen and
Eddie Gray. There was also attached a transcript of
testimony given by one Dr. Fernando Woodworth in a
civil suit for damages brought by the heirs of the murder
victim against King.

Upon the hearing of the motion, the affiant Steen
repudiated his affidavit and testified for the prosecu-
tion. Affiant Hddie Gray was not produced at all.

Dr. Woodworth did testify. He said that he was serv-
ing as a doctor at the Penitentiary Hospital in September
1962 when he was called to attend Alex Morris, an in-
mate and King’s accomplice in the murder. He said
further that Morris on his deathbed recanted his testi-
mony, given at the mistrial, that he had been employed
by King to kill the murder victim. However, this death-
bed confession remained locked within the breast of Dr.
Woodworth for almost two years and was not divulged
to anyone until, on an occasion when Dr. Woodworth
himself was confined in the Choctaw County jail on
charges not connected with this case, he was allowed
to go across the street, escorted by the sheriff, to con-
sult professionally the attorney who defended King in
the murder prosecution. This- attorney also prepared
and filed the motion for a new trial here under con-
sideration.

920

Upon the hearing on the motion, the attorney, quite
properly, declined to disclose Woodworth’s purpose in
visiting him on this occasion on the ground that it was
privileged as a communication between attorney and
client. In any event, on this visit, for the first time,
Woodworth advanced the assertion that he could testify
that Morris had recanted his former testimony.

Upon the hearing on the motion, testimony was in-
troduced to the effect that Dr. Woodworth’s reputation
for truth and veracity was bad, and that he was not to
be believed upon oath. It was shown that he had been
refused membership in the Tri-County Medical Society
and in the Mississippi Medical Society, and that he had
surrendered his narcotic’s license. There was proof
that he was a violent and unstable character. Also, in
reply to a question as to whether he had confessed to
an agent of the Treasury Department of the Bureau of
Narcotics at Monticello, Mississippi, that he had been
taking demorol for three years, he finally answered that
he denied making the statement, ‘‘. . . because I don’t
recall the name of the agent, and I don’t recall what the
conversation was about. It has been too long.’’

This witness admitted that he had been compelled to
resign his commission in the Air Force ‘‘in lieu of court
martial.’”? It appears that this witness had a number
of misdemeanor convictions. The movant introduced the
record made in the original trial in which the jury failed
to agree. Movant also introduced the record made in a
civil case brought by the heirs of the murder victim
against King in which Dr. Woodworth testified as to
the alleged recanting of his former testimony by Morris,
Morris then being dead.

The affiant Steen, King’s fellow inmate at the Peni-
tentiary, whose affidavit is attached to the motion, tes-
tified at the hearing and said that King had induced him
to make the affidavit by promising that when he, King,
was released, he would obtain the release of affiant. He

921

testified that Morris had not made any admission to him
that his former testimony was untrue, and his own
statement to that effect in the affidavit was wholly false.
Gray, the other affiant, did not testify at all.

The evidence shows that Dr. Woodworth and King
were friendly at the Penitentiary and at one period King
was the ambulance driver for the prison hospital.

The background of the appellant’s motion is as fol-
lows:

At the original trial on the murder indictment it was
shown that King, the sheriff of Montgomery County,
had employed Morris to kill Kelly, one of King’s depu-
ties, of whose wife King had become enamored. In
addition to the testimony of Morris, there was other
corroborating circumstantial evidence of King’s guilt.
At the time, King was nearing the completion of a four-
year term as sheriff of Montgomery County. He was
thoroughly familiar, by virtue of his office, as chief law
enforcement officer of the county, with criminal proce-
dure and practice, and the effect of a guilty plea. He
was a man of affluence and standing in his community.

Throughout, at every stage of the proceedings, he was
represented by and had the advice of the most competent,
experienced, and able defense counsel in the State of
Mississippi.

At the time he entered his plea of guilty to the charge
of murder, he had already gone through a trial of the
ease and well knew of what it consisted. At the hearing
upon the motion, King’s chief counsel testified as to
the facts immediately antecedent to the entry of the plea
of guilty. He said:

«c|., The result of that was that Mr. Ringold, and

Mr. Lester Williamson (King’s other counsel) and

myself took Mr. King back to the witness room, along

with the members of his family, and we went into a

long discussion in consideration of the point.’’

BS

(The point having been whether to plead guilty or

not.)

King’s chief counsel continued:

“«|.. He (King) wanted to go ahead with the trial,
but it was our considered judgment as his counsel
that under all the facts and circumstances of the case,
wherein he was accused by a witness that we had
no opportunity to impeach, that if a jury did believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had hired Alex
Morris or caused Alex Morris to kill the sheriff, (sic)
that the jury very likely would put him in the gas
chamber, and we felt it was the better part of good
judgment regardless of the merits of the case to plead
guilty and to wait further developments.’’ (Record at
93-94.)

Lawrence King was called as a witness at the hearing

on the motion. However, in placing him on the stand,
his attorney specified, ‘‘this man is called as a rebuttal
witness only’’ and his testimony was expressly limited
by his counsel to an attempt to refute testimony offered.
by the state as to the procuring of Steen’s false affidavit
and related solely to giving his version of how he ob-
tained the affidavit from Steen. He did not testify that
he was not guilty of the murder, nor subject himself to
eross-examination, except upon the restricted question

of

he false affidavit.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied

the motion. MIM We think the court was correct in so
doing.

n Jenness v. State, 144 Me. 40, 64 A. 2d 184 (1949),

the court stated the effect of a plea of guilty:

“What is the effect of such a plea of guilty upon
arraignment? A voluntary plea of guilt when under-
stood by a respondent has always been considered a
solemn confession from the only person who ‘had the
est possible knowledge of the truth.’ State v. Siddal,
103 Me. 144, 146; 68 A. 634, 635;.14 American Juris-

923

prudence 951, Sections 270-272. It admits all facts in

the indictment sufficiently pleaded. Green v. Common-

wealth, 12 Allen (Mass.) 155, 172; 22 C.J.S. ‘Criminal

Law,’ 656, Section 424. A plea of guilt is in itself a

conviction. It is as conclusive as a verdict of a jury.

The court has nothing to do but give judgment and

sentence. Kercheval v. U. S., 47 8. Ct. 582; 274 U. 8.

220; 71 L. Ed. 1009. ‘The sentence is the judgment.’

State v. Stickney, 108 Me. 136; 79 A. 370, 371. The

plea being guilty, there is no ‘issue of fact joined on

the indictment’ as contemplated by Revised Statutes

(1944), Chapter 135, Section 15.’’ 64 A. 2d at 186-87.

There can be no question as to the voluntary character
of King’s plea of guilty to the charge of murder. Nor
does he claim that he did not understand the nature and
effect of his plea. Indeed, he could not in reason do so.

He had served four years as sheriff and chief law
enforcement officer of Montgomery County. He was
required by his office to attend all criminal trials in
the circuit court as chief officer of that court. The duties
of his office thoroughly acquainted him personally with
criminal procedure, the trial of criminal cases, and the
effect of a guilty plea made in open court.

In addition to his own personal knowledge and ex-
perience as to these matters, King was represented by
the most formidable defense counsel afforded by the State
of Mississippi. These counsel were privately employed
by him and were of his own choosing. His attorneys were
all experienced, reputable and capable members of the
bar. We know his chief counsel to be one of the most
resolute, forceful and able defense attorneys at the bar.
He is a man of dauntless courage and impeccable charac-
ter, with a long record of the successful defense of crimi-
nal cases. Cooper v. State, 244 Miss. 370, 141 So. 2d 735
(1962). In this case, the testimony of his client, a man of
standing and affluence, as to his innocence of the crime
could only be opposed by that of a lowly Negro accom-
plice, a confessed and convicted criminal.

fe

Mie
Both King and his counsel had the benefit of partici-
pating in the trial of the case in which the jury failed to
agree. They were thoroughly familiar with every facet
of it. The plea of guilty was entered only after long
and deliberate consideration and following a conference
in which there participated not only King and his coun-
sel, but members of King’s family. The court below, as
the trier of facts, was fully warranted in rejecting the
evidence offered in support of King’s motion. King was
not convicted upon the testimony of Morris; he was |
convicted upon his own plea of guilty, made in open
court upon arraignment upon the charge of murder.

The witness Steen, whose affidavit was attached to |
the motion, testified to facts, which the court was war-
ranted in believing, showing that King knowingly ob-
tained and filed in support of his motion, a false affidavit.
Gray, the other convict whose affidavit King attached
to his motion, was not produced and did not testify. The
long delay of Dr. Woodworth in ‘‘disclosing’’ the alleged
confession of Morris, after Morris was dead and could
not deny it, coupled with the circumstances under which
the disclosure was finally made, plus the impeaching tes-
timony offered by the State, more than warranted the
trial court in rejecting Dr. Woodworth’s testimony.

King himself did not testify that he was innocent of
the crime to which he had plead guilty. He did not so
testify upon the hearing of the motion nor at the first
trial when the jury failed to agree. In fact, he did not
testify at all at that trial. At the hearing on the motion,
he specifically limited his testimony to attempting to
refute the testimony of Steen as to the circumstances
under which Steen’s affidavit was obtained.

The Court might properly consider this fact in con-
nection with all of the other circumstances of the case.
Miles v. Monaghan, 211 Miss. 150, 51 So. 2d 212 (1951).

The record discloses that King voluntarily confessed
his guilt shortly after his arrest. But we leave entirely

925

out of consideration this extra-judicial confession (as
distinguished from his open court confession by his guil-
ty plea) for the trial court’s denial of the motion was
fully warranted without it. See Pittman v. State, 198
Miss. 797, 23 So. 2d 685 (1945) ; 21 Am. Jur. 24 Criminal
Law § 505 at 496 (1965).

Because of the peculiar circumstances which gave rise
to the motion, it has been necessary in the course of this
opinion to refer to appellant’s counsel at several stages
of the proceedings. We wish to make abundantly clear
that in all respects the conduct of counsel for appellant
throughout has been in accordance with the highest tra-
ditions of the bar.

Affirmed.

Gillespie, P. J., and Brady, Inzer and Robertson, JJ.,
coneur.

Contract Truckine Company, et al. v. May
No. 43816 February 28, 1966 183 So. 2d 488

Satterfield, Shell, Williams & Buford, Kenneth G.
Perry, Jackson, for appellants.

Walker & Sullivan, Mendenhall, for appellee.

927

Rosertson, J.

On April 22, 1963, Hulon May, age 38, was injured
when he fell from a ladder while unloading chicken feed
into a purchaser’s bin in Simpson County, Mississippi.
He sought medical aid for the first time on May 10,
1963, eighteen days after his fall, when he consulted
Dr. J. O. Stephens of Magee, Mississippi, his family
physician.

He was hospitalized from May 10, 1963, to May 13,
1963, and treated for a low back sprain. He was re-
ferred by Dr. Stephens, a general practitioner, to Dr.
T. S. Hddleman, an orthopaedic surgeon, of Jackson,
Mississippi, but Dr. Stephens continued to follow up
generally on his court of treatment and talked from time
to time with Dr. Eddleman about May’s condition.

Dr. Stephens discharged him for work on November
5, 1963, and Dr. Eddleman released him for full employ-

928

ment on December 2, 1963. May did not return to his
regular employment because he developed a condition
in his colon known as ulcerative colitis. He was referred
by Dr. Stephens to Dr. Jack King and Dr. J. Manning
Hudson of Jackson, Mississippi, and was treated for
this condition at the Mississippi Baptist Hospital for
eleven days beginning January 13, 1964.

The first and only hearing was conducted on August
17, 1964, before the Attorney-Referee for the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission. Hulon May, his wife, and
Dr. J. O. Stephens were the only witnesses offered by
the claimant.

The Attorney-Referee found that Hulon May had sus-
tained a low back injury, that he reached maximum
recovery on December 2, 1963, and ordered compensation
to be paid accordingly.

The Attorney-Referee further found that the proof
was insufficient to show any causal connection between
the injury sustained on April 22, 1963, and the ulcerative
colitis condition from which Hulon May now suffers.

The claimant appealed to the full Commission, and
after hearing oral argument for both the claimant and
defendants, and after carefully examining the record
in this cause, the Commission unanimously affirmed the
order of the Attorney-Referee.

The claimant then appealed to the Cireuit Court of
Simpson County, where the court, on May 14, 1965, with-
out making any findings of fact or giving any reason
therefor, reversed the order of the Commission and
awarded permanent total disability benefits to May. The
employer and carrier have appealed to this Court.

Hulon May testified that he fell about seven feet to
the ground when the ladder on which he was standing
broke. He landed on his feet and knees, and one part
of the ladder hit him in the lower back and the other
part in the upper back. After recovering from a resultant
weak and dizzy spell, he unloaded the feed, drove back to

929

the mill and, according to his testimony, went to the
bathroom at the mill and passed blood from his bowels
and kidneys. Although he testified that he continued
to pass some blood from his colon, he did not consult a
doctor until eighteen days after the fall.

Dr. Stephens testified that May’s primary complaint
was with his back, and that his records do not reflect
that May told him that he passed any blood immediately
after his fall. Dr. Stephens further testified that the
cause of ulcerative colitis is not known by the medical
profession. .

In response to a question as to whether the accident
could have caused sufficient trauma to have produced
an injury to the colon, either directly or indirectly, Dr.
Stephens responded:

“My personal feeling is there was not enough direct
injury to cause any direct trauma resulting in ulcera-
tive colitis to the bowel, but since we don’t know what
causes ulcerative colitis the question is whether it caus-
ed it indirectly — is, I believe, what we’re here to
decide and I’m not able to answer that because I don’t
know.’’

WE This Court has held many times that the Com-
mission is the trier of fact and where there is substantial
evidence to support its decision, this Court will not dis-
turb the findings and order of the Commission. Bates
v. The Merchants Company and New Amsterdam Casu-
alty Company, 249 Miss. 174, 161 So. 2d 652 (1964).

MMB The same ruling would apply to the Cireuit
Court which acts also in a purely appellate capacity
in Workmen’s Compensation cases. California Eastern
Airways, Inc., et al. v. Neal, 228 Miss. 370, 87 So. 2d
895 (1956).

HM The sole and only question then before this
Court, as it should have been before the Circuit Court,
is whether or not the decision and order of the Com-
mission is supported by substantial evidence.

930

We find that the unanimous decision and order of
the Commission is not only supported by substantial
evidence, but by a clear preponderance of the credible
evidence and, therefore, that the judgment of the Cireuit
Court should be reversed and the decision and order of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission reinstated.
. Reversed and order of Commission reinstated.

Ethridge, C. J., Rodgers, Jones and Inger, JJ., concur.

Mississrert Stare Hiceway Commission v. Jacozs
No, 43822 February 28, 1966 183 So. 2d 498

Pack & Ratcliff, Laurel, for appellant.

931

F. B. Collins, Laurel, for appellee.

Inzur, J.

Appellee, John Jacobs, filed suit against appellant,
Mississippi State Highway Commission, in the Cireuit
Court of Jones County seeking to recover damages al-
leged to have been sustained by him as the result of the
relocation of U. 8S. Highway 11 through the City of
Laurel. From a judgment in a former trial awarding
appellee damages in the amount of $2,000, the Commis-
sion appealed to this Court. We reversed and remanded.
for a new trial because there was a variance between
the pleadings and the proof as to damages. We held
that appellee was entitled to recover at least nominal
damage for the loss of access due to the closing of the
north end of an alley that ran to the rear of appellee’s

932

property and that the granting of a peremptory instruc-
tion was not error. Miss. State Highway Commission
v. John Jacobs, 248 Miss. 476, 160 So. 2d 201 (1964).
After remand, the declaration was amended to charge
other items of damage, including damage alleged to have
resulted due to the diversion of water caused by the
construction of an embankment of the new highway and
the reconstruction of Royal Street to the south of ap-
pellee’s property. It was alleged that the drainage had
been changed so that appellee’s property flooded every
time there was a big rain. A new trial resulted in a
jury verdict in favor of appellee in the sum of $8,000.
Judgment was entered accordingly and the trial court
overruled a motion for a new trial. The Mississippi
State Highway Commission again appeals to this Court.
Appellant assigns several errors on the part of the
trial court, but we are of the opinion that none justifies
a reversal of this case except the fourth error assigned,
which is, that the trial court was in error in overruling
appellant’s motion for a new trial because the verdict
was grossly excessive and evidenced bias and prejudice
on the part of the jury. This assignment is well taken.
The record reflects that the property then owned by
appellee is Lot 10 of Block 11, Boulevard Addition to
the City of Laurel. It is a lot 75 feet wide, facing Beacon
Street on the west, and 167 feet long, abutting on an
18-foot alley at the rear of the property. This alley
was closed at the point where it entered Jefferson Street,
about 150 feet north of appellee’s lot. When appellant
relocated U. 8. Highway 11, it built an embankment
about 25 feet high at the point where the alley entered
Jefferson Street. The proof shows that appellee pur-
chased his property in 1936 and resided there until 1963,
at which time he sold the property to Humble Oil Com-
pany for the sum of $20,000. The house in which appel-
lee resided was a wooden frame building with brick
pillars and a composition roof. It consisted of a living

933

room, dining room, three bedrooms, kitchen and one bath.
There was 1059 feet of floor space in the house proper,
and in addition, it had a screened porch at the front
and another at the rear and an open side porch with
conerete floor. At the rear of his lot, appellee had a
garage apartment, with a gravel floor in the parking
area, behind which was a storage room with a concrete
floor extending the entire width of the building. Above
the garage there was a small two bedroom apartment
with kitchen, bath and one closet. The evidence shows
that the lot was located in the flat, low-lying area of
the city. This area slopes very gradually toward the
south and because of its gradual slope, there is now and
has been some problem relative to the drainage in this
area.

We do not deem it necessary to detail all the evidence
relative as the matter of damage due to drainage. The
evidence on behalf of appellee was sufficient to show
that appellee’s lot was subject to more flooding due to
heavy rains after the construction of Highway No. 11
and the reworking of Fulton Street than it was prior
to that time. During heavy rains appellee’s lot would
be flooded, and the water would remain thereon for a
considerable length of time. There was also some evi-
dence as to damage resulting from vibration due to the
driving of piling in the new highway and from dust
while the embankment was being constructed.

Appellee estimated that the reasonable market value
of his property prior to the relocation of the highway
was $20,000 and that its value after the work had been
done was $10,000; however, he had no knowledge of the
market value of property in the community. The testi-
mony of Mr. Morgan Holifield, former Sheriff of Jones
County, was to this same effect. He estimated the before
value at $20,000 and the after value at $10,000. We have
heretofore commented on the lack of qualifications of
this witness to make appraisals of property. See Miss.

934

State Highway Comm’n v. Rhymes, 253 Miss. 577, 176
So. 2d 326 (Miss. 1965).

Witness W. F. Easterling, who was a carpenter with
many years of experience in his trade and also with
experience in contracting, testified that it was his opinion
that due to water standing on appellee’s lot and ponding
up under his house that it had caused the foundation of
the house to deteriorate and settle. This resulted in
damage to the roof and other parts of the house. He
estimated the total cost of restoring the house and garage
apartment to its former condition to be around $4,500;
however, he did not attempt to give the cost of the spe-
cific items which he included in this total figure. He
estimated the cost of the rebuilding of a suitable foun-
dation under the house to be between $3,000 and $4,000.
His testimony was objected to by appellant, but the trial
court overruled the objection for the reason that the
testimony was competent, not as forming a basis for the
jury to determine from it the damage, but in determin-
ing the true before and after value as shown by other
testimony. We think this testimony was competent. In
Baker v. Miss. State Highway Comm’n, 204 Miss. 166,
180, 37 So. 2d 169, 172 (1948), which was also not a
condemnation proceeding, we said:

In all cases proof of the cost of remedying the
situation to bring the property as near as may be to
its former usable condition is competent — not as a
separate, independent foundation for a verdict but
only as bearing upon and as tending to establish the
true value shown by the evidence adduced under one
of the foregoing rules.

HBB The testimony of Mr. Easterling was competent
for this purpose, and the trial court was not in error in
overruling the objection. However, the value of his
testimony is materially reduced for the reason that he
did not give specific proof as to the cost of the restoration
that in his opinion was necessary.

935

The only qualified realtor who testified in this case
was Mr. Clarence Boone, who testified on behalf of ap-
pellant. Mr. Boone testified that he was familiar with
the property in 1957 when the work began, and he was
familiar with the property values in this neighborhood,
and that he had made a very careful and detailed exami-
nation of the property in 1963 after the highway had been
completed. He said that he could detect no water damage
to the foundation of the house or garage apartment. It
was his opinion that the state of repair of the foundation
and the house was due to its age and natural deteriora-
tion. He estimated that the fair market value of the
entire property in 1957 was $8,500 and that after the
completion of the construction work on the highway and
the reconstruction of Fulton Street that the property
still had a reasonable market value of $8,500. The other
evidence on behalf of appellant was to the effect that
there had been no change in the drainage situation that
would or did cause appellee water damage.

HM We have carefully considered the evidence in
this case relative to the question of damages and taken
into consideration the qualifications of the witnesses
who fixed the before and after values and the lack of
definite information as to the cost of restoration, and
we are of tlie opinion that there is no substantial testi-
mony to justify a verdict for $8,000 in this case. The
verdict of the jury clearly indicates that it did not re-
spond to reason and evidences bias and prejudice. We
have decided to do in this case, as we did in Miss. State
Highway Comm’n v. Rhymes, supra, to affirm this case
on the condition that the appellee enter a remittitur of
$4,500. We do this in spite of the fact that the evidence
is not entirely satisfactory to support a judgment for
$3,500. We are of the opinion that this affords a proper
method of disposing of this case. We are not reducing
the verdict but are merely offering the appellee an op-
tion of accepting the remittitur or retrying the case on
the question of damages only.

If the appellee enters the remittitur of $4,500 within
ten days from the date that the judgment of this Court
becomes final, the case will be affirmed for $3,500; other-
wise, it will be reversed and remanded for trial on the
issue of damages only.

Affirmed on condition of remittitur.

Ethridge, C. J., and Rodgers, Jones and Robertson,
JJ., concur.

Reserve Lire Insurance Company v. Coxn
No. 43834 February 28, 1966 183 So. 2d 490

Bacon & Smith, Jackson, for appellant.

Ralph E. Pogue, Aberdeen, for appellee.

Surrz, J.

Reserve Life Insurance Company has appealed from
a judgment entered against it by the Circuit Court of
Monroe County in favor of Will Hdd Coke in the amount
of $329.50.

Appellant issued its health and accident policy to
Will Edd Coke, the appellee, providing indemnities
against liability for hospital and surgical expense ‘‘ac-
tually incurred,’’ not to exceed $6 per day. The policy
also covered appellee’s wife, Mrs. Betty Ann Coke. Mrs.
Coke was a patient in the Mississippi State Sanatorium
at Magee, Mississippi, during 1963, for 52 days.

After Mrs. Coke was discharged, the State Sanatori-
um submitted a bill to Mr. Coke for his wife’s hospitali-
zation in the amount of $8 per day. When, however, it
was discovered that Mr. Coke had a hospitalization policy
that paid up to $6 per day, the bill was reduced to $6
per day.

Reserve Life Insurance Company refused to pay the
amount of $6 per day, but said that it would pay the
maximum of $21 per week, or $3 per day, as provided
by Mississippi Code Annotated section 6872 (1952). That

939

section provides that there shall be collected from pa-
tients in the State Sanatorium not less than $5 per
week, nor more than $21 per week, according to the
patient’s ‘‘ability to pay.’”? Appellee declined to accept
this offer, and Reserve Life Insurance Company paid
into court the sum of $173.50, which included hospi-
talization expense computed at the statutory maximum
rate of $21 per week.

It is the contention of Reserve Life Insurance Com-
pany that Section 6872 fixes $21 per week as the maxi-
mum which may be charged for hospitalization at the
State Sanatorium, and therefore appellee could not leg-
ally incur hospital expense in excess of that amount.

At the conclusion of the evidence on behalf of the
plaintiff (appellee), and without the defendant ever
having rested, the court sustained a motion for a di-
rected verdict for the plaintiff. However, no point is
made on this appeal that the defendant was not allowed
to present testimony.

The policy insured appellee against certain ‘‘expenses
of hospital confinement’’ incurred while the policy was
in force.

These ‘‘hospital expense benefits’? are specified on
the front page of the policy under Schedule A, Part
One. Here the policy provided:

“|, . If the insured ... shall be necessarily con-
fined within a recognized hospital as a resident patient
on account of ... such sickness, the Company will
pay the Insured (or the Hospital if authorized by
the Insured to do so) for the following items of hos-
pital expense actually incurred by the Insured or mem-
ber of the Family Group ... (Emphasis added.)

“A. HOSPITAL ROOM, including meals and
general nursing care, not to exceed Six Dollars ($6.00)
per day, for the period that the Insured or member
of the Family Group shall be confined therein,.. . .’’
The first provision for the State Sanatorium made by

the Mississippi Legislature is embodied in Chapter 109,
Mississippi Laws 1916. Section One of that Act provides
that, ‘‘a sanatorium for the prevention and treatment
of tuberculosis shall be established.’’

Mississippi Code Annotated section 6872 (1952) is as
follows: :
“The State Board of Health shall determine the
qualifications and conditions for admission of those
applying as patients to the institution, and shall make
all bylaws and regulations that may be necessary for
the government of said sanatorium, provided they
shall direct the superintendent to collect from each
patient admitted into the institution a sum of not less
than five ($5.00) dollars per week nor more than
twenty-one ($21.00) dollars per week according to the
patient’s ability to pay; the said sum of money shall
be collected each month and shall constitute a lien on
any property owned by said patient which may be
subject to execution, or, in case of minor, against the
parent or guardian. The said sanatorium shall be
conducted so that it may be as nearly self-supporting
as shall be consistent with the purpose of its creation,
and the Board of Health is empowered and authorized
to take such steps as may be necessary for the collec-
tion of said sums of money and to do such other things
as may appear to them reasonably necessary and
incident to the proper management of the institution.”’
Several grounds are assigned by appellant as requir-
ing the reversal of this case. We consider it necessary
to notice only one. Were hospitalization expenses ‘‘ac-
tually incurred’? by appellee within the meaning of the
policy, in the amount of $6 per day, or were the expenses
incurred limited to the maximum permitted to be charged
under Section 6872, supra?

It is contended by appellee that, notwithstanding the
provisions of the above statute, the administrative au-
thority of the sanatorium was authorized within its dis-

941

cretion to exceed the maximum charge fixed in the stat-
ute, if a patient was able to pay more. The patient here
was able to pay.

HH Hf The Mississippi State Board of Health is an
administrative board created by the legislature, and its
powers are defined and limited by statute. In Tepper
Bros. v. Buttross, 178 Miss. 659, 664, 174 So. 556 (1937),
this Court said:

“".. The statutory rule of construing laws is that
where a statute enumerates the powers given, it must
be held that it names all the powers dealt with therein,
and that there is nothing implied. State ex rel. Greaves
v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 40 So. 152, 5 L. R. A. (N.S.)
340...”

In 73 O.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Pro-
cedure section 94 at 414-15 (1951), it is stated:

“A public administrative body may make only such
rules and regulations as are within the limits of the
powers granted to it and within the boundaries es-
tablished by the standards, limitations, and policies
of the statute giving it such power, and it may go no
further than to make administrative rules and regu-
lations which fill in the interstices of the dominant
enactment. It may make only rules and regulations
which effectuate a law already enacted, and it may
not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent
with the provisions of a statute, particularly the stat-
ute it is administering or which created it, or which
are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute, and it may not, by its rules and regulations,
amend, alter, enlarge, or limit the terms of a legis-
lative enactment.’’

In Broadhead v. Monaghan, 238 Miss. 239, 117 So.
2d 881, (1960), this Court said:

... ‘As stated by the textwriter in 73 C.J.S., 323,
Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, par 29,
‘The law-making power may not be granted to an

administrative body to be exercised under the guise
of administrative discretion.’ Accordingly, in delegat-
ing powers to an administrative body with respect to
the administration of statutes, the legislature must
ordinarily prescribe a policy, standard, or rule for
their guidance and must not vest them with an arbi-
trary and uncontrolled discretion with regard there-

to.’? 238 Miss. at 263, 117 So. 2d at 892.

The question here is whether appellee ‘‘actually in-
curred’? hospital expenses in excess of $21 per week,
within the meaning of the policy. The situation is ana-
logous to that considered in several cases involving treat-
ment in a government hospital of a veteran or service
man entitled to receive such treatment without cost. In
those cases, it has been held that since the veteran was
not legally liable for hospital charges he had not legally
“‘ineurred’’ the expense and was not entitled to payment
under a policy which provided for reimbursement for
‘“meurred’? medical and hospital expenses.

Irby v. Government Employees Ins. Oo., 175 So. 2d
9 (La. 1965), involved a suit for reimbursement for
medical and hospital expenses. The court said:

“Under the pertinent portion of the policy’s medi-
cal payments provision the insurer is required to pay
to the insured, who has sustained bodily injury caused
by accident, ‘* * * all reasonable expenses incurred

* * ® for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental

services, * * * and necessary ambulance, hospital,

professional nursing and funeral services: * *.’? As
established by the record and under the provisions of

a Federal statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 253, plaintiff was

never charged with the medical and hospital services

he received and, because of his status as a member

of the United States Coast Guard on active duty, he

was under no obligation to pay for those services; the
government was required to furnish them without
eharge. ...

a:

“‘As used in the policy in suit the word ‘incurred’
emphasizes the idea of liability and the definition of
‘incur’ is: ‘To have liabilities (or a liability) thrust
upon one by act or operation of law’; a thing for which
there exists no obligation to pay, either express or
implied, cannot in law constitute an ‘incurred ex-
pense’; a debt or expense has been incurred only when
liability attaches. Drearr v. Connecticut General Life
Insurance Co., La. App. 119 So. 2d 149; United States
v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 8 Cir., 238 F. 2d
594; see also Stuyvesant Insurance Co. of New York

_ Vv. Nardelli, 5 Cir., 286 F, 2d 600, 603.’? 175 So. 2d at

10.

“«|. . . As the policy requires payment by the de-
fendant only of ‘incurred’ expenses and as plaintiff
never was under any obligation to pay the medical
and hospital expenses and therefore never ‘incurred’
the same, the defendant cannot be forced to pay under
its contract. The same question was before this court,
and the same result was reached, in the case of Drearr
v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., supra.”’
175 So. 2d at 10-11.

In Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of New York v. Nardelli, 286
F. 2d 600, 608 (5th Cir. 1961), cited in the Irby case,
supra, the court said: ‘‘The term ‘incur,’ when used
in policies of insurance, has a fixed legal meaning. ‘A
debt has been incurred when liability attaches; ...’”

HEB The policy here under consideration provides
for indemnity against liability for hospital expenses
‘‘ineurred.’’ This contemplates expenses for which the
policyholder has become legally liable.

HEEB Under the statute, the Board of Health was re-
stricted to a charge of not more than $21 per week.
For that reason, appellee incurred no legal liability in
excess of that sum for the hospitalization of his wife
in the sanatorium. The statute has not been revised in
recent years and admittedly the charges authorized are

quite small; however, MEME the amendment of this stat-
ute is a matter within the exclusive province of the leg-
islature.

A cross-appeal appears to be without merit and has
been expressly abandoned by appellee. The case will be
affirmed on cross-appeal, and on direct appeal the judg-
ment of the lower cort will be reversed and judgment
entered here limiting appellee’s recovery to the sum
of $173.50, the amount paid into court by appellant.

Affirmed on cross-appeal; reversed and judgment for
appellant on direct appeal.

Gillespie, J. J., and Brady, Patterson, and Robertson,
JJ., coneur.

Watace v. Srare
No. 43838 February 28, 1966 183 So. 2d 525

ti

Fountain D. Dawson, Greenville, for appellant.

946

R. Hugo Newcomb, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for
appellee.

Parrerson, J.

Defendant was indicted for murder in Washington
County. He was found guilty of manslaughter and sen-
tenced to the state penitentiary for a period of three
years. He appeals to this Court, assigning as error the
following:

(1) The court erred in allowing Carrie Wallace to
testify over the objections of the defendant on the grounds
that she was the wife of the defendant.

(2) The court erred in denying defendant’s motion
for a directed verdict when the prosecution rested its
ease, and in denying a directed verdict after both the
State and defense rested.

947

(8) The court erred in failing to give full credit to
the defendant’s version of the homicide, there being no
other eye witness thereto.

(4) The verdict of the jury is contrary to and against
the overwhelming weight of the evidence and the evi-
dence is insufficient to convict.

On the trial of the cause the defendant’s wife, the
only eye witness to the fatal affray other than the de-
fend, was permitted to testify against him. Her testi-
mony was of utmost importance to the State’s case and
thus equally damaging to the defendant. The defendant’s
objections were to no avail and this testimony was con-
sidered by the jury. We are of the opinion that this was
reversible error.

The provisions of Mississippi Code Annotated section
1689 (1956) are as follows:

Husband and wife may be introduced by each other
as witness in all cases, civil or criminal, and shall be
competent witnesses in their own behalf, as against
each other, in all controversies between them. A
criminal prosecution of either husband or wife for
contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a child
or desertion or nonsupport of children under the age
of sixteen (16) years or abandonment of children shall
be deemed controversies between husband and wife
for the purpose of this section. But im all other in-
stances where either of them is a party litigant the
other shall not be competent as a witness and shall
not be required to answer interrogatories or to make
discovery of any matters involved in any such other
instances without the consent of both. (Emphasis
ours.)

HM Wi It is apparent from this section that the de-
fendant’s wife could not testify against him without the
consent of both unless the controversy was between them,
which it was not. In fact, we have held that the mere
offering of a wife to testify against her husband is

948

reversible error. In Outlaw v. State, 208 Miss. 13, 20, 43
So. 2d 661, 664 (1949) we held:

From these authorities it is seen that this court has
repeatedly held that it is improper for the prosecution
to call the defendant’s wife and offer her as a witness
against him. We seriously doubt that there is a prose-
cuting attorney in this state who does not know this
to be the law. A violation of this salutary rule by
a prosecuting attorney must be interpreted as moti-
vated by a desire to prejudice the jury against a de-
fendant and tip the scales against him in a close case
such as is here presented, with the hope that this
court will say on appeal, as it did say in some of the
foregoing authorities, that the defendant has been
proven guilty notwithstanding the error, and that con-
sequently the error will be held harmless. This is a
ease in which we cannot confidently so assert. Since
every man is entitled to a fair and impartial trial by
a jury uninfluenced by anything except competent
evidence, and since all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the defendant, the judgment of
conviction will be reversed and the cause remanded
for another trial.

See also Smith v. State, 193 Miss. 474, 10 So. 2d 352
(1942) ; Davis v. State, 157 Miss. 669, 128 So. 885 (1930) ;
Pearson v. State, 97 Miss. 841, 53 So. 689 (1910) ; Finklea
v. State, 94 Miss. 777, 48 So. 1 (1909); and Garner v.
State, 76 Miss. 515, 25 So. 363 (1898). This prohibition
of testimony, unless it is consented to by both husband
and wife, is so well established in our jurisprudence that
it needs no further comment.

WB The defendant, through the circuit clerk of the
county, introduced into evidence the certificate of mar-
riage between Carrie Nelson, the witness, and himself
on March 3, 1961. This certificate raises a strong pre-
sumption that the marriage was in fact valid. In Fleming
v. Fleming, 213 Miss. 74, 84, 56 So. 2d 35, 38, 39 (1952)
we held:

949

The appellant was not entitled to a divorce from
the appellee on the ground of the appellee’s prior
marriage to C. T. Ying. In the early case of Powell
v. Powell, Adm’r, 27 Miss. 783, the Court said: ‘‘The
law favors marriage, and when once solemnized ac-
cording to the forms of law, will not declare its nullity
upon anything less than clear and certain testimony
**#) (Emphasis added.)

In 55 C.J.S., Marriage, § 48, pages 893-894, it is
said, ‘‘In the case of conflicting marriages of the
same spouse, the presumption of validity operates in
favor of the second marriage. Accordingly the party
attacking the validity of such second marriage has
the burden of proving such invalidity, even though it
involves the proving of a negative; and the burden
of showing a valid prior marriage is on the party
asserting it.’’

This Court has held in many cases that where in
any proceeding the validity of a ceremonial marriage
is attacked the burden rests on the party alleging its
invalidity to prove it. Powell v. Powell, supra; Ladner
v. Pigford, 138 Miss. 461, 103 So. 218; McAllum v.
Spinks, 129 Miss. 237, 91 So. 694; Alabama & V. Ry.
Co. v. Beardsley, 79 Miss. 417, 30 So. 660; United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Smith, 211 Miss. 573, 52
So. 2d 351.

And in Hill v. United Timber & Lbr. Co., 68 So. 2d 420,
424. (Miss. 1953) we held:

First, the Court has held in a long line of decisions
that, where a second ceremonial marriage, that is, one
solemnized according to the forms of law, is contract-
ed, every presumption will be indulged in favor of
its validity, and the burden of proof is upon the party
who attacks the validity of such marriage to show its
invalidity by clear and certain testimony.

See also Bunkley & Morse’s Amis, Divorce and Separa-
tion im Mississippi§ 1.02(6) at page 21 (1957) and §
1.02(6) of Supplement at page 7 (1964).

HEE The burden of proof was upon the State, who
attacked the validity of the marriage, to show its in-
validity by clear and certain testimony. This it failed
to do, the only evidence in this regard being elicited from
the defendant’s wife who testified that she was first
married to Albert Nelson in 1938 and that they were
separated in 1945. She further testified that she had
never gotten a divorce from Nelson and that she was not
aware as to whether or not he had obtained a divorce
from her, though he did write concerning a divorce in
1948, but that she had never been served with notice of
any divorce proceeding by Nelson. The testimony in-
dicates that Nelson died in 1964 without communicating
with the witness subsequent to 1948. As heretofore stated,
the witness and the defendant were married in 1961 and
she considers him to be her husband, as in her testimony
she referred to him as ‘‘Yes, sir. That’s my husband,”’
and that by referring to ‘‘James’’ she meant ‘‘James
Wallace — my husband.’’

HE We have considered this evidence in the light
of the authorities which require clear and certain testi-
mony to overcome the presumption of validity which
arose with the second ceremonial marriage and are of
the opinion that the State failed to overcome this pre-
sumption. MME Neither did the defendant waive the
benefit of his objection by cross-examination on the
same subject. 3 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 833
(12th Ed. 1955) and McCormick v. State, 185 Tenn. 218,
186 S. W. 95 (1916). We hold that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error in permitting the State to in-
troduce the defendant’s wife as a witness against him.

The next assignments of error address themselves to
the sufficiency of the evidence to convict and to the tes-
timony of the defendant which, it is contended, is with-
out contradiction in the absence of the wife’s testimony
and therefore must be accepted as a basis for reversal.
We have considered these assignments and are of the

951

opinion that they are not well taken, and since we are
of the opinion that a new trial must be had, we with-
hold comment on this evidence.

For the reasons heretofore ascribed we are of the
opinion the defendant was deprived of a fair and im-
partial trial as contemplated by our laws and that the
cause must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Gillespie, P. J., and Brady, Smith, and Robertson, JJ.,
concur.