State: New Mexico
Volume: 150
Term: 2010-2011
Jurisdiction(s): New Mexico
Source: https://static.case.law/nm/150.pdf

a

2011-NMSC-028
256 P.3d 13

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-
Petitioner,

ve
Ronald MYERS, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 32,126.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

June 17, 2011.

i)

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Martha
Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General, San-
ta Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Caren Ilene Friedman, Edwards Law
Firm, P.A., Mare Walker Edwards, Santa
Fe, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} In this, our second review of Defen-
dant’s convictions under the Sexual Exploita-
tion of Children Act, we once again affirm
the result of the trial below, and we also hold
that trial judges have neither the power nor
the discretion to stay the application of the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act (SORNA) pending the outcome of an
appeal. In affirming Defendant’s convic-
tions, we reverse a second opinion of the
Court of Appeals. After our first opinion in
this case issued, the Court of Appeals held on
remand that retroactively applying our opin-
ion to Defendant’s conduct “violates due pro-
cess because it constitutes an unforeseeable
judicial enlargement of the [Sexual Exploita-
tion of Children Act], which operates like an
ex-post facto law.” State v. Myers (Myers
ITD), 2010-NMCA-007, 128, 147 N.M. 574,
226 P.3d 678, cert. granted, 2010-NMCERT-
001, 147 N.M. 674, 227 P.3d 1056. For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that the
Court of Appeals misapprehended both our
opinion and the law relative to retroactive
application of judicial decisions. According-
ly, we reverse and remand to the district
court for further proceedings enforcing De-
fendant’s convictions.

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant was convicted of seven
counts of the Sexual Exploitation of Children
Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 30-6A-1 to ~4
(1984, as amended through 2007), for covertly
videotaping two female minors while they
used the bathroom in a government office in
2004. State v. Myers (Myers II), 2009-
NMSC-016, 111-4, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d
1105. Defendant hid the video camera be-
neath a radiator and positioned it to capture
the pubic area of the victims before and after
they used the restroom. State v. Myers
(Myers I), 2008-NMCA-047, 112, 16, 148
N.M. 710, 181 P.8d 702, rev'd, Myers II,
2009-NMSC-016, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d
1105. Defendant was convicted under that

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portion of the Act which prohibits the inten-
tional “ ‘manufactur[ing of] any obscene visu-
al or print medium depicting any prohibited
sexual act or simulation of such an act if one
or more of the participants in that act is a
child under eighteen years of age.’” Myers
I, 2008-NMCA-047, 19, 148 N.M. 710, 181
P.8d 702 (quoting § 30-6A-3(D)).

{3} Defendant appealed the convictions
claiming that the images did not depict a
“prohibited sexual act” and were not “ob-
scene.” Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, 1124,
34, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105. Upon
motion by Defendant, the district court or-
dered a stay of Defendant’s required regis-
tration under SORNA, NMSA 1978, §§ 29-
11A-1 to -10 (1995, as amended through
2007), pending the outcome of Defendant’s
appeal. Myers I, 2008-NMCA-047, 1 20, 143
N.M. 710, 181 P.8d 702; Myers IIT, 2010-
NMCA-007, 128, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d
673.

{4} The Court of Appeals reversed Defen-
dant’s convictions, relying on the only case,
State v. Rendleman, 2008-NMCA-150, 134
NM. 744, 82 P.8d 554, overruled in part by
Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, 146 N.M. 128,
207 P.3d 1105, that had previously applied
the Act, Myers I, 2008-NMCA-047, 11 17-19,
143 N.M. 710, 181 P.38d 702. Of the five
prohibited sexual acts defined in the Act, the
one at issue was “a ‘lewd and sexually explic-
it exhibition with a focus on the genitals or
pubic area of any person for the purpose of
sexual stimulation’” Jd. 11 (citing § 30-
6A-2(A) and defining the “prohibited sexual
act” at issue). The Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the videotaped images did not
depict a “prohibited sexual act” because the
images were neither “lewd and sexually ex-
plicit” nor manufactured “for the purpose of
sexual stimulation” within the meaning of the
Act. Id. 1117-19.

{5} The State petitioned for certiorari, and
this Court reversed. Myers II, 2009-
NMSC-016, 11 12, 47, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d
1105. In Myers II, we explained that the
images did depict a “prohibited sexual act”
under Section 80-6A-2(A)(5)(1) as “ ‘lewd
1, Defendant argued in his original, Myers I, brief

to the Court of Appeals that the district court had
erred in “performing its gatekeeping function,

and sexually explicit,” Myers IJ, 2009-
NMSC-016, 130, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.8d
1105, (2) focused on “ ‘the genitals or pubic
area,’” id., and (8) they were made “ ‘for the
purpose of sexual stimulation, ” id. 127. We
also held that the images were obscene with-
in the meaning of the Act. Id. 140.

{6} We remanded Defendant’s appeal for
the Court of Appeals to consider two remain-
ing issues raised by the parties in the initial
appeal that the appellate court had not yet
addressed: (1) “whether the Act is void for
vagueness as applied to Defendant’s con-
duct,” and (2) “whether the trial court prop-
erly entered a stay of execution that relieved
Defendant of the obligation to register as a
sex offender [under SORNA] pending the
outcome of this appeal.” Myers II, 2009-
NMSC-016, 147, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.8d
1105. Instead of addressing the constitution-
ality of applying the Act to Defendant’s con-
duct—one of only two remaining issues—the
Court of Appeals reframed that issue, asked
for additional briefing from the parties on
that reframed issue, and proceeded down a
different course. See Myers III, 2010-
NMCA-007, 11 11-25, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d
673.

{7} The Court of Appeals held that our
Myers IT Opinion interpreting the Act had
itself made the Act unconstitutionally vague
as applied to Defendant. Jd. 1922-25.
Through the eyes of the Court of Appeals,
Myers IT was an “unforeseeable judicial en-
largement of the statute, which operates like
an ex post facto law,” such that Defendant
could not fairly have foreseen that his con-
duct would be “lewd” within the reach of the
Act. Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, 11 22-23,
147 N.M. 574, 226 P.38d 673. Notably, the
Court of Appeals on remand adopted a posi-
tion not endorsed by either party to the
appeal and certainly not one requested by
this Court’s mandate. See id. Instead, the
parties in their supplemental briefing to the
Court of Appeals agreed that Myers II did
not create a vagueness issue. Defendant
responded that Myers II had no impact on
his earlier void for vagueness claim.! The

and its concomitant error in failing to dismiss
the [iIndictment ... constitut{ed] ... an unfore-

4 De

State argued that Myers IJ had “foreclose[d]
any claim of vagueness.” Subsequently, dur-
ing oral argument before this Court, Defen-
dant admitted he had previously argued that
Myers II had no effect on his original void
for vagueness claim, although he asks us now
to uphold the ultimate conclusion in Myers
IIL.

{8} The Court of Appeals did address the
second of the two issues remaining on re-
mand—whether the district court could law-
fully issue a stay of the SORNA registration
requirements pending appeal—which the
Court of Appeals answered in the affirma-
tive. Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, 11 26-33,
147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 678. The State then
petitioned for certiorari as to both rulings,
asking us to reverse the Court of Appeals by
upholding Defendant’s convictions and clari-
fying that SORNA sexual offender registra-
tion cannot be stayed pending appeal. We
do so in this Opinion.

ANALYSIS

HM {9} As explained, we review De-
fendant’s convictions for a second time. Ini-
tially, we address the Court of Appeals con-
clusion that our Myers IJ Opinion made the
Act unconstitutionally vague as applied to
Defendant’s conduct. We also perform the
constitutional analysis of the Act’s statutory
language that we requested on remand. Fi-
nally, we consider whether any district judge
has the authority to stay the SORNA re-
quirements pending appeal. We review such
‘Gssues of statutory and constitutional inter-
pretation de novo.” State v. Lucero, 2007-
NMSC-041, 18, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489.

The Court of Appeals Analysis of Myers II

HE {10} Concluding that our Myers II
opinion was “unforeseeable,” the Court of
Appeals held that we had rendered the Act
unconstitutional as applied to Defendant.
See Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, 118, 147
N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673. The Court did so
primarily by relying on a U.S. Supreme
Court opinion, Bowie v. City of Colwmbia,
378 U.S. 847, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894
(1964), which we will address momentarily.
See Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, 115, 147

seeable and retroactive expansion of the Act’s

N.M. 574, 226 P.8d 678. To support its
analysis, the Court of Appeals also cited two
New Mexico cases, State v. Alderette, 111
N.M. 297, 804 P.2d 1116 (Ct.App.1990), and
State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, 130 N.M.
6, 15 P.38d 1233, that previously had discussed
or applied Bowie. See Myers III, 2010-
NMCA-007, 19 16-18, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d
673.

{11} In Alderette, our Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, citing Bowie, that its
construction of a criminal statute (escape
from jail) to include a new class of inmates
(those civilly committed to jail) could not be
applied retroactively to the defendant (who
escaped while civilly incarcerated for failure
to pay child support) when the Court of
Appeals had previously held the opposite:
that the escape statute only applied to those
in custody under criminal charges. Alder-
ette, 111 N.M. at 298-300, 804 P.2d at 1117-
19. The new and completely contrary con-
struction of the escape statute could not be
applied to the defendant’s escape without
raising due process concerns. Jd. at 300, 804
P.2d at 1119.

{12} In Johnson, this Court in a footnote
recognized Bouie as an extreme example of a
“(eJourt engaging] in an impermissible in-
terpretation of a statute,” that was “so wnex-
pected, [and] so outlandish, that no reason-
able person could have expected it,” thus one
that creates a due process problem when
applied to an unsuspecting accused. John-
son, 2001-NMSC-001, 114 n. 4, 180 N.M. 6,
15 P.3d 1283 (alteration in original) (empha-
sis added) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). Correctly, Johnson concluded
that the first-time construction of DWI laws
in that case, so as to reach intoxication on
private property as well as public property,
was altogether “foreseeable” in light of statu-
tory language and the intended purpose of
the statute. Id. 1113-21. Significantly, and
unlike the situation in Alderete, our courts
had never held the opposite in previous opin-
ions: that DWI laws did not apply to private
property. Johnson, 2001-NMSC~-001, 19,
130 N.M. 6, 15 P.8d 1283.

{18} Accordingly, the principle we glean
from these two prior opinions is that it is

narrow and precise language.”

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fundamentally unfair to apply a criminal stat-
ute to the accused in a way that contradicts
binding precedent on the same question,
upon which the accused could have relied.
Before examining our own opinion in Myers
IZ in that same light, we turn to Bouie, 378
US. 847, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894,

{14} Bowie arose when, in 1960, two Afri-
can-American college students, protesting
South Carolina’s oppressive Jim Crow segre-
gation practices, entered a whites-only res-
taurant and awaited service. Id. at 348~49,
84 S.Ct. 1697. Upon being denied and told
to leave, the two students refused to leave,
whereupon they were arrested and prosecut-
ed for criminal trespass. Id. The U.S. Su-
preme Court overturned the trespass convic-
tions on due process grounds, because the
convictions were based on a novel interpreta-
tion of that trespass statute that flatly con-
tradicted clear precedent in the students’
favor and effectively amounted to an ex-post
facto law. Id. at 362-63, 84 S.Ct. 1697.

{15} Importantly, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court had previously applied the
criminal trespass statute many times over
the years, uniformly requiring notice to the
trespassing party before entry, something
that was conspicuously absent in the present
case. See City of Columbia v. Bowie, 239
S.C. 570, 124 S.H.2d 332 (1962), rev'd, 378
US. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697. The U.S. Supreme
Court noted that

in the 95 years between the enactment of

the statute in 1866 and the 1961 decision in

the [first case to support a conviction for
remaining on the premises upon receiving
notice after entry], the South Carolina
cases construing the statute wniformly em-
phasized the notice-before-entry require-
ment, and gave not the slightest indication
that that requirement could be satisfied by
proof of the different act of remaining on
the land after being told to leave.
Bowie, 878 U.S. at 356-57, 84 S.Ct. 1697
(emphasis added) (referencing prior cases
such as State v. Mays, 24 S.C. 190, — S.E.
—— (1886); State v. Green, 35 S.C. 266, 14
S.E. 619 (1892); State v. Tenny, 58 S.C. 215,
36 S.E. 555 (1900); State v. Olasov, 183 S.C.
139, 130 S.E. 514 (1925); City of Charleston
v. Mitchell, 239 S.C. 376, 123 S.B.2d 512

(1961), rev'd, 378 U.S. 551, 84 S.Ct. 1901, 12
L.Ed.2d 1038 (1964); see also id, at 350 n. 2,
84 S.Ct. 1697.

{16} South Carolina’s novel statutory in-
terpretation resulted despite the “admirably
narrow and precise” language of the statute,
specifically stating the temporal relationship
between elements of the crime—first warn-
ing, then illegal entry. Bowie, 378 U.S. at
351-52, 84 S.Ct. 1697. The U.S. Supreme
Court reasoned that, unlike a broad or vague
statute,

[when a statute on its face is narrow and
precise ... it lulls the potential defendant
into a false sense of security, giving him no
reason even to suspect that conduct clearly
outside the scope of the statute as written
will be retroactively brought within it by
an act of judicial construction.

Id. at 852, 84 S.Ct. 1697. If an “wnempected
and indefensible” construction of a statute is
given retroactive effect, id. at 354, 84 S.Ct.
1697 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), a criminal de-
fendant is deprived of due process of law “in
the sense of [not receiving a] fair warning
that his contemplated conduct constitutes a
crime,” id. at 355, 84 S.Ct. 1697.

{17} How do these important due process
principles of Bowie apply to our opinion in
Myers IT? We are at a loss to say. Unlike
Defendant in the present case, the students
in Bouie fell clearly outside the scope of the
criminal trespass statute according to its own
“narrow and precise” language, as confirmed
by nearly a century of case law. Bowie, 378
US. at 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697. The students in
Bowie were undisputedly on the property of
another before they were warned, while the
statute specifically prohibited entry occur-
ring after a warning to not enter. Id. at 350,
84 S.Ct. 1697. By contrast, the dispute in
the present case centers on the meaning of
the word “lewd,” a term from an Act that
this Court had never applied or interpreted,
much less interpreted in a fashion that would
have comforted Defendant and lulled him
into a sense of security, as was the case for
the students in Bowie. See Myers III, 2010-
NMCA-007, 122, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d
678.

6

{18} Unlike the simple task of determin-
ing whether a warning occurred before entry
or after entry, lewdness is considered on a
case-by-case basis, given an evaluation of
many factors; it is not “narrow and precise”
in its meaning. See United States v. Dost,
636 F.Supp. 828, 882 (S.D.Cal.1986), aff'd,
United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1289,
1244 (9th Cir.1987); Rendleman, 2003-
NMCA-150, 143, 184 N.M. 744, 82 P.8d 554
“(Most courts have adopted the ‘Dost fac-
tors’ to help determine whether a photo-
graph involving a child is lewd.”); see also
Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, 120, 146 N.M.
128, 207 P.38d 1105 (applying the same fac-
tors, but emphasizing that “‘these factors
are neither‘ comprehensive nor necessarily
applicable in every situation’, ... ‘there may
be other factors that are equally if not more
important in determining whether a photo-
graph contains a [lewd] exhibition,’ and ‘[t]he
inquiry will always be case-specific’ ” (altera-
tion in original) (quoting United States v.
Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 32 (ist Cir.1999)));
Myers I, 2008-NMCA-047, 112, 143 N.M.
710, 181 P.8d 702 (applying the same fac-
tors).

{19} Notably, our Court of Appeals in
Rendleman acknowledged that it could be
“difficult ... to articulate” the meaning of
certain elements of the Act. 20083-NMCA-
150, 146. The Court quoted and applied a
case describing certain of the Dost factors as
“confusing and contentious.” Jd. We find
Rendleman’s assessment persuasive. Divin-
ing the meaning of certain elements of the
Act and applying the elements to differing
fact situations will challenge our courts for
years to come.

{20} In short, a determination of “lewd-
ness” is vastly different from an evaluation of

2. The Court of Appeals also relies on a quote
from 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal
Law § 2:14(c) (2d. ed. 2003), discussing the risks
of retroactive application of judicial decisions,
Myers If, 2009-NMSC-016, 124, 146 N.M. 128,
207 P.3d 1105, but LaFave then proceeds to
qualify those risks significantly:

Actually, the proposition cannot be applied
that broadly, as all case-law, including that
interpreting criminal statutes, operates retro-
actively, and such retroactivity is an essential
part of our legal system. It is fair to conclude
that: (1) the prohibition of retroactive judicial

whether conduct falls into a category de-
scribed by “narrow and precise” language, as
was the situation in Bowie. Equally impor-
tant, this Court had never previously applied
“lewd” in a manner opposite to our applica-
tion in Myers II, such that Defendant might
have believed his conduct was not lewd. Any
parallel between the persecuted students in
Bouie and the actions of Defendant in this
case is simply unpersuasive.?

{21} Despite these obvious differences, our
Court of Appeals asserted “only one reason
why Myers II is an unforeseeable interpreta-
tion” of the Act: namely, that our Myers IT
opinion was based upon the “ ‘voyeuristic
quality’” of the offensive images at a time
when voyeurism was not a crime in New
Mexico. Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, 120,
147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673 (quoting Myers
II, 2009~-NMSC-016, 124, 146 N.M. 128, 207
P.3d 1105). According to the Court of Ap-
peals, “the Myers II test for determining
what is Jewd’ under the child pornography
statute” was unforeseeable because we
adopted reasoning used in a 2006 Illinois
case, People v. Sven, 365 IlApp.3d 226, 302
Ti.Dec. 228, 848 N.E.2d 228 (2006), and be-
cause New Mexico’s own voyeurism statute
was not enacted until 2007, long after Defen-
dant created the offensive images in this
case. Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, 11 21-22,
147 N.M. 574, 226 P.38d 673. In addition, the
Court of Appeals mentions that in Myers IT
we overruled a small part of the Court of
Appeals opinion in Rendleman. See Myers
IIT, 2010-NMCA-007, 123, 147 N.M. 574,
226 P.3d 673. In light of all this, the Court
of Appeals concluded that we had effectively
rewritten the Act, crafting “an unforeseeable
judicial enlargement of the statute, which
operates like an ex post facto law.” Id.
Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, it

decisions is not as extensive as the prohibition
of ex-post facto statutes; and (2) the Jaw re-
garding the former is not as clearly developed
as that concerning the ex-post facto clause.
LaFave also notes that “ ‘the promise of Bouie
has been largely illusory,’ as ‘courts have con-
strued the foreseeability requirement generous-
ly,’ and are inclined to “reverse on Bouie
grounds only when the judicial change seems
entirely arbitrary.” Id. (quoting Harold J. Krent,
Should Bouie Be Buoyed?: Judicial Retroactive
Lawmaking and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 Rog-
er Williams U.L.Rev. 35, 39 (1997).

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was “unreasonable to expect a person of
ordinary intelligence [Defendant] to be on
notice of what conduct was within the scope
of [the Act],” and therefore “applying the
new Myers II interpretation ... to Defen-
dant’s conduct... offends due process.” Id.
924,

{22} We take these points one at a time.
Obviously, we did not hold that Defendant
was guilty of the non-existent crime of voyeu-
rism. Similarly, the Sven reasoning that we
found persuasive in Myers IJ was not hinged
upon ideas that had only developed since
Defendant’s exploitive conduct. Thus, the
dates of the enactment of the New Mexico
voyeurism statute and the writing of the
Sven opinion, relative to our’ Myers IT opin-
ion, have no bearing on the constitutionality
of the Act as applied to Defendant’s conduct.

{23} Voyeurism is and has been an activity
defined by observing naked bodies from a
covert perspective for sexual gratification.
Images that convey a voyeuristic perspective
therefore, by definition, fulfill several of the
Dost factors that our courts use to ascertain
when an image can fairly be described as
“lewd” within the meaning of the Act. Com-
pare The American Heritage Dictionary
1930 (4th ed. 2000) (A voyeur is “a person
who derives sexual gratification from observ-
ing the naked bodies or sexual acts of others,
especially from a secret vantage point.”),
with Myers I, 2008-NMCA-047, 112, 143
N.M. 710, 181 P.8d 702, and Myers II, 2009-
NMSC-016, 19, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.38d 1105
(citing Dost, 686 F.Supp. at 832, which offers
factors for determining if an image is lewd,
including a focus on the pubic area, a sexual-
ly suggestive setting, unnatural poses, partial
clothing, and designed “to elicit a sexual re-
sponse in the viewer”). In addition, “lewd”
is commonly defined as either “[p]reoccupied
with sex and sexual desire; lustful” or “{oJb-
scene; indecent.” The American Heritage
Dictionary, supra, at 1007. Compare that
definition with our description of the images
in Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, 11 24, 146 N.M.
128, 207 P.3d 1105: “[T]he private nature of
the setting, the intimate bodily function in
which the victims are engaged, and the voy-
euristic quality of the images all combine to

transform th[{e] otherwise prosaic setting into
a fetishistic and sexualized one.”

{24} Thus, it was hardly novel, much less
unforeseeable, that we would arrive at our
conclusion in Myers II that “lewdness” could
be assessed through the prism of an image’s
voyeuristic character. As an idea, voyeurism
has been around for a long time; this Court
did little more than recognize its defining
characteristics. It is true that, before Defen-
dant took his offensive images, this Court
had never had the opportunity to address
whether images conveying a voyeuristic per-
spective were lewd. But the mere absence of
judicial authority on a point of law is hardly
the test for a Bouie-type, “unexpected and
indefensible” interpretation of a criminal
statute. More to the point, neither this
Court nor the Court of Appeals had ever
rejected the characteristics of voyeurism as a
possible aspect of lewdness; the subject sim-
ply never came up in Rendleman. As this
Court had never created precedent upon
which Defendant could rely, and the lan-
guage of the Act clearly circumscribes cer-
tain images due to qualities that are shared
with voyeuristic images, Defendant has no
legitimate complaint against applying our
ruling in Myers IT to his conduct.

{25} Similarly, applying our few modifica-
tions of Rendleman in the Myers IT opinion
to Defendant does not provide any claim of
unfairness or unforeseeability. Rendle-
man—an exemplary opinion in many ways
and the seminal opinion in this area of the
Jaw—is nonetheless not an opinion of this
Court, and before Myers IT, this Court had
never interpreted the Act one way or the
other. Our denial of certiorari in Rendle-
man did not indicate any affirmation or
adoption of law. See Rule 12-405 NMRA
(specifying that only formal opinions involve
“new points of law, making the decision of
value as a precedent”); State v. Breit, 1996-
NMSC-067, 113, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792
(‘{A] denial of [certiorari] review carries no
implication that the decision or the opinion of
the Court of Appeals was correct.”); see also
Hagan v. Caspari, 50 F.3d 542, 547 (8th
Cir.1995) (“We have some doubt whether a
state supreme court’s overruling of an inter-
mediate appellate court decision ever can

pO

8 Dt

constitute a change in state law for due
process purposes. In fact, we are strongly
inclined to agree with the state that until the
state’s highest court has spoken on a particu-
lar point of state law, the law of the state
necessarily must be regarded as unsettled.”).
Additionally, obvious differences between the
facts of Rendleman and those in the present
case make Defendant’s reliance on the for-
mer perilous to say the least.

{26} Rendleman placed photographs into
two categories: those that a reasonable jury
could find portrayed a “prohibited sexual
act” under the Act, and those that a jury
could not. 2003-NMCA-150, 1129-31, 134
N.M. 744, 82 P.8d 554 (“[T]he district court
may dismiss the charges where, on the undis-
puted face of the materials before the court,
a jury could not find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the material meets the elements
of the offense as defined by the Act.”). The
Court of Appeals did not consider whether
images focusing on underage females’ pubic
areas from a secret vantage point were lewd.
Rather, the reasons certain images were not
lewd in Rendleman included: (1) some of the
images lacked both nudity and “ ‘simulated’
sexual behavior,” id. 170; (2) some of the
images did not clearly exhibit the minors’
genitals or pubic areas, id. 1171, 80; and (8)
the obvious purpose or theme of some images
was not sexual, but rather, were artistic,
familial, documentary, or examples of “ado-
lescent spontaneity,” id. 1178, 81-82.

{27} Defendant’s images, in contrast, fo-
cused relentlessly on exposed pubic areas of
minor girls; Defendant made no argument of
any innocent or artistic theme. To the con-
trary, Defendant conceded that the images
were made for his own sexual gratification,
something conspicuously absent from Ren-
dleman, and he stored them among similar
commercial materials, Myers II, 2009-
NMSC-016, 113, 33, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d
1105. Further, we found that the covert
angle, and other elements of the setting,

3. The Court of Appeals describes our minor dif-
ferences with Rendleman as changing the ele-
ments of the crime, Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016,
(1, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105 (‘On certiora-
ri, the Supreme Court overruled and modified
Rendleman in part, with the result that the ele-
ments of the crime were changed ...”), a con-

contributed to making the theme voyeuristic
and therefore sexual. Id. 128 (“This feeling
of voyeurism is enhanced by the quality of
the images, which are slightly unfocused and
grainy, the perspective of the images, the
victims are viewed from the floor adjacent to
the toilet, and the shadows that border the
images, which lend the sense that the viewer
is peering at the female victims through a
peep hole on the floor.”).

{28} The portions of Rendleman that
might apply to Defendant suggest that his
images were lewd. In Rendlemam, an “un-
usual focus on the girls’ genitalia” weighed in
favor of sending the photographs to the jury.
20083-NMCA-150, 11 72-78, 184 N.M. 744, 82
P.8d 554. Photographs that focused on the
minors’ genitalia without any discernable
reason—their “purpose and predominant
theme” were not obvious—could foreseeably
be found lewd by a jury. Id. 9977, 82 (‘Giv-
en the questionable focus of these photos, a
rational juror might find they were designed
to appeal to prurient interests or that they
are patently offensive and that the other
photos were merely a pretext or cover for
obscene material.”). Rendleman, if any-
thing, should have forecast our categorization
of Defendant’s images as lewd, rather than
not lewd.

Clarifying Rendleman and Myers IT

{29} We acknowledge that our opinion in
Myers II did alter Rendleman in two re-
spects.? First, the Court of Appeals had
limited the scope of “lewd and sexually ex-
plicit exhibition” to “hard-core child pornog-
raphy; that is, it must display visible signs
of sexual eroticism, rather than merely de-
pict a naked child.” Rendleman, 2003-
NMCA-150, 144, 184 N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554
(“An ‘exhibition’ requires an objective show-
ing, apart from the child’s genitalia being
merely visible. Webster's defines ‘exhibition’
as ‘showing, evincing, or showing off.’ To
‘exhibit’ is to ‘show or display ... outwardly

clusion we find unsupportable. The elements of
the crime remain as they were inscribed in the
statute. All that has changed is that this Court
has had the opportunity—for the first time—to
address those elements in this precise context, a
factual setting which differs significantly from
Rendleman in certain respects.

a
| 9

esp(ecially] by visible signs or actions; ... to
have as a readily discernible quality or fea-
ture; [or] ... to represent or make clear by
a drawing, plan or other visual means.’ The
word ‘explicit’ is ‘characterized by full clear
expression; being without vagueness or am-
biguity: leaving nothing implied: unequivo-
cal” In the context of the Act then, a ‘lewd
and sexually explicit exhibition’ means a visi-
ble display or readily discernible depiction of
a child engaged in sexually provocative con-
duct. In other words, the photograph must
be identifiable as hard-core child pornogra-
phy ....” (alterations in original) (internal
citations omitted)). This Court, however,
found that a sexually explicit exhibition “is a
clear, graphic and unequivocal display or por-
trayal of nudity or sexual activity” and con-
cluded that this display or portrayal, even
combined with lewdness, need not be synony-
mous with “hard-core pornography.” Myers
IT, 2009-NMSC-016, 11 19, 26, 146 N.M. 128,
207 P.3d 1105.

{30} We clarified that, in the context of
adult pornography, the idea of “hard-core
pornography” assists in describing images
that are obscene (and thus unprotected by
the First Amendment, as recognized in fed-
eral jurisprudence), but when the objects of
the pornography are children, no such hard-
core pornography consideration should be
read into the Act. Myers II, 2009-NMSC-
016, 126, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105 (citing
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27, 93 S.Ct.
2607, 87 L.Ed.2d 419 (1978), and contrasting
the application of the term “hard-core” in
obscenity jurisprudence with its use to deter-
mine “lewd and sexually explicit” in Rendle-
man, 20083-NMCA-150, 144, 134 N.M. 744,
82 P.3d 554). Though we differed with the
Court of Appeals on this point, we noted
approvingly certain language from the Ren-
dleman opinion that described the obscenity
standard: “ ‘What the community finds toler-
able for adults will be a far cry from what it
will tolerate when visual materials include
children’” Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016,
138, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.38d 1105 (quoting
Rendleman, 2003-NMCA-150, 161, 184
N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554). Our disagreement
with Rendleman on this point—merely a
small part of a larger discussion of lewdness,
most of which we agreed with in Myers II—

falls far short of the “unexpected” and “inde-
fensible” standard that would give rise to due
process concerns. We note that although
Myers II initially equates our eliminating
“hard-core child pornography” with changing
an element of the crime, the opinion never
returns to that point or explains why a
“hard-core child pornography” analysis
would have any impact on the application of
the Act to Defendant’s conduct or help De-
fendant in any way. Accordingly, we shall
not pursue it either.

HE {31} Second, we altered the Rendle-
‘mon analysis in terms of the third element in
the Section 30-6A-2(A)(5) definition of a
“sexually prohibited act”: whether images
are made “for the purpose of sexual stimu-
lation.” Rendleman had concluded that im-
ages must pass an objective test; they must
objectively appear to be intended to sexually
stimulate others. See 2003-NMCA~150,
148, 134 N.M. 744, 82 P.8d 554. The images
cannot just stimulate the perverse, private
mind of the maker. Id. In Myers II, we
concluded that, usually, images must do both:
(1) they must objectively appear created for
the purpose of sexually stimulating, to satisfy
the sixth Dost factor (“designed to elicit a
sexual response in the viewer”), customarily
used to define lewdness; and (2) the accused
must also have the subjective intent to make
the images for the purpose of sexual stimu-
lation (either his own stimulation or someone
else’s). Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, 11 20,
21, 32, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.38d 1105. Al-
though this construction might appear to
conflict with Rendleman, on closer examina-
tion the two opinions are more in harmony
than not.

{32} Rendleman was concerned that the
maker’s own perspective should not alone
render otherwise innocent images porno-
graphic. See 2003-NMCA-150, 148, 134
N.M. 744, 82 P.3d 554, And so, Rendleman
made clear that subjective intent alone would
not suffice. See id. “The premise behind an
objective intent analysis is that child pornog-
raphy is not created and the Act is not
violated simply because a person derives sex-
ual enjoyment from otherwise innocent pho-
tographs.” Id. We find no fault with either
Rendleman’s concern or its conclusion: sub-

10

jective intent alone will not violate the Act.
As we pointed out in Myers II, before we get
to the question of the maker’s intent, the
prosecutor must first establish that the im-
ages are lewd, a question that considers the
images objectively. 2009-NMSC-016, 111 20-
21, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.3d 1105. The images
cannot be innocent if they meet the threshold
element of lewdness.

{33} Thereafter, we look to the maker’s
intent to see what he or she had in mind in
manufacturing images that already meet the
objective criteria of “lewd.” In Rendleman,
however, the Court of Appeals chose to look
to “the purpose of sexual stimulation,” yet
again from an objective perspective, in effect.
ereating a redundancy which we corrected in
Myers II. Compare Rendleman, 2003-
NMCA~150, 1148, 46-48, 134 N.M. 744, 82
P.3d 554 (concluding that “the Act is not
violated simply because ... a defendant’s
private reaction ... transforms an innocent
photo into a lewd exhibition, but rather [be-
cause of] the objectively ascertainable intend-
ed effect on the viewer” when it determined
how to apply the third prong of “sexually
prohibited act,” requiring that an image be
“for the purpose of sexual stimulation”), with
Myers II, 2009-NMSC-016, 121, 146 N.M.
128, 207 P.8d 1105 (clarifying that lewdness
“focuses on whether the visual depiction was
intended or designed to elicit a sexual re-
sponse in the viewer, whereas the statute
focuses on whether the visual depiction was
intended or designed to elicit a sexual re-
sponse in the defendant” and that the two
inquiries are “separate and distinct”). But
far from being an unfair surprise to Defen-
dant in this case, our change in Myers II
actually worked to his benefit.

{34} Whereas previously in Rendleman,
the prosecution only had to meet an objective
standard, now, after Myers II, the state must
apply both: an objective standard for lewd-
ness and a subjective standard for the statu-
tory element of “for the purpose of sexual
stimulation.” In line with the Court of Ap-
peals’ caution in Rendleman, no accused can
be convicted under the Act merely for his
own misguided subjective intent; the images
must first satisfy the objective criteria for
lewdness, such as the Dost factors. Where-

as, before Myers II the state had only one
purpose or intent hurdle, now it has two—
hardly a due process imposition on Defen-
dant in this case.

{35} Even Rendleman appears to recog-
nize the need for a subjective intent analysis
of the accused—a fact we appreciate, per-
haps belatedly. It seems that Rendleman
always considered the subjective intent of the
accused as a factor in its analysis. Rendle-
man directed that “[aJt trial, the subjective
motive of the photographer, the circum-
stances of the photography, and the use of
the photo become relevant on the issue of
intent.” 2003-NMCA-150, 149, 184 N.M.
144, 82 P.8d 554 (emphasis added). These
considerations are exactly the type we ad-
dressed in Myers IJ when we applied a sub-
jective test to determine the fulfillment of the
third statutory element of the Section 30-
6A-2(A)(5) definition of “sexually prohibited
act”: whether the images were made for “the
purpose of sexual stimulation.”  2009-
NMSC-016, 121, 146 N.M. 128, 207 P.8d
1105.

{36} For the all the reasons previously
discussed, we find no due process violation
by virtue of applying Myers IT to Defendant.

Defendant’s Unaddressed Due Process Ar-
guments

{87} In his original briefing to the Court of
Appeals, before that Court issued Myers I,
Defendant made three arguments that the
Act was unconstitutionally vague as applied:
(1) a person of ordinary intelligence would
not have had notice that his conduct—charac-
terized as simply “voyeurism”—was prohibit-
ed, (2) the Act was arbitrarily enforced, and
(8) district court unconstitutionally expanded
the meaning of the “narrow and precise stat-
utory language” when it applied the Act to
Defendant. These are the arguments that
we expected would be addressed in Myers
IIT when we remanded this case to the Court
of Appeals. We address them now and find
none meritorious.

HM {38} First, while Defendant argued
he was not on notice that “voyeurism,” char-
acterized by “watching girls use the rest-
room” and “even surreptitiously videotaping

them for his own use,” would be criminal
behavior under the Act, it was not Defen-
dant’s voyeurism that caused his criminal
liability. Simply watching the girls without
recording videos (and thus without manufac-
turing) would not have been criminal under
the Act. Similarly, if Defendant had recorded
non-lewd images of girls using the restroom,
for his own or even others’ sexual stimu-
lation, he would not have incurred criminal
liability under the Act. It was the combina-
tion of the specifically captured content of
the images—their focus on the minors’ geni-
tals, the upward angle, the peephole-like
framing, the grainy quality, and the objec-
tively ascertainable purpose, making them
lewd as discussed at length earlier in this
Opinion and in Myers IJ—and Defendant's
subjective sexual purpose for the images that
made their covert manufacture by Defendant
into a criminal act.

{39} Next, while it is true that the
State arrested Defendant for his videotapes
of minors, but not for those videos he took of
adult women, that distinction cannot be de-
scribed as “arbitrary enforcement.” Rather
than “ ‘impermissibly delegat{ing] basic poli-
ey matters to policemen, judges, and juries
for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbi-
trary and discriminatory application,” Old
Abe Co. v. N.M. Mining Comm'n, 121 N.M.
83, 91-92, 908 P.2d 776, 784-85 (Ct.App.1995)
(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
USS. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d
222 (1972), the Act specifically applies only
to minors. Thus, Defendant’s arrest and
conviction for the images he manufactured of
minors, but not those he manufactured of
adults, was not arbitrary.

{40} Finally, the district court did not
unforeseeably expand the scope of the Act’s
“narrow and precise statutory language.”
Because we ultimately upheld the district
court’s holding in Myers II, and because
Myers II did not unforeseeably expand the
scope of the Act, this argument is also with-
out merit.

Judicial Stay of SORNA

Hl {41} The Court of Appeals concluded
that district judges have the authority to stay

SORNA registration pending appeal of a con-
viction. Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, 11 31-
33, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673. The Court
characterized a stay of SORNA registration
as part of Defendant’s conditions of release
pending appeal. Id. 181 (citing Rule 12-
205(B) NMRA). “[Blecause SORNA does
not explicitly deprive a trial court of its dis-
eretion to stay the registration requirement
pending appeal, and [New Mexico] rules and
statutes otherwise vest such discretion in the
trial court,” id. 129, Myers III held that the
district judge retains discretion to grant a
stay, id. 1931-33 (citing NMSA 1978, § 31-
11-1(C) (1988) and quoting Rule 5-402(C)
NMRA). We are not persuaded.

HH {42} A district judge does not have
discretion to stay SORNA registration.
SORNA registration is not a sentence, nor is
it a condition of release. Rather, “registra-
tion and notification provisions under SOR-
NA are immediate and automatic, [but] they
do not constitute punishment for a crime.”
State v. Moore, 2004A-NMCA-035, 124, 185
N.M. 210, 86 P.8d 635. Unlike sentencing
and release conditions, “SORNA is primarily
remedial in purpose and effect.” Id; see
also § 29-11A-2(B) (stating that the purpose
of SORNA is “to assist law enforcement,
agencies’ efforts to protect their communi-
ties”); State v. Brothers, 2002-NMCA-110,
120, 188 N.M. 86, 59 P.8d 1268 (“SORNA
has a remedial purpose, namely, to protect
communities from sex offenders.”).

{43} In Moore, the Court of Appeals was
“persuaded by the rationale of the majority
of jurisdictions, which hold sex offender reg-
istration law consequences to be collateral
consequences of a plea.” 2004-NMCA-035,
1.24, 185 N.M. 210, 86 P.3d 635. Thus, SOR-
NA is a collateral consequence of the plea,
which most certainly is not under the disere-
tionary control of the court. See id. In fact,
the Court of Appeals has recognized for
years now, and we agree, that the district
court does not “impose SORNA provisions or
have discretion to modify them in accepting a
plea.” Id. 124.

{44} While SORNA mandates a sex of-
fender to register, the court plays no role in
imposing that mandate. See § 29-11A-4(B);

12

see also Brothers, 2002-NMCA-110, 9 22, 188
N.M. 36, 59 P.3d 1268 (“The duty to register
{as a sexual offender under SORNA] arises
by legislative mandate, not by court order.
SORNA requires the court to give notice, not
to order a defendant to comply with SORNA.
The duty to register is an independent statu-
tory duty with a remedial purpose and is not
terminated by dismissal of criminal charges.”
(internal citations omitted)).

{45} Just as the district court does not
“impose SORNA provisions or have discre-
tion to modify them,” the court does not have
the power to stay a defendant’s required
compliance. Although counsel was required
to advise Defendant regarding the collateral
SORNA consequences of a potential plea, see
State v. Edwards, 2007-NMCA-048, 131, 141
N.M. 491, 157 P.8d 56, just as counsel is
required to advise a client of collateral depor-
tation consequences, see id. 126 (citing State
v, Paredez, 2004~-NMSC-036, 118, 186 N.M.
583, 101 P.3d 799), that responsibility does
not relate to a court’s power to stay those
consequences.

CONCLUSION

{46} We reverse Myers III and remand
this case in its entirety to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.

{47} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.

SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMSC-029
256 P.3d 24
TW TELECOM OF NEW MEXICO,
L.L.C., Appellant,

v.

NEW MEXICO PUBLIC REGULATION
Commission, Appellee,

and

Qwest Corporation and Office of the
Attorney General, Intervenors.

No. 32,193.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
June 21, 2011.

Jones, Snead, Wertheim & Wentworth,
P.A., Carol A. Clifford, Santa Fe, NM, for
Appellant.

Margaret Kendall Caffey-Moquin, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Jaime R.
Kennedy, Thomas W. Olson, Gary K. King,
Attorney General, Brian Edward Harris, As-
sistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for
Intervenors.

OPINION
MARS, Justice.

{1} Appellant, TW Telecom of New Mexi-
eo, LLC (TW Telecom), appeals from the
final order issued by the New Mexico Public
Regulation Commission (the PRC) in In the
Matter of the Development of an Alternative
Form of Regulation Plan for Qwest Corpora-
tion (AFOR III), No. 09-00094-UT (AFOR
II Final Order). TW Telecom claims that
the PRC (1) adopted certain conclusions from

13

a previous final order, lacking justification in
the AFOR III record; (2) deregulated Qwest
Corporation’s (Qwest) rates in violation of
the New Mexico Telecommunications Act,
NMSA 1978, Sections 63-9A-1 to -20 (1985)
(as amended through 2004), and the separa-
tion of powers doctrine in Article III, Section
1 of the New Mexico Constitution; and (8)
deprived TW Telecom of proper due process.
We annul and vacate the AFOR III Final
Order and remand to the PRC for further

. proceedings affording the parties an opportu-

nity to present evidence. Because we re-
mand this case based on the PRC’s due
process violation, resulting from the adoption
of conclusions from a previous proceeding
without affording the parties an opportunity
to be heard, we do not address TW Telecom’s
second claim,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{2} The claims raised in this appeal involve
three cases before the PRC that concerned
the development of various alternative form
of regulation plans issued by the PRC, and
Qwest’s compliance with the terms and con-
ditions therein. The cases addressed various
issues, including pricing provisions and de-
tailed requirements for the filing of tariff
changes, tariffs for new services, promotional
offerings, packaged services, and individual
contracts for services. Those facts relevant
to the development of the final orders issued
in those cases are introduced in this section;
additional facts are set forth as needed.

{3} In the first case, the AFOR II final
order on pricing and quality of service
(AFOR II Final Order), was issued in In the
Matter of the Development of an Alternative
Form of Regulation Plan for Qwest Corpora-
tion (AFOR II), No. 05-00466-UT, on No-
vember 28, 2006. The AFOR II Final Order
specifically addressed Qwest’s pricing and
quality of service provisions. The effective
dates of the AFOR II Final Order were
January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2009.

{4} Pursuant to the procedures enumerat-
ed in the AFOR II Final Order, Qwest filed
a series of promotions and tariff changes
with the PRC in which Qwest offered waiv-
ers or reductions of recurring monthly
charges and of nonrecurring charges. Cy-
ber Mesa Computer Systems, Inc. (Cy-

14 ee

berMesa) and the PRC staff (Staff) filed
objections to the promotional and tariff pro-
grams, and claimed that Qwest had engaged
in anti-competitive behavior by pricing its
services below cost. The objections resulted
in two separate cases, later consolidated: In
the Matter of Objections to Qwest Corpora-
tion’s Proposed “Residence and Business
Competitive Response Program” Tariff
Changes in its Transmittal 2008-022, No.
08-00826-UT; and In the Matter of a Pro-
test of a 90 Day “Residence and Business
Competitive Response Programs” Promotion
by Quest Corporation for “Potential New”
Quest Residence Local Exchange Customers
and Existing Quest Business Customers “in
Retention Situations,” No. 08-00197-UT
(collectively the “Competitive Response
Case”).

{5} The focus of the Competitive Response
Case was to decide the relevant costs used to
determine a price floor for a promotional
offering or a tariff reduction. TW Telecom
made a business decision not to intervene in
the Competitive Response Case because TW
Telecom did not actively market the Qwest
business services that were the subject of the
promotions or tariffs.

{6} The final order issued by the PRC in
the Competitive Response Case on August
25, 2009 (Competitive Response Case Final
Order), was sent via email by the AFOR IIT
hearing examiner to the AFOR III parties,
which included TW Telecom. The PRC
urged the AFOR III hearing examiner and
parties to “take note of [the] ruling and to
see whether, if adopted [in AFOR III], it
might forestall similar confusion in the imple-
mentation of AFOR III.”

{7} The third case resulted in the AFOR
TI Final Order which is the subject of this
appeal. The AFOR III case was initiated by
the PRC to develop the third alternative
form of regulation, specifically addressing
how Qwest was to calculate its rates and
charges. The PRC provided that “[t]he
scope of this proceeding shall extend to all
issues necessary and convenient to the devel-
opment of a new AFOR plan concerning
Qwest Corporation, including but not limited
to, pricing, quality of service, infrastructure
investment, and deployment of advanced ser-

vices.” The PRC determined that the AFOR
III case would be conducted as an adjudicat-
ed case and all interested parties would be
given an opportunity to participate in devel-
oping the next alternative form of regulation
plan. Notice was served to all entities listed
on the PRC’s Telecommunications Service
List, and a copy of the notice was placed on
the PRC’s website.

{8} A time line of critical dates relating to
the development of AFOR III follows.

July 7-10, 2009: AFOR III public hearing.

August 28, 2009: AFOR III briefs-in-chief
were due; AFOR III parties received notice
of the Competitive Response Case Final Or-
der.

October 22, 2009: The hearing examiner
filed the AFOR III recommended decision.

November 2009: Certain AFOR III par-
ties, including TW Telecom, Qwest, Cy-
berMesa, Level 3, the New Mexico Attorney
General, and the Department of De-
fense/Federal Executive Agencies, filed ex-
ceptions to the AFOR III recommended de-
cision.

November 6, 2009: Qwest filed a request
for oral argument on exceptions to the
AFOR III recommended decision.

December 8, 2009: Oral argument was
held at which TW Telecom, Qwest, CyberMe-
sa, Level 8, the New Mexico Attorney Gener-
al, and the Department of Defense/Federal
Executive Agencies, presented their excep-
tions to the AFOR III recommended deci-
sion.

December 31, 2009: AFOR II expired.
The PRC issued its AFOR III Final Order,
adopting the AFOR III recommended deci-
sion, as modified, and it became effective.

{9} The PRC imported findings from the
Competitive Response Case Final Order into
the AFOR III Final Order to establish the
correct price floor for AFOR III. The PRC
also adopted the finding from the Competi-
tive Response case that “Qwest does not
need to file imputation studies in support of
its rates” test because the analysis should
“focus on Qwest’s costs and revenues, rather
than on those incurred by [Competitive Local
Exchange Carriers],” such as TW Telecom.

{10} The PRC recognized in the AFOR III
Final Order that several parties had raised
due process concerns regarding the inclusion
of the Competitive Response Case Final Or-
der provisions in the AFOR III Final Order.
Specifically, TW Telecom claimed that since
it was not a party to the Competitive Re-
sponse Case, its

procedural and substantive rights [were]

implicated by the Commission’s decision in

this [clase; it has relied in good faith on
the scope of [the] case as defined by the

Commission’s notice here; and [it] should

not be deprived of its right to be heard on

the merits of the testimony and evidence
presented here.
Quoting from the AFOR III recommended
decision filed by the hearing examiner, the
PRC concluded that,

based on the evidence in this case, no

reason has been shown for reversing the

Commission’s prior finding that Qwest

does not need to file imputation studies in

support of its rates. However, any final
decision on these issues should be deferred
pending the outcome of the motions for
rehearing that have been filed in the Com-
petitive Response Case.
The PRC further concluded that the AFOR
I Final Order was decided on the merits,
and the decision not to require an imputation
test was made independent of prior orders,
namely the AFOR II Final Order and the
Competitive Response Case Final Order.

{11} The PRC provided notice to TW Tele-
com and the other AFOR III parties that the
Competitive Response Case Final Order
could be adopted into the AFOR III when
the Competitive Response Case Final Order
was issued. Specifically, the PRC advised
“the parties and the Hearing Examiner in
the AFOR III case to take note of this ruling
and see whether, if adopted there, it might
forestall similar confusion in the implementa-
tion of AFOR III.” The AFOR III parties
received notice of the Competitive Response
Final Order the same day the parties’ post-
hearing AFOR III briefs-in-chief were due
and over a month after the AFOR III public
hearing.

{12} PRC Commissioner Jason Marks is-
sued a dissent to the AFOR III Final Order

in which he reiterated concerns previously
set forth in his dissent to the Competitive
Response Case Final Order. Commissioner
Marks expressed his due process concerns
that, “[w]hen decisions are based on informa-
tion not brought forward in testimony or
otherwise put into the record, parties that
might be opposed to these provisions are
denied the opportunity to cross examine the
information or offer alternative testimony.”

{13} TW Telecom filed a motion for re-
hearing, but it was deemed denied by the
PRC's inaction. 1.2.2.370F)(6)(a) NMAC (“If
the commission does not act on a motion for
rehearing within twenty (20) days after the
final order has been issued, the motion shall
be deemed denied.”). Thereafter, TW Tele-
com filed its direct appeal to this Court. See
NMSA 1978, § 62-11-1 (1998) (providing’ a
right of direct appeal from a final order of
the PRC).

{14} TW Telecom claims that the conclu-
sions in the Competitive Response Case Fi-
nal Order adopted by the PRC in the AFOR
Ill Final Order are not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, are arbitrary and capri-
cious, represent an abuse of discretion, and
are unlawful. NMSA 1978, § 68-7-1.1(G)
(1998); NMSA 1978, § 63-94-16(B) (1998).
TW Telecom raises three issues on appeal:
(1) whether “the [PRC] adopted the new
pricing plan derived from the Competitive
Response Case [Final Order] without justifi-
cation in the AFOR III Case record and
without explanation”; (2) whether “the new
pricing plan effectively deregulate[d] Qwest’s
rates in violation of the New Mexico Tele-
communications Act ... and the separation
of powers doctrine, Article III, Section 1 of
the New Mexico Constitution”; and (8)
whether “the [PRC] ... deprived [TW Tele-
com] and other parties of their right to pro-
cedural due process by denying them the
right to confront the evidence supporting the
new pricing plan.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM {15} When reviewing a PRC deci-
sion, the challenging party bears the burden
of proving that the decision “is arbitrary and
capricious, not supported by substantial evi-
dence, outside the scope of the agency’s au-

16

thority, or otherwise inconsistent with law.”
Albuquerque Bernalillo Cnty. Water Util.
Auth. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n and
Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. (ABCWUA), 2010-
NMSC-013, 117, 148 N.M. 21, 229 P.3d 494
(internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted); see § 63-9A-16(B). The due process
claims raised by TW Telecom are constitu-
tional issues of law that we review de novo.
ABCWUA, 2010-NMSC-013, 119, 148 N.M.
21, 229 P.3d 494.

DISCUSSION

Hl {16} TW Telecom conceded during
oral argument that if this Court found a
violation of TW Telecom’s due process rights,
there would be no need to address the other
issues raised in their brief-in-chief. TW
Telecom claims that the PRC “deprived the
parties of essential elements of due process
including adequate notice, an opportunity to
present witnesses or evidence, the chance to
cross-examine witnesses, and, perhaps most
important, the right to have a decision based
on the record with a statement of reasons for
the decision.” The PRC argues that TW
Telecom had actual notice and an opportunity
to be heard in both the Competitive Re-
sponse Case and AFOR III, in which they
referred to and relied upon the Competitive
Response Case record in the AFOR III pro-
ceedings.

HH s({17} Due process is not a concrete
concept, but rather “is flexible in nature and
may adhere to such requisite procedural pro-
tections as the particular situation demands.”
U S&S West Comme’ns, Inc. v. N.M. State
Corp. Comm'n (U.S. West), 1999-NMSC-
016, 125, 127 N.M. 254, 980 P.2d 37 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see
also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481,
92 S.Ct. 2598, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (“It has
been said so often by this Court and others
as not to require citation of authority that
due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situ-
ation demands.”). Although the specific pro-
cedural requirements of due process vary
depending on the situation, “‘[i]t is well set-
tled that the fundamental requirements of
due process in an administrative context are
reasonable notice and opportunity to be

Pe

heard and present any claim or defense.
ABCWUA, 2010-NMSC-013, 121, 148 N.M.
21, 229 P.38d 494 (emphasis added) (quoting
Jones v. N.M. State Racing Comm’n, 100
N.M. 434, 486, 671 P.2d 1145, 1147 (1983)).
The opportunity to be heard should be “at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner.” N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v.
N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 104 N.M. 565, 568,
725 P.2d 244, 247 (1986); see Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1988, 32
L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) (holding that for proce-
dural due process to be met, “the right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard must
be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner” (internal quotations
marks and citation omitted)).

{18} The PRC claims that in AFOR III,
TW Telecom “had, and took advantage of,
ample opportunity to present its own price
floor proposal, to present evidence, and to
advocate for its position.” The PRC cites
TW Telecom’s testimony in AFOR III, which
referenced evidence from the Competitive
Response Case, to show that TW Telecom
had knowledge that the PRC was considering
adoption of certain pricing methodologies in
the Competitive Response Case into the
AFOR III Final Order.

{19} TW Telecom admits to citing to “the
procedural history of the Competitive Re-
sponse Case to demonstrate that the Com-
mission needed to streamline its procedures
for tariff filings’so as to avoid the delay and
expense necessitated by that case.” Howev-
er, TW Telecom claims to have responded
only to those portions of the Competitive
Response Case that were placed in the
AFOR III record, and argues that “if the
entire Competitive Response Case record
had been taken notice of, [then] TW Telecom
would have responded accordingly.”

HI {20} “The [PRC] is authorized only to
make its decision [based] upon the evidence
adduced at the hearing and made a part of
the record.” Transcon. Bus Sys. v. State
Corp. Comm'n, 56 N.M. 158, 177, 241 P.2d
829, 841 (1952), The AFOR III Final Order
was not based solely on the evidence present-
ed and made part of the record; rather,
certain conclusions were based on evidence
heard at the Competitive Response Case

hearing a month earlier and later incorporat-
ed into the AFOR III recommended decision.
Although TW Telecom referenced Competi-
tive Response Case evidence in its AFOR III
testimony, such reference does not negate
the fact that TW Telecom was denied the
opportunity to present evidence and to exam-
ine and cross-examine witnesses regarding
PRC’s decision in the Competitive Response
Case. Furthermore, TW Telecom’s motion
for a rehearing, requesting that the AFOR
III parties be given the opportunity to pres-
ent evidence regarding the implementation of
the Competitive Response Case to AFOR
ITI, was deemed denied by the PRC’s inac-
tion. 1.2.2.37F) NMAC.

{21} Due to the timing of the Competitive
Response Case Final Order, the parties were
denied the opportunity to substantively ad-
dress the impact of the Competitive Re-
sponse Case Final Order on the pending
AFOR III proceeding through the presenta-
tion of evidence or the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses. Because TW
Telecom was precluded from making a rec-
ord in AFOR III regarding the Competitive
Response Case Final Order, an essential ele-
ment of due process, the opportunity to be
heard, was violated.

CONCLUSION

{22} We annul and vacate the AFOR III
Final Order and remand to the PRC for
further proceedings so that the parties are
afforded the opportunity to present evidence.
See NMSA 1978, § 62-11-5 (1982) (“The su-
preme court shall have no power to modify
the action or order appealed from, but shall
either affirm or annul and vacate the same.”).
Because we remand this case based on the
due process violation, we do not address TW
Telecom’s second claim.

{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

17
2011-NMCA-057
256 P.3d 29
Wendy CHARLES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

The REGENTS OF NEW MEXICO
STATE UNIVERSITY, f/k/a New Mexi-
co College of Agriculture and Mechanic
Arts, Defendant—-Appellant.

No. 28,825.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Nov. 4, 2010.
Certiorari Denied, Jan. 3, 2011, No. 32,780.

aa

a
©

Mike Milligan, El] Paso, TX, for Appellee.

Miller Stratvert P.A. Charlotte Lamont,
Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} Defendant, New Mexico State Univer-
sity (NMSU), appeals from a jury verdict
awarding Plaintiff Wendy Charles
$124,658.98 on her claims of retaliation and
constructive discharge. On appeal, we ad-
dress Defendant’s arguments that (1) the
statute of limitations provided in the New
Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA),
NMSA 1978, §§ 28-1-1 to -14 (1969, as
amended through 2007), bars acts outside the
limitations period from being considered, and
(2) there is insufficient evidence, as a matter
of law, to support the jury’s verdict. We
hold that Plaintiff's retaliation claim can be
considered under the continuing violation
doctrine, allowing facts and evidence prior to
the NMHRA statute of limitations cut-off to
be considered. We further hold that there is
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s de-
termination that a constructive discharge oc-
curred. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND

{2} Plaintiff began working as a teaching
assistant in the Facilities Maintenance Pro-
gram at NMSU’s Dofia Ana Branch Commu-
nity College on January 19, 2001, and she
worked there until her resignation on Janu-
ary 31, 2005. Plaintiff was a Technician IV-
Lab Tech and assisted instructor James
Thompson with his courses. Juan Reyes was
also a lab technician and worked part-time
assisting Thompson. Thompson was Plain-
tiffs supervisor from January 2001 until July
2003. Following a university reorganization,
in July 2003, Terry Mount became Plaintiff's

20

supervisor. Mount acted as Plaintiff's super-
visor until Plaintiff's resignation in January
2005.

{8} Plaintiff testified that shortly after she
began working at the university, Reyes com-
mented to Plaintiff that he did not like it
when Plaintiff held her blouse closed as she
bent over to pick something up. Plaintiff
testified that she informed Reyes that such
statements were inappropriate. Reyes made
this statement or similar statements on three
separate occasions. The first statement oc-
curred on January 28, 2001, four days after
Plaintiff began working for Defendant. The
other statements occurred on January 24,
and August 8, 2001. Plaintiff testified that, a
few days after she first informed Reyes that
his comment was inappropriate, Reyes told
Plaintiff to “shut-up” and that she did not
“know what [she was] talking about” at a
meeting in front of both faculty and students.
During Plaintiff's employment, Reyes also
called Plaintiff names, yelled at Plaintiff,
made sarcastic comments about Plaintiff's
abilities and the amount of work she did,
slammed or hit tables or equipment in Plain-
tiffs presence, and refused to give Plaintiff
receipts or promptly return Plaintiffs credit
card when he purchased items using the
university credit card issued in Plaintiff's
name. Some of these acts occurred in front
of students.

{4} In March 2001, Plaintiff complained to
Thompson about her difficulties in sharing
use of the university credit card with Reyes.
In August 2001, Plaintiff complained to
Thompson again about Reyes’s behavior, in-
forming Thompson that Reyes had made in-
appropriate comments about Plaintiff holding
her blouse closed when she bent over.
Thompson talked to Reyes on more than one
occasion and told Plaintiff that they all need-
ed to “try harder to get along.” In February
2008, Plaintiff complained to Thompson in
writing about Reyes’s behavior, and a per-
sonnel meeting was held. The dean attended
the meeting and an agreement was reached
between Plaintiff and Reyes to treat each
other more professionally.

{5} Plaintiff contends that, beginning in
August 2002, Thompson began retaliating
against her by unfairly criticizing her attend-

ance and work performance. According to
Plaintiff, Thompson also became more angry,
rude, and demeaning toward Plaintiff after
the personnel meeting. Thompson began ac-
cusing Plaintiff of being late, of not getting
the correct supplies, and of not completing
her job duties. Thompson also cancelled
training Plaintiff had requested and lowered
Plaintiff's performance evaluation in the area
of “work relations.” Plaintiff testified that
Thompson yelled at her in front of students
and threw a cigarette butt at her. When
Plaintiff returned to the dean of the universi-
ty in September 2003 to complain about this
conduct, the dean referred Plaintiff to her
new supervisor, Mount. Plaintiff had multi-
ple meetings with Mount regarding her con-
cerns.

{6} In June 2004, Plaintiff filed an infor-
mal grievance with NMSU’s Equal Employ-

* ment Opportunity (EEO) office. On Septem-

ber 27, 2004, the EEO office issued a letter
stating that it did not find Plaintiff's com-
plaints to amount to discrimination and re-
ferred the case to the Assistant Director of
Employee Relations for NMSU, Mack
Adams. Adams instituted a mediation pro-
cess that began on October 28, 2004. The
mediation concluded, and a mediation agree-
ment circulated in mid-December 2004. The
agreement provided Plaintiff with a flexible
work schedule; provided Plaintiff training if
budgetary constraints allowed; established
bi-weekly meetings between Mount, Plaintiff,
Thompson, and Reyes; and stated that Plain-
tiff would bring any inappropriate conduct by
Reyes to Thompson’s or Mount’s attention.
Following suggestions by Mount and Thomp-
son, the mediation agreement was amended
in early January 2005 to provide for bi-week-
ly meetings between Plaintiff and Mount,
rather than including all parties. The
amended mediation agreement also provided
that Plaintiff should attempt to resolve any
complaints she had that Reyes was not treat-
ing her correctly first with Reyes, then with
Thompson, and lastly with Mount. The
agreement provided, however, that Plaintiff
could go directly to Thompson if she did not
feel she could discuss her concern with
Reyes. On January 14, 2005, Plaintiff sub-
mitted her notice of resignation. Plaintiff's

last day of employment was January 31,
2005.

{7} Plaintiff filed complaints with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the New Mexico Human Rights
Division. In October 2006, Plaintiff filed this
civil suit alleging sexual harassment, retalia-
tion, and constructive discharge. Prior to
trial, Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that the evidence did not
support a constructive discharge. After con-
sidering the conflicting evidence presented,
the district court denied the motion. At the
close of Plaintiff's evidence at trial, Defen-
dant made an oral motion for directed ver-
dict, asserting again that the evidence was
insufficient to support a constructive dis-
charge, and the district court denied the
motion. The jury entered a verdict in favor
of Plaintiff on the retaliation claim, but it
found in Defendant’s favor on the sexual
harassment claim. The jury further found
that “Plaintiff was constructively discharged
from her employment.” The jury awarded
Plaintiff $94,658.98 in lost wages and $30,000
for emotional distress. After the jury re-
turned its verdict, Defendant filed a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or
in the alternative, a new trial, arguing a third
time that the evidence was insufficient to
support a constructive discharge. The dis-
trict court denied this motion as well. De-
fendant appeals.

RETALIATION CLAIM

Hs {8} The NMHRA provides that it
is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any
person or employer to “engage in any form
of threats, reprisal or discrimination against
any person who has opposed any unlawful
discriminatory practice or has filed a com-
plaint, testified or participated in any pro-
ceeding under the [NMHRA].” Section 28-
1-7@)(@). In order to establish a claim of
retaliation under the NMHRA, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that “(1) she engaged in
protected activity; (2) she suffered an ad-
verse employment action; and (8) there is a
causal connection between these two events.”
Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 2004A-NMSC-
018, 138, 185 N.M. 589, 91 P.8d 58. “An
adverse employment action occurs when an
employer imposes a tangible, significant,

fn

21

harmful change in the conditions of employ-
ment.” Ulibarri v. State of N.M. Corr.
Acad., 2006~-NMSC-009, 116, 139 N.M. 198,
181 P.3d 43. Plaintiff claims that the ad-
verse employment action she suffered was a
constructive discharge.

{9} On appeal, Defendant argues that (1)
the applicable statute of limitations bars
Plaintiff from including in her retaliation
claim acts that occurred more than 180 days
prior to Plaintiff filing her complaint with the
EEOC, and (2) Plaintiff presented insuffi-
cient evidence to establish either that she
was constructively discharged or that her
constructive discharge was causally connect-
ed to a protected activity. We address each
argument below.

Statute of Limitations

TI {10} Defendant contends that Plain-
tiff filed her complaint with the EEOC on
April 12, 2005. Defendant therefore claims
that any acts occurring prior to November
2004 should not be considered in support of
Plaintiff's retaliation claim. Plaintiff con-
tends that her EEOC complaint was filed
when the EEOC received her intake ques-
tionnaire, which, according to Plaintiff, was
on March 27, 2005. Regardless, Plaintiff
substantively advocates that all of the con-
duet that oecurred during her employment
be considered pursuant to the continuing vio-
lation doctrine. We note that neither party
argues that the new 300-day limitation peri-
od created by the 2005 amendment to Section
28-1-10 applies. See Ulibarri, 2006~-NMSC-
009, 18, 189 N.M. 193, 131 P.3d 43.

HMM {11} “(The continuing violation
doctrine [is] an equitable doctrine permitting
a plaintiff to bring an otherwise untimely
claim.” Id. 19. The continuing violation doc-
trine distinguishes between “[d]iscrete acts
such as termination, failure to promote, deni-
al of transfer, or refusal to hire[, which] are
easy to identify,” and hostile environment
cases. Id. 119-10 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The basis for this
distinction is that discrete acts generally
“constitute separate, actionable unlawful em-
ployment practices” and “take place at an
identifiable time,” id. 19, while hostile envi-
ronment cases “involve repeated conduct

22

over days or years” and “can be said to have
‘oceurred’ at the time of any act contributing
to the hostile environment.” Jd. 110. Thus,
while “a charge covering ... discrete acts
must be filed within the appropriate time
period,” id. 19, “if one act contributing to a
hostile environment claim occurred within
the filing period, all acts creating the hostile
environment may be considered.” Jd. 110.

HM {12} Although our Supreme Court
adopted the continuing violation doctrine for
hostile work environment cases in Ulibarri,
it did not address whether the doctrine ap-
plies to retaliation claims. Nevertheless, like
hostile environment cases, cases involving re-
taliation resulting in constructive discharge
may “involve repeated conduct over days or
years and individual acts of [retaliation] may
not be separately actionable.” Id; see also
Gonzales v. New Mewico Dept of Health,
2000-NMSC-029, 11 28, 25, 129 N.M. 586, 11
P.8d 550 (holding that a jury could reason-
ably conclude that the evidence supported
the plaintiffs claim of retaliation based on
evidence that the plaintiff was criticized,
called a troublemaker, transferred to a more
remote building, not informed of, and denied
aecess to, a posting in which she was inter-
ested, and discussing the plaintiff's claim that
“the acts of discrimination and retaliation
occurred in [a] six-year period”). Therefore,
a claim of retaliation resulting in constructive
discharge may be based on a series of acts
over time. See, eg., Littell v. Allstate Ins.
Co,, 2008-NMCA-012, 116-32, 41-44, 51,
143 N.M. 506, 177 P.3d 1080 (affirming a jury
verdict for retaliation resulting in construc-
tive discharge based on a series of acts by
the supervisor and not on one distinct act).
We see no reason to exclude Plaintiff's retali-
ation claim from the continuing violation doc-
trine. Consequently, “if one act contributing
to a [retaliation] claim [based on a series of
actions and not a single, discrete act] oc-
curred within the filing period, all acts creat-
ing the [retaliation claim] may be consid-
ered.” Ulibarri, 2006-NMSC-009, 110, 189
N.M. 198, 181 P.3d 43.

HM {13} We must therefore consider
whether Plaintiff's retaliation claim is based
on a discrete act or on a cumulative series of
acts. See id. 111. “The NMHRA makes it

unlawful for any person or employer to retal-
iate against any person who has opposed any
unlawful diseriminatory practice.” Ocana,
2004-NMSC-018, 135, 135 N.M. 539, 91 P.3d
58 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); Section 28-1-7(1)(2). Retaliation
can include threats, reprisals, or discrimina-
tion. See Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-029, 119,
129 N.M. 586, 11 P.8d 550. In this case,
Plaintiff asserts that she complained several
times, and after each complaint, she experi-
enced retaliation from Reyes, Thompson, and
Mount. According to Plaintiff, the retalia-
tion took the form of harassment, threaten-
ing behavior discrimination, and reprisals.
Plaintiff's claim of retaliation is, therefore,
based on a cumulative series of acts, not a
“discrete discriminatory act.” Contra Uli-
barri, 2006~-NMSC-009, 111, 189 N.M. 193,
181 P.8d 48. Consequently, we agree with
Plaintiff that all of the conduct that occurred
during her employment could have been con-
sidered by the jury for her claim, pursuant to
the continuing violation doctrine.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Hs {14} Defendant argues that
Plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to
support either a claim of constructive ‘dis-
charge or that there was a causal connection
between the constructive discharge and a
protected activity. The sufficiency of the
evidence is assessed in the context of the
jury instructions. Littell, 2008-NMCA-012,
141, 143 N.M. 506, 177 P.3d 1080. To estab-
lish her claim for constructive discharge, the
jury was instructed that Plaintiff had the
burden of proving that “Defendant ... made
[Plaintiff's] working conditions so intolerable,
when viewed objectively, that a reasonable
person would be compelled to resign; essen-
tially, that she had no other choice but to
quit.” The instruction correctly sets forth
the elements of a constructive discharge un-
der New Mexico law. Gormley v. Coca-Cola
Enters. (Gormley II), 2005-NMSC-003, 110,
187 N.M. 192, 109 P.3d 280 (stating that a
claim for constructive discharge requires an
employee to show “that the employer made
working conditions so intolerable, when
viewed objectively, that a reasonable person
would be compelled to resign”); see also

Littell, 2008-NMCA-012, 1141, 143 N.M. 506,
177 P.3d 1080 (providing the jury with a
constructive discharge elements instruction
stating that, in order to consider the plaintiff
constructively discharged, the jury must
“find that [the dlefendant ... made her
working conditions so intolerable, when
viewed objectively, that a reasonable person
would be compelled to resign, and she had no
other choice but to quit”). Our Supreme
Court has noted that “(t]he bar is quite high
for proving constructive discharge.” Gorm-
ley IZ, 2005-NMSC-003, 110, 187 N.M. 192,
109 P.8d 280 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Hs {15} Our standard of review in
assessing whether the verdict of the jury is
supported by the evidence is well settled:

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence

claim, this Court views the evidence in a

light most favorable to the prevailing party

and disregard[s] any inferences and evi-
dence to the contrary. We defer to the
jury’s determination regarding the credi-
bility of witnesses and the reconciliation of
inconsistent or contradictory evidence.

We simply review the evidence to deter-

mine whether there is evidence that a rea-

sonable mind would find adequate to sup-

port a conclusion.
Littell, 2008-NMCA-012, 118, 143 N.M. 506,
177 P.3d 1080 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Our
courts have looked to federal decisions for
guidance to determine the elements of a con-
structive discharge under New Mexico law.
See Gormley II, 2005-NMSC-008, 110, 187
N.M. 192, 109 P.8d 280. However, we have
not adopted, wholesale, federal decisions,
particularly when assessing whether the evi-
dence is sufficient to prove a constructive
discharge. Littell, 2008-NMCA-012, 118,
143 N.M. 506, 177 P.38d 1080 (“We reject
[Defendant’s] contention that the ‘clearly er-
roneous’ standard of review, which is em-
ployed by the federal courts, applies in this
state court action.”). Our standard of review
does not change because we are tasked with
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence for a
constructive discharge. That is, we view the
evidence as described in Littell to determine
if the essential elements of a constructive

23

discharge, as set forth in the elements in-
struction, were proven.

{16} In determining whether a
plaintiff has satisfied this burden, “[tJhe spe-
cific facts of the employment condition, and
the severity of its impact upon the employee,
are pivotal.” Jd. 112. “In many cases, the
circumstances surrounding resignation are
not egregious enough to support a claim.”
Id. Our appellate courts have declined to
establish bright-line rules for determining
whether a constructive discharge exists and
have instead chosen to consider a number of
factors in assessing the specific circum-
stances of each case. See id. 121; Littell,
2008-NMCA-012, 148, 143 N.M. 506, 177
P.3d 1080. Some of the factors that our
appellate courts have identified in construc-
tive discharge cases include whether an em-
ployer has threatened termination, suggested
that the employee resign or retire, demoted
the employee, or reduced the employee’s pay,
see Gormley II, 2005-NMSC-003, 1111, 16,
137 N.M. 192, 109 P.8d 280; whether the
employee has been subjected to unreasonable
criticism or discipline, id; see Littell, 2008-
NMCA-012, 142, 143 N.M. 506, 177 P.3d
1080; whether an employee remained on the
job after the onset of the intolerable working
conditions and for what length of time, see
Ulibarri, 2006-NMSC-009, 114, 139 N.M.
193, 131 P.3d 48; Gormley II, 2005-NMSC-
003, 1119-20, 187 N.M. 192, 109 P.3d 280;
whether an employee gave notice prior to
quitting, Gormley II, 2005-NMSC-003,
11 20-21, 187 N.M. 192, 109 P.3d 280; wheth-
er the employee was subjected to conduct
such as aggressive, physically intimidating
behavior or public humiliation, see Littell,
2008-NMCA-012, 1 42; and whether an em-
ployer had an opportunity to or attempted to
resolve the problem, Gormley I, 2004-
NMCA-021, 111 14, 17, 185 N.M. 128, 85 P.3d
252; see Littell, 2008-NMCA-012, 143, 143
N.M. 506, 177 P.3d 1080.

{17} In line with Gormley IJ, the question
for the jury under the elements instruction in
this case was not whether the working condi-
tions were merely difficult or unpleasant, but
whether Defendant made Plaintiff's working
conditions “so intolerable, when viewed ob-
jectively, that a reasonable person would be

24

compelled to resign; essentially, that she had
no other choice but to quit.” See 2005-
NMSC-008, 110, 187 N.M. 192, 109 P.8d 280.
The jury also received an instruction that
Defendant denied Plaintiff's retaliation claim
and contended that “she was not subjected to
any objectively materially adverse employ-
ment action and that the alleged acts of
retaliation were normal supervisory acts
done in the regular course of business.” In
addition, the jury received an instruction that
Defendant also denied that Plaintiff was con-
structively discharged and asserted that “the
acts complained of were average supervisory
conduct, and that Plaintiff ... voluntarily
resigned.” In accordance with UJI 13-304
NMRA, the Jury was instructed that, in eval-
uating the competing claims of Plaintiff and
Defendant,

A party seeking recovery or a party
relying upon a defense has the burden of
proving every essential element of the
claim or defense by the greater weight of
the evidence.

To prove by a greater weight of the
evidence means to establish that some-
thing is more likely true than not true.
When I say in these instructions that the
party has the burden of proof on sexual
and retaliatory harassment and construc-
tive discharge, I mean that you must be
persuaded that what is sought to be
proved is more probably true than not
true. Evenly balanced evidence is not suf-
ficient.

The jury received accurate, complete instruc-
tions on the applicable law and its duties in
evaluating the evidence and contentions of
the parties.

{18} Plaintiff presented testimony that,
during her four years of employment with
Defendant, her co-worker Reyes yelled at
her; told her to “shut-up”; said she did not
do anything; and called her “telele” (Spanish
for “dummy”), “Miss know-it-all,” and, on one
occasion, a “stupid bitch.” Plaintiff also tes-
tified that, on at least one occasion, Reyes
subjected her to aggressive and intimidating
conduct by yelling at her while standing with
his face only inches from her own, and on
another occasion told Plaintiff that if she held
her blouse closed while bending over he

would “kick {her] right up the ass.” Some of
this conduct occurred in front of students.
Plaintiff also presented evidence that Reyes
slammed drawers and cabinets, refused to
give her receipts for purchases he had made
using a university credit card that was issued
in Plaintiff's name, and laughed at Plaintiff
and made fun of her. Similarly, Plaintiff
presented evidence that her supervisor,
Thompson, yelled at Plaintiff and criticized
her in front of students, and on one occasion,
picked up a cigarette butt off the floor and
threw it at Plaintiff's chest accusing Plaintiff
of having left it on the floor.

{19} Plaintiff also claims she was subject-
ed to unfair criticism of her work perform-
ance. Plaintiff presented evidence that
Thompson accused her of being late and of
not following the class syllabus, complained
that student grades were missing, com-
plained that the program website contained
misspelled words and had not been updated,
and complained that Plaintiff had not com-
pleted other job duties, such as inventory, in
a timely fashion. Further, Plaintiff present-
ed evidence that Thompson came into her
office and threw folders on the floor looking
for something he had misplaced in his own
office, began changing his mind about due
dates for projects and about supplies he had
requested Plaintiff to purchase, and had de-
creased Plaintiff's performance rating on her
evaluation under “working relations.”

{20} The jury concluded, based on the
evidence, that Plaintiff was constructively
discharged. The jury apparently concluded
that Plaintiff's evidence was more credible
than Defendant’s, and our task is not to
second guess its factual findings. Littell,
2008-NMCA-012, 1138, 45, 48, 143 N.M.
506, 177 P.8d 1080 (stating that we review for
substantial evidence to support the result
reached, that the trier of fact resolves con-
flicts in testimony, and that we do not re-
weigh evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the jury). In Littell, we rejected
the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence
argument that in effect asked us to reweigh
the evidence. Id. 148. We stated that “[ilt
is not our role to reweigh the evidence or
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.”
Id. We therefore concluded that “the evi-

dence, when considered in its totality, could
have reasonably supported the jury’s conelu-
sion that [the dJefendant made [the p]lain-
tiff’s working conditions so intolerable that a
reasonable person in her position would have
been compelled to resign.” Jd. As in Littell,
the evidence set forth by Plaintiff is sufficient
to sustain the jury verdict.

{21} We note that Defendant attempts to
distinguish this case from Littell. We are
not persuaded. In Littell, this Court held
that a constructive discharge existed when,
among other factors, the plaintiff had been
subjected to criticism that was “inaccurate
and outrageous” in that the plaintiff testified
the criticism was without any factual basis,
and the plaintiff had presented testimony
from other people that she worked with
closely that she was a competent employee
who did excellent work. Id. 142. In con-
trast to Littell, Defendant argues that Plain-
tiff was never formally disciplined, that her
work space was not altered, and that she was
not denied a leave of absence. Defendant
further argues that Plaintiff did not offer
testimony from people who could attest to
“unusual interactions between [Plaintiff] and
Thompson”; she was not subjected to any
formal discipline; and she was not ever
threatened with termination, demoted, asked
to resign, or subjected to a reduction in pay.
Defendant additionally points out that Plain-
tiff remained on the job after the onset of
allegedly intolerable working conditions for
quite some time, Plaintiff explored her op-
tions prior to leaving, and Plaintiff gave no-
tice prior to her resignation.

HN {22} However, we do not review evi-
dence to determine if it supports an opposite
result, but we determine whether the evi-
dence is sufficient to support the result
reached. Jd. 138. As discussed above, the
evidence presented to the jury was sufficient
to support the jury’s findings. Although De-
fendant attempts to resolve the issues raised
by Plaintiff by undercutting Plaintiff's argu-
ment that a reasonable person would have
felt she had no other choice but to quit at the
time Plaintiff submitted her resignation, we
do not reweigh evidence or “substitute our
judgment for that of the jury.” Id 148.

25

WN {23} © Defendant —_ additionally
makes similar arguments, pursuant to Gorm-
ley I, that (1) Plaintiff had been looking for
another job during the last months of her
employment and intended to quit once she
had secured one, see 2004-NMCA-021, 117,
185 N.M. 128, 85 P.8d 252 (relying, in part,
on the fact that the plaintiff waited over a
year after a reduction in pay during which he
investigated his social security benefits and
decided to take early retirement prior to
resigning and concluding that the plaintiff
was not constructively discharged); and (2)
Plaintiff tolerated the conduct she complains
of for a significant period of time. However,
our Supreme Court declined to stipulate “a
time within which an employee must leave to
complain of constructive discharge.” Gorm-
ley IT, 2005-NMSC-003, 121, 187 N.M. 192,
109 P.8d 280 (further stating that “the cir-
cumstances surrounding how long the em-
ployee remains on the job and continues to
suffer from onerous conditions” is only one
factor that we must consider in looking at the
specific circumstances of a case to determine
if a constructive discharge occurred). More-
over, a plaintiff remaining in a position and
tolerating inappropriate behavior for a signif-
icant period of time is not fatal to a construc-
tive discharge. See Littell, 2008-NMCA-
012, 1917, 24, 80, 42, 143 N.M. 506, 177 P.8d
1080 (upholding the jury’s determination that
a constructive discharge had occurred when
the plaintiff tolerated sexually harassing be-
havior for more than three years and physi-
eal intimidation, pretextual discipline, and
sabotage by her supervisor for at least a
year).

CONCLUSION
{24} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO
and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.

2011-NMCA-070
256 P.3d 969

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Y.
Archie SKINNER, Defendant—Appellant.
No. 28,815.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Feb, 24, 2011.

Certio Denied, May 25,
2011, No. 32,921.

nw
a

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, Francine A. Chavez, Assistant Attorney
General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C.,
Nancy L. Simmons, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellant.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Chief Judge.

{1} Defendant appeals his conviction of
criminal sexual penetration of a minor
(CSPM). His primary contention is that the
district court erred in allowing Dr. Karen
Carson, a pediatrician, to testify as to hear-
say statements made by the child victim
(Child) during a sexual assault nurse exami-
nation (SANE exam). We hold that Dr.
Carson’s testimony concerning Child’s ac-
count of the abuse, as well as the identifica-
tion of Defendant as the perpetrator, was
properly admitted pursuant to Rule 11-
803(D) NMRA. Dr. Carson’s testimony re-
garding Child’s statements about a drawing
of a penis were admitted in error, but this

28

error was harmless. Defendant failed to
preserve his argument that the drawing itself
was inadmissible hearsay and that Child’s
statements were inadmissible because they
were more prejudicial than probative. We
are unpersuaded by Defendant’s sufficiency
of the evidence and Sixth Amendment con-
frontation clause arguments. Accordingly,
we affirm.

J. BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant was charged with two
counts of CSPM, in violation of NMSA 1978,
Section 80-9-11 (2007) (amended 2009), and
one count of criminal sexual contact with a
minor (CSCM), in violation of NMSA 1978,
Section 30-9-13 (2003). All three counts
were based on allegations that Defendant
engaged in sexual activity with Child who is
his granddaughter and who was six years old
at the time. Several witnesses testified at
Defendant’s trial, among them Child and Dr.
Carson.

{3} Child took the stand and testified that
Defendant put his hand underneath her un-
derwear, touched her vagina, and performed
the act of cunnilingus on her. Dr. Carson,
who performed a SANE exam of Child short-
ly after the sexual abuse came to light, also
testified. Dr. Carson was asked what history
she obtained from Child during the exam in
relation to Defendant. As she began testify-
ing about what Child told her, Defendant
objected on grounds of hearsay and confron-
tation. The district court asked the State for
additional foundation, which the State provid-
ed. The district court then overruled Defen-
dant’s objection concluding that Dr. Carson
was engaged in medical diagnosis and treat-
ment during the SANE exam and, thus,
could testify as to hearsay statements Child
made during the exam pursuant to Rule 11-
808(D) that provides that statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment are not excluded by the hearsay rule.

{4} After the ruling, Dr. Carson proceeded
to explain that Child identified Defendant as
the perpetrator of the abuse and then de-
scribed the nature and scope of the abuse.
Dr. Carson testified that Child told her that,
Defendant inserted his fingers into her vagi-
na and anus, that he performed cunnilingus

on her, and that he made her perform fella-
tio. Dr. Carson further testified that, after
obtaining Child’s medical history, she studied
Child’s vagina with specialized medical equip-
ment and observed that Child’s hymen had
been torn in abnormal areas suggesting that
Child’s vagina had been deeply penetrated
with either a finger or some other object.

{5} The district court also admitted, over
Defendant’s objection, a drawing Child made
for Dr. Carson during the SANE exam. The
drawing was of a penis, and Dr. Carson
testified that Child told her the drawing de-
picted Defendant’s penis. Defendant object-
ed that the drawing was irrelevant because
Child had testified that the drawing depicted
her uncle’s penis.

{6} A directed verdict was granted as to
the one count of CSCM and as to one of the
two counts of CSPM. The jury found Defen-
dant guilty on the remaining count of CSPM.
Defendant was sentenced based on this con-
viction.

I. DISCUSSION

{7} On appeal, Defendant makes four ar-
guments. First, Defendant argues that the
district court made several errors relating to
the admissibility of the evidence. Specifical-
ly, Defendant claims that the district court
wrongly permitted Dr. Carson to testify as to
statements Child made during the SANE
exam. Defendant also argues that the dis-
trict court erred in admitting the drawing
Child drew during the SANE exam. Third,
Defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction. Finally,
Defendant argues, pursuant to State vu
Franklin, 78 N.M. 127, 129, 428 P.2d 982, 984
(1967), and State v. Boyer, 103 N.M. 655,
658-60, 712 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Ct.App.1985), that
allowing Dr. Carson to testify about Child’s
statements during the SANE exam violated
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to con-
frontation. We address these matters in
turn.

A. Evidentiary Matters

{8} “Generally speaking, a reviewing
court defers to the trial court’s decision to
admit or exclude evidence and will not re-

29

;
| cesmeuaerecmmmar
inherently untrustworthy because of the risk
of misperception, failed memory, insincerity,

verse unless there has been an abuse of
discretion. However, our review of the ap-
plication of the law to the facts is conducted
de novo.” State v. Martinez, 2008-NMSC-
060, 110, 145 N.M. 220, 195 P.3d 1282 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A misapprehension of the law upon which a
court bases an otherwise discretionary evi-
dentiary ruling is subject to de novo review.”
Id. We begin our analysis by examining De-
fendant’s arguments relating to Dr. Carson’s
testimony and then turn to Defendant’s
claims concerning the drawing.

1. Statements by Child to Dr. Carson

{9} Relying on State v. Ortega, 2008-
NMCA-001, 127, 143 N.M. 261, 175 P.8d
929, overruled in part by State v. Mendez,
2010-NMSC-044, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d
328, Defendant asserts that hearsay state-
ments made by a victim of sexual abuse
during a SANE exam do not fall within Rule
11-803(D) as such statements are not for the
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment
but are primarily for evidentiary purposes to
prosecute a crime. Accordingly, Defendant.
contends that the district court improperly
admitted Dr. Carson’s testimony concerning
statements made by Child during the SANE
exam. However, our Supreme Court over-
ruled Ortega to the following extent: “Under
(Ortega, 2008-NMCA-001, 1116-27, 143
N.M. 261, 175 P.8d 929], hearsay statements
made to a [SANE] nurse ... during an
examination of a victim of alleged sexual
abuse, are rarely admissible at trial, even if
some of those statements pertain to ‘medical
diagnosis or treatment’ under Rule 11-
803(D) ..., and even if the declarant testifies
at trial.” Mendez, 2010-NMSC-044, 111, 148
N.M. 761, 242 P.8d 328, The Court concluded
that “Ortega went too far in its hearsay
analysis and in categorically excluding state-
ments made to SANE nurses,” and “re-
verse[d] the evidentiary ruling of the trial
court, and the affirming opinion of the Court
of Appeals that relied on Ortega,” which the
Supreme Court partially overruled. Mendez,
2010-NMSC-044, 1, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.8d
328,

Ws {10} “The hearsay rule excludes
from admissible evidence statements that are

ambiguity, and the like.” Mendez, 2010-
NMSC-044, 119, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328.
“There are, however, numerous exceptions to
the hearsay rule when statements made by
an out-of-court declarant nevertheless pos-
sess circumstantial guarantees of reliability
sufficient to make the statements trustwor-
thy and admissible.” Id; see Rule 11-802
NMRA (“Hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by these rules....”). Rule 11-
803(D) is one such exception and provides:
The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:

Statements made for purposes of medi-
cal diagnosis or treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symp-
toms, pain, or sensations, or the inception
or general character of the cause or exter-
nal source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

“The State bears the burden of laying the
proper foundation for admitting statements
under Rule 11-803(D) and Rule 11-403
(NMRAJ].” Mendez, 2010-NMSC-044, 154,
148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328.

{11} In Mendez, our Supreme Court over-
ruled Ortega, in part, and clarified existing
law for applying Rule 11-803(D) as it relates
to the admissibility of hearsay statements
elicited from a victim of sexual abuse during
a SANE exam. Mendez, 2010-NMSC-044,
1118, 40-55, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.38d 328.
Defendant’s trial occurred before Mendez,
and Defendant’s submissions on appeal were
also filed before Mendez had been issued.
Mendez explains that Ortega erroneously di-
rected “courts to determine the purpose of
the encounter, instead of considering the
substance of, and circumstances surrounding,
individual statements.” Mendez, 2010-
NMSC-044, 139, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.8d 328,
This approach, our Supreme Court deter-
mined, “is irreconcilable with previous hear-
say opinions in which our courts have focused
on particular statements, determining in each
instance the purpose for which the statement.
was made.” Jd. The Court acknowledged
“the special challenges posed by determining

30

the admissibility of statements made” by vic-
tims during SANE exams under Rule 11-
803(D), but rejected “the notion that state-
ments can be categorically excluded based on
the professional status or affiliation of the
individual to whom the statement is made.”
Mendez, 2010~NMSC-044, 141, 148 N.M.
761, 242 P.8d 828. We reject Defendant’s
assertion that Child’s statements to Dr. Car-
son during the SANE exam were categorical-
ly inadmissible as this claim is contrary to
Mendez. We proceed to evaluate these
statements in light of the guidance provided
in Mendez.

{12} Our Supreme Court explained in
Mendez that “[t]wo underlying rationales tra-
ditionally animate Rule 11-803(D).” Men-
dez, 2010-NMSC-044, 120, 148 N.M. 761,
242 P.8d 828. The first rationale is the help-
seeking motivation. Id. “(Tyhe declarant’s
self-interest in obtaining proper medical at-
tention renders the usual risks of hearsay
testimony ... minimal when associated with
medical treatment.” Id. (omission in origi-
nal) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The second rationale is commonly
referred to as pertinence. Id. 121. “[I]fa
statement is pertinent to a medical condition,
such that a medical care provider reasonably
relies upon it in arriving at a diagnosis or
treatment, the statement is deemed suffi-
ciently reliable to overcome hearsay con-
cerns.” Jd. “Trustworthiness can be estab-
lished under either rationale alone, or some
degree of both. In any event, trial courts
are best suited to consider the relevant facts
and circumstances of a given case in order to
make the ultimate determination.” Id. 123.
Trial courts must closely scrutinize the ex-
change between the medical provider and
patient “to determine the statement’s overall
trustworthiness under Rule 11-8038(D) in
light of the[se] two rationales.” Mendez,
2010-NMSC-044, 142, 148 N.M. 761, 242
P.8d 328. In other words, “[tJhe trial court
must ... carefully parse each statement
made to a [SANE nurse] to determine
whether the statement is sufficiently trust-
worthy, focusing on the declarant’s motiva-
tion to seek medical care and whether a
medical provider could have reasonably re-
lied on the statement for diagnosing or treat-
ing the declarant.” Id. 148.

{18} The hearsay statements proffered by
Dr. Carson can be divided into three discrete
categories. The first is Dr. Carson’s testimo-
ny concerning Child’s account of the nature
and scope of the sexual abuse. The second is
Dr. Carson’s testimony regarding Child’s
identification of Defendant as the perpetrator
of the abuse, The third is Dr. Carson’s
testimony that Child stated the drawing she
drew was of Defendant’s penis. We analyze
the admissibility of each category in turn.

HM {14} As to the first category, Mendez
states that a “patient’s account of what hap-
pened to her body helps medical care provid-
ers determine the best way to proceed in
diagnosing and ultimately treating any inju-
ry.” Id. 148. Mendez further indicates that
statements elicited from a victim of sexual
abuse by a medical provider concerning the
nature of any body-to-body contact involved
in the abuse, the possibility of any fluid-to-
body contact occurring during the abuse, and
any bodily sensations experienced by the vic-
tim during the abuse may, under the context
and circumstances, relate directly to the vic-
tim’s help-seeking motivation and be perti-
nent to medical diagnosis and treatment. Id.
11 44-45.

{15} The evidence shows that in the morn-
ing hours of November 8, 2007, Child was
taken to a doctor because she was experienc-
ing vaginal pain. Officers from the Roswell
Police Department were summoned to the
doctor’s office at around 10 a.m. and were
informed that Child had been sexually as-
saulted. Child was brought to Esperanza
House at 11:00 a.m. for an interview and then
taken to Dr. Carson at roughly 1:45 p.m. for
the SANE exam.

{16} Dr. Carson testified that she com-
plied with the statewide SANE protocols and
obtained a history of Child prior to conduct-
ing the physical examination. The State
asked Dr. Carson what purpose was served
in her attempt to obtain Child’s history. Dr.
Carson responded that the purpose of obtain-
ing Child’s medical history was to diagnose
Child and treat her physical complaints. Dr.
Carson further testified that this is some-
thing that all physicians do when a person
with physical maladies seeks treatment. Dr.

Carson then described Child’s account of the
nature and extent of the abuse which, as
previously described, involved vaginal and
anal penetration, cunnilingus, and fellatio.
Dr. Carson testified that after she obtained
this history, she performed an external and
internal examination of Child’s body. Dr.
Carson discovered that Child had no external
injuries but had sustained penetrating inju-
ries to her vagina which corroborated Child’s
claim that she had been vaginally penetrated
with either a finger or some other object.

{17} In our view, the State laid a sufficient
foundation to permit us to conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that Child’s statements to Dr. Carson
about the nature and scope of the abuse
were admissible under Rule 11-803(D). The
evidence indicates (1) that Dr. Carson was
attempting to identify whether Child was in-
jured when Dr. Carson asked Child to de-
scribe the nature and scope of the abuse, (2)
that Child’s statements about the scope of
the abuse were pertinent to her health and
treatment, and (8) that it was reasonable for
Dr. Carson to rely on Child’s statements in
attempting to identify Child’s injuries. In-
deed, during her physical examination of
Child, Dr. Carson found injuries in the areas
of Child’s body where Child claimed she had
been penetrated. Dr. Carson’s testimony
concerning Child’s account of the scope and
nature of the abuse was properly admitted.

Hl {18} We turn now to the second cate-
gory of Dr. Carson’s testimony—Child’s
identification of Defendant as the perpetrator
of the sexual abuse. Mendez instructs that
“statements of fault or identity are inadmissi-
ble under the hearsay exception for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment because
they are not pertinent to treatment or diag-
nosis[,]” but there is an exception: victim
statements involving the identification of the
abuser may be admissible under Rule 11-
803(D) where the identity of the abuser is
pertinent to psychological treatment or
where treatment involves separating the vic-
tim from the abuser. Mendez, 2010-NMSC-
044, 1152-58, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.8d 328,

{19} At trial, the State presented evidence
that Defendant served as a caregiver for
Child during the period of time preceding

31

Child’s complaint of vaginal pain. Dr. Car-
son stated that Child told her that Defendant
was her “Papa,” thus alerting Dr. Carson to
the probability that Defendant was Child’s
relative. This evidence is sufficient to permit
‘us to conclude that Dr. Carson would need to
know if Defendant was the source of the
sexual abuse so as to prevent Child from
being returned to Defendant’s care and fur-
ther harmed. See id. 158 (‘{IInformation
that a child sexual abuser is a member of the
patient’s household is reasonably pertinent to
a course of treatment that includes removing
the child from the home.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). We conclude
that Dr. Carson’s statement that Child told
her Defendant was the perpetrator of the
abuse was also properly admitted under Rule
11-803(D).

Hl {20} The last category of hearsay at
issue here is Dr. Carson’s statement that
Child told her that the drawing she drew was
of Defendant’s penis. At trial, Dr. Carson
testified that Child volunteered to draw the
drawing during the SANE exam. Dr. Car-
son stated that she does not ask patients
undergoing SANE exams to make drawings,
but she allowed Child to make the drawing in
this instance because Child volunteered to do
so. Dr. Carson testified that after Child
drew the drawing, Child told Dr. Carson it
‘was a drawing of Defendant’s penis.

{21} The record provides no guidance as
to how Child’s assertion that the drawing
was of Defendant’s penis might have assisted
Dr. Carson in her efforts to diagnose or treat
Child’s injuries. Dr. Carson merely testified
that Child asked to draw a drawing, she did
so, and then she claimed it was of Defen-
dant’s penis. Without more, we cannot con-
clude that the State met its foundational
burden as to the admissibility of this state-
ment under Rule 11-803(D).

I {22} Even though admission of this
evidence was error, we conclude that this
error was harmless. The standard for harm-
less error review in the evidentiary context is
summarized in State v. Branch, 2010-
NMSC-042, 148 N.M. 601, 241 P.3d 602.
There, ow Supreme Court provided the fol-
lowing guidance.

32 De

Given that the error in this case was an
evidentiary error, we employ the non-con-
stitutional standard for the harmless error
analysis. [A] non-constitutional error is
harmless when there is no reasonable
probability the error affected the verdict.
Reviewing courts consider three factors
when determining whether an error is
harmless: [W]hether there is: (1) substan-
tial evidence to support the conviction
without reference to the improperly admit-
ted evidence; (2) such a disproportionate
volume of permissible evidence that, in
comparison, the amount of improper evi-
dence will appear minuscule; and (8) no
substantial conflicting evidence to discredit
the State’s testimony. These factors are
considered in conjunction with one another

... [and] provide a reviewing court with a

reliable basis for determining whether an

error is harmless.
Id. 115 (alterations in original) (omission in
original) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted).

{23} As to the first factor, there was sub-
stantial evidence other than Dr. Carson’s im-
properly admitted statement regarding the
drawing to support Defendant’s conviction.
The jury was instructed that, to find Defen-
dant guilty of CSPM, they were required to
find: (1) that Defendant caused Child to
engage in cunnilingus or that Defendant
caused the insertion of his finger, to any
extent, into Child’s vagina; (2) that Child
was twelve years of age or younger; and (8)
that this happened in New Mexico on or
about November 6, 2007. Child testified that
Defendant touched her vagina and performed
cunnilingus on her. Dr. Carson similarly
testified that Child stated during the SANE
exam that Defendant inserted his finger into
her vagina and anus and performed cunnilin-
gus on her. Dr. Carson’s examination of
Child’s vagina revealed evidence that Child’s
vagina had been penetrated with either a
finger or some other object.

{24} Turning to the second factor, we
determine that Dr. Carson’s improperly ad-
mitted testimony appears minuscule in com-
parison to the permissible evidence just de-
scribed. As detailed above, the testimony
regarding the drawing was insignificant in

relation to the permissible evidence admit-
ted.

{25} The third factor relates to other evi-
dence in the case. While there was some
evidence of Child’s untruthfulness, there was
no substantial conflicting evidence to discred-
it the testimony presented by the State.
Moreover, Defendant submitted evidence in
the form of testimony from various family
members that Child had a reputation for
being untruthful. The conflict between
Child’s testimony as to the drawing and that
of Dr. Carson provided support for Defen-
dant’s theory. Although Defendant contends
that Dr. Carson’s testimony as to the draw-
ing corroborated Child’s account, this is not
the case. Child’s other testimony regarding
the abuse was corroborated by Dr. Carson’s
testimony, but Child’s identification of the
penis in the drawing contradicted Dr. Car-
son’s testimony and in doing so, aided Defen-
dant in presenting his theory of the case.

{26} Accordingly, after weighing the fac-
tors, we conclude that there was no reason-
able probability that the admission of Dr.
Carson’s testimony concerning Child’s state-
ments about the drawing during the SANE
exam affected the verdict. The district court
committed harmless error in admitting this
evidence.

{27} Before proceeding to the next issue
on appeal, we address Defendant’s contention
that Dr. Carson’s hearsay statements should
be excluded under Rule 11-403 NMRA. Spe-
cifically, Defendant argues that Dr. Carson’s
status as an expert shrouded her testimony
in an air of trustworthiness and impinged on
the jury’s role as factfinder. We decline to
entertain this argument because “Defen-
dant’s brief-in-chief fails to include the requi-
site statement regarding preservation” re-
garding this argument. State v. Harrison,
2010-NMSC-038, 111, 148 N.M. 500, 238
P.8d 869; see Rule 12-218(A)(4) NMRA.

2. Drawing

Hl {28} We now turn to Defendant's ar-
guments concerning the admissibility of the
drawing itself. In his brief-in-chief, Defen-
dant provides three grounds for his position
that the drawing was inadmissible: (1) be-
cause it was based on the inadmissible state-

ments of Dr. Carson, (2) because allowing
Dr. Carson to testify to the drawing allowed
improper validation of the exhibit, and (8)
because it was irrelevant. Defendant did not
preserve the first two claims; thus, we will
not address them on appeal. See Rule 12-
216(A) NMRA (“To preserve a question for
review it must appear that a ruling’ or deci-
sion by the district court was fairly in-
voked[.]”).

{29} As to relevancy, Defendant maintains
that because there was no admissible testi-
mony linking the drawing to Defendant, the
drawing itself was irrelevant and was there-
fore wrongly admitted. We disagree. As we
have explained in paragraph 25, Defendant’s
theory of the case was that Child had a
reputation for being untruthful and that the
accusations against Defendant were false.
Child’s testimony that the drawing depicted
her uncle’s penis would tend to show that she
had seen her uncle’s penis. This could raise
a question regarding the veracity of her tes-
timony that Defendant was the perpetrator.
Viewed in this light, we cannot see how such
evidence was relevant because this evidence
tends to show precisely what Defendant
wanted the jury to believe—that Child had
lied. The drawing was relevant, and we
reject Defendant’s arguments to the con-
trary.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

HMM {80} Defendant contends that
the evidence was insufficient to “allow a ra-
tional trier of fact to find him guilty of” the
one count of CSPM of which he was convict-
ed. “The test for sufficiency of the evidence
is whether substantial evidence of either a
direct or circumstantial nature exists to sup-
port a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt with respect to every element essential
to a conviction.” State v. Riley, 2010-
NMSC-~005, 112, 147 N.M. 557, 226 P.3d 656
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). We set forth the jury instruction and
described the evidence supporting the convic-
tion in the preceding section of this opinion
and need not do so again here. Rather, we
focus on Defendant’s arguments.

HM {81} Defendant asserts that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the verdict

33

because Child’s credibility is dubious and
because Child testified that her family mem-
bers instructed her to identify Defendant as
the source of the abuse. This line of argu-
ment is unavailing. “As an appellate court,
we do not substitute our judgment for that of
the factfinder concerning the credibility of
witnesses or the weight to be given their
testimony.” State v. Nichols, 2006-NMCA-
017, 19, 139 N.M. 72, 128 P.3d 500 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Contrary evidence supporting acquittal does
not provide a basis for reversal because the
jury is free to reject [the dJefendant’s version
of the facts.” State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-
001, 119, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829.

{32} Defendant also claims that, while the
medical evidence indicates that Child suf-
fered a penetrating injury to her vagina,
there was no evidence to connect Defendant,
with the injury. We disagree. Child testi-
fied that Defendant touched her vagina with
his finger. Dr. Carson testified that during
the SANE examination Child claimed that
Defendant penetrated her vagina with his
finger. Moreover, the jury instruction indi-
cates that Defendant could be convicted of
CSPM for either inserting his finger into
Child’s vagina to any degree or by causing
Child to engage in cunnilingus. Putting
aside the evidence that Defendant penetrated
Child’s vagina with his finger, there was also
evidence presented that Defendant caused
Child to engage in cunnilingus. We reject
Defendant’s assertion that the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction.

D. Confrontation

HI {33} Defendant’s final argument is
submitted pursuant to Franklin and Boyer.
He asserts that his Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation was violated when the dis-
trict court allowed Dr. Carson to testify
about the statements Child made during the
SANE exam. This argument is without mer-
it as Child testified in this case, and Defen-
dant did have an opportunity to face Child at
trial and cross-examine her. Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94
L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (observing that the con-
frontation clause provides criminal defen-
dants the right to physically face those who

34 De
testify against them and the right to conduct
cross-examination).

Il. CONCLUSION

{34} For the foregoing reasons, the judg-
ment of the district court is affirmed.

{85} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN
and LINDA M. VANZI, Judges.

2011-NMCA-071
256 P.3d 977

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

ve
Richard LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 29,382.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

March 16, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, May 6, 2011, No. 32,951.

35

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, Francine A. Chavez, Assistant Attorney
General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E.
Tangora, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} Defendant Richard Lopez appeals
from the district court's order of criminal
commitment, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sec-
tion 31~9-1.5(D) (1999). Defendant argues
that the district court erred by (1) finding
that there was sufficient evidence that Defen-
dant inflicted great bodily harm while com-
mitting armed robbery, (2) concluding that
armed robbery is a crime delineated in Sec-
tion 31-9-1.5(D) permitting commitment, and
(8) denying Defendant presentence confine-
ment credit for the period of detainment.
prior to the commitment. Because armed
robbery that results in the infliction of great
bodily harm on another person is a delineat-
ed crime under Section 31-9-1.5(D) and
there was sufficient evidence to support the
district court’s finding that Defendant inflict-
ed great bodily harm on the victim while
committing armed robbery, the district court
did not err by ordering Defendant’s commit-
ment for twelve years. However, because
Defendant was entitled to presentence con-
finement credit for the period of detainment
prior to the commitment in light of our opin-
ion in State v. Lopez, 2009-NMCA-112, 147
NLM. 279, 219 P.8d 1288, we remand to the
district court to modify the commitment peri-
od.

BACKGROUND

{2} A grand jury indicted Defendant on
charges of armed robbery, contrary to
NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-2 (1978), aggra-
vated burglary with a deadly weapon, con-
trary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-4(A)
(1963), and aggravated battery with a deadly
weapon or, alternatively, aggravated battery
with great bodily harm, contrary to NMSA
1978, Section 30-3-5(A), (C) (1969). Before

36

trial, the district court ordered a criminal
commitment hearing after finding that De-
fendant was incompetent to proceed to trial
and still dangerous, pursuant to Section 31-
9-1.5(D). Section 31-9-1.5(D) permits a dis-
trict court to criminally commit a defendant
in a locked, secured facility for a period of
time equal to the maximum sentence that
could have been imposed had the defendant
been convicted in a criminal proceeding.
The judge must find by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant committed a
erime specified in Section 31-9-1.5(D) and
that the defendant is incompetent and dan-
gerous.

{83} Prior to the commitment hearing, the
parties stipulated to facts regarding the inci-
dent forming the basis of the charges against
Defendant, which we summarize as follows.
Defendant was staying with his girlfriend at
the Ambassador Inn (hotel). During the
stay, the victim, who is a night clerk at the
hotel, twice told Defendant, his girlfriend,
and another individual to refrain from drink-
ing outside their room. Both times, Defen-
dant and his companions complied with the
request. Early the next morning, Defendant
approached the victim in the hotel laundry
room and asked for towels. The victim
turned away to get the towels, and when he
turned to hand them to Defendant, Defen-
dant struck him in the face with a closed fist.
As a result, the victim fell into an industrial-
sized laundry basket, and Defendant contin-
ued to strike him. The victim could not
defend himself due to a congenital birth de-
fect that does not allow him to extend his
hands. Defendant then picked up a hard,
plastic tube and beat the victim over the
head with it until the victim “ ‘played dead.”
Defendant took the keys to the hotel office
from the victim and entered the hotel office.
Police later discovered that $46.81 was miss-
ing from the cash drawer inside the office.
Defendant was charged and arrested three
weeks later. While being arrested, Defen-
dant told the arresting officers that he “re-
called being in an altercation with an employ-
ee,” that he “received a few dollars from the
{hotel’s] cash drawer,” and spontaneously
stated that “$40 was not worth it.”

{4} Based on the preceding stipulated
facts, the district court found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Defendant com-
mitted armed robbery that resulted in
great bodily harm to the victim and both
alternative counts of aggravated battery.
The district court concluded that both
armed robbery and aggravated battery are
crimes delineated for criminal commitment.
pursuant to Section 81-9-1.5(D) and or-
dered Defendant’s commitment in a locked,
secure facility for three years for the ag-
gravated battery and nine years for the
armed robbery. The district court denied
Defendant presentence confinement credit
for the period of detainment prior to the
criminal commitment.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

I {5} Robbery requires the intent to
take something of value from another person.
See State v. Nelson, 83 N.M. 269, 271, 490
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Ct.App.1971) (holding that.
robbery includes “the concept of criminal
intent”); see also UJI 14-1621 NMRA (in-
cluding the intent to permanently deprive the
victim of property as an element of armed
robbery). Section 31-9-1.5(D) only permits
a district court to commit a defendant upon a
finding by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant committed a crime that “in-
volves the infliction of great bodily harm on
another person,” and that the defendant was
incompetent and dangerous. As a result, to
have committed Defendant, the district court
must necessarily have found that (1) Defen-
dant inflicted great bodily harm on the victim
during the commission of the armed robbery,
and therefore, (2) Defendant intended to
steal the property of the victim while he
inflicted great bodily harm on the victim.

HMM {6} Defendant argues that there
was insufficient evidence in the stipulated
facts to support a finding that Defendant
intended to commit armed robbery at the
time that great bodily harm was inflicted on
the victim. This Court reviews the sufficien-
ey of the evidence for an order of commit-
ment under Section 31-9-1.5(D) using a test
that parallels the test for substantial evi-
dence in reviewing a criminal conviction. See
State v. Taylor, 2000-NMCA-072, 118, 129
N.M. 376, 8 P.8d 863. We determine wheth-

er there is direct or circumstantial evidence
to support a verdict of guilty with respect to
every element essential to conviction. Id.
We review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, resolving
all conflicts and permissible inferences in its
favor. Id. We will not substitute our judg-
ment for that of the district court and only
determine whether “any rational fact finder
could have found ... the essential facts re-
quired” for conviction. State v. Adonis,
2008-NMSC-059, 112, 145 N.M. 102, 194
P.38d 717 (emphasis, internal quotation
marks, and citation omitted).

I {7} While there is no direct evidence
as to the time that Defendant formed the
intent to commit robbery, circumstantial evi-
dence can be sufficient to support a finding
of intent. See State v. Durant, 2000-
NMCA-066, 115, 129 N.M. 845, 7 P.8d 495
(recognizing that “[iJntent can rarely be
proved directly and often is proved by cir-
cumstantial evidence”). The stipulated facts
indicate that Defendant committed the bat-
tery on the victim and that immediately after
the victim “played dead,” Defendant took the
keys to the hotel office. Defendant did not
leave the laundry room between the battery
and the taking of the keys. The stipulated
facts also indicate that Defendant admitted
“veceiv[ing] a few dollars” from the cash
drawer and that he spontaneously told the
arresting officer that “$40 was not worth it.”
While this statement is not a direct admis-
sion, it can be interpreted as circumstantial
evidence that Defendant committed the bat-
tery on the victim with the intent to rob him.
The close temporal proximity between the
battery and the taking of the keys, along
with the statement to the officer, is sufficient
circumstantial evidence to support a finding
that Defendant formed the intent to commit
the robbery before or during the time he
committed the battery on the victim.

{8} While Defendant implies in his brief in
chief that he may have had other reasons for
committing the battery aside from intent to
commit robbery, such as that he was upset
that the victim had previously told Defendant
and his friends to refrain from drinking in
public, we decline to disturb the judgment of
the factfinder and reweigh the evidence. See

37

State v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, 133, 148
N.M. 747, 242 P.3d 314. The factfinder is
free to reject a defendant's version of events.
State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 131, 758 P.2d
1814, 1319 (1988).

GREAT BODILY HARM UNDER SEC-
TION 31-9-1.5(D)

Hl {9} Defendant further argues that
the district court erred in finding that armed
robbery is a crime for which a defendant can
be committed because Section 31-9-1.5(D)
only permits commitment of a defendant who
commits a felony containing the infliction of
great bodily harm as an element necessary
for conviction. Our review of Section 31-9-
1.5@) is a question of statutory interpreta-
tion that we review de novo. See Villa v.
City of Las Cruces, 2010-NMCA-099, { 12,
148 N.M. 668, 241 P.3d 1108 (“Statutory con-
struction calls for de novo review.”), cert.
denied, 2010-NMCERT-009, 149 N.M. 49,
243 P.3d 753.

Hs {10} In interpreting a statute, our
primary objective is to give effect to the
Legislature’s intent. State v. Davis, 2003~
NMSC-022, 16, 184 N.M. 172, 74 P.8d 1064.
In determining legislative intent, we first
look to the language used and give effect to
the plain meaning of that language. Id. Un-
der the plain meaning rule, if the plain mean-
ing of the statute is clear and unambiguous,
we refrain from any further statutory inter-
pretation. State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001,
110, 184 N.M. 768, 82 P.8d 989. Moreover,
when the statute at issue is complete and
makes sense as written, we do not read into
the statute any words that are not in the
statutory language. Burroughs v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of Bernalillo, 88
N.M. 308, 306, 540 P.2d 283, 236 (1975).

{11} We must determine whether the Leg-
islature intended “a felony that involves the
infliction of great bodily harm” in Section 31-
9-1.5(D) to mean that the felony must con-
tain infliction of great bodily harm as an
element necessary for conviction. (Emphasis
added.) The question hinges on the meaning
the Legislature intended by the term “in-
volves.” In determining the plain meaning
of statutory language, we are aided by the
dictionary definition. See Battishill v.

38

Farmers Alliance Ins. Co., 2006-NMSC-004,
18, 189 N.M. 24, 127 P.8d 1111 (“We ...
hold that the common and ordinary meaning
... may be ascertained from a dictionary.”).
“Involve” is defined as “to oblige to become
associated.” Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary 1191 (Unabridged 1993).
“Associated” is defined as “closely connected,
joined, or united with another.” Jd. at 132.
Using these definitions as a guide, the plain
meaning of Section 31-9-1.5 is that it allows
for confinement of defendants who commit
felonies closely connected, joined, or united
with the infliction of great bodily harm.

{12} A felony can be closely connected,
joined, or united with the infliction of great
bodily harm even when the felony does not
contain the infliction of great bodily harm as
an element necessary for conviction, such as
in this case in which a felony is committed in
a manner that results in great bodily harm to
another. To require that the infliction of
great bodily harm be an element of the felo-
ny requires us to equate “involves” with a
phrase such as “contains as an element.”
Such a reading would require this Court to
add words not specifically stated in Section
31-9-1.5(D) and place a limitation not found
in the text of the statute. We decline to do
so. See Burroughs, 88 N.M. at 306, 540 P.2d
at 286 (recognizing that this Court “will not
read into a statute or ordinance language
which is not there, particularly if it makes
sense as written”). If the Legislature had
intended great bodily harm to be a necessary
element of the underlying felony before crim-
inal commitment can be imposed, the Legis-
lature could have drafted the statute using
such language. Cf State v. Ordunez, 2010-
NMCA-095, 18, 148 N.M. 620, 241 P.38d 621
(stating that if “the Legislature intended to
extend the district court’s jurisdiction beyond
a defendant’s probation period, it certainly
could have done so”), cert. granted, 2010-
NMCERT-010, 149 N.M. 65, 243 P.3d 1147.

{18} While this Court may deviate from
the plain meaning of a statute when the plain
meaning leads to results that are “absurd,
unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the
statute,” we believe that our reading of Sec-
tion 81-9-1.5 furthers the legislative purpose
behind the New Mexico Mental Illness and

Competency Code (NMMIC). See Martinez
v. Cornejo, 2009-NMCA-011, 111, 146 N.M.
228, 208 P.8d 443 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The NMMIC provides
for the “confinement of dangerous, incompe-
tent defendants,” State v. Trujillo, 2009-
NMSC-012, 115, 146 N.M. 14, 206 P.8d 125,
and thereby promotes the state’s interest in
protecting the community from dangerous
individuals, See State v. Rotherham, 122
N.M. 246, 262, 923 P.2d 1181, 1147 (1996).
In fulfilling this purpose, the Legislature “in-
tended to include, not exclude, the most seri-
ous crimes involving the most dangerous de-
fendants.” Taylor, 2000-NMCA-072, 114,
129 N.M. 376, 8 P.38d 863. Commitment for
felonies committed in a manner that results
in great bodily harm to another person fur-
thers the community protection purpose to a
much greater extent than if criminal commit-
ment were limited to only those felonies con-
taining the infliction of great bodily harm as
an element. Because the Legislature intend-
ed the delineation of crimes in Section 31-9-
1.5(D) to be inclusive and because the plain
meaning furthers the purpose of the
NMMIC, we see no reason to deviate from
the plain meaning of Section 31-9-1.5(D) and
read into it a requirement that the felony
must contain the infliction of great bodily
harm, an element necessary for conviction in
order for a court to commit a defendant.
PRESENTENCE CONFINEMENT
CREDIT

HE {14} Defendant lastly argues that he
was entitled to presentence confinement
eredit toward his commitment period under
NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-12 (1977). Sec-
tion 31-20-12 provides that a “person held in
official confinement on suspicion or charges
of the commission of a felony shall ... be
given credit for the period spent in presen-
tence confinement against any sentence final-
ly imposed for that offense.” The district
court found that Defendant was not entitled
to presentence confinement credit because
the district court did not convict Defendant
of a criminal offense and did not impose a
criminal sentence. In other words, the dis-
trict court found that Section 31-20-12 does
not require presentence confinement credit
to apply to commitment pursuant to Section
81-9-1.5(D), because commitment under Sec-

Po

wre ———!
tion 31-9-1.5(D) is not a criminal conviction.
However, this Court has recently deter-
mined, and the State concedes, that presen-
tence confinement credit should be credited
to criminal commitment under Section 31-9-
1.5(D) to the same extent the confinement
would have been credited against a sentence
for a criminal conviction. See Lopez, 2009-
NMCA-112, 110, 147 N.M. 279, 219 P.3d
1288. We therefore remand to the district
court to modify Defendant’s commitment pe-
riod for the time spent in detention prior to
the commitment.

CONCLUSION

{15} Because Section 31-9-1.5(D) allows
criminal commitment of a defendant who
commits a felony in a manner that results in
great bodily harm to another person, and the
evidence was sufficient to support a finding
that Defendant inflicted great bodily harm on
the victim during the commission of an
armed robbery, we uphold the district court’s
order detaining defendant for twelve years.
However, because the district court erred in
concluding that Defendant was not entitled to
presentence confinement credit, we remand
to the district court to modify Defendant’s
commitment period granting credit for the
time spent in detention prior to commitment.

{16} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge, and LINDA M. VANZI, Judge.

2011-NMCA-065

256 P.3d 982
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-
Appellant,
v.
Alfred LOVATO, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 30,399.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
March 18, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, May 6, 2011, No. 82,956.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney
General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Bregman & Loman, P.C., Sam Bregman,
Erie Loman, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

{1} The State appeals from the district
court order dismissing with prejudice one

count of homicide by vehicle, NMSA 1978,
Section 66-8-101(C) (2004), and one count of
accident involving death or personal injuries,
NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-201(C) (1989). Al-
though Defendant was not the driver of the
vehicle, Defendant was charged pursuant to
the parties to a crime provision of the Motor
Vehicle Code. See NMSA 1978, § 66-8-120
(1978). In dismissing the charges against
Defendant, the district court concluded that
this Court’s decision in State v. Marquez,
2010-NMCA-064, 148 N.M. 511, 238 P.3d
880, cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-006, 148
NLM. 584, 241 P.8d 182, was an unforeseeable
interpretation of Section 66-8-120, could not
be retroactively applied to Defendant, and
passengers would not have had fair notice,
prior to Marquez, that the conduct Defen-
dant engaged in exposed him to criminal
prosecution. On appeal, the State contends
that Section 66-8-120 “provided a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that it was a
erime to aid and abet vehicular homicide[,]”
and application of Section 66-8-120 to the
facts of Defendant’s case would not violate
due process. Having considered the argu-
ments raised by the State on appeal, we
reverse the district court and remand for the
charges against Defendant to be reinstated.

BACKGROUND

{2} The State alleges that on the evening
of November 25, 2008, and in the early morn-
ing hours of November 26, 2008, Carlos Fier-
ro and Defendant went out drinking. Ac-
cording to the State, it was Defendant’s idea
to go out and get a few drinks and smoke a
cigar. The two men first consumed alcohol
at the Rio Chama Steakhouse, and then Fier-
ro drove the two of them to Willie’s Blues
Bar at Defendant’s encouragement. The two
men consumed more alcohol at Willie’s Blues
Bar—aleohol purchased by Defendant. Af-
ter leaving the bar, Fierro struck William
Tenorio with his vehicle as Tenorio was
crossing the street outside of the bar. Wit-
nesses testified that Fierro and Defendant
drove away from the scene of the accident.
Fierro was later identified as the driver, and
Defendant was identified as the passenger of
the vehicle that struck Tenorio. After Fier-
ro’s car was stopped by police, the police
concluded that Fierro was intoxicated. Ten-

orio later died from the injuries he sustained
from being hit by Fierro’s vehicle.

{3} On June 3, 2009, subsequent to this
Court issuing its opinion in Marquez, the
State filed charges against Defendant on a
theory of accomplice liability under Section
66-8-120. The district court dismissed the
charges on the basis that Marquez could not
be retroactively applied to Defendant. The
district court found that Defendant did not
have fair notice that his conduct, which oc-
curred prior to Marquez being decided, ex-
posed him to the possibility of criminal prose-
cution.

DISCUSSION
This Court’s Decision in Marquez

{4} We begin our analysis by first examin-
ing this Court’s decision in Marquez. In
Marquez, we were presented with the issue
of whether there was “such a charge as party
to the crime of homicide by a vehicle and
great bodily injury by a vehicle.” Marquez,
2010-NMCA-064, 11, 148 N.M. 511, 238 P.3d
880. We looked to the statutory language of
Section 66-8-101(C) and Section 66-8-120,
established case law regarding accessory lia-
bility under the criminal code, and case law
and commentary defining the requisite mens
rea for homicide by vehicle, and concluded
that a defendant could aid and abet in the
crime of homicide by vehicle or great bodily
injury by vehicle. Marquez, 2010-NMCA-
064, 118-15, 148 N.M. 511, 238 P.3d 880.

{5} Section 66-8-101(C) provides:

A person who commits homicide by vehicle

or great bodily harm by vehicle while un-

der the influence of intoxicating liquor or
while under the influence of any drug or

while violating [NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-

118 (1987)] is guilty of a third degree

felony.

{6} Section 66-8-120 provides:

Every person who commits, attempts to
commit, conspires to commit or aids or
abets in the commission of any act de-
clared herein to be a crime, whether indi-
vidually or in connection with one or more
other persons or as a principal, agent or
accessory, shall be guilty of such offense,
and every person who falsely, fraudulently,
forcibly or willfully induces, causes,

41

coerces, requires, permits or directs anoth-

er to violate any provision of the Motor

Vehicle Code [Section 66-1-1] or any oth-

er law of this state pertaining to motor

vehicles is likewise guilty of such offense.

{7} We pointed out in Marquez that Sec-
tion 66-8-120 makes it a crime to aid or abet,
in violation of any provision of the Motor
Vehicle Code. Marquez, 2010-NMCA-064,
18, 148 N.M. 511, 238 P.3d 880. Further, in
defining how a person goes about aiding or
abetting in homicide by vehicle or great bodi-
ly injury by vehicle, our analysis relied on
pre-existing case law discussing accessory
liability. We stated that we had previously
“Gnterpreted the accessory provisions of the
Criminal Code as requiring that the accesso-
ry share the criminal intent of the principal
and that there be a community of purpose
and partnership in the unlawful undertak-
ing.” Id. 19 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We further noted that in
order to constitute a “community of purpose
and partnership” someone who aids and
abets must do more than merely be present;
instead, that person’s “{p]resence must be
accompanied by some outward manifestation
or expression of approval, or shared pur-
pose.” Jd. 1111, 18. Finally, we acknowl-
edged that prior case law identified the req-
uisite criminal intent for homicide by vehicle
as conscious wrongdoing or the “purposeful
doing of an act that the law declares to be a
crime.” Jd. 12 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Consequently, in
Marquez, this Court concluded that based on
the defendant’s knowledge that the driver
was intoxicated, evidenced by the fact that
they were refused service at two bars and by
the defendant’s admissions after the accident
that he knew the driver was drunk, the de-
fendant’s encouragement of the driver to
drive his vehicle although intoxicated, and
the defendant’s purchase of aleohol consumed
in the vehicle just prior to the accident, the
defendant had aided and abetted in the crime
of homicide by vehicle or great bodily injury
by vehicle. Id. 917.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing
the Charges Against Defendant.

HH {8} In the district court order grant-
ing Defendant’s motion to dismiss the

42

charges against him, the district court con-

cluded:
[Plassengers simply could not have been
on notice or had fair warning of the stan-
dards set forth in Marquez. Assuming for
purposes of this [o]rder that Defendant’s
actions were the same as those of the
defendant in Marquez, that he shared the
driver’s criminal intent, and that all factual
issues were resolved in favor of the State,
he could not have had fair notice prior to
Marquez of the criminal liability defined
by the standards set forth in that case.

In support of its ruling, the district court
stated that, prior to Marquez, there were no
established standards as to the requisite
mens rea for homicide by vehicle or as to
what level of participation would subject a
passenger to criminal prosecution, and it was
only by means of this Court’s decision in
Marquez that these standards were estab-
lished.

{9} “We have previously considered the
due process implications of retroactively ap-
plying the interpretation of a criminal statute
to a defendant whose conduct, at the time of
the alleged offense, did not fall under the
statute.” State v. Myers, 2010-NMCA-007,
116, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673, cert. grant-
ed, 2010-NMCERT-001, 147 N.M. 674, 227
P.8d 1056; see also State v. Alderette, 111
N.M. 297, 298, 804 P.2d 1116, 1117 (Ct.App.
1990). In doing so, we have adhered to the
basic principle that “a criminal statute must
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice of the conduct that the statute crimi-
nalizes or it will violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Myers, 2010-NMCA-007, 115, 147 N.M. 574,
226 P.3d 673. In Myers, we looked to Bouie
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct.
1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), for guidance in
determining whether a subsequent judicial
interpretation applied retroactively can of-
fend due process. Myers, 2010-NMCA-007,
115, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.38d 673. There, we
stated, “an unforeseeable judicial enlarge-
ment of a criminal statute, applied retroac-
tively, operates precisely like an ex post facto
Jaw, such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution
forbids.” Myers, 2010-NMCA-007, 115, 147
N.M. 574, 226 P.8d 673 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). “An ex post
facto law has been defined ... as one that
makes an action done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action, or that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was, when committed.” Alderette, 111
N.M. at 300, 804 P.2d at 1119 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). Thus, we stated in Myers that
“filf a state legislature is forbidden from
passing such a law, it must follow that a
{court] is barred by the Due Process Clause
from achieving precisely the same result by
judicial construction.”  2010-NMCA-007,
115, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.8d 673 Gnternal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We
further stated,

If a judicial construction of a criminal stat-

ute is unexpected and indefensible by ref-

erence to the law which had been ex-
pressed prior to the conduct in issue, it
oust not be given retroactive effect. Oth-
erwise, a criminal defendant is deprived of
due process of Jaw in the sense of fair
warning that his contemplated conduct
constitutes a crime.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Hl {10} In determining whether applica-
tion of a new construction of a criminal stat-
ute would violate due process, our task is to
determine whether the new interpretation
was foreseeable. Id, 118; see State v. John-
son, 2001-NMSC-001, 114, n.4, 130 N.M. 6,
15 P.3d 1233 (“The test in determining
whether such an interpretation and retroac-
tive application of a statute offends due pro-
cess is whether the construction actually giv-
en the statute was foreseeable.”). If this
Court’s interpretation of Section 66-8-120 in
Marquez was foreseeable, then Defendant
‘was on notice that his conduct was arguably
in violation of the law and there is no due
process violation. On the other hand, if our
interpretation was unforeseeable, the retro-
active application of that interpretation to
Defendant’s conduct would violate his right
to due process.

{11} The State argues that, unlike other
eases in which a judicial interpretation has
been held to violate due process if retroac-

tively applied, this Court’s decision in Mar-
quez neither overturned preexisting case law
nor constituted a judicial enlargement of a
criminal statute. We find the State’s argu-
ment persuasive. In Alderette, this Court
overruled a previous judicial interpretation of
the escape from jail statute. 111 N.M. at
298, 804 P.2d at 1117. The earlier decision of
this Court had held that the escape from jail
statute only applied to those persons commit-
ted on a criminal charge. Jd. We subse-
quently overruled that decision and held that
“filf a person is committed to a jail by lawful
authority and thereafter escapes from that
jail, he can be charged with escape from jail.”
Id. at 299, 804 P.2d at 1118. Because this
Court’s interpretation of the escape from jail
statute in Alderette created a new base of
conduct that fell within the statute, we held
that its interpretation of the statute could not
be retroactively applied to the defendant.
Id. at 300, 804 P.2d at 1119.

{12} Similarly, in Bowie, the United States
Supreme Court held that the South Carolina
Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute
regarding criminal trespass could not be ret-
roactively applied to the defendants where
the language of the statute did not proscribe
the petitioner’s conduct. 3878 U.S. at 362-63,
84 S.Ct. 1697. The language prohibited per-
sons from entering the property of another
after notice not to enter, but the South Car-
olina court interpreted the statute as also
criminalizing the act of remaining on the
premises after being asked to leave. Id. at
355, 360, 84 S.Ct. 1697. There, the United
States Supreme Court held that “[t]he crime
for which the[] petitioners stand convicted
was not enumerated in the statute at the
time of their conduct.” Id. at 363, 84 S.Ct.
1697 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ac-
cordingly, the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s interpretation of its criminal trespass
statute acted as a judicial enlargement of the
statute, criminalizing a new base of conduct,
thus violating due process. Id. at 362-63, 84
S.Ct. 1697.

{13} Such a judicial enlargement did not
occur in the present case. Here, the plain
language of the statute indicates that it is a
crime to aid and abet in a violation of the
Motor Vehicle Code. This Court in Marquez

43

neither changed a previous interpretation of
Section 66-8-120 nor enlarged the scope of
the conduct criminalized by our Legislature’s
enactment of Section 66-8-120. Instead, this
Court relied on pre-existing case law to de-
fine common terminology contained in the
statute. Our interpretation of Section 66-8-
120 was neither “unexpected” nor “indefensi-
ble by reference to the law which had been
expressed prior to the conduct in issue[.]”
Myers, 2010-NMCA-007, 115, 147 N.M. 574,
226 P.3d 673 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Thus, we conclude that
this Court’s interpretation of Section 66-8-
120 as set forth in Marquez was foreseeable.
See Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, 114, n. 4, 180
N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (“The Court engages in
an impermissible interpretation of a statute
when the interpretation is so unexpected, and
so outlandish, that no reasonable person
could have expected it.” (alteration, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

HMM {14} To the extent the district
court concluded that, prior to Marquez, pas-
sengers were not on “notice that they would
be subject to criminal liability as a party to
the crime of homicide by vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor,” we con-
strue the district court’s order as concluding
that Section 66-8-120 was unconstitutionally
vague. Similar to our analysis above of
whether Marquez was a foreseeable interpre-
tation of Section 66-8-120, “[t]he vagueness
doctrine is based on the principle of fair
notice in that no one may be held criminally
responsible and subject to criminal sanctions
for conduct without fair warning as to the
nature of the proscribed activity.” Santil-
lanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 221 n. 5, 849
P.2d 358, 364 n. 5 (1998). “[A] statute denies
constitutional due process if it is so vague
that persons of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning.” State v.
Rogers, 94 N.M. 527, 529, 612 P.2d 1388, 1340
(Ct.App.1980) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

HM {15} Section 66-8-120 clearly sets
out that it is a crime for a person to aid and
abet in a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code.
Section 66-8-101(C), which provides that it is
a third degree felony to commit homicide by
vehicle or great bodily injury by vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or

44 a

drug, is contained in the Motor Vehicle Code.
To the extent Marquez set forth standards
for applying Section 66-8-120 by examining
how we have interpreted accessory provi-
sions under the Criminal Code, the Legisla-
ture’s failure to define these standards within
Section 66-8-120 does not render the statute
unconstitutionally vague. To the contrary,
“(t]he [Legislature is not required to write
statutes for the understanding of persons
who cannot or will not apply ordinary mean-
ings to plain words[.]” Rogers, 94 N.M. at
529, 612 P.2d at 1340. “If the language used
makes the statute understandable and sensi-
ble, that is all that is necessary to uphold it
as valid.” Id. We therefore conclude that
Section 66-8-120 provided fair notice that
the conduct Defendant engaged in could ex-
pose him to criminal prosecution.

HM {16} Finally, the fact that Marquez
was the first time Section 66-8-120 had been
interpreted by an appellate court in this state
is of little consequence to our decision. “A
judicial construction of a statute is an author-
itative statement of what the statute meant
before as well as after the decision of the
case giving rise to that construction.” Rivers
v. Roadway Express, Inc. 511 U.S. 298, 312-
18, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994).
When this Court engages in the judicial con-
struction of a statute “it is explaining its
understanding of what the statute has meant
continuously since the date when it became
law.” Id. at 818, n. 12, 114 S.Ct. 1510. Be-
cause we conclude that this Court’s interpre-
tation of Section 66-8-120 in Marquez was
foreseeable, we reverse the district court or-
der dismissing the charges against Defen-
dant with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

{17} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
and remand to the district court for the
charges against Defendant to be reinstated.

{18} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge, and JAMES J. WECHSLER,

Judge.

2011-NMCA-072
256 P.3d 987

Tony Q. CHAN and Carolyn Hong,
Trustees, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

ve
Karen L. MONTOYA, Bernalillo County
Assessor, Defendant—Appellant.

First Baptist Church of New Mexico, a
New Mexico non-profit corporation,
Plaintiff—Appellee,

ve

Karen L. Montoya, Bernalillo County
Assessor, Defendant—Appellant.

Nos. 29,142, 29,760.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

April 1, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, May 25,
2011, No. 82,990.

a “

Keleher & McLeod, P.A., Jeffrey A. Dahl,
Javier F. Junco, Albuquerque, NM, for Ap-
pellees Tony Q. Chan and Carolyn Hong.

James T. Roach, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellee First Baptist Church of New Mexi-

8

Jeffrey S. Landers, Bernalillo County At-
torney, M. David Chacon, II, Assistant Ber-

nalillo County Attorney, Albuquerque, NM,
for Appellant.

OPINION

VIGIL, Judge.

{1} The question presented in these cases
is whether the statutory time limit for filing a
property tax refund complaint, under NMSA
1978, Section 7-88-40 (2003) of the Property
Tax Code, begins to run on the date the tax
payment is due, or on the date the payment
becomes delinquent. We conclude that the
time begins on the due date. We therefore
hold that the district court erred in denying
Defendant’s motions to dismiss on grounds
that the complaints were untimely, and re-
verse.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} In the first case, Taxpayers, as trus-
tees for property located in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, were mailed a property tax bill
for the 2007 tax year. In the second case,
Taxpayer also received its 2007 property tax
bill for property it owns in Albuquerque,
New Mexico. (Hereinafter, “Taxpayers” re-
fers to both sets of Taxpayers.) Each of the
tax bills stated that the first of two install-
ments of the annual tax payment was due on
November 10, 2007, and that the first install-
ment payment would become delinquent on
December 10, 2007.

{3} After making the installment pay-
ments, Taxpayers each filed a complaint for
property tax refund in February 2008, ap-
proximately ninety days after the November
10 due date. Pursuant to Section 7-38-
40(A)(1), claims for refund must be filed as a
civil action in district court “no later than the
sixtieth day after the first installment of the
property tax for which a claim for refund is
made is due[.]” According to Taxpayers, the
statutory time limit for filing their complaint
did not begin to run until the delinquency
date.

{4} Asserting that the complaints were
untimely, the Bernalillo County Assessor
(Assessor) moved to dismiss. In response,
Taxpayers argued that the common under-
standing among taxpayers and tax authori-
ties is that the first installment payment is

46

not due until the delinquency date and,
therefore, Section 7-38-40(A)(1) should be
interpreted to favor public convenience and
not to prejudice the public interest. Taxpay-
ers further argued that if the filing time limit
begins to run on the statutory due date, the
result is an unreasonably short time frame
for taxpayers to file a tax refund complaint,
rendering the filing time limit unconstitution-
al as a violation of due process. After hear-
ings in each case, the district court denied
the motions to dismiss, concluding the tax
refund complaints may be filed within sixty
days of the delinquency date. Stipulated
judgments were entered in each case, which
allowed Assessor to appeal the district court
determination that each complaint was timely
filed, and Assessor appealed in both cases.
We consolidated the two cases since the ap-
peals raise an identical issue.

Il. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

{5} We review the district court interpre-
tation of the Property Tax Code de novo.
See Sonic Indus. v. State, 2006-NMSC-038,
17, 140 N.M. 212, 141 P.3d 1266 (stating that
questions of statutory interpretation are
questions of law that are reviewed de novo).
Taxpayers also raise questions concerning
the constitutionality of Section 7-380,
which we also review de novo. See Manning
v. N.M. Energy, Minerals, & Natural Res.
Dep't, 2006-NMSC-027, 19, 140 N.M. 528,
144 P.38d 87 (reviewing constitutional ques-
tion under de novo standard).

B. The Language of the Property Tax
Code Requires a Tax Refund Com-
plaint to be Filed Within Sixty Days
of the Statutory Due Date

Hl {6} When interpreting statutes, our
guiding principle is to determine and give
effect to legislative intent. Pub. Serv. Co. of

N.M. v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 1999-

NMSC-040, 118, 128 N.M. 309, 992 P.2d 860.

In ascertaining the intent of the Legislature,

we are assisted by classic canons of statutory

construction. Id. The first of these is that a

court is required to give effect to the stat-

ute’s language and refrain from further in-
terpretation when the language is clear and

unambiguous. Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-
078, 117, 122 N.M. 618, 980 P.2d 153; Bd. of
Comm'rs of Dota Ana Cnty. v. Las Cruces
Sun-News, 2008-NMCA-102, 119, 184 N.M.
283, 76 P.3d 36 (noting that where language
is clear, appellate courts “give the statute its
plain and ordinary meaning and refrain from
further interpretation”).

{T} NMSA 1978, Section 7-88-38(A) (1987)
provides that the first installment of two
property tax payments is due on November
10 of the year in which the tax bill was
prepared and mailed. If taxpayers believe
they have been excessively taxed and want to
file a tax refund complaint, Section 7-38-
40(A)(1) directs: “Claims for refund shall be
filed by the property owner as a civil action
in the district court ... and shall be filed no
later than the sixtieth day after the first
installment of the property tax for which a
claim for refund is made is due[.]” Since
Section 7-88-40 clearly and unambiguously
directs that a tax refund complaint must be
filed within sixty days of the due date, the
statutory time limit for filing a complaint
began to run on the due date of November
10. Taxpayers’ complaints, which were filed
more than sixty days later, were untimely
under the plain language of the statute.

C. The Common Usage of the Word
“Due” Does Not Alter the Plain Mean-
ing of the Statute

{8} Although Section 7-38-40 provides
that the first installment of a tax payment is
due on November 10, NMSA 1978, Section 7-
38-46 (2008) provides that the payment does
not become delinquent so as to incur a penal-
ty for being late until thirty days after the
statutory due date or, in other words, by
December 10. Taxpayers argue that the
common usage and understanding among
taxpayers of their tax bill notices is that the
first installment of the tax payment is not
actually “due” until the statutory delinquency
date. To support this contention, Taxpayers
cite dictionary definitions of the word “due.”
These definitions state that the word “due”
means “having reached the date at which
payment is required” and “required or ex-
pected in the prescribed, normal, or logical
course of events.” Merriam-Webster Online

Dictionary, hittp://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/due. As such, Taxpayers con-
tend that payment is not “required” or “due”
until a penalty is to be assessed on the
delinquency date. Taxpayers assert that it is
not common to believe that tax payments are
“past due” before the delinquency date and
urge that we construe the word “due” with
this ordinary meaning. Tafoya v. N.M. State
Police Bd., 81 N.M. 710, 714, 472 P.2d 973,
977 (1970) (stating that where there is no
clearly expressed legislative intent providing
otherwise, “the word is to be given its usual,
ordinary meaning”). Thus, based on the as-
serted common understanding that a pay-
ment is not actually due until the date on
which a penalty will be assessed, Taxpayers
contend that the statutory time limit for fil-
ing tax refund complaints should not begin to
run until one day after the delinquency date.
We disagree.

HI {9} First, Taxpayers have provided
no facts or evidence to support this argu-
ment. “It is not our practice to rely on
assertions of counsel unaccompanied by sup-
port in the record. The mere assertions and
arguments of counsel are not evidence.”
Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-008, 151, 145
N.M. 451, 200 P.8d 104. In addition, this
common usage argument does not alter the
plain language of the Property Tax Code
itself. Reading “delinquent” as synonymous
with “due” does not comport with the Legis-
lature’s use of two, distinct statutory defini-
tions of the two words. The “due” date is a
statutorily fixed date of November 10, and
the “delinquency” date is a separate date,
thirty days later. See § 7-88-40; § 7-88-
46(A). Because the legislative intent is clear
that the due date is a different date from the
delinquency date, we decline Taxpayers’ invi-
tation to alter the most logical reading of the
word “due” as it is used in the Property Tax
Code.

{10} Our conclusion is further supported
by the way the Legislature requires tax bills
to be worded. NMSA 1978, Section 7-38-
87(B) (2008), states that “[elach property tax
bill shall ... contain at least the following:
... the amount of property taxes due on
each installment, the due dates of the install-
ments and the dates on which taxes become

47

delinquent [.)” (Emphasis added). As Tax-
payers concede, they received appropriately
worded tax bills informing them that the first
installment of their annual tax payment was
due on November 10 and that payment would
become delinquent on December 10. There-
fore, it follows that if “delinquent” were
meant to be one and the same with “due”
than such a distinction between the words
would not have been made in Taxpayers’ bills
as required by Section 7-38-37.

D. The Practical Implications of the
Property Tax Code Do Not Alter the
Plain Meaning of the Statute

{11} NMSA 1978, Section 7-38-39 (2003)
states that “[alfter receiving his property tax
bill and after making payment prior to the
delinquency date of all property taxes due in
accordance with the bill, a property owner
may protest the value ... for his property.”
Thus, it is payment that creates the right of
action, Taxpayers contend that Section 7-
88-39 supports their argument that the due
date of the first installment is actually the
delinquency date because to hold otherwise
would have the practical result of allowing
the statutory time limit to begin to run be-
fore payment is actually made and, thus,
before the taxpayer’s cause of action for a
claim for refund arises. Thus, a taxpayer
who makes payment on December 9, the day
before the delinquency date, will only have
thirty days to file a tax refund complaint
before the sixty-day filing time limit expires.
‘Taxpayers contend that such a result makes
an interpretation of Section 7-88-40, which
requires the time limit for filing a tax refund
complaint to begin to run on November 10,
unreasonable. Taxpayers argue that a more
reasonable reading would be that the time
limit begins to run on December 10, so all
taxpayers who make payment prior to the
delinquency date have the full sixty days to
bring their claims for refund. We are not
persuaded.

HMM {12} Section 7-88-39 sets forth
who has the right to file a complaint for a tax
refund. It provides that if a taxpayer has (1)
received his or her property tax bill and (2)
has made payment prior to the delinquency
date of all property taxes due in accordance

48 .

with the bill, then the taxpayer may elect to
file a claim for refund. Section 7-38-40 dic-
tates when a taxpayer may file a tax refund
claim. A taxpayer cannot assert a right to
file a refund claim until making a payment
before the delinquency date of the first in-
stallment. However, the taxpayer must also
abide by the separate procedural filing dead-
line for filing a claim in district court within
sixty days of the dwe date of the first install-
ment. Hence, the two sections serve differ-
ent functions. One purpose of Section 7-38-
89 is to ensure that only taxpayers who are
not delinquent in their tax payment may file
a tax refund complaint. On the other hand,
Section 7-88-40 is a statute of repose, which
begins to run from the statutorily deter-
mined tax payment due date without regard
to when the tax is actually paid. See Garcia
v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 582, 537, 898 P.2d 428,
438 (1995) (stating that “[s]tatutes of repose
begin to run from a statutorily determined
time defined without regard to when the
underlying cause of action accrues and with-
out regard to the discovery of injury or
damages”). As such, it is the nature of a
statute of repose to begin to run before a
cause of action accrues in some circum-
stances.

E. Taxpayers Must Make Payment of
Property Taxes Due on the First In-
stallment Due Date

{13} In the alternative, Taxpayers argue
that their complaints were timely because a
taxpayer may file a complaint any time be-
fore any delinquency date shown on the tax
bill. Since their tax bills stated that the
second installment of the annual tax payment
was not delinquent until April 10, they assert
that their complaints were timely filed be-
cause the complaints were filed prior to April

10. They base their argument on language

of Section 7-88-39 that the right to file a

claim for refund arises when payment is

made “prior to the delinquency date of all
property taxes due in accordance with the
billl]” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, Tax-
payers contend that taxpayers have until

April 10 to file a complaint for refund. In

essence, Taxpayers’ argument requests us to

look solely at Section 7-88-39 and disregard

the requirements articulated in Section 7-38-

ee

40. However, we decline to do so. Section
7-88-40 plainly dictates that filing must take
place sixty days from the first installment
due date, Therefore, a taxpayer must make
payment of all property taxes due as of the
first installment due date in order to pre-
serve his or her right to file a tax complaint.

F. The Sixty-Day Period for Bringing
Suit Does Not Violate Due Process

{14} Taxpayers argue that our inter-
pretation of Section 70-88-40 creates a time
limit for filing suit that is too short for
purposes of due process under the federal
and state constitutions. Taxpayers’ main
contention is that if the sixty-day time limit
begins to run on the due date of November
10, then the statute begins to run even be-
fore the cause of action accrues because pay-
ment, which creates the right of action, does
not become delinquent until December 10.
Therefore, taxpayers will have only between
thirty and sixty days to file tax refund
claims, depending on when they make their
payments.

{15} We agree with Taxpayers that for a
statute of repose to be constitutional, the
time frame to pursue a remedy cannot be
unreasonably short. See Terry v. N.M. State
Highway Comm’n, 98 N.M. 119, 122, 645
P.2d 1875, 1379 (1982) (holding that the con-
stitutionality of statutory time limits has
“hinged on the reasonableness of the time
provided to pursue a remedy”). However,
we do not agree that the time frame provided
in these cases is unnecessarily short.

{16} Taxpayers rely on Terry and Garcia
to support their argument that the sixty-day
statute of repose provided in Section 7-88-40
is unreasonably short and, therefore, violates
due process. In Terry, the relevant statute
provided that wrongful death actions against
engineers or contractors that arise out of an
unsafe condition of a physical improvement
to real property must be brought within ten
years of the date of substantial completion of
the improvement. 98 N.M. at 120, 645 P.2d
at 1876. The decedents in Terry were killed
in a car accident on a state highway built by
the contractor and engineer defendants three
months before the ten-year filing time limit

pT 49
Le

ended. Jd. Our Supreme Court held that
three months was not a constitutionally rea-
sonable amount of time to give the plaintiffs
time to pursue their claim. Jd. at 128, 645
P.2d at 1879. In Garcia, our Supreme Court
considered the three-year statute of repose
in the Medical Malpractice Act. Garcia, 119
N.M. at 584, 898 P.2d at 430. The plaintiffs
medical malpractice cause of action arose
after a cardiac arrest, which occurred eighty-
five days before the statute of repose ex-
pired. Id. at 542, 893 P.2d at 438, The court.
held that eighty-five days was an unreason-
ably short amount of time to require the
plaintiff to file his malpractice claim. Id. In
both Terry and Garcia, the due process in-
quiry hinged on the reasonableness of the
time limit as applied to the particular facts of
those cases.

{17} The tax situation in this case is dis-
similar. In both Terry and Garcia, applica-
tion of the statutes was unconstitutional be-
cause the cause of action had arisen, or an
injury had been discovered, near the expira-
tion of the statutory time limit. We have no
such facts in this case. Moreover, unlike
situations involving accidents or illness,
which are unpredictable and generally cannot
be anticipated, taxpayers are aware that they
will be required to pay taxes every year on
particular dates. Furthermore, taxpayers
have notice each year as of April 1 of the
actual property valuations on which their
claims for refund will necessarily be based.
See NMSA 1978, § 7-88-20(A) (2001) (“By
April 1 of each year, the county assessor
shall mail a notice to each property owner
informing him of the net taxable value of his
property that has been valued for property
taxation purposes by the assessor.”). Tax-
payers may pursue redress by either protest-
ing the property valuation with the county
assessor, or electing to protest the property
valuation by filing a claim for refund after
payment of taxes. See NMSA 1978, § 7-38-
21(A) (2001). As such, taxpayers have notice
almost nine months in advance of the district,
court filing deadline and, therefore, almost
nine months in which to pursue an alternate
remedy or wait to file a tax refund complaint
after payment. Thus, the time period pro-
vided in Section 7-38-40 for which to file tax

refund complaints is reasonable and does not
violate due process.

Il. CONCLUSION

{18} We hold that the Legislature meant
for Section 7-88-40 to begin to run on the
statutory due date and that Taxpayers’ com-
plaints for refund were untimely filed. We
therefore reverse the district court orders
denying Assessor’s motions to dismiss Tax-
payers’ untimely complaints seeking claims
for refund.

{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER
and MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judges.

2011-NMCA-063

256 P.3d 992
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-

Appellant,

ve
Christopher GURULE and Linda
Davis, Defendants—Appellees.
No. 29,734.

“Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

April 18, 2011.

Certiorari Granted, June
8, 2011, No. 33,023.

ed

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney
General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Chief Public Defender, Nina Lalevic, As-
sistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM,
for Appellee Gurule.

Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E.
Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee Davis.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Chief Judge.

{1} The State appeals from a district court
order suppressing evidence. On appeal, the
State claims that Defendants lacked standing
to challenge the seizure of a digital camera,
and even if Defendants had standing, the
district court erred in concluding that the
digital camera had to be suppressed because
there was no probable cause to seize it dur-
ing the execution of the search warrant. The
State also claims that the district court erred
in excluding certain testimony under the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine. Finally, the
State argues that the district court erred in
suppressing out-of-court statements made by

Bn

co-defendant Linda Davis, who resided with
co-defendant Gurule at the home that was
searched. We conclude that Defendants had
standing to challenge the seizure of the digi-
tal camera and that the district court proper-
ly concluded that the seizure was not sup-
ported by probable cause. We also conclude
that the district court did not err in sup-
pressing testimony tainted by the illegal sei-
zure and that statements made by co-defen-
dant Davis were properly excluded as well.
Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} On September 5, 2007, Special Agent
Lois Kinch, a law enforcement officer em-
ployed by the New Mexico Attorney Gener-
al’s Office, Internet Crimes Against Children
Task Force, initiated an investigation into
the distribution of child pornography on an
ultra-peer internet site. During this investi-
gation, Agent Kinch determined that a com-
puter located at Defendants’ home was one of
the computers linked to this ultra-peer site,
Gnutella, that was being used to share child
pornography. She drafted an affidavit in
support of a search warrant. The affidavit
contained boilerplate sections outlining Agent
Kinch’s background and experience, describ-
ing how the ultra-peer network operates, and
explaining Agent Kinch’s beliefs about how
child predators act and what items need to
be seized in order to collect all relevant
evidence of those acts. The affidavit also
contained a section that stated that based on
this particular investigation, Agent Kinch
had reason to believe that someone using the
computer at the home of Defendants was
receiving, possessing, and/or distributing
child pornography. Nothing in the affidavit
provided any evidence that anyone at the
home was actually taking pornographic pho-
tographs of children, only that someone was
involved in downloading and distributing
such images. Nevertheless, the affidavit
states that, among numerous other items,
any digital cameras should be seized.

{3} Based on Agent Kinch’s affidavit, the
district court issued a search warrant on
September 27, 2007. During the search of
Defendants’ home the following day, the offi-
cers seized a Sony Cybershot camera in a
closet down the hallway from the bedroom

where the computer was located. On Febru-
ary 5, 2008, Agent Kinch conducted a foren-
sic analysis of the camera’s digital informa-
tion, in which she found images of Defendant
Gurule engaging in sexual acts with a prepu-
bescent girl. It was later determined that
this girl was the four-year-old granddaughter
of Defendant Davis.

{4} Defendants moved to suppress the evi-
dence obtained from the seizure of the cam-
era. In response, the State argued that De-
fendants did not have standing to challenge
the seizure of the camera since the camera
had been obtained by use of a fraudulently
obtained credit card, and that even if they
did have standing, the camera was properly
seized pursuant to the warrant.

{5} The district court granted Defendants’
motion to suppress. In its order, the district
court concluded that Defendants had stand-
ing to challenge the seizure of the camera,
presumably finding Defendant Gurule’s testi-
mony that the camera was lawfully pur-
chased to be credible. As to the legality of
that seizure, the district court stated:

10. The section of the affidavit which
described the “current investigation” does
not mention a digital camera in any man-
ner connected to this case. [Agent] Kinch
testified that she had no information that
either defendant:

was involved in creating child pornogra-
phy.

had uploaded any images from a digital
camera to the computer.

had downloaded any images from the
computer to a camera,

had the equipment to transfer images
between a camera and the computer.

11. [Agent] Kinch testified that if [D]e-
fendants had the proper cables, they could
transfer images from the camera to the
computer; and if [DJefendants had the
proper cables, and 7f the cameras had a[n]
optional aftermarket increased memory
storage device, [D]efendant{s] could trans-
fer images from the five (6) files that were
known to contain the illegal images to the
camera.

53

12. The digital camera did not have the
optional device. No cable to connect the
camera and the computer was discovered.

Based on these facts, the district court con-
cluded that there was no probable cause to
seize the camera. The district court also
concluded that certain witness testimony
would be excluded because it was tainted by
the illegal seizure and that a statement made
by Defendant Davis would be excluded on
confrontation grounds. The State then filed
this appeal pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section
39-8-3(B)(2) (1972).

DISCUSSION
Motion to Suppress

Standard of Review

HN s{6} We review the grant or denial
of a motion to suppress as a mixed question
of fact and law. State v. Gutierrez, 2004-
NMCA-081, 14, 186 N.M. 18, 94 P.8d 18.
We determine whether the law was correctly
applied to the facts and view “the facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party.”
State v. Cline, 1998-NMCA-154, 16, 126
N.M. 77, 966 P.2d 785; see State v. Jason L.,
2000-NMSC-018, 110, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.8d
856. Furthermore, we employ all reasonable
presumptions in support of the district
court’s ruling. See Jason L., 2000-NMSC-
018, 111, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.38d 856. With
this is mind, we discuss below the more
deferential review that applies to the issu-
ance of search warrants.

The Digital Camera

Standing

HMMM {7} The State argues that Defen-
dants do not have standing to object to the
seizure of the digital camera. “Whether a
defendant has standing involves two inqui-
ries: (1) whether the defendant had an actu-
al, subjective expectation of privacy in the
premises searched; and (2) whether the de-
fendant’s ‘subjective expectation [is] one that
society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able’” State v. Zamora, 2005-NMCA-039,
110, 187 N.M. 301, 110 P.8d 517 (quoting
State v. Esguerra, 1138 N.M. 310, 318, 825
P.2d 248, 246 (Ct.App.1991) (alteration in
original)).

54

{8} The State concedes that Defendants
satisfied the first part of this inquiry in that
they had an actual and subjective expectation
of privacy in their shared residence. Howev-
er, the State argues that Defendants failed to
show that they had an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize. See
Zamora, 2005-NMCA-039, 111, 187 N.M.
301, 110 P.8d 517. Specifically, the State
argues that the digital camera was likely
purchased by a stolen credit card. See United
States v. Caymen, 404 F.8d 1196, 1200-01
(9th Cir.2005) (holding that a person who
fraudulently purchased an item with someone
else’s credit card did not have an expectation
of privacy in the item that society was pre-
pared to recognize and therefore had no
standing to raise a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge to the seizure of the item).

{9} Even assuming, arguendo, that we
were inclined to adopt the principles dis-
cussed in Caymen in the context of a search
of a home, a review of the evidence indicates
that the matter involved a factual conflict
resolved in favor of Defendants that would
support standing under this analysis. Agent
Kinch testified that during the execution of
the search warrant, officers found eight to
twelve credit cards and credit card state-
ments that did not belong to Defendant
Davis. One of these cards listed Defendant
Davis as a cardholder, but it belonged to a
victim of identity theft who lived out of state.
Defendant Davis had used this card to pur-
chase a memory stick for a digital camera at
an Office Max on July 8, 2007. The State
also presented evidence that the Sony Cyber-
shot camera was distributed by Office Max
North America in Las Vegas, Nevada, al-
though Agent Kinch did not know to which
store it had been distributed. In support of
Defendants’ standing, Defendant Gurule tes-
tified that he and Defendant Davis purchased
the camera for the two of them at a Wal-
Mart using a credit card and that he paid her
cash to cover the purchase. In light of this
testimony and our standard of review, the
district court could find Defendant Gurule to
be credible and conclude that the digital cam-
era was lawfully purchased.

{10} The State cites to State v. Van Dang,
2005-NMSC-033, 188 N.M. 408, 120 P.8d

830, in support of its contention that Defen-
dants needed to make a more affirmative
showing in light of evidence that the camera
may have been illegally obtained. In Van
Dang, our Supreme Court held that a person
claiming standing based on the owner’s con-
sent or permission needed to present some
evidence of that consent. Id. 112. We are
unpersuaded that the holding in Van Dang
requires Defendants to introduce evidence
beyond their own testimony in this case.

{11} In Van Dang, the defendant testified
at the suppression hearing that he had a
right to drive the rental car, but he did not
testify that the person who rented the car
had given him permission to drive it. Id. 12.
In reaching its holding that the defendant
lacked standing, the Court specifically relied
in part on the defendant’s failure to even
claim he was given permission by the owner
or renter. Id. 112. As previously discussed,
in this case Defendant Gurule testified that
he and Defendant Davis purchased the cam-
era together and that he reimbursed her with
a cash payment.

HM {12} Furthermore, in Van Dang our
Supreme Court was considering a claimed
privacy interest in an automobile. This case
involves a dwelling, and our appellate courts
have long recognized “[tJhe constitutional
distinction between vehicles and homes
[which] turns on this privacy expectation. A
lesser expectation of privacy attaches to a
vehicle.” State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005,
1128, 187 N.M. 174, 108 P.8d 1082; of Esgu-
erra, 113 N.M. at 313-14, 825 P.2d at 246-47
(recognizing that the privacy interest in one’s
dwelling place is entitled to “the highest
degree of protection from unreasonable in-
trusion by the government”).

Probable Cause to Seize the Camera

HMM {13} “The Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and [Alrticle
TI, [Slection 10 of the New Mexico Constitu-
tion both require probable cause to believe
that a crime is occurring or seizable evidence
exists at a particular location before a search
warrant may issue.” State v. Nyce, 2006-
NMSC-026, 19, 139 N.M. 647, 187 P.3d 587,
limited on other grounds by State v. Wil-
liamson, 2009-NMSC-039, 129, 146 N.M.

488, 212 P.8d 876. Probable cause to issue
the warrant requires a factual showing that
there is a reasonable probability that evi-
dence of a crime will be found in the place to
be searched. See State v. Evans, 2009-
NMSC-027, 10, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216.
As we noted, because this case involves the
search of a dwelling place, it is “ordinarily
afforded the most stringent [Fourth
[A]lmendment protection.” State v. Clark,
105 N.M. 10, 12, 727 P.2d 949, 951 (Ct.App.
1986).

Hs {14} A search warrant may be
issued when “sufficient facts are presented in
a sworn affidavit to enable the magistrate to
make an informed, deliberate, and indepen-
dent determination that probable cause ex-
ists.” State v. Gonzales, 2008-NMCA-008,
111, 183 N.M. 158, 61 P.8d 867, limited on
other grounds by Williamson, 2009-NMSC-
039, 129, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.38d 376. “The
degree of proof necessary to establish proba-
ble cause for the issuance of a search war-
rant is more than a suspicion or possibility
but less than a certainty of proof.” Id, 112
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). “Thus, the magistrate must have suffi-
cient facts upon which to conclude that there
is a reasonable probability that evidence of a
crime will be found in the place to be
searched.” Id.

H.s«{15} As we indicated above,
our standard of review in considering
search warrant probable cause determina-
tions departs from that normally applicable
to motions to suppress. “{Ajn issuing
court’s determination of probable cause
must be upheld if the affidavit provides a
substantial basis to support a finding of
probable cause.” Williamson, — 2009-
NMSC-039, 129, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.8d
376.

A reviewing court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the issuing court.
Rather ... the reviewing court must de-
termine whether the affidavit as a whole,
and the reasonable inferences that may be
drawn therefrom, provide a substantial ba-
sis for determining that there is probable
cause to believe that a search will uncover
evidence of wrongdoing.

55

Id. “[Tyhe substantial basis standard of re-
view is more deferential than the de novo
review applied to questions of law, but less
deferential than the substantial evidence
standard applied to questions of fact.” Id.
130. As a result, “if the factual basis for the
warrant is sufficiently detailed in the search
warrant affidavit and the issuing court has
found probable cause, the [reviewing] courts
should not invalidate the warrant by inter-
preting the affidavit in a hypertechnical,
rather than a commonsense, manner.” Id.
(alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

HE ({16} In this case, it is undisputed
that Agent Kinch’s affidavit provided proba-
ble cause to search Defendants’ dwelling for
evidence of child pornography. Notwith-
standing an otherwise valid search warrant,
however, “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires
that a warrant describe with particularity the
things to be seized.” United States v.
Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 993 (9th Cir.2009) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). “Search
warrants must be specific in both particulari-
ty and breadth.” Jd. “Particularity is the
requirement that the warrant must clearly
state what is sought. Breadth deals with the
requirement that the scope of the warrant be
limited by the probable cause on which the
warrant is based.” Jd. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Courts there-
fore will suppress an individual item for lack
of an adequate description, to prevent uncon-
strained police discretion, see State v. Hina-
hara, 2007-NMCA-116, 18, 142 N.M. 475,
166 P.8d 1129, or for lack of probable cause
with respect to any individual item. See
State v. Jacobs, 2000-NMSC-026, 67, 129
NM. 448, 10 P.3d 127 (observing practice of
only suppressing illegally obtained items
where search warrant was otherwise valid
with respect to other items); see generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.6(6),
at 641 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing partial inval-
idity of search warrant); Martin J. McMa-
hon, Annotation, Propriety in State Prosecu-
tion of Severance of Partially Valid Search
Warrant and Limitation of Suppression to
Items Seized Under Invalid Portions of
Warrant, 32 A.L.R.4th 378 (1984).

56

{17} Here, there is no particularity of de-
scription concern because the search warrant
expressly authorized the seizure of the digital
camera. Instead, we consider whether the
warrant was overly broad in its inclusion of
the digital camera. This requires a review of
Agent Kinch’s affidavit. See State v. Don-
aldson, 100 N.M. 111, 117, 666 P.2d 1258,
1264 (Ct.App.1983) (noting that courts do not
generally look beyond the four corners of the
affidavit in examining sufficiency of the war-
rant).

{18} Agent Kinch’s affidavit provided a
detailed technical description of how she
identified Defendant Davis’s Internet Proto-
col (IP) address and how that address was
linked to the ultra-peer sharing of child por-
nography. By searching the Gnutella ultra-
peer site’s own records, she was able to trace
fifty-eight files to the Davis IP address, with
names suggestive of child pornography, and
one depicting a child under the age of twelve
performing oral sex on an adult male. She
concluded from her training and experience
that the computer located at this IP address
“was receiving, possessing and/or distribut-
ing child pornography.” Agent Kinch also
stated in her affidavit that it was necessary
to seize “[clomputer storage media to include
but not limited to floppy disks, hard drives,
tapes, DVD disks, CD-ROM disks or other
magnetic, optical or mechanical storage
which can be accessed by computers to store
or retrieve data or images of child pornogra-
phy.” Of particular relevance to the issue
here, Agent Kinch stated in her affidavit that
it is common for online child predators “to
collect adult pornography for the purposes of
grooming a young child. This is why it is
important to seize all computer devices[ ] and
photographic equipment to which the resi-
dents have access.”

{19} The State argues that the affidavit
established a nexus between the possession
or distribution of child pornography and the
digital camera, because the camera is capable
of storing digital images and downloading
images to a computer. The State argues
that the warrant may authorize officers to
seize items “potentially connected” to the
crime. Hinahara, 2007-NMCA-116, 110,
142 N.M. 475, 166 P.3d 1129 (“All of the

items sought in the warrant were potentially
connected with the assault and the child por-
nography described in the affidavit.”), Hi-
nahara is distinguishable from the present
case because all of the items were related to
child pornography. The search warrant in
Hinahara authorized the seizure of comput-
ers, video tapes, computer diskettes, CDs,
DVDs, photographs, and magazines contain-
ing child pornography. . Jd. 13. That warrant
did not state that digital cameras may be
seized. Id.

{20} The State also relies on Hinahara for
the proposition that when a court has deter-
mined that a dwelling contains contraband or
evidence of a crime, “the officer can search
every container and location within the per-
mitted area where that item could be locat-
ed.” Id. 120 Gnternal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We do not believe that it
is necessary to rely on this independent au-
thority because the search warrant expressly
authorized the search of the digital camera.
Instead, the dispositive issue is whether
there was probable cause to permit the
search of the camera. To the extent that the
officers could have looked at images readily
viewable at the scene, there is no indication
that they did so in this case—it was not until
after the camera was seized and a forensic
examination conducted months later that the
illegal images were discovered. In the ab-
sence of any indication that this camera,
which did not contain a memory card, was
being used for the storage of internet child
pornography, or was being used for the inde-
pendent manufacture of pornography, there
‘was no substantial basis for concluding that
there was probable cause that the camera
would contain child pornography.

{21} Even if we assume that the ultra-peer
sharing of child pornography constitutes the
manufacture of child pornography, see State
v. Smith, 2009-NMCA-028, 12, 145 N.M.
757, 204 P.3d 1267 (holding that copying child
pornography to a portable storage device
constitutes manufacturing), cert. quashed,
2009-NMCERT-012, 147 N.M. 601, 227 P.38d -
91, there is a qualitative difference between
this internet use and creating one’s own child
pornography, with its attendant child abuse.
This qualitative difference is accompanied

with further concerns over validating fishing
expeditions that trump one’s heightened pri-
vacy protections in the use of cameras and
similar First Amendment, expressive media.
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
564, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978)
(“Where the materials sought to be seized
may be protected by the First Amendment,
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
must be applied with ‘scrupulous exacti-
tude’” (quoting Stanford v. Teaas, 379 U.S.
476, 485, 85 S.Ct. 506, 18 L.Ed.2d 431
(1965))).

{22} Defendants argue that, in the ab-
sence of evidence of broader criminal con-
duct, the better approach here would have
been to seek an additional warrant based on
newly obtained evidence. We agree. For
example, the initial search may have led to
the discovery of evidence supporting the req-
uisite nexus between the camera and child
pornography. The mere fact that the cam-
era is capable of media storage is insufficient
absent any indication of its use for child por-
nography. See generally Lily R. Robinton,
Courting Chaos: Conflicting Guidance from
Courts Highlights the Need for Clearer
Rules to Govern the Search and Seizure of
Digital Evidence, 12 Yale JL. & Tech. 311
(2010) (discussing problem of overly-broad
warrants in digital media context).

{23} In summary, we conclude that the
district court properly suppressed the digital
eamera because, even under our deferential
standard of review, there was no probable
cause to support its seizure. Our holding is
made with consideration of both the height-
ened privacy expectation in one’s home and
its contents, and the additional First Amend-
ment concerns that come in to play when a
camera is searched.

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

{24} The State also challenges the
exclusion of witness testimony under the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 871 U.S. 471,
487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963);
see also State v. Ingram, 1998-NMCA-177,
19, 126 N.M. 426, 970 P.2d 1151 (“Evidence
which is obtained as a result of an unconsti-
tutional search or seizure may be suppressed

57

under the exclusionary rule.” (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted)). Here, the
district court excluded the testimony of De-
fendant Davis’s daughter, Candace Stevens,
regarding Defendant Gurule’s use of the
computer on the ground that Candace’s “ex-
istence would not have been known but for
the illegal search.” Naked images of Can-
dace’s young daughter, C. S., had been found
on the digital camera during the forensic
evaluation that took place months after the
execution of the search warrant.

HM s«{25} We have already concluded
that the digital camera, which contained im-
ages of C.S., was illegally seized. Although a
federal good faith exception permits admis-
sion of tainted evidence under certain cir-
cumstances, the New Mexico Constitution re-
quires unconstitutionally obtained evidence
to be excluded because “(dJenying the gov-
ernment the fruits of unconstitutional con-
duct at trial best effectuates the constitution-
al proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures by preserving the rights of the ac-
cused to the same extent as if the govern-
ment’s officers had stayed within the law.”
State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 481, 446, 863
P.2d 1052, 1067 (1993). However, notwith-
standing New Mexico’s rejection of the good
faith exception, “not all evidence discovered
as the result of police misconduct need be
suppressed.” State v. Wagoner, 2001-
NMCA-014, 122, 180 N.M. 274, 24 P.3d 306.
The applicable inquiry is whether the evi-
dence would not have come to light “but for”
the illegality. Id.

{26} The State argues that Candace would
have independently come forward to provide
information in this case. See id. 1922-31
(discussing independent source doctrine).
Because this issue required the district court
to infer what might have occurred, we believe
that we should defer to the factual finding
that she would not have been involved. The
record indicates that the district court’s rul-
ing on the “but for” finding was supported by
substantial evidence. After the forensic ex-
amination of the camera, Agent Kinch
showed Defendant Davis a non-pornographic
image of the girl who appeared on the cam-
era, at which time Defendant Davis identified
the girl as her four-year-old granddaugh-

58

ter—the daughter of Candace. Up to this
point, months after the initial search warrant
took place, neither Candace nor her daughter
was involved in this case. We therefore be-
lieve that the district court could reasonably
infer that Candace would not have been a
witness “but for” Agent Kinch’s forensic
search of the digital camera. As a result, we
affirm the exclusion of Candace’s testimony.

Co—Defendant Statement.

HI {27} The State also challenges the
district court’s exclusion of testimony from
Defendant Davis’s son, who would have testi-
fied that she told him that she caught Defen-
dant Gurule looking at child pornography on
the computer. The district court determined
that the testimony violated Defendants’ right
of confrontation under Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 128, 125, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20
L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), which held that the ad-
mission of statements by a co-defendant who
did not take the stand deprived the defen-
dant of his rights under the Sixth Amend-
ment Confrontation Clause when those state-
ments implicated the defendant.

{28} The State argues that Bruton has
been limited by Crawford v. Washington, 541
US. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d
177 (2004), which held that the Confrontation
Clause generally will not require the exclu-
sion of non-testimonial statements. Craw-
ford listed a “core class” of statements that
are considered testimonial, including state-
ments made under circumstances that would
lead to the objectively reasonable belief that
they would be used at a later trial. See id. at
51-52. Here, the prosecutor indicated to the
district court that the statements were made
sometime after the search warrant had been
execiited. It is objectively reasonable to be-
lieve that the statements would be used at.
trial. Nevertheless, the State argues that
the United States Supreme Court does not
deem every statement of this nature to be
testimonial. See Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 818, 828, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d

224 (2006) (characterizing statement made
during 911 call as non-testimonial).

{29} We do not deem it necessary to de-
cide whether the co-defendant’s statements
at issue in Bruton are limited by Crawford in
that they now would need to be testimonial
as well to be excluded. Cf United States v.
Williams, 429 F.3d 767, 773 n. 2 (8th Cir.
2005) (noting that “Crawford did not overrule
Bruton and its progeny”); United States v.
Ramos-Cardenas, 524 F.3d 600, 609-10 (5th
Cir.2008) (“[While Crawford certainly pro-
hibits the introduction of a codefendant’s out-
of-court testimonial statement against the
other defendants in a multiple-defendant tri-
al, it does not signal a departure from the
rules governing the admittance of such a
statement against the speaker-defendant
himself, which continue to be provided by
Bruton ....”). The reason we do not need
to reach any possible Bruton/Crawford con-
flict is because it was objectively reasonable
to anticipate that the statements made by
Defendant Davis to her son would be used in
a later trial, unlike the situation discussed in
Davis, where other factors may make such a
potential witness reluctant to cooperate with
investigators. As such, we conclude that the
statements fell within Crawford’s “core class”
of testimonial statements and were properly
excluded even if that analysis applied.

CONCLUSION

{30} Based upon the foregoing, we affirm
the district court.

{81} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER
and LINDA M. VANZI, Judges.

2011-NMCA-066
257 P.3d 404
Clara ROMERO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF COUNTY OF TAOS, and the New
Mexico Association of Counties, Defen-
dants-Appellees.

No, 29,524.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
March 21, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, No. 32,963,
May 11, 2011.

The Herrera Firm, P.C., Samuel M. Herr-
era, Taos, NM, for Appellant.

Slease & Martinez, P.A, William D.
Slease, Jonlyn M. Martinez, Albuquerque,
NM, for Appellees.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} We address in this appeal whether the
requirements of NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-
801(A) (1983), pertaining to uninsured and
underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage,
apply to a group of counties that pool their
financial resources under NMSA 1978, Sec-
tion 3-62-1 (1986) and NMSA 1978, Section
‘8-62-2 (1986) to satisfy claims against the
individual counties of the group. We hold

60

that Section 66-5-301(A) does not apply and
affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.

BACKGROUND

{2} Plaintiff Clara Romero, an employee of
Defendant Taos County (the County), was
injured in a motor vehicle accident while she
was driving a vehicle belonging to the Coun-
ty in the course of her employment. She
was struck by another vehicle and was not at
fault. Plaintiff received a settlement for the
policy limits of the insurance policy of the
driver of the other vehicle. She also re-
ceived workers’ compensation benefits.
Plaintiff made a claim for UM/UIM coverage
against the County’s insurance coverage.

{3} The County provided coverage for its
losses through a coverage agreement with
Defendant New Mexico Association of Coun-
ties (the Association of Counties). Through
the Association of Counties, member counties
pool contributions to a fund (the multi-line
fund or pool) to provide coverage for proper-
ty and liability losses. The coverage agree-
ment specified the coverage provided by the
Association of Counties through the multi-
line pool. The coverage agreement did not
include UM/UIM coverage.

{4} Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment
action against the County and the Associa-
tion of Counties, requesting in part a deter-
mination that, based on Section 66-5-801(A),
the County had coverage for, and the Associ-
ation of Counties was obligated to pay, UM/
UIM benefits to Plaintiff. Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that
the County did not have UM/UIM insurance
and that the Association of Counties was
immune from suit. Plaintiff filed a counter-
motion, contending in part that Section 66-5-
301(A) and public policy required the Associ-
ation of Counties to provide UM/UIM cover-
age, and the County did not waive such
coverage. The district court denied Plain-
tiffs motion and granted Defendants’ motion.
It stated that the County was neither obligat-
ed to purchase nor could it purchase UM/
UIM coverage to compensate Plaintiff for
her injuries. Plaintiff appeals from the dis-
trict court’s order.

APPLICATION OF SECTION 66-5-301(A)
TO THE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES

HM {5} Plaintiff contends that the district
court erred in granting Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment and in denying her
motion. We review the district court’s grant
of a motion for summary judgment de novo
to determine whether the district court was
correct that there was no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Tafoya v. Rael, 2008-NMSC-057, 911, 145
NLM. 4, 193 P.8d 551.

{6} Plaintiff states that the issue in this
case is whether the Association of Counties is
obligated to offer UM/UIM coverage to the
County and, if so, whether the County
waived UM/UIM coverage. She argues that
the law of New Mexico, as stated in Section
66-5-801(A), requires an insurance provider
to offer UM/UIM coverage in all automobile
insurance policies unless the named insured
rejects such coverage. Thus, Plaintiff con-
cludes that because the County did not reject
UM/UIM coverage, the County had such cov-
erage as a result of its coverage agreement
with the Association of Counties.

WM {7} Plaintiff is correct that Section
66-5-301(A) generally requires an insurer to
provide UM/UIM coverage as part of an
automobile liability insurance policy unless
rejected by the insured. See Romero v.
Dairyland Ins. Co. 111 N.M. 154, 156, 803
P.2d 248, 245 (1990) (stating that public poli-
cy embodies making uninsured motorist
overage part of automobile liability insurance
policies and that an insured may reject such
coverage). We therefore agree with Plaintiff
that our focus should be on whether Section
66-5-301 applies to the Association of Coun-
ties. Plaintiff made this argument to the
district court, and, although the district court
did not expressly rule on this issue, we can
affirm if the district court was correct for
any reason that was before it on the basis of
the presentations of the parties. See Mei-
boom v. Watson, 2000-NMSC-004, 120, 128
N.M. 586, 994 P.2d 1154 (moting that an
appellate court may “affirm a district court
ruling on a ground not relied upon by the
district court, but will not do so if reliance on
the new ground would be unfair to appellant”

(alteration, internal quotation marks, and ci-
tation omitted)).

Tl {8} We view the matter as one of
legislative intent. See Jordan v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 2010-NMSC-051, 115, 149 N.M. 162,
245 P.3d 1214 (stating that the “primary goal
when interpreting statutes is to further legis-
lative intent”). To ascertain legislative in-
tent, we look to the words used by the Legis-
lature in the statutes at issue as “the primary
indicator of legislative intent.” High Ridge
Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque,
1998-NMSC-050, 15, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d
599 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). We seek to harmonize our reading
of the relevant statutes to give effect to each
of them. See State v. Davis, 2008-NMSC-
022, 1112, 184 N.M. 172, 74 P.38d 1064 (“All of
the provisions of a statute, together with
other statutes in pari materia, must be read
together to ascertain legislative intent.”),
We interpret the UM/UIM statute liberally
to implement its remedial purpose. Marck-
stadt v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 2010-
NMSC-001, 114, 147 N.M. 678, 228 P.3d 462.

{9} The statutes relevant to our analysis
are Section 66-5-301(A), Section 3-62-1, Sec-
tion 8-62-2(A), and NMSA 1978, Section 66-
5-207(A) (1998). Section 66-5-301(A) re-
quires automobile liability insurance policies
to provide UM/UIM coverage and reads, in
relevant part:

No motor vehicle or automobile liability
policy insuring against loss ... shall be
delivered or issued for delivery in New
Mexico with respect to any motor vehicle
registered or principally garaged in New
Mexico unless coverage is provided ... for
the protection of persons insured thereun-
der who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of unin-
sured motor vehicles ..., according to the
rules and regulations promulgated by, and
under provisions filed with and approved
by, the superintendent of insurance.

Sections 3-621 and 3-62-2(A) address the
manner in which public bodies, including
counties, may provide for their insurance
needs. Section 3-62-1 permits New Mexico
counties to self-insure through self-insurance
reserves as an alternative to, or in combina-
tion with, insurance secured by “any other

61

method provided by law.” Section 3-62-2(A)
permits two or more counties to pool their
self-insured reserves, claims, or losses. Sec-
tion 3-62-2(A) provides that such pooling
“shall not be construed to be transacting
insurance or otherwise subject to the provi-
sions of the laws of this state regulating
insurance or insurance companies.” Section
66-5-207(A) exempts a motor vehicle owned
by a political subdivision of a state, such as
the County, from the Mandatory Financial
Responsibility Act (MFRA), NMSA 1978,
Sections 66-5-201 to -239 (1978, as amended
through 2003).

{10} Sections 3-62-1 and 3-62-2(A) are
inconsistent with Plaintiff's position that Sec-
tion 66~-5-301(A) requires the Association of
Counties to provide the County UM/UIM
coverage. The Association of Counties pro-
vides the mechanism by which its member
counties self-insure through their pooled re-
serves. The Legislature recognized that this
type of self-insurance coverage afforded by
the Association of Counties is not the same
as other liability insurance by exempting it
from state Jaws that regulate insurance and
insurance companies. Section 8-62-2(A). In
the general sense, Section 66~5-301(A) is
such a law because it regulates the terms of
a motor vehicle or automobile liability policy
by requiring insurance companies to provide
UM/UIM coverage. With this reading of
Section 66-5-801(A), the Association of
Counties has no obligation to provide UM/
UIM coverage to its self-insuring members.

{11} We acknowledge that the Legisla-
ture’s use of the word “regulating” with re-
spect to laws regulating insurance and insur-
ance companies may be ambiguous in that it
might arguably only refer on its face to laws
establishing administrative regulation. How-
ever, when we read Section 66-5-301(A) not
only in conjunction with Sections 3-62~1 and
8-62-2(A) but also with the provisions of the
MFRA, the legislative intent is clear that
Section 66-5-301(A) does not apply to the
Association of Counties coverage. See De-
witt v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc, 2009-NMSC-032,
129, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341 (stating that
to the extent statutory language is ambigu-
ous, courts can consider principles of statuto-

62

ry construction to ascertain legislative in-
tent).

{12} The purpose of the MFRA “is to
require residents of New Mexico who own
and operate motor vehicles upon the high-
ways of the state either to have the ability to
respond in damages to accidents arising out
of the use and operation of a motor vehicle or
to obtain a motor vehicle insurance policy.”
Section 66-5-201.1. The MFRA requires mo-
tor vehicle owners to have insurance in speci-
fied minimum amounts or evidence of finan-
cial responsibility in specified minimum
amounts to permit anyone to operate a motor
vehicle on the streets or highways of the
state. Sections 66-5-205(A), -208, and —
215(A). It specifically exempts motor vehi-
cles owned by “any state or any political
subdivision of a state.” Section 66-5-207(A).
The County is a political subdivision of the
state of New Mexico. El Dorado at Sania
Fe, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Santa Fe
Cnty., 89 N.M. 818, 817, 551 P.2d 1860, 1864
(1976) (“A county is but a political subdivision
of the [s]tate, and it possesses only such
powers as are expressly granted to it by the
Legislature, together with those necessarily
implied to implement those express pow-
ers.”).

Hl {13} By virtue of its exemption from
the MFRA, the County is not required to
purchase motor vehicle liability insurance or
have evidence of financial responsibility in
order to permit its vehicles to operate on
New Mexico roads. Because the Legislature
exempted the County from any obligation to
purchase any motor vehicle liability insur-
ance, the Legislature certainly did not intend
that the County have any obligation to ac-
quire UM/UIM coverage.

{14} This conclusion, however, does not
fully address Plaintiff's argument because
Section 66~-5-301(A) places the burden on the
insurance provider to include UM/UIM cov-
erage and, arguably, even though the County
as the recipient of the coverage had no obli-
gation to obtain UM/UIM coverage, the As-
sociation of Counties still had the obligation
to provide it. To be sure, Section 66-5~
801(A) does not contain an exemption for
insurance policies issued to political subdivi-
sions of the state. Nevertheless, when we

construe Section 66-5-301(A) in connection
with the MFRA, the County’s exemption un-
der the MFRA indicates that the Legislature
did not intend the Association of Counties to
have any obligation under Section 66-5-
801(A) to offer UM/UIM coverage to the
County.

HM {15} “The rule that statutes in pari
materia should be construed together has the
greatest probative force in the case of stat-
utes relating to the same subject matter
passed at the same session of the Legisla-
ture.” Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, 112, 184
N.M. 172, 74 P.38d 1064. Even though Sec-
tion 66-5-301(A) is not part of the MFRA,
both the MFRA and Section 66-5-801(A)
were originally enacted in 1978 and address
required motor vehicle liability insurance.
Both are designed to protect persons who
are injured in motor vehicle accidents. The
MFRA requires insurance or evidence of fi-
nancial responsibility for motor vehicle own-
ers and drivers so that they will be able to
respond in damages to those injured in motor
vehicle accidents. Sections 66-5-201.1, -205.
Section 66-5-301(A) further fulfills the
MFRA purpose by requiring insurance cov-
erage for uninsured and underinsured motor-
ists unless the insured rejects such coverage.

{16} When we read these statutes togeth-
er, we believe that the Legislature intended
the requirement of Section 66-5-301(A) to
apply to the insurance required under Sec-
tion 66-5-205. Indeed, Section 66-5-301(A),
in stating the necessary UM/UIM coverage,
specifically references the minimum limits of
the MFRA. Thus, Section 66-5-301(A) does
not specifically exempt the County because it
need not do so. The Legislature focused on
the actions of the insurance provider in Sec-
tion 66-5-801(A), not on those of the insured.
Because the County was exempt from the
MFRA requirements, even if the Association
of Counties was an insurance provider under
Section 66-5-301(A), an issue we do not de-
cide, it was not required to offer the County
UM/UIM coverage.

HM {17} Contrary to our conclusion,
Plaintiff makes the additional argument that
public policy requires the Association of
Counties to provide UM/UIM coverage. As

a general matter, the public policy stated in
Section 66-5-301(A) is “to make uninsured
motorist coverage a part of every automobile
liability insurance policy issued in this state,
with certain limited exceptions.” Romero,
111 N.M. at 156, 803 P.2d at 245. ‘Indeed,
Section 66-5-301(A) was “intended to expand
insurance coverage and to protect individual
members of the public against the hazard of
culpable uninsured motorists.” Progressive
Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior Servs., 2010-
NMSC-050, 15, 149 N.M. 157, 245 P.8d 1209
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). However, the Legislature stated in
Section 66-5-301(A) that there were limited
exceptions to the required coverage, and it
set forth countervailing public policy with
respect to governmental entities in the
MFRA and Sections 8-62-1 and 3-62-2(A).
In the context of this case, involving a politi-
eal subdivision of the state, the Legislature

63

did not intend the general policy of Section
66-5-301(A) to apply.

CONCLUSION

{18} Section 66-5-301(A) does not require
the Association of Counties to provide UM/
UIM coverage to the County. We affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment
to Defendants.

{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: MICHAEL E. VIGIL and
LINDA M. VANZI, Judges.

2011-NMSC-011

257 P.3d 884

SAN JUAN AGRICULTURAL WATER
USERS ASSOCIATION, Electors Con-
cerned About Animas Water, and Steve
Cone, Plaintiffs—Petitioners,

v.

KNME-TV, Board of Education of the Al-
buquerque Public Schools, Board of Re-
gents of the University of New Mexico,
John D’Antonio, New Mexico Interstate
Stream Commission, and Office of the
Governor of New Mexico, Defendants-
Respondents.

No. 32,139.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.

March 8, 2011.

S
ot

Victor R. Marshall & Associates, P.C., Vie-
tor R. Marshall, Albuquerque, NM, for Peti-
tioners.

Long, Pound & Komer, P.A., Mark Travis
Baker, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondents.

Peifer, Hanson & Mullins, P.A., Charles R.
Peifer, Matthew R. Hoyt, Elizabeth K. Ra-
dosevich, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Cu-
riae New Mexico Foundation for Open Gov-
ernment.

OPINION

DANIELS, Chief Justice.

{1} The New Mexico Inspection of Public
Records Act (IPRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 14-2-1
to -12 (1947, as amended through 2009), pro-
vides in Section 14-2-12(A)(2) that a person
may bring an enforcement suit if that per-
son’s written request to inspect public rec-
cords has been denied. In this case, we hold
that a person may bring suit to enforce a
public records request made through an
agent, even if the agent did not disclose that
the initial request was being made on behalf
of another. We also hold that a person who
has not requested public records, either per-
sonally or through an agent, does not have
standing to seek judicial enforcement.

66

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Victor R. Marshall & Associates, P.C.
(Marshall Jaw firm) submitted written IPRA
requests to inspect public records to multiple
public agencies, including KNME-TV, the
Board of Regents of the University of New
Mexico (UNM), John D’Antonio of the Office
of the State Engineer (State Engineer), the
Interstate Stream Commission (Stream Com-
mission), and the Office of the Governor of
New Mexico. The Marshall law firm includ-
ed its own name, address, and phone number
on the requests, and none of the requests
disclosed the fact that the request was being
made on behalf of the Marshall law firm’s
client, the San Juan Agricultural Water
Users Association (San Juan Association).
In the written requests, the Marshall law
firm asked each public entity to provide all
public records relating to a documentary pro-
gram, The Water Haulers, that aired on
KNME-TV in January 2007 and discussed a
proposed water rights settlement affecting
the San Juan River Basin. Although the
State Engineer, Stream Commission, Office
of the Governor, and UNM each produced
some records related to The Water Haulers,
Plaintiffs contend that the production of doc-
uments was incomplete.

{3} In order to compel Defendants to pro-
duce the remainder of the requested records,
the San Juan Association and two additional
plaintiffs, Electors Concerned About Animas
Water (Electors) and Steve Cone, brought a
Section 14-2-12(A)(2) IPRA enforcement suit
against Defendants. Electors, an environ-
mental organization, and Cone, a teacher and
environmental activist, represent that they
joined the lawsuit because they asserted an
interest in compelling full production of the
documents relating to The Water Haulers,
even though the Marshall law firm had not
been acting as attorney or agent for Electors
or Cone when the firm requested the rec-
ords,

{4} Defendants moved to dismiss the case
pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(1) and (6) NMRA.
They argued that Plaintiffs did not have a
cause of action because “IPRA only creates
rights in the person who actually requests
public records and expressly limits the power
to enforce its provisions to the requester, the

attorney general, and district attorneys.”
Attorney Victor Marshall responded with an
affidavit stating that the Marshall law firm
had been acting as attorney and agent for its
client, the San Juan Association, when it
submitted the records requests to Defen-
dants. Defendants do not challenge Victor
Marshall’s assertion that the Marshall law
firm had requested the records on behalf of
the San Juan Association.

{5} The Second Judicial District Court
granted the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ com-
plaint. The district court found that
Electors and Cone did not have standing to
sue because IPRA gives judicial enforcement
remedies only to the attorney general, a dis-
trict attorney, or “a person whose written
request has been denied.” See § 14-2-12(A).
‘The district court also concluded that the San
Juan Association did not have standing to
enforce a records request made through an
agent because Section 14~2-8(C) requires all
records requests to include “the name, ad-
dress and telephone number of the person
seeking access to the records.” Although the
district court found that the Marshall law
firm had been representing the San Juan
Association when the firm made the records
request, the court concluded that the San
Juan Association did not have a cause of
action under IPRA because the request did
not disclose the San Juan Association’s name,
address, and phone number and because the
Marshall law firm had not disclosed in the
initial request that it was made on behalf of
the San Juan Association.

{6} Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that nei-
ther IPRA nor the common law of agency
requires a requesting agent to disclose its
principal. San Juan Agric. Water Users
Ass’n v. KNME-TV, 2010-NMCA-012, 15,
147 N.M. 648, 227 P.38d 612. Defendants
argued that the district court’s ruling should
be upheld because it was supported by both
the plain language of IPRA and the body of
federal case law interpreting the federal
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5
US.C.A. § 552 (Thomson Reuters, Westlaw
2011). San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass’n,
2010-NMCA-012, 19, 147 N.M. 643, 227 P.3d
612. The Court of Appeals upheld the district,
court. Id. 1.

{T} We granted certiorari to consider two
issues raised by Plaintiffs. One of those
issues, whether the district court improperly
refused to allow Plaintiffs to amend their
enforcement complaint by adding the Mar-
shall law firm as a named plaintiff, is patent-
ly devoid of merit and needs no extended
discussion. The record reflects that no such
motion to amend was ever made, either prior
to or after entry of judgment, and we there-
fore affirm the Court of Appeals on that
issue. See id. 1133-87. We now address
Plaintiffs’ other issue, whether an undis-
closed principal has standing to enforce an
IPRA request made by that principal’s agent.

IL DISCUSSION

Ts {8} When evaluating standing to
sue under a statutory cause of action, “we
must look to the Legislature’s intent as ex-
pressed in the Act or other relevant authori-
ty.” Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp, 1996-
NMSC-088, 121 N.M. 764, 768, 918 P.2d 350,
354. Where the Legislature has granted
specific persons a cause of action by statute,
the statute governs who has standing to sue.
ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 2008-
NMSC-045, 19 n. 1, 144 N.M. 471, 188 P.3d
1222; see also Key, 121 N.M. at 768, 918 P.2d
at 354 (explaining that there is no “signifi-
cant difference between having standing to
sue and having a cause of action”). Whether
Plaintiffs have standing is a question of law
that we review de novo. See ACLU of N.M.,
2008-NMSC-045, 116, 144 N.M. 471, 188 P.3d
1222.

Hl {9} To determine whether Plaintiffs
have standing to enforce the records request
made by the Marshall law firm, we must
begin with the language of IPRA. See Key,
121 N.M. at 768-69, 918 P.2d at 354-55.
“The entire statute is to be read as a whole
so that each provision may be considered in
its relation to every other part.” State ex
rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 794,
568 P.2d 1236, 1240 (1977). We begin our
discussion with an overview of the IPRA
provisions relevant to our resolution of this
case.

1. IPRA exempts certain types of records from
inspection. See § 14-2-1(A)(1)-(12). We do not

67

A. IPRA Was Enacted to Ensure Public
Access to Public Documents.

{10} Under IPRA, “[e]very person has a
right to inspect” the public records of New
Mexico. Section 14-2-1(A). IPRA defines
“person” broadly to include “any individual,
corporation, partnership, firm, association or
entity.” Section 14-2-6(C). In order to fa-
cilitate the publie’s right to inspect records,
each public body of New Mexico must have a
designated custodian to receive and respond
to records requests and provide opportunities
for inspection. Section 14-2-7; see § 14-2-
6(D) (defining “public body”). “Any person
wishing to inspect public records may submit
an oral or written request to the custodian.”
Section 14-2-8(A). Written requests must
describe the records that are sought and
must include the name, address, and tele-
phone number “of the person seeking access
to the records,” but “{njo person requesting
records shall be required to state the reason
for inspecting the records.” Section 14-2—
8(C).

{11} The records custodian “shall permit
the inspection immediately or as soon as is
practicable under the circumstances, but not
later than fifteen days after receiving a writ-
ten request.” Section 14-2-8(D). If the rec-
ords are not available “within three business
days, the custodian shall explain in writing
when the records will be available for inspec-
tion or when the public body will respond to
the request.” Jd. Within fifteen days of
receiving a written request, the custodian
must either permit inspection of the records,
provide a written explanation of why any
request has been denied, or in the case of an
excessively burdensome or broad request, in-
form the requester that additional time will
be needed to respond. See §§ 14-2-10 to -
11. If the custodian has not responded to a
written request within fifteen days, the “per-
son requesting the public records” may con-
clude that the request has been denied. Sec-
tion 14-2-11(A).

{12} IPRA includes remedies to encourage
compliance and facilitate enforcement. The
attorney general and district attorneys are

address whether any of the records requested in
this case fall into an exception.

68

empowered to enforce IPRA, Section 14-2-
12(A)(1), and the statute also provides that a
“person whose written request has been de-
nied” may bring an enforcement suit, Section
14-2-12(A)(2). By giving enforcement power
to any person whose written request has
been denied, IPRA’s provisions create “ ‘pri-
vate attorneys general’” for “more effective
and efficient enforcement” of IPRA than
would be possible if only the attorney general
or district attorney could enforce the statute.
Office of the New Mexico Attorney General,
Inspection of Public Records Act Compli-
ance Guide 41 (6th ed. 2009) (IPRA Compli-
ance Guide).

{18} A plaintiff who prevails in an IPRA
enforcement suit can obtain attorneys’ fees,
costs, and damages. Section 14-2-12(D). If
a records custodian fails to respond to a
records request within fifteen days of receiv-
ing the request and a court concludes that
the failure to respond was unreasonable, the
court shall award the plaintiff damages not to
exceed one hundred dollars a day. Section
14-2-11(C)(1)-(2). In such cases, damages
“accrue from the day the public body is in
noncompliance until a written denial is is-
sued” and shall “be payable from the funds
of the public body.” Section 14-2-11(C)8)-
(4). IPRA’s damage provisions are intended
to encourage public entities’ prompt compli-
ance with records requests. See Derringer
v. State, 20083-NMCA-073, W11, 15, 138
N.M. 721, 68 P.3d 961 (determining that “the
legislature's focus was to provide prompt
compliance” and holding that IPRA “does not.
provide for damages pursuant to an action
brought after a public body has complied
with the Act”).

{14} We must construe IPRA in light of its
purpose. “A statute should be interpreted to
mean what the Legislature intended it to
mean, and to accomplish the ends sought to
be accomplished by it.” Newsome, 90 N.M.
at 794, 568 P.2d at 1240. The Legislature
expressly stated IPRA’s purpose and under-
lying public policy in Section 14-2-5:

Recognizing that a representative gov-
ernment is dependent upon an informed
electorate, the intent of the legislature in
enacting [IPRA] is to ensure, and it is
declared to be the public policy of this

state, that all persons are entitled to the
greatest possible information regarding
the affairs of government and the official
acts of public officers and employees. It is
the further intent of the legislature, and it
is declared to be the public policy of this
state, that to provide persons with such

information is an essential function of a

representative government and an integral

part of the routine duties of public officers
and employees.

{15} IPRA’s stated policy reflects the fact
that people in our democratic society have “a
fundamental right” to inspect public records.
Newsome, 90 N.M. at 797, 568 P.2d at 1248.
Open records laws such as IPRA are based
on the premise that public access to public
records will result in better government.
See IPRA Compliance Guide, supra, at 26.
IPRA creates a presumption in favor of ac-
cess: “The citizen’s right to know is the rule
and secrecy is the exception. Where there is
no contrary statute or countervailing public
policy, the right to inspect public records
must be freely allowed.” Newsome, 90 N.M.
at 797, 568 P.2d at 1243.

{16} IPRA is intended to ensure that the
public servants of New Mexico remain ac-
countable to the people they serve. “Writ-
ings coming into the hands of public officers
in connection with their official functions
should generally be accessible to members of
the public ... to determine whether those
who have been entrusted with the affairs of
government are honestly, faithfully and com-
petently performing their function.” Id. at
795, 568 P.2d at 1241 (Gnternal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In order for
government to truly be of the people and by
the people, and not just for the people, our
citizens must be able to know what their own
public servants are doing in their name.

B. Common-Law Principles of Agency
Apply Unless Explicitly Abrogated.

{17} When a statute’s plain language “is
clear and unambiguous, we must give effect
to that language and refrain from further
statutory interpretation.” Quynh Truong v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, 137, 147
N.M. 588, 227 P.8d 78 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). This case illus-

trates how “a statute, apparently clear and
unambiguous on its face may for one reason
or another give rise to legitimate ... differ-
ences of opinion concerning the statute’s
meaning.” Key, 121 N.M. at 769, 918 P.2d at
355 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

{18} Defendants argue that only a person
identified by name, address, and telephone
number in a written records request can
enforce the act because IPRA (1) states that
a written records request must include “the
name, address and telephone number of the
person seeking access to the records,” Sec-
tion 14-2-8(C), and (2) provides that “a per-
son whose written request has been denied”
ean enforce the act, Section 14-2-12(A)(2).
The statutory language does not explicitly
address the issue before us, whether a per-
son can request records or enforce the re-
quest through an agent.

{19} Plaintiffs, joined by amicus curiae
New Mexico Foundation for Open Govern-
ment (NMFOG), argue that the common law
of agency applies and that a request made by
an attorney on behalf of a client is the legal
equivalent of a request made by the client
personally. If a request made by an attor-
ney on behalf of a client is denied, the client
would be a “person whose written request
has been denied” within the meaning of Sec-
tion 14-2-12(A)(2) and would therefore have
standing to bring an enforcement suit.

HMM {20} When this Court interprets
statutes, we do so against a background of
common-law principles. In 1876, New Mexi-
co’s territorial Legislature determined that
“the common law as recognized in the United
States of America shall be the rule of prac-
tice and decision.” 1875-1876 N.M. Laws,
ch. 2, § 2; see NMSA 1978, § 38-1-8 (1876)
(current version of the statute). “(TJhe com-
mon law, upon its adoption, came in and filled
every crevice, nook and corner in our juris-
prudence where it had not been stayed or
supplanted by statutory enactment....”
Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, 123, 122
N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We presume
that the Legislature enacts statutes that are
consistent with the common law and that the
common law applies unless it is clearly abro-

69

gated. Id. 124. “A statute will be interpret-
ed as supplanting the common law only if
there is an explicit indication that the legisla-
ture so intended.” Id. 122.

Hl {21} ‘The legal principles governing
the relationship between an agent and a prin-
cipal are part of the common-law perspective
from which IPRA must be viewed. “An
agent is a person who, by agreement with
another called the principal, represents the
principal in dealings with third persons or
transacts some other business, manages
some affair or does some service for the
principal, with or without compensation.”
UJI 13-401 NMRA. “Generally, a person
may appoint an agent to do the same acts
and to achieve the same legal consequences
by the performance of an act as if he or she
had acted personally, unless public policy or
the agreement with the principal requires
personal performance.” 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency
§ 18, at 442 (2002). “Unquestionably, insofar
as an agent’s acts are within [the agent’s]
authority they are in legal contemplation the
acts of the principal.” Ronald A. Coco, Inc.
v. St. Paul’s Methodist Church of Las
Cruces, N.M., Inc, 78 N.M. 97, 99, 428 P.2d
636, 638 (1967).

{22} The common law of agency does not
require an agent to disclose that he or she is
acting on behalf of someone else. See 3
Am.Jur.2d Agency § 305, at 674; see, eg.
Latch v. Gratty, Inc, 107 S.W.8d 548, 546
(Tex.2003) (“An agent need not disclose his
or her principal’s identity in order to act on
behalf of that principal.”).

{23} Where an agent makes a contract on
behalf of an undisclosed principal, the third
party’s liability to the principal is generally
the same as the third party’s liability to the
agent. See William A. Gregory, The Law of
Agency and Partnership § 105, at 192 (8d
ed. 2001). An undisclosed principal can sue
and be sued on a contract made in the
agent’s name because the common law of
agency regards the agent’s actions as the
principal’s own. See id. The undisclosed
“principal may at any time appear as such
and claim all the benefits of the contract,
from the other contracting party, so far as
the principal can do so without injury to the

70

other party by the substitution of himself or
herself for the agent.” 8 Am.Jur.2d Agency
§ 816, at 684. Apart from some limited ex-
ceptions not relevant here, courts have unan-
imously held that an undisclosed principal
becomes a party to transactions entered into
by the principal’s agent. See Dana v. Boren,
183 Wash.App. 307, 185 P.8d 963, 965 (2006)
(isting exceptions); 2 Restatement (Third) of
Agency § 6.03 cmt. d, at 48-45 (2006) (dis-
cussing exceptions); Gregory, supra, § 95, at
180 (noting that this rule is universal).

{24} The application of agency law is not
limited to contracts but instead “encompass-
es a wide and diverse range of relationships
and circumstances.” 1 Restatement (Third)
Agency § 1.01 emt. c, at 19. In New Mexico
as elsewhere, the common law of agency
allows an agent to do on behalf of the princi-
pal whatever the principal would be able to
do. See Turley v. State, 96 N.M. 579, 581,
633 P.2d 687, 689 (1981) (“It is an elementary
principle of law that a person may do any-
thing through an agent that he may lawfully
do personally, unless public policy or some
agreement requires personal performance.”),
overruled on other grounds by U.S. Brewers
Ass’n, Inc. v. Dir. of the N.M. Dep't of Alco-
holic Beverage Control, 100 N.M. 216, 219,
668 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1983).

HH S{25} A person may use an agent to
take action under the authority of a statute,
even when the agent is not the person specif-
ically identified in the statute. Coldwater
Cattle Co. v. Portales Valley Project, Inc. 78
NLM. 41, 45, 428 P.2d 15, 19 (967). “In
order to determine that a right conferred by
statute shall only be exercised personally and
cannot be delegated to an agent something
must be found in the Act by express enact-
ment or necessary implication which pre-
vents an agent from acting.” Id.

{26} In Coldwater Cattle, the nonprofit
corporation Portales Valley Project filed 197
applications with the state engineer on behalf
of multiple water rights owners seeking to
drill supplemental wells and change the
points of diversion for the water rights. Id.
at 48, 428 P.2d at 17. New Mexico’s water
code provided that “[t]he owner of a water
right may drill and use a supplemental well”
and may “change the location of [a] well,” but

these acts could be done “only upon applica-
tion to the state engineer.” Id. at 44-45, 428
P.2d at 18-19 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The Coldwater Cattle
Company challenged the applications, argu-
ing that under the plain language of the
water code the only person who could file an
application with the state engineer was the
owner of a water right and that “an agent is
excluded from performing any of the re-
quired acts” under the statute. Id. at 45, 428
P.2d at 19.

{27} This Court looked to legislative intent
to determine whether a water rights owner
could file an application through an agent.
Id. The water code provisions at issue were
intended “to provide a procedure for deter-
mining whether proposed changes [to a wa-
ter right] injuriously affect the rights of oth-
ers, not to limit the right of water right
owners ... to act only in person and not
through a designated agency.” Jd. (internal
citation omitted). Because the water code
did not “expressly or impliedly prevent an
agent of the owners of water rights from
filing and prosecuting applications ... [o]n
behalf of the owners,” this Court held that
the water rights owners could “delegate the
function of filing and prosecuting such appli-
cations.” Id; see also Turley, 96 N.M. at
581, 633 P.2d at 689 (holding that the use of
an agent was permissible under a statute
because the statute did not state or imply
that the use of an agent was prohibited).

{28} We therefore must consider whether
there is anything in IPRA that reflects a
legislative intent to abrogate common law
agency principles.

C. IPRA Does Not Preclude Enforcing a
Records Request Made Through an
Agent.

HM {29} As in Coldwater Cattle, we
must look to the language of the statutory
provisions at issue and interpret them in
light of their purpose in order to determine
whether IPRA precludes an undisclosed
principal from delegating the function of re-
questing records to an agent and then later
enforcing that request in the principal’s own
name. Defendants argue that Section 14-2-

8(C), stating that all written requests “shall
provide the name, address and telephone
number of the person seeking access to the
records,” expresses legislative intent to limit
standing to bring an enforcement suit under
IPRA only to the person who is specifically
named in the request. Defendants assert
that Section 14-2-8(C) gives public entities
the right to have notice of who the litigants
might be should the public body deny the
request. We disagree.

{30} An IPRA request must include a
name, address, and telephone number in or-
der to facilitate the inspection procedures set
forth in IPRA. In order to comply with
IPRA’s procedural provisions, a records cus-
todian must have contact information that
will enable the custodian to seek clarification
of a records request, furnish public records
for inspection, send written explanations of
why any request has been denied, or inform
the requester that more time is needed to
respond to a burdensome request. See, eg.
§ 14-2-8(D) (“If the inspection is not permit-
ted within three business days, the custodian
shall explain in writing when the records will
be available ....”); § 14-2-11(B) (“{Tlhe
custodian shall provide the requester with a
written explanation of the denial.”), A rec-
ords custodian cannot perform the statutory
duties set forth in IPRA unless the custodian
has someone with whom to communicate. A
request’s provision of a name, address, and
telephone number is essential to the inspec-
tion process.

{81} Section 14-2-8(C) has an administra-
tive function; it was not intended to give
public bodies notice of who the litigants
might be should the public body decide to
deny the request. The purpose and intent of
IPRA is to provide “all persons” with “the
greatest possible information regarding the
affairs of government.” Section 14-2-5. In
order to further this goal, IPRA makes it
clear that all public entities must furnish
records without regard to who is requesting
the records and cannot require disclosure of
the reason for inspecting the records. Sec-
tion 14-2-8(C).

{32} Requiring a person to state the rea-
son for a request, either directly or by impli-
cation, could have a chilling effect on the free

71

flow of information and potentially compro-
mise the public entity’s prompt compliance
with the request. Amicus NMFOG argues
that in many situations a person seeking
records may deem the use of an agent neces-
sary because disclosing the identity of the
principal would automatically reveal the pur-
pose of the request, which IPRA protects
from disclosure. For example, an agency
may have an incentive to treat the news
media differently from other requesters. An
agency may hesitate before providing infor-
mation to an advocacy organization because
of an assumed motivation behind the request.
A whistleblower or candidate for public office
may wish to request records through an
agent to avoid revealing the reason for the
request.

{33} Defendants argue that such hypothet-
ical situations are speculative and improperly
assume that public entities will act in bad
faith. While we hope that all public servants
will act in good faith in complying with their
statutory obligations under IPRA, “New
Mexico’s policy of open government is intend-
ed to protect the public from having to rely
solely on the representations of public offi-
cials that they have acted appropriately.”
City of Farmington v. The Daily Times,
2009-NMCA-~057, 117, 146 N.M. 349, 210
P.8d 246, The very fact that IPRA provides
a remedy for wrongful withholding of public
documents reflects a legislative expectation
that there will be occasions when public offi-
cials will fail to follow the law.

{34} It is also reasonable to expect many
instances when parties will request records
through agents who may not be available to
participate in IPRA enforcement suits.
Foreseeable requesting parties include liti-
gants who request records for litigation
through attorneys who may not represent
them in the IPRA suit, news organizations
that make requests through employees who
may no longer be employed when the IPRA
suit is filed, political parties or public interest
organizations who make requests through
employees or volunteers who are not avail-
able for the IPRA suit, and any organization
that can act only through human agents who
are mobile and mortal by nature. There is
no sound justification for requiring those

72

principals to start the requesting process all
over again, with likely identical results, each
time an agent becomes unavailable.

{35} Courts in other states have concluded
that under their statutes a principal has
standing to enforce a records request made
through an agent. See Norton v. Town of
Islip, 17 A.D.3d 468, 470, 7938 N.Y.S.2d 133
(N.Y.App.Div.2005) (“[A]ny person on whose
behalf a [public records] request was made
has standing to maintain a proceeding to
review the denial of disclosure of the records
requested.”); Kleven v. City of Des Moines,
111 Wash.App. 284, 44 P.3d 887, 888-89
(2002) (holding that an undisclosed client
could sue for relief under Washington’s pub-
lic disclosure act to enforce a records request.
made through the client’s attorney); of State
ex rel. Hansen v. Schall, 126 Conn. 586, 12
A.2d 767, 770 (1940) (concluding that a town
inhabitant with the right to inspect that
town’s records could employ a noninhabitant
agent to acquire the information on the in-
habitant’s behalf).

HMI {36} The purpose of IPRA is to
encourage disclosure of public documents.
Allowing an undisclosed principal to enforce
a records request made through an agent
furthers this purpose without creating any
prejudice to the public entity holding the
records. Public bodies have a statutory duty
to respond diligently to all records requests,
regardless of who makes the request. As
with the statutes at issue in Turley and
Coldwater Cattle, we find nothing in the text
or legislative history of IPRA indicating that
the Legislature intended to supplant the
common law of agency. See Sims, 1996-
NMSC-078, 1 28, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153.
Under the common law of agency, a public
records request made by an agent on behalf
of an undisclosed principal is therefore the
Jegal equivalent of a public records request
made by the principal in the principal’s own
name.

D. Federal FOIA Interpretations Do Not
Control Interpretation of IPRA.

{87} Defendants argue that we should in-
terpret IPRA consistently with federal case-
law interpretations of FOIA. Federal courts
have held that an individual must be specifi-

cally named in a FOIA request in order to
bring suit under that statute. See, ag.
McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227,
1238 (8d Cir.1993) (“A ‘case or controversy’
conferring standing arises only when a per-
son makes a request for information under
the FOIA and the petitioned agency denies
that request.”); Burka v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs, 142 F.3d 1286,
1290-91 (D.C.Cir.1998) (explaining that the
attorney, and not his undisclosed client, was
the real party in interest in the FOIA suit
and the only one with standing to sue).

{38} There are several reasons why we
must decline to follow federal FOIA caselaw
when interpreting IPRA. The text of IPRA is
significantly different from the text of FOIA.
For example, FOIA lacks (1) the unequivocal
statement of public policy found in IPRA,
Section 14-2-5, (2) the rule that a public
entity cannot ask a person requesting rec-
ords the reason for the request, Section 14—
2-8(C), and (8) the provision for damages
when a records custodian fails to respond to
a request in a timely fashion, Section 14-2-
11(C). These IPRA provisions underscore a
legislative intent to ensure that New Mexi-
cans have the greatest possible access to
their public records. The differences in sub-
stantive text and legislative purposes make
the application of federal FOIA law inappro-
priate when construing IPRA. See Phelps
Dodge Tyrone, Inc. v. N.M. Water Quality
Control Comm'n, 2006-NMCA-115, 137, 140
N.M. 464, 143 P.8d 502 (“[TJhere may be
reasons, such as differences in statutory lan-
guage, that may make federal law or law
from other jurisdictions inapplicable or inap-
propriate in New Mexico ....”); see eg.
State v. Badont, 2008-NMCA-009, 116, 183
N.M. 257, 62 P.3d 348 (“[FJundamental dif-
ferences between federal and New Mexico’s
rules of pleading make federal case law on
the issue of notification distinguishable
-..."); of State v. Cardenas—Alvarez, 2001-
NMSC-O17, 1114-16, 130 N.M. 886, 25 P.38d
225 (noting that New Mexico may wish to
diverge from federal precedent because of “a
flawed federal analysis, structural differences
between state and federal government, or
distinctive state characteristics” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{39} Federal courts interpret FOIA within
a legal framework different from that found
in our state court jurisprudence. When eval-
uating standing, federal courts are con-
strained by the limited federal jurisdiction
delegated to them under Article III of the
United States Constitution. See U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see, eg. Mahtesian v.
U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. 388 F.Supp.2d
1047, 1050 (N.D.Cal.2005) (“[S]tanding to sue
is an essential and unchanging part of the
case or controversy requirement of Article
IIL.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); Natl Trust for Historic Preserva-
tion v. City of Albuquerque, 117 N.M. 590,
598, 874 P.2d 798, 801 (Ct.App.1994) (“Feder-
al courts have very limited authority beyond
that conferred by statute or the Constitu-
tion.”). Unlike the federal courts, “New
Mexico state courts are not subject to the
jurisdictional limitations imposed on federal
courts by Article III, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution.” ACLU of N.M., 2008-
NMSC-045, 119, 144 N.M. 471, 188 P.3d 1222
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).

Hs {40} A significant difference be-
tween federal and state courts is that, unlike
state courts, federal courts do not presume
that Congress intended for the common law
to apply when interpreting a statute. See
Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, 1122-24, 122 N.M.
618, 930 P.2d 153 (discussing the state pre-
sumption). Federal courts use federal com-
mon law in only a few restricted contexts,
such as “those concerned with the rights and
obligations of the United States, interstate
and international disputes implicating the
conflicting rights of States, or our relations
with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.”
Natl Trust for Historic Preservation, 117
N.M. at 598, 874 P.2d at 801 (quoting Texas
Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S.
630, 641, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500
(1981)). “[A] state court, because it possess-
es common-law authority, has significantly
greater power than a federal court to recog-
nize a cause of action not explicitly expressed
in a statute” and may do so in order to
further public policy. Id. at 593-94, 874 P.2d
at 801-02.

B

{41} A number of other jurisdictions have
also declined to follow federal caselaw when
interpreting their own state public records
statutes. See, eg, Graham v. Ala. State
Emps. Ass’n, 991 So.2d 710, 720 (Ala.Civ.
App.2007) (finding no basis to apply FOIA
caselaw when construing the Alabama stat-
ute); Bowers v. Shelton, 265 Ga. 247, 458
S.E.2d 741, 748 (1995) (“Because the Georgia
Act materially differs from the FOIA, [case-
law interpreting FOIA] is inapplicable.”);
Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. Magic
Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr. 188 Idaho 143, 59
P.3d 314, 316-17 (2002) (finding that FOIA
did not apply to a case brought under the
Idaho statute); State ew rel. Thomas v. Ohio
State Univ, 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 643 N.E.2d
126, 129 (1994) (rejecting FOIA’s privacy-
public interest balancing test for the Ohio
Public Records Act because FOIA did not.
apply, and the Ohio law contained no similar
personal-privacy exception); Kleven, 44 P.8d
at 890 (refusing to apply FOIA caselaw to
interpret Washington’s public disclosure law
because the state law provisions differed sig-
nificantly from the federal law provisions).
We agree with the jurisdictions that have
rejected federal FOIA interpretations in in-
terpreting their own statutes guaranteeing
public access to public records. Both recog-
nized principles of common law and the re-
medial purposes of our statute lead us to
conclude that a previously unnamed principal
may enforce IPRA rights, either directly in
its own name or through its agent.

E. Neither Electors nor Cone Have
Standing to Enforce San Juan Associ-
ation’s Records Request.

Hs {42} New Mexico courts general-
ly expect a litigant to demonstrate the tradi-
tional standing requirements of “injury in
fact, causation, and redressability to invoke
the court’s authority to decide the merits of
the case.” ACLU of N.M., 2008-NMSC-045,
110, 144 N.M. 471, 188 P.3d 1222, Because
all persons are entitled to inspect the public
records of New Mexico, Section 14-2-5, a
person who follows IPRA’s procedure for
requesting records and whose request is
wrongfully denied or ignored suffers a cogni-
zable injury in fact. This injury is caused by
the public entity's failure to provide the rec-

74

ords through a records custodian as required
by law. See § 14-2-7. This injury can be
redressed through an IPRA enforcement suit
under Section 14-2-12(A)(2), which provides
in relevant part that “[aJn action to enforce
[IPRA] may be brought by ... a person
whose written request has been denied.”
The traditional standing requirements of in-
jury, causation, and redressability are met by
any person whose request to inspect public
records has been denied.

HM {43} The San Juan Association has
standing to enforce the public records re-
quest it made through its agent, the Marshall
law firm. “Whether an agent acts on behalf
of an undisclosed principal is a question of
fact.” 2 Restatement (Third) of Agency
§ 6.08 emt. ¢, at 42; see, eg., DeBaca, Inc. v.
Montoya, 91 N.M. 419, 420-21, 575 P.2d 603,
604-05 (1978) (explaining that evidence was
admissible to show that an agent had acted
on behalf of an undisclosed principal). In
order to have standing, a plaintiff bears the
burden of showing that there was an agency
relationship. See Santa Fe Techs, Inc. v.
Argus Networks, Inc, 2002-NMCA-030,
926, 181 N.M. 772, 42 P.8d 1221. In this
case, Victor Marshall submitted an uncontro-
verted affidavit stating that the Marshall law
firm had been acting as agent for the San
Juan Association when the firm made the
request to inspect public records. The district
court concluded that the Marshall law firm
was acting as agent for its client, the San
Juan Association, when the firm requested
the public records.

{44} Unlike the San Juan Association,
Electors and Cone cannot meet the standing
requirements of injury, causation, and re-
dressability. It is the act of requesting ac-
cess to public records and the subsequent
denial of that request that enables a plaintiff
to establish injury and distinguishes the
plaintiff from the general public. Neither
Electors nor Cone were persons “whose writ-
ten request has been denied,” as required by
Section 14-2-12(A)(2). See City of Newark
v. Law Dep't of City of N.Y., 805 A.D.2d 28,
34-35, 760 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y.App.Div.2003)
(finding that petitioners lacked standing un-
der New York’s freedom of information law
because the records request was not made on

their behalf), Accordingly, Electors and
Cone do not have standing to bring an en-
forcement suit under IPRA.

III. CONCLUSION

{45} We hold that a principal, whether
disclosed or not, can delegate the function of
requesting public records to an agent, such
as the principal’s attorney, and that either
the agent or the principal, even if previously
unknown to the public records custodian, can
enforce that request if it is denied. We
therefore reverse the judgment of the dis-
trict court dismissing the claims of the San
Juan Association, affirm the dismissal as to
Electors and Cone, and remand to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

{46} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA,
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C,
BOSSON, EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMSC-012
257 P.3d 894

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff—
Petitioner,

ve

Victor GONZALES, Defendant-
Respondent.

No. 31,891.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
March 9, 2011.

vis)

Gary K. King, Attorney General, James W.
Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Gorence & Oliveros, P.C., Robert J. Go-
rence, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

CHAVEZ, Justice.

{1} The State appeals a district court or-
der suppressing methamphetamine evidence
based on its conclusion that a traffic stop of
Defendant Victor Gonzales was an unconsti-
tutional pretext to a narcotics investigation.
During the suppression hearing, Detective
Carlos Gallegos, who had been monitoring
Defendant's activities during the day in ques-
tion, testified that he coordinated the traffic
stop of Defendant for a window tint violation
by asking Officer Thomas Griego to make the
stop and arranging for a canine unit to be
present at’ the time of the stop. Detective
Gallegos wanted the vehicle stopped to follow
‘up on information he received from a confi-
dential informant that sometime that after-
noon or evening, Defendant would be trans-
porting a large amount of methamphetamine
south of Albuquerque. The detective re-
ferred to the stop as pretextual and testified
that he did not believe he had reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to stop Defen-
dant for a narcotics investigation. A search
of the vehicle pursuant to a search warrant
revealed a large quantity of methamphet-
amine.

{2} Defendant filed a motion to suppress
the evidence contending, among other things,
that the stop was pretextual in violation of
the New Mexico Constitution. The trial
judge announced his intention to deny the
motion in a letter concluding that the patrol
officer who stopped Defendant did have rea-
sonable suspicion to stop Defendant for a
window tint violation, and therefore, under
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116
S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the stop
was constitutional. The trial judge noted
that whether a pretextual stop violates the
New Mexico Constitution was at the time a
matter of first impression and offered to
certify the question for an interlocutory ap-
peal. However, on the same date as the

76

letter ruling, the Court of Appeals issued its
Opinion in State v. Ochoa (Ochoa III), 2009-
NMCA-002, 146 N.M. 32, 206 P.3d 148
(2008), holding that a pretextual traffic stop
violates Article II, Section 10 of the New
Mexico Constitution if the real purpose for
the stop is not supported by reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause, and the officer
would otherwise not have stopped the vehi-
cle. Ochoa III, 2009-NMCA-002, 140, 146
N.M. 32, 206 P.8d 143. The trial court re-
considered its letter ruling sua sponte and
entered an order suppressing the evidence,
relying on Ochoa III. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.

{3} We interpret Ochoa III to require a
determination whether the real reason for
the stop is supported by objective evidence of
reasonable suspicion. If the answer is yes,
the stop is constitutional. Because Ochoa II
had not been published at the time of the
evidentiary hearing and the trial court did
not conduct such an analysis, we reverse and
remand for a hearing consistent with Ochoa
Hl.

BACKGROUND

{4} On July 20, 2006, Detective Gallegos,
who was assigned to the Valley Narcotics
Unit of the Albuquerque Police Department,
asked Officer Griego to stop a certain gold-
colored Chevy Tahoe if he agreed that its
window tint violated the law. He also in-
structed the officer to conduct the stop as he
normally would while other officers conduct-
ed a narcotics investigation. In addition,
Detective Gallegos arranged for Detective
Daniel Campbell, who operated a canine unit,
to be present at the time of the stop. The
three officers followed Defendant for approx-
imately one mile before Officer Griego
stopped Defendant near the intersection of
Coors and Blake in Albuquerque at approxi-
mately 8:45 p.m. The narcotics dog was
walked around the exterior of the vehicle,
which had two open doors, and alerted to the
presence of narcotics. Defendant refused to
consent to a search of his vehicle. Detective
Campbell left the scene and obtained a war-
rant to search the vehicle, where metham-
phetamine was eventually found.

{5} Defendant was indicted for trafficking
methamphetamine contrary to NMSA 1978,

Section 30-31-20 (2006), and conspiracy to
commit trafficking of methamphetamine, con-
trary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979).
Defendant was also cited for a window tint
violation, but the citation was later voluntari-
ly dismissed by the police because Defendant
was being prosecuted on felony charges.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, arguing, among other things, that
the traffic stop was pretextual, in violation of
his rights under the New Mexico Constitu-
tion.

{6} During the suppression hearing, De-
tective Gallegos testified that on July 20,
2006, a confidential informant called and told
him that an individual named Victor Gonzales
would be transporting a large amount of
methamphetamine south out of Albuquerque
that afternoon or evening. The informant
also told Detective Gallegos the name of the
street on which he believed Victor Gonzales
resided.

{7} Armed with this information, Detective
Gallegos conducted a background investiga-
tion and discovered a booking slip photo-
graph taken after the misdemeanor arrest of
aman named Victor Gonzales. The detective
also set up a surveillance operation of Defen-
dant’s residence. At approximately 4:00
p.m., he visually identified a suspect who
matched the booking slip photograph of Vic-
tor Gonzales. The suspect arrived in a white
Mustang, parked in the driveway, and en-
tered the residence. Shortly thereafter, a
gold-colored Chevy Tahoe was seen pulling
out of the garage. Detective Gallegos was
unable to determine the identity of the
Chevy Tahoe’s driver due to the vehicle’s
dark window tint. Other officers on the de-
tective’s team followed the Chevy Tahoe to a
local car wash, where one of them initiated
an innocuous conversation with the driver
and confirmed that his name was Victor.
The suspect then drove the Chevy Tahoe
back to the residence, parked in the garage,
and drove off in the white Mustang. The
detective followed as the suspect drove the
Mustang to a second residence several miles
to the north. Four men came out of the
second residence to meet the suspect. Two
of them got into the Mustang while the other
two remained on the street conducting what

the detective believed to be “some sort of
countersurveillance.” The three men in the
Mustang returned to the suspect’s residence
and pulled into the garage. A short time
later, the Chevy Tahoe was again seen back-
ing out of the garage, and Detective Gallegos
followed as it proceeded south on Coors Bou-
levard. The detective asked uniformed Patrol
Officer Griego to stop the Chevy Tahoe for a
window tint violation near the intersection of
Coors and Blake and arranged for a canine
unit to be present.

{8} During the evidentiary hearing, while
attempting to clarify the reason for the stop,
the trial judge asked Detective Gallegos,
“[gs]o in your estimation, based on the narcot-
ics investigation and the surveillance that
day, you didn’t feel you had enough reason-
able suspicion to pull the vehicle over, absent
the tint violation?” Detective Gallegos an-
swered:

I just wanted to—yes. I mean, I felt it
was still kind of a thin investigation up to
that point, I didn’t feel like I had any
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. I
mean, everything was falling in order with
what the informant had told me, but I
didn’t want to violate his rights by con-
ducting a car stop without him doing any-
thing wrong.... So we decided do [sic]
conduct a pretextual stop with a traffic
violation and then as a pretextual stop
occurred, to begin a narcotics investigation
at that point.

{9} The trial judge wrote a letter to the
attorneys advising them that he was “deny-
ing the Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Physical Evidence based on Whren v. U.S,
517 US. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 185 L.Ed.2d 89
(1996) and State v. Ochoa [Ochoa I, [2006-
NMCA-131,] 140 N.M. 578[, 144 P.8d 132]
(2006).” He emphasized that the Court of
Appeals in Ochoa I never reached the issue
of a pretextual stop, which meant to the trial
judge that whether a pretextual stop violates
the New Mexico Constitution remained an
issue of first impression. Three days later
the trial judge wrote to the attorneys and
announced that because the Court of Appeals
had issued an Opinion in Ochoa III, holding
that pretextual stops violate the New Mexico
Constitution, he was going to suppress the

7

evidence. The trial judge stated, “{bJecause
the traffic stop of Mr. Gonzales was admit-
tedly pretextual, the evidence found in the
motor vehicle is suppressed. The Court
commends the investigating police officer’s
candor in this case.”

{10} On appeal, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed in an unpublished Memorandum
Opinion, concluding that the trial court was
correct because “the officer testified that the
real reason for the stop was pretextual.”
State v. Gonzales, No. 29,297, slip op. at 9,
2009 WL . 6551753 (N.M.Ct.App. Jul. 29,
2009). We granted the State’s petition for
writ of certiorari to determine whether the
trial court correctly applied the Court of
Appeals analysis in Ochoa III. We conclude
that the trial court did not analyze whether
the real reason for the stop, ie., a narcotics
investigation, was objectively supported by
reasonable suspicion. Because this is a nec-
essary requirement of Ochoa III, we reverse
and remand to the trial court.

OCHOA III REQUIRES A DETERMINA-
TION THAT THE UNRELATED MOTIVE
FOR A STOP IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
REASONABLE SUSPICION BEFORE A
STOP IS CONSIDERED PRETEXTUAL

{11} In State v. Ochoa (Ockoa II), 2008-
NMSC-028, {1 22, 143 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 130,
we remanded the case to the Court of Ap-
peals with instructions “to determine wheth-
er the stop was pretextual and, if so, whether
article II, section 10 prohibits pretextual
stops.” Jd. On remand, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the question of whether
pretextual stops violate the New Mexico
Constitution was a matter of first impression.
Ochoa III, 2009-NMCA-002, 11, 146 N.M.
82, 206 P.3d 143. The Court began by recog-
nizing that “the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution does not protect
citizens against pretextual stops,” citing to
the United States Supreme Court opinion in
Whren. Id. 18. The Court next described
the widespread criticism of Whren, id. 1113-
19; noted this Court’s historical willingness
to afford greater protection from unreason-
able searches and seizures, including automo-
piles, under the New Mexico Constitution, id.
1122-24; and chose to depart from Whren
and other federal constitutional law because

78 De

the Court found “the federal analysis unper-
suasive and incompatible with our state’s dis-
tinctively protective standards for searches
and seizures of automobiles,” id. 112.

{12} The Court of Appeals defined a pre-
textual stop as “a detention supportable by
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
believe that a traffic offense has occurred,
but is executed as a pretense to pursue a
‘hunch,’ a different more serious investigative
agenda for which there is no reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause.” Id. 125. To as-
sist trial courts in determining whether an
unconstitutional pretextual stop has oc-
curred, the Court of Appeals outlined a
three-step approach. First, the State has
the burden to establish reasonable suspicion
to stop the motorist. If the State fails in its
burden, the stop is unconstitutional. Id.
140. Second, if the State satisfies its bur-
den, the defendant may still establish that
the seizure was unreasonable by proving that
the totality of the circumstances indicates the
officer had an unrelated motive to stop the
motorist that was not supported by reason-
able suspicion. If the defendant does not
satisfy the burden, the stop is constitutional.
Id. Third, if the defendant satisfies the bur-
den, there is a presumption of a pretextual
stop, and the State must prove that the
totality of the circumstances supports the
conclusion that the officer who made the stop
would have done so even without the unrelat-
ed motive. Id.

{13} In this case, the trial judge was per-
suaded that the officer’s candor in admitting
that the stop was pretextual was sufficient to
conclude that the stop was unconstitutionally
pretextual. Looking at the evidence in the
light most favorable to Defendant, who pre-
vailed, see State v. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-
038, 114, 188 N.M. 408, 120 P.8d 830, we
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support a finding that the stop would not
have occurred except for the unrelated mo-
tive to conduct a narcotics investigation. De-
tective Gallegos basically testified that he
orchestrated the stop of Defendant by Patrol
Officer Griego, who otherwise would not have
been aware of Defendant’s presence. Detec-
tive Gallegos testified that he followed Defen-
dant as Defendant traveled south on Coors.

Detective Gallegos then had to pull over to
allow Officer Griego to drive up and conduct
the stop on Defendant. Detective Gallegos
had also directed a canine unit to be present
at the moment Defendant was stopped.

HE {14} What is not clear is whether the
trial judge also concluded that Detective
Gallegos lacked a reasonable suspicion to
stop Defendant for the unrelated motive—a
narcotics investigation. Under Ochoa III,
this analysis is a necessary prerequisite to
concluding that a pretextual stop is unconsti-
tutional. Detective Gallegos did testify, in
response to questions from the trial judge,
that he did not believe he had reasonable
suspicion to stop Defendant for a narcotics
investigation, despite his surveillance of De-
fendant and the information he received from
a confidential informant who previously had
provided him with accurate information in
unrelated cases.

HM {15} In analyzing whether an officer
has reasonable suspicion, the trial court must
look at the totality of the circumstances, and
in doing so it may consider the officer’s
experience and specialized training to make
inferences and deductions from the cumula-
tive information available to the officer.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 278,
122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). How-
ever, an officer’s subjective belief about
whether the officer had a reasonable suspi-
cion is not conclusive. State v. Urioste,
2002-NMSC-028, 116, 182 N.M. 592, 52 P.38d
964 (“Police officers possess reasonable sus-
picion when they are ‘aware of specific artic-
ulable facts’ that, judged objectively, ‘would
lead a reasonable person to believe criminal
activity occurred or was occurring. ” (citation
omitted). Cf State v. Prince, 2004-NMCA-
127, 121, 186 N.M. 521, 101 P.3d 332 (“The
... agent used a lawful traffic stop to per-
form an unrelated drug investigation when
he himself knew there was no reasonable
suspicion to detain Defendant for such pur-
pose.”),

I {16} In this case, Defendant had the
burden to prove that the real motive for the
stop was not supported by a reasonable sus-
picion under Ochoa III. During oral argu-
ment, defense counsel gave this Court a lita-

ny of questions he would have explored with
Detective Gallegos had he known that the
issue was whether there was reasonable sus-
picion to stop Defendant for a narcotics in-
vestigation. The State relied on Whren and
argued that the reasonable suspicion to in-
vestigate the narcotics case was supported by
the canine alert, which followed a stop based
on a reasonable suspicion of a window tint
violation. Obviously neither party foresaw
the approach ultimately taken by the Court
of Appeals in Ochoa III. In addition, the trial
judge overruled his prior letter decision with-
out benefit of argument or an opportunity for
either party to present additional evidence
that might have informed his decision under
Ochoa III. We would be speculating that
when the trial judge found that “[tJhe traffic
stop that was conducted on Defendant’s vehi-
cle was pretextual,” the trial judge necessari-
ly found that the confidential informant was
not reliable, and Detective Gallegos did not
corroborate predictive details sufficient to
rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. Al-
though our appellate determination of rea-
sonable suspicion is based on a de novo re-
view, we review any factual questions under
a substantial evidence standard, looking at
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party. State v. Neal, 2007-
NMSC-043, 1115, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57.
We take defense counsel at his word that he
would have developed a different record un-
der the circumstances. In its reply brief, the
State also noted that at the time of the
suppression hearing, it could not have known
that the Court of Appeals would adopt a new
rule regarding pretextual stops and the test
that would be applied for such a rule. We
also believe that the State should be at liber-
ty to develop whatever record it believes is
required by Ochoa III. See Pinnell v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 1999-NMCA-074, 114, 127
N.M. 452, 982 P.2d 508 (cautioning against
engaging in fact-finding at the appellate level
when a party has not had a full opportunity
to develop the record).

CONCLUSION

{17} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial
court to conduct a hearing on Defendant’s

79

motion to suppress consistent with this Opin-
ion.

{18} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES,
Justices, and RICHARD C. BOSSON,
Justice (specially concurring).

BOSSON, Justice (specially concurring).

{19} I concur in the remand for the rea-
sons ably set forth in the Court’s Opinion.
However, I wish to note that this Court has
not yet written on the subject of pretextual
stops under our state constitution. State v.
Ochoa is a Court of Appeals opinion in which
this Court first granted and then quashed
certiorari. 2009-NMCA-002, 146 N.M. 82,
206 P.3d 148, cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-
012, 145 N.M. 572, 203 P.8d 103, and cert. |
quashed, 2009-NMCERT-O11, 147 N.M. 464,
225 P.8d 794. As one of the dissenting votes
in that decision to quash, I continue to be-
lieve that Ochoa was wrongly decided and
that we should follow the Fourth Amendment.
analysis set forth in Whren v. United States,
517 US. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 185
L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (“Subjective intentions
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.”), a rare unani-
mous opinion of that Court. However, at
least for now, Ochoa is the law of the land
within our state borders, and therefore our
duty lies in overseeing its fair application to
both the state and the accused, a purpose
achieved by remand in this case.

2011-NMSC-013
257 P.3d 900
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-
Appellant,
ve
Leonard ROMERO, Defendant—Appellee.
No. 32,283.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.
March 16, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Ralph E.
Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender,
Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

CHAVEZ, Justice.

{1} This case is on appeal solely to deter-
mine whether it is a “pending” case for pur-
poses of the procedural rule change an-
nounced in State v, Savedra, 2010~-NMSC-
025, 19, 148 N.M. 801, 286 P.38d 20. Savedra
eliminated portions of Rule 5-604 NMRA
(“the six-month rule”) effective for all cases
pending in district court as of the date Save-
dra was filed. We explained that instead of
the six-month rule, “defendants may rely

81

upon and assert their right to a speedy trial
whenever they believe impermissible delay
has occurred; whether that delay is the re-
sult of a dismissal and refiling or any other
cause.” 2010-NMSO-025, 19, 148 N.M. 301,
236 P.3d 20. We recently clarified that for all
prosecutions originating in district court,
“pending” for purposes of Savedra includes
cases at the district court or appellate level
as of May 12, 2010. State v. Martinez, 2011-
NMSC-010, 110, 149 N.M. 370, 249 P.8d 82
(2011). Therefore, the six-month rule does
not apply to Romero’s case. However,
Romero also asserts that withdrawing the
six-month rule for his case would deprive him
of due process under the United States and
New Mexico Constitutions because retroac-
tive application is a prohibited ex post facto
law. We reject Romero’s argument for three
reasons: (1) federal due process protection
only extends to ex post facto situations that
do not include procedural rules not affecting
substantive matters, (2) Romero does not
have a protected interest in procedural rules,
and (8) we have the authority to give a rule
prospective or retrospective application with-
out offending constitutional principles.
BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant Leonard Romero was
charged with an open count of murder, con-
trary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1)
(1994); four counts of tampering with evi-
dence, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-
22-5 (2003); conspiracy to commit tampering
with evidence, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sec-
tion 80-28-2 (1979) and Section 30-22-5; and
possession of a firearm or destructive device
by a felon, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section
30-7-16 (2001). Romero was arraigned in
district court on October 6, 2008. Prior to
October 6, 2008, an assistant public defender
hhad already entered an appearance and as-
serted Romero’s right to a speedy trial.
Romero again asserted his right to a speedy
trial in a motion to compel discovery on
December 12, 2008 because he had not yet.
received any discovery from the State. On
December 23, 2008, Romero once again as-
serted his due process and speedy trial
rights. On January 30, 2009, Romero’s new
private counsel entered an appearance and
asserted his speedy trial rights for the fourth
time.

{3} On March 19, 2009, the State filed a
Rule 5-604 petition for an extension of time
to commence trial until October 6, 2009, ex-
plaining that “the parties need more time to
conduct pretrial discovery and interviews”
and citing the fact that the State had not
received the finalized reports from the lead
detective until March 10, 2009. Romero op-
posed the petition. The district judge grant-
ed an extension only until July 6, 2009. On
June 30, 2009, the State filed a second Rule
5-604 petition, asserting that because of new-
ly-discovered evidence the parties needed ad-
ditional time to conduct interviews. Romero
concurred with this petition. The district
court granted the petition, extending the
time for trial until October 6, 2009.

{4} On October 15, 2009, the State failed
to appear for a pretrial conference. The
State subsequently filed another Rule 5-604
petition on October 26, 2009 that was op-
posed by Romero. The State’s petition ac-
knowledged that it was filed after the time
for trial had expired and well after the ten-
day grace period for seeking an extension.
However, the State contended that Rule 5-
604, as amended effective September 1, 2009,
authorized the district court to grant an un-
timely petition. The State argued that the
amended rule requires the court to conduct a
speedy trial violation analysis before denying
a motion for an extension. Romero disa-
greed, arguing that analysis of the speedy
trial factors is only required if the State files
a timely motion for an extension, and having
failed to do so, the court was required to
deny the motion and dismiss the case. The
district court agreed with Romero and de-
clined to engage in what would effectively be
a speedy trial analysis because the State
failed to show exceptional circumstances for
filing the motion well beyond any deadlines
required under Rule 5-604.

{5} Romero subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss with prejudice under the six-month
rule. During the hearing, Romero argued
that under the six-month rule and existing
case law at the time of the hearing he was
not required to establish prejudice, because
in his view his motion was not a speedy trial
motion. Nevertheless, Romero did attempt

82

to show prejudice, largely at the district
judge’s request. Romero pointed out that he
had been kept in segregation for the past
year due to the severity of the alleged crime
and also argued that he had been unable to
pursue a plea deal due to discovery delays
and the State’s failure to diligently pursue
his case. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the district court explained that under Rule
5-604, an untimely petition filed outside the
ten-day grace period required “exceptional
circumstances beyond the control of the par-
ties or trial court.” The court then conclud-
ed that there was no showing of exceptional
circumstances by the State, and “[w]ithout
that having happened ... the rule does not
allow [the court] to look at cause or any of
the other factors” such as prejudice. The
court accordingly granted Romero’s motion
to dismiss. At a later hearing to present the
court's order, the district judge again ex-
plained that while “the defense did outline
prejudice,” he did not think he would even
get to that prong because there had been no
showing of exceptional circumstances under
the rule. The district court filed its final
order of dismissal with prejudice on Febru-
ary 17, 2010.

{6} The State appealed the order of dis-
missal to this Court pursuant to Rule 12~
102(A) NMRA. See State v. Smallwood,
2007-NMSC-005, 111, 141 N.M. 178, 152
P.8d 821 (“we conclude that the legislature
intended for us to have jurisdiction over in~
terlocutory appeals in situations where a de-
fendant may possibly be sentenced to life
imprisonment or death”). The State con-
tends that in Savedra this Court withdrew
application of the six-month rule in all cases
that originated in district court and that were
pending at the time Savedra was filed. The
State does not contest that the pre-Savedra,
unmodified version of Rule 5-604 was still in
effect at the time of the dismissal. Instead,
the State argues that Romero’s case is still
“pending,” and thus that Savedra is applica-
ble to reverse the district court for dismiss-
ing the case under the six-month rule. Cit-
ing State v. Morales, 2010-NMSC-026, 19,
148 N.M. 305, 236 P.8d 24, Romero urged
this Court not to apply Savedra to this case
because to do so “would materially alter the

legal duties of the respective parties after the
fact.”
THE SIX-MONTH RULE DOES NOT AP-
PLY TO ROMERO’S CASE BECAUSE IT
WAS PENDING ON APPEAL ON MAY
12, 2010

HE {7} In Martinez, 2011-NMSC-010,
1912-8, 149 N.M. 370, 249 P.3d 82 this Court
recently had the opportunity to clarify what
we meant in Savedra, which stated that “ef-
fective for all cases pending as of the date
this Opinion is filed, we withdraw the six-
month rule provisions set forth in Rule 5-
604(B)E).” Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, 19,
148 N.M. 301, 236 P.8d 20. After detailing
numerous policy considerations, Martinez
held that “the six-month rule should be with-
drawn across the board for all prosecutions
originating in district court, no matter at
what stage of the criminal process—trial or
appellate—they may have been as of May 12,
2010.” Martinez, 2011-NMSC-010, 4 10, 149
N.M. 370, 249 P.8d 82. Because the State
had appealed the order of dismissal and the
appeal was pending as of May 12, 2010,
Savedra is controlling in this case. Accord-
ingly, the six-month rule does not apply to
Romero’s case. However, Romero is not
without a remedy. As we made clear in
Savedra, a defendant who believes that his
speedy trial rights have been violated may
pursue a motion to dismiss.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE SIX-MONTH
RULE FOR ROMERO’S CASE DOES
NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS AS AN
EX POST FACTO LAW

Hs {8} Romero also argues that appli-
cation of Savedra to his case would deprive
him of his due process rights under both the
federal and state constitutions. See U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting states from
passing any ex post facto law); N.M. Const.
art. II, § 19 (“No ex post facto law ... shall
be enacted by the legislature.”); Rogers v.
Tenmn., 582 U.S. 451, 455, 121 S.Ct. 1698, 149
L.Ed.2d 697 (2001) (explaining that “due pro-
cess prohibits retroactive application of any
judicial construction of a criminal statute
[that] is unexpected and indefensible by ref-
erence to the law which has been expressed
prior to the conduct in issue”) (alteration in

83

original) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). In this argument, however,
Romero makes two key concessions regard-
ing the United States Constitution. First,
federal due process protection only extends
to ex post facto situations that do not include
procedural rules, even if the amendments
disadvantage defendants. See Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94, 97 S.Ct. 2290,
53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). Second, a defendant
does not have a protected interest in proce-
dural rules. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 US. 244, 275, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128
L.Ed.2d 229 (1994).

{9} In Dobbert, the State of Florida pur-
sued the death penalty against Dobbert for
committing a capital felony. 432 U.S. at 287,
97 S.Ct. 2290. Between the time he commit-
ted the offenses with which he was charged
and the time of his trial, Florida had changed
the functions of the judge and the jury in the
imposition of a death sentence. Id. at 287-
88, 97 S.Ct. 2290. At the time Dobbert was
alleged to have committed first-degree mur-
der, a person convicted of a capital felony
was to be sentenced to death unless a majori-
ty of the jury recommended mercy. Id. at
288, 97 S.Ct. 2290. By the time of his trial
the jury’s function had changed: the jury
was only authorized to recommend a sen-
tence, leaving the ultimate decision to the
judge. Id. at 290-91, 97 S.Ct. 2290. Dob-
bert was found guilty of a capital crime. Jd.
at 287, 97 S.Ct. 2290. The jury recom-
mended a life sentence. Id. The judge,
however, overruled the jury recommendation
and sentenced him to death. Id.

{10} Dobbert contended that depriving
him of the procedure in effect at the time the
crime was committed would be unconstitu-
tional because applying the new procedure
would be an ex post facto law. Id. The
United States Supreme Court ultimately dis-
agreed with Dobbert, concluding that the
changes in the law were procedural and that
applying the new procedure in Dobbert’s
ease did not constitute an ex post facto viola-
tion, Id. at 293-94, 97 S.Ct. 2290. The
Court reasoned that the constitutional pro-
scription against the passage of ex post facto
Jaws did not mean that the legislature could
not alter the method of procedure that does

not affect substantive matters. Id. That is,
as long as the procedure does not make
eriminal a previously innocent act, increase
the punishment, or change the proof neces-
sary to convict the defendant, the change is
not a prohibited ex post facto law. See id. at
292-94, 97 S.Ct. 2290. This applies even
though the procedural change works to the
defendant’s disadvantage. Id. at 298, 97
S.Ct. 2290.

{11} In this case, the crimes for which
Romero was indicted, the prescribed punish-
ment, and the quantity and quality of proof
required to establish his guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt remained unaffected by our
withdrawal of the six-month rule. Our retro-
active withdrawal of the six-month rule, a
procedural rule, is not an unconstitutional ex
post facto law under the United States Con-
stitution.

HM {12} Romero next argues that the
due process clause of the New Mexico Con-
stitution, Article II, Section 18, should be
interpreted more broadly than its federal
counterpart because “New Mexico has ex-
pressed a much stronger distrust of retroac-
tivity than the United States Supreme
Court,” citing Beavers v. Johnson Controls
World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 891, 395-97, 881
P.2d 1876, 1880-82 (1994). Romero also cites
Article IV, Section 34 of the New Mexico
Constitution as evidence of New Mexico’s
stronger distrust of retroactive rule changes.
Article IV, Section 34 provides that “[nJo act
of the legislature shall affect the right or
remedy of either party, or change the rules
of evidence or procedure, in any pending
case.” N.M. Const. art. IV, § 84. In Mar-
quez v. Wylie, this Court accepted the broad
view that Article IV, Section 34 also applies
to court-adopted rules, relying primarily on
language from two Supreme Court orders
giving the rules adopted in those orders the
same effect as if they had been passed by the
Legislature. 78 N.M. 544, 546, 434 P.2d 69,
71 (1967). However, as we explained in State
v. Pieri, the plain language of Article IV,
Section 34 applies only to legislative acts.
2009-NMSC-019, 1134-35, 146 N.M. 155,
207 P.8d 1182. Since we have not affirma-
tively given Rule 5-604 the force and effect
of a legislative act similar to the situation in

84

Marquez, Article IV, Section 34 does not
apply to our withdrawal of the six-month
rule.

{13} The State asserts that Romero still
retains his right to a speedy trial, and his
ability to raise the speedy trial issue in the
future is sufficient to afford him due process.
We agree with the State. The six-month
rule was implemented to “provide the courts
and the parties with a rudimentary warning
of when speedy trial problems may arise.”
State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, 146, 146
N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The rule was
not intended to supplement or supplant a
defendant’s speedy trial rights.

{14} We carefully analyzed the rationale
for applying Savedra retroactively and pro-
spectively in both Martinez and Savedra.
Because we were concerned that as our juris-
prudence evolved, “the six-month rule be-
came increasingly unmoored from its consti-
tutional and proactive origins,” we exercised
our inherent power to apply the rule change
in Savedra retroactively. Martinez, 2011—
NMSC-010, 18, 149 N.M. 370, 249 P.3d 82;
see also Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 632, 651
P.2d 1269, 1276 (1982) (“It is within the
inherent power of a state’s highest court to
give a decision prospective or retrospective
application without offending constitutional
principles.”).

{15} As the State points out, Romero has
not been denied the opportunity to defend
his case by pursuing dismissal on the basis
that his speedy trial rights have been violat-
ed. In Savedra, although we abolished the
six-month rule for cases that originated in
district court, we made it clear that a defen-
dant could still assert that his or her right to
a speedy trial was violated. In this case
there was not argument, analysis, nor weigh-
ing of the speedy trial factors at the district
court level as suggested by the ad hoc bal-
ancing test set forth in Garza, 2009-NMSC-
038, 118, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.38d 387. This
balancing test includes the four factors iden-
tified in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530,
92 S.Ct. 2182, 88 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972): length
of delay, reasons for delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his or her right, and any preju-
dice to the defendant. Garza, 2009-NMSC-

088, 118, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.8d 387.
Therefore, Romero may assert his right to a
speedy trial on remand.
CONCLUSION

{16} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
and remand to the district court for proceed-
ings consistent with this Opinion.

{17} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.

SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices.

2011-NMSC-014
257 P.3d 904

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-
Petitioner,

v.
Jaime GUTHRIE, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 31,567.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 1, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Anita
Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E.
Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} Citing its recent opinion, State v. Phil-
lips, 2006-NMCA-001, 188 N.M. 730, 126
P.3d 546, the Court of Appeals reversed De-
fendant’s probation revocation on due pro-
cess grounds. See State v. Guthrie, 2009-
NMCA-~036, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.8d 1271,
cert. granted, 2009-NMCERT-003, 146 N.M.
604, 218 P.3d 508. Defendant did not have an
opportunity to cross examine his probation
officer, who did not testify, and the probation
officer's former supervisor, who did testify,
had no personal knowledge of the circum-

87

stances surrounding the alleged violations.
Id. 113-4. The Court concluded that Defen-
dant’s due process right to confrontation de-
manded that the district judge specifically
“address” the reasons for the absence of
Defendant’s probation officer or “specifically
state the reasons that the evidence was suffi-
ciently accurate or reliable so as to excuse
[her] presence.” Id. 17 14-15.

{2} Because we conclude that Phillips es-
tablished a standard that is unnecessarily
preoccupied with the reason a witness is
absent, instead of considering whether con-
frontation of the witness is essential to the
truth-finding process in the context of proba-
tion revocation, we overrule Phillips, 2006-
NMCA-001, 188 N.M. 780, 126 P.38d 546. In
so doing, we attempt to guide the due pro-
cess inquiry of our courts to focus more on
the need for, and the utility of, confrontation
of a live witness in the context of a particular
case. Although the district court in the pres-
ent case should have been more explicit in its
reasons for relying on hearsay evidence with-
out confrontation, our review of the record
supports the court’s decision to revoke. Ac-
cordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals
and remand to the district court for any
remaining proceedings in furtherance of its
decision to revoke Defendant’s probation.

BACKGROUND

{3} In 2005, Defendant pled guilty to three
offenses and was placed on supervised proba-
tion. Following a motion to revoke proba-
tion, Defendant agreed to attend a ninety-
day residential treatment program. Defen-
dant’s probation officer, Cindy Chavez,
signed his order of probation.

{4} In 2006, the State filed a motion to
revoke probation alleging several probation
violations, the most significant, for our pur-
poses, being Defendant’s failure to complete
the ninety-day treatment program. The
State initially subpoenaed Chavez as its only
witness to testify at the probation revocation
hearing. When the hearing was rescheduled,
however, the State called Jaime Olivas, Cha-
vez’s supervisor, to testify, instead of Chavez,
who apparently had transferred to another
part of the state.

88

{5} During the revocation hearing, Defen-
dant moved to dismiss because Chavez was
not available for cross examination, although
she had filed the probation violation report
upon which the motion was based. Olivas
apparently had little or no personal knowl-
edge about the case. After a brief discussion
of the merits of Defendant’s hearsay and
confrontation objections, the judge reserved
ruling.

{6} Olivas testified that he was a probation
supervisor but that he had not directly su-
pervised Defendant. Olivas identified a doc-
ument presented to him as a “report of pro-
bation.” Olivas referred to documents from
Defendant's probation file, including a proba-
tion report and a fax from Defendant’s resi-
dential treatment center, to testify that De-
fendant had been discharged from the court-
ordered treatment program without complet-
ing it, had not attended other required ap-
pointments, and had not paid probation costs.

{7} In the course of cross examining Oli-
vas, Defendant challenged Olivas’s lack of
personal knowledge of the alleged probation
violations and the lack of explanation why
Chavez was not present at the hearing. Oli-
vas conceded that he had not signed Defen-
dant’s probation report, had never met De-
fendant, and had no personal knowledge
about Defendant. In addition, Olivas had
never spoken with anyone from the residen-
tial treatment center, nor had he indepen-
dently investigated any of the allegations
against Defendant. Olivas’s knowledge was
based solely on the information he had re-
viewed in the probation file and the report,
including a fax from the treatment program
and documents prepared by Chavez.

{8} At the conclusion of the hearing, the
district. court found that Defendant had vio-
lated his probation. Importantly, the judge
observed that Defendant had been arrested
in Quay County and that “we have no resi-
dential treatment center in Quay County,”
the obvious inference being that Defendant
could not have successfully completed his
assigned program. The judge did not evalu-
ate the reasons for Chavez’s absence or elab-
orate on his reasons for relying on the hear-
say evidence from Olivas.

{9} When Defendant appealed his proba-
tion revocation, owr Court of Appeals re-
versed, stating that the district court had
failed to address the reasons for Chavez’s
absence or “the reasons that the evidence
was sufficiently accurate or reliable so as to
excuse the presence of Ms. Chavez.” Guth-
rie, 2009-NMCA-036, 115, 145 N.M. 761,
204 P.38d 1271. According to the Court of
Appeals, the district court’s failure to justify
Chavez's absence or make an explicit finding
of reliability deprived Defendant of his con-
stitutionally protected opportunity to con-
front the principal witness against him. Id.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals relied on
Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, 188 N.M. 730,
126 P.38d 546. See Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-
036, 115, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.38d 1271. We
granted certiorari to consider both this case
and the continued viability of Phillips.

DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO CONFRON-
TATION IN PROBATION PROCEED-
INGS

HM s{10} The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that, under the conditions specified in
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487, 92
S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), “a proba-
tioner, like a parolee, is entitled to a prelimi-
nary and a final revocation hearing.” Gag-
non v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct.
1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1978). Morrissey em-
phasized that revocation hearings are infor-
mal. 408 U.S. at 487, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Revo-
cation of probation “ ‘deprives an individual,
not of the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional
liberty properly dependent on observance of
special [probation] restrictions.’” Gagnon,
411 U.S. at 781, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (quoting Mor-
rissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593). Be-
cause loss of probation is loss of only condi-
tional liberty, “the full panoply of rights due
a defendant in a [criminal trial] do[] not
apply.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct.
2598; accord State v. Mendoza, 91 N.M. 688,
690, 579 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1978).

HB {11} Morrissey instructs that due
process “is flexible and calls for such proce-
dural protections as the particular situation
demands” and “not all situations calling for
procedural safeguards call for the same kind
of procedure.” 408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593

(emphasis added). Given that inherent flexi-
bility, Morrissey established minimum due
process requirements for probation revoca-
tion proceedings, including “an informal
hearing structured to assure that the finding
of a [probation] violation will be based on
verified facts and that the exercise of discre-
tion will be informed by an accurate knowl-
edge of the parolee’s behavior.” Jd. at 484,
92 S.Ct. 2593. The hearing
must lead to a final evaluation of any
contested relevant facts and consideration
of whether the facts as determined war-
rant revocation. The parolee must have
an opportunity to be heard and to show, if
he can, that he did not violate the condi-
tions, or, if he did, that circumstances in
mitigation suggest that the violation does
not warrant revocation.
Id. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (emphasis added).

Hs {12} Within that basic framework,
the U.S. Supreme Court detailed six compo-
nents of due process in Gagnon:

a) written notice of the claimed violations

of (probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to

the (probationer or) parolee of evidence
against him; (¢) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and docu-
mentary evidence; (d) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (un-
less the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confronta-
tion); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing
body such as a traditional parole board,
members of which need not be judicial
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written state-
ment by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking (proba-
tion or) parole.’
411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (emphasis
added) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489,
92 S.Ct. 2598). Significantly, live testimony
of adverse witnesses, such as a probation
officer, is not always required during proba-
tion revocation hearings. We also observe
that the purpose of the hearing is to evaluate
“contested relevant facts,” Morrissey, 408
US. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (emphasis added),
not every assertion the state may put for-
ward as part of its case for revocation. The
right protected in probation revocations is
not the sixth amendment right to confronta-

89

tion, guaranteed every accused in a criminal
trial, but rather the more generally worded
right to due process of law secured by the
fourteenth amendment. Jd. at 472, 497, 92
S.Ct. 2593,

{13} In Gagnon, the Supreme Court sub-
sequently addressed “the difficulty and ex-
pense of procuring witnesses from perhaps
thousands of miles away,” and emphasized
that alternatives to live testimony are avail-
able during probation revocation hearings.
411 US, at 782 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1756.

While in some cases there is simply no

adequate alternative to live testimony, we

emphasize that we did not in Morrissey
intend to prohibit use where appropriate of
the conventional substitutes for live testi-
mony, including affidavits, depositions, and
documentary evidence. Nor did we intend
to foreclose the States ... from developing
other creative solutions to the practical
difficulties of the Morrissey requirements.
Id. (emphasis added). The requirements
were not meant to “impose a great burden on
any State’s [probation or] parole system.”
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490, 92 S.Ct. 2593.
Today we focus on what Morrissey means
when it entitles a probationer to confront
adverse witnesses, “unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation.” 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct.
2593.

{14} Until now, this Court has not had
occasion to apply the Morrissey require-
ments to probation. Even before Morrissey,
however, we recognized that the right to due
process in a probation revocation hearing
means, at a minimum, notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard. See Ea parte Lucero, 23
NLM. 433, 438-89, 168 P. 718, 715 (1917),
superseded by statute as stated in State v.
Holland, 78 N.M. 324, 431 P.2d 57 (1967).
Our Court of Appeals later adopted “reason-
able certainty” as the proper standard of
proof in a probation revocation hearing.
State v. Brusenhan, 78 N.M. 764, 766, 438
P.2d 174, 176 (Ct.App.1968) (“‘[A] violation
of the conditions of probation must be estab-
lished with such reasonable certainty as to
satisfy the conscience of the court of the
truth of the violation. It does not have to be
established beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

90

(quoting and adopting language from Sparks
v. State, T7 Ga.App. 22, 47 S.E.2d 678, 680
(1948))).

{15} Our Court of Appeals has previously
applied several of the Morrissey due process
factors. See, eg., State v. Orguiz, 2003-
NMCA-089, 115, 134 N.M. 157, 74 P.8d 91
(written notice); State v. Sanchez, 94 N.M.
521, 528, 612 P.2d 1832, 1834 (Ct.App.1980)
(due process in light of revocation hearing
delay); State v. Montoya, 93 N.M. 84, 85-86,
596 P.2d 527, 528-29 (Ct.App.1979) (right to
be heard). In addition, the Court of Appeals
has outlined certain limitations on those
rights and related rights. See, eg., State v.
Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-060, (111-18, 130
N.M. 602, 28 P.8d 1143 (establishing due
process standards for admitting lab test re-
sults in probation revocation hearing and not
requiring live testimony); State v. DeBorde,
1996-NMCA-042, 118, 121 N.M. 601, 915
P.2d 906 (“To require full discovery ...
would interfere with the State’s strong ‘inter-
est in being able to return the individual to
imprisonment without the burden of a new
adversary criminal trial’” (quoting Morris-
sey, 408 U.S. at 483, 92 S.Ct. 2593). In
State v. Vigil, 97 N.M. 749, 751, 643 P.2d 618,
620 (Ct.App.1982), our Court of Appeals first
applied the Morrissey “right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause
for not allowing confrontation).” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)

Hl {16} In Vigil, a confidential informant
gave sworn, out-of-court statements accusing
probationer Vigil of having committed a new
crime—possessing stolen property—while on
probation. 97 N.M. at 750, 643 P.2d at 619.
The informant, however, refused to testify
against Vigil, leaving Vigil unable to cross-
examine his accuser. Id. at 750-51, 643 P.2d
at 619-20. On appeal from a revocation or-
der, our Court of Appeals correctly held that
the right to confrontation was “violated to
the extent the trial court relied on the infor-
mant’s sealed answers in revoking proba-

1. Vigil cited two out-of-state cases for guidance
in future probation revocation cases where “non-
confronted information might properly be used.”
97 N.M, at 751, 643 P.2d at 620 (citing Mason v.
State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1056 (Wyo.1981) and Ana-

tion.”1 Id. at 751, 643 P.2d at 620. We
agree with the result in Vigil.

{17} After Vigil, our Court of Appeals
next applied Morrissey’s good-cause excep-
tion in Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, 11 11~16,
188 N.M. 780, 126 P.3d 546 and, most recent-
ly, in the present case Guthrie, 2009-
NMCA--036, 1 14-21, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d
1271. The Guthrie and Phillips proceedings
share similar facts. First, probation officers
who had not personally supervised the proba-
tioners presented the only live testimony in
support of revocation. Compare Phillips,
2006~NMCA-001, 114-7, 188 N.M. 730, 126
P.3d 546, with Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-036,
113-4, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.8d 1271. In both
cases, the probation officer relied exclusively
on documents in the probation file, about
which he had no personal knowledge, to testi-
fy about a probationer’s failure to complete a
required treatment program. Guthrie, 2009-
NMCA-036, 11 3-4, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d
1271; Phillips, 2006~NMCA-001, 11 4~7, 188
N.M. 780, 126 P.3d 546. Phillips was further
complicated in that the probation had been
transferred to Arizona and some documents
to which the officer made reference in his
testimony were from that state. 2006-
NMCA-001, 111, 6-7, 188 N.M. 730, 126
P.3d 546. In both cases, the state failed to
enter the contents of the probation files into
evidence or submit sworn affidavits. Impor-
tant to this Opinion, however, the accused
probationers in both Guthrie and Phillips
never disputed the substance of the state’s
evidence; namely, a failure to complete a
mandatory treatment program. In addition,
neither probationer attempted to show how
he could have contested the charge of failure
to complete treatment, if only he had been
offered an opportunity to cross examine the
absent witness. See generally Guthrie,
2009-NMCA-036, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d
1271; Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, 188 N.M.
730, 126 P.3d 546.

{18} In each proceeding, the district court
revoked probation without requiring testimo-
ny from the probation officer having personal

ya v. State, 96 Nev. 119, 606 P.2d 156, 158

(1980)). While we agree with the outcome in

Vigil, we do not necessarily follow the reasoning
of the cases upon which it relied.

91

knowledge of the contents of the file. In
Phillips, the judge appropriately emphasized
that the state’s evidence about failure to
complete the treatment program had not
been rebutted and was essentially uncontest-
ed: “it was a verified fact that [the dlefen-
dant ... had been in his program for less
than the requisite six months.”  2006-
NMCA-001, 18, 188 N.M. 780, 126 P.3d 546.
As the district judge observed, Phillips was
returned to custody during the time he was
supposed to be in treatment. Id; but see
id, 118 (criticizing the district judge’s
knowledge of the actual time line).

{19} Similarly in Guthrie, the district
court noted that the probationer (Defendant
in this case) was arrested in Quay County at
the very time he was supposed to be in
treatment in another locale. In addition to
that verifiable fact, the State’s in-court testi-
mony concerning the fax from the treatment
center was “‘probative of the fact’ that De-
fendant had violated the terms of his proba-
tion by not successfully completing the resi-
dential treatment program.” Guthrie, 2009-
NMCA-036, 16, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d
1271. Since Defendant had not challenged
the substance of the State’s evidence or pro-
vided any contrary evidence or an explana-
tion for his absence from the program, the
court concluded that Defendant had failed to
complete the program and had violated his
probation. Jd. A revocation order followed.

{20} Notwithstanding the explanations by
the trial judges for their findings of proba-
tion violation, in each case the Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that the probationers
were denied due process. According to Phil-
lips, if the state had attempted to obtain the
testimony of the out-of-state witnesses but
could not, or if there were another “reason
on the record for the district court to accept
the documents ... as true,” then that might
have constituted good cause. 2006-NMCA-
001, 118, 188 N.M. 780, 126 P.8d 546. In the
present case, the Court of Appeals looked to
Phillips to conclude that Defendant was not
afforded due process, explaining that a dis-
trict court can make the necessary finding of
good cause for not requiring live testimony
by either “(1) specifically addressing the
State’s problems in securing the presence of

the absent witness, or (2) specifically stating
the reasons that the hearsay evidence offered
has particular indicia of accuracy and reliabil-
ity such that it has probative value.” Guth-
rie, 2009-NMCA-036, 114, 145 N.M. 761,
204 P.3d 1271 (citing Phillips, 2006-NMCA-
001, 1116-17, 188 N.M. 730, 126 P.3d 546).

{21} In both cases, our Court of Appeals
interpreted “good cause” to mean, in large
part, a sufficient explanation for the absence
of live testimony. In neither case did the
Court of Appeals consider the necessity for,
and utility of, confrontation with respect to
the truth-finding process in the specific case
before it. And in neither case did the Court
of Appeals attempt to assess the utility of
confrontation in light of these straightfor-
ward and routine charges—the “simple, ob-
jective, and uncontroverted fact” that proba-
tioner “either did or did not successfully
complete the program,” Bailey v. State, 327
Md. 689, 612 A.2d 288, 295 (1992).
DISCUSSION

HI {22} Because we review a question
purely of law, we review the Court of Ap-
peals’ decision de novo while deferring to the
trial court’s factual findings. See State v.
Brown, 2006-NMSC-023, 18, 189 N.M. 466,
184 P.3d 753; In re Estate of Armijo, 2001-
NMSC-~027, 17, 180 N.M. 714, 31 P.8d 872.

{23} Other state courts have embraced the
U.S. Supreme Court directive to develop
“creative” solutions to the practical difficul-
ties presented under the Morrissey require-
ments to probation revocation. See Gagnon,
411 U.S. at 782 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1756. In the
context of confrontation, courts have adopted
multi-factor tests, see, ag., Bailey, 612 A.2d
at 293-95; two-factor tests, see, eg. State v.
Craig, 130 Ohio App.8d 689, 720 N.E.2d 966,
969~70 (1998); “totality of the circumstances”
tests, see, eg., Commonwealth v. Durling,
407 Mass. 108, 551 N.E.2d 1198, 1199-1200
(1990); and a conditional balancing test, see,
e.g. People v. Stanphill, 170 Cal.App.4th 61,
87 Cal.Rpir.3d 643, 657 (2009) (applying a
balancing test, but if a hearsay exception
such as the spontaneous statement exception
applies, then good cause exists without a
balancing test).

{24} Some courts only consider the rea-
sons for a witness’s absence, while other

92

courts only consider the “substantial trust~
worthiness” of the evidence presented with-
out concerning themselves with the absence.
Compare State v. Brown, 215 W.Va. 664, 600
S.E.2d 561, 565 (2004) (finding no “good
cause” when the lower court did not consider
whether a lab technician was unavailable as a
witness), with Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d
488, 441-42 (Ind.2007) (finding no “good
cause” for determining hearsay evidence that
should be admitted at a probation revocation
hearing, despite witness availability). Sever-
al courts have adopted a balancing test simi-
lar to the federal Ninth Circuit that weighs
multiple factors. See, eg., United States v.
Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 692 n. 2 (7th Cir.2006);
United States v. Walker, 117 F.3d 417, 420
(Oth Cir.1997); State v. Wibbens, 238 Or.App.
787, 243 P.38d 790, 791-92 (2010). “The rele-
vant factors ... include ‘(1) the importance
of the evidence to the court’s finding; (2) the
probationer’s opportunity to refute the evi-
dence; (8) the difficulty and expense of ob-
taining witnesses; and (4) traditional indicia
of reliability borne by the evidence.’”” Wib-
bens, 243 P.3d at 792 (quoting State v. John-
son, 221 Or.App. 394, 190 P.8d 455, 459
(2008)).

HM {25} Regardless of the test applied,
the focus of the good-cause inquiry is “funda-
mental fairness,” the “touchstone of due pro-
cess.” Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790, 98 S.Ct.
1756. We find four state court opinions par-
ticularly helpful in understanding the core
policy considerations that animate the good-
cause analysis. Accordingly, we will discuss
these specific opinions in more detail.

{26} The first case, Bailey, is one of the
strongest opinions to rely primarily on the
reliability of the evidence presented to de-
termine the necessity for confrontation with-
out inquiring too much into the reasons for
the witness’s absence. 612 A2d at 293.
Like the case before us, the state sought to
revoke probation for failure to complete a
mandatory treatment program. See id. at
290. The state placed in evidence a letter
from the treatment center, introduced
through the probation officer, to prove non-
compliance. Id. at 293.

{27} The Maryland Court of Appeals
found certain factors helpful in determining

sufficient reliability. Jd. The court’s non-
exhaustive list of factors included:

the presence of any additional evidence

which corroborates the proffered hearsay;

the type of and centrality of the issue that

the hearsay is being offered to prove; and

the source of the hearsay, including the

possibility of bias or motive to fabricate

[and] the facts and circumstances of a par-

ticular case... .
Id. Applying these factors, the court found
the letter was reasonably reliable. Its con-
tents were corroborated by tacit admissions
from the probationer to his probation officer
and were uncontested at the revocation hear-
ing. Id. at 295. The relevant portions of the
letter asserted the “simple, objective, and
uncontroverted fact” that the probationer
had left the treatment program. Id. More-
over, the source of the information (the treat-
ment center) was reliable because it was
“duty-bound to report to the Division of Pa-
role and Probation or the court any failure of
the probationer to comply with its conditions
for the completion of its program.” Id.
Thus, the Maryland trial court properly ad-
mitted and relied upon the letter to revoke
probation, without requiring any additional
testimony or providing for additional oppor-
tunities to confront witnesses. Id. at 296.

{28} In the second case, Reyes, the Su-
preme Court of Indiana upheld a probation
revocation based on an affidavit from the
scientific director of a toxicology laboratory,
stating his professional opinion that the pro-
bationer had used cocaine within seventy-two
hours of a urine sample collected during the
probation period. 868 N.E.2d at 442-43.
Attached to the affidavit were the urinalysis
test results and “related documents,” which
were all admitted without requiring live testi-
mony from anyone with personal knowledge
about the documents or the test results. Id.
at 439-40. Adopting a “substantial trustwor-
thiness” test, the Indiana court observed that
affidavits and related documents were the
kinds of “letters, affidavits, and other materi-
al” that the U.S. Supreme Court had found
reliable in Morrissey. Reyes, 868 N.E.2d at
440-42.

{29} The Indiana court found that the
scientific director’s education in related sci-

ence, experience with various labs and their
procedures, and his personal review of proba-
tioner’s urinalysis, rendered the affidavits
substantially trustworthy. Jd. at 442. The
court saw

no reason to require that the State expend

its resources to demonstrate that its inter-

est in not producing the declarant out-
weighs the probationer’s interest in con-
fronting the same every time it seeks to
admit reliable hearsay evidence in a rou-
tine probation revocation hearing or, if the

State fails the balancing test, expend its

resources to produce a witness (or indeed

to require that witness to expend his or
her time) to give routine testimony in that
routine probation revocation hearing, when

a reliable piece of hearsay evidence is

available as a substitute.
Id. at 441-42

{30} In our third case, People v. Gomez,
the California Court of Appeal upheld the
admission of a hearsay probation report on
electronic probation records during a revoca-
tion hearing to prove that the probationer
did not report as directed, make restitution
payments, or submit verification of his em-
ployment and attendance at counseling ses-
sions. 181 Cal.App.4th 1028, 104 Cal-Rptr.3d
683, 690-91 (2010). The California court rea-
soned that the presence of the probationer’s
probation officer at the hearing “likely would
not have added anything to the truth-further-
ing process, because he would be testifying
to a negative”—i.e., that the required events
had not occurred. Id. at 690.

{31} Continuing, the Gomez court ob-
served that “the demeanor of the [probation]
officers would not have been a significant
factor in evaluating the credibility of their
foundational testimony pertaining to the con-
tents of the probation department’s records
regarding defendant’s failure to report, pro-
vide verification of his employment, attend
counseling, and pay restitution.” Id. In oth-
er words, live testimony is not required when
the evidence concerns “routine matters,”
such as keeping appointments, making resti-
tution, and “similar records of events of
which the probation officer is not likely to
have personal recollection and as to which
the officer would rely instead upon the rec-

93

ord of his or her own action.” Id. at 691
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). The court did not discuss the reasons
why certain witnesses were not present to
testify, but instead analyzed good cause in
terms of the reliability of the hearsay evi-
dence to determine that the probationer’s
confrontation rights were not compromised.

{832} A final case, Wibbens, thoughtfully
illustrates when confrontation is essential to
due process, depending, again, on the relia-
bility of the hearsay evidence. 243 P.3d at
793. In Oregon, a previous appellate opinion
upheld a probation revocation based primari-
ly on documentary evidence (an affidavit and
the contents of the defendant’s probation file)
that the probationer failed to report to his
probation officer and to disclose his present.
address. Johnson, 190 P.8d at 457-58. By
contrast, the case against Wibbens was based
upon testimony from a probation officer who
had been verbally informed by a sheriff's
deputy that the probationer “smelled of aleo-
hol [and] appeared to be intoxicated.” Wib-
bens, 243 P.8d at 791. Because the deputy
was unavailable, and the evidence unreliable,
the court reversed the revocation. Id. at
798. The court noted, in part, that unlike the
earlier case, in which the facts proved by
hearsay (failure to report) were “few and
straightforward,” not involving “matters of
opinion or interpretation,” the allegation of
Wibbens’ intoxication was based on the depu-
ty’s “sensory perception” and, as such, was
“subject to errors of judgment or interpreta-
tion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). Accordingly, the state had to
produce and make the deputy available for
cross examination to ensure the reliability of
the accusation. Jd.

General Principles

Hs{83} From our review of the case
law, and these four opinions in particular, we
glean certain principles that guide us as we
try to determine what it means to establish
“good cause for not allowing confrontation.”
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756. Ini-
tially, we reiterate the cautionary words from
Morrissey that due process “is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.” 408 U.S. at

94.

481, 92 S.Ct. 2598. Determining good cause,
therefore, is based on a case-by-case analy-
sis. See, ag. People v. Arreola, 7 Cal.4th
1144, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 631, 875 P.2d 736, 746
(1994), At its heart are considerations of
pragmatism and fairness and the utility of
confrontation in a particular factual context.
The Court also keeps a careful eye on the
admonition in Morrissey—that “the process
should be flexible enough to consider evi-
dence including letters, affidavits, and other
material that would not be admissible in an
adversary criminal trial.” Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct.
2593.

{34} In evaluating the utility of confronta-
tion, courts look to the kind of evidence
offered to prove a particular kind of asser-
tion. Is the assertion central to the reasons
for revocation, or is it collateral? See Bailey,
612 A.2d at 298 (listing “type of and centrali-
ty of the issue” as factors determining relia-
bility, and thus utility). Is the assertion
contested by the probationer, or is the state
merely being asked to produce a witness to
establish something that is essentially uncon-
troverted? For example, in the case at bar,
Defendant never indicated that he did com-
plete the residential treatment program, cen-
tral as it was to the reasons for revocation.
Defendant never created any doubt in the
truth of the evidence offered by the State.
In addition, he never offered any reasons to
suspect the validity of the charge, nor any
factors in mitigation, such as his reasons for
leaving the treatment facility, or that per-
haps it was all just a misunderstanding. In
evaluating the utility of confrontation, there-
fore, many courts would question the pur-
pose of, and the need for, a live witness to
establish an evidentiary fact (failure to com-
plete) that is never challenged for its accura-
ey or its reliability, but only on procedural or
evidentiary grounds.

HMM {35} We reiterate that under Mor-
rissey only contested relevant facts must be
evaluated during a hearing to guarantee due
process. See 408 U.S. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593
(‘(The] hearing ... must lead to a final
evaluation of any contested relevant facts
and consideration of whether the facts as
determined warrant revocation.”). Evidence
is contested if contrary evidence has been

introduced or the probationer persuades the
court that a particular assertion may not be
reliable, accurate, or true. See, e.g., State v.
Ellis, 2008-NMSC-032, 12, 144 N.M. 253,
186 P.3d 245 (characterizing “contested facts
as alleged by [the defendant,” as “contradic-
tory testimony”); Ruhe v. Abren, 1 N.M. 247,
258 (Terr.1857) (characterizing a “conflict of
evidence” as a “contested fact”). See gener-
ally Black’s Law Dictionary 361 (9th ed.
2009) (defining “contest” as “1. To strive to
win or hold; contend <he chose to contest
for the prize>. 2. To litigate or call into
question; challenge <they want to contest
the will>. 3. To deny an adverse claim or
assert a defense to it in a court proceeding
<she contests that charge>.” (Emphasis
added.)). By reserving a hearing for contest-
ed facts only, Morrissey recognized that the
procedural protections inherent in the truth-
finding process, such as a hearing or confron-
tation, are only necessary when the truth of
the state’s allegations is challenged.

HM {86} Examining utility through an-
other Jens, many courts look either exclusive-
ly or primarily to the inherent reliability of
the evidence offered. As discussed in Bai-
ley, certain hearsay evidence is inherently
reliable due to its source and the circum-
stances surrounding its introduction. 612
A2d at 294. The more reliable the source
and contents of hearsay evidence, the less
the need for live testimony. As just one of
many possible examples, hearsay evidence
may be inherently reliable if it conforms to
proven exceptions to the hearsay rule. See
Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 1997-
NMCA-111, 18, 124 N.M. 239, 947 P.2d 1059
(“Exceptions to the hearsay rule are based
on guarantees of reliability and trustworthi-
ness of particular circumstances which the
rules of evidence accept as substitutes for the
declarant’s testimony at trial.”). Evidence
may be inherently wnreliable, however, when
given by an unidentified, confidential source
to prove certain kinds of accusations; for
example, an allegation that the probationer
has committed another crime must be tested
in the crucible of cross examination. See
Vigil, 97 N.M. at 758, 648 P.2d at 622.

{37} By way of another example of the
utility analysis, live testimony and confronta-

tion are not equally useful in all situations
to test the truthfulness and credibility of
hearsay evidence. As recognized in Gomez,
certain in-court testimony would rely upon
records, even if given by the witness who
originally made the records, while the
source of other hearsay is essentially live
testimony given elsewhere. 104 Cal.Rptr.3d
at 687-88; see also Bailey, 612 A.2d at 294
(“A second consideration may be whether
the proffered hearsay is an objective fact
reported by the declarant or instead con-
tains conclusions which ought to be tested
by cross-examination.”), Hearsay may re-
late to objective or subjective observations,
assert that a probationer acted or failed to
act as required, or support facts that are
central or ancillary to the ultimate probation
violation inquiry. The utility inquiry should
consider all of these factors and more.

{38} Evidence supporting subjective con-
clusions, which may require confrontation,
includes sensory-based or judgment-based
determinations or interpretations, such as
testimony evaluating a probationer’s prog-
ress during a treatment program. This evi-
dence stands in contrast with evidence sup-
porting the straightforward fact of treatment
completion: the probationer “either did or
did not successfully complete the program.”
Bailey, 612 A.2d at 295. Another example of
a subjective conclusion might be an accusa-
tion of another crime committed by a proba-
tioner during probation. If probation viola-
tion occurs upon indictment or conviction,
introducing documents alone should be suffi-
ciently reliable in the absence of some unusu-
al variable. If, on the other hand, the viola-
tion is that the probationer is alleged to have
committed a crime, but has not been convict-
ed, then we would be hard pressed to envi-
sion a situation in which personal testimony
and confrontation would not be required.

{39} Live testimony is often more useful
and important in ascertaining the truth of
subjective conclusions which involve judg-
ment, perception, credibility, inferences, and
interpretation. See Wibbens, 243 P.3d at 793
(reasoning that whether a probationer
smelled of alcohol and appeared intoxicated
were “precisely the kind of unverified facts
that the right to confrontation is designed to

95

test” during a probation violation hearing).
Conversely, if the evidentiary question is
merely objective, negative, and routine—that
the probationer was not in a particular place
when he was supposed to be—then the ques-
tion frequently may be answered without the
need for confrontation.

The Good-Cause Spectrum

HE {40} For illustrative purposes, we
set forth the need-for-confrontation analysis
as a kind of spectrum or sliding scale with
extremes at either end and much balancing
and weighing of competing interests in be-
tween. Combinations of the non-exhaustive
factors that affect the utility of cross exami-
nation create infinite degrees of “cause,” a
full spectrum. On one end of the spectrum,
where good cause for not requiring confron-
tation is likely, we would include situations in
which the state’s evidence is uncontested,
corroborated by other reliable evidence, and
documented by a reliable source without a
motive to fabricate, or possibly situations
where the evidence is about an objective
conclusion, a routine recording, or a negative
fact, making the demeanor and credibility of
the witness less relevant to the truth-finding
process. On this side of the good-cause spec-
trum, live testimony and cross examination
offer almost no utility to the fact-finding
process.

HM {41} On the “no good cause” end
of the spectrum, evidence is contested by the
defendant, unsupported or contradicted, and
its source has a motive to fabricate; it is
about a subjective, judgment-based observa-
tion that is subject to inference and interpre-
tation, and makes a conclusion that is central
to the necessary proof that the defendant
violated probation. In such a case, the
state’s failure to produce the witness, for
almost any reason, deprives a defendant of
due process. Between the two extremes
there is no bright-line rule for determining
good cause—but then, that is the nature of
due process; it “is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situ-
ation demands.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481,
92 S.Ct. 2593.

96

Applying the Test for Good Cause to Guth-
rie

HM {42} Ironically, the Court of Appeals
in Guthrie appeared to be headed in the very
direction we set forth today, with one excep-
tion. The Court stated, “[t]he weaker the
probative value, the greater the need for
confrontation, and, hence, the greater the
need to justify the absence of the witness.”
Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-036, 120, 145 N.M.
761, 204 P.8d 1271. We would state it differ-
ently; the weaker the probative value, the
greater the need for live testimony and con-
frontation. On the other hand, the Court
stated, “[t]he stronger the probative value,
the lesser the needs of confrontation and
justification. Indeed, with a showing of suffi-
ciently probative or reliable hearsay evi-
dence, there is no need to show good cause
for the absence of the witness.” Id.

HH s(48} The trial court should focus its
analysis on the relative need for confronta-
tion to protect the truth-finding process and
the substantial reliability of the evidence, as
we have outlined in this Opinion. If that
need is significant, and the court specifies the
reasons why, then the witness must appear
and be subject to confrontation, regardless of
the reasons for his or her absence. Con-
versely, if the need for confrontation is not
significant, as discussed earlier, and the court
specifies why, then it does not matter wheth-
er the witness is available. Simply put, the
reasons for the witness’s absence are, for the
most part, irrelevant to the balancing process
we set forth. A court’s focus should instead
be on the need for, and utility of, confronta-
tion with respect to the truth-finding process
and in light of the particular case at hand,
including the specific charge pressed against
the probationer.

{44} Our Court of Appeals may have felt
bound by Phillips in continuing to focus on
the reason for the witness’s absence. There-
fore, we overrule Phillips. With some revi-
sions as indicated, we endorse the Court of
Appeals’ balancing analysis; namely, the
stronger the probative value and reliability of
the evidence, the less the need for confronta-
tion.

HH {45} Applying our spectrum or slid-
ing scale analysis, Guthrie falls decisively on
the “good cause” end and does not require
confrontation. Several reasons support our
conclusion. First, Defendant did not contest
the allegation that he failed to complete his
treatment at the rehabilitation center, thus
precluding a due process complaint under
Morrissey’s requirement for a hearing on
contested facts. 408 U.S. at 488, 92 S.Ct.
2598 (“The parolee must have an opportunity
to be heard and to show, if he can, that he
did not violate the conditions, or, if he did,
that circumstances in mitigation suggest that
the violation does not warrant revocation.”).
Indeed, Defendant never offered any evi-
dence in mitigation to explain his absence.

{46} Second, the key evidentiary fact of
Defendant’s non-compliance with residential
treatment—an objective, negative, and rath-
er routine fact—was easily and reliably es-
tablished to a reasonable degree of certainty
by a written statement from the treatment
center. Here the testifying probation officer
had a fax from the treatment center saying
as much. While it would have been prefera-
ble to introduce the fax itself into evidence,
and better yet with an affidavit, in this case
the fax was in the probation file and the
probation officer testified to its contents re-
lating to routine matters, like those in Go-
mez, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d at 691. Olivas also
testified that Defendant did not report to his
probation officer, did not pay probation costs,
and did not complete treatment. As noted in
Gomez, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d at 690, even a live
‘witness with personal knowledge would likely
have referred to the file to make many of
these assertions.

{47} Third, based on this record, little to
nothing could be gained by testimony from a
treatment center representative or from
Chavez, the absent probation officer. Live
testimony would have been of little use to
gauge Chavez’s demeanor, truthfulness, and
eredibility. Chavez was known to Defendant,
so identity was not at issue. There was no
known need to impress upon a probation
officer the seriousness of revocation. Nei-
ther Chavez nor any representative from the
treatment center had any known motive to
fabricate or deceive. See Morrissey, 408
US. at 485-86, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (reasoning it
would “be unfair to assume that the [proba-

tion] officer bears hostility against the [pro-
bationer] that destroys his neutrality; realis-
tically the failure of the [probationer] is in a
sense a failure for his supervising officer”).

{48} Finally, in this particular case, the
district judge made his own observations—
essentially taking judicial notice—that it
would have been factually impossible for De-
fendant to have completed treatment as re-
quired, given the time and place of his arrest.
In so doing, the judge not only corroborated
the State’s hearsay evidence, but also provid-
ed an independent source supporting the
State’s hearsay allegation that Defendant
had violated his probation. In effect, the
judge made the functional equivalent of “spe-
cifie finding of good cause” for not requiring
confrontation. While the content of the
State’s hearsay evidence was central and im-
portant to the State’s case against Defen-
dant, when no doubt is cast upon otherwise
reliable evidence, the centrality of that evi-
dence does not make confrontation any more
essential. Defendant only attacked Olivas’s
testimony on hearsay grounds; he did not
dispute the accuracy of the evidence or bring
to light any mitigating circumstances.

HM (49} Although the judge made no
explicit findings of good cause, and we do
exhort district judges in the future to explain
their rulings in more detail, the test for
validity of the finding need not be so formu-
laic. The record supports, and incontroverti-
bly so, the judge’s finding that Defendant
violated the terms of his probation. Accord-
ingly, the district court should have been
affirmed.

CONCLUSION

{50} We reverse the Court of Appeals and
remand to the district court for remaining
proceedings, if any, in furtherance of proba-
tion revocation.

{51} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, and
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMSC-015
257 P.3d 917

Gina DELFINO, individually and as per-
sonal representative of the Estate of
Manuel Delfino and as parent and next
friend of Dominic S. and Gabriel D.,
minors, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Don GRIFFO, et al., Defendants-
Appellees,

and

Kraffty, L.L.C., a New Mexico limited lia-
bility company d/b/a Uptown Sports Bar
& Grill, Uptown Square Venture, a New
Mexico general partnership, John Whi-
senant, and Ronald Nelson, Defendants—
Appellants,

and

Cue Ine., a New Mexico corporation,
et al., Defendants.

No. 32,372.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.
April 8, 2011.

Aguilar & Aguilar, P.C., Esteban A. Agui-
lar, Sr., Robles, Rael & Anaya, P.C., Brian S.
Colon, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant Gina
Delfino.

Riley & Shane, P.A., Mark J. Riley, Kris-
ten J. Dalton, Albuquerque, NM, for Appel-
lants Kraffty, L.L.C., Uptown Square Ven-
ture, John Whisenant, and Ronald Nelson.

Yenson, Lynn, Allen & Wosick, P.C., Ter-
rance P. Yenson, Michael S. Jahner, Albu-
querque, NM, for Appellee Don Griffo.

O’Brien & Padilla, P.C., Daniel J. O’Brien,
Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee Tom Gon-
zales.

Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk,
P.A., Douglas G. Schneebeck, Megan A.
Muirhead, Bannerman & Johnson, P.A,
Thomas P. Gulley, Rebecca Avitia, Albuquer-
que, NM, Baker & Botts L.L.P., Travis J.
Sales, Houston, TX, for Appellees James Paz
and Merck & Company.

Keleher & McLeod, P.A., Thomas C. Bird,
Kathleen Wilson, Albuquerque, NM, for Ap-
pellee Michael Donahue.

The Roehl Law Firm, P.C., Jerrald Joseph
Roehl, Albuquerque, NM, Ashe, Raguse and
Hill, L.L.P., William B. Hill, Jr., Joshua D.
Jewkes, Atlanta, GA, for Appellee Abbott
Laboratories, Inc.

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} Who is liable for injuries caused by an
individual for whom alcohol was purchased
and served in a public establishment? The
events precipitating this lawsuit began with a
luncheon and ended in tragedy. Plaintiff
Gina Delfino was struck by a drunk driver,
resulting in the death of Plaintiff's minor son
and injuries to herself and the other passen-
gers in her car. The driver, Alicia Gonzales,
recently had left the company of the individu-
al Defendants in this appeal, pharmaceutical
representatives who were acquainted with
Ms. Gonzales through her employment in a
doctor’s office, following approximately eight
hours of consuming alcohol. Plaintiff filed a
wrongful death suit against the establish-
ments that served Ms. Gonzales and against
the pharmaceutical representatives and their
employers, Don Griffo, Tom Gonzales, James
Paz, Mike Donahue, Merck & Company, Inc.,
Schering Corporation, and Abbott Laborato-
ries, Inc. (collectively, Pharmaceutical Defen-
dants).

{2} The Second Judicial District Court
granted Pharmaceutical Defendants’ motion
to dismiss under Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA,
concluding Pharmaceutical Defendants owed
Plaintiff no legal duty under our common law
or the Liquor Liability Act, NMSA 1978,
Section 41-11-1(E) (1986). Plaintiff appeal-
ed, and the Court of Appeals certified the
question to this Court because it presents a
unique legal issue of substantial public inter-
est. We accepted certification and exercise
jurisdiction under NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-
14(C)@) (1972). We conclude that the dis-
trict court erred by granting Pharmaceutical
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be grant-
ed because Plaintiff properly characterized
Pharmaceutical Defendants as social hosts
under the Liquor Liability Act. The district
court is hereby reversed, and this case is
remanded for further proceedings.

iL BACKGROUND

{8} This appeal is before us after being
dismissed by the district court for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be grant-

ed, and therefore “we accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations in the complaint as true.”
Valdez v. State, 2002~-NMSC-028, 14, 132
N.M. 667, 54 P.3d 71. The following recita-
tion of events are derived from the allega-
tions set forth in Plaintiff's Third Amended
Complaint.

{4} On April 29, 2005, Plaintiff was in an
automobile accident caused by Ms. Gonzales,
who was speeding and had a blood aleohol
content level of more than twice the legal
limit. Plaintiff's minor son was killed, and
Plaintiff and her passengers suffered grave
injuries.

{5} Ms. Gonzales had spent the hours pri-
or to the accident with the individual phar-
maceutical representatives: Griffo and Gon-
zales, employees of Schering; Donahue, an
employee of Abbot; and Paz, an employee of
Merck. The pharmaceutical representatives
hosted an out-of-office business luncheon for
Ms. Gonzales and her colleagues from Dr.
David Leech’s! office. The employers of the
pharmaceutical representatives had policies
that authorized the entertainment of physi-
cians and their staff, through the purchase of
food and alcohol, to further the business in-
terests of the companies. The pharmaceutical
representatives were working within the
scope of their employment during the lun-
cheon.

{6} The luncheon began at Chilis Restau-
rant. After consuming multiple alcoholic
beverages over the course of several hours,
Ms. Gonzales drove to Uptown Bar & Grill
with Griffo as her passenger. At Uptown,
Ms. Gonzales, Griffo, and Donahue consumed
more alcohol, and then Ms. Gonzales drove to
Doe & Eddy’s, again with Griffo in her car.
After one and one half hours of drinking at
Doe & Eddy’s, Ms. Gonzales, obviously intox-
icated, departed in her vehicle. The fatal
accident occurred approximately 14 minutes
later. Griffo purchased alcoholic beverages

4. Dr. Leech initially was a defendant in this case.
The district court granted his motion for sum-
mary judgment on August 23, 2007.

2. Motions to dismiss filed by Bar Defendants
were granted in part and denied in part and are
not part of this appeal.

3. Certain of the Bar Defendants (Kraffty LLC,
Uptown Square Venture, and Ronald Nelson,

101

for Ms. Gonzales at all three bars; Gonzales,
Donahue, and Paz purchased alcohol for Ms.
Gonzales in at least one bar.

{7} Plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit
against Pharmaceutical Defendants and the
owners and operators of the various bars and
restaurants where Ms. Gonzales had con-
sumed alcohol that evening (collectively, Bar
Defendants)’ Plaintiff's complaint included
21 counts against the various Defendants.
The counts at issue in this appeal are those
alleging common-law negligence against the
individual pharmaceutical representatives for
purchasing alcohol for Ms. Gonzales and per-
mitting her to drive, recklessness for the
same actions under the Liquor Liability Act,
and against their employers under responde-
at superior (Counts 7-9); negligent hiring,
retention and training against the pharma-
ceutical companies (Counts 18-15); and pri-
ma facie tort, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and loss of consortium against all
Defendants (Counts 16-18). The theories
underlying the claims asserting liability
against Pharmaceutical Defendants are that
they owed a common-law duty to prevent Ms.
Gonzales from driving while intoxicated; that
Pharmaceutical Defendants were aiding and
abetting Ms. Gonzales in committing a tor-
tious action under Restatement (Second) of
Torts Section 876(B) (1977); and that Phar-
maceutical Defendants are social hosts who
acted recklessly and thus liable under the
Liquor Liability Act.

{8} Each of the Pharmaceutical Defen-
dants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 1-
012(B)(6)2 The district court granted Phar-
maceutical Defendants’ motions to dismiss
filed under Rule 1-012(B)(6); the letter ex-
plaining the reasons for granting the initial
motion to dismiss is referenced in the orders
dismissing all other Pharmaceutical Defen-

collectively Kraffty Defendants) filed a motion
opposing the dismissal of Pharmaceutical Defen-
dants to preserve a comparative fault defense.
While Defendant Schering questions whether
Kraffty Defendants have standing to file briefing
in this appeal, we decline to address this conten-
tion, noting only that the arguments set forth in
the briefs of Kraffty Defendants mirror those set
forth by Plaintiff.

102

dants. The district court concluded that
Pharmaceutical Defendants were not social
hosts under the Liquor Liability Act; that
the Liquor Liability Act precludes any com-
mon-law cause of action that may have exist-
ed against Pharmaceutical Defendants; and
that the complaint states no cause of action
under the Restatement. Donahue’s motion
to dismiss for improper service also was de-
nied.

Dl. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

HH {9} The question presented by this
appeal is whether the district court erred in
granting the Pharmaceutical Defendants’ mo-
tions to dismiss under Rule 1-012(B)() for
failure to state a claim under which relief can
be granted. Dismissals under Rule 1-
012(B)(6) are proper when the claim asserted
is legally deficient. “A district court’s deci-
sion to dismiss a case for failure to state a
claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6) is reviewed de
novo.” Valdez, 2002-NMSC-028, 14, 132
N.M. 667, 54 P.8d 71. “In reviewing a district
court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, we accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations in the complaint as true and re-
solve all doubts in favor of sufficiency of the
complaint.” Id.

Hs {10} Plaintiff and Abbot suggest
that our review should convert the Rule 1-
012(B)(6) motions to motions for summary
judgment under Rule 1-056 NMRA. We re-
view motions to dismiss as motions for sum-
mary judgment when the district court con-
sidered matters outside the pleadings in
making its ruling. See Rule 1-012(B); V.P.
Clarence Co. v. Colgate, 115 N.M. 471, 472,
858 P.2d 722, 723 (1993). As with motions to
dismiss, we review rulings on motions for
summary judgment de novo. See Montgom-
ery v. Lomos Altos, Inc. 2007-NMSC-002,
116, 141 N.M. 21, 150 P.38d 971. The differ-
ence in the review is that evidentiary infor-
mation submitted to the district court is con-
sidered when determining whether summary
judgment was proper. Jd. “Summary judg-
ment is appropriate where there are no gen-
uine issues of material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

{11} Our review of the record proper and
the transcripts of the hearings on the mo-
tions to dismiss indicate the district court did
not rely on matters outside the pleadings in
granting Pharmaceutical Defendants’ mo-
tions to dismiss. Indeed, certain of the
Pharmaceutical Defendants were dismissed
before any exhibits or affidavits were submit-
ted to the district court, and all Pharmaceuti-
cal Defendants that were later dismissed
were dismissed in reference to the initial
ruling. The district court dismissed Pharma-
ceutical Defendants under Rule 12-012(b)(6),
and thus our review is de novo, taking as
true the facts pled in the complaint and
resolving all doubts in favor of sufficiency of
the complaint.

MMM 12} “Dismissal on 12(B)(6)
grounds is appropriate only if [the plaintiff
is] not entitled to recover under any theory
of the facts alleged in their complaint.” Cal-
lahan v. N.M. Fed’n of Teachers—TVI, 2006-
NMSC-010, 14, 189 N.M. 201, 131 P.3d 51.
The existence of a legal duty is a question of
law for the courts. See Edward C. v. City of
Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, 114, 148
N.M. 646, 241 P.38d 1086. We must decide
whether Plaintiffs complaint stated a legally
sufficient claim, a task which requires con-
struing the Liquor Liability Act to determine
if Pharmaceutical Defendants had a legal
duty to Plaintiff, a question of law we under-
take de novo. See State v. Marquez, 2008-
NMSC-055, 17, 145 N.M. 1, 193 P.8d 548.

In construing a statute, our charge is to

determine and give effect to the Legisla-

ture’s intent. In discerning the Legisla-
ture’s intent, we are aided by classic can-
ons of statutory construction, and [w]e look
first to the plain language of the statute,
giving the words their ordinary meaning,
unless the Legislature indicates a different
one was intended.
Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conserva-
tion Comm'n, 2009-NMSC-013, 19, 146
N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 185 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). If the Legislature is silent on an issue,
we look at the overall structure and function
of the statute, as well as the public policy
embodied in the statute. See N.M. Dep’t of
Health v. Compton, 2001-NMSC-032, 118,

181 N.M. 204, 34 P.3d 593; see also State v.
Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, 11 13-14, 134 N.M.
768, 82 P.8d 939 (stating that statutory con-
struction includes looking at a statute’s struc-
ture, function, history, and policy implica-
tions).

B. The Liquor Liability Act Imposes a
Duty on All Social Hosts.

{18} The Liquor Liability Act provides for
the tort liability of liquor licensees and social
hosts who sell, serve, or provide alcohol.
The Act was passed in 1983, in response to
Lopez v. Maez, in which this Court recog-
nized a common-law cause of action against a
tavern that had furnished alcoholic beverages
to an intoxicated individual who later caused
injury to a third party. 98 N.M. 625, 632,
651 P.2d 1269, 1276 (1982) (“In light of the
use of automobiles and the increasing fre-
quency of accidents involving drunk drivers,
we hold that the consequences of serving
liquor to an intoxicated person whom the
server knows or could have known is driving
a car is reasonably foreseeable.” (footnote
omitted)); see also Baxter v. Noce, 107 N.M.
48, 50, ‘752 P.2d 240, 242 (1988) (discussing
the transition from a common-law dram shop
action to the Liquor Liability Act after Lo-
pez). The Liquor Liability Act imposes lia-
bility based on varying relationships between
plaintiffs and defendants. For a suit by an
injured third party against a licensee, the
plaintiff must show that the licensee was
negligent—that it was “reasonably apparent”
that the person being served was intoxicated.
Section 41-11-1(A)(2). For a suit against a
licensee by a patron, the plaintiff must show
“gross negligence and reckless disregard for
the safety of the person who purchased or
was served the alcoholic beverages.” Section
41-11-1(B). For a suit against a gratuitous
provider, or social host, the plaintiff must
show that the host provided alcoholic bever-
ages “recklessly in disregard of the rights of
others, including the social guest.” Section
41-11-1(E).

s{14} With the social host provision
of Liquor Liability Act, “the legislature in-
tended to limit the rights of third parties to
recover against social hosts who provided
alcoholic beverages to intoxicated guests who
negligently injure a third party.” Walker v.

103

Key, 101 N.M. 681, 636, 686 P.2d 978, 978
(Ct.App.1984). The social host provision of
the Liquor Liability Act states:
No person who has gratuitously provided
alcoholic beverages to a guest in a social
setting may be held liable in damages to
any person for bodily injury, death or
property damage arising from the intoxi-
cation of the social guest unless the alco-
holie beverages were provided recklessly
in disregard of the rights of others, includ-
ing the social guest.
Section 41-11-1(E). The statute does not
further define social host, nor does the appli-
cable uniform jury instruction, UJI 13-1643
NMRA, which tracks the statute. The use
note to the jury instruction states that the
“instruction should be given when the plain-
tiff claims injury resulting from the conduct
of a person who became intoxicated in a
private setting.” (Emphasis added.)

1. The Liquor Liability Act does not limit
social host liability to private settings.

{15} The district court ruled that
“the pharmaceutical representatives were not
social hosts.” In reaching this conclusion,
the district court relied on the language of
the use note to UJI 13-1643 requiring a
“private setting” and quoted the Court of
Appeals opinion in Chavez v. Desert Eagle
Distributing Co. of New Mewico, 2007-
NMCA-018, 132, 141 N.M. 116, 151 P.3d 77,
for the proposition that liability under Sec-
tion 41-11-1 is limited “to those who actually
exercised some degree of control over the
service or consumption of alcohol.” The dis-
trict court reasoned that the individual phar-
maceutical representatives, though they may
have paid for at least some of the alcoholic
beverages consumed by Ms. Gonzales, “did
not exercise control over the service and
provision of alcohol: the licensees did.” Bar
Defendants, according to the district court’s
ruling, had the sole duty to halt service of
alcohol to Ms. Gonzales. The district court
concluded that “[blecause the Pharmaceutical
Defendants were not licensees or social
hosts, the Liquor Liability Act does not ap-
ply.”

{16} Plaintiff argues that the district court
erred in concluding that social host liability is

104

limited to private settings where there is no
licensed liquor provider who has an explicit
statutory duty under the Liquor Liability
Act. Rather, according to Plaintiff, social host
liability should exist in this case because
alcohol was consumed at a “business lunch”
pursuant to a “corporate policy” of purchas-
ing alcohol for potential clients. The setting
gave the individual pharmaceutical represen-
tatives “special control over their targeted
business-related guest, control [over] the
flow of liquor to that person by their pur-
chase of the drinks—all with a singular busi-
ness motive.”

{17} Pharmaceutical Defendants assert
that imposing social host liability beyond a
private setting would extend a duty to mere
“eo-patron[s] and social companion[s]” or to
“individual[s] who buy[] drinks for col-
leagues or friends.” Doing so, they argue,
would be contrary to the Liquor Liability
Act’s imposition of liability on licensed estab-
lishments or servers.

TI {18} As discussed above, the Liquor
Liability Act imposes a duty to not act reck-
lessly on one “who has gratuitously provided
alcoholic beverages to a guest in a social
setting[.]” Section 41-11-1(E). The plain
language of the statute does not indicate a
legislative intent to limit social host liability
to private settings; rather, a social host is
one who provides his or her guest with gratu-
itous alcohol in a social setting. The Liquor
Liability Act is silent on whether the duty
imposed on social hosts is limited to only
those who are entertaining in their homes, or
whether it is extended to individuals who
host events, and otherwise provide alcohol, in
public spaces, including when the actual ser-
vice of aleoholic beverages is performed by
licensed servers. As such, we turn to other
tools of statutory construction. Prior to do-
ing so, we will consider the authorities used
by the district court.

HM {19} The district court relied on the
use note to the applicable jury instruction to
conclude that “social setting” was synony-
mous with “private setting.” The use note to
UJI 13-1643 states that the jury “should be”
instructed on social host liability when the

4. We direct the UJI Committee to create a sec-

alcohol provision occurred in a private set-
ting. Use notes, though not part of the
statute or jury instruction, are adopted by
this Court and binding on district courts.
See State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, 110 n.
1, 185 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 638. In Barber, this
Court concluded that the refusal of the dis-
trict court to instruct the jury with the defi-
nition of possession, when the use note said
the instruction “should be given if possession
is in issue[,]” would have been reversible
error if the instruction had been requested,
as possession was at issue in that case.
2004-NMSC-019, 9910, 12, 185 N.M. 621, 92
P.8d 638. Stating that an instruction “should
be given” under a particular factual scenario,
however, is not the same as stating that an
instruction be given only under that scenario.
See State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 481, 488, 672 P.2d
654, 656 (1983) (“The language in a Use Note

. cannot elevate a jury instruction to the
status of an essential element.”). The use
note does not embody any prior conclusion
by this Court that the Legislature intended
to preclude social host liability when the
hosting occurs in a public setting.

{20} The district court also relied on the
Court of Appeals’ discussion of the Liquor
Liability Act in Chavez for the proposition
that Pharmaceutical Defendants cannot be
held liable in this case because they did not
exercise the requisite control over the liquor
supply. 2007-NMCA-018, 141 N.M. 116, 151
P.38d 77. We are not persuaded that Chavez
provides the Legislature’s definition of social
host. In Chavez, the plaintiffs brought suit
against liquor distributors who sold alcohol to
a casino, allegedly with the knowledge that
the casino would sell alcohol for a 24-hour
period. Id. 12. The Court of Appeals held
that the district court did not err in dismiss-
ing the claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6) because
the liquor distributors did not owe a statuto-
ry duty to casino patrons or those whom they
injure. 2007-NMCA-018, 1913-14, 141
N.M. 116, 151 P.3d 77. The Court also held
that no common-law duty from defendant to
plaintiff existed because the accident was not
a foreseeable result of the sale of liquor to
the casino, id. 123, and public policy did not
support the imposition of a duty on a liquor

ond use note consistent with this Opinion.

distributor who had no degree of “control or
supervision” over the actual “service or con-
sumption of aleoholl,]” id. 1130-31.

HH {21} While Chavez cites the Liquor
Liability Act in support of its public policy
analysis, it did so for the purpose of showing
the public policy of imposing liability on third
parties for alcohol-related accidents is limited
in scope. Id. 131 (citing Section 41-11-1(A),
(8), (H)). The Court stated that the exclu-
sivity and standard of care provisions of the
Liquor Liability Act “indicate[ ] that our leg-
islature wanted to limit liability for aleohol-
related injuries and deaths resulting from
the sale or service of alcohol to those who
actually exercised some degree of control
over the service or consumption of alcohol.”
Id. We agree that the Liquor Liability Act
only imposes a duty on individuals exercising
some degree of control over the service or
consumption of liquor. Control is implicit in
the Legislature’s choice to define social host
as one who gratuitously “provided” liquor to
a guest, and who “provided” liquor in a reck-
less manner.

{22} Turning to the structure of the Li-
quor Liability Act, we do not find evidence
that the Legislature intended to limit social
host liability to instances in which no licensed
alcohol server was involved in providing the
alcohol. Most subsections of the Act de-
scribe the duty on licensees based on differ-
ent relationships; Subsection (E), discussed
above, sets forth the duty on social hosts.
The only subsection of the Act that discusses
both licensees and social hosts is Subsection
(HD), the exclusivity provision, which states
that the Act is the exclusive remedy for
injuries proximately caused by the sale or
service of alcohol, not that a suit against one
class of liquor providers is exclusive of a suit
against another. The absence of any lan-
guage expressly precluding social host liabili-
ty when alcohol is consumed in a licensed
establishment indicates the intent of the Leg-
islature to permit concurrent social host and
licensee liability.

{23} Construing the term social host to
include those who host in bars is consistent,
both with our comparative fault system in
torts and with the regulations applicable to
licensed establishments. This Court adopted

105

a comparative fault system in 1981. See
Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234
(1981), superseded by statute as stated in
Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 628, 875 P.2d 384
(1992). When the Liquor Liability Act was
enacted, therefore, it was done so in a tort
environment in which each liable party was
apportioned his or her share of the damages.
In regulations promulgated by the Alcohol
and Gaming Division of the New Mexico
Regulation and Licensing Department, we
find further support for the Liquor Liability
Act placing a duty on both a social host and
licensee for the same event. See City of
Albuquerque v. N.M. Pub. Reg. Comm’n,
2003-NMSC-028, 1116, 134 N.M. 472, 79 P.3d
297 (stating that agency regulations should
be formulated “in a reasonable manner con-
sistent with legislative intent”). Regulation
15.10.51.12(A), (B), (Z) NMAC expressly per-
mits licensees to allow private parties, in
which the host of the party provides all the
alcohol, on the licensed premises, so long as
the alcohol is served by licensed servers dur-
ing the times the licensee is authorized to
serve alcohol. This regulatory law seems to
contemplate concurrent duties on the social
hosts and licensees.

HM {24} We conclude that the Liquor
Liability Act permits a cause of action
against a social host who recklessly provides
aleohol to a guest when the alcohol is con-
sumed in a licensed establishment.

2, Social hosts are those who exercise
control over the alcohol service.

HMMs (25} Having concluded that the Leg-
islature contemplated suits against a liquor
licensee and a social host for the same events
under the Liquor Liability Act, we turn to
the question of who may be considered a
social host. Social host liability under the
Liquor Liability Act, as indicated in Chavez,
requires “some degree of control over the
service or consumption of alcohol.” 2007-
NMCA-018, 131, 141 N.M. 116, 151 P.3d 77.
As discussed above, control is implicit in the
statutory language, applicable to a social host
“who has gratuitously provided” alcohol.
This Legislative choice of language is re-
flected in case law from other jurisdictions,
where courts have imposed social host liabili-

106

ty only when the social host had performed
some sort of affirmative act in the service or
provision of alcohol. See, eg., Knight v.
Rower, 170 Vt. 96, 742 A.2d 1287, 1241 (1999)
(stating that a social host must furnish alco-
hol through “some affirmative act or active
part in the provision of alcohol”); Alwmni
Ass'n v. Sullivan, 524 Pa. 356, 572 A.2d 1209,
1218 (1990) (finding that social host liability
did not exist where “there are no allegations
that either the fraternity or the University
was involved in the planning of these events
or the serving, supplying, or purchasing of
liquor”).

{26} Courts in our sister states have con-
sidered the question of social host liability
when the alcohol consumption occurred in a
licensed establishment and, though not al-
ways under the same duty of care as re-
quired by the Liquor Liability Act, we find
their interpretations generally consistent
with the our Legislature’s choice to provide
for social host liability. In Born v. Mayers,
the Supreme Court of North Dakota con-
strued that state’s dram shop statute to per-
mit a claim against a company representative
who purchased alcohol for an individual in a
bar in order to promote “business good will”
in the community. 514 N.W.2d 687, 689-90
(N.D.1994) (construing N.D.C.C. Section 5-
01-06.1, which permits a cause of action
“against any person who knowingly disposes,
sells, barters, or gives away alcoholic bever-
ages to ... an obviously intoxicated person”).
The Born court concluded that the statute
imposes a duty upon those who purchase
alcohol in a bar because “‘no reason occurs
to us why those who furnish liquor to others,
even on social occasions, should not be re-
sponsible for protecting innocent third per-
sons from the potential dangers of indiscrimi-
nately furnishing such hospitality”” Id. at
690 (quoting Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200
N.W.2d 149, 153 (1972), superseded by stat-
ute as stated in Urban v. Am. Legion Dept.
of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn.2006)).

5. It is appropriate in this case to consult the
treatment of analogous liability standards in oth-
er states in discerning our own Legislature's in-
tent. In establishing our common-law dram

shop act in Lopez, this Court relied on the devel-
opment of liquor liability in our sister states. 98

{27} The Court of Appeals of Indiana
construed that state’s dram shop act, which
prohibits “furnishing” alcohol to a visibly in-
toxicated individual, to impose a duty on a
“gratuitous server” who orders and pays for
drinks for another in a licensed bar because
the gratuitous server controlled at least
some of the drinks served. Vanderhock v.
Willy, 728 N.E.2d 218, 216-18 (Ind.Ct.App.
2000) (discussing Indiana Code Section 7.1-
5-10-15 and -15.5 and concluding that the
plaintiff properly stated a claim under the
dram shop act against both the bar and the
individual who purchased the drinks at the
bar); see also Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.B.2d
1167, 1169 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (concluding
that the legislature intended to extend liabil-
ity “to family, friend or acquaintance who
merely furnishes ‘one more drink’ to an in-
toxicated person”).

{28} The Massachusetts courts recognize a
common-law cause of action against social
hosts. See McGuiggan v. New Eng. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 398 Mass. 152, 496 N.E.2d 141, 146
(1986). In Makynen v. Mustakangas, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed sum-
mary judgment granted in favor of an uncle
who permitted his nephew to consume multi-
ple beers at his house and then purchased
more beers for the nephew at a bar. 39
Mass.App.Ct. 309, 655 N.E.2d 1284, 1286-87
(1995). Makynen stated that “[bly being at
the bar drinking with his nephew and paying
for the drinks and food, [the uncle], the jury
could find, made the beer available to [the
nephew] at a time when he knew or should
have known [that the nephew] was intoxicat-
ed.” Id. at 1287 (citing Solberg v. Johnson,
306 Or. 484, 760 P.2d 867, 870 (1988)). In
Dube v. Lanphear, however, the court ruled
that social host liability was not available
against the three friends of an individual who
drove drunk and caused an accident because
a group of “drinking buddies,” who shared
the bill evenly, were not social hosts. 69
Mass.App.Ct. 886, 868 N.E.2d 619, 623
(2007). Important to the Dube holding was

N.M. at 630, 651 P.2d at 1274, As discussed
above, the Liquor Liability Act, including the
social host liability provision, was enacted in
response to Lopez, codifying the common-law
liability developing not just in New Mexico but
around the country.

the fact that the friends had no ability to cut
off the flow of aleohol to the individual who
later drove, evidenced by the fact that the
individual continued to purchase drinks for
himself after the group bill had been settled.
Id. at 624 (distinguishing Makynen due to
the “relationship between the uncle and the
nephew, including the fact that the nephew
did not share in the payment”); see also Lev
v. Beverly Enter.Mass., Inc., 457 Mass. 234,
929 N.E.2d 308, 311 (2010) (refusing to dis-
tinguish between employer-hosts and other
sorts of social hosts, concluding that “em-
ployer-host liability is predicated on control
of the alcohol, not control of the person who
consumes it”),

{29} In Solberg, the Supreme Court of
Oregon defined social host as “one who re-
ceives guests, whether friends or associates,
in a social or commercial setting, in which the
host serves or directs the serving of alcohol
to guests.” 760 P.2d at 870 (construing
O.R.S. § 471.565, formally OR ST § 30.950).
The court explained:

The typical example of a social host ... is

where a host invites associates to partici-

pate in a social gathering, in a private
setting, and furnishes and serves alcohol to

a guest. But not every host entertains

guests at home. Many entertain at hotels,

clubs or resorts. Hosting at taverns is not

uncommon.... One may ... ante up per

drink at a tavern and still be a host.
Id. (holding that the defendant tavern prop-
erly stated a contribution claim against the
stepfather who purchased the alcohol for his
stepson in the tavern); see also Grady v.
Cedar Side Inn, Inc., 330 Or. 42, 997 P.2d
197, 200 (2000) (holding that plaintiff was not
barred from recovery from defendant tavern
even though it was possible that the fact
finder could determine that the plaintiff was
the drunk driver's “social host” because the
plaintiff purchased alcohol from the tavern
for the driver, his social companion). As
discussed later in this Opinion, we do not
believe ow Legislature necessarily would
agree with the definition of social host em-
ployed by the Oregon courts.

HM. s«{80} We perceive the following
common themes in these well-reasoned cases
that are instructive in determining what our

107

Legislature envisioned when it statutorily en-
acted social host liability. Social hosting
need not occur in a home; one may host in a
bar or restaurant where the actual delivery
of alcoholic beverages to the guests is per-
formed by a licensed server. Factors that
are key to determining whether one is a
social host in a public establishment are
whether the alleged social host exercised
control over the aleohol consumed by the
guests; whether the alleged social host con-
vened the gathering for a specific purpose or
benefit to the alleged social host, such as
promoting business good will; and whether
the alleged host intended to act as a “host” of
the event, meaning arrange for the service of
and full payment for all food and beverages
served to the guests.

{81} None of these factors is determina-
tive, and this Opinion will not attempt to
capture the myriad host/guest relationships
that may exist. The presence of a business
incentive, as corroborated by a corporate pol-
icy of encouraging entertainment to foster a
business relationship, is evidence which could
persuade a jury that a guest/host relationship
exists. However, it is equally apparent that
this kind of business atmosphere is not es-
sential, and factors indicating whether one is
acting as a social host, and thereby assuming
some responsibility for the service of aleohol
to guests, may be present in a purely social
setting.

HM {32} In our view, the guest/host re-
lationship implies a certain degree of control
by the host over the guest and the provision
of alcohol. The host creates the environment,
and has the power to change it. It is the
degree of control and responsibility envi-
sioned by the Legislature in its careful choice
of wording that distinguishes the present
case, and others like it, from the more casual
social arrangement in which each individual
is responsible for herself or himself. Unless
the social arrangement fits within the guest/
host paradigm, the Legislature has not im-
posed a duty of care. Friends sharing
drinks, regardless of who pays, normally
would not rise to a guest/host relationship.
When one is put in a position of being anoth-
er’s guest, it is implied that the host will be
in the position of some responsibility, albeit

108

only a responsibility not to be reckless in
providing gratuitous alcohol.

3. The recklessness standard limits social
host liability.

Hs {83} Our construction of social
host to include individuals and companies
who host in licensed establishments does not,
contrary to Pharmaceutical Defendants’ pre-
dictions, create a slippery slope leading to
the creation of a duty to the whole world or,
at least, to the whole bar. We think this
characterization is unrealistic under the Li-
quor Liability Act. “As a general rule, an
individual has no duty to protect another
from harm.” Edward C., 2010-NMSC-043,
116, 148 N.M. 646, 241 P.3d 1086. A duty to
act under a specific standard of care towards
a specific group of people may be imposed,
however, by statute or common law, see id.
115; in this case the Liquor Liability Act
imposes a duty on social hosts not to act
recklessly in the service of aleohol beverages
to their guest, Section 41-11-1(E). Reck-
lessness, as defined by the Uniform Jury
Instructions for liquor liability, is “the inten-
tional doing of an act with utter indifference
to or conscious disregard for a person’s
[rights or safety].” UJI 13-1641(4) NMRA.
A plaintiff, therefore, has two sizeable hur-
dles to be successful in a suit under a social
host liability theory: to establish facts from
which a well-instructed jury could identify a
guest/host relationship, and to prove reckless
misconduct resulting from that relationship.

{34} The Liquor Liability Act’s reckless-
ness standard for social hosts indicates that
the Legislature did not intend to impose on
“social host” a meaning as broad as that
attributed to the phrase by Solberg, where an
individual who “antes up” at a tavern may be
liable as a social host. 760 P.2d at 870. We
agree with Dube that

[alpplying existing social values and cus-

toms, it cannot reasonably be argued that

the common practice of patronizing eating
and drinking establishments with compan-
ions, each participant paying a fair share of
the charges, imposes social host liability on
each member of the group in the event one
individual visibly drinks to excess and
causes damage afterward.

868 N.E.2d at 623 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). The Liquor Liability

Act’s statutory limitation on the duty “act[s]
as [a] safeguard[] against indiscriminately
imposing liability upon a person who gives
someone else an alcoholic beverage.” Born,
514 N.W.2d at 690. The mere presence of an
individual in a bar is not enough to impose a
duty on her or him; nor is merely purchasing
a round for friends, or even a stranger. Cf.
State v. Marquez, 2010-NMCA-064, 118, 148
N.M. 511, 238 P.3d 880, cert. quashed, 2010-
NMCERT-006, 148 N.M. 584, 241 P.8d 182
(holding that a passenger in a car could be
charged with aiding and abetting crimes
‘committed by a driver who drove intoxicat-
ed).

{85} In creating the Liquor Liability
Act, our Legislature endorsed a public policy
that an individual or company who hosts a
party where alcohol is gratuitously served,
whether at a bar or in a private home, can be
expected to refrain from reckless activity in
association with providing alcohol to guests.
The following may reflect the reasoning of
the Legislature in imposing liability on social
hosts for the reckless service of alcohol:

[Wle believe that given society’s extreme

concern about drunken driving, any change

in social behavior resulting from the rule
will be regarded ultimately as neutral at
the very least, and not as a change for the

worse; but that in any event if there be a

loss, it is well worth the gain.

Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A2d
1219, 1224 (1984). When individuals split a
check, purchase a drink for a friend, or en-
gage in other socially acceptable practices,
such action, alone, does not create a guest/
host relationship and is not “reckless” under
the Liquor Liability Act. In the Act, the Leg-
islature limited liability only to those actions
of a social host that are considered reckless
under our contemporaneous social values and
customs.

4, Pharmaceutical Defendants were so-
cial hosts.

WM {36} Plaintiffs complaint properly
characterized Pharmaceutical Defendants as
social hosts, and pleaded facts that raise the
question of recklessness, thus stating a cause
of action against them under the Liquor Lia-
bility Act. The individual pharmaceutical rep-
resentatives invited Ms. Gonzales and her co-
workers to a business luncheon, organized

for business purposes under corporate poli-
cies of “wining and dining” medical office
personnel in order to develop business good-
will and eventually increase sales to that
office. The representatives arranged the
business luncheon, paid for all of Ms. Gon-
zales’ many alcoholic beverages at multiple
licensed establishments, accompanied her at
and between the multiple establishments,
and escorted her to her car at the end of the
evening.’ Pharmaceutical Defendants’ busi-
ness motive in organizing the luncheon
weighs in favor of the conclusion that they
were acting as hosts for Ms. Gonzales and
her work colleagues. As discussed above,
the fact that the hosting took place in li-
censed bars and restaurants, as opposed to a
private home or office, is not determinative.
Under the facts alleged in the complaint,
Pharmaceutical Defendants were social hosts
in a licensed establishment. We reverse the
district court’s order granting the motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, and hold
that Plaintiff stated a claim against Pharma-
ceutical Defendants as social hosts under the
Liquor Liability Act.

HM {87} We need not reach Plaintiff's
argument that Pharmaceutical Defendants
owed her a common-law tort duty or that a
duty was stated under the Restatement, be-
cause the Liquor Liability Act is the exclu-
sive remedy for injuries caused by social
hosts. The plain language of the Act needs
no interpretation: “No person may seek re-
lief in a civil claim against a licensee or a
social host for injury or death or damage to
property which was proximately caused by
the sale, service or provision of alcoholic
beverages except as provided in this sec-
tion.” Section 41-11-1(H) (emphasis added);
see also Chavez, 2007-NMCA-018, 131, 141
N.M. 116, 151 P.8d 77 (discussing the exelu-
sivity of the Liquor Liability Act when it
applies),

C. Donahue’s Motion to Dismiss for Un-
timely Service

{38} Donahue raises an issue unique from
the other Pharmaceutical Defendants: that

6. We recognize the ongoing dispute among the
various Pharmaceutical Defendants as to who
was with Ms. Gonzales, for how long, at what
locations, and who purchased her beverages. Al-
though in this Opinion we refer to Pharmaceuti-

109

the district court erred by not dismissing the
claims against him due to untimely service
based on Plaintiff's lack of diligence under
Rule 1-004(C)(2) NMRA. The district court
order denying Donahue’s motion to dismiss
for untimely service did so without explana-
tion, At the hearing on Donahue’s motion to
dismiss, Donahue indicated he wanted a rul-
ing for preservation purposes on the service
issue in the event this Court reversed the
district court on the Rule 1-012(B)(6) motion.
While the district court did hear from both
Donahue and Plaintiff on the issue, it did not
make any oral or written findings on the
service issue, but, as it had indicated it would
do before hearing arguments, granted Dona-
hue’s motion to dismiss under Rule 1-
012(B)(6) and denied the motion to dismiss
for untimely service. As it appears to us
that the district court’s treatment of the mo-
tion to dismiss for untimely service was per-
funetory and performed solely to permit
Donahue to preserve the issue, on remand
we direct the district court to reconsider the
motion and rule on its merits with a reasoned
order that will be suitable for review if, or
when, this case reaches the appellate courts
again.

Ii CONCLUSION

{89} We reverse the district court’s dis-
missal of Pharmaceutical Defendants on the
ground that the complaint failed to state a
claim under which relief could be granted
and hold that Plaintiff properly stated a
claim against Pharmaceutical Defendants as
social hosts under the Liquor Liability Act.
We remand to the district court to proceed in
a manner consistent with this Opinion.

{40} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PETRA
JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON
and EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

cal Defendants collectively, we anticipate that
such issues will be resolved in due course, per-
haps at a subsequent motion for summary judg-
ment, and this Opinion is without prejudice to
any such subsequent efforts.

2011-NMSC-016
257 P.3d 930

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

Jeremiah Kenneth DOWLING,
Defendant—Appellant.

No. 31,105.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.

April 12, 2011.

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender,
Vicki W. Zelle, Assistant Appellate Defender,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, M. Victo-
ria Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, San-
ta Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

CHAVEZ, Justice.

{1} In this case, we revisit depraved mind
murder involving a motorist. Over the
course of seven-tenths of a mile, the 18—-
year-old Defendant drove his truck at speeds
estimated to approach 80 miles per hour on a
four-lane suburban street during the middle
of a weekday, striking and injuring a jogger
on the street’s raised median, then driving
onto a sidewalk and striking and killing a
second pedestrian; all the while speeding
and weaving in and out of traffic, including
into oncoming traffic, until crossing all four
lanes of the street and ultimately crashing
into a boulder on the raised median. Be-
cause the jury found that Defendant struck
the first pedestrian with the intent to injure
her, it found him guilty of aggravated battery
with a deadly weapon, contrary to NMSA
1978, Section 30-3-5 (1969). Defendant was
also convicted of first degree depraved mind
murder, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 80-
2-1(A)(8) (1994); leaving the scene of an
accident not resulting in great bodily harm,
contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-201(D)
(1989); knowingly leaving the scene of an
accident resulting in great bodily harm, con-
trary to Section 66-7-201(C); reckless driv-
ing, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-
113 (1987); and escape or attempt to escape
from jail, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section
30-22-8 (1963).

{2} There is only one prior New Mexico
case that addresses depraved mind murder
in the context of a homicide caused by a
motorist. State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad,
102 N.M. 274, 278, 694 P.2d 922, 926 (1985),
holding modified on other grounds by State
v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, 127, 127 N.M.
240, 980 P.2d 23. In Omar—Muhammad we
made it clear that mere reckless driving is
insufficient to support a depraved mind mur-
der conviction. Instead, extremely reckless
conduct evidencing indifference for the value
of human life is required. In this case, we
must decide whether the jury was properly

instructed and whether Defendant's driving
behavior constitutes sufficient evidence to
support a depraved mind murder conviction.
We conclude (1) that the jury was improperly
instructed by the trial court to consider only
reckless and not “extremely reckless” driv-
ing, and (2) that double jeopardy does not
bar Defendant's retrial because sufficient evi-
dence supports the jury verdict.

{3} Our conclusions in this case should not
be construed by prosecutors as a broad li-
cense to bring depraved mind murder
charges whenever the State seeks to convict
a motorist for homicide. As we set forth in
the body of this Opinion, this case involves
extraordinary facts that permit the rare in-
ference of a depraved mind in the context of
a vehicular killing. As we have made clear in
the past and reiterate here, the depraved
mind doctrine is to be applied sparingly,
regardless of the circumstances. However,
this admonition is especially resonant where
the lethal instrumentality is an automobile
and the jury is provided only circumstantial
evidence from which to infer the presence of
a depraved mind.

I. BACKGROUND

{4} During the middle of the day, Defen-
dant was driving a truck southbound on a
four-lane roadway divided by a raised dirt-
filled median surrounded by concrete curb-
ing. Witnesses saw Defendant drive up onto
the median and accelerate straight toward a
jogger, striking her with the truck’s large
exterior mirror. After striking the jogger,
Defendant continued driving southbound for
approximately seven-tenths of a mile at
speeds estimated to be more than twice the
posted speed limit of 85 miles per hour. At
one point Defendant was observed driving up
onto the median to pass vehicles occupying
both southbound lanes. On at least two oth-
er occasions, Defendant drove over the
raised median into oncoming northbound
traffic and then crossed the median back
onto the southbound lanes, almost colliding
with other motorists on both sides of the

1. Because the Defendant received a life sentence,
we review this case as a direct appeal pursuant
to the Court's jurisdiction under Article VI, Sec-
tion 2 of the New Mexico Constitution, as codi-
fied per Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA. See State v.

median. In addition to weaving between the
north and southbound lanes of the road, De-
fendant crossed the two southbound lanes,
climbed the sidewalk to the west, and struck
a pedestrian with such force that “almost all”
of the victim’s internal organs were severely
injured, causing numerous fractures includ-
ing a broken neck, and resulting in victim’s
brain being dislodged from her skull. She
died at the scene.

{5} Defendant continued driving recklessly
and crossed the raised median one more
time, once again driving the wrong way in
the northbound lanes. Defendant then
swerved out of the path of an oncoming car,
narrowly avoiding a collision, and crashed
into a boulder on the median between the
north and southbound lanes. His truck dis-
abled, Defendant fled on foot and was later
captured about one mile away. Further
facts will be developed as needed in the body
of this Opinion.

{6} Defendant appeals only his conviction
for depraved mind murder. In the table of
contents of his brief in chief, Defendant rais-
es one main issue: whether sufficient evi-
dence supports the depraved mind murder
conviction. However, in stealth fashion, De-
fendant also raises two other issues in the
body of the brief: (1) whether the trial court
erred in its instruction to the jury on de-
praved mind murder because “[t]he given
jury instructions did not clearly explain that
to convict of first degree depraved mind mur-
der there must be much more than simply
establishing that reckless conduct caused the
death of a person,” and (2) whether three
isolated statements made by the prosecution
improperly inflamed the jury’s passions,
thereby encouraging them to convict Defen-
dant of depraved mind murder instead of
vehicular homicide.

{7} With respect to the sufficiency of the
evidence challenge, we interpret Defendant's
brief to ask us to review whether a rational
jury could find the following three elements
of depraved mind murder: (1) whether De-

Smallwood, 2007-NMSC-005, 16, 141 N.M. 178,
152 P.3d 821 (“our appellate jurisdiction extends
to appeals from district court judgments impos-
ing a sentence of life imprisonment or death”).

114

fendant had “subjective knowledge that his
[driving] was greatly dangerous to the lives
of others,” State v. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031,
123, 188 N.M. 365, 120 P.38d 447 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); (2)
whether Defendant’s driving was “dangerous
to more than one person,” id. 122; and (8)
whether Defendant’s driving indicated “a de-
praved mind without regard for human life.”
UJI 14-203 NMRA. After viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude as a matter of law
that any rational juror as instructed could
have found the essential elements of the
erime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State
v. Rosaive, 1996-NMCA-115, 121, 123 N.M.
250, 989 P.2d 597. However, we also con-
clude that the jury in this case was not
properly instructed because the given in-
struction incorrectly stated that a finding of
mere reckless driving was adequate to find
Defendant guilty of depraved mind murder.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand this
matter for a new trial on the depraved mind
murder charge. Because of our holding, we
do not address the three isolated remarks
made by the prosecution to which Defendant
made no objection.

I. DEPRAVED MIND MURDER IN
NEW MEXICO

{8} New Mexico law defines “depraved
mind murder” as an unintentional first de-
gree killing caused “by any act greatly dan-
gerous to the lives of others, indicating a
depraved mind regardless of human life.”
Section 30-2-1(A)(8). First degree murder
is a capital felony. Id. Accordingly, a defen-
dant convicted of first degree murder is sub-
ject to a mandatory term of life imprison-
ment. NMSA 1978, § 31-18-14 (1993).

{9} New Mexico is one of only three states
to classify depraved mind murder in the first
degree. Other jurisdictions typically classify
depraved mind killings in the second degree,
reserving the first degree designation for
killings characterized by some indicia of pre-
meditation and deliberation. See 2 Wayne R.
LaFave & David C. Baum, Substantive
Criminal Law § 14.7 (2d ed. 2003); see also
State v. Lacquey, 117 Ariz. 231, 571 P.2d
1027, 1080 (1977) (in bane) (“That this crime

was brutal there can be no doubt, but brutali-
ty alone cannot, in itself, support a finding of
premeditation and deliberation.”). Only Col-
orado and Washington join New Mexico in
classifying depraved mind killings in the first
degree.  Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-8-102(1)(d)
(2000); Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.32.030(1)(b)
(1990). Because first degree murder is sub-
ject to our most serious criminal sanction, we
have repeatedly emphasized the importance
of ensuring that only the most “heinous and
reprehensible” killings fall under the de-
praved mind category. See State v. Garcia,
114 N.M. 269, 272, 887 P.2d 862, 865 (1992);
see also Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, 117, 188
N.M. 365, 120 P.8d 447; State v. Brown,
1996-NMSC-073, 115, 122 N.M. 724, 981
P.2d 69.

{10} To that end, this Court has recog-
nized a number of elements to be considered
in appraising whether a defendant has dis-
played the requisite depraved mind pursuant
to Section 30-2-1(A)(8). Reed, 2005-NMSC-
031, 1122-24, 138 N.M. 365, 120 P.8d 447.
Our development of these criteria is directed
by the plain language of the statute and the
recognition that the Legislature intends only
the most reprehensible unintentional homi-
cides to be classified in the first degree,
clearly distinct from homicides that warrant
punishment as second degree murder. Reed,
2005-NMSC-031, 9917, 36, 188 N.M. 365,
120 P.3d 447; Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, 118,
122 N.M. 724, 981 P.2d 69. Thus, we have
developed these elements for the express
purpose of limiting the application of de-
praved mind murder to only those rare unin-
tentional murders that warrant the first de-
gree murder punishment. See Reed, 2005-
NMSC-031, 11 24, 25, 188 N.M. 365, 120 P.38d
447 (“[D]epraved mind murder ... is not a
fallback position available whenever the
State fails to prove deliberation.”).

HM {11} First, as directed by Section
80-2~1(A)(8), we require that more than one
person be endangered by the defendant’s act.
This element conforms to the statute’s plain
Janguage, which requires “any act greatly
dangerous to the lives of others.” Id. (em-
phasis added); State v. DeSantos, 89 N.M.
458, 461, 553 P.2d 1265, 1268 (1976) (holding
that a depraved mind instruction was im-

proper because defendant’s actions were only
dangerous to one person). Second, we re-
quire that the defendant’s act be intentional
and of an extremely reckless character.
Reed, 2005-NMSC-081, 1117, 25, 188 N.M.
865, 120 P.3d 447 (“[T]he accused must sub-
jectively intend to commit an act that has a
great likelihood of resulting in death.”).
Mere recklessness will not suffice for a de-
praved mind murder conviction. Id. 143.
Third, we require that the defendant possess
subjective knowledge that his act was “great-
ly dangerous to the lives of others.” State v.
McCrary, 100 N.M. 671, 672-73, 675 P.2d
120, 121-22 (1984). By imposing this mens
rea standard, we ensure that only an actor
who was aware of the extremely reckless
nature of his conduct can be held to account
for first degree murder. Fourth and finally,
‘we require that the act “encompass an inten-
sified malice or evil intent.” Brown, 1996-
NMSC-078, 115, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69.
This concept further differentiates between
killings characterized by a “depraved mind”
versus less reprehensible killings. Id. (“Be-
cause the legislature has deemed that a kill-
ing performed with a depraved mind is an
especially serious homicide, deserving of pun-
ishment equal to that imposed for other
forms of first-degree murder, we conclude
that the legislature intended the offense of
depraved mind murder to encompass an in-
tensified malice or evil intent.”); see general-
ly Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce,
Criminal Law 60 (8d. ed. 1982) (identifying
the presence of “viciousness-an extreme in-
difference to the value of human life” as a
characteristic key to distinguishing uninten-
tional killings constituting murder versus
manslaughter).

Ill. ANALYSIS

A. THE DEPRAVED MIND JURY IN-
STRUCTION

Because the Depraved Mind Jury In-
struction Given at Trial Misstated the Law
and Misdirected the Jury, We Reverse De-
fendant’s Depraved Mind Conviction.

Hl {12} We first address Defendant’s
roundabout challenge to the jury instruction
provided at trial. In the midst of his argu-
ment regarding sufficiency of the evidence,

Defendant raises concerns over the definition

of the depraved mind act included in the
instruction. Among other things, Defendant
complains that “[t]he given jury instruction[ ]
did not clearly explain that to convict of first
degree depraved mind murder there must be
much more than simply establishing that
reckless conduct caused the death of a per-
son.” Defendant contends that the State
must prove, inter alia, that “the [depraved
mind] act showed a most extreme level of
recklessness.”

{13} In this case, to find Defendant guilty
of first degree murder, the jury was instruct-
ed that it must find:

1. The defendant drove his vehicle errati-

cally and recklessly for a long distance on

Roadrunner Parkway striking Andrea

Thomas [the jogger] and Sharon McNair

[the pedestrian];

2. The defendant's act caused the death

of Sharon McNair;

8. The act of the defendant was greatly

dangerous to the lives of others, indicating

a depraved mind without regard for human

life;

4, The defendant knew that his act was

greatly dangerous to the lives of others;

5, This happened in New Mexico on or

about the 21st day of December, 2005.

HMMs {14} Defendant's challenge focuses
on the instruction’s first paragraph, which
defines Defendant’s alleged depraved mind
act. During the trial, Defendant submitted
an alternate instruction to the trial court
proposing different language for that para-
graph, namely: “The defendant drove his
vehicle in an extremely reckless manner.”
The trial court rejected Defendant’s prof-
fered instruction, electing to omit the “ex-
tremely” modifier and instead incorporate a
more extensive description of the act without
any adverb preceding “recklessly.” Because
Defendant preserved the issue by offering an
alternate instruction, we review Defendant’s
claim for reversible error. State v. Ellis,
2008-NMSC-032, 114, 144 N.M. 253, 186
P.8d 245 (“When, as in this case, a challenge
to the jury instructions has been preserved,
we review for reversible error.”). “A jury
instruction which does not instruct the jury

116

upon all questions of law essential for a
conviction of any crime submitted to the jury
is reversible error.” State v. Parish, 118
N.M. 39, 44, 878 P.2d 988, 998 (1994).

{15} We conclude that the trial court’s
failure to clarify the extent of the reckless-
ness required to find a depraved mind consti-
tutes error. We have consistently held that
“mere ... recklessness” is not enough.
Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, 123, 188 N.M. 365,
120 P.8d 447. See, eg., id. 124 (“Depraved
mind murder, therefore, requires outra-
geously reckless conduct....”); Brown,
1996-NMSC-073, 115, 122 N.M. 724, 931
P.2d 69; State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 368,
107 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Ct.App.1985). In Reed,
we even exhorted the UJI Criminal Commit-
tee to amend the instruction to help juries
better “understand the function of the phrase
‘depraved mind.’ ” 2005-NMSC-031, 146, 138
N.M. 365, 120 P.8d 447. In 2009, this result-
ed in a fleshed-out standard whereby only
“outrageously reckless conduct” resulting in
death rises to the level of a depraved mind.
UJI 14-203 NMRA. The additional 2009 lan-
guage follows.

A person acts with a depraved mind by
intentionally engaging in outrageously
reckless conduct with a depraved kind of
wantonness or total indifference for the
value of human life. Mere negligence or
recklessness is not enough. In addition,
the defendant must have a corrupt, per-
verted, or malicious state of mind, such as
when a person acts with ill will, hatred,
spite, or evil intent.

Id. While this new language was not in
effect at the time of Defendant’s trial, Reed
was published more than a year and a half
earlier, putting the court and litigants on
notice that “mere recklessness” was not an
adequate standard.

{16} In our only prior opinion to address
depraved mind murder in the context of a
homicide caused by an automobile driver,
published years before Reed, we similarly
stated that “[dlepraved mind murder re-
quires extremely reckless conduct evidencing
2. Our holdings requiring a finding of extreme

recklessness are reflected in the 2009 amend-

ments to the depraved mind uniform jury in-
struction. UJI 14-203 NMRA. Under the in-

indifference for the value of human life.”
Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278, 694
P.2d at 9262 Therefore, at the time of De-
fendant’s trial in April 2007, the omission of
the term “extremely” misstated the law to
the jury.

HH s{17} However, the trial court’s er-
tor does not warrant reversal unless the
erroneous instruction “misdirected” or “con-
fused” jurors. State v. Benally, 2001-
NMSC-038, 1112, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134
(internal quotation marks omitted). We con-
clude that it did. When a jury instruction is
facially erroneous, as when it directs the jury
to find guilt based upon a misstatement of
the law, a finding of juror misdirection is
unavoidable. See Parish, 118 N.M. at 41,
878 P.2d at 990. Because no modifier for the
term “recklessness” was included in the giv-
en instruction, “we have no way of knowing
... whether the conviction was or was not on
the basis” that the act was “extremely” reck-
less. State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 663,
808 P.2d 624, 633 (1991). As a result, we are
left with no alternative but to reverse the
depraved mind conviction. See Parish, 118
N.M. at 41, 878 P.2d at 990 (“if an instruction
is facially erroneous it presents an incurable
problem and mandates reversal”).

B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Hs({18} Having determined that the
defective jury instruction mandates reversal,
we now consider Defendant’s sufficiency of
the evidence claim. We undertake this inqui-
ry to ascertain whether double jeopardy pro-
tections are implicated by retrying Defen-
dant. See State v. Mascarenas, 2000-
NMSC-017, 131, 129 N.M. 230, 4 P.3d 1221.
If we find that sufficient evidence was pre-
sented at trial to support a conviction, then
retrial is not barred. Rosaire, 1996-NMCA~
115, 120, 123 N.M. 250, 989 P.2d 597. We
review Defendant’s claim under the errone-
ous instruction provided to the jury at trial.
Id.

{19} Defendant argues that his conduct.
simply did not meet the standard of first

struction, a person “acts with a depraved mind

by intentionally engaging in outrageously reck-
Jess conduct ” Td:

degree depraved mind murder. In particu-
lar, Defendant contends that he lacked the
required subjective knowledge of the danger-
ousness of his conduct to support a depraved
mind murder conviction. We focus primarily
on that element and consider it first, but we
also analyze whether more than one person
was endangered by Defendant’s conduct and
whether Defendant demonstrated “a de-
praved mind without regard for human life.”

Hs ({20} We review sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal from a highly deferential
standpoint. The Court must determine
“whether substantial evidence of either a di-
rect or circumstantial nature exists to sup-
port a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt with respect to every element essential
to a conviction.” State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M.
126, 181, 758 P.2d 1314, 1819 (1988); Reed,
2005-NMSC-031, 114, 188 N.M. 365, 120
P.8d 447. The evidence is to be viewed in
the light most favorable to the State, resolv-
ing all conflicts and making all permissible
inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. Sut-
phin, 107 N.M. at 181, 753 P.2d at 1319. It
is our duty to determine whether any ration-
al jury could have found the essential facts to
establish each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Garcia, 114 N.M. at 274,
837 P.2d at 867. Thus, the Court must scru-
tinize the evidence and review the jury’s fact-
finding function to ensure that a rational jury
could have found the facts required for each
element of the conviction beyond a reason-
able doubt. Id.; State v. Orgain, 115 N.M.
123, 126, 847 P.2d 1877, 1380 (Ct.App.1993)
([O]ur review involves a two-step process:
deference to the resolution of factual conflicts
and inferences derived therefrom, and a legal
determination of whether the evidence
viewed in this manner could support the
conviction.”).

1. Sufficient Evidence Supports the
Jury’s Finding that Defendant Pos-
sessed Subjective Knowledge that
His Conduct Was “Greatly Danger-
ous to the Lives of Others.”

Hs {21} The mens rea standard is of
paramount consideration in depraved mind
murder analysis. Brown, 1996-NMSC-073,
15, 122 N.M. 724, 981 P.2d 69 (“[T]he dif-

117

ference in culpable mental states [between
depraved mind murder and lesser uninten-
tional homicides) is crucial in justifying the
more serious penal consequences of first-
degree murder.”). Because depraved mind
murder is.unintentional, demonstrating the
requisite mental state serves to establish that
the defendant's underlying dangerous con-
duct was intentional and that his behavior
exposed victims to mortal danger. Only a
defendant who acts with such conscious dis-
regard for the welfare of others warrants a
depraved mind murder conviction. Thus,
subjective knowledge of the risk introduced
by the defendant “serves as proof that the
defendant acted with a ‘depraved mind’ ...
with utter disregard for human life,” thereby
justifying imposition of a first degree murder
conviction. Id. 116.

{22} We have observed that a defendant
will rarely concede subjective knowledge of
the danger his conduct posed to others.
McCrary, 100 N.M. at 678, 675 P.2d at 122
(“{T]he element of intent is seldom suscepti-
ble to direct proof and accordingly may be
proved by circumstantial evidence.”). As a
result, it is often the jury’s task to glean
subjective knowledge from the circumstances
of the defendant’s act. Id. As we have stated
previously, the jury must determine “what
the defendant should realize to be the degree
of risk, in the light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances which [the defendant] knows.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In many instances where a de-
praved mind murder charge is viable, this
inquiry will be reasonably straightforward,
such as acts of terrorism or drive-by shoot-
ings. See Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, 131, 138
N.M. 365, 120 P.8d 447; see also Johnson,
108 N.M. at 368, 707 P.2d at 1178; 2 LaFave,
supra, § 14.4(a) at 440-41. It is only under
unusual circumstances, such as where the
defendant’s conduct and circumstances give
rise to multiple viable inferences or the de-
fendant is mentally impaired, that determin-
ing his or her awareness becomes difficult.
See, e.9., Brown, 1996-NMSC-078, 135, 122
N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69 (“We hold that, when
the crime charged is depraved mind murder,
evidence of intoxication may be taken into
consideration by the jury when determining
the existence of the required mens rea of

118

‘subjective knowledge.’”); see generally 2
LaFave, supra, § 14.4(b) at 443 (“No doubt
most depraved-heart murder cases do not
require a determination of the issue of
whether the defendant was aware of the risk
entailed by his conduct; his conduct was very
risky and he himself was reasonable enough
to know it to be so.”).

{23} When the defendant disputes the
presence of subjective knowledge, New Mexi-
co jurisprudence demonstrates that such
knowledge may only be inferred from “sub-
stantial” evidence. See Reed, 2005-NMSC-
081, 135, 188 N.M. 365, 120 P.38d 447. Such
indicia of subjective knowledge has often
come in the form of a defendant’s actions,
In McCrary, for example, the defendants
claimed that their late-night shooting spree
to avenge their grudge against carnival oper-
ators was only intended to puncture the tires
of the carnival’s vehicles. 100 N.M. at 673,
675 P.2d at 122, However, indisputable
physical evidence revealed that every shot
the defendants fired was directed at the pas-
senger compartments of the carnival’s vehi-
cles, which permitted the jury to disregard
their contradictory testimony and rationally
infer depraved mind conduct. Jd.

{24} We have also permitted an inference
of subjective knowledge where a defendant’s
depraved mind act arises out of personal
animus. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, 134, 188
N.M. 365, 120 P.8d 447. New Mexico is not
alone in relying on some indicia of animosity
on a defendant’s part to establish the pres-
ence of a depraved mind. In at least one
other jurisdiction, for example, a jury must
find that the defendant harbored “ill will,
hatred, spite or an evil intent toward or
directed at his eventual victim” to sustain a
depraved mind conviction. Hicks v. State, 41
So0.3d 327, 880 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2010) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted);
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 98. Our reli-
ance on the animosity factor is illustrated by
cases such as McCrary, State v. Trujillo,
2002-NMSC-005, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.8d 814,
and State v. Sena, 99 N.M. 272, 657 P.2d 128
(1983). In McCrary, a defendant’s animosity
arose from a slight he perceived at the hands
of carnival concessionaires. The defendant
in question even admitted that his shooting

spree constituted an act of revenge. 100
N.M. at 672, 678, 675 P.2d at 121, 122. In
Trujillo, the defendant and his fellow gang
members fired shots into a group of rival
gang members after the two groups engaged
in an argument. 2002-NMSC-005, 13, 131
N.M. 709, 42 P.8d 814. In Sena, the defen-
dant fired into a crowded bar after being
maced and ejected from the bar by the door-
man. 99 N.M. at 278, 657 P.2d at 129. In all
of these instances, the jury had access to
straightforward evidence of the defendant’s
animosity to support a finding of subjective
knowledge.

{25} A unifying characteristic among these
three New Mexico cases is the presence of a
basis beyond the depraved act itself that
lends substantial support to infer the pres-
ence of subjective knowledge. In each in-
stance, the jury could rely upon some direct
indicia of subjective knowledge that con-
firmed the defendant’s personal desire to
undertake acts that gave rise to dangerous
circumstances. In such situations, it is evi-
dent that the very design of the defendant’s
conduct is to frighten or injure someone by
exposing others to dangerous acts, thereby
permitting a clear inference of subjective
knowledge.

{26} No such external basis for subjective
knowledge exists in this case. Defendant
never made any statement regarding his ac-
tions that was presented at trial and he did
not testify. In addition, little persuasive evi-
dence was proffered to support a conclusion
that Defendant’s conduct arose out of person-
al animus. To the contrary, the testimony
adduced at trial portrayed a defendant who
demonstrated little in the way of any angry
or hostile emotions before, during, or after
the events at issue in these proceedings.
Defendant's father, who housed and em-
ployed Defendant, spent the entire morning
with him and blandly observed that Defen-
dant was “fine ... maybe a little tired” and
had performed his normal duties at the shop,
assisting with brake jobs and oil changes.
Likewise, when apprehended by law enforce-
ment, an officer testified that Defendant
didn’t display “any emotion ... at all.” Sev-
eral hours after Defendant’s arrest, one offi-
cer observed that Defendant “could not sit

still, couldn’t stop moving, as if [his behavior]
was uncontrolled.” However, even this odd
behavior does not indicate the presence of
any animosity or otherwise show Defendant’s
state of mind during the commission of the
act that gives rise to the depraved mind
charge.

HN {27} Because there are no external
indicia of Defendant’s subjective knowledge,
we are left to scrutinize the circumstances of
his alleged depraved mind conduct to ascer-
tain whether there is substantial evidence to
infer that Defendant knew his act was great-
ly dangerous to the lives of others. While
circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a
finding of subjective knowledge, we are still
reluctant to find depraved mind murder
when that evidence is limited to the depraved
mind act alone. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031,
148, 188 N.M. 365, 120 P.3d 447. Our deci-
sion in Reed illustrates this principle: in that
case, the defendant was indicted on a de-
praved mind murder charge after inexplica-
bly pointing his revolver at a friend, squeez-
ing the trigger, and killing the friend with a
single shot, Jd, 116-7. The defendant testi-
fied that he had loaded a single bullet into
the revolver, believing it was positioned not
to discharge. Id. 16. We concluded that the
circumstances did not “lend themselves to
one obvious conclusion” that the defendant,
was subjectively aware that he “was taking a
grave risk with respect to everyone in the
living room.” Jd. 132. Because the defen-
dant harbored no animosity against the vic-
tim or any other occupant of the room, no
direct testimony supported an intentional act,
and the evidence was insubstantial, the State
failed to establish the presence of a depraved
mind, Id, 1133-35.

{28} The circumstances in this case repre-
sent a marked contrast to those that trig-
gered the concerns we expressed in Reed.
Unlike Reed, Defendant’s conduct does not
appear to be an inexplicable and momentary
act of homicidal misfortune. In Reed, the
defendant fired a single gunshot in a mo-
ment’s time, unhinged from any apparent
explanation. Jd. 16; Brown, 1996-NMSC-
078, 17, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69. As we
explained in Reed, the cireumstances did not
give rise to the “obvious conclusion” that

119

defendant was aware his actions were “a
grave risk” to the lives of others. 2005-
NMSC-081, 1132, 188 N.M. 365, 120 P.3d 447.

{29} In this case, Defendant perpetrated a
sustained course of conduct from which a
reasonable jury could infer that he possessed
the requisite subjective knowledge to demon-
strate the presence of a depraved mind. The
jury was exposed to a parade of witnesses
who testified consistently—and largely un-
contradicted—to the wanton and reckless
character of Defendant's conduct. Even
though Defendant displayed little in the way
of hostile emotion in the aftermath of his
actions, the prolonged and reckless character
of his driving spree stands in marked con-
trast to the instantaneous killing perpetrated
by the defendant in Reed. Defendant had
many opportunities to abandon his conduct,
including following his collision with the jog-
ger and after killing the pedestrian, yet he
chose to continue until his truck was no
longer functional. There was substantial evi-
dence for the jury to infer that Defendant
acted with subjective knowledge that his act
was greatly dangerous to the lives of others.

{30} Of particular relevance was the testi-
mony that Defendant deliberately struck the
jogger. Two witnesses testified that Defen-
dant intentionally collided with the jogger,
leading the jury to convict Defendant of ag-
gravated battery with a deadly weapon. In
order to convict for aggravated battery, a
jury must find an “application of force” with
the specific “intent to injure.” Section 30-3-
5(A). For the jury to conclude that Defen-
dant’s conduct indicated an intent to injure
the jogger by hitting her with the truck, it
was necessary to conclude that Defendant
was aware of the potentially injurious nature
of such a collision. In other words, Defen-
dant could not have committed aggravated
battery—a conviction not contested in this
appeal—without comprehending the danger
inherent in his behavior. See State v. Wynn,
2001-NMCA-020, 114, 180 N.M. 381, 24 P.38d
816 (holding that to prove aggravated bat-
tery, the State must prove that the defendant
“subjectively intended the consequences of
application of force to the victim and injury
to the victim from that application of force”).

120

{31} Defendant contends that his mindset
during the collision with the jogger has no
bearing on his mens rea during the “separate
and distinct” act of killing the pedestrian.
Therefore, Defendant argues that the aggra-
vated battery against the jogger “did nothing
to establish” that Defendant possessed sub-
jective knowledge of the dangerous character
of his conduct when he struck the pedestrian
approximately one minute later. Because his
driving actions were part of an uninterrupted
course of consistent conduct, it is not reason-
able to conclude that Defendant did not real-
ize that his conduct was dangerous after his
collision with the jogger. It was reasonable
for the jury to infer that Defendant knew his
conduct was dangerous to the lives of others
as he continued his reckless driving down the
road after his initial collision with a jogger.

{32} The jury also heard substantial testi-
mony regarding an alternate basis to infer
Defendant’s subjective knowledge on a fact
he conceded: his repeated avoidance of other
motorists along the road. As the State ar-
gues, a motorist who takes great pains to
avoid collisions with other vehicles arguably
displays an understanding of the conse-
quences of a collision. Such conduct betrays
comprehension that a collision involves dan-
ger—danger that imperils the operators of
the vehicles and any nearby pedestrians,
such as the pedestrian he struck. See, e.g,
People v. Murray, 225 Cal.App.3d 734, 275
Cal.Rptr. 498, 506 (1990) Gury could infer
that defendant was actually “aware” of the
dangerousness posed by his reckless driving
where he actively avoided collisions with oth-
er motorists); People v. McCarnes, 179 Cal.
App.3d 525, 224 Cal.Rptr. 846, 852 (1986)
(court held that defendant was aware of the
danger for others posed by his “reckless,
high-speed passing maneuvers on two-lane
roads, involving repeated and deliberate driv-
ing into oncoming traffic, and culminating in
a head-on collision”); McKinley v. State, 945
A2d 1158, 1164 (Del.2008) (court observed
that defendant’s “attempt to reduce his speed
{when crossing traffic intersections} demon-
strates that he perceived the risk” of his
extremely reckless driving).

{33} The jury was presented with substan-
tial testimony to establish Defendant’s active

avoidance of other motorists. One witness
testified that when Defendant encountered a
sport utility vehicle and a cement truck occu-
pying both lanes of traffic so that he could
not pass them in the traffic lanes, he veered
onto the dirt median and sped past the vehi-
cles there. Moments later, Defendant exe-
cuted another risky maneuver to avoid a
different motorist. This time, he was travel-
ing the wrong way in the northbound lanes
after he hit the pedestrian when he skidded
onto the median, narrowly avoiding an on-
coming motorist, and instead collided with a
boulder on the median. These deliberate
efforts to avoid collisions provided the jury
with a straightforward and rational basis to
infer Defendant’s subjective knowledge of
the dangerousness of his conduct.

{34} Defendant argues that his conduct
may give rise to alternative viable inferences
that do not suggest subjective knowledge,
such as the simple desire to flee the scene of
the collision with the jogger. However, our
role is not to choose between competing via-
ble inferences. Rather, we investigate the
record to ascertain whether the jury was ina
position to make the inferences that support
its verdict. See Sutphin, 107 N.M. at 181,
753 P.2d at 1319. Our scrutiny of the record
reveals that a jury could rationally conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant
“knew that his act was greatly dangerous to
the lives of others.” UJI 14-203.

2. Sufficient Evidence Supports a Jury
Finding that Defendant’s Act Was
Greatly Dangerous to the Life of
More than One Person.

HE {35} We next address Defendant's
multiplicity argument, that his act was not
“greatly dangerous” to more than one per-
son. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, 122, 188 N.M.
365, 120 P.3d 447 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Defendant concedes
that his conduct endangered the pedestrian,
but that the collision with the jogger was a
separate act and was improperly cumulated
to satisfy the multiplicity requirement of de-
praved mind murder. Defendant also con-
tends that none of the motorists he encoun-
tered along the road were endangered, and
therefore they cannot serve as a basis to

conclude that his act was “greatly dangerous
to the lives of others.” Section 30-2-1(A)(8).
We reject both arguments.

{36} New Mexico law defines “depraved
mind murder” as “any act greatly dangerous
to the lives of others, indicating a depraved
mind regardless of human life.” Jd. (empha-
sis added). Thus, we require that “more
than one person” be endangered by the de-
fendant’s reckless conduct to establish de-
praved mind murder. DeSantos, 89 N.M. at
461, 558 P.2d at 1268. This requirement is
consistent with the unintentional yet wanton
nature of the depraved mind act, namely that
depraved mind murder “has been limited to
reckless acts in disregard of human life in
general as opposed to the deliberate inten-
tion to kill one particular person.” Jd. This
expression of “universal malice” underscores
our multiplicity requirement. See id.

{87} Based upon this Court’s previous de-
terminations of the term “act” in Section 30-
2-1(A)(8), we find no basis to conclude that
the collisions with the jogger and the pedes-
trian should be considered separate incidents
or acts and not cumulated to satisfy the
multiplicity standard. In State v. Hernan-
dez, we considered the point at which a de-
praved mind act is completed, and thus,
when a defendant ceases to imperil others
through his or her depraved mind conduct.
117 N.M. 497, 499, 873 P.2d 248, 245 (1994),
In Hernandez, the defendant fired several
gun shots at acquaintances visiting his home
who had “interfer[ed] in his personal affairs.”
Id. at 498, 873 P.2d at 244. The defendant.
initially fired the shots in his backyard, then
proceeded to fire additional shots, pursuing
the acquaintances as they fled. Jd. None of
the shots fired by the defendant during this
episode struck any of his targets. Id. The
defendant then stopped shooting and began
to walk back to his house. At this point two
of the men at whom the defendant had been
shooting tackled the defendant and attempt-
ed to retrieve the gun. In the course of that
struggle, one of the men was killed. At trial,
the jury convicted the defendant of depraved
mind murder. Id.

{38} We overturned the conviction in Her-
nandez because the depraved mind act had
ceased when the victim was killed. While we

121

conceded that the initial shooting spree could
constitute a depraved mind act, once the
defendant abandoned the “depraved” conduct
and began to return home, he was no longer
engaged in an act exhibiting a depraved
mind. Id. at 499, 873 P.2d at 245. We held
that the shooting spree and the struggle to
disarm the defendant were “distinguishable
and separate” acts. Id. The defendant’s re-
treat indicated a change in his state of
mind—an alteration of intent that evidenced
an abandonment of the depraved mind con-
duct. Id.

{39} In the instant matter, Defendant’s
conduct showed neither a departure nor
abandonment of the act giving rise to the
depraved mind allegation. To the contrary,
the record is clear that his conduct continued
unabated from the time he struck the jogger
until his truck stopped after colliding with
the boulder on the median. Unlike the de-
fendant in Hernandez, Defendant neither
abandoned nor retreated from the course of
conduct that gave rise to the extreme danger
that resulted in the two pedestrian collisions.
The record makes clear that Defendants er-
ratic driving for nearly a mile constituted a
single, uninterrupted act. Therefore, a ra-
tional jury could have properly cumulated
the two pedestrian collisions to establish be-
yond a reasonable doubt that Defendant’s act
was “greatly dangerous” to more than one
person.

{40} Even if we were to accept Defen-
dant’s view that the two collisions constituted
separate acts under Section 30-2-1(A)(8),
there is sufficient evidence that Defendant's
conduct was “greatly dangerous” to at least
one motorist he encountered on Roadrunner
Parkway. At trial, a witness testified that
she was driving northbound on Roadrunner
Parkway when Defendant’s truck came di-
rectly toward her, traveling in the wrong
direction in the northbound lanes. Before
the two vehicles could collide, Defendant
veered onto the median and crashed into a
boulder, bringing his truck to a stop. The
witness testified that Defendant was within
30 feet of her car before he veered onto the
median and she feared they would collide. It
was rational for the jury to conclude that
Defendant’s conduct was greatly dangerous

122

to this witness, thereby including her under
the multiplicity requirement.

{41} Moreover, the circumstances of this
case do not implicate the policy concerns that
underscore the multiplicity requirement. As
we have noted previously, the multiplicity
requirement serves to preclude depraved
mind convictions where the defendant’s con-
duct is directed at one “particular person”
and no others are endangered. DeSantos, 89
N.M. at 461, 558 P.2d at 1268. In such
instances, application of depraved mind mur-
der would serve as an inappropriate “fall-
back” remedy in lieu of proving intentional
murder. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, 125, 138
N.M. 365, 120 P.3d 447. The concerns in
Reed are not implicated where the defen-
dant’s act, as here, is not directed at any one
particular individual. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we reject Defendant’s claim that his
conduct was not “greatly dangerous” to more
than one person.

8. Sufficient Evidence Supports the
Finding that Defendant’s Conduct
“Indicat[ed] a Depraved Mind With-
out Regard for Human Life.”

HM {42} The record is replete with eye-
witness accounts of Defendant’s recklessness
and apparent disregard for the lives of his
fellow citizens that permitted the jury to find
the presence of “a depraved mind without
regard for human life.” From the outset of
the trial testimony, evidence was presented
enabling the jury to infer that Defendant
harbored no concern for the well-being of
either pedestrians or his fellow motorists.
While witnesses conveyed that Defendant's
intentional collision with the jogger was a
horrifying event, Defendant’s conduct imme-
diately subsequent to that collision—driving
recklessly and almost immediately striking
another pedestrian—gives rise to the de-
praved mind charge that warranted the
jury’s conclusion that his conduct met the
high standard for a depraved mind. In fact,
witness testimony indicated that Defendant’s
recklessness seemed to crescendo in the mo-
ments after the initial collision with the jog-
ger. Defendant made no effort to stop and
tend to the jogger, and instead fled the
scene. During his flight, Defendant’s speed

“probably” approached 80 miles per hour,
prompting Defendant to recklessly maneuver
around other motorists in his path as he
negotiated the midday traffic. His driving
spree only ended when his truck would no
longer function after cresting a blind rise,
striking the fatally injured pedestrian, re-
entering the northbound lanes going the
wrong way, veering onto the median to avoid
an oncoming car, and colliding with a large
landscaping boulder. A police officer testi-
fied that physical evidence at the scene was
consistent with the conclusion that Defendant
did not brake before he hit his second victim.
After his truck crashed, Defendant ran from
the scene, again neglecting to check on his
second victim,

{43} Of particular poignance is Defen-
dant’s reaction to the collisions with his two
victims. After striking the jogger, an act
adjudged intentional and knowing by the
jury, Defendant not only failed to stop, but
rather the reckless character of his conduct
appeared to increase. Witnesses testified
that he drove at speeds more than double the
posted limit, recklessly avoided all obstacles
in his path, and only stopped when his truck
was no longer mobile. After hitting the pe-
destrian with adequate force to jar her brain
from her skull, Defendant demonstrated no
apparent concern for her well-being. In-
stead, he ran from the scene into a suburban
neighborhood where he asked a resident for
a ride to Wal-Mart.

{44} Our view that the “[dislvegard for
human life” required to establish a depraved
mind can be inferred from such reckless
driving finds support in jurisdictions outside
New Mexico. See, eg. People v. Gomez, 65
N.Y.2d 9, 489 N.Y.S.2d 156, 478 N.E.2d 759,
761 (1985) (court found “indifference to hu-
man life” where the defendant drove at high
rates of speed on busy Manhattan city
streets, collided with other motorists, wove
from lane to lane, and then drove onto the
sidewalk, striking and killing two children
riding bicycles); People v. Moore, 187 Cal.
App.4th 937, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 540, 543 (2010)
(defendant “acted with wanton disregard of
the near certainty that someone would be
killed” where defendant “drove 70 miles per
hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone, crossed

into the opposing traffic lane, caused oncom-
ing drivers to avoid him, ran a red light and
struck a car in the intersection without even
attempting to apply his brakes”); State v.
Mouzon, 281 S.C, 655, 99 S.E.2d 672, 675
(1957) (where a highly intoxicated driver
drove 70-80 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-
hour zone, killing a pedestrian, and made no
effort to avoid the accident, the court con-
cluded “there is evidence of such reckless-
ness and wantonness as to indicate a depravi-
ty of mind and disregard of human life”);
McKinley, 945 A.2d at 1159-60 (court con-
cluded there was sufficient evidence that de-
fendant’s conduct constituted “ ‘cruel, wicked
and depraved indifference to human life’”
where he drove at speeds between 88 and 98
miles per hour, fled police pursuit, failed to
stop at multiple stop signs and red lights,
drove down the wrong side of the road and
onto the shoulder to pass other motorists,
and ultimately collided with and killed anoth-
er motorist). Of course, it is important to
bear in mind that all of these jurisdictions
classify depraved mind murder in the second
degree.

{45} Defendant also argues that the inten-
tional driving spree by itself is inadequate to
establish Defendant's depraved mind. This
argument misconstrues the law of depraved
mind murder in New Mexico. While we have
emphasized the value of some external indi-
cia of a defendant’s depravity, such as per-
sonal animus, the absence of such factors
does not preclude the finding of a depraved
mind. As we explained in Reed, it is only
when “the circumstances alone do not mani-
fest a depraved indifference to human life”
that “there must be some circumstances
showing malevolence or indifference other
than the doing of [the depraved mind] act.”
2005-NMSC-031, 143, 188 N.M. 365, 120
P.8d 447. As we have discussed, the jury in
this case had access to substantial evidence
from the circumstances of the depraved mind
act alone to support the inference that De-
fendant harbored “a depraved mind without
regard for human life.” UJI 14-203.

{46} Finally, Defendant argues that his
actions fall well short of the circumstances of
Omar-Muhammad, the only other case
where we determined that sufficient evidence

123

existed for a jury to conclude that a motorist
possessed a “depraved mind.” 102 N.M. at.
274, 694 P.2d at 922. However, because the
circumstances of Omar-Muhammad were
markedly different from this matter, nothing
in that case precludes our conclusions here.
Omar-Mukammad involved a clear-cut fac-
tual scenario where the defendant conceded
that he acted intentionally in his attempts to
collide with police officers during a high-
speed police pursuit. Id. at 276, 694 P.2d at
924, His expressions of personal animosity
and admission of subjective knowledge pro-
vided direct proof that did not require the
more intensive review mandated by the cir-
cumstances in this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

{47} For the foregoing reasons, Defen-
dant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails
and there is no bar to retrying him on the
depraved mind murder charge. Therefore,
we remand for a new trial consistent with
this Opinion, including the use of the revised
UJI 14-208.

{48} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES and
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices.

2011-NMSC-017
257 P.3d 943

William K. SUMMERS, M.D.,
Plaintiff—-Respondent,

v.

ARDENT HEALTH SERVICES, L.L.C.,
and Lovelace Health System, Inc.,
Defendants-Petitioners.

No. 32,202.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
April 12, 2011.
Rehearing Denied May 9, 2011.

ami

126

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
P.A, Jocelyn C. Drennan, Edward Ricco,
Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioners.

Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C., Emily A.
Franke, Neil R. Blake, Albuquerque, NM,
for Respondent.

Bannerman & Johnson, P.A. David C.
Johnson, Deborah E. Mann, Albuquerque,
NM, for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Hospital
Association.

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} Defendants Ardent Health Services,
L.L.C. and Lovelace Health Systems, Inc.
terminated the medical privileges of Plaintiff
William K. Summers, M.D. following a for-
mal professional review. Plaintiff subse-
quently filed a lawsuit for damages. Defen-
dants moved for summary judgment under
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
(HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1986),
which provides immunity from damages for
participants of professional peer review ac-
tions if four requirements are satisfied. The
district court denied Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, and the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed. We granted certiorari to
consider whether the Court of Appeals prop-
erly construed the immunity provisions of the
HCQIA, and now reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Plaintiff held medical privileges at the
Lovelace Sandia Health System (hospital) to
practice psychiatry and internal medicine.
His affiliation with the hospital began in
1995. In May 2005, Plaintiffs medical privi-
leges were permanently suspended following
a multi-step review and appeal process per-
formed under the hospital’s internal bylaws,
which are designed to be consistent with the
HCQIA.

{3} The peer review process commenced in
2002, in response to a complaint by one of
Plaintiff's female patients (Patient A) that
Plaintiff used sexually explicit and offensive
language during a psychiatric consultation.

Defendants’ Medical Executive Committee
(MEC) appointed an ad hoe committee to
investigate Patient A’s complaint as well as
complaints that Plaintiff was selling memory
pills in violation of hospital policies. The ad
hoe committee conducted three meetings
over the course of a month; Plaintiff was
present at the second and third meetings and
was given an opportunity to respond to the
information presented about him. Plaintiff
admitted to the veracity of Patient A’s com-
plaints and to delivering memory pills to
patients. The ad hoc committee recom-
mended that Plaintiff be instructed to im-
prove his chart documentation and that
Plaintiff's admissions and consultations be
reviewed for a six-month period. The MEC
adopted these recommendations.

{4} In 2003, a second female patient (Pa-
tient B) complained that Plaintiff used sex-
ually explicit and inappropriate language
during a consultation. The incident was re-
ported by a caseworker who contacted Pa-
tient B after her discharge from the hospi-
tal. Following a request by the hospital’s
Chief Medical Officer, the MEC appointed
a second ad hoe committee to investigate
Patient B’s complaint and reports that
Plaintiff was discharging patients to the
nursing facility where he was the physician,
contrary to directives by the patients’ pri-
mary care physicians. In addition to re-
viewing Patient B’s medical file, the second
ad hoe committee reviewed the records of
eleven of Plaintiff's patients. The commit-
tee found “a relatively high incidence of
questionable medical decisions or treat-
ments rendered” by Plaintiff, and identified
seven problems specific to individual pa-
tients and three general problems. Plaintiff
was not interviewed by the second ad hoc
committee, contrary to the hospital's by-
Jaws. Based on the second ad hoe commit-
tee’s findings and recommendations, the
MEC suspended Plaintiff's internal medi-
cine privileges, placed Plaintiff's psychiatric
privileges on probation for two years, and
prohibited Plaintiff from discussing any sex-
ual issues with patients. The MEC report-
ed this action in an adverse action report to
the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB).

127

{5} Plaintiff appealed the MEC’s decision.
A two-day hearing was held in front of a
Professional Review Committee (PRC), com-
posed of medical practitioners “selected to
exclude any individuals in direct competition”
with Plaintiff, to determine if the MEC had
acted unreasonably or arbitrarily and capri-
ciously. Both the MEC and Plaintiff were
represented by counsel, and afforded the op-
portunity to call witnesses (the MEC called
four; Plaintiff testified on his own behalf)
and conduct cross-examination during the
hearing. Plaintiff again admitted to the con-
duct relating to Patient A, but-denied the
allegations of Patient B, arguing that neither
the story of Patient B nor the notes of the
caseworker were credible. Following the
hearing, both Plaintiff and the MEC submit-
ted written statements with requested find-
ings of facts and recommendations.

{6} The PRC concluded that some of the
specific issues raised by the ad hoc commit-
tee were unfounded, but credited testimony
by members of the committee that they re-
mained concerned with the general standard
of care provided by Plaintiff. Finding Plain-
tiffs use of explicit sexual language during
consultations with female patients to be “[olf
primary importance” and evidence of a pat-
tern of sexually inappropriate language with
female patients, the PRC recommended that
Plaintiff's internal medicine privileges remain
suspended and his psychiatric privileges be
suspended. The MEC unanimously adopted
the PRO’s recommendations.

{7} Plaintiff again appealed the MEC’s
decision, and a hearing was held before the
Board of Trustees Appellate Review Commit-
tee (ARC), composed of hospital executives.
Prior to the hearing, the ARC members were
provided with statements and exhibits from
Plaintiff and the MEC, both represented by
counsel; each party was permitted thirty
minutes for argument. After the hearing,
the ARC requested, with Plaintiff's consent,
that the PRC submit additional findings of
fact and clarify its issues of concern. The
PRC submitted a report stating that its con-
cerns were related to Plaintiffs “treatment,
of his female patients in all areas of his
practice.” The ARC ultimately recom-

mended that the Board of Trustees uphold

128

the permanent suspension of Plaintiff's privi-
Jeges. The Board of Trustees adopted the
ARC’s recommendation. A revised adverse
action report was submitted to the NPDB.

{8} Following the Board of Trustees’ sus-
pension of his privileges, Plaintiff filed suit
for damages in the Second Judicial District
Court, claiming defamation, breach of con-
tract, prima facie tort, and tortious interfer-
ence with prospective contracts. Plaintiff al-
leged that the investigations were retaliatory,
conducted as a result of his reporting ques-
tionable practices of Defendants’ hospital ad-
ministrators, and that the ad hoe committees
and the MEC failed to conduct investigations
into the allegations against Plaintiff before
suspending him. Defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment, asserting immunity
under the HCQIA! Plaintiff responded to
the motion for summary judgment and sub-
mitted an affidavit stating the Defendants
had proceeded in bad faith and were unrea-
sonable in the peer review process. After a
hearing on all four of the requirements for
HCQIA immunity, the district court denied
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
ruling that “[a] genuine issue of material fact
exists regarding the reasonableness of the
efforts taken by Defendant{s] to obtain the
facts of the matter during the professional
review action.” The district court’s order did
not address the other three immunity re-
quirements.

{9} The district court certified the order
denying summary judgment for interlocutory
appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals limited its review to the second
requirement of the HCQIA immunity stan-
dard. Summers v. Ardent Health Services,
L.L.C., 2010-NMCA-026, 111, 147 N.M. 506,
226 P.38d 20. Although the Court acknowl-
edged that the reasonableness of the fact-
finding process depended on the totality of
the circumstances, id. 114, it focused its
discussion on the fact-finding relating to Pa-
tient B, id. 115. The Court concluded that
the reliance by the peer reviewers on the
caseworker’s notes, particularly when Plain-
tiff disputed the content of those notes,

1. Defendants also raised the defense of immunity
under the New Mexico Review Organization Im-
munity Act (ROIA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41-9-1 to -7
(1979). The district court concluded that the

“raise[d] a question as to the reasonableness
of the peer reviewers’ efforts to find and
verify the facts supporting their action.” Jd.
116. Based on this conclusion, the Court of
Appeals upheld the district court’s denial of
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Id. 118.

IL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

HMM {10} Appellate review of orders
granting or denying summary judgment are
reviewed de novo. Romero v. Philip Morris
Inc., 2010-NMSC-035, 17, 148 N.M. 713, 242
P.3d 280. A motion for summary judgment
under Rule 1-056 NMRA is granted only
when there are no issues of material fact,
with the facts viewed in the light most favor-
able to the nonmoving party. Romero, 2010-
NMSC-035, 17, 148 N.M. 718, 242 P.3d 280,
The movant has the burden of producing
“such evidence as is sufficient in law to raise
a presumption of fact or establish the fact in
question unless rebutted.” Jd. 110 Gnternal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The
nonmoving party then must “demonstrate
the existence of specific evidentiary facts
which would require trial on the merits.” Id.
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). In addition to being specific, these
facts must be material to the dispute, and the
applicable substantive law determines wheth-
er a fact is material. Id. 111 (using federal
antitrust law as the “filter” through which
the state summary judgment standard is ap-
plied).

HMB {11} The burden-shifting provision
of HCQIA immunity provides a twist on the
typical summary judgment standard. “The
HCQIA creates a rebuttable presumption in
favor of immunity, and the plaintiff has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the peer review process was
not reasonable.” N. Colo. Med. Ctr, Inc. v.
Nicholas, 27 P.38d 828, 838 (Colo.2001) (en
bane); accord Bryan v. James E. Holmes
Regi Med. Ctr, 33 F.3d 1818, 1883 (11th

HCQIA was determinative of Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment and thus did not address
the application of the ROIA,

Cir.1994), Immunity should be granted un-
less the district court can answer the follow-
ing question in the affirmative: “Might a
reasonable jury, viewing the facts in the best
light for [the plaintiff], conclude that [the
plaintiff] has shown, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the defendants’ actions are
outside the scope of § 11112(a)?” Bryan, 33
F.3d at 1833-34 (first alteration in original)
(quoting Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728,
784 (9th Cir.1992))?

Hs {12} Whether a professional review
action was taken after a reasonable effort to
obtain the facts is determined by a review of
the totality of the cireumstances. Brader v.
Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 882, 841 (38d
Cir.1999). Courts do not reweigh the evi-
dence considered during the professional re-
view process. Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1837. The
HCQIA “does not require that the profes-
sional review result is an actual improvement
of the quality of health care, nor does it
require that the conclusions reached by the
reviewers were in fact correct.... [T]he
good or bad faith of the reviewers is irrele-
vant.” Poliner v. Tex. Health Sys., 587 F.3d
368, 878 (6th Cir.2008) (internal quotation
marks and footnotes omitted). The role of
the appellate court is to consider whether the
professional review action was objectively
wreasonable. Id. at 379-80 (“Our sister cir-
cuits have roundly rejected the argument
that ... subjective motivations overcome
HCQIA immunity, as do we.” (footnote omit-
ted)).

B. HCQIA Immunity Applies When the
Fact-Finding Process is Objectively
Reasonable.

HH s{18} While this Opinion marks
the first opportunity this Court has had to
consider the immunity provisions of the

2. For an interesting discussion of the role of the
jury in deciding whether immunity under the
HCQIA is proper in a given case, a question we
need not address in this Opinion, see Bryan, 33
F.3d at 1332-33, and Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 33, 36 (Ist
Cir.2002).

3. We note that Plaintiff filed suit for damages
only, though the HCQIA does not provide im-
munity from suits for injunctive or declaratory
relief, See Poliner, 537 F.3d at 381 ("The im-

129

HCQIA, we previously have discussed the
policy of utilizing professional peer review
actions to assure quality health care. In
Southwest Community Health Services v.
Smith, we described the ROIA as “pro-
mot{ing] the improvement of health care in
New Mexico.” 107 N.M. 196, 198, 755 P.2d
40, 42 (1988). “[The ROIA] recognizes that
candor and objectivity in the critical evalua-
tion of medical professionals by medical pro-
fessionals is necessary for the efficacy of the
review process.” Jd. Likewise, the goal of
the HCQIA immunity provision is to promote
professional peer review to prevent the prac-
tice of medicine by incompetent medical pro-
fessionals. 42 U.S.C. § 111012). The
HCQIA provides immunity from damages,
the threat of which “unreasonably discourag-
es physicians from participating in effective
professional peer review.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 11101(4)3 Any consideration of the immu-
nity provided by the HCQIA, therefore, must
be conducted in light of the goal of promoting
physician participation in professional peer
review activities.

HM {14} Immunity applies when a pro-
fessional review action, as defined at 42
US.C. § 11151(9), is taken in compliance
with the standards of Section 11112(a):

(1) in the reasonable belief that the action

was in the furtherance of quality health

care,

(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the

facts of the matter,

(8) after adequate notice and hearing pro-

cedures are afforded to the physician in-

volved or after such other procedures as
are fair to the physician under the circum-
stances, and

(4) in the reasonable belief that the action

was warranted by the facts known after

munity from money damages may work harsh
outcomes in certain circumstances, but that re-
sults from Congress’ decision that the system-
wide benefit of robust peer review in rooting out
incompetent physicians, protecting patients, and
preventing malpractice outweighs those occa-
sional harsh results; that giving physicians ac-
cess to the courts to assure procedural protec-
tions while denying a remedy of money damages
strikes the balance of remedies essential to Con-
gress’ objective of vigorous peer review.”).

130

such reasonable effort to obtain facts and
after meeting the requirement of para-
graph (3).

The statute presumes compliance, and thus
immunity, unless “the presumption is rebut-
ted by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
At issue in this appeal is the second of the
immunity requirements, whether Defendants
permanently suspended Plaintiff's internal
medicine and psychiatry privileges “after a
reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the
matter.” 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)@). In order
to rebut the presumption of reasonableness,
Plaintiff must produce evidence showing that
the fact-finding process conducted by Defen-
dants was not objectively reasonable. See
Potiner, 587 F.3d at 879-80.

MMM {15} Under the HCQIA, a physi-
cian is entitled only to a reasonable investiga-
tion. See Poliner, 587 F.3d at 380 (noting
that a physician is “entitled to a reasonable
effort, not a perfect effort”); Singh, 308 F.3d
at 43 (same). The HCQIA does not require
participants at every level of a peer review
action to perform an independent investiga-
tion of the facts. Participants in later stages
of the review process are entitled to rely on
information gathered in earlier stages; reli-
ance on the information provided by other
doctors is presumptively reasonable. See
Poliner, 587 F.3d at 380 (stating that peer
reviewers were “entitled to rely on the infor-
mation provided ... by the other doctors,
and there is nothing to suggest that the
information was facially flawed or otherwise
so obviously deficient as to render [the dJe-
fendants’ reliance ‘unreasonable’” (footnote
omitted); Gabaldoni v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp.
Ass'n, 250 F.8d 255, 261-62 (4th Cir.2001)
(finding it reasonable for the ultimate deci-
sion maker to rely on reports of various
committees because “[a]lthough the summar-
ies [of the investigations] did not—and in-
deed could not—include every single fact and
finding from every committee report, there is
no evidence to suggest that the summaries
provided to the Board were materially insuf-
ficient or misleading”); Bryan, 33 F.3d at
1835 (concluding that the plaintiff did not
overcome the presumption that reasonable
effort was used to gather facts when three
separate panels submitted reports to the
board, “which made its decision based upon

the documentary record developed during
the various peer review proceedings and af-
ter [the plaintiff] had the opportunity to
make a presentation”); N. Colo. Med. Ctr.,
27 P.38d at 840 (holding that the board of
directors acted reasonably to obtain the facts
when it suspended the physician “only after a
lengthy investigation by a number of commit-
tees and independent parties”).

HH {16} The presumption of reasonable-
ness is not overcome by simply identifying
one piece of factually questionable evidence
upon which the peer review committees re-
lied. See Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Health-
care Corp. 341 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir.2003)
(concluding a physician did not meet his bur-
den by only making “conclusory statements
attacking individual items of evidence consid-
ered by the reviewers”); Brader, 167 F.3d at
841 (holding the fact-finding process reason-
able despite the plaintiff's argument that one
study was flawed and his views were not
heard when the ultimate decision was based
on an initial review, first hand observations,
testimony before an impartial panel, written
submissions, and two levels of appellate re-
view). To overcome the presumption of rea-
sonableness, the physician must show that
the fact-finding process is unreasonable in its
totality.

WM {17} Nor can the physician chal-
lenge the fact-finding process by questioning
the integrity or motivations of the individuals
conducting the professional peer review. See
Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp, 87 F.3d
624, 687 (Bd Cir.1996) (stating that a chal-
lenge to the integrity of one of the investigat-
ing committees did not rebut the presump-
tion that the defendants had “engaged in a
reasonable effort to obtain the facts”); Reyes
v. Wilson Mem'l Hosp. 102 F.Supp.2d 798,
818-19 (S.D.Ohio 1998) (finding that the
plaintiff did not rebut the presumption of
reasonableness when the “only evidentiary
rejoinder ... consists of testimony impugn-
ing the motives of the [dlefendants” and an
argument that additional evidence could have
been discovered). Because HCQIA immunity
applies when the fact-finding process is ob-
jectively reasonable, an inquiry into the sub-
jective intent of the individual members of

the various review committees is inappropri-
ate,

Hs {18} Additionally, the failure of a
professional peer review to comply in full
with applicable bylaws does not render the
fact-finding process unreasonable. “Provid-
ed that a peer review action as defined by
the statute complies with those standards, a
failure to comply with hospital bylaws does
not defeat a peer reviewer's right to HCQIA
immunity from damages.” Poliner, 587 F.8d
at 381. Compliance with the bylaws is a
good measure of the reasonableness of the
peer review process, but doing so is not
required by the HCQIA.

HM {19} To rebut the presumption of
reasonableness in the fact-finding efforts of
the peer review action, a plaintiff must point
to specific and material facts demonstrating
that the fact-finding efforts were unreason-
able. See Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Balti-
more, Inc. 108 Md.App. 341, 658 A.2d 541,
546 (1995) (concluding that the plaintiff did
not meet his burden by “present[ing] no evi-
dence, absent his own bare allegations, that a
reasonable effort was not made to obtain the
facts”). In Brown v. Presbyterian Health-
care Services, the Tenth Circuit held that the
plaintiff successfully rebutted the presump-
tion that the fact-finding process was reason-
able by demonstrating, through expert testi-
mony, that the peer review process consisted
of one meeting, two chart reviews, and two
hours of deliberation before the plaintiff's
privileges were revoked. 101 F.3d 1824,
1383-84 (10th Cir.1996). Unlike the cases
cited above, the Brown plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable
jury could have found the panel’s review to
be unreasonably restrictive and not taken
after a ‘reasonable effort to obtain the
facts.” Id. at 1334,

C. Plaintiff Did Not Rebut the Presump-
tion That Defendants Made a Reason-
able Effort to Obtain the Facts of the
Matter.

HM {20} The Court of Appeals deter-
mined that Plaintiff rebutted the presump-
tion of reasonableness by presenting facts
material to the question of the reasonable-
ness of the fact-finding process. Swmmers,

131

2010-NMCA-026, 1114-16, 147 N.M. 506,
226 P.8d 20. Focusing its analysis on the
allegations of Patient B, the Court of Appeals
found that Plaintiff had met his burden by
articulating the following “concerns: that Pa-
tient B’s allegation was based on notes taken
by a case manager during a phone conversa-
tion, that neither the case manager nor [Pa-
tient B] was ever contacted or questioned
regarding the incident, and that [Plaintiff]
vigorously disputed the allegation throughout
the process.” Jd. 114. We cannot agree
that Plaintiff rebutted the presumption of
HCQIA immunity in this case.

Hs {21} In order to rebut the presump-
tion that Defendants were reasonable in their
fact-finding efforts, Plaintiff must do more
than identify one part of the investigation—
the failure of the ad hoc committee to inter-
view Patient B and the caseworker—that
could have been more thorough, see Brader,
167 F.8d at 841; Bryan, 33 F.8d at 1335, or
argue that the peer review action was taken
in bad faith, see Bryan, 33 F.8d at 1835.
Although the second ad hoe committee failed
to interview Plaintiff, as required by the
hospital bylaws, this fault is not fatal. See
Poliner, 587 F.3d at 381. Plaintiff must
identify fallacies in the fact-finding process
that render it unreasonable as a whole. See
Goodwich, 653 A2d at 546-47. Plaintiff's
privileges were permanently suspended after
two investigations by separate ad hoe com-
mittees; reviews of the ad hoc committees’
reports by the MEC; an appeal to the PRC,
at which Plaintiff was represented by coun-
sel, presented evidence, cross-examined wit-
nesses, and was provided the opportunity to
call witnesses; a final appeal to the ARC;
and a review by the Board of Trustees of the
entire record. Plaintiffs allegations of bad
faith and the failure of the ad hoc committee
to interview the caseworker or Patient B
were not sufficient to meet the required bur-
den on summary judgment. Cf Brown, 101
F.3d at 1834.

HH {22} The Court of Appeals erred by
not considering the totality of the fact-finding
process, but instead focusing on the peer
reviewer's reliance on the caseworker’s notes
relating to Patient B. Swmmers, 2010-

132

NMCA-026, 114, 147 N.M. 506, 226 P.3d 20.
Although our review of the proceedings indi-
cates that the incidents involving Patients A
and B were of primary concern to the peer
reviewers, the final action suspending Plain-
tiffs medical privileges was taken after a
fact-finding process that involved a broad
and thorough investigation of Plaintiff's care
regarding a number of patients. We con-
clude that the fact-finding process conducted
by Defendants was reasonable as a matter of
law.

Ill. CONCLUSION

{23} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Be-
cause the district court did not consider the
remaining three immunity requirements of
the HCQIA summary judgment standard, we
remand for further proceedings.

{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PETRA
JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON,
and EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMSC-018
257 P.3d 952

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EM-
PLOYEES, et al., Petitioners,

v.

Hon. Susana MARTINEZ, Governor
of the State of New Mexico,
Respondent,

and

State of New Mexico, Real
Party in Interest.

No. 32,905.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.
May 18, 2011.

Youtz & Valdez, P.C., Shane Youtz, Albu-
querque, NM, for Petitioners.

Jessica Hernandez, Jennifer L. Padgett,
Matthew J. Stackpole, Santa Fe, NM, for
Respondent.

OPINION

CHAVEZ, Justice.

{1} May the Governor use the broad re-
moval authority under Article V, Section 5 of
the New Mexico Constitution to remove
members of the Public Employee Labor Re-
lations Board (PELRB) who have the re-
sponsibility to adjudicate the merits of dis-
putes involving the Governor? We answer
this question of first impression in the nega-
tive for three reasons. First, none of the
PELRB members serve at the pleasure of
the Governor because the Public Employee
Bargaining Act (the Act) obligates the Gover-
nor to appoint one member recommended by
organized labor, one member recommended
by public employers, and one neutral mem-
ber jointly recommended by these two ap-
pointees. Second, the Governor's responsi-
bility under the Act and Article V, Section 4
of the New Mexico Constitution to “take care
that the laws be faithfully executed” clearly
requires that the Governor respect the Act’s
requirement for continuity and balance by
not attempting to remove appointed mem-
bers of the PELRB, Third, constitutional
due process requires a neutral tribunal
whose members are free to deliberate with-
out fear of removal by a frequent litigant in
that forum, such as the Governor. Accord-
ingly, a writ of mandamus has issued order-
ing the reinstatement of PELRB members
John Boyd and Duff Westbrook, effective
immediately, and otherwise enjoining their
removal,

134

BACKGROUND

{2} The PELRB is composed of three
members appointed by the Governor, whose
appointment power is circumscribed as fol-
lows: “The governor shall appoint one mem-
ber recommended by organized labor repre-
sentatives actively involved in representing
public employees, one member recommended
by public employers actively involved in col-
lective bargaining and one member jointly
recommended by the other two appointees.”
NMSA 1978, § 10-7E-8(A) (2003). The Act
is silent regarding how and whether a board
member may be removed. On March 1,
2011, Governor Susana Martinez removed all
members of the PELRB. John Boyd was
the member duly appointed by the Gover-
nor’s predecessor on the recommendation of
labor, and his term expires on June 30, 2011.
Martin Dominguez was the member duly ap-
pointed by the Governor’s predecessor on the
recommendation of public employers, and his
term expires on June 30, 2012. Duff West-
brook was appointed as the neutral board
member on the recommendation of Boyd and
Dominguez. Westbrook’s term expired on
June 30, 2010. However, under the provi-
sions of Article XX, Section 2 of the New
Mexico Constitution, Westbrook serves until
his successor is duly qualified, unless he is
lawfully removed. See Denish v. Johnson,
1996-NMSC-005, 154, 121 N.M. 280, 910
P.2d 914, All PELRB members serve three-
year terms and are eligible for reappoint-
ment to an unlimited number of terms. Sec-
tion 10-7E-8(B).

{38} The PELRB has rule-making authori-
ty, NMSA 1978, § 10-7E-9(A) (2008), and it
is empowered to adjudicate disputes and en-
force the provisions of the Act, NMSA 1978,
§ 10-7E-12(A)(8), (C) (2005). With respect
to hearings, the Legislature mandated that
the PELRB adopt procedures that meet all
minimal due process requirements of the fed-
eral and state constitutions. Section 10-7E-
12(B). Because the State is a public employ-
er subject to the provisions of the Act, the
PELRB will adjudicate disputes involving

1. Governor Martinez also terminated the Public
Employee Labor Relations Director on February
5, 2011. Petitioners also seek a writ prohibiting
the Governor from “interfering in the Board's
decision to hire an Executive Director.” The

the Governor. NMSA 1978, § 10-7E-4(S)
(2008) (stating that a public employer in-
cludes the state and its political subdivisions).
According to Petitioners, seventeen cases
currently pending before the PELRB direct-
ly involve the Governor’s executive depart-
ment, a contention unchallenged by the Gov-
ernor.

HMMM {4} Petitioners are organized labor
representatives actively involved in repre-
senting public employees. They seek a writ
of mandamus prohibiting the Governor from
removing Boyd and Westbrook from the
PELRB,! arguing that the Governor’s re-
moval authority under Article V, Section 5
does not extend to members of the PELRB
because the Governor’s appointment of its
members is purely ministerial, and their re-
moval would violate the separation of powers
doctrine and offend due process. In order
for Petitioners to prevail, we must be per-
suaded that a writ of mandamus is being
issued only to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty that is clear and indisputa-
ble. New Energy Econ, Inc. v. Martinez,
2011-NMSC-006, 123, 149 N.M. 207, 247
P.3d 286. A writ of mandamus may be used
in a prohibitory manner to prohibit unconsti-
tutional official action. See Kiddy v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs, 57 N.M. 145, 152, 255 P.2d
678, 683 (1953) (“Public functionaries may be
restrained by mandamus from doing what
they know is an illegal act.”). In considering
whether to issue a prohibitory mandamus, we
do not assess the wisdom of the public offi-
cial’s act; we determine whether that act
goes beyond the bounds established by the
New Mexico Constitution. State ex rel.
Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 570, 904
P.2d 11, 19 (1995).

{5} The Governor counters that her ac-
tions are consistent with this Court’s broad
interpretation of Article V, Section 5 in State
ex rel. New Mexico Judicial Standards Com-
mission v. Espinosa, 20083-NMSC-017, 184
N.M. 59, 73 P.38d 197. In Espinosa, we
declined to abrogate the Governor’s removal

Governor agrees that she is not empowered to
hire the Executive Director and therefore will not
interfere in the hiring for this position. Finally,
Petitioners did not seek the reinstatement of
Dominguez.

authority by implication, instead requiring an
express limit on the power articulated by the
Legislature. Jd. 125. The Governor argues
that because the Act does not expressly cur-
tail the Governor’s removal authority, she
was authorized to remove Boyd and West-
brook from the PELRB. If our consider-
ation of the issue were limited to the Act, we
might agree with the Governor. However,
the competing constitutional provisions that
require the Governor to faithfully execute the
laws and to comply with the due process
clause, which has been interpreted to require
a neutral tribunal not subject to upheaval
through removal by one of the litigants, com-
pel our conclusion that the Governor may not
arbitrarily remove members of this adjudica-
tory board.

THE GOVERNOR MUST ENSURE THAT
THE INTENDED GOALS OF DULY EN-
ACTED LEGISLATION ARE EFFECTU-
ATED

HMMM {6} Article III, Section 1 of the
New Mexico Constitution sets forth the gen-
eral parameters of the separation of powers
in state government. Article IV empowers
the Legislature to create the law. Article V,
Section 4 requires the Governor to “take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.” In
order to carry out this constitutional man-
date, the Governor is required to apply his or
her full energy and resources to ensure that
the intended goals of duly enacted legislation
are effectuated. Op. of the Justices to the
Senate, 375 Mass. 827, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1221
(1978).

{7} The question in this case is whether
the Governor’s removal of the members of
the PELRB is at odds with the Governor's
responsibility to ensure that the Act’s intend-
ed goals are effectuated. We conclude that it
is. Under the Act’s structure, the Governor
does not have the absolute power to appoint
any person to the PELRB. The Governor
has a clear and indisputable duty to appoint
one representative for labor, one for manage-
ment, and the third based on the designation
by the other two appointees. Section 10-7E-
8(A); S. Barry Paisner & Michelle R. Hau-
bert-Barela, Correcting the Imbalance: The
New Mexico Public Employee Bargaining
Act and the Statutory Rights Provided to

135

Public Employees, 87 N.M. L.Rev. 357, 877
(2007) (“The governor is required to appoint
a member that has been recommended by
organized labor, a member that has been
recommended by public employers, and a
member that the two other appointees have
jointly recommended.” (emphasis added)).
When labor, management, or the two appoin-
tees insist on recommending only one person
to the Governor for appointment, the Gover-
nor, under the plain wording of the Act, must
appoint the person who was recommended.
{8} The Legislature’s stated purpose in
promulgating the Act sets forth the rationale
for the Governor’s limited role in the ap-
pointment of PELRB members and the im-
portance of a continuously operating
PELRB. In particular, the Legislature es-
tablished the following purpose for the Act:
The purpose of the Public Employee
Bargaining Act is to guarantee public em-
ployees the right to organize and bargain
collectively with their employers, to pro-
mote harmonious and cooperative relation-
ships between public employers and public
employees and to protect the public inter-
est by ensuring, at all times, the orderly
operation and functioning of the state and
its political subdivisions.
NMSA 1978, § 10-7E-2 (2003). These no-
tions of “harmonious and cooperative rela-
tion[s]” and the “orderly operation and func-
tioning of the state” have been interpreted
by the Court of Appeals to encompass a
“balancing of policies” in crafting the Act. ,
Id.; see also Intl Ass’n of Firefighters v.
City of Carlsbad, 2009-NMCA-097, 113, 147
N.M. 6, 216 P.3d 256, In the context of the
PELRB’s composition, the Court of Appeals
has concluded that the Legislature intended
the PELRB to be a “balanced and, therefore,
neutral body.” City of Albuquerque v. Mon-
toya, 2010-NMCA-100, 110, 148 N.M. 980,
242 P.8d 497, cert. granted, 2010-NMCERT-
010, 149 N.M. 65, 243 P.8d 1147. This neu-
tral and balanced character is achieved by
allowing both labor and management to des-
ignate one member and then empowering
those two representatives to select a neutral,
consensus third member. See id; § 10-
7E-8(A). To ensure a continuously operat-
ing PELRB, the Legislature established a

136

board with three staggered terms and enact-
ed a provision that enables members to serve
an unlimited number of terms. Sections 10-
7E-8(B), (E). Article XX, Section 2 comple-
ments this scheme by requiring incumbent
members to retain office “until his successor
has duly qualified.” Jd. Therefore, by man-
dating a balanced and continuously opera-
tional PELRB, the Legislature gave effect to
its priority that labor relations between gov-
ernment workers and the state be harmoni-
ous, cooperative, and coincide with “at all
times, the orderly operation and functioning
of the state and its political subdivisions.”
Section 10-7E-2.

{9} The removal of the board member
selected by the unions casts a pall over the
operations of the PELRB and evinces a, will-
ingness to interfere with the unions’ right to
designate a board member of their choice.
The Act expressly prohibits an employer
from interfering with a public employee’s
rights under the Act. NMSA 1978, § 10-7E-
19(B) (2003). Through her actions, the Gov-
ernor has disrupted the PELRB’s careful
balance as envisioned by the Legislature.
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
PROHIBITS ARBITRARY REMOVAL
OF BOARD MEMBERS BY THE GOV-
ERNOR WHO ADJUDICATE DISPUTES
INVOLVING THE GOVERNOR

HN {10} Due process considerations
are also implicated because when the Gover-
nor reserves the power to remove board
members at any time and for any reason, the
Governor exerts subtle coercive influence
over the PELRB, further compromising its
balanced and fair character. “A fair trial in
a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.” In ve Murchison, 349 U.S. 183,
186, 75 S.Ct. 628, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955).

At a minimum, a fair and impartial tri-
bunal requires that the trier of fact be
disinterested and free from any form of
bias or predisposition regarding the out-
come of the case. In addition, our system
of justice requires that the appearance of
complete fairness be present. The inquiry
is not whether the [bloard members are
actually biased or prejudiced, but whether,
in the natural course of events, there is an
indication of a possible temptation to an

average man sitting as a judge to try the
case with bias for or against any issue
presented to him.

Reid v. N.M. Ba. of Exam’rs in Optometry,

92 N.M. 414, 416, 589 P.2d 198, 200 (1979)

(citations omitted).

{11} What is significant in this case is that

the PELRB adjudicates disputes involving
the Governor and all the myriad executive
department agencies under her control, in-
cluding determining whether the Governor or
her appointees have engaged in prohibited
labor practices under Section 10-7E-19. Be-
cause the PELRB is empowered to make
decisions that may adversely affect the exec-
utive branch, the PELRB must remain free
from the executive’s control. The PELRB
cannot remain free from the executive’s con-
trol or coercive influence if we conclude that
the members of the PELRB serve at the
pleasure of the Governor. The Act’s statuto-
ry scheme for the appointment of PELRB
members provides adequate guarantees that
an independent, unbiased decision maker will
be selected, and thus comports with the re-
quirements of due process. However, inter-
preting Article V, Section 5 to empower the
Governor to arbitrarily remove its members
would not comport with the requirements of
due process.
ESPINOSA 1S INAPPOSITE BECAUSE
BROAD REMOVAL AUTHORITY OVER
THE PELRB WOULD DIRECTLY CON-
TRAVENE THE LEGISLATURE’S PUR-
POSE IN PROMULGATING THE ACT
AND CONFLICT WITH THE GOVER-
NOR’S DUTY TO FAITHFULLY EXE-
CUTE THE LAWS

{12} The Governor urges us to adhere to
our broad interpretation of Article V, Section
5 in Espinosa. Article V, Section 5, in rele-
vant part, reads as follows: “The governor
shall nominate and, by and with the consent
of the senate, appoint all officers whose ap-
pointment or election is not otherwise provid-
ed for and may remove any officer appointed
by him [or her] unless otherwise provided by
law.” A narrow majority of the Espinosa
Court declared a strong disapproval of im-
plied abrogations of the Governor's constitu-
tional removal authority. 2003-NMSC-017,
1125, 134 N.M. 59, 78 P.8d 197 (citing Flaska

v. State, 51 N.M. 18, 20, 177 P.2d 174, 178
(1946) (“It is presumed that the people ex-
pressed themselves in careful and measured
terms in framing the constitution and that
they left as little as possible to implication.”
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted))).

{13} In Espinosa, members of the Judicial
Standards Commission (Commission) chal-
lenged then-Governor Bill Richardson’s au-
thority to remove the Commission’s six gu-
bernatorial appointees en masse. 2003-
NMSC-017, 11, 184 N.M, 59, 78 P.3d 197.
One argument advanced by the Espinosa
petitioners was that the language in Article
VI, Section 32, which created the Commis-
sion, “impliedly” prohibits the application of
the Governor's Article V, Section 5 removal
powers to the Commission. 2008-NMSC-
017, 118, 184 N.M. 59, 73 P.8d 197. The
petitioners contended that a provision setting
forth staggered terms for Commission mem-
bers, id. 118, coupled with a provision that
explicitly prescribes the manner by which
Commission vacancies shall be filled but is
silent as to removal, evinced an “intent ... to
deny the Governor the authority to remove
members,” id. 123. We rejected the peti-
tioners’ invitation to impliedly abrogate the
Governor’s removal power, finding that the
Legislature has demonstrated a willingness
to “provide[] for both staggered terms and
gubernatorial removal power,” id. 121, and
“frequently addresses both the power to fill a
vacancy and the power to remove,” id. 128.
As a result, we concluded that Article V,
Section 5 and Article V1, Section 32 coexist
as “harmonious constitutional provisions.”
Id. 123. Having dispensed with the petition-
ers’ argument, the majority concluded that
“{wlithout a compelling reason to hold other-
wise,” Article V, Section 5 authorized the
Governor to arbitrarily remove executive ap-
pointees from the Commission. Espinosa,
2008-NMSC-017, 127, 1384 N.M. 59, 73 P.38d
197.

{14} In this case, there are three compel-
ling reasons to hold otherwise. First, in
Espinosa the Governor had absolute appoint-
ment authority—that is, the Governor was at
liberty to appoint anyone he chose to the
Commission. That is not so in this case,

137

where the Governor has a clear and indisput-
able duty to appoint those members desig-
nated by labor, management, and a neutral
designated by the labor and management.
designees. Second, in Espinosa the appoin-
tees were not empowered to adjudicate dis-
putes involving the Governor. In this case,
the PELRB must decide disputes involving
the Governor. Third, in Espinosa we could
read the competing constitutional provisions
harmoniously, whereas in this case, we can-
not read the competing duty of the Governor
to faithfully execute the laws, with her ap-
pointment and removal authority, or with the
due process requirements of our Constitution
as interpreted by this Court.

CONCLUSION

{15} For the foregoing reasons, a writ of
mandamus has issued ordering the reinstate-
ment of members Boyd and Westbrook to
the PELRB, effective immediately, and oth-
erwise enjoining their removal.

{16} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA,
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C.
BOSSON, Justices and CELIA FOY
CASTILLO, Judge, Sitting by Designation.

2011-NMSC-023
257 P.3d 957

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff
Petitioner,

v

Gregory KETELSON, Defendant—
Respondent.

No. 32,170.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.

May 20, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, James W.
Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

Goldberg Segalla, LLP, Matthew S. Ler-
ner, Brian T. Stapleton, Albany, NY, for

139

Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association of
America.

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} The issue presented in this appeal is
whether a police officer can temporarily re-
move a visible firearm from a vehicle to
prevent immediate access to it by an occu-
pant during the short duration of a lawful
traffic stop, consistent with the strictures of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the
New Mexico Constitution. Pursuant to our
interstitial approach to constitutional analy-
sis, we first address the federal constitutional
issue. With respect to the Fourth Amend-
ment, we conclude that the officers had rea-
sonable articulable suspicion permitting them
to remove the weapon. Accordingly, their
actions were consistent with the federal con-
stitution. With respect to Article IT, Section
10, we conclude that the officers’ removal of
the firearm was a minimal intrusion, which
was reasonable given the grave need for
officer safety during traffic stops. Thus, we
hold that the temporary removal of the fire-
arm was consistent with our state constitu-
tion. We reverse the judgments of the Court
of Appeals and the district court and remand
for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{2} The record reflects the following facts
found by the district judge during the sup-
pression hearing. On the evening of Novem-
ber 18, 2008, Officer Shane Blevins of the
Hobbs Police Department stopped a GMC
Jimmy with expired temporary tags. Officer
Blevins approached the driver side of the
vehicle and informed the driver, Kerri Allen,
of the reason for the stop. Meanwhile, Offi-
cer Miroslava Belyeu (née Jurado) ap-
proached the passenger side of the vehicle,
where Gregory Ketelson (Defendant) was
seated. Officer Belyeu saw a black nine
millimeter handgun lying on the back seat
floorboard. Officer Belyeu asked Defendant
to step out of the vehicle, and Officer Blevins
retrieved the firearm from the back seat
floorboard. Neither Defendant nor Ms. Al-

140

Jen was in the vehicle when Officer Blevins
retrieved the firearm. After Officer Blevins
retrieved the firearm, Defendant signed a
card consenting to the search and admitted
that the firearm belonged to him.

{8} Officer Blevins requested dispatch to
run a background check on Defendant. The
background check revealed that Defendant
had a prior felony conviction in Texas for
burglary in 1999. Defendant was placed un-
der arrest as a felon in possession of a fire-
arm in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-
7-16 (2001).

{4} Prior to trial, Defendant moved to
suppress the firearm and statements made to
the police regarding its ownership. Defen-
dant argued that pursuant to State v. Garcia,
2005-NMSC-017, 129, 188 N.M. 1, 116 P.8d
72, an officer does not have authority to
enter a car and seize an object absent a
search warrant, consent, or exigent circum-
stances. The State responded that the entry
into the vehicle and removing the firearm
were lawful as a “minimal intrusion” neces-
sary for officer safety while the officers de-
termined that Defendant was a felon. The
district court found that the State did not
make a showing sufficient to support exigent
circumstances; rather, it found that both De-
fendant and the driver of the car were “at all
times cooperative, and they created no ap-
parent threat or imminent danger to life or
serious damage to property.” Accordingly,
the district court granted the motion to sup-
press, noting that non-felons may legally car-
ry loaded handguns in private automobiles,
and thus, the State must make some showing
beyond the mere presence of a firearm in the
car before officers effect a warrantless “sei-
gure.”

{5} The State appealed to the Court of
Appeals. See NMSA 1978, Section 39-8-
8(B)2) (1972) (permitting appeal upon a dis-
trict court’s order to suppress evidence). In
a memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court, determining that
“there was no proper basis upon which to
justify the warrantless seizure of the fire-
arm.” State v. Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op.
at 3, 2009 WL 6669350 (N.M.Ct.App. Dec. 28,
2009). Relying on State v. Bomboy, 2008-
NMSC-029, 117, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.8d

1045, and Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, 131, 138
N.M. 1, 116 P.8d 72, the Court held that
either exigent circumstances or another ex-
ception to the warrant requirement was re-
quired before an officer may seize an object
in plain view from a vehicle and found no
such exception applicable here. Ketelson,
No. 29,876, slip op. at 8, 5.

{6} The Court rejected several bases for
exigent circumstances. It noted that the
driver's allegedly nervous behavior after the
stop could support exigent circumstances,
which would provide a basis for the warrant-
less seizure of the firearm, but deferred to
the district court’s finding that no exigencies
were present. Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op.
at 8-4. The Court also noted that evidence
of a crime in plain view could support exigent
circumstances pursuant to Bomboy. Ketel-
son, No. 29,876, slip op. at 6. Bomboy held
that incident to a lawful traffic stop an officer
may seize an object in plain view provided
the officer has probable cause to believe the
object is evidence of a crime. 2008-NMSC-
029, 117, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.8d 1045.
However, the Court distinguished the pres-
ent stop from Bomboy, concluding that in
this case the officers did not have probable
cause to believe the firearm was evidence of
a crime because they only learned after it
had been removed from the car that Defen-
dant was a felon. Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip
op. at 6.

{7} Finally, the Court rejected officer safe-
ty as a potential basis for exigent circum-
stances. Id. at 4. It found unpersuasive the
State’s argument that removing the firearm
from the car was a “minimal intrusion” justi-
fied by the needs of officer safety. Id. The
State argued that “a weapon in plain view
during a traffic stop creates a reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants are
armed and dangerous, and thus is subject to
seizure to ensure officer safety.” Id. at 5.
The State grounded its argument in federal
authority, which permits an officer to disarm
a suspect during an investigatory detention
when the officer has a reasonable suspicion
that the suspect is armed and dangerous.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“[Tyhere must
be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a

reasonable search for weapons for the pro-
tection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, regardless
of whether he has probable cause to arrest
the individual for a crime.”); see also Penn-
sylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12, 98
S.Ct. 880, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (concluding
that, under the principles of Terry, an officer
could conduct a protective frisk for weapons
after observing a bulge in the suspect’s jack-
et). To the Court of Appeals, accepting the
State’s argument was tantamount to estab-
lishing a presumption of exigent circum-
stances whenever an officer observed a fire-
arm in a lawfully stopped vehicle. Ketelson,
No. 29,876, slip op. at 4-5. It declined to
adopt such a presumption, noting that New
Mexico had not adopted other “bright line”
presumptions from federal law, such as the
federal automobile exception. Id. at 5; see
State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063, 116, 141
N.M. 582, 158 P.3d 1025.

{8} We granted the State’s petition for
writ of certiorari pursuant to NMSA 1978,
Section 34-5-14(B) (1972) and Rule 12-502
NMRA to determine whether it is unreason-
able under the state and federal constitutions
for a police officer to remove a visible fire-
arm from a vehicle subject to a lawful traffic
stop.

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review

Hs {9} Appellate review of a motion to
suppress presents a mixed question of law
and fact. We review factual determinations
for substantial evidence and legal determina-
tions de novo. State v. Urioste, 2002-
NMSC-028, 16, 182 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964.
Because the district court “is in a better
position to judge the credibility of witnesses
and resolve questions of fact, the factual
analysis should be viewed in a light favorable
to the prevailing party.” Garcia, 2005-
NMSC-017, 127, 188 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d 72.

IL Interstitial Approach and Preserva-
tion

HI {10} “Because both the United States

and the New Mexico Constitutions provide

overlapping protections against unreasonable

searches and seizures, we apply our intersti-

141

approach.” State v. Rowell, 2008-
NMSC-041, 112, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95
(citing State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006,
9119-23, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1). The
interstitial approach requires that we first
consider “whether the right being asserted is
protected under the federal constitution.”
Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 119, 122 N.M. 777,
932 P.2d 1. If the right is protected by the
federal constitution, then the state constitu-
tional claim is not reached. Jd. If not, we
next consider whether the New Mexico Con-
stitution provides broader protection, and we
may diverge from federal precedent for three
reasons: “a flawed federal analysis, structur-
al differences between state and federal gov-
ernment, or distinctive state characteristics.”
Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 119, 122 N.M. 777,
982 P.2d 1. As we recently explained in
State v. Leyva, a defendant must properly
preserve his argument under the state con-
stitution in order for us to consider it on
appeal. 2011-NMSC-009, 136, 149 N.M.
435, 250 P.3d 861. Thus, as an initial matter,
we must determine whether our analysis is
confined to the Fourth Amendment or
whether Defendant properly preserved his
argument under Article II, Section 10.

{11} Varying preservation requirements
apply, depending on whether the state consti-
tutional provision has “previously been inter-
preted more expansively than its federal
counterpart.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, 1 49,
149 N.M. 485, 250 P.3d 861. Where the state
constitutional provision has already been in-
terpreted to provide broader protection than
‘its federal counterpart, “trial counsel must
develop the necessary factual base and raise
the applicable constitutional provision in trial
court.” Id. However, where the state con-
stitutional provision has not been determined
to offer broader protection, more stringent
preservation requirements apply. See id.
(“Where the provision has never before been
addressed under our interstitial analysis, tri-
al counsel additionally must argue that the
state constitutional provision should provide
greater protection, and suggest reasons as to
why....”). Our precedents have clearly es-
tablished that Article II, Section 10 offers
broader protection than the Fourth Amend-
ment. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, 150, 149

142

N.M. 485, 250 P.8d 861. Thus, we apply the
general requirements of Rule 12-216(A) to
determine whether Defendant “develop[ed]
the necessary factual base and raised] the
applicable constitutional provision” at the
trial level. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, 149,
149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861.

{12} In Leyva, we determined that the
defendant had preserved his argument under
the state constitution by pleading both the
Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section
10 in his motion to suppress and “developing
a factual record in his motion and at the
suppression hearing.” Jd. 150. Here, De-
fendant plead both the Fourth Amendment
and Article II, Section 10 in his motion to
suppress; moreover, Defendant developed a
factual record in his motion and at the hear-
ing. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 127, 122
N.M. 777, 982 P.2d 1 (concluding that argu-
ment under the state constitution was pre-
served where testimony at the suppression
hearing discussed the circumstances of the
search). Accordingly, Defendant's Article II,
Section 10 argument was preserved.

{183} We also address an additional preser-
vation issue. In his motion to suppress, De-
fendant challenged only the officers’ decision
to remove the handgun from the vehicle after
they had observed it. He did not challenge
the propriety of the traffic stop, nor could he,
because the stop was lawful; Officer Blevins
pulled over the vehicle in which Defendant
rode as a passenger because its tags were
expired. See NMSA 1978, § 66-3-18(C)
(2007) (requiring display of valid vehicle reg-
istration); see also Mimms, 484 US. at 109,
98 S.Ct. 330 (holding there was a lawful
reason to conduct a traffic stop where vehicle
tags were expired, in violation of state law).
Moreover, Defendant did not challenge the
officers’ subsequent actions, namely running
the weapon through a registry to determine
whether it was stolen and running the back-
ground check that ultimately determined that
Defendant was a felon. Thus, we do not
reach the issue of whether officers may con-
duct further investigation when they tempo-
rarily remove a firearm from a vehicle as a
safety precaution. See generally Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 US. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94
L.Ed.2d 847 (1987) (holding that the officer,

performing an exigent circumstances search
of a residence in response to a shooting,
violated the Fourth Amendment by moving
stereo equipment observed during the search
in order to reveal its serial number). Rath-
er, our sole focus is the propriety of the
officers’ removal of the gun from the vehicle.
Thus, pursuant to our interstitial approach,
we first address the Fourth Amendment and
then turn to Article II, Section 10. State v.
Garcia, 2009-NMSC--046, 1 13, 147 N.M. 184,
217 P.8d 1032; Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006,
119, 122 N.M. 777, 982 P.2d 1.

iL Fourth Amendment

HM s{14} The Fourth Amendment guar-
antees “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
US. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth
Amendment, a search or seizure conducted
without a warrant supported by probable
cause is “presumptively unreasonable,” un-
less the officer’s conduct fell within one of
the well-defined exceptions. United States v.
Karo, 468 US. 705, 717, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82
L.Ed.2d 580 (1984). In this case, there was
no warrant, so our analysis focuses on wheth-
er the officers’ conduct falls within one of the
well-defined exceptions. See id.

{15} In Terry, the U.S. Supreme Court
explained that one such exception provides

that where a police officer observes unusu-
al conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encoun-
ter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may

properly be introduced in evidence against

the person from whom they were taken.
392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868. This excep-
tion was invoked in Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111-
12, 98 S.Ct. 380. There, an officer conduct-
ing a traffic stop observed a bulge protruding
from the suspect’s sports jacket and “[flear-
ing that the bulge might be a weapon, the
officer frisked [the suspect] and discovered in
his waistband a .38-caliber revolver loaded
with five rounds of ammunition.” Id. at 107,
98 S.Ct. 380. Because, under Terry, an offi-
cer may “conduct[] a limited search for
weapons” upon a reasonable suspicion that
the “suspect might be armed and presently
dangerous,” the Court concluded that the
limited protective search conducted by the
officer was constitutional. Mimms, 434 U.S.
at 111-12, 98 S.Ct. 330.

HM {16} In order to determine whether
a limited protective search is proper, the
“critical question” is whether the officer had
a “particularized and objective basis” for his
suspicion that the suspect might have been
armed and dangerous. United States v.
Jones, 606 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir.2010) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). Courts assess the totality of
the cireumstances in order to determine
whether the officer maintained reasonable
suspicion in order to support the frisk.
United States v. Tinnie, 629 F.3d 749, 751
(7th Cir.2011). In viewing the totality of the
circumstances, the court “must look at the
facts objectively.” Id. at 753.

{17} We note that the federal courts have
long stressed the importance of officer safety
and the danger firearms pose during an offi-
cer interaction with a suspect. As the U.S.
Supreme Court has observed, “[flirearms are
dangerous, and extraordinary dangers some-
times justify unusual precautions.” Florida
v, IL, 529 US. 266, 272, 120 S.Ct. 1875, 146
L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). The federal courts are
keenly aware that traffic stops pose particu-
lar dangers to police officers. “An officer in
today’s reality has an objective, reasonable
basis to fear for his or her life every time a
motorist is stopped. Every traffic stop, after
all, is a confrontation.” United States v.
Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir.2001) (en
bane), holding modified on other grounds by

143

United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1269
(10th Cir.2007). With these considerations in
mind, we turn to the traffic stop during
which the officers took possession of Defen-
dant’s gun.

{18} After Officer Blevins stopped the ve-
hicle in which Defendant rode as a passen-
ger, Officer Belyeu observed a gun on the
back floorboard of the vehicle, directly be-
hind Defendant. Officer Belyeu alerted Offi-
cer Blevins to the presence of the gun. Both
the driver and Defendant were outside of the
vehicle when Officer Blevins reached into the
passenger compartment of the vehicle to se-
cure the firearm and unload the ammunition;
however, neither was handcuffed nor re-
strained.

Hs {19} Terry does not require cer-
tainty on the part of the officer that a sus-
pect is armed and dangerous in order to
conduct a limited protective search; rather,
it requires only that the suspect “may” be
armed and dangerous. 892 U.S. at 30, 88
S.Ct. 1868. Critically, in this case, the gun
was visible to the officers during the traffic
stop, and thus the officers were certain that
Defendant had access to a firearm. Addi-
tionally, neither the Defendant nor the driver
was restrained, and thus the risk that one of
them would access the firearm was especially
potent. Under such circumstances, Officer
Blevins could constitutionally remove the
firearm from the vehicle because he pos-
sessed a reasonable belief based on specific
and articulable facts which warranted him in
believing that Defendant was “armed and
thus posed a serious and present danger to
{his} safety.” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112, 98
S.Ct. 880; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct.
1868.

IV. Article II, Section 10

HS {20} Pursuant to our interstitial
approach, we next turn to Article II, Section
10 of the New Mexico Constitution. See
Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, 118, 147 N.M. 134,
217 P.8d 1032. Article II, Section 10 ensures
that

[t]he people shall be secure in their per-

sons, papers, homes and effects, from un-

reasonable searches and seizures, and no

144

warrant to search any place, or seize any

person or thing, shall issue without de-

scribing the place to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized, nor without,

a written showing of probable cause, sup-

ported by oath or affirmation.

The key inquiry under Article II, Section 10
is reasonableness. See Campos v. State, 117
N.M. 155, 157, 870 P.2d 117, 119 (1994)
((TJhe ultimate question is whether the
search and seizure was reasonable.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); State
v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 149, 870 P.2d 103,
111 (1994), modified on other grounds by
State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, 1113-20,
188 N.M. 9, 116 P.3d 80. The constitutional
provision “expresses the fundamental notion
that every person ... is entitled to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusions.”
State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 481, 444, 868
P.2d 1052, 1065 (1993). Accordingly, reason-
ableness depends on the balance between the
public interest and the individual’s interest in
freedom from police intrusion upon personal
liberty.

{21} In this case, the facts presented re-
quire us to undertake a thorough exploration
of the competing interests at stake, individu-
al rights and officer safety. See Gomez,
1997-NMSC-006, 119, 122 N.M. 777, 982
P.2d 1 (noting that distinctive state charac-
teristics may provide a reason to depart from
the federal analysis); State v. Dees, 100 N.M.
252, 258, 669 P.2d 261, 262 (Ct.App.1983)
(noting that New Mexico’s constitutional pro-
tection of firearms is “unique”). Our Article
II, Section 10 jurisprudence has long focused
on concepts of reasonableness, and we con-
clude that through the lens of reasonable-
ness, we can properly explore the competing
interests at stake here.

{22} In order to determine whether Offi-
cer Blevins’ removal of the gun from the
vehicle was reasonable, we first examine the
public interest supporting his action. The
State identifies officer safety as the public
interest which justifies the removal of the
gun from the vehicle. The State explains
that police officers perform a public service,
and therefore, relying on Terry, the State
argues that “it would be unreasonable to
require that police officers take unnecessary

risks in the performance of their duties.”
392 U.S. at 28, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The State also
highlights the dangers inherent in traffic
stops. The State contends that when an
officer confronts a motorist, the officer en-
ters an uncertain situation, not knowing the
motorist’s intentions, and as a result the
officer is exposed to a grave risk of assault.

{23} Against concerns for officer safety,
we balance the individual’s interest in free-
dom from police intrusion upon personal lib-
erty. In New Mexico, individuals may carry
a gun “in a private automobile or other pri-
vate means of conveyance, for lawful protec-
tion of the person’s or another’s person or
property,” without fear of criminal prosecu-
tion. NMSA 1978, § 30-7-2(A)@) (2001);
see N.M. Const. art. II § 6. Even though
this was not a traditional seizure of evidence
or contraband, even a temporary moving of
the firearm constituted, to some degree, an
interference with Defendant’s possessory in-
terest. See Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, 19,
144 N.M. 151, 184 P.8d 1045 (recognizing
that seizwre of methamphetamine in plain
view in a car affected a property interest).
Here, unlike the seizure in Bomboy, however,
the retrieval of the gun from the vehicle
during the limited context of the traffie stop
was at most a minimal interference with the
suspect's possessory interest.

{24} Two considerations lead us to con-
clude that the interference with the suspect’s
possessory rights is minimal. First, the in-
terference is minimal because the officer
holds the firearm for a limited period. The
interference is subject to temporal con-
straints on the length of a traffic stop. See
State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, 135, 138
N.M. 414, 120 P.8d 836 (“The length of the
detention should be reasonably limited to the
time it takes to complete the underlying jus-
tification for the stop.”), overruled on other
grounds by Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, 162,
149 N.M. 485, 250 P.3d 861. Thus, the inter-
ference with the suspect’s possessory inter-
est in the gun is constrained by the mandato-
ry brevity of a lawful traffie stop. Second,
we consider the officer’s retrieval of the gun
from the vehicle to be a minimal intrusion to
the suspect’s possessory interests because

the officer’s actions are unlikely to disturb
any legitimate use of the firearm.

{25} We proceed to balance the relevant
interests. Concerns for officer safety are
undoubtedly legitimate and weigh heavily in
the reasonableness calculus. We have recog-
nized that officers face inordinate risks when
they are conducting traffic stops. See State
v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 134, 134
N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. Against these con-
cerns, we must weigh the individual’s interest
in freedom from governmental intrusion
upon a personal possessory interest. The
officer’s removal of the firearm from the
vehicle was at most a minimal intrusion upon
a personal possessory interest, as it was lim-
ited in duration and did not interfere with
any legitimate use for the firearm. Accord-
ingly, because the need for officer safety
outweighs the minimal intrusion upon a per-
sonal possessory interest occasioned by the
officer’s retrieval of the firearm from the
vehicle, it is reasonable, pursuant to Article
II, Section 10, for an officer to temporarily
take possession of a visible firearm during a
lawful traffic stop.

{26} We recognize that the course we
chart today, which focuses so heavily on rea-
sonableness, may appear inconsistent with
some of the language employed in Garcia.
Indeed, both the Court of Appeals and the
district court relied upon it in their decisions
below. See Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op. at
5-6. In Garcia, officers conducting a traffic
stop observed “what appeared to be a gun in
a holster protruding from underneath the
rear of the passenger seat.” 2005-NMSC-
017, 14, 188 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d 72. The
officers removed the driver and passenger
from the vehicle and patted them down for
weapons. As the officers retrieved the fire-
arm from the vehicle, they happened upon an
open beer bottle. Jd. As a result, the pas-
senger was prosecuted on an open container
charge and on a felon in possession charge.
See id. 15. At the inception of the traffic
stop, the passenger left the car prematurely
and then refused to follow the officers’ com-
mands to return to the vehicle. We held that
this aggressive behavior constituted exigent
circumstances, and thus, the officers were
entitled to a limited search of the car, includ-

145

ing seizing the firearm. Jd. 132. In the
course of our analysis, we also stated that.

[t]here must be a reasonable suspicion

[that] the suspect is both armed and dan-

gerous. An individual in a car with a

weapon, by itself, does not create exigent

circumstances. In New Mexico it is lawful
for a non-felon to carry a loaded handgun
in a private automobile or other private
means of conveyance. Because of that, it
would be anomalous to treat the mere
presence of a firearm in an automobile as
supporting a reasonable suspicion that the
occupants are inclined to harm an officer in
the course of a routine traffic stop.
Id. 131 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted). This dicta was part of the
discussion of the issue presented by the par-
ties in Garcia, whether the circumstances
justified a finding of particularized reason-
able suspicion to believe that a particular
person was dangerous. It has no applicabili-
ty to the situation presented here, in which
an officer takes a routine precaution of sepa-
rating any person from a deadly weapon
during the brief duration of a traffie stop.
Moving the weapon temporarily is no less
reasonable a choice than directing the occu-
pants to step away from the vehicle tempo-
rarily. Although either may technically be
called “seizures,” they are both minimal in-
trusions on possessory or liberty interest
that are equally reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.

{27} In this case, we are mindful of the
grave need for officer safety in the midst of
the dangers and uncertainties that are al-
ways inherent in traffic stops. We conclude
that removing Defendant’s firearm from the
vehicle in order to ensure that it was beyond
the reach of any of the occupants during the
stop was a reasonable and minimal intrusion,
which does not outweigh legitimate concerns
of officer safety. Our decision in this case,
which addresses a temporary separation of a
firearm from the occupants of a car during
the duration of a traffie stop, does not de-
pend on any requirement of particularized
suspicion that an occupant is inclined to use
the firearm improperly. As with other war-
rant exception cases, our touchstone is the
requirement of Article II, Section 10 of our

146

New Mexico Constitution that “(t]he people
shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable
searches and seizures....” Under the cir-
cumstances of this case, it was constitutional-
ly reasonable for the officer to remove the
firearm from the vehicle. Therefore, the evi-
dence should not have been suppressed.
CONCLUSION

{28} For the foregoing reasons, the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and we remand the case to the district court
for further proceedings in accordance with
this opinion,

{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMCA-073
257 P.3d 966
Carmen M. ALCANTAR and Isidro R.
Alcantar, Plaintiffs/Judgment
Creditors,

and

Gilbert Sanchez, Personal Representative
of the Estate of Mike Sanchez, deceased,
Intervenor/Third—-Party Plaintiff-Appel-
lant,

ve

Joe SANCHEZ, d/b/a Glenwood Custom
Homes, Defendant/Judgment.
Debtor,

and

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
Garnishee/Third-Party
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 28,436.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
April 22, 2011.

>
m

René Ostrochovsky, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellant, Gilbert Sanchez.

Moses, Dunn, Farmer & Tuthill, P.C., Ali-
cia L. Gutierrez, Jason M. Wexler, Albuquer-
que, NM, for Appellee, Wells Fargo Bank,
NA.

Aldridge, Grammer, Jeffrey, & Hammer,
P.A., David A. Grammer III, Albuquerque,
NM, for Appellees, Carmen M. Aleantar and
Isidro R. Aleantar.

OPINION
KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} This appeal presents issues relating to
the garnishment of funds held in a joint bank
account. The district court awarded sum-
mary judgment in favor of the bank. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further pro-
ceedings.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{2} Our standard of review is well settled.
“Summary judgment is appropriate where
there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Self v. United Parcel Serv,
Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, 116, 126 N.M. 396, 970
P.2d 582. “In determining whether a factual
dispute exists, courts must resolve all reason-
able inferences in favor of the nonmovant
and must read the pleadings, affidavits, depo-
sitions, answers to interrogatories, and ad-
missions in the light most favorable to a trial
on the merits.” Limacher v. Spivey, 2008-
NMCA-163, 18, 145 N.M. 344, 198 P.3d 370.
“Ultimately, we review de novo the legal
question of whether a party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.”
State ew rel. State Eng’r v. Comm’r of Pub.
Lands, 2009-NMCA-004, {1 12, 145 N.M. 433,
200 P.3d 86.

149
BACKGROUND

{3} In March or April 2006, Mike Sanchez
(Mike) visited a local branch of Wells Fargo
Bank (the Bank) in order to change the
status of his accounts. In light of the recent
death of his wife, Mike wanted his two sons,
Joe and Gilbert, to be able to assist him with
the payment of bills and other financial mat-
ters. Mike was advised by the Bank to close
his existing accounts and open new ones. To
that end, a “Consumer Account Application”
was filled out, in which Mike was denom-
inated the “Primary Joint Owner” and his
sons were denominated “Secondary Joint
Owner[s].” Midway through a paragraph at
the bottom of the application is an affirma-
tion that the applicant has “received a copy
of the applicable account agreement and pri-
vacy brochure and agree[s] to be bound by
them.” Mike signed the application, and the
joint accounts that are the subject of this
appeal were opened.

{4} In late October 2006, a writ of garnish-
ment was issued in connection with a civil
lawsuit in which Carmen and Isidro Alcantar
(the Alcantars) had obtained a judgment
against Joe. The writ, which was addressed
to the Bank, identified Joe as the judgment
debtor and specified that the outstanding
balance exceeded $36,000. In its answer, the
Bank indicated that it owed Joe $17,474.77.
This was the entire amount held in the ac-
counts held jointly by Mike, Joe, and Gilbert.
The Bank took immediate possession of all of
the funds, such that none of the joint account
owners could access them.

{5} When Mike received notice of the gar-
nishment, he promptly filed a motion to in-
tervene, asserting that he was in fact the sole
owner of all funds in the accounts and con-
tending the garnishment was wrongful. The
motion was granted. Mike then filed a per-
missive complaint in intervention against the
Bank, advancing claims of conversion, breach
of fiduciary duty, negligence, and negligence
per se. In response, the Bank filed a coun-
terclaim and cross-claim for interpleader, in-
dicating that while it had no claim of its own
upon the funds in question, both the Alcan-
tars and Mike had made conflicting claims.

150

Over Mike’s objections, the Bank’s counter-
claim and cross-claim for interpleader were
granted.

{6} Mike filed a motion for partial sum-
mary judgment, asserting that his sole own-
ership of the funds was undisputed. This
motion was denied. The Bank then filed its
own motion for summary judgment. It con-
tended that its seizure of the funds was in
accordance with the terms of the consumer
account agreement as well as the law per-
taining to garnishment, such that the claims
for conversion and negligence were not via-
ble. The Bank further contended there was
no basis for the existence of a fiduciary duty.
The district court found in the Bank’s favor
and granted summary judgment with respect
to all of Mike’s claims. Mike was reim-
bursed by the Bank. This appeal followed.

Il. DISCUSSION

{7} A large number of issues have been
raised on appeal. We will address related
matters together under unified headings.

A. Denial of Mike’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Hl {8} First, Mike contends the district

court erred in denying his motion for partial

summary judgment with respect to the own-

ership of the funds in the garnished accounts,

{9} The denial of a motion for summary
judgment is not generally reviewable on ap-
peal. Green v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of
Am., 106 N.M. 528, 527, 746 P.2d 152, 156
(1987) (holding that “denial of a motion for
summary judgment is not reviewable after
final judgment on the merits”); but see, e.g.
McAlpine v. Zangara Dodge, Inc. 2008-
NMCA-064, 1129-30, 144 N.M. 90, 183 P.3d
975 (veviewing the denial of a motion for
summary judgment). However, to the extent
that the argument might be characterized as
an attack on the award of summary judg-
ment to the Bank, we briefly address the
merits.

{10} In support of his motion, Mike relied
on an affidavit and an alleged admission. In
the affidavit, Joe stated that he had never
deposited or withdrawn any money from the
garnished accounts, he claimed no ownership

in the accounts, and his name had merely
been added in order to assist Mike with
Mike’s own financial affairs. The “admis-
sion” was extracted from an e-mail exchange
between counsel for the Bank and counsel for
Mike, in which document production was the
subject of discussion. Counsel for the Bank
suggested that documents reflecting recent
deposits into the account, “which would sup-
port your position that the money did not
belong to Joe,” should be produced.

{11} Mike contends that the foregoing ma-
terials “conclusively” established Mike as the
sole owner of the funds in the garnished
accounts, such that partial summary judg-
ment should have been granted with respect
to this central question. We disagree. With
respect to the affidavit, we fail to see how
Joe’s unilateral assertion as to the ownership
of the funds could be regarded as conclusive.
Cf. Jemko, Inc. v. Liaghat, 106 N.M. 50, 52,
738 P.2d 922, 924 (Ct.App.1987) (“The an-
swer of the garnishee is not conclusive upon
the court issuing the garnishment as to the
true ownership of the funds sought to be
garnished[,]”). Plus, the alleged “admission”
extracted from the e-mail message is ambig-
uous. These documents cannot be said to
conclusively resolve the ownership issue, par-
ticularly in light of conflicting evidence that
the funds were jointly owned by Mike, Joe,
and Gilbert as reflected in the account docu-
ments. Because there was a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to the ownership of
the funds, the district court properly denied
Mike’s motion for partial summary judgment.

B. Award of Summary Judgment to the
Bank

HI {12} As an initial matter, the Bank
suggests’ Mike’s appeal from the award of
summary judgment should be deemed moot
because the garnished funds were ultimately
returned to him. However, the return of the
funds was not the only relief sought in the
complaint. Mike also requested compensato-
ry damages, pre- and post-judgment interest,
punitive damages, and attorney fees and
costs. Insofar as these matters were not
addressed by the return of the funds, the
various issues relating to the award of sum-
mary judgment are not moot. See, eg.

Cromer v. J.W. Jones Constr. Co. 79 N.M.
179, 181, 441 P.2d 219, 221 (Ct.App.1968)
(concluding that an appeal from an order
dismissing a complaint was not rendered
moot by payment where the claimant’s enti-
tlement to additional recovery remained un-
resolved), overruled on other grounds by
Schiller v. Sw. Air Rangers, Inc, 87 N.M.
476, 478, 535 P.2d 1827, 1829 (1975).

{13} A variety of theories were advanced
below regarding the Bank’s motion for sum-
mary judgment. The district court did not
specifically identify the basis for its ruling.
We therefore address all pertinent argu-
ments, organizing our analysis around the
claims advanced in the complaint.

1. Conversion

HE {14} ‘The first claim set forth in the
complaint is for conversion. “Conversion is
the unlawful exercise of dominion and control
over property belonging to another in defi-
ance of the owner's rights, or acts constitut-
ing an unauthorized and injurious use of
another’s property, or a wrongful detention
after demand has been made.” Sec. Pac.
Fin. Servs. v. Signfilled Corp., 1998-NMCA-
046, 115, 125 N.M. 38, 956 P.2d 837.

{15} In his complaint, Mike avers that the
Bank converted his property when it seized
the funds held in his accounts. The Bank’s
conduct is alleged to have been unlawful,
unauthorized, and/or wrongful, insofar as no-
tice and joinder were not accomplished as
required by law, and insofar as all of the
funds actually belonged to Mike, rather than
the judgment debtor identified in the writ.

{16} The Bank successfully argued it was
entitled to summary judgment on either of
two theories: (1) the Bank’s conduct was in
compliance with the writ and in conformity
with all applicable laws; and (2) the consum-
er account agreement associated with Mike’s
accounts provided complete authorization for
the Bank’s course of conduct. For the fol-
lowing reasons, we conclude that neither of
these arguments supports the award of sum-
mary judgment.

151
a. The Writ and Applicable Law

Wl {17} The writ of garnishment issued
by the court was in the general, statutorily
specified form. See NMSA 1978, § 35-12-18
(1969) (generally setting forth the form of
writs of garnishment issued by the magis-
trate courts); NMSA 1978, § 35-12-19
(1979) (providing for the issuance of writs of
garnishment by the district courts in the
same manner specified for the magistrate
courts). It orders the Bank to file an an-
swer, keep any money that is owed to the
judgment debtor in sufficient quantity to sat-
isfy the outstanding indebtedness and mail
copies of the writ, the application, the an-
swer, and the claim of exemption forms to
the judgment debtor within four business
days.

{18} Superficially, the Bank’s conduct ap-
pears to have been in compliance with the
terms of the writ. The difficulty arises, how-
ever, when the identity of the judgment
debtor is considered. As the writ clearly
specifies, the only judgment debtor was Joe.
Accordingly, only monies owed by Joe were
subject to seizure. Jemko, 106 N.M. at 52,
738 P.2d at 925 (“A judgment creditor acting
under a writ of garnishment, after due notice
to interested parties, can only seize the prop-
erty that belongs to the judgment debtor.”);
see NMSA 1978, § 35-12-3(A), (C) (1969)
(providing that “service of a garnishment on
the garnishee has the effect of attaching all

. money ... of the defendant in the gar-
nishee’s possession or under his control at
the time of service of the garnishment” and
that after service, “it is unlawful for the
garnishee to pay to the defendant in the
action” any money attached by the garnish-
ment (emphasis added)). It is therefore
questionable whether the Bank’s act of seiz~
ing all the funds contained in the accounts
jointly held by Mike, Joe, and Gilbert could
be said to conform with the writ.

{19} To our knowledge, no authority in
New Mexico directly addresses the handling
of joint accounts in situations like this. A
broad variety of approaches have been taken
in other jurisdictions. See generally Martha
A. Churchill, Annotation, Joint Bank Ac-
count as Subject to Attachment, Garnish-

152

ment, or Execution by Creditor of One Joint
Depositor, 86 A.L.R.5th 527 (2001).

{20} Where joint bank accounts are the
subject of garnishment, statutory provisions
and case law provide limited guidance. Own-
ership of multiple-person accounts is ad-
dressed in NMSA 1978, Section 45-6-211(B)
(1992), which provides that “[dJuring the life-
time of all parties, an account belongs to the
parties in proportion to the net contribution
of each to the sums on deposit, unless there
is clear and convincing evidence of a different
intent.” In this context, “net contribution” is
defined in pertinent part as “the sum of all
deposits to an account made by or for the
party, less all payments from the account
made to or for the party which have not been
paid to or applied to the use of another
party.” Section 46-6-211(A).

IM {21} Accordingly, absent clear and
convincing evidence of a different intent, the
ownership of the funds at issue in this case
corresponded with net contributions. Inso-
far as “[a] judgment creditor acting under a
writ of garnishment ... can only seize the
property that belongs to the judgment debt-
or,” Jemko, 106 N.M. at 52, 738 P.2d at 925,
arguably only Joe’s net contributions to the
accounts should have been subject to seizure
pursuant to the writ of garnishment. Cf
Johnston v. Sunwest Bank, 116 N.M. 422,
423, 863 P.2d 1043, 1045 (1993) (agreeing
that, by enacting provisions of this nature,
the Legislature intended to prevent a holder
of an interest in a joint account from defeat-
ing the ownership rights of the other joint
owners by his or her unilateral acts).

{22} Although the foregoing principles
seem relatively simple in the abstract, diffi-
culties arise with respect to their practical
application. As the Bank has argued, gar-
nishees may not have sufficient information
at their disposal to perform the “net contri-
bution” calculation when served with a writ.
Accordingly, we understand the Bank to con-
tend that seizure of the entire amount held in
a joint account should be deemed appropriate
whenever a writ of garnishment identifies
any co-owner of a joint account as a judg-
ment debtor.

{23} Upon careful consideration, we con-
clude that the approach advocated by the

Bank is at odds with the basic propositions
articulated above, concerning the ownership
interests of joint account holders and judg-
ment creditors’ ability to garnish only prop-
erty belonging to judgment debtors. We
therefore reject the Bank’s argument that
the seizure of all of the funds held in the
joint accounts, without any acknowledgment.
of or concession to the interests of the non-
debtor co-owners, was in accordance with
Jaw.

{24} We recognize that banking institu-
tions may be placed in a difficult position
when presented with a writ of garnishment
in a case such as this where a joint account
exists and only one of the co-owners is identi-
fied as a judgment debtor. See Churchill,
supra, at 559-60 (describing the difficulties
presented in such cases). Immediate resort
to interpleader, together with payment of all
disputed monies into the court registry, may
be the most appropriate response. See su-
pra. Alternatively, placing a brief hold on
the account and promptly engaging in a rea-
sonable investigation might be permissible.
Cf. Landrum v. Sec. Nat'l Bank of Roswell,
104 N.M. 55, 62, 716 P.2d 246, 253 (Ct.App.
1985) (holding that a bank could place a hold
on a depositor’s checking account in order to
make a reasonable inquiry). However, nei-
ther of those approaches was taken in this
case. Instead, as previously stated, the
Bank acted on the writ by seizing all funds in
the joint accounts and sending the standard
paperwork to the judgment debtor, disre-
garding entirely any interests of the other
named co-owners.

{25} Likewise, the Bank’s conduct runs
afoul of at least one statutory provision,
which applies with respect to adverse claims
on deposits:

Notice to any bank of an adverse claim
to a deposit with such bank need not be
recognized, and shall not be deemed effec-
tive, unless and until either the person
making the claim supplies indemnity
deemed adequate by the bank or the bank
is served with process or order issued by a
court of competent jurisdiction in an action
in which the adverse claimant and the

person or persons nominally entitled to
the deposit are parties[.]

NMSA 1978, § 58-1~7 (1975) (emphasis add-
ed). This language suggests that a writ of
garnishment is not to be deemed effective
absent indemnity provided by the garnishor,
service of process, or an order reflecting that
all interested parties have been joined.

{26} To the extent the Bank deemed the
writ to be effective without ensuring that the
necessary statutory preconditions were met,
Mike contends that the seizure of the funds
in the joint accounts may be characterized as
unauthorized, unlawful, and wrongful, there-
by supplying further support for his conver-
sion claim. By contrast, the Bank character-
izes Section 58-1-7 as permissive, allowing it
to refuse to honor an adverse claim under
the specified circumstances but not requiring
it to do so.

Hl {27} We reject the Bank’s interpreta-
tion for two reasons. First, it is at odds with
the mandatory nature of the language em-
ployed. See generally State v. Guerra, 2001-
NMCA-081, 114, 180 N.M. 302, 24 P.3d 334
(“The word ‘shall’ as used in a statute is
generally construed to be mandatory.”).
Second, it is inconsistent with precedent.
See Landrum, 104 N.M. at 59-60, 716 P.2d at
250-51 (rejecting an argument that Section
58-1-7 should be deemed to permit banks to
recognize adverse claims that fail to comply
with the specified procedural requirements).
“Section 58-1~7 provides that notice of an
adverse claim is not an effective notice unless
the claimant complies with the procedure set
forth in Section 58-1-7.” Landrum, 104
N.M. at 60, 716 P.2d at 251. Accordingly, to
the extent the Bank deemed the writ to be
effective notice of an adverse claim, despite
the absence of parties nominally entitled to
the deposit, the Bank’s conduct was contrary
to Section 58~1~7 when Mike’s money was
taken by the Bank.

{28} In summary, we conclude that the
foregoing authorities provide sufficient sup-
port for the claim of conversion to render the
award of summary judgment to the Bank
improper, and we reverse.

153

b. The Applicable Account Agreement.

{29} As stated above, the consumer ac-
count application that Mike, Joe, and Gilbert
signed contained a provision indicating each
“received a copy of the applicable account
agreement and privacy brochure and
agree[d] to be bound by them.” In connec-
tion with its motion for summary judgment,
the Bank relied on portions of a document in
excess of thirty-five pages in length, which a
paralegal for the Bank identified as the appli-
cable account agreement in effect at the time
the accounts in question were opened. This
document specifies that account holders
“agree” to numerous terms and conditions,
among which is a provision allowing the Bank
to “accept and act on any legal process that it
believes is valid [including] garnish-
ment[J” Additionally, the document pro-
vides that “[tJhe Bank may rely solely on its
records to determine the form of owner-
ship[.]” Finally, the document indicates that
“(iJf there is ... legal action (such as a third-
party garnishment ...) affecting any co-own-
er, the Bank may treat all funds in the
Account as belonging to the person against
whom the ... legal action is directed.”

WM {30} The Bank has argued that its
course of conduct in relation to the account
and in response to the writ of garnishment
‘was expressly authorized under the foregoing
terms, such that there is no basis for the
claim of conversion.

{31} We tend to agree that if the docu-
ment in question actually governs Mike’s
contractual relationship with the Bank, the
Bank’s conduct was authorized. However, in
his response to the Bank’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, Mike filed an affidavit in
which he clearly and explicitly denied ever
receiving a copy of the applicable “account
agreement,” or being informed of its terms.
This creates a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to the applicability of the agree-
ment. See generally Pope v. The Gap, Inc.,
1998-NMCA-103, 1111, 13, 125 N.M. 376,
961 P.2d 1283 (“For an offer and acceptance
to create a binding contract, there must be
an objective manifestation of mutual assent
by the parties to the material terms of the
contract ... [and, mJutual assent is based on

154

objective evidence, not the private, undis-
closed thoughts of the parties.”).

{82} We understand the Bank to contend
that there should be no question as to Mike’s
receipt of the applicable account agreement
and its binding effect because the consumer
account application contains an affirmation of
receipt. Yet, the affirmation is not strictly
controlling. Rather, we may look beyond the
terms of the consumer account application
and consider the circumstances surrounding
the bargain. See generally Ponder v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2000-NMSC-033,
18, 129 N.M. 698, 12 P.3d 960 (“In abandon-
ing reliance only on the four-corners ap-
proach, courts are now allowed to consider
extrinsic evidence in determining whether an
ambiguity exists in the first instance, or to
resolve any ambiguities that a court may
discover.”).

{33} Because there is a genuine dispute as
to whether the applicable account agreement
was incorporated in the parties’ contractual
relationship, its terms do not supply a basis
for the award of summary judgment to the
Bank.

2. Negligence and Negligence Per Se

Hs {84} We turn next to the claims for
negligence and negligence per se. “Negli-
gence as a cause of action requires the proof
of the following elements: duty, breach of
that duty by failing to conform to the re-
quired standard, proximate cause, and loss or
damage.” Payne v. Hall, 2004-NMCA-113,
117, 186 N.M. 380, 98 P.3d 1030, rev'd on
other grounds, 2006-NMSC-029, 139 N.M.
659, 187 P.8d 599. Negligence per se re-
quires:

(1) There must be a statute which pre-

scribes certain actions or defines a stan-

dard of conduet, either explicitly or implic-
itly, (2) the defendant must violate the
statute, (8) the plaintiff must be in the
class of persons sought to be protected by
the statute, and (4) the harm or injury to
the plaintiff must generally be of the type
the [Llegislature through the statute
sought to prevent.

McElhannon v. Ford, 2008-NMCA-091, 132,

134 N.M. 124, 78 P.3d 827 (alteration omit-

ted) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

{35} In the complaint, the claims for negli-
gence and negligence per se are premised on
much the same conduct and considerations as
the claim for conversion. To summarize, the
Bank is alleged to have wrongfully seized the
funds in the accounts despite its actual or
constructive knowledge of Mike’s actual own-
ership in violation of Section 58-1~7 without
providing notice to Mike.

{36} The Bank moved for summary judg-
ment with respect to these claims on grounds
that (1) no basis for the existence of any
statutory duty had been established, (2)
proper notice was given, and (8) its conduct
was in compliance with the terms of the writ
and the applicable account agreement.

HM {87} We have already rejected the
Bank’s first and third enumerated arguments
in connection with the claim for conversion.
To briefly reiterate, Section 58-1~7 estab-
lishes a mandatory statutory procedure with
respect to the handling of adverse claims to
deposits. As a result, it supplies a basis for
the existence of a statutory duty. Had the
Bank only complied with that statute, this
ease may well have not been needed to vindi-
cate Mike’s rights. With respect to the
Bank’s conduct, there are genuine issues of
material fact concerning compliance with the
terms of the writ and the law as it pertains to
the garnishment of joint accounts, as well as
with the applicability of the account agree-
ment. We therefore reject these arguments
as grounds for the award of summary judg-
ment in relation to the claim for negligence
per se.

{38} The Bank’s remaining argument, re-
lating to the question of Mike’s entitlement
to notice, has greater merit. Our rules con-
cerning notice to third-party, non-debtor co-
holders of jointly held accounts when a notice
of garnishment is received require nothing of
abank. Rule 1-065.2(F) NMRA provides for
mailings to each debtor by the garnishee, but
leaves off short of the present situation.
When a bank has knowledge of a non-debtor
owner of an account subject to garnishment,
Section 58-1-7 obligates the bank to act with
regard to the garnishment and the sufficien-

ey of the ereditor’s claim, but not with regard
to the non-debtor owners.

{39} Mike relies principally on an excerpt
from Jemko, which provides that “[a] judg-
ment creditor acting under a writ of garnish-
ment, after due notice to interested parties,
can only seize the property that belongs to
the judgment debtor.” 106 N.M. at 52, 738
P.2d at 924 (emphasis added). Jemko, how-
ever, does no more than state that a judg-
ment creditor cannot reach funds owned
jointly by the debtor and someone who is not
a party to the garnishment proceeding.
While Jemko’s holding may be furthered and
enforced by a bank declining under Section
58-1-7, a garnishment that does not on its
face show that the other owners of a bank
account sought to be garnished, it does not
require that the bank provide notice to the
non-debtor depositors. Similarly, Johnston,
mentioned above, may deny summary judg-
ment to a bank and allow an action for
negligence when a bank has violated its own
procedures by allowing a new person to be
added to an account without any notice to an
account holder, even if the complaining party
is not an owner by virtue of having made no
contribution to the account, but having a
contingent survivor’s interest. 116 N.M. at
426, 863 P.2d at 1047. However, Johnston
did not deal with a garnishment, but the
removal of the funds by the added third
owner of whom the plaintiff might not have
been given notice. It did not deal with a
claim for funds in a joint account by an
outsider through garnishment.

{40} A debtor may not make his
fellow depositors aware of his status or of
proceedings against him that might impact
their interests in the joint account. A bank,
as garnishee, has the obligation not to honor
a garnishment that does not list all owners of
an account, but we are hesitant to impose a
further duty to notify the non-debtor account
owners of the garnishment. Current stat-
utes impose a duty to ensure that incoming
claims against accounts are sufficient; that
account ownership exists in proportion to
account contributions under Section 46-6-
211(A) absent contrary intent of the owners
does not compel a bank garnishee to provide
any greater measure of protection to non-

155

debtor account owners. In the absence of
clear legislative or common law rules estab-
lishing a duty of notice, we find none and
affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the Bank as to negligence.

{41} Jemko and other authorities previous-
ly discussed in relation to the garnishment of
joint accounts imply that all interested par-
ties are entitled to notice with respect to
garnishment, but from the creditor, not the
garnishee bank.

HN {42} Such a duty to give notice when
the bank is aware of non-debtor holders (in
this case, owners) whose interests are jeopar-
dized by a garnishment of which the bank
becomes aware comes from the primary sta-
tus as garnishee that the bank occupies. A
fellow depositor may not be made aware of
the garnishment by the fellow depositor who
is a debtor, but the bank possesses the infor-
mation concerning the claim quite directly.
Together with the statutory duty to ensure a
garnishment not proceed against innocent
depositors if they were not included in or
served with the proceedings for garnishment,
the bank can properly be viewed as having a
responsibility to notify the non-debtor hold-
ers of an account that a problem with their
account exists by way of a claim against it.
To the extent to which these duties are sup-
ported by sufficient facts in this case, we hold
that the claims for negligence per se and
negligence were improperly dismissed, and
we reverse the district court.

8. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Hs“ {43} Next, we consider Mike’s
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. “[A] fidu-
ciary relationship exists in all cases where
there has been a special confidence reposed
in one who in equity and good conscience is
bound to act in good faith and with due
regard to the interests of one reposing the
confidence.” Moody v. Stribling, 1999-
NMCA-094, 118, 127 N.M. 630, 985 P.2d
1210 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Our assessment of whether a fidu-
ciary duty exists between two parties turns
on “whether the relationship between the
parties is one of trust and confidence.” Id.
117.

156

{44} As the basis for the claim in this case,
the complaint specifies that the Bank owed
Mike a fiduciary duty “as trustee of [his]
deposited funds.” The Bank challenged this
proposition below, contending as a matter of
Jaw that it could not be said to owe any
fiduciary duty to Mike.

{45} No authority has been cited to sug-
gest that banks universally owe fiduciary
duties to their depositors. See generally In
re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676
P.2d 1829, 1880 (1984) (observing that if a
party cites no authority to support an argu-
ment, we may assume no such authority ex-
ists). There is a similar lack of authority to
support the proposition that banks should be
regarded as trustees vis-a-vis their deposi-
tors. To the extent Mike advocates the
adoption of either of these approaches, we
decline to do so.

{46} Nor do we find any evidentiary sup-
port for the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship in this case. The only evidence in the
record addressing the specifics of the rela-
tionship between the parties is the aforemen-
tioned account agreement. Nothing therein
suggests the Bank was a fiduciary. By all
appearances, the parties merely established
an arm’s-length, commercial relationship.
Under such circumstances, a claim for breach
of a fiduciary duty cannot stand. Branch v.
Chamisa Dev. Corp., 2009-NMCA-~181, 141,
147 N.M. 397, 223 P.8d 942, cert. denied,
2009-NMCERT-011, 147 N.M. 463, 225 P.38d
7193.

{47} In his reply brief to this Court, Mike
suggests that his claim for breach of fiducia-
ry duty could properly be based on the
Bank’s activities as an account advisor, which
were undertaken in response to his request
to alter the status of his accounts. But this
theory was not advanced below, and we de-
cline to consider its merits.

{48} In summary, because Mike failed to
establish any basis for the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between himself and
the Bank, we affirm the district court’s
award of summary judgment with respect to
that claim.

C. Interpleader

HM {49} Mike argues the district court
erred in granting the Bank’s counterclaim
and cross-claim for interpleader. The Bank
contends Mike’s challenge to the propriety of
the interpleader order should be deemed
moot because the funds that were the subject
of interpleader have been returned to Mike.

HE {50} We do not generally consid-
er moot issues. State v. Wilson, 2005-
NMCA-180, 114, 188 N.M. 551, 123 P.8d
784, affd, 2006-NMSC-037, 140 N.M. 218,
141 P.8d 1272, “An appeal is moot when no
actual controversy exists, and an appellate
ruling will not grant the appellant any actual
relief.” State v. Sergio B., 2002-NMCA-070,
19, 132 N.M. 375, 48 P.3d 764.

{51} In this case, vacating the interpleader
order affords Mike no relief, insofar as the
interpleader proceedings have been conclud-
ed and the disputed funds have been re-
turned to him. Although Mike contends that
the order should be vacated on remand to
“dispense with the fiction that the Bank was
an innocent bystander,” the order supports
no such inference. To the contrary, it specif-
ically provides that the interpleader did not
absolve the Bank of any liability with respect
to Mike’s complaint in intervention. As a
result, we agree with the Bank that the
propriety of the interpleader order is moot.
Yet, in the event some form of supplemental
relief might otherwise be afforded, we very
briefly address Mike’s various challenges.

HM {52} Mike attacks the order chiefly
on the theory that the Bank abandoned neu-
trality by litigating against him, rendering
interpleader improper. However, the Bank’s
litigation conduct was not inconsistent with
interpleader.

{53} “Traditionally, one of the essential
requirements in an equitable interpleader ac-
tion was that the plaintiff seeking interplead-
er be entirely indifferent to the conflicting
claims, asserting no interest in the fund or
property deposited.” Fireman’s Ins. Co. v.
Bustani, 105 N.M. 760, 761, 737 P.2d 541, 542
(1987). We find no indication that the Bank
ever asserted any claim to the funds, which
were the subject of the garnishment dispute.
Nor did the Bank advance any other claim

against Mike or any other party. Rather, it
was Mike who advanced claims against the
Bank. The Bank’s defensive response to
Mike’s claims does not undermine the propri-
ety of interpleader. See id. (“It is no longer
a ground for objection that the [party seek-
ing interpleader] avers that he is not liable in
whole or in part to any or all of the claim-
ants.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

HM {54} Mike further argues that the
district court erred because there was no
longer any dispute with respect to the dispo-
sition of the funds at the time the interplead-
er order was entered. In support of this
proposition, Mike relies on the Alcantars’
filing of notice of withdrawal of the writ of
garnishment. However, that withdrawal was
expressly “conditioned on there being no
fees, costs, or damages assessed” against the
Alcantars. We find no indication the district
court took action upon that conditional no-
tice. To the contrary, the record reflects
that the writ was withdrawn only after the
parties stipulated to the disbursement of the
funds to Mike. We therefore conclude that,
there was a continuing dispute at the time
the order was entered, providing a proper
subject for interpleader.

HM {55} Finally, Mike takes issue with
supplemental language appearing in the in-
terpleader order. In part, this language in-
dicates that the Bank “is discharged from
any liability to any of the parties, except as
to the allegations pled by Mike ... [which]
will be decided by the [court at a later date.”
Mike contends that this represents an im-
proper attempt to eliminate the basis for any
claims that might have been brought by third
parties. However, Mike has failed to demon-
strate any basis to assert the rights of third
parties. See generally ACLU of N.M. v. City
of Albuquerque, 2008-NMSC-045, 1381, 144
N.M. 471, 188 P.3d 1222 (describing the
showing that a litigant must make in order to
assert the rights of third parties).

{56} Mike further contends that the lan-
guage indicating that his claims and the
Bank’s request for attorney fees would be
decided at a later date was improper because
it reflects an expression of intent to deny him
a jury trial and because there was no basis

157

for an award of attorney fees to the Bank.
It seems reasonably clear, however, that the
language in question was merely intended to
reflect that there had been no release of
liability with respect to Mike’s claims and
that the merits of the Bank’s request for
attorney fees would not be immediately ad-
dressed. See generally Albuquerque Natl
Bank v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct, 77 N.M. 608,
609, 426 P.2d 204, 208 (1967) (Wood, J., dis-
senting) (“Orders, like judgments, must re-
ceive a reasonable interpretation. Whenever
a judgment is susceptible of two interpreta-
tions, one of which is in the power of the
court and the other would exceed it, the first
must be preferred.”), As such, we perceive
no impropriety. We therefore reject Mike’s
challenges to the interpleader order.

D. Miscellaneous Matters

{57} Finally, we briefly address an assort-
ment of residual issues and arguments ad-
vanced in the briefs.

1. Violation of Federal Laws

HM {58} In several places throughout
his briefs to this Court, Mike contends that
the Bank’s course of conduct violated federal
Jaws.

HI {59} “To preserve an issue for ap-
peal, a party must clearly raise the issue in
the lower court by invoking a ruling from the
court on the question.” Juneau v. Intel
Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, 112, 189 N.M. 12,
127 P.3d 548 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Mike did not request or
receive any ruling with respect to the assert-
ed violations of federal law. To the contrary,
he took the position that these matters could
only be addressed in federal court. As such,
it is dear that Mike failed to preserve his
arguments based on federal law for consider-
ation by this Court.

2. Intervention—Gilbert

{60} Gilbert moved to intervene below.
After conducting a hearing, the district court
denied the motion on grounds that Gilbert
did not claim an interest in the disputed
funds. Mike seeks to challenge this ruling
on appeal. We decline to consider the mat-

158

ter, chiefly because a timely appeal from the
district court’s order was not taken, see
Heimann v. Adee, 122 N.M. 340, 348, 924
P.2d 1852, 1360 (1996) (observing that the
denial of a petition to intervene is a final,
appealable order), but also because Mike has
failed to make a showing of entitlement to
assert Gilbert’s rights. See generally ACLU,
2008-NMSC-045, 131, 144 N.M. 471, 188
P.38d 1222 (describing the showing that a
litigant must make in order to assert the
rights of third parties, including a demon-
stration that the third party is somehow hin-
dered in his or her ability to protect his or
her own interests).

3. Ruling on the Bank’s Motion for At-
torney Fees

HH {61} In connection with its motion
for summary judgment, the Bank sought an
award of attorney fees, In its order on the
motion, the district court denied the request.
Mike seeks to challenge this ruling on appeal,
contending that insofar as the Bank had ver-
bally withdrawn its request for attorney fees,
the court should not have ruled on the mer-
its. However, our review of the transcript
reveals that the alleged “withdrawal” of the
request for attorney fees was both ambigu-
ous and conditional. We therefore reject the
premise. Furthermore, we fail to see how
the claimed error could be said to affect the
substantial rights of the parties. See gener-
ally Rule 1-061 NMRA (stating the harmless
error rule).

4, Ruling on the Alcantars’ Notice of
Withdrawal of Writ

{62} Finally, Mike contends the district
court erred in granting the Alcantars’ notice
of withdrawal of the writ to the extent it was
conditioned on a full release from any liabili-
ty. As previously mentioned, however, the
record contains nothing to suggest that the
district court took action upon the conditional
notice. Instead, the writ was withdrawn af-
ter the parties stipulated to the disbursement
of the funds to Mike. We therefore perceive
no factual basis for the claim of error.

IV. CONCLUSION

{63} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the award of summary judgment with re-
spect to the claim for breach of fiduciary
duty; we reverse the award of summary
judgment with respect to the claims for con-
version, negligence, and negligence per se;
and we remand for further proceedings con-
sistent with this Opinion.

{64} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge, and MICHAEL E. VIGIL,

Judge.
2011-NMCA-069
257 P.3d 978
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff
Appellant,

y.
Javier TREVIZO, Defendant—Appellee.
No. 30,482.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
May 10, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrew
S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Chief Public Defender, Lisa Bozone, Assis-
tant Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, NM,
for Appellee.

OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} We consider in this appeal whether
driving under the influence (DWI) (first of-
fense), in violation of NMSA 1978, Section
66-8-102(E) (2005) (amended 2010), and
reckless driving, in violation of NMSA 1978,
Section 66-8-113 (1987), have an applicable
statute of limitations of one, two, or three
years. We conclude that the applicable stat-
ute of limitations for both crimes is one year.
We therefore affirm the district court order
remanding to the metropolitan court for dis-
missal of the charges against Defendant with
prejudice.

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant Javier Trevizo was arrested
and charged with DWI (first offense), reck-
less driving, and other violations of the Mo-
tor Vehicle Code, NMSA 1978, Sections 66-
1-1 to -8-141 (1978, as amended through
2010), that are not relevant to this appeal.
Defendant’s arrest occurred on October 13,
2005. A criminal complaint was filed against
Defendant in metropolitan court on April 12,
2007. The time between Defendant’s arrest
and the filing of the criminal complaint was
one day short of eighteen months.

{3} Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing
that the charges were barred because the
complaint was filed outside the applicable
limitations period. The metropolitan court
denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that a
two-year statute of limitations applied and,
therefore, the charges against Defendant
were not time-barred. Defendant was subse-
quently convicted of DWI (first offense) and
reckless driving. He appealed his convic-
tions to the district court.

{4} The district court reversed the metro-
politan court’s decision and remanded for the
charges against Defendant to be dismissed
with prejudice. The district court concluded
that DWI (first offense) and reckless driving
were petty misdemeanors and subject to a
one-year statute of limitations. The State
appeals.

APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS

{5} This Court must determine whether a

one, two, or three-year statute of limitations

160

applies to the charges of DWI (first offense)
and reckless driving. NMSA 1978, Section
30~1-8 (2005) (amended 2009) of the Criminal
Code provides for the following relevant time
limitations for commencing prosecution:
C. for a misdemeanor, within two years
from the time the crime was committed;
D. for a petty misdemeanor, within one
year from the time the crime was commit-
ted;

G. for any crime not contained in the
Criminal Code or where a limitation is not
otherwise provided for, within three years
from the time the crime was committed[.]*

I {6} The State contends that the Leg-
islature has designated all violations of the
Motor Vehicle Code to be misdemeanors un-
Jess otherwise designated as a felony and,
thus, a two-year statute of limitations applies.
Alternatively, the State argues that because
the crimes of DWI and reckless driving are
found outside of the Criminal Code, the
three-year statute of limitations provided for
in Subsection (G) applies. Defendant con-
tends that both DWI (first offense) and reck-
less driving are petty misdemeanors pursu-
ant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-1-6(C) (1963)
and, thus, the limitations period is only one
year.

I {7} The limitations provisions relied
on by the parties are statutory in nature.
“Statutory interpretation is an issue of law,
which we review de novo.” State v. Duhon,
2005-NMCA-120, 110, 188 N.M. 466, 122
P.8d 50. “Our primary goal when interpret-
ing statutory language is to give effect to the
intent of the [Llegislature.” State v. Torres,
2006-NMCA-106, 18, 140 N.M. 230, 141 P.38d
1284. “We do this by giving effect to the
plain meaning of the words of [the] statute,
unless this leads to an absurd or unreason-
able result.” State v. Marshall, 2004-
NMCA-104, 17, 186 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801.

1. The Legislature's 2009 amendment to Section
30-1-8 added a provision providing a statute of
limitations of five years for identity theft once
discovered. The amendment did not change the
substance of Section 30-1-8(G), but the number-
ing for the statute changed. The provision is
now codified as Section 30-1-8(H). We refer to
the provision herein as Section 30-1-8(G).

We therefore engage in a de novo review of
“whether a particular statute of limitations
applies.” Jaramillo v. Gonzales, 2002-
NMCA-072, 18, 182 N.M, 459, 50 P.8d 554.

{8} In Robinson v. Short, 93 N.M. 610, 603
P.2d 720 (1979), our Supreme Court consid-
ered the applicability of the three-year stat-
ute of limitations for crimes not contained in
the Criminal Code. The Court determined
that the crime of falsely obtaining unemploy-
ment benefits, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sec-
tion 51-1-38 (1993), was subject to a one-
year statute of limitations, not a three-year
statute of limitations, even though it was
“uncontroverted that the crimes with which
[the defendant was] charged [were] not con-
tained in the Criminal Code.” See Robinson,
93 N.M. at 611, 603 P.2d at 721. In making
this determination, the Court looked to Sec-
tion 80-1-8(G)? and concluded that because
the sentence authorized for a violation of
Section 511-38 was consistent with charac-
terizing the crime as a petty misdemeanor, a
limitation was otherwise provided for, thus,
making the three-year statute of limitations
contained in Section 30-1-8(G) inapplicable.
Robinson, 93 N.M. at 611, 603 P.2d at 721.
The Court determined that, because the
crime charged carried “an authorized penalty
of imprisonment for not longer than thirty
days, or a fine of not over one hundred
dollars or both,” and Section 51-1-88 did not
specifically delineate the degree of crime, the
definition for petty misdemeanors provided
by Section 30-1-6(C) should control. Robin-
son, 93 N.M. at 611, 603 P.2d at 721; see
§ 30-1-6(C) (providing that “[a] crime is a
petty misdemeanor if it is so designated by
law or if upon conviction thereof a sentence
of imprisonment for six months or less is
authorized”). The Court therefore held that
the one-year statute of limitations for petty
misdemeanors contained in Section 30-1-
8(D) should apply. See Robinson, 93 N.M. at
611-12, 603 P.2d at 721-22.

2. At the time Robinson was decided, the three-
year statute of limitations for crimes outside of
the Criminal Code was codified as Section 30-1-
8(F). We note that the language in Section 30-
1-8(G) is the same as when the Court decided
Robinson. To avoid confusion, we continue to
refer to this provision as Section 30-1-8(G) in
the text of the opinion.

{9} Implicit in our Supreme Court’s treat-
ment of Section 30-1-8(G) was its decision to
read the provisions conjunctively. Thus, our
Supreme Court determined that the fact that
“the crimes with which [the defendant was]
charged [were] not contained in the Criminal
Code” was insufficient to make the three-
year statute of limitations apply. See Robin-
son, 93 N.M. at 611, 603 P.2d at 721 (“It is
uncontroverted that the crimes with which
[the defendant was] charged [were] not con-
tained in the Criminal Code. What we con-
cern ourselves with is whether a limitation is
‘otherwise provided for” ”). To the extent
the State argues that the three-year statute
of limitations applies because the crimes
charged are contained in the Motor Vehicle
Code and not the Criminal Code, we are
bound by our Supreme Court’s interpretation
of Section 80-1-8(G) in Robinson. See State
v. Travarez, 99 N.M. 309, 311, 657 P.2d 636,
638 (Ct.App.1983) (stating that the Court of
Appeals must follow applicable precedents of
the Supreme Court).

{10} Furthermore, to the extent the State
contends that Robinson is no longer good
law, we disagree. The State points out that,
following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Robinson, the Legislature amended Section
80-1-8 and included a section providing that
violations of Section 51-1-88 are subject to a
three-year statute of limitations. We agree
that this amendment indicated a legislative
intent contrary to what our Supreme Court
had determined to have been the legislative
intent in Robinson. See Robinson, 93 N.M.
at 612, 603 P.2d at 722 (“To interpret the
statutes [to apply a three-year statute of
limitations] would result in an inconsistency
we do not believe the Legislature intended.
Crimes with an authorized maximum penalty
of less than six months which do not express-
ly state the degree of the crime would have
the same length of limitation as a third or
fourth degree felony.”). However, although
with the amendment the Legislature provid-
ed a specific statute of limitation for viola-
tions of Section 51-1-88, it chose not to alter
the language in Section 30-1-8(G) interpret-
ed by our Supreme Court. As a result, the
Legislature’s subsequent amendment of Sec-
tion 30-1-8 did not abrogate our Supreme

161

Court’s reading of Section 30-1-8(G) in Rob-
‘imson.

{11} Moreover, to interpret Section 30-1-
8(G) as the State suggests would result in a
three-year statute of limitations for all viola-
tions of the Motor Vehicle Code. A three-
year statute of limitations would therefore
apply not only to DWI (first offense) and
reckless driving, but to speeding violations,
parking violations, failure to signal, following
too closely, and other traffic violations. See
NMSA 1978, § 66-7-801 (2002); NMSA
1978, § 66-7-352 (1978); NMSA 1978, § 66~-
7-825 (1978); NMSA 1978, § 66-7-318
(4978). Thus, crimes generally subject to
penalty assessments in the Motor Vehicle
Code would have a statute of limitations
longer than all crimes other than felonies.
See generally § 30-1-8(C), (D). We do not
believe that the Legislature intended such a
result. For these reasons, we reject the
State’s argument that a three-year statute of
limitations should apply to all violations of
the Motor Vehicle Code.

HI {12} We now turn to the State’s argu-
ment that a two-year statute of limitations
should apply to DWI (first offense) and reck-
Jess driving. The State relies on Section 30-
1-6, which provides:

B. A crime is a misdemeanor if it is so
designated by law or if upon conviction
thereof a sentence of imprisonment in ex-
cess of six months but less than one year is
authorized.

C. Acrime is a petty misdemeanor if it
is so designated by law or if upon convic-
tion thereof a sentence of imprisonment
for six months or less is authorized.

{13} The State contends that Section 66~-
8-7(A) designates all violations of the Motor
Vehicle Code as misdemeanors “unless the
violation is declared a felony.” Section 66-8-
(A) provides that “i]t is a misdemeanor for
any person to violate any provision of the
Motor Vehicle Code [Section 66-1-1] unless
the violation is declared a felony.” The State
argues that, in selecting between these two
means of defining a misdemeanor or petty
misdemeanor, the Legislature’s designation
of violations of the Motor Vehicle Code as
misdemeanors takes precedence over the au-
thorized punishment for the violation. The

162

State relies on cases holding that a statute
must not be construed to render any part of
it surplusage. See State v. Rivera, 2004—
NMSC-001, 118, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.38d 939
(“We are generally unwilling to construe one
provision of a statute in a manner that would
make other provisions null or superfluous.”).
We understand the State to argue that, be-
eause all criminal violations will have a spe-
cific punishment associated with them, if this
Court does not give the legislative designa-
tion priority, that provision of the statute will
be rendered superfluous. The State there-
fore asserts that the Legislature’s classifica-
tion of all violations of the Motor Vehicle
Code as misdemeanors, unless specifically
designated as felonies, results in the applica-
tion of a two-year statute of limitations.

{14} We disagree with the State that, if
this Court were to rely on the Legislature’s
designation of violations of the Motor Vehicle
Code as “misdemeanors” in Section 66-8-
7(A), our inquiry would be complete. Misde-
meanor is defined as “[a] crime that is less
serious than a felony and is usually punisha-
ble by fine, penalty, forfeiture, or confine-
ment ... in a place other than prison.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1089 (9th ed. 2009)
(emphasis added). Based on this definition,
a misdemeanor would encompass any crime
that was not a felony, including petty misde-
meanors. We read the Legislature’s use of
“misdemeanor” in Section 66-8-7 as merely
making this distinction and not as precluding
treatment of violations of the Motor Vehicle
Code as petty misdemeanors. Cf Incorpo-
rated Cnty. of Los Alamos v. Johnson, 108
N.M. 688, 636, 776 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1989)
(Baca, J., specially concurring) (“‘[Mlisde-
meanor’ ... includes ‘petty misdemeanors’ as
it historically always has.”).

{15} Section 66-8-7(B) provides further
support for our interpretation of these provi-
sions:

Unless another penalty is specified in the
Motor Vehicle Code, every person convict-
ed of a misdemeanor for violation of any
provision of the Motor Vehicle Code shall
be punished by a fine of not more than
three hundred dollars ($300) or by impris-
onment for not more than ninety days or
both.

The Legislature has therefore set the penalty
for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code to be
consistent with the classification of petty mis-
demeanors found in the Criminal Code. See
§ 30-1-6(C) (“A crime is a petty misdemean-
or if it is so designated by law or if upon
conviction thereof a sentence of imprison-
ment for six months or less is authorized.”).

{16} To the extent the State argues that
there are “persuasive policy considerations
based on which the Legislature could ration-
ally treat the particular offenses of DWI and
reckless driving as more serious than petty
misdemeanors[,]” we agree. However, it
does not appear that the Legislature has
chosen to do so with respect to DWI (first
offense) and reckless driving. Instead, the
punishment designated by the Legislature
for reckless driving and DWI (first offense)
indicates the legislative intent to treat these
crimes as petty misdemeanors. See § 66-8-
113(B); § 66-8-102(E); of Lewis v. United
States, 518 U.S. 322, 326, 116 S.Ct. 2168, 135
L.Ed.2d 590 (1996) (stating that the maxi-
mum penalty attached to an offense “is con-
sidered the most relevant with which to as-
sess the character of an offense, because it
reveals the legislature’s judgment about the
offense’s severity”); Frank v. United States,
395 U.S. 147, 148, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Hd.2d
162 (1969) (“The most relevant indication of
the seriousness of an offense is the severity
of the penalty authorized for its commis-
sion.”).

{17} The State also relies on City of Santa
Fe v. Martinez, 2010-NMSC-033, 148 N.M.
708, 242 P.8d 275. In Martinez, our Su-
preme Court recognized the compelling pub-
lic interest in eradicating DWI occurrences
and the potentially deadly consequences
when DWI is committed. Id. 113. The
State argues that the same interests support
a limitations period longer than that of a
petty misdemeanor. The misdemeanor ar-
yest rule has its origins in the common law.
State v. Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023, 911, 148
N.M. 749, 182 P.38d 130. As our Supreme
Court explained,

the original purpose of the [misdemeanor

arrest] rule was to minimize the harm

historically associated with lengthy custo-
dial detentions for minor crimes. Ochoa,

2008-NMSC-028, 112 [143 N.M. 749, 182
P.8d 180] [ (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) ].
Although the continued viability of the mis-
demeanor arrest rule has been questioned
generally, see Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478,
483-84, 152 P.2d 886, 890 (1944), we con-
clude that DWI investigations, in particu-
Jar, fall outside the original purpose of the
rule.

TI {18} The case before us, involves a
criminal statute of limitations imposed by the
Legislature. Criminal statutes of limitation
“are to be liberally construed in favor of a
defendant because their purpose ‘is to limit
exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain
fixed period of time following the occurrence
of those acts the [Llegislature has decided to
punish by criminal sanctions.’” State v. Ker-
by, 2007-NMSC-014, 118, 141 N.M, 413, 156
P.8d 704 (quoting Toussie v. United States,
397 US. 112, 114, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Bd.2d
156 (1970)). Because the purposes of the
misdemeanor arrest rule and criminal stat-
utes of limitations are distinct, we decline the
State’s invitation to use the reasoning in
Martinez to expand the limitation period set
by the Legislature.

163

{19} If the State is correct and the Legis-
lature intended to treat these crimes more
seriously by providing for a longer limita-
tions period, the Legislature may explicitly
do so by providing a specific limitation period
for these crimes in Section 30-1-8 as it did
following our Supreme Court’s decision in
Robinson. However, based on the current
legislation, we conclude that the Legislature
intended for these crimes to be treated as
petty misdemeanors. We further conclude
that, pursuant to Section 30-1-8(D), a one-
year statute of limitations applies.
CONCLUSION

{20}. We affirm the district court and re-
mand to the metropolitan court to dismiss
the charges with prejudice.

{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge, and LINDA M. VANZI, Judge.

2011-NMSC-032
258 P.3d 443

Pete RODRIGUEZ, Jose Turrubiates, Bill
and Norma Corsaut, as guardians of mi-
nor children, Draven C. and Devan W.,
natural children of Eloy Doporto, Jr.,
deceased, and Mike Lucas, Workers-Pe-
titioners,

v.

PERMIAN DRILLING CORPORATION
and American Home Assurance,
Employer-Insurer-Respondents.

No. 32,311.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
July 19, 2011.

© :
a

167

Trenchard & Hoskins, Royce E. Hoskins,
Josephine Lue Roswell, NM, Trenchard &
Hoskins, Paul G. Tellez, El Paso, TX, Chavez
Law Office, Gonzalo Chavez, Roswell, NM,
for Petitioners.

Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C., Carlos G.
Martinez, Emily A. Franke, Albuquerque,
NM, for Respondents.

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} This Opinion addresses an exception in
the Workers’ Compensation Act, NMSA
1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1987) (as amended
through 2006) (the Act), that permits com-
pensation for injuries incurred in travel by
employees when those injuries “aris[e] out of
and in the course of employment.” Section
52-1-19. Eloy Doporto, Jr.1 Mike Lucas,
Jose Turrubiates, and Pete Rodriguez (col-
lectively, Workers), oilfield workers em-
ployed by Permian Drilling Corporation
(Permian), insured by American Home As-
surance, were involved in an automobile acci-
dent while traveling to their work site, re-
sulting in the death of Doporto and injuries
to the others. We conclude that the injuries
suffered by Workers arose out of and in the
course of their employment because the trav-
el was mutually beneficial to employees and
employer and Workers encountered special
hazards unique to their employment while
traveling, thus rendering Workers “traveling
employees” whose injuries are compensable
under the Act.

I. FACTUAL AND
BACKGROUND

{2} Our review of the whole record devel-
oped before the Workers’ Compensation
Judge (WCJ) supports the following state-
ment of the factual background. Permian
operates mobile drilling rigs throughout
southeastern New Mexico and western Tex-
as. The rigs are mobile and are moved to a
new location after the drilling of a well is
complete, generally every seven to eight
days. The drill sites typically are located in

PROCEDURAL

1._ Petitioners concerned with Doporto's claim are
Bill and Norma Corsaut as guardians of Dopor-

rural areas, far from any town, making travel
necessary. Crews travel to and from the
drill site daily; if the site is extremely re-
mote, however, the drilling company provides
lodging. The rigs, operated twenty-four
hours a day, are staffed by three crews work-
ing eight-hour shifts and a relief crew that
replaces the others on their respective days
off.

{3} Each crew consists of a driller and
three to four crew members. The driller is
responsible for hiring and supervising his
crew, subject to Permian’s approval. The
driller is obligated to have a full crew present
at the drilling site at the beginning of the
shift; an insufficient number of crew mem-
bers results in an idle rig and imposes a
significant financial burden on the company.
To meet this responsibility, the industry
practice is for drillers to transport their
crews to the rig site, though Permian has no
written policy requiring such. Permian re-
quires drillers to maintain a valid driver’s
license and automobile insurance, and com-
pensates the drillers at the rate of twenty-
five cents for each mile traveled to a rig site.
Individual crew members are not compensat-
ed for their travel time, even if they choose
to travel individually; they are paid hourly
once they begin their scheduled shift. Per-
mian’s crews may travel up to 4000 miles per
month, or as much as 200 miles per day, to
reach the mobile drilling rigs to which they
are assigned, though Permian does not dic-
tate the route they must travel nor the mode
of transportation.

{4} Workers were members of an oil well
drilling crew employed by Permian. Rodri-
guez, the driller, customarily picked up the
members of his erew—Doporto, Lucas, and
Turrubiates—at their homes in Hobbs to
transport them to the rig site in his vehicle.
Rodriguez led weekly safety meetings with
his crew on topics that included travel safety.
The crew had been working extra shifts in
the days prior to the accident. In the early
morning of November 10, 2006, Rodriguez
picked up his crew at their homes, and they

to’s minor children.

168

set forth from Hobbs to the rig site, a dis-
tance of approximately sixty to seventy
miles. The crew stopped at a gas station to
fill their water cooler. A short time later,
the vehicle was involved in a single-car acci-
dent in which Doporto was killed and the
others were injured.

{5} Workers filed workers’ compensation
claims under the Act, arguing that they were
traveling employees injured in the course of
their employment. Their claims were consol-
idated before a WCJ. The WCJ bifurcated
the trial to decide the issue of compensability
before determining benefit entitlements. Af-
ter a trial on the merits and the submission
of proposed findings of fact by each party,
the WCJ entered written findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a compensation order.
The WCJ concluded that Workers were com-
muters, that the mileage payments to Rodri-
guez did not make him a traveling employee,
and that the travel to the rig site was “not an
incidental or integral part of Workers’ em-
ployment.” As a result, Workers’ claims
were dismissed because their injuries did not
occur within the course and scope of their
employment and thus the injuries were not
compensable under the Act.

{6} Workers appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals, which, in a memorandum opinion, up-
held the WCJ’s dismissal of Workers’ claims.
Rodriguez v. Permian Drilling Corp. No.
29,435, slip op. at 18, 2010 WL 4060770
(N.M.Ct.App. Mar. 18, 2010). The Court of
Appeals concluded that substantial evidence
supported the WCJ’s conclusion that Rodri-
guez was not fulfilling a duty of his employ-
ment in transporting his crew, id, and that
Workers were not traveling employees under
the Act when the accident occurred, id. at
12-13.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

WS {7} “All workers’ compensation
cases are reviewed under a whole record
standard of review.” Moya v. City of Albu-
querque, 2008-NMSC-004, 16, 143 N.M. 258,
175 P.8d 926. As a general matter, we defer
to the expertise of the administrative judge
and “(w]e will not ... substitute our judg-
ment for that of the agency; although the
evidence may support inconsistent findings,

we will not disturb the agency’s finding if
supported by substantial evidence on the rec-
ord as a whole.” Herman v. Miners’ Hosp.,
111 N.M. 550, 552, 807 P.2d 734, 736 (1991).

TMs {8} If the facts are largely undis-
puted, as in this case, whether Workers’ inju-
ries are compensable under the Act is a
question of law. See Edens v. N.M. Health
and Soc. Servs. Dep’t, 89 N.M. 60, 62, 547
P.2d 65, 67 (1976); Ramirez v. Dawson Prod.
Partners, Inc, 2000-NMCA-011, 114, 128
N.M. 601, 995 P.2d 1043, “When an agency
that is governed by a particular statute con-
strues or applies that statute, the court will
begin by according some deference to the
agency’s interpretation.” Morningstar Wa-
ter Users Ass'n v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
120 N.M. 579, 583, 904 P.2d 28, 32 (1995).
The court, however, “is not bound by the
agency’s interpretation and may substitute
its own independent judgment for that of the
agency because it is the function of the
courts to interpret the law.” Jd. Because our
review of this case requires us to construe
the Act, our primary goal is to give effect to
legislative intent. See El Paso Elec. Co. v.
N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 2010-
NMSC-048, 117, 149 N.M. 174, 246 P.3d 443;
see also State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032,
§99-10, 186 N.M. 372, 98 P.8d 1022 (sum-
marizing our canon of statutory construc-
tion).

IIL ANALYSIS

Hs {9} New Mexico’s workers’ com-
pensation scheme, codified in the Act, is de-
signed “to compensate workers for injury
arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment.” Flores v. McKay Oil Corp. 2008-
NMCA~123, 19, 144 N.M. 782, 192 P.38d 777.
Claims under the Act are to be resolved with
due consideration for the rights of both em-
ployees and employers. NMSA 1978, § 52—
5-1 (1990). The Act provides the exclusive
remedy for an employee to receive compen-
sation for an injury “arising out of and in the
course of his employment.” Section 52-1-
9(B). This includes

accidental injuries to workers and death

resulting from accidental injury as a result

of their employment and while at work in

any place where their employer’s business

requires their presence but shall not in-
clude injuries to any worker occurring
while on his way to assume the duties of
his employment or after leaving such
duties.

Section 52-1-19. An injury arises out of and
in the course of employment if the injury was
sustained “during the commission of an activ-
ity that is reasonable and foreseeable both as
to its nature and manner of commission.”
Ramirez, 2000-NMCA-011, 117, 128 N.M.
601, 995 P.2d 1043; see § 52-1-28(A)(1) & (2)
(requiring proof that the injury was “arising
out of and in the course of [the] employment”
and “reasonably incident to [the] employ-
ment”).

HM s{10} The Act excludes injuries
incurred by an employee “while on [the] way
to assume the duties of ... employment or
after leaving such duties,” Ramirez, 2000-
NMCA-O11, 17, 128 N.M. 601, 995 P.2d
1043, commonly referred to as the “going and
coming” rule. See, eg., id; Garcia v. Phil
Garcia’s Elec. Contractor, Inc, 99 N.M. 374,
876, 658 P.2d 449, 451 (Ct.App.1982). “This
rule arises from the recognition that, while
admittedly the employment is the cause of
the workman’s journey between his home
and the factory, it is generally taken for
granted that workmen’s compensation was
not intended to protect him against all the
perils of that journey.” Ramirez, 2000-
NMCA-011, 17, 128 N.M. 601, 995 P.2d 1043
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). That is, injuries incurred during a
commute are not covered under workers’
compensation law.

{11} Recognized exceptions to the going
and coming rule are numerous; we limit our
discussion, however, to the single exception
at issue in this appeal, that of the traveling
employee. This exception was adopted, and
thoroughly explained, by the Court of Ap-
peals in Ramirez. Id. 111. Ramirez de-
fined traveling employees as “employees for
whom travel is an integral part of their jobs,
such as those who travel to different loca-
tions to perform their duties, as differentiat-
ed from employees who commute daily from
home to a single workplace.” Jd. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

169

HE. s«{12} ‘Traveling employees are
distinct from “mere commuters” whose inju-
ries are excluded from compensation under
the Act. See Flores, 2008-NMCA-123, 127,
144 N.M. 782, 192 P.3d 777. We imagine a
commuter as one who chooses to live in
Albuquerque or Tesuque but works in Santa
Fe. The commuter has the option of living
and working in the same city, but for any
number of reasons chooses to travel some
distance between home and work. In Flores,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the oil
rig workers injured while traveling to the rig
site were commuters, not traveling employ-
ees. The Court of Appeals found that the
injuries did not arise out of the employment
because the rig was in a fixed location, rela-
tively close to the workers’ residences, and
because the employer did not provide any
reimbursement or per diem specifically for
transportation costs nor require any of the
workers to maintain valid licenses or insur-
ance. Id. 1122-24, 27. Traveling employ-
ees, in contrast, are those who encounter
special hazards on the road that could be
avoided were travel not a necessary compo-
nent of the employment. Anyone for whom
travel is an integral, avoidable part of the job
is a traveling employee. See Chavez v. ABF
Freight Systems, Inc. 2001-NMCA-039,
115, 130 N.M. 524, 27 P.3d 1011 (noting that
the truck driver “was on the road, serving his
employer’s interests, and it was the fact that
he was on the road that exposed him to
hazards he would not have faced at home”).

HM {18} The primary reason for the
distinction between a commuter and a travel-
ing employee is that travel undertaken by a
traveling employee provides substantial ben-
efit to both employee and employer. “[TJhe
activity giving rise to the injury must confer
some benefit on the employer.” Ramirez,
2000-NMCA-011, 116, 128 N.M. 601, 995
P.2d 1048; see also Kurtis A. Kemper, Appli-
cation of the “Mutual Benefit” Doctrine to
Workers’ Compensation Cases, 11 A.L.R.6th
351 Table (2006) (compiling cases). “The
benefit to the employer need not be pecuni-
ary, and may be as intangible as a well-fed
and well-rested employee.” Ramirez, 2000-—
NMCA-O011, 117, 128 N.M. 601, 995 P.2d
1043.

170

The rationale behind the traveling employ-
ee rule is that an employee who is required
to travel away from home is furthering the
business of his employer as he eats, sleeps,
and performs other acts necessary to his
health and comfort during his travels. In
addition, where the employment requires
travel, the employee is consequently ex-
posed to hazards she would otherwise have
the option of avoiding. Thus the hazards
of the route become the hazards of employ-
ment. But, it is not merely travel on a
highway that creates a risk of compensable
injury; if that were so, every ordinary
commuter would be covered under the Act.
Rather, it is the job’s requirement of travel
and the employer’s authority and control in
assigning its employees to different work
sites that increase the normal risk and
render compensable injuries suffered dur-
ing such travel.

Id. 112 (internal quotation marks, citation,

and alterations omitted).

Hs {14} To determine whether an
injury incurred while en route to the place of
employment falls within the traveling em-
ployee exception to the going and coming
rule, the Court of Appeals has utilized vari-
ous factors. Ramirez set forth certain con-
siderations relevant to determining whether
an employee is a traveling employee for pur-
poses of the Act. These considerations in-
clude “that an injury ... takes place within
the period of employment, at a place where
the employee may reasonably be, and while
the employee is reasonably fulfilling the
duties of employment or doing something
incidental to it.” Id. 116 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In Flores, the
Court of Appeals quoted as persuasive au-
thority certain factors used by the Colorado
Supreme Court to determine if an injury falls
within the traveling employee exception:

(1) whether the travel occurred during

working hours, (2) whether the travel oc-

curred on or off the employer’s premises,

(8) whether the travel was contemplated

by the employment contract, and (4)

2. The Colorado Supreme Court articulated these
factors in Madden v. Mountain West Fabricators,
noting that contractual travel requirements could
be express or implied, but that a key factor is
“when such travel confers a benefit on the em-

whether the obligations or conditions of
employment created a “zone of special dan-
ger” out of which the injury arose.
Whether meeting one of the variables is
sufficient, by itself, to create a special cir-
eumstance warranting recovery depends
upon whether the evidence supporting that
variable demonstrates a causal connection
between the employment and the injury
such that the travel to and from work
arises out of and in the course of employ-
ment.

2008-NMCA-123, 114, 144 N.M. 782, 192
P.8d 777 (quoting Staff Adm’rs, Inc. v. Reyn-
olds, 977 P.2d 866, 868 (Colo.1999) (en
bane)? All of the considerations listed in
Ramirez and Flores are sound guideposts for
analyzing whether a worker was a traveling
employee at the time of the injury, which, in
turn will determine whether an injury arose
out of and in the course of employment.

{15} A review of New Mexico caselaw
reveals that our appellate courts have used
two of the above-listed factors in particular
to decide whether the traveling employee
exception to the going and coming rule ap-
plies: the express or implied employment
contract terms and the zone of special danger
ereated by the required travel. In Barring-
ton v. Johnn Drilling Co., we stated that the
going and coming rule did not apply “where
hazards of the journey may fairly be regard-
ed as hazards of the service to be performed
and are dependent on the nature and the
circumstances of the particular employment;
also where the employer contracts to and
does furnish transportation to and from
work.” 51 N.M. 172, 177, 181 P.2d 166, 169-
70 (1947). The decedent in Barrington was a
driller who transported his crew sixty-five
miles round-trip daily between Hobbs and
the oil rig, where no lodging was available,
and was compensated at the rate of seven
cents per mile; he died in a car accident
between Hobbs and the rig site. 51 N.M. at
174-15, 181 P.2d at 167-68. The Court de-
termined that the decedent was killed in the

ployer beyond the sole fact of the employee's
arrival at work.” 977 P.2d 861, 864-65 (Colo.
1999) (en banc) (citing, inter alia, Loffland Bros.
v. Baca, 651 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Colo.App.1982)).

171

course of his employment because the em-
ployer had agreed to provide transportation
by an “express agreement or ... course of
dealing,” and paid for the cost of transporta-
tion. Jd. at 177-78, 181 P.2d at 169-70 (em-
phasis omitted) (quoting Cardillo v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 380 US. 469, 480, 67 S.Ct. 801,
91 L.Ed. 1028 (1947). The decedent's travel
to the rig site “was not a case of employees
traveling in the same city between home and
work. Extended cross-country transporta-
tion was necessary. And it was transporta-
tion of a type that an employer might fairly
be expected to furnish.” Id. at 179, 181 P.2d
at 171 (quoting Cardillo, 330 U.S. at 484, 67
S.Ct. 801); see also Wilson v. Rowan Drill-
‘ing Co., 55 N.M. 81, 87, 227 P.2d 365, 368-69
(1950) (concluding that an injury incurred by
a driller while transporting his crew arose
out of and in the course of employment be-
cause the driller was contractually required
to ensure he had a fully staffed crew when
his shift commenced and throughout the
shift).

{16} Ramirez’ analysis focused on the
terms of the employment contract, although
its definition of a traveling employee indicat-
ed the special hazards faced by oil rig work-
ers were given due consideration. The three
plaintiffs in Ramirez were oil field workers
assigned to a job site in western Texas,
approximately 90 miles from Hobbs. 2000-
NMCA-O11, 12, 128 N.M. 601, 995 P.2d
1043. As a condition of their employment,
they were provided with per diem for lodging
near the job site and travel between the hotel
and the site, and initially were provided with
transportation between the site and Hobbs
on their days off. Id. 13. Later, however,
the employer provided an extra crew mem-
ber in exchange for the employees providing
their own transportation between the work
site and Hobbs. Jd. 14. The three plaintiffs
were injured while traveling to Hobbs from
the work site. Id. 15. Ramirez concluded
that two workers were covered: the worker
who took the trip to transport a colleague
who was scheduled to begin his time off and
to transport dirty uniforms for laundering at
the request of the site supervisor, id. 118,
and the worker who was scheduled to take
time off and arranged to travel in his col-
league’s vehicle, id. 119. The third worker,

however, took the trip to keep his colleague
company and thus “conferred no benefit”
upon the employer and did not qualify for
benefits. Id. 120; see also Martinez v, Fi-
del, 61 N.M. 6, 9, 293 P.2d 654, 656 (1956)
(concluding that slipping on ice while taking
one of many possible routes between the
office and the employer’s parking lot was not
an accident incurred in travel “peculiar to
[plaintiff's] work”); Brown v. Arapahoe
Drilling Co, 70 N.M. 99, 101, 370 P.2d 816,
818 (1962) (finding that the fact that a driller
participated in a car pool with his crew,
occasionally using company gas, was not
enough to bring the deceased driller within
the traveling employee exception); Arias v.
AAA Landscaping, 115 N.M. 239, 240, 849
P.2d 382, 383 (Ct.App.1998) (holding that the
worker was not entitled to workers’ compen-
sation because, although the employer typi-
cally provided transportation for the employ-
ees and paid them during the travel time, on
the date of the injury the worker had re-
ceived permission to leave early, was not paid
for the rest of the day, and traveled in a
private vehicle).

{17} Other jurisdictions likewise review
the circumstances of employment when de-
termining whether an injury incurred en
route to an oil rig falls within the traveling
employee exception to the going and coming
rule. See Loffland Bros. 651 P.2d at 433
(“[W]here the employer required the employ-
ees to travel a considerable distance to their
job, where there was a benefit to the employ-
er in having a full crew on hand, and where
they had made arrangements to pay the dril-
ler to collect the crew and bring them to the
drill site so as to make it more probable that
a full crew would be on hand, the accident
did occur within the course of and arise out
of the employment of these claimants.”);
Messenger v. Sage Drilling Co, 9 Kan.
App.2d 435, 680 P.2d 556, 560 (1984) (holding
that the trial court did not err in concluding
that the employee’s travel was of substantial
benefit to the employer, and thus covered by
workers’ compensation, when the oil rig
workers had no set place of employment,
were required to travel long distances daily,
and were compensated for their mileage);
Lassabe v. Simmons Drilling, Inc. 228

172

Mont. 94, 743 P.2d 568, 570-71 (1987) (con-
cluding that the employer’s policy required
the driller to transport his crew to the rig at
the start of a shift, rendering the accident
compensable by the workers’ compensation
scheme); Christian v. Nicor Drilling Co.
653 P.2d 185, 186, 188 (Okla.1982) (noting
that, “[w]hen drilling sites are at locations
remote from population centers, transporta-
tion is commonly provided by the employer
for the mutual benefit of all parties,” and
concluding that workers traveling in their
private vehicle because they missed the em-
ployer-provided transportation were covered
by the traveling employee exception); Texas
Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Byrd, 540 S.W.2d 460,
462 (Tex.Civ.App.1976) (“[H]olding ... that
the requirement of the employees being in
the course and scope of their employment in
the furtherance of the employer’s affairs is
satisfied by the undisputed facts as to the
plan of getting them to and from the job
location in a remote area and the benefits
which such plan conferred upon the employ-
er.”).

{18} Some courts have focused their analy-
sis specifically on the special hazards encoun-
tered by oil rig workers. The Ohio Supreme
Court, in Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc.,
applied a special hazard test to a workers’
compensation claim by oil rig workers who
worked at a fixed site* and concluded that
their injuries incurred when traveling to the
rig site were covered. 81 Ohio St.3d 117, 689
N.E.2d 917, 924 (1998). Ruckman stated
that travel to a rig site is a special hazard of
oil rig workers’ employment because: (1) the
rig sites are temporary in nature and con-
stantly changing; (2) workers are unable to
“fix their commute in relation to these re-
mote work sites”; and (8) workers are re-
quired to travel vast distances as conditions
of their employment. Jd. The court held that
“because of the combination of all these fac-
tors, the riggers have established a risk

3. Ruckman’s definition of “fixed situs” distin-
guishes it from a situation in which travel is the
job, eg,, traveling salesman, stating that a fixed-
site employee ‘“‘may be reassigned to a different
work place monthly, weekly, or even daily.” 689
N.E.2d at 920-21. This definition is consistent
with that utilized by Flores, 2008-NMCA-123,
127, 144 N.M. 782, 192 P.3d 777 (‘“The rig itself
was a fixed work site.”).

quantitatively greater than risks common to
the public,” and accordingly were entitled to
recovery under the workers’ compensation
scheme. Id; see also Falls v. Union Drill-
‘ing Inc., 223 W.Va. 68, 672 S..2d 204, 212-
13 (2008) (concluding that a “special hazard
or increased risk” existed in the scope of the
employment when an oil rig worker worked
an extra shift and then fell asleep during his
lengthy trip home, thus precluding a negli-
gence cause of action against the employer).

HM {19} While we believe all of the
above-stated factors are important consider-
ations to be undertaken by the WCJ and
reviewing courts, we find the “zone of special
danger” or “special hazard” factor to be most
significant to resolving this case.t See Bar-
rington, 51 N.M. at 177, 181 P.2d at 169-70.
As discussed above, the traveling employee
exception to the going and coming rule per-
mits recovery under the Act for employees
injured while traveling when that travel is an
integral part of the employment. For an
employee to be a traveling employee due to a
special hazard of employment, two factors
are required: (1) “but for the employment,
the employee would not have been at the
location where the injury occurred”; and (2)
“the risk is distinctive in nature or quantita-
tively greater than risks common to the pub-
lic.” 82 AmJur.2d Workers’ Compensation
§ 284 (2008). This analysis, along with the
requirement that the travel provide some
benefit to the employer, helps determine
whether travel is an integral part of employ-
ment, which, in turn, ensures that only those
individuals whose injuries arose out of and in
the course of employment receive compensa-
tion, maintaining the balanced approach to
the Act intended by the Legislature. See
§§ 52-1-19 and 52-5-1. It ensures that not
every employee who is injured on the road
receives benefits under the Act but that
4. Although certain states appear to apply the

special hazard or special danger as a separate

exception to the going and coming rule, see, e.g.,

Parks v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 33 Cal.3d

585, 190 Cal.Rptr. 158, 660 P.2d 382, 384-85

(1983), we approve of the doctrine only as a tool

to interpret the traveling employee exception.

those who must be on the road as an “inte-
gral part of their jobs” are covered.

Ts (20} We now return to the rec-
ord in this appeal and conclude that the facts
of this case indicate Workers fall squarely
within the traveling employees exception be-
cause their travel provided a mutual benefit
to the employer and employee and the condi-
tions of employment placed the employees in
a zone of special danger out of which the
injury arose. The rig site to which Workers
were traveling when the accident occurred
was some sixty or seventy miles away from
Workers’ residences in Hobbs, and lodging
was not available at the rig site. Workers
did not have a stationary work site but were
required to move to another site every seven
to eight days, preventing them from fixing
their commute in relation to the rig site.
Permian benefitted from having a mobile
work crew that resided in a central location
and could travel to different sites weekly
without having to change residences. Permi-
an incurred a substantial benefit by having
its employees provide their own transporta-
tion, while subsidizing only the driller’s
transportation, rather than providing daily
transportation for all employees. Rodriguez,
the driller, was compensated for his mileage
and was expected to arrive at the drilling site
with a full crew and for having a valid license
and proof of insurance on file with Permian.
His crew was not compensated for their trav-
el, but this is not required if the cireum-
stances indicate the travel was for the pur-
pose of fulfilling their duties of employment
and benefit of the travel was incurred by the
employer.® We conclude that these special
characteristics attendant to employment in
the oil rig field satisfy the requirement that
travel be mutually beneficial to employer and
employee.

5. Permian argues that the stop at a local gas
station en route to the rig site to purchase food
and water when Workers were not directed to do
so by their employer mandates affirmance of the
WCI's order denying compensation. Even if the
stop at the gas station were an unauthorized
deviation, a point on which we pass no opinion,
see, e.g, Parr v. N.M. State Highway Dep’t, 54
N.M. 126, 131, 215 P.2d 602, 605-06 (1950),

Workers were injured on the road, not at the gas
station, so the stop does not affect our analysis.

173

HE {21} The conditions of employment
placed Workers in a zone of special danger
from which arose their injuries. The long
hours, long and varied travel time, and lack
of choice in decreasing the commute gave
rise to risks distinct from those of an average
traveler on a public highway. Extensive
travel is an integral part of the work of oil
rig drillers and crew members, particularly
for mobile rigs such as the ones on which
Workers were employed, and as such distin-
guishes the travel to the rigs from a com-
mute. The special hazards faced by Workers
in their travel to and fromthe rig site were a
requirement of their employment, and the
accident giving rise to their claims would not
have occurred but for the. required travel.
We conclude that the WCJ erred in its appli-
cation of the traveling employee exception of
the going and coming rule to Workers, and
that substantial evidence in the whole record
supports the conclusion that Workers were
injured in the course of their employment.$

Iv. CONCLUSION

{22} For the foregoing reasons, we con-
clude that the Court of Appeals and WCJ
erred in their conclusion that Workers’ inju-
ries are non-compensable under the Act. We
reverse the Court of Appeals’ memorandum
opinion and remand to the WCJ for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PETRA
JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON,
and EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

6. Because we conclude the injuries to Workers
arose out of and in the course of their employ-
ment under the traveling employee exception, we
do not address Rodriguez’ separate claim that
the mileage payment meant that he was fulfilling
a duty of his employment at the time he was
injured. We note simply that the mileage pay-
ment adds further support to the conclusion that
Rodriguez’ injury arose out of and in the course
of his employment.

2011-NMSC-034
258 P.3d 453

ATTORNEY GENERAL of the State
of New Mexico, Appellant,

v.

NEW MEXICO PUBLIC REGULATION
COMMISSION, Appellee,

and
Public Service Company of New Mexico,
Western Resource Advocates, and Coali-

tion for Clean Affordable Energy, Inter-
venors.

New Mexico Industrial Energy
Consumers, Appellant,
v.

New Mexico Public Regulation
Commission, Appellee,

and

Public Service Company of New Mexico,
Western Resource Advocates, and Coali-
tion for Clean Affordable Energy, Inter-
venors.

Nos. 32,475, 32,480.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
July 27, 2011.

175
Es
_

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Jeffery S.
Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellant Attorney General of
the State of New Mexico.

Peter Jude Gould, Santa Fe, NM, for Ap-
pellant New Mexico Industrial Energy Con-
sumers.

Robert Y. Hirasuna, General Counsel,
Margaret Kendall Caffey-Moquin, Associate
General Counsel, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
New Mexico Public Regulation Commission.

Benjamin Phillips, Ruth Fuess Keegan, Al-
buquerque, NM, Cuddy & McCarthy, L.L.P.,
Rebecca D. Dempsey, Santa Fe, NM, for
Intervenor Public Service Company of New
Mexico.

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} These consolidated appeals are chal-
lenges to the Public Regulation Commission’s
(PRC) effort to comply with the Efficient
Use of Energy Act. NMSA 1978, Sections
62-17-1 to -11 (2005) (amended 2008)
(BUEA). The EUEA was amended by the
Legislature, requiring the PRC to identify
and remove regulatory disincentives to a
public utility’s implementation of energy effi-
ciency programs. To comply with this legis-
lative mandate, the PRC issued a Final Or-
der on April 8, 2010, amending its Energy
Efficiency Rules contained in 17.7.2 NMAC

176

(08/01/2007). The Attorney General (AG)
and the New Mexico Industrial Energy Con-
sumers (NMIEC) appealed separately from
the PRC’s Final Order, challenging the Final
Order on several grounds. We consolidated
both appeals, and after reviewing the record
below, address only one dispositive issue,
annulling and vacating the PRC’s Final Or-
der.

I, BACKGROUND

{2} In 2005, the Legislature enacted the
EUEA, requiring the PRC to “direct public
utilities to evaluate and implement cost-effec-
tive programs that reduce energy demand
and consumption.” Section 62-17-5(B). The
Legislature in Section 62-17-5(F) instructed
the PRC to “identify any disincentives or
barriers that may exist for public utility ex-
penditures on energy efficiency and load
management and, if found, ensure that they
are eliminated.”

{3} In response to this mandate, the PRC
promulgated its Energy Efficiency Rules at
17.7.2 NMAC (08/01/2007). The Energy Ef-
ficiency Rules required, in relevant part, that
utilities file proposals with the PRC to re-
move disincentives or barriers to energy effi-
ciency programs that the utilities believe to
exist. See 17.7.2.9K) NMAC (03/01/2007).
If a utility did not file such a proposal, that
utility would be precluded from recovering
the costs of eliminating the disincentives and
barriers to its energy efficiency programs.
17.7.2.9(K)(4) NMAC (03/01/2007).

{4} In 2008, the Legislature amended the
EUEA to allow utilities both to earn a profit
on energy efficiency development and receive
an incentive for instituting energy efficiency
programs. See § 62-17-5(F). In response
to the 2008 amendments to the EUBA, the
PRC issued an order to conduct a rulemak-
ing proceeding to amend 17.7.2 NMAC
through the use of workshops conducted by
interested parties and presided over by an
appointed hearing officer. Between May 2008
and January 2009, twenty-two workshops
were held and attended by several interested
parties.

{5} The workshops produced a proposed
rule known as “Alternative A” to amend
17.7.2 NMAC. Alternative A has three major

components. One, it permits utilities to tem-
porarily recover an adder of one cent for
each kilo-watt hour saved and ten dollars for
each kilo-watt reduced from the annual de-
mand due to approved energy efficiency pro-
grams. This adder, called the “Interim Ad-
der,” would expire almost two years after the
Final Order. Two, Alternative A requires
utilities and interested parties to file propos-
als for a permanent solution to eliminate
disincentives to energy efficiency programs.
Three, Alternative A provides that, after the
Interim Adder expires, the utilities will con-
tinue to receive an incentive of one-half a
cent for every kilo-watt hour saved and ten
dollars for each kilo-watt reduced from the
annual demand due to approved energy effi-
ciency programs, the “Reduced Adder,” even
after a permanent solution to removing disin-
centives is implemented.

{6} The PRC requested public comment
on Alternative A and scheduled an evidentia-
ry hearing on the economic justification of
Alternative A. The PRC stated that evidence
and comments collected during the work-
shops would not be part of the evidentiary
record for the rulemaking process.

{7} At the evidentiary hearing, the three
investor-owned utility companies in New
Mexico, Public Service Company of New
Mexico (PNM), Southwestern Public Service
Company (SPS), and El Paso Electric Com-
pany (EPE), each presented projected reve-
nue the utility anticipated losing due to its
energy efficiency programs and the projected
recovery the utility would experience if the
PRC were to adopt Alternative A. SPS esti-
mated that it would lose $2.52 million in
revenue the first two years that Alternative
A would be in effect, but recover $9.57 mil-
jion from the Interim Adder. PNM estimat-
ed that it would lose $9.36 million in revenue
the first two years that Alternative A would
be in effect, but recover $12.15 million from
the Interim Adder. EPE estimated that it
would lose $2.53 million in revenue the first
two years that Alternative A would be in
effect, but recover $1.36 million from the
Interim Adder. From these estimates, the
PRC concluded that in the first two years,
the Interim Adder contained in Alternative A
would result in SPS receiving a profit of

$7.05 million, PNM a profit of $2.79 million,
and EPE not receiving a profit, but failing to
recover $1.16 million of its lost revenue.
Each utility testified that Alternative A was a
reasonable compromise that removed the di-
sincentives to implementing energy efficiency
programs. Evidence was received from sev-
eral other parties, both in support of and
opposition to Alternative A.

{8} The PRC issued a Final Order amend-
ing 17.7.2 NMAC with Alternative A, with
minor amendments not relevant to this ap-
peal! The AG and NMIEC requested a
rehearing which the PRC denied. An appeal
to this Court, pursuant to our appellant juris-
diction over appeals from final orders of the
PRC contained in Article VI, Section 2 of the
New Mexico Constitution and NMSA 1978,
Section 62-11-1 (1993), followed.

Il. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

HN (9} “We review administrative or-
ders to determine whether the Commission’s
decision is arbitrary and capricious, not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, outside the
scope of the agency’s authority, or otherwise
inconsistent with law.” N.M. Indus. Energy
Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation
Comm'n (NMIEC), 2007-NMSC-053, 113,
142 N.M. 588, 168 P.38d 105 (brackets, inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The burden is on the parties challenging the
agency order to make this showing. Id. This
Court does not have the authority to modify
orders of the PRC; we must “either affirm
or annul and vacate” the order. NMSA
1978, § 62-11-5 (1982); accord In re Petition
of PNM Gas Servs. (In ve PNM), 2000-
NMSC--012, 110, 129 N.M. 1, 1 P.8d 383.
“In reviewing the PRC’s decision, we begin
by looking at two interconnected factors:
whether the decision presents a question of
law, a question of fact, or some combination
of the two; and whether the matter is within
the agency’s specialized field of expertise.”
Albuquerque Bernalillo Cnty. Water Util.
Auth. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n (AB-
CWUA), 2010-NMSC-018, 117, 148 N.M. 21,

1, The PRC’s Final Order also considered and
rejected an Alternative B, which is not relevant

177

229 P.3d 494 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Hs {10} “Statutory interpretation is an
issue of law, which we review de novo.”
NMIEC, 2007-NMSC-058, 119, 142 N.M.
588, 168 P.8d 105. “When construing stat-
utes, our guiding principle is to determine
and give effect to legislative intent.” Id.
120. We follow “classic canons of statutory
construction,” looking “first to the plain Jan-
guage of the statute, giving the words their
ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature in-
dicates a different one was intended.” Jd.
When construing statutes related to the
same subject matter,

the provisions of a statute must be read
together with other statutes in pari mate-
ria under the presumption that the legisla-
ture acted with full knowledge of relevant
statutory and common law. Thus, two
statutes covering the same subject matter
should be harmonized and construed to-
gether when possible, in a way that facili-
tates their operation and the achievement
of their goals.

State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 115 N.M.
578, 575-76, 855 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1998) (in-
ternal ellipses, alteration omitted); accord
Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. N.M. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 1999-NMSC-040, 123, 128 N.M.
309, 992 P.2d 860.

B. Just and Reasonable Rates

{11} The New Mexico Public Utility Act
(PUA) defines “rate” as
every rate, tariff, charge or other compen-
sation for utility service rendered or to be
yendered by a utility and every rule, regu-
lation, practice, act, requirement or privi-
lege in any way relating to such rate,
tariff, charge or other compensation and
any schedule or tariff or part of a schedule
or tariff thereof.
NMSA 1978, § 62-3-3(H) (2009). When a
utility implements an energy efficiency pro-
gram, the utility reduces the amount of ener-
gy consumed by its customers. This neces-
sarily results in a reduction in the utility’s

to this appeal.

178

revenue. Through the adders contained in
Alternative A, utilities receive additional rev-
enue as compensation for reducing the con-
sumption of their energy. We, therefore,
agree with the PRC’s conclusion that the
adders contained in Alternative A are rates.

{12} The PRC determined that the EUEA
does not require the adder rates contained in
Alternative A to be cost-based. The PRC
reasoned that by not specifying how to deter-
mine the amount of profit each utility would
earn from its energy efficiency programs, the
Legislature intended to leave the method of
that determination to the PRC’s discretion.
On appeal, the PRC also suggests that the
EUEA’s use of the word “profit” rather than
“investment,” when “profit” is not used in
any other ratemaking statute, demonstrates
the Legislature’s intent to allow rates creat-
ed under the EULA to ignore the cost-based
requirement of rates created under the PUA.
The crux of the PRC’s argument is that a
rate created under the EUEA does not need
to follow the ratemaking principles that must
be followed when creating a rate under the
PUA.

{13} When the PRC sets a rate, that rate
must be “just and reasonable.” NMSA 1978,
§ 62-8-1 (1941). The declared policy of the
PUA is “that the public interest, the interest
of consumers and the interest of investors
require the regulation and supervision of
public utilities to the end that reasonable and
proper services shall be available at fair, just
and reasonable rates.” NMSA 1978, § 62-3—
1(B) (2008) (emphasis added), Under the
PUA, a rate is “just and reasonable” when it
balances the investor’s interest against the
ratepayer’s interest. See In re PNM, 2000-
NMSC-012, 18, 129 N.M. 1, 1 P.8d 383. Only
when a rate falls within a “zone of reason-
ableness ... between utility confiscation and
ratepayer extortion” can the rate be “just
and reasonable.” Behles v. N.M. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n (In re Application of Timberon Wa-
ter Co.), 114 N.M. 154, 161, 886 P.2d 78, 80
(1992).

TH {14} We now look to the language of
the EUEA to determine whether the Legis-
lature intended a different method of deter-
mining whether a rate is “just and reason-
able” when the rate is created under the

EUEA. In both the legislative findings of the
EUBA, Section 62-17-2(E), and the declared
policy of the EUEA, Section 62-17-83, the
Legislature states that disincentives to ener-
gy efficiency programs should be removed
“in a manner that balances the public inter-
est, consumers’ interests and investors’ inter-
ests.” When listing the requirements of the
PRC under the EUEA, the Legislature ex-
plicitly directs the PRC to identify and re-
move disincentives to energy efficiency pro-
grams “in a manner that balances the public
interest, consumers’ interests and investors’
interests.” Section 62-17-5(F).

{15} The balancing language used in the
EUBA is almost identical to the balancing
language used under the PUA. Both require
the PRC to balance the public interest, con-
sumers’ interests, and investors’ interests.
We read the EUEA in harmony with the
PUA to conclude that when the PRC sets a
rate, the Legislature intended the balancing
requirement of the EUBA to be the same as
the balancing done under the PUA to deter-
mine just and reasonable rates. Cf NMIEC,
2007-NMSC-053, 122, 142 N.M. 533, 168
P.38d 105 (reading NMSA 1978, Section 62—
16-6(A) (2004) (amended 2007) of the New
Mexico Renewable Energy Act in harmony
with the PUA to conclude that the Legisla-
ture intended the same ratemaking process
to apply to both acts).

C. Alternative A’s Adder Rates

HMMs {16} Having determined that the
balancing test to determine “just and reason-
able” rates is the same for rates created
under both the PUA and EUEA, we turn to
whether the PRC followed the required bal-
ancing test in its Final Order. When deter-
mining the investor’s interest, the PRC takes
into account the utility’s interest in recover-
ing its prudently incurred costs and earning
a reasonable return on its capital invest-
ments, In ve PNM, 2000-NMSC-012, 11 8,
25, 129 N.M. 1, 1 P.38d 383. This encourages
and attracts capital and investments so as to
provide economic service to the general pub-
lie and to industry, and protects the utility
from a violation of due process and taking of
property without just compensation. Id. 18.
The ratepayer’s interest, on the other hand,

is to be protected from excessive rates that
unjustly burden ratepayers while receiving
steady and quality service from the utility.
Id.; see also State v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 54 N.M. 815, 888, 224 P.2d 155, 170
(1950) (“The [PRC] should not burden the
public with unreasonable or extortionate
rates, considering the circumstances of each
case....”). “There is a significant zone of
reasonableness ... between utility confisca-
tion and ratepayer extortion.” Behles, 114
N.M. at 161, 836 P.2d at 80.

Ws{17} The PRC “is vested with
considerable discretion in determining
whether a rate to be received and charged”
falls within the zone of reasonableness.
Hobbs Gas Co. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
94 N.M. 781, 788, 616 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1980).
The factors the PRC uses to determine
whether a proposed rate falls within the zone
of reasonableness are “based on [the utility’s]
revenue requirements: the costs of supplying
the fuel and profit for the utility in an
amount sufficient to encourage investment.”
El Paso Elec. Co. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation
Comm'n, 2010-NMSC-048, 113, 149 N.M.
174, 246 P.8d 443. “The traditional elements
of the ratemaking process and the establish-
ment of the total revenue requirement are (1)
determination of the costs of the operation,
(2) determination of the rate base which is
the value of the property minus accrued de-
preciation, and (3) determination of the rate
of return.” Hobbs Gas Co. 94 N.M. at 733,
616 P.2d at 1118.

{18} Here, the PRC concluded that rates
created under the EUEA do not need to be
cost-based. The PRC did not inquire into
any of the utilities’ revenue requirements,
nor any of the traditional elements of the
ratemaking process. At the evidentiary
hearing, the utilities merely presented evi-
dence on what the impact of Alternative A
would be. Without inquiring into a utility’s
revenue requirements, we fail to see how the
PRC could adequately balance the investors’
interests against the ratepayers’ interests
when adopting Alternative A. The PRC’s
adoption of the adder rates was arbitrary
and unlawful in that they were not evidence-
based, cost-based, nor utility specific. We
conclude, therefore, that the PRC’s Final

179

Order is inconsistent with the law because
the PRC had no basis in the record for
determining that the adder rates contained
in Alternative A were “just and reasonable.”

IIL CONCLUSION

{19} We therefore annul and vacate the
PRC’s Final Order due to the lack of a lawful
basis in the record to support its decision.
‘We remand this case to the PRC for further
proceedings in accordance with this Opinion.

{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PETRA
JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON,
and EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMSC-035
258 P.3d 458

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

ve
Ramon LOPEZ, Defendant—Appellant.
No. 30,257.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.
Ang. 2, 2011.

:
®
m

182
EE

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender
Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrea
Sassa, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} Defendant Ramon Lopez was convict-
ed by a jury of multiple crimes, including
first-degree felony murder, contrary to
NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(2) (1994),
with first-degree criminal sexual penetration
(CSP), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-
9-11(C)(2) (1995) (amended 2009), as the un-
derlying felony. Defendant invokes this
Coui't’s appellate jurisdiction over sentences
for life imprisonment, contained in Article
VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution
and Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA. We address
two of the issues Defendant has raised on
appeal: whether Defendant’s right to con-
front witnesses who testified against him
were violated by the admission of the prelim-
inary hearing testimony of an unavailable
witness, and whether the district court erred
in allowing the State to impeach its own
witness with otherwise inadmissible hearsay.
We conclude that the district court commit-
ted reversible error by allowing the hearsay
to be admitted under the auspices of the
State’s impeachment of the preliminary hear-
ing testimony of the unavailable witness.

{2} Crystal Calderella (Victim) last was
seen alive the night of April 12, 2001, with

Defendant, Greg Romero, and others who
were consuming drugs and alcohol at Vic-
tim’s home in Socorro, New Mexico. On
April 15, 2001, Victim’s body was discovered
in her home, her clothes partially removed.
There were bruises and contusions on Vic-
tim’s neck and lower legs, and blood on the
back of Victim’s head. Semen, later shown to
be Defendant’s, was found in Victim’s vagina.
Defendant was charged with Victim’s murder
after being arrested on an unrelated charge.

{3} At Defendant’s preliminary hearing,
Romero testified under oath about the
events that occurred during the evening of
Victim’s death. Before trial, the State in-
formed the district court that it was unable
to locate Romero, who had absconded from
probation in California, and explained the
efforts that had been undertaken to locate
him. The district court permitted the State
to introduce Romero’s preliminary hearing
testimony via tape under the hearsay excep-
tion for unavailable witnesses contained in
Rule 11-804(A)(6) and (B)(1) NMRA. Defen-
dant argues that the admission of Romero’s
preliminary hearing testimony violated the
Confrontation Clauses contained in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and Article II, Section 14 of the New
Mexico Constitution.

HME {4} “We first determine whether
the preliminary hearing testimony was prop-
erly admitted under the Rules of Evidence.”
State v. Henderson, 2006-NMCA-059, 18,
139 N.M. 595, 136 P.38d 1005. Only if the
preliminary hearing testimony was properly
admitted do we address the Confrontation
Clause issue. Id. Defendant argues that the
preliminary hearing testimony was improper-
ly admitted because Defendant did not have
an opportunity for a meaningful cross-exami-
nation of Romero. We review the admission
of evidence pursuant to an exception or an
exclusion to the hearsay rule under an abuse
of diseretion standard. State v. McClaugher-
ty, 20083-NMSC-006, 117, 183 N.M. 459, 64
P.8d 486,

HI {5} “A hearsay statement consists of
an out-of-court statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted,” and is
inadmissible as substantive evidence unless it

falls within an exclusion or exception to the
hearsay rule. Id. Rule 11-804(A)(5) defines
as unavailable a witness who “is absent from
the hearing and the proponent of a statement
has been unable to procure the declarant’s
attendance ... by process or other reason-
able means.” A statement of an unavailable
witness is admissible if the unavailable wit-
ness’s “[t]estimony [was] given as a witness
at another hearing of the same or a different
proceeding ... [and] if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered ... had
an opportunity and similar motive to develop
the testimony by direct, cross or redirect,
examination.” Rule 11-804(B)(1); see also
State v. Gonzales, 118 N.M. 221, 226, 824
P.2d 1028, 1028 (1992) (stating that the mo-
tives for cross-examination at the prelimi-
nary hearing and the trial must be similar,
but need not be identical).

HI {6} Whether a party had an oppor-
tunity and similar motive to develop testi-
mony must be determined on a case-by-case
basis. Gonzales addressed a situation
where the defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine a witness at a preliminary
hearing, but at trial, when the witness was
unavailable to testify, the defendant’s theory
of his defense had changed from self-de-
fense to identification. 113 N.M. at 225-26,
824 P.2d at 1027-28. We noted that the
Court of Appeals had set forth a “per se
rule that absent extraordinary circum-
stances preliminary hearing testimony may
be admitted at trial if the witness is unavail-
able because the motive to cross-examine is
similar.” Id. at 226, 824 P.2d at 1028 (citing
State v. Massengill, 99 N.M. 288, 285, 657
P.2d 189, 141 (Ct.App.1988)). Despite the
change in the defendant’s theory, Gonzales
concluded that because the defendant “was
given the opportunity to cross-examine the
witness at the preliminary hearing, [the] de-
fendant was not denied the right to confront
the witness against him.” Jd. at 227, 824
P.2d at 1029.

{T} In Henderson, the preliminary hearing
testimony of two unavailable witnesses was
admitted at trial. 2006-NMCA-059, 17, 139
N.M. 595, 186 P.8d 1005. “(T]he trial court
acknowledged that [the d]efendant could not
have cross-examined [the unavailable wit-

183

nesses] at the preliminary hearing on all
issues that were relevant to his defense be-
cause all the issues were not known at that
time.” Jd. The Court of Appeals neverthe-
Jess concluded that the defendant had an
adequate opportunity for cross-examination
because he was able to cross-examine the
witness “about whether any crime was com-
mitted and whether [the dJefendant was in-
volved.” Jd. 112. The defendant, therefore,
“had an ‘opportunity and similar motive’ to
cross-examine [the witness] at the prelimi-
nary hearing as he would have at trial.” Id.

{8} In this case, the purpose of the prelim-
inary hearing was to determine whether
“there [was] probable cause to believe that
the defendant committed an offense.” Rule
5-802(C) NMRA; see State ew rel. Whitehead
v. Vescovi-Dial, 1997-NMCA~-126, 15, 124
N.M. 375, 950 P.2d 818 (“The primary pur-
pose of the preliminary examination is to
provide an independent evaluation of wheth-
er the state has met its burden of demon-
strating probable cause.”). At the prelimi-
nary hearing, Defendant questioned Romero
about whether Romero witnessed Defendant
engage in sexual intercourse with Victim;
whether Defendant assaulted Victim, or re-
moved Victim’s clothes; and whether Rome-
ro witnessed anything “unusual” happen be-
tween Victim and Defendant that night. At
the preliminary hearing, Defendant argued
that there was insufficient evidence to estab-
lish probable cause that Defendant commit-
ted a crime, and that the case should not be
bound over for trial; his motive for cross-
examining Romero, therefore, was to show
that Defendant did not rape and murder
Victim.

{9} Defendant’s motive at trial likewise
was to demonstrate that he was not guilty of
raping and murdering Victim. During both
proceedings, Defendant’s motive was to dis-
credit the State’s case and to argue that the
evidence did not establish his guilt. We con-
clude, therefore, that because Defendant had
an opportunity and similar motive to cross-
examine Romero at the preliminary hearing
as he did at trial, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting Romero’s
preliminary hearing testimony at trial.

184

HMMM {10} Having determined that the
Rules of Evidence were not violated by the
admission of Romero’s preliminary hearing
testimony, we turn to the constitutional ques-
tion. Claimed violations of the Confrontation
Clause are questions of law which we review
de novo. Id. 16.

Hs {11} Under the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, all crimi-
nal defendants “shall enjoy the right ... to
be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” Testimonial statements satisfying the
Rules of Evidence do not necessarily satisfy
the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 50-51, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1854, 158 L.Ed.2d 177
(2004) (“Leaving the regulation of out-of-
court statements to the law of evidence
would render the Confrontation Clause pow-
erless to prevent even the most flagrant in-
quisitorial practices.”). When admitting tes-
timonial statements, the Confrontation
Clause requires that the accused have a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. Id; ac-
cord United States v. Aldridge, 413 F.3d 829,
836 (8th Cir.2005) (Bye, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The main and es-
sential purpose of confrontation is to provide
a meaningful opportunity for the cross-exam-
ination of the adverse witness.”). Once a
defendant has tested the reliability of an
unavailable witness’s testimony against him
in the “crucible of cross-examination,” the
demands of the Confrontation Clause have
been met. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 68, 124
S.Ct. 1854. When a witness testifies under
oath at a preliminary hearing, admission of
that preliminary hearing testimony does not
violate the Confrontation Clause if: “(1) the
witness is unavailable; and (2) the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
statement that is now being offered into evi-
dence against him.” Henderson, 2006-
NMCA-059, 116, 189 N.M. 595, 136 P.3d
1005 (emphasis omitted).

{12} Defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine Romero, and actually did
cross-examine him, on the “statement that is

1. We do not reach Defendant's confrontation
rights under Article II, Section 14 of the New
Mexico Constitution as that argument was not
preserved. See State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009,
149, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861 (stating that

now being offered into evidence against him.”
Id. (emphasis omitted). At both the prelimi-
nary hearing and at trial, Defendant was
facing the same charges, was represented by
the same defense counsel, and had the same
motive to cross-examine Romero. See id.
119. We conclude that the opportunity to
cross-examine Romero at the preliminary
hearing satisfied the demands of the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.t
The introduction of Romero’s testimony at
the preliminary hearing, therefore, did not
run afoul of the Rules of Evidence or the
Sixth Amendment.

{13} Defendant next argues that the
district court erred in permitting the State to
impeach Romero’s preliminary hearing testi-
mony with a prior inconsistent statement.
In his preliminary hearing testimony, Rome-
ro denied that he told an acquaintance, Bar-
bara Olguin, that he saw Defendant choke
and rape Victim. After Romero’s prelimi-
nary hearing testimony was played for the
jury, the State was permitted to call Olguin
to impeach Romero’s statement. Before Ol-
guin testified, the district court gave a limit-
ing instruction to the jury, stating that her
testimony was to be used solely for the pur-
pose of impeachment. Olguin testified that a
few weeks after Victim’s death, Romero told
her that he saw a physical altercation be-
tween Defendant and Victim on the night
Victim died and Victim hit her head on a
table edge and was knocked unconscious.
Olguin testified that Romero said he saw
Defendant crawl on top of Victim, hold her
by the mouth, choke her, and rape her.

Hs {14} Admission of a prior incon-
sistent statement is within “the sound discre-
tion of the trial court ... and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”
Davis, 97 N.M. at 188, 687 P.2d at 564. A
trial court abuses its discretion when a “rul-
ing is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances of the case,”
such that it can be characterized “as clearly

when a state constitutional provision has never
been interpreted as providing greater protections
than its federal counterpart, the proponent must
make the arguments necessary for the court to
conduct an interstitial analysis).

untenable or not justified by reason.” State
v. Dominguez, 2007-NMSC-060, 116, 142
N.M. 811, 171 P.8d 750, holding modified on
other grounds by State v. Garcia, 2011~
NMSC-008, 11 17-18, 149 N.M. 185, 246 P.3d
1057 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

Hs {(15} If offered for the truth of
the matter asserted, Olguin’s testimony of
Romero’s out-of-court statements would con-
stitute inadmissible hearsay. See McClaugh-
erty, 20083-NMSC-006, 1117, 183 N.M. 459, 64
P.3d 486. Out-of-court statements are not
hearsay, however, if they are offered to im-
peach a witness on a material matter incon-
sistent with the testimony presented at trial.
See Rule 11-618 NMRA; State v. Davis, 97
N.M. 180, 183, 687 P.2d 561, 564 (1981);
State v. Carlton, 82 N.M. 587, 542, 484 P.2d
57, 762 (Ct.App.1971). “When impeaching
with prior inconsistent statements not made
under oath, it is the fact of the inconsistency
that is admissible, not the substantive truth
or falsity of the prior statement.” State v.
Macias, 2009-NMSC-028, 120, 146 N.M.
378, 210 P.8d 804. The declarant of a hear-
say statement admitted into evidence may be
attacked for lack of credibility in the same
manner as if the declarant had testified as a
witness. Rule 11-806 NMRA.

HH {16} Rule 11-607 NMRA “allow/s] a
party to attack the credibility of its own
witnesses.” Jd. 121. Courts and commenta-
tors are in general agreement that a witness
may not be called and then impeached solely
for the purpose of evading the rules of evi-
dence. See United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d
1172, 117475 (8th Cir.1997) (“Courts must
be watchful that impeachment is not used as
a subterfuge to place otherwise inadmissible
hearsay before the jury.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); United States
v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir.1984)
(“{Ijt would be an abuse of the rule [permit-
ting impeachment], in a criminal case, for the
prosecution to call a witness that it knew
would not give it useful evidence, just so it
could introduce hearsay evidence against the
defendant in the hope that the jury would
miss the subtle distinction between impeach-
ment and substantive evidence-or, if it didn’t
miss it, would ignore it.”); accord United

185

States v. Morlang, 581 F.2d 188, 190 (4th
Cir.1975); State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 348, 378
§.E.2d 754, 757 (1989); 1 Kenneth S. Broun
et al. eds., McCormick on Evidence § 39, at
168 (6th ed. 2006). Only if the primary
purpose of the proffered testimony is to pro-
vide evidence, and not as a back-door at-
tempt to introduce otherwise inadmissible
hearsay under the auspices of impeachment,
should a court permit that evidence to be
presented to the jury.

HM {17} This Court, in State v. Brown,
stated that a party may not call a witness for
the primary purpose of impeaching a witness
with a prior statement which otherwise
would be inadmissible hearsay. 1998-
NMSC-037, 152, 126 N.M. 388, 969 P.2d 318.
In Brown, we used the Florida Supreme
Court’s approach to determining whether a
witness’s testimony has a proper primary
purpose, set forth in Morton v. State, 689
So.2d 259, 264 (F'la.1997) (abrogated in part
by Rodriguez v. State, 758 So.2d 29, 47 (Fla.
2000)). 1998-NMSC-037, 11 50-53, 126 N.M.
338, 969 P.2d 313. The Morton approach
scrutinizes the content of the witness’s testi-
mony to ascertain whether it contains evi-
dence that is both favorable and unfavorable
to the proponent. Morton, 689 So.2d at 264.

HM {18} Although this Court has not
engaged in substantial analysis as to the
meaning of “favorable” and “unfavorable” in
Morton, Florida’s courts have reviewed the
analysis and we look to their cases as instruc-
tive. See State v. Richards, 843 So.2d 962,
964-65 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (holding that
the state’s impeachment of its own witness
was proper where the witness’s favorable
testimony “place[d] the defendant in proximi-
ty to ... the victim throughout the evening
of the crime [and] supplie[d] a possible mo-
tive for the shooting.”); Owens v. State, 817
So.2d 1006, 1008 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002) (find-
ing impeachment of the state’s own witness
proper where the witness’s unfavorable testi-
mony was materially inconsistent with prior
statements and directly contradicted the de-
fendant’s guilt). These cases indicate that
the primary purpose of a witness’s testimony
is characterized as favorable when that testi-
mony goes to a substantive matter in contro-

186

versy, not simply whether it is merely rele-
vant. See State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045,
729, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280 (“If the
prosecution elicits relevant, substantive testi-
mony from [a] witness [it calls], [the prosecu-
tion] may impeach its witness with prior
inconsistent statements about the same mat-
ter being testified to at trial.” (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted)); James v.
State, 765 So.2d 763, 765 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
2000). “If the witness’s testimony is useful
to establish any fact of consequence signifi-
cant in the contest of litigation, the witness
may be impeached by means of a prior incon-
sistent statement as to any other matter
testified to.” McCormick, supra, at 169.
Even if testimony is relevant and substan-
tive, however, if it is cumulative or duplica-
tive, evidence may not be introduced for the
primary purpose of later impeaching that
testimony. See Ruff v. State, 31 So.8d 833,
838 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2010) (finding impeach-
ment of its own witness was improper where
the witness’s testimony was duplicative and
“not substantive evidence of any facts in
dispute”); James v. State, 765 So.2d 768, 765
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2000) (finding impeachment
of the state’s own witness improper where
the witness “did not testify as to any sub-
stantive matter in controversy that had not
already been testified to by other prosecution
witnesses”),

{19} Unfavorable testimony, on the other
hand, is that which is “affirmatively harmful”
to the proponent of the witness’s case. See
Brown, 1998-NMSC-037, 1152, 126 N.M. 338,
969 P.2d 313 (quoting Morton, 689 So.2d at
264); see also Lawr v. State, 781 So.2d 452,
454-55 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (finding the
state’s impeachment of its own witness was
proper where she provided both favorable
testimony and “affirmatively harmful” testi-
mony, including denying the crime had oc-
ewred); 4 Clifford §. Fishman, Jones on
Evidence § 26:27, at. 365 (7th ed. 2000) (stat-
ing that testimony must be “affirmatively
harmful,” not “merely disappointing”).

{20} The State suggests that Romero’s
testimony was both favorable and unfavora-
ble to its case against Defendant, and that
Olguin’s testimony was proper for the im-
peachment of the unfavorable portion of

Romero’s testimony. According to the State,
Romero's favorable testimony established the
events of the last night of Victim’s life, identi-
fied Victim’s car, and corroborated the testi-
mony of other witnesses. See Varela, 1999-
NMSC-045, 130, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d
1280 (citing corroborating testimony as fa-
vorable evidence for the State). The State
contends that Romero’s unfavorable testimo-
ny was his statement that he did not see
anything “unusual” happen between Defen-
dant and Victim, weakening the case against
Defendant. The State used Olguin’s testimo-
ny of Romero’s prior inconsistent statement
to attack the credibility of that statement.

{21} We are not convinced that the State
introduced Romero’s testimony for the pri-
mary purpose of providing evidence material
to its prosecution. Much of Romero’s “favor-
able” testimony pertained to innocuous
events surrounding the purchase and use of
drugs on the night of Victim’s death, to which
other live witnesses testified at trial. Testi-
mony concerning the purchase and use of
drugs is immaterial in establishing Defen-
dant’s guilt in Victim’s death. Moreover,
Defendant largely conceded the events set
forth in Romero's testimony in his opening
statements to the jury. Romero’s “unfavora-
ble” testimony, that nothing “unusual” was
afoot when he left Victim’s home on the night
of her death, was consistent with the State’s
theory of the case and leveled no affirmative
harm in the State’s direction.

{22} The State knew with certainty before
trial that the recorded preliminary hearing
testimony contained Romero’s denial that he
made statements to Olguin inculpating De-
fendant. Even if there had been anything in
Romero’s preliminary hearing testimony that
the State could plausibly claim it needed at
trial, the State could have introduced that
portion of the preliminary hearing testimony
without introducing the denials that purport-
edly gave rise to the reason for introducing
Olguin’s otherwise inadmissible hearsay.
The State did not have a proper primary
purpose of admitting Romero’s testimony to
provide evidence material to its case. We
agree with Defendant that the introduction of
Romero’s testimony was for the purpose of
impeaching that testimony with Olguin’s tes-

_
io)
a

timony as to Romero’s otherwise inadmissi-
ple statements. Accordingly, we hold that
the district court abused its discretion by
permitting Olguin to testify.

{23} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
Defendant’s convictions and remand the case
to district court for a new trial.

{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, and PETRA
JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON,
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMCA-079
258 P.3d 466

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vy.
Arturo PORTILLO, Defendant—Appellant.
No. 29,564.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
April 1, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, June 28, 2011,
Docket No. 33,044.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret
E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Joel
Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Law Works L.L.C., John A. McCall, Albu-
querque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION
FRY, Judge.

{1} Defendant challenges the denial of his
motion to suppress. We conclude that Defen-

189

dant, a passenger in a vehicle subjected to a
valid traffic stop, was illegally detained when
the stop was extended by the officer’s ques-
tions, which were unrelated to the reason for
the stop and unsupported by independent
reasonable suspicion. Because the evidence
sought to be suppressed was the fruit of that
illegal detention, we reverse the district
court’s order denying suppression.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

{2} “In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a
motion to suppress, we observe the distinc-
tion between factual determinations which
are subject to a substantial evidence stan-
dard of review and application of law to the
facts[,] which is subject to de novo review.”
State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031, 119, 129
NLM. 688, 12 P.8d 442 (alteration in original)
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). “We view the facts in the manner most
favorable to the prevailing party and defer to
the district court’s findings of fact if substan-
tial evidence exists to support those find-
ings.” State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023,
16, 182 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964.

{3} For the factual background in this
ease, we rely primarily on the district court’s
formal findings of fact that are undisputed by
the parties. We supplement these findings
with additional information upon which the
record is unequivocal and the parties are in
agreement.

BACKGROUND

{4} Officer Dean Thatcher was the only
witness at the hearing on the motion to
suppress. He testified that he initiated a
routine traffic stop for a speeding violation
on July 19, 2008. Defendant was a passen-
ger in the vehicle. Officer Thatcher asked
the driver for his license, proof of insurance,
and registration. As the driver searched for
these documents, Defendant remained look-
ing straight ahead with his hands in his lap,
avoiding eye contact with Officer Thatcher
and only glancing furtively at him once when
Officer Thatcher moved. Officer Thatcher
found this behavior to be abnormal, and it
caused him to suspect that there were nar-
cotics or weapons in the vehicle, Therefore,
when Officer Roy Askin arrived on the scene,
Officer Thatcher asked him to watch Defen-
dant.

190

{5} Officer Thatcher asked the driver to
step out of the vehicle and issued a citation to
him. Officer Thatcher then returned the
documents to the driver and told him that he
was free to leave. However, as the driver
was walking back toward his vehicle, Officer
Thatcher asked whether he had any illegal
narcotics or weapons in the vehicle. The
driver indicated that there were none. Offi-
cer Thatcher requested and obtained the
driver’s consent to search the vehicle.

{6} Officer Thatcher then approached De-
fendant and asked him whether there were
any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle and
whether the vehicle contained any of Defen-
dant’s personal property. Defendant re-
sponded in the negative and, upon the offi-
cer’s request, Defendant also consented to a
search of the vehicle. After Defendant exit-
ed the vehicle, Officer Thatcher asked Officer
Askin to continue to watch Defendant.

{7} In the course of the ensuing search of
the vehicle, Officer Thatcher discovered ille-
gal narcotics. Defendant admitted owner-
ship. He was arrested and later charged
with possession of a controlled substance.

{8} Defendant moved to suppress on the
ground that he had been impermissibly de-
tained in the course of the traffic stop and
further argued that the scope of the investi-
gatory detention had been improperly ex-
panded to include drug-related questioning
without reasonable suspicion. Based on
these alleged illegalities, Defendant contend-
ed that the evidence obtained in the course of
the search of the vehicle, as well as all other
evidentiary fruits of the search, should be
suppressed. The district court denied the
motion. Defendant entered a plea agree-
ment, in which he reserved the right to chal-
lenge the district court’s ruling on the mo-
tion. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
Standing

HMM {9} Because this case involves the
search of a vehicle in which Defendant was a
passenger, standing is presented as a thresh-
old question. See generally State v. Van
Dang, 2005-NMSC-038, 17, 188 N.M. 408,
120 P.8d 830 (characterizing standing as a
threshold issue). The district court conclud-

ed that Defendant had “standing to file his
(mlJotion to [sluppress,” but did not elabo-
rate. An overview of the applicable princi-
ples of law is helpful.

HI {10} Generally speaking, passengers
lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in
vehicles or their contents and, as a conse-
quence, passengers typically lack standing to
challenge automobile searches. See, eg.,
State v. Waggoner, 97 N.M. 78, 75, 686 P.2d
892, 894 (Ct.App.1981) (holding that passen-
gers lacked any reasonable expectation of
privacy and therefore had no standing to
challenge the search of the vehicle). A show-
ing of special circumstances, such as status
as a regular permissive user who exerts con-
trol over the vehicle and its contents, may
support a different result in an appropriate
case. See Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033,
178-10, 188 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d 830 (discuss-
ing circumstances in which a non-owner may
have standing to challenge a vehicle search).
In this case, however, no such showing was
made. We therefore conclude that Defen-
dant lacked standing to directly challenge the
search of the vehicle.

Hs {11} Although an individual may lack
standing to directly challenge a search of a
vehicle, he or she may nevertheless contest
the lawfulness of his or her own detention
and seek to suppress evidence found as a
result of that detention. See id. 1112-13
(observing in a case where the defendant
lacked standing to challenge the search of a
vehicle that he nevertheless had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of his own de-
tention); State v. Creech, 111 N.M. 490, 492,
806 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Ct.App.1991) (observing
that while a passenger may lack a privacy

_ interest sufficient to establish standing to

challenge a vehicle search, a passenger nev-
ertheless has standing to challenge the validi-
ty of the stop). Accordingly, to the extent
that Defendant was illegally detained, Defen-
dant has standing to seek the suppression of
any evidence obtained as a result of that
detention. See State v. Sewell, 2009-NMSC-
033, 116, 146 N.M. 428, 211 P.3d 885 (observ-
ing that a defendant has standing to object to
a seizure “which occurred as a result of the
exploitation of [the dJefendant’s own unlawful
... detention” (omission in original) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)). In
light of the foregoing principles, we must
first ascertain whether Defendant was ille-
gally detained.

Illegal Detention

HH s({12} It is well established that the
initiation of a traffic stop constitutes a sei-
zure of the vehicle’s occupants. State v. Ley-
va, 2011-NMSC-009, 110, 149 N.M. 435, 250
P.3d 861 (explaining that “[a] law enforce-
ment officer who stops a vehicle to investi-
gate a traffic violation seizes the occupants”).
Accordingly, Defendant was clearly seized
when Officer Thatcher stopped the vehicle in
which he was traveling as a passenger, and
he would have standing to challenge that
stop. See Creech, 111 N.M. at 492, 806 P.2d
at 1082. However, Defendant does not take
issue with the validity of the stop itself.

{18} Defendant contends that the stop rip-
ened into an unlawful investigatory detention
when Officer Thatcher improperly expanded
the scope of inquiry beyond the circum-
stances that justified the initial stop. More
specifically, he asserts that once Officer
Thatcher completed his investigation relative
to the speeding violation and issued the cita-
tion, the stop should have concluded. Defen-
dant argues that the officer’s inquiry about
the presence of narcotics and weapons in the
vehicle without reasonable suspicion for do-
ing so impermissibly continued the detention.
See generally State v. Funderburg, 2008-
NMSC-026, 114, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.8d 922
(“An officer’s continued detention of an indi-
vidual, while lawful at the outset, may be-
come unlawful if the officer unjustifiably ex-
pands the scope of the detention or, without
a valid factual basis, makes inquiries about
other criminal activity unrelated to the traffic
violation.”).

{14} Defendant contends that the imper-
missible questioning directly implicated his
own constitutional rights because he was de-
tained himself while the officer engaged in
the narcotics- and weapons-related inquiry.
The State takes a different position. While
acknowledging that Defendant was effective-
ly seized when the traffic stop was initiated,
the State contends that his detention was

191

concluded when the vehicle came to a stop, at
which point Defendant was free to leave.

{15} We appear to lack authority address-
ing the specific situation presented in this
ease. Although a series of cases have estab-
lished that a passenger is detained if an
officer requests his or her identification, no
such request was made of Defendant in this
ease. See, eg. City of Roswell v. Hudson,
2007-NMCA-034, 1113-14, 141 N.M. 261,
154 P.8d 76; State v. Patterson, 2006-
NMCA-037, 121, 139 N.M. 322, 181 P.8d
1286; State v. Affsprung, 2004A-NMCA-038,
118, 185 N.M. 306, 87 P.38d 1088. We must
therefore apply more general principles.

HM {16} “A seizure takes place when
the officer detains the individual in such a
way that a reasonable person would not feel
free to leave, given the totality of the circum-
stances.” Patterson, 2006-NMCA-037, 118,
139 N.M. 822, 181 P.8d 1286. “{IIn deter-
mining whether a passenger in a detained
vehicle would feel free to leave ... three
factors are to be considered: (1) the conduct
of the police, (2) the person of the individual
citizen, and (8) the physical surroundings of
the encounter.” Id. 120 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

{17} In this case, the encounter began
with a display of authority sufficient to effec-
tuate the traffic stop. Soon afterward, a
second officer arrived on the scene as well.
This officer was specifically requested to
watch Defendant. Although the district
court’s findings do not specifically address
the matter, the uncontroverted testimony of
Officer Thatcher indicates that Defendant
was also individually questioned about the
presence of narcotics and weapons in the
vehicle. Cf. State v. Figueroa, 2010-NMCA-
048, 112, 20, 148 N.M. 811, 242 P.8d 378
(elying on uncontroverted testimony of the
officer to establish circumstances surround-
ing an encounter where the officer was the
sole witness at a suppression hearing), cert.
granted, 2010-NMCERT-006, 148 N.M. 584,
241 P.8d 182. Finally, there was no evidence
suggesting that Defendant was ever in-
formed that he was free to terminate the
encounter or to refuse to answer questions.
We conclude that under such circumstances,
a reasonable person would not feel free to

192

leave. The fact that Defendant was initially
seized with a show of authority and kept
under constant scrutiny by two officers
throughout the remainder of the traffic stop,
together with the fact that Defendant was
subjected to questioning about narcotics and
weapons himself, is consistent with a continu-
ous detention. See, ¢9., State v. Jason L.,
2000-NMSC-018, 1117-18, 129 N.M. 119, 2
P.8d 856 (observing that circumstances such
as a threatening presence of several officers,
accusatory or intrusive questioning of indi-
viduals, and failure to inform the individuals
that they were free to leave or not required
to answer questions, are all factors that could
lead a reasonable person to believe he or she
is not free to terminate an encounter with
the police).

{18} Because Defendant remained subject
to continuous detention, the question be-
comes whether his detention was supported
by reasonable suspicion. See generally Fun-
derburg, 2008-NMSC-026, 124, 144 N.M. 87,
183 P.3d 922 (observing that questions about.
drugs and weapons are a distinct line of
inquiry and “must be supported by a showing
of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
other than that which gave rise to the initial
traffic stop” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); State v. Prince, 2004-
NMCA-127, 19, 136 N.M. 521, 101 P.8d 332
(observing that “continued investigation be-
yond the scope of the initial traffic stop is
justified only if the officer can articulate
specific and particularized factors that give
rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion
that other criminal activity has been or may
be afoot”). It is at this point that analysis
under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution diverges from an analysis
under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexi-
co Constitution.

HI {19} Our Supreme Court recently
filed its opinion in Leyva, in which the Court
clarified that an officer’s actions following a
valid traffic stop will be scrutinized different-
ly under the Federal Constitution than under
the State Constitution. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-
009, 1121, 55, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.38d 861.
Under the Fourth Amendment, if an officer
has made a valid traffie stop, “[aln officer’s
subsequent actions are not reasonably relat-

ed in scope to the circumstances that caused
him to stop the vehicle if he detains its
occupants beyond the time needed to investi-
gate the circumstances that caused the stop,
unless he develops reasonable suspicion of
additional criminal activity in the meantime.”
Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, 119, 149 N.M. 435,
250 P.3d 861 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus,
“{w]hether an officer's questioning measur-
ably extends the length of a traffic stop
remains the proper analysis under the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. 121.

HM {20} However, the analysis is differ-
ent under Article II, Section 10 of the New
Mexico Constitution. According to the Ley-
va Court, that provision requires “a reason-
able justification for the initial stop and that
all questions asked during the stop be rea-
sonably related to the reason for the stop or
otherwise supported by reasonable suspi-
cion.” 2011-NMSC-009, 155, 149 N.M. 435,
250 P.8d 861. “Unrelated questions are per-
missible when supported by independent rea-
sonable suspicion, for reasons of officer safe-
ty, or if the interaction has developed into a
consensual encounter.” Id.

{21} It appears that Officer Thatcher's
questioning about narcotics and weapons
would pass muster under Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. Those few questions, while
unrelated to the reason for the initial stop,
did not appreciably extend the length of the
traffic stop as a whole. See Leyva, 2011-
NMSC-009, 118, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861
(observing that under Fourth Amendment
analysis, “[tJhe questions posed during a traf-
fic stop no longer need to be reasonably
related to the initial justification of the stop”
as long as the length of the stop is not
extended beyond “the time required to con-
duct a reasonable investigation into the initial
justification for the stop”).

HI {22} While there appears to be no
Fourth Amendment violation under these cir-
cumstances, it is clear that Defendant pre-
served his claim that the extension of the
initial traffic stop violated Article IT, Section
10 of the State Constitution. The Court in
Leyva clarified what is required to preserve
a claim under the State Constitution and

stated that “[w]here a state constitutional
provision has previously been interpreted
more expansively than its federal counter-
part, trial counsel must develop the neces-
sary factual base and raise the applicable
constitutional provision in trial court.” Ley-
va, 2011~NMSC-009, 149, 149 N.M. 435, 250
P.8d 861. “[A] plethora of precedent already
interprets Article II, Section 10 more expan-
sively than the Fourth Amendment,” so De-
fendant was required only to raise that state
provision below and develop a factual record
in support of his argument. Leyva, 2011-
NMSC-009, 150, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). Defendant did both, and we therefore
turn to an analysis of Defendant’s state con-
stitutional argument.

{28} Under our State Constitution, Officer
Thatcher could ask questions about narcotics
and weapons only if he had developed inde-
pendent, reasonable suspicion giving rise to
such questions. See Funderburg, 2008-
NMSC-026, 124, 144 N.M. 87, 183 P.8d 922.
The only basis for suspicion of criminal activ-
ity that the State articulated in the district
court involved Defendant’s demeanor when
Officer Thatcher approached the vehicle and
requested the driver’s documentation. Offi-
cer Thatcher testified that Defendant’s pos-
ture, with his hands in his lap while looking
straight ahead and failing to make eye con-
tact apart from a single furtive glance, was
abnormal and caused him to suspect that
there were narcotics or weapons in the vehi-
cle. We conclude that this behavior, stand-
ing alone and in the absence of any other
suspicious circumstances, was insufficient to
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. See, eg. State v. Vandenberg,
2008-NMSC-030, 1144, 184 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d
19 (observing that a nervous demeanor and
failure to make eye contact did not give rise
to reasonable suspicion about the possession
of drugs or other criminal activity sufficient
to support further detention of the oceupants
of a vehicle); State v. Gutierrez, 2008-
NMCA-015, 121, 143 N.M. 522, 177 P.38d
1096 (holding that a nervous and possibly
furtive demeanor was insufficient to give rise
to reasonable suspicion to detain); Patterson,
2006-NMCA-037, 999, 29, 139 N.M. 322, 131
P.3d 1286 (holding that nervous behavior and

193

failure to make eye contact did not give rise
to reasonable, individualized suspicion).

{24} To summarize, Defendant was de-
tained at the inception of the traffic stop, and
he remained subject to continuing detention
thereafter. Although the stop was originally
justified, the ensuing expansion of the inqui-
ry into weapons and narcotics was unsup-
ported by reasonable suspicion. We there-
fore conclude that Defendant was subjected
to an illegal detention.

Exploitation of the [Megality

Ms({25} It is established law that
evidence discovered as a result of the exploi-
tation of an illegal seizure must be sup-
pressed unless it has been purged of its
primary taint. See State v. Garcia, 2009-
NMSC-046, 111 14, 28, 147 N.M. 184, 217 P.3d
1082 (reciting the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine set forth in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 US. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d
441 (1968)). We therefore turn to the ques-
tion of whether the evidence discovered in
the vehicle in this case was found as a result
of the exploitation of Defendant’s illegal de-
tention.

{26} As stated earlier, we are unaware of
any New Mexico authority addressing the
precise circumstances in this case. However,
in this Court’s opinion in State v. Van Dang,
2004-NMCA-067, 116, 135 N.M. 719, 93 P.3d
1, rev'd on other grounds by Van Dang,
2005-NMSC-038, 138 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d
830, we cited the case of United States v.
DeLuca, 269 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir.2001), a
case in which the circumstances were strik-
ingly similar.

{27} In DeLuca, a New Mexico police offi-
cer stopped a vehicle in which the defendant
was a passenger. Jd. at 1180. Upon the
officer’s request, the driver and owner of the
vehicle produced valid documentation. Id.
Observing that the occupants of the vehicle
appeared to be nervous, the officer inquired
about their travel plans. Jd. Meanwhile, a
second officer arrived on the scene. Id. Per-
mission to search the trunk of the vehicle
‘was requested, and the driver consented. Id.
Narcotics were subsequently found, and all of
the occupants of the vehicle were arrested

194

for possession. Id. at 1181. The defendant
subsequently moved to suppress the narcot-
ics found in the course of the search. Id.

{28} On appeal, the DeLuca majority opin-
ion noted that as a passenger, the defendant.
lacked standing to directly challenge the
search of the vehicle. Id. at 1132. Never-
theless, the defendant had standing to con-
test the lawfulness of his own detention and
could seek to suppress evidence found in the
vehicle as the fruit of his illegal detention.
Id. Because the government conceded that
the defendant’s continued detention had been
unlawful, the only issue on appeal was wheth-
er the narcotics found in the vehicle were the
fruit of the defendant’s illegal detention. Id.
This was held to depend upon a showing of
“a factual nexus between his unlawful deten-
tion and the discovery” of the narcotics. Id.
In order to make such a showing, the DeLu-
ca court held that it was incumbent upon the
defendant to adduce evidence demonstrating
that the narcotics “would never have been
found but for his, and only his, unlawful
detention.” Id. at 1133. In satisfaction of
this requirement, the court suggested that
the defendant was required to demonstrate
that “had he requested to leave the scene of
the traffic stop, he would have been able to
do so” in the vehicle. Jd. Without such evi-
dence, the DeLuca court majority opinion
held that “we must assume that regardless of
[the defendant’s] presence, the car and its
owner would have continued to be detained
and the officer would still have found the
methamphetamine.” Jd. Because the defen-
dant failed to present any evidence to rebut
that presumption, the DeLuca court ulti-
mately held that the narcotics were not the
fruit of the defendant's illegal detention. Id.
at 1133-34,

{29} Judge Seymour dissented from the
DeLuca majority opinion on several grounds
and began her analysis by noting that “in
vehicle stop cases[,] ... once the occupants
of the vehicle have established that their
detention, arrest or stop was illegal, as a
general rule any evidence obtained as a re-
sult of their detention must be excluded as
fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. at 1137
(Seymour, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The dissent

observed that the majority opinion relied on
a flawed analysis in United States v. Nawa-
Ramirez, 210 F.8d 1128 (10th Cir.2000),
which imposed a “heightened factual nexus
test” that was contrary to precedent. DeLu-
ca, 269 F.8d at 1142, 1144 (Seymour, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). According to the dissent, precedent
requires no such heightened nexus and “has
simply assumed ... that the factual nexus
between the illegal conduct and discovery of
evidence in the car in such cases is crystal
clear given the proximity in time and in
location of the events, and the unbroken links
between them.” Jd. at 1144 (Seymour, J.,
dissenting).

{30} Judge Seymour further noted that,
unlike the DeLuca majority opinion and
Nava-Ramirez, established precedent does
not distinguish between a driver and a pas-
senger when determining whether the evi-
dence is the fruit of the illegality. DeLuca,
269 F.3d at 1145 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
Instead, “once the issue of standing has been
resolved we have conducted the fruits analy-
sis in the exact same manner with respect to
each type of occupant,” whether driver or
passenger. Id.

{31} Finally, Judge Seymour noted that
Nawva-Ramirez erroneously required a non-
owner driver to “attempt to remove the car
from the scene in order to stop it from being
illegally searched before he is entitled to
have evidence discovered in the trunk sup-
pressed.” DeLuca, 269 F.8d at 114647
(Seymour, J., dissenting). In reliance on this
flawed proposition in Nava-Ramirez, the
majority in DeLuca held that the passenger
defendant had to establish that he asked the
detaining police officers if he could leave the
scene of the traffic stop in the driver’s car
before he could challenge the discovery of
the evidence. 269 F.3d at 1188, The dissent
observed that this proposition is tantamount
to saying that “because the illegal search
would have happened anyway, the evidence is
admissible,” and such a notion is contrary to
precedent. Id. at 1147 (Seymour, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Seymour further noted that
“{ujnder the heightened Nava-Ramirez
fruits analysis, ... while a non-owner driver
and a passenger may theoretically challenge

their illegal detention, they will have no rem-
edy because they will be unable to satisfy the
implausible Nava-Ramirez requirement that
they prove they tried to leave with the vehi-
cle prior to the illegal search.” DeLuca, 269
F.3d at 1148 (Seymour, J., dissenting).

{32} We believe Judge Seymour’s dissent
provides the better view of this issue, and a
leading treatise agrees, stating:

It is unquestionably true, just as the dis-

sent [in DeLuca] concludes, that the De-

Luca [majority's] approach undermines the

rationale for the exclusionary rule; indeed,

DeLuca provides positive encouragement

for Fourth Amendment violations by tell-

ing the police that there are potential law
enforcement benefits to be derived, at least
against the passengers, in extending lawful
stops even when, as in DeLuca, such action
is flagrantly illegal.
6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search And Seizure: A
Treatise On The Fourth Amendment § 11.4
(4th ed. 2010) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Given the more expansive interpretation
our courts have given Article II, Section 10
of the State Constitution, we conclude in the
present case that the illegal detention of
Defendant resulted in the discovery of the
evidence in the car. That discovery was fruit
of the poisonous tree, and it was subject to
suppression unless the State demonstrated
that the evidence was purged of its taint.
See DeLuca, 269 F.3d at 1187-88 (Seymour,
J., dissenting).

Hs {38} We understand the State to
suggest that Defendant’s consent to the
search rendered any preceding illegality im-
material. “In order for evidence obtained
after an illegality, but with the voluntary
consent of the defendant, to be admissible,
there must be a break in the causal chain
from the illegality to the search.” State v.
Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, 1128, 126 N.M. 569,
973 P.2d 246 (alterations omitted) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “In
deciding whether the consent is sufficiently
attenuated from the ... violation, we consid-
er the temporal proximity of the illegal act
and the consent, the presence or absence of
intervening circumstances, and the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id.
In this case, there was no attenuation what-

195

soever between the improper questioning
and the request for consent. Officer Thatch-
er asked the improper questions immediately
before seeking consent to search, and no
other events occurred to separate the con-
sent and the questions. Moreover, the pur-
pose of requesting consent to search was
clearly to verify the answers to the improper
questions, thereby continuing an investiga-
tion that was beyond the scope of reasonable
suspicion. Under such circumstances, we
conclude that Defendant's consent was not
sufficiently attenuated from the illegality to
remove its taint. See id. 129 (arriving at a
similar conclusion under analogous cireum-
stances).

{34} To the extent the State suggests that
the driver’s consent overrode the illegality of
the detention, we are not persuaded. Both
the driver and Defendant were illegally de-
tained by way of Officer Thatcher’s improper
questioning, and the evidence was discovered
as a result of that detention. The driver’s
consent did not purge the taint of that pri-
mary illegality.

CONCLUSION

{35} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the district court’s denial of Defendant’s mo-
tion to suppress.

{836} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D.
BUSTAMANTE, and JONATHAN B.
SUTIN, Judges.

2011-NMCA-080
258 P.3d 474
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
v.
Manuel TURRIETTA, Defendant-
Appellant.
No. 29,561.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
April 29, 2011.
Certiorari Granted, July 26, 2011,
Docket No. 33,057.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney
General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Trace L. Rabern, Santa Fe, NM, Scott M.
Davidson, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION
BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} Following a jury trial, Manuel Turriet-
ta (Defendant) was found guilty of murder in
the second degree (firearm enhancement)
contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(B)
(1994) and NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-16(A)
(1998), shooting at or from a motor vehicle
resulting in great bodily harm contrary to
NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-8(B) (1993), ag-
gravated battery with a deadly weapon con-
trary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-5(C)
(1969), and tampering with evidence contrary
to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-5(B)(1) (2003).
Defendant appeals, claiming that (1) the dis-
trict court improperly closed the courtroom
during the testimony of two confidential in-
formants in violation of Defendant’s right to
a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article
II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitu-
tion; (2) the State suppressed favorable ma-
terial evidence in violation of Brady v. Mary-
land, 873 US. 88, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d
215 (1963); and (8) Defendant is entitled to a
judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, a new
trial, under the cumulative error doctrine.
We affirm Defendant’s convictions.

198

I. BACKGROUND

{2} On July 20, 2006, Defendant was in-
volved in a gang-related shooting in Albu-
quergue, New Mexico. Defendant, a mem-
ber of a gang known as Bad Boys Krew
(BBR), shot and killed Alberto Sandoval (Vie-
tim), a member of a gang known as West
Side, following a verbal exchange in a gas
station/grocery store parking lot. Defendant
explained that “[s]ome of the BBK brothers
are from [Thugs Causing Kaos] TCK.” Evi-
dence was presented that Defendant was a
member of TCK. Defendant confessed to the
killing, but claimed that he had acted in self-
defense.

{83} Prior to trial, Defendant moved to
compel the production of any “and all docu-
ments that [the State had] in [its] possession
related to gang affiliation” of certain wit-
nesses, including the following confidential
informants: David Torrez, Joshua Ayala,
Brandon Neal, and George Morales. Addi-
tionally, Defendant sought an order “requir-
ing the State to disclose ... any and all
motives for the confidential informants to
cooperate with authorities in this case.” In
light of the State’s alleged failure to provide
this information in a timely manner, Defen-
dant moved to strike the testimony of these
witnesses and to suppress “any and all excul-
patory information” pursuant to Rules 5~
501, -508, and -505 NMRA and Brady, 373
US. 88, 83 S.Ct. 1194,

{4} The City of Albuquerque moved to
quash all subpoenas “seek[ing] the identifica-
tion and records of confidential informants,
as well as other records, the production of
which may compromise the safety of individ-
uals who are non-parties and further compro-
mise on-going criminal investigations.” The
State filed a motion to clear the courtroom of
unnecessary persons during the testimony of
Torrez, Ayala, Neal, and Morales. The State
alleged that these witnesses, all of whom
were current or former gang members, had
been threatened and/or beaten due to their
involvement in this case. . The State in-
formed the district court that it was “fearful
that other gang members, and possibly fami-
ly members, affiliated with ... Defendant
will ‘pack’ the [cJourtroom and ‘maddog’ the
witnesses, or even try to physically intimi-

date [the witnesses] so that they will not
testify.”

{5} The district court held a hearing on
the parties’ discovery motions. At the hear-
ing, the State argued that it did not intend to
admit any “gang files” into evidence, instead
the rivalry between the TCK and West Side
gangs would be presented through the testi-
mony of Albuquerque police officers “based
on their experience and their training and
... knowledge.” Additionally, the State in-
formed the district court that there were no
confidential informant files related to this
case because Torrez, Ayala, Neal, and Mor-
ales “came forward of their own volition” and
were not given any “promises in return, not
paid, nothing.” Although there was one con-
fidential informant file unrelated to this case,
the State claimed that it was irrelevant to the
proceedings and more prejudicial than proba-
tive because its disclosure could put the con-
fidential informant in danger.

{6} The district court conducted an in
camera review of the confidential informant
file and held “that portions of the file should
be redacted and limited portions produced
subject to the provisions of [a] [p]rotective
[o]rder.” With respect to the gang files, the
district court decided to “wait until trial and
address those objections as they are present-
ed.” Defendant agreed that this was the
appropriate course of action, stating that
“folbviously we're asking for this gang mate-
rial based upon what we think [the State is]
going to try to do. If it is not successful
doing it, I don’t need this stuff. I don’t care
about it.”

{7} The district court also held a hearing
on the State’s motion to close the courtroom
during the testimony of Torrez, Ayala, Neal,
and Morales. The district court recognized
that, in light of Defendant’s constitutional
right to a public trial, the State had the
burden to establish a “substantial probability
of danger.” The district court afforded the
State an opportunity to fulfill its burden by
conducting a limited voir dire of the confiden-
tial informants in a closed courtroom. De-
fendant objected, arguing that a closed court-
room, even during voir dire, violated the
“First Amendment rights of the people in the
gallery to be present” and Defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to a public trial. In re-
sponse, the district court informed the par-
ties that, twice at the beginning of the trial, a
graffiti “tagging” reading “TCK Blast” had
been found outside of the courtroom. In
light of the evidence of a gang presence in
the courtroom, the court found that there
was “a significant and compelling reason for
the protection of witnesses ... to determine
whether or not there have been any threats
to any of the witnesses who will be testify-
ing?”

{8} During voir dire, Torrez, a former
member of TCK, testified that he was twice
“jumped” or “beat up” in jail by other TCK
members, Joey Leyba, Julian Leyba, Jason
Rubio, and Anthony (ast name unknown), for
being a “snitch[].” Additionally, Torrez tes-
tified that “some fools broke [the] windows”
of his girlfriend’s car. At the close of Torrez’
testimony, the State informed the district
court that the individual with the moniker
“TCK Blast” had been identified as Joey
Leyba, one of the gang members who had
physically beaten and threatened Torrez.

{9} George Morales, who was affiliated

with “some” gangs, but no particular one,
testified that there was “paperwork” out on
him because he was a “witness,” a “rat,

snitch, whatever.” Morales clarified that
“paperwork” meant an “open hit” and that
the members of TCK “were going to try and
get at me, kill me, whatever.”

{10} In light of the danger to the wit-
nesses and the evidence of an undetected
TCK presence in the courtroom, the district
court partially granted the State’s motion to
close the courtroom. The district court held
that the immediate family members of both
Defendant and Victim, as well as attorneys,
staff members, and press, could remain in
the courtroom during Torrez’ and Morales’
testimony, but that all other members of the
public would not be permitted entry “for the
purposes of witness protection, as well as the
protection of [D]efendant and the [cJourt.”
Defendant objected to the exclusion of “ap-
proximately [thirty] people who are extended
family members of [D]efendant,” noting that
they had a First Amendment right to attend
the proceedings and that Defendant had a
federal and state constitutional right to their

199

presence. The district court stated that it
did not “know of any other alternatives,”
except to “request names and [sJocial [s]ecu-
rity numbers and allow the deputies to run
these names to determine whether or not
they’ve been affiliated with any gangs.” Be-
cause a partial closure of the courtroom was
the “least intrusive and least limiting alterna-
tive that the [cJourt [could] come up with,”
the district court overruled Defendant’s ob-
jection.

{11} The State withdrew its motion to
close the courtroom during Neal’s testimony,
because during voir dire Neal testified that
he had not been threatened by any TCK
members and that he was “not worried”
about any possible retaliation due to his in-
court testimony. The district court denied
the State’s motion with respect to Ayala,
because there was no testimony indicating
that Ayala had been threatened by TCK or
West Side gang members. Accordingly, the
courtroom was open to the public during
both Neal’s and Ayala’s testimony.

{12} At trial, Torrez, Morales, Neal, and
Ayala all testified that Defendant had admit-
ted to shooting and killing Victim. Based on
this testimony, as well as Defendant’s confes-
sion, the jury found Defendant guilty of mur-
der in the second degree, shooting at or from
a motor vehicle, aggravated battery, and
tampering with evidence. Additional facts
and procedural history will be set forth as
necessary.

Il. DISCUSSION
A. Partial Closure of the Courtroom

Hl {13} Defendant claims that he was
deprived of his right to a public trial under
the United States and New Mexico Constitu-
tions because the district court closed the
courtroom to the general public during the
testimony of Torrez and Morales. The State
responds that the partial closure of the court-
room was justified by the threats of violence
against the witnesses and the evidence of a
gang presence at Defendant’s trial.

HI {14} The district court’s ruling on a
motion to close the courtroom presents a
mixed question of law and fact. We “re-
view[ ] factual findings under a substantial

200

evidence standard, viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party,
and we review de novo whether the district
court correctly applied the law to the facts.”
State v. Slayton, 2009-NMSC-054, 111, 147
N.M. 340, 228 P.8d 387. The ultimate ques-
tion of whether a constitutional violation oc-
curred is a question of law, which we also
review de novo. State v. Brown, 2006-
NMSC-023, 18, 139 N.M. 466, 184 P.38d 753;
see United States v. Al-Smadi, 15 F.3d 158,
154 (10th Cir.1994) (“The underlying facts
concerning the closure [of the courthouse] as
found by the district court will be accepted
unless clearly erroneous; however, whether
the closure violated the Sixth Amendment is
a legal issue which we review de novo.”).

{15} The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which is applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
provides in relevant part that “[iln all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S.
Const. amend. VI; see In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 271-78, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial applies to the states). “‘Our
cases have uniformly recognized the public-
trial guarantee as one created for the benefit
of the defendant.’” Presley v. Georgia, —
US. —, 180 S.Ct. 721, 724, 175 L.Ed.2d
675 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380, 99 S.Ct.
2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979).

Whatever other benefits the guarantee to

an accused that his trial be conducted in

public may confer upon our society, the

guarantee has always been recognized as a

safeguard against any attempt to employ

our courts as instruments of persecution.

The knowledge that every criminal trial is

subject to contemporaneous review in the

forum of public opinion is an effective re-

straint on possible abuse of judicial power.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270, 68 S.Ct. 499
(footnote omitted).

WN {16} However, a criminal defen-
dant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial is not absolute. The United States Su-
preme Court has made clear that this “right
... may give way in certain cases to other
rights or interests, such as the defendant’s

right to a fair trial or the government’s inter-
est in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation. Such circumstances will be rare,
however, and the balance of interests must
be struck with special care.” Waller v. Geor-
gia, 467 US. 39, 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81
L.Ed.2d 81 (1984); of Press-Enter. Co. v.
Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 509, 104
S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (holding,
under the First Amendment, that “(closed
proceedings, although not absolutely preclud-
ed, must be rare and only for cause shown
that outweighs the value of openness”). To
justify a complete closure of the courtroom,
the party seeking to close the hearing
must advance an overriding interest that is
likely to be prejudiced, the closwre must be
no broader than necessary to protect that
interest, the trial court must consider rea-
sonable alternatives to closing the proceed-
ing, and it must make findings adequate to
support the closure.

Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210.

HS {17} The Circuit Courts of Appeals
“have developed a more lenient standard for
closure orders which only partially exclude
the public or are otherwise narrowly tailored
to specific needs.” Davis v. Reynolds, 890
F.2d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir.1989). This is be-
cause “partial closures do not implicate the
same fairness and secrecy concerns as total
closures.” United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d
94, 98-99 (5th Cir.1995). Under the more
lenient standard, the party seeking closure
need only proffer a “substantial reason,”
rather than an “overriding interest,” to justi-
fy the limited exclusion of certain persons
from the courtroom. Woods v. Kuhlmann,
977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.1992) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98-
99; United States v. Farmer, 32 F.8d 369,
871 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Sherlock,
962 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir.1992); Nieto v.
Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 (10th Cir.1989);
Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 581, 588
(11th Cir.1984). Additionally, a partial clo-
sure satisfies the court’s obligation to consid-
er, sua sponte, reasonable alternatives to a
complete closure of the proceeding. Ayala v.
Speckard, 181 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir.1997) (in
banc) (noting that there is “nothing in the
First Amendment cases or in Waller to indi-

cate that once a trial judge has determined
that limited closure is warranted as an alter-
native to complete closure, the judge must
sua sponte consider further alternatives to
the alternative deemed appropriate”); see
Presley, 180 S.Ct. at 724 (recognizing that
“trial courts are required to consider alterna-
tives to closure[,] even when they are not
offered by the parties”).

Hl {18} Torrez and Morales both testi-
fied that TCK gang members had threatened
them with death or physical harm in retalia-
tion for their cooperation with authorities.
Additionally, there was evidence of a “TCK
presence” in the courtroom, as reflected by
the twice tagging “TCK Blast.” The individ-
ual with the moniker Blast had been identi-
fied as Joey Leyba, a TCK gang member
who had physically beaten and threatened
Torrez. Under these circumstances, we
agree with the Supreme Court of Ohio that
“the dangerous nature of gang violence and
the genuine need to protect witnesses testify-
ing against gang members from the deadly
threat of retaliation” is a “ ‘substantial rea-
son’ to order the partial closure of [a] court-
room.” State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.8d
14, 2006~Ohio~-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1088, at 154;
see Woods, 977 F.2d at 77 (recognizing that
the “protection of a witness who claims to be
frightened as a result of perceived threats
meets both the ‘substantial reason’ and the
‘overriding interest’ standards”); Feazell v.
State, 111 Nev. 1446, 906 P.2d 727, 729 (1995)
(per curiam) (holding that a witness’ interest
“in her personal safety qualifies as both a
‘substantial reason’ and an ‘overriding inter-
est’ sufficient to justify partially closing the
trial”).

{19} The partial closure of the courtroom
was narrowly tailored to protect the wit-
nesses, Defendant, and the court from specif-
ic threats of gang violence. The closure did
not extend beyond Torrez’ and Morales’ tes-
timony and did not exclude the immediate
family members of Defendant or Victim, at-
torneys, staff, or the press from the proceed-
ings. Although the district court considered
screening attendees for any gang affiliations
prior to entry, we cannot disagree with the
district court’s determination that an order of
partial closure was “the least intrusive and

201

least limiting alternative.” Accordingly, we
conclude that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial was not violated.

{20} Defendant argues that “any separate
standard” for a partial closure was rejected
by the United States Supreme Court in Pres-
ley. We disagree. In Presley, the district
court excluded the defendant's uncle from
juror voir dire because, as a general rule, it
did not permit spectators to intermingle with
jurors during jury selection proceedings.
130 S.Ct. at 722. The Supreme Court re-
versed, explaining that “[t]rial courts are ob-
ligated to take every reasonable measure to
accommodate public attendance at criminal
trials.” Jd. at 725. The Court recognized
that “[tJhere are no doubt circumstances
where a judge could conclude that threats of
improper communications with jurors or
safety concerns are concrete enough to war-
rant closing voir dire,” but held that the
“generic risk of jurors overhearing prejudi-
cial remarks, unsubstantiated by any specific
threat or incident” was insufficient “to over-
ride a defendant’s constitutional right to a
public trial.” Id.

HE {21} Presley is distinguishable from
this case. First, Presley involved a complete
closure because no spectators were permitted
to remain in the courtroom during the entire
jury selection proceedings. See Common-
wealth v. Cohen, 456 Mass. 94, 921 N.E.2d
906, 922 n. 28 (2010) (“Presley addressed a
full closure of the [courtroom].”). Second, in
Presley, there was no evidence of a specific
threat or incident to justify the district
court’s wholesale exclusion of spectators from
the proceeding. By contrast, in this case,
the district court’s order of partial closure
‘was supported by specific, articulable threats
of retaliatory gang violence and evidence of a
gang presence in the courtroom. Under
these circumstances, we conclude that the
district court struck a proper balance be-
tween the need for courtroom safety and
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial.

HI {22} Alternatively, Defendant argues
that the New Mexico Constitution provides
broader protection than the United States
Constitution. The courts of this state have

202

not previously construed the right to a public
trial under Article II, Section 14 of the New
Mexico Constitution. Where a state consti-
tutional “provision has never before been
addressed under our interstitial analysis, tri-
al counsel ... must argue that the state
constitutional provision should provide great-
er protection, and suggest reasons as to why,
for example, a flawed federal analysis, struc-
tural differences between state and federal
government, or distinctive state characteris-
ties.” State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, 1 49,
149 N.M. 485, 250 P.8d 861 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted); see Rule
12-216(A) NMRA (“To preserve a question
for review it must appear that a ruling or
decision by the district court was fairly in-
voked[.]”). Defendant failed to provide the
district court with any reasons for interpret-
ing Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico
Constitution differently from its federal
counterpart. Accordingly, we conclude that
Defendant's state constitutional claim was
not preserved for our review.

B. Suppression of Evidence

HM {23} Defendant next claims that the
State suppressed favorable evidence that was
material to the issue of guilt in violation of
Defendant’s right to due process of law un-
der the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. Specifi-
cally, Defendant argues that the State im-
properly failed to disclose its “gang files” and
the fact that the confidential informants ei-
ther received or expected to receive compen-
sation in exchange for their testimony. The
State responds that evidence was not sup-
pressed, but even if it was, there was no
Brady violation because the evidence was
immaterial to Defendant’s guilt and was dis-
covered during trial.

{24} The following additional facts are nec-
essary for our resolution of this claim. Prior
to trial, the State informed the district court
“that no one who is listed as a confidential
informant was a confidential informant on
this case.” Defendant responded that “that’s
just flat-out inaccurate. It’s wrong.” The
State quickly clarified that it was “using the
wrong terminology” and that it meant to say
that “no one was paid, and there are no files

related to this case.” The State assured the
district court that the confidential informants
“freely gave information with no promises in
return, not paid, nothing.”

{25} At trial, it was revealed that one of
the confidential informants, Morales, struck
“a, deal with the State to get released from
jail, in exchange for [his] testimony.” The
State informed the district court that it had
disclosed the deal to Defendant and that
Defendant was “fully aware of that, the
[Community Corrections Program] agree-
ment and all of that.” Defendant did not
dispute that the State had disclosed this ex-
culpatory material as soon as it had become
available.

{26} Neal steadfastly maintained that no
one from the State or law enforcement had
given him anything in exchange for his testi-
mony, except for traveling expenses and ho-
tel accommodations during trial. The other
confidential informants, Torrez and Ayala,
offered conflicting testimony regarding their
motivations for testifying. During voir dire,
Torrez testified that he had received “(nJoth-
ing” in exchange for becoming a confidential
informant. Thereafter, the following collo-
quy with defense counsel occurred:

Q. Why did you [become a confidential
informant]?

To get out of jail.

Sorry?

To get out of jail.

So you got out of jail by becoming an
informant, right?

A. Yes.

When he testified before the jury, Torrez
clarified that he became a confidential infor-
mant because he “thought that would some-
how help” him to “get out of jail.” But when
asked whether “[tJhe State gave [him] a good
deal on all [his] cases” in return for providing
information, Torrez responded “I don’t know.
No.” When asked more specifically whether
his probationary status was reinstated in
compensation for his cooperation with the
authorities in this case, Torrez responded
“No, they didn’t help in my—they didn’t help
with my probation being reinstated.”

{27} Ayala testified that he neither re-
ceived nor expected to receive anything from

epep

203

the State in exchange for his testimony.
During cross-examination, Defendant at-
tempted to impeach Ayala’s testimony with a
prior inconsistent statement, in which Ayala
explained, with regard to his then current
sentence, that all “that’s going to get
dropped once [he was] done with doing all
this stuff.” Ayala admitted that his prior
inconsistent statement was true, but also tes-
tified that “there’s nothing out there to get
rid of? because he had already “pled” guilty
to all pending charges, “been sentenced,” and
was “just serving [his] time.”

HM {28} “An alleged Brady violation
[constitutes] a charge of prosecutorial mis-
conduct.” Case v. Hatch, 2008-NMSC-024,
147, 144 N.M. 20, 183 P.3d 905. “When an
issue of prosecutorial misconduct is properly
preserved by a timely objection at trial, we
review the trial court’s ruling on this issue
under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard because the trial court is in the best
position to evaluate the significance of any
alleged prosecutorial errors.”! State v. Tru-
fillo, 2002~-NMSC-005, 1 49, 181 N.M. 709, 42
P.8d 814 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). “The trial court should be
upheld unless its ruling was arbitrary, capri-
cious, or beyond reason.” Case, 2008-
NMSC-024, 147, 144 N.M. 20, 183 P.8d 905
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation niarks
and citation omitted).

{29} In Brady, the United States
Supreme Court held “that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373
US. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. “In order to
establish a Brady violation, the [defendant]
must show that: (1) the prosecution sup-
pressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favor-
able to the accused; and (8) the evidence was
material to the defense.” Case, 2008-
NMSC-024, 144, 144 N.M. 20, 188 P.3d 905
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-

1. Defendant argues that we should apply a more
stringent standard of review because “the state-
ments by the State made at the Brady hearing
about the evidence were in fact false.” As ex-
plained in the body of this opinion, there is no

ted). “[Tyhe ‘prosecution’ for Brady pur-
poses encompasses not only the individual
prosecutor handling the case, but extends to
the prosecutor's entire office, as well as law
enforcement personnel and other arms of the
state involved in investigative aspects [of the
case].” Id. 146 (second alteration in origi-
nal) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

{80} Defendant has failed to establish that
the State suppressed evidence in violation of
Brady. Although, Morales struck “a deal
with the State” sometime between the pre-
trial hearing and the trial, the record reflects
that the prosecutor promptly informed De-
fendant of this fact. Torrez’ and Ayala’s
testimony was not a model of clarity, but it
supports an inference that they were moti-
vated to become confidential informants by
the hope that they would receive favorable
treatment from the State in exchange for
their cooperation. However, there is no evi-
dence to indicate that this hope was ever
realized or that a deal with the State was
ever reached. In the absence of such evi-
dence, we cannot conclude that Defendant
was deprived of his constitutional right to
due process of law.

TM {31} Additionally, we hold that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by
delaying its ruling on Defendant’s motion to
compel certain gang files. Defendant in-
formed the district court that a ruling on his
motion was not necessary unless the State
sought to admit the gang files into evidence.
Defendant does not allege that the gang files
were admitted into evidence or that he re-
newed his motion to compel during trial. See
Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-008, 172, 145
N.M. 451, 200 P.8d 104 (“We will not search
the record for facts, arguments, and rulings
in order to support generalized arguments.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that this claim was
waived in the district court.

C. Cumulative Error

HM {32} Lastly, Defendant argues that
the State’s “handling of the [confidential] in-

indication in the record that the State suppressed
evidence or made false statements. Accordingly,
we review the district court's ruling for abuse of
discretion.

204 a

formers-from the discovery errors ... to the
way they were protected from public scrutiny
during testimony at trial-constituted cumula-
tive error.” “The doctrine of cumulative er-
ror applies when multiple errors, which by
themselves do not constitute reversible error,
are so serious in the aggregate that they
cumulatively deprive the defendant of a fair
trial.” State v. Roybal, 2002-NMSC-027,
133, 182 N.M. 657, 54 P.38d 61. In the
absence of trial error, there can be no cumu-
lative error. See State v. Salas, 2010-
NMSC-028, 140, 148 N.M. 318, 236 P.3d 32;
State v. Casillas, 2009-NMCA-034, 151, 145
N.M. 788, 205 P.8d 830. Because there was
no trial error in this case, we reject Defen-
dant’s cumulative error claim.

Tl. CONCLUSION

{33} We conclude that the partial closure
of the courtroom during the testimony of two
confidential informants did not deprive De-
fendant of his Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial. We further conclude that the
State did not suppress material evidence in
violation of Brady. Accordingly, we affirm
Defendant’s convictions.

{34} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER
and JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judges.

2011-NMCA-082
258 P.3d 483

Estella MARTINEZ and Lila Salazar, in-
dividually and as Co-Personal Represen-
tatives of the Estate of Natalie Martinez
Espinoza; Isaac Martinez and Estella
Martinez, individually and as Co-Per-
sonal Representatives of the Estate of

Amelia D. Martinez; Lila Salazar and
Donna Salazar, as Co-Personal Repre-
sentatives of the Estate of Donald D.
Espinoza; Tony Espinoza and Edna Es-
pinoza; and Anthony Mark Espinoza,
individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
ve
NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 28,661.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

June 1, 2011.

Certiorari Granted, Aug. 5, 2011,
Docket No. 33,083.

Hemphill & Grace, P.C., Linda G. Hemp-
hill, Paul W. Grace, The Okon Law Firm,
Christa M. Okon, Santa Fe, NM, for Appel-
lants.

Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP, M. Karen Kil-
gore, Evelyn A. Peyton, Santa Fe, NM, for
Appellee.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} This case stems from a head-on colli-
sion between a vehicle driven by Amelia
Martinez, in which Donald Espinoza was a
passenger, and another vehicle driven by An-
thony Griego. All involved died. Plaintiffs,
representatives of Martinez’s and Espinoza’s
estates, pursue wrongful death and loss of
consortium claims against the New Mexico
Department of Transportation (DOT) for
negligent failure to maintain the road. The
district court granted DOT partial summary
judgment on the grounds that DOT’s alleged
failure to install a concrete barrier separat-
ing traffic constituted a design issue, which
insulates DOT from liability under the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act (Act), NMSA 1978,
Sections 414-1 to -30 (1976, as amended
through 2010). At trial, the jury found for
DOT on the remaining claims, and Plaintiffs

207

now appeal. Plaintiffs argue the district
court erred by (1) granting partial summary
judgment to DOT on the issue of design
immunity, (2) excluding evidence relating to
DOT's duty to sweep gravel, (8) admitting
Espinoza’s toxicology report and drug para-
phernalia, (4) admitting testimony of DOT’s
expert witness, and (5) providing inaccurate
jury instructions. Additionally, Plaintiffs re-
quest that this Court should provide guid-
ance on whether the grandparents are per-
mitted to bring a loss of consortium claim for
an unborn grandchild. We affirm all of the
district court’s decisions on these issues and
decline to advise whether the grandparents
are permitted to bring a loss of consortium
claim for an unborn grandchild.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

{2} On December 9, 2004, Griego drove
eastbound on NM 502 in Santa Fe County,
using the center turn lane to pass another
driver. Around mile marker nine, Griego
Jost control and collided with the vehicle oc-
cupied by Martinez and Espinoza. Griego
was intoxicated and driving above the speed
limit. Griego, Martinez, and Espinoza died.
Martinez’s and Espinoza’s approximately
eight-month-old fetus also died. Sheriff's
deputies determined that Martinez was not
at fault for the accident. Plaintiffs and DOT
do not dispute this fact.

{8} Plaintiffs are the parents of Martinez
and Espinoza and paternal grandparents of
their unborn grandchild. As representatives
of Martinez’s and Espinoza’s estates, Plain-
tiffs pursue wrongful death and loss of con-
sortium claims against DOT. Plaintiffs also
bring a loss of consortium claim for their
unborn grandchild.

{4} At trial, Plaintiffs argued that DOT's
negligent failure to sweep away crushed red
cinder from the center turn lane in part
caused Griego to skid into oncoming traffic
and collide into Martinez and Espinoza’s ve-
hicle. Plaintiffs also argued that DOT had a
duty to erect a concrete barrier separating
eastbound and westbound traffic. Plaintiffs
asserted that DOT’s duty arose from notice
of NM 502’s dangerous condition. Plaintiffs

208

contended that DOT had notice of (1) previ-
ous fatal accidents occurring on NM 502, (2)
newspaper articles discussing the dangerous-
ness of the road, and (8) two citizens’ com-
plaints made to DOT regarding the dangers
of NM 502. Plaintiffs argued that if DOT
had heeded these notices of problems with
the road’s design and exercised its duty to
erect concrete barriers, Griego would not
have crossed the center turn lane and struck
and killed Martinez and Espinoza.

{5} The court granted partial summary
judgment to DOT on this issue prior to trial
and explained its decision on the record.
The district court held that the erection of
barriers in this case was a matter of road
design and within the scope of preserved
state immunity under the Act. Section 414—
11(B)(1)-2). In reaching its conclusion, the
district court acknowledged that defects in
the road design, if known to DOT as a cause
of accidents, could give rise to a duty on the
part of DOT to change the design to make
the road safer. The district court stated that
it had considered the prior accidents cited by
Plaintiffs on that road, and they did not
sufficiently demonstrate that road conditions
resulting from the road’s design, absent oth-
er factors involved in those previous inci-
dents, were similar to decedents’ accident.
The district court stated that absent an abili-
ty to make such a showing, Plaintiffs could
not demonstrate that DOT was on notice of
the danger of such accidents occurring as a
result of the road’s design. Plaintiffs could
not show that DOT had notice of an ongoing
defect of design in that part of the road, so
as to give rise to a duty on DOT's part to
correct it. To the extent that Plaintiffs failed
to establish that there was a hazardous road
design that gave rise to a duty to correct it,
the district court concluded that it would not
be proper to waive sovereign immunity for
Plaintiffs’ allegation that the design of the
road contributed to the conditions causing
the accident in this case. On appeal, Plain-
tiffs contend that the district court improper-
ly granted partial summary judgment on the
issue of DOT’s duty to erect concrete barri-
ers.

{6} After granting partial summary judg-
ment to DOT on the issue of road design, the

district court excluded other evidence that
Plaintiffs argue demonstrated DOT’s liability
for failure to sweep away gravel in the center
turn lane. Plaintiffs’ evidence included facts
relating to prior fatal accidents that occurred
in the vicinity of the decedents’ accident: (1)
newspaper articles describing these prior ac-
cidents and the dangerousness of NM 502,
(2) testimony by two citizens who expressed
concern to DOT regarding the alleged unsafe
conditions of NM 502, (8) testimony by Plain-
tiffs’ expert that center turn lane barriers
could have prevented the deaths of Espinoza
and Martinez, and (4) other information per-
taining to the configuration of NM 502.
Apart from testimony by one citizen that
related to an observation of gravel build-up,
the district court excluded all of the evidence
on the basis that it was unrelated to DOT’s
duty to sweep away gravel. Left to decide
whether DOT negligently failed to sweep
away crushed cinders in the center turn lane,
the jury found for DOT. On appeal, Plaintiffs
argue that the district court abused its dis-
eretion in excluding this evidence.

{7} Plaintiffs also contest the district
court’s admission of a bag belonging to Espi-
noza, containing cash, a gun, a crack pipe,
and various prescription and non-prescription
drugs discovered in Martinez’s vehicle, as
well as the results from an autopsy report
indicating that Espinoza tested positive for
drugs. The district court admitted the con-
tents of the bag and toxicology report on the
basis that it went to the issue of damages.
Plaintiffs argue that the admission of this
evidence was extremely prejudicial, and the
district court abused its discretion in admit-
ting it.

{8} Next, Plaintiffs appeal the district
court’s decision to permit the testimony of
DOT's expert witness, Dr. Stephen Pike, who
testified to Griego’s degree of intoxication.
Plaintiffs allege that DOT’s untimely identifi-
cation of Dr. Pike as a witness should have
precluded his testimony, and the district
court abused its discretion in admitting it.

{9} Plaintiffs also appeal the district
court’s jury instructions. Plaintiffs argue
that the district court improperly denied
them the right to submit two additional jury
instructions. Lastly, Plaintiffs assert that

this Court should give guidance regarding a
grandparent’s ability to bring a loss of con-
sortium claim for an unborn grandchild. We
first address DOT’s immunity under the Act
and then concern ourselves with the remain-
ing issues that arose at trial.

Il. DISCUSSION

A. Immunity

HMMM {10} Plaintiffs argue that DOT
negligently failed to maintain NM 502 and is
not immune from liability under Section 41-
4-11(B)(1) and (2). Whether immunity bars
Plaintiffs’ suit for DOT’s alleged failure to
erect concrete barriers is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Rutherford v.
Chaves Cnty., 2003-NMSC-010, 18, 133
N.M. 756, 69 P.3d 1199. Summary judgment
is proper if material facts are undisputed,
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Rule 1-056(C) NMRA;
Bierner v. City of Truth or Consequences,
2004-NMCA-098, 18, 136 N.M. 197, 96 P.3d
822. In interpreting the meaning of a stat-
ute, we seek to effectuate legislative intent.
Rutherford, 2008-NMSC-010, 111, 183 N.M.
756, 69 P.8d 1199; California First Bank v.
State Dep't of Alcohol Beverage Control, 111
N.M. 64, 68, 801 P.2d 646, 650 (1990). Statu-
tory provisions that waive governmental im-
munity are strictly construed. Rutherford,
2003-NMSC-010, 111, 183 N.M. 756, 69 P.3d
1199; Armijo v. Dep’t of Health & Env't, 108
N.M. 616, 618, 775 P.2d 1838, 1835 (Ct.App.
1989).

HM {11} Section 41-4-11(B)(1) and (2)
preserves state immunity against suits for
injuries caused by “a defect in plan or design
of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway,
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area” or by
the state’s “failure to construct or recon-
struct any bridge, culvert, [or] roadway([.]”
Section 41-4-11(A) waives state immunity
against suit for injuries caused by “the negli-
gence of public employees while acting within
the scope of their duties during the construc-
tion, and in subsequent maintenance of any
bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, al-
ley, sidewalk or parking area.” The legisla-
tive purpose of Section 414-11 is to ensure
highways are kept safe for the public’s use.
See Rutherford, 2003-NMSC-010, 111, 133

209

N.M. 756, 69 P.8d 1199; see Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 95 N.M. 56, 59, 618 P.2d
894, 897 (Ct.App.1980) (“[T]he New Mexico
Legislature intended to protect the general
public from injury by imposing liability upon
governmental agencies when they fail to
maintain safe public highways.”). We have
previously recognized a city’s immunity from
a suit resulting from its alleged failure to
make structural changes to a roadway in
Villanueva v. City of Tucumcari, 1998-
NMCA-138, 17, 125 N.M. 762, 965 P.2d 346
(“We need not decide whether the City had a
duty to install [wheelchair] ramps.... [T]he
... Act immunized the City from liability for
breach of any such duty.”). In Villanueva,
we reaffirmed that “maintenance” of a road
involves “upkeep and repair[,]” and our view
that installations of structural elements are
matters for which design immunity is con-
ferred. Id. 18 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In carrying out the legis-
lative objective of the Act, it has been well
established that installing and maintaining
traffic controls constitute maintenance activi-
ties under the Act. Rutherford, 20083-NMSC-
010, 19, 183 N.M. 756, 69 P.8d 1199.

{12} Plaintiffs argue that “design flaws
become ‘maintenance’ obligations after re-
peated notice to DOT,” stating that their
claim originates in a design flaw inherent to
NM 502. In framing their argument, they
characterize the placement of “solid traffic
{-Jcontrol median barriers” in the center turn
lane as performance of a “maintenance” fune-
tion and the barriers themselves as “traf-
fic[-]control devices.” Plaintiffs contend that
DOT's duty to maintain New Mexico’s high-
ways entailed a responsibility to place a con-
crete barrier, also known as a “Jersey” barri-
er, between eastbound and westbound traffic
on NM 502 pursuant to a statutory duty
under NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-102(A)
(2008) (“The state transportation commission
shall place and maintain such traffic-control
devices ... as it deems necessary ... or to
regulate, warn or guide traffic.”). Plaintiffs
urge that conerete barriers in the center turn
Jane would be traffic-control devices that
come under the purview of maintenance and,
thus, DOT is not immune from suit for its
failure to install such barriers.

210

{18} During argument on the motions for
summary judgment, Plaintiffs recognized
that immunity had not been waived for de-
sign of roadways. However, they pointed to
Rutherford as representing an erosion of our
rule in Villanueva. As such, they argued
that we should impose a waiver of immunity
in this case. We recognize that the addition
and changing of traffic-control devices has
been increasingly litigated under the waiver
of immunity, but decline to erode the rule
where New Mexico has not abrogated sover-
eign immunity for injuries caused by the
design of a roadway. For the'reasons given
in this Opinion, we are unpersuaded.

HI {14} In determining whether con-
crete barriers constitute a traffic-control de-
vice in this case, we draw on cases in which
our appellate courts have examined the dif-
ference between maintenance and design.
Changing signage and erecting portable bar-
riers has come under the rubric of mainte-
nance thus far. See Rutherford, 2003~
NMSC-010, 19, 183 N.M. 756, 69 P.8d 1199
(determining that portable barricades used to
prevent motorists from crossing a flooded
road was a method of traffie control); Bier-
ner, 2004-NMCA-098, 121, 186 N.M. 197, 96
P.3d 322 (“Erected barriers or curbs ...
appear to involve design [for which] Section
4l-4-11(B) grants immunity.”); Pollock v.
State Highway & Transp. Dep't, 1999-
NMCA-083, 111, 127 N.M. 521, 984 P.2d 768
(determining that the placement of “Wrong
Way” and “Do Not Enter” traffic warning
signs were within the Act’s meaning of main-
tenance (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted)); Villanueva, 1998-NMCA-
188, 18, 125 N.M. 762, 965 P.2d 346 (deciding
that the addition of wheelchair ramps was
not maintenance because it involved a struc-
tural change to the sidewalk); Ryan v. N.M.
State Highway & Transp. Dep't, 1998-
NMCA-116, 18, 125 N.M. 588, 964 P.2d 149
(declaring that the defendant had a duty to
put up warning signs if the defendant had
notice of a dangerous condition created by
wild animal crossings). In contrast, structur-
al changes, resulting in permanent altera-
tions to a road’s original design, have been
granted immunity.

{15} From these cases, it appears that a
line between maintenance and design is in
part influenced by whether the plaintiffs’
harm was caused by changing conditions that
can be addressed by the use of traffic-control
devices, the state’s purported failure to re-
spond to such conditions of which it had prior
notice, or whether the plaintiffs’ harm was
caused by the inherent nature of the road
itself as designed. For example, with regard
to a duty to place traffic signs, this Court in
Ryan concluded that the state’s ostensible
notice of animal crossings necessitated a re-
sponse—placement of signs—to ensure that
ordinary care was taken to protect the pub-
lic. 1998-NMCA-116, 112, 125 N.M. 588,
964 P.2d 149. Similarly, in Rickerson v.
State, light signals were required because of
increased traffic flow. 94 N.M. 473, 475, 612
P.2d 708, 705 (Ct.App.1980). In Rutherford,
the Supreme Court held that dangerously
high flood waters, as a predictable result of
occasional storms upstream, changed road
conditions such that they required the county
to quickly respond with temporary barri-
cades. 2003-NMSC-010, 119-10, 183 N.M.
756, 69 P.3d 1199.

{16} In Villanueva, this Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that a failure to con-
struct wheelchair ramps was maintenance
where none were designed to exist. 1998-
NMCA-138, 18, 125 N.M. 762, 965 P.2d 346.
We stated such an addition would be a signif-
icant structural change that constituted an
installation or reconstruction and “not a mat-
ter of routine maintenance.” Jd. Plaintiffs
rely on Rutherford and cases from other
jurisdictions to support their claim that in-
stalling barriers is maintenance. We dis-
agree, as Rutherford does not address per-
manent changes to a road’s design, and our
statute conferring immunity is outside the
purview of other states’ law. See 2003-
NMSC-010, 125, 133 N.M. 756, 69 P.8d 1199
(holding that “identification and remediation
of roadway hazards constitutes highway
maintenance”). The district court correctly
saw the issue presented by Plaintiffs’ motion
for partial summary judgment as separating
the issue of whether immunity was waived
for aspects of the road’s design from factual
issues concerning maintenance for problems

of which DOT may have been on notice that
maintenance was required.

{17} Plaintiffs attempt to contrast our dic-
ta in Bierner, 2004-NMCA-098, 121, 186
N.M. 197, 96 P.3d 322, concerning curbs and
barriers “appear[ing] to involve design” with
the Supreme Court’s treatment of barricades
in Rutherford as being a method of traffic
control. We believe the contrast is illustra-
tive of the propriety of granting immunity.
Bierner involved the plaintiffs’ argument that
aroad in Truth or Consequences should have
had permanent barriers and curbs to prevent
vehicles from rolling across a street and into
a business. 2004-NMCA-098, 13, 136 N.M.
197, 96 P.3d 322. In contrast, the barricades
in Rutherford were described by the Su-
preme Court as temporary traffic-control de-
vices that fit within the meaning of mainte-
nance because they were not designed to be
permanent, but would come and go as needed
to prevent the public from driving into the
rushing waters of a flash flood—a transient,
yet predictable, condition. See 2003-NMSC-
010, 19, 188 N.M. 756, 69 P.38d 1199. The
barricades were placed on the road as need-
ed, not permanently built into the road for a
distance of miles. See id. 12. Our ruling in
Villanueva and comment in Bierner, even
though dicta, both hinged on the difference
between guiding traffic and designing perma-
nent attributes of a road itself. Though our
comment in Bierner might have been dicta
for that case, we now conclude that erection
of permanent barriers as part of a road
constitutes a matter of road design.

Hl {18} The addition of permanent con-
crete barriers, as Plaintiffs demand in this
particular case, is not a method of traffic
control within the meaning of maintenance
under the Act. Erected Jersey barriers are
concrete, dense structures, the placement of
which is not simple or uncomplicated. See
Charles F. McDevitt, Basics of Concrete Bar-
riers, Vol. 63 No. 5 (2000), available at http://
fhwicsint01.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/
publicroads (“Concrete barriers appear to be
simple and uncomplicated, but in reality, they
are sophisticated safety devices.”). The bar-
ricades in Rutherford were placed on and
removed from the road as needed. They
would not change the design or structure of

211

the road on which they appeared. The road
would then be returned to its original state
after the floodwaters resided. Such is not
the case with the structural changes pro-
posed by Plaintiffs, which are not a matter of
upkeep and repair or routine maintenance
and, thus, reside outside the Act’s conferred
waiver of immunity.

{19} In addition, Plaintiffs also con-
tend that DOT had a duty to place barriers
in the road upon learning about its danger-
ous design. Plaintiffs asserted that DOT had
“designed an inherently dangerous stretch of
road” and that the road had been “rede-
signed and reconstructed” to its current con-
figuration without barriers in the center turn
lane. Plaintiff's allege that following the re-
design of NM 502 in 1998, there was evi-
dence of the road’s changed conditions re-
quiring installation of barriers in the center
turn lane: four fatal accidents over a period
of six years, two citizens’ complaints made to
DOT, and several newspaper articles high-
lighting the dangerousness of the road. In
Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, they
attribute the accident to a number of factors,
but state that the accident occurred “mostly,
because DOT created an inherently danger-
ous condition when it designed NM 502.”
Their exhibits mentioned accidents over an
eleven-and-a-half-mile stretch of road. Yet,
their motion for summary judgment asserted
fault within a barrier-free, two-mile-long
stretch of road. Plaintiffs’ proposed
change—a conerete barrier—is also relevant
to our analysis. They contend that upon
receiving notice of the dangers created by
the redesign, DOT had a maintenance duty
to place a barrier in the road.

{20} We reiterate that, as yet, the princi-
ple of maintenance has not been applied to
describe a responsibility to alter a road’s
design. Moreover, it has never been applied
to transcend the immunity that Section 41-4—
11(B)(2) restored to the state for design,
construction, or reconstruction of a highway
in the event the state’s design for that con-
struction was somehow faulty. For instance,
when the highway department erected a
fence, it had a duty to maintain it and, failing
to do so, invoked its duty to carry out its
proper maintenance responsibilities. See

212

Lerma ex rel. Lerma v. State Highway
Dep't, 117 N.M. 782, 784, 877 P.2d 1085, 1087
(1994) (concluding that the state has a duty
to exercise ordinary care to protect the pub-
lie from foreseeable harm resulting from its
maintenance of roads). Similarly, in Ruther-
ford, the design of the road itself was not at
issue when the court held that the county
had a duty to use temporary barricades to
halt traffic during storms in order to protect
the public from the known danger of flash
floods. 2008-NMSC-010, 19. These cases
deal with attributes that fall short of design
and construction or reconstruction of the
road itself under Section 41-4-11(B). Thus,
we will not apply them in this instance to
give rise to a duty for DOT to alter the
design of NM 502.

HE {21} To the extent that the district
court’s statements from the bench indicate
that, at some point, DOT might acquire no-
tice of a dangerous condition sufficient to
require it to redesign or reconstruct a high-
way, we make two observations. First, such
considerations are outside the purview of the
immunity retained for DOT concerning the
design and construction of NM 502. The
district court granted summary judgment to
DOT, finding it immune as to the issue of
design of the road, leaving only the issue
concerning the accumulation or effect of the
cinders at the location of the accident. Sec-
ondly, any indication that a notice-based obli-
gation to redesign or reconstruct a road
might fall outside the state’s immunity from
suit is not supported by New Mexico law.
Our opinion is not affected by the district
court’s possible reliance on this statement in
granting the partial summary judgment be-
cause we are empowered to affirm the dis-
trict court in those instances where the court,
was right for the wrong reasons. Capco
Acquisub, Inc. v. Greka Energy Corp., 2008-
NMCA-153, 135, 145 N.M. 328, 198 P.38d
854. We affirm because the lack of perma-
nent barriers in the center turn lane was an
attribute of the design of NM 502 and, as a
result—and as the summary judgment re-
flects—DOT is immune from suit because of
Section 41-4-11(B). Thus, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s holding that DOT is, as a matter
of law, immune from suit for its alleged
failure to install concrete barriers. We must,

now address the remaining issues from the
trial concerning evidentiary matters and jury
instructions.

B. Evidentiary Issues

{22} Plaintiffs make three evidentiary
claims: (1) evidence pertaining to DOT’s fail-
ure to sweep gravel in the center turn lane
was incorrectly excluded, (2) a toxicology re-
port concerning Espinoza and evidence that
he possessed a gun and drug paraphernalia
were improperly admitted, and (8) DOT’s
expert testimony was improperly admitted.
‘We address the claims below in this order.

I {23} Under New Mexico’s Rules of
Evidence, relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury. Rule 11-403 NMRA. A district court’s
evidentiary decisions are reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Santa Fe Custom Shutters &
Doors, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A, Ince,
2005-NMCA-051, 119, 187 N.M. 524, 118
P.3d 347. A district court is given great
discretion in determining whether the proba-
tive value of evidence is substantially out-
weighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.
State v. Dombos, 2008-NMCA-035, 133, 143
N.M. 668, 180 P.3d 675. A district court’s
decision will not be disturbed unless “the
ruling is clearly against the logic and effect
of the facts and circumstances of the case
[and] is clearly untenable or is not justified
by reason.” Heath v. La Mariana Apart-
ments, 2007-NMCA-003, 118, 141 N.M. 181,
151 P.3d 908 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), aff'd, 2008~NMSC-017, 143
N.M. 657, 180 P.3d 664.

{24} First, Plaintiffs argue that the dis-
trict court incorrectly excluded evidence
demonstrating a dangerous condition that re-
lated to DOT’s duty to sweep gravel in the
center turn lane. Plaintiffs attributed the
accident to Griego’s speed, his use of the
center turn lane for passing, the presence of
cinders in the center turn lane, and “mostly,
DOT[’s creation of] an inherently dangerous
condition when it designed NM 502.” The
supporting exhibits tendered by Plaintiffs

provided evidence of cross-over accidents at-
tributed to a possible heart attack, drowsy
drivers, possibly drunk drivers, unknown
causes excluding wet and snowy conditions,
and one article stating that most accidents
“involve cars hitting guard rails, barricades,
embankments or curbs.” The evidence the
district court decided to exclude included (1)
facts from prior fatal accidents that occurred
in the vicinity of the decedents’ accident, (2)
newspaper articles describing these prior ac-
cidents and the dangerousness of NM 502,
(8) testimony from two citizens who ex-
pressed their concern to DOT about unsafe
conditions on NM 502, (4) testimony from
Plaintiffs’ expert that center turn lane barri-
ers could have prevented the deaths of Espi-
noza and Martinez, and (5) other information
pertaining to the configuration of NM 502.

IM {25} In excluding the evidence of pri-
or accidents, the district court determined
that the previous accidents occurred too far
from the location of decedents’ accident to
prove that the same defect or dangerous
condition was present. Without a connection
between the previous accidents and the dece-
dents’ accident, the district court held that
evidence of the prior accidents was irrelevant
to DOT’s duty to sweep gravel.

HH {26} Similarly, the district court ex-
cluded the newspaper articles, citizen com-
plaints, testimony by Plaintiffs’ expert, and
evidence pertaining to the configuration of
the road on the basis that this evidence dealt
with the design of the road and was unrelat-
ed to DOT’s duty to sweep gravel in the
center turn lane. Plaintiffs argue that the
exclusion of this evidence forced the jury to
decide DOT’s negligence in a vacuum. We
disagree.

{27} In the cases discussed above that
shape DOT’s liability for failing to maintain
the road to prevent or ameliorate known
conditions, the duty for the governmental
entity to act was determined based on its
knowledge of specific risks requiring mainte-
nance on its part. This connection was dem-
onstrated in Rickerson, 94 N.M. at 476, 612
P.2d at 706 (holding that the state had a duty
to install traffic signals at a place in the road
known to be confusing), in Villanueva, 1998-
NMCA~188, 1118, 12, 125 N.M. 762, 965 P.2d

oo

213

346 (stating that the state is not liable for
failing to construct wheelchair ramps, but it
has a duty to keep sidewalks in a safe condi-
tion) and, in Rutherford, 2008-NMSC-010,
‘119, 25, 183 N.M. 756, 69 P.3d 1199 (conclud-
ing that temporary barriers were required
when the state had knowledge of the nature
of the road during flash floods). These acci-
dents also occurred in different places on
NM 502 than the location of the present
accident. Thus, viewing the factual dispari-
ties involved, the district court could deter-
mine that their probative value was insuffi-
cient to allow their admission. In view of
DOT’s immunity for the design and construc-
tion of the center turn lane, and the absence
of a direct connection between the evidence
of previous complaints and accidents to
DOT's duty to sweep gravel in the center
turn lane, Plaintiffs’ evidence has little, if
any, probative value. As a result, we cannot
hold that the district court’s decision to ex-
clude this evidence was “clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and cireum-
stances of the case[.]” Heath, 2007-NMCA-
003, 118, 141 N.M. 181, 151 P.8d 908 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).

HH {28} Second, Plaintiffs argue that
the results of Espinoza’s toxicology report,
and the contents of the black bag found in
Martinez’s vehicle, were improperly admit-
ted. The district court admitted this evi-
dence on the basis that it went to the issue of
damages. According to the district court,
Espinoza’s drug use and possession of drugs
at the time of his death were important
factors in assessing Plaintiffs’ request for lost
wages and loss of consortium damages.
Plaintiffs insist that the admission of this
evidence was highly prejudicial and without
probative value, and DOT failed to present a
link between Espinoza’s drug use and what
the district court considered was relevant to
his diminished life expectancy and earning
capacity.

{29} Plaintiffs rely on Romero v. State, in
which the Court found that a district court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding evi-
dence of a passenger’s intoxication. 112
NM. 332, 333, 815 P.2d 628, 629 (1991),
receded from on different grounds by Dun-

214

leavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 358, 862 P.2d 1212
(1998). While Romero is relevant in that it
demonstrates that the exclusion of such evi-
dence is not an abuse of discretion, it is silent
as to whether the inclusion of such evidence
is an abuse of discretion. While we are not
unsympathetic to Plaintiffs’ argument, we
also recognize that jury instructions were
given to limit the potential prejudicial effect
on jurors, and Plaintiffs were free to argue
the weight of the evidence. Thus, we cannot
declare the district court’s decision was com-
pletely against logic to assume that a victim’s
drug use does, to some extent, have an affect
on his earning capacity. Thus, we uphold
the district court’s admission of this evidence.

HE {80} Third, Plaintiffs contest the dis-
trict court’s admission of DOT’s expert wit-
ness, Dr. Pike, whose testimony concerned
Griego’s intoxication. A district court’s ad-
mission of an expert witness will not be
reversed absent a showing of abuse of discre-
tion. Chavez v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2001-—
NMCA-065, 135, 130 N.M. 753, 31 P.3d
1027. Moreover, “remedies for the violation
of discovery rules or orders are discretionary
with the trial court.” Id. Plaintiffs assert
that DOT’s late disclosure of Dr. Pike as a
witness violated the trial scheduling order, as
the doctor was only identified a few days
before trial was to begin. To remedy the
late disclosure, the district court gave Plain-
tiffs a one-hour telephone interview and per-
mitted them to submit a rebuttal witness.

HI {81} We conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in admit-
ting Dr. Pike’s testimony. Plaintiffs had no-
tice of DOT’s intent to call a toxicologist to
testify concerning Griego’s impairment
weeks in advance. Moreover, the court
remedied the situation by giving Plaintiffs
the opportunity to interview Dr. Pike and to
call a rebuttal witness. These were appro-
priate remedies even when a witness is not
disclosed until after the trial begins. See
State v. Ruiz, 2007-NMCA-014, 1150-54,
141 N.M. 53, 150 P.8d 1003 (stating the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting a surprise rebuttal witness because
the opposing party failed to show materiality,
prejudice, and the inadequacy of the court’s
remedy).

{82} In demonstrating that the district
court abused its discretion, Plaintiffs rely on
Khalsa v. Khalsa, 107 N.M. 31, 751 P.2d 715
(Ct.App.1988), and Shamalon Bird Farm,
Lid. v. US. Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 111
NM. 718, 809 P.2d 627 (1991). Plaintiffs
argue that this Court should, like this Court
in Khalsa and the Supreme Court in Sham-
alon Bird Farm, “find that Plaintiffs were
unfairly prejudiced by the belated identifica-
tion of Dr. Pike.” In Khalsa, a child custody
case, we reversed the district court’s decision
in part because the father had no opportunity
to interview the witnesses or call a rebuttal
witness after the mother’s surprise witness
testified. 107 N.M. at 34-85, 751 P.2d at
718-19. Yet, in the case at hand, Plaintiffs
had the opportunity to both interview Dr.
Pike and call a rebuttal witness. Thus,
Plaintiffs did not suffer the prejudice that
oceurred in Khalsa,

{33} Additionally, in Shamalon Bird
Farm, the Supreme Court upheld the district
court’s decision to exclude the plaintiffs wit-
ness at trial in a case where the plaintiff
brought suit against its insurer for bad faith
failure to pay insurance benefits. 111 N.M.
at 716, 809 P.2d at 680. The Supreme Court
reasoned that the testimony of the plaintiffs
witness was surprise testimony because the
factual basis for the witness’s opinions was
virtually unknown to the defendant the night
before the trial. Id. at 715, 809 P.2d at 629.
Tn contrast, Plaintiffs in this case were well
aware that Dr. Pike’s testimony would be
based on Griego’s toxicology report. Thus,
we decline to reverse on grounds that Plain-
tiffs suffered prejudice from the testimony of
Dr. Pike because of unfair surprise.

HM {34} Lastly, Plaintiffs contend that
Dr. Pike’s testimony was cumulative as a
state police officer had already testified on
Griego’s impairment. However, at the time
of that officer’s testimony, Plaintiffs objected
to his opinion on the issue, citing that he did
not have the technical or medical expertise to
make such judgments. Admitting Dr. Pike’s
medical and professional opinions on Griego’s
impairment provided what the officer could
not, but we see no cause for reversal. Fur-
thermore, Dr. Pike’s testimony was not cu-

mulative because it was offered as a scientific
interpretation of Griego’s toxicology report.

{35} We conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion by permitting Dr. Pike to
testify. The district court provided Plaintiffs
aremedy to DOT’s late identification. More-
over, Plaintiffs knew the factual basis of Dr.
Pike’s testimony, and his testimony was not
cumulative.

C. Jury Instructions

TH s«{36} Plaintiffs contend that the
district court’s jury instructions were im-
proper because they were denied the right to
submit two additional instructions: (1) an
open and obvious danger does not lessen
DOT’s obligation to protect the public from
foreseeable negligence, and (2) notice was not
required where DOT created the dangerous
condition. “The propriety of denying a jury
instruction is a mixed question of law and
fact that we review de novo.” Akins v. Unit-
ed Steelworkers of Am. 2009-NMCA-051,
142, 146 N.M. 237, 208 P.8d 457 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd,
2010-NMSC-081, 148 N.M. 442, 2387 P.3d
744. However, a case will not be reversed on
the basis of an error in jury instructions
unless the result is fundamentally unjust.
McNeill v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co.,
2007-NMCA-024, 119, 141 N.M. 212, 158
P.3d 46, affd, 2008-NMSC-022, 143 N.M.
740, 182 P.8d 121. The party complaining of
jury instructions must show prejudice before
reversal is granted. Blackburn v. State, 98
N.M. 34, 87, 644 P.2d 548, 551 (Ct.App.1982).
Moreover, there is no error in jury instrue-
tions when the instructions given adequately
cover the law to be applied. Kirk Co. v.
Ashcraft, 101 N.M. 462, 466, 684 P.2d 1127,
1181 (1984).

{37} In this case, Plaintiffs have not shown
how the refusal to include these instructions
prejudiced their case. Plaintiffs simply al-
lege that the extensive questioning of one of
DOT’s witnesses, Raymond Helmer, was so
significant in that the jury requested clarifi-
cation of his testimony. It is unclear how
this is related to the alleged deficiency of

215

jury instructions in any way. Additionally, it
appears that the jury instructions provided
by the court fairly presented the issues and
laws applicable to this case. We therefore
reject Plaintiffs’ claim that jury instructions
‘were improper.

D. Loss of Consortium

{88} Plaintiffs ask this Court to provide
guidance on the issue of whether grandpar-
ents should be permitted to bring a loss of
consortium claim for an unborn grandchild.
Plaintiffs admit that there is no law on this
issue. Nevertheless, they contend that other
New Mexico consortium cases could extend
this right to grandparents. It is unecessary
for us to decide this issue. As DOT correctly
points out, our decision on this issue will not
affect the disposition of the case because any
hypothetical additional loss of consortium
claim is moot since the jury found that DOT
was not negligent. Thus, we deny Plaintiffs’
request to provide guidance on this issue.

Il. CONCLUSION

{39} We affirm the district court’s order of
partial summary judgment to DOT as the use
of concrete barriers in this case is an issue of
design for which DOT is afforded immunity.
We also affirm the district court’s evidentiary
decisions and the district court’s exclusion of
Plaintiffs’ proposed jury instructions. We
refrain from providing guidance on whether
grandparents can bring a loss of consortium
claim for an unborn grandchild.

{40} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge and JONATHAN B. SUTIN,

Judge.

2011-NMSC-021
258 P.3d 1008

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-
Petitioner,

v

Clinton SKIPPINGS, Defendant-
Respondent.

No. 32,137.
Supreme Court of New Mex
May 12, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Joel Ja-
cobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender,
Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

CHAVEZ, Justice.

{1} In this case, we consider whether De-
fendant’s requested involuntary manslaugh-
ter instruction was properly denied by the
district court. First, we evaluate the State’s
claim that insufficient evidence was adduced
at trial to support giving the instruction.
Second, finding that the evidence was suffi-
cient, we proceed to analyze whether Defen-
dant’s theory that the killing was accidental
precludes giving the instruction. Because
these two theories of the killing implicate
inconsistent mental states, the State con-
tends that it would have been improper for
the district court to furnish the involuntary
manslaughter instruction.

{2} We conclude that where there is suffi-
cient evidence of both criminal negligence
and accident, it is proper to grant an involun-
tary manslaughter instruction. We also re-
ject the State’s contention that Defendant
failed to preserve the instruction issue at
trial, finding that the district court was abun-
dantly alerted to Defendant’s desired instruc-
tion and his underlying argument. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals, which
found that the district court improperly de-
nied the instruction. State v. Skippings, No.
28,324, slip op. at 2, 2009 WL 6667453
(N.M.Ct.App. Nov.25, 2009).

I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCE-
DURAL HISTORY

{3} Defendant was convicted in a jury trial
of voluntary manslaughter, contrary to
NMSA 1978, Section 30-2~8(A) (1994). De-
fendant’s conviction arose from a series of
interactions with Christy Rogers (Victim)
that ultimately culminated in her death. We
recount only the facts relevant to the issues

before us. Additional facts are incorporated
into the body of the Opinion where appropri-
ate.

{4} According to Defendant’s testimony,
Defendant and Victim had been involved in a
long-term romantic relationship that included
extended periods of cohabitation prior to Vic-
tim’s death on March 7, 2007. On March 5,
2007, Victim had been released from jail
after being incarcerated for a little more than
a month for drug-related offenses. Defen-
dant testified that upon her release, Victim
and Defendant reunited, spending the night
of March 5 together in a Hobbs motel. The
next day, Defendant took Victim shopping to
purchase new clothes and cosmetics, and the
two discussed Victim abstaining from future
drug use. That evening, Defendant dropped
Victim off at her father’s home to spend the
night.

{5} On March 7, Defendant suspected that
Victim was visiting Dunn Street, an area in
Hobbs associated with the illicit drug trade.
According to his testimony, he twice re-
turned to that area that day and found Vic-
tim present. On the second occasion, upon
observing Victim, Defendant believed that
Victim had been “getting high.” Defendant
confronted Victim and insisted that she re-
turn with him to her father’s residence.

{6} Victim apparently resisted his over-
tures and the two engaged in a loud argu-
ment that spilled into the street and quickly
escalated into a physical confrontation. One
witness characterized the two as “fighting,
hitting each other.” At one point, Victim and
Defendant became entangled, with Victim
straddling Defendant. Defendant sought to
extricate himself from Victim and forced her
off of him, resulting in her landing on the
asphalt roadway and cracking her skull. De-
fendant summoned assistance from a by-
stander and transported Victim to a hospital,
where she died from her injuries.

{7} At Defendant’s trial, the jury was in-
structed regarding second. degree murder
and voluntary manslaughter. The district
court denied Defendant’s requested involun-
tary manslaughter instruction. The jury re-
turned a conviction on the voluntary man-
slaughter charge.

{8} On appeal, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the involuntary manslaughter in-

219

struction was improperly denied, prompting
reversal of the district court. Skippings, No.
28,324, slip op. at 2. The Court found that
there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial
for the jury to conclude that Defendant’s
deadly altercation with Victim was the result
of a misdemeanor battery. Jd. at 4. The
Court explained that this view of the evi-
dence constitutes “unlawful act” involuntary
manslaughter under Section 30-2-3(B) (“[iJn-
voluntary manslaughter consists of man-
slaughter committed in the commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to felony”).
Skippings, No. 28,324, slip op. at 4. Because
a defendant is entitled to an “instruction on a
lesser-included offense, [when] there [is] evi-
dence tending to establish the lesser of
fense,” the Court concluded that Defendant
was entitled to the involuntary manslaughter
instruction. Jd. at 3-4 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In addition, the
Court also dispensed with the State’s preser-
vation arguments, concluding that Defendant
had properly “alert{ed] the court’s mind to
the argument being made [to] invoke a rul-
ing.” Id. at 7.

{9} We granted certiorari to consider
whether Defendant was entitled to the invol-
untary manslaughter instruction. We con-
clude that the instruction should have been
granted, and accordingly affirm the Court of
Appeals.

IL THE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGH-
TER INSTRUCTION

A. Standard of Review

Hs {10} The propriety of jury instruc-
tions denied or given involves mixed ques-
tions of law and fact that we review de novo.
State v. Lucero, 2010-NMSC-011, 111, 147
N.M. 747, 228 P.3d 1167. “When considering
a defendant's requested instructions, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the giving of the requested instruction[s].”
State v. Boyett, 2008-NMSC-030, 112, 144
N.M. 184, 185 P.8d 355 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “A defendant is
entitled to an instruction on his or her theory
of the case if evidence has been presented
that is sufficient to allow reasonable minds to
differ as to all elements of the offense.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted); see also State v. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-
036, 127, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.8d 170 (clarify-

ing that an instruction should be given when
there is “evidence sufficient to justify a rea-
sonable jury determination as to whatever
element is under consideration” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). In
addition, to obtain an instruction on a lesser
included offense, “[t]here must be some view
of the evidence pursuant to which the lesser
offense is the highest degree of crime com-
mitted, and that view must be reasonable.”
State v. Brown, 1998-NMSC-037, 112, 126
N.M. 338, 969 P.2d 318 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Therefore, if “a
jury rationally could acquit on the greater
offense and convict on the lesser,” the defen-
dant is entitled to the instruction. State v.
Ramirez, 2008-NMCA-165, 15, 145 N.M.
367, 198 P.3d 866 Gnternal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
B. Involuntary Manslaughter in New
Mexico

HM {11} Under New Mexico law, involun-
tary manslaughter is an unintentional killing,
State v. Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, 114, 148
N.M. 359, 287 P.3d 103, that consists of an
“unlawful killing of a human being without
malice ... committed in the commission of
an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in
the commission of a lawful act which might
produce death in an unlawful manner or
without due caution and circumspection.”
Section 30-2-3. We have interpreted this
statutory scheme to encompass unintentional
killings that result due to “1) the commission
of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony
[that causes death]; 2) the commission of a
lawful act that might produce death, in an
unlawful manner; or 3) the commission of a
lawful act that might produce death without
due caution and circumspection.” Henley,
2010-NMSC-039, 114, 148 N.M. 359, 237
P.8d 103 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted).

1. Sufficient evidence was presented at
trial to allow reasonable minds to dif-
fer regarding whether Defendant com-
mitted misdemeanor battery against
Victim, a crime that constitutes an
unlawful act not amounting to a felo-
ny under Section 30-2-3(B).

{12} At trial, Defendant presented an
involuntary manslaughter instruction em-

220

bodying the theory that Victim’s death re-
sulted from Defendant’s “commission of an
unlawful act not amounting to a felony,”
Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, 114, 148 N.M.
359, 237 P.3d 103 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted), namely, that Defen-
dant committed the non-felonious “unlawful
act” of misdemeanor battery during the scuf-
fle with Victim that immediately preceded
her death, id. 121. In these proceedings,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the jury
could have reasonably found that Defendant’s
actions during the scuffle satisfied the “un-
Jawful act” category under Section 30-2-3(B).
Skippings, No. 28,324, slip op. at 4. The State
contends that the Court of Appeals erred
because the alleged battery resulted in Vic-
tim’s death, and therefore constitutes aggra-
vated battery, a felony which cannot properly
predicate involuntary manslaughter.

HM {13} Any misdemeanor requiring a
showing of at least criminal negligence, in-
cluding simple battery, can serve as the
predicate unlawful act for involuntary man-
slaughter. See State v. Yarborough, 1996-
NMSC-068, 1 20, 122 N.M. 596, 930 P.2d 131;
see also State v. Holden, 85 N.M. 397, 400,
512 P.2d 970, 973 (Ct.App.1978) (“Inflicting a
beating is an unlawful act.”), Our Legisla-
ture has defined battery as “the unlawful,
intentional touching or application of force to
the person of another, when done in a rude,
insolent or angry manner.” NMSA 1978,
§ 30-84 (1963). In contrast, aggravated
battery is a felony defined as follows:

A. Aggravated battery consists of the
unlawful touching or application of force to
the person of another with intent to injure
that person or another.

B. Whoever commits aggravated bat-
tery, inflicting an injury to the person
which is not likely to cause death or great
bodily harm, but does cause painful tempo-
rary disfigurement or temporary loss or
impairment of the functions of any mem-
ber or organ of the body, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.

C. Whoever commits aggravated bat-
tery inflicting great bodily harm or does so
with a deadly weapon or does so in any
manner whereby great bodily harm or

death can be inflicted is guilty of a third
degree felony.

NMSA 1978, § 30-3-5 (1969).

HM {14} A key distinction between the
two battery statutes is the mens rea require-
ment. State v. Gammill, 102 N.M. 652, 656,
699 P.2d 125, 129 (Ct.App.1985). Under the
aggravated battery statute, it must be estab-
lished that the perpetrator possessed the
specific “intent to injure that person or an-
other.” See also § 30-38-5(A); State v
Wynn, 2001-NMCA--020, 14, 130 N.M. 381,
24 P.8d 816 (“Aggravated battery is a specific
intent crime.”). In contrast, the simple bat-
tery statute only requires that the perpetra-
tor possess general criminal intent to touch
or apply force “to the person of another,
when done in a rude, insolent or angry man-
ner.” Section 30-84; State v. Nozie, 2007-
NMCA-131, 912, 142 N.M. 626, 168 P.38d
756, affd, 2009-NMSC-018, 146 N.M. 142,
207 P.8d 1119 (noting that “general criminal
intent” is the mental state necessary to es-
tablish battery). Therefore, absent the spe-
cific intent to injure, a defendant cannot be
convicted of aggravated battery.

{15} In these proceedings, reasonable
minds can differ regarding whether Defen-
dant’s actions during the scuffle with Victim
constitute simple battery. At trial, witness
testimony was presented supporting the con-
clusion that Defendant intentionally applied
force to Victim in a “rude, insolent or angry
manner.” Defendant himself conceded that
he and Victim engaged in a verbal dispute
that escalated into a physical altercation, he
was “mad,” and he ultimately pushed her
“real hard.” However, Defendant also testi-
fied that he lacked the intent to injure Vic-
tim, asserting that he “didn’t mean to hurt
her in any kind of way” and that he “wasn’t
thinking” when he pushed Victim. Two addi-
tional witnesses also testified to witnessing
the scuffle between Defendant and Victim.
One contended that he saw Defendant “lift-
ing [Victim] and throwing her back to the
ground.” The second testified that Defen-
dant was mad, the two were “fighting with
each other, and ... she was on him ... [and]
he threw her down and fell.” The second
witness also testified that Victim jumped on

Defendant and she hit the ground due to his
efforts to “get her off” him.

HMM {16} The testimony of the two
eyewitnesses, coupled with Defendant’s ex-
planation of the fatal confrontation with Vic-
tim, were adequate to enable “reasonable
minds to differ” regarding whether Defen-
dant committed simple battery versus aggra-
vated battery. In particular, Defendant’s
testimony provided evidence that he lacked
the “intent to injure” Victim, a statutory
element of aggravated battery. Section 30-
3-5(A). Although the State presents a view
of the evidence that supports its theory of an
aggravated battery, the testimony of Defen-
dant and the eyewitnesses lends sufficient
evidentiary support to Defendant’s theory of
a simple battery. Such competing strands of
evidence are for the jury to consider and
resolve. State v. Gallegos, 2001-NMCA-021,
115, 130 N.M. 221, 22 P.3d 689; State v
Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, 15, 149 N.M. 185,
246 P.8d 1057. Only if we were to conclude
that Defendant’s actions constituted aggra-
vated battery as a matter of law could we
foreclose Defendant’s theory that he commit-
ted simple battery. See State v. Allen, 2000-
NMSC-002, 188, 128 N.M. 482, 994 P.2d 728.
Merely because Defendant engaged in a scuf-
fle with Victim that possibly escalated into a
physical fight of some sort does not preclude
a finding of simple battery. See State v.
Hill, 2001-NMCA~094, 1118-19, 181 N.M.
195, 84 P.3d 139 (in applying analogous bat-
tery against a peace officer statute, court
concluded that a “possible view[ ] of the evi-
dence” was that defendant who struck and
kicked officer committed an “intentional
touching or application of force in a rude,
insolent, or angry manner” (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted)); see also
State v. Seal, 76 N.M. 461, 463, 415 P.2d 845,
846 (1966) (court found ample evidence for a
battery conviction where the defendant
“grabbed his wife, pushed or slammed her
against a parked car, held her there, then
after she broke away, followed her to [anoth-
er] car where he proceeded to talk to her for
at least an hour, while she cried and
screamed for him to let her go” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Because there is
sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s
theory, we conclude that sufficient evidence

221

of an “unlawful act not amounting to [a]
felony” is present to support an involuntary
manslaughter instruction. Section 380-2-
3B).

2, Reasonable minds could differ regard-
ing whether Defendant (1) acted with
willful disregard for Victim’s safety
and (2) was subjectively aware of the
danger or risk his actions posed to
Victim, so he thereby acted with crimi-
nal negligence.

HMI {17} The State argues that the evi-
dence adduced at trial “reveals no act as-
eribed to Defendant that would allow any
rational jury to conclude that the most culpa-
ble mens rea Defendant possessed was crimi-
nal negligence.” According to the State, the
evidence supports only two conclusions re-
garding Defendant’s mental state: (1) that
Defendant killed Victim intentionally, or (2)
that Victim’s death was an accident. As the
State points out, neither of these conclusions
comports with a mind-set of criminal negli-
gence. However, our review indicates that
sufficient evidence was presented to the jury
to allow reasonable minds to differ regarding
whether Defendant possessed the required
criminal negligence to support giving an in-
voluntary manslaughter instruction.

Hs {18} In New Mexico, “the State
must show at least criminal negligence to
convict a criminal defendant of involuntary
manslaughter.” Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-
068, 120, 122 N.M. 596, 930 P.2d 131. Be-
cause involuntary manslaughter is an unin-
tentional killing, we only attach felony liabili-
ty where the actor has behaved with the
requisite mens rea. Jd. 1919-20. This
Court has made clear that the criminal negli-
gence standard applies to all three categories
of involuntary manslaughter. State v. Sala-
zar, 1997-NMSC-044, 154, 123 N.M. 778,
945 P.2d 996 (“{I]nvoluntary manslaughter,
whether premised upon a lawful or unlawful
act, requires a showing of criminal negli-
gence.”). Criminal negligence exists where
the defendant “act[s] with willful disregard of
the rights or safety of others and in a man-
ner which endanger[s] any person or proper-
ty.” Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, 116, 148

222
N.M. 359, 287 P.8d 108 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); UJI 14-133
NMRA. We also require that the defendant
must possess subjective knowledge “of the
danger or risk to others posed by his or her
actions.” Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, 117,
148 N.M. 359, 287 P.3d 103.

{19} Reasonable minds could differ re-
garding whether Defendant’s scuffle with
Victim was a criminally negligent act. As we
have discussed, Defendant and Victim en-
gaged in a verbal quarrel that escalated into
a physical confrontation in which Defendant’s
actions caused Victim’s fall and subsequent
death. Ample evidence was provided to sup-
port the view that Defendant engaged in the
dispute and behaved in a fashion that ex-
posed Victim to danger without intending her
death. Based on this evidence, the jury
could reasonably have concluded that Defen-
dant demonstrated a willful disregard of Vic-
tim’s safety. In addition, Defendant’s sub-
jective knowledge of the danger posed by his
conduct could be inferred by a rational jury
from the evidence presented. See State v.
McCrary, 100 N.M. 671, 678-74, 675 P.2d
120, 122-28 (1984). Even though Defendant.
contended at trial that he was unaware of the
danger posed by his actions, a jury could
infer from the circumstances that Defendant
possessed the required subjective knowledge.
As the State suggested at trial, a jury could
conclude that Defendant was aware “of the
danger or risk to others posed by his ...
actions” when he caused Victim to fall on the
hard asphalt, a commonly understood peril.
See Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, 117, 148 N.M.
859, 287 P.3d 108.

{20} The State’s contention that “no act
ascribed to Defendant” would enable “any
rational jury” to conclude that he committed
an act of criminal negligence once again dis-
regards the standard applicable to the review
of denied jury instructions. The State’s view
of the evidence that Defendant “tracked [the
Victim] down, rousted her from her hiding
place, knocked her to the ground and, when
she tried to get up, forcefully threw her
headfirst into the asphalt” is better suited to
argue a sufficiency of the evidence challenge
where we view the evidence in a light most
favorable to a conviction. State v. Romero,

2005-NMCA-060, 118, 187 N.M. 456, 112
P.8d 1118. However, as we have explained,
when considering the propriety of a denied
jury instruction, “we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the giving of the

requested instruction{s].” Boyett, 2008-
NMSC-030, 112, 144 N.M. 184, 185 P.3d 355
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).

{21} For the foregoing reasons, we deter-
mine that sufficient evidence has been pre-
sented to allow reasonable minds to differ
regarding whether Defendant acted with
criminal negligence during his scuffle with
Victim. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, 127, 144
N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170.

3. Defendant’s accident theory does not
preclude an involuntary manslaughter
instruction because sufficient evidence
was presented at trial to support both
theories.

HM {22} We also reject the State’s re-
lated argument that Defendant’s accident
theory precludes giving an involuntary man-
slaughter instruction because the two theo-
ries denote inconsistent mental states. The
State suggests that our decision in Henley
supports its view that a theory of accident is
incompatible with an involuntary manslaugh-
ter instruction. 2010-NMSC-039, 119, 148
N.M. 359, 237 P.38d 103. The State cites
Henley for the proposition that “the mens
rea of accident and involuntary manslaughter
are irreconcilably distinct, and the evidence
of one does not support instructing the jury
on the other.” However, Henley does not
address instances when evidence of the mens
rea of both accident and involuntary man-
slaughter is presented to the jury. Under
these circumstances, the two theories of acci-
dent and involuntary manslaughter can prop-
erly be placed before the jury. See id;
Lucero, 2010-NMSC-O11, 118, 147 N.M.
747, 228 P.3d 1167. In fact, when a defen-
dant’s theory in a homicide case is an acci-
dental killing, the committee commentary for
the excusable homicide uniform jury instruc-
tion envisions that the “defendant will un-
doubtedly ... bring out the absence of the
elements of involuntary manslaughter.” UJI
14-5140 NMRA, Committee Commentary.

This recognition of the potential juxtaposi-
tion of the two theories clarifies that accident
and involuntary manslaughter are compati-
ble, although competing, explanations of the
same event. See Stevenson v. United States,
162 U.S. 318, 322-23, 16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed.
980 (1896) Gury instructions on inconsistent
theories are not improper if supported by
the evidence).

{23} In this case, Defendant testified that
Victim’s death was accidental. Additional
eyewitness testimony could also be construed
consistent with Defendant’s accident claim.
As a result, because sufficient evidence was
adduced in this regard, we leave it to the
jury to decide what version it believes.

C. Preservation

MMM {24} Finally, we dispose of the
State’s claim that Defendant failed to pre-
serve the jury instruction issue because he
failed to provide the court with a “correct
written instruction” pursuant to Rule 5-
608(D) NMRA. The State asserts that to
uphold the Court of Appeals finding that
Defendant preserved the instruction issue
would degrade our “adversarial system of
justice” and introduce “a modified inquisitori-
al system in which judges litigate against the
prosecution.” We disagree.

TH s«(25} Rule 5-608(B) mandates
that “a]t the close of the defendant’s case, or
earlier if ordered by the court, the parties
shall tender requested instructions in writ-
ing.” To preserve an error for “failure to
instruct on any issue, a correct written in-
struction must be tendered before the jury is
instructed.” Rule 5-608(D). The rule’s pur-
pose is to “alert the trial court to the defen-
dant’s argument,” State v. Jernigan, 2006-
NMSC-003, 110, 189 N.M. 1, 127 P.8d 587,
and enable a “well-informed ruling” by the
court, State v. Griffin, 2002-NMCA-051, 16,
132 N.M. 195, 46 P.38d 102. Therefore, while
it is true that a defendant must “/gJenerally”
tender a legally correct instruction to pre-
serve the issue on appeal, Rule 5-608 is
subject to flexible enforcement that is consis-
tent with its underlying rationale. See Jer-
nigan, 2006-NMSC-003, 110, 189 N.M. 1,
127 P.3d 537 (emphasis added); see also Hill,
2001-NMCA-094, 17, 181 N.M. 195, 34 P.38d

223

189 (“The State overlooks the purpose of the
rule requiring the tender of a correct instruc-
tion, which is to alert the trial court to the
defendant's argument.”). Accordingly, “if
the record reflects that the judge clearly
understood the type of instruction the Defen-
dant wanted and understood the tendered
instruction needed to be modified to correctly
state the law, then the issue is deemed pre-
served for appellate review.” Jernigan,
2006-NMSC-003, 110, 189 N.M. 1, 127 P.38d
537.

HM {26} In this case, it is abundantly
clear that the district judge was on notice
that Defendant wanted an involuntary man-
slaughter instruction. Defendant proffered a
clearly written involuntary manslaughter in-
struction. The proposed instruction begins
with the unmistakable language “[flor you to
find the defendant guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter... .” The instruction then proceeds
to enumerate all five elements contained in
the corresponding uniform jury instruction,
UJI 14-231 NMRA. The State contends that
the first element, which requires a descrip-
tion of Defendant’s lawful or unlawful act,
provides only a “narrative” of the scuffle with
Victim but fails to identify “any wrongful
act.” Id. The proffered instruction provided
that “[Defendant] and [Victim] were engaged
in an argument that escalated into a physical
fight and [Victim] fell to the ground, struck
her head and died as a result of her injuries.”
While the first element may be an imprecise
articulation of Defendant’s unlawful act, the
use of the term “physical fight” alerted the
district court to Defendant’s theory that the
“unlawful act not amounting to [a] felony”
was a battery. Section 80-2-3(B). We do
not demand exact precision in the wording of
an instruction to preserve the issue for ap-
peal. See Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, 114,
139 N.M. 1, 127 P.38d 587 (despite failure to
define the elements of “attempted voluntary
manslaughter,” court deemed the failure to
instruct preserved because the district court
understood which instruction defendant
sought).

{27} In addition to the written instruction,
counsel and the district court engaged in an
extensive colloquy where both sides made
arguments regarding the propriety of Defen-
dant’s proposed instruction, again alerting

224

the court to Defendant’s theory and the rele-
vant Jaw. This exchange resulted in the
district court explicitly addressing Defen-
dant’s request in which the judge rejected
the instruction because “the involuntary is
present, essentially, to the exclusion of [all]
others.” Far from signaling that the district
court was unaware of Defendant’s requested
instruction, this testimony suggests that the
judge may have actually believed that such
an instruction was appropriate. Finally,
when court reconvened the following morn-
ing, defense counsel reiterated its position,
clarifying Defendant’s theory that the evi-
dence supported a finding that Defendant
battered Victim, therefore providing the ba-
sis for an unlawful act involuntary man-
slaughter instruction. As a result of these
interactions, the district court (1) was aware
of Defendant’s request and the underlying
argument, (2) was presented with a written
instruction, (8) allowed opposing counsel to
respond, (4) provided an informed ruling on
the subject, and (5) was in a position to
correct any misstatements of the law con-
tained in the proffered instruction. These
events satisfy the rationale underlying the
preservation requirement and are consistent
with what New Mexico courts have required
for preservation of a failure to instruct claim.
See, eg. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-~003, 11 10-
15, 189 N.M. 1, 127 P.8d 587; Griffin, 2002-
NMCA-051, 116-7, 182 N.M. 195, 46 P.38d
102. Therefore, the State’s preservation ar-
gument fails.

Il. CONCLUSION

{28} Based on our foregoing analysis and
finding the issue preserved, we conclude that
Defendant was entitled to an involuntary
manslaughter instruction. We affirm the
Court of Appeals and remand to the district
court for proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.

{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MARS, and
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices.

2011-NMSC-022
258 P.3d 1016

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-
Petitioner,

v.

Timothy SANDOVAL, Defendant—
Respondent.

No. 32,149.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
May 18, 2011.

8
N

226

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrew
8. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

David Henderson, Attorney at Law, P.C.,
C. David Henderson, Santa Fe, NM, for Re-
spondent.

|

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} Timothy Sandoval (Defendant) was
convicted of the second-degree murder of
Jeff McCormick (McCormick) contrary to
NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(B) (1994). The
central issue at trial was whether, at the time
McCormick was shot, he was a mere by-
stander or an actual participant with the two
other men involved in the altercation. The
Court of Appeals determined that the self-
defense and defense of another jury instruc-
tions issued at Defendant's trial constituted
fundamental error because the instructions
failed “to adequately and accurately describe
Defendant’s theory of defense” based on a
confrontation with multiple assailants, imper-
missibly lessened the State’s burden of proof,
and misstated the applicable law. State v.
Sandoval, 2010-NMCA-025, 1128, 29, 32,
147 N.M. 465, 225 P.38d 795. The Court held
that reversal of Defendant’s conviction was
necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Id. 133. We hold that the instructions were
not a correct statement of the law, but be-
cause the jury could have found that Defen-
dant acted in self-defense and defense of
another without considering McCormick as
an assailant, issuing the instructions did not
constitute fundamental error. We reverse
and remand this case to the Court of Appeals
to consider the issues not previously ad-
dressed.

I, FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTO-
RY

{2} This appeal requires us to determine
whether Defendant was entitled to the self-
defense and defense of another instructions,
and therefore we “review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the giving of the self-
defense [or defense of another] instruction.”
State v. Ellis, 2008-NMSC-032, 12, 144
N.M. 258, 186 P.3d 245.

{8} Ross “Chino” Ramos (Ramos) and his
brother James Arbizu (Arbizu) had been
drinking beer and repairing Ramos’ Explorer
when McCormick, the father of Ramos’ and
Arbizu’s younger brother, called to ask for a
ride home from work. After picking up
McCormick in the Explorer, the three men

stopped at a gas station to buy cigarettes.
Defendant and Vanessa Couch (Girlfriend)
were at the same gas station, filling Girl-
friend’s car. After Defendant paid for the
gas and exited the store, a verbal altercation
occurred between Defendant and certain oc-
cupants of the Explorer.

{4} Girlfriend testified that the passengers
of the Explorer called Defendant to their
vehicle and started yelling “East Side.” At
some point during the altercation, Arbizu got
out of the Explorer and started walking to-
ward Defendant. According to Girlfriend,
Defendant told Arbizu that he did not know
who he was and did not “want any prob-
Jems.” Arbizu testified that it was Defen-
dant who approached the Explorer at the gas
station and asked whether the two had gone
to school together.

{5} Defendant returned to Girlfriend’s car,
and she sped away. The three men in the
Explorer followed Defendant and Girlfriend.
Ramos was driving, Arbizu was sitting in the
front passenger seat, and McCormick was
sitting in the back, passenger-side seat. Ra-
mos forced Girlfriend’s car off the road and
stopped in front of her car. Holding a gun,
Arbizu exited the Explorer first, followed by
Ramos. Defendant exited Girlfriend’s car,
also with a gun in hand. Ramos put his
hands in the air, telling Defendant to lower
his gun. As Defendant put his gun down,
Ramos reached to his side, as if he had a
gun. A rapid succession of shots followed.

{6} Defendant fired his semiautomatic
weapon at least eight times. Arbizu raised
his gun, which had been cocked and loaded
with eight rounds of ammunition, but one of
Defendant’s bullets struck and disabled the
gun. Arbizu suffered gunshot wounds to the
shoulder, chest, neck, and both hands. Ra-
mos was shot twice in the head and died at
the scene, .

{7} At some point during the altercation,
the back door of the Explorer opened and
McCormick’s legs became visible. Defen-
dant fired two shots into the back of the
Explorer. One shot traveled through the
Explorer without hitting McCormick. The
first bullet’s trajectory indicated that Defen-
dant was standing between two and four feet
from the Explorer when he fired the gun.

227

Defendant fired the second shot while hold-
ing the muzzle of his gun less than six inches
from McCormick's lips. The autopsy later
revealed that McCormick was shot once; the
bullet entered the side of his mouth and
exited through the back of his head. Blood
stains on the seat and floorboard indicated
that McCormick was nearly prostrate when
he was shot, with his head six to twelve
inches above the seat cushion. Lieutenant
Jeff Noah, of the Valencia County Sheriff's
Department, was dispatched to the scene and
discovered McCormick laying lifeless in the
back seat of the Explorer with his feet dan-
gling out the passenger side door, clutching a
package of cigarettes.

{8} Other than Girlfriend and Arbizu, Per-
ry Sanchez (Sanchez), who testified for the
State, was the only other eyewitness. San-
chez was in his barn when he saw two vehi-
cles stop along the road. Sanchez stated
that he saw Defendant exit Girlfriend’s car
and two individuals exit the Explorer, Arbizu
and Ramos. Sanchez saw Defendant point a
gun at Ramos who told Defendant to “{p]ut
your gun down, homes....” Sanchez turned
away as Defendant and Arbizu were lowering
their guns. He heard gunfire, and looking
back, Sanchez saw Defendant shoot into the
back window of the Explorer and then leave
in Girlfriend's car.

{9} Defendant turned himself in to law
enforcement within twenty-four hours of the
incident and was charged with, inter alia, two
open counts of murder, one as to Ramos and
the other as to McCormick, and one attempt-
ed open count of murder as to Arbizu. Prior
to trial, the State dismissed the attempted
murder charge.

{10} Although Defendant did not testify,
Defendant called Girlfriend to the stand to
establish a claim of self-defense and defense
of another. Girlfriend testified that during
the shooting she was scared for her life as
well as Defendant's life. The trial court is-
sued two self-defense instructions, one as to
the killing of Ramos and one as to the killing
of McCormick. Both self-defense instruc-
tions read as follows:

228

Evidence has been presented that [Defen-
dant] killed [Ramos or McCormick] in self
defense.

1. The killing is in self defense if:

2. There was an appearance of immediate
danger of death or great bodily harm
to [Defendant] as a result of his con-
frontation with Ross Ramos and
James Arbizu; and

8. [Defendant] was in fact put in fear by
the apparent danger of immediate
death or great bodily harm and killed
[Ramos or McCormick] because of that.
fear; and

4, A reasonable person in the same cir-
cumstances as [Defendant] would have
acted as [Defendant] did.

The burden is on the state to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that [Defendant] did

not act in self defense. If you have a

reasonable doubt as to whether [Defen-

dant] acted in self defense you must find

[Defendant] not guilty.

(Emphasis added.) Similarly, the trial court
issued two defense of another jury instruc-
tions. In the defense of another instructions,
the jury was to consider whether “[t]here
was an appearance of immediate danger of
death or great bodily harm to [Girlfriend] as
a result of the confrontation between [Defen-
dant] and Ross Ramos and James Arbizu.”

{11} The jury acquitted Defendant for the

killing of Ramos but found him guilty of
second-degree murder as to McCormick.
Defendant was also found guilty of using a
firearm to commit the crime. The trial court
denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Defendant was sentenced to sixteen years in
prison, a fifteen-year basic term with a one-
year firearm enhancement, with ten years of
the sentence suspended.

Hl {12} Defendant appealed, and the
Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s con-
victions and remanded for a new trial. San-
doval, 2010-NMCA-025, 134, 147 N.M. 465,
225 P.3d 795. The Court held that the jury
instructions failed “to adequately and accu-
rately describe Defendant’s theory of de-
fense” based on multiple assailants, thus vio-
lating Defendant’s fundamental rights. Id.
128. We granted the State’s petition for

writ of certiorari to decide “[wJhether it is
fundamental error against [Defendant] to in-
struct a jury that it may find that [Defen-
dant] killed justifiably without stating or re-
quiring the jury to find that the victim was
an aggressor.” State v. Sandoval, 2010-
NMCERT-003, 148 N.M. 560, 240 P.8d 15;
see NMSA 1978, § 84-5-14(B)(1) (1972).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMMM {13} “The standard of review we
apply to jury instructions depends on wheth-
er the issue has been preserved.” State v.
Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, 112, 181 N.M.
258, 34 P.3d 1184. If the issue has been
preserved, this Court reviews the instruction
for reversible error, Id. If the issue has not
been preserved, this Court reviews for funda-
mental error. Id. Under both standards of
review, we determine “whether a reasonable
juror would have been confused or misdirect-
ed by the jury instruction.” Jd. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Un-
der fundamental error review, however, the
jury verdict will not be reversed unless nec-
essary to prevent a “miscarriage of justice.”
State v. Silva, 2008-NMSC-051, 118, 144
N.M. 815, 192 P.38d 1192 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also State v.
Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, 11 15-18, 185 N.M.
621, 92 P.8d 633 (discussing the history of
fundamental error review and the circum-
stances under which fundamental error has
been found).

Hl {14} It is unclear from the record and
the trial transcripts which party tendered the
jury instructions to the trial court, but it is
undisputed that neither Defendant nor the
State objected to the tendered instructions.
“Ordinarily a defendant may not base a claim
of error on instructions he or she requested
or to which he or she made no objection.”
State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, 111, 128
N.M. 454, 998 P.2d 1280; see also State v.
Sosa, 2009-NMSC-056, 126, 147 N.M. 351,
228 P.8d 348 (“Where counsel fails to object,
the appellate court is limited to a fundamen-
tal error review.”).

{15} Accordingly, because the jury instruc-
tion claim was not preserved at the trial
level, we review for fundamental error. We
first determine whether the self-defense and

defense of another jury instructions should

have been presented to the jury. If the
issuing of the instructions was proper, we
then determine whether the instructions
were erroneous, that is, whether a reason-
able juror would have been “misdirected” or
“confused” by the instructions. Only if the
answer to this second inquiry is in the affir-
mative do we decide whether reversal is nec-
essary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

TE {16} “{Clase law and commentary
treat ‘defense of another’ and ‘self-defense’
as virtually identical for purposes of analy-
sis.” State v. Gallegos, 2001-NMCA-021,
17, 180 N.M. 221, 22 P.3d 689; see also UJI
14-5172 NMRA Committee Commentary
(cross-referencing UJI 14-5171 NMRA, self-
defense instruction’s Committee Commen-
tary). Therefore, assertions made regarding
self-defense instructions are also assumed to
apply to defense of another instructions.

Ill. DISCUSSION

A. Whether the Issuing of the Self-De-
fense and Defense of Another Jury
Instructions was Proper

HN s({17} The State argues that Defen-
dant was not entitled to the self-defense and
defense of another jury instructions as to

McCormick because there was not enough

evidence to show that McCormick acted in

concert with Arbizu and Ramos. For a court
to issue a self-defense instruction, “there

need be only enough evidence to raise a

reasonable doubt in the mind of a juror about

whether the defendant lawfully acted in self-
defense. If any reasonable minds could dif-
fer, the instruction should be given.” State

v. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, 127, 144 N.M.

305, 187 P.3d 170 (internal citation omitted).

The elements of self-defense that must be

shown by sufficient evidence to warrant the

self-defense instruction are that “(1) the de-
fendant was put in fear by an apparent dan-
ger of immediate death or great bodily harm,

(2) the killing resulted from that fear, and (8)

the defendant acted reasonably when he or

she killed.” Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, 117,

144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170 (internal quota-

tion marks and citation omitted); see UJI

14-5171. A defense of another jury instruc-

tion is properly issued when

229

(1) there was an appearance of death or
great bodily harm to a person; (2) the
defendant believed the person was in im-
mediate danger of death or great bodily
harm from the victim and killed the victim
to prevent the death or great bodily harm;
and (8) the apparent danger “would have
caused a reasonable person in the same
circumstances to act as the defendant did.”

Gallegos, 2001-NMCA-021, 19, 180 N.M.
221, 22 P.8d 689 (quoting UJI 14-5172).

HM {18} A multiple assailant defense in-
struction should be issued when more than
one assailant is involved in creating an imme-
diate danger of death or great bodily harm
toward the defendant. State v. Cooper,
1999-NMCA-159, 1114-15, 128 N.M. 428,
998 P.2d 745 (“If supported by the evidence,
the defendant is entitled to a self-defense
instruction in which the jury considers
threatened harm from all assailants, not just
the one against whom the defendant may
have retaliated.”). In State v. Coffin, this
Court stated that “a person may act in self-
defense against multiple attackers acting in
concert, [but] this principle applies only to
the extent that each accomplice poses an
immediate danger of death or great bodily
harm, thereby necessitating an act of self-
defense.” 1999-NMSC-038, 112, 128 N.M.
192, 991 P.2d 477.

{19} Although McCormick’s role in this
incident is unclear, it is undisputed that he
was with Arbizu and Ramos during the inci-
dent. There was testimony that while Arbi-
zu and Ramos were confronting Defendant,
McCormick looked as if he were searching
for something in the back of the Explorer.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that
there was sufficient evidence to support the
giving of these instructions. Sandoval,
2010-NMCA-025, 1124, 26, 147 N.M. 465,
225 P.8d 795. We now determine whether
the issued instructions constituted fundamen-
tal error.

B. Fundamental Error in the Self—De-
fense and Defense of Another Jury
Instructions

Hs“ {20} In reviewing the self-de-
fense and defense of another jury instruc-

230

tions for fundamental error, we first deter-
mine “whether a reasonable juror would have
been confused or misdirected by the jury
instruction[s].” Barber, 2004-NMSC-019,
719, 185 N.M. 621, 92 P.8d 683. If we
conclude that a reasonable juror would have
been confused or misdirected, then we “re-
view the entire record, placing the jury in-
structions in the context of the individual
facts and circumstances of the case, to deter-
mine whether the [defendant's conviction
was the result of a plain miscarriage of jus-
tice.” Id. (quoting Benally, 2001-NMSC-
033, 124, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.8d 1184 (Baca,
J., dissenting).

WM {21} “A juror may suffer from con-
fusion or misdirection despite the fact that
the juror considers the instruction straight-
forward and perfectly comprehensible on its
face.” Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, 112, 131
N.M. 258, 34 P.8d 1184 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), “Thus, juror
confusion or misdirection may stem not only
from instructions that are facially contradic-
tory or ambiguous, but from instructions
which, through omission or misstatement, fail
to provide the juror with an accurate rendi-
tion of the relevant law.” Id.

HH {22} Two cases, Coffin, 1999-
NMSC-088, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477, and
Cooper, 1999-NMCA-159, 128 N.M. 428, 993
P.2d 745, have addressed the self-defense or
defense of another instructions when there
are multiple assailants involved. A self-de-
fense or defense of another jury instruction
is normally “justified when force is directed
toward a person posing a threat of imminent.
bodily harm.” Cooper, 1999-NMCA-159, 18,
128 N.M. 428, 993 P.2d 745. A self-defense
or defense of another instruction may also be
justified when more than one assailant is
involved in creating an immediate threat of
death or great bodily harm toward the defen-
dant or another and the assailants were act-
ing in concert. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038,
112, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477.

{23} In Coffin, the defendant fatally shot a
father and son, members of a rival gang,
after they approached the defendant in a
liquor store parking lot. 7d. 113-7. At trial,
the defendant requested a self-defense in-
struction based on the fact that he saw the

father reach in his pocket for a weapon and
that the son “was not wearing a shirt even
though it was a relatively cold night, which,
according to [the defendant], indicated an
aggressive posture.” Id. 111. The trial
court accepted the defendant's self-defense
jury instruction which described the appear-
ance of immediate death or great bodily
harm in the context of both the father and
the son approaching the defendant. Id. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial
court erred in denying his proffered jury
instruction, based on an accomplice liability
theory, which he felt “would have elaborated
on his claim of self-defense and provocation.”
Id. 11. This Court held that “(t]he jury
instruction on self-defense in this case includ-
ed both [the father and the son] and their
alleged threatening actions and, thus, accu-
rately and adequately reflected [the defen-
dant’s] argument” that both were acting in
concert in threatening the defendant. Id.
918. To have issued the defendant’s prof-
fered instruction based on accomplice liability
“would have allowed a claim of self-defense
against an accomplice to an attacker despite
the fact that the accomplice posed no imme-
diate danger of death or great bodily harm
and despite a lack of necessity for the actions
against the accomplice.” Jd. 112.

{24} In Cooper, the Court of Appeals held
that the trial court erred in refusing the
defendant’s self-defense instruction based on
a multiple assailant theory. 1999-NMCA-
159, 11, 128 N.M. 428, 993 P.2d 745. In that
ease, the defendant’s estranged wife came to
his house to gather her things, accompanied
by a male friend carrying a gun. Id. 113-4.
The defendant became scared and grabbed
his wife, allegedly holding a knife to her
throat, using her as a shield against the man.
Id. 14, The trial court denied the defen-
dant’s self-defense jury instruction, which al-
leged an appearance of immediate death or
great bodily harm when he saw the man with
a gun, and acted against wife because of his
fear of death or great bodily harm. Jd. 111,
22. The defendant was convicted of aggra-
vated assault against a household member.
Id. V1.

{25} Even though the wife did not pose an
immediate threat of death or great bodily

231

harm, the Court recognized that, based on
the circumstances, it was not unreasonable
for the defendant to believe that the wife
acted in concert with the man with a gun,
and therefore the wife was an assailant. Id.
717. “If such a response is not unreason-
able as a matter of law, then [the defendant
is] entitled to an opportunity to prove his
defense theory, supported by an appropriate
jury instruction.” Id. 117. In creating an
appropriate multiple assailant jury instruc-
tion, all assailants must be included in the
description of the imminent threat of death
or great bodily harm. Id. 111. To omit an
assailant from the description of the immi-
nent threat of death or great bodily harm is a
misstatement of the law that essentially al-
lows the jury to find that the defendant acted
in self-defense against an innocent bystander.
Id. 122.

{26} In this case, the self-defense and
defense of another jury instructions stated
that the killing of McCormick was in self-
defense or defense of another if “[t]here was
an appearance of immediate danger of death
or great bodily harm to [Defendant] as a
result of his confrontation with Ross Ramos
and James Arbizu.” Due to the omission of
McCormick as an assailant in the instruction,
the jury could have found that Defendant
acted in self-defense or defense of another
against McCormick merely as a result of
Defendant's confrontation with Arbizu and
Ramos. Although the self-defense and de-
fense of another instructions appeared
straightforward, the omission of McCormick
as an assailant in the instructions did not
properly reflect the law regarding multiple
assailants, and thus was error. Jd. 122.
Therefore, we now place the jury instructions
within the facts and circumstances of this
case to determine whether Defendant’s con-
viction was a plain miscarriage of justice,
hence constituting fundamental error. Bar-
ber, 2004-NMSC-019, 119, 185 N.M. 621, 92
P.8d 633.

{27} While there is no dispute that an
altercation between Defendant, Ramos, and
Arbizu ensued on the side of the road, the
role that McCormick played in the alterca-
tion is vague. Witnesses, other than Arbizu,
included Sanchez, who testified for the State,

and Girlfriend, who testified for Defendant.
‘When Sanchez was asked how many individ-
uals he saw engaged in the confrontation, he
responded to have “only seen the two outside
of the vehicles.” On cross-examination, San-
chez agreed that he did not know McCormick
was in the Explorer until he approached the
scene after Defendant and Girlfriend had
left.

{28} Girlfriend admitted that she did not
know anyone was in the back seat of the
Explorer until the back passenger door
opened. Girlfriend’s assumption that
McCormick was searching for a weapon was
“{bJased on what I could think and with two
other people attacking us, at that point that
was the only thing that I could assume he
was doing.” On cross-examination, Girl-
friend admitted that when she was at the gas
station, she was not aware of a third person
in the Explorer.

{29} Although we agree that there was
sufficient evidence for Defendant to receive
the self-defense and defense of another jury
instructions, the jury could have viewed the
evidence as depicting McCormick as either
an assailant or as a bystander. Regardless
of how the jury viewed the evidence, the
omission of McCormick from the instructions
did not preclude Defendant from presenting
his multiple assailant claim to the jury. De-
fendant claimed that he was acting in self-
defense and defense of another against multi-
ple assailants, Arbizu, Ramos, and McCor-
mick. The State presented evidence that
countered Defendant’s theory, arguing that
McCormick did not pose a threat of death or
great bodily harm because he was not one of
the multiple assailants. Ultimately, the jury
chose to accept the State’s theory of the case
and reject Defendant’s theory. See Coffin,
1999-NMSC-038, 113, 128 N.M. 192, 991
P.2d 477 (holding that the State introduced
evidence from which the jury could infer that
one or both of the victims did not pose an
immediate danger of death or great bodily
harm, and that the verdict illustrates the
jury’s acceptance of the State’s evidence, re-
jecting the defendant's argument). The
facts, which were vague as to McCormick’s
role in the incident, combined with the cir-
cumstances of this case, primarily that De-

232

fendant was not precluded from presenting
his multiple assailant claim to the jury, lead
us to conclude that Defendant's conviction
was not a plain miscarriage of justice.

Iv. CONCLUSION

{30} The omission of McCormick as an
assailant in the self-defense and defense of
another jury instructions did not properly
reflect the law regarding multiple assailants.
Under the circumstances in this case, pri-
marily that Defendant was not precluded
from presenting his multiple assailant claim
to the jury, Defendant’s conviction was not a
plain miscarriage of justice and the self-de-
fense and defense of another jury instruc-
tions did not constitute fundamental error.
We reverse and remand to the Court of
Appeals to consider the issues not previously
addressed.

{81} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMSC-024
258 P.3d 1024

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,

ve
Oden GUTIERREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 31,619.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.
May 24, 2011.

oD
nN

ey
8
nN |

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender,
J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Farhan
Khan, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

CHAVEZ, Justice.

{1} Defendant Oden Gutierrez (Child), a
sixteen-year-old, confessed to shooting and
killing Thomas Powell (Powell) in Powell's
home and stealing his car. Child was
charged by criminal information with an open
charge of murder, aggravated burglary,
armed robbery for stealing a car and car
keys while armed with a deadly weapon, and
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. A jury
found him guilty on all counts and he was
sentenced to life in prison plus nineteen and
one-half years.

{2} Child appeals pursuant to Rule 12~
102(A)(1) NMRA and Article VI, Section 2 of
the New Mexico Constitution, which provide
for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of a
conviction resulting in a sentence of life im-
prisonment. Child raises several issues,
which fall into four categories: (1) the sup-
pression of evidence, namely, his confession
and the shoes he was wearing when he was
arrested, which were taken from him when
he was booked into a juvenile facility; (2)
change of venue due to prejudicial pre-trial
publicity; (8) a double jeopardy violation for
his convictions of both armed robbery and
the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle; and
(4) an unlawful sentence because (a) it was
rendered without a pre-sentence report, (b)
the district court incorrectly presumed that a
life sentence was mandatory for a serious
youthful offender, and (c) the life sentence

was cruel and unusual punishment. We con-
clude that first, the confession was admissi-
ble because Child knowingly and intelligently
waived his Miranda rights, he voluntarily
consented to the interrogation, and he volun-
tarily confessed. The shoes were also admis-
sible because they were taken during a con-
stitutional inventory search. Second, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to change venue because
voir dire of the jury did not reveal any
prejudice of the panel from the pre-trial pub-
licity that had occurred several months be-
fore the trial. Third, because Child’s convic-
tion of armed robbery required proof of the
taking of Powell’s car, which was the same
proof required for the unlawful taking of the
vehicle conviction, conviction for both crimes
is a violation of double jeopardy, and there-
fore the unlawful taking of a vehicle convic-
tion is vacated. Finally, because a mandato-
ry pre-sentence report was not provided to
the district court or the parties before the
sentence was imposed on Child, we remand
for re-sentencing only after both the court
and the parties have received a pre-sentence
report.

I. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE

{3} On December 10, 2007, authorities in
Nevada arrested Child on two outstanding
New Mexico warrants that appeared in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s computer-
ized index of criminal justice information,
more commonly known as the NCIC system.
One warrant pertained to Child’s escape
from the Albuquerque Boys Reintegration
Center and the other to his suspected in-
volvement, after his escape, in the killing of
Powell at Powell’s home in Farmington.
Following his arrest, Child was booked into a
juvenile detention facility in Las Vegas, Ne-
vada and his shoes were taken from him as
evidence of a crime.

{4} The next day New Mexico detectives
Cordell Tanner (Tanner) and Kyle Lincoln
(Lincoln) of the San Juan County Sheriff's
Office traveled to Nevada and conducted an
audio-recorded custodial interrogation of
Child at the juvenile detention center. Dur-
ing the interrogation, Child made certain in-
culpatory statements, ultimately confessing

to shooting and killing Powell so that he
could steal Powell’s car.

{5} Child filed a motion to suppress as
evidence his statements and confession, ad-
vaneing several arguments to demonstrate
that waiver of his Miranda rights was not
knowing and intelligent and his statements
and confession were not voluntary, but were
the product of duress. He also sought to
suppress as evidence the shoes that were
taken from him when he was booked into the
juvenile facility, contending that the seizure
of his shoes was unconstitutional. For the
following reasons, we reject Child’s argu-
ments.

A. CHILD KNOWINGLY, INTELLI-
GENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY
WAIVED HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS

{6} In support of his argument that he
neither knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily waived his Miranda rights nor volun-
tarily confessed during the custodial inter-
rogation, Child claims that (1) his mental
impairment, caused by attention deficit hy-
peractivity disorder (ADHD), coupled with
the fact that Spanish is his primary lan-
guage, made it difficult for him to fully un-
derstand the Miranda warnings he was giv-
en; (2) Tanner exploited Child’s upbringing
in a traditional Latino household where he
was taught to be polite and deferential to
authority figures; (8) he did not compre-
hend that his confession would be an over-
whelming determinant of his guilt or inno-
cence; (4) he did not validly waive his
rights because he did not sign a waiver;
and (5) Tanner promised him leniency to
get him to confess.

Hs} On appeal of a district court’s
decision to deny a motion to suppress incul-
patory statements,

we accept the factual findings of the dis-
trict court unless they are clearly errone-
ous, and view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the district court's rul-
ing. The ultimate determination of wheth-
er a valid waiver of [Miranda ] rights has
occurred, however, is a question of law
which we review de novo.

239

State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, 115,
127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). Before
statements obtained during a custodial inter-
rogation may be introduced at trial, the State
must demonstrate “a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver” of constitutional rights
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
1913-14. “Both the Fifth Amendment pro-
tection against self-incrimination and the
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
negate admissibility of a confession elicited
through intimidation, coercion, deception, as-
surances, or other police misconduct that
constitutes overreaching.” State v. Setser,
1997-NMSC-004, 19, 122 N.M. 794, 982 P.2d
484, In addition, the Fifth Amendment has
been interpreted as requiring the State, prior
to a custodial interrogation of an accused, to
advise the accused (1) of the right to remain
silent; (2) that any statement made by the
accused may be used as evidence against him
or her; and (8) of the right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). As with
adults, the legitimacy of a child’s waiver of
Miranda rights is resolved by assessing the
totality of the circumstances. Fare v. Mi-
chael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61
L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).

{8} With respect to children, we have in-
terpreted NMSA 1978, Section 82A-2-14(E)
(2003) as codifying factors relevant to the
totality of the circumstances, similar to those
approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Fare, 442 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560. See
Seiser, 1997-NMSC-004, 113, 122 N.M. 794,
982 P.2d 484. Section 32A-2-14(E) provides:

In determining whether [a child over the
age of fifteen] knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily waived the child’s rights, the
court shall consider the following factors:

(1) the age and education of the respon-
dent;

(2) whether the respondent is in custo-
dy;

(8) the manner in which the respondent
was advised of the respondent’s rights;

(4) the length of questioning and cir-
cumstances under which the respondent
was questioned;

240

(5) the condition of the quarters where
the respondent was being kept at the time
of being questioned;

(6) the time of day and the treatment of
the respondent at the time of being ques-
tioned;

(7) the mental and physical condition of
the respondent at the time of being ques-
tioned; and

(8) whether the respondent had the
counsel of an attorney, friends or relatives
at the time of being questioned.

We have, however, emphasized “some of the
circumstances that may be particularly rele-
vant for a juvenile, such as the presence of a
relative or friend.” Martinez, 1999-NMSC-
018, 118 [127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718].

THM {9} We therefore proceed to ana-
lyze the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding Child’s interrogation, bearing in
mind that the waiver inquiry

has two distinct dimensions. First, the

relinquishment of the right must have been

voluntary in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion, or de-
ception. Second, the waiver must have
been made with a full awareness of both
the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it.

Moran v. Burbine, 475 US. 412, 421, 106

S.Ct. 1185, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (citations

omitted).

{10} The facts surrounding Child’s custodi-
al interrogation are not in dispute. Tanner
and Lincoln arrived at the juvenile detention
facility in Nevada at approximately 10:00
am. on December 11, 2007. They found
Child visiting with his mother in the facility’s
cafeteria. Tanner introduced himself and
told Child he wanted to visit with him. Child
agreed, and Tanner took him into an approxi-
mately fifteen by fifteen foot office located
nearby, while Child’s mother waited in the
cafeteria. Once in the office, Tanner set up
an audio recording device and sat across a
table approximately four to five feet away
from Child. Lincoln sat next to Tanner, but
was even further away from Child. Tanner
read Child his Miranda rights and Child

acknowledged the reading of each right by
nodding his head. After reading Child his
rights, Tanner asked him whether he under-
stood them, and Child answered, “Yes sir.”
Tanner told Child, “You can visit with us, if
you wanna stop you can stop, 0.k.?” Tanner
then asked Child if he wanted to visit with
the detectives, to which Child asked, “Is it
alright if I call my mom in here?” Tanner
answered, “Yeah, absolutely.” The detec-
tives then brought Child’s mother into the
room and began questioning him. Child pro-
ceeded to answer each of Tanner’s questions.
Child stated that he escaped from the Albu-
querque Boys Reintegration Center in late
October of 2007, and that after he had es-
caped he went to Powell’s door, found it to be
open, and saw Powell’s “body laying there.”
About halfway through the interrogation, and
prior to actually confessing, Child asked,
“Um, is it alright if I can visit with my mom
and you guys can talk to me then?” Tanner
responded, “You guys can visit, it’s not like
you're gonna be hauled out of here, dude. I
think she'll be supportive of you. She under-
stands you’ve been through a f---ing hard
life. Okay? But we need to get through this
first.” Following the denial of this request,
Child asked his mother to leave the room,
and she did. Child then asked, “Where do
you want me to start?” Tanner asked Child
to “{jJust explain what happened, man.”

{11} With his mother out of the room,
Child gave a different account of what hap-
pened. He stated that after his escape he
decided he needed a car to get to Las Vegas,
Nevada, to visit his mother. He went to
Powell’s house and knocked on the door, and
when Powell opened the door, Child pulled
out a gun. Although he did not want to kill
Powell and just wanted his car, once he was
inside Powell’s house Child realized that
Powell would know his whereabouts, so he
‘Sust shot him” and then fled the state in
Powell’s 1996 Oldsmobile.

{12} During the hearing on the motion to
suppress Child’s confession, Dr. Mark Irwin,
a clinical psychologist, testified to several
opinions on Child’s behalf. Dr. Irwin stated
that Child suffers from ADHD and Spanish
is his primary language, although he can also
speak English fluently and had been able to

241

do so for many years. He then opined that it
would be difficult for Child to take in “a lot of
information” if it was given to him “rapidly”
in English. Dr. Irwin said that he had lis-
tened to the recording of Child’s interroga-
tion and “suspectfed] that [Child] was not
focusing and able to process [the Miranda
warnings issued by Tanner] very efficiently.”
After the hearing, the district court entered
an order denying Child’s motion to suppress.
Child’s statements, including the audio re-
cording of his interrogation and a transcript
of it, were later admitted into evidence
against him at trial.

HHMI {13} In this case, we first assess
whether Child’s waiver was knowing and in-
telligent, ic., whether it was “made with a
full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.” Moran, 475 U.S. at
421, 106 S.Ct. 1185. There is no bright line
test for determining when a child sufficiently
comprehends his or her rights so as to effec-
tuate a valid waiver; instead, we look to the
totality of the circumstances and the factors
enumerated in Section 82A-2-14(E). Setser,
1997-NMSC-004, 1114, 122 N.M. 794, 982
P.2d 484,

{14} In Setser, we were asked whether a
sixteen-year-old who suffered from mental
and emotional problems, including attention
deficit disorder and hyperactivity, had validly
waived her rights prior to making inculpato-
ry statements to the police. 1997-NMSC-
004, 115-7, 122 N.M. 794, 982 P.2d 484.
Pre-trial testing and the testimony of a clini-
eal psychologist revealed that Setser’s intelli-
gence level was possibly subnormal and that
she was “passive and easily dominated ...
and willing to go to great extremes to get
approval from others.” Id. 16. We conclud-
ed that “aJithough there is testimony that
Setser suffers from certain conditions and
disorders that affect her cognitive abilities,
there is no evidence that she lacks sufficient
intelligence to understand her rights and the
repercussion of waiving those rights.” Id. %
57 14,

{15} In this case, we similarly conclude
that, notwithstanding Child’s ADHD diagno-
sis, there is no evidence that he lacks suffi-
cient intelligence to have understood his

rights or the consequences of waiving them.
Evidence in the record supports the district
court’s findings that Child was sixteen years
and eleven months old at the time of his
interrogation, he had been advised of his
rights on previous occasions, and he had, in
fact, refused to speak to authorities without a
lawyer present on at least one of these occa-
sions. In addition, Child possessed a lengthy
juvenile arrest record and had appeared in
court several times. On these facts, we are
not persuaded that Child’s ADHD prevented
him from sufficiently understanding his
rights or the consequences of waiving them.
One advantage of the totality-of-the-cireum-
stances approach is that it allows courts “to
take into account those special concerns that
are present when young persons, often with
limited experience and education and with
immature judgment, are involved.” Fare,
442 US, at 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560. Another
advantage is that it “refrains from imposing
rigid restraints on police and courts in deal-
ing with an experienced older juvenile with
an extensive prior record who knowingly and
intelligently waives his Fifth Amendment
rights and voluntarily consents to interroga-
tion.” Id. at 725-26, 99 S.Ct. 2560.

{16} We are likewise not persuaded that
Child was unable to understand the warnings
provided to him due to the fact that he is
primarily a Spanish speaker, especially in
light of Dr. Irwin’s testimony that Child is
also a fluent English speaker. Indeed, we
find little reason to doubt that Child speaks
sufficient English to understand his Miranda
rights when they were read to him. At no
point during his interrogation did Child claim
not to understand what was being said or
otherwise indicate any problems with com-
prehension. Instead, he acknowledged the
reading of each of his rights, and when asked
if he understood those rights, he responded
by saying “yes sir.” Further, he did not
simply answer “yes” or “no” to Tanner’s
other questions, but he was also able to give
detailed, narrative responses. Thus, the
transcript and recording of his interrogation
reveal that he had no difficulty comprehend-
ing the questions that were asked of him or
effectively communicating his responses. On
this record, we fail to see any indication that

242

Child’s language abilities posed any obstacle
to his understanding of his rights or the
consequences of waiving them.

HE s{17} Child also suggests that he
did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
rights because he did not sign a written
waiver or comprehend that his confession
would be an “overwhelming determinant” of
his guilt or innocence. However, a waiver
“need not be reduced to writing and signed
by [the] defendant,” State v. Smith, 80 N.M.
126, 129, 452 P.2d 195, 198 (Ct.App.1969), and
we can see from both the transcript and the
recording of the interrogation that Child be-
gan answering questions immediately after
being advised of his rights, stating that he
understood those rights. Under these cirecum-
stances, we conclude that Child’s conduct
constitutes an implied waiver. See Martinez,
1999-NMSC-018, 123, 127 N.M. 207, 979
P.2d 718 (finding implied waiver by juvenile
based on his course of conduct in answering
police questions after being advised of Mi-
randa rights).

{18} We find support for our determina-
tion of an implied waiver in Berghuis v.
Thompkins, in which the U.S. Supreme
Court explained that

[tlhe course of decisions since Miranda,

informed by the application of Miranda

warnings in the whole course of law en-
forcement, demonstrates that waivers can
be established even absent formal or ex-
press statements of waiver that would be
expected in, say, a judicial hearing to de-
termine if a guilty plea has been properly
entered.

— US. ——, —, 180 S.Ct. 2250, 2261, 176

L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010). The Court added that

[t]he main purpose of Miranda is to en-

sure that an accused is advised of and

understands the right to remain silent and
the right to counsel. Thus, “if anything,
our subsequent cases have reduced the
impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate
law enforcement while reaffirming the de-
cision’s core ruling that unwarned state-
ments may not be used as evidence in the
prosecution’s case in chief.”

Id. (citations omitted). In this light, the

Court concluded that “a suspect who has

received and understood the Miranda warn-
ings, and has not invoked his Miranda
rights, waives the right to remain silent by
making an uncoerced statement to the po-
lice.” Id. at ——, 180 S.Ct. at 2264.

{19} In this case, the record supports find-
ings that Child understood his rights as they
were read to him by Tanner, Child had been
advised of his rights on previous occasions,
and he had, in fact, refused to speak to
authorities without a lawyer present on at
least one of these occasions. We believe
these facts adequately establish that Child’s
age and experience were such that he was
mature enough and experienced enough to
understand the nature of his rights and the
consequences of his decision to waive those
rights.

Hs {20} As for Child’s assertion that
he did not know what weight his confession
would be given as evidence against him,
“(t]he Constitution does not require that a
criminal suspect know and understand every
possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.” Colorado v. Spring,
479 U.S. 564, 574, 107 S.Ct. 851, 98 L.Bd.2d
954 (1987). Miranda and its progeny only
require that Child be warned and understand
that any statement made may be used as
evidence against him. Child does not cite
any authority, and we have found none, in
which the potential weight a jury might as-
cribe to a confession must be explained to or
understood by a defendant to effectuate a
valid waiver.

HM {21} Finally, Miranda instructs that
“any evidence that the accused was threat-
ened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of
course, show that the defendant did not vol-
untarily waive his privilege.” 384 U.S. at
476, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Having reviewed both
the transcript and the audio recording of the
interrogation, we find nothing to indicate
that Child was threatened, tricked, or cajoled
into waiving his rights and consenting to
interrogation, and here, too, Child offers no
argument on the matter. Therefore, under
the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
that Child knowingly, intelligently, and vol-
untarily waived his Miranda rights.

1. Child’s Statements and Confession
Were Not Elicited Through Intimi-
dation, Coercion, Deception, Assur-
ances, or Other Police Misconduct
that Constitutes Overreaching

HN {22} Although we have concluded
that Child knowingly, intelligently, and vol-
untarily waived his Miranda rights, Child
also contends that his statements and confes-
sion were nonetheless coerced by implied
promises and deception, thus rendering them
involuntary and inadmissible. Whether the
police coerced Child into confessing requires
a separate analysis from Child’s claim that he
did not voluntarily waive his Fifth Amend-
ment rights under Miranda. State v. Fekete,
120 N.M. 290, 298, 901 P.2d 708, 716 (1995).

The ultimate test remains that which has

been the only clearly established test in

Anglo-American courts for two hundred

years: the test of voluntariness. Is the

confession the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its mak-
er? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it
may be used against him. If it is not, if

his will has been overborne and his capaci-
ty for self-determination critically im-
paired, the use of his confession offends
due process.

Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81
S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1087 (1961); see also
State v. Evans, 2009-NMSC-027, 133, 146
N.M. 819, 210 P.3d 216 (“We base our deter-
mination of whether a confession is voluntary
on whether official coercion has occurred.
Official coercion occurs when a defendant’s
will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination [has been] critically im-
paired. There must be an essential link be-
tween coercive activity of the State ... anda
resulting confession by a defendant.” (altera-
tion in original) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted)). Before a confession
may be admitted into evidence, the district
judge must determine, as a threshold matter
of law outside the presence of the jury, that
the prosecution proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that the confession was vol-
untarily given. Seéser, 1997-NMSC-004, 19,
122 N.M. 794, 932 P.2d 484. Once it has been
admitted, the jury must then find that the
confession was voluntarily given before the

243

jury may use it for any purpose. UJI 14—
5040 NMRA.

{23} The U.S. Supreme Court has offered
a litany of factors to be considered by a
district court in assessing whether a confes-
sion is voluntary.
In determining whether a defendant’s
will was overborne in a particular case, the
Court has assessed the totality of all the
surrounding cireumstances—both the char-
acteristics of the accused and the details of
the interrogation. Some of the factors
taken into account have included the youth
of the accused, eg., Haley v. Ohio, 382
US. 596 [68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224]
[ (1948) ]; his lack of education, e.g., Payne
v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 [78 S.Ct. 844, 2
L.Ed.2d 975] [ 1958) ]; or his low intelli-
gence, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Wd.2d 246] [ (1957) ]; the
lack of any advice to the accused of his
constitutional rights, e.g., Davis v. North
Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 [86 S.Ct. 1761, 16
L.Ed.2d 895] [ (1966) ]; the length of de-
tention, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, [3809
US. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716
(1940) J; the repeated and prolonged na-
ture of the questioning, e.g., Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 [64 S.Ct. 921, 88
L.Ed. 1192] [ (1944) ]; and the use of phys-
ical punishment such as the deprivation of
food or sleep, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 [81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Hd.2d 948)
[ (1961) ]. In all of these cases, the Court
determined the factual circumstances sur-
rounding the confession, assessed the psy-
chological impact on the accused, and eval-
uated the legal significance of how the
accused reacted. Culombe v. Connecticut,
[867 U.S. 568, 603, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d
1087 (1961) |.
The significant fact about all of these
decisions is that none of them turned on
the presence or absence of a single control-
ling criterion; each reflected a careful
scrutiny of all the surrounding circum-
stances.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US. 218,
226, 98 S.Ct. 2041, 86 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978)
(parallel citations omitted).

{24} Dr. Irwin testified during the sup-
pression hearing that Tanner “really made

244

with what he asked him to do.” Dr. Irwin
further explained that being raised in a tradi-
tional Latino household made Child deferen-
tial to authority figures, and that despite his
extensive juvenile record, his upbringing cre-
ated a situation in which Tanner was able to
utilize his position of authority to convince
him to confess.

W225} Relying on Dr. Irwin’s testi-
mony, Child claims that Tanner exploited the
fact that he was raised in a traditional Latino
household and was taught to be polite and
deferential to authority figures. According
to Child, Tanner did this by first approaching
him as a friend and implicitly promising him
that his cooperation would result in a juvenile
disposition, and then explicitly telling him
that he could not make any promises about
his sentence or disposition. We recognize
that

[t}he line between proper and permissible

police conduct and techniques and methods

offensive to due process is, at best, a diffi-
cult one to draw, particularly in cases such
as this where it is necessary to make fine
judgments as to the effect of psychological-
ly coercive pressures and inducements on
the mind and will of an accused.
Haynes v. Washington, 873 U.S. 508, 515, 88
S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 518 (1963). However,
unlike an express promise of leniency, which
ean render a confession inadmissible as a
matter of law, evidence of an implied promise
is only a factor in the totality of the circum-
stances that courts consider in determining
whether a confession is voluntary. State v.
Tindle, 104 N.M. 195, 199, 718 P.2d 705, 709
(Ct.App.1986). Accordingly, to determine
whether Child’s will was overborne, we ex-
amine the part of the interrogation where
Tanner engaged in a monologue lasting sev-
eral minutes in which Child claims implicit
promises were made to coerce him to con-
fess. Tanner stated:

After twenty-one they can’t hold you any-

more when they charge you as a juvenile.

But on violent crimes they charge people

. well someone over the age of fifteen,
they can charge them as an adult. And

there’s no telling ... do you see what I

mean? But when a violent crime happens

[Child] want to like him and want to go along

they look at that crime and they look at
the person and if they're under eighteen,
they look at them and see if they can be,
what they call rehabilitated. That means a
£---ed up person and they're always going
to be f---ed up. And they charge them as
adults. Or are they a person who messed
up and they can be what they call rehabili-
tated, given some instruction in life ...

- sent to school and some counseling. When
there’s a violent crime they look at that
and decide whether they’re going to hold
someone accountable as an adult or as a
juvenile. Now, something that’s major in
that is when a juvenile, someone under
eighteen, does a violent crime and they can
say “I f---ed up. I’ve had a rough life.”
And I did this f---ed up thing. I’m scared
and I needed to get the hell out of here; 1
needed to get to Vegas. But if that person
can take responsibility for what they've
done, they say that person can be rehabili-
tated and almost always handle them as an
adult.... And that’s what you need to do
is make people understand why what hap-
pened, happened. You need to give your
side of this; but the true side. Because
they’re going to look at this moment and
say cold-blooded, clear as day and night
and he’s going to [inaudible] cold blooded,
f.-- it and toss him to the wolves the rest
of his life. I can’t promise you what’s
going to happen, but I know that’s going to
have the biggest influence on this thing as
anything... I can help you through this.
[Inaudible] tell the truth, so that when
people look back on this day they're saying
this is a young man who ... it was a tragic
mistake but he’s not an animal who de-
serves to be tossed to the wolves. Can
you help me? I can help you. I know it’s
hard, probably the hardest thing you've
ever done. But let me help you through
this. What happened ... how did you
meet Thomas Powell that day? I know
this is hard man. It’s probably the hard-
est thing you've ever done.

{26} It was after this monologue that
Child asked to finish visiting with his mother.
However, Tanner declined the request, indi-
cating that Child could visit with his mother
after he finished making his statement. At

245

this point, Child asked his mother to leave
the room, and then confessed the details of
how he killed Powell. Following the confes-
sion, Child asked Tanner, “So what do you
think might happen?” Tanner responded,
“There’s still a possibility it could turn [inau-
dible] because you've shown remorse. I
can’t tell you what’s going to happen, I don’t
know.”

{27} After closely examining Tanner’s
statements and Child’s reactions and re-
sponses, we conclude that while Tanner un-
doubtedly employed aggressive tactics, noth-
ing he said could have reasonably led Child
to believe that he had been promised lenien-
cy or a juvenile disposition in return for his
confession. Instead, we conclude that it is
far more likely that Child weighed and bal-
anced competing considerations and then
made an autonomous decision to confess.
See Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 605 8d
Cir.1986) (“[T]he interrogator may play on
the suspect’s sympathies or explain that hon-
esty might be the best policy for a criminal
who hopes for leniency from the state.
These ploys may play a part in the suspect's
decision to confess, but so long as that deci-
sion is a product of the suspect’s own balanc-
ing of competing considerations, the confes-
sion is voluntary.” (citations omitted)).

{28} Child’s assertion that he was implicit-
ly promised leniency conflicts with Tanner’s
explicit statement to Child that he couldn’t
promise him anything. Further, Child’s as-
sertion following his confession was belied
when he asked Tanner, “What do you think
might happen?” The timing of the question
and the question itself reveal that Child was
not in fact expecting a particular result prior
to confessing. In addition, Child did not
exhibit an adverse reaction when Tanner re-
sponded, “I can’t tell you what’s going to
happen, I don’t know.” Judging by these
statements and Child’s reactions, or lack
thereof, we conclude that Child simply did
not heed Tanner’s ultimate warning that
nothing could be promised.

{29} Finally, none of the other factors
suggested by the Schnecklotk Court in as-
sessing the voluntariness of a confession un-
der the totality of the circumstances weigh in
Child’s favor. The record reflects that Child,

who was almost seventeen, was interrogated
for less than one hour, during the late morn-
ing, after being advised of his rights and
indicating that he understood his rights. His
mother was present during the interrogation
until Child asked her to leave. None of
these circumstances lend support to a claim
of involuntary confession. Martinez, 1999-
NMSC-018, 19 22-24, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d
718 (finding nothing objectionable about one-
hour custodial interrogation of a child over
age fifteen and noting with approval that the
interrogation occurred at a time child could
be expected to be alert); see also State v.
Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 791, 791 P.2d 64,
66 (1990) (stating that child over age fifteen
is unlikely to make an involuntary statement
after receiving Miranda warnings).

{30} In concluding our evaluation of the
totality of the circumstances, the balance of
the relevant criteria leads us to conclude that
Child’s will “was not overborne and his self-
determination was not critically impaired,”
and that his confession was therefore volun-
tarily given. State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-
048, 138, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847, Asa
result, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Child’s motion to suppress his inculpatory
statements.

B. CHILD’S SHOES WERE SEIZED
DURING A VALID INVENTORY
SEARCH

HE s{81} Child asserts that his shoes
were improperly admitted as evidence be-
cause the shoes were not seized pursuant to

a valid inventory search. An inventory

search is constitutional if the inventory is

made pursuant to an established police regu-
lation, the search is reasonable, and the po-
lice have control or custody of the object of

the search. State v. Boswell, 111 N.M. 240,

241, 804 P.2d 1059, 1060 (1991). It is also

well settled that

both the person and the property in his
immediate possession may be searched at
the station house after the arrest has oc-
curred at another place and if evidence of
crime is discovered, it may be seized and
admitted in evidence. Nor is there any
doubt that clothing or other belongings
may be seized upon arrival of the accused

246

at the place of detention and later subject-

ed to laboratory analysis or that the test

results are admissible at trial.

United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803-
04, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 89 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974)
(footnote omitted). “Indeed, it is difficult to
perceive what is unreasonable about the po-
lice’s examining and holding as evidence
those personal effects of the accused that
they already have in their lawful custody as
the result of a lawful arrest.” Id. at 806, 94
S.Ct. 1284; see also 8 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 5.3(a) (4th ed. 2004)
(discussing the constitutionality of searches
and seizures upon arrival at a place of deten-
tion).

{82} In this case, Child was arrested in
Nevada, handeuffed, taken into custody, and
driven to a local juvenile detention facility.
Prior to booking Child into the juvenile facili-
ty, Sergeant David Stansbury contacted De-
tective Tanner of the San Juan County Sher-
iffs Office to advise him of Child’s arrest.
Tanner told Sergeant Stansbury that Child
was suspected of wearing a white pair of
shoes with a circle on the bottom at the time
of the alleged homicide. Sergeant Stansbury
confirmed that this description matched the
shoes that Child was wearing at that mo-
ment. Child’s shoes were seized when he
was booked into the juvenile detention facili-
ty. The shoes were later transferred to the
eustody of the San Juan County Sheriff's
Office and subsequently admitted into evi-
denee at trial.

{33} On appeal, Child does not challenge
the fact that both he and his shoes were
lawfully in custody when he was booked into
the juvenile detention facility. Instead,
Child contends that the State failed to pres-
ent evidence regarding the policy and proce-
dure for seizing the personal property of the
person being incarcerated. We disagree.
Our review of the record reveals that, con-
trary to Child’s assertion, Sergeant Stans-
bury did testify to the relevant policies and
procedures for conducting inventory searches
at the juvenile detention facility. See State
v. Wilson, 116 N.M. 798, 798, 867 P.2d 1175,
1180 (1994) (“Inventory search procedures
must be standardized, but need not be writ-

ten.”), This testimony indicated that taking
a detainee’s clothes was a normal part of the
detention facility's booking procedure when
the clothes either were not sufficient to be
worn in the facility or were determined to
have evidentiary value. We therefore con-
clude that Child’s claim lacks merit because
there was testimony regarding standard in-
ventory practices at the Nevada juvenile de-
tention facility. We affirm the district
court’s decision admitting the shoes as evi-
dence.

i, VENUE

{84} Child asserts that the district court
abused its discretion when it denied his pre-
trial motion for a change of venue from San
Juan County. Child cited, inter alia, Article
II, Sections 14 and 18 of the New Mexico
Constitution and NMSA 1978, Section 38-3-
8(B)(2) and (8) (2008) in support of his mo-
tion. Child argued there was a reasonable
probability that he would be unable to obtain
a fair trial by an impartial jury in San Juan
County as a result of the pre-trial publicity
and public excitement surrounding his case.
Child attached numerous exhibits to his writ-
ten motion, including but not limited to news-
paper articles, editorials, and online forum
postings. All of the articles centered on
Child’s multiple escapes, a few contained de-
tails of his alleged crimes and indicated that
he had confessed to murder, and a few de-
scribed him as dangerous or extremely dan-
gerous. Most of the editorials and online
forum postings contained individual opinions
of Child’s character and his alleged criminal
conduct, some of which were clearly less than
favorable, although others indicated support
for Child. Also attached to Child’s motion
was a photograph that Child’s trial counsel
claimed was taken at the San Juan County
courthouse where the trial was to be held.
The photograph depicts an office window,
presumably inside the courthouse, upon
which is taped a newspaper article displaying
a picture of Child following his recapture and
arrest in Albuquerque. The following hand-
written message was scrawled on top of the
newspaper story: “South Siders-How about
a Bake Sale to bail out your homie? Gang
life Pays!” Child’s motion also claimed that
Child had been a subject on the television

show “America’s Most Wanted.” Finally,
Child’s trial counsel submitted an affidavit
testifying to his belief that an impartial jury
“may not be obtained” in San Juan County
because “[i]t has been my experience that the
people of San Juan County are familiar with
the Child’s alleged escape from two juvenile
facilities and pending case, and that the citi-
zens believe him to be guilty.” The State
opposed the motion and the district court
conducted an evidentiary hearing to address
the venue question.

A. PREJUDICIAL PRE-TRIAL PUB-
LICITY CAN DEMONSTRABLY
SUPPORT A CHANGE OF VENUE
IN NEW MEXICO

HN. s«(85} The New Mexico Constitu-
tion guarantees every defendant a fair trial
by an impartial jury. See N.M. Const. art.
II, § 14 (as amended 1994) (guaranteeing “an
impartial jury”); N.M. Const. art. IT, § 18
(as amended 1972) (due process and equal
protection). Section 38-3-3 helps effectuate
these guaranties. That statute provides, in
pertinent part:

‘The venue in all civil and criminal cases
shall be changed, upon motion, to another
county free from exception:

B. when the party moving for a change
files in the case an affidavit of himself, his
agent or attorney, that he believes he can-
not obtain a fair trial in the county in
which the case is pending because:

(2) the inhabitants of the county are
prejudiced against the party;

(8) of public excitement or local preju-
dice in the county in regard to the case
or the questions involved in the case, an
impartial jury cannot be obtained in the
county to try the case.

Section 38-3-3. A court may require evi-
dence in support of a motion to change venue
in addition to the affidavit, even when it is
made for the first time, and even when it is
made by a defendant. See NMSA 1978,
§ 38-3-5 (1929); State v. House, 1999-
NMSC-014, 1 29, 127 N.M. 151, 978 P.2d 967;

247

State v. Lunn, 88 N.M. 64, 70, 537 P.2d 672,
678 (Ct.App.1975).

{36} Child asserts that he was not re-
quired to conclusively prove that it was im-
possible for him to obtain a fair trial in San
Juan County for the district court to grant
his motion. Further, he claims that he made
a sufficient showing to the district court that
he could not obtain an impartial jury in San
Juan County on the basis of the presumed
prejudicial effect of pre-trial publicity on the
county’s citizens.

Hs{87} Child is correct that pre-
sumed prejudice based on pre-trial publicity
can support a change of venue in New Mexi-
co. Certainly, “there is no requirement in
our constitution, statutes, or case law that a
venue change should be supported by proof
of actual prejudice through voir dire.”
House, 1999-NMSC-014, 155, 127 N.M. 151,
978 P.2d 967. Rather, it can be sufficient to
“demonstrate a reasonable probability that a
fair trial cannot be obtained in a particular
venue.” Jd. 157. Further, we have ex-
plained that sufficient

[plrejudice may be established if a commu-

nity is so saturated by a barrage of inflam-

matory and biased publicity, close to the
beginning of legal proceedings, that the
trial inevitably takes place in an atmo-
sphere of intense public passion. Under
such circumstances there is a reasonable
probability that prospective jurors were
exposed to the sensational publicity, as
well as the emotional atmosphere in the
community, and that many of them are
strongly predisposed for or against one of
the parties in the case. .
Id. 158 (citations omitted).

HE s{88} This “presumed” form of
prejudice is adequate to support a change of
venue whenever the publicity is “demonstra-
bly prejudicial,” id. 157, and “close to the
beginning of legal proceedings,” id. 158. In
House, we went to great lengths to discuss
the many factors that courts consider when
determining whether “prejudice from pretrial
publicity has evolved to such a degree that a
fair trial is improbable,” and a motion for a
change of venue should be granted on the
basis of presumed prejudice. Id. 159; see
id. 1959-75 (discussing factors such as the

248

neutrality of publicity, its timing in relation
to the start of trial, its form and source, and
the size of the community). The assessment
of all factors that may be relevant to a
particular case remains the proper method
for district courts to utilize in resolving com-
peting claims over the need for a change of
venue due to presumed prejudice based on
pre-trial publicity.

B. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DENIAL
OF CHILD’S MOTION FOR A
CHANGE OF VENUE DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION BECAUSE IT WAS SUP-
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE OBTAINED THROUGH
VOIR DIRE

HE «{(89} We review a district court’s
change of venue decision for an abuse of
discretion, keeping in mind that its “disere-
tion in this matter is broad and will not be
disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of
that discretion can be demonstrated.” Id.
131. The party appealing the change of
venue decision has the burden of establishing
the abuse of discretion. Jd. “The standard of
review required in assessing most abuse-of-
diseretion claims is whether the trial court’s
venue determination is supported by sub-
stantial evidence in the record.” Id. 182.
“(The same standard of review applies to the
trial court’s decision—a determination based
upon substantial evidence in the record—
whether a venue change is based upon pre-
sumed or actual prejudice.” Id. 146.

We must be mindful that it is the role of
the trial court, and not the appellate court,
to weigh the evidence and determine the
credibility of witnesses. We will not sub-
stitute our own judgment for a determina-
tion of the trial court that is supported by
substantial evidence in the record.

Id. 138 (citation omitted). In other words,
“the question for this Court is whether the
trial court abused its discretion by denying
Defendant’s motion to change venue, not
whether Defendant presented substantial ev-
idence regarding prejudice to the trial court.”
State v. Barrera, 2001-NMSC-014, 114, 130
N.M. 227, 22 P.38d 1177.

{40} The evidentiary hearing on Child’s
motion was held on April 30, 2008. Child’s
trial counsel reiterated the argument made
in his written motion—that there was a rea-
sonable probability that Child would be un-
able to obtain a fair trial by an impartial jury
in San Juan County because pre-trial publici-
ty had disseminated irrelevant and prejudi-
cial information about Child. The State
countered that San Juan County was a large
county and the time between the publicity
and the start of Child’s trial would adequate-
ly diminish any effect the publicity might
have had on the community. The State add-
ed that there had been no additional publici-
ty since Child had been recaptured in late
March 2008, after his escape from the San
Juan County Detention Center earlier that
month. Child did not challenge this asser-
tion, much less demonstrate that the publici-
ty had continued after his recapture. Nev-
ertheless, he maintained that there was a
reasonable probability that the residents of
San Juan County would be tainted by the
prejudicial publicity that had earlier sur-
rounded his case due to his escape.

{41} At the end of the evidentiary hearing,
the district court was not persuaded that
Child had made a sufficient showing of pre-
sumed prejudice to support a change of ven-
ue. Specifically, the district court found that
San Juan County was “large” and noted that
in its past experience with voir dire, many
jurors did not “read the paper [and] are not
even aware of literally what’s going on in the
county around them.” The district court
concluded that at that time Child had made
an insufficient showing to support a change
of venue based on presumed prejudice.
However, the district court also indicated
that it was going to assess the actual preju-
dice of potential jurors through the voir dire
process before making a final ruling on
whether a change of venue was appropriate
to ensure that Child received a fair trial by
an impartial jury. The district court also
announced that it intended to bring in an
additional panel of potential jurors for the
voir dire process and to allow for individual
questioning by Child’s counsel of any poten-
tial juror who indicated an awareness of
Child’s case based on pre-trial publicity.

{42} Seven months after the evidentiary
hearing was held, voir dire was conducted
and the district court directly inquired
whether any of the potential jurors had been
exposed to publicity involving either Child or
his case. The two potential jurors who an-
swered affirmatively were further asked
whether they had already formed an opinion
about either Child or his case. One individu-
al answered the second question affirmative-
ly. The district court then indicated that it
would alert the attorneys to follow up with
their own questions, and this additional ques-
tioning would take place in the privacy of the
district court’s chambers, if necessary. Fol-
lowing voir dire, a jury was impaneled and
the trial commenced.

HM {43} In Barrera, we addressed a
defendant’s appeal of a district court’s venue
decision made under circumstances similar to
those described in this case. 2001-NMSC-
014, 1910-18, 180 N.M. 227, 22 P.8d 1177.
There we explained that “if the trial court
determines that a movant has not demon-
strated presumed prejudice and proceeds
with voir dire, we will limit our review to the
evidence of actual prejudice.” Id. 116. Still,
“fajs with all aspects of a venue change, the
choice of waiting until after voir dire before
granting a motion to change venue rests with
the sound discretion of the trial court and
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that
discretion.” House, 1999-NMSC-014, 155,
127 N.M. 151, 978 P.2d 967.

HM {44} In this case, the district court
should not have relied upon its own personal
experience and impressions of the citizens of
San Juan County in determining that Child
had made an insufficient showing to support
a change of venue based on presumed preju-
dice. See id. 1168-69 (“We are concerned
that, in discussing this issue, the trial judge
inserted his own impressions of the citizens
of Taos.... In the past, we have expressed
disapproval of trial judges who base a venue
decision on their own opinions and impres-
sions.”). Further, there is nothing in the
record to support the conclusion that San
Juan County is a large county. Nonetheless,
we conclude that these indiscretions are in-
significant in light of the substantial time
that elapsed between the publicity cited by

249

Child and the start of his trial. See id. 160
(“If detrimental articles and broadcasts ap-
peared months or years before the beginning
of a trial, the probability of prejudice is
significantly reduced.” (citing Patton v.
Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1034, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81
L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) and Murphy v. Florida,
421 U.S. 794, 802, 95 S.Ct. 2081, 44 L.Ed.2d
589 (1975))).

Ws {45} Further, when the record
reflects that the district court decided to
impanel a jury from the available jurors after
voir dire, we will conclude that the district
court implicitly determined that actual preju-
dice did not exist, even though no written
order has been entered to that effect. See
State v. Vasquez, 2010-NMCA-041, 137, 148
NM. 202, 232 P.8d 438 (citing Stinson v.
Berry, 1997-NMCA-076, 18, 123 N.M. 482,
948 P.2d 129). Voir dire allows a court to
“determine whether prospective jurors will
be able to reach a verdict based solely on
evidence received in open court, not from
outside sources.” Howse, 1999-NMSC-014,
152, 127 N.M. 151, 978 P.2d 967 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Use
of voir dire can establish “whether there is
such widespread and fixed prejudice within
the jury pool that a fair trial in that venue
would be impossible.” Id. 146. According-
ly,

courts will change a venue based upon

actual prejudice if they find that the opin-

ions of the community, as reflected by the
opinions of prospective jurors in voir dire,
are so fixed that, were the trial to be held
in that community, the jurors would be
unlikely to lay aside their preconceived
notions and base their judgment exclusive-
ly on the evidence presented at trial.

Id. 156.

HM {46} Finally, because “voir dire is
evidence to be used by the trial court in
reaching its decision,” State v. Robinson, 94
N.M. 693, 696, 616 P.2d 406, 409 (1980),
holding limited on other grounds by Sells v.
State, 98 N.M. 786, 788, 653 P.2d 162, 164
(1982), we find that the district court’s
change of venue decision is supported by
substantial evidence obtained during voir
dire when there is nothing offered by the

250

appellant to indicate “that any of the jurors
who actually tried the case were in any way
tainted by any of the publicity,” Deais v.
State, 80 N.M. 77, 80, 451 P.2d 981, 984
(1969).

{47} In this case, the district court deter-
mined that Child did not make a sufficient
showing of presumed prejudice and deferred
a final ruling on the motion until after voir
dire. Child has offered neither evidence nor
testimony to prove that any of the jurors who
tried the case were actually prejudiced in any
way, let alone exposed to or tainted by either
the pre-trial publicity or the photograph that
he alleges he found in the courthouse. Con-
sequently, we affirm the district court’s deni-
al of Child’s motion to change venue.

I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

{48} Under the laws enacted by our Legis-
lature, taking of a motor vehicle and taking
anything of value by use of force or threat-
ened force are separate statutory offenses.
See NMSA 1978, § 66-3~504(A)(2) (1998) (re-
compiled and amended as NMSA 1978, § 30-
16D-1 by Laws 2009, ch, 258, § 1 and Laws
2009, ch. 261, § 1) (unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle); NMSA 1978, § 30-16-2
(1978) (@obbery). Child claims that his con-
victions for armed robbery, an enhanced ver-
sion of robbery described as occurring when
a robbery is committed “while armed with a
deadly weapon” contrary to Section 30-16-2,
and for unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
contrary to Section 66-3~504(A)(2), violate
the protection against multiple punishments
for the same offense provided by the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Child’s brief
references State v. McGruder, where we held
that under a strict application of the “ele-
ments test” set out in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76
L.Ed. 306 (1932), and adopted by this Court
in Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 8, 18-14, 810
P.2d 1223, 1238-84 (1991), convictions for
these two offenses did not constitute a double
jeopardy violation. 1997-NMSC-028, 1133,
39, 123 N.M. 302, 940 P.2d 150, abrogated on
other grounds by State v. Chavez, 2009~-
NMSC-035, 1 26, 146 N.M. 484, 211 P.3d 891.
While acknowledging McGruder, Child seeks

to distinguish his case from McGruder, and
to do so he asks this Court to examine the
jury instructions given in his case, effectively
arguing for the application of a modified
version of the Blockburger test. See Swaf-
ford, 112 N.M. at 8 n. 4, 810 P.2d at 1228 n. 4
(citing Whalen v. United States, 445 US.
684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) as
an example of “departure from the strict
elements application of Blockburger,” and
further referencing Pandelli v. United
States, 685 F.2d 533, 587 (6th Cir.1980), a
case that both applies such a departure and
discusses the rationale for it). We find the
rationale discussed in Pamdelli to be directly
applicable to Child’s claim in this case and,
for the reasons that follow, we today adopt a
modified version of the Blockburger test for
double jeopardy claims involving statutes
that are “vague and unspecific,” in addition
to those that are “written with many alterna-
tives.” Pandelli, 635 F.2d at 588.

A. CHILD’S CONVICTIONS FOR UN-
LAWFUL TAKING OF A MOTOR
VEHICLE AND ARMED ROBBERY
PUT HIM TWICE IN JEOPARDY
FOR THE SAME OFFENSE

HE {49} We review Child’s claim of
double jeopardy de novo. State v. Quick,
2009-NMSC-015, 16, 146 N.M. 80, 206 P.38d
985. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment was held to be applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause in Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Bd.2d
107 (1969). The clause provides: “{NJor
shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. It functions in
part to protect “‘against multiple punish-
ments for the same offense.” Swafford, 112
N.M. at 7, 810 P.2d at 1227 (quoting North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89
S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)). Child’s
claim is a “double-description” form of a
multiple punishment because he was charged
with violations of multiple statutes that may
or may not be deemed the same offense for
double jeopardy purposes. See State v. De-
Graff, 2006-NMSC-011, 125, 189 N.M. 211,
181 P.3d 61.

Hs {50} It is well established that
“the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more
than prevent the sentencing court from pre-
scribing greater punishment than the legis-
lature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459
US. 359, 366, 108 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535
(1983). “{W]here the legislature has explic-
itly authorized multiple punishment the ju-
dicial inquiry is at an end, [and] multiple
punishment is authorized and proper.”
Swafford, 112 N.M. at 9, 810 P.2d at 1229,
The result of these established principles is
that “the Legislature is not restrained by
double jeopardy from atomizing a defen-
dant’s conduet into multiple punishments if
they are imposed in a single proceeding.
The courts, however, are restrained from
doing so without legislative authorization,
and therefore legislative intent must be the
touchstone of our inquiry.” Quick, 2009-
NMSC-015, 117, 146 N.M. 80, 206 P.3d 985.

HH {51} In Swafford, “this Court syn-
thesized the many varied theories set forth in
both New Mexico and federal decisional law
to come up with a single test for multiple
punishment cases.” State v. Frazier, 2007
NMSC-032, 114, 142 N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1
(citing Swafford, 112 N.M. at 8, 810 P.2d at
1228). The synthesis performed in Swafford
resulted in our adoption of what is generally
a two-part inquiry for double-deseription
claims, first analyzing “whether the conduct
underlying the offenses is unitary, ie,
whether the same conduct violates both stat-
utes,” and, if so, proceeding to analyze
“whether the legislature intended to create

separately punishable offenses.” 112 N.M.
at 18, 810 P.2d at 1233.
1. Child’s Conduct Underlying the

Crimes of Armed Robbery and Unlaw-
ful Taking of a Motor Vehicle Was
Unitary
HM {52} Child properly references
McGruder in his briefing on the double jeop-
ardy issue, see Rule 16-303(A)(2) NMRA (ci-
tation of adverse authority), yet, for the rea-
sons that follow, that case is distinguishable

1. See State v. Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, 1939-49,
147 N.M, 557, 226 P.3d 656 (Chavez, C.J., spe-
cially concurring) (Bosson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (Daniels, J., specially con-

251

from the instant case and does not control
the outcome here. Instead of arguing the
merits of overruling McGruder,! Child ar-
gues that the jury instructions provide a
starting point for distinguishing between the
two cases. In McGruder, “(t]he jury was
charged ... on armed robbery based on the
evidence of the taking of [the victim’s] keys,”
1997-NMSC-028, 19, 123 N.M. 302, 940 P.2d
150, meaning the jury was only instructed to
consider whether the defendant stole keys
when it considered the conduct supporting
the charge of armed robbery. On the other
hand, in the instant case, because Child was
charged with armed robbery for taking both
Powell’s “1996 Oldsmobile bearing New Mex-
ico license plate GMD807 and car keys” (em-
phasis added), the jury was instructed to
consider whether he stole both car keys and
a car when it deliberated upon the conduct
supporting the charge of armed robbery.

HH {58} We take judicial notice of the
record in McGruder to be certain of the
distinction between the conduct that sup-
ported the charge in McGruder and the con-
duct Child was alleged to have perpetrated to
support the charge of armed robbery in this
case. See State v. Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-
001, 19, 187 N.M. 1, 106 P.3d 563 (taking
judicial notice of the jury instructions in a
previous case that was on our docket). Ac-
cording to the record in McGruder, the de-
fendant was in fact indicted on the charge of
armed robbery solely for taking his victim’s
keys. We are also able to confirm from the
record that the McGruder opinion accurately
indicates the jury was only instructed to
consider whether the defendant stole keys
when it considered the conduct supporting
the charge of armed robbery in that case.
Accordingly, we conclude that the crime of
armed robbery and the conduct supporting
that charge in McGruder are necessarily dis-
tinguished from the crime of armed robbery
and the conduct supporting that charge in
the instant case. The distinction between
stealing keys and stealing keys along with
the car appears to be a distinction without a

curring) (agreeing with the decision not to over-

rule an earlier opinion absent argument by the
parties).

252

difference because common sense suggests
that the purpose for stealing the keys to a
car is to steal the car. However, this distinc-
tion calls into question the analysis and con-
clusion reached by this Court in McGruder
as opposed to the approach taken in this
case, in which we consider the prosecution’s
theory as expressed in the charging docu-
ment and the jury instructions,

{54} Nevertheless, we note that the State
does not argue that the conduct was not
unitary in this case, but rather relies on the
second prong of the Swafford test to argue
that there is no double jeopardy violation.
We conclude that the conduct was unitary
because Child was charged with taking Pow-
el’s 1996 Oldsmobile under both statutes.
See Frazier, 2007-NMSC-082, 1 24, 142 N.M.
120, 164 P.3d 1 (explaining that when the
same conduct supports two different statuto-
ry offenses, there is “no way for the conduct
not to be unitary”). Next, “we proceed to the
second part of the Swafford analysis to de-
termine whether the Legislature intended to
allow multiple punishments based on the
facts and circumstances of this case.” State
v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-018, 911, 137 N.M.
447, 112 P.3d 1104.

2. Application of the Blockburger Test
Indicates that the Legislature Did Not
Intend to Cumulatively Punish Uni-
tary Conduct for the Crimes of (1)
Armed Robbery Based on the Taking
of a Vehicle and Keys and (2) the Un-
lawful Taking of a Motor Vehicle

HME 55} “(Tihe sole limitation on
multiple punishments is legislative intent,
and, unless the Legislature clearly author-
ized multiple punishments, we apply the test
articulated in Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306
(1932), to determine that intent.” Franco,
2005-NMSC-013, 112, 187 N.M. 447, 112
P.8d 1104 (alteration in original) (citation

2. We note, however, that our Legislature knows
how to accomplish such a task and has expressly
provided for multiple punishments in the case of
other crimes that might, depending on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, be precluded
for double jeopardy purposes when charged to-
gether with robbery, armed or otherwise. See
NMSA 1978, § 30-16-38 (1971) (providing that

omitted). In the instant case, the State does
not contend, and we do not find, that the
Legislature has expressly provided for multi-
ple punishments. Neither Section 30-16-2
nor Section 66-8-504 contains any such lan-
guage.” In the absence of express legislative
authorization of multiple punishments, we
move on to application of the Blockburger
test. See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d
at 1234,

HN «£56} Blockburger provides that
“where the same act or transaction consti-
tutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to deter-
mine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof
of a fact which the other does not.” 284 U.S.
at 804, 52 S.Ct. 180. If the Blockburger test
“establishes that one statute is subsumed
within the other, the inquiry is over and the
statutes are the same for double jeopardy
purposes—punishment cannot be had for
both.” Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at.
1284; see also Whalen, 445 US. at 691-92,
100 S.Ct. 1432 (“The assumption underlying
the rule is that Congress ordinarily does not
intend to punish the same offense under two
different statutes. Accordingly, where two
statutory provisions proscribe the same of-
fense, they are construed not to authorize
cumulative punishments in the absence of a
clear indication of contrary legislative in-
tent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

{57} In McGruder, we compared the same
two statutes now at issue and concluded that
each statute required proof of a fact which
the other did not. 1997-NMSC-028, 11 27-
28, 123 N.M. 302, 940 P.2d 150. However,
unlike the defendant in McGruder, Child was
charged with taking a vehicle under both the
armed robbery and unlawful taking of a mo-
tor vehicle statutes. See discussion supra
Part IILA.1, 17 52-53. Therefore, in this
case, we cannot fairly say that Child’s unlaw-
ful taking of a motor vehicle conviction re-

the statutory sections dealing with the various
forms that credit card crimes might take “shall
not be construed to preclude the applicability of
any other provision of the criminal law of this
state or any municipality thereof that presently
applies or may in the future apply to any transac-
tion that violates the cited provisions”).

quired “proof of an additional element absent
in the robbery statute; that additional ele-
ment is the taking of a motor vehicle.”
McGruder, 1997-NMSC-028, 127, 123 N.M.
802, 940 P.2d 150. Instead, it is plain that in
Child’s case both convictions required proof
of the same theft of Powell’s 1996 Oldsmo-
bile. Thus, Child’s unlawful taking of a mo-
tor vehicle conviction failed to require proof
of a fact that the robbery statute did not.
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 804, 52 S.Ct. 180.
Accordingly, we find that (1) Child’s unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle conviction was sub-
sumed by his armed robbery conviction, and
(2) his conviction for both resulted in double
jeopardy.

HM s«{58} The robbery statute is a
generic, multipurpose statute. Unlike Sec-
tion 66-3-504, the unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle statute, the robbery statute, Section
30-16-2, uses the phrase “anything of value”
to describe stolen property and does not
specify what type of property theft will be
punished. Under this generic statute, any
sort of property can supply the “anything of
value” element of the crime, although sepa-
rating out each item of property stolen dur-
ing an armed robbery should not be used to
create multiple convictions. If Blockburger
is applied to the elements of the two offenses
in the abstract, it appears that they are not.
identical because proof of armed robbery,
which may involve the theft of any type of
property, will not always entail proof that an
automobile was taken, a necessary element of
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. In this
case, however, Child’s conviction for armed
robbery required the State to prove the same
taking of Powell’s 1996 Oldsmobile that had
to be proven to sustain the unlawful taking of
a motor vehicle conviction. It is therefore
the State’s legal theory of the crime that
supplies the “anything of value” element of
robbery in each and every case where that
crime is charged, and it is to that legal
theory, and not the particular facts of the
case, to which we will turn when we apply
Blockburger. See Pandelli, 685 F.2d at 588
(“Courts have always looked to the law the
indictment claims the defendant violated. If
they did not do so, they would not know even
what statutes are at issue under the Block-
burger rule. What the reviewing court must

253

do now in applying Blockburger is go further
and look to the legal theory of the case or the
elements of the specific criminal cause of
action for which the defendant was convicted
without examining the facts in detail.” (em-
phasis added)); accord United States v. Bar-
rington, 806 F.2d 529, 584 (5th Cir.1986)
(acknowledging that for purposes of the
Blockburger test, the comparable proof of
two offenses must be examined with respect
to the particular case). In addition to refer-
encing both Whalen and Pandelli in Swaf-
ford, we expressly approved the use of a
modified version of the Blockbwrger test in
the case of alternatively written statutes in
Franco, where we explained that.

[als Swafford suggested, we treat statutes
written in the alternative as separate stat-
utes for purposes of the Blockburger anal-
ysis. This means that instead of looking at
the statute in the abstract, we look at the
legal theory of the offense that is charged.
Nevertheless, we then compare the ele-
ments of the specific criminal cause of
action for which the defendant was convict-
ed without examining the facts in detail.
The reason for this approach is that a
statute that serves several purposes and
has been written in the alternative may
have many meanings and a wide range of
deterrent possibilities. Unless we focus on
the relevant alternatives, we run the risk
of misconstruing legislative intent.

2005-NMSC-013, 114, 187 N.M. 447, 112
P.3d 1104 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted).

Ts«{59} The State contends that
Section 30-16-2 is not a statute written in
the alternative, and therefore that the modi-
fied version of the Blockburger test should
not apply. However, as Pandeili points out,
it is not just statutes that are explicitly writ-
ten in the alternative that require courts “to
ascertain the operation and deterrent pur-
poses of such statutes for double jeopardy
purposes by determining the elements—the
legal theory—that constitute the criminal
causes of action in the case at hand.” 635
F.2d at 539. Rather, the same approach is
applicable to “a statute that is multi-pur-
posed and written with many alternatives, or

254

is vague and unspecific.” Id. at 588 (empha-
sis added). In this case, it is the use of the
ambiguous phrase “anything of value” that
makes Section 30-16-2 a “vague and unspe-
cifie” statute that demands the Blockburger
test be applied by reference to the State’s
legal theory of the case.

{60} As a result of these principles, we
conclude that Child’s armed robbery convic-
tion required proof of the taking of Powell’s
1996 Oldsmobile, and it therefore subsumed
the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle convic-
tion, placing Child in double jeopardy. Ac-
cordingly, we vacate Child’s conviction for
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle contrary
to Section 66-8-504, the lesser-included of-
fense in this case.

IV. SENTENCING LAW

{61} Child asserts that the district court
erred by failing to order a pre-sentence re-
port from adult probation services as re-
quired by NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15.3(E)
(1993), prior to sentencing him. He also
claims that the district court abused its dis-
eretion by sentencing him under the mistak-
en belief that a life sentence was mandatory
for his first degree murder conviction. He
further claims that his life sentence violates
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment.

A, PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION
OF A PRE-SENTENCE REPORT TO
THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE
PARTIES WERE MANDATORY
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO
CHILD’S SENTENCING

{62} Section 31-18-15.3(E) provides
that “(plrior to the sentencing of an alleged
serious youthful offender who is convicted of
first degree murder, adult probation services
shall prepare a presentence report and sub-
mit the report to the court and the parties
five days prior to the sentencing hearing.”

The State concedes that a pre-sentence re-

port does not appear in the record and that

Child and his attorney did not receive such a

report. Instead, the State argues (1) the

issue was not preserved, (2) it was the obli-
gation of adult probation services and not the
court, and (8) Child has not shown any preju-

dice. We reject the State’s arguments and
remand this case to the district court to re-
sentence Child, but only after a pre-sentence
report is submitted to the court and the
parties.

HH {63} Initially, the State contends
that Child failed to preserve this issue for
appellate review under Rule 12-216(A)
NMRA. However, “[a] trial court has no
jurisdiction to impose a sentence except in
accordance with the law,” State v. Mares, 119
N.M. 48, 50, 888 P.2d 930, 932 (1994) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted),
and, in this case, the question of whether the
district court erred in sentencing Child impli-
cates review of a sentencing procedure that
has been mandated by our Legislature. If
the district court did not follow the mandated
procedure, it follows that it did not have
jurisdiction to sentence Child. Therefore, we
undertake review of Child’s claim of error
without further addressing the alleged infir-
mity in its preservation. Rule 12-216(B).

TM {64} The State’s next argument is
that Section 31-18-15.3(E) imposes the re-
sponsibility on adult probation services and
does not require any action to be taken by
the district court. Although adult probation
services has the responsibility to prepare the
pre-sentence report, the court is not permit-
ted to sentence a youthful offender until two
precedent conditions have been satisfied.
First, a pre-sentence report must be pre-
pared by adult probation services, and sec-
ond, the report must be submitted to the
district court and the parties five days prior
to the sentencing hearing. See State v. Mar-
tinez, 1998-NMSC-~028, 112, 126 N.M. 389,
966 P.2d 747 (“A trial court's power to sen-
tence is derived exclusively from statute.”),
It is axiomatic that the district court was not
endowed with the authority to impose any
sentence unless and until the mandatory con-
ditions precedent to sentencing had been ful-
filled. The State’s statutory onus argument
does not overcome this precept.

{65} The State’s final argument is that
Child’s sentence should not be reversed be-
cause Child has failed to demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by the error. In State v.
Jose §., 2007-NMCA-146, 142 N.M. 829, 171

255

P.8d 768, the Court of Appeals recently re-
jected a similar argument. In Jose S., 2007~
NMCA-146, 1916, 17, 142 N.M. 829, 171
P.3d 768, the sentencing judge did not obtain
a predisposition report from the Children,
Youth and Families Department regarding
Child’s amenability to treatment as required
by NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-17(A)(@)
(2005). The State argued, among other
things, that Jose S. had failed to show preju-
dice. Id. 111. The Court of Appeals reject-
ed the argument because although it agreed
that Child had not shown prejudice, “Child is
thwarted in his attempt to show prejudice
because the reports do not exist.” Id. 121.
The court went on to emphasize that “Child
has no way of demonstrating that the reports
would be favorable to him and contrary to
the trial court’s determination because the
reports were never created. This inability to
demonstrate prejudice is itself prejudicial to
Child.” Jd. We agree with the sensible rea-
soning of the Court of Appeals and apply it
in this case to reject the State’s argument.

{66} Having concluded that a pre-sentence
report is mandatory in this case and other-
wise rejecting all of the State’s arguments,
we reverse Child’s sentence and remand to
the district court with instructions that a pre-
sentence report be prepared and submitted
to the court and the parties prior to re-
sentencing. To avoid any confusion upon re-
sentencing, we note that a life sentence
based on Child’s first degree murder convic-
tion is authorized, although not mandated, by
statute. See § 31-18-15.3(D) (a “court may
sentence [a serious youthful] offender to less
than, but not exceeding, the mandatory term
for an adult”). In light of our ruling, we do
not reach Child's other sentence-related
claims.

V. CONCLUSION

{67} We reverse Child’s sentence and re-
mand for re-sentencing with instructions that
a pre-sentence report be prepared and sub-
mitted to the district court and the parties
prior to re-sentencing. We also vacate
Child’s conviction for unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle because it violates the pro-
seription against double jeopardy in this case.

We affirm the district court on all other
issues.

{68} IT IS SO ORDERED.

‘WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES,
Justices, and RICHARD C. BOSSON,
Justice, specially concurring.

BOSSON, Justice (specially concurring).

{69} I write separately to offer my own
thoughts on the double jeopardy issue. I
agree with the result, and the new analytical
tack taken in the opinion with respect to
determining whether a conviction under a
lesser criminal statute (unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle) is subsumed within a convic-
tion under a broader, more generic statute
(armed robbery). My difficulty is with how
we deal with State v. McGruder, 1997-
NMSC-023, 11 33, 39, 123 N.M. 302, 940 P.2d
150, abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, 126, 146 N.M.
434, 211 P.8d 891, which I believe should be
given a swift and decent burial.

{70} As the majority notes, the relevant
inquiry for double jeopardy purposes is
whether Child can be convicted for both (1)
the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and (2)
armed robbery, after Child robbed Victim of
his car ignition keys and then used those
keys to take Victim’s car. We encountered a
nearly identical situation fourteen years ago
in McGruder.

{71} It is helpful to quickly run through
McGruder’s relevant facts. After test driv-
ing a truck earlier in the day, McGruder
returned to the truck owner’s apartment
where he shot and killed the man who an-
swered the door. Id. 14. McGruder then
entered a bedroom where the owner and her
two-year-old daughter were located. Id. 15.
He pointed the gun at the owner and de-
manded keys to the truck. Jd. The owner
could not find the keys, so she searched from
room-to-room as McGruder continued to
threaten her with the gun. Id The owner
eventually came upon a pair of keys belong-
ing to the man who had been shot and at-
tempted to give them to McGruder. Jd.
However, he refused those keys and insisted

256

that she retrieve keys to the truck. Id. After
a few minutes had passed, the owner was
able to locate the truck keys and handed
them over. Jd. McGruder then placed the
gun on the owner’s temple and threatened to
kill her. Id. The owner pleaded with him to
spare her life because of her young child,
who was standing behind the owner crying.
Id. Following this exchange, McGruder be-
gan to walk out of the apartment, but re-
turned and again held the gun to the owner’s
head, warning her not to say anything about
the incident. Id. 16. He then left the apart-
ment, but on his way out, kicked the corpse
of the man he had just shot and killed, calling
him a “punk.” Id.

{72} As to whether convictions for the
crimes of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
and armed robbery violated double jeopardy,
McGruder, 1997-NMSC-023, 128, 128 N.M.
302, 940 P.2d 150 applied our traditional two-
part, double-description test from Swafford
v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1228 (1991).
McGruder held the following: (1) Defen-
dant’s conduct was not unitary, although the
question was “close;” and (2) even if the
conduct was unitary, under a strict applica-
tion of the “same elements” test from Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52
S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1982), looking at the
elements in the abstract, neither statute was
subsumed within the other because unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle requires proof of an
element that armed robbery does not, name-
ly, taking a motor vehicle. McGruder, 1997-
NMSC-023, 11 30-39, 123 N.M. 302, 940 P.2d
150. We also determined that the two stat-
utes were intended to protect different inter-
ests—property and personal safety. Id. 137.

{73} While I agree with the majority that
the two cases can be distinguished, I would
go one step further and hold that McGruder
erred in its double jeopardy analysis and
should be overruled. First, I believe the
conduct at issue in McGruder was in fact
unitary. The two crimes were not sufficient-
ly distinct in terms of “time and space,”
despite the brief lapse in time that occurred
between the search for the keys and McGru-
der’s subsequent removal of the vehicle. Ad-
mittedly, reasonable minds might view the
time/space question differently. That said, I

find the remainder of McGruder’s unitary
conduct analysis highly problematic. I do
not believe we should have drawn an analyt-
ical distinction between the two crimes based
on a finding that the armed robbery occurred
when the keys were taken, while the unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle occurred later,
when McGruder drove away with the truck.

{74} In my mind, the only reasonable view
of the facts in McGruder is that the object of
the armed robbery was to acquire the truck,
not the keys. Securing the ignition keys was
no more than a necessary precondition to
successfully entering and operating that
truck. In this sense, the legal significance of
the car keys in McGruder was based on their
unique relationship to the object those keys
were capable of accessing. This position
comports with property law, particularly the
special status conferred to keys under the
law of gifts. When manual delivery of a gift
is impractical, a donor may perform a con-
structive or symbolic delivery by “giving the
donee the ‘means of obtaining possession and
control of the gifted property.” Elizabeth
Townsend Gard & Rachel Goda, The Fizzy
Experiment: Second Life, Virtual Property
and a iL Property Course, 24 Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 915, 936 (2007-
2008) (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp & Shel-
don F. Kurtz, Principles of Property Law 38
(6th ed. 2005)). Providing a key that grants
access to the gifted property is the most
widely recognized and oft-cited example of
constructive or symbolic delivery. Id. Thus,
the taking of keys by force to gain access to
the truck subsumes the taking of the truck.
Rationally, the two acts cannot be separated.

{75} Going beyond the unitary conduct
analysis, I remain perplexed by McGruder’s
application of Blockburger’s “same elements”
test. Under a straightforward application of
Blockburger, we ask whether, in the abstract,
each offense requires a legal element that
the other does not. See State v. Frazier,
2007-NMSC-032, 1114-15, 142 N.M. 120,
164 P.8d 1; Swafford, 112 N.M. at 10, 810
P.2d at 1230. If one statute does not include
a distinct element, that statute is subsumed
within the broader and more encompassing
law. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-082, 115, 142
N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1. Contrary to our hold-

eT

257

ing in McGruder, I do not believe that the
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle statute
contains a legal element that is not also
found in the armed robbery statute. Under
my reading of the two laws, a motor vehicle
is just one type of property that could be
classified as something of value. Therefore,
when one takes a motor vehicle, or almost
any other piece of property, one also, by
definition, takes something of value. As I
see it, under a routine Blockburger analysis,
the “taking a motor vehicle” element from
the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle statute
is subsumed within the more general element.
relating to “anything of value” in the armed
robbery statute. Armed robbery simply
adds the element of taking by force. That
McGruder held otherwise was error.

{76} While we are rightfully concerned not
to reverse existing precedent without first
being presented with an express argument
based on principles of stare decisis, State v.
Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, 1133-35, 147 N.M.
557, 226 P.3d 656, it does us no good to act
tentatively in this instance. For all practical
purposes, the majority opinion already over-
rules McGruder, although it does so implicit-
ly. The majority opinion effectively reverses
McGruder by applying a completely different
(and much improved) version of the Block-
burger test than we used to decide McGru-
der. In so doing, we reach exactly the oppo-
site result that the McGruder court did, even
though we are again analyzing the same stat-
utes. For the benefit of the bench and bar,
we should be clear that applying Pandelli v.
United States, 635 F.2d 538 (6th Cir.1980)
amounts to a rejection of our reasoning in
McGruder.

{77} That being said, I wholeheartedly
agree with the majority’s decision to directly
incorporate Pandelli into our jurisprudence.
The Pandellé rule has much to offer, particu-
larly here, where a motor vehicle, or any
piece of property for that matter, would nor-
mally be subsumed within the broader “any-
thing of value” language under a strict appli-
cation of Blockburger. It bears mentioning
that Pandelli represents a significant shift
away from our previous holdings, in which
we have instructed lower courts to look at
the legal elements in the abstract when de-

termining whether one crime is subsumed
within another.

{78} As we open the door to future use of
Pandelli, we must also ensure that its use is
properly circumscribed. Looking beyond the
indictment and jury instructions to the spe-
cific facts of the case would portend retreat-
ing from Swafford and returning to the fact-
based, ad hoe double jeopardy adjudications
that characterized our pre-Swafford cases.
See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 10-15, 810 P.2d at
1280-35 (explaining New Mexico’s double
jeopardy law at the time Swafford was is-
sued). While it makes sense to allow a party
to look at the specific language used in the
indictment along with the jury instructions to
analyze the state’s “legal theory,” any factual
inquiry beyond those two limited areas has
not been sanctioned by this Court. But at
the same time, something creative is happen-
ing whereby this Court, for the first time in
twenty years, is rethinking some of the un-
derpinnings of our double jeopardy jurispru-
dence. We encourage constructive critical
thinking from counsel and from our col-
leagues on the Court of Appeals in terms of
where this process should lead.

{79} Regarding the application of Pandelli
to the instant case, I agree with the majori-
ty’s resolution, albeit with some hesitation.
This case is clearly much easier than McGru-
der. Here, the indictment, as controlled by
the State through the drafting process, iden-
tified the specific items of value that Child
was alleged to have taken during the armed
robbery. Unlike McGruder, the armed rob-
bery indictment specifically lists the car that
forms the basis of the unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle charge. Because the thing of
value in this case is the car, Child’s convic-
tion for the unlawful taking of a motor vehi-
cle is unquestionably subsumed within the
broader armed robbery conviction. I am,
however, concerned that we not create the
impression that under Pandelli double jeop-
ardy problems can be avoided by clever in-
dictment drafting. A prosecutor should not
be allowed to defeat the constitutional pro-
tections afforded by the double jeopardy
clause by simply indicting for armed robbery
based on the theft of ignition keys without
ever mentioning the underlying vehicle.

258

{80} I would not leave open the question of
what might have occurred had the armed
robbery indictment referred to ignition keys
alone, as was the case in McGruder. When
applying Pandelli, we should not lose track
of what a key symbolizes, which is the under-
lying property. For this reason, I find no
distinction in terms of “legal theory” between
car ignition keys and the vehicle to which
those keys belong. When the victim of a
robbery unwillingly gives up his or her car
keys under threat of force, that victim has
transferred possession of both keys and vehi-
cle, much like a donor who delivers a gift by
way of a key. This view finds support
among property law teachings while also em-
bracing a common sense approach to the law.

{81} While I concur in Justice Chavez’s
well reasoned and original approach to dou-
ble jeopardy, I remain troubled by the notion
in McGruder that unlawfully taking a vehicle
can be considered a separately punishable
crime from forcibly stealing a set of ignition
keys to start and drive away in that same
vehicle. McGruder was wrong in 1997, is
wrong now, and should be corrected for the

future.

2011-NMSC-030
258 P.3d 1050
Gina MENDOZA, as personal representa-
tive under the Wrongful Death Act of
Michael Mendoza, deceased, and F. Mi-
chael Hart, as personal representative
under the Wrongful Death Act of Desi-
ree Mendoza, deceased, Plaintiffs—-Re-
spondents,

v.

TAMAYA ENTERPRISES, INC., a feder-
ally chartered corporation, d/b/a Santa
Ana Star Casino, Defendant-Petitioner.

No. 32,447.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
June 27, 2011.

Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom,
Schoenburg & Bienvenu, L.L.P., Richard W.
Hughes, Donna M. Connolly, Santa Fe, NM,

Plotsky & Dougherty, P.C., David L. Plot-
sky, Toulouse & Associates, P.A., Charlotte
Mary Toulouse, Albuquerque, NM, for Re-
spondents.

OPINION
MAKS, Justice.
{1} In this appeal we first address the
question of state court jurisdiction in a dram
shop action brought under the Tribal-State

Class III Gaming Compact (the Compact),
negotiated between the State of New Mexico

260

and the Pueblo of Santa Ana pursuant to the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006). There is an
apparent conflict between Section 8 of the
Compact, which provides for state court ju-
risdiction where a casino visitor has been
injured by the conduct of a casino, and Sec-
tion 191 of the Pueblo of Santa Ana Liquor
Ordinance, which reserves exclusive jurisdic-
tion to tribal courts. See Pueblo of Santa
Ana Liquor Ordinance, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,903,
17,910 (Apr. 7, 2006) (Pueblo Liquor Ordi-
nance).

{2} Siblings Michael and Desiree Mendoza
attended a wedding reception at the Santa
Ana Star Casino operated by Petitioner, Ta-
maya Enterprises, Inc. (the Casino), where
they were served alcoholic beverages and
became intoxicated. Casino employees con-
tinued to serve Michael and Desiree alcohol
despite their apparent intoxication. Michael
and Desiree left the Casino and were killed
when their vehicle left the roadway and
rolled over. Suit was filed in state court
against the Casino claiming that the Casino’s
delivery of alcohol to Michael and Desiree
while they were obviously intoxicated was in
violation of Section 184 of the Pueblo Liquor
Ordinance and proximately caused their
deaths. See 71 Fed. Reg. at 17,909 (“No
person shall sell any alcoholic beverage to a
person who the seller has reason to believe is
intoxicated or who the seller has reason to
believe intends to provide such alcoholic bev-
erage to an intoxicated person.”). The Casi-
no sought to dismiss the suit, claiming the
state court lacked jurisdiction over a dram
shop action where the tavernkeeper’s duty
not to serve alcohol to an intoxicated person
is imposed by tribal law, not state law, and
where the tribal law contains a provision
reserving exclusive jurisdiction to the tribal
courts.

{3} Pursuant to the Compact, our state
courts properly exercise jurisdiction over ca-
sino visitors’ personal injury claims. The
language of Section 8 reflects the parties’
agreement on this matter and is not suscepti-
ble to differing interpretations—the Pueblo
of Santa Ana (the Pueblo) consented to suit
in state court for personal injury claims prox-

1. For reference, the text of the Compact can be

imately caused by the conduet of the Casino.
Thus, the exclusive tribal jurisdiction provi-
sion cannot change the agreement of the
parties expressed in the clear language of
Section 8. Moreover, the fact that a previous
version of the Pueblo Liquor Ordinance,
which included an exclusive tribal jurisdiction
provision, was in effect at the time the Pueb-
lo entered into the Compact with the State
suggests that the Pueblo knowingly relin-
quished jurisdiction. See generally Doe v.
Santa Clara Pueblo, 2007-NMSC-008, 1 18,
141 N.M. 269, 154 P.8d 644; Gallegos v.
Pueblo of Tesuque, 2002-NMSC-012, 17, 182
N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668. Accordingly, by vir-
tue of Section 8 of the Compact, the Pueblo
unambiguously agreed to proceed in state
court for claims involving injuries proximate-
ly caused by the conduct of the Casino.
Therefore, we hold that our state courts may
exercise jurisdiction over this case.

{4} The second issue concerns the two
types of common law dram shop claims:
claims brought by third parties injured by
the conduct of the intoxicated patron against
a tavernkeeper (third-party claims) and
claims brought by the intoxicated patron
against the tavernkeeper to recover for his
own injuries (patron claims). We consider
the status of such common law claims follow-
ing the codification of dram shop liability in
the Liquor Control Act. See NMSA 1978,
§§ 60-8A-1 to -12 (1981, as amended
through 2009); NMSA 1978, § 41-11-1
(1986). Due to the explicit language of Sec-
tion 41-11-1, limiting its application to tav-
erns licensed under New Mexico law, we hold
that Section 41-11-1 was not intended to
preempt all common law claims. According-
ly, because Section 41-11-1 does not preempt
all common law claims, we hold that the
common law recognizes an action by a third
party against a tavernkeeper for over service
of aleohol. Additionally, given the Legisla-
ture’s adoption of patron claims subject to
proof of gross negligence on the part of the
liquor licensee, see § 41-11-1(B), we hold
that modern public policy supports an analo-
gous common law patron claim. Therefore,
we affirm the result reached by the Court of
Appeals.

found at www.nmgcb.org/tribal/2001compact.pdf

I BACKGROUND

HM {5} Because our review is of the Casi-
no’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1-
012(B)(6) NMRA, we accept as true all facts
pleaded in the complaint in order to deter-
mine whether the plaintiffs “may prevail un-
der any state of the facts alleged.” Callahan
v NM. Fedn of Teachers-TVI, 2006-
NMSC-010, 14, 189 N.M. 201, 181 P.8d 51.
The following facts were pleaded by the per-
sonal representatives (Respondents) of Mi-
chael and Desiree Mendoza in their second
amended complaint.

{6} On July 9, 2006, Michael and Desiree
attended a wedding reception at the Casino.
Casino employees served alcoholic beverages
to Michael and Desiree at the reception; as a
result, Michael and Desiree became intoxicat-
ed. Casino employees continued to serve
Michael and Desiree alcohol despite their
apparent intoxication. Following the recep-
tion, Michael and Desiree left the Casino and
traveled south on I-25. North of the Tram-
way exit, their vehicle left the roadway and
rolled over, causing their deaths. No other
yehicles were involved in the fatal crash.
Respondents also allege that the Casino is
licensed by the Pueblo to sell and serve
alcoholic beverages. Respondents do not al-
lege which of the siblings was driving the
vehicle at the time of the crash.

{7} Respondents filed a suit for wrongful
death against the Casino, seeking to impose
liability on the Casino for selling or serving
alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons.
They claim that the Casino’s delivery of alco-
hol to Michael and Desiree while they were
obviously intoxicated was in violation of Sec-
tion 184 of the Pueblo Liquor Ordinance and
proximately caused their deaths. See 71
Fed. Reg. at 17,909 (“No person shall sell
any alcoholic beverage to a person who the
seller has reason to believe is intoxicated or
who the seller has reason to believe intends
to provide such alcoholic beverage to an in-
toxicated person.”).

{8} Before the district court, the Casino
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Rule 1-012(B)(6). See Mendoza v. Tamaya
Enters., 2010-NMCA-074, 11, 148 N.M. 534,
288 P.3d 908. The district court granted the

261

Casino’s motion to dismiss and subsequently
denied Respondents’ motion for reconsidera-
tion. Id. 13,

{9} Respondents appealed, and the Court
of Appeals issued an opinion reversing the
district court’s dismissal of the complaint and
remanding for further proceedings. See id.
The Court of Appeals held that claims by
casino visitors for “bodily injury or property
damage” were within the Compact’s grant of
state court jurisdiction and therefore con-
cluded that the district court could properly
exercise jurisdiction over the matter. Id.
124. The Court also held that “there is a
recognized common law cause of action for
an injured, third-party passenger,” id. 119,
as well as 2 common law cause of action for
patrons, based on the duty not to serve alco-
hol to intoxicated individuals provided by the
Pueblo Liquor Ordinance, Mendoza, 2010-
NMCA-074, 122, 148 N.M. 534, 238 P.3d
903. Subsequently, the Casino filed a peti-
tion for certiorari pursuant to NMSA 1978,
Section 34-5-14(B) (1972) and Rule 12-502
NMRA. Mendoza v. Tamaya Enters., 2010-
NMCERT-008, 148 N.M. 948, 242 P.3d 1289.
We granted the Casino’s petition to consider
three issues: (1) whether our state courts
may exercise jurisdiction over a dram shop
action where the tavernkeeper’s duty not to
serve alcohol to an intoxicated person is im-
posed by tribal law, not state law, and where
the tribal law contains a provision reserving
exclusive jurisdiction to the tribal courts; (2)
whether the common law recognizes a third-
party claim against a tavernkeeper for over
service of alcohol following the enactment of
Section 41-111; and (8) whether the com-
mon law recognizes a patron claim against a
tavernkeeper for over service of aleohol fol-
lowing the enactment of Section 41-11-1.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Tl {10} The issue of whether the district
court has jurisdiction to hear Respondents’
complaint or whether the matter must be
heard by a tribal court is a question of
subject matter jurisdiction which we review
de novo. Gallegos, 2002-NMSC-012, 1 6, 182
N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668.

262

HH s{11} Our review of the motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim requires
that we assume the factual allegations made
in the complaint are true, and, thus, our
review is confined to the “legal sufficiency of
the complaint.” Herrera v. Quality Pontiac,
2008-NMSC-018, 12, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.8d
181. Accordingly, we must determine as a
legal matter if Respondents “may prevail
under any state of the facts alleged.” Calla-
han, 2006-NMSC-010, 14, 189 N.M. 201, 181
P.8d 51. Our determination of whether Re-
spondents may prevail depends upon the con-
struction of Section 41-11-1. In construing
a statute, “[wle look first to the plain lan-
guage of the statute, giving the words their
ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature in-
dicates a different one was intended.” Old-
ham v. Oldham, 2011-NMSC-007, 110, 149
N.M. 215, 247 P.3d 786 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).

Ill. DISCUSSION

A. The Compact Permits State Courts to
Exercise Jurisdiction over Claims by
Injured Casino Visitors

HM {12} The Casino claims that the dis-

trict court does not have jurisdiction over a

claim based on Section 184 of the Pueblo

Liquor Ordinance, 71 Fed. Reg. at 17,909,

which provides a duty not to serve alcohol to

intoxicated individuals, because of Section

191 of the Pueblo Liquor Ordinance, id. at

17,910. Section 191 provides that any action

premised on a violation of the Pueblo Liquor

Ordinance “shall be brought in the Tribal

Court of the Pueblo, which court shall have

exclusive jurisdiction thereof.” Id. at 17,910

(emphasis added). In light of this provision,

we must determine whether our state courts

have jurisdiction to hear Respondents’ case
before we reach the merits of the appeal.

{13} Respondents maintain that by virtue
of the Compact our state courts can properly
exercise jurisdiction. They explain that the

Pueblo consented to be sued by casino visi-

tors in state courts in exchange for gaming

privileges. Section 8(D) of the Compact pro-
vides that the Pueblo “waives its defense of
sovereign immunity in connection with any
claims for compensatory damages for bodily

injury or property damage.” Section 8(A) of
the Compact states that such claims “may be
brought in state district court” even if the
claims arose on tribal land. (Emphasis add-
ed.) Relying on Doe, 2007-NMSC-008, 11 47,
141 N.M. 269, 154 P.8d 644, Respondents
further argue that we deemed enforceable
the provisions of the Compact permitting
tribes to be sued in state court, and therefore
the Pueblo “cannot nullify a negotiated provi-
sion of the Compact (agreeing to be sued in
[state] court) by ... enacting a non-negotiat-
ed term (exclusive jurisdiction) in its ordi-
nances negating it.” (Alteration in original.)

{14} We briefly note that there is a dis-
pute among the parties as to which version of
the Compact is applicable to this appeal.
Respondents quote from the form Compact
found at NMSA 1978, Section 11-18-1 (1997).
The Casino maintains that a latter version,
which took effect in 2001, is the applicable
law. We agree and apply the 2001 Compact
here. See R & R Deli v. Santa Ana Star
Casino, 2006-NMCA-020, 1116-17, 139
N.M. 85, 128 P.3d 518 (holding that the 2001
Compact was duly enacted and superceded
the prior version of the Compact even though
the prior version is still found at Section 11-
13-1).

{15} The Compact provides for state court
jurisdiction for a discrete set of claims: those
brought by persons who suffer “bodily injury
or property damage proximately caused by
the conduct of” the tribal entity authorized to
conduct gaming pursuant to the Compact.
In Doe, we considered whether these “juris-
diction shifting” provisions were enforceable.
2007-NMSC-008, 114, 141 N.M. 269, 154 P.3d
644, We concluded that they were enforce-
able and permitted the casino visitors’ per-
sonal injury claims to go forward in district
court. Id. 1147-48. Thus, pursuant to the
Compact, our state courts properly exercise
jurisdiction over casino visitors’ personal in-
jury claims. Moreover, a prior version of the
Pueblo Liquor Ordinance, which included a
provision reserving exclusive jurisdiction to
tribal courts, was adopted in 1995, before the
Pueblo entered into the Compact with the
State in 1997. See Santa Ana Pueblo Liquor
Code, 61 Fed. Reg. 41,172, 41,172 (Aug. 7,
1996) (noting that the ordinance was duly

adopted by the tribal council on May 2, 1995);
id. at 41,177 (lodging exclusive jurisdiction in
tribal court over actions pertaining to the
ordinance); see also Gallegos, 2002-NMSC-
012, 1111-22, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.8d 668
(noting that the 1995 Compact was deemed
invalid by state and federal courts); Notice
of Tribal-State Gaming Compact Taking Ef-
fect, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,878, 59,878 (Nov. 5,
1997) (providing public notice that the 1997
Compact was approved by the Secretary of
the Interior as required by the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act). The fact that the exclu-
sive jurisdiction provision was in effect be-
fore the Pueblo entered into the Compact
with the State suggests that the Pueblo
knowingly relinquished jurisdiction. See
generally Doe, 2007-NMSC-008, 118, 141
N.M. 269, 154 P.8d 644; Gallegos, 2002-
NMSC-012, 17, 182 N.M. 207, 46 P.8d 668.
Accordingly, by virtue of Section 8 of the
Compact, the Pueblo unambiguously agreed
to proceed in state court for claims involving
injuries proximately caused by the conduct of
the Casino. Because we conclude that our
courts have jurisdiction to hear Respondents’
claim, we proceed to the merits of the appeal.

B. Status of Common Law Dram Shop
Claims Following Enactment of Sec-
tion 41-11-1

HM {16} Having determined that state
court jurisdiction is proper, we next address
whether Respondents stated a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Respondents

seek to impose liability on the Casino as a

result of both Michael’s and Desiree’s deaths.

The complaint does not state which of the

siblings was driving the vehicle at the time of

the crash, but we do not consider this a fatal
flaw. See Petty v. Bank of N.M. Holding

Co, 109 N.M. 524, 526-27, 787 P.2d 448, 445-

46 (1990) (“Under our rules of ‘notice plead-

ing,’ it is sufficient that defendants be given

only a fair idea of the nature of the claim
asserted against them sufficient to apprise
them of the general basis of the claim; spe-
cific evidentiary detail is not required at this
stage....”); Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074,

113, 148 N.M. 584, 238 P.38d 903. We con-

strue the complaint as alleging a common law

third-party claim with respect to the passen-
ger of the vehicle involved in the fatal crash,

263

and a common law patron claim with respect
to the driver of the vehicle. We now proceed
to determine whether our common law recog-
nizes such claims following the Legislature’s
enactment of Section 41-11-1. We begin
with third-party claims.

1. Respondents’ Complaint States a
Third-Party Claim

{17} At the outset of our analysis, we
examine the effect of Section 41-11-1, which
codified, at least partially, dram shop liability
in this state. As discussed below, the parties
disagree whether Section 41-11-1 completely
preempted common law dram shop liability.
The common law scheme which operated pri-
or to the enactment of Section 41-11-1 pro-
vides a backdrop to our statutory interpreta-
tion, so we begin our discussion there.

{18} We first recognized a common law
action in favor of a third party injured by the
tavernkeeper’s over service of alcohol to a
patron in Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 631,
651 P.2d 1269, 1275 (1982). There, we exam-
ined the history of dram shop liability and
concluded that traditionally the “common law
imposes no liability on the seller of intoxicat-
ing liquor for damages that resulted from the
intoxication of a patron.” Id. at 628, 651
P.2d at 1272. We noted that many states
had adopted statutes in order to change the
existing common law, such that it permitted
an action against the tavernkeeper; however,
no such statute existed in New Mexico. Id.
Even though our Legislature had not acted
to change the common law, we held that the
traditional common law view that the tavern-
keeper was not liable for a third party's
injuries from an intoxicated patron was out-
moded, and that it was within the province of
the judiciary to change the common law. Id.
at 629-30, 651 P.2d at 1278-74. Therefore,
we validated a common law action premised
upon breach of a statutory or regulatory duty
not to serve alcohol to an intoxicated patron.
See id. at 631, 651 P.2d at 1275.

{19} In Lopez, we noted that the statute
providing a duty not to serve alcohol, NMSA
1978, Section 60-10-27 (repealed 1981), “[did]
not define or qualify the type of person who
sells, serves or gives any alcoholic liquor.”

264

Lopez, 98 N.M. at 631, 651 P.2d at 1275.
Section 60-10-27 was repealed by NMSA
1978, Section 60-7A-16 (1981) (as amended
through 1993), the version currently in force.
Section 60-7A-16 delineates a duty not to
serve alcohol to intoxicated individuals, and
akin to its predecessor, it is a broadly appli-
cable duty, which does not limit or qualify
the person who serves the liquor. Specifical-
ly, Section 60-7A-16 provides:

It is a violation of the Liquor Control
Act ... for a person to sell or serve alco-
holic beverages to or to procure or aid in
the procurement of alcoholic beverages for
an intoxicated person if the person selling,
serving, procuring or aiding in procure-
ment, knows or has reason to know that he
is selling, serving, procuring or aiding in
procurement of alcoholic beverages for a
person that is intoxicated.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, the common law
action was premised upon a broad duty, ap-
plicable to any “person” who sold or served
alcohol.

{20} In 1983, however, the Legislature
enacted Section 41-11-1, which provides a
statutory cause of action applicable to a tav-
ernkeeper who is licensed to serve liquor
under New Mexico law. See 1983 N.M.
Laws, ch. 328, § 1(A), (C); § 41-11-1(A),
(D)(1) Wersion in force). The Legislature
made Section 41-11-1 the exclusive remedy
for breach of Section 60-7A-16 by a licensee
which, as mentioned above, provides a broad
duty not to serve alcohol to intoxicated per-
sons. See § 41-11-1(H) (“No person may
seek relief in a civil claim against a licensee
or a social host for injury or death or damage
to property which was proximately caused by
the sale, service or provision of alcoholic
beverages except as provided in this sec-
tion.”).

Hl {21} We note that, in this case, Re-
spondents cannot proceed under Section 41—
11-1 because the Casino is not a “licensee”
within the meaning of the section. Section
41-11-1(D)(1) defines a licensee as “a person
licensed under the provisions of the Liquor
Control Act and the agents or servants of the
licensee.” The Casino does not fall within
this definition because it is not licensed to
sell liquor under New Mexico law; rather, it

is licensed by the Pueblo. Thus, the Court of
Appeals addressed whether the common law
cause of action, originally recognized in Lo-
pez, survived subsequent legislative enact-
ments, namely Section 41-11-1. The Court
concluded that “there is a recognized com-
mon law cause of action for an injured, third-
party passenger.” Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-
074, 119, 148 N.M. 584, 238 P.3d 903.

{22} The Casino contests this conclusion,
arguing that Section 41-11-1 provides an
exclusive remedy against tavernkeepers,
such that there can be no common law alter-
native. The Casino argues that if there is a
common law alternative to Section 41~11-1,
then Section 41-11-1’s limitations on dram
shop liability are rendered meaningless, and
therefore urges that we reverse the Court of
Appeals.

{23} In response, Respondents maintain
that when the Legislature codified dram shop
liability it limited the scope of the legislation
as to licensees; however, it did not “abolish a
cause of action.” Baater v. Noce, 107 N.M.
48, 50, 752 P.2d 240, 242 (1988). Respon-
dents also point out that the original common
Jaw cause of action recognized in Lopez was
based on the duty derived from the “broadly
worded” Section 60-7A-16, which is applica-
ble to persons, not just licensees. See § 60-
74-16 (prohibiting any “person” from serv-
ing alcohol to intoxicated individuals (empha-
sis added)). Thus, Respondents argue that
Section 41-11-1 is the exclusive remedy
against licensees; however, it is not the ex-
clusive remedy against non-licensees, such as
the Casino. Respondents claim that the
Legislature could have chosen to make Sec-
tion 41-11-1 applicable to any person, but it
did not elect to do so. Accordingly, Respon-
dents argue that this Court should affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, recogniz-
ing a common law cause of action for injured
third-parties.

HM {24} Im order to determine whether
Section 41-11~1 preempts common law third-
party claims, we first examine the plain lan-
guage of the statute. Oldham, 2011~
NMSC-007, 110, 149 N.M. 215, 247 P.8d
736. Section 41-11-1 applies to licensees.
See § 41-11-1(A), (H). As discussed above,

265

a “licensee” is “a person licensed under the
provisions of the Liquor Control Act and the
agents or servants of the licensee.” Section
41-11-1(D)(). Therefore, the plain lan-
guage of Section 41-11~1 limits its reach to
those individuals licensed pursuant to the
Liquor Control Act; it is not applicable to all
individuals. See § 41-11-1(A), (D), (H).
Subsection H provides that no person may
maintain a civil claim “against a licensee ...
except as provided in this section.” Section
41-11-1(H) (emphasis added). Similarly,
Subsection A limits its reach to licensees; it
provides that “[nJo civil liability shall be
predicated upon the breach of Section 60-
TA-16 ... by a licensee, except in the case
of the licensee” who serves alcohol to an in-
toxicated individual. Section 41-11-1(A)(1)
(emphasis added). Because Section 41-11-1
explicitly limits its scope to licensees, we
conelude that it only supplanted the common
law cause of action against licensees. It did
not change the common law’s recognition of
third-party claims against non-licensees.
Because the Casino is not a “licensee,” Re-
spondents may pursue a common law third-
party claim.

{25} Our interpretation is confirmed by
our prior cases. As discussed above, in Lo-
pez, we modified the common Jaw so as to
permit an injured third party to maintain an
action against a tavernkeeper. 98 N.M. at
682, 651 P.2d at 1276. Following Lopez, the
Legislature enacted Section 41-11-1 in 1983.
See 1983 N.M. Laws, ch. 328, § 1 (enacting
section later codified as Section 41~-11-1).
We had the opportunity to examine the 1983
version of Section 41-11~1 in Baater, 107
N.M. at 50, 752 P.2d at 242, There, we
concluded that Section 41~11-1 “did not cre-
ate or abolish a cause of action; instead it
narrowed the liability of tavernkeepers ...
and set out the elements which would consti-
tute a breach of the duty established in [Lo-
pez).” Baxter, 107 N.M. at 50, 752 P.2d at
242, Therefore, according to Bawter, Section
4J-11-1 did not supplant the common law
cause of action originally recognized in Lo-
pez. Our interpretation of Section 41-11-1
places it in harmony with Lopez and Baxter.

{26} Because Section 41-11-1 does not
preempt all common law claims, our common

law permits a third-party claim against a
tavernkeeper. Accordingly, we hold that the
factual allegations in Respondents’ complaint
are sufficient to state a third-party common
law claim with respect to the passenger of
the vehicle.

2, Respondents’ Complaint States a Pa-
tron Claim

{27} We next address whether the com-
mon law permits patron claims, which are
those brought by an intoxicated patron to
recover for his own injuries. Section 41-11-
1(B) permits a patron action against a “licen-
see” where the “licensee is determined to
have acted with gross negligence and reck-
less disregard for the safety of the person
who purchased or was served the alcoholic
beverages.” As we have previously noted,
Respondents may not proceed under the
statutory cause of action provided in Section
41-11-1(B) because the Casino is not a “li-
censee.” Therefore, for Respondents’ com-
plaint to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, it must do so pursuant to a
common law patron action.

{28} In our discussion above, we concluded
that the plain language of Section 41-11-1
limits its reach to licensees, and as a result,
the section does not preempt all common law
third-party claims. This analysis of Section
41-11-1 is equally applicable as to common
law patron claims, and therefore, we need
not restate it here. Rather, we proceed from
the conclusion that Section 41~-11~1 does not,
supplant all common law claims.

{29} Even though we have settled that the
enactment of Section 41-11-1 did not
preempt all common law claims, there re-
niains an important issue for our consider-
ation. We must address whether our com-
mon law recognizes patron claims. Our
opinion in Lopez, which was issued prior to
the enactment of Section 41-11-1, recognized
a common law cause of action in favor of
third parties. Lopez, 98 N.M. at 632, 651
P.2d at 1276. Accordingly, in our consider-
ation of whether Section 41-11-1 preempts
third-party claims, we were able to proceed
knowing that the background principles of
our common law supported a cause of action
for third parties. We are unable to proceed

266

in such fashion here; we did not have occa-
sion to address the existence of a common
Jaw patron cause of action prior to the enact-
ment of Section 41-11-1. .

{30} The Court of Appeals concluded that
our common law recognizes a patron cause of
action. Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074, 11 20-
22, 148 N.M. 534, 288 P.8d 903. The Court
analyzed the Casino’s duty pursuant to Sec-
tion 184 of the Pueblo Liquor Ordinance and
determined that the Casino owed a duty to
patrons. Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074, 122,
148 N.M. 584, 238 P.3d 903. In determining
that the Casino owed a duty to patrons, the
Court relied upon the Compact’s policy con-
cern of casino visitor protection, noting that
the Compact specifies that “safety and pro-
tection of visitors” is a priority of the Pueblo.
Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074, 122, 148 N.M.
534, 238 P.3d 908 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Because the Court
determined that the Casino’s duty under the
Pueblo Liquor Ordinance extended to pa-
trons, it concluded that Respondents stated a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Mendoza, 2010-NMCA-074, 122, 148 N.M.
534, 238 P.3d 908.

{31} The Casino disagrees with the
Court’s conclusion and submits that we
should not adopt a common law patron ac-
tion. The Casino argues that, if we were to
adopt a common law patron action, every
plaintiff would elect the less stringent com-
mon law theory, which presumably would
require only proof of simple negligence,
rather than Section 41-11-1(B)’s stricter re-
quirement of “gross negligence and reckless
disregard for the safety of the person who
purchased or was served the alcoholic bever-
ages” on the part of the alcohol purveyor.
Alternatively, if the common law alternative
to Section 41-11-1 only applies where the
claimant proceeds against a tribal gaming
facility, then the Casino argues there is a
violation of equal protection—tribal facilities
would be held to a much higher legal stan-
dard than non-tribal facilities.

HM {32} In Lopez, we recognized our
ability to revise the common law when the
policy concerns which undergirded a common
law doctrine no longer reflected modern real-
ities. 98 N.M. at 629-30, 651 P.2d at 1278-

74. There, we noted it was within our prov-
ince to elect not to “adhere to ancient, com-
mon law doctrines when those doctrines [be-
come] out of tune with today’s society.” Id.
at 629, 651 P.2d at 1273. Thus, we revised
the “outmoded” common law in order to per-
mit an injured third party to pursue an ac-
tion against the seller of liquor. Id. at 680,
632, 651 P.2d at 1274, 1276.

{33} Traditionally, the common law re-
flected a belief that patrons should not be
able to seek relief from a tavernkeeper for
injuries arising out of their intoxication.
Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex.
1993). The rationale was that the “proxi-
mate cause of the injury was not the furnish-
ing of the liquor, but the drinking of it.”
Lopez, 98 N.M. at 628, 651 P.2d at 1272.
This view holds the patron alone responsible
for injuries arising out of his liquor consump-
tion and does not require the tavernkeeper to
bear any responsibility.

{34} Just as we recognized in Lopez that
the policy considerations concerning third-
party claims were no longer valid, we recog-
nize that the policy considerations concerning
patron claims no longer stand on solid
ground. Two factors lead to this conclusion.
First, our statutory laws evidence a change
in the prevailing view regarding the responsi-
bility of the tavernkeeper. In 1985, the Leg-
islature amended Section 41-11-1 to recog-
nize a patron cause of action. See 1985 N.M.
Laws, ch. 191, § 1(B). Pursuant to Section
41-11-1(B), a patron who is served alcohol
while intoxicated and injured as a result may
obtain relief from the “licensee” who served
him. As we have discussed, the statutory
patron cause of action requires proof beyond
simple negligence; the claimant must show
that the licensee “acted with gross negli-
gence and reckless disregard for the safety”
of the patron. Id. This statute articulates a
policy in favor of holding the tavernkeeper
responsible for the patron’s injuries, where it
is clear that the tavernkeeper’s actions were
reckless. Thus, the Legislature’s recognition
of a patron cause of action undermines the
common law’s view that only the patron can
be held responsible for injuries resulting
from his aleohol consumption.

{35} Second, a patron cause of action can
be a catalyst which promotes important so-

cial goals. New Jersey courts have recog-
nized “the senseless havoc and destruction
caused by intoxicated drivers” and have per-
mitted a patron cause of action in order to
discourage drunk driving. See Voss v. Tran-
quilino, 413 N.J.Super. 82, 992 A.2d 829, 836
(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2010), affd, 206 N.J.
98, 19 A8d 470 (2011) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In our state,
where tragedies too often result from drunk
driving, this policy consideration certainly
strikes a chord. See, eg., State v. Roper,
1996-NMCA-078, 117, 122 N.M. 126, 921
P.2d 822 (taking account of “severe drunk-
driving problems in New Mexico”).

{36} This important policy consideration,
in conjunction with Section 41-11-1(B), per-
suades us that the common law’s bar on
patron actions does not reflect the realities of
our modern times. See Lopez, 98 N.M. at
632, 651 P.2d at 1276 (revising outmoded
common law doctrine). Accordingly, because
Section 41-11-1 does not preempt all com-
mon law claims, we hold that the common
law recognizes an action by a patron against
a tavernkeeper for over service of alcohol.

TE {87} While the Court of Appeals
concluded that the common law permitted a
patron cause of action, it did not subject this
patron cause of action to a more demanding
standard akin to the requirements of Section
41-11-1(B) that the liquor licensee acted with
“gross negligence and reckless disregard for
the safety” of the patron. Mendoza, 2010-
NMCA-074, 122, 148 N.M. 534, 238 P.3d
903. The common law must reflect modern
policy considerations. These considerations
are best encapsulated in the balance struck
by our Legislature in Section 41-11-1(8),
which allows a patron cause of action, yet
demands proof of gross rather than simple
negligence. We revise the common law and
adopt the standard articulated in Section 41-
11-18). Thus, the common law recognizes
an action by an injured patron against a
tavernkeeper who served the patron alcohol
while intoxicated; in such an action, the
claimant must show that the tavernkeeper
acted with gross negligence and reckless dis-
regard for the safety of the patron in order
to recover. This standard ensures that the
common law reflects modern policy consider-
ations, and additionally, because the standard

267

mirrors Section 41-11-1(B), it resolves the
potential equal protection concerns brought
to light by the Casino.

{38} We clarify the application of the dis-
tinct standards required by common law
third-party claims as distinguished from
common law patron claims. Because third-
party claims require proof of simple negli-
gence while patron claims require proof of
gross negligence, it is necessary to distin-
guish who may seek relief as a third party
and who must seek relief as a patron.
Where, as here, an intoxicated passenger
seeks relief, it may be unclear to courts and
litigants whether the intoxicated passenger
should be treated as a patron or as an in-
jured third party.

{39} We construe Respondents’ complaint
as alleging a third-party claim with respect
to the intoxicated passenger. We do so
based on Baater and Murphy v. Tomada
Enterprises, Inc, 112 N.M. 800, 819 P.2d
1858 (Ct.App.1991). Both Baater and Mur-
phy involve claims by intoxicated passen-
gers—individuals who drank liquor and were
subsequently injured when they rode as pas-
sengers in vehicles driven by their drinking
partners. Bawter, 107 N.M. at 48, 752 P.2d
at 240; Murphy, 112 N.M. at 801, 819 P.2d
at 1859. In Baster, we permitted the intoxi-
cated passenger’s claim to proceed on the
basis that she “was an injured third party in
relation to” the tavern. 107 N.M. at 50, 752
P.2d at 242. Similarly, in Murphy, the Court
of Appeals treated an intoxicated passenger’s
cause of action as a third-party claim. 112
NM. at 802, 819 P.2d at 1360.

{40} Murphy made clear that the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiffs injuries is the
key element which distinguishes a patron
claim from a third-party claim. See id. (not-
ing that the statutory patron claim, found in
Section 41-11-1(B), extends only to injuries
“proximately caused by the patron’s own in-
toxication, not by the intoxication of another
patron”). Murphy made this distinction in
the context of statutory dram shop claims—
those maintainable against licensees pursu-
ant to Section 41-11-1.

{41} The Casino expresses concerns re-
garding disparate treatment between non-
licensee taverns, which are subject to com-
mon law dram shop claims, and “licensee”

268

taverns, which are subject to statutory claims
under Section 41-11-1. However, if the
common law dram shop claim mirrors the
statutory claim, no potential for disparate
treatment exists—non-licensee taverns will
be subject to the same standards as “licen-
see” taverns. Thus, in order to ensure that
common law claims mirror statutory claims,
we extend Murphys rationale to the common
Jaw context.

HM {42} Therefore, a passenger sues as
a third party, whether under Section 41-11-1
or the common law. The passenger must
prove that the tavern was negligent and that
the passenger’s damages were proximately
caused by the tavern. An intoxicated driver
sues as a patron, whether under Section 41-
11-1 or the common law. The intoxicated
driver must prove that the tavern acted with
gross negligence and in reckless disregard of
the driver’s safety and that the driver’s dam-
ages were proximately caused by the tavern.
Accordingly, the factual allegations in the
complaint regarding the driver are sufficient
to state a patron claim.

Il. CONCLUSION

{43} We hold that the district court had
jurisdiction. We further hold that Section
41-11-1 did not displace all common law
dram shop claims. Apart from the statutory
claims permitted by Section 41-11-1, our
common law recognizes two types of dram
shop claims against non-licensee tavernkeep-
ers who serve alcohol to intoxicated patrons:
a claim in favor of injured third parties upon
traditional negligence principles and a claim
in favor of patrons upon proof that the tav-
ernkeeper acted with gross negligence and
reckless disregard for the safety of the pa-
tron. We remand to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.

{44} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMSC-031
258 P.3d 1060
Lynette CONCHA, et al., Petitioners,
ve

Hon. Sam B. SANCHEZ, District Court
Judge, Eighth Judicial District,
Respondent,

and

State of New Mexico, Real
Party in Interest.

No. 32,080.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
July 19, 2011.

>
nN

a
—

Jacqueline Cooper, Chief Public Defender,
Nancy M. Hewitt, Appellate Defender, T.
David Eisenberg, Deputy Public Defender,
David A. Bouchard, Deputy Public Defender,
Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioners.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, David
Tourek, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Respondent and Real Party in
Interest.

OPINION

DANIELS, Chief Justice.

{1} The extraordinary contempt powers of
our courts often require judges to accommo-
date important, but potentially conflicting,
obligations. Judges must take reasonable
and necessary steps to maintain the order
and safety of our court processes. At the
same time, they must comply with fundamen-
tal principles of our constitutional system of
due process of law to ensure that the judicia-
ry itself does not act lawlessly in the course
of enforcing the law. In this Opinion, we
address how each of those important obli-
gations should be honored without sacrificing
the others.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HIs-
TORY

{2} This case came before us on a petition
invoking our emergency original jurisdiction
to review the indefinite detention of thirty-
two courtroom spectators who had all been
summarily ordered to jail for contempt of
court by Respondent after a contentious
hearing evolved into a courtroom disruption

created by some, but not all, of the Petition-
ers.

{3} The underlying hearing related to a
criminal case in which a defendant had en-
tered guilty pleas to criminal sexual pen-
etration and criminal sexual contact of a mi-
nor, his thirteen-year-old niece. Respondent
had sentenced the defendant to six years of
imprisonment on each of the two counts, to
be served consecutively.

{4} On the afternoon of Thursday, Novem-
ber 19, 2009, Respondent heard the defen-
dant’s motion for sentence reduction. On the
north side of the courtroom’s large gallery
sat the victim, accompanied by her mother,
step-father, grandparents, and a victims’ ad-
vocate from the district attorney’s office. On
the east side of the gallery sat Petitioners,
many of whom apparently supported a re-
duced sentence for the defendant. All but
one of the Petitioners, who ranged in age
from twenty-two to seventy-one years old,
were members of Taos Pueblo. The other
Petitioner was the defendant's employer.
The court had two bailiffs present, and sever-
al employees of the district attorney’s office
also attended the hearing to provide addi-
tional security in light of the tensions that
existed between the victim’s family and the
defendant’s friends and family.

{5} During the reconsideration hearing,
four people spoke in support of the defen-
dant’s request for a sentence reduction.
Three of the victim’s family members also
spoke and urged Respondent to uphold the
sentence. The courtroom remained orderly
throughout the witnesses’ presentations. At
the end of the hearing, Respondent denied
the motion to reduce the sentence, emphasiz-
ing that the defendant “[was] the adult in
this situation,” had “destroyed a lot of fami-
lies,” and was “the one to blame” for what
had happened. Respondent concluded the
hearing by stating that the court was in
recess.

{6} The events that took place immediate-
ly after Respondent recessed the court were
preserved in a digital audio recording and
supplemented by accounts of some of the
persons present. Four seconds after the
bailiff announced, “All rise,” Respondent,
who had left the bench but was still in the

271

courtroom, said, “I want everyone on this
side to remain seated,” apparently referring
to the area in which Petitioners were stand-
ing. The defendant responded by saying,
“This has all been one sided,” and murmurs
from unidentified members of the crowd indi-
cated that some of them agreed. Respon-
dent ordered the bailiff to remove the defen-
dant from the courtroom.

{7} At that point, the noise level in the
courtroom increased as the voices of the
defendant and some of the spectators became
louder. Unidentified voices shouted mes-
sages of support to the defendant, such as
“We love you,” and “Bye.” Derogatory
statements about the victim and her family
were also made, including “she’s no virgin,”
her “grandfather’s a rapist,” and a reference
to “a little whore and a bunch of liars.” As
the defendant was being led out of the build-
ing, the noisy exchange between opposing
sides of the courtroom continued in both
English and Tiwa, the traditional Taos Pueb-
lo language. The victim and her family were
safely escorted through a locked jury room
to their car.

{8} Thirty-nine seconds after the bailiff
first told the crowd to rise and while audible
statements were still being made, Respon-
dent yelled, “That’s enough-I’ll hold every
one of you in contempt and jail you all!”

“Although the noise level in the courtroom

immediately dropped dramatically, an un-
identified voice could be heard saying, “We'll
all go.” According to an employee of the
district attorney’s office who was present at
the hearing, “[a] gentleman sitting near the
front row shouted that he didn’t care and
they would go to jail” Respondent, who
represented at oral argument before this
Court that there were “several” unidentified
people who stated that they would go to jail,
yelled, “You'll all go? Okay, take them all.
Go on, all of you, go on to jail!” Respondent
asked that the sheriff be called immediately
to provide further assistance.

{9} Moments after Respondent ordered
Petitioners to “go on to jail,” members of the
Taos County Sheriff's Department, Taos Po-
lice Department, and New Mexico State Po-
lice began to arrive. The officers advised the

272

east gallery spectators that they would be
booked and jailed. Respondent left the
courtroom and allowed the police officers to
process Petitioners, which apparently took
place without further incident. One Petition-
er was taken to the hospital to be examined
for an unrelated health condition. Four of
the more elderly Petitioners were incarcerat-
ed at the Taos Pueblo jail. Because there
was room for only seven Petitioners at the
Taos County jail, all of those not locked up in
the two Taos area jails were transported to
Santa Fe by bus and booked into the Santa
Fe County Detention Center.

{10} The persons arrested were the spec-
tators who had been in the east side of the
public area of the courtroom where the de-
fendant’s family, friends, and employer were
seated. Without any further hearing or fact-
finding process, Respondent entered thirty-
two identical two-sentence orders that facial-
ly adjudicated each Petitioner guilty of direct
criminal contempt:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
[name] is held in direct contempt of court
for misconduct during a hearing in State of
New Mexico v. Dominic Bau, CR-2008-
0004 on November 19, 2009. Defendant to
be held until further order of the Court.

The orders contained no individualized alle-
gations or findings concerning any individual
Petitioner’s conduct, no provisions for bond
or other conditions of release, no specific
sentences, and no settings for any future
hearings. The jails were, in effect, ordered
to incarcerate each Petitioner until and un-
less the court issued a future order to the
contrary.

{11} After Respondent summarily ordered
Petitioners to jail on Thursday, there was no
hearing of any kind held or even scheduled
on either Thursday or Friday. Petitioners
secured the assistance of counsel, who
learned from the court clerk that the only
setting in the case was an “arraignment”
scheduled for the following Monday at 4 p.m.,
meaning that Petitioners would have to re-
main locked in jail without bond for at least
four days and nights before having any op-
portunity to be heard on any issue.

{12} On the next day, Friday afternoon,
Petitioners filed a petition for emergency

writ of prohibition or superintending control
in this Court, seeking relief from the con-
tempt orders. Late that afternoon, this
Court issued a stay of the proceedings
against Petitioners, ordered their immediate
release from custody, and ordered them to
appear before Respondent for the purported
“arraignment” hearing on Monday afternoon,
November 23.

{18} At the November 23 district court
hearing, instead of conducting arraignments
or any further proceedings in the thirty-two
contempt cases, Respondent orally an-
nounced to Petitioners and their counsel that
he was dismissing all contempt proceedings.
On the following day he entered a single
order, naming all Petitioners as codefendants
in a single case, that was as brief and unin-
formative as the original separate charging
orders:

“THIS MATTER having come before
this Court on the 23rd of November, 2009,
for Arraignment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
this matter is hereby dismissed with preju-
dice.”

{14} On November 30, Respondent filed in
this Court a cursory response to the pending
petition for extraordinary relief that did not
respond to either the factual or legal allega-
tions in the petition, but instead took the
position that “the remaining relief sought in
the Petition has become moot” as a result of
Respondent’s intervening order dismissing
the contempt “matter.”

{15} On December 4, we entered an order
stating that “this Court d[id] not consider
th[e] matter moot” and instructing Respon-
dent “to respond to the questions raised in
the petition concerning the appropriateness
of contempt and, more generally, the appro-
priate procedure for a judge to follow when
considering contempt for unruly behavior in
a courtroom and whether [Respondent] fol-
lowed that procedure in this case.”

{16} In his filed response to our December
4 order, Respondent took the position that he
had used contempt sanctions against all Peti-
tioners, whether guilty or innocent of miscon-
duct, in order to protect the safety of all

courtroom occupants and to regain control of
the courtroom:

While it may be true that a small number
of Petitioners may not have acted as con-
temptuously as other Petitioners or con-
temptuously at all, the Court in acting to
protect the safety of all individuals in the
courtroom and regain control of the court-
room had to act quickly and did not have
the time to separate out a few passive
members of the defendant’s group that
may not have acted contemptuously.

{17} At the subsequent oral argument be-
fore this Court, Respondent represented that
his primary goal was to ensure the safety of
the victim and her family. He feared that an
attack was imminent because “all hell broke
loose” in the courtroom at the close of the
hearing and there were some members of the
crowd who were standing and yelling. Re-
spondent said he was especially concerned
because there were no “law enforcement”
personnel present at the court and one of the
court’s two bailiffs was outside the courtroom
managing security at the entrance.

{18} Respondent further explained that he
could not tell which members of the crowd
were standing or yelling after he ordered all
spectators to remain quietly seated. Be-
cause he admittedly could not determine
which of the thirty-two Petitioners had en-
gaged in contemptuous conduct, he took the
position that he had no choice but to arrest
all the spectators in the area of the court-
room where the disturbance had taken place.
Respondent stated that he had never con-
fronted this type of disturbance in his court-
room and merely did what he thought was
necessary to regain control of the situation.

{19} Respondent further represented to
this Court that he had intended to dismiss
the contempt orders and release Petitioners
on the Friday after they were jailed, despite
Petitioners’ counsel’s inconsistent assertion
that, when Petitioners served their extraordi-
nary writ petition on Respondent on that
same Friday afternoon, Respondent stated,
“You guys didn’t have to do that. I was
going to release them on Monday.” When
asked by this Court why he would have
planned to dismiss charges against all Peti-
tioners without following through on his

273

criminal contempt orders, Respondent stat-
ed:
I didn’t look at it as guilt or non-guilt....
I didn’t look at it as finding anyone having
conducted anything that was going to re-
sult in any jail sentence except that I had
to control the crowd at that time.

{20} At the conclusion of our writ hearing,
and with the concurrence of all parties and
counsel, this Court ordered the contempt
convictions vacated and Petitioners’ arrest
and booking records expunged. In this fol-
low-up Opinion, we address the reasons why
we issued our writ and discuss the interrelat-
ed issues of contempt powers and limitations,
courtroom control, and due process of law.

Il. DISCUSSION

A. Source and Nature of Contempt
Powers
{21} We begin by recognizing the indisput-
able authority of judges to compel obedience
to their orders and to maintain the decorum
and safety of their courtrooms.

{22} Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34—
1-2 (1851), all New Mexico courts have the
power to “preserve order and decorum, and
for that purpose to punish contempts by
reprimand, arrest, fine or imprisonment, be-
ing circumscribed by the usage of the courts
of the United States.” “This statute is de-
claratory of the common law.” In re Klecan,
93 N.M. 687, 688, 603 P.2d 1094, 1095 (1979).

HM {23} Even in the absence of express
statutory authority, “courts of justice are
universally acknowledged to be vested, by
their very creation, with power to impose
silence, respect and decorum in their pres-
ence, and submission to their lawful man-
dates.” Anderson v. Dumn, 6 Wheat. 204, 19
USS. 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821). While
statutes may provide reasonable regulatory
measures, the Legislature may not “substan-
tially impair or destroy the implied power of
the court to punish for contempt.” State ex
rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 162,
815 P.2d 228, 227 (1957).

Hs {24} The exercise of the contempt
power and the conduct it is intended to ad-
dress may take various forms. “Contempts

274

of court are classified as civil or criminal... .
The major factor in determining whether a
contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose
for which the power is exercised.” In re
Klecan, 938 N.M. at 688, 603 P.2d at 1095.
Criminal contempts are further delineated
“as direct or indirect.” Id. at 638, 603 P.2d
at 1095. “Direct contempts are contemptu-
ous acts committed in the presence of the
court, while indirect [contempts] are such
acts committed outside the presence of the
court.” Id. at 639, 603 P.2d at 1096.

Hs {25} Civil contempts are remedial
and may use fines, imprisonment, or other
sanctions as coercive measures to compel the
contemnor to comply in the future with an
order of the court. See State ea rel. Apodaca
v. Our Chapel of Memories of N.M., Inc. 74
N.M. 201, 204-05, 392 P.2d 347, 349-50
(1964). Because the purpose of those civil
contempt sanctions is to compel compliance
with the court’s orders and not to punish, the
continuing contempt sanctions end when the
contemnor complies. A civil contempt defen-
dant “carries the keys of his prison in his
own pocket. He can end the sentence and
discharge himself of contempt at any moment
by doing what he has previously refused to
do.” State v. Pothier, 104 N.M. 363, 364, 721
P.2d 1294, 1295 (1986) Gnternal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Civil contempt
sanctions may be imposed by honoring the
most basic due process protections-in most
cases, fair notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827, 114 S.Ct.
2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994); see Turner v.
Rogers, —- US. ——, ——, 181 S.Ct. 2507,
2520, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) (holding that
constitutional due process in civil contempt
proceedings requires notice and a hearing
but not the right to counsel).

Hs {26} Criminal contempt proceed-
ings are instituted to punish completed acts
of disobedience that have threatened the au-
thority and dignity of the court and are
appropriate even after the contemnor is no
longer acting contemptuously. Bagwell, 512
US. at 828-29, 114 S.Ct. 2552. Both this
Court and the United States Supreme Court
have long recognized that “‘(cJriminal con-
tempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a

violation of the law.’” Pothier, 104 N.M. at.
365, 721 P.2d at 1296 (alteration in original)
(quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201,
88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968)). A
criminal contempt defendant is therefore en-
titled to due process protections of the crimi-
nal law, the specific nature of which will
depend on whether the criminal contempt is
categorized as direct or indirect. No matter
how a criminal contempt is characterized, it
is a “fundamental proposition that criminal
penalties may not be imposed on someone
who has not been afforded the protections
that the Constitution requires of such crimi-
nal proceedings, including the requirement
that the offense be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt.” Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624,
632, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988).

HE s{27} A person who commits dis-
ruptive or defiant conduct in the midst of an
ongoing court proceeding within the personal
perception of the judge has committed an act
of direct criminal contempt and may be pun-
ished summarily without further evidentiary
proceedings. See, eg., Purpura v. Purpura
(In ve Cherryhomes), 115 N.M. 80, 81-82, 85,
847 P.2d $14, 315-16, 319 (Ct.App.1998) (up-
holding a finding of contempt where an attor-
ney disobeyed the judge’s direct orders, at-
tempted to leave the court room before the
hearing had finished, and pushed the sheriff's
deputy who was attempting to restrain him).
If feasible, even in summary proceedings for
an act of direct contempt occurring in open
court, an “adequate opportunity to defend or
explain one’s conduct is a minimum require-
ment before imposition of punishment.” In
ve Klecan, 98 N.M. at 639, 603 P.2d at 1096
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted) (reversing a direct contempt citation for
failure of the judge to permit the contemnor
to explain his conduct).

HMI {28} When the judge has not per-
sonally witnessed the defendant’s contemptu-
ous behavior in the course of a court pro-
ceeding, the contempt is classified as indirect
criminal contempt and must be resolved
through more traditional due process proce-
dures. State v. Stout, 100 N.M. 472, 474, 672
P.2d 645, 647 (1983) (holding that an attorney
charged with contempt for failing to attend a

275

scheduled hearing could be charged only with
indirect, not direct, contempt because the
contempt did not oceur in open court and the
judge did not have personal knowledge of the
reasons for the attorney’s nonappearance).

{29} The contempt power of a court is so
broad that it is uniquely “ ‘liable to abuse.’”
Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202, 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quot-
ing In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 318, 9 S.Ct. 77,
32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)). As human beings,
judges “ ‘sometimes exhibit vanity, irascibili-
ty, narrowness, arrogance, and other weak-
nesses to which human flesh is heir’” Id. at
202 n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quoting Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96
L.Ed. 717 (1952)). Contumacy “often strikes
at the most vulnerable and human qualities
of a judge’s temperament.” Jd. at 202, 88
S.Ct. 1477. Not only is a judge often person-
ally involved to some degree in the conflict
that must be adjudicated, the same judge
exercises several responsibilities normally as-
signed to separate persons or institutions:
“That one and the same person should be
able to make the rule, to adjudicate its viola-
tion, and to assess its penalty is out of accord
with our usual notions of fairness and separa-
tion of powers.” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 840,
114 S.Ct. 2552 (Scalia, J., concurring).

{30} Because we necessarily give judges
such extraordinary unilateral powers, this
Court repeatedly has cautioned that we must
require judges to exercise a correspondingly
extraordinary self-restraint to avoid abuses
of those powers. See, eg., Pothier, 104 N.M.
at 369, 721 P.2d at 1800 (explaining that, in
exercising the contempt power, a court
“should not exercise more than the least
possible power adequate to the end pro-
posed”); Case v. State, 103 N.M. 501, 503,
709 P.2d 670, 672 (1985) (“It is the responsi-
bility of the judiciary to exercise that power
wisely and always within its limitations.”);
Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Local 177,
United Stone & Allied Prods. Workers, 74
N.M. 195, 200, 392 P.2d 348, 346 (1964) (ex-
plaining that contempt power must be used
“cautiously and sparingly”).

{31} We now examine Respondent’s ac-
tions in this case to determine whether they
constituted a lawful exercise of judicial pow-
er. In doing so, we must first determine

what kind of contempt power was exercised
by Respondent and then consider whether he
acted within the bounds of his lawful discre-
tion.

B. The Commitment Orders Were Not
Civil Contempt Because Petitioners
Could Not Obtain Release from Jail
by Compliance with the Orders.

HE «s«{32} In determining the proper
classification of a contempt order as criminal
or civil, we look to “the nature and purpose
of the punishment, rather than the character
of the acts to be punished, as a controlling
factor.” Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp. T4
N.M. at 198, 392 P.2d at 345. Respondent's
written orders, which state that Petitioners
were being “held in direct contempt,” reflect
that Respondent intended to impose criminal
sanctions. Although we are not bound by
Respondent’s characterization of the civil or
criminal nature of the action he was taking,
we agree that his orders were in the nature
of criminal contempt.

{33} Whatever contemptuous conduct any
of the Petitioners allegedly had been en-
gaged in before Respondent summarily or-
dered all to jail, whether sitting when the
bailiff told them to rise, or standing when
Respondent then told them to sit back down,
or talking when he wanted them to be quiet,
there was nothing in the oral or written
contempt orders that gave any of the Peti-
tioners the ability to “end the sentence and
discharge [themselves] of contempt at any
moment by doing what [they had] previously
refused to do.” Pothier, 104 N.M. at 364,
721 P.2d at 1295. In the terms of our case-
law, none of them carried the keys of their
prisons in their own pockets. See Our Chap-
el of Memories of N.M., Inc. 74 N.M. at 205,
392 P.2d at 350.

{34} Indeed, the record reflects that
whoever had been acting in any disruptive or
disobedient manner had ceased doing so im-
mediately upon Respondent’s oral pronounce-
ment that he was sending everyone to jail,
before a single written contempt order was
prepared. At that point, there was no need
for any further crowd control or imposition of
civil contempt sanctions. Petitioners clearly

276

were jailed for the past behavior of one or
more of them and not as a coercive measure
to stop any continuing disorderly or disobedi-
ent behavior. “Where a contempt sanction is
punitive, not remedial, the proceeding is one
of criminal contempt.” Beverly v. Beverly,
2000-NMCA-097, 18, 129 N.M. 719, 18 P.38d
77 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Because Petitioners were ordered
jailed without regard to their future conduct,
we must analyze Respondent’s actions by
established rules of law applicable to punitive
criminal contempt proceedings.

C. Summary Direct Criminal Contempt
Proceedings Were Inappropriate Be-
cause the Judge Did Not Have Person-
al Knowledge of Any Petitioner’s
Guilt.

HS {85} The thirty-two identical con-
tempt orders and jail commitments entered
by Respondent specifically recited that he
was holding each Petitioner in direct criminal
contempt. But the due process shortcuts of
summary direct contempt proceedings are
permitted only in exceptional circumstances:

Except for a narrowly limited category
of contempts, due process of law ... re-
quires that one charged with contempt of
court be advised of the charges against
him, have a reasonable opportunity to
meet them by way of defense or explana-
tion, have the right to be represented by
counsel, and have a chance to testify and
-eall other witnesses in his behalf, either by
way of defense or explanation. The nar-
row exception to these due process re-
quirements includes only charges of mis-
conduct, in open court, in the presence of
the judge, which disturbs the court’s busi-
ness, where all of the essential elements of
the misconduct are under the eye of the
court, are actually observed by the court,
and where immediate punishment is essen-

State v. Diamond, 94 N.M. 118, 121, 607 P.2d
656, 659 (Ct.App.1980) (first alteration in
original) (emphasis omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting with approval
In re Oliver, 333 U.S, 257, 275, 68 S.Ct. 499,
92 L.Ed. 682 (1948)).

{36} Although an immediate need to con-
trol courtroom misconduct may justify quick
action of some kind, one of the necessary
bases for dispensing with normal due process
fact-finding protections before criminal con-
viction and punishment may be imposed is
“the personal knowledge of the judge” as to
the defendant's guilt. Jd. at 120-21, 607 P.2d
at 658-59. Since the earliest days of the
common law, Anglo-American courts have
recognized that where determination of guilt
or innocence requires a “ ‘confession of the
party or the testimony of others’” to supple-
ment the judge’s incomplete personal obser-
vations, the summary procedures of direct
contempt are inappropriate. In ve Terry,
128 US. at 307, 9 S.Ct. 77 (quoting 4 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *286).

{87} In this case, the judge concededly
had no personal knowledge of the guilt or
innocence of any single one of the thirty-two
courtroom spectators he sentenced to jail.
In a striking perversion of the “overriding
presumption of innocence with which the law
endows the accused and which extends to
every element of the crime,” Respondent en-
tered orders that essentially inflicted on each
Petitioner an irrebuttable presumption of
guilt. State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 562, 817
P.2d 1196, 1204 (1991) (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted), abrogated on other grounds by State v.
Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, 19 1, 31, 142 N.M.
120, 164 P.3d 1. In convicting and jailing
Petitioners without having judicial knowledge
of their guilt, Respondent unlawfully used
the summary processes of direct criminal
contempt. If he had wished to pursue con-
tempt actions against any or all Petitioners,
the only lawful avenue would have been
through non-summary indirect criminal con-
tempt proceedings where their guilt or inno-
cence could be properly determined.

{88} We now consider whether his actions
could be justified as a proper exercise of
indirect criminal contempt powers.

D. The Due Process Protections of Indi-
rect Criminal Contempt Proceedings
Were Not Honored.

HH {89} The explicit language of the
brief contempt orders, reciting that each Pe-

titioner had already been “held in direct con-
tempt of court,” reflected that criminal con-
victions had already been entered, with
nothing left to be adjudicated. Those orders
cannot be reconciled with the scheduling of
an “arraignment” on the charges several
days later. An arraignment is “{t]he initial
step in a criminal prosecution whereby the
defendant is brought before the court to
hear the charges and to enter a plea.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 123 (9th ed. 2009).
But any further contempt proceedings would
have been barred by our constitutional pro-
tections against double jeopardy after Peti-
tioners already had been found in criminal
contempt for the same behavior. State v.
Driscoll, 89 N.M. 541, 546-47, 555 P.2d 136,
141-42 (1976) (holding that further contempt
proceedings after a lawyer was summarily
jailed for contempt in open court would con-
stitute double jeopardy).

{40} Even if we construe the contempt
orders as indirect contempt findings, Respon-
dent also failed to honor any of the due
process protections required in non-summary
indirect contempt prosecutions, The con-
tempt orders provided no fair notice of each
Petitioner’s allegedly contemptuous behavior.
See Norton v. Reese, 76 N.M. 602, 605, 417
P.2d 205, 207 (1966) (observing that a con-
tempt defendant has a right under Article II,
Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution to
be given notice of “the nature and cause” of
the criminal accusation). The findings were
not based on any evidence at all, admissible
or inadmissible. See Rule 11-1101(B)
NMRA (providing that the New Mexico rules
of evidence apply in all “contempt proceed-
ings except those in which the court may act
summarily”). Petitioners were given no op-
portunity to prepare or present any defense.
See Pothier, 104 N.M. at 366, 721 P.2d at
1297 (observing that due process of law in
indirect contempt cases requires an opportu-
nity to present a defense). They were not
afforded their constitutional right to the as-
sistance of counsel, either appointed or re-
tained. See State v. Montoya, 1998-NMCA-
149, 15, 126 N.M. 278, 968 P.2d 784. They
were held indefinitely without any opportuni-
ty to be released on bail, in violation of
Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico
Constitution and Rule 5-401 NMRA.

{41} Respondent lawfully could have initi-
ated indirect contempt proceedings against
those individuals whom he had reason to
believe were participating in disruptive or
defiant conduct, but he was required to honor
the procedures of the law and the limits of
constitutional due process. In this case, he
utterly failed to do so.

E. The Need for Courtroom Control Can-
not Override the Requirement That
Judges Themselves Must Honor the
Rule of Law.

{42} We address one final point with re-
gard to Respondent’s exercise of the court’s
contempt powers. Respondent has argued
from the outset of these proceedings that,
notwithstanding his convicting Petitioners of
direct criminal contempt and ordering them
jailed indefinitely, his goal had been court-
room control and not punishment. But
judges above all others in our society must
honor the fundamental principle that a desir-
able end cannot justify means that violate the
law. The contempt power has always been
viewed as a lawful tool in achieving court-
room control. But it is not the only tool
available, and it normally need not be the
first to be used. A clear admonition of what
is expected by a judge, coupled with a specif-
ie warning of the alternative of contempt
sanctions, often can achieve control without
resort to a collateral contempt prosecution.
Our courts have recognized the importance
of such clear warnings in a number of pub-
lished opinions:

[E]xcept in cases of flagrant contemptuous
conduct, before summary punishment for
contempt may be imposed and enforced,
the record should be clear that: (1) a
specific warning was given by the judge;
(2) an opportunity to explain was afforded,
and (8) a hearing was held.

In re Klecan, 93 N.M. at 640, 603 P.2d at
1097 (internal citations omitted); see also In
ve Herkenhoff, 1997-NMSC-007, 122 N.M.
766, 769, 931 P.2d 1382, 1885 (citing with
approval the prior warning caution of In re
Klecan); In re Byrnes, 2002-NMCA-102,
116, 182 N.M. 718, 54 P.3d 996 (emphasizing
that “[wlithout a clear prior warning, it is

278

improper for a judge to act summarily in
issuing a contempt order”).

{43} Respondent’s warnings of what he
expected of the spectators lacked the clarity
required either by our caselaw or by the
need to achieve courtroom control without
resorting to contempt sanctions. The hear-
ing had recessed when Respondent counter-
manded the bailiff’s instruction for the spec-
tators to stand and told them to be seated.
Respondent never told the spectators that
they could not speak. He certainly never
effectively communicated to any of the spec-
tators, collectively or individually, that stand-
ing or speaking would result in contempt
citations or jail. His single reference to the
possibility of contempt sanctions before or-
dering an entire group of spectators to jail
was when he yelled, “That’s enough—I’ll hold
every one of you in contempt and jail you
alll” If he had simply stated that anyone
who did not sit down or anyone who contin-
ued talking would be jailed for contempt, he
probably would have achieved the control
that he did just seconds later when he yelled,
“You'll all go? Okay, take them all. Go on,
all of you, go on to jail!” And if he had made
reasonable efforts to identify the person or
persons who stated their willingness to go to
jail, he could have avoided sweeping up the
innocent with the guilty.

{44} The record before us makes it clear
that Respondent had achieved complete
courtroom control within less than a minute
from the initiation of the disturbance, at the
moment he orally announced he was sending
Petitioners to jail. At that point, there was
no courtroom control to be achieved by going
further and convicting or jailing anyone, and
there certainly was no lawful justification for
jailing innocent and guilty alike or disregard-
ing the most fundamental requirements of
due process.

HM {45} We stress that nothing in our
Opinion should suggest that a judge may not
hold a disruptive audience member in con-
tempt of court. But in holding a person in
contempt, a court must honor the rule of law.
A judge’s exercise of the contempt power
must be tailored to the contemptuous con-
duct, exerting just enough judicial power to
right the wrong; no more, no less. “{I]n

selecting contempt sanctions, a court is
obliged to use the ‘least possible power ade-
quate to the end proposed.” Spallone v.
United States, 498 U.S. 265, 276, 110 S.Ct.
625, 107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). Not only
was Respondent’s mass jailing of all thirty-
two occupants of a public section of a court-
room, without any due process or determina-
tion of personal guilt, not the least power
necessary to control the courtroom, it consti-
tuted such a uniquely egregious abuse of a
court’s contempt power that our research has
found no comparable occurrence in any juris-
diction in the history of American law.

F. The Extraordinary Circumstances of
This Case Called for the Exercise of
This Court’s Original Writ Jurisdic-
tion.

TE {46} ‘The arrests, convictions, and
continued detentions of Petitioners were a
clear and continuing abuse of judicial power
that called for this Court’s exercise of our
original writ jurisdiction. Criminal contempt
convictions may be routinely reviewed on
appeal for arbitrariness and abuse of discre-
tion. Case, 103 N.M. at 503, 709 P.2d at 672.
But despite the technical availability of an
ordinary appeal, this Court has long recog-
nized that our superintending control juris-
diction under Article VI, Section 3 of the
New Mexico Constitution “will be exercised if
the remedy by appeal is wholly or substan-
tially inadequate, or if the exercise thereof
will prevent irreparable mischief, great, ex-
traordinary or exceptional hardship, costly
delays, or unusual burdens in the form of
expenses.” State ex rel. DuBois v. Ryan, 85
N.M. 575, 577, 514 P.2d 851, 853 (1973); see
also State ex rel. N.M. Press Ass’n v. Kauf-
man, 98 N.M. 261, 265, 268, 648 P.2d 300,
804, 807 (1982) (granting Article VI, Section
8 writ of prohibition where a district court’s
order limiting media coverage of a trial could
not be justified as “a valid exercise of judicial
power under any legal theory”).

{47} Given the extraordinary request for
immediate judicial relief presented to us in
this case by thirty-two people jailed indefi-
nitely without any semblance of due process,
for this Court to have remained idle, waiting

279

for routine appellate processes to have
worked their course, would have seriously
compounded the ongoing grave injustice be-
ing committed by a court subject to our
superintending control. We therefore grant-
ed the requested emergency relief.

Ul. CONCLUSION

{48} Respondent’s convictions and jail sen-
tences of Petitioners were an unlawful abuse
of judicial power requiring this Court’s or-
ders that Petitioners be released from jail
and that their criminal contempt convictions
be vacated. We reaffirm our contemporane-
ous orders to that effect.

{49} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: PETRA JIMENEZ
MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMCA-023
258 P.3d 1071
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Kenneth YAW, Defendant-Appellant.

State of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve
Rita Starceski, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 29,529, 29,528,
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Sept. 14, 2010.
Certiorari Denied, Jan. 3, 2011, No. 32,645.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret
E. MeLean, Assistant Attorney General, Joel
Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Michael L. Stout, Las Cruces, NM, for
Appellant Yaw.

David C. Serna, Albuquerque, NM, for Ap-
pellant Starceski.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} These separate interlocutory appeals
arise from the district court’s denial of De-
fendants’ joint motion to dismiss their in-
dictments. Defendants raise two issues on
appeal: (1) the district court erred in deter-
mining that it was unable to grant the relief
Defendants sought; and (2) the grand jury
judge failed to enforee NMSA 1978, Section
81-6-11(B) (2003) through the procedures
outlined in Jones v. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-
002, 145 N.M. 478, 200 P.3d 523. Because
the district court did not have the power to
grant the relief Defendants seek, we affirm.
We write in a single opinion deciding both
appeals.

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendants, Kenneth Yaw and Rita
Starceski, husband and wife, were arrested
and indicted on six counts of child abuse in
violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(D)
(2009). The charges stemmed from instanc-
es of locking several of their children in their
garage as punishment for various rules viola-
tions and for sending several of their chil-
dren to live in a trailer far from the family
residence for approximately two weeks for
stealing money in an attempt to purchase
clothing and enroll in public school.

{3} After Defendants were issued target
notices, but before the grand jury proceed-
ing, Defendant Yaw sent a letter to the pros-
ecutor serving as the grand jury aide, re-
questing that the prosecutor allow the grand
jury to hear testimony from the children.
The letter indicated that the children would

testify that the garage in which they were
confined had sufficient provisions, that any
punishment the children had received from
Defendants was appropriate and not cruel,
and that Defendant Starceski’s father would
also testify about Defendants’ parenting.
The prosecutor did not comply with Defen-
dant Yaw’s request. Defendant Yaw then
moved the grand jury judge to order the
prosecutor to present such evidence to the
grand jury. Defendant Starceski joined in
this motion.

{4} On October 1, 2008, the grand jury
judge held a hearing to consider whether
Section 31-6-11(B) compelled him to order
the prosecutor to present Defendant Yaw’s
proffered evidence. The grand jury judge
ruled that Section 31-6-11(B) did not compel
him to order that the prosecutor offer any
piece of evidence to the grand jury and did
not remove from the prosecutor the wide
discretion granted to him in decisions re-
garding the presentation of evidence to the
grand jury. The grand jury judge held that
the proper remedy for Defendants was to
move to quash the indictment if and when
the grand jury issued one and to raise the
issue of a potential violation of Section 31-6-
11(B) at that time. The grand jury indicted
each Defendant on six counts of intentional
child abuse in violation of Section 30-6~1(D).
Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment
in the district court, renewing their argu-
ment that the grand jury judge incorrectly
applied Section 31-6-11(B). After the grand
jury issued its indictment, but before the
district court heard Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, our Supreme Court decided Jones.
Jones outlined the procedures for resolving
disputes between grand jury targets and
prosecutors when targets wish evidence to be
presented to the grand jury in accordance
with Section 31-6-11(B). Jones, 2009-
NMSC-002, 135, 145 N.M. 478, 200 P.3d 523.

{5} On appeal, Defendants argue that the
district court erred in ruling that Defendants
did not have a right to vindicate their rights
under Section 31-6-11(B) through a motion
to quash the indictment. Defendants further
argue that the grand jury judge erred by
failing to enforce the procedures for enfore-
ing Section 81-6-11(B) as articulated in

Jones. We hold that the district court was
correct in concluding that Defendants could
not receive relief through a motion to quash
the indictment and affirm. Because we hold
that the district court did not have the power
to review the grand jury judge’s enforcement
of Section 31-6-11(B), we do not address
Defendants’ arguments concerning the appli-
cation of that statute.

AVAILABILITY OF POST-INDICTMENT
REVIEW

WM {6} Whether Defendants have a right
to post-indictment review depends on statu-
tory interpretation of Section 31-6-11(B).
Statutory interpretation presents a question
of law, which this Court reviews de novo.
State v. Myers, 2010-NMCA-007, 130, 147
N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673, cert. granted, 2010-
NMCERT-001, 147 N.M. 674, 227 P.3d 1056.
Section 31-6-11(B) provides:

It is the duty of the grand jury to weigh
all the evidence submitted to it, and when
it has reason to believe that other lawful,
competent and relevant evidence is avail-
able that would disprove or reduce a
charge or accusation or that would make
an indictment unjustified, then it shall or-
der the evidence produced. At least twen-
ty-four hours before grand jury proceed-
ings begin, the target or his counsel may
alert the grand jury to the existence of
evidence that would disprove or reduce an
accusation or that would make an indict-
ment unjustified, by notifying the prose-
cuting attorney who is assisting the grand
jury in writing regarding the existence of
that evidence.

In Jones, our Supreme Court set forth a pre-
indictment remedy for enforcement of a tar-
get’s right to offer evidence to the grand jury
as allowed by Section 31-6-11(B). Jones,
2009-NMSC-002, 185, 145 N.M. 473, 200
P.3d 528. If a prosecutor wishes to prevent
the grand jury from accessing the evidence
proffered by the grand jury target, “the
prosecutor must file a motion with the grand
jury judge, with notice to the target, seeking
confirmation of the prosecutor’s decision not
to call the witness or not to inquire into the
subject matter proposed by the target.” Id.
At this hearing, the prosecutor has the bur-
den of persuading the grand jury judge that

281

the evidence in question is not “lawful, com-
petent and relevant” as required by Section
31-6-11. Jones, 2009-NMSC-002, 139, 145
N.M. 478, 200 P.8d 523 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

{7} Normally, New Mexico courts cannot
review the evidence presented during grand
jury proceedings after indictment absent a
showing of bad faith on the part of the
prosecutor. See § 31-6-11(A) (“The suffi-
ciency of the evidence upon which an indict-
ment is returned shall not be subject to
review absent a showing of bad faith on the
part of the prosecuting attorney assisting the
grand jury.”); State v. Chance, 29 N.M. 34,
89, 221 P. 183, 184-85 (1928) (“{U]nless there
is some clear statutory authority to do so, we
think the courts are without power to review
[grand jury proceedings] to determine
whether or not [the grand jury] had suffi-
cient or insufficient, legal or illegal, compe-
tent or incompetent evidence upon which to
return an indictment.”). This Court has pre-
viously applied this principle in refusing to
review a prosecutor’s refusal to present ex-
culpatory evidence to the grand jury. State
v. McGill, 89 N.M. 631, 633, 556 P.2d 39, 41
(Ct.App.1976) (holding that post-indictment
review of the prosecutor's failure to comply
with the predecessor statute to Section 31-6-
11(B), which required prosecutors to present
direct exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury, would be an impermissible inquiry into
the evidence upon which the grand jury
based its indictment).

{8} Defendants argue that the existence of
4 pre-indictment enforcement mechanism in
Jones also creates a right to post-indictment
review of grand jury proceedings to ensure
that the mechanism is properly applied.
They argue that review for the proper appli-
cation is distinct from review of the evidence
before the grand jury, such that reviewing
for compliance with Section 31-6-11(B) does
not conflict with Section 31-6-11(A). How-
ever, the nature of the remedy fashioned in
Jones indicates that our Supreme Court did
not believe that Section 31-6-11(B) allowed
for post-indictment review of the grand jury
proceedings. In reaching its conclusion that
a pre-indictment procedure was necessary to
fulfill the purposes of Section 31-6-11(B), the

282

Court specifically rejected the state’s conten-
tion that a post-indictment motion to quash
the indictment would be an adequate remedy
for grand jury targets whose evidence was
excluded by the prosecutor. Jones, 2009-
NMSC-002, 118, 145 N.M. 473, 200 P.3d 523.
The Court reasoned, in part, that any post-
indictment review of the application of Sec-
tion 81-6-11(B) would, by its nature, be a
review of the evidence before the grand jury
at the time of the indictment and that, as a
consequence, the district court would only be
able to quash the indictment if the defendant
made an additional showing of bad faith on
the part of the prosecutor. Jones, 2009-
NMSC-002, 119, 145 N.M. 478, 200 P.3d 523;
Section 31-6-11(A). The Court acknowl-
edged that this need for a showing of bad
faith on the part of the prosecutor would
make it much more difficult for defendants to
vindicate their rights under Section 31~6-
11(B). Jones, 2009-NMSC-002, 119, 145
N.M. 478, 200 P.3d 523.

{9} This analysis by the Court indicates
that the Court envisioned that post-indict-
ment review for violations of Section 31-6-
11(B) would be treated like any other post-
indictment review of the evidence before the
grand jury at the time of the indictment as
laid out in Section 31-6-11(A). Review
would therefore be unavailable to Defendants
absent a showing of bad faith on the part of
the prosecutor in the presentation of evi-
dence to the grand jury. See § 31-6-11(A).
Defendants do not argue on appeal that
there was prosecutorial bad faith, and, as a
result, post-indictment review of the evidence
before the grand jury would not generally be
available to them.

{10} In addition, Jones provides further
insight into the propriety of the relief Defen-
dants seek in its discussion of the procedure
for vindicating a target’s rights under Sec-
tion 31-6-11(B). The Jones Court recog-
nized that Section 31-6-11(B) did not provide
for appellate review, even of pre-indictment
rulings. It was thus “unwilling to recognize
aright of appeal from a decision of the grand
jury judge under Section 31-6-11(B).”
Jones, 2009-NMSC-002, 1140, 41, 145 N.M.
473, 200 P.8d 528. It contemplated that any
such review would ‘take place by extraordi-

nary writ in extreme cases. Id. 141, 200
P.8d 528. Defendants seek to distinguish
their case from Jones on the grounds that
they never received a “decision of the grand
jury judge under Section 31-6-11(B)” be-
cause they were not provided a hearing as
outlined in Jones. Jones, 2009-NMSC-002,
140, 145 N.M. 473, 200 P.3d 523. However,
the grand jury judge in this case reviewed
the evidence that Defendants wished to pres-
ent under Section 31-6-11(B) and ruled that
the State did not have to present that evi-
dence to the grand jury. Regardless of
whether this decision was in compliance with
the procedure set out in Jones, it was cer-
tainly a “decision of [the] grand jury judge
under Section 31-6-11(B),” and therefore not
the proper subject of an appeal. Jones,
2009-NMSC-002, 141, 145 N.M. 473, 200
P.3d 523.

HMMM {11} Defendants also argue that a
violation of Section 31-6-11(B) should instead
be reviewed by a different standard, the one
by which courts review violations of other
grand jury statutes, such as those involving
the presence of unauthorized people in the
deliberation room or a failure to demonstrate
that the grand jury has been properly in-
structed on the elements of the charges al-
leged. See State v. Ulibarri, 2000-NMSC-
007, 191, 3, 128 N.M. 686, 997 P.2d 818
(holding that failure to read the elements of
the charges against the target to the grand
jury before its deliberations warranted dis-
missing the indictment without prejudice);
Davis v. Traub, 90 N.M. 498, 501, 565 P.2d
1015, 1018 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that
the presence of an unauthorized person dur-
ing grand jury deliberations warranted dis-
missing the indictment without prejudice).
We agree with Defendants that there are
circumstances in which failure to comply with
grand jury statutes warrants quashing an
indictment without prejudice. However,
these circumstances are limited to those
eases, such as Davis and Ulibarri, in which
there is a failure as to the grand jury process
that goes to the heart of the grand jury’s
essential function. See State v. Ulibarri,
1999-NMCA-142, 1112-15, 128 N.M. 546,
994 P.2d 1164 (discussing the differences be-
tween challenges to the evidence before the
grand jury and challenges to the manner in

which the grand jury is conducted), affd,
2000-NMSC-007, 128 N.M. 686, 997 P.2d
818. In matters relating to the grand jury
process, the prosecutor does not have discre-
tion, and the courts do not defer to any
decision the prosecutor makes if that decision
was not in compliance with the law. Ulibar-
ri, 1999-NMCA-142, 1 14-15, 128 N.M. 546,
994 P.2d 1164. In those types of cases,
prejudice to the defendant is assumed due to
the “obviously improper nature of the viola-
tion.” Jd. 118. We treat disputes over evi-
dence before the grand jury quite differently.
Id. 112, When there is such a dispute, the
prosecutor has broad discretion as to what
evidence to present to, or exclude from, the
grand jury, and courts will not review any
good-faith decisions the prosecutor makes in
that regard once an indictment is returned.
Id. 112. There is no post-indictment relief
for a defendant once the grand jury returns
an indictment absent a showing of prosecuto-
rial bad faith. Section 31-6-11(A). As noted
above, Jones indicates that disputes arising
under Section 81-6-11(B) are treated like
other disputes concerning evidence before
the grand jury for the purposes of post-
indictment relief. Jones, 2009-NMSC-002,
918-19, 145 N.M. 478, 200 P.3d 528, As a
result of this distinction between the process
of, and the evidence to be submitted to, the
grand jury, Defendants were required to
show prosecutorial bad faith before the dis-
trict court could inquire into their claims.
Because Defendants have made no such
showing, they are not entitled to the relief
they seek.

CONCLUSION

{12} Jones did not create a statutory right
to post-indictment review for compliance with
the pre-indictment procedures for enforcing
Section 31-6-11(B). Thus, Defendants are
not entitled to post-indictment review absent.
a showing of bad faith on the part of the
prosecutor. Defendants did not argue prose-
cutorial bad faith in their motion to the
grand jury judge, in their motion to quash
their indictments, or in their appeal to this
Court. They thus do not have a right for
post-indictment review of the evidence pre-
sented to the grand jury. Because we affirm
the district court on this finding, we do not

283

address either the grand jury judge’s appli-
cation of Section 31-6-11(B) or the district
court’s analysis of that application. We af-
firm the decision of the district court as to
both appeals.

. {13} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D.
BUSTAMANTE and LINDA M. VANZI,

Judges.

2011-NMCA-024
258 P.3d 1075
Phillip GRASSIE, as Personal Repre-
sentative and Executor of the Estate
of Walter Grassie, Plaintiff—Appellee,
ve

ROSWELL HOSPITAL CORPORATION,
d/b/a Eastern New Mexico Medical
Center, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 28,050.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Nov. 30, 2010.

Certiorari Denied, Feb. 16, 2011,
Nos. 32,825/32,826.

y

Law Office of Stephen Durkovich, Stephen
Durkovich, Garcia & Vargas, LLC, Ray M.
Vargas, II, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Montgomery & Andrews, PA, Stephen S.
Hamilton, Jaime R. Kennedy, Santa Fe, NM,
Sheehy, Serpe & Ware, P.C., Richard A.
Sheehy, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} Walter Grassie died less than two
hours after he was admitted to the emergen-
cy room at Eastern New Mexico Medical

ter (Hospital) in Roswell, New Mexico.
Mr. Grassie’s personal representative sued
the Hospital asserting that (1) the emergency
room medical staff was medically negligent;
(2) the Hospital was negligent in allowing the
treating physician to practice in its faci
and (8) the Hospital misrepresented its
emergency room services to the public con-
trary to the New Mexico Unfair Practi

Act (UPA), NMSA 1978, §§ 57-12-1 to -26
(1967, as amended through 2009). The dis-
trict court allowed the three theories to be
submitted to the jury. The jury awarded
$1,986,981 in compensatory damages “[flor
the death of Walter Grassie” and $9,501.65
under the UPA. The jury also entered two
separate punitive damages awards of
$10,000,000 each, one premised on Plaintiff's
medical malpractice count and the other
based on the negligent hiring theory.

{2} The Hospital does not appeal the
award of compensatory damages insofar as it
is based on medical negligence. The Hospi-
tal does challenge the compensatory award to
the extent it is based on the negligent hiring
claim. The Hospital generally asserts that
the punitive damages awards are not sup-
ported by substantial evidence and are exces-
sive. More specifically, the Hospital asserts
that (1) the punitive award flowing from any
medical negligence cannot be grounded—as a
factual or legal matter—on the cumulative
conduct approach of Clay v. Ferrellgas, Inc.,
118 N.M. 266, 881 P.2d 11 (1994); and (2)
there is no evidence of a sufficiently culpable
state of mind with regard to the negligent
hiring theory to allow the claim to be submit-
ted to the jury.

{3} We agree with the Hospital that the
claim for negligent hiring should not have
been submitted to the jury, and we reverse
as to that portion of the verdict and judg-
ment. We affirm the remainder of the judg-
ment.

INTRODUCTION

{4} The issues in this case revolve around
three areas of inquiry—medical malpractice,
negligent hiring, and the UPA matter. Be-
cause each area involves different facts and
legal rules, we will discuss each separately,
providing pertinent factual and procedural
summaries as appropriate.

I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

{5} Viewing the record in the light most
favorable in support of the jury verdict, Mr.
Grassie probably died of an aortic dissection,
a process in which the inner wall of the aorta
tears, allowing blood to be pushed in between
the inner walls and the outer walls of the
vessel. The effect is to very painfully rip

287

apart the walls of the vessel as blood contin-
ues to be pumped into the break. A classic
symptom of aortic dissection is a sudden
onset of chest pain radiating to the back as
the tear progresses. A “big risk factor” for
aortic dissection is high blood pressure.

A. Emergency Room Treatment

{6} On August 19, 2005, Mr. Grassie was
driving by himself from Ruidoso to Roswell
when he began feeling pain in his chest. At
about 3:40 p.m. the pain became severe
enough that he pulled over and called 911.
He also spoke with his wife. The ambulance
reached him at approximately 4:10 pm. The
EMTs found Mr. Grassie sitting in his vehi-
cle and fully conscious. Mr. Grassie report-
ed chest pain radiating to his back which he
rated as “9 out of 10” in terms of severity.
The ambulance patient care record reflects
that the first blood pressure reading ob-
tained by the EMTs upon arrival was
260/120. This blood pressure level is “fright-
eningly high” or “scary high,” raising con-
cerns that the patient could suffer a stroke, a
heart attack or a rupture of the lining in the
blood vessels.

{7} Within one minute of reaching Mr.
Grassie, the EMTs gave him aspirin. Within
six minutes of their arrival, the EMTs ad-
ministered a sublingual nitroglycerin tablet
to Mr. Grassie, followed by a second tablet
seven minutes later, and a third five minutes
after that. Mr. Grassie’s blood pressure
readings reflect a concomitant drop, reaching
170/100 by the time Mr. Grassie arrived at
the Hospital’s emergency room. Mr. Grassie
was also administered four milligrams of
morphine intravenously starting at 4:30 p.m.
‘When he was triaged by Hospital personnel,
Mr. Grassie reported his pain level at five out
of ten.

{8} The ambulance patient care record
reflects that the ambulance reached the
emergency room at 4:32 p.m. The first hospi-
tal records—reflecting a time of 4:43 p.m—
are the Initial Assessment Form and the
Emergency Department Chest Pain Nursing
Assessment. The Initial Assessment Form
reflects that Mr. Grassie’s blood pressure
was 216/96 at that point, and his reported

288

pain was still at 5 out of 10. He was still
reporting chest pain radiating to the back.
The Initial Assessment Form also reflects
that Mr. Grassie reported having “substernal
and crushing” pain radiating to his jaw, neck,
and arm, and “syncope [fainting] or near
syncope, dyspnea [shortness of breath], dysp-
nea on exertion, orthopnea and nausea or
vomiting.”

{9} Mr. Grassie was assigned a priority
level of “2” or “urgent” rather than “emer-
gent” under the Hospital triage criteria. A
patient assessed as “urgent” was not re-
quired to be seen by a doctor for an hour
after arrival in the emergency room. A pa-
tient assessed as “emergent” was required to
be seen “[a]s soon as [the doctor] can get in
the room.”

{10} The triage nurse assigned Mr. Gras-
sie to the urgent or priority two status be-
cause she decided he was stable at least in
part because “[Mr. Grassie] was able to an-
swer my questions.” The triage nurse made
the priority “2” assignment even though she
was aware that, while Mr. Grassie’s blood
pressure and other symptoms had reacted
positively to the EMTs treatment, with the
passage of only a few minutes they were
again increasing.

{11} The triage nurse thought Mr. Grassie
was having a heart attack. As such, she
entered “chest pain” into the computer, and
the computer printed out a set of forms
appropriate to that diagnosis. The forms are
placed on a yellow clipboard with a room
designation. The yellow clipboard alerts
doctors and others that the patient has been
designated “urgent.” The EMT report may
or may not be included on the yellow clip-
board, and the triage nurse could not recall if
Mr. Grassie’s EMT report was attached to
his clipboard. The EMT report was not part
of the Hospital’s records. The information
from the EMTs did get entered into the
triage notes.

{12} The standard protocol for a heart
attack is a regimen of morphine, nitroglyce-
rin, oxygen, and aspirin. The triage nurse
started oxygen under her own authority but
could not administer any other medications
without a doctor’s order. Another part of
the standard protocol is a chest x-ray and the

triage nurse ordered one at 4:45 pm. The
chest x-ray was performed at 4:50 pm. X-
rays are digitally transferred to a “pack sys-
tem” upon being taken. The triage nurse
also ordered standard blood work indicated
by the chest pain protocol. All of the diag-
nostic orders made by the triage nurse were
reflected on the medical record so they would
be accessible to the doctor.

{13} The triage nurse had worked at the
Hospital since 1998. The day Mr. Grassie
came to the Hospital was the first day the
nurse had worked with the treating doctor—
Theodore Collins. She had not had any or-
ientation sessions with him before he ap-
peared to work that day, and she was not
aware of any orientation programs for doc-
tors and nurses in the emergency room.

{14} Neither the triage nurse nor the
treating nurse even spoke to Dr. Collins
about starting any medications or about re-
viewing Mr. Grassie’s x-rays. They felt it
was not their responsibility to do so. And
neither of them even brought Mr. Grassie’s
blood pressure readings to Dr. Collins’ atten-
tion. The treating nurse stated: “The physi-
cian can look at the monitor as easy as I can,
sir.”

{15} There are four particularly salient
aspects of the treating nurse’s testimony
with regard to Mr. Grassie’s blood pressure
readings. First, he noted blood pressure
readings for Mr. Grassie at least four times
before Mr. Grassie “coded.” There is a
question, however, whether they were chart-
ed contemporaneously or after Mr. Grassie
died. If they were not charted contempora-
neously, the treating doctor would not have
had the readings history available to him.
Second, even though the blood pressure
readings were “scary high” (224/106, 216/99,
218/112, 224/108), the treating nurse never
reported them to the treating physician, Dr.
Collins. Third, even though the monitoring
equipment was set to issue an audible alarm
when readings exceeded 170, the treating
nurse could not recall the alarm ever sound-
ing. The alarm feature could be turned off
by the nursing staff. Fourth, the treating
nurse did not recall a blood pressure reading

of 280/146 even though the Grassie family
testified they saw such a reading.

{16} The treating nurse was charged with
administering medications per doctor orders.
The Hospital record does not reflect when
the order for medication was entered or giv-
en. The treating nurse could not recall when
or how he received the order for medication,
and thus the time span from the time the
order was received to the time the nitro-
glycerin drip was started could range any-
where from forty-three minutes to twenty
minutes.

{17} In either event, Mr. Grassie did not.
receive any medications for a full hour after
his arrival at the emergency room.

{18} The treating physician, Dr. Collins,
first saw Mr. Grassie at 5:00 p.m. The emer-
gency room Physician Record outlines his
examination of Mr. Grassie. The record re-
flects Mr. Grassie’s chest pain radiating to
his back. The pain, rated at seven out of ten,
‘was worsened by change in position and deep
breathing and relieved by nitroglycerin. Dr.
Collins noted no nausea, vomiting or short-
ness of breath—only sweating. Dr. Collins
reviewed the. nursing assessments and vital
signs record.

{19} Dr. Collins was not confident that the
reported blood pressure readings from the
automatic cuff were accurate, but he never
obtained a manual reading of his own to
verify the range. Also, Dr. Collins did not
dispute that Mrs. Grassie told him about the
280/146 blood pressure she had seen on the
monitor. He did not know if the reading was
accurate, but he did not do anything to verify
it before Mr. Grassie died.

{20} Dr. Collins did not review the x-ray
that had been taken by the time he first saw
Mr. Grassie. Dr. Collins never asked to see
x-rays and never inquired about their avail-
ability. In fact, the x-ray was not read until
two and a half weeks later. When read, the
radiologist suggested further CT testing to
“consider dissecting aneurysm” if the patient
had chest pain. Dr. Collins did not order
any further testing and circled “Chest pain—
acute pericardial” as his clinical impression.
“Acute Aortic Dissection” and “Acute MI”
are not circled, though Dr. Collins testified

289

he kept them in the back of his mind. Dr.
Collins stated that seeing the x-ray would not
have changed his treatment.

{21} Further, Dr. Collins did not enter any
order for medication on the ER Physician
Record. The boxes for aspirin, ACE inhibi-
tors, nitrates, beta blockers and thrombolyt-
ies were not checked. Dr. Collins testified
he ordered a nitroglycerin drip after he saw
Mr. Grassie and after Mrs. Grassie reported
the 280/146 reading, but he could not recall
how he conveyed the order to the nursing
staff. The Physician Record did not reflect
any times when medications were ordered.
Despite these issues, Dr. Collins thought that
Mr. Grassie’s treatment “ran pretty smooth-
ly”

B. Plaintiff’s Expert Testimony

{22} Plaintiffs expert radiologist agreed
with the xray assessment done two and a
half weeks after Mr. Grassie’s death, in par-
ticular the need for a CT scan. CT scans
“can be done rapidly, faster than most radiol-
ogists can read them.” They are a “defini-
tive procedure” for diagnosing a possible dis-
section, which “directs the care of the patient
from that point on.”

{23} Plaintiff's cardiovascular surgery ex-
pert opined that Mr. Grassie died of a rup-
tured aortic dissection. “[H]e should have
had his blood pressure brought to an accept-
able level ... 100 to ... 120.” Lowering his
blood pressure could have been done very
quickly, perhaps “in seconds.” Blood pres-
sure could also be reduced safely, more grad-
ually—say within twenty minutes. He also
opined that the emergency personnel were
negligent in not treating the high blood pres-
sure sooner. In addition, he testified that
the x-ray showing “a widened mediastinum in
the face of a guy with hypertension” needed
to be addressed “with an immediate CAT
scan” if the hospital can do so. If not, the
patient should be transported to a facility
that can do appropriate treatment for a dis-
section. That assessment and decision
should be made “[aJoout when you see the
patient.” Instead, Mr. Grassie “sat around
with a real high blood pressure until his
ultimate demise.”

290

{24} Plaintiff's expert in emergency room
medicine testified that aortic dissection
should have been the first candidate for a
diagnosis, given the report of a sudden onset
of chest pain radiating to the back with high
blood pressure. Customary diagnostic pro-
cedures could be and should have been fol-
lowed to help narrow diagnostic options.
For example, chest x-rays could reveal a
collapsed lung (which is also painful) or a
widened mediastinum (which would indicate
an aortic dissection). An EKG can help de-
termine whether the person is having a heart
attack. None of the diagnostic tools avail-
able to Dr. Collins were appropriately used.

{25} The emergency room expert testified
that: It was negligent and “unconscionable”
that the chest xray was not reviewed.
“That’s just something you must absolutely
do as a physician.” There is no evidence
from Dr. Collins’ documentation in the Hos-
pital records, that he ever “considered the
diagnosis of aortic dissection.” Mr. Grassie
never received any of the lifesaving treat-
ment that “we would have done for him to
basically, if this wasn’t aortic dissection, to
save his life. And that treatment is quite
simply lowering his blood pressure.” It was
medically negligent not to treat Mr. Grassie’s
high blood pressure independently of any
diagnosis which might have applied. There
were “real issues with communication”
among the emergency room personnel with
regard to documentation, reading blood pres-
sure, and looking at x-rays. There was also
an unfortunate culture of not talking among
the Hospital’s staff stifling the flow of infor-
mation and allowing more mistakes to occur.

{26} Finally, asked if not treating a blood
pressure of 280/146 constituted conscious dis-
regard for the patient’s safety, the emergen-
ey room expert replied: “I think one of two
things is happening, either Dr. Collins was
consciously ignoring that combination of facts
and the blood pressure and choosing not to
treat it, or he was incompetent, slash, negli-
gent and did not know what to do.”

{27} Plaintiff presented one other expert
in emergency room medicine and procedures.
Initially reluctant to “participate because it’s
a plaintiff case,” he decided to get involved
because “the case was very powerful.” His

testimony, is best quoted rather than para-

phrased.
Q: Having read the medical records,
okay, what are the principle [sic] facts of
your opinion?
A: The principle [sic] facts are that the
real grade that needs to be given to the
crew at [the Hospital], the ER crew, is an
F. It is failure. Walter Grassie did not
need to die August 19th, 2005. As painful
as this is to discuss, it just did not need to
happen. Because he had a disease entity
that was easily recognizable, that being
aortic dissection, a condition of hyperten-
sion that was easily treatable at [the Hos-
pital].

He had a condition that required team-
work which was absent. And most basic of
all he had—there was a tool that was
utilized that showed what was wrong with
him, that being a chest x[-Jray that wasn’t
even looked at. So there was failure to
recognize the disease process, failure to
treat the disease process, and failure to do
the most basic things that could have given
him time. And in my opinion, could have
allowed, would have allowed most probably
for his survival.

Q: Okay. What are the facts that you
feel should have compelled the physicians
at [the Hospital] to recognize what was
going on? In other words, what told
them? What are the facts that told them
what was going on?

A: Just two things. And one of those
things was the nature of the pain, the
severe sudden onset of the pain that made
him slump over in his vehicle, associated
with a blood pressure that was, as was
mentioned by one of the nurses earlier,
scary high, truly scary high, 260/140 over
120 rather, associated with that pain. And
it’s so classic for aortic dissection.

And then with a chest x{[-Jray that
proves that it’s there, that’s the second
thing. That’s all that was needed to make
this diagnosis. Medicine is nothing but a
balancing of possibilities. It’s not really
science. Some of us like to think it’s sci-
ence. But it’s not. It’s just balancing
possibilities. What is the likelihood that
something is going on.

ee 291
es

Because of the type of pain he had and
because of his chest x[-Jray, the likelihood
that he had an aortic dissection was far
and away evident. And his blood pres-
sure, which of course is obvious, was easily
treatable with medications that are in the
[Hospital] ER.

Q: Allright. I will ask the simple ques-
tion first. But was it negligent for Dr.
Collins not to have read the chest x[-]ray?
A: Yes. Yes.

Q: Okay. How far out of normal, out of
what's recognized practice, out of what’s
acceptable practice, is it to have an x[-lray
in this type of a situation where someone
has chest pain, okay, chest pain that goes
into their back, they have blood pressures
in the ranges that are up there, and have
an x[-lray that’s not read?

A: T’ve never heard of it. I’ve never seen
it, never heard of it, never been associated
with it. It’s basic. It’s blocking and tack-
ling. The chest x[-lray was ordered
prompted by the chest pain protocol at
[the Hospital]. And that was appropriate.
But to think of ordering that because it’s
so basic—I mean, it goes back to 1890
when we were able to get chest x[-lray.
This is not new science. This is not rocket
science. To get it and not look at it is
beyond description as far as negligence is
concerned. I mean, it’s almost willful. It
was sitting right there on his computer
screen.

Q: For a patient who has chest pain that
radiates to his back, who has a blood pres-
sure above 210, 220, 230, 260, you know, up
in that number, 280, okay, do you have an
opinion about whether or not failing to look
at that chest x[-]ray if you know a chest
x(-]ray has been taken if that’s in conscious
disregard of that patient’s safety?

A: Well, conscious disregard. Let me
put it this way: To me, that may be a legal
term. But here is what I would say, what
I'm going to say about that, is that indeed
one would have to conscious—well, one
would have to consciously disregard. One
would have to ignore the fact that a chest
x{-Jray was ordered and done. One would

have to actively not look at it. It’s just
unimaginable. I’m not overemphasizing
this.

Q: Would it be in disregard of the impor-
tance of the chest x[-Jray? It is not just a
chest x[-Jray, this is a critical chest x[-lray,
is it not?

A: It’s a critical chest x[-Jray. It would
be in disregard of the patient’s safety. It
would be in disregard of the most basic
teachings that any third-year medical stu-
dent knows. You order a test. You look
at it. That's why you order it. You order
it for a reason. And because it gives you
information.

And once you have that information,

then you can act on it. You can figure out.
what’s going on. And then hopefully you
can treat it. In this situation, it’s my
strong opinion that the chest x[-Jray shows
the aneurysm, the dissection. And it’s a
treatable condition.
Q: Is it in conscious disregard of a pa-
tient’s safety? Was it in conscious disre-
gard of Walter Grassie’s safety that peo-
ple—

Q: —for the people at [the Hospital], this
is the emergency room people, to not treat
his blood pressure from the time he came
in at 1682 until 1743 a whole hour later?

A: One would have to ignore that blood
pressure in order not to treat it. One
would have to essentially act as if it wer-
en’t present. And in my opinion, that’s
what happened.

This blood pressure, which was scary
high from the very beginning and lasted all
the way up until he had his cardiac arrest
at 1757, was high enough to scream for
treatment even without the chest pain.
Even without the chest x[-Iray. And so
one would have to purposefully not treat
this in order for it to go on for an hour.
Q: Is it medically negligent in your opin-
ion? Was it medically negligent for the
nurses at [the Hospital] not to bring to Dr.
Collins’s attention the fact that there was
an x[-Jray there that hadn’t been read?

292

A: Yes. Yes. The concept that was dis-
cussed this morning about teamwork is
true in the emergency room. And part of
the F grade that I’m giving to the activity
in this case is the failure to communicate.
In order to have teamwork—therefore a
failure of teamwork. In order to have
teamwork, we, in the ER have to commu-
nicate. The nurse has to be able to tell the
doctor, “A family member said that the
blood pressure was 280, or that [the] blood
pressure is now 280/110, the chest x[-Jray
has been done.” All of these things are
how we function in the emergency room.
Q: Okay. You can’t overlook things; is
that right?
A: You can’t overlook things. And you
can’t do it all yourself. You have to do it
this way in the emergency room. That’s
why it’s such a neat way to practice medi-
cine. Is you rely on each other. And that
was completely absent in this case.

Cc. Analysis

{28} As noted above, the Hospital does not
appeal the award of compensatory damages
based on medical negligence. In addition,
the Hospital insists it is not asserting a sub-
stantial evidence challenge to the punitive
damages award. Our only task is to deter-
mine whether the punitive damages award
can stand as a matter of law. We are per-
suaded that on this record it can.

{29} The Hospital advances four argu-
ments: (1) Clay v. Ferrellgas has not been
recognized as a viable theory of liability for
punitive damages, (2) UJI 13-1827 NMRA
should not have been modified and the jury
instruction given did not accurately reflect
Clay’s rationale, (8) the punitive damages
award fails as a matter of law because the
jury found no proximate cause as to the
nurses’ conduct, and (4) the award is exces-
sive and contrary to due process. We ad-
dress each in turn.

1. The Viability of Clay v. Ferrellgas.
HH {30} The Hospital makes the nar-

row and technical argument that Clay’s “cu-
mulative conduct” theory has not been ac-
cepted in New Mexico because it has not

been incorporated into the punitive damages

uniform jury instructions. The cumulative
conduct theory provides that an award of
punitive damages against a corporation may
be based on “the actions of the employees
[viewed] in the aggregate [in order] to deter-
mine whether [the employer corporation] had
the requisite culpable mental state because of
the cumulative conduct of the employees.”
Id, at 270, 881 P.2d at 15. The Hospital
notes that UJI 18-1827 has been amended
twice since Clay was decided—substantially
in 1998 and slightly in 2008—and yet the
instruction does not reflect a “cumulative
conduct” method of proof against employers.
The Hospital deduces from this happenstance
that “Direct Liability” and “Vicarious Liabili-
ty,” as described in UJI 13-1827, are the
only routes available to impose punitive dam-
ages on an employer.

{31} We reject the Hospital’s premise.
Just because a theory of recovery has not
been incorporated into a uniform instruction
does not mean that the theory, which was
previously recognized by our Supreme Court
and is binding on this Court, is suddenly
invalid. The UJI itself recognizes this. UJI
1-051) NMRA (recognizing that courts
may instruct on a subject, even in the ab-
sence of an applicable uniform instruction);
see Payne v. Hall, 2006-NMSC-029, 137, 39
n, 5, 189 N.M. 659, 187 P.38d 599 (noting that
“there were no {ujniform [jJury [instructions
on successive tortfeasor theory” and propos-
ing language for review and adoption by the
UJI-Civil committee).

{32} Further, Clay has not been overruled
or even criticized. It was cited with approval
in Chavarria v. Fleetwood Retail Corp.,
2006-NMSC-046, 121, 140 N.M. 478, 143
P.8d 717, as a way in which a “corporation
may be held liable for punitive damages for
the misconduct of its employees.” We un-
derstand full well that the Clay approach was
not applied in Chavarria, but we doubt the
Supreme Court would include a defunct theo-
ry of liability in a general statement of avail-
able approaches. More to the point, Clay
has been applied in two cases. In Coates v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 1999-NMSC-018,
1147-48, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999, the
Court relied on Clay’s cumulative conduct
theory to analyze whether the record includ-

ed substantial evidence “to support the jury’s
verdict of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and to warrant punitive future dam-
age awards.” Similarly, in Atler v. Murphy
Enterprises, Inc. 2005-NMCA-006, 11 16~
22, 186 N.M. 701, 104 P.3d 1092 (filed 2004),
this Court relied on Clay to support and
explain our review of the record and our
affirmance of a punitive damages award
against corporate defendants. Clay is a
healthy part of New Mexico’s tort law.

2. The Jury Instruction.

{33} The jury was given the following
instruction concerning punitive damages:

In this case, Phillip Grassie seeks to
recover punitive damages from [Hospital].
You may consider punitive damages only if
you find that Phillip Grassie should recov-
er compensatory damages.

If you find that the conduct of Rich
Robinson, the CEO of [Hospital], was will-
ful, reckless, or wanton, then you may
award punitive damages against it.

If you find that the combined acts or
omissions of Pamela Hayes Rodriguez,
and/or Brian Miller, as employees, and
[Dr.] Collins, as the apparent agent, of
{Hospital] amounted to willful, reckless, or
wanton conduct, you may award punitive
damages against [Hospital].

Willful conduct is the intentional doing
of an act with knowledge that harm may
result,

Reckless conduct is the intentional doing
of an act with utter indifference to the
consequences.

Wanton conduct is the doing of an act
with utter indifference to or conscious dis-
regard for a person’s safety.

{34} The Hospital makes two arguments
with regard to the instruction. First, it ar-
gues that the district court erred as a matter
of law in revising UJI 13-1827 to exclude its
language describing vicarious liability. The
Hospital’s basic theory was and is that Clay’s
“cumulative conduct” approach cannot be
used to negate the need for proof of manage-
rial capacity or ratification in order to impose
punitive damages on employees. As we dem-
onstrate above, Clay allows another way to

293

establish employer liability. As such, the
Hospital's first argument fails.

HI {85} Second, the Hospital argues that
the instruction given does not accurately re-
flect the Clay rationale. The Hospital now
argues that the instruction is wrong because
under Clay the “question is not whether the
nurses or Dr. Collins engaged in ‘willful,
reckless, or wanton conduct, but rather,
whether their cumulative actions or inactions
indicated that ... Hospital had a culpable
mental state.”

{36} We decline to address this argument
because the Hospital failed to preserve it
below. We have reviewed the record of all
the discussions between counsel and the dis-
trict court concerning the punitive damages
instruction and we find no argument by the
Hospital that the instruction given did not
accurately reflect the Clay theory. In con-
text, the Hospital’s final objection that the
instruction “misstates the law” clearly refers
to the general argument that the vicarious
liability grounds were being omitted. And
even as to that ground, the objection by itself
would have been insufficient. Budagher v.
Amerep Corp., 97 N.M. 116, 119, 687 P.2d 547,
550 (1981) (noting that “mere assertion that
the given instruction is not an accurate state-
ment of the law is insufficient to alert the
mind of the trial judge to the claimed vice of
the instruction”).

TM s({37} Nothing the Hospital argued
below can fairly be said to have alerted the
district court's mind to the argument made
on appeal. This failure to alert the district
court—and opposing counsel—to the objec-
tion now being made implicates the core
rationale of our preservation rules. As we
noted in Hinger v. Parker & Parsley Petro-
leum Co., 120 N.M. 480, 440, 902 P.2d 1033,
1043 (Ct.App.1995):

Fairness underlies the rule of preserva-
tion of error. Each party to a lawsuit has
only one opportunity to present its case
and challenge the case of its opponent;
that occurs at trial, and not for the first
time on appeal. Objections to a theory of
recovery and the sufficiency of the factual
allegations underlying it must be brought
to the [district] court’s attention. More-

|

294

over, the objection on appeal cannot
change from that argued to the [district]
court. This is particularly true for chal-
lenges to jury instructions.
(citations omitted). The Hospital’s objec-
tions below 1 were based only on the applica-
bility of Clay to the case and not the descrip-
tion of the Clay approach in the instruction
given. As such, the instruction is the law of
the case and is not vulnerable to attack on
this new ground. Montgomery Ward v. Lar-
ragoite, 81 N.M. 888, 386, 467 P.2d 399, 402
(1970); see Atler, 2005-NMCA-006, 1 6-11,
186 N.M. 701, 104 P.3d 1092.

8. The Effect of the Jury Finding of no
Proximate Cause as to the Nurses.

I {33} In response to questions on the
special verdict form, the jury found that the
nurses were negligent but also determined
that their negligence was not a proximate
cause of Mr. Grassie’s death. The Hospital
argues that as a result of the jury’s finding,
the Clay concept of cumulative conduct sim-
ply cannot apply because there is only one
tortfeasor, Dr. Collins. To apply Clay in this
circumstance, the Hospital asserts, would re-
sult in imposing punitive damages on it for
the acts of one employee without any finding
of managerial capacity for the doctor or a
finding of ratification. The underlying as-
sumption of this argument is that the nurses’
conduct was not considered by the jury and
cannot be taken into account on appeal in
evaluating the Hospital’s state of mind and
the award of punitive damages against it.

HH {39} The Hospital misinterprets
Clay. Clay did not alter New Mexico’s gener-
al rule that punitive damages are not im-
posed on an employer for the acts of an
employee as a matter of simple respondeat
superior. Gillingham v. Reliable Chevrolet,
1998-NMCA-148, 1 20, 126 N.M. 30, 966 P.2d
197, overruled on other grounds by Fernan-
dez v. Espanola Pub. Sch. Dist, 2005-
NMSC-026, 138 N.M. 283, 119 P.3d 163.
Rather, there must be proof in some form of
the employer’s own culpable state of mind
and conduct. Id. Prior to Clay, imposition of
punitive damages on an employer—particu-
larly a corporation—required either (1) proof

1. This is true even in its motion for a new trial.

that the employee-tortfeasor possessed and
was exercising managerial capacity, Albu-
querque Concrete Coring Co. v. Pan Am
World Services, Inc., 118 N.M. 140, 145-46,
879 P.2d 772, 777-78 (1994); or (2) the em-
ployer through other managerial employees
ratified, accepted, or acquiesced in the con-
duct of the tortfeasor. Chavarria, 2006-
NMSC-046, 11 30-33, 140 N.M. 478, 143 P.38d
717.

{40} Clay provided an alternative method
of proving a culpable mental state on the
part of the employer. In Clay, the plaintiffs
were injured when propane fumes from an
improperly installed propane tank infiltrated
the passenger compartment of a car and
ignited. The testimony revealed that one
employee, Candelaria, performed the improp-
er installation work while the other employ-
ee, Schell, released the car without verifying
the actual status of the installation work.
Neither employee warned the plaintiffs con-
cerning the dangers potentially posed by the
incomplete installation. In addition, there
was testimony that this second employee rou-
tinely failed to file a State-required form with
the State inspector’s office. The form was
required in order to allow the inspector an
opportunity to double check the installer’s
work.

{41} Clay was submitted to a jury on four
alternate theories of liability: two based on
the improper installation and two based on
Ferrellgas’s employees’ failure to warn of the
hazards caused by the improper installation.
Both Candelaria and Schell were named in
the jury instructions, though only Candelaria
was actually joined as a party defendant.
The jury awarded compensatory and punitive
damages, and judgment on the verdict was
entered against Ferrellgas and Candelaria
jointly and severally.

{42} On appeal, this Court reversed the
punitive damages award. Clay v. Ferrellgas,
Inc, 114 N.M. 333, 338-39, 838 P.2d 487,
492-98, rev'd by Clay, 118 N.M. at 272, 881
P.2d at 17. The Court of Appeals approach
was to analyze the acts of each employee
separately. In addition, this Court refused
to infer any knowledge by the employees of

each others’ acts or failures to act. Finally,
this Court’s opinion held that the evidence as
to the failure to file the State-required form
could not be relied on to support the punitive
damages award because the jury had not
been instructed on the failure as a theory of
liability. Id.

{48} The Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals, disagreeing with the man-
ner in which the trial evidence had been
reviewed and marshaled.? The Supreme
Court noted: “The Court of Appeals incor-
rectly compartmentalized the conduct of the
Ferrellgas employees. It should have
viewed the actions of the employees in the
aggregate to determine whether Ferrellgas
had the requisite culpable mental state be-
cause of the cumulative conduct of the em-
ployees.” 118 N.M. at 270, 881 P.2d at 15.

{44} The Supreme Court explained the
anomalous effect of viewing the employees’
conduct in isolation as follows:

The Court of Appeals exonerated Ferrell-

gas from paying punitive damages because

neither Candelaria nor Schell knew what.
the other was doing. If we follow this
analysis, Ferrellgas escapes liability be-
cause its employees failed to communicate
with each other. The culpable mental
state of the corporation, however, may be
inferred from the very fact that one em-
ployee could be ignorant of the acts or
omissions of other employees with poten-
tially disastrous consequences.

Id. at 271, 881 P.2d at 16 (citation omitted).

{45} The question raised by the Hospital’s
argument is: What evidence is properly
available to be aggregated by the jury—and
thus by this Court—to determine the pres-
ence of a culpable mental state? The answer
is provided by the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Clay with regard to the evidence about the
failure to file the State-required forms. The
Court held that this evidence could be used
to assess corporate mental state even though
it had not been presented as a theory of
liability. Id. at 272 n. 4, 881 P.2d at 17 n. 4.
The jury is not precluded from considering
such background or contextual evidence in its

2. That portion of Clay dealing with the concept
that as the risk of danger increases, the duty of

295

deliberations. Such background or contextu-
al evidence need not be about acts which are
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages,
and the background evidence need not con-
stitute a completed tort.

{46} Here the jury found that the nurses’
conduct did not constitute a completed tort.
But under Clay, that does not mean that the
evidence about what they did and failed to do
cannot be taken into account in assessing the
Hospital’s mental state. Once the medical
negligence claim was established, the full
panoply of admitted evidence was available to
assess the separate issue of the Hospital’s
responsibility as an entity. Id.

{47} Again, the Hospital does not argue
that the full record is insufficient to merit a
punitive damages award. Similarly, we are
confident in concluding that there is substan-
tial evidence supporting a punitive damages
award based on medical negligence. A rea-
sonable jury could conclude that the record
paints a scenario of aggravated patient ne-
gilect broad enough in its sources to support
finding a culpable mental state on the part of
the Hospital.

4, The Punitive Damage Award Does Not
Violate Due Process.

Hs {48} Whether an award of puni-
tive damages is reasonable and comports
with constitutional due process is a question
of law which we review de novo. Aken v.
Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission
Coop., Inc., 2002-NMSC-021, 119, 182 N.M.
401, 49 P.8d 662. As we have noted, howev-
er, de novo review in this context is some-
what limited. To date at least, we have not
undertaken to “ourselves determine the actu-
al award of punitive damages.” Jolley v.
Energen Res. Corp., 2008-NMCA-164, 131,
145 N.M. 350, 198 P.38d 376. In addition, in
the course of our review, any doubts we may
have “concerning the question of what appro-
priate damages may be in the abstract, or
owing to the coldness of the record, should
be resolved in favor of the jury verdict.”

care also increases is not applicable here.

296

Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, 119, 182 N.M. 401,
49 P.8d 662.

HE {49} Following BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574, 116
S.Ct. 1589, 184 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), our re-
view takes three criteria into account: “(1)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s misconduet{,] (2) the disparity between
the harm (or potential harm) suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award[,]
and (8) the difference between the punitive
damages awarded by the jury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in compara-
ble cases.” Aken, 2002-NMSC-021, 120,
182 N.M. 401, 49 P.8d 662. Of these, repre-
hensibility is the “most important indicium of
the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award.” Chavarria, 2006-NMSC-046, 137,
140 N.M. 478, 148 P.3d 717 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted).

A. Reprehensibility
HN £50} The commonly considered
factors used by courts to measure reprehen-
sibility include whether:
the harm caused was physical as opposed
to economic; the tortious conduct evinced
an indifference to or a reckless disregard
of the health or safety of others; the tar-
get of the conduct had financial vulnerabili-
ty; the conduct involved repeated actions
or was an isolated incident; and the harm
was the result of intentional malice, trick-
ery, or deceit, or mere accident.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
588 U.S. 408, 409, 123 S.Ct. 1518, 155
L,Ed.2d 585. The inquiry is concerned with
the social odium which should be attached to
the defendant’s conduct. The applicability of
the factors is obviously fact and case depen-
dent. See Jolley, 2008-NMCA-164, 1132-
34, 145 N.M. 350, 198 P.3d 376 (finding three
factors applicable where the defendant had
failed to barricade a natural gas wellhead for
an extended time, resulting in the plaintiff's
decedent hitting it and dying from the result-
ing explosion); Bogle v. Summit Inv. Co.,
2005-NMCA-024, 134, 187 N.M. 80, 107 P.3d
520 (finding punitive damages award appro-
priate when the defendant acted with “inten-
tional malice” in depriving another realtor of
its commission); Atler, 2005-NMCA-006,

124, 186 N.M. 701, 104 P.8d 1092 (approving
punitive damages award for the defendant’s
failure to meet its contractual obligation to
inspect carnival rides daily).

{51} The Hospital makes two arguments
with regard to the issue. It halfheartedly
asserts that the historical facts describing
the events in the emergency room which
culminated in Mr. Grassie’s death are not
serious enough to warrant exemplary dam-
ages. The Hospital also argues that the
award here is based on injuries or wrongs
assertedly inflicted on nonparties and is thus
contrary to Philip Morris USA v. Williams,
549 U.S. 346, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 166 L.Ed.2d 940
(2007). We address each in turn.

{52} We characterize the Hospital’s first
argument as halfhearted for two reasons.
First, the Hospital wholly fails to address the
evidence. If the Hospital were making a
pure substantial evidence argument we
would reject it out of hand for its clear
failure to comply with Rule 12-213(A)(4)
NMRA. Out of an abundance of caution,
giving some credence to the Hospital’s asser-
tion that the argument is one of law, we
reject the argument as such. The Hospital
asserts that whatever the facts are, they do
not fit or meet three of the State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. factors. The Hospital fails to
acknowledge or discuss the application of the
most obvious factor: whether the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or reckless
disregard of the health of others. We have
already noted our view that a reasonable jury
could view the events of August 19, 2005, as
an aggravated instance of patient neglect.
We agree with that assessment. The facts
are sufficient to support an award of punitive
damages.

{53} The Hospital’s second argument
based on Philip Morris fails on factual and
legal grounds. Broadly speaking, Philip
Morris prohibits punishing a defendant for
injury it may have inflicted on nonparties to
an action. The Hospital argues that Plain-
tiffs “indiscriminate attack on Chaves Emer-
gency Group” (Dr. Collins’ employer), and
the reference to the Hospital’s parent corpo-
ration during closing argument, show that
the punitive damages award here was based

on injuries inflicted on others. On their rec-
ord, we simply disagree. The murky testi-
mony concerning the status of Dr. Collins’
employer was relevant to the issues sur-
rounding his hiring and his status as an
apparent agent or employee of the Hospital.
In any event, there was no testimony that
Chaves Emergency Group itself committed
any torts against or harmed anyone else.
We fail to see how this testimony contributed
to the punitive damages award or runs afoul
of Philip Morris.

{54} Similarly, we fail to see how remarks
made during closing argument about the
Hospital’s parent corporation run afoul of
Philip Morris. The vast majority of Plain-
tiffs 60-page closing argument dealt with the
events of the day. The rhetorical flourish
the Hospital relies on does not include any
reference to injuries done to others. It does
remind the jury of the larger corporate con-
text it is dealing with in setting the amount
of any award it might choose to make. That
larger context would be relevant to consider-
ation of the deterrent effect an award might
have. Further, concerns about the public
safety aspects of a defendant’s conduct have
not been precluded by Philip Morris, 549
US. at 850 (noting there is no constitutional
violation in using punitive damages to punish
and deter conduct). See Grefer v. Alpha
Technical, 2002-CA-1287, p. 7 (La.App. 4
Cir. 8/8/07); 965 So.2d 511, 517 (holding that
jury instruction allowing punitive damages
“to compel the defendant to have ‘proper
regard for the rights of the public’” was
proper under Philip Morris ).

{55} Finally, we must assume that the jury
properly followed its instruction. Our UJI
18-1827 specifically warns the jury that any
amount it awards “must be reasonably relat-
ed to the injury and to any damages given as
compensation and not disproportionate to the
circumstances.”

B. Proportionality of the Award

HM {56} The second criterion under
BMW of North America, Inc. considers the
relationship between the damage actually
suffered by the plaintiff and the size of the
punitive damages award. Aken, 2002-
NMSC-021, 123, 182 N.M. 401, 49 P.8d 662.

297

The compensatory award and the punitive
damages award must bear a rational relation-
ship to each, The United States Supreme
Court has refused to date to impose a bright
line ratio that a punitive damages award
cannot exceed. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 588 U.S. at 425, 128 S.Ct. 1513. It has
noted, however that “[s]ingle-digit multipliers
are more likely to comport with due process”
while acknowledging that single-digit multi-
pliers might not be appropriate in egregious
cases. Id. at 410, 123 S.Ct. 1518. Whether
an award of punitive damages is “grossly
excessive” in comparison to the damages suf-
fered by the plaintiff is—within these impre-
cise boundaries—dependent on the circum-
stances of each case. Id. at 409, 123 S.Ct.
1513,

{57} In this case, the ratio is just slightly
greater than 10 to 1; the compensatory
award tied to medical negligence is $998,465
and the punitive damages award is
$10,000,000. This award is thus on the outer
edge of the range that could be considered
perhaps presumptively acceptable. But it is
not so large as to raise concerns of constitu-
tional dimension. The testimony detailing
the medical negligence that resulted in Mr.
Grassie’s painful death is a compelling narra-
tive. The New Mexico Supreme Court af-
firmed a ratio of 7.4 to 1 in an insurance bad
faith context involving improper premiums
charges. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc.
v. N. River Ins. Co., 1999-NMSC-006, 1 49,
127 N.M. 1, 976 P.2d 1. This Court approved
a 6.76 to 1 ratio in a wrongful death case.
Jolley, 2008-NMCA-164, 138, 145 N.M. 350,
198 P.38d 376. We see no constitutional de-
fect created by the slightly higher ratio
found in this case.

C. Comparable Penalties

{58} The third criterion under BMW of
North America, Inc. requires us to “[clom-
parfe] the punitive damages award and the
civil or criminal penalties that could be im-
posed for comparable misconduct.” Aken,
2002-NMSC-021, 125, 132 N.M. 401, 49 P.3d
662 (first alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). New
Mexico has noted that this criteria “has been
criticized as ineffective and very difficult to

298

employ.” Id. First, there is the problem of
identifying “substantial legislative judgments
concerning appropriate sanctions for the con-
duct at issue.” Jd. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Second, there is the
danger that a civil penalty—even for compa-
rable conduect—may be too low to have a
reasonable deterrent effect. Id. As a result,
New Mexico and other courts have not ap-
plied this factor vigorously. Id. 126; Buell-
Wilson v. Ford Motor Co. 73 Cal.Rptr.3d
277, 821 (Cal.Ct.App.2008), review granted
and superseded by 80 Cal.Rptr.38d 27, 187
P.3d 887 (2008); cert. denied, — U.S. —,
180 S.Ct. 742, 175 L.Bd.2d 515 (2009).

{59} The Hospital argues that the legisla-
tive sanctions for violations of the Emergen-
cy Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2003),
which mandates that hospitals give appropri-
ate medical screenings and that hospitals
stabilize patients before discharge or trans-
fer, provides the best guidance for the appro-
priate measure of punitive damages. EM-
TALA provides for a civil penalty up to
$50,000 for violations. 42 USC.
§ 1895dd(d)(1)(A).

HN {60} We disagree. EMTALA was
designed as a means to encourage equitable
screening for emergency medical conditions
and to discourage “patient-dumping” by hos-
pitals—the practice in which hospitals inap-
propriately move usually uninsured patients
to other facilities. Ward v. Presbyterian
Healthcare Servs., 72 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1291
(D.N.M.1999); Godwin v. Mem’ Med. Ctr.,
2001-NMCA-033, 1 81, 180 N.M. 434, 25 P.8d
273. It was not designed or intended to
address potential tort liability of any kind to
admitted patients who suffer injuries as a
result of medical negligence. The “appropri-
ate medical screening” required by EMTA-
LA is not evaluated in terms of its medical
efficacy, but rather whether it is performed
equitably as compared with other patients.
See Scott v. Dauterive Hosp. Corp., 02-1864,
p. 19 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/28/03); 851 So.2d 1152,
1166 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

{61} In addition, the penalty provided by
EMTALA is simply too low to serve as a
deterrent. It is obvious that adding a five

percent “penalty” on top of the compensatory
award in this case would have a de minimis
effect. It would not even be as much as the
yearly interest accruing on the compensatory
award during this appeal. As such, it is not
helpful to the analysis or resolution of the
case.

I. NEGLIGENT HIRING

WM {62} The “theory-of-the-case” in-
struction given to the jury included the as-
sertion that the Hospital “was negligent in
allowing [Dr.] Collins to work in its emergen-
cy room.” Characterizing the claim as a
matter of negligent credentialing, the Hospi-
tal’s primary argument here is that the claim
should not have been submitted to the jury
at all because Plaintiff failed to present any
expert evidence concerning the standard of
care applicable to the Hospital’s decision-
making process. Plaintiff argues that expert
testimony was not needed because the claim
was for ordinary negligence, not negligent
credentialing. We conclude that in the con-
text of this case, expert testimony was re-
quired to guide the jury concerning the appli-
cable standard of care and its breach. Given
that Plaintiff did not submit such evidence,
the claim should not have been submitted to
the jury, and we reverse the compensatory
and punitive awards incident to the negligent
hiring claim.

A. Facts and Proceedings

{63} Count IV of the first amended com-
plaint is entitled “Negligent Hiring and Neg-
ligent Management of the Emergency Room
Department.” Among other allegations, the
first amended complaint asserted that Dr.
Collins “was not qualified to work in an
emergency room and, had [the Hospital]
made any inquiry on its own, it would have
known that.” At trial, Plaintiffs honed the
argument to two basic points:

1. Rich Robinson, as chief executive offi-
cer of the Hospital, was negligent
when he accepted Dr. Collins to work
in the Hospital emergency room even
though (a) the contract under which he
was accepted required that doctors
providing services “[sJhall be certified
by the AMA/AOA recognized Board in

the specialty indicated or eligible for
certification by such Board by virtue of
having successfully completed all edu-
cational and residency requirements
required to [sic] it for the Board exam-
inations.”

2. Mr. Robinson failed to adequately in-
vestigate Dr. Collins’ employment; in
particular his early release from his
term as an Air Force doctor and the
non-renewal of his privileges at other
hospitals in the past.

{64} The contract Plaintiff relies on is the
Emergency Services Agreement the Hospital
entered into with Chaves Emergency Group
(Chaves) to provide “Emergency Medical
Services” to the Hospital. Broadly speaking,
the Agreement describes the terms under
which Chaves would provide doctors to staff
the Hospital’s emergency room. Plaintiff fo-
cuses on two provisions of the Agreement:
Section 1.1.3.1, which requires that any doc-
tor proposed by Chaves “[m]ust be accepted
by the Facility’s Chief Executive Officer”—
Mr. Robinson; and (2) Section 1.1.3.3, sub-
stantially quoted above in paragraph 63.
Plaintiffs theory at trial and here is that
these provisions of the Agreement set the
standard of care for Mr. Robinson’s action in
allowing Dr. Collins to work in the Hospital’s
emergency room.

{65} It is undisputed that Dr. Collins was
not board certified in emergency medicine by
either the AMA or the AOA. He was board
certified in family practice by the AOA. He
was also certified in emergency medicine by
the American Association of Physician Spe-
cialists in 1995. Mr. Robinson himself did
not have any information about Dr. Collins’
prior work history before he accepted him to
work pursuant to the Agreement with
Chaves. Mr. Robinson relied on the recom-
mendation he received from the Hospital’s
medical staff to grant Dr. Collins “Locum
Tenens” privileges starting August 19, 2005.
“Locum Tenens” is the term used to describe
full, though temporary, privileges to practice
at the Hospital. The decision of the medical
staff was based on a full application from Dr.
Collins, including licensing, confirmation of
privileges at other hospitals, and a data bank

299

query used to identify any malpractice
claims—nationwide—against him.

{66} At the time he applied for privileges
at the Hospital, Dr. Collins had never had a
malpractice action filed against him, and he
held or had held privileges at hospitals in
Artesia, Carlsbad, Clovis, and Ruidoso.
Privileges at these other facilities had been
granted to him using the same process used
by the Hospital. Dr. Collins has practiced
medicine since 1983, and for the vast majori-
ty of the time in emergency rooms.

{67} Plaintiff's counsel questioned Dr. Col-
lins about his history with regard to his
service as a physician with the Air Force and
the circumstances which led to his being
asked not to return to work at two hospitals.
Dr. Collins described the discharge as a “mu-
tual situation” brought on by his failure to
recognize and follow military protocol with
regard to calling in too many specialists to
help in the emergency room. In 1988 or so,
Dr. Collins received an honorable discharge
after serving only one year of a four-year
enlistment. Plaintiff did not call any wit-
nesses to counter Dr. Collins’ explanation.
With regard to the hospitals, Dr. Collins
agreed with Plaintiffs counsel that he was
asked to leave one hospital in Illinois because
of a “problem with doing an IV stick.” Dr.
Collins did not dispute Plaintiff's counsel's
assertion that he was also asked to leave a
hospital in Missouri because of undefined
“trouble with the nurses.” The record does
not reveal a time frame for Dr. Collins’ de-
parture from the latter facilities nor does it
reveal any more detail about the incidents.

B. Expert Testimony Was Required In
This Case

{68} Plaintiffs core argument on appeal is
that expert testimony was not necessary be-
cause “[Plaintiff] made no negligent creden-
tialing claim” as defined in UJI 13~1119B
NMRA. Plaintiff characterizes his theory as
simple or ordinary negligence flowing from
Mr. Robinson’s failure to enforce the Hospi-
tal’s contract with Chaves to the letter and
his failure to adequately delve into Dr. Col-
lins’ work history. Consistent with this as-
sertion, Plaintiff's answer brief does not cite
to or rely on the foundational cases in New

300

Mexico recognizing the “theory of hospital
liability generally known as corporate negli-
gence, which arises when the hospital has
failed to take reasonable steps to determine
the qualifications or competency of a practi-
tioner to whom it has granted clinical privi-
leges.” UJI 18-1119B, committee cmt;
Eckhardt v. Charter Hosp. of Albuquerque,
Ine, 1998-NMCA-017, 141, 124 N.M. 549,
958 P.2d 722 (filed 1997); Diaz v. Feil, 118
N.M. 385, 389-90, 881 P.2d 745, 749-50 (Ct.
App.1994).

{69} Plaintiff emphasizes that the jury in-
struction given on his claims was based on
UJI 18-1119A NMRA, which deals with a
hospital’s duty of ordinary care to its pa-
tients. Plaintiff further notes that the Hos-
pital did not request that UJI 13-1119B be
given to the jury. UJI 13-1119B describes
the duty hospitals have to “exercise reason-
able diligence in obtaining and acting upon
information concerning the competence of
[applicants to] its staff” The Hospital does
not dispute it failed to request that UJI 13-
1119B be given. As such, the Hospital did
not preserve error as to the giving of UJI
18-1119A, and the instruction is the law of
the case. Andrus v. Gas Co. of NM, 110
N.M. 593, 597, 798 P.2d 194, 198 (Ct.App.
1990).

{70} Contrary to Plaintiff's argument,
however, the fact that UJI 18-1119A was
given does not by itself resolve the question
as to what type of evidence is necessary to
prove the claim. In saying this, we are fully
aware that the Use Note for UJI 13-1119A
indicates that the “first paragraph” of the
instruction—the one given to the jury—“re-
lates to conduct which can be evaluated by
the jury without the aid of expert testimony.”
We, of course, do not disagree that the Use
Note accurately reflects the overall design of
the instruction. But we are not—and the
district court was not—considering or apply-
ing the instruction in a vacuum.

{71} Plaintiff's claim is that the Hospital,
through Mr. Robinson, was negligent in al-
lowing Dr. Collins to work as a doctor in its
emergency room. The essence of the claim
involves negligence in granting staff privi-
leges to a doctor. The essence of the claim
must inform the inquiry as to the applicable

standard of care and the nature of the evi-
dence necessary to elucidate the standard of
care and its breach. Proof may or may not
require expert testimony depending on the
circumstances of a particular case, but use of
UJI 18-1119A to instruct the jury should not
by itself foreclose the inquiry. The instrue-
tion does not transform the basic nature of
the claim being made. Plaintiff cannot es-
cape the implications inherent to his claim of
negligence in hiring a doctor.

{72} New Mexico, as noted above, has
adopted the concept of direct liability on the
part of hospitals for negligence in granting
staff privileges to doctors. Feil, 118 N.M. at
390, 881 P.2d at 750. Feil generally dis-
cussed what would be required to make a
prima facie showing, but did not address the
specifics of the type of evidence that would
be required or suffice to prove such a claim.
Id. Eckhardt similarly did not address the
type of evidentiary showing that might be
required.

{73} The Committee Commentary to both
UJI 13-1119A and 13-1119B acknowledges
the difficulty. “While there is a single stan-
dard of ordinary care ... the type of testi-
mony required to establish a breach ... dif-
fers depending on the kind of conduct that is
alleged to constitute a breach.... Where the
issue is not within the common knowledge of
jurors ... expert testimony is required.”
UJI 18-1119A committee emt. The Commit-
tee Commentary to UJI 18-1119B echoes
these concerns and provides some limited
guidance by way of hypothetical examples.

Consistent with the approach taken in UJI

18-1119A, the [district] court should deter-

mine the need for expert testimony based
on the kind of conduct that is alleged to
constitute a breach of the duty. For in-
stance, a case in which the hospital entirely
failed to inquire about, or utterly ignored,
the existence of prior malpractice judg-

ments against the physician presents a

situation that could likely be evaluated by

a lay jury under ordinary negligence stan-

dards. Cf Eckhardt, 1998-NMCA-017,

143 [124 N.M. 549, 953 P.2d 722].... On

the other hand, a case in which the hospital

relied on the medical judgments of physi-
cians on its credentials committee, who

recommended granting an application for

clinical privileges after reviewing materials

in the applicant’s file, might require expert
testimony on the question whether the
committee reasonably should have known
of deficiencies in the applicant’s competen-
cy based on the materials reviewed.

UJI 13-1119B committee emt.

{74} Comparing these hypotheticals to this
case leads us to conclude that we are not—
and the jury below was not—dealing with a
simple factual scenario that is within the ken
of lay persons. The record does not reflect
the kind of utter failure to investigate noted
in the commentary. Dr. Collins filed a com-
plete application seeking privileges, including
all the material required by the Hospital’s
by-laws. The medical staff reviewed the ap-
plication and checked a national database for
past malpractice actions against Dr. Collins.
The record does not reveal any malpractice
claims against Dr. Collins prior to this case.
The application reflected that Dr. Collins
held staff privileges at three other eastern
New Mexico hospitals; that he had been
practicing medicine for about twenty years,
and he was board certified in family practice
by the AOA and board certified in emergen-
cy medicine by the AAPS.

{75} After this review, the medical staff
recommended to Mr. Robinson that Dr. Col-
lins be granted staff privileges. Mr. Robin-
son relied on the recommendation in making
his decision to accept Dr. Collins as a physi-
cian at the Hospital.

{76} Plaintiff does not acknowledge, much
less discuss, any of the facts just recounted
in his answer brief. Plaintiff's approach to
the case makes these facts irrelevant. Un-
der Plaintiff's approach, the Agreement with
Chaves and Mr. Robinson’s failure to en-
force it overshadows all other facts and con-
siderations. Under Plaintiff's theory, the
Agreement by itself defines the standard of
conduct applicable to the case, and Mr. Rob-
inson’s failure to enforce it provides all the
evidence of breach necessary to carry his
burden of proof.

{77} We disagree. First, we doubt that
the Agreement by itself can or should be
used to set the definitive standard of conduct
against which the Hospital’s action must be

301

measured. See Titchnell v. United States,
681 F.2d 165, 178 (8rd Cir.1982) (“Mere fail-
ure to act in accordance with one’s own inter-
nal procedures, however, will not automati-
cally thereby render a health care facility
negligent.”); FFE Transp. Servs. Inc. v.
Fulgham, 154 S.W.8d 84, 92 (Tex.2004) (not-
ing that self-imposed or internal policies by
themselves do not determine the governing
standard of care); Pedroza v. Bryant, 101
Wash.2d 226, 677 P.2d 166, 170-71 (1984) (en
bane) (noting that the accreditation stan-
dards of the Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Hospitals and the hospitals’ own by-
laws could serve as sources of the standard
of care applicable to the hiring of doctors);
Sapp v. W.T. Grant Co., 172 Cal.App.2d 89,
341 P.2d 826, 828 (1959) (noting that internal
operating rules of a railway company would
be used as evidence bearing on the standard
of care appropriate for truck crossings);
Bryan v. 8. Pac. Co., 79 Ariz. 258, 286 P.2d
‘761, 765 (1955) (noting that internal rules
have probative value in establishing negli-
gence, but that violation of internal rules
would not constitute negligence per se). The
Agreement is evidence of a standard the
Hospital set for itself. But a failure to follow
it may or may not be negligent when viewed
in the context of the entire screening process
actually undertaken.

TMM {78} Second, consistent with the
general concerns evident in all negligent hir-
ing cases, Feil clearly contemplated review
and consideration of the entire procedure
used by hospitals to screen physicians. The
basic inquiry in all negligent hiring cases is
whether the employer knew or should have
known of circumstances in the employee’s
background which create an unreasonable
risk of injury to the persons with whom the
employee could be reasonably expected to
interact. Spencer v. Health Force, Inc.
2005-NMSC-002, 110, 187 N.M. 64, 107 P.8d
504. Lack of board certification in emergen-
ey medicine would likely be relevant in a case
involving an emergency room physician, but
it could not properly be the sole inquiry if
there is broader testimony about a doctor’s
experience and background which a hospital
reviewed in evaluating a prospective physi-
cian for privileges. Applying Plaintiff's posi-

302

tion literally here would lead to the anoma-
lous result that the Hospital would have been.
negligent and liable if it had hired one of
Plaintiff's own expert witnesses.

{79} Third, we fail to see how a lay person
could have the special knowledge necessary
to evaluate the weight and effect of Mr.
Robinson’s acceptance of Dr. Collins (even
though he was not AMA or AOA board certi-
fied in emergency medicine) in view of all of
the evidence noted above. We conclude that
expert testimony was necessary to explain
the credentialing process to jurors and estab-
lish the standard of care to be applied. In
this case, that explanation would perforce
address the Agreement with Chaves, placing
it in the context of the entire range of evi-
dence detailing what the Hospital and Mr.
Robinson did know, and should have known,
before offering Dr. Collins staff privileges.
Without expert guidance, a lay person could
not knowledgeably decide if Mr. Robinson’s
decision was negligent or not.

{80} Comparing our analysis to similar
cases from other jurisdictions, we find we are
in the mainstream. A recent American Law
Report Annotation on the subject observed
that “[aJll courts that have looked at the
question have concluded that expert testimo-
ny is necessary to establish the standard of
care owed by a hospital, or whether the
hospital has been negligent.” Benjamin J.
Vernia, Annotation, Tort Claim for Negligent
Credentialing of Physician, 98 A.L.R.5th
588, 558 (2002). Our own canvass of the law
confirms the assertion. Without attempting
to be encyclopedic, the following cases are a
representative sample. Welsh v. Bulger, 548
Pa. 504, 698 A.2d 581, 585 (1997) (holding
that, “unless a hospital’s negligence is obvi-
ous, a plaintiff must produce expert testimo-
ny to establish that the hospital deviated
from an accepted standard of care and that
the deviation was a substantial factor in caus-
ing the harm to the plaintiff”); Johnson v.
Misericordia Cmty. Hosp. 99 Wis.2d 708,
301 N.W.2d 156, 172 (1981) (holding that
“since the procedures ordinarily employed by
hospitals in evaluating applications for staff
privileges are not within the realm of the
ordinary experience of mankind, we agree
... that expert testimony was required to

prove the same”); Frigo v. Silver Cross
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 377 Il.App.3d 48, 315
IlLDee. 385, 876 N.E.2d 697, 724 (2007) (hold-
ing that expert testimony is required to
prove the applicable standard of care con-
cerning granting staff privileges and whether
the standard was violated); Neff v. Johnson
Mem. Hosp., 98 Conn.App. 584, 889 A.2d 921,
928 (2006) (holding that the “parameters of a
hospital’s judgment in credentialing its medi-
cal staff is not within the grasp of ordinary
jurors. To the contrary, a hospital’s decision
whether to grant staff privileges to a physi-
cian is a specialized activity, executed by
senior members of the hospital's staff, such
as the chief executive officer and the depart-
ment chief”); Mills v. Angel, 995 S.W.2d 262,
275 (Tex.App.1999) (holding that “[e]xpert
testimony is required to establish liability in
the area of credentialing, because the proce-
dures ordinarily used by a hospital in evalu-
ating applications for staff privileges are not
within the realm of the ordinary experience
of jurors”); Jordan v. Long Beach Cmty.
Hosp. 248 Cal.Rptr. 651, 664 (Cal.Ct.App.
1988) (withdrawn from publication) (holding
that “[wJhere, as here, the question turns on
where and whether the physician received a
proper medical education, or his success rate
on certain tests, expert testimony is required
to assist the jury in making its determination
as to the medical matters involved”).

{81} Because Plaintiff did not present ex-
pert testimony to establish the standard of
care under the circumstances of this case, we
reverse the compensatory damages award
based on the claim of negligent hiring.
Without the compensatory award, there can
be no award of punitive damages, and we
therefore reverse the punitive damages
award based on this claim as well.

I. THE UNFAIR PRACTICES CLAIM

MM (82} The jury found that the
Hospital willfully engaged in unfair or decep-
tive trade practices and awarded $9,501.65 in
damages. The claim was based on New
Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act. Sections 57—
12-1 to -26. “Generally speaking, the UPA
is designed to provide a remedy against mis-
leading identification and false or deceptive
advertising.” Lohman v. Daimler-Chrysler

Corp., 2007-NMCA-100, 122, 142 N.M. 437,
166 P.8d 1091. In addition, “(t]he UPA ...
imposes a duty to disclose material facts
reasonably necessary to prevent any state-
ments from being misleading.” Id. 140 (sec-
ond alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

{83} The Hospital argues that the UPA
claim should not have been submitted to the
jury at all, This presents a question of law
which we review de novo. McNeill v. Bur-
lington Res. Oil & Gas Co, 2008-NMSC-
022, 186, 143 N.M. 740, 182 P.3d 121 (we
review de novo the district court’s decision on
a motion for a directed verdict); Swnwest
Bank v. Garrett, 118 N.M. 112, 115, 823 P.2d
912, 915 (1992) (“A directed verdict is appro-
priate only when there are no true issues of
fact to be presented to a jury.”).

HM {84} The Hospital makes two sepa-
rate arguments: (1) an assertion—likely mis-
labeled—that the practice of medicine and
the operation of hospitals are exempt from
the UPA, and (2) that the advertising relied
upon by Plaintiff was mere puffery and thus
not actionable as a matter of law. We de-
cline to address the second because it was
not preserved. Woolwine v. Furr’s Inc. 106
N.M. 492, 496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App.
1987). The Hospital’s argument below was
that the materials Plaintiff relied on were too
vague to be unlawful. Vagueness is distinct
enough from the concept of puffery to re-
quire an argument based on its particular
features. Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yel-
low Book USA, Inc., 309 F.Supp.2d 401, 405
(G.D.N.Y.2004) (mem. & order) (“Puffery is
a somewhat amorphous concept ... defined
alternately as ‘an exaggeration or overstate-
ment expressed in broad, vague, and com-
mendatory language’ ... and as an ‘exagger-
ated, blustering, and boasting statement
upon which no reasonable buyer would
rely.’” (citation omitted)).

{85} The Hospital’s first argument is more
nuanced. Contrary to its general claim of
exemption from the UPA, the Hospital con-
cedes that “it is generally recognized that
physicians and health care providers are sub-
ject to statutes prohibiting unfair trade prac-
tices.” There is a limit to the reach of such
statutes over health care and other profes-

303

sionals. The case law across the country
holds that unfair practice statutes only apply
to the entrepreneurial, commercial, or busi-
ness aspect of a physician’s practice, includ-
ing advertising, solicitation of business, and
billing practices. Ihkuno v. Yip, 912 F.2d 306,
312 (9th Cir.1990) (applying Washington law
that consumer protection law can be applied
to legal and medical professionals “when the
actions at issue are chiefly concerned with
‘entrepreneurial’ aspects of practice”); Dar-
viris v. Petros, 442 Mass. 274, 812 N.B.2d
1188, 1193 (2004) (holding that violation of
informed consent statute and medical negli-
gence could not form basis for claim under
consumer protection statute); Quimby v.
Fine, 45 Wash.App. 175, 724 P.2d 403, 406
(1986) (upholding denial of summary judg-
ment requested by doctor and noting that
medical negligence claims could not form ba-
sis of Consumer Protection Act claim, but
that claim alleging lack of informed consent
could be asserted under CPA depending on
factual showing).

{86} Quimby is particularly instructive.
The court there held that the claim under the
consumer protection statutes premised on
the same facts as the medical negligence
claim could not go forward because it related
to the actual competence of the medical prac-
titioner defendant. The Quimby court dis-
tinguished the claims under the consumer
protection statutes relating to problems of
informed consent by noting that lack of in-
formed consent is not limited to a breach of
professional standards. “Instead, a lack of
informed consent claim can be based on dis-
honest and unfair practices used to promote
the entrepreneurial aspects of a doctor’s
practice, such as when the doctor promotes
an operation or service to increase profits
and the volume of patients, then fails to
adequately advise the patient of risks or
alternative procedures.” Id. The inquiry
thus hinges on whether the medical negli-
gence and UPA claims are coterminous or
indistinguishable; that is, whether they rely
on the same facts and rely on a judgment as
to the “actual competence of the medical
practitioner” for resolution. Jd. If they do,
a UPA claim is not appropriate. If they do

304

not, a UPA claim may be viable, depending
of course on the facts.

{87} We review the district court’s denial
of a directed verdict by resolving conflicts in
the evidence and including all reasonable in-
terpretations of the evidence in favor of the
party resisting the directed verdict. Sun-
west Bank, 113 N.M. at 115, 828 P.2d at 915.
Plaintiff's presentation focused on the Hospi-
tal’s billboard and internet advertising, in
particular its description of “{oJur team of
trained physicians, nurses and technicians”
and the Hospital’s “ER + goal” to provide 24—
hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week access to
“qualified physicians.” Plaintiff argued that
the impression left by these materials was
that the Hospital was in charge of its emer-
gency room. Plaintiff then contrasted that
impression with the testimony from Dr. Col-
lins that even though he was an independent
contractor, no one could direct how he dealt
with patients as to his treatment or clinical
judgment. This testimony raises a sufficient
question of fact about whether the Hospital’s
representations were misleading and wheth-
er it had an obligation to disclose facts—such
as the status of the ER doctors—in order to
allay the potential for misunderstanding.
Resolution of the question whether the ad-
vertising materials were materially mislead-
ing does not rely on the actions of the medi-
eal personnel on the day Mr. Grassie died.
Thus, the UPA issues are separate enough
from the questions of the actual medical com-
petence of the doctors and nurses to allow
the UPA claims to proceed. We find no
error in the district court’s refusal to grant a
directed verdict as to the UPA claims.

Iv. DENIAL OF LEAVE TO FILE A
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

HM {88} The Hospital argues that the
district court abused its discretion in twice
denying its motion for leave to file a third-
party complaint against Chaves. We review
such decisions under an abuse of discretion
standard. “An abuse of discretion occurs
when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logi-
cal conclusions demanded by the facts and
circumstances of the case.” Sims v. Sims,
1996-NMSC-078, 165, 122 N.M. 618, 930
P.2d 158. To merit reversal of a discretion-

ary ruling—in particular one dealing with the
district court’s management of its own dock-
et—the ruling must be “clearly untenable or
not justified by reason.” State v. Apodaca,
118 N.M. 762, 770, 887 P.2d 756, 764 (1994)
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted); Kerman v. Swafford, 101 N.M. 241,
245, 680 P.2d 622, 626 (Ct.App.1984).

{89} The Hospital filed its first motion on
January 31, 2007, one month after Plaintiff
filed his first amended complaint. The Hos-
pital asserted that it wished “to protect its
rights to indemnification and contribution”
from Chaves. The Hospital later expanded
its reasoning to include the potential for in-
consistent results in any later separate litiga-
tion between it and Chaves.

{90} The matter was not heard by the
district court until April 2, 2007. During the
argument it was noted that trial was then set
for June 26, 2007. Trial was actually held in
mid-July 2007. After a forty-eight minute
argument in which counsel for both parties
had a full opportunity to air their positions,
the district court ruled as follows:

The Court: I’m going to deny the motion.
Two bases: One is, at this stage in this
litigation I think the joinder would cause
a substantial delay in these proceedings.
Second is that I can’t imagine that the
[H]ospital wasn’t clearly aware that
there was the issue of indemnity, the
issue of the negligence of these physi-
cians early on in these proceedings so
that if they wanted to bring the Chaves
Group into this suit, they could have
done that in a timely way. Motion be
denied.

{91} On appeal the Hospital does not re-
prise any of the arguments made below.
Here, the Hospital asserts that the absence
of Chaves in the courtroom allowed Plaintiff
to make assertions and arguments about
Chaves which “resulted in a verdict tainted
by passion and prejudice.”

{92} We discern no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s decision. The district
court’s concern about the trial schedule is
reasonable. Further, we do not perceive
that Chaves’ absence from the courtroom
caused any prejudice of any kind, much less
reversible prejudice. As noted above, the

evidence of aggravated medical negligence
was strong. Our own detailed review of the
trial assures us that the Hospital was able to
and did respond to all of Plaintiff's assertions
concerning Chaves. If the quality of the
response fell short from the Hospital’s stand-
point, it seems likely it was the result of the
Hospital’s own litigation strategy at trial.

V. CONCLUSION

{93} We affirm the compensatory and pu-
nitive damages award flowing from Plaintiff's
theory of medical negligence. We also affirm
the award premised on the UPA. We re-
verse the compensatory and punitive dam-
ages award premised on Plaintiff's negligent
hiring theory. We affirm the district court’s
denial of the Hospital’s motion to join
Chaves. Each party will bear their own
costs on appeal.

{94} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief
Judge and TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
(specially concurring).

GARCIA, Judge (specially concurring).

{95} I write to specially concur in this
decision because of the need to amend UJI
18-1827. In addition, the factual cireum-
stances in this case support a review and
clarification of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Clay.

{96} In this case, the punitive damage
instruction—instruction number twenty-six—
failed to meet one of the specific elements in
Clay that required the jury to find a culpable
mental state on the part of the Hospital in
order to award punitive damages. Clay, 118
N.M. at 269, 881 P.2d at 14 (recognizing that
“{t]o be liable for punitive damages, a wrong-
doer must have some culpable mental state,
... and the wrongdoer’s conduct must rise to
a willful, wanton, malicious, reckless, oppres-
sive, or fraudulent level” (citations omitted)).
It is undisputed that only one of these ele-
ments was included when UJI 13-1827 was
modified and given to the jury. This Court
agrees with the Hospital’s argument that the
proper language from Clay was excluded
from punitive damage instruction number
twenty-six. Despite the significance of this

305

mistake, we have determined that the puni-
tive damage instruction given in this case
must stand due to the Hospital’s failure to
properly preserve its argument in the district
court. The Hospital failed to propose proper
language for instruction twenty-six and failed
to make any specific argument regarding the
accuracy of the proposed Clay instruction
offered by Plaintiff. As a result of our deter-
mination regarding the preservation issue, it
is important to reemphasize the defect in
punitive damage jury instruction number
twenty-six and seek guidance for our district
courts. UJI 13-1827 has not been amended
to address the cumulative conduct theory
recognized in Clay for over seventeen years.
It appears that an appropriate amendment to
UJI 13-1827 is needed to avoid a reoccur-
rence of the jury instruction problem that
arose in this case.

{97} In addition, this case highlights a
potential flaw in the application of the cumu-
lative conduct theory where all but one of the
alleged employee-tortfeasors was exonerated
from liability for Plaintiff's injuries. In this
ease, the jury specifically found that the
nurses’ actions were not a cause of Mr. Gras-
sie’s injuries or death. As a result of this
finding, Dr. Collins was determined to be the
only alleged employee-tortfeasor who caused
Mr. Grassie’s injuries and death. Therefore,
Plaintiff's recovery of compensatory damages
was limited to the actions of Dr. Collins. See
Lewis v. Samson, 2001-NMSC-035, 1134-
85, 181 N.M. 317, 35 P.8d 972 (explaining
that in order to recover, a plaintiff still must
establish that the second tortfeasor’s negli-
gence proximately caused some harm, even
where damages are not apportionable). The
significance of this jury finding in favor of
the nurses is critical in this case because
Plaintiff chose to abandon its claim of puni-
tive damages arising under the theories of
direct liability or vicarious liability. These
additional theories of liability were excluded
from instruction number twenty-six that was
given to the jury. As a result, the actions of
just one employee were the only legal basis
for the recovery of actual compensatory dam-
ages, but the factual basis for a recovery of
punitive damages was expanded to include
the actions of additional employees, including

306

the nurses, under the cumulative conduct
theory.

{98} Punitive damages have never been
upheld in New Mexico under a cumulative
conduet theory where liability was limited to
the actions of a single employee-tortfeasor.
See Clay, 118 N.M. at 271-72, 881 P.2d at 16—
17 (recognizing that the cumulative acts and
failure of communication between two negli-
gent employees, Candelaria and Schell, along
with the cavalier attitude of their employer
were a sufficient basis to establish the culpa-
ble mental state of the employer and impose
punitive damages); see also Chavarria,
2006-NMSC-046, 1121-34, 140 N.M. 478,
148 P.3d 717 (recognizing the applicability of
the cumulative acts theory for the recovery
of punitive damages resulting from the fraud-
ulent actions of two employees, Pike and
Lancaster, but ultimately addressing only the
theories of managerial capacity and corpo-
rate ratification). In Clay, the Supreme
Court also ratified the plaintiffs’ position that
allowed the jury to consider the employer's
failure to file “Form 6” as evidence of a
cavalier attitude toward safety. Clay, 118
NUM. at 272 n. 4, 881 P.2d at 17n. 4. Asa
result, this additional evidence was used to
help establish the employer's culpable mental
state. Id.

{99} Based upon footnote 4 in Clay, we
now recognize that the jury can properly
consider the exonerated acts of the nurses as
part of the Plaintiff's cumulative conduct the-
ory for two purposes: (1) to expand the
overall employee-tortfeasor actions to be con-
sidered in the punitive damages analysis to
include more than just the acts of Dr. Col-
lins; and (2) to allow the consideration of
actions by exonerated employee-tortfeasors
as further evidence of punitive damages and
a culpable mental state of their employer.
Although this determination could be consid-
ered an expanded application of Clay, it is
also consistent with the broad language used
by the Supreme Court when it adopted the
cumulative conduct approach set forth in
Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co.,
690 8.W.2d 382 (Ky.1985). Clay, 118 N.M. at
270-71, 881 P.2d at 15-16 (concluding that
“(t]he culpable mental state of the corpora-
tion ... may be inferred from the very fact

that one employee could be ignorant of the
acts or omissions of other employees with
potentially disastrous consequences”). If the
exonerated actions of the Hospital’s nurses
should be ignored for the purposes of deter-
mining punitive damages under the cumula-
tive conduct theory, the Supreme Court
needs to clarify the broad language utilized
in Clay. See Aguilera v. Palm Harbor
Homes, Inc., 2002-NMSC-029, 116, 132 N.M.
715, 54 P.8d 993 (explaining that the Court of
Appeals is bound by Supreme Court prece-
dent).

{100} Therefore, I specially concur herein
and suggest that the Supreme Court address
UJI 13-1827 and add the necessary language
to directly deal with the cumulative conduct
theory established in Clay. In addition, I
suggest that the Supreme Court clarify the
application of its Clay decision under the
factual circumstance where the jury limits
the causation for a plaintiffs injuries and
compensatory liability to the actions of a
single employee-tortfeasor.

2011-NMCA-025
258 P.3d 1098
Jesus GONZALEZ, Worker—Appellant,
v.

PERFORMANCE PAINTING, INC. and
Builders Trust of New Mexico,
Employer/Insurer—Appellees.

No. 29,629.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Jan, 10, 2011.

Certiorari Granted, March
28, 2011, No. 32,844.

James Rawley, Albuquerque, NM, for Ap-
pellant.

Miller Stratvert P.A., Thomas R. Mack,
Nathan A. Cobb, Albuquerque, NM, for Ap-
pellees.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Worker Jesus Gonzalez appeals the
decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Judge (WCJ) denying him modifier benefits
from his employer Performance Painting,
Ine. (Employer) under NMSA 1978, Section
52-1-26(C) (1990), of the New Mexico Work-
ers’ Compensation Act (the Act), NMSA
1978, §§ 52-I-1 to -70 (1929, as amended
through 2007). The WCJ denied modifier
benefits because Worker's undocumented im-
migration status precluded rehire, thereby
constituting an unreasonable refusal of Em-
ployer’s return-to-work offer. The WCJ also
denied Worker modifier benefits under Sec-
tion 52-1-26(D) after he returned to the
workforce with a different employer and
earned a wage equal to or greater than his
pre-injury wage after maximum medical im-
provement (MMI). Worker contended that
Employer should be estopped from asserting
a bar to his recovery under Section 52-1—

1. Nothing in the record indicates what the func-
tion of this agency is, including what, if anything,
the agency does with a person's social security
number. New Mexico New Hires has a website,
hittp://newhire-reporting.com/NM-Newhire/PAQ.

26(C) of modifier benefits because Employer
knew or should have known that Worker was
undocumented. The WCJ made no explicit
ruling on that issue. The WCJ rejected
Worker’s claim that Employer's return-to-
work offer was pretextual and that Worker
was denied equal protection of the law. We
hold that Worker was not entitled to modifier
benefits because Section 52-1-26(C) and (D)
are inapplicable to cases involving workers
with undocumented, illegal immigration sta-
tus, and because the Act does not provide for
modifier benefits except under the provisions
of those statutory subsections.

BACKGROUND

{2} Worker is an undocumented worker
who came from Mexico in 2003. He was
hired by Employer in February 2006, after
providing a false social security number on
his employment application. Teri Jinzo,
Employer’s office manager, gave persons
seeking employment, including Worker, an
application to fill out, and she received the
application from the applicants when they
returned it. Ms. Jinzo never had conversa-
tions with anyone, including workers, and in-
cluding Employer’s owner, Joe Spiess, to
whom she directly reported, about the need
to review documents showing an applicant’s
legal status to work in the United States.
She did not take it upon herself to look into
the legal status, nor did she attend any
training or seminars, or receive any written
materials in that regard. She would simply
give the applicant an application, who would
take it, fill it out, and return it to her, and
she would then give the application to a
foreman and from there the foreman “just
hired” the applicant.

{3} Ms. Jinzo’s practice for new hires was
to take the social security numbers they pro-
vided in the application and submit them to
New Mexico New Hires, an agency about
which Employer provides no explanation as
to whether it has any duty or conducts any
activity or investigation in regard to a work-
er’s undocumented status! New Mexico

aspx, which explains that employers are required
pursuant to state and federal law to report newly
hired and rehired employees to a state directory
within twenty days of their hire date. Nothing in
this website indicates that the reporting pertains

New Hires never informed her that any sub-
mitted social security numbers were illegiti-
mate. She never handed out employment
eligibility verification forms. As we discuss
later in this opinion, employers are required
under federal law to complete an employ-
ment eligibility verification form, also known
as an I-9 form.

{4} Worker testified that a friend called
“Panda,” who worked for Employer, helped
him fill out the employment application at
Employer’s office. According to Worker,
Panda wrote in Worker’s false social security
number that Worker provided, and no one
requested Worker to produce a social securi-
ty card.

{5} Mr. Spiess testified that immigration
was never discussed. Mr. Spiess stated that
“(if [the application] looked good, then they
would go ahead and hire.” Mr. Spiess was
not involved in the hiring of Worker. Mr.
Spiess stated that he had no reason to be-
lieve that Worker was undocumented during
the time Worker worked for Employer. Em-
ployer’s files did not contain a copy of Work-
ex’s social security card.

{6} In August 2006, Worker was injured
while working for Employer, rendering
Worker temporarily totally disabled. Work-
er was placed at MMI on August 30, 2007,
was assigned a 3% whole-person impairment.
based upon his injury, and was released back
to work with permanent lifting restrictions,
as well as “no climbing of ladders and no
extended bending.” Worker did not return
to work with Employer until January 2008,
when Employer offered him employment in a
modified capacity. A few weeks later, in late
January or early February 2008, Worker
stopped working for Employer. The WCJ
found that this was due to a combination of
Worker's inability to perform the tasks re-
quired of him, which often exceeded his med-
ical restrictions, and a slow down in work
available. On February 18, 2008, Worker
filed a complaint for workers’ compensation.

{7} Sometime between February and April
2008, Worker found part-time employment
that would accommodate his medical restric-

to undocumented workers. It pertains to a child
support income withholding order process and

309

tions cleaning a baseball stadium and earned
approximately $250 per week. Because the
work would be over once the baseball season
ended around September, Worker began
looking for another job in the summer of
2008.

{8} During 2007, Employer had a slow
down of business and laid off half of its
twenty-eight workers. By October 21, 2008,
Employer only had four workers left. Em-
ployer offered Worker a return to work by
letter from its attorneys on two separate
occasions, first on April 30, 2008, and a sec-
ond time on June 16, 2008. Worker testified
that after receiving one of the letters, he
went by Employer’s office and one of Em-
ployer’s workers communicated to Worker
that they had absolutely no work for Worker
whatsoever. Then, Worker’s attorney asked
Worker to go by Employer’s office once more
to pick up an employment application. On or
about June 20, 2008, Worker went to Em-
ployer’s office to pick up the application, but
instead of an application, Worker was given
an immigration status verification form.
Without knowing what it was, Worker took
the form to a person that could assist him in
filling out documents in English and that
person informed Worker that the document
was not an employment application. Worker
took the form back to Employer without
filling it out and requested an employment
application and, at that time, Mr. Spiess
asked to see Worker’s social security card
and driver’s license. Worker did not provide
any documents and left.

{9} Mr. Spiess testified that he did not
find out that Worker was undocumented until
the date Mr. Spiess was deposed in October
2008. Mr. Spiess further testified that even
when Employer’s workforce had been re-
duced to six or seven, or even, perhaps, four
employees when it made the offer, Worker
was a good employee and “well requested,”
and Employer would have been able to make
room for Worker had Worker been able to
provide proper documentation.

the collection of child support.

310

{10} Worker found employment at the Hi-
Lo Market in August 2008, which continued
at least through trial on April 16, 2009.
Worker was earning a weekly average salary
of $359.88 at the time he was injured while
working for Employer. The first time that.
Worker earned in excess of $359.88 after
MMI was the week ending on August 16,
2008, when he earned $587.75 at his new
employment with Hi-Lo Market.

{11} Employer filed a motion for partial
summary judgment arguing that because
Worker was undocumented and could not
accept Employer’s return to work offer,
Worker's partial permanent disability bene-
fits should be limited to Worker’s physical
impairment. The WCJ denied the motion,
and the case proceeded to a trial on the
merits. The WCJ addressed whether Work-
er’s illegal immigration status prevented him
from receiving modifier benefits, whether
Worker was entitled to permanent partial
disability benefits based on return to work,
and the rate at which Worker should be paid
if Worker were entitled to benefits.

{12} The WCJ concluded that Worker was
entitled to partial disability benefits com-
mencing August 30, 2007, Worker’s MMI
date, at the rate of 51% (8% impairment plus
48% modifier points) until June 20, 2008.
After June 20, 2008, the WCJ concluded,
Worker was entitled to receive benefits at
the rate of 83% impairment until conclusion of
the benefit period. The WCJ reasoned that
Worker was not entitled to modifier points
after June 20, 2008, because Worker could
not accept a bonafide return-to-work offer by
Employer due to Worker’s undocumented
status, which was equivalent to an unreason-
able refusal to a return-to-work offer. The
WC further found that Worker was also not
entitled to modifiers after Angust 10, 2008,
because, although he was employed by a
different employer, Worker began earning in
excess of his pre-injury wage after this date.
Employer did not in the district court and
does not on appeal contest Worker's entitle-
ment to permanent partial disability benefits
under the Act.

{13} Worker appeals arguing that (1) Em-
ployer should be estopped from raising the
issue of Worker’s immigration status because

Employer illegally hired Worker; (2) Worker
is not barred from receiving modifier bene-
fits because he is working for a different
employer earning more than he was when
employed by Employer; (3) Employer’s offer
to return to work was pretextual; and (4) the
decision of the WCJ violates Worker's equal
protection rights.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review

HN {14} “We review workers’ compen-
sation orders using the whole record stan-
dard of review.” Leonard v. Payday Profi,
2007-NMCA-128, 110, 142 N.M. 605, 168
P.3d 177. “In applying whole record review,
this Court reviews both favorable and unfa-
vorable evidence to determine whether there
is evidence that a reasonable mind could
accept as adequate to support the conclusions
reached by the fact finder.” Levario v. Ysi-
dro Villareal Labor Agency, 120 N.M. 734,
737, 906 P.2d 266, 269 (Ct.App.1995).
“Where the testimony is conflicting, the issue
on appeal is not whether there is evidence to
support a contrary result, but rather whether
the evidence supports the findings of the
trier of fact.” Tom Growney Equip. Co. v.
Jouett, 2005~NMSC-015, 118, 187 N.M. 497,
118 P.8d 320 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We review the interpreta-
tion of a statute de novo. Kahrs v. Sanchez,
1998-NMCA-087, 111, 125 N.M. 1, 956 P.2d
132.

The Workers’ Compensation Act

{15} The Act defines “worker” in Section
52-1-16(A) as “any person who has entered
into the employment of or works under con-
tract of service or apprenticeship with an
employer, except a person whose employ-
ment is purely casual and not for the purpose
of the employer’s trade or business.” The
Act nowhere expressly prohibits or excludes
undocumented workers from receiving bene-
fits provided by the Act. A reference to
denying benefits to a worker’s non-resident
alien dependents in Section 52-1-52, as the
section existed before it was amended in
1984, was deleted by the 1984 amendment
passed by the Legislature. N.M. Laws 1984,
ch. 95, § 1; see Pedrazea v. Sid Fleming
Contractor, Inc. 94 N.M. 59, 61-62, 607 P.2d

597, 599-600 (1980) (disqualifying the de-
ceased worker’s children from receiving
workers’ compensation benefits by the 1929
version of Section 52-1-52 that stated, “No
claim or judgment for compensation, under
this act ..., shall accrue to or be recovered
by relatives or dependents not residents of
the United States at the time of the injury of
such workman” (alteration omitted)). In its
place, the Legislature enacted a law that
protects all dependents regardless of their
residency. Section 52-1-52. In the present
case, Employer does not dispute that Worker
was entitled to permanent partial disability
benefits under the Act based on his physical
impairment. Nothing presented by Employ-
er indicates that undocumented workers are
precluded from receiving benefits under the
Act even if federal law prohibits the workers’
employment. In fact, the contrary appears
to be the case. See Boyd v. Permian Servic-
ing Co., 118 N.M. 821, 328, 825 P.2d 611, 613
(1992) (indicating that a worker hired in vio-
lation of the FLSA was still covered by the
Workers’ Compensation Act and subject to
its provisions).

{16} This Court has interpreted Section
52-1-26(C) and (D) to deny modifier benefits
to a worker who unreasonably refuses a re-
turn-to-work offer. Connick v. Cnty. of Ber-
nalillo, 1998-NMCA-060, 19-10, 17, 125
N.M. 119, 957 P.2d 1158 (holding that the
worker was entitled only to benefits based on
his impairment rating and not to disability
benefits based on the statutory modification
of his impairment rating because the work-
er’s incarceration effectively removed him
from the labor market and it would have
been futile for the employer to offer the
worker a job); Jeffrey v. Hays Plumbing &
Heating, 118 N.M. 60, 68-65, 878 P.2d 1009,
1012-14 (Ct.App.1994) (holding that the
worker’s refusal to accept an offer of employ-
ment based on his desire to start his own
business was not reasonable under Section
52-1-26(D) of the Act, thus affirming the
WCJ’s decision not to allow application of
benefit modifiers under Section 52-1-26(C)).

The Immigration Reform and Control Act

{17} The Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 (IRCA) and Hoffman Plastic

311

Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 187, 122
S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002), are cen-
tral to Worker’s claims. See generally Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, 8 C.F.R. § 274A
(1988, as amended through 2009); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (1952, as amended through 2009).
The objective of the IRCA is to discourage
illegal immigration by prohibiting the em-
ployment of unauthorized aliens. See 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (1952, as amended
through 2005). “IRCA forcefully made com-
bating the employment of illegal aliens cen-
tral to the policy of immigration law.” Hojf-
man Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147,
122 S.Ct. 1275 (alteration omitted) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

{18} The IRCA requires employers to ver-
ify before hiring “that the person is not an
unauthorized alien by examining specified
documents that establish the person’s identi-
ty and eligibility for employment in the Unit-
ed States and completing Form I-9, which
evidences that examination.” Cogue v. Wild-
flower Estates Developers, Inc. 58 A.D.3d 44,
867 N.Y.S.2d 158, 163 (2008); see also Reyes
v. Van Elk, Ltd., 148 Cal.App.4th 604, 56
Cal.Rptr.3d 68, 72 n. 4 (2007) (“The IRCA
requires employers to verify that each new
hire is authorized to work in the United
States. The employee must present docu-
ments establishing his or her identity and
employment authorization.”).

{19} In the present case, Employer pro-
vided no evidence that it used the required
I-9 forms, much less used any in connection
with Worker’s hire. “Form I-9, Employ-
ment Eligibility Verification Form, is a docu-
ment in which an employer hiring an individ-
ual for employment in the United States
attests under penalty of perjury that he has
verified, by examining certain documents,
that the employee is not an unauthorized
alien.” United States v. Ye, 588 F.8d 411,
412-13 n. 1 (7th Cir.2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1824(a)(b)); 8 C.F.R. § 2740.2). Em-
ployers are required to retain the I-9 form
for a specified period of time. Jd. (citing 8
US.C. § 1824(a)(b)(8)).

HMM {20} Under the IRCA, if the appli-

cant does not have the documents to prove
legal status, the applicant cannot be hired.

312 De

Hoffman Plastie Compounds, 535 U.S. at
148, 122 S.Ct. 1275. Employers who fail to
verify an applicant’s eligibility can be subject
to civil and criminal penalties. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1824(a)(1)(B)@), (e). “Similarly, if an em-
ployer unknowingly hires an unauthorized
alien, or if the alien becomes unauthorized
while employed, the employer is compelled to
discharge the worker upon discovery of the
worker’s undocumented status.” Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, 585 U.S. at 148, 122
S.Ct. 1275. “Regrettably, many employers
turn a blind eye to immigration status during
the hiring process; their aim is to assemble a
workforce that is both cheap to employ and
that minimizes their risk of being reported
for violations of statutory rights. Therefore,
employers have a perverse incentive to ig-
nore immigration laws at the time of hiring
but insist upon their enforcement when their
employees complain.” Rivera v. NIBCO,
Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir.2004).

{21} In regard to the incentive to ignore
immigration laws, cases dealing with reme-
dies available to undocumented workers un-
der the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
are illustrative. In Patel v. Quality Inn
South, 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir.1988), the
Court held that the IRCA did not purport to
limit an undocumented worker’s remedies for
unpaid wages available under the FLSA
since, if these workers were not covered un-
der the FLSA, employers would have an
incentive to hire them. Similarly, in Reyes,
56 Cal.Rptr.3d at 78, the California Court of
Appeals held that “(bly reducing the incen-
tive to hire [undocumented] workers[,] the
FLSA’s coverage of undocumented aliens
helps discourage illegal immigration and is
thus fully consistent with the objectives of
the IRCA.” (Internal quotation marks and
citation omitted.) See Singh v. Jutla & C.D.
& R’s Oil, Inc, 214 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1058
(N.D.Cal.2002) (reaching the same conclu-
sion).

HE {22} The IRCA does not preempt
workers’ compensation laws or otherwise
preclude states from providing compensation
benefits to undocumented workers. See
Dowling v. Slotnik, 244 Conn. 781, 712 A.2d
396, 404 (1998); Econ. Packing Co. v. Ill.
Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 387 Il.App.3d 288,

327 Ill.Dec. 182, 901 N.E.2d 915, 928 (2008);
Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md.
718, 882 A.2d 817, 827-28 (2005); Correa v.
Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 824, 329
(Minn.2003); Rosa v. Partners in Progress,
Inc, 152 N.H. 6, 868 A.2d 994, 1000, 1002
(2005); Cogue, 867 N.Y.S.2d at 162; Balbue-
na v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d 338, 812
N.Y.S.2d 416, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1257 (2006).

Worker’s Estoppel-Based Argument
{23} In summary judgment proceedings
before trial, Worker argued that Employer’s
unlawful hiring practices should estop Em-
ployer from asserting Worker’s immigration
status to avoid paying modifiers. Worker
attempted to support this point through evi-
dence, which the WCJ declined to admit, that
Employer either knew or should have known
of the illegal immigrant status of Worker
because other workers were from Mexico,
did not speak any English, and admitted to
each other their illegal status. In his re-
quested findings of fact, Worker asserted
that “Employer did not follow the law
against hiring illegal workers such that Em-
ployer and its insurer are estopped from
asserting the doctrine of voluntary [underem-
ployment] due to illegal status.” In his clos-
ing argument at trial, Worker argued that
Employer was careless when hiring workers.
{24} On appeal, in his brief in chief, Work-
er cites Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board, 570 Pa. 464,
810 A.2d 99 (2002). Referring to the lower
court’s opinion in that case, the court in
Reinforced Earth stated:
The court reasoned that all that would do
is reward an employer who failed to prop-
erly ascertain an employee’s immigration
status at the time of hire, and potentially
subvert any public policy against illegal
immigration because employers may ac-
tively seek out illegal aliens rather than
citizens or legal residents because they will
not be forced to insure against or absorb
the costs of work-related injuries.
Id. at 108 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted). The court in Reinforced
Earth affirmed the lower court, but on differ-
ent grounds. Jd. at 104, 109. Based in part
on Reinforced Earth, Worker states on ap-

peal that it was “[inequitable] for Employer
to assert [its] defense of unauthorized alien
status due to its negligent hiring practice,
estoppel, waiver, unclean hands, [and] lach-
es.”

{25} In its answer brief, Employer did not
address Worker’s assertions of estoppel,
Worker’s contention that Employer’s hiring
practice was careless, or Worker’s indication
through his discussion of Reinforced Earth
that, in ignoring Worker’s immigration sta-
tus, Employer subverted public policy. Em-
ployer addressed only Worker's assertion of
waiver based on “the fact that Employer
hired Worker when Worker was undocu-
mented.” Employer contends that “(i]t
would be unjust to punish Employer simply
because Worker used fake documents that
were able to escape Employer’s detection
through reasonable methods.” Employer re-
lies on Cenvill Development Corp. v. Cande-
lo, 478 So.2d 1168, 1169-70 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
1985), pointing out that in Cenvill Develop-
ment “an undocumented worker argued that
the employer should be estopped from as-
serting [the] worker’s undocumented status
as a defense to [the] worker’s claims because
[the] employer originally hired [the] worker
even though he was undocumented.” Em-
ployer further states that the court in Cenvill
Development “rejected that argument stating
that employers should be estopped from rais-
ing a defense based on [a] worker’s immigra-
tion status only if the employer knew or
should have known ... of [the] worker's
undocumented status.” In reply, after dis-
cussing Cenvill Development, Worker states
that “Employer should have known this
Spanish[-]speaking laborer without a [slocial
[slecurity [card] to copy was likely not docu-
mented in the New Mexico labor market.”

An Undocumented Worker Is Not Entitled
to Modifier Benefits

TI {26} In our view, for the reason we
discuss later in this opinion, Section 52-1-26,
the rationales of Connick and Jeffrey, the bar
of estoppel, and Worker’s employment with
another employer, are simply not applicable
to the cireumstance involving whether an
injured, undocumented worker is entitled to
modifier benefits.

313

{27} Nothing in the Act precludes an in-
jured, undocumented worker from receiving
temporary or permanent disability benefits
and medical expenses. Modification of a per-
manent partial disability rating, however, is
specifically addressed in Section 52~1-26’s
provisions. Section 52~-1-26(C) states that
“[plermanent partial disability shall be deter-
mined by calculating the worker’s impair-
ment as modified by his age, education and
physical capacity, pursuant to Sections 52-1-
26.1 through 52-1-26.4[.)” But the impair-
ment will not be subject to the modifications
calculated pursuant to those sections where
the employer offers to rehire and the worker
“returns to work at a wage equal to or
greater than the worker’s pre-injury wage[.]”
Section 52-1-26(D). Thus, under the return-
to-work circumstance, a worker’s permanent
partial disability rating can be limited to a
rating equal to his impairment only, without
the modifiers. Jd.

HMMM {28} The Act “provides statutory
incentives to both employers and employees
to encourage return to work with minimal
dependence on compensation rewards.”
Lackey v. Darrell Julian Constr, 1998-
NMCA-121, 120, 125 N.M. 592, 964 P.2d
158. Section 52-1-26 benefits both employ-
ers and workers. An employer is encour-
aged to make a rehire offer because it re-
lieves the employer of the obligation to pay
modifier benefits. An injured worker is en-
couraged to get off workers’ compensation by
returning to work with a wage that is at or
above his pre-injury wage. As we stated in
Connick:

The statutory incentive to return to work

is unmistakable. The [Llegislatwre has ex-

plicitly stated that the policy and purpose
behind this legislation is to provide every
person who suffers a compensable injury
with resulting permanent partial disability

... the opportunity to return to gainful

employment as soon as possible with mini-

mal dependence on compensation awards.
Connick, 1998-NMCA-060, 16, 125 N.M.
119, 957 P.2d 1153 (omission in original) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A worker does not have to search for other
employment. Read as a whole, Section 52-
1-26 does not unconditionally grant modifier

314

benefits. When the pre-injury employer of-
fers to rehire at or above pre-injury wage,
the worker will lose modifier benefits if he
unreasonably refuses to accept the offer.
Connick, 1998-NMCA-060, 119-10, 17, 125
N.M. 119, 957 P.2d 1158; Jeffrey, 118 N.M.
at 63-65, 878 P.2d at 1012-14; see also Rein-
forced Earth, 810 A.2d at 108 (holding that
where the worker, as an unauthorized alien,
could not apply for or accept employment,
the worker’s loss of earning power was
caused by his immigration status and not his
work-related injury and therefore the em-
ployer was not required to show job availabil-
ity as a condition precedent to suspending
the worker’s benefits).

{29} Where, as here, an employer is legal-
ly forbidden to rehire a worker because the
worker is undocumented, we doubt that the
Legislature intended Section 52-1-26 to nev-
ertheless apply to allow the worker to receive
modifier benefits. Where the pre-injury em-
ployer knew or should have known of the
injured worker’s undocumented status, the
employer cannot make a bona fide rehire
offer. An offer as contemplated in Section
52-1-26 by a pre-injury employer to rehire
an injured, undocumented worker would in
that instance be illusory, if not a ruse. Un-
der the IRCA, it would be unlawful for the
employer to rehire the worker.

{30} Because the parties in their initial
briefs on appeal approached the Section 52-
1-26 issues with arguments relating to Con-
nick, Jeffrey, and estoppel, this Court initial-
ly analyzed the issues as argued by the par-
ties. In doing so, we determined that we
were unable rationally and without tortured
analysis to decide the issues within the con-
straints of those arguments. It became clear
to the Court that the arguments and con-
straints were unworkable under Section 52-
1-26 given that an employer is legally forbid-
den from offering to rehire and, therefore,
unless the employer made an illegal, illusory,
or bogus offer, an undocumented worker
would automatically be entitled to modifier
benefits. In the Court’s view, the Legisla-
ture had not contemplated this circumstance
and the Court should leave the issue for
legislative consideration.

HI {81} In addressing these views,
Worker argues in supplemental briefing that
to hold Section 52-1-26 inapplicable would
violate “the application of the policy of equal
protection,” the fact that there exists “no
statutory denial of benefits,” and the fact
that “federal immigration law [does] not fa-
vor[ ] employers benefitting from violation of
law.” Worker contends that to hold Section
52-1-26 inapplicable is “perverse” because it
encourages employers to rehire injured
workers but then allows employers to benefit
by paying less to injured workers they ille-
gally employed, and is “morally inequitably
wrong” because it “devise[s] a system of
compensation where most of the measured
disability is denied a worker,” and thus fun-
damental fairness and equal protection of the
law are undermined unless Section 52-1-26
is employed and estoppel is applied to pre-
vent an unjust result. To support his denial
of equal protection position, Worker cites
Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools, 2005-
NMSC-028, 119-10, 28, 188 N.M. 381, 120
P.3d 418, which held that the Workers’ Com-
pensation Act resulted in dissimilar treat-
ment of similarly situated workers, namely,
treatment of persons with mental disabilities
or physical impairments, and therefore vio-
lated the New Mexico’s Equal Protection
Clause, requiring intermediate scrutiny be-
cause persons with mental disability consti-
tute a sensitive class.

{32} We are not persuaded by Worker’s
fairness and policy arguments, nor are we
persuaded by his reliance on Breen. We fail
to see how our interpretation of the Act and
of Section 52~1-26 in particular rises to a
constitutional level in any respect. It is clear
to us that Worker’s undocumented status
does not fall into a similarly situated catego-
ry necessary for an equal protection applica-
tion. Even were he to fit into such a catego-
ry, he is not a suspect class and the scrutiny
required would be rational scrutiny. See
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S, 202, 219 n. 19, 102
S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (stating
that undocumented workers are a distinct
group by virtue of their voluntary act of
entering this country illegally, and they are
not a suspect class). Worker presents no
argument relating to rational scrutiny.

{33} In sum, we cannot ignore the inappli-
cability of Section 52-1-26 and simply pro-
ceed to analyze the issues as framed by the
parties in their briefs and determine whether
Connick and Jeffrey preclude Worker from
recovery of modifier benefits under Section
52-1-26, whether Employer is estopped from
raising Connick and Jeffrey, and whether
Worker would be entitled to modifier bene-
fits even though he earned more than his
pre-injury wage when he went to work for
another employer. We therefore hold that
Worker was not entitled to modifier benefits.
The WCJ’s denial of modifier benefits was
right, albeit for a reason that is different
than what we express in this opinion. See,
eg. Ideal v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co.,
2010~NMSC-022, 119, 148 N.M. 228, 283
P.8d 862 (stating that “a district court’s deci-
sion will be upheld as long as the right result
was reached, even if the court reached the
decision for the wrong reason”).
CONCLUSION

{34} We affirm the WCJ’s denial of Sec-
tion 52-1-26 modifier benefits.

{85} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER,
and MICHAEL D, BUSTAMANTE, Judges.

2011-NMCA-026
258 P.3d 1107
CHISOS, LTD., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

JKM ENERGY, L.L.C., Defendant—
Appellee.

No. 29,265.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Jan. 13, 2011.

315

Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP,
Barry F. Cannaday, Dallas, TX, Marek &
Francis, P.A., Jay L. Francis, Carlsbad, NM,
for Appellant.

Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, L.L.P.,
Richard E. Olson, Jared A. Hembree, Ros-
well, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} This case involves a dispute over the
ownership of certain interests in two oil
wells—the Stetson well and the HL2 well—
both of which are located in the W/2 of
Section 2, Township 19 South, Range 29
East, N.MLP.M., Eddy County, New Mexico
(the W/2 of Section 2). The case presents
two issues: (1) Did the “Conveyance and Bill
of Sale” Appellant Chisos, Ltd. (Chisos), and
Appellee JKM Energy, L.L.C. (JKM) en-
tered into convey all of Chisos’ operating
rights in the W/2 of Section 2, or did it
convey rights only in the Stetson well? (2)
Is the district court’s finding that Chisos
failed—in bad faith—to give JKM proper
notice of its intent to “recomplete the HL2
Well” supported by substantial evidence?

{2} After a bench trial on the merits, the
district court found the conveyance to be
ambiguous and interpreted it as a convey-
ance of all of Chisos’ rights in the W/2 of
Section 2. The district court also ordered
Chisos to provide JKM with an accounting of
the costs and revenues of the HL2 well and

317

an opportunity to retroactively elect to par-
ticipate. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

{3} On August 17, 2005, Jack Matthews,
president of JKM, made an offer to Sue Ann
Craddock, president of Chisos, to purchase
“the Stetson # 1 in Eddy County, New Mexi-
co” for $48,000. The offer indicated that
JKM desired to obtain “100% of the [working
interest] and all of the [net revenue inter-
est].” Chisos countered that it would be
willing to “sell [JKM a] 100% Working Inter-
est and a 75% Net Revenue Interest for
$55,000.”

{4} JKM prepared a conveyance for the
deal. The conveyance was for the entire W/2
of Section 2, not simply for the Stetson well.
Both the Stetson well and the HL2 well were
located in the W/2 of Section 2. The HL2 well
was one of dozens of wells that could be seen
from the Stetson well. Although Matthews
had worked on the HL2 well before, he was
not aware at the time he made the offer that
it was in the W/2 of Section 2.

{5} Craddock was not satisfied with the
conveyance. She testified that she called
Matthews and clearly explained that Chisos
was willing to make a wellbore conveyance
only. Matthews testified that a call took
place, but that Craddock was worried mainly
about a royalty override. The district court
found Matthews to be more credible. Crad-
dock prepared a new conveyance, which she
signed and forwarded to Matthews. Crad-
dock testified that her intent in preparing
this new conveyance was to convey only the
wellbore. Starting with the original convey-
ance, Craddock added sections from other
documents in her possession and removed or
changed language she felt was inappropriate.
Matthews signed the “Conveyance and Bill of
Sale” forwarded by Craddock and recorded it
on September 80, 2005. A copy of the docu-
ment is attached as Appendix 1.

{6} The HL2 and Stetson wells were sub-
ject to a joint operating agreement (JOA).
At the time the JOA was executed, Pure
Energy Group, Ine. (Pure) had a 50% inter-
est in both wells, and Bellwether Exploration
Company (Bellwether) also had a 50% inter-
est in both wells. Chisos acquired Bellweth-

318

er’s interest when it purchased the W/2 of
Section 2. Among other things, the JOA
contained a procedure for parties to elect
whether to participate in the drilling and
reworking of the wells. Ifa party elected to
participate, it would share the costs of the
work. If it elected not to participate, the
participating parties would receive its share
of the profits from the well until those profits
amounted to six times the non-consenting
party’s share of the participation costs.

{7} About two months after the convey-
ance was recorded, Chisos received notice
from the State of New Mexico that the HL2
well had shown no production for the previ-
ous twelve months. Chisos understood this
notification to mean that it was required to
either plug the HL2 well or return it to
production. In August 2006 Chisos obtained
a non-consent election from Pure in anticipa-
tion of bringing the HL2 well back online.
Chisos then sent a crew to the HL2 well to
fracture the well. On October 19, 2006, Mat-
thews saw the crew and informed them that
Chisos was trespassing on his well. Chisos
immediately stopped work on the HL2 well.

{8} Chisos filed its lawsuit against JKM on
November 2, 2006. Several months later,
Chisos decided to proceed with the work,
apparently assuming that JKM had no inter-
est in the HL2 well. On March 13, 2007, in
lieu of obtaining another letter of non-con-
sent, Chisos acquired a limited term assign-
ment of Pure’s rights in the HL2 well. Chi-
sos also arranged for a workover rig to be at
the HL2 well by May 8, 2007. Once again,
Matthews only learned of the work on the
HL2 well when he happened to be on site
and noticed it. JKM communicated to Chi-
sos that, pursuant to this litigation, JKM
asserted rights in the well. Chisos respond-
ed by sending JKM an election letter. The
letter, which purported to give JKM forty-
eight hours to make its decision, was faxed
late on a Friday afternoon and required JKM
to commit almost $170,000 or elect not to
participate. The forty-eight-hour deadline
was based on a provision of the JOA that
allowed for a reduced deadline if a drilling
rig was on the premises. The letter claimed
that this provision applied because a “drill-
ing/workover” rig was on the premises.

Craddock testified that the rig was a work-
over rig, and that drilling rigs and workover
rigs were not the same.

IL DISCUSSION

{9} On appeal, Chisos raises questions
about the interpretation of the conveyance
and about the obligations of the parties un-
der the joint operating agreement. We ad-
dress the issues in the order they were
raised.

A. Ambiguity of the Conveyance

HMM {10} Chisos contends that the dis-
trict court’s conclusion that the “Conveyance
and Bill of Sale” was ambiguous was in error.
Ambiguity exists if the contract is “reason-
ably and fairly susceptible of different con-
structions.” Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 114
N.M. 778, 781, 845 P.2d 1232, 1235 (1998). A
court may hear evidence of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the contract in
order to determine if it is unclear. CR.
Anthony Co. v. Loretio Mall Partners, 112
N.M. 504, 508-09, 817 P.2d 288, 242-43
(1991). In fact, “{w]ithout a full examination
of the circumstances surrounding the making
of the agreement, ambiguity or lack thereof
often cannot properly be discerned.” Mark
V, 114 N.M. at 781, 845 P.2d at 1235. The
existence of ambiguity is an issue of law that
we review de novo. Id. at 782, 845 P.2d at
1286.

HM {11} The circumstances surrounding
the making of the contract were discussed at
length at trial. The original conveyance pre-
pared by JKM was for the entire W/2 of
Section 2. Craddock testified that Chisos
desired to convey only the Stetson well. To
accomplish this, Craddock asserted she modi-
fied the original conveyance, incorporating
fragments from other assignments she had
used previously. The district court conclud-
ed that under these circumstances, Chisos
was aware of JKM’s intent, but JKM was not
aware of Chisos’ intent.

{12} Craddock’s modifications created sig-
nificant ambiguities. As Craddock observed,
her modified conveyance contained language
referring to a lease and to the conveyance of
operating rights that she should have re-

moved. Chisos’ own expert testified that
“there were some questions in [his] mind as
to exactly what the parties intended with
some of the language that they used.” Chi-
sos’ expert also frequently referenced the
document’s ambiguity. On cross-examina-
tion, Chisos’ attorney led JKM’s landman
expert Carl Shellinger to admit that the con-
veyance was “very ambiguous” and that “rea-
sonable people could interpret it either way.”
Chisos’ cross-examination of JKM’s legal ex-
pert, Phil Brewer, also resulted in admissions
that the conveyance was confusing and am-
biguous. Brewer also testified at length as
to the impediments to clear title that the
conveyance language caused.

{13} Chisos asserts that this issue “was
preserved in the court below through [rJe-
quested [findings of [fJact and [conclusions
of [Ilaw.” We harbor some concern about
this assertion. Chisos began its opening ar-
gument by noting that “[bJoth sides agree
that there is [sic] some potential ambiguities
in the conveyance.” Chisos made JKM’s ex-
perts admit the conveyance was ambiguous.
And Chisos requested a conclusion of law
that the conveyance was “ambiguous on its
face.” In fact, the only time at trial that
Chisos suggested the document was not am-
biguous was during its closing statement.
Perhaps these persistent attempts to obtain
a result opposite to the one Chisos now advo-
eates could be said to have “fairly invoked a
ruling ... on the same grounds argued in the
appellate court.” Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc,
106 N.M. 492, 496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App.
1987). However, even if this were true, “[a]
party who has contributed ... to perceived
shortcomings in a [district] court’s ruling
should hardly be heard to complain about
those shortcomings on appeal.” Cordova v.
Taos Ski Valley, Inc. 121 N.M. 258, 263, 910
P.2d 334, 389 (Ct.App.1995),

{14} In any event, it is clear that the
conveyance is ambiguous. Ultimately, no-
body who testified was willing to state that
the conveyance was unambiguous. Chisos’
expert thought it was closer to a wellbore
assignment. JKM’s experts thought it was
closer to an assignment of lease or operating
rights. We agree with the district court that.
neither interpretation is necessarily wrong.

319

Since the conveyance is reasonably suscepti-
ble to different constructions, we conclude
that it is ambiguous.

B. Interpretation of the Conveyance

HM {15} Chisos next contends that the
district court erred in determining that the
ambiguous language was not a wellbore as-
signment. We have said that “[oJnce [an]
agreement is found to be ambiguous, the
meaning to be assigned the unclear terms is
a question of fact.” Mark V, 114 N.M. at
781, 845 P.2d at 1235, Factual issues include
evidence which is “in dispute, turns on wit-
ness credibility, or is susceptible of conflict-
ing inferences.” C.R. Anthony, 112 N.M. at
510, 817 P.2d at 244. “We review factual
questions for substantial evidence. Substan-
tial evidence is relevant evidence that a rea-
sonable mind would find adequate to support
a conclusion.” Sitterly v. Matthews, 2000-
NMCA-087, 122, 129 N.M. 134, 2 P.8d 871
(citation omitted).

HN s{16} When the parties attach dif-
ferent meanings to the same terms, we apply
the test from the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 201 (1981) (Restatement) to de-
termine their meaning. Farmington Police
Officers Ass’n v. City of Farmington, 2006-
NMCA-077, 117, 1389 N.M. 750, 187 P.38d
1204. The Restatement provides that

(2) Where the parties have attached differ-

ent meanings to a promise or agreement

or a term thereof, it is interpreted in ac-
cordance with the meaning attached by
one of them if at the time the agreement
was made
(a) that party did not know of any dif-
ferent meaning attached by the other,
and the other knew the meaning at-
tached by the first party; or
(b) that party had no reason to know of
any different meaning attached by the
other, and the other had reason to know
the meaning attached by the first party.
Restatement § 201(2). This inquiry is a
question of law based on findings of fact.
“We review legal questions de novo.” Con-
sol. Elec. Distribs, Inc. v. Santa Fe Hotel
Group, LLC, 2006-NMCA-005, 17, 188 N.M.
‘781, 126 P.3d 1145.

320

{17} Applying Restatement Section 201,
the district court concluded that the convey-
ance should be interpreted in favor of JKM.
The district court provided findings of fact to
support its conclusion. First, it found that
“Chisos knew or had reason to know that
JKM intended for the Conveyance and Bill of
Sale ... to be a conveyance of all of Chisos’
operating rights in the W/2 of Section 2.”
Second, it found that “JKM did not know or
have reason to know that Chisos intended
the Conveyance and Bill of Sale ... to be a
producing wellbore assignment only.” These
findings would support a decision in favor of
JKM under either Section 201(2)(a) or Sec-
tion 201(2)(b) of the Restatement.

HM {18} The district court did not err if
these findings of fact are supported by sub-
stantial evidence. We first examine the dis-
trict court’s finding that Chisos knew or had
reason to know that JKM intended the con-
veyance to encompass all of Chisos’ operating
rights covering in the W/2 of Section 2.
Both parties agree that the original convey-
ance sent by JKM to Chisos was a convey-
ance of operating rights covering all of W/2
of Section 2. The only evidence suggesting
that JKM’s intentions might have changed
was Craddock’s testimony regarding her
phone conversation with Matthews prior to
changing the conveyance. However, the dis-
trict court did not credit this testimony. We
cannot second-guess the district court’s deci-
sion in this regard. We conclude that this
evidence is adequate to support at least the
conclusion that Chisos should have known of
the meaning attached by JKM.

{19} We next examine the district court's
finding that JKM was unaware of Chisos’
intent. The district court found that Crad-
dock had never informed Matthews of Chi-
sos’ intent to convey only the wellbore. Al-
though Craddock and Matthews presented
conflicting testimony on this point, the dis-
trict court found Matthews to be more credi-
ble. As this finding relates to witness credi-
bility, we defer to the fact finder. See State
v Quintana, 2009-NMCA-115, 122, 147
N.M. 169, 218 P.3d 87. Furthermore, Mat-
thews was not aware that any other wells
were on the W/2 of Section 2. The experts
also noted that wellbore conveyances were

uncommon. Accordingly, Matthews had no
reason to think that Craddock was proposing
a wellbore conveyance. To the extent that
Chisos argues that the use of well names in
various communications put JKM on notice
of Chisos’ intent, we note that JKM’s experts
testified that it was common for parties to
refer to properties by well name. Chisos’
expert said this was not common, but con-
ceded that Matthews might have used the
term that way. Under these conditions, we
conclude that the district court’s finding that
Craddock’s changes to the conveyance
“would not have reasonably prompted ...
Matthews to think that the transaction in-
volved only a wellbore interest” is supported
by substantial evidence.

{20} Because we conclude that a reason-
able mind would find the above evidence
adequate to support the district court’s find-
ings of fact, the findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Applying Section 201
of the Restatement, we hold that the district
court did not err in assigning to the convey-
ance the meaning intended by JKM. Further,
given that significant evidence addressing the
meaning of the conveyance was presented at
trial, we need not address Chisos’ argument
about canons of construction. See Mark V,
114 N.M. at 782, 845 P.2d at 1236 (observing
that canons of construction may be used to
interpret contracts as a matter of law when
no evidence is presented to decide the issues
as a matter of fact). Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s interpretation of the
“Conveyance and Bill of Sale.”

C. Breach of the Operating Agreement

HM {21} Chisos appeals the district
court’s conclusion that it violated its obli-
gations under Section VIA of the JOA and
under the Oil Conservation Division (OCD)
regulation 19.15.3.104. “Breach of contract
is a question of fact that we review under a
substantial evidence standard.” Collado v.
City of Albuquerque, 2002-NMCA-048, 1115,
132 N.M. 138, 45 P.3d 73.

{22} The district court found that the con-
veyance made JKM a party to the JOA. As
such, JKM was “entitled to the protections
and rights provided therein.” By virtue of
its limited term acquisition of Pure’s interest

in the HL2 well, Chisos was also a party to
the JOA. Under Section VI.A.1 of the JOA,
Chisos was required to give JKM notice of
its intent to recomplete the HL2 well and
allow JKM thirty days to elect whether or
not to participate in the operations. Howev-
er, the district court determined that Chisos
did not provide the required notice, but in-
stead “made a disingenuous and bad faith
attempt to force JKM to opt out of the
operations in regard to HL2, and contrary to
the JOA, gave JKM only [forty-eight] hours
to commit to the expenditure of $170,000.”
JKM did not respond to the notice. Chisos
went ahead with the operations and, between
August 2007 and May 2008, the HL2 well
produced $367,539 of product. The district
court ordered Chisos to prepare an account-
ing of all costs and proceeds of the HL2 well
and to give JKM at least thirty days to elect
either to pay its 50% share of the costs or to
elect not to participate under the JOA.

{23} Chisos argues that the district court’s
finding that it had violated Section VI.A.2 of
the JOA was in error because of language in
that section that states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of this Sec-

tion VI.A.2,, it is agreed that without the

mutual consent of the parties, no wells

shall be completed in or produced from a

source of supply from which a well located

elsewhere on the Contract Area is produc-
ing, unless the well conforms to the then-
existing well spacing pattern for such
source of supply.
Chisos maintains that returning the HL2
well to production conformed with the then-
existing spacing pattern. However, Section
VI.A.2 only applies if “either party receiving
a notice elects not to participate in the pro-
posed operation.”

HM {24} Election can only happen after
notice. The district court’s findings were
directed to the inadequacy of Chisos’ notice
to JKM. Notice is governed by Section VI.
A.1, which requires a party desiring to re-
work a well to provide thirty-days written
notice of proposed operations. As discussed
below in the discussion of bad faith, there is
substantial evidence that Chisos could have
provided such notice but did not. Because
the district court’s finding of breach related

321

to the notice provisions found in Section VI.
A.l, this same evidence is substantial evi-
dence of breach.

{25} Chisos also argues that the district
court erred in finding that Chisos violated
19.15.8.104(C)(2) NMAC (10/21/2001) (re-
placed by 19.15.15.10 NMAC (12/01/2008)),
which regulates well spacing in Eddy Coun-
ty. Chisos contends that this is important
because of language in the JOA stating that

[nJotwithstanding the provisions of this

Section VI.A.2, it is agreed that without

the mutual consent of the parties, no wells

shall be completed in or produced from a

source of supply from which a well located

elsewhere on the Contract Area is produc-
ing, unless the well conforms to the then
existing well spacing pattern for such
source of supply.
But this language appears in Section VI.A.2
of the JOA, which describes the procedures
for non-consent operations. Because the
breach issue depends on Section VI.A.1, not
Section VI.A.2, this finding does not. affect
the outcome in any way. Accordingly, we
decline to disturb this finding. See In re
Estate of Heeter, 113 N.M. 691, 695, 881 P.2d
990, 994 (Ct.App.1992) (“On appeal, error will
not be corrected if it will not change the
result.”).
D. Bad Faith and Retroactive Election

HS «{26} In its final argument, Chi-
sos contends that the district court erred in
finding that it acted in bad faith and that, as
a consequence, the district court erred in
ordering Chisos to provide JKM a retroac-
tive opportunity to participate in the HL2
well. The district court found that Chisos’
letter giving JKM forty-eight hours to con-
sent to work on the HL2 well and to contrib-
ute $170,000 related to that work was sent in
bad faith. Chisos argues that this finding
was “inexplicable.” In the contracts context,
bad faith exists when the “breaching party is
consciously aware of, and proceeds with de-
liberate disregard for, the potential of harm
to the other party.” Paiz v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 118 N.M. 203, 218, 880 P.2d 300,
310 (1994). The issue of bad faith is a factual
question that we review for substantial evi-
dence. McKay v. Farmers & Stockmens

322

Bank of Clayton, 92 N.M. 181, 183, 585 P.2d
325, 327 (Ct.App.1978). Certainly, a finding
of bad faith that was “inexplicable” would not
be supported by substantial evidence.

HMM {27} Nevertheless, the record does
provide an explanation. Even before it
learned of the dispute, Chisos intended to
work on the HL2 well. It stopped work for
several months when it learned of the possi-
bility that it might have no ownership inter-
est in the well. However, in March 2007 it
proceeded, disregarding this possibility. It
procured the limited term assignment from
Pure in order to continue with the rework.
For two months, it did not give JKM the
thirty-day notice required by the JOA.
However, during that time it did arrange for
a workover rig to be sent to the well. Once
the rig was in place, it attempted to pass the
workover rig off as a “drilling/workover” rig
that would trigger the forty-eight-hour notice
provision in the JOA applicable to drilling
rigs. Chisos knew that the rig was not a
drilling rig. Chisos also knew that JKM
asserted ownership of the HL2 well. And,
despite the fact that the rig was on site
earlier in the week, Chisos sent the letter

late on a Friday. These facts are substantial
evidence supporting a finding of bad faith.

{28} By upholding the bad faith finding,
we dispose of Chisos’ argument that the or-
der for a retroactive election was improper.
Upholding the bad faith finding also disposes
of Chisos’ argument that JKM was not enti-
tled to an equitable remedy. See Romero v.
Bank of the Sw., 2008-NMCA-124, 1137-88,
1835 N.M. 1, 88 P.8d 288. Chisos also cites to
no authority in support of this argument,
which appears only in the heading and in the
last. sentence of the section. We need not.
and do not address arguments that are not
supported by authority. See ITT Educ.
Servs. Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't,
1998-NMCA-078, 110, 125 N.M. 244, 959
P.2d 969,

TL. CONCLUSION

{29} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the district court’s decision.

{30} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: RODERICK T.
KENNEDY and MICHAEL E. VIGIL,
Judges.

2011-NMCA-027 No. 29,085.
258 P.3d 1118
UNTY OF LOS ALAM Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Plaintiff—Appellant,

¥ Feb. 7, 2011.

John Paul MARTINEZ and Michael
Dickman, Defendants,
Robbie Stibbard, as President of the Los

Alamos Firefighters Association
Local # 3279, Appellee.

Mary McInerny, County Attorney, Los Al-
amos, NM, Charles Rennick, LLC, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellant.

328

Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, LLP,
§. Barry Paisner, Santa Fe, NM, for Appel-
lee.

OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

{1} In this appeal, we review the district
court's order denying Plaintiff's, County of
Los Alamos (County), motion for summary
judgment and granting Intervenor'’s, Los Al-
amos Firefighters Association Local #3279
(Union), cross-motion for summary judg-
ment. The district court determined that
paramedic training contracts are subjects of
mandatory bargaining and that the County
may not unilaterally enter into such contracts
with Union members without including the
Union in its negotiations. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the decision of the
district court.

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendants John Paul Martinez and
Michael Dickman (Defendants) were em-
ployees of the Los Alamos County Fire De-
partment and members of the Union. De-
fendants were accepted to participate in a
voluntary paramedic training program at
Eastern New Mexico University in Roswell,
New Mexico. The County offered contracts
to Defendants called housing agreements,
which Defendants entered into with the
County. The contracts provided that the
County would allow Defendants to continue
their employment on paid status with full
salary while they attended the paramedic
training, that it would provide per diem or
reimbursement for lodging, meals, and trav-
el, and that it would make a vehicle avail-
able to them to drive to and from Roswell.

{3} Defendants agreed that in return they
would comply with several provisions in the
contract, including maintaining employment
as firefighter paramedics with the County for
at least two years after completion of the
fourteen-month training program. A failure
to abide by the terms of the contract could
result in disciplinary action up to and includ-
ing termination. Further, Defendants
agreed that if they failed to complete the
training or maintain employment with the
County as provided by the contract, they

would reimburse the County for all expenses
incurred by the County associated with the
training. The County could, in its sole dis-
eretion, waive the reimbursement require-
ment for good cause shown.

{4} Both Defendants executed a contract.
with the County, and both completed the
paramedic training program. Martinez
signed his contract and remained employed
with the County for seven months after com-
pleting the program. He then voluntarily
left his employment without making reim-
bursement. Dickman signed his contract
and remained employed for six months after
completing the program. He also voluntarily
left his employment without making reim-
bursement.

{5} The County and the Union were par-
ties to a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) that covered Defendant’s bargaining
unit, effective January 1, 2004, through De-
cember 31, 2005. The CBA contained provi-
sions relating to wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment. The paramedic
training contracts, however, were not cov-
ered by the CBA.

{6} In addition to the specific provisions
relating to wages, hours, and terms and con-
ditions of employment, the CBA contained a
management-rights clause that gave manage-
ment certain specific operational and policy
rights, as well as “all rights not specifically
limited by this [CBAJ].” Finally, the CBA
contained a “zipper clause,” which provided
that the CBA was the “complete and only
agreement between the parties,” that all the
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
had been “discussed and negotiated upon,”
and that each party waived the right “to
bargain collectively with respect to any sub-
ject matter not specifically referred to or
covered in [the CBA.]”

{7} The County filed suit against Defen-
dants for breach of contract and restitution.
Some months later, in early 2007, the Union
moved to intervene through its President,
Robbie Stibbard. The motion was approved
in a stipulated order permitting intervention
and a complaint was filed. The complaint in
intervention requested a declaratory judg-
ment that the paramedic training contracts

were void because the issue involved a sub-
ject of mandatory bargaining that had not
been negotiated with the Union and the con-
tracts were therefore unenforceable.

{8} The County and the Union subse-
quently filed motions for summary judgment,
and a hearing was held on both motions.
After the hearing, the district court granted
the Union’s motion for summary and declara-
tory judgment and denied the County’s mo-
tion for summary judgment. The district
court entered an order on the two summary
judgment motions as well as a stipulated
order dismissing all the remaining claims of
the parties. This appeal timely followed.

{9} The County raises four issues on ap-
peal: (1) the district court erred in granting
the Union’s motion for summary judgment
on the basis that the paramedic training con-
tracts contained terms and conditions of em-
ployment that are subjects of mandatory
bargaining; (2) the district court erred in de-
nying the County’s motion for summary
judgment based on the employer's right to
negotiate paramedic training contracts pur-
suant to its management-rights authority;
(8) the district court erred in granting the
Union’s motion for summary judgment inso-
far as a balancing of interests presents a
genuine issue of material fact; and (4) the
district court erred in denying the County's
motion for summary judgment based on the
Union’s waiver of bargaining rights set forth
in the zipper clause of the CBA. We address
the first three issues raised by the County
together, and we then turn to its argument
relating to waiver under the zipper clause.
DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

HM {10} “Summary judgment is appro-
priate where there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Selfv. United
Parcel Serv, Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, 16, 126

N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. “An appeal from
the grant of a motion for summary judgment
presents a question of law and is reviewed de
novo.” Montgomery v. Lomos Altos, Inc.,
2007-NMSC-002, 116, 141 N.M. 21, 150 P.38d
971. “The meaning of language used in a
statute is a question of law that we review de

329

novo.” Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2002-
NMSC-020, 1116, 182 N.M. 382, 49 P.3d 61.

The Paramedic Training Contracts Are
Subjects of Mandatory Bargaining

Hs {11} The threshold question that
the County asserts we must address in this
case is whether the paramedic training con-
tracts contained terms or conditions of em-
ployment such that they are mandatory sub-
jects of collective bargaining that had not
been negotiated. Under both NMSA 1978,
Section 10-7E-17(A)(1) (2003), of the Public
Employee Bargaining Act (PEBA), and the
County Labor Management Relations Ordi-
nance (the Ordinance), Los Alamos County,
N.M.,, Code § 30-44(a) (2005), an employer is
obligated to bargain in good faith on all
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment. Any direct communication
with a union-represented employee made for
the purpose of altering terms and conditions
of employment, therefore, constitutes a viola-
tion of the PEBA. See Permanente Med.
Group, Inc, 332 NLRB 1143, 1144 (2000)
(noting that direct communications with em-
ployees made “for the purpose of establishing
or changing wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment or undercutting
the Union’s role in bargaining” constitutes
improper direct dealing).

{12} There is no definition of the phrase
“wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment” in either the PEBA or
the Ordinance so as to delineate exactly what
constitutes a subject of mandatory bargain-
ing. Thus, the issue of whether the para-
medic training contracts are subjects of man-
datory bargaining appears to be one of first
impression in New Mexico. For the reasons
that follow, however, we need not reach that
determination today.

{13} This case was decided on summary
judgment. The issues were those raised in
the two motions filed by the County and
Union. Whether the paramedic training con-
tracts were mandatory subjects of bargaining
was not a matter of contention in either of
the two summary judgment motions. For
the purpose of the motions, the County
agreed that the paramedic training contracts
were mandatory subjects of bargaining. The

330

Union’s summary judgment motion in the
district court asserted that the training con-
tracts were mandatory subjects of bargaining
and, therefore, were not enforceable. The
County responded that, assuming for the
purposes of the motion, that the paramedic
training contracts were mandatory subjects
of bargaining, the contracts were enforceable
because of the management-rights clause and
because of waiver. The County sought sum-
mary judgment on the same basis as that
stated in its response to the Union’s motion.
The district court ruled in the Union’s favor,
essentially holding that the management-
rights and zipper clauses could not override
or defeat the County’s obligation to engage
in collective bargaining on the subject of the
paramedic training contracts.

{14} The County’s first argument on ap-
peal is that we should reverse on a ground
that was not a part of the summary judg-
ment proceedings, namely, that the paramed-
ie training contracts were not mandatory
subjects of bargaining.

The County summarizes its issue on appeal

as follows: The County requests that this

Court hold that the training agreements

are not terms and conditions of employ-

ment and that the management-rights
clause be given effect as a matter of law.

Alternatively, applying the balancing test,

this Court should find that the predomi-

nant concern is a matter of public policy,
subject to the management-rights clause.

{15} We will not address the County’s
contention to the extent that it is based on
the argument that the paramedic training
contracts were not terms and conditions of
employment. See Spectron Dev. Lab. v. Am.
Hollow Boring Co., 1997-NMCA-025, 132,
123 N.M. 170, 936 P.2d 852 (“We review the
case litigated below, not the case that is
fleshed out for the first time on appeal.”
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). The County did not
oppose the Union’s or Defendants’ claims in
the district court and seek a trial or judg-
ment on the premise that the paramedic
training contracts were not mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining, nor did the County offer
any evidence of that question. When argu-
ing the motions for summary judgment, the

County conceded that the paramedic training
contracts were mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining during the following colloquy be-
tween the district court and the County’s
counsel:

THE COURT: I do, Mr. Graeser. I
recognize, and I understand, that the
County’s reliance is basically on two issues,
one the contractual agreement and the
contractual nature of the bargaining agree-
ment. I understand that. The second is
the zipper clause. But let me ask you the
particular action, and I am not sure what.
you said, and I thought I wrote it down,
but what is your position with respect to
the subject of this issue being in the Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement? Is your
position that it’s a mandatory subject?

MR. GRAESER: Your Honor, certainly
for the purpose of this motion I can agree
it’s a mandatory subjective collective bar-
gaining. I think that’s an issue to deter-
mine during bargaining for the next con-
tract, but I don’t suspect there will be a lot
of debate about that.

THE COURT: So you agree that it is a
mandatory subject?

MR. GRAESER: Again, in my role of
representing the County for the purposes
of this case, I will agree to that, yes.
HI {16} In its oral ruling at the conclu-

sion of the hearing on the motions, the dis-
trict court confirmed—without objection or
concern expressed by the County—that
“{hlere we are talking about a mandatory
subject of the [CBA], and we all agree that
this is a mandatory subject.” Neither as a
part of its argument in the district court, nor
as a follow-up to the foregoing colloquy and
oral ruling, did the County suggest to the
district court that if the court were to grant
the Union’s motion and deny the County’s
motion, the County wanted to proceed to
trial to prove that the training contracts were
not subjects of mandatory bargaining.
“Facts stipulated to are not reviewable on
appeal.” Haaland v, Baltzley, 110 N.M. 585,
587, 798 P.2d 186, 188 (1990).

{17} The County’s second contention on
appeal is that the concept of management-
rights and the language and breadth of the
management-rights provision provide the le-

gal basis for enforcing the training contracts
notwithstanding that the training contracts
are mandatory subjects of bargaining. The
County argues that this Court should adopt a
balancing test, by which the court is to weigh
the interests of the employees against those
of management. The County then argues
that under that balancing of interests test,
the district court should have favored man-
agement-rights as the predominant interest.
We see nothing in the record indicating that
the County raised this balancing test in the
district court or that the district court con-
sidered it, and the County concedes as much.
Thus, we will not address this balancing-test
argument. See Rule 12-216(A) NMRA (“To
preserve a question for review it must appear
that a ruling or decision by the district court
was fairly invoked[.]”); Woolwine v. Furr’s,
Inc., 106 N.M. 492, 496, 745 P.2d 717, 721
(Ct.App.1987) (same).

{18} We note that in arguing that the
management-rights provision should be given
effect, the County argues that “the present
case does not contain a well-developed record
as to the nature of the interests,” and that
the balancing of interests presents a genuine
issue of material fact requiring remand to
the district court. For the reason just dis-
eussed in regard to the County’s preserva-
tion failure, and also because the County did
not raise this specific ground in the district
court, we do not address this argument.
Woolwine, 106 N.M. at 496, 745 P.2d at 721.

HM {19} Accordingly, the County is left
with an argument that the plain language
and breadth of the management-rights provi-
sion must be given effect notwithstanding
that the paramedic training contracts are
subjects of mandatory -bargaining. The
County’s argument is antithetical to the very
concept of mandatory subjects of bargaining
which, by its terms, means that these are
subjects about which the parties must bar-
gain. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-War-
ner Corp, 356 US. 342, 78 S.Ct. 718, 2
L.Ed.2d 823 (1958). We recognize that a
union can contractually waive its right to
mandatory bargaining if the waiver is ex-
pressed clearly and unmistakably. Metro.
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S.
693, 705, 708, 103 S.Ct. 1467, 75 L.Ed.2d 387

331

(1983). However, courts will not infer a
waiver “unless it is clear that the parties
were aware of their rights and made the
conscious choice, for whatever reason, to
waive them.” NLRB v. New York Tel. Co.
930 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir.1991). In this
case, the County has pointed to no clear and
unmistakable waiver to bargain over the par-
amedic training contracts, and we have found
none. For summary judgment purposes
with regard to both motions for summary
judgment, the County assumed that the par-
amedic training contracts were a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Under that assumed
fact, the County was foreclosed from unilat-
erally entering into the contracts with indi-
vidual union members instead of entering
into the bargaining process with respect to
the contracts or the work under the con-
tracts. Consequently, we see no error in the
district court’s summary judgment disposi-
tions.

The Union Did Not Waive Its Right to
Bargain Under the Zipper Clause

HE {20} The County’s remaining argu-
ment is that the Union waived any right to
bargain based on a broad zipper clause con-
taining waiver provisions in the CBA. The
clause provides:

The parties agree that this is the com-
plete and only agreement between the par-
ties. Each party has negotiated on all
issues identified for negotiations and such
negotiations have led to this agreement.
No additional negotiations will be conduct-
ed on any item, whether contained herein
or not, except by mutual agreement of the
parties. This agreement replaces any and
all previous agreements between the par-

ties.

The parties acknowledge that during the
negotiations which resulted in this Agree-
ment, each had the unlimited right and
opportunity to make demands and propos-
als with respect to all proper subjects of
collective bargaining and that all such sub-
jects have been discussed and negotiated
upon and the agreements contained in this
Agreement were arrived at after the free
exercise of such rights and opportunities;
therefore, the [County] and the Union, for

332

the life of this Agreement, each voluntarily
and unqualifiedly waives the right and
each agrees that the other shall not be
obligated to bargain collectively with re-
spect to any subject matter not specifically
referred to or covered in this Agreement,
even though such subject or matter may
not have been within the knowledge or
contemplation of either or both of the par-
ties at the time they negotiated or signed
this Agreement.

{21} At the outset, we note that New
Mexico courts have not ruled on whether
broad zipper clauses in a CBA such as the
one before us relieves an employer from the
duty to bargain. In the absence of guidance
from our own courts, the New Mexico Su-
preme Court has directed that we should
interpret language in the PEBA “in the man-
ner that the same language of the [National
Labor Relations Act] has been interpreted.”
Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed’n of
Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, 118, 125 N.M.
401, 962 P.2d 1236.

{22} The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) has taken two approaches when an-
swering the question of whether a zipper
clause in a CBA can by its terms eliminate
otherwise binding practices.

Prior to 1974, the [NLRB] strictly applied

the rule that only “clear and unmistakable”

language in the contract expressly waiving
the right to negotiate over a particular
subject would suffice to relieve a party of
the duty to bargain. This was especially
the case with broad “zipper” clauses which
stated that the contract was the complete
agreement between the parties on all sub-
jects. Such clauses, standing alone, did
not constitute a sufficiently clear and un-
mistakable waiver as to a specific bargain-
ing item.
1 Charles J. Morris, The Developing Labor
Law 642 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted).

{23} In 1974, the NLRB modified its ap-
proach so that the language of broad zipper
clauses could, in fact, support a contractual
waiver defense. The new standard required
zipper clauses to be given “such effect as the
negotiating history and other surrounding
circumstances seem to make appropriate.”
Radioear Corp., 214 NLRB 862, 364 (1974);
see also Aeronca, Inc, 253 NLRB 261, 264

(1980) (noting that a contractual right to have
an issue bargained effectively can be waived
only on “showing of a clear relinquishment of
the right which is to be decided on the facts
and circumstances surrounding the making
of the contract as well as the language of the
contract itself”), enforcement denied on other
grounds by Aeronca, Inc. v. NLRB, 650 F.2d
501 (4th Cir.1981). As a result, under this
approach, the expectations caused by the ac-
tions of the opposing party are relevant to
whether there has been a contractual waiver.
See AMCAR Div, ACF Indus, Inc. v.
NLRB, 592 F.2d 422, 429 (8th Cir.1979); S.
Materials Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No.
822, 198 NLRB 257-258 (1972).

{24} Notwithstanding the NLRB’s guid-
ance on evaluating contractual waiver defens-
es, the federal circuit courts are split on the
issue, with some circuits following a more
flexible approach, while others continue to
apply other analyses. Compare, ¢.g., NLRB
v, Auto Crane Co., 586 F.2d 310, 811-12 (10th
Cir.1976) (denying enforcement of an NLRB
order finding a Section 8(a)(5) violation in the
employer’s unilateral imposition of a wage
increase and thrift plan during the term of
an agreement; holding the zipper clause of
the labor contract—including the phrase re-
ferring to “any matter or subject not specifi-
cally referred to or covered in” the con-
tract—constituted a clear waiver of the right
to bargain), with NLRB v. Challenge-Cook
Bros. of Ohio, Inc., 843 F.2d 230, 233-84 (6th
Cir.1988) (granting enforcement of an NLRB
order holding that the employer violated See-
tion 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act, finding that the zipper clause
did not amount to a relinquishment of the
right to bargain over effects of the employ-
er’s unilateral shift of production from one
bargaining unit to another).

{25} The Union here argues that the
“clear and unmistakable” language is the
standard that we should apply in this case,
The County, on the other hand, urges this
Court to follow the decisions of the federal
circuit courts that have found that broad-
type waiver clauses satisfy the clear and
unmistakable language. In our view, the
answer does not call for a rigid rule, formu-
lated without regard for the bargaining pos-
tures, past practices, and agreements of the
parties for two reasons. First, notwithstand-

ing the split in the circuits, the NLRB has
continued to adhere to the broader position
taken in Radioear. See ¢.g., Temple—Eastex,
Inc, 228 NLRB 203 (1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 579 F.2d 932 (6th Cir.1978); A-Z
Fire Protection, Inc., 2833 NLRB 38 (1977),
remanded in part, 600 F.2d 918 (D.C.Cir.
1979). Moreover, given our Supreme Court’s
direction in this area, we believe that applica-
tion of the reformulated standard described
by the NLRB in Radioear is the more rea-
soned approach to deciding the question of
whether the language of the CBA expressly
waived the right to negotiate the paramedic
training contracts. See Las Cruces Profl
Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces, 123
N.M. 289, 243, 988 P.2d 1384, 1388 (1997)
(instructing that interpretations of the
NLRA by the National Labor Relations
Board and reviewing courts should act as a
guide in interpreting similar provisions of the
PEBA).

{26} We observe that there is virtually no
evidence in the record and no argument in
the district court in connection with bargain-
ing history, expectations of the parties, past
practices, or surrounding circumstances for
the purpose of supporting or rejecting waiver
on summary judgment. Additionally, the
parties never argued to the district court
that there were disputes of fact requiring a
trial. They have also not done so on appeal.
Therefore, we do not consider the bargaining
history, the parties’ interpretation of the lan-
guage, or whether the case should be re-
manded for trial on the issue of waiver.
Woolwine, 106 N.M. at 496, 745 P.2d at 721.
The district court did not err in determining
in the summary judgment proceeding that,
as a matter of law, the Union did not waive
its right to bargain based on the zipper
clause.

CONCLUSION

{27} For the reasons set forth above, we
affirm the decision of the district court.

{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN
and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.

333
2011-NMCA-028
258 P.3d 1125

John F. WARNER,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant—Appellee,

vy

Horace CALVERT and Jody Lusk a/k/a
Jody Calvert, Individually, North Ameri-
can Pizza Solutions, Inc., a New Mexico
Corporation, and Albuquerque Pizza So-
lutions, L.L.C., a Limited Liability Com-
pany, Defendants/Counterclaim-
ants/Crossclaimants—Appellants,

and

Nina W. True and John D. Phillips,
Crossdefendants/Crossclaimants—
Appellees.

No. 29,674.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Feb. 9, 2011.

oD
oO

335

Aguilar & Aguilar, P.C., Esteban A. Agui-
lar, Jr., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee War-
ner.

The Frith Firm, Gilbert Houston Frith,
Heather Breen, Santa Fe, NM, for Appel-
Jants.

Ahmad Assed, Albuquerque, NM, George
M. Allen, Telluride, CO, for Appellee True.

John D. Phillips, Pro Se Appellee.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

{1} In this interlocutory appeal, Horace
Calvert and Jody Calvert, a.k.a. Jody Lusk,
North American Pizza Solutions, Ine.
(NAPS) and Albuquerque Pizza Solutions,
L.L.C. (APS) (hereinafter referred to as Ap-
pellants) appeal the district court’s order ap-
pointing Judith Wagner as an expert witness
pursuant to Rule 11-706 NMRA and deter-

336

mining that the valuation report prepared by
Ms. Wagner in 2009 (2009 Valuation Report)
may be admitted at trial. Appellants raise
two issues on appeal: (1) Ms. Wagner may
not serve as a Rule 11~706 expert witness
because she was a nonparty participant in
the mediation; and (2) Ms. Wagner’s 2009
Valuation Report is a mediation communica-
tion that is confidential and inadmissible as
evidence at trial. This appeal presents is-
sues of first impression under the Mediation
Procedures Act (the MPA or the Act),
NMSA 1978, Sections 44~7B-1 to -6 (2007),
which became effective on July 1, 2007. We
affirm the district court ruling regarding the
appointment of Ms. Wagner as a Rule 11-706
expert witness, but we reverse regarding the
admissibility of Ms. Wagner’s 2009 Valuation
Report.

BACKGROUND

{2} Although this case has an extensive
history, we limit our recitation of the factual
and procedural history to those details perti-
nent to the issues on interlocutory appeal.
In the underlying lawsuit, Appellee John
Warner (Warner) and Crossclaimant-Appel-
Jee Nina True (True) each claim entitlement
to money damages as well as stock in Defen-
dant corporations, NAPS and APS. Warner
and True each allegedly loaned Crossdefen-
dant-Appellee John Phillips (Phillips) funds
for purposes of building and operating a new
APS franchise. Both loans were allegedly
secured with interest in Phillips’ stock in
NAPS, and concomitantly, his membership
interest in APS. Additionally, Phillips alleg-
edly executed assignments separately trans-
ferring his equity interest in NAPS to both
Warner and True.

{3} On September 18, 2008, the district
court referred this case to a settlement con-
ference and appointed a settlement facili-
tator. During the first settlement confer-
ence on February 22, 2008, the facilitator’s
outcome report indicates that “{t]he parties
reached an agreement to obtain some addi-
tional information, necessary to settlement.
evaluation, before reconvening” for a second
settlement conference. At that conference,
the parties also entered a written agreement.
to hire an expert to perform a valuation of
NAPS, which was signed by all parties. The

agreement recognized that True and Warner
were “unable to fully evaluate [Defendants’]
settlement offer without a valuation of the
business and a valuation of the stock owned
by John Phillips.” As a result, the parties
agreed to retain Ms. Wagner to perform a
valuation of NAPS and further agreed that
the cost of the valuation would be split equal-
ly between the parties. Once the valuation
was completed, the parties agreed to deter-
mine if a settlement could be reached based
on the initial settlement offer, and if not, the
parties agreed to participate in a second
settlement conference.

{4} On March 28, 2008, Ms. Wagner draft-
ed a letter of engagement regarding the
terms of the business valuation, which each
of the parties ultimately signed. The letter
stated that the “purpose of the valuation is to
provide information relating to the value of
NAPS and Mr. Phillips’ disputed value there-
in for purposes of mediation.” The letter
clarified that Ms. Wagner was not acting as
an arbitrator in the dispute and that any
agreement as to the value ultimately agreed
upon between the parties would be their own.
The parties retained Ms. Wagner to create
the 2009 Valuation Report “for purposes of
mediation” and agreed that distribution of
the report would be restricted to mediation
purposes and internal use by the parties’ tax
and legal advisors. Finally, the letter con-
templated that additional fees would apply if
Ms. Wagner was requested to testify. The
letter clarified that the original fee estimate
included drafting the 2009 Valuation Report,
but it did not include “any services that may
be required to defend [the] valuation report
in litigation, including conferences, deposi-
tions, court appearances and testimony.”

{5} A second settlement conference was
originally scheduled for October 6, 2008, but
it was rescheduled for January 14, 2009, in
order to allow time for the 2009 Valuation
Report to be completed prior to the media-
tion. The report was completed on January
8, 2009. The report’s preface indicates that
“{t]he purpose of the valuation is to provide
information relating to the value of NAPS
and Mr. Phillips’ disputed value therein for
purposes of mediation.” The report further
indicated that the calculation was “prepared

for mediation purposes only and should not
be provided to third parties without the ex-
press written consent of Wagner Valuation &
Financial Forensics, LLC.” Finally, the re-
port reiterated that the “calculation was per-
formed solely to assist [the parties] in media-
tion” and that the resulting estimate of value
“should not be used for any other purpose”
without the express written consent of Wag-
ner. The second settlement conference did
not result in settlement, and this case was
subsequently scheduled for trial.

{6} On March 2, 2009, Warner filed a
motion to appoint Ms. Wagner as an expert
witness pursuant to Rule 11-706. After a
hearing on the matter, the district court en-
tered an order on May 18, 2009, appointing
Ms. Wagner as the district court’s Rule 11-
706 expert witness. The district court or-
dered that the cost of Ms. Wagner’s services
would be split equally between the parties,
pending the district court’s review. Addi-
tionally, the court ruled that Ms. Wagner’s
2009 Valuation Report “may be admitted at
trial to show liability of any and all claims in
this lawsuit and to determine the amount of
liability and/or punitive damages if any,” sub-
ject to possible limitations on its use based
on further motion by the parties.

{7} Appellants requested an interlocutory
appeal of the district court’s order appointing
Ms. Wagner as a Rule 11-706 expert witness,
and the district court entered an order certi-
fying the issue for interlocutory appeal to
this Court. The district court reasoned that
the issue “involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immedi-
ate appeal from the order or decision may
materially advance the ultimate termination
of the litigation.” The district court also
entered findings that Ms. Wagner “was re-
tained by the parties to perform a valuation
of [NAPS] for purposes of mediation,” that
the court appointed Ms. Wagner as a Rule
11-706 expert witness, and that Appellants
requested an interlocutory appeal based
upon Ms. Wagner’s “role in the mediation
and her agreement to prepare a valuation for
purposes of mediation between the parties.”

337

DISCUSSION

{8} This appeal requires an interpretation
of the newly enacted MPA. Only one publish-
ed New Mexico case has cited to the MPA,
but the Act did not control the outcome of
that case. See Carlsbad Hotel Assocs.
LLC. v. Patterson-UTI Drilling Co., 2009-
NMCA-005, 131, 145 N.M. 385, 199 P.3d 288
(noting that the MPA was enacted after the
settlement conference had already occurred
and that it did not control the outcome of the
case). The MPA applies to mediators, medi-
ation parties, and nonparty participants in
mediations where the parties were either
“required to mediate by statute or court or
administrative agency rule or [were] referred
to mediation by a court, administrative agen-
cy or arbitrator.” Section 44~7B-8(A)(1).
The MPA also applies where the parties and
mediator agree to participate in mediation
and evidence that agreement with “a record
that is signed by the mediation parties.”
Section 44-7B-3(A)@). The district court
referred this case to a settlement conference
on September 18, 2007, and the settlement
conferences occurred after the effective date
of the MPA. As a result, the MPA is applica-
ble to this case pursuant to Section 44-7B-
BAD.

{9} Appellants raise two issues on appeal
pursuant to the MPA. Appellants contend
that Ms. Wagner may not serve as a Rule
11-706 expert witness because she was a
nonparty participant in the mediation, as de-
fined by Section 44~7B-2. Additionally, Ap-
pellants argue that Ms. Wagner’s 2009 Valua-
tion Report is a mediation communication
that is confidential and inadmissible as evi-
dence at trial, pursuant to Section 44~7B~4.

A. Review of Expert Witness Issue on
Interlocutory Appeal

TE {10} As a preliminary matter, we ad-
dress Warner’s argument that the issue of
whether Ms. Wagner may testify as a Rule
11-706 expert is not “ripe” for interlocutory
review. We determine that the district court
order properly certified the expert witness
issue to this Court for interlocutory review,
pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-4(A)
(1999). Specifically, the district court’s order
indicated that its appointment of Ms. Wagner

338

as a Rule 11-706 expert witness “involves a
controlling question of law as to which there
is a substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion and that an immediate appeal from the
order or decision may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.” As a
result, the district court’s order appointing
Ms. Wagner as an expert witness is appro-
priate for review on interlocutory appeal.
See Candelaria v. Middle Rio Grande Con-
servancy Dist, 107 N.M. 579, 581, 761 P.2d
457, 459 (Ct.App.1988) (reasoning that inter-
locutory appeals are allowed when the dis-
trict court identifies an issue and certifies
that “the order involves a controlling ques-
tion of law on which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion,” and “reso-
lution of the question will materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation”).

B. Interpretation of the Mediation Pro-
cedures Act

{11} We first examine whether the MPA
imposes any limitations that would prevent
Ms. Wagner from either testifying or disclos-
ing the contents of her 2009 Valuation Re-
port as a result of her being retained by the
parties to prepare the report for mediation
purposes.

Hs {12} The meaning of statutory lan-
guage “is a question of law that we review de
novo.” United Rentals Nw, Inc. v. Yearout
Mech. Inc. 2010-NMSC-030, 17, 148 N.M.
426, 237 P.3d 728 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In interpreting a stat-
ute, our goal is to “determine and give effect
to the Legislature’s intent.” Marbob Energy
Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n,
2009-NMSC-013, 19, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.38d
185. Pursuant to the Uniform Statute and
Rule Construction Act, “[t]he text of a stat-
ute or rule is the primary, essential source of
its meaning.” NMSA 1978, § 12-24-19
(1997). As a result, we first examine “the
plain language of the statute, giving the
words their ordinary meaning, unless the
Legislature indicates a different [meaning]
was intended.” N.M. Indus. Energy Con-
sumers v. N.M. Pub. Reg. Comm'n, 2007-
NMSC-058, 120, 142 N.M. 538, 168 P.3d 105.
“(When a statute contains language [that] is
clear and unambiguous, we must give effect

to that language and refrain from further
statutory interpretation.” Truong v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, 137, 147 N.M.
583, 227 P.38d 73 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “Only if an ambiguity
exists will we proceed further in our statuto-
ry construction analysis.” Marbob Energy
Corp., 2009-NMSC-013, 19, 146 N.M. 24,
206 P.3d 135.

1. Definition of a Nonparty Participant
in a Mediation

{13} As a preliminary matter, we examine
how the MPA defines Ms. Wagner’s role in
the mediation. Appellants argue that Ms.
Wagner served as a “nonparty participant” in
the mediation, as defined by Section 44~7B-
2(F). We agree based upon the plain lan-
guage of the defined term. The MPA de-
fines a nonparty participant as “a person,
other than a mediation party or mediator,
who participates in, is present during the
mediation or is a mediation program adminis-
trator, including a person consulted by a
mediation party to assist the mediation party
with evaluating, considering or generating
offers of settlement.” Section 44~7B-2(F).

WM {14} Ms. Wagner was a nonparty
participant in the mediation because she was
retained by the parties to assist the media-
tion process by preparing a report that would
allow Warner and True to more accurately
evaluate the settlement offer of NAPS and
Phillips. At the first settlement conference,
the facilitator’s outcome report indicated that
“[t]he parties reached an agreement to ob-
tain some additional information, necessary
to settlement evaluation, before reconvening”
for a second settlement conference. (Em-
phasis added.) Moreover, the agreement en-
tered by the parties at the first settlement
conference indicates that the parties agreed
to hire Ms. Wagner to perform a valuation of
NAPS because True and Warner were “un-
able to fully evaluate [Defendants’] settle-
ment offer without a valuation of the business
and a valuation of the stock owned by John
Phillips.” (Emphasis added.) As a result,
the parties mutually agreed to retain Ms,
Wagner. The engagement agreement specif-
ically indicated that her valuation service
were to be performed “for purposes of medi-

ation.” The importance of Ms. Wagner’s val-
uation to reconvening mediation was further
highlighted by the rescheduling of the second
settlement conference in order to allow the
valuation report to be completed. Conse-
quently, Ms. Wagner was a nonparty partici-
pant in the mediation because she was con-
sulted and retained by the parties to prepare
specific documentation that would assist with
the settlement evaluations during the media-
tion process.

{15} Warner argues that Ms. Wagner does
not qualify as a nonparty participant because
she was not present and did not personally
participate in either settlement conference.
However, the MPA does not require that a
nonparty participant be physically present or
participate at the actual settlement confer-
ence. Instead, the use of the conjunctive
word “or” to connect each statutory phrase
indicates that there are three distinct alter-
native circumstances under which a person
may qualify as a nonparty participant: (1)
participating in the mediation, (2) being pres-
ent at the mediation, or (8) serving as a
“mediation program administrator, including
a person consulted by a mediation party to
assist in evaluating, considering, or generat-
ing offers of settlement.” Section 44~7B-
2(F); see Wilson v. Denver, 1998-NMSC-
016, 117, 125 N.M. 308, 961 P.2d 153 (holding
that the use of the word “or” in a statute
means that any of the listed alternatives will
suffice unless the context of the statute indi-
cates otherwise). Consequently, the fact
that Ms. Wagner was not physically present
at either of the settlement conferences does
not preclude her from being a nonparty par-
ticipant in the mediation. Moreover, we
need not decide whether Ms. Wagner’s ac-
tions constituted “participating” in the medi-
ation under the first prong of the definition
because she clearly qualifies as a nonparty
participant under the third prong as a result
of being consulted by the parties to assist in
their evaluation of the proposed settlement
offer.

{16} Warner further argues that Ms. Wag-
ner does not qualify as a nonparty partici-
pant because her valuation was not complet-
ed at the request of the mediator or for use
by the mediator. However, the definition of

339

a nonparty participant expressly includes a
person who was “consulted by a mediation
party to assist the mediation party with
evaluating, considering or generating offers
of settlement.” Section 44~-7B-2(F) (empha-
sis added). The Act clarifies that a “media-
tion party” is “a person who participates in a
mediation and whose agreement is necessary
to resolve the dispute.” Section 44~7B-2(C).
Hence, the parties in this lawsuit were the
mediation parties under the MPA because
their participation and agreement was neces-
sary to resolve the dispute being litigated.
Consequently, under the plain language of
the Act, a nonparty participant need not be
consulted by the mediator or asked to direct-
ly assist the mediator. Instead, as in this
case, a nonparty participant includes a per-
son consulted by the mediation parties to
assist the parties in evaluating a settlement
offer. As a result, the MPA defines Ms.
Wagner’s role in the mediation as that of a
nonparty participant.

2. Nonparty Participant Testimony at
Trial

HM {17} Appellants argue that the MPA
prevents Ms. Wagner from testifying at trial
because she was a nonparty participant in
the mediation. We disagree based upon an
examination of the MPA as a whole and
consideration of how its provisions relate to
one another in the overall settlement process.
See N.M. Bad. of Veterinary Med. v. Rieger,
2007-NMSC-044, 111, 142 N.M. 248, 164
P.8d 947 (determining that the entire statute
should be construed “as a whole so that all
the provisions will be considered in relation
to one another” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). Although the MPA
contains a specific provision limiting the dis-
closure of matters related to mediation com-
munications by a mediator, the MPA does
not impose limitations specific to nonparty
participants in a mediation. Section 44-7B-
5(C). However, the general provisions of the
Act are applicable to nonparty participants.
See § 44-7B-3 (stating that the MPA applies
to mediators, nonparty participants, and me-
diation parties). One general provision
states that “{elxcept as otherwise provided in
the [MPA] ... or by applicable judicial court
rules, all mediation communications are con-

340

fidential, and not subject to disclosure and
shall not be used as evidence in any proceed-
ing.” Section 44-7B-4. The MPA also in-
cludes generally applicable exceptions, which
permit disclosure and admissibility of media-
tion communications under certain circum-
stances. Section 44-7B-5(A) & (B). The
MPA does not, however, contain any general
prohibitions against nonparty participants
testifying at trial.

HI {18} We “will not read into a statute
or ordinance language which is not there,
particularly if it makes sense as written.”
High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of
Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, 15, 126 N.M.
418, 970 P.2d 599 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). We read Section 44~
TB-4 to prevent a nonparty participant from
disclosing mediation communications, absent
an applicable exception in Section 44~7B-5 or
other judicial court rules. The MPA does
not contain any additional provisions that
further limit a nonparty participant’s disclo-
sure or testimony. In this context, we must
now address Ms. Wagner's participation in
the mediation. Ms. Wagner did not testify
before the mediator; however, her valuation
report was prepared for the parties so that
they could better assess the offer pending
during the mediation process. We interpret
the MPA to limit the content of a nonparty
participant’s testimony at trial to prevent the
disclosure of mediation communications ab-
sent an applicable exception. Consequently,
the MPA does not prohibit Ms. Wagner from
testifying at trial, but it may limit the scope
of her testimony. Where such a limitation
makes sense as written and the parties do
not argue that the statutory language is am-
biguous, we apply the language of the Act as
written and leave any alternation or exten-
sion of the scope of the MPA to the Legisla-
ture. See Clark v. Lovelace Health Sys.,
Inc., 2004-NMCA-119, 1 14, 186 N.M. 411, 99
P.8d 232 (reasoning that when statutory lan-
guage is unambiguous, this Court applies it
as written, leaving any alteration or exten-
sion of the scope of a statute to the Legisla-
ture).

3. Limitations and Admissibility of Medi-
ation Communications

{19} Appellants argue that the MPA pro-

hibits Ms. Wagner from testifying regarding

her valuation of NAPS and the 2009 Valua-
tion Report because the report is a mediation
communication. Appellants also contend
that Ms. Wagner may not testify regarding
her communications with the parties during
the mediation process. However, Appellants
cite neither the record nor case law to devel-
op their argument regarding whether any
additional communications beyond Ms. Wag-
ner’s 2009 Valuation Report qualify as media-
tion communications. Consequently, we only
address whether Ms. Wagner’s 2009 Valua-
tion Report qualifies as a mediation commu-
nication and do not address any additional
communications between Ms. Wagner and
the parties. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt.
Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, 115, 187 N.M. 339,
110 P.8d 1076 (concluding that this Court has
no duty to review an argument that is not
adequately developed with facts, citation to
the record, and authority).

{20} The MPA defines a “mediation com-
munication” as “a statement, whether oral or
in a record or verbal or nonverbal, that oc-
curs during a mediation or is made for pur-
poses of considering, conducting, participat-
ing in, initiating, continuing or reconvening a
mediation or retaining a mediator.” Section
44-TB-2(B). As previously discussed, “[e]x-
cept as otherwise provided in the [MPA] ...
or by applicable judicial court rules, all medi-
ation communications are confidential, and
not subject to disclosure and shall not be
used as evidence in any proceeding.” Sec-
tion 44~7B-4. The only exceptions under the
MPA to the confidentiality of mediation com-
munications are identified in Section 44~7B-
5.

TI {21} Based upon the plain language
of the MPA, Ms. Wagner’s 2009 Valuation
Report is a mediation communication be-
cause it is a written statement that was
“made for purposes of considering, conduct-
ing, participating in, initiating, continuing or
reconvening a mediation.” Section 44-7B-
2(B). At the first settlement conference, the
facilitator’s outcome report indicated that
“the parties reached an agreement to obtain
some additional information, necessary to set-
tlement evaluation, before reconvening” for

a second settlement conference. (Emphasis
added.) Moreover, the pleadings and the
parties’ written agreements confirm that Ms.
Wagner was retained to perform a valuation
of NAPS “for purposes of mediation” due to
Warner and True’s inability to fully evaluate
the settlement offer without a valuation.
The agreement expressly states that “{olnce
the evaluation is done, the parties will deter-
mine if a settlement can be reach[ed] and, if
they are not able to agree, the parties will
participate in a second mediation at which all
of the parties shall appear and attend.” Sim-
ilarly, the parties’ engagement agreement re-
garding the retention of Ms. Wagner and the
2009 Valuation Report itself both state that
Ms. Wagner’s valuation was performed for
purposes of mediation. Finally, the resched-
uling of the second settlement conference in
order to allow the 2009 Valuation Report to
be completed further emphasizes the report’s
centrality to reconvening mediation. As a
result, we conclude that the 2009 Valuation
Report is a mediation communication be-
cause it was prepared for purposes of consid-
ering the settlement offer from the first set-
tlement conference and for participating in,
initiating, or reconvening a second settlement
conference.

{22} The parties do not contend that the
definition of a mediation communication is
ambiguous. Instead, Warner appears to ar-
gue that the 2009 Valuation Report does not
qualify as a mediation communication be-
cause the underlying documents that Ms.
Wagner used to prepare the report are dis-
coverable and not confidential. Warner re-
lies upon Section 44~7B-5(D)(1) of the MPA,
which states that “[nJothing in the [MPA]
shall prevent ... the discovery or admissibil-
ity of any evidence that is otherwise discov-
erable or admissible, merely because the evi-
dence was presented during a mediation.”
The district court determined and Appellants
do not dispute that the documents underlying
the 2009 Valuation Report are discoverable
and admissible. Such underlying documents
remain fully admissible at trial. However,
the issue on appeal is whether the 2009 Valu-
ation Report itself is admissible. We con-
clude that the 2009 Valuation Report was not
an underlying document and is not admissi-
ble pursuant to Section 44~7B-5(A)(1) be-

341

cause the MPA provides that such mediation
communications “are not subject to disclo-
sure and shall not be used as evidence in any
proceeding” unless an exception applies.
Section 44~7B-4 (emphasis added). As de-
fined by the Uniform Statute and Rule Con-
struction Act, the words “ ‘shall not’ prohibit
the exercise of a power, authority, privilege
or right.” NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-4(C) (1997).
Consequently, the MPA contains mandatory
language that prevents disclosure and admis-
sibility of the 2009 Valuation Report that was
prepared for mediation, unless an exception
applies. See Marbob Energy Corp. 2009-
NMSC-018, 122, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.8d 185
(reasoning that “ ‘shall’ indicates that [a] pro-
vision is mandatory, and we must assume
that the Legislature intended the provision
to be mandatory absent a[] clear indication
to the contrary”).

TE {23} We further conclude that no
exception permits the disclosure of the 2009
Valuation Report at trial. The MPA pro-
vides that mediation communications are not
confidential if the communications meet one
of ten exceptions, including where the com-
munications

(1) are contained in an agreement reached

by the mediation parties during a media-

tion ...; (2) are communications that all
mediation parties agree may be disclosed

...} (8) threaten or lead to actual violence

in the mediation; (4) reveal the intent of a

mediation party to commit a felony or in-

flict bodily harm ...; (5) disprove a felony
charge; (6) are required by law to be made
public or otherwise disclosed; (7) relate to
abuse, neglect or criminal activity that is
not the subject of the mediation; (8) are
sought or offered to disprove a claim or
complaint of professional misconduct or
malpractice ...; (9) relate to the adminis-

trative facts of the mediation ...; or (10)

relate to whether the parties reached a

binding and enforceable settlement in the

mediation.
Section 44-7B-5(A). Additionally, the MPA
states that “[m]ediation communications may
be disclosed if a court, after hearing in cam-
era and for good cause shown, orders disclo-
sure of evidence that is sought to be offered

342

and is not otherwise available.” Section 44~
7TB-5B).

{24} Warner argues that pursuant to Sec-
tion 44~-7B-5(A)(2), Ms. Wagner’s 2009 Valu-
ation Report and the documents produced to
her are not confidential because the parties
reached an agreement at the mediation that
all parties were entitled to any information
given to Ms. Wagner for the valuation. Sec-
tion 44-7B-5(A)(2) provides that mediation
communications are not confidential if they
“are communications that all mediation par-
ties agree may be disclosed, as evidenced by
a record signed by all mediation parties prior
to or at the mediation.” At the first settle-
ment conference, the parties agreed that
“{t]he parties are entitled to disclosure of any
documents upon which Ms. Wagner relies for
her opinions, subject to a [clonfidentiality
[o]rder.” However, the agreement does not
contain any language indicating that the 2009
Valuation Report may be disclosed and was
not confidential. Moreover, the letter engag-
ing Ms. Wagner’s services supports the de-
termination that Ms. Wagner and the parties
agreed that the 2009 Valuation Report was
confidential and not subject to disclosure.
The letter, which was signed by all of the
parties, expressly states that the distribution
of the 2009 Valuation Report is restricted to
internal use by the parties’ tax and legal
advisors and “for purposes of mediation only
and accordingly, will not be distributed to
outside parties to obtain credit or for any
other purposes.” Consequently, we conclude
that the parties did agree that the 2009
Valuation Report itself was a confidential
mediation communication that could not be
used for any other purpose, including disclo-
sure or use at trial.

{25} Finally, we recognize that our inter-
pretation of whether Ms. Wagner’s 2009 Val-
uation Report is a mediation communication
is also consistent with the Uniform Mediation
Act (UMA). The definition of “mediation
communication” in the MPA is exactly the
same as the UMA definition. Compare
MPA, § 44-7B-2(B), with Unif. Mediation
Act § 2(2), U.L.A. Med § 2 (2009). More-

over the UMA commentary regarding a me-
diation communication indicates that whether
the document is prepared for the mediation
is crucial to determining whether the docu-

ment is a mediation communication. Unif.
Mediation Act, § 2(2) cmt., U.L.A. Med § 2.
The commentary further indicates that docu-
ments prepared for mediation by an expert
witness may be included in the definition.
Id. Consequently, because the 2009 Valuation
Report was prepared for the mediation, the
UMA supports the determination that it
qualifies as a mediation communication.

C. Limitations Imposed by the Parties’
Agreements

Hs“ {26} Interpretation of the par-
ties’ agreements is a question of law that we
review de novo. Campbell v. Millennium
Ventures, LLC, 2002-NMCA-101, 115, 182
N.M. 738, 55 P.8d 429. In interpreting the
agreements, our goal is to “give effect to the
intent of the parties, and when the terms of
the agreement are clear and unambiguous,
[we] try to ascertain the intent of the parties
from the ordinary meaning of the language
in the agreement.” Heimann v. Kinder-
Morgan CO2 Co., 2006-NMCA-127, 118, 140
N.M. 552, 144 P.8d 111 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

{27} We emphasize that nothing in the
parties’ agreements regarding the retention
of Ms. Wagner prevents her from testifying
at trial. Although the parties agreed to re-
tain Ms. Wagner to prepare a valuation re-
port for purposes of mediation, the agree-
ment regarding the engagement of Ms.
Wagner’s services contemplates that addi-
tional fees would apply if Ms. Wagner was
requested to testify at trial. The agreement
clarifies that the original fee estimate includ-
ed drafting the 2009 Valuation Report, but
did not include “any services that may be re-
quired to defend [the] valuation report in
litigation, including conferences, depositions,
court appearances and testimony.” Conse-
quently, based upon the unambiguous terms
of the engagement agreement, the parties
expressly contemplated that Ms. Wagner
may be requested to testify at trial regard-
ing her valuation of NAPS.

{28} As previously discussed, the MPA
prevents Ms. Wagner from testifying regard-
ing the 2009 Valuation Report or other use of
that report at trial. However, Ms. Wagner

may testify regarding documents underlying
the valuation of NAPS pursuant to the par-
ties’ agreement allowing the disclosure of
those documents and the district court’s de-
termination that those underlying documents
are not confidential and can be disclosed. In
addition, the parties’ agreements do not ad-
dress Ms. Wagner’s preparation or use of a
new valuation report for trial purposes.
Consequently, if the district court or the
parties desire for Ms. Wagner to prepare a
new expert valuation report for trial pur-
poses, that new report would need to be
prepared under the parameters of Ms. Wag-
ner’s appointment as a Rule 11-706 expert.

D. Appointment of Ms. Wagner as a Rule
11-706 Expert

HM {29} Appellants argue that the dis-
trict court erred by appointing Ms. Wagner
as a Rule 11-706 expert due to her role as a
nonparty participant in the mediation and
her preparation of the 2009 Valuation Report
for mediation purposes. We disagree.

{30} Rule 11-706(A) provides that the dis-
trict court “may appoint any expert wit-
nesses of its own selection to give evidence in
the action except that, if the parties agree as
to the experts to be appointed, the court
shall appoint only those designated in the
agreement.” Pursuant to Rule 11-706, the
district court has “authority to appoint an
independent expert unaligned with either
party to assist the court in determining sig-
nificant issues in the proceeding.” Papa-
theofanis v. Allen, 2009-NMCA-084, 111,
146 N.M. 840, 215 P.38d 778 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). We review
the district court’s appointment of Ms. Wag-
ner as a Rule 11-706 expert for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Adoption of Stailey,
117 N.M. 199, 204-05, 870 P.2d 161, 166-67
(Ct.App.1994) (concluding that Rule 11-706
gives the district court broad discretion to
appoint an impartial expert witness to assist
the court and to apportion the costs of the
expert witness among the parties).

{31} Before appointing Ms. Wagner as the
Rule 11-706 expert witness, the district court
considered Ms. Wagner’s previous role in the
mediation, the mutual agreement to retain
Ms. Wagner to prepare an independent valu-

343

ation of NAPS for the benefit of the parties,
and the agreed sharing of the costs for Ms.
Wagner’s services equally among the parties.
The court determined that Ms. Wagner “has
no confidential information from the media-
tion process” and that Ms. Wagner was “not
tainted in any way.” The court further con-
cluded that Ms. Wagner’s testimony and
opinion regarding the valuation would assist
the court in determining the amount of liabil-
ity and/or punitive damages if any. Addi-
tionally, the court reasoned that hiring a
different expert witness would result in in-
ereased costs to the parties. Finally, the
district court reasoned that even if Ms. Wag-
ner had confidential information from the
mediation process, her testimony could be
limited to prevent disclosure of that informa-
tion. As previously discussed, the MPA will
impose a slight limitation on the content of
Ms. Wagner’s testimony, but it does not pro-
hibit Ms. Wagner from otherwise testifying
as a valuation expert as a result of her prior
service as a nonparty participant in the medi-
ation to prepare the 2009 Valuation Report.
We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by appointing Ms. Wag-
ner as a Rule 11-706 expert witness and that
Ms. Wagner may serve in that capacity, sub-
jéct to the previously discussed limitations
imposed by the MPA regarding any use of
the 2009 Valuation Report.

{32} If the district court desires for Ms.
‘Wagner to prepare a new valuation report in
her capacity as a Rule 11~706 expert, the
nature and scope of any new report remains
within the discretion of the district court,
subject to the limitations imposed herein re-
garding the use of the 2009 Valuation Re-
port. The scope of any new report may also
take into account other circumstances that
have transpired since the date of mediation.
If a new valuation report is not prepared,
then the MPA and the parties’ existing
agreements would limit Ms. Wagner’s expert
testimony to her opinion based upon the
documents underlying her valuation of
NAPS, without any submission or testimony
regarding the 2009 Valuation Report. Al-
though this Court’s determination may effec-
tuate little change in Ms. Wagner’s expert
testimony at trial, the parties’ agreement

344 —

combined with the limitations imposed by the
MPA require such a result.
CONCLUSION

{83} We affirm the district court’s order
regarding appointment of Ms. Wagner as a
Rule 11-706 expert, but we reverse the dis-
trict court’s ruling that Ms. Wagner’s 2009
Valuation Report may be used or admitted at
trial. We remand the case to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion.

{34} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,

Chief Judge and JAMES J. WECHSLER,
Judge. .

2011-NMCA-029
258 P.3d 1136

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Steven PADILLA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 29,014.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Feb. 9, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender,
Santa Fe, NM, Linda Yen, Assistant Public
Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Judge.

{1} Defendant filed an on record appeal to
the district court challenging a judgment and
sentence entered by the Bernalillo County
Metropolitan Court (the metro court). After
review, the district court entered an order
remanding the case to metro court with in-
structions to resentence Defendant in accor-
dance with the district court’s memorandum
opinion. Defendant appeals from this order.

{2} The primary issue in this case is
whether Defendant continued to serve his
sentence while on furlough. Other issues
relate to the calculation of good time credit
and the metro court’s failure to impose man-
datory community service and fines at Defen-
dant’s initial sentencing. We hold that the
time on furlough is to be credited as time
served. We further conclude that good time
was properly calculated by the Metropolitan
Detention Center (the detention center).
Thus, Defendant did complete his sentence
while on furlough and any resentencing is
unlawful. For the reasons set forth below,
we reverse the order of the district court and
remand this case to the metro court for
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
jon.

I. BACKGROUND

{3} Defendant pled guilty to second of-
fense driving under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor or drugs (DUI) in violation of
NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(F) (2005)
(amended 2010). On June 16, 2006, the met-
ro court sentenced him to 364 day’s incarcer-
ation in the Detention center. Defendant
was given a credit of forty-three days for
presentence confinement and began serving
his sentence on June 20, 2006.

{4} Roughly one month after Defendant
began serving his sentence, the metro court
filed an order allowing Defendant to be fur-
loughed from the Detention center. That
order states:

345

It is hereby ordered that [DJefendant
.» be released on a furlough July 18,
2006[,] by 10:00 a.m. Defendant ... is to
enter and complete the inpatient program
at Hoy Recovery, Inc. Defendant is to have
no further violations of law, no alcohol, no
drugs, [and] no driving. Defendant is to
return to custody October 20, 2006[,] by

5:00 p.m. Failure to return will result in a

charge of escape.

{5} While on furlough, Defendant filed a
motion asking the metro court to extend the
furlough based on the fact that Defendant
had successfully completed the program at
Hoy Recovery, Ine. and had enrolled at
Northern New Mexico Community College.
Defendant requested an extension to com-
plete the current semester which was to end
on December 18, 2006. The metro court
granted the motion and entered an order
extending the furlough as requested.

{6} On December 18, 2006, Defendant at-
tempted to turn himself in at the detention
center consistent with the metro court's or-
der, but he was refused readmission. During
a subsequent hearing in metro court, a repre-
sentative from the detention center explained
that Defendant had fully served his sentence
as of November 28, 2006—almost a month
before he appeared for readmission—because
he had been given credit for both the time he
was on furlough and for good time.

{7} Four days after Defendant was denied
readmission to the detention center, the met-
ro court issued a bench warrant for Defen-
dant’s arrest based on Defendant’s failure to
comply with the metro court’s orders. The
metro court later entered an “affidavit for
arrest warrant” indicating that Defendant
had escaped from the detention center in
violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-8
(1963). According to the affidavit, a district
court felony case number had also been gen-
erated and assigned to Defendant’s case.

{8} On January 30, 2007, Defendant was
incarcerated at the detention center based on
the metro court’s bench warrant and for
purportedly violating the terms of his com-
mitment. There was a short hearing on
January 31, 2007, at which the court stated it
would reschedule the hearing. No hearing
on any issue was held until mid-March. On

346

February 19, 2007, Defendant filed a motion
for discharge arguing that he had already
completed his sentence. On February 20,
2007, the metro court, without a hearing,
filed a judgment and sentence (the 2007
judgment and sentence) ordering Defendant
to complete his sentence of incarceration by
serving 271 days, the portion of the original
364-day sentence which, according to the
metro court, had not yet been served.

{9} Defendant moved to correct his sen-
tence arguing that he was entitled to receive
“credit” for the furlough time and that the
metro court had unlawfully increased his pre-
viously imposed sentence and had acted with-
out “jailable jurisdiction” in doing so. A hear-
ing on that motion was held on March 16,
2007, during which the metro court explained
that it did not intend Defendant to receive
credit for the furlough time and that, in any
event, it was not possible to credit Defendant
for that time because Defendant had been
released from and was not in the custody of
the detention center during the furlough.

{10} Defendant filed a habeas corpus peti-
tion on March 20, 2007, which he converted
ten days later to a notice of appeal. He
challenged the 2007 judgment and sentence
as well as the metro court’s denial of Defen-
dant’s motion to reconsider that sentence.
Defendant’s sentence was stayed pending fi-
nal disposition of his appeal.

{11} In its memorandum opinion, the dis-
trict court described the issue on appeal as
whether Defendant should have received
credit toward his sentence for the furlough
time during which he went to a treatment
program and attended community college.
The district court concluded, citing State v.
Fellhauer, 199T-NMCA-064, 123 N.M. 476,
943 P.2d 123, that Defendant was ineligible
for credit toward his sentence for the fur-
lough time because during the furlough De-
fendant was not in actual or constructive
custody of law enforcement and there were
no restrictions placed on Defendant’s free-
dom. The district court further concluded
that the metro court erroneously failed to
impose the mandatory fine and community
service provisions in Section 66-8-102(F).
Finally, the district court determined that it
was the metro court’s duty, not the detention

center’s duty, to ascertain whether Defen-
dant “got good time credit for the furlough.”
The district court remanded Defendant's
ease to metro court with instructions to re-
sentence Defendant, impose the community
service and monetary fine provisions, and
determine the amount of good time Defen-
dant should have been credited. This appeal
followed.

Il. DISCUSSION

{12} Defendant presents us with three is-
sues, all of which relate to sentencing. Our
review is de novo. See State v. Frost, 2003—
NMCA-002, 16, 183 N.M. 45, 60 P.38d 492
(stating that whether a sentence violates the
applicable sentencing statutes is a question of
statutory interpretation which this court re-
views de novo).

A. Furlough Time

{13} We first address the treatment of
Defendant's time on furlough. The district
court, relying on Fellhauer, concluded that
Defendant was not entitled to “credit” for the
furlough because he was not in official con-
finement during that time. According to the
district court, he was neither in actual nor
constructive custody of the State during the
furlough. In Fellhawer, we discussed the
applicability of the presentence confinement
credit statute. 1997-NMCA-064, 11 4-17,
123 N.M. 476, 948 P.2d 123. That statute
“mandates that credit be given for time spent
in ‘official confinement’ prior to sen-
tenc[ing].” Jd. 14. In the present case, De-
fendant had already been sentenced and
committed, so we are not dealing with pre-
sentence confinement. Moreover, our case
law holds that the concept of “credit,” as
used in Fellhauer, is inapplicable in the post-
sentencing context. See State v. Clah, 1997-
NMCA-091, 117, 124 N.M. 6, 946 P.2d 210
(concluding that a defendant could not be
given “credit” for post-sentencing treatment
because credit is normally used only to refer
to reductions for presentence confinement
and for time spent on probation when a
sentence is imposed after the conditions of
probation are violated). Accordingly, we
consider any reliance on Fellhauer to be
misplaced.

{14} Since 1963, the Legislature has recog-
nized that a defendant may be in the custody
of the state but outside the walls of a prison.

See State v. Woods, 2010-NMCA-017, 112,”

148 N.M. 89, 230 P.3d 836. The concept of
constructive custody reflects this recognition
and refers to situations where an inmate is
temporarily outside a penal institution but is
expected to return to the place of confine-
ment. See State v. Guillen, 2001-NMCA-
079, 18, 180 N.M. 803, 32 P.3d 812 (“We
understand constructive custody to apply to
situations in which a defendant is temporari-
ly outside a penal institution, but is expected
to return to the place of confinement.”). Our
criminal statutes instruct that an inmate in
constructive custody remains in lawful custo-
dy or confinement. See NMSA 1978, § 30-
1-12(H) (1963) (“‘{L]awful custody or con-
finement’ means the holding of any person
pursuant to lawful authority, including, with-
out limitation, actual or conseructive [con-
structive] custody of prisoners temporarily
outside a penal institution, reformatory, jail,
prison farm or ranch[.]” (alterations in origi-
nal)). In State v. Hill, 117 N.M. 807, 808,
877 P.2d 1110, 1111 (Ct.App.1994), we de-
fined the concept of furlough as the tempo-
rary release of an inmate from the physical
confines of a jail upon the condition that the
inmate is legally required to return to the jail
at a specified time. In effect, we determined
in Hill that an inmate remains in the con-
structive custody of the state during a fur-
lough.

{15} In this case, Defendant was lawfully
committed to the detention center following
sentencing. It was only after sentencing and
commitment that Defendant was released on
furlough. The furlough orders were not am-
biguous. They imposed limitations on Defen-
dant’s movement, required Defendant to re-
turn to custody at the end of the furlough
period, and also informed Defendant that
“{flailure to return will result in a charge of
escape.”

{16} The State recognizes that Defendant
could have been charged with escape for not
returning to jail after the furlough, but it
focuses on the time during furlough and ar-
gues that Defendant was not in constructive
custody because there was nothing to keep

347

Defendant from walking away from Hoy Re-
covery, Inc. or from his classes. This argu-
ment is based on Fellhauer, which does
speak to constructive custody. See Fell-
hauer, 1997-NMCA-064, 19 16-17, 128 N.M.
476, 943 P.2d 123. But as we have explained,
constructive custody in this context is for
purposes of determining when an individual
is in official confinement such that he would
be entitled to presentence confinement credit
under NMSA. 1978, Section 31-20-12 (1977).
See Fellhauer, 1997-NMCA-064, ‘If 16-17,
123 N.M. 476, 943 P.2d 123. Under Fell-
hauer, “the constructive custody must be suf-
ficiently restrictive or onerous to be consid-
ered as confinement, and home confinement,
by itself, is neither sufficiently restrictive nor
onerous.” Id. 9910-13.

I {17} In the case before us, we are
dealing with post-sentence confinement. De-
fendant had already been sentenced, and the
metro court had authorized the furloughs.
Although Defendant was not inside a penal
institution, he was in lawful custody or con-
finement pursuant to the sentencing and fur-
Jough orders, and thus he was in constructive
custody while on furlough. See Guillen,
2001-NMCA-079, 18, 180 N.M. 803, 32 P.3d
812 (observing that an inmate remains in
constructive custody during a furlough and
may be charged with the crime of escape for
failing to return from a furlough). Accord-
ingly, we hold that for purposes of caleulat-
ing time served, the time Defendant served
on furlough is to be treated in the same
manner as any of the time he served in the
detention center.

B. Calculation of Good Time and Com-
pletion of Sentence

HMMM {18} The parties agree that the
district court erred in concluding that the
metro court was responsible for deciding
both whether Defendant was eligible for
good time and the amount of good time to
which Defendant was entitled. While Defen-
dant’s eligibility for good time is determined
by the metro court, the specific amount of
good time Defendant may receive is deter-
mined by the administration of the detention
center. State v. Wyman, 2008-NMCA-113,
17, 144 N.M. 701, 191 P.8d 559, cert.

348

quashed, 2009-NMCERT-012, 147 N.M. 601,
227 P.3d 91. The State makes no claim that
Defendant is ineligible for good time and
raises no objection to the amount of good
time awarded to him by the detention center.
We thus conclude that Defendant was eligi-
ble for good time and entitled to the amount
of good time awarded.

{19} The detention center calculated that
Defendant completed his sentence on No-
vember 28, 2006, during the furlough. There
is no objection by the State to this caleula-
tion. Accordingly, we adopt this conclusion
and hold that the metro court did not have
authority to sentence Defendant to 271 days
of incarceration as per the 2007 judgment
and sentence because Defendant had already
completed his sentence by the date of the
judgment. See State v. Baros, 78 N.M. 623,
626, 485 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1968) (observing
that after a defendant has fully served his or
her sentence, even if that sentence is an
irregular sentence and subject to being set
aside for that reason, the court’s jurisdiction
over him is at an end as it is impermissible,
under Article II, Sections 15 and 18 of the
New Mexico Constitution, to punish an of-
fender twice for the same offense).

C. Community Service and Monetary
Fines

HE {20} Section 66-8-102(F)(1) requires
an individual who has committed a DUI,
second offense, to serve forty-eight hours of
community service and pay a five hundred
dollar fine, and further instructs that these
penalties “shall not be suspended or deferred
or taken under advisement[.}” The district
court correctly observed that the metro court
failed to impose these mandatory provisions.
However, the district court did not have au-
thority to order the metro court to impose
these provisions on remand because Defen-
dant had completed his sentence prior to the
on-record appeal to district court. See Ba-
vos, 78 N.M. at 626, 485 P.2d at 1008; see
also State v. Diaz, 2007-NMCA-026, 119,
141 N.M. 228, 153 P.38d 57 (observing that
“the power to correct a sentence, even one
that is statutorily invalid, is subject to some
temporal limit under principles of fundamen-
tal fairness” and that “due process may be

denied when a defendant has already served
so much of the original sentence imposed
that his expectations as to its finality have
erystallized and it would be fundamentally
unfair to defeat them” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).

Il. CONCLUSION

{21} While the metro court was responsi-
ble for determining Defendant's eligibility for
good time, the specific amount of good time
Defendant would receive was to be deter-
mined by the detention center. Defendant
continued to serve his sentence while on fur-
lough and completed his sentence on Novem-
ber 28, 2006. Thereafter, neither the district
court nor the metro court had authority to
impose an additional period of incarceration
or to impose new penalties on remand. This
matter is remanded to the metro court where
the 2007 judgment and sentence shall be
vacated, and Defendant shall be discharged
as having completed his sentence.

{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: RODERICK T.
KENNEDY and TIMOTHY L. GARCIA,

Judges.

2011-NMCA-056
258 P.3d 1140

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.
Gunnar OLSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 29,010.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
April 8, 2011.

Certiorari Granted, May 24, 2011,
Docket No. 32,976.

350

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrew
S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Chief Public Defender, Allison H. Jaramil-
lo, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Defendant Gunnar Olson pleaded no
contest to possession of a controlled sub-
stance (cocaine). He reserved his right to
appeal from the judgment convicting him of
that offense upon a “guilty plea” in order to
attack the court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence. He now appeals from the
judgment and asks this Court to reverse the
district court’s denial of his motion to sup-
press on the grounds that the search and
seizure of his person and property violated
the United States and New Mexico Constitu-
tions. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

{2} As factual background, we have only
the testimony offered by Officer Trey Eco-
nomidy, the officer who conducted the search
and seizure of Defendant. On an evening in
December 2007, just prior to 12:30 a.m., Offi-
eer Economidy was parked in his patrol car
in an alley behind a convenience store near
the intersection of University Boulevard and
Central Avenue in Albuquerque, New Mexi-
co. Defendant drove his vehicle into the
alley, then pulled back out and continued on
University Boulevard. Officer Economidy
found this behavior suspicious “[b]ecause the
vehicle pulls in the alley, doesn’t conduct any
business in the alley, kind of sees me in my
marked police unit, kind of gives me the
impression like, oh, no, the police, then backs
out and then heads back southbound.” Be-
cause of the suspicious behavior, the officer
pulled out of the alley to follow Defendant.
Upon seeing a “significantly expired” tempo-
rary tag, he conducted a traffic stop.

{3} Officer Economidy approached Defen-
dant’s vehicle alone because he was not pa-
trolling with a partner. Defendant had al-
ready begun “digging for paperwork” when
the officer approached, and Defendant did
not make eye contact with him. The officer

351

recognized right away that Defendant had a
passenger known to the officer to be a prosti-
tute. The officer had previous law enforce-
ment interactions with the prostitute and
knew the passenger by name. “It was a
known male[-] dressed[-] female prostitute[.]”

{4} “[Plretty much immediately” after the
stop, the officer requested Defendant to exit
the car. Requiring the driver to exit the
vehicle was the officer’s typical practice
where there was a known prostitute involved,
so that the officer could interview the driver
and passenger separately and see how they
knew one another and what business they
had with each other that evening. After
Defendant was out of the car, the officer
asked him who his passenger was, “at which
point he told me it was him.” Defendant also
told the officer that the transvestite, “Emily,”
was a friend he had known for about a year
and was a “working girl,” but was not work-
ing that evening and that he was “just giving
her a ride.” At this point, the officer was
investigating possible criminal solicitation of
prostitution. The officer asked if Defendant
had any weapons or anything illegal on his
person because he saw that Defendant was
holding a fanny pack like a purse. In re-
sponse, Defendant responded that he did not
“believe in violence.” The officer explained
to Defendant that his temporary tag was
“significantly expired” and asked what De-
fendant was doing in the alley. Defendant
replied that he saw the officer in the alley
and he “didn’t know if there was something
going on, so he backed out.”

{5} For his safety, the officer had Defen-
dant place the fanny pack on the hood while
he continued the interview. He asked De-
fendant if he had a driver’s license on him.
Defendant “went to the fanny pack” as
though he was possibly going to retrieve his
identification from it, the officer asked De-
fendant if his identification was in the fanny
pack, and Defendant said it was. Still con-
cerned that Defendant might have had “a
gun or knives or any kind of edge weapon” in
the fanny pack, for safety reasons the officer
asked Defendant if he could “take a look to
make sure there [was] no weapon in the
fanny pack before [Defendant] started grab-
bing things out of itl” Defendant consent-

ed to the officer looking in the fanny pack for
weapons.

{6} The officer looked in the fanny pack
and saw “two glass crack pipes and one
metal crack pipe in one of the far compart-
ments that was in the back zipper that would
be closest to your body.” When questioned
by the officer about the pipes, Defendant
admitted to using the pipes to smoke cocaine.
Defendant was placed under arrest, and the
officer asked him where his cocaine was.
Defendant said it was in his front pocket.
The officer found the cocaine in a container
pulled from Defendant's front pocket.

{7} Defendant moved to suppress all evi-
dence obtained as a result of the search and
seizure. In his motion, Defendant argued
that the officer did not have reasonable, ar-
ticulable suspicion of any criminal activity on
his part beyond a traffic violation and did not
have authority to ask him to step out of the
vehicle. Defendant further argued that the
officer did not have probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion of any criminal activity to
support a warrantless search or seizure of
the fanny pack. He also argued that his
consent to search was not voluntary.

{8} The district court denied Defendant’s
motion to suppress. In sum, the court’s
reasoning was that it found nothing in the
evidence that would cause it to conclude that,
the officer’s actions were unreasonable in any
way. The court further found that Defen-
dant was not coerced or threatened in any
way and that his consent to search the fanny
pack was given knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. After entry of his plea, Defen-
dant reserved his right to appeal on the
ground that the denial of his suppression
motion constituted reversible error.

{9} Defendant contends that his rights
under the United States and New Mexico
Constitutions were violated by the warrant-
Jess search of his person and property and
without a valid exception to the warrant re-
quirement. In support of this contention,
Defendant argues that the officer illegally
expanded the scope of the traffie stop, with-
out reasonable suspicion or concern for safe-
ty. Defendant also argues that consent to
search his fanny pack was not voluntarily

352

given and that his consent was not purged of
the Fourth Amendment violation.

DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Related Rules

Hs {10} A motion to suppress evidence
based on an alleged unlawful detention in-
volves a mixed question of fact and law. Our
review procedure is set. out in State v. Leyva,
2011-NMSC-009, 130, 149 N.M. 435, 250
P.8d 861, State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC~
026, 110, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922, and
State v. Vandenberg, 2008-NMSC-030,
1117-19, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. In the
present case, we review de novo whether the
officer’s actions were objectively reasonable;
this includes addressing whether reasonable
suspicion or safety concerns existed to sup-
port the officer’s questioning and continuing
detention on matters unrelated to the rea-
sons for the traffic stop. Leyva, 2011-
NMSC-009, 130, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861;
Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 119, 134
N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. We look at the totality
of circumstances. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009,
11.30, 59, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.8d 861; Van-
denberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 119, 184 N.M.
566, 81 P.3d 19. “By assessing the totality of
circumstances, we recognize that officers
may draw on their own experience and spe-
cialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that might well elude an
untrained person.” State v. Neal, 2007-
NMSC-048, 121, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). We examine the evolving circum-
stances facing the officer. State v. Sewell,
2009-NMSC-033, 922, 146 N.M. 428, 211
P.3d 885; Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026,
116, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.8d 922; State v
Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, 136, 188 N.M. 414,
120 P.8d 836, We consider whether an “offi-
cer’s ... actions were fairly responsive to the
emerging tableau—the circumstances origi-
nally warranting the stop, informed by what
occurred, and what the officer learned, as the
stop progressed.” Funderburg, 2008-
NMSC-026, 127, 144 N.M. 87, 183 P.38d 922
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).

Expansion of the Traffic Stop Tests

HMM {11} “The [FJederal and New Mex-
ico Constitutions are not a guarantee against
all searches and seizures, only unreasonable
ones.” Sewell, 2009-NMSC-033, 116, 146
N.M. 428, 211 P.3d 885 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). New Mexico
courts apply a two-part test to analyze the
reasonableness of an officer’s actions during
a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. Leyva, 2011-
NMSC-009, 11 10, 31, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d
861; Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, 123, 138
N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836. First, we must
ascertain whether the traffic stop was justi-
fied at its inception. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-
009, 131, 149 N.M. 485, 250 P.8d 861; Du-
ran, 2005-NMSC-034, 123, 188 N.M. 414,
120 P.8d 886. The requirements under the
second part of the test are different depend-
ing on whether we are analyzing Fourth
Amendment protections or protections under
Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution. See Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009,
‘1 10-35, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861 (setting
out the analysis under the Fourth Amend-
ment); see also id. 1152-61 (setting out the
analysis under Article II, Section 10).

{12} Defendant concedes that under the
first test in the analysis there existed reason-
able suspicion for the traffic stop. Defen-
dant was driving with an expired temporary
registration tag. This constituted a traffic
violation, which supplied an appropriate basis
for the traffic stop. See, eg. Vandenberg,
2003-NMSC-030, 1 21, 184 N.M. 566, 81 P.8d
19 (noting that suspicion of violating a traffic
law supplies the initial justification for stop-
ping a vehicle); cf, Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009,
1931, 58 (stating that the defendant con-
ceded that the initial stop for excessive speed
was reasonable).

{18} Relating to the second test in the
analysis, Defendant argues that the officer’s
actions after the initial stop violated the
Fourth Amendment, but if this Court were to
determine that the Fourth Amendment was
not violated, Defendant argues that Article
II, Section 10 provides greater protection
and the officer’s actions violated Article II,
Section 10. In oral argument based on the
filing of Leyva while this case was pending

on appeal, the State conceded that Defendant
preserved an Article II, Section 10 argument.
Defendant alerted the district court by citing
Article II, Section 10, and the facts surround-
ing the officer’s actions in detaining and ask-
ing questions were before the district court.
See Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, 1149-51, 149
N.M. 485, 250 P.8d 861 (stating that, because
Article IT, Section 10 had previously been
interpreted more expansively than the
Fourth Amendment trial counsel need only
“plead[ ] that his right to be free from an
unreasonable search and seizure was violated
under both the Fourth Amendment and Arti-
cle II, Section 10” and “develop the neces-
sary factual base”).

Hs {14} Leyva refers to the Fourth
Amendment test as a “bright-line temporal
test{ 11” Id. 1953-55. The focus of the
Fourth Amendment inquiry is whether the
officer’s questioning “did not measurably ex-
tend the length of the valid stop; that is,
whether the questioning exceeded the tempo-
ral limitations on the scope of the investiga-
tion.” Id. 131. Temporal limitations are to
be analyzed based on whether the question-
ing “was a permissible de minimis extension
of a valid stop” and whether they “measur-
ably extend[ed] the length of the valid
stop[.]” Id. 1131, 33, 35.

HH s{15} Significantly different than
that in the Fourth Amendment test, the Arti-
cle II, Section 10 test is expressed by our
Supreme Court in Leyva as follows.

Article II, Section 10 requires that all

questions asked during the investigation of

a traffic stop be reasonably related to the

initial reason for the stop. Unrelated

questions are permissible when supported
by independent reasonable suspicion, for
reasons of officer safety, or if the interac-
tion has developed into a consensual en-
counter. The overall reasonableness of
the stop continues to be determined by
balancing the public interest in the en-
forcement of traffic laws against an indi-
vidual’s right to liberty, privacy, and free-
dom from arbitrary police interference.
Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, 1155, 149 N.M. 435,
250 P.8d 861 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “Reasonable suspicion is
measured by an objective standard based on

353

the totality of the circumstances.” Id. 1159,
61. “[Rleasonable suspicion is a common-
sense, nontechnical conception, which re-
quires that officers articulate a reason, be-
yond a mere hunch, for their belief that an
individual has committed a criminal act.”
Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, 115, 144
N.M. 87, 188 P.3d 922 (alteration omitted)
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).

Inquiry Related to Prostitution

HM {16} In the present case, the officer
quickly focused his investigation on prostitu-
tion because of the passenger’s identity and
the passenger’s clothing and makeup. There
exist several criminal statutes relating to
prostitution. See NMSA 1978, §§ 30-9-2
to -9 (1963, as amended through 1989). Rel-
evant here are the statutes criminalizing
prostitution and patronizing prostitutes. See
§ 30-9-2 (making it a crime to knowingly
offer to engage in a sexual act for hire);
§ 30-9-2(B) (defining patronizing a prosti-
tute as “knowingly hiring or offering to hire
a prostitute, or one believed by the offeror to
be a prostitute, to engage in a sexual act with
the actor or another”). Based on his experi-
ence of driving down Central Avenue, it was
“pretty obvious” who was a “working per-
son[,]” “as well as the clothing a lot of times
and the heavy makeup.” To the officer, “it
was pretty obvious that [the prostitute] was a
working ... person in this case.” The offi-
cer testified he “pretty much immediately”
asked Defendant to step out of the car be-
cause this is what the officer typically would
do when the investigation involves a known
prostitute, in order to inquire separately into
the circumstances and to ask how they know
each other and what business they have with
each other.

{17} In line with Leyva’s requirement that
“all questions asked ... be reasonably relat-
ed to the initial reason for the stop” and that
“[ujnrelated questions” are not permissible
unless they are supported by “independent
reasonable suspicion,” 2011-NMSC-009, 155,
149 N.M. 485, 250 P.8d 861, we hold that
under Article II, Section 10, the officer did
not have sufficient independent articulable
and reasonable suspicion to expand the scope

354

of the initial detention for the further inquiry
regarding Defendant’s relationship with the
prostitute. The only circumstances possibly
giving rise to suspicion of solicitation of a
prostitute before the officer began his imme-
diate inquiry relating to solicitation of prosti-
tution were the officer’s having seen Defen-
dant’s vehicle pull into and then out of an
alley at 12:30 am., after which, upon stop-
ping the vehicle for a traffic violation, the
officer saw the passenger, a person he knew
was a transvestite prostitute. These very
limited circumstances are insufficient to meet,
the standard of reasonable and articulable
suspicion that Defendant had knowingly
hired or offered to hire his passenger to
engage in a sexual act. Were we to hold
otherwise, police officers would have carte
blanche based on suspicion of solicitation of a
prostitute to stop any vehicle late at night
whenever he saw a driver and a known pros-
titute in the vehicle, to require the driver to
exit the vehicle, and to question the driver
and the passenger regarding their relation-
ship. That conduct, no different than the
conduct in the present case, is tantamount to
a seizure of a driver based on the mere
presence of a passenger known to have com-
mitted a past criminal act. Cf State v. Affs-
prung, 2004-NMCA-038, 914, 20-21, 185
N.M. 806, 87 P.8d 1088 (holding that an
officer’s request of a passenger who “was
present solely by virtue of the coincidence he
‘was a passenger” for the passenger’s identifi-
cation just because the officer wanted to
know who he was dealing with for safety
purposes constituted an unlawful detention);
State v. Jones, 114 N.M. 147, 151, 885 P.2d
863, 867 (Ct.App.1992) (refusing to “make the
final leap of faith ... that [an] inference
arising from gang membership and presence
in a gang activity area [was] sufficient alone
to support reasonable suspicion”). Such a
seizure, or extended detention, as the case
may be, is based on no more than hunch or
speculation of ongoing criminal conduct. It
is closer to arbitrary or harassing police con-
duct than to society’s need for reasonable law
enforcement investigative activity.

{18} Because we determine that Defen-
dant was unlawfully detained in violation of
Article II, Section 10, his consent to search
and the search itself were not purged of

taint, and it was error not to grant Defen-
dant’s motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION

{19} We reverse the district court’s denial
of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The mo-
tion should have been granted, and the evi-
dence obtained in the search should be sup-
pressed.

{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D.
BUSTAMANTE and TIMOTHY L.
GARCIA, Judges.

2011-NMCA-076
258 P.3d 1146

ZIA TRUST, INC., as Personal Represen-
tative of the Estate of Bryan Trujil-
lo, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
Leyna ARAGON, Defendant—Appellee.
No. 29,160.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

April 18, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, June 8, 2011, No. 38,022.

NM, for Appellee.

OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.

district court.

Carter & Valle Law Firm, P.C., Richard J.
Valle, C.D. Carter, III, Albuquerque, NM,
for Appellant.

Simone, Roberts & Weiss, P.A., Kathleen
M. Mixon, Meena H. Allen, Albuquerque,

{1} We consider in this appeal both the
district court’s decision not to allow an emer-
gency room doctor’s opinion concerning a
decedent’s chance of survival from fatal inju-
ries after being struck by an automobile, as
well as issues at trial pertaining to the de-
fense of suicide as an intervening cause.

{2} As to the doctor’s opinion testimony,
the district court did not allow the testimony
on the basis that it was conjectural and unre-
liable. It granted partial summary judgment
precluding the claim of lost chance of surviv-
al. We hold that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in disallowing the testi-
mony and affirm the district court’s grant of
partial summary judgment. As to the trial
issues, we hold that (1) the district court did
not abuse its discretion in allowing the use of
the term “suicide” at trial, and (2) even if the
instruction on suicide as an independent in-
tervening cause was erroneous, the error was
harmless because the jury concluded that
there was no negligence on the special ver-
dict form. We affirm the judgment of the

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACK-
GROUND

{3} Plaintiff Zia Trust, Inc. as personal
representative of the estate of Bryan Trujil-
lo, Decedent, brought suit against Defendant
Leyna Aragon, alleging claims of negligence,
negligence per se, wrongful death (collective-
ly, wrongful death claims) and lost chance of
survival as the result of an automobile acci-
dent in which Decedent, a pedestrian, died.
The district court granted Defendant’s mo-
tion for partial summary judgment with re-
gard to the lost chance of survival claim, and
the wrongful death claims proceeded to trial.

{4} The facts underlying the claims involve
an automobile accident between Defendant,
while driving an automobile, and Decedent,
while a pedestrian, causing fatal injuries to
Decedent. With respect to the wrongful
death claims, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant
caused Decedent’s death by her negligence
and failure to comply with applicable laws.
As the basis for its lost chance of survival
claim, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant fled
the scene of the accident, did not provide
assistance to Decedent, and delayed the pro-
vision of medical services to Decedent, who
was alive after the accident. To support its
allegations of lost chance of survival, Plaintiff
retained as an expert Dr. Philip J. Froman,
who opined that immediate action at the time
of the accident could have increased Dece-
dent’s likelihood of survival by twenty-five
percent.

{5} Many of the facts of the accident and
its aftermath are disputed. There was testi-
mony that Decedent, age twenty, had been
drinking the night of the accident with Bar-
bara Salazar and Jennifer Gallegos at Galle-
gos’ home. Donna Archibeque was also
present. Decedent and Salazar had a
lengthy relationship and were the parents of
two children. Decedent was drunk and be-
came upset with Salazar and left. He re-
turned in about fifteen minutes. When he
came to the door, Salazar and the others
were laughing. Decedent again became up-
set, and when Salazar told him to “shut up,”
Decedent said something to the effect that he
was going to kill himself and that he was
“going to go die.” He again left. In a

subsequent telephone conversation with Sala-
zav, Decedent told her that he “was walking
between cars[.]”

{6} Defendant, age seventeen, was driving
with Lenore Moya and Tim Cogis in the car
with her. Defendant testified that she had
consumed a small amount of marijuana the
night of the accident. She saw a shadow
“move across the road[,]” toward a truck in
front of her, and “then to the shoulder.” The
truck swerved. She thought the shadow was
an animal. She slowed down, and a man
came running from her blind spot and threw
himself on her car. He was wearing dark
clothes.

{7} Right after the accident, Moya an-
swered Decedent’s cell phone and spoke with
Salazar. Believing that there had been an
accident, Salazar and Archibeque drove for a
couple of minutes to find Decedent. When
they arrived, Decedent was breathing, re-
sponded to Salazar by trying to lift his head,
and squeezed Salazar’s hand. In the mean-
time, Defendant had panicked and left the
seene of the accident because Cogis pos-
sessed marijuana. John Gordon, a deputy
sheriff, drove upon the scene approximately
five minutes after Salazar arrived. He re-
ported the accident and checked Decedent’s
pulse, which was present.

{8} Living Cross Ambulance (Living
Cross) responded to the scene three minutes
after it received a dispatch call. A Living
Cross supervisor, Allison Lopez, one of the
responders, stated that Decedent “had sus-
tained multi[-Jsystem traumatic injuries.”
She observed, among other things, that
“(D]ecedent’s spine was exposed and part of
his skull and brain matter was missing.”
Approximately eleven minutes after Living
Cross arrived, its personnel could not discern
any pulse. They were unable to revive Dece-
dent, who died at the scene.

{9} The Office of the Medical Investigator
(OMI) performed a “gross autopsy” or an
external review of the body. It did not
perform an internal or open autopsy. No x-
rays were performed. The medical records
indicated that Decedent sustained numerous
external injuries, including fractures, abdom-
inal injury, traumatic blood loss, cardiac ar-
rest, flail chest, lacerations to the front of the

357

head, foot fracture, right eloow open frae-
ture, unstable pelvis, multiple leg: fractures,
right knee fracture, hypovolemia shock, and
neck injury.

{10} Defendant filed a motion for partial
summary judgment with respect to the lost
chance of survival claim, challenging the va-
lidity of the claim and arguing that, even if
there were a valid claim, Dr. Froman’s opin-
ions were insufficient to support such a claim.
Defendant also filed a motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff's other claims that is
not relevant to this appeal except to the
extent that facts developed by the parties in
connection with that motion were used by the
parties in connection with the motion con-
cerning the lost chance of survival claim.
The district court granted only the motion
for partial summary judgment. The wrong-
ful death claims proceeded to trial, at which
Defendant raised as a defense the interven-
ing cause of Decedent’s suicide. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Defendant.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court’s
judgment.

{11} On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the
district court erred in (1) granting the motion
for partial summary judgment, (2) allowing
the jury to consider whether Decedent at-
tempted suicide, and (8) instructing the jury
that suicide was a defense to negligence. We
turn to Plaintiffs arguments.

LOST CHANCE OF SURVIVAL

HE {12} The district court granted De-
fendant’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment on Plaintiff's claim of lost chance of
survival. The district court stated that the
problem with the claim, in part, was Dr.
Froman’s testimony. As to the testimony, it
stated that: “This is guess; this is conjec-
ture. This is not based on anything other
than making assumptions that should not
support any type of verdict.... It clearly
would be allowing a jury to just guess, based
on this.” When denying Plaintiff's motion to
reconsider partial summary judgment on lost
chance of survival, the district court ruled
that, even if Plaintiff had a claim, “the testi-
mony of ... Plaintiff's expert regarding this
matter is too speculative and unreliable. The
expert did not even possess the necessary

358

facts to enable him to express a reasonably
accurate conclusion.” Plaintiff argues on ap-
peal that the testimony of its expert, Dr.
Froman, was sufficient for the jury to consid-
er on the issue of lost chance of survival.
We do not agree.

. [2,8] {13} Rule 11-702 NMRA entitled
“Testimony by experts,” governs the admis-
sion of expert testimony in our courts. The
Rule states:

If scientific, technical or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.

The three prerequisites for the admission of
expert testimony under the rule are: (1) the
witness must be qualified as an expert; (2)
the specialized testimony must assist the tri-
er of fact; and (8) the expert witness testi-
mony must be limited to scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge in which the
witness is qualified. State v. Alberico, 116
N.M. 156, 166, 861 P.2d 192, 202 (1993). The
party offering the evidence has the burden to
satisfy these requirements. State v. Mor-
ales, 2002-NMCA-052, 1121, 23, 182 N.M.
146, 45 P.3d 406.

HN ({14} This case concerns the second
prerequisite; there is no issue concerning
Dr. Froman’s qualifications as an emergency
medical provider. In considering the second
prerequisite, the district court has the duty
to make sure that “an expert’s testimony
rests on both a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand so that specula-
tive and unfounded opinions do not reach the
jury.” Parkhill v. Alderman-Cave Milling
& Grain Co. of N.M., 2010-NMCA-110, 1 12,
149 N.M. 140, 245 P.8d 585, cert. granted,
2010-NMCERT-012, 150 N.M. 493, 268 P.8d
270. This determination lies in the discretion
of the district court. See Alberico, 116 N.M.
at 169, 861 P.2d at 205 (stating that we
review a district court’s admission or exclu-
sion or expert testimony for abuse of discre-
tion). An abuse of discretion requires this
Court to conclude that the district court’s
ruling “is clearly contrary to the logical con-
clusions demanded by the facts and circum-

stances of the case.” Sims v. Sims, 1996—
NMSC-078, {1 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153.
“When there exist reasons both supporting
and detracting from a trial court decision,
there is no abuse of discretion.” Talley v.
Talley, 115 N.M. 89, 92, 847 P.2d 323, 326
(Ct.App.1993).

HI {15} Plaintiff supported its response
to Defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment on lost chance of survival with two
affidavits and Dr. Froman’s deposition testi-
mony. Affidavits of expert witnesses must
present admissible evidence to be considered
in connection with a motion for summary
judgment. See Galvan v. City of Albuquer-
que, 85 N.M. 42, 45, 508 P.2d 1839, 1342
(Ct.App.1973) (“The affidavit did not set
forth facts admissible in evidence and was
not entitled to consideration.”); see also Lo-
pez v. Reddy, 2005-NMCA-054, 115, 10, 14,
22, 137 N.M. 554, 113 P.8d 377 (upholding
district court’s Rule 11~702 exclusion of ex-
pert’s affidavit in response to summary judg-
ment motion); ¢f In re Estate of Keeney, 121
N.M. 58, 61, 908 P.2d 751, 754 (Ct.App.1995)
(allowing affidavit of expert witness that pre-
sented admissible testimony that was not
based on the expert’s personal knowledge
rather, it was opinion testimony of an expert,
and therefore would have been admissible at
trial).

{16} In connection with this case, Dr. Fro-
man reviewed the reports of the OMI, Living
Cross, as well as the deposition of Salazar,
who was with Decedent at the scene of the
accident. Dr. Froman stated his opinion that
“Sf there had been an immediate call to EMS
at the time of the traumatic event, there
could have been an increased likelihood of
survival of 25%.” He supported his caleula-
tion with the resuscitation rates of the Ab-
breviated Injury Scale to arrive at a Trauma
Injury Severity Score. He determined from
the OMI report that Decedent suffered mul-
tiple rib fractures, hemothorax, pelvie frac-
tures, open tib fib, and soft tissue injuries.
He noted that the OMI report did not discuss
an open head injury that would result in loss
of brain matter as reported by Living Cross.
There was no internal autopsy, and Dr. Fro-
man needed to assume certain medical infor-
mation to reach his opinion. For example,

he did not know Decedent’s respiratory rate,
systolic blood pressure, and Glasgow Coma
Scale. To compensate for the absence of
information, Dr. Froman made assumptions
in his scenario that resulted in a twenty- eight
percent chance of survival.

{17} The district court did not abuse its
discretion by declining Dr. Froman’s testimo-
ny because it was speculative or conjectural.
If a claim for lost chance of survival is recog-
nized in this context, an issue we do not
decide, Plaintiff would be required to estab-
lish through a medical expert that Defen-
dant’s failure to initiate emergency response
caused the loss of chance of survival. See
UJI 18-1635 NMRA (requiring evidence for
Jost chance claim from a medical expert es-
tablishing that the plaintiff lost a measurable
opportunity to avoid a better outcome or
survival due to the defendant’s negligence);
Alberts v. Schultz, 1999-NMSC-015, 129,
126 N.M. 807, 975 P.2d 1279 (stating that in
claim for loss of chance of survival in medical
malpractice case that evidence “must show to
a reasonable degree of medical probability
that the defendant’s negligence caused the
loss of the chance of a better result”). The
district court concluded that Dr. Froman’s
testimony was too speculative to establish
this causation.

{18} Although Dr. Froman did his best to
quantify the possibility of Decedent’s survival
based in part on known facts established in
the investigation of the accident, his opinion
was necessarily based on information that
was not available. Most significantly, there
was no internal autopsy. Dr. Froman there-
fore did not know what brain or internal
injuries Decedent had suffered. In addition,
there were no x-rays from which he could
ascertain the extent or existence of skull or
back fractures. As a result, Dr. Froman
opined about Decedent’s chance of survival
without specific knowledge as to the cause of
Decedent’s death or the conditions that led to
his death. From the nature of this type of
information, the district court could have log-
ically concluded that it was material to the
issue that would have been before the jury—
Decedent’s chance of survival from the inju-
ries that caused his death.

359

Ts {19} ‘To be sure, an expert witness
may make assumptions based on evidence in
the record to reach a conclusion that may be
presented to a jury. State v. Downey, 2008-
NMSC-061, 134, 145 N.M. 282, 195 P.38d
1244. However, to be admissible under Rule
11-702, an expert’s testimony must assist the
trier of fact. Alberico, 116 N.M. at 168, 861
P.2d at 204. This requirement focuses on
the reliability and therefore the relevancy of
the testimony. Id. To be relevant, expert
testimony must “fit” the facts of the case and
“prove[ ] what it purports to prove.” Dow-
ney, 2008-NMSC-061, 130, 145 N.M. 232,
195 P.8d 1244 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In addition, to provide
admissible testimony, rather than inadmissi-
ble conjecture, an expert must “possess[ ]
such facts” to enable the expert “to express a
reasonably accurate conclusion.” Jd. 132.

{20} In Downey, our Supreme Court held
that an expert’s opinion concerning retro-
grade extrapolation did not fit the facts of
the case because the expert assumed that the
defendant had consumed his last drink prior
to a collision. Jd. 133. The defendant left
the scene for five to ten minutes after the
collision to call emergency assistance. Id.
(2. Although the prosecution claimed there
was circumstantial testimony that the defen-
dant had not consumed alcohol after the colli-
sion, the time that the defendant ceased
drinking was “impossible to pinpoint to a
reasonable certainty.” Id. 136.

{21} Downey is sufficiently similar to this
case to assist us in our analysis. In Downey,
the expert assumed that the defendant had
not consumed alcohol after the collision. Id.
131. Indeed, there was evidence from which
the expert could have made that assumption,
although, as the Court determined, that evi-
dence was not conclusive. Id. 136. As a
consequence, the expert’s testimony was too
conjectural to assist the trier of fact. Id.
134,

{22} In this case, Dr. Froman made his
assumptions from evidence that was available
to him. His conclusions could not be conclu-
sive, and they need not have been provided
he had sufficient facts to support them. See
id. 132 (‘Expert testimony may be received
if, and only if, the expert possesses such facts

360

as would enable him to express a reasonably
accurate conclusion as distinguished from
mere conjecture.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). However, Dr. Fro-
man lacked significant information concern-
ing Decedent’s internal injuries and cause of
death. His assumptions, therefore, form a
substantial part of the foundation for his
opinion. The district court determined that
Dr. Froman’s opinion was conjectural with-
out more concrete support such as that pro-
vided by the data concerning the internal
injuries and cause of death. We agree with
the district court that, without this informa-
tion in the record, and even with Dr. Fro-
man’s testimony, the jury would have been
required to speculate as to the extent of
Decedent’s injuries and cause of death in
order to determine Decedent’s chance of sur-
vival. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting Dr. Froman’s testimo-
ny on the basis that he did not have sufficient
facts to enable him to express a reasonably
accurate conclusion, and therefore his testi-
mony was speculative or conjectural.

{23} We are not persuaded otherwise by
Plaintiff's reliance on Bass by Lewis v. Wal-
lenstein, 769 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.1985) (Lew-
is), and Fuentes v. Reilly, 590 F.2d 509 (84
Cir.1979), because both cases are not on
point. In Lewis, a jury returned a verdict in
favor of the estate of a prison inmate for
failing to provide emergency medical treat-
ment and thereby denying the inmate his
civil rights. 769 F.2d at 1176. The defen-
dant doctor delayed responding to the call to
go to the emergency room for ten to fifteen
minutes, Jd. at 1183. There was conflicting
testimony as to whether the inmate was alive
when he was discovered in his cell. Id. As
to the causal connection between the defen-
dant’s delay and the inmate’s death, all testi-
fying doctors agreed that an immediate re-
sponse was crucial and that “seconds count.”
Id. One expert supported his testimony with
a study that established that “if basic life
support is provided within five minutes and
advanced cardiac life support within eight to
ten minutes, the patient’s chance for survival
would be 10-30%.” Id. The Seventh Circuit
included this testimony in reaching the con-
clusion that, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, there was sufficient.

evidence to support the jury’s finding of a
direct causal connection. Jd. at 1184, Plain-
tiff argues that the testimony in Lewis is
analogous to Dr. Froman’s testimony. How-
ever, the context is entirely different. The
issue in Lewis did not involve the review of
the exercise of the trial court’s discretion as
to the admissibility of the testimony under
Rule 11-702 or its equivalent. The testimo-
ny was admitted, and the question was
whether it, along with other evidence, sup-
ported a jury verdict. Lewis has no bearing
on this case.

{24} In Fuentes, in which the Third Cir-
cuit recognized a lost chance of survival claim
under New Jersey law, the trial court had
denied the admission of the plaintiff's expert
witness’s testimony based on its error in
interpreting the testimony pertaining to
proximate cause. 590 F.2d at 513, The
Third Circuit reversed, specifically stating
that the trial court had abused its discretion
because it did not act on a correct legal
premise. Id. Although Plaintiff in the case
before us argues that the district court erred
as a matter of law because (1) it did not
consider all evidence for the purpose of sum-
mary judgment and (2) it did not permit
Plaintiff to raise an inference from statistical
evidence, we do not agree. As to Plaintiff's
first argument, as we have discussed, the
district court may exclude expert testimony
offered in connection with summary judg-
ment. See Lopez, 2005-NMCA-054, 115, 14,
22, 187 N.M. 554, 118 P.8d 877. As to the
second, we do not rely on the use of statisti-
cal evidence in determining that the district
court did not abuse its discretion; we agree
with Plaintiff that it was entitled to do so.
The district court made no mention of statis-
tical evidence in ruling that Dr. Froman’s
testimony was too speculative and unreliable.
The district court did not abuse its discretion
when it concluded that the foundation for an
expert’s quantification of a possible result
was insufficient.

ISSUES CONCERNING WRONGFUL
DEATH CLAIMS

HN (25} At trial of Plaintiff's wrongful
death claims, Defendant took the position
that Decedent committed suicide. On ap-
peal, Plaintiff argues that the district court

erred in allowing Defendant to use the term
“suicide” and in instructing the jury that
suicide was a defense to negligence through
an independent intervening cause instruction.

{26} We first address Plaintiff's argument
regarding the term “suicide.” Plaintiff con-
tends that “suicide” only applies to cireum-
stances in which a person takes his or her
own life and not to a situation such as Defen-
dant argued at trial in which a third person
causes the death. Plaintiff points out that
this Court in Solorzano v. Bristow, 2004—
NMCA-136, 114, 186 N.M. 658, 103 P.3d
582, defined “suicide” as “a voluntary, delib-
erate, and intentional self-destruction by
someone of sound mind.” According to
Plaintiff, the requirement of self-destruction
limits suicide to cireumstances in which the
person, not another, takes the action to end
the person’s life. Plaintiff further supports
its argument by citing Fister ea rel. Estate of
Fister v. Allstate Life Inswrance Co. 366
Mad. 201, 783 A.2d 194, 197 (2001), in which
the decedent asked a friend to point a gun at
her while she pulled the trigger to kill her-
self. When she was unable to pull the trig-
ger with the string she had attached, she told
the friend to shoot her, which he did. Jd. at
197. The Maryland Court of Appeals inter-
preted a statute permitting insurance compa-
nies to exclude coverage for death by suicide.
Id. at 200-01. It held that the death was not,
suicide for the purposes of the statute and
insurance policies at issue because the friend
exercised his own will and “was ultimately
responsible for” the death. Jd. at 201.
Plaintiff asserts that it was prejudiced at
trial when the district court allowed the use
of the term “suicide” over Plaintiff's objec-
tion because of the term’s prejudicial nature.

HE {27} We need not determine the full
scope of the term “suicide” in order to ad-
dress Plaintiff's argument. Our case law has
not interpreted the self-destruction aspect of
suicide in the restrictive way that Plaintiff
proposes. See Solorzano, 2004-NMCA-136,
116, 186 N.M. 658, 103 P.8d 582 (holding
that the defendant had the burden of pre-
senting evidence regarding the decedent’s
state of mind, motivation, and intent as to
whether the decedent committed suicide even
though the defendant was driving the vehicle

361

she fell from). Moreover, Fister is distin-
guishable because it involved the interpreta-
tion of an insurance statute, a life insurance
policy, and a third party who actually caused
the death. 783 A.2d at 197-98, 201. A dis-
trict court has discretion to ascertain the
admission of evidence. State v. Riley, 2010-
NMSC-005, 1 28, 147 N.M. 557, 226 P.3d 656
(stating that a district court has “a great deal
of discretion in admitting or excluding evi-
dence” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). In this case, Salazar testified that
Decedent threatened to “kill himself” and
had made similar threats in the past. We
see little distinction between her terminology
and the term “suicide” as defined in Solorza-
no, 2004-NMCA-136, 14, 186 N.M. 658, 103
P.3d 582. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the use of the term
“suicide.”

Hs«{28} Plaintiff's claim that the dis-
trict court improperly instructed the jury
that suicide was an independent intervening
cause is also without merit. The district
court instructed the jury on Plaintiffs negli-
gence claim. It continued the instruction by
stating Defendant’s contentions that Dece-
dent was negligent and that Decedent’s ac-
tions were an independent intervening cause
of the accident. An independent intervening
cause “relieves a negligent party of liability.”
Johnstone v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-
NMCA-119, 124, 140 N.M. 596, 145 P.3d 76.
The jury returned the special verdict form in
this case, stating that Defendant was not
negligent. With that finding, the district
court’s instruction on independent interven-
ing cause was not an issue and therefore the
instruction, even if improper, was not preju-
dicial and therefore constituted harmless er-
ror. See Blackburn v. State, 98 N.M. 34, 37,
644 P.2d 548, 551 (Ct-App.1982) (“A party
complaining of faulty instructions must show
prejudice before reversal is warranted.”).

CONCLUSION

{29} We conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr.
Froman’s testimony. Without Dr. Froman’s
testimony, the district court did not err in
granting partial summary judgment. We
further conclude that the district court did

362

not abuse its discretion in allowing the use of
the term “suicide” at trial and that Plaintiff's
argument concerning the impropriety of the
independent intervening cause instruction is
moot. We therefore affirm.

{80} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B, SUTIN
and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.

2011-NMCA-059
258 P.3d 1154
Eve RANDLES, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vy.

Allegra HANSON and KCB, LLC,
Defendants—Appellees.

No. 29,427.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
April 27, 2011.

oD
ey

364
_

Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP, Daniel J.
Behles, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Allegra Hanson, Attorney at Law, Allegra
Hanson, Albuquerque, NM, Pro Se Appellee.

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
P.A., Edward Ricco, Jocelyn Drennan, Albu-
querque, NM, for Appellee KCB, LLC.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} In this appeal, we must determine the
legal and equitable remedies available to per-
forming and contributing coguarantors
against a principal debtor who has defaulted
on a loan. Adopting the approach of the
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guar-
anty, we hold that a coguarantor who has
fulfilled a duty of contribution to a perform-
ing coguarantor is entitled to recourse
against a principal debtor as though the con-
tributing coguarantor had performed the
guaranty to the same extent as his or her
contribution. Restatement (Third) of Surety-
ship & Guaranty § 58 (1996). A contributing
coguarantor has the right to seek reimburse-
ment, restitution, or subrogation against a
defaulting principal debtor to the extent of
his or her contribution. Jd. cmts. b, ¢, d, at
248-50. We further conclude that a perform-
ing coguarantor’s claim against a principal
debtor is reduced to the extent that he/she
receives contribution from another coguaran-
tor. Id. emt. e, at 250. Applying this hold-
ing to the facts of this case, we reverse the
district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Defendant KCB, LLC (KCB or
“performing coguarantor”) and remand with
instructions.

BACKGROUND

{2} This case arose out of a $500,000 loan
issued by Compass Bank to New Mexico
Motor Speedway, Inc. (Speedway) in October
2000. The loan was secured through the
execution of personal guaranties by four
shareholders of Speedway—Steven Kadner,
Richard Chaves, and Jerome Beckes, who
are the individual members of Defendant
KCB, and Plaintiff Eve Randles—and by Mi-
chael Jones, Speedway’s president at the
time.

{8} Two days after the promissory note
for the loan was executed, the parties en-
tered into two written agreements that are
relevant to the present dispute. The first
agreement (Memorandum Agreement) was
executed between all five guarantors and es-
sentially allocated liability among the guar-
antors in the event of a default by Speedway.
In this agreement, the guarantors acknowl-
edged that they were “jointly and severally
liable for all unpaid amounts” and, therefore,
if Speedway defaulted, the agreement pro-
vided that each guarantor would be responsi-
ble for paying “one-fifth (1/5) of all amounts
owed” within twenty days of the date of any
written demand by the bank for payment.

{4} The second agreement (Compensation
Agreement) was executed between Speedway
and all five guarantors. This agreement me-
morialized an earlier offer from Speedway to
pay “each guarantor $1.00 for each dollar
guaranteed” as compensation for the “signifi-
eant risk” each guarantor had taken in per-
sonally guaranteeing the loan. Accordingly,
the agreement provided that Speedway
would pay approximately $500,000 to the
guarantors as compensation for their guaran-
ties and that this amount would be distribut-
ed in equal percentages among the five guar-
antors.

A. Speedway’s Default and Subsequent.
Bankruptcy

{5} In 2008, Speedway defaulted on the
loan, and the bank demanded payment from
the guarantors. Randles and Speedway’s
president, Jones, refused to pay, and the
remaining three guarantors ultimately paid
the entire $500,000 plus interest due on the

note. These three individuals, as performing
guarantors, then formed KCB and assigned
their rights under the written agreements to
KCB. Shortly thereafter, KCB sued Randles
and Jones to recover their pro-rata shares of
the amount KCB had paid to the bank. In
that action, KCB obtained a judgment
against Randles for her pro-rata share of the
principal in the amount of $113,406, plus
attorney fees, which Randles paid to KCB in
June 2005.

{6} KCB also sought reimbursement from
Speedway for its default. This effort stalled
in June 2005 when Speedway filed for Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy. During the bankruptcy
proceedings, KCB filed two claims against
Speedway totaling one million dollars. The
first claim was for $500,000—the amount
KCB claimed it had paid to the bank upon
Speedway’s default (which we refer to as the
“principal amount” or “underlying obli-
gation”). The second claim was for an addi-
tional $500,000—the compensation KCB
claimed it was due under the terms of the
Compensation Agreement (“premium
amount”). Subsequently, as part of its Chap-
ter 11 reorganization efforts, Speedway
agreed to pay KCB’s claims and proposed a
payment of one million dollars to cover both
the principal and the premium amounts. At
this point, Randles filed a conditional objec-
tion in bankruptey court for $200,000 of
Speedway’s proposed payout to KCB, argu-
ing that she was entitled to this amount
because half ($100,000) represented her pro-
rata share of the principal she had previously
paid to KCB in the earlier judgment and the
other half ($100,000) was her portion of the
premium. Without addressing the merits of
this dispute and in order to allow the bank-
ruptey proceedings to conclude, the parties
agreed to a stipulated order that the disput-
ed $200,000 would be placed in the trust
account for KCB’s attorney, Defendant Alle-
gra Hanson, pending resolution of the par-
ties’ dispute as to the amount. The bank-
ruptcy court’s order disbursed the remaining
$800,000 directly to KCB and stated that
Speedway was deemed to have fulfilled its
obligations to Randles and KCB regardless
of the outcome of their dispute as to the
$200,000. The parties then asked the bank-
ruptey court to decide the merits of their

365

dispute as to: the $200,000, but the court
determined that it no longer had subject
matter jurisdiction to do so. That set the
stage for the current lawsuit.

B. Present Dispute

{7} In the proceedings below, which gave
rise to this appeal, Randles filed an action in
district court against KCB, arguing that she
was entitled to the $200,000. She argued
that half of this sum represented reimburse-
ment from Speedway for her payment of the
judgment to KCB for her pro-rata share of
the principal and that the other half was her
share of the premium. The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, with
each party arguing that it was entitled to the
$200,000 as a matter of law and equity. Af
ter a hearing on both motions, the district
court denied Randles’ motion and granted
KCB’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
The court concluded that Randles was not
entitled to the $100,000 principal or the
$100,000 premium amounts as a matter of
both law and equity. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{8} On appeal, Randles argues that the
district court erroneously denied her motion
for summary judgment as to both the princi-
pal and the premium amounts. We address
the parties’ arguments with respect to each
amount in turn.

A. Standard of Review

HE {9} “On appeal from the grant of
summary judgment, we ordinarily review the
whole record in the light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment to
determine if there is any evidence that places
a genuine issue of material fact in dispute.”
City of Albuquerque v. BPLW Architects &
Eng’rs, Inc, 2009-NMCA-081, 17, 146 N.M.
717, 218 P.8d 1146. “However, if no material
issues of fact are in dispute and an appeal
presents only a question of law, we apply de
novo review and are not required to view the
appeal in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment.” Jd. In
addition, “[wJhere cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment are presented on the basis of
a common legal issue, this Court may reverse

366

both the grant of one party’s motion and the
denial of the opposing party’s cross-motion
and award judgment on the cross-motion.”
Grisham v. Allstate Ins. Co. 1999-NMCA-
158, 12, 128 N.M. 340, 992 P.2d 891.

B. Whether Randles is Entitled to the
$100,000 Principal

HM {10} With regard to the $100,000
principal amount, Randles argues that her
previous payment of the judgment to KCB
for her pro-rata share of the principal enti-
tled her to seek recourse from Speedway for
that payment. Specifically, Randles con-
tends that her contribution to KCB placed
her in the position “as if she ha[d] participat-
ed with them originally in paying Compass
Bank” and, therefore, she became entitled to
recover the $100,000 principal from Speed-
way under three different theories: assign-
ment, subrogation, and what she terms as
general “equitable principles ... [of] unjust
enrichment and double recovery.” In re-
sponse, KCB argues that Randles is preclud-
ed from any recovery because she breached
the Memorandum Agreement by refusing to
pay when the bank demanded payment fol-
lowing Speedway’s default. KCB further
claims that the theories of assignment and
subrogation are inapplicable under the facts
of this case and that the doctrine of unclean
hands precludes any recovery on equitable
grounds.

{11} On this issue, the parties contend that
there are no material facts in dispute. The
parties agree that Randles breached the
Memorandum Agreement by not paying her
share of the principal within twenty days of
Speedway’s default; that KCB then sued

1. Although only a few cases in New Mexico have
touched on the right of contribution between
coguarantors, see FDIC v. Hiatt, 117 N.M. 461,
469, 872 P.2d 879, 887 (1994) (Montgomery,
CJ., dissenting); First Nat’ Bank in Albuquerque
v. Energy Equities Inc., 91 N.M. 11, 17, 569 P.2d
421, 427 (Ct.App.1977), the principle is well-
established in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Les-
torti v. DeLeo, 298 Conn, 466, 4 A.3d 269, 275-77
(2010); Hills Bank & Trust Co. v. Converse, 772
N.W.2d 764, 772-73 (Iowa 2009); Rodehorst v.
Gartner, 266 Neb. 842, 669 N.W.2d 679, 686-87
(2003); Albrecht v. Walter, 1997 ND 238, 110,
572 N.W.2d 809, 812; Katz v. Prete, 459 A.2d 81,
85 (R.1.1983); Gardner v. Bean, 677 P.2d 1116,
1118 (Utah 1984). Additionally, the Restatement

Randles for her share of the principal after it
had paid the entire loan principal to the
bank; and that Randles paid $118,406, plus
attorney fees, to KCB in satisfaction of the
ensuing judgment KCB obtained against her.

{12} We diverge briefly to clarify that
although the previous lawsuit filed by KCB
against Randles was termed a “complaint for
collection of debt” without using the term
“contribution,” we consider that lawsuit es-
sentially to be an action for contribution.!
See Black’s Law Dictionary 378 (9th ed.
2009) (defining “contribution” as “[t]he right
that gives one of several persons who are
liable on a common debt the ability to recov-
er proportionately from each of the others
when that one person discharges the debt for
the benefit of all”). We think that Randles’
payment of the judgment is economically
equivalent to the result that would be ob-
tained in an action for contribution against
her. For reasons that become apparent in
our discussion later, we therefore re-cast the
facts mentioned above in the context of an
action for contribution as follows. After
KCB paid Speedway’s obligation to the bank,
it had a right to seek contribution from Ran-
dies for her pro-rata share of the principal.
Subsequently, when Randles paid the
$113,406 judgment to KCB, we consider her
to have fulfilled a duty of contribution to
KCB.

{13} Based on our review of the record, we
agree with the parties’ contention that there
are no disputed material facts on this issue.
Thus, resolution of the parties’ dispute over
the $100,000 principal depends solely on de-
termining whether Randles is entitled to the
$100,000 prineipal amount paid by Speedway

(Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty has recog-
nized the right of one cosurety to seek contribu-
tion from another cosurety. See § 55(2), at 236
(1996); see also Peter A. Alces, The Law of Sure-
tyship & Guaranty § 5.03{2], at 5-13 (1996) (de-
scribing the Restatement’s approach on contribu-
tion by stating that ‘when one cosurety has paid
the obligee more than that cosurety’s proportion-
ate share of the underlying obligation, the co-
surety who has overpaid will have a claim
against the other cosurety(ies) to recover the
amount he paid in excess of his proportionate
share. The idea is that each cosurety should
ultimately be out of pocket only in the amount to
which he agreed”).

by virtue of her previous contribution to
KCB. Stated differently, we must decide
whether a contributing coguarantor—ie., a
guarantor who has paid its pro-rata share of
the underlying obligation through an action
for contribution brought by a fellow coguar-
antor—is entitled to seek recovery from the
principal debtor to the extent of its contribu-
tion. We apply de novo review to this legal
question.

{14} This is a novel issue in New Mexico
as we have not found any New Mexico case
to have addressed this precise issue, nor
have the parties directed us to any such
authority. In the absence of any relevant
New Mexico authority, we turn to the Re-
statement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaran-
ty for guidance. This Court has previously
stated that we look to the Restatement for
“authoritative guidance on the common law”
of guaranties. Venaglia v. Kropinak, 1998-
NMCA-048, 1112, 125 N.M. 25, 956 P.2d 824,

{15} For purposes of clarity, we begin our
analysis by setting forth the relationship be-
tween the parties in terms of the Restate-
ment because these terms differ from those
employed by the parties in their briefing.
The Restatement avoids the use of the term
“guarantor” and instead refers to a guaran-
tor as a “secondary obligor,” who is liable to
the “obligee” (or creditor) for the underlying
obligation in the event of a default by the
principal obligor (or principal debtor). See
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guar-
anty § 1 emt. d, at 7 (1996). The obligation
of a secondary obligor to pay the underlying
obligation is considered the secondary obli-
gation. Jd. Additionally, in cases where
there are multiple secondary obligors for the
same underlying obligation, the relationship
between them is that of a cosuretyship or a
subsuretyship. Restatement (Third) of Sure-
tyship & Guaranty § 53, at 227 (1996).

{16} Applying these terms to the parties in
this case, Randles and KCB were secondary
obligors with joint and several liability to
Compass Bank, the obligee, for the $500,000
underlying obligation in the event of a de-
fault by Speedway, the principal obligor.
Also, Randles and KCB were cosureties be-
cause they expressly agreed in the Memoran-
dum Agreement to be jointly and severally

367

liable for the underlying obligation. See id.
§ 55 emt. a, at 236 (stating that individuals
are cosureties when “the relationship be-
tween them is such that they should share
the cost of performance of their secondary
obligations”). Moreover, based on the proce-
dural history of this case, KCB is considered
a performing cosurety because it performed
under the guaranty when the principal obli-
gor defaulted while Randles is a contributing
cosurety because she acted only through the
previous action for contribution. See id. § 55
emts. a-e, at 236-388 (describing performing
eosurety’s role and right to seek contribu-
tion); § 58 cmts. a-b, e, at 248-50 (describing
contributing cosurety).

{17} Based on our review of the Restate-
ment, we conclude that one section in partic-
ular is on point for resolving the issue before
this Court because it covers the rights of a
contributing cosurety with respect to a prin-
cipal obligor who has defaulted. Section 58
of the Restatement provides two general
rules directly applicable here that govern the
rights of performing and contributing co-
sureties in seeking recovery against a princi-
pal obligor in the event of a default. First,
the section provides that “{a] cosurety who
satisfies a duty of contribution owed to an-
other cosurety ... is entitled to recourse
against the principal obligor as though that
cosurety had performed its secondary obli-
gation to the same extent.” Id. § 58(1), at
248. Second, it provides that “[t]he claim
against the principal obligor of a cosurety
who performs its secondary obligation ... is
reduced to the extent that the cosurety re-
eeives contribution from another cosurety.”
Id. § 58(2), at 248; see id. emt. e, at 250
(“When a cosurety performs its secondary
obligation, the magnitude of its claim against
the principal obligor is determined by the
magnitude of its performance pursuant to the
secondary obligation. If the performing co-
surety later recovers from another cosurety
under a right of contribution, however, the
performing cosurety no longer requires the
original remedy against the principal obligor
in order to be made whole.”). A leading
treatise on suretyship and guaranty offers an
illustration of these rules in operation togeth-
er that is directly on point:

368

If S1, $2, and $8 are each liable for $2,500

of a $7,500 obligation of P to O, when S 1
pays O the full $7,500, S 1 may recover
that amount from P. Once Si recovers
$2,500 in contribution from $2, S2 will be
able to recover that amount, $2,500, from
P. Upon that payment by S2 to Sl, Sl’s
claim against P is reduced by $2,500.

Alces, supra, § 5.08[2], at 5-14.

{18} The general rationale underlying
Section 58 is to place the contributing co-
surety in the same position as the per-
forming cosurety when it comes to seeking
recovery from the principal obligor. Re-
statement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaran-
ty § 58 cmt. a, at 248 (“When one co-
surety performs beyond its contributive
share and receives contribution from anoth-
er cosurety, the cosureties are in the same
position as if the contributing cosurety had
performed the secondary obligation to the
same extent as its contribution to the per-
forming cosurety.”); id. cmt. d, at 249 (“If
[a] cosurety fulfills a duty of contribution
to the [performing] cosurety, the result is
economically equivalent to a situation in
which the two cosureties, by each perform-
ing to the extent of their contributive
shares, discharge the underlying obli-
gation.”).

TH s({19} We adopt the approach of Sec-
tion 58 of the Restatement for determining
the rights of contributing and performing
cosureties against a principal obligor who has
defaulted on a loan. Thus, we describe the
theories of recovery provided in Section 58
by which a contributing cosurety can seek
recovery against a principal obligor: (1) re-
imbursement, which is based on “notions of
an implied contract on the part of the princi-
pal obligor to make [a contributing] second-
ary obligor whole for the costs of its perform-
ance”; (2) restitution, which is based on the
principle of unjust enrichment; and (8) sub-
rogation. See id. cmts. b, ¢, d, at 248-50.
The Restatement defines reimbursement as
the duty of a principal obligor who is charged
with notice of a cosurety’s secondary obli-
gation to “reimburse [a] secondary obligor
for [the] cost of fulfilling its duty of contribu-
tion.” Id. cmt. b, at 249. Restitution differs
from reimbursement in that it covers situa-

tions where the principal obligor is not
charged with notice of the secondary obli-
gation. Id. cmt. ¢, at 249. Finally, subroga-
tion is essentially an equitable assignment of
the obligee’s rights to the guarantor when it
comes to seeking recourse against a principal
obligor. See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Reme-
dies § 4,3(4), at 404 (2d ed. 1993) (“Having
paid the defendant’s creditor, the plaintiff
stands in the creditor’s shoes, becomes the
real party in interest, and is entitled to exer-
cise all the remedies which the creditor pos-
sessed against the defendant.” (footnote
omitted) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted)). In this context, once a co-
surety has fulfilled a duty of contribution, the
Restatement provides that the cosurety “is
subrogated to the rights of the obligee
against the principal obligor to the same
extent as if that cosurety had paid the same
funds to the obligee.” Restatement (Third)
of Suretyship & Guaranty § 58 emt. d, at
249-50. Under any of these three theories, a
contributing cosurety is entitled to recourse
from the principal obligor to the extent of his
contribution. Id. § 58, illus. 1-4, at 249-50.

{20} Applying the Restatement’s approach
to the facts presented in this case, we re-
verse the district court’s ruling as to the
principal amount. We hold that Randles, as
a contributing cosurety, was entitled to re-
course from Speedway for the principal to
the extent of her earlier contribution to KCB.
That is, following Randles’ contribution, Ran-
dies and KCB were in the same position and
had the same rights in seeking recourse from
Speedway for their respective payments un-
der the guaranty either through initial per-
formance (by KCB) or contribution (by Ran-
dies). Thus, when Speedway agreed to pay
$500,000 to cover the principal during bank-
ruptcy proceedings, KCB’s claim to the
$500,000 should have been reduced by
$100,000 based on Randles’ contribution, and
Randles should then have been allowed to
claim the $100,000 based on her contribution.
Under the Restatement, Randles correctly
asserted a right to the $100,000 principal in
the bankruptcy proceedings under theories
of reimbursement or subrogation. Speedway
had a duty to reimburse Randles to the
extent of her contribution or, alternatively,

Randles became subrogated to the rights of
the bank against Speedway to the extent of
her contribution. Although Randles also
made arguments based on restitution in her
briefing, we follow the Restatement’s ap-
proach and conclude that restitution is not
available to her because Speedway, as princi-
pal obligor, has always had notice of the
personal guaranties. See Restatement
(Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 58 cmt.
ec, at 249. This result would prevent any
double recovery on the part of KCB and
would also make both KCB and Randles
whole for their respective actions as a result
of Speedway’s default.

HM s{21} Having determined that Ran-
dies is entitled to the principal amount under
the approach of the Restatement, we turn to
examine whether KCB’s arguments preclude
her recovery. KCB’s arguments regarding
the principal amount do not change our hold-
ing. Based on our above reasoning, we dis-
agree with KCB’s first argument that subro-
gation is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
This leaves only KCB’s second argument on
appeal, which is that the doctrine of unclean
hands precludes Randles from seeking any
portion of the principal amount paid by
Speedway to KCB in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. “The doctrine of unclean hands
generally prevents a complainant from recov-
ering where he or she has been guilty of
fraudulent, illegal or inequitable conduct in
the matter with relation to which he [or she]
seeks relief.” Magnolia Mountain Ltd.
P’ship v. Ski Rio Partners, Lid, 2006-
NMCA--027, 136, 189 N.M. 288, 131 P.8d 675
(alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The doctrine is
invoked in circumstances where the com-
plainant has “dirtied [his or her hands] in
acquiring the right he [or she] now asserts.”
Romero v. Bank of the Sw. 20083-NMCA-
124, 138, 185 N.M. 1, 88 P.3d 288 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, KCB contends that the doctrine ap-
plies because Randles engaged in inequitable
conduct by “not shar[ing] the burden [of
Speedway’s default] with the other guaran-
tors” and by letting “the entire onus of re-
sponding to Compass Bank fall on KCB.” In
support, KCB relies on Lampton v. Staebler,
252 Ky. 405, 67 S.W.2d 478 (1984), a case that

369

involved the right of contribution between
cosureties and which held that a performing
cosurety’s inequitable conduct can lead to a
forfeiture of his or her right to seek contribu-
tion. Id. at 478.

{22} We do not consider Lampton to be
applicable to the facts of this case. Here, we
are not faced with a claim for contribution
between cosureties or the right of a perform-
ing cosurety to seek contribution; rather, we
are concerned with the rights of cosureties in
post-contribution circumstances. In this law-
suit, which concerns a determination of the
legal and equitable remedies available to
KCB and Randles against a third party,
Speedway, we remain unconvinced that Ran-
dies engaged in conduct during the bank-
ruptey proceedings or in district court that
would merit application of the unclean hands
doctrine. See Gen. Electric Co. v. Klein, 129
A.2d 250, 252 (Del.Ch.1956) (“The repentant
sinner, especially where he has been duly
punished, is not unwelcome in equity.”);
Halls v. White, 2006 SD 47, 118, 715 N.W.2d
577, 585 (“If a person guilty of unconsciona-
ble or wrongful conduct purges himself or
herself by adequate and effective renuncia-
tion and repudiation, the right to relief will
be restored.” (alteration omitted) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Ad-
ditionally, whatever inequitable conduct Ran-
dies engaged in after Speedway’s default was
remedied by the judgment KCB obtained
against her. Once KCB received the judg-
ment, which included attorney fees and costs,
it was made whole with respect to the portion
of the principal that it had paid to the bank
on Randles’ behalf.

{23} Therefore, we reverse the grant of
summary judgment in favor of KCB and
remand with instructions to enter summary
judgment in favor of Randles as to the
$100,000 principal.

C. Whether Randles is Entitled to the
$100,000 Premium

Hl {24} Randles argues that she became
entitled to the $100,000 premium as soon as
she executed the promissory note as a guar-
antor. She contends that the terms of the
Compensation Agreement did not require the

370

guarantors to actually perform the guaranty
in order to receive compensation. KCB in-
terprets the terms of the Compensation
Agreement differently, arguing that it should
be construed together with the Memorandum
Agreement based on this Court’s holding in
Master Builders, Inc. v. Cabbell, 95 N.M.
871, 378, 622 P.2d 276, 278 (Ct.App.1980)
(“{Iin the absence of anything to indicate a
contrary intention, instruments executed at
the same time, by the same parties, for the
same purpose, and in the course of the same
transaction, are, in the eye of the law, one
instrument, and will be read and construed
together[.]” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Construing the two writ-
ten agreements together, KCB contends that
performance of the guaranty was required in
order to receive compensation and, therefore,
Randles’ breach of the Memorandum Agree-
ment precludes her from being entitled to a
premium payment under the Compensation
Agreement. Alternatively, KCB argues that
even if the Compensation Agreement is con-
sidered in isolation, Randles breached that
agreement because she did not provide a
guaranty as contemplated by the agreement
based on the word’s usual and customary
meaning.

{25} The parties contend that resolution of
this issue on appeal is a question of contract.
interpretation requiring us to determine
whether the Compensation Agreement is am-
biguous as to what constitutes perform-
ance—that is, we must decide whether the
terms of the Compensation Agreement pro-
vide that Randles and KCB earned the pre-
mium upon execution of the promissory note
or upon performance of the guaranty in the
event of a default. On a somewhat related
ground, we understand the parties to also
argue that we must decide whether the Com-
pensation Agreement and the Memorandum
Agreement should be construed together as
one instrument for purposes of determining
the respective rights of the parties to the
disputed $100,000 premium. This requires
us to consider the rule from Master Builders
that two or more writings should be con-
strued together if they are part of the same
transaction, which Randles refers to as the
‘§oint construction” principle on appeal and

which was referred to as “incorporation by
reference” in the record below.

WH {26} We begin our analysis by
setting forth the applicable law governing
ambiguity in contractual agreements in the
context of motions for summary judgment.
It is well established that “[w]hether a con-
tractual provision is ambiguous is a question
of law, which we review de novo.” McNeill
v. Rice Engg & Operating, Inc, 2003-
NMCA-078, 113, 183 N.M. 804, 70 P.8d 794
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). We utilize the following approach in
determining whether a contract term is am-
biguous:

The standard to be applied in determining

whether a contract is subject to equally

logical but conflicting interpretations is the
same standard applied in a motion for
summary judgment. If the evidence pre-
sented is so plain that no reasonable per-
son could hold any way but one, then the
court may interpret the meaning as a mat-
ter of law, and summary judgment would
be proper. On the other hand, if the court
determines that the contract is reasonably
and fairly susceptible of different construc-
tions, an ambiguity exists, and summary
judgment would not be proper. Rather,
the jury must resolve any factual issues
presented by the ambiguity. In resolving
ambiguity, extrinsic evidence may be ad-
mitted to aid the jury in interpreting the
intent of the parties. The jury must then
decide if the evidence presented supports
one interpretation rather than the other.

Id. (alteration omitted) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). As our Su-
preme Court held in Mark V, Ine. v. Melle-
kas, a district court may consider extrinsic
evidence in making its preliminary finding of
whether a contractual provision is ambigu-
ous. 114 N.M. 778, 781, 845 P.2d 1282, 1235
(1998). In other words, a district court “may
consider the circumstances surrounding the
making of the contract and of any relevant
usage of trade, course of dealing, and course
of performance in making its threshold de-
termination of whether the contract terms
are ambiguous.” McNeill, 2003~-NMCA-078,
1.14, 183 N.M. 804, 70 P.38d 794,

371

{27} In this case, the provision of the
Compensation Agreement at issue is the lan-
guage concerning payment of the premium:

Il. COMPENSATION IN EXCHANGE

FOR GUARANTY OF NOTE
A. Amount of Compensation Paid to

Guarantors. In exchange for the guaranty

of the obligations of Speedway under the

Note, Speedway agrees to pay the Guaran-

tors the total sum of FOUR HUNDRED

NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND AND

00/100 DOLLARS ($495,000), plus all ac-

crued interest under the Note until the

Note is paid in full.

{28} On appeal, the parties’ disagree as to
whether the district court actually found the
Compensation Agreement ambiguous and
specifically the above language that Speed-
way would pay the premium “[i]Jn exchange
for the guaranty of the obligations of Speed-
way under the Note.” Although the district
court did not enter a specific finding that this
Janguage was ambiguous, our review of the
hearing indicates that the court considered
the parties’ various arguments regarding in-
terpretation of the Compensation Agreement
and that the court appeared to agree with
KCB’s interpretation that the two agree-
ments should be construed together. The
court stated that “under the [Clompensation
{Algreement, there was no entitlement to
any recovery of those funds because in equity
there was a failure to perform under the
[Mlemorandum [A]greement.” Randles con-
tends that the district court must have found
ambiguity in the Compensation Agreement in
order to reach the conclusion that a guaran-
tor must have performed the guaranty in
order to earn the premium payment. KCB
counters that the district court did not need
to address ambiguity of the Compensation
Agreement because performance was a re-
quirement under the Memorandum Agree-
ment and “all writings that are part of the
same transaction are interpreted together.”

{29} Both Randles and KCB assert on
appeal that the language of the Compensa-
tion Agreement is unambiguous and supports
their respective interpretations. We must
determine, therefore, whether the Compen-
sation Agreement is reasonably susceptible
to the two interpretations argued by the

parties; if we determine that it is, then the
district court erred in granting summary
judgment and we must remand for a fact
finder to resolve the ambiguity. See C.R.
Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 112
N.M. 504, 509, 817 P.2d 288, 243 (1991) (“{IIf
the court finds ambiguity, the jury (or court
as the fact finder in the absence of a jury)
resolves the ambiguity as an issue of ultimate
fact[.)”).

{30} We first consider Randles’ interpreta-
tion of the Compensation Agreement. Ran-
dies construes the language of the agreement
to mean that upon execution of the guaranty
on the promissory note alone, the guarantors
became automatically entitled to the premi-
um payment. She argues that the text of the
agreement contains no express language re-
quiring performance under the Memorandum
Agreement as a prerequisite to earning the
premium under the Compensation Agree-
ment. Instead, in her view, the guarantors
receive the premium regardless of whether
there was a default by Speedway. In other
words, even if Speedway did not default and
the guarantors were thus never required to
perform the guaranty under the Memoran-
dum Agreement, Speedway would neverthe-
less be required to make the premium pay-
ment to the guarantors. To support her
interpretation, Randles points to extrinsic ev-
idence in the form of an offer letter from
Speedway that pre-dates the Compensation
Agreement and provides that the “compensa-
tion [ie., the premium] will be paid at Phase
I funding.” Randles appears to argue that
the fact compensation would occur at Phase I
funding indicates that Speedway would pay
the premium even in a no-default scenario
where the guaranty was not performed.

{31} KCB counters by arguing that the
terms of the Compensation Agreement re-
quire performance of the guaranty in two
primary ways. First, KCB contends that the
Memorandum Agreement was “incorporated”
into the Compensation Agreement under the
holding of Master Builders. KCB claims
that the two writings were part of a single
transaction, concern the same subject matter
and were executed on the same date and,
therefore, they should be read and construed
together as a single contract. If the agree-
ments are construed together, KCB contends

372

that performance of the guaranty under the
terms of the Memorandum Agreement was
necessary before Randles had any legal right
to enforce the terms of the Compensation
Agreement. KCB further argues that even
if there was no explicit requirement of per-
formance in the Compensation Agreement,
there was an implicit requirement that each
guarantor had a duty to actually honor the
guaranty based on the usual and customary
meaning of the word “guaranty.” In its
view, the only reasonable interpretation of
the agreement is “that the guarantors who in
fact bore the risk upon Speedway’s default
and performed when needed would corre-
spondingly be entitled to recover a propor-
tionate share of any compensation Speedway
paid as the reward for that performance.”

HE s({82} Although we recognize that
“(t]he mere fact that the parties are in dis-
agreement on construction to be given to the
contract does not necessarily establish an
ambiguity,” we conclude that the contractual
language at issue here is fairly and reason-
ably susceptible to the two different con-
structions put forth by the parties, thereby
creating an ambiguity. Levenson v. Mobley,
106 N.M. 399, 401, 744 P.2d 174, 176 (1987);
see Mark V, Inc, 114 N.M. at 781, 845 P.2d
at 1235 (“If the court determines that the
contract is reasonably and fairly susceptible
of different constructions, an ambiguity ex-
ists.”). We determine that the Compensa-
tion Agreement is ambiguous as to what
event triggers payment of the premium and
susceptible to conflicting interpretations in
this regard. On the one hand, the agree-
ment is vague and does not explicitly state
under what circumstances, the premium pay-
ment would be made. The agreement does
not define the word “guaranty” and it is
silent as to the means and manner of pay-
ment of the premium. Additionally, the
agreement contains an integration clause
stating that it is the “entire agreement of the
parties with respect to the subject matter
hereof,” and Speedway’s offer letter may
support Randles’ interpretation. On the oth-
er hand, it would not be unreasonable to
conclude that the two contracts are incorpo-
rated and should be construed together be-
cause they were signed on the same date by
all five guarantors and Speedway and argu-
ably involve the same subject matter and

transaction. Moreover, we conclude that
several material issues of fact exist regard-
ing the parties’ intent and the circumstances
surrounding execution of the two written
agreements: Did the parties expect payment
of the premium in a no-default scenario or
only if there was a default? Under what cir-
cumstances did the guarantors sign the
agreements? What was Speedway’s intent
in obtaining the guaranties? All of these
questions remain unresolved on appeal and
subject to multiple conflicting inferences,
none of which are fully resolved by the evi-
dentiary record. We note that “[a]lthough a
written contract need not detail every term,
essential terms must be expressly provided
or necessarily implied by construction for a
court to find the contract unambiguous on its
face.” McNeill, 2003-NMCA-078, 1127, 188
N.M. 804, 70 P.3d 794.

{33} Based on the foregoing, we hold that
it was improper for the district court to grant
summary judgment at this stage. Rather,
the meaning to be assigned to the ambiguous
language of the Compensation Agreement
and the parties’ intent are questions of fact
that should be decided by a fact finder.
Therefore, we reverse and remand to the
district court for further proceedings on the
premium amount.

CONCLUSION

{34} For the reasons set forth above, we
reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Defendants KCB and Hanson
and the denial of summary judgment to Ran-
dies under the Memorandum Agreement.
We hold that Randles is entitled to the
$100,000 principal under that agreement, and
we therefore instruct the district court on
remand to enter summary judgment in favor
of Randles as to that amount. With respect.
to the $100,000 premium amount under the
Compensation Agreement, we remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
jon.

{35} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: MICHAEL E. VIGIL and
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judges.

2011-NMCA-077
258 P.3d 1165

STATE of New Mexico,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Carlos LOYA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 29,343.

t of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 18, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, June 14,
2011, No. 33,027.

g
a

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Anita
Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Eleanor Brogan, Assistant Appel-
late Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION
BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} Defendant Carlos Loya appeals from
his conviction of felony aggravated DWI in
violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-
102(D)(8) (2007, prior to amendments
through 2010). Defendant contends that it
was error for the district court to try his case
after he moved for dismissal based upon a
violation of the six-month rule set forth in
Rule 5-604 NMRA. As of March 28, 2011, a
new rule applies to all pending cases. After

analyzing the case in light of the new rule,
we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} On April 18, 2008, Defendant was
pulled over for driving at night without head-
lights. The responding officer immediately
noted a strong odor of alcohol, that Defen-
dant had bloodshot, watery eyes and a
flushed face, and that Defendant’s speech
was slurred. After Defendant failed the field
sobriety tests, he was arrested for DWI.
Deputy Flores, who was fluent in Spanish,
read and explained the implied consent act to
Defendant. Defendant then refused to pro-
vide a breath sample.

{3} Because Defendant argues that his
case should have been dismissed under the
six-month rule, we must examine the timing
of his case. Defendant was arraigned on
April 28, 2008. Subsequently, the State
learned that Defendant had at least three
prior DWI convictions, making Defendant’s
DWI charge a felony. Defendant was indict-
ed for the felony DWI on June 12, 2008, and
the case in magistrate court was dismissed.
On November 10, 2008, Defendant asked the
district court to dismiss his case based on a
violation of Rule 5-604, the six-month rule.
A hearing was held, and though the court
never entered a formal order, it did send
counsel a letter ruling on the motion. The
matter proceeded to trial on January 8, 2009,
and a jury found Defendant guilty of aggra-
vated driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor (refusal).

{4} The State began its opening statement
by saying

Ladies and gentlemen, [thirteen] is seen

by some people as an unlucky number.

However, on April 13, 2008, it was a very

good day for the citizens of Dofia Ana

County, because [DJefendant in this case

was seen driving without his headlights

and was pulled over before he could cause

any significant harm.
Defendant objected to this statement, and
the district court sustained, instructing the
State to “restrict your opening statements to
what you think the evidence will show.” Pri-
or to closing arguments, Defendant request-
ed that the State not make similar remarks

during closing. However, despite the fact
that this request occurred during a discus-
sion about jury instructions, Defendant did
not request any curative instructions for the
initial comment. Defendant also did not
move for a mistrial.

I. DISCUSSION

{5} Defendant makes three arguments
that he contends require reversal: (1) that
his case should have been dismissed pursuant
to the six-month rule;! (2) that the district
court erred by not declaring a mistrial after
the initial two sentences of the State’s open-
ing statement; and (8) that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support his conviction. We
address each argument in turn.

A. Rule 5-604

HM {6} Defendant first argues that the
district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss for violation of the magistrate court’s
six-month rule. Defendant asserts that his
situation is governed by the holding and ra-
tionale of State v. Carreon, 2006~NMCA-145,
140 N.M. 779, 149 P.8d 95, abrogated by
State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, 148 N.M.
801, 236 P.38d 20 and State v. Yates, 2008-
NMCA-129, 144 N.M. 859, 192 P.8d 1236
(both holding in essence that dismissal of a
magistrate court case does not stop the run-
ning of the magistrate court’s six-month rule
when the matter is refiled, unless the State
overcomes the presumption that the refiled
ease is a continuation of the original prosecu-
tion). The State counters that (1) Defendant
has not developed an adequate record; (2)
Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, 148 N.M. 301, 236
P.8d 20, does not apply because the State
brought different charges in district court
than it had in magistrate court; and (8)
Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, 140 N.M. 779,
149 P.8d 95, does not apply because of new
evidence that the crime charged was a fourth
or subsequent DWI and, therefore, a felony
that required the State to refile.

{7} The law regarding the six-month rule
has been in flux during the time this case has

1. At the time this case was tried, there were two
relevant six-month rules: Rule 6-506 NMRA,
which applied in the magistrate courts, and Rule
5-604, which applied to the district courts. Al-
though the header in Defendant's brief-in-chief

375

been pending. As a result of these changes,
the concepts Defendant relies on in his brief-
ing have been vitiated. On May 12, 2010, our
Supreme Court issued Savedra, which with-
drew the six-month rule provisions set forth
in Rule 5-604(B)-(E). Savedra, 2010-
NMSC-025, 19, 148 N.M. 301, 236 P.3d 20.
Rather than apply a rigid six-month rule,
Savedra instructed the courts to use the
speedy trial factors of Barker v. Wingo, 407
US. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101
(1972). See Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, 18,
148 N.M. 801, 286 P.8d 20; see also State v.
Martinez, 2011-NMSC-010, 12, 149 N.M.
870, 249 P.8d 82. On February 25, 2011, the
Supreme Court made it clear that the hold-
ing in Savedra applied to all cases pending in
any court in New Mexico. See Martinez,
2011-NMSC-010, 110, 149 N.M. 370, 249
P.8d 82.

{8} Subsequently, the Supreme Court re-
wrote Rule 5-604 to reflect the holding of
Savedra. See Supreme Court Order No. 11-
8300-019 (May 1, 2011). The new Rule 5-
604 is entitled “Time of commencement of
trial for cases of concurrent trial jurisdiction
originally filed in the magistrate, metropoli-
tan, or municipal court.” The relevant por-
tions of the new rule, parts (B) and (C),
became effective for all cases pending in any
court in New Mexico on March 28, 2011. See
id. Because this case was pending on or
after March 28, 2011, we apply the new rule.

{9} However, by its own terms, the new
rule does not apply to “cases within the
exclusive trial jurisdiction of the district
court.” Rule 5-604(C)(8). The magistrate
court does not have jurisdiction to prosecute
felonies. See NMSA 1978, § 35-384 (1985).
Instead, when subsequent information of pri-
or DWI convictions prompts the State to file
felony DWI charges in district court, the
district court has exclusive jurisdiction. See
State v. Gardea, 1999-NMCA-116, 110, 128
N.M. 64, 989 P.2d 489. That is what oc-
curred here. Accordingly, Rule 5-604 does
not apply to the instant case.

states that the district court incorrectly denied
Defendant's motion to dismiss “for violation of
the magistrate court six-month rule,” the motion
he refers to is based on Rule 5-604, the district
court’s six-month rule.

376

THs {10} Although the speedy trial is-
sue is no longer governed by court rule, this
does not mean that it may not be pursued.
The Sixth Amendment provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const.
amend. VI. The new rule is careful to empha-
size that it does not prohibit defendants from
filing motions to dismiss for violations of the
right to a speedy trial. See Rule 5-604(B).
Such a motion would be based on the same
factors set forth in the new rule. Compare
State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, 113, 146
N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (applying the Barker
factors to evaluate a speedy trial claim), with
Rule 5-604(B) (instructing courts to consider
the four Barker factors, as well as the com-
plexity of the case, to determine whether a
defendant's speedy trial right has been vio-
lated). Accordingly, we apply the test from
Barker, which weighs four factors: “(1) the
Jength of delay, (2) the reasons for the delay,
(8) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and
(4 the actual prejudice to the defendant.”
Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, 1118, 146 N.M. 499,
212 P.38d 387. However, a court is only
required to reach this balancing test if “the
length of delay is ‘presumptively prejudi-
cial’ ” Id. 121. For simple cases, a delay of
one year is presumptively prejudicial. Id.
148.

{11} Because less than a year passed be-
tween Defendant's arraignment in magistrate
court and his conviction, we need not weigh
the Barker factors in this case. Defendant
was arraigned on April 23, 2008, and tried
less than nine months later on January 8,
2009. Since this is less than one year, the
delay was not presumptively prejudicial, and
Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not
violated.

B. Prejudicial Statements

Hl {12} Defendant next argues that the
State “made prejudicial statements concern-
ing drunk drivers during his opening state-
ment” that require this Court to remand for
a new trial. The State counters that Defen-
dant’s failure to request a curative instruc-
tion means that the issue is not preserved.
The State also contends that the instruction
to the State to limit its opening to what the

evidence would show cured any problem, that
the single comment was at most an isolated,
minor impropriety insufficient to warrant re-
versal, and that Defendant has not shown he
was prejudiced by the statement.

Hs {13} Our Supreme Court has ex-
plained the standard that we apply to prose-
cutorial misconduct as follows:

The trial court has broad discretion in

controlling the conduct and remedying the

errors of counsel during trial. Moreover,
the trial court is in the best position to
evaluate the significance of any alleged
prosecutorial errors. Thus, in reviewing
claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we de-
termine whether the trial court abused its
discretion by denying a motion for a new
trial based upon the prosecutor’s conduct,
by overruling the defendant’s objection to
the challenged conduct, or by otherwise
failing to control the conduct of counsel
during trial. The trial court’s determina-
tion of these questions will not be dis-
turbed unless its ruling is arbitrary, capri-
cious, or beyond reason. Our ultimate
determination of this issue rests on
whether the prosecutor’s improprieties
had such a persuasive and prejudicial ef-
fect on the jury’s verdict that the defen-
dant was deprived of a fair trial.
State v. Duffy, 1998-NMSC-014, 146, 126
N.M. 182, 967 P.2d 807 (citations omitted).
Ordinarily, an isolated, minor statement will
not provide grounds for reversal. See State
v, Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, 195, 128 N.M.
482, 994 P.2d 728. However, a single state-
ment will require reversal if it is so egregious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
See Duffy, 1998-NMSC-014, 147, 126 N.M.
182, 967 P.2d 807. Additionally, “prosecuto-
rial misconduct will be deemed harmless only
if we find that the evidence of guilt is so
overwhelming that there can be no reason-
able probability that the conviction was
swayed by the misconduct.” Id. 159.

{14} We have previously held that a dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied a motion for mistrial after question-
able comments. See State v. Reynolds, 111
N.M. 263, 804 P.2d 1082 (Ct.App.1990). In
the opening arguments of Reynolds, the
prosecutor asserted that the defendant had

given the police a “cock-and-bull story.” Id.
at 266, 804 P.2d at 1085. The defendant
moved for a mistrial. The district court de-
nied the motion, but instructed the jury that
opening statements are not evidence and
should not include argument. See id. In
concluding that the district court had not
abused its discretion, this Court noted that,
declaring a mistrial was only appropriate if
the State’s comments were “substantially
likely to cause a miscarriage of justice.” Id.
This Court also noted that, since the evi-
dence supported the statement that the de-
fendant’s story was a “cock-and-bull” story, it
would have been proper in closing argu-
ments, and therefore could not have denied
the defendant a fair trial. Id.

{15} We find Reynolds analogous to the
instant case. As in Reynolds, the State here
made an ill-advised comment in his opening
statement. However, the district court sus-
tained Defendant’s timely objection before it
became egregious. The State was only al-
lowed to say that the people of the county
were fortunate that Defendant was pulled
over before he could cause any significant
harm. The State did not get a chance to
turn this into a prejudicial statement about.
drunk drivers. The district court’s decision
to let the State proceed subject to the re-
quirement that he restrict his statements
was not arbitrary, capricious, or beyond rea-
son. As we discuss below, the State went on
to put forth evidence sufficient to support
Defendant’s conviction for aggravated DWI.
Accordingly, as in Reynolds, the statements
could have been considered and addressed in
some manner without denying Defendant a
fair trial, as the district court had the disere-
tion to consider allowing some version of
these statements if they had been made dur-
ing the State’s closing argument. Finally,
although no instructions were issued to the
jury regarding the objectionable statements,
we note that Defendant did not at any point
request such instructions. Under these cir-
cumstances, we hold that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
trial to proceed after sustaining Defendant’s
objection. However, we note that the state-
ments came close to improperly appealing to
the “passions and prejudices of the jury,”
and we may have reached a different result

377

had the State been allowed to continue.
State v. Ashley, 1997-NMSC-049, 1115, 21,
124 N.M. 1, 946 P.2d 205.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

WI {16} Finally, Defendant argues that
his conviction was not supported by substan-
tial evidence. In particular, Defendant con-
tends that “there was no testimony indicating
that the officers had probable cause to be-
lieve that he was impaired.” “(T]he test to
determine the sufficiency of evidence in New
Mexico ... is whether substantial evidence
of either a direct or circumstantial nature
exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to every ele-
ment essential to a conviction.” State v.
Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 181, 753 P.2d 1814,
1819 (1988). “In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the guilty verdict,
indulging all reasonable inferences and re-
solving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of
the verdict.” State v. Cunningham, 2000-
NMSC-009, 126, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176.

{17} In the instant case, the jury found
Defendant guilty of aggravated DWI. In
order to do so, the jury was required to find

1. (D]efendant operated a motor vehicle;

2. At that time, [Defendant was under

the influence of intoxicating liquor;
that is, as a result of drinking liquor
[D]efendant was less able to the slight-
est degree, either mentally or physical-
ly, or both, to exercise the clear judg-
ment and steady hand necessary to
handle a vehicle with safety to the
person and the public;

8. [Defendant refused to submit to

chemical testing;

4. This happened in New Mexico on or

about the 13th day of April, 2008.
The jury was further instructed that Defen-
dant refused to submit to chemical testing if

1. [D]efendant was arrested on reason-

able grounds to believe that [D]efen-
dant was driving while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor or drugs;

2. [D]efendant was advised by a Jaw en-

forcement officer that failure to submit

378
to the test could result in the revoca-
tion of [D]efendant’s privilege to drive;

8. A law enforcement officer requested
[Djefendant to submit to a chemical
breath or blood test;

4, [Defendant was conscious and other-
wise capable of submitting to a chemi-
cal test; and

5. [D]efendant willfully refused to submit
to a breath or blood test.

Defendant concedes all elements of the DWI
instruction except for the third: refusal to
submit to chemical testing. Regarding re-
fusal to submit to testing, Defendant argues
only that “there was no testimony indicating
that the officers had probable cause to be-
lieve that he was impaired.”

{18} Contrary to Defendant’s position, the
record provides ample evidence that Defen-
dant “was arrested on reasonable grounds to
believe that [he] was driving while under the
influence.” Officer Ballard testified that he
originally pulled Defendant over for driving
at night without headlights. When he made
contact with the driver, he immediately no-
ticed a strong odor of alcohol and that Defen-
dant had bloodshot, watery eyes, a “very
flushed” face, and slurred speech. He also
testified that Defendant had admitted to hav-
ing three beers earlier in the evening. The
officer administered field sobriety tests,
which Defendant failed. At that point, the
officer arrested Defendant,

{19} The record also contains evidence
supporting the other elements of refusal to
submit to chemical testing. Deputy Flores
testified that he read the implied consent act
to Defendant in Spanish. Deputy Flores tes-
tified that Defendant said that he under-
stood, but that Defendant repeatedly refused
to provide a breath sample. Deputy Flores
testified that he then explained to Defendant
that refusal to provide a sample could result
in loss of driving privileges and increased
penalties if convicted of DWI. Deputy
Flores then testified that Defendant again
said that he understood but continued to
refuse to take the chemical test. Viewing
this evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, the jury could reasonably have
concluded that the elements of the jury in-
struction regarding refusal to submit to

chemical testing had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Ill. CONCLUSION

{20} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the district court and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: RODERICK T.
KENNEDY and TIMOTHY L. GARCIA,

Judges.

2011-NMCA-075
258 P.3d 1170

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,

Vv.
Darrick SUBLET, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 28,819.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
June 8, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrew
S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Defendant Darrick Sublet appeals the
court's denial of his motion to suppress. An
undercover detective entered the apartment
that Defendant occupied, engaged in a drug
buy, and signaled an awaiting police team
which then entered the apartment and de-
tained the occupants. Defendant contends
that after the occupants of the apartment
were taken and detained outside some mem-
bers of the police team reentered the apart-
ment without a warrant resulting in an un-
lawful search that followed. We agree that,
the search was unlawful and reverse the
denial of the motion to suppress.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} We summarize the underlying
events in the light most favorable to the
ruling rendered below. See State v. Flores,
2008-NMCA-074, 12, 144 N.M. 217, 185 P.3d
1067. Detective Brett Lampiris-Tremba,
working undercover and posing as a drug
buyer, arranged for a purchase of cocaine
from Annette Salvato. The detective, Salva-
to, and a confidential informant went inside
an apartment to complete the undercover
drug transaction. Defendant was one of sev-
eral others in the apartment at the time of
the transaction. The detective and the infor-
mant were taken to a back bedroom where
the detective gave Salvato money to purchase
eleven stones of crack cocaine. There was

another person in the bedroom sitting on one
of the beds with a pair of scissors beside him
smoking what appeared to be crack cocaine,
The man offered the detective some crack
cocaine, but he refused.

381

{83} Salvato left the bedroom, shut the
door, returned a few minutes later, and gave
Detective Lampiris-Tremba what appeared
to the detective to be cocaine, which the
detective put in his pocket. The detective
then gave a prearranged arrest signal to
surveillance narcotics detectives, after which
the detective heard commotion and people
yelling and “more banging on the door,” and
the detective saw Defendant run into the
bedroom where the detective was located,
yelling “[t]ask force, task force.” The detec-
tive “continue[d] playing [his] role as a drug
buyer” and acted like he was one of the
suspects. The detective saw Defendant run
into the closet of the bedroom and “jump[]
repeatedly up and down in the closet, as if
trying to push something [to] the top.” De-
tective Lampiris-Tremba testified that De-
fendant appeared to be trying to hide some-
thing, possibly money or drugs, in the upper
right area of the closet. He also testified
that he could not see what was in Defen-
dant’s hand, but that it was later determined
that Defendant was stuffing the buy-money
that Defendant had given Salvato into what
was characterized as both a hole and a crawl
space in the upper closet area that was large
enough for a person.

{4} Occupants of the apartment, including
Detective Lampiris~Tremba, were detained,
handcuffed, and escorted outside. Detective
Lampiris-Tremba told his fellow officers, in-
cluding Detective Martinez, that he thought
Defendant had hidden “something in the ceil-
ing” in the bedroom closet and that “[y]ou
guys ... need to look up there.” Detective
Martinez and the other officers went back
into the apartment and when one of the
officers, who was “a pretty large guy” could
not fit into the hole, two officers helped
Detective Martinez get into the hole where
he found the buy-money. By this time, De-
fendant and Salvato had been arrested.

{5} Defendant was charged with traffick-
ing by distribution (cocaine), conspiracy to
commit trafficking by distribution (cocaine),
and tampering with evidence. See NMSA
1978, § 30-81-20(A)(2) (2006); NMSA 1978,
§ 30-28-2 (1979); NMSA-1978, § 30-22-5
(2008). Defendant moved to suppress the
evidence obtained from the closet as the fruit

382

of a warrantless and therefore an unlawful
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution. He argued that the search was
not authorized by any exception to the war-
rant requirement and focused his argument
on the exigent-cireumstances exception, as
well as the protective-sweep exception.

{6} In response, the State claimed that (1)
Defendant did not have standing because he
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the residence searched; (2) the evidence of a
crime was in plain view; (8) exigent cireum-
stances, relating to safety concerns and the
likelihood that the evidence would be de-
stroyed, justified the warrantless search; (4)
the search of the closet was authorized as a
protective sweep incident to arrest; and (5)
Defendant abandoned the evidence by plac-
ing it where it could not be linked to or
associated with him.

{7} After a hearing, the district court
found that Defendant had a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy to challenge the search of
the apartment, but the court denied the mo-
tion to suppress. The court determined that
Detective Lampiris-Tremba was lawfully in
the apartment and that his observations did
not impact Defendant’s constitutional rights.
The district court further found that “{elxi-
gent circumstances existed at the time of the
officers’ entry into the apartment to justify
both the entry and subsequent protective
sweep of the apartment. The protective
sweep lawfully included the closet and the
hole in the upper closet area where a person
could hide[.!’ The district court also found
that “[tlo the extent that ... [DJefendant
had any standing or claim of an expectation
of privacy in the undercover buy-money used
in the investigation, he abandoned any such
claim when he disposed of the money by
throwing it in the hole in the upper closet
area of the bedroom[.]” After entering a
conditional plea to trafficking by distribution
(cocaine), Defendant appealed the denial of
his motion to suppress.

Il. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

HH {8} A motion to suppress evidence
based on an alleged unlawful search or sei-

zure involves a mixed question of law and
fact. Our review procedure is set out in
State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, 130, 149
N.M. 435, 250 P.8d 861, State v. Sewell, 2009-
NMSC-083, 112, 146 N.M. 428, 211 P.8d 885,
State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, 1110,
144 N.M. 37, 183 P.8d 922, and State v.
Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 11 17-19, 134
N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. In the present case,
we review de novo the constitutional reason-
ableness of the actions of the officers. Van-
denberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 119, 134 N.M.
566, 81 P.38d 19. We look at the totality of
circumstances. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009,
1130, 59, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861; Van-
denberg, 2003-NMSC-030, 119, 134 N.M.
566, 81 P.3d 19. We view the facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Sewell, 2009-NMSC-038, 112, 146 N.M. 428,
211 P.3d 885.

B. Standing: Expectation of Privacy in
the Apartment

HMM {9} The State argues that Defen-
dant did not have standing to object to the
search because he did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the apartment. We
disagree. “Whether a defendant has stand-
ing involves two inquiries: (1) whether the
defendant had an actual, subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the premises searched; and
(2) whether the defendant’s subjective expec-
tation [is] one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.” State v. Zamora,
2005-NMCA-039, 110, 187 N.M. 301, 110
P.3d 517 (alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted).

{10} In support of his expectation of priva-
cy, Defendant testified that he had been
staying in the apartment for about three
weeks, slept in both the living room and the
bedrooms, and had access to the kitchen and
bathroom. Defendant testified that Ernesto
Rodriguez was allowed to stay in the apart-
ment because Rodriguez paid rent, and Rod-
riguez allowed Defendant to stay in the
apartment because Defendant paid Rodri-
guez $50 per week. Defendant further testi-
fied that he kept his clothes and personal
hygiene items in the apartment in a drawer
in one of the bedrooms. Defendant's testi-

mony establishes that he had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the apartment. See
id. V1.

{11} The State contends that even if De-
fendant had a subjective expectation of priva-
cy, that expectation is not one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable because
of the complete absence of evidence that
Rodriguez was a lawful owner or renter of
the premises and that Rodriguez had any
right or authority to allow Defendant to stay
in the apartment. The State asserts that
without such evidence Defendant could not
establish standing because he could not show
that he was anything other than a trespasser.
We are not persuaded.

{12} Defendant's testimony was not rebut-
ted by the State, and the State offered no
evidence questioning Defendant’s right to
stay in the apartment. Cf. id. 118 (recogniz-
ing that house guests have a right to chal-
lenge a search of the premises if they were
permitted “by the owner or occupant of the
property to use a private part of the resi-
dence”). The district court found that De-
fendant had an actual and subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the apartment and had
standing to challenge the search. The court
thought that the issue would have been “a
little closer had the State presented ...
some evidence to establish that Ernesto Rod-
riguez didn’t have the lawful right to convey
the right to ... [DJefendant to stay or to
remain in the residence.”

{13} Given Defendant’s unrebutted testi-
mony that he resided in the apartment based
on Rodriguez’s permission and his and Rodri-
guez’s payment of rent, we are unpersuaded
that the Jack of any additional testimony
regarding Rodriguez’s authority to allow De-
fendant’s occupancy is fatal to Defendant's
claim to standing. Cf State v. Ryan, 2006-
NMCA-044, 11 22-27, 139 N.M. 354, 132 P.8d
1040 (recognizing that an individual’s privacy
expectation in a home is usually very high,
but holding that any such expectation in the
case with regard to two searches and viewing
one videotape was unreasonable given the
evidence presented by the prosecution rebut-
ting the defendant’s claim to an expectation
of privacy); State v. Hensel, 106 N.M. 8, 9-
10, 738 P.2d 126, 127-28 (Ct.App.1987) (hold-

383

ing that the defendant did not have standing
to object to the search of a house where
there was no evidence he had the owner's
permission, explicit or implicit, to reside
there, and no evidence that he was, in fact,
residing in or occupying the house), rev'd in
part on other grounds by State v. Rivera,
2008-NMSC-056, 144 N.M. 836, 192 P.8d
1213,

{14} We note that the State heavily relies
on State v. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, 188
N.M, 408, 120 P.8d 830, in support of its
contention that Defendant needed to make
an affirmative showing of Rodriguez's au-
thority. In Van Dang, our Supreme Court
held that the driver of a rented vehicle failed
to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle when the rental con-
tract did not list him as the driver, and he
presented no direct evidence that a lawful
owner or renter of the vehicle had given him
permission to operate the vehicle. Id. 117,
11-12. We are unpersuaded that the holding
in Van Dang required Defendant to have
introduced evidence beyond his own testimo-
ny in this case.

{15} In Van Dang, the defendant testified
at the suppression hearing that he had a
right to drive the rental’ car, but he did not
testify that the person who rented the car
had given him permission to drive it. Id. 12.
In reaching its holding that the defendant
lacked standing, our Supreme Court relied
on the fact that the defendant failed to pres-
ent any direct evidence that the person who
rented the vehicle gave him permission to
operate it. Id. 112. The Court also specifi-
cally relied on the defendant’s failure to even
claim he was authorized by the renter to
operate the vehicle. Jd. As previously dis-
cussed, in the present case, unlike in Van
Dang, Defendant indicated that he paid rent
to Rodriguez, had permission to stay in the
apartment, and Rodriguez himself paid rent
to reside in the apartment.

{16} Furthermore, in Van Dang, our Su-
preme Court was considering a claimed pri-
vacy interest in an automobile. Id. 197, 11-
12. The present case involves a dwelling,
and our appellate courts have long recog-
nized “[t]he constitutional distinction be-
tween vehicles and homes turns on ... pri-

384

vacy expectation. A lesser expectation of
privacy attaches to a vehicle.” State v.
Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, 123, 187 N.M. 174,
108 P.38d 1082; of State v. Esguerra, 113
N.M. 310, 313-14, 825 P.2d 248, 246-47 (Ct.
App.1991) (recognizing that the privacy in-
terest in one’s dwelling place is entitled to
“the highest degree of protection from un-
reasonable intrusion by the government”).
The State acknowledged as much in the
hearing in district court.

{17} Defendant presented evidence of his
and Rodriguez’s permission to occupy the
apartment. A person’s subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in an apartment in which the
person is paying rent for oecupancy and is
residing is an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as reason-
able. See Zamora, 2005-NMCA-039, 11 10—
14, 187 N.M. 301, 110 P.38d 517 (holding that
the defendant had a subjective expectation of
privacy in a motel room that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable based on
the defendant’s testimony that he had an
expectation of privacy “because his ‘family’
was there and because he was going to spend
the night there”). The district court correct-
ly ruled that Defendant had standing to seek
suppression of the buy-money evidence.

C. Expectation of Privacy in the Proper-
ty Seized

HI {18} The State argues on appeal, as a
related aspect of standing, that Defendant
cannot challenge the seizure of the buy-mon-
ey and seek its suppression because he un-
lawfully possessed it and therefore could
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
it. The argument appears to stem in part
from the statement in Van Dang, cited by
the State in its answer brief, that “[g]eneral-
ly, one who owns, controls, or lawfully pos-
sesses property has a legitimate expectation
of privacy.” Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-038,
17, 188 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d 830.

{19} In its answer brief on appeal, the
State compares the buy-money in the pres-
ent case to property that a person steals,
citing United States v. Caymen, 404 F.8d
1196, 1200 (9th Cir.2005), for the proposition
that “{tJhe Fourth Amendment does not pro-
tect a defendant from a warrantless search

of property that he stole” because any expec-
tation to maintain privacy in the contents of
stolen property “is not one that society is
prepared to accept as reasonable.” (Internal
quotation marks and citation omitted.) We
are not persuaded. Caymen is limited to
instances where a thief claims an expectation
of privacy in stolen goods. See id. (“What-
ever possessory interest a thief may have,
that interest is subordinate to the rights of
the owner[.]”). We will not, as the State
wishes, tie Caymen and stolen goods into
Van Dang’s general language of “lawfully
possesses property” to deny Defendant in
the present case a reasonable expectation of
privacy. See State v. Tanner, 304 Or. 312,
745 P.2d 757, 759 (1987) (en bane) (“An un-
lawful search that uncovers effects such as
stolen goods or contraband, which also may
not be legally possessed, will nevertheless
result in suppression of those effects because
the unlawfulness involves an infringement of
rights apart from possessory interests (or
the lack thereof) in the stolen goods or con-
traband seized as a consequence of the un-
lawful search.”).

{20} The State’s reliance in oral argument
on Bomboy is misplaced. In Bomboy, our
Supreme Court held that the defendant had
no expectation of privacy in methamphet-
amine he had placed in a highly visible area
in a vehicle and in a police officer’s plain
view. State v. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029,
110, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.8d 1045. The
Court stated that the officer reaching into
the car was not an “infringement on a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy.” Jd. The
Court continued, saying, “[IJikewise, there
can be no infringement on [the dlefendant’s
possessory interest in the methamphetamine
because an individual does not have a lawful
right to possess such contraband[,]” citing for
support State v. Foreman, 97 N.M. 583, 642
P.2d 186 (Ct.App.1982). Bomboy, 2008-
NMSC-029, 110, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.8d
1045. In Foreman, this Court held that the
“{dJefendant’s privacy expectations in [al
cowboy boot box were lawfully breached by
{an] inventory search.” 97 N.M. at 585, 642
P.2d at 188 (emphasis added). We are not
willing to apply or expand either the holdings
in these cases or the language they use to

the present case. The facts in Bomboy and
Foreman are far removed from those in the
present case. In Foreman, the search was
of the contents of a container, and the search
was lawful. Id. In Bomboy, it seems clear
that because a vehicle was involved, exigency
permitted the officer’s breach of the vehicle
plane to seize contraband in plain view.
2008-NMSC-029, 12, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.8d
1045. Bomboy and Foreman did not directly
address the issue here, and their general
statements were not made with any particu-
lar regard to their general applicability.
Furthermore, that Defendant’s possession of
the buy-money in the present case may not
have been lawful does not deprive him of
standing to seek its suppression under the
exclusionary rule. Tanner, 745 P.2d at 759.
The search was for suspected contraband in
a residence, and the search was unlawful
because the police did not have a warrant
and no circumstances excused the warrant-
less search. See United States v. Carnes,
809 F.3d 950, 959-60 (6th Cir.2002) (holding
that the defendant had standing to seek sup-
pression of audiotape recordings of conversa-
tions obtained illegally and stating that “ille-
gally obtained objects, such as contraband,
are often suppressed” and “[t]he legality of a
person’s possession cannot be the lynchpin of
their Fourth Amendment standing”).

{21} In addition to mentioning Bomboy in
oral argument, the State attempted to distin-
guish the circumstance in the present case
from others in which unlawful police conduct
precedes an otherwise lawful search for and
seizure of contraband, such as when the
seized contraband is the fruit of a “poison-
ous,” unlawful detention or warrantless entry
into an apartment in violation of the knock-
and-announce rule. The State argued that in
eases in which an entry into a house is
unlawful, it is the entry that constitutes the
Fourth Amendment violation and not the la-
ter seizure of contraband in the home. The
State further argued that, in the present
case, the seizure of the buy-money was to be
considered separate and apart from the
search and that the seizure in and of itself
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
State argued that Defendant had no expecta-
tion of privacy in police buy-money used in
an unlawful drug transaction because society

385

would not recognize such privacy expectation
as reasonable. Last, the State argued that
Defendant could not sustain an expectation of
privacy based on assertion of a property
interest in the buy-money because Defendant
could not be successful in a replevin action
were he to attempt to obtain the buy-money
from the police.

HM {22} We see no valid distinction to
be made between a suppression case in which
suppression of seized contraband is based on
an earlier unlawful entry into a residence and
a case such as the present where the sup-
pression of seized contraband is based on a
simultaneous unlawful search. See Tanner,
745 P.2d at 759 (stating that “[slearches and
seizures are separate acts calling for sepa-
rate analysis” and that “[i]f the police violat-
ed any right of [the] defendant’s, it was a
right against the search that uncovered the
effects, not some right in the effects them-
selves”). The following language in United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52-54, 72 S.Ct.
98, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951), makes the same point,
in regard to the government’s contention in
Jeffers regarding the seizure of contraband.

The significant act ... is the seizure of the
goods of the respondent without a warrant.
We do not believe the events are so easily
isolable. Rather they are bound together
by one sole purpose—to locate and seize
the narcotics of respondent. The search
and seizure are, therefore, incapable of
being untied.

It is urgently contended by the [glovern-

ment that no property rights within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment exist
in the narcotics seized here, because they
are contraband goods in which [clongress
has declared that ‘no property rights shall
exist)...
... We are of the opinion that [clongress,
in abrogating property rights in such
goods, merely intended to aid in their for-
feiture and thereby prevent the spread of
the traffic in drugs rather than to abolish
the exclusionary rule formulated by the
courts in furtherance of the high purposes
of the Fourth Amendment.

386

Since the evidence illegally seized was
contraband[,] the respondent was not enti-
tled to have it returned to him. It being
his property, for purposes of the exclusion-
ary rule, he was entitled on motion to have
it suppressed as evidence on his trial.

(Footnote omitted.) (Citations omitted.)

{23} Here, the buy-money can be consid-
ered the fruit solely of a warrantless search
unexcused by an exception to the warrant
requirement, no different from other unlaw-
ful searches in which contraband such as
buy-money or drugs, which a defendant has
no lawful right to possess, is ultimately found
in a defendant’s possession or control and
seized. For the foregoing reasons, we reject,
the State’s contention and argument that De-
fendant lacked standing to attack the seizure
of the buy-money because Defendant lacked
any expectation of privacy in the money that
society would accept as reasonable.

D. The Earlier Warrantless Entry

{24} Defendant does not dispute that De-
tective Lampiris-Tremba lawfully entered
the apartment and had probable cause to
arrest Defendant after receiving the cocaine
from Salvato in exchange for the controlled
buy-money. Defendant challenges the war-
rantless entry of the police team based on
the detective’s pre-arranged arrest signal,
arguing that no exception to the warrant
requirement was shown. We do not address
this issue because we hold in Defendant’s
favor on the issue of the warrantless search
and suppression and, therefore, there exists
no reason to address the issue.

E, The Entry to Search the Closet

{25} Defendant challenges as unlawful
what he characterizes as a warrantless “reen-
try” into the apartment by one or more
officers culminating in the officers’ warrant-
less search of the closet area for suspected
stashed drugs or drug buy-money after the
officers had already detained the occupants
and Detective Lampiris-Tremba outside. In
response to the State’s arguments made in
the district court and on appeal to support
denial of his suppression motion, Defendant
argues that no exigent-circumstances or pro-
tective-sweep exception justified the reentry

for the purpose of the hole-in-the-closet
search that followed. He argues that Detec-
tive Lampiris~Tremba could have left before
he signaled the police team and could have
obtained a warrant and, as well, the officers
who reentered could have sought a warrant
after detaining the occupants and securing
the premises. Defendant further argues that
no buy-money was in Detective Lampiris—
Tremba’s plain view as Defendant was plac-
ing it in the closet and that no evidence
supports an intent on Defendant’s part to
abandon the property left in his own place of
residence. He argues that the evidence ob-
tained from the search should have been
suppressed under the Fourth Amendment
and, if not under the Fourth Amendment,
then under Article IT, Section 10 of the New
Mexico Constitution. Because Defendant
raised Article II, Section 10 in the district
court and the pertinent circumstances were
before the district court at the hearing on the
suppression motion, Defendant preserved his
Article II, Section 10 position. See Leyva,
2011-NMSC-009, 149, 149 N.M. 485, 250
P.3d 861 (stating the preservation require-
ments). We agree with Defendant.

1, Abandonment

HE s«{26} “The party seeking to prove
abandonment must show this intent by clear,
unequivocall,] and decisive evidence.” State
v. Celusniak, 2004-NMCA-070, 126, 185
N.M. 728, 93 P.38d 10 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The State pro-
vided no evidence of any subjective intent of
Defendant to abandon any expectation of pri-
vacy in the buy-money. Nor has the State
presented authority that persuades us that
the stashing of contraband by a defendant in
his rented apartment during a police drug-
bust constitutes an abandonment of posses-
sion.

{27} For its abandonment contention, the
State relies primarily on State v. Clark, 105
N.M. 10, 727 P.2d 949 (Ct.App.1986), in
which the police approached a rented mobile
home without a search warrant to locate
reported stolen goods and spoke to the land-
lady-owner. Jd. at 12, 727 P.2d at 951. At
the time, the defendant’s rent was unpaid,
one eviction notice had been posted, the own-

er was set to post a second eviction notice,
the owner had heard that the defendant was
incarcerated, the owner had been told by the
defendant’s sister to remove his possessions,
and the owner gave permission for the police
to enter and search. Id. The circumstances
in the present case are considerably different
from those in Clark, Furthermore, the cir-
cumstances here do not fit within the “sever-
al general factual scenarios that give rise to a
finding of abandonment[.]” Celusniak, 2004—
NMCA-070, 128, 185 N.M. 728, 93 P.3d 10
(setting out abandonment scenarios). There
exists no disclaimer of ownership, discarding
of evidence out of a window of a moving
vehicle, unsuccessful attempt to destroy the
property, or having left the property in va-
cated premises. See id.; Clark, 105 N.M. at
12-14, 727 P.2d at 951-53 (holding that the
owner of a mobile home was able to consent
to a search when the defendant/tenant lacked
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
mobile home when he intended to abandon it
as his residence).

{28} We hold that, in the present case,
Defendant did not abandon the buy-money
that was ultimately found stashed in the hole
in the closet. See Celusniak, 2004-NMCA-
070, 129, 185 N.M. 728, 93 P.8d 10 (holding
that, even in the light most favorable to the
district court’s ruling, the facts of the case
departed from this Court’s existing abandon-
ment holdings and were too equivocal to
support a ruling of abandonment); of Com-
monwealth v. White, 459 Pa. 84, 327 A.2d 40,
48 (1974) (stating that, where the defendant’s
effects were seized pursuant to an unlawful
search while the defendant was not physical-
ly present, “there is no evidence that [the
defendant] meaningfully abdicated his con-
trol, ownership, or possessory interest in the
items seized[,] [hJe did not sell them, give
them away or abandon themf[;] [iInstead, he
left them in the apparent safety and security
of his temporary residence, his mother’s
apartment[, and] [o]ne must, therefore, con-
clude that [the defendant] had a reasonable
expectation that such items would be free
from government intrusion whether or not he
was physically present”).

387
2. Plain View

HN {29} Items may be seized under
the plain-view exception to the warrant re-
quirement when the incriminating nature of
the evidence is immediately apparent. State
v. Ochoa, 2004~NMSC-028, 19, 135 N.M.
781, 98 P.3d 1286. There exists no evidence
that the buy-money was in plain view of
either Detective Lampiris-Tremba or the of-
ficers who conducted the search. The detec-
tive was the only law enforcement officer
who knew directly about something being
stashed by Defendant in the closet. But he
did not see what was stashed; he testified
only that Defendant “jumped repeatedly up
and down in the closet, as if trying to push
something into the top of the closet[,]’ that
he “thought maybe [Defendant] was trying to
put money in there or more drugs, trying to
hide something[,]” that “it looked like[] he
was just hiding something[,]” and that he
could not actually see what was in Defen-
dant’s hand. That testimony is patently in-
sufficient for application of the plain-view
exception to the warrant requirement. See
State v. Rivera, 2010-NMSC-046, 111 28-29,
148 N.M. 659, 241 P.3d 1099 (holding under
Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution that “[tJhe plain{-]view doctrine
did not authorize [the officer] to open the
opaque bundle because he thought he had
probable cause to believe the bundles con-
tained marijuana”).

8. Exigency and Protective Sweep

Ts {30} As to exigency, officers
must have “knowledge of specific, articulable
facts that demonstrate that immediate action
is necessary to prevent imminent danger to
life or serious damage to property, or to
forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or
destruction of evidence.” State v. Moore,
2008-NMCA-056, 1114, 144 N.M. 14, 183 P.8d
158 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A protective sweep is allowed if
incident to an arrest and the officers have a
reasonable belief that the area of the sweep
harbors a person who poses a danger to the
officers or others. State v. Trudelle, 2007-
NMCA-066, 1121, 142 N.M. 18, 162 P.8d 173.
The sweep must be “narrowly confined to a
cursory visual inspection of those places in

388

which a person might be hiding.” Zamora,
2005-NMCA-039, 117, 187 N.M. 301, 110
P.3d 517 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).

{31} The State fails to present evidence of
exigency facing the police officers or evi-
dence to support their protective-sweep theo-
ry. Nor is there evidence of lack of suffi-
cient time to obtain a warrant. There is
simply a complete absence of evidence of
cireumstances to bring the search and sei-
zure of the buy-money within the reasonable-
ness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
and Article II, Section 10 under these excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. According
to Detective Lampiris-Tremba, all occupants
were detained outside. Nothing in the rec-
ord indicates that the officers did not have
complete control of the apartment. There
obviously existed time to obtain a warrant
under the circumstances, and the State relies
on no evidence from which one could reason-
ably conclude that a particular exigency or
safety concern required the warrantless
search in question. That Detective Lampir-
is-Tremba felt concerned about his safety
while he was in the apartment and before he
and the other occupants were arrested and
taken outside is irrelevant.

HM {82} Further, the State’s argument,
that the search was lawful based on the fact,
that the officers who searched the hole in the
closet discovered that an officer of a certain
size was able to fit in the hole is not sustaina-
ble. No concern existed, subjectively or ob-
jectively, before the search occurred about
safety, destruction of evidence, or occupant
escape in relation to the dimensions of the
place in the closet where Detective Lampir-
is-Tremba thought Defendant was stashing
something. The officers who conducted the
search were not aware of a hole beforehand,
much less the size of any hole, before they
entered the apartment to conduct the partic-
ular search of the closet. They certainly
were not informed regarding any hole that
was large enough for a person to fit in.
They entered the apartment based solely on
the detective’s information for the purpose of
searching the closet for stashed buy-money
or drugs, not for humans. That the district
court found, based on what occurred at the

time of the search, that a hole existed and
that the hole was large enough for an officer
smaller in. size to fit in it, is irrelevant, since
that fact was learned only at the point that
the officers reached the closet and saw the
hole and one of the officers was able to climb
to some extent into the hole.

{33} We reject the State’s argument that,
under the circumstances, and objectively, a
prudent, cautious, trained officer under the
circumstances could have a safety concern,
concern for destruction of evidence, or con-
cern about occupant escape, and would have
believed it appropriate to check all places in
the apartment where suspects could be hid-
ing, including the hole in the closet, particu-
larly given the district court’s finding that
the hole was large enough for a small officer
to enter. The officers entered the apartment
solely to search the closet for any object(s)
Defendant may have “tried to hide” therein.
‘There exists no evidence from which one can.
conclude that they subjectively or objectively
had any concerns related to safety, destruc-
tion of evidence, the presence of any suspect,
or the size of any hole in the closet. The
State’s attempt to bootstrap the after-the-
fact occurrence of an officer being lifted up
into a hole in the closet cannot in any way
salvage the unjustified warrantless search.
We hold that the State failed to prove its
claimed exigency and protective-sweep justi-
fications for the search of the hole in the
closet.

Ill. CONCLUSION

{34} We reverse the district court’s denial
of Defendant's motion to suppress, and we
remand this matter to the district court.

{35} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY and
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judges.

eo
ie)
i)

2011-NMCA-078
258 P.3d 1181
Horace L. BOUNDS, Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Ray HAMLETT, Nanci Kelleher, Norm
Wheeler, Cindy Lee, and William
Lee, Defendants—Appellees,
and
‘The San Lorenzo Community
Ditch Association, Nominal
Defendant—Appellee.

No. 29,412.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
June 18, 2011.

390

Law Office of Beverly Singleman, Beverly
J. Singleman, Mesilla Park, NM, for Appel-
Jant.

Domenici Law Firm, P.C., Charles N. La-
kins, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, DL Sand-
ers, Special Assistant Attorney General, San-
ta Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae Office of the
State Engineer.

New Mexico Legal Aid, Inc., David Bena-
vides, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae New
Mexico Acequia Association.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} This appeal involves an election con-
test between two competing boards of com-
missioners of the San Lorenzo Community
Ditch Association (the Association). As rele-
vant to the appeal, Plaintiff Horace L.
Bounds, Jr., along with Wigwam Ranch, LLC
(Wigwam Ranch), and Boots & Spurs, LLC
(Boots & Spurs), sought a declaratory judg-
ment that they were duly elected commis-
sioners at a December 3, 2007 election of the
Association and that Defendants Ray Ham-
lett, Nanci Kelleher, and Norm Wheeler,
elected at a January 4, 2008 meeting, were
not commissioners entitled to act on behalf of
the Association.

{2} The district court held that neither
group of commissioners was duly elected. In
doing so, it concluded that a “hybrid” form of
voting in an acequia election in which voting
may be based on either water rights or ditch
rights was contrary to NMSA 1978, Section
73-2-14 (1921), and the New Mexico Su-
preme Court's holding in Wilson v. Denver,
1998-NMSC-016, 125 N.M. 308, 961 P.2d
158. It further concluded that a 1982 stipu-
lated judgment between Plaintiff and the As-
sociation was not lawful because the stipu-
lated judgment attempted to create a hybrid
voting scheme and does not comply with the
alternatives allowed by statute. It ordered
the Association to hold a new election, allow-
ing members to vote either by casting one
vote per member, reflecting the tenancy in
common in the ditch, or by voting in propor-
tion to the member’s water rights on the
ditch. Plaintiff appeals.

{3} We hold that the district court correct-
ly held that the 1982 stipulated judgment
was not lawful and that the bylaws control-
ling the December 2007 election were im-
properly based on the 1982 stipulated judg-
ment that created a hybrid form of voting
rights that was contrary to both Section 73-
2-14 and Wilson. We do not address the
district court’s actions concerning the Janu-
ary 4, 2008 election and the special election
because they are not before us in this appeal.
We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{4} The Association is a community aceq-
uia association organized under NMSA 1978,
Sections 78-2-1 to -68 (1874, as amended
through 2006). It adopted its first official set
of bylaws in 1981, which provided that
“{eJach member will have the same number
of votes as acres of land with water rights.”
At that time, Plaintiff owned 208.8 acres of
land with water rights and had “ditch rights”
totaling 141 hours and 20 minutes, which he
acquired from his predecessors in interest,
his father, Horace L. Bounds, and Wigwam
Ranch. Ditch rights are the amount of time
during a water cycle that an individual water
user may take water from the ditch.

{5} In 1982, Plaintiff filed a declaratory
judgment action against the Association to
clarify voting practices. He did not name
any of the individual members of the Associa-
tion as defendants. The case resulted in a
stipulated judgment, confirming Plaintiff's
ditch rights of 141 hours and 20 minutes, and
stating his voting rights to be “in proportion
to his interest in [the] ditch or in proportion
to the number or amount of his water rights

(208.8 acres), whichever is larger.”

{6} In 1989, the Association adopted a
second set of bylaws that again provided that
voting rights would be based on water rights.
There is no evidence in the record of any
objections to these bylaws. In 1999, Plaintiff
transferred 46.17 of his 203.8 acres of water
rights from the San Lorenzo Community
Ditch to another location and, as a result,
thereafter owned 157.63 acres of water rights
on the ditch. After this transfer, the Associ-
ation did not readjust any of its member’s
ditch rights, including those of Plaintiff.

{7} In 2001, the Association held an elec-
tion in which voting was based on water
rights as required by the 1989 bylaws. At
that time, Plaintiff, through his attorney, in-
formed the board of commissioners of the
1982 stipulated judgment. The board indi-
cated that, based on the 1982 stipulated judg-
ment, it understood Plaintiff to “prefer ditch
rights to water rights[,]” and “that all future
dealings of the ... Association will be done
by ditch rights.” In February 2002, the
board of commissioners adopted new bylaws
that based voting rights on ditch rights, a

391

departure from all previously recorded by-
laws. The change was prompted by commu-
nications from Plaintiff and his attorneys
leading commissioners to believe that compli-
ance with the 1982 stipulated judgment was
required by law and to prevent litigation.

{8} On December 3, 2007, the Association
held a meeting, called by Plaintiff, and con-
ducted an election based on the 2002 bylaws
under which a member’s voting rights were
in proportion to the member’s ditch rights.
Plaintiff, Wigwam Ranch, LLC (represented
by Jo Bounds), and Boots & Spurs, LLC
(represented by Steve Bounds) were elected
commissioners. Plaintiff was also elected
mayordomo.

{9} On January 4, 2008, the Association
held another meeting called by members who
did not believe that the December 3, 2007
meeting was proper. Plaintiff did not attend.
The members present conducted an election
based on a recalculation of each member's
ditch rights or water rights, whichever pro-
vided the member the greater number of
votes. Defendants Hamlett, Wheeler, and
Kelleher were elected commissioners, and
Defendant William Lee was elected mayordo-
mo.

{10} Plaintiff, Wigwam Ranch, and Boots
& Spurs filed this action for declaratory
judgment in response to the January 4, 2008
election. After trial, the district court ruled
that neither set of commissioners was duly
elected and entitled to act on behalf of the
Association. It held that both elections im-
properly employed hybrid voting systems
contrary to Section 73-2-14 and Wilson and
were therefore invalid. The district court
further held that the 1982 stipulated judg-
ment was not binding on the Association’s
members. The district court ordered the
Association to conduct a special election with
voting based either by each member casting
one vote reflecting the tenancy in common
interest of the members of the ditch or by
each member voting in proportion to the
member's water rights in the ditch.

{11} In Plaintiff's appeal of these rulings,
he raises three issues: (1) whether the Asso-
ciation’s voting rights may be based dispro-
portionally upon hours of ditch time because

392

of the members’ agreement and the 1982
stipulated judgment; (2) whether the 1982
stipulated judgment is binding on the Associ-
ation and its members; and (8) whether the
district court improperly subjected the 1982
stipulated judgment to collateral attack.
Each issue presents a question of law that we
review de novo. See Jordan v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 2010~-NMSC-051, 114, 149 N.M. 162,
245 P.38d 1214 (holding that statutory inter-
pretation is a question of law that is reviewed
de novo); Roybal v. Lujan de la Fuente,
2009-NMCA-114, 123, 147 N.M. 193, 218
P.8d 879 (holding that the district court’s
determination as to the preclusive effect of a
judgment is reviewed de novo).

VOTING RIGHTS IN ASSOCIATION
ELECTIONS

Wl {12} Plaintiff's first argument on ap-
peal asks this Court to overturn the district
court because the district court did not prop-
erly recognize Plaintiff's voting rights in the
Association’s December 3, 2007 and January
4, 2008 elections. Plaintiff argues that “ditch
rights” are an easement interest and are,
therefore, a valid method of apportioning
votes in acequia elections under Section 73-
2-14 and Wilson. According to Plaintiff, un-
der the second type of ditch interest recog-
nized in Wilson, Association voting may be
disproportionate because an easement in a
ditch measured by hours of ditch time “gen-
erally results in disproportionate voting.”
Further, Plaintiff contends that a February
2, 1962 document signed by the owners of
water rights in the ditch and notarized creat-
ed vested rights in the stated ditch times
such that, based on Holmberg v. Bradford, 56
N.M. 401, 244 P.2d 785 (1952), and Olson v.
H & B Properties, Inc, 118 N.M. 495, 882
P.2d 586 (1994), the district court could not
reallocate Plaintiff's ditch rights to be in
direct proportion to water rights to be more
fair. The district court held that the Associ-
ation’s voting methods used at the December
8, 2007 and the January 4, 2008 elections
were flawed because of the 1982 stipulated
judgment and overturned the results of the
elections. We address Plaintiff's arguments
only as necessary to review the district
court’s decision.

{18} Section 73-2-14 controls the conduct
of election of acequia officers in Grant Coun-
ty, New Mexico. It reads in its entirety as
follows:

The election for acequia or community
ditch officers under this article shall be
held by the outgoing commissioners under
rules and regulations to be prescribed by
them. Only those having water rights in
the acequia or ditch and who are not delin-
quent in the payment of their assessments,
and fail to [sic] proffer such delinquent
assessment at the time they offer to vote,
shall be allowed to vote; but votes may be
cast by written proxy and shall be in pro-
portion to the interest of the voter in the
ditch or water, or in proportion to the
number or amount of his water rights.

Id. (alteration in original).

Hs {14} Plaintiffs concern about the
district court’s decision overturning the elec-
tions requires us to interpret Section 73-2-
14. When interpreting a statute, we seek to
fulfill the legislative intent. Wilson, 1998-
NMSC-016, 1.36, 125 N.M. 308, 961 P.2d 153.
We look first to the plain language of the
statute in accordance with its ordinary mean-
ing. Id. 116.

{15} The central issue in this case is the
manner in which voting rights may be appor-
tioned. We thus specifically address the lan-
guage that states that votes “shall be in
proportion to the interest of the voter in the
ditch or water.” When we look to the plain
language of Section 73-2-14, it states that
votes shall be cast “in proportion to the
interest of the voter in the ditch or water, or
in proportion to the number or amount of his
water rights.” Section 73-2-14 (emphasis
added). See Wilson, 1998-NMSC-016, 117,
125 N.M. 308, 961 P.2d 158 (stating that the
Jack of a comma between “ditch” and “water”
indicates a disjunctive meaning while the
comma following “water” separates an ex-
planatory phrase). This language of the
statute indicates that these voting methods
exist as alternatives. Id. (“As a rule of con-
struction, the word ‘or’ should be given its
normal disjunctive meaning unless the con-
text of a statute demands otherwise.” (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted)),
Nothing in Section 73-2-14 suggests that an

election may be conducted using a combina-
tion of methods. Cobb v. State Canvassing
Bad., 2006-NMSC-~034, 134, 140 N.M. 77, 140
P.8d 498 (stating that we will not read lan-
guage into a statute that is not there when
the statute makes sense as written).

{16} Our reading of the relevant cases
supports this analysis. In Holmberg, a new
landowner sought to compel a community
ditch association to reallocate the shares of
the community ditch company “in proportion
to the number of acres irrigated by each land
owner from the waters of [the] ditch.”
Holmberg, 56 N.M. at 403, 244 P.2d at 787.
An existing ownership statute provided that
acequias were the property of the persons
who constructed them, and others could not
use the waters without the consent of the
majority of the owners and upon payment of
a proportionate share of the cost of construc-
tion, or for the quantity of water to be used.
Id. at 404, 244 P.2d at 788. Our Supreme
Court held that requested relief was inappro-
priate because the relief requested asked the
Court to strike down the ownership statute
and destroy vested property rights. Id. at
407, 244 P.2d at 790-91. The Court dis-
cussed the history of the ownership statute
as emanating from the recognition of two
methods of acquiring a property right in a
community ditch: through participation in
construction or by consent and purchase
from those who did. Id. at 405, 244 P.2d at
788. The Court distinguished the voting
statute that has the same language as Sec-
tion 73-2-14, by stating that it “merely pro-
vides two alternative methods of voting[.]”
Holmberg, 56 N.M. at 405, 244 P.2d at 788.

{17} In Olson, the Court addressed the
ditch rights of water users to a community
ditch. Olson, 118 N.M. at 497, 882 P.2d at
538. The owners of the ditch had executed a
declaration allocating usage time. Id. The
final order in a water rights adjudication
reduced the defendant’s irrigable acres and
water rights, and the plaintiff sought a de-
claratory judgment that the defendant’s ditch
rights should be correspondingly reduced.
Id. The Court acknowledged the long-recog-
nized distinction between water rights and
ditch rights, stating that “ditch rights are
derived from ownership of the ditch and an

393

easement therein,” whereas water rights
stem from “appropriation for beneficial use.”
Td. at 498, 882 P.2d at 589. It stated that
ownership of the ditch is a real property
interest in the physical structure of the ditch,
which is owned by those who constructed it
and their successors in interest as tenants in
common. Jd. According to the Court, the
owners’ declaration created an easement in
the water flow through the ditch. Id. The
Court held that the reallocation of the defen-
dant’s ditch rights to conform to the purpose
of the ditch did not divest the defendant of a
property right in the ditch structure. Id. at
499, 882 P.2d at 540.

HM {18} In Wilson, the Court consid-
ered a protest to the way acequia elections
were conducted. Wilson, 1998-NMSC-016,
11, 125 N.M. 308, 961 P.2d 158. The control-
ling statute at issue in that case was NMSA
1978, Section 73-3-3 (1921), but the Court
found it “identical in relevant part to [Section
73-2-14].” Wilson, 1998-NMSC-016, 124,
125 N.M. 308, 961 P.2d 153. The Court
clarified its earlier ruling in Olson, and dis-
cussed three types of “interests” in a ditch
that, in addition to proportionate voting
based on water rights, may provide for pro-
portionate voting rights under Section 73-2~
14—an ownership interest, an easement in-
terest, and the interest in being a water user.
Wilson, 1998-NMSC-016, 11 33-34, 125 N.M.
308, 961 P.2d 158. As the Court explained,
the first, an ownership interest as a tenant in
common or joint tenant, stems from the con-
tribution made by the individual or the indi-
vidual’s successors in interest to the con-
struction of the ditch. Id. 133. The second
relates to “holding an easement in the land of
another” that is “measured by the nature and
purpose of the easement” and is “substantial-
ly dependent on water rights.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The
third is an interest as a water user that is
“held equally by all those with water rights
in the ditch.” Jd. 134. Ultimately, the
Court held that “{vJoting in ditch elections
may be conducted based proportionately on
water rights, based proportionately on ditch
ownership, or based on a majority of those
using the ditch for the distribution of water.”
Id. 143.

394

{19} Historically, a community ditch has
the flexibility to use the voting method for
election of its officers that it believes is best
to fulfill its particular purposes. Id. 148.
Section 738-2-14 provides two alternatives,
“in proportion to the interest of the voter in
the ditch or water, or in proportion to the
number or amount of his water rights.”
These alternatives derive from the distinction
between water rights and ditch rights that
has long been recognized in our case law.
See Olson, 118 N.M. at 498, 882 P.2d at 589
(“New Mexico cases have long recognized
that ditch rights and water rights are dis-
tinct, are derived from different sources, and
are governed by different rules of law.”).
Olson worked from this distinction between
water rights and ditch rights and included
within ditch rights both ownership and ease-
ment rights. Id. Wilson further defined the
ditch interest to also include the interest in
being a water user, held equally by those
with water rights in the ditch. Wilson,
1998-NMSC-016, 1384, 125 N.M. 308, 961
P.2d 153. But Wilson continues to make
clear that voting rights derive either through
an interest in the ditch or from an interest in
the water flowing through the ditch. Id.
17. Moreover, Wilson recognizes that vot-
ing methods exist as alternatives, stating that
the statute “contains plain language and that
its plain language, properly construed, should
be understood to provide alternative meth-
ods of voting for ditch association officers.”
Id. (emphasis added). See Holmberg, 56
NLM. at 405, 244 P.2d at 788 (stating that the
predecessor statute to Section 73-2-14
“merely provides two alternative methods of
voting”).

{20} With the predicate that the plain
meaning of Section 73-2-14 requires voting
based on one of the alternatives set forth in
Wilson, we turn to the two elections at issue
to consider whether the voting methods satis-
fy these requirements. We address the De-
cember 8, 2007 election in its historical con-
text.

{21} The Association’s initial bylaws
adopted in 1981 called for members to vote in
Association elections based on their water
rights. In 1982, Plaintiff brought a declara-
tory judgment action against the Association,

alleging that by virtue of historical practice
and the 1962 document of the Association's
members setting forth the ditch time of the
members, Association voting should be con-
ducted on the basis of ditch rights rather
than water rights. No members of the Asso-
ciation besides Plaintiff were parties to the
declaratory judgment action. The action
ended in a stipulated judgment providing as
to voting that Plaintiff's “voting rights for the
election of ... Association officers is in pro-
portion to his interest in said ditch or in
proportion to the number or amount of his
water rights ..., whichever is larger.” The
1989 bylaws again stated that voting rights
were to be based on water rights. However,
as a direct result of communications from
Plaintiff and his attorney, the Association
changed its bylaws in 2002 in an attempt to
comply with the 1982 stipulated judgment
and to prevent additional litigation.

{22} However, the 1982 stipulated judg-
ment creates a hybrid voting scheme that is
facially invalid. The 1982 stipulated judg-
ment, allows Plaintiff to vote in Association
elections either in proportion to his interest
in the ditch or in proportion to the number or
amount of his water rights, depending on
which interest is larger. In addition, the
1982 stipulated judgment gave Plaintiff the
power to decide the manner in which he
could vote regardless of the manner in which
other members were allowed to vote. For
example, if the board of commissioners decid-
ed to base voting on the number of acres in
the ditch with water rights attached, the 1982
stipulated judgment would nevertheless per-
mit Plaintiff to vote based on other interests.
While Wilson holds that Section 73-3-8, and
thereby Section 78-2-14, contemplates alter-
native methods of voting, nothing permits
combining alternative methods into another
method in a single election. A hybrid voting
method is one that does not follow a single
method of apportioning votes in an acequia
election and, therefore, does not comport
with Section 73-2-14 and Wilson. The 1982
stipulated judgment was therefore contrary
to Section 73-2-14 and Wilson and therefore
is invalid.

{28} We acknowledge that the Associa-
tion’s 2002 bylaws did not provide for a hy-

brid voting method and based voting solely
on ditch rights. However, the district court
concluded that the December 8, 2007 election
could not stand because of the hybrid voting
method established by the 1982 stipulated
judgment. Specifically, the district court
found that the Association changed the vot-
ing method in the bylaws to one based on
ditch rights contrary to all previously exist-
ing bylaws because of communications from
Plaintiff and his attorney that led the Associ-
ation to believe that the 1982 stipulated judg-
ment required the change in order to prevent
litigation.

{24} Plaintiff does not contest the district
court’s factual findings. With such facts, the
2002 bylaws were improperly based on the
1982 stipulated judgment. The district
court’s findings indicate that the changes to
the bylaws occurred because Plaintiff and his
attorneys led the commissioners to believe
compliance with the stipulated judgment was
required by law and in order to prevent
litigation, which presumably would be initi-
ated by Plaintiff. The Association ac-
quiesced and complied with the 1982 stipu-
lated judgment by, presumably, adopting the
voting method that reflected Plaintiff's great-
er interest as between water rights and ditch
rights, that of voting on the basis of ditch
rights. Substantial evidence supported the
district court's conclusion to overturn the
December 3, 2007 election in this regard.
See Malissa C. v. Matthew Wayne H., 2008-
NMCA-128, 120, 145 N.M. 22, 198 P.38d 569
(stating that “we will not disturb factual find-
ings that are supported by substantial evi-
dence”).

{25} Although Plaintiff frames the issues
before us in the context of disproportionate
voting, because we conclude that the Decem-
ber 8, 2007 election was not validly conducted
because of the hybrid method underlying the
voting process, we need not specifically ad-
dress this argument. We pause briefly, how-
ever, to mention Plaintiff's argument that the
1962 document provided him vested rights.
The document lists water rights, work per-
formed, and assessments as of specified re-
corded dates. For “the present owners of
water rights” on the ditch as of February 2,
1962, it states “the time to which each is

395

entitled to receive water.” Nothing in the
document discusses voting. Rather, it con-
cludes with the ditch time available to the
owners of water rights on the ditch. To the
extent that the document can be understood
to include voting rights, from its allocation of
ditch time based on water rights, voting
would follow water rights as well. As a
result, the 1981 and 1989 bylaws that base
voting rights on water rights are consistent
with the 1962 document. If anything alters
vested rights based on the 1962 document, it
would be the 1982 stipulated judgment that
sought to create voting based on Plaintiff's
choice of voting rights based on his greater
rights regardless of the rights of the other
members. Cf Holmberg, 56 N.M. at 407, 244
P.2d at 790 (holding that reallocating interest
in a community ditch to new landowners
would destroy vested property rights of oth-
ers).

{26} At the January 4, 2008 meeting, the
Association based voting on each member’s
ditch time or water rights, whichever gave
the member the greater number of votes.
The district court also held that this manner
of voting was an invalid hybrid method. It
granted declaratory judgment in Plaintiff's
favor declaring that the officers elected at
the January 4, 2008 meeting were not duly
elected and were not entitled to act on behalf
of the Association. Defendants do not appeal
from the district court’s judgment, and, as a
result, we do not review the judgment in this
regard. See State ew. rel. Children, Youth &
Families Dep't v. John D., 1997-NMCA-019,
15, 123 N.M. 114, 934 P.2d 308 (stating that
appellate review is limited to orders that
were appealed).

1982 STIPULATED JUDGMENT—RES
JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ATTACK

Wl {27} In his second and third argu-
ments on appeal, Plaintiff contends that the
district court should have followed the 1982
stipulated judgment because it was entitled
to res judicata effect and because it was not
subject to collateral attack.

TH {28} “Res judicata bars relitigation of
the same claim between the same parties or
their privies when the first litigation resulted
in a final judgment on the merits.” Deflon v.
Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, 12, 189 N.M.

396

637, 137 P.8d 577 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). We consider whether
the 1981 case and this case involved the same
parties or their privies. In particular, we
consider whether the individual Defendants
in this case are in privity with the Associa-
tion as the defendant in the 1981 case.

{29} In 1981, Plaintiff sued the Association
only; he did not name or serve as a party
any individual members of the Association.
The 1982 stipulated judgment was approved
by the attorneys on behalf of their clients,
Plaintiff and the Association. In this case,
Plaintiff named the individual Defendants in
their complaint as members of the Associa-
tion. Plaintiff also named the Association as
a nominal Defendant. As we have discussed,
the controversy involves the voting rights of
members of the Association to elect the Asso-
ciation’s board of commissioners.

HME {30} ‘The determination of whether
parties are in privity “requires a case-by-case
analysis.” Id. 14. A court must determine
whether a party is “so identified in interest
with another” that the party “represents the
same legal right.” Lewis v. City of Santa
Fe, 2005-NMCA-032, 115, 187 N.M. 152, 108
P.8d 558 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). We perceive the legal rights
of the Association as a party to differ from
those of its members with regard to voting in
Association elections.

{31} The interest, and concomitant legal
right, of the Association is that the election
be legally held and binding. See § 73-2-12
(requiring that officers of ditch corporations
be elected biannually); § 73-2-21 (defining
powers and duties of ditch corporation offi-
cers). The members, on the other hand, in
addition to interests that may be common to
the Association, have the legal right to vote
in the election. See § 73-2-15 (stating that
when commissioners neglect to call an elec-
tion in reasonable time, those entitled to vote
may call an election in the same manner as
the commissioners). The Association does
not vote, and although it has an interest in
ensuring that the members’ votes are legally
cast, that interest is not the same as a mem-
ber’s interest and right to participate in the
Association’s governance by voting to elect
the Association’s governing board. As this

case illustrates, voting rights bear upon a
member’s rights in the acequia because the
Association’s board of commissioners has the
authority to determine the allocation of water
from the acequia. See generally § 73-2-21.
Although the Association did not remove the
right to vote of any member by entering into
the 1982 stipulated judgment, it altered the
members’ voting rights, which necessarily di-
luted the rights of some members. Thus,
because the rights of the Association and its
members did not coincide, the Association
could not have protected the legal rights of
all its members in the action. The Associa-
tion and the members do not share the re-
quired privity, and res judicata does not ap-
ply to the 1982 stipulated judgment.

HE s{(82} We next address Plaintiff's
collateral attack issue. Generally, district
court judgments are presumptively correct.
Porter v. Mesilla Valley Cotton Prods. Co.,
42 N.M. 217, 224, 76 P.2d 937, 941 (1987).
This presumption is so strong that a final
judgment is not open to collateral attack if it
is based on a mistake of law, Aceguia Del
Llano v. Acequia De Las Joyas Del Llano
Frio, 25 N.M. 184, 142-48, 179 P. 285, 287
(1919), or even if the final decision is uncon-
stitutional. See In re Philip M. Kleinsmith,
2005-NMCA-~136, $11, 188 N.M. 601, 124
P.38d 579 (stating that with strictly limited
exceptions, the collateral bar rule applies
even when the underlying order is unconsti-
tutional).

{33} However, “judgments entered
by the consent of the parties and upon stipu-
lations have only been regarded as immune
from collateral attack by the parties them-
selves, or those in privity with them.” Lew-
is, 2005~-NMCA-082, 114, 187 N.M. 152, 108
P.3d 558. See Myers v. Olson, 100 N.M. 745,
748, 676 P.2d 822, 825 (1984) (“Properly au-
thorized and acknowledged consent judg-
ments and judgments rendered on stipula-
tions are conclusive of all claims determined
therein and may not be collaterally attacked
by the parties thereto.” (emphasis added));
Johnson v. Aztec Well Servicing Co, 117
N.M. 697, 700, 875 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Ct.App.
1994) (observing that a judgment entered
into by consent “is not subject to collateral

attack by a party or a person in privity”
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). As we have dis-
cussed, the individual Association members
who are Defendants in this case are not in
privity with the Association as the party
defendant to the 1982 stipulated judgment.
As a result, the member Defendants in this
case may properly challenge the 1982 stipu-
lated judgment in this case.

SPECIAL ELECTION

{34} After determining that the Associa-
tion did not validly conduct the December 8,
2007 and the January 4, 2008 elections, the
district court ordered the Association to con-
duct a special election in a manner not previ-
ously stated in any of the Association’s by-
Jaws. The district court ordered the members
to agree as to one of two alternative methods
of voting: by casting one vote per member
representing the tenancy in common in the
ditch, or by voting in proportion to the mem-
bers’ water rights in the ditch. Plaintiff's
appeal does not challenge this action, and
Defendants did not cross appeal. We there-

397

fore do not address this aspect of the district
court's decision in this appeal. See John D.,
1997-NMCA-019, 115, 123 N.M. 114, 934 P.2d
308.

CONCLUSION

{35} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the district court’s ruling.

{36} In addition, the Court notes that, on
its own initiative, it requested briefing from
the Office of the State Engineer and the New
Mexico Acequia Association as amicus curiae
in this appeal. We thank amicus curiae for
their presentations to the Court.

{87} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: RODERICK T.
KENNEDY and MICHAEL E. VIGIL,

Judges.

398
2011-NMSC-033
259 P.3d 803
Kim RIVERA, Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v.

AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC., a/k/a American Gen-
eral Finance, Inc., American Security
Insurance Company, a/k/a American Se-
curity Group, Linda Callahan, and Jane
Doe, Defendants—Respondents.

No. 82,340.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
July 27, 2011.

a

Martinez, Hart & Thompson, P.C., Bruce
Evan Thompson, Albuquerque, NM, Public
Justice, P.C., F. Paul Bland, Jr., Melanie
Hirsch, Washington, DC, Treinen Law Of

fice, Robert Dale Treinen, Albuquerque, NM,
for Petitioner.

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
P.A,, Charles K. Purcell, Albuquerque, NM,
for Respondents.

Michael B. Browde, Albuquerque, NM,
Law Office of William E. Snead, William E.
Snead, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae,
New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association.

Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk
P.A, Kenneth L. Harrigan, Albuquerque,
NM, for Amici Curiae, American Financial
Services Association and Consumer Bankers
Association.

OPINION

DANIELS, Chief Justice.

{1} We granted certiorari in this case to
review a Court of Appeals opinion upholding
a district court’s order compelling arbitration
of Petitioner Kim Rivera’s claims against a
title loan lender, American General Financial
Services, Inc. and its affiliated insurance
agency, American Security Insurance Com-
pany. We base our reversal of those deci-
sions on our holding that the arbitration pro-
visions in the title loan contract cannot be
enforced because the involvement of the now-
unavailable National Arbitration Forum
(NAF) to arbitrate contract disputes was an
integral requirement of the parties’ agree-
ment. Although no longer technically neces-
sary to our disposition of this appeal, we
correct the analysis in the published opinion
of the Court of Appeals that imposes an
overly narrow construction on New Mexico’s
unconscionability jurisprudence and misap-
plies this Court’s holding in Cordova v.
World Finance Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-
021, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d 901.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} On August 15, 2000, Rivera obtained a
car title loan from American General in the
amount of $6,517 in cash plus $1,981 in life,
disability, and unemployment insurance pre-
miums. As collateral, Rivera gave American
General the title to her 1995 truck, which had
a value of $15,500 at the time.

{3} The form title loan contract used by
American General is three pages long. The
first page includes the particularized data
about Rivera’s loan, including figures for
payments, interest, and principal, inserted in
preprinted blanks. Preprinted language at
the bottom of the page explicitly requires
that “ARBITRATION WILL BE CON-
DUCTED PURSUANT TO THE RULES
OF THE [NAF].” Page two includes nine
preprinted provisions, including repayment
rules, default provisions, and a requirement
that the borrower must maintain physical
damage insurance on the collateral. Page
three, titled “ARBITRATION PROVI-
SIONS,” specifies again that “[alrbitration
will be conducted under the rules and proce-
dures of the [NAF] or successor organiza-
tion” and provides additional arbitration
rules and procedures. Page three also de-
tails claims covered by and excluded from
the arbitration agreement. The binding ar-
bitration agreement encompassed “any and
all claims” that Rivera could conceivably
have against American General, including,

without limitation, all claims and disputes

arising out of, in connection with, or relat-
ing to [Rivera’s] loan from Lender today or
any previous loan from Lender Gneluding
all amendments, modifications and refi-
naneings); any previous retail installment
sales contract or loan assigned to Lender;
all documents, actions, or omissions relat-
ing to this or any previous loan or retail
installment sales contract; whether the
daim or dispute must be arbitrated; the
validity of the Arbitration Provisions, [Riv-
era’s] understanding of them, or any de-
fenses as to the enforceability of the Loan

Agreement or the Arbitration Provisions;

any negotiations between [Rivera] and

lender; any claim or dispute based on the
closing, servicing, collection, or enforce-
ment of any transaction covered by the

Arbitration Provisions; any claim or dis-

pute based on an allegation of fraud or

misrepresentation; any claim or dispute

based on or arising under any federal or

state statute or rule; any claim or dispute

based on a contract or an alleged tort; and

any claim for injunctive or equitable relief.
Although the arbitration provisions require
Rivera to arbitrate any claims she may have
against American General, the arbitration
provisions exempt from binding arbitration
certain claims that the Lender might have
against Rivera:

[Rivera] cannot elect to arbitrate Lender’s

self-help or judicial remedies including,

without limitation, repossession or foreclo-
sure, with respect to any property that
secures any transaction described under
the definition of “Covered Claims.” In the
event of a default under those transactions,

Lender can enforce its rights to [Rivera’s]

property in court or as otherwise provided

by law, and [Rivera] cannot require that

Lender’s actions be arbitrated.

{4} Because Rivera did not provide Ameri-
can General with proof of physical damage
insurance, American General obtained from
its own affiliate, American Security, twelve
months of “creditor-placed insurance” for
Rivera’s truck and added an additional $2,197
insurance premium to the balance of the
loan. The insurance policy covered direct
and accidental loss of or damage to the truck.
In the case of loss or damage, the insurance
contract stated that American Security
would, subject to a deductible, pay the lesser
of (1) the cost of repairing or replacing the
truck, (2) the unpaid balance of Rivera’s loan,
or (8) the actual cash value of the truck
immediately prior to the loss or damage.

{5} According to Rivera’s district court
complaint, after an accident in 2000 that left
her truck unusable, neither American Gener-
al nor American Security ever adjusted the
claim, even though Rivera immediately made
a claim for the loss of her truck, personally
went to American General’s office multiple
times, and filled out several claim forms and
proof-of-loss forms.

{6} Rivera alleged that American General
continued to send her monthly billing state-
ments and that she continued to submit pay-

403

ments. When Rivera finally defaulted on the
loan, American General notified credit re-
porting bureaus of her delinquency and hired
a law firm to recover the remaining debt
from her. Although Rivera never repaid the
Joan in full, in August 2004, nearly four years
after her truck was destroyed, American
General mailed the truck title back to Rivera
in an unmarked envelope without any cover
letter or explanation.

{7} In September 2006, Rivera filed suit
against Defendants American General and
American Security in the Second Judicial
District Court, alleging breach of contract,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, insurance bad faith, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, fraud, constructive fraud, and vi-
olations of statutory protections in the In-
surance Practices Act, the Unfair Trade
Practices Act, and the federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act. Defendants removed the
case to the United States District Court and
filed a motion to compel arbitration. After
Rivera voluntarily dismissed her only federal
claim, the federal court remanded the case
back to state court. In April 2008, the Sec-
ond Judicial District Court granted Defen-
dants’ motions to compel arbitration and
stay the judicial proceedings.

{8} Rivera appealed the order compelling
arbitration to the Court of Appeals, which
rejected her contentions that (1) the arbitra-
tion clause was substantively unconscionable,
(2) the arbitration clause was procedurally
unconscionable, (8) American General’s
promise to arbitrate was illusory, (4) equita-
ble relief was inappropriate because of Amer-
ican General’s unclean hands, and (5) Ameri-
can Security, which was neither a party to
nor mentioned in the arbitration agreement,
had no right as a third-party beneficiary to
enforce the arbitration provisions. Rivera v.
Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. Inc., 2010-NMCA-046,
111, 6, 10, 16, 19-20, 148 N.M. 784, 242 P.38d
851.

{9} Rivera also raised a new issue before
the Court of Appeals in a motion for rehear-
ing. After this case had been submitted to
the Court of Appeals, the NAF, in response
to a lawsuit filed by the Minnesota Attorney
General challenging NAF’s suspect ties to

404

the consumer loan and debt collection indus-
tries, stipulated to a consent judgment in
which the NAF agreed not to administer,
process or “[iJn any manner participate” in
any arbitration of consumer disputes after
July 24, 2009. Rivera argued that the NAF’s
unavailability rendered the arbitration provi-
sions in American General’s form title loan
contract unenforceable. The Court of Ap-
peals denied the motion for reconsideration.

{10} Rivera argues in this Court that the
arbitration provisions are unenforceable be-
cause (1) arbitration before the NAF was
integral to the agreement to arbitrate but is
now impossible and (2) the arbitration agree-
ment is unconscionable under Cordova, 2009-
NMSC-021, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.8d 901. In
addition to opposing Rivera’s arguments on
their merits, Defendants make a procedural
claim that her petition for writ of certiorari
was untimely. We (1) reject Defendants’
untimeliness arguments, (2) hold on the mer-
its that the arbitration provisions are unen-
forceable because of the unavailability of the
NAF to perform as contemplated in the par-
ties’ agreement, and (8) correct the Court of
Appeals’ overly narrow construction of our
holding in Cordova.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Rivera’s Certiorari
Timely Filed.

HI {11} Defendants take the position
that we should decline to reach the merits of
Rivera’s appeal because she arguably was
late in filing her petition for writ of certiora-
ri. The time limits for filing a petition for
writ of certiorari with this Court are found in
Rule 12-502(B) NMRA:

The petition for writ of certiorari shall be

filed with the Supreme Court clerk within

thirty (80) days after final action by the

Court of Appeals.... Final action by the

Court of Appeals shall be the filing of its

decision ... unless timely motion for re-

hearing is filed, in which event, final action
shall be the disposition of the last motion
for rehearing that was timely filed.

HM {12} Under Rule 12-404(A) NMRA, a
party must file a motion for rehearing within
fifteen days of the appellate court’s disposi-

Petition Was

tion of a case “unless the time is shortened
or enlarged by order.” The time period is
not jurisdictional because the rule explicitly
permits the court to enlarge or shorten the
fifteen day period. Rivera filed a motion for
rehearing on March 8, 2010, eighteen days
after the Court of Appeals issued its Febru-
ary 18, 2010, opinion. Although the Court of
Appeals did not enter a separate order ad-
dressing the time for filing the motion for
rehearing, its written order denying Rivera’s
motion for rehearing explicitly stated: “Ap-
pellant having filed a motion for rehearing
which has been considered by the Cow. IT
IS ORDERED that the motion for rehearing
is denied.” (Emphasis added.)

{13} In the absence of an indication from
the Court of Appeals that the motion for
rehearing was rejected as untimely, we look
to the order denying rehearing as the “final
action by the Court of Appeals” under Rule
12-502(B). We have “consistently followed a
policy of construing [procedural] rules lib-
erally, to the end that causes on appeal may
be determined on the merits where it can be
done without impeding or confusing adminis-
tration or perpetrating injustice.” Olguin v.
State, 90 N.M. 308, 305, 563 P.2d 97, 99
(1977) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

{14} The Court of Appeals superintends
its own docket and has the discretion to
indicate in an order whether a motion for
rehearing has been denied on grounds of late
filing. The Court of Appeals’ order did not
state that Rivera’s motion had been denied
for untimely filing; to the contrary, it explic-
itly represented that the Court of Appeals
had “considered” the motion before denying
it. Because Rivera filed her petition for writ
of certiorari in this Court within thirty days
after the Court of Appeals’ final action, as
required by Rule 12-502(B), we accept Riv-
era’s petition for writ of certiorari as proper-
ly invoking this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction
and address the merits of this case.

B. Arbitration Provisions in a Contract
Must, If Possible, Be Enforced Ac-
cording to Their Terms, Subject to
Established Principles of Contract
Law.

HM {15} “While the interpretation of an
arbitration agreement is generally a matter

of state law, the [Federal Arbitration Act]
imposes certain rules of fundamental impor-

tance.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Intl Corp, 559 US. ——, ——, 180 S.Ct.
1758, 1778, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The
arbitration provisions in the form title loan
contract between Rivera and American Gen-
eral state that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006), “applies to
and governs the Arbitration Provisions.” To
determine whether the arbitration provisions
are enforceable, we therefore must consider
not only general principles of New Mexico
contract law but also substantive federal
caselaw interpreting the FAA.

{16} Section 2 of the FAA provides that
arbitration provisions in contracts involving
interstate commerce are “valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The United
States Supreme Court has emphasized “the
fundamental principle that arbitration is a
matter of contract” and that “courts must
place arbitration agreements on an equal
footing with other contracts ... and enforce
them according to their terms.” AT&T Mo-
bility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ——,
——, 181 S.Ct. 1740, 1745, 179 L.Ed.2d 742
(2011) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

Hs {17} Despite the policy favoring en-
forcement of arbitration agreements, under
the FAA an arbitration agreement is not
enforceable where “grounds ... exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Agreements to arbi-
trate may accordingly “be invalidated by
generally applicable contract defenses, such
as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561
US. —, —, 180 S.Ct. 2772, 2776, 177
L.Ed.2d 408 (2010) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “[{S]tate law, whether
of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if
that law arose to govern issues concerning
the validity, revocability, and enforceability
of contracts generally.” Perry v. Thomas,
482 US. 483, 492-93 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96
L.Ed.2d 426 (1987). But states cannot invali-
date arbitration agreements through the ap-
plication of “defenses that apply only to arbi-
tration or that derive their meaning from the

fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at
issue.” AT&T Mobility, 563 US. at —-,
181 S.Ct. at 1746. State law is preempted
“to the extent that it actually conflicts with
federal law—that is, to the extent that it
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment.
and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress.” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Ba. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ,
489 US. 468, 477, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103
L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) Gnternal quotation marks
and citation omitted).

{18} With this interplay of federal and
state law in mind, our evaluation of the
meaningful enforceability of the arbitration
provisions turns on consideration of generally
applicable principles of New Mexico contract
law.

C. The Arbitration Provisions in This
Case Could Not Be Enforced As Writ-
ten Because Involvement of the NAF
Was Integral to the Contract.

WI {19} As a threshold matter, Defen-
dants argue that we should not consider
whether the NAF’s unavailability renders the
arbitration provisions unenforceable because
Rivera did not raise this issue until after the
Court of Appeals had filed its opinion. In«
general, “[t]o preserve a question for review
it must appear that a ruling or decision by
the district court was fairly invoked.” Rule
12-216(A) NMRA. But because the NAF
became unavailable more than a year after
the district court had issued its order com-
pelling arbitration, Rivera was unable to
raise this claim before the district court.

{20} Our published rules specifically rec-
ognize that this Court has the discretion to
consider legal matters of “general public in-
terest,” even if not technically preserved be-
low. Rule 12-216(8)(1). Amici curiae,
American Financial Services Association and
Consumer Bankers Association, have ex-
plained that the NAF’s withdrawal from all
consumer arbitrations affects millions of arbi-
tration provisions currently in force. Given
the prevalence of arbitration provisions des-
ignating the NAF, we conclude that the una-
vailability of the NAF to arbitrate any con-
sumer disputes presents a legal matter of
general public interest, and we exercise our

406

discretion to consider this issue, which the
parties have had a full and fair opportunity
to brief and argue. See id.

{21} On the merits, Defendants concede
that the NAF is unavailable to resolve Riv-
era’s claims, but they argue that the arbitra-
tion provisions remain enforceable despite
the unavailability of the NAF, on the theory
that § 5 of the FAA authorizes a court to
select a substitute arbitrator.

{22} Under § 5 of the FAA,

fil in the agreement provision be made for

a method of naming or appointing an arbi-

trator or arbitrators or an umpire, such

method shall be followed; but if no method
be provided therein, or if a method be
provided and any party thereto shall fail to
avail himself of such method, or if for any
other reason there shall be a lapse in the
naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or
umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon
the application of either party to the con-
troversy the court shall designate and ap-
point an arbitrator or arbitrators or um-
pire....

9USSC. § 5.

{23} Rivera argues that § 5 of the FAA
does not apply in cases where the sole desig-
nated arbitrator is no longer available, citing
Weiner v. Gutfreund (In re Salomon Inc.
Shareholders’ Derivative Litigation), 68 F.3d
554 (2nd Cir.1995). In ve Salomon ad-
dressed an arbitration provision that re-
quired all disputes to be resolved by the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) “and only the
NYSE, ‘in accordance with the [NYSE] Con-
stitution and Rules.’” Jd. at 557 (alteration
in original). “The NYSE declined to arbi-
trate the dispute, and the defendants went
back to the district court, seeking the ap-
pointment of substitute arbitrators under § 5
of the FAA.” Id. at 555-56. The defendants
argued that another arbitration provider
could be appointed to arbitrate the dispute
using the NYSE’s rules. Id. at 558. Look-
ing “to the text of the arbitration agreements
themselves,” id., the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that “the parties had con-
tractually agreed that only the NYSE could
arbitrate any disputes,” id. at 559. The
court held that a district court cannot “use
§ 5 [of the FAA] to circumvent the parties’

designation of an exclusive arbitral forum”
because the unavailability of the parties’
named arbitration provider does not consti-
tute “‘a lapse in the naming of an arbitra-
tor’” within the meaning of § 5. Id. at 560-
61. “[Tyhe lapse referred to in § 5 means a
lapse in time in the naming of the arbitrator
or in the filling of a vacancy on a panel of
arbitrators or some other mechanical break-
down in the arbitrator selection process.”
Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted); see also Grant v. Magnolia
Manor-Greenwood, Inc. 383 S.C. 125, 678
S.E.2d 485, 438 (2009) (perceiving “great
merit in the Second Circuit's view that [§ 5
of the FAA] does not apply in cases where a
specifically designated arbitrator becomes
unavailable”).

{24} A number of other jurisdictions, in-
cluding the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, have taken a less rigid approach to the
question of whether § 5 of the FAA allows a
court to appoint a substitute arbitration pro-
vider to replace an unavailable provider. See
Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp, 211
F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir.2000). Like In re
Salomon, Brown focused its analysis on the
intent of the transacting parties as evidenced
by the plain language of the contract.
Brown, 211 F.3d at 1222. Brown recognized
that a court cannot appoint a substitute arbi-
tration provider if doing so would be con-
trary to the transacting parties’ intent ex-
pressed in the terms of their agreement. If
the parties’ designation of a particular arbi-
tration provider was integral to the parties’
agreement to arbitrate, then § 5 of the FAA
cannot be used to circumvent the parties’
intent to arbitrate before that specific forum.
Brown, 211 F.3d at 1222. But if the parties’
designation of a provider was merely an “an-
cillary logistical concern,” a court can appoint
a substitute under § 5 of the FAA. Brown,
211 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Brown rejected In re
Salomon’s conclusion that § 5 of the FAA
never applies in cases where the arbitration
provider designated in the contract is un-
available. Brown, 211 F.8d at 1222 (explain-
ing that § 5 of the FAA “provides a mecha-
nism for appointment of an arbitrator” unless

the NAF was “an integral part of the agree-
ment to arbitrate”).

{25} Many jurisdictions have likewise de-
clined to apply In ve Salomon’s bright-line
rule and have instead concluded that Brown’s
“integral” versus “ancillary logistical con-
cern” test is a proper way to determine
whether a court may appoint a substitute
arbitration provider. See, eg. Ranzy v. Ti-
jerina, 898 Fed.Appx. 174, 175-76 (5th Cir.
2010) (ooking to the plain language of the
arbitration agreement to determine whether
the parties intended for the NAF to be an
integral part of contract); Reddam v. KPMG
LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.2006) (con-
cluding that the naming of a particular arbi-
trator was not “so central to the arbitration
agreement that the unavailability of that ar-
bitrator brought the agreement to an end”),
abrogated on other grounds as recognized by
Atlantic Nat'l Trust LLC v. Mt. Hawley Ins.
Co., 621 F.8d 931, 940 (9th Cir.2010); Carr v.
Gateway, Inc., 241 Il.2d 15, 348 Ill.Dec. 374,
944 N.E.2d 327, 336-37 (2011) (holding that
§ 5 of the FAA could “not be utilized to
select a substitute arbitrator” because “the
designation of the NAF as the arbitral forum
was integral to the parties’ agreement to
arbitrate”); Stewart v. G@NSC-Canonsburg,
L.P., 9 Ad 215, 221 (Pa.Super.Ct.2010) (con-
cluding that “the plain language of the arbi-
tration agreement [w]as the sole evidence of
the parties’ intent” and “delineat[ing] the
NAF ... as the exclusive arbitrators”);
Grant, 678 S.E.2d at 439 (concluding that the
parties’ decision to submit to the rules of a
particular arbitrator “reflects their specific
intent to arbitrate exclusively before that
body” when that arbitrator “may substantial-
ly affect the substantive outcome of the reso-
lution”).

TE {26} We disagree with Rivera’s con-
tention that § 5 of the FAA never applies in
cases where the designated arbitration pro-
vider is no longer available. We agree with
the jurisdictions that have focused on the
parties’ intent, as expressed in the contract,
to determine whether § 5 of the FAA per-
mits a court to substitute a different arbitra-
tion provider. The “integral” or “ancillary
logistical concern” test articulated by the
Eleventh Cireuit in Brown, 211 F.3d at 1222,

407

is consistent with New Mexico’s general prin-
ciples of contract law in requiring courts to
“give effect to the intent of the parties.”
Continental Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMo-
ran, Inc, 115 N.M. 690, 704, 858 P.2d 66, 80
(1993); see Carr, 348 Ill.Dec. 374, 944 N.E.2d
at 329 (applying Illinois contract law princi-
ples to interpret an arbitration agreement);
Stewart, 9 A.38d at 221-22 (applying Pennsyl-
vania contract law principles to determine
whether the designated arbitration provider
was integral to the agreement to arbitrate).
This approach also best complies with the
admonition of the United States Supreme
Court that a fundamental purpose of the
FAA is to require that courts enforce arbi-
tration agreements “according to their
terms.” Volt Info., 489 U.S at 479, 109 S.Ct.
1248.

T.s«{27} We conclude that whether
the NAF is integral to the parties’ agree-
ment to arbitrate is a matter of contract
interpretation. Contract interpretation is a
matter of law that we review de novo. See
W. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Carter, 1999-
NMSC-012, 14, 127 N.M. 186, 979 P.2d 231.
“The purpose, meaning and intent of the
parties to a contract is to be deduced from
the language employed by them; and where
such language is not ambiguous, it is conclu-
sive.” Continental Potash, 115 N.M. at 704,
858 P.2d at 80 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). If the plain language of a
contract evidences the parties’ intention to
resolve disputes solely through a specific ar-
bitration provider, the parties’ intent would
be frustrated if a court appointed a different
arbitration provider. The determinative is-
sue is whether arbitration before the NAF is
integral to the agreement to arbitrate. See
Summit Props. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of
N.M., 2005-NMCA-090, 132, 188 N.M. 208,
118 P.8d 716 (explaining in a non-arbitration
context that enforcement of a contract term
may be rendered impossible by the occur-
rence of a supervening event that is contrary
to “a basic assumption on which the contract
was based”).

{28} Courts have concluded that the iden-
tity of the arbitration provider is an ancillary
Jogistical concern in contracts where the arbi-
tration provisions do not specifically desig-

408 a

nate a provider or where a provision gives
transacting parties a choice of providers.
See, e.g. Jackson v. Payday Loan Store of
Il, No. 09 C 4189, 2010 WL 1031590, at *1
(N.D.IIL Mar. 17, 2010) (concluding that
where “the arbitration agreement offers a
choice of arbitrators, the selection of a single
particular arbitrator cannot logically be so
central to the agreement as to merit voiding
it”); Premier Real Estate Holdings, LLC v.
Butch, 24 So.3d 708, 709-10 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
2009) (concluding that the choice of arbitra-
tor was not integral because the contract had
an unfilled blank space for designating an
arbitrator). But see QuickClick Loans, LLC
v. Russell, 407 I.App.8d 46, 347 Ill.Dec. 876,
943 N.E.2d 166, 174 (2011) (holding unen-
forceable an arbitration agreement that spec-
ified arbitration before one of two arbitration
providers, both of which were unavailable).

HM {29} On the other hand, an arbitra-
tion agreement’s express designation of a
single arbitration provider weighs in favor of
a finding that the designated provider is
integral to the agreement to arbitrate. For
example, the arbitration provision in Ranzy
contained terms strikingly similar to the
terms in this case:

[Alny and all claims ... shall be resolved

by binding individual (and not class) arbi-

tration by and under the Code of Proce-
dure of the [NAF].... This agreement to
arbitrate all disputes shall apply no matter
by whom or against whom the claim is
filed. Rules and forms of the NAF may be
obtained and all claims shall be filed at any
NAF office, [or by contacting the NAF via
the internet, phone, or mail].
393 Fed.Appx. at 175 (second and third alter-
ations in original). Ranzy concluded that the
district court had properly denied the motion
to compel arbitration in a substitute forum
because “the parties explicitly agreed that
the NAF shall be the exclusive forum for
arbitrating disputes.” Jd. at 176; see also
Reddam, 457 F.3d at 1060 (“[Clourts ...
have decided that a clause which adopts the
rules of an organization like the [NAF] im-
plicitly chooses that organization as the, or a,
forum.”). But see Carr, 348 Ill.Dec. 374, 944
N.E.2d at 335 (“T]he mere fact [that] parties
name an arbitral service to handle arbitra-

tions and specify rules to be applied does not,
standing alone, make that designation inte-
gral to the agreement.”).

{30} The parties’ designation of the rules
of a specific arbitration provider may indicate
that arbitration pursuant to those rules is an
integral part of the agreement to arbitrate.
In Grant, the South Carolina Supreme Court
focused on the significance of the transacting
parties’ agreement to arbitrate using the
rules of the American Health Lawyers Asso-
ciation (AHLA). 678 S.E.2d at 437. Under
AHLA rules, “the parties may not vary the
rules on communications, service, counting of
days, publication and form of the award,
release of documents, or administration.
The parties are bound by a panel of arbitra-
tors selected by the [AHLA].” Id. at 439.
Grant explained that adherence to a specific
set of rules can have “wide-ranging substan-
tive implications that may affect,” among oth-
er things, “the arbitrator-selection process,
the law, procedures, and rules that govern
the arbitration, the enforcement of the arbi-
tral award, and the cost of the arbitration.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Grant concluded that, where the
designation of a particular set of rules “has
implications that may substantially affect the
substantive outcome of the resolution,” the
parties’ selection of those rules is integral to
the agreement to arbitrate. Id.

I {31} Mandatory, as opposed to per-
missive, contractual language further demon-
strates that a specifically named arbitration
provider is integral to the agreement to arbi-
trate. See, eg. NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-4(A)
(1997) (“‘Shall’ and ‘must’ express a duty,
obligation, requirement or condition prece-
dent.”); Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil
Conservation Comm’n, 2009-NMSC-018,
122, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.8d 185 (“‘{SJhall’
indicates that the provision is mandatory([.]”).
Ranzy emphasized the portions of the con-
tract that said the parties “‘shall’ submit all
claims to the NAF for arbitration” and that
NAF rules “‘shall’ govern the arbitration.”
393 Fed.Appx. at 176. In Khan v. Dell, Inc.,
No. 09-3703(JAP), 2010 WL 3283529, at *1
(D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2010), the arbitration agree-
ment provided that “ANY CLAIM, DIS-
PUTE, OR CONTROVERSY ... SHALL

BE RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY AND FI-
NALLY BY BINDING ARBITRATION
ADMINISTERED BY THE [NAF] under
its Code of Procedure then in effect[.]”
Khan found that the mandatory language,
“ ‘shall be resolved’” by the NAF, “evince[d]
the parties’ intent to arbitrate exclusively
before a particular arbitrator, not simply an
intent to arbitrate generally.” Id. at *4.

HM {82} In this case, American Gener-
al’s form title loan contract names the NAF
specifically and exclusively throughout and
states that “[alrbitration will be conducted
under the rules and procedures of the [NAF]
or successor organization that are in effect at
the time arbitration is started and under the
rules set forth in the Arbitration Provisions.”
The “rules set forth in the Arbitration Provi-
sions” state that, in order to initiate arbitra-
tion, the borrower must obtain a “Demand
for Arbitration” form from the NAF, com-
plete the NAF form, send three copies of the
completed form to the NAF, and pay the
NAF an initial filing fee. The rules further
state that, once arbitration has been initiated,
the NAF will provide the parties with a list
of seven NAF arbitrators. Each party then
strikes three people from the NAF list, and
the remaining NAF-designated person
serves as arbitrator. Finally, the rules pro-
vide complete contact information for the
NAF so that the consumer can obtain more
information about NAF arbitration proce-
dures.

{33} In addition to naming the NAF exclu-
sively throughout the arbitration provisions
of the agreement, the parties mandated that
“falrbitration will be conducted under the
rules and procedures of the [NAF].” The
published NAF Code of Procedwre exempli-
fied the importance of designating the rules
of a particular organization to govern dispute
resolution. See NAF, Code of Procedure
(Aug. 1, 2008), http:/Avww.adrforum.com/
users/naf/resources/CodeofProcedure2008—
print2.pdf. The seventy-four page code
states that it is “incorporated by reference
into every Arbitration Agreement” that re-
fers to the NAF. Jd. at 1. Among other
things, the code governs the manner in which
claims can be brought, id. at 18-25, the selec-
tion and powers of the arbitrator, id. at 28-

409

88, the type of hearing afforded to the par-
ties, id. at 84-51, the entry of a final binding
order by the arbitrator, id. at 52-58, and the
payment of fees by the parties, id. at 59-63.

{34} Additionally, as in Ranzy and Khan,
the arbitration provisions in this case use
mandatory rather than permissive language:
() “lalrbitration will be conducted under the
rules and procedures of’ the NAF, (2) to
start arbitration “you or Lender must ...
complete a Demand for Arbitration (contact
NAF for a copy),” (8) the “NAF will provide”
a list of potential arbitrators, and (4) “NAF
rules shall determine what portion of the
costs you or Lender will pay.” (Emphasis
added.) The pervasive references to the
NAF, selection of the NAF rules, and man-
datory language of the contract all support
our conclusion that the NAF was integral to
the agreement to arbitrate.

{35} Defendants argue that several fea-
tures of the contract before us indicate that
the NAF was merely an ancillary logistical
concern. Because the contract requires arbi-
tration under the NAF “rules and proce-
dures ... that are in effect at the time
arbitration is started,” Defendants argue that
a court-appointed substitute arbitrator can
be ordered to apply the NAF Code of Proce-
dure that is currently available online. See
Levy, D.D.S. v. Cain, Watters & Assocs.,
PLLC. No. 2:09-ev-723, 2010 WL 271300,
at *6 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 15, 2010) (finding “no
apparent reasons why the NAF rules cannot
be applied by a substitute arbitrator”). Pur-
suant to the consent decree, however, the
NAF cannot arbitrate any consumer disputes
initiated after July 24, 2009, so there cannot
be any NAF rules that remain “in effect” for
administering consumer disputes. See Cari-
deo v. Dell, Inc., No. C06-1772JLR, 2009 WL
3485938, at *5 (W.D.Wash. Oct. 26, 2009)
(“[Blecause NAF does not arbitrate consum-
er disputes filed after July 24, 2009, there
are simply no NAF rules currently in effect
for such arbitrations.”). And even if we were
to assume that the August 1, 2008, NAF
Code of Procedwre were somehow still in
effect, the code itself states that it “shall be
administered only by the [NAF] or by any
entity or individual providing administrative
services by agreement with the [NAF'.”

410

NAF Code of Procedure, swpra, at 1. Rivera
asserts that there is no “entity or individual
providing administrative services by agree-
ment with” the NAF at this time. See Cary,
348 Dl.Dec. 374, 944 N.E.2d at 335 (“[I]t is
unclear whether a substitute arbitrator could
use NAF rules.”). Defendants have not pro-
vided this Court with any information to the
contrary.

{36} Defendants also argue that because
the arbitration provisions require “[alrbitra-
tion ... conducted under the rules and pro-
cedures of the [NAF] or successor organiza-
tion that are in effect at the time arbitration
is started,” a “successor” to the NAF can be
appointed by a court pursuant to § 5 of the
FAA. (Emphasis added.) We doubt that a
substitute arbitrator, not selected by the par-
ties but imposed instead by order of a court,
could be considered in law a “successor or-
ganization” as contemplated by the plain lan-
guage of the contract. In corporate law, the
term “successor” is a legal term of art mean-
ing a “corporation that, through amalgam-
ation, consolidation, or other assumption of
interests, is vested with the rights and duties
of an earlier corporation.” Black’s Law Dic-
tionary 1569 (9th ed. 2009).

{37} Finally, Defendants point to the sev-
erance clause in the contract as support for
the proposition that the parties’ designation
of the NAF was merely an ancillary logistical
concern. See Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC,
684 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1167-68 (D.S.D.2010)
(“The existence of [a] severance clause in the
arbitration agreement is evidence that the
parties did not intend for the entire agree-
ment to fail if one portion was invalid or
unenforceable.”). The boilerplate severance
clause in this contract provides simply that
“[ilf any term of the Arbitration Provisions is
unenforceable, the remaining terms are sev-
erable and enforceable to the fullest extent
permitted by law.” Given the number of
references to the NAF as the only named
arbitrator and the substantial reliance on the
NAF Code of Procedure throughout the con-
tract, we could not sever the unenforceable
terms of the arbitration provisions without
substantially rewriting the contract. Where
the NAF involvement in the arbitration pro-
visions is so integral to the agreement itself,

for us to change those core provisions would
violate our duty to enforce the agreement
according to its terms. See Stewart, 9 A3d
at 221 (concluding “that the severability
clause cannot ... override the fact that the
NAF and the NAF Code were an integral
part of the Agreement”); John R. Ray &
Sons, Inc. v. Stroman, 923 S.W.2d 80, 87
(Tex.App.1996) (“[W]hen the severed portion
is integral to the entire contract, a severabili-
ty clause, standing alone, cannot save the
contract.”).

Hs {88} The pervasive references to
the NAF in the contract compel our conclu-
sion that the parties intended for the NAF to
be the exclusive arbitrator in any out-of-court
dispute resolution. The parties explicitly
specified that arbitration would proceed un-
der NAF rules and procedures. Arbitration
“is a matter of consent, not coercion,” and
the parties “may ... specify by contract the
rules under which that arbitration will be
conducted.” Volt Info., 489 U.S. at 479, 109
S.Ct. 1248. We conclude that “[t]he unavail-
ability of NAF as arbitrator ... threaten[s]
to eviscerate the core of the parties’ agree-
ment.” Carideo, 2009 WL 3485938, at *6.
We hold that arbitration before the NAF was
integral to the agreement to arbitrate and
that § 5 of the FAA does not allow a court to
select and impose on the contracting parties
a substitute arbitrator inconsistent with the
plain terms of their contract.

D. The Court of Appeals Construed Too
Narrowly This Court’s Opinion in Cor-
dova.

{39} Rivera has argued throughout this
litigation that the arbitration provisions are
unenforceable under the generally applicable
contract defense of unconscionability because
the title loan contract requires the borrower
to arbitrate any and all claims but allows the
lender to go to court for its preferred reme-
dies. Although the district court made its
ruling without the benefit of our opinion in
Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, 146 N.M. 256,
208 P.3d 901, holding a similar arbitration
provision of a small loan agreement void for
unconscionability, Cordova had been decided
before the Court of Appeals issued its opin-
ion rejecting Rivera’s argument. One of the

ee 411
|

issues on which we granted certiorari was
whether the Court of Appeals misapplied our
Cordova holding by upholding a clause that
required a borrower to arbitrate all her
claims, but reserved to the lender the right
to a judicial determination of its most impor-
tant claims. Rivera argues in this Court that
the Court of Appeals misstated Cordova’s
holding as requiring “complet[e] one-sided-
ness” before an arbitration clause can be
found unconscionable. Defendants argue
that the Court of Appeals was correct and
that the arbitration provisions are enforce-
able under New Mexico law.

Hs {40} A threshold issue we must
address is whether Rivera’s challenge to the
Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Cordova
and resolution of the unconscionability issue
are now moot in light of our holding that
there is no longer an arbitrator eligible to
arbitrate either the substance of the dispute
or the threshold issue of unconscionability
under the terms of the agreement by the
parties. While as a prudential matter we
normally will not address moot issues that
will have no practical impact on the parties
before us, we will address issues of substan-
tial public interest or issues that “are capable
of repetition yet evading review.” Cobb v.
State Canvassing Bd, 2006-NMSC-034,
114, 140 NM. 77, 140 P.3d 498 (deciding
issues of election recount and recheck even
though it was no longer possible to affect the
election results); Howell v. Heim, 118 N.M.
500, 503-04; 882 P.2d 541, 544-45 (1994) (ad-
dressing legality of a superseded regulation
where similar issues could arise in future
cases yet evade appellate review).

{41} The issues regarding the Court of
Appeals’ published interpretation of Cordova.
in the context of one-sided arbitration clauses
represent the kinds of issues that are capable
of repetition yet likely to evade our appellate
review. This is particularly so in light of the
inevitable jurisprudential effect of the United
States Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Rent-A-Center, which held that where a del-
egation clause within the arbitration agree-
ment clearly and unmistakably delegates the
issue of unconscionability to the arbitrator,
that issue should be decided by the arbitra-
tor, instead of by a court, unless the party

opposing arbitration has specifically chal-
lenged the validity of the delegation clause.
561 U.S. at —,, 180 S.Ct. at 2775~76, 2780-
81; see, eg, Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982,
987-88, 2011 WL 2464781, at *5 (9th Cir.
2011) (applying Rent-A-Center to hold that
general language giving the arbitrator au-
thority to determine “the validity or applica-
tion of any of the provisions of” the arbitra-
tion clause was sufficient to take that issue
away from a court of law (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). Given the pre-
dictable result that arbitration clauses in
form contracts between large corporations
and individual consumers will assign such
unconscionability determinations to arbitra-
tors, this Court and other courts will have
few, if any, future opportunities to participate
in the development of our published common
law related to unconscionability doctrines in
those contexts. Because arbitrators will
have to rely on the common law that was
developed before Rent-A-Center, it is partic-
ularly important that we correct a judicial
misinterpretation of our caselaw that may
otherwise remain on the books as an errone-
ous precedent. We therefore will address
the correctness of the interpretation of Cor-
dova contained in the Court of Appeals opin-
ion in this case.

Hs {42} Whether a contract provi-
sion is unconscionable and unenforceable is a
question of law that we review de novo. See
Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, 111, 146 N.M.
256, 208 P.3d 901. Although we have already
concluded that the arbitration provisions are
unenforceable due to the unavailability of the
NAF to arbitrate the dispute, we agree with
Rivera that the Court of Appeals in this case
misapplied the central holding of Cordova.
We formally reverse the Court of Appeals
opinion and hold that the arbitration provi-
sions are unfairly one-sided and substantive-
ly unconscionable.

HN {43} “Unconscionability is an equita-
ble doctrine, rooted in public policy, which
allows courts to render unenforceable an
agreement that is unreasonably favorable to
one party while precluding a meaningful
choice of the other party.” Id 121. “The
doctrine of contractual unconscionability can

412

be analyzed from both procedural and sub-
stantive perspectives.” Jd.

Hs {44} “Procedural unconscionabili-
ty ... examines the particular factual cir-
cumstances surrounding the formation of the
contract, including the relative bargaining
strength, sophistication of the parties, and
the extent to which either party felt free to
accept or decline terms demanded by the
other.” Jd. 123. When assessing procedur-
al unconscionability, courts should consider
whether the contract is one of adhesion. An
adhesion contract is a standardized contract
offered by a transacting party with superior
bargaining strength to a “weaker party on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, without opportunity
for bargaining.” Jd. 133. Adhesion con-
tracts generally warrant heightened judicial
scrutiny because the drafting party is in a
superior bargaining position. See Wis. Auto
Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 290 Wis.2d 514,
714 N.W.2d 155, 170 (2006). Although not all
adhesion contracts are unconscionable, an
adhesion contract is procedurally unconscion-
able and unenforceable “when the terms are
patently unfair to the weaker party.” Cordo-
va, 2009-NMSC-021, 133, 146 N.M. 256, 208
P.8d 901; see also Guthmann v. La Vida
Llena, 103 N.M. 506, 509, 709 P.2d 675, 678
(1985), disapproved of on other grounds by
Cordova, 2009~NMSC-021, 131, 146 N.M.
256, 208 P.3d 901.

Hs {45} “Substantive unconsciona-
bility concerns the legality and fairness of
the contract terms themselves,” and the
“analysis focuses on such issues as whether
the contract terms are commercially reason-
able and fair, the purpose and effect of the
terms, the one-sidedness of the terms, and
other similar public policy concerns.” Cordo-
va, 2009-NMSC-021, 122, 146 N.M. 256, 208
P.3d 901. A contract provision is substan-
tively unconscionable if it “is grossly unrea-
sonable and against our public policy under
the circumstances.” Jd. 19 22, 31.

Hs {46} “Contract provisions that
unreasonably benefit one party over another
ave substantively unconscionable.” Id. 125.
For example, where a lender imposes on a
borrower a contract that requires the bor-
rower to settle all claims it may have against

the lender through arbitration “while reserv-
ing for the lender the exclusive option of
aecess to the courts for all remedies the
lender is most likely to pursue against the
borrower,” the contract “is against New
Mexico public policy and is therefore void as
unconscionable.” Jd. 11; see also Padilla v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 2008-
NMSC-O11, 110, 183 N.M. 661, 68 P.3d 901
(striking down a facially neutral contract pro-
vision because application of the provision
benefitted only the insurer, not the insured).

Ws {47} Under New Mexico princi-
ples of contract law, a finding of unconsciona-
bility may be based on either procedural or
substantive unconscionability, or a combina-
tion of both. “While there is a greater likeli-
hood of a contract’s being invalidated for
unconscionability if there is a combination of
both procedural and substantive unconsciona-
bility, there is no absolute requirement in our
law that both must be present to the same
degree or that they both be present at all.”
Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, 124, 146 N.M.
256, 208 P.8d 901. “The more substantively
oppressive a contract term, the less proce-
dural unconscionability may be required for a
court to conclude that the offending term is
unenforceable.” Id.

{48} The arbitration provisions analyzed in
Cordova “broadly stated that the parties
must arbitrate all disputes,” id. 13, but also
provided that if the borrower defaulted on
the loan, the lender could “ ‘seek its remedies
in an action at law or in equity, including but
not limited to, judicial foreclosure or repos-
session,” id. 14. Cordova concluded that
the arbitration clause was “so unfairly and
unreasonably one-sided that it [wa]s substan-
tively unconscionable.” Jd. 132. This Court
determined that the substantive unconsciona-
bility of the one-sided contract provisions
was “so compelling” that we found it unnec-
essary to address whether the provisions
were also procedurally unconscionable. Jd.

{49} Other jurisdictions have concurred
that unfairly one-sided contract provisions
are unconscionable. See, eg, Batory v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co, 456 F.Supp.2d 1187,
1189-40 (D.Ariz.2006) (concluding that a one-
sided provision was substantively unconscion-
able under Arizona law); Iwen v. U.S. West

De
|

Direct, 293 Mont. 512, 977 P.2d 989, 995-96

(1999) (holding a contract provision uncon-

scionable where “the weaker bargaining par-
ty ha[d] no choice but to settle all claims ...

through ... arbitration, whereas the more
powerful bargaining party and drafter [of the
agreement] ha[d] the unilateral right to set-
tle a dispute ... in a court of law”);
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co. 88 Ohio St.3d
464, 700 N.E.2d 859, 866-67 (1998) (refusing
to enforce a provision in a consumer loan
that allowed the finance company to obtain
the judicial remedy of foreclosure but re-
quired the borrower to arbitrate all claims);
Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tenn.
2004) (“[TJhe arbitration clause ... is uncon-
scionable and therefore void because it re-
serves the right to a judicial forum for the
defendants while requiring the plaintiff to
submit all claims to arbitration.”); Arnold v.
United Cos. Lending Corp, 204 W.Va. 229,
511 S.E.2d 854, 862 (1998) (holding uncon-
scionable and unenforceable a contract provi-
sion that waived the borrower’s right to ac-
cess the courts while preserving the lender’s
right to obtain relief in a judicial forum);
Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc, 714 N.W.2d at
172-78 (holding that a contract provision that
unfairly limited the debtor’s remedies, as
compared to those available to the creditor,
was substantively unconscionable).

{50} In this case the Court of Appeals
concluded that American General reasonably
excepted judicial foreclosure and reposses-
sion from the claims covered by arbitration
because (1) “judicial actions for foreclosure
and repossession are highly regulated by the
statutory provisions governing secured trans-
actions of the Uniform Commercial Code”
and (2) “without access to these judicial and
extra-judicial procedures, American General
would lose many of the statutory protections
it enjoyed as a secured creditor.” Rivera,
2010-NMCA-046, 113, 148 N.M. 784, 242
P.3d 351. We disagree.

HM s{51} As a matter of law arbitra-
tors have broad authority and are deemed
capable of granting any remedy necessary to
resolve a case. See Thomas E. Carbonneau,
The Law and Practice of Arbitration 48-49
(8d ed. 2009) (citing, for example, Rodriguez
v. Prudential-Bache Sees., Inc. 882 F.Supp.

413

1202, 1209-10 (D.P.R.1995)); 4 Am.Jur.2d Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution § 198 (2007)
(explaining that “[a]n arbitrator’s judgment
has the same effect as a judgment of a court
of last resort”). The arbitrator’s power in-
cludes the authority to arbitrate and resolve
statutory claims. “By agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbi-
tral, rather than a judicial, forum.” Mitsubi-
shi. Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346,
87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985); see also Shear-
son/Am. Eupress, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 226-27, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185
(1987) (explaining that the FAA “mandates
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate stat-
utory claims” but providing that the “man-
date may be overridden by a contrary con-
gressional command” and that the “burden is
on the party opposing arbitration ... to
show that Congress intended to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue”).

WM {52} Both the 2008 NAF Code of
Procedure and the contract in this case re-
flect the principle that an arbitrator has
broad power to resolve claims involving a
lender’s security interest in collateral. The
NAF Code of Procedure expressly provides
that “[aJll types of legal and equitable reme-
dies and relief available in court are available
in arbitration.... Parties may effectively
pursue any remedy or relief in arbitration
including statutory, common law, injunctive,
equitable, and all other lawful remedies and
relief.” NAF Code of Procedure, supra, at
10. And the contract at issue in this case
specifically states that the “Lender can en-
force its rights to [the borrower's] property
in court” or “can elect to arbitrate such
claims.” We conclude that an arbitrator can
be given the authority to address any claims
a lender may have against a borrower.

{53} In its form loan contract, American
General unilaterally chose the forum in which
it wanted to resolve its disputes, ensuring
that it could “enforce its rights to [Rivera’s]
property in court or as otherwise provided by
law” while extinguishing Rivera’s right to
access the courts for any reason. By except-

414

ing foreclosure and repossession from arbi-
tration, American General retained the right
to obtain through the judicial system the only
remedies it was likely to need. If Rivera’s
truck had not been destroyed and still had
been worth $15,500, American General easily
could have recouped the loan principal of
$6,517 through repossession. American Gen-
eral’s ability under the arbitration clause to
seek judicial redress of its likeliest claims
while forcing Rivera to arbitrate any claim
she may have is unreasonably one-sided.
See Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc.,
98 Cal.App.4th 846, 854-55, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d
876 (Cal.Ct.App.2001) (concluding that a con-
tract provision that forced the borrower to
arbitrate all claims but allowed the lender to
obtain foreclosure, the only remedy the lend-
er was likely to need, was “so one-sided as to
be substantively unconscionable”); Iwen, 977
P.2d at 995-96 (explaining that the more
powerful bargaining party unfairly reserved
the right to go to court and obtain the only
remedy it was likely to need).

{54} We therefore determine that the arbi-
tration provisions are unfairly one-sided and
void under New Mexico law. As in Cordova,
the arbitration provisions in this case are so
substantively unconscionable that we need
not consider whether the provisions are also
procedurally unconscionable.

E. The Arbitration Provisions Must Be
Struck in Their Entirety.

HS £55} When this Court determines
that contract provisions are unenforceable we
can either “strike the ... provisions in their
entirety” or reform the provisions “into a fair
and balanced” agreement. Cordova, 2009-
NMSC-021, 139, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d 901;
see also Padilla, 2003-NMSC-011, 115, 133
N.M. 661, 68 P.3d 901 (explaining that where
a contract or contract term is unconscionable,
a court can “refuse to enforce the contract,”
“enforce the remainder of the contract,” or
“limit the application of any unconscionable
term” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

HN {56} The title loan contract in this
case contains numerous provisions that are
unenforceable either because they refer to
the NAF or because they are unfairly one-

sided and substantively unconscionable. Ar-
bitration before the NAF using the NAF
Code of Procedure was integral to the par-
ties’ agreement to arbitrate, and “[t]o appoint
a substitute arbitrator would constitute a
wholesale revision of the arbitration clause.”
Carideo, 2009 WL 3485933, at *6. Addition-
ally, as in Cordova the unconscionable terms
are central to the arbitration scheme and
cannot be severed without substantially alter-
ing the method of dispute resolution contrac-
tually agreed on by the parties. See Cordo-
va, 2009-NMSC-021, 140, 146 N.M. 256, 208
P.8d 901. This Court’s “duty is confined to
interpretation of the contract which the par-
ties made for themselves.” Continental Po-
tash, Inc, 115 N.M. at 704, 858 P.2d at 80
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). We will not perform “judicial surgery”
by rewriting a contract that is laced with
unenforceable terms that were “central to
the original mechanism[] for resolving dis-
putes between the parties.” Cordova, 2009-
NMSC-021, 140, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d 901.
We hold that the arbitration provisions must
be struck from the contract in their entirety.

CONCLUSION

{57} The arbitration provisions in the loan
contract are unenforceable. We vacate the
order compelling arbitration, reverse the dis-
trict court and the Court of Appeals, and
remand to the district court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this Opinion.

{58} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA,
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C.
BOSSON, and EDWARD L. CHAVEZ,

Justices.

2011-NMCA-074
259 P.3d 820
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Freddie Benji MONTOYA,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 28,881.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 27, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Anita
Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Law Office of Craig C. Kling, Craig C.
Kling, San Diego, CA, for Appellant.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} Defendant appeals from convictions of
kidnaping, conspiracy to commit kidnaping,
second-degree criminal sexual penetration
(CSP II), and aggravated burglary. He rais-
es three points on appeal: (1) his right to a
speedy trial was violated by a twenty-one-
month delay between his arrest and trial; (2)
he was deprived of his right to a trial by jury
because a certified court interpreter was not
sworn in before voir dire commenced; and
(8) his right to be free from double jeopardy
was violated by his convictions for kidnaping,
OSP II, and aggravated burglary. We con-
clude that Defendant’s convictions of kidnap-
ing and CSP II violate principles of double
jeopardy, and we therefore remand with in-
structions to vacate one of Defendant’s con-
victions. We affirm on all other issues.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant’s convictions stem from an
incident that occurred on March 2, 2006, in
Dofia Ana County, New Mexico. At trial,
Victim testified that she was driving home
that evening after stopping for fuel at a gas
station. Shortly after leaving the gas sta-
tion, Victim observed a work truck pass her
vehicle. A few minutes later, Victim testified
that she stopped her vehicle on the roadway
because the work truck she had observed
earlier was now parked sideways across the
road, blocking traffic in both directions. Vie-
tim stated that two men exited the truck and
approached her vehicle. She explained that
she opened her car door after the driver of
the truck displayed a gun. She testified that
after the truck driver gained entry to her
vehicle, he proceeded to sexually assault her

419

while the passenger of the truck held her
hands above her head. After the assault,
Victim stated that the men let her go, re-
turned to the work truck, and drove away.
The next day, Victim reported the incident to
the police and subsequently identified Defen-
dant as the driver of the truck.

{3} Defendant was arrested and charged
with: (1) kidnaping; (2) conspiracy to com-
mit kidnaping; (8) aggravated burglary com-
mitted with a deadly weapon or, in the alter-
native, committed during the commission of a
battery; and (4) CSP II committed during
the commission of a felony, or in the alterna-
tive, committed while being aided or abetted
by another. Following a jury trial, Defen-
dant was convicted on all charges. This ap-
peal followed.

IL. DISCUSSION

{4} Defendant argues that his right to a
speedy trial was violated, that he was denied
his right to trial by jury, and that his convic-
tions violate his right to be free from double
jeopardy. We address each argument in
turn.

A. The District Court Did Not Violate
Defendant’s Right to a Speedy Trial

{5} Defendant argues that the delay of his
trial for over twenty-one months prejudiced
his defense due to the death of an alibi
witness during the pretrial delay. As a re-
sult, he maintains that the delay violated his
right to a speedy trial.

TH {6} As an initial matter, we consider
Defendant’s argument that our Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.8d 387,
should not apply retroactively to his case.
Defendant claims that Garza overturned es-
tablished precedent governing speedy trial
analysis and held that the burden no longer
shifts to the state if pretrial delay is deter-
mined to be presumptively prejudicial. As a
result, according to Defendant, this holding
in Garza is a “new rule” enacted prior to
Defendant’s convictions becoming final, and
it should not have retroactive effect. See
State v. Mascarenas, 2000-NMSC-017, 124,
129 N.M. 280, 4 P.8d 1221 (“An appellate

420

court's consideration of whether a rule
should be retroactively or prospectively ap-
plied is invoked only when the rule at issue is
in fact a ‘new rule.’ ”).

{7} While Defendant correctly states the
relevant holding in Garza, we disagree with
his characterization of that holding. The
Court in Garza sought to clarify what it
perceived to be ambiguities in Barker v.
Wingo, 407 US. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33
L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the United States Su-
preme Court’s seminal decision concerning
the right to speedy trial. Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, 115, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 887.
The Court in Garza reviewed New Mexico
case law and case law from federal appeals
courts and stated that “[iJn light of the over-
whelming consensus among the federal Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals and our policy of
providing a functional analysis based on the
facts and circumstances of each case, we
abolish the presumption that a defendant’s
right to a speedy trial has been violated
based solely on the threshold determination
that the length of delay is presumptively
prejudicial.” Id. 121 (internal quotation
marks omitted), Although the Court used
the term “abolish” in describing its holding,
it nonetheless characterized its holding as
“modify[ing!” New Mexico precedent on the
issue. Id. 1121, 22. As a result, we do not
view Garza’s holding as a “new rule” trig-
gering an inquiry into whether it may be
applied retroactively. See Kersey v. Hatch,
2010-NMSC-020, 116, 148 N.M. 381, 237
P.3d 688 (explaining that “a court establishes
a new rule when its decision is flatly inconsis-
tent with the prior governing precedent and
is an explicit overruling of an earlier holding”
(internal quotation marks omitted).

{8} Defendant’s argument regarding the
alleged retroactive application of Garza ap-
pears to be directed solely at Garza’s modifi-
cation of the burden-shifting employed in
prior New Mexico case law. To the extent
that Defendant’s argument is also directed to
Garza’s modification of the guidelines gov-
erning the determination of presumptive
prejudice, we reject the argument. The
Court in Garza changed the existing guide-
lines from nine months to one year for a
simple case, from twelve months to fifteen

months for an intermediate case, and from
fifteen months to eighteen months for a com-
plex case. 2009-NMSC-038, 1141, 47, 48,
146 N.M. 499, 212 P.38d 387. The Court
explicitly stated that these new guidelines
would apply “to speedy trial motions to dis-
miss initiated on or after August 13, 2007.”
Id. 150. Because Defendant filed his motion
to dismiss on December 26, 2007, the new
guidelines announced in Garza are applica-
ble.

1. Application of the Barker factors

HME {9} We tum now to analysis of
Defendant’s argument that his speedy trial
right was violated. In making this determi-
nation, we employ the balancing test created
in Barker and weigh the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant in light of four
factors: “(1) the length of delay, (2) the
reasons for the delay, (8) the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and (4) the actual
prejudice to the defendant.” Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, 113, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387
(internal quotation marks omitted). In con-
sidering each of the factors, we defer to the
district court’s factual findings but review de
novo the question of whether Defendant’s
constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated. State v. Brown, 2003-NMCA-110,
111, 134 N.M. 356, 76 P.3d 1113.

THE {10} According to Garza, the initial
inquiry in speedy trial analysis is a determi-
nation as to whether the length of pretrial
delay is “presumptively prejudicial.” 2009-
NMSC-~088, 115, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.
“[A] presumptively prejudicial length of de-
lay is simply a triggering mechanism, requir-
ing further inquiry into the Barker factors.”
Id. 121 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, there was a delay of
approximately twenty-one months between
Defendant’s indictment and the beginning of
his trial. Although the district court made no
findings regarding the complexity of the
present case, twenty-one months exceeds the
guideline for even the most complex case.
See id. 148. Accordingly, inquiry into the
Barker factors is warranted.

HM {11} Garza provides guidance as to
the order in which we consider the factors.
Our Supreme Court in Garza stated that

“generally a defendant must show particular-
ized prejudice of the kind against which the
speedy trial right is intended to protect.”
2009-NMSC-038, 139, 146 N.M. 499, 212
P.3d 387. If a defendant does not demon-
strate prejudice, he or she may still show
violation of the speedy trial right “if the
length of delay and the reasons for the delay
weigh heavily in [the] defendant’s favor and
[the] defendant has asserted his right and
not acquiesced to the delay.” Id. Therefore,
we turn first to the fourth Barker factor and
consider whether Defendant has demonstrat-
ed actual prejudice. See Garza, 2009-
NMSC-088, {If 35-37, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.38d
887 (explaining that the defendant has the
burden to demonstrate and substantiate prej-
udice).

a. Prejudice Factor

Ms {12} “The United States Supreme
Court has identified three interests under
which we analyze prejudice to the defendant:
@ to prevent oppressive pretrial incarcera-
tion[,] Gi) to minimize anxiety and concern of
the accused[,] and (iii) to limit the possibility
that the defense will be impaired.” Id. 135
(internal quotation marks omitted). “As to
the first two types of prejudice, some degree
of oppression and anxiety is inherent for
every defendant who is jailed while awaiting
trial.” Jd. (alterations omitted) (nternal
quotation marks omitted). “Therefore, we
weigh this factor in the defendant’s favor
only where the pretrial incarceration or the
anxiety suffered is undue.” Jd. Further-
more, “(t]he oppressive nature of the pretrial
incarceration depends on the length of incar-
ceration, whether the defendant obtained re-
lease prior to trial, and what prejudicial ef-
fects the defendant has shown as a result of
the incarceration.” Id.

{13} In the present case, Defendant spent.
only three months in jail while he negotiated
the reduction of his bond. He was released a
full year-and-a-half before his trial. In addi-
tion, while Defendant asserts that he “was
forced to worry about the pending trial for
the better part of two years,” he has not
demonstrated that his worry was undue. See
In re Ernesto M., Jr. 1996-NMCA-039, 1 10,

421

121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 318 (“An assertion of
prejudice is not a showing of prejudice.”).

{14} Defendant also claims he was preju-
diced because one of his alibi witnesses died
during the time he was awaiting trial. How-
ever, Defendant did not inform his attorney
about the existence of this witness until the
week before trial. In addition, Defendant
concedes that he was able to present the
testimony of another alibi witness and, as a
result, he was not deprived of an alibi de-
fense. Moreover, Defendant failed to state
what exculpatory testimony would have been
offered through the alibi witness and, in turn,
how the witness’s absence prejudiced him.
Therefore, because Defendant has not made
a particularized showing of prejudice, we
conclude that he has not met his burden.

{15} We now turn to the other Barker
factors to determine whether they weigh
heavily in his favor, despite his failure to
demonstrate prejudice. See Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, 139, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387
(explaining that the right to a speedy trial
may be violated if the factors other than
prejudice weigh heavily in the defendant’s
favor).

b. Length of Delay

HMM.s«{16} The greater the delay in
comparison to the complexity of the case,
“the more heavily it will potentially weigh
against the [s]tate.” Id. 124. As previously
noted, the district court made no findings
regarding the complexity of the present case,
but we conclude that it was of intermediate
complexity. “Typically, simple cases require
less investigation and tend to involve primar-
ily police officer testimony during the trial.”
State v. Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, 114, 134
N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Cases of intermediate
complexity, on the other hand, seem to in-
volve numerous or relatively difficult criminal
charges and evidentiary issues, numerous
witnesses, expert testimony, and scientific
evidence.” Id. Here, Defendant faced four
somewhat difficult charges, and there were
nine witnesses, including a sexual assault
nurse examiner and a forensic scientist. Ac-
cordingly, this case falls in the category of
intermediate complexity, for which our Su-

422

preme Court has determined that a fifteen-
month delay may be deemed presumptively
prejudicial. Garza, 2009-NMSC-~038, 1 48,
146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.

{17} The delay in this case was six months
longer than the fifteen-month guideline. In
our view, such a delay was not so long or
protracted as to weigh more than slightly
against the State. See State v. Wilson, 2010-
NMCA-018, 129, 147 N.M. 706, 228 P.3d 490
(stating that delay of five months beyond the
guideline for a simple case was not so ex-
traordinary or protracted as to compel
weighing the length of delay factor against
the state more than slightly), cert. denied,
2010-NMCERT-001, 147 N.M. 678, 227 P.3d
1055.

c. Reasons for the Delay

HI {18} There are three types of delay,
each of which weighs differently in favor of
or against the state. The delays range from
a deliberate attempt to delay trial to a valid,
non-negligent reason for delay. See Barker,
407 US. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (noting that a
“deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order
to hamper the defense should be weighted
heavily against the government,” that “more
neutral” delays caused by negligence or ad-
ministrative problems should be weighted
less heavily against the state, and that “a
valid reason, such as a missing witness,
should serve to justify appropriate delay”)
(footnote omitted).

{19} The record reflects only one motion
for continuance and one petition for exten-
sion of the so-called six-month rule, both filed
by the State. Our Supreme Court granted
two additional extensions of the six-month
rule. It appears that the majority of the
delay in the present case was due to backlog
at the lab that was conducting what the State
termed “DNA testing.” In fact, the forensic
scientist who testified for the State clarified
that she tested vaginal swabs taken from
Victim and items of Victim’s clothing for the
presence of semen and, finding no semen,
she did no further testing. The scientist also
testified that the evidence to be tested ar-
rived at the lab in May and June 2006, but
that she was unable to test the evidence until

March 2007 due to the “very large backlog”
of evidence waiting to be tested.

{20} We conclude that the delay attribut-
able to the lab’s backlog weighs only slightly
against the State. There is no evidence and
Defendant does not suggest that the State
deliberately caused the backlog. See State v.
Tortolito, 1997-NMCA-128, 119, 13, 124
N.M. 368, 950 P.2d 811 (weighing only slight-
ly against the state a delay attributable to
the crime lab’s backlog when there was no
evidence suggesting that the state was negli-
gent or willful in the conduct of its DNA
investigation).

{21} The reason for the remaining delay,
from the completion of the lab’s testing in
March 2007 to the trial in December 2007, is
unclear. However, it appears likely that this
delay was attributable to the district court’s
schedule because no motions for continuance
appear in the record. Accordingly, we con-
sider this period of delay to be administra-
tive, which we weigh only slightly against the
State, given the relatively short length of
time that the overall delay extended beyond
the triggering guideline. See Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, 11 29-80, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d
387 (explaining that administrative delay is
negligent and weighed against the state ac-
cording to the length of the delay and, where
the delay extends only slightly beyond the
triggering guideline, the factor weighs only
slightly in the defendant’s favor).

d. Defendant’s Assertion of the Right

Hs {22} Im considering the third
Barker factor, “we assess the timing of the
defendant’s assertion and the manner in
which the right was asserted.” Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, 132, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.
“An early assertion of the speedy trial right
indicates the defendant’s desire to have the
charges resolved rather than gambling that
the passage of time will operate to hinder
prosecution.” Zurla v. State, 109 N.M. 640,
644, 789 P.2d 588, 592 (1990) modified on
other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038,
146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387.

{23} Defendant objected to only one of the
State’s two motions for continuance or exten-
sion. Moreover, he waited until the day
before trial to affirmatively assert the right

through a motion to dismiss. Thus, this
factor weighs only slightly in Defendant’s
favor. See Laney, 20083-NMCA-144, 124,
134 N.M. 648, 81 P.8d 591 (“Because [the
dJefendant waited until the eleventh hour to
specifically and meaningfully invoke a ruling
on the speedy trial issue, we find this factor
weighs only slightly in his favor.”).

e. Balancing the Factors

{24} In the present case, Defendant
failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, and
the remaining factors weigh only slightly in
his favor. The delay passed the threshold
for asserting the right by only a few months
and was largely caused by the time it took to
complete lab testing and by administrative
delay. Defendant acquiesced in part of the
delay because he did not oppose the State’s
first motion for continuance, and he did not
assert his right to a speedy trial until the day
before trial began. Thus, Defendant’s failure
to make an affirmative showing of particular-
ized prejudice precludes a determination that
his speedy trial right was violated because
the other three factors weigh only slightly
against the State. Accordingly, on balance,
we affirm the district court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss.

B. The District Court Did Not Violate
Defendant’s Right to Trial by Jury

TE {25} Defendant argues that he was
deprived of his right to a trial by jury be-
cause a certified court interpreter who
served the jury venire during voir dire was
not properly sworn in. Defendant maintains
that the district court abused its discretion
by not granting a mistrial after defense coun-
sel alerted the court to this fact. Defendant
did not properly preserve the issue and,
therefore, we decline to address it.

{26} The trial transcript does not conclu-
sively show whether or not the interpreter
was sworn in. Although the transcript of
voir dire does not reflect that the interpreter
was sworn, it is possible that the oath oc-
curred before voir dire took place. However,
even if the oath did not take place before voir
dire, Defendant did not draw the district
court’s attention to this procedural defect
until after voir dire, after the petit jury had

423

been seated, and after four witnesses had
already testified. Defendant did not proper-
ly preserve the issue because he waited until
after the time when the district court could
have avoided or cured the error. See Gracia
v. Bittner, 120 N.M. 191, 195, 900 P.2d 351,
855 (Ct.App.1995) (stating that one purpose
of the preservation requirement is to give the
district court “an opportunity to correct the
mistake”); see also State v. Trujillo, 119
N.M. 772, 776, 895 P.2d 672, 676 (Ct.App.
1995) (explaining that timely objections must
be made in order to preserve an issue for
appeal),

HE {27} Moreover, even if Defendant
had properly preserved the alleged error,
there was no prejudice to him. Apparently
the only venire person for whom the inter-
preter provided her services, juror no. 62,
was not ultimately selected to serve on the
jury.

C. Defendant’s Convictions for Both CSP
II (Commission of a Felony) and Kid-
naping Violated Protections Against
Double Jeopardy

{28} Defendant claims that his con-
stitutional protection against double jeopardy
was violated because he was convicted of
both CSP II (commission of a felony) and the
predicate felony underlying the CSP II con-
viction. The State offered two theories of
CSP II:(1) sexual intercourse during the
commission of aggravated burglary and (2)
sexual intercourse during the commission of
kidnaping. Defendant maintains that the
conduct supporting his conviction of CSP II
under either theory and the conduct support-
ing his convictions of aggravated burglary
and/or kidnaping was unitary and not intend-
ed to be punished separately.

Hs {29} “The right to be free from
double jeopardy consists of three separate
constitutional protections. It protects
against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal. It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense.” State v.
Rodriguez, 2005-NMSC-019, 16, 1838 N.M.
21, 116 P.3d 92 (alteration omitted) (internal

424

quotation marks omitted). In the present
case, we are concerned with the third type—
multiple punishment for the same offense.
This is “a question of legislative intent, which
we review de novo.” State v. Franco, 2005-
NMSC-013, 15, 187 N.M. 447, 112 P.38d 1104.

HN {80} “We analyze a multiple pun-
ishment double jeopardy challenge under
Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 8, 810 P.2d 1223
(1991), and its progeny.” State v. Padilla,
2006-NMCA-107, 126, 140 N.M. 383, 142
P.3d 921, rev'd on other grounds by 2008-
NMSC-006, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299.
The protection against multiple punishments
Defendant invokes in the present case is
categorized as a “double-description [case],
which prohibits charging a defendant with
violations of multiple statutes for the same
conduct in violation of the [Llegislature’s in-
tent.” State v. Armendariz, 2006-NMCA-
152, 15, 140 N.M. 712, 148 P.3d 798 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In such a case,
“double jeopardy bars a conviction if the
conduct underlying the two offenses is uni-
tary and the [Llegislature has not indicated
an intent to punish the same conduct sepa-
rately.” Padilla, 2006-NMCA-107, 26, 140
N.M. 333, 142 P.8d 921.

1. Unitary Conduct

HH s{31} We begin our analysis by
determining whether Defendant’s actions
may be viewed as one, single transaction.
Conduct is not unitary if sufficient “indicia of
distinctness” separate the transaction into
several acts. State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-
058, 159, 124 N.M. 277, 949 P.2d 660 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). In making
this determination, we evaluate separations
in time and space as well as the quality and
nature of the acts or the results involved.
Swafford, 112 N.M. at 18-14, 810 P.2d at
1233-34. Sufficient indicia of distinctness ex-
ist “when one crime is completed before an-
other,” and also “when the conviction is sup-
ported by at least two distinct acts or forces,
one which completes the first crime and an-
other which is used in conjunction with the
subsequent crime.” Armendariz, 2006-
NMCA-152, 17, 140 N.M. 712, 148 P.3d 798.
The key consideration is whether the same
force was used to commit both crimes. Id.

{32} We consider in turn whether unitary
conduct supported (1) CSP II and aggravat-
ed burglary, or (2) CSP II and kidnaping.

a. CSP II (Commission of a Felony) and
Aggravated Burglary

HM {83} In order to convict Defendant
of CSP II (commission of a felony), the jury
had to find that Defendant “caused [Victim]
to engage in sexual intercourse” and that he
committed this act “during the commission of
[either] kidnap[ Jing or aggravated burglary.”
The district court gave the jury two alterna-
tive instructions on the charge of aggravated
burglary. The first charge was that Defen-
dant committed aggravated burglary by en-
tering a vehicle without authorization “armed
with a pistol while entering, leaving, or while
inside the vehicle.” In the alternative, the
court instructed the jury that it could find
Defendant guilty of aggravated burglary if it
found that Defendant entered the vehicle and
“touched or applied force to [Victim] in a
rude or angry manner while entering, leav-
ing, or while inside the vehicle.” Both De-
fendant and the State agree that the jury
convicted Defendant on the first charge—
being armed with a pistol—and not on the
alternative charge. We therefore analyze
unitary conduct in accordance with the first
charge of aggravated burglary.

{34} The jury could convict Defendant of
aggravated burglary if it found that he en-
tered Victim’s vehicle without authorization
with the intent to commit criminal sexual
penetration and while armed. Accordingly,
the crime of aggravated burglary was com-
pleted as soon as Defendant, with the requi-
site intent, gained entry to Victim’s vehicle
while armed with a pistol. The force Defen-
dant used to gain entry into Victim’s car
while armed with a pistol was distinct from
the force used to restrain Victim in order to
commit criminal sexual penetration. Cf
State v. Crain, 1997-NMCA-101, 121, 124
N.M. 84, 946 P.2d 1095 (explaining that CSP
II involves “some force or restraint occurring
either before or after the sexual penetration
without consent”). Thus, the conduct is not
unitary and the evaluation of this crime ends.
See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at

1234 (explaining that if conduct is not unitary
the “inquiry is at an end”).

b. CSP II (Commission of a Felony) and
Kidnaping

{85} We tum now to Defendant’s
argument that convictions of both CSP II
and kidnaping violated his protections
against double jeopardy. Again, in order to
convict Defendant of CSP II, the jury had to
find that Defendant “caused [Victim] to en-
gage in sexual intercourse” and that he com-
mitted this act “during the commission of
[either] kidnap[ Jing or aggravated burglary.”
In order to convict Defendant of kidnaping,
the jury was required to find that Defendant
“restrained or confined [Victim] by force or
intimidation” and that he “intended to hold
[Victim] against [her] will to inflict a sexual
offense on [Victim].” Defendant argues that
the force used to restrain or confine Victim
was the same force used to cause Victim to
engage in sexual intercourse and, therefore,
the conduct underlying both crimes was uni-
tary.

{36} In order to address Defendant’s argu-
ment, we briefly review our case law on the
matter. In a case this Court decided prior to
the decision in Swafford, we suggested that
double jeopardy principles do not preclude
punishment for both CSP II (commission of a
felony) and kidnaping. See State v. Tsethli-
kai, 109 N.M. 871, 374, 785 P.2d 282, 285
(Ct.App.1989) (stating that “[blecause CSP IL
and kidnaping address different social
norms,” convictions of both crimes do not
violate protections against double jeopardy).
However, we also indicated that “special cir-
cumstances in a particular case may require
merger.” Id. Since Swafford’s adoption of
the double-deseription analysis set forth in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), our case
Jaw has made it clear that a double-descrip-
tion analysis is appropriate only on a showing
of unitary conduct. See Armendariz, 2006-
NMCA-152, 18, 140 N.M. 712, 148 P.38d 798
(explaining that a reviewing court applies the
Blockburger analysis to ascertain legislative
intent “{iJf the conduct underlying two of-
fenses is unitary”). Thus, the “special cir-
cumstances” alluded to in Tsethlikat refer to

425

the constitutional problems that arise when a
defendant is convicted and punished of two
crimes based on unitary conduct. See State
v. Pisio, 119 N.M. 252, 261, 889 P.2d 860, 869
(Ct.App.1994) (stating that “the special cir-
cumstances to which Tsethlikai referred in-
clude unitary conduct”).

{37} As we have made clear in cases decid-
ed after Swafford, unitary conduct occurs
when the state bases its theory of kidnaping
on the same force used to commit CSP IL
(commission of a felony) even though there
were alternative ways to charge the crime.
See, e.g., Crain, 1997-NMCA-101, 19 21-22,
124 N.M. 84, 946 P.2d 1095 (stating that
“CSP III cannot be charged as CSP II with-
out some force or restraint occurring either
before or after the sexual penetration with-
out consent” and that the defendant's convic-
tions must be vacated because the court,
could not tell whether the jury convicted him
on the theory that the kidnaping was accom-
plished by force or by deception); Pisio, 119
N.M. at 261-62, 889 P.2d at 869-70 (explain-
ing that “force or coercion exerted prior to
the act [of penetration] itself [which] will
support a conviction for kidnap[ Jing” and
CSP II’s “force or coercion executed prior to
the act of sexual intercourse without consent
but closely associated with it” can amount to
unitary conduct).

{38} In the present case, Defendant’s con-
viction for CSP II (commission of a felony)
was based on sexual intercourse “during the
commission of kidnap[]Jing or aggravated
burglary,” and his conviction for kidnaping
required that he “restrained or confined”
Victim with the intent to “inflict a sexual
offense” on her. We said in Crain and Pisio
that because some force or restraint is in-
volved in every sexual penetration without.
consent, kidnaping cannot be charged out of
every CSP without a showing of force or
restraint separate from the CSP. Crain,
1997-NMCA-~101, 121, 124 N.M. 84, 946 P.2d
1095; Pisio, 119 N.M. at 261-62, 889 P.2d at
869-70. The State argues that such force or
restraint exists in this case because the jury
could have based the kidnaping conviction on
Defendant’s confining Victim by blocking the
highway with his truck rather than on the

426

force Defendant exerted in restraining Vic-
tim while committing CSP.

HI {39} We are unable to determine
from the record whether the jury found that
the kidnaping was accomplished by the
truck’s confinement of Victim’s vehicle or by
Defendant’s restraint of Victim inside the
vehicle. The jury instruction supported ei-
ther theory of kidnaping. Under such cir-
cumstances, we must “reverse a conviction if
one of the alternative bases for the conviction
provided in the jury instructions is legally
inadequate because it violates a defendant’s
constitutional right to be free from double
jeopardy.” State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-
007, 12, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140, abro-
gated on other grownds by Kersey, 2010-
NMSC-020, 148 N.M. 381, 237 P.3d 688.
Because one of the alternative bases for kid-
naping was the force of restraining Victim
and because that force was the same force
used to commit CSP, we conclude that the
conduct underlying both of the convictions
‘was unitary.

2. Legislative Intent

Ts {40} Having determined that the
conduct was unitary, we turn to the second
prong of our inquiry under a double-deserip-
tion analysis, which is to determine if the
Legislature intended for the unitary conduct
to be punished as separate offenses. The
“sole limitation on multiple punishments is
legislative intent.” Swafford, 112 N.M. at 18,
810 P.2d at 1233. “If the [Llegislature ex-
pressly provides for multiple punishments,
the double jeopardy inquiry must cease.” Id.
at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234. If the Legislature
has not provided a clear expression of intent
for multiple punishments, a court must apply
the Blockburger test to the elements of each
statute. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d
at 1234. If, as a result of that test, one
statute is subsumed within the other, the
statutes are the same for double jeopardy
purposes. Jd. If, through the Blockburger
test, we conclude that each statute requires
an element that the other does not, we wili
presume that the Legislature intended for
the conduct to result in separately punishable
offenses. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d
at 1234. However, this presumption is not

conclusive and may be overcome by other
indicia of legislative intent, such as the “lan-
guage, history, and subject of the statutes.”
Id.

HM {41} In the present case, there are
no clear legislative expressions indicating
that multiple punishments are permissible.
Thus, we turn to the Blockburger elements
test. The Blockburger test “focuses strictly
upon the elements of the statutes.” State v.
Armendariz, 2006-NMSC-036, 121, 140
N.M. 182, 141 P.3d 526. When applying the
Blockburger test to offenses that may be
charged in alternate ways, we focus our in-
quiry on the elements of the statute as they
were presented in the jury instructions.
State v. Armijo, 2005-NMCA-010, 122, 136
N.M. 728, 104 P.8d 1114 (“{W]e look only to
the elements of the statute[] as charged to
the jury and disregard the inapplicable statu-
tory elements.”). The jury instruction in the
present case for CSP II (commission of a
felony) required the jury to find that Defen-
dant caused Victim to engage in sexual inter-
course during the commission of kidnaping or
aggravated burglary. The jury instruction
for kidnaping required the jury to find that
Defendant restrained or confined Victim by
force or intimidation with the intent to hold
her against her will to inflict a sexual offense
on her.

{42} In comparing the two offenses, we
consider whether each offense requires proof
of an element that the other does not. Fran-
co, 2005-NMSC-013, 112, 187 N.M. 447, 112
P.3d 1104. Because we have already deter-
mined that the conduct in this case is uni-
tary, the “during the commission of a felony”
element of CSP II requires proof of all of the
elements of kidnaping. Thus, the offense of
kidnaping is subsumed in CSP I (commis-
sion of a felony), and convictions of both
offenses violated Defendant’s right to be free
from double jeopardy. See Armendariz,
2006-NMCA-152, 111, 140 N.M. 712, 148
P.3d 798 (holding that aggravated burglary
was subsumed within CSP II (commission of
a felony) when the conduct was unitary and
an element of CSP II (commission of a felo-
ny) required that the sexual contact occur in
the “commission of aggravated burglary”).

PT

[er

{48} This does not mean that a defendant
could never be punished for both kidnaping

and CSP II (commission of a felony). See
Tsethlikai, 109 N.M. at 378-74, 785 P.2d at
284-85 (stating that convictions normally are
allowed for both predicate and compound
offenses and our courts have held that CSP
statutes and kidnaping statutes protect dif-
ferent social norms). Had the jury in this
case been instructed only on a theory based
on non-unitary conduct to establish kidnap-
ing—for example, the theory that Defendant
kidnaped Victim by preventing her vehicle
from traveling further by blocking it with his
truck—convictions for both CSP II (commis-
sion of a felony) and kidnaping may have
been upheld. However, in light of the uni-
tary conduct in this case, punishment for
both kidnaping and CSP II (commission of a
felony) fail the Blockburger test and violate
Defendant’s right to be free from multiple
punishments. Therefore, we remand to the
district court with instructions to vacate the
conviction for the lesser offense. See Kersey,

427

2010-NMSC~020, 112, 148 N.M. 381, 237
P.8d 688 (explaining that if double jeopardy
is violated, the conviction for the lesser of-
fense should be vacated).

HI. CONCLUSION

{44} For the foregoing reasons, we re-
mand to the district with instructions to va-
cate Defendant’s conviction for the lesser
offense, either kidnaping or CSP II. We af-
firm the district court’s judgment in all other
respects.

{45} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: LINDA M. VANZI and
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judges.

2011-NMSC-037
260 P.3d 414

CITY OF RIO RANCHO, Plaintiff-
Respondent,

vy.
AMREP SOUTHWEST INC.,
Defendant—Petitioner.
City of Rio Rancho, Plaintiff-Respondent
and Cross-Petitioner,
ve

Cloudview Estates, LLC, Defendant-
Petitioner and Cross—
Respondent.

Nos. 32,486, 32,489.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Aug. 22, 2011.

432

Lastrapes, Spangler & Pacheco, P.A., Mat-
thew M. Spangler, Jenica J. Jacobi, Rio Ran-
cho, NM, for Petitioner.

Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Randy S.
Bartell, Sharon T. Shaheen, Santa Fe, NM,
for Respondent/Respondent and Cross—Peti-
tioner.

Foster, Rieder & Jackson, P.C., J. Douglas
Foster, Travis G. Jackson, Albuquerque,
NM, for Petitioner and Cross-Respondent.

Dave Thomas & Associates, P.C., David H.
Thomas III, Albuquerque, NM, R.S. Rad-
ford, Sacramento, CA, for Amicus Curiae
Pacifie Legal Foundation.

OPINION

CHAVEZ, Justice.

{1} In 1985, at the behest of the City of
Rio Rancho, Amrep Southwest Inc. recorded
a plat for the Vista Hills West Unit 1
(VHWU1) subdivision, granting the City a
drainage easement over ten acres identified
as Parcel F. In 2004, Amrep sold Parcel F to
the Mares group in fee simple, subject to the
drainage easement. Mares in turn sold it to
Cloudview Estates in fee simple, subject to
the same recorded drainage easement.
Cloudview asked the City to vacate the
drainage easement and subdivide the parcel
into thirty lots. The City declined because it
found that the City and Amrep had originally
intended to perpetually dedicate Parcel F as
open space.

{2} Even if the City and Amrep intended
Parcel F to be open space, what effect does
the recorded plat designating Parcel F as a
drainage easement have on Cloudview’s sub-
sequent purchase of Parcel F? Cloudview
contends that the recorded plat controls be-
cause it was not aware of any unrecorded
interests the City had in Parcel F, making
Cloudview a good faith purchaser whose
ownership is subject only to the City’s drain-
age easement. In addition, Cloudview con-
tends that the City’s decision not to vacate
the easement and approve Cloudview’s subdi-

vision plan was arbitrary and contrary to
law, ultimately entitling Cloudview to reason-
able compensation because the City deprived
Cloudview of any economically beneficial use
of the land.

{3} The City responds that Cloudview is
not a good faith purchaser because (1) the
drainage easement over the entirety of the
ten-acre parcel grants fee title to the City
because such an easement is a dedication of
land for public use under NMSA. 1978, Sec-
tion 3-20-11 (1978); (2) the City has fee title
by adverse possession because the City open-
ly possessed the land and had color of title
by virtue of the plat; and (8) a drainage
easement on the entirety of a ten-acre parcel
is the type of ambiguity that should have put
Cloudview on notice that it had to diligently
investigate whether the City had a claim to
title to the land greater than a drainage
easement. Finally, the City seeks equitable
relief against Amrep for having sold Parcel F
in fee simple, despite Amrep’s promises to
the City and VHWU1 lot purchasers that
Parcel F would remain open space in perpe-
tuity.

{4} We conclude that Cloudview is a good
faith purchaser whose fee-title ownership in-
terest is subject only to the City’s drainage
easement for three reasons. First, the plat
does not specifically designate Parcel F for
public use, and therefore fee title was not
conveyed to the City under Section 3-20-11.
Second, the City does not have color of title
for purposes of adverse possession because
the grant of an easement is not the equiva-
lent of granting fee title. Third, the record-
ed plat unambiguously grants to the City an
easement for the specific purpose of drain-
age, thereby extinguishing any unrecorded
interests and relieving Cloudview, which was
a subsequent purchaser without knowledge
of the unrecorded interests, from its duty to
diligently investigate whether the City had
other adverse claims to the property title.

{5} We also agree that the City’s decision
declining to vacate the drainage easement
was arbitrary and contrary to law because
the City relied on an unrecorded open space
easement in declining Cloudview’s applica-
tion. However, because we remand to the

City to reconsider Cloudview’s application to
subdivide Parcel F and vacate the drainage
easement, we conclude that Cloudview’s in-
verse condemnation claim is premature.

{6} Finally, we hold that genuine issues of
material fact exist with respect to the City’s
unjust enrichment claim against Amrep,
making summary judgment on that count
inappropriate.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{7} After purchasing Parcel F, Cloudview
submitted a preliminary plat to the City’s
Planning and Zoning Board, seeking to sub-
divide the parcel into thirty lots. The Plan-
ning and Zoning Board approved the plat
and subdivision. However, after receiving
citizen objections, the City Council remanded
the approval back to the Planning and Zon-
ing Board for its reconsideration. Cloudview
filed another application with the Planning
and Zoning Board that included a request for
the City to vacate the drainage easement on
Parcel F. This time the Planning and Zoning
Board did not grant the application because
it concluded that the drainage easement im-
plicitly granted the City the right to use
Parcel F as open space. The City’s Govern-
ing Body affirmed the Planning and Zoning
Board, adopting verbatim the Planning and
Zoning Board’s decision and declining to va-
cate the easement. The Governing Body
stated that “the protection of Parcel F as
open space provides a valued public use orig-
inally made a condition of the development of
[VHWU1] that should be continued.”

{8} Cloudview timely sued the City in
federal district court, alleging due process
and equal protection violations and seeking
judicial review of the City’s decision to de-
cline to vacate the easement. On October 6,
2006, the federal district court dismissed the
complaint without prejudice, concluding that
the case was not ripe for decision.

{9} Four days before the dismissal, on
October 2, 2006, the City sued Amrep and
Cloudview in state district court. The City
sought to quiet title to Parcel F, contending
that fee title to Parcel F was vested in the
City. In the alternative, the City sought a
declaratory judgment that the City owns a
permanent open space easement over the

entirety of Parcel F that cannot be vacated
and with which no form of development is
compatible. The City also sought equitable
relief to prevent the unjust enrichment of
Amrep and Cloudview that would arise from
the development of Parcel F, despite Am-
rep’s promises to the City that Parcel F
would be maintained as open space. Cloud-
view filed a counterclaim seeking reversal of
the City’s decision not to vacate the drainage
easement and for reasonable compensation,
alleging in a claim of inverse condemnation
that the City’s decision deprived Cloudview
of any economically beneficial use of Parcel
F.

{10} Amrep and Cloudview subsequently
filed motions for summary judgment on the
City’s quiet title claim and the City’s request
for a declaration that it had a perpetual open
space easement. The district court found
that the City’s only property interest in Par-
cel F was a drainage easement and that
Cloudview was a good faith purchaser for
value of Parcel F without knowledge or con-
structive notice of any adverse interest of the
City that is greater than the City’s drainage
easement. The district court therefore
granted partial summary judgment to Amrep
and Cloudview, dismissing with prejudice the
City’s quiet title and declaratory judgment
claims.

{11} The district court also granted Cloud-
view’s motions for partial summary judgment
on Cloudview’s counterclaims. The district
court reversed the City’s administrative deci-
sion not to vacate the drainage easement as
“contrary to law and not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.” The district court grant-
ed summary judgment to Cloudview on its
inverse condemnation claim based on the
City’s refusal to vacate a portion of the ease-
ment.

{12} On appeal from the district court, the
Court of Appeals reversed summary judg-
ment on the City’s quiet title and declaratory
judgment claims, concluding that the district
court erred by relying solely on the recorded
final plat and refusing to consider extrinsic
evidence of “what the City and Amrep actu-
ally intended by the designation of a drain-
age easement over the entirety of Parcel F.”

434

City of Rio Rancho v. AMREP Sw. Inc.
2010-NMCA-075, 111-2, 15, 148 N.M. 542,
238 P.8d 911. The Court of Appeals also
reversed the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Cloudview on its
counterclaims, concluding that the City’s de-
cision was in accordance with the law and
supported by substantial evidence. City of
Rio Rancho v. Cloudview Estates, LLC, No.
29,510, slip op. at 5, 2010 WL 4162542
(N.M.Ct.App. June 11, 2010). With respect
to the inverse condemnation claim, the Court
of Appeals found that there are genuine is-
sues of material fact regarding the nature
and extent of the easement over Parcel F. Id.
at 19-20. The Court of Appeals explained
that “Cloudview purchased the property as a
good faith purchaser for value without notice
but subject to the easement over the entirety
of Parcel F.” Id. at 19.

{18} Amrep and Cloudview petitioned this
Court for certiorari, and the City filed a
conditional cross-petition challenging Cloud-
view’s good faith purchaser status and the
timeliness of Cloudview’s request for judicial
review of the City’s administrative decision.
We granted each party’s petition for writ of
certiorari and affirm the Court of Appeals in
part and reverse in part.

IL DISCUSSION

A. Cloudview Is a Good Faith Purchaser
of Parcel F and Owns Parcel F Sub-
ject to the City’s Recorded Drainage
Easement.

1. Summary Judgment Standard of Re-
view

{14} In Romero v. Philip Morris Ine.
(Philip Morris), 2010-NMSC-035, 148 N.M.
718, 242 P.3d 280, we repeated the following
standards regarding appeals of summary
judgments, Our review of summary judg-
ment on appeal is de novo. Jd. 17. Summary
judgment will be affirmed if we conclude that
“there are no genuine issues of material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Jd. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We “view the
facts in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment and draw all
reasonable inferences in support of a trial on

the merits.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The party moving for
summary judgment has the “initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case for summary
judgment” by presenting “such evidence as is
sufficient in law to raise a presumption of
fact or establish the fact in question unless
rebutted.” Jd. 10 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Once the mov-
ing party has met this burden, “the burden
shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the
existence of specific evidentiary facts which
would require trial on the merits.” Id. (in-
ternal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted). To determine which facts are material,
a court’s focus should be on whether, under
the pertinent substantive law, “the fact is
necessary to give rise to a claim.” Jd. 111
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).

2. Fee Title to Parcel F Did Not Vest
in the City.

{15} The City contends that evidence be-
fore the district court created genuine issues
of material fact precluding summary judg-
ment because such evidence supports a rea-
sonable inference that the City acquired fee
title to Parcel F by either statutory dedica-
tion or adverse possession. The evidence
before the district court was that in 1985,
Amrep submitted to the City a preliminary
plat for the proposed VHWU1 subdivision.
The VHWU1 preliminary plat is part of the
record on appeal, but it contains no markings
to indicate that it was ever recorded in San-
doval County. The preliminary plat de-
scribes Parcel F as land that “WILL BE
OPEN SPACE.”

{16} In contrast, the final plat for the
VHWU1 subdivision, which was recorded in
the public property records of Sandoval
County on October 18, 1985, labels Parcel F
with the abbreviation “D.E.,” which, accord-
ing to the plat, stands for “Drainage Ease-
ment.” The recorded final plat also states
that “the Owners of the Property do hereby
dedicate all public thoroughfares which are
shown hereon to the City of Rio Rancho,
New Mexico, and do hereby grant easements
shown on the plat.” The VHWU1 recorded

435

plat was approved by the City’s Planning and
Zoning Commission and endorsed by Amrep.

{17} The record on appeal reflects the
City’s consistent admission that it instructed
Amrep to apply the drainage easement desig-
nation to Parcel F on the VHWU1 recorded
plat. The City maintains, however, that
“drainage easement” was used as a surrogate
term for “open space,” and that it relied on
Amrep’s representations that Amrep would
nonetheless set Parcel F “aside as open
space in perpetuity when the City approved
the plat.” Thus, argues the City, having
acquired fee title by virtue of dedication or
adverse possession prior to Amrep’s sale of
Parcel F, Amrep had no interest in Parcel F
to convey, thus depriving Cloudview of good
faith purchaser status.

a. Statutory Dedication Under
Section 3-20-11

HMM {18} Because the City relies on
Section 3-20-11 for its argument that fee
title to Parcel F vested in the City before
Amrep sold Parcel F, we will rely on this
section to determine which facts are material
for purposes of summary judgment. Under
Section 8-20-11, a municipality automatically
acquires fee title to land within its territory
once a plat that designates the land “for
public use” is endorsed and filed. The City
contends that the drainage easement desig-
nated on the final recorded plat constitutes a
dedication for public use under Section 3-20-
11. We disagree. “Although drainage un-
doubtedly can be a public use of property,
... [merely because land can be dedicated
to public use[] does not mean it has been.”
Smith v. Beesley, 226 Ariz. 313, 247 P.38d 548,
556 (App.2011) (finding that drainage ease-
ments designated solely for the purpose of
drainage on subdivision plat were not for
public use); see State ex rel. State Highway
Comm'n v. Briggs, 73 N.M. 170, 172, 386
P.2d 258, 259-60 (1963) (“The plat ... as
filed and received into evidence certainly did
not designate the parking area as an area set
aside for public use as required by the stat-
ute. It merely designates the area involved
as a ‘parking area’ ”). Where a subdivision
plat does not clearly designate land as set
aside for public use, we cannot find the land

to have been dedicated under Section 3-20-
il.

{19} The practical effect of allowing the
City to prevail on this claim would be the
transformation of a lesser, nonpossessory
property interest—an easement—into a
greater, possessory interest—fee title—with-
out an indication on the recorded plat of the
parties’ intent to do so. Section 8-20-11 only
operates to vest fee title to a specific proper-
ty in a municipality where a plat expressly
dedicates the property “for public use.” Al-
though the preliminary plat submitted by
Amrep did identify Parcel F as land that will
be open space, that preliminary plat was not
recorded as required by NMSA 1978, Section
14-9-1 (1991). Moreover, the only “dedica-
tion” in the recorded plat was of the public
thoroughfares. The language in the plat
abundantly clarifies the grant of a drainage
easement for Parcel F, not a more general
open space easement. Had the City wanted
Parcel F to be dedicated for public use, it
could have insisted that Parcel F be dedicat-
ed “for public use” as open space. It did not.

{20} There is no genuine issue of material
fact concerning whether the VHWU1 record-
ed plat designates Parcel F “for public use.”
The plat designates Parcel F as a drainage
easement and nothing more. Because the
VHWU1 recorded plat did not meet this
statutory requirement, the City’s claim for
acquisition of fee title by operation of Section
3-20-11 fails as a matter of law. The district
court’s grant of summary judgment against
the City on this claim was appropriate.

b, Adverse Possession

HM s{21} The City also claims that it
has fee title to Parcel F under adverse pos-
session. Adverse possession is defined as
“an actual and visible appropriation of land,
commenced and continued under a color of
title and claim of right inconsistent with and
hostile to the claim of another.” NMSA
1978, § 87-1-22 (1973). “A party claiming
ownership of land by adverse possession
must prove by clear and convincing evidence
continuous adverse possession for ten years
under color of title, in good faith, and pay-
ment of taxes on the property during these
years.” Williams v. Howell, 108 N.M. 225,

436

227, 770 P.2d 870, 872 (1989). “If any one of
the elements necessary to establish title to
land by adverse possession is missing, the
claimant will not obtain title.” Hernandez v.
Cabrera, 107 N.M. 435, 436, 759 P.2d 1017,
1018 (Ct.App.1988).

HE {22} The City relies on the VHWU1
recorded plat for color of title. “To possess
color of title, the claimant must have a writ-
ing or a conveyance of some kind that pur-
ports to convey the land title to which is
claimed.” Madrid v. Rodriguez (In ve Es-
tate of Duran), 2003-NMSC-008, 120, 183
N.M. 553, 66 P.8d 326 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see Slemmons
v. Massie, 102 N.M. 33, 34, 690 P.2d 1027,
1028 (1984) (“Color of title] must attempt to
give title to the adverse occupant, but for
some reason fails to do so.”).

WM {23} The VHWU1 recorded plat
grants a drainage easement to the City over
the entirety of Parcel F. Is the grant of this
drainage easement a writing or conveyance
that purports to convey fee title to the City?
The answer is no; “an easement is distin-
guished from a fee, and constitutes a liberty,
privilege, right, or advantage which one has
in the land of another ... measured by the
nature and purpose of the easement.” Ken-
nedy v. Bond, 80 N.M. 734, 736-37, 460 P.2d
809, 811-12 (1969) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). We conclude that the
City has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact on the essential element of color
of title because the VHWU1 recorded plat
does not purport to grant fee title to the
City. We hold that this claim fails as a matter
of law and uphold the district court’s grant of
summary judgment as to the City’s adverse
possession claim.

8. Cloudview Bought Parcel F Without.
Notice of the City’s Claimed Open
Space Easement.

{24} The City next argues that even if the
City does not hold fee title to Parcel F,
Cloudview is not a good faith purchaser with-
out notice of the City’s claim to an open
space easement. In district court, the City
sought a declaratory judgment that the
drainage easement designated on the final
recorded plat actually granted the City a

permanent open space easement over the
entirety of Parcel F that cannot be vacated
because the City and Amrep intended to
create open space as part of the VHWUL
subdivision approval process. In the alterna-
tive, the City sought a declaratory judgment
that Amrep impliedly dedicated Parcel F to
the City when Amrep represented that Par-
cel F would be maintained as open space in
perpetuity. See Santa Fe Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs v. Town of Edgewood, 2004-
NMCA-111, 118, 186 N.M. 301, 97 P.3d 633
(explaining that the public obtains an ease-
ment if “a landowner offers to dedicate cer-
tain property for public use and the offer is
accepted”).

{25} The City does not assert that Cloud-
view had actual knowledge of the City’s al-
leged open space easement. Instead the
City argues that Cloudview was on “inquiry
notice” of the City’s claim to an open space
easement. Therefore, argues the City, be-
cause “Cloudview had knowledge of facts
that would have led a prudent person to
investigate the history and reasons for desig-
nating a drainage easement over the entirety
of Parcel F,” Cloudview should be charged
with knowledge of all facts that a reasonably
diligent investigation would have revealed.
The City contends that such an investigation
would have revealed to Cloudview that Am-
rep and the City intended Parcel F to be
open space in perpetuity.

HMMM {26} A good faith purchaser of
veal property who has invested money in the
property without notice of a third party's
unrecorded interest in that property is pro-
tected under New Mexico law. See NMSA
1978, § 14-9-8 (1990); Angle v. Slayton, 102
N.M. 521, 528, 697 P.2d 940, 942 (1985). The
general rule is that a prospective purchaser
of real property is deemed to have notice of
adverse claims to that property if the pur-
chaser has “[k]nowledge of such facts as
ought to put a prudent [person] upon inquiry
as to the title.” Hunt v. Ellis, 27 N.M. 397,
401, 201 P. 1064, 1065 (1921) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). Once a
prospective purchaser obtains knowledge of
facts that trigger a duty to inquire about the
title, that purchaser must perform a “reason-

ably diligent investigation”-one that “would
lead to the knowledge of the requisite facts
by the exercise of ordinary diligence and
understanding.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). In such cases,
the prospective purchaser is charged with
knowledge of all facts that “a reasonably
diligent investigation would have ascer-
tained.” Jd. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In applying the inquiry
notice rule, “each case must be governed by
its own peculiar circumstances.” Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A person cannot be a [good faith] purchas-
er” if that person is aware of facts that
“should have put him [or her] to an inquiry,
which if pursued with due diligence, would
have led to a knowledge of the infirmities
appearing upon the face of the instrument
involved in the transaction.” Dunne v. Pet-
terman, 52 N.M. 284, 287-88, 197 P.2d 618,
620 (1948).

{27} The City presents two distinct theo-
ries to support its claim that Cloudview had a
duty to inquire: (1) that the City was in
“open possession” of Parcel F when Cloud-
view made its purchase, and (2) that before
purchasing Parcel F, Cloudview knew of an
“inherent ambiguity” in the VHWU1 record-
ed plat. We analyze each theory in turn.

a. The City Failed to Present Evidence
upon Which Reasonable Minds Could
Differ as to the City’s Open Posses-
sion of Parcel F.

TI {28} The City argues that Cloud-
view had a duty to inquire about the nature
and scope of the drainage easement on Par-
cel F because Cloudview’s agent, Mr. Garcia,
knew that the City had an easement over
Parcel F, and Parcel F had remained open
space despite having been surrounded by
development for more than twenty years. In
light of these facts, the City contends that
Cloudview had a duty to investigate why the
City was in open possession of Parcel F when
Cloudview purchased the property. Cloud-
view argues that the City was not in open
possession, citing Teofan v. Cools (In ve
Spring Creek Invs. of Dallas, N.V., Inc.), TL
B.R. 157, 159 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1987) (“posses-
sion, to act as ... notice of adverse owner-

437

ship, must be visible, open, notorious, and
exclusive, and not merely constructive pos-
session.”).

HI {29} Possession of land by one other
than the owner of record can be sufficient to
trigger a purchaser’s duty to inquire further.
See Hunt, 27 N.M. at 402, 201 P. at 1066 (“A
person who purchases an estate in the pos-
session of” someone other than the seller is
“bound to inquire of such possessor what
right [the possessor] has in the estate.” (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
“What acts may or may not constitute a
possession are necessarily varied and depend
to some extent upon the nature, locality, and
use to which the property may be applied,
the situation of the parties, and a variety of
circumstances which have necessarily to be
taken into consideration.” Id. at 401-02, 201
P. at 1065 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Hs {80} However, open possession
of property creates no duty to investigate
where all signs of possession can be attrib-
uted to and are consistent with ownership by
the owner of record. See éd. at 403, 201 P. at
1066 (holding that a subsequent purchaser
did not have constructive notice of a third
party’s claimed interest because the third
party’s land use was not noticeably different
than the use made prior to the third party’s
alleged acquisition); see also Teofan, 71 B.R.
at 159 (“Possession that could easily be re-
ferred to the person in whom stood the rec-
ord title is not sufficient.”). Where open
possession can be attributed to the owner of
record, “[a]n investigator may certainly rely
upon the truth of the recitals of a record,
where they are specific.” Smith & Ricker v.
Hill Bros, 17 N.M, 415, 431, 134 P. 243, 247
(1918); see also Allison v. Curtis, 62 N.M.
387, 390, 310 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1957) (holding
that innocent purchasers for value were enti-
tled to rely on the property records).

{81} Is the fact that Parcel F is undevel-
oped and surrounded by subdivided parcels
inconsistent with ownership by Amrep? No.
The lack of development on Parcel F, even
when viewed in contrast to the surrounding
development, fails to raise a reasonable infer-
ence that anyone other than Amrep, and
subsequently the.Mares group, made the de-

438

cision to leave the parcel undeveloped, and it
certainly does not constitute open possession
by anyone other than the owner of record.
Accordingly, we conclude that the City failed
to present evidence upon which reasonable
minds would differ as to the City’s open
possession of Parcel F.

b. Cloudview Had No Duty to Investigate
the Nature or Scope of the Easement
over Parcel F Because the Recorded
Plat Unambiguously Granted a Drain-
age Easement to the City.

MM {32} The City also argues that
Cloudview owed a duty to inquire further
because Mr. Garcia “readily admits that pri-
or to purchase he was aware of the inherent
ambiguity in the Final Plat.” More specifical-
ly, the City contends that there is an inher-
ent ambiguity in the language granting the
drainage easement because (1) the recorded
drainage easement covered the entirety of
Parcel F; (2) the topography of Parcel F
precluded its use as a drainage easement; (8)
the easement had to be vacated before the
City would permit the subdivision to proceed;
(4) Cloudview’s inquiry with the City resulted
in an indefinite answer because the City em-
ployees with whom Cloudview spoke did not
know the history of Parcel F’s designation as
a drainage easement; and (6) the City would
require Cloudview to cite all previous drain-
age studies and reports in its new drainage
report for the area.

HE s({88} The VHWUI recorded plat
expressly grants the City a drainage ease-
ment over Parcel F. “An easement creates a
nonpossessory right to enter and use land in
the possession of another and obligates the
possessor not to interfere with the uses au-
thorized by the easement.” Restatement
(Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 1.2(1), at 12
(2000). The easement holder’s right to use
the property is limited to the particular pur-
pose for which the easement was created.
See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servi-
tudes § 1.2 emt. d, at 15 (“The holder of the
easement ... is entitled to make only the
uses reasonably necessary for the specified
purpose.”). The owner of the fee title re-
tains the right to make “any reasonable use
desired of the land in which the easement

TT

exists,” as long as that use is consistent with
the rights of the easement holder. Kennedy,
80 N.M. at 736-87, 460 P.2d at 811-12 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
For example, the transferor of an ease-
ment for an underground pipeline retains
the right to enter and make any use of the
area covered by the easement that is not
specifically prohibited by the easement and
that does not unreasonably interfere with
use of the easement for pipeline purposes.

The holder of the easement may only use

the area for purposes reasonably related to

the pipeline.
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes
§ 1.2 emt. d, at 15.

TH {34} The purpose of the City’s ease-
ment, according to the unambiguous lan-
guage on the VHWUI1 recorded plat, is
drainage. “The ordinary connotation of the
word ‘drainage’ means the carrying away of
water and other liquids either in closed or
open conduits.” Peterson v. Barron, 401
§.W.2d 680, 686 (Tex.Civ.App.1966). Cloud-
view and other subsequent purchasers are
entitled to rely upon the recorded plat’s spe-
cific recital of the City’s right to use Parcel F
only for drainage purposes. See Smith &
Ricker, 17 N.M. at 481, 184 P. at 247 (Cloud-
view “may certainly rely upon the truth of
the recitals of a record, where they are spe-
cific”). The City, which admits that it in-
structed Amrep to use “drainage easement”
as a surrogate term for “open space” on the
recorded plat, cannot now rely upon a theory
of ambiguity arising from that written instru-
ment, unambiguous on its face, to defeat
Cloudview’s claim for protection as a good
faith purchaser for value without notice. We
hold as a matter of law that the designation
of a drainage easement over Parcel F did not
give rise to a duty for Cloudview to investi-
gate the nature or extent of the easement.

ec. The District Court Properly Excluded
Extrinsic Evidence of Amrep’s and the
City’s Intent Because Cloudview’s
Good Faith Purchaser Status Extin-
guished the City’s Claimed but Unre-
corded Interests.
HM {85} As the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly noted, “‘[a]n easement should be con-

strued according to the intent of the par-
ties.” Cloudview, No. 29,510, slip op. at 19
(quoting Olson v. H & B Props, Inc, 118
N.M. 495, 498, 882 P.2d 536, 589 (1994); see
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes
§ 4.101), at 496-97 (“A servitude should be
interpreted to give effect to the intention of
the parties ascertained from the language
used in the instrument, or the circumstances
surrounding creation of the servitude, and to
carry out the purpose for which it was creat-
ed.”).

{36} Based on these general principles, the
Court of Appeals relied upon contract law to
conclude that the district court erred when it
“failed to consider all of the extrinsic evi-
dence presented by the City to show that the
Plat was ambiguous as to the true intent of
the parties regarding the designation and
future use of Parcel F.” AMREP, 2010-
NMCA-075, 111, 148 N.M. 542, 238 P.3d
911; see Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 114 N.M.
718, 781, 845 P.2d 1282, 1235 (1993) (holding
that the district court should have allowed
the parties to submit extrinsic evidence to
show that the meaning of a contract was
unclear); C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall
Partners, 112 N.M. 504, 508-09, 817 P.2d
238, 242-48 (1991) (“{IIn determining wheth-
er a term or expression to which the parties
have agreed is unclear, a court may hear
evidence of the cireumstances surrounding
the making of the contract and of any rele-
vant usage of trade, course of dealing, and
course of performance.” (footnote omitted)).
The City argues that this rule of contract
interpretation should be applied to plats as
well as contracts. See Wilson v. Owen, 261
S.W.2d 19, 28 (Mo.1958) (explaining that
where the meaning of writing on a plat is in
doubt, the court can look to extrinsic evi-
dence to determine the parties’ intent).

Ws {37} However, the legal treat-
ment of language in a recorded plat is differ-
ent than the legal treatment of language in a
contract. An easement described in a record-
ed instrument must be in writing and duly
recorded in the office of the county clerk of
the county where the easement is situated.
Section 14-9-1. More importantly, when in-
terpreting the nature and extent of an ease-
ment, we place “heavy emphasis ... on the

439

written expressions of the parties’ intent.”
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes
§ 4.1 cmt. d, at 499. Easements “are intend-
ed to bind successors to interests in the land,
as well as the contracting parties, and are
generally intended to last for an indefinite
period of time.” Id. The recorded instru-
ment “is often the primary source of informa-
tion available to a prospective purchaser of
the land.” Jd. Therefore, the language in a
granting instrument “should be interpreted
to accord with the meaning an ordinary pur-
chaser would ascribe to it in the context of
the parcels of land involved.” Id. Consider-
ation of extrinsic evidence that may illumi-
nate “a particular meaning adopted by the
creating parties is generally inappropriate
because the creating parties intended to bind
and benefit successors for whom the written
record will provide the primary evidence of
the [easement]’s meaning.” Jd. at 499-500.
“An easement should be construed according
to its express and specific terms as a man-
ifestation of the intent of the parties.” Sand-
ers v. Lutz, 109 N.M. 198, 194, 784 P.2d 12,
18 (1989). But “{wJhen the express terms of
an easement are ambiguous, the intent of the
parties should be determined from the lan-
guage of the granting instrument in conjunc-
tion with the surrounding circumstances.”
Olson, 118 N.M. at 498, 882 P.2d at 539.

{38} To allow extrinsic evidence to estab-
lish an ambiguity in the meaning of language
in a plat, when the language itself is unam-
biguous, would frustrate the purpose of our
law that governs the recording of instru-
ments affecting real estate. To ensure that
subsequent purchasers of property have no-
tice of prior claims of interest, New Mexico
law provides that all “writings affecting the
title to real estate shall be recorded in the
office of the county clerk of the county or
counties in which the real estate affected
thereby is situated.” Section 14-9-1. The
inevitable consequence of this requirement is
the constructive knowledge that flows from it
because “{s]uch records shall be notice to all
the world of the existence and contents of the
instruments so recorded from the time of
recording.” NMSA 1953, § 14-9-2 (1886-
87).

440

HH {89} The purpose for requiring the
recording of instruments affecting real estate
in the county where the property is situated
is to provide “a place and a method by which
an intending purchaser ... can safely deter-
mine just what kind of title [the purchaser] is
in fact obtaining.” Romero v. Sanchez, 83
N.M. 358, 361, 492 P.2d 140, 143 (1971) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The recording requirement seeks “to protect.
[good faith] purchasers against loss” from
adverse claims of interest that are “not dis-
closed by any public record” and “not ascer-
tainable by due diligence.” Id. (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted); see also
Arias v. Springer, 42 N.M. 850, 359, 78 P.2d
158, 159 (1988) (“The object of the statute is
to prevent injustice by protecting those who,
without knowledge of infirmities in the title,
invest money in property or mortgage loans;
and those who have acquired judgment liens
without such knowledge.”).

{40} Thus, Section 14-9-3 provides that
unrecorded instruments asserting interests
in real estate shall not affect the title or
rights of purchasers to real estate if the
purchaser did not have knowledge of the
existence of such unrecorded instruments.
See Jeffers v. Doel, 99 N.M. 351, 353, 658
P.2d 426, 428 (1982) (explaining that the stat-
ute protects “innocent purchasers for value
without notice of unrecorded instruments”
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted)).

{41} Municipalities are not exempt from
the recording requirements. Municipalities
are “entitled to have instruments affecting
real estate [conveyed] to them ... to be duly
recorded in ... the various counties in which
the real estate is situated.” NMSA 1978,
§ 14-9-7(A) (1987). When a municipality
records an instrument affecting real estate,
that instrument “shall have the full legal
effect of recording and be legal notice of the
rights of the public entities [to the] interests
conveyed or granted.” Section 14-9~7(B).

{42} The final recorded plat is what gov-
erns in this case, and the recorded plat un-
ambiguously grants a drainage easement to
the City. Because the drainage easement is
unambiguous, Cloudview did not have a duty
to investigate any additional adverse claims

the City might have had to the title of Parcel
F. Even if the City and Amrep intended
“drainage easement” to mean “open space,”
their intent is now irrelevant in light of
Cloudview’s good faith purchaser status.
When a good faith purchaser takes real
property without notice of an unrecorded
easement, the unrecorded easement is extin-
guished under Section 14-9-3. See Restate-
ment (Third) of Prop. Servitudes § 7.14
emt. a, at 440 (“The basic rule is that all
unrecorded servitude benefits, regardless of
the manner of their creation, are subject to
extinguishment under the recording act.”).
We agree with the Restatement that the
“benefits produced by subjecting [easements]
to extinguishment under the recording act
will outweigh the social costs” because pro-
spective purchasers will be able to rely on
the property records. Id.

{43} Cloudview is a good faith purchaser
who took Parcel F subject only to the City’s
recorded drainage easement. See § 14-92
(charging subsequent purchasers with con-
structive notice of all recorded documents
within the purchaser’s chain of title). We
hold that each of the City’s claimed but
unrecorded interests in Parcel F have been
extinguished by Cloudview’s good faith pur-
chaser status. Further, under the circum-
stances of this case, neither the scope nor the
purpose of the easement may vary from
drainage as expressed on the VHWU1 re-
corded plat.

B. The City’s Administrative Decision
Was Arbitrary and Contrary to Law.
HN {44} As a threshold matter, the City
contends that Cloudview failed to appeal the
City’s administrative decision within the ap-
plicable limitation period because Cloudview
failed to file a complaint in state district
court within two days of when the federal
court dismissed Cloudview’s complaint with-
out prejudice. A person aggrieved by a deci-
sion of a zoning authority has thirty days to
appeal to the district court. See NMSA
1978, § 3-21-9 (1999) (“A person aggrieved
by a decision of the zoning authority ... may
appeal the decision pursuant to the provi-
sions of Section 89-8-1.1 NMSA 1978.”);
NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1(C) (1999) (“[A] per-

son aggrieved by a final [administrative] de-
cision may appeal the decision to district
court by filing in district court a notice of
appeal within thirty days of the date of filing
of the final decision.”).

{45} In this case, the City’s Governing
Body issued its final decision on November
10, 2005. Cloudview sought review in federal
district court on December 8, 2005, twenty-
eight days later. See Cloudview Estates,
LLC v. City of Rio Rancho, Civ. No. 05-
01283 MV/WPL (D.N.M. Dee. 8, 2005). The
filing of the federal action tolled the limita-
tions period. See Gathman-Matotan Archi-
tects & Planners, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Fin.
& Admin., Prop. Control Div., 109 N.M. 492,
495, 787 P.2d 411, 414 (1990) (“[T]he filing of
a complaint ordinarily tolls the applicable
limitations period. In this respect, New
Mexico has adopted an ‘equitable’ or nonstat-
utory tolling principle alongside the statutory
tolling provisions in NMSA 1978, Sections
87-1-14, 37-1-9 and 387-1-12.”); see also
Bracken v. Yates Petrolewm Corp., 107 N.M.
463, 465, 760 P.2d 155, 157 (1988) (“When a
lawsuit is filed, that filing shows a desire on
the part of the plaintiff to begin [the] case
and thereby toll whatever statutes of limita-
tion would otherwise apply. The filing itself
shows the proper diligence on the part of the
plaintiff which such statutes of limitation
were intended to insure.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)), disagreed with
on other grounds, Team Bank v. Meridian
Oil Inc, 118 N.M. 147, 151, 879 P.2d 779, 783
(1994).

{46} While Cloudview’s federal action was
still pending, the City initiated its suit in
state district court. Cloudview had thirty
days to file its answer to the complaint and
any counterclaims it had against the City.
Rules 1-012(A), 1-018 NMRA. Once the fed-
eral action was dismissed, Cloudview coun-
terclaimed in state district court for review
of the City’s administrative decision. A
counterclaim is not barred by a statute of
limitations if it was not barred at the time
the complaint was filed. See, eg., NMSA
1958, § 87-1-15 (1880); see generally
MAL, Annotation, Commencement of Ac-
tion as Suspending Running of Limitation
Against Claim Which Is Subject of Setoff,

Counterclaim, or Recoupment, 127 A.L.R.
909, 910 (1940) (“The rule which is supported
by the majority of the cases is that unless
otherwise provided by statute, if a counter-
claim or setoff is not barred at the com-
mencement of the action in which it is plead-
ed, it does not become so afterward during
the pendency of that action.”). Additionally,
Cloudview’s counterclaim was compulsory;
as such, Cloudview could not have raised it
separately as it would have been barred by
res judicata. See Rule 1-018(A) (“A pleading
shall state as a counterclaim any claim which
at the time of serving the pleading the plead-
er has against any opposing party, if it arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party’s
claim.”); see also City of Sunland Park v.
Macias, 2008-NMCA-098, 118, 184 N.M.
216, 75 P.8d 816 (“Res judicata bars not only
claims that were raised in the prior proceed-
ing, but also claims that could have been
raised.”). We conclude that Cloudview’s ap-
peal for review in the state district court was
timely.

Hs {47} Having found that the state
district court properly reviewed the City’s
administrative decision, “we will conduct the
same review of an administrative order as
the district court sitting in its appellate ca-
pacity, while at the same time determining
whether the district court erred in the first
appeal.” Rio Grande Chapter of the Sierra
Club v. N.M. Mining Comm’n, 2003-NMSC-
005, 116, 1838 N.M. 97, 61 P.38d 806. The
district court may set aside, reverse, or re-
mand final administrative orders if it finds
that “(1) the agency acted fraudulently, arbi-
trarily or capriciously; (2) the decision was
not supported by substantial evidence; or (8)
the agency did not act in accordance with
law.” Section 89-3-1.1(D). “A ruling by an
administrative agency is arbitrary and capri-
cious if it is unreasonable or without a ration-
al basis, when viewed in light of the whole
record.” Rio Grande, 2008-NMSC-005,
117, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806.

{48} In this case, the City declined to
vacate the drainage easement in part because
the “protection of Parcel F as open space
provides a valued public use originally made
a condition of the development of [(VHWU1]

442

that should be continued.” Because the City
owns only a drainage easement over Parcel
F, we conclude that the City’s decision to
enforce an unrecorded open space easement
against the rights of a subsequent good faith
purchaser was arbitrary and contrary to law.
However, we do not know how the City
would have decided Cloudview’s application if
it had not interposed a perpetual open space
easement as a reason not to grant Cloud-
view’s application. Therefore, we vacate the
City’s administrative decision and remand to
the City’s Governing Body for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this Opinion.

C. Cloudview’s Claim for Inverse Con-
demnation Is Not Ripe for Consider-
ation.

HM {49} Cloudview argues that the
City’s decision to retain Parcel F for public
use as open space was in effect a taking of its
property. See NMSA 1978, § 42A-1-29(A)
(1983) (“A person authorized to exercise the
right of eminent domain who has taken ...
any property for public use without making
just compensation ... is liable to the con-
demnee, or any subsequent grantee thereof,
for the value thereof.”). Specifically, Cloud-
view argues that the City deprived Cloud-
view of any economically beneficial use of its
property. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Cowneil,
505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120
L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (“(W]hen the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacri-
fice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave
[the] property economically idle, [the owner]
has suffered a taking.”).

{50} Because the City’s administrative de-
cision has been vacated and remanded,
Cloudview’s inverse condemnation claim is
not yet ripe for our consideration. We re-
verse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Cloudview on this claim
and remand the claim to the district court
where it shall be stayed pending the outeome
of the City’s administrative decision.

D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist
with Respect to the City’s Claim for
Damages Against Amrep for Unjust
Enrichment.

{51} The City also seeks equitable relief in
the form of a constructive trust to prevent

Amrep’s and Cloudview’s unjust enrichment.
The City argues that “Amrep should be held
accountable for selling Parcel F to a third
party for residential development after prom-
ising the City, as well as VHWUI lot pur-
chasers, that Parcel F would remain open
space in perpetuity.” See Knight v. City of
Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 265, 266, 794 P.2d
739, 740 (Ct.App.1990) (“[A] developer will
not be allowed to induce purchasers to buy
property by purporting to include open space
such as parks or golf courses in a subdivision
plat, only to subsequently change the uses of
those open space areas.”),

HE £52} Wrongful conduct, such as
fraud, may in some instances “warrant the
imposition of a constructive trust.” Gushwa
v. Hunt (In re Estate of Gushwa), 2008-
NMSC-064, 134, 145 N.M. 286, 197 P.8d 1.
“A court will impose a constructive trust to
prevent the unjust enrichment that would
result if the person having the property were
permitted to retain it.” Id. (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). “If a court
imposes a constructive trust, the person hold-
ing legal title is subjected to an equitable
duty to convey the property to a person to
whom the court has determined that duty is
owed.” Jd. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

HM {53} In light of our conclusion that
Cloudview is a good faith purchaser for value
without notice of the City’s claimed but unre-
corded interests in Parcel F, we find no
grounds in the evidence presented by the
City that would justify our imposition of a
constructive trust upon Parcel F. In this
context, Cloudview is entitled to retain the
benefit of its bargain with the Mares group
and its resulting fee ownership of Parcel F.

Hs {£54} Nevertheless, we conclude
that the City presented sufficient evidence,
including affidavits and deposition testimony,
to allow reasonable minds to differ on the
elements of the City’s unjust enrichment
claim against Amrep. To prevail on a claim
for unjust enrichment, “one must show that:
(1) another has been knowingly benefitted at,
one’s expense (2) in a manner such that

allowance of the other to retain the benefit
would be unjust.” Ontiveros Insulation Co.
v. Sanchez, 2000-NMCA-~051, 111, 129 N.M.
200, 8 P.3d 695.

TE {55} Amrep has, at various times in
this litigation, argued that it should not be
considered a defendant of the City’s unjust
enrichment claim because the unjust enrich-
ment count of the City’s complaint sought
specific relief in the form of a constructive
trust on Parcel F, which Amrep no longer
owns. We disagree. The City has always
based its claim of entitlement to equitable
relief on Amrep’s alleged knowledge and con-
duct. Unjust enrichment is a claim based in
equity, and once a court is “rightfully pos-
sessed of a case it will not relinquish it short
of doing complete justice. It weighs the
equities between the parties and adopts vari-
ous devices to protect against unjust enrich-
ment.” Id. 118 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Our denial of the con-
structive trust relief initially requested by
the City does not prevent the City’s mainte-
nance of its unjust enrichment claim against
Amrep for damages for unjust enrichment.
We reverse the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Amrep on the
City’s claim for unjust enrichment and re-
mand to the district court to consider this
claim and the appropriate remedy.

I. CONCLUSION

{56} Cloudview is a good faith purchaser
for value of Parcel F subject only to the

443

City’s recorded drainage easement. We up-
hold the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Amrep and Cloudview
on the City’s fee ownership and open space
easement claims. We vacate the City’s ad-
ministrative decision and remand to the
City’s Governing Body for further proceed-
ings consistent with this Opinion. We re-
verse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Cloudview on Cloud-
view’s inverse condemnation counterclaim
and remand that claim to the district court
where it shall be stayed pending the outcome
of the City’s administrative decision. We
reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Amrep on the City’s
unjust enrichment claim, but we uphold sum-
mary judgment on that claim as to Cloud-
view.

{57} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES,
Justices, and RICHARD C. BOSSON,
Justice, recused.

2011-NMCA-035
261 P.3d 592
William R. HUMPHRIES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PAY AND SAVE, INC., a/k/a Lowe’s
Grocery #55 and Tim Cotton,
Defendants—Appellees.

No. 29,197.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
March 11, 2011.

Steven K. Sanders & Associates, LLC,
Steven K. Sanders, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellant.

Littler Mendelson, P.C., R. Shawn Oller,
Phoenix, AZ, for Appellees.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} Plaintiff William R. Humphries argues
the district court improperly dismissed his
claims. He alleged below that his employers
Pay and Save, Inc., and Tim Cotton (collec-
tively Defendants) improperly terminated his
employment on suspicion that he engaged in
union-organizing activities. The district
court concluded that federal labor law
preempted Plaintiff's claims. We agree and
affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} On May 18, 2008, Plaintiff filed a com-
plaint in the district court seeking relief on
six counts: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
(8) negligent or intentional misrepresenta-
tion; (4) wrongful termination; (5) tortious
interference with contractual relations
(against Tim Cotton individually); and (6)
declaratory relief. All counts relied on the
same core of common facts. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleged that until he was terminated
on February 23, 2006, he had been employed
as a produce manager for five years at
Lowe’s Grocery #55 in Alamogordo, New
Mexico. Defendant Pay and Save, Inc., owns
and operates Lowe’s Grocery #55, and De-
fendant Tim Cotton was the store manager
at the time Plaintiff was terminated. Plain-
tiff alleged that although he had never been
“reprimanded or disciplined ... in any man-

|

445

ner,” Defendants fired him because they “be-
lieved [he] was involved in organizing the
employees of Lowes.” Plaintiff contended
that termination in this manner was unjust
and that Defendants’ actions resulted in nu-
merous injuries for which he sought compen-
sation. Plaintiff's complaint for wrongful
termination specifically asserted Defendants’
violation of state public policy that encour-
ages the right to form, join, organize, and
collectively bargain as a member of a labor
organization.

{3} On July 7, 2008, Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint. In perti-
nent part, they argued that pursuant to Rule
1-012(B)(1) NMRA and Rule 1-012(B)(6)
NMRA, the federal labor law vested the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
with exclusive and primary jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's claims. Citing San Diego Build-
ing Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S, 236,
79 S.Ct. 778, 8 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), Defen-
dants argued that the facts underlying Plain-
tiffs claims, if true, constituted an unfair
labor practice under the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947)
and 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1974). As such, the
claims were expressly preempted under long-
standing Supreme Court precedent. Defen-
dants further argued that if Plaintiff were to
claim status as a “supervisor” outside the
NLRA, his claims would still be preempted
under the Supreme Court’s holdings in Beas-
ley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc. 416
US. 658, 94 S.Ct. 2023, 40 L.Ed.2d 443
(1974), and Lodge 76, International Associa-
tion of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Eneployment Rela-
tions Commission, 427 U.S. 182, 96 S.Ct.
2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976). As an exhibit
to their motion, Defendants included a photo-
copy of a retaliatory discharge claim Plaintiff
made to the NLRB before filing the present
complaint. Dated August 4, 2006, that claim
describes Plaintiff's status as an “employee.”
Plaintiff argued in his response to the motion
to dismiss that neither Garmon, Beasley, nor
Machinists were dispositive. He instead
contended that because his claims did not
require interpretation of a collective bargain-

446
ing agreement, preemption did not apply.t

{4} The district court held a hearing on
Defendants’ motion via conference call, and
at its conclusion, the district court granted
Defendants’ motion on the basis of federal
preemption. It found that each of Plaintiff's
claims was based on Defendants alleged be-
lief that Plaintiff “was engaged in union ac-
tivity” and found that claims involving ter-
mination for such activities constituted a
“federal issue.”

{5} Plaintiff now appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his complaint. He con-
tends that because his claims for breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, misrepresentation, wrongful
termination, and tortious interference do not
originate in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, they do not implicate federal labor law
and are therefore not preempted. Plaintiff
contends that because these claims are based
exclusively on state law, they should be re-
solved in state court. He also argues that
there is no reason why his other allegations
cannot remain viable, even assuming his
claim for wrongful termination is preempted.
As such, Plaintiff contends the district court
was incorrect in refusing jurisdiction of all
counts in his complaint without considering
each individually. We consider these argu-
ments below.

DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

TH {6} Motions to dismiss under Rule 1-
012(B)(1) and (B)(6) are reviewed de novo.
See Holguin v. Tsay Corp. 2009-NMCA-
056, 19, 146 N.M. 346, 210 P.8d 243 (“We
review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 1-
012(B)(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction
issue de novo.”); Healthsource, Inc. v. X-
Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 2005-NMCA-097,
116, 1388 N.M. 70, 116 P.3d 861 (“A district
court's decision to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim [under Rule 1-
012(B)(6) ] is reviewed de novo.”). In such
cases, we test “the legal sufficiency of the
complaint, not the factual allegations of the
pleadings[,] which ... the court must accept
as true.” Healthsowrce, Inc., 2005-NMCA-
097, 116, 188 N.M. 70, 116 P.3d 861. Like-

1. Plaintiff withdrew this NLRB complaint before

wise, this Court has applied a de novo stan-
dard to questions of federal preemption.
Weise v. Wash. Tru Solutions, L.L.C., 2008-
NMCA-121, 19, 144 N.M. 867, 192 P.8d
1244; Hadrych v. Hadrych, 2007-NMCA-
001, 15, 140 N.M. 829, 149 P.8d 593,

B. Federal Preemption Generally

HI {7} Federal preemption derives from
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
United States Constitution. Largo v. Atchi-
son, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co, 2002-
NMCA-021, 16, 181 N.M. 621, 41 P.8d 347.
The doctrine ensures uniformity in federal
policies by protecting against the potentially
dilutive effects of state legislation and judi-
cial interpretation. Jd. New Mexico's
courts maintain a strong preference against
the doctrine. Id. As a result, we apply it
only in situations where Congress has an-
nounced a “clear and manifest purpose” for
us to do so. Montoya v. Mentor Corp., 1996-
NMCA-067, 18, 122 N.M. 2, 919 P.2d 410
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). Thus, congressional intent often arises
in the heavily regulated landscape of federal
labor law. Preemption may apply in a vari-
ety of ways and a few have been discussed by
New Mexico’s appellate courts in recent
years. See, ¢.g., Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon,
1999-NMSC-025, 1133-34, 127 N.M. 282,
980 P.2d 65 (analyzing preemption under the
NLRA and Garmon ); Weise, 2008-NMCA-
121, 117-9, 144 N.M. 867, 192 P.3d 1244
(discussing preemption under both the
NLRA and Section 301 of the LMRA); Ker-
schion v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 2002-
NMCA-045, 11 6-8, 182 N.M. 119, 45 P.8d 59
(discussing preemption under Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000)). This
case requires us to consider three types of
federal labor law preemption.

{8} First, under Section 301 of the LMRA,
federal courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction
over all disputes requiring interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement. Kerschion,
2002-NMCA-045, 16, 182 N.M. 119, 45 P.8d
59. Second, state courts may not adjudicate
a matter that arguably falls under Sections 7
or 8 of the NLRA. Those sections prohibit

it received consideration.

several unfair labor practices, and Congress
has vested the NLRB with exclusive jurisdic-
tion to decide claims implicating them.
Dominguez v. Excell Agent Servs, L.L.C.,
187 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1265-66 (D.N.M.2001).

{9} Third, in Machinists, the United
States Supreme Court recognized that even
though some labor practices fall outside the
restrictions of Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA,
such practices were intentionally omitted by
Congress for the benefit of parties engaged
in labor negotiations. Practices of this type
are “weapons” intended by Congress “to be
controlled by the free play of economic
forces.” Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140, 147, 96
S.Ct. 2548; see Beasley, 416 U.S. at 661-62,
94 S.Ct. 2023 (discussing the claims of super-
visors, though specifically excluded from pro-
tection under the NLRA, may not be decided
by state courts in the interest of uniform
national labor policy). As such, the NLRB
maintains exclusive jurisdiction over them
also. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140, 147, 96
S.Ct. 2548.

{10} We consider each type of preemption
below. While Plaintiff is correct that his
claims are not preempted by Section 301 of
the LMRA, we hold that his claims still fail
under Garmon, Beasley or Machinists, re-
gardless of whether we consider him an em-
ployee or a supervisor under the NLRA.

C. Section 301 of the LMRA

HMMM {11} Section 301 preemption ap-
plies where the scope of the parties’ relation-
ship is defined by either a collective bargain-
ing agreement “between an employer and a
labor organization” or a contract among la-
bor organizations. Weise, 2008-NMCA-121,
1.29, 144 N.M. 867, 192 P.3d 1244; see Lingle
v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc, 486 U.S.
399, 412, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410
(1988) (holding that state law claims for re-
taliatory discharge are preempted by Section
801 to the extent they require interpretation
of a collective bargaining agreement). When
a party’s claim requires interpretation of
such an agreement, the federal courts exer-
cise exclusive jurisdiction. Lingle, 486 U.S.
at 401, 418, 108 S.Ct. 1877; see Kerschion,
2002-NMCA-045, 16, 182 N.M. 119, 45 P.8d
59 (stating that Section 301 preempts “claims

447

raised in state court that require the inter-
pretation or application of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement”). Section 301 provides
that:

Suits for violation of contracts between an

employer and a labor organization repre-

senting employees in an industry affecting
commerce ... or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any dis-
trict court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect.
to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a). We have interpreted
this language to forbid states from deciding
matters under state law that are more appro-
priately analyzed under federal law as
“duties assumed in  collective-bargaining
agreements.” Kerschion, 2002~NMCA-045,
16, 182 N.M. 119, 45 P.8d 59 (quoting Liva-
das v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122-23, 114
S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). This
process ensures state law will not frustrate
Congressional intent by determining “ques-
tions [related] to what the parties to a labor
agreement agreed, and what legal conse-
quences were intended to flow from breaches
of that agreement.” Id.

{12} Plaintiff argues his claims are not
preempted because his relationship with De-
fendants was not governed by a collective
bargaining agreement. He cites Mowry v.
United Parcel Service, 415 F.3d 1149 (10th
Cir.2005), Garley v. Sandia Corp. 236 F.3d
1200 (10th Cir.2001), and Jarvis v. No-
bel/Sysco Food Services Co., 985 F.2d 1419
(10th Cir.1993), for support. To the extent
Section 301 preemption might apply in this
case, Plaintiff is correct. Neither the plead-
ings nor the record alert the court to the
existence of a collective bargaining agree-
ment or a labor union among the employees
at Pay and Save. In this context, Section 301
does not preempt Plaintiff's claims.

{13} Yet, several types of federal preemp-
tion are applicable in the labor law context,
and the absence of preemption under Section
801 does not void preemption from other
sources. Plaintiff fails to analyze other types
of preemption, specifically preemption under
Garmon, Beasley, or Machinists. We now
analyze Garmon, Beasley, and Machinists

448

and conclude that Defendants’ reading of the
case law is consistent with our own.

D. Garmon Preemption

HM {14} In Weise, this Court analyzed
Garmon preemption in detail. Under that
doctrine, whenever a disputed activity “is
arguably subject to Section 7 or Section 8 of
the NLRA, the States as well as the federal
courts must defer to the exclusive compe-
tence of the NLRB if the danger of state
interference with national policy is to be
averted.” Weise, 2008-NMCA-121, 18, 144
N.M. 867, 192 P.3d 1244 (alterations omitted)
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). In pertinent part, Section 7 of the
NLRA provides that, “Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
29 U.S.C. § 157; see Weise, 2008-NMCA~
121, 18, 144 N.M. 867, 192 P.8d 1244. Section
8 forbids several unfair labor practices, in-
cluding: (1) interfering with an employee’s
rights under Section 7; (2) interfering with
or dominating “the formation or administra-
tion of any labor organization”; (8) basing
hiring decisions on union membership; (4)
terminating an employee for filing charges or
giving testimony under the NLRA; and (5)
refusing to bargain collectively with union
representatives. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a); see
Weise, 2008-NMCA-~121, 18, 144 N.M. 867,
192 P.8d 1244 (stating that preemption pre-
cludes consideration of Section 7 activities of
the NLRA by state courts).

{15} Garmon preemption functions to
maintain a uniform national labor policy, but
has several exceptions. Weise, 2008-
NMCA-121, 19, 144 N.M. 867, 192 P.3d
1244. For instance, states maintain jurisdic-
tion over matters that present only “periph-
eral concern{s] to the NLRA, such as slander
by an employer or retaliation for filing a
worker’s compensation claim.” Dominguez,
187 F.Supp.2d at 1266. States also maintain
2. We note that this language is repeated almost

verbatim, in paragraph 24 of Plaintiff's com-
plaint, asserting that Defendants’ violating these

jurisdiction over claims involving acts of vio-
lence or disturbance, damage to property,
and matters “so deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility that [it] could not [be in-
ferred] that Congress had deprived the
States of the power to act.” Machinists, 427
US. at 136, 96 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The test for
applying Garmon preemption has been de-
scribed as “whether the substance of the
dispute is the same under both the NLRA
and state law.” Dominguez, 187 F.Supp.2d
at 1266, If so, the dispute must be heard by
the NLRB. Id. Even in cases where it is
unclear whether the NLRA prohibits the ac-
tivity, “courts are not the primary tribunals
to adjudicate the issue; instead, such a de-
termination must be left in the first instance
to the NLRB.” Id. at 1265.

In other words, when an activity is argu-

ably subject to Section 7 or 8 of the

NLRA, state and federal courts must defer

to the competence of the NLRB to avoid

state interference with national labor poli-
cy. [The United States District Court]
must first decide whether there is an argu-
able case for preemption; if there is, the

Court must defer to the NLRB, and the

Court may not entertain this case unless

the NLRB has decided that the activity is

not governed by Section 7 or 8.

Id. at 1265-66 (citation omitted).

{16} The analysis in Dominguez aligns
closely with the facts of the case before us.
In Dominguez, the plaintiff filed suit under
state law against his employer, alleging he
was terminated for pro-union beliefs and past
union activities. Id. at 1265. The employer
filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of
NLRA preemption, which the court granted.
Id. The court concluded that, “the conduct
that forms the basis of [the p]laintiff’s state-
law claim is [the dJefendant’s alleged anti-
union conduct, firing [the pllaintiff for his
pro-union history and comments, The public
policy he relies on to support his claim is a
purported policy against anti-union activity.”
Id. at 1266. As a result, “the public policy
forming the basis of his retaliatory-discharge

principles is the basis for Plaintiff's wrongful

termination claim.

claim is exactly the same as the purposes
behind the NLRA—to prevent anti-union ac-
tions by employers.” Jd. Therefore, the
court held that “[the dJefendant’s action in
this case, firing [the pllaintiff due to his
supposed pro-union views, is arguably a vio-
lation of the NLRA and therefore subject to
the jurisdiction of the NLRB.” Id.

{17} It is well-established that the protec-
tions of Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA only
cover employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158; see
29 U.S.C. § 152(8) (1978) (defining “employ-
ee”); 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (defining “supervi-
sor”); see Int'l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-
CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 394-95, 106 S.Ct.
1904, 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986) (holding that in
order for NLRA preemption to apply, the
claimant must have “arguably” been an em-
ployee covered by the NLRA); Beasley, 416
US. at 661-62, 94 S.Ct. 2028 (holding that
Congress specifically excluded supervisors
from the NLRA’s protections). Plaintiff al-
leges he was terminated on suspicion that he
was organizing a union. Accepting for the
moment that Plaintiff was an employee and
not a supervisor under the NLRA, we agree
with the analysis in Dominguez. The NLRA
prohibits firing employees for union-organiz-
ing activity. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(4).
Thus, assuming Plaintiff's status as an em-
ployee, his claims arguably fall within the
purview of the NLRA and must first be
heard by the NLRB.

{18} Because supervisors are not protect-
ed by the NLRA, their claims are not subject
to Garmon preemption. Plaintiff argues that.
because his complaint identifies his title as
“produce manager,” he should be considered
a supervisor for purposes of the NLRA and
his claims should not be preempted under
Garmon. The term, supervisor, is specifical-
ly defined by the NLRA as someone who
exercises the “authority ... to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees,
or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Plain-
tiffs argument falls short of this definition.
Plaintiff never refers to himself as a supervi-
sor in his complaint. The title, “produce
manager,” says nothing of Plaintiff's func-

449

tional authority over subordinate personnel,
and Plaintiff provides no such information in
his complaint. When Plaintiff previously
filed a complaint with the NLRB in this case,
he referred to himself specifically as “William
Humphreys, an employee.” These matters
of record lead us to seriously question Plain-
tiff's alleged status as a supervisor under the
NLRA.

Hl {19} Despite such disagreements
over Plaintiff's authority Dominguez reminds
us that “[w]Jhere there is an arguable ques-
tion as to whether an employee is a supervi-
sor or an employee covered under the
NLRA, that question must be submitted ini-
tially to the NLRB for a decision.” 187
F.Supp.2d at 1267. Nevertheless, even
should we view Plaintiff as a supervisor, his
claims are still preempted under Beasley and
Machinists.

E. Preemption under Beasley and Ma-
chinists

HE {20} In Beasley, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether state courts could hear claims
brought by supervisors terminated for union
activity. 416 U.S. at 654-55, 94 S.Ct. 2023.
It was undisputed that the plaintiffs qualified
as supervisors under the NLRA, id. at 656,
94 S.Ct. 2028, and as such, the plaintiffs
argued the state had the authority to hear
their claims. Id. at 658, 94 S.Ct. 2023. The
Court disagreed. It analyzed the NLRA and
its amendments in detail and concluded that.
Congress specifically removed supervisors
from the NLRA and intentionally exposed
them to termination for union activity. Id. at
661-62, 94 S.Ct. 2028. In doing so, the Court
held that, “Congress’ dominant purpose ...
was to redress a perceived imbalance in la-
bor-management relationships that was
found to arise from putting supervisors in the
position of serving two masters with opposed
interests.” Jd. Thus, the states have no
jurisdiction to consider claims of this type
made by supervisors because to do so would
“flout the national policy against compulsion
upon employers ... to treat supervisors as
employees.” Jd, at 662, 94 S.Ct. 2023.

{21} The Court decided Machinists two
years later. 427 U.S. at 182, 96 S.Ct. 2548,

450

The Court observed that certain state in-
volvement in labor regulation was neverthe-
less preempted even though it fell outside
the NLRA. Jd. at 140, 96 S.Ct. 2548. Such
involvement is preempted when Congress
has expressed an intent “that the conduct
involved be unregulated because [it should]
be controlled by the free play of economic
forces.” Jd. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In order to balance the
parry and thrust of union-management nego-
tiations, Congress has armed each with cer-
tain “weapons” to aid in the collective bar-
gaining process. Id. at 147-48, 96 S.Ct. 2548,
Labor is no less powerful than management
in this regard. Jd. Thus, where Congress
specifically leaves certain practices unregu-
lated, states “may not prohibit [their use] or
add to an employer's federal legal obligations
in collective bargaining.” Id. at 147, 96 S.Ct.
2548 (internal quotation marks omitted).

{22} So, if Plaintiff was a supervisor, the
holdings of Beasley and Machinists control.
See Bowlen v. ATR Coit Co., Inc. 558 N.E.2d
1262, 1264 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (holding that
supervisor's state law claims were preempt-
ed); 190 A.L.R. Fed. 323 § 26 (2008) (dis-
cussing preemption of supervisor termination
claims). Beasley instructs us that Congress
has given employers the authority to termi-
nate supervisors for their union activities.
416 U.S. at 661-62, 94 S.Ct. 2023. Under
Machinists, if Congress has expressed an
intent to arm a party with such a weapon,
state courts may not confiscate it. 427 U.S.
at 147-51, 96 S.Ct. 2548. Thus, assuming
Plaintiff was a supervisor, his state law
claims are preempted by the authority of the
NLRB.

F. Severability

HE {23} Finally, we reject Plaintiff's ar-
gument that his claims are severable for
purposes of federal preemption on these
facts. We agree with the well-established
general principle that some counts in a com-
plaint may be preempted while others may
continue in state court. See Garley, 236 F.8d
at 1214-15 (affirming dismissal of claims for
breach of contract, breach of duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and defamation be-
cause of preemption, but reversing dismissal

of claims for alleged civil conspiracy and
retaliation, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress). But in this case, each count
of Plaintiffs complaint grows from one uni-
versal core allegation: Plaintiff was terminat-
ed by Defendants on suspicion that he sought
to organize a union among the employees at.
their grocery store. This allegation remains
constant despite the fact that five individual
legal arguments, each relying on unique au-
thorities, grow out from it. For example, in
count one, Plaintiff argues breach of con-
tract. In count four, he argues wrongful
termination. If we ask, why are Defendants
guilty of these allegations, the only reason-
able conclusion we can reach is—Defendants
are guilty because they terminated Plaintiff
on their belief that he engaged in organizing
a union. Such logic applies equally to each
count in Plaintiff's complaint, and each count
implicates the broader concerns of national
labor policy. We therefore hold that all are
uniformly precluded.

CONCLUSION

{24} We affirm the district court. While it
is true that Section 301 of the LMRA poses
no obstacle to Plaintiff's claims, each still
fails under either Garmon, Beasley or Ma-
chinists, regardless of whether we consider
Plaintiff an employee or a supervisor under
the NLRA.

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: MICHAEL E. VIGIL,
Judge and TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
(specially concurring).

GARCIA, Judge (specially concurring).

{26} I specially concur to emphasize that.
Plaintiff's claims were dismissed under Rule
1-012(B) without prejudice. Since the dis-
trict court’s order does not indicate whether
Plaintiffs claims were dismissed with or
without prejudice, we presume that Plaintiff's
claims were dismissed without prejudice.
Cruz v. FTS Constr. Inc., 2006-NMCA-109,
127, 140 N.M. 284, 142 P.8d 365 (reasoning
that where a district court's order does not
specify whether a dismissal is with or without
prejudice, the dismissal is considered to be
without prejudice).

{27} As a result of the district court's
dismissal of Plaintiff's claims without preju-
dice, Plaintiff still has a right to refile his
state law claims if he can overcome issues
regarding whether the NLRA preempts his
state law claims and any statute of limita-
tions issues. I agree with the majority that
since the disputed activity is arguably subject
to Section 7 or 8 of the NLRA, and there is
an arguable question regarding whether
Plaintiff is an employee covered under the
NLRA, the proper forum to initially address
those issues is before the NLRB. Majority
Opinion, 1116-19. As a result, the district
court’s dismissal of Plaintiff's claims without
prejudice was appropriate. See Dominguez,
187 F.Supp.2d at 1267 (concluding that where
the plaintiff was arguably covered by provi-
sions of the NLRA and his state law claim
arguably fell within the core purposes of the
NLRA, dismissal was appropriate because
the state law claim was preempted by the
NLRA).

{28} As the majority recognizes, if a dis-
puted activity “is arguably subject to Section
7 or 8 of the NLRA, the States as well as the
federal courts must defer to the exclusive
[jurisdiction] of the NLRB if the danger of
state interference with national policy is to
be averted.” Majority Opinion, 114; Weise,
2008-NMCA-121, 18, 144 N.M. 867, 192 P.3d
1244, The United States Supreme Court has
clarified that the proper procedure for a
state court to determine whether Section 7 or
8 of the NLRA preempts a state law claim is
as follows: “{A] court first must decide
whether there is an arguable case for [pre-
emption]; if there is, it must defer to the
[NLRB], and only if the [NLRB] decides
that the conduct is not protected or prohibit-
ed may the court entertain the litigation.”
Int'l Longshoremen’s Ass'n v. Davis, 476
U.S. 380, 397, 106 S.Ct. 1904, 90 L.Ed.2d 389
(1986). Until the NLRB makes its initial
determination of whether Plaintiff's activity
is actually governed by Section 7 or 8 of the
NLRA, it is uncertain whether the NRLA
preempts any future state law claims by
Plaintiff.

{29} As a result, I agree that since there is
an arguable case for preemption, the NLRB
has exclusive initial jurisdiction to determine

451

whether the disputed activity is subject. to
the NLRA. However, as Davis clarifies, a
state court’s initial determination that the
NLRA arguably preempts state law does not
necessarily preclude all future state law
claims. Instead, if the NLRB determines
that the conduct is not protected or prohibit-
ed under the NLRA, then a state court may
entertain the litigation under the following
circumstances: “(1) if the conduct in question
is only a peripheral concern of the NLRA, or
(2) if the state law claims touch interests so
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibil-
ity that, in the absence of compelling con-
gressional direction, [a court] could not infer
that Congress had deprived the States of the
power to act.” Weise, 2008-NMCA~121, 19,
144 N.M. 867, 192 P.3d 1244 (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted).

{30} I concur with the ultimate result in
this case and the dismissal of Plaintiff's
claims without prejudice.

2011-NMCA-036
261 P.3d 599
STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner-
Appellee,
v
‘Tiffany BOND, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 29,436.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
March 17, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrea
Sassa, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

Chief Public Defender, Nancy M. Hewitt,
Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Ap-
pellant.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} Defendant Tiffany Bond entered a con-
ditional plea to one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a
fourth degree felony, contrary to NMSA
1978, Section 30-31-23(D) (2005), reserving
the right to appeal the district court’s denial
of her motion to suppress. Because we con-
clude that the investigating officer unreason-
ably searched Defendant’s purse and seized
contents within it without consent, we re-
verse.

BACKGROUND

{2} On June 29, 2008, police officers were
attempting to locate a white Pontiac convert-
ible that had been stolen from the lot of
Performance Auto in Farmington, New Mex-
ico. The vehicle’s global position system in-
dicated that the vehicle was located at the
intersection of Knollerest and Kingsway. Of-
ficer Kyle Dowdy was dispatched to the loca-
tion and observed the vehicle in the driveway
of a residence at the identified location, when
he saw two people come out of the residence
and enter the vehicle. He initiated a felony
traffic stop while the vehicle was still in the
driveway. Officer Dowdy then detained the
driver and Defendant, who was a passenger
in the vehicle, in connection with his investi-
gation. He handeuffed them and read them
Miranda rights,

453

{3} The investigating officer, Officer David
Karst, arrived at the location of the stop.
Officer Karst had spoken with the manager
of Performance Auto, and the manager had
informed Officer Karst that he saw a woman.
with long hair driving the vehicle out of the
lot. Officer Karst asked Defendant to step
in front of his patrol unit, again read her
Miranda rights, and placed her in the back-
seat of his patrol unit. Officer Karst asked
Defendant if she had identification, and De-
fendant informed him that it was located in
her wallet that was in her purse on the
passenger side of the stolen vehicle. Officer
Karst went to the vehicle and retrieved a
brown purse with what appeared to be a
phone charger in the top of it. Officer Karst
also retrieved a white hand mirror, a yellow
Corona hat, and a cell phone. Defendant
informed Officer Karst that the yellow hat,
phone charger, and mirror that were visible,
as well as the brown purse, belonged to her,
but the black bag or pencil bag that was
inside the purse did not. Officer Karst re-
moved the black bag from the purse and
opened it to see if he could find any owner
identification. Upon opening the black bag,
Officer Karst discovered both paraphernalia
and a crystal rock-like substance that he
believed was methamphetamine.

{4} Defendant filed a motion to suppress,
challenging the search of her purse. The
district court denied Defendant’s motion.
Defendant entered a conditional plea, reserv-
ing the right to appeal the district court’s
ruling.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

{5} We begin by defining the issue to be
addressed in this case. In her motion to
suppress, Defendant argued that the officer
violated her rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and
Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution by searching her purse. The
district court denied Defendant’s motion to
suppress on the ground that Defendant had
no expectation of privacy in the black bag
Officer Karst removed from Defendant's
purse because Defendant had disclaimed
ownership of the black bag. In making that
ruling, it appears the district court assumed
that Officer Karst had the right to enter

454

Defendant’s purse and remove the black bag.
On appeal, Defendant does not contest that
she abandoned the black bag, but argues that
the officer did not have the right to lawfully
retrieve the black bag from her purse. The
State also submits that the issue on appeal is
the officer’s ability to enter Defendant's
purse. We therefore limit our analysis to
this issue.

{6} Furthermore, Defendant moved to
suppress the evidence pursuant to both the
federal and state constitutions. The State
contends that Defendant failed to preserve
her state constitutional claim. We need not
reach the issue of whether Defendant pre-
served a state constitutional argument, since
we are reversing based on an application of
the Fourth Amendment.

Standard of Review

TMs {7} “We engage in a two-part re-
view of a district court’s decision regarding a
motion to suppress: The legality of a search
questioned in a suppression hearing is gener-
ally tested as a mixed question of law and
fact wherein we review any factual questions
under a substantial evidence standard and
‘we review the application of law to the facts
de novo.” State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043,
115, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We
therefore “review the district court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress to determine wheth-
er the law was correctly applied to the facts,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party.” State v. Cline,
1998-NMCA-154, 16, 126 N.M. 77, 966 P.2d
785.

Defendant’s Standing to Challenge the
Search

HM {8} In determining that Defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the black bag because of her disclaimer of
ownership, the district comt ruled that De-
fendant lacked standing to challenge the
search of the black bag. See State v. Leyba,
1997-NMCA-028, 19, 123 N.M. 159, 985 P.2d
1171 (stating that a defendant’s “standing to
challenge a search as violative of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and Article II, Section 10 of the New

Mexico Constitution hinges on whether [the
defendant] had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place entered”). As we noted
above, the district court did not address the
issue of the officer's entry into Defendant’s
purse. As a result, we begin our analysis by
determining whether Defendant had stand-
ing to challenge the officer’s entry of her
purse.

HH {9} To establish standing, a defen-
dant must demonstrate a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. See Leyba, 1997~NMCA-
028, 19, 123 N.M. 159, 985 P.2d 1171. “De-
termining whether a search is an intrusion on
a legitimate expectation of privacy requires
two considerations. First, we consider
whether the individual’s conduct demonstrat-
ed a subjective expectation of privacy. Sec-
ond, we consider whether society recognizes
the individual’s expectation of privacy as rea-
sonable.” State v. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-
029, 110, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.8d 1045 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citations omitted).

HE {10} “{O]wnership or lawful posses-
sion generally gives rise to a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy[.]” State v. Celusniak,
2004-NMCA-070, 125, 185 N.M. 728, 93 P.3d
10. However, “one can relinquish this expec-
tation if he or she abandons the property.”
Id. “(The basic inquiry is whether the de-
fendant either denied ownership of the item
or physically relinquished it.” Id. 128.
There is no indication from the record that
Defendant disclaimed her ownership of the
purse through either her words or her ac-
tions. Nor does the State argue that Defen-
dant abandoned any claim of ownership to
her purse. See id. 126 (“The party seeking
to prove abandonment must show this intent
by clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted)). Moreover, this Court has previously
concluded that society recognizes a reason-
able expectation of privacy in an individual’s
purse. See id. 128 (citing to cases holding
that “a purse is a type of container in which a
person possesses the highest expectations of
privacy” (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted)). We therefore conclude that
Defendant had standing to challenge the
search of her purse, and we turn to the
merits of Defendant’s claim of error.

Reasonableness of the Search of Defen-
dant’s Purse

Hs {11} Under the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution,
searches and seizures must be reasonable.
See State v. Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA-081, 16,
186 N.M. 18, 94 P.8d 18. Warrantless
searches are presumed to be unreasonable.
See State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, 110,
144 N.M. 371, 188 P.8d 95 (“Any warrantless
search analysis must start with the bedrock
principle of both federal and state constitu-
tional jurisprudence that searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable, subject only to well-delineated
exceptions.” (emphasis, internal quotation
marks, and citation omitted)). The State
bears the burden of proving that a warrant-
Jess search or seizure is reasonable. Gutier-
rez, 2004-NMCA-081, 16, 186 N.M. 18, 94
P.3d 18. “In order to prove that a warrant-
less seizure is reasonable, the State must
prove that it fits into an exception to the
warrant requirement.” State v. Weidner,
2007-NMCA--063, 116, 141 N.M. 582, 158 P.3d
1025. “Recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement include exigent circumstances,
searches incident to arrest, inventory
searches, consent, hot pursuit, open field, and
plain view.” Id.

HH {12} In its response to Defendant’s
motion to suppress before the district court,
the State argued that Defendant’s statement.
that the black bag did not belong to her
could be interpreted as granting the officer
consent to remove the item from her purse.
“The validity of a consensual search depends
on the voluntary nature of the consent and
whether the resulting search exceeds the
reasonable scope of that consent.” State v.
Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, 120, 122 N.M. 84,
920 P.2d 1038. Our Supreme Court has
identified “the following three factors to be
considered when an appeals court is assess-
ing the voluntariness of a consent to search:
(1) the consent must be unequivocal and spe-
cific, (2) the consent must be given without
duress or coercion, and (8) the first two
factors must be assessed with a presumption
against the waiver of constitutional rights.”
Id.

455

{13} Officer Karst did not testify that De-
fendant told him he could search her purse.
The State argues that Defendant’s disclaimer
of the ownership of the bag within her purse
can be interpreted as providing consent to
enter her purse to remove the item. Howev-
er, Defendant’s statement was not a clear
statement of consent. It could also reason-
ably be interpreted to have been only a
statement intending to preclude ownership in
the event that Officer Karst instituted a
search. Given the presumption against the
waiver of the constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures,
State v. Munoz, 2008-NMCA-090, 119, 144
N.M. 350, 187 P.38d 696, the State did not
meet its burden below of demonstrating that
Defendant provided the officer with consent
to enter her purse.

H,s«{14} On appeal, the State at-
tempts to support the warrantless search by
arguing that the black bag was in Officer
Karst’s plain view. We disagree with the
State’s argument that the search of Defen-
dant’s purse can be supported under the
plain view exception to the warrant require-
ment. “Under the plain view exception to
the warrant requirement, items may be
seized without a warrant if the police officer
was lawfully positioned when the evidence
was observed, and the incriminating nature
of the evidence was immediately apparent,
such that the officer had probable cause to
believe that the article seized was evidence of
acrime.” See State v. Ochoa, 2004-NMSC-
023, 19, 185 N.M. 781, 93 P.8d 1286, As
stated in Ochoa, the plain view exception
requires that the incriminating nature of the
evidence be immediately apparent. In this
case, the testimony establishes that Defen-
dant had stated that the black bag did not
belong to her. This fact, alone, does not
render Defendant’s possession of the black
bag unlawful. There was also no testimony
that Defendant indicated the bag contained
drugs or that the bag was stolen. Thus, the
testimony does not support the requirement
that Officer Karst knew the incriminating
nature of the evidence at the time he re-
moved it from Defendant's purse. As a con-
sequence, the plain view exception does not
support Officer Karst’s removal of the black

456

bag from Defendant’s purse. See id. 114
(“{Aln officer’s mere suspicion about an ordi-
nary object, which has common, non-criminal
uses, will not support probable cause for its
seizure.”); see also State v. Vasquez, 112
N.M. 368, 368, 815 P.2d 659, 664 (Ct.App.
1991) (indicating that a diaper bag taken
from a vehicle was unlawfully seized pursu-
ant to the plain view doctrine because the
contents “could not be discerned from the
bag’s outward appearance,” and thus the in-
criminating nature of the bag was not appar-
ent); State v. Zelinske, 108 N.M. 784, 786-87,
‘779 P.2d 971, 973-74 (Ct.App.1989) (recogniz-
ing that presence of a heavily taped card-
board box and deodorizer in the trunk of a
vehicle did not give probable cause to justify
its seizure under the plain view doctrine;
these items “are used much more frequently
for entirely innocent purposes than for trans-
porting narcotics”), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Bedolla, 111 N.M. 448,
806 P.2d 588 (Ct.App.1991).

{15} Finally, the State argues that the
search of Defendant’s purse was reasonable
under the factors set out in this Court’s
recent opinion in State v. Williams, 2010-
NMCA-030, 148 N.M. 160, 281 P.3d 616, cert.
granted, 2010-NMCERT-004, 148 N.M. 578,
240 P.3d 660. In Williams, this Court con-
sidered whether a search was reasonable by
balancing “(1) the scope of the particular
intrusion, (2) the manner in which it is con-
ducted, (8) the justification for initiating it,
and (4) the place in which it is conducted.”
2010-NMCA-030, 112, 148 N.M. 160, 231
P.8d 616. This Court in Williams, however,
applied this reasonableness analysis to a
search conducted incident to a valid arrest.
Id. 18. In this case, the State does not
argue that Officer Karst conducted the

search of Defendant’s purse pursuant to a
valid arrest. Instead, it appears the State is
asking this Court to determine that the
State’s interest in determining the ownership
of the black bag justified the de minimis
nature of the intrusion. We decline to do so.
A reach into a protected space to retrieve an
object that is not clearly contraband is not de
minimis. Cf State v. Bomboy, 2007-NMCA-
O81, 112, 141 N.M. 853, 161 P.3d 898 (stating
that reaching in to a vehicle “is far from a de
minimis intrusion”), reversed on other
grounds, 2008-NMSC-029, 144 N.M. 151, 184
P.3d 1045; State v. Valdez, 111 N.M. 488,
441, 806 P.2d 578, 581 (Ct.App.1990) (holding
that an officer’s observation of marijuana
plants from outside a residence’s greenhouse
did not authorize warrantless entry into the
greenhouse and seizure of the plants, absent
some exception to the warrant requirement).
Moreover, Williams does not excuse the
State from its burden of demonstrating an
exception to the warrant requirement. Be-
cause the State failed to meet its burden, the
district court erred in denying Defendant's
motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

{16} For the foregoing reasons, we re-
verse.

{17} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge, and LINDA M. VANZI, Judge.

2011-NMSC-036
261 P.3d 1089
Cynthia and Perfecto PROVENCIO,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
Steven WENRICH, D.O., Defendant-
Petitioner.
No. 32,344.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
Aug. 17, 2011.

458 —

Sandenaw Law Firm, P.C., Thomas A.
Sandenaw, Jr., Caralyn Banks, Las Cruces,
NM, for Petitioner.

Law Offices of James P. Lyle, P.C., James
P. Lyle, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondents.

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} Since we issued Lovelace Medical Cen-
ter v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603
(4991), more than 20 years ago, this Court
has not had an opportunity to clarify whether
a doctor who negligently performs a tubal
ligation procedure, but who then informs the
patient of her continued fertility, may be
sued for the future costs of raising a subse-
quently conceived child to the age of majori-
ty. We hold that those particular damages
are only available when a doctor has breach-
ed a duty to inform. Our Court of Appeals
held otherwise, concluding that notice of con-
tinued fertility, or lack thereof, was merely a
factor for the jury to consider as questions of
causation and comparative fault. According-
ly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and
affirm the district court’s dismissal of this
action.

BACKGROUND

{2} On December 12, 2002, Defendant Dr.
Steven Wenrich delivered Plaintiff Cynthia
Provencio’s fourth child via caesarean sec-
tion. Prior to surgery, Mrs. Provencio con-
sented to Defendant contemporaneously per-
forming a tubal ligation procedure on her
sole fallopian tube because she did not wish
to have additional children. After complet-
ing the surgeries, Defendant sent a portion
of what he believed was ligated fallopian tube
to a laboratory for analysis. The resulting
pathology report revealed that the tissue De-
fendant had ligated was ligament, not fallopi-
an tube, and Plaintiff still could conceive
children.

{3} Mrs. Provencio’s first follow-up ap-
pointment with Defendant occurred on either
December 18 or 19, 2002, several days after
Mrs. Provencio was discharged from the hos-
pital. At this appointment, Defendant told
Mrs. Provencio that the tubal ligation sur-
gery was unsuccessful; that he had failed to
“get it.” At the same appointment, Defen-
dant informed Mrs. Provencio that only a
hysterosalpingogram (HSG) test would con-
clusively reveal the extent of her continued
fertility. Defendant provided Mrs. Provencio
with a laboratory form for an HSG test.

{4} For reasons that are not clear from
the record, Mrs. Provencio never returned to
Defendant’s care after this initial appoint-
ment. Mrs. Provencio did, however, com-
plete an HSG test in November 2003, some
eleven months after her last appointment
with Dr. Wenrich. The results of this test
confirmed that Mrs. Provencio’s fallopian
tube remained open. Approximately five
months after receiving the HSG test results,
Mrs. Provencio conceived her fifth child with
her husband, Plaintiff Perfecto Provencio.
Mrs. Provencio eventually gave birth to a
normal, healthy child.

{5} On December 12, 2005, Mr. and Mrs.
Provencio filed suit against Defendant for
wrongful conception and battery. As to the
wrongful conception claim, the only damages
for which Plaintiffs sought recovery were the
costs associated with raising Mrs. Provencio’s
fifth child to the age of majority and punitive
damages. Plaintiffs did not seek other dam-
ages for the costs of a second tubal ligation

surgery or any other harm associated with
the failed sterilization.

{6} The case proceeded to trial where, at
the close of Plaintiffs’ case in chief, Defen-
dant moved the district court for judgment
as a matter of law on each of Plaintiffs’
claims. See Rule 1-050(A) NMRA. In grant-
ing Defendant’s motion on the tort of wrong-
ful conception, and particularly Plaintiffs’
claim for the costs of raising Mrs. Proven-
cio’s fifth child, the district court ruled that
“the physician’s failure to timely inform the
patient of the failed sterilization is an essen-
tial element” in wrongful conception. The
district court observed that because “Plain-
tiffs were well aware of the failed steriliza-
tion,” and “were fully advised the steriliza-
tion had failed by the time the parties’ child
was conceived,” they could not as a matter of
law establish an essential element of their
wrongful conception claim. Because of this,
Mr. and Mrs. Provencio could not recover the
costs of raising their child. In the alterna-
tive, the district court ruled that by providing
Plaintiffs with information about the failed
procedure, Defendant had broken the causal
chain as a matter of law.

{7} After making these rulings, the district
court asked Plaintiffs if they wanted to pro-
ceed on a claim for different, albeit smaller,
damages based on the negligently performed
sterilization procedure alone, such as the
costs of a second surgery, or emotional suf-
fering, but without recovering child-raising
expenses as set forth in Mendez. Plaintiffs
declined, and the district court entered judg-
ment in favor of Defendant.

{8} The Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that Mendez did not establish a distinct
tort of wrongful conception and that failure
to inform was not a prerequisite to recovery
for the costs of child-raising. Provencio v.
Wenrich, 2010-NMCA-047, 19, 148 N.M.
799, 242 P.3d 366. The Court of Appeals
concluded that a claim for wrongful concep-
tion is nothing more than a standard claim
for medical negligence, albeit one that allows
for special damages. Jd. 199-10. The
Court of Appeals explained its reasoning:

Because a “wrongful conception” action
is nothing more than a normal medical
malpractice action with a unique type of

459

damages, Plaintiffs, as in any medical mal-
practice action, “ha[ve] the burden of prov-
ing that: 1)[D]efendant owed [them] a
duty recognized by law, 2)[D]efendant.
failed to conform to the recognized stan-
dard of medical practice in the community,
and, 3) the actions complained of were the
proximate cause of [P]laintiff[s’] injuries.”
Schmidt v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. 105 N.M.
681, 683, 736 P.2d 135, 137 (Ct.App.1987).
Plaintiffs do not, however, have to prove
that Defendant failed to disclose that the
sterilization procedure was unsuccessful,
and the fact that Defendant here undisput-
edly informed Plaintiffs that the steriliza-
tion was unsuccessful does not automatical-
ly bar Plaintiffs’ case from going to the
jury.

Provencio, 2010-NMCA-047, 110, 148 N.M.

799, 242 P.3d 366.

{9} The Court of Appeals also rejected the
district court’s causation analysis, and cor-
rectly so. Id. 1118-16. Because the inde-
pendent intervening-cause doctrine does not
apply to a plaintiff's own negligence, Defen-
dant could not have interrupted the causal
chain as a matter of law by disclosing to Mrs.
Provencio that she was still fertile. Id. 113.
Relying on general principles of New Mexico
negligence law, the Court of Appeals rea-
soned that “the effect of the doctor’s disclo-
sure” goes to the issues of causation and
comparative fault, both within the province of
the jury. Jd 111. Because “reasonable
minds could differ on the question of whether
and to what extent [Defendant’s] actions and
the actions of Plaintiffs caused the pregnan-
ey,” the Court of Appeals determined that
the case should have gone to the jury to
determine liability and, if needed, apportion
fault between the parties. Id. 112.

{10} We granted Defendant's petition for a
writ of certiorari to clarify the scope and
meaning of our Mendez opinion. Provencio
v. Wenrich, 2010-NMCERT-006, 148 N.M.
584, 241 P.3d 182.

DISCUSSION

{11} As our resolution of this appeal de-
pends on the applicability of Mendez, our
seminal opinion in this area, we begin by
reviewing that case. The facts in Mendez

460

are straightforward. Mrs. Mendez under-
went an unsuccessful tubal ligation procedure
in which the doctor negligently ligated only
one of her two open fallopian tubes. Men-
dez, 111 N.M. at 337-38, 805 P.2d at 604-05.
Compounding his negligence, the doctor nev-
er informed Mrs. Mendez that the surgery
had failed. Jd. Unaware of her continued
fertility, Mrs. Mendez took no birth control
measures and “within months of the surgery”
conceived a healthy child. Id. at 338, 348,
805 P.2d at 605, 615. Among other claims,
the Mendez plaintiffs sued for the cost of
raising the unexpected child to the age of
majority, a substantial sum. Id. at 348, 805
P.2d at 615. In resolving Mendez, this Court
analyzed the nature of the plaintiffs’ various
injuries and the damages that must be avail-
able, as a matter of sound policy, to compen-
sate them for the full extent of those injuries.
Id. at 341-54, 805 P.2d at 608-21.

{12} In a seminal opinion, we held that
New Mexico would join a minority of juris-
dictions which recognize damages resulting
from the birth of an unplanned, yet healthy
child. Id. at 345, 349-50, 805 P.2d at 612,
616-17. We specifically held that damages
could include the costs of raising an unex-
pected child to the age of majority. Id. In so
doing, we joined what was, and to this day
remains, a small number of jurisdictions
which permit full recovery for child-rearing
costs with no offset to the doctor for any
benefits that the child might provide the
parents over the course of their lives. Id. at
850-58, 805 P.2d at 617-20; see also Chaffee
v. Seslar, 786 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ind.2003)
(observing that New Mexico, California, Ore-
gon, and Wisconsin are the only states that
permit full recovery for child-rearing costs
without a potential offset to the doctor).

{13} In the current case, Plaintiffs urge us
to adopt the Court of Appeals opinion and
hold that “in an ordinary medical malpractice
claim stemming from a negligently per-
formed sterilization procedure, the cost of
raising a child may be recovered when a
doctor’s negligence causes the birth of an
unwanted child,” regardless of whether that
doctor informs the patient about the failed
procedure. Provencio, 2010-NMCA-047,
19, 148 N.M. 799, 242 P.8d 366. In other

words, damages—the cost of raising an unex-
pected child—would flow solely from the neg-
ligently performed tubal ligation, even if the
doctor informed the patient about the unsuc-
cessful procedure and the patient’s continued
fertility. The jury would weigh the effect of
the notice, or lack of it, when assessing cau-
sation. Under Plaintiffs’ reading of Mendez,
it would fall on trial counsel to present factu-
al arguments to the jury regarding notice
and the nature of the patient’s subsequent
conduct. If sufficiently persuaded, the jury
could award the costs of child-raising, or a
portion thereof, notwithstanding the patient’s
full knowledge and awareness of her poten-
tial for conception.

{14} Naturally, Defendant disagrees. Ac-
cording to Defendant, the issue here is not
causation but duty. Defendant contends that
the particular damages discussed in Mendez
flow from the breach of a duty to fully and
timely inform the patient of her continued
fertility. Under Defendant’s reading of
Mendez, once a doctor sufficiently notifies a
patient that she remains fertile following an
unsuccessful sterilization procedure, even
when caused by medical negligence, liability
for child-rearing costs, as opposed to lesser
damages like the cost of a second steriliza-
tion procedure, terminates as a matter of
Jaw.

HMM {15} As a preliminary matter, we
agree with the Court of Appeals’ assessment
that wrongful conception is not a distinct
tort. It is well-established among courts and
scholars that wrongful conception sounds in
the law of medical negligence. See, e.g., Pro-
canik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755, 760
(1984) (“The terms ‘wrongful birth’ and
‘wrongful life’ are but shorthand phrases that,
describe the causes of action of parents and
children when negligent medical treatment
deprives parents of the option to terminate a
pregnancy to avoid the birth of a defective
child.”); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 55, at 370-73
(Sth ed. 1984); Mark Strasser, Misconcep-
tions and Wrongful Births: A Call for a
Principled Jurisprudence, 31 Ariz. St. LJ.
161, 162 (1999) (“{The claim in each of these
kinds of cases is that but for a professional’s
negligence with respect to the mechanics of

contraception, an unwanted conception would
not have taken place.” (footnotes omitted).
Like any medical negligence action, the
plaintiffs in a wrongful conception claim
“‘hafve] the burden of proving that:
[Gb [Dlefendant owed [them] a duty recog-
nized by lawl,][ (12) [DJefendant failed to con-
form to the recognized standard of medical
practice in the community[,] and, [ (13) the
actions complained of were the proximate
cause of [PJlaintifffs’] injuries.” Provencio,
2010-NMCA-047, 110, 148 N.M. 799, 242
P.8d 866 (quoting Schmidt, 105 N.M. at 683,
736 P.2d at 187).

{16} We are of the view, however, that this
case is fundamentally about duty, which is
for the court alone to define. Before the
jury can resolve any factual matter, like cau-
sation, the court must first frame the rele-
vant law. In a negligence action, this means
the court must first find an actionable duty of
care and then define the nature and scope of
that duty. See Herrera v. Quality Pontiac,
20083-NMSC-018, 116-10, 184 N.M. 43, 73
P.8d 181. Neither party disputes that De-
fendant owed Plaintiffs a duty of reasonable
medical care. The parties, however, do dis-
pute the nature and scope of that duty, and
whether it is satisfied by the doctor provid-
ing adequate and timely notice to the patient
about ongoing risks of an unsuccessful sterili-
zation procedure.

{17} We recognize that Mendez does not
clearly resolve the question of duty. In fact,
Mendez appears susceptible to multiple in-
terpretations, some of which support the
Court of Appeals opinion and some of which
do not. For example, we stated in Mendez
that the tortious conduct was both “the doc-
tor’s negligence in performing the steriliza-
tion operation and failing to inform the moth-
er of the unsuccessful outcome.” Mendez,
111 N.M. at 342, 805 P.2d at 609. Yet, at.
other points in the opinion, we appear to
characterize the tortious conduct as the neg-
ligently performed surgical procedure alone
without including the effect of a failure to
warn. Id. at 342, 345, 805 P.2d at 609, 612.

{18} We recognize that any ambiguity in
Mendez is due to its concern with damages—
whether New Mexico would recognize the
recovery of child-raising costs as a matter of

461

policy—rather than a careful analysis of ev-
ery aspect of the doctor’s duty. Id. at 342,
805 P.2d at 609 (stating that the “fundamen-
tal question on the merits issue in this appeal
is a question as to [the] measure of dam-
ages”). At the time, at least twenty-nine
jurisdictions had rejected these same child-
rearing damages on policy grounds. Id. at
350 n. 1, 805 P.2d at 617 n. 1 (listing the
jurisdictions that had dealt with the child-
rearing damages issue); Lori McCamey Ben-
coe, Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez: A
New Approach to Damages Awards in New
Mewico, 23 N.M. L.Rev. 451, 452-54 (1993)
(same). Unlike the current case, the facts in
Mendez did not require a close analysis of
duty. The doctor in Mendez had made no
effort to notify his patient after the unsuc-
cessful surgery, and Mrs. Mendez was not
aware of her condition. We did not address
the consequences, if any, if Mrs. Mendez had
been made aware. Because Mendez does not
provide clear guidance on this issue, we turn
to legal principles that underlie medical neg-
ligence claims when based on wrongful birth
and wrongful conception.

{19} As we previously mentioned, wrong-
ful birth and wrongful conception are negli-
gence actions, yet these claims are unlike
other, more traditional claims for pre-natal
medical malpractice. In the more typical
prenatal medical negligence case, it is the
child or the child’s representative who as-
serts a claim for damages against a health-
care provider, generally a doctor, for the
child’s own injuries. See generally Siemien-
iec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp. 117 TIL2d 230,
111 LDec. 302, 512 N.E.2d 691, 697-98
(1987). Commonly, the child claims that the
doctor’s negligence during pregnancy or at
childbirth caused the child, who otherwise
would have been born healthy, to be born
with some defect or disease. See Clark v.
Children’s Mem. Hosp., 2011 IL 108656, 358
T.Dee. 254, 955 N.E.2d 1065, 1080-82, 2011
WL 1783582 (2011). While the parents of
the child might have derivative claims, such
as loss of consortium, the essence of a prena-
tal negligence action is injury to the child
itself.

TM {20} At the other end of the negli-
gence spectrum is wrongful birth, which is a

462

prenatal medical negligence claim based on
injuries suffered by the parents, not the
child. In jurisdictions recognizing these
claims, wrongful birth is generally brought
“by the parents of a child born with birth
defects alleging that due to negligent medical
advice or testing they were precluded from
making an informed decision about whether
to conceive a potentially handicapped child,
or, in the event of pregnancy, to terminate
it.” Chaffee, 786 N.E.2d at 710 n. 3 (Rucker,
J., dissenting). The nature of the parent’s
injury “is not that the defendant caused the
child’s condition, but that the defendant de-
prived the parents of the opportunity to
make an informed decision.” Clark, 2011 IL
108656, 353 Ill.Dec. 254, 955 N.E.2d at 1084.

{21} Wrongful birth is appropriately char-
acterized as a claim-based failure to diagnose
or failure to advise the parents. The duty
owed is part of the doctor’s obligation to
provide adequate care so that the parents
can make an informed decision about the
risks of pregnancy and childbirth; adequate
care includes adequate notice. See Keeton,
supra § 55, at 370 (“The defendants in [a
wrongful birth case] are typically doctors
charged with negligence ... in failing to
diagnose or inform the parents that the child
might be born deformed—because of a dis-
ease contracted by the mother or a genetic
condition in one of the parents—in time to
permit the termination [or avoidance] of the
pregnancy.”).

Hl {22} Wrongful conception is a closely
related medical negligence claim that in-
volves the birth of a healthy, but unplanned,
child. See Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc. 575
N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind.1991) (stating that
wrongful conception “refers to a claim for
damages sustained by the parents of an un-
expected child alleging that the conception of
the child resulted from negligent sterilization
procedures or a defective contraceptive prod-
uct”). Like wrongful birth, parents file
wrongful conception suits on their own be-

1. A more controversial cause of action is wrong-
ful life, which is a negligence claim brought by a
disabled child or that child's representative “for
the harm of being born deformed.” Keeton,
supra § 55, at 370. “By and large, the child’s
wrongful life action mirrors that of the parents’

half, alleging injuries that they alone have
suffered, including the costs associated with
the pregnancy and the costs of raising an
unexpected child. See Phillips v. United
States, 508 F.Supp. 544, 545 n. 1 (D.S.C.
1981). Both Mendez and the Provencio’s
case present claims for wrongful conception.

Wl {23} There is a dearth of case law
discussing the nature and scope of a doctor’s
duty in a wrongful conception case. Like our
opinion in Mendez, most of the reported deci-
sions in this area focus not on the nature of
the tortious conduct, but on whether the
birth of a healthy child is a compensable
injury and whether child-raising costs are too
speculative or contrary to public policy. See
generally David Kerrane, Part Bight: Par-
enting: Damages for Wrongful Pregnancy,
11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 467 (Nov. 2000)
(discussing the treatment of wrongful con-
ception cases in various state courts); Po-
dewils, supra (same). Rather than relying
on out-of-state cases, which we do not find
helpful in an area of law where our precedent
has already chosen a different course, the
question of duty is best answered by resort-
ing to general principles, including the na-
ture of the doctor’s tortious conduct, and our
medical negligence jury instructions. “The

. Scope of a defendant’s duty of care is a
legal question that depends on the nature of
the ... activity in question, the parties’ gen-
eral relationship to the activity, and public
policy considerations.” Edward C. v. City of
Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, 114, 148
NM. 646, 241 P.8d 1086. The question of
policy is “answered by reference to legal
precedent, statutes, and other principles of
law.” Id. 118. We turn once again to Men-
dez.

{24} In Mendez, we identified two related
injuries suffered by the parents. 111 N.M.
at 345, 805 P.2d at 612. The first was an
injury to the parental “interest in the finan-
cial security of their family.” Id. The second
was an injury to “the parents’ interest in

wrongful birth claim, with one major exception:
it generally is rejected by the courts.” Donald L.
DeVries, Jr., and Alan M. Rifkin, Wrongful Life,
Wrongful Birth, and Wrongful Pregnancy: Judi-
cial Divergence in the Birth-Related Torts, 20
Forum 207 (1985).

Ee 463
ee
limiting the size of their family.” Id. The Id, at 349, 805 P.2d at 616 (citing UJI 18-

two may often overlap. An injury to the
parental interest in financial security occurs
when parents are forced to take on one of
life’s most significant financial burdens, rais-
ing a healthy child, without an opportunity to
make an informed decision on the matter.
Judge Alarid recognized this principle in
Mendez, when, speaking for the Court of
Appeals, he observed that “children need to
be fed, clothed, housed, educated, and provid-
ed with medical care and other necessities.
[Many] people ... decide whether or not to
become parents, or how many children to
have, based in part on their financial re-
sources.” 111 N.M. at 352, 805 P.2d at 619.
Similarly, an injury to the parental interest
in limiting the size of one’s family occurs
when parents are deprived of an opportunity
to make an informed, family-planning deci-
sion. Id. at 345-46, 805 P.2d at 612-13. The
notion of a compensable injury flowing from
a lack of medical information was critical to
the Court of Appeals majority opinion in
Mendez, which our Court included as an
appendix and took great pains to adopt. 111
N.M. at 338, 805 P.2d at 605 (“On the merits,
we find ourselves in substantial agreement
with Judge Alarid’s opinion... .”).

{25} The Court of Appeals opinion, again
specifically embraced by this Court in Men-
dez, also discussed several medical negli-
gence jury instructions. 111 N.M. at 349,
805 P.2d at 616. These instructions help to
place wrongful conception within the larger
universe of medical negligence. The Court
described a doctor’s general duty as a duty
“to possess and apply the knowledge and to
use the skill and care ordinarily used by
reasonably well-qualified doctors in the same
field of medicine practicing under similar cir-
cumstances.” Jd. at 349, 805 P.2d at 616
(citing UJI 13-1101 NMRA). The Court
then noted that this same duty includes “a
duty to provide the patient with certain infor-
mation.” Id. (citing UJI 18-1104(B)
NMRA). The Court also stated that “[a]
doctor who breaches this duty is liable for
the harm that results to the patient if a
reasonably prudent person would have acted
upon the information to avoid the harm,”
making reference to our current instruction.

1116(B) NMRA).

{26} These jury instructions relied upon in
Mendez are relevant only in failure-to-inform
cases. These specific jury instructions,
which were cited with approval by our Court
of Appeals in Mendez, support a conclusion
that the duty owed by a doctor in a wrongful
conception case is the duty to inform follow-
ing an unsuccessful sterilization procedure.
111 N.M. at 347, 805 P.2d at 614 (Ransom J.,
specially concurring) (“Mrs. Mendez was in-
jured the moment the doctor reached his
duty to exercise required care and left her
with an unligated tube in the sterilization
operation, and she was further injured when
he failed to inform her of the unsuccessful
outcome.”).

Hs {27} In describing the differences
between prenatal medical negligence, wrong-
ful birth, and wrongful conception, we ob-
serve that a doctor may owe multiple duties
of care when treating a particular patient.
For example, a doctor owes a general duty to
provide competent care in treating a patient’s
medical condition. See, e.g., Mireles v. Bro-
derick, 117 N.M. 445, 447, 872 P.2d 863, 865
(1994) (patient alleged that an anesthesiolo-
gist’s negligent care during surgery caused
nerve damage in her arm). In the pregnan-
cy and childbirth context, this duty might
include competently delivering a baby or per-
forming a sterilization procedure, A doctor
may also owe the same patient a duty to
properly diagnose his relevant medical condi-
tions. See, eg. Gonzales v. Sansoy, 102
N.M. 186, 187, 692 P.2d 522, 528 (1984) (pa-
tient alleged that a doctor failed to make a
timely diagnosis of appendicitis). In the
pregnancy and childbirth context, this duty
to diagnose might include recognizing certain
abnormalities in the fetus or determining
whether a sterilization procedure was suc-
cessfully performed. At the same time, a
doctor may owe yet another duty to inform
the patient of any pertinent medical informa-
tion. See Alberts v. Schultz, 1999-NMSC-
015, 117, 126 N.M. 807, 975 P.2d 1279 (not-
ing that failure to inform is a “traditional
theor[y] of recovery in New Mexico tort
Taw”). This duty would certainly include an
obligation to inform a patient that a steriliza-

464

tion procedure was unsuccessful, regardless
of the cause, when the doctor reasonably
knows or should know the results of a failed
procedure. These various duties are not mu-
tually exclusive, and depending on the con-
text of the treatment sought, they may exist
concurrently.

{28} As we previously stated, New Mexico
remains one of very few jurisdictions to per-
mit complete recovery for the costs of raising
a child to the age of majority in a wrongful
conception case, Because child-rearing costs
will normally far exceed other damages asso-
ciated with a failed sterilization procedure,
such as the costs of a second procedure and
pain and suffering, courts should take great
care when shifting the full weight of child-
rearing expenses onto someone other than
the parents. As a matter of sound policy, we
think that the extraordinary damages of rais-
ing a child to the age of majority should be
reserved for extraordinary cases like Men-
dez,

{29} Mendez helps explain why this ex-
traordinary remedy should only be available
in duty-to-inform cases. In Mendez, the fu-
ture costs of raising the unexpected child
were necessarily going to fall on either the
doctor or the parents. Between the negli-
gent doctor who failed to disclose information
about the unsuccessful sterilization proce-
dure, and the unsuspecting parents who mis-
takenly believed they were no longer fertile,
it was fair to require the doctor to pay for
the subsequent pregnancy and any children
resulting from that pregnancy. It was the
doctor in Mendez, not the patient, who con-
trolled the relevant medical information. By
conforming his conduct to the relevant stan-
dard of care and fulfilling his duty to inform,
the doctor in Mendez could have empowered
the parents to take whatever measures they
deemed appropriate to avoid pregnancy. It
was the doctor’s failure to do so that placed
the parents in a position they could not be
reasonably expected to control. Following
this reasoning, we think the Mendez court
intended to define the duty, though some-
what obscured, to include an obligation of
notice. Conversely, if the doctor had provid-
ed notice to Mr. and Mrs. Mendez, we believe

the Court would not have authorized the
recovery of future, child-rearing costs.

{30} Turning to the present case, Mrs.
Provencio, unlike Mrs. Mendez, was aware
that she remained fertile well before conceiv-
ing her next child, whether the source of that
knowledge was Dr. Wenrich’s ambiguous
warning at the first post-operative confer-
ence or the results of the later-completed
HSG test. In contrast to Mendez, Mr. and
Mrs. Provencio possessed information that
they could have used to avoid conception,
assuming this was their goal. As a matter of
sound policy, we believe that shifting the
costs of raising Plaintiffs’ fifth child onto Dr.
Wenrich is not commensurate with the duty
that he breached nor with the harm that such
a breach could have caused.

{31} One particular hypothetical illustrates
the soundness of this policy. If we were to
allow Mendez-type recovery when parents
are aware of their continued fertility, then a
jury could award child-raising costs not only
for the resulting child, but for all children
born thereafter. Theoretically, a doctor’s lia-
bility for a poorly-performed sterilization
procedure could continue for the reproduc-
tive life of that patient, irrespective of wheth-
er that patient knew or should have known of
her continued fertility, and irrespective of
whether the doctor’s post-surgical conduct
had deprived that patient of a reasonable
opportunity to avoid conception.

{32} This result would be absurd and un-
just. It would also invite unnecessary confu-
sion, since the jury’s attention would not be
directed towards a doctor’s post-surgical con-
duct and whether these actions deprived the
parents of the opportunity to make an in-
formed choice about pursuing additional chil-
dren. Under Plaintiffs’ theory, doctors
would have no incentive to inform their pa-
tients about the results of a failed procedure
since providing notice would not terminate
liability in a future lawsuit for medical negli-
gence based on the failed surgery. As a
matter of policy, our rulings should encour-
age doctors to act responsibly and notify
their patients about surgical results.

I {83} Accordingly, we hold that, fol-
lowing a failed sterilization procedure, dam-
ages related to an additional pregnancy,

along with the costs of raising any subse-
quent children to the age of majority, are
only available when plaintiffs can prove a
breach of the duty to inform. In so doing,
‘we reject the position advocated by the Court
of Appeals. We find that damages relating
solely to a negligently performed sterilization
are those that would normally flow from a
failed surgery, such as the cost of a second
sterilization procedure, any physical or emo-
tional harm that may result from the initial
or subsequent sterilization, lost wages, the
reasonable costs of birth control until a see-
ond procedure is feasible, and so forth.

I {34} Because the timeliness and ade-
quacy of a doctor’s warning are questions of
fact that go to the element of breach, we see
no reason to discuss in any detail the compo-
nents of a successful warning following a
failed sterilization procedure. See Herrera,
2008-NMSC-018, 133, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d
181 (“The finder of fact must determine
whether Defendant breached the duty of or-
dinary care....”). Each case will contain its
own unique set of circumstances, and our
case law commits this important issue to the
jury. See id. (noting that the issue of wheth-
er a specific duty has been breached “‘is a
factual determination or, perhaps, a mixed
determination of law and fact, involving as it
does the application of precepts of duty to
the historical facts as found by the fact find-
ex’” (quoting Bober v. N.M. State Fair, 111
NM. 644, 650, 808 P.2d 614, 620 (1991))).
We note, however, that the duty to inform
requires doctors, at a minimum, to provide
patients with adequate and timely informa-
tion about the failed sterilization procedure
and the patient’s continued fertility. See
UJI 18-1104(B){C); 18-1116(B). Any suc-
cessful warning must include information
that is objectively understandable, delivered
in a manner that is reasonably likely to con-
vey the desired information to the patient in
a meaningful way, keeping in mind that most
patients are not medically trained and need
help understanding the full ramifications of
professional jargon.

Hs {85} In the current case, we can
easily resolve the notice question. Despite
our misgivings about the adequacy of Defen-
dant’s post-surgical communications to Mrs.

465

Provencio, the fact remains that Plaintiff un-
derstood she was still fertile. She admitted
as much at trial; there is no dispute on this
question. The nature of Mrs. Provencio’s
admission is such that neither she nor her
husband could have suffered the information-
al injury that lies at the heart of a claim for
wrongful conception. Accordingly, the trial
court was correct in granting Defendant’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law. See
Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 1999-NMSC-
029, 126, 127 N.M. 729, 987 P.2d 886, over-
ruled on other grounds by Herrera, 2003-
NMSC-018, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 181.

CONCLUSION
{36} We reverse the Court of Appeals.
{37} IT IS SO ORDERED.

We CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES and
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMCA-083
261 P.3d 1097

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Frankie TELLES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 28,943.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

April 28, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, July 18, 2011, No. 33,085.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Farhan
Khan, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

Jacqueline Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Ap-
pellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appel-
lant.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

{1} Frankie Telles (Defendant) appeals his
convictions for second-degree murder (fire-
arm enhancement), aggravated assault (fire-
arm enhancement), tampering with evidence,
and conspiracy to commit tampering with

467

evidence. Defendant raises four issues on
appeal, including a violation of the Confronta-
tion Clause under the Sixth Amendment.
We conclude that the district court commit-
ted no error and affirm Defendant’s convic-
tions.

BACKGROUND

{2} On the night of February 27, 2004,
fourteen-year-old J.0. (Victim), was shot and
killed while Victim was walking home in the
company of his friend, A.B. Defendant was
identified as the person who shot Victim.

{3} A.B. testified that Victim and several
friends started their evening by dancing at
Club Fusion Teen Center. While walking
home down Union Street, three of the friends
stopped at the Pic-Quik convenience store to
purchase food. Victim and A.B. were not
hungry and continued walking down Union
Street toward Victim’s home. After crossing
the railroad tracks, a dark-colored car passed
the pair, and the person later identified as
Defendant yelled things at them like “East
Side” and “West Side.” A.B. testified that he
“was really scared,” and the two continued
walking. Someone in the car said, “We'll
come back for you” and then drove away.
Looking back, A.B. saw the car make a U-
turn in the intersection past the railroad
tracks and return to stop in the middle of the
street by A.B. and Victim. Three males got
out of the car, one carrying a dark-colored
handgun pointed at the ground, one carrying
an object described as a brick, and one carry-
ing a silver-colored handgun that was pointed
at Victim and A.B. One of the individuals
threw the brick-like object and hit Victim in
the leg. Defendant, whom A.B. described as
the bigger or wider of the three and the one
carrying the silver-colored gun, began shoot-
ing. After shots were fired, A.B. heard Vic-
tim yelling in pain and then pulled Victim to
the ground and laid on top of him. One of
the three assailants then retrieved the brick-
like object while the other two returned to
the car, and they subsequently drove away.

{4} D.J. testified that Defendant and sev-
eral friends started the night in question by
drinking alcohol at D.J’s home. Five of
them, including Defendant and D.J., left in
R.0’s blue car to drive to the Pic-Quik on
Union Street. The car approached Victim

468

and A.B. on Union Street near the railroad
tracks, and Defendant yelled at the pair as
the car passed. D.J. indicated that the three
individuals who exited the car at the time of
the confrontation were Defendant, R.O., and
himself. During the investigation following
the incident and at trial, D.J. identified De-
fendant as the person who fired his gun.
After the incident, the three got back in the
car, and they took DJ. home. D.J. then
called his mother, G.J., and told her that he
wanted her to come home. GJ. returned
home with T.M., and D.J. told them that
Defendant had shot somebody. Shortly
thereafter, Defendant returned to DJs
home in a different car. G.J. and T.M. testi-
fied regarding D.J.’s statements made to
them about the incident. T.M. also testified
that Defendant told her that he had shot
somebody. T.M. further testified that she
knew that Defendant had a silver-colored
revolver.

{5} Upon locating Defendant, the Las
Cruces Police Department questioned Defen-
dant about the shooting incident. Defendant.
indicated that he was not involved in the
incident because he was in Alamogordo that
weekend with T.M., identified as his girl-
friend. T.M. was then questioned by detec-
tives and implicated Defendant in the shoot-
ing. Defendant was then given his Miranda
warnings, signed a waiver, and was ques-
tioned a second time by the detectives. De-
fendant gave a recorded statement to the
detectives at that time. After the recorded
statement was completed, the detectives
placed Defendant in a room with R.O. with
the hope that the two would talk with one
another and potentially disclose more infor-
mation. This conversation between Defen-
dant and R.O. was secretly videotaped by the
detectives, the video was played for the jury,
and a transcript of the conversation was also
provided to the jury. Finally, a telephone
conversation between Defendant and his fa-
ther was also recorded while Defendant was
in jail, and the district court admitted the
conversation into evidence.

{6} Defendant was convicted in a jury trial
and now raises four issues on appeal: (1)
whether the district court erred when it ad-
mitted D.J.’s out-of-court statement to G.J.

and T.M. as an excited utterance pursuant to
Rule 11-803(B) NMRA; (2) whether Defen-
dant’s constitutional right to confront a wit-
ness against him was violated when the dis-
trict court admitted the secretly videotaped
conversation at the police station between
Defendant and R.O.; (8) whether the district
court erred when it admitted a recorded
telephone conversation at the jailhouse be-
tween Defendant and his father; and (4)
whether the district court erred in admitting
evidence regarding Defendant’s invocation of
his constitutional right against self-incrimina-
tion.
DISCUSSION
I. Excited Utterance Testimony

{7} Defendant argues that the testimony
by GJ. and T.M. recounting D.J.’s out-of-
court statement shortly after the shooting
was inadmissible hearsay. The State asserts
that the district court properly admitted the
statement as an excited utterance pursuant
to Rule 11-803(B).

WN {8} The admission of evidence is
within the sound discretion of the district
court and will only be set aside upon a show-
ing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Stan-
ley, 2001-NMSC-037, 15, 131 N.M. 368, 37
P.3d 85. “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the ruling is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances of
the case. We cannot say the [district] court
abused its discretion by its ruling unless we
can characterize it as clearly untenable or
not justified by reason.” State v. Rojo, 1999-
NMSC-001, 1141, 126 N.M. 488, 971 P.2d 829
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).

{9} An “excited utterance” is de-
fined as “(a] statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant
was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition.” Rule 11-803(B).
“The theory underlying the excited utterance
exception is that the exciting event induced
the declarant’s surprise, shock, or nervous
excitement which temporarily stills capacity
for conscious fabrication and makes it unlike-
ly that the speaker would relate other than
the truth.” State v. Macias, 2009-NMSC-
028, 130, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.8d 804 (inter-

nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“There is nothing in the case law nor in the
ordinary meaning of ‘excited’ which restricts
the meaning of the word to any narrow re-
quirement of a frenzied or hyperactive state.”
State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, 148, 147
N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641. Instead, we exam-
ine the totality of the cireumstances underly-
ing a particular fact situation, including the
following factors:

[H]ow much time passed between the star-

tling event and the statement, and wheth-

er, in that time, the declarant had an op-
portunity for reflection and fabrication;
how much pain, confusion, nervousness, or
emotional strife the declarant was experi-
encing at the time of the statement;
whether the statement was self-serving;
and whether the statement was made in
response to an inquiry.
Id. 149 (alteration omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). We have
also recognized that “the excited utterance
doctrine [is] not so much limited in time as it
[is limited] to the emotional state of the
declarant when making the out-of-court dec-
laration.” State v. Mares, 112 N.M. 198, 201,
812 P.2d 1841, 1849 (Ct.App.1991); see State
v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 698, 697, 616 P.2d 406,
410 (1980) (recognizing that “under the excit-
ed utterance doctrine, there is no definite or
fixed limit on time”); see also State v. Maes-
tas, 92 N.M. 135, 140, 584 P.2d 182, 187
(Ct.App.1978) (noting that “the time se-
quence continues as long as the [declarant] is
under the stress and strain of the excitement,
caused by the event” and that “[a]dmissibility
depends more on circumstances than on
time”).

HI {10} D.J’s statement to his mother
and T.M. was made after he returned home
following the shooting. We must review the
totality of the circumstances regarding the
time sequence of this statement, as well as
the stress and emotional strife declarant was
experiencing at the time of the statement.
See Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, 149, 147 N.M.
542, 226 P.8d 641. DJ. was only sixteen
years old at the time of the shooting. He felt
that he was actually in the line of fire and
became scared when the shots rang out. He
got back in the car, and the next thing he

469

remembered was being taken home, Al-
though the actual time sequence was not
described in specific detail, the district court
could have reasonably determined that the
ear returned to D.J.’s home immediately af-
ter the shooting. See Rojo, 1999-NMSC-
001, 141, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. More-
over, D.J.’s home was close to where the
shooting occurred. Once home, D.J. called
his mother and told her, “You need to get
home.”

{11} G.J. was at the store with T.M. when
G.J. received the call from her son saying,
“Mom, get home ... [jlust get home.” G.J.
testified that her son “sounded really
scared.” GJ, and T.M. left the store and
hurried straight home. When G.J. walked
into her home, her son looked scared, and
she asked him what was wrong. As D.J. told
her about the shooting without further
prompting, he was really scared, really ner-
vous, shook-up, and upset, telling her what
happened really quickly because Defendant
and the others were returning to the house.
G.J. further testified that D.J. was walking
or standing as he talked, rather than sitting
down. T.M. was also present when D.J. told
his mother about the shooting. T.M. similar-
ly testified that D.J. was really nervous and
seared, and that D.J. just told them what
happened without them having to ask him
questions.

{12} Based upon the totality of the cireum-
stances, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
D.J.’s out-of-court statement to his mother
and T.M. under the excited utterance excep-
tion set forth in Rule 11-803(B). The state-
ment was made shortly after the shooting.
Furthermore, D.J. continued to show signs of
stress and emotional strife caused by the
shooting incident, as demonstrated by his
appearing nervous and scared, talking quick-
ly, and walking or standing as he talked. In
addition, the declaration was voluntarily
made and was not in response to any direct
questioning. Finally, the declaration was not
self-serving since it implicated D.J. as a wit-
ness to the confrontation. As the district
court did not abuse its discretion, it is unnec-
essary for this Court to determine whether
the harmless error doctrine applies.

470

Il. Confrontation Clause Challenge

{13} Defendant asserts that the admission
of the secretly videotaped conversation at the
police station between Defendant and R.O.
violated his right to confront the witnesses
against him under the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The State contends that no
violation of the Confrontation Clause oc-
curred because admission of Defendant’s own
statements did not violate the Confrontation
Clause, and R.0.’s statements were non-testi-
monial. It is undisputed that Defendant was
unable to cross-examine R.O. as a result of
R.0.’s unavailability to testify at trial.

Hs {14} Initially, we note that “t]he
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause
are not coextensive and must remain dis-
tinct.” State v. Mendez, 2010-NMSC-044,
128, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.8d 328. Whereas
“(t]he hearsay rule is intended to ensure that
the jury is not exposed to unreliable evi-
dence,” the right of confrontation “guaran-
tees the accused in a criminal trial the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against
him, regardless of how trustworthy the out-
of-court statement may appear to be.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). As a result, “[o]nce it has been estab-
lished that the Confrontation Clause does not
bar admission of the statement, the rules of
evidence govern whether the statement is
admissible.” State v. Aragon, 2010-NMSC-
008, 16, 147 N.M. 474, 225 P.3d 1280. Here,
Defendant does not argue that the state-
ments were inadmissible under the rules of
evidence, so we only address whether the
admission of the statements violated the Con-
frontation Clause. See State v. Torres, 2005-
NMCA-070, 134, 187 N.M. 607, 113 P.8d 877
(stating that this Court will not address is-
sues unsupported by argument and authori-
ty). Questions of admissibility under the
Confrontation Clause are issues of Jaw that
we review de novo. State v. Bullcoming,
2010-NMSC-007, 110, 147 N.M. 487, 226
P.3d 1, cert. granted, — U.S. —, 181 S.Ct.
62, 177 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010).

HH {15} Our Supreme Court has ap-
plied the analysis in Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 US. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1854, 158 L.Ed.2d
177 (2004), to determine the admissibility of

evidence challenged pursuant to the Confron-
tation Clause. See, eg, Aragon, 2010-
NMSC-008, 16, 147 N.M. 474, 225 P.3d 1280.
Citing Crawford, the Court recognized that a
critical distinction exists between testimonial
and non-testimonial hearsay evidence, and
the Confrontation Clause only applies to tes-
timonial evidence. Aragon, 2010-NMSC-
008, 16, 147 N.M. 474, 225 P.8d 1280. If the
conversation between Defendant and R.O.
was non-testimonial in nature, then Defen-
dant recognizes that this evidence cannot be
excluded on the basis of a Confrontation
Clause challenge. Defendant asserts, howev-
er, that these statements were testimonial
because Defendant and R.O. “would have
never made the statements resulting in the
DVD evidence without the involvement of
government[al] officers[.]”

{16} Detective Myers testified that shortly
after his second interview with Defendant, he
placed Defendant and R.O. in a room togeth-
er at the station because “we thought that if
we put them in the room together, we may
get a little bit more information that no one
‘was willing to tell us, but they might talk to
each other about.” Defendant “might tell
[R.0.] a little more than he’d tell [me].” The
videotaping of the conversation between De-
fendant and R.O. was “sort of clandestine,
hidden camera,” and “[w]e just put them in
there and hoped for the best.” Both Defen-
dant and R.O. subsequently made inculpatory
statements implicating themselves in the
shooting. Whether the involvement of gov-
ernmental officers in obtaining secretly re-
corded statements from suspects in a crimi-
nal investigation brings those statements
within the realm of testimonial statements
under the Confrontation Clause is a matter
of first impression in New Mexico.

{17} Crawford recognizes that statements
made as a result of “police interrogations”
are testimonial in nature. 541 US. at 68, 124
S.Ct. 1354. The United States Supreme
Court later clarified that police interroga-
tions produce testimony when “the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington,
547 US. 818, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165
L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). In State v. Lopez, our

Supreme Court determined that statements
made by co-defendants during a police inter-
rogation were “testimonial” when the ques-
tioning by officers constituted an attempt to
“prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.” 2007-NMSC-
087, 120, 142 N.M. 188, 164 P.3d 19 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Therefore, we must determine whether the
detectives’ involvement in the clandestine
videotaped conversation arranged between
Defendant and R.0. constitutes a “police in-
terrogation” for purposes of the Confronta-
tion Clause.

{18} Defendant acknowledges that a per-
son has a minimal expectation of privacy
while in police custody, but relies on State v.
Dedman to argue that a core concern under-
lying protection under the Confrontation
Clause is the “involvement of government
officers in the production of testimony with
an eye toward trial, because this provides a
unique potential for prosecutorial abuse.”
2004-NMSC-037, 129, 136 N.M. 561, 102
P.3d 628 (alteration omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted), overruled
on other grounds by Bullcoming, 2010-~
NMSC-007, 147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d1. Asa
result, Defendant contends that since Defen-
dant and R.O. would never have made the
statements resulting in the video evidence
without governmental involvement, the con-
versation was testimonial and protected un-
der the Confrontation Clause. Defendant
cites no additional supporting authority, but
instead recognizes contrary authority. See
Ferrer v. State, 2 So.3d 1111, 1112 (Fla.Dist.
Ct.App.2009) (noting that law enforcement
did not foster any expectation of privacy and
that recorded conversations with the co-de-
fendant at the police station were not testi-
monial in violation of Crazuford ).

{19} We agree with the State that Defen-
dant’s own statements during the conversa-
tion with R.O. were non-testimonial and do
not violate the Confrontation Clause. See
State v. Hernandez, 2009-NMCA-096, 117,
16, 147 NM. 1, 216 P.3d 251 (recognizing
that a defendant’s own admissions generally
do not present Confrontation Clause con-
cerns as long as they are authenticated and
admitted through a proper vehicle); State v.

471

Castillo-Sanchez, 1999-NMCA-085, 1 23, 127
N.M. 540, 984 P.2d 787 (recognizing that a
defendant’s own admissions cannot “violate
his right to confront the witnesses against
him”),

{20} We also agree with the State that
R.0.’s statements were non-testimonial. In
Dawis, the Supreme Court recognized that
“statements made unwittingly to a [glovern-
ment informant” and “statements from one
prisoner to another” were clearly non-testi-
monial. Dawis, 547 U.S. at 825, 126 S.Ct.
2266. Relying on Dawis, the Tenth Circuit.
Court of Appeals held that an accomplice’s
statements to an undercover informant act-
ing as a fellow prisoner were non-testimonial
even though those statements were clandes-
tinely recorded by the informant. United
States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 768, 778 (10th
Cir.2010). The Court reasoned that al-
though the government coordinated the
placement of the wired informant in a room
with the accomplice, no interrogation oc-
eurred where the accomplice spoke freely
with the informant. Jd. at 779. Similarly,
we conclude that no interrogation of either
Defendant or R.O. occurred where the detec-
tives coordinated the placement of Defendant
and R.O. in a room with a hidden camera,
but did not question them. Because Defen-
dant and R.O. talked freely with one another
without police questioning, no police interro-
gation will be recognized for Confrontation
Clause purposes. Therefore, despite the
subversive nature of the detectives’ maneu-
ver, both Defendant’s and R.0.’s statements
were non-testimonial for Confrontation
Clause purposes.

{21} As a result, we conclude that the
Confrontation Clause did not bar admission
of the recorded police station conversation
between Defendant and R.0., and it is unnec-
essary for this Court to determine whether
the harmless error doctrine applies.

Ill. Recorded Jailhouse Telephone Con-
- versation
HM {22} Defendant argues that the dis-
trict court erred when it admitted a recorded
telephone conversation at the jailhouse be-
tween Defendant and his father. Three of
Defendant’s recorded jailhouse conversations

472

were proffered by the State as evidence. At
trial, Defendant asserted that all three con-
versations should be excluded as improper
impeachment evidence. After reviewing all
three recordings in camera, the district court
ruled that only the conversation between De-
fendant and his father would be admitted as
evidence relevant to the element of intent to
commit the charge of first-degree murder.
In the recording, Defendant told his father
that he learned from discovery paperwork
who had “ratted” against him. When his
father inquired who the person was, Defen-
dant replied, “It was [T.M.] and that other
guy that, [expletive], that I let live.”

{23} The admission of Defendant’s state-
ment to his father is within the sound discre-
tion of the district court and will only be set.
aside upon a showing of a clear abuse of that
discretion. See Stanley, 2001-NMSC-037,
15, 181 N.M. 368, 37 P.8d 85 (stating that
appellate courts “examine the admission or
exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion,
and the [district] court’s determination will
not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that
discretion”). On appeal, Defendant appears
to abandon his position that the statement.
constitutes improper impeachment evidence
and now asserts that the district court
abused its discretion based upon a misunder-
standing of the law. However, Defendant
fails to identify any particular rule of law
that the district court misunderstood, but
instead asks for review under State v. Frank-
lin, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982 (1967), and
State v. Boyer, 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1
(Ct.App.1985).

HM {24} The State offered the conver-
sation as evidence relevant to establish the
element of intent to commit the charge of
first-degree murder under Count I of the
indictment. No specific argument has now
been put forward by Defendant to rebut the
relevance of the conversation to show intent.
Additionally, both parties recognize that
tape recordings of a defendant’s own state-
ments may be admitted as admissions of a
party-opponent. See Rule 11-801(D)(2)(a)
NMRA (stating that a party's own admis-
sion is admissible non-hearsay); see also
State v. Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, 116, 21,
148 N.M. 50, 229 P.3d 528 (recognizing that

a defendant’s own statements in recorded
jailhouse phone conversations implicating
himself in criminal conduct were properly
admitted under Rule 11-801(D)(2)(a)). Ad-
ditionally, we note that the admission of De-
fendant’s father’s follow-up question regard-
ing who “ratted” was properly admitted to
show context for Defendant's statement.
See  Castillo-Sanchez, 1999-NMCA-085,
123, 127 N.M. 540, 984 P.2d 787 (recogniz-
ing that the other party’s statements in a
conversation containing an admission by the
defendant were admissible since they were
necessary to put the defendant’s statements
in context). Once evidence is properly ad-
mitted under any theory, the admission of
the evidence by the district court will be
affirmed. See Macias, 2009-NMSC-028,
117, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804 (recogniz-
ing that an appellate court may affirm the
district court’s admission of evidence if it
was right for any reason). Therefore, the
district court did not err by admitting De-
fendant’s recorded jailhouse conversation
with his father.

IV. Right Against Self-Incrimination
TM {25} Defendant’s final argument is
that his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was violated at trial. i
citing Franklin and Boyer, Defendant fails to
identify any evidentiary portion of the trial
where the claimed error occurred. See
Franklin, 73 N.M. at 129, 428 P.2d at 984;
Boyer, 103 N.M. at 659, 712 P.2d at 5. Defen-
dant notes that the only reference at trial to
the Fifth Amendment occurred when Defen-
dant objected to the. testimony of T.M. re-
garding whether Defendant had asked her to
“{take] the Fifth.” This reference to T.M.’s
rights will not be expanded to include Defen-
dant’s right against self-incrimination. See
State v. Calvillo, 110 N.M. 114, 119, 792 P.2d
1157, 1162 (Ct.App.1990) (recognizing that
the Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination is personal to the defendant or
witness and that a witness’s failure to testify
ordinarily does not infringe on the defen-
dant’s right against self-incrimination). We
decline to further address Defendant’s argu-
ment where it is not supported by legal
authority or any further reference to the
record before this Court. See State v. Bar-

vera, 2001-NMSC-014, 133, 180 N.M. 227,
22 P.8d 1177 (recognizing that appellate
courts will not review arguments unsupport-
ed by references to the record and cited legal
authority). As a result, we determine that
the district court did not allow Defendant's
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation to be violated during the trial in this
matter.

CONCLUSION

{26} We conclude that the district court
did not err when it admitted the evidence
objected to by Defendant in this appeal.
Therefore, we affirm Defendant’s convictions
for second-degree murder (firearm enhance-
ment), aggravated assault (firearm enhance-
ment), tampering with evidence, and conspir-
acy to commit tampering with evidence.

{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER
and JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judges.

2011-NMCA-084
261 P.3d 1105
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
v.
Christopher LAVONE, Defendant-
Appellant.

No. 29,266.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 24, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, July 19, 2011, No. 33,084.

473

474,

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Farhan
Khan, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee,

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} While driving under the influence of
alcohol, Defendant struck a pedestrian at
night on a busy street, knocking her into
oncoming lanes of traffic, and immediately
left the scene. The victim died, and Defen-
dant pleaded guilty to homicide by vehicle
(driving while under the influence of liquor).
At sentencing, the district court classified
Defendant's offense as a serious violent of-
fense under the Earned Meritorious Deduc-
tions Act (EMDA), NMSA 1978, § 33-2-34
(2006), which limits his ability to earn good
time. The district court reasoned that by
failing to stop and render aid, Defendant left
the victim in danger of being hit by other
vehiclés at a time when he did not know her
condition. Defendant appeals the district
court's decision and raises other issues relat-
ed to the fairness of his sentencing hearing.
We hold that the court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the offense

was a serious violent offense. We reject
Defendant’s other claims and affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} After dark, at about 8:30 p.m. on
March 21, 2007, Defendant was driving
northbound on St. Francis Drive in Santa Fe,
New Mexico. There is no evidence that he
was speeding, but his blood alcohol content
was above the legal limit. He struck the
victim, a pedestrian, as she attempted to
cross St. Francis Drive at the intersection of
Paseo de Peralta. It appears that the victim
was knocked into the southbound lanes of St.
Francis Drive and that, because of darkness,
it would have been more difficult for the
drivers of other vehicles to see her. Defen-
dant did not stop to render aid and instead
drove away from the scene. He stopped
later in Tesuque, New Mexico, and called
911.

{3} At the sentencing hearing, Defendant
claimed that he failed to stop at the time of
the accident because the accident triggered
his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
The State argued that Defendant’s crime
should be designated as a serious violent
offense under the EMDA because Defendant,
without knowing the victim’s condition, failed
to stop and render aid to her. The district
court agreed, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
The EMDA

{4} Under the EMDA, some offenses are
per se serious violent offenses, while other
listed offenses may, in the court’s discretion,
be found to be so. The offense in the pres-
ent case, third degree homicide by vehicle, is
in the discretionary category. See § 88-2-
84(L)(4)(0). To designate an offense as a
serious violent one, the district court must
determine that the crime was “committed in
a physically violent manner either with an
intent to do serious harm or with reckless-
ness in the face of knowledge that one’s acts
are reasonably likely to result in serious
harm.” State v. Solano, 2009-NMCA-098,
110, 146 N.M. 881, 215 P.8d 769 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), cert.
denied, 2009-NMCERT-007, 147 N.M. 363,
223 P.3d 360.

Hs (5} We review the court’s ruling
for an abuse of discretion. See Solano, 2009-
NMCA-098, 17, 146 N.M. 831, 215 P.8d 769.
A court abuses its discretion if it acts con-
trary to law or when its decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. In con-
ducting our review for abuse of discretion,
we consider whether the court’s serious vio-
lent offender designation is supported by suf-
ficient evidence, free of legal error, and re-
flects a reasonable choice among alternatives.
Id.

{6} This Court has decided a number of
cases considering whether a particular vehic-
ular homicide conviction was properly deter-
mined to be a serious violent offense. All of
these cases involved a defendant who had a
history of drinking or facts demonstrating
recklessness. See id. 1113-18 (involving a
defendant who had a prior criminal history
involving alcohol-related offenses and who
drove at a high rate of speed and caused a
particularly violent collision with a bicyclist);
State v. Worrick, 2006-NMCA-035, 19, 139
N.M. 247, 131 P.3d 97 (involving a defendant
who had an extremely high blood alcohol
content and a history of intoxication); State
v. Montoya, 2005~NMCA-078, 119-10, 187
N.M. 718, 114 P.38d 893 (concerning a defen-
dant who had a long prior history of a drink-
ing problem); State v. Wildgrube, 2003-
NMCA-108, 137, 134 N.M. 262, 75 P.3d 862
(concerning a defendant who had four previ-
ous arrests for alcohol-related offenses and
two convictions for driving while intoxicated).

WM {7} By contrast, Defendant in the
present case has no record and no past histo-
ry of drinking and driving. There is no
evidence of speeding or reckless driving be-
fore the accident. The district court found
Defendant’s offense to be a serious violent
one based solely on his failure to stop and
help, reasoning that he left the victim in
danger from oncoming traffic at a time when
Defendant did not know her condition. We
must decide whether this is sufficient.

Hl {8} A determination that an offense is
a serious violent offense may not be based on
the physically violent death of the victim and
must be based on something more than the
mere elements of the crime. See Solano,
2009-NMCA-098, 118, 146 N.M. 881, 215

475

P.3d 769. The determination is highly de-
pendent on the “particular factual context” of
the case. State v. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036,
137, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.8d 170; see also
State v. Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, 1116, 131
N.M. 580, 39 P.8d 747 (recognizing that there
are “differences in the ways of committing
the offenses listed in Section 33-2-
34(L)(4)(n)”).

HI {9} Sentencing statutes indicate the
Legislature’s intent that district courts have
broad sentencing discretion. See State v
Clah, 1997-NMCA-091, 1 19, 124 N.M. 6, 946
P.2d 210 (stating that “the sentencing stat-
utes evidence a legislative intent that the
trial court have a wide variety of options by
which to sentence” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). In the sentencing
context, generally, a district court must con-
sider many factors when it makes a sentenc-
ing determination, and the court is given
broad discretion to fashion a sentence “ap-
propriate to the offense and the offender.”
State v. Sinyard, 100 N.M. 694, 697, 675 P.2d
426, 429 (Ct.App.1983). These general prin-
ciples, combined with Rudolfo’s direction to
consider the “particular factual context,” in-
dicate that a district court is given broad
discretion under the EMDA to consider all
relevant factors.

{10} Considering the “particular factual
context,” as required by Rudolfo, we con-
clude that the district court appropriately
acted within its discretion in determining
that the offense was a serious violent one.
The court’s determination was not based
solely on the physically violent death of the
victim or on the elements of the crime.
Rather, it was based on Defendant’s indiffer-
ence to the victim’s condition and to her
vulnerability to oncoming traffic. Although
Defendant’s recklessness occurred immedi-
ately after the accident rather than before it,
that fact does not change our conclusion.
Defendant’s conduct in leaving the scene of
the accident still demonstrated reckless dis-
regard for the victim, who had been thrown
into traffic lanes, and potentially increased
the risk of harm to her. Accordingly, the
district court could reasonably conclude that
Defendant’s conduct constituted “reckless-

476

ness in the face of knowledge that one’s acts
are reasonably likely to result in serious
harm.” Solano, 2009-NMCA-098, 110, 146
N.M. 831, 215 P.3d 769 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

{11} Defendant relies on the differences
between the present case and the other ve-
hicular homicide cases involving the EMDA
and argues that this case does not meet the
relevant standard, either as a matter of fact
or of law. He argues that his conduct was
not “egregious enough.” He also argues that
his conduct did not demonstrate the requisite
physical violence or intent. He describes his
failure to stop as “indifference,” arguing that
it does not rise to the level of recklessness.
While his case is different from the other
vehicular homicide cases we have considered,
we cannot say that the district court’s deci-
sion was untenable or contrary to law.

{12} Defendant relies on case law holding
that offenses not listed in the EMDA cannot,
be found to be serious violent offenses. See
State v. Loretto, 2006-NMCA-142, 19, 140
N.M. 705, 147 P.8d 1188 (reversing the dis-
trict court’s determination that the crime of
attempted first degree criminal sexual pen-
etration was a serious violent offense because
the crime is not an offense enumerated in
Section 83-2-84(L)(4)(m) and therefore can-
not be found to be a serious violent offense);
State v. Bennett, 2008-NMCA-147, 11 12-18,
134 N.M. 705, 82 P.3d 72 (holding that third-
degree aggravated battery on a household
member could not be a serious violent of-
fense because it is not enumerated in the
statute). He argues that the offense of fail-
ure to render aid is not listed in the EMDA
and, therefore, his failure to render aid can-
not be used to support the district court’s
decision.

{13} We are not persuaded. In the cases
relied on by Defendant, the offenses found to
be serious violent offenses were not listed in
the EMDA. In the present case, however,
vehicular homicide is a listed offense. That
key fact distinguishes this case from Loretto
and Bennett. Defendant calls this distinction
one “without [a] difference,” arguing that the
absence of failure to render aid in the EMDA
means that cesduct like Defendant’s may

never be used to justify a finding like the one
in the present case.

{14} We disagree. Our task is to deter-
mine legislative intent and to construe legis-
Jation in a reasonable fashion. See State v.
Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, 18, 127 N.M. 240,
980 P.2d 23, We believe Defendant over-
states what was intended by the Legislature.
The Legislature understandably did not in-
clude failure to render aid in the EMDA
because it is not normally considered a vio-
lent offense, at least in the abstract. We
cannot, however, stretch this legislative
choice beyond what must have been intend-
ed. There is a difference between the of-
fense of failure to render aid, viewed in the
abstract, and leaving a victim unprotected in
a dark, busy roadway after having struck the
victim with a car. In our view, Defendant
reads more into the EMDA than what the
Legislature intended. Consequently, we are
not persuaded that the district court’s ruling
was prohibited by either the EMDA or the
cases on which Defendant relies.

{15} Finally, Defendant relies on his
PTSD to excuse his conduct, but this is a
factual argument, and the weight to be given
to that evidence was for the district court to
decide. See State v. Hughey, 2007-NMSC-
036, 116, 142 N.M. 88, 163 P.8d 470 (stating
that the fact finder determines matters of
credibility and the weight of evidence). The
district court was not required to find it
persuasive.

Other Arguments Regarding Fairness

I {16} Defendant argues that he did
not receive adequate notice that the State
would seek a determination that his offense
was a serious violent offense and that he was
denied the right to present a defense to the
State’s claim. He also claims that the State
affirmatively misled him because the State
“changed its position” or “apparently
changed its position” at the sentencing hear-
ing. (Emphasis added.) He argues that, con-
trary to the State’s “prior representations,”
the State improperly relied on “conduct it
had previously agreed not to pursue.”

{17} Our law does not require formal no-
tice that the State will seek a determination
that an offense is a serious violent one. A

defendant is deemed to have notice from the
EMDA itself. See State v. Cooley, 2003-
NMCA-149, 112, 184 N.M. 717, 82 P.8d 84
(holding that the statute gives notice). Addi-
tionally, when the facts on which the State
relies should not have been a surprise to a
defendant, he cannot complain about a lack of
notice. Id. 116. Finally, a defendant com-
plaining of a lack of notice must show preju-
dice. Id. 117.

{18} Defendant’s assertion that he was
misled is based solely on the fact that the
count ‘alleging failure to render aid was
dropped as part of the plea bargain. Other
than making this general assertion, Defen-
dant’s brief does not cite any evidence in the
record, such as statements by the prosecu-
tion, supporting his contention that the State
affirmatively misled him. The fact that the
State dropped the count alleging failure to
render aid as part of the plea bargain is not
enough to establish that the State misled
Defendant.

{19} Moreover, at sentencing, a district
court may consider an almost limitless vari-
ety of information. See United States v.
Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136
L.Ed.2d 554 (1997), per curiam (holding that
the court could consider crimes of which the
defendant has been acquitted); 6 Wayne R.
LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedwre § 26.4(b)
(8d ed.2010) (explaining that, at sentencing,
even acts that are beyond the charged con-
duet, including unrelated criminal conduct,
are relevant and may be considered). Con-
sequently, a defendant should be prepared to
deal with all of the facts surrounding the
criminal incident, which would include facts
that might have supported convictions for
other, related crimes. Because the sentenc-
ing court may consider a broad range of
information, we are not persuaded that there
were any constitutional or legal limitations on
the district court’s ability to consider Defen-
dant’s failure to stop. And because the sen-
tencing court must consider the “particular
factual context,” Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036,
187, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170, the fact
that the State had agreed to drop a charge as
part of a plea bargain did not foreclose the
district court from considering Defendant’s
entire course of conduct during the criminal

477

incident. On these facts, we hold that the
State did not unfairly mislead Defendant.

{20} Defendant also relies on statements
from his counsel’s motion for a new trial.
The motion claimed that Defendant did not
receive any notice that the State would seek
a determination that the offense was a seri-
ous violent one, and it contained a vague
reference to the plea agreement. However,
based on the law we have discussed, Defen-
dant could not reasonably assume that the
district court was precluded from considering
his failure to render aid.

{21} The motion further asserted that, had
trial counsel known the State would rely on
the failure to stop and render aid, he would
have played a tape of the 911 call made by
Defendant. Trial counsel’s claim that he
would have made a different strategy deci-
sion is not compelling. According to Defen-
dant’s brief in chief, the tape would have
supported his argument that his PTSD ex-
cused his failure to remain at the scene be-
cause it demonstrated that Defendant was
“agitated and disoriented.” The parties had
already squarely presented that issue to the
district court through expert testimony. As
we have already noted, the resolution of this
factual issue was a matter for the district
court to decide. Furthermore, because noth-
ing indicates the tape would have made any
difference, we conclude that Defendant has
not shown any prejudice. See Cooley, 2003-
NMCA-149, 117, 184 N.M. 717, 82 P.8d 84
(requiring a showing of prejudice).

{22} Finally, we reject Defendant’s claim
that.he was unfairly surprised and could not
present a defense. Given the law granting a
sentencing court broad power to consider a
wide range of information, Defendant should
not have been surprised. In addition, the
record indicates that Defendant was well pre-
pared to deal with the potential negative
impact presented by his failure to remain at
the scene. At sentencing, he presented ex-
pert testimony to explain that his P[SD was
the reason he was unable to remain at the
scene. He knew his conduct was an issue,
despite the fact that he no longer faced a
conviction for failure to render aid. Even if
Defendant had been surprised, he was able
to respond when he filed his motion for a

478

new trial asking the district court to recon-
sider its sentencing decision.

{23} For all of these reasons, we conclude
that Defendant had adequate notice, knew
that his failure to stop was relevant, and has
not shown prejudice. See id. 111 16-17.

Double Jeopardy

{24} Pursuant to State v. Franklin, 78
N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982 (1967), Defendant.
argues that the court’s ruling subjected him
to double jeopardy because the count for
failing to stop and render aid had been dis-
missed as part of the plea bargain. We
reject this argument. The EMDA does not
change the penalty, impose an additional
penalty, or lead to impermissible further
punishment. Therefore, there is no double
jeopardy violation. See Solano, 2009-
NMCA-098, 114, 146 N.M. 881, 215 P.8d
‘769.
CONCLUSION

{25} We affirm Defendant’s conviction and
sentence.

{26} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: MICHAEL E. VIGIL,
and LINDA M. VANZI, Judges.

2011-NMCA-086
261 P.3d 1110
Frank SABATINI, Plaintiff-
Appellee/Cross—
Appellant,

v

Cervantes ROYBAL and Irene Roybal,
Defendants-Appellants/Cross—
Appellees.

No. 29,804.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 25, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, July 28, 2011, No. 33,089.

3
oS

Cassutt, Hays & Friedman, P.A., John P.
Hays, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Sommer, Udall, Sutin, Hardwick, & Hyatt,
PA, Kurt A. Sommer, Jack N. Hardwick,
Candice Lee, Santa Fe, NM, William H. La-
zar, Tesuque, NM, for Appellants.

OPINION
BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} Appellants Cervantes and Irene Roy-
bal (Roybals) appeal the district court’s grant
of an injunction requiring them to reduce in
size or eliminate a garage located on their
property. Appellee Sabatini cross appeals,
claiming that the maximum size permitted by
the court’s order is still too large. At issue
in this case is whether the district court
erred in construing a restrictive covenant
allowing a “private garage” to mean only
those garages capable of holding no more
than a reasonable number of vehicles for the
use of a single family. Because the district
court incorrectly applied our standards for
construing terms in restrictive covenants, we
reverse.

480

I. BACKGROUND

{2} The Roybals own a 4.618-aecre lot in
the DeVargas Development Company Subdi-
vision No. 2 in Santa Fe, New Mexico. The
property, like most or all of the others in the
subdivision, is subject to restrictive cove-
nants designed to maintain certain aspects of
the character of the subdivision. One of the
covenants requires that,

N]o building whatsoever except a private

dwelling house, guest house and a private

garage shall be erected, placed or permit-
ted on said premises or any part thereof,
and said dwelling house ... shall cost and
be reasonably worth not less than Ten

Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars, ... and

said dwelling house and private garage and

guest house, if one is built, shall be in the
style or form or appearance known as the

Old Santa Fe or Pueblo Spanish style ar-

chitecture.

The deed containing these covenants was
filed in 1947.

{3} Mr. Roybal, who collects cars, decided
to purchase the property in part because it
had enough space for him to build a garage
to house his collection. In September 2007
the Roybals began construction on a 50 x
110 foot garage designed to house the cars.
The front of the structure consisted of three
large garage doors capable of admitting two
cars side-by-side and one taller, more narrow
door allowing entrance into a bay containing
a hydraulic lift. A small room used as an
office was located behind the lift. Mr. Roy-
bal testified that the exterior of the garage
was designed to match the existing house
and to conform to the Old Santa Fe style.

{4} The property immediately to the west.
of the Roybals’ property is owned by Sabati-
ni. When Sabatini learned of the construc-
tion taking place on the Roybals’ property,
he filed a complaint for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief to stop the construction,
which he alleged violated the restrictive cove-
nants. After discovery, both the Roybals
and Sabatini filed motions for summary judg-
ment on the issue of whether the garage
qualified as a “private garage” within the
meaning of the restrictive covenants. The
district court ruled for Sabatini, concluding
that “private garage” unambiguously meant

“a structure which is able to house a reason-
able number of vehicles for use by the occu-
pants of the private, single-family residence.”
The court then found that the Roybals’ ga-
rage was not a “private garage” under that
definition, After a bench trial regarding
remedies and defenses, the district court
ruled that the Roybals were required to ei-
ther reduce in size or demolish the garage.
Il. DISCUSSION

{5} The Roybals argue that (1) the district
court incorrectly determined the meaning of
the term “private garage” in the restrictive
covenants, (2) summary judgment was im-
proper because there were disputed issues of
material fact, and (3) the district court
abused its discretion by ordering that the
garage be razed or reduced in size. In his
cross appeal, Sabatini argues that the district
court erroneously held that reducing the size
of the garage to a 3,000 square-foot, eight-car
garage would bring it into compliance with
the restrictive covenants. Because we hold
that the district court incorrectly concluded
that the Roybals’ garage was not a “private
garage,” we do not discuss the remainder of
the arguments.

Hl {6} The district court interpreted the
term “private garage” in the restrictive cove-
nants to unambiguously mean “a structure
which is able to house a reasonable number
of vehicles for use by the occupants of the
private, single-family residence.” The Roy-
bals claim that this was error. Sabatini
maintains that the district court correctly
determined that the garage was not a “pri-
vate garage,” but instead a “car showroom.”
Whether a district court has correctly con-
strued a restrictive covenant is a question of
law which we review de novo. See Smart v.
Carpenter, 2005-NMCA-056, 116-7, 139
N.M. 524, 184 P.3d 811.

HS {7} “The [district] court has a duty
to enforce the expressed intentions as set
forth in covenants when they are unambigu-
ous.” Aragon v. Brown, 2008-NMCA-126,
11, 184 N.M. 459, 78 P.38d 913. When the
expressed intentions are ambiguous, we ap-
ply our rules of construction of restrictive
covenants. See Wilcox v. Timberon Protec-
tive Ass’n, 111 N.M. 478, 483, 806 P.2d 1068,

1073 (Ct.App.1990). Failure to apply the
rules of construction is an error of law, See
id. at 485, 806 P.2d at 1075.

A. “Private Garage” Is Ambiguous

HME {8} Our first task is to determine if
the phrase “private garage” is ambiguous.
Ambiguity exists when a word or phrase is
susceptible to two or more meanings. Id. at
484, 806 P.2d at 1074. “Whether ambiguity
exists is a question of law.” Id; see Rusa-
nowski v. Gurule, 114 N.M. 448, 450, 840
P.2d 595, 597 (Ct.App.1992) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). In decid-
ing whether a covenant is ambiguous, we
Jook at the document as a whole. Id.

{9} Our cases have found even the most
innocuous terms in restrictive covenants to
be ambiguous. For example, our Supreme
Court found the word “family” ambiguous
when it was not defined in the restrictive
covenant and “nothing in the covenant sug-
gest[ed] that it was the intent of the framers
to limit the term to a discrete family unit
comprised only of individuals related by
blood or by law.” Hill v. Cmty. of Damien
of Molokai, 1996~-NMSC-008, 113, 121 N.M.
358, 911 P.2d 861. Resolving the term in
favor of free use of property, the Court
determined that members of a family need
not be related. Jd. In Rusanowski, this
Court determined that the term “outbuild-
ing” was ambiguous because it was not de-
fined and because it was used inconsistently
within the covenants. See 114 N.M. at 451,
840 P.2d at 598.

{10} Courts of other states have consid-
ered whether the term “private garage” was
ambiguous. In Johnson v. Dawson, the
Indiana Court of Appeals determined that
the phrase “private garage,” by itself, was
ambiguous with respect to the size and ar-
rangement of garages. 856 N.E.2d 769, 773
(Ind.Ct.App.2006). However, what was un-
ambiguous in Johnson was the accompanying
language limiting the size of the garage to
“not more than three cars.” Id. (“[NJot
more than three means not more than
three.”). Another court, apparently finding
no ambiguity, has defined “private garage”
as “a structure or building kept for the stor-
age of motorcars by the owners, or certain

481

other persons, but not for the general pub-
lie.” Woods v. Kiersky, 14 S.W.2d 825, 828
(Tex.Comm’n App.1929).

{11} We conclude that the term “private
garage” is ambiguous. As in Hill and Rusa-
nowski, the covenants here do not define the
term. The term is susceptible to at least two
meanings. The Roybals proffer a dictionary
definition for garage: “a building or indoor
area for parking or storing motor vehicles.”
Dictionaries have also defined a garage as “a
repair shop for automotive vehicles.” Web-
ster’s Third New Int'l Dictionary 935 (8d ed.
1986). Unlike Johnson, the covenants under
consideration here do not include an explicit
limitation on the size of the garage, and the
term by itself is ambiguous with respect to
size. Examination of the entire document.
does not resolve this ambiguity. Finally, we
note that we are not aware of—and the
parties do not cite—any case, dictionary, or
source of any kind that has concluded that
the meaning of “garage” includes the restric-
tions adopted by the district court below.
Were we to assume that the district court’s
definition was plausible, the plethora of defi-
nitions not containing restrictions would
force us to conclude that the term was am-
biguous.

B. “Private Garage” Contains No Size
Limitations

Hs {12} Because the term “private
garage” is ambiguous with regard to size, we
must apply our rules of interpretation to
determine what size restrictions, if any, ap-
ply. Our cases set forth four such rules.
We must give the words in a restrictive
covenant their ordinary and intended mean-
ing. See Hill, 1996-NMSC-008, 16, 121
N.M. 358, 911 P.2d 861. “[Wle construe the
language strictly in favor of the free enjoy-
ment of the property and against restric-
tions, but not so strictly as to create an
illogical, unnatural, or strained construction.”
Baker v. Bennie J. Aday & Diswie J. Aday
Revocable Trust, 1999-NMCA-123, 17, 128
N.M. 250, 991 P.2d 994 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Finally, “we
will not read restrictions into covenants by
implication.” Id.

482

{13} In this case, each of our four rules for
construing restrictive covenants compels us
to conelude that the phrase “private garage”
contains no size limitation. First, as dis-
cussed above, the ordinary meaning of “ga-
rage” does not contain restrictions, but in-
stead appears to refer to a structure or space
whose purpose is to store vehicles. Second,
reading a size limitation into the term would
be inconsistent with our rule favoring the
free use of land. Third, we do not believe
that the failure to include a size limitation
creates an unnatural or strained construc-
tion—to the contrary, Sabatini’s attempts to
avoid using the term “garage” have been
strained and unnatural. Fourth, the district
court’s definition reads reasonableness re-
quirements into the term “private garage” by
implication, a practice we have repeatedly
cautioned against. We also note that the
covenant in question contains an example of
restrictive language: it assigns a lower
bound to the value of any residence con-
structed on the land. This not only demon-
strates that the drafters were capable of
adding limiting language, but also that their
intent was not that the buildings be limited
in size, but that they be of at least a certain
quality or value.

TE {14} The meaning of “private ga-
rage” should thus be governed by its ordi-
nary meaning, absent any implied restric-
tions. We hold that the meaning of that
term here is a structure or area whose essen-
tial purpose is the storage of motor vehicles
by the owners and not by the general public.
The question is not whether the Roybals’
garage might be described by some other
term, but whether the garage fits within the
meaning we have described. Thus, the fact
that it could be referred to as a warehouse, a
showroom, or any other term is irrelevant.

{15} This is not to say that a residence
could be turned into a garage by parking a
car in a bedroom. What is important is the
essential purpose of the structure. See Hill,
1996-NMSC-008, $11, 121 N.M. 858, 911
P.2d 861 (examining the essential purpose of
a group home to determine if the operation
of a group home was residential use);
Woods, 14 S.W.2d at 828 (reasoning that
whether a structure was a residence or a

private garage depended on its essential
character and dominant features). Here, the
garage was designed primarily to store the
Roybals’ vehicles. The single small office did
not change that essential purpose. Sabatini’s
attempts to refer to the garage by other
terms inevitably sounded strained and unnat-
ural because terms such as “structure,”
“warehouse,” or “showroom,” simply ignore
or attempt to hide the garage’s essential
purpose—the storage of vehicles.

C. The Roybals’ Garage Is a “Private Ga-
rage”

Hs {16} The facts about the Roy-
bals’ garage are not in dispute. Further-
more, for the purposes of the restrictive cov-
enants at issye here, we have determined the
meaning of “private garage” as a matter of
law. The application of the law to the undis-
puted facts is a legal conclusion that we
review de novo. See Baker, 1999-NMCA~
128, 19, 128 N.M. 250, 991 P.2d 994, The
essential purpose of the garage here is to
store the Roybals’ collection of vehicles. The
fact that a small portion of the garage con-
tained a room for use as an office does not
change the essential purpose of the struc-
ture. There was no evidence that the garage
would be made available to the general pub-
lic. Accordingly, we hold that the garage is
a “private garage” within the meaning of the
restrictive covenants.

Il. CONCLUSION

{17} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.

{18} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY and
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.

2011-NMCA-085
261 P.3d 1115
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Bryan COFER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 29,717.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

May 27, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, July 20, 2011, No. 33,096.

484

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, Francine A. Chavez, Assistant Attorney
General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate
Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

{1} Defendant Bryan Cofer appeals his
conviction for shoplifting merchandise worth
over $500, a fourth-degree felony, in violation
of NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-20(B)(3)
(2006). On appeal, we address his argu-
ments that (1) the district court abused its
diseretion in admitting improper hearsay evi-
dence by allowing the State’s only witness to
testify to statements from a report that was
not admitted into evidence, and (2) the State
failed to present sufficient evidence that the
market value of the merchandise was over
$500. We reverse Defendant’s conviction be-
cause the district court erred in allowing
hearsay testimony about the price of the
merchandise and because the report the wit-
ness relied on was not admitted into evidence
under the hearsay exception of a record of
regularly conducted activity. However, be-
cause there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port Defendant’s conviction, retrial is not
barred.

BACKGROUND

{2} On June 22, 2008, Defendant took a 32”
Sanyo LCD HD television from Wal-Mart in
Artesia, New Mexico. When an officer in
Roswell, New Mexico, pulled Defendant over
based on information provided by the police
dispatcher, the officer noticed a 32’ Sanyo
television in plain view in the back seat of
Defendant’s vehicle. After the police officer
read Defendant his Miranda rights, Defen-
dant admitted that he shoplifted the televi-
sion from Wal-Mart. The State charged De-
fendant with one count of shoplifting over
$500, in violation of Section 30-16-20(B)().

{3} At a bench trial on April 28, 2009,
Defendant stipulated to the facts that “[o]n
June 22, 2008, he took a Sanyo 32” television
from the Wal-Mart in Artesia ... without
paying for it.” He did not stipulate to the

value of the item taken. Kathryn Moeller,
an assistant manager from the electronics
department at the Artesia Wal-Mart, was
the only witness for the State. She testified
that she had researched the value of the
television and that based on an intranet data-
base, the in-store price for the television was
$576 on the date of the crime.

{4} Defense counsel objected to Moeller’s
testimony, arguing that the price of the tele-
vision was hearsay, that Moeller needed to
lay a better foundation for the evidence, that
the prosecution had violated its duty to dis-
close the report Moeller researched in viola-
tion of Rules 5-501 and 16-308 NMRA, and
that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation had been violated. The State
responded that there is a pricing exception to
the hearsay rule and that, therefore, Moel-
ler’s testimony about the price of the televi-
sion was not hearsay. The district court
asked the State to lay a foundation for Moel-
ler’s testimony and then allowed her to testi-
fy regarding the price of the television. The
district. court concluded that Moeller’s testi-
mony could establish that the report she
researched qualified as a business record and
that the State did not breach its duty to
disclose the report because it had disclosed
the witness months before the trial.

{5} Following Moeller’s testimony, the dis-
trict court found that the value of the televi-
sion exceeded $500 and Defendant was con-
victed of shoplifting merchandise valued at
more than $500, in violation of Section 30-16-
20(B)(8), a fourth-degree felony. Defendant
was sentenced to eighteen months on the
shoplifting charge, with one year suspended;
however, his sentence was enhanced by four
years due to his status as a habitual offender.
DISCUSSION

{6} On appeal, Defendant raises two is-
sues. He argues that the district court
abused its discretion in allowing hearsay into
evidence. He also contends that the State
did not present sufficient evidence to support
his conviction. We address each in turn.

Hearsay Testimony and the Business Rec-
ords Exception

HM {7} We review the district court’s
“admission of evidence for an abuse of discre-

Pp 485

tion.” State v. Branch, 2010-NMSC-042,
19, 148 N.M. 601, 241 P.3d 602. There is an
abuse of discretion “when the ruling is clear-
ly against the logic and effect of the facts and
cireumstances of the case.” State v. More-
land, 2008-NMSC-031, 19, 144 N.M. 192,
185 P.3d 363 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). If there are reasons that
both support and detract from a court’s deci-
sion, there is no abuse of discretion. Id.

{8} In this case, Moeller testified that she
conducted research on Wal-Mart’s electronic
intranet database to determine the price of
the television. There is no dispute that
Moeller’s testimony that the television set
was priced at $576 on the date of the crime
was being offered to establish that the televi-
sion was worth over $500. On appeal, Defen-
dant asserts that the district court erred in
allowing Moeller to testify to the price of the
television. Defendant contends that the
statement of price was inadmissible hearsay
evidence. Further, Defendant argues that
Moeller’s testimony should not have been
admitted as an exception to the rule against
hearsay for records of regularly conducted
activity because the price report Moeller re-
lied on was not introduced into evidence.

{9} “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
Rule 11-801(C) NMRA. Rule 11-802 NMRA
prohibits the admission of hearsay evidence
with certain exceptions. One of the excep-
tions to the hearsay rule is the admission of
records of regularly conducted activity, also
known as the business records exception.
Rule 11-803(F) NMRA. We begin our analy-
sis by first determining whether Moeller’s
statements of price based on her research of
the Wal-Mart computer database constitutes
hearsay and, if it does, whether her testimo-
ny based on documents not admitted into
evidence constitutes an exception under Rule
11-803(F).

TI {10} We agree with Defendant that
Moeller’s testimony at trial that the price of
the television was $576 was inadmissible
hearsay. We do so for two reasons. First,
we note that although it did not explicitly
rule that Moeller’s testimony was hearsay,

the district court determined that Moeller
could testify about the price of the television
based on her research under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule if the
State laid an adequate foundation. The
State apparently did so, and the district
court allowed Moeller’s testimony under the
business record exception, ultimately ruling
that the price of the television was $576 on
the date it was stolen. On appeal, the State
contends that the district court properly ad-
mitted her testimony under the records of
regularly conducted activity exception. Be-
cause the State does not challenge Moeller’s
testimony as not being hearsay, we conclude
that it has acquiesced in the district court’s
ruling that the admission of Moeller’s testi-
mony was proper only under the business
record exception to the hearsay rule.

{11} Second, even if the State properly
preserved its argument that there is a price
exception to the hearsay rule, we neverthe-
less determine that Moeller’s testimony in
this case constituted inadmissible hearsay.
At trial, the State argued—as it does on
appeal—that this Court in City of Albuquer-
que v. Martinez, 93 N.M. 704, 604 P.2d 842
(Ct.App.1979), implicitly held that a written
statement of price is not hearsay. There-
fore, the State argues that all testimony
about the price of a stolen item is admissible
evidence notwithstanding that there is no
corresponding documentation introduced into
evidence at trial. We are not persuaded, and
we conclude that the State’s application of
Martinez is distinguishable from the present
case on its facts.

{12} In Martinez, a security manager tes-
tified to the value of a stolen coat based on a
price tag that he picked up that had been
attached to the coat. Martinez, 93 N.M. at
705, 604 P.2d at 843. The defendant argued
that the State failed to prove the value of the
merchandise he shoplifted. Jd. at 705, 604
P.2d at 843. We disagreed and held that “in
a shoplifting case [the security manager’s
testimony] that merchandise was displayed
for regular sale at a marked price represent-
ing its retail price is sufficient circumstantial
evidence of value, where totally uncontradict-
ed, to support a conviction grounded upon
the marked price as its value.” Id. Martinez

486

adopted the holding in Norris v. State, 475
S.W.2d 558, 555-56 (Tenn.Crim.App.1971), in
which the Tennessee appellate court conclud-
ed that the testimony of two security officers
regarding the price of merchandise they ob-
served on price tags attached to the mer-
chandise displayed for sale was not hearsay.

{18} Martinez, Norris, and the line of
cases allowing testimony concerning the val-
ue of a stolen item based on the information
found on a price tag have generally found
that such testimony is admissible because
items displayed for sale over a period of time
with a price tag upon it, indicating the item’s
regular sale price, is commonly known and
capable of ready demonstration. See, eg,
Norris, 475 S.W.2d at 555-56; see also Rob-
inson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 8, 516
S.E.2d 475, 478-79 (1999) (stating that it is
common knowledge that department stores
regularly affix price tags to merchandise and
that is the price the purchaser must pay
without an opportunity to negotiate a re-
duced price); People v. Drake, 131 Ill.App.3d
466, 86 Ill.Dec. 639, 475 N.E.2d 1018, 1021-
22 (1985) (stating that information shown on
stickers attached to stolen items are admissi-
ple evidence); DeBruce v. State, 461 So.2d
889, 892 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (holding that
price attached to stolen property at time of
theft is circumstantial evidence of value);
Lacy v. State, 482 So.2d 1205, 1206 (Miss.
1988) (holding that price tags are not hear-
say and are admissible when attached at
time of theft); Calbert v. State, 99 Nev. 759,
670 P.2d 576, 576 (1988) (per curiam) (stating
that price tags attached at time of theft are
competent evidence of value); Lauder v.
State, 233 Md. 142, 195 A.2d 610, 611 (1963)
(price tags admissible where tag is attached
at time of arrest and similar tags are at-
tached to similar articles throughout the
store). As one court has explained, the in-
herent unreliability of hearsay is not present
in these circumstances because “{i]t is com-
mon knowledge that department and other
stores regularly affix price tags to items of
merchandise and that the tagged price is
what a purchaser must pay to acquire an
item, without the opportunity to negotiate a
reduced price or to question how the tagged
price was reached.” Twine v. Convmon-
wealth, 48 Va.App. 224, 629 8.E.2d 714, 718

(2006). Thus, it is “unreasonable and unnec-
essary to require that in each case a mer-
chant must send to court not only a[witness
to the theft] but also other personnel to
establish the reliability of the information
shown on a price tag affixed to an item that
has been stolen.” Id.

{14} We need not decide today whether
price tags should be technically excludable as
hearsay because this case is markedly differ-
ent from those instances in which a person—
generally a security guard or store employ-
ee—testifies at trial about the value of the
stolen item based on a price tag affixed to
the item at the time of the theft. Here,
Moeller had no independent knowledge of
the value of a 82” Sanyo LCD HD television
at the Wal-Mart in Artesia—that it was dis-
played for regular sale and carried a price
tag of $576. Rather, Moeller testified that
she obtained the price information after be-
ing requested to do so by the State, some ten
months after the theft occurred. The State
provided the make and model number to
Moeller in order for her to conduct her re-
search. Moeller explained that she learned
the price of the television by researching
inventory reports on the Wal-Mart intranet.
She testified that the price of a 82” Sanyo
LCD HD television in January 2009—seven
months after Defendant stole the television—
had changed to $478, that the price was $576
in June 2008, and that the price had been
“rolled back” to $498 in September 2008.
The reports which formed the basis of Moel-
ler’s testimony were not introduced at trial
or admitted into evidence.

{15} Given the facts of this case, Martinez
and the line of cases addressing the issue of
whether price tags are out-of-court asser-
tions of the fact to be proved have no bearing
on our inquiry. Moeller’s testimony about
the price of the television was not based on
independent knowledge of figures stated on a
price tag affixed to or near the television at
the time of the theft. Rather, her testimony
concerning the price of a 32” Sanyo LCD HD
television on June 22, 2008, was the result of
a records search of Wal-Mart’s intranet da-
tabase many months and several price ad-
justments after the theft had occurred.
What is involved here is simply classic hear-

say testimony which, by itself, does not meet
any exceptions to the rule. Accordingly, we
conclude that Moeller’s testimony about the
price of the television was properly excluda-
ble as hearsay unless qualified under the
business records exception. We now turn to
the district court’s ruling in that regard.

WE {16} At trial, Moeller testified about
the research she conducted to determine
that the in-store price of a 32" Sanyo LCD
HD television on June 22, 2008, was $576,
exclusive of any tax. She also testified in
some detail about the records concerning
merchandise and pricing that Wal-Mart
keeps on its electronic intranet database.
Defense counsel objected to Moeller’s testi-
mony, because he did not know of and had
not seen the reports she was relying on for
her testimony. Moeller admitted that she
did not print out the records on which she
had based her testimony, but she testified
that the records are kept both as a hard
copy and on the database. However, she did
not print out any of the reports nor did she
bring a hard copy of the information on
which she based her testimony to the trial.
The State merely elicited testimony from
Moeller about the contents of records that
were not available for review and were not
admitted into evidence. The district court
nevertheless allowed Mboeller’s testimony
alone to be introduced as a business record
exception. Defendant contends that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in admitting
Moeller’s testimony because if the record she
referred to qualified as a business record,
then a printout or some other record should
have been admitted into evidence. We
agree.

{17} Evidence is admissible pursuant to
Rule 11-803(F) when it is:

[a] memorandum, report, record or data

compilation, in any form, of acts, events,

conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at
or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conduct-
ed business activity, and if it was the regu-
lar practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, record or
data, compilation, all as shown by the testi-
mony of the custodian or other qualified

487

witness ... unless the source of informa-
tion or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness.

Rule 11-803(F). The plain language of this
rule provides that the exception is for “[a]
memorandum, report, record or data compi-
lation.” See Rule 11-803(F). Thus, it is
clear that the business records exception re-
quires some form of document that satisfies
the rule’s foundational elements to be offered
and admitted into evidence and that testimo-
ny alone does not qualify under this excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. We find persuasive
the Georgia appellate court’s holding that
“testimony regarding the contents of busi-
ness records, unsupported by the records
themselves, by one without personal knowl-
edge of the facts constitutes inadmissible
hearsay.” Ingles Mkts. Inc. v. Martin, 236
Ga.App. 810, 518 S.E.2d 536, 538 (1999).
“While the testimony is apparently sufficient
to identify the records as those of facts duly
recorded in the normal course of business,
thus qualifying the records for admission in
evidence as [an] exception to the hearsay
rule, the testimony of the witness based on
no personal knowledge, just the records is
inadmissible hearsay.” Id. (alteration omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Goodman v. State, 2 Md.
App. 478, 235 A2d 560, 562 (Md.Ct.
Spec.App.1967) (holding that it was error to
allow a qualified witness to give lay opinion
testimony about records, when the records
were not admitted, even though they may
have been admissible). Accordingly, we con-
elude that Rule 11-803(F) requires that the
physical document, record or report, be ad-
mitted into evidence and that testimony
about the contents of record not produced is
insufficient under the rule.

{18} The district court permitted Moeller
to testify without the report over Defendant’s
objections. Even if Moeller was qualified to
testify as to the foundational requirements of
the business record as the State contends, it
was still error for the district court to admit
her testimony regarding the price of the
television where the record was not admitted
into evidence and where she had no personal
knowledge of that information. See State v.

488

Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, 134, 145 N.M.
40, 193 P.3d 587 (“A district court abuses its
discretion when it misapplies or misappre-
hends the law.”). Consequently, the district
court erred in admitting Moeller’s testimony
that the price of the television on the date of
the theft was $576. For these reasons, we
reverse Defendant's conviction.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence
to Support a Finding That the Television
Had a Market Value of Over $500 on the
Date of the Crime

Hl {19} Defendant contends that the
State did not present sufficient evidence
upon which a rational fact finder could have
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
television was worth more than $500 on June
22, 2008. We address his argument because
he is entitled to greater relief if sufficient
evidence was not presented to support his
conviction. See State v. Akers, 2010-NMCA-
103, 131, 149 N.M. 58, 243 P.3d 757. If we
conclude that the State did not present suffi-
cient evidence that the value of the television
exceeded $500, Defendant may not be retried
on these charges. See State v. Montes,
2007-NMCA-083, 124, 142 N.M. 221, 164
P.3d 102.

{20} When reviewing the sufficien-
ey of the evidence presented to support a
conviction, we apply a substantial evidence
standard. State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035,
(11, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.8d 891. The re-
viewing court must consider “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution
means that we indulge all reasonable infer-
ences and resolve all conflicts in the evidence
in favor of the verdict. Id. When reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, “we consider all the evidence, in-
cluding evidence that was improperly admit-
ted.” State v. Lopez, 2009-NMCA-044, 127,
146 N.M. 98, 206 P.3d 1003.

{21} In shoplifting cases, where the State
is required to prove the value of the mer-

chandise that was taken, we have previously
held that “ ‘value’ ... means ‘market value’”
and it can be supported with evidence of the
price of the item. State v. Contreras, 1996-
NMCA-045, 113-4, 121 N.M. 550, 915 P.2d
306. However, in cases where a price set by
a store does not reflect the actual market
value of an item, the inference established by
the price can be rebutted by other evidence.
Id. 14,

{22} Moeller testified that the retail price
of the 82” Sanyo television was $576, exclud-
ing any sales tax. She also testified that the
price had probably changed at some point in
September and was $478 in January 2009
after the theft. Defendant questioned Moel-
ler about Wal-Mart’s pricing techniques.
She explained that Wal-Mart does not en-
gage in retail reference pricing—the practice
of offering items for sale at a fictional price
and later discounting to a sale price so that a
consumer will feel like he has received a good
deal, even though the store has made its fully
anticipated profit when it sells the item at
the discounted price. Moeller testified that
the Artesia Wal-Mart had not sold any other
82" Sanyo televisions in June 2008. She stat-
ed that she did not know whether other Wal-
Mart stores had sold 32” Sanyo televisions
for $576 in June 2008 or how many had sold
after the price decreased.

{23} Defendant also presented Moeller
with a print-out dated September 8, 2008,
from Wal-Mari’s internet website, that listed
a 82” Sanyo television for sale at the price of
$498. She explained that she had looked at
an intranet database, not Wal-Mart’s inter-
net website, to determine the price of the
television on June 22, 2008. She explained
that she was not familiar with the prices of
items on the internet website, because a
Wal-Mart store will not price match or price
compare Wal-Mart’s internet website prices.
Moeller acknowledged that the store had oc-
casionally sold display items for a discount of
up to ten percent off the marked price be-
cause display models do not have a box or an
owner’s manual.

{24} Indulging in all reasonable inferences
in favor of the verdict, we conclude that the
State presented substantial evidence that the

value of the television was more than $500 in
June 2008. Moeller testified that the price in
June 2008 was $576. The fact that the Wal-
Mart in Artesia did not sell any 32” Sanyo
televisions during that month for $576 does
not mean that there was not a buyer that
would pay $576 for a 32” Sanyo television in a
different month in the Artesia store or at
some other Wal-Mart store during the
month of June 2008. See State v. Kleist, 126
Wash.2d 482, 895 P.2d 398, 401 (1995) (en
bane) (concluding that the market value of an
item is the sale price arrived at by a well-
informed buyer and a well-informed seller).
Furthermore, because Moeller’s testimony
supported the idea that Wal-Mart does not
engage in retail reference pricing or price
matching with its own internet site, there is
sufficient evidence that on June 22, 2008, the
television was worth more than $500. See
Contreras, 1996-NMCA-045, 14, 121 N.M.
550, 915 P.2d 306 (holding that the inference
that ticket price reflects market value could
not be sustained when there was testimony
that “jewelry [was] never sold at the ticket
price” (emphasis in original).

{25} For these reasons, we conclude that.
the State presented substantial evidence that

489

the value of the television exceeded $500.
Defendant may be retried on this charge.
See Montes, 2007-NMCA-088, 124, 142
NLM. 221, 164 P.8d 102.

CONCLUSION

{26} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
Defendant's conviction for shoplifting mer-
chandise worth more than $500, in violation
of Section 30-16-20(B)(8). However, retrial
is not barred because the State presented
substantial evidence to support his convic-
tion. We remand this matter to the district
court for retrial of the felony shoplifting
charge.

{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D.

BUSTAMANTE and TIMOTHY L.
GARCIA, Judges.

2011-NMCA-081

263 P.3d 271

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,

v

Alicia Victoria GONZALES,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 28,700.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
May 19, 2011.

Certiorari Granted, Aug. 5, 2011,
Docket No. 33,077.

496

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Anita
Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, for Ap-
pellant.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} This case raises an issue of first im-
pression as to whether a case that might
otherwise be regarded as vehicular man-
slaughter is punishable under our child abuse
statute simply because the person killed or
injured by Defendant’s criminal negligence
was a child. Here, we distinguish between
criminal negligence that endangers the public
at large and results in injury or death to a
member of the public, who happens to be a
child, and criminally negligent conduct that
creates a discernable risk of danger to a
particular child or particular children. We
hold that a discernable risk of danger to a
particular child or particular children is re-
quired to support a conviction for negligent
child abuse by endangerment under NMSA
1978, Section 30-6-1(D)(1) (2004) (amended
2009). We further hold that for a defendant
to be criminally liable for child abuse by
endangerment, he or she must be aware of a
particular danger to the identifiable child or
children when engaging in the conduct that
creates the risk of harm.

{2} In this case, Defendant contends that
the district court erred in failing to grant her
motion for dismissal and her motion for di-
rected verdict on the child abuse by endan-
germent charges on the basis that she was
unaware that her conduct posed a particular
and foreseeable risk of likely injury to the
children injured by her actions. The district
court similarly denied Defendant’s proposed
jury instructions requiring child abuse by
endangerment to include an element of
awareness. We conclude that the district
court erred. Accordingly, we reverse Defen-
dant’s convictions for negligent child abuse
by endangerment, as she was not proven to

pO
ryan ee
be aware of the danger to the particular

children who were the victims of her drunk
driving.

{3} Defendant argues that the State is
barred from retrying her for vehicular homi-
cide and intentional child abuse. We agree
and hold that double jeopardy bars retrial of
Defendant for vehicular homicide. We re-
mand for vacation of the child abuse convic-
tions and discharge of Defendant and the
amendment of the judgment and sentence to
reflect those charges on which Defendant’s
convictions remain unaffected by this Opin-
lon.

I. BACKGROUND

{4} Defendant drove on the interstate
while severely drunk, sideswiped one car,
and ploughed into the rear of another car, in
which two minors, Manuel and Deandre,
were riding in the back seat. Manuel was
pronounced dead at the scene; Deandre re-
ceived minor injuries. As a result, the grand
jury indicted Defendant for two counts of
negligent child abuse by endangerment, in-
cluding one count of endangerment resulting
in death.! Defendant was also charged and
convicted of aggravated driving while intoxi-
cated and leaving the scene of an accident.
Defendant does not contest those convictions,
and they are not a part of this appeal.

{5} Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss the charges of child abuse, arguing
that child abuse cannot be charged when the
children injured were “not in the vehicle of
the accused and the accused [was] not aware
of their presence on the roadway.” (Empha-
sis omitted.) Defendant argued that the
State sought to criminalize as child abuse any
negligent behavior undertaken on the road
when a child might be present in another car
without consideration of whether Defendant’s
conduct specifically put a child at risk. The
State did not disagree with this characteriza-
tion, stating that any conduct undertaken in
reckless disregard of the “welfare and safety
of everyone on the road” was sufficient to
prove child abuse. The State stated:

1, Defendant was alternatively indicted for inten-
tional and negligent child abuse in each count.

497

Criminal negligence does not require a
showing that [D]efendant had specific
knowledge of her victims. It only requires
a reckless disregard of the danger that she
is putting her potential victims in.... It
was foreseeable that her conduct could en-
danger the lives of not only adults, but also
children. Children are a part of the gen-
eral public, a more vulnerable part.

{6} During the hearing on the motion to
dismiss, the district court inquired of the
State why child abuse had not been charged
in the alternative with vehicular homicide.
Counsel for the State initially did not know,
but later stated that its decision to charge
Defendant only with child abuse and not
vehicular homicide was intentionally under-
taken as an exercise of its discretion. The
State thus did not pursue vehicular homicide
charges at any time.

{7} Following extensive argument by the
parties, the district court held as a matter of
law that “the current statute as it stands
under child abuse does not necessitate or
need an awareness factor ... all that’s re-
quired as far as knowledge is that the defen-
dant knows or should have known that the
defendant’s conduct created the substantial
or foreseeable risk.” The district court fur-
ther stated its opinion that a “person [can]
cause [a child to be placed] or place a child

. in a dangerous situation, life or health,

. and not be aware of it.” The district
court denied Defendant's motion, and the
ease proceeded to trial, resulting in Defen-
dant’s convictions and her appeal. The issue
continued to be raised by Defendant
throughout the trial, including a motion for
directed verdict, with identical results.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM {8} We review the interpretation of
a statute in the context of a motion to dis-
miss de novo with the primary goal of ascer-
taining and giving effect to the intent of the
Legislature. State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-
082, 18, 186 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. Crimi-
nal statutes are to be strictly construed. We
take care that criminal statutes are not ap-

She was convicted of negligent child abuse.

498

plied beyond their intended scope and are
“defined with appropriate definiteness.”
State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, 110, 146
N.M. 434, 211 P.38d 891 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see Smith,
2004-NMSC-032, 18, 186 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d
1022 (applying a de novo standard of review
to determine whether conduct exists within
the intended scope of the child endanger-
ment statute).

Hl {9} Double jeopardy arguments can-
not be waived. A defendant may raise such
arguments at any time. NMSA 1978, § 30-
1-10 (1963); see State v. Jimenez, 2007-
NMCA-005, 111, 141 N.M. 106, 151 P.3d 67;
State v. Vaughn, 2005-NMCA-076, 18, 137
N.M. 674, 114 P.3d 354. When such argu-
ments arise on appeal, we apply a de novo
standard of review. Jimenez, 2007-NMCA~
005, 111, 141 N.M, 106, 151 P.3d 67.

Ii. DISCUSSION

A. The Current Landscape of Child
Abuse By Endangerment

{10} Until now, every child abuse by en-
dangerment case in New Mexico pertaining
to a defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated involved the defendant’s
knowledge or placement of the children in
the vehicle prior to the conduct that consti-
tuted the endangerment. See, eg., State v.
Chavez, 2009-NMCA-089, 114, 146 N.M.
729, 214 P.8d 794 (holding that a defendant
who drove drunk with a child in the car was
guilty of child endangerment); State v.
Watchman, 2005-NMCA-125, 114-5, 188
N.M. 488, 122 P.3d 855 (holding that the
defendant was guilty of child abuse when she
drove drunk to a bar with her child and left
the child unattended in a dangerous parking
lot); State v. Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078,
192, 4, 187 N.M. 713, 114 P.3d 398 (holding
that the defendant’s drunk driving with unre-
strained children in his truck was sufficient
to prove child abuse); State v. Santillanes,
2001-NMSC-018, 112, 38, 180 N.M. 464, 27
P.3d 456 (affirming the defendant’s child
abuse conviction when the defendant’s drunk
driving resulted in the death of the four
children in his vehicle); State v. Castaneda,
2001-NMCA-052, {If 19-22, 130 N.M. 679, 30
P.3d 368 (affirming the defendant’s child

abuse conviction when the evidence showed
that the defendant drove on the wrong side
of a divided highway with children in her
vehicle who were not in safety seats).

{11} Similarly, in State v. Lujan, the de-
fendant was convicted of child abuse when he
attacked another car with his own vehicle
with prior knowledge that the victim’s car
‘was transporting a child. 103 N.M. 667, 669-
70, 712 P.2d 18, 15-16 (Ct.App.1985). His
awareness of the child’s presence within the
car prior to his attack was dispositive. Id. In
each of the above cases, the child was within
the circumstantial ambit of foreseeable risk
and likely injury created by the defendant.
The defendant’s behavior was directed to-
ward the child, and the defendant was or
should have been aware of the risk to the
child of whose presence he or she knew of at
the time.

{12} We have further interpreted Section
30-6-1(D) “to address situations where an
accused’s conduct exposes a child to a signifi-
cant risk of harm,” irrespective of whether
the child was actually injured. Chavez,
2009-NMSC-035, 115, 146 N.M. 434, 211
P.8d 891. Nonetheless, there has been no
appellate case in New Mexico for endanger-
ing a child whose presence was not previous-
ly known to the defendant at the time the
negligent and dangerous behavior was com-
menced. Because our appellate courts have
not previously determined whether the Leg-
islature intended the child endangerment
statute to encompass conduct similar to that
in the present case, we turn to the language
of the statute for guidance.

B. Criminal Negligence

Hs {13} According to our rales of stat-
utory construction, the statute’s plain lan-
guage “is the primary indicator of legislative
intent.” High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v.
City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, 15,
126 N.M. 418, 970 P.2d 599 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). In addi-
tion, we are to apply the ordinary meaning of
the words in the statute unless the Legisla-
ture indicated otherwise. Id. We now apply
these rules in interpreting the meaning of
Section 30-6-1(D)(1).

{14} Section 30-6-1(D)(1) criminalizes
abuse of a child by endangerment,” stating,
“{albuse of a child consists of a person know-
ingly, intentionally or negligently, and with-
out justifiable cause, causing or permitting a
child to be ... placed in a situation that may
endanger the child’s life or health[.)” At
issue is whether this statute can be construed
to apply in situations where a defendant nei-
ther knows of the presence of the child en-
dangered by his or her driving, nor specifi-
cally endangers that child any more than his
or her actions may endanger the general
public. Thus, we must determine the Legis-
lature’s intent when it required a defendant
to, at minimum, “negligently” cause or per-
mit the child to be placed in a situation that
endangered the child’s life.

HME {15} In Santillanes v. State, our
Supreme Court held that in convicting a de-
fendant of criminally negligent child abuse,
the state must prove negligence to a crimi-
nal, rather than civil, standard. 115 N.M.
215, 223, 849 P.2d 358, 366 (1993). The

Court specifically rejected the idea rooted in
a civil negligence standard that child abuse

“encompassed any and all harm to a child[.]”
Id. at 219, 849 P.2d at 362. “What distin-
guishes civil negligence from criminal negli-
gence is not whether the person is subjec-
tively aware of a risk of harm; rather, it is
the magnitude of the risk itself.” State v.
Schoonmaker, 2008-NMSC-010, 143, 148
N.M. 878, 176 P.8d 1105. In the context of
child abuse, criminal negligence is defined as
something beyond mere civil negligence or
accidental conduct because it requires that a
person “knew or should have known of the
danger involved and acted with a reckless
disregard for the safety or health of the
child.” Garcia v. State, 2010-NMSC-023,
133, 148 N.M. 414, 287 P.3d 716 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). In
Schoonmaker, our Supreme Court indicated
that the “magnitude of the risk” could act as
a way to infer a person’s subjective knowl-
edge of the risk posed to a child and its likely
consequences. 2008-NMSC-010, 111 43-45,
143 N.M. 878, 176 P.8d 1105. Schoonmaker

2, The crime of negligent abuse of a child by
endangerment under Section 30-6-1(D)(1) is
predicated on the same elements regardless of
the consequence to the child, which only influ-

499

pointed out that a person could act with the
requisite knowledge should the person vio-
lently and intentionally shake a child without
a subjective knowledge of the risk of harm or
indifference to the risk of that behavior, sim-
ply because the magnitude of the risk to the
child is so high. Id. 148.

{16} We have held that the child abuse by
endangerment statute was “intended to ad-
dress conduct with potentially serious conse-
quences to the life or health of a child.”
State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMCA-100, 21, 132
N.M. 649, 53 P.8d 909. This standard was
not intended by the Legislature to render
conduct that creates “a mere possibility, how-
ever remote, that harm may result to a child”
the basis for criminal liability. State v.
Trossman, 2009-NMSC-034, 120, 146 N.M.
462, 212 P.8d 350 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In Trujillo, we stated
that for the purposes of child endangerment,
the behavior “that may cause harm,” must
place a child “directly in the line of physical
danger.” There, we reaffirmed that “that
mere proximity to a dangerous situation was
insufficient to support a conviction for child
abuse by endangerment.” 2002-NMCA-100,
9917-18, 182 N.M. 649, 58 P.3d 909 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). By
casting a net to include the endangerment of
the general public of which children are a
part, the State’s argument ignores that the
statute only criminalizes endangering chil-
dren,

HS {17} Our Supreme Court in Chavez
provided factors to consider in determining
whether there was a substantial and foresee-
able risk of harm to the child, so as to
authorize a charge of criminal child abuse by
endangerment. Under Chavez, a court
should consider (1) the gravity of the risk
ereated by the defendant, (2) whether the
underlying conduct violates a statute, and (8)
the likelihood of harm to the child. 2009-
NMSC-035, 111 23-25, 146 N.M. 484, 211 P.8d
891. Moreover, “{iJt is the gravity of the risk
that serves to place an individual on notice
that his conduct is perilous, and potentially

ences the degree of punishment for the offense.
Thus, we apply the same analysis to both counts
of negligent child abuse of which Defendant
stands convicted.

500

criminal[.]” Id. 123, Although our Su-
preme Court stated the likelihood that the
harm will occur is no longer a determinative
factor in the criminal negligence analysis, it
still “remains an important consideration
when evaluating the magnitude of the risk.”
Id. 126. This is particularly pertinent to
endangerment cases “where the risk of harm
is too remote, which may indicate that the
harm was not foreseeable.” Id.

{18} Concerned with the breadth of con-
duct potentially ensnared by the phrase “may
endanger,” our Supreme Court in Chavez
limited criminal liability under Section 30-6-
1@)(1) by excluding liability for risks posed
by conduct directed at a child that only theo-
retically endangered the life or health of a
child. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, 1118-19,
146 N.M. 484, 211 P.8d 891 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). “Taken
literally, owr endangerment statute could be
read broadly to permit prosecution for any
conduct, however remote the risk, that may
endanger [a] child’s life or health. However,
by classifying child endangerment as a third-
degree felony, our Legislature anticipated
that criminal prosecution would be reserved
for the most serious occurrences, and not for
minor or theoretical dangers.” Jd. 116 (al-
teration in original) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted), Instead, our Supreme
Court stated that the statute required a rea-
sonable probability or likelihood that the
child’s life or health would be endangered by
the defendant's conduct. Id. As such, the
risk of harm posed to the child must be
“substantial and foresecable.” Id. 122 (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted);
UJI 14-604 NMRA. Our Supreme Court not-
ed this to mean that the defendant must have
“place[d] a child within the zone of danger
and physically close to an inherently danger-
ous situation.” Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035,
126, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891 (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting State v. Jensen, 2006~NMSC-
045, 110, 140 N.M. 416, 143 P.38d 178); see
Trossman, 2009-NMSC-034, 120, 146 N.M.
462, 212 P.3d 350 (stating that in creating the
crime of child abuse by endangerment, “the
Legislature did not intend to criminalize con-
duct creating a mere possibility, however
remote, that harm may result to a child”

(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted)). Our Supreme Court further com-
mented that a remote risk of harm may
indicate that it was not foreseeable. Chavez,
2009-NMSC-035, 126, 146 N.M. 434, 211
P.3d 891.

{19} For instance, in State v. Clemonts, we
reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding
that the defendant’s speeding and minor traf-
fic violations committed during a slow speed
police chase did not pose a substantial risk to
the children in the car because the risk of
harm was too remote. 2006-NMCA-~031,
1716-17, 139 N.M. 147, 180 P.38d 208. We
also reversed the conviction in Trujillo, hold-
ing that the defendant’s actions had not
placed a child in the direct line of danger
when a child only witnessed the defendant’s
attack on her mother from another part of
the house and therefore did not expose the
child to a significant risk of harm. 2002-
NMCA-100, 17, 182 N.M. 649, 58 P.8d 909.

HM {20} From this discussion, we reach
two conclusions. First, endangerment is
something that exists as an antecedent to
any harm that might befall a child. We
reach this conclusion by observing that all of
these cases describe endangerment rooted in
criminal negligence as arising from a danger
to the child that is known or capable of being
known. The defendant must have knowledge
of potential and likely consequences of the
endangering behavior that results in a palpa-
ble and foreseeable danger to a child. This
is more than merely a “possibility, however
remote, that harm may result to a child.”
Trossman, 2009-NMSC-034, 120, 146 N.M.
462, 212 P.3d 350. Where the magnitude of
a risk of injury is significant enough to im-
pute knowledge of the palpable and foresee-
able danger to a child, the crime of endan-
germent strongly supports an awareness on
the part of the defendant that the child is
foreseeably within the trajectory of risk the
defendant created. Stated another way,
placing a child in a dangerous situation and
in the direct line of danger, however briefly,
must precede the injury that is likely to
result from that danger. Since it is the
endangerment and not the resulting injury
that constitutes the offense, there must be an
actual or imputed foreseeability of danger

directed toward the children who might be
injured as a result of Defendant’s acts.

HM {21} Second, and contrary to the
State’s contention at trial, the defendant's
conduct must create a substantial and fore-
seeable risk of harm to an identified or iden-
tifiable child within the zone of danger. The
risk cannot be merely hypothetical, as the
child must be physically close to an inher-
ently dangerous situation of the defendant’s
creation. The extension of the risk to en-
compass any unidentified child who might
hypothetically be present within the general
population that is endangered by a drunk
driver’s conduct is too broad an application
of this statute. The child victim cannot be-
come identified simply by being injured by
Defendant: identification of the child and
the risk to that child must precede the inju-
ry. We now discuss the particularity with
which the conduct must be directed at a
child victim to constitute child endanger-
ment.

C. Criminal Negligence Must be Directed
Toward a Child

{22} In addition to the requirement that
the defendant create a substantial and fore-
seeable risk of harm—placing a child in the
zone of danger—the defendant must also di-
rect his or her criminal negligence toward a
child specifically and not solely at the general
public. The State argues that it can meet its
burden to prove child abuse by endanger-
ment, simply by showing that Defendant put
children at risk when she put the public as a
whole at risk in driving drunk.

{23} We agree that the Legislature intend-
ed to protect children through this statute
because of their vulnerability. Our Supreme
Court has been quite clear to point out that
the child abuse statute is “designed to give
greater protection to children than adults
because children are more vulnerable than
adults and are under the care and responsi-
bility of adults. When an adult, without jus-
tification, endangers a child’s safety, the
adult is more culpable than when the safety
of another adult is jeopardized.” Santil-
lanes, 2001-NMSC-018, 124, 130 N.M. 464,
27 P.8d 456 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Thus, in protecting this

501

vulnerable group, the Legislature designated
child abuse to be a more egregious crime
than other identical negligent behavior re-
sulting in non-intentional homicide. Negli-
gent child abuse resulting in death of a child
is a first-degree felony. Section 30-6-1(F).
Yet, the Legislature has designated involun-
tary manslaughter to be a fourth-degree felo-
ny and homicide by vehicle while driving
drunk a third-degree felony. NMSA 1978,
§ 80-2-2(B) (1994) (involuntary manslaugh-
ter); NMSA 1978, § 66-8-101(C) (2004)
(homicide by vehicle while driving drunk).
The classification of negligent child abuse by
endangerment that consequently results in
death as a more serious felony than vehicular
homicide or involuntary manslaughter is
therefore a direct reflection of the severity
with which the Legislature views conduct
directed at a child.

{24} However, precedent indicates that to
be convicted of child endangerment, the de-
fendant must act in such a way so as to
specifically endanger the child. The defen-
dant must do more than act in a way that
endangers the public as a whole. In Chavez,
our Supreme Court required that the risk
created by the defendant create conditions
that “present truly consequential and fore-
seeable threat of harm to children.” 2009-
NMSC-035, 137, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891
(emphasis added). Chavez also held that no
crime was committed when “the [s]tate failed
to present any specific evidence to establish a
substantial and foreseeable risk that the chil-
dren would suffer serious [injury] as a re-
sult” of the defendant’s risk-creating conduct.
Id. 139.

Hs“ {25} In this case, Defendant may
have acted with criminal negligence in driv-
ing drunk, but she did not act with reckless
disregard in relation to the safety or health
of the children specifically. The “should
have known standard” of criminal negligence
is consistent with the requirement that the
defendant has “disregarded [the] risk and
[has been] wholly indifferent to the conse-
quences.” Schoonmaker, 2008-NMSC-010,
145, 143 N.M. 378, 176 P.3d 1105 (alterations
in original) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Our case law establishes
that the consequences of the defendant’s ac-

502

tions must be specifically directed at children
in the case of child abuse. In Clemonts, we
stated that endangerment of children cannot
be predicated on a child’s mere proximity to
a dangerous situation, but rather that the
defendant’s actions must place the child who
is endangered “in the direct line of any dan-
ger” so as to create more than a “mere
possibility of harm.” 2006-NMCA-031, 1116,
1389 N.M. 147, 180 P.8d 208; see Trossman,
2009-NMSC-034, 120, 146 N.M. 462, 212
P.8d 850. In other words, the crime is com-
mitted when “a defendant places a child with-
in the zone of danger and physically close to
an inherently dangerous situation.” Id. We
conclude that the risk and the consequences
of risky conduct are those required to be
directed at or sufficiently close to the alleged
victim of the abuse. See id. 121 (concluding
that precedent requires “the [s]tate to prove
the child’s presence in a situation where
harm was both probable and sufficiently
grave to justify a criminal sanction”).

{26} The fact that the behavior creating a
risk results in the injury of a child is not
dispositive to the analysis. As our Supreme
Court observed in Schoonmaker, it is almost
impossible to be indifferent to or disregard a
risk of which one is not aware. 2008-
NMSC-010, 145, 143 N.M. 873, 176 P.3d
1105. As such, negligent child abuse is no
accident. Garcia, 2010-NMSC-023, 135,
148 N.M. 414, 237 P.3d 716 (explaining that
referring to an act of negligent child abuse as
an “accident” is “a clear misstatement of the
law” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). The incidental injury of a child
caused by criminally negligent behavior to-
ward the public at large was not contemplat-
ed by the Legislature to be criminalized by
this statute. Yet, the State has staked out
the contrary position that the resulting inju-
ry determines the crime and not the anteced-
ent conduct.

{27} In this case, the facts establish the
accidental nature of the harm to the children.
Defendant’s reckless behavior endangered all
persons on the road, but nothing about the
situation gives rise to evidence that the chil-
dren were subjected to any particular danger
not shared by all fellow motorists and their
passengers. Defendant did not specifically

act in a criminally negligent manner with
regard to endangering these particular chil-
dren. Rather, she acted that way toward
people of all ages on the road that night.

{28} The State acknowledges the nature of
endangerment as proceeding the harm when
it points out that Defendant did not know if
she would crash into another vehicle, injure
another person, or cause no injury at all.
The State stated, “Defendant did not know
what penalty she was facing until the results
were seen.” This is an incorrect standard to
apply. Under the State’s logic, the occur-
rence of child abuse depends completely
upon the incidental age of the injured party
and not upon any culpable state of mind of
the defendant. Such logic imposes criminal
liability irrespective of how remote the risk
of injury is to a child. To adopt this view
does not allow consideration of whether De-
fendant can assess the potential occurrence
of “a substantial and foreseeable risk” of
harm to the children. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-
035, 122, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891 (empha-
sis omitted) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see UJI 14-604 NMRA.
Rather, it concentrates on the ultimate con-
sequence of the behavior, which is uncertain
at the time as to the result the risk may
produce.

{29} More specifically, to operate under
the State’s view offends the requirement that
a defendant be cognizant that his or her
behavior creates a specific danger to a partic-
ular child. This approach creates a strict
liability crime based on the victim’s age and
the resultant injury, not the defendant’s cul-
pability in creating antecedent and child-di-
rected danger. Such an application of the
statute is improper. Conviction of a defen-
dant for negligent child abuse by endanger-
ment requires a demonstration of some risk
to a child specifically, as opposed to a general
risk to the public with an accidental harm
resulting to a child.

HM {30} “Typically, criminal liability is
premised upon a defendant’s culpable con-
duct, the actus reus, coupled with a defen-
dant’s culpable mental state, the mens rea.”
State v. Padilla, 2008~NMSC-006, 112, 148
N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299. Even if Defendant
commits an act that endangers a child, the

State cannot prove child abuse by endanger-
ment unless Defendant’s culpable mental
state coincided with the act. Defendant
must be criminally negligent in placing the
child in the direct line of, or at least close to,
the danger by recklessly disregarding the
substantial and unjustifiable risk to the
child’s life and health. As stated above, this
mental state requires that Defendant know,
or at least should know, that her conduct is
endangering a child. The fact that a child
was incidentally affected by Defendant’s con-
duct, even if she knew, or should have
known, that she was endangering the public,
is insufficient to prove the mens rea for
negligent child abuse.

Hs {31} Where the risk of an injury
is apparent or of a great magnitude, the
statute requires that we ask to what extent
the circumstances are a particular risk to
children. Consequently, we hold that for a
person to be guilty of child abuse by endan-
germent, it must be shown that he or she
engaged in conduct that directs the risk at a
child in a manner that is foreseeable and is
likely to produce endangerment to the partic-
ular child. We interpret the plain meaning
of “negligence” in Section 30-6-1(D)(1) to
require the State to prove that Defendant
knew, or should have known, of the foresee-
able risk created by her behavior that threat-
ens a child’s life or health. Because a drunk
driver creates the possibility of a risk to all
persons on the road, it is insufficient for the
State to prove a substantial and foreseeable
risk by simply establishing that the possibili-
ty exists that a hypothetical child will be
injured thereby, or that a child was actually
injured as a result of the defendant’s acts,
even though that child was not known to be
endangered at the time. The risk of harm to
the child must be perceived separately from
a risk to the public as a whole, so that the
defendant actively disregarded the likelihood
of injury to a child.

{82} The State failed to prove that Defen-
dant’s behavior endangered a particular child
that was foreseeable at the time of the acci-
dent. As a result, Defendant’s conviction
must be reversed. In addition, the jury

hung and did not return a verdict on the
intentional child abuse charges.

Based on

503

the facts of this case and this Court’s rever-
sal of the conviction for the lesser-included
offenses of negligent child abuse, the evi-
dence is also insufficient to convict Defendant
on the more severe charge of intentional
child abuse. Intentional child abuse also re-
quires that the facts demonstrate that Defen-
dant endangered a particular child that was
foreseeable at the time of the accident. Ab-
sent such facts, as conceded by the State in
this case, the charge of intentional child
abuse by endangerment must also be dis-
missed as insufficient as a matter of law.
State v. Reed, 1998-NMSC-030, 118-19,
125 N.M. 552, 964 P.2d 118 (holding that the
defendant’s cocaine possession charge must
be dismissed because there was insufficient,
evidence to prove he had the requisite knowl-
edge to commit the crime).

D. Double Jeopardy

TH {83} As a final matter, Defendant
argues that if this Court reverses her convic-
tion, the doctrine of double jeopardy prohib-
its the State from prosecuting her for vehicu-
lar homicide. As double jeopardy applies
where Defendant challenges her convictions
for sufficiency of the evidence and she has
successfully done so with regard to negligent
child abuse here, we now review Defendant’s
double jeopardy contentions. See State v.
Lynch, 2003-NMSC-020, 111, 184 N.M. 189,
74 P.3d 73. We hold that double jeopardy
precludes the State from prosecuting Defen-
dant for vehicular homicide.

H.s«{84}, «The Double Jeopardy
Clause represents three broad guarantees.
First, when a defendant has been acquitted
of an offense, the clause guarantees freedom
from subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. Second, the double jeopardy clause
guarantees freedom from prosecution for the
same offense after conviction. Third, it
guarantees a defendant will not be punished
twice for the same offense. Id. 19; see U.S.
Const. amend. V (“No person shall be ...
subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb[.J”); N.M. Const.
art. IT, § 15 (“No person shall be ... twice
put in jeopardy for the same offensef.]”);
§ 80-1-10 (“No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy for the same crime [and] he may

504

not again be tried for a crime or degree of
the crime greater than the one of which he
was originally convicted.”). In Lynch, our
Supreme Court held:
[T]he State with all its resources and pow-
er should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as en-
hancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.
2003-NMSC-020, 19, 184 N.M. 139, 74 P.3d
73 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Where a defendant successfully
challenges his or her conviction on some
basis “other than insufficiency of the evi-
dence[,]” double jeopardy does not apply.
Id. 111. As stated above, because we hold
that the State’s evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction for negligent child
abuse, we consider the double jeopardy issue.

HMM s(85} For double jeopardy pur-
poses, a greater offense is considered the
same offense as any lesser offenses included
therein. See id. {11 (holding that double
jeopardy barred the state from prosecuting a
defendant for first-degree murder after his
acquittal for second-degree murder for the
same killing). “The Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits successive prosecutions for two of-
fenses arising out of the same conduct if
either one is a lesser-included offense within
the other.” State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. 88,
41, 908 P.2d 781, 784 (1995). The strict
elements test provides the most straightfor-
ward answer on whether a specific offense
constitutes a lesser-included offense of anoth-
er. Id. at 42, 908 P.2d at 735. Under this
approach, courts must determine whether an
offense is “sub-set of the statutory elements
of the greater offense such that it would be
impossible ever to commit the greater of-
fense without also committing the lesser of-
fense.” Id. While New Mexico observes this
standard as a baseline, our state also em-
ploys a more flexible “cognate” approach,
which provides that a specific offense consti-
tutes a lesser-included offense if “the evi-
dence adduced at trial is sufficient to sustain
a conviction on the lesser offense[] and ...

the elements that distinguish the lesser and
greater offenses are sufficiently in dispute
such that a jury rationally could acquit on the
greater offense and convict on the lesser.”
Id. at 44, 908 P.2d at 787; see State v.
Tanton, 88 N.M. 333, 335, 540 P.2d 813, 815
(1975) (describing the same evidence test);
Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 8, 10, 810 P.2d
1223, 1280 (1991) (explaining the same evi-
dence test).

{36} Applying the cognate approach an-
nounced in Meadors, we hold that, under the
unique facts of this case, any subsequent
prosecution of Defendant for vehicular homi-
cide would be prohibited as a lesser-included
offense under double jeopardy. 121 N.M. at
44, 908 P.2d at 737. Defendant was convict-
ed of negligent child abuse resulting in death
in violation of Section 30-6-1(D)(1), which
prohibits negligently causing a child to be
placed in a situation that may endanger that
child’s life or health. The offense of vehicu-
lar homicide, of which the State chose not to
charge Defendant, prohibits killing or seri-
ously injuring another person with a vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor. Section 66-8-101. These two statutes
clearly describe separate offenses under the
strict elements test. See Meadors, 121 N.M.
at 42, 908 P.2d at 785. Yet, under the cog-
nate approach, vehicular homicide constitutes
a lesser-included offense of negligent child
abuse on these facts. See Santillanes, 2001-
NMSC-018, 137, 180 N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456
(holding “that vehicular homicide is a lesser
offense than child abuse resulting in death
... [blecause the Legislature did not intend
to create separately punishable offenses” un-
der those statutes for the same death).

{37} As stated above, during trial, the
State presented evidence that Defendant
drank to intoxication and drove her vehicle in
such a manner that she negligently caused
the death of one child and injured another.
The crux of the parties’ dispute at trial, and
indeed this appeal, was whether such evi-
dence was sufficient to convict Defendant of
negligent child abuse, particularly in light of
the fact that the State presented little evi-
dence suggesting Defendant appreciated any
risk that her actions posed any harm to a
specific child victim. Had the jury been

instructed on vehicular homicide, it could
have reasonably concluded that Defendant
was guilty of that offense instead of negligent.
child abuse. Moreover, Defendant's aware-
ness that her actions imperiled a specific
child was sufficiently in dispute, so as to
reasonably lead to acquittal on the negligent
child abuse charge, had the jury received a
vehicular homicide instruction.

{88} Accordingly, we hold that any subse-
quent prosecution for vehicular homicide in
this case would violate double jeopardy. The
State chose an “all or nothing” strategy that
excluded vehicular homicide. See State v.
Villa, 2004-NMSC-081, 114, 186 N.M. 367,
98 P.8d 1017 (discussing the consequences of
an “all-or-nothing” trial strategy). As our
courts have stated many times, the parties
“should be liable for the risks of their respec-
tive trial strategies.” Jd. To do otherwise
would be to violate the very essence of fair-
ness at the core of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

IV. CONCLUSION

{39} For Defendant to be convicted of
child abuse, the State must show that she
specifically directed her criminally negligent
conduct toward children, particularly toward
Manuel and Deandre, in such a way that is
distinguishable from the danger she posed to
the public at large. Furthermore, double
jeopardy bars retrial of Defendant for vehic-
ular homicide. Thus, we reverse and remand
for vacation of the child abuse convictions,
for amendment of the judgment and sentence
to reflect those charges on which Defendant's
convictions remain unaffected by this opinion,
and for discharge of Defendant.

{40} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER
and TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judges.

505
2011-NMCA-088
263 P.3d 282

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,

ve

Jose M. GUTIERREZ, Defendant-
Appellant.

No. 28,754.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
June 6, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, No. 33,106, Aug. 1, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Farhan
Khan, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

Robert E. Tangora, L.L.C., Robert E.
Tangora, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} Defendant Jose Gutierrez’s involve-
ment in an April 2005 altercation resulted in
two separate grand juries indicting him on a
total of ten counts of criminal behavior. The
two indictments were joined for trial. The
first trial resulted in a conviction on one
count, acquittal on two counts, and a hung

507

jury mistrial on the remaining counts. De-
fendant appealed the conviction. While that
appeal was pending, a second trial was con-
ducted on the mistrial counts. The second
jury convicted Defendant on all counts sub-
mitted to it.

{2} Defendant now appeals from the sec-
ond verdict and sentence, asserting that the
district court (1) was without jurisdiction to
try him while his first conviction was on
appeal; (2) violated his rights under the Con-
frontation Clause when it admitted a video-
tape taken at the scene of the incident; and
(8) improperly admitted a 2003 judgment and
sentence entered against Defendant for pre-
vious crimes, as well as a prior stipulated
restraining order against Defendant concern-
ing one of the victims in this case. We
affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

A. The District Court Had Jurisdiction to
Conduct the Trial

HM {8} Defendant argues that the dis-
trict court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the
second trial against Defendant while the ap-
peal from his first trial was pending. “We
review jurisdictional issues ... under a de
novo standard of review.” State v. Heinsen,
2005-NMSC-035, 16, 188 N.M. 441, 121 P.38d
1040; see State v. Chavarria, 2009-NMSC-
020, 111, 146 N.M. 251, 208 P.3d 896 (“Ques-
tions regarding subject matter jurisdiction
are questions of law which are subject to de
novo review.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)),

{4} In April 2005, a grand jury indicted
Defendant of first-degree murder, conspiracy
to commit first-degree murder, two counts of
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon,
two counts of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon, and aggravated stalking. In
February 2006, another grand jury indicted
Defendant of additional charges that included
aggravated burglary, aggravated battery
against a household member, and violation of
an order of protection. In May 2006, Defen-
dant was simultaneously tried for all charges.

{5} At his first trial, the jury acquitted
Defendant of first-degree murder and bat-
tery on a household member and convicted

508

Defendant of violating an order of protection.
On the remaining counts, the jury was unable
to reach a verdict, and the district court
ordered a mistrial on those counts. Defen-
dant then appealed his conviction and sen-
tence for violating the protective order?
While the appeal was pending, Defendant
was retried and convicted of the counts on
which the jury was unable to reach a verdict
during the first trial and was sentenced by
the district court on the other charges for
which he was convicted. Defendant now ap-
peals from that case and contends that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to retry him
on those offenses while his convictions were
on appeal to this Court.

Hl {6} In general, “[a] trial court loses
jurisdiction of a case upon the filing of the
notice of appeal, except for the purposes of
perfecting such appeal, or of passing upon a
motion directed to the judgment pending at
the time.” State v. Roybal, 120 N.M. 507,
512, 903 P.2d 249, 254 (Ct.App.1995) (altera-
tion omitted) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Yet, it is established “that a
pending appeal does not divest the [district]
court of jurisdiction to take further action
when the action will not affect the judgment
on appeal.” Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kap-
nison, 113 N.M. 281, 241, 824 P.2d 1088, 1043
(1992). The United States Supreme Court
has explained that “[tJhe filing of a notice of
appeal is an event of jurisdictional signifi-
cance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of
appeals and divests the district court of its
control over those aspects of the case in-
volved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Disc. Co. 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103
S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (emphasis
added).

Wl {7} In addition, the “right to appeal is
restricted to final judgments and decisions.
A final order is commonly defined as an
order that decides all issues of fact and law
necessary to be determined or which com-
pletely disposes of the case to the extent the
court had the power to dispose of it.” State
v. Begay, 2010-NMCA-089, 111, 148 N.M.
685, 241 P.8d 1125 (internal quotation marks

1. This appeal was dismissed by Defendant about
a month following the conclusion of his second

and citation omitted). The United States
Supreme Court has held that a “[flinal judg-
ment in a criminal case means sentence.
The sentence is the judgment.” Berman v.
United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct.
164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937).

{8} In State v. Lobato, we stated that “an
order declaring mistrial simply terminates
the trial before a verdict is reached and does
not finally determine any issues in the case.”
2006-NMCA-051, 134, 189 N.M. 481, 184
P.3d 122. There, we held that an “order
declaring mistrial was not a final order [the
defendant could appeal as a matter of right.”
Id. Thus, any charges resulting in a mistrial
or hung jury are not finally determined. In
contrast, as in this case, a matter upon which
a defendant has been convicted and sen-
tenced and which he has appealed is finally
determined and no longer within the district
court’s jurisdiction. Charges that have not
been finally determined properly remain with
the district court.

{9} This case presents us with a trial that
resulted in part with a conviction and in part
with a mistrial. In People v. Schulz, the
California Court of Appeals dealt with a simi-
lar situation. 5 CalApp.4th 563, 7 Cal.
Rptr.2d 269 (1992). In that case, the defen-
dant argued on appeal that he could not be
retried for a great bodily injury enhance-
ment, which the jury had hung on, while he
appealed his conviction from that same trial
for attempted murder. Jd. at 270. The
Schulz court “concluded that] the [district]
court had jurisdiction to retry and sentence
the great bodily injury enhancement, since
its resolution would have no direct impact on
the validity of the guilty verdict and sentence
for the attempted murder charge pending on
appeal.” Id. at 278.

{10} We apply a similar rationale to this
ease. Here, Defendant’s first trial, from
which he appealed, ended in a conviction for
a protective order violation, yet, the jury
hung on the other charges. Defendant was
sentenced only for the protective order viola-
tion. As to that charge, the criminal trial

trial and is not a part of this appeal.

process was complete, and the judgment and
sentence filed was a final order as to that
charge. Defendant thus had an appealable
judgment with respect to that conviction and
not with respect to the counts that resulted
in a mistrial. As a matter of right, Defen-
dant could and did appeal the conviction on
that single count, but his appeal was limited
to only the conviction for violating the pro-
tective order. The district court retained
jurisdiction to retry the unresolved charges.

B. The Videotapes Were Properly Admit-
ted

HM {11} Defendant contends that the dis-
trict court improperly admitted videotaped
statements in violation of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront witnesses. Owing to
the poor quality of the videotape, only sever-
al statements were audible. After hearing
arguments and testimony about this issue,
the district court redacted two of the state-
ments on the videotape which were made by
police officers because the statements were
“improper.” The court determined that
“{these] other statements [were not] confron-
tational clause issues,” and the jury heard
the following taped statements: (1) “[we] are
[the] victims”; (2) “this guy had a restraining
order”; (8) “[tJhe chick who lives in there,
he’s her baby daddy, he pulled a knife on her
first thing”; and (4) “[t]hey fucking stabbed
me, brof.J]” The court identified two speak-
ers who could have made these statements as
“Landeros or ... Martinez,” both of whom
were victims of Defendant’s attack.

TE {12} We now determine the extent to
which the admission of such statements vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause. “We apply a
de novo standard of review as to the constitu-
tional issues related to [the d]efendant’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause.”
State v. Massengill, 2003-NMCA-024, 15,
133 N.M. 268, 62 P.8d 354; see State v. Soliz,
2009-NMCA--079, 17, 146 N.M. 616, 218 P.3d
520 (reviewing de novo the district court’s
admission of statements recorded in a 911
transcript for Sixth Amendment violations),
cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-008, 148 N.M.
948, 242 P.3d 1289.

HH s{18} “The Confrontation Clause
guarantees the accused in a criminal trial the

509

right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him, regardless of how trustworthy
the out-of-court statement may appear to
be.” State v. Mendez, 2010-NMSC-044,
128, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328 Gnternal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
“{T]Jhe Confrontation Clause prohibits the ad-
mission of testimonial statements unless the
declarant is unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.” State v. Bulleoming,
2010-NMSC-007, 111, 147 N.M. 487, 226
P.3d 1 Gnternal quotation marks and citation
omitted), cert. granted, Bulleoming v. N.M.,
— US. —,, 181 S.Ct. 62, 177 L.Ed.2d 1152
(2010). At issue here is whether the state-
ments made on the videotape were testimoni-
al.

Hs {14} “Statements are non [-ltesti-
monial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objective-
ly indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency.” State v.
Romero, 2007-NMSC-013, 1 7, 141 N.M.
408, 156 P.8d 694 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). On the other hand,
statements “are testimonial when the cir-
cumstances objectively indicate that there is
no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially rel-
evant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In Romero, our Supreme Court examined
the United States Supreme Court’s rulings
in Davis v. Washington, 547 US. 818, 126
S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) and
Crawford v. Washington, 541 US. 36, 124
S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed2d 177 (2004). The
Court explained that “t]he [United States
Supreme) Court distinguished Crawford,
which considered an interrogation by police
officers of a witness hours after the event
[the witness] described, from Davis, which
considered an interrogation by a 911 opera-
tor during an ongoing emergency, based on
the immediacy of the event.” Romero,
2007-NMSC-013, 18, 141 N.M. 408, 156
P.8d 694. Cranuford’s interrogation of a wit-
ness was testimonial, and Davis’s question-
ing by a 911 operator during an on-going

510

emergency was non-testimonial. Romero,
2007-NMSC-018, 18, 141 N.M. 403, 156
P.3d 694. The purpose for the questioning in
each case is the dispositive distinction: ques-
tions asked to resolve an on-going emergen-
ey are non-testimonial, and questions used to
elicit information about past events involving
no present emergency are testimonial. Id.
Furthermore, the formality of the interroga-
tion is also of importance in determining
whether the statements were testimonial as
testimonial questions are typically given un-
der the circumstances involving greater for-
mality. Id. 198, 21.

{15} The circumstances in this case are of
the type associated with non-testimonial
statements. The videotape at issue was tak-
en from a police officer’s patrol car when the
officer was responding to a call about a fight
in progress. The officer testified that at the
time the video was recorded, the police were
“still trying to figure out ... if [they were]
still looking for other suspects, if the guys
[on the videotape were] just victims or sus-
pects ... and if there [were] any other vic-
tims that [they were] not aware of.” The
officer arrived to find four men at the scene,
two of whom had been stabbed. He ex-
plained that the two injured men “were just
blurting out statements and were in a lot of
pain[,)” and the uninjured men were not
talking.

{16} After listening to the video and the
testimony from the officer, the district court
determined that at the time the video was
taken, the police were “securing the scene,
finding out if other suspects or victims [were]
out there [because] they need[ed] to act
quickly to put a perimeter around the ac-
tion.” The court further stated that if the
statements were made in “response to an
inquiry, it would be a very general inquiry
about what’s happening, not some interroga-
tion at this point.” We reason that the lack
of a structured question and answer, and the
fact that the statements were spontaneously
given, support this view. We therefore con-
clude that the statements were non-testimo-
nial.

C. Defendant’s Prior Bad Acts and Con-
victions Were Properly Admitted

{17} Pursuant to State v. Frank-

lin, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982 (1967) and

State v. Boyer, 108 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1
(Ct.App.1985), Defendant argues that the dis-
trict court improperly admitted evidence of
his prior convictions and restraining order.
Defendant contends that their admission was
improper under Rule 11-404(B) NMRA. “As
a general rule, the [a]dmission of evidence is
entrusted to the discretion of the [district]
court, and rulings of the [district] judge will
not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
discretion.” State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-
005, 115, 131 N.M. 709, 42 P.8d 814 (altera-
tion in original) (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “An
abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is
clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances of the case. We
cannot say the [district] court abused discre-
tion by its ruling unless we can characterize
it as clearly untenable or not justified by
reason.” State v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041,
133, 148 N.M. 747, 242 P.8d 314 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Abuse of discretion occurs when a district
court exercises its discretion based on a mis-
understanding of the law. State v. Elinski,
1997-NMCA-117, 18, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d
1209.

HH {18} Generally, “[e]vidence of a per-
son’s character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action
in conformity therewith on a particular occa-
sion[.)” Rule 11-404(A).

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformi-
ty therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
mistake or accident.

Rule 11-404(B). Our Supreme Court has
held that “elvidence is admissible under
Rule [11-]404([B]) if it is probative of a
material element at issue.” State v. McGhee,
103 N.M. 100, 104, 703 P.2d 877, 881 (1985).
In determining whether the district court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence
under Rule 11-404(B), we examine “whether
the State made a sufficient showing that the

en

Es
evidence would serve a legitimate purpose
other than to show character ... and wheth-

er the probative value was substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or

other factors.” State v. Dietrich, 2009-
NMCA-081, 1 40, 145 N.M. 788, 204 P.3d 748
(alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

{19} In this case, Defendant was charged
with aggravated stalking of Barbara Olivas.
Under the statute applicable at the time,
“{sltalking consists of a person knowingly
pursuing a pattern of conduct that would
cause a reasonable person to feel frightened,
intimidated or threatened. The alleged
stalker must intend to place another person
in reasonable apprehension of death, bodily
harm, sexual assault, confinement or re-
straint.” NMSA 1978, § 80-3A-3(A) (1997)
(amended 2009). Furthermore, “[alggravat-
ed stalking consists of stalking perpetrated
by a person ... who knowingly violates a
permanent or temporary order of protection
issued by a court, except that mutual viola-
tions of such orders may constitute a defense
to aggravated stalking[.]” NMSA 1978,
§ 30-8A-3.1(A)(1) (1997).

{20} Over Defendant’s Rule 11-404(B) ob-
jections, the district court admitted his 2003
judgment and sentence stemming from his
convictions for false imprisonment and bat-
tery against a household member. The sixth
condition of the 2008 judgment and sentence
stated that Defendant was to have no contact
with Olivas. The State argued that the no
contact provision was necessary to prove the
aggravated stalking charge at issue in the
present case, and we agree. The State con-
tended that it demonstrated that Defendant’s
entry into Olivas’s house in this case was
unlawful and that he engaged in a pattern of
conduct to frighten, intimidate, or threaten
her. The State asserted that the previous
incident showed Defendant’s intent, motive,
and absence of mistake under Rule 11-
404(B). Defendant responded that the judg-
ment and sentence were inadmissible propen-
sity evidence. After argument, the court
admitted the evidence. We observe that evi-
dence of Defendant’s convictions for false
imprisonment and battery on a household
member are less probative of his prior rele-
vant conduct than the facts establishing the

511

crimes for which he was convicted. Thus,
the fact of conviction may look more like
evidence of being a criminal, like criminal
propensity evidence, than pattern of conduct
evidence that would support a conviction un-
der the stalking statute. Care is needed to
avoid confusion, but the use of such evidence
was acceptable as the charges directly spoke
to physical harm and physical restraint, and
the no contact condition of the sentence also
constituted a judicial order of protection for
the period of time which Defendant was
bound by the sentence in that case.

{21} Additionally, the district court admit-
ted a stipulated restraining order between
Defendant and Olivas. Defendant argues
that this was improper character evidence.
We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting Defendant’s
2008 judgment and sentence and the stipu-
lated restraining order. The State made a
sufficient showing at trial that the evidence
served the legitimate purpose of proving the
requisite elements of aggravated stalking.
The judgment and sentence go to the issue of
whether a reasonable person in Olivas’s posi-
tion would have felt “frightened, intimidated
or threatened” by Defendant. Section 30-
8A-3(A). The judgment and sentence pro-
vide evidence as to why Olivas might have
been intimidated or frightened by Defendant
because it shows that Defendant and Olivas
had some prior incident and that he was to
have no contact with Olivas as a condition of
his sentence. In addition, the stipulated re-
straining order directly proves an element of
aggravated stalking and, therefore, has a le-
gitimate purpose in proving Defendant’s
guilt,

{22} The value of neither piece of evidence
‘was outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice. Both documents were probative of
the elements of aggravated stalking. During
direct examination of Olivas, the State asked
her if she recognized the judgment and sen-
tence document. Olivas stated that it was a
“{jludgment for [slentencing on a prior inci-
dent between [her] and [Defendant]” and
that, as a condition of his sentence, Defen-
dant was to have no contact with her. The
judgment and sentence showed restraint and
battery of Olivas and supported the required

512

pattern of conduct element. The stipulated
restraining order also did not unfairly preju-
dice Defendant as it established an element
of aggravated stalking, and its admission did
not reveal any prejudicial details upon which
the order was based. We hold that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence.

D. Cumulative Error

{23} Defendant contends that the above
issues amounted to cumulative error. Since
we concluded that the district court did not
err with regard to the issues appealed, we do
not address Defendant’s cumulative error ar-
gument.

Il. CONCLUSION

{24} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
Defendant's convictions.

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D.
BUSTAMANTE and LINDA M. VANZI,

Judges.

2011-NMCA-089
263 P.3d 289

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff
Appellant,

v.
Jeffery MOORE, Defendant—Appellee.
No. 29,248.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
June 9, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, Aug. 5, 2011,
Doeket No. 33,111.

{| 513
es

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret
E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Joel
Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Liane E. Kerr, Albuquerque, NM, for Ap-
pellee.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

{1} The State appeals the district court’s
pretrial dismissal of three counts of criminal
sexual penetration (CSP) that were each
charged under two alternative theories: (1)
CSP in the second degree (CSP II) based
upon CSP perpetrated during the commis-
sion of a felony, contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 30-9-11(E)() (2007) (amended 2009);
or (2) CSP in the fourth degree (CSP IV)
based upon CSP “perpetrated on a child
thirteen to sixteen years of age when the
perpetrator is at least eighteen years of age
and is at least four years older than the child
and not the spouse of that child[,]” contrary
to Section 30-9-11(G)(1). This appeal re-
quires us to consider whether the district
court erred by concluding that the State
improperly instructed the grand jury on the
definition of the unlawfulness element for
CSP II and CSP IV when it omitted lan-
guage that the act must have been done
“without consent” of the fourteen-year-old
alleged victim. We conclude that the State
properly instructed the grand jury regarding
the definition of unlawfulness because the
consent of a statutorily defined child is legal-
ly irrelevant to the unlawfulness element for
both CSP II and CSP IV. As a result, we
reverse the district court’s order dismissing
Counts I, V, and VI of the indictment, and
we remand for further proceedings consis-
tent with this Opinion.

BACKGROUND

{2} During the grand jury proceedings on
June 2, 2008, the grand jury considered eight
criminal counts in the proposed indictment,
including three counts of CSP. The State
instructed the grand jury that unlawfulness
‘was an essential element of both CSP II and
the alternative counts of CSP IV, as charged
in Counts I, V, and VI. The State further
defined “unlawfulness” as follows:

514

In addition to the other elements of [CSP

Il], ... or [CSP IV], for you to return a

True Bill on these charges[,] you must find

probable cause as to each of the following

elements: For the act to have been unlaw-
ful it must have been done with the intent
to arouse or gratify sexual desire[,] or to
intrude on the bodily integrity or personal
safety of the [V]ictim[,] or for some other
unlawful purpose. [CSP II], ... and [CSP

TVJ do not include a penetration for pur-

poses of reasonable medical treatment,

non-abusive parental or custodial care, law-
ful arrest or confinement[,] or for some
other unlawful [sic] purpose.

See UJI 14-132 NMRA.

{3} Detective Lavilla then testified that
V.M. (Victim) and Jeffery Moore (Defen-
dant) were unrelated, that Victim was four-
teen years old, and that Defendant was for-
ty-six years old. Detective Lavilla further
testified that during a recorded interview,
Victim stated that Defendant was her fa-
ther’s friend and that Defendant and Victim
were “with each other” every Friday night
for two and a half months before law en-
forcement officers discovered their activity
on May 16, 2008. Additionally, Victim told
Detective Lavilla that she voluntarily agreed
to have sexual intercourse with Defendant
and that Defendant and Victim smoked mar-
ijuana and engaged in sexual intercourse on
multiple occasions. The grand jury subse-
quently returned a true bill on all counts,
and the State filed a grand jury indictment
charging Defendant with eight criminal
counts, including three counts of CSP that
were each charged as CSP II, or in the
alternative, CSP IV. The underlying felony
supporting the CSP II charge was contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor, contrary
to NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-3 (1990), based.
upon Defendant allegedly providing marijua-
na or smoking marijuana with Victim.

{4} On September 16, 2008, Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss Counts I, V, and VI,
charging Defendant with CSP II or alterna-
tively CSP IV. Defendant asserted that the
State omitted the “without consent” language
in UJI 14-182 in its instructions to the grand
jury, which was “critical to this case since the
unequivocal and undisputed evidence is that

the sexual intercourse was consensual.” De-
fendant further contended that “[blecause
the prosecutor failed to properly instruct
grand jurors on the essential element of ‘un-
lawfulness,’ the grand jury was not instruct-
ed on all the essential elements of [CSP].” As
a result, Defendant argued that dismissal of
the charges was required pursuant to State
v. Ulibarri, 1999-NMCA-142, 128 N.M. 546,
994 P.2d 1164, aff'd, 2000-NMSC-007, 128
NM. 686, 997 P.2d 818. In a subsequent
reply and argument before the district court,
Defendant additionally argued that this
Court recognized the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s approval of “jury instructions for the
defense of consent in CSP cases” filed after
January 20, 2005. See State v. Jensen, 2005-
NMCA-118, 121, 188 N.M. 254, 118 P.8d 762
(recognizing that “effective for cases filed
after January 20, 2005, the Supreme Court
has approved instructions for the defense of
consent in CSP cases that are analogous to
the defense of self-defense,” pursuant to UJI
14-132 and UJI 14-946 NMRA). Defendant
relied upon Jensen to argue that because
Defendant's case was filed after January 20,
2005, and the undisputed evidence of consent
raised a genuine issue of unlawfulness, the
State was required to include language re-
garding the absence of consent in its defini-
tion of unlawfulness.

{5} In response, the State argued that
although unlawfulness is an element of CSP,
UJI 14-132 provides that the optional “with-
out consent” language is to be used only in
applicable cases. The State further contend-
ed that since this Court has repeatedly held
that absence of consent is not an element of
CSP, the State properly excluded language
regarding the absence of consent from the
grand jury instructions. See Jensen, 2005-
NMCA-118, 119, 188 N.M. 254, 118 P.8d 762
(stating that “our cases have long held that
absence of consent is not an element of the
crime of CSP”). Additionally, the State ar-
gued that the definition of “unlawfulness” in
UJI 14-182 indicates that the “without con-
sent” language is not applicable to all
charges that use the unlawfulness definition
because absence of consent is not a question
of law essential for a CSP conviction. Final-
ly, the State argued that even if consent were
a defense to CSP in some cases, consent is

not a defense where the alleged victim is
under sixteen years of age. As a result, the
State argued that the grand jury instructions
were proper and that Defendant’s motion to
dismiss should be denied.

{6} On December 18, 2008, the district
court entered an order dismissing without
prejudice the CSP charges in Counts I, V,
and VI. The court found that it was undisput-
ed that the sexual intercourse providing the
basis for the CSP charges was consensual.
The court further found that the State omit-
ted the “without consent” language when it
read the “unlawfulness” instruction to the
grand jury. Finally, the court noted that in
Jensen, 2005-NMCA-118, 121, 188 N.M.
254, 118 P.3d 762, this Court recognized the
Supreme Court’s approval of jury instruc-
tions regarding the defense of consent in
CSP cases filed after January 20, 2005. Asa
result, the district court concluded that
“{gliven the evidence of alleged consensual
intercourse in this case, a genuine issue of
the unlawfulness of [Defendant's] actions was
raised[,]” and the State was required to in-
clude the “without consent” language in

grand jury instructions regarding the “un-
lawfulness” element. Based on its conclusion
that the grand jury instructions were legally
insufficient, the court dismissed without prej-
udice the CSP charges against Defendant.
The State now appeals the district court’s
order of dismissal.

DISCUSSION

{7} The State presents four arguments on
appeal: (1) language regarding the absence
of consent was properly excluded from the
unlawfulness instruction because absence of
consent is not an element of CSP involving a
fourteen-year-old victim; (2) even if consent
were considered a defense to CSP, the State
is not required to disprove trial defenses
during grand jury proceedings; (8) the Uni-
form Jury Instructions are a secondary
source of law that cannot overrule primary
sources; and (4) to the extent that UJI 14-
182 may require the State to prove lack of
consent in CSP cases, it is an erroneous
statement of law. In response, Defendant
asserts that an instruction regarding unlaw-
fulness was required since unlawfulness is an
element of CSP II and CSP IV and that the

515

“without consent” language was required
since it is included in the jury instruction
defining unlawfulness. We conclude that the
State properly instructed the grand jury re-
garding the definition of unlawfulness be-
eause the consent of a fourteen-year-old child
is legally irrelevant to the unlawfulness ele-
ment for both CSP II and CSP IV. As a
result, we reverse the district court’s dis-
missal of Counts I, V, and VI, and we need
not consider the State’s remaining arguments
on appeal.

Standard of Review

Hs {8} “CA) prosecutor has a duty to
advise the grand jury of the essential ele-
ments of the charges presented.” State v.
Gallegos, 2009-NMSC-017, 112, 146 N.M.
88, 206 P.8d 993. Furthermore, the remedy
for a failure to advise the grand jury of the
essential elements is a dismissal of the
charges without prejudice. Ulibarri, 1999-
NMCA-142, 1915, 24, 128 N.M. 546, 994
P.2d 1164. Here, it is undisputed that un-
lawfulness is an essential element of CSP II
and CSP IV, but the parties disagree regard-
ing whether language regarding the absence
of consent was required to be included in the
definition of unlawfulness. Whether the un-
lawfulness instruction was required to in-
clude language regarding the absence of con-
sent is a question we review de novo. See
State v. Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, 112, 148
N.M. 359, 287 P.3d 103.

Unlawfulness Element of CSP II and CSP
Iv

{9} Section 30-9-11(A) defines CSP as
“the unlawful and intentional causing of a
person to engage in sexual intercourse, cun-
nilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse or the
causing of penetration, to any extent and
with any object, of the genital or anal open-
ings of another, whether or not there is any
emission.” (Emphasis added.) Section 30-
9-11 then incorporates this general definition
of CSP into subsections defining the various
degrees of CSP. See § 30-9-11(C) to (F).
CSP II may be met through multiple cireum-
stances, including “all [CSP] perpetrated ...
in the commission of any other felony.” Sec-
tion 80-9-11(E)(). CSP in the third degree

516

(CSP III) “consists of all [CSP] perpetrated
through the use of force or coercion not
otherwise specified in this section.” Section
30-9-11(F). Finally, CSP IV “consists of all
[CSP] ... not [otherwise] defined in Subsec-
tions D through F ... perpetrated on a child
thirteen to sixteen years of age when the
perpetrator is at least eighteen years of age
and is at least four years older than the child

- and not the spouse of that child.” Section
80-9-11(G)(1).

{10} In State v. Perea, the defendant ap-
pealed his conviction of CSP III, arguing
that the evidence only supported a conviction
for CSP IV (involving a child between thir-
teen and sixteen years of age). 2008-
NMCA-147, 11, 145 N.M. 128, 194 P.8d 738.
Specifically, the defendant contended that
there was no evidence of the required ele-
ment of force for CSP IIT because the victim
consented to the sexual encounters. Id.
118-9. This Court held that “consent is not
a viable legal defense to conviction for CSP
III” and that the “[clonsent of a child be-
tween the ages of thirteen and sixteen to
engage in sexual intercourse is irrelevant
where force or coercion is involved.” Id. 19.
In considering the defendant’s argument that
he should have been convicted of the lesser
CSP IV charge, this Court similarly conclud-
ed that:

Under the CSP IV statute, the law does
not recognize the willingness of a child
between the ages of thirteen and sixteen to
engage in sexual intercourse with a twen-
ty-nine-year-old man as vitiating his caus-
ing the intercourse to occur. Such a
child’s consent is legally irrelevant.

Id. 1110-11 (citations omitted).

TM {11} We first consider whether the
State properly excluded language requiring
the absence of Victim’s consent in instructing
the grand jury regarding the unlawfulness
element for the three alternative counts of
CSP IV. As stated in Perea, the law does not
recognize the willingness of a fourteen-year-
old child to consent to sexual intercourse
with a forty-six-year-old man as vitiating the
act of CSP, and as a result, Victim’s consent
or lack thereof is legally irrelevant under the
CSP IV statute. See id. Defendant pro-
vides no basis to distinguish the present case

from Perea in relation to the CSP IV
charges, but instead concedes that Victim’s
consent is irrelevant to the element of unlaw-
fulness for CSP IV. Consequently, we con-
dude that the grand jury instructions re-
garding the unlawfulness element for the
three alternative counts of CSP IV properly
excluded language regarding the absence of
Victim’s consent.

WM {12} We next turn to whether the
State properly excluded the “without con-
sent” language when instructing the grand
jury regarding the unlawfulness element for
the three counts of CSP II. Defendant ar-
gues that pursuant to the definition of CSP
I in UJI 14-954 NMRA, the State was
mandated to instruct the grand jury that
Defendant’s act was required to be unlawful
since there was a genuine issue regarding
the unlawfulness of Defendant’s actions. See
‘UJI 14-954 n. 7 (“Use the bracketed element,
[that the defendant’s act was unlawful] if the
evidence raises a genuine issue of the unlaw-
fulness of the defendant’s actions.”). Defen-
dant further contends that the issue of
whether Victim could consent due to her
young age applies only to the CSP IV charge
under Perea, and the “without consent” lan-
guage must be included in the instruction
regarding the unlawfulness element of CSP
IL

{13} We conclude that the consent of a
statutorily defined child is irrelevant to the
unlawfulness element of CSP II. In Perea,
‘we reasoned that the consent of a child be-
tween the ages of thirteen and sixteen is
legally irrelevant for both CSP III, where
force is required, and CSP IV, where force is
not required. 2008-NMCA-147, 11 9-11, 145
N.M. 123, 194 P.8d 788. Similarly, CSP II
incorporates the same universal definition of
CSP in Section 30-9-11(A), including the re-
quirement that the act be unlawful. See
§ 30-9-11(E)(6). Furthermore, the only ad-
ditional element required for CSP II is that
the defendant must have perpetrated the act
of CSP “in the commission of any other
felony.” Id. Just as Perea concluded that
the consent of a child between thirteen and
sixteen years of age to engage in sexual
intercourse with a twenty-nine-year-old man
does not vitiate the act of CSP required for

CSP III (use of force or coercion) or CSP IV,
we conclude that the consent of a fourteen-
year-old child to engage in sexual intercourse
with a forty-six-year-old man does not vitiate
the act of CSP required for CSP II. Id. 199,
11. Furthermore, just as Perea concluded
that the additional question for CSP ITI is
“whether [the d]efendant used force in ac-
complishing his ends irrespective of the [un-
der-aged] victim’s role[,]” we determine that
a similar question applies for CSP II regard-
ing whether Defendant perpetrated the act
of CSP during the commission of another
felony irrespective of the under-aged Victim’s
role. Id. 111; see State v. Maestas, 2005-
NMCA-062, 124, 187 N.M. 477, 112 P.3d
1184, (determining that CSP II based on
commission of a felony “requir[es] the jury to
find that [the d]efendant caused [the vlictim
to engage in the various sex acts and that the
acts oceurred during the commission of the
underlying felony”), rev’d on other grounds,
2007-NMSC-001, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.38d
933.

{14} Additionally, we recognize that force
or coercion is not always an essential element
of CSP II. Maestas, 2005-NMCA-062, 126,
187 N.M. 477, 112 P.3d 1134. “Through its
definitions of CSP II, the [Llegislature in-
tended to punish those who participate in
certain sexual activity, even without exerting
force or coercion, when the participant is in a
position of authority over an inmate, when
the participant is armed with a deadly weap-
on, or when the sex act is caused by the
defendant in the commission of any other
felony.” Jd. Furthermore, the Legislature
did not limit CSP II (commission of a felony)
to only those underlying felonies involving
force or coercion, but instead, “simply re-
quired that the CSP be caused by the defen-
dant in the commission of any other felony.”
Id. Gnternal quotation marks and citation
omitted). As a result, we decline to extend
the definition of the unlawfulness element of
CSP II to include an additional requirement
that Victim did not consent to the sexual
intercourse during Defendant’s commission
ofa felony. See id. 114, 24 (recognizing in a
CSP II case where the alleged victim was an
adult, the required “causal connection” be-
tween the requested sexual act and the un-
derlying felony was sufficient to ensure that

517

an accused will not be convicted for engaging
in an act of purely consensual sex).

{15} Finally, we recognize that our statu-
tory authority and cases similarly indicate
that absence of consent is not an element of
the crime of CSP. See NMSA 1978, § 30-9-
10(A) (2005) (stating that “[pJhysical or ver-
bal resistance of the victim is not an element
of force or coercion” under the sex crimes
statutes); see also Jensen, 2005-NMCA-118,
119, 188 N.M. 254, 118 P.38d 762 (recognizing
that “our cases have long held that absence
of consent is not an element of the crime of
CSP”); State v. Gillette, 102 N.M. 695, 697—
98, 700, 699 P.2d 626, 628-29, 681 (Ct.App.
1985) (recognizing that lack of consent is not
an element of CSP II in a case involving a
twelve-year-old victim). Having recognized
that absence of consent is not an essential
element of CSP, we similarly decline to ex-
pand the definition of unlawfulness related to
charges of CSP to include absence of consent.
as an essential element. As a result, the
State properly excluded the “without con-
sent” language from the definition of unlaw-
fulness in this case, as set forth in the CSP
IV and CSP II instructions to the grand jury.
See State v. Augustin M., 20083-NMCA-065,
1916, 19, 1838 N.M. 636, 68 P.8d 182 (recog-
nizing that the prosecution is required to
instruct the grand jury regarding the ele-
ments of the offense, but not possible defens-
es that a defendant may raise).

{16} Consequently, we hold that the State
properly excluded the “without consent” lan-
guage from the grand jury instruction defin-
ing “unlawfulness” because Victim’s consent
or lack thereof is legally irrelevant to the
unlawfulness element of both CSP II and
CSP IV.

Uniform Jury Instruction Defining “Un-
Jawfulness”

I {17} We briefly address Defendant’s
argument that the “without consent” lan-
guage was required because it “is clearly
part of the jury instruction setting forth the
meaning of unlawfulness.” UJI 14-182 pro-
vides a definition of “unlawfulness” for of-
fenses that include the term “unlawful” in
defining the offense, including certain assault

518

and battery offenses, sex offenses, and false
imprisonment or kidnapping offenses. See
USI 14-132 n. 1. UJI 14-182 defines “unlaw-
fulness” as follows:

For the act to have been unlawful it must.
have been done [without consent and]:

‘with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual
desire]
or]
to intrude upon the bodily integrity or
personal safety of
___ (name of vic-
tim)]
or]
(other un-
lawful purpose ) j.
ee (newme ff f-
fense) does not include a [touching] [pen-
etration] [confinement]
(relevant

act )] for purposes of [reasonable medical

treatment] [nonabusive (parental care) (or)

(custodial care) ] [lawful arrest, search or

confinement] [.

(other larfidl purpose ) }.

(Alterations in original).

{18} We conclude that nothing in UJI 14-
182 requires the bracketed “without consent”
language to be included in defining the un-
lawfulness of CSP II or CSP IV where the
alleged victim is a statutorily defined child.
The use notes clearly indicate that the brack-
eted alternatives are not applicable to every
case. See UJI 14-182 n. 1 (“The examples
suggested in the bracketed language have
been taken from controlling cases addressing
particular offenses and are not applicable to
every case.”). The use notes further clarify
that “[o]ne or more of the three [bracketed]
alternatives may be given without the brack-
eted ‘without consent and’.” UJI 14-182 n.
3. Here, the State defined unlawfulness using
the three bracketed alternatives in UJI 14~
182, specifying that for the act to be unlaw-
ful, “it must have been done with the intent
to arouse or gratify sexual desire[,] or to
intrude on the bodily integrity or personal
safety of the [vlictim[,] or for some other
unlawful purpose.” Additionally, the State
instructed the grand jury that lawful pur-
poses such as “a penetration for purposes of

reasonable medical treatment, non-abusive
parental or custodial care, [or] lawful arrest
or confinement” were not included in the
definition of the CSP offenses. However, as
previously discussed, the State properly ex-
cluded the “without consent” language since
it is legally irrelevant to both CSP II and
CSP IV involving a statutorily defined child
victim. As a result, we conclude that the
State properly instructed the grand jury re-
garding the definition of unlawfulness by us-
ing the appropriate bracketed alternatives
set forth in UJI 14-132.

The District Court’s Reliance on Jensen

{19} Finally, we briefly address the dis-
trict court's reliance on Jensen, 2005-
NMCA-118, 121, 188 N.M. 254, 118 P.8d
762, to conclude that our Supreme Court had
approved the defense of consent for CSP
cases filed after January 20, 2005. We first
note that the issue in Jensen was whether
the defendant received ineffective assistance
of counsel, not whether the defendant was
entitled to a jury instruction regarding con-
sent. Id. 1917-18; see Fernandez v. Farm-
ers Ins. Co. of Ariz, 115 N.M. 622, 627, 857
P.2d 22, 27 (1998) (“[C]ases are not authority
for propositions not considered.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). We
further note that Jensen recognized that pur-
suant to our case law and statute, “absence
of consent is not an element of the crime of
CSP.” 2005-NMCA-113, 119, 188 N.M. 254,
118 P.38d 762. Finally, we recognize that
Jensen is distinguishable because it ad-
dressed whether consent was a defense in a
CSP case where the alleged victim was the
adult wife of the defendant, rather than
whether absence of consent was required to
be included in defining the essential elements
of CSP involving a child victim as in the
present case. Id. #11, 22. As a result, we
conclude that the district court erred in de-
termining that the “without consent” lan-
guage was required to be included in the
definition of unlawfulness for CSP II and
CSP IV in a case involving an alleged victim
that was a statutorily defined child.
CONCLUSION

{20} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the district court’s order dismissing Counts I,

nr
pe
=

V, and VI of Defendant’s indictment, and we
remand for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.

{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN
and CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judges.

2011-NMCA-090
263 P.3d 296
Herman SPENCER, Third-Party
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Vv.

Paul BARBER and Barber & Borg, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants/Appellees,

and

Ellen Sam, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Hermanda Spencer (De-
ceased), Plaintiff/Counter—Defen-
dant/Appellee,

v

Herman Spencer, Defendant/Counter—
Plaintiff/Appellant.

No. 29,390.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

June 24, 2011.

Certiorari Granted, Sept.
9, 2011, No, 33,133.

520

Luebben Johnson & Barnhouse, LLP,
Randolph H. Barnhouse, Kelli J. Keegan,
Los Ranchos de Albuquerque, NM, for Ap-
pellant.

Madison, Harbour & Mroz, P.A., M. Eliza
Stewart, Jacqueline Olexy, Albuquerque,
NM, for Appellees.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} This case evolved from a wrongful
death action filed by Plaintiff Ellen Sam as
personal representative of the estates of her
daughter, Hermanda Spencer, and her
granddaughter, Lydia Burnett. Through her
attorneys, third-party Defendants Paul Bar-
ber and the law firm of Barber & Borg, LLC
(collectively Barber), Sam entered into a set-
tlement agreement with decedent Hermanda
Spencer’s father, Defendant Herman Spenc-
er (Spencer), concerning Spencer’s entitle-
ment to proceeds from the wrongful death
case. Spencer later repudiated the settle-
ment agreement, Sam sued Spencer for en-
forcement of the agreement, and Spencer
filed a third-party complaint against Barber,
claiming that Barber wrongfully induced
Spencer to sign the agreement and that he
breached duties owed to Spencer as a statu-
tory beneficiary of the wrongful death es-
tates.

{2} The district court granted Barber’s
motion for summary judgment and, in accor-
dance with Leyba v. Whitley, 120 N.M. 768,
907 P.2d 172 (1995), held that any duties
Barber may have owed Spencer as a statuto-

ry beneficiary ended when an adversarial
relationship developed between Sam and
Spencer. We agree with this determination
and affirm summary judgment on this issue.
The district court also granted summary
judgment on the question of the enforceabili-
ty of the settlement agreement between Sam
and Spencer and held that the agreement
was enforceable. We conclude that issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment
on this issue and reverse this aspect of the
district court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

{3} Sam retained Barber to represent her
in the wrongful death action she filed as
personal representative of the estates of
Hermanda Spencer and Hermanda’s daugh-
ter, Lydia Burnett. As previously men-
tioned, Spencer was Hermanda’s father and
Lydia’s grandfather. It is undisputed that
both Sam and Spencer were potential statu-
tory beneficiaries of both estates pursuant to
the Wrongful Death Act, NMSA 1978, Sec-
tions 41~2-1 to -4 (1882, as amended through
2001).

{4} Spencer knew nothing about the
wrongful death case that Sam was pursuing
until nearly a year after it was filed. Sam
took the position that Spencer had aban-
doned Hermanda and was therefore not enti-
tled to share in the proceeds of the estates’
ultimate recovery. See Perry v. Williams,
2003-NMCA-084, 11 20, 22, 183 N.M. 844, 70
P.8d 1288 (holding that a parent who fails to
support a child may not benefit from a
wrongful death recovery).

{5} Approximately ten months after Bar-
ber filed the lawsuit on Sam’s behalf, some
but not all of the defendants in that case
made offers to settle with Sam. Barber locat-
ed Spencer at his employer's place of busi-
ness and met with him in order to offer to
settle any claims Spencer may have had re-
garding the wrongful death estates. At the
time of this meeting, Barber claimed that he
did not know the final settlement amount in
the wrongful death case, nor did he know
how any settlement would be divided be-
tween the two estates. However, Barber did
know that two of the defendants in the case
had offered to settle for a total of $900,000.

Barber told Spencer that he was a lawyer
representing Sam in a suit against certain
entities for the deaths of Spencer’s daughter
and granddaughter. He told Spencer that
the case was close to settling. Spencer
asked Barber how much the settlement was
and, according to Spencer, Barber did not
say. Barber, on the other hand, recalled
telling Spencer that the settlement was “a
large or very large amount.”

{6} Barber told Spencer that he was not
Spencer’s lawyer, and Spencer understood
this. Spencer also understood that Sam was
Barber's client. Although Barber recalled
telling Spencer that he could seek advice
from his own lawyer, Spencer did not recall
this discussion. Barber recalled telling
Spencer that Sam was willing to settle
Spencer's potential claims against the estates
for $10,000 or $15,000, while Spencer recalled
Barber initially offering $10,000, plus release
of Spencer’s obligation to pay child support,
which amounted to approximately $14,000.
Spencer asked if he could get $20,000 plus
release of the child support obligation, which
was apparently being garnished from Spenc-
er’s wages. Barber responded that he would
have to ask Sam for authority to do this. A
short time later, Sam agreed to settle with
Spencer for $20,000, plus forgiveness of
Spencer’s child support obligation.

{7} Barber produced a settlement agree-
ment for Spencer’s signature. Spencer had
an opportunity to read the agreement and,
according to Barber, he said he understood it
and had no questions. Spencer agreed to the
settlement of $20,000, plus forgiveness of the
child support obligation, and he and Barber
agreed to meet again after lunch so that
Spencer could sign the settlement agreement
before a notary. After lunch, Spencer and
Barber went to the office of attorney Robert
Ionta, where Spencer signed the agreement
before a notary.

{8} Barber told Spencer it would take at
least 30 days for the settlement in the under-
lying case to be finalized and for the money
to become available. A few weeks later,
Spencer received in the mail a copy of the
settlement agreement he had signed and, a
few days later, a check in the amount of
$20,000. Between the time Spencer met with

521

Barber and the time he received the agree-
ment and the check, Spencer thought he had
made a deal with Barber. However, once he
received the agreement, Spencer wanted to
make sure he was “doing it right,” so he
called attorney William Keeler. After talk-
ing to Keeler, Spencer decided not to accept
the check. Keeler sent a letter to Barber
asking him not to distribute the settlement
proceeds in the underlying case until it could
be determined how much of that settlement
Spencer was entitled to.

{9} In the meantime, according to Barber,
Sam relied on Spencer’s settlement of his
claims against the estates in agreeing to
settle with the defendants in the underlying
case. In fact, later the same day as his
meeting with Spencer, Barber emailed the
attorneys for the defendants in the underly-
ing case and accepted settlement offers total-
ing $900,000. In addition, Barber, on Sam’s
behalf, asked the Navajo Nation Child Sup-
port Department for the forms necessary to
effectuate a waiver of child support from
Spencer.

{10} After Spencer repudiated the settle-
ment agreement he had signed, Sam filed
suit against Spencer seeking a declaration
that the agreement was binding. Spencer
then filed a counterclaim against Sam and a
third-party complaint against Barber and his
law firm. In the third-party complaint,
Spencer alleged that Barber deceived Spenc-
er and induced him into signing the settle-
ment agreement and that Barber breached
duties owed to Spencer as a beneficiary of
the wrongful death estates.

{11} Barber filed a motion for summary
judgment on Spencer’s third-party claims
and sought a determination that the settle-
ment agreement was enforceable and that
Spencer breached the settlement agreement.
Barber’s primary argument was that the un-
disputed facts established the existence of all
elements of an enforceable contract. Spencer
responded and argued that Barber breached
various duties he owed to Spencer, including
(1) a duty to disclose, (2) a duty of reasonable
care owed as the attorney for the wrongful
death estates, (8) a duty to deal fairly and
honestly in contract formation, and (4) a duty
to protect Spencer’s interests in the wrongful

522

death estates. Spencer further argued that
the settlement agreement was unenforceable
because (1) Barber misrepresented an essen-
tial term of the agreement, (2) Spencer was
mistaken as to a basic assumption underlying
the agreement, and (8) the agreement was a
contingent contract that was canceled before
the contingencies were met. Barber's reply
brief argued that Spencer understood the
settlement agreement, bargained for more
favorable terms, and willingly signed the
agreement of his own volition. Barber fur-
ther argued, in reliance on Leyba, 120 N.M.
768, 907 P.2d 172, that even if he owed
Spencer a duty as a beneficiary of the wrong-
ful death estates, the adversarial relationship
between Spencer and Barber’s client, Sam,
terminated that duty.

{12} Without holding a hearing, the dis-
trict court entered an order granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of Barber. The
court concluded that there was no genuine
issue of material fact and that (1) Barber did
not owe a duty to Spencer because of the
adversarial relationship between Spencer and
Sam, and (2) the settlement agreement be-
tween Sam and Spencer was enforceable.
The court held that Spencer's recovery for
the death of Hermanda Spencer was limited
to that allowed under the terms of the settle-
ment agreement. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION

{13} “Summary judgment is appropriate
where there are no genuine issues of materi-
al fact and the movant is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.” Self v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, 16, 126
N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. “We review these
legal questions de novo.” Id.

{14} Spencer makes three primary argu-
ments on appeal. First, he maintains that
the district court improperly determined that
Leyba barred his claims against Barber.
Second, he contends that the settlement
agreement was unenforceable for a number
of reasons. Third, he claims that issues of
fact precluded summary judgment. We turn
now to his first contention.

1. Whether Leyba Barred Spencer’s
Claims Against Barber

HM {15} In his third-party complaint

against Barber, Spencer asserted essentially

two claims, including the one we now ad-
dress, which is that Barber breached certain
duties owed to Spencer. This claim rests on
our Supreme Court’s decision in Leyba.

{16} In Leyba, the Court addressed the
duties owed by an attorney handling a
wrongful death case. 120 N.M. at 769-70,
907 P.2d at 173-74. In that case, Leyba, the
conservator for her minor son, sued attor-
neys who had handled a claim for the wrong-
ful death of the child’s father. Id. Although
the child was the estate’s sole statutory bene-
ficiary, the attorneys handling the case had
paid all of the proceeds from the case to the
decedent's mother, the personal representa-
tive of the estate. Jd. Instead of disbursing
the proceeds to the child beneficiary, the
personal representative had dissipated the
proceeds, and the child recovered a mere
fraction of the total. Id. Leyba maintained
that the attorneys owed her son a duty to
ensure that he received the proceeds and
that they had breached that duty. Id.

{17} In considering whether the attorneys
owed a duty to the child—who was not the
attorneys’ client—the Court considered a
number of cases from other jurisdictions and
ultimately concluded that an attorney owes a
duty to a nonclient if the attorney and the
client intended to benefit the nonelient. Id.
at 778, 907 P.2d at 177. In determining
whether the attorney and the client so in-
tended, the Court adopted a balancing test.
Id. at 774-75, 907 P.2d at 178-79. However,
in the particular context of a wrongful death
case, the Court went on to conclude that
application of the balancing test is not neces-
sary; “the very nature of a wrongful death
action is such that we will imply in law a
term in every agreement between an attor-
ney and personal representative that the
agreement is formed with the intent to bene-
fit the statutory beneficiaries of the action.”
Id. at 776, 907 P.2d at 180.

{18} In the present case, consistent with
this holding in Leyba, the law implied a term
in Barber’s agreement to represent Sam in
the wrongful death case to the effect that
Barber’s pursuit of the case was not only for
the benefit of Sam, in her personal capacity

523

as the mother and grandmother of the dece-
dents, but also for the benefit of Spencer
because Spencer was a statutory beneficiary.
However, the Court in Leyba carved out an
exception to this duty owed to a nonclient in
a wrongful death case, which it called “the
adversarial exception.” Id.

{19} In explaining the adversarial excep-
tion, the Court in Leyba observed that

[thhe policy considerations against finding

a duty to a nonclient are the strongest

where doing so would detract from the

attorney’s ethical obligations to the client.

This occurs where a duty to a nonclient

creates a risk of divided loyalties because

of a conflicting interest or of a breach of

confidence,
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The Court then
discussed a Colorado case that had adopted
the adversarial exception in a wrongful death
case in which adverse interests developed
between the personal representative and oth-
er statutory beneficiaries such that the attor-
neys retained by the personal representative
“could not ethically represent both sides.”
Id. at. 777, 907 P.2d at 181 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). As a result, the
Colorado court held that “[ulnder these cir-
cumstances, [the attorneys’] only client was
[the personal representative].” Jd. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

{20} Our Supreme Court explained the
Colorado case, noting that, “rather than ap-
plying the adversarial exception to deny the
existence of a duty to the nonclient, the
[Colorado court] found a duty to exist and a
breach of that duty to arise out of continuing
representation of conflicting interests. We
concur and believe that any such conflict
should be resolved by notice to the nonclient
that the latter cannot rely on the attorney to
act for his or her benefit.” Id. (citation omit-
ted). The Court then concluded that “when
recognition of a duty running from an attor-
ney to the third party would burden the
attorney’s duty to the client in a wrongful
death action—as when an adversarial rela-
tionship develops between the client and the
third party—as a matter of public policy the
attorney’s duty to the third party should
end.” Id. at 778, 907 P.2d at 182. The

Court went on to note that “[s]hould a con-
flict arise, the adversarial exception negates
duty only if the third party knows or should
know that he or she cannot rely on the
attorney to act for his or her benefit.” Id.

{21} Barber argues and the district court
concluded that the adversarial exception ap-
plied in the present case such that any duty
Barber may have owed to Spencer ended
because of the adversarial relationship be-
tween Sam and Spencer. The relationship
was adversarial because Sam took the posi-
tion that the estates owed nothing to Spencer
because he had abandoned his daughter, de-
eedent Hermanda Spencer. See Perry,
2003-NMCA-084, {If 20, 22, 183 N.M. 844, 70
P.3d 1283 (holding that a parent who fails to
support a child may not benefit from a
wrongful death recovery). Spencer main-
tains that the district court improperly ap-
plied the adversarial exception because: (1)
Barber created the adversarial relationship,
and the exception can apply only if the bene-
ficiary creates the adversarial relationship;
(2) the adversarial exception impacts only
contract remedies, not the tort remedies
Spencer sought; and (8) Barber improperly
raised the adversarial exception for the first
time in the reply brief he filed in the district
court. We address each of Spencer’s conten-
tions in turn.

a. Creation of the Adversarial Relation-
ship

{22} Spencer initially argues that Barber
owed attorney/client duties to Spencer, a
statutory beneficiary, when Barber under-
took to represent the decedents’ estates in
the wrongful death action. Leyba supports
the view that Barber owed Spencer—a non-
client—a duty of reasonable care arising out
of an intent implied in Barber’s agreement
with his client, Sam. See 120 N.M. at 775-76,
907 P.2d at 179-80 (explaining that intent to
benefit a third party is implied by law “in
every agreement between an attorney and
personal representative that the agreement
is formed with the intent to benefit the statu-
tory beneficiaries”). However, we see noth-
ing in Leyba establishing that the attorney’s
duties to the intended beneficiary equate to
all of the duties owed to the attorney's client.

524

Nonetheless, we continue our analysis consis-
tent with the premise that Barber owed
Spencer a duty of reasonable care. See id.
at 771, 907 P.2d at 175 (stating that “an
implied term of an attorney's contract to
provide professional services for the benefit
of a third party is the promise to render
services with reasonable skill and care”).

{23} Spencer then goes on to assert that
Barber himself created the adversarial rela-
tionship upon which the adversarial exception
relies by breaching several duties imposed by
the Code of Professional Conduct. Spencer
relies on a statement in Leyba to the effect
that “[tJhe fact that an attorney identifies a
conflict, actual or potential, should not, how-
ever, in itself negate the duty owed to the
statutory beneficiaries.” Id. at 778, 907 P.2d
at 182. Instead, Spencer maintains, the Su-
preme Court in Leyba recognized that proce-
dures set out in Rules 16-107(A), -116(A)(1),
(D) NMRA apply, and that they “specify{]
procedures for terminating representation
when there is a conflict of interest.” Leyba,
120 N.M. at 778, 907 P.2d at 182. Thus,
Spencer argues, Barber's representation of
Spencer was in conflict with his representa-
tion of Sam from its inception, and Barber
was obliged to withdraw in accordance with
the detailed process outlined in Rule 16-
116(D). Because Barber did not withdraw
from representation, according to Spencer,
he created the adversarial relationship and
cannot rely on it now as an exception to his
duty to Spencer.

{24} We are not persuaded. Spencer's
arguments constitute an unjustified extension
of Leybe’s holding. Leyba did not focus on
the Code of Professional Conduct in its dis-
cussion of the adversarial exception. In-
stead, the Court noted that even if an attor-
ney identifies an actual or potential conflict,
the attorney continues to owe a duty to the
third-party beneficiary wnless “the third par-
ty knows or should know that he or she
cannot rely on the attorney to act for his or
her benefit.” Leyba, 120 N.M. at 778, 907
P.2d at 182. In the present case, the evi-
dence established that when Spencer met
with Barber, Spencer knew that Barber was
representing Sam, he knew that Barber was
not his attorney, and he knew that Barber

was not providing any services to him. In-
deed, Spencer negotiated with Barber to ob-
tain a better settlement for himself.

{25} Along these same lines, Spencer fur-
ther argues that Barber breached the duty of
loyalty he owed Spencer by failing to avoid
conflicts of interest and by “generating an
adversarial relationship” or by “assisting the
personal representative in doing so.” Thus,
Spencer asserts, the duty of loyalty should
have prevented Barber from “creat[ing] an
adversarial relationship sufficient to negate
other duties owed” to Spencer.

HE {26} We do not agree. While an
attorney owes his client “a duty of loyalty,”
Rael v. Blair, 2007-NMSC-006, 110, 141
N.M. 232, 158 P.3d 657 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), Spencer has not
cited any authority for the proposition that
an attorney owes a third party a duty of
loyalty if the third party’s interests are ad-
verse to the client’s interests. Indeed, this is
precisely the situation addressed by the ad-
versarial exception discussed in Leyba. If an
attorney identifies a conflict between his
client and a third-party beneficiary, then the
attorney should give notice to the third party
that he or she “cannot rely on the attorney to
act for his or her benefit,” Leyba, 120 N.M.
at 777, 907 P.2d at 181, and the adversarial
exception negates the duty owed to the third
party. See id, at 778, 907 P.2d at 182 (noting
that the adversarial exception negates duty if
a conflict arises and “if the third party knows
or should know that he or she cannot rely on
the attorney to act for his or her benefit”).
It defies logic to suggest that in such a
situation the attorney must withdraw from
representation of his or her client in order to
represent the interests of the third party,
which is the scenario Spencer seems to sug-
gest.

{27} Spencer next argues that Barber ad-
mitted that he breached duties owed Spencer
before the adversarial relationship developed
and, therefore, Barber cannot take advantage
of the adversarial exception. Although
Spencer's argument is somewhat convoluted
and difficult to follow, we understand his
contention to be that the adversarial relation-
ship did not come into existence until Barber
presented Spencer with Sam’s settlement of-

fer and, as a result, all of the actions Barber
took prior to that time that were in deroga-
tion of his duties to Spencer amounted to
breach of professional duties giving rise to
Barber’s liability to Spencer for malpractice.
Spencer bases this argument on a statement
in one of Barber's district court pleadings,
which stated: “When ... Spencer was pre-
sented with ... Sam’s offer to settle his
interests in the wrongful death estate be-
cause she considered her interests to be ad-
verse to his, Leyba’s adversarial exception
immediately went into effect.”

{28} We are not persuaded by Spencer's
argument. Spencer fails to specify what
Barber did prior to his meeting with Spencer
that constituted breach of the duty of reason-
able care he owed Spencer as a third-party
beneficiary. Prior to the meeting, Barber
had not accepted any settlement offers from
the tortfeasors in the underlying case on
behalf of the wrongful death estates. Thus,
Barber had not done anything reflecting a
failure to exercise reasonable care for the
benefit of the estates’ statutory beneficiaries,
including Spencer. Once Barber determined
that Sam’s position—that Spencer had aban-
doned Hermanda Spencer and consequently
was not entitled to recover from the wrongful
death estates—conflicted with Spencer’s in-
terest as a potential statutory beneficiary, he
took steps to make Spencer aware of the
conflict and of the fact that Barber could not
act for Spencer’s benefit. This was precisely
the scenario set out in Leyba as the proper
approach to take.

{29} In addition, Spencer argues that only
the beneficiary may establish the adversarial
relationship giving rise to the exception. In
his view, allowing the adversarial relationship
to be “created” by the personal representa-
tive renders meaningless the duties owed by
the personal representative’s attorney to the
statutory beneficiaries. We do not agree.
In our view, Leyba envisioned the attorney
for a wrongful death estate as having the
usual attorney duties toward his or her client
and, in addition, a duty of reasonable care
toward the estate’s beneficiaries, so long as
the interests of the client and the nonclients
are consistent. Once a conflict in those in-
terests arises, however, the attorney does not

525

have to withdraw from representation of his
or her client. See id. at 777, 907 P.2d at 181
(citing with approval a Colorado case holding
that “[uJnder these circumstances, [the attor-
neys’] only client was [the personal represen-
tative].” (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). In-
stead, the attorney is obliged to notify the
nonclient beneficiaries of the conflict and of
the fact that the attorney can no longer act
for the benefit of the nonclients. See id.
(explaining that “any such conflict should be
resolved by notice to the nonclient that the
latter cannot rely on the attorney to act for
his or her benefit”). Thus, the attorney con-
tinues to represent the client, with whom he
or she has entered into a contract of repre-
sentation, and the nonclients may seek their
own representation. This is precisely what
happened in the present case.

b. The Adversarial Exception’s Impact on
Tort Remedies

HI {30} Spencer next argues that the
adversarial exception applies only to termi-
nate Barber’s contractually based profession-
al duties and, therefore, the district court
improperly granted summary judgment in
favor of Barber on Spencer’s tort claims. In
support of this argument, Spencer relies on
what he characterizes as Leyba’s distinction
between the “traditional contract remedies
with respect to the bargain intended for [the
third-party beneficiary’s] benefit,” 120 N.M.
at 771, 907 P.2d at 175, and “traditional tort
claims against an attorney for misrepresenta-
tion, fraud, and collusion, none of which de-
pend upon a duty arising out of cont 7
Id. at 773 n. 8, 907 P.2d at 177 n. 3. Spencer
maintains that the Court in Leyba applied
the adversarial exception only to contractual-
ly based duties and that the exception “has
no bearing on tort claims.”

{31} Spencer’s argument is based on a
misreading of Leyba. The Court in Leyba
began its preliminary discussion by noting
the general principles applicable to third-
party beneficiary contracts, including the
principle upon which Spencer relies, that a
third-party beneficiary “is accorded tradi-
tional contract remedies with respect to the
bargain intended for his or her benefit.” Id.

526

at 771, 907 P.2d at 175. The Court went on
to observe that “the common law of torts also
recognizes an attorney’s duty to provide pro-
fessional services with the skill, prudence,
and diligence of attorneys of ordinary skill
and capacity.” Id. at 772, 907 P.2d at 176.
The Court then stated that “the foundation of
any malpractice claim by an intended benefi-
ciary remains the express or implied contract
that gives rise to the lawyer-client relation-
ship.” Jd. This is because “{o]ut of the
agreement to provide legal services to a
client ... arises the duty to act with due care
as to the interests of the intended beneficia-
ry.” Id. (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). Against this backdrop, the
Court then observed that many courts have
determined that a third-party beneficiary
cannot assert a “cause of action in tort
aris{ing] from a breach of duty existing by
virtue of a contract unless there exists be-
tween the defendant and the injured person
what is termed privity of contract.” Id. (al-
teration omitted) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).

{82} It is clear that up to this point in the
Leyba opinion, the Court was simply provid-
ing historical background. The Court then
announced its determination that “we join
those jurisdictions that have rejected any
stringent privity test as the touchstone of an
attorney’s duty to a nonclient.” Id. at 773,
907 P.2d at 177.

[I]t seems logical to treat an intended (not
incidental) third-party beneficiary as
though in privity of contract and accord
such a beneficiary traditional remedies in
the enforcement of promises and common-
law duties in his or her own right and not
simply in the enforcement of the promis-
ee’s right. As we explain below, however,
whether in contract or tort, it is nonethe-
less the intent of the attorney and client to
benefit the third party that forms the basis
of a malpractice action by the third party.

Id. (emphasis added). Contrary to Spencer's
argument, it is evident from the emphasized
language that the Court did not draw a dis-
tinction between a contract-based claim of
malpractice and a tort-based claim of mal-
practice.

{33} The Court went on to analyze how a
court can determine whether the attorney
and client intended to benefit the third party,
and it ultimately adopted a balancing test for
this purpose. Id. at 774~75, 907 P.2d at 178~-
79. The Court went beyond the balancing
test and, as we have previously noted, it held
that in every wrongful death case in which an
attorney represents a personal representa-
tive, the law will imply a term “that the
agreement is formed with the intent to bene-
fit the statutory beneficiaries of the action.”
Id. at 776, 907 P.2d at 180. The Court then
adopted the adversarial exception to this im-
plied term. Jd. at 777-78, 907 P.2d at 181-
82.

{34} At no point in the opinion did the
Leyba Court suggest that the adversarial
exception applied only to contractually based
claims made by a third-party beneficiary
against the personal representative’s attor-
ney. To the contrary, the Court indicated
that it made no difference whether the third
party based his or her malpractice claim on a
theory of contract or on a theory of tort.
The Court expressly stated that a third-party
beneficiary may have “remedies in the en-
forcement of promises and common-law
duties,” id. at 778, 907 P.2d at 177, and
common law duties certainly encompass
duties recognized in tort law.

ce. Raising Adversarial Exception for the
First Time in the Reply Brief

{35} Spencer also argues that the district
court improperly considered Barber’s argu-
ment regarding the adversarial exception be-
cause Barber failed to cite Leyba or mention
the exception until he filed his reply brief in
support of his motion for summary judgment.
In support of this argument, Spencer cites a
case from a federal district court in New
York.

{36} We disagree with Spencer’s conten-
tion. While Barber did not mention Leyba in
his initial brief in support of his motion for
summary judgment, Spencer cited Leyba in
his response brief and discussed it at some
length. In his reply, Barber responded to
Spencer’s arguments, including his argu-
ments based on Leyba, and asserted Leyba’s
adversarial exception, which Spencer had

failed to mention in his brief. We are not
aware of any New Mexico authority that
would preclude a party from responding in a
reply brief to arguments made by the oppos-
ing party.

d. Summary

{37} In conclusion, we determine that the
district court properly applied Leyba’s adver-
sarial exception in the present case and held
that any duty Barber owed Spencer was
negated by the exception. Barber proceeded
with his representation of Sam in the wrong-
ful death case in.a manner that was not
inconsistent with the duty of reasonable care
he owed Spencer as a statutory beneficiary.
Once the wrongful death case approached
settlement with the alleged tortfeasors, the
interests of Barber's client, Sam, and the
interests of Spencer diverged. Sam took the
position that Spencer was not entitled to any
proceeds from the wrongful death case due
to his alleged abandonment of the decedent
Hermanda Spencer. Thus, Barber’s contin-
ued representation of Spencer’s interests
“create[d] a risk of divided loyalties because
of a conflicting interest.” Jd. at 776, 907
P.2d at 180 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Consequently, Barber did
what Leyba instructs an attorney to do in
such a circumstance: he told Spencer that he
was acting only on behalf of Sam, and Spenc-
er acknowledged that he understood this.
Id. at T77, 907 P.2d at 181 (explaining that
“any such conflict should be resolved by no-
tice to the nonclient that the latter cannot,
rely on the attorney to act for his or her
benefit”). The district court’s decision was
consistent with Leyba. Thus, to the extent
the summary judgment dismissed Spencer’s
malpractice claims against Barber, we affirm
that judgment.

2. Whether the Settlement Agreement
was Enforceable

{88} Even if the district court properly
applied Leyba, Spencer maintains that it
erred for a number of reasons in determining
that the settlement agreement was enforce-
able. He argues that: (1) Barber breached
the duty to disclose or misrepresented a
material term of the agreement; (2) Barber

527

breached the duty to deal fairly and honestly
with Spencer; (8) the agreement was uncon-
scionable and presumptively fraudulent; (4)
the agreement was voidable; and (5) the
agreement was contingent and canceled be-
fore the contingencies were met. We con-
clude that genuine issues of material fact
precluded summary judgment on the en-
forceability of the agreement.

a. Whether There was Failure to Disclose
or Misrepresentation of a Material
Term

Hl {39} Spencer argues that “there was
a settlement [of the underlying wrongful
death case] before ... Barber ever spoke to
... Spencer.” He asserts that Barber failed
to disclose the amount of this settlement to
Spencer even when Spencer asked about the
amount and, as a result, the failure to dis-
close constituted a “misrepresentation suffi-
cient to invalidate the agreement” that
Spencer ultimately signed.

{40} In support of his argument, Spencer
relies on several provisions of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts. This Court re-
lied on the same provisions in Sisneros v.
Citadel Broadcasting Co., where we outlined
the requirements for finding a contract to be
voidable due to the misrepresentation of one
of the parties to the contract. 2006-NMCA-
102, 17 18-28, 140 N.M. 266, 142 P.38d 34.
We explained that in order for a contract to
be deemed voidable due to misrepresenta-
tion, “the recipient of the misrepresentation
must show that (1) there was a misrepresen-
tation that was (2) material or fraudulent and
which (8) induced the recipient to enter into
the agreement, and that (4) the recipient’s
reliance on the misrepresentation was justi-
fied.” Id. 119.

{41} In the present case, Spencer contends
that Barber’s failure to disclose the anticipat-
ed amount of the estates’ settlement with the
tortfeasors was the same as an affirmative
misrepresentation of a material term of the
settlement agreement Spencer ultimately
signed. See Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 161 cmt. a (1981) (explaining that if
a party is making a contract, “his assertion of
only some of the facts without the inclusion
of such additional matters as he knows or

528

believes to be necessary to prevent it from
being misleading is itself a misrepresenta-
tion”). Spencer maintains that without
knowing how much money was at stake, he
was in no position to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of Sam’s offer to settle with Spencer for
$20,000, plus forgiveness of the child support
obligation.

{42} We conclude that the evidence pre-
sented by Spencer created issues of material
fact on at least two of the elements of mis-
representation. First, there was conflicting
evidence as to whether there was a misrepre-
sentation. While Barber attested that he
told Spencer that the expected settlement of
the wrongful death claims was “large or very
large,” Spencer testified that Barber did not
answer when Spencer asked him the amount
of the anticipated settlement. It is for the
fact finder to determine whose testimony to
believe and whether the statement or the
silence, as the case may be, constituted a
misrepresentation.

{43} Second, if there was a misrepresenta-
tion, there are issues of fact as to whether it
was material or fraudulent. “If a fact is
intentionally withheld for the purpose of in-
ducing action, this is equivalent to a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation.” Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 161 cmt. b. Barber
claims that disclosing the anticipated amount
of the settlement to Spencer would itself be
misleading because Barber did not know the
final amount of the settlement or how the
settlement would be divided between the es-
tates of Hermanda and Lydia. On the other
hand, Spencer points out that Barber obvi-
ously had a fairly good idea about the
amount of the settlement because he accept-
ed offers totaling $900,000 the evening after
Spencer signed the settlement agreement.
Consequently, Spencer argues, Barber
should have told him about these offers so
that Spencer could make an informed deci-
sion about the settlement offered to him by
Sam. Again, the conflicting testimony gives
rise to an issue of fact best determined by
the fact finder.

{44} To the extent that the summary judg-
ment determined that the settlement agree-
ment was enforceable, we reverse that deter-
mination. Given our holding on this issue,

we need not address Spencer’s arguments
that the agreement was unconscionable, that
it was voidable due to Barber's failure to deal
with Spencer fairly, or that it was canceled
before various contingencies were met.
CONCLUSION

{45} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
that aspect of the district court’s summary
judgment dismissing Spencer’s malpractice
claims against Barber, and we reverse that
aspect of the summary judgment determin-
ing that the settlement agreement was en-
forceable. We remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

{46} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge and JAMES J. WECHSLER,

Judge.

2011-NMCA-091
263 P.3d 305

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

ve

Lauren OWELICIO, Defendant-
Appellant.

No. 30,461.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Tuly 5, 2011.

Certiorari Granted, Sept.
9, 2011, No. 33,148,

R
16

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret.
E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Joel
Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Santa Fe, NM, Josephine H. Ford,
Assistant Public Defender, Albuquerque,
NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} Defendant Lauren Owelicio appeals
from a district court judgment affirming her
conviction in metropolitan court for aggravat-
ed driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs (DWI), contrary to NMSA
1978, Section 66-8-102(D)(1) (2008) (amend-
ed 2010), after a bench trial. Defendant

contends that her own uncorroborated extra-
judicial statement admitting that she was
driving was insufficient to support her con-
viction. We hold that evidence that someone
was driving while intoxicated established the
corpus delicti of the crime and that, regard-
less, there was evidence corroborating De-
fendant’s admission that she was driving.
Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient
evidence to support Defendant's conviction.
We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} The pertinent facts are undisputed.
Officer Wayne Harvey testified that around
midnight on August 23, 2007, he responded
to a reported accident. He arrived at a
parking lot and found a dark-colored vehicle
with a man outside, later identified as Aaron
Atcitty, who appeared to be changing a flat
tire. The vehicle had two flat front tires, and
Atcitty was changing the one on the driver’s
side. Harvey testified that when he arrived,
he remembered seeing a woman, later identi-
fied as Defendant, seated in the passenger
seat, although the tape from the video re-
corder, which was admitted into evidence,
showed the woman getting into the car on
the passenger side as Harvey arrived. No
one was sitting in the driver’s seat.

{3} Harvey testified that Atcitty emitted a
strong odor of alcohol. He testified that
Atcitty’s speech was very slurred, and he
could not initially understand what Atcitty
was telling him. Atcitty denied driving the
vehicle and claimed that an unnamed friend
had been driving but ran away. Harvey
testified that it was clear that Atcitty denied
driving.

{4} Harvey then spoke with Defendant.
He noticed that she had bloodshot, watery
eyes, and that she emitted a strong odor of
alcohol. Harvey asked her to step out of the
vehicle, which she did, albeit slowly. She
was swaying back and forth and was unsure
of her balance.

{5} Harvey escorted Defendant to the pa-
trol car and asked her who had been driving.
She initially said nothing, then put her head
down, let out a deep sigh, and said “I was
driving the vehicle.” Defendant told Harvey
she was coming from Graham Central Sta-

tion, a nightclub, where she had consumed
three drinks, and she had a blowout while
driving.

{6} Harvey specifically asked Defendant if
Atcitty was driving, and she said no. He
accused Defendant of lying because she
looked at Atcitty before responding, but De-
fendant again told him she was driving.
Harvey testified that he gave Defendant sev-
eral chances to consider what she was saying,
and Defendant admitted to driving each time.
He testified that he initially thought both
Defendant and Atcitty were lying and Atcitty
was driving until Defendant admitted to driv-
ing several times. Harvey believed Defen-
dant had a “bout of good conscience” when
she admitted to driving, and he testified that
he gave her several chances to change her
story to ensure that she was not trying to
cover up for Atcitty.

{7} After determining that Defendant was
driving, Harvey administered field sobriety
tests, and Defendant performed poorly.
Harvey concluded that she was under the
influence of alcohol and arrested her for
DWI. When Harvey escorted Defendant back
to the vehicle, she went to the passenger side
to retrieve her license. Harvey later admin-
istered a breath alcohol test at the police
station, and the breath card admitted into
evidence at trial showed Defendant had a
breath score of .20/.19.

{8} The tape from the video recorder was
admitted into evidence and shows that as
Defendant and Harvey approached the vehi-
cle, Atcitty again insisted that his friend had
been driving. Harvey told Atcitty to stop
lying because Defendant had already admit-
ted she was driving. When Defendant again
claimed she was driving, Atcitty responded
“No you weren't, dumb-ass[.]”

{9} Atcitty’s sister, Cynthia Qualo, testi-
fied that she, her husband, Atcitty, and De-
fendant were at Graham Central Station on
the night in question. She testified that
Defendant had “a lot” to drink while they
were at Graham Central Station, while she
herself had one drink. She also testified that
she saw Atcitty in the driver’s seat when
Atcitty and Defendant drove away from Gra-
ham Central Station.

531

{10} Qualo testified that Atcitty and De-
fendant were driving behind the car contain-
ing Qualo and her husband, but the cars
became separated, and by the time Qualo
found Atcitty and Defendant, they were
standing outside the car surrounded by po-
lice officers. Qualo testified that she did not
see the accident that caused the blowout and
did not know what happened after the cars
became separated.

{11} At trial, Defendant testified that no
one was with her and Atcitty in the vehicle,
and she admitted she had previously told
Harvey she was driving. However, she re-
canted her earlier statements, claiming she
only said she was driving because she wanted
to protect Atcitty and his job. She claimed
Atcitty’s job was more important than her
job, and he might lose it if he was convicted
of DWI. In response to Defendant’s testimo-
ny, the metropolitan court judge told defense
counsel that his client was a liar; she either
lied to Harvey or was lying to the court and
asked which testimony the court should be-
lieve.

HE {12} No one other than Atcitty and
Defendant was present during Harvey’s in-
teractions with them. Harvey could not re-
member where the keys were located but
admitted Defendant did not have them and
that the keys eventually went with Atcitty.
Harvey testified that he did not know the
identity of the registered owner of the car.
We note that Defendant has attached a copy
of the car’s registration to her brief in chief,
but we decline to consider this evidence be-
cause it was not before the trial court. See
State v. Cumpton, 2000-NMCA-033, {20,
129 N.M, 47, 1 P.8d 429 (“Counsel should not,
refer to matters not of record in their
briefs.”).

{13} The metropolitan court convicted De-
fendant of DWI, and the district court af-
firmed her conviction. On appeal, Defendant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support her conviction. Specifically, she
claims there was insufficient evidence to
prove she was driving the vehicle because the
only evidence supporting that finding is her
own uncorroborated, extrajudicial admission.
We affirm.

532

CORPUS DELICTI AND/OR TRUST-
WORTHINESS RULE

{14} In order to convict Defendant of ag-
gravated DWI, the State had to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Defendant
operated a motor vehicle; (2) within three
hours of driving, she had an alcohol concen-
tration of at least sixteen one-hundredths
(16) grams in two hundred ten liters of
breath; and (8) her alcohol concentration
resulted from alcohol consumed before or
while she drove the vehicle. See § 66-8-
102(D)(1); UJI 14-4506 NMRA. Defendant.
claims that she was entitled to a directed
verdict because, other than her admission to
driving, there was no other evidence that she
drove or operated a motor vehicle.

Hl {15} Defendant’s contention that her
admission was untrustworthy is a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence based on
the corpus delicti or trustworthiness rule.
Cf. United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 860
(6th Cir.2010) (recognizing that the trustwor-
thiness/corroboration requirement goes to
sufficiency, not admissibility). The corpus
delicti rule provides that commission of a
erime cannot be proved solely through the
admission of an extrajudicial confession. See
State v. Paris, 76 N.M. 291, 294, 414 P.2d
512, 514 (1966) (recognizing that “unless the
corpus delicti of the offense charged has
been otherwise established, a conviction can-
not be sustained solely on [the] extrajudicial
confessions or admissions of the accused”).
In New Mexico, the traditional corpus delicti
rule has been abandoned, and courts apply a
modified version of the trustworthiness rule
adopted in Paris and recently applied and
interpreted in State v. Weisser, 2007-
NMCA-015, 117, 141 N.M. 93, 150 P.8d 1043
(acknowledging that New Mexico has
adopted the modified trustworthiness doc-
trine espoused in State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 87,
152 A2d 50, 61 (1959)). Defendant claims
that pursuant to the modified trustworthi-
ness rule, there was insufficient proof to
corroborate the trustworthiness of her ad-
mission that she was driving the vehicle.
The State contends that the modified trust-
worthiness rule does not apply to Defen-
dant’s admission to driving because her iden-

tity as the driver is not part of the corpus
delicti of the offense of DWI.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{16} The pertinent facts are undisputed.
Therefore, we apply a de novo standard of
review to determine as a matter of law
whether the uncontested facts were sufficient
to establish the corpus delicti of aggravated
DWI pursuant to the modified trustworthi-
ness doctrine adopted and applied in New
Mexico. See Weisser, 2007-NMCA-O015, 117,
141 N.M. 98, 150 P.3d 1043.

CORPUS DELICTI OF DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED

Hs {17} The corpus delicti of an of-
fense requires proof that a crime was
committed, through direct or circumstantial
evidence showing that (1) a loss or harm
occurred, and (2) someone’s criminal agen-
ey caused the loss or harm. See id. 910.
In State v. Sosa, 2000-NMSC-036, 120,
129 N.M. 767, 14 P.3d 32, our Supreme
Court succinctly stated that “the corpus
delicti of an offense is established by proof
that the crime was committed, and the
identity of the perpetrator is not material.”
That statement was recently reaffirmed by
our Supreme Court in State v. Wilson,
2011-NMSC-001, 116, 149 N.M. 278, 248
P.3d 315.

{18} Pursuant to our Supreme Court’s
holdings in Sosa and Wilson, and in light of
Defendant’s concession that there was inde-
pendent evidence that the crime of DWI was
committed by someone, her admission to
driving is unnecessary for purposes of estab-
lishing the corpus delicti of DWI because the
“fdentity of the perpetrator is not material”
to that determination. Sosa, 2000-NMSC-
036, 120, 129 N.M. 767, 14 P.3d 32. We
cannot and will not revisit our Supreme
Court’s holdings on this issue. See State v.
Duarte, 2004-NMCA-117, 111, 136 N.M.
404, 98 P.3d 1054 (recognizing that this
Court’s ability to disregard Supreme Court
precedent is limited to cases in which “the
precise issue has not been already decided by
our Supreme Court”).

{19} In response to the State’s contention
that Defendant’s admission is not necessary
to establish the corpus delicti, Defendant ar-

gues that this case is not about the corpus
delicti rule, but instead is about the due
process requirement of corroboration of an
untrustworthy confession. She contends
“there is nothing in the case law indicating
that the New Mexico courts intended to limit
application of the trustworthiness doctrine
... to cases where the corpus delicti is at
issue.” She then argues that the modified
trustworthiness doctrine should apply to any
use of an extrajudicial confession, not just
with regard to establishing the corpus delicti.
We disagree.

{20} The opinion in Sosa was issued long
after the modified trustworthiness doctrine
was adopted by our Supreme Court, and the
opinion is consistent with that doctrine. See
Weisser, 2007-NMCA-015, 123-24, 141
N.M. 98, 150 P.3d 1043 (recognizing that the
“Court in Sosa did not cite to Paris in its
discussion of the corpus delicti of a homicide”
but observing that the result in Sosa is con-
sistent with that rule). As previously dis-
cussed, the Court in Sosa held that because
there was independent evidence establishing
that the crime of homicide occurred, it did
not need to consider the trustworthiness of
the defendant’s confession because his identi-
ty as the perpetrator was “nonessential to
the [s]tate’s evidence concerning corpus [de-
licti].” Sosa, 2000-NMSC-036, 116, 129
N.M. 767, 14 P.8d 82. By rejecting the
defendant’s contention that his confession
should not be used to establish his identity as
the perpetrator of the crime, our Supreme
Court clearly suggested that application of
the modified trustworthiness doctrine-is lim-
ited to cases in which the corpus delicti is at
issue, See td. 91 15-20.

{21} All remaining New Mexico cases ap-
plying the modified trustworthiness doctrine
address the issue of whether the corpus de-
licti was established by addressing whether
there was evidence, apart from the defen-
dant’s confession, that the crime actually oc-
curred. See, ¢.g., Doe v. State, 94 N.M. 548,
549, 613 P.2d 418, 419 (1980) (holding that
the child’s admission to shoplifting was insuf-
ficient because, outside of that admission,
there was no evidence to establish that the
erime of shoplifting had occurred). No case
considers whether the admission or confes-

533

sion may be used to establish the identity of
the perpetrator or whether an admission or
confession must be corroborated for that pur-
pose.

{22} For example, in Weisser, this Court
ultimately determined that the corpus delicti
of the crime of criminal sexual contact of a
minor (CSCM) was not established because
the state failed to present any independent
evidence tending to establish the trustworthi-
ness of the defendant's admission that he
committed the crime. See Weisser, 2007—
NMCA-015, 19 26-36, 141 N.M. 98, 150 P.38d
1043 (holding that the child’s ambiguous be-
havioral symptoms were insufficient to estab-
lish the requisite “independent proof of the
loss or harm” because they did not establish
that the abuse had occurred or that the child
had been harmed, and further holding there
was no evidence corroborating the defen-
dant’s admission that he committed the
crime). Likewise, in Wilson, the Court en-
gaged in a review of the evidence introduced
in addition to the defendant’s confession to
show that the crime of homicide had taken
place. Wélson, 2011-NMSC-001, 1119-28,
149 N.M. 278, 248 P.3d 315 (concluding that
the corpus delicti of homicide was well sup-
ported because the defendant’s confession
was sufficiently trustworthy, and there was
independent evidence showing the child’s
death was caused by a criminal act). Nei-
ther Wilson nor Weisser considers, much less
addresses, whether the trustworthiness doc-
trine applies to require corroboration of a
defendant’s admission for any purpose other
than establishing the corpus delicti of the
crime.

{23} Out-of-state cases cited by Defendant
also apply the trustworthiness doctrine in
considering whether there was independent
evidence that a crime was committed. How-
ever, in those cases, the defendant’s identity
is essential to establishing the corpus delicti
because, due to the nature of the crime
charged, in the absence of evidence pertain-
ing to identity, there would be no crime at
all. See, eg. Brown, 617 F.8d at 862-63
(observing that it is only when a defendant
confesses to a crime that cannot be commit-
ted without identifying the accused, such as
felon-in-possession of a firearm, that “the

534

corroborative evidence must implicate the ac-
eused,” but even then, “the independent cor-
roborating evidence need only show that the
crime occurred” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).

{24} In Smith v. United States, 348 U.S.
147, 153-54, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192
(1954), the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the corpus delicti or
“corroboration rule” applied to all crimes in-
cluding the crime of tax evasion. The Court
recognized that the crime of tax evasion has
no “tangible injury which can be isolated as a
corpus delicti.” Id. at 154, 75 S.Ct. 194. As
it could not “be shown that the crime has
been committed without identifying the ac-
cused,” the corroborative evidence had to
“implicate the accused in order to show that
a erime has been committed.” Jd. Likewise,
in Brown, the defendant’s conviction for be-
ing a felon-in-possession of a firearm was
based in part on his admission that he had
stolen a firearm from the victim. Brown,
617 F.3d at 859. On appeal, the court held
that the defendant’s confessions were suffi-
ciently corroborated by evidence that the
victim had filed a police report claiming that
the gun and other items were stolen. Id. at
863. There did not need to be any indepen-
dent evidence establishing that the defendant
was the person who actually stole the hand-
gun. Id.

{25} In this case, unlike Wilson, Weisser,
Smith, and Brown, the crime of DWI could
be, and was, established without identifying
the driver. Therefore, the modified trust-
worthiness doctrine is not applicable because
the corpus delicti of the crime of DWI was
established by independent evidence showing
that someone drove while intoxicated. See
People v. Martinez, 156 Cal-App.4th 851, 67
Cal.Rptr.3d 670, 673-74 (Ct.App.2007) (ob-
serving that “[tJhe corpus delicti of the of-
fense of driving under the influence consists
of proof that the automobile was being driven
by some person who was under the influence
of alcohol,” and distinguishing cases in which
the corpus delicti could not be established
because there was no evidence eliminating
other sober persons as possible drivers).

SUFFICIENT CORROBORATION OF
TRUSTWORTHINESS

I {26} Even if we were to agree with
Defendant that the modified trustworthiness
doctrine applied and agreed with the metro-
politan and district courts that there needed
to be some evidence corroborating Defen-
dant’s admission that she was driving, we
would nonetheless affirm. We would affirm
because, contrary to Defendant’s contentions,
there was sufficient corroborating evidence
to establish the trustworthiness of her state-
ment that she was driving and independent
proof to confirm that she committed the
crime of aggravated DWI. See Weisser,
2007-NMCA-015, 117, 141 N.M. 98, 150 P.8d
1048 (holding that under the modified trust-
worthiness doctrine, the state must produce
“independent corroborative proof tending to
establish that when the defendant confessed
he was telling the truth, plus independent
proof of the loss or injury” (emphasis, inter-
nal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

WE {27} In determining the trustworthi-
ness of Defendant’s extrajudicial statement,
we look not at the circumstances surrounding
the statement, but instead at the actual con-
tent of the statement and evidence that cor-
roborates the information contained in the
statement. See id. 1130-31. Defendant ac-
knowledges that evidence was introduced
showing that she and Atcitty were intoxicat-
ed and coming from a bar, Defendant was
present in the car, someone was fixing the
tire that she said had a blow out, she and
Atcitty were the only people in the vicinity of
the car, and Atcitty, the only other person
present, strongly denied driving. There was
also evidence that the vehicle was disabled in
a way that indicated impaired driving. Fur-
thermore, although Harvey testified he saw
Defendant on the passenger side when he
arrived, the video tape showed Defendant
‘was just getting into the car on the passen-
ger side as Harvey arrived. There was also
independent evidence that Defendant had a
breath alcohol level of over .16.

{28} This evidence constitutes “evidence
establishing the trustworthiness of [Defen-
dant’s] confession” id. 117, because it corrob-
orates Defendant’s admission that she was
driving to the extent required. Cf United

535

States v. Lee, 315 F.Supp.2d 1038, 1045
(D.Ariz.2003) (acknowledging that the evi-
dence used to show that the crime occurred
can also be used to establish the trustworthi-
ness of the defendant’s confession); Wilson,
2011-NMSC-001, 126, 149 N.M. 278, 248
P.8d 315 (considering evidence that corrobo-
rated the facts contained in the defendant's
confession, including but not limited to, the
testimony of the forensic pathologist who
supervised the autopsy that the child’s cause
of death “was consistent with a blockage to
his mouth and nose,” which corroborated the
defendant’s admission that he had suffocated
the child).

HI {29} We note that the metropolitan
court found that Defendant’s admission was
corroborated in part by the fact that she
made the admission several times. We agree
with Defendant and the district court that
the metropolitan court erred in so finding.
See id. 130 (stating that multiple extrajudi-
cial statements are not sufficient to establish
the trustworthiness of the statements).
However, as recognized by the metropolitan
court and the district court, there was signifi-
cant other corroborating evidence.

{30} Defendant also suggests that her ad-
mission was not trustworthy because she was
intoxicated at the time she made the state-
ment, she was under pressure, and she later
provided a motive for lying. As previously
stated, we do not consider such circum-
stances that surround the making of Defen-
dant’s extrajudicial statement. See Weisser,
2007-NMCA-015, 1130-31, 141 N.M. 98, 150
P.8d 1048 (refusing to consider the fact that
the defendant had Huntington’s disease and
the impact the defendant’s disease had on his
truthfulness).

{31} We acknowledge that other evidence
indicated Defendant was not the driver.
However, the mere fact that there was testi-
mony or evidence calling the trustworthiness
of Defendant’s admission into question does
not negate that there was also corroborating
evidence. Furthermore, Defendant has
failed to apprise us of any cases in which the
existence of some evidence calling the truth-
fulness of the defendant's admission into
question is enough to ban the use of the
defendant’s admission despite the fact that

other evidence corroborated the admission or

tended to establish its trustworthiness. In-
stead, the existence of contradictory evidence
merely raises a credibility issue to be re-
solved by the factfinder. See State v. Red-
dish, 181 N.J. 558, 859 A.2d 1178, 1212 (2004)
(applying the modified trustworthiness doc-
trine and holding that once the court deter-
mines as a matter of law that the state’s
evidence is sufficient to generate a belief in
the trustworthiness of the extrajudicial state-
ment, any discrepancies or missing details do
not undercut the truthfulness of the defen-
dant’s confession, but instead raise factual
issues regarding the reliability of the confes-
sion to be resolved by the factfinder).
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

I {32} Defendant also contends that
there was insufficient evidence to establish
that she operated the vehicle as required for
a DWI conviction. In analyzing a sufficiency
challenge on appeal, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict, re-
solving all conflicts and indulging all infer-
ences in favor of the verdict. State v. Apo-
daca, 118 N.M. 762, 765-66, 887 P.2d 756,
759-60 (1994). “We do not weigh the evi-
dence or substitute our judgment for that of
the factfinder.” State v. Akers, 2010-
NMCA-103, 132, 149 N.M. 53, 243 P.8d 757.
Moreover, this Court cannot consider the
merit of evidence that may have supported a
different result. Id.

{33} Defendant does not dispute that she
was intoxicated at the time of the accident or
that someone drove the vehicle in an intoxi-
eated state. As previously discussed, Defen-
dant admitted that she was driving, that
there was evidence placing her at the scene
of the accident, that she and Atcitty were the
only persons at the scene, that Atcitty vigor-
ously denied driving, and that the videotape
showed her approaching the passenger side.
From this evidence, the metropolitan court
could reasonably conclude that Defendant
was driving the vehicle in an intoxicated
state. See State v. Mailman, 2010-NMSC-
036, 11 24-28, 148 N.M. 702, 242 P.8d 269
(recognizing that the factfinder may infer
that the accused drove while intoxicated
based on circumstantial evidence that in-
cludes “the accused’s own admissions, the

536

location of the vehicle next to the highway, or
any other similar evidence that tends to
prove that the accused drove while intoxicat-
ed”); of State v. Greyeyes, 105 N.M. 549,
552, 734 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct.App.1987) (uphold-
ing a conviction for DWI based on evidence
that the defendant smelled of alcohol, failed
field sobriety tests, and admitted to drinking
and driving into a rail),

{34} Although there was other evidence
and testimony indicating that Defendant was
not the driver, the factfinder is entitled to
weigh these inconsistencies against Defen-
dant’s admission and the evidence suggesting
she was driving. See State v. Salas, 1999-
NMCA-099, 118, 127 N.M. 686, 986 P.2d 482
(recognizing that it is for the district court
acting in its role as factfinder to resolve any
conflict in the testimony of the witnesses and
to determine where the weight and credibili-
ty lay). We will not disturb the factfinder’s
determinations on these matters. See Akers,
2010-NMCA-103, 1 32, 149 N.M. 53, 243 P.38d
757 (“We do not weigh the evidence or sub-
stitute our judgment for that of the factfin-
der.”); of State v. Sarracino, 1998-NMSC-
022, 124, 125 N.M. 511, 964 P.2d 72 (observ-
ing that “although contrary evidence is pre-
sented which may have supported a different
verdict, the appellate court will not weigh the
evidence or foreclose a finding of substantial
evidence” (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).

CONCLUSION

{35} Based upon the foregoing, we affirm
Defendant’s conviction for aggravated DWI.

{36} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D.
BUSTAMANTE and CYNTHIA A. FRY,

Judges.

2011-NMCA-095
263 P.3d 313
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Randy SORRELHORSE, Defendant-

Appellant.

No. 29,894.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

July 5, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, Aug. 29,
2011, No. 33,142.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret
E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Joel
Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

538

McGarry Law Office, Kathleen McGarry,
Glorieta, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} Our opinion filed March 22, 2011, is
hereby withdrawn, and this opinion is filed in
its stead. We deny the State’s motion for
rehearing.

{2} Defendant Randy Sorrelhorse appeals
his convictions for breaking and entering and
criminal damage to property. Defendant ar-
gues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for breaking and en-
tering, and (2) his conviction for criminal
damage to property violates his right to be
free from double jeopardy. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm Defendant’s conviction
for breaking and entering, and we vacate his
conviction for criminal damage to property.
BACKGROUND

{3} At trial, Jimmy Arrellano testified that
he and his friend Christine Southworth were
at his apartment when Defendant knocked on
the door and asked for cigarettes. Arrellano
told Defendant to leave and closed the door.
Defendant returned several minutes later,
and when Arrellano opened the door, Defen-
dant told Arrellano that he would cut him
with a knife. Arrellano then tried to close
the door, and Defendant began kicking and
banging on it, while Arrellano and South-
worth both tried to hold the door closed.

{4} Arrellano testified that during this
struggle, Defendant was able to get into his
apartment a little way. He testified that
Defendant was able to push him back into
the apartment about a foot. Southworth tes-
tified that, while Arrellano was trying to
keep Defendant out, she called 911, and De-
fendant began to walk away. The 911 opera-
tor asked which direction Defendant was
headed, and when Arrellano opened the door
to see, Defendant returned and began kick-
ing the door again. Southworth also testified
that during Defendant’s struggle with Arrel-
Jano over the door, Defendant was able to get
his foot into the apartment and that he was
stepping into the apartment. Based on these
events, Defendant was convicted of breaking
and entering, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sec-

tion 80-14-8(A) (1981), and criminal damage
to property, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section
80-15-1 (1963). Defendant timely appeals.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

WM {5} Defendant first argues that his
conviction for breaking and entering was not
supported by sufficient evidence. “In re-
viewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we
must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all
reasonable inferences and resolving all con-
flicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.”
State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009,
126, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176. “The
reviewing court does not weigh the evidence
or substitute its judgment for that of the fact
finder as long as there is sufficient evidence
to support the verdict.” State v. Mora,
1997-NMSC-060, 127, 124 N.M. 346, 950
P.2d 789, abrogated on other grounds as
recognized by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-
020, 148 N.M. 381, 237 P.3d 683.

{6} In order to convict Defendant of
breaking and entering, the State was re-
quired to present evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt that (1) Defendant entered a
dwelling house without permission, and (2)
entry was obtained by breaking a door. See
USI 14-1410 NMRA; see also § 30-14-8(A).
Defendant argues that the evidence was in-
sufficient to establish that he entered the
apartment. Defendant argues that, since Ar-
rellano and Southworth testified that Arrella-
no was able to prevent Defendant from com-
ing into the apartment, the essential element
of entry cannot be established.

{7} Our case law interpreting the term
“entry” in the criminal code requires only the
slightest penetration of an interior space.
See State v. Reynolds, 111 N.M. 263, 270, 804
P.2d 1082, 1089 (Ct.App.1990) (noting that
any penetration of the interior space, howev-
er slight, is sufficient to constitute “entry”
within the meaning of the burglary statute);
State v. Tiwier, 89 N.M. 297, 298-99, 551 P.2d
987, 988-89 (Ct.App.1976) (holding that evi-
dence that an unidentified instrument pen-
etrated one-half inch inside a building is
enough to effectuate an entry under the bur-
glary statute); see also State v. Muqqddin,
2010-NMCA-069, 1111-18, 148 N.M. 845,

242 P.38d 412 (holding that the defendant’s
act of penetrating the gas tank of a van with
a nail constituted an entry for purposes of
the burglary statute).

{8} In this case, there was evidence that
Defendant’s foot entered the apartment.
Additionally, the jury could reasonably infer
that Defendant entered the apartment based
on the testimony that he pushed the people
who were inside the apartment back further
into the apartment. We also reject Defen-
dant’s assertion that Arrellano’s testimony
that he was able to stop Defendant from
coming into the apartment necessarily means
that no part of Defendant’s body ever pen-
etrated the interior space of the apartment.
Defendant’s conviction for breaking and en-
tering was supported by sufficient evidence.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY

HI {9} We now address Defendant's ar-
gument that he was improperly convicted for
both breaking and entering and criminal
damage to property in violation of his right
to be free from double jeopardy. Defendant
raises a “double-description” double jeopardy
claim. See State v. Dombos, 2008-NMCA-
035, 110, 143 N.M. 668, 180 P.3d 675 (stating
that double-description cases are those in
which a single act results in multiple charges
under different criminal statutes). We re-
view double jeopardy claims de novo. See
State v. Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, 16, 140
N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289.

HH s({10} In addressing double-descrip-
tion claims, we employ the two-part test set
forth by our Supreme Court in Swafford v.
State, 112 N.M. 8, 18-15, 810 P.2d 1223,
1233-35 (1991). See State v. Vallejos, 2000-
NMCA-075, 16, 129 N.M. 424, 9 P.3d 668.
“First, we examine whether the conduct was
unitary, meaning whether the same criminal
conduct is the basis for both charges.” Ber-
nal, 2006-NMSC-050, 19, 140 N.M. 644, 146
P.8d 289. In determining whether conduct
was unitary, we “consider whether the defen-
dant’s acts are separated by sufficient indicia
of distinctness.” State v. Lopez, 2008-
NMCA-111, 19, 144 N.M. 705, 191 P.3d 563
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). “(W]e consider such factors as whether
the acts were close in time and space, their
similarity, the sequence in which they oc-

539

curred, whether other events intervened, and
a defendant's goals for and mental state dur-
ing each act.” State v. Ford, 2007-NMCA-
052, 112, 141 N.M. 512, 157 P.38d 77.

HM {11} Applying these factors to the
facts of this case, we conclude that Defen-
dant’s conduct was unitary. There was little
separation in time and no separation in space
between Defendant’s initial act of trying to
force open the door and his returning mo-
ments later to beat on the door again. Nor
was there any significant change in the na-
ture or objective of Defendant’s conduct. The
conduct underlying both convictions was the
same, and Defendant’s intent was to open the
door to the apartment by physical force. See
State v. Demongey, 2008-NMCA-066, 1115,
144 N.M. 333, 187 P.38d 679 (holding that
firing three shots separated by minutes and
distance traveled was unitary conduct, where
the shots were fired during one high-speed
chase in an attempt to escape from a pursu-
ing officer); State v. Mares, 112 N.M. 193,
200, 812 P.2d 1841, 1848 (Ct.App.1991) (hold-
ing that the defendant could be found guilty
of only one count of aggravated battery when
he was charged with four counts involving
pulling hair, beating, choking, and slapping
the victim at various different locations “over
one violent rampage with little time between
offensive contacts”).

{12} The State argues that Defendant’s act
of walking away from the apartment and
Arrellano’s sticking his head out of the apart-
ment door constituted intervening events
that rendered Defendant’s conduct non-uni-
tary. However, we disagree that Defen-
dant’s act of momentarily walking away from
the apartment door before returning to con-
tinue to bang on it is sufficient to render the
conduct non-unitary. Cf State v. Cooper,
1997-NMSC-058, 161, 124 N.M. 277, 949
P.2d 660 (finding non-unitary conduct when a
struggle “was an intervening event between
the initial battery and the acts that caused
the death”).

I {13} “If the defendant’s conduct is
unitary, we next determine whether the Leg-
islature intended to create separately punish-
able offenses for the same conduct.” De-
mongey, 2008-NMCA-066, 118, 144 N.M.

540

338, 187 P.8d 679. Absent a clear expression
of legislative intent, we apply the test stated
in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
See State v. Armendariz, 2006-NMSC-036,
121, 140 N.M. 182, 141 P.3d 526. Neither
party argues that there is any indication of
legislative intent to impose multiple punish-
ments, nor do we find any. We therefore
apply the Blockburger test.

HM {14} “In applying the Blockburger
test, this Court compares the elements of
each crime with the elements of the other to
determine whether the Legislature intended
separate punishments under each statute.”
State v. Lee, 2009-NMCA-075, 19, 146 N.M.
605, 218 P.38d 509, cert. denied, 2009~
NMCERT-006, 146 N.M. 783, 215 P.3d 42.
“(If we conclude that each statute requires
proof of an element that the other does not,
then a presumption arises that our [Llegisla-
ture intended for the conduct to result in
separately punishable offenses.” State v.
Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, 111, 143 N.M.
792, 182 P.8d 775. This presumption can be
overcome by other indicia of legislative in-
tent. See id.

WM {15} Breaking and entering can be
committed a number of ways. Section 30-
14-8(A) provides, in relevant part, that
“(blreaking and entering consists of the un-
authorized entry of any ... dwelling ...,
where entry is obtained by fraud or decep-
tion, or by the breaking or dismantling of
any part of the ... dwelling ..., or by the
breaking or dismantling of any device used to
secure the ... dwelling[.]” Through Section
80-14-8(A), the Legislature has provided al-
ternative methods of committing the crime of
breaking and entering a dwelling: by unlaw-
fully entering a dwelling by fraud and decep-
tion or by unlawfully entering a dwelling by
breaking or dismantling any part of the
dwelling or any device that secures the
dwelling.

HE {16} When conducting a Blockbur-
ger analysis of a crime that may be charged
in alternative ways, we look to the “legal
theory” of the crime charged, State v. Fran-
co, 2005-NMSC-018, 114, 187 N.M. 447, 112
P.38d 1104. We do so by focusing on “the

elements of the statute as charged to the
jury” and disregarding “the inapplicable stat-
utory elements.” Lee, 2009-NMCA-075,
111, 146 N.M. 605, 213 P.3d 509 (alteration,
internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). When it is clear upon which statutory
alternative the defendant was convicted, we
apply the Blockburger test by comparing the
elements of the crime as charged with the
elements of the other crime at issue. See
Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, 115, 137 N.M.
447, 112 P.8d 1104 (observing that a strict
application of the Blockburger test may not
be used if there are “multiple alternatives of
a compound statute and it is unclear which
alternative the jury relied on”). In compar-
ing the elements under the Blockburger test,
we do not examine the facts in detail. Fran-
co, 2005-NMSC-013, 114, 187 N.M. 447, 112
P.3d 1104,

{17} The jury was instructed that to con-
viet Defendant of breaking and entering, it
had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) Defendant entered a dwelling house with-
out permission, and (2) entry was obtained
by the breaking of a door. The elements of
criminal damage to property are “intentional-
ly damaging any real or personal property of
another without the consent of the owner: of
the property.” Section 30-15-1; see also
UJI 14-1501 NMRA (requiring proof that
the defendant intentionally damaged the
property of another and that the defendant
did not have the owner's permission to dam-
age the property).

{18} When we compare the two crimes, we
conclude that breaking and entering requires
proof of an entry, which is not an element of
criminal damage to property, and criminal
damage to property does not require proof of
an element that is not contained in breaking
and entering. The State argues otherwise,
contending that criminal damage to property
contains the essential element of intent to
damage property, which it contends is not an
element of breaking and entering. The State
bases its argument on the common law
meaning of the term “breaking,” which it
asserts this Court must conclude the Legisla-
ture intended when it used the term in Sec-
tion 30-14-8(A). To be sure, the common
Jaw is the backdrop for the Legislature’s

enactments, and courts therefore can rely on
the common law to construe unclear or am-
biguous statutes. Sims v. Sims, 1996-
NMSC-078, 1124, 122 N.M. 618, 980 P.2d 153.
The State asserts, and we agree, that courts
should construe a statute based on its com-
mon law meaning unless the Legislature in-
tended otherwise. Id. 123. We address the
State’s argument as raising an issue of statu-
tory construction concerning legislative in-
tent, which we consider de novo. Ortiz v.
Overland Express, 2010-NMSC-021, 418,
148 N.M. 405, 237 P.8d 707. In our analysis,
“we seek to give effect to legislative intent by
looking to the language used and considering
the statute’s history and background.” Id.
119 (alteration, internal quotation marks,
and citation omitted).

{19} At common law, the focus of the
crime of burglary was to protect the security
of the home and those living within it. Min-
turn T. Wright III, Note, Statutory Burgla-
ry—The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof,
100 U. Pa. L.Rev. 411, 427 (1951). Burglary
consisted of breaking and entering a dwelling
of another in the night time with the intent
to commit a felony. Id. at 411. Although the
breaking element required some aspect of
force in order to distinguish it from the
element of entering, actions such as opening
a closed window or crawling down a chimney
were considered breaking, and damage to
property was not necessary. Id. at 412. As
the crime of common law burglary evolved,
an actual breaking was not required for com-
mon law burglary; a constructive breaking
was sufficient. Id; State v. Ortiz, 92 N.M.
166, 168, 584 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Ct.App.1978).
In construing the New Mexico burglary stat-
ute, this Court held that entry by fraud,
deceit, or pretense was sufficient to consti-
tute the “unauthorized entry” requirement,
which had been adopted by the New Mexico
Legislature instead of the common law re-
quirement of “breaking.” See id. at 168, 584
P.2d at 1808 (observing that “New Mexico no
longer defines burglary in terms of a ‘break-
ing’”).

{20} To adopt the State’s position, we
must construe Section 80-14-8(A) to adopt
the meaning of the term “breaking” as used
in common law burglary. As argued by the

_ breaking or dismantling of any p:

541

State, the term would then embrace the com-
mon law concepts of the “breaking of the
planes” or “breaking the close.” See United
States v. Hichman, 756 F.Supp. 143, 148
(S.D.N.Y.1991); People v. Frey, 126 I.
App.8d 484, 81 IlL.Dee. 602, 467 N.E.2d 302,
304 (1984). However, this case does not
involve a burglary statute, but rather in-
volves the crime of breaking and entering.
Section 30-14-8(A) specifically prohibits “the
” of a
dwelling. It does not mention the concepts
of common law burglary that the State con-
tends are controlling. Nor are we concerned
with a constructive breaking under the
charges against Defendant. Rather, Section
30-14-8(A), by addressing the “breaking” of
“any part” or “any device used to secure,”
contemplates a physical breaking contrary to
common law burglary. The Legislature de-
parted from the common law burglary con-
cepts in enacting Section 30-14-8(A).

{21} Thus, looking at the elements of
breaking and entering and criminal damage
to property, the offense of criminal damage
to property does not require proof of a sepa-
rate element, and it was subsumed within
breaking and entering. See Lee, 2009-
NMCA-075, 114, 146 N.M. 605, 213 P.3d 509
(stating that when one offense is subsumed
within another, the inquiry is over and the
statutes are the same for double jeopardy
purposes). As a result, Defendant’s right to
be free from double jeopardy was violated by
his convictions for breaking and entering and
criminal damage to property.
CONCLUSION

{22} We affirm Defendant’s conviction for
breaking and entering and vacate his convic-
tion for criminal damage to property. See
Lee, 2009-NMCA-075, 116, 146 N.M. 605,
213 P.3d 509 (stating that when double jeop-
ardy exists, the offense carrying the lesser
punishment is to be vacated).

{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge and LINDA M. VANZI, Judge.

542 Le
2011-NMCA-092
263 P.3d 319

EKER BROTHERS, INC., Plaintiff-
Counterdefendant/Appellant,

ve

John G. REHDERS, General Contrac-
tor, Inc., Defendant-Counter-
claimant/Appellee.

No. 29,839.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Aug. 2, 2011.

Sommer, Udall, Sutin, Hardwick, & Hyatt,
PA, Kurt A. Sommer, Candice Lee, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellant.

543

i
 eeeenar waren se
McClaugherty & Silver, P.C., Tamara R.

Safarik, Joe L. McClaugherty, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} Eker Brothers, Inc. (Subcontractor)
sued John G. Rehders, General Contractor,
Inc. (General) seeking payment for work
Subcontractor had performed. The district
court found that Subcontractor was owed
$74,964.05 and that General had incurred
$42,448.20 in damages, but that Subcontrac-
tor’s “claims [were] barred by its willful,
material[,] and anticipatory breach of the
parties’ contract.” The court awarded Gen-
eral $42,448.29. We conclude that the dis-
trict court erred by not offsetting General’s
damages against the benefit General received
from Subcontractor’s unpaid work, and re-
verse.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Subcontractor submitted a bid to Gen-
eral to perform site and concrete work neces-
sary to construct an elementary school for
the Archdiocese of Santa Fe. After Subcon-
tractor agreed to reduce the site work bid by
$100,000, General verbally accepted the bid
and work began on the project. General
paid Subcontractor’s first invoice, covering
work from July 1 to July 31, in full. Subcon-
tractor continued work through August, and
on September 2, Subcontractor tendered an
invoice for $126,358.95 covering work per-
formed between August 1 and August 31.

{3} On September 8, Subcontractor ceased
all work on the project. Four days later, on
September 12, General offered to pay
$58,947.95 for the work Subcontractor had
performed. Subcontractor did not accept
this payment. On September 14, Subcon-
tractor submitted an invoice for the work it
had performed from August 1 to September
7 in the amount of $122,099.45. General did
not pay this invoice and this lawsuit followed.

{4} The district court concluded that the
value of the work performed by Subcontrac-
tor between August 1 and September 7 and

1. Tt would appear that the additional $0.09 is a

invoiced on September 14 was $74,964.05.
To arrive at this number, the court began
with the $122,099.45 from Subcontractor’s
September 14 invoice. The court then sub-
tracted (1) $28,900 for grading work that had
not actually been performed; (2) $7656 for
curbs that were of poor quality; (8) $3,036.90
to cover General’s cost to remove the defec-
tive curbs; (4) $5,512.50 for General’s cost to
re-stake an area that had been impacted by
Subcontractor’s departure; and (5) $2030 to
cover half of the cost of fixing footings that
had been damaged due to rain.

{5} The district court next turned to Gen-
eral’s damages. It found that General had
“incurred [an extra] $50,194.45 in additional
expenses due to [Subcontractor’s] failure to
complete the concrete work.” It also found
that General had mitigated its damages by
completing the site work for $7,746.25 less
than it would have paid Subcontractor. Sub-
tracting the savings from the additional
costs, the district court concluded that Gen-
eral’s damages were $42,448.20. The district
court did not offset the amount owed to
Subcontractor against the damages, but in-
stead entered judgment against Subcontrac-
tor for the full amount of the damages.

Il. DISCUSSION

{6} Subcontractor contends that the dis-
trict court's decision that his claims were
“barred by its willful, material[,] and antici-
patory breach” was error as a matter of
law, and that “[dlespite its breach, [it] was
entitled to restitution for the value of the
benefits its performance conferred.” Sub-
contractor argues that New Mexico follows
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374
(1981), which allows a breaching party to
obtain restitution for benefits conferred in
excess of damages. As we understand it,
General’s response is that the $74,964.05 of
unpaid work performed by Subcontractor
did not constitute a benefit to General and
therefore should not be offset against Gen-
eral’s damages. General also argues that
its damages exceeded any benefit. Subcon-
tractor has also made a substantial evidence
argument, which we do not address because

typographical error.

544

we agree with Subcontractor’s legal argu-
ment.

A. The Nature of Restitution

{7} Both parties have framed the is-
sue of whether restitution must be awarded
here as if it were equitable in nature, deriv-
ing from unjust enrichment. The district
court denied Subcontractor’s request for eq-
uitable relief in the form of restitution for
unjust enrichment. That does not, however,
end our analysis. To the extent that the
requested restitution refers to an offset of
compensatory damages by the amount of any
benefit conferred, it is a legal issue which we
review de novo. See Primetime Hospitality,
Ine. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-
011, 110, 146 N.M. 1, 206 P.8d 112, As an
initial matter, we must determine whether
the damages question at issue here is legal or
equitable in order to select the appropriate
standard of review.

{8} Traditionally, restitution is thought of
as an equitable remedy. See, eg. Arena
Res. Inc. v. OBO, Inc, 2010-NMCA-061,
115, 148 N.M. 483, 238 P.8d 357. However,
in the context of offsetting compensatory
damages, at least one court has found that
restitution is a legal remedy. See Ducolon
Mech, Inc. v. Shinstine/Forness, Inc. 77
Wash.App. 707, 893 P.2d 1127, 1129 (1995).
A popular treatise notes that “[t]he remedy
of restitution, ... [cannot] properly be de-
seribed as either ‘legal’ or ‘equitable’ in any
narrowly restricted signification of those
terms.” 12 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 1103, at 10 (interim ed.2002).
Our Supreme Court has also noted the dual
nature of restitution. See C.R. Anthony Co.
v. Loretto Mail Partners, 112 N.M. 504, 512
n. 10, 817 P.2d 288, 246 n. 10 (1991). As
Corbin observes, modern restitution is a mix-
ture whose rules “are the rules of equity
wherever they differ from those of the com-
mon law.” See Corbin on Contracts, supra,
§ 1108, at 5 (emphasis added).

HMMM {9} Nevertheless, equity may still
intervene, as it apparently did here. See
Builders Contract Interiors, Inc. v. Hi-Lo
Indus., Inc., 2006-NMCA-053, 18, 139 N.M.
508, 134 P.8d 795. The district court ruled
that Subcontractor was barred from recover-

FT

ing, effectively working a forfeiture on Sub-
contractor for the value of its work from
August 1 to September 7. Our Supreme
Court has observed that “a forfeiture decla-
ration is essentially an equitable remedy.”
Cortez v. Cortez, 2009-NMSC-008, 125, 145
N.M. 642, 208 P.38d 857 (alteration omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The
question of whether, on a particular set of
facts, the district court is permitted to exer-
cise its equitable powers is a question of law,
while the issue of how the district court uses
its equitable powers to provide an appropri-
ate remedy is reviewed only for abuse of
discretion.” United Props. Lid. v. Walgreen
Props., Inc., 20083-NMCA-140, 7, 184 N.M.
725, 82 P.3d 535.

B. Our Case Law About Compensatory
Damages and Restitution

{10} We begin our discussion with the
question of damages. As we have noted, this
is a legal question, and will determine the
outcome unless equity intervenes. Subcon-
tractor contends that in Famiglietta v. Ivie-
Miller Enters, Inc, 1998-NMCA-155, 126
N.M. 69, 966 P.2d 777, we recognized Re-
statement Section 374 and that, while not
citing to it, we implicitly followed it in Tyner
v. DiPaolo, 76 N.M. 488, 484, 416 P.2d 150,
151 (1966). General cautions us that Tyner
“should not be misread” as having adopted
the Restatement’s rule. We begin by exam-
ining these two cases.

{11} In Famiglietta, two sellers sold a
tortilla chip distributorship to a buyer in
return for a series of installment payments.
1998-NMCA-1565, 111, 126 N.M. 69, 966 P.2d
7TT. As a condition of the contract, one of the
sellers agreed to remain employed by the
distributorship for five years. Id. 12. The
seller quit after eighteen months, and the
buyer stopped making installment payments.
Id. 112, 9. The sellers sued for the remaining
installment payments. Id. 19. The district
court, finding that the seller’s breach was not
material, awarded the payments to the sell-
ers. Id. 110. On appeal, this Court noted
that if the seller had “committed a material
breach of the contract which remained un-
cured, [the bluyer was not required to per-
form its remaining obligations under the con-

tract.” Id. 114. We applied a five-factor
test for materiality and concluded that the
district court erred in its determination that
the breach was not material. Id. 124. Ac-
cordingly, we held that the district court’s
ruling that the buyer was obligated to make
the remaining payments was wrong. Id.

{12} Although Famiglietta mentioned Sec-
tion 374 of the Restatement, it did not apply
or adopt it. The focus of Famiglietta was
the introduction of a framework for analyzing
whether a breach of contract is material.
See 1998-NMCA-155, 111 17-24, 126 N.M. 69,
966 P.2d 777. Famiglietta’s brief discussion
of the consequences of material breach sim-
ply confirmed that the non-breaching party is
relieved of its remaining obligations. See id.
9914, 24. Furthermore, Famiglietta is limit-
ed by its unique facts: buyer had attempted
to return the business to the seller, who
refused, forcing buyer to sell the business in
order to mitigate his damages. See id. 121.
Therefore, Famiglietta provides little in the
way of useful guidance to us in this case.

{13} In Tyner, a subcontractor wrongfully
breached his contract with a prime contrac-
tor when he stopped working on the contract.
76 N.M. at 484, 416 P.2d at 151. The sub-
contractor sued for the value of “work per-
formed and materials supplied,” and the
prime contractor counterclaimed for money
he had spent above what he would have
spent had the subcontractor completed the
contract. Jd. The subcontractor had not.
been paid for $4,055.77 of work, and it cost
the prime contractor $5,961.61 to complete
the unfinished job. Id. at 486, 416 P.2d at
152. The district court, concluding that the
prime contractor could offset his costs of
completion against the subcontractor’s un-
paid work, awarded nothing to the subcon-
tractor, and we affirmed. Id. at 486, 488, 416
P.2d at 153-54. However, because the prime
contractor had waived his claims against the
subcontractor, the court did not determine if
he was entitled to the amount of his damages
that exceeded the value of the subcontrac-
tor’s unpaid work. See id. at 486, 416 P.2d at
153.

{14} We agree with Subcontractor that the
reasoning in Tyner reflects the rule of Sec-
tion 374 even though the case made no men-

545

tion of it. There, the subcontractor was de-
nied restitution for the benefit he conferred
because the prime contractor’s damages ex-
ceeded the amount of that benefit. Con-
versely, the Restatement would have allowed
the prime contractor to recover the amount
of his damages that exceeded the benefit he
received from the subcontractor’s work. Un-
fortunately for purposes of analysis, the
prime contractor in Tyner waived his claims
against the subcontractor. As a result, Tyn-
er does not indicate whether the court would
have awarded the excess to the prime con-
tractor in the manner contemplated by Sec-
tion 374, While we agree with the methodol-
ogy set followed in the case, we do not
discern from it a rule that can be clearly
applied here. We thus move on to consider
the application of Section 374 directly.

C. Restitution Under Restatement Sec-
tion 374

Hl {15} Subcontractor contends that the
award should be determined according to
Section 374(1), which states:

(I]f a party justifiably refuses to perform

on the ground that his remaining duties of

performance have been discharged by the
other party’s breach, the party in breach is
entitled to restitution for any benefit that
he has conferred by way of part perform-
ance or reliance in excess of the loss that
he has caused by his own breach.
As discussed above, our cases have never
adopted this section. We therefore take this
opportunity to examine the arguments for
and against the Restatement’s position.

{16} At common law, a breaching party
could not obtain restitution for benefits con-
ferred. The common law rule reflected a
belief that breach was “morally unworthy
conduct,” and that a breaching party should
not benefit from his own wrong, see Lancel-
lotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa.Super. 1, 491 A.2d
117, 118-19 (1985) Gnternal quotation marks
omitted). In contrast to the common law
rule, the Restatement rule reflects a policy
against awarding a windfall to the non-
breaching party. See id. at 119-20. The
court in Lancellotti rejected the view that
breach is morally wrong, see id. at 122
(Rules of contract law are not rules of pun-

546

ishment; the contract breaker is not an out-
law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
and joined the many other jurisdictions that
had already adopted Restatement Section
874. See id. at 120-21.

{17} Under the Restatement, a breaching
party can recover for the value of benefits
conferred in excess of damages. The con-
tract price is frequently used as evidence of
the value of the benefit conferred. See gen-
erally Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 1124 &
n17, at 104. For example, in Roberts Con-
tracting Co. v. Valentine-Wooten Road Pub-
lic Facility Board, a subcontractor stopped
performing and the Board refused to pay for
some of the completed work. 2009 Ark.App.
487, 820 S.W.3d 1, 5. Arkansas had adopted
the Restatement view, see id., 320 S.W.3d at,
11, and the court used the contract price as a
basis to determine the value of the benefit
conferred. Jd., 320 S.W.3d at 11-12. Simi-
larly, in Ducolon, a breaching subcontractor
attempted to recover his costs for work per-
formed. See 893 P.2d at 1128-29. The court,
found no error in the district court’s meas-
urement of the benefit to the general con-
tractor as the “original contract price less
[the general contractor’s] cost to complete
and repair.” Id. at 1130. The court also
noted that although restitution was tradition-
ally an equitable remedy, “quantum meruit
and restitution under [Section] 874 are legal
remedies.” Id. at 1129; see also Corbin on
Contracts, supra, §§ 1102-1108.

{18} We believe that the Restatement ap-
proach is consistent with New Mexico law.
We have expressed an unwillingness to
award windfall damages in contract actions.
See Cent. Sec. & Alarm Co. v. Mehler, 1996-
NMCA-060, 118, 121 N.M. 840, 918 P.2d
1840; Bd. of Educ. of Alamogordo Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Jennings, 102 N.M. 762, 765,
701 P.2d 361, 364 (1985) (“[A] party whose
contract has been breached is not entitled to
be placed in a better position because of the
breach than he would have been in had the
contract been performed.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The same policy animates
Section 374, which provides for restitution of
benefits conferred pursuant to an explicit
contract in order to prevent a windfall from
being awarded. Accordingly, we now explic-

itly adopt the approach set forth in Section
374,

D. Application to This Case

Hl {19} Having determined that Section
874 governs the calculation of damages in
this case, we must now apply it. The district
court found that Subcontractor’s invoice for
work from August 1 to September 7 should
have been in the amount of $74,964.05. The
district court also found that General was
damaged in the amount of $42,448.29 by Sub-
contractor’s breach. Neither party argues
that these findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. The district court’s
finding regarding the amount owed for Sub-
contractor’s work is essentially a finding of
the contract price of the work performed.
As we have discussed, this is a valid method
for proving the amount of the benefit con-
ferred. The correct amount of damages is
easily concluded using the district court’s
findings. The amount of the benefit con-
ferred is $74,964.05. The amount of the
damages to General is $42,448.29. Applying
Section 874, since the benefit is greater than
the damages, Subcontractor is owed the dif-
ference of $32,515.76.

{20} We note that on appeal General takes
a completely different approach to the caleu-
lation of damages using the original total
contract price with Subcontractor as a touch-
stone. We reject General’s attempt to re-
frame the issue at this point. First, it would
be unfair to Subcontractor to affirm the dis-
trict court’s judgment on this basis because
there is no indication in the record that
General made this argument to the district
court. Cf Cordova v. World Fin. Corp.
2009-NMSC-021, 118, 146 N.M. 256, 208
P.8d 901 (“[OJur appellate courts will affirm a
district court’s decision if it is right for any
reasons, so long as the circumstances do not
make it unfair to the appellant to affirm.”).
Second, General does not argue that the
district court’s findings of fact concerning the
value of work performed and applicable off-
sets are not supported by substantial evi-
dence. It is thus improper to argue for a
different approach—an approach untethered
to the record or the district court’s findings.
See In re T.B., 1996-NMCA-085, 113, 121

N.M. 465, 913 P.2d 272 (“[W]e review the
case litigated below, not the case that is
fleshed out for the first time on appeal.”).
Finally, General’s approach is unworkable in
that (1) it allows restitution only when the
benefit is greater than the benefit plus its
damages—an impossible condition, (2) its cal-
culation includes as damages a sum it never
paid, and (8) it uses two different amounts
for the value of Subcontractor’s work.

E. Equity and Forfeiture

{21} There remains one way that the dis-
trict court’s ruling can be reconciled with
Section 374. The court concluded that Sub-
contractor’s “claims [were] barred by its will-
ful, material[,] and anticipatory breach of the
parties’ contract.” It is conceivable that it is
on this ground that the court based its deci-
sion not to offset General’s damages by the
amount of the benefit Subcontractor had con-
ferred.

Hs {22} The decision to bar Subcon-
tractor’s claim causes a forfeiture. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 722 (9th ed.2009) (de-
fining forfeiture as “[s]omething (esp. money
or property) lost or confiscated”). Forfei-
tures are equitable remedies. See Cortez,
2009-NMSC-008, 125, 145 N.M. 642, 203
P.3d 857. However, even at equity, they are
disfavored. See id. 118. As we observed in
United Properties,

A court of equity should not be the first,
but the last resort. It is bound by a
contract as the parties have made it and
has no authority to substitute for it anoth-
er and different agreement, and should
afford relief only where obviously there is
fraud, real hardship, oppression, mistake,
unconscionable results, and the other
grounds of righteousness, justice and mo-
rality.

547

2003-NMCA-140, 131, 184 N.M. 725, 82 P.3d
535 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where a contract exists, it will be construed
to avoid forfeiture absent clear and unequivo-
cal language; silence will not support forfei-
ture. See Cortez, 2009-NMSC-008, 1118,
25, 145 N.M. 642, 208 P.3d 857.

{23} None of the conditions prerequisite to
the exercise of equity are present here.
There has been no allegation or finding of
fraud, hardship, oppression, mistake, or un-
conscionability. The district court did not
make findings that would indicate Subcon-
tractor’s behavior in breaching was egregious
or otherwise blameworthy, and in fact reject-
ed proposed findings of fact to that effect.
Furthermore, the district court found that a
contract existed, but there is no finding that
there was clear and unequivocal language
requiring a forfeiture here. Absent any jus-
tification for the forfeiture, the district court
erred as a matter of law in resorting to
equity to deny Subcontractor restitution for
the benefit it had conferred on General.

I. CONCLUSION

{24} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
and remand for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY and
RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges.

548
2011-NMSC-038
263 P.3d 890

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff
Petitioner,

Y.
Debbie CRUZ, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 32,130.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept. 14, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Ann M.
Harvey, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, Assistant

Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Re-
spondent.

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} Defendant was convicted of issuing
payroll checks with insufficient funds to cov-
er them. Because the worthless checks were
issued a week after the last day of the pay
period, the Court of Appeals reversed the
convictions, relying on previous opinions of
our respective courts to conclude that the
Worthless Check Act (“the modern Act”),
NMSA 1978, §§ 30-36-1 to -10 (1963, as
amended through 1984), applies only to a
“contemporaneous exchange” and not to pre-
existing or antecedent debts. We reject that
distinction as inconsistent with the clear leg-
islative intent and purpose of the Act. We
reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals
for their consideration of the remaining is-
sues raised, but not decided, on appeal.
BACKGROUND

{2} Debbie Cruz (“Defendant”) was the
owner and president of DGM Construction.
DGM employed Benjamin Kallestewa, Vicki
Kallestewa, and Leo Erachio (collectively,
“the workers”) to work on a construction
project on the Zuni Pueblo in 2002. Defen-
dant signed all the company’s paychecks,
which were delivered to the workers by the
site foreman one week after the end of the
pay period. In June 2002, the workers cashed
four paychecks at a local trading post. The
trading post owner deposited the checks at
his bank, but the bank returned all four
checks for insufficient funds. The trading
post owner made three additional attempts to
deposit the checks before the bank returned

the checks for a final time, noting that the
“aecount [had] closed.”

{3} Defendant was charged with four
counts of issuing worthless checks, pursuant
to Section 30-364 of the Act. Convicted on
each count, Defendant argued on appeal,
among other issues, the lack of sufficient
evidence to prove that she had issued a check
“in exchange for anything of value” as set
forth in Section 30-36-4 of the Act. State v.
Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, 111, 26, 40, 147
N.M. 758, 228 P.38d 1173. The Court of
Appeals agreed, reversing Defendant’s con-
victions on that ground. Jd. 191, 41.

{4} Relying on some hoary case law from
this Court and a more recent case of its own,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the stat-
utory “exchange” for which the worthless
checks issued—in this case an exchange of
labor for wages—had to be “contemporane-
ous,” meaning the checks had to issue at or
near the end of the pay period. Id. 11381, 33,
88. Because these paychecks were delivered
one week after the end of the pay period,
they were in payment of an “antecedent or
pre-existing debt” not covered by the Act. Id.
‘1132-83. Thus, if we were to follow the
logic of the Court of Appeals, the Act would
never apply to most payroll situations in
which a delay of a week or two between the
end of the pay period and receipt of a pay-
check is common. We granted certiorari to
determine whether the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly interpreted the Act and whether the
ease law on which it relied has any continu-
ing vitality. State v. Cruz, 2010-NMCERT-
001, 147 N.M. 674, 227 P.3d 1056,
DISCUSSION

HM {5} As phrased in the petition for
certiorari, we consider whether the Act’s pro-
hibition against issuing worthless checks “in
exchange for anything of value” applies to
checks issued for labor, often “paid within
the traditional two weeks required for pro-
cessing payroll.” “We review issues of statu-
tory and constitutional interpretation de
novo.” State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041,
18, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489.

{6} This is the first time we apply the Act
in its modern form, as it has been approxi-
mately ninety years since we last spoke on
this subject. We considered predecessor

549

versions of the Act in the early part of the
Jast century. Since our last relevant review,
see generally State v. Davis, 26 N.M. 528,
194 P. 882 (1921) (applying the 1919 Act), it
has been amended or replaced in its entirety
nine times. See 1929 N.M. Laws, ch. 126,
§ 1; 1937 N.M. Laws, ch. 142, §§ 1-5; 1958
N.M. Laws, ch. 182, § 1; 1959 N.M. Laws,
ch, 118, §§ 1-2; 1961 N.M. Laws, ch. 206,
§ 1; 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315, §§ 1-10; 1965
N.M. Laws, ch. 114, §§ 1-2; 1979 N.M.
Laws, ch. 8, §§ 1-2; 1984 N.M. Laws, ch.
110, §§ 1-2. Thus, our Davis, 26 N.M. 528,
194 P. 882, opinion from 1921—the most
recent relevant case from this Court—consid-
ered a substantially different statute.

{7} We begin our analysis by looking at
the language of the modern Act, for the most
part enacted in 1963, and the plain meaning
of its text. See State v. Moya, 2007-NMSC-
027, 16, 141 N.M. 817, 161 P.3d 862 (“{Olur
primary goal is to effectuate the Legisla-
ture’s intent. We do so by looking first to
the words the Legislature chose and the
plain meaning of the language.”). We will
then turn to prior iterations of the Act and
the case law interpreting them and deter-
mine whether such a comparison can shed
any light on the Act in its present form.

{8} Defendant was convicted of violating
Section 30-364 of the Act, which states:
It is unlawful for a person to issue in
exchange for anything of value, with intent
to defraud, any check, draft or order for
payment of money upon any bank or other
depository, knowing at the time of the
issuing that the offender has insufficient
funds in or credit with the bank or deposi-
tory for the payment of such check, draft,
or order in full upon its presentation.

(Emphasis added.) This appeal turns on the
meaning of the phrase in Section 30-36-4 “in
exchange for anything of value.”

{9} The Act defines a “thing of value” to
include “money, property, services, goods
and wares; and lodging.” Section 30-36-
2(D) (emphasis added). The Act does not
define “exchange,” see § 30-36-2 (defining
only “check,” “person,” “draw,” “thing of val-
ue,” and “eredit”), and so we must interpret
the word by applying its ordinary meaning.

550

See Oldham v. Oldham, 2011-NMSC-007,
110, 149 N.M. 215, 247 P.3d 736 (“‘[Wle look
first to the plain language of the statute,
giving the words their ordinary meaning,
unless the Legislature indicates a different
one was intended.’” (quoting Marbob Energy
Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n,
2009-NMSC-018, 19, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d
185)). The ordinary definition of “exchange”
includes a broad construction, “[t]o give in
return for something received,” and more
specific interpretations, such as “trade” and
“[t]o give and receive reciprocally,” among
others. The American Heritage Dictionary
619 (4th ed.2000). Without any further guid-
ance as to the definition of “exchange,” we
may appropriately apply any of the ordinary
definitions.

{10} Thus, under a straightforward, textu-
al reading of the Act, its language would
appear to embrace the present dispute aris-
ing from paychecks issued in exchange for
labor. Recall that the Act specifically in-
cludes “services” within the definition of
“thing of value,” which can only mean that
our Legislature intended to cover situations
in which workers are paid by check for their
“services.” As we will address later, the text
of the Act does not condition its protections
on whether payment is a “contemporaneous”
transaction; the word never appears in the
Act. Nor does the Act say that worthless
checks issued in exchange for “antecedent or
pre-existing debts” are excluded; those
words are equally absent from the text of the
Act.

{11} Our textual reading of the operative
portion of the Act comports with its stated
purpose as well. See Lion’s Gate Water v.
D’Antonio, 2009-NMSC-057, 123, 147 N.M.
528, 226 P.3d 622 (“Statutes are enacted as a
whole, and consequently each section or part
should be construed in connection with every
other part or section, giving effect to each,
and each provision is to be reconciled in a
manner that is consistent and sensible so as
‘to produce a harmonious whole.’”) (quoting
Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764,
769, 918 P.2d 350, 355 (1996)). In the words
of our Legislature, the purpose of the Act is

to remedy the evil of giving checks on a

bank without first providing funds in or

credit with the depository on which they

are made or drawn to pay or satisfy the

same, which tends to create the circulation
of worthless checks on banks, bad banking,
check kiting and mischief to trade and
commerce.

Section 30-36-38.

{12} Applying the Act to worthless payroll
checks, with or without a lapse of time be-
tween payment and work performed, pre-
sumably furthers the purposes of the Act.
Worthless payroll checks, no less than any
others, go to the heart of the “evil of giving
checks on a bank without first providing
funds in or credit with the depository.” Id.
Worthless checks issued for payroll have the
same deleterious effect on the banking sys-
tem and represent a “mischief to trade and
commerce,” id., whether or not the bad
checks issue contemporaneously with the last
work day, or a week or two later. Thus,
reading a strict requirement of “contempora-
neous” into the Act’s exchange, would appear
to undercut the laudable policy goals of the
Act.

{13} Perhaps most persuasive is that if we
were to exclude common payroll transactions
from the Act, then we would narrow signifi-
cantly the scope of the Act. Indeed, we would
render the inclusion of “services” within the
definition of “thing of value” practically
meaningless. Thus, even aside from the text
of the Act, if we focus on an interpretation
that fosters, not obstructs, the beneficial
goals of the Act, then the direction taken by
our Court of Appeals gives rise to considera-
ble doubt.

The Court of Appeals Opinion

{14} How did our Court of Appeals come
to such a different conclusion? First, we
must acknowledge some of our case law that,
quite frankly, begs for clarification. See
Cruz, 2010-NMCA-O11, 131, 147 N.M. 753,
228 P.8d 1173 (discussing State v. Platt, 114
N.M. 721, 722-28, 845 P.2d 815, 816-17 (Ct.
App.1992); Davis, 26 N.M. at 525, 194 P. at
882; State v. Tanner, 22 N.M. 498, 495, 164
P. 821, 822 (1917)). The Court of Appeals
cited to Platt, Davis, and Tanner, concluding
that “[i]t is well established that a check
given in payment for an antecedent or pre-

existing debt is not covered by the ... Act.”
Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, 131, 147 N.M. 753,
228 P.3d 1173. The Court of Appeals was
not wrong in terms of its reading of history.

{15} However, the Court of Appeals was
not asked to consider, and it did not consider,
whether the 1963 repeal of the Act and its
replacement with a substantially different
statute might affect the persuasive authority
of such distant precedent. The Court of
Appeals validated its reasoning by looking to
case law from other states, interpreting other
statutes. See Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011, 17 34—
87, 147 N.M. 758, 228 P.8d 1178. Because
the confusion, at least initially, lies in our
own case law, it falls on this Court to address
the matter squarely.

{16} To understand our early precedent, it
is helpful to recall that when the crime of
issuing worthless checks was first enacted,
see NMSA 1915, § 1560 (1907), it was intend-
ed to supplement existing crimes that were
familiar to the courts of the time. See Bad
Check Laws, 44 Harv. L.Rev. 451, 451 (1981)
(“In [that] era of expanding credit and the
widespread use of checks as a substitute for
eurrency, it [was] necessary to have some
effective legal deterrent for the issuance of
checks drawn without funds.” (footnote omit-
ted)). Existing common-law crimes, such as
“cheating,” had been thought too narrow be-
cause they often focused on the manner in
which the bad check was used (e.g., to obtain
property falsely) and not on the issuance of
the worthless check itself. See id. at 451-52
(“The common law crime of cheating ha[d]
never been deemed broad enough to embrace
this evil. Under the early English statute
making it a crime to obtain property by false
pretenses, however, such [a check issued
without sufficient funds] was sometimes re-

1, “Cheats and false pretenses” required that a
person

designedly, by any false pretense, or by any
privy or false token, and with intent to de-
fraud, obtain from any other person any
money or goods, wares, merchandise or oth-
er property, or shall obtain with such intent
the signature of any person to any written
instrument, the false making whereof would
be punishable as forgery ...

Section 1551 (1897).

“Cheats and false representations” required
that a person

551

garded as a form of false pretense, and it’s
[sic] issuance indictable.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). In other words, over time and with
the growing use of checks in commerce, the
evil had become the issuance of a check
without sufficient funds, regardless of how
property might have been obtained by virtue
of that check. See id. at 452-53. Therefore,
specific statutes were created to address the
problem of bad checks. See id. at 453.

{17} New Mexico seems to have followed
the national trend. The first version of the
Act appeared in New Mexico statutes along-
side crimes such as “Cheating and false
pretenses” and “Cheating and false repre-
sentations” in the “Cheats—Frauds—False
Pretenses” article. See generally NMSA
1915, §§ 1551 to ~72 (1854, as amended
through 1909). Notably, the cheating
crimes required that a person obtain or at-
tempt to obtain property, or a forgery in
the case of “Cheats and false pretenses,”
through the use of some form of trickery or
deception. See §§ 1551 to -53 (emphasis
omitted). In addition, “Cheating and false
representation” could be accomplished by
obtaining property through the use of a
check. In comparison, the original Act re-
quired that a person “wilfully or with intent
to defraud draw or utter any order or
check or other instrument, for moneys, on
any bank ... knowing that such order or
check or other instrument will not be paid
or honored upon presentation thereof.” See
§ 1560 (1907). Unlike the cheats crimes,
the original Act did not explicitly require
that things of value be obtained by use of a
check; nor did it make any reference to
false pretense. Jd. Instead, the original Act
concentrated more on the issuer’s state of
mind when the check issued, regardless of
the manner in which the check was used.

with intent to cheat and defraud, shall ob-
tain, or attempt to obtain, from any other
person or persons any money property or
valuable thing whatever by means or by use
of any trick or deception or false or fraudu-
lent representation or statement or pretense,
or by any other means or instrument or
device commonly called the “confidence
game,” or by means or by use of any false or
bogus check, or by any other printed, written
or engraved instrument or spurious coin or

metal.
Section 1553 (1897).

552

{18} Tanner, written in 1917, is the only
case from this Court to mention the original
version of the Act. 22 N.M. at 495, 164 P. at
822. Although the Court of Appeals cites
Tanner to support the existence of a pre-
existing debt rule, see Cruz, 2010-NMCA-
O11, 181, 147 N.M. 758, 228 P.8d 1173, on
closer scrutiny we cannot agree. Tanner
only mentions the original Act in passing,
stating that the Act and the earlier men-
tioned cheating crimes were all properly in-
dicted. Tanner, 22 N.M. at 495, 164 P. at
822 (“There are three sections of the Code of
1915, which are applicable to the facts of the
case, ... [Sections] 1551, 1553, and 1560.”).
The Court’s legal inquiry in Tanner, howev-
er, was whether the facts alleged in the
indictment—a worthless check in return for
the delivery of cattle—were sufficient to
show false pretenses. The crimes “Cheats
and false pretenses” and “Cheats and false
representations” each mention “false pre-
tenses,” explicitly as a violation of those
crimes. See id. at 495 n. 1, 164 P. at 822 n.
1. The original Act did not. While it is
possible that the justices on the Tanner
Court also thought false pretenses was an
element of the original Act, Tanner does not
actually say that. In our judgment, there-
fore, Tanner is a weak reed upon which the
Court of Appeals relied for the proposition
that the modern Act requires false pretenses
in obtaining property and does not apply to
pre-existing debts. The Tanner opinion is
simply not clear.

{19} During this same “era of expanding
credit and the widespread use of checks as a
substitute for currency,” Bad Check Laws,
supra, at 451, other jurisdictions began to
recognize the essential difference between
worthless check acts and other common-law
crimes. For example, the Arizona Supreme
Court stated in 1926:

While the courts generally hold that one

who obtains property upon a credit agree-

ment and later gives a bogus check in
payment is not guilty of the crime of ob-
taining property by false pretenses be-
cause nothing in exchange for the check is
obtained, the offense defined in [Arizona’s

Bad Check Act] is a new and distinct one,

and to be guilty of it is not necessary that

one obtain money or property at the time
of passing the check.
State v. Meeks, 30 Ariz. 436, 247 P. 1099,
1099-1100 (1926). The Ohio Supreme Court
commented similarly:

It was the evident purpose of this stat-
ute to prevent the negotiation of false
checks drawn on accounts which did not
exist, or were insufficient to pay the checks
drawn. It was meant, for example, to
protect hotelkeepers from receiving ‘cold
checks’ in payment of obligations incurred
for lodging, many of which are past due.
It was enacted to protect business men all
over the state, to protect. commercial life;
about 90 per cent. of the commercial work
of the world being done on credit. In
order to protect the credit intercourse of
the community this statute was enacted
creating a new crime and providing new
and distinct rules of evidence.

State v. Lowenstein, 109 Ohio St. 393, 142
N.E. 897, 899 (1924), superceded by statute,
Passing Bad Checks, Ohio Rev.Code Ann.
§ 2918.11 (West 1986), as stated in State v.
Rudd, 55 Ohio Mise.2d 1, 562 N.E.2d 955,
956-57 (Ohio Mun.Ct.1988). These courts
recognized that “the evils referred to are all
quite distinct from those consequent on
fraud, and the statute is to be regarded as
creating a new and distinct offense.” State
v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 P. 838, 839
(1922), superceded by statute, Kans. Stats.
Ann. § 21-554 (1968), as stated in State v.
Beard, 197 Kan. 275, 416 P.2d 783, 785
(1966).
{20} Unlike obtaining property by false
pretenses,
[t]he present statute is aimed at a practice
which has become a menace to trade, an
evil and a mischief in the field of com-
merce, where the major portion of busi-
ness is done on paper.... [I]t is a crime,
an injury to society, to undermine, in any
degree, the very foundation upon which all
credit rests.
State v. Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498, 140 S.E. 216,
220 (1927) (Stacey, C.J., concurring). Admit-
tedly, these cases do not interpret statutes
requiring a check to be given “in exchange
for a thing of value.” They do, however,
take into account the purposes behind these

worthless checks statutes, which are similar
to those stated in the modern Act.

{21} Even though some courts, like those
cited above, took notice of the purpose of
bad-checks legislation, “[a] number of courts
clung to the notion that there could be no
intent to defraud unless something of value
was obtained by the accused, and therefore a
check given in payment of an antecedent
obligation was held not within the scope of
the ordinary bad check law.” Bad Check
Laws, supra, at 454 (emphasis added). For
a time, at least initially, New Mexico seems
to have followed the latter trend by “clinging
to the notion” of “antecedent obligations.”

{22} Davis, decided in 1921, and the sec-
ond case cited by our Court of Appeals for
the pre-existing debt rule stands for just
such a proposition. In that case, this Court
concluded that the 1919 version of the Act
did not apply to a buyer who obtained goods
on open account and later settled the existing
account with a bad check. Davis, 26 N.M. at
524-25, 194 P. at 882. The then recently
amended 1919 Act defined the crime as “at-
tempted larceny” or “larceny,” committed “if
money or property is obtained from anoth-
er” by use of a worthless check. Compare
§ 1560 (1907), with 1919 N.M. Laws, ch. 182,
§ 1 (emphasis added). Since the goods had
already been “obtained” before the issuance
of the check, this Court held that the Act did
not apply because “there could be no ...
fraudulent intent.” Davis, 26 N.M. at 525,
194 P. at 882 (“The question is whether or
not it is a violation of the section of the
statute quoted for one to issue a check in
payment of an outstanding account, credit
not being given on the strength of the checks
so issued. Clearly it is not a violation of the
statute, because ... there [could] be no in-
tent to defraud, which is the gist of the
offense.”),

{23} Davis seems to have overlooked the
1919 Act’s newly-added provision that ap-
pears to contradict this reasoning: “the mak-
ing ... of a check, ... payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of lack of
funds or credit, shall be prima facie evidence
of intent to defraud.” 1919 N.M. Laws, ch.
182, § 1 (emphasis added). Whether or not
correct at the time, however, Davis does

553

stand for the proposition that the 1919 Act,
with its particular language pertaining to
obtaining property and an intent to defraud,
does not cover worthless checks issued to
pay antecedent obligations.

{24} Significantly, our Legislature amend-
ed the 1919 Act soon thereafter to eliminate
the language that money or property must
be “obtained from another” by use of the
fraudulent check. Compare 1919 N.M.
Laws, ch. 126, § 1, with 1929 N.M. Laws, ch.
132, § 1. At the time, the 1929 amendment
was characterized in a scholarly journal as
part of a national trend, a “flurry of legisla-
tion definitely resolving the doubt in respect
to checks given for antecedent obligations in
favor of their inclusion within the statutory
penalty.” Bad Check Laws, supra, at 454 &
n. 20 (citing 1929 N.M. Laws, ch. 126, along
with statutes from Indiana, Michigan, and
Montana). Continuing along that same line
of thought, “[t]he Tentative Draft of the
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code
(1955), § 206.22, establish[ed] as a crime the
issuance or passing of a check knowing that
it will not be honored, regardless of whether
or not property was thereby obtained.”
State v. Goerdes, 48 N.J.Super. 298, 187 A.2d
100, 104 (N.J.Super.Ct. Law Div.1957) (citing
the Model Penal Code proposal in support of
the proposition that false pretenses and issu-
ing of a worthless check are distinct crimes).

{25} During the subsequent decades, New
Mexico courts had no occasion to revisit
Davis, and specifically the “notion” of the
antecedent-debt exclusion, in light of the
1929 amendments to the Act, as well as
changes thereafter. That lack of opportunity
is unfortunate. Accordingly, Davis continues
to stand as cited precedent for the anteced-
ent-debt rule, despite material changes in the
Act, reflecting notable changes in societal
attitudes towards the crime of issuing worth-
Jess checks. Decades later, we now have
such an opportunity.

{26} Continuing with our analysis of the
evolution of the Act, in 1963 the Legislature
replaced the Act in its entirety with what, for
the most part, is the statute in its present
form. Compare 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315,
§§ 1-10, with §§ 30-36-1 to -10. As previ-
ously observed, the 1968 Act was the first to

554

include the language at issue today, “in ex-
change for anything of value.” Compare
1963 N.M. Laws, 315, §§ 1-10, with § 1560
(1907); 1919 N.M. Laws, ch. 182, § 1; 1929
N.M. Laws, ch. 126, § 1; 1937 N.M. Laws,
ch. 142, §§ 1-5; 1958 N.M. Laws, ch. 182,
§ 1; 1959 N.M. Laws, ch.118, §§ 1-2; 1961
N.M. Laws, ch. 206, § 1. With the 1963 re-
placement, the Legislature continued the
trend, begun in 1929, that the check need not
be issued to “obtain[]” property. Compare
1919 N.M. Laws, ch. 182, with 1929 N.M.
Laws, ch. 126, § 1, and 1963 N.M. Laws, ch.
815, §§ 1-10. Presumably, given these
trends and the inclusion of a purpose state-
ment that saying as much, our Legislature
intended courts to focus on the evils of the
worthless check itself and Jess on whether a
check issued to pay for a present transaction
or a pre-existing obligation.

{27} In 1992 the antecedent debt “notion”
resurfaced in Platt, the only case to date that
has construed the 1963 Act. Platt, 114 N.M.
at 722, 845 P.2d at 816. In Platt, an owner,
seeking to renovate his property for use as
an inn, entered into a contract for the pur-
chase and installation of carpeting and
drapes. Jd. at 722, 845 P.2d at 816. The
owner paid for those goods and services by a
series of checks, some of them worthless,
having been issued after the goods were
delivered and installed, and some of them in
payment of previous checks that had been
returned for insufficient funds. Id.

{28} Like the open account in Davis, the
owner argued that his check had issued to
pay for a pre-existing debt—the installations
already performed and the goods already
delivered. Platt, 114 N.M. at 722, 845 P.2d
at 816. Correctly, our Court of Appeals
rejected that argument and instead “read
Davis as limited to its facts.” Platt at 723,
845 P.2d at 817. Based on this reading, the
Platt court determined that the pre-existing
debt exception would only apply to “situa~
tions in which something of value has previ-
ously been delivered to a person in reliance
on that person’s credit, and the check is later
tendered as partial payment on the credit
account.” Jd. In other words, the kind of
open account litigated in Davis.

{29} According to Platt, the modern Act
does apply to transactions in which goods
and services are delivered before the issu-
ance of a check, if a creditor/debtor relation-
ship was not contemplated and the “parties
intended to have a cash transaction.” 114
N.M. at 723, 845 P.2d at 817. Because the
parties in Platt “intended to have a cash
transaction,” and there was “no evidence that
[the contractors] intended to extend credit to
defendant,” then “the fact that the goods and
services were delivered before the check was
issued did not signify that an exchange did
not occur within the meaning of Section 30-
36-4.” Platt, 114 N.M. at 728, 845 P.2d at
817.

{30} Up to that point, we have no dispute
with Platt. However, despite Platt’s newly
functional approach and its purported limita-
tion of Davis, the Court of Appeals then
proceeded to limit the Act’s application to a
“contemporaneous transaction.” Based on
the timing of the exchange, “a worthless
check is given for something of value if the
worthless check is issued as part of a con-
temporaneous transaction.” Plati, 114 N.M.
at 723, 845 P.2d at 817. In other words, if
the worthless check is not part of a contem-
poraneous transaction, then presumably it
would be in payment of an antecedent debt
and the modern Act would not apply.
Though seemingly circular in its analysis, it
is Platt’s condition of contemporaneousness
that caught the eye of the Court of Appeals
in the present case.

{31} Applying Platt to this case, the Court
of Appeals asked whether a “payment of
wages earned is payment of a pre-existing
debt” or a “contemporaneous transaction.”
Cruz, 2010-NMCA-O11, 1132-33, 147 N.M.
158, 228 P.8d 1173. The Court of Appeals
distinguished this case from Platt on the
basis that, in Platt, “the recipients of the
check sought payment on the very day they
provided services,” and that “there [was]
nothing to suggest that the recipients ever
agreed to a delay before being compensated
for their work.” Cruz, 2010-NMCA-011,
140, 147 N.M. 758, 228 P.3d 1173. On the
other hand, the workers “in this case worked
for a week with the expectation that they
would have to wait another week before be-

ing paid for their labor.” Jd. In other words,
according to the Court of Appeals, the work-
ers became creditors of their employer, in
effect loaning the employer their wages for
the week it took to deliver their payroll
checks. Having previously “read Davis as
limited to its facts,” Platt, 114 N.M. at 723,
845 P.2d at 817, the Court of Appeals now, in
effect, exhumed it. And along with it, came
the discredited exception of an antecedent or
pre-existing debt.

The Amended Act Evidences Legislative
Intent to Change the Act’s Application

{32} Although Platt was on the right track
in limiting Davis “to its facts,” it failed to
appreciate that, after Davis, the Act was
amended or replaced nine times. Platt, 114
N.M. at 722-28, 845 P.2d at 816-17 (failing to
consider, for example, changes made in 1929
N.M. Laws, ch. 126, § 1; 1963 N.M. Laws,
ch, 815, §§ 1-10; and 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 8,
§§ 1-2). Section 4 of the 1963 Act made it a
crime, for the first time, to issue a check “in
exchange for anything of value, with intent to
defraud”—the essence of the crime still to-
day. Compare 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 315, § 4,
with § 30-36-4. It also defined “thing of
value” in the way it is still defined today:
“money, property, services, goods and wares
and lodging.” Compare 1963 N.M. Laws, ch.
315, § 2, with § 30-36-2. The existing pur-
pose statement was also first added in 1963.
See § 30-36-3.

{33} These changes, along with those
made in 1929, discussed earlier, indicate.a
legislative intent to alter the Act’s applica-
tion. See Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co. 2010-
NMSC-009, 136, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73
(‘In our statutory construction, we must give
effect to those changes. ‘This Court has long
held that we must avoid constructions of
statutory amendments that would render the
change unnecessary and meaningless.’”
(quoting State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050,
128, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868). Although
Platé read a “contemporaneous transaction”
into the Act, the modern Act does not indi-
cate that the Legislature contemplated a
“contemporaneous exchange” or any other
specialized meaning of “exchange.” See
§ 30-364. As previously noted, the word

555

“eontemporaneous” does not appear in the
text of the modern Act.

{34} The Legislature’s inclusion of “ser-
vices” in the definition of “thing of value,”
also indicates that “exchange” should not be
limited to “contemporaneous exchange.”
That the definition of “thing of value” specifi-
cally includes “services,” “property,” and
“lodging” indicates that the modern Act
should apply even when contemporaneous ex-
changes are not possible, expected, or typi-
eal. For example, it is not uncommon for
employers to pay wages by check with a
week’s delay. It is not uncommon for ten-
ants to use checks to pay their rent for the
coming month. Vacationers commonly pay
well in advance for lodging to reserve a space
(for example, on a cruise or for vacation
rental). The Act gives no indication that
such transactions should be excluded. Such
checks are unquestionably “given in return
for” services, property, or lodging, whether
or not the transaction can be described as
contemporaneous.

{35} If an exchange need not be contempo-
raneous, then what strictures exist to limit
coverage under the Act? Simply put, as se-
lected by our Legislature, there must be an
exchange, a guid pro quo of some kind, in-
volving “anything of value.” The Act would
appear not to apply, for instance, to checks
given gratuitously, such as charitable dona-
tions. Beyond that, although we do not here
decide questions not directly presented to us,
the Act would appear to apply. Our Legisla-
ture appears to have decided, as a matter of
public policy, that it is more important to
punish and deter the issuance of worthless
checks than whether goods and services were
provided contemporaneously with that check.
We will enforce that policy choice.

Other States

{36} We recognize that other states have
adopted a contemporaneous transaction test.
See Platt, 114 N.M. at 723, 845 P.2d at 817
(isting cases in support of its adoption of the
contemporaneous transaction rule and its
reading of Davis that the Act excludes “situ-
ations in which something of value has previ-
ously been delivered to a person in reliance
on that person’s credit, and the check is later

556

tendered as partial payment on the credit
account”). We note, however, that in each of
the cases cited in Platt and Cruz, the statute
in question is materially different from our
modern Act. See Ledford v. State, 184 Ga.
App. 556, 362 S.E.2d 133, 183-34 (1987) (per
curiam) (requiring a contemporaneous ex-
change for the Georgia Act to apply when the
statute in question called for the issuance of
the check to be “in exchange for a present
consideration or wages,” rather than “in ex-
change for something of value” (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Parker v. State, 484 So.2d 1038,
1036 (Miss.1986) (requiring the recipient of a
check to have relied upon the issued check
itself for the Mississippi statute to apply,
when the Mississippi statute was called “false
pretenses by delivery of a bad check” (em-
phasis added)); Hoyt v. Hoffman, 82 Nev.
270, 416 P.2d 232, 233 (1966) (requiring the
maker of a check to receive a benefit “as a
result of” a check’s delivery in order to apply
the Nevada act, but also asserting that the
purpose of the statute in question was “to
charge a defendant who obtains a benefit as
a result of the check” and that “[tJhe legisla-
ture did not intend to make it a crime to
issue a worthless check absent damage or
injury to the payee thereof”). Unlike the
Georgia, Mississippi, and Nevada statutes,
our Act does not require an exchange for
present consideration, it has never mentioned
false pretenses, and it does not require that
anything happen “as a result” of a check’s
delivery. See §§ 30-36~1 to -10.

{37} The Court of Appeals also cited State
v. Sinclair, 274 Md. 646, 337 A.2d 703, 707~
11 (1975); State v. Cote, 62 Ohio Mise.2d 202,
594 N.E.2d 198, 199 (Ohio Mun.Ct.1991); and
Hindman v. State, 378 So.2d 668, 664 (Miss.
1980). Cruz, 2010-NMCA-Ol1, 136, 147
N.M. 753, 228 P.3d 1173. Upon close exami-
nation, however, none of these cases consider
statutes that include the provisions of the Act
we find determinative today, which include
“exchange for anything of value,” “thing of
value” defined to include “services,” and an
explicit purpose statement to reduce harm to
the banking system. Each case makes refer-
ence to “obtain[ing]” things of value through
the use of a check. See Sinclair, 387 A2d at
706-07 (interpreting a Maryland statute that

required that “money, credit, goods, wares or
anything of value” are obtained by means of
a check and had previously been considered a
form of false pretenses, did not mention of
services, and provided that there was “ ‘pre-
sumptive evidence of such intent to cheat and
defraud’ only where there ha[d] not been a
return or tender of the return of the ‘thing so
obtained,” and it is impossible to “return”
services); Cote, 594 N.E.2d at 200 (interpret-
ing an Ohio statute that defined defraud as
“ ‘knowingly obtain, by deception, some bene-
fit for oneself or another, or to knowingly
cause, by deception, some detriment to an-
other’”); Hindman, 878 So.2d at 664-65 (in-
terpreting a statute that not only required
that a check be used to obtain money, or
articles of value or services, but also specifi-
cally codifying that “past due” accounts were
excluded).

{38} Not only do the cases cited in Cruz
apply significantly different statutes, but
they apply those statutes in a manner similar
to the common-law prohibition against false
pretenses. Compare State v. Rochette, 25
Conn.App. 298, 594 A.2d 1006, 1010 (1991)
(“To be found guilty of [obtaining property
by false pretenses], a person, therefore, must
knowingly make a false representation with
the intent to defraud, and that false repre-
sentation must induce action that effectively
causes the accused to receive something of
value without compensation.”), with Hind-
man, 378 So.2d at 665 (“Reliance upon the
check must have been the efficient induce-
ment which moved the party receiving it to
part with something of value, including valu-
able services, relying upon its validity.”), As
previously discussed, the purpose of our Act
and our general history of worthless check
legislation do not support such a reading.

{39} For the foregoing reasons, we hold
that the antecedent or pre-existing debt ex-
ception no longer applies to criminal prosecu-
tions under the Act, including the State’s
case against Defendant herein. We also re-
ject the requirement of a contemporaneous
transaction as set forth in Platt. The lan-
guage of the Act requiring “an exchange for
anything of value” is to be read broadly,
according to its terms, in conjunction with

; 557
es

the rest of the Act, and in light of the
history, purpose, and context of the Act as
set forth in this opinion.

CONCLUSION

{40} We reverse the Court of Appeals and
remand for consideration of the remaining
issues raised, but not decided, before the
Court of Appeals.

{41} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES,
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

2011-NMCA-093
263 P.3d 903

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Vv.
Wayne BENT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 29,227.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

June 28, 2011.
Certiorari Granted, No. 33,136,

562

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Nicole
Beder, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Law Works L.L.C., John A. McCall, Albu-
querque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} Defendant stands convicted of various
counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor
and contributing to the delinquency of a mi-
nor as a result of which he was sentenced to
prison. Of the many issues he raises on
appeal, one defect in the grand jury proceed-
ings deprives the district court of its jurisdie-
tion and is, accordingly, dispositive of all
other issues.

HE {2} Defendant was indicted by a
grand jury, which was convened on October
8, 2007, and whose statutory term would
hhave ended on January 4, 2008, but for an
order extending the statutory term issued
verbally by a district judge. Defendant’s

case was presented to the grand jury on May
20, 2008. Since NMSA 1978, Section 31~6-1
(1988) provides that a “grand jury shall serve
for a period of no longer than three
months[,]” we hold that this statutory term is
a mandatory limitation on the grand jury’s
jurisdiction. An indictment returned after
the grand jury’s term expires is void ab
initio. Therefore, Defendant's motion to
quash the indictment should have been
granted, as the grand jury was without legal
authority to consider his case and return an
indictment. As a result, the indictment is-
sued by the grand jury was void, and the
district court did not have jurisdiction to
proceed with the trial in this case.

{8} Because our decision renders the pro-
ceedings in this matter a nullity ab initio for
lack of jurisdiction, we need not address the
issues related to motions brought by Defen-
dant concerning the State’s manner of con-
ducting the grand jury proceedings, nor mat-
ters raised at trial. See State v. Chacon, 62
N.M. 291, 293-94, 309 P.2d 280, 231-82 (1957)
(holding that a challenge against the court's
jurisdiction for lack of an accusation in the
form required by the New Mexico Constitu-
tion was dispositive of the appeal); People v.
Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 84, 588 N.Y.S.2d 222,
585 N.E.2d 275, 279 (1989) (concluding that
because a fundamental defect in the grand
jury proceeding rendered it a nullity, there
‘was no need to reach the defendant’s conten-
tions regarding other claimed defects arising
from the conduct of the state). We reverse
the district court and remand this case for
entry of an order quashing the grand jury
indictment, dismissing this case without prej-
udice, and discharging Defendant.

I FACTUAL AND
BACKGROUND

{4} Defendant, the apparent leader of a
religious community in northeastern New
Mexico, was charged with various crimes
centering around what he maintained were
religious practices intended to be cleansing
ceremonies. The State argued that such
practices amounted to criminal sexual contact
of minors and contributing to the minors’
delinquency. The case was presented to the
grand jury of Union County on May 20, 2008.

PROCEDURAL

Defendant was indicted and arraigned on the
indictment.

{5} There is no dispute in this case as to
the facts pertaining to this issue. The grand
jury that heard Defendant’s case had been
convened on October 8, 2007. An almost
indecipherable pleading bearing a file stamp
from that date appears to have summoned
grand jurors for service on November 12,
2007. At the hearing on Defendant’s motion
to quash the indictment, the prosecutor stat-
ed to the court that the grand jury’s term
had been verbally extended “[sua sponte]”
by District Judge Sam Sanchez without the
entry of any written order. There is no doc-
umentary evidence concerning such an ex-
tension, nor does the record contain any ex-
planation as to why the extension was made.
We are left to rely on assertions by counsel
and the district court that it happened. The
parties agree that the grand jury only sat
twice, once in November, and again on May
20, 2008. The date in May was beyond three
months past the date of any previous grand
jury activity.

{6} Defendant’s motion to quash the in-
dictment was heard on August 12, 2008, al-
leging that, under NMSA 1978, Section 31-6-
8(A) (2008), the grand jury was not selected
and seated in accordance with the law. Spe-
cifically, Defendant alleged that the grand
jury had been convened on October 3, 2007,
and had convened again on May 20, 2008, in
violation of Section 31-6-1, which mandates a
maximum period of grand jury service of “no
longer than three months.”

{7} The district court responded to the
portion of the motion related to the grand
jury term by stating that the statute “doesn’t
provide for any relief if there’s a violation.”
Defendant responded that the remedy for an
illegal indictment is that it be “quashed[,]
and a new [g]rand [{jjury seated properly.”
The district court read the annotation to the
statute and noted that the annotation indicat-
ed that Sections 31-6-1 and 31-6-2 were
“merely directory, not mandatory” pursuant
to State v. Garcia, 110 N.M. 419, 796 P.2d
1115 (Ct.App.1990), and State v. Apodaca,
105 N.M. 650, 785 P.2d 1156 (Ct.App.1987)
(overruled on other grounds by Garcia, 110
NLM. 419, 796 P.2d 1115). The court further

563

inquired as to whether a showing of preju-
dice to Defendant was required before an
indictment may be quashed. Defendant re-
sponded that the indictment was deficient on
its face and should be quashed because the
grand jury exceeded its term, the State de-
nied discovery, and the State did not present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury that
had been requested by Defendant. The
State responded that the district court had
already noted that the statute was only advi-
sory in nature. The State then asserted,
without citation to the record, that Judge
Sanchez had explained to the grand jury that
he extended their tenure sua sponte for an
additional three months without issuing a
written order on the record. The prosecutor,
without having them admitted, showed to the
court certified pay records indicating the
grand jury served on two days.

{8} The State was aware and informed the
district court of case law indicating that an
indictment handed down by a grand jury
after the expiration of its statutory period
would in some states render the indictment
“void [ab initio].” The State mentioned that
there are such things as “de facto” grand
juries that are allowed to proceed past their
terms. At the end of the argument, the
district court ruled:

With respect to the first issue, that the
[glrand [j]ury was [empaneled] or served
beyond the three [-]months time period as
provided by Section 31-6-1, it appears that
within that section, there is no remedy
provided for a jury that serves longer than
its term. And at this point in time, there’s
been no prejudice shown by ... Defendant
with respect to that issue by itself. And
so, the motion to quash with respect to
that violation or apparent violation of the
statute will be dismissed.

What’s more is that even in the constitu-
tional section, Section 14, dealing with the
[g}rand [jlury[,] the right to a [glrand
{jlury and the convening of a [g]rand
{jJury, ... there is no time limitation for
the service of a[g]rand [jJury. And then
... Apodaca is a case that tells us that
this section, as well as Section 31-6-2 is
directory and not mandatory. I will state
though that Apodaca dealt with not this

564

precise issue, but the issue of the quashing
of an indictment based on the discharge of
an individual grand juror by the [dlistrict
[a]ttorney and replacement of him by an
alternate to serve on that case.... [E]ven
in that situation, ... which is pretty clear-
ly set out what the process is in the stat-
ute, ... the Court of Appeals has said that
that’s discretionary or directory and not
mandatory. For those reasons, that issue
is denied.

I. DISCUSSION

HI {9} We review the construction of
statutes and the legal requirements for con-
vening and maintaining a grand jury as a
matter of law under a de novo standard.
State v. Isaae M., 2001-NMCA-088, 14, 131
N.M. 235, 34 P.8d 624.

Hl {10} The New Mexico Constitution
provides that the composition of and process
for convening a grand jury be as “prescribed
by law.” N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 (“A grand
jury shall be convened upon order of a judge
of a court empowered to try and determine
cases of capital, felonious or infamous crimes
... or... may be convened in any additional
manner as may be prescribed by law.”). The
statutory basis for the convening of grand
juries has been recognized since at least
1892. Territory v. Baca, 6 N.M. 420, 440, 30
P. 864, 870 (N.M.Terr.1892) (holding that a
constitutionally infirm statute could not cre-
ate a legal grand jury). This is so because,
while the existence of grand juries is consti-
tutionally required, the nature of their com-
position, work, and term are matters enacted
by statute. In re Mills, 185 U.S. 263, 268, 10
S.Ct. 762, 84 L.Ed. 107 (1890) (holding that.
in the absence of statute, empowering a court.
to entertain cases for which grand jury in-
dictment required to charge, a court had no
power to charge a crime).

When an indictment is presented by a
grand jury in open court, the presumption
is that it is legally presented; that the
jurors were properly summoned, legally
qualified, and competent, and that the re-
quired number, at least concurred in the
finding. These facts [are] essential to the
lawful finding and presentmentf.]

State v. Rogers, 31 N.M. 485, 498-99, 247 P.
828, 834 (1926) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In this case, the questions
are (1) whether the term of the grand jury
had expired; and (2) if the term expired,
what was the expiration’s effect on the validi-
ty of the grand jury’s indictment of Defen-
dant. Challenges to the validity of the grand
jury are specifically limited by statute to
three enumerated grounds: (1) the grand
jury was not legally constituted, (2) an indi-
vidual grand juror was not legally qualified
to serve as a juror, and (8) an individual
juror was a witness against the person indict-
ed. Section 31-6-3; State v. Laskay, 103
N.M. 799, 800, 715 P.2d 72, 73 (Ct.App.1986).
It is to the legal constitution of the grand
jury that Defendant directs his appeal.

A. The Requirement of the Filing of an
Indictment or Information is a Consti-
tutional Requirement Upon Which the
Jurisdiction of the District Court De-
pends

MM {11} “TA] court obtains no jurisdie-
tion to proceed and render judgment in an
action brought without authority.” State ex
rel. Attorney Gen. v. Reese, 78 N.M. 241, 248,
430 P.2d 399, 401 (1967). The New Mexico
Constitution, Article II, Section 14 and the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution require the State to file an indict-
ment or information before commencing a
felony prosecution. State v. Chacon, 62 N.M.
291, 295-96, 309 P.2d 280, 233 (1957); State
v. Ross, 1999-NMCA~134, 114, 128 N.M.
222, 991 P.2d 507. In such cases, the district
court has no jurisdiction to try a defendant
without an indictment. Ross, 1999-NMOA-
184, 115, 128 N.M. 222, 991 P.2d 507. The
failure of jurisdiction in this regard may not
be waived. Chacon, 62 N.M. at 295, 309 P.2d
at 232-33. Nor, in the absence of a proper
indictment conferring jurisdiction on the dis-
trict court, may a defendant be sentenced.
Id. at 296, 309 P.2d at 283. Thus, if the
indictment in this case is void for having
been issued by a grand jury that was not
empowered to sit, the indictment cannot con-
fer jurisdiction on the court to consider the
case and would require dismissal.

B. Convening Grand Juries is Governed
by Statute

{12} We pointed out earlier that the way
in which a grand jury is convened is left to
legislative enactment by our Constitution. A
grand jury is thus “a body provided for by
the New Mexico Constitution and by stat-
utel.!” McKenzie v. Fifth Jud. Dist. Ct. 107
N.M. 778, 779, 765 P.2d 194, 195 (Ct.App.
1988). We consider a statute’s plain wording
to be the primary, essential source of its
meaning and when the statute contains clear
and unambiguous language, we are com-
pelled to give effect to that language, refrain-
ing from further statutory interpretation.
Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009,
137, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.38d 73. As we
employ the plain meaning rule, statutes “are
to be given effect as written without room for
construction unless the language is doubtful,
ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use
of the words would lead to injustice, absurdi-
tyL] or contradiction.” State v., Davis, 2003-
NMSC-022, 16, 184 N.M. 172, 74 P.8d 1064.
We are compelled to construe a statute “ac-
cording to its obvious spirit or reason.” Id.
It is our responsibility, “if the meaning of a
statute is truly clear—not vague, uncertain,
ambiguous, or otherwise doubtful ... to ap-
ply the statute as written and not to second-
guess the [Llegislature’s selection from
among competing policies or adoption of one
of perhaps several ways of effectuating a
particular legislative objective.” State ew rel.
Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 352, 871
P.2d 1852, 1358 (1994). In this statute, there
is no ambiguity in the Legislature’s limitation
of the term of a grand jury. It unequivocally
expresses the Legislature’s intention to limit
the term of a grand jury to “no longer than
three months.” § 31-6-1.

HI {13} Section 31-6-1 constitutes the
statutory framework applicable to grand ju-
ries and states: “The district judge may
convene one or more grand juries at any
time, without regard to court terms. A
grand jury shall serve for a period of no
longer than three months.” The Supreme
Court, in adopting the Uniform Jury Instruc-
tions, uses this construction. The district
court judge swears in a grand jury with an
oath, which contains the following instruc-

565

tion: “Your term as members of the grand
jury expires [Use Note 2] unless
you are discharged or excused by the court
prior to this time.” UJI 14-8002 NMRA.
Use Note 2 states: “Members of a grand
jury may not serve for a period longer than
three months.” We read the statute and
jury instruction as being in parity, establish-
ing and recognizing in turn that a grand jury
cannot by law be convened for a period
“longer than three months.” Jd. There is no
exception to this mandate contained in the
statute, nor provision for an extension of the
statutory period. The language is clear and
unambiguous.

C. Three Months is not Calculated by
Counting Actual Days of Service

Hl {14} The State’s briefing points us to
no statute or precedent that allows a grand
jury to operate legally past its term, and we
will not pursue avenues left unexplored by a
party. Defendant argues that a grand jury
whose term has expired after three months
cannot legally return a valid indictment and,
thus, the district court was without jurisdic-
tion to try him. The State’s first response to
this argument is that, although the grand
jury was empaneled for seven-and-a-half
months at the time it indicted Defendant, it
had actually only served two days—Novem-
ber 12, 2007 and May 20, 2008—of the three-
month term set by statute. To assert that
the grand jury “may have been [empaneled
for] six or seven months, but it actually
served for only two days, bringing it within
the terms of the statute” is untenable. The
statute clearly contemplates an end to a
grand jury's period of service, yet the State’s
argument seems to suggest that grand jurors
could be empaneled indefinitely until they
completed a total of some ninety days of
investigation and deliberation. The record
indicates that the grand jury was called to
service in October 2007, and was directed to
appear in the month after it was empaneled.
The grand jury heard absolutely nothing
from the district court for another six
months until recalled in May 2008, to hear
Defendant’s case. The abandonment of stat-
utory control of a grand jury’s term that is
inherent to the State’s approach here stands
in stark contrast to the clear three-month

566

limit. We can find no authority at all that,
when Judge Sanchez had “sua sponte” in-
formed the grand jury that its term was to
be extended and did not commit his order to
writing, he acted pursuant to any lawful au-
thority whatsoever, and the State directs us
to none.

HN {15} The clear language of the stat-
ute limits the term of a grand jury to not
more than three months. There being no
statutory language for extending the period
of a grand jury’s service, we hold that, in the
absence of any legislative expression to the
contrary, a grand jury may not be empaneled
to serve under Section 31-6-1 for a period
Jonger than three months. See State ex rel.
Jacobson v. Dist. Ct. of Ward Cnty. Fifth
Jud. Dist., 68 N.D. 211, 277 N.W. 843, 848,
850 (1988) (per curiam) (holding that, in the
face of a statute limiting the term of the
grand jury, an extension of its term by order
of a district judge was of no legal effect, and
the actions of the grand jury beyond the end
of its statutory term were invalid). The
grand jury in this case completed its work
during the three-month term, making it fune-
tus officio thereafter under Section 31-6-1.
Because the grand jury’s statutory life had
ended, the return of the May 2008 indictment
was not permissible under the circumstances.
To ask it to engage in further work on
another matter after the end of its three-
month term was beyond the power of the
prosecutor or district court. In re Lawrens
Cnty. April-June 2001 & July-September
2001 Grand Jury, 267 Ga.App. 204, 598
§.E.2d 915, 918 (2004) (holding that, after the
grand jury had completed its statutory term,
the court could not reconvene it in a special
session). New Mexico has never recognized
the de facto grand jury which was suggested
below by the State to exist elsewhere. The
State did not pursue such an argument on
appeal, and we agree with the Idaho Su-
preme Court which, in rejecting such an
argument, stated:

The grand jury ... was properly formed
and convened. There was no defect, error,
or irregularity in the filling of the grand
jurors’ positions, either at the commence-

ment of the term or at its conclusion. The
term of office expired, and thus, the offices

and positions of the grand jurors ceased to
sustain a legally recognized existence.
The grand jurors were not acting as de
facto officers when they returned [the de-
fendant’s] indictment.
State v. Dalling, 128 Idaho 203, 911 P.2d
1115, 1118 (1996) (holding that indictment
was void ab initio, requiring dismissal of a
criminal case). Here, as in Dalling, the
grand jury ceased to sustain its legal exis-
tence once the statutorily prescribed three-
month term expired.

D. The Statute is Mandatory on Its Face

{16} The State’s second contention does
not argue that the statute is ambiguous, just
that it is not “mandatory,” but “directory” in
nature. As a canon of construction, we re-
gard the word “shall” as mandatory. Bur-
sum v. Bursum, 2004-NMCA-138, 117, 136
N.M. 584, 102 P.8d 651 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “It is widely accepted that
when construing statutes, ‘shall’ indicates
that the provision is mandatory, and we must
assume that the Legislature intended the
provision to be mandatory absent [a] clear
indication to the contrary.” Marbob Energy
Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n,
2009-NMSC-0138, 122, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.8d
185 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
have previously held that “[dJeviation from a
mandatory statute or one intended to pre-
vent fraud and unfounded prosecutions is
usually fatal and renders the grand jury
iegal and its indictments null and void.”
State v. Gunthorpe, 81 N.M. 515, 517, 469
P.2d 160, 162 (Ct.App.1970) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). In this
case, it is undisputed that the Union County
grand jury that heard this case was convened
by the district court on October 3, 2007, and
Defendant’s case was considered on May 20,
2008, more than seven months and two weeks
later. If Section 31-6-1 sets three months
as a mandatory maximum term for a grand
jury to sit, then the grand jury returned its
indictment of Defendant three months after
they ceased to have any legal existence and,
accordingly, the indictment must be declared
void.

{17} On appeal, the State cites solely to
Apodaca for authority. Apodaca is inappo-
site, as it deals with neither of their argu-

ments. Rather than dealing with the statu-
tory term of the grand jury, Apodaca dealt
with how qualified grand jurors are substi-
tuted once a grand jury is empaneled. 105
N.M. at 652-58, 735 P.2d at 1158-59. The
case involved a challenge of the release and
replacement of a grand juror by a prosecutor
where the statute provided that the district
court was to perform that function’ Our
holding concerning provisions of the statute
regards as mandatory those provisions relat-
ing to the composition of the grand jury—the
required number and qualification of grand
jurors when the grand jury is convened—but
considers provisions concerning “those which
prescribe details as to the manner of selec-
tion or drawing [as] usually ... directory.”
Id. at 658, 785 P.2d at 1159. Apodaca thus
supports Laskay’s holding that a failure to
convene a legally constituted grand jury
transgresses a mandatory precondition to the
empaneling of a grand jury.

HH {18} Statutory provisions concerning
the nature of what is fundamental in empan-
eling, convening, and providing structure to
the grand jury are thus generally mandatory,
and provisions concerning its administration
once empaneled are directory. In State v.
Ulibarri, 1999-NMCA-142, 998, 15-25, 128
NLM. 546, 994 P.2d 1164, we held that compli-
ance with the statutes, requiring the prepa-
ration of a verbatim record of grand jury
proceedings, setting the number of concur-
ring jurors necessary to issue an indictment,
and requiring instruction of the grand jurors
on the record concerning the elements of
offenses they were considering, were manda-
tory preconditions to an indictment. There,
statutes mandated the existence of an ade-
quate record of the proceedings and proper
instruction on the law and ensured the over-
all legal adequacy of the process of the grand
jury’s work as protecting “the very heart of
the grand jury system[.]” Id. 115. When a
person appeared to prosecute before the
grand jury who was not properly authorized
by statute to do so, we held that the violation
of the mandatory statute compelled dismissal
of the indictment. State v. Hollenbeck, 112

1._A similar issue arises in this case, as a grand
juror was apparently aware of a Children, Youth
& Families Department investigation into the

567

N.M. 275, 276-78, 814 P.2d 148, 144-46 (Ct.
App.1991). We have recognized that a “tech-
nical violation” of NMSA 1978, Section 31-6-
4(A) (2008), requiring a grand jury to con-
vene during the business hours of the court,
did not require dismissal of the indictment.
State v. Weiss, 105 N.M. 288, 285-86, 731
P.2d 979, 981-82 (Ct.App.1986). However,
Weiss involved a grand jury continuing their
work until two in the morning during their
regular term and not being brought back and
convened by the district court more than
three months after their statutory term ex-
pired. Id. at 284, 731 P.2d at 980. In fact,
Weiss contrasted the statute requiring work
during “business hours” as a “direction” for
how to do the work as opposed to “the es-
sence of things to be done,” the latter of
which would be regarded as mandatory. Id.
at 285, 731 P.2d at 981. We have previously
noted that, in a statute where the terms
“shall” and “may” occur together, ordinarily
it must be concluded that the Legislature
was aware of and intended different mean-
ings. Thriftway Mktg. Corp. v. State, 114
N.M. 578, 579, 844 P.2d 828, 829 (Ct.App.
1992) Gnternal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Legislature unequivocally stated
that the grand jury’s term of service shall
not exceed three months. Other provisions
in the statute are directed to the operation of
the grand jury once convened. As in Weiss
and Apodaca, these terms have nothing to do
with the legal existence of the grand jury
body and are directory. Accordingly, we
conclude that the language in the statute,
restricting the term of the grand jury to
three months, is central to the legal constitu-
tion and empanelment of the grand jury and,
hence, a mandatory requirement.

{19} Returning to the State’s argument,
‘its contention that three months’ service can
be parceled out almost infinitely until three
months’ actual time is spent by the grand
jury in the grand jury room offends the
plain-language rule, its disparagement of us-
ing statutory language to obtain absurd re-
sults, and the universal practice of limiting
the terms of grand juries. Even in states
that provide for extending a grand jury's

religious community of which Defendant was the

leader. We do not address it here.

568

service, there is no provision for a grand jury
to consider new matters not taken up during
its original term. To allow a grand jury to
be called back for a day or two until about
ninety days’ service was eked out by the
State, as it asks us to hold, offends the
underlying idea inherent to the function of
the grand jury as protecting the interests of
justice. We are in accord with the Court of
Appeals of New York, which reasoned that
statutes limiting grand jury terms are in-
tended to prevent hold-over grand juries
from considering any new matters “elimi-
nat{ing] the danger of ‘vestpocket’ [glrand
[jJuries” that could become the captives of
courts or prosecutors. Williams, 538
N.Y.S.2d 222, 585 N.E.2d at 278-79 (citation
omitted).

E. Obtaining an Indictment After the
Grand Jury’s Term Expires Results in
an Indictment That is Void Ab Initio
and Confers No Jurisdiction to Try
Defendant

{20} Other jurisdictions that set specific
terms for their grand juries have held them
to have no power after the expiration of their
terms. United States v. Fein, 504 F.2d 1170,
1178 (2d Cir.1974). Under federal law, “an
indictment returned by a grand jury sitting
beyond its legally authorized time is a nulli-
ty.” Id. at 1177. “The uniform rule is that
in the absence of statute to the contrary the
grand jury is discharged by operation of law
at the end of the term of court for which it
was called.” State ex vel. Adami v. Lewis &
Clark Cnty., Dist. Ct. of First Jud. Dist., 124
Mont. 282, 220 P.2d 1052, 1058 (1950);
Grand Jury Law and Practice § 4:12 (2d
ed.2010).

{21} We therefore construe the statute in
this case as unambiguously mandatory in
limiting the term of grand juries to not more
than three months. We are provided with no
legislative history, but note that, in most
other jurisdictions, the terms of grand juries
are limited by statute, and we impute what
we know of their intent in limiting grand jury
terms to our situation in New Mexico. The
policy considerations employed elsewhere are
illustrative of why a limited term of service is
considered mandatory elsewhere, and why

we have come to regard it as such in this
case.

{22} “The concept of limited grand jury
existence was based on considerations of in-
fusing new blood into the grand jury at fre-
quent intervals, avoiding the extreme person-
al sacrifices to jurors extended service would
entail, and eliminating the possibility of semi-
professional jurors.” Steinbeck v. Iowa Dist.
Ct. In & For Linn Cnty. 224 N.W.2d 469,
475 (lowa 1974). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated succinctly: “A tendency to es-
tablish anything approaching permanency in
a grand jury is repugnant to our scheme of
government and subversive of individual
rights.” Shenker v. Harr, 382 Pa. 382, 2
A.2d 298, 301 (1938).

{23} Thus, for a grand jury to act without.
authorization beyond the term during which
it is empowered to sit, is fatal to the indict-
ment. An unauthorized extension of the
term of a grand jury beyond its term is a
defect which “goes to the very existence of
the grand jury itself[.]’ United States v.
Macklin, 523 F.2d 198, 195 (2d Cir.1975)
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted); United States v. Armored Transp.
Inc, 629 F.2d 1318, 1316 (9th Cir.1980)
(‘Such a defect—that the grand jury lost its
power to hand down indictments—is jurisdie-
tional and may be raised at any time.”).
There is no statutory provision for extending
the term of a grand jury in New Mexico
contained in Section 31-6-1 or otherwise and,
in that absence, we cannot legislate the exis-
tence of one. The jurisdiction of any pro-
ceeding in which Defendant is charged with a
felony depends on the “presentment or in-
dictment of a grand jury.” N.M. Const. art.
II, § 14. Without a properly constituted
grand jury returning a valid indictment
charging Defendant with a crime, we hold
that the district court was without jurisdic-
tion to proceed against him.

II CONCLUSION

Hs{24} The indictment in this case
is void because the group of citizens that
issued the purported indictment was not a
legally constituted grand jury, as it had fin-
ished its term some months before and had
ceased to exist. Any extension of its term by

the district court was undertaken without
statutory authority. Legally speaking, there
was no grand jury convened in this case.
Therefore, there was no indictment under
the law in this case to confer jurisdiction on
the district court to try, convict, or sentence
Defendant. We note that Defendant's ac-
quittal in a court lacking proper jurisdiction
did not violate the constitutional prohibitions
against double jeopardy and would not in and
of itself bar retrial. State v. Hamilton, 107
N.M. 186, 188, 754 P.2d 857, 859 (Ct.App.
1988). “[D]ismissals for failure to comply
with the grand jury statutes and rules are of
necessity without prejudice.” State v. Uli-
barri, 2000~NMSC-007, 12, 128 N.M. 686,
997 P.2d 818 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Therefore, we remand this
case to the district court and instruct that
the charges and conviction be set aside with-
out prejudice, the indictment be quashed,
and Defendant be discharged from custody.

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B, SUTIN
and TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judges.

2011-NMCA-099
263 P.3d 911
DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS,

Cavern City Chapter 13; Disabled Amer-
ican Veterans Department Of New Mex-
ico; E. De P. Bujac Post 3277 Veterans
of Foreign Wars; Veterans of Foreign
Wars New Mexico; Allen Semrau, Indi-
vidually; and Earl Diggs, Individually,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,

v.

The LAKESIDE VETERANS CLUB,
INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 29,134.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
July 14, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, Sept. 7, 2011, No. 33,153.

569

570 De

Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Sarah M,
Singleton, Jaime R. Kennedy, Santa Fe, NM,
McCormick, Caraway, Tabor & Byers,
L.LP., John M. Caraway, Carlsbad, NM, for
Appellees.

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
P.A., Edward R. Ricco, Jocelyn C. Drennan,
Albuquerque, NM, Marek & Francis, P.A.,
Thomas L. Marek, Carlsbad, NM, for Appel-
lant.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

{1} Under NMSA 1978, Section 53-8-
55(A)(D(e) (1975), the liquidation of a non-
profit corporation may be initiated by the
individual members of the organization. The
district court recognized that as of a specific
date prior to the filing for liquidation, Lake-
side Veterans Club, Inc. (Lakeside) did not
have any members. Despite this specific
finding, the district court allowed the corpo-
rate liquidation action filed by two former
members of Lakeside to proceed under the
statute. On appeal, Lakeside asserts that
these two nonmember Plaintiffs did not have
standing to pursue liquidation. Without stat-
utory standing to pursue a cause of action,
our Supreme Court has recognized that the
district court is without subject matter juris-
diction to proceed. We agree with Lakeside
and determine that Plaintiffs Allen Semrau
(Semrau) and Earl Diggs (Diggs) did not
have standing to initiate liquidation proceed-
ings and that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction in this case. We reverse
and remand this matter for a dismissal of the
statutory proceeding to liquidate Lakeside
pursuant to Section 58-8-55(A)(1)(e).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTO-
RY

{2} The material facts that are necessary
to address the standing issue in this case are
not significantly in dispute. However, the
parties materially disagree regarding the le-
gal interpretation of those facts as they apply

to the liquidation of Lakeside under Section
58-8-55(A)(1).

{3} Lakeside is a veterans’ organization
that was formed in 1957 to preserve and
promote fellowship among veterans of for-
eign wars and/or disabled American veterans
through the ownership of real property and a
service club facility located in Carlsbad, New
Mexico. The original plaintiffs included E. De
P. Bujac Post 3277 Veterans of Foreign Wars
(VFW 8277) and Disabled American Veter-
ans, Cavern City Chapter Number 18 (DAV
13), but the district court dismissed both
organizations from this lawsuit at trial.
VFW 3277 is a local Carlsbad, New Mexico
chapter under the jurisdiction and control of
the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the State
Department of New Mexico (VFW State),
which was established under the National
Constitution of Veterans of Foreign Wars
(VFW National). DAV 18 is a local Carls-
bad, New Mexico chapter under the jurisdic-
tion and control of the Disabled American
Veterans Department of New Mexico (DAV
State), which was established under the Na-
tional Constitution of Disabled American
Veterans (DAV National). VFW 3277 and
DAV 18 were both in existence in Carlsbad,
New Mexico, prior to the formation of Lake-
side in 1957.

{4} On January 21, 1953, VFW 3277 and
DAV 18 came into joint ownership of a parcel
of real estate in equal, undivided one-half
interests (the Plum Lane Property). VFW
8277 and DAV 18 were apparently aware of a
restriction that prohibited the local chapters
of these two organizations from jointly own-
ing or operating real property together, in-
cluding the Plum Lane Property. Lakeside
was apparently created by VFW 3277 and
DAV 18 in an effort to thwart this prohibition
and to obscure their joint ownership and
operation of the Plum Lane Property. VFW
8277 and DAV 18 originally conveyed the
Plum Lane Property to Lakeside in 1958 and
then reconveyed it to Lakeside in 1995. At
all relevant time periods, membership in
Lakeside was limited to persons who were (1)
original September 1, 1957 members in good
standing of VFW 3277 or DAV 13; or (2)
persons who later satisfied all eligibility re-
quirements for membership and became

571

members in good standing of VFW 3227 or
DAV 18 after September 1, 1957. In 2007,
both VFW 3227 and DAV 13 were suspended
by VFW State and DAV State as a result of
the circumstances involving the joint owner-
ship of the Plum Lane Property and their
joint membership arrangement in Lakeside.

{5} Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit seeking
damages and other relief against Lakeside,
including ‘a liquidation and distribution of all
of its assets pursuant to Section 53-8-
55(A)(1) and NMSA 1978, Section 53-8-56
(1975). The parties do not dispute that
Plaintiffs Semrau and Diggs were previous
members in good standing with DAV 13 prior
to its suspension by DAV State. At trial,
Plaintiffs argued that the suspensions of
VFW 3227 and DAV 18 left Lakeside without
any membership. Plaintiffs further argued
that Lakeside must be liquidated because it
could not engage in corporate acts or other-
wise carry out any corporate business.
Lakeside argued that the suspensions of
VFW 8227 and DAV 18 did not cause the loss
of Lakeside’s membership or a revocation of
any local charter. The district court agreed
with Plaintiffs’ argument and found that due
to the suspensions of VFW 3227 and DAV 13
by their respective state organizations, Lake-
side had no membership and could not en-
gage in corporate acts or otherwise carry out
its purposes. As a result, the court ordered
the liquidation of Lakeside and distribution
of its assets.

{6} On appeal, Lakeside asserts that
Plaintiffs Semrau and Diggs did not have
standing to pursue liquidation under Section
53-8-55(A)(1) based upon the district court’s
finding that Lakeside had no members.
Consequently, Lakeside contends that the
district court should have dismissed the ac-
tion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Despite prevailing below, Plaintiffs now ar-
gue that in fact Lakeside still has its mem-
bership, but the current members should be
given a special type of classification and be
recognized as ineligible and nonfunctioning
members. As a result, Plaintiffs argue that
Semrau and Diggs still have standing as
ineligible members to seek a corporate liqui-
dation under Section 53-8-55(A)(1). Alter-
natively, Plaintiffs contend that Lakeside is

572

barred and has waived. any right to contest
the issue of standing and subject matter
jurisdiction due to Lakeside’s undisputed po-
sition and proposed findings that Semrau and
Diggs were members of Lakeside in good
standing and that subject matter jurisdiction
existed to proceed with a liquidation under
Section 53-8-55(A)(1).
DISCUSSION

Wl {7} Our Supreme Court recently clar-
ified the analysis of the issue of standing and
its effect on subject matter jurisdiction in
New Mexico proceedings. ACLU of N.M. v.
City of Albuquerque, 2008-NMSC-045, 144
N.M. 471, 188 P.3d 1222. Specifically, the
Court noted that “standing may be a jurisdic-
tional matter when a litigant asserts a cause
of action created by statute.” Id. 19 n. 1.
“When a statute creates a cause of action and
designates who may sue, the issue of stand-
ing becomes interwoven with that of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Jd. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Under these
circumstances, “[s]tanding then becomes a
jurisdictional prerequisite to an action.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). Our Courts have long recognized that.
when the issue of standing is considered
jurisdictional, it “may not be waived and may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even sua sponte by the appellate court.” Gu-
naji v. Macias, 2001~NMSC-028, 120, 180
N.M. 734, 31 P.8d 1008 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Alvarez v. State
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1999-NMCA-
006, 16, 126 N.M. 490, 971 P.2d 1280; Armi-
jo v. Save "N Gain, 108 N.M. 281, 282, 771
P.2d 989, 990 (Ct.App.1989). Under the
present circumstances, standing is a jurisdic-
tional question because Section 53-8-55(A)(1)
creates a cause of action and explicitly desig-
nates who is entitled to bring an action under
that provision. See Section 53-8-55(A)(1)
(providing that a district court shall have
power to liquidate a corporation under cer-
tain circumstances in an action initiated by a
director or member of that corporation). As
a result, although Lakeside did not expressly
raise the issue of standing in the district
court below, the issue of standing is a juris-
dictional prerequisite that may properly be
addressed by this Court. See Gunaji, 2001—
NMSC-028, { 20, 130 N.M. 734, 81 P.8d 1008.

{8} Lakeside asserts that Plaintiffs Sem-
rau and Diggs did not have standing to pur-
sue liquidation under Section 53-8-55(A)(1)
because the district court found that Lake-
side did not have any members once VFW
8227 and DAV 13 were suspended by their
respective state organizations. Plaintiffs
specifically argued and requested that the
district court enter findings of fact reflecting
that once VFW 3227 and DAV 18 were sus-
pended, Lakeside had “no members ... ca-
pable of voting” and had no members capable
of “engag{ing] in corporate acts or otherwise
carrying] on corporate business.” Plaintiffs’
factual argument was premised on the ex-
press language in Lakeside’s bylaws stating
that no person was eligible for membership
in Lakeside “unless that person has satisfied
all eligibility requirements for membership
in, and is a member in good standing of
[VFW 3227] and/or [DAV 13].”

Standard of Review

HM {9} “We review factual questions for
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
would find adequate to support a conclusion.”
Sitterly v. Matthews, 2000-NMCA-087, { 22,
129 N.M. 134, 2 P.3d 871 (citation omitted).
However, the determination of “{wJhether a
party has standing to bring a claim is a
question of law which we review de novo.”
Prot. & Advocacy Sys. v. City of Albuquer-
que, 2008-NMCA-149, 117, 145 N.M. 156,
195 P.3d 1.

Substantial Evidence

HI {10} We first examine the underlying
factual question of whether Plaintiffs Semrau
and Diggs were members of Lakeside at the
time they filed the action for liquidation of
Lakeside in December 2007. Plaintiffs argue
that the undisputed evidence established that
Plaintiffs Semrau and Diggs were members
of Lakeside and that the corporation contin-
ued to have members after the state organi-
zations suspended DAV 13 and VFW 3227.
“In reviewing [a] verdict for substantial evi-
dence, we examine the record for relevant
evidence such that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Nawa ». City of Santa Fe, 2004-NMSC-039,
110, 186 N.M. 647, 103 P.3d 571 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “We
resolve disputed facts in favor of the party
prevailing below, indulging all reasonable in-
ferences in favor of the verdict and disre-
garding contrary inferences, and we do not
independently weigh conflicting evidence.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

{11} The district court entered detailed
findings regarding Lakeside membership:

28. Both the local chapters [VFW 3227
and DAV 13] have remained suspended by
the respective state organizations since the
above dates [June and September 2007];
the state organizations have assumed con-
trol of the affairs of the local chapters
during the suspension.

24, Unless the joint ownership of the
[Plum Lane] Property is changed, it is
likely that the state organizations will con-
tinue suspension of the local chapters; ulti-
mately the state organizations are likely to
revoke the local chapters’ [charters with-
out a change in joint ownership.

25. As a result of the suspension, mem-
bers of [DAV 18] and members of [VFW
8227] cannot meet, vote, or conduct any
business related to either of the local chap-
ters or Lakeside.

26. As a result of the suspension, none
of the members of [DAV 18] or [VFW
8227] are in good standing with their local
chapters and, as a result, are not eligible
for Lakeside membership.

27. Membership in Lakeside requires
membership in good standing in [DAV 13]
or [VFW 8227].

28. Members in the local chapters com-
prise the exclusive membership of Lake-
side.

29. Since the state organizations have
suspended the memberships of the local
chapters, the local members are not in
good standing and therefore there are no
members of Lakeside.

30. As a result of the suspension, Lake-
side has no members and therefore none
qualify to engage in corporate acts or oth-

573

erwise carry out corporate business of

Lakeside.

81. In short, Lakeside can no longer
carry out its purposes.
(Emphasis added.)

{12} We can find no sound basis for Plain-
tiffs’ substantial evidence argument. In fact,
this is contrary to Plaintiffs’ evidence and
arguments in the trial before the district
court. Lakeside’s bylaws were submitted to
show that Lakeside’s membership was limit-
ed exclusively to members who were in good
standing in DAV 18 or VFW 3227. Testimo-
ny and exhibits were admitted to show that
no members in good standing existed after
the state organizations suspended VFW 3277
in June 2007 and DAV 18 in September 2007.
The inability for Lakeside to act in a corpo-
rate capacity was at the center of Plaintiffs’
case and arguments at trial. We conclude
that substantial evidence supports the dis-
trict court’s finding that Lakeside had no
members after September 2007. Pursuant to
this finding, Plaintiffs Semrau and Diggs
were not members of Lakeside at the time
this suit was filed in December 2007.

Standing and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

HM {18} We next review de novo
whether Plaintiffs Semrau and Diggs had
standing to bring an action for the dissolu-
tion and liquidation of Lakeside under Sec-
tion 58-8-55(A)(1)(e). See Prot. & Advocacy
Sys., 2008-NMCA-149, 117, 145 N.M. 156,
195 P.8d 1. “Whether a plaintiff has stand-
ing depends on whether the constitutional or
statutory provision on which the claim rests
properly can be understood as granting per-
sons in the plaintiff's position a right to
judicial relief” N.M. Gamefowl Ass’n v.
State ex rel. King, 2009-NMCA-088, 114,
146 N.M. 758, 215 P.8d 67 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), cert. denied,
2009-NMCERT-007, 147 N.M. 361, 223 P.3d
358. In interpreting a statute, we first ex-
amine “the plain language of the statute,
giving the words their ordinary meaning,
unless the Legislature indicates a different
[meaning] was intended.” N.M. Indus. En-
ergy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Reg. Comm'n,
2007-NMSC-053, 120, 142 N.M. 538, 168
P.8d 105. When employing the plain mean-

574

ing rule, statutes “are to be given effect as
written without room for construction unless
the language is doubtful, ambiguous, or an
adherence to the literal use of the words
would lead to injustice, absurdity or contra-
diction[.]” State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022,
16, 184 N.M. 172, 74 P.8d 1064. “[W]hen a
statute contains language [that] is clear and
unambiguous, we must give effect to that
language and refrain from further statutory
interpretation.” Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
2010-NMSC-009, 187, 147 N.M. 588, 227
P.3d 78 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). “Only if an ambiguity exists
will we proceed further in our statutory con-
struction analysis.” Marbob Energy Corp. v.
N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n, 2009-
NMSC-018, 19, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.8d 185.

{14} Section 58-8-55(A)(1)(e) provides that
“{dlistrict courts shall have full power to
liquidate the assets and affairs of a corpora-
tion ... in an action by a member or di-
rector when it is made to appear that ... the
corporation is unable to carry out its pur-
poses[.]!” (Emphasis added.) Section 58-8-
55(A)(1)(e) expressly limits the right to initi-
ate an action to liquidate a corporation to
members or directors of that corporation.
Furthermore, the limitation of Section 53-8—
55(A)(1)(e) to “an action by a member or
director” is unambiguous and cannot be
properly understood as granting persons who
are neither directors nor members of a cor-
poration the right to initiate an action to
liquidate that corporation. See N.M. Game-
fowl, 2009-NMCA-088, 114, 146 N.M. 758,
215 P.3d 67. Here, statutory standing under
Section 58-8-55(A)(1)(e) was premised upon
the allegations of Plaintiffs Semrau and
Diggs that they were members of Lakeside,
As previously discussed, the district court
ultimately found that Lakeside had no mem-
bers after September 2007. As a result, we
conclude that Plaintiffs Semrau and Diggs
had no standing to initiate an action to liqui-
date Lakeside under Section 58-8-55(A)(1)(e)
in December 2007. Because of Plaintiffs’
Jack of standing, the district court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction to proceed
with the liquidation action under Section 53—
8-55(A)(D(e). See ACLU, 2008-NMSC-045,
19 n. 1, 144 N.M. 471, 188 P.3d 1222 (reason-
ing that where a statute creates a cause of

action and designates who can sue, standing
is a jurisdictional prerequisite that is inter-
‘woven with subject matter jurisdiction).

Addressing Plaintiffs’
Standing and Jurisdiction

TM {15} Plaintiffs have placed them-
selves in a strange and conflicting position.
The district court ruled in Plaintiffs’ favor
and adopted their proposed factual position
regarding the legal recognition of no mem-
bership in Lakeside as of the end of Septem-
ber 2007. On appeal, Plaintiffs are attempt-
ing to discredit and cast ambiguity upon the
specific findings that they previously asked
the district court to enter when it ruled in
their favor. Plaintiffs frame this apparent
paradox into two separate arguments. First,
Plaintiffs argue that Lakeside should be
barred from raising the issues of standing
and lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this
case because Lakeside made factual admis-
sions to the contrary in the district court
below. Second, Plaintiffs assert that the dis-
trict court’s findings should be construed to
recognize a limited form of membership in
Lakeside that would allow liquidation to pro-
ceed even after all the members of DAV 13
and VFW 3227 were suspended by their
state organizations. We do not agree with
Plaintiffs’ arguments.

{16} Plaintiffs recognize that where stand-
ing is jurisdictional, it cannot be waived. See
Gunaji, 2001-NMSC-028, 120, 180 N.M.
734, 31 P.8d 1008 (reasoning that where
standing is jurisdictional, it “may not be
waived and may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). However, Plaintiffs con-
tend that where a party admits facts that
establish the district court’s jurisdiction, the
party is bound by those factual admissions on
appeal. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that
Lakeside’s factual claims regarding member-
ship and jurisdiction at trial must now be
treated as binding admissions. Effectively,
Plaintiffs want to bind Lakeside to its factual
version of the membership dispute at trial.
Plaintiffs have cited numerous cases from
other jurisdictions to support their argument
that Lakeside should be factually bound and
that this effectively prevents Lakeside from

Arguments for

raising the standing and jurisdictional defect
claim on appeal. See Railway Co. v. Ram-
sey, 89 U.S. 322, 327, 22 Wall. 322, 22 L.Ed.
828 (1874); Ferguson v. Neighborhood Hous.
Servs. of Cleveland, Inc. 780 F.2d 549, 550
(6th Cir.1986). This authority is not on
point, and Plaintiffs also recognize that no
New Mexico court has ever recognized this
principle to restrict a party from raising the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction on appeal.
See Pickett Ranch, LLC v. Curry, 2006-
NMCA-082, 145, 140 N.M. 49, 189 P.3d 209
(stating that where no supporting authority
for a proposition is cited, this Court may
assume that no applicable or analogous au-
thority exists).

{17} Railway and Ferguson are not on
point because the parties in those cases did
not dispute the facts giving rise to subject
matter jurisdiction. See Railway, 89 U.S. at
826-27 (noting that the stipulation to federal
jurisdiction was an admission to the existence
of supporting factual documents that were
accidentally destroyed by fire); Ferguson,
780 F.2d at 550-51 (stating that the employ-
er’s judicial admissions “eliminate[d] the
need for evidence on the subject matter of
the admission, as admitted facts are no long-
er at issue” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). In contrast, the parties in
this case did not agree on the critical factual
issue regarding the current status of mem-
bership in Lakeside. Specifically, the issue
of whether Lakeside had members after Sep-
tember 2007 remained a contested issue of
fact and law throughout the trial in district
court. Furthermore, the district court rea-
soned that its “decision [was] narrowly based
on the issue regarding Lakeside member-
ship” and ultimately concluded that “there
are no eligible Lakeside members to carry
out its purposes.”

{18} Our Supreme Court has recognized
that “{ujnder ordinary circumstances a party
is not permitted to take a position in the
court below and, thereafter, to take a con-
trary position on appeal. However, the rule
is otherwise when jurisdiction is involved.”
Zarges v. Zarges, 79 N.M. 494, 497, 445 P.2d
97, 100 (1968). In Zarges, the Court rea-
soned that “(jjurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter cannot be conferred by consent, much

575

less can it be waived.” Id. (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). As a re-
sult, we conclude that Lakeside is not barred
from arguing the jurisdictional implications
of the district court’s findings on appeal,
despite having proposed contrary findings
that were rejected by the district court at
trial.

TI {19} Plaintiffs next argue that the
district court’s findings of “no members” in
Lakeside should be construed liberally to
mean that members still exist for purposes of
liquidation under Section 53-8-55(A)(1) even
though these members are ineligible or non-
functioning for all other corporate and busi-
ness purposes. As previously discussed, the
district court found that “[a]s a result of the
suspension, Lakeside has no members and
therefore none qualify to engage in corpo-
rate acts or otherwise carry out corporate
business of Lakeside.” (Emphasis added.)
This Court will not disturb the district
court’s findings of fact “unless they are dem-
onstrated to be clearly erroneous or not sup-
ported by substantial evidence.” Roybal v.
Morris, 100 N.M. 305, 811, 669 P.2d 1100,
1106 (Ct.App.1983). The district court’s find-
ing does not appear ambiguous or erroneous.
Instead, the court’s factual finding simply
carries an unintended legal consequence be-
cause standing and subject matter jurisdic-
tion were not being considered when the
requisite findings were entered.

{20} As Lakeside points out, Plaintiffs
have failed to explain how seeking corporate
liquidation under Section 58-8-55(A)(1) does
not constitute a corporate act or involve the
carrying out of its corporate business. Fur-
thermore, Plaintiffs provide no authority for
the proposition that all actions or business
carried out within a corporation may be
deemed corporate acts or business except for
the act of liquidation under Section 53-8-
55(A)(1), and we assume no such authority
exists. See Pickett Ranch, 2006-NMCA-082,
145, 140 N.M. 49, 139 P.3d 209 (stating that
where no supporting authority for a proposi-
tion is cited, this Court may assume that no
applicable or analogous authority exists).

{21} Plaintiffs also fail to explain how the
district court’s findings and conclusions that
prevent further corporate acts or business

576

can be construed to carve out one special
exception for corporate liquidations. The
district court’s findings and conclusions do
not recognize or identify any exception to the
limitations placed upon Lakeside’s former
membership. Furthermore, to the extent
that the district court’s finding of no mem-
bership conflicts with its legal determination
to proceed with the liquidation of Lakeside,
the district court’s finding prevails. See
Roybal v. Chavez Concrete & Excavation
Contractors, Inc, 102 N.M. 428, 480, 696
P.2d 1021, 1028 (Ct.App.1985) (reasoning that
“{wJhen a finding supported by substantial
evidence conflicts with an opinion [or conflict-
ing conclusion of law], the finding prevails”).
Consequently, we conclude that the district
court’s finding of no membership in Lakeside
was not clearly erroneous.

{22} As a result, the statutory basis cho-
sen for liquidation, Section 58-8-55(A)(1)(e),
was not available to Plaintiffs. The district
court was not asked to consider or address
the issue of how Plaintiffs might otherwise
effectuate a liquidation of Lakeside without
any legal members who could act on behalf of
the corporation. This Court will not speculate
about potential avenues of relief that might
have been available or what further action
the district court might have taken. See
Sanchez v. Saylor, 2000-NMCA-099, 111 22-—
28, 129 N.M. 742, 18 P.3d 960 (reasoning that
this Court will not speculate regarding alter-
native actions the district court might have
taken or “take the district court’s place as
weigher of facts and judge of credibility”
where substantial evidence supports the
court’s findings). We simply hold that the
district court’s findings of fact cannot reason-
ably be construed to recognize a form of
membership in Lakeside that would still au-
thorize acting in a corporate capacity to seek
a liquidation pursuant to Section 53-8-
55(A)(1).

CONCLUSION

{23} We reverse the decision of the district
court that allowed the liquidation of Lakeside
to proceed under Section 53-8-55(A)(1)(e).
Plaintiffs Semrau and Diggs did not have
standing to initiate liquidation proceedings
under Section 58-8-55(A)(1)(e) because they
were not members of Lakeside at the time

the suit was filed. Therefore, the district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to proceed with a liquidation action under
Section 53-8-55(A)(1)(e). We remand for a
dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiffs’ stat-
utory proceeding pursuant to Section 53-8-
SBCA) (e).

{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY, and
LINDA M. VANZI, Judges.

2011-NMCA-098
263 P.3d 918
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
ve
Dominic L. EBERT, Jr., Defendant—
Appellant.
No. 28,898.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

July 15, 2011.

>
>

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Albright Law & Consulting, Jennifer R.
Albright, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} After the district court denied his mo-
tion to dismiss, Defendant Dominic L. Ebert
entered a conditional guilty plea to one count
of child solicitation by computer, contrary to
NMSA 1978, Section 30-37-8.2 (2005)
(amended 2007). Defendant argued below
and argues here that Section 30-87-3.2 is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and
that it violates the Commerce Clause. We
disagree and affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

{2} Our understanding of the facts in this
case comes from Defendant’s brief in support
of his motion to dismiss, which sets forth the
following facts. Agent Carrie McPherson, a
member of the New Mexico State Police
Online Predator Unit, initiated an e-mail con-
versation with Defendant. In this conversa-
tion, Agent McPherson pretended to be a
twelve-year-old child named “Chrissy.” De-
fendant initially advised “Chrissy” that she
should not talk to strangers. The exchanges
continued, eventually leading to graphic sex-
ual discussions via e-mail and instant mes-
saging.

{8} Defendant explained what he believed.
to be the basis for the count to which he
pleaded guilty. Defendant began sharing
sexual fantasies with “Chrissy.” On March
29, 2007, Defendant asked “Chrissy” to touch
her clitoris. The conversation progressed
until Defendant asked “Chrissy” to touch
herself while taking a bath and to make
herself orgasm. Defendant characterized his
behavior as “request[ing] that ‘Chrissy’ touch
herself” and as “communicat{ing] a wish that
an adult police officer, pretending to be a
minor child, masturbate.”

Il. DISCUSSION

{4} Defendant argues that the statute un-
der which he was convicted is unconstitution-
al for three reasons: (1) because it criminal-
izes speech that is protected under the First
Amendment, (2) because it is unconstitution-
ally vague, and (8) because it regulates
speech and conduct across multiple states.
Our standard of review is de novo. See
ACLU of N.M. ». City of Albuquerque, 20086-
NMCA-078, 110, 189 N.M. 761, 187 P.3d
1215.

A. First Amendment—Overbreadth

WM {5} Defendant argues that Section
30-37-3.2 violates the First Amendment be-
cause it criminalizes speech that is otherwise
legal, “particularly because the law as writ-
ten does not distinguish between lawful and
unlawful conduct.” In response, the State
points to numerous state and federal deci-
sions that have upheld similar laws under a
strict scrutiny analysis by relying on the idea
that speech used to further the sexual exploi-
tation of children is not constitutionally pro-
tected.

HE s({6} “TA] statute is facially invalid if
it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
speech.” United States v. Williams, 553
U.S. 285, 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Bd.2d
650 (2008). Statutes enjoy a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality, and the burden
is on the challenger to prove a statute uncon-
stitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. See
State v. Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152, 124, 128
N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896. Although a constitu-
tional challenge is ordinarily limited to the
facts of the case, a defendant may make an

overbreadth challenge based on the First
Amendment even if the statute is constitu-
tional as applied to him. See State v. Luckie,
120 N.M. 274, 276, 901 P.2d 205, 207 (Ct.App.
1995); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 767-69, 102 S.Ct. 3848, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113
(1982).

1. Section 30-37-3.2 Is Not Facially Over-
broad

{7} We begin our analysis with the issue of
whether the speech prohibited by Section 30-
87-8.2, soliciting children to engage in sexual
conduct, is protected under the First Amend-
ment. At the time Defendant was charged,
Section 80-87-8.2(A) provided:

Child solicitation by computer consists of a

person knowingly and intentionally solicit-

ing a child under sixteen years of age, by
means of computer, to engage in sexual
intercourse, sexual contact or in a sexual
or obscene performance, or to engage in
any other sexual conduct when the perpe-
trator is at least three years older than the
child.
The statute also provided that “child solicita-
tion by computer is committed in this state if
a computer transmission either originates or
is received in this state.” Section 30-37—
38.2(C).

{8} We assume without deciding that be-
cause Section 30-37-8.2 targets communica-
tions based on their sexual content, it is a
content-based prohibition. See, eg. Turner
Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643,
114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“As a
general rule, laws that by their terms distin-
guish favored speech from disfavored speech
on the basis of the ideas or views expressed
are content[-Jbased.”); People v. Foley, 94
N.Y.2d 668, 709 N.Y.S.2d 467, 731 N.E.2d
128, 181 (2000) (concluding that a similar
statute was content-based because it target-
ed sexually explicit communication). Accord-
ingly, it is subject to strict scrutiny and must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 87, 45, 103
S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983).

{9} In Ferber, the United States Supreme
Court examined a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a law prohibiting the promotion of

579

any performance known to include sexual
conduct by a child under the age of sixteen.
458 U.S. at 751, 102 S.Ct. 3348. The owner
of a bookstore specializing in sexually orient-
ed products was convicted under the contest-
ed statute for selling films depicting young
boys masturbating. Id. at 751-52, 102 S.Ct.
8348. The question in Ferber was whether,
in order to “prevent the abuse of children
who are made to engage in sexual conduct
for commercial purposes,” the statute could
“prohibit the dissemination of material which
shows children engaged in sexual conduct,
regardless of whether such material is ob-
scene.” 458 U.S. at 753, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (em-
phasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court had previously held
that obscene speech was not protected under
the First Amendment. See id. at 754, 102
S.Ct. 3348 (citing Roth v. United States, 354
US. 476, 485, 77 S.Ct. 1804, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498
(4957).

{10} Although the Court did not identify a
specific level of scrutiny, it appeared to ac-
knowledge that singling out child pornogra-
phy was a content-based restriction. See id.
at 763-64, 102 S.Ct. 3348. The Court ob-
served that it was “evident beyond the need
for elaboration that a [s]tate’s interest in
‘safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’” Id. at
756-57, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (quoting Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
607, 102 S.Ct. 2618, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982)).
Furthermore, it declared that “[t]he preven-
tion of sexual exploitation and abuse of chil-
dren constitutes a government objective of
surpassing importance.” Id. at 757, 102
S.Ct. 8348. Balancing the effect of the law
on the welfare of children against the de
minimis value of the speech, the Court up-
held the law. Id. at 762-64, 102 S.Ct. 3348.

{11} More recently, the Court emphasized
that it is the protection of children—not a
general condemnation of material containing
child pornography—that is a state’s compel-
ling interest. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, the Court struck down a federal
statute prohibiting the possession or distribu-
tion of sexually explicit images that appeared
to display minors regardless of whether they
were produced using real children. 585 U.S.

580

234, 289, 256, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403
(2002). Providing examples such as Romeo
and Juliet (where Juliet was only thirteen
years old) and virtual porn (where porno-
graphic images are generated by computer),
the Court characterized the law as “prohib-
it{ing] speech that records no crime and cre-
ates no victims.” Id. at 247, 250, 122 S.Ct.
1389. It reiterated the holding of Ferber,
observing that “Ferber’s judgment about
child pornography was based upon how it
was made, not on what it communicated.”
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250-51, 122 8.Ct. 1389.

{12} In light of the above, and as a matter
of common wisdom, it is beyond question that
the State has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting children from sexual predators and
sexual exploitation. See, eg. Ferber, 458
US. at 756-57, 102 S.Ct. 3348; People v.
Hsu, 82 Cal.App.4th 976, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 184,
190 (2000); Foley, 709 N-Y.S.2d 467, 781
N.E.2d at 182; State v. Tarbay, 157 Ohio
App.38d 261, 2004-Ohio-2721, 810 N.E.2d 979,
at 17 9-10.

{18} Recognizing that compelling interest,
the inquiry then turns to whether Section
30-87-3.2 is narrowly tailored to the interest
it is intended to serve. We hold that it is.
Tailoring is primarily accomplished through
the “knowingly” scienter requirement, which
ensures that communications are criminal-
ized only when knowingly made to a child
under the age of sixteen. See State v. Rob-
ims, 2002 WI 65, 140, 253 Wis.2d 298, 646
N.W.2d 287 (noting that prohibitions on sexu-
al communications are overbroad when they
do not require the speakers to know they are
communicating to children); see also United
States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 687, 639 (6th Cir.
2000) (holding that a similar federal statute
was not overbroad because it only applied to
those who knowingly persuaded or enticed
minors). Furthermore, the statute does not,
restrict adults from communicating about sex
to children, nor does it restrict adults from
soliciting sex from one another over the in-
ternet. In fact, the statute prohibits only
that conduct necessary to achieve the State’s
interest. See, eg., United States v. Meek,
866 F.3d 705, 721-22 (9th Cir.2004) (noting
the significance, under a very similar federal
statute, of the mens rea requirement).

{14} Because Section 30-37-3.2 is narrow-
ly tailored to the compelling interest of pro-
tecting children from online sexual predators,
it is not unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. But, Defendant suggests that
the statute is overbroad because it might, for
example, prevent clergy or Planned Parent-
hood from “advising [teenagers] to engage in
abstinence and use masturbation as a means
of relieving sexual frustration.” We do not
believe that advising—in the contexts sug-
gested—is the same as soliciting. See
Williams, 558 U.S. at 298-99, 128 S.Ct. 1830
(distinguishing abstract advocacy from solici-
tation). Nonetheless, even assuming that
Defendant’s example was criminalized by the
statute, this single example does not show
that the statute prohibits a substantial
amount of free speech. See id. at 308, 128
S.Ct. 1830 (“The ‘mere fact that one can
conceive of some impermissible applications
of a statute is not sufficient to render it
susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.’ ”)
(quoting Members of City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 800, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772
(1984); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752-53, 773, 102
S.Ct. 3348 (concluding that statute prohibit-
ing distribution of books known to contain
depictions of sexual performances of children
was not overbroad despite its possible inclu-
sion of medical textbooks or National Geo-
graphic magazines). Should such a case
arise, future defendants could properly argue
that Section 30-37-3.2 is unconstitutional as
applied to them. See Ferber, 458 US. at
773-74, 102 S.Ct. 3348,

2. An Unlawful Element Is Not Neces-
sary

HE {15} Relying on State v. Pierce, 110
N.M. 76, 792 P.2d 408 (1990), and State v.
Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 808 P.2d 624 (1991),
Defendant argues that the statute is over-
broad because it is not limited by the phrase
“onlawful.” We disagree.

{16} In Pierce, a defendant argued that
the criminal sexual contact of a minor
(CSCM) statute was overbroad unless a spe-
cific intent element was read into it. 110

N.M. at 80, 792 P.2d at 412. The CSCM
intentional

statute prohibited unlawful,

touching of the intimate parts of a minor.
Id. The defendant argued that, without re-
quiring the specific intent that the touching
be for sexual gratification, the statute would
criminalize legal behavior such as ordinary
parental child care. Id. Our Supreme Court
disagreed, observing that the statute prohib-
ited only unlawful conduct. Id. Our cases
have defined unlawful as “without legal justi-
fication or excuse.” Id. at 80, 792 P.2d at
412. In the context of assault, we have noted
the importance of “unlawful” as a qualifier
because “[t]here are many strikings which
are not unlawful.” Territory v. Miera, 1
N.M. 887, 888 (1866). Because the statute
only prohibited touchings without justifica-
tion or excuse, the Court concluded that the
statute did not include the activities that the
defendant argued rendered it overbroad. Id.

{17} The Court again examined meaning
of the “unlawful” element in the CSCM stat-
utes one year after Pierce. In Osborne, a
man was convicted of CSCM for touching the
buttocks of his girlfriend’s seven-year-old
daughter while he hugged her. 111 N.M. at
655, 808 P.2d at 625. In dispute was wheth-
er the term “unlawful” was an element of the
crime or a defense. Id. The Court “found no
indication of express legislative intent as to
whether unlawfulness was meant to be treat-
ed as an element of the offense or its oppo-
site as a defense.” Jd. at 658, 808 P.2d at
628. Looking at both the practical conse-
quences and the use of “unlawful” in the
uniform jury instructions, the Court conclud-
ed that “unlawfulness” was an element that
the prosecution was required to prove. See
id. at 658-60, 808 P.2d at 628-30.

{18} We agree that the explicit inclusion of
an “unlawful” element could only improve
Section 30-87-8.2. However, we do not be-
lieve that the failure to include “unlawful”
renders the statute unconstitutionally over-
broad. Pierce instructs us that inclusion of
“anlawful” would limit the breadth of the
statute to avoid the hypotheticals propound-
ed by Defendant in this case. Pierce does
not say that statutes without an “unlawful”
element are necessarily overbroad. Osborne
provides guidance on whether “unlawful” is
an element or defense when it is present in a
statute. As we have noted above, this con-

581

cern is adequately addressed by the ability of
future defendants to argue that the statute is
unconstitutional as applied.

B. Due Process—Vagueness

TE {19} Defendant argues that Section
30-87-3.2 is unconstitutionally vague. In
particular, he asserts that the statute is
vague “because the statutory language lacks
a requirement that the communication serv-
ing the basis for [the] charge is unlawful
communication.” Additionally, Defendant
contends that the definition of sexual conduct.
“was not particularly defined to indicate what
conduct was prohibited.”

HM {20} ‘Under the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution,
vagueness can render a statute unconstitu-
tional. See State v. Leiding, 112 N.M. 148,
148, 812 P.2d 797, 802 (Ct.App.1991) (Bivins,
J., specially concurring). A statute is uncon-
stitutionally vague if it does not “allow indi-
viduals of ordinary intelligence a fair oppor-
tunity to determine whether their conduct is
prohibited.” Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152,
125, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896. Vagueness
also exists when “the statute permits police
officers, prosecutors, judges, or juries to en-
gage in arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment of the statute, which occurs because the
statute has no standards or guidelines and
therefore allows, if not encourages ... ad
hoe application.” Jd. 126. A statute enjoys
a strong presumption of constitutionality, and
the burden is on Defendant to prove it un-
constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. 124, “Because the essence of a vague-
ness claim rests on a lack of notice, a party
may not succeed on the claim if the statute
clearly applies to the defendant’s conduct.”
State v. Duran, 1998-NMCA-153, 131, 126
N.M. 60, 966 P.2d 768, abrogated on other
grounds, Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152, 123,
128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896.

{21} The statute in this case clearly ap-
plies to Defendant’s conduct. Section 30-37-
38.2 prohibits knowingly soliciting by comput-
er a child under sixteen to engage in sexual
conduct. There is no dispute that Defendant
believed he was communicating electronically
with a twelve-year-old girl. But Defendant
also cannot contend that he did not solicit

582

sexual conduct. Chapter 37 defines sexual
conduct to include, among other acts, an “act
of masturbation.” See NMSA 1978, § 30-
87-1(C) (1973). Defendant characterizes his
own behavior as a request that “Chrissy”
masturbate. Under the plain meaning of the
terms “solicit” and “masturbation,” Defen-
dant’s version of the facts supports a conclu-
sion that Defendant solicited “Chrissy” to
masturbate. Because the statute clearly ap-
plies to the facts of this case, Defendant may
not argue that the statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague.

C. Commerce Clause

TE {22} Defendant’s final argument is
that Section 30-37-3.2 violates the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion by regulating speech across multiple
states. The State responds that Defendant
has not shown that the statute imposes an
excessive burden on interstate commerce.
The State also cites to numerous out-of-state
cases that have concluded that soliciting chil-
dren to perform sex acts is not legitimate
interstate commerce.

HM {23} “In what has become known as
the ‘negative’ or ‘dormant’ Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, the Commerce Clause has
been interpreted as implicitly ‘prohibitling]
certain state actions that interfere with inter-
state commerce’”” Kmart Props. Ine. v.
N.M. Tawation & Revenue Dep't, 2006-
NMCA-026, 1118, 189 N.M. 177, 181 P.38d 27
(alteration in original) (quoting Quill Corp. v.
N.D. ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 309, 112
S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992)), reversed
on other grounds sub nom. Kmart Corp. v.
Taxation & Revenue Department, 2006-
NMSC-006, 189 N.M. 172, 181 P.8d 22. To
determine whether a statute impermissibly
burdens interstate commerce, we apply the
following balancing test:

Where [a] statute regulates evenhandedly

to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local pur-
pose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the

burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be pro-
moted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.

NM. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 111 N.M. 622, 628, 808
P.2d 592, 598 (1991) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 875, 393-94, 103
S.Ct. 1905, 76 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983)).

{24} Because the statute applies “even-
handedly” to both in-state and out-of-state
actors, we balance its burden on interstate
commerce against its local purpose. We
have already discussed the importance of the
State’s interest in preventing the sexual ex-
ploitation of children. As have the other
states to address this issue, we now hold that
Section 30-87-3.2 imposes no burden on le-
gitimate interstate commerce. See Hsu, 99
Cal.Rptr.2d at 190 (“[I]t is difficult to con-
ceive of any legitimate commerce that would
be burdened by penalizing the transmission
of harmful sexual material to known minors
in order to seduce them.”); Simmons v.
State, 944 So.2d 317, 334 (Fla.2006) (“[T]here
is no legitimate interstate commerce interest
in communicating with ... minors for the
purpose of luring them into sexual activity.”);
Foley, 709 N.Y.S.2d 467, 731 N.E.2d at 183
(“We are hard pressed to ascertain any legit-
imate commerce that is derived from the
intentional transmission of sexually graphic
images to minors for the purpose of luring
them into sexual activity.”). In addition, the
statute addresses only the behavior relevant
to its local purpose and thus could not be
drafted in a less restrictive way.

{25} Avoiding the balancing test, Defen-
dant argues that, according to American Li-
braries Association v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp.
160 (S.D.N.Y.1997), Section 30-37-3.2 vio-
lates the Commerce Clause. Defendant’s re-
liance on Pataki is misplaced. In Pataki, the
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the New York
Attorney General from enforcing a statute
that prohibited individuals from:

Knowing the character and content of the

communication which, in whole or in part,

depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual
conduct or sadomasochistic abuse, and

Pp 583
eer pene

which is harmful to minors, [to] intention-

ally use[] any computer communication

system allowing the input, output, exami-

nation or transfer, of computer data or

computer programs from one computer to

another, to initiate or engage in such com-

munication with a person who is a minor.
969 F.Supp. (alterations in original). The
court concluded that the statute violated the
Commerce Clause for three reasons: (1) be-
cause it criminalized conduct that occurred
entirely outside of New York, (2) because the
burdens on interstate commerce outweighed
the local benefits, and (8) because the inter-
net “must be marked off as a national pre-
serve to protect users from inconsistent leg-
islation” that might limit its growth. Id. at
169, 173-81.

{26} Patalei is easily distinguished. First,
Section 30-37-3.2 only applies to communica-
tions that originated or were received in New
Mexico. See § 30-37-3.2(C). Second, as we
discussed above, the New Mexico statute sur-
vives the balancing test because it burdens
no legitimate commerce. Because we do not
consider soliciting children to perform sex
acts to be legitimate conduct, we find Pa-
taki’s third rationale inapposite. Further-
more, unlike the law in Pataki, Section 30-
87-8.2 contains mens rea components that
require a defendant to know he is soliciting
acts from a child. Finally, Section 30-37-3.2
also prohibits only a narrow area of unpro-
tected speech, compared to the law in Pataki,
which included a significant amount of inde-
cent, but protected speech.

II CONCLUSION

{27} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the district court’s judgment and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.

{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER
and JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judges.

2011-NMCA-096
263 P.3d 925
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
v.
Jeremy COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 30,014.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

July 18, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, Aug. 29,
2011, No. 38,163.

584

a

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Jaequeline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Ap-
pellate Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, As-
sistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM,
for Appellant.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Chief Judge.

{1} Defendant was in the driver's seat of a
van parked on a roadside near Hobbs, New
Mexico, His girlfriend and her four young
children were in the car with him. Deputy
Kelly had been called to the location to inves-
tigate a report of a possible domestic incident.
occurring in the van. Suspecting that Defen-
dant was intoxicated, Deputy Brown ques-
tioned Defendant who admitted that he had
consumed alcohol recently. Defendant then
failed field sobriety tests (FSTs), was arrest-
ed for DWI, refused to submit to chemical
testing, and was unwilling to cooperate when
he was placed in the police car after arrest.
He was ultimately charged with and convict-
ed of aggravated DWI in violation of NMSA
1978, Section 66-8-102 (2008) (amended

2010); negligent child abuse not resulting in
great bodily harm or death in violation of
NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1 (2005) (amended
2009); and resisting, evading, or obstructing
an officer in violation of NMSA 1978, Section
30-22-1 (1981). On appeal, Defendant's pri-
mary challenge is to the sufficiency of the
evidence underlying the convictions. He ar-
gues that there was no evidence presented at
trial to prove that he actually drove while
impaired or that he endangered the chil-
dren’s lives. We agree, and we reverse these
convictions. His sufficiency arguments as to
resisting arrest are unpersuasive; the evi-
dence shows Defendant vigorously resisted
the deputies. We reverse in part, affirm in
part, and remand for resentencing on the
sole count of resisting arrest.
DISCUSSION

{2} As a preliminary matter, Defendant,
for the first time on appeal, contends that the
district court erred in failing to issue UJI 14-
4511 NMRA that defines the term “operat-
ing” in the DWI context. Because we con-
clude that the evidence is insufficient to sup-
port the DWI conviction, we need not reach
Defendant’s argument that UJI 144511 was
wrongly withheld. We first set out our stan-
dard of review, then turn our attention to the
DWI conviction, and finally examine the oth-
er convictions.

Standard of Review

{3} “The sufficiency of the evidence is
assessed against the jury instructions be-
cause they become the law of the case.”
State v. Quinones, 2011-NMCA-018, 138,
149 N.M. 294, 248 P.3d 836. The sufficiency
review itself involves a two-step process.
State v. Huber, 2006-NMCA-087, 1111, 140
N.M. 147, 140 P.8d 1096. Initially, the evi-
dence is viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict. Jd. The appellate court must
make a legal determination of “whether the
evidence viewed in this manner could justify
a finding by any rational trier of fact that
each element of the crime charged has been
established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Apodaca, 118 N.M. 762, 766, 887
P.2d 756, 760 (1994) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “[W]e will not.
reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judg-

{|
Es
ment for that of the fact finder provided that
there is sufficient evidence to support the

verdict.” State v. Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-
027, 118, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Aggravated DWI Conviction

TE {4} We begin with a summary of the
evidence presented at Defendant’s trial rela-
tive to the DWI count. In October 2008, the
Lea County Sheriff's Department received a
report of a possible domestic incident oceur-
ring in a van parked on a roadside in Hobbs,
New Mexico. Roughly five minutes after the
report was received, Deputy Brown arrived
at the location where the van was parked.
Deputy Sheriff Drew Buescher also respond-
ed and arrived shortly after Deputy Brown.

{5} Defendant was seated in the driver's
seat of the van; Defendant’s girlfriend was
seated in the front passenger seat; and the
four children, who were between the ages of
two and nine, were seated in the rear. The
van was not running, and the keys were not
in the ignition. Deputy Brown detected the
odor of alcohol emanating from the van and
suspected that both Defendant and his girl-
friend were intoxicated. Defendant’s girl-
friend’s speech was slurred, and she was
bleeding from her lip.

{6} Deputy Brown asked Defendant.
whether he had consumed any alcohol and
Defendant responded that he had consumed
twenty-four ounces of beer about one hour
earlier. The deputy ordered Defendant out
of the van and asked him to perform the
standard FSTs. Defendant initially objected,
stating that he was blind in one of his eyes,
but Defendant eventually acquiesced. He
failed the tests and was arrested for DWI
and went to trial on these and other charges.

{7} The jury was instructed that the es-
sential elements of aggravated DWI include
the following:

1. [Dlefendant operated a motor vehicle;

2. At the time [Defendant was under the

influence of intoxicating liquor; that is,
as a result of drinking liquor [D]efen-
dant was less able to the slightest de-
gree, either mentally or physically, or
both, to exercise the clear judgment

585

and steady hand necessary to handle a
vehicle with safety to the person and
the public;

8. [Defendant refused to submit to
chemical testing;

4, This happened in New Mexico, on or
about the 7th day of October, 2008.

Defendant asserts that the State failed to
submit sufficient evidence to prove that he
operated a motor vehicle while impaired to
the slightest degree and, alternatively, failed
to submit sufficient evidence of impairment.
We begin with the first of these two argu-
ments.

{8} Relying on State v. Sims, 2010-
NMSC-027, 148 N.M. 330, 236 P.3d 642, and
State v. Mailman, 2010-NMSC-036, 148
N.M. 702, 242 P.8d 269, Defendant claims
that the State failed to prove that he “intend-
ed to drive or that he had recently driven.”
Defendant’s argument must be divided into
two parts: did he intend to drive in the
future or did he recently drive. As to the
first scenario, the State did not try to prove
that Defendant intended to drive—that he
had actual physical control of the vehicle—as
a basis for the conviction. The State con-
firms and concedes this point on appeal.
The State’s sole theory at trial was that there
was ample circumstantial evidence that De-
fendant drove the van before he encountered
Deputies Brown and Buescher and that De-
fendant was impaired to the slightest degree
at that time. Only the Mailman case applies
here. We explain.

{9} In Sims, our Supreme Court compre-
hensively reviewed the origins and applicabil-
ity of the actual physical control standard
and set new parameters for its applicability.
Sims involved a driver who had lapsed into
unconsciousness while sitting behind the
wheel of a parked vehicle. 2010-NMSC-027,
11, 148 N.M. 330, 236 P.8d 642. When the
police discovered the defendant in his vehicle,
it was not running; and the keys were not in
the ignition. Id. The metropolitan court de-
termined that the defendant had been in
actual physical control of the vehicle, so the
defendant pled to one count of DWI but
reserved the right to appeal the metropolitan
court’s determination. Id. 12.

586

{10} In reversing the metropolitan court,
our Supreme Court turned a new page in its
DWI jurisprudence and concluded that the
State must prove two elements to secure a
DWI conviction under the actual physical
control standard: “(1) the defendant was ac-
tually, not just potentially, exercising control
over the vehicle, and (2) the defendant had
the general intent to drive so as to pose a
real danger to himself, herself, or the public.”
Id. 14, The Court expressly recognized the
consequence of these new requirements: “in-
terpreting actual physical control to require
proof of intent makes it analytically similar
to an attempt crime.” Jd. 127. Applying
this reformulated standard to the facts in
Sims, the Court determined that the State
failed to meet its burden. Id 14. Sims
directs that the actual physical control stan-
dard is applicable only when the prosecution
is premised on prospective or anticipated im-
paired driving.

{11} In Mailman, as in Sims, the defen-
dant was seated in the driver’s seat of his
parked vehicle when he was approached by
an officer. Mailman, 2010-NMSC-036, 12,
148 N.M. 702, 242 P.3d 269. The vehicle was
not running, and the keys were not in the
ignition. Jd. 15. The officer suspected that
the defendant was intoxicated—there was an
open beer can on the center console, and he
demonstrated physical signs of impairment.
Id. 13. The defendant confirmed the officer’s
suspicions by admitting that he had con-
sumed a six pack of beer and had thrown the
empty cans out of the window of his vehicle
as he drove from the location he had been
earlier. Id. 14, The defendant refused to
perform field sobriety tests or take a breath
test. Id. 15. As to the latter, he admitted
that he was too drunk to pass. Id.

{12} At trial, the state argued that the
defendant was guilty of DWI based on either
of the following two theories: (1) the defen-
dant was in actual physical control of the
vehicle while impaired; or (2) the defendant
actually drove the vehicle while impaired.
Id. 16. The jury returned a general verdict
of guilty. Id.

{18} Citing the new requirements estab-
lished in Sims, the Mailman Court observed
that there was insufficient evidence present-

ed “to demonstrate that [the d]efendant had
taken an overt step toward driving with a
general intent to drive so as to endanger
himself or the public” and held that the
defendant could not have been convicted un-
der a theory of actual physical control. Id.
121. The Court clarified, however, that this
conclusion had no bearing on the viability of
the past impaired driving theory of convic-
tion and held that “[aletual physical control is
not necessary to prove DWI unless there are
no witnesses to the vehicle’s motion and in-
sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer
that the accused actually drove while intoxi-
cated.” Id. 1926, 28 (emphasis omitted).
The Court determined that the evidence sup-
ported a conviction based on past impaired
driving. Id. 1923-24. The jury had re-
turned a general verdict. Id. 112. Because
that verdict could have been reached by con-
viction based on actual physical control—a
theory that had not been proved at trial—the
Court determined that the general verdict
could not stand. Id. The Court reversed the
conviction and remanded for a new trial sole-
ly on the issue of past impaired driving. Id.
‘19 12, 28-29,

{14} We now turn to the present case. At
Defendant's trial, the State’s exclusive theory
was that he drove the van before he encoun-
tered Deputies Brown and Buescher and was
impaired to the slightest degree at that time.
This matter is analogous to Mailman; Sims
is inapplicable here. Thus, we need not ad-
dress Defendant's contention that the State
failed to prove actual physical control and
need not concern ourselves with the parties’
discussion of Sims. We need only evaluate
whether there was sufficient evidence to
prove the State’s theory that Defendant
drove before the deputies made contact with
him and that he was impaired to the slightest
degree at that time. The State offered the
following remarks during closing argument:

The vehicle is on the side of road. We can

probably take for granted that it wasn’t

placed there by aliens. There’s no indica-
tion that the vehicle is the home. In other
words, that these people live out of this
van. So, if it is on the side of the road, it
got there somehow. You can infer that
somebody drove it. You can also infer

that the person sitting in the driver's seat

was the one that brought it there. Those

are called reasonable inferences from the

evidence.
As proof of Defendant's impairment at the
time he had driven, the State directed the
jury to the following facts: the odor of alco-
hol emanating from the van, Defendant’s ad-
mission that he had consumed twenty-four
ounces of beer one hour before he encoun-
tered Deputy Brown, Defendant’s poor per-
formance on the FSTs, Defendant's belliger-
ent and unruly behavior, and his refusal to
undergo breath or blood testing. This evi-
dence supports the conclusion that Defen-
dant was impaired during the time of contact
with the deputies. The mere fact that De-
fendant’s van was observed at a roadside
location with Defendant sitting in it in a state
of intoxication, without more, does not prove
Defendant drove while impaired in violation
of Section 66-8-102. Indeed, there was no
evidence presented to prove that the driving
and impairment overlapped. No one testi-
fied about seeing Defendant driving while
impaired. Although Defendant admitted he
consumed alcohol one hour before speaking
to Deputy Brown, there was no evidence
regarding when Defendant parked the van.
Defendant could have parked and then con-
sumed the beer. The State, therefore, failed
to establish that Defendant drove after he
had consumed alcohol and after aleohol had
impaired his ability to drive to the slightest
degree. The State’s inability to supply this
needed evidence is determinative. Although
the jury could infer that Defendant drove to
the location where he was arrested, the jury
could not infer that Defendant drove while
impaired. Based on the evidence presented,
any connection drawn between the drinking
and driving had to result from impermissible
speculation. See State v. Vigil, 2010~NMSC-
003, 120, 147 N.M. 587, 226 P.3d 636 (“For
the jury to have reached [the conclusions
necessary to the verdict, it] had to speculate.
This it may not do.” (alteration in original)
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).

{15} We hold that there was insufficient
evidence presented to prove Defendant oper-
ated a motor vehicle while impaired to the
slightest degree. As such, we conclude that

587

Defendant’s aggravated DWI conviction
must be reversed. In light of this conclu-
sion, we need not consider Defendant's alter-
native argument that the State failed to pres-
ent sufficient evidence of impairment or his
contention that the district court committed
fundamental error in failing to issue UJI 14-
4511. We turn to the next issue.

Child Abuse Conviction

TI {16} Defendant next argues that the
State failed to present sufficient evidence to
support the child abuse conviction. The evi-
dence on this charge is essentially the same
as the evidence presented in relation to the
DWI count. The jury was instructed that in
order to convict Defendant of child abuse in
violation of Section 30-6-1, the State had to
prove the following:

1. [Defendant] permitted four small chil-
dren to be placed in a situation which
endangered the life or health of the
four children;

2. [D]efendant acted with reckless disre-
gard. To find that [Defendant] acted
with reckless disregard, you must find
that [Defendant] knew or should have
known [that his] conduct created a
substantial and foreseeable risk, [D]e-
fendant disregarded that risk and
[Defendant was wholly indifferent to
the consequences of the conduct and to
the welfare and safety of the four chil-
dren;

8. [Defendant] was a parent, guardian or
custodian of the children, or [D]efen-
dant had accepted responsibility for
the children’s welfare;

4, The four children were under the age
of 18;

5. This happened in New Mexico on or
about the 7th day of October, 2008.

At trial, the State argued during closing that
elements one and two were established by
evidence that both Defendant and his girl-
friend were impaired and incapable of driv-
ing and, yet, had the children in the car with
them. The State did not rely on the chil-
dren’s proximity to the violence apparently
inflicted on the mother by Defendant as evi-
denced by her bleeding lip. Nor did the

588

State rely, as it did with the DWI charge, on
evidence of past driving. Even if it had, we
have held that there was insufficient evidence
to prove that Defendant was DWI based on
past driving. As to DWI based on actual
physical control under Sims, 2010-NMSC-
027, 148 N.M. 330, 236 P.8d 642, the State
concedes that this theory was not raised at
trial and is not “sufficiently at issue.” In-
stead, the State’s case on the child abuse
count was premised on the theory that hypo-
thetical conduct, i.e, the possibility that De-
fendant might drive, placed the children in a
situation which endangered their lives and
health. We evaluate the State’s position in
light of State v. Chavez, 2009~-NMSC-035,
146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891, a recent decision
from our Supreme Court clarifying the appli-
eability of Section 30-6-1.

{17} Chavez recognized that in cases of
child abuse, remedies range from civil inter-
vention by CYFD to criminal sanctions.
2009-NMSC-035, 11 12-15. “Child abuse by
endangerment ... is a special classification
designed to address situations where an ac-
cused’s conduct exposes a child to a signifi-
cant risk of harm, even though the child does
not suffer a physical injury.” Id. 115 (nter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Chavez Court rejected a literal interpre-
tation of the statute to permit any conduct
that “may endanger [a] child’s life or health.”
Id. 116 (alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). Rather,
it understood the Legislature to reserve
criminal prosecution of this third-degree felo-
ny for “the most serious occurrences, and not
for minor or theoretical dangers.” Id. (em-
phasis added). The Court went on to parse
out what differentiated a “serious occur-
rence” from a “minor or theoretical danger.”
Looking to language derived from the uni-
form jury instruction for Section 80~6-1, the
Court focused on the portion of the instruec-
tion directing the jury to “find that ‘defen-
dant’s conduct created a substantial and
foreseeable risk’ of harm.” Chavez, 2009-
NMSC-035, 1122, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891
(quoting UJI 14-604 NMRA). The Court

explained that this standard—whether the
defendant’s conduct created a substantial and
foreseeable risk of harm—‘“more closely
aligns with the legislative purpose that ani-

mates the child endangerment statute—to
punish conduct that creates a truly signifi-
cant risk of serious harm to children.” Id.

{18} In this case, the State did not rely on
Defendant’s actual conduct, but rather on the
possibility of his future conduct—conduct
that did not occur because the police inter-
vened. The State points to State v. Graham,
2005-NMSC-004, 110, 187 N.M. 197, 109
P.3d 285, a case in which the Court deter-
mined that there was sufficient cireumstan-
tial evidence to support an inference that the
defendant had left marijuana in the living
room and a marijuana bud in the baby crib,
both of which were accessible to the children.
The State likens the reasonable possibility
that the children would come in contact with
the marijuana to the reasonable possibility
that Defendant would drive off thus exposing
the children to the dangers of being in a car
with an impaired driver. We see a differ-
ence.

{19} In Graham, the defendant acted; he
left the marijuana available to the children,
and marijuana is a dangerous substance as
evidenced by its inclusion as a Schedule I
controlled substance. See NMSA 1978,
§ 30-81-6(C)(10) (2007); Graham, 2005-
NMSC-004, {11 10, 12, 187 N.M. 197, 109 P.8d
285. In the case before us, Defendant had
not yet acted. Any possibility of harm to the
children would have to be based on Defen-
dant’s driving of the vehicle. At some point,
Defendant might drive the vehicle, but there
was no evidence about when or if this was
going to occur. He might have decided to
wait until the effects of the alcohol in his
system had dissipated. Or, as happened in
this case, he was arrested, and there was no
opportunity to drive away.

{20} The other cases relied on by the State
also involved acts by Defendant. State v.
McGruder, 1997-NMSC-023, 138, 128 N.M.
302, 940 P.2d 150 (upholding child abuse
conviction based on the defendant’s threat to
kill the child’s mother with a gun when the
child was standing behind her), abrogated on
other grounds by Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035,
146 N.M. 434, 211 P.8d 891; State v. Ungar-
ten, 115 N.M. 607, 609, 856 P.2d 569, 571
(Ct.App.1993) (basing child abuse charge on
the defendant’s brandishing a knife at the

father with the child so close that the child
felt he was in danger), abrogated on other
grounds by Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, 146
N.M. 484, 211 P.3d 891. These cases are
distinguishable because, in both cases, there
was evidence that the defendant took action
and that the action endangered a child.

{21} The facts presented at trial were as
follows: Defendant was sitting in the driver’s
seat of a van parked by the side of the road;
he exhibited signs of impairment; the other
adult passenger in the van was impaired;
there were no keys in the ignition; four
children were seated in the back of the van;
he was arrested and never drove the van
away. The State’s theory is that the danger
posed by the possibility that Defendant
might drive while impaired exposed the chil-
dren to a substantial and foreseeable risk of
harm. While we agree that driving impaired
with children in the car could cause grave
harm depending on the circumstances, the
possibility that Defendant might drive is a
theoretical danger—the exact type of danger
our Legislature did not intend to bring with-
in the ambit of Section 30-6-1.

{22} We conclude that the theoretical dan-
ger to the children posed by the possibility of
Defendant’s impaired driving was insufficient
to support Defendant’s child abuse convic-
tion. We do not mean to minimize the prob-
lem of drunken driving or the possibility of
danger to the children had Defendant actual-
ly driven. We cannot, however, conclude
that the State met its evidentiary burden in
this case. We proceed to the last issue on
appeal.

Conviction for Resisting Arrest

WM {23} Finally, Defendant contends,
pursuant to State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127,
129, 428 P.2d 982, 984 (1967), and State v.
Boyer, 103 N.M. 655, 658-59, 712 P.2d 1, 4-6
(Ct.App.1985), that there was insufficient evi-
dence presented that he resisted arrest. At
trial, there was evidence that after Defen-
dant was arrested, Deputies Brown and
Buescher then together attempted to place
him in one of their vehicles. Defendant ar-
gued with the deputies and was unwilling to
cooperate. He was eventually persuaded to
enter the vehicle, but would not put his legs

589

inside which prevented the officers from clos-

ing the door. Deputy Brown attempted to
force Defendant’s legs inside by pulling him
into the vehicle, but Defendant then placed
his head in a position which prevented the
door from being closed. Defendant then
purposely moved in such a way that he fell
out of the vehicle. He was arguing and
screaming while lying face down on the
ground. When the deputies attempted to
pick him up, he kicked Deputy Buescher.
The deputies then attempted to apply leg
restraints, at which time Defendant kicked
Deputy Buescher again. A third deputy was
ultimately needed to secure Defendant in the
vehicle. After that was accomplished, Depu-
ty Brown drove Defendant to a detention
center.

{24} The jury was instructed that the es-
sential elements of resisting, evading, or ob-
structing an officer in violation of Section 30-
22-1 include the following:

1. [Deputy] Brown was a peace officer
in the lawful discharge of duty;

2, [D]efendant resisted or abused
[Deputy] Brown in the lawful discharge of
[his] duties;

3. This happened in New Mexico, on or
about the 7th day of October, 2008.

Defendant takes issue only with the evidence
relating to element two. His arguments ap-
pear to be that the evidence at trial was
wrongly construed. He claims that he was
not resisting arrest but merely attempting to
speak with his girlfriend and that the officers
overreacted and handled him roughly. De-
fendant’s arguments are unavailing; he is
asking us to reweigh the evidence. This we
cannot do. Fuentes, 2010~-NMCA-027, 113,
147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181. There was
ample evidence to demonstrate that Defen-
dant resisted or abused Deputy Brown.

CONCLUSION

{25} We hold that the State failed to pres-
ent sufficient evidence to sustain the aggra-
vated DWI and the child abuse convictions.
The Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial on
these matters, State v. Sanchez, 2000-
NMSC-021, 130, 129 N.M. 284, 6 P.3d 486,
so these charges are dismissed. However,
we hold that the resisting arrest conviction is

590 Le
supported by sufficient evidence, and we re- [i

mand this matter to the district court with
instructions to resentence Defendant on that.

sole conviction.
{26} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER

and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges.

2011-NMCA-104
263 P.3d 932

STORM DITCH, a community
ditch, Plaintiff-Appellant,

ve

John R. D’ANTONIO, Jr., New Mexico
State Engineer, Defendant-
Appellee.

No. 29,778.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

July 21, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, Sept. 21,
2011, No. 38,159.

George Chandler Law, George Chandler,
‘Los Alamos, NM, for Appellant.

DL Sanders, Chief Counsel, Martha C.
Franks, Special Assistant Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

H. John Underwood, Ltd., Zach Cook, Rui-
doso, NM, for Ruidoso Downs.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} Two years after the time for filing a
protest had expired, Storm Ditch, a commu-
nity acequia, tried to protest an application
filed with the State Engineer by the estate of
Alfred MeTeigue (the Estate) and the City of
Ruidoso Downs (together, the Applicants) for
the transfer of the Estate’s water rights from
the acequia. We must decide whether the
Applicants gave proper notice of their appli-
cation to Storm Ditch. We conclude that
notice by publication, as required by statute,
was sufficient and proper notice to Storm
Ditch and that Storm Ditch’s protest came
too late. As a result, we affirm the denial of
Storm Ditch’s motions to intervene in the
application process, its request for a hearing
before the State Engineer, and its petition
for mandamus.

BACKGROUND

{2} In December 2004, the Applicants filed
an application with the State Engineer to
transfer water rights owned by the Estate
from Storm Ditch to the City of Ruidoso
Downs (the City). If a proposed transfer of
water rights moves water into or out of an
acequia, the transfer cannot be approved un-
Jess the applicant complies with any require-
ments adopted by the acequia, and the appli-
cant must submit documentary evidence of
such compliance along with the application.

591

See NMSA 1978, § 72-5-24.1(A), (B) (2008).
Tf an acequia has not adopted any require-
ments for approval, the applicant must sub-
mit an affidavit from the commissioners of
the acequia stating this fact. See § 72-5-
24.1(C). In this case, the Applicants did not
submit the required affidavit when they sub-
mitted the application, but it is undisputed
that at the time the application was filed,
Storm Ditch did not have any bylaws or
regulations requiring approval for any
changes or transfers in water rights.

{3} The Applicants sought to comply with
the statutory notice requirement, NMSA
1978, Section 72-5-4 (2001), by publishing a
notice of the application in a local newspaper
on three occasions, with the last publication
occurring on January 13, 2005. Four days
prior to the deadline for filing protests, a
friend of Storm Ditch commissioner Lucia
Sanchez informed her of the application dur-
ing a telephone call. Entities other than
Storm Ditch filed timely protests with the
State Engineer. See NMSA 1978, § 72-5-5
(1985) (stating the time for filing protests).
Storm Ditch did not file a protest within the
time limit.

{4} A hearing on the application was con-
vened and then adjourned so that settlement
negotiations could take place between the
Applicants and the protestants. A little over
two years later, the Applicants became aware
that they needed to obtain an affidavit from
Storm Ditch indicating that Storm Ditch had
not adopted any compliance requirements for
applicants seeking transfer of water into or
out of the acequia, as required by Section 72-—
5-24.1(C). The administrative proceedings
were stayed pending receipt of the affidavit.

{5} The Applicants approached Storm
Ditch to obtain the affidavit. Storm Ditch
refused to provide it and instead filed a
motion to intervene in the application pro-
ceeding or, in the alternative, to have the
application dismissed. In the motion, Storm
Ditch argued that the Applicants’ failure to
comply with the affidavit requirements of
Section 72-5-24.1(C) resulted in a lack of
constitutionally required notice to Storm
Ditch of a proceeding directly affecting its
interests. It also argued that the notice
given by telephone to one of its commission-

592

ers four days before the protest period ended
was insufficient because the four days did not
allow enough time to file a protest.

{6} The hearing officer from the Office of
the State Engineer (OSE) denied Storm
Ditch’s motion to intervene without holding a
hearing. He found that Storm Ditch had in
fact received notice of the application when
the commissioner received notice by tele-
phone before the protest deadline. He also
rejected Storm Ditch’s argument that the
affidavit requirement in Section 72-5-24.1(C)
mandated the Applicants to provide Storm
Ditch with actual notice. The hearing officer
lifted the stay of the administrative proceed-
ings related to the application because an
affidavit from one of Storm Ditch’s commis-
sioners, previously attached to the motion to
intervene, acknowledged that at the time the
application was filed, Storm Ditch had yet to
enact a rule or bylaw requiring that changes
in water rights be subject to the approval of
the commissioners.

{7} Storm Ditch filed a motion for a hear-
ing before the State Engineer consistent with
NMSA 1978, Section 72-2-16 (1978), for re-
consideration of the denial of its motion to
intervene because it had not received consti-
tutionally adequate notice of the application.
The State Engineer denied Storm Ditch’s
motion without holding a hearing. He found
that no hearing was required because Storm
Ditch had failed to file a timely objection or
protest and, as a result, it was not a party to
the application. He also found that Storm
Ditch had no bylaws requiring that any
change in water rights be subject to acequia
approval and that a Storm Ditch commission-
er had actual notice four days before the
protest period expired. Storm Ditch re-
ceived notice of the denial by certified mail.

{8} Storm Ditch again filed a request for a
hearing with the State Engineer. The OSE
hearings unit administrator sent a letter to
Storm Ditch informing it that the case was
closed because Storm Ditch’s initial motion
had been heard on the basis of the pleadings
and the acequia commissioner’s affidavit.
The letter also indicated that the State Engi-
neer had determined that any request for a
further hearing on the motion should be de-
nied.

{9} Storm Ditch appealed to the district
court and petitioned for a writ of mandamus
requiring the State Engineer to hold a hear-
ing on its earlier motion to intervene, consis-
tent with Section 72-2-16. The State Engi-
neer and the City filed motions to dismiss.

{10} The district court dismissed the ap-
peal and the petition for writ of mandamus,
finding that Storm Ditch was not a party
because it failed to file a timely protest to the
application and, as a result, it did not qualify
as an aggrieved person for purposes of the
hearing requirements in Section 72-2-16.
‘The court further found that, because Storm
Ditch was not aggrieved, it had no standing
to appeal. Finally, the court found that,
under NMSA 1978, Section 72-7-1 (1971),
Storm Ditch had failed to file a timely appeal
of the State Engineer's initial decision deny-
ing Storm Ditch’s motion to intervene. This
appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{11} Storm Ditch raises three issues on
appeal that we have combined into two is-
sues. First, it claims that, consistent with
due process considerations and with the affi-
davit requirement of Section 72-5-24.1, it
was entitled to receive actual notice of the
proposed transfer of water rights from the
acequia. Asserting that it did not receive
proper notice, it contends that it was not
required to file its protest within the statuto-
ry time limits. Second, Storm Ditch argues
that the State Engineer improperly denied
its request for a hearing. Because a hearing
before the State Engineer is a prerequisite
to a district court appeal under Section 72-2-
16, Storm Ditch maintains that the district
court should have either determined that
Storm Ditch’s appeal was timely or granted
its petition for a writ of mandamus requiring
the State Engineer to hold a hearing on the
denial of its motion to intervene.

Hl {12} The contentions raised by Storm
Ditch in its appeal require interpretation of
various water law statutes and, as a result,
review is de novo. See Derringer v. Turney,
2001-NMCA-075, 18, 131 N.M. 40, 33 P.8d
40 (“Interpretation of a statute is a matter of
law, which an appellate court reviews de
novo.”).

1. Storm Ditch Received Adequate Notice
of the Application and Was Required
to File a Timely Protest

{13} Storm Ditch argues that it should not
be bound by the statutory time limits for
filing a protest because the affidavit require-
ment in Section 72-5-24.1 entitles it and all
other acequias to actual notice rather than
the notice by publication that occurred in this
case. To provide context, we first review the
relevant portions of the statutory time limits
governing protests.

{14} Section 72-5-5(A) provides:

‘Whenever an application is filed which re-

quires advertisement{,] ... the advertise-

ment shall state that objections or protests
to the granting of the application may be
filed with the state engineer within ten
days after the last publication of the notice.

If objection or protest is timely filed, the

state engineer shall advise interested par-

ties, and a hearing shall be held as other-
wise provided by statute.

Under this provision, anyone wanting to pro-

test or object to the Applicants’ application in

the present case had until January 23, 2005,

to file an objection or protest. It is undis-

puted that Storm Ditech failed to do this.

Despite its failure to comply with Section 72-

5-5(A), Storm Ditch claims that it was ex-

cused from filing a timely protest; and it was

entitled to intervene over two years later
because it did not receive proper notice of
the application. Cf Eldorado at Santa Fe,

Inc. v. Cook, 113 N.M. 38, 36-87, 822 P.2d

672, 675-76 (Ct.App.1991) (recognizing that

due to an erroneous publication notice, the

petitioners “failed to receive notice of the
application for the permit ... without any
fault or negligence on their part” and holding
that the district court properly issued a writ
of certiorari because the failure to provide
the petitioners with notice and an opportuni-
ty to be heard rendered the state engineer’s
act in issuing the permit either void or voida-
ble), abrogated on other grounds as recog-
nized by Goodloe v. Bookout, 1999-NMCA-—

061, 127 N.M. 327, 980 P.2d 652.

{15} Storm Ditch claims that notification
by publication was insufficient because it is
entitled to actual notice. It argues that it
would have received actual notice of the ap-

593

plication and filed a timely protest if the
Applicants had complied with the require-
ments of Section 72-5-24.1(C) by seeking an
affidavit from the commissioners at the time
the Applicants filed the application.

{16} Section 72-5-24.1(A) provides in rele-
vant part:
A. The state engineer shall not ap-
prove an application for a change ... in
point of diversion or place or purpose of
use of a water right into or out of an
acequia or community ditch if the applicant
has not complied with the applicable re-
quirement adopted by an acequia or com-
munity ditch pursuant to [NMSA 1978,
Section 73-2-21(E) (2003)] or [NMCA
1978, Section 73-3-4.1 (2008) ].
B. The applicant for a change de-
scribed in Subsection A of this [slection
shall submit with the application to the
state engineer documentary evidence pro-
vided by the commissioners of the acequia
or community ditch of the applicant's com-
pliance with any applicable requirement
for the change adopted by the acequia or
community ditch pursuant to Subsection E
of Section 78-2-21 or Section 73-8-4.1....
C. If an acequia or community ditch
has not adopted an applicable requirement,
the applicant shall submit to the state en-
gineer along with the application an affida-
vit provided by the commissioners of the
acequia or community ditch stating this
fact.
It is undisputed that Storm Ditch had not
adopted any requirements for applicants. As
a result, the Applicants in this case should
have complied with Section 72-5-24.1(C) and
submitted with their application to the State
Engineer an affidavit from Storm Ditch stat-
ing this fact. The Applicants did not seek
this affidavit until more than two years after
they submitted their application during the
time that proceedings on the application had
been suspended for settlement negotiations.

{17} Storm Ditch appears to make a two-
part argument in connection with the notice
issue. First, it claims that the statutory
scheme established a property right that en-
titled it to more than notice by publication.
Second, it argues that the Applicants’ failure

594

to comply with the affidavit requirement in
Section 72-5-24.1(C) should have caused the
State Engineer to reject the application. In
either case, Storm Ditch maintains, the State
Engineer should have dismissed the applica-
tion, at which time Storm Ditch would be
placed in the position it would have been in
had it been given proper notice, and it could
have intervened to protest the granting of
the application. We address each of these
sub-arguments in turn.

a. Storm Ditch Was Not Entitled to
Heightened Notice and, in Fact, it Re-
* ceived Actual Notice

HM {18} Storm Ditch claims that if the
Applicants had sought the affidavit as re-
quired by Section 72-5-24.1(C), it would have
received actual notice of the application. It
maintains that it was entitled to this actual
notice because it has a property interest at
stake in the application proceeding that war-
ranted greater process and protection than
what was provided in this case. See Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 389 U.S.
306, 318, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)
(holding that notice by publication was insuf-
ficient to accord due process to the beneficia-
ries of a trust whose residence was known
and who could be deprived of property in the
pending legal action); Uhden v. N.M. Oil
Conservation Comm’n, 112 N.M. 528, 580-31,
817 P.2d 721, 728-24 (1991) (recognizing that
a grant of royalty rights in a mineral lease is
a grant of real property so the appellant had
a property interest in an oil and gas lease
and was entitled to personal notice of an
administrative proceeding that could directly
impact that interest). We disagree for three
reasons.

{19} First, the plain language of Section
'72-5-24.1(C) makes no reference to notice.
See Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Con-
servation Comm’n, 2009-NMSC-018, 19, 146
N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135 (stating that we con-
sider a statute’s plain language in order to
“give effect to the Legislature’s intent”). In-
stead, Section 72-5-24.1 appears to be di-
rected at providing the state engineer with
assurance that an applicant has met all re-
quirements imposed by acequia bylaws be-
fore the state engineer acts on an application

to transfer water rights served by an aceq-
uia. See generally § 72-5-24.1(A), (B). As
a result, nothing in the plain language of
Section 72-5-24.1 and, more specifically,
nothing in Subsection C leads us to conclude
that Storm Ditch is entitled to actual notice.

{20} Second, we are not convinced that
any other circumstances entitled Storm Ditch
to any notice beyond the notice by publica-
tion provided by the Applicants in compliance
with Section 72-54. Storm Ditch argues
that it has a property interest that the Legis-
lature recognized by passing Sections 72-5-
24.1 and 78-2-21(E), because these provi-
sions allow acequia commissioners to approve
or deny water transfers. See generally
§ 72-5-24.1 (stating in part that an applicant
seeking to transfer water from an acequia
must show that it has complied with any
rules or regulations adopted by the acequia
for approval of the transfer); Section 73-2-
21(E) (authorizing an acequia to adopt rules
or bylaws requiring approval of the acequia
commissioners for any “change in point of
diversion or place or purpose of use of a
water right served by th[at] acequia” but also
stating that the acequia commissioners can-
not deny approval unless they determine the
change would be detrimental to the acequia
or its members).

{21} Although Sections 72-5-24.1 and 73-
2-21(E) authorize an acequia to enact certain
requirements before a transfer may be ap-
proved, we do not interpret this authorization
as conveying a “property right” in the aceq-
uia requiring anything more than notice by
publication as provided in Section 72-5-4.
Storm Ditch had not enacted any rules or
bylaws concerning transfer approval, and
Storm Ditch therefore had no power to ap-
prove or deny the application. As a result,
we fail to see why it would be entitled to
some form of heightened notice of the appli-
cation. See Wilson v. Denver, 1998-NMSC-
016, 129, 125 N.M. 308, 961 P.2d 158 (recog-
nizing, in an opinion predating the enactment
of Section 72-5-24.1, that a ditch association
“does not and cannot control the use to which
the landowners who are entitled to the water
choose to put it” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). The only authority
Storm Ditch had under the circumstances

was to execute an affidavit stating that it had
no requirements governing water transfers.

{22} Storm Ditch also relies on Section 72-
5-5(B) and argues that it is entitled to actual
notice because, as a political subdivision, it
“has automatic statutory standing to pro-
test.” See § 72-5-5(B) (stating that “all po-
litical subdivisions of the state ... shall have
standing to file objections or protests”). We
are not persuaded because Section 72-5~5(B)
does not confer special rights on acequias or
on any other political entity. Instead, it
merely confers standing to file an objection
or protest on anyone “substantially and spe-
cifically affected by the granting of the appli-
cation,” any agency or division of the [S]tate
of New Mexico, and “all political subdivisions
of the state and their agencies, instrumentali-
ties and institutions.” Section 72-5-5(B). If
Section 72-5-5(B) is interpreted as entitling
Storm Ditch to actual notice, then any person
or entity eligible to file a protest or objection
under that Section would also be entitled to
actual notice. This interpretation would ren-
der meaningless the language of Section 72-
5-4 authorizing notice by publication. See
Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed’n of
Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, 128, 125 N.M.
401, 962 P.2d 1236 (recognizing that statutes
must be interpreted so that no part is ren-
dered superfluous or meaningless).

{23} Third, even if notice by publication
was somehow inadequate, the actual tele-
phone notice received by a Storm Ditch
commissioner four days before the protest
deadline would be sufficient to satisfy any
constitutional requirement. See Mullane,
839 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652 (holding that
notice is sufficient if it is “reasonably caleu-
lated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections”). Although Storm
Ditch claims that it did not have time to
formally protest the application once it had
notice, we are not convinced that this excus-
es its decision to wait over two-and-a-half
years before making any attempt to inter-
vene. See Anthony Water & Sanitation
Dist. v. Turney, 2002-NMCA-095, 114-5, 9-
18, 182 N.M. 683, 54 P.3d 87 (rejecting the
appellant’s argument that it should be ex-

595

cused from strict compliance with the ser-
vice by publication requirements of Section
72-T-1 because compliance within the statu-
tory time period would be too difficult).

b. The Alleged Deficiency in the Applica-
tion Did Not Provide Storm Ditch with
an Additional Remedy

HI {24} Storm Ditch claims that the Ap-
plicants’ failure to seek an affidavit at the
proper time in compliance with Section 72-5-
24,1(C) should result in dismissal of the ap-
plication and the dissent agrees with this
argument. Storm Ditch argues that the
State Engineer should have rejected the ap-
plication before the Applicants published no-
tice. It relies on NMSA 1978, Section 72-5-
8 (1941), which provides in part that if an
“application is defective as to form, ... it
shall be returned with a statement of the
corrections, amendments or changes re-
quired, within thirty days after its receipt,
and sixty days shall be allowed for the refil-
ing thereof.” Storm Ditch maintains that if
the application had been rejected, the Appli-
cants would have been required to obtain the
affidavit required by Section 72-5-24.1(C),
Storm Ditch would have received actual no-
tice of the application, and Storm Ditch could
have filed a timely protest.

{25} We are not persuaded. As we stated
above, the Applicants’ failure to request the
affidavit at an earlier point did not deprive
Storm Ditch of notice as required by Section
72-5-4. Notice by publication was adequate,
and Storm Ditch had actual telephone notice
through its commissioner. Any deficiency in
the application that the State Engineer alleg-
edly overlooked could have been raised in a
timely filed protest or objection to the appli-
cation, but Storm Ditch failed to file such a
protest within the statutory time limits,

{26} Storm Ditch also relies on an admin-
istrative regulation that provides in part that
the state engineer should reject and preclude
publication of an application that fails to com-
ply with the applicable requirements of Sec-
tion 72-5-24.1. See 19.26.2.12(B) NMAC
(1/31/2005). But as noted by the hearing
examiner when he rejected Storm Ditch’s
motion to intervene, that regulation was not
in effect at the time the Applicants submitted

596

the application or when notice of the applica-
tion was published in a local newspaper.
Therefore, that regulation does not apply in
this case. See Howell v. Heim, 118 N.M.
500, 506, 882 P.2d 541, 547 (1994) (stating
that statutes and regulations are presumed
to “apply prospectively absent a clear inten-
tion to the contrary”).

{27} In summary, the Applicants complied
with the statutory notice provisions contained
in Section 72-5-4 by publishing an accurate
notice on three occasions. As a result, Storm
Ditch received adequate notice. The district
court properly determined that Storm
Ditch’s objection to the application was too
late and that the State Engineer appropriate-
ly denied its motion to intervene.

2, Storm Ditch Was Not Entitled to a
Hearing Under Section 72-2-16

{28} Storm Ditch argues that the district
court erroneously determined that its appeal
was untimely. The district court determined
that Storm Ditch should have filed its notice
of appeal within thirty days of its receipt of
the State Engineer's order denying its mo-
tion for a hearing, as required by Section 72-
7-1(B) (stating that “[a]ppeals to the district
court shall be taken by serving a notice of
appeal upon the state engineer ... within
thirty days after receipt by certified mail of
notice of the decision, act or refusal to act”).
Storm Ditch claims that it could not file a
notice of appeal within the required time
limit because Section 72-2-16 states that.
“{nJo appeal shall be taken to the district
court until the state engineer has held a
hearing and entered his decision in the hear-
ing.” As a result, it contends that the dis-
trict court should have either deemed its
appeal to be timely or granted its motion for
a writ of mandamus requiring the State En-
gineer to hold a hearing on the denial of its
motion to intervene. We disagree for the
following reasons.

a. Storm Ditch Was Not Entitled to a
Hearing
Hl {29} Storm Ditch appears to argue
that because it was entitled to a hearing on
its motion to intervene and because the State
Engineer improperly denied its request for a

hearing, its appeal to the district court
should be deemed timely. We are not per-
suaded by Storm Ditch’s underlying argu-
ment that it was entitled to a hearing.

{30} Storm Ditch bases its argument on
the premise that it was aggrieved by the
State Engineer’s decision denying its motion
to intervene without holding a hearing. As a
result, it maintains that Section 72-2-16 re-
quired the State Engineer to grant it a hear-
ing. The relevant part of Section 72-2-16
provides:

The state engineer may order that a hear-

ing be held before he enters a decision,

acts or refuses to act. If, without holding

a hearing, the state engineer enters a deci-

sion, acts or refuses to act, any person

aggrieved by the decision, act or refusal to
act, is entitled to a hearing, if a request for

a hearing is made in writing within thirty

days after receipt by certified mail of no-

tice of the decision, act or refusal to act.

(Emphasis added.)

{31} We have already determined that
Storm Ditch was properly notified of the
application proceedings when the Applicants
complied with the publication requirements
in Section 72-54 and when a Storm Ditch
commissioner received notice of the applica-
tion by telephone. As a result, Storm Ditch
waived the right to a hearing in this case by
failing to file a timely protest. See D’Anto-
mio v. Garcia, 2008-NMCA-139, 91 9-10, 145
N.M. 95, 194 P.8d 126 (holding that the de-
fendant waived his right to a post-judgment
hearing pursuant to Section 72-2-16 by fail-
ing to (1) respond to a summary judgment
motion, (2) comply with the OSE scheduling
order, (8) make a timely request for a post-
judgment hearing, or (4) appeal to the dis-
trict court pursuant to Section 72~7-1), cert.
granted, 2008-NMCERT-010, 145 N.M. 524,
201 P.8d 855; see also Bogan v. Sandoval
Cniy. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 119 N.M.
334, 342, 890 P.2d 395, 403 (Ct.App.1994)
(holding that landowners who had received
proper notice could not appeal the decision of
the zoning board to district court because,
even though possibly aggrieved, they had
failed to challenge the decision at the admin-
istrative level).

{32} We are also unpersuaded by Storm
Ditch’s reliance on Derringer in support of
its argument that it is entitled to a hearing.
In that case, the state engineer denied the
plaintiff's application for a permit to acquire
water rights and granted summary judgment
to the other party having an interest in the
water. 2001-NMCA-075, 138, 131 N.M. 40,
83 P.8d 40. The plaintiff initially waived a
hearing on the summary judgment motion;
but after the state engineer entered its or-
der, the plaintiff requested a postjudgment
hearing under Section 72-2-16, which was
denied. Derringer, 2001-NMCA-075, 14,
181 N.M. 40, 33 P.8d 40. This Court reversed,
holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a
post-judgment hearing before the state engi-
neer because he was a person aggrieved by
an adverse decision of the state engineer
entered without a hearing. Jd. 1110-16. In
Derringer, unlike the situation in this case,
the plaintiff was the applicant, not a person
seeking to object to an application.

b. Storm Ditch Was Not Entitled to a
Writ of Mandamus

{33} Storm Ditch claims that it was enti-
tled to a writ of mandamus requiring the
State Engineer to hold a hearing before de-
nying its motion to intervene. We disagree.

HS {84} “Mandamus lies only to force
a clear legal right against one having a clear
legal duty to perform an act and where there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate reme-
dy in the ordinary course of law.” Brantley
Farms v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 1998-
NMCA-028, 116, 124 N.M. 698, 954 P.2d
763; see NMSA 1978, § 44-2-5 (1915) (“The
writ shall not issue in any case where there is
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.”). Mandamus is only
appropriate “to compel the performance of a
statutory duty [if] that duty is clear and
indisputable.” Brantley Farms, 1998-
NMCA-023, 116, 124 N.M. 698, 954 P.2d
763.

{35} We have already determined that
Storm Ditch was not entitled to a hearing
under Section 72-2-16 on the denial of its
motion to intervene because it waived that
right by failing to file a timely protest under
Section 72-5-5. See Garcia, 2008-NMCA-

597

139, 999-10, 145 N.M. 95, 194 P.3d 126.
Therefore, the State Engineer did not have a
“clear and indisputable” duty to conduct a
hearing on Storm Ditch’s motion, Brantley
Farms, 1998-NMCA-023, 116, 124 N.M. 698,
954 P.2d 763.

CONCLUSION

{36} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the order of the district court dismissing
Storm Ditch’s appeal and denying its petition
for a writ of mandamus.

{87} IT IS SO ORDERED.

ICONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge.

TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
(dissenting).

GARCIA, Judge (dissenting).

{38} I respectfully dissent in this case.
Storm Ditch argues that the State Engineer
was statutorily required to reject the original
application because the Applicants failed to
comply with the statutory obligations set
forth in Sections 72-5-3 and 72-5-24.1(C).
See Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co, 2010-
NMSC-009, 1.87, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73
(“[W]hen a statute contains language which
is clear and unambiguous, we must give ef-
fect to that language and refrain from fur-
ther statutory interpretation.” (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). Both of
these statutory sections utilize the mandato-
ry language “shall” when dealing with the
obligations placed upon the Applicants. See
Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conserva-
tion Comm’n, 2009-NMSC-013, 922, 146
N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135 (“It is widely accepted
that when construing statutes, ‘shall’ indi-
cates that the provision is mandatory, and we
must assume that the Legislature intended
the provision to be mandatory absent al ]
clear indication to the contrary.”). Section
72-5-3 states that “[i]f the application is
defective as to form, ... it shall be returned
with a statement of the corrections, amend-
ments or changes required[.]” Section 72-5-
24.1(C) requires that the Applicants “shall
submit to the state engineer along with the
application an affidavit provided by the com-

598

missioners of the acequia or community
ditch.”

{89} Because the Applicants failed to sub-
mit the required affidavit with their original
application, the mandatory language required
the application to be rejected by the State
Engineer and returned to the Applicants for
correction and refiling. This application pro-
cedure was not followed, and the majority
failed to establish a proper basis for disre-
garding this statutory requirement. As a re-
sult, the Applicants should have been re-
quired to restart the application process
anew when they failed to submit the required
affidavit, and their application should not
have been processed or approved. The sec-
ondary issues of notice and publication only
apply to a correctly filed application. These
secondary issues need not be reached for a
defective application that is statutorily re-
quired to be rejected and returned for refil-
ing. As a result, I would have reversed and
remanded the approval of the application and
required the Applicants to refile a new appli-
cation with the State Engineer.

2011-NMCA-101
263 P.3d 940
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-
Appellant,
ve
Jerome D. BLOCK, a/k/a Jerome D. Block
II and Jerome D. Block, Jr., and Jerome

D. Block, a/k/a Jerome D. Block, Sr.,
Defendants—Appellees.

No. 30,285.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Aug. 2, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrew
S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom,
Schoenburg & Bienvenu, LLP, Daniel Philip
Estes, Carolyn M. “Cammie” Nichols, Albu-
querque, NM, Freedman, Boyd, Hollander,
Goldberg, Ives & Duncan, PA, Zachary A.
Ives, Theresa M. Duncan, Albuquerque, NM,
for Appellees.

James Harrington, Santa Fe, NM, for
Amicus Curiae Common Cause.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} The secretary of state assessed fines
against Jerome Block, Jr., (Block Jr.) for
violations of the New Mexico Voter Action
Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 1-19A-1
to -17 (2003, as amended through 2007),
which provides public financing for certain
candidates running for political office. The
attorney general then filed criminal charges
against Block Jr. and his father, Jerome
Block, Sr. (Block Sr.), for violations of the
Act. The district court dismissed the charges,
holding that the attorney general may not
initiate prosecution under the Act unless the
secretary of state refers the violations to the
attorney general for that purpose. We re-
verse the dismissal because the Act does not

600

limit the attorney general’s authority to pros-
ecute. We also reject Block Jr.’s argument
that prosecution following fine assessment
violates principles of double jeopardy.
BACKGROUND

I. The Voter Action Act

{2} Enacted in 2008 as part of our compre-
hensive Election Code, the Act has not been
analyzed in any prior case, and our review is
thus a matter of first impression. To frame
our discussion, we begin by providing a brief
overview of the Act’s relevant, statutory pro-
visions. The Act established a public cam-
paign finance scheme for the purpose of fi-
nancing the election campaigns of candidates
running for various public offices in New
Mexico. Sections 1-19A-2 to -17. Toward
that end, the Act created a “public election
fund” for the purpose of “financing the elec-
tion campaigns of certified candidates for
covered offices.” Section 1-19A-10(A)(1).

{3} Under the Act, candidates who are
interested in obtaining public financing must
undergo a certification process that is admin-
istered by the office of the secretary of state.
Sections 1-19A-3 to -6, -16. Upon certifica-
tion, candidates become eligible to receive
distributions from the public election fund
during the election cycle and, in return, they
are required to comply with all requirements
of the Act. Section 1-19A-6(C). These re-
quirements include, among others, using dis-
bursed funds only for campaign-related pur-
poses, limiting total campaign expenditures
to the amounts distributed from the public
election fund, refraining from seeking contri-
butions from any other source, and returning
any unspent or unencumbered money to the
public election fund at the time a person
ceases to be a candidate. Section 1~19A-7.
The candidate must also report campaign-
related expenditures to the secretary of state
in accordance with the campaign reporting
requirements specified in the Act as well as
in other portions of the Election Code. Sec-
tion 1-19A-9. The Act charges the secretary
of state with administering the Act’s statuto-
ry provisions and directs the secretary of
state to adopt rules to “ensure effective ad-
ministration of the [Act].” Section 1-19A-
15(A).

{4} This appeal concerns Section 1-19A-
17, the sole penalties provision of the Act.
This section prescribes penalties for viola-
tions of the Act, including a civil penalty of
up to $10,000 per violation in Subsection (A)
and a criminal penalty in Subsection (B) for a
willful or knowing violation that is punishable
as a fourth degree felony. Sections 1-19A-
17(A), (B). In addition, candidates who vio-
late the Act “may” be required to return
money disbursed to their campaigns from the
public election fund under Subsection (A) and
“shall” be required to return such money
under Subsection (B). Jd. We address this
provision in detail in our discussion.

Il. Factual and Procedural History

{5} The underlying facts of this case stem.
from Defendant Block Jr.’s campaign for the
office of commissioner of the New Mexico
Public Regulation Commission during the
2008 election cycle. During the primary and
general elections that year, Block Jr. ran as a
certified candidate for office pursuant to the
Act and, as a result, he was authorized to
receive public campaign financing from the
public election fund. Approximately
$101,508 was disbursed to Block Jr.’s cam-
paign from the public election fund through-
out the 2008 election cycle.

A. The Secretary of State’s Investigation
and Assessment of Civil Fines Against
Block Jr.

{6} On October 4, 2008, amid news reports
that Block Jr. had allegedly misappropriated
funds disbursed to him from the public elec-
tion fund, the secretary of state initiated a
preliminary inquiry into possible violations
by Block Jr.’s campaign of the Act and the
Campaign Reporting Act, NMSA 1978, Sec-
tions 1-19-25 to ~86 (1979, as amended
through 2009), both of which are closely situ-
ated statutory chapters within the Election
Code. After a series of communications be-
tween the secretary of state and Block Jr.
regarding the investigation into the purport-
ed violations, the secretary of state issued a
notice of final action on November 1, 2008, in
which she levied three fines totaling $11,000
against Block Jr. for three separate viola-
tions of the Act and the Campaign Reporting

Act. In addition to the fines, the secretary of
state required Block Jr. to return $10,000 of
the $101,508 previously disbursed to his cam-
paign from the public election fund and also
to return a $700 donation made by Block Jr.
from the disbursed funds. In sum, Block Jr.
‘was required to pay a total of $21,700 to the
secretary of state as a result of the three
violations.

{7} Although the secretary of state deter-
mined that the three fines totaling $11,000
resulted from violations of both the Act and
the Campaign Reporting Act, we describe
the three violations only in the context of the
Act for purposes of our discussion. The first
fine levied by the secretary of state, in the
amount of $5,000, was based on a violation of
Section 1-19A-9(D) of the Act for the “fail-
ure to accurately and truthfully report” a
campaign expenditure. See § 1-194-9(D)
(requiring certified candidates under the Act
to “report expenditures according to the
campaign reporting requirements specified in
the Election Code”). This fine corresponded
to Block Jrs failure to correctly report a
$2,500 payment to a musical group for rally
entertainment that the group never actually
provided.

{8} The second fine, also in the amount of
$5,000, was based on a violation of Section 1-
19A~7(D) of the Act for “improper use in the
general election cycle of public funds ear-
marked for the primary election.” See § 1-
19A~7(D) (stating that “[a] certified candi-
date shall return to the secretary, within
thirty days after the primary election, any
amount that is unspent or unencumbered by
the date of the primary election for direct
deposit into the [public election] fund”). The
secretary of state found that Block Jr. had
failed to return the $2,500 paid to the musical
group, although that amount should have
been previously returned to the secretary of
state’s office within thirty days of the pri-
mary election. The third fine, in the amount
of $1,000, was based on a violation of Section
1-19A~7(A) of the Act for the use of dis-
bursed public election funds for non-cam-
paign related purposes. See § 1-194~7(A)
(stating that “{a]ll money distributed to a
certified candidate shall be used for that
candidate’s campaign-related purposes in the

601

election cycle in which the money was dis-
tributed”). This fine corresponded to a $700
contribution by Block Jr. from the funds
disbursed to his campaign in order to help
retire a former presidential candidate’s cam-
paign debt.

{9} The secretary of state’s notice of final
action indicated that a copy of the notice was
transmitted to the office of the New Mexico
Attorney General. On appeal, the parties
agree that aside from sending a copy of the
notice to the attorney general’s office, the
secretary of state made no express decision
to refer the matter to the attorney general
for criminal prosecution. During the pro-
ceedings below, the secretary of state stated
that any decision as to whether a criminal
prosecution should be initiated for violations
of the Act was beyond her statutory purview
and area of expertise and that her office did
not make any kind of referral to the attorney
general’s office for criminal prosecution.

B. Criminal Proceedings Against Block
Jr. and Block Sr.

{10} On April 8, 2009, approximately five
months after the secretary of state’s final
action against Block Jr., a grand jury indict-
ed Block Jr. for: (1) two counts of willfully or
knowingly violating the Act and other provi-
sions of the Election Code (Counts 1 and 3),
(2) two counts of conspiracy to commit viola-
tions of the Act and other provisions of the
Election Code (Counts 2 and 4), (8) one count
of tampering with evidence, (4) one count of
conspiracy to commit tampering with evi-
dence, and (5) two counts of embezzlement
over $500 but not more than $2,500. On the
same date, a grand jury indicted Block Jr.’s
father, Defendant Block Sr. for: (1) one
count of willfully or knowingly violating the
Act and other provisions of the Election
Code (Count 1), (2) one count of conspiracy
to commit a violation of the Act and other
provisions of the Election Code (Count 2), (8)
one count of tampering with evidence, and (4)
one count of conspiracy to commit tampering
with evidence. Pursuant to Rule 5-203(B)
NMRA, the charges against Block Jr. and
Block Sr. (collectively, Defendants) were
joined.

602

{11} Subsequently, Defendants moved to
dismiss specific counts in the indictments.
Defendants initially filed a joint motion in
district court to dismiss all charges brought
under the Act, arguing that the attorney
general lacked statutory authority to initiate
criminal proceedings for violations of the Act.
Defendants asserted that the attorney gener-
als broad authority to prosecute criminal
cases under NMSA 1978, Section 8-5-2
(1975), was limited by the Act. Specifically,
Defendants contended that the plain lan-
guage of the Act’s penalties provision re-
quires the attorney general’s office to receive
a referral from the secretary of state prior to
initiating criminal prosecutions for violations
of the Act. Because no such referral allegedly
occurred in this case, Defendants argued that
the attorney general lacked the authority to
prosecute the charges brought under the Act.
In addition to this joint motion, Block Jr.
separately moved to dismiss three specific
counts of the indictment—1 and 2 (both for
violations of the Act), and 7 (for embezzle-
ment)—on double jeopardy grounds. Specif-
ically, Block Jr. argued that the fines levied
by the secretary of state constituted criminal
punishment for purposes of the double jeop-
ardy clause of the New Mexico Constitution
and therefore precluded a successive criminal
prosecution for the same conduct.

{12} After a hearing on both motions, the
district court issued an order granting the
joint motion filed by Defendants as well as
the separate motion filed by Block Jr. The
court determined that the plain language of
the Act’s penalties provision permitted “the
secretary of state to either impose a fine if
she or he finds a violation of the [Act] or
transmit a finding of a violation to the attor-
ney general for prosecution, but not both.”
(Emphasis added.) The court reasoned that
the attorney general lacked the statutory
authority to prosecute violations of the Act
without a prior referral from the secretary of
state and, further, that “had the Legislature
intended to allow the attorney general to
exercise his or her usual broad authority to
initiate criminal charges without the secre-
tary of state having [first] transmitted find-
ings of a violation, it would have said so.”
Because the secretary of state had levied
fines and also testified at the hearing that

she did not make a referral to the attorney
general’s office, the court held that the attor-
ney general lacked prosecutorial authority to
initiate criminal proceedings against Defen-
dants for violations of the Act. On this basis,
the court dismissed all charges brought for
violations of the Act against both Defendants.
{13} The district court further determined,
as a separate and alternate ground support-
ing dismissal, that all charges brought under
the Act violated Block Jr.’s state constitu-
tional protections against double jeopardy.
The court found that legislative intent behind
the Act authorized imposition of either a civil
penalty or criminal prosecution, but not both
and, therefore, the prior issuance of civil
penalties in this case precluded any subse-
quent criminal prosecution for the same un-
derlying conduct. The court further rea-
soned that the civil penalties levied by the
secretary of state constituted criminal pun-
ishment because they were more punitive
than remedial in nature and that any subse-
quent criminal charges brought under the
Act for conduct previously punished through
the civil penalties resulted in a violation of
double jeopardy. Accordingly, the district
court dismissed all charges brought under
the Act against Block Jr., with the order
specifically referencing Counts 1-4. This ap-
peal followed. The district court granted a
stay of all further proceedings pending reso-
lution of this appeal.
DISCUSSION

{14} On appeal, the State contends that
the district court erroneously determined
that: (1) the attorney general has no authori-
ty to prosecute criminal violations of the Act
without a prior referral from the secretary of
state, and (2) double jeopardy precludes
criminal prosecution for violations of the Act
based on the same conduct for which the
secretary of state has previously assessed a
civil penalty. These issues hinge on our
interpretation of Section 1-19A-17, the pen-
alties provision of the Act. We address each
issue in turn.

I. Attorney General’s Authority to Prose-
cute Criminal Violations of the Act
TE {15} We begin by examining the
basic statutory grant of authority to the at-

torney general. In New Mexico, the attor-
ney general has no common law powers;
instead, his/her duties are determined entire-
ly by statute. State v. Davidson, 33 N.M.
664, 669, 275 P. 378, 375 (1929). The basic
statutory grant of authority to the attorney
general is set forth in NMSA 1978, Section
8-5-2(B) (1975), which provides in relevant
part that: “Except as otherwise provided by
law, the attorney general shall ... prosecute
and defend in any other court or tribunal all
actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, in
which the state may be a party or interested
when, in his [or her] judgment, the interest
of the state requires such action.” Section
8-5-2(B). Thus, “Section 8-5-2 provides au-
thority for the [attorney general] to prose-
cute criminal cases in any court when the
[s]tate’s interest requires such action,” but
that authority may be limited or conditioned
where the Legislature has “otherwise provid-
ed by law.” State v. Koehler, 96 N.M. 293,
295, 629 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1981) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).

HI {16} The first issue is whether the
Legislature has “otherwise provided” in Sec-
tion 1-19A-17 for a limitation on the attorney
general’s authority to initiate criminal prose-
cutions for violations of the Act. The district
court construed Section 1-19A-17 to limit the
attorney general’s authority to initiate crimi-
nal proceedings under the Act to only the
circumstance where a prior referral has been
received from the secretary of state. In
addition, the district court construed the
word “or” in Section 1-19A-17(A) to be dis-
junctive and to denote mutually exclusive
alternatives—ie., meaning that the secretary
of state shall either impose a fine for a
violation or transmit the finding to the attor-
ney general for criminal prosecution, but not
both. See § 1-19A-17(A) (“If the secretary
makes a determination that a violation of [the
Alet has occurred, the secretary shall impose
a fine or transmit the finding to the attorney
general for prosecution.” (emphasis added)).
On these grounds, the district court conclud-

1. Because the State conceded below and again at
oral argument that the secretary of state did not
make a referral to the attorney general in this
case, we do not reach the issue of whether the
secretary of state’s transmission of the notice of
final action to the attorney general—as evidenced

603

ed that the attorney general exceeded the
scope of his prosecutorial authority under the
Act by initiating criminal proceedings against
Defendants without first receiving a referral
from the secretary of state.! Our review of
the district court’s holding presents issues of
statutory construction concerning Section 1-
19A-17 of the Act.

Hs {17} We apply de novo review to
questions of statutory interpretation. State
v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, 19, 134 N.M.
768, 82 P.3d 939. “The primary aim of statu-
tory construction is to give effect to the
intent of the Legislature.” State v. Lewis,
2008-NMCA-070, 16, 144 N.M. 156, 184 P.8d
1050 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
discerning legislative intent, we are aided by
canons of statutory construction, and we look
first to the plain language of the statute to
determine if the statute can be enforced as
written. See State v. Davis, 2008-NMSC-
022, 16, 184 N.M. 172, 74 P.38d 1064. “Under
the plain meaning rule, when a statute’s lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous, we will give
effect to the language and refrain from fur-
ther statutory interpretation.” State v. Hub-
ble, 2009-NMSC-014, 110, 146 N.M. 70, 206
P.3d 579 (internal quotation marks omitted).
If, however, the language of the statute is
“doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the
literal use of the words would lead to injus-
tice, absurdity or contradiction,” we reject
the plain meaning rule in favor of construing
the statute “according to its obvious spirit or
reason.” Davis, 20083-NMSC-022, 16, 184
N.M. 172, 74 P.8d 1064.

{18} We begin with the language of Sec-
tion 1-19A-17, which reads:

A. In addition to other penalties that
may be applicable, a person who violates a
provision of the Voter Action Act is subject
to a civil penalty of up to ten thousand
dollars ($10,000) per violation. In addition
to a fine, a certified candidate found in
violation of that act may be required to
return to the fund all amounts distributed

by the fact that the notice, on its face, indicated
that a copy was sent to the attorney general—
constitutes a referral (transmission for prosecu-
tion). Although we are not bound to accept the
State’s concessions, our holding here does not
require us to reach this issue.

604

to the candidate from the fund. If the
secretary makes a determination that a
violation of that act has occurred, the sec-
retary shall impose a fine or transmit the
finding to the attorney general for prose-
cution. In determining whether a certi-
fied candidate is in violation of the expen-
diture limits of that act, the secretary may
consider as a mitigating factor any cireum-
stances out of the candidate's control.

B. A person who willfully or knowingly
violates the provisions of the Voter Action
Act or rules of the secretary or knowingly
makes a false statement in a report re-
quired by that act is guilty of a fourth
degree felony and, if he is a certified candi-
date, shall return to the fund all money
distributed to that candidate.

Section 1-19A-17 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Looking at the language, we ob-
serve that the attorney general is mentioned
only once in the section, as the official recipi-
ent of referrals from the secretary of state.
Section 1-19A-17(A). There is no language
in either subsection that expressly states
what the attorney general shall or may do
regarding violations of the Act. Subsection
(A) specifies only what the secretary of state
“shall” or “may” do in administering the Act,
without explicitly addressing the attorney
general’s authority to prosecute criminal vio-
lations of the Act. Similarly, Subsection (B)
specifies the nature of the criminal penalties
available for violations of the Act, again with-
out specifically addressing the attorney gen-
eral’s authority or the procedures by which a
criminal prosecution may arise. Defendants
have not argued that the Act includes any
explicit language limiting the authority of the
attorney general; rather, their arguments
are focused on construing the word “or,” as
mentioned above, as a limitation on the attor-
ney general’s prosecutorial authority.

Hl {19} Although “{llegislative silence is
at best a tenuous guide to determining legis-
lative intent,” Swink v. Fingado, 115 N.M.
275, 283, 850 P.2d 978, 986 (1993), the fact
remains that there is no express language in
Section 1-19A-17 or elsewhere in the Act
specifying the nature of or any limit on the
attorney general’s authority to initiate crimi-
nal prosecutions for violations of the Act. We

also assume that the Legislature was aware
of Section 8-5-2 when it drafted the Act and
that, had the Legislature intended for the’
Act to “otherwise provide” a limitation on the
attorney general’s authority under Section 8-
5-2, it could have included such limiting lan-
guage in the Act. See El Vadito de los Cervil-
los Water Ass’n v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
115 N.M. 784, 789, 858 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1993)
(assuming that the Legislature is aware of
existing laws at the time of subsequent legis-
lation). As a result, the attorney general’s
basic statutory grant of authority in Section
8-5-2 plays an important role in our analysis
and cannot be ignored.

{20} The district court held that the fol-
lowing language in Section 1-19A-17 acts as
a limitation on the attorney general’s authori-
ty to initiate criminal proceedings against
Defendants: “If the secretary makes a deter-
mination that a violation of [the Act] has
occurred, the secretary shall impose a fine or
transmit the finding to the attorney general
for prosecution.” Section 1-19A-17(A) (em-
phasis added). The district court concluded
that the “or” denotes mutually exclusive al-
ternatives and, thus, if the secretary of state
elects to issue a fine, as in this case, the
attorney general has no authority to com-
mence a prosecution. We are not persuaded
that this is a reasonable interpretation of the
meaning of Section 1-19A-17(A).

{21} The word ‘or’ in legislative acts
is not given its normal disjunctive meaning if
it will frustrate evident legislative intent, if
adherence to the literal use of the word leads
to absurdity or contradiction, and if the con-
text of the section and other statutes read in
conjunction with the section call for a differ-
ent interpretation. See Swink v. Fingado,
115 N.M. 275, 279 n. 10, 850 P.2d 978, 983 n.
10 (1993) (indicating that “or” is a conjunc-
tion and that “the alternatives are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive”); Hale v. Basin
Motor Co., 110 N.M. 314, 318, 795 P.2d 1006,
1010 (1990) (“The word ‘or’ should be given
its normal disjunctive meaning unless the
context of a statute demands otherwise.”);
First Nat'l Bank v. Bernalillo Cnty. Valua-
tion Protest Bd., 90 N.M. 110, 112, 560 P.2d
174, 176 (Ct.App.1977) (stating that the “ordi-
nary meaning [of ‘or’] should be followed

unless it renders the statute doubtful or un-
certain”). Courts do not inexorably apply
the rule that the use of the disjunctive “or”
means only that one of the listed choices can
be employed, if a “strict grammatical con-
struction will frustrate evident legislative in-
tent ... [or] statutory context can render the
distinction [between “and” and “or”] second-
ary.” Yule Kim, Legislative Attorney, Amer-
ican Law Division, Congressional Research
Service, CRS Report for Congress, Statutory
Interpretation: General Principles and Re-
cent Trends (Updated August 31, 2008), page
8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
cases indicating that “the word ‘or’ is often
used as a careless substitute for the word
‘and?’”; and that “[bloth ‘and’ and ‘or’ are
context-dependent, and each word ‘is itself
semantically ambiguous, and can be used in
two quite different senses”); see also 1A
Norman J. Singer, Statutes & Statutory Con-
struction § 21:14, at 185-89 (7th ed. 2009)
(observing that there has been “such laxity in
the use of [the terms ‘and’ and ‘or’]” and then
describing cases where courts have found the
terms to be interchangeable if this is more
consistent with legislative intent). Here, all
of these considerations bear on the issue.

{22} Section 1-19A-17(A) sends mixed sig-
nals and raises questions as to its intent in
regard to administrative civil penalties and
criminal prosecutions. The section opens
with the phrase, “[i]n addition to other penal-
ties that may be applicable.” Construed
broadly, this phrase includes civil penalties
in other statutes and criminal penalties for
violation of criminal laws. Such penalties
would include that for a Section 1-19A-17(B)
felony. Nothing in Section 1-19A-17(A) in-
dicates a legislative intention to make the
secretary of state a gatekeeper with prosecu-
torial discretion to determine whether proba-
ble cause exists to prosecute a Section 1-
19A-17(B) felony or whether a felony charge
instead of a civil penalty ought to be pur-
sued. Nothing in that section indicates an
intent to preclude the attorney general from
prosecuting that felony. The more reason-
able view of the section is that the adminis-
trative penalty was intended as a remedial
remedy to cover violations that were neither
willful nor knowing, with a prosecution still
open for violations that were willful or know-

605

ing. We doubt that the Legislature meant
the wording in that section to place the sec-
retary of state in an “either/or” straitjacket
or by implication to hamstring the attorney
general when a felony has been committed.
We are unpersuaded that the Legislature
would enact a criminal felony proscription
intending a violation of it to be rendered
unenforceable at the whim of the secretary
of state.

{23} The Act contains no express language
addressing the authority of the attorney gen-
eral to act, and Section 1~19A-17 speaks only
to the duties of the secretary of state without
addressing the authority of the attorney gen-
eral. Therefore, the language of the Act
does not “otherwise provide” for a limitation
on the attorney general’s authority under
Section 8-5-2 to prosecute criminal violations
of the Act. The word “or” in Subsection (A)
of Section 1-19A-17 denotes choices that are
not mutually exclusive and, as a result, the
issuance of a civil penalty does not preclude
the possibility of subsequent prosecution.

Il. Double Jeopardy Analysis

{24} We next address whether double
jeopardy barred the prosecution of Block Jr.
due to the previous assessment of civil penal-
ties against him by the secretary of state.
On appeal, the State and amicus curiae Com-
mon Cause contend that the district court
erroneously dismissed Counts 1-4 of the in-
dictment against Block Jr. on the alternate
ground that double jeopardy barred the im-
position of successive civil and criminal pen-
alties under the Act for the same conduct by
Block Jr.

{25} Block Jr. concedes that it was error
for the district court to dismiss Counts 3 and
4 on double jeopardy grounds because the
conduct alleged in these counts was not the
same conduet for which Block Jr. was fined.
As a result, because there is no dispute that
the conduct underlying Counts 3 and 4 and
the conduct that resulted in the secretary of
state’s action concerned separate offenses
and therefore was not unitary, we reverse
the district court’s order as to these two
charges.

606

{26} As for the remaining counts, we must.
determine whether New Mexico’s constitu-
tional and statutory double jeopardy provi-
sions bar criminal prosecution under the Act.
for conduct for which the secretary of state
has previously assessed a “civil penalty.”?
We apply de novo review to this legal ques-
tion. See State v. Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074,
112, 183 N.M. 782, 70 P.3d 772.

{27} Because Block Jr. does not as-
sert a violation of the federal double jeopardy
clause, our analysis is limited to our state’s
double jeopardy jurisprudence. The New
Mexico Constitution’s double jeopardy clause
states that “[nJo person shall ... be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.” N.M.
Const. art. II, § 15. Similarly, our state
double jeopardy statute provides that “[nJo
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same crime.” NMSA 1978, § 30-1-10 (1963).
It is well established that these provisions
protect “against the imposition of multiple
criminal punishments for the same offense
and then only when such occurs in successive
proceedings.” City of Albuquerque v. One
(1) 1984 White Chevy Util, 2002-NMSC-014,
17, 182 N.M. 187, 46 P.3d 94 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). In this context, our
Supreme Court has recognized that a “legis-
lature may impose both a criminal and a civil
sanction in respect to the same act or omis-
sion without violating the Double Jeopardy
Clause.” Jd. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).

{28} In State ea rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy,
our Supreme Court delineated the following
three-part framework for determining
whether double jeopardy bars successive
criminal and civil sanctions for the same con-
duct: “(1) whether the [s]tate subjected the
defendant to separate proceedings[,] (2)
whether the conduct precipitating the sepa-
rate proceedings consisted of one offense or
two offenses[,] and (8) whether the penalties
in each of the proceedings may be considered
‘punishment? for the purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.” 120 N.M. 619, 626, 904

2. Our use of the label “civil penalty” throughout

the double jeopardy analysis is based on Section
1-19A-17, which refers to the secretary of state’s
assessment of monetary fines against violators of
the Act as a “civil penalty.” Section 1-19A-17A.
(stating that “a person who violates a provision

P.2d 1044, 1051 (1995). In applying the third
Schwartz factor, a reviewing court deter-
mines whether the penalty constitutes “pun-
ishment” by considering (1) the Legislature’s
“purpose in enacting the legislation, rather
than evaluating the effect of the sanction on
the defendant”; and (2) “whether the sanc-
tion established by the legislation was suffi-
ciently punitive in its effect that, on balance,
the punitive effects outweigh the remedial
effect.” White Chevy, 2002-NMSC-014,
V11, 182 N.M. 187, 46 P.3d 94 Gnternal quo-
tation marks omitted). We apply the
Schwartz framework to this case.

A. First and Second Schwartz factors:
Separate Proceedings and Unitary
Conduct

{29} The parties are in agreement regard-
ing the first and second Schwartz factors.
With regard to the first Schwartz factor, it is
uncontroverted that the action by the secre-
tary of state that resulted in the levying of
civil penalties against Block Jr. and the sub-
sequent criminal prosecution in district court
were two separate proceedings. As for the
second Schwartz factor, the State conceded
below, and again on appeal, that the conduct
underlying Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment
against Block Jr. was the same conduct that
precipitated the secretary of state’s investi-
gation and assessment of monetary penalties.

B. Third Schwartz factor: Whether the
Civil Penalty Constitutes “Punish-
ment”

HM {30} With regard to Counts 1 and 2,
the dispositive issue before us is the third
Schwartz factor—whether the civil penalties
levied by the secretary of state against Block
Jr. are considered “punishment” for purposes
of the double jeopardy clause so as to pre-
elude subsequent criminal prosecution. As
stated above, our Supreme Court has stated
that courts should determine whether a sanc-
tion is “punishment” for double jeopardy pur-

of the ... Act is subject to a civil penalty of up to
ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per violation” (ci-
tation omitted)). We clarify that the secretary of
state's assessment of three fines totaling $11,000
against Block Jr. are the “civil penalties” we
refer to throughout our analysis.

poses by first considering the Legislature’s
purpose in enacting the penalty and, second,
whether the penalty is so punitive in its
effect that, on balance, the punitive effects
outweigh its remedial effect. White Chevy,
2002-NMSC-014, 118, 11, 182 N.M. 187, 46
P.3d 94.

{31} The district court answered the third
Schwartz factor in the affirmative, determin-
ing that the civil penalties imposed by the
secretary of state were more punitive than
remedial in nature and that this was suffi-
cient to bar Block Jr.’s subsequent criminal
prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. On
appeal, we conclude that the district court’s
determination was incorrect and, accordingly,
we reverse the district court’s dismissal of
Counts 1 and 2 on this basis. As we explain
more fully below, our review of legislative
intent and the effects of the civil penalty
indicates that the civil penalty is not consid-
ered “punishment” under the third Schwartz
factor and, therefore, it does not preclude
subsequent criminal prosecution for the same
conduct.

1. Legislative Intent

{32} In applying the third Schwartz factor,
we must first ascertain the Legislature’s pur-
pose in enacting the Act and, specifically,
Section 1-19A-17. See Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 98, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139
L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (explaining that “[wJheth-
er a particular punishment is criminal or civil
is, at least initially, a matter of statutory
construction” and that “{aJ] court must first
ask whether the legislature, in establishing
the penalizing mechanism, indicated either
expressly or impliedly a preference for one
label or the other” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).

{33} Although the Act does not specifically
enumerate its purposes, it is clear that the
Act’s provisions are directed at establishing a
public campaign financing system that is sub-
ject to considerable oversight by the office of
the secretary of state. Sections 1-19A-2 to -
17. There is no question that the Act’s
provisions establish a regulatory and admin-
istrative scheme for the management of pub-
lic campaign funds. Jd. This is evidenced by
the provisions covering the certification pro-

607

cess, Sections 1-19A-8 to -6, -16, manage-
ment of and disbursements from the public
election fund, Sections 1-19A-10 to -14, and
candidate expenditures and reporting re-
quirements, Sections 1-19A~7 to -9.

{84} It is therefore apparent that the Act,
as a whole, is directed to a remedial purpose.
Its provisions are aimed at protecting against
misappropriation of public campaign funds,
promoting transparency in campaign expen-
ditures, and protecting the public from de-
ceptive practices by candidates. Also, the
Act is part of our state Election Code, a
statutory chapter that was enacted with the
purpose of “secur[ing] ... the purity of elec-
tions and guard[ing] against the abuse of the
elective franchise” and “to provide for effi-
cient administration and conduct of elec-
tions.” NMSA 1978, § 1-1-1.1 (1979). The
inclusion of the Act within the Election Code
further reflects the intent of the Legislature
to create a remedial regulatory and adminis-
trative scheme for the management of public
campaign funds. Cf State v. Nunez, 2000-
NMSC-013, 152, 129 N.M. 68, 2 P.8d 264
(determining that the penalty provisions of
the Controlled Substances Act, which is part
of the Criminal Code, were punitive in nature
because that act “d[id] not concern a regulat-
ed lawful activity, but rather an illegal crimi-
nal activity”).

{35} We also conclude that the civil penal-
ty in Section 1-19-17 evinces a remedial
and regulatory purpose. Under Subsection
(A) of Section 1-19A~17, the secretary of
state has the authority to impose a civil
penalty for violations of the Act, and the
secretary of the state may also require a
violator to return any funds he/she was dis-
bursed from the public election fund. Sub-
section (A) also includes language that the
imposition of a civil penalty and the return of
disbursed funds is “[iIn addition to other
penalties that may be applicable.” Jd. As a
result, the civil penalty is one of multiple
tools of regulatory and administrative en-
forcement available to the secretary of state
to ensure compliance with the Act. See Kir-
by, 2003-NMCA-074, 126, 133 N.M. 782, 70
P.8d 772. This further supports our view that
the Legislature intended that the civil penal-
ty “constitute an integral part of an overall

608

remedial regulatory and administrative
scheme to protect the public.” Id.

2. Balancing of Remedial and Punitive
Effects of the Civil Penalty

{36} Having determined that the Act has a
remedial purpose, we next address whether
the civil penalty “was sufficiently punitive in
its effect that, on balance, the punitive effects
outweigh the remedial effect.” Id. 1922, 27
(internal quotation marks omitted). We do
so because “[e]ven in those cases where the
[Legislature has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty,” it is still possible
that the Act’s statutory scheme is “so puni-
tive either in purpose or effect, as to trans-
form what was clearly intended as a civil
remedy into a criminal penalty.” Hudson,
522 US. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488 (alteration
omitted) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).

{37} Our inquiry here centers on a seven-
factor, non-exhaustive framework established
by the United States Supreme Court in Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 88
S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1968), and previous-
ly adopted by this Court in Kirby:

(1) [whhether the sanction involves an af-

firmative disability or restraint; (2) wheth-

er it has historically been regarded as a

punishment; (8) whether it comes into play

only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether
its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence; (5) whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime; (6) whether an
alternative purpose to which it may ration-
ally be connected is assignable for it; and

(7) whether it appears excessive in relation

to the alternative purpose assigned.

Kirby, 2008-NMCA-074, 128, 188 N.M. 782,
70 P.8d 772 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As we explain
more fully below, upon applying the seven
Mendoza-Martinez factors, we conclude that
the civil penalty in the Act is more remedial
than punitive in its effect.

{38} First, the administrative sanctions
that the secretary of state can impose under
the Act—i.e., a civil penalty of up to $10,000
per violation and the return of disbursed
funds—do not constitute an affirmative dis-

ability or restraint. These sanctions un-
equivocally do not approach “the infamous
punishment of imprisonment,” Kirby, 2003-
NMCA-074, 130, 183 N.M. 782, 70 P.38d 772
(nternal quotation marks omitted), “which is
the paradigmatic affirmative disability or re-
straint.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100, 123

S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). Con-
trary to Block Jr.’s assertion that the civil
penalty imposes an affirmative restraint on a
candidate’s ability to run for public office,
any civil penalty imposed by the secretary of
state under the Act does not bar a fined
candidate from continuing his or her current
campaign or from running for public office in
the future. See § 1-19A-17(A). As a result,
the civil penalty carries neither the stigma
nor the harsh consequences of a criminal
conviction on a candidate’s election-related
activities. Kirby, 2008-NMCA-074, 130, 133
N.M. 782, 70 P.38d 772; see NMSA 1978,
§ 31-13-1(A), (E) (2005) (stating that, unless
certain conditions are met, a person convict-
ed of a felony cannot vote or hold an office of
public trust).

{39} Second, the civil penalty that may be
imposed under the Act has not historically
been regarded as punishment and is instead
traditionally viewed as a form of civil reme-
dy. Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, 131, 183 N.M.
782, 70 P.38d 772 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“[MJonetary assessments are traditionally a
form of civil remedy[.J”) (quoting United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 256, 100 S.Ct.
2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980); see Hudson,
522 US. at 104, 118 S.Ct. 488 (“(Nleither
money penalties nor debarment has histori-
cally been viewed as punishment.”).

{40} Third, we conclude that the civil pen-
alty does “not come into play only on a
finding of scienter.” Kirby, 2003-NMCA-
074, 132, 183 N.M. 782, 70 P.38d 772 (empha-
sis added) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Section 1-19A-17(A) allows the secre-
tary of state to assess a civil penalty against
any “person who violates a provision of the
[Act]” without regard to the violator’s state
of mind or culpable intent. By contrast,
Section 1-19A-17(B) provides for criminal
penalties only where the person has “willfully
or knowingly violate[d] the provisions of the
[Act].” As a result, we view the penalties

provision of the Act to require a finding of
scienter only in connection with the imposi-
tion of a criminal penalty. To the extent that
Block Jr. argues that a finding of scienter
comes into play for the civil penalty because
“the secretary [of state] may consider as a
mitigating factor any circumstances out of
the candidate’s control” in determining
whether a violation of Section 1-194-17(A)
has occurred, we are unpersuaded. Because
consideration of mitigating factors is a dis-
eretionary act—as evidenced by the use of
the word “may” in the statutory provision—
‘we agree with the State’s position that a civil
penalty can be imposed under the Act even
without consideration of mitigating factors.
See NMSA 1978, § 1-1-3 (1969) (stating that
“fals used in the Election Code, ‘shall’ is
mandatory and ‘may’ is permissive” (citation
omitted)). Consequently, the civil penalty
does not come into play only on a finding of
scienter, as required under the third Mendo-
za-Martinez factor. Cf: Hudson, 522 US. at
104, 118 S.Ct. 488 (reasoning that consider-
ation of the violator’s “good faith” in deter-
mining the amount of the penalty to be im-
posed did not signify that the penalty comes
into play only on a finding of scienter be-
cause the “penalty can be imposed even in
the absence of bad faith”).

{41} Fourth, we consider whether the im-
position of a civil penalty under the Act
promotes the traditional aims of punish-
ment—retribution and deterrence. This
Court has previously recognized that it would
be against common sense to conclude that a
“civil penalty [such as the one imposed by
the Act] does not have some punitive and
deterrent aspects in its nature.” Kirby,
2003-NMCA-074, 133, 183 N.M. 782, 70 P.3d
772, But our Supreme Court has empha-
sized that “{aJlthough a civil penalty may
cause a degree of punishment for the defen-
dant, such a subjective effect cannot override
the legislation’s primarily remedial purpose.”
White Chevy, 2002-NMSC-014, 111, 132
N.M. 187, 46 P.8d 94. Similarly, we have
stated that “the mere presence of [a deter-
rent] purpose is insufficient to render a sanc-
tion criminal [for double jeopardy purposes],
as deterrence may serve civil as well as
criminal goals.” Kirby, 2003~-NMCA-074,
134, 188 N.M. 782, 70 P.8d 772 Gnternal

609

quotation marks omitted). We therefore re-
ject Block Jr.’s assertion that the civil penal-
ty at issue here promotes only punitive pur-
poses.

{42} We do not consider the negative ef-
fect of the penalty on Block Jr. to conelu-
sively establish that the penalty constitutes
“punishment” because, as previously noted,
“whether a sanction constitutes punishment
is not determined from the defendant’s per-
spective, as even remedial sanctions carry
the sting of punishment.” Schwartz, 120
N.M. at 631, 904 P.2d at 1056 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted), In addition, although
the imposition of the civil penalty will likely
deter future wrongdoing by other certified
candidates, the civil penalty serves impor-
tant non-punitive goals, such as promoting
transparency in our state’s public campaign
financing scheme, regulating the use of dis-
bursed public funds by campaigns, and in-
creasing public confidence in our state elec-
toral system. See Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074,
134, 183 N.M. 782, 70 P.3d 772 (holding that
although sanctions in the Securities Act had
deterrent effects, the sanctions served im-
portant non-punitive goals, were remedial in
nature, and were “plainly part of the di-
rector’s arsenal for regulation of persons
dealing in the sale of securities ... and
[spoke] as much, if not more, to that regula-
tory challenge than to a sole need to pun-
ish”); see also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105, 118
S.Ct. 488 (concluding that although the mon-
etary sanctions at issue were “intended to
deter future wrongdoing, [they] also serve[d]
to promote the stability of the banking in-
dustry” and thus, “[t]o hold that the mere
presence of a deterrent purpose renders
such sanctions ‘criminal’ ... would severely
undermine the [glovernment’s ability to en-
gage in effective regulation”). Because the
civil penalty reasonably serves the regulato-
ry goals of the Act and protects the public,
we conclude that any deterrent or punitive
effects of the civil penalty “are incidental to
and do not override the Act’s and the civil
penalty’s primarily remedial purpose.” Kir-
by, 2003-NMCA-074, 134, 183 N.M. 782, 70
P.3d 772.

{43} Fifth, it is undisputed that the con-
duct upon which the civil penalties were

610

based also formed the basis of Counts 1 and
2 of Block Jr.’s indictment. However, “al-
though we answer this Mendoza—Martinez
issue affirmatively, this fact is insufficient to
render the money penalties ... criminally
punitive ... particularly in the double jeop-
ardy context.” Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074,
135, 188 N.M. 782, 70 P.8d 772 (alteration
omitted) Gnternal quotation marks omitted).

{44} Finally, we consider the sixth and
seventh factors together: whether “there
exists an alternative, remedial, purpose to
which the civil penalty may rationally be
connected” and whether “imposition of the
civil penalty ... appear[s] excessive in rela~
tion to the [Act’s alternative] purpose” as-
signed. Jd. 1136-37. The district court
determined that the civil penalty was not
earmarked for specific remedial purposes
and, further, that any remedial goals of the
Act were accomplished by the reimburse-
ment aspect of Section 1-19A-17(A), which
requires violators to return disbursed funds
to the secretary of state. On appeal, the
State argues that the civil penalty is con-
nected to the alternative remedial purpose
of “promoting openness and honesty and
keeping corruption out of New Mexico’s
publicly financed election campaigns.” It
argues that the civil penalty is “integral to
enforcing regulatory compliance” with con-
ditions imposed by the Act to protect these
remedial interests. The State further as-
serts that the civil penalty is earmarked for
return to the public election fund “for the
purpose of ... recouping administrative and
enforcement costs. Section 1-19A-15(B)(5)
(directing the secretary of state to establish
procedures for the return of fund disburse-
ments and “other money” to the public elec-
tion fund); Section 1~19-A10(A)(2) (stating
that one purpose of the public election fund
is “paying administrative and enforcement
costs” of the Act).

{45} We agree with the State’s position as
to the sixth factor. It is clear that the civil
penalty is connected to the remedial purpose
of protecting our state’s publicly financed
election campaign system from misappropri-
ation and to insuring that public funds are
not subject to unlawful and deceptive prac-
tices. The use of the civil penalty toward

the administrative and enforcement costs of
the Act serves that purpose. As for the
seventh Mendoza~Martinez factor, we con-
clude that the civil penalty is integral to the
remedial goals of the Act and that it does not
appear excessive in relation to these goals.
The district court incorrectly determined
that reimbursement of disbursed funds
would remedy any harm arising from viola-
tions of the Act because reimbursement
would not include the costs of an investiga-
tion and enforcement of the Act. Moreover,
“the Legislature chose to label the penalty a
civil penalty.” Kirby, 20083-NMCA-074,
138, 138 N.M. 782, 70 P.8d 772. Although
the label is not dispositive on the double
jeopardy analysis, see id. 129, the use of the
term “civil” supports our interpretation of
the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the
penalty.

{46} In summary, the Mendoza-Martinez
factors indicate that the civil penalty is not
sufficiently punitive in its effect. or purpose
so as to outweigh its remedial effect. This,
in conjunction with the Legislature’s purpose
in enacting the Act, leads us to conclude that
the civil penalty is not “punishment” for dou-
ble jeopardy purposes under the third
Schwartz factor. It was therefore error for
the district court to dismiss Counts 1 and 2
against Block Jr. on double jeopardy
grounds. As previously stated, we also re-
verse the dismissal of Counts 3 and 4 against
Block Jr. on double jeopardy grounds be-
cause the conduct underlying those criminal
charges and the secretary of state’s previous
action was not unitary.

CONCLUSION

{47} We hold that the Act does not limit
the attorney general’s authority to initiate
criminal proceedings for violations of the Act.
The attorney general is not required to first
receive a referral from the secretary of state
before he or she can initiate criminal pro-
ceedings. We also conclude that the civil
penalty authorized under Section 1-19A-
17(A) of the Act is not considered punish-
ment for double jeopardy purposes and, thus,
it does not preclude subsequent criminal
prosecution for the same conduct against
which the civil penalty was assessed. Ac-
cordingly, we reverse the district court’s or-

der of dismissal and remand with instruc-
tions to reinstate all charges brought under
the Act against Defendants.

{48} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN
and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges.

2011-NMCA-102
263 P.3d 953

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

ve
Norman DAVIS, Defendant~Appellant.
No. 28,219.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Aug. 10, 2011.
Certiorari Granted, Oct. 4, 2011, No. 33,203.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Ap-
pellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appel-
Tant.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} After being tipped off by a surveil-
lance helicopter that there was vegetation
spotted in Defendant's greenhouse and
plants behind his house, at least six or seven
armed law enforcement officers and at least
five government vehicles entered Defen-
dant’s property as the helicopter hovered
overhead. While officers spread out across
the property, Officer William Merrell told
Defendant that officers in the helicopter be-
lieved they had located marijuana at Defen-
dant’s residence. Officer Merrell asked De-
fendant for consent to search the. property
and, after some hesitation, Defendant said he
would permit the search, whereupon officers
discovered marijuana. When the district
court denied his suppression motion, Defen-
dant entered a conditional plea to one count
of possession of a controlled substance. We
conclude that the State failed to establish
that Defendant’s consent was voluntary and
reverse the district court’s denial of Defen-
dant’s suppression motion.

BACKGROUND

{2} The New Mexico State Police, with the
assistance of the New Mexico National
Guard, undertook an operation to identify
marijuana “plantations” in Taos County, New
Mexico. The operation utilized two Army

National Guard helicopters for air surveil-
lance and two ground teams composed of
individuals from various law enforcement
agencies. During the operation, a spotter in
one of the helicopters directed a ground team
to Defendant’s property, stating that he ob-
served “vegetation” in the greenhouse and
“plants at the back of the house.” Defen-
dant, who was seventy-two years old at the
time, was at his residence when the ground
team arrived. At least six or seven uni-
formed, armed officers, some carrying semi-
automatic weapons, entered Defendant’s
property, disbursed, and formed a perimeter
around part of the property. At least five
vehicles from different law enforcement,
agencies and the National Guard also en-
tered the property, while the helicopter hov-
ered directly above.

{3} Officer Merrell recorded the encounter
with Defendant that followed. Officer Mer-
rell approached Defendant, identified him-
self, and said that “the helicopter [was] look-
ing for marijuana plants and they believe
they’ve located some at your residence.” He
then asked Defendant for permission to
search the residence. Defendant asked what
would happen if he said no, and Officer Mer-
rell responded, “Well, then we will secure the
residence. That’s up to you.” When Officer
Merrell again asked Defendant for permis-
sion to search the property, Defendant said,
“Sure.” Defendant then said, “Looks like
they're searching anyway.” Officer Merrell
replied, “No, theyre just here to make
sure—our biggest thing is safety. We’re not
going to be searching. If you’re giving us
permission to search, I'll get a form.” Offi-
cer Merrell then asked Defendant if there
were marijuana plants in the greenhouse,
and Defendant said that there were. When
Officer Merrell produced a consent form and
asked Defendant to sign it, Defendant said,
‘Tm not really thrilled about you searching
my house” and “I don’t know if I should do
this; I don’t know if it is in my best inter-
est.” He then asked what would happen if
he did not sign the consent form, and Officer
Merrell responded that he “would go forth
and try to execute a warrant through the
district attorney’s office.” Defendant ulti-
mately signed the consent form.

{4} Defendant testified that his green-
house is made of opaque material and that
someone in a helicopter could not have seen
the marijuana plants in the greenhouse. He
also testified that when he first came out of
his house to investigate the helicopter racket,
he saw officers near buildings on his proper-
ty who appeared to be “searching or looking
in[to] those buildings.”

{5} Officers searched Defendant’s proper-
ty and found marijuana and drug parapher-
nalia, Defendant was indicted for possession
of marijuana and possession of drug para-
phernalia. Defendant filed a motion to sup-
press the evidence obtained from the search,
arguing that the helicopter surveillance of his
property violated the federal and state con-
stitutions and that his consent was not volun-
tarily given. The district court denied De-
fendant’s motion, finding that the helicopter
flyover was “just barely permissible” and
that Defendant’s consent to the search was
valid and not given under duress or coercion.
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty
plea, and this appeal followed.

{6} Although this case was submitted to
this panel in 2009, it was discovered that a
portion of the recording of the suppression
hearing was missing. We ordered the par-
ties to attempt to reconstruct the missing
portion, and they submitted their stipulations
in June 2011.

DISCUSSION

WM {7} In reviewing a district court’s
decision regarding a motion to suppress, we
conduct a two-part analysis. “[Wle review
any factual questions under a substantial evi-
dence standard and we review the application
of law to the facts de novo.” State v. Neal,
2007-NMSC-043, 115, 142 N.M. 176, 164
P.8d 57 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).

{8} On appeal, Defendant argues that (1)
the helicopter surveillance of his property
violated the federal and state constitutions,
(2) his consent to a search of his property
‘was not voluntarily given and was not purged
from the taint of a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion arising from the illegal air surveillance,
and (8) the district court erroneously denied
Defendant’s motion for judicial view. Be-
cause the issue of Defendant’s consent is

613

dispositive here, we do not address the re-
maining issues,

Validity of Consent

TI {9} Defendant argues that the dis-
trict court erroneously determined that his
consent to a search of his property was vol-
untarily given under the Fourth Amendment.
In a letter decision, the district court entered
factual findings that essentially tracked the
recording made by Officer Merrell, with one
exception. The court found that Defendant
admitted there was marijuana in his green-
house before he gave oral consent to the
search. In fact, according to the recording,
the admission followed Defendant’s consent.
The court found that Defendant gave consent
to the search, which it concluded was valid
under the Fourth Amendment.

{10} On appeal, Defendant contends, as he
did below, that his consent was not voluntari-
ly given but the product of duress and coer-
cion or acquiescence. Defendant argues that
his consent was coerced because his property
‘was swarmed by heavily armed police offi-
cers who were spread throughout his proper-
ty and that a helicopter was flying directly
overhead throughout his encounter with offi-
cers. Defendant also contends that he ac-
quiesced in the search because he thought
the officers were already searching his prop-
erty and because he was feeling ill.

TMs {11} Generally, in order to prove
that a warrantless search or seizure under
the Fourth Amendment was reasonable be-
cause it met the consent exception, the prose-
eution bears the burden of proving that, un-
der the totality of the circumstances, “the
consent given to search [was] voluntary and
not a product of duress, coercion, or other
vitiating factors.” State v. Paul T., 1999-
NMSC-087, 128, 128 N.M. 360, 993 P.2d 74.
The issue is a factual one that we review for
substantial evidence. Id; see State v. Chap-
man, 1999-NMCA~-106, 119, 127 N.M. 721,
986 P.2d 1122. “Although we must view the
evidence and inferences in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, the presumption
of the trial court’s correctness does not re-
place the requirements of proof.” State v.

614

Valencia Olaya, 105 N.M. 690, 694, 736 P.2d
495, 499 (Ct.App.1987).

Ns {12} On appeal, we undertake a
three-tiered analysis in assessing the volun-
tariness of a consent to search. First, the
consent must be unequivocal and specific;
second, the consent must be given without
duress or coercion; and third, the first two
factors must be viewed with a presumption
against the waiver of constitutional rights.
State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, 120, 122
N.M. 84, 920 P.2d 1088. To determine the
voluntariness of consent, we consider factors
such as “the individual characteristics of the
defendant, the circumstances of the deten-
tion, and the manner in which the police
requested consent.” State v. Pierce, 2003-
NMCA-117, 120, 184 N.M. 388, 77 P.8d 292.
“Ultimately, the essential inquiry is whether
[the defendant's will had been overborne.”
Id.

{13} Applying the three-tiered analysis
mentioned above to this case, we conclude
that although Defendant gave specific and
unequivocal consent to a search of his prop-
erty, the consent was given under duress and
coercive circumstances. Applying the pre-
sumption against a waiver of Defendant's
constitutional rights, we conclude that the
voluntariness of Defendant’s consent was not
established by substantial evidence and that
the district court failed to consider the totali-
ty of circumstances. We explain.

Unequivocal and Specific Consent

{14} Initially, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the district court’s findings
that Defendant's oral and written consent to
a search of his property was specific and
unequivocal at the time it was given to Offi-
cer Merrell. Both Defendant and Officer
Merrell testified at the suppression hearing
that Defendant gave actual oral and written
consent to the search. Defendant’s written
consent form was admitted as evidence at the
hearing, and Officer Merrell’s recording of
the encounter confirms that Defendant orally
consented to a search of his greenhouse and
residence and that he signed the written
consent form. See Chapman, 1999~-NMCA-
106, 120, 127 N.M. 721, 986 P.2d 1122 (hold-
ing that “[slubstantial evidence exist[ed] of

clear and positive testimony that the consent
was specific and unequivocal” based on the
uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of
the deputy); see also State v. Cohen, 103
NUM. 558, 563, 711 P.2d 3, 8 (1985) (holding
that consent was specific and unequivocal on
the basis of a written consent form).

{15} This does not end the inquiry, howev-
er. We must determine whether Defen-
dant’s consent was given without duress or
coercion, considering the totality of the cir-
cumstances.

Duress or Coercion

{16} Although Defendant gave specific and
unequivocal consent, we conclude that the
consent was given under duress and coercive
circumstances. Defendant was surrounded
by numerous uniformed, armed law enforce-
ment officers and several law enforcement,
vehicles while a helicopter hovered overhead.
Professor LaFave observes in his treatise
that, although such circumstances are not
per se coercive, “[t]he presence of a number
of policemen is likely to suggest that the
police are contemplating an undertaking
which does not depend upon the cooperation
of the individual from whom permission to
search is being sought.” 4 Wayne R. La-
Fave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment § 8.2(b), at 62 (4th ed.
2004). Although only Officer Merrell ap-
proached Defendant to seek consent, it is
undisputed that the remaining officers were
spread throughout the property and were
visible to Defendant during his exchange
with Officer Merrell.

{17} In its discussion of the lawfulness of
the helicopter surveillance, the district court
commented that there was “merit to the
claim that the police swooped in as if they
were in a state of war, searching for weapons
or terrorist activity,” which “can be terrify-
ing and intimidating to most normal per-
sons.” Although the district court found the
helicopter search “just barely permissible”
on these facts, it did not address these same
facts in the context of whether the consent
was coerced. In fact, the only circumstance
the district court mentioned in its discussion

of coercion was Officer Merrell’s statement
that he would obtain a search warrant if
Defendant did not consent to the search.
The court dismissed this circumstance as
simply an “explanation of the process that
would be followed.”

{18} In our view, the district court failed
to consider the totality of the coercive cir-
cumstances brought to bear on Defendant.
The obtrusive presence of officers, vehicles,
and a helicopter was at least one factor sup-
porting a finding of coercion, and the officers
were heavily armed, carrying both their ser-
vice handguns as well as AR-15 semi-auto-
matic weapons. Although Officer Merrell
testified that, to his knowledge, the officers
did not draw or point their weapons, Defen-
dant testified that he could see the weapons.
Thus, the display and number of weapons
was an additional factor pointing to coercion,
one that the district court also did not ad-
dress. Cf Chapman, 1999-NMCA-106, 121,
127 N.M. 721, 986 P.2d 1122 (giving as exam-
ples of coercion the improper use of force or
the threatening display of weapons before
consent is given).

{19} Another factor pointing to duress or
coercion is the evidence that Defendant
thought his refusal to consent was futile and
that he acquiesced to a claim of authority
because he thought the officers were already
searching his property. While the State dis-
misses this argument because Officer Merrell
explained that the officers were approaching
the greenhouse as part of their normal safety
procedure, Officer Merrell acknowledged
that Defendant had the perception that the
officers had already started to search his
property. Officer Merrell’s testimony and
the recording of the encounter also establish
that Officer Merrell had to tell the officers to
back off. By appearing to have already
started the search, the officers communicated
to Defendant that they were authorized to
make the search even without consent. See
LaFave, supra, § 8.2(a), at 60-61 (explaining
that “if the police have already attempted to
make the search without the person’s cooper-
ation, ... they have ... communicated to the
individual a claim that they are authorized to

615

make the search even without consent” (foot-
note omitted)).

{20} Finally, it is significant that Officer
Merrell communicated to Defendant that he
would obtain a search warrant if Defendant
declined to consent to the search. The dis-
trict court dismissed the coercive effect of
this communication in reliance on State v.
Shaulis-Powell, 1999-NMCA-090, 127 N.M.
667, 986 P.2d 463. In Shaulis-Powell, the
officer testified that he told the defendants
that he “felt” or “believed” that he had
enough information to obtain a search war-
rant if consent was not given. Jd. 111 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). In that
case, this Court did not construe the officer’s
statement as an assertion that he could get a
warrant, but as the officer’s assessment of
the situation. Jd. Here, the district court
likened Officer Merrell’s response to the
statement given by the officer in Shawlis—
Powell. On appeal, however, we conclude
that Shaulis-Powell is distinguishable be-
cause Officer Merrell’s statements were
more assertive than those of the officer in
Shaulis-Powell. Although Officer Merrell
told Defendant several times that he did not
have to give consent, he stated that the
execution of a warrant would only take about
thirty minutes and when Defendant respond-
ed that he guessed that he really did not
have any options at that point, Officer Mer-
rell did not respond at all. Thus, Officer
Merrell appeared to assert that it would be
futile to refuse consent. See generally La-
Fave, supra, § 8.2(c), at 69-75 (discussing
the distinction between threatening to seek
and threatening to obtain a search warrant).
As a result, there was evidence that Defen-
dant thought his refusal to consent was futile
and that he acquiesced to a claim of authori-
ty.

{21} Because the district court did not
properly consider the totality of the cireum-
stances, we determine that the State failed to
meet its burden of demonstrating that De-
fendant’s consent was voluntary. Defendant
was subjected to coercive circumstances and
was under duress when he gave consent.
See Dale v. State, 2002 OK OR 1, 114-8, 38
P.8d 910, 911-12 (holding that the defen-

616 De

dant’s consent to search his premises was
involuntary considering the totality of the
circumstances, including an unlawful entry
onto his property by climbing over a locked
gate, the number of agents participating, the
fact that they were armed with both pistols
and semi-automatic weapons, and the pres-
ence of a police helicopter immediately over-
head during. the encounter). We conclude
that the district court erred in denying De-
fendant’s motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

{22} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
and remand to the district court for proceed-
ings consistent with this Opinion.

{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN
and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges.

621

2011-NMCA-087
264 P.3d 523
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jericole COLEMAN, Defendant-
Appellant.
No. 29,143.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
May 6, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, Aug. 3, 2011, No. 33,053.

623

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Farhan
Khan, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

Chief Public Defender, Carlos Ruiz de la
Torre, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Chief Judge.

{1} Defendant was convicted of aggravated
fleeing in violation of NMSA 1978, Section
30-22-1.1 (2008), and conspiracy to commit
shooting at a dwelling in violation of NMSA
1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979). He challenges
two evidentiary rulings, claims that thé deni-
al of his motion for directed verdict was
error, and raises two issues regarding jury
instructions. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} At approximately 4:00 a.m. on April 12,
2008, Defendant received a phone call from
Mario Montoya and Daniel Martinez. They
asked Defendant for a ride from a party,
Defendant agreed, picked them up, and then
accompanied them back to Mario’s home.
Mario then suggested that they go “do some
shootings.” Defendant reluctantly agreed to
this plan and drove them to a location in
Roswell selected by Mario, a trailer located
at 2409 North Mesa Street. When they
reached the trailer, Mario exited Defendant’s
vehicle and fired three rounds at the trailer.

{3} At the time of the shooting, Richard
Villa was the owner of the targeted trailer.
Although he had recently moved from the
trailer, he still kept varying possessions
there and parked two vehicles in front of the
trailer. The shots Mario fired entered the
trailer’s bedroom, living room, and kitchen
and struck one of Villa’s cars.

{4} A sheriff's deputy, who happened to be
in the vicinity of Villa’s trailer at the time of
the shooting, heard the shots and proceeded
in his marked sheriff's vehicle toward the
sounds. The deputy encountered Defendant
as he was driving away from the trailer with
Daniel and Mario. The deputy began to
follow Defendant, who rapidly accelerated in
an attempt to flee. A high speed chase

624

ensued; Defendant drove in excess of 100
miles per hour, ran through several stop
signs, and a shotgun was jettisoned from the
vehicle. The deputy’s emergency lights and
siren were activated throughout the pursuit.
The chase came to a sudden conclusion when
Defendant slammed into a curb, immobilizing
his vehicle.

{5} Defendant, Daniel, and Mario were
arrested and taken to the police station. At
the station, Defendant was advised of his
rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384
US. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966), and he agreed to speak with Officer
Northeutt. Defendant acknowledged his
participation in the shooting and the high
speed’ chase, but explained that his conduct
was a consequence of peer pressure, and he
claimed that he was merely following Mario’s
commands.

{6} In May 2008, Defendant was charged
by criminal information with one count of
aggravated fleeing in violation of Section 30-
22-1.1 and one count of conspiracy to commit
shooting at a dwelling in violation of Section
30-28-2. At a pretrial conference, the State
raised the issue of the admissibility of evi-
dence relating to the deputy’s compliance
with the Chaves County high speed pursuit
policy. Citing State v. Padilla, 2008-
NMSC-006, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299, the
State asked the court to “exclude from all
stages of the trial” any inquiry into whether
the officer’s conduct conformed to the re-
quirements of the policy. After reviewing
Padilla, the court issued a letter ruling pro-
hibiting “evidence pertaining to the ... pur-
suit policy or compliance therewith.”

{7} At his jury trial, Defendant objected to
Officer Northcutt’s testimony about Defen-
dant’s post-arrest statements. The district
court denied the objection and determined
that the State had laid a sufficient founda-
tion. At the close of the State’s case, Defen-
dant moved for a directed verdict as to both
counts. Defendant asserted that there was
insufficient evidence that he committed ag-
gravated fleeing or conspiracy to commit
shooting at a dwelling. The court disagreed
and denied the motion.

{8} As to jury instructions, Defendant
asked the court to provide the jury with an

instruction informing them of the require-
ments of NMSA 1978, Section 31-1-5(A)
(1978), which states that “[flollowing arrest,
any person accused of a crime is entitled to
have reasonable opportunity to make three
telephone calls beginning not later than
twenty minutes after the time of arrival at a
police station.” Defendant explained that he
wanted the jury to be aware that he had not
been informed that “he could make three
phone calls as required by the statute.” The
court denied the requested instruction and
concluded that the statute did not require
officers to inform suspects of their right to
make phone calls.

{9} The jury convicted Defendant of both
charges. The court entered judgment and
sentenced Defendant to eighteen months of
incarceration to be followed by one year of
parole. Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

{10} Defendant raises five issues on ap-
peal. As to the evidence presented, Defen-
dant claims that the district court erred in
admitting Officer Northcutt’s testimony re-
garding Defendant’s post-arrest statements
and asserts that the court erred “in sup-
pressing evidence regarding” the Chaves
County high speed pursuit policy. Defen-
dant next argues that the district court erred
in denying his motion for directed verdict as
to both counts. Finally, Defendant claims
two errors in the jury instructions. First, he
argues that the court erred in failing to issue
an instruction “concerning his right to be
informed that he could make three phone
calls while in custody, pursuant to ... Sec-
tion 31-1-5(A).” Second, he asserts that the
instruction given as to the charge of conspir-
acy to commit shooting at a dwelling was
insufficient because the jury was not in-
structed that Defendant must have known or
should have known that the trailer was occu-
pied. We address these arguments in turn.

Evidentiary Rulings

{11} “We review the admission of evidence
under an abuse of discretion standard and
will not reverse in the absence of a clear
abuse. An abuse of discretion occurs when a
ruling is against logic and is clearly untena-

ble or not justified by reason.” State v.
Sarracino, 1998-NMSC-022, 120, 125 N.M.
511, 964 P.2d 72 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).

Hl {12} Defendant’s first claim is that
Officer Northeutt should not have been per-
mitted to testify about the statements Defen-
dant made during the post-arrest interroga-
tion. Defendant asks this Court to suppress
this portion of Officer Northcutt’s testimony
on the basis that Defendant's statements
were involuntary. The State objects that
this argument was not preserved and asserts
that Defendant failed to file a motion to
suppress at or before trial nor did he raise
the issue of voluntariness at trial. The State
asserts that a careful review of the record
reveals that Defendant objected to the ad-
missibility of Northeutt’s testimony on foun-
dational grounds only. We review the events
at trial and the circumstances surrounding
Defendant's objection.

{13} On direct examination, Officer North-
eutt testified that he had been on duty the
night of the shooting, during which he inter-
viewed Defendant and his two companions.
He explained that he read Defendant his
Miranda rights prior to questioning him.
Officer Northeutt also stated that, in his
opinion, Defendant understood his rights.
The State asked whether Defendant admit-
ted involvement in the incident at 2409 North
Mesa and asked Officer Northeutt, “What did
[Defendant] eventually say about how he got
involved?” Defendant objected at this point
stating, “Your honor, unless he’s [going to]
introduce the statement, the court needs to
rule on admissibility.” The court appeared
confused by this objection and said, “Uh ...
well ... [State], I'l allow you to establish or
Jay some more foundation if you’d like in
regard to a knowing and voluntary state-
ment” by Defendant. The State proceeded
to inquire further about whether Defendant
had been properly Mirandized. Afterwards,
the State addressed the court and stated, “I
believe that’s sufficient foundation, your hon-
or.” The court agreed and directed the
State to “proceed.” Defendant made no fur-
ther objection.

{14} Defendant cites the portion of the
record discussed above and claims that he

625

objected to Officer Northcutt’s statements
“arguing that the foundation for a valid and
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights had
not been laid” and goes on to argue that the
district court should have concluded that his
statements were involuntary and suppressed
Officer Northeutt’s testimony. At trial, De-
fendant did not, however, raise the issue of
voluntariness and did not request suppres-
sion. He made only a foundational objection
as to whether Officer Northcutt complied
with the procedural requirements of Mi-
rvanda. On appeal, Defendant conflates the
necessity for Miranda warnings with the
voluntariness of the statement.

{15} In State v. Gallegos, 92 N.M. 336, 340,
587 P.2d 1847, 1851 (Ct.App.1978), we ob-
served that the “(Miranda ] requirements for
admissibility and the ‘voluntariness’ require-
ments for admissibility are separate con-
cepts.” This distinction arises from the fact
that Miranda not only requires that a defen-
dant’s statements be voluntary to be admissi-
ble, but also holds that admissibility is inde-
pendently contingent on officer compliance
with the strict procedural rules articulated in

Miranda. Gallegos, 92 N.M. at 340, 587
P.2d at 1851. We provided the following
explanation:

[Ulnless law enforcement officers give cer-

tain specified warnings before questioning

a person in custody, and follow certain

specified procedures during the course of

any subsequent interrogation, any state-
ment made by the person in custody can-
not over his objection be admitted in evi-
dence against him as a defendant at trial,
even though the statement may in fact be
wholly voluntary.

Id.

{16} At his trial, Defendant raised a foun-
dational objection implicating the Miranda
procedural requirements. On appeal, he ar-
gues about the voluntariness requirements.
This latter ground was not raised or argued
below and will not be reviewed. See Rule
12-216(A) NMRA (“To preserve a question
for review it must appear that a ruling or
decision by the district court was fairly in-
voked[.}”). Defendant takes no issue with
the court’s determination that an adequate
foundation was laid as to the Miranda proce-

626

dural requirements. As a result, we proceed
to the next evidentiary issue on appeal.

TI {17} Defendant’s second evidentiary
argument concerns the district court’s deci-
sion to exclude evidence pertaining to the
Chaves County high speed pursuit policy and
to also exclude any evidence relating to the
deputy’s compliance with that policy. As we
understand Defendant’s argument on appeal,
he is asking us to hold that he should not
have been convicted of aggravated fleeing
because the deputy who pursued him violated
the Chaves County high speed pursuit policy.

{18} Defendant appears to acknowledge
that this argument is contrary to the majori-
ty opinion in Padilla where our Supreme
Court concluded that officer compliance with
the Law Enforcement Safe Pursuit Act,
NMSA 1978, Sections 29-20-1 to -4 (2008),
or a local policy adopted thereunder, is not
an essential element of the crime of aggra-
vated fleeing. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006,
1178, 34, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.8d 299. He
asks us to ignore the majority opinion and to
adopt the dissenting opinion in Padilla. We
decline to do so. See State v. Swick, 2010~-
NMCA-098, 121, 148 N.M. 895, 242 P.3d 462
(“Defendant urges this Court to adopt the
position of the dissenting justices. This we
cannot do.”), cert. granted, 2010-NMCERT-
010, 149 N.M. 65, 243 P.8d 1147; see also
State v. Glascock, 2008-NMCA-006, 126, 143
N.M. 328, 176 P.38d 317 (noting that the
Court of Appeals is bound by Supreme Court
precedent), cert. quashed, 2009-NMCERT-
006, 146 N.M. 734, 215 P.3d 43.

Directed Verdict

{19} Defendant next argues that the dis-
trict court erred in denying his motion for
directed verdict as to both charges and asks
this Court to reverse his convictions. “The
question presented by a directed verdict mo-
tion is whether there was substantial evi-
dence to support the charge.” State v. Rael,
1999-NMCA-068, 115, 127 N.M. 347, 981 P.2d
280 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Specifically, we inquire “whether
substantial evidence exists of either a direct
or circumstantial nature to support a verdict
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with
respect to each element of the crime.” State

v. Armijo, 1997-NMCA-080, 116, 123 N.M.
690, 944 P.2d 919. “We do not weigh evi-
dence or substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court so long as the jury was pre-
sented with such relevant evidence as a rea-
sonable mind might accept as adequate to
support [its verdict].” State v. Schackow,
2006-NMCA~123, 18, 140 N.M. 506, 148 P.3d
745 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We analyze the
evidence in light of the jury instructions sub-
mitted at trial. State v. Barreras, 2007-
NMCA-067, 13, 141 N.M. 658, 159 P.8d
1138.

Aggravated Fleeing

Hl {20} The jury was instructed that the
essential elements of aggravated fleeing of a
Jaw enforcement officer include:

1. The defendant operated a motor ve-
hicle;

2. The defendant drove willfully and
carelessly in a manner that endangered
the life of another person;

8. The defendant had been given a vi-
sual or audible signal to stop, either by
light, siren, or other signal by a uniformed
Jaw enforcement officer;

4, The uniformed law enforcement offi-
cer was in an appropriately marked law
enforcement vehicle engaged in pursuit{.]

Defendant takes issue only with the evidence
as to element two; he does not contest the
evidence underlying the other elements.
Specifically, Defendant claims that there was
insufficient evidence that he drove carelessly
and claims that there was insufficient evi-
dence that he endangered the life of another
person.

{21} The evidence at trial established that
Defendant drove at speeds exceeding 100
miles per hour through residential areas of
Roswell, New Mexico, and ignored and drove
through several stop signs also while travel-
ing at excessive speeds. The chase conclud-
ed only after Defendant struck a curb and
damaged his vehicle rendering it immobile.
We have little difficulty concluding, given
these facts, that there was sufficient evidence
Defendant “drove willfully and carelessly.”

{22} We also have little trouble concluding
that Defendant endangered “the life of an-
other person” by his conduct. See § 30-22-
1.1(A). The lives of his passengers, Daniel
and Mario, and the life of the deputy sheriff
were placed in jeopardy during the chase.
See Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, 117, 143 N.M.
310, 176 P.8d 299 (relying on the fact that the
defendant endangered his passengers and
the pursuing officer during a high speed
chase in reaching the conclusion that all of
the elements of aggravated fleeing were
met). We see no error with the district
court’s decision to deny the directed verdict
motion as to the aggravated fleeing charge.

Conspiracy

{23} Defendant was convicted of conspira-
cy in violation of Section 30-28-2. A conspir-
acy “consists of knowingly combining with
another for the purpose of committing a felo-
ny.” Section 30-28-2(A). The underlying
felony here is “[sJhooting at a dwelling” in
violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-8(A)
(1998). Defendant argues on appeal that
there was insufficient evidence to prove that
he conspired to commit shooting at a dwell-
ing. He makes two specific claims to sup-
port this argument. We address them in
turn.

{24} First, Defendant asserts that he had
no reason to know that Villa’s trailer was
occupied at the time of the shooting which,
he claims, is an essential element of the
offense of shooting at a dwelling. The State
responds that Defendant has conflated shoot-
ing at a dwelling with shooting at an occupied
building and asserts that knowledge of occu-
pancy is not an essential element of shooting
at a dwelling. We agree with the State.

Hl {25} Section 30-3-8(A) is violated
when a defendant willfully discharges “a fire-
arm at a dwelling or occupied building.” It
is apparent that the “or” between the terms
“dwelling” and “occupied building” operates
in the disjunctive. A criminal defendant may
violate the statute either by shooting at a
“dwelling” or by shooting at an “occupied
building.” The uniform jury instruction as-
sociated with Section 30-8-8(A) bears this
out. See UJI 14-340 NMRA (directing
courts to determine whether the charge is

627

shooting at a dwelling or shooting at an
oceupied building and instructing courts to
use only the applicable alternative).

HI {26} In this case, the jury was prop-
erly instructed at Defendant’s trial that
shooting at a dwelling consists of “1. The
defendant willfully shot a firearm at a dwell-
ing; 2. The defendant knew that the building
was a dwelling[.!” See UJI 14-840. In addi-
tion, the jury was properly instructed that
the term “dwelling” means “any structure,
any part of which is customarily used as
living quarters.” See id. Use Note 1; UJI
14-1631 NMRA. Defendant raises no issues
as to whether Villa’s trailer constituted a
dwelling. Rather, he focuses on the second
part of Section 30-3-8—the portion relating
to the crime of shooting at an occupied build-
ing. He relies on State v. Elmquisi, 114
NLM. 561, 844 P.2d 131 (Ct.App.1992), and he
argues that knowledge of occupation is an
essential element of shooting at a dwelling.
We disagree. Knowledge of occupation is
not an element of shooting at a dwelling.
See UJI 14-840. Moreover, Elmquist is in-
apposite. There, we held that shooting at an
oceupied building requires that “the accused
knew or should have known that the building
at which they were shooting was occupied” at
the time of the shooting. Hlmquist, 114
N.M. at 554-55, 844 P.2d at 134-35. Howev-
er, Defendant was not charged with conspira-
ey to commit shooting an occupied building.
Rather he was charged with conspiracy to
shoot a firearm at a dwelling, and there is no
occupancy requirement for this charge.

HEM {27} Defendant also claims that the
evidence was insufficient to support the
charge of conspiracy to commit shooting at a
dwelling because there was no evidence he
“willfully sought to shoot at the trailer.” “In
order to be convicted of conspiracy, the de-
fendant must have the requisite intent to
agree and the intent to commit the offense
that is the object of the conspiracy.” State v.
Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, 142, 128 N.M. 454,
998 P.2d 1280. “The requisite culpability of
the crime of shooting at a dwelling, as stated
in Section 30-8-8 and repeated in the jury
instruction, is willful ... behavior. Under
New Mexico law, willful conduct is conscious
or intentional conduct.” Varela, 1999-
NMSC-045, 142, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d

628

1280. Here, Defendant willfully agreed to
drive Mario and Daniel to “do some shoot-
ings” and willfully drove to the location Mar-
io selected—Villa’s trailer—knowing full well
what Mario intended to do when they arrived
at the destination. This evidence is sufficient
to prove Defendant had the requisite intent
to agree and the intent to commit shooting at
a dwelling, the object of the conspiracy
charge for which Defendant was convicted.

Jury Instructions

Hs {28} Defendant raises two issues
with respect to the jury instructions prof-
fered at his trial. He argues that the district
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
that Defendant was denied his “rights” to
post-arrest phone calls as provided by Sec-
tion 31-1-5(A) and claims, for the first time
on appeal, that the instruction proffered on
the conspiracy charge was flawed.

The standard of review we apply to jury
instructions depends on whether the issue
has been preserved. If the error has been
preserved[,] we review the instructions for
reversible error. If not, we review for
fundamental error. Under both standards
we seek to determine whether a reason-
able juror would have been confused or
misdirected by the jury instruction.

State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, 112, 181
NUM. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). We address
Defendant’s arguments in turn.

TH {29} Section 31-1-5(A) provides that
“(flollowing arrest, any person accused of a
crime is entitled to have reasonable opportu-
nity to make three telephone calls.” Defen-
dant asserted below, as he does on appeal,
that he was denied the “rights” extended to
him by this statute. Accordingly, he claims
that he was entitled to an instruction inform-
ing the jury of this deprivation because such
an instruction “would have been helpful to
the defense in that it would have permitted
the jury to consider the violation .of the stat-
ute in assessing the voluntariness of [Defen-
dant’s post-arrest] statement[s].” Defendant
asks for a new trial at which such an instruc-
tion can be issued.

{30} Whether Defendant was entitled to
an instruction based on Section 31-1-5(A)
was preserved and, therefore, reviewed for
reversible error. We have little trouble con-

cluding that Defendant failed to establish
error of any kind. Section 31-1-5(A) merely
states that following arrest, any person ac-
cused of a crime is “entitled” to a “reason-
able opportunity” to make three calls. Con-
trary to Defendant’s arguments, the statute
neither provides a criminal defendant with a
“right” to make three calls—the statute
speaks merely of an entitlement—nor ad-
dresses the officer’s duty to inform a criminal
defendant of his or her entitlement to make
those calls. In addition, the statute has no
bearing on the issue of Defendant’s culpabili-
ty for the offense for which he was charged.
See Jackson v. State, 100 N.M. 487, 489, 672
P.2d 660, 662 (1983) (concluding that absence
in jury instruction of an essential element of
the crime is reversible error). Finally, it is
unclear how Section 31-1-5(A) fits into De-
fendant’s theory of his case. State v. Jerni-
gan, 2006-NMSC-~003, 13, 139 N.M. 1, 127
P.3d 537 (“Failure to instruct a jury on a
defendant’s theory of the case is reversible
error.”). Defendant claims he was entitled
to the instruction so as to bolster his asser-
tion that his post-arrest statements were in-
voluntary. The issue of the voluntariness of
Defendant's post-arrest statements, however,
was not raised at trial. For these reasons, we
conclude that the court did not err in reject-
ing Defendant’s request for an instruction
concerning Section 31-1-5(A).

{31} Turning to Defendant’s second argu-
ment on appeal concerning the instructions,
Defendant claims that the court committed
fundamental error in failing to instruct the
jury that Defendant must have known Villa’s
trailer was occupied at the time of the shoot-
ing. We addressed and rejected this argu-
ment in the portion of this opinion upholding
the district court’s denial of the motion for
directed verdict as to the charge of conspira-
cy. The analysis set out there applies here,
CONCLUSION

{82} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

{33} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: LINDA M. VANZI and
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judges.

o
iy
o

2011-NMCA-103

264 P.3d 725
David MARTINEZ, Worker-Appellant,

ve
POJOAQUE GAMING, INC., d/b/a Cities

Of Gold Casino, Pojoaque Pueblo, and
Food Industries Self-Insurance Fund,
Employer/Insurer-Appellees.

No. 29,975.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
June 10, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, Sept. 16,
2011, No. 33,113.

Certiorari Denied, Sept. 20,
2011, No. 33,108.

630

il

Annie Laurie Coogan, Santa Fe, NM, for
Appellant.

Pueblo of Pojoaque Legal Department,
Frank A. Demolli, Rosemary Maestas Swazo,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellees.

OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

{1} This is the second time this case has
come before us for review. See Martinez v.
Cities of Gold Casino (Martinez I), 2009-
NMCA-087, 146 N.M. 735, 215 P.3d 44, cert.
denied, 2009-NMCERT-007, 147 N.M. 361,
223 P.8d 358. In the first appeal, we held
that the Workers’ Compensation Judge
(WCJ) had the authority to order employer,
Cities of Gold Casino (the Casino), to rehire
employee, David Martinez (Worker), after
the Casino fired Worker in retaliation for
filing a workers’ compensation claim. Id.
137. We affirmed the WCJ on the adequacy
of the remedies available under the bad faith
and retaliatory discharge provisions of the

Worker’s Compensation Act (Act) and on the
constitutionality of the cap on attorney fees
set forth in NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(1)
(2003). Martinez I, 2009-NMCA-087, 11 34-
86, 146 N.M. 735, 215 P.38d 44. Worker now
appeals from the WCJ’s decision that Work-
er could not be rehired by the Casino.
Worker also asks this Court to award pre-
and post-judgment interest on the bad faith
awards and fees previously ordered by the
WCJ and to allow the payment of attorney
fees when an employer has acted in bad
faith.

BACKGROUND

{2} We briefly review the parties and the
facts that gave rise to the original controver-
sy, which are set forth in detail in Martinez
I. The Casino is a commercial business enter-
prise that is owned and operated by Poj-
oaque Gaming, Inc. (PGI). PGI is an inde-
pendent corporation owned by Pojoaque
Pueblo (Pueblo), a federally recognized Indi-
an tribal government. Another independent.
tribal entity, the Pueblo of Pojoaque Gaming
Commission (PPGC), is responsible for issu-
ing gaming licenses that certain employees
are required to possess pursuant to the gam-
ing compact between the tribe and the State
of New Mexico. Art Garcia, a high-level
supervisor above Worker, is an employee of
both PGI and PPGC. Finally, the Food In-
dustries Self-Insurance Fund (FISIF) is the
workers’ compensation insurance carrier PGI
contracted with to provide workers’ compen-
sation insurance for the employees of the
Casino,

{3} In February 2006, Worker filed a
claim with the Workers’ Compensation Ad-
ministration (WCA) against PGI alleging that
he was injured while working as a manager
at the Casino. The parties were unable to
successfully mediate the claim and, as a re-
sult, the case went to trial before the WCJ.
Art Garcia was present at the trial and testi-
fied against Worker. On November 21, 2006,
the WCJ filed a memorandum opinion find-
ing for Worker and stating that Worker was
entitled to medical and compensation bene-
fits.

{4} Hight days after the WCJ’s opinion
was entered, the PPGC suspended Worker’s
license, and Worker was banned from the

631

Casino premises until further notice. On
January 25, 2007, Worker’s license was per-
manently revoked by PPGC resulting in the
termination of his employment at the Casino.

{5} After his termination, Worker filed a
complaint with the WCA against PGI, the
Pueblo, PPGC, and FISIF alleging bad faith,
unfair claims processing, and retaliation as a
direct result of the initial complaint he had
filed with the WCA. Worker's claims were
brought pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections
52-1-28.1 (1990) and 52~1-28.2 (1990), which
prohibit unfair and bad faith claim-process-
ing practices and retaliation against employ-
ees seeking benefits. Defendants filed mo-
tions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and the WCJ concluded that
PPGC was never Worker’s employer and
that it was immune from suit pursuant to its
status as a tribal entity possessing sovereign
immunity. Worker’s complaint against
PPGC was dismissed. However, the WCJ
held that PGI had waived its sovereign im-
munity, and Worker’s complaint against PGI
could proceed.

{6} On April 1, 2008, the WCJ issued a
compensation order on the bad faith, unfair
claims processing, and retaliation claims
brought by Worker. The WCJ found that
the revocation notice relied on non-existent
evidence to support the decision to revoke
Worker’s gaming license. The WCJ further
noted that Art Garcia, an employee of both
PGI and PPGC who had testified at Worker’s
earlier compensation claim trial, had provid-
ed inaccurate or incomplete information to
the PPGC. “By inference of timing,” the
WCZJ stated, the information provided by Art
Garcia was “intended to retaliate against
Worker for his successful claim for workers’
compensation.” Accordingly, the actions of
PGI constituted bad faith under Section 52-
1-28.1(B). The WCJ awarded Worker a
twenty-five percent increase in his initial
compensation award for PGI’s violation of
this provision of the Act. In addition, the
WCJ found that the actions of PGI were
“intended to result in license revocation for
Worker, with the intent of terminating Work-
er’s employment with [PGI].” Thus, the WCJ
concluded that PGI’s actions constituted re-
taliation against Worker for seeking workers’

632

compensation benefits in violation of Section
52-1-28.2. The WCJ imposed a $2500 penalty
against PGI, payable to the WCA pursuant
to the remedy provisions contained in Section
52-1-28.2(C) and (D). Although Section 52~
1-28.2(B) requires employers who retaliate
against employees for seeking workers’ com-
pensation benefits to rehire, the WCJ con-
cluded that it had no authority to do so
because it could not require PPGC to license
Worker.

{7} In the first appeal, Worker challenged
the WCJ’s decision that it could not order
PGI to rehire Worker as well as the adequa-
cy of the remedies and cost-sharing provi-
sions established in Sections 52~1-28.1, 52-1-
28.2, and Section 52-1-54(1) of the Act. On
the issue of the rehire provision, we stated in
Martinez I that “[gliven the mandatory lan-
guage of Section 52~1-28.2(B), the serious-
ness of the public policy at issue, and the
conclusiveness of the finding by the WCJ
that Worker’s employment was terminated
as a consequence of his filing a claim with the
WCA, this Court concludes that PGI must
rehire Worker.” Martinez I, 2009~NMCA-
087, 131, 146 N.M. 735, 215 P.8d 44. We
rejected Worker’s assertion that we should
interpret Section 52-1-28.2 to include reme-
dies beyond those expressly provided in the
Act and his contention that the cap on attor-
ney fees in Section 52-1-54(1) is unconstitu-
tional. Martinez I, 2009-NMCA-087, 19 33-
36, 146 N.M. 785, 215 P.3d 44.

{8} Our Supreme Court denied Worker’s
petition for writ of certiorari, Martinez v.
Cities of Gold, 2009~NMCERT-007, 147
N.M. 361, 228 P.3d 358, and on August 18,
2009, this Court issued a mandate remanding
the case to the WCJ for further proceedings
consistent with the Martinez I opinion.

{9} After the mandate issued, Worker filed
a motion to compel payment records and to
enforce the compensation order and Court of
Appeals mandate. Worker requested that he
be rehired in a job of equal pay or status or
for front and back pay in an amount to be
determined. Worker also requested that the
WCJ award pre- and post-judgment interest
on all amounts due. PGI filed a response,
arguing that any award for pre- and post-
judgment interest should be denied. PGI

also argued that with regard to Worker’s
request for reinstatement, “[t]here remain
issues of material fact to be determined
which may necessitate that [PGI] present
additional evidence to the [cJourt.”

{10} The WCJ held a hearing on October
5, 2009, during which PGI’s human resources
director testified and presented evidence that
there were no jobs within PGI that did not
require a gaming license and that gaming
licenses must be issued by the PPGC. Be-
cause Worker did not have a license, he
would not be rehired. The WCJ filed a
memorandum opinion on October 16, 2009,
ruling that the twenty-five percent bad faith
penalty provision due to Worker was
$1,702.78. In addition, the WCJ concluded
that “(nJotwithstanding the direction from
the Court of Appeals the [WCA] is without
authority to require [PPGC] to license Work-
er in order that he may be reemployed by
PGI.” The opinion was silent on Worker's
request for pre- and post-judgment interest.

{11} In this second appeal, Worker asserts
that bad faith damages under the Act are
inadequate when a worker is terminated and
cannot be rehired. Worker further contends
that pre- and post-judgment interest should
be awarded on all damages awarded, and the
attorney fees provisions in the Act are either
unconstitutional or ambiguous. We address
each argument in turn.

DISCUSSION
The Adequacy of Bad Faith Damages Un-
der the Act

{12} On remand, the WCJ again concluded
that he could not require PGI to rehire
Worker. In light of that ruling, Worker does
not argue that because the WCJ failed to
follow our mandate, its decision is erroneous
as a matter of law. Instead, Worker con-
tends that because he “[cannot] and will not,
be rehired by [PGI,]” we should look for
other remedies to compensate him. He asks
this Court to provide compensation benefits
for the statutory period of 500 weeks in lieu
of his rehire. Worker asks us to be guided
by fundamental fairness and argues that Sec-
tion 52-1-28.2 can be interpreted to include
other remedies when the employer cannot
rehire a worker fired in retaliation for seek-

ing medical and compensation benefits. We
disagree, and Worker gives us no authority
for this proposition. See In re Adoption of
Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330
(1984) (noting that where a party cites no
authority to support an argument, we may
assume no such authority exists).

{18} PGI, on the other hand, continues to
argue—as it did in Martinez I—that PPGC
has full authority to revoke Worker’s license;
Worker was provided an appeal process to
seek reinstatement of his gaming license,
which he did not do; and PPGC is not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the WCA. PGI
claims that it cannot rehire Worker because
he does not have a license to do his old job.
Apparently undeterred by the WCJ’s find-
ings that the actions of PGI in terminating
Worker constituted bad faith, PGI continues
to disparage Worker and says that “Worker
should learn that, when working for a tribal
entity, [he is] possibly subject to federal,
state and tribal law and that these laws are
not necessarily in harmony.” Further, in
response to Worker’s contention that he has
been unemployed since his termination, PGI
states that Worker's assertion “shows a com-
plete ignorance of federal and tribal law” and
that “[bloth Worker and his attorney should
Jearn that they must exhaust their tribal
remedies before bringing their complaints to
another forum.” PGI apparently still re-
fuses to acknowledge its role in Worker's
termination. In particular, PGI continues to
ignore the WCJ’s findings that Worker’s
gaming license was revoked because of the
actions of PGI and that the person who “pro-
vided inaccurate or incomplete information to
the [PPGC]” resulting in Worker’s license
revocation is the same person who is also “an
employee and agent of [PGI] and {PPGC].”
In any event, these issues have already been
decided in Martinez I, and we do not revisit
them here.

{14} As we have noted, PGI argues that
the bad faith damages—essentially the award
of no damages in this case—are adequate
and that it simply cannot rehire Worker.
Worker cites to cases in which courts in
other jurisdictions have fashioned alternative
remedies, such as back pay and front pay,
when the reinstatement of a terminated em-

633

ployee is not feasible. However, those cases
were decided in the context of a range of
available remedies to make the injured work-
er whole and are therefore not helpful to this
decision. See, ¢g., Whittington v. Nordam
Group Inc, 429 F.3d 986, 1000 (10th Cir.
2005) (holding that front pay is an equitable
remedy in age discrimination case); Mechi-
ing v. K-Mart Corp., 62 Ohio App.3d 46, 574
N.E.2d 557, 559 (1989) (holding that an em-
ployee who had been discharged for filing a
workers’ compensation claim was entitled to
reinstatement of benefits, even though that
remedy was not specifically mentioned in the
statute). Accordingly, we must rely on the
language of the Act to determine its mean-
ing.

HE {15} We recognize that some state
statutes provide that employers must rehire
but that when an employer refuses to do so,
it must pay the employee lost wages. See,
eg., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 102.35(8) (West 2005).
The Act, however, is unequivocal in its lan-
guage. It is short, unambiguous, and to the
point. We repeat Section 52-1-28.2(B)’s re-
quirement that “[aJny person who discharges
a worker in violation of Subsection A of this
section shall rehire that worker pursuant to
the provisions of the ... Act ... provided
the worker agrees to be rehired.” (Empha-
sis added.) This statutory provision does not
recognize that an employer might have legiti-
mate business reasons for not rehiring the
employee nor does it allow consideration of
any other remedies as a substitution for re-
hire. More importantly, nothing in Section
52-1-28.2(B) allows an employer who has
acted in bad faith and with “willful, wanton
or reckless disregard” of a worker’s rights to
escape with no sanction as the WCJ decided
in this instance. See § 52-1-54(1).

I {16} As we explained in Martinez I,
“by enacting Section 52-1-28.2(B), the Legis-
lature expressly set out the clear mandate
that the act of retaliatory discharge is a clear
violation of public policy.” Martinez I, 2009-
NMCA-087, 130, 146 N.M. 785, 215 P.38d 44
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The overall purpose of
the Act would be seriously undermined if
employers could be relieved of the responsi-
bility expressly placed upon them by the Act

634

by openly discharging workers for exercising
their statutory rights. Further, exempting
an employer from the mandatory rehiring
requirements of the statute permits it to
defeat the Legislature’s intent with regard to
compensating a worker who has been retali-
ated against. To allow such a result would
open the door for virtually every employer to
circumvent the statutory mandate by arguing
that it had a valid justification as to why it
could not rehire a terminated worker. Final-
ly, we observe that such an exemption could
readily discourage employees from exercising
their rights under the Act.

HM {17} In this case, our mandate and
opinion in the prior appeal limited the WCJ
to issuing an order requiring PGI to rehire
Worker. “It is well settled that the duty of a
Jower court on remand is to comply with the
mandate of the appellate court, and to obey
the directions therein without variation[.]”
Vinton Eppsco Ine. of Albuquerque v. Showe
Homes, Inc., 97 N.M. 225, 226, 638 P.2d 1070,
1071 (1981) (emphasis omitted). Where
there is a question as to whether a lower
court followed this Court’s mandate on re-
mand, “[i]t is within the power, and it is the
duty, of this [CJourt to construe its own
mandate in case there is any ambiguity in the
same.” State ex rel. Bujac v. Dist. Ct. of
Second Judicial Dist., 28 N.M. 28, 82, 205 P.
716, 718 (1922). We review the question of
whether the WCJ has followed its authority
on remand de novo, as it involves a question
of law. See Garcia v. Garcia, 2010-NMCA-
014, 127, 147 N.M. 652, 227 P.8d 621, cert.
quashed, 2010-NMCERT-007, 148 N.M. 611,
241 P.3d 612.

WM {18} In Martinez J, this Court re-
versed in part the WCJ and remanded with
the instruction that PGI must rehire Worker
in accordance with the mandatory provision
of Section 52-1-28.2(B). Martinez I, 2009-
NMCA-087, 1.37, 146 N.M. 735, 215 P.3d 44.
We did not mandate that the WCJ make
findings related to whether PGI could or
would rehire Worker, or whether alternative
remedies existed. Rather, we mandated that
the WCJ order PGI to rehire Worker, which
the WCJ did not do. Instead, at PGI’s re-

quest, the WCJ held a hearing and then
concluded that “{nlothwistanding direction

from the Court of Appeals the [WCA] is
without authority to require [PPGC] to li-
cense Worker in order that he may be reem-
ployed by PGI.” By virtue of the WCJ’s
failure to follow our mandate, its decision is
erroneous as a matter of law. We remand
again with instructions to the WCJ to order
PGI to rehire Worker.

Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest.

{19} Worker argues that he is entitled to
pre- and post-judgment interest on previous-
ly awarded damages and attorney fees. Spe-
cifically, Worker contends that he is entitled
to such interest because the judgments in
this case for the bad faith damages to Work-
er and bad faith award of attorney fees were
entered in April and June 2008 and were not
paid until September and December 2009.
We turn first to the issue of prejudgment
interest and then address Worker’s request
for post-judgment interest.

HI {20} Whether to award prejudgment
interest pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 56—
84 (2004) is a decision left to the sound
discretion of the WCJ, and we will reverse
only for an abuse of that discretion. See
Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp, 120 N.M. 188,
150, 899 P.2d 576, 598 (1995). Section 56-8-
A(B) provides:

[T]he court in its discretion may allow

interest of up to ten percent from the date

the complaint is served upon the defendant
after considering, among other things:

(1) if the plaintiff was the cause of un-
reasonable delay in the adjudication of the
plaintiffs claims; and

(2) if the defendant had previously made
a reasonable and timely offer of settlement
to the plaintiff.

{21} The WCJ did not address or make
any specific factual findings regarding Work-
er’s request for pre-judgment interest in his
memorandum opinion or compensation order.
We assume therefore—and the parties do not
disagree—that Worker’s motion was denied.
Our Supreme Court has stated that a court’s
reasons for denying pre-judgment interest
need not be in writing but need only be
ascertainable from the record and not con-
trary to logic and reason. Gonzales, 120
N.M. at 150, 899 P.2d at 593.

Hs {22} Worker here does not contend
that the WCJ abused his discretion in failing
to grant Worker pre-judgment interest.
Rather, he argues only that there was “am-
ple evidence” to support such an award
based on the bad faith actions of PGI. We
observe that Section 56-8-4(B) is a discre-
tionary statute designed to encourage settle-
ment and discourage delay. In this case,
Worker does not argue that PGI caused any
unreasonable delay in the proceedings or
that it made an unreasonable settlement of-
fer prior to trial. He argues only that “there
was substantial cause to believe from the
initial filing of the [alpplication by ... Work-
er and his witness that bad faith and wrong-
ful termination had been committed.” Under
the circumstances, we cannot say that the
WCJ’s ruling denying Worker’s request for
prejudgment interest was contrary to logic
and reason.

{23} Worker next contends that he is enti-
tled to post-judgment interest at a rate of
fifteen percent. Section 56-8-4(A) states the
following:

Interest shall be allowed on judgments and

decrees for the payment of money from

entry and shall be calculated at the rate of
eight and three-fourths percent per year,
unless:

(1) the judgment is rendered on a writ-
ten instrument having a different rate of
interest, in which case interest shall be
computed at a rate no higher than speci-
fied in the instrument; or

(2) the judgment is based on tortious
conduct, bad faith or intentional or willful
acts, in which case interest shall be com-
puted at the rate of fifteen percent.
Hs {24} PGI seems to argue that

because it was not responsible for any delay
in enforeing the WCJ’s original compensation
order, the WCJ properly denied Worker's
request for post-judgment interest. Howev-
er, unlike a discretionary award of pre-judg-
ment interest under Section 56-8-4(B), “an
award of post-judgment interest under Sec-
tion 56-8-4(A) is mandatory.” Nava v. City
of Santa Fe, 2004-NMSC-039, 122, 136
N.M. 647, 108 P.3d 571, Further, this Court
has noted that “{w]hen a judgment is based
on tortious conduct, bad faith, or a finding

635

that the defendant acted intentionally or will-
fully, a court must award interest at the
higher rate of [fifteen] percent.” Pub. Serv.
Co. of N.M. v. Diamond D Constr. Co., 2001-
NMCA-082, 155, 181 N.M. 100, 38 P.8d 651
(emphasis added). Here, the WCJ specifical-
ly found that PGI intended to retaliate
against Worker for his successful workers’
compensation claim, that the actions of PGI
constituted bad faith, and that PGI’s actions
amounted to “fraud, malice, oppression or
willful, wanton or reckless disregard of the
rights of [Worker].” As a result, post-judg-
ment interest for Worker’s successful bad
faith claim should have been awarded and
computed at the proper rate of fifteen per-
cent. We reverse the WCJ’s denial of post-
judgment interest to Worker.

Attorney Fees Provisions Under the Act

{25} In this second appeal, Worker again
argues that the cap on attorney fees under
the Act is unconstitutional and urges us to
“depart from the plain meaning of the statute
because not to do so results in an absurdity.”
Worker’s arguments were previously raised
and addressed in Martinez I. In that opinion,
we cited to Wagner v. AGW Consultants,
2005-NMSC-016, 13, 187 N.M. 734, 114 P.8d
1050, in which our Supreme Court held that
the fee limitations in Section 52-1-54(1) are
constitutional. Martinez I, 2009-NMCA-
087, 136, 146 N.M. 735, 215 P.8d 44, Ac-
cordingly, we said, “[w]e have no authority to
do as Worker requests.” Jd. As we have
previously decided this issue in Martinez I,
we do not reach this question again today.
CONCLUSION

{26} Pursuant to Section 52-1-28.2(B), we
reverse the WCJ and remand with instruc-
tions to order PGI to rehire Worker. We
affirm the WCJ’s denial of pre-judgment in-
terest, but we reverse on the issue of post-
judgment interest as set forth above. Final-
ly, we affirm on the issue of attorney fees.

{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER,
and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.

2011-NMCA-100
264 P.3d 732
Patricia HOLGUIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
ve
SALLY BEAUTY SUPPLY INC. and
Amanda Estrada, individually,
Defendants—Appellees.

No. 29,624.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
July 15, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, Sept. 7, 2011, No. 38,151.

be 637
[

Behles Law Firm, P.C., Jennie Deden
Behles, Albuquerque, NM, Erie N. Ortiz,
LLC, Eric N. Ortiz, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellant.

Butt, Thornton & Baehr, PC, Phillip W.
Cheves, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellees.

OPINION

VIGIL, Judge.

{1} Merchants have a conditional privilege
to detain a customer in a reasonable man-
ner, for a reasonable time, to effect a recov-
ery of the merchandise when they have
probable cause to believe the customer has
willfully concealed merchandise. Two ques-
tions of first impression are presented in
this case: (1) whether a customer who
places merchandise into a reusable, personal
canvas shopping bag, without more, has
“willfully concealed” merchandise; and (2)
whether a statutory presumption of intent
applicable to a criminal prosecution for shop-
lifting also applies to the merchant’s condi-
tional privilege. The district court answered
both questions in the affirmative and grant-
ed Defendants summary judgment. We dis-
agree and reverse.

BACKGROUND

{2} Plaintiff sued Sally Beauty Supply and
the assistant manager (Defendants) seeking
damages in a jury trial, for false imprison-
ment, false accusation of shoplifting, and
false and malicious abuse of prosecution.
Defendants answered asserting, among other
defenses, that they are immune from liability
under NMSA 1978, Sections 30-16-22 and
30-16-23 (1965). Plaintiff and Defendants
each sought summary judgment on this de-
fense.

{3} Plaintiff presented evidence she went
to Defendants’ store carrying her “eco-
friendly canvas shopping tote,” a large bag
which is conspicuous when used. Upon en-
tering Defendants’ store, there were no post-
ed signs stating that shopping totes were not
allowed, and she was not made aware that
they were prohibited. Plaintiff picked up a
can of mousse that was not exactly what she

638

wanted and started to carry it in her tote
toward the front counter to ask the cashier a
question about it. As she approached the
front of the store, the assistant manager
approached her and asked what was in the
bag. The manager told Plaintiff that once
she put the hair mousse in her tote bag, she
was shoplifting. The police were called, and
when Plaintiff refused to sign a “no trespass”
card indicating she would not return to the
store, Plaintiff was arrested and charged
with shoplifting, resisting, evading or ob-
structing an officer, and disorderly conduct.

{4} The district court concluded, “As a
matter of law, Defendants had the authority
to detain Plaintiff and are immune from suit,
pursuant to [Section] 30-16-23.” According-
ly, the district court granted summary judg-
ment in Defendants’ favor and dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.
Two of the court’s findings are pertinent to
this appeal: (1) when the mousse was put
inside the bag, and before it was removed,
the assistant manager had probable cause to
believe Plaintiff was shoplifting because “she
took merchandise belonging to Sally’s Beauty
Supply and put it into her bag”; and (2)
placing the mousse into the bag satisfies a
statutory presumption that Plaintiff intended
to shoplift, and the statutory presumption
applies to a determination of whether Defen-
dants have immunity.

{5} At oral argument, the parties agreed
that the operative fact pertinent to this ap-
peal is Plaintiff's act of placing the mousse in
the shopping bag and that this Court will not
consider anything which may have occurred
afterward. As more fully explained below,
we agree with the parties, and focus our
analysis on this fact.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{6} “Summary judgment is proper if there
are no genuine issues of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Roth v. Thompson, 113 N.M. 381, 334,
825 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1992); see Rule 1-
056(C) NMRA. “We review these legal ques-
tions de novo.” Self v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, 1 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970
P.2d 582. Issues involving application of a
statute to the facts of a case are questions of
law that we review de novo. See Hise v. City

of Albuquerque, 2008-NMCA-015, 18, 138
N.M. 188, 61 P.3d 842 (stating that review of
the application of the law to the facts is
conducted de novo).

{7} To determine whether the district
court properly granted summary judgment
under this standard, we discuss: (1) the ele-
ments of the conditional statutory privilege
afforded merchants to detain a customer, and
(2) if a statutory presumption of an intent to
shoplift applies to a determination of whether
the merchant has a privilege to detain a
customer.

THE CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE FOR A
REASONABLE DETENTION

{8} To determine whether the district
court properly granted Defendants summary
judgment on grounds that their detention of
Plaintiff was privileged under Section 30-16-
23, we examine statutory language as it per-
tains to the facts of this case, the probable
cause requirement of the statute, and the
meaning of “willfully concealed” under the
statute.

The Statute

{9} In Section 30-16-23, the Legislature
has invested police officers, special officers,
and merchants with a conditional privilege to
detain a person free from civil or criminal
liability. In its entirety, the statute provides:

If any law enforcement officer, special
officer or merchant has probable cause for
believing that a person has willfully taken
possession of any merchandise with the
intention of converting it without paying
for it, or has willfully concealed merchan-
dise, and that he can recover the merchan-
dise by detaining the person or taking him
into custody, the law enforcement officer,
special officer or merchant may, for the

purpose of attempting to affect [effect] a

recovery of the merchandise, take the per-

son into custody and detain him in a rea-
sonable manner for a reasonable time.

Such taking into custody or detention shall

not subject the officer or merchant to any

eriminal or civil liability.

Any law enforcement officer may arrest
without warrant any person he has proba-
ble cause for believing has committed the

crime of shoplifting. Any merchant who

causes such an arrest shall not be criminal-

ly or civilly liable if he has probable cause
for believing the person so arrested has
committed the crime of shoplifting.

Id. (alteration in original).

{10} Preliminarily, we identify the perti-
nent parts of the statute that are involved in
this case. First, the arguments and the dis-
trict court ruling consider only whether
Plaintiff “willfully concealed merchandise.”
No argument is made by Plaintiff or Defen-
dants about whether Plaintiff took possession
of the mousse “with the intention of convert-
ing it without paying for it,” and the district
court did not consider this part of the statute
in rendering its ruling. Secondly, we are
only concerned with Defendants’ conduct.
This case does not involve the conduct of a
police officer or a “special officer” (which is
not defined). Further, since the undisputed
facts demonstrate that the decision to arrest
Plaintiff, was made by the police and that
Defendants did not “cause” Plaintiffs arrest,
we do not consider the last paragraph of the
statute. Finally, the parties and the district
court agree that this case involves a deten-
tion, not a taking into custody.

Hl {11} Thus, the elements of the mer-
chant’s conditional privilege as applied in this
ease are: (1) that Defendants had probable
cause for believing that Plaintiff willfully con-
cealed merchandise; and (2) that Defendants
detained Plaintiff in a reasonable manner for
a reasonable time to effect a recovery of the
merchandise.

The Requirement of Probable Cause

HM {12} The conditional privilege given
to merchants requires probable cause to jus-
tify a detention. This requirement balances
the interests of the merchant, on the one
hand, to protect itself from shoplifters, and
the interests of the public, on the other hand,
to be free from being detained without a
good and sufficient cause. See Henry v.
Shopper’s World, 200 N.J.Super. 14, 490 A.2d
820, 322 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1985) (per cu-
riam) (stating that the merchant’s privilege
statute “must be construed in a manner rea-
sonably calculated to carry out its objective
of protecting the merchant from shoplifting

639

and safeguarding the innocent customer” and
stating that a merchant may not act without
eause); J.C. Penney Co. v. Cow, 246 Miss. 1,
148 So.2d 679, 684 (1963) (stating that, on the
one hand, such statutes protect merchants
from shoplifters and, on the other hand, they
do not give merchants complete power and
authority to detain, search, and accuse cus-
tomers of stealing upon the mere whim of a
merchant or its employees). The burden is
on the merchant to demonstrate probable
cause and that probable cause was present at
the time the detention commenced. See
Jones v. Target Corp, 341 F.Supp.2d 583,
587-88 (E.D.Va.2004) (stating that the bur-
den is on the merchant to establish probable
cause and that the probable cause determina-
tion is based on the information known to the
merchant at the time of the detention under
Virginia merchant immunity statute); Coa,
148 So.2d at 684 (stating that the burden of
proof is on the merchant to show probable
cause that a person willfully concealed un-
purchased merchandise upon his person or
otherwise before the merchant may question
that person).

{13} The parties agree on the substance of
what probable cause means. Citing Yucca
Ford, Inc. v. Scarsella, 85 N.M. 89, 92, 509
P.2d 564, 567 (Ct.App.1978), Plaintiff states,
“Probable cause is defined as an honest be-
lief in the guilt of the accused based on
reasonable grounds. Reasonable grounds
are facts and circumstances which would
warrant a prudent and cautious person in
believing that the accused is guilty.” Defen-
dants in turn quote from State v. Copeland,
105 N.M. 27, 31, 727 P.2d 1842, 1846 (Ct.App.
1986), in asserting that “Probable cause ex-
ists when the facts and circumstances within
the officers’ knowledge, and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information, are
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution to believe that an offense has been or
is being committed.”

HM {14} We agree with the parties and
hold that a merchant has probable cause to
detain a person when the totality of the facts
and circumstances within the merchant’s
knowledge, and of which the merchant has
reasonably trustworthy information, are suf-

640

ficient to warrant a merchant of reasonable
caution to believe that the person is willfully
concealing merchandise.

The Meaning of “Willfully Concealed”

{15} Whether Defendants had probable
cause to detain Plaintiff hinges on what “will-
fully concealed” means in Section 30-16-23.

Hl {16} In self-service stores, customers
have permission to pick up, handle, move, try
on, replace, and carry about merchandise
within the store. See Durphy v. United
States, 235 A.2d 826, 827 (D.C.1967) (stating
that customers in a self-service store have
implied permission of the store to pick up,
move, and either replace or pay for the prod-
uet offered for sale); Lee v. State, 59 Md.
App. 28, 474 A2d 587, 541 (Ma.Ct.
Spec.App.1984) (stating that in modern, self-
service stores, customers are impliedly invit-
ed to examine, try on, and carry about the
merchandise on display for sale); Carter v.
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 100, 694 S.E.2d 590,
594 (2010) (stating that in a self-service store
customers have implied permission to move
merchandise about the premises of the
store). Within this context, it is readily ap-
parent that merchandise can be “willfully
concealed” in the sense that is willfully with-
drawn from observation or kept from sight in
ways that are nevertheless still within the
scope of the express or implied permission
given by a store to its customers. Plaintiff
invites us to consider the scenario in which a
store manager who is trying to sell a wallet
and tells the customer to put the wallet into
his pocket to see how it feels. By complying,
the customer has “willfully concealed” the
wallet in the sense that he “willfully” with-
drew the wallet from sight. On the other
hand, the customer is not acting in any way
adverse to the interests of the merchant.
Many more examples can readily be con-
structed, and courts have done so.

Grocery stores often have separate areas
within them—for example, a pharmacy, an
electronics center, or a café and deli—
where items can be separately purchased,
even though the person intends to continue
shopping in the store. If the ... conceal-
ment-of-merchandise ordinance were inter-
preted literally, a person would violate the

ordinance if they made a pharmacy pur-
chase and then placed the purchased item
in their pocket, or in an opaque shopping
bag, while they remained in the store and
continued to shop for other items. The
person would have ‘knowingly concealed’
merchandise while ‘upon the premises
where such merchandise ... is kept for
the purposes of sale, barter or storage.’

In addition, there are circumstances
where a person might knowingly conceal
an unpurchased item even though they
fully intend to pay for the item before
leaving the store. For example, a person
who is shopping with their young children
might conceal candy from the children,
even though the person has every intention
of paying for the item at the check-out
counter. Similarly, a person who is shop-
ping with their spouse might conceal an
anniversary card (again, with the intention
of paying for it).

Strane v. Municipality of Anchorage, 250
P.3d 546, 549-50 (Alaska Ct.App.2011) (foot-
notes omitted).

{17} We also note that courts have even
disagreed on whether merchandise in open
view is “concealed.” Compare Henry, 490
A.2d at 321-22 (concluding that because the
phrase “concealed unpurchased merchan-
dise” applies to items in plain view, but worn
as though they had been purchased, a coat
worn by a customer with a tag fastened to its
back constituted “concealed unpurchased
merchandise”), with Walters, 2003 OK 100,
192, 11 n. 24, 82 P.8d 578 (rejecting Henry’s
approach and concluding the word “con-
cealed” did not apply to a sweater worn in
plain view).

{18} The term “willfully” in the merchant's
conditional privilege indicates an intent which
requires more than merely putting merchan-
dise out of sight. See Strane, 250 P.8d at 550
(concluding that to knowingly conceal mer-
chandise in violation of a criminal statute, the
purpose must be to hide the merchandise
from the store owner or store employees);
May Dep't Stores v. Devercelli, 314 A.2d 767,
771 on. 8 & 13 (1978) (construing a criminal
statute to mean that “a willful concealment

Leer er errr sen!
statutory presumption that Plaintiff intended

to shoplift and that the statutory presump-
tion applied to a determination of whether

would seem to involve necessarily a wrongful
purpose such as to defraud or convert to
one’s own use” and that “[p]lacing items in a
shopping bag, without more, does not permit
an inference of criminal intent”); State v.
Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.B.2d 768, 773
(1961) (stating that “willfully conceals” in a
criminal statute means that the concealing
must indicate a purpose to do it without
authority and in violation of the law); Carter,
694 S.E.2d at 594-95 (stating that “[w]here
there is evidence that an individual has acted
in a manner that is inconsistent with that of a
prospective purchaser, and has exercised im-
mediate dominion and control over the prop-
erty,” there is sufficient possession to consti-
tute larceny in a self-service store). “The
fact that [the customer] placed the goods in a
shopping bag provided no valid reason for
the trial court to infer a criminal intent or a
possession clearly adverse to the interests of
the store.” Durphy, 235 A.2d at 327.

Hl {19} While the foregoing cases con-
strue criminal statutes, we find them instruc-
tive because the overarching purpose of the
conditional merchant’s privilege in Section
30-16-23 is to give the merchant appropriate
tools to combat the crime of shoplifting. On
the one hand, the customer has been given
permission to pick up, handle, move, try on,
replace, and carry about merchandise within
the store. On the other hand, the merchant,
has an expectation that the customer will
exercise this permission in a way that is not
inconsistent with paying for the merchandise.
When the customer's conduct in putting the
merchandise out of sight crosses the line
between the permission granted and the
merchant's right to be paid, the customer has
“willfully concealed” merchandise consistent
with the policies recognized by the statute.
We therefore hold that when merchandise is
concealed in the sense that it is not in plain
sight, there must also be circumstances
which reflect that the purpose of the conceal-
ment is adverse to the store owner’s right to
be paid for the merchandise before a conelu-
sion can be made that the merchandise was
“willfully concealed” under Section 30-16-23.

WHETHER THE STATUTORY PRE-
SUMPTION APPLIES

HE {20} The district court also ruled that
placing the mousse into the bag satisfied a

641

Defendants have immunity. We disagree.

{21} We begin with the pertinent statutory
provision, NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-
20(A)(2) (2006), which defines the crime of
shoplifting in the following language:

A. Shoplifting consists of one or more
of the following acts:

(2) willfully concealing merchandise
with the intention of converting it with-
out paying for it[.]

Thus, in such a case, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt a willful conceal-
ment of merchandise “with the intention of
converting it without paying for it[]” Id.

HMMM {22} The best evidence to prove
specific intent is a voluntary statement from
a mentally competent person that he acted
with the intent set forth in the statute. See
State v. Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, 168, 146
NLM. 525, 212 P.8d 418 (Vigil, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (stating that the
best evidence of intent is a defendant's state-
ment that he acted with the requisite intent),
cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-006, 148 N.M.
584, 241 P.8d 182. However, such evidence
is not usually available and proof of a specific
intent must ordinarily be proved cireumstan-
tially by inferences from the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. State v. Ortega, 79
N.M. 707, 708, 448 P.2d 813, 814 (Ct.App.
1968); People v. Johnson, 28 Il.2d 441, 192
N.E.2d 864, 866 (1963).

{23} For shoplifting, the Legislature has
established a factual presumption by which
the fact finder is allowed, but not required, to
presume intent from proof of another fact.
Section 30-16-22 is entitled “Presumptions
created” and it provides:

Any person who willfully conceals mer-
chandise on his person or on the person of
another or among his belongings or the
belongings of another or on or outside the
premises of the store shall be prima facie
presumed to have concealed the merchan-
dise with the intention of converting it

642

without paying for it. If any merchandise

is found concealed upon any person or

among his belongings it shall be prima
facie evidence of willful concealment.

HM {24} Thus, “prima facie evidence” of
“willful concealment” may be found if mer-
chandise is found concealed upon a person or
among his belongings, and a person who
“willfully conceals” merchandise may be “pri-
ma, facie presumed” to have acted with the
specific intent of converting the merchandise
without paying for it. Id. This is a presump-
tion of fact, not a presumption of law. See
White v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 619, 636
§.E.2d 358, 357 (2006) (“Prima facie evidence
is lelvidence that will establish a fact or
sustain a judgment unless contradictory evi-
dence is produced.’” (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 598 (8th ed. 2004))); of Monto-
ya v. Torres, 118 N.M. 105, 110, 823 P.2d 905,
910 (1991) (stating that a presumption of
undue influence is a presumption of fact, not
a presumption of law). The Committee Com-
mentary to UJI 14-5061 NMRA makes a
specific reference to Section 30-16-22:
“Some New Mexico statutes allow the jury to
‘presume’ certain facts from other facts. For
example, the intention of converting mer-
chandise may be presumed from the fact that
the person concealed the merchandise.”
New Mexico is not unique. Other states also
have statutes which provide that in a criminal
prosecution the fact finder may, but is not
required to, presume specific intent exists
when the accused conceals goods that are for
sale. See In re R.M.D., 829 P.2d 852, 854 n.
8 (Colo.1992) (en banc) (collecting cases).

HN {25} The question presented to us in
this case is whether the statutory presump-
tion contained in Section 30-16-22 applies to
the merchant’s privilege codified in Section
30-16-23. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that the district court erred as a
matter of law in applying the statutory pre-
sumption in Section 30-16-22 to the mer-
chant’s privilege set forth in Section 30-16-
23.

{26} The history behind the merchant's
privilege statutes such as Section 30-16-22 is
set forth in Alvarado v. City of Dodge City,
238 Kan. 48, 708 P.2d 174, 180-82 (1985), and
Gortarez ew rel. Gortarez v. Smitty’s Super

Valu, Inc. 140 Ariz. 97, 680 P.2d 807, 811-18
(1984) (In Banc), which we summarize herein.
In the case of misdemeanors such as shoplift-
ing, the merchant did not have a common
right privilege to arrest because there was no
breach of the peace. If a merchant saw a
customer stealing merchandise, the merchant
was only permitted to use reasonable force to
retake his goods. However, there was no
room for a mistake, and if the customer did
not actually take goods, the merchant was
subject to liability, even if his mistake was
reasonable. The common law adequately
protected a merchant who had a small shop
and kept all his merchandise on shelves be-
hind him or in a counter between him and his
customers because he could be certain in his
mind when someone was stealing goods dis-
played in this way. With the advent of mod-
ern stores, however, where merchandise is on
open shelves throughout the store and cus-
tomers are allowed, and even expected, to
handle the goods before purchasing them,
the merchant’s ability to protect his property
from theft became significantly untenable.
The merchant was faced with the choice of
allowing a suspect to leave the store, risking
the loss of the merchandise, or he took the
risk of undertaking to recover what he rea-
sonably believed to be stolen merchandise,
and facing liability for a wrongful detention if
it turned out he was wrong.

{27} As Alvarado explains, “[u]nder these
circumstances, the common-law rule did not
work.” 708 P.2d at 181 (citation omitted).
Some courts therefore adopted a rule permit-
ting a merchant for reasonable cause to de-
tain a customer he believed was shoplifting.
Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 120A (1965) agreed with this position. En-
titled “Temporary Detention For Investiga-
tion” the Restatement provision states:

One who reasonably believes that another

has tortiously taken a chattel upon his

premises, or has failed to make due cash
payment for a chattel purchased or ser-
vices rendered there, is privileged, without
arresting the other, to detain him on the
premises for the time necessary for a rea-
sonable investigation of the facts.
Comment (2) states that this section is neces-
sary to protect shopkeepers from the dilem-

ma of either permitting the suspected shop-
lifter to walk out or arrest him at the risk of
liability for false arrest if the theft is not
proved. Comment (e) further explains that
the privilege protects the shopkeeper who
has made a reasonable mistake regarding the
guilt of the suspect.

{28} In addition to the court decisions,
many state legislatures responded by enact-
ing statutes modifying the common law rules.
These statutes vary in form, but in general
give merchants, their employees, and agents
a qualified right, based on probable cause or
reasonable grounds, to detain any person
believed to have taken goods from the store
without paying for them, provided the deten-
tion is for a reasonable time, and is conduct-
ed in a reasonable manner. New Mexico is
one of these states, and Section 30-16-23 is
such a statute. Section 30-16-23 on its face
grants a conditional privilege to a merchant
to detain a person based on probable cause,
and by its terms, it expands upon the com-
mon law rights given to a merchant under
the common law.

{29} Thus, Sections 30-16-22 and 30-16-
23 were enacted to accomplish different pur-
poses in different ways. Section 30-16-22 is
a statute which simply allows the finder of
fact in a criminal prosecution of a Section 30-
16-20(A)(2) shoplifting case to infer a specific
intent to convert merchandise without paying
for it if a person “willfully conceals” mer-
chandise as described in the statute. On the
other hand, Section 30-16-23 gives a mer-
chant a conditional privilege to detain a per-
son when the merchant has probable cause to
believe the person has shoplifted or “willfully
concealed merchandise.” The conditional
privilege expands the common law and does
not require the merchant to be correct in his
belief that merchandise was actually taken,
as long as the detention is supported by
probable cause, and the other conditions of
the statute are satisfied.

{30} We note that if the factual presump-
tion of Section 30-16-22 applied to the mer-
chant’s privilege contained in Section 30-16-
28, the inclusion of the probable cause re-
quirement would be meaningless. We will
not assume this is what the Legislature in-

643
tended when the express language in Section
80-16-28 calls for probable cause.

{81} In light of the foregoing discussion,
we conclude that the factual presumption of
Section 30-16-22 does not apply to the mer-
chant’s conditional privilege set forth in See-
tion 30-16-23. Since the district court ruled
otherwise in granting Defendants summary
judgment, we reverse.

CONCLUSION

{32} The order of the district court is

reversed.

{83} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN
and LINDA M. VANZI, Judges.

2011-NMCA-109
264 P.3d 739

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

ve

Daniel FROHNHOFER, Defendant—
Appellant.

No. 30,001.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Aug. 28, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, Sept. 30,
2011, No. 33,192.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, Francine A. Chavez, Assistant Attorney
General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Liane E. Kerr, Albuquerque, NM, for Ap-
pellant.

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} Pursuant to the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers (IAD), NMSA 1978, Section 31-—
5-12 (1971), the State of New Mexico lodged
a detainer against Defendant Daniel Frohn-
hofer. Defendant requested a final disposi-
tion of the detainer, triggering a 180-day
deadline for the commencement of his trial.
Prior to the deadline, Defendant was paroled
in Colorado. When his trial did not com-

mence before the 180-day deadline, Defen-
dant filed a motion to dismiss. The district
court denied the motion. Because we con-
elude that the IAD does not apply to parol-
ees, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} When the State learned that Defen-
dant was incarcerated in Colorado, it lodged
a detainer against him. Defendant respond-
ed on January 6, 2009, by filing a request for
final disposition pursuant to Article 3(A) of
the IAD. This triggered Defendant's transfer
to Curry County, New Mexico, on March 3,
2009. On March 16, 2009, Defendant was
placed on parole in Colorado. On July 17,
2009, more than 180 days after he requested
a final disposition, Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss the New Mexico charges for viola-
tion of the speedy detainer limits of the IAD.
The district court denied the motion, and a
jury convicted Defendant of aggravated bat-
tery against a household member, contrary
to NMSA 1978, Section 30-38-16 (1995)
(amended 2008), and false imprisonment,
contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-4-3
(1963).

If. The IAD Does Not Apply After a De-
fendant Is Released from Imprison-
ment

Wl {3} Defendant’s IAD argument is
contained entirely in two sentences at the
end of an extensive—but mostly irrelevant—
recitation of facts and law: “Defendant’s No-
vember 2007 motion to dismiss ... triggered
the start of the 180 days. The State’s win-
dow for prosecuting this case thereby ex-
pired in May[] 2008.” The State contends
that the I[AD—and hence the 180-day dead-
line—ceased to apply when Defendant was
paroled in Colorado in March 2009. Al-
though we have held that the completion of a
sentence in the sending state terminates a
prisoner’s rights under the IAD, see State v.
Quiroz, 94 N.M. 517, 520, 612 P.2d 1828, 1831
(Ct.App.1980), whether the parole of a pris-
oner in the sending state renders the JAD
inapplicable is a question of first impression
in New Mexico.

{4} We must briefly address Defendant’s
yeference to a November 2007 motion to

dismiss. The record, which begins with the
criminal information that initiated this case
on March 28, 2009, contains no evidence of
such a motion. See State v. Harrison, 2010-
NMSC-088, 110, 148 N.M. 500, 238 P.38d 869
(stating that matters not of record are not
considered on appeal). Defendant mentioned
this motion at a hearing, but indicated that
whatever it was, it was filed prior to the
detainer against him. Defendant requested
a final disposition of the detainer on January
6, 2009. It was this request that triggered
the 180-day deadline. See § 31~-5-12, art.
(A).

Hl {5} We turn to the meaning of Article
8 of the IAD, which is a question of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo. See
Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc, 2002-
NMSC-020, 116, 182 N.M. 382, 49 P.3d 61.
However, “[a]s a congressionally sanctioned
interstate compact within the Compact
Clause of the United States Constitution ...,
IAD is a federal law subject to federal con-
struction.” New York v. Hill, 528 US. 110,
111, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted), “Our
first step in interpreting a statute is to deter-
mine whether the language at issue has a
plain and unambiguous meaning ... [our
inquiry must cease if the statutory language
is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent.” Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co, 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 186
L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “{WJhen the statute’s language is
plain, the sole function of the courts—at least.
where the disposition required by the text is
not absurd—is to enforce it according to its
terms.” Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 US.
526, 584, 124 S.Ct. 1028, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024
(2004) Gnternal quotation marks omitted).
Unless otherwise defined, we give words in a
statute their ordinary, contemporary, mean-
ing. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
87, 42, 100 S.Ct. 811, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979).

{6} We begin with the plain language of
the statute. Article 3 provides:

A. Whenever a person has entered
upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of a party state,
and whenever during the continuance of
the term of imprisonment there is pending

645

in any other party state any untried indict-
ment, information or complaint on the ba-
sis of which a detainer has been lodged
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
trial within one hundred eighty days after
he has caused to be delivered to the prose-
cuting officer and the appropriate court of
the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction writ-
ten notice of the place of his imprisonment.
and his request for a final disposition to be
made of the indictment, information or

complaint... .

Section 31-5-12, art. 8(A) (emphasis added).

HE {7} Most courts that have examined
the effects of parole on the IAD have focused
their attention on the requirement that the
person asserting rights under the IAD be a
prisoner. Imprisonment necessarily implies
confinement. See Black’s Law Dictionary
825 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “imprisonment”
as “[t]he act of confining a person, [especial-
ly] in a prison”). In contrast, “parole” is
“(t]he conditional release of a prisoner from
imprisonment.” Id. at 1227, Accordingly,
parole by definition ends a term of imprison-
ment, thereby rendering Article 3(A) inappli-
cable. See Cunningham v. State, 341 Ark.
99, 14 S.W.3d 869, 872 (2000) (“{T)he plain
language contained in Article [3(A)] ... pro-
vides the IAD only applies during the period
when a prisoner continues to serve a term of
imprisonment.”); State v. Foster, 107 Or.
App. 481, 812 P.2d 440, 441 (1991) (“When
[the] defendant was released on parole, the
relevant term of imprisonment ended. Expi-
ration of the 180 days did not occur ‘during
the continuance of [that] term of imprison-
ment,’” (citation omitted)); Womble v. State,
957 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997)
(“We believe that the plain language of [Arti-
cle 3] indicates that a ‘term of imprisonment’
does not include a term of parole.”).

{8} As the State points out, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss relied on Snyder v. Swm-
ner, 960 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.1992), a Ninth
Cireuit case with analogous facts. In Sny-
der, a prisoner was transferred from Iowa to
Nevada pursuant to a detainer Nevada had
filed under the IAD. Id at 1449-50. The
prisoner was held in Nevada for 426 days
before his trial began and argued that dis-
missal was necessary because Article 4 of the

646

IAD required trial to commence within 120
days of his arrival in Nevada, Jd. at 1450.
However, the prisoner had been paroled in
Towa on the 120th day. See id. at 1451. The
magistrate court judge denied the motion,
holding that the 120-day limit was no longer
applicable because the prisoner had been pa-
roled. See id.

{9} In the prisoner’s subsequent habeas
corpus action, the Ninth Circuit held that
“the 120-day clock starts to run and cannot
be turned off by a grant of parole by the
sending state.” Jd. at 1458. The court of-
fered two rationales for this result. First,
the court believed that allowing parole in the
sending state to cut off IAD rights in the
receiving state “would give every receiving
state a way to bypass the requirements of
the [[AD].” Id. at 1453. Second, the court
argued that such an interpretation was con-
trary to the plain language of the statute
because the 120-day requirement could only
be extended “for good cause shown in open
court.” Jd. at 1454. We find neither argu-
ment persuasive. Regarding the plain lan-
guage argument, we note that the Snyder
court framed the question as whether the
120-day limit could be extended. However,
as the court acknowledged, the magistrate
court judge had denied the prisoner’s motion
to dismiss because “the 120-day limit was no
longer applicable,” not because it had been
extended. Id. at 1451. As discussed above,
we agree with the determination that the
relevant language of the statute relates to
“the continuance of the term of imprison-
ment.” Section 33-5-12, art. 3(A)

{10} Furthermore, we do not agree that
our holding that a prisoner’s parole in the
sending state renders the IAD inapplicable
gives receiving states a tool to bypass the
IAD. Whether for the purpose of helping
other states prosecute prisoners or other-
wise, we do not believe that states are gener-
ally willing to grant parole to otherwise ineli-
gible prisoners. See Cunningham, 14

S.W.8d at 872 (“We simply do not share the
Snyder court's concerns that the LAD’s re-
quirements can or will be so easily manipu-
lated by the states....”); Dunaway v. Com-
monwealth, 60 S.W.3d 568, 568 (Ky.2001)
(characterizing this rationale from Snyder as

“specious”). Furthermore, we agree with
the Supreme Court of Kentucky that “[olnce
the prisoner has been released, the need for
protection from detainers—substantiated or
not—evaporates.” Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at
567-68; of Quiroz, 94 N.M. at 520, 612 P.2d
at 1831 (“(W]hen a prisoner is discharged by
a sending state, his treatment and rehabilita-
tion in that state is ended and the purpose of
the [IAD] loses significance.”). Thus, al-
though it is not necessary to consider policy
to interpret Article 3, we believe that policy
supports the result we reach today.

Til. Evidentiary Issues

{11} Defendant has raised two additional
arguments he claims require reversal. The
first of these arguments is entirely contained
in one sentence: “(t]he repeated reference to
‘victim’ or ‘victims’ served to ‘destroy the
presumption of innocence’ in violation of [the
Sixth and Seventh amendments of the United
States Constitution] and [article II, sections
14 and 18 of the New Mexico Constitution].”
This statement is so general we are at a loss
to decipher its substance. We decline to
address this unsupported single-sentence as-
sertion. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt.
Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, 115, 187 N.M. 339,
110 P.3d 1076.

{12} Defendant also contends that testimo-
ny about the “cycle of violence” was improp-
erly admitted through lay witnesses. We
agree with the State that this issue was not
preserved below, and we therefore do not
consider it. See In re T.B., 1996-NMCA~
035, 118, 121 N.M. 465, 913 P.2d 272 (‘{Wle
review the case litigated below, not the case
that is fleshed out for the first time on
appeal.”). Defendant does argue that we
should review the matter for fundamental
error, and we do not. State v. Cortez, 2007-
NMCA-054, 15, 141 N.M. 623, 159 P.8d 1108
(“Appellate courts are to exercise discretion
to review an assertion of fundamental error
only in rare instances and solely to prevent a
miscarriage of justice where some fundamen-
tal right has been invaded.”).

Iv. CONCLUSION

{13} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the district court.

{14} IT IS SO ORDERED.

PL 647
Le

WE CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge, and TIMOTHY L. GARCIA,

Judge.

2011-NMSC-039
265 P.3d 701

Michael and Tia WACHOCKL, individually
and as personal representatives of the
Estate of Jason Wachocki, deceased, and
Bill Wachocki, Plaintiffs—Petitioners,

v.

BERNALILLO COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, Defendant-—
Respondent.

No. 32,131.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Oct. 11, 2011.

Kennedy, Moulton & Wells, P.C., Deborah
D. Wells, Slease & Martinez, P.A., William D.
Slease, Albuquerque, NM, for Bernalillo
County Sheriff's Department.

McGinn, Carpenter, Montoya & Love,
P.A,, Randi McGinn, A. Elicia Montoya, Ty-
ler J. Atkins, Albuquerque, NM, for Michael

Wachocki, deceased, and Bill Wachocki.

651

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} This appeal involves the loss-of-consor-
tium claim brought by Bill Wachocki (Bill),
the adult brother of Jason Wachocki (Jason).
Twenty-two-year-old Jason was killed when
his vehicle was struck by a speeding van
driven by Willie Hiley (Willie), a corrections
officer at the Metropolitan Detention Center
Gail). Bill argues his loss-of-consortium
claim was improperly foreclosed by the appli-
cation of the “mutual dependence” standard
which was developed for spousal-type rela-
tionships. Lozoya v. Sanchez, 2003-NMSC-
009, 127, 188 N.M. 579, 66 P.3d 948 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), abro-
gated on other grounds by Heath v. La Mar-
iana Apartments, 2008-NMSC-017, 21, 143
NM. 657, 180 P.8d 664. We clarify that
recovery for loss of consortium may extend
to sibling relationships; however, the facts
presented in this case do not exhibit the
mutual dependence required for recovery.
The Court of Appeals having reached a simi-
Jar conclusion, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Jason was 15 months older than Bill
and as children they had shared a bedroom
together. At the time of Jason’s death, they
had been sharing an apartment for approxi-
mately eight months. Jason and Bill split
the rent, utilities, and grocery bills and
shared household chores and cooking. The
brothers enjoyed a close relationship. They
spent their free time together, socializing,
playing basketball, and going to the movies
and the racetrack. Bill considered his older
brother his role model and best friend, and
he relied on Jason for advice and emotional
support.

{3} While upholding a wrongful death
claim against the Bernalillo County Sheriff's
Department (BCSD), the courts below denied
the loss-of-consortium claim brought by Ja-
son’s brother, Bill. Wachocki v. Bernalillo
Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 2010-NMCA-021, 19 2,
57, 147 N.M. 720, 228 P.8d 504. The Court
of Appeals held that Bill had not shown that
BCSD owed him a duty of care because it
was not foreseeable that injury to Jason

would harm Bill’s relational interest. Id.
1155-56. The Court also held that even if
BCSD owed Jason a duty of care, no recov-
ery was warranted because Bill had not
shown he shared a sufficiently close relation-
ship with Jason under the “mutual depen-
dence” factors we outlined in Lozoya. Wa-
chocki, 2010-NMCA-021, 1156-57, 147 N.M.
720, 228 P.8d 504. We granted certiorari
pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(B)
(1972) and Rule 12-502 NMRA. Wachocki v.
Bernalillo Cty., 2010-NMCERT-002, 147
N.M. 705, 228 P.8d 489.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

TNs {4} We address whether the courts
below improperly foreclosed Bill’s' recovery
for loss of consortium by applying the Lozo-
ya mutual dependence factors. The Lozoya
factors assess whether the claimant and the
injured party shared a sufficiently close rela-
tionship, proof of which is necessary to recov-
er under a consortium theory. See Fitzjer-
rell v. City of Gallup ex rel. Gallup Police
Dep't, 2008-NMCA-125, 114, 134 N.M. 492,
79 P.3d 836. Bill claims error because the
Lozoya factors are not specifically tailored to
the sibling relationship. This call to reassess
the Lozoya factors presents a question of
law, which we review de novo. Boradiansky
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 2007-
NMSC-015, 15, 141 N.M. 387, 156 P.3d 25.
To the extent we review the factual premise
underlying the loss-of-consortium claim, we
defer to the “trial court’s factual findings
unless the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.” Strata Prod. Co. v.
Mercury Exploration Co., 121 N.M. 622, 627,
916 P.2d 822, 827 (1996); of Fitgjerrell,
2008-NMCA-125, 118, 184 N.M. 492, 79 P.8d
836 (“The legal availability of relief depends
on the factual determination of whether a
plaintiff has a significant enough relational
bond with the victim of a tort to recover for
loss of consortium.”).

Il. AVAILABILITY OF RECOVERY
FOR SIBLING’S LOSS-OF-CON-
SORTIUM CLAIM

HH {5} A loss-of-consortium claimant
must demonstrate two elements in order to
recover damages. See Fitajerrell, 2003-

652

NMCA-125, 114, 134 N.M. 492, 79 P.8d 836.
The first element is that the claimant and the
injured party shared a sufficiently close rela-
tionship. Id. In Lozoya, we held that the
following factors were relevant in determin-
ing whether the claimant and injured party
shared such a close relationship:

“the duration of the relationship, the de-
gree of mutual dependence, the extent of
common contributions to a life together,
the extent and quality of shared experi-
ence, and ... whether the plaintiff and the
injured person were members of the same
household, their emotional reliance on each
other, the particulars of their day to day
relationship, and the manner in which they
related to each other in attending to life’s
mundane requirements.”

2003-NMSC-009, 1 27, 183 N.M. 579, 66 P.38d
948 (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 186 N.J. 99,
642 A.2d 372, 378 (1994)). The second ele-
ment is a duty of care. Lozoya, 2003-
NMSC-009, 115, 183 N.M. 579, 66 P.3d 948.
The tortfeasor owes a duty of care to the
claimant where it is foreseeable that the
harm inflicted upon the injured party would
damage the relationship between the injured
party and the claimant. Jd. Because we
decide this appeal based on the lack of the
first element—a sufficiently close relation-
ship—we need not address foreseeability.

{6} The Court of Appeals concluded that
the siblings did not share a sufficiently close
relationship under the Lozoya test. See Wa-
chocki, 2010-NMCA-021, 156, 147 N.M. 720,
228 P.3d 504. Bill argues that the Court of
Appeals improperly applied the Lozoya “mu-
tual dependence” factors, developed for
spousal-type relationships, to the sibling loss-
of-consortium claim presented here. He
claims that sibling relationships are distinct
from spousal-type relationships, and there-
fore some of the Lozoya factors, such as the
extent and quality of shared experience and
emotional reliance, are not applicable to an
adult-sibling relationship. Thus, he urges
this Court to adopt a loss of consortium
analysis that is specifically tailored to the
unique nature of sibling relationships, consid-
ering such factors as whether siblings remain
in close communication during adulthood,

provide emotional support to one another,
and share interests and activities.

{7} BCSD responds that adopting Bills
proposed test would exalt the legal status
of siblings over the fact-specifie inquiry into
mutual dependence, and therefore is incon-
sistent with our analysis in Lozoya. In Lo-
zoya, we considered “whether unmarried
cohabitants may recover against negligent
actors for loss of consortium.”  2003-
NMSC-009, 1, 183 N.M. 579, 66 P.8d 948.
We rejected the defendants’ contentions
that only those with “special legal status” in
relation to the injured party, such as spous-
es or blood relatives, may recover consor-
tium damages. Id. 119. We observed that
loss-of-consortium claims are intended to
compensate for “damage to a relational in-
terest, not a legal interest.” Jd. 120.
Therefore, we declined to utilize “legal sta-
tus as a proxy for a significant enough rela-
tional interest,” id. 120, and held that co-
habitants, even though not legally married,
may be entitled to recover, id. 127.

{8} We decline to inject factors specific to
the sibling relationship into our loss of con-
sortium analysis. A relationship-specific test
is not in accord with Lozoya, which clarified
that legal status is not a “dispositive factor in
determining whether loss of consortium ben-
efits should be extended.” 2003-NMSC-009,
120 n. 2, 183 N.M. 579, 66 P.3d 948. Thus, it
would contravene Lozoya to fashion a test
that is directly dependent on the type of
legal relationship involved. Moreover, we
are concerned that a relationship-specific test
would detract from the important goals of
clarity and stability in this area of the law.
A relationship-specific test would presumably
spawn many iterations—the factors would
have to be tailored to siblings in this in-
stance, then to many other types of relation-
ships in cases to come. With the proper
analysis so reliant upon the nature of the
relationship, we fear that lower courts would
be left with little clear guidance when faced
with a loss-of-consortium claim.

{9} Though we decline to inject sibling-
specific factors into the analysis of whether
the claimant and injured parties shared a
sufficiently close relationship, we hold that
the analysis should be streamlined to accom-

modate different types of relationships. In
Lozoya, we held that the degree of mutual
dependence, as well as a host of other fac-
tors, such as duration of the relationship,
emotional reliance, and sharing of a common
residence, bear upon whether the claimant
and injured party shared a sufficiently close
relationship. 2003-NMSC-009, 127, 133
N.M. 579, 66 P.3d 948. We acknowledge that
these factors may be helpful in the context of
some relationships, especially spousal-type
relationships; however, we strive for a uni-
form analysis applicable to all relationships.

Hl {10} With that goal in mind, we con-
clude that mutual dependence is the key
element. The unmarried cohabitants in Lo-
zoya were certainly mutually dependent—
they jointly ran a household, made life deci-
sions together and had made a long-term
commitment to one another. See id. 119-10,
29. Similarly, in Fernandez v. Walgreen
Hastings Co., a grandparent claiming loss of
consortium shared a household with the
granddaughter she lost and acted as the
child’s caretaker. 1998-NMSC-039, 41 4, 32,
126 N.M. 263, 968 P.2d 774. In both of these
situations, the parties relied on the relation-
ship and could not enjoy life in the same way
once the relationship was severed. Under
such circumstances, the claimant and injured
party are mutually dependent, and therefore
the relationship was sufficiently close to per-
mit recovery for loss of consortium.

HM {11} Having concluded that mutual
dependence is the key factor in determining
whether the claimant shared a sufficiently
close relationship with the injured party, we
proceed to apply this analysis, looking to the
factual findings made by the district court.
See Fitzjerrell, 2003-NMCA-125, 113, 134
N.M. 492, 79 P.3d 836. Before his death,
Jason shared an apartment with Bill for ap-
proximately eight months. The brothers
“split bills and shared household chores, so-
cialized together and relied on each other for
friendship.” As the Court of Appeals noted,
“yecovery by a sibling may be proper,” but
here the “factual basis simply falls short.”
Wachocki, 2010-NMCA-021, 157, 147 N.M.
720, 228 P.3d 504. We agree. The brothers
were roommates and shared a small amount
of financial responsibilities, but we hold that

653

their relationship did not exhibit the mutual
dependence required for recovery.

Hl {12} We are mindful of the limited
nature of loss-of-consortium claims in other
jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have ex-
pressly rejected sibling loss-of-consortium
claims. See Bobick v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 489 Mass. 652, 790 N.E.2d 653, 661-62
(2008) (holding that a sibling may not main-
tain a loss-of-consortium claim); Ford Motor
Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 383 (Tex.1998)
(same). Though we recognize that other ju-
risdictions draw the line at particular rela-
tionships, we emphasize that our rejection of
Bil’s claim does not mean that a sibling
cannot prevail in a loss-of-consortium claim.
Where the facts demonstrate that two sib-
lings shared a mutually dependent relation-
ship, recovery for loss of consortium may be
available.

{13} We conclude that the factual findings
made by the district court do not demon-
strate a sufficiently close relationship, and
therefore recovery for loss of consortium is
not available to Bill. We need not address the
remaining element of loss of consortium, a
duty of care. See Lozoya, 2003-NMSC-009,
115, 183 N.M. 579, 66 P.3d 948.

IV. CONCLUSION

{14} The findings presented here do not
establish Bill Wachocki’s right to recover
damages for loss of consortium.

{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA,
RICHARD C. BOSSON, EDWARD L.

CHAVEZ, Justices and RAYMOND Z.
ORTIZ (Pro Tem).

2011-NMSC-041
265 P.3d 705
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
v.
Adriana CABEZUELA, Defendant-
Appellant.
No. 32,000.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Pe
Oct. Bi, 2011. PC
P|
Pe
eS
— fF
a

fry

56

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Ap-
pellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appel-
Jant.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Nicole
Beder, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} Adriana Cabezuela (Defendant) direct-
ly appeals her conviction for intentional child
abuse resulting in the death of her eight-
month-old-daughter, contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 30-6-1(H) (2005), alleging that (1)
the jury was improperly instructed as to the
elements of intentional child abuse resulting
in the death of a child under the age of
twelve; (2) the State failed to present suffi-
cient evidence from which the jury could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant intentionally abused her child; (8)
the testimony of the supervising pathologist
regarding the baby’s autopsy violated the
Confrontation Clause; and (4) the prosecutor
engaged in multiple incidents of prosecutorial
misconduct. We conclude that (1) the jury
was improperly instructed as to the elements
of intentional child abuse resulting in the
death of a child under the age of twelve, and
(2) double jeopardy does not bar retrial be-
cause there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port the jury’s verdict. We reverse Defen-
dant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
Because the claims of prosecutorial miscon-
duct were not preserved and we remand for
a new trial, we do not address that claim.

{2} Although our determination of the jury
instruction claim is dispositive of Defendant’s
appeal, to provide guidance to the trial court
on remand, we address Defendant’s Confron-
tation Clause claim. See State v. Juan,
2010-NMSC-041, 120, 148 N.M. 747, 242
P.3d 314.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTO-
RY

{3} We begin with a summary of events
based on DVD video recordings of Defen-
dant’s three police interviews. At Defen-

dant’s trial, the police interviews were en-
tered into evidence and played for the jury.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary
to address Defendant’s claims on appeal.

{4} Defendant was the mother of six chil-
dren. In June 2007, Defendant’s three
youngest children, including eight-month-old
Mariana Barraza (Baby Mariana), resided
with Defendant in a small, one-bedroom rent-
al home. Defendant’s boyfriend, Leonardo
Samaniego, Jr. (Boyfriend), had recently
moved into Defendant’s home.

{5} On June 14, 2007, shortly after mid-
night, Baby Mariana was rushed to the emer-
geney room after she stopped breathing.
The emergeney room nurse asked a police
officer, who was at the medical center with
another suspect, to look at Baby Mariana’s
body, which was covered in bruises and bite
marks. At 3:46 am. Baby Mariana was
pronounced dead.

{6} A short time after their arrival at the
hospital, a Hobbs police officer transported
Defendant and Boyfriend to the Hobbs police
station. During Defendant's initial police in-
terview, she eventually agreed with the de-
tective that due to the stress of caring for
three small children she had lost her temper
with Baby Mariana. Defendant admitted
that a few weeks earlier she bit Baby Mari-
ana on the leg and cheek. She also admitted
that on a separate occasion she shook Baby
Mariana to the point of bruising. When
asked about the day of the incident, June 18,
2007, Defendant recalled that while she was
at her storage shed with Baby Mariana lying
in a baby carrier, she hit Baby Mariana on
the head with an open hand and shook the
baby carrier.

{7} On the night of Baby Mariana’s death,
Defendant admitted that she “pitched” Baby
Mariana to the floor from the height of about
one foot. She then picked Baby Mariana up
“real quick” without supporting her head.
As she “jerked” Baby Mariana up from the
floor, Baby Mariana gasped and stopped ery-
ing. Defendant stated to the detective, “I
would never hurt my babies.” Defendant
insisted that Boyfriend had never hurt her
children.

657

{8} At the end of the first interview, detec-
tives informed Defendant that Baby Mariana
had died. Defendant requested that she tell
Boyfriend of Baby Mariana’s death. Without
the detectives present, but as the DVD con-
tinued to record, Boyfriend entered Defen-
dant’s interrogation room. Boyfriend looked
toward the camera before he turned to De-
fendant in tears. After Defendant informed
Boyfriend of Baby Mariana’s death, she whis-
pered to him, “I put the blame on myself that
I bit her ... that I threw her.” Defendant
was arrested at the police station and
charged with child abuse resulting in the
death of a child.

{9} A Hobbs police detective interviewed
Defendant a second time the following day.
Defendant again stated that she was not
covering for Boyfriend and he had never
been abusive toward her or her children.

{10} Almost two years later, and three
days before the trial was scheduled to start,
Defendant requested a third police interview.
Defendant revealed that Boyfriend was re-
sponsible for Baby Mariana’s injuries, and
she did not implicate Boyfriend earlier be-
cause he had previously threatened her and
her children.

{11} Defendant additionally gave a differ-
ent account of the day of the incident. De-
fendant explained that while she was at her
storage shed getting clothes for her children,
Defendant heard Baby Mariana ery from the
car where Boyfriend was watching the chil-
dren. When Defendant returned to the car,
she noticed a bruise on Baby Mariana’s fore-
head and a cut above her left eye. Defen-
dant did not question Boyfriend about Baby
Mariana’s injuries because “he was already
frustrated,” and she was “scared ... of him.”

{12} Defendant also gave a different ac-
count of the night of Baby Mariana’s death.
She told the detective that all three children
began to fuss in the middle of the night and
both Defendant and Boyfriend went into the
children’s bedroom. Defendant stated that
as she stood between the playpen and the
crib, Boyfriend picked up Baby Mariana and
left the room. Defendant then “heard just a
thump,” but thought Boyfriend had kicked
the door as he walked from the room with
Baby Mariana. Boyfriend then told Defen-

658

dant to turn on the lights because Baby
Mariana was not breathing.

{18} Unable to revive Baby Mariana, De-
fendant, Boyfriend, and the children went
down the street to Boyfriend’s father’s home
to call an ambulance because Defendant’s
house did not have a phone. The police and
the ambulance arrived shortly thereafter,
and Baby Mariana was rushed to the hospi-
tal. Defendant and Boyfriend were initially
at the hospital with Baby Mariana, but were
then transported to the police station. While
in the police car Boyfriend told Defendant,
“You know what you have to say. Don’t let
them twist it around.”

{14} Defendant stated that Boyfriend
threatened her regularly, saying if she ever
went outside the house he would kill her and
if she “disrespect[ed]” him she was “gonna
get it.” Defendant also claimed that Boy-
friend had abused her three younger chil-
dren. Defendant said that Boyfriend had
bitten Baby Mariana more than once because
he was “anxious,” and that he had shaken
her.

{15} The jury found Defendant guilty of
intentional child abuse resulting in Baby
Mariana’s death. In accordance with NMSA
1978, Section 31-18-15(A)(1) (2005), Defen-
dant received a life sentence followed by five
years of parole. Defendant appeals her con-
viction pursuant to Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA.
and Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico
Constitution, which provide for direct appeal
from the trial court when a sentence of death
or life imprisonment has been imposed. See
State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-005, 18, 131
N.M. 709, 42 P.3d 814.

Il. DISCUSSION

A. The jury instructions do not accurate-
ly reflect the statutes and case law.

{16} The State charged Defendant with
“Abandonment or Abuse of a Child Resulting
in Death.” The criminal information de-
scribed the offense as “knowingly, intention-
ally, and without justification, caus[ing] Mari-
ana Isabelle Barraza, a child under 12 years
of age, to be placed in a situation that may
{have] endanger[ed] the child’s life or health,
resulting in Marian{a] Isabelle [Barraza’s]

death, contrary to [NMSA 1978, Sections 30-
6-1(D)(1) and 30-6-1(H) }.”

{17} This Court has adopted Uniform
Criminal Jury Instructions that set out the
elements for intentional child abuse. UJI
14-602 NMRA (“Child abuse; intentional act
or negligently ‘caused’; great bodily harm;
essential elements.”). The General Use Note
for Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions pro-
vides, in part:

Except for grand jury proceedings, when a

uniform instruction is provided for the ele-

ments of a crime, a defense or a general
explanatory instruction on evidence or trial
procedure, the uniform instruction must be
used without substantive modification or
substitution. In no event may an elements
instruction be altered or an instruction giv-
en on a subject which a use note directs
that no instruction be given. For any
other matter, if the court determines that

a uniform instruction must be altered, the

reasons for the alteration must be stated in

the record.

{18} Following the language set forth in
USI 14-602 and UJI 14-610 NMRA, the trial
court issued an elements instruction (Instruc-
tion No. 3) and an instruction defining “inten-
tionally” (Instruction No. 4).

INSTRUCTION NO. 3

For you to find Adriana Cabezuela
guilty of child abuse resulting in death, the
State must prove to your satisfaction be-
yond a reasonable doubt each of the follow-
ing elements of the crime:

1. Adriana Cabezuela caused Mariana
Barraza to be placed in a situation which
endangered the life or health of Mariana
Barraza;

2. The defendant acted intentionally;

8. Adriana Cabezuela’s actions or fail-
ure to act resulted in the death of Mariana
Barraza;

4. Mariana Barraza was under the age
of 18.

5. This happened in New Mexico on or
about the 14th day of June, 2007.
INSTRUCTION NO. 4

A person acts intentionally when the
person purposely does an act. Whether

Pe
as

the defendant, Adriana Cabezuela, acted

intentionally may be inferred from all of

the surrounding circumstances, such as

Adriana Cabezuela’s actions or failure to
act, conduct and statements.

See UJI 14-602 (“Child abuse; intentional

act or negligently ‘caused’; great bodily
harm; essential elements.”); UJI 14-610
(Child abuse; ‘intentional’; defined.”).

{19} Defendant claims that Instruction No.
8 included both intentional and negligent the-
ories of child abuse, and it was “impossible to
tell under which theory the jury returned a
guilty verdict.” Defendant also argues that
Instruction No. 3 improperly instructed the
jury as to the elements of intentional child
abuse resulting in the death of a child. Spe-
cifically, Defendant argues that the phrase
“failure to act” should have been omitted
because such language aligns itself solely
with a negligent child abuse theory. In addi-
tion, Defendant claims that the jury did not
find Baby Mariana to be less than twelve
years of age, an essential element of the
crime.

{20} The State’s theory of the case was
that either Defendant’s intentional actions or
intentional failure to act resulted in Baby
Mariana’s death. The State argued at trial
that Defendant’s failure to act in protecting
Baby Mariana qualified as intentional child
abuse because UJI 14-610’s definition of “in-
tentionally” includes a defendant’s failure to
act.

1. Standard of Review

HE {21} “(Jury instructions] are to be
read and considered as a whole and when so
considered they are proper if they fairly and
accurately state the applicable law.” State v.
Hamilton, 89 N.M. 746, 750, 557 P.2d 1095,
1099 (1976). “{Aln erroneous instruction
presents an error without cure.” State v.
Parish, 118 N.M. 39, 44, 878 P.2d 988, 993
(1994) “The standard of review we apply to
jury instructions depends on whether the
issue has been preserved.” State v. Benally,
2001-NMSC-038, 1112, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d
1184. “If the [issue] has been preserved we
review the instruction for reversible error.”
Id. If the issue has not been preserved, we
review for fundamental error. Id. In this

659

case, defense counsel preserved the jury in-
struction claim when he objected to the inclu-
sion of the words “failure to act” in Instruc-
tion No. 8, and therefore, we review for
reversible error.

HM ({22} “Reversible error arises if ...
a reasonable juror would have been confused
or misdirected.” Parish, 118 N.M. at 42, 878
P.2d at 991. “A juror may suffer from confu-
sion or misdirection despite the fact that the
juror considers the instruction straightfor-
ward and ‘perfectly comprehensible’ on its
face.” Benally, 2001-NMSC-083, 112, 181
N.M. 258, 34 P.8d 1184 (citing Parish, 118
N.M. at 44, 878 P.2d at 998). “Thus, juror
confusion or misdirection may stem not only
from instructions that are facially contradic-
tory or ambiguous, but from instructions
which, through omission or misstatement, fail
to provide the juror with an accurate rendi-
tion of the relevant law.” Benailly, 2001-
NMSC-083, {1 12, 181 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134.

2. Definition of Intentional and Negli-
gent Child Abuse

{23} The definition of abuse of a child is
set out in Section 80-6-1(D) as “consist[ing]
of a person knowingly, intentionally or negli-
gently, and without justifiable cause, causing
or permitting a child to be” placed in a
dangerous situation, tortured, or exposed to
the weather. Section 30-6-1(A)(8) defines
“negligently” as “refer[ring] to criminal neg-
ligence and means that a person knew or
should have known of the danger involved
and acted with a reckless disregard for the
safety or health of the child.” Although the
Legislature defined “negligently” for pur-
poses of the criminal child abuse statute, the
Legislature did not define “intentionally” and
did not include the phrase “failure to act” in
Section 30-6-1.

3. Permitting and Causing Child Abuse

{24} The Uniform Criminal Jury Instrue-
tions provide two different instructions for
negligent child abuse resulting in death.
‘When a defendant negligently cawses child
abuse resulting in death, UJI 14-602 is given
to the jury, whereas when a defendant negli-
gently permits child abuse resulting in death,

660

UJI 14-603 NMRA is given. However, when
a defendant’s intentional act of child abuse
results in the death of a child, only UJI 14~
602, the same instruction for negligently
causing child abuse, is presented to the jury.
{25} Because UJI 14-602 provides the es-
sential elements for both intentionally and
negligently causing child abuse resulting in
death, some of the elements listed in UJI 14-
602 are alternatives, placed in brackets, with
an explanation that only the applicable alter-
native or alternatives are to be used. UJI
14-602 Use Note 2 (“Use only applicable
alternative or alternatives.”). The trial judge
must determine which alternatives are to be
used. In this case, Instruction No. 3 permit-
ted the finding that Defendant was guilty of
child abuse resulting in death by her “actions
or failure to act result[ing] in the death of
Mariana Barraza.” (emphasis added).

HH {26} State v. Leal clarified that un-
der Section 80-6-1(D)’s definition of criminal
child abuse, “ ‘cause’ and ‘permit’ are distinct.
One is active, the other passive.” 104 N.M.
506, 509, 723 P.2d 977, 980 (Ct.App.1986).
“{Plermit’ refers to the proscribed act, the
passive act of allowing the abuse to occur.”
Id. at 510, 723 P.2d at 981. By prohibiting
both causing and permitting child abuse,

the legislature intended to provide flexibili-

ty. Since abuse will frequently occur in

the privacy of the home, charging a defen-
dant with “causing or permitting” may en-
able the state to prosecute where it is not.
clear who actually inflicted the abuse, but
the evidence shows beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant either caused the
abuse or permitted it to occur.
Id. at 509, 723 P.2d at 980. When correctly
charged and proven, this statute allows the
State to charge a defendant, alternatively,
with causing or permitting child abuse when
it is not clear who inflicted the abuse. Id.
However, “[w]hen the state chooses to
charge under only one portion of the statute
(that defendant ‘caused’ or defendant ‘per-
mitted’ the abuse) the prosecution is limited
to proving what it has charged.” Id.

{27} In this case, the State only charged
Defendant with intentionally causing Baby
Mariana to be placed in a situation which
endangered her life, resulting in Baby Mari-

ana’s death. As a result, the State never
proffered a negligent child abuse jury in-
struction.

4. Intentional child abuse occurs only
when a defendant causes the abuse.

HI {28} The criminal child abuse statute
is silent on whether a defendant's “failure to
act” in protecting a child constitutes inten-
tional child abuse. Therefore, we look both
to this Court's and the Court of Appeals’
application of Section 80-6-1 to determine
whether a defendant’s “failure to act” can
result in an intentional child abuse charge, or
if such a charge is reserved for those defen-
dants who actively cause harm to the child.

{29} In State v. Adams, the mother and
father were convicted of child abuse resulting
in the death of their daughter. 89 N.M. 787,
788, 557 P.2d 586, 587 (Ct.App.1976), over-
ruled on other grounds by Santillanes v.
State, 115 N.M. 215, 225 n. 7, 849 P.2d 358,
368 n. 7 (1993). The Court of Appeals stated
that the “inference from the evidence [was]
that the physical abuse came from [the moth-
er],” and that the father “contend[ed], and
the State agree[d], that his conviction was
based on negligence.” Jd. The Court ad-
dressed “not whether [the father] allowed the
abuse but whether he was negligent in fail-
ing to take action in connection with the
abuse.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court
determined there was substantial evidence to
prove that the father was negligent in failing
to take action regarding his daughter’s abuse
at the hands of another. Id. at 738-39, 557
P.2d at 587-88.

{30} In State v. Williams, the defendant
was convicted of child abuse for the criminal
abuse that her husband inflicted on her four-
year-old daughter. 100 N.M. 322, 328, 670
P.2d 122, 123 (Ct.App.1983), overruled on
other grounds by Santillanes, 115 N.M. at
225 n. 7, 849 P.2d at 368 n. 7. The defendant.
conceded that it was her husband that crimi-
nally abused her child. Jd. The Court of
Appeals determined that to

uphold the conviction the evidence must.

show that on May 29, 1982, [the] defendant

negligently, and without justifiable cause,
permitted her daughter to either be placed

a
as
child under the age of twelve, negligent child

abuse resulting in the death of a child carries
a much lower maximum punishment: eigh-

in a situation that might endanger her life

or health, or be cruelly punished, and that

this abuse resulted in great bodily harm to

the child.
Id. The Court upheld the defendant’s convie-
tion for child abuse because the defendant's
“failure to remove her child from the situa-
tion or her failure to seek help at the time of
the incident was a proximate cause of [the
child’s] injuries,” which provided sufficient
evidence for a rational jury to find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 324, 670
P.2d at 124 (emphasis added).

{31} The most recent example in New
Mexico of a defendant being charged with
negligent child abuse versus intentional child
abuse for a failure to act is State v. Lopez,
2007-NMSC-037, 128, 142 N.M. 188, 164
P.8d 19. The defendant in that case stated
that on the night of the incident she was in
the bedroom of her mobile home with the
child’s father and others, and “that she had
two to three beers prior to falling asleep at
approximately 10:00 p.m.” Jd. 15. The father
and the two uncles remained awake, and
when the defendant woke the next morning,
the child was “bruised, pale, and not breath-
ing.” Jd. Although the father’s and the un-
cle’s statements were “largely silent with
regard to [the defendant’s] actions or knowl-
edge during the last two days of [the child’s]
life,” both placed the defendant in the room
the night of the abuse. Id. 126. In Lopez,
this Court held that statements made by the
defendant placing her in the same room as
the child being abused supported the charge
of negligently permitting child abuse result-
ing in death. Id.

{32} The distinction between intentional
child abuse resulting in the death of a child
under the age of twelve and negligent child
abuse resulting in the death of a child bears
important practical consequences. The se-
verity of the sentence that the Legislature
has provided for the crime of intentional
child abuse resulting in the death of a child
under the age of twelve, a life sentence,
indicates that the Legislature meant to pun-
ish only the most deliberate and reprehensi-
ble forms of child abuse under this crime. In
contrast to the severe punishment for inten-
tional child abuse resulting in the death of a

661

teen years. See Garcia v. State, 2010~
NMSC-028, 119-10, 148 N.M. 414, 237 P.8d
716. In State v. Adonis, we looked to the
relative severity of the punishment for first-
degree and second-degree murder in assess-
ing the required showing of intent that the
Legislature intended for each crime. 2008-
NMSC-059, 114, 145 N.M. 102, 194 P.8d 717.
We concluded that “[t]o prove first-degree
murder, the State has a heightened burden
[in proving intent] commensurate with the
[greater] severity of punishment reserved for
that crime.” Id. 114.

HM {33} Similarly, in this case, the Leg-
islature has reserved a more severe punish-
ment for intentional child abuse resulting in
the death of a child under the age of twelve
than negligent child abuse resulting in the
death of the same child. See Garcia, 2010-
NMSC-028, {1 9-13, 148 N.M. 414, 237 P.8d
716. Therefore, we conclude that the Legis-
lature did not intend to “lump within [inten-
tional child abuse]” other forms of abuse
committed with a lesser degree of intent,
specifically failure to act to prevent another
from abusing the victim child. Adonis, 2008-
NMSC-059, 115, 145 N.M. 102, 194 P.38d 717
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). Accordingly, a defendant’s failure to
act to protect a child from abuse aligns with
a negligent theory of child abuse in which the
defendant permits or fails to act to prevent
the abuse. This is in contrast to the defen-
dant causing the abuse, which aligns with an
active, intentional theory of child abuse.

{34} In this case, Instruction No. 3 con-
tained two distinct theories of child abuse.
The first theory was intentional child abuse.
In her first two police interviews, Defendant
stated she caused the abuse by her actions
toward Baby Mariana. The second theory
was negligent child abuse. In her third po-
lice interview, Defendant stated she permit-
ted the abuse by not protecting Baby Mari-
ana from Boyfriend.

{35} Similar to the facts in Lopez, neither
party disputes that Defendant was in the
vicinity of both Boyfriend and Baby Mariana
when the abuse occurred. 2007-NMSC-087,

662

15, 142 N.M. 138, 164 P.3d 19 (noting that
the defendant was in the same room as the
individuals who actually abused the child, but
was unaware of what happened because she
was asleep). According to statements in her
third police interview, however, Defendant
did not abuse Baby Mariana. Defendant
claimed that Boyfriend carried Baby Mariana
from the children’s room, and it was while
Defendant was with the other children that
she heard a “thump.” Defendant initially
thought the “thump” was Boyfriend hitting
the door on the way out of the children’s
room. Boyfriend then told Defendant to turn
on the light because Baby Mariana was not
breathing.

{36} UJI 14-602, the jury instruction for
intentionally causing child abuse, is a mis-
statement of the relevant law because the
instruction, when it includes the phrase “fail-
ure to act,” does not follow the language of
Section 30-6-1. In addition, because of De-
fendant’s statements in her third police in-
terview, Defendant should have received UJI
14-603, if requested, the jury instruction for
negligently permitting child abuse. There is
no doubt that a reasonable jury, presented
with an intentional child abuse instruction
that misstated the law and void of an addi-
tional instruction that proffered the negli-
gent child abuse theory, would have been
misdirected by the instructions tendered at
Defendant’s trial. See Benally, 2001-
NMSC-088, 112, 181 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134
(“Thus, juror confusion or misdirection may
stem not only from instructions that are fa-
cially contradictory or ambiguous, but from
instructions which, through omission or mis-
statement, fail to provide the juror with an
accurate rendition of the relevant law.”).
Accordingly, we reverse Defendant’s convic-
tion of intentional child abuse resulting in
the death of a child and remand for a new
trial.

{37} We request that the UJI Committee
for Criminal Cases (the Committee) review
USI 14-602, along with UJI 14-603 and UJI
14-610. In particular, we suggest that there
should be separate instructions for negligent
and intentional child abuse. We also raise a
concern with the definition of “intentionally”
in UJI 14-610. In 1993, the Committee de-

fined “intentionally,” for criminal child abuse
purposes, to occur “when the person pur-
posefully does an act. Whether the —_
(name of defendant ) acted intentionally may
be inferred from all of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, such as [the defendant's] actions
or failure to act, conduct and statements.”
UJI 14-610. This language, however, runs
contrary to the definition of child abuse as
defined by Section 30-6-1, which does not
reference a defendant’s failure to act in the
definition of intentional child abuse.

5. Omission of an Essential Element that
the Child Was Under the Age of
Twelve in the Intentional Child Abuse
Jury Instruction

{38} We next address Defen-
dant’s claim that Instruction No. 3 omitted
an essential element of intentional abuse re-
sulting in the death of a child: that the jury
find the child to be under the age of twelve.
Element 4 of Instruction No. 8 required the
jury to find that “Mariana was under the age
of 18.” “The language of a statute deter-
mines the essential elements of an offense.”
State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, 141, 143
N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299 (Chavez, C.J., dis-
senting). Section 30-6-1(H) explicitly states
that for a defendant to be guilty of a first-
degree felony resulting in the death of a
child, the abuse that results in the child’s
death must be intentional, and the child must
be less than twelve years of age.

HM {39} It is “ ‘the fundamental right of
a criminal defendant to have the jury deter-
mine whether each element of the charged
offense has been proved by the state beyond
a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Nick R.,
2009-NMSC-050, 137, 147 N.M. 182, 218
P.3d 868 (quoting State v. Orosco, 113 N.M.
780, 786, 833 P.2d 1146, 1152 (1992). Such
determinations “cannot be ruled on by a trial
court as a matter of law and taken from the
jury’s consideration, no matter how obvious
the existence of any essential element of an
offense may seem.” Jd. Accordingly, In-
struction No. 3 incorrectly required the jury
to find that Baby Mariana was under the age
of eighteen, rather than under the age of
twelve.

B. The State presented sufficient evi-
dence from which the jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Defendant intentionally abused her
child.

T.«{(40}' We next address Defen-
dant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim to
determine whether a retrial would implicate
double jeopardy protections. See State v.
Dowling, 2011-NMSC-016, 118, 150 N.M.
110, 257 P.38d 980; State v. Mascarefas,
2000-NMSC-017, 131, 129 N.M. 230, 4 P.8d
1221 (“By addressing [the defendant’s] claim
of insufficient evidence and determining that
retrial is permissible, we ensure that no dou-
ble jeopardy concerns are implicated.”). “If
we find that sufficient evidence was present-
ed at trial to support a conviction, then retri-
al is not barred. We review Defendant’s
claim under the erroneous instruction provid-
ed to the jury at trial.” Dowling, 2011-
NMSC-016, 118, 150 N.M. 110, 257 P.3d 930
(internal citation omitted).

{41} Defendant claims that the State failed
to present sufficient evidence to support her
conviction of intentional child abuse resulting
in the death of a child because there was
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that Defendant committed the
abuse. The State argues that there was
sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of
intentional child abuse resulting in the death
of Baby Mariana, either through her actions
or her failure to act.

Hs {42} “The test for sufficiency of
the evidence is whether substantial evidence
of either a direct or circumstantial nature
exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to every ele-
ment essential to a conviction.” State v.
Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, 112, 147 N.M. 557,
226 P.8d 656 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). This Court views “the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the
guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable infer-
ences and resolving all conflicts in the evi-
dence in favor of the verdict.” State v. Cun-
ningham, 2000-NMSC-009, 126, 128 N.M.
711, 998 P.2d 176. However, in determining
the sufficiency of evidence, we must scruti-
nize “the evidence and supervision of the
jury’s fact-finding function to ensure that,

663

indeed, a rational jury could have found be-
yond a reasonable doubt the essential facts
required for a conviction.” State v. Rojo,
1999-NMSC-001, 119, 126 N.M. 488, 971
P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).

{43} Defendant does not dispute that Baby
Mariana died due to a blunt force injury to
the head and that the cause of death was
homicide. Rather, Defendant argues that
the State lacked sufficient evidence to prove
it was Defendant who abused Baby Mariana.
Defendant argues that the strongest evi-
dence presented by the State to prove Defen-
dant abused Baby Mariana was Defendant’s
three interviews with police.

{44} In Defendant’s first two police inter-
views, she admitted to harming Baby Mari-
ana on both the day and the night of the
incident. In her third police interview, De-
fendant stated it was Boyfriend who harmed
Baby Mariana.

WM {45} Defendant argues that her
statements in the third police interview “pro-
vided a plausible explanation of what had
actually happened,” and that although the
jury did not have to accept her third version
of the facts, “her explanation should not sim-
ply be disregarded by this Court.” However,
contrary evidence offered by Defendant does
not warrant a reversal “because the jury is
free to reject Defendant’s version of the
facts.” Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, 119, 126
N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. In this case, regard-
less which of her statements the jury found
to be credible, Defendant admitted to either
abusing Baby Mariana or failing to protect
Baby Mariana from the abuse by Boyfriend.
Thus, the evidence adduced was sufficient.

{46} Defendant also argues that the psy-
chological testimony presented by Dr. Ken-
ney, that she was suffering from post-trau-
matic stress disorder, established that it was
possible that Defendant falsely confessed to
hurting Baby Mariana in order to protect
herself and her children. Dr. Kenney noted
that it is not uncommon for individuals in a
high-stress situation, such as Defendant’s, to
confess to something they did not do. Dr.
Kenney’s testimony, that Defendant could
have lied about harming Baby Mariana, does

664

not negate the fact that she failed to act to
protect Baby Mariana from Boyfriend.

{47} Our review of the record reveals that
there was sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that Defendant intentionally
abused Baby Mariana, either through her
actions toward Baby Mariana or through her
failure to act to protect Baby Mariana from
Boyfriend. Because we find that there was
sufficient evidence to convict Defendant, De-
fendant’s retrial is not barred by double
jeopardy implications.

C. The testimony of the supervising pa-
thologist regarding the autopsy did
not violate the Confrontation Clause.

{48} Defendant claims that Dr. Mi-

chelle Barry's expert testimony violated the
Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const. Amend.
VI, because, as the supervising pathologist,
she did not actually perform Baby Mariana’s
autopsy. The State argues that Dr. Barry's
testimony was properly admitted because, as
the supervisor, Dr. Barry had personal
knowledge of the examination; her testimony
included her own opinion, reached by review-
ing records prepared with the assistance of
another doctor; and even if the trial court
erred in admitting the testimony, the error
was harmless.

Hs {49} Under the Confrontation
Clause, “[ojut-of-court testimonial [hearsay
is] barred ... unless the witness is unavail-
able and the defendant had a prior opportu-
nity to cross-examine the witness.” State v.
Aragon, 2010-NMSC-008, 16, 147 N.M. 474,
225 P.8d 1280 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We generally review Con-
frontation Clause claims de novo. See State
v. Lasner, 2000-NMSC-038, {1 24, 129 N.M.
806, 14 P.8d 1282. However, because this
claim was not preserved, we review only for
fundamental error. See State v. Martinez,
2007-NMSC-025, 125, 141 N.M. 713, 160
P.3d 894; see also State v. Dietrich, 2009-
NMCA-031, 51, 145 N.M. 783, 204 P.3d 748
(noting that the defendant failed to preserve
the confrontation issue before the trial court,
and therefore the Court will analyze it only
for fundamental error). “A fundamental er-
ror occurs where there has been a miscar-

riage of justice, the conviction shocks the
conscience, or substantial justice has been
denied.” Dietrich, 2009-NMCA-031, 152,
145 N.M. 783, 204 P.38d 748. “The first step
in reviewing for fundamental error is to de-
termine whether an error occurred. If that,
question is answered affirmatively, we then
consider whether the error was fundamen-
tal.” State v. Silva, 2008-NMSC-051, 111,
144 N.M. 815, 192 P.3d 1192 (internal citation
omitted).

{50} Dr. Barry testified that Dr. Ann Bra-
cey, a forensic pathology fellow, performed
Baby Mariana’s autopsy. Although Dr. Bar-
ry did not perform Baby Mariana’s autopsy,
she was the supervising pathologist for this
autopsy; she went “through every key fea-
ture with Dr. Bracey,” which included the
“microscopic exam, examination of the body
and the injuries, examination of all the photo-
graphs.” Dr. Barry explained that because
of her involvement in the autopsy, both her
name and Dr. Bracey’s name appeared on
the reports, and that in her testimony she
would be referring to “owr autopsy report” in
order to be as accurate as possible.

{51} Defendant relies on the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massa-
chusetis to argue that autopsy results are
testimonial statements which should be intro-
duced at trial by the doctor who performed
the autopsy. 557 U.S. 305, —, 129 S.Ct.
2527, 2581, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). In Me-
lendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court held that
the admission of certificates prepared and
sworn to by analysts at a state crime labora-
tory, identifying a substance as cocaine, were
testimonial statements which triggered the
defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause. Jd. at ——, 129 S.Ct. at 2531-32.
The Court recognized that although there
may be “other ways—and in some cases bet-
ter ways—to challenge or verify the results
of a forensic test,” “[slome forensic analyses,
such as autopsies ... cannot be repeated,”
and therefore the Confrontation Clause is
crucial in such instances to protect a defen-
dant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at —~—
&n. 5, 129 S.Ct. at 2536 & n. 5.

{52} Defendant’s reliance on Melendez—
Diaz is flawed. In Melendez—Diaz, the State

submitted three “certificates of analysis”
showing the results of the forensic analysis
performed on the seized substances without
having the analysts testify in court. Jd. at
— ,, 129 S.Ct. at 2581. This case is materi-
ally different in that the autopsy report was
never entered into evidence and Dr. Barry,

who “went through every key feature” of the
autopsy with Dr. Bracey, testified at trial.
Unlike the defendant in Melendez-Diaz, De-
fendant had a full and fair opportunity to
cross-examine Dr. Barry to determine
whether Dr. Barry had personal, first-hand
knowledge of how Dr. Bracey conducted the
autopsy and what Dr. Bracey found by ob-
serving the autopsy. See Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, — US. —~, —, 181 S.Ct. 2705,
2709-10, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011) (finding a
Confrontation Clause violation where the tes-
tifying analyst “had neither participated in
nor observed the test on Bulleoming’s blood
sample”). Absent such cross-examination,
the record before us supports a reasonable
inference that Dr. Barry had personal know]-
edge of and participated in making the au-
topsy report findings by virtue of her own
independent participation in the microscopic
exam, examination of the body and the inju-
ries, and examination of all the photographs.
Therefore, the record supports a conclusion
that Dr. Barry had sufficient personal knowl-
edge to testify as to what Dr. Bracey discov-
ered through the autopsy. There was no
error in the admission of Dr. Barry’s testimo-
ny at trial.

D. Did the State engage in multiple inci-
dents of prosecutorial misconduct?
{53} Defendant claims that the State com-
mitted multiple incidents of prosecutorial
misconduct when the State made biblical ref-
erences during closing arguments, misrepre-
sented the fact that use immunity for Boy-

friend had been obtained, and failed to make
a witness in State custody available for an
interview. Defendant concedes that the
claims of prosecutorial misconduct were not
preserved at trial. Because we have re-
versed Defendant's conviction of intentional
child abuse resulting in the death of a child
and remanded for a new trial, we do not
address these issues.

IIL. CONCLUSION

{54} We hold that (1) the jury instructions
presented by the trial judge, though properly
derived from the Uniform Jury Instructions
issued by this Court, resulted in reversible
error because the jury was improperly in-
structed as to the elements of intentional
child abuse resulting in the death of a child
under the age of twelve; (2) the State pre-
sented sufficient evidence from which the
jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Defendant intentionally abused
her child; and (8) the testimony of Dr. Bar-
ry, the supervising pathologist regarding
Baby Mariana’s autopsy, did not violate the
Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, we re-
verse Defendant's conviction and remand for
anew trial.

{55} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.

SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices.

669

2011-NMCA-094
265 P.3d 720
Isabel BARRON, as power of attorney for
Manuela Barron, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

The EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD
SAMARITAN SOCIETY, a North Dako-
ta corporation, d/b/a Betty Dare Good
Samaritan; Myrna Acosta, a New Mexi-
co resident, director of nursing, and
Does 1-10, Defendants—Appellants.

No. 29,707.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
May 31, 2011.

Certiorari Dismissed, Sept.
14, 2011, No. 38,104.

o
a
Ss

Harvey Law Firm, LLC, Dusti D. Harvey,
Jennifer J. Foote, Albuquerque, NM, Du-

igg, Cronin, Spring and Berlin, P.A., Nancy
Cronin, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk,
P.A., Martha G. Brown, Deana M. Bennett,
Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Defendants The Evangelical Lutheran
Good Samaritan Society d/b/a Betty Dare
Good Samaritan and Myrna Acosta (collec-
tively Defendants) appeal the district court’s
denial of their motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration pursuant to an admission agree-
ment. We consider whether Betty Dare res-
ident, Manuela Barron, gave sufficient au-
thorization to her granddaughter, Cindy
Chapman, to agree to binding arbitration
when Ms. Barron authorized Ms. Chapman
to complete her admission paperwork. We
conclude that under the circumstances of this
case, the authority granted to Ms. Chapman
by Ms. Barron was sufficient to allow Ms.
Chapman to agree to arbitrate disputes, and
we reverse the district court’s denial of De-
fendants’ motion to dismiss. In reaching this
conclusion, we consider New Mexico’s public
policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.

{2} Additionally, we reject Plaintiff Isabel
Barron’s contention that we should affirm
the district court’s decision on the alterna-
tive grounds that (1) the circumstances sur-
rounding the arbitration provision rendered
it procedurally unconscionable, or (2) the ar-
bitration provision was not supported by
consideration. We remand to the district
court for a determination as to whether the
unavailability of the National Arbitration Fo-
rum (NAF) renders the arbitration clause
unenforceable.

BACKGROUND

{3} Ms. Barron was discharged from Ger-
ald Champion Medical Center to Betty Dare
on April 10, 2006. She was admitted to
Betty Dare in order to recuperate from hip
surgery and upon advice from hospital staff.
Lucila Santillan was the social services di-
rector and handled admissions and discharg-
es, among other things. After Ms. Barron
had spent her first night in the facility, Ms.
Santillan asked Ms. Barron “who would be
doing her paperwork, trying to find out if she
was going to be able to do the paperwork

671

herself.” When Ms. Barron was admitted to
Betty Dare, she was mentally competent,
alert, and oriented. According to Ms. Santil-
Jan, Ms. Barron responded that Ms. Chap-
man would be doing her paperwork. On
April 11, 2006, Ms. Chapman met with Ms.
Santillan, at which time, Ms. Santillan re-
viewed “every section of the Admission
Agreement” with Ms. Chapman. At this
meeting, Ms. Chapman filled out all of the
paperwork related to Ms. Barron’s admission
to Betty Dare, The admission paperwork in-
cluded a thirteen-page Admission Agree-
ment, as well as nine other documents.

{4} Also at this meeting, Ms. Chapman
told Ms. Santillan that she (Ms. Chapman)
was assuming responsibility for Ms. Barron’s
care, that she would have Ms. Barron’s pow-
er of attorney, and that she would be the
responsible party for Ms. Barron during her
stay at Betty Dare. Pursuant to these repre-
sentations by Ms. Chapman, Ms. Santillan
marked three boxes on the final page of the
Admission Agreement: Medical or Health
Care Power of Attorney, Other (next to
which Ms. Santillan wrote “granddaughter”),
and Financial Power of Attorney. Ms. San-
tillan marked these boxes in Ms. Chapman’s
presence. Ms. Chapman signed her own
name on the final page. The day after Ms.
Chapman completed the admission paper-
work, Ms. Barron signed a power of attorney
for healthcare that designated Ms. Chapman
as her agent to make healthcare decisions.
The power of attorney for healthcare was
subsequently presented to Ms. Santillan.

{5} Page twelve of the Admission Agree-
ment was a full-page form titled “Resolution
of Legal Disputes.” The form included des-
ignated lines for the resident’s name and the
date, followed by three paragraphs. The
first paragraph addressed the resident’s
rights. The second paragraph contained ex-
planations of the types of disputes that would
be “settled exclusively by binding arbitra-
tion[.]” The third paragraph explained what
“agreeing to arbitrate legal disputes
means[.J” The first two sentences of the
third paragraph read, “[tJhe [rlesident un-
derstands that agreeing to arbitrate legal
disputes means that [she] is waiving [her]
right to sue in a court of law and to a trial by

jury. If the [resident does not wish to agree
to arbitration, then [she] should inform the
[flacility by marking the box below and ini-
tialing and dating where indicated.”

{6} Ms. Barron’s name and the date were
handwritten at the top of the Resolution of
Legal Disputes form in the designated lines.
Directly below the resident’s name in bold
type was a sentence that read, “Please note
that the [rlesident’s agreement to arbi-
trate disputes is not a condition of admis-
sion or of continued stay.” At the bottom
of the page there was a box, next to which
read, “No I do NOT wish to arbitrate dis-
putes[.]” The box was unmarked. Directly
below this option to reject arbitration was a
line, initialed by Ms. Chapman, acknowl-
edging receipt of a copy of the Resolution of
Legal Disputes form. The form provided the
phone number, mailing address, and website
address for the NAF to request information
regarding rules and procedures.

{7} In an affidavit provided in support of
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Ms. Santillan
stated that, when she met with Ms. Chap-
man, she “spent approximately an hour and a
half reviewing the Admission Agreement
with [Ms. Chapman, and that she] went over
every section of the Admission Agreement
with [her].” Ms. Santillan further stated
that she “asked [Ms. Chapman] to read the
Resolution of Legal Disputes section” and
that “{olnce she had read that section, [Ms.
Santillan] ... explained to [Ms. Chapman]
that if she did not want to agree to arbitrate,
she would have to mark an ‘X’ in the box
indicating that she did not wish to arbitrate
disputes and initial that place on the form.”

{8} The record reflects that Ms. Chapman
read the Resolution of Legal Disputes form.
In response to a question about her under-
standing of the Resolution of Legal Disputes
form, Ms. Chapman stated in a deposition
that she “read over it” though she could not
“say really a hundred percent [that she] un-
derstood it[.J” Ms. Chapman also stated that
when she took the papers home, following
her meeting with Ms. Santillan, she “read
them over.” Despite any limited under-
standing of the Resolution of Legal Disputes
form, Ms. Chapman stated that she did not
contact the NAF for more information. Nor

672 De

did Ms. Chapman contact Ms. Santillan with
any questions after she took the paperwork
home and read over it.

{9} It is undisputed that Ms. Barron was
not specifically apprised of the fact that the
paperwork for her admission included an ar-
bitration agreement. Ms. Santillan stated in
a deposition that she did not recall every-
thing she discussed with Ms. Barron; howev-
er, her typical practice was to ask a new
resident “who is going to be signing your
paperwork” and to tell the resident that
“[t]here’s Medicare paperwork that needs to
be signed, so that Medicare can pay for your
therapies.” Ms. Chapman also stated in her
deposition that she did not discuss the arbi-
tration-related form with Ms. Barron.

{10} Ms. Barron’s term of residence at
Betty Dare continued from April 10, 2006,
until August 8, 2006. During her stay at
Betty Dare, Ms. Barron allegedly suffered
injuries that required hospitalization and
caused her overall health to deteriorate. In
October 2006, Ms. Barron transferred health-
care power of attorney to Plaintiff, Ms. Bar-
ron’s daughter. In August 2007, Ms. Barron
granted general power of attorney to Plain-
tiff. In March 2008, Plaintiff, acting pursu-
ant to Ms. Barron’s power of attorney, filed a
complaint in district court against Defen-
dants alleging, among other things, negli-
gence and violation of the Unfair Practices
Act, NMSA 1978 §§ 57-12-1 to ~26 (1967, as
amended through 2009). Subsequently, De-
fendants filed a motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration based on the arbitration clause in
the Admission Agreement.

{11} At a hearing, the district court pro-
vided three reasons for denying the motion
to dismiss and compel arbitration. The dis-
trict court stated that “[t]he agreement by
Ms. Barron that Ms. Chapman would be
basically doing all of the paperwork for her
for admission [was] not detailed enough to
allow [the court] to conclude that Ms. Barron
was giving Ms. Chapman the right to deter-
mine a legal forum for disputes.” The court
reasoned that “what [it could] tell from the
record [was] that there was no detailed list,
for instance, presented to Ms. Barron saying,
[‘JDo you agree that Ms. Chapman can de-
cide all of these enumerated things for

you??’] And [this] included [choosing the]
forum for settling legal disputes.” The court
further concluded that any agreement about
arbitration would fall outside the scope of the
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (the
Act). See NMSA 1978, §§ 24-7A-1 to -18
(1995, as amended through 2009). And final-
ly, the court found that “[t]he only way Ms.
Chapman could have had authority to enter
into the arbitration agreement would have
been through a power of attorney such as the
one that ultimately was signed by Ms. Bar-
ron’s daughter.” Defendants appeal from
the district court’s denial of their motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration.
DISCUSSION

{12} On appeal, Defendants argue that (1)
Ms. Chapman was expressly authorized by
Ms. Barron to act on her behalf and, as Ms.
Barron’s agent, Ms. Chapman did not need a
separate grant of authority to bind Ms. Bar-
ron to arbitration; (2) the district court’s
reliance on the Act was erroneous (a) be-
cause Defendants did not contend that Ms.
Chapman’s authority arose from the Act, and
(b) because the court’s interpretation of the
Act was improper; and (8) the district court
erred when it severed the arbitration clause
from the Admission Agreement. We exam-
ine New Mexico’s public policy on arbitration
agreements, followed by a discussion of agen-
cy law. We conclude that the scope of Ms.
Chapman’s agency was not limited so as to
prohibit her from agreeing, on Ms. Barron’s
behalf, to arbitrate disputes. We disagree
with the district court that Ms. Chapman
could only act on Ms. Barron’s behalf pursu-
ant to an enumerated list or a power of
attorney. We do not address the Act be-
cause Defendants did not argue in the dis-
trict court, nor do they argue on appeal, that
Ms. Chapman’s authority stemmed from that
Act. In light of the fact that we are reversing
the district court’s denial of Defendants’ mo-
tion to dismiss, we need not address Defen-
dants’ argument regarding the district
court’s severance of the arbitration provision
from the Admission Agreement. We further
reject Plaintiff's arguments for affirmance to
the effect that the arbitration provision was
unconscionable or lacking consideration. Fi-
nally, we remand to the district court the
issue of the NAF’s unavailability and the

673

question of what effect that has on the over-
all contract.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{13} The issues presented in this appeal
are subject to de novo review. See Piano v.
Premier Distrib. Co., 2005-NMCA-018, 14,
187 N.M. 57, 107 P.8d 11 (reviewing de novo
a district court’s denial of a motion to compel
arbitration and, “(slimilarly, whether the par-
ties ... agreed to arbitrate presents a ques-
tion of law, and we review the applicability
and construction of a contractual provision
requiring arbitration de novo”); Robertson v.
Carmel Builders Real Estate, 2004-NMCA-
056, 118, 185 N.M. 641, 92 P.38d 653 (provid-
ing a definition of “agent” and explaining
that, where the material facts are undisput-
ed, the existence of an agency relationship
becomes a conclusion of law, requiring de
novo review).

Arbitration

{14} The New Mexico Supreme Court “has
repeatedly reaffirmed the strong public poli-
cy in this [S]tate ... in favor of resolution of
disputes through arbitration.” Fernandez v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz. 115 N.M. 622, 625,
857 P.2d 22, 25 (1993). “When a party
agrees to a non-judicial forum for dispute
resolution, the party should be held to that
agreement.” Lisanti v. Alamo Title Ins. of
Tex,, 2002-NMSC-032, 117, 182 N.M. 750,
55 P.3d 962. “[Rleducfing] caseloads in the
courts, not only by allowing arbitration, but
also by requiring controversies to be resolved
by arbitration where contracts or other docu-
ments so provide” was the legislative intent
behind this State’s enactment of the Uniform
Arbitration Act. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Rose,
92 N.M. 527, 581, 591 P.2d 281, 285 (1979);
see NMSA 1978, §§ 44-7A~1 to -82 (2001).

{15} Inasmuch as arbitration provisions
are favored where they have been agreed
upon by both parties, New Mexico courts
have clearly distinguished those situations
where lack of agreement by the parties ren-
ders an arbitration clause unenforceable.
See Lisanti, 2002-NMSC-032, 114-8, 182
N.M. 750, 55 P.3d 962 (holding an insured’s
right to a jury trial was violated by a state
regulation that mandated arbitration of cer-

674

tain title insurance disputes at the option of
one party); see also McMillan v. Allstate
Indem. Co., 2004-NMSC-002, 11, 20, 185
N.M. 17, 84 P.8d 65 (holding that in the
context of uninsured motorist disputes
where the insurance endorsement provides
for arbitration only upon the agreement of
both parties, the insureds could not unilater-
ally compel insurer to arbitrate); DeArmond
v. Halliburton Energy Servs, Inc, 2008-
NMCA-148, 115, 14, 23, 184 N.M. 630, 81
P.3d 578 (holding that an employee could not
be bound to an arbitration agreement that
had been mailed to him by his employer, ac-
ceptance of which was indicated by employ-
ee’s continued tenure with the company,
where there was no evidence in the record
that the employee had received, read, or
understood the document). Thus, New Mex-
ieo courts generally uphold arbitration
agreements except in the absence of a clear
agreement on behalf of both parties to arbi-
trate disputes.

Agency

HH {1.6} “An agent is a person who, by
agreement with another called the principal,
represents the principal in dealings with
third persons or transacts some other busi-
ness, manages some affair[,] or does some
service for the principal, with or without
compensation.” Tercero v. Roman Catholic
Diocese, 2002-NMSC-018, 112, 182 N.M.
812, 48 P.3d 50 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “The law in New Mexico is
that an agency relationship can be created
orally[.]” DeBaca, Inc. v. Montoya, 91 N.M.
419, 420, 575 P.2d 603, 604 (1978). “The
authority of an agent may be actual or appar-
ent.” Tercero, 2002-NMSC-018, 112, 132
N.M. 312, 48 P.8d 50. “Actual authority is
given to the agent by the principal in terms
that are express, or in terms that are implied
from words or conduct of the principal to the
agent or from the circumstances of the rela-
tionship.” Comstock v. Mitchell, 110 N.M.
181, 184, 793 P.2d 261, 264 (1990) (Ransom,
J., specially concurring). “Apparent authori-
ty arises from manifestations by the principal
to the third party and can be created by
appointing a person to a position that carries
with it generally recognized duties.” Diver-
sified Dev. & Inw., Inc. v. Heil, 119 N.M. 290,

296, 889 P.2d 1212, 1218 (1995) (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). A princi-
pal is bound by the acts of his or her agent
within the agent’s actual designated authori-
ty and is also bound by the acts of the agent
that the principal “holds the agent out to the
public as possessing.” Fryar v. Emyp’rs Ins.
of Wausau, 94 N.M. 77, 80, 607 P.2d 615, 618
(1980) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Furthermore, “a principal ... is
responsible for the acts of the agent when
the principal has clothed the agent with the
appearance of authority.” Romero v. Mer-
vyn’s, 109 N.M. 249, 253, 784 P.2d 992, 996
(1989). In considering the scope of an
agent’s apparent authority, New Mexico
courts look to the reasonableness of the third
party’s reliance on the agent’s representation
of authority. See Comstock, 110 N.M. at 132,
798 P.2d at 262 (stating that “a person deal-
ing with an agent must use reasonable dili-
gence and prudence to ascertain whether the
agent is acting within the scope of his pow-
ers”), Where a principal claims not to be
bound by an agreement with a third party
because it was made by an agent who ex-
ceeded his or her authority, the proper inqui-
ry is whether the third party “knew or
through the exercise of due diligence should
have known that [the agent’s] authority was
limited” to the extent that the principal
claims. Id. at 183, 798 P.2d at 263. A
principal is bound by his or her agent’s ac-
tions “when the principal has clothed the
agent with the appearance of authority” and
that authority “carries with it generally rec-
ognized duties.” Heil, 119 N.M. at 296, 889
P.2d at 1218 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).

S17} Ms. Chapman had actual au-
thority. The evidence indicates that she was
given authority either expressly or in terms
that were implied from words or conduct of
Ms. Barron. See Comstock, 110 N.M. at 184,
798 P.2d at 264 (Ransom, J., specially coneur-
ring) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 7 emt. ¢ (1958) for the proposition that
“{a]etual authority is given to the agent by
the principal in terms that are express, or in
terms that are implied from words or con-
duct of the principal to the agent or from the
circumstances of the relationship”). Ms.

Chapman also had apparent authority given
that Ms. Barron communicated Ms. Chap-
man’s authority to Ms. Santillan. See Com-
stock, 110 N.M. at 184, 798 P.2d at 264 (citing
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8 emt. e
& § 27 emt. a (1958) to support “apparent
authority must emanate from the conduct of
the person to be charged as principal”).

{18} Plaintiff agrees that Ms. Barron au-
thorized Ms. Chapman “to complete her pa-
perwork” for admission to Betty Dare. Plain-
tiff does not dispute that the arbitration
clause was part of the Admission Agreement.
Plaintiff expresses her perception of the arbi-
tration clause as part of the overall Admis-
sion Agreement by stating that Ms. Chap-
man “signed the ‘Admission Agreement,
which included an optional arbitration clause”
and that “she signed the ‘Admission Agree-
ment[,? which included an arbitration
clansef.]”

HI {19} The parties’ dispute centers on
whether Ms. Chapman’s authority was limit-
ed so as to exclude the arbitration clause
from the paperwork. Plaintiff contends that
Ms. Chapman’s authority to complete the
admission documents did not encompass the
arbitration clause based on the following ar-
gument. Defendants’ arbitration clause is
titled “Resolution of Legal Disputes” and the
title is closely followed by the statement,
“Please note that the [rlesident’s agreement
to arbitrate disputes is not a condition of
admission or of continued stay.” Thus, ac-
cording to Plaintiff, it cannot correctly be
characterized as an admission document, as it
was explicitly not required for Ms. Barron’s
admission to or continued stay at the facility.

{20} We are not persuaded. While the
Resolution of Legal Disputes form does not
require a prospective resident to agree to
arbitrate future disputes, its placement in the
Admission Agreement and its clear language
indicate that, as a part of its standard admis-
sion procedure, Betty Dare requires an
agreement as to how a resident and Betty
Dare will resolve future legal disputes.
Hence, the language contained in the form
that “the [rlesident’s agreement to arbitrate
disputes is not a condition of admission” indi-
cates that the facility will admit a resident
who chooses not to arbitrate, just as it will

675

admit a resident who does agree to arbitrate.
The prospective resident’s free choice as to
arbitration must be made either by checking
a box that specifically indicates the resident
does not wish to arbitrate disputes or by
leaving the box unchecked and acknowl-
edging receipt of the form. Thus, we hold
that the Resolution of Legal Disputes form is
properly considered an admission document
and that accepting or rejecting arbitration is
part of the admission process.

HMM {21} While conceding that Ms.
Chapman had authority to complete the pa-
perwork, Plaintiff appears to argue that it
was a limited authority only to complete the
paperwork related to Medicare. Plaintiff rea-
sons that, in giving the authority, Ms. Barron
could reasonably only have known that the
paperwork included authorizations for Medi-
care payment. Plaintiff bases this argument
on Ms. Santillan’s deposition testimony that
she typically singles out Medicare paperwork
when she is describing the content of the
paperwork to a new resident. Plaintiff also
reasons that Ms. Santillan had only told Ms.
Barron that the paperwork was for Medicare
and had not told her about the arbitration
clause. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff
argues, it was Ms. Santillan’s responsibility
to “use reasonable diligence and prudence”
to ascertain whether Ms. Chapman was act-
ing within the scope of her powers. See
Comstock, 110 N.M. at 132, 798 P.2d at 262
(stating that “a person dealing with an agent
must use reasonable diligence and prudence
to ascertain whether the agent is acting with-
in the scope of his powers”). Plaintiff con-
cludes that because Ms. Santillan failed to
exercise reasonable diligence, presumably by
not asking Ms. Barron specifically whether
Ms. Chapman had authority to agree to arbi-
tration of future legal disputes, Ms. Barron
cannot be bound by Ms. Santillan’s “mis-
placed reliance” on Ms. Chapman’s authority.

{22} We disagree with Plaintiff's view of
the limitations of Ms. Chapman’s authority.
We find unavailing Plaintiff's argument that
Ms. Barron could not have authorized Ms.
Chapman to sign the arbitration clause be-
cause Ms, Barron was unaware of it, The
parties agreed that Ms. Barron did, in fact,
authorize Ms. Chapman “to complete her pa-

676

perwork” for admission. Plaintiff's assertion
that Ms. Barron’s authorization was limited
to the Medicare paperwork is not persuasive
considering that the facility was prospective-
ly assuming every aspect of her day-to-day
care. Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute
Ms. Chapman’s authority to complete any of
the paperwork other than the arbitration
clause. The following forms were also in-
cluded in the admission paperwork, yet were
separate from the Admission Agreement: (1)
Handling of Resident Mail, (2) Resident Au-
thorization of Benefits and Release of Infor-
mation, (8) Statement to Permit Payment to
Provider and Liability for Charges, (4) Pa-
tient Authorization Form (on which Ms.
Chapman elected to reject a monitoring de-
vice for Ms. Barron’s room), (5) Get a Lift
Policy and Procedure (pertaining to mechani-
cal lift devices), (6) Acknowledgment of Re-
ceipt of Notice of Privacy Practices, (7) Re-
port to Social Security of Patient Admission
From: Betty Dare Good Samaritan Center,
(8) Social Security Split-Deposit Permission

(permitting Betty Dare to accept Ms. Bar- °

ron’s social security check each month and
apportioning that money partly to the resi-
dent trust account and partly toward pay-
ment of Ms. Barron’s room charge), and (9)
Resource Checks-Split Deposit Permission
(similar to the preceding but pertaining to
checks from alternative sources).

{23} Furthermore, Plaintiff does not pres-
ent any evidence as to what Ms. Barron did
or did not understand to be included in “the
paperwork.” The record does not reflect
that Ms. Barron manifested any interest in
what was or was not contained in “the paper-
work.” Ms. Santillan offered Ms. Barron the
option of completing the paperwork herself,
which she declined, and there is no evidence
in the record that she requested any further
information about the paperwork. Plaintiff,
who visited Ms. Barron at the facility more
than once, never asked to review the docu-
ments to see what had been agreed to as
part of the admission process nor did she
object to Ms. Chapman having signed the
admission documents.

{24} Considering Ms. Barron’s unlimited

designation of authority to Ms. Chapman,
Ms. Barron’s apparent lack of interest in the

content of the paperwork or in looking it over
herself, Ms. Chapman’s representation to Ms.
Santillan that she would be assuming respon-
sibility for Ms. Barron, and Ms. Barron’s
subsequent designation of Ms, Chapman as
her agent under the power of attorney for
healthcare, we are not persuaded that Ms.
Barron’s broad grant of authority to Ms.
Chapman to complete the admission paper-
work should be viewed as narrowly as Plain-
tiff asserts. Nor do we believe that Ms.
Santillan was remiss in her duty by not
confirming with Ms. Barron that Ms. Chap-
man had authority to complete the arbitra-
tion clause contained in the Admission
Agreement after Ms. Barron expressly held
Ms. Chapman out as possessing authority to
complete the necessary paperwork. See
Fryar, 94 N.M. at 80, 607 P.2d at 618 (stating
that a principal is “bound by his agent’s acts
within the apparent authority which the prin-
cipal himself ... holds the agent out to the
public as possessing” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).

{25} Defendants argue that “established
principles of agency law compel the conelu-
sion that [Ms. Chapman] was authorized by
{Ms. Barron] to enter into the Admission
Agreement,” and therefore her authority en-
compassed the selection of a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism as a necessary part of the
admission process. Further, as Ms. Chap-
man’s authority was unlimited, Ms. Barron
was bound by Ms. Chapman’s act of agreeing
to the entire Admission Agreement, including
the arbitration clause. Defendants’ view is
that Ms. Chapman was authorized to take all
steps necessary to admit Ms. Barron to Bet-
ty Dare, and those steps included electing a
dispute resolution forum.

{26} California courts have taken a similar
view to that expressed by Defendants, and
have concluded that

{aln agent or fiduciary has the authority to

require a patient’s medical malpractice

claims to be arbitrated. The black letter
statement of California law in this regard
is, ... an agent or other fiduciary who
contracts for medical treatment on behalf
of his beneficiary retains the authority to
enter into an agreement providing for arbi-
tration of claims for medical malpractice.

|
[reey-rrur we war

Garrison v. Super. Ct., 182 Cal.App.4th 258,

33 Cal.Rptr.3d 350, 358 (2005) (internal quo-

tation marks and citation omitted). Thus,
under the law of California, agents with au-
thority to admit their principals to medical
facilities also had authority to sign arbitra-
tion agreements that were included in the
admission paperwork as a related healthcare
decision. See Hogan v. Country Villa
Health Servs., 148 Cal.App.4th 259, 55 Cal.
Rptr.3d 450, 453 (2007) (holding that “unless
that power is restricted by the principal[,]”
an agent under a California statutory health-
care power of attorney “has the power to
execute applicable admission forms, including
arbitration agreements”). These cases sup-
port the view that an agent’s authority to
bind a principal to arbitration does not have
to be specifically or separately granted.
Rather, an agent with authority to complete
the documents for admission is likewise per-
mitted to decide on behalf of the principal
whether future disputes with the facility
should be arbitrated or litigated. See Garri-
son, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d at 352, 358, 360-61 (hold-
ing that a healthcare power of attorney in-
cludes the authority to bind the principal to
an optional arbitration agreement because,
among other reasons, “[aln agent has author-
ity ... [t]o do everything necessary or prop-
er and usual, in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, for effecting the purpose of his agency”
and that “[tJhe decision to enter into [such
agreements] in connection with placement in
a (healtheare] facility ... is a proper and
usual exercise of an agent’s powers” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). As
the Garrison court explained, “[w]hether to
admit an aging parent to a particular care
facility is a [healthcare] decision.” Id.
Therefore, revocable arbitration agreements
may be “executed as part of the [healthcare]
decision[ Jmaking process.” Id.

{27} Here, when Ms. Barron designated
Ms. Chapman as her agent to complete the
paperwork necessary for admission to Betty
Dare, she did not limit Ms. Chapman’s au-
thority. When Ms. Barron executed a
healthcare power of attorney in favor of Ms,
Chapman one day after Ms. Chapman signed
the admission paperwork, at the very least
Ms. Barron was indicating her comfort not
only with the authority just given to complete

677

the admission paperwork, but also with Ms.
Chapman making decisions for her specifical-
ly in regard to all aspects of healthcare,
including end of life decisions. This is simi-
lar to Carraway v. Beverly Enterprises Ala-
bama, Inc., 978 So.2d 27, 28-29 (Ala.2007), in
which a nursing home resident’s brother act-
ing as her “authorized representative” signed
a number of admission documents on her
behalf, including an arbitration agreement.
Twenty-five days after her admission to the
nursing home the resident executed a written
power of attorney in favor of her brother.
Id. at 28, 30. Later, the resident’s brother
sued the nursing home. Id. at 30. The
nursing home filed a motion to dismiss and
compel arbitration, which the trial court
granted. Id. Relying on principles of agency
law, the Alabama Supreme Court reasoned
that “[jJust as [her brother] signed all the
other documents relating to [his sister’s] ad-
mission into the nursing home on [her] be-
half, [he] signed the arbitration agreement

. expressly as an ‘authorized representa-
tive’” Id. Further, the Carraway court
stated that “{tJhere is no evidence indicating
that [the resident] had any objection to [her
brother’s] acting on her behalf.... A few
weeks into [the resident’s stay] at the nurs-
ing home, she executed a [durable] power of
attorney, giving [her brother] further author-
ity to act on her behalf.” Id, at 31.

{28} Here, as in Carraway, there was no
evidence indicating that Ms. Barron objected
to Ms. Chapman acting on her behalf. No
limitation of any sort on Ms. Chapman’s ac-
knowledged authority was ever communicat-
ed to Ms. Santillan. Nor was there any
indication that Plaintiff, who visited Ms. Bar-
ron at the nursing home a number of times,
objected to Ms. Chapman having acted on
Ms. Barron’s behalf. To the contrary, Ms.
Barron did not limit Ms. Chapman’s authori-
ty to act on her behalf in completing the
admission paperwork and nothing in the rec-
ord indicates that either Ms. Barron or Plain-
tiff ever questioned Ms. Chapman or Ms.
Santillan about what would be or had been
agreed to as part of the admission process.
Like the Carraway, Garrison, and Hogan
courts, we view Ms. Barron’s words and ac-
tions as indicating that Ms. Barron was com-

678

fortable with Ms. Chapman making admis-
sion decisions on her behalf without herself
knowing or being specifically advised about
the dispute resolution issue. As the Admis-
sion Agreement and the admission process
included a decision on the Resolution of Le-
gal Disputes form, we view Ms. Chapman’s
authority as encompassing that decision.

{29} Courts from other jurisdictions to
which Plaintiff directs our attention have tak-
en a more restrictive view. For example,
some of the cases cited by Plaintiff stand for
the proposition that authority under a health-
care power of attorney without further indi-
cation of authority is insufficient to allow the
agent to bind the principal to arbitration.
See Life Care Ctrs. of Am. v. Smith, 298
Ga.App. 789, 681 S.E.2d 182, 183-85 (2009)
(holding that the plain language of a health-
care power of attorney did not give daughter
the right to sign away her mother’s right to a
jury trial); McNally v. Beverly Enters., Inc.,
191 P.38d 363, No. 98,124, 2008 WL 4140635,
at, *1-2 (Kan.Ct.App. Sept. 5, 2008) (per cu-
riam) (unpublished table decision) (holding
that a healthcare power of attorney con-
ferred by a resident to his wife explicitly
limited the powers of the agent to those set
out in writing in the document); Tew. City-
view Care Ctr, L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d
845, 352-58 & n. 7 (Tex.App.2007) (determin-
ing that the medical power of attorney signed
by the resident’s daughter had not taken
legal effect at the time the documents were
signed and there was no evidence that the
resident was even aware that her daughter
had signed any documents on her behalf).
We do not think these cases are persuasive.

HH {80} We reject Plaintiff's challenge
to Ms. Chapman’s authority because she
had not received her healthcare power of at-
torney before she signed the admission doc-
uments. Ms. Chapman had actual and ap-
parent authority, without the next-day
healtheare power of attorney, to act as Ms.
Barron’s agent in signing the admission doc-
uments. It is this agency relationship upon
which Defendants relied in the district court
and rely here to prove that Ms. Chapman
had authorization to act on Ms. Barron’s
behalf. As we have indicated, the health-
care power of attorney that Ms. Barron

signed supports the already-given actual and
apparent authority to complete the admis-
sion paperwork; however, the healthcare
power of attorney was not the source of
authority for Ms. Chapman’s agency upon
which Defendants relied in the district court
or upon which they rely in this appeal.
Thus, regardless of whether an agent’s au-
thority to admit a principal to a nursing
home is granted through a healthcare power
of attorney, as in Garrison and Hogan, or is
orally granted, as in the present case, once
granted, the authority encompasses arbitra-
tion agreement decisions.

{31} Plaintiffs other cases are unpersua-
sive because their facts or holdings make
them inapplicable here. For example, Lujan
v. Life Care Centers of America, 222 P.38d
970, 971-72 (Colo.App.2009), involved an in-
capacitated patient whose doctor asked the
family to appoint a healthcare proxy. The
court held that “a [healthcare] proxy deci-
sion-maker ... does not have authority to
enter into arbitration agreements for inca-
pacitated patients.” Id. at 971. The court
pointed out that a healthcare proxy is not
selected by the patient, who has no role in
determining what authority the healthcare
proxy may have. Id. at 973. In the present
ease, Ms. Barron, unlike the incapacitated
patient in Lujan, was alert and oriented, and
chose Ms. Chapman to complete her admis-
sion paperwork. Thus, Lujan is inapplicable
to this case.

{32} Also inapplicable and unpersuasive
are In re Estate of McKibbin, 977 So.2d 612
(Fla Dist.Ct.App.2008) (per curiam), Ashburn
Health Care Center, Inc. v. Poole, 286 Ga.
App. 24, 648 S.E.2d 430 (2007), and Mé.
Holly Nursing Center v. Crowdus, 281
S.W.3d 809 (Ky.Ct.App.2008), upon which
Plaintiff relies. In McKibbin, a Florida trial
court held the decedent's estate was not
bound by an arbitration agreement signed by
the decedent’s son upon her admission to a
nursing home. 977 So.2d at 613. There, the
decedent's son had signed an arbitration
agreement acting under a durable power of
attorney which, under Florida law, is strictly
construed to grant only the powers specified.
Id. As nothing in the power of attorney
stated that the decedent’s son could sign an

arbitration agreement on her behalf and
“there was no other basis upon which to bind
[the decedent] to the arbitration agree-
ment[,]’ the court reversed the trial court’s
grant of a motion to compel arbitration. Id.
As we have already explained, unlike the
decedent’s son in McKibbin, Ms. Chapman’s
authority in this matter arose from authority
that preceded the next-day power of attor-
ney.

{33} In Poole, the Georgia Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court’s denial of a
motion to compel arbitration. 648 S.E.2d at
481. There, the court explained that the
nursing home did not provide any “legal or
factual basis for finding an agency relation-
ship in [the] case.” Jd. at 483. The nursing
home “broadly assert[ed] on appeal[,] without
any supporting citations to the record[,] that
‘the facts establish that [the resident’s hus-
band] acted as the agent for his wife.” Id. at
432 (internal quotation marks omitted), In
this case, Defendants present ample evidence
in the record to indicate that Ms. Barron
personally designated Ms. Chapman as her
agent for the purpose of completing the ad-
mission paperwork.

{34} In Crowdus, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of a
motion to compel arbitration where a nursing
home employee asked a resident’s friend to
sign the admission paperwork for the resi-
dent who was twice admitted to the nursing
home. 281 S.W.8d at 811-12. The nursing
home argued that an apparent authority rela-
tionship existed at the first admission be-
cause the resident’s friend had signed the
resident into a hospital before the resident
was admitted to the nursing home. Jd. at
814. However, there was no evidence that
anyone at the home knew anything about the
hospital admission and, moreover, the resi-
dent’s friend did not recall whether she had
in fact signed the resident into the hospital.
Id. As to the second admission, the nursing
home admissions director could not remem-
ber anything about the resident’s admission,
and there was no evidence that the resident
did anything to hold the friend out as having
authority to act on her behalf. Jd. Here,
unlike Crowdus, there is evidence in the rec-
ord of an actual and apparent agency rela-

679

tionship that arose from Ms. Barron’s man-
ifestations to Ms. Chapman and Ms. Santillan
that Ms. Chapman was authorized to com-
plete the admission paperwork. Further, un-
like Crowdus, Ms. Santillan did not approach
Ms. Chapman about the paperwork without
Ms. Barron’s express permission.

{35} Plaintiff cites only two cases that
arguably support her position. One is an
unpublished case from the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, which we decline to consider. See
Rule 12-405(C) NMRA (stating that a “mem-
orandum opinion [of a New Mexico appellate
court], because it is unreported and not uni-
formly available to all parties, shall not be
published nor shall it be cited as precedent in
any court”); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 76.28(4)(e)
(West 2009) (stating that “{o]pinions that are
not to be published shall not be cited or used
as binding precedent in any other case in any
court of” Kentucky).

{36} Plaintiff also cites to Koricic v. Bever-
ly Enterprises-Nebraska, Inc., 278 Neb. 713,
773 N.W.2d 145, 148 (2009), in which a resi-
dent’s son signed his mother’s nursing home
admission documents, including an arbitra-
tion agreement. The two had a ten-year
history of the son signing medical documents
for his mother, but he only signed documents
after he explained and translated them for
his mother, who had a limited understanding
of English. Id. at 148, 150. The son testi-
fied at a deposition that he never signed on
his mother’s behalf without her express per-
mission to do so. Id. at 150. He further
stated that, on their way to the nursing
home, his mother authorized him to sign
paperwork required for her admission to the
home. Jd. at 151. The court held that, as
his mother’s agent, the son had been author-
ized to sign the required admission papers,
but that nothing in the record indicated that
his mother knew of the arbitration agree-
ment or that the authority she granted to her
son included waiving her “right of access to
the courts and to trial by jury.” Jd. The
court agreed that the resident’s son “had
authority to sign the mandatory paperwork
for admission,” but concluded that he “did
not have authority to sign the arbitration
agreement because it was not a condition of
admission.” Id. at 148.

680

{37} In rejecting the nursing home’s ap-
parent authority argument, the Koricic
court, among other reasons, explained that
the nursing home “knew of [the resident's]
limited ability to understand these docu-
ments, or she would not have been asking
her son ... to sign them for her.” Id. at
152. Thus, the resident’s limited ability to
understand English, which was the reason
the resident did not sign the documents her-
self, was a factor in the court’s decision.
Here, on the other hand, there is nothing in
the record to support the idea, nor do the
parties argue, that Ms. Barron was incapable
of reading, understanding, or signing the ad-
mission documents herself. Moreover, as we
have already held, the Resolution of Legal
Disputes form was included in the admission
paperwork and required a decision either to
reject or to accept arbitration as the method
of resolving future disputes between the resi-
dent and Betty Dare.

{38} In our view, the courts’ reasoning in
Carraway, Garrison, and Hogan is logically
sound and more applicable to the facts of
this case. If a mentally competent, alert,
and oriented resident gives her agent au-
thority to complete the admission paper-
work, that authority is made known to the
care facility, and the admission documents
include an optional arbitration clause, it fol-
lows that the agent has authority to decide
whether to reject or accept an arbitration
clause in the admission agreement that is to
be signed as part of the admission process.
Tf, as Plaintiff argues in this case, Ms. Bar-
ron “only ... authorized [Ms. Chapman] to
fill out her ‘paperwork’ that pertained to
Medicare payment ‘for her therapies[,)”
then it should follow that Ms. Chapman
lacked the authority to complete any of the
several non-Medicare admission-related doc-
uments and provisions identified earlier in
this opinion including, as well, any non-Medi-
care provisions in the Admission Agreement.
As Defendants argue, Ms. Chapman would
“then [have] lacked the authority to agree to
the Admission Agreement, or to admit [Ms.
Barron] to the facility.” Thus, not only
would the arbitration clause be invalidated
by Ms. Chapman’s lack of authority, the va-
lidity of the entire Admission Agreement
would be equally vulnerable.

HH {89} Additionally, we disagree with
the district court’s comments in the present
case that a written power of attorney or an
enumerated list authorizing Ms. Chapman to
take each specific step was required to indi-
cate the scope of her agency. Rather, Ms.
Barron, as the principal, was in a position to
limit her agent’s authority if she so chose.
Cf. Comstock, 110 N.M. at 182, 793 P.2d at
262 (stating that “(i]t is always competent for
a principal to limit the authority of his agent,
and if such limitations have been brought to
the attention of the party with whom the
agent is dealing, the power to bind the prin-
cipal is defined thereby”); Morris Oil Co. v.
Rainbow Oilfield Trucking, Inc, 106 N.M.
287, 240, 741 P.2d 840, 844 (Ct.App.1987)
(recognizing that a principal may limit the
authority of its agent and such limitation will
be binding on a third party who is aware of
the limitation). Furthermore, the law in
New Mexico is that an agency relationship
may be created orally. DeBaca, Inc, 91
N.M. at 420, 575 P.2d at 604. Therefore, a
written power of attorney is not necessary
for a principal to create a valid and effective
agency relationship. While the better prac-
tice for facilities such as Betty Dare might be
to require a general power of attorney or
more specific authority in admitting a resi-
dent, we cannot say that such demonstration
of authority was required under the circum-
stances of this case.

{40} Having determined that Ms. Chap-
man’s authority encompassed the arbitration
clause, we further conclude that Ms. Chap-
man’s decision to accept arbitration bound
Ms. Barron to arbitrate future disputes with
Betty Dare. Unlike the parties in McMillan,
DeArmond, and Lisanti, the record indicates
that Ms. Chapman voluntarily and knowingly
chose arbitration of future disputes. The
Resolution of Legal Disputes form clearly
stated that agreeing to arbitrate legal dis-
putes indicated a waiver of a right to sue or
go to trial in a court of law. To the extent
that Plaintiff argues on appeal that Ms.
Chapman did not fully understand the impli-
cations of the arbitration clause, we find this
argument unavailing. Parties to an agree-
ment are presumed to know and understand
the terms of the agreement. See Ballard v.

Chavez, 117 N.M. 1, 3, 868 P.2d 646, 648
(1994) (recognizing that “each party to a
contract has a duty to read and familiarize
himself with [its] contents ... [and] general-
ly is presumed to know the terms of the
agreement”). Furthermore, Plaintiff did not
develop any evidence as to what Ms. Chap-
man may or may not have fully understood.

{41} We are not insensitive to the con-
cerns of nursing home residents and their
families. We understand and appreciate that
admission agreements and other admission-
related documents can be lengthy and de-
tailed and are often presented to aging indi-
viduals and their families when they are at
their most vulnerable, in need of quick assis-
tance, and potentially can easily be taken
advantage of. That said, however, we do not
view arbitration clauses such as the one at
issue here as inherently unfair or as leaving
one or the other party at a disadvantage
simply on the ground that they appear within
admission documents that an agent has au-
thority to sign. Plaintiff does not attack
specific aspects of the Resolution of Legal
Disputes form as ambiguous or unfair. Nor
does Plaintiff attack arbitration itself as un-
fair or inadequate, or attack the arbitration
clause here as repugnant to New Mexico’s
policy favoring arbitration. We note that,
under the New Mexico Uniform Arbitration
Act, arbitrators may award punitive damages
or any other relief authorized by law in a
civil action involving the same claim. Section
44-7A-22(a). Moreover, there are advan-
tages to arbitration which, among other ben-
efits, are that it generally costs less than
litigation and leads to a quicker resolution.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
US. 265, 280, 115 S.Ct. 834, 180 L.Ed.2d 753
(1995).

{42} We thus conclude that the law of
agency and New Mexico’s well-established
public policy preference in favor of resolving
disputes through arbitration, where that is
the agreement of the parties, require rever-
sal of the district court’s denial of the motion
to dismiss and compel arbitration.

Unconscionability and Consideration

TM {43} As we have determined that
the district court’s ruling regarding the scope

681

of Ms. Chapman’s authority was incorrect,
we examine Plaintiff's argument that we
should affirm the district court on other
grounds argued below. We therefore turn to
Plaintiff's arguments regarding the proce-
dural unconscionability of and lack of consid-
eration for the arbitration clause.

{44} Without making an official finding,
the district court commented that it “[did
not] think [the arbitration clause agreement
was] unconscionable. And ... if we [had]
reached that, [it] would have gone in ...
Defendants’ favor.” We agree with the dis-
trict court. Procedural unconscionability,
which Plaintiff argues here, has been ex-
plained by our Supreme Court as going “be-
yond the mere facial analysis of the contract
and examin[ing] the particular factual cir-
cumstances surrounding the formation of the
contract, including the relative bargaining
strength, sophistication of the parties, and
the extent to which either party felt free to
accept or decline terms demanded by the
other.” Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of
N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, 123, 146 N.M. 256,
208 P.3d 901.

{45} In support of her unconscionability
argument, Plaintiff cites several cases in
which courts from other jurisdictions have
identified instances of procedural unconscion-
ability. See, eg. Woebse v. Health Care &
Ret. Corp. of Am. 977 So.2d 630, 633 (Fla.
Dist.Ct.App.2008) (holding that procedural
unconscionability existed where a nursing
home resident’s daughter met with the
home’s administrator for about five minutes,
during which time she was presented with a
thirty-seven page document that included an
arbitration clause, and instructed that her
father’s continued stay in the home was con-
ditioned upon her signing the papers, which
the administrator flipped through and pre-
sented the signature pages); Prieto v.
Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am. 919 So.2d
581, 532-33 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (agreeing
with the trial court’s finding of procedural
unconscionability where a nursing home resi-
dent’s daughter was “hurried into signing
numerous documents” that were not ex-
plained to her); Romano ex rel. Romano v.
Manor Care, Inc., 861 So.2d 59, 68-64 (Fla.
Dist.Ct.App.2008) (reversing an order com-

682

pelling arbitration based on the “egregious
substantive unconscionability of the terms of
the agreement” and also concluding that
“some quantum of procedural unconscionabil-
ity” existed, where the nursing home admit
istrator did not explain that agreeing to arbi-
tration was not a condition of admission);
Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc. 159 Ohio
App.3d 66, 2004-Ohio-5757, 823 N.E.2d 19,
at 116, 9, 25-28 (determining there was pro-
cedural unconscionability where a nursing
home resident's wife signed an arbitration
clause in a matter of minutes, without having
the clause explained, and under the stress of
her semi-conscious husband being admitted
to the facility and immediately transported to
a hospital); Howell v. NHC Healtheare-Fort
Sanders, Inc, 109 S.W.3d 731, 782, 735
(Tenn.Ct.App.2008) (holding that an agree-
ment to arbitrate was not binding where the
nursing home employee who presented ad-
mission paperwork to a resident’s illiterate
husband “took it upon herself to explain the
contract, rather than asking him to read it,
and ... did not mention, much less explain,
that he was waiving a right to a jury trial”).

{46} The procedural unconscionability de-
scribed in Woebse, Prieto, Romano, Smail,
and Howell was not present in this case. Ms.
Chapman and Ms. Santillan met for an hour
and a half, during which time Ms. Santillan
reviewed every section of the Admission
Agreement. Ms. Santillan specifically in-
structed Ms. Chapman to read the Resolu-
tion of Legal Disputes form and explained
that if Ms. Chapman decided to reject arbi-
tration, she would need to mark the appro-
priate box on the form and initial next to that
mark. Moreover, the Resolution of Legal
Disputes form noted in bold at the top of the
form that a resident’s agreement to arbitrate
was not a condition of admission. The form
also clearly stated that “agreeing to arbitrate
... means that [the resident] is waiving [the]
right to sue in a court of law and to a trial by
jury” and there is evidence in the record that
Ms. Chapman read the agreement. Ms.
Chapman was free to accept or reject arbi-
tration. There is no evidence that Ms. Chap-
man was rushed in signing any of the docu-
ments, that she felt under any duress, or that
she had unanswered questions. Additionally,
Ms. Santillan advised Ms. Chapman to read

through the paperwork at home and to call if
she had any questions. Ms. Chapman stated
that she took the documents home and read
them over. After reading over the docu-
ments at home, which review presumably
included the Resolution of Legal Disputes
form, Ms. Chapman did not call Ms. Santillan
or contact the NAF with questions. We do
not believe there was any procedural uncon-
scionability here.

{47} As to Plaintiff's argument that the
arbitration clause lacked consideration, we
hold that the arbitration clause was a part of
the underlying contract, and no additional
consideration was necessary for enforcement
of the clause. The arbitration clause was one
portion of the Admission Agreement and was
supported by the same consideration.

NAF

{48} The Resolution of Legal Disputes
form stated, “[alny arbitration conducted
pursuant to this [form] shall be conducted

. in accordance with the [NAF] Code of
Procedure for Arbitration.” After the dis-
trict court issued its order in this matter, the
NAF entered into a settlement agreement,
according to which, it was prohibited from
conducting arbitrations. Raney v. Tijerina,
393 Fed.Appx. 174, 175 & n. 1 (6th Cir.2010)
(per curiam) (unpublished). Plaintiff argues
that the arbitration clause has been ren-
dered unenforceable due to the unavailability
of the NAF. The district court did not have
an opportunity to consider or rule on this
issue, and it is not properly before this
Court. We note that the unavailability of
the NAF does not necessarily render an
agreement to arbitrate unenforceable simply
on the basis of its incorporation in the arbi-
tration document as the forum for the arbi-
tration. “A split in authority exists over
whether the unavailability of the NAF as a
forum for consumer disputes renders arbi-
tration agreements contemplating NAF as a
forum unenforceable, or whether the Federal
Arbitration Act in such cases requires the
[clourt to appoint an arbitrator.” Jones v.
GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F.Supp.2d 1161,
1168 (D.S.D.2010); see Brown v. ITT Con-
sumer Fin. Corp. 211 F.8d 1217, 1222 (11th
Cir.2000) (holding that “[tJhe unavailability
of the NAF does not destroy the arbitration

clause”). But ¢f Carr v. Gateway, Inc, 395
TiLApp.3d 1079, 335 Ill.Dee. 253, 918 N.H.2d
598, 603 (2009) (concluding that the selection
of the NAF as the dispute resolution forum
‘was an integral part of the arbitration clause
and affirming the trial court’s denial of the
appellant’s motion to compel arbitration
based on the unavailability of the NAF). We
therefore respectfully request that the dis-
trict court consider this issue on remand.
CONCLUSION

{49} We reverse the district court’s denial
of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration. We hold that Ms. Chapman had
actual authority, which was not limited by
Ms. Barron, and also had apparent authority
to complete the admission paperwork; that
the arbitration clause did not need separate
consideration from the overall Admission
Agreement; and that the circumstances sur-
rounding the formation of the agreement do
not render the agreement void for procedural
unconscionability. On remand to the district
court for entry of the appropriate order with
respect to arbitration, the court should ad-
dress the issue of whether the arbitration
clause in the Resolution of Legal Disputes
form has been rendered unenforceable due to
the unavailability of the NAF.

{50} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CYNTHIA A. FRY and
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.

2011-NMCA-105
265 P.3d 734
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff—
Appellant,
v.
RANDY J., Child-Appellee.
No. 29,791.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
July 25, 2011. -
Certiorari Denied, Sept. 16,
2011, No. 33,170.

Z

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, M. Victoria Wilson, Assistant Attorney
General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

{1} Whenever children are subject to an
investigatory detention, they must be advised
of their right to remain silent and advised
that anything they say can be used against
them. Ifa child is not advised of his or her
rights, “any statement or confession” by the
child is inadmissible in court pursuant to
NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-14(C), (D) (2003)
(amended 2009). It is undisputed that Ran-
dy J. (Child) was subject to an investigatory
detention for driving under the influence
(DUI) and that the investigating officer
failed to advise Child of his constitutional
rights as required by Section 32A-2-14(C).
However, the parties disagree regarding
whether Child’s responses during field sobri-
ety tests, the results of a blood test taken
following Child’s arrest, and Child’s implied
consent to a blood test constitute statements
that must be suppressed under Section 82A—
2-14(D). The district court agreed with
Child and suppressed the evidence. We hold
that Child’s responses during the field sobri-
ety tests, results of the blood test, and
Child’s implied consent to the blood test are
not statements that are subject to suppres-
sion under Section 82A-2-14(D). As a re-
sult, we reverse the district court’s order of
suppression and remand to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTO-
RY

{2} On March 25, 2009, Officer Joseph
Schake observed a vehicle fail to stop at a
stop sign. Officer Schake stopped the vehi-

cle and made contact with the driver, Child,
who identified himself. Officer Schake de-
tected the strong odor of what he knew
based on his training and experience to be
“purnt marijuana” coming from the vehicle.
At that point, Officer Schake asked Child to
exit the vehicle and accompany him to the
back of the vehicle. While Officer Schake
and Child were near the back of the vehicle,
Officer Schake smelled “burnt marijuana” on
Child’s person. Officer Schake then conduct-
ed an investigation for a possible DUI.

{8} Officer Schake had Child perform
three field sobriety tests: a horizontal gaze
nystagmus tests (HGN), a walk-and-turn
test, and a one-leg-stand test. During the
HGN test, Officer Schake observed that
Child had bloodshot, watery eyes and
“slowed” facial expressions that were consis-
tent with a subject who was on a depressant.
During the walk-and-turn test, Child used
very methodical and slow steps, swayed from
side-to-side, stopped during the test, and
held his arms up more than six inches for
balance. During the one-leg-stand test,
Child “hopped,” held his arms up more than
six inches for balance, swayed from side to
side, did not keep his toe pointed, did not
stare at his toe the entire time as instructed,
and skipped a number while counting.
Based on these observations, Officer Schake
concluded that Child was “under the influ-
ence” and arrested him.

{4} Officer Schake transported Child to
San Juan Regional Medical Center and read
him the Implied Consent Act, NMSA 1978,
§ 66-8-107(A) (1993), after which Child’s
blood was drawn for testing. Officer Schake
testified that he did not recall when he found
out Child’s age. Officer Schake further testi-
fied that he did not recall giving Child Mi-
ronda warnings or advising him of his consti-
tutional rights as required by Section 32A-2-
14(C) at any time.

{5} Child was sixteen years old at the time
of the incident. On March 27, 2009, the
State filed a petition alleging that Child was
a delinquent child based upon the following:
(1) driving while under the influence of alco-
hol or drugs, or in the alternative, driving
while under the influence of any drug to a
degree that rendered Child incapable of safe-

ly driving a vehicle, contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 66~-8-102(A), (B) (2008) (amended
2010); (2) driving without a valid license,
contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-
2(A)(1) (2007); (8) failure to stop and yield
the right-of-way, contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 66-7-330(B) (1978); (4) possession of
drug paraphernalia, contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 30-31-25.1(A) (2001); and (5) posses-
sion of marijuana (one ounce or less), con-
trary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(B)(1)
(2005) (amended 2011).

{6} Child filed a motion to suppress any
statements or admissions he made to Officer
Schake during the traffic stop, as well as any
evidence obtained pursuant to those state-
ments. Child relied on State v. Javier M.,
2001-NMSC-030, 181 N.M. 1, 33 P.8d 1, to
argue that any statement or confession must
be suppressed because Child was not advised
of his constitutional rights as required by
Section 32A-2-14(C). Specifically, Child in-
dicated that after Officer Schake ordered him
out of the vehicle, he admitted to smoking
marijuana about an hour prior to the stop.
Child further contended that any physical
evidence seized by Officer Schake must be
suppressed as the fruits of the unlawful ques-
tioning. Finally, Child relied on Section
82A-2-14 and Article II, Sections 14, 15, and
18 of the New Mexico Constitution to argue
that children in New Mexico are provided
broader protections than adults during police
questioning. In response, the State con-
ceded that Officer Schake failed to advise
Child of his right to remain silent as required
by Section 82A-2-14(C) and that any state-
ment or confession should be suppressed.
However, the State argued that Section 32A—
2-14(D) did not require suppression of the
physical evidence.

{7} At the hearing on the motion to sup-
press, Child argued that the fruits of the
Section 82A-2-14(C) violation should be sup-
pressed, including the field sobriety tests, the
blood draw, and any consent by Child to
conduct those tests. In response, the State
relied on Javier M. to argue that Section
82A-2-14(D) only required suppression of
any incriminating statements but not sup-
pression of the physical evidence. The dis-
trict court ultimately determined that Child

687

was never advised of his constitutional rights
pursuant to Section 82A-2~14(C) and relied
on Javier M. to conclude that the remedy for
the violation was suppression of the results of
the field sobriety tests and the results of the
blood test. The court reasoned that Child’s
responses during the tests were statements,
and the results should be suppressed. The
State disagreed that Child’s responses dur-
ing the field sobriety tests and blood tests
were statements, and the court allowed the
State to prepare a supplemental brief on that
issue. The State filed a supplemental brief
in support of its argument that the results of
the field sobriety tests and blood tests are
not statements and are not required to be
suppressed under Section 32A-2-14(D) as in-
terpreted by Javier M. At a subsequent
hearing, the court ruled that Section 32A-2-
14(D) required suppression of all of Child’s
statements, including the results of the field
sobriety tests and the blood tests.

{8} The district court ordered “that no
statement or confession, including Child’s ad-
mission to smoking marijuana, consent to
conduct field sobriety testing and drug analy-
sis testing, and any results of field sobriety
testing and drug analysis testing, may be
introduced at trial or hearing.” The court
further dismissed the allegation in Count I of
driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs for lack of evidence. The
State appealed.

DISCUSSION

{9} On appeal, the State argues that
Child’s performance on the field sobriety
tests, the results of the blood test, and any
consent by Child to submit to the blood test
do not constitute statements or confessions
under Section 32A-2-14(D). As a result, the
State contends that Section 32A-2-14(D)
does not require suppression of that evidence
as a remedy for the failure to advise Child of
his constitutional rights as required by Sec-
tion 82A-2-14(C).

Standard of Review

{10} In reviewing an order of suppression,
we defer to the district court’s findings of
fact that are supported by substantial evi-
dence, and we review the district court’s
application of the law to the facts de novo.

688

State v. Gerald B., 2006-NMCA-022, 113,
189 N.M. 118, 129 P.38d 149. The relevant
facts are undisputed. On appeal, we must
determine as a matter of law whether the
district court erred in determining that
Child’s responses during the field sobriety
tests, the results of his blood test, and his
implied consent to the blood test are state-
ments that must be suppressed pursuant to
Section 82A-2-14(D). Our review also in-
volves interpretation of Section 32A-2-14(D)
and the Implied Consent Act. As a result, we
review the district court’s order of suppres-
sion de novo. See State v. Jade G., 2007-
NMSC-010, 115, 141 N.M. 284, 154 P.3d 659
(stating that appellate courts review issues
involving statutory interpretation de novo);
see also Gerald B., 2006-NMCA-022, 11 18,
19, 189 N.M. 113, 129 P.8d 149 (applying a de
novo standard in reviewing the district
court’s application of the law to the facts to
determine whether a violation of Section
82A-2-14 occurred).

Section 32A-2-14(D) Provides That the
Remedy for a Violation of Section 32A-2-—
14(C) Is Suppression of a Child’s State-
ments or Confessions

{11} “Our primary goal when interpreting
statutory language is to give effect to the
intent of the [L]egislature.” State v. Torres,
2006-NMCA-106, 18, 140 N.M. 230, 141 P.3d
1284. “The text of a statute ... is the
primary, essential source of its meaning.”
NMSA 1978, § 12-24-19 (1997). “Under the
plain meaning rule[,] statutes are to be given
effect as written without room for construc-
tion unless the language is doubtful, ambigu-
ous, or an adherence to the literal use of the
words would lead to injustice, absurdity[,] or
contradiction[.]” State v. Davis, 2003-
NMSC-022, 16, 184 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064.
If a statute’s meaning is clear, our responsi-
bility is “to apply the statute as written and
not to second-guess the [Llegislature’s selec-
tion from among competing policies or adop-
tion of one of perhaps several ways of effec-
tuating a particular legislative objective.”
State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M.
346, 352, 871 P.2d 1352, 1358 (1994).

{12} In pertinent part, Section 32A-2-
14(C), (D) states the following:

C. No person subject to the provisions
of the Delinquency Act who is alleged or
suspected of being a delinquent child shall
be interrogated or questioned without first
advising the child of the child’s constitu-
tional rights and securing a knowing, intel-
ligent[,] and voluntary waiver.

D. Before any statement or confession
may be introduced at a trial or hearing
when a child is alleged to be a delinquent
child, the state shall prove that the state-
ment or confession offered in evidence was
elicited only after a knowing, intelligent[,]
and voluntary waiver of the child’s consti-
tutional rights was obtained.

(Emphasis added.)

HH s{18} The protections of Section
32A-2-14 are triggered in two circumstances:
(1) when a child is subject to an investigatory
detention, and (2) after formal charges are
filed against a child. Javier M, 2001-
NMSC-030, 138, 181 N.M. 1, 33 P.8d 1.
When children are subject to investigatory
detentions, they must be advised of “their
right to remain silent and that anything they
say can be used against them.” Id. 141.
Section 32A-2-14(D) provides the remedy for
a violation of a child’s rights under Section
82A-2-14(C). Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030,
127, 181 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1. Specifically,
Section 32A-2-14(D) indicates that “[i]f a
child is not advised of the right to remain
silent and warned of the consequence of
waiving that right, any statement or confes-
sion obtained as a result of the detention or
seizure is inadmissible in any delinquency
proceeding.” Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030,
11, 181 N.M. 1, 83 P.8d 1. The State con-
cedes that Child was subject to an investiga-
tory detention and that his rights were vio-
lated by Officer Schake’s failure to inform
Child of his constitutional rights as required
by Section 32A-2-14(C). However, the State
contends that the district court erred in con-
cluding that Child’s performance on the field
sobriety tests, results of the blood test, and
consent to the blood test were statements
subject to suppression under Javier M. and
Section 82A-2-14(D).

{14} The State asserts that whether evi-
dence constitutes a “statement or confession”
under Section 32A-2-14(D) is synonymous

with whether the evidence is testimonial for
purposes of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation provided by the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The State
relies upon reasoning in Javier M. that the
Legislature enacted Section 32A-2-14 to ex-
tend the privilege against self-incrimination
to children during investigatory detentions,
regardless of whether the child invoked the
privilege. See Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030,
144, 181 N.M. 1, 83 P.3d 1. Child appears to
agree that the meaning of a “statement or
confession” under Section 32A-2-14(D) is
consistent with the meaning of what is testi-
monial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. As a result, we analyze this case
on the basis of this premise. We consider
whether Child’s responses during the field
sobriety and blood tests constitute state-
ments under Section 32A-2-14(D) consistent
with whether those responses are testimonial
under the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.

Child’s Responses During the Field Sobri-
ety Tests Do Not Constitute Statements
Under Section 32A-2-14(D)

Hl {15} We first consider whether the
district court erred in determining that
Child’s responses during the field sobriety
tests were statements that must be sup-
pressed pursuant to Section 32A-2-14(D).
As previously described, Child performed
three field sobriety tests: the HGN, the
walk-and-turn test, and the one-leg-stand
test.

HMM {16} Under the Fifth Amendment,
“the privilege against self-incrimination only
protects the accused from being compelled to
provide the state with evidence of a testimo-
nial or communicative nature and does not
protect a suspect from being compelled by
the state to produce real or physical evi-
dence.” City of Rio Rancho v. Mazzei,
2010-NMCA-054, 126, 148 N.M. 558, 239
P.8d 149 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted), cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-
005, 148 N.M. 575, 240 P.3d 1049. Accord-
ingly, physical evidence, such as blood,
breath, and fingerprints, is excluded from the
scope of the protection against self-incrimina-
tion. Mazzei, 2010-NMCA-054, 125, 148

689

N.M. 558, 239 P.3d 149. Relying on Penn-
sylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592, 110
S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), this
Court has also concluded that “[a] person’s
responses to a field sobriety test are, at least
for the most part, not testimonial.” State v.
Wright, 116 N.M. 882, 835, 867 P.2d 1214,
1217 (Ct.App.1993). This appeal requires us
to examine under what circumstances a per-
son’s responses during a field sobriety test
are testimonial.

{17} In Muniz, the Supreme Court held
that the defendant’s slurred speech and lack
of muscular coordination during the HGN,
walk-and-turn, and one-leg-stand field sobri-
ety tests were not testimonial. 496 U.S. at
585-86, 591-92, 110 S.Ct. 2638. The Court
reasoned that the privilege against. self-in-
crimination “is a bar against compelling com-
munications or testimony, but that compul-
sion which makes a suspect or accused the
source of real or physical evidence does not
violate it.” Id. at 591, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In contrast, the Court held that the defen-
dant’s response to a question regarding
whether he remembered the date of his sixth
birthday was testimonial. Id. at 598-99, 110
S.Ct. 2638. Testimonial evidence “encom-
pass[es] all responses to questions that, if
asked of a sworn suspect during a criminal
trial, could place the suspect in the cruel
trilemma [of self-accusation, perjury, or con-
tempt.” Id. at 596-97, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Because the
defendant could not remember or calculate
the date of his sixth birthday, he was con-
fronted with the choice of incriminating him-
self by admitting that he did not know the
date or answering untruthfully by answering
with a date that he did not believe to be
accurate. Id. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2688. As a
result, the Court concluded that the defen-
dant’s response to the sixth-birthday ques-
tion was testimonial and that suppression
was required under the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 599-600, 110 S.Ct. 2638. Nonverbal
conduct such as Child’s performance on the
tests, however, is testimonial only if the con-
duct reflects a person’s communication of his
or her thoughts to another, or conveys
knowledge of a fact specific to the person
asked to perform the tests. See id. at 595 n.

690

9, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (“[NJonverbal conduct con-
tains a testimonial component whenever the
conduct reflects the actor’s communication of
his thoughts to another.”); see also Vanhou-
ton v. Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 327, 676
N.E.2d 460, 466 (1997) (reasoning that in
order to be testimonial, a statement must
“convey knowledge of a fact specific to the
person being questioned”).

{18} Based upon the reasoning in Muniz,
we conclude that evidence of Child’s lack of
muscular coordination during the field sobri-
ety tests is not a statement subject to sup-
pression under Section 82A-2-14(D). The
mere fact that Child was a source of real or
physical evidence does not make that evi-
dence a statement under that section. See
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 591, 110 S.Ct. 2638. Fur-
thermore, Child’s nonverbal responses to re-
quests that he perform the HGN, walk-and-
turn test, and one-leg-stand test did not re-
late a factual assertion about himself or oth-
erwise reveal his thoughts to Officer Schake.
See id. at 595 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 2638; Vanhou-
ton, 676 N.E.2d at 466. As a result, we
reverse the district court’s suppression of the
evidence of Child’s lack of muscular coordina-
tion during the field sobriety tests. See
Mumiz, 496 US. at 585-86, 592, 110 S.Ct.
2638.

Hl {19} We further conclude that Child’s
response to Officer Schake’s request that he
count during the one-leg-stand test is not a
statement under Section 32A~-2-14(D).
Muniz expressly declined to consider wheth-
er counting during field sobriety tests was
testimonial under the Fifth Amendment.
See 496 U.S. at 608 n. 17, 110 S.Ct. 2638. The
majority of states that have considered the
issue have concluded that counting or recit-
ing the alphabet during a field sobriety test
is not testimonial under the Fifth Amend-
ment. See, eg. State v. Super. Ct. of Ariz,
154 Ariz. 275, 742 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz.Ct.App.
1987); Hughes v. State, 259 Ga. 227, 378
S.E.2d 853, 854 (1989); State v. Maze, 16
Kan.App.2d 527, 825 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1992);
Vanhouton, 676 N.E.2d at 466; State v. Dev-
lim, 1999 MT 90, 120, 294 Mont. 215, 980
P.2d 1037; State v. Zwmmach, 467 N.W.2d
745, 746 (N.D.1991); Gassaway v. State, 957
§.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (en bane).

{20} Counting or recitation of the alphabet
during a field sobriety test do not relate
factual assertions specific to the person being
questioned or otherwise require a person to
reveal his or her thoughts to another. See
Muniz, 496 US, at 595 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 2638;
Vamhouton, 676 N.E.2d at 466. Unlike re-
membering and calculating the date of one’s
own sixth birthday, counting or recitation of
the alphabet during a field sobriety test “lack
inherent communicative value because [they]
do not convey knowledge of any fact specific
to the person being questioned.” Vanhou-
ton, 676 N.E.2d at 466. Instead, the purpose
of counting or recitation of the alphabet dur-
ing a field sobriety test is to provide evidence
of a person’s physical condition. Super. Ct.
of Ariz., 742 P.2d at 289. The Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against  self-incrimination
“does not protect a suspect from being com-
pelled by the state to produce real or physi-
cal evidence.” Mazzei, 2010-NMCA-054,
126, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.8d 149 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). As a
result, we conclude that a response to a
request to count during a field sobriety test
is not testimonial under the Fifth Amend-
ment. We similarly conclude that Child’s ©
response to Officer Schake’s request that he
count during the one-leg-stand test does not
constitute a statement under Section 32A-2-
14(D). We reverse the district court’s order
suppressing the results of Child’s field sobri-
ety tests under Section 82A-2-14(D).

Implied Consent to Submit to a Blood Test.
Does Not Constitute a Statement Under
Section 32A-2-14(D)

TM {21} We next address whether the
district court erred in determining that
Child’s consent to submit to a blood test
under the Implied Consent Act constitutes a
statement under Section 32A-2-14(D). Fol-
lowing Child’s arrest on allegations of DUI,
Officer Schake transported Child to the San
Juan Regional Medical Center and read him
the Implied Consent Act. The State asserts
that it is undisputed that Child then agreed
to the administration of the blood test, and
Child does not dispute that allegation.

Child’s blood was then drawn for drug test-
ing.

{22} Pursuant to the Implied Consent Act,

[alny person who operates a motor vehicle

within [New Mexico] shall be deemed to

have given consent ... to chemical tests of
his breath or blood or both ... for the
purpose of determining the drug or alcohol
content of his blood if [that person is]
arrested for any offense arising out of the
acts alleged to have been committed while
the person was driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicating
liquor or drug.
Section 66-8-107(A). Additionally, “Section
66-8-107(B) authorizes an officer who has
reasonable grounds to believe a person may
be driving while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor [or drugs] to request that the
person agree to take a chemical test to deter-
mine blood alcohol [or drug] content.” Maz-
zei, 2010-NMCA-054, 124, 148 N.M. 553,
239 P.8d 149.

{23} We conclude that Child’s consent pur-
suant to the Implied Consent Act is not a
statement under Section 32A-2-14(D). Sec-
tion 66-8-107(A) expressly states that “[alny
person” who drives a vehicle in New Mexico
is deemed by law to have consented to a drug
test if that person is arrested upon allega-
tions of DUI. Furthermore, the Motor Vehi-
cle Code defines “person” to include “every
natural person.” NMSA 1978, § 66-1-
4,14(E) (1999). As a result, we conclude that
Section 66-8-107(A) applies to a sixteen-
year-old person who drives a vehicle in New
Mexico and is arrested upon allegations of
DUI. Thus, Child’s consent to the blood test
was implied as a matter of law under Section
66-8-107(A).

{24} Child’s implied consent to the blood
test is not inadmissible pursuant to Section
32A-2-14(D) because it is not a statement.
In Mazzei, this Court concluded that a “[d]e-
fendant was not entitled to Miranda warn-
ings prior to being advised and tested pursu-
ant to the Implied Consent Act.” 2010-
NMCA-054, 127, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d
149. We reasoned that physical evidence,
such as blood, breath, and fingerprints, is
excluded from the scope of the protection
against self-incrimination. Id. 125. “Be-

691°

cause of this exclusion, New Mexico common
law requires explicit Miranda-type warnings
only in situations where an accused is asked
to provide testimonial or communicative evi-
dence and does not require such warnings
[when an aceused is asked to provide] physi-
cal evidence.” Id. This Court concluded that,
the officer’s questioning of the defendant re-
quired only a simple yes or no answer re-
garding whether he agreed to take the test,
and, therefore, the defendant’s response was
not testimonial in nature. Id. 127. We
similarly conclude that Child’s consent to
take a blood test pursuant to the Implied
Consent Act is not a statement and does not
require exclusion under Section 32A-2-14(D).
As a result, we reverse the district court’s
suppression of Child’s consent to the blood
test pursuant to Section 32A-2-14(D).

The Results of a Blood Test Do Not Con-
stitute Statements Under Section 32A-2—
142)

HI {25} Finally, we address whether the
district court erred in determining that a
blood test is a statement that must be ex-
eluded under Section 32A-2-14(D).

{26} In State v. Simpson, 116 N.M. 768,
778, 867 P.2d 1150, 1155 (1993), the defen-
dant argued that the district court erred in
admitting the results of his blood-alcohol test
because it was obtained without first advising
him of his Miranda rights. Our Supreme
Court held that blood-alcohol tests are non-
testimonial evidence that are not protected
by the Fifth Amendment. Jd. Consequently,
the Court held that the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights were not violated when
his blood was drawn without his having pre-
viously received a Miranda warning and af-
firmed the admission of the blood test re-
sults. Jd. at 773-74, 867 P.2d at 1155-56.
We similarly conclude that Child’s blood test
results are not statements under Section
82A-2-14(D). As a result, we reverse the
district court’s order suppressing Child’s
blood test results pursuant to Section 832A-2-
14).

Whether Article II, Section 15 Provides
Greater Protection Than the Fifth Amend-
ment

WM {27} Child argues that Article II,
Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution

692

provides broader protection than the Fifth
Amendment. Specifically, Child contends
that “given New Mexico’s stronger protection
of an individual's privacy, ... physical evi-
dence that is private ... should be protected
by [Article IT], Section 15.” As a result,
Child asserts that the field sobriety tests
violated the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion under Article II, Section 15, and that
this Court should affirm the district court
under the right for any reason doctrine.

HM {28} Child acknowledges that Arti-
cle II, Section 15 has not previously been
interpreted more expansively than the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. See State v. Perry, 2009-NMCA-052,
1728, 31, 146 N.M. 208, 207 P.3d 1185 (con-
cluding that the defendant failed to demon-
strate that Article II, Section 15 provides
greater protection than the Fifth Amend-
ment). Child also concedes that he did not
preserve his argument that Article II, Sec-
tion 15 provides broader protection than the
Fifth Amendment. “As the appellee, howev-
er, [Child] was not strictly required to pre-
serve his arguments[.]” State v. Granville,
2006-NMCA-098, 112, 140 N.M. 345, 142
P.3d 933. “Under the right for any reason
doctrine, we may affirm the district court’s
order on grounds not relied upon by the
district court if those grounds do not require
us to look beyond the factual allegations that
were raised and considered below.” State v.
Vargas, 2008-NMSC-019, 18, 143 N.M. 692,
181 P.3d 684 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). This Court will not, how-
ever, assume the role of the district court,
and delve into fact-dependent inquiries.
Meiboom v. Watson, 2000-NMSC-004, 120,
128 N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154. Similarly, we
will not affirm the district court under the
right for any reason doctrine if it would
result in unfairness to the appellant. State v.
Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, 126, 141 N.M.
185, 152 P.3d 828.

HE {29} Even if we were to assume,
without deciding, that Child presented the
necessary factual allegations to support his
Article II, Section 15 claim below, Child has
failed to adequately develop his argument
that Article II, Section 15 provides broader
protection than the Fifth Amendment. On

appeal, this Court must analyze the facts and
determine whether Article II, Section 15 af-
fords Child broader protection than the Fifth
Amendment. See State v. Leyva, 2011-
NMSC-009, 140 n. 6, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.38d
861 (clarifying that “{i]f a state constitutional
argument has been preserved, the role of the
appellate court is to conduct the interstitial
analysis if necessary, reviewing the reasons
for departure and determining whether de-
parture is warranted under the particular
provision”). “[W]Je may diverge from federal
precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal
analysis, structural differences between state
and federal government, or distinctive state
characteristics.” State v. Ketelson, 2011-
NMSC-028, 10, 150 N.M. 187, 257 P.3d 957
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).

{30} In the present case, Child failed to
analyze any of these reasons for diverging
from federal precedent either below or on
appeal. Instead, Child asserts that Article
II, Section 15 should be interpreted more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment because
“frlequiring an individual to consent to a
search without warning that the results of
that search could be used against the individ-
ual is antithetical to the protections of priva-
cy New Mexico prides itself on.” However,
Child fails to explain how the protection of
privacy relates to the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination. See State v. John-
son, 2010-NMSC-016, 111 14, 18, 148 N.M. 50,
229 P.8d 528 (reasoning that Article IT, Sec-
tion 15 and the Fifth Amendment protect
against compelled or coerced self-incrimina-
tion). We will not review undeveloped or
unclear arguments on appeal. See State v.
Gonzales, 2011-NMCA-007, 119, 149 N.M.
226, 247 P.8d 1111 (stating that “this Court
has no duty to review an argument that is
not adequately developed”); see also State v.
Ortiz, 2009-NMCA-092, 1182, 146 N.M. 873,
215 P.8d 811 (reasoning that “[a] party can-
not throw out legal theories without connect-
ing them to any elements and any factual
support for the elements” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly,
we conclude that Child has failed to persuade
this Court that he should receive greater
protection, and we therefore decline to con-

sider whether Child’s responses during the
field sobriety test are testimonial under Arti-
dle II, Section 15.

Whether Article I, Section 10 Requires
Suppression of the Results of the Field
Sobriety Tests

HMM {31} Relying again on the right for
any reason doctrine, Child argues that this
Court must uphold the order of suppression
because field sobriety tests constitute a
search under Article II, Section 10 of the
New Mexico Constitution, and the State
failed to meet its burden of showing an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement or that
Child voluntarily consented to the search.
In response, the State asserts that the dis-
trict court erred when it suppressed the re-
sults of the field sobriety tests because the
request for Child to perform the tests was
justified by a reasonable suspicion of DUI.

{32} We examine the factual allegations
below to determine whether affirmance is
merited under the right for any reason doc-
trine. See Vargas, 2008-NMSC-019, 18, 143
N.M. 692, 181 P.8d 684. At the suppression
hearing, Child argued that any consent to
perform the field sobriety tests was tainted
by a violation of Article II, Section 10. Child
contended that without his admission to
smoking marijuana, which was obtained in
violation of Section 82A-2-14(C), Officer
Schake did not have individualized, reason-
able suspicion that Child was driving under
the influence. Child reasoned that the odor
of marijuana emanating from the vehicle pro-
vided only generalized suspicion because
there were five occupants of the vehicle. As
a result, Child argued that the district court
should carefully scrutinize whether any con-
sent by him to perform the field sobriety
tests was voluntary. Child further asserted
that, at a minimum, the district court should
suppress all evidence related to the DUI
investigation unless the State could provide
additional individualized suspicion as to
Child.

HM. s«{83} Under Article II, Section
10, an officer must have a reasonable justifi-
cation for the initial traffie stop. Leyva,
2011-NMSC-009, 155, 149 N.M. 435, 250
P.3d 861. All questions asked during the

693

stop must be either (1) reasonably related to
the initial justification for the stop; or (2)
unrelated questions that are supported by
independent reasonable suspicion, justified
by officer safety concerns, or asked during a
time when the interaction has developed into
a consensual encounter. Jd. In order to ex-
pand the scope of an investigation, “[a] law
enforcement officer must have reasonable
and articulable suspicion that other criminal
activity has been or may be afoot.” Id. 159
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). We evaluate whether reasonable suspi-
cion existed as a matter of law based on the
totality of the circumstances. Id. 130.

{34} Child does not dispute that the initial
stop was lawful based upon his failure to stop
at a stop sign. See id. 155. Furthermore,
we conclude that reasonable suspicion sup-
ported the expansion of the scope of the stop
to investigate a possible DUI even without.
considering Child’s admission to smoking
marijuana. See id. 159. When Officer
Schake approached the vehicle on the driv-
er’s side, he detected the strong odor of what
he knew to be “burnt marijuana” coming
from the vehicle based on his training and
experience. Additionally, after Officer
Schake asked Child to exit the vehicle and
accompany him to the back of the vehicle,
Officer Schake smelled “burnt marijuana” on
Child’s person. Officer Schake then began
an investigation for a possible DUI, including
the field sobriety tests. We conclude that
the odor of marijuana emanating from the
vehicle combined with the odor of marijuana
on Child’s person provided objective, articu-
lable facts that would lead a reasonable offi-
cer to suspect that Child was driving under
the influence. See State v. Candelaria, 2011-
NMCA-001, 114, 21, 149 N.M. 125, 245 P.3d
69 (reasoning that the odor of marijuana
emanating from the vehicle provided reason-
able suspicion to continue the detention of
the driver of the vehicle); see also State v.
Walters, 1997-NMCA-018, 11 6, 26, 123 N.M.
88, 984 P.2d 282 (reasoning that the odor of
alcohol gave the officer reasonable suspicion
to investigate whether the defendant was
driving under the influence through field so-
briety testing). As a result, Officer Schake
permissibly expanded the scope of the traffic

694

stop to investigate a possible DUI. Further-
more, we have held that administration of
field sobriety tests is a reasonable part of an
investigation where the officer has reason-
able suspicion that the person was driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. See,
e.g. State v. Williamson, 2000-NMCA-068,
118-9, 129 N.M. 387, 9 P.3d 70. According-
ly, we reject Child’s argument that Article II,
Section 10 requires suppression of the results
of the, field sobriety tests.

CONCLUSION

{35} We hold that Child’s responses dur-
ing the field sobriety tests, results of the
blood test, and implied consent to the blood
test are not statements that are subject to
suppression under Section 82A-2-14(D). As
a result, we reverse the district court’s order
of suppression and dismissal of Count I of
the petition based on insufficient evidence of
DUI. We remand to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.

{36} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN
and CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judges.

2011-NMCA-097
265 P.3d 745
In the Matter of the Appeal of FINAL
ORDER IN the ALTA VISTA SUBDI-
VISION DP # 1498 WQCC 07-11(A).

Link Summers, Carol Richman, Michael
Freebourn, and Sheila Shepherd,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,

v.

New Mexico Water Quality Control
Commission, Defendant
Appellee,

Sara Edelman, Real-Party-
in-Interest—Appellee.

No. 29,753.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Aug. 17, 2011.

The Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons,
P.C., Nancy L. Simmons, Albuquerque, NM,
for Appellants.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Zachary
Shandler, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

{1} This case requires us to consider the
discharge permitting scheme of the Water.
Quality Act (WQA), NMSA 1978, Sections
74-6-1 to -17 (1967, as amended through
2009). Specifically, we must determine
whether a knowing misrepresentation of ma-
terial fact on a permit application is pre-
sumed to have occurred “within the ten years
immediately preceding” submission of that
application for purposes of Section 74-6-

696

5(E)(4)(a). Because we conclude that the
Legislature intended that a knowing misrep-
resentation of material fact made during the
application process comes within the above
statutory period, we reverse the New Mexico
Water Quality Control Commission’s (Com-
mission) order granting a discharge permit
to Sara Edelman.

BACKGROUND

{2} On August 16, 2004, Edelman filed an
application for a septic waste discharge per-
mit pursuant to the WQA, Sections 74-6-1
to -17, and the New Mexico Water Quality
Ground and Surface Water Protection regu-
lations, 20.6.2 NMAC (12/01/95) (amended
1/15/01). Edelman filed the application in
anticipation of creating the Alta Vista Subdi-
vision, an area for ten mobile home units
located on a 1.78-acre lot in Taos, New Mexi-
co. Pursuant to the application, Edelman
proposed to discharge an estimated 3,750
gallons of wastewater per day to two conven-
tional septic tank leachfield systems located
on the lot. Because of the large amount of
effluent to be discharged, the regulations
required that Edelman provide site-specific
information that demonstrates the lithogra-
phy below the site if such information was
available.

{3} Between August 2004 and September
2007, the New Mexico Environment Depart-
ment (NMED), Ground Water Bureau (Bu-
reau), and a hearing officer appointed by the
NMED, reviewed Edelman’s application and
the proposed discharge site. Representa-
tives from the Bureau visited and inspected
the site, ran tests, and created models of the
expected site lithology, and the hearing offi-
cer held hearings and accepted comments
from the public. During the 2005-2006 time
period, the Bureau twice requested that
Edelman supplement her application with ad-
ditional information. In her initial applica-
tion, Edelman had only provided information
about the lithological description of the Con-
cha Torres well, which was located 1,100 feet
from the proposed discharge site. The Bu-
reau’s first letter, in September 2005, asked
Edelman to provide information about other
wells that were located closer to the site than
the Concha Torres well and requested “{s]pe-
cific information on the underlying geology at

the site, including all well logs from adjacent

properties.” In response to the Bureau’s
letter, Edelman supplemented her applica-
tion with information from a well that we
refer to as the Edelman well, which is on an
adjacent property that she owns, and which
she claimed was drilled in 2005. After the
Bureau received comments from neighbors
that no well had been drilled on the adjacent
property in 2005, it conducted further inquiry
into the matter. In a letter dated July 25,
2006, the Bureau advised Edelman of the
discrepancy and asked for “a well log show-
ing well construction and lithological informa-
tion” for that supply well. Edelman then
admitted to the Bureau that the Edelman
well was actually drilled without a permit in
1996 and that Edelman had not applied for a
permit for that well until 2005. The consul-
tant that Edelman hired to assist her with
her application told the Bureau that he had
requested information about the Edelman
well from the driller and that he had asked
the driller to create a well log from memory
so that Edelman could respond to the Bu-
reau’s inquiry. Edelman submitted the
Edelman well log. Several months later, the
Bureau discovered that the log had been
fabricated; and the information in it could
not be verified.

{4} The hearing officer reviewed the appli-
cation and other materials, considered public
comments, and issued a 58-page report to
the NMED Secretary. The hearing officer
summarized the evidence, made detailed
findings of fact, and ultimately recommended
granting the permit application with certain
conditions, including the installation of an
advanced treatment unit. In addressing the
fabricated well log, the hearing officer stated
that “[t]he material misrepresentation made
here was to the State Engineer’s Office” and
that “[a]lthough the submission [of the log]
to the Bureau might have ultimately made a
difference in its determination on the ap-
provability of the [alpplication, it did not.”
Nevertheless, the report “encourage[d] the
Secretary to carefully review the related doc-
uments in the file, and ... make an express
finding on this subject as part of his final
order.”

{5} Upon receipt of the hearing officer’s
report, the Secretary considered the adminis-
trative record and the hearing officer’s rec-
ommendations. The Secretary adopted all of
the regulatory analysis and conclusions con-
tained in the report with the exception of
“the misrepresentation of a material fact in
the permit application.” Based on the infor-
mation provided, the Secretary determined
that Edelman knowingly misrepresented ma-
terial facts in her application when she pro-
vided a well log for the Concha Torres well
as evidence of the proposed site’s lithology,
when information about the closer Edelman
well was available to her. The Secretary
denied the permit application in accordance
with Section 74~6-5(E)(4)(a), which provides:

E. The constituent agency shall deny
any application for a permit or deny the
certification of a federal water quality per-

mit.

(4) the applicant has, within the ten
years immediately preceding the date of
submission of the permit application:

(a) knowingly misrepresented a mate-

rial fact in an application for a per-

mit[.]

{6} Edelman appealed the Secretary’s fi-
nal order denying the discharge permit to
the Commission, arguing that she had not
knowingly misrepresented any material facts
in her application. Shortly thereafter, Link
Summers, Carol Richman, Michael Freeb-
ourn, and Sheila Shepherd (collectively, Ap-
pellants) successfully intervened in the ap-
peal to the Commission, expressing their
support for the Secretary’s decision.

{7} The Commission reviewed the record,
heard closing arguments, and ultimately en-
tered a final order in July 2009. It sus-
tained the Secretary’s adoption of the hear-
ing officer’s findings with regard to the
regulatory analysis and conclusions con-
tained in the report. In addition, the Com-
mission adopted the hearing officer’s find-
ings in their entirety, thereby explicitly
adopting the hearing officer’s finding that
Edelman had made a material misrepresen-
tation to the State Engineer's office. The
Commission nevertheless concluded that the
record did not demonstrate by substantial

697

evidence that Edelman knowingly misrepre-
sented a material fact in her application “in
violation of existing regulatory require-
ments.” Deciding that the Secretary mis-
takenly relied on the mandatory denial lan-
guage in Section 74-6-5(E)(4)(a), a non-
unanimous Commission ordered NMED “to
issue the permit with all requirements and
conditions provided by the [hlearing [olffi-
cer’s [rJeport.” The Commission also con-
cluded as a matter of law, however, that
Edelman had failed to fully disclose all in-
formation in her permit application and
suggested that the Secretary could instead
terminate or modify Edelman’s permit un-
der Section 74~6-5(M) of the WQA. That
provision provides:

M. A permit may be terminated or
modified by the constituent agency that
issued the permit prior to its date of expi-
ration for any of the following causes:

(2) obtaining the permit by misrepre-
sentation or failure to disclose fully all
relevant facts[.]

{8} Appellants timely appealed to this
Court the order of the Commission approv-
ing Edelman’s discharge permit application.
DISCUSSION

{9} On appeal, Appellants argue that (1)
the Commission erred in rejecting the Secre-
tary’s finding that Edelman misrepresented
a material fact and that the Commission mis-
applied the law, (2) there is not substantial
evidence that Edelman met her burden un-
der the regulations to demonstrate that pub-
lic health and groundwater quality will be
protected, and (8) procedural errors by the
hearing officer mandate reversal. Because
‘we agree with Appellants on the first issue
and reverse the Commission’s order granting
the permit, we do not reach Appellants’ sec-
ond and third arguments.

Standard of Review

HH {10} On appeal, we will only set
aside the Commission’s order if it is “(1)
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discre-
tion; (2) not supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record; or (8) otherwise not in
accordance with law.” Section 74-6~7(B)

698

(setting forth the standard of review for ap-
peals arising out of administrative actions
under the WQA). Ultimately, our review in
this case is based on whether, under Section
74-6-5(E)(4)(a), a knowing misrepresentation
of material fact on a permit application is
deemed to have occurred “within the ten
years immediately preceding” submission of
that application. A ruling that is not in
accordance with law should be reversed “if
the agency unreasonably or unlawfully misin-
terprets or misapplies the law[.]” Archuleta
v. Santa Fe Police Dep't, 2005-NMSC-006,
918, 187 N.M. 161, 108 P.3d 1019. We are
not bound by the Commission’s interpreta-
tion of the statute, as this is a matter of law
that we review de novo. Rio Grande Chap-
ter of Sierra Club v. N.M. Mining Comm'n,
20083-NMSC-005, 117, 183 N.M. 97, 61 P.8d
806.

Edelman Knowingly Misrepresented a Ma-
terial Fact in Her Permit Application

{11} Appellants argue that the Commis-
sion erred when it determined that Edelman
did not knowingly misrepresent a material
fact in her application for a discharge permit.
At the outset, we note that the Commission
appears to have confused the factual and
legal issues before it in this case. On one
hand, the Commission adopted the hearing
officer’s findings in their entirety, including
that Edelman made a material misrepresen-
tation to the State Engineer’s office. And it
concluded that substantial evidence sup-
ported a finding that Edelman “failed to fully
disclose all relevant facts in obtaining the
permit.” On the other hand, however, the
Commission determined that the record did
not “demonstrate support by substantial evi-
dence ... the Secretary's decision to deny
the permit on grounds of [a] knowing[ ] mis-
representation of material submitted in this
matter in violation of existing regulatory re-
quirements.” Finally, on appeal, the Com-
mission contends that if we conclude that the
Secretary properly construed the statutory
period, it will concede that Edelman know-
ingly misrepresented a material fact in her
application materials and will not defend her
actions in this matter. Edelman has not filed
a brief in this Court. Given the seemingly
contradictory determinations concerning

whether there was a material misrepresenta-
tion and because we are not bound by the
Commission’s concession on appeal in that
regard, we conduct our own analysis of the
issue in order to provide clarity. See State v.
Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, 18, 143 N.M.
792, 182 P.3d 775 (stating that we are not
bound by a party’s concession on an issue on
appeal).

{12} We review the Commission’s
finding that Edelman did not knowingly mis-
represent a material fact in her permit appli-
cation for an abuse of discretion. The first
part of the issue, whether there was a know-
ing misrepresentation, is a question of fact
that we review for substantial evidence. See
Durham v. Sw. Developers Joint Venture,
2000-NMCA-010, 139, 128 N.M. 648, 996
P.2d 911 (stating that issues involving intent
or knowledge are generally questions of fact).
The second inquiry, whether that knowing
misrepresentation was material, is a mixed
question of law and fact. See State v. Bena-
videz, 1999-NMCA-053, 116, 127 N.M. 189,
979 P.2d 234 (adopting a standard that mate-
viality of a false statement is generally a
mixed question of law and fact), vacated in
part on other grounds, 1999-NMSC-041, 15,
128 N.M. 261, 992 P.2d 274.

Hl {13} We begin with whether Edelman
made a knowing misrepresentation in her
application. The record establishes that
when Edelman initially filed her application
with NMED, she provided information relat-
ing only to the Concha Torres well in order
to satisfy the regulatory requirement that an
applicant provide the “{dJepth to and litho-
logical description of rock at base of alluvium
below the discharge site if such information
is available[.]” 20.6.2.3106(C)(6) NMAC
(09/15/02). The Concha Torres well was lo-
cated approximately 1,100 feet from the pro-
posed discharge site, and the log listed a 60-
foot basalt layer underlain by a 140-foot clay
layer. This information might have satisfied
the regulation’s requirement had it been the
only information available to Edelman and
had it been representative of the site. See
20.6.2.3106(C)(6) NMAC. It was neither.
When Edelman first filed her application, she
had already drilled the Edelman well, which

was located a mere 100 feet from the pro-
posed discharge site. Rather than submit
information about that well, which was avail-
able to her and which she had a duty to
provide under the regulation, Edelman did
not furnish the information until the Bureau
pressed her for it in a letter stating that it
needed clarification and specific information
about all the wells located on properties adja-
cent to the proposed discharge site. See
20.6.2.3106(C)(6) NMAC (stating that an ap-
plicant shall provide lithological information
“if such information is available” (emphasis
added)). Even then, she concealed facts
about the date and circumstances surround-
ing how the Edelman well had been drilled,
which caused the Bureau confusion about
which well her first supplemental information
was referencing and whether that informa-
tion addressed their request for information
about all wells on adjacent properties. As a
result, the Bureau had to again ask for addi-
tional information. This time, Edelman sub-
mitted a well log, however, it contained fabri-
cated information that could not be verified.
While there is evidence that Edelman may
have inadvertently failed to apply for a per-
mit for the Edelman well in 1996 when it was
first drilled, there is no evidence in the rec-
ord that Edelman had forgotten that this
well existed or that she could not have ob-
tained and provided the necessary informa-
tion to the Bureau at an earlier point in the
application process. Thus, we conclude that
there is no evidence in the record to support
the Commission’s determination that Edel-
man did not knowingly misrepresent infor-
mation in her permit application when she
initially failed to disclose the information re-
garding the Edelman well and impliedly rep-
resented that information about the Concha
Torres well was the only relevant information
available.

HMMs {14} The second question we ad-
dress is whether Edelman’s knowing misrep-
resentation about the site lithology was a
“material fact.” See § 74-6-5(E)(4)(a). “A
fact is material if such fact may affect the
outcome of the case.” Lopez v. Kline, 1998-
NMCA-016, 118, 124 N.M. 589, 958 P.2d 304.
Because the regulations require an applicant
to provide the lithological description of the
proposed site if that information is available,

699

it is clear that such information could affect
the outcome of any particular permitting de-
cision. Thus, the lithological information was
material to the Commission’s decision. See
20.6.2.3106(C)(6) NMAC. Here, Edelman ini-
tially did not produce a well log for the
Edelman well, and when she did eventually
provide one, the Bureau discovered that the
drilling date on the well log was incorrect,
the integrity of the log was called into ques-
tion, and the log was later determined to be a
fabrication. Therefore, to the extent that the
Commission concluded there was not sub-
stantial evidence that Edelman knowingly
misrepresented a material fact in her permit
application, we disagree and hold that the
Commission erred in so finding.

Edelman’s Misrepresentation During the
Application Process Required Denial of
the Permit

I {15} Because there was unambiguous
and uncontroverted evidence that Edelman
knowingly misrepresented a material fact in
her application for a discharge permit, and
because the Commission so concedes this
point on appeal, we next determine whether
the Commission abused its discretion in
granting the permit. Appellants contend
that the Commission was required to deny
the permit application pursuant to Section
T4-6-5(E)(4)(a) because the misrepresenta-
tion occurred “within the ten years immedi-
ately preceding the date of submission of the
permit application.” See id. The Commis-
sion, on the other hand, contends that the
misrepresentation did not occur within the
statutory period and, therefore, the permit
was properly granted. The critical question
in this case is whether Edelman’s misrepre-
sentation made during the application pro-
cess was within the ten years immediately
preceding the date of submission of her ap-
plication, For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that it was.

Hs {16} First, we decide when Edel-
man’s misrepresentation about the Edelman
well occurred. We then ask whether this
date “preceded” the “date of the submission”
of the application, such that the permit
should have been denied pursuant to Section

700

‘74-6-5(E)(4)(a). As we have noted, Section
74-6-5(E)(4)(a) provides that “[tJhe constitu-
ent agency shall deny any application for a
permit ... if ... the applicant has, within
the ten years immediately preceding the
date of submission of the permit application
... knowingly misrepresented a material fact.
in an application for a permit[.)” (Emphasis
added). We interpret the provisions of Sec-
tion 74-6-5(E)(4)(a) to “give effect to the
intent of the [Llegislature.” Wilson v. Den-
ver, 1998-NMSC-016, 136, 125 N.M. 308,
961 P.2d 158. We begin by considering the
plain language of the statute and “assume
that the ordinary meaning of the words ex-
presses the legislative purpose.” N.M. Min-
ing Ass’ v. N.M. Water Quality Control
Comm'n, 2007-NMCA-010, 112, 141 N.M.
41, 150 P.38d 991. However, “[w]e must also
consider the practical implications and the
legislative purpose of a statute, and when the
literal meaning of a statute would be absurd,
unreasonable, or otherwise inappropriate in
application, we go beyond the mere text of
the statute.” Bishop v. Evangelical Good
Samaritan Soc’y, 2009-NMSC-036, 1111, 146
N.M. 478, 212 P.8d 361, cert. denied, 2010-
NMCERT-004, 148 N.M. 572, 240 P.8d 659.

{17} Turning to the first question, we note
that there is no separate definition or clarifi-
cation in the statute of when a misrepresen-
tation occurs. We turn, therefore, to the
plain meaning of the words. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines a misrepresentation as
“{t}he act of making a false or misleading
assertion about something.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1091 (9th ed.2009). It encom-
passes an element of communication about
something to some audience. See Eckhardt
v. Charter Hosp. of Albuquerque, Inc. 1998—
NMCA-017, 155, 124 N.M. 549, 958 P.2d 722
(explaining that a misrepresentation is a
statement that is communicated). Because a
misrepresentation does not occur until it has
been communicated to another person, we
conclude that under the WQA, a misrepre-
sentation occurs when materials containing a
misrepresentation are conveyed to the Bu-
reau. Consequently, in this case, Edelman’s
misrepresentation occurred on August 19,
2004, when she conveyed information about
the Concha Torres well and failed to include
information about the yet more proximate

Edelman well to the Bureau in her initial
application. The Commission does not dis-
pute that this is the relevant date.

{18} With regard to the second question,
however, the Commission argues that under
a plain meaning interpretation of the statute,
Edelman’s misrepresentation does not pre-
cede the “date of submission of [her] permit
application.” Under the Commission’s theo-
ry, Edelman’s application was originally filed
on August 19, 2004, and it was therefore
“submitted” on that date. Thus, according to
the Commission, the statutory period ran
from August 18, 1994, to August 18, 2004.
Because Edelman’s misrepresentation oc-
curred simultaneously with the submission of
the application, and not “within the ten years
immediately preceding the date of submis-
sion of the permit application,” the Commis-
sion contends that it did not misconstrue the
requirement for denial of the permit under
Section 74~6-5(E)(4)(a). We are not per-
suaded.

{19} We observe that the plain meaning
interpretation of Section 74-6-5(E)(4)(a) pro-
posed by the Commission in this case leads
to an unreasonable gap in the statutory
scheme. See Bishop, 2009-NMSC-036, 111,
146 N.M. 473, 212 P.8d 361 (“We must also
consider the practical implications and the
legislative purpose of a statute, and when the
literal meaning of a statute would be absurd,
unreasonable, or otherwise inappropriate in
application, we go beyond the mere text of
the statute.”). The Commission’s interpreta-
tion of the statute would require the agency
to deny applications for permits only in those
situations where the applicant knowingly
misrepresented material facts in earlier per-
mit applications, and which therefore clearly
precede the submission of a current applica-
tion. Conversely, according to the Commis-
sion, if a deliberate misrepresentation occurs
in an application currently before the agency,
the agency would be limited to—at the
most—granting the permit and then termi-
nating or modifying it pursuant to Section
74-6-5(M). Section 74-6-5(M)(2) states that.
“{a] permit may be terminated or modified
by the constituent agency that issued the
permit ... for ... obtaining the permit by
misrepresentation.” This statutory provi-

sion, however, expressly deals only with
those cases in which the permit has already
been issued, which is not the case here. We
acknowledge that Section 74-6-5(B)(4) pro-
vides no guidance for those circumstances in
which a knowing misrepresentation is re-
vealed or discovered in an ongoing permit-
ting process, but we do not believe that the
Legislature intended the result suggested by
the Commission.

{20} Accordingly, we look beyond the plain
language to determine legislative intent. We
begin by considering the meaning of “sub-
mit.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sub-
mit” as “[t]o end the presentation of further
evidence in (a case) and tender a legal posi-
tion for decision.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1562 (9th ed.2009). Although this definition
is ordinarily used when submitting a case to
the fact finder at the close of trial, we con-
clude that its use is appropriate in this con-
text as well. When we apply this definition
to the statute, the date of submission of an
application and discharge plan to NMED
occurs once the agency has received all of the
information that it needs to consider the
application, which necessarily includes all of
the information that an applicant must in-
clude in their discharge plan pursuant to
20.2.6.3106(C) NMAC. We clarify that the
date of submission of the application could be
the date that an applicant initially files an
application and discharge plan with NMED,
or some later point if the applicant fails to
provide necessary information in the initial
filing, and the agency determines that it
needs that information in order to consider
the application. See U.S. W. Comme’ns, Inc.
v. N.M. State Corp. Comm’n, 116 N.M. 548,
549, 865 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1993) (concluding
that the six-month period the agency had to
consider an application did not begin on the
date the application was initially filed be-
cause the application was missing critical in-
formation, so the six-month period began
after the applicant provided all the informa-
tion in its application that the agency needed
to consider the application).

{21} Here, in July 2006, the Bureau re-
quested additional information from Edelman
in order to fully evaluate her permit dis-
charge application, Edelman provided the

701

additional information on July 28, 2006, and
as a result, that is the date we determine her
application was actually submitted. Edel-
man’s material misrepresentation of fact to
the Bureau therefore occurred in the rele-
vant period of time “immediately preceding
the date of submission of the permit applica-
tion.”

{22} The facts of this case, however, are
not the sole basis for our decision, and we
take the opportunity to provide guidance in
other factual situations that require the deni-
al of an application. As we have noted, we
must take care to avoid adoption of a con-
struction of a statute that would render its
application absurd or unreasonable or lead to
injustice or contradiction. State v. Nick R.,
2009-NMSC-050, 111, 147 N.M. 182, 218
P.3d 868. The Legislature’s obvious concern
for safeguarding our groundwater from pol-
lution and contamination is made clear by the
fact that making a false representation of
fact is a fourth degree felony. See § 74-6-
10.2(A), (B). Consistent with the Legisla-
ture’s intent, it is reasonable to assume that
mandatory denial of a discharge permit is
required for those cases in which an applica-
tion conveys a material misrepresentation of
fact when the application is submitted. A
logical extension of this interpretation re-
quires a denial of permits in situations where
a misrepresentation is made in an initial ap-
plication and no further information is re-
quested by the agency, as well as in those
cases in which an applicant might not misre-
present any information in the initial applica-
tion but may convey a material misrepresen-
tation of fact in supplemental information
requested by the agency.

{23} In conclusion, we believe that to in-
terpret the statute as the Commission re-
quests would create an absurd result as an
applicant who knowingly misrepresents a
material fact in a current application for a
discharge permit could effectively escape any
sanction during the permitting process. At
most, the applicant would be subject to the
possibility of termination or modification of
their permit at the Secretary’s discretion af-
ter the permit had already been issued,
thereby eliminating any incentive to fully and
honestly disclose all material facts on the

702

application form. We do not believe that this
comports with the spirit of the WQA. There-
fore, we interpret the “immediately preced-
ing the date of submission of the application”
language in the statute to apply to all appli-
cants who knowingly misrepresent a material
fact in both current and prior applications for
discharge permits. This interpretation is
both reasonable and consistent with the Leg-
islature’s intent, and it allows the entire per-
mitting scheme to be covered. Finally, we
observe that a knowing misrepresentation of
a material fact that is revealed or disclosed
during the application process necessarily
prevents a waste of the agency's time and
resources on applicants that have violated an
important aspect of the permitting process.

{24} In this case, Edelman knowingly mis-
represented a material fact in her application
for a discharge permit before the application
was submitted to the agency for review. As
a result, the Commission was required to

deny her permit application under Section
14-6-5(E)(4)(a).
CONCLUSION

{25} For the reasons set forth above, we
set aside the Commission’s order because it
is not in accordance with law. Pursuant to
Section 74-6-5(E)(4)(a), the Edelman appli-
cation for a discharge permit must be denied.

{26} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D.

BUSTAMANTE and RODERICK T.
KENNEDY, Judges.

2011-NMSC-043
265 P.3d 1276
STATE of New Mexico, ex rel., Hon. John
Arthur SMITH, Hon. Michael S. San-
chez, Hon. Henry Kiki Saavedra, Hon.
Luciano “Lucky” Varela, members of
the New Mexico Legislature and citizens
of New Mexico, Petitioners,

v.

Hon. Susana MARTINEZ, Governor of the
State of New Mexico, Hon. Dianna J.
Duran, Secretary of State of New Mexi-
co, Respondents,

and

Office of the Attorney General,
Intervenor.

No. 33,029.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Nov. 21, 2011.

703

Youtz & Valdez, P.C., Shane Youtz, Gabr-
ielle Valdez, Albuquerque, NM, for Petition-
ers.

Jessica Hernandez, Jennifer L. Padgett,
Matthew J. Stackpole, Gregory S. Shaffer,
Santa Fe, NM, for Respondents.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Scott Fu-
qua, Assistant Attorney General, Mark
Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Intervenor.

OPINION
MAES, Justice.

{1} In the General Appropriation Act of
2011, the Legislature appropriated $150,000
to the Department of Finance and Adminis-
tration “{flor disbursement to the New Mexi-
co mortgage finance authority to carry out
the responsibilities, duties and provisions of
the regional housing law.” On April 8, 2011,
the Governor signed the General Appropria-
tion Act of 2011; however, the Governor
struck the “1” from the $150,000 appropriat-
ed by the Legislature to the Department of
Finance and Administration, thereby chang-
ing or “scaling” the appropriation down to
$50,000. In House Executive Message No.
31, the Governor stated that she vetoed the
“1” because, although she agreed with the
Legislature that regional housing oversight
‘was a necessary expenditure, she “disap-
proved of the excessive part of the appropria-
tion,” evidently the vetoed $100,000.

{2} Citizens of the State of New Mexico,
electors, taxpayers, and members of the New
Mexico Legislature (Petitioners) subsequent-
ly filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Manda-
mus/Prohibition. See N.M. Const. art. VI,
§ 8 (The supreme court shall have original
jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus
against all state officers, boards and commis-
sions....”). Petitioners sought a writ re-
storing the full appropriation, claiming it was
an unconstitutional application of the Gover-
nor’s partial veto authority. This Court
heard oral argument and granted Petitioner’s
Writ of Mandamus/Prohibition. This Court
ordered that the Governor’s “partial veto
that would allow scaling of appropriations
[was] invalid and unconstitutional” and re-
stored the $150,000 Legislative appropria-

704

tion. We now issue this Opinion to further
explain the order of this Court.
DISCUSSION

{3} Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexi-
co Constitution sets forth the separation-of-
powers doctrine for state government.
There are three distinct departments of gov-
ernment: legislative, executive, and judicial.
N.M. Const. art. III, § 1 (“{[NJo person or
collection of persons charged with the exer-
cise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any powers
properly belonging to either of the others,
except as in this constitution otherwise ex-
pressly directed or permitted.”).

{4} Under Article IV of the New Mexico

Constitution, the Legislature and the Execu-
tive are given separate roles in respect to
appropriations. The New Mexico Constitu-
tion vests the power to appropriate money
exclusively with the Legislature. N.M.
Const. art. IV, § 16. Our Constitution fur-
ther requires that a law making an appropri-
ation must “distinctly specify the sum ap-
propriated and the object to which it is to be
applied,” with money being “paid out of the
treasury only upon appropriations made by
the legislature.” N.M. Const. art. IV, § 30.
The Governor has the power to “approve or
disapprove any part or parts, item or items,
of any bill appropriating money, and such
parts or items approved shall become a law,
and such as are disapproved shall be void
unless passed over his [or her] veto.” N.M.
Const. art. IV, § 22.
THE GOVERNOR’S PARTIAL VETO AU-
THORITY DOES NOT ALLOW THE
POWER TO REDUCE OR “SCALE” AN
APPROPRIATION

{5} The Governor argues that she properly
executed her partial veto power because
“New Mexic[o] governors have the ability to
veto something smaller and more discrete
than ‘items,’” and that “[oJne hundred thou-
sand is a ‘part’ of $150,000.00.” The Gover-
nor relies on State ea rel. Coll v. Carruthers
for the premise that “New Mexico differs
from most other states with item-veto provi-
sions because it allows the broadest. possible
veto authority by additionally providing au-
thority to veto ‘parts’, not only ‘items.’” 107

N.M. 489, 442, 759 P.2d 1380, 1883 (1988)
(per curiam).

{6} This Court’s partial veto decisions do
not answer the question raised in this case,
but do contain principles about the line-item
veto. In State ew rel. Dickson v. Saiz, this
Court held that the Governor's partial veto
power is a quasi-legislative function, which is
an exception to our separation of powers
doctrine. 62 N.M. 227, 236, 308 P.2d 205, 211
(1957) (per curiam) (“Our Constitution does
not, necessarily, foreclose the exercise by one
department of the state of powers of another
but contemplates in unmistakable language
that there are certain instances where the
overlapping of power exists. Indeed, when
the Governor exercises his [or her] right of
partial veto he [or she] is exercising a quasi-
legislative function.”). In Dickson, the Gov-
ernor was presented with House Bill No. 155
and struck all language that would have
made it possible to have saloons and bars
open on Sunday. 62 N.M. at 231, 238, 308
P.2d at 208, 212. This Court held that the
Governor was acting strictly within his quasi-
legislative capacity because there was “no
reducing, nor any scaling, of appropriations.”
Id. at, 238, 308 P.2d at 212.

{7} In State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, we
held that the Governor’s power to impose a
partial veto is not an absolute power. 86
N.M. 359, 362, 524 P.2d 975, 978 (1974) (“The
power of veto, like all powers constitutionally
conferred upon a governmental officer or
agency, is not absolute and may not be exer-
cised without any restraint or limitation
whatsoever. The very concept of such abso-
lute and unrestrained power is inconsistent
with the concept of ‘checks and bal-
ances’....”). The respondents in Sego, as in
this case, relied on the dictionary definitions
of “item” and “part” to support their argu-
ment that a part is inherently smaller than
an item. 86 N.M. at 364, 524 P.2d at 980.
This Court concluded, however, that there
was not “any significant distinction between
or among [the terms item and part].” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
State ea rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway
Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 149 (Iowa 1971).
The purpose of including the terms “part or
parts” and “item or items” in our Constitu-

tion was to extend the partial veto power
beyond other states’ constitutions that limit
the partial veto to items of appropriation and
general appropriation bills. Jd. at 365, 524
P.2d at 981. This Court interpreted the
Governor’s partial veto power under Article
IV, Section 22 to apply to “(1) bills of general
legislation, which contain incidental items of
appropriation, as well as general appropria-
tion bills, and (2) to ‘items or parts’ thereof in
addition to ‘items of appropriation” ” Sego, 86
N.M. at 364-65, 524 P.2d at 980-81. Thus,
so long as the bill is a “bill appropriating
money,” the Governor may veto any part or
item thereof, and not just a part actually
appropriating money.

{8} The Governor is correct that our Con-
stitution allows the broadest possible veto
authority by providing authority to veto
“parts,” not only “items.” In Coll, however,
this Court recognized the limitation of this
veto power by clarifying that the “power of
partial veto is only a negative power to disap-
prove; it is not the power to enact or create
new legislation by selective deletions.” 107
N.M. at 442, 759 P.2d at 1383. Our case law
emphasizes the limitation of the Governor's
partial veto power by requiring that the veto
eliminate the whole of an item or part and
prohibiting the striking of individual words
that result in legislation inconsistent with the
Legislature's intent. Sego, 86 N.M. at 365,
524 P.2d at 981 (“[A] partial veto must be so
exercised that it eliminates or destroys the
whole of an item or part and does not distort
the legislative intent, and in effect create
legislation inconsistent with that enacted by
the Legislature, by the careful striking of
words, phrases, clauses or sentences.” (em-
phasis added). By striking a single numeri-
cal digit, the Governor did not eliminate the
whole of the item; she distorted the Legisla-
ture’s intent to appropriate $150,000 to the
Department of Finance and Administration
for the mortgage finance authority. There is
no authority to scale back: the Governor
may strike the whole of the appropriation or
leave it intact; she may not conceive her own
appropriation.

{9} The Governor cites numerous out-of-
state cases to support her position that the
partial veto power includes the power to

705

scale down an appropriation. The cases cit-
ed by the Governor interpret other states’
constitutional partial veto powers, none of
which are analogous to our constitutional
partial veto power. We need not rely on
these cited cases because, as discussed
above, our case law sufficiently addresses the
Governor’s partial veto authority, including
the Governor’s lack of authority to scale
down an appropriation. See State ew rel.
Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin, 69 N.M. 430,
434, 367 P.2d 925, 928 (1961) (“[T]t is general-
ly held that the governor has no power to
scale down an item in an appropriation act.”).
The Governor also argues that former New
Mexico governors have used their partial
veto authority to reduce an appropriation
without being challenged. While it is true
that legislative acquiescence to actions by the
governor may indicate that the governor's
action is proper, see State ew rel. Lee v.
Hartman, 69 N.M. 419, 427, 367 P.2d 918,
924 (1961), it remains the role of this Court
to determine the constitutionality of an ac-
tion.

CONCLUSION

{10} The Governor’s partial veto that.
would allow scaling of appropriations is inval-
id and unconstitutional. The Governor vio-
lated the separation of powers doctrine when
she struck the “1” from the $150,000 appro-
priation to the Department of Finance and
Administration “[flor disbursement to the
New Mexico mortgage finance authority to
carry out the responsibilities, duties and pro-
visions of the regional housing law.” Accord-
ingly, a writ of mandamus has been issued
ordering the reinstatement of the Legisla-
ture’s $150,000 appropriation.

{11} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA,
RICHARD C. BOSSON, EDWARD L.

CHAVEZ, Justices, and RODERICK T.
KENNEDY, COA Judge (sitting by

designation).

2011-NMCA-106
265 P.3d 1279
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. as Indenture
Trustee; Delaware Trust Company, N.A.,
as Owner Trustee of the ACLC Business
Loan Receivable Trust 1998-2, acting
through Amresco Commercial Finance,
LLC, as Servicing Agent; and ACFI
1998-2, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, Plaintiffs—Appellants,
v.
CITY OF GALLUP, Defendant-Appellee,
and
Hans J. Pircher, Individually; Grand Gal,
Inc; and Taxation and Revenue Depart-
ment of the State of New MEXICO, De-
fendants.
No. 29,198.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Sept. 8, 2011.

Holland & Hart, LLP, Mark F. Sheridan,
Jacqueline E. Davis, Santa Fe, NM, for Ap-
pellants.

Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, R. David
Pederson, Gallup, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

OPINION VIGIL, Judge.

{1} District courts have discretion under
Rule 1-060(B) NMRA to grant relief from
final judgments. In this foreclosure action,
the district court exercised this discretion to
address an issue of first impression: whether
a lodger’s tax lien under Section 3-88-18.1 of
the Lodgers’ Tax Act, NMSA 1978, §§$ 3-38-
18 to -24 (1969, as amended through 2000),
has statutory priority over a previously filed
deed of trust lien (deed of trust). We hold

7107

that the district court did not abuse its dis-
eretion, and we agree with its legal conclu-
sion that the lodger’s tax lien has a statutory
priority over the deed of trust. In addition,
the district court concluded that a utility lien
filed by the City was entitled to priority over
the Bank’s deed of trust lien. As to this
issue, the Bank concedes that under the op-
erative statutes the City’s utility lien is enti-
tled to priority. However, it argues that
since the City did not assert its priority
before the final judgment was filed and that
there are no grounds which justified reopen-
ing the judgment under Rule 1-060(B), that
we should reverse as to this issue as well. We
reject this argument because the district
court did not abuse its discretion in granting
relief from the final judgment under Rule 1-
060(B). We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND

{2} This appeal arises out of an action
brought by the Bank to foreclose on a prom-
issory note secured by a deed of trust on a
motel located in Gallup, New Mexico. The
City was named as a defendant because it
had recorded liens on the property for delin-
quent lodger’s taxes and utility service
charges. The City not only did not dispute
that its liens were junior and inferior to the
Bank’s deed of trust, but affirmatively stated
that it was “informed and believes [that the
liens] are junior and inferior to the [d]eed of
[t]rust.” The Bank filed an unopposed mo-
tion for summary judgment seeking foreclo-
sure judgment and a declaration that its
rights to the property were superior to those
of the City. The Bank prepared a foreclosure
judgment, approved by the City, which or-
dered that the property be sold to satisfy the
Bank’s judgment and further declared that
the City’s liens were junior and inferior to
the Bank’s deed of trust. The foreclosure
judgment, being approved by all the parties,
was filed by the district court.

{3} The parties then stipulated to the en-
try of an amended foreclosure judgment (fi-
nal judgment), which was again approved by
the City as to form. The final judgment was
also approved by all the parties and was filed
by the district court. The final judgment
ordered that the judicial sale of the property
would be postponed so that a sale to the

708

Navajo Nation could be pursued, and it cor-
rected the amount owed to the Bank and the
redemption rights of the obligor under the
note. The Navajo Nation Tribal Council had
approved the purchase of the property in a
special session, but it was subsequently ve-
toed by the Navajo Nation’s president. If
the sale to the Navajo Nation had taken
place, the City claims that.it would have
resulted in sufficient funds to pay the claims
of all the parties, including the City’s. The
final judgment also reiterated that the City’s
liens were junior and inferior to the deed of
trust.

{4} Sixty-five days after entry of the final
judgment, the City filed a motion under Rule
1-060(B)(1) and (6), seeking to correct the
final judgment. The City asserted that the
final judgment was legally incorrect because
its lodger’s tax and utility liens had statutory
priority over the deed of trust pursuant to
NMSA 1978, Sections 3-36-1 and -2 (1981),
and Section 3-38-18.1(B). Moreover, the
City stated that it had inadvertently failed to
assert the priority status of the liens because
it believed its claim would be paid in its
entirety from the sale of the property to the
Navajo Nation. According to the City, once
the sale to the Navajo Nation failed, it be-
came apparent that a judicial sale would not
provide enough money to pay all the claims
and that the City’s priority to payment had
become critical. The Bank opposed the mo-
tion on various grounds, which we subse-
quently discuss.

{5} The district court agreed with the City
that its liens had statutory priority over the
Bank’s deed of trust, and it ruled that the
City’s motion would be granted without spec-
ifying whether the motion was granted under
Rule 1-060(B)(1) or (6). A formal order was
entered that granted the City’s Rule 1-
060(B) motion and further ordered that the
City’s lodger’s tax and utility liens had statu-
tory priority over the deed of trust. The
Bank appeals.

DISCUSSION
I. The City’s Rule 1-060(B) Motion Was
Timely Filed

HMMM {6} Asserting that the district
court granted the City’s motion based on a
legal error pursuant to Rule 1-060(B)(1), the

Bank contends that the district court had no

jurisdiction to do so. Assuming this argu-
ment presents a question of jurisdiction, we
address the merits. See Rule 12-216(B)
NMRA (providing that jurisdiction chal-
lenges may be raised for the first time on
appeal); see also Smith v. City of Santa Fe,
2007-NMSC-055, 110, 142 N.M. 786, 171
P.8d 300 (“{I]t is incumbent upon the appel-
late Court to raise jurisdictional questions
sua sponte when the court notices them.”).
‘We review this issue de novo. Armijo v.
Pueblo of Laguna, 2011-NMCA-006, 19, 149
N.M. 234, 247 P.3d 1119 (stating that the
“determination of whether jurisdiction exists
is a question of law which an appellate court
reviews de novo”).

{7} The Bank argues from language in
Resolution Trust Corporation v. Ferri, 120
N.M. 820, 901 P.2d 788 (1995), and Deerman
v. Board of County Commissioners, 116
N.M. 501, 864 P.2d 317 (Ct.App.1998), that all
Rule 1-060(B)(1) motions asserting legal er-
ror must be filed within the time permitted
for an appeal. Ferri, 120 N.M. at 328, 901
P.2d at 741; Deerman, 116 N.M. at 506, 864
P.2d at 322. Since the City’s motion was
filed sixty-five days after the final judgment,
the Bank asserts that it was untimely. See
Rule 12-201(A)(2) NMRA (stating that a no-
tice of appeal must be filed within thirty days
after the filing of the final judgment). We
disagree.

{8} The Bank asks this Court to read
Ferri and Deerman as preventing all Rule 1-
060(B)(1) motions after the time permitted
for an appeal has lapsed. However, we do
not read Ferri and Deerman so broadly.
These authorities hold that a Rule 1-
060(B)(1) motion cannot be filed after the
period permitted for a direct appeal has
Japsed only when the motion is used as a
substitute for a direct appeal or as a means
of circumventing the time period allowed for
a direct appeal. See Ferri, 120 N.M. at 328,
901 P.2d at 741 (stating that Rule 1-060(B)
should not be used as a substitute for appeal
nor as a means of circumventing the appeals
process); Deerman, 116 N.M. at 506, 864
P.2d at 322 (stating that it is well-settled in
New Mexico law that Rule 1-060(B)(1) is not
to be used as a substitute for appeal).

{9} However, in this case, the City could
not have filed a direct appeal of the amended
judgment at the time it was filed by the
district court because it was based upon a
stipulation by the parties. The City never
asked the district court to rule on the appli-
cability of Section 3-38-18.1 until it filed the
Rule 1-060(B)(1) motion. As a result, before
the motion, the City was unable to appeal the
priority issue to this Court. See Rule 12-
216(A) (stating that to preserve a question
for review, a party must “fairly invoke” a
ruling by the district court); Diversey Corp.
v. Chem-Source Corp, 1998-NMCA~112,
114, 125 N.M. 748, 965 P.2d 332 (stating that,
this Court will not address arguments not
preserved for review). Therefore, the dis-
trict court’s consideration of the City’s mo-
tion was not used to circumvent the appeals
process.

{10} Assuming the City’s motion was
granted under Rule 1-060(B)(1), we hold that
the City’s motion was timely. See Rule 1-
060(B)(6) (stating that motions requesting re-
lief from a judgment pursuant to Rule 1-
060(B)(1) must be filed within one year of the
judgment).

IL. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion in Reopening the Case

{11} The Bank argues that the district
court abused its discretion in granting the
City’s motion because it characterizes the
alleged error in the judgment as resulting
from judicial error, which the Bank argues
falls outside the ambit of “mistake” under
Rule 1-060(B)(1). We are not persuaded.
See Koppenhaver v. Koppenhaver, 101 N.M.
105, 108, 678 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Ct.App.1984)
(“Precise nomenclature for the motion seek-
ing relief from the finality of a judgment is
not controlling; the court must look to the
substance of the relief sought.”),

Hs {12} The ultimate issue before us is
whether the district court abused its discre-
tion in amending the final judgment whether
it was granted under either Rule 1-060(B)(1)
or (6). See Click v. Litho Supply Co, 95
N.M. 419, 420, 622 P.2d 1039, 1040 (1981)
(Relief under Rule [1-0]60 is discretionary
with the trial judge and will be reviewed only
for an abuse of that discretion.”). It is well-

709

settled that to reverse the district court’s
ruling on a Rule 1-060(B) motion under the
abuse-of-discretion standard, the district
court’s ruling must be “arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable.” Meiboom v. Watson, 2000-
NMSC-004, 129, 128 N.M. 586, 994 P.2d
1154 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In considering a motion under
Rule 1-060(B), the district court should “be
liberal in determining what constitutes good
cause to vacate a judgment so that the ulti-
mate result will address the true merits and
substantial justice will be done.” Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Guerra, 92 N.M. 47, 51, 582
P.2d 819, 823 (1978); see also Kinder Mor-
gan CO2 Co., L.P. v. State Tawation & Reve-
nue Dep't, 2009-NMCA-019, 110, 145 N.M.
579, 203 P.3d 110 (same).

HM {13} In this case, there are no rea-
sons for concluding that reopening the priori-
ty issue was “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreason-
able.” Meiboom, 2000-NMSC-004, 129, 128
N.M. 536, 994 P.2d 1154 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The City as-
serted it initially contemplated that the sale
to the Navajo Nation would result in its liens
being paid in full, although its liens were
deemed junior to the Bank’s deed of trust.
When the sale to the Navajo Nation failed,
the City claimed it realized for the first time
that it had inadvertently failed to recognize
that its lodger’s tax lien might have statutory
priority. The City then brought the issue to
the attention of the district court and candid-
ly acknowledged to the district court that it
had overlooked the issue, because it initially
believed it was going to be paid. The Bank
did not dispute these assertions and never
asserted that the City acted in bad faith in
failing to raise the arguments earlier or that.
the Bank would suffer any legal prejudice if
the district court considered the City’s mo-
tion. The City’s motion raised an issue of
first impression, and the parties were given
an opportunity to fully present their argu-
ments. The district court reopened the case
and granted the City’s motion only after
carefully considering these circumstances
and the arguments of both parties. For the
foregoing reasons, we fail to see how the
district court was arbitrary or unreasonable
in deciding to address the merits of the

710

priority issue, and we conclude that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in
amending the final judgment.

HMMM {14} The Bank also argues that the
district court abused its discretion because
the City failed to dispute throughout the case
that its lien was inferior. We disagree.
Even if we construe the City’s failure to
dispute whether its lien was inferior as a
stipulation, a court may refuse to enforce a
stipulation for good cause. Ballard v. Mil-
ler, 87 N.M. 86, 91, 529 P.2d 752, 757 (1974)
(stating that “stipulations will be encouraged
by the courts, and enforced by them, unless
good cause is shown to the contrary” (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Good cause for granting relief from the
terms of a stipulation is present when the
agreement was entered into as the result of
inadvertence, improvidence, or excusable ne-
glect that the party seeking relief was rea-
sonably diligent in doing so and that the
prejudice to the opposing party is not great-
er than that to the applicant. Jd. As we have
already discussed, all these conditions are
present in this case.

I. The Plain Language of Section 3-38-
18.1(B) Provides First Priority From
Sale Proceeds to the City’s Lodger’s
Tax Lien
HH {15} Since issues involving statuto-
ry interpretation are questions of law, we
review de novo the question of whether Sec-
tion 3-38-18.1 provides first priority of pay-
ment from the sale proceeds to the City’s
lodger’s tax lien. See Sonic Indus. v. State,
2006-NMSC-038, 117, 140 N.M. 212, 141 P.38d
1266 (stating that questions of statutory in-
terpretation are questions of law that are
reviewed de novo).

{16} The Lodgers’ Tax Act provides that
municipalities or counties may collect taxes
on the rent paid by consumers for certain
types of lodgings, such as hotel rooms, occu-
pied for less than thirty days. See §§ 3-38-
14, -15, -16. The Lodgers’ Tax Act further
provides that persons providing the service
of furnishing lodgings, called vendors for
purposes of the Act, are responsible for col-
lecting the lodger’s taxes from consumers
and are liable for the payment of delinquent.
lodger’s taxes plus interest and penalties. See

§§ 3-38-14, -17, -18. Section 3-38-18.1
then governs one way in which municipalities
or counties may enforce payment of delin-
quent lodger’s taxes as against vendors.

{17} Section 3-38-18.1(A), (B) provides:

A. The occupancy tax imposed by a
municipality or county constitutes a lien in
favor of that municipality or county upon
the personal and real property of the ven-
dor providing lodgings in that municipality
or county. The lien may be enforced as
provided in Sections 3-36-1 through 3-36-
7 NMSA 1978. Priority of the lien shall
be determined from the date of filing.

B. Under process or order of court, no
person shall sell the property of any ven-
dor without first ascertaining from the
clerk or treasurer of the municipality or
county in which the vendor is located the
amount of any occupancy tax due the mu-
nicipality or county. Any occupancy tax
due the municipality or county shall be
paid from the proceeds of the sale before
payment is made to the judgment creditor
or any other person with a claim on the
sale proceeds.

(Emphasis added.)

HM s{18} The district court deter-
mined that Subsection (B) controls in this
case, and we agree. When interpreting stat-
utes, our guiding principle is to determine
and give effect to legislative intent. Pub.
Serv. Co. of NM. vu. N.M. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 1999-NMSC-040, 118, 128 N.M.
309, 992 P.2d 860. In ascertaining the intent
of the Legislature, we are assisted by classic
canons of statutory construction. Jd. The
first of these is that a court is required to
give effect to the statute’s language and re-
frain from further interpretation when the
language is clear and unambiguous. Sims v.
Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, 117, 122 N.M. 618,
980 P.2d 153; Bd. of Comm’rs of Doha Ana
Cnty. v. Las Cruces Sun-News, 2003-
NMCA-102, 119, 184 N.M. 288, 76 P.3d 36
(noting that where language is clear, appel-
late courts “give the statute its plain and
ordinary meaning and refrain from further
interpretation”).

{19} Section 3-38-18.1(A) creates a lodg-
er’s tax lien and prescribes the mechanisms
municipalities or counties may use to enforce
the lodger’s tax lien. See NMSA 1978, §§ 3-

36-4 to -5 (1965), -6 (1977) (providing types
of foreclosure methods to enforce municipal
liens). Section 3-38-18.1(B) states that it
applies to situations where any person, such
as the Bank, attempts to sell the property of
a vendor under process or order of the court.
Section 3-38-18.1(B) clearly governs judicial
sales pursuant to foreclosure actions initiated
by someone other than a municipality or
county. In such circumstances, Section 3-
88-18.1(B) further provides that any lodger’s
taxes owed must first be paid to the munici-
pality or county before any of the other
parties’ claims are paid.

{20} When read together, Subsections (A)
and (B) indicate a legislative intent of Section
8-88-18.1 that when named as a defendant in
a deed of trust foreclosure action, as in this
case, a municipality can choose not to pro-
ceed by way of enforcement through foreclo-
sure as provided in Sections 3-36-1
through -6 together with Subsection (A)’s
priority language, but can rely instead on
Subsection (B) for priority of payment from
the proceeds of sale. This is the approach
the City sought were it to be given a second
chance under Rule 1-060(B). The City was
appropriately given that chance. We there-
fore hold that when Subsections (A) and (B)
are read in tandem the priority language in
Subsection (A) was intended to apply where
a municipality is enforcing a lodger’s tax lien
as provided by Sections 3-36-1 through -6
and not to apply when, as here, a municipali-
ty chooses to enforce its lien under Subsec-
tion (B)’s first priority on proceeds of sale in
a pending deed of trust foreclosure action.
Thus, in conformity with the ruling of the
district court, the applicable subsection is
Subsection (B) and the City was entitled to
payment from the sale proceeds before the
Bank received any proceeds.

{21} The Bank argues that this interpreta-
tion of Section 3-38-18.1 is contrary to the
“first in time is first in right” doctrine and
common law principles that deny municipal
taxes priority over other encumbrances. We
are unpersuaded because the plain language
of Section 3-88-18.1 controls. See United
States v. Atlantic Mun. Corp., 212 F.2d 709,
711 (6th Cir.1954) (stating that the “first in
time is the first in right” doctrine is widely
accepted and applied, absent legislation to
the contrary); Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, 1 23,

71

122 N.M. 618, 980 P.2d 153 (“(Wyhen legisla-
tion directly and clearly conflicts with the
common law, the legislation will control be-
cause it is the most recent statement of the
law.”).

{22} In sum, Section 3-38-18.1(A) involves
the enforcement of lodger’s liens by munici-
palities, while Section 3-38-18.1(B) controls
situations where parties, besides foreclosing
municipalities, are selling a vendor's property
through court order. Therefore, Subsections
(A) and (B) are not in conflict since they
govern different cireumstances.

{23} The Bank also urges us to follow
federal and Maryland cases and to conclude
that the City’s lodger’s tax lien only has
priority against unsecured creditors. We de-
cline to do so because those cases are inappli-
eable. See Brent v. Bank of Wash., 35 U.S.
(10 Pet.) 596, 605-09, 615, 9 L.Ed. 547 (1836)
(holding that the federal priority statute does
not give the United States a lien but a legal
right to payment); Conard v. Atl. Ins. Co. of
N.Y., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 444, 7 L.Ed. 189
(1828) (stating that the priority of the United
States to payment from an insolvent’s assets
cannot displace a specifie and perfected lien
since the “priority is not of itself equivalent
to a lien”); Wethered v. Alban Tractor Co.,
224 Md. 408, 168 A.2d 358, 362-63 (1961)
(stating that the Maryland priority statutes
“do no more than establish a priority of
payment for unpaid taxes... . [however, tJhis
does not establish a lien” (citation omitted)).
Section 3-38-18.1(A) does not provide merely
a right to payment but explicitly creates a
lodger’s tax lien that is entitled to priority.
See 72 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation
§ 899 (1974) (providing that some courts will
give priority to state tax liens over other
encumbrances when there is a clear state-
ment of legislative intent that such prefer-
ence be given).

CONCLUSION
{24} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER
and JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judges.

712
2011-NMCA-113
265 P.3d 1285

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

ve
Carol BOYSE, Defendant-Appellant,

State of New Mexico, Plaintiff—Appellee,
ve
Lester Boyse, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 30,656, 30,657.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Sept. 19, 2011.

Certiorari Granted, Nov.
4, 2011, No. 38,257.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, William
Lazar, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

Jeff C. Lahann, Christopher K.P. Carde-
nas, Las Cruces, NM, for Appellants.

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} Defendants appeal the denial of a mo-
tion to suppress evidence that was obtained
pursuant to a warrant that the investigator
obtained by telephone. At issue is whether
such warrants are recognized under the New
Mexico Constitution. We hold that they are
not and reverse.

1. BACKGROUND

{2} On August 21, 2008, Sergeant Jeff
Gray (Investigator) responded to a call about
a dead horse smell at, Defendants’ residence.
Investigator saw evidence of numerous prob-
lems and decided to obtain a search warrant.
The courts were closed, and Investigator did
not attempt to find the judge in person.
Instead, Investigator contacted the on-call
judge, Judge Oscar Frietz, by telephone in
order to obtain verbal approval for the war-
rant.

{3} Investigator described the procedure
by which the warrant was obtained as fol-
lows. Investigator prepared a typewritten
affidavit in the same way he would have for a
written search warrant. Investigator then
spoke over the telephone with Judge Frietz.
Judge Frietz administered an oath to Investi-
gator, and Investigator read to him the state-
ment of facts in support of the search war-
rant. The judge orally approved the warrant
at 8:55 pm., and Investigator signed the
judge’s name to the warrant. The warrant
was executed immediately. At some point in
the next several days after the warrant had
been executed, the judge signed and initialed
the warrant.

Il, DISCUSSION

{4} Defendants argue that telephonic war-
rants are not valid in New Mexico because
(1) they are inconsistent with our rules and

(2) they may only be authorized by statute.
The State counters that the warrant was not,
telephonic, but was instead a standard writ-
ten warrant that was telephonically ap-
proved. Defendant also raises a number of
other issues regarding the validity of the
search warrant in this case. Because we
conclude that New Mexico does not recognize
telephonic warrants, we need not examine
the remaining issues.

{5} Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexi-
co Constitution protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures:

The people shall be secure in their per-

sons, papers, homes and effects, from un-

reasonable searches and seizures, and no
warrant to search any place, or seize any
person or thing, shall issue without de-
scribing the place to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized, nor without

a written showing of probable cause, sup-

ported by oath or affirmation.

(emphasis added). It is well settled that this
section of the New Mexico Constitution pro-
vides greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment. See State v. Leyva, 2011-
NMSC-009, 151, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861.
Our rule governing warrants is equally clear.
See Rule 6-208(A)(4) NMRA (“A warrant
shall issue only on a sworn written state-
ment of the facts showing probable cause for
issuing the warrant.” (emphasis added)).

{6} The question of whether New Mexico
recognizes telephonic warrants has impor-
tant implications. If such warrants are rec-
ognized, then our review is deferential, and
we “must determine whether the affidavit as
a whole, and the reasonable inferences that
may be drawn therefrom, provide a substan-
tial basis for determining that there is prob-
able cause to believe that a search will un-
cover evidence of wrongdoing.” State v.
Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, 29, 146
N.M. 488, 212 P.8d 376. If they are not rec-
ognized, then this was a warrantless search,
and the burden is on the State to prove that
an exception to the warrant requirement ap-
plies. See State v. Gutierrez, 200A-NMCA-
081, 16, 136 N.M. 18, 94 P.3d 18.

Wl {7} It is clear that telephonic war-
rants do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
See Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(d)@); United States v.

713

Rome, 809 F.2d 665, 670 (10th Cir.1987) (up-
holding a telephonic warrant despite proce-
dural deficiencies). We have not previously
determined whether such warrants are rec-
ognized under the New Mexico Constitution.
After a brief discussion of the telephonic oath
in this case, we examine the differences be-
tween the Fourth Amendment and Article II,
Section 10, and conclude that telephonic war-
rants are not permitted in New Mexico.

A. Oath and Affirmation

{8} As an initial matter, we must consider
whether the affidavit prepared by Investiga-
tor was supported by oath or affirmation. If
it was not, the warrant is not valid. See
N.M. Const. art. II, § 10 (requiring that the
writing be supported by oath or affirmation).
The State asserts without citation that the
“sworn written statement of facts’ need not
be contemporaneous with its presentation to
the magistrate.” For the purposes of this
Opinion, we need not decide the issue.

HE {9} It is not clear that an oath can be
administered over the telephone. See 58
Am. Jur. 2d Oath & Affirmation § 18 (2011)
(The law requires the person taking an
oath to be in the personal presence of the
officer administering it. Oaths cannot be
taken or administered over the telephone.”
(footnote omitted)). It is nevertheless possi-
ble that the affidavit was supported by oath
or affirmation. “A sworn statement is one
made under penalty of perjury.” Citizens
for Incorporation, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs, 115 N.M. 710, 715, 858 P.2d 86, 91
(Ct.App.1993). It is not inconceivable that
Investigator could face perjury charges if the
statements in the affidavit are false. See
State v. Knight, 2000-NMCA-016, 11 25-29,
128 N.M. 591, 995 P.2d 1033 (holding that an
affidavit was sufficient despite failure to com-
ply with statutorily required formalities).
However, it is not necessary for us to decide
the issue. Instead, we assume without decid-
ing that the “affidavit for search warrant”
and the “statement of facts in support of
search warrant” were sworn statements sup-
ported by oath or affirmation.

714

B. The Judge Must See the Writing Be-
fore Issuing a Warrant

I {10} Every state has its own constitu-
tional provision protecting against unreason-
able searches and seizures. All but two of
these provisions require a sworn showing of
probable cause. See Ariz. Const. art. IT, § 8;
Wash. Const. art. I, § 7. Many of these
states also have procedures for obtaining
warrants over the phone. See generally 2
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 4.3(C), at 511-12 & nn. 29-80 (4th ed.
2004). However, forty of the fifty state con-
stitutions, as well as the Federal Constitu-
tion, do not require the showing of probable
cause to be presented in writing. See, eg.
US. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I,
§ 9. Five states require probable cause to be
shown by affidavit, see Fla. Const. art. I,
§ 12; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17; Ill. Const.
art. I, § 6; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 11; Wyo.
Const. art. I, § 4, and five, including New
Mexico, specify that the showing of probable
cause must be in “writing.” See Colo. Const.
art. II, § 7; Mo. Const. art. I, § 15; Mont.
Const. art. II, § 11; N.M. Const. art. II,
§ 10, R.L. Const. art. I, § 6.

{11} The requirement of a writing is key
to our analysis. Article II, Section 10 re-
quires “a written showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation” (emphasis
added). This language expresses a clear and
unambiguous requirement that the facts
upon which the probable cause determination
is made must be in writing. Acknowledging
this, the State directs us to authority from
Idaho, Illinois, and South Dakota, which it
claims supports its argument that telephonic
warrants do not conflict with constitutions
containing search and seizure provisions that
require a writing. These states each require
probable cause to be shown by affidavit.
Our Supreme Court has said that an affidavit
is “a written statement, under oath, sworn to
or affirmed by the person making it before
some person who has authority to administer
an oath or affirmation.” Kiehne v. Atwood,
93 N.M. 657, 667, 604 P.2d 123, 183 (1979).
This is essentially identical to Article II,
Section 10’s requirement that probable cause
be shown by a writing supported by oath or
affirmation. Accordingly, we agree that tele-

phonic warrant cases from these states may
be instructive.

{12} We are aware of only one state with a
writing requirement that has allowed the sort
of telephonic warrant at issue here. In State
v. Badger, two roommates were convicted of
possession of a controlled substance with in-
tent to deliver. 96 Idaho 168, 525 P.2d 363,
364 (1974). They appealed the denial of their
motion to suppress evidence on the ground
that the warrant was based on electronically
recorded testimony. Id. The Idaho constitu-
tion requires that probable cause be shown
by affidavit. See Idaho Const. art. I, § 17.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion
to suppress. Badger, 525 P.2d at 366. Its
rationale was simple: as the Supreme Court,
it had “the inherent power to formulate rules
of practice and procedure in the courts of
Idaho.” Id. at 365. Accordingly, the court
decreed that “the word ‘affidavit’ is broad
enough to include the recording of sworn
testimony.” Jd. Justice McFadden’s dissent
observed that this interpretation ignored the
well-established meaning of the word ‘affida-
vit,” which had always been defined as a
writing and which required no construction
to interpret. Jd. at 367-68 (McFadden, J.,
dissenting).

{18} We are not in a position to adopt the
reasoning from Badger. Unlike the Idaho
Supreme Court, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals does not have rule-making power.
See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc. 89
N.M. 307, 312, 551 P.2d 1354, 1859 (1976)
(holding that rule-making power is vested
exclusively in the New Mexico Supreme
Court), Furthermore, we are bound by Su-
preme Court precedent defining an affidavit
as a writing. See Kiehne, 93 N.M. at 667,
604 P.2d at 133. Even if we were not so
bound, we would agree with Judge McFad-
den’s dissent, which correctly noted that the
vast majority of authority concludes that an
affidavit must be a writing. See Black’s Law
Dictionary 66 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “affi-
davit” as a “voluntary declaration of facts
written down and sworn to by the declarant
before an officer authorized to administer
oaths”); Webster’s Third New Intl Dictio-
nary (unabridged) 35 (1986) (defining an “af-
fidavit” as “a sworn statement in writing

made esp. under oath or on affirmation be-
fore an authorized magistrate or officer”).

{14} The State has also directed our atten-
tion to cases from Illinois and South Dakota,
both of which require probable cause to be
supported by affidavit. The State’s argu-
ment appears to be that since these states
have “codified procedures governing tele-
phonic search warrants,” such warrants are
compatible with constitutions requiring a
writing. It is true that the legislature of
Illinois has enacted a procedure governing
the issuance of telephonic warrants. See Ill.
Const. art. I, § 6; 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/108-
A(b) (2007). However, the courts of Illinois
appear to have rejected the idea that tele-
phonic warrants are valid. See People v.
Taylor, 198 Ill.App.3d 667, 144 Ill.Dec. 699,
555 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (1990) (“We decline to
read into the search warrant statute authori-
zation for long distance factual findings by
telephone....”); see also People v. Blake,
266 IllLApp.3d 232, 203 Ill.Dec. 658, 640
N.E.2d 817, 320 (1994) (“It appears the criti-
cal factor influencing the [Taylor] court’s
decision was the failure to comply with the
requirements that the warrant be issued
upon a written complaint under oath or affir-
mation.”). Furthermore, although the State
did not mention this in its brief, we also note
that the Illinois statute applies only to acts of
terrorism and that by its own terms it “is
inoperative on and after January 1, 2005.”
See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/108-4(b)(1), (8).

{15} South Dakota has taken a different
approach. The South Dakota statute pro-
vides a procedure for obtaining a telephonic
warrant and states that, where the procedure
is followed, the certified, filed transcription of
the telephone conversation “shall be deemed
to be an affidavit.” S.D. Codified Laws
§ 23A-35-5 (1978). However, unlike South
Dakota, we have no rule or statute purport-
ing to equate a recording or transcript of a
telephone conversation with a writing for the
purposes of Article II, Section 10. In any
event, no recording or transcript was made
in this case.

{16} The mere existence of a sworn writ-
ing is not enough to satisfy the requirements
of Article II, Section 10. The issuing court
must base its decision, at least in part, on the

715

writing. Our constitution and rules require
that “no warrant ... shall issue ... without
a written showing of probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation.” Article II,
Section 10 (emphasis added); see also Rule
6-208(A). We construe this to mean not
simply that a sworn writing must exist some-
where, but also that it must be shown to and
considered by the issuing court before the
warrant issues. Thus, as the State acknowl-
edges, a judge may make his or her decision
based upon the writing without hearing from
the officer. See Rule 6-208(F) (allowing the
judge, at his or her discretion, to require
testimony from the affiant). However, the
requirement is not satisfied when an investi-
gator makes a writing but does not show it to
the judge. Here, at the time the magistrate
court approved the warrant, it had not seen a
written affidavit showing probable cause.
Instead, its decision was based on an unre-
corded phone conversation. Because this
procedure does not meet the requirements of
the New Mexico Constitution, the warrant
was invalid and the evidence should have
been suppressed.

{17} There are obvious problems with the
procedure that was followed in this case.
Investigator testified that he read the state-
ment of facts verbatim to the magistrate
judge after he was sworn during the phone
conversation. However, the district court
had no way of knowing whether the writing
actually existed. If the affidavit did exist,
the judge had no way of determining wheth-
er the Investigator’s reading of the affidavit
was verbatim. If the reading was verbatim,
the judge had no way of knowing whether
the affidavit was modified in the days be-
tween when the phone conversation took
place and when the affidavit was actually
signed by the judge. There is also no way to
determine whether the conversation included
material not contained in the affidavit. In
short, neither Defendants nor this Court has
any way to review the basis of the court’s
decision that there was probable cause. The
potential for error or abuse in such a proce-
dure is evident.

{18} With appropriate protections, tele-
phonic warrants may well be useful and ad-
visable. After all, New Mexico has a strong

716

preference for warrants, State v. Gomez,
1997-NMSC-006, 136, 122 N.M. 777, 932
P.2d 1, and telephonic warrants “encourage
law enforcement officers to obtain approval
for a search from a magistrate, in situations
where they might otherwise feel that there
was no time for anything but a warrantless
search.” 88 A.L.R.4th 1145, § 2[a]. Many
jurisdictions have adopted rules that address
the concerns that arise when the showing of
probable cause is made over the telephone.
However, under our current law, telephonic
warrants are not permissible. If New Mexi-
co is to adopt them, it is for our Supreme
Court to formulate rules that would render
them valid.

Ill. CONCLUSION

{19} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the order denying Defendants’ motion to sup-
press and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.

{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER,
Judge and CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge.

2011-NMCA-116
265 P.3d 1289

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Devin RAPCHACK, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 30,094.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Sept. 22, 2011.

Certiorari Denied, Oct. 21, 2011, No. 38,241.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret.
E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Joel
Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Will O’Connell, Assistant Appel-
late Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge.

{1} Defendant Devin Rapchack pleaded
guilty to two separate sets of crimes in sepa-
rate criminal actions before two different
judges. The sentence in the second case was
ordered to be served consecutive to the first
sentence, though both were suspended. De-
fendant was then arrested for a third crime,
and both courts revoked probation. The first
court ordered that upon revocation the first
sentence would be served concurrently with
the second sentence, but later amended its
order “to reflect that ... Defendant’s sen-
tence does not run concurrently.” At issue is
whether the court’s order removing the “con-
current” provision impermissibly lengthened
Defendant’s sentence. We hold that the lan-
guage purporting to make the first sentence
run concurrent with the later consecutive
sentence was illegal under NMSA 1978, Sec-
tion 81-18-21(B) (1977), and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Because the facts of this case are
somewhat convoluted, we begin with an over-
view of the three criminal actions relevant to
this appeal.

{3} On the record before us, Defendant’s
first encounter with the justice system oc-
curred in CR-2006-0211 (the 211 case), the
case that is the subject of this appeal. On
July 19, 2006, Defendant pleaded guilty to

1. The parties do not agree on the length of De-
fendant’s sentence in the 1383 case. The exact

117

burglary of a vehicle, criminal damage to
property (over $1000), and larceny (over
$250), all fourth-degree felonies. He was
sentenced to four and one-half years impris-
onment followed by one year of parole. For
convenience, we will refer to this as “Sen-
tence A.” The district court suspended the
entire sentence and ordered that Defendant
be placed on supervised probation.

{4} Some months later, he was arrested on
auto theft-related crimes which were dealt
with in CR-2006-1383 (the 1883 case). He
pleaded guilty and received a suspended sen-
tence of between two and six years! to be
served consecutive to the sentence entered in
the 211 case. We refer to the sentence in
the 1383 case as “Sentence B.”

{5} As a result of his 1888 case troubles,
the State petitioned to revoke Defendant's
probation in the 211 case. The district court
partially revoked his probation for Sentence
A, but gave him an equal amount of credit
for time served on probation; essentially,
Defendant remained released on probation.
Defendant ended up with suspended sen-
tences in both cases, although he did spend
some time in jail while awaiting sentencing.

{6} On November 10, 2008, Defendant was
arrested for shoplifting ammunition. The
State filed petitions to revoke probation in
both the 211 case and the 1888 case. On
December 23, 2008, the 1883 case court par-
tially revoked Defendant’s probation in Sen-
tence B and ordered Defendant to serve two
years of his sentence in prison. Subsequent-
ly, in an order dated April 17, 2009, (the
April Order), the 211 case court revoked his
probation for Sentence A. The April Order
indicated that Sentence A would now run
coneurrently with Sentence B.

{7} The State filed a “motion to correct,
illegal sentence” in the 211 case, arguing that
the language running Sentences A and B
concurrent, should be removed. In its mo-
tion, the State observed that Defendant had
received Sentence A prior to receiving Sen-
tence B. Furthermore, the 1383 case court
had explicitly made Sentence B consecutive
to Sentence A. As a result, the State argued,

length of the sentence in the 1383 case is not
material to this Opinion.

718

the part of the April Order stating that Sen-
tence A would run concurrently with Sen-
tence B was illegal. The State requested
that the April Order be modified to reflect
that Sentence A would not run concurrently
with Sentence B. Defendant responded that
Judge Martin, who had entered the April
Order revoking Defendant’s probation in the
211 case, was “the last sentencing [jludge”
and that “the last sentencing determines if
the cases are concurrent/consecutive.” The
211 case court granted the State’s motion
and entered a new order simply directing
that the April Order be “corrected to reflect
that ... Defendant’s sentence does not run
concurrently with” Sentence B. It is this
order, reflecting a removal of the “concur-
rent” requirement, that Defendant appeals.

Il. DISCUSSION

HM {8} “A trial court’s power to sen-
tence is derived exclusively from statute.”
State v. Davis, 20083-NMSC-022, 16, 184
N.M. 172, 74 P.8d 1064. The meaning of
these statutes is a question of statutory in-
terpretation which we review de novo. Id.
Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is
to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Id. “We do this by giving effect to the plain
meaning of the words of [the] statute, unless
this leads to an absurd or unreasonable re-
sult.” State v. Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104,
17, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801.

A. The Original Sentences

{9} Sentencing is governed by the Crimi-
nal Sentencing Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 31-18-
12 to -26 (1977, as amended through 2009)
(the Act). Section 31-18-13(A). The Act
calls for a one and one-half year sentence for
fourth-degree felonies such as those at issue
here. Section 31-18-15(A)(10). However, for
crimes other than capital offenses and first-
degree felonies, the court has discretion to
suspend the sentence and assign conditions
of probation. NMSA 1978, § 31-20-38 (1985).

{10} Although the goal of probation is
rehabilitation, see State v. Grossetete, 2008-
NMCA-088, 110, 144 N.M. 346, 187 P.8d
692, not all probationers are successfully re-
habilitated. In recognition of this potential,

the Act provides additional sentencing guide-
lines for crimes committed by probationers:
B. Any person, who commits a crime
while at large under a suspended or de-
ferred sentence or probation or parole, and
who is convicted and sentenced therefor,
shall serve the sentence consecutive to the
remainder of the term, including remaining
parole time, under which he was released
unless otherwise ordered by the court in
sentencing for the new crime.
Section 31-18-21(B); see also Davis, 2003-
NMSC-022, 19, 184 N.M. 172, 74 P.38d 1064.

{11} Under the plain language of Section
31-18-21(B), a sentence can only be made
consecutive or concurrent to a previous sen-
tence which has not yet been completed. See
§ 81-18-21(B) (providing sentencing guid-
ance for crimes committed by persons “while
at large under a suspended or deferred sen-
tence or probation or parole”). The statute
requires that the new sentence be served
consecutively to the pending sentence unless
the court orders otherwise “in sentencing for
the new crime.” Jd. (emphasis added).
Thus, Section 31-18-21(B) only applies to the
sentence for the new crime, and a sentence
can only be made concurrent or consecutive
when a defendant is already subject to a
prior sentence which he has not yet complet-
ed.

{12} Here, Sentences A and B were origi-
nally imposed correctly. Because Defendant
was not “at large under a suspended or
deferred sentence or probation or parole”
when he received Sentence A, Sentence A
could not have been concurrent or consecu-
tive to anything. Before his arrest and con-
viction in the 211 case, Defendant was a free
man. His conviction and sentencing de-
prived him of that freedom. Sentence A
could not be concurrent or consecutive with
any other sentence, because no other sen-
tence existed at that time.

{13} When Defendant was convicted in the
1888 case, the court had discretion to make
Sentence B either concurrent or consecutive
to Sentence A. Defendant committed the
erimes in the 1883 case while on probation
for his conviction in the 211 case. According-
ly, Section 31-18-21 required Sentence B to
be consecutive unless the court ordered oth-

erwise. It is undisputed that the court in the
1388 case explicitly made Sentence B consec-
utive to Sentence A. Thus, after his sentenc-
ing in the 1383 case, Defendant was subject
to two sentences: Sentence A, which was
suspended, and Sentence B, which was con-
secutive to Sentence A, but also suspended.
Both sentences were lawfully imposed.

B. The Parole Revocations

{14} The confusion in this case arose after
Defendant was arrested for a third crime and
the State moved to revoke his probation for
Sentences A and B. The 1383 case court
acted first, revoking Defendant’s probation
and ordering him to begin serving two years
of Sentence B in prison. Several months
later, the 211 case court revoked Defendant’s
probation for Sentence A, restoring the four
and one-half year sentence but giving Defen-
dant credit for three years and seventy-three
days. In doing so, it included language pur-
porting to make Sentence A run concurrent
with Sentence B.

{15} The question thus becomes whether
this cireumstance—that probation was re-
voked first as to Sentence B—makes Sen-
tence A the subsequent crime for purposes of
Section 31-18-21(B), thus allowing the 211
case court to run Sentence A concurrent with
Sentence B. We hold that it does not. Sec-
tion 31-18-21(B) applies to the sentences as
originally imposed. The order of probation
revocation does not change their character or
original order.

HI {16} When a probationer violates the
conditions of his probation, a probation revo-
cation hearing is held. NMSA 1978, § 31-
21-15(B) (1989); State v. Guthrie, 2011-
NMSC-014, 1110-12, 150 N.M. 84, 257 P.3d
904. Courts have wide discretion to deal
with probation violations. “If a [probation]
violation is established, the court may contin-
ue the original probation, revoke the proba-
tion and either order a new probation ... or
require the probationer to serve the balance
of the sentence imposed or any lesser sen-
tence.” Section 31-21-15(B). However, a
court may not increase a valid sentence once
a defendant begins serving that sentence.
State v. Porras, 1999-NMCA-016, 17, 126
N.M. 628, 978 P.2d 880.

719

Hl {17} A probation revocation hearing
is different than a sentencing hearing. Ina
sentencing hearing, the court may impose
any sentence consistent with the Act. As
discussed above, the court may make the
sentence concurrent or consecutive, pursuant
to Section 31-18-21(B), so long as there is a
previous sentence. In a parole revocation,
on the other hand, the court may only modify
an existing sentence. See Section 31-21-
15(B). When the existing sentence is consec-
utive to a previous sentence, the court may
make the existing sentence concurrent, be-
cause doing so does not increase the sen-
tence. However, it may not change a sen-
tence that was originally concurrent to be
consecutive as this would increase the sen-
tence.

Hl {18} The analysis is different when
probation is revoked for a first sentence,
such as the sentence imposed in the 211 case.
In a first sentence, Section 31-18-21(B) is
never applicable, and the sentence cannot be
made concurrent or consecutive to anything.
A first sentence cannot be made concurrent,
or consecutive with later sentences as a re-
sult of a probation revocation. To hold oth-
erwise would allow probation revocations for
previous convictions to undermine later deci-
sions making sentences concurrent or consec-
utive. Section 31-18-21(B) requires these de-
cisions to be made at the later sentencings,
and Section 31-21-15 allows these decisions
to be modified, if at all, by subsequent proba-
tion revocations regarding the later sen-
tences. But, for a first sentence, there is no
concurrent or consecutive status to be modi-
fied. Instead, when the State moves to re-
voke parole, the sentence may either be sus-
pended, partially suspended, or served.

Hl {19} Here, the 211 case court lacked
the authority to make Sentence A concurrent
with Sentence B. The April Order was not a
sentencing; instead, it was a probation revo-
cation made pursuant to Section 31-21-15.
Under Section 31-21-15(B), the 211 case
court was authorized to continue or modify
the probation, or to “require the probationer
to serve the balance of the sentence imposed
or any lesser sentence.” Section 31-21-
15(B). Because Sentence A was the first

720

sentence, it could not originally have been
concurrent with or consecutive to anything.
As a result, it could not be modified to be-
come concurrent or consecutive. Only the
1888 case court, in revoking probation for
Sentence B, was at liberty to decide whether
the second sentence would be modified to
become concurrent. Had the 211 case court
desired to achieve a concurrent effect, it was
free to leave Defendant on probation in Sen-
tence A.

Til. CONCLUSION

{20} The portion of the April Order pur-
porting to make Sentence A concurrent with
Sentence B was contrary to law. The dis-
trict court therefore had the power to correct
it. See Porras, 1999-NMCA-016, 17, 126

N.M. 628, 973 P.2d 880. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm the order granting the
motion to correct the error in the April Or-
der and remand for further proceedings con-
sistent with this Opinion.

{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: RODERICK T.
KENNEDY and TIMOTHY L. GARCIA,

Judges.

2011-NMSC-040
266 P.3d 1

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff
Petitioner,

v.

Jerry TRUJILLO, Jr., Defendant-
Respondent.

No. 32,234.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
Oct. 27, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, James W.
Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa
Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant. Appellate
Defender, for Respondent.

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} In State v. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-
039, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.38d 376, we advised
district judges reviewing a search warrant
after the fact to defer to the judgment and
reasonable inferences of the judge who is-
sued the warrant “if the affidavit provides a
substantial basis to support a finding of prob-
able cause.” Id. 129, In the case before us,
we once again review an order suppressing
evidence obtained pursuant to a search war-
rant, and once again we emphasize that “[a]
reviewing court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the issuing court.” Jd.
The Court of Appeals having upheld the sup-
pression order, we now reverse and remand
to the district court for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND

{2} The following facts come directly from
the State’s affidavit in support of the search
warrant, upon which the district judge relied
in finding probable cause to issue the war-
rant. We set forth those factual assertions
in some detail to provide the context neces-
sary for our review of the probable cause
determination.

{8} On September 10, 2007, a detective
with the Bernalillo County Sheriff's Office,
‘with over 10 years of law enforcement expe-
rience, was asked to respond “to an address”
to investigate allegations that a teenage girl
‘was being molested by a male family mem-
ber. “Upon arrival at the address,” the de-
tective made contact with the girl, identified
in the affidavit as J.J., age 15.

{4} J.J. told the detective that after she
and her brother were removed from her
mother’s custody by the New Mexico Chil-
dren, Youth and Families Department, they
were adopted by her grandmother, Gloria
Jaramillo, and her step-grandfather, Jerry B.
Trujillo, Sr. Gloria Jaramillo and Jerry B.
Trujillo, Sr. were married and had two chil-
dren of their own, one of whom was identi-
fied as Jerry Trujillo, Jr., age 19, Defendant
in this case. J.J., her brother, her grand-
mother and step-grandfather, and Defendant
all lived at the same residence.

{5} J.J. explained how, over a period of
time, Defendant wrote her letters “asking
her for sex.” Even though she felt like she
was being “sexually harass[ed],” J.J. finally
gave in to Defendant's demands. J.J. told
the detective that Defendant had anal sex
with her approximately three times “in [his]
bedroom.” She also told the detective that,
Defendant would “placfe] his hand down her
pants” and “have her touch his penis and
‘play’ with it.” These incidents occurred five
or more times over the course of 15 months.

{6} Defendant also showed J.J. “porno-
graphic magazines with pictures of ‘naked
men and women.” J.J. told the detective
that Defendant “kept the magazines under
his mattress in his room, and in the bath-
room.” In addition to the magazines, J.J.
stated that Defendant also showed her por-
nography on his computer. J.J. told the
detective that “these incidents took place
when her brother was at work or school, her
grandmother was not at home, and her
grandfather was either not home, or not
watching” them.

{7} When asked about Defendant’s letters
to her, J.J. told the detective that she had
destroyed most of them, but did give one to a
friend for safekeeping. The detective was

724

able to recover that letter, which was repro-
duced, at least in part, in the affidavit.

{8} J.J. also identified a cousin who may
also have been molested by Defendant. The
detective then interviewed the cousin, identi-
fied in the affidavit as D.M., who stated that
Defendant “had touched her numerous times

. while she, J.J., and J.J.’s brother were
watching television in [Defendant's] room.”

{9}. When asked how long this had been
going on, D.M. responded, “{s]ince J.J. went
to live with [Defendant] and his parents.”
The detective “asked D.M. why she stopped
going to the Trujillo home, and she stated,
‘{w]ith your uncle touching you, you wouldn’t
wanna [sic] go over there either.’ ” (Empha-
sis added.) D.M. also told the detective that
“{Defendant] would show her pornographic
magazines.” “D.M. stated the magazines
were kept under [Defendant’s] bed and con-
tained pictures of ‘naked girls.’ ”

{10} Based on the interviews with J.J. and
D.M., the detective prepared an affidavit and
obtained a search warrant from a district
judge (issuing judge) based on that affidavit.
Each page of the affidavit is captioned:
“STATE OF NEW MEXICO VS. 1208 Jua-
nita SW, Albuquerque, NM 87105.” The affi-
davit begins with the detective stating that
he “has reason to believe that the following
described residence contains evidence of
crimes.” (Emphasis omitted.) The affidavit
then describes 1208 Juanita SW in such great
detail that it was apparent the officer had
personally observed the residence. He de-
scribes such details as the color of different
pieces of trim, the layout of the windows, and
the location and types of trees in the yard.

{11} After detailing the allegations dis-
cussed above, the affidavit concludes by de-
scribing specific pieces of evidence to be
seized. It states that the detective has “rea-
son to believe [Defendant] may have letters
detailing some of his activity with J.J.” The
affidavit also states that the detective has
“reason to believe [Defendant] has possession
of the pornographic magazines he showed to”
the alleged victims, “which he keeps under
his bed, or beneath his mattress.” Finally,

the affidavit concludes by requesting “this
search warrant be granted in order to exam-
ine the residence for any and all evidence

which may provide investigators additional
information in this case.” (Emphasis added.)

{12} Based upon the affidavit, the issuing
judge found probable cause and issued the
warrant. After the search was conducted
and evidence, including a pornographic mag-
azine and a letter written between Defendant
and J.J., was collected, Defendant filed a
motion to suppress physical evidence. The
motion was based on a lack of an express
nexus between the criminal activity described
in the affidavit and 1208 Juanita SW, the
actual address to be searched. While the
narrative in the affidavit contains references
to “an address” or “the residence” or “the
Trujillo home,” at no point does the affidavit
explicitly state that “the residence” and 1208
Juanita SW are one and the same, that 1208
Juanita SW is the place where these events
occurred, or that 1208 Juanita SW is where
the evidence can be found.

{13} Defendant claimed that the search
violated his rights under both the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and Article II, Section 10 of the New
Mexico Constitution. A second district
judge, to whom the trial was assigned (re-
viewing judge), granted Defendant’s motion
and suppressed all of the evidence obtained
in the search. The State appealed and the
Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum
opinion. State v. Trujillo, No. 29,870, 2010
WL 3968960 (N.M.Ct.App. Jan.13, 2010).
We granted certiorari and now reverse.
State v. Trujillo, 2010-NMCERT-003, 148
N.M. 560, 240 P.8d 15.

DISCUSSION
Probable Cause Required for a Search
Warrant

Hl {14} The Fourth Amendment guaran-
tees “(t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and sei-
gures....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Except in
the case of “a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions,” before conduct-
ing a search, the Fourth Amendment re-
quires police to obtain a warrant issued by a
judge or magistrate. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d
576 (1967), superceded by statute as stated in

United States. v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450,
1455 (9th Cir.1991).

HM {15} Similarly, Article II, Section 10
of the New Mexico Constitution provides that
“no warrant to search any place, or seize any
person or thing, shall issue without describ-
ing the place to be searched, or the persons
or things to be seized, nor without a written
showing of probable cause.” Both the Unit-
ed States Constitution and the New Mexico
Constitution require a showing of probable
cause prior to the issuance of a search war-
rant. See Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039,
1114, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.3d 376.

TH s{16} “Probable cause to search a
specific location exists when there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe that a crime has
been committed in that place, or that evi-
dence of a crime will be found [in that loca-
tion].” State v. Evans, 2009-NMSC-027,
110, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216. “Put an-
other way, before a valid search warrant may
issue, the affidavit must show: (1) that the
items sought to be seized are evidence of a
crime; and (2) that the criminal evidence
sought is located at the place to be
searched.” Id, 11 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “There are no
‘bright line, hard-and-fast rules’ for deter-
mining probable cause, but the degree of
proof necessary to establish probable cause is
‘more than a suspicion or possibility but less
than a certainty of proof’ ” Id. (quoting State
v. Nyce, 2006-NMSC-026, 110, 189 N.M.
647, 187 P.3d 587, overruled in part on other
grounds by Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039,
146 N.M. 488, 212 P.8d 376 (expressly disa-
vowing the de novo standard of review)).

Standard of Review

{17} Recently, in Williamson, this
Court resolved a conflict in our caselaw re-
garding the proper standard of review for
challenges to search warrants under Article
II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitu-
tion. Williamson, 2009-NMSC-~039, 1 19-
30, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.8d 376. In that case,
we clarified that “an issuing court’s determi-
nation of probable cause should not be re-
viewed de novo but, rather, must be upheld if
the affidavit provides a substantial basis to
support a finding of probable cause.” Jd. 11.

725

“A reviewing court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the issuing court.” Jd.
29. Rather, it is the reviewing judge’s duty
to “determine whether the affidavit as a
whole, and the reasonable inferences that
may be drawn therefrom, provide a substan-
tial basis for determining that there is proba-
ble cause to believe that a search will uncov-
er evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. This same
standard is used to review challenges to
search warrants brought under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 218, 236, 103
S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

HH s({18} “{Tyhe substantial basis stan-
dard of review is more deferential than the
de novo review applied to questions of law,
but less deferential than the substantial evi-
dence standard applied to questions of fact.”
Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, 130, 146
N.M. 488, 212 P.38d 376. The United States
Supreme Court reasoned that “[a] deferen-
tial standard of review is appropriate to fur-
ther the ... strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant.” Massa-
chusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 738, 104
S.Ct. 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984). A defer-
ential stance “to the warrant process encour-
ages police officers to procure a search war-
rant.” Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, {1 28,
146 N.M. 488, 212 P.38d 376. This in turn
provides “a layer of protection from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures” without a
warrant. Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Accordingly, “‘the resolu-
tion of doubtful or marginal cases in this
area should be largely determined by the
preference to be accorded to warrants.’” Up-
ton, 466 U.S. at 734, 104 S.Ct. 2085 (quoting
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 18 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).

WM {19} This standard “does not pre-
clude the reviewing court from conducting a
meaningful analysis of whether the search
warrant was supported by probable cause.”
Williamson, 2009-NMSC-039, 130, 146
N.M. 488, 212 P.3d 376. Rather, “[ilf, after
reviewing the affidavit as a whole, the direct
and circumstantial evidence alleged, as well
as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from
those allegations, does not support the issu-

726

ing court’s determination of probable cause,
then the search is invalid and unreasonable.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). But, if the factual basis for issuing
the warrant is sufficiently detailed in the
affidavit, “and the issuing court ‘has found
probable cause, the [reviewing] courts should
not invalidate the warrant by interpreting
the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than
commonsense, manner.’” Id. (quoting Ven-
tresca, 380 U.S. at 109, 85 S.Ct. 741). As
stated previously, under a deferential stan-
dard the reviewing judge does not substitute
his or her judgment for that of the issuing
judge.

The Necessary Nexus Between the Affida-
vit and the Place to Be Searched

HE {20} There must be sufficient de-
tail in the affidavit to show a nexus between
the evidence sought and the particular place
being searched. See Evans, 2009-NMSC-
027, 124, 146 N.M. 319, 210 P.3d 216. This
link “must be made by the [issuing] judge or
magistrate on a case-by-case basis.” Id. “The
fundamental inquiry is whether there is
probable cause to believe there will be evi-
dence of a crime at a particular location.”
Id. 25. Finally, when considering whether
an affidavit established probable cause to
issue a search warrant, review is limited to
the four corners of the document. William-
son, 2009-NMSC~039, 131, 146 N.M. 488,
212 P.3d 3876.

{21} Returning to the case before us, we
recall that the address to be searched, 1208
Juanita SW, was listed on each page of the
affidavit. The affidavit describes in graphic
detail numerous acts of sexual molestation,
and evidence to be found in proof thereof, at
a place variously described as “the resi-
dence,” “the Trujillo home,” and “the ad-
dress,” with the only address listed in the
affidavit being 1208 Juanita SW. But the
affidavit never explicitly connects the two.
Accordingly, we must decide whether the
lack of an explicit nexus in the affidavit be-
tween the place to be searched, 1208 Juanita
SW, and the place of the evidence, “the Tru-

1, We are aware that the Court in Hunter re-
viewed the affidavit in that case de novo. 86
F.3d at 681. We decline to comment on the
adoption of such a standard by the Seventh Cir-

jillo home,” the “residence,” and “the ad-
dress” is determinative.

HE {22} We are not without guidance in
our inquiry. We agree with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit that the failure to explicitly state in a
search warrant affidavit that the listed ad-
dress is that of the defendant “is not a fatal
flaw,” at least not always, as long as a rea-
sonable inference to that effect can be drawn
from the facts detailed in the affidavit.
United States v. Hunter, 86 F.3d 679, 681
(Th Cir.1996).! The facts of Hunter are
quite similar to those of the instant case.
Probable cause that the defendant committed
bank robbery was not at issue, as the defen-
dant turned himself in to the authorities
three days before the search warrant issued.
Id. at 681-82. An attachment to the affidavit,
deseribed the place to be searched as “the
residence at 510 Palace Court, Schaumburg,
Illinois,” while the affidavit only referred to
“Hunter's residence” without linking the resi-
dence to the address. Id. at 682 (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, the af-
fidavit “made no reference to any other place
connected to Hunter.” Jd. The court ruled
that “[ajlthough Hunter correctly notes that
the affidavit did not explicitly state that 510
Palace Court was his residence, that is the
only logical conclusion supported by a com-
mon-sense reading of the affidavit.” Id.

{23} The most significant of the similari-
ties between Hunter and the case before us
is that both affidavits only describe one place
connected to the suspects. In each case, the
affidavit lists the address to be searched, and
then the narrative proceeds to discuss one
location in detail. And, in each case, no
express statement connects the address to be
searched with the address described where
evidence can be found. Nonetheless, that
connection is “the only logical conclusion sup-
ported by a common-sense reading of the
affidavit.” Id.

{24} Such an inference is even more rea-
sonable in the case before us. The same
cuit, and merely point out this fact so as not to

create any confusion in our own law that the
substantial basis standard of review governs.

address is listed at the top of each page of
the affidavit; all of the crimes described in
the instant case occurred in Defendant’s bed-
room; some of the specific items of evidence
are expected to be found under Defendant’s
bed or mattress. The detective had two
separate victims tell him precisely where in
his bedroom Defendant kept the pornograph-
ie magazines that were the object of the
search, The issuing judge had a more solid
foundation from which to draw inferences
than in Hunter, where the crimes occurred
away from the suspect’s residence and the
affiant wished to search for evidence that
might have been brought back to the sus-
pect’s residence.

{25} Barring a hypertechnical reading of
the affidavit, an inference that the residence
described is the same as the residence where
evidence can be found, is much more reason-
able than its opposite—that the residence
described in such painstaking detail actually
has no relationship to the events of this case.
We think the reviewing judge was well within
his rights to draw the rational inference and
avoid the irrational. Understandably, the re-
viewing judge was concerned that “[tJhere
[was] no indication in the affidavit that ...
Defendant lived at this address, that he was
presently at that address or had been at that
address sometime in the past.” However,
considered in context, what else could the
detective have intended to say? More signif-
icant still, what other inference could the
issuing judge reasonably have come to?

{26} Simply put, it is a stretch to draw the
opposite inference; one must work hard not
to infer that 1208 Juanita SW is “the resi-
dence” where all these criminal acts occurred
and where incriminating evidence can be
found. Deference is due under the circum-
stances, and his decision to issue the warrant
is supported by a substantial basis in the
record,

{27} Defendant argues that State v. Herr-
era, 102 N.M. 254, 694 P.2d 510 (1985) sup-
ports suppression in this case. In Herrera,
this Court found insufficient probable cause
to determine that the residence to be
searched was in fact the defendant's resi-
dence. Id. at 258, 694 P.2d at 514. The
affidavit in that case provided “(a] thorough

727

description of the residence to be searched,”
and later referred to it as “his residence” or
the “[d]efendant’s residence.” Id. at 257,
694 P.2d at 513 (emphasis omitted). But,
there was no statement of foundation ex-
plaining why the affiant thought the resi-
dence was the defendant’s. Id. The only
supporting information in the affidavit was
that the defendant was apprehended driving
away from the “ ‘general direction’” of the
described residence, and there were “unfro-
zen, fresh tire tracks at the described resi-
dence.” Id. at 258, 694 P.2d at 514. This
Court concluded that “merely because a resi-
dence is described in even minute detail does
not provide a magistrate with the necessary
evidence to infer that a suspect makes such
residence his home.” Jd. “The affidavit
merely stated the conclusion that the de-
scribed residence was Herrera’s home.” Id.
As a result, “[tJhere was virtually no evi-
dence presented in the affidavit from which a
magistrate could properly infer that the
place to be searched was Herrera’s resi-
dence.” Id.

{28} In contrast with Herrera, the affida-
vit in this case is sufficiently detailed to allow
the issuing judge to reasonably infer that
Defendant in fact lives at the described resi-
dence, the one listed as an address where all
the evidence will be found. All of the alleged
criminal conduct in the instant case occurred
in the same residence, in Defendant’s bed-
room, whereas the criminal conduct in Herr-
era occurred at a nightclub away from the
defendant’s home. From the affidavit, we
know that both J.J. and D.M. know where
Defendant lives, with J.J. residing in the
same house, while in Herrera there was no
indication that any of the eyewitnesses who
identified the defendant actually knew where
he lived. Reading Herrera even today, we
are left to speculate why the affiant picked
that house as the defendants residence.

{29} Additional corroboration was not nec-
essary in this case. Again, it is clear from
the affidavit that J.J. lived with Defendant.
It is equally clear that D.M. knew were
Defendant lived. The detective even asked
D.M. why she stopped going over to the
“Trujillo home.” This is more than an inves-
tigating officer’s mere unsupported assump-

728

tion that the residence to be searched is that
of the defendant, as was the case in Herrera.
Rather, the affidavit details the factual foun-
dation for exactly how the detective conclud-
ed that Defendant resided at 1208 Juanita
SW and why incriminating evidence would be
found at that particular place.

{30} Defendant argues that “(i]t would be
inappropriate to search based on the word of
a 15 year old girl that the address is the one
listed,” and “there is no way for an issuing
court to know whether the officers in a case
like this one had verified the girl’s state-
ment.” First, we disagree with the argu-
ment that a 15-year-old girl is not qualified
to identify where and with whom she lives.
Second, it is clear from the affidavit that the
detective in this case independently verified
J.J’s allegations. According to the affidavit,
and prior to applying for the search warrant,
the detective was able to obtain a letter
written between J.J. and Defendant. This
letter not only directly corroborates her alle-
gations, but documents the abuse of D.M. as
well.

HH {81} In sum, the difference between
Herrera and Defendant’s case is that the
affidavit in Herrera was wholly lacking any
foundational information to allow the infer-
ence that the residence described was in fact,
the defendant’s residence. In contrast, the
affidavit in this case lacked only a statement
of the obvious—that “the residence” referred
to on the final page of the affidavit, the one
in which the alleged crimes occurred and
which evidence from under Defendant’s bed
can be found, is identified as 1208 Juanita
SW—the address that appears on every page
of the affidavit. The affidavit laid an ade-
quate foundation for how Defendant’s ad-
dress was determined; the affidavit just
Jacked the final link in the chain. While this
link is a material fact, it “need not be proved
by direct evidence. It is sufficient if there is
evidence from which the fact can properly be
inferred.” State v. Snedeker, 99 N.M. 286,
290, 657 P.2d 618, 617 (1982).

{32} This same discussion equally applies
to United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225
(10th Cir.2005), upon which Defendant also

2. Notably, the dissent makes no reference to this

relies. Again, lacking in Gonzales was any
foundational information that would permit
an inference that the described residence
was that of the defendant or contained evi-
dence of a crime. Id. at 1227-28, Like Herr-
era, the actual crime occurred away from the
residence, no information linked the defen-
dant to the residence, and the only link be-
tween the residence and the evidence to be
seized was a conclusory statement by the
affiant. Gonzales, 399 F.3d at 1230. As
explained above, that situation is vastly dif-
ferent from the one presented in this case.

{33} We acknowledge that this is a close
case. Had the issuing judge denied the
search warrant based on the same affidavit,
we would likely uphold that decision as well.
Here, we sustain the search because some
deference is due the decision of the issuing
judge? and because, in accordance with
sound policy, close cases in this area are to
be decided in favor of our pronounced prefer-
ence for warrants.

Defendant’s Jurisdictional Argument Is
Moot

TH {84} Defendant also argues that the
State filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari
after the thirty-day deadline and that, as a
result, this Court lacks subject matter juris-
diction and, thus, must be quashed. Howev-
er, this Court on October 5, 2009, issued its
Notice granting the State’s explicitly wnop-
posed Motion to accept its Writ of Certiorari
as timely, and as a result the issue is moot.
See N.M. Bus Sales v. Michael, 68 N.M. 228,
226, 360 P.2d 639, 641 (1961).

CONCLUSION

{35} We reverse the Court of Appeals and
remand to the district court for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with this Opinion.

{36} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES,
Justices, and EDWARD L. CHAVEZ,
Justice (dissenting).

deference.

CHAVEZ, Justice (dissenting).

{37} Before the government is constitu-
tionally authorized to physically invade the
privacy and sanctity of a person’s home
based on a search warrant, the affidavit in
support of the search warrant must, at a
minimum, provide reliable facts and cireum-
stances to establish that it is reasonably
probable that the place to be searched pres-
ently contains evidence of a crime. Simply
describing the place to be searched is not
enough to fulfill this requirement. The affi-
davit must contain information that estab-
lishes why the place that is described in
detail presently holds evidence of a crime. It
could be that the crime occurred in the home
of the accused and the affidavit contains reli-
able facts and circumstances to explain why
the affiant believes the place to be searched
is the defendant’s home and presently has
evidence of the crime. Merely because a
residence is described in detail does not pro-
vide the judge who reviews the affidavit with
the essential evidence to infer that an ac-
cused actually lives at the residence. State

v. Snedeker, 99 N.M. 286, 292, 657 P.2d 613,
619 (1982).

{38} In this case, the warrant issued for
the search of 1208 Juanita Street, S.W. in
Albuquerque, New Mexico was described in
detail. Among the items to be seized was
“{aJny and all documentation that may show
possession or ownership of said residence.”
As conceded by the prosecution during the
hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress,
the affidavit does not provide any direct evi-
dence that the crime occurred at 1208 Juani-
ta Street or that Defendant lived or lives
there. Instead, the affidavit contains infor-
mation that the affiant was dispatched “to an
address” where he interviewed a 15-year-old
female who claimed that she had been mo-
Jested by her step-grandfather over the
course of four years. She also alleged that
her 19-year-old uncle had molested her in
his bedroom over the last 15 months, showed
her pornographic magazines he kept under
his mattress, and showed her “porn” on his
computer. The trial judge was unwilling to
infer from these facts that Defendant resided
or presently resides at 1208 Juanita Street or
that the alleged events occurred there.

729

{39} The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court. In my opinion, both courts cor-
rectly applied existing New Mexico law on
the subject. Setting aside time consider-
ations, the affidavit must establish a suffi-
cient nexus between (1) criminal activity, (2)
the things to be seized, and (8) the place to
be searched. In Snedeker, this Court held
that it would allow a magistrate to assume
that certain stolen property might be located
at the home of an accused. 99 N.M. at 292-
98, 657 P.2d at 619-20. However, in that
case we did not dispense with the basic re-
quirement that the place to be searched must.
be established to be that of the accused, or
that the items sought to be seized are located
at the residence. Id.

{40} We reaffirmed this basic requirement
in State v. Herrera, 102 N.M. 254, 694 P.2d
510 (1985). In Herrera, we acknowledged
that “the existence of probable cause to be-
lieve that a suspect has committed murder is
ordinarily sufficient to justify a search of the
suspect's home, the surrounding area, and
his business.” Jd. at 257, 694 P.2d at 518.
However, we made it abundantly clear that
the affidavit in support of the search warrant
must still set forth facts stating why law
enforcement believes the residence to be
searched was the home of the accused or why
Jaw enforcement believed that the evidence
they sought would be located at the place to
be searched. Id. at 258, 694 P.2d at 514,

{41} In Herrera, which is strikingly simi-
Jar to the present case, a thorough descrip-
tion of the residence to be searched was
stated in the affidavit and the prosecution
conceded that the affidavit lacked descriptive
facts showing that the described residence
was the home of the accused. Jd. at 257, 694
P.2d at 518. As in this case, the prosecution,
relying on Snedeker, argued that the magis-
trate could infer from, among other things,
the detailed description of the place to be
searched that the described place was the
defendant’s home. Id. This Court rejected
the argument, stating that “merely because a
residence is described in even minute detail
does not provide a magistrate with the neces-
sary evidence to infer that ... the suspect
resides at that residence.” Id. at 258, 694
P.2d at 514. In arriving at this conclusion,

730

we analyzed our opinion in Snedeker, noting
that we held that probable cause to believe
the accused stole property entitled the mag-
istrate to assume that the stolen property
could be found at the home of the accused.
Id. at 257, 694 P.2d at 5138. However, simply
because a magistrate can assume that stolen
property is presently at the home of the
aecused does not permit the inference that
the only specifically described place to be
searched is the accused’s home. Id. at 257-
58, 694 P.2d at 513-14. In addition, the
conclusory statement in the Herrera affidavit
that the described residence was that of the
defendant was not sufficient to establish that
the place to be searched was the accused’s
home. Jd. at 258, 694 P.2d at 514. A conclu-
sory statement is insufficient because the
magistrate must make an independent judg-
ment that there is probable cause to believe
that evidence of a crime is presently located
at the place to be searched. State v. Barker,
114 N.M. 589, 591, 594, 844 P.2d 839, 841, 844
(Ct.App.1992).

{42} We reaffirmed that Snedeker “does
not do away with the basic requirement that
the residence to be searched must be estab-
lished to be that of the suspect, or alterna-
tively, that the items sought to be seized are
located at that residence.” Herrera, 102
N.M. at 257-58, 694 P.2d at 5138-14. We
went on to note that the magistrate in Sne-
deker was given some facts from which he
could infer that the accused lived at the place
to be searched—namely, the affiant indicated
that he had personal knowledge of where the
accused resided, id. at 257, 694 P.2d at 518,
and that “{h]is personal and household ef-
fects have been moved to the location above
described to the best of [the affiant’s] knowl-
edge.” Snedeker, 99 N.M. at 288, 657 P.2d at
615. In direct contrast to the facts in both
Snedeker and Herrera, the affidavit in this
case does not mention Defendant’s residence,
nor does it identify 1208 Juanita Street as
Defendant’s residence, the place’ where his
niece resides, or as a place having any con-
nection to Defendant or the alleged crime.

{43} In both Snedeker and Herrera we
held that if there is probable cause to believe
that the accused stole property or murdered
someone, the government is entitled to

search the residence of the accused. We
presume as a matter of law that evidence of
the crime is located at the home of the
accused if there is probable cause to believe
the accused stole property or committed
murder. If the affidavit in support of the
search warrant describes the place to be
searched in minute detail and even makes
the conclusory statement that the described
place is the home of the accused, we do not
simply ask “in context, what else could the
detective have intended to say? More signif-
icant still, what other inference could the
Issuing Judge reasonably have come to?”
Maj. Op. 125. We have, until today, always
required more. Like other jurisdictions, we
have required reliable facts and circum-
stances to establish how the accused is con-
nected to the place to be searched or why
evidence of a crime is presently believed to
be in the place to be searched. Bouch v.
State, 143 P.3d 648, 649 (Wyo.2006); 2 La-
Fave, Wayne R., Search and Seizure § 8.7(a)
(4th ed. 2004).

{44} Finally, the majority opinion’s reli-
ance on the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Hunter, 86 F.3d 679, 681
(7th Cir.1996) is misplaced. The affidavit in
Hunter “veferred four times to Hunter's
residence.” Id. at 682. Based on this infor-
mation, the Hunter court understandably
concluded that “the warrant application and
affidavit ... clearly established that the
place to be searched was Hunter’s resi-
dence.” Id. at 681. In direct contrast to
the facts in Hunter, the affidavit challenged
in this case makes no mention of Defen-
dant’s residence and does not identify 1208
Juanita Street as Defendant’s residence, the
place where his niece resides, or as a place
having any connection to Defendant or the
alleged crime. What the affiant knew about
whether Defendant resided at 1208 Juanita
Street or that evidence of the crime was
presently located there was kept secret from
the issuing judge. Indeed, the affiant’s re-
quest to seize items that would establish
who occupied or owned the premises gives
rise to a reasonable inference that the affi-
ant himself was uncertain whether the place
to be searched was the residence of the
accused. However, the decision as to
whether there is a sufficient nexus between

731

the alleged criminal activity, the evidence to
be seized, and the place to be searched is
for the court to decide, not the affiant. A
basic question any judge must answer when
deciding whether to issue a search warrant
is “why does the government want to search
this place?” If the information is not con-
tained in the affidavit, before ruling on a
request for a warrant the judge may require
the affiant to appear personally and may
examine the affiant under oath, provided
such additional evidence is reduced to writ-
ing, supported by oath or affirmation and
served with the warrant. Rule 5-211(B)
NMRA. Because the affidavit in this case
did not contain the requisite information, the
issuing judge erred in issuing the warrant
and the reviewing judge correctly sup-
pressed the evidence.

{45} Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

2011-NMSC-042
266 P.3d 11
In the Matter of Dennis W. MONTOYA,

An Attorney Suspended from the Practice
of Law in the Courts of the State of
New Mexico.

No. 32,397.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
Nov. 9, 2011.

William D. Slease, Joel L. Widman, Albu-
querque, NM, for Disciplinary Board.

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
P.A., Charles J. Vigil, Brenda M. Saiz,
Theresa W. Parrish, Albuquerque, NM, for
Respondent.

OPINION
PER CURIAM.

{1} Almost three years ago, a state district
judge initiated a disciplinary complaint
against attorney Dennis Montoya alleging

734

numerous, serious ethical violations arising
out of Montoya’s legal representation of sev-
eral clients in regard to an accidental death.
Over time, that one disciplinary complaint
became many, as several federal judges in
separate proceedings publically reprimanded
Montoya for numerous, well-documented eth-
ical lapses. When considered as a whole, all
these complaints set forth a deeply troubling
mosaic of ethical misconduct that, for reasons
set forth herein, unquestionably calls for dis-
cipline and seriously calls into question Mon-
toya’s fitness to practice law. For reasons
beyond the scope of this Opinion, resolution
of these complaints was delayed inexcusably
before the Disciplinary Board, which enabled
Montoya to claim an appearance of innocence
for far too long. As a result, this Court has
undertaken substantial revisions to our disci-
plinary process to ensure that no such delays
will reoccur.

BACKGROUND

{2} In 2010, counsel for the New Mexico
Disciplinary Board charged Montoya with
seventy-four violations of the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. Disciplinary counsel con-
solidated the charges into three disciplinary
actions. Eventually, Montoya stipulated to
facts and violations charged in each of the
three actions. Based on the stipulations, dis-
ciplinary counsel and Montoya came to condi-
tional agreements regarding discipline and
made a joint motion to consolidate the three
disciplinary actions into one. This Court
adopted the consolidated agreement with
some significant modifications to the pro-
posed discipline that will be discussed later in
this Opinion. The following recitation of
events and violations derives from facts out-
lined in the stipulations that support the
admissions made in the conditional agree-
ments and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom.

{3} We divide this Opinion into three
parts: the state cases, the federal cases, and
the discipline.

THE STATE CASES

{4} The first disciplinary action against
Montoya derived from several state claims
(the state cases) related to a tire failure that
killed a New Mexico resident (Decedent).
The state cases involved recovery of Dece-

dent’s life insurance proceeds, workers’ com-
pensation benefits, and wrongful death pro-
ceeds. The woman with whom Decedent
lived at the time of his death (Girlfriend)
retained Montoya for legal representation in
the state cases.

{5} As a preliminary matter, it is impor-
tant to understand the relationships between
Decedent, Girlfriend, and the two children.
Decedent and Girlfriend lived together for a
time in Utah. Though they never married,
Decedent and Girlfriend held themselves out.
to be common-law spouses. Girlfriend had a
daughter (Girlfriend’s Daughter) from a pre-
vious relationship who Decedent never
adopted. At some point, Decedent, Girl-
friend, and Girlfriend’s Daughter moved
from Utah to reside in New Mexico, where
Decedent and Girlfriend had a son (Son).
When Decedent died, Son was approximately
three years old.

{6} During the state cases, Montoya rep-
resented not only Girlfriend, but also Girl-
friend’s Daughter and Son. As we shall dis-
cuss, these parties’ legal interests were
hopelessly conflicted. While it is not clear at
exactly what point Montoya knew that Girl-
friend was not Decedent’s wife, it is clear
that Montoya should have known before he
recovered funds in any of the state cases.

Insurance Case

{7} Decedent died intestate and had a
life insurance policy that did not list any
beneficiaries. In order to convince the life
insurance company to allocate proceeds to
Girlfriend, Montoya filed an application for
Informal Appointment of Personal Repre-
sentative with the Eleventh Judicial District
Court. In that application, he asserted that
Decedent died intestate, that Girlfriend was
Decedent’s wife, and that Girlfriend’s
Daughter was Decedent’s issue, Neither of
the latter assertions were true. Based on
Montoya’s misrepresentations, the district
court appointed Girlfriend as the personal
representative of Decedent’s estate and,
without a hearing, issued an order. Por-
tions of that order, prepared by Montoya,
declared that Girlfriend was Decedent's
wife, that Son and Girlfriend’s Daughter

Po
Es
children. The Workers’ Compensation Act

“only” permits persons prescribed as depen-
dents therein to receive compensation bene-

were Decedent’s minor children, and that
Girlfriend was Decedent’s “heir-in-law.”
Only the statement regarding Son was true.

{8} Montoya’s paralegal submitted the
court order and an affidavit signed by Girl-
friend, each representing to the life insur-
ance company that Decedent and Girlfriend
had a common-law marriage pursuant to
Utah law. Montoya admits that these docu-
ments were submitted for the purpose of
establishing Girlfriend’s claim to the insur-
ance proceeds. As a result, the life insur-
ance proceeds, $78,806.97, were paid directly
to Girlfriend, rather than to Decedent’s es-
tate.

{9} If the life insurance proceeds had been
designated to Decedent’s estate, rather than
to Girlfriend in her individual capacity, the
proceeds would have passed according to the
New Mexico’s intestate succession statute.
See NMSA 1978, § 45-2-101(A) (1998) (“Any
part of a decedent’s estate not effectively
disposed of by will passes by intestate suc-
cession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed
in the Uniform Probate Code, except as mod-
ified by the decedent’s will.” (citation omit-
ted)). Under the intestate succession stat-
ute, if a decedent has issue but no spouse,
the estate will pass to the decedent’s descen-
dants. NMSA 1978, § 45-2-103 (1993)
(amended 2011); see also NMSA 1978, § 45-
2-102 (1975) (“Share of the spouse.” (empha-
sis omitted)). Thus, Son was Decedent’s
only statutory beneficiary.

{10} Rather than setting aside proceeds
for Son through Decedent’s estate, Girlfriend
received the entire amount in her individual
capacity. Girlfriend then paid $25,000 of that
amount directly to Montoya for payment of
costs of litigation of the state cases. Some
unquantified and unaccounted for portion of
the remaining $48,806.97 was used for Son’s
clothing, education, and basic needs. Girl-
friend never accounted for any of the
$48,806.97.

Workers’ Compensation Case

{11} Montoya filed a workers’ compensa-
tion claim for the “Estate of [Decedent],”
which named Girlfriend as both Decedent’s
personal representative and wife and named
Girlfriend’s Daughter and Son as Decedent’s

735

fits. NMSA 1978, § 52-1-17 (1989). The
only persons prescribed are dependent chil-
dren of certain ages, widows or widowers,
dependent parents, and dependent grandchil-
dren. See id. Montoya never advised the
Workers’ Compensation Administration that
Girlfriend’s Daughter was not Decedent’s
child.

{12} Montoya’s representation in the
workers’ compensation case resulted in a
lump-sum workers’ compensation settlement
of $55,000. From that amount, Montoya dis-
tributed $28,135.25 directly to Girlfriend in
her individual capacity. No part of the set-
tlement was set aside for Son or paid to
Decedent’s estate. Montoya apparently re-
tained the remainder of the settlement,
$31,864.75, for costs and fees.

Wrongful Death Cases

{18} Montoya also brought a lawsuit
against the tire manufacturer and tire vendor
that made and sold the tire that failed during
the accident that caused Decedent's death.
He brought the suit on behalf of the Wrong-
ful Death Estate of the Decedent and on
behalf of Girlfriend, Son, and Girlfriend’s
Daughter for individual loss-of-consortium
claims. The Wrongful Death Act provides
that proceeds from a judgment shall be dis-
tributed entirely to a decedent’s child, if
there is a child and no “surviving spouse.”
NMSA 1978, § 41-2-8(A), (B) (2001). The
complaint and the amended complaint signed
by Montoya specifically alleged that Girl-
friend was Decedent’s lawful wife. In the
course of the lawsuit, Montoya made repre-
sentations about Decedent's “wife and two
children.” The pleadings never advised the
court that Girlfriend’s Daughter was not De-
cedent’s child or that Montoya was relying on
any theory of Girlfriend being a common-law
wife under Utah law.

{14} Montoya settled the wrongful death
claim against the tire vendor for a substantial
sum. Montoya retained approximately
$22,250 of the total amount under a 33.38%
contingency agreement. The remainder,

736

$45,000, was distributed entirely to Girlfriend
in her individual capacity; none of that
amount went to Decedent’s estate or Son. It
is stipulated that a portion of the proceeds,
unquantified and unaccounted for, was used
for the clothing, education, and basic needs of
Son.

{15} Subsequently, Montoya negotiated a
settlement of the claim against the tire man-
ufacturer for $550,000. He initially proposed
allocating $450,000 of that amount to Girl-
friend and $100,000 to Son. This settlement
was the first for which Montoya sought court
approval. From the total $550,000, Montoya
initially planned to receive 40% as a contin-
gency fee, but eventually lowered that
amount. The settlement proposal was
brought before District Judge Linda Vanzi,
who appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to
represent Son’s interests. GAL began to
investigate the proposed settlement and to
question the previous settlements (life inswr-
ance, workers’ compensation, and the wrong-
ful death claim against the tire vendor) from
which no money had been specifically set
aside for Son.

{16} Although Montoya had consistently
represented Girlfriend as Decedent’s wife in
his wrongful death pleadings, he later repre-
sented to GAL that he was not relying on
marital status for Girlfriend’s recovery.
Rather, he claimed that Girlfriend was enti-
tled to the settlement amount solely due to a
loss-of-consortium claim under Lozoya v.
Sanchez, 20083-NMSC-009, 133 N.M. 579, 66
P.8d 948, abrogated by Heath v. La Mariana
Apartments, 2008-NMSC-017, 143 N.M. 657,
180 P.3d 664. Lozoya stands for the proposi-
tion that persons who are unmarried, in
addition to married persons, may have a loss-
of-consortium claim under certain cireum-
stances. It states that “if a couple were to
satisfy the elements of a common law mar-
riage, as it exists in other states, this would
be a great indication that the couple would
have a significant enough relationship to war-
rant a claim for loss of consortium.” Id. 124.
Montoya did not attempt to plead facts to
prove that Decedent and Girlfriend’s rela-
tionship would “satisfy the elements of a
common law marriage.” Jd. Rather, he sim-
ply asserted that Girlfriend was Decedent’s

wife, a relationship for which we recognized
recovery for loss of consortium before decid-
ing Lozoya. See Romero v. Byers, 117 N.M.
422, 424, 872 P.2d 840, 842 (1994) (holding
that New Mexico should recognize a claim
for spousal loss of consortium).

{17} Eventually, GAL alerted Judge Vanzi
to potential problems and ethical violations
with regard to the proposed wrongful death
settlement with the tire manufacturer.
Judge Vanzi ordered an investigation which
uncovered many of the ethical violations dis-
cussed herein related to the state cases.
Based on what she learned, Judge Vanzi filed
detailed allegations with the Disciplinary
Board regarding Montoya’s conduct. We are
grateful to her for doing so. Those allega-
tions, eventually joined with others filed with
the Disciplinary Board, led to the consolidat-
ed conditional agreement and ultimately to
this Opinion.

{18} The fact that Montoya egregiously
violated numerous rules of professional con-
duct in the course of representing the state
cases is obvious. We now review those rules
in detail.

Duty of Candor

Hl {19} Montoya repeatedly violated his
duty of candor to the court. The integrity of
the adjudicative process requires that a law-
yer act truthfully and honestly before the
court. Montoya violated Rule 16-303(A)(1)
NMRA by knowingly making false state-
ments of fact and law to a tribunal (e.g., the
district court) and to GAL who was acting as
an arm of the court. Rule 16-303(D) pro-
vides that lawyers must also be forthcoming
with all material facts known so that the
court may make informed decisions. Monto-
ya also failed in an ex parte proceeding-—the
application for appointment of Girlfriend as
Decedent’s personal representative—to in-
form the district court of all material facts
known to Montoya that would enable the
court to make an informed decision. Monto-
ya thus violated Rule 16-303(D), which pro-
vides that lawyers must be forthcoming with
all known material facts so that the court
may make informed decisions.

Hl {20} In regard to Montoya’s apparent
understanding at certain points during the
state cases that Girlfriend may have been
Decedent’s common-law wife under Utah law,
the theory was unfounded on several
grounds. First, it is well known that, unlike
certain jurisdictions, New Mexico does not
recognize common-law marriages. See Hart-
ford Ins. Co. v. Cline, 2006-NMSC-033, 118,
140 N.M. 16, 189 P.38d 176. As an exception,
New Mexico does recognize common-law
marriages that are valid in the jurisdiction
where the marriage was consummated. See
In re Estate of Lamb, 99 N.M. 157, 159, 655
P.2d 1001, 1003 (1982). In order to make
Girlfriend’s marriage valid, however, Monto-
ya agrees that he needed to establish the
marriage in Utah, under the terms of a Utah
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (West
2011).

{21} Montoya could have moved to estab-
lish the marriage for up to a year after
Decedent’s death, id, but he neglected to
take those steps. Without doing so, even
Utah would not have recognized Girlfriend
and Decedent as married. Id. If he had done
so, Utah may or may not have recognized the
relationship because the state requires evi-
dence that Decedent had consented to the
union. “[The statute on legalizing a com-
mon-law marriage] requires general reputa-
tion, cohabitation, and assumption of marital
obligations as separate elements in addition
to consent.” Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791,
795 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court
has cautioned that

[clare must be given to guard against
fraudulent marriage claims, especially
where a declaration of marriage would
reap financial rewards for an alleged
spouse. When a reward is available, hu-
man nature may choose to strengthen and
augment, in retrospect, the consent to
marry that was only tentative before the
reward became available.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Regardless
of the merits of such a theory, Montoya
represented that Girlfriend and Decedent
were lawfully married, without mention of
the common-law theory, in all of his court
documents.

737

HM {22} In addition to dishonesty to
the Court, Montoya’s lack of candor to others
caused him to violate additional rules. He
violated Rule 16-401(A) NMRA, by making a
false statement to a third party (the life
insurance company) in connection with the
life insurance proceeds. He also violated
Rule 16-401(B), by failing to disclose a mate-
vial fact to a third party when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client. He did so when
his paralegal represented to the insurer that
Girlfriend was the wife of Decedent under
Utah law and submitted her affidavit to that
effect.

Hl {23} Moreover, if sufficient, a failure
of candor to the court can prejudice the
administration of justice in violation of Rule
16-804(D) NMRA. Montoya’s conduct
reached that level because his misconduct
left the only lawful beneficiary in the state
cases, Son, without protection of his legal
interests.

Conflicts of Interest

HM {24} A concurrent conflict of interest
exists if there is a significant risk that the
representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client or will be materially
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to an-
other client. Rule 16-107(A) NMRA. Monto-
ya had a duty to his clients to avoid a conflict
of interest. Id. Montoya violated Rule 16-
107(A)(1) by representing the substantially
adverse interests of Girlfriend, Son, and Girl-
friend’s Daughter. He violated Rule 16-
107(A)(2) by representing a client when the
representation was materially limited by the
attorney's responsibilities to another client or
third party. Montoya’s representation of
Girlfriend and Son created a particularly
egregious, concurrent conflict of interest be-
cause the legal status of Girlfriend affected
the amount of money available to Son. A
competent lawyer would realize that, because
of the conflict, one attorney could not repre-
sent them both.

{25} To illustrate, it was in Girlfriend’s
best interest that she be considered Dece-
dent’s wife. If Girlfriend were not the wife,
she was limited to an individual claim for loss
of consortium. Because Decedent and Girl-

738

friend were never married, nor recognized as
married in another state, Girlfriend was not
statutorily entitled to recover from any of the
state cases. Conversely, it was in Son’s best
interest that Girlfriend not be considered
Decedent’s wife. He was entitled to recover
in all the state cases. If Girlfriend were not.
Decedent’s wife, Son was the sole statutory
intestate beneficiary, workers’ compensation
beneficiary, and wrongful death beneficiary.
Despite Son’s superior legal standing, howev-
er, he recovered far less than the amount to
which he was entitled. For the most part,
the two parties were in conflict over the
same proceeds, a “zero sum game,” in which
the interest of one party necessarily dimin-
ished the interests of the other.

{26} The concurrent conflict of interest
was not just theoretical. It caused a signifi-
eantly disparate and unjust outcome in this
ease. The combination of life insurance pro-
ceeds, workers’ compensation settlement, and
the first wrongful death settlement against
the tire seller totaled $226,290.80. None of
that sum was specifically set aside for Son,
and none of it was distributed through Dece-
dent’s estate. Then, Montoya proposed a
particularly egregious distribution in the sec-
ond wrongful death settlement, based on the
false representation that Girlfriend was De-
cedent’s wife. Even if that representation
had been true, Girlfriend’s wrongful death
entitlement as a spouse would have been
limited to one-half. See NMSA 1978, § 41-
2-8(B) (2001). Even with a nominal claim for
loss of consortium, Girlfriend’s legitimate
claim to settlement proceeds could not have
approached $450,000 of the available
$550,000, the settlement that was put for-
ward by Montoya.

{27} Montoya violated Rule 16-
108(G) NMRA, by making aggregate settle-
ments of the claims of Girlfriend and Son
(and purportedly for Girlfriend’s Daughter)
without obtaining the written consent of each
client after consultation (or court approval
for the minor client). While Montoya may
have obtained Girlfriend’s consent, he failed
to meet his obligation to Son, who was only
three years old when Montoya was retained
for representation. Because Montoya could
not adequately represent Son’s interests

while simultaneously representing Girlfriend,
he should have sought the appointment of a
GAL or a conservator to take action to pro-
tect Son. See Rule 16-114(B) NMRA. By
failing to seek the appointment of a GAL or a
conservator, or take other protective action
for Son in the negotiation and distribution of
settlement proceeds, Montoya violated Rule
16-114(B).

Competence

HI {28} In addition to his failed duty of
candor to the court and conflicts of interest,
Montoya failed to provide competent repre-
sentation. See Rule 16-101 NMRA. Montoya
failed to competently represent both Girl-
friend and Son. In regard to Girlfriend, he
failed to take appropriate steps to establish a
common-law marriage between Girlfriend
and Decedent under the terms of the Utah
statute. In regard to Son, Montoya’s compe-
tency failures were numerous. He failed to
properly distribute settlement proceeds, ig-
noring statutes that mandated certain distri-
butions. He failed to seek court approval of
settlements which should have benefited Son.
And, he failed to protect funds that were
rightfully Son’s.

{29} Aside from conflicts-of-interest viola-
tions, Girlfriend, as Son’s mother, may legal-
ly have been able to represent Son if that
representation was for the purpose of distrib-
uting proceeds to him. See Chisholm v.
Rueckhaus, 1997-NMCA-112, 15, 124 N.M.
255, 948 P.2d 707 (stating that a parent can
be a party to a child’s suit by representing
the child’s interests). Montoya had a reason-
able duty of care, however, to ensure that
Son’s interests as a statutory beneficiary
were protected—that Son received any pro-
ceeds obtained. See Leyba v. Whitley, 120
N.M. 768, 770, 907 P.2d 172, 174 (1995).
Montoya did not fulfill this reasonable duty
of care, nor is there any indication that Girl-
friend was intended to be a legal representa-
tive for Son. Although it was stipulated that
some portion of the proceeds, unidentified
and unaccounted for, was used (presumably
by Girlfriend) for Son’s clothing, education,
and basic needs, all settlement proceeds, be-
fore Judge Vanzi’s intervention, were paid
directly to Girlfriend, in her individual capac-

ity, without any supervision and without any
accounting.

{30} Even in light of a legal possibility of
representation, the facts in this case suggest
that Girlfriend should not have been trusted
to represent Son. Before he recovered any
settlement amounts, Montoya knew that Girl-
friend was using illegal drugs and that she
had been charged with felony possession of
drugs, specifically methamphetamine. Drug
possession and use may be relevant to a
parent’s ability to care for a child. See gen-
erally State ew rel. CYFD v. Amanda H.,
2007-NMCA-029, 1926-27, 141 N.M. 299,
154 P.3d 674. This Court finds it inexcusable
that Montoya would distribute settlement
proceeds—rightfully belonging to Son—to
Girlfriend, unsupervised and unaccounted
for, when Montoya was aware of her use of
illegal drugs.

Staff Supervision

HM {81} In order to protect the public
against unqualified persons rendering legal
services, only those who have passed the bar
may practice law. See Rule 16-505 NMRA,
ABA Comment [2]. This rule does not limit a
Jawyer’s ability to hire paralegals, as long as
a lawyer supervises the delegated tasks and
assumes responsibility for their actions. See
Rule 16-505, ABA Comment {2]. Montoya
did not stipulate to the facts relating to his
paralegal’s unauthorized practice of law
(namely, the paralegal’s representation to the
insurance company the legal significance of
certain facts). Despite this, he did not con-
test the conclusion that he violated Rule 16-
503(B) NMRA by failing to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that his paralegal’s conduct
‘was compatible with the Rules of Profession-
al Conduct. He also admitted to violating
Rule 16-503(C) by ordering or, with knowl-
edge of the specific conduct, ratifying the
conduct of his paralegal, and Rule 16-505(A),
by assisting another person to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law.

THE FEDERAL CASES

{32} The second and third disciplinary ac-
tions against Montoya arose out of six federal
lawsuits (the federal cases). While it is rare
for even one federal judge to single out and

739

publically admonish an attorney, several fed-
eral judges found it necessary to reprimand
Montoya. In the federal cases, like the state
cases, Montoya failed to fulfill his duty of
candor to the court and to adequately super-
vise his staff. In addition, he filed frivolous
claims and ignored deadlines. Unlike the
state cases, which were unified by their un-
derlying facts, the federal cases are unified
by patterns of behavior, arising from differ-
ent factual scenarios. For that reason, we
address Montoya’s violations in the federal
cases by the type of violation rather than by
the case.

Candor to Court

I {33} As we mentioned in our discus-
sion of the state cases, the integrity of the
adjudicative process requires that a lawyer
act truthfully and honestly before the court.
In observation of this duty, a lawyer shall not
knowingly make false statements of fact or
law. See Rule 16-303(A)(1) NMRA. As with
the state cases, Montoya failed to meet his
duty of candor in the federal cases. As an
example of an infraction that represents the
tip of the iceberg, Montoya violated Rule 16-
303 when he titled a motion that he knew
‘was opposed—he noted the opposition in the
body of his motion—as “unopposed.”

{34} In another case, Montoya filed a com-
plaint under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA) that was assigned to
US. District Judge Judith C. Herrera.
ADEA protects individuals over the age of 40
from certain discriminatory employment
practices. Montoya alleged that his client
was over the age of 40. During discovery,
however, his client admitted that she was
only 35 at the time of her termination. Op-
posing counsel notified Montoya of the signif-
ieance of that age, a jurisdictional fact, but
Montoya refused to dismiss the case.

{35} Rule 16-303(A) provides that lawyers
must “correct a false statement of material
fact or law previously made to the tribunal
by the lawyer.” Once Montoya knew the age
of his client and that her case Jacked merit,
he should have notified the court. By failing
to do so, he violated Rule 16-303. Whether
Montoya knew the age of his client, and
therefore that the ADEA claim was frivolous

740

when filed, is unclear. It is clear, however,
that he should have investigated his client’s
age before filing the lawsuit.

HM {36} If sufficient, a failure of candor
to the court can prejudice the administration
of justice in violation of Rule 16-804(D)
NMRA. It appears Judge Herrera concluded,
and we agree, that Montoya’s failure preju-
diced the administration of justice. She
granted summary judgment to the federal
employer and dismissed the ADEA action
with prejudice. Citing Rule 11(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Judge Herrera
gave Montoya the benefit of the doubt that
his initial allegation about his client’s age was
made in good faith. However, the judge
asked, rhetorically, “why no effort appear[ed]
to have been made to drop the claim follow-
ing the revelation of Plaintiff's actual age.
Not only did [Montoya] not file an amended
complaint dropping the claim, but [he] did
not renounce the claim in [the] Response to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judg-
ment....”

{87} In the same ADEA case, Montoya
failed to meet his duty of candor to the court
in yet another way, when he altered deposi-
tion testimony to favor his client. The client
‘was a postal worker who had lost an “Arrow
Key” while delivering mail and did not report
its loss. A supervisor had testified regarding
the importance of the key, a type of master
key for mailboxes in Albuquerque. The su-
pervisor specifically referenced the loss of
the Arrow Key as a reason for termination.
While the supervisor’s original testimony
supported the contention that the key opened
ail mailboxes in Albuquerque, Montoya filed
a motion with the supervisor's testimony re-
dacted to read that the key only opened
mailboxes in specific areas of Albuquerque.
Judge Herrera chastised Montoya for this
behavior: “{Montoya’s] use of an altered quo-
tation that changes the substance of [the]
statement as a basis for challenging a materi-
al fact is disturbingly misleading at best.”

{88} In yet another case, Montoya
failed to meet his duty of candor to the court
by violating Rule 16-802(A) NMRA, which
prohibits making reckless statements about
the integrity of a judge. In that case, U.S.
District Judge William P. Johnson awarded

attorney’s fees against Montoya, and Monto-
ya filed an order to recuse the judge, accus-
ing Judge Johnson of having a personal bias
against him. Montoya claimed that the basis
for his accusations was that Judge Johnson
had ruled against Montoya in previous cases,
criticized Montoya’s legal representation ear-
lier in this same case, which, as discussed
below, was more than justified, and obtained
Montoya’s exclusion from the Criminal Jus-
tice Act (CJA) panel through the Judge’s
limited role in that decision, thereby making
Montoya ineligible to be appointed to repre-
sent criminal defendants in criminal court.

{39} We have reminded attorneys before
that “[p]ersonal bias cannot be inferred from
an adverse ruling or the enforcement of the
rules of criminal procedure.” State v. Her-
nandez, 115 N.M. 6, 20, 846 P.2d 312, 326
(1993). Montoya did not explain why Judge
Johnson’s prior adverse rulings and criti-
cisms were not justified. Further, Judge
Johnson just happened to be one of seven
New Mexico federal judges who had signed
the order excluding Montoya from the CJA
panel.

Frivolous Litigation

WM {40} Montoya had a duty to use
legal process to effectively advocate for his
clients without abusing that process. Includ-
ed in this obligation is a duty not to bring or
defend legally or factually frivolous proceed-
ings. Rule 16-301 NMRA. Montoya brought
many frivolous claims and filed many frivo-
lous motions in the federal courts in violation
of Rule 16-301.

{41} To begin, in Montoya’s groundless
age discrimination claim, even when the dis-
positive fact that his client was too young
was plainly put before Montoya, he ignored it
and continued litigating until he reached both
the inevitable result and a written reprimand
from a federal judge. If the lawsuit was not
frivolous when it was filed, it certainly be-
came frivolous when Montoya was alerted to
the age discrepancy and failed to take action
to dismiss the lawsuit.

{42} In another case, Montoya filed two
complaints, one of which was frivolous be-
cause its legal basis was precluded by the

other. First, he filed a “mixed-case” com-
plaint with the federal Merit System Protec-
tion Board (MSPB), meaning that Montoya
claimed that an agency personnel action was
based in whole or part on discrimination in
terms of race, sex, or age. Three days later,
he filed a complaint with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), al-
leging the same facts. Filing the mixed-case
complaint with the MSPB, however, consti-
tuted an election of remedy to the exclusion
of an EEOC complaint. Williams v. Munoz,
106 F.Supp.2d 40, 48 (D.D.C.2000) (stating
that “[a] mixed-case complaint may be filed
with [the EEOC] or with the MSPB, but not
in both places at once” (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 7702 (2007); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b)
(2010))). Thus, the EEOC claim had no ef-
fect, or possible effect, whatsoever. The
EEOC claim was frivolous.

{43} Then, despite the law on mixed-case
complaints, Montoya opposed a summary
judgment motion on the basis that the ongo-
ing EEOC complaint justified continuing the
MSPB case. That motion in opposition was
frivolous because it had no legal basis. The
federal court granted summary judgment
based on Montoya’s untimeliness in the
MSPB case, calling the EEOC claim a legal
“nullity.”

{44} Yet another federal claim made by
Montoya was frivolous because it lacked
proper defendants and supporting evidence.
Montoya listed eight “unidentified” defen-
dants but failed to name or serve them,
despite ample opportunity to do so. The one
defendant Montoya did name was a sheriff's
department. The sheriff's department, how-
ever, was not a proper defendant because a
prior ruling had held that governmental sub-
units were not proper defendants. Because
Montoya also failed to put forth any evidence
in support of some of the claims he made, the
claims were dismissed.

{45} In a case that highlights Montoya’s
repeated frivolous filings, Montoya repre-
sented a civil defendant in a lawsuit filed in
Arizona state court. Montoya improperly re-
moved the case from the Arizona state court
to the federal district court for the District of
New Mexico. Instead of attempting to im-
properly remove the action across state lines,

741

Montoya could have removed the case to
Arizona federal court, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) (2006), and then filed a motion to
transfer to New Mexico federal court, see 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). Opposing counsel
sent a letter to Montoya correctly advising
him that the removal was improper because
the case could only be removed to a federal
district court in Arizona. Montoya never
withdrew the removal or responded to the
letter. Opposing counsel in New Mexico was
then forced to file a motion to remand. Mon-
toya argued forwm non conveniens in re-
sponse, which had no basis in law or fact.

HMI {46} Because neither filing had any
legal merit, Montoya’s removal and forwm
non conveniens claims were both frivolous,
in violation of Rule 16-301. In addition, the
claims delayed the litigation unnecessarily,
in violation of Rule 16-302 NMRA. In ruling
on opposing counsel’s motion for remand to
Arizona, federal Judge Johnson stated, not
surprisingly, that the removal petition was
deficient on its face and that Montoya’s ar-
guments were “totally devoid of merit.”
Judge Johnson also described Montoya’s re-
moval as “blatantly improper,” questioning
why Montoya had insisted “that removal was
somehow proper” despite opposing counsel’s
efforts “to demonstrate to [Montoya] just
how legally unsound and untenable his re-
moval” attempt was. In addition to admon-
ishing Montoya, Judge Johnson awarded at-
torney’s fees against him.

Untimeliness

HM {47} Montoya chronically failed to
meet court deadlines, thereby impeding the
administration of justice. A client is entitled
to expect that an attorney will take reason-
ably prompt action. In re Carrasco, 106
N.M. 294, 295, 742 P.2d 506, 507 (1987).
Dilatory practices, such as a consistent fail-
ure to expedite litigation, discredit the ad-
ministration of justice. See Rule 16-302,
Committee Commentary. Therefore, a law-
yer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation in accordance with clients’ interests,
Rule 16-302. Failure to expedite litigation
not only discredits the administration of jus-
tice, but the passage of time can also ad-
versely affect a client’s interests. Rule 16-

742

1083 NMRA, Committee Commentary, para.
8. Thus, a lawyer must act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a
client. Rule 16-103.

{48} In at least four federal cases, Mon-
toya failed to file essential pleadings on be-
half of his clients. The fact patterns are
strikingly similar in all four cases, illustrat-
ing a disturbing trend of representation
without diligence or promptness. Montoya’s
repeated failure to file, or to timely file,
pleadings represents a failure to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in rep-
resenting his clients in violation of Rule 16-
103. In one case, Montoya’s client had sev-
en days to file an appeal of his removal
from the U.S. Air Force. Montoya waited
forty-two days after the deadline to file the
appeal. Montoya then had thirty days to
appeal to the federal district court which he
did not file until ninety-four days after that
deadline.

{49} Failing to file and filing late seemed
to have become a matter of course for Mon-
toya. In one case, Montoya had a thirty-day
window for initiating review of his client’s
termination by the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture. Twenty-nine days after the deadline
had passed, Montoya filed the complaint. In
another instance, Montoya failed to timely
respond to a motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment was granted against that
client, in part due to Montoya’s failure to
timely respond. In yet another case, Monto-
ya failed to put forth evidence in support of
his allegations, which provoked the court to
accept an opposing party’s facts, undisputed,
and to dismiss those claims.

{50} Montoya’s failure to act in a timely
manner repeatedly prejudiced the adminis-
tration of justice. For example, when feder-
al Judge Johnson awarded attorney's fees
against Montoya, the court allowed Montoya
ten days to object. Three months later,
Montoya finally objected. In another federal
ease, an opposing counsel sought attorney's
fees from Montoya’s client. Montoya initial-
ly obtained an agreement from opposing
counsel for an extension to respond, but then
failed to file that extension with the court.
He then obtained a second continuance with
the consent of opposing counsel. When Mon-

toya requested a third continuance, opposing
counsel did not consent. When Montoya’s
opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees
was finally filed, despite the numerous exten-
sions, it was late and without leave from the
court.

{51} In the same federal case, Montoya
failed to timely respond to opposing counsel's
motion for summary judgment. Instead,
without leave of the court, he filed an untime-
ly motion for an extension to respond. Then,
Montoya filed another untimely response,
again without leave of the court, opposing
counsel’s motion for summary judgment.
Montoya also filed an untimely appendix of
exhibits to his already untimely response.
These repeated delays and requests for con-
tinuances represent Montoya’s failure to
make reasonable efforts to expedite litiga-
tion, consistent with the interests of a client,
in violation of Rule 16-302.

{52} Montoya’s untimeliness and lack of
diligence provoked U.S. Chief Magistrate
Lorenzo F. Garcia to recommend sanctions
against Montoya in response to the “need-
lessly prolonged and increased ... costs of
the litigation.” U.S. District Judge James A.
Parker adopted Judge Garcia’s recommenda-
tion, finding that Montoya “brought federal
discrimination claims that had no basis, en-
gaged in dilatory tactics, and continued to
assert meritless claims long after it became
clear that the claims had no basis.” Monto-
ya’s untimeliness in another federal case
caused U.S. District Judge Bruce D. Black to
hold Montoya’s client responsible for Monto-
ya’s “errors that fall short of due diligence.”

Supervision of Staff

HM s-{53} As with the state cases, in
which Montoya failed to supervise his parale-
gal, he also failed to supervise his office staff,
in violation of Rule 16-503 and Rule 16-505.
Montoya blamed his staff for his inability to
meet court deadlines. This misplaced blame
demonstrates Montoya’s ignorance of his own
professional responsibility to make reason-
able efforts to oversee his staff's conduct and
ensure compatibility with professional obli-
gations. See Rule 16-503(B). Our rules pro-
vide that a lawyer acting in a managerial
capacity must take measures to reasonably

assure that the staff's conduct is compatible
with the lawyer’s own professional obli-
gations. See Rule 16-503(A). Moreover, the
lawyer, not office staff, is ultimately responsi-
ble for the knowledgeable and diligent repre-
sentation of clients. See In re Martinez, 107
N.M. 171, 172, 754 P.2d 842, 843 (1988) (find-
ing the actions of a legal assistant to be
imputed to the actions of the attorney). The
reoccurring inability of Montoya’s staff to
calendar deadlines and otherwise comply
with Montoya’s professional obligations rep-
resents a failure on Montoya’s behalf. He
has the responsibility to oversee his staff's
conduct and ensure that their work was com-
patible with his own professional obligations.
See Rule 16-503, Committee Commentary.
{54} Blaming his staff for his own failure
to meet court deadlines is an example of
Montoya’s alarming pattern of shirking his
own responsibilities. This pattern is particu-
larly disconcerting in terms of whether Mon-
toya can ever be trusted to practice law in
the future.
DISCIPLINE

HN {55} As mentioned at the opening of
this Opinion, disciplinary counsel and Monto-
ya came to a conditional agreement regard-
ing discipline after consolidating the state
and federal cases. This agreement formed
after Montoya conceded the various facts and
violations described herein and after he
waived the right to a hearing before a hear-
ing committee and the Disciplinary Board.

{56} Upon initial review, this Court could
not agree on several of the terms in the
initial consolidated agreement signed by
Montoya and disciplinary counsel; the sever-
ity and number of Montoya’s violations war-
ranted a harsher penalty. The initial consoli-
dated agreement provided for a one-year
suspension—six months for the state cases
and six months for the federal cases. It also
provided for an automatic reinstatement of
Montoya’s license. Following reinstatement,
the agreement provided for a one-year pro-
bationary period. Because this Court must
ensure that our expectations for Montoya’s
period of suspension are fulfilled before al-
lowing him to practice again, we could not
agree to an automatic reinstatement of his
license. In addition, we insisted that the

743

probationary period must be long enough so
that, if Montoya does resume the practice of
law, he does so responsibly and in accordance
with the Rules of Professional Conduct.

{57} The agreement was amended to ad-
dress our concerns. It now provides that if
Montoya desires to reinstate his license after
his one-year suspension, he must petition this
Court for reinstatement as provided under
Rule 17-214 NMRA. Montoya’s suspension
began April 25, 2011. In addition, the proba-
tionary period is now three years rather than
one. As a condition of the agreement, Mon-
toya was required to pay the costs incurred
during the disciplinary matter within ninety
days. Any unpaid balance is subject to an
8.5% interest rate per annum.

{58} During Montoya’s suspension, he may
not provide any legal services, including
paralegal services, in connection with cases in
which any of his present or former clients
are or were involved. He cannot work in,
out of, or for the same office where his
former clients’ cases are handled. If he does
provide paralegal services, he must do so
under the direct supervision of a lawyer ap-
proved by this Court who is not representing
any of Montoya’s former clients. Such an
attorney must notify the Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel that the attorney is retaining
Montoya and that the attorney will act as a
supervisor.

{59} If Montoya is reinstated after a year,
he will be on supervised probation, under the
supervision of a lawyer approved by this
Court. This Court will approve a supervis-
ing attorney and Montoya will be obligated to
compensate the supervising attorney for time
spent providing supervision. Montoya and
the supervising attorney will be required to
meet no less than once per month. Montoya
will be required to accept instruction and
direction from his supervisor, including di-
rectives related to the handling of trust ac-
counts, maintenance of records, files and cal-
endars, management methods, and caseload.
Montoya will have to limit his caseload as
determined prudent by his supervisor. The
supervisor will submit quarterly reports to
disciplinary counsel and thirty days before
the end of the probationary period will report

744

whether Montoya. has satisfactorily complied
with the terms of his probation.

{60} The ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (2005) (ABA Standards )
provide that sanctions should be applied
based on a consideration of the ethical duty a
lawyer has violated (duty to client, duty to
public, duty to legal system, and duty to
profession), the lawyer’s mental state (inten-
tional, knowing, or negligent), the extent of
the actual or potential injury caused by the
lawyer's misconduct, and aggravating or mit-
igating circumstances. ABA Standards Rule
TI, at 9. All these considerations played into
Montoya’s prescribed discipline. The earlier
portion of this Opinion summarizes Monto-
ya’s numerous professional conduct viola-
tions. We now turn to the other factors:
mental state, actual and potential injury, and
mitigating factors. In addition, it is impor-
tant that the discipline in this case be con-
gruent and proportional to discipline applied
in other, similarly situated cases.

{61} In regard to mental state, some of
Montoya’s infractions were at least knowing,
while for others we have no evidence that
they were more than negligent. In the state
cases, disciplinary counsel has represented
that there is no evidence that Montoya’s
actions were intended to defraud either his
clients or GAL. Some of Montoya’s violations,
such as candor to the court, must have been
knowing by their very nature.

{62} In terms of injury, Montoya caused
injury or potential injury to his clients, to the
legal system, and to the profession. In the
state cases, Montoya’s actions primarily
caused financial injury to Son and general
injury to the legal system. There is some
evidence of restitution by Montoya to Son,
the financially injured party in the state
cases. A legal malpractice lawsuit on behalf
of Son resulted in a confidential financial
settlement, which GAL believes is in an
amount that would make Son whole. Thus,
the remaining injury in the state cases was to
the administration of justice, in that Montoya
lied to the courts, wasted the court’s time,
made a mockery of the legal system, and
required GAL to investigate his conduct. In
the federal cases, Montoya primarily caused
injury to the administration of justice by

making late filings, frivolous filings, and mis-
representations to the court. He also poten-
tially injured clients. Although it is not clear
if any of the clients in the federal cases had
meritorious claims, at a minimum, their inju-
ries were the time and any resources lost by
hiring Montoya.

{63} Absent aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances, the ABA Standards generally
recommend reprimand or, at most, suspen-
sion for negligent conduct. See generally
ABA Standards §§ 4.18, 4.28, 4.33, 4.42(b),
4.48, 4.53(b), 4.68, 6.18, 6.28, 6.33, 7.8, 8.3(a),
at 17-25. In regard to conflicts of interest,
suspension is appropriate if the lawyer knows
of the conflict, does not disclose the possible
effect of the conflict, and causes injury to a
client.

{64} Reprimand is appropriate if the law-
yer is negligent in determining conflicts of
interest and causes injury to a client. Id.
§ 4.38, at 18, Disbarment for creating a
conflict of interest is only recommended in
three circumstances. It is recommended
when the conflict is created to benefit the
lawyer or another and causes the client seri-
ous or potentially serious injury. Disbar-
ment is also recommended when the infor-
mation obtained through the conflict is
knowingly used to benefit the lawyer or an-
other and causes serious or potentially seri-
ous injury to the client. Id. § 4.31(a)-(c), at
17-18.

{65} Disbarment is also appropriate when
an attorney knowingly makes false state-
ments to a court with the intent to deceive
and causes a significant, or potentially signif-
icant, injury to a party or adverse effect on
the legal proceeding. Jd. § 6.11, at 22. Sus-
pension, by contrast, is appropriate if the
misrepresentation is knowingly made but not
necessarily with the intent to deceive and
causes injury, or potential injury, to the
client or legal proceeding. Jd. § 6.12, at 22.
We note that for lack of diligence, negligence
is enough for disbarment if the lawyer’s ne-
glect causes serious, or potentially serious,
injury to a client. Id. § 4.410), at 18.

{66} This case presents several mitigating

and aggravating factors. Most important,
there was no evidence that dishonest or self-

ish motivations inspired Montoya’s actions.
See id. § 9.82(b), at 27 (absence of dishonest
or selfish motives is a mitigating factor).
There is some evidence that Montoya had
sudden and significant health issues around
the time of many of his infractions that af-
fected his ability to handle his caseload. See
id. § 9,32(h), at 28 (physical disability is a
mitigating factor), § 9.32(c), at 27 (personal
or emotional problems are mitigating fac-
tors). Prior to the violations described here-
in, Montoya had no disciplinary record. Id.
§ 9,82(a), at 27 (no prior record is mitigating
factor). Yet, he committed all these infrac-
tions after practicing law since 1985, when he
certainly should have known better. See id.
§ 9.22), at 27 (substantial experience in
practice of law is an aggravating factor). In
addition, in the state cases, Son was a vulner-
able victim to Montoya’s negligence. See id.
§ 9.22(h) (vulnerability of a victim is an ag-
gravating factor). The number and variety
of infractions is also an aggravating factor.
See id. § 9.22(d) (multiple offenses is an ag-
gravating factor).

{67} It is important to this Court that we
apply discipline in a fair and consistent man-
ner. Disciplinary counsel cited In re Cooley,
No. 30,345 (May 18, 2007) (unpublished) as
an example of a recent case in which this
Court responded to similar infractions with
discipline proportional to the discipline
agreed upon in this case. Cooley admitted to
a number of varied violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, including violations re-
garding mismanagement of his trust account,
including disbursements to himself without
known purposes; counts of incompetent rep-
resentation; engaging in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice, including an
outburst in court that interrupted a trial and
confused a jury and a missed hearing sched-
uled by the court; and various other infrac-
tions.

{68} A settlement agreement with Cooley
provided for a two-and-a-half-year suspen-
sion, with one year of actual suspension and
the remainder deferred in favor of probation.
Cooley was required to abstain from alcohol
and controlled substances during his proba-
tion and to undergo random alcohol and drug
testing. Upon reinstatement, which would

745

occur automatically if no conditions during
suspension were violated, the agreement pro-
vided that Cooley would undergo an 18-
month supervision period, during which he
would continue random drug and alcohol
testing and a monitoring agreement with the
Lawyers Assistance Committee of the New
Mexico State Bar.

{69} Like Montoya, Cooley had numerous
and varied violations of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct of varying degrees of severi-
ty. Unlike Montoya, we hinged Cooley’s re-
instatement upon his successful abstention
from alcohol and other drugs, among other
things. Because we do not know whether
Montoya’s indiscretions are curable with time
or treatment, and because his infractions are,
on balance, more serious, we opted for a non-
automatic reinstatement and a longer proba-
tionary period in his case.

CONCLUSION

{70} For the foregoing reasons, we accept
the consolidated agreement of disciplinary
action against Montoya, as amended.

{T1} IE IS SO ORDERED.

2011-NMSC-044
266 P.3d 25

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-
Petitioner,

vy.

Curtis HARPER, Defendant-Respondent.
State of New Mexico, Plaintiff-
Respondent,
ve
Curtis Harper, Defendant—Petitioner.
Nos. 32,388, 32,402.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Nov. 22, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Jacque-
line R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for State of New Mexico.

747

Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, Carlos Ruiz De La Torre, Assis-
tant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for
Curtis Harper.

OPINION

CHAVEZ, Justice.

{1} Defendant Curtis Harper was indicted
on fifteen counts of criminal sexual pen-
etration of a child under the age of thirteen.
During a docket call in December 2006, the
district court learned for the first time that
not all witness interviews had been conduct-
ed, including those of the alleged victim and
the doctor who examined her. The district
court rescheduled the trial for February 19,
2007, and verbally instructed the attorneys to
complete the witness interviews by January
19, 2007. During a subsequent hearing, be-
cause neither the victim nor the doctor were
interviewed before the court-imposed dead-
line, the district court prohibited the State
from calling either of them as witnesses.
The State agreed with Harper that it could
not make a prima facie case against him if
these two witnesses were not allowed to tes-
tify.

{2} The State appealed the district court’s
exclusion of the two witnesses. The Court of
Appeals unanimously reversed the district
court regarding the victim, concluding that
the State made efforts to comply with the
district court’s request and Harper was not
prejudiced by the State’s failure to make the
victim available for an interview within the
time frame established by the district court.
Among other reasons, the Court of Appeals
noted that this Court had granted Harper’s
Rule 5-604 NMRA petition for an extension
of time to try the case until June 24, 2007. A
majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the
exclusion of the doctor because, although
Harper was not prejudiced, the State inten-
tionally did not comply with the district
court’s deadline due to the doctor’s demand
for payment in advance of the interview.
Because exclusion of witnesses requires an
intentional violation of a court order, preju-
dice to the opposing party, and consideration
of less severe sanctions, we affirm the Court
of Appeals with respect to the victim and

748

reverse with respect to the doctor. There-
fore, we reverse the district court's order
precluding the victim and the doctor from
testifying at trial and remand for proceed-
ings consistent with this Opinion.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{3} On November 22, 2004, Harper was
indicted on fifteen counts of criminal sexual
penetration of a child under the age of thir-
teen, a first-degree felony. After initially
being represented by private defense coun-
sel, Harper secured representation from the
New Mexico Public Defender Department
beginning in June 2005. Harper’s attorney
made his first request for witness interviews
to the State on July 8, 2006.

{4} Five months later during a docket call,
Harper’s attorney advised the district court
that the parties were not prepared to go to
trial because, despite two attempts, not all of
the witnesses had been interviewed. Har-
per’s attorney acknowledged that the district
court would not entertain a motion to dismiss
at that time. Harper’s attorney therefore
asked the court to set a date by which the
witnesses were to be made available, and if
the witnesses were not available or did not
cooperate, then they could “take it from
there.”

{5} The State explained that one group of
witnesses had been scheduled but had failed
to appear, and stated that those witnesses
would be rescheduled under subpoena. The
two remaining witnesses included the victim,
who was a minor, and Dr. Ornelas, who
examined her. The State agreed to make
the victim available, but indicated that her
interview would be the last to be scheduled
so that Harper could consider the pending
offer of a plea agreement. The State ex-
plained that under a policy in the Second
Judicial District Attorney’s Office, a plea of-
fer is withdrawn once a minor victim is inter-
viewed. With respect to Dr. Ornelas, the
State represented that there had been no
attempt to set up the interview because the
Public Defender Department had not yet au-
thorized payment of Dr. Ornelas, and “we've
got to get payment set up before that can be
done.”

{6} In response to an inquiry from the
district court about the time left to try the

case, the prosecutor stated that one month
remained, but he intended to seek an exten-
sion of time for an additional six months.
The district court then asked how much time
was needed to complete the interviews. The
prosecutor estimated that a couple of weeks
would be needed to interview the first set of
witnesses. With respect to the victim, the
prosecutor believed she could be scheduled at
any time, but cautioned that the plea offer
would be withdrawn once that interview oc-
curred. With respect to Dr. Ornelas, the
prosecutor represented that “the doctor can-
not be set up until payment is approved.”
Harper’s attorney did not comment on any of
the State’s representations. Accordingly, the
district court scheduled the trial for Febru-
ary 19, 2007. With respect to the interviews,
the district court stated, with brief interrup-
tions from counsel acknowledging what was
being said:
[W]hat I’d like to do is to try to give a
deadline of the 19th of January for these
interviews to be completed.... And that
way if we're at that point and everything
that can be done has been done, then you
folks have a month to get the case actually
ready to try.... Then if there’s at least in
the Defense’s mind some continuing non-
compliance, we’ll—the Court will consider
any motions that you have sometime {sic]
after that and figure out if any remedy is
necessary.

{7} An order regarding the witness inter-
views was never entered by the district
court. It is not clear from the above pro-
nouncement who had the responsibility to
make the witnesses available. Despite the
Jack of clarity or any rule obligating the
State to make witnesses available, it appears
from the record that the State assumed that
responsibility. It is also not clear who was
to make arrangements to pay Dr. Ornelas, or
if that arrangement was necessary at all.
However, in a subsequent hearing, the State
represented that other judges in the Second
Judicial District Court have required the
Public Defender Department to pay the doc-
tor in this type of case. Overall, the lack of
evidence and the vagueness of the commen-
tary by both the attorneys and the district
court make analysis of this case difficult.

{8} In any event, although some witnesses
were interviewed under subpoena, the victim
and Dr. Ornelas were not. The prosecutor
scheduled the victim to be interviewed by
Harper on January 19, 2007, and as recently
as January 18 the victim had purportedly
advised the prosecutor that she would attend
the interview. However, she did not appear
for her interview and apparently avoided a
follow-up phone call from the prosecutor.
The prosecutor never scheduled Dr. Ornelas
for an interview because payment arrange-
ments were not made. The State filed a
motion to extend the time to produce wit-
nesses, and Harper filed a motion to exclude
the State’s witnesses. Both motions were
heard on March 29, 2007. Prior to the hear-
ing, pursuant to Rule 5-604, the State se-
cured an additional time extension from this
Court to try the case, which was then set for
trial on June 24, 2007.

{9} The district court ultimately excluded
both the victim and Dr. Ornelas as witnesses,
citing the following reasons: (1) the State
failed to comply with an unambiguous dead-
line; (2) “witness[es cannot] hold hostage
their testimony and their cooperation with
discovery in a criminal case on simply a
philosophy of no-pay-no-play”; (8) the State
failed to produce any witnesses to testify in
support of its allegations that the victim had
been pressured by Harper’s family not to
cooperate with the prosecution; and (4) Har-
per was prejudiced because of “lack of dis-
covery, lack of ability to prepare, lack of
confrontation, incarceration ... during all of
this delay.” The prosecution conceded that
“as long [as] these two witnesses remain
unable to testify, the State cannot go forward
and put on a prima facie case.”

{10} Following the district court’s order
excluding the two witnesses, the court low-
ered Harper’s $200,000 cash-only bond to a
$50,000 cash or surety bond with numerous
conditions of release. Harper was released
from state custody in late July 2007. The
State appealed to the Court of Appeals.

{11} The Court of Appeals, in an Opinion
authored by Judge Kennedy with Judge Ro-
bles concurring, reversed the district court’s
exclusion of the victim’s testimony, and af-
firmed the district court’s exclusion of Dr.

749

Ornelas’s testimony. Judge Bustamante
concurred as to the victim and dissented as
to Dr. Ornelas. State v. Harper, 2010-
NMCA--055, 1137-61, 148 N.M. 286, 235 P.3d
625 (Bustamante, J., specially concurring in
part and dissenting in part). At the outset of
its Opinion, the majority emphasized that it
would not disturb the district court’s rulings
absent an abuse of discretion, but noted that
exclusion of witnesses is improper absent a
party’s intentional refusal to comply with a
court order and prejudice to the opposing
party. Jd. 1911-12. Judge Bustamante
agreed with this statement of the law. Id.
1945, 48-49 (Bustamante, J., specially con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).

{12} Regarding the victim, the majority,
with Judge Bustamante concurring, conelud-
ed that the State had made adequate efforts
to make the victim available for an interview
within the time frame set forth by the dis-
trict court, and prejudice shown by Harper
was insufficient. Id. 1116, 51-52. With re-
gard to the State’s compliance, the Court of
Appeals cited the State’s scheduling of the
interview with the victim, its willingness to
reschedule the interview when the victim
failed to attend, and Harper’s ability to ac-
cess the victim’s Safehouse interview. Id.
1914, 16. The Court also concluded that
Harper failed to establish more than specula-
tive prejudice when the victim’s possibly fad-
ed memory was the only prejudice offered.
Id. 1916, 47, 54. The Court of Appeals
concluded that any “culpability” attributable
to the State for the victim’s eleventh-hour
interview date was “mollifie{d]” by the
State’s efforts to secure the victim for an
interview. Id. 114.

{13} With respect to Dr. Ornelas, the ma-
jority concluded that the State’s refusal to
schedule the doctor directly contravened the
district court’s order. Jd. 117-18. The
majority’s conclusion was driven by its firm
rejection of the State’s claim that the State’s
recalcitrance was justified by its concerns
regarding payment of Dr. Ornelas’s witness
fees. Id. 124. Indeed, the majority con-
cluded that the State had failed to even
preserve the issue regarding the fees, as it
had not invoked a ruling before the district
court. Id. 118. In reviewing the substance

750

of the State’s claim, the majority explained
that the State could not exploit its control
over witnesses to make demands for pay-
ment of witness fees in the face of an “unam-
biguous” district court order. Id. 1120, 28.
The majority also rejected the State’s con-
tention that it was Harper’s obligation to
subpoena Dr. Ornelas under Rule 5-503
NMRA, concluding that the State could not
suddenly shed the responsibility it adopted
for scheduling witness interviews, and that
the district court obviated Harper’s obli-
gation to seek a subpoena for Dr. Ornelas.
Harper, 2010-NMCA-055, 1122, 30, 148
N.M. 286, 235 P.8d 625. Finally, the majori-
ty found that, despite the State’s intransi-
gence, Harper was not prejudiced by the
State’s failure to schedule the doctor for an
interview. Id. 184. Despite this finding,
and despite noting earlier in the Opinion the
need for a showing of prejudice, the majority
affirmed the district court’s exclusion of Dr.
Ornelas. Id. 135.

{14} In his dissent to the majority’s affir-
mation of the exclusion of Dr. Ornelas, Judge
Bustamante emphasized the lack of prejudice
to Harper jand cited both parties’ culpability
in failing to address the payment of fees to
Dr. Ornelas. Jd. 1155, 61 (Bustamante, J.,
specially concurring in part and dissenting in
part). We agree that Harper was not preju-
diced by the failure to schedule the inter-
views of either the victim or Dr. Ornelas
under the deadline established by the district
court.

Hl {15} Because the exclusion of a wit-
ness is improper absent an intentional refusal
to comply with a court order, prejudice to the
opposing party, and consideration of less se-
vere sanctions, we affirm the Court of Ap-
peals as to the victim and reverse as to Dr.
Ornelas. Therefore, exclusion of the wit-
nesses was an abuse of discretion.

EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES AS A
SANCTION REQUIRES AN INTENTION-
AL VIOLATION OF A COURT ORDER,
PREJUDICE TO THE OPPOSING PAR-
TY, AND CONSIDERATION OF LESSER
SANCTIONS.

TH s{16} A court has the discretion to
impose sanctions for the violation of a discov-

ery order that results in prejudice to the
opposing party. State v. Bartlett, 109 N.M.
679, 680, 789 P.2d 627, 628 (Ct.App.1990). A
court abuses its discretion when its “ruling is
clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances of the case.” State
v. Lopez, 2011-NMSC-035, 114, 150 N.M.
179, 258 P.8d 458 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). The assessment of
sanctions “depends ... upon the extent of
the Government’s culpability ... weighed
against the amount of prejudice to the de-
fense.” State v. Chouinard, 96 N.M. 658,
661, 634 P.2d 680, 683 (1981) (discussing non-
disclosure of evidence (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); see generally 5
Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Proce-
dure § 20.6(b) (8d ed.2010). Extreme sanc-
tions such as dismissal are “to be used only
in exceptional cases.” Bartlett, 109 N.M. at
680, 789 P.2d at 628. “The trial court ...
should seek to apply sanctions that affect the
evidence at trial and the merits of the case as
little as possible.” LaFave, § 20.6(b), at
500-01 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Under this rubric, the mere show-
ing of violation of a discovery order, without
a showing of prejudice, is not grounds for
sanctioning a party. Bartlett, 109 N.M. at
680, 789 P.2d at 628. Prejudice must be more
than speculative; the party claiming preju-
dice must prove prejudice—it is not enough
to simply assert prejudice. State v. McDan-
iel, 2004-NMCA-~022, 16, 185 N.M. 84, 84
P.8d 701.

{17} Our case law generally provides
that the refusal to comply with a district
court’s discovery order only rises to the level
of exclusion or dismissal where the State’s
conduct is especially culpable, such as where
evidence is unilaterally withheld by the State
in bad faith, or all access to the evidence is
precluded by State intransigence. See, eg,
State v. Ortiz, 2009-NMCA-092, 137, 146
N.M. 878, 215 P.38d 811; State v. Layne,
2008-NMCA-108, 113, 144 N.M. 574, 189
P.3d 707. In Ortiz, the defendant who had
been charged with driving while intoxicated
(DWI) sought to prove that the stop of his
vehicle was pretextual. 2009-NMCA-092,
138, 146 N.M. 878, 215 P.3d 811. The district
court ordered the State to turn over a police

officer’s personal cell phone records that
were “relevant” to the defendant’s theory
that the DWI stop was pretextual. Jd. 1912,
15. The State refused to comply with the
order, even though the district court offered
to allow the State to review the records in
advance of production and to seek a protec-
tive order if the records were irrelevant or
implicated confidentiality concerns. Id.
136-87. The State also rejected the court’s
offer to conduct an in-camera review of the
records prior to production. Id. 1120, 37.
Coneluding that “the actions of the State
were] in bad faith, arguably intentionally
preventing the trial from going forward,” id.
120 (internal quotation marks omitted), the
district court dismissed the charges against
the defendant, id. 121. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals held that the “State’s actions con-
stituted conscious, intentional, and unjustifia-
ble rejection of and refusal to comply with
the district court’s order.” Id. 139. Accord-
ingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court’s sanction of dismissal. Id. 1133-
84, 50. The Court of Appeals has taken a
similar approach in cases involving the exclu-
sion of witnesses. Layne, 2008-NMCA-103,
918, 144 N.M. 574, 189 P.8d 707 (finding
exclusion of confidential informant proper
where the State “intentionally chose not to
comply with the [district court’s discovery]
order”).

{18} By way of contrast, in instances
where the State has not demonstrated bad
faith, willful non-compliance, or flat-out disre-
gard for a discovery order, our appellate
courts have been reluctant to affirm the im-
position of extreme sanctions. For example,
in Bartlett, the district court ordered the
State to produce a videotape of a police
interview with the victim. 109 N.M. at 680,
789 P.2d at 628. Upon the State’s failure to
produce the tape, the district court dismissed
the case. Id. On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals noted that the district court had failed
to establish any “deliberate misconduct or
bad faith on the part of the state,” id. at 681,
789 P.2d at 629, and that absent “indications
of more culpable behavior,” the rare sanction
of dismissal was unwarranted, id. at 682, 789
P.2d at 630.

HN {19} However, even when a party
has acted with a high degree of culpability,
the severe sanctions of dismissal or the ex-
clusion of key witnesses are only proper
where the opposing party suffered tangible

prejudice. Compare Mathis v. State, 112
NM. 744, 748, 819 P.2d 1302, 1806 (1991)
(affirming dismissal), State v. Duarte, 2007-
NMCA-012, 115, 140 N.M. 930, 149 P.3d
1027 (affirming dismissal), and State v. Mar-
tinez, 1998-NMCA-022, 112, 124 N.M. 721,
954 P.2d 1198 (affirming dismissal), with
Bartlett, 109 N.M. at 680-81, 789 P.2d at
628-29 (holding dismissal was not warrant-
ed). The requirement that any serious sanc-
tion against the State be conditioned on a
finding of prejudice is well established in our
ease law, is conceded by both parties in this
ease, and is recognized by both the majority
opinion and the dissent filed by the Court of
Appeals in these proceedings. See Harper,
2010-NMCA-055, 1912, 49, 148 N.M. 286,
235 P.8d 625. “[T]he focus in determining
prejudice is on whether the missing evidence
is important and critical to the case.” Math-
is, 112 N.M. at 748, 819 P.2d at 1306; see
also LaFave, § 20.6(b), at 495-96 (“In gener-
al, the concept of ‘prejudice’ in this context is
limited to an adverse impact upon the de-
fense’s ability to prepare and present its
ease.”). “[P]rejudice must be more than
speculative.” McDaniel, 2004-NMCA-022,
16, 135 N.M. 84, 84 P.3d 701.

HM s«{20} Therefore, when discovery
has been produced late, prejudice does not
accrue unless the evidence is material and
the disclosure is so late that it undermines
the defendant’s preparation for trial. See
Martinez, 1998-NMCA-022, 912, 124 N.M.
721, 954 P.2d 1198 (“The focus in determin-
ing prejudice is whether the missing evidence
is important and critical to the case.” (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The potential for prejudice is manifest when,
for example, material evidence is withheld
altogether, see, eg. Layne, 2008-NMCA-
108, 15, 144 N.M. 574, 189 P.8d 707, or
where the State withholds evidence until the
eleventh hour and then springs it on the
defendant, see, ¢.g., Martinez, 1998-NMCA-
022, 1911-12, 124 N.M. 721, 954 P.2d 1198
(prejudice found when State introduced an
amended witness list including a new witness

752

the day before the trial was scheduled).
However, when discovery is merely delayed
in reaching the defendant, or the defendant
has knowledge of the contents of the unpro-
duced evidence, determination of prejudice is
more elusive. State v. McGee, 95 N.M. 817,
819, 621 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Ct.App.1980) (“The
defendant was not prejudiced by the non-
disclosure of [an audio] tape ... [where dle-
fense counsel was already aware of the con-
versation.”); United States v. Ingraldi, 793
F.2d 408, 411-12 (1st Cir.1986) (“When the
issue is one of delayed disclosure rather than
of nondisclosure ... the test is whether de-
fendant’s counsel was prevented by the delay
from using the disclosed material effectively
in preparing and presenting the defendant’s
case.”),

EXCLUSION OF THE WITNESSES IN
THIS CASE WAS AN ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION.

HMM {21} Here, the district court did not
dismiss the State’s case. However, exclusion
of the victim and the doctor who examined
the victim deprived the State of making a
prima facie case against Harper, which is the
functional equivalent of a dismissal. The
exclusion of witnesses is a severe sanction
that raises questions about the fairness of
the judicial process. Patterson v. State, 419
So.2d 1120, 1122 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982).
Therefore, like outright dismissal of a case,
the exclusion of witnesses should not be im-
posed except in extreme cases, and only after
an adequate hearing to determine the rea-
sons for the violation and the prejudicial
effect on the opposing party. O’Brien v.
State, 454 So.2d 675, 677 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
1984).

HME {22} The State’s conduct in these
proceedings was not characterized by the
degree of culpability that gives rise to an
exclusionary sanction. Unlike in Ortiz and
Layne, here the State has neither acted in
bad faith nor completely blocked access to
evidence. Regarding the victim’s interview,
the State did schedule an interview, even
though it did so at the eleventh hour. Al-
though the State is not generally obligated to
make witnesses available for an interview, we
proceed with the premise that, because the
State in this case assumed the responsibility

of scheduling witness interviews, it had the
obligation to follow through in good faith.

{23} It is undisputed that the State did
schedule the victim for an interview and that
the victim simply did not appear. The prose-
cutor represented to the district court that
he met with the victim and her aunt in his
office to arrange the interview, and the vic-
tim agreed to appear. The prosecutor also
represented that his office confirmed the vic-
tim’s appearance for her interview the day
before it was scheduled. The State repre-
sented to the district court that the reason
she did not appear was because of pressure
put on her by Harper’s daughter. The dis-
trict court scolded the State for failing to
bring witnesses to the hearing who could
testify about the familial pressure brought to
bear on the victim. The State suggested
that it would subpoena the witness, but had
not done so for the hearing because it
thought it was “a legal motion.” Although
the State should have produced the witness
at this hearing, the prosecutor's representa-
tions about the victim’s anticipated coopera-
tion were based on personal knowledge.
This information from an officer of the court
could only lead to the conclusion that the
State did not intend to preclude Harper's
attorney from interviewing the victim. In its
motion, the State asked the district court for
an extension of time to schedule the inter-
view once the victim, who is a minor, was
subpoenaed. This evidenced the State’s ef-
forts to comply with the district court’s or-
der.

{24} In addition, Harper was not preju-
diced by the delay. The record reflects that
Harper’s attorney did not request the oppor-
tunity to interview witnesses until July 8,
2006. Harper had neither filed a motion to
compel interviews nor issued subpoenas, nor
did he contend during the docket call that
interviewing the victim at that late date, or
even on January 19, 2007, would somehow
prejudice him. Harper’s attorney had a copy
of a previous Safehouse interview with the
victim. More importantly, ample time re-
mained on the Rule 5-604 extension to con-
duct interviews after the March 2007 exclu-
sion hearing. By the time that hearing was
held, the deadline for trial was not set to

expire until June 24, 2007. At the December
2006 hearing, when the district court im-
posed the January 19 discovery deadline, the
district court noted that under the February
trial date, the parties still had “a month to
get the case actually ready to try.” Faced
with a request for even more time to conduct
interviews in March, the district court
abruptly excluded the State’s two vital wit-
nesses. In so doing, the district court made
only a cursory finding of prejudice, merely
enumerating “the subcategories of lack of
discovery, lack of ability to prepare, lack of
confrontation, [and] incarceration of the de-
fendant during all of this delay.” Given that
we do not uphold exclusion without more
than a finding of speculative prejudice and
the extreme character of the exclusion sanc-
tion, the district court’s finding of prejudice
and the resulting exclusion of the victim con-
stitutes an abuse of discretion.

HM {25} With respect to Dr. Ornelas, we
do not agree that the State acted in bad faith
or intentionally violated the district court’s
deadline. Unlike in Ortiz and Layne, here
the State did not completely block access to
evidence. Therefore, in this case, the prose-
cutor’s actions were more akin to a negligent
failure to comply than willful non-compliance.
See Bartlett, 109 N.M. at 681, 789 P.2d at 629
(“Given the trial court’s failure to explicitly
find [bad faith or misconduct on the part of
the State] ... and the absence of any real
indication that loss of the tape was deliber-
ate, this fault weighs against the state only
slightly more than negligent loss of evi-
dence.”).

TH {26} The issue for the State to ad-
dress was whether the Public Defender De-
partment would arrange to pay the doctor
for her time during the interview. It is
beyond cavil that an indigent defendant is
entitled to reasonable and necessary ex-
penses for his or her defense. See State v.
Brown, 2006-NMSC-023, 1 31, 189 N.M. 466,
134 P.8d 758. The remaining questions to be
resolved are (1) whether Dr. Ornelas was
entitled to a fee in advance of her interview,
if at all, and (2) whether the State or the
Public Defender Department had to pay the
fee. The record in this case does not allow
us to provide a definitive answer. We agree

753

with Judge Bustamante’s observation that
had the parties availed themselves of formal
discovery methods, the issue “of fees for
experts in these circumstances, including
whether, when, and how they were to be
paid” could have been appropriately ad-
dressed. Harper, 2010-NMCA-055, 158,
148 N.M. 286, 235 P.3d 625 (Bustamante, J.,
specially concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

{27} In this case, the State did not abso-
lutely refuse to comply with the district
court’s directive. The district court was on
notice that the only reason Dr. Ornelas was
not interviewed at the time of the docket call
was because of a concern regarding her pay-
ment. Unlike the district court in Ortiz,
2009-NMCA-092, 136, 146 N.M. 873, 215
P.8d 811, here the district court made no
efforts to work with the State to address its
concerns. The payment issue was raised by
the State during the docket call, and a deci-
sion as to whether, when, and how the fees
were to be paid was not decided. Harper
certainly did not protest the State’s assertion
that the Public Defender Department had to
arrange for the payment. It would be pure
speculation whether the parties had any dis-
cussions or disagreements regarding pay-
ment until the hearing that resulted in the
exclusion of the two witnesses. If the dis-
trict court believed that it had issued an
unambiguous directive to the State to pro-
duce Dr. Ornelas for an interview, regardless
of the compensation issue, the district court
could have ordered the State to pay any fees
as a sanction for not producing the doctor for
an interview. This would have been a less
severe sanction than excluding the witnesses
altogether. Instead, the district court simply
indicated that what it would “like to do is to
try to give a deadline of the 19th of January
for these interviews to be completed,” and “if
there’s at least in the Defense’s mind some
continuing noncompliance, we’ll—the Court
will consider any motions that you have
sometime after that and figure out if any
remedy is necessary.” This declaration is
hardly an unambiguous order for the State to
produce the witnesses for an interview by a
time certain, or suffer the exclusion of the
witnesses from testifying at trial. Under the

154

circumstances of this case, failure to impose
a less severe sanction, together with the lack
of any proof of prejudice to Harper or an
intentional refusal to obey the district court’s
discovery directive, constituted an abuse of
discretion.
CONCLUSION

{28} We reverse the district court’s order
precluding the victim and Dr. Ornelas from
testifying at trial and remand for proceed-
ings consistent with this Opinion.

{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: CHARLES W.
DANIELS, Chief Justice, PATRICIO M.
SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES,
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices.

2011-NMCA-115
266 P.3d 34

STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff—Appellee,

v

Garrell Ray TSOSIE, Defendant
Appellant.

No. 30,070.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Aug. 28, 2011.
Certiorari Denied, Oct. 18, 2011, No. 83,227.

a

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrew
S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General,
Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C.
Nancy L. Simmons, Albuquerque, NM, for
Appellant.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

{1} Defendant Garrell Tsosie appeals the
district court’s order for conditional dis-
charge and supervised probation following
his plea to one count of battery upon a health
care worker, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sec-
tion 30-8-9.2(E) (2006). The State alleged
that Tsosie struck Alan Albo, an employee of
the Four Winds Recovery Center, Inc. in
Farmington, New Mexico (Four Winds).
Tsosie filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

756

the charges lacked a legally sufficient basis
because Albo was not a health care worker
employed at a health facility as contemplated
by Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1) and (2). The dis-
trict court denied Tsosie’s motion, concluding
that the Four Winds Protective Care Unit
(the PCU) constitutes a health facility and
that Albo was both employed there and en-
gaged in the performance of the duties of a
health care worker at the time of the alleged
battery. Tsosie subsequently entered a con-
ditional guilty plea and reserved the right to
appeal the district court’s denial of his mo-
tion to dismiss.

{2} Tsosie raises three issues on appeal:
(1) whether the New Mexico Detoxification
Reform Act (the DRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 43-
2-11 to -23 (1949, as amended through
2005), precludes the State from prosecuting
Tsosie for battery upon a health care worker;
(2) whether Albo met the definition of a
health care worker employed by a health
facility as contemplated by Section 30-3-
9,2(A)(1) and (2), thereby precluding prosecu-
tion under Section 30-3-9.2(E); and (8)
whether Section 30-3-9.2(A) and (EB) are un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad. We
hold that (1) the DRA does not preclude
prosecution of Tsosie for battery upon a
health care worker; (2) Albo was a health
care worker employed by a health facility at
the time of the alleged battery; and (8)
Section 30-3-9.2(A) and (E) are not unconsti-
tutionally vague or overbroad. As a result,
we affirm the district court's denial of Tso-
sie’s motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTO-
RY

{3} On August 3, 2009, law enforcement
officers brought Tsosie to the PCU for the
purposes of protective custody and detoxifi-
cation, pursuant to Section 43-2-8(A)(7) of
the DRA. Section 43-2-8(A)(7) provides that
an intoxicated person may be committed to a
treatment facility for protective custody if
there is probable cause to believe that the
person being committed is incapacitated by
alcohol or drugs.

{4} When Tsosie arrived at the PCU, Albo
was on duty and checked his vital signs and
admitted him to the PCU. Approximately ten
minutes later, Albo served Tsosie a cup of

soup instead of the tray of food that earlier
arrivals had received since the meal count
had already been completed for the evening.
Tsosie became upset and began to throw
other clients’ trays on the ground. When
Albo attempted to restrain him, Tsosie
grabbed Albo’s neck and injured him. Albo
then punched Tsosie in the face. Tsosie had
not yet received a formal assessment at the
time of the incident because he was still
intoxicated, and formal assessments do not,
occur until clients have been at the PCU for
twenty-four hours and are no longer under
the influence of alcohol or drugs.

{5} Tsosie moved to dismiss the charge of
battery upon a health care worker on the
grounds that (1) the DRA does not allow
prosecution for batteries committed while a
person was under the influence of alcohol;
(2) Albo was not a health care worker at a
health facility as defined by Section 30-3-
9.2(A)(1) and (2); and (8) Section 30-3-9.2(A)
and (E) are unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. Tsosie contended that dismissal
‘was appropriate because the undisputed facts
did not provide a legally sufficient basis for
the charges. The State filed a response to
all three contentions raised in Tsosie’s mo-
tion to dismiss.

{6} At the hearing on the motion to dis-
miss, the district court clarified that it was
deciding as a matter of law whether Albo was
a health care worker employed by a health
facility based upon the undisputed facts re-
garding the facility and the nature of Albo’s
employment. Accordingly, this question of
Jaw was appropriate for disposition in a mo-
tion to dismiss. See State v. Johnson, 2009-
NMSC-049, 14, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.8d 863
(concluding that where the facts were undis-
puted, it was appropriate for the district
court to determine as a matter of law wheth-
er security guards were “school employees”
as envisioned in a statute prohibiting battery
upon school personnel upon a motion to dis-
miss).

{7} The record reflects that the following
undisputed facts were heard by the district
court at the hearing on the motion to dismiss.
Four Winds is licensed by the New Mexico
Department of Health and Safety (the De-
partment) as an adult residential care facili-

ty, and the PCU does not hold a separate
license. The PCU is one of several buildings
at Four Winds, which also includes an admin-
istrative building, a treatment facility, and a
long-term treatment facility. The PCU is
under the same management as the rest of
Four Winds, and the PCU does not receive
any separate funding.

{8} When clients arrive at Four Winds,
they are initially admitted to the PCU if they
are intoxicated or test positive for any drug
at the time of their arrival. Clients are not
permitted to leave the PCU for at least
twenty-four hours and usually remain in pro-
tective custody for seventy-two hours. At
that point, they may choose to remain at the
PCU for up to twelve days before they are
either released or moved to another Four
Winds facility for further treatment.

{9} Employees such as Albo are given the
title of Counselor Aides. When clients arrive
at the PCU, Counselor Aides check clients’
vital signs, perform various laboratory test-
ing, question clients regarding their medical
history, dispense meals, and provide care for
clients. After clients are admitted to the
PCU, Counselor Aides continue checking the
clients’ vital signs approximately every two
hours, including temperature, respiration,
blood pressure, and heart rate. Counselor
Aides also monitor the blood sugar of clients
with diabetes. As soon as PCU clients are
sober enough to interact with the staff, they
also begin receiving substance abuse treat-
ment. Treatment may include talking to
clients about their drinking behavior and its
consequences, prescribing and dispensing
medication, and completing behavioral thera-
py. After clients have been at the PCU for
twenty-four hours, formal assessments are
completed, and treatment plans are devel-
oped. If clients wish to be referred to long-
term treatment, then additional assessments
must be completed.

{10} Counselor Aides receive special train-
ing and become certified medical technicians.
They are trained to take vital signs and
identify issues associated with detoxification,
and they are also instructed regarding the
past medical history of specific clients.
Counselor Aides are required to have current
CPR and first aid certification. Although

17

Albo testified that he had not yet received
his certification as a medical technician at the
time of the alleged incident, he had prior
medical experience, was trained in how to
use the equipment, and had also completed
his training with Four Winds. Once certi-
fied, Counselor Aides at the PCU are permit-
ted to dispense prescription medication. One
trained nurse on staff also serves the Four
Winds facility, including the PCU. Finally,
Four Winds employs a physician who is on
call twenty-four hours per day and visits the
facility weekly.

{11} The district court denied Tsosie’s mo-
tion to dismiss, concluding that Four Winds
was a health facility as defined by Section
30-8-9.2(A)(1), that Albo was employed at
Four Winds, and that Albo was engaged in
the performance of the duties of a health
care worker at the time of the alleged bat-
tery. Tsosie subsequently entered a condi-
tional guilty plea, reserving his right to ap-
peal the district court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss. We must now review the district
court’s denial of Tsosie’s motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
The DRA Does Not Preclude Prosecution
of Tsosie for Battery Upon a Health Care
Worker

{12} Tsosie argues that because he was in
protective custody due to intoxication at the
time of the incident, the DRA precludes his
prosecution for battery upon a health care
worker. Specifically, he contends that be-
cause the DRA is more specific than the
battery upon a health care worker statute,
the DRA controls. Tsosie reasons that the
broader criminal statute prohibiting battery
upon a health care worker cannot impinge
upon the specific protections the DRA af-
fords to intoxicated persons and that the
criminal statute must yield to the DRA in
order to achieve a harmonious interpretation.

HM {13} The issue of whether the DRA
precludes prosecution of intoxicated persons
such as Tsosie for battery upon a health care
worker is a question of statutory interpreta-
tion, which this Court reviews de novo. See
State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-082, 18, 136
N.M. 872, 98 P.8d 1022. “Our ultimate goal
in statutory construction is to ascertain and

758

give effect to the intent of the Legislature.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). We determine legislative intent by
“first lookfing] at the words chosen by the
Legislature and the plain meaning of those
words.” State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014,
110, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579. “(When a
statute contains language which is clear and
unambiguous, we must give effect to that
language and refrain from further statutory
interpretation.” State v. Rivera, 2004-
NMSC-001, 110, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). Furthermore, where multiple statutes
are applicable, we attempt to read them in
harmony with each other. State v. Trujillo,
2009-NMSC-012, 11 22, 146 N.M. 14, 206 P.38d
125. If two statutes cannot be harmonized,
then the more specific statute controls.
State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, 117, 127
N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 28.

WM {14} Battery upon a health care
worker is defined as “the unlawful, intention-
al touching[,] or application of force to the
person of a health care worker who is in the
lawful discharge of the health care worker’s
duties, when done in a rude, insolent[,] or
angry manner.” Section 80-3-9.2(E). Bat-
tery upon a health care worker is punishable
as a fourth degree felony. Id. The statutory
language contained in the DRA must also be
considered. In pertinent part, the DRA
states:

It is the policy of this state that intoxi-
cated and incapacitated persons may not.
be subjected to criminal prosecution, but
rather should be afforded protection. It is
further the policy of this state that alcohol-
impaired persons and drug-impaired per-
sons should be afforded treatment in order
that they may lead normal lives as produc-
tive members of society.

Section 43-2-8,

{15} In State v. Correa, 2009-NMSC-051,
16, 147 N.M. 291, 222 P.8d 1, our Supreme
Court addressed a similar issue regarding
whether the DRA precludes prosecution for
disorderly conduct. Correa held that the
DRA does not prohibit criminal prosecution
for disorderly conduct merely because the
accused party was intoxicated, as long as the
statutory elements of the charge are satis-

fied. Id. 11. Correa reasoned that the Leg-
islature’s intent in adopting Section 43-2-3
was to address substance abuse issues, rath-
er than “to make a radical change in existing
criminal law.” Correa, 2009-NMSC-051,
915, 147 N.M. 291, 222 P.8d 1. Correa re-
jected an expansive interpretation of Section
43-2-8 under which “an accused would not
be criminally liable for murder, burglary,
assault, or battery if he was intoxicated when
he committed the offense.” Correa, 2009-
NMSC-051, 116, 147 N.M. 291, 222 P.8d 1.
In doing so, Correa reasoned that the Legis-
lature did not intend for “voluntary intoxi-
cation [to] provide wholesale immunity to the
accused, or preclude the State from pursuing
criminal sanctions.” Id. Instead, Correa de-
termined that “[w]hile intoxication itself is
not criminal, any criminal offenses committed
while an accused is intoxicated are still pun-
ishable under the Criminal Code.” Id. 119.
Finally, Correa concluded the DRA did not
conflict with the Criminal Code. Jd.

{16} Relying on Correa, we conclude that
the DRA does not preclude Tsosie’s prosecu-
tion for battery upon a health care worker
under Section 30-3-9.2. Our Court’s reason-
ing that “any criminal offenses committed
while an accused is intoxicated are still pun-
ishable under the Criminal Code” encom-
passes the criminal offense of battery upon a
health care worker. Correa, 2009-NMSC-
051, 119, 147 N.M. 291, 222 P.3d 1 (emphasis
added). Furthermore, the Court specifically
indicated that the Legislature did not intend
for the DRA to eliminate criminal liability for
“murder, burglary, assault, or battery”
merely because an accused was intoxicated
when he committed the offense. Id 116
(emphasis added). Here, Tsosie was not
prosecuted for intoxication itself, but rather
for a battery allegedly committed while he
was intoxicated.

{17} Tsosie has not distinguished his case
from Correa in any meaningful way. In-
stead, he argues that we should interpret the
criminal statute regarding battery upon a
health care worker as more broad than the
DRA, and thus treat the DRA as an excep-
tion which prohibits prosecution in this case.
However, this principle is not applicable if
the DRA does not conflict with the battery

on a health care worker statute. See id.
119; see also Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, 117,
127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 28 (reasoning that the
more specific of two statutes controls only if
the statutes cannot be harmonized). Consis-
tent with Correa, Tsosie is not being crimi-
nally prosecuted for intoxication contrary to
the DRA, but only for a criminal offense
committed while he was intoxicated. See
2009-NMSC-051, 119, 147 N.M. 291, 222
P.8d 1. Accordingly, we hold that the DRA
does not preclude the State from prosecuting
Tsosie for battery upon a health care worker
merely because he was in protective custody
due to his intoxication at the time of the
offense. Although the DRA does not pre-
clude prosecution, the State was still re-
quired to carry the burden of proving all of
the statutory elements of battery upon a
health care worker. See id.

Albo Met the Definition of a Health Care
Worker Under Section 30-3-9.2

{18} Next, we address the issue regarding
whether Albo was a health care worker pur-
suant to Section 30-3-9.2(E). See Johnson,
2009-NMSC-049, 119, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.8d
863 (concluding that “[t]he issue of whether
security guards are ‘school employees’ as
defined in the battery upon school personnel
statute is a purely legal question”). Because
this issue presents a matter of statutory
interpretation, our review is de novo. State
v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, 18, 142 N.M.
102, 163 P.3d 489.

TH {19} As previously discussed, we
first seek to give effect to the language of a
statute as written. State v. Padilla, 2008-
NMSC-006, 17, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.8d 299.
“(W]here a statute specifically defines a
term, we interpret the statute according to
those definitions because those definitions re-
flect. legislative intent.” State v. Smith,
2009-NMCA~028, 113, 145 N.M. 757, 204
P.8d 1267, cert. quashed, 2009-NMCERT-
012, 147 N.M. 601, 227 P.38d 91. “When a
term is not defined in a statute, we must
construe it, giving those words their ordinary
meaning absent clear and express legislative
intention to the contrary.” Johnson, 2009-
NMSC-049, 110, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.38d 863
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-

159

ted). Where “language is doubtful, ambigu-
ous, or an adherence to the literal use of the
words would lead to injustice, absurdity[,] or
contradiction,” we construe a statute “accord-
ing to its obvious spirit or reason.” State v.
Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, 16, 184 N.M. 172,
74 P.3d 1064.

HM {20} As previously noted, battery
upon a health care worker is defined as “the
unlawful, intentional touching[,] or applica-
tion of force to the person of a health care
worker who is in the lawful discharge of the
health care worker’s duties, when done in a
rude, insolent[,] or angry manner.” Section
80-3-9.2(E). As defined in the statute, a
“health care worker” is “an employee of a
health facility or a licensed emergency medi-
eal technician{.]” Section 380-3-9.2(A)(2).
Additionally, Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1) defines a
“health facility” as follows:

a public or private hospital, outpatient fa-
cility, diagnostic and treatment center, re-
habilitation center[,] or infirmary. ‘Health
facility’ also includes those facilities that,
by federal regulation, must be licensed by
the state to obtain or maintain full or
partial, permanent or temporary federal
funding, but ‘health facility’ does not in-
clude a skilled nursing facility, a nursing
facility[,] or other long-term residential
care facility[.]

{21} Two categories of persons are consid-
ered health care workers under Section 30—
8-9.2(A)(2): employees of a health facility or
licensed emergency medical technicians.
The district court determined that Albo was
a health care worker because he was an
employee of a health facility. The parties
agree that Albo was an employee of Four
Winds at the time of the alleged incident.
However, they disagree as to whether Four
Winds, and specifically the PCU therein, con-
stitutes a health facility as envisioned by
Section 30-8-9.2(A)(1). Therefore, in order
to determine whether Albo was a health care
worker as contemplated by Section 30-3-
9.2(A)(2), we must determine whether the
Four Winds PCU meets the definition of a
health facility under Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1).

{22} The district court concluded that the
Four Winds PCU constitutes a health facility

760 ee

because it met the definition of a “diagnostic
and treatment center” under Section 30-3-
9.2(A). Although Section 30-3-9.2 provides a
definition for “health facility’ and “health
care worker,” “diagnostic and treatment cen-
ter” is not defined by Section 30-3-9.2 or by
the general definitions applicable in the
Criminal Code. See NMSA 1978, § 30-1-12
(1963) (providing general definitions applica-
ble in the Criminal Code). Furthermore,
Section 30-3-9.2 does not indicate that the
Legislature intended for a meaning other
than the ordinary meaning of “diagnostic and
treatment center” to apply under the Crimi-
nal Code. Therefore, we examine the ordi-
nary meaning of “diagnostic and treatment
center.” See Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049,
910-11, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (con-
cluding that the ordinary meaning of “school
employee” applied where the term was not
defined in the relevant statutory section or
elsewhere in the Criminal Code).

{23} “Diagnostic” means “[o]f, relating to,
or used in a diagnosis.” Am. Heritage Dic-
tionary of the English Language 500 (4th ed.
2000). “Diagnosis” is “[t]he act or process of
identifying or determining the nature and
cause of a disease or injury through evalua-
tion of patient history, examination, and re-
view of laboratory data.” Jd. Additionally,
“treatment” is defined in pertinent part as
the “{aldministration or application of reme-
dies to a patient or for a disease or injury;
medicinal or surgical management; therapy.”
Td. at 1838. Counselor Aides at the Four
Winds PCU identify issues associated with
detoxification, and they are also instructed
regarding the past medical history of specific
clients. Counselor Aides also question
clients regarding their medical history, talk
to clients about their drinking behavior and
its consequences, take vital signs, and per-
form various laboratory testing. After
clients have been at the PCU for twenty-four
hours, formal assessments are completed and
treatment plans are developed. Treatment
may include prescribing and dispensing med-
ication as well as behavioral therapy. We
conclude that the ordinary meaning of “diag-
nostic and treatment center” includes the
Four Winds PCU because the PCU identifies
substance abuse issues based upon patient
history, laboratory testing, and formal as-

sessments and then develops treatment plans
based upon those observations.

{24} We also look to related provisions of
the DRA to determine whether facilities such
as the Four Winds PCU are traditionally
viewed as diagnostic and treatment centers.
See Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, 116, 147
N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (examining related
provisions of the Administrative Code to de-
termine whether school guards are tradition-
ally viewed as “school employees” when de-
termining the ordinary meaning of statutory
language). Tsosie was admitted to the Four
‘Winds PCU pursuant to the DRA, that pro-
vides that “[ajn intoxicated or incapacitated
person may be committed to a treatment
facility.” Section 48-2-8(A) (emphasis add-
ed). The DRA provides definitions for both
“treatment” and “treatment facility.” Sec-
tion 43-2-2(L), (M). According to Section
43-2-2(L), “treatment” is defined to include
“the broad range of emergency, outpatient,
intermediate[,] and inpatient services and
care, including protective custody, diagnostic
evaluation, medical, psychiatric, psychological
and social service care, vocational rehabilita-
tion and career counseling, which may be
extended to alcohol-impaired, drug-im-
paired[,] and intoxicated persons[.!” (Em-
phasis added.) Section 43-2-2(M) defines
“treatment facility” to include:

(1) an institution under the supervision
of the [D]epartment and approved by the
[D]epartment for the care and treatment
of alcohol-impaired persons or drug-im-
paired persons;

(2) a public institution approved by the
{Dlepartment for the care and treatment
of alcohol-impaired persons or drug-im-
paired persons, but not specifically under
the supervision of the [DJepartment; or

(8) any other facility that provides any
of the services specified in the [DRA] and
is licensed by the [DJepartment for those
services.

(Emphasis added.)

{25} The Four Winds PCU falls within the
meaning of “treatment” as defined by the
DRA. Section 43-2-2(L) specifically includes
“protective custody” as one of the services
that constitutes “treatment.” It is undisput-

ed that the Four Winds PCU was a “protec-
tive custody” unit. It is also undisputed that
Tsosie was brought to the PCU for the pur-
poses of protective custody and detoxification
because he was aleohol-impaired. Based on
the plain meaning of Section 43-2-2(L), the
services provided to Tsosie at the PCU clear-
ly constituted “treatment” as defined by the
DRA.

{26} Furthermore, the PCU constitutes a
“treatment facility” under the definition pro-
vided by the DRA. Under Section 43-2-2(M),
a treatment facility is an institution that pro-
vides any of the services enumerated in the
DRA and is licensed by the Department for
those services. As previously discussed, the
PCU provides protective custody to alecohol-
impaired persons, a service which is specifi-
cally enumerated in the DRA’s definition of
“treatment.” Section 43-2-2(L). Further-
more, it is undisputed that Four Winds is
licensed by the Department as an adult resi-
dential health facility. Because the Four
Winds PCU provides enumerated services
and is licensed by the Department for those
services, we conclude that the Four Winds
PCU meets the definition of “treatment facil-
ity” as defined by the DRA. Based upon the
ordinary meaning of a “diagnostic and treat-
ment center” and the DRA’s traditional in-
clusion of facilities such as the PCU in the
definition of a “treatment facility,” we con-
clude that the Four Winds PCU constitutes a
“health facility’ for purposes of the battery
upon a health care worker statute.

{27} Tsosie argues that the Four Winds
PCU is not a health facility because it is not
a hospital or outpatient facility in its capacity
as a protective custody facility. Section 30-
3-9.2(A)(1) defines a health facility as “a
public or private hospital, outpatient facility,
diagnostic and treatment center, rehabilita-
tion center[,] or infirmary.” (Emphasis add-
ed.) The Legislature’s use of the word “or”
indicates that any of the listed definitions
brings a facility within the definition of a
health facility. See State v. Johnson, 2001-
NMSC-001, 130, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233
(stating that as a rule of statutory construc-
tion, the word “or” should be given its nor-
mal disjunctive meaning unless the context of
the statute demands a different meaning).

761

As a result, we conclude that the Four Winds
PCU is a health facility because it meets the
definition of a diagnostic and treatment cen-
ter, regardless of whether it meets the addi-
tional definitions under the statute.

{28} Finally, Tsosie argues that the Four
Winds PCU is not a health facility because it
is licensed as an adult residential care facility
and therefore is a long-term residential care
facility excluded under the definition of a
health facility under Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1).
This argument is unconvincing, as the undis-
puted testimony indicated that the PCU is
not a longterm treatment facility because
clients are not permitted to stay beyond a
maximum of twelve days. Additionally, if
clients wish to be referred to long-term
treatment upon their release from the PCU,
then additional assessments must be com-
pleted. As a result, the undisputed testimo-
ny established that the Four Winds PCU is
not a long-term residential care facility.

{29} Based upon the ordinary meaning of
a “diagnostic and treatment center” and the
DRA’s traditional consideration of facilities
such as the PCU as treatment facilities, we
hold that the Four Winds PCU constitutes a
“health facility” under Section 30-3-9.2(A)(1).
As a result, Albo qualifies as a health care
worker under Section 30-3-9.2(A)(2) because
he was employed at Four Winds at the time
of the alleged incident.

The Battery Upon a Health Care Worker
Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

{30} Tsosie argues that Section 30-3-
9.2(A) and (E) are unconstitutionally vague.
Specifically, Tsosie contends that the impre-
cise definition of “health facility” in Section
80-8-9.2(A)(1) provides no notice to a reason-
able person that an employee of a detoxifica-
tion facility’s protective custody unit is a
“health care worker” and that such a person
is afforded special protection against battery.

HE {31} We review a vagueness
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute
de novo in light of the particular facts of the
ease and the conduct prohibited by the stat-
ute. State v. Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, 117,
146 N.M. 525, 212 P.8d 418, cert. quashed,
2010-NMCERT-006, 148 N.M. 584, 241 P.8d

762

182. This Court applies a two-part test for
vagueness, considering whether the statute
(1) “fails to provide persons of ordinary intel-
ligence using ordinary common sense a fair
opportunity to determine whether their con-
duct is prohibited[,]” or (2) “fails to create
minimum guidelines for ... enforcement ...
[and thus] encourages subjective and ad hoc
application [of the law].” State v. Jacquez,
2009-NMCA-124, 16, 147 N.M. 313, 222 P.3d
685. Tsosie bears the burden of overcoming
the strong presumption of a statute’s consti-
tutionality by proving that Section 30-3-9.2
is unconstitutional beyond all reasonable
doubt. State v. Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152,
124, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896. Further-
more, if the statute clearly applies to Tsosie’s
conduct, he cannot succeed on his claim of
vagueness. Jacquez, 2009-NMCA~-124, 16,
147 N.M. 318, 222 P.8d 685. On appeal, Tso-
sie disputes only that the statute provides
fair notice of the prohibited conduct, so we
do not address whether the statute creates
any potential for discriminatory and arbi-
trary enforcement. See State v. Torres,
2005-NMCA-070, 134, 187 N.M. 607, 113
P.8d 877 (stating that this Court will not
address issues not briefed, argued, or sup-
ported by authority).

Hs {82} “A statute may be void for
vagueness if its meaning is so uncertain that
the court is unable, by the application of
known and accepted rules of construction, to
determine what the Legislature intended
with any reasonable degree of certainty.”
State v. Castillo, 2011-NMCA-046, 122, 149
N.M. 536, 252 P.3d 760, (alterations omitted)
(internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted), cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-004, 150
N.M. 648, 264 P.3d 1171 (No. 32,918, Apr. 13,

2011). We have concluded above that the
Four Winds PCU constitutes a “health facili-
ty” under the plain meaning of Section 30-3-
9.2(A)(1). Because we were able to deter-
mine the statutory meaning using accepted
principles of statutory construction, we con-
clude that Section 30-3-9.2 is not unconstitu-
tionally vague. See Castillo, 2011-NMCA-
046, 1 22, 149 N.M. 586, 252 P.3d 760 (holding
that the statute prohibiting fraudulent use of
a debit card was not unconstitutionally vague
because this Court was able to determine
legislative intent using established statutory
construction principles). We hold that Sec-
tion 30-3-9.2(A)(1) and (E) are sufficiently
definite to provide fair warning to a reason-
able person that a battery upon an employee
of a health facility, such as the Four Winds
POU, would result in prosecution for battery
upon a health care worker.

CONCLUSION

{33} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the district court’s denial of Tsosie’s motion
to dismiss. Accordingly, the district court
did not err by accepting Tsosie’s plea and
sentencing him to a conditional discharge
with probationary supervision.

{34} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN
and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.

765

766 De
2011-NMCA-107 [|

266 P.3d 635
STATE of New Mexico,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
Ila COMBS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 30,044.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Aug. 16, 2011.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Andrea
Sassa, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe,
NM, for Appellee.

Jaequeline L. Cooper, Acting Chief Public
Defender, B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Ap-
pellant.

OPINION

FRY, Judge.

{1} Just before Deputy Dale Frazier en-
tered a magistrate courtroom to testify at
Defendant’s preliminary hearing, he was
shown a large mug shot of Defendant and
told that she was the driver to whom he had
issued a routine traffic citation two months
previously. He was also told that Defendant
had given Deputy Frazier another person’s
identifying information when the citation was
issued, and that Defendant had been charged
with forgery as a result. Deputy Frazier
then entered the courtroom and identified
Defendant as the driver who had received
the citation two months before. We conclude
that showing Deputy Frazier the mug shot
immediately prior to his in-court identifica-
tion of Defendant was highly suggestive and
that the identification lacked other indicia
that it was reliable. We reverse Defendant's
conviction on the ground that the district
court improperly denied her motion to sup-
press the identification.

BACKGROUND

{2} On the night of January 9, 2009, Depu-
ty Frazier stopped a vehicle that did not have
its headlights on. He made contact with the
female driver who stated that she did not
have her license with her, identified herself
as Natasha Torres, and gave Deputy Frazier
her date of birth and social security number.
Deputy Frazier issued the driver a citation
for driving without headlights.

{3} About two months after the citation
was issued, Deputy Tim Nyce told Deputy
Frazier that the driver was not in fact Nata-
sha Torres. It was alleged that the driver
who identified herself as Torres was in fact
Defendant Ila Combs, and the State had filed
a criminal information charging Defendant
with one count of forgery arising from the
citation. Deputy Nyce asked Deputy Frazier
to give testimony at Defendant's preliminary
hearing. When Deputy Frazier arrived at
the courthouse, he was given an evidence
packet that contained the citation he had
issued on January 9, 2009, and a single pho-
tograph of Defendant. At the preliminary
hearing, Deputy Frazier identified Defendant
as the driver he had cited, and he was certain
that Defendant was the person driving the
vehicle that night.

{4} Defendant filed a motion to suppress
any future in-court identification of her by
Deputy Frazier on the ground that the single
photograph shown to Deputy Frazier was
impermissibly suggestive such that any sub-
sequent identification was tainted and violat-
ed Defendant’s right to due process. At the
suppression hearing, Deputy Frazier testified
that the photograph of Defendant presented
to him prior to the preliminary hearing re-
freshed his recollection of Defendant; it did
not supply the memory. He did not particu-
larly remember any other events of the eve-
ning that he stopped Defendant’s vehicle.
He said that he remembered the incident
with Defendant because at first he thought
he might be dealing with a DWI investiga-
tion. However, the incident was not remark-
able, and Deputy Frazier did not recall how
many incidents he dealt with before or after
this one or what day of the week it was.

{5} The district court denied the suppres-
sion motion but made no findings of fact.

167

The case proceeded to trial, and Deputy Fra-
ier again identified Defendant as the person
driving when he issued the citation on Janu-
ary 9, 2009. He also testified that he saw a
mug shot of Defendant that was “about the
size of a sheet of paper” before he was ever
asked to identify her in court at the prelimi-
nary hearing. Other than the mug shot and
his encounter with her when he issued the
citation, Deputy Frazier had never had any
interaction with Defendant. Nonetheless, he
continued to maintain that he had an inde-
pendent memory of the events that evening.
Defendant was convicted, and this appeal
followed.

DISCUSSION

{6} Defendant makes several arguments
on appeal that we need not address because
we conclude that the issue involving Deputy
Frazier’s identification is dispositive. We
have a fairly extensive body of case law
regarding the admissibility of showup identi-
fications. The circumstances in the present
case are somewhat different from the cir-
cumstances in those cases. This case in-
volves an in-court identification of an alleged
perpetrator immediately following the wit-
ness’s exposure to a single photo of the al-
leged perpetrator, while other cases address-
ing this issue involve a witness’s out-of-court
identification of the alleged perpetrator fol-
lowing a showup procedure. See, e.g., Pat-
terson v. LeMaster, 2001-NMSC-013, 130
N.M. 179, 21 P.3d 1032 (involving a showup
identification of the defendant immediately
after an armed robbery by witnesses to the
crime); State v. Johnson, 2004-NMCA-058,
135 N.M. 567, 92 P.3d 18 (involving a showup
identification by witnesses ten days after the
crime). In addition, the witness in the pres-
ent case is a law enforcement officer. How-
ever, we do not believe that these differences
impact the analysis we undertake. We fail
to see any significance in the location where
the post-showup identification occurs, and we
know of no authority suggesting that law
enforcement officers’ identifications following
a showup procedure are inherently more reli-
able than those of lay witnesses.

Standard of Review

{7} In considering whether an identi-
fication violated a defendant’s due process

768

rights under these circumstances, we “defer
to the trial court’s purely factual assessment;
however, we are not bound by the court’s
application of law to the facts.” Johnson,
2004-NMCA-058, 1112, 185 N.M. 567, 92 P.3d
13. “Because the trial court’s ultimate con-
clusion drawn from the facts was a legal
determination, that is, that the witnesses’
testimony did not violate [the dJefendant’s
due process rights, we review it de novo.”
Ia.

Two-Prong Analysis

HMM {8} It is well established that a
court assessing the admissibility of an identi-
fication procedure must first consider
“whether the procedure used was so imper-
missibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misiden-
tification.” Jd. 113. If it was, then the
court’s second task is to determine “whether
the identification is nonetheless reliable un-
der the totality of the circumstances.” Id. In
assessing reliability, “courts weigh the cor-
rupting effect of the suggestive identification
against the witness’s opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the atten-
tion the witness paid, the accuracy of any
pre-identification description, the witness’s
level of certainty at the identification, and the
time between the crime and the identifica-
tion.” Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, { 20, 180
N.M. 179, 21 P.38d 1032 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

{9} We begin our discussion with the es-
tablished principle that “(s]howup identifica-
tions are inherently suggestive, and their use
should be avoided.” Johnson, 2004-NMCA-
058, 114, 185 N.M. 567, 92 P.3d 18 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The circum-
stances in the present case were highly sug-
gestive. Deputy Frazier issued a citation
that he characterized as “routine” for a rela-
tively insignificant traffic violation on a night
when he dealt with several other traffic inci-
dents of which he had “little memory.” The
citation was only one of nearly “[100] stops”
he would typically make in a month. Two
months later, he was told that the driver who
had received the citation was not the person
she claimed to be. Immediately before going
into a courtroom to identify this driver, he

was shown a letter-sized mug shot of the
person he was supposed to identify. Given
these circumstances, “[t]he indicia of reliabili-
ty must be significant to outweigh the sug-
gestiveness.” Id. 116. We therefore turn to
the factors used to assess reliability.

Opportunity to View the Perpetrator at
the Time of the Crime

{10} Deputy Frazier certainly had
the opportunity to view Defendant when he
stopped the vehicle she was driving, asked
for her documents, and issued her a citation.
But we deem it significant that the stop was
only one of many performed by Deputy Fra-
ier that night and that there were virtually
no other characteristics that might distin-
guish this stop from the many others he
undertook in the two months between the
citation and his first in-court identification of
Defendant. These circumstances are quite
different from those in other cases in which
the witnesses had the opportunity for close
observation of the perpetrators in inherently
memorable contexts. See State v. Flores,
2010-NMSC-002, 159, 147 N.M. 542, 226
P.3d 641 (explaining that the witness had
observed and spoken with the perpetrator
several days before the crime occurred and
had observed the perpetrator several times
on the day of the crime, and that the wit-
ness described the perpetrator’s features,
clothing, and manner of speech); State v.
Jacobs, 2000-NMSC-026, 1128, 82, 129
N.M. 448, 10 P.8d 127 (stating that the wit-
nesses spoke with the perpetrator and ob-
served him during a fifteen-minute ride in
his car and that they described him to a
police artist well enough that a penitentiary
employee was able to identify the perpetra-
tor from the composite sketch); State v.
Stampley, 1999-NMSC-027, 124, 127 N.M.
426, 982 P.2d 477 (stating that witnesses,
who were in a car at which the perpetrator
fired shots, had ample opportunity to ob-
serve the perpetrator); State v. Cheadle, 101
N.M. 282, 283-84, 681 P.2d 708, 709-10
(1983) (explaining that witness, who saw the
perpetrator shoot the witness’s companion
twice and who the perpetrator attempted to
rape, saw the perpetrator’s face from within
inches), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025, 146 N.M. 357,

210 P.8d 783. Under these circumstances,
we give this factor neutral weight.

Witness’s Degree of Attention

{11} There is no dispute that Deputy Fra-
zier was paying attention to Defendant dur-
ing the citation process. When he issues a
citation, he particularly watches what the
vehicle’s occupants are doing because that is
a matter of safety. As a result, this factor
tends to establish reliability.

Accuracy of Witness’s Pre-identification
Description

{12} There is nothing in the record sug-
gesting that Deputy Frazier ever described
the driver before he identified Defendant at
the preliminary hearing. Therefore, this fac-
tor weighs against reliability.

Witness’s Certainty

{13} Deputy Frazier expressed certainty
that Defendant was the driver he cited on
January 9, 2009. However, that certainty is
tempered by the lack of evidence that he
ever described Defendant before he saw her
mug shot and was told that the person in the
photograph was the driver. See Johnson,
2004-NMCA-058, {1 23, 135 N.M. 567, 92 P.8d
18 (stating that the witness’s certainty was
tempered by “the absence of evidence that
[he] saw any of the perpetrator’s distinctive
physical characteristics”). As a result, we
give this factor neutral weight.

Time Elapsed Between the Crime and
Identification

{14} Two months elapsed between Deputy
Frazier’s issuance of the citation and his
identification of Defendant at the preliminary
hearing. This is a significant length of time
in light of Deputy Frazier’s testimony that he
conducts close to 100 traffic stops each
month. In the ordinary course of events, it
seems remarkable that he could remember
Defendant’s face out of the approximately
200 faces he saw in the interim without hav-
ing first seen Defendant’s mug shot. This
factor weighs against reliability.

769

Weighing of Factors

{15} Of the five factors considered, two are
neutral, one weighs in favor of reliability, and
two weigh against reliability. On balance, we
conclude that the showup procedure em-
ployed by Deputy Nyce “lacked the indicia of
reliability necessary to overcome the sugges-
tiveness of the identification procedure.” Jd.
926. As a result, we further conclude that
the showup tainted Deputy Frazier’s subse-
quent in-court identifications of Defendant.
See id. 127. The district court improperly
denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the
in-court identifications, and we reverse De-
fendant’s conviction.

CONCLUSION

{16} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
Defendant's conviction and remand for a new
trial.

{17} IT IS SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR: JAMES J. WECHSLER,
and RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judges.

2011-NMCA-110
266 P.3d 638

The BANK OF NEW YORK as Trustee for
Popular Financial Services Mort-
gage/Pass Through Certificate Series

# 2006, Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.
Joseph A. ROMERO and Mary Romero,
a/k/a Mary O. Romero a/k/a Maria
Romero, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 29,945.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Aug. 28, 2011,

Certiorari Granted, Oct. 25,
2011, No. 33,224,

it

771

Little & Dranttel, P.C., Elizabeth M.
Dranttel, Peggy A. Whitmore, Albuquerque,
NM, Severson & Werson, Jan T. Chilton,
San Francisco, CA, for Appellee.

Joshua R. Simms, P.C., Joshua R. Simms,
Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Santa Fe Neighborhood Law Center,
Frederick M. Rowe, Daniel M. Yohalem,
Santa Fe, NM, for Amici Curiae.

OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

{1} In 2006, Joseph and Mary Romero
(the Romeros) refinanced the mortgage on
their home in order to pay off existing debts
and loans. When they defaulted two years
later, The Bank of New York, as trustee for
Popular Financial Services Mortgage/Pass
Through Certificate Series #2006, (the
Bank) started foreclosure proceedings. In re-
sponse to the complaint for foreclosure, the
Romeros counterclaimed against the Bank,
alleging, among other things, predatory lend-
ing practices. At issue in this appeal is
whether the district court correctly deter-
mined that the Bank did not engage in “flip-
ping” the loan in violation of NMSA 1978,
Section 58-21A-4(B) (2003) (amended 2009),
of the Home Loan Protection Act (HLPA), or
violate the Unfair Practices Act (UPA),
NMSA 1978, Sections 57-12-1 through -26
(1967, as amended through 2009). Because
substantial evidence supports the district
court’s findings, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} The Romeros inherited their home,
located in Chimayo, New Mexico, from Jo-
seph Romero’s father in the early 1970s.
They have owned the property ever since.
Prior to refinancing the mortgage at issue in
this case, the Romeros were making monthly
payments on their home of approximately
$1,200 to New Century Mortgage Corpora-
tion (New Century). In early 2006, the
Romeros were behind on the New Century
loan, which had an estimated payoff of
$176,450.08, and were in debt on credit card
and other loan obligations. Mr. Romero
wanted to refinance his home loan in order to
repay his debts and to revitalize the Rome-

772

ros’ clothing and music store in Espanola,
New Mexico. As a result, the Romeros ac-
cepted and signed a new home loan offered
by Equity One, Inc. (Equity One) for
$227,240 that repaid their existing home loan,
credit card debt, and other obligations. The
Joan also gave the Romeros $31,164.82 in
cash to pay bills and restock their store.
Monthly payments of $1,688.28 became due
starting August 1, 2006.

{8} In September 2007, the Romeros
stopped making payments on their mortgage
and note. They fell behind in repaying the
home loan, and by the end of the year, the
Romeros owed over $8,000 in payments and
fees. They were also eventually locked out
of their store for failure to pay rent. The
Romeros agree that they were properly
served with notices of delinquency and de-
fault. Although the Romeros were given an
opportunity to cure their default, they did
not do so; and on April 1, 2008, the Bank, as
trustee/assignee of the Romeros’ mortgage,
filed its complaint for foreclosure.

{4} The Romeros answered the complaint
and admitted that they had entered into the
mortgage and note and that they were sever-
al payments behind on the loan. The Rome-
ros also counterclaimed against the Bank,
alleging deceptive loan practices and unfair
trade practices. The Romeros’ basic conten-
tion is that Equity One took advantage of
them—two individuals with limited edu-
cation—and coerced them to incur a debt
that Equity One knew they could never af-
ford. Based on these allegations, the Rome-
ros claimed that the Bank had (1) failed to
disclose the “actual rate upon the home loan”
as required by the HLPA; (2) had “flipp[ed]”
the loan in violation of Section 58-21A-4(B);
(8) had engaged in predatory lending prac-
tices including using deceptive marketing,
concealing fees and costs, and structuring the
Joan to strip the Romeros of their equity;
and (4) had violated the federal Truth in
Lending Act (Regulation Z), Real Estate
Practices Act, as well as the New Mexico
HLPA and UPA,

{5} After a bench trial, the district court
entered findings and conclusions, ruling in
favor of the Bank and ordering the sale of
the Romeros’ home. The district court

found, among other things, that the Bank did
not engage in “flipping” because the loan
resulted in a “reasonable, net tangible bene-
fit” to the Romeros, nor did it violate the
UPA. Further, the district court found that
the HLPA did not apply to the Bank because
it was preempted by federal law. The dis-
trict court ruled against the Romeros on all
of their counterclaims.

{6} On appeal, the Romeros raise five
issues challenging seven of the district
court’s findings of fact and three of its con-
clusions of law. The Romeros contend that,
with the exception of the court’s ruling on
preemption, which they claim fails as a mat-
ter of law, the remaining four issues fail
based on lack of substantial evidence. Be-
cause we conclude that substantial evidence
exists for each of the district court’s findings
and conclusions, and we affirm on those
grounds, we do not address the Romeros’
preemption argument.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Hs {7} As we have noted, the issue
raised by the Romeros and that we address
in this appeal is whether substantial evidence
exists to support certain findings and conclu-
sions made by the district court. In accor-
dance with our standard of review, the judg-
ment of the trial court will not be disturbed
on appeal if the findings of fact entered by
the court are supported by substantial evi-
dence, are not clearly erroneous, and are
sufficient to support the judgment. See
Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 111 N.M. 410, 412,
806 P.2d 59, 61 (1991) (stating that it is the
appellate court’s duty to interpret the trial
court’s findings to determine whether they
are sufficient to support the judgment).
When considering a claim of insufficient evi-
dence, we resolve “all disputes of facts in
favor of the successful party and indulge all
reasonable inferences in support of the pre-
vailing party.” Las Cruces Profl Fire Fight-
ers v. City of Las Cruces, 1997-NMCA--044,
12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P.2d 177. Thus,
“{t]he question is not whether substantial
evidence exists to support the opposite re-
sult, but rather whether such evidence sup-
ports the result reached.” Id. Finally, “we

will not reweigh the evidence nor substitute
our judgment for that of the fact finder.” Id.

I {8} Before we turn to the issues in
this case, however, we express our concern
about the Romeros’ brief in chief, which, in
Jarge measure, fails to conform to the New
Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
brief contains almost no argument, it fails to
cite the record, and it fails to present the
evidence as a whole. In order to properly
support a challenge to the sufficiency of evi-
dence, the argument section of the brief in
chief must include “citations to authorities,
record proper, transcript of proceedings or
exhibits relied on.” Rule 12-213(A)(4)
NMRA. This Court has no duty to review an
argument that is not adequately developed.
Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-
NMCA-045, 115, 187 N.M. 339, 110 P.8d
1076 (declining to entertain a cursory argu-
ment that relied on several factual assertions
that were made without citation to the rec-
ord). Further, where a party fails to cite
any portion of the record to support its factu-
al allegations, we need not consider its argu-
ment on appeal. Santa Fe Exploration Co.
v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 114 N.M. 103,
108, 835 P.2d 819, 824 (1992), Although the
deficiencies in the Romeros’ brief make it
almost impossible to address many of their
assertions, we consider their arguments
where we can.

{9} We begin our analysis with the issue of
whether the Bank violated the HLPA’s re-
quirement that a borrower receive a reason-
able, tangible net benefit as this appears to
be the crux of the Romeros’ appeal. See
§ 28-21A-4(B). We then turn to their re-
maining arguments.

Substantial Evidence Supports the District
Court’s Finding That the Romeros Re-
ceived a Reasonable, Tangible Net Benefit

Hl {10} The New Mexico Legislature en-
acted the HLPA in 2003 in response to the
harm that predatory lending schemes were
causing residents, resulting in the loss of
home equity and an increase in foreclosures.
NMSA 1978, § 58-21A-2 (2003). Like most
states in the nation, our Legislature has
found that such abusive practices are often
intended to drive unsophisticated consumers

173

into making ill-advised financial decisions
and, as a result, too many homeowners find
themselves victims of overreaching creditors.
Under the HLPA, a proposed loan that refi-
nances an existing home loan has to suffi-
ciently protect the interests of the borrower
from financial harm.

{11} Although it underwent substantial re-
visions in 2009, two provisions of the HLPA.
applied to the Romeros’ 2006 loan. The first,
Section 58-21A-4, applied to all home loans
and included restrictions on predatory lend-
ing practices such as “flipping” a loan and
encouraging default in connection with refi-
nancing the loan. On the other hand, NMSA
1978, Section 58-21A-5 (2003) (amended
2009), sets forth limitations and prohibited
practices for “high-cost” mortgages. High-
cost loans are those that exceed either a rate
or a points and fees threshold. NMSA 1978,
§ 58-21A-3(1) (2003) (amended 2009).

{12} On appeal, the Romeros do not chal-
lenge the district court’s finding that their
Joan did not meet the “total points and fees
threshold” or the “rate threshold” and, as a
result, that their mortgage was not a “high-
cost” home loan under Section 58-21A-5 of
the HLPA. We therefore consider the Rome-
ros’ argument as it pertains to Section 58-
21A-4 only. The relevant provision of that
section provides:

B. No creditor shall knowingly and in-
tentionally engage in the unfair act or
practice of flipping a home loan. As used
in this subsection, “flipping a home loan”
means the making of a home loan to a
borrower that refinances an existing home
loan when the new loan does not have
reasonable, tangible net benefit to the bor-
rower considering all of the circumstances,
including the terms of both the new and
refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan
and the borrower's circumstances.

Section 58-21A-4(B).

{13} The Romeros argue that substantial
evidence does not support the district court’s
findings that the loan they received provided
a “reasonable, tangible net benefit” to them,
as that term is used in Section 58-21A-4(B).
In particular, they challenge the following

774

findings of fact and conclusions of law en-
tered by the district court:

62. [The Bank] did not violate the
(HLPA], [UPA], Regulation Z, or the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act in the
extension and servicing of the [Romeros’]
Joan.

64. The subject loan resulted in the
payoff of several of the Romeros’ debts,
and a $81,164.82 cash payment to the
Romeros. The subject loan provided a
reasonable, net tangible benefit to the
Romeros.

H. [The Bank] did not engage in “flip-
ping” as set forth in ... [S]ection 58-21A—
4(B) ....as the subject loan resulted in a
reasonable, net tangible benefit to the
[Romeros].

I. [The Bank] did not violate the
[UPA]

{14} The Romeros’ argument is not entire-
ly clear. They do not challenge the district
court’s reasoning that the payoff of several of
the Romeros’ debts and a $31,164.82 cash
payment to the Romeros constituted a rea-
sonable, tangible net benefit. Instead, they
argue that the new loan did not confer upon
them a reasonable, tangible net benefit be-
cause the loan was made with “no regard to
the ability of the Romeros’ to repay” and
because the loan “clearly stripped [them] of
their entire equity.” The Romeros go on to
say that “(iJf [Equity One] had asked for tax
returns, [Equity One] would certainly have
realized that Mr. Romero had clearly misun-
derstood what the question was asking for
when they asked for his gross monthly in-
come.” We begin with a review of the dis-
trict court’s findings and then turn to the
Romeros’ argument.

{15} The HLPA does not specify under
what circumstances a “reasonable, tangible
net benefit” will be considered to exist.
Here, the district court took several factors
into consideration in making that determina-
tion. The court began by noting that the
Romeros wanted to refinance their prior
mortgage, reducing the equity in their prop-
erty in order to pay off other debts. The

Romeros’ prior mortgage was in default at
the time they signed the new loan, leaving
their home subject to foreclosure proceed-
ings by New Century. In addition, the
Romeros were in debt and needed funds to
revitalize their music and clothing store in
Espanola. In evaluating whether there was
a reasonable, tangible net benefit to the
Romeros, the district court took into consid-
eration those aspects of the 2006 loan that it
found were not beneficial to the Romeros,
including the fact that their new loan had a
higher monthly payment, it required pay-
ment of costs and fees for the refinance, and
the overall term of the loan was extended.
The district court nevertheless concluded
that the Romeros received a reasonable,
tangible net benefit. It specifically found
that the Romeros received a minor benefit
insofar as a lower rate was extended on the
Joan for an additional year, there was a
slightly lower cap on the interest rate, and
the Romeros had signed a form acknowl-
edging they had received a reasonable, tangi-
ble net benefit. Of greater significance to
the district court, however, was the fact that
with the new loan, the Romeros were able to
pay off about $9,000 in other debts, and they
received a cash payment in excess of $30,000
as a result of the transaction. Thus, the
district court concluded that under these cir-
cumstances, “the subject loan resulted in a
reasonable, net tangible benefit to the
[Romeros].” We are persuaded that these
findings—in particular, the cash out of over
$40,000—support the district court’s determi-
nation that, considering all of the circum-
stances, the Romeros received a reasonable,
tangible net benefit from the 2006 loan.

Hl {16} As we have noted, the Romeros
make a generalized argument that the refi-
nanced loan was made without regard to
their ability to repay and that it stripped
them of their entire equity. They contend
that “[cJourts outside New Mexico have
found that these predatory practices are not
acceptable.” However, the Romeros do not
cite to any case in support of this statement.
Where a party cites no authority to support
an argument, we may assume no such au-
thority exists. In re Adoption of Doe, 100
N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1830 (1984).
The Romeros do not explain why the ability

ee
Es
tion 58-21A-4(B), however, is identical to the

prior version. The 2009 amendments are not
applicable to this case.

to repay a loan is or should be a factor in
assessing whether a borrower has received a
reasonable, tangible net benefit under New
Mexico law. This Court has no duty to
review an argument that is not adequately
developed. Headley, 2005-NMCA-~045, 115,
187 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (declining to
entertain a cursory argument).

{17} Notwithstanding the Romeros’ failure
to develop their argument, we nevertheless
make two observations. First, we note that
the issue of repayment ability and the result-
ing prohibition on equity stripping is specifi-
cally addressed in the HLPA with respect to
high-cost home loans. See § 58-21A-4(C),
(N). There is no such requirement in the
provision prohibiting flipping a home loan.
See § 58-21A-4(B). This Court assumes
that the Legislature was fully aware of the
language in all of the HLPA’s statutory pro-
visions when it enacted Section 58-21A-4(B)
and that it chose not to require consideration
and documentation of a borrower’s reason-
able ability to repay the loan when determin-
ing what tangible benefit, if any, the borrow-
er would receive from a mortgage loan. See
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 2004~
NMSC-035, 1115, 186 N.M. 630, 108 P.8d 554
(“We presume that the Legislature acts with
full knowledge of, and consistent with, exist-
ing legislation.”). We are mindful that while
the ability to repay a loan is an important
consideration when otherwise assessing a
borrower's financial situation, we will not
read such meaning into the statute’s “reason-
able, tangible net benefit” language simply
because we are asked to do so.

{18} Additionally, it is noteworthy that in
2009, the Legislature amended Section 58-
2144 of the HLPA setting additional mini-
mum standards and prohibited practices for
creditors making home loans. See § 58-
21A4-4(C)(N). Under the new version of the
statute, several provisions have been added,
including Section 58-21A-4(C), which pro-
vides, in part, “No creditor shall make a
home loan without documenting and consid-
ering the borrower’s reasonable ability to
repay that loan pursuant to its terms.” Simi-
larly, Section 58-214-4(D) prohibits the
making of a home loan without determining
the borrower’s ability to repay costs. Sec-

775

Tl {19} We believe that the reasonable,
tangible net benefit standard requires a find-
ing that the benefit of making the transaction
outweighs the costs associated with the loan.
In other words, a lender must make a rea-
sonable inquiry of the borrower that refi-
nancing the existing home loan is in the
borrower's interest. In this case, whether
there was a reasonable, tangible net benefit
to the Romeros depended in large part on
the importance of curing the default on their
prior mortgage, as well as paying off their
debts and getting an infusion of cash in an
effort to get their business back on its feet.
‘The district court found that at the time of
the loan, the refinanced mortgage enabled
the Romeros to realize their goals of obtain-
ing debt relief and attempting to save their
business. We agree with the district court
that, looking back, the price to the Romeros
was high because their business ultimately
failed, and they were unable to make the
payments on their new loan. However, we
also agree with the district court that viewing
the new loan at the time it was accepted, the
Romeros received a reasonable, tangible net
benefit from the 2006 mortgage and note
because it could have salvaged their business
and saved their home from foreclosure by
New Century. For these reasons, we affirm
the district court’s ruling that the Bank did
not violate Section 58-21A~-4(B) of the HLPA
or the UPA.

The Bank of New York, as Trustee for
Popular Financial Services, Holds the
Romeros’ Note and Mortgage

HH {20} The Romeros contend that there
is not substantial evidence to support the
district court’s finding that the Romeros’
note and mortgage were held by the Bank
and that, as the legal and beneficial owner,
the Bank is entitled to enforce the note and
mortgage. The sum of the Romeros’ argu-
ment is that “[t]he assignment stamps or
endorsements that appear on the note are to
JP Chase Morgan, not the Bank of New
York.” They point to no other evidence, nor
do they provide any support or citation for

776

the proposition that such an endorsement is
required to transfer rights in a promissory
note. In re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. at
765, 676 P.2d at 1880 (stating that an appel-
Jate court will not consider an issue if no
authority is cited in support of the issue, as
absent cited authority to support an argu-
ment, the court assumes no such authority
exists). Furthermore, we have said that in
order to challenge the district court’s find-
ings of fact as not supported by substantial
evidence, a party must provide this Court
with a summary of all the evidence bearing
on the finding being challenged, including the
evidence that supports the trial court’s deter-
mination, regardless of interpretation. Mar-
tinez v. Sw. Landfills, Inc, 115 N.M. 181,
184-85, 848 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Ct.App.
1993). The Romeros have failed to do this.

{21} Our review of the record shows that
an assignment of mortgage was admitted into
evidence at trial without objection. The as-
signment transferred the mortgage and note
at issue in this case from Equity One to the
Bank in June 2008, Kevin Flanagan, a sen-
ior litigation processor for Litton Loan Ser-
vicing, a service provider for the Bank, testi-
fied that the note and mortgage had been
assigned to the Bank and that it had not
been assigned to another financial institution.
With no evidence to the contrary, we con-
clude that the record provides substantial
evidence for the district court’s factual deter-
mination that the Bank is the legal owner of
the note and mortgage and had standing to
enforce it when the complaint for foreclosure
was filed.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Dis-
cretion When It Rejected Harold John-
son’s Expert Opinions

Hs {22} After hearing the testimony
of the Romeros’ expert witness, Harold John-
son, the district court determined that John-
son did “not have sufficient knowledge, skill,
experience, training[,] and education under
Rule 11-702 [NMRA] to testify as an expert
witness in this case.” Accordingly, the dis-
trict court did not admit Johnson’s opinion
testimony into evidence. The standard of
review on appeal for a district court’s deci-
sion regarding the admission of expert testi-

mony is abuse of discretion. “[TJhe admis-
sion of expert testimony or other scientific
evidence is peculiarly within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed absent a showing of abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156,
169, 861 P.2d 192, 205 (1998). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly
contrary to the logical conclusions demanded
by the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, 165, 122
N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153.

{23} The Romeros’ argument that there is
not substantial evidence for the district
court’s findings concerning Johnson’s exper-
tise is reduced to a single sentence: “Where,
as a bare investigator his opinion or knowl-
edge of the Romerofs’] loan is quite substan-
tial.” The Romeros do not explain why they
believe Johnson’s knowledge is substantial or
why he was qualified to render expert opin-
ions about the legality of their loan, nor do
they challenge any of the district court's
specific findings as inconsistent with other
evidence in the record.

{24} The district court found that although
Johnson had worked as a loan officer, his
experience with respect to the type of loan at
issue was very limited. Johnson testified
that he had only worked as a loan officer
under a broker’s supervision and that he had
only occasionally performed HLPA calcula-
tions. He had no certifications, no specific
training or classes related to the issues in the
case, and had never testified as an expert.
The district court also determined that John-
son’s opinions were not credible because they
consisted of “novel legal arguments regard-
ing the interpretation of applicable statutes
and rules which are not supported by exist-
ing law.” Given these uncontested findings,
we conclude that substantial evidence sup-
ported the exercise of the district court’s
discretion to exclude the testimony of John-
son and to exclude his opinions about the
Romeros’ loan.

Substantial Evidence Supports the District
Court’s Finding That the Romeros Had a
Sufficient Opportunity to Review the Loan
Closing Documents

Hs {25} Lastly, we turn to the
Romeros’ assertion that they did not have an

adequate opportunity to review the loan clos-
ing documents and, therefore, the status of
their loan under the HLPA is necessarily
affected. [BIC 8] The Romeros raise this
issue under the substantial evidence stan-
dard. As we have noted, “[s]ubstantial evi-
dence is such relevant evidence as a reason-
able mind might accept as adequate support
for a conclusion.” Samora v. Bradford, 81
N.M. 205, 207, 465 P.2d 88, 90 (Ct.App.1970).
‘When determining whether a finding of fact
is supported by substantial evidence, we re-
view the evidence in the light most favorable
to upholding the finding and indulge all rea-
sonable inferences in support of the district
court’s decision. Id.

{26} The Romeros cite to evidence pre-
sented at trial that when they arrived at the
title company for their closing, the loan docu-
ments were not at the title company, they
had to wait, and the time allotted for the
closing was shortened as a result. Mr.
Romero testified that he completed the 12th
grade and that it would take him at least a
week with a dictionary to understand the
documents. Mrs. Romero only completed
the 10th grade. It appears that the Romeros
are arguing that they did not have enough
time to review the loan documents, and we
can only assume that this means they would
not have signed the documents if they under-
stood what the documents said.

{27} The district court found, however,
that the Romeros did have an opportunity to
review all of the loan closing documents and
that the closing agent made a good faith
effort to explain those documents to the
Romeros at the closing. Further, Mr.
Romero testified that they received copies of
the loan documents and had three days to
examine them and exercise their right to
rescind the loan if they had problems with
the transaction. We acknowledge that loan
documents are often lengthy, complex, and
difficult to understand. However, upon our
review of the record, coupled with the fact.
that the Romeros had entered into a mort-
gage previously and were familiar with the
process, we cannot conclude that substantial
evidence did not support the district court’s
findings that the Romeros had adequate time

TT

to review the documents during the closing
and after they had signed the loan.

{28} Without question, the Romeros’ finan-
cial situation has greatly deteriorated over
the past several years. Their debts have
continued to pile up, they lost their business,
and the Bank now stands positioned to sell
their family home. Notwithstanding this un-
fortunate set of circumstances, however, we
conclude that the record supports the district
court’s finding that neither Equity One nor
the Bank violated the HLPA in this case.
CONCLUSION

{29} For the reasons set forth above, we
affirm the decision of the district court.

{30} IT IS SO ORDERED.

‘WE CONCUR: MICHAEL D.
BUSTAMANTE and CYNTHIA A. FRY,

Judges.

2011-NMCA-114
266 P.3d 646
Nick RICCI, Lynda Ricci, Meade Estate
Neighborhood Association, Frank Cha-
vez, William Aceves, Jr., William Aceves,
Irma Aceves, Deborah Hall, Kenneth
Tisdale, Daniel Ortega, and Roxanne
Ortega, Petitioners—Appellants,
ve
BERNALILLO COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Respondent—Appellee,

and

Albuquerque Excavators, Inc., Loretta
Chavez, and William F. Davis,
Interested Parties.

No. 30,264.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Oct. 4, 2011.

a
a
oa)

Oman & Yntema P.A., Hessel E. Yntema,
II, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants.

Bernalillo County, Jeffrey Landers, Coun-
ty Attorney, Patrick F. Trujillo, Deputy
County Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for Ap-
pellee.

OPINION

SUTIN, Judge.

{1} Petitioners-Appellants (Petitioners),
who are neighbors of property to be devel-
oped into a residential subdivision were
unsuccessful in their attempt, before the
Bernalillo County Board of County Com-
missioners (the board), to stop a developer
from removing certain material in the
ground before construction of the subdivi-
sion. The material being removed had
commercial value in and of itself, The
board approved issuance of a special-use
permit for the excavation and removal of
the material. Petitioners unsuccessfully
appealed to the district court, and now, on
certiorari, they ask this Court to reverse
the district court with remand to the
board. Petitioners assert that the board
failed to employ the correct standard for
issuance of a special-use permit.

{2} The dispute regarding the correct
standard for issuance of a special-use permit
is whether an administratively adopted stan-
dard for issuance of special-use permits
should include additional criteria that our
Supreme Court established for approval of a
zone map change in Albuquerque Commons
Partnership v. City Council of Albuquerque
(ACP), 2008-NMSC-025, 144 N.M. 99, 184
P.8d 411. We hold that the board was not
required to employ the ACP criteria in con-
sidering issuance of the special-use permit.

BACKGROUND

{3} The petition for a writ of certiorari
filed by Petitioners, stems from their unsue-
cessful appeal to the district court from a
decision of the board. The board approved
an application for a special-use permit for
mining, excavating, removing, processing,
and stockpiling. This work was to be done in
connection with development of a subdivision.
The district court affirmed the findings and
decision of the board. The applicants for the
special-use permit were Loretta Chavez, the
owner of property to be developed, whom we
refer to as “Developer,” and Albuquerque
Excavators, Inc. (Excavators), the company
hired to perform the work permitted under
the special-use permit. Developer and Exca-

vators were Interested Parties in the district
court proceeding.

The Administrative Proceedings

HI {4} Developer applied to Bernalillo
County (the county) to develop a thirty-one
unit subdivision on an approximate fifty-six
acre site, following which a grading and
drainage plan was approved by the county.
In the process of grading and draining, it
was discovered that the soil underneath the
property was rich in aggregate material,
sand, and gravel. Developer determined
that it would be worthwhile to remove the
material because it was valuable and because
the material would ultimately have to be
removed to develop the lot. When Excava-
tors started the removal, the county issued a
zoning violation citation based on rock re-
moving activity. Consequently, Developer
and Excavators applied for the special-use
permit.

{5} The Bernalillo County Planning Com-
mission (the planning commission) denied the
application for a special-use permit, conclud-
ing that because the site was located next to
a residential area, it would be detrimental to
the residential area, and also concluding that
Developer failed to demonstrate that the ex-
isting A-1 zoning was inappropriate. Devel-
oper appealed the planning commission’s de-
nial of the special-use permit to the board,
and the board reversed the planning commis-
sion’s determination and granted the special-
use permit.

{6} Specifically, the board found that the
request for the special-use permit was consis-
tent with County Zoning Ordinance Resolu-
tion 116-86 and Policies of the Rural Area
Section of the Albuquerque/Bernalillo County
Comprehensive Plan (the plan) in that the
site was near other sand and gravel sites and
was not near highly scenic or prime recre-
ational areas. The board also found the re-
quest to be consistent with a Resolution 116-
86 “more advantageous to the community”
standard, on the ground that the “land use is
more advantageous to the community since it
encourages a small-scale, locally owned and
operated industry and reduces the need to
travel as articulated in Policies 3.g, 6.a, 6.b
[and] 6.g of the ... [pllan.” The board

779

further determined that the request was con-
sistent with the health, safety, and general
welfare of residents of the county, a require-
ment also contained in Resolution 116-86.
The board imposed a number of conditions
on the permit. The conditions consisted of a
substantial number of requirements and re-
strictions, and the permit was issued for two
years.

The District Court’s Decision

{7} Petitioners raised only one issue in
their appeal to the district court from the
decision of the board: whether the board
applied the wrong legal standard in approv-
ing the Interested Parties’ request for a spe-
cial-use permit. In the district court, Peti-
tioners asserted that when applying the
standard of “more advantageous to the com-
munity,” the board did not act in accordance
with the law because the board failed to spe-
cifically find that “(1) there is a public need
for a change of the kind in question, and (2)
that need will be best served by changing
the classification of the particular piece of
property in question as compared with other
available property[,]” as stated by our Su-
preme Court in ACP, 2008-NMSC-025, 130,
144 N.M. 99, 184 P.8d 411, and reiterated in
Albuquerque Commons Partnership v. City
Council of Albuquerque, 2009-NMCA-065,
116, 146 N.M. 568, 212 P.38d 1122, rev'd on
other grounds, 2011-NMSC-002, 149 N.M.
308, 248 P.3d 856.

{8} According to the district court, the
board’s response in the district court was
that ACP did not apply to special-use per-
mits but applied to zone map downzoning
circumstances only, as reflected by the fact
that the findings required in ACP were pre-
ceded by the following reference to downzon-
ing from ACP, 2008-NMSC-~025, 130, 144
N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411.

[The resolution] adequately accommodates

the need for planning and zoning flexibili-

ty. Therefore, without adopting any abso-
lute standards or mechanical tests, we rec-
ognize that a municipality may be able to

justify an amendment that downzones a

particular property by demonstrating that

the change is “more advantageous to the
community, as articulated in the [clompre-

780

hensive [pJlan or other [c]ity master plan.”

The proof in such a case would have to

show, at a minimum, that “... there is a

public need for a change... .”

(Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.) The
district court indicated further that the board
had asserted that the word such, found in the
last sentence of the quoted material, can only
refer to a downzoning case because of the
language that precedes the word. The dis-
trict court read the board’s position to be
that, because the case before the board did
not involve downzoning, Interested Parties
did not have to meet the additional criteria in
ACP in order to obtain a special-use permit.
And the district court noted that the board
distinguished ACP on the ground that Inter-
ested Parties were not seeking a zone change
but were merely seeking a special-use permit
under the existing zoning of A-1, and the
court further noted that after two years the
special use would cease to be and the site
would revert to A~1 zoning without a special-
use overlay.

{9} The district court’s rationale for af-
firming the findings of the board and the
board’s decision was based in part on its
analysis of Miller v. City of Albuquerque, 89
N.M. 503, 554 P.2d 665 (1976), and a later
case relating to zoning. Miller involved re-
view of a zone change approved by a city
commission, and it set out a standard for
zone changes called the “change-or-mistake
rule.” See id. at 506, 554 P.2d at 668 (“The
fundamental justification for an amendatory
or repealing zoning ordinance is a change of
conditions making the amendment or repeal
reasonably necessary to protect the public
interest. Also, a zoning amendment may
cover and perfect previous defective ordi-
nances or correct mistakes or injustices
therein.” (internal quotation marks and cita~
tion omitted)). The district court stated that
the later decision, W. Old Town Neighbor-
hood Ass’n v. City of Albuquerque, 1996~
NMCA-107, 123, 122 N.M. 495, 927 P.2a
529, superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in C.F.T. Dev, LLC v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs, 2001-NMCA--069, 180 N.M. 775, 32
P.3d 7841, clarified that Miller did not apply

1. CRD. Dev, LLC was overruled on other
grounds by Rio Grande Chapter of Sierra Club v.

only to rezonings and downzonings. The
district court noted that “the ‘more advanta-
geous to the community’ standard” was “the
subsequently added third element” to the
change-or-mistake rule.

{10} Turning then to ACP, the district
court quoted ACP’s statement that “New
Mexico courts have not limited the Miller
rule’s applicability to piecemeal rezonings of
single parcels, but have extended it to down-
zonings done pursuant to a comprehensive
plan, and even to an upzoning of a specific
property upon petition of the landowner.”
ACP, 2008-NMSC-025, 126, 144 N.M. 99,
184 P.3d 411. The district court concluded
that “[a] special-use permit, however, is nei-
ther a rezoning, a downzoning or an upzon-
ingl,J” referring to language in Embudo
Canyon Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Albu-
querque, 1998-NMCA-171, 116, 126 N.M.
827, 968 P.2d 1190, superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in C.F.T. Dev, LLC,
2001-NMCA-069, 130 N.M. 775, 32 P.3d 784.
Therefore, the district court reasoned, “the
enhanced criteria stated in ACP [did]. not
apply[,]” and the board was required to find
only that a different use category would be
more advantageous to the community under
the factors employed by the board. Accord-
ingly, in the district court’s view the board’s
decision was in accordance with the law, as it
was based on the correct legal standard and
because the enhanced standard from ACP
that Petitioners required did not apply to
special-use permits.

DISCUSSION

{11} Petitioners fault the board for failing
to apply the standards of proof required in
ACP when considering the “more advanta-
geous to the community” standard. This
failure, according to Petitioners, resulted in
an approval of the special-use permit that
was not in accordance with law. Petitioners
ask this Court to reverse and remand for the
board to evaluate whether the special-use
permit would be more advantageous to the
community under the standards of proof es-
tablished in ACP.

N.M,. Mining Comm'n, 2003-NMSC-005, 133
N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806.

Standard of Review

TE {12} The standards of review on ap-
peal to the district court from an administra-
tive decision are well established in our
eases. See Gallup Westside Dev, LLC v.
City of Gallup, 2004-NMCA-O010, 110, 185
N.M. 30, 84 P.8d 78; Siesta Hills Neighbor-
hood Ass’n v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-
NMCA-028, 116, 124 N.M. 670, 954 P.2d 102;
W. Old Town Neighborhood, 1996-NMCA-
107, 111, 122 N.M. 495, 927 P.2d 529. We
apply the same administrative standards of
review. Rio Grande Chapter, 20083-NMSC-
005, 116, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.38d 806; see
NMSA 1978, § 39-3-1.1(D) (1999); Rule 1-
075(R) NMRA. We review whether a ruling
by an administrative agency is in accordance
with the law de novo. Clark v. N.M. Chil-
dren, Youth & Families Dep't, 1999-NMCA-
114, 17, 128 N.M. 18, 988 P.2d 888.

Consideration of ACP Criteria When Ap-
proving a Special-Use Permit

{13} The planning commission’s determi-

nation in the record before us states that
Resolution 116-86 defines criteria for evalu-
ating zone map changes and special-use per-
mit applications. This planning commission
document sets out nine “policies for deciding
zone map changes and [special-use]} [pJermit
applications[.]” One of the nine policies no-
tably contains change-or-mistake criteria
plus a third factor, more advantageous to the
community. It reads:

E. The applicant must demonstrate that
the existing zoning is inappropriate be-
cause:

1. An error in the original zone mapf;]
2. Changed neighborhood conditions,
which justifies a change in land use[;]
or
3. That a different use category is
more advantageous to the community
as articulated in the ... [plan or oth-
er land use plans as adopted by the
[bloard[.]
Petitioners assert that under Resolution 116~
86 this policy is applicable equally to zone
map changes and special-use permits.

{14} In ACP, our Supreme Court stated,

in the context of a zone map amendment

OY

781

resulting in downzoning a property, that “a
municipality may be able to justify an
amendment that downzones a particular
property by demonstrating that the change is
more advantageous to the community, as ar-
ticulated in the [cJomprehensive [pJlan or
other [c]ity master plan[,]” but that “[tJhe
proof in such a case would have to show, at a
minimum, that ‘(1) there is a public need for
a change of the kind in question, and (2) that
need will be best served by changing the
classification of the particular piece of prop-
erty in question as compared with other
available property.” ACP, 2008-NMSC-
025, 130, 144 N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).

{15} While acknowledging that ACP is not
a special-use permit case, Petitioners contend
that its reasoning applies to special-use per-
mits, particularly where, as here, the county
zoning code requires the same treatment for
special-use permits as for zone map changes.
See Cadena v. Bernalillo Cnty. Bd. of
Comm'rs, 2006-NMCA-036, 19, 189 N.M.
300, 181 P.8d 687 (stating that “when in-
voked, [Resolution 116-86] ... imposes sub-
stantive and procedural guidelines for any
zone map changes and applications for spe-
cial-use permits” (alteration omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted),
In the same breath, Petitioners reject, as an
incorrect reading of New Mexico law, the
board’s argument that ACP applies to down-
zoning only and not to a zone change, argu-
ing that the case from which ACP obtained
its standards for the downzoning involved a
zone change from “single family residential”
to “planned residential” and did not involve
either “downzoning” or “upzoning.” See Fa-
sano v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 264 Or. 574,
507 P.2d 23, 28-80 (1978) (en bane) (requiring
proof that for a change in conformance with
the comprehensive plan, at a minimum, there
should be proof that (1) there is a public need
for a change of the kind in question, and (2)
that need will be best served by changing the
classification of the particular piece of prop-
erty in question as compared to other avail-
able property), superseded by statute/rule as
stated in Menges v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 44
Or.App. 603, 606 P.2d 681 (1980); see also
Embudo Canyon, 1998-NMCA-171, 1917-
18, 126 N.M. 327, 968 P.2d 1190 (distinguish-

782

ing special-use permits and zone changes,
but, according to Petitioners, treating the
requested special-use permit like a zone
change because the city’s ordinance required
application for a zone change, not a special-
use permit). A final attack on the board’s
decision is that it constitutes nothing more
than an ad hoe determination lacking in dis-
cernable standards. Petitioners seek greater
definitional protection against unfettered dis-
cretion through application of the ACP crite-
ria since those standards provide “certain
policies and uniform rules of action” and limit
the “wide discretion to grant [special-use]
permits as ‘more advantageous to the com-
munity.” For these reasons, Petitioners
contend that the board’s failure to address
the ACP standards in relation to the approv-
al of the special-use permit resulted in an
approval that was not in accordance with law.

{116} We are not persuaded by Petition-
ers’ arguments. Nothing in ACP indicates
that its enhanced approval criteria were in-
tended to apply to temporary special-use per-
mits. We are not going to expand ACP’s
zoning context involving restrictive and dura-
tionally indeterminate zone map changes to
circumstances in which a developer seeks to
temporarily lessen a restrictive zoning under
a limited-in-time, special-use permit. We
leave it to our Supreme Court to consider
whether the additional definitional criteria it
required for a zone map change are suited
equally for special-use permits.

The Dissent.

{117} Judge Garcia’s dissenting view es-
sentially adopts Petitioners’ logic, which is
that (1) ACP applies to zoning under Resolu-
tion 116-86, (2) Resolution 116-86 applies
equally to zoning and special use permits,
therefore, (8) ACP applies to special-use per-
mits. The concern we have with the logic is
that ACP’s judicially adopted enhanced crite-
ria are not in the Resolution; ACP did not
apply its enhanced criteria to anything but
zoning; and in construing its own resolution,
the board could have applied, but refused to
apply, ACP’s enhanced criteria to special-use
permits. Nothing in ACP, as we read it,
indicates that the Resolution must, as a mat-
ter of law, be read to incorporate the judicial-

ly created enhanced criteria as necessarily
applicable to both zoning and special-use per-
mits. Because the enhanced criteria came
into existence solely through judicial adop-
tion to be applied to zoning, we think it is
more appropriate to leave to our Supreme
Court the requirement, as a matter of law,
that the enhanced criteria be applied under
the Resolution to special-use permits.
CONCLUSION

{18} We affirm the decision of the district
court. The board’s refusal to apply the ACP
criteria required in considering a governmen-
tal entity’s proposed zone map change to
consideration of issuance of a limited, less
restrictive, special-use permit was in accor-
dance with law.

{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.

ICONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO,
Chief Judge and TIMOTHY L. GARCIA,
Judge (dissenting).

GARCIA, Judge, (dissenting).

{20} I respectfully disagree with the ma-
jority and would apply the criteria set forth
in ACP and Miller to a special-use permit
under Resolution 116-86.

{21} County Resolution 116-86 was
adopted to apply an identical application cri-
teria for zone changes and special-use per-
mits. The County chose to adopt the same
policies, procedures, and criteria to all the
potential changes contemplated by applica-
tions submitted under Resolution 116-86.
“A municipal legislative body is bound to
follow the regulations it has adopted, in the
exercise of its delegated legislative power.”
Miller, 89 N.M. at 507, 554 P.2d at 669. The
factual findings necessary to satisfy the more
advantageous to the community criteria re-
quire “proof in such a case would have to
show, at a minimum, that ... there is a
public need for a change of the kind in
question[.]” ACP, 2008-NMSC-025, 1 30, 144
N.M. 99, 184 P.8d 411 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “{BJecause
such changes must be justified pursuant to
the Miller rule and Resolution [116-86] (or a
similar local policy), they require specific fac-
tual findings relating to the affected proper-
ties.” ACP, 2008-NMSC-025, 132, 144 N.M.

99, 184 P.8d 411; see Miller, 89 N.M. at 506,
554 P.2d at 668.

{22} Although the present case factually
differs from the downzoning changes in ACP
and Miller, the uniform criteria identified in
Resolution 116-86 is not limited to zoning
changes and must also be applied to special-
use permits placed within the same resolu-
tion. Special-use permits, like small scale
zone changes are usually restricted to identi-
fiable persons or groups and would be con-
sidered quasi-judicial actions rather than leg-
islative actions. See ACP, 2008-NMSC~025,
132, 144 N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411. Because
such small-scale zoning changes must be jus-
tifiable under the Miller rule and the applica-
ble resolution, applying a different criteria to
special-use permits that have been intention-
ally placed within the same land-use regula-
tion is illogical. Rigid application of the Mil-
ler rule is not always necessary to protect
the beneficial interests of the community at
large. ACP, 2008-NMSO-025, 130, 144
N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411. Through this dissent,
I do not suggest that the County was legally
incapable of applying a less restrictive erite-
ria for the quasi-judicial review of a special-
use permit application. It was the County’s
decision to identify only one criteria to be
applied to zoning changes and special-use
permits under Resolution 116-86 that is de-
terminative in this case. Where a more re-
strictive judicial criteria is required when

783

determining whether a small-scale zoning ap-
plication is “more advantageous to the com-
munity,” there is no reason the County does
not have the right to impose this same re-
strictive criteria on other small-scale special-
use applications that are quasi-judicial. By
intentionally including special-use permits
under the same zoning resolution adopted by
the County, the more restrictive criteria
must now be imposed for both types of appli-
cations. Once the same criteria is applied,
ACP and Miller require a finding and deter-
mination that the public’s needs and interests
are protected by the necessary change being
proposed for the property. See ACP, 2008-
NMSC-025, 130, 144 N.M. 99, 184 P.3d 411;
Miller, 89 N.M. at 506, 554 P.2d at 668.

{23} I would reverse and remand this case
to the district court with instructions to ex-
amine the record to determine whether the
board’s decision was supported by proof and
to make findings establishing that there was
a public need for the change contemplated by
the application for a special-use permit. For
the reasons stated herein, I dissent.