State: Georgia
Volume: 302
Term: None-None
Jurisdiction(s): Georgia
Source: https://static.case.law/ga/302.pdf

$17Y1780. IN THE MATTER OF FINCOURT BRAXTON
SHELTON.
(804 SE2d 338)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Report and
Recommendation of the Review Panel of the State Bar, recommend-
ing that respondent Fincourt Braxton Shelton (State Bar No. 771101)
be suspended for four years as substantially similar reciprocal disci-
pline, following his receipt of a suspension pursuant to order of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Shelton, who has been a member of the
State Bar of Georgia since 2007, acknowledged service of the notice of
reciprocal discipline, filed pursuant to Rule 9.4 (b) of the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct, as set forth in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), and
filed a response, to which he attached a filing he submitted in a
reciprocal discipline proceeding in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which proceeding arose in
response to the same four-year suspension that prompted this disci-
plinary matter. The Bar replied, attaching materials from the Penn-
sylvania disciplinary proceeding that led to his suspension.

Shelton’s Pennsylvania suspension was based on his conduct in
two unrelated client matters. In one matter, the Disciplinary Board
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that Shelton made
material misrepresentations in court documents, mishandled funds
that had been entrusted to him, labored under a significant conflict of
interest, committed a breach of his fiduciary duties, and engaged in
extreme incompetence. In the other matter, Shelton persistently
misrepresented the identity of a party in filed pleadings, acted

2 ee

without the consent of his client, filed inaccurate and false docu-
ments, and disbursed funds without authority to do so. In the Penn-
sylvania disciplinary proceeding, Shelton failed to file a response to
the petition for discipline filed by that state’s Office of Disciplinary
Counsel. Shelton did, however, participate in a hearing before a
three-member hearing committee, which concluded that Shelton had
committed the violations of which he was accused. After that finding
was reviewed and approved by the Disciplinary Board, the matter
proceeded to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which ordered that
Shelton be suspended for four years.

The Review Panel considered Shelton’s objections to the impo-
sition of reciprocal discipline, first finding to be without merit Shel-
ton’s arguments that he was deprived of due process because he was
denied oral argument before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, because
the Disciplinary Board was not an impartial body, and because the
Disciplinary Board simply accepted as true the allegations against
him. The Review Panel noted that Shelton was clearly provided with
notice and an opportunity to be heard, as he was provided with notice
through service of the petition for discipline, to which he failed to
respond, and as he participated in the hearing before the hearing
committee and was allowed to file a brief before the Supreme Court.
The Review Panel further noted that the Pennsylvania disciplinary
rules dictate that Disciplinary Board members who investigate attor-
ney misconduct are precluded from further participation in that
matter, such that there was no basis upon which to suspect that there
had been a lack of impartiality. The Review Panel next considered
and rejected Shelton’s argument that there was a lack of evidence
supporting the findings of misconduct in the Pennsylvania proceed-
ings, finding that the record of those proceedings supported the
conclusions reached by the Pennsylvania disciplinary authorities.
Finally, the Review Panel considered Shelton’s objection that the
imposition of discipline would result in a “grave injustice,” see Rule
9.4 (b) (8) (iii), as it would leave an innocent party without legal
representation, but rejected that argument, as Shelton had failed to
present evidence in support of that assertion and had failed to present
any authority in support of his assertion that depriving a client of its
chosen counsel due to that counsel’s suspension would constitute a
grave injustice within the meaning of the rule. Finding that Shelton
had failed to prove the existence of any element under Rule 9.4 (b) (3)
to support the imposition of discipline other than that imposed in
Pennsylvania, the Review Panel recommended that Shelton be sus-
pended for four years and until such time as he has been readmitted
to practice in Pennsylvania.

ee 3

Having reviewed the record, this Court agrees with the Review
Panel’s recommendation that a four-year suspension is the appropri-
ate sanction in this reciprocal discipline matter. Accordingly, we
direct that Fincourt Braxton Shelton be suspended from the practice
of law in the State of Georgia for four years. At the conclusion of the
suspension imposed in this matter, if Shelton wishes to seek rein-
statement, he must offer proof to the State Bar’s Office of General
Counsel that he has been reinstated to the practice of law in Penn-
sylvania. If the State Bar agrees that this condition has been met, the
State Bar will submit a notice of compliance to this Court, and this
Court will issue an order granting or denying reinstatement.

Shelton is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (©).

Four-year suspension with conditions for reinstatement. All the
Justices concur.

DECIDED AUGUST 28, 2017.

aula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Wolanda R.
Shelton, Jenny K. Mittelman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar,
for State Bar of Georgia.

$17Y1811. IN THE MATTER OF LAKEISHA TENNILLE GANTT.
(804 SE2d 336)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on special master
J. Thomas Morgan III’s report and recommendation in which he rec-
ommends that this Court accept the petition for voluntary discipline
filed by Respondent Lakeisha Tennille Gantt (State Bar No. 142126)
pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (c) after the State Bar filed a Formal
Complaint and impose a public reprimand as discipline for Gantt’s
admitted violation of Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct, see Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum penalty
for a violation of Rules 1.2 and 1.3 is disbarment, while the maximum
penalty for a violation of Rule 1.4 is a public reprimand.

In her petition, Gantt, who has been a member of the State Bar
of Georgia since June 2005, admitted that in September 2007, a client

1 The Formal Complaint filed in this matter also accused Gantt of violations of Rules 1.1
and 8.4 (a) (4). Although the maximum penalty for a violation of either of those Rules is
disbarment, Gantt denied violating those Rules, and the State Bar agreed that the evidence
likely would not support those claims

4 ee

retained Gantt to represent her in a civil matter arising from an
incident where the parking brake on an unoccupied asphalt truck had
disengaged, causing the truck to roll across the client’s front lawn and
into her house. The home incurred extensive damage, causing the
client and her minor children to move out while repairs were per-
formed. Although no physical injuries were noticed or reported, the
client believed that her children had suffered emotional damage from
the incident. Gantt assisted the client in obtaining compensation for
the repairs to the residence, loss of personal property, temporary
lodging, and some meals. In August 2009, Gantt timely filed a lawsuit
on behalf of the client individually and on behalf of the client’s minor
children. After the defendants answered the complaint and some
initial written discovery was conducted, Gantt decided to voluntarily
dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice, knowing that it could be
refiled. So, on or about April 30, 2010, she dismissed the suit, but she
admits that she did not adequately communicate with the client
about her intent to do so or about the actual dismissal, and that she
never filed a renewal lawsuit. Consequently, some of the claims of the
client’s minor children were barred.

Gantt admitted that her actions violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4,
but argued that a public reprimand was a sufficient sanction in light
of the absence of any aggravating factors and the presence of many
factors in mitigation, including, no prior disciplinary history; the
absence of a selfish motive; personal and emotional problems, which
required medical treatment and counseling, and which may have
contributed to her behavior; cooperation during these disciplinary
proceedings; relative inexperience in the practice of law at the time of
these infractions; and good character, integrity, and reputation, as
evidenced by letters submitted from two attorneys who know Gantt.
See In the Matter of Brockington, 296 Ga. 438 (768 SE2d 458) (2015)
(Review Panel reprimand for violation of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 9.3
in connection with one client matter); In the Matter of Brown, 296 Ga.
439 (768 SE2d 456) (2015) (Review Panel reprimand for violation of
Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16; attorney had prior discipline, but
many mitigating factors present). The State Bar responded, indicat-
ing that it agreed with Gantt’s positions on the violations and on the
aggravating and mitigating factors and that it believed that accep-
tance of the petition would best serve the interests of the public and
the Bar. The special master agreed with Gantt’s and the State Bar’s
views of the violations, as well as the aggravating and mitigating
factors. He found that ABA Standard 4.43 (reprimand generally
appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with rea-
sonable diligence in representing a client and causes injury or poten-
tialinjury to a client) was applicable to Gantt’s admitted conduct, and

ee 5

concluded, in light of the mitigating factors, that Gantt’s requested
public reprimand was an appropriate level of discipline in this case.”

Having reviewed the record, we agree that Gantt’s admitted
facts are sufficient to support a finding that she violated Rules 1.2,
1.3, and 1.4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and that in
light of the mitigating factors a public reprimand is an appropriate
level of discipline for Gantt’s violations. Therefore, we accept Gantt’s
petition for voluntary discipline and order that she receive a public
reprimand in accordance with Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (¢).

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Public reprimand. All
the Justices concur.

DECIDED AUGUST 28, 2017.

‘aula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

Warren R. Hinds, for Gantt.

S17Y1852. IN THE MATTER OF CASSANDRE M. GALETTE.
(804 SE2d 335)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is pending before the Court on the
report of the special master, Charles D. Jones, who recommends that
the Court accept the petition for voluntary surrender filed by respon-
dent Cassandre M. Galette (State Bar No. 920625) after the filing of
a formal complaint.' See Bar Rule 4-227 (c). In the petition, Galette
requests that she be allowed to voluntarily surrender her license for

2 We note that the special master found that information regarding one mitigating factor
was shared with the State Bar, but was not formally produced to the special master, and that
the special master specifically found that viewing this information was not necessary to his
recommendation; thus, the information was not included in the record submitted to this Court.
While in this case, like the special master, we find that evidence regarding this mitigating factor
is not necessary for a determination of the appropriate level of discipline, we caution the State
Bar and special masters that the record supplied to this Court must be complete so as to provide
a proper basis for a determination of appropriate discipline

1 This Court suspended Galette in 2013 during the pendency of the related criminal
charges against her. See In the Matter of Galette, 292 Ga. 341 (737 SE2d 691) (2012). Her earlier
petition for voluntary discipline, filed in 2015, requested a suspension of no more than three
years for her admitted violations, but the special master essentially rejected that petition in his
jnitial report and recommendation wherein he stated that he believed that her misconduct
warranted disbarment.

6 ee

her admitted violation of Rule 8.1 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, see Bar Rule 4-102 (d).

Although the underlying proceedings are complicated, the only
relevant facts at this point are that Galette admits that she provided
false information to the Office of General Counsel during its inves-
tigation of a grievance that alleged Galette assisted a third party in
filing a false petition for a temporary protective order against the
grievant and in falsely acknowledging service of that petition —
actions that ultimately led to the arrest and jailing of the grievant.
Galette admitted that her actions violated Rule 8.1 (a) and requested
that she be allowed to voluntarily surrender her license. The Bar had
no objection to her second petition, and the special master recom-
mends that the Court accept it, noting that disbarment is appropriate
where, as here, the lawyer engages in intentional conduct involving
dishonesty or submits false statements during the disciplinary pro-
cess. In the Matter of Majette, 295 Ga. 4 (757 SE2d 114) (2014); In the
Matter of Davis, 290 Ga. 857, 860-861 (725 SE2d 216) (2012).

We have reviewed the records and agree to accept Galette’s
petition for voluntary surrender of her license, which is tantamount
to disbarment. See Bar Rule 4-110 (f). Accordingly, it hereby is
ordered that the name of Cassandre M. Galette be removed from the
rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia.
Galette is reminded of her duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).
Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED AUGUST 28, 2017.

‘aula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

R. Gary Spencer, for Galette.

$17A1103. BREWNER v. THE STATE.
(804 SE2d 94)

GRANT, Justice.

Appellant Brian Joseph Brewner was convicted of murder and
numerous other crimes in connection with an August 2014 home
invasion in which victim Adam Schrier was shot and killed and two
other victims were injured. Brewner now appeals, asserting that he
was denied his constitutional right to be present at certain stages of
the proceedings; that the trial court erred in admitting certain

ee 7

evidence; that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective
assistance; and that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions. Finding no error, we affirm.’

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
evidence shows that in the early morning hours of August 6, 2014, a
group of men forcibly entered Adam Schrier’s home. Schrier’s girl-
friend, Jami Smith, had arisen around 5:30 a.m. and gone to the
basement-level garage to smoke a cigarette. Hearing strange noises
on the main floor, Smith went back up the stairs and was confronted
by a man who hit her in the head with a gun and demanded to know
where “the money” was. When Smith responded that she did not
know, he shot her in the leg and dragged her upstairs to the main
floor. Another man with a gun confronted Smith’s daughter Madison
on the second floor of the home and dragged her downstairs. Mother
and daughter were forced to lie on the living room floor, where
Schrier, who had also been shot, was also lying. The men again asked
where the money was; one stated that he had been told that there was
$40,000 in the home. Smith told the men she had money in her purse
upstairs, which the men took. The assailants bound Smith and
Madison’s arms and legs with duct tape, and one fired a gun; the
bullet traversed Smith’s shoulder and struck Madison’s arm. The
men then left, and Smith was able to unbind Madison’s legs so that
Madison could retrieve a phone for Smith to call 911. Police and
paramedics responded, but Schrier died at the scene of a gunshot
wound to the chest.

The State presented evidence showing that the home invasion
arose from a complicated web of drug-related transactions. In mid-
July 2014, law enforcement conducted a drug bust at the apartment
of Becky Banner, who was involved in a methamphetamine traffick-
ing operation supplied by a Mexican drug cartel. While the bust was

In November 2014, Brewner was indicted in Gwinnett County, together with four other
indictees, on charges of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, burglary, first-
degree home invasion, conspiracy to commit robbery, armed robbery, false imprisonment,
first-degree cruelty to children, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer.
Brewner was re-indieted for the same offenses in August 2015. At the conclusion of an eight-day
jury trial in October 2015, Brewner was convicted on all of the 18 counts in which he was named.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus a total of 50
consecutive years to serve. Brewner filed a motion for new trial on October 22, 2015, which he
amended on October 29, 2015 and May 16, 2016. Following a hearing on June 8, 2016, the
motion for new trial was denied. Brewner filed a timely notice of appeal on October 20, 2016,
which he amended on January 17, 2017. This appeal was docketed to this Court's April 2017
term and was orally argued on June 26, 2017

8 |

in progress, Becky’s son Bryan drove up to his mother’s apartment,
realized what was happening, and drove to Becky’s other residence.
Parked outside this house was a Chevy Blazer in which Becky was
storing five kilos of methamphetamine — Becky’s “last drop” — which
Bryan retrieved. Bryan then got his friend, victim Schrier, to hide the
drugs for him in a storage unit near Schrier’s home. Within a week,
Bryan had sold most of the drugs.

Jamie Staples, who was also connected with the drug operation,

new that Bryan had taken the drugs from the Chevy Blazer, but
believed that they were being stored at Schrier’s home. Staples
testified at trial that, during the week prior to the crimes, he met with
Appellant Brewner several times to discuss recovering the drugs, and
any money from the sale of the drugs, from Schrier’s home. Staples
had been acquainted with Brewner since 2010 and often purchased
drugs from him. In 2013, to recover a debt owed by Staples, Brewner
had dispatched a crew of men to invade Staples’ home, where Staples
was bound, beaten, and robbed of $5,500 and three ounces of meth.
Brewner later apologized to Staples over the incident.
At the time he and Staples were devising the Schrier home
invasion, Brewner was staying at a La Quinta hotel with his girl-
friend, Charlice Roberts. Roberts testified that Staples visited their
hotel room several times during the week before the crimes and that
Staples and Brewner were discussing a plot to recover drugs and
money from Schrier’s home. Roberts also testified that during the
night before the early-morning crimes, co-indictees Devon Jenkins
and Pierre Scott visited Brewner. Roberts testified that Jenkins
expressed excitement at the prospect of making money and was
carrying a gun.

Neighbors of Schrier reported seeing a white Dodge truck parked
outside Schrier’s home with its engine running that morning around
the time of the crimes. One of these witnesses, whose suspicions were
aroused, recorded the Tennessee tag number of the vehicle, and
investigators later determined that on the afternoon following the
crimes a truck with that tag number had been parked outside the
Congress hotel, which was adjacent to the La Quinta hotel. Video
surveillance footage from the Congress hotel at 6:35 on the morning
of the crimes showed a white Dodge Ram truck pulling in followed by
a white Toyota Camry with tinted windows; three males exited the
truck and got into the Camry, which drove away. Testimony estab-
lished that Roberts owned a white Toyota Camry with tinted win-
dows, which Brewner often drove and had access to at the time of the
crimes. A vehicle matching this description was observed making a
sudden U-turn on Schrier’s street around the time of the crimes.
Roberts told police that a female in Tennessee had rented the white

ee 9

truck for Brewner, and investigators matched the truck’s tag number
to a vehicle that had gone missing in mid-July from a Chattanooga
rental car company.

A few weeks after the crimes, Staples was arrested on drug
trafficking charges, and in subsequent police interviews he impli-
cated Brewner in the crimes. With assistance from Staples, Police
Detective Bobby Johnson located Brewner in a vehicle in a motel
parking lot. When the detective approached him on foot, Brewner
drove the vehicle at the officer and then fled. Roberts, who was left
behind in the parking lot, submitted to police questioning and con-
firmed Brewner’s knowledge of the robbery plot, though she claimed
he had disavowed any participation in it. Ultimately, at the urging of
Roberts, Brewner telephoned Detective Johnson to discuss the crimes;
these conversations were recorded. Though Brewner consistently
denied being present for the crimes at Schrier’s home, he admitted
introducing Staples to Jenkins to help Staples recover the five kilos
of meth, and he also admitted to previously robbing Staples over a
drug debt.

The evidence described above was clearly sufficient to enable a
rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Brewner was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Though
Brewner may not have been present for the home invasion, there was
ample evidence of his knowledge of and participation in the planning
of the crimes, and his contact with and assistance to the perpetrators
before and after the crimes occurred. See OCGA § 16-2-20 (one may
be culpable for commission of a crime if he “[i]ntentionally aids or
abets in the commission of the crime” or “[i]ntentionally advises,
encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another tocommit the crime’).

II.

Brewner contends that he was denied his right under the Geor-
gia Constitution to be present at certain “critical stages” of his trial
proceedings. “Embodied within the constitutional right to the courts
is acriminal defendant’s right to be present and see and hear all the
proceedings which are had against him on the trial before the Court.”
Ward v. State, 288 Ga. 641, 645 (4) (706 SE2d 480) (2011) (citations
and punctuation omitted). Violations of this due process right are
presumed prejudicial, and, absent a waiver by the defendant, require
a new trial. Sammons v. State, 279 Ga. 386, 387 (2) (612 SE2d 785)
(2005). Here, however, there was no violation of Brewner’s right to be
present.

10 P|

“The right to be present attaches ‘at any stage of a criminal
proceeding that is critical to its outcome if the defendant’s presence
would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’ ” Huff v. State, 274
Ga. 110, 111 (2) (649 SE2d 370) (2001) (punctuation omitted). Thus,
a “critical stage” of a criminal proceeding is defined as “one in which
the defendant’s rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed
or waived, or one in which the outcome of the case is substantially
affected in some other way.” Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457, 458 (1) (532
SE2d 102) (2000) (punctuation omitted); accord Campbell v. State,
292 Ga. 766, 770 (4) (740 SE2d 115) (2013) (right to be present exists
where “a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant’s
absence”). Proceedings during which the jury is selected or modified,
for example, are a critical stage at which the right to be present
attaches. Sammons, 279 Ga. at 387 (2); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797,
807 (6) (505 SE2d 731) (1998). On the other hand, pre-trial hearings
and bench conferences pertaining to purely legal issues, such as the
admissibility of evidence or jury instructions, ordinarily do not
implicate the right to be present. See, e.g., Campbell, 292 Ga. at 770
(4) (pre-trial discussion of motions regarding the scope of cross-
examination and suppression of the defendant’s statement were not
critical stages at which right to be present attached); Huff, 274 Ga. at
111-112 (2) (jury charge conference and in-chambers discussion of
legal matters were not critical stages).

Brewner contends that he was denied his constitutional right to
be present when the trial court ruled on the State’s motion to admit
evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) and when the court, in his
absence, excused a prospective juror due to a family emergency.
Neither contention is correct.

Regarding the 404 (b) ruling, the record reflects that the trial
court held a pre-trial motions hearing approximately one month
before trial at which several motions were argued, including the
State’s motion to admit 404 (b) evidence. In this motion, the State
sought leave to introduce testimony regarding (1) Brewner’s involve-
ment in past drug dealings and (2) his participation in the 2013 home
invasion and robbery of Staples. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
trial court reserved ruling on the motion and directed the State to
provide, as an aid in the court’s decision-making, the recordings of
Detective Johnson’s phone conversations with Brewner and his
interview with Staples. The trial court never did issue any express
ruling on the 404 (b) motion, either by written order or in open court.
Instead, the court implicitly granted the motion by allowing both
types of evidence to be offered during the trial.

Brewner now contends that, because he was not present when
the trial court announced its ruling on the 404 (b) motion, he was

eS u

denied his constitutional right to be present. As an initial matter, it
could be argued that Brewner was in fact present when the trial court
“announced” its decision, as he was present at all times during trial
when the evidence in question was being introduced. But even if this
were not so, Brewner’s claim would fail for the simple reason that a
trial court’s announcement of a legal ruling on a motion is not a
“critical stage” of the proceedings at which the right to be present
attaches. Brewner has cited no authority, and we are aware of none,
holding that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to be present at
the time a court issues a ruling. Were it otherwise, trial courts would
be compelled to announce all rulings in open court in the defendant’s
presence, meaning that they would be forbidden from ever issuing
rulings by written order. That is plainly not the case. Accordingly,
there was no denial of any right to be present in connection with the
admission of the 404 (b) evidence.
Regarding the juror dismissal, the record reflects that, during
jury selection on the first day of trial, the trial court dismissed a
prospective juror during the lunch break after receiving a note from
the juror requesting excusal due to a family emergency. Immediately
following the lunch break, the trial court noted in open court, where
Brewner himself as well as the prosecutor and Brewner’s counsel
were present, that it had made a “command decision” to excuse the
juror because of the emergency. The court asked both defense counsel
and the prosecutor whether there was “anything we need to talk
about with regard to [the juror],” and both responded in the negative.
Brewner did not express any disagreement with his counsel’s assent
to the trial court’s decision, either contemporaneously with the trial
court’s statement or at any other time during the trial proceedings.
Itis true that Brewner had the right to be present during the trial
court’s exchange with the prospective juror. See Sammons, 279 Ga. at
387 (2); Hanifa, 269 Ga. at 807 (6); but see Waldrip v. State, 266 Ga.
874, 879 (2) (471 SE2d 857) (1996) (finding no error where commu-
nications were unrelated to the case and were not prejudicial to the
defendant). Even so, “ ‘the right to be present belongs to the defen-
dant, and he is free to relinquish it if he so chooses.’ ” Burney v. State,
299 Ga. 813, 820 (3) (b) (792 SE2d 354) (2016). The mechanics of
relinquishment are plain:

The right to be present is waived if the defendant personally
waives it in court; if counsel waives it at the defendant’s
express direction; if counsel waives it in open court while the
defendant is present; or if counsel waives it and the defen-
dant subsequently acquiesces in the waiver.

2 P|

Id.; accord Pennie v. State, 271 Ga. 419, 421 (2) (520 SE2d 448) (1999).
Here, Brewner’s counsel affirmed in open court while Brewner was
present that he had no objection to the juror’s dismissal, or to the trial
court’s manner of handling the situation. And Brewner never voiced
any disagreement during the ensuing eight-day trial with either the
trial court’s decision or his counsel’s conduct. Brewner thus waived
any right to be present and cannot now assert error in this regard. See
Fuller v. State, 277 Ga. 505, 506 (2) (591 SE2d 782) (2004) (defendant
waived right to be present by failing to object after being informed of
trial court’s communications with jury outside his presence); Hanifa,
269 Ga. at 807-808 (6) (defendant waived right to be present by failing
to object after being informed of trial judge’s meeting with the jury
outside presence of defendant and counsel).

Ill.

Brewner next contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
other acts evidence relating to his prior drug dealings and the 2013
home invasion targeting Staples. As an initial matter, it is undis-
puted that Brewner did not assert any objection when this evidence
was first introduced at trial.* Accordingly, as Brewner concedes, our
review of the trial court’s admission of this evidence is limited to a
plain error review. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (d); Jones v. State, 299 Ga.
AO, 42 (2) (785 SE2d 886) (2016). The bar for plain error is a high one:

First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally
relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the
appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error
must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which
in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it
affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth
and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error —
discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error

2 At one point, in the course of moving for a mistrial when Staples referred during his
testimony to Brewner’s having been in jail, defense counsel did interpose an objection to “this
whole line of questioning about these drug transactions.” This objection, however, came after
Staples had already testified, without objection, that he had met Brewner in 2010, used drugs
with him at that time, and then began purchasing drugs from Brewner to resell and to support
his own habit.

eS 13

seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.

State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) (punctua-
tion omitted; emphasis in original). Under the circumstances here,
there was no error, much less any clear or obvious error, and therefore
Brewner’s other acts claims fail.

Under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b),

[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be
admissible to prove the character ofa person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

Ofcourse, even if offered for a proper purpose under OCGA § 24-4-404
(b), evidence may nonetheless be excluded “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence.” OCGA § 24-4-403; State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 158 (1) (773
SE2d 170) (2015). Because these provisions of our new Evidence Code
were borrowed from the Federal Rules of Evidence, our interpreta-
tion of these provisions is guided by the decisions of the federal
appellate courts, especially the United States Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit. Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 185 (2) (a) (2) (787 SE2d
221) (2016). Thus, in construing OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) in conjunction
with OCGA § 24-4-403, this Court has adopted the three-part test
utilized in the Eleventh Circuit under the analogous Rules 403 and
404 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 101
(4) (786 SE2d 648) (2016). This test assesses whether (1) the evidence
is relevant to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s charac-
ter; (2) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the likelihood of its undue prejudice; and (8) there is
sufficient proof for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant in fact committed the other act. Id.; Olds v. State,
299 Ga. 65, 69-70 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016). We review a trial court’s
ruling on the admission of 404 (b) evidence for abuse of discretion.
Jones, 297 Ga. at 159 (1).

The evidence of Brewner’s involvement in the Staples home
invasion was relevant to prove his intent to participate in the scheme
to invade Schrier’s home in search of drugs and money. See Olds, 299
Ga. at 71-72 (2) (a defendant’s not guilty plea makes intent an issue

“4 P|

for purposes of 404 (b)). More specifically, it was relevant to rebut
Brewner’s assertion that he merely introduced Staples to the other
participants, with no intent to further orchestrate and actively assist
in the enterprise. Because Brewner’s defense was premised on his
alleged disavowal of the robbery scheme, which Brewner sought to
establish by highlighting Roberts’ testimony regarding his intent to
distance himself from the scheme, his prior involvement in a similar
plot the year before the crimes here is highly probative of his intent
to participate in the overall criminal scheme. Accordingly, the sig-
nificant probative value of this evidence in undercutting the defense
Brewner himself interposed was not substantially outweighed by the
likelihood of undue prejudice from its admission. Finally, there is
little dispute that Brewner did in fact mastermind the 2013 crime, as
Staples’ testimony on this subject was unchallenged, and Brewner
himself admitted doing the acts in his interview with Detective
Johnson.

As for the evidence regarding Brewner’s involvement in the drug
trade, this evidence was clearly relevant to establish context for his
relationship with Staples and to the others involved in the crimes.
Because this evidence was integral to the narrative surrounding the
crimes, its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the
risk of undue prejudice. See generally Old Chief v. United States,
519 U. S. 172, 183 (II) (B) (1) (117 SCt 644, 136 LE2d 574) (1997)
(recognizing, in weighing the probative value versus prejudice of
evidence offered under Rule 404 (b), “the offering party’s need for
evidentiary richness and narrative integrity in presenting a case”).?
Again, this evidence was undisputed, so the jury was authorized to
find by a preponderance of the evidence that Brewner did engage in
such drug dealing. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence under 404 (b).

To the extent Brewner asserts error in the trial court’s failure to
make on-the-record findings with regard to the three prongs of the
404 (b) test, he is incorrect. Again, because Brewner failed to object at
trial on this basis, we review this issue only for plain error. While our
case law pre-dating the effective date of the new Evidence Code held

2 In fact, to the extent this evidence simply helps to present a complete picture of the
various parties’ relationships and the context within which the crimes were planned and
perpetrated, this evidence might even be viewed as “intrinsic” evidence not subject to the 404
(b) requirements. See Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 11:3, at 243-251 (2016-17 ed.);
Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 726 (2), n. 11 (783 SE2d 895) (2016) (evidence is “intrinsic” if it is
(1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the
charged offense; (2) necessary to “complete the story of the crime”; or (3) “inextricably
intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense’).

eS 15

that trial courts must make on-the-record findings that the require-
ments for admissibility had been satisfied, see, e.g., Moore v. State,
290 Ga. 805, 809 (2) (725 SE2d 290) (2012), the Eleventh Circuit has
imposed no such requirement under Rule 404 (b). See United States
v. Schatz, 545 Fed. Appx. 934, 936 (II) (11th Cir. 2013) (because there
is no United States Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent
specifically requiring on-the-record findings prior to the admission of
evidence under Rule 404 (b), defendant could not establish plain error
in district court’s failure to do so); United States v. Braithwaite, 709
F2d 1450, 1455-1456 (11th Cir. 1983) (no error in district court’s
failure to make on-the-record finding under 404 (b)); see also United
States v. Veltmann, 6 F3d 1483, 1499 (III) (B) (5) (11th Cir. 1993)
(where record did not indicate the district court conducted the proper
review under Rule 404 (b), the appeals court conducted the analysis
itself). Accordingly, there was no plain error in the trial court’s failure
to make on-the-record findings in support of admission of the 404 (b)
evidence. Schatz, 545 Fed. Appx. at 936 (II).

IV.

Brewner contends that his trial counsel rendered constitution-
ally ineffective assistance in two respects, but neither argument
succeeds. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that his counsel’s performance was professionally defi-
cient and that such deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the
defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (IID (B) (104
SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (3)
(689 SE2d 280) (2010). To prove deficient performance, one must
show that his attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unrea-
sonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of
prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3)
(745 SE2d 637) (2013); see also Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687-688
(IIT (A). To prove prejudice, one must establish a reasonable prob-
ability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance, the
result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
695 (IIT) (B). If the defendant fails to establish either the “deficient
performance” or the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test, this
Court is not required to examine the other. Green v. State, 291 Ga.
579, 580 (2) (731 SE2d 359) (2012).

Brewner’s first argument is that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to request a limiting instruction contemporane-
ous with the admission of the 404 (b) evidence. But the trial court gave

16 P|

a comprehensive limiting instruction at the conclusion of the evi-
dence regarding the limited purposes for which the jury could con-
sider the 404 (b) evidence. The giving of the instruction at the
conclusion of the evidence mitigated any risk that the jury would
ultimately consider the evidence for animproper purpose. See United
States v. Lamons, 532 F3d 1251, 1266-1267 (IT) (B) (11th Cir. 2008) (no
error where limiting instruction regarding 404 (b) evidence given at
the close of evidence). See also Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 68, 70 (3) (508
SE2d 145) (1998) (counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction
contemporaneously with the admission of prior bad act evidence did
not constitute ineffective assistance where trial court gave limiting
instruction at close of evidence). Brewner therefore cannot establish
prejudice from trial counsel's failure to request the instruction at an
earlier point in the trial.

Brewner also asserts ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to
object to the admission of the audio recordings of Brewner’s phone
calls to Detective Johnson based on lack of voice authentication. Under
OCGA § 24-9-901 (a), authentication of evidence may be achieved
through any of a variety of means affording “evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.” It is true, as Brewner notes, that the State did not present
any evidence that Detective Johnson or any other person who was
familiar with Brewner’s voice recognized that voice on the recordings.
But the record does reflect, among other things, that in these con-
versations, the speaker provided verifiable information that only
Brewner would possess, such as the location of his truck and contents
of his backpack. Trial counsel, moreover, testified at the new trial
hearing that he believed the voice on the recording was Brewner’s,
and thus any objection based on lack of authentication could have
been overcome by readily available evidence. We agree with counsel’s
assessment, and thus Brewner can show neither deficient perfor-
mance nor prejudice.

Vv.

In his final enumeration, Brewner contends that the trial court
erred in admitting as prior inconsistent statements the video record-
ings of Roberts’ interview with Detective Johnson. Under OCGA §
24-6-613 (b), extrinsic evidence of a witness’ prior inconsistent state-
ment may be admitted so long as “the witness is first afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement and
the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the
witness on the prior inconsistent statement or the interests of justice

ee 7

otherwise require.” See also OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (1) (A) (prior incon-
sistent statements meeting requirements of OCGA § 24-6-613 (b) are
not hearsay if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to
cross-examination).

The recordings were admitted, over objection by the defense,
after Roberts testified at length regarding the relationships among
Brewner, Staples, the other co-indictees, and various witnesses; her
observations regarding the interactions among these individuals in
the days leading up to the crimes and immediately thereafter; and
her understanding about the plot to recover the missing drugs and/or
money from Schrier’s home. Roberts steadfastly maintained at trial
that Brewner’s involvement in the robbery plot was limited to merely
introducing Staples to Jenkins and that she had convinced him to
eschew further participation in the scheme. At various points during
Roberts’ direct testimony, she was asked about discrepancies between
her testimony and her prior recorded statement to Detective John-
son. For example, Roberts claimed not to recall telling Detective
Johnson that Brewner had initially wanted to be an active partici-
pant in the robbery, and she attempted to reconcile her trial testi-
mony that Brewner had gotten rid of all his guns by the time of the
crimes with her prior statement to Detective Johnson that Brewner
always carried a gun. When given the opportunity to explain why her
trial testimony might have differed from her statements to police,
Roberts testified that at the time of her police interview she was
extremely tired and under the influence of drugs.

The failure of a witness to remember making a statement may
provide the foundation for offering extrinsic evidence to prove that
the statement was made. See Hood, 299 Ga. at 99 (2); McNair v. State,
330 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (767 SE2d 290) (2014) (evidence of witness’s
past statements to police, including recording of police statement,
were properly admitted where witness claimed he could not recall
speaking with police). Here, the foundation was laid for admission of
Roberts’ prior statements to Detective Johnson when Roberts gave
testimony inconsistent with those statements, was confronted with
them, and disclaimed them. There was no error in the trial court’s
admission and publication of the recorded statements at trial.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

rances C. Kuo, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Christopher M. Quinn, Lee F.
Tittsworth, Nigel R. Lush, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher

18 Pe

M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy
Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
S. Taylor Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$16G1786. MCCONNELL et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.
(805 SE2d 79)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

Thomas McConnell filed this action against the Georgia Depart-
ment of Labor (Department), alleging claims for negligence in dis-
closing “personal information,” invasion of privacy through the public
disclosure of private facts, and breach of fiduciary duty. All of these
claims are connected to the Department’s disclosure of the personal
information, including social security numbers, of McConnell and
some 4,000 proposed class members in an e-mail sent to approxi-
mately 1,000 Georgians. The Department filed a motion to dismiss
McConnell’s claims, which the trial court granted on two bases:
(1) McConnell’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity and (2) on
the merits, each of McConnell’s contentions failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. McConnell then appealed the
trial court’s dismissal order to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court after analyzing the
merits of each of McConnell’s claims. McConnell v. Dept. of Labor, 337
Ga. App. 457 (787 SE2d 794) (2016). Although, in a footnote, the
Court of Appeals mentioned the trial court’s alternative ruling that
McConnell’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity, id. at 458
n. 2, the Court of Appeals, itself, did not consider the application of
that doctrine to McConnell’s contentions. We granted certiorari to
determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by failing to address
sovereign immunity, and we now hold that the Court of Appeals did
err in this manner.

The applicability of sovereign immunity! to claims brought
against the State is a jurisdictional issue. Indeed “[s]overeign immu-
nity ... like various other rules of jurisdiction and justiciability . .. is
concerned with the extent to which a case properly may come before

1 ‘The Georgia Constitution provides broad sovereign immunity:
Except as specifically provided in this Paragraph, sovereign immunity extends to
the state and all of its departments and agencies. The sovereign immunity of the
state and its departments and agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General
Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived
and the extent of such waiver.

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (¢).

eS 19

acourt at all.” Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 432 (IID (B) (801 SE2d
867) (2017). Therefore, the applicability of sovereign immunity is a
threshold determination,” and, ifit does apply, a court lacks jurisdic-
tion over the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the
merits of a claim that is barred. For this reason, the Court of Appeals
erred by deciding the merits of McConnell’s claims without first
considering whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars any of
his allegations against the State. Accordingly, we vacate the Court of
Appeals’ judgment, and we remand the case with the direction to
make the threshold determination of whether the trial court erred in
its holding that McConnell’s claims are barred by sovereign immu-
nity.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Hines,
C. J., Benham, Hunstein, Nahmias, Blackwell, Boggs, JJ., Chief
Judge Christopher C. Edwards, and Judge D. Scott Smith concur.
Peterson and Grant, JJ., disqualified.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

ee

Cohen, Cooper, Estep & Allen, Jefferson M. Allen, Scott A. Schwe-
ber, for appellants.

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Kathleen M. Pacious,
Deputy Attorney General, Loretta L. Pinkston-Pope, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Angela E. Cusimano, Assistant Attorney General,
for appellee.

$17A0718. ROSCOE v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 11)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

Following a jury trial, Tyshawn Roscoe was found guilty of malice
murder and various other offenses in connection with the shooting
death of John Douglas.’ On appeal, Roscoe contends, among other
things, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sup-

2 McConnell contends that sovereign immunity for the specific types of claims he is making
has been waived pursuant to the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA §§ 50-21-20 to 50-21-37.

+ On March 23, 2007, Roscoe was indicted for malice murder, felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, three counts of possession of a firearm
by aconvicted felon, hijacking a motor vehicle, misdemeanor carrying a concealed weapon, and
misdemeanor obstruction. Roscoe's initial trial, which began on April 27, 2009, ended in a
mistrial. The trial court also granted Roscoe's plea in bar on April 29, 2009, but later granted
the State’s motion for reconsideration on the issue, clearing the way for a new trial. This Court

20 A

port the verdict and that the trial court erred in granting the State’s
motion in limine to exclude certain evidence. We affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record
shows that, on September 30, 2006, Roderick Robinson was at his
auto repair shop in Fulton County performing repairs on a white 1999
Dodge Ram truck with an auto dealer tag on it. The repair shop was
adjacent to a BNS Auto Sales (“BNS”) store, where the truck was for
sale, and the truck had just arrived at the repair shop a few days prior.
Robinson also assisted customers who were looking to purchase cars
at BNS. Roscoe inquired about the truck, and Robinson took him on
a test drive. During the test drive, Roscoe pulled out a gun and
ordered Robinson out of the truck. Robinson complied, and Roscoe
drove away. Robinson told the owner of BNS about the incident, and
the owner informed police. Robinson later identified Roscoe in a
police lineup and at trial as the man who had forced him out of the
truck at gunpoint.

On the morning of October 5, 2006, several gunshots rang out at
the Regency Park Apartments, which was also in Fulton County.
Douglas had just been shot multiple times and killed in front of one
of the apartments. Jordan Dial was walking toward the apartments
at the time, and he heard a gunshot followed by screeching tires. Dial
saw a white truck pull out of the apartment complex and speed away
with two men inside. Dial had seen that same white truck with a
dealer tag on it at the apartments the night before the shooting, and
he recognized Roscoe as the person who had opened the door of the
truck to put something inside of it or take something out of it that
night.

On October 11, 2006, police went to the Regency Park Apart-
ments, where they found Roscoe standing between two buildings. As
they approached him, Roscoe started to walk away. One of the police

affirmed the trial court's ruling on the State’s motion for reconsideration in Roscoe v. State, 286
Ga. 325 (687 SE2d 455) (2009), and Roscoe was retried on April 27-29, 2010. Roscoe was found
guilty on all counts. The three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were
bifurcated, and Roscoe was found guilty on those specific counts in a separate proceeding.
Roscoe was sentenced to life imprisonment for malice murder, twenty consecutive years for
hijacking a vehicle, five consecutive years for each count of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, five years for each count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
(two counts to run concurrent with the murder count and one count to run consecutive to the
hijacking count), and twelve months on each misdemeanor (to run concurrent with each other
and with the murder sentence). The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law,
Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369 (4) (484 SE2d 479) (1993), and the remaining counts were merged
for sentencing purposes. Roscoe filed a motion for new trial on May 13, 2010, which he amended
on July 29, 2014. Following a hearing, the motion was denied on April 15, 2016. Roscoe filed a
timely notice of appeal, and, after the payment of costs, his appeal was docketed to the April
2017 term of this Court and submitted for decision on the briefs

eS a

officers, Detective Israel, identified himself and ordered Roscoe to
stop. Instead, Roscoe reached under his shirt and began to run. A foot
chase ensued, and, at one point, Detective Israel noticed that Roscoe
was no longer running with his arm under his shirt. After losing sight
of Roscoe, Detective Israel retraced Roscoe’s steps and found a
firearm in the center of the path. The firearm was dry despite a heavy
rain a few hours before. Subsequent testing of the firearm and the
bullets recovered from Douglas’ body revealed that the bullets had
been fired from this gun, and later testimony from Robinson revealed
that this gun looked similar to the one used by Roscoe to force him
from the white truck on September 30, 2006. Roscoe’s fingerprints
and palm prints were also found on the 1999 white Dodge Ram truck.
Police continued to search for Roscoe in the apartment complex, and
they eventually saw him emerge from behind a building. Police
caught up to Roscoe, where they were eventually able to subdue him
after Roscoe reached for Detective Israel's firearm.
This evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find Roscoe
guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
979).

2. Roscoe claims that the trial court abused its discretion by
granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude hearsay testimony
allegedly showing that someone other than Roscoe had murdered
Douglas. Specifically, Roscoe contends that the trial court should
have allowed his roommate, Harold Bird, to testify that, while Bird
was incarcerated, an inmate named Douglas Graves told Bird that
Graves and a man named Arthur Moore were the ones who actually
committed the murder. We disagree.

In general, hearsay “declarations to third persons against the
declarant’s penal interest, to the effect that the declarant, and not the
accused, was the actual perpetrator of the offense, are not admissible
in favor of the accused at his trial.” (Citations omitted.) Timberlake v.
State, 246 Ga. 488, 492 (1) (271 SE2d 792) (1980).” Indeed, “if such
admissions were allowed as evidence upon the trial of the accused, a
person could subvert the ends of justice by admitting the crime to
others and then absenting himself.” Id. However, “the hearsay rule
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice when
the rejected testimony b[ears] persuasive assurances of trustworthi-
ness and [i]s critical to (the) defense.” Greil v. State, 291 Ga. 615, 618
(2) (732 SE2d 741) (2012), quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.

2 This case was tried under the old Evidence Code. Statements against interest are
addressed in the new Evidence Code in OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (3).

22 A

284, 302 (93 SCt 1038, 35 LE2d 297) (1973). Such evidence “may be
admitted in the guilt-innocence phase under exceptional circum-
stances that show a considerable guaranty of the hearsay declarant’s
trustworthiness. The trial court must determine whether the value
and reliability of the tendered hearsay evidence outweigh the harm
resulting from a violation of the evidentiary rule.” (Citation an
punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902, 906 (4) (708 SE2
294) (2011).

Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision
to exclude Bird’s testimony. During his proffer to the trial court,
Roscoe claimed that Bird would testify that Graves told Bird that he
and Moore had committed the murder. However, as the State pointe’
out, when Graves was interviewed by police, Graves denied that he
had anything to do with Douglas’ murder and he further denied ever
making any statement to Bird admitting to the murder. The police
also conducted an independent investigation of both Graves an
Moore based on Bird’s allegations and found no relevant evidence in
the men’s apartments to connect them to Douglas’ murder. Nor di
they find any fingerprint evidence to connect the men to the white
truck used as the getaway vehicle. Thus, the only evidence directly
connecting Graves and Moore to the murder was the uncorroborate’
hearsay statement of Roscoe’s roommate that was based on state-
ments that Graves, himself, denied ever making. We find no error in
the trial court’s decision to exclude this proffered testimony. See, e.g.,
Grell, supra. See also McCray v. State, 301 Ga. 241, 249 (6) (799 SE2
206) (2017) (“This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or
refuse to admit evidence for abuse of discretion”); Thompson v. State,
277 Ga. App. 323, 324 (2) (626 SE2d 825) (2006) (“Atrial court’s ruling
on a motion in limine is reviewed for abuse of discretion”) (citation
omitted).

3. Roscoe asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a mistrial after Detective Israel testified that he went to the
apartment complex to look for Roscoe based on an anonymous caller
who indicated that a person who was seen the morning of the murder
was standing between some buildings in the complex. However, the
trial court sustained Roscoe’s objection to this testimony as imper-
missible hearsay and further gave a comprehensive curative instruc-
tion to the jury to inform them that the testimony should not be
considered. The jurors are presumed to have followed this instruc-
tion (see Johns v. State, 274 Ga. 23, 25 (3) (549 SE2d 68) (2001)), and,
when the trial judge specifically asked if any of the jurors could
not disregard the offending testimony, none of the jurors indicated
that they could not ignore it. See, e.g., Alatise v. State, 291 Ga. 428 (5)
(728 SE2d 592) (2012). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial

eS 28

court’s decision to give a curative instruction rather than grant
Roscoe’s motion for a mistrial. Id.

4. Roscoe contends that the trial court erred by allowing the
State’s medical examiner, Dr. Sullivan, to testify that the bullets
recovered from Douglas’ body were actually sent to the State’s crime
lab for analysis, because Dr. Sullivan was not the doctor who per-
formed the victim’s autopsy and therefore had no firsthand knowl-
edge of whether the bullets recovered from the body were actually
sent to the crime lab. He claims that, because Dr. Sullivan could not
testify about the actual sending of the bullets to the crime lab, the
State could not establish a sufficient chain of custody for the bullets
removed from Douglas’ body. However, Roscoe’s argument is mis-
placed. Indeed, independent of Dr. Sullivan’s testimony, the bullets
themselves were identified by the State’s ballistics expert, who
verified that he actually received the bullets from the medical exam-
iner’s office, that he tested the bullets that he received, and that the
tests showed that the bullets had been fired from the same gun that
police recovered on the night that they arrested Roscoe. We find no
error. See Kempson v. State, 278 Ga. 285, 286-287 (3) (602 SE2d 587)
(2004).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

'ynthia W. Harrison, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Paige
Reese Whitaker, Kevin C. Armstrong, Assistant District Attorneys;
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton,
Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Elizabeth M. Haase, Assistant Attorney General, for appel-
lee.

$17A0720. HOBBS v. WINFIELD et al.
(805 SE2d 74)

BENHAM, Justice.

This case involves the revocation of a will due to after-born
children of the testator. The probate court determined the will did not
contemplate the birth of future children, and therefore their birth
revoked the will. The named beneficiary appeals.

Therecord shows that the testator, Alphonzo Raul Hobbs, executed
a willin 1989 when he was a 20-year-old serving in the military. The

24 eS

will named Hobbs’s mother as sole beneficiary and personal repre-
sentative of the estate, and, in the event his mother did not survive
him, he named his “grandmother,” appellant Evelyn Hobbs, as the
successor beneficiary and successor personal representative. Alphon-
zo’s mother predeceased him, and Alphonzo died in 2007. He fathered
three children out of wedlock, each of whom he legitimated and
supported, the oldest of whom was born twelve years after he executed
the will. In 2008, appellant filed a petition to probate the will.
Appellant acknowledged in her filings that she was not Alphonzo’s
biological grandmother but represented that she had reared him from
infancy. The probate court appointed guardians ad litem for the
children. By order dated May 29, 2008, the probate court found that
the validity of the will was in question and that the assets of the estate
may not have been properly protected, and it declined to appoint
appellant as personal representative of the estate. Instead, the court
appointed the County Administrator. The following day, the admin-
istrator filed a caveat to the will asserting that the will made no
provision for the future birth of a child to the testator and that, asa
consequence of children being born, the will should be revoked
pursuant to OCGA § 53-4-48 and should not be probated. A petition
for a year’s support was filed on behalf of each child.

After further proceedings, the probate court conducted a hearing
on the caveat to the will. The probate court entered an order dated
May 3, 2016, in which it agreed with the administrator of the estate
and found the will made no provision in contemplation of future
children. It further found that because of the birth of the testator’s
children years after the date the will was executed, the will was
revoked, the testator was deemed to have died intestate, and the
three children are the testator’s legal heirs. The probate court set a
date for a hearing to determine the assets to be set aside for the
children as an award of a year’s support. A notice of appeal was filed
in the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court.'

1. Generally speaking, the birth of a child to the testator after the
making of a will “in which no provision is made in contemplation of
such event shall result in a revocation of the will... .” OCGA § 53-4-48
(a).? In such a case, by statute, the after-born child is to receive the

+ The notice of appeal in this case was filed prior to the January 1, 2017 effective date of
OCGA § 15-3-3.1, pursuant to which jurisdiction in cases involving wills was vested in the
Court of Appeals rather than the Supreme Court.

2 As noted in subsection (a) of the statute, certain limitations apply to the revocation of the
will by the event of after-born children or the marriage of the testator after making the will.
Pursuant to subsection (b), a provision of a class of the testator's children is presumed to be
made in contemplation of the birth or adoption of additional members of that class. And

eS 25

share of the estate he or she would have received if the testator had
died intestate. See OCGA § 53-4-48 (c). Appellant contends the pro-
bate court erred in finding the will was not made in contemplation of
future children. She points to Item VI of the will, which states as
follows:

Thave served in the Armed Forces of the United States.
Therefore, I direct my Personal Representative to consult
the legal assistance officer at the nearest military installa-
tion to ascertain if there are any benefits to which my
dependents are entitled by virtue of my military affiliation
at the time of my death. Regardless of my military status at
the time of my death, I direct my Personal Representative to
consult with the nearest Veterans Administration and Social
Security Administration office to ascertain if there are any
benefits to which my dependents may be entitled.

Appellant argues that future-born children would fall within the
definition of the testator’s dependents who would be entitled as a
matter of law to Social Security survivor benefits if they met certain
age and dependency criteria at the time of the testator’s death.
Accordingly, appellant argues, the language of the will clearly demon-
strates the testator contemplated future-born children and expressly
provided for them by way of the federal survivors’ benefits they may
be entitled to collect upon his death.

The paramount objective when a court construes a will is to
determine the intent of the testator. See Anderson v. Anderson, 299
Ga. 756, 759 (2) (791 SE2d 40) (2016). To accomplish this, “courts
must look to the entire will and the circumstances surrounding its
execution.” Timberlake v. Munford, 267 Ga. 631, 632 (481 SE2d 217)
(1997). Appellant does not assert that the language of the will is
ambiguous. Instead, she argues that use of the term “my dependents”
clearly demonstrates the contemplation of future-born children. We
are unpersuaded.

Appellant acknowledges that “dependents” for purposes of deter-
mining Social Security and veteran survivor benefits may include
more than just children, and may include a dependent spouse, as
well. See 38 USC § 5121 (a) (2) (A) (establishing eligibility for veter-
ans benefits to the surviving spouse); 20 CFR § 404.330 (establishing
eligibility for Social Security Administration old-age or disability

subsection (c) sets forth the manner in which the net residuum of the estate is to be distributed
in order to satisfy the child or spouse's intestate share of the estate.

26 eS

benefits for the spouse of an insured person). In fact, dependent
parents may also be entitled to veterans survivor benefits (see 38
USC § 5121 (a) (2) (C)) and Social Security benefits (see 20 CFR
§ 404.374). Reference to dependents who may be entitled to govern-
ment survivor benefits no more indicates the testator contemplated
future-born children, who would thereby be pretermitted from inheri-
tance from the testator’s estate, than it indicates he contemplated
marriage, thereby excluding any future spouse from inheritance. The
clear language of the will merely directed the personal representa-
tive of the testator’s estate to “consult” with government authorities
“to ascertain” whether his dependents were entitled to certain gov-
ernment benefits upon his death.

The parties agree that at the time the testator executed this will
he was a 20-year-old serving in the military who had not married and
had no children. We agree with the appellee that, considering these
circumstances, it does not appear the testator intended the reference
to survivor benefits under federal law, to which his “dependents”
might be entitled, to indicate a contemplation of future-born children
or to provide a benefit to them.? In fact, it appears that the language
of Item VI of the will is a standard clause recommended for use in
wills drafted by military assistance lawyers for service personnel.+
The stated reason for including such language in a service person’s
will is to alert the “survivors” (not simply the dependents) of former
or retired military personnel that they may be entitled to survivor
benefits that are difficult or impossible to recover if not obtained
promptly after the veteran’s death.®

What matters is whether the will contemplates the event of
after-born children. See McParland v. McParland, 233 Ga. 458, 459
(211 SE2d 748) (1975). See also Shackelford v. Washburn, 60 S. 318
(Ala. 1912) (applying Alabama’s similar will revocation rule). Over a
century ago, this Court held that in order to serve as a disinheritance
of a future-born child, a provision in a will “must refer to the
contingent event in some way and provide for it, either by unequivo-
cally making a beneficial provision for the child or by disinheriting it

® Item VI of the will cannot be construed as directing the personal representative of the
estate to provide some benefit to the testator’s dependents, currently in life or future-born,
because if survivor benefits existed at the time of the testator's death, they existed by operation
of law by virtue of the testator’s status as a veteran and a wage earner enrolled in the Social
Security system, and did not depend upon any provision made in the will.

+ See The Army Lawyer, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-103, July 1981, pp. 18-19,
Maj. Joo! R. Alvarey et al., Legal Assistance Items, Section 1, Wills — Provisions for Survivor's
Benefits. www.loc.gov/rr/frd/military_law/pd{/07-1981 pdf. (Website last accessed August 29,
2017.)

old.

eS 21

altogether in such clear and unmistakable terms as to leave no doubt
that the testator had the event in mind.” (Emphasis omitted.) Sutton
v. Hancock, 115 Ga. 857, 863 (42 SE 214) (1902) (where the will
requested the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary to take care of their
children, and another child was born after the will was made, this
Court held the will did not indicate the testator contemplated the
birth of children in addition to those in life at the time the will was
executed). While the applicable statute has been amended since the
date of the Sutton case to state that “[a] provision in a will for a class
of testator’s children shall be presumed to be made in contemplation
of the birth or adoption of additional members of that class,”® the
standard regarding the contemplation of an event that would other-
wise serve to invalidate a will remains the same. Pursuant to that
standard, the language used in the will at issue in this case cannot be
deemed to indicate a contemplation of after-born children, either by
making a beneficial provision for them or by expressly disinheriting
them.

The same revocation rule that applies to a will after the birth of
children to the testator applies to the testator’s marriage after the
making of a will, and in such a case, “to avoid revocation of a will by
a subsequent marriage, it must appear in clear and unmistakable
terms that the testator contemplated the event of a future marriage
and made some reference to that event.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Johnson v. Cromer, 234 Ga. 73, 74 (214 SE2d 644) (1975).
Consequently, we may look to subsequent marriage cases to provide
authority by analogy. In Evans v. Palmour,’ the testator’s will expressly
stated it was made in contemplation of marriage, and that in such an
event “ ‘it is my intention that this will be valid and not be revoked by
operation of law.’” The testator married several years later to one he
did not know at the time the will was executed, and divorced that
spouse before he died. Nevertheless, this unambiguous provision for
the contingency of a future marriage resulted in the will being
deemed valid upon the testator’s death. Palmour, supra, 274 Ga. at
285 (1). By contrast, in Johnson v. Cromer, supra, the will left the
testator’s entire estate to his siblings and the siblings of his deceased
wife, and it contained the following language: “I declare that except
as provided in this will, I have intentionally omitted to provide herein
for any of my heirs living at the time of my death.” (Punctuation
omitted.) 234 Ga. at 73. The testator later married without revising
his will, and his surviving wife challenged the will on several grounds,

® OCGA § 53-4-48 (b).
7 274 Ga. 283 (553 SE2d 585) (2001)

28 eS

including the assertion that it was revoked by his subsequent mar-
riage. This Court determined that the provision in the will disinher-
iting all heirs not expressly provided for was insufficient to show the
testator contemplated a future marriage. Id.

Likewise, the reference in the will now under consideration to
“my dependents” in the context of directing the personal representa-
tive to check on the availability of survivor benefits is insufficient to
show the testator contemplated future-born children. It does not
meet the “essential basic requirement” of showing that the event of
future-born children was in the testator’s mind at the time the will
was executed. See Williams v. Lane, 193 Ga. 306, 311 (2) (18 SE2d
481) (1942) (holding that because the testatrix’s will did not meet the
“essential basic requirement” of showing the event of a future mar-
riage was contemplated, her subsequent marriage revoked the will).

By comparison, an example of language that was found to have
clearly contemplated the birth of after-born children can be seen ina
will provision bequeathing all the testator’s property to her husband
“notwithstanding I may havea childor children living at my death....”
(Punctuation omitted.) Shackelford v. Washburn, supra, 60 S. at 318
(applying a statute noted to be similar to that of Georgia’s). The
language used in the will at issue in this case, however, did not clearly
contemplate the birth of the testator’s after-born children. Conse-
quently, the probate court did not err in finding the testator’s will was
not made in contemplation of future children and was thus invali-
dated by the birth of children after the execution of the will.

2. Appellant’s assertion that the caveat filed by the court-
appointed estate administrator was untimely, and that the adminis-
trator lacked standing to file it, lacks merit. Although the testator’s
children were represented by guardians ad litem and the petition to
probate the will was served on them no later than February 5, 2008,
the estate remained unrepresented until an administrator was appointed
on May 29, 2008. Within twenty-four hours after appointment, the
administrator filed a caveat to the will. Accordingly, the filing was
timely pursuant to the requirement of OCGA § 53-11-10 (a) stating
that any objection to a proceeding in probate court is required to be
filed no later than ten days after the date the person filing the
objection is personally served.

Moreover, the court-appointed administrator has standing in
this case to file a caveat to contest the will.

The question of who has standing to caveat a will has been
determined on a case by case basis, the general statement of
the rule being that a will may be contested by any person

eS 29

interested in the estate of the deceased, but cannot be
contested by strangers. [Cits.]

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Medican v. Parker, 283 Ga. 253,
254 (1) (657 SE2d 234) (2008) (holding a testamentary trustee under
an earlier will has standing to oppose what purports to be a later will).
In its order following a status conference in this matter, the probate
court declined to appoint appellant as personal representative of the
estate, noting that the validity of the will was in question and that the
assets of the estate may not have been properly protected since many
items belonging to the estate were lost or sold. The court stated it
would reserve ruling on the will’s validity at that time and appointed
the County Administrator as the administrator of the estate. In this
case, the appointed administrator of the estate possesses a clear
interest in the estate, and thus he had standing to file a caveat to the
will.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

Russell H. Hippe LI, for appellant.
Elizabeth W. Winfield; Brown & Romeo, Robert T. Romeo, for
appellees.

$17A0721. SCOTT v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 40)

Bocas, Justice.

Ajury acquitted Jeremy Scott of malice murder in the shooting
death of Dexter Holliday, but found him guilty of felony murder,
aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.' His

1 The crime occurred on December 4, 2011. On April 6, 2012, a Fulton County grand jury
indicted Scott for murder, two counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He
was tried before a jury November 18-21, 2013. The jury found Scott not guilty of malice murder
but guilty on all remaining counts. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for one count of felony murder; the trial court merged the remaining felony
murder charge and the aggravated assault charge into the first felony murder charge. Seott was
also sentenced to five years to serve, suspended, on the first firearms charge, but, as noted in
Division 3, infra, the second firearms charge was improperly merged into the second felony
murder charge, which was vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369,
372-373 (6) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Scott’s amended motion for new trial was denied on July 5,

30 eS

amended motion for new trial was denied, and he appeals, asserting
as his sole enumeration of error that the trial court erred in its charge
to the jury. For the reasons that follow, we affirm but vacate and
remand to the trial court for resentencing.

Construed to support the jury’s verdict, the evidence shows that
a witness, Jackson, and a passenger in his car, Varner, were driving
near Underground Atlanta when Scott hailed Jackson and offered to
pay for a ride to “the west side. MLK.” Jackson, who knew Scott
through mutual friends, drove Scott to an apartment on Auburn
Avenue and then to a gas station on Martin Luther King Drive. Scott
told Jackson to pull in behind a parked truck, then got out of the car
and approached the truck, where the victim was standing. After Scott
got into the victim’s truck, Jackson heard “4, 5, 6 maybe” gunshots
and saw the victim falling out of the truck. The truck rolled across the
street and collided with a building. Scott then returned to Jackson’s
car and instructed him to drive him to Campbellton Road. After
dropping Scott off and taking Varner home, Jackson told his father
what had happened, and they called police. Varner, the passenger,
was present throughout the incident and gave similar testimony. The
gas station’s video surveillance system also recorded the encounter,
and the video was played for the jury twice. The medical examiner
testified that, based on an examination of the victim’s wounds, he was
shot at least four and as many as seven times.

Scott testified at trial and stated that he and the victim were
previously incarcerated together in 2010. He claimed that the victim
had arranged to purchase cocaine from him and that he entered the
victim’s truck to complete the sale, but instead of paying, the victim
pointed a gun at him and demanded the drugs. Scott decided to try to
take the gun from the victim, succeeded, and got out of the truck. He
contended that he shot the victim in self-defense because the victim
revved his engine, and Scott believed he was going to try to run him
down with the truck.

1. Although appellant has not raised the sufficiency of the
evidence in his appeal, we note that it was sufficient to support the
jury’s guilty verdicts under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. In Scott’s sole enumeration of error, he contends that the trial
court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it should consider each
charge separately. But after the trial court instructed the jury, Scott,
while objecting to one charge on justification, did not raise the

2016, his notice of appeal was filed on July 18, 2016, and the case was docketed in this Court.
for the April 2017 term. The case was submitted for decision on the briefs.

eS 31

objection he now asserts. As Scott acknowledges, we therefore review
his enumeration of error only for plain error. State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29,
31 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011). In Kelly, this Court established a
four-prong test for determining whether a jury instruction amounts
to plain error: (1) whether the instruction was erroneous; (2) whether
the error was obvious or clear; (3) whether the error affected appel-
lant’s substantial rights; and (4) only if the first three elements are
established, the reviewing court in its discretion may reverse if the
error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 33
(2) (a). As Scott has not met this standard, his enumeration of error
is without merit.

Scott complains of the following instruction given by the trial
court near the conclusion of its charge to the jury:

If after considering the testimony and evidence pre-
sented to you, together with the charge of the Court, you
should find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant in Fulton County, Georgia, didon or about Decem-
ber 4th, 2012, commit the offense of murder, felony murder,
felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as alleged in the
indictment, you would be authorized to find the defendant
guilty.

In that event the form of your verdict as to each count
would be: We, the jury, find the defendant guilty.

Ifyou do not believe that the defendant is guilty of these
offenses or you have any reasonable doubt as to the defen-
dant’s guilt then it would be your duty to acquit the defen-
dant in which event the form of your verdict would be: We,
the jury, find the defendant not guilty.

In analyzing this instruction, we must view the trial court’s
charge as a whole to determine if error exists. Franklin v. State, 295
Ga. 204, 208 (3) (758 SE2d 813) (2014), citing Sapp v. State, 290 Ga.
247, 251 (2) (719 SE2d 434) (2011). So viewed, the charge was
sufficient to apprise the jury that each crime charged in the indict-
ment must be considered separately. The trial court referred repeat-
edly to “these criminal charges,” “the crime or crimes charged” and
the multiple counts of the indictment in its preliminary charges and
in its charge at the conclusion of the evidence. The trial court
separately defined malice murder and felony murder, noting that
aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon

32 eS

“are felonies and are defined later in this charge,” and laying out the
verdict process for malice murder and felony murder with reference
to the verdict form. The trial court also charged on the lesser included
offense of voluntary manslaughter, as well as on aggravated assault
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court
instructed the jury that venue must be proved “[a]s to each crime
charged in the indictment, just as any element of the offenses.” And,
finally, the verdict form submitted to the jury listed each offense
separately by count, with blanks provided for the jury’s decision. The
jury entered its handwritten verdict on each count separately as
indicated by the verdict form, and found Scott not guilty of the offense
of malice murder; obviously, therefore, the jurors demonstrated that
they considered each charge separately as instructed by the trial
court.

Moreover, even if error had been shown, it could not be consid-
ered obvious. Scott points to no pattern charge or decision of the
courts of this state indicating a charge that should have been given in
addition to the instructions already noted. See Sapp, supra, 290 Ga.
at 251 (2) (when jury instructed on causation, omission of additional
language on proximate cause not clear or obvious error). While Scott
cites Tiller v. State, 218 Ga. App. 418 (461 SE2d 572) (1995), that
decision is inapposite because the language of the complained-of
charge was never revealed in the opinion, and the Court of Appeals
ultimately concluded that the instruction “clearly conveyed” that the
jury should consider each charge separately and could return sepa-
rate verdicts on each count. Id. at 419 (2). Finally, particularly in light
of the jury’s finding of “not guilty” on one of the counts of the
indictment, Scott has failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the
trial was affected in any way.

As Scott has failed to demonstrate any of the first three prongs of
the Kelly test, we do not reach the fourth prong, and this enumeration
of error is without merit.

3. The State notes that, based on Noel v. State, 297 Ga. 698, 700
(2) (777 SE2d 449) (2015), the trial court erred in merging the felony
murder convictions and then merging the predicate felonies into the
remaining felony murder conviction. When the trial court sentenced
Scott on Count 2 (felony murder based on aggravated assault),
Count 3 (felony murder based on possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon) was vacated by operation of law. Count 6 (possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon) then cannot merge into Count 3,
which stands vacated. We therefore vacate the merger of Count 6 into
Count 3 and remand for resentencing on Count 6.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded
for resentencing. All the Justices concur.

eS 33

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.
OCs
Juwayn Haddad, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong,
Lyndsey H. Rudder, Paige Reese Whitaker, Assistant District Attor-
neys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, S. Taylor Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, for
appellee.

$17A0762. BENNETT v. ETHERIDGE.
(805 SE2d 38)

Boaas, Justice.

Rhonda Bennett f/k/a Rhonda Donley filed an amended motion
for new trial following a habeas court order discharging the payment
of restitution and any arrearage for back child support by the
purported biological father of Bennett’s minor child. Concluding that
she is a non-party to the underlying action and therefore has no
standing to challenge its order, the court dismissed Bennett’s motion.
Because the habeas court erred in concluding that Bennett lacks
standing, we reverse and remand this case.

The record reveals that in September 2012, the father, Damian
Etheridge, pled guilty to four counts of abandonment of a dependent
child. He was sentenced to ten years’ probation and ordered to pay
$46,080 in restitution for past-due child support to Bennett. In May
2015, Etheridge filed an application for writ of habeas corpus alleging
fraud, that his plea was invalid, the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction, and asserting that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. In March 2016, the habeas court entered a
one-page order’ finding that Bennett had blocked Etheridge’s attempts
to legitimate the child, and that she had filed a criminal complaint
against him for abandonment requesting back child support. The
court noted that Etheridge had moved to Las Vegas, Nevada, was
married and had a family and a steady job, and had been ordered to
pay back child support totaling over $40,000. The habeas court
granted Etheridge’s petition for habeas corpus relief, finding that he
had satisfied his debt of back child support. The court ordered “that
any further arrearage be discharged. The court does, however, note

1 Tt is unclear from the designated portions of the record whether the habeas court held a
hearing on Etheridge’s petition.

a4 A

that Mr. Ether[i]dge is to continue paying child support in the
court-ordered monthly amount of $377.00 by automatic payroll deduc-
tion until the child reaches adulthood.”

Bennett filed a timely motion for new trial on March 30, 2016,
and an amended motion on April 7, 2016. On April 26, 2016, the
habeas court issued an order requesting that Bennett, within 30
days, brief the issue “on whether the relief sought in the Motion of
New Trial is proper and has any basis in the law.” On May 25, 2016,
Bennett filed a brief in which she asserted that the court’s order on
Etheridge’s habeas corpus petition was contrary to law and the
evidence, and strongly against the weight of the evidence. On June 8,
2016, the habeas court dismissed Bennett’s amended motion for new
trial on the ground that she “is a non-party to this action. Ms. Bennett
has not been able to produce any legal authority that would demon-
strate to the Court that she has standing in this case.” It is from this
order that Bennett appeals.

Bennett asserts that she has standing as the recipient of resti-
tution based on a pre-existing arrearage and as the child’s represen-
tative, and that even if she did not have standing on Etheridge’s
habeas corpus matter generally, she gained standing when her prop-
erty rights were impaired. We agree with Bennett that she has stand-
ing to challenge the habeas court’s ruling on Etheridge’s petition.

“Generally, only a party to a civil case, or one who has sought to
become a party as by way of intervention and has been denied the
right to do so, can appeal from a judgment. However, where judgment
is entered against a nonparty, that nonparty becomes a party with
standing to appeal.” (Citations omitted.) Barham v. City of Atlanta,
292 Ga. 375, 376 (1) (738 SE2d 52) (2013); see Garibay v. Terry, 299
Ga. 701, 702 (791 SE2d 806) (2016) (“ ‘[h]abeas corpus is a civil pro-
ceeding. ...’[Cit.]”). Etheridge was ordered to pay Bennett restitution
for back child support, so the judgment discharging the payment of
that pre-existing arrearage is a judgment against Bennett, making
her a party to the action. Bennett is directly aggrieved and thus has
standing to challenge the court’s judgment. See Barham, supra, 292
Ga. at 377 (1) (a) (although injunction directed against city, appel-
lants had standing to challenge ruling where court’s judgment con-
tains findings of guilt and directs punitive action against appellants);
see also Ford Motor Co. v. Young, 322 Ga. App. 348, 352 (1) (a) (745
SE2d 299) (2013) (attorney for party has standing to appeal order
where “directly aggrieved” by judgment); cf. Baars v. Freeman, 288
Ga. 835, 839 (2) (a) (708 SE2d 273) (2011) (obligee under judgment
requiring payment of child support may pursue all available rem-
edies for enforcing judgment); OCGA § 19-6-35 (“[c]hild support obli-
gee” means person to whom payment of a child support obligation is

owed and includes a custodial parent

35

t; “child support obligee shall be

regarded as a creditor, and a child support obligor shall be regarded

as a debtor. .
judgment . . . or other arrangemen

. for the purposes of attacking as fraudulent a

t interfering with the creditor’s

rights, either at law or in equity”). We therefore reverse the habeas

court’s dismissal of Bennett’s ame

nded motion for new trial and

remand this case for the court to consider the motion on the merits.?
Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEM

rew Mosley, Andrew tf.

losley

BER 13, 2017.

, for appellant.

Dexter M. Wimbish, for appellee.

$17A0769. HOUSTO
(805 SE2

NAHMIAS, Justice.

N v. THE STATE.
id 34)

Appellant Thomas Houston challenges the trial court’s order
denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal from his 2008 convic-

tions by guilty pleas to two murder:

's and numerous other crimes in

connection with a series of home invasions targeting Hispanic victims
in Columbus. Pretermitting whether Appellant has shown a proper

excuse for not filing a timely appeal
entitled to an out-of-time appeal. A
1. The home invasions began on

, the record shows that he is not

ccordingly, we affirm.

February 16, 2007, andended on

the night of April 8, 2007, when Marcelo Rivera and 15-year-old Isaias
Bartolon were shot to death. On October 21, 2008, a Muscogee County
grand jury returned a 66-count indictment against Appellant and six

other defendants, including Appe
brother."
At the start of a plea hearing

lant’s mother and his younger

on November 5, 2008, the State

informed the trial court that Appellant, along with two co-defendants
(Jeffery Miller and Reginald Hoskin) who were charged with partici-

pating in only one of the home i
negotiated guilty pleas. But Appel

invasions, had decided to enter
lant then changed his mind and

2 We note that Bennett appeals only from th

e dismissal of her amended motion for new

trial. She raises no issue with regard to the arguments presented in her motion or to the

underlying order on the petition for habeas corp

pus relief. Therefore, the absence of written

findings of fact and conclusions of law in that order is not in issue here. See OCGA § 9-14-49.

+ Appellant’s co-defendant Raymond Baker p
convictions. See Baker v. State, 293 Ga. 811 (750.

proceeded to trial, and this Court affirmed his
SE2d 137) (2013)

36 eS

said that he wanted to go to trial. Appellant’s trial was scheduled for
the following week, and his counsel asked to be excused from the plea
hearing. The court replied, “Why don’t we let Mr. Houston sit through
the pleas with the rest of them?” Appellant’s counsel replied, “Yes,
sir,” and Appellant and his counsel remained in the courtroom.
During the subsequent plea colloquies with Miller and Hoskin, the
State questioned them about the home invasion involving those
defendants, including some questions about Appellant’s involvement
init. The court then accepted their guilty pleas, pronounced sentence
on them, andasked, “Do you understand that you will—this sentence
is tentative on your testimony to tell the truth on the stand in the
upcoming trial?” Miller and Hoskin answered, “Yes, sir.”

Appellant then changed his mind again and decided to accept the
State’s plea offer. The court questioned him carefully about whether
he was sure of his decision to enter his guilty pleas. As part of that
extended colloquy, the court said:

Do you understand if you enter his [sic] this plea, all
appeals are off. There’s no trial. We will get twelve people
over here. They listen to the evidence. If they believe your
version of it, you walk out a free man. If they don’t, Pll
sentence you on the guidelines for each one of these cases. Do
you understand that?

Appellant said, “Yes.”

The court ultimately accepted Appellant’s guilty pleas and sen-
tenced him to serve concurrent terms of life in prison for the two
murders and concurrent terms of years on 13 counts of armed
robbery, 19 counts of aggravated assault, seven counts of attempted
armed robbery, and four counts of burglary. Six of the remaining
counts were nolle prossed, and the rest were vacated or merged for
sentencing purposes.

More than seven years later, on November 9, 2015, Appellant
filed a pro se motion for an out-of-time appeal, which he amended on
March 29, 2016. Appellant challenged the voluntariness of his guilty
pleas based on alleged ineffective assistance of his plea counsel,
coercion by the trial court, and other infirmities. On April 5, 2016, the
trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal from that order.

2. Appellant claims that the trial court deprived him of his right
to an appeal by misinforming him at the plea hearing that “[i]f you
enter . .. this plea, all appeals are off.” Although the grounds for such
an appeal are limited, a criminal defendant has a right to a direct
appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered ona guilty

eS 37

plea, so the trial court’s statement that “all appeals are off” if
Appellant pled guilty was erroneous. See Nazario v. State, 293 Ga.
480, 488-489 (746 SE2d 109) (2013) (discussing the availability of,
and limitations on the scope of, a direct appeal from a guilty plea).

However, a defendant is entitled to a direct appeal from a
conviction entered on a guilty plea “only to the extent that the issues
presented on appeal can be resolved by reference to the existing
record.” Mims v. State, 299 Ga. 578, 580 (787 SE2d 237) (2016). See
also Smith v. State, 253 Ga. 169, 169 (316 SE2d 757) (1984). Thus,
where the claims that a defendant belatedly seeks to raise on appeal
require factual development, an out-of-time appeal is unavailable,
and his remedy, if any, is in habeas corpus. See Stephens v. State, 291
Ga. 837, 838 (733 SE2d 266) (2012). Moreover, if the claims that a
defendant seeks to raise on appeal can be resolved by reference to
facts in the existing record, he must show that the claims would be
resolved in his favor or an out-of-time appeal is properly denied. See
id. at 839. See also Grace v. State, 295 Ga. 657, 659 (763 SE2d 461)
(2014). In addition, before being entitled to an out-of-time appeal, a
defendant must allege and prove an excuse of constitutional magni-
tude for failing to file a timely direct appeal, which is usually done by
showing that the delay was caused by his trial counsel’s ineffective
assistance in providing advice about or acting upon an appeal. See
Stephens, 291 Ga. at 837-838. See also Grace, 295 Ga. at 658.

Pretermitting both whether the trial court’s overbroad state-
ment that “all appeals are off” was the reason that Appellant failed to
file a timely appeal from his guilty pleas and whether this allegation
was properly raised in the trial court, Appellant was not entitled to an
out-of-time appeal. Appellant asserts that his guilty pleas were
invalid on five grounds. To the extent that his claims can be resolved
by reference to the existing record, the record refutes the claims. And
to the extent that his claims require more factual development,
Appellant must look for redress, if any, by way of a petition for habeas
corpus rather than an out-of-time appeal.

Appellant contends first that the trial court’s erroneous state-
ment regarding the availability of an appeal rendered his guilty pleas
involuntary. Appellant cites no authority for this proposition, and the
fact that he may have thought that he was waiving more rights than
he actually did by entering his guilty pleas enhances rather than
undermines the voluntariness of his pleas. Moreover, as the trial
court found, Appellant

executed a detailed, written waiver of his constitutional
rights in [the trial] court; was advised by his attorney of
those same rights just prior to the guilty plea hearing; was

38 eS

also present during a mass advisement by the [trial] court of
those same rights just before his plea was taken; and was
again individually and fully re-advised of his rights during
the plea colloquy.

Appellant cannot show from the existing record that his guilty pleas
were involuntary, so this claim provides no basis for an out-of-time
appeal.

Appellant argues next that the trial court erred by improperly
participating in the plea negotiations, by defying his unequivocal
assertion of his right to proceed to trial, and by coercing him to plead
guilty by requiring him to remain present while two of his co-defen-
dants entered guilty pleas. But the transcript of the plea hearing
shows that after Appellant’s counsel asked to be excused before the
hearing concluded, the court proposed having Appellant stay through
the entry of his co-defendants’ guilty pleas, and Appellant’s counsel
replied, “Yes, sir.” Neither Appellant nor his counsel objected to the
court’s proposal, and Appellant identifies no authority requiring that
co-defendants be sequestered during plea colloquies or sentencing.
See Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 538, 539 (570 SE2d 289) (2002)
(concluding that a defendant’s guilty pleas were knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent despite his claim that his attorney coerced him into
entering the pleas by making him watch the sentencing of his
accomplice). Moreover, when Appellant then changed his mind and
decided to accept the State’s plea offer (which is what he had come to
the plea hearing to do in the first place), the court told him: “You're
entitled to trial. We have jurors. We'll give you a trial. . . . We'll give
you atrial if you wanta trial.” Appellant replied, “No, P’'ll go ahead and
plead out.” As part of the ensuing colloquy, the court asked Appellant,
“Has anybody threatened you or coerced you in any way at all... to
enter this plea?” and Appellant answered, “No.” The existing record
therefore refutes these claims, so Appellant was not entitled to an
out-of-time appeal in order to raise them.

Appellant also maintains that the trial court violated the Sixth
Amendment by not allowing him to confront and cross-examine
Miller and Hoskin, but this claim again can be resolved against
Appellant by reference to the existing record. Miller and Hoskin gave
testimony during their own plea colloquies; at that point, Appellant’s
trial was scheduled for the following week. He did not have the right
to confront his co-defendants during their plea hearing, although he
would have had that right at his trial the next week had he not
entered his guilty pleas — a point that the transcript shows the court
explicitly advised him of before he entered his own guilty pleas. See
State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361, 364 (518 SE2d 677) (1999) (“The right

eS 39

to confrontation is a ‘trial right,’ guaranteeing a defendant the ability
to confront and question adverse witnesses at trial.” (citations omit-
ted)).

Finally, Appellant asserts that the existing record shows that the
trial court erred in failing to merge seven counts of criminal attempt
to commit armed robbery (Counts 22, 23, 26, and 54-57) with the 13
counts of completed armed robberies (Counts 1-4, 14-16, 38-42, and
53). See OCGA § 16-4-2 (“Aperson ... may not be convicted of both the
criminal attempt and the completed crime.”). However, a review of
the indictment reveals that Appellant’s seven attempted armed
robbery convictions involved different victims than his 13 completed
armed robberies. Appellant victimized 20 separate individuals and
thus he was properly convicted and sentenced on each of the 20
counts. See Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 1, 7 (799 SE2d 196) (2017). This
claim too can be resolved against Appellant based on the existing
record.

For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying Appel-
lant’s motion for an out-of-time appeal.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

Thomas Houston, pro se.

Julia F. Slater, District Attorney, Matthew J. Landreau, Assistant
District Attorney, Charles A. Spahos, District Attorney pro tempore,
Gary D. Bergman, Sheila A. Ross, Assistant District Attorneys pro
tempore; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Jason M. Rea, Assistant Attorney General, for
appellee.

$17A0799. ROSS vy. ROSS.
(805 SE2d 7)

BENHAM, Justice.

This appeal arises from a granted application for interlocutory
review. The parties were divorced in Connecticut on January 25,
2010. At that time, appellant Husband’s child support obligation was
$279 per week for the parties’ two minor children. On June 16, 2010,
the Connecticut court entered an order of modification to facilitate
appellee Wife’s move to Georgia with the children. In that order, the

40 Pe

Connecticut court reduced Husband’s child support obligation to
$100 per week. Husband still resides in Connecticut, while Wife and
the children live in Coweta County. On January 12, 2016, Wife filed
an action in Coweta County to domesticate and modify the parties’
Connecticut divorce decree and the modified order.! The complaint
was served on Husband personally while he was in Coweta County
visiting the children.

Husband moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the
Georgia trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the
Connecticut child support order under the Uniform Interstate Fam-
ily Support Act (UIFSA), OCGA § 19-11-100 et seq., in particular
because the requirements of OCGA § 19-11-172 (a)? had not been
met. Wife argued that jurisdiction was proper under OCGA § 9-12-130
et seq., which is the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law
(UEFJL), to both enforce and modify the Connecticut child support
order. The trial court ultimately denied Husband’s motion to dismiss,
reasoning that it had jurisdiction to modify the Connecticut child
support order; however, it granted Husband’s request for a certificate
of immediate review. We granted Husband’s application for inter-
locutory review on May 31, 2016, and, having considered the record,
the parties’ arguments, and the relevant legal authorities, we reverse
the trial court’s judgment for the reasons set forth below.

1. Since the 1950s, there has been an ongoing effort to make laws
concerning the enforcement of child support orders more uniform
across the states. See Margaret Campbell Haynes & Susan Friedman
Paikin, “Reconciling” FFCCSOA and UIFSA, 49 Fam. L. Q. 331, 332
(Summer 2015). Prior to 1975, the attempt at uniformity was largely
left to the states through the adoption and implementation of the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). See id. In
1975, while amending the Social Security Act, Congress became more
involved in the regulation of child support by conditioning receipt of
federal funding on the states’ adoption of certain legislative initia-
tives. Id.* These congressional efforts ultimately led to the formation

+ As basis for her complaint for modification, Wife alleges: “Since June 16, 2010, there has
been substantial change [in Husband's] income and financial circumstances such as to warrant
a modification/increase of Husband's child support obligations.” There is no allegation that
Husband is in default of any of his child support obligations.

2 OCGA § 19-11-172 (a) provides: “If all of the parties who are individuals reside in Georgia
and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal in Georgia has jurisdiction to
enforce and to modify the issuing state's child support order in a proceeding to register that
order.”

® “Congress has an interest in enforcement of child support orders because when child
support is not paid by a noncustodial parent the federal government pays child support in the

eS a1

of the United States Commission on Interstate Child Support in the
early 1990s. Id. at 333. This commission was tasked with reviewing
the URESA and making recommendations to Congress for improving
the interstate enforcement of child support. Id. The commission was
ultimately responsible for major congressional legislation that would
effectively federalize the enforcement of child support, including
drafting the model UIFSA in 1992. Id. at 334.°

In 1994, based on recommendations from the commission, the
United States Congress enacted the Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA). See 28 USC § 1738B. That law est-
ablishes a general rule requiring a state to enforce the child support
order of another state. See 28 USC § 1738B (a) (1). The law further
prohibits a state from modifying another state’s child support order
if that issuing state has “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” over the
matter. See 28 USC § 1738B (a) (2), (d), and (e).° In 1997, Georgia cod-
ified the requirements of 28 USC § 1738B at OCGA § 19-6-26. See
Connell v. Woodward, 235 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1) (509 SE2d 647) (1998)
(‘On July 1, 1997, OCGA § 19-6-26, which adopts the provisions of
the FFCCSOA, became effective in Georgia.”). OCGA § 19-6-26 (a) (2)
defines continuing, exclusive jurisdiction as “the authority and juris-
diction of a court to enter or modify a judgment, decree, or order for
the payment of child support. . . .”

In 1996, Congress took further action to regulate interstate child
custody orders by mandating the states to adopt the UIFSA as a

form of welfare.” Laura W, Morgan, Pre-Emption or Abdication? Courts Rule Federal Law
‘Trumps State Law in Child Support Jurisdiction, 24 J.Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 217, 219 (2011).

* The problems reported to the commission about child support enforcement under the
URESA are described as follows:

Because states had enacted different versions of URESA, the so-called
uniform act was not uniform; caseworkers did not know what to expect when they
transmitted a case to a different state. Parents had the most complaints. Under
URESA, every time a noncustodial parent moved, a custodial parent had to start
over again. Even when a custodial parent wanted to enforce an existing support
order, the state where the other parent lived usually issued its own order. The
presence of two or more conflicting orders meant that the noncustodial parent
never knew which order was the “real” order, the custodial parent never knew how
much support to count on, and the courts had difficulty in calculating arrears.
Custodial parents also noted the abysmal collection rate.

Haynes & Paikin, supra, 49 Fam. L. Q. at 333. See also Morgan, supra, 24J.Am.Acad. Matrim,
Law. at 217-219 (discussing the history and problems associated with the URESA).
® See also Laura W. Morgan, The Federalization of Child Support, A Shift in the Ruling
Paradigm: Child Support as Outside the Contours of “Family Law,” 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrim
Law. 195 (provides a historical overview of the federal oversight of child support enforcement).
® 28 USC § 1738B became effective on October 20, 1994. See Haynes & Paikin, supra, 49
Fam. L. Q. at 335.

42 Pe

condition of receiving federal funds:

The Personal and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-193), mandated that all states adopt
the 1993 Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”)
Model Act, andthe 1996 amendments adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
UIFSA was duly enacted by the General Assembly and is
codified at sections 19-11-100 through 19-11-190 of the
Georgia Code. The UIFSA was created to force uniformity in
procedures and law with regard to intergovernmental estab-
lishment, enforcement, and modification of child support
orders.

Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 290-7-1-.13. See also Haynes & Paikin,
supra, 49 Fam. L. Q. at 336. In keeping with federal law concerning
full faith and credit for child support orders, the UIFSA, as codified
by the General Assembly at OCGA § 19-11-100 et seq., prohibits
Georgia from modifying another state’s child support order unless
specific requirements are met divesting the foreign state of its con-
tinuing, exclusive jurisdiction. See OCGA §§ 19-11-168, 19-11-169,
19-11-170, and 19-11-172. See also Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v.
Deason, 238 Ga. App. 853, 857 (1) (a) (520 SE2d 712) (1999) (one of the
purposes of UIFSA was to legislate that “foreign support orders are
unmodifiable, except by FFCCSOA, Ga. L. 1997, pp. 1613, 1619-1620,
§ 7 (OCGA § 19-6-26)”).” Accordingly, there are only a handful of
circumstances in which a Georgia tribunal may modify another
state’s child support order:

(1) (a) neither of the parties nor the child live in the
foreign state/issuing state; (b) the petitioner who seeks
modification is a nonresident of Georgia; and (c) the respon-

7 The FFCCSOA and UIFSA thus interact together. . . . The federal statute lays out
jurisdictional requirements for state courts to recognize, enforce, and modify orders
of sister states, while the state statute lays out the requirements for the state to
make original orders, recognize foreign orders, and modify any outstanding order.
Thus, FFCCSOA is a federal statute that establishes the standards by which the
states can determine their jurisdiction to issue their own support orders and the
effect to be given to support orders from other states. As a jurisdictional statute, it
is authorized by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution,
which empowers Congress to enact general laws, to prescribe the manner in which
state Acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

(Footnotes omitted.) Morgan, supra, 24J.Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. at 220-221.

eS 43

dent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of a Georgia
tribunal;* or

(2) (a) the child is a Georgia resident or an individual
party is subject to the personal jurisdiction of a Georgia
tribunal and (b) all of the individual parties have filed
written consents in the foreign tribunal for a Georgia tribu-
nal to modify the child support order and assume continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction;® or

(3) (a) all the individual parties reside in Georgia and
(b) the child does not reside in the foreign state/issuing
state.'°

If none of the above factual circumstances exist, then a Georgia
tribunal cannot modify a foreign state’s child support order."

In this case, Connecticut has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
over the child support order at issue because Husband is still a
resident of Connecticut and neither party has provided written
consent for a Georgia tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
See 28 USC § 1738B (d); Connell v. Woodward, 235 Ga. App. at 754.
See also 28 USC § 1738B (e) (2) (A); OCGA § 19-6-26 (d). Therefore,
the trial court erred when it held it had jurisdiction to modify the
parties’ child support order.'” If Wife continues to pursue modifica-
tion of the child support order, she must do so through proceedings in
the Connecticut court.'*

2. Wife’s invocation of the UEFJL does not change this result.
That law is necessarily preempted by 28 USC § 1738B as it pertains
to her request for the Georgia court to modify the parties’ Connecticut
child support order." See, e.g., Kilroy v. Superior Court of Los Angeles

® See OCGA § 19-11-170 (a) (1). See also 28 USC § 1738B (e) (2) (A).

° See OCGA § 19-11-170 (a) (2). See also 28 USC § 1738B (d); OCGA § 19-6-26 (a)

1 See OCGA § 19-11-172 (a).

4 We note, however, that a Georgia tribunal generally has authority to enforce a foreign
child support order as a matter of comity. See 28 USC § 1738B (a) (1); OCGA §§ 19-11-104 (b);
19-11-110 (a) (1). It is only when modification is requested that more careful consideration must
be had to determine a Georgia court’s authority to act.

22 We find it disconcerting that counsel for the parties did not mention 28 USC § 1738B or
OCGA § 19-6-26 in the briefing to this Court or, apparently, to the trial court below.

18 The UIFSA does provide that a Georgia tribunal may act as an “initiating tribunal” to
forward proceedings to a foreign tribunal. See OCGA § 19-11-112. See also, e.g., Baars v.
Freeman, 288 Ga. 835 (2) (a) (708 SE2d 273) (2011) (a parent may enlist the assistance of a
Georgia tribunal, i.e., the Georgia Department of Human Resources, to commence proceedings
ina foreign country to enforce child support obligations).

+ Tn Dial v. Adkins, 265 Ga. App. 650 (1) (595 SE2d 332) (2004), the Court of Appeals held
that the “procedures” set forth in the UIFSA for the registration and enforcement of foreign
support orders are in addition to and not exclusive to the UEFJL. That is an accurate statement;

a4 Pe

County, 54 Cal. App.4th 793, 818-819 (63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390) (1997)
(28 USC § 1738B preempts “state court jurisdiction to modify inter-
state child support orders”).!° Likewise, the cases relied upon by Wife
and the trial court, '* which predate the passage of 28 USC § 1738Bin
October 1994 and the effective date of Georgia’s implementation of
the UIFSA in January 1998 and which allow for Georgia courts to
modify foreign support orders upon domestication, are no longer good
law inasmuch as those precedents have effectively been superseded
by federal law and Georgia statutory law implementing same.

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is reversed.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

Jason G. Smith, for appellant.
McNally, Fox, Grant & Davenport, Patrick J. Fox, for appellee.

$17A0806. REVERE v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 69)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

Following a jury trial, Jermaine Revere was found guilty of
murder and various other offenses in connection with the stabbing
death of Angelo Patterson.’ In his sole enumeration on appeal,
Revere contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial coun-
sel. We affirm.

however, since Dial v. Adkins only involved the enforcement of a ‘Tennessee child support order
by a Georgia court, the decision cannot support the proposition that a foreign child support
order may be modified by a Georgia court pursuant to the UEFJL when the foreign tribunal has
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

+6 In Kilroy, the California Court of Appeal held that a California trial court had no
authority to modify a Georgia child support order under 28 USC § 1738B. The facts showed the
mother, who was the petitioner, and the child still lived in Georgia, while the respondent father
lived in California. These factual circumstances meant that Georgia had continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter, prohibiting the California court from modifying the Georgia child
support order in the absence of the parties’ written consent to jurisdiction in California. Kilroy,
supra, 54 Cal. App. 4th at 804.

1 See Blue v. Blue, 243 Ga. 22 (252 SH2d 452) (1979); Sovern v. Sovern, 156 Ga. App. 752
(275 SE2d 791) (1980).

« OnNovember 22, 2011, Revere was indicted for malice murder, felony murder predicated
on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, theft by taking, and possession of a knife during the
commission of a felony. Following a February 28-March 5, 2013 jury trial, Revere was found
guilty on all counts. Revere was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, ten years

eS 45

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record
shows that Patterson ran a nonprofit organization that provided
assistance to released felons who were attempting to reintegrate into
society. Revere was one of the released felons to whom Patterson was
serving as a mentor. On August 16, 2011, Patterson picked up Revere
from an Atlanta MARTA station and took Revere back to his home,
where Revere stabbed him in the throat and the back, killing him.
Revere stole Patterson’s wallet, and he left the scene in Patterson’s
car. When he was called to meet with his probation officer about a
week later, Revere drove to the appointment in Patterson’s car, but he
parked the car away from the building and hid the keys to the car so
that his probation officer would not find them on him at the meeting.

At trial, Revere testified that he had stabbed Patterson by
accident while acting in self-defense. Specifically, Revere claimed
that, while he was lying down on a sofa in Patterson’s home, Patter-
son made an unwanted sexual advance upon him. According to
Revere, he then jumped up from the sofa to confront Patterson about
his actions, and Patterson began backing away from Revere to reach
for something that Revere suspected was a knife. However, before
Patterson could grab anything, Revere claims that he charged at
Patterson, pushed him out of the way, grabbed the knife himself, an
stabbed Patterson in the neck by accident while making a gesture to
get Patterson away from him. Revere then claimed that he droppe
the knife on top of Patterson after Patterson fell to the ground, which
caused the stab wound to Patterson’s back. The State’s medica
examiner testified that, although Patterson had no defensive wounds
on his hands to indicate that he had been trying to defend himself
from Revere’s attack when he was stabbed in the neck, the large neck
injury had components of both a deep stab wound and a cutting
wound, indicating that Patterson was trying to turn away while he
was being stabbed. The medical examiner also testified that it woul
not be possible for a knife to be dropped onto Patterson’s body from a
height of six feet or less to create the type of cutting wound inflicte:

concurrent for theft by taking, and five consecutive years for possession of a knife during the
commission of a felony. Although the trial court purported to merge the felony murder counts
into the malice murder count, the felony murder counts were actually vacated by operation of
law, Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993), and the aggravated assault count
was merged into the malice murder count for sentencing purposes. Revere filed a motion for new
trialon March 13, 2013, which he amended with new counsel on December 1, 2014 and January
30, 2015. Following a hearing, the motion was denied on May 7, 2015. Revere filed a timely
notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed to the April 2017 term of this Court and submitted
for decision on the briefs.

46 es

on his back, as such a wound would have had to have occurred while
“the weapon was held and driven with strength by an individual
wielding the weapon.”

The jury was authorized to reject Revere’s contentions that the
stabbing took place by accident or while he was acting in self-defense
and find that Revere was guilty of the crimes for which he was
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878 (1)
(644 SE2d 120) (2007) (witness credibility is for jury to decide, as is
the question of justification; therefore, jury is free to reject claim that
defendant acted in self-defense).

2. Revere contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to (a) object or request a mistrial after three of the State’s
witnesses improperly placed Patterson’s character in issue, and
(b) introduce evidence of Patterson’s prior felony convictions to rebut
or impeach the State’s improper character evidence. We disagree.

In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance,
[Revere] must prove both that his trial counsel’s perfor-
mance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that the trial result would have been different if not for
the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U. S. 668 (104 SC[t] 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If an
appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either
prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not
have to examine the other prong. Id. at 697 (IV); Fuller v.
State, 277 Ga. 505 (3) (591 SE2d 782) (2004). In reviewing
the trial court’s decision, “‘[w]e accept the trial court’s
factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly
erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles
to the facts.’ [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586
SE2d 313) (2003).

Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (2) (734 SE2d 876) (2012).

(a) Three witnesses with whom Patterson had lived and to whom,
like Revere, he had served as a mentor, testified at trial. These State’s
witnesses were Sanchez Griffin, Shannon Williams (Griffin’s brother),
and Brittani Ledford. Revere contends that these witnesses improp-
erly placed Patterson’s good character in issue and that trial counsel
should have objected or moved for a mistrial in response to the
testimony from these witnesses when (1) Griffin was asked why he
chose Patterson as a mentor and he testified that it was because
Patterson was a “good dude”; (2) Williams testified that Patterson

eS a7

was “like a father to [him]” and that he did not know where he would
have gone if it had not been for Patterson taking him in; and (3) in
response to questions about whether Patterson had ever made inap-
propriate sexual advances on her or any of his mentees, Ledford
testified that Patterson had not, and that she knew “that he wouldn't
have[,] [because] [t]hat’s not his character.” For the reasons that
follow, we agree with Revere that counsel should have objected to
these inadmissible statements and that he performed deficiently by
failing to do so. However, we do not find that there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if
not for counsel’s deficient performance.

The admissibility of the aforementioned testimony is controlled
by OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2) (Rule 404 (a) (2)) and § 24-4-405 (a) (Rule
405 (a)) of Georgia’s new Evidence Code.” Pursuant to Rule 404 (a) (2):

Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character shall
not be admissible for the purpose of proving action in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, except for .. .
[s]ubject to the limitations imposed by Code Section 24-4-412
[dealing with a witness’s past sexual history], evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime
offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the
same; or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case
to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
ageressor[.]

And, under Rule 405 (a):

In all proceedings in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof shall be made by
testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an
opinion.

Consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 404 (a) (2), the Rule
upon which Georgia’s Rule 404 (a) (2) is based, the State may only
introduce evidence of a victim’s good character to rebut evidence of a
pertinent character trait of the victim after the defendant has first
introduced such evidence at trial. Federal Rule 404 (a) (2) states in

® Because Revere’s trial took place after January 1, 2013, Georgia’s new Evidence Code is
applicable here.

48 es

relevant part:

Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character or trait. [However,]
[t]he following exceptions apply in a criminal case... .
[S]ubject to the limitations in Rule 412 [dealing with a
witness’s past sexual history], a defendant may offer evi-
dence of an alleged victim’s pertinent trait, and if the evi-
dence is admitted, the prosecutor may . . . offer evidence to
rebut it. .. . [I]In a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer
evidence of the alleged victim’s trait of peacefulness to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.

(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at (a) (1), (2) (B) @ and (C).® See also Estep
v. Ballard, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28970 (IT) (B) (2) (c) (1) (S.D. W. Va.
Mar. 21, 2011) (With respect to West Virginia’s similarly worded Rule
404 (a) (2), “Rule 404 (a) (2) allows the prosecution to introduce
evidence of the victim’s character only upon introduction by the
defendant of evidence for a relevant character trait”) (emphasis
supplied); Rule 404 (a) (2) (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait
of character shall not be admissible for the purpose of proving action
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except for...
evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the
crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the alleged victim was the first aggressor”) (emphasis supplied).

Here, the testimony mentioned above was introduced during the
State’s case-in-chief before Revere offered any testimony or evidence
of his own regarding Patterson’s character or alleged actions as the
first aggressor. In this regard, the testimony was not introduced in
conformity with the mandate of Rule 404 (a) (2) requiring that a

® We note that, while the language in Federal Rule 404 (a) (2) differs slightly from that of
Georgia’s Rule 404 (a) (2), the differences between the two Rules are not substantive. Through
the adoption of the new Evidence Code, it was “the intent of the General Assembly .. . to adopt
the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States and
the United States circuit courts of appeal as of January 1, 2013, to the extent that such
interpretation is consistent with the Constitution of Georgia.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (8) (a) (769 SE2d 329) (2015). Only “[w]here a
provision of the new Evidence Code differs in substance from the counterpart federal rule, as
interpreted by federal courts, . . . must [we] correspondingly presume that the General
Assembly meant the Georgia provision to be different.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Id.

eS 49

defendant first introduce evidence of a pertinent character trait of the
victim or evidence that the victim was the first aggressor before the
State may introduce evidence to rebut that which was presented by
the defendant. Therefore, the testimony presented by the State here
was simply inadmissible evidence of Patterson’s good character. Rule
404 (a) (2). Accordingly, Revere’s counsel could have objected to its
admission. See, e.g., Estep, supra, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28970 at
(ID) (B) (2) © (1) (counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to
good character evidence showing that the victim was, among other
good things, “like a. . . father” to the State’s witness and was also
“humble. .. hardworking... [of a] strong moral fiber... generous...
[and] always helping everybody”). We will assume that counsel per-
formed deficiently by failing to raise a meritorious objection to the
testimony of the three witnesses in this case.

However, counsel’s failure to object to the aforementioned evi-
dence was not prejudicial. The burden of showing a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been different but for
counsel’s deficient performance, “though not impossible to carry, is a
heavy one.” Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 270 (2) (737 SE2d 98) (2013),
citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (II) (C) (106 SCt
2574, 91 LE2d 305) (1986). At trial, Revere admitted to stabbing
Patterson, and the medical testimony indicated the stabbing was
done purposefully and with force; that Patterson was turning away
when he was stabbed and cut in the neck; and that the stab wound to
Patterson’s back could not have occurred based on a knife being
dropped. By contrast, Revere testified that he grabbed the knife in
self-defense while Patterson was backing away from him, but then
accidentally inflicted the cutting and stabbing wounds to Patterson’s
neck by swiping at him in an effort to get Patterson further away from
him. He then claimed that he accidentally dropped the knife onto
Patterson’s back after Patterson fell to the ground, thereby stabbing
him a second time. Considering the totality of the evidence, we findno
reasonable probability that, had trial counsel objected to the testi-
mony regarding Patterson’s good character, the outcome in Revere’s
case would have been different. See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
695 (“In making [the prejudice] determination, a court hearing an
ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before
the judge or jury”). See also, e.g., Estep, supra at (II) (B) (2) (c) (2).

(b) Revere also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to introduce evidence of Patterson’s alleged prior crimes from
Texas relating to sexual offenses to rebut the good character evidence

50 es

presented by the State’s witnesses. However, to the extent that
Revere

bases his contention on Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407
(3) (c) (405 SE2d 669) (1991), in which this Court created an
evidentiary exception “permit[ting] a defendant claiming
justification to introduce evidence of specific acts of violence
by the victim against third persons[,]” [his claim must fail].
Chandler . . . was decided under Georgia’s old Evidence
Code, and, it related specifically to the application of that old
code. The present case, because it was tried on or after
January 1, 2013, is subject to the new Evidence Code, under
which the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s character is
governed by OCGA §§ 24-4-404 and 24-4-405. . . . [T]he
evidentiary rule set forth in Chandler does not remain viable
under the new Evidence Code, and [Revere’s] argument
based on this outdated precedent fails.

Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532, 535-536 (3) (773 SE2d 755) (2015).
See also Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga. 576, 580 (8) (f) (669 SE2d 133) (2008)
(failure to file meritless motion “cannot amount to ineffective assis-
tance”) (citation omitted). To the extent that Revere bases his argu-
ment on the provisions of the new Evidence Code in particular or on
the theory that the State “opened the door” to evidence of Patterson’s
prior crimes in general, Revere also cannot succeed on such claims
here. Even if any of Patterson’s alleged prior crimes involved specific
acts of violence, Revere never introduced into evidence at the motion
for new trial hearing any of Patterson’s alleged prior convictions.
Without introducing certified copies of the prior convictions or other
acceptable evidence to show Patterson’s alleged prior acts of specific
violence, Revere cannot support his claim that his counsel could have
been ineffective for failing to attempt to introduce such evidence at
trial. Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248 (6) (f) (773 SE2d 254) (2015).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

L. Davis Madden, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Paige
Reese Whitaker, Joshua D. Morrison, Assistant District Attorneys;
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton,

eS 51

Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Elizabeth M. Haase, Assistant Attorney General, for appel-

lee.

$17A0811, S17X0812. JOHNSON STREET PROPERTIES, LLC
v. CLURE; and vice versa.
(805 SE2d 60)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

This case stems from a negligence action filed by Appellee/Cross-
Appellant Cynthia Clure for injuries she sustained after being struck
by a tree limb while on a premises belonging to Appellant/Cross-
Appellee Johnson Street Properties, LLC (hereinafter “JSP”). Clure
alleged that JSP failed to maintain a safe premises for its invitees.
JSP filed a notice to apportion fault to a non-party and moved for
summary judgment, alleging that no genuine issue of material fact
existed regarding its negligence. In response, Clure filed a motion for
partial summary judgment, alleging that Georgia’s Apportionment
Statute (OCGA § 51-12-33) was unconstitutional and that JSP’s
notice of non-party fault should be dismissed because of issues of
proof regarding causation.

The trial court denied JSP’s summary judgment motion, finding
that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding its negligence.
As to Clure’s partial motion for summary judgment, though the trial
court found Georgia’s Apportionment Statute to be constitutional, the
trial court agreed that issues remained concerning causation, and
granted partial summary judgment to Clure with respect to the
non-party.

Both parties appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court regarding JSP’s motion for summary
judgment, reverse the judgment of the trial court regarding JSP’s
notice of non-party fault, and vacate and remand the trial court’s
order regarding Clure’s constitutional claim on cross-appeal.

Case No. S17A0811

1. JSP raises two issues on appeal, contending that the trial court
erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and granting

82 A

partial summary judgment to Clure concerning JSP’s notice of non-
party fault.

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” OCGA § 9-11-56
(c). We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, and “we must view the evidence, and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 623 (1) (a) (697
SE2d 779) (2010).

Woodcraft by MacDonald v. Ga. Cas. and Sur. Co., 293 Ga. 9, 10 (743
SE2d 378) (2013). See also American Multi-Cinema v. Brown, 285 Ga.
442, 444-445 (2) (679 SE2d 25) (2009). “The party opposing summary
judgment is not required to produce evidence demanding judgment
for it, but is only required to present evidence that raises a genuine
issue of material fact.” (Citation omitted.) Ansley v. Raczka-Long, 293
Ga. 138, 140 (2) (744 SE2d 55) (2013). Furthermore, “the trial court
can conclude as a matter of law that the facts do or do not show
negligence on the part of the defendant or the plaintiff only where the
evidence is plain, palpable and undisputable.” (Citations and punc-
tuation omitted.) The Landings Assn. v. Williams, 291 Ga. 397, 399
(728 SE2d 577) (2012). With these principles in mind, we review JSP’s
claims.

(a) Motion for Summary Judgment

JSP alleges that the trial court erred in denying its motion for
summary judgment on Clure’s negligence claims because: (i) JSP had
no knowledge of the hazard; (ii) Steve Wilbur, the person who
removed the limb, was not an agent or employee of JSP acting within
the course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident;
and (iii) Clure had superior knowledge of the hazard, failed to
exercise ordinary care for her own safety, and assumed the risk by
getting too close to a known hazard. However, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Clure, we agree with the trial court that
genuine issues of material fact remain as to all three of these issues.

The record shows that, at all relevant times, Clure was a tenant
of Johnson Street Apartments, a complex in Bremen, Georgia, that
was owned and operated by JSP. JSP was owned and managed by Dan
and Elaine Cartwright, and their two sons, Chris and John.

eS 58

Sometime in early 2013, a limb fell onto JSP’s property from a
tree located on a neighboring lot. Other tree limbs had fallen onto the
property during storms in the past, including some from the adjacent
property, and the Cartwrights took action to remove those branches
when such instances occurred. In this case, a limb fell during a storm
and became suspended between the gutter of one of JSP’s apartment
buildings and some brush. The parties agree that the suspended limb
was an open and obvious condition, yet the length of time the limb
remained suspended is disputed by the parties, ranging anywhere
from a few days to a few months. Clure and her neighbors were aware
that the limb was stuck on the gutter, and Clure had gone so far as to
warn other tenants to stay away from the limb because it was
dangerous and could fall. Clure testified that she left voicemails with
the Cartwrights, notifying them of the suspended limb; the owners,
however, deny ever receiving any such voicemails.

On the day of the incident, Clure discussed the limb with Steve
Wilburn, a fellow tenant who sometimes worked as a maintenance
man for JSP. Wilburn and Clure walked over to the area of the hazard,
at which time Wilburn took a rope and/or string and threw it over the
limb. Clure testified that she heard the gutter tear and told Wilburn
to stop so she could warn the tenant inside the apartment, who
suffered from mental health issues, about the loud noise. As she
walked out of the apartment, Clure told Wilburn “Hold on. If you’re
going to do anything, just wait.” She saw Wilburn pulling on the rope
in a downward motion and turned to walk away from the same;
though the parties dispute how far away Clure was from the hazard,
they agree that the limb swung down from its perch and struck her,
causing injuries.

(i) JSP’s Knowledge

First, JSP contends that it had no knowledge of the hazard prior
to the incident at issue. It is well established that Georgia premises
liability law holds owner/occupiers of land liable for damages suffered
by an invitee on their property where the invitee’s injuries were

caused by [the owner/occupier’s] failure to exercise ordinary
care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. While not
an insurer of the invitee’s safety, the owner/occupier is
required to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from
unreasonable risks of harm of which the owner/occupier has
superior knowledge. The owner/occupier owes persons invited
to enter the premises a duty of ordinary care to have the
premises in a reasonably safe condition and not to expose the
invitees to unreasonable risk or to lead them into a danger-
ous trap. The owner/occupier is not required to warrant the

BA A

safety of all persons from all things, but to exercise the
diligence toward making the premises safe that a good
business person is accustomed to use in such matters. This
includes inspecting the premises to discover possible danger-
ous conditions of which the owner/occupier does not have
actual knowledge, and taking reasonable precautions to
protect invitees from dangers foreseeable from the arrange-
ment or use of the premises.

(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268
Ga. 735, 740 (493 SE2d 403) (1997). In other words, an owner/occupier
is generally on constructive notice of what a reasonable inspection
conducted in the exercise of ordinary care would reveal. See Ferguson
v. Premier Homes, 303 Ga. App. 614, 617 (695 SE2d 56) (2010);
Hagadorn v. Prudential Ins. Co., 267 Ga. App. 143, 146 (598 SE2d
865) (2004). However, “one is not chargeable with negligence in
failing to discover and remedy a danger in the property which he
could not have discovered by the exercise of ordinary care, or which
has not existed for a sufficient time to charge him with the duty of
discovering it.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ferguson, 303
Ga. App. at 617.

Construing the evidence in favor of Clure, genuine issues of
material fact remain as to whether JSP had either actual or construc-
tive notice of the hazardous condition on its property. First, as
discussed in more detail below, there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Wilburn acted as JSP’s agent when removing the
limb; if so, then any knowledge about the hazard posed by the limb
andits removal could be imputed to JSP. Moreover, thereis a question
of fact as to whether JSP knew about the limb even aside from
Wilburn’s knowledge. As discussed above, there is a dispute in the
evidence as to whether Clure notified the property owners of the
presence of the limb by leaving them voicemails concerning the tree
limb. Also, while there is evidence that the owners conducted inspec-
tions of the property after major storms, there is a dispute as to
whether: (1) a reasonable inspection was conducted between the time
the limb in question became suspended (which evidence suggests
may have occurred after a major storm) and Clure’s injuries; and
(2) whether a sufficient amount of time existed for JSP to discover the
hazard prior to Clure’s injuries. Indeed, the record is filled with
contradictory sworn testimony from the parties and lay witnesses
concerning these matters, raising credibility issues which cannot be
resolved on summary judgment. See Jones v. Howard, 153 Ga. App.
137, 142 (264 SE2d 587) (1980).

eS 58

(ii) Steve Wilburn’s Employment Status

JSP next contends that the trial court erred in denying summary
judgment because Steve Wilburn was not an employee acting within
the course and scope of his employment at the time he decided to
remove the tree limb from the gutter; therefore, according to JSP,
Wilburn’s actions cannot be imputed onto JSP under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.

Typically, “[qluestions of the existence and extent of an agent’s
authority are generally for the triers of fact. When an alleged princi-
pal, by acts or conduct, has knowingly caused or permitted another to
appear as his agent, he will be estopped to deny the agency, to the in-
jury of third persons.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams
v. Dept. of Corrections, 224 Ga. App. 571, 576 (481 SE2d 272) (1997).
Furthermore, while

[a] master rarely employs a servant with the expectation
that he will commit a negligent or wilful tort . . . if the act is
done in the prosecution of the master’s business, the master
willbe liable ....The testis whether the tort was done within
the scope of the actual transaction of the master’s business
for accomplishing the ends of his employment. If a servant
steps aside from his master’s business to do an act entirely
disconnected from it and injury to another results, the
master is not liable. Where the tort is entirely personal to the
employee, it is not within the scope of his employment and
the employer is not liable.

(Citations omitted.) Reynolds v. L & L Mgmt., 228 Ga. App. 611, 612
(492 SE2d 347) (1997).

Here, the evidence shows that a question of fact remains as to
whether Wilburn was an employee working within the course and
scope of his employment at the time of the incident. It is undisputed
that Wilburn had an on-again-off-again working relationship with
JSP as the maintenance man for the property at issue. This is
emphasized by James Cartwright, wherein he admitted that during
2013, JSP would have Wilburn perform tasks around the property
“as needed.” Furthermore, there is evidence that Wilburn held him-
self out as the apartment complex’s maintenance man to other
tenants as late as March 2013. During that same time period, Elaine
Cartwright instructed at least one tenant that she could “go to Cynthia
[Clure] or Steve [Wilburn]” if she had any issues with her apartment.
This evidence creates an issue of fact as to whether Wilburn was an
agent of, or employed by JSP at the time of the incident.

56 A

As to whether Wilburn was working within the course and scope
of his employment, Wilburn testified that he would perform odd jobs
around the property and would not always ask permission from the
owners prior to beginning a maintenance task if he determined that
task to be within his job description. Additionally, Clure testified that
she witnessed Wilburn removing tree limbs from the parking lot prior
to this incident. Though JSP points to evidence contradicting this
testimony, such contradictions simply underline the existence of
genuine issues of material fact that are for a jury to decide. Based on
the foregoing, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether
Wilburn was an employee acting within the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the incident! and, also, raises the question
of whether his knowledge of the hazard could be imputed to JSP.

(iii) Clure’s Knowledge/Negligence

Finally, JSP argues that Clure’s knowledge of the hazard created
by the suspended tree limb was equal to or greater than that of JSP’s,
therefore precluding her from recovering on her negligence claims.
We agree that the record shows Clure was clearly aware of the tree
limb and testified that she understood the dangers it posed by it being
suspended in the air. “But it is a plaintiff’s knowledge of the specific
hazard which precipitates [the injury] which is determinative, not
merely her knowledge of the generally prevailing hazardous condi-
tions or of the hazardous conditions which she observes and avoids.”
(Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Lore v. Suwanee Creek
Homeowners Assn., 305 Ga. App. 165, 170 (1) (b) (i) (699 SE2d 332)
(2010). In other words, Clure was not injured by the chance falling of
the suspended tree limb — a possibility of which she was aware;
instead, she was injured when the limb swung off the gutter while
Wilburn was attempting to remove it. Wilburn had superior knowl-
edge of his own plans and actions with respect to removing the limb
and the danger posed by such removal, a knowledge that would be
imputed to JSP if Wilburn was its agent. Thus, although the record
shows Clure had some knowledge of the general hazard, we cannot con-
clude as a matter of law that her knowledge of the “specific hazard”
was equal to or greater than JSP’s; consequently, a jury question
remains as to this issue.

JSP also alleges that Clure was contributorily negligent as she
failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety in avoiding the

1 JSP also alleges that, even if Wilburn had been working for JSP at the time of the
incident, he was an independent contractor, making JSP liable for Wilburn’s actions only if it
controlled the time, manner or method of his work. However, this argument was not raised
below or ruled on by the trial court and therefore is not properly before us on review. See Pfeiffer
v. Ga, Dept. of Transp., 275 Ga. 827 (2) (573 SE2d 389) (2002).

eS oT

falling limb. Itis well established that “the ‘routine’ issues of premises
liability, i.e., the negligence of the defendant and the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff's lack of ordinary care for personal safety are generally not
susceptible of summary adjudication, and that summary judgment is
granted only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed.”
Robinson, 268 Ga. at 748.

Taking into account all the circumstances existing at the time
and place of Clure’s injuries, and construing the evidence in favor of
Clure, we cannot say that the evidence of Clure’s alleged contributory
negligence is plain, palpable and undisputed. Here, the record shows
a dispute as to Clure’s proximity to Wilburn and the tree limb at the
time he was attempting to remove the hazard. Clure also testified
that she was walking away from the hazard at the time it fell.
Significantly, Wilburn testified on deposition that the tree limb fell so
quickly, he was unsure that Clure had enough time to see it fall,
raising a question as to whether Clure could have avoided the falling
limb in the first place. Consequently, we conclude that a jury question
remains as to whether Clure exercised ordinary care for her own
personal safety on the day of the incident.

Finally, JSP argues that Clure assumed the risks associated with
the limb removal by entering “the danger zone” as Wilburn was
removing the limb. Assumption of the risk bars a plaintiff’s recovery
when a defendant establishes that a plaintiff, “ ‘without coercion of
circumstances, chooses a course of action with full knowledge of its
danger and while exercising a free choice as to whether to engage in
the act or not.’” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Muldovan v.
McEachern, 271 Ga. 805, 807-808 (523 SE2d 566) (1999). In order to
successfully assert this affirmative defense, the defendant “must
establish that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger;
(2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with such dan-
ger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those risks.” (Citations
omitted.) Id. Put simply, “assumption of the risk means that the
plaintiff, in advance, has given his consent to relieve the defendant of
an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury
from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave
undone.” (Citation and emphasis omitted.) Id.

We agree with the trial court that genuine issues of material fact
remain as to whether Clure had actual knowledge of, and appreciated
the risks associated with, the danger related to Wilburn’s removal of
the tree limb from its perch, and voluntarily exposed herself to those
risks. Once again, because there are disputes in the evidence as to
what occurred immediately preceding the limb’s fall — namely,
Wilburn’s actions, Clure’s location at the time in question and whether

58 A

she could have seen the limb fall from the gutter — we cannot say, as
a matter of law, that Clure assumed the risk.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in denying
JSP’s motion for summary judgment on Clure’s negligence claims.

(b) Apportionment Claim

JSP filed a notice of non-party fault pursuant to OCGA §

51-12-33, contending that the jury should be allowed to allocate fault
to the Smiths, the owners of the adjacent property, because the limb
that caused Clure’s injuries came from a dead tree on the Smiths’
property. In her partial motion for summary judgment, Clure alleged
that there was no competent evidence to show that the Smiths knew
of a dangerous condition for which they could be held liable. In
granting this portion of Clure’s motion, the trial court found the
Smiths’ alleged acts or omissions “were too removed to be a proximate
cause of [Clure’s] injuries.” JSP alleges that the trial court’s ruling
was in error. We agree.
Pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-33 (c), “[iJn assessing percentages of
fault, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons or entities
who contributed to the alleged injury or damages, regardless of
whether the person or entity was, or could have been, named as a
party to the suit.” (Emphasis supplied.) A person is “considered to
have contributed to the alleged injury where that person is shown to
have ‘breach(ed) . . . a legal duty in the nature of (a) tort that is owed
for the protection of the plaintiff, the breach of which is a proximate
cause of hisinjury.’ ” Martin v. Six Flags Over Ga. IT, L.P., 301 Ga. 323,
337 (IID) (801 SE2d 24) (2017) (quoting Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga.
589, 595 (1) (774 SE2d 688) (2015)). Indeed, “the apportionment
statute permits consideration, generally speaking, of the ‘fault’ of a
tortfeasor, notwithstanding that he may have a meritorious affirma-
tive defense or claim of immunity against any liability to the plain-
tiff.” Zaldivar, 297 Ga. at 598.

While it is the defendant’s burden to establish a rational basis for
apportioning fault to a non-party, whether the non-party contributed
to the alleged injury is a question of fact for a jury to decide. See Six
Flags Over Ga. IL, L.P. v. Martin, 335 Ga. App. 350, 364-365 (780 SE2d
796) (2015), rev'd on other grounds, Martin, 301 Ga. at 341; Couch v.
Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359 (1) (729 SE2d 378) (2012). Finally, “it
is axiomatic that questions regarding proximate cause are ‘undeni-
ably a jury question’ and may only be determined by the courts ‘in
plain and undisputed cases.’” (Citations omitted.) Ontario Sewing
Machine Co. v. Smith, 275 Ga. 683, 687 (572 SE2d 533) (2002).

Here, there is evidence that: lay witnesses saw numerous dead or
decaying trees on the Smiths’ property prior to the incident at issue;
limbs from other dead trees located on the Smiths’ land had fallen

eS 59

onto JSP’s property prior to the incident at issue; John Cartwright
had a conversation with Mr. Smith concerning the removal of dead
trees from the Smiths’ property, and Mr. Smith subsequently sought
bids for the trees’ removal; the limb which caused Clure’s injuries had
fallen from a tree on the Smiths’ property that was conspicuously
dead and decaying prior to the incident; and that at least one of JSP’s
tenants saw the limb at issue after it had fallen and noticed it was
dead. Furthermore, as discussed above, a question of fact remains as
to how long the limb had been suspended on the apartment gutter
prior to this incident.

Based upon the record before this Court, there are clearly
questions of fact as to: whether the Smiths had notice of the dead and
decaying trees on their property, which could impart a legal duty on
them to act, see Willis v. Maloof, 184 Ga. App. 349 (2) (361 SE2d 512)
(1987); and whether Clure’s injuries were reasonably foreseeable
under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the trial court’s
grant of partial summary judgment as to the apportionment of fault
to the Smiths is reversed.

Case No. S17X0812

2. In her cross-appeal, Clure alleges that the trial court erred by
upholding Georgia’s Apportionment Statute (OCGA § 51-12-33) as
constitutional because, she alleges, the statute deprives non-parties
of their rights to due process and equal protection. JSP argues that
Clure lacks standing in which to challenge the statute. We agree with
JSP, as Clure is not among the class of non-party persons impacted by
the statute. See Bell v. Austin, 278 Ga. 844, 846 (2) (a) (607 SE2d 569)
(2005) (“A party will not be heard to complain of the violation of
another person’s constitutional rights.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)). See also Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Burgess, 282
Ga. 433, 434 (1) (651 SE2d 36) (2007) (“Asa generalrule, a litigant has
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a law only if the law has
an adverse impact on that litigant’s own rights.”).

Because Clure lacked standing to bring a summary judgment
motion regarding the constitutionality of Georgia’s Apportionment
Statute as it applies to non-parties, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
over this matter and consequently erred in entering an order address-
ing the claim on the merits. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of
the trial court and remand this matter with direction that the court
dismiss this portion of Clure’s motion for partial summary judgment.
See generally Perdue v. Lake, 282 Ga. 348 (2) (c) (647 SE2d 6) (2007).

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part in Case No.
S17A0811. Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction in

60 Pe

Case No. S17X0812. Hines, C. J., Melton, P. J., Benham, Nahmias,
Blackwell, Boggs, Grant, JJ., and Judge Jane C. Barwick concur.
Peterson, J., not participating.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.
ee
Bovis, Kyle, Burch & Medlin, W. Randal Bryant, Wayne S.
Tartline, for appellant.

Slappey & Sadd, James N. Sadd, Edward M. Wynn III, for
appellee.

Hawkins, Parnell, Thackston & Young, Christopher S. Keith,
Charles B. Carmichael, amici curiae.

$17A0822. DUBLIN v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 27)

PETERSON, Justice.

Willie Dublin appeals his convictions for felony murder and other
crimes stemming from the fatal shooting of Terry Slack during an
attempted robbery.' He raises an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim based on his counsel’s failure to object to hearsay and what he
contends was an improper comment on his pre-trial silence, as well as
other enumerations of error related to the admission of additional
hearsay and other acts evidence. We conclude that the alleged
hearsay was admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule. Dublin has not shown that trial counsel’s failure to
object to a detective’s comment on his silence prejudiced his defense.
And we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
a mistrial after a witness alluded to some prior bad acts. We also
reject Dublin’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port his convictions and we therefore affirm them. We vacate the
judgment in part, however, as the trial court erred by merging the

Slack was killed on December 31, 2012. In an indictment filed on February 21, 2014,
Dublin was charged with malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After a February 2015 trial, a jury
acquitted Dublin of malice murder and found him guilty of the other counts. On March 17, 2015,
the trial court sentenced Dublin to life without the possibility of parole on the felony murder
count and five years’ imprisonment on the firearm count and merged the two counts of
aggravated assault into felony murder. Trial counsel filed a motion for new trial on March 19,
2015. An amended motion for new trial was filed by appellate counsel on May 18, 2016. The trial
court denied the motion on July 5, 2016. Dublin filed a notice of appeal on July 20, 2016, and
the case was docketed to the term beginning in April 2017 and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.

eS 61

count of aggravated assault with intent to rob into the offense of
felony murder, and we remand for the trial court to sentence Dublin
on that aggravated assault count.

The evidence presented at trial showed that Dublin, co-defendants
Darnell Mitchell and Dewayne Reynolds, and others gathered at
Reynolds’s home to celebrate New Year’s Eve on December 31, 2012.
Dublin admittedly had a Glock handgun with him that night. Mitch-
ell testified that he, Reynolds, and Dublin discussed robbing Slack,
who lived one street away and was believed to have marijuana in his
shed. Reynolds’s live-in girlfriend, Judy Cronan (his wife by the time
of trial), testified that she overheard the three men talking on her
porch that night and “they were talking about doing a lick or a hit or
something like that.” Dublin’s brother, Terrence Redwine, told police
that he was with the other three men that evening and admitted to
hearing them making plans to rob someone. Slack was fatally shot in
the back that night, but there was conflicting evidence at trial as to
who pulled the trigger.

Aneighbor, Davonte Mostilley, testified that he saw four people
in an abandoned lot across from Slack’s house as he walked home
from the store that night. He said he could not tell whether they were
men or women because it was dark. He observed that one was
wearing a blue and white striped collared shirt. Evidence at trial
showed that Dublin and Mitchell were wearing dark clothing that
night, and Reynolds wore a blue and white striped collared shirt.
Redwine testified that he, Dublin, Mitchell, and Reynolds went to the
vacant lot that night — Redwine testified that he did not know why
they were there — then turned back to Reynolds’s house after about
10 or 15 minutes.

Mitchell and Reynolds? testified at Dublin’s trial. Mitchell tes-
tified that he proceeded to Slack’s house with Dublin and Reynolds
and lingered in the vacant lot for about 10 minutes, but they turned
back after they believed they were observed by Mostiller, and that he
left Reynolds’s house thereafter. Mitchell said he later spoke with
Reynolds, who said, “I didn’t mean to shoot him.” In his trial testi-
mony, Reynolds denied going to Slack’s house that night, but the jury
heard a recording of a police interview in which Reynolds admitted
that he, Mitchell, and Dublin went to Slack’s house. In that interview,
Reynolds claimed Dublin was the shooter.

2 Prior to Dublin's trial, Reynolds was tried and convicted of felony murder and other
crimes and sentenced to life in prison for the felony murder and five years to serve consecutively
sion of a firearm during the commission of a crime. We affirmed Reynolds's convie-
Reynolds v. State, 299 Ga. 781 (792 SE2d 393) (2016). The record suggests that
Mitchell's case had not been resolved at the time of Dublin's trial.

62 es

Cronan (Reynolds’s wife) testified that on the day after the
shooting she overheard Dublin, Mitchell, and Reynolds discussing
Slack’s death, including that they did not intend to kill him. Mitchell’s
girlfriend, Tonya Dupree, also testified that at some point she over-
heard Dublin, Mitchell, and Reynolds talking about the shooting.
Based on her eavesdropping, Dupree testified she understood “they
was trying to rob him, and I guess a struggle came out or whatever,
and they said Willie Dublin froze up. He wouldn’t shoot when they
told him to shoot or whatever, so Dewayne Reynolds snatched the
gun, and he shot.”

Dublin’s girlfriend, Kristina Watson, initially rebuffed investi-
gators’ attempt to speak with her. She ultimately cooperated, how-
ever, leading investigators to a pond where she and Dublin had
disposed of the gun (which she had given him). Watson testified at
trial that Dublin asked her to lie to the police for him regarding the
events of New Year’s Eve. She testified that she heard Reynolds
confess to shooting Slack and that Dublin told her that he had given
Reynolds the gun. She also testified that she heard Mitchell, Rey-
nolds, and Dublin discussing their alibis.
Dublin testified at trial. He acknowledged being at Reynolds’s
home on New Year’s Eve. He testified that at some point in the
evening he followed Reynolds to Slack’s house and witnessed Rey-
nolds pull the trigger of a gun while standing no more than five or six
feet away from Slack, then hand Dublin the gun. But Dublin testified
that he did not know of any plan for a robbery and was surprised by
the shooting. Dublin admitted that the gun used to shoot Slack was
his, that he later disposed of it, and that he had Watson lie for him.
Convicted of felony murder and other crimes, Dublin argued in
an amended motion for new trial that the trial court erred
admitting hearsay testimony by Dupree and by not declaring a
mistrial when Reynolds testified as to other bad acts by Dublin, and
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain
hearsay testimony or a detective’s remark that Dublin had declined
to speak with police. The trial court denied the motion, and this
appeal followed.

1. Dublin argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to inadmissible hearsay from Kristina Watson and Judy
Cronan. We conclude that any objection to this testimony would have
been futile.

In order to establish that trial counsel was ineffective, Dublin
must show both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and
that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
“The failure to pursue a futile objection does not amount to ineffective

eS 63

assistance.” Ventura v. State, 284 Ga. 215, 218 (4) (663 SE2d 149)
(2008). “We accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply
the legal principles to the facts.” Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586
SE2d 313) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Dublin argues that counsel should have objected to Cronan’s
testimony that she overheard certain statements both on New Year’s
Eve and the following day. She testified that she overheard Dublin,
Mitchell, and Reynolds planning a robbery the night of the shooting.
Cronan also testified that the following day she overheard Dublin,
Mitchell, and Reynolds discussing Slack’s death, and encouraging
each other “not to say anything.” Dublin also argues that trial counsel
should have objected to testimony by Watson that she overheard the
men discussing possible alibis the day after the shooting. In denying
Dublin’s motion for new trial, the trial court ruled that the testimony
of the two women was admissible because the statements fell within
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule and the witnesses
could identify the people they overheard speaking.

Dublin argues that the testimony of neither Watson nor Cronan
falls under the hearsay exception because the State failed to establish
a conspiracy between Dublin and his co-defendants independent of
the alleged co-conspirator declarations. Under OCGA § 24-8-801
(d) (2) (E), a statement by a defendant’s co-conspirator made “during
the course andin furtherance of the conspiracy, including a statement
made during the concealment phase of aconspiracy[,]” is not excluded
by the hearsay rule when offered against the defendant. A conspiracy
need not be charged in order for the exception to apply. Id. For
evidence to be admissible under this rule, the government must prove
the existence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Hasner, 340 F3d 1261, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). In
determining the existence of a conspiracy, the trial court may con-
sider both the co-conspirator’s statements and independent external
evidence, although the co-conspirator’s statement alone does not
suffice. Id. In considering whether a conspiracy was established for
purposes of the rule, we do not require that the conspiracy be proven
prior to the admission of the evidence in question, but only that the

® Where a provision of our new Evidence Code is borrowed from the Federal Rules of
Evidence, we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and applying the
Federal Rules, especially the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Eleventh Cireuit. See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016). Although
OCGA § 24-8-801 (@) (2) (E) contains some language the federal rule does not, the additional
language in the Georgia rule is drawn from federal case law. See Ronald L. Carlson & Michael
Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 473 (5th ed. 2016).

64 es

conspiracy was proven at trial. Id. at 1274-1275.4 Here, the State
established by a preponderance that Dublin, Reynolds, and Mitchell
conspired to rob Slack, and so Dublin’s argument fails.

Dublin also argues that the testimony of Watson and Cronan was
inadmissible as unreliable because the women did not specify who
said what in the conversations they purportedly overheard. Dublin
quotes a United States Supreme Court opinion construing the Con-
frontation Clause for the proposition that “hearsay evidence used to
convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its
inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.”
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 138 (119 SCt 1887, 144 LE2d 117)
(1999) (citation and punctuation omitted). But to the extent that any
of the Lilly analysis has survived subsequent decisions, see Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004), its
requirement of reliability certainly does not apply to nontestimonial
statements such as those made in furtherance of a conspiracy. See
McClendon v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 617-618 (4) (b) (791 SE2d 69) (2016).
Because Dublin’s arguments as to the admissibility of Watson’s and
Cronan’s testimony are unavailing, his ineffectiveness claim based
on trial counsel's failure to object to that testimony fails. See Ventura,
284 Ga. at 218 (4).

2. Relatedly, Dublin also argues that the trial court erred by
allowing Tonya Dupree to give hearsay testimony over trial counsel’s
objection. Dublin contends that the admission of this testimony was
error because the State failed to establish a conspiracy independent
of the alleged co-conspirator declarations and because the testimony
lacked sufficient indicia of reliability due to Dupree’s failure to
identify who made the statements in question.® Dublin’s first argu-
ment is foreclosed by our conclusion above that the State did prove a
conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. And, again, the State
need not show any particular reliability of the declarants’ statements
for Confrontation Clause purposes.

3. Dublin argues that his trial counsel also was ineffective for
failing to object to a detective’s testimony that Dublin did not show a
willingness to talk to police. We disagree.

+ Even under the old Evidence Code, we did not require the State to make out a prima facie
case of conspiracy prior to the introduction of the statements, notwithstanding that the rule
explicitly provided that co-conspirator declarations shall be admissible “[alfter the fact of
conspiracy is proved[.|” See Williams v. State, 293 Ga. 750, 758 (2) (749 SE2d 693) (2013)

® To the extent that a conclusory clause in a sentence of Dublin's opening appellate brief
raises a question as to whether the statements to which Dupree testified were made “during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” under OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E), Dublin has
failed to make any argument or offer any authority on that point, and, therefore, we do not
consider any such argument. See Supreme Court Rule 22.

eS 65

Detective Jeff Richerson testified that he attempted to speak
with Watson, Dublin’s girlfriend, a few days after the shooting. Asked
whether Watson wanted to speak with him, Richerson testified
without objection, “No, not at first. Myself and the other investigator
went down to Willie Dublin’s house on Maple and tried to talk with
him and her, and neither one of them showed any kind of willingness
to talk with us, so we left the house.” Dublin argued in his amended
motion for new trial and contends on appeal that this amounted to a
violation of the rule articulated in Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625 (409
SE2d 839) (1991), overruled on other grounds by Clark v. State, 271
Ga. 6, 10 (5) (515 SE2d 155) (1999). We held in Mallory that it is
impermissible to comment ona criminal defendant’s silence or failure
to come forward, even where the defendant’s silence was not induced
by Miranda warnings and he takes the stand in his own defense. Id.
at 630 (5). To date we have declined to consider the continuing validity
of Mallory under the new Evidence Code. See Bradford v. State, 299
Ga. 880, 886 (7) n. 7 (792 SE2d 684) (2016).°

We do not find it necessary to examine the viability of Mallory
here, either. In order to show prejudice from counsel's deficient per-
formance, the defendant must show that a reasonable probability
exists that, but for trial counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceed-
ing would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A rea-
sonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome.” Id. Even if counsel’s failure to object to the
testimony of Detective Richerson in question amounted to deficient
performance, Dublin has not shown prejudice from his counsel’s
failure to raise such an objection.

Dublin argues that the improper comment contributed to the
guilty verdict because the evidence was “conflicted as to the identity
and participation of the co-defendants[.]” But Dublin was charged
with felony murder predicated on the crime of aggravated assault,
and “a defendant need not personally possess a weapon or fire a shot
to be found guilty as a party to an aggravated assault, if the evidence
shows that he intentionally aided or abetted in the commission of the
crime.” Herrington v. State, 300 Ga. 149, 150 (1) (b) (794 SE2d 145)
(2016) (citing OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (3)) (punctuation omitted). “Whether
a person was a party to a crime can be inferred from his presence,
companionship, and conduct before and after the crime was commit-
ted.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, a defendant

® Mallory was based on former OCGA § 24-38-36, which provided that “[a]equiescence or
silence . .. may amount to an admission,” as well as the Court's conclusion, prior to the
legislature's adoption of OCGA § 24-4-403, that acomment ona defendant's silence is “far more
prejudicial than probative.” 261 Ga. at 630 (5).

66 es

may be convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony even if he possesses the firearm only constructively as a party
to the crime. See Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 888 (8) (572 SE2d
612) (2002).

Here, multiple witnesses said they heard Dublin discuss with
others the possibility of robbing Slack. Although Mostiller was not
able to identify the men he saw in the vacant lot across from Slack’s
house, Redwine and Mitchell both placed Dublin at the vacant lot.
Reynolds told police that he and Dublin went to Slack’s house that
night, and Dublin admitted as much. The evidence showed at least
one member of the group pointed a gun at Slack with the intent to rob
him: Reynolds told police that Dublin was the shooter, while Watson
and Mitchell testified that they heard Reynolds confess to shooting
Slack, and Dupree testified that, based on her eavesdropping on
Dublin andhis co-conspirators, she understood that Reynolds snatched
the gun from Dublin and shot Slack. Although the evidence was
conflicting as to whether Dublin was the shooter, Dublin admitted
that the gun used to shoot Slack was his, that he later disposed of it,
and that he asked Watson to lie for him. Dublin thus has not shown
a reasonable probability that Richerson’s remark affected the out-
come of the trial, particularly given that it was an isolated statement
made in the context of questioning about cooperation of Dublin’s
girlfriend, not that of Dublin. See Hernandez v. State, 299 Ga. 796,
800 (4) (792 SE2d 378) (2016) (given collective weight of evidence
refuting appellant’s claim of self-defense, he cannot demonstrate
reasonable probability outcome of trial would have been different but
for trial counsel's failure to object under Mallory and other alleged
deficiency); Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 647, 649 (3) (a) (670 SE2d 421)
(2008) (no error in denying ineffective assistance of counsel claim
based on counsel’s failure to object under Mallory where there was
overwhelming evidence, including eyewitness accounts, that appel-
lant shot the unarmed victim).

4. Dublin argues that the trial court erred by not declaring a
mistrial when a co-defendant testified to inadmissible other acts
evidence. We disagree.

Reynolds testified on direct examination as follows:

Q: So you never heard Willie or Darnell talk about robbing
someone?

A: I have heard some — them say something about robbing
somebody on occasions, times before, but I never paid it no
attention.

Q: Okay. On December 31st, did you hear them talk about
robbing anybody?

eS 67
A: I don’t think I did.

The trial court then sua sponte instructed the jury to disregard “that
last testimony,” telling the jury that it should “disregard . . . com-
pletely .. . any events other than on December 31.” After Reynolds
concluded his testimony, trial counsel requested a mistrial, and the
trial court denied the request. Dublin argues on appeal that the trial
court should have granted a mistrial because the testimony improp-
erly commented on Dublin’s character.

“The refusal to grant a mistrial based on a prejudicial comment
lies within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not
interfere with that discretion on appeal in the absence of a manifest
abuse.” Turner v. State, 299 Ga. 720, 723 (5) (791 SE2d 791) (2016)
(citation omitted). “Moreover, a new trial will not be granted unless it
is clear that the trial court’s curative instruction failed to eliminate
the effect of the prejudicial comment.” Id. (citation omitted). The trial
court’s instruction in this case was sufficient to protect Dublin from
any prejudicial effect of Reynolds’s vague, nonresponsive allusion to
prior discussions of robbing someone. Assuming that Dublin’s motion
for a mistrial was not made too late,’ the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to grant appellant’s motion for a mistrial. See
Williams v. State, 301 Ga. 712, 717 (4) (804 SE2d 31) (2017) (no abuse
of discretion in denying mistrial where State asked defendant if he
was aware that a friend attempted to bribe a juror; the judge told the
jury to ignore the question and explained it had excused the juror
because she had been in the courtroom when she was supposed to be
in the jury room); Turner, 299 Ga. at 722-723 (5) (no abuse of
discretion in denying mistrial where witness testified that about a
week before the shooting with which defendant was charged she saw
defendant smoking marijuana); Rafi v. State, 289 Ga. 716, 720 (4)
(715 SE2d 113) (2011) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying motion for mistrial when witness referred to defendant as
drug dealer).

5. Finally, Dublin argues that, setting aside what he claims is
inadmissible hearsay, the State did not introduce sufficient evidence
to support his convictions. As detailed in Divisions 1 and 2, we reject
his claims that the State was permitted to present inadmissible
hearsay evidence. In any event, in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we “consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court,

7 “A motion for mistrial must be promptly made as soon as the party is aware of the matter
giving rise to the motion.” Ragan v, State, 299 Ga. 828, 833 (8) (792 SE2d 842) (2016) (motion
for mistrial untimely where made only after the State concluded direct examination during
which photographs in question were admitted) (citation and punctuation omitted).

68 es

regardless of whether that evidence was admitted erroneously.”
Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 343 (6) (751 SE2d 399) (2013) (citation
and punctuation omitted). And as detailed above, the trial evidence
was legally sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Dublin was guilty of felony murder,
aggravated assault with intent to rob, aggravated assault with a
firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979).

6. The trial court erred in merging both Count 3 (aggravated
assault with intent to rob) and Count 4 (aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon) into the felony murder account. We held in the case
of Dublin’s co-defendant, Reynolds, that this same handling of the
counts at sentencing was error as to Reynolds. See Reynolds, 299 Ga.
at 786 (4). The offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob does
not merge into felony murder predicated on aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon, as

[Dublin]’s conviction on the charge of aggravated assault
with intent to rob required proof of intent to rob that the
State was not required to prove in order to convict him on
felony murder predicated on aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. Likewise, the felony murder count required
proof that the appellant caused the death of the victim,
which the State was not required to prove in order to convict
for aggravated assault with an intent to rob.

Id. at 786 (4) n. 3 (citations omitted). We therefore vacate the judg-
ment in part and remand for the trial court to enter a sentence on the
count of aggravated assault with intent to rob. Id. at 786 (4).

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded
with direction. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

lames K. Luttrell, for appellant.

Leigh E. Patterson, District Attorney, Emily G. Johnson, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patri-
cia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant Attor-
ney General, for appellee.

ee 69

$17A0874. WHITE v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 25)

Boaas, Justice.

In 1992, Cynthia White was found guilty of felony murder an:
cruelty to children in the death of her three-year-old son. We affirme:
her convictions in White v. State, 265 Ga. 392 (456 SE2d 587) (1995).
In July 2016, White filed a pro se “Petition for Resentencing Under
the First Offenders Act.” She now appeals from the trial court’s denia.
of that motion. We affirm.

1. White argues on appeal that she was eligible for first offender
treatment pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-66, which provides for the retro-
active exoneration of guilt and discharge under certain circum-
stances. OCGA § 42-8-66 (a) sets forth two categories of individuals
who may seek a petition in superior court for exoneration of guilt an
discharge. Paragraph (a) (2) applies to individuals who were sen-
tenced between March 18, 1968 and October 31, 1982. Paragraph
(a) (1) applies to “[a]n individual who qualified for sentencing pursu-
ant to this article but who was not informed of his or her eligibility for
first offender treatment[.]” White argues that she was not so informe’
and was eligible for first offender treatment at the time of her
conviction. However, this paragraph provides further that such an
individual “may, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney, petition
the superior court in the county in which he or she was convicted for
exoneration of guilt and discharge pursuant to this article.” (Empha-
sis supplied.) The State argues that White’s petition is invalid on its
face and was properly denied without the need for a hearing or
findings of fact and conclusions of law, because the prosecuting
attorney (of Gwinnett County, where White was convicted) did not
consent to the filing of the petition. And White has made no showing
to the contrary. The trial court therefore did not err in denying her
petition.’

2. White argues further that the trial court erred in failing to hold
a hearing on the matter and enter findings of fact and conclusions of
law in its order denying her petition. Although OCGA § 42-8-66 (b)
requires the trial court to hold a hearing on the petition “if requested
by the petitioner or prosecuting attorney or desired by the court,” as
explained above, White has not shown that she had the consent of the
prosecuting attorney to meet the threshold requirement for petition-

+ We express no opinion here on the Court of Appeals’ holding in Bishop v. State, 341 Ga,
App. 590 (802 SE2d 39) (2017), decided after the time for filing briefs in this case.

70 Pe

ing to the superior court. The trial court was therefore not required to
hold a hearing on the petition in this circumstance.”
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

Cynthia White, pro se.

Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Lee F. Tittsworth, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A0880. O'CONNOR v. FULTON COUNTY et al.
(805 SE2d 56)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellant Patrick J. O’Connor appeals the grant of summary
judgment to Appellees Fulton County and its County Manager,
Richard Anderson, on his claims for breach of contract, mandamus
relief, and attorney fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

As found by the trial court, the undisputed facts establish as
follows. O’Connor was hired in 1996 as the CFO/Finance Director for
Fulton County. At all relevant times, O’Connor was an unclassified,
at-will employee, and, though the Finance Director position was
originally an “on-range position” — i.e., one that is on a pay scale —
it was later changed to a set-rate position, which has a salary
specifically approved by either the County Manager or the Fulton
County Board of Commissioners (“the Board”). In October 2014, the
Board appointed O’Connor as Interim County Manager. Just a few
months later, however, O’Connor was removed from that position and
given the option to resign as Finance Director or be fired; O’Connor
refused to resign, and the Board terminated his employment.

In September 2015, O’Connor filed a three-count complaint
against the County and its new County Manager seeking damages for
breach of contract from the County, a writ of mandamus compelling
Anderson to reinstate O’Connor to the position of Finance Director,
and attorney fees from both parties. In his complaint, O’Connor
asserted that the Fulton County Personnel Regulations constituted

2 Further, we find no authority requiring the trial court to include findings of fact and
conclusions of law in an order issued pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-66.

eS 1

anemployment contract and that, pursuant to Fulton County Person-
nel Regulation 300-4 (7), he was entitled to be returned to his former
position as Finance Director after he was removed as Interim County
Manager; O’Connor also asserted that, once reinstated to the former
position, his employment could only be terminated by the County
Manager, not the Board, and, thus, sought a writ of mandamus
compelling Anderson to return him to his former position.

The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, con-
cluding that the personnel regulations did not create an employment
contract and that, even if they had, Personnel Regulation 300-4 (7)
did not apply to O’Connor. The trial court also concluded that,
because O’Connor could not prevail on his underlying breach-of-
contract claim, he was not entitled to mandamus relief or attorney
fees. O’Connor now appeals.

1. As O’Connor recognizes in his brief, this appeal turns on
whether the Fulton County Personnel Regulations amount to an
employment contract and, if they do, whether they apply to him. The
issues before this Court are purely legal, see City of Buchanan v. Pope,
222 Ga. App. 716, 717 (476 SE2d 53) (1996), and “[o]ur review of the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo.” See Southern
States-Bartow County v. Riverwood Farm Homeowners Assn., 300
Ga. 609, 611 (797 SE2d 468) (2017).

Generally speaking, the policies and information in personnel
or employee manuals! neither create a contract, see, e.g., Ellison v.
DeKalb County, 236 Ga. App. 185 (1) (611 SE2d 284) (1999), nor
support a claim for breach of contract, see Jones v. Chatham County,
223 Ga. App. 455 (5) (477 SE2d 889) (1996). Nevertheless, “an at-will
employment relationship can give rise to certain contractual rights.”
See Shelnut v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah, 333 Ga.
App. 446, 450 (2) (776 SE2d 650) (2015). “[P]rovisions in an employee
manual relating to additional compensation plans, of which an
employee is aware, may amount to a binding contract between the
parties,” Ellison, 236 Ga. at 186 (1), as may “a promise of future
compensation made at the beginning of the employment relation-
ship,” Shelnut, 333 Ga. App. at 451 (2).2 O’Connor recognizes these

+ Though the personnel policies involved here are regulations that have the force and effect
of law, neither side argues that, for the purposes of our breach-of-contract analysis, the
personnel regulations at issue here are not substantially similar to a personnel manual or
employee handbook, and we do not address such an argument

2 But see Arby's, Inc. v. Cooper, 265 Ga. 240, 241 (454 SE2d 488) (1995) (recognizing that
“the promise of future compensation must also be for an exact amount or based upon a ‘formula
or method for determining the exact amount’ ” (citation omitted).

72 Pe

general principles and argues that Fulton County Personnel Regu-
lation 300-4 (7) constitutes an additional or future compensation
policy that amounts to an enforceable contract.* We disagree.

When interpreting this regulation, we must give effect to its
plain and unambiguous provisions. See City of Buchanan, 222 Ga.
App. at 717. Fulton County Personnel Regulation 300-4 (7) states as
follows:

Any permanent Classified or permanent Unclassified
on-range employee, who is required by the Appointing Author-
ity, or designee, to work in an acting or interim capacity
whereby he/she performs the duties of a vacant existing
higher classification and position outside of his/her regular
classification/position for twenty (20) or more consecutive
workdays in one (1) calendar year, shall receive the salary of
the acting or interim position effective on the twenty-first
(21st) workday. Such appointment shall not exceed one (1)
year. An Appointing Authority shall not appoint an employee
unless such employee meets the eligibility requirements for
the higher class. Once the employee is no longer performing
the duties in the higher classification and position, he/she
shall be returned to his/her former classification and posi-
tion and to the salary at which he/she would have been
entitled had he/she remained in the position. .. .

(Emphasis supplied.) By its plain language, Regulation 300-4 (7) does
not guarantee future compensation; instead, it speaks to the admin-
istration of certain temporary appointments. The mentions of salary
are in the context of a temporary appointment (or a return therefrom)
and the referenced salary is plainly contingent upon continued
employment. Indeed, the nature of O’Connor’s argument supports our
reading of the regulation; namely, O’Connor asserts that Regulation
300-4 (7) gave him a contractual right to return to his former position
at the conclusion of his temporary appointment; any concern regard-
ing future compensation is dependent upon and collateral to his

S ‘To the extent that O'Connor is actually asserting that the County failed to follow its own
procedures under Regulation 300-4 (7) when it terminated his employment, such a claim, even
if true, does not give rise to a claim for breach of contract, See Doss v. City of Savannah, 290 Ga
App. 670, 67 (5) (660 SE2d 457) (2008) (“Even if Doss were able to establish that the City failed
to follow its own procedures in connection with her termination, this Court has held that such
evidence does not give rise to a breach of contract claim.”)

eS 7

central argument of being returned to his former position.* But see
E. D. Lacey Mills, Inc. v. Keith, 183 Ga. App. 357, 359 (2) (359 SE2d
148) (1987) (“[A]n employee cannot sue to enforce future performance
of a terminable-at-will employment agreement.”).

Simply put, Regulation 300-4 (7) controls the administration of
certain temporary appointments and does not amount to a promise of
future compensation; accordingly, the provision does not form the
basis of an employment contract. Compare Shelnut, 333 Ga. App. at
451-452 (2) (contract created by policy that explicitly addressed
salary and provided “for an automatic increase at a definite percent-
age upon promotion to a supervisory position”), and Fulton-DeKalb
Hosp. Auth. v. Metzger, 203 Ga. App. 595 (2) (417 SE2d 163) (1992)
(provision controlling disability pay for on-the-job injury constituted
enforceable contract).

Moreover, even if this Court were to construe O’Connor’s argu-
ment as a true claim for breach of contract premised on future
compensation and to conclude that Regulation 300-4 (7) is a provision
that could give rise to such a claim, O’Connor stil] does not prevail on
his claim. Under its plain language, Regulation 300-4 (7) applies only
to “on-range” employees, and it is undisputed that O’Connor was a
“set-range” employee. Compare Regulation 300-4 (4) (addressing the
temporary appointment of “employees” generally). Apparently rec-
ognizing that the language of the regulation is unambiguous, O’Connor
asserts that a plain reading of the regulation leads to an absurd
result. This argument, however, is unavailing because O’Connor has
failed to detail how the plain-language reading is absurd or unwork-
able; further, the mere fact that the plain language of the regulation
is unfavorable to O’Connor does not in and of itself render it absurd
or untenable. See Harris v. Mahone, 340 Ga. App. 415 (1) (797 SE2d
688) (2017).

2. O’Connor also argues that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus
compelling Anderson, the new County Manager, to reinstate him as
Finance Director. Again relying on Regulation 300-4 (7), O’Connor
asserts that he was automatically returned to his former position as
Finance Director when he was removed as Interim County Manager
and that he has never been lawfully removed from that position. This
argument fails for two reasons.

First, as explained above, Regulation 300-4 (7) is inapplicable to
O’Connor because he was not an “on-range” employee. Second, as a

+ Notably, O'Connor acknowledged below that, after his employment was terminated, he
was compensated for his accrued, unused paid vacation leave at the hourly rate of the County
Manager position.

u™ Pe

public, at-will employee with no vested right in his continued employ-
ment, see, e.g., Barnes v. Mendonsa, 110 Ga. App. 464 (2) (188 SE2d
914) (1964), O’Connor cannot demonstrate that he has a clear legal
right to be reinstated to his position as Finance Director. Cf. Wayne
County v. Herrin, 210 Ga. App. 747 (7) (487 SE2d 793) (1993) (writ of
mandamus proper remedy where County employees with vested right
in employment were terminated without due process).

3. Finally, because O’Connor has not prevailed on his claim for
damages, the trial court correctly concluded that he was not entitled
to attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. See Benchmark Builders v.
Schultz, 289 Ga. 329 (1) (711 SE2d 639) (2011).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

ee

Parks, Chesin & Walbert, J. Matthew Maguire, Jr., for appellant.

Jerolyn W. Ferrari, Kristen B. Williams, Paula R. Miller, Kaye W.
Burwell, Dominique A. Martinez, for appellees.

$17A0894. ANDERSON v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 47)

BENHAM, Justice.

James Edwin Anderson was found guilty of felony murder and
other crimes arising out of the shooting death of Franklin Ron Burch.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
presented at trial shows that Burch was dating appellant’s daughter-
in-law Brittany Anderson, who was involved in a divorce proceeding
with appellant’s son, Edwin Anderson, Jr. Several weeks before the

1 The crimes occurred on June 29, 2011. On July 13, 2011, a Wayne County grand jury
returned an indictment charging appellant with malice murder; felony murder (aggravated
assault); aggravated assault upon Burch; voluntary manslaughter; aggravated assault upon
Brittany Anderson; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Prior to trial,
the voluntary manslaughter charge was nolle prossed. Appellant faced a jury trial conducted
October 15-18, 2012. Appellant was found not guilty of the charge of malice murder and the
charge of aggravated assault upon Brittany Anderson. Appellant was found guilty of all other
charges. The trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without parole for the felony
murder guilty verdict, and the aggravated assault guilty verdict merged with the felony murder
guilty verdict. The trial court sentenced appellant to imprisonment for five years for the
possession of a firearm guilty verdict to run consecutively to the sentence for felony murder.
Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial which was later amended, but the trial court denied
the motion after conducting a hearing. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this case
was docketed to the April 2017 term of court. The appeal was orally argued on April 17, 2017

eS 7

shooting, after learning that Ms. Anderson was seeing Burch, appel-
lant called his daughter-in-law while intoxicated and left voice mail
messages in which he threatened Burch, and those messages were
played to the jury. On the day of the shooting, appellant’s son
exchanged angry words with Burch when he went by Burch’s house
in the afternoon to pick up his five-year-old son, after which Burch got
into his vehicle and chased Anderson, Jr., down the road where more
angry words were exchanged. Appellant and his wife were in St.
Simons Island on a brief vacation, and Anderson, Jr., telephoned his
mother to tell her he was upset by the encounter and wanted to bring
his son to join his parents and get away from the situation. While
waiting for Anderson, Jr., to arrive, appellant and his wife proceeded
to a restaurant for dinner. When Anderson, Jr., had not yet arrived
when they returned to their hotel room, appellant informed his wife
that he was going back home to Wayne County to have a talk with
Burch. Appellant testified at trial that he first stopped by his own
home to retrieve guns and ammunition out of his locked gun safe
because he did not know where his son was and he was concerned that
his son might take the guns and either harm himself or others. He
admitted, however, that he could have simply taken the key to the
locked safe.

Appellant loaded all five of his firearms into the covered bed of
his truck and started driving toward where he believed Burch lived.
At some point he telephoned his daughter and asked her to look up
Burch’s address. It was well after dark when he drove by that address
and while he saw what he believed to be his daughter-in-law’s car in
the driveway, he could tell the house was unoccupied. Appellant
pulled off to the side of the road. Anderson, Jr., having learned that
his father had driven back to Wayne County to find Burch, called
appellant andasked him not to go to Burch’s house, but appellant told
his son that he needed to “resolve this.” Shortly thereafter, appellant
saw a truck that he believed to be Burch’s pull into the driveway of
Burch’s house. Appellant had already retrieved the rifle from the
back of the truck and placed it on the front seat, and he had placed a
Colt .45 semiautomatic in the pocket of the passenger door. Appellant
new the rifle had one round in it, and although several other rifle
cartridges were found in the cup holder of his truck after he turned
himself in, appellant denied they had ever been loaded into the rifle.
Appellant pulled his vehicle into Burch’s driveway and saw Ms.
Anderson inside the open garage near the door to the house. Appel-
lant grabbed his rifle, went to the front of his vehicle, and saw Burch
standing near the garage. Appellant testified he took the rifle with a
scope with him as he exited the vehicle, but not one of the handguns,
because the rifle would be easier for Burch to see in the dark.

16 Pe

According to appellant, he wanted to have the rifle with him as a
“symbol” to keep Burch from possibly “jumping on me,” since he knew
Burch was younger and in better physical condition. In a recorded
statement appellant gave to the investigator who interviewed him
when he turned himself in later that evening, he repeatedly stated
that he took the rifle out of the truck because he wanted to scare
Burch but that he had no intention of harming him. He loaded one
bullet in the rifle thinking that he might shoot into the air ifnecessary
to scare Burch.
In the recorded statement, appellant stated that when he saw
Burch coming at him after he exited his truck, he decided to strike
him in the stomach with the barrel of the rifle so that Burch would
bend forward and appellant could then tell him that he just wanted
to talk. In that statement, appellant claimed the two men did not
struggle over the rifle but that, instead, it simply went off while he
had the barrel pressed against Burch’s stomach. He told the inves-
tigator he had the rifle repaired in the 1990s because it had misfired
and he believed that may have been what had happened on the night
in question because he had fired the weapon only a few times in the
many years he owned it. At trial, however, appellant testified that
when Burch came toward him Burch reached for the rifle and the two
men engaged in a “[t]ug of war,” as Burch tried to “tear it out of my
hands.” At that point, according to appellant, the gun discharged. He
was not sure what had happened, or whose hand was on the trigger
when the gun went off, but he saw blood “everywhere” and panicked,
got into his truck, and drove away.

Ms. Anderson testified at trial that she was inside the open
garage when appellant pulled into Burch’s driveway, and when she
saw appellant get out of his truck “toting” a long gun at his side she
hollered, “No, Big Edwin [the name she called appellant], no.” She
remembered Burch’s hands going up, andas appellant walked around
the front of the truck steadily approaching Burch, Burch said, “No,
man, no.” She saw Burch take maybe two steps back and then she saw
him bent over with his hand on the barrel of the gun. She heard the
gun go off, after which Burch slumped to the ground. On cross-
examination, Ms. Anderson acknowledged that on the night of the
shooting the investigating officer asked her if there had been a
struggle and she had responded affirmatively, but at trial she rejected
defense counsel's characterization that a “struggle” ensued between
appellant and the victim over the gun. Instead, she explained that
there was never a fight over the gun, but that she saw Burch bent over
with his hands on the end of the barrel as the gun was pressed into his
stomach.

eS 17

Emergency medical personnel were called and arrived at the
scene, as did the Screven Police Chief. Efforts to revive Burch were
unsuccessful, and he died at the scene. After speaking by telephone
with his wife and daughter, appellant turned himself in to the
authorities and gave the statement that was recorded. Pursuant toa
warrant to search appellant’s truck, the agent who took appellant’s
statement found a .308-caliber rifle and four other firearms, along
with four .308-caliber cartridges and other ammunition. DNA testing
confirmed that blood found on the driver-side tire was Burch’s. The
forensic pathologist who conducted an autopsy of Burch’s body tes-
tified at trial that Burch died from a gunshot wound at near contact
range to the abdomen, and that parallel scrapes appearing on the
victim’s chest were the result of the barrel of the gun and the gun
scope scraping over Burch’s skin. He also identified an abrasion on
the victim’s left lower abdomen. Firearms testing confirmed that the
metal jacket recovered from Burch’s abdomen during the autopsy
was fired from the rifle found in appellant’s truck.

1. Although appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the convictions, this Court regularly conducts an
examination of the record to determine the legal sufficiency of the
evidence in murder cases. We conclude the evidence adduced at trial
and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of
fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the
crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (IIT) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion
for new trial because during voir dire one of the jurors, who is
identified in this opinion by his initial “H.,” improperly concealed his
connection to the case and his bias toward the victim. Appellant
asserts a defendant is entitled to a new trial based on juror miscon-
duct if the defendant is able to demonstrate that “(1) the juror failed
to answer honestly a material question on voir dire and (2) a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”
See Glover v. State, 274 Ga. 213, 214 (2) (552 SE2d 804) (2001). The
problem with that argument is that the record does not demonstrate
that H. failed to give honest answers to voir dire questions.

(a) During voir dire, H. answered all questions that were asked
of him. He disclosed, in response to questioning, that he was appel-
lant’s neighbor; that his father and appellant’s father had been
friendly business competitors; that he considered himself to be a
personal friend to the victim’s father; that he knew Brittany Ander-
son and Anderson, Jr., who had been his neighbors; and that he had
been personal friends with the Chief Assistant District Attorney for
forty years, was friends with the sheriff, and knew the Screven Police

78 Pe

Chief (who was identified as a witness and later testified at trial). The
record shows the crimes were committed and the case was tried in a
rural county where many individuals and families are acquainted
and have numerous interconnections. In fact, other members of the
jury array also answered that they were acquainted with persons
connected to the case. With respect to each person H. identified as
being a friend or acquaintance, he stated that he could nevertheless
be impartial and fair, and could make a decision based solely on the
evidence. With respect to those individuals he said he knew who were
identified as potential witnesses, H. stated his acquaintance would
not cause him automatically to believe the witness. The answers H.
gave during voir dire regarding these persons were consistent with
the testimony he gave at the hearing on the motion for new trial,
except that at the motion hearing H. gave additional details in
response to additional questions the parties asked him. Appellant
has failed to demonstrate that H. failed to give honest answers to the
questions he was asked regarding his knowledge about or acquain-
tance with persons identified to him in voir dire.

The same can be said regarding H.’s answers regarding his
occupation. H. answered on voir dire that he was employed by the
local funeral home which handled the arrangements for Burch’s
funeral, and that he had conversations with both the Burch and
Anderson families associated with his duties at the funeral home. He
mentioned that he was referred to as a mortician. No follow-up
questions were asked with respect to these disclosures. At the motion
for new trial hearing, however, H. disclosed in response to more
detailed questioning that he embalmed Burch’s body, and confirmed
that at that time he had the opportunity partially to inspect and view
the gunshot wound and abrasions on the body. Appellant argues that
as the decedent’s embalmer, he would have been qualified to testify
that the victim had sustained a gunshot wound. See Young v. State,
232 Ga. 285, 289 (206 SE2d 439) (1974). But in the current case, that
the victim had died from a gunshot wound was an undisputed fact,
and H. was not identified as a potential witness prior to trial.
Consequently, H. was not a known prospective witness who was
subject to being excused for cause upon a proper motion. Compare
Lively v. State, 262 Ga. 510, 511 (1) (421 SE2d 528) (1992) (ajuror with
close connections to the victim, who had given the victim “fatherly
advice” concerning her relationship with the accused, and who was
listed as a State’s witness should have been excused).

As noted, H. disclosed that he knew a number of individuals
connected to the case, including both the victim and the accused, as
well as their respective families. Relying upon Lively, supra, appel-
lant argues that a close relationship between a juror and the victim

eS 79

and the victim’s family prevents the juror from rendering an impar-
tial verdict despite the juror’s testimony that he could be a fair and
impartial juror. But the degree of the juror’s involvement with the
victim in Lively is distinguishable from the juror’s involvement in this
case. Not only did that juror know the victim and her family, he had
discussed with the victim her relationship with the accused and had
given her “fatherly advice” concerning that relationship and other
matters that might be brought out at trial. The juror had also
discussed the relationship between the victim and the accused with
the accused, himself. Demonstrating the close relationship between
the juror and the victim’s family, he was asked to serve as a pall
bearer at her funeral, and did serve. The juror also testified he had
expressed his remorse to the victim’s family about her death. Given
these facts, this Court held that, regardless of the juror’s testimony
hat he could be impartial, the record failed to support the trial court’s
finding “that the juror could put aside his close relationship with the
deceased and his personal knowledge of her difficulties with the
defendant and render an impartial verdict based solely on the evi-
dence presented at trial.” Lively, supra, 262 Ga. at 511 (1). Moreover,
in Lively, the juror was identified as a potential State’s witness.
H. testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he greeted the
Burch family when they arrived at the funeral home to make funeral
arrangements and that he hugged them and expressed condolences
for their loss, but this conduct does not rise to the level of connection
with the victim and his family as that involved in the Lively case.
H. did not attend the victim’s funeral.

H. disclosed during voir dire that he was acquainted with, or even
friends with, several persons who were scheduled to testify at trial,
and appellant asserts this prevented him from being an unbiased
juror. In particular, appellant points to H.’s answer in response to
questioning at the motion for new trial hearing that he would testify,
if asked, to the good character and truthfulness of the Chief of Police
of the Screven police department, who was the first law enforcement
officer to arrive at the scene of the shooting and who testified at trial
about what he observed. Appellant argues this demonstrates juror
bias in that H. was predisposed to believe this State’s witness. In this
case, however, the witness in question offered no expert testimony,
and the testimony about his first-hand observations involved no
disputed issues. H. testified similarly when asked whether he could
testify to the good character and truthfulness of another person who
was identified prior to trial as a potential witness but who was not
called. Neither party asked such questions of H. during voir dire.
Accordingly, appellant has failed to demonstrate that H. failed to
answer voir dire questions honestly. Neither has appellant shown

a

80 Pe

H. was a biased juror. Appellant’s reliance on cases that involve
intentional misrepresentations by a juror on voir dire,” or unreason-
able failure to disclose relevant information in response to questions
on voir dire® are inapposite to the facts of this case and unpersuasive
with respect to appellant’s assertion that he is entitled to a new trial
for juror misconduct on the basis of implied bias.

Because appellant has failed to demonstrate that H. answered
questions dishonestly during voir dire, he has failed to meet the
requirements of the first prong of the two-pronged test set forth in
Glover for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial
for juror misconduct — that the juror failed to give honest answers to
voir dire questions. The trial court did not err in denying the motion
for new trial on this ground. See Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 571 (3)
(783 SE2d 622) (2016) (to prevail on a juror misconduct claim the
defendant must satisfy both the required prongs for establishing such
a claim).

(b) Appellant further argues that H. had knowledge about the
victim’s wounds, including the abrasions on the victim’s chest and
abdomen, and thus had exposure to extrinsic physical evidence in the
case that other jurors did not have. Relying on Remmer v. United
States,‘ appellant argues this extrinsic knowledge should be deemed
presumptively prejudicial. In Remmer, however, a juror had been
contacted during trial by a person who suggested to him that he could
profit from returning a verdict favorable to the defendant. That
comment was reported to the trial court and investigated by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, but the defendant and his counsel
were not informed. The United States Supreme Court held that such
private communications or tampering with a juror during trial “is, for
obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial,” and that under
such circumstances an evidentiary hearing was required to deter-
mine the impact of the communications on the juror and whether it
was, in fact, prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 229-230. Of course,
this case does not involve private communications during trial.
Moreover, in this case, an evidentiary hearing was conducted in
response to the motion for new trial at which H. testified that the

2 See Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing implied juror bias in a case
in which the juror had given untruthful answers to voir dire questions); United States v.
Perkins, 748 ¥2d 1519 (IV) (11th Cir, 1984) (juror had made intentional misrepresentations
during voir dire and actual bias was shown by this dishonesty, and the juror's knowledge of the
defendant was used during the deadlocked jury's deliberations).

8 See United States v. Scott, 854 F2d 697 (5th Cir, 1988) (the juror’s testimony at the motion
for new trial hearing regarding his reasons for not disclosing relevant information during voir
dire raised a sufficient implication of bias to require a new trial).

4347 U. $. 227, 229 (74 SCt 450, 98 LE 654) (1954)

eS 81

decisions he made as a juror were based solely upon what he saw and
heard in the courtroom and upon the trial judge’s instructions. No
evidence was presented that H. discussed his observations of the
victim’s body with other members of the jury. Compare United States
v. Perkins, 748 F2d 1519 (IV) (11th Cir. 1984). Based upon the evi-
dence and argument at the hearing, the trial court did not err in
concluding no prejudice was shown.
Appellant further argues that juror H. had knowledge and
information that other jurors did not have. But photographs of the
victim’s body taken prior to the embalming were admitted into
evidence and given to the jury, which clearly depicted the gunshot
wound and the scrapes on the victim’s body. The primary contested
issue at trial was whether appellant and the victim engaged in a
struggle that caused the gun to fire. According to appellant, the
abrasions on the victim’s body constituted evidence of a struggle,
whereas, in closing arguments, the prosecutor argued the evidence
showed appellant had used the barrel of the rifle as a bayonet. But
appellant did not establish that H. had formed any opinion about this
issue based on his viewing of the body as the embalmer. In fact, as
noted, he testified he based his decision on the evidence presented at
trial. Again, appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.
Moreover, returning to appellant’s enumeration of error, he has
failed to demonstrate that H. failed to give honest answers to voir dire
questions about his employment at the funeral home. Appellant
argues that H. improperly failed to disclose the “whole truth” as to his
role in the victim’s funeral arrangements, but appellant provides no
authority for a requirement of a juror to give anything other than
truthful answers to voir dire questions, and he fails to demonstrate
that this juror gave responses that were untruthful or unresponsive.
Pretermitting the issue of whether juror misconduct might be shown
if a juror provided technically truthful, but misleading, information
on voir dire regarding an issue that might be prejudicial to the
defendant, that is not what happened in this case. At the commence-
ment of voir dire, the jurors were asked to raise their right hand and
swear they would “give true answers” to the questions asked regard-
ing their qualifications as jurors in the case. After H. disclosed his
employment, counsel for the State and the defendant were permitted
to pose additional questions. It was at that point that H. volunteered
that the funeral home where he was employed handled the arrange-
ments for the victim’s funeral. Reference to H.’s employment at the
funeral home was made several more times during voir dire, but
neither party asked what role, if any, H. played in the handling of the
victim’s funeral arrangements. Appellant has failed to demonstrate

82 Pe

this juror improperly concealed any facts surrounding his involve-
ment with the victim’s body or that he was prejudiced by the juror’s
involvement.

3. Appellant asserts trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by failing to ask questions on voir dire that would have uncovered the
reasons why juror H. was not qualified to sit on the jury, including the
extent of his relationships with persons involved with the case, his
personal bias, and his personal handling and viewing of evidence. As
set forth in Division 2, however, appellant has failed to demonstrate
that this juror was not qualified to sit on the jury or that he was
subject to a challenge for cause. Accordingly, even if appellant coul:
demonstrate trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable professiona.
assistance during voir dire, appellant fails to establish the require’
showing of prejudice resulting from counsel’s conduct, as required by
the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.®

4, Appellant also asserts trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
conduct an adequate investigation of the defense that the rifle fire:
accidentally as a result of a struggle between appellant and the
victim, and in failing to present expert testimony that would have
supported that defense. Trial counsel’s testimony at the motion for
new trial hearing, however, established that he worked with a private
investigator while preparing for trial, that he reviewed the medica.
examiner’s report, and reviewed the photographs of the victim‘s
wounds. Counsel admitted that, in hindsight, it would have been
reasonable for him to consult with an expert, such as a crime scene
expert or firearms expert, to determine if there was evidence of a
struggle that would have provided additional support for the accident
defense. He testified, however, that at the time he tried the case he
believed the evidence was clear that the parties had struggled over
the gun; and the law is well settled that decisions relating to trial
strategy and tactics are not to be judged by hindsight. See Grissom v.
State, 296 Ga. 406, 412 (4) (768 SE2d 494) (2015). From counsel’s
testimony, it is clear that the decision not to retain an expert witness
was not due to a lack of preparation or investigation but was a
strategic decision based on counsel’s opinion that the evidence was
sufficiently straightforward so as not to require an expert on the
defense of accident. “Absent a strong showing that counsel’s actions
were not reasonable, we will presume that [trial] strategies were not
deficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Watkins v. State, 285

6 466 U. S. 668, 694 (III) (B) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984) (requiring both deficient
performance of professional assistance of defense counsel as well as a showing of prejudice as
a result thereof).

eS 83

Ga. 107, 110 (3) (b) (674 SE2d 275) (2009). Contrary to appellant’s
assertion, he has failed to demonstrate that counsel's strategic deci-
sions in this regard were not reasonable as a matter of law under the
circumstances of this case. See Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 889 (7) (b)
(725 SE2d 305) (2012).

The medical examiner who testified at trial was called as a
witness at the motion for new trial hearing, and in response to
questioning he answered that the abrasions on the victim’s body
could have been associated with a struggle over the firearm involved
in the shooting. He also said they might not have been associated with
a struggle, and the witness agreed with the prosecutor that, instead,
the marks could have been caused by the upward recoil of the gun
after it fired. Appellant faults trial counsel for his failure to cross-
examine the medical examiner at trial, thereby establishing by the
State’s own witness that the evidence was consistent with a struggle.
The medical examiner did testify at trial that the abrasions on the
victim’s body were consistent with the barrel of a gun scraping over
the victim’s skin. From this testimony and evidence, the jury could
have deduced that the parties engaged in a struggle even in the
absence of an explicit question to and answer from an expert witness.
Additionally, the testimony of the medical examiner at the motion
hearing demonstrates his testimony likely would have been equivo-
cal, in any event. Given trial counsel’s testimony that he believed a
struggle was clear from the evidence, appellant has failed to carry the
burden of showing trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine the medical
examiner was not reasonable.

Because appellant has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s
performance, with respect to presenting evidence to support his
self-defense claim, did not fall “within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance,”® appellant has failed to meet the required
deficient performance prong of the Strickland test. The trial court did
not err in denying appellant’s motion for new trial on this ground.

5. Trial counsel's testimony at the motion for new trial hearing
established that he made a reasoned decision to present the defense
that appellant initially acted in self-defense when he thrust the rifle
into the victim’s abdomen, but that the victim was shot accidentally
after the victim commenced fighting with appellant over the gun.
Accordingly, pursuant to the facts of the case, counsel pursued the
unusual strategy of both a self-defense theory and an accident theory,
and the trial court gave jury instructions on both theories. Appellant
asserts, however, that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of

® Gill v. State, 295 Ga. 705, 708 (2) (763 SE2d 719) (2014).

84 Pe

counsel by his failure to request a charge on involuntary manslaugh-
ter. According to appellant, the evidence supported an involuntary
manslaughter charge; and if requested, the trial judge would have
given such a charge; and if given, it is reasonably probable that the
jury would have returned a verdict on this lesser included offense. At
the motion for new trial hearing, however, trial counsel testified that
he never intended to claim involuntary manslaughter in light of the
defenses of self-defense and accident because he did not believe all
these charges could or should be given. The trial court properly held
an instruction on involuntary manslaughter would have been incon-
sistent with appellant’s alternative defenses of self-defense and
accident and thus denied the motion for new trial with respect to this
claim.

Pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-3 (a), a person commits involuntary
manslaughter “in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes
the death of another human being without any intention to do so by
the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.” In this case,
appellant asserted the defenses of self-defense and accident, and the
trial court gave instructions on these two defenses. But neither self-
defense nor accident are unlawful acts at all. Consequently, involun-
tary manslaughter is inconsistent with both the defense of self-
defense and the defense of accident. Not only has appellant failed to
demonstrate trial counsel’s decision not to request an inconsistent
involuntary manslaughter charge was unreasonable, he has also
failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by that decision. See Wil-
liams v. State, 298 Ga. 208, 219 (9) (779 SE2d 304) (2015). Accord-
ingly, ineffective assistance of counsel is not established.

6. Appellant presented a character witness, and during the
State’s cross-examination of the witness the prosecutor asked him
whether it would change his opinion of appellant if he knew of certain
alleged instances of appellant’s conduct, including an instance of
domestic violence associated with appellant’s consumption of alcohol
when the police were called by appellant’s wife. The witness testified
he did not know of that alleged conduct, and also testified it would not
change his opinion of appellant’s good character if it were true given
his extensive experience of working with appellant. During closing
argument, the prosecutor referred to appellant as one who “gets into
disputes with his wife and the police have to come.” Appellant’s
counsel objected on the ground that the prosecutor referenced facts
not in evidence, but the trial court stated in the jury’s presence, “the
jury will be the judge of what’s in evidence or not in evidence.” After
closing argument, and outside the presence of the jury, appellant’s
counsel renewed his objection, and argued that an announcement by
the court that the jury would be the judge of what’s in evidence was

eS 85

an insufficient curative instruction. Counsel for both parties debated
with the trial judge about what would be an appropriate response to
appellant’s objection, given the constraints upon the court not to
comment on the evidence, as well as the possibility that an instruc-
tion would simply draw more attention to the statement about the
disputed fact. The judge asked counsel for a suggested approach to
the problem, and appellant’s counsel responded that he was seeking
a mistrial, but that if the court did not grant a mistrial they “would
just have to move on.” The motion for mistrial was denied.

As part of the jury instructions that followed, the trial court
stated that neither the opening statements or closing arguments of
the lawyers, nor the questions asked by the lawyers, constituted
evidence. The trial judge also gave an appropriate charge regarding
the jury’s consideration of character evidence. In response to the trial
court’s inquiry to counsel at the end of the jury charge, appellant’s
counsel stated he had no exceptions to the charge.

Citing OCGA § 17-8-75,’ appellant argues the trial court abused
its discretion when it denied the motion for mistrial and gave an
inadequate curative instruction that failed to rebuke the prosecutor
for making prejudicial statements not in evidence. After the charac-
ter witness answered that he was unaware of the domestic dispute,
the prosecutor did not present evidence to establish the incident
occurred. Nevertheless, in his closing argument the prosecutor refer-
enced “disputes,” plural, in which the police had to be called. Appel-
lant asserts the prosecutor’s comment improperly implied multiple
instances in which the police responded to domestic disputes, and
that the comment unduly influenced the jury to believe appellant had
engaged in domestic violence on multiple occasions, none of which
was in evidence. He claims this entitles him to a new trial.

Pretermitting whether trial counsel’s failure to renew his objec-
tion to the closing argument or to renew his motion for mistrial served
to waive the issue for appellate review, we find no reversible error. A
trial court’s error in not fulfilling its duty under OCGA § 17-8-75 is
subject to harmless error analysis. See Arrington v. State, 286 Ga.
335, 345-346 (16) (a) (687 SE2d 438) (2009) (finding harmless error in
trial court’s failure to rebuke the State in response to prosecutor’s

7 OCGA § 17-8-75 states:

Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial
matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and
prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and
by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper
impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the
prosecuting attorney is the offender.

86 Pe

misstatement of evidence during closing argument, where improper
statement consisted of one sentence, was interrupted by defense
counsel’s objection, and trial court immediately observed that the
‘jury w(ould) remember the evidence,” and where other inculpatory
evidence rendered it highly probable that the error did not contribute
to the guilty verdicts). In light of the substantial evidence against
appellant, as well as the jury instructions given, it is highly probable
that neither this statement by the prosecutor in closing argument,
nor any alleged failure of the trial court to comply with OCGA §
17-8-75, contributed to the verdict.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

irm Oj ein randenburg, Marcia G. Shein, Leigh S.
Schrope, for appellant.

Jacquelyn L. Johnson, District Attorney, Andrew J. Ekonomou,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth M. Haase, Assis-
tant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A0901. MARTINEZ v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 44)

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Maurilio Martinez appeals his convictions for the rape
and murder of Joy Morris.’ Appellant urges this Court to reverse his
convictions because he contends the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of rape, trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to
move for a directed verdict on the rape charge, and the trial court
erred when it overruled his objection to certain comments the pros-
ecutor made during closing argument. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.

1 The crimes occurred on or about October 31, 2002. On March 26, 2010, a Lowndes County
grand jury indicted appellant for malice murder and rape. Appellant was tried before a jury on
February 4-6, 2013, with the jury returning verdicts of guilty on both charges. The trial court,
sentenced appellant to life in prison for malice murder and 20 years to be served concurrently
for rape. Appellant moved for a new trial on March 4, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion on July 25, 2015, and the trial court denied the motion on August 21, 2015. Appellant
filed a notice of appeal on August 24, 2015, and, upon receipt of the record, the case was
docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

eS 87

1. (a) The facts viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the
jury’s verdicts show that, on the morning of November 1, 2002, police,
who were responding to a call about a suspicious person/vehicle,
discovered Morris deceased in her black Mustang in Lowndes County.
Morris lived in Kentucky, but had been working in Lowndes County
and, according to her husband, she was going to spend the night in the
motel near where police discovered her vehicle. When the police
found her, Morris was slumped in the driver’s seat of the vehicle,
which was pushed back in such a manner that she would not have
been able to operate the vehicle. Morris had a phone cord wrapped
around her neck, her shirt and bra were raised above her breasts, her
pants were unbuttoned and slightly down her hips, and she was not
wearing underwear. Morris had blood coming from her ear. The
victim’s car was in drivable condition, but Morris was positioned in
such a way that her feet could not reach the pedals and she only had
one shoe on. The other shoe was found under the front, passenger-side
bumper of her vehicle. In addition, an impression of a forearm was
found on the hood of the car. Upon measuring the angle of the
impression in relation to the hood of the car and the ground, authori-
ties concluded the impression was consistent with someone of the
victim’s height. Blood belonging to the victim was also found on the
hood. Additionally, there were drag marks on the ground that went
from the passenger side of the vehicle to the driver’s side. Inside her
vehicle, police recovered a gas station receipt, showing that Morris
had purchased gas at a nearby gas station at about 9:00 p.m. October
31. Morris’s husband testified that he last spoke to his wife on the
phone at 8:00 or 9:00 that night.

During the autopsy, the medical examiner performed a rape kit
and discovered spermatozoa inside the victim’s vagina, although
there was no bruising to her genitals. The medical examiner testified
Morris had butalbital, a type of barbiturate, in her blood in an amount
that was sufficient to render her unconscious. He also opined that the
victim’s unconsciousness would explain why there was no bruising of
her genitalia upon being sexually assaulted. The medical examiner
testified that the contents of Morris’s stomach indicated that she had
eaten approximately an hour before her death. The medical examiner
concluded the cause of death was ligature strangulation and explained
that it appeared the phone cord had been wrapped around Morris’s
neck about two or three times and that the hemorrhaging in her neck
suggested the phone cord had been pulled on her neck from right to
left and from front to back. Morris also had “grab marks” on her arms,
scratches on her body and extremities, and abrasions anda laceration
to her face.

88 Pe

The spermatozoa collected during the autopsy was submitted for
DNA testing, and the resulting DNA profile was entered into a
national database. At that time a match was made to someone
identified as Miguel Santizo in the database. Despite the DNA match,
the case went cold for seven years. In 2009, appellant was arrested in
Florida, and the DNA he submitted during that arrest came up as a
match to the DNA collected in Morris’s rape kit. When interviewed by
officers investigating the Morris case, appellant admitted that, as a
migrant worker, he used a number of aliases? and admitted he had
been working in Lowndes County around the time of the victim’s
death. Appellant denied ever knowing or meeting the victim, and he
had no explanation for the presence of his DNA in the rape kit.
Appellant told authorities that when he was drunk, he often had no
memory of what he did while intoxicated. During one of the inter-
views with appellant, a detective collected a DNA sample directly
from appellant and that sample also matched the DNA collected from
Morris’s rape kit seven years earlier. In addition, appellant’s known
DNA profile could not be excluded as the source of DNA material
collected from the phone cord wrapped around the victim’s neck.

(b) OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1) provides that a person commits rape
when that person has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and
against her will. Appellant argues that because there was no injury
to Morris’s genitalia that the evidence was insufficient to show that
any carnal knowledge of Morris was forcible. This argument is
without merit. “Vaginal trauma and physical injury are not neces-
sarily a constituent element of the criminal offense of rape.” Searcy v.
State, 158 Ga. App. 328 (2) (280 SE2d 161) (1981). See also Skipper v.
State, 257 Ga. 802 (1) (b) (364 SE2d 835) (1988) (“Other than the
penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ, the
infliction of physical injury is not an element of the offense of rape.”).
The medical examiner explained that the lack of injury to Morris’s
genitalia was consistent with the fact that she was likely unconscious
due to the butalbital in her system. Furthermore, there was other
evidence that Morris was forcibly assaulted, including the acute
abrasions to her face and extremities, “grab marks” on her arms, her
blood being found on the hood of her vehicle, and drag marks on the
ground indicating she was dragged from one side of the vehicle to the
other. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact

2 At trial, the State showed that appellant, Miguel Santizo, and Sebastian Moreno were
one and the same person by presenting DNA evidence, fingerprint evidence, and in-court
identifications by law enforcement officers who had past encounters with appellant going by
one of his aliases.

eS 89

to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of rape, as well as
malice murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. 8. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61
LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Appellant alleges trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to move for a directed verdict on the charge of rape.

In light of this Court’s holding in [Division 1 (b)] that the
evidence adduced at trial satisfied the requirements of
Jackson v. Virginia, . . . counsel’s failure to move for a
directed verdict [on the rape count] presents an insufficient
ground as a matter of law for claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 880 (608
SE2d 229) (2005).
3. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued as follows:

[The crime scene investigator] measured from the ground
to where that [forearm] impression is left on the hood, and
guess who it matched? Joy Morris. From the ground to where
that impression is to Joy Morris’s height. So where did the
sexual assault and rape happen? The hood of the car. He had
her bent over the hood of that car.

Appellant objected on the ground that the statement assumed facts
not in evidence, namely that the sexual assault occurred over the
hood of the car. The trial court overruled his objection. On appeal,
appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error in
failing to sustain his objection. We disagree.

Attorneys are generally granted wide latitude in making closing
arguments and may argue points that may be reasonably inferred
from the evidence. See Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 305 (4) (a) (801 SE2d
782) (2017). Here the evidence showed there was a forearm impres-
sion on the hood of the car; the measurements from the forearm
impression in relation to the car’s hood and the ground matched the
victim’s height; one of the victim’s shoes was wedged under the
passenger side bumper of the car; appellant’s blood was on the hood
of the car; the victim had abrasions to her face and extremities; and
appellant’s DNA was found inside the victim’s body. Based on this
evidence, it was not unreasonable for the State to infer in its argu-
ment to the jury that the rape occurred over the hood of the car. The
trial court did not commit reversible error.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

90 Pe
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

Conger & Smith, Gregory D. Smith, for appellant.

Bradfield M. Shealy, District Attorney, Michelle T: Harrison,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A0931. DANIELS v. THE STATE.
$17A0932. THOMAS v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 80)

HINES, Chief Justice.

In Case No. $17A0931, Demetrius Tyshaun Daniels appeals his
convictions and sentences for felony murder, violations of the Street
Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, in connection with the death of
Alvin Hunt; in companion Case No. $17A0932, Tobias Demere Thomas
appeals his convictions and sentences for the felony murder of
Bernardino Perez, violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Pre-
vention Act, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, in connection with mul-
tiple criminal incidents. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in both
cases.!

1 The crimes for which Daniels and Thomas were indicted occurred on April 25, 2009, and
July 2, 2010; Perez was killed on April 25, 2009, and Hunt was killed on July 2, 2010. On March
22, 2011, a Colquitt County grand jury returned an 80-count indictment charging Daniels,
Thomas, and nine other persons with various crimes. Daniels was charged with eight counts in
the indictment. Counts 49-56 were based on incidents that occurred in the area of the Shy
Manor Apartments in Moultrie. In those counts, Daniels — along with other named indictees
including Thomas — was charged with the felony murder of Hunt while in the commission of
aggravated assault, the aggravated assault of Hunt, possession of a firearm during the
commission of the felony murder of Hunt, possession of a firearm while in the commission of the
aggravated assault of Hunt, and separate violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and
Prevention Act for each of these aforementioned crimes. Thomas was charged in 72 counts of
the indictment. Counts 1-8 were based on incidents that occurred in the Sardis Church Road
area in Moultrie. In these counts, Thomas — along with other named indictees not including
Daniels — was charged with the felony murder of Perez while in the commission of aggravated
assault, the aggravated assault of Perez, possession of a firearm during the commission of each
of those two crimes, and a violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act for
participation in a criminal street gang through the commission of each of those aforementioned
crimes. Counts 9-48 were based on incidents that occurred in the Circle Road area in Moultrie.
In these counts, Thomas — along with other named indictees not including Daniels — was
charged with one count of the burglary of the dwelling house of Margaret Ortiz, Samuel Cruz,
and Angel Gasper, separate counts of armed robbery regarding each of those three victims,

eS a1

Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed that
Daniels and Thomas were members of a local street gang known as
the “Forrest Hill Boyz,” and were tried together, with four other
defendants, for their roles in various crimes that took place in and
around Moultrie. Of the incidents that resulted in convictions ger-
mane to these appeals, the first occurred in the Sardis Church Road
area in Moultrie. On the night of April 25, 2009, eyewitnesses heard
gunshots and saw an SUV drive away from a mobile home park
located on Sardis Church Road. Law enforcement officers arrived and
found Perez fatally shot in the chest; he had been paid that day, but
no money was found on his person. Alphonso Knighton, who was a
co-indictee of Daniels and Thomas, testified that he, Thomas, and
Jeudy, each armed with a handgun, drove to the Sardis Church Road

separate counts of aggravated assault regarding each of those three victims, separate counts of
the aggravated assaults of Jorge Luiz Ortiz and Javier Santiago, violation of the Street Gang
Terrorism and Prevention Act for participation in a criminal street gang through the commis-
sion of each of these crimes, separate counts of possession of a firearm during the commission
of each of the aforementioned crimes of burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault, and
violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act for participation in acriminal street
gang through the commission of each of the separate counts alleging possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime. Counts 49-56 charged Thomas — along with other named
indictees including Daniels — with the felony murder of Hunt while in the commission of
aggravated assault, the aggravated assault of Hunt, possession of a firearm during the
commission of each of those two crimes, and a violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and
Prevention Act for participation in a criminal street gang through the commission of the
aforementioned crimes. Counts 65-80 were based on incidents that occurred in the area of 11th
Court, a street in Moultrie. In these counts, Thomas was charged with the burglary of the
dwelling house of Jimmy Meyers, the armed robbery of Jimmy Meyers, two separate counts of
aggravated assault upon Jimmy Meyers, separate counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of each of the aforementioned crimes of burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated
assault, and violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act for participation in a
criminal street gang through the commission of each of the aforementioned crimes. Neither
Daniels nor Thomas was charged in Counts 57-64 of the indictment. Daniels and Thomas, along
with Nyneson Seymore Jeudy, Robert Lee Fuller, Randarius Lamar Perry, and Willie C
Hightower, Jx., were tried together before a jury May 14, 2012-May 31, 2012. As toThomas, the
trial court directed a verdict of acquittal on Counts 49-56. The jury found Daniels guilty of all
crimes with which he was charged, and found Thomas not guilty of Counts 65-80 in the
indictment, but guilty of the remaining charges. On July 16, 2012, Daniels was sentenced to life
in prison for felony murder, and prison terms totaling 35 years for the crimes that were not
merged or vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372-374 (4), (5) (434
SE2d 479) (1993). On July 16, 2012, Thomas was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder,
and prison terms totaling 190 years, to be served both consecutively and concurrently, for the
crimes that were not merged or vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm, supra. On June 11,
2012, Daniels filed a motion for new trial, which he amended on December 29, 2014; the motion,
as amended, was denied on April 28, 2016. Thomas filed a motion for new trial on August 6,
2012, which he amended on October 17, 2014; the motion, as amended, was denied on November
13, 2015. Daniels filed a notice of appeal on April 4, 2016, see Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 465
(1) (796 SE2d 261) (2017), and Thomas filed his notice of appeal on December 8, 2015, and the
appeals were docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term and submitted for decision on the
briefs.

92 ee

neighborhood. When they saw Perez, Jeudy jumped out of the vehicle
torob him. Knighton testified that he heard gunshots, Jeudy got back
in the vehicle, told them not to say anything, and they left. An hour
before Perez was killed, Crystal Slaughter was outside her cousin’s
home and Thomas called her to come over to Jeudy’s SUV. Thomas
handed her a cell phone, and she spoke with Danny Hill; the phone
call was recorded as Hill was then incarcerated, and had calle
Thomas from jail. While Thomas spoke with Hill, Thomas said he ha
“three heaters,”? was “loaded to the T,” and was looking for “some-
thing to do now.”

Another set of crimes occurred later that same night, when
Knighton, Jeudy, and Thomas went to a mobile home on Circle Road.
Knighton held a gun on two or three people outside the home, while
Jeudy and Thomas went inside it; Knighton, Jeudy, and Thomas ha’
their faces covered, and all three were armed with pistols. Inside,
either Jeudy or Thomas grabbed the hair of Margaret Ortiz, who
resided in the home, and hit her with a pistol. The assailants
demanded money, and Ortiz’s husband, Samuel Cruz, told her to give
the men her backpack, in which the couple kept money; it containe’
$1,500, a gold chain, checks, social security cards, and the title to a
vehicle; one of the assailants also took money from the pockets of
Angel Gasper. One of the assailants shot Jorge Luis Cruz and Javier
Santiago, who also resided in the home; both of these shooting victims
survived. Knighton heard two gunshots, and Jeudy and Thomas ran
from the home with what Knighton described as a “pocketbook”; one
of the victims saw the three men flee in a vehicle that matched the
description of Jeudy’s; Jeudy gave Knighton $200 of the robbery
proceeds. Thomas told his cousin, Michael Enoch, that he and Jeudy
had been involved in robbing, hurting, and killing “some Hispanics,”
and had obtained about $900 by committing those crimes.

On July 2, 2010 another set of crimes occurred in and around the
Shy Manor Apartments in Moultrie. Deon Moore (“Deon”) was driv-
ing his car with its windows down and his brother Basil Moore
(“Basil”) and Alvin Hunt as passengers. As they drove past a group of
people outside the apartments, someone sprayed liquid from a water
gun into the car. Deon stopped, and the three men got out, prepared
to fight people in the crowd. Threats to call police were made, and the
three men got back into the car and left. Later, Daniels got into a
vehicle with co-defendant Robert Fuller and co-indictee Dontavious

2 There was testimony that “three heaters” was a reference to three handguns.

eS 93

Jackson. After a phone call, they met Thomas, who distribute:
handguns to Daniels, Fuller, and Jackson.* They then went to the Shy
Manor Apartments looking for Hunt, Basil, and Deon, and foun
them. Daniels, Fuller, and Jackson started firing at Hunt, Basil, an
Deon, who were seated on a porch at the complex. Hunt was hit while
trying to run away; he was taken to a hospital, where he died of his
injuries. Daniels was identified as one of the shooters, but it was
unknown who fired the fatal gunshot.
Daniels did not testify at trial. Thomas testified that, as to the
Sardis Church Road crimes, he left the company of Jeudy ani
Knighton before they went to Sardis Church Road, did not see them
again that night, and had no involvement in the crimes that occurre’
on Sardis Church Road or Circle Road. Thomas also testified that he
had received a telephone call from Hill, and that during that call, he
said that he was “riding around with two heaters. Two or three
heaters, something like that.” However, Thomas maintained that
this was because, during the phone call, Hill had asked that Thomas
“flex” during the call, which meant to exaggerate his statements in a
“tough” manner; Thomas testified that his reference to “heaters” was
in that vein and was inspired by rap song lyrics of an artist named
TL, and that “TI.” was also a nickname that had been given to
Thomas.

Case No. S17A0931

1. Daniels does not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence of
his guilt. Nevertheless, in accordance with this Court’s general
practice in appeals of murder cases, this Court has reviewed the
record and concludes that the evidence presented at trial authorized
the jury to find Daniels guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes
of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Daniels contends that his trial counsel failed to provide
effective assistance in several respects. In order to prevail on any
such claim, he must show both that counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his
defense. Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783 (1) (325 SE2d 362) (1985),

2 Jackson testified to this, but upon Thomas's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal
regarding the counts of the indictment pertaining to the Shy Manor incidents, the trial court
agreed that the evidence was that Jackson was an accomplice of Thomas's, but his testimony
regarding Thomas's involvement in these crimes was uncorroborated, and granted the motion;
the directed verdict was granted only as to Thomas.

o4 ee

citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d
674) (1984). To meet the first prong of the required test, he must
overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance fell
within a “wide range of reasonable professional conduct,” and that
counsel’s decisions were “made in the exercise of reasonable profes-
sional judgment.” Id. The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is
examined from counsel's perspective at the time of trialand under the
particular circumstances of the case, id. at 784, and decisions regard-
ing trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness
claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent
attorney would have followed such acourse. Redding v. State, 297 Ga.
845, 850 (5) (778 SE2d 774) (2015). To meet the second prong of the
test, Daniels must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
absent any unprofessional errors on counsel's part, the result of his
trial would have been different. Smith, supra at 783. “ ‘We accept the
trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless
clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to
the facts.’ [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 SE2d 313)
(2003).

Daniels contends that trial counsel should have moved to sever
his prosecution from that of the other defendants. During the hearing
on Daniels’s motion for new trial, trial counsel testified that he
believed it was a better course of action to ensure that Daniels would
not be tried separately; counsel noted that Daniels had been offered
— and had rejected — a favorable plea deal, and that counsel had
reason to believe that if Daniels were tried alone, a co-defendant
would accept a deal similar to the one offered to Daniels, and would
testify against Daniels, and that this decision was made in consul-
tation with Daniels. Counsel further testified that he believed that
the better course of action was to “hide in the weeds” and, as the
multi-defendant trial concerned five incidents, and as Daniels was
accused of being involved in only one of them, to try to avoid Daniels
being mentioned often during trial, and hope that he could remain in
obscurity.4 Counsel’s chosen strategy was not patently unreasonable,
see Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433, 438 (2) (a) (1) (796 SE2d 242) (2017);
Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 522, 529 (6) (615 SE2d 532) (2005), and the
fact that Daniels’s present counsel might have pursued a different

+ During closing argument, counsel noted the paucity of evidence naming his client, and
that the one witness who testified that Daniels was involved in the crimes contended that four
men were involved, a number contradicted by eyewitness testimony.

eS 95

strategic course does not warrant a different conclusion. Woods v.
State, 291 Ga. 804, 808 (2) (733 SE2d 730) (2012).

Daniels also asserts that trial counsel was “generally ineffec-
tive,” apparently by asking what present counsel considers an insuf-
ficient number of questions during voir dire and the cross-exam-
ination of witnesses. During the hearing on his motion for new trial,
Daniels did not ask trial counsel any questions about voir dire or the
cross-examination of witnesses, and makes no specific argument that
trial counsel’s conduct was deficient regarding these matters other
than to note that counsel for Willie Hightower, who was tried with
Daniels, but only on charges arising from a separate incidentin which
Daniels was not alleged to be involved, was able to secure an acquittal
for his client. However, the mere fact that during Daniels’s trial, the
State failed to prove that Hightower — or anyone else — was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes arising from this
separate incident® does not establish that Daniels’s trial counsel
performed deficiently in pursuing the chosen strategy. Of course,
“decisions about what questions to ask on cross-examination are
quintessential trial strategy and will rarely constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Henry v. State, 297 Ga. 74, 77 (2) (c) (772 SE2d
678) (2015) (Citation and punctuation omitted.) And, Daniels does
not suggest what further questioning of prospective jurors or wit-
nesses trial counsel should have pursued, much less show what
evidence might have been produced from such questioning, and fails
to meet either prong of the Strickland test.

Case No. S17A0932

3. Thomas contends that the evidence presented by the State was
insufficient to authorize the jury to find him guilty of the crimes of
which he was convicted.* See Jackson, supra. He particularly asserts
that the testimony of Knighton, who was an accomplice in the Sardis
Church Road and Circle Road crimes, was uncorroborated.

® Thomas, the only other defendant tried with Daniels who faced charges with Hightower
arising from this incident, was also found not guilty of those charges.

® At various points in his brief, Thomas states that he “adopts his argument and citations
as set out in the transcript from the hearing on his Motion for New Trial pages [__] as if set out
herein in full,” or presents a similar statement. This briefing technique does not comport with
this Court’s Rule 22, which states in pertinent part, “[alny enumerated error not supported by
argument or citation of authority in the brief shall be deemed abandoned. All citations of
authority must be full and complete.” (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, this opinion will not
consider arguments or citations of authority not properly presented in Thomas's brief. See
Holmes v. State, 301 Ga. 143, 146 (2) (800 SH2d 353) (2017).

96 ee

At the time of Thomas’s 2012 trial, former OCGA § 24-4-8 pro-
vided:

The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient
to establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including
prosecutions for treason, prosecutions for perjury, and felony
cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony
of a single witness is not sufficient. Nevertheless, corrobo-
rating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for
the testimony of a second witness, except in prosecutions for
treason.”

As to the accomplice corroboration requirement,

it is well established that slight evidence of corroboration is
all that is needed. The necessary corroboration may consist
entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the
defendant’s conduct before and after the crime was commit-
ted may give rise to an inference that he participated in the
crime.

McCain v. State, 300 Ga. 400, 401 (794 SE2d 58) (2016) (Citations and
punctuation omitted.)

Evidence corroborating Knighton’s testimony regarding Thomas’s
involvement in the Sardis Church Road crimes included the record-
ed cell phone call in which Thomas told Hill that he was carrying
“three heaters,” was “loaded to the T,” and looking for “something to
do now”; although Thomas in his testimony offered other explana-
tions of those phrases than that he was carrying weapons and seeking
a criminal opportunity, the jury was not required to credit this
testimony. Cain v. State, 300 Ga. 614, 615 (1) (797 SE2d 466) (2017).
Further, Thomas was tied to these crimes through the testimony of
Eric Lamar and through ballistic evidence. Lamar testified that: on
April 19, 2009, he shot Ricky Yates with a .380 pistol; that same day,
he went to a location near Thomas’s home, telephoned Thomas, and
asked Thomas to meet him; Thomas and Jeudy came to meet Lamar;
the three men got into Jeudy’s vehicle and searched for another man
to shoot in retaliation for a prior incident which caused Lamar to be
hospitalized; they found the man and shot at him; and after that
shooting, Lamar gave the .380 pistol to Thomas and told him to getrid
of it. This .380 pistol was recovered on November 5, 2010, by a law
enforcement officer after it was discarded by Nathaniel Baker while

* Under the new Georgia Evidence Code, effective for trials conducted on or after January
1, 2013, the necessity for corroboration of accomplice testimony is now codified at OCGA § 24-14-8

eS 97

he was being pursued on foot by law enforcement officers; at the end
of the pursuit, Baker ran into a house that bore graffiti indicative of
the Forrest Hill Boyz gang. Cartridge casings recovered from the
scene of the shooting of Yates, and cartridge casings recovered from
the scene of the fatal shooting of Perez were shown to have been fired
from the same .380 pistol; it was also shown that at the time of the
fatal shooting of Perez, Baker was incarcerated.

Further, Knighton’s testimony regarding Thomas’s involvement
in the Circle Road crimes was corroborated by Thomas’s own state-
ments to Enoch. And, as to the violations of the Street Gang Terror-
ism and Prevention Act, in addition to Knighton’s testimony, co-indictee
Jackson testified that he was a member of the Forrest Hill Boyz, as
was Thomas, and they engaged in street gang activity. See Pittman v.
State, 300 Ga. 894, 897 (1) (799 SE2d 215) (2017) (Evidence corrobo-
rating accomplice testimony “ ‘may be testimony from another accom-
plice.’ [Cit.]”) Two other witnesses, who denied being members of the
gang, also testified that Thomas was a member of the Forrest Hill
Boyz, and engaged in the activities of that gang.

The evidence presented at trial authorized the jury to find
Thomas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he
was convicted. Jackson, supra.

4. Thomas asserts that the trial court erred in denying his
general demurrer.

An indictment may be challenged by general or special
demurrer. A general demurrer “challenges the sufficiency of
the substance of the indictment.” [Cit.] If the accused could
admit each and every fact alleged in the indictment and still
be innocent of any crime, the indictment is subject to a
general demurrer. [Cit.] If, however, the admission of the
facts alleged would lead necessarily to the conclusion that
the accused is guilty of a crime, the indictment is sufficient
to withstand a general demurrer. [Cit.] A special demurrer,
on the other hand, “challenges the sufficiency of the form of
the indictment.” [Cit.] By filing a special demurrer, the
accused claims “not that the charge in an indictment is
fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction
(as would be asserted by general demurrer), but rather that
the charge is imperfect as to form or that the accused is
entitled to more information.” [Cit.]

Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 880 (2) (799 SE2d 229) (2017)
(Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.)

98 ee

In his general demurrer, Thomas challenged 12 counts of the
indictment; each charged him with a violation of the Street Gang
Terrorism and Prevention Act, based upon his participation in crimi-
nal street gang activity through the commission of the offense of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Thomas
cites in his brief as an example Count 3 of the indictment, which
charged Thomas and two other defendants with

the offense of VIOLATION OF STREET GANG TERROR-
ISM AND PREVENTION ACT for the said accused per-
son(s), in the County of Colquitt and State of Georgia, on or
about the 25th day of April 2009, being associated with
Forrest Hill Boyz a/k/a FHB a/k/a So Icy Boyz, a criminal
street gang, did unlawfully participate in criminal street
gang activity through the commission of the offense of
POSSESSION OF A FIREARM DURING THE COM-
MISSION OFA FELONY by unlawfully having on or about
his person a firearm during the commission of the crime of
Murder as set forth in count 1 above.

Thomas’s general demurrer challenged Count 3 of the indictment; it
did not challenge Count 1, referred to in Count 3. Count 1 charged
Thomas and two other defendants with

the offense of VIOLATION OF STREET GANG TERROR-
ISM AND PREVENTION ACT for the said accused per-
son(s), in the County of Colquitt and State of Georgia, on or
about the 25th day of April 2009, being associated with
Forrest Hill Boyz a/k/a FHB a/k/a So Icy Boyz, a criminal
street gang, did unlawfully participate in criminal street
gang activity through the commission of the offense of
FELONY MURDER by causing the death of BERNAR-
DINO PEREZ, a human being while in the commission of an
Aggravated Assault, a felony, by shooting said BERNAR-
DINO PEREZ with a firearm.

The other 11 counts of the indictment encompassed in the general
demurrer were structured in the same manner as Count 3; they each
specified a violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention
Act, based upon participation in criminal street gang activity through
the commission of the offense of Possession of a Firearm During the
Commission of a Felony, and then identified the felony underlying the
possession charge by stating the name of the underlying crime,

eS 99

specifically “as set forth in,” and then gave the number of a different
count in the indictment.

The trial court did not err in denying Thomas’s general demur-
rer. As to the offenses set forth in an indictment, “each count must be
complete within itself and contain every allegation essential to
constitute the crime.” State v. Jones, 274 Ga. 287, 288 (1) (553 SE2d
612) (2001). Nonetheless, “one count [of an indictment] may incorpo-
rate by reference portions of another, and the indictment is read as a
whole.” Id. at 289 (1). Thus, Thomas could not “admit each and every
fact alleged in [Count 3 of] the indictment and still be innocent of any
crime.” Kimbrough, supra. Although Thomas notes that Count 1 does
not charge the crime of murder, that is of no moment; Count 3
incorporates the language of Count 1, and thus, if Thomas admitted
each and every fact alleged in Count 3, he would admit that he
“unlawfully ha[d] on or about his person a firearm during the
commission of the crime of Murder as set forth in count 1 above,” to
wit, the felony murder of Perez, “while in the commission of an
Aggravated Assault, a felony, by shooting said BERNARDINO PEREZ
with a firearm,” as that crime is set forth in Count 1, andin admitting
those facts, he would admit that he had committed a violation of the
Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, as specified in Count 3.
The indictment, read as a whole, put Thomas on notice of the crimes
charged and against which he must defend and comported with due
process; there was no error. Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 178-180 (2)
(611 SE2d 52) (2005).

5. Before trial, Thomas moved to sever various counts of the
indictment, so that there would be separate trials for: those crimes
that took place on April 25, 2009, related to the Sardis Church Road
and Circle Road incidents (Counts 1-48); those crimes that took place
on July 2, 2010, related to the Shy Manor incidents (Counts 49-56);
those crimes that took place on July 9, 2010, related to the robbery of
a grocery store (Counts 57-64, in which Thomas was not a named
defendant); and, those crimes that took place on July 20, 2010, on or
near 11th Court in Moultrie (Counts 65-80, in which Thomas was a
named defendant, but for which verdicts of not guilty were returned).
Thomas also moved that he be tried separately from all other defen-
dants. The trial court denied these motions, and Thomas asserts that
this was error.

However,

[w]hen several defendants are indicted together for a capital
crime, but the State does not seek the death penalty, whether
the defendants are to be tried together or separately is a
matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

100 ee

OCGA § 17-8-4 (a). “In ruling on a severance motion, the
court should consider: (1) the likelihood of confusion of the
evidence and law; (2) the possibility that evidence against one
defendant may be considered against the other defendant;
and (3) the presence or absence of antagonistic defenses.”
[Cit.]

Blackledge v. State, 299 Ga. 385, 387 (2) (788 SE2d 353) (2016).
Although Thomas notes that he was not charged with all of the crimes
alleged in the indictment and that the alignment of co-indictees
named with him was not consistent as to all of the different crimes,
and suggests that confusion on the part of the jury could have
resulted, he fails to show any such prejudice. Indeed, the record belies
the claim; the jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to Counts 65-80
of the indictment, relating to allegations involving crimes that took
place at 11th Court on July 20, 2010.

Further, the crimes set forth in the indictment involved allega-
tions of gang activity, and evidence of gang membership, tattoos, and
acertain method of disguising their faces that gang members termed
“ninja style.” And, had there been separate trials, evidence of the
gang activities of his co-defendants would have been admissible at his
trial. See Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 242 (794 SE2d 67) (2016). The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance. Black-
ledge, supra.

6. Thomas contends that the trial court violated former OCGA §
17-8-57;° that Code section forbade the court from “express[ing] or
intimat[ing an] opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to
the guilt of the accused.”® Thomas first complains that the Code

® At the time of Thomas's trial, OCGA § 17-8-57 read:

It is error for any judge in any criminal case, during its progress or in his
charge to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been
proved or as tothe guilt of the accused. Should any judge violate this Code section,
the violation shall be held by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals tobe error and
the decision in the case reversed, and a new trial granted in the court below with
such directions as the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals may lawfully give.

° The current version of OCGA § 17-8-57 reads

(a) (1) It is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to

express or intimate tothe jury the judge's opinion as to whether a fact at issue

has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.

(2) Any party who alleges a violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection
shall make a timely objection and inform the court of the specific objection
and the grounds for such objection, outside of the jury's hearing and presence.
After such objection has been made, and if it is sustained, it shall be the duty
of the court to give a curative instruction to the jury or declare a mistrial, if
appropriate.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, failure to make
a timely objection to an alleged violation of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this

eS 101

section was violated when the trial court asked a witness for clarifi-
cation regarding an answer the witness gave when asked if he liked
Thomas, to wit, that the witness “didn’t know him like that”; when the
witness answered that the phrase meant “I know of him, but I don’t
associate with him,” the court further asked, “You don’t know him
well enough to form an opinion?,” to which the witness responded
affirmatively. There was no violation of then OCGA § 17-8-57 as “the
trial court’s questions were posed for the purpose of clarifying the
witness’[s] testimony concerning [his] prior statement and did not
express or intimate an opinion regarding the credibility of the evi-
dence being offered or the guilt of the accused. [Cits.]” Alexander v.
State, 294 Ga. 345, 348 (3) (751 SE2d 408) (2013).

Thomas also urges that former OCGA § 17-8-57 was violated
when the trial judge gave an audible grunt and tossed a pen down on
the bench.'° Thomas contends that this action would be taken by the
jury to be a comment upon the evidence, noting that the incident
occurred after Thomas’s testimony. However, the trial transcript,
together with the ensuing discussion between counsel and the court
regarding the incident, which was conducted outside the jury’s
presence, shows that Thomas had already left the witness stand
when the court inquired who would be the defense’s next witness, and
it was then that counsel stated that Thomas rested; it is uncontro-
verted that any expression of displeasure by the court took place at
this point. Accordingly, the record does not support Thomas’s conten-
tion that the incident “intimated to the [j]ury” that Thomas’s testi-
mony “was other than truthful [and] had to be taken by the [j]ury as
a derogatory remark” on Thomas’s credibility.

Shortly after the sidebar conference at which Thomas’s counsel
stated that alibi witnesses were prepared to testify, see footnote 10,
supra, the court rebuked counsel for attempting to place information

Code section shall preclude appellate review, unless such violation constitutes
plain error which affects substantive rights of the parties. Plain error may be
considered on appeal even when a timely objection informing the court of the
specific objection was not made, so long as such error affects substantive rights of
the parties.

(© Should any judge express an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, the
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals or the trial court ina motion for a new trial shall
grant a new trial.
© Although the trial transcript does not report these actions, outside the jury’s presence,
the trial judge conceded that he had acted in this manner, and did so after Thomas had testified
inhis own behalf, and rested his case, despite the fact that Thomas's counsel had just informed
the court that he had three alibi witnesses outside the courtroom “if we have to call them.”

Counsel's statement regarding alibi witnesses took place during a sidebar conference after the

State had objected to counsel's attempt to have Thomas testify regarding a purported transcript

ofa preliminary hearing; after counsel's statement that alibi witnesses were prepared totestify,

the court stated, “[let’s get away from the transcript, then.”

102 ee

before the jury regarding the purported transcript of a preliminary
hearing" by Thomas’s counsel asking him if “witnesses testified as to
an alibi on your behalf” at such a hearing; the court warned counsel
about “attempting to elicit from him hearsay testimony about a
proceeding outside of this courtroom”; counsel stated that he “would
like to object to the [c]ourt’s ruling excluding the fact that there was
a preliminary hearing in that case. And —” The court then declared:
‘Don’t try ringing the bell again. I'll ring yours. Now proceed.” Of
course,

[i]t is the duty of the trial court to control the trial of the case
and to [e]nsure a fair trial to both sides on the disputed
issues in the case. Sometimes this requires interference by
the court with the conduct of counsel [Cit.] [Thomas] has not
shown that the trial court abused its considerable discretion
in the manner in which it dealt with his lawyer during [this
portion of the trial].

Bonner v. State, 295 Ga. 10, 15 (3) (757 SE2d 118) (2014). See also
Buttram v. State, 280 Ga. 595, 598 (8) (631 SE2d 642) (2006) (The
court’s final instructions to the jury included that no ruling or
comment the court had made was “intended to express any opinion
upon the facts of the case, upon the credibility of the witnesses, upon
the evidence, or upon the guilt or innocence of the defendants.”) The
court’s statement did not constitute a violation of former OCGA §
17-8-57.
7. The trial court instructed the jury:

The testimony of a single witness, if believed, is gener-
ally sufficient to establish any fact. An exception to this rule
is made in the case of a felony, as these offenses are alleged
to be, where the witness is an accomplice. The testimony of
the accomplice alone is not sufficient to warrant a conviction.
The accomplice’s testimony must be supported by other
evidence of some type, and that evidence must be such as
would lead to the inference of the guilt of the accused
independent of the testimony of the accomplice.

This language was requested by Thomas on May 17, 2012, and
appears to be taken from the Georgia pattern jury instructions. See

4 Although these incidents served as a basis for Thomas's motion for new trial, during the
hearing on that motion, Thomas did not attempt to introduce the purported transcript.

eS 103

Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases,
§§ 1.31.90, 1.31.92 (4th ed. 2007). However, Thomas contends that
after he submitted his May 17, 2012 requests to charge the jury, he
submitted additional requests on May 24, 2012, and that the tria.
court erred in failing to give certain of those later requested charges.
While it appears from discussion during a conference on the requests
for jury charges that Thomas did, in fact, submit some additiona.
requests on or about May 24, 2012, no such requests appear in the
record before this Court. Inquiry with the trial court failed to produce
any such written requests and, after order of this Court, the tria.
court has certified that no such requests to charge are to be found in
its records; Thomas has not attempted to supplement the record with
any additional jury instructions filed after May 17, 2012. See OCGA §
5-6-41 (f), (g). Of course, requests to charge the jury are to be sub-
mitted in writing” and “[a] request to charge has to be ‘legal, apt, an:
precisely adjusted to some principle involved in the case and be
authorized by the evidence.’ [Cit.]” Barron v. State, 297 Ga. 706, 708
(2) (777 SE2d 435) (2015). Further, “[t]he burden is on him who
asserts error to show it affirmatively by the record [Cit.],” Kemp v.
State, 226 Ga. 506, 507 (2) (175 SE2d 869) (1970), and Thomas’s
failure to pursue the available statutory provisions to ensure that the
record before this Court reflects that which he contends occurred
prevents this Court from considering his assertion that the trial court
erred in rejecting requests for jury instructions.

Nonetheless, Thomas states in his brief that for the trial court to
fail “to give the full charge” was plain error, and it appears that by
“the full charge,” Thomas intends to refer to the complete language of
Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions §§ 1.31.90 and 1.31.92.1? This

2 Uniform Superior Court Rule 10.3 reads:

All requests to charge shall be numbered consecutively on separate sheets of
paper and submitted to the court in duplicate by counsel for all parties at the
commencement of trial, unless otherwise provided by pre-trial order; provided,
however, that additional requests may be submitted to cover unanticipated points
which arise thereafter.

18 Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 1.31.90 (4th ed. 2007)
reads:

‘The testimony of a single witness, if believed, is sufficient to establish a fact.
Generally, there is no legal requirement of corroboration of a witness, provided you
find the evidence to be sufficient.

Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. IT: Criminal Cases, § 1.31.92 (4th ed. 2007) reads:

An exception to this rule is made in the case of (specify felony charge), where
the witness is an accomplice. The testimony of the accomplice alone is not sufficient
to warrant a conviction. The accomplice’s testimony must be supported by other
evidence of some type, and that evidence must be such as would lead to the
inference of the guilt of the accused independent of the testimony of the accomplice.

104 ee

Court has previously stated the test for a finding of plain error.

First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally
relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the
appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error
must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which
in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it
affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth
and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error —
discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings. [Cit.]

Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 683 (2) (724 SE2d 366) (2012)
(Emphasis in original.) See also Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. 370, 373
(2) (788 SE2d 494) (2016). “Beyond showing a clear or obvious error,
plain-error analysis requires the appellant to make an affirmative
showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” Jones
uv. State, 299 Ga. 40, 42-43 (2) (785 SE2d 886) (2016) (Citation and
punctuation omitted.)

Pretermitting whether the charge as given to the jury represents
“an error or defect,” although the complete language of Suggested
Pattern Jury Instructions §§ 1.31.90 and 1.31.92 contains amplifica-
tion regarding the jury’s obligation to find corroboration of an accom-
plice’s testimony that would lead to an inference of Thomas’s guilt,

It is not required that supporting evidence be sufficient to warrant a
conviction or that the testimony of the accomplice be supported in every material
particular.

The supporting evidence must be more than that a crime was actually
committed by someone. It must be sufficient to connect the accused with the
criminal act and must be more than sufficient to merely cast upon the accused a
grave suspicion of guilt.

Slight evidence from another source that connects the accused with the
commission of the alleged crime and tends to show participation in it may be
sufficient supporting evidence of the testimony of an accomplice. In order to convict,
that evidence, when considered with all of the other evidence in the case, must be
sufficient to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty.

(Insert here .98 or .94 charge(s) below only if applicable)

The sufficiency of the supporting evidence of an accomplice is a matter solely
for you to determine.

Whether or not any witness in this case was an accomplice is a question for
you to determine from the evidence in this case.

eS 105

independent of the testimony of the accomplice, the charge as given
properly informed the jury of what corroboration was required.
Further, “[j]ury instructions are read and considered as a whole in
determining whether there is error [Cit.],” White v. State, 281 Ga.
276, 280 (4) (637 SE2d 645) (2006), and the jury was instructed on
reasonable doubt, participation in a crime, “mere presence” at the
scene of a crime, and that “grave suspicion” does not authorize a
conviction. Accordingly, there is no likelihood that the failure to
instruct the jury using the complete language of Suggested Pattern
Jury Instructions §§ 1.31.90 and 1.31.92 affected the outcome of the
trial, and there was no plain error. Allen v. State, 290 Ga. 743, 746 (3)
(723 SE2d 684) (2012).™

8. In his final enumeration of error, Thomas asserts that the
cumulative effect of all of the alleged errors raised above deprived
him of due process. But, Thomas has failed to demonstrate any error
by the trial court. See Divisions 3-6, supra. “Moreover, with regard to
asserted errors by the trial court, a cumulative error rule is not
applied. [Cit.]” Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 772, 774 (3) (683 SE2d 581)
(2009). To the extent that Thomas contends that a new trial is
warranted based on his contention that testimony presented against
him was false, the jury was fully instructed on its role in determining
the facts and resolving evidentiary issues, as well asits role regarding
witness credibility. Thomas’s convictions stand.

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

Conger & Smith, Gregory D. Smith, for appellant (case no.
$17A0931).

Jon W. McClure, for appellant (case no. $17A0932).

Bradfield M. Shealy, District Attorney, April M. Hancock, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patri-
cia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Assistant Attor-
ney General, for appellee.

14 We also note that, as the State contends, the language that Thomas states in his brief
should have been given as part of the jury instructions either constitutes a comment on the
evidence, or is addressed elsewhere in the jury instructions. See OCGA § 17-8-57; White, supra.

106 Pe

$17A0950. WILSON v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 98)

GRANT, Justice.

Appellant Charles Rodney Wilson was convicted of murder and
related offenses in connection with the October 2012 shooting death
of Jesse Howard. Wilson now appeals, asserting various errors in the
adjudication of his motion for new trial, insufficiency of the evidence,
evidentiary error, and improper refusal to bifurcate the trial of
certain counts. Though none of Wilson’s enumerations have merit, we
do note an error in his sentencing, and we therefore affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for resentencing.’

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence at trial showed that Wilson, a convicted felon, shot and kille
victim Howard on October 25, 2012. Earlier that month, Howard ha
broken into Wilson’s car and stolen several ounces of marijuana.
During the days that followed, Wilson sought out Howard, first at
Howard’s girlfriend’s workplace and then at his grandmother’s home.
Wilson told Howard's girlfriend to tell him that Wilson “got something
for him, he going to do something to him.” At Howard’s grandmother’s
home, Howard’s mother, who answered Wilson’s knock at the door an
told him that Howard was not there, noticed that Wilson “was
standing at an angle, as if he had something on his side.”

On the day of the shooting, two of Wilson’s friends spotte
Howard with Scotty Hawk at the mall. Knowing that Wilson was
looking for Howard, the friends followed the men as they left the mal.

1 The crimes were committed on October 25, 2012. Wilson was indicted by a Clarke County
grand jury for malice murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder, predicated on aggravated
assault and felon-in-possession (Counts 2 and 3, respectively), aggravated assault (Count 4),
possession ofa firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5), and four counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime (Counts 6 through 9). At the conclusion of a trial held March
3-10, 2014, a jury found Wilson guilty on all counts, and on March 10, 2014, Wilson was
sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, plus a consecutive five-year term for firearm
possession during the commission of a crime and additional concurrent terms of years for the
other firearm possession counts; the remaining counts were “merged.” See Division V, below.
Wilson filed a motion for new trial on April 10, 2014, which was denied on January 29, 2016.
Wilson filed a notice of appeal on February 16, 2016, but this Court dismissed the appeal on
August 15, 2016, upon our finding that Wilson’s motion for new trial had been void because it
was filed one day late; because the motion for new trial was void, the time for filing Wilson's
appeal had not been tolled, and the notice of appeal was therefore untimely. Upon remittitur,
the trial court granted Wilson's motion for out-of-time appeal on September 27, 2016; Wilson
filed a new motion for new trial on October 11, 2016; the motion was denied on December 13,
2016; and Wilson filed a notice of appeal on December 15, 2016. The appeal was docketed tothe
April 2017 term of this Court and thereafter was submitted for a decision on the briefs.

eS 107

in Howard's girlfriend’s black Honda Accord and drove to Stone-
henge, an Athens neighborhood where both men lived. One of the
friends called Wilson and told him they had located Howard. Wilson
drove to Stonehenge and found Howard standing in Hawk’s driveway
with Hawk and two other men, Stepny Billups and Fred Hunter.
Hawk, who had noticed he was being followed and saw Wilson’s
car pull up, approached Wilson and asked what was going on. Wilson
had a handgun in his lap and was “talking in arage.” After attempting
to calm Wilson down, Hawk walked away from Wilson’s car to talk to
his neighbor. Wilson then exited the car with his gun and called to
Howard to come in the street, threatening to “whoop his ass.” Hawk
told Howard to go inside because Wilson had a gun. Howard yelled
back that Wilson “ain’t going to do nothing.” Wilson chambered a
round, ran toward Howard, and hit him in the head with the gun; the
gun fired, and Howard fell to the ground. Wilson fled.

Police responders found Howard lying on the ground next to the

Honda Accord with a fatal gunshot wound to the head. The officers
observed what appeared to be a bullet mark on the side of the Accord;
according to Howard's girlfriend, the mark had not been there before
he shooting. As for Wilson, after disappearing for several days and
getting rid of his handgun, he turned himself in to law enforcement.
Attrial, Billups and Hunter both testified that Wilson had struck
Howard with the gun and the gun discharged almost immediately.
Hawk testified that Wilson had hit Howard with the gun, Howard
grabbed Wilson, and then Wilson shot Howard in the head.
The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was a
gunshot wound to the head; Howard also had abrasions consistent
with being struck with a gun on the forehead. The bullet had entered
through Howard’s left ear and exited from behind his right ear.
Gunpowder stippling at the entrance wound indicated, based on its
diameter and concentric pattern, that the muzzle-to-target distance
was three to five inches with no obstruction. Upon questioning about
the possibility that the fatal wound had been inflicted by a ricocheting
bullet rather than a direct gunshot, both the medical examiner anda
State crime scene reconstruction expert testified that this scenario
was unlikely. Specifically, both witnesses opined that both the stip-
pling pattern observed on the victim and the bullet’s apparent
trajectory were inconsistent with the possibility of a ricocheting
bullet. Theorizing about the bullet mark on the Accord, the crime
scene expert suggested that two shots had been fired, one hitting the
Accord and one hitting the victim. Based on the bullet’s path through
the victim’s head, the crime scene expert also rejected the theory that
the fatal gunshot had been fired simultaneously with the blow to the
victim’s forehead.

ct

108 es

Wilson testified at trial that he had never intended to shoot
Howard and instead intended only to hit him with the gun. He also
testified that he had believed Howard was armed at the time, though
investigators found no weapons on or around Howard at the scene.

Contrary to Wilson’s contention, the evidence described above
was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Wilson was guilty of the crimes of which he was
convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d
560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (1) (673 SE2d 223)
(2009) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the
evidence.’ ”) (citation omitted).

Il.

Wilson contends that the verdict was contrary to “the principles
of justice and equity” and “decidedly and strongly against the weight
of the evidence” under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. “When properly
raised in a timely motion, these grounds for a new trial — commonly
known as the ‘general grounds’ — require the trial judge to exercise
abroad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’ ” White v. State, 293 Ga.
523, 524 (2) (753 SE2d 115) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Wilson did timely move for a new trial on these general grounds,
citing evidentiary conflicts and witness credibility issues. Following
a hearing at which Wilson’s counsel expressly requested that the
court exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror,” the trial court
denied the motion for new trial. Wilson challenges the trial court’s
decision in several respects, none of which is supported by law.

(a) Wilson asserts that there is no evidence that the trial court
actually exercised its discretion as the “thirteenth juror.” But “the
trial court need not explicitly speak of its discretion with respect to
the general grounds, and unless the record shows otherwise, we must
presume that the trial court understood the nature of its discretion
and exercised it.” Murdock v. State, 299 Ga. 177, 178 (2) (787 SE2d
184) (2016). This Court will thus presume, in the absence of affirma-
tive evidence to the contrary, that the trial court did properly exercise
such discretion. Compare Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 771-772 (3) (778
SE2d 205) (2015) (presuming trial court properly exercised its dis-
cretion where the general grounds were expressly referenced at the
new trial hearing but summary denial order did not explicitly address
its weighing of the evidence as a thirteenth juror), with White, 293 Ga.
at 525 (reversing for consideration of general grounds where record
reflected that trial court reviewed new trial motion only for legal
sufficiency of the evidence); Walker v. State, 292 Ga. 262, 264 (2) (737

eS 109

SE2d 311) (2013) (same). Here, the trial court’s attention was clearly
directed to its discretion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, andthere
is no indication that the court failed to exercise its discretion in
denying the new trial motion.

(b) Regarding Wilson’s related complaint that the trial court
failed to issue express findings of fact and conclusions of law in ruling
on the new trial motion, we are aware of no authority — and, indeed,
Wilson has directed us to none — requiring such express findings. See
Murdock, 299 Ga. at 178 (affirming summary denial of new trial
motion based on general grounds); Butts, 297 Ga. at 772 (same).

(c) Wilson also attacks the denial of his new trial motion on the
ground that it was decided by a different judge than the judge who
had presided at his trial. But there is no prohibition on a successor
judge deciding a new trial motion. Quite to the contrary, our Code
expressly authorizes itin OCGA § 5-5-43: “Ajudge who did not try the
case may, if presented with a motion for new trial within 30 days from
the date of the verdict or judgment sought to be set aside, allow the
filing of, issue rule nisi thereon, and decide the motion . . . where he
is presiding in the court in which the trial was had[.]” See also Kuhn
v. State, 301 Ga. 741, 743-744 (2) n.2 (804 SE2d 9) (2017) (our law
“clearly authorizes a judge who did not try a case to preside over and
decide a motion for new trial”); State v. Harris, 292 Ga. 92, 94-95 (734
SE2d 357) (2012) (affirming grant of new trial by successor judge).

(d) Finally, to the extent Wilson asks this Court to review the
merits of the trial court’s exercise of its discretion as the thirteenth
juror, we decline to do so; this Court does not sit as an arbiter of the
general grounds, which are “solely within the discretion of the trial
court.” Smith v. State, 300 Ga. 532, 534 (1) (796 SE2d 671) (2017). In
sum, we have no basis to disturb the trial court’s denial of Wilson’s
motion for new trial on the general grounds.

III.

Wilson asserts that the trial court erred when, during his
case-in-chief, it refused to admit evidence of victim Howard’s prior
drug convictions, which he contended were admissible to support the
narrative that Howard was involved in the “drug lifestyle” and was
thus likely to be armed at the time of Wilson’s encounter with him.
Under our Evidence Code, evidence of a victim’s character is admis-
sible only if it bears on a “pertinent trait of character” of the victim.
OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2). We have previously rejected the contention
that a victim’s alleged involvement in the drug trade, without more,
would tend to show that the victim was armed so as to support a
defendant’s claim of self-defense. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 295 Ga.

no es

709, 712-713 (2) (763 SE2d 670) (2014) (finding no factual nexus
between victim’s alleged drug possession and defendant’s self-
defense claim). And even if evidence of Howard’s involvement in the
“drug lifestyle” had been relevant to contested issues in the case, this
particular evidence was not of the type that would have been admis-
sible in any event. See OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) (where character evi-
dence is admissible other than as an essential element of a charge,
such evidence must bein the form of reputation or opinion testimony);
Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532, 536 (3) (773 SE2d 755) (2015) (“asa
general rule, character evidence of a victim is limited to reputation or
opinion, not specific bad acts”). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding this evidence.

IV.

Contrary to Wilson’s contention, the trial court properly denie
Wilson’s motion to bifurcate the trial of the counts charging him with
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and felony murder
predicated on that felon-in-possession charge. See Ballard v. State,
297 Ga. 248, 251 (4) (773 SE2d 254) (2015) (motion to bifurcate is
properly denied where felon-in-possession count serves as predicate
for felony murder); Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 806 (8) (764 SE2
376) (2014) (same).

V.

In its sentencing order, the trial court purported to sentence
Wilson to life in prison on Counts 1, 2, and 3 (the malice murder an
both felony murder counts); a five-year term consecutive to the life
sentence on Count 6 (the first of the four firearm-possession-during-
commission-of-a-crime counts); and five-year concurrent terms, respec-
tively, on Counts 7 through 9 (the three other firearm possession
counts). The court properly merged the aggravated assault (Count 4)
with the malice murder, see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 374 (5)
(434 SE2d 479) (1993), and purported to merge the felon-in-
possession count (Count 5) with the felony murder count predicated
thereon (Count 3). To the extent the sentencing order purports to
impose a life sentence for each of the three murder counts, this was
error, as a defendant may be sentenced only on a single verdict of
murder where there is but one victim. See id. at 371-372. Because the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt as to
malice murder, the trial court should have sentenced Wilson on that
count only, and the separate sentences on the two alternative felony
murder counts then stood vacated by operation of law. Hulett v. State,
296 Ga. 49, 53 (2) (766 SE2d 1) (2014). With the felony murder counts

eS m

vacated, the felon-in-possession count charged in Count 5 was improp-
erly merged into the felony murder charged in Count 3. See id.
Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s sentencing
order in which it purported to impose life sentences on Counts 2 and
3 and in which it purported to merge Count 5 into Count 3, and we
remand for the trial court to impose a sentence on Count 5.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded
for resentencing. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

fessica I. Benjamin, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Brian V. Patterson, James
V. Chafin, Kalki Valamanchili, Assistant District Attorneys; Christo-
pher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy
Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A0966. LOCKAMY v. LOCKAMY.
(805 SE2d 5)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

We granted an application for interlocutory appeal in this case to
determine whether the trial court erred when it granted Margie
Lockamy’s (“Wife”) motion to reform a divorce decree by awarding her
permanent periodic alimony where the original divorce decree did not
award her alimony. See Douglas v. Cook, 266 Ga. 644, 645 (2) (469
SE2d 656) (1996). As explained more fully below, because Wife failed
to file her motion in a timely manner, we must reverse the trial court’s
decision based on the untimeliness of Wife’s effort to reform the
original decree, and we need not address the merits of the case.

By way of background, Ricky Lockamy (“Husband”) and Wife
were divorced on September 11, 2009, pursuant to a final decree that
incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement. The settlement agree-
ment provided that Wife would receive 40% of Husband’s “military
retirement” payments (but that her share of the military retirement
payments would never be less than $1,274 per month). The trial court
awarded these payments as an equitable division of marital property,
and it did not award any alimony to Wife.

In March 2010, the Navy informed Husband that the payments
he thought were for military retirement were actually disability
benefit payments and that those payments could not be divided with

12 |

Wife. As a result, Husband promptly stopped making payments to
Wife provided under the “military retirement” provision of the settle-
ment agreement. Six years later, on April 22, 2016, Wife filed a motion
to reform the divorce decree to provide for the original 60% to 40%
division of the payments from the Navy that the parties originally
thought were for Husband’s retirement. The trial court determined,
among other things, in an order entered on October 13, 2016, that,
because Husband’s disability benefits could not be divided as marital
property, it would enforce the parties’ original intent to divide those
payments by reforming the decree to award alimony to Wife in the
amount of $1,400 per month.

The trial court was not authorized to modify the divorce decree
pursuant to Wife’s motion, as the motion to reform the decree was
untimely. While a settlement agreement, like any contract, may be
reformed based on a mutual mistake of the parties (see Douglas,
supra), once the settlement agreement is incorporated into a final
decree, a party may not attack that judgment by seeking to change
the settlement agreement. The party must attack the judgment itself
through one of the acceptable means outlined in OCGA § 9-11-60.
Mehdikarimi v. Emaddazfuli, 268 Ga. 428, 429 (2) (490 SE2d 368)
(1997). Indeed, “voiding the settlement agreement as an independent
contract could have no effect on the validity of the final divorce decree
itself[, as] [t]he respective rights of the parties after the entry of
judgment are founded upon the judgment itself, and not upon the
underlying agreement.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Once
the settlement agreement has been incorporated into a final decree,
the parties’ obligations “can be affected only by means of an action
addressing the underlying divorce decree itself.” Id.

In this regard, Wife was not authorized to file an actual petition
for a revision of “alimony” here, as it is undisputed that she was not
awarded alimony in the original divorce decree. See OCGA § 19-6-21
(‘A petition authorized in subsection (a) of Code Section 19-6-19
[regarding the revision of a judgment for permanent alimony] can be
filed only where a party has been ordered . . . to pay permanent
alimony . . . and not where the former spouse of such party has been
given an award from the corpus of the party’s estate in lieu of such
periodic [alimony] payment”).' Instead, in order to challenge the final

* Ofcourse, if Wife had been awarded alimony in the original decree, she could have moved
to modify such an award consistent with the terms of OCGA § 19-6-19. However, because she
was not awarded alimony, her action here is really one to create an entirely new judgment to
replace the original one that treated Husband’s payment obligation to Wife as an equitable
division of property rather than permanent periodic alimony. In this regard, contrary to Wife’s
arguments, her action was not simply one to modify the existing terms of a divorce decree. This

eS 113

decree under the circumstances of this case, she had to directly attack
the judgment itself through a timely filed motion pursuant to OCGA §
9-11-60:

A judgment may be attacked by motion for a new trial or
motion to set aside. ... A motion to set aside may be brought
to set aside a judgment based upon: (1) Lack of jurisdiction
over the person or the subject matter; (2) Fraud, accident, or
mistake or the acts of the adverse party unmixed with the
negligence or fault of the movant; or (8) A nonamendable
defect which appears upon the face of the record or plead-
ings....Ajudgment void because of lack of jurisdiction of the
person or subject matter may be attacked at any time.
Motions for new trial must be brought within the time
prescribed by law [i.e., generally within 30 days of the entry
of the judgment (OCGA § 5-5-40)]. In all other instances, all
motions to set aside judgments shall be brought within three
years from entry of the judgment complained of.

(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-60 (b), (d), and (f).

Because this case does not involve a void judgment that could be
attacked at any time, Wife was required to file her motion to attack the
September 11, 2009 divorce decree “within three years from entry of
the judgment.” OCGA § 9-11-60 (f); Mehdikarimi, 268 Ga. at 429 (2).
See also Myles v. Myles, 300 Ga. 261 (794 SE2d 56) (2016) (a wife’s
failure to discover her husband’s alleged fraud in obtaining final
divorce judgment did not toll three-year period within which to file
motion to set aside final judgment as “a motion to set aside a
judgment must be filed within three years of entry of the judgment{,
and the] language [in OCGA § 9-11-60 (f) requiring such filing] is
susceptible to only one interpretation”) (citations and punctuation
omitted; emphasis supplied). In other words, she had until Septem-
ber 11, 2012 to file her motion to set aside the decree in this case.
Because Wife did not file her action until April 22, 2016, it was
untimely, and the trial court erred by granting Wife’s motion to
reform the original decree. See id. See also Mehdikarimi, supra;
Riddle v. Miller, 242 Ga. 231 (248 SE2d 616) (1978).

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

is not to say, however, that Wife could not pursue enforcement of the existing terms of the
divorce decree to collect any payments to which she is entitled out of the military retirement
benefits that Husband is currently receiving and that Husband has failed to pay under the
original terms of the decree. But we cannot address the potential merits of any such claim, as
that issue is not currently before us in this appeal.

m4 Pe

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

Garnett Harrison, Jacqueline N. Fortier, for appellant.
Andrews & Sanders Law Offices, Richard A. Sanders, Jr., for
appellee.

$17A1004. WILLIAMS v. HEARD et al.
(805 SE2d 1)

Boaas, Justice.

In this election contest for a seat on the Baker County Board of
Education, we granted the application for interlocutory appeal filed
by Brendette Williams, who challenges the trial court’s denial of her
motion to dismiss the contest petition filed by Sharon Heard, her
opponent in the primary election. We conclude that Heard’s challenge
to the primary election is now moot, and we therefore vacate the trial
court’s order and remand this case for the contest action to be
dismissed. We further conclude that because the trial judge did not
meet the requirements of OCGA § 21-2-523 (b) to preside over this
action, upon remand, a judge meeting such requirements must be
selected to preside over entry of the dismissal.

Heard and Williams were candidates in a primary election on
May 24, 2016, for a seat on the Baker County Board of Education. On
May 27, the certified returns showed that Williams had defeated
Heard by 21 votes, or about 1.90 percent of the total votes cast. Heard
requested a recount, and the Board of Elections responded that
although a mandatory recount was not required because the margin
of victory was more than one percent, it nevertheless decided to
recount the race because it was already conducting a mandatory
recount in another district.

On June 3, 2016, the recount was conducted with the results of
the race being the same as the original returns. For this reason, the
returns were not sent a second time to the Secretary of State. The
Board of Elections executed a recount certification of returns and
placed it in the sealed storage box containing the materials from the
May 24 elections. On June 8, 2016, Heard filed a petition to contest
the primary election, raising allegations of misconduct, fraud or
irregularity by one or more election officials, and the receipt of illegal

eS 115

votes and the rejection of legal votes. Judge O. Wayne Ellerbee, a
retired juvenile court judge, was appointed to preside over the matter
by an order dated June 15, 2016. On August 31, 2016, the court
allowed Williams to intervene in the contest action. Williams moved
to dismiss Heard’s petition as untimely filed and to recuse Judge
Ellerbee because he was not qualified to preside over the action. The
court denied both motions in late September and issued a certificate
of immediate review. The general election was held on November 8,
2016 with Williams, running unopposed, winning the election.

On November 14, 2016, we granted Williams’ interlocutory
application. In granting the application, we posed the following
questions: (1) Is this case moot because it involves a primary election
contest and the general election has taken place? (2) If the case is not
moot, did the trial court err when it denied the appellant’s motion to
dismiss the appellee’s petition as untimely? (3) If the case is not moot,
did the trial court err when it denied the appellant’s motion to recuse?

1. “[T]he established rule in Georgia is that a primary election
contest becomes moot after the general election has taken place.”
(Punctuation omitted.) Dawkins-Haigler v. Anderson, 301 Ga. 27
(799 SE2d 180) (2017), quoting Payne v. Chatman, 267 Ga. 873, 875
(485 SE2d 723) (1997). Citing authority from two other jurisdictions,
Heard urges this Court to recognize exceptions to this general rule.
Barber v. Moody, 229 So2d 284, 287 (Fla. App. 1969) (where defen-
dants used “every dilatory tactic available to them” under the civil
procedure rules, court declined to apply mootness rule); Griffin v.
Buzard, 342 P2d 201 (Ariz. 1959) (contest to primary election not
brought too late where candidate violated criminal statutes and
defrauded voters by adding to the ballot a “diversionary candidate”
with a name similar to his opponent; general election did not operate
to make the issues presented moot). However, we decline to recognize
the exceptions noted in those cases. As we explained in Payne, supra,

[we] adhere to the rule that litigants should make every
effort to dispose of election disputes with dispatch and that
the courts should not interfere with the orderly process of
elections after the general election has been held. It is
imperative that time remains for appeals and new elections
if necessary before a succeeding election renders the issues
moot, and before unnecessary expenses are incurred in

1 Heard amended her petition on June 14, 2016, and June 27, 2016.

16 eS

holding more than one general election. It is also important
that decisions concerning election of officials not be delayed
so that elected officials can take their stations in a timely
manner.

267 Ga. at 877. Although Heard argues that as the appellee in this
action she was without the remedy provided to an appellant under
OCGA § 21-2-528, she did not avail herself of any extraordinary or
expedited relief in the trial court or this Court. See Eturriaga v.
Valdez, 784 P2d 24, 29-30 (N.M. 1989) (mootness doctrine applied
where general election had been held and contestants did not avail
themselves of expedited procedures or seek extraordinary relief from
appellate court). Heard could have requested an expedited hearing on
her contest petition in the trial court, moved to stay the general
election, or requested expedited consideration of Williams’ applica-
tion for interlocutory appeal. But Heard took no action to ensure that
her challenge to the primary election result was considered in a
timely manner. As explained in Eturriaga, “it is incumbent upon the
contestant of a primary election to utilize every available means to
resolve the dispute in time to place his name on the ballot in the
general election.” Id. at 30.

The questions presented in Heard’s election challenge do not
present a classic situation of a problem capable of repetition, yet
evading review. See Payne, supra, 267 Ga. at 873, 876-877. We
therefore conclude that the mootness doctrine applies to the election
challenge in this case. See Dawkins-Haigler, supra, 301 Ga. at 28.
However, because the appeal here is from the denial of Williams’
motion to dismiss Heard’s contest petition, rather than dismissing
the appeal as moot, see id., we must vacate the judgment and remand
this case for the trial court to dismiss the pending contest action as
moot.

2. In light of our holding in Division 1, we do not address the
parties’ arguments related to the second question posed by this
Court, involving the trial court’s ruling on Williams’ motion to
dismiss. But because we direct that the pending contest action be
dismissed by the court below, we must consider the third question in
part — whether Judge Ellerbee qualifies to preside over this matter
on remand. We hold that he does not so qualify, and that a different
judge, who satisfies the requirements of OCGA § 21-2-523, must be
selected to preside.

OCGA § 21-2-523 (b) provides: “The superior court having juris-
diction of a contest case governed by this article shall be presided over

eS 7

by a superior court judge or senior judge.” (Emphasis supplied.)

When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must pre-
sume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said
what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text
its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory
text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the
statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an
ordinary speaker of the English language would. Conse-
quently, courts sometimes refer to the rules of English gram-
mar, inasmuch as those rules are the guideposts by which
ordinary speakers of the English language commonly struc-
ture their words, and the legislature is presumed to know the
rules of grammar.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170,
172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). In applying these principles
with reference to the rules of English grammar and in the context of
the beginning phrase in OCGA § 21-2-523 (b), that only superior
courts have jurisdiction over election contests, the phrase “superior
court judge or senior judge” must be read to require that either a
superior court judge or a senior superior court judge preside over
contest actions, with “superior court” modifying both “judge” and
“senior judge.”

In 1976 when the “office of Senior Judge of the Superior Courts”
was created, “senior judge” was a position held by superior court
judges. See Ga. L. 1976, pp. 586, 593; OCGA §§ 47-8-1, 47-8-40, and
47-8-41. Even as early as 1945, a judge of the superior court who
desired to resign could accept appointment as a senior judge. See
OCGA § 47-8-60. OCGA § 21-2-523, governing jurisdiction and pro-
ceedings in election contest cases, was enacted in 1964. See Ga. L.
1964, Ex. Sess., p. 179. This statute was amended in 1991 with the
current language: “superior court judge or senior judge.” Ga. L. 1991,
p. 611, § 2. But OCGA § 15-1-9.3 was not enacted until 1992. See Ga.
L. 1992, p. 1116. At that time, the Code section governed the request
for the assistance of a senior judge “appointed . . . pursuant to the
provisions of Article 8 of Chapter 10 of Title 47,” and former OCGA §
47-10-130 (a) provided that a state court or juvenile court judge may
be appointed senior judge “of the type of court from which the judge
retired.” See Ga. L. 1992, p. 1114. In 1998, former OCGA § 47-10-130
was repealed along with other Code sections, and the language,
providing for senior judge status for state court judges, probate court
judges, and juvenile court judges, is now found in OCGA § 15-1-9.3.
See Ga. L. 1998, pp. 513, 535-536. In sum, when the legislature used

us Pe

the phrase “superior court judge or senior judge” in OCGA § 21-2-523,
there was no statutory provision allowing senior judge status for
juvenile court judges.

The order appointing Judge Ellerbee to preside over this matter
designates him as a senior juvenile judge.” He was therefore not
eligible to preside over this case.* For this reason, upon remand, in
compliance with OCGA § 21-2-523, a superior court judge or senior
superior court judge must be selected to preside over the dismissal of
this contest action.

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

i . Williams, for appellant.
Tyson Heard, Lawton C. Heard, Jr., for Sharon Heard.
Perry & Walters, Franklin T. Coleman HL, Franklin T. Coleman
IV, Robert K. Raulerson, for Karen Tabb, Trudy Spears, and Tommy

Rogers.

$17A1101. MILLER v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 22)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Michael York Miller was tried by a Muscogee County jury and
convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting
death of Shawnita Nicole Campbell.' Miller appeals, contending that

2 See OCGA § 15-1-9.3 (a) (1) (retired state court judge or juvenile court judge may be
appointed as senior judge “of the type of court from which the judge retired” (emphasis
supplied)).

8 See also OCGA § 15-1-9.2 (a) (judge of superior court or former judge of superior court
may become senior judge); OCGA § 15-1-9.2 (a.1) (‘Notwithstanding the provisions of subsec-
tion (a) of this Code section, any Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Judge of the Court
of Appeals, superior court judge, state court judge, magistrate court judge, or juvenile court
judge who ceases holding office as a judge .... may become a senior judge” with ten years of
service that includes at least five years’ service, or five years as total served in combination, as
“a Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge of the Court of Appeals, or judge of the superior court.”
There is no indication from the record here that Judge Ellerbee has been appointed by the
governor as a senior superior court judge pursuant to OCGA § 15-1-9.2 (a.2).

1 On July 31, 2012, a Muscogee County grand jury indicted Miller, charging him with
malice murder, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (murder), possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, and two counts of threatening a witness. His trial began on May 20, 2014, and

eS ng

an error in the poll of the jury requires that his convictions be set
aside, and asserting that his prosecution for the crimes of which he
was convicted other than murder was barred by the statute of
limitation. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
at trial shows that, late in the evening of April 11, 1999, Miller shot
and killed Campbell with a .25 caliber pistol near a house known as
the “Dog Pound” in Columbus. After Campbell’s body was discovere’
the next day, investigators could not find any witnesses willing to
come forward, and the case went cold. Then, in 2010, a detective
located two witnesses, Angela Lyles and Tuiquana Dowdell, who hai
previously frequented the Dog Pound and knew the victim.

Dowdell testified that on the day of the shooting, she anda friend,
Lavasco Armour, were sitting on the porch of the Dog Pound when
Miller approached them, looking “mad,” and asked Dowdellif she ha’
“seen that b***h [Campbell].” Miller told Dowdell: “When you see
[Campbell], tell that b***h I’m looking for her. I got something for
her.” Sometime later, Dowdell watched as Campbell and Miller got
into an argument in front of the house, walked off together, and sat in
acar a few houses up the street. Shortly afterward, Dowdell heard a
gunshot coming from the car. Later that night, Miller approache
Dowdell and Armour, and said, “[y]ou better not say nothing.” At the
time Miller said this, he was carrying a small black bag that Dowdel.
believed contained a firearm, as she had seen him pulla firearm from
the bag on previous occasions. Dowdell testified that Miller’s state-
ment made her feel scared and that Armour also looked afraid.
(Armour died before trial.)

Lyles testified, among other things, that she saw Miller an:
Campbell arguing in a car near the Dog Pound on the day of the
shooting. She then heard a “weird noise like gurgling” coming from
the car, saw a light flick, and heard a sound like a firecracker. The car
then drove past Lyles, driven by an unidentified individual, with
Miller and Campbell in the back seat. Campbell appeared to be

the jury returned its verdiet three days later, finding Miller guilty on all counts. The trial court
initially sentenced Miller to life imprisonment without parole for malice murder, a consecutive
term of imprisonment for five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, and a concurrent term of imprisonment for five years for one count of threatening a
witness, The felon-in-possession count and the other count of threatening a witness were
dead-docketed. The felony murder was vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263
Ga. 369, 373 (5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Miller moved for a new trial on June 9, 2014, and he
amended the motion on December 11, 2015. The trial court denied the motion on June 27, 2016,
after a hearing, but resentenced Miller tolife with the possibility of parole on the murder count.
Miller timely appealed, and this case was docketed to the April 2017 term of this Court and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.

120 es

having a seizure. Lyles ran away in fear, hiding out at a friend’s house
overnight and eventually moving to Texas so she could not be found.
Lyles testified that Miller had thrown bleach in her face before, that
he has a “bad attitude,” and that if he thinks “you owe him some-
thing,” even if it’s a dollar, “he will hurt you for that dollar. He'll go off
on you.” Lyles also testified that Miller carried a gun in a small black
bag and used it to intimidate people. Other evidence showed that
Miller hada prior conviction in 1988 stemming from pointing a Raven
Arms .25 caliber pistol at another. Forensics matched the manufac-
turer and caliber of the gun that killed Campbell with the gun used
by Miller in the prior offense.

Miller does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain his convictions. Nevertheless, as is our customary practice in
murder cases, we independently have reviewed the record with an
eye toward the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude that the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier
of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller was guilty of
malice murder and the other offenses for which he was ultimately
convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (IID) (B) (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Miller argues that an error in the poll of the jury entitles him
to a new trial. After the jury returned the verdict, at Miller’s request,
the trial court polled the jurors one by one, asking them whether the
verdict was theirs in the jury room, whether the verdict was freely
and voluntarily made, and whether it was still their verdict. Each of
the jurors so polled answered in the affirmative, but the trial court
inadvertently failed to poll one of the twelve jurors.

Relying on our decision in Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 466
(602 SE2d 631) (2004), Miller contends that the trial court’s failure to
poll the juror, without taking any corrective action, requires auto-
matic reversal because the incomplete jury poll indicated that the
verdict was not unanimous.? But Miller’s reliance on Benefield is
misplaced. In that case, a juror answered “no” when asked during the

2 Miller concedes that he did not contemporaneously object to the incomplete jury poll, but,
he argues, this issue should be reviewed for plain error. We disagree. Our plain-error review is
limited to only certain types of errors, namely, (1) alleged errors in the sentencing phase of a
death penalty trial; (2) certain improper comments by the trial judge in violation of OCGA §
17-8-57; (8) errors in jury instructions; and (4) evidentiary errors in trials occurring after
January 1, 2013. See Williams v. State, 201 Ga, 501, 505 (2) (732 SE2d 47) (2012); Durham v.
State, 292 Ga. 239, 240 (2) (734 SE2d 377) (2012). Thus, any errors relating to polling the jury
are waived if not timely brought to the trial court's attention. See Tucker v. State, 252 Ga. 263,
263 (349 SH2d 172) (1984) (“We need not decide whether [alleged errors in polling the jury]
deprived [defendant] of any right, procedural or substantive, because [defendant] imposed no
objection to any aspect of the jury poll.”)..

eS 121

jury poll if he had voted for the guilty verdict. See Benefield, 278 Ga.
at 466. Although the defendant did not contemporaneously object to
the verdict, we held that the juror’s negative response showed a
non-unanimous verdict, which required the trial court sua sponte to
send the jury back for further deliberations. See id. In this case,
however, there is no indication at all that the jury failed to reach a
unanimous verdict or that any juror’s guilty verdict was improperly
tained. There was no negative answer to a jury poll question. Thus,
here are no grounds for reversal. See Hunter v. State, 177 Ga. App.
26, 327 (2) (839 SE2d 381) (1985) (finding no reversible error where
ne juror was inadvertently omitted during the polling, without
jection from the defendant).

3. Miller contends that the statute of limitation barred his
prosecution for possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony and threatening a witness. But Miller did not assert a statute-
of-limitation defense below, and the trial court did not rule on it;
herefore, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. See Hum-
phrey v. State, 299 Ga. 197, 199 (2) (787 SE2d 169) (2016); Barnes v.
State, 291 Ga. 831, 833 n.2 (732 SE2d 752) (2012).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

oownto

ct

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

Ui falker, for appellant.
Julia F Slater, District Attorney, Matthew J. Landreau, Jennifer
E. Dunlap, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-
ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula kK. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Vanessa T. Meyer-
hoefer, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1145. NEELY v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 18)
Bocas, Justice.
A jury found Truseno Al Neely guilty of malice murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in the
shooting death of Shelton Lee Brooks.’ His amended motion for new

1 The crime occurred on November 5, 2011. On October 3, 2012, a Brooks County grand jury
indicted Neely for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
He was tried before a jury June 25-26, 2013. The jury found Neely guilty on both counts, and
he was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for murder and five

122 ee

trial was denied, and he appeals, asserting insufficiency of the
evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.

Construed to support the jury’s verdict, the evidence shows that
Neely, who lived in Florida, was visiting his aunt in Quitman,
Georgia. On November 4, 2011, Kevin Fountain (“Fountain”), Neely’s
co-defendant,” met Neely at his aunt’s house and they drove back and
forth to Valdosta several times. Fountain was wearing all black
clothes, and Neely was wearing a camouflage jacket. Neely’s aunt
identified the camouflage jacket taken by police from her house as
Neely’s.

Fountain testified that he and Neely stopped at a convenience
store, where they saw Brooks. Videotape from the convenience store
showed all three individuals; Fountain was dressed in black and
Neely was wearing a camouflage jacket. Brooks asked Fountain for a
ride home; in exchange for the ride, Brooks promised to give them
marijuana.

Once they arrived at Brooks’ apartment, Brooks said he did not
have any marijuana and would “have to call someone to bring it.”
Neely became angry and struck Brooks multiple times in the face,
knocked him to the floor, and kicked him in the face. Fountain
testified that he attempted to leave, but Neely threatened him with
a gun. At Neely’s insistence, Fountain helped him search the apart-
ment for marijuana but could not find any. Neely then shot Brooks in
the head. Neely and Fountain left the apartment, but Neely sent
Fountain back into the apartment for a sock that had come off his
hand; afterward, they returned to his aunt’s house.

The medical examiner testified that Brooks’ injuries were con-
sistent with having been struck multiple times about both sides of the
head and face at least 15 minutes before his death, a blunt force injury
where he was struck with the muzzle of a gun, and a single contact
gunshot wound that caused his death.

Brooks’ next-door neighbor heard “a bunch of fighting” in Brooks’
apartment, but never heard a gunshot. She kept a lookout to see who
would leave Brooks’ apartment, and saw two males — one in a
camouflage jacket holding a gun, and the other “wearing all black.”
She saw the man dressed in black go back up to the apartment, then

years for the firearms charge. Neely’s motion for new trial was filed on July 5, 2013, amended
onAugust 26, 2014, and denied on September 29, 2014. His notice of appeal was filed on October
9, 2014, and the case was docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term. The case was submitted
for decision on the briefs.

2 At trial, which occurred in June 2013, Fountain entered a plea to voluntary manslaugh-
ter and agreed to testify against Neely.

eS 133

return. Both men got into “a dark blue or black Honda Prelude with
a scoop on the back,” backed out with the lights off, and drove away.*
At trial, she identified both Fountain and Neely as the individuals she
saw leaving the apartment. The police investigation led to Fountain
and then to Neely, who was discovered hiding in the back of a car.
Neely was arrested and agreed to talk with investigators. In his
interview, Neely denied meeting Brooks or knowing who he was,
denied that he went to the apartments where Brooks lived, and
claimed that he and Fountain went back and forth between Quitman
and Valdosta several times that evening before he went to see his
girlfriend in Tallahassee early the next morning.

Neely took the stand and testified in his own defense. He denied
knowing Brooks, but said Brooks offered to sell marijuana to him, and
that Fountain insisted that they go to Brooks’ place to complete the
transaction. He claimed that Fountain went upstairs while he stayed
in the car, and that when he did go upstairs Fountain told him to go
back to the car, so he never went into Brooks’ apartment. He also
testified that Fountain had a .45 caliber pistol. He admitted that he
had lied to law enforcement about his whereabouts at the time of the
murder.

1. Neely argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions, because the State’s case was “completely circumstantial”
and did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of
Neely’s guilt. The record, however, does not support this claim.

[U]nder OCGA § 24-14-6, questions as to the reasonable-
ness of hypotheses are generally to be decided by the jury
which heard the evidence and where the jury is authorized
to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, was suffi-
cient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of
guilt, that finding will not be disturbed unless the verdict of
guilty is insupportable as a matter of law.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smiley v. State, 300 Ga. 582, 586
(1) (797 SE2d 472) (2017). Here, an eyewitness identified Neely as the
man leaving Brooks’ apartment wearing a camouflage jacket and
with a gun in his hand. Video from the convenience store at the time
Neely and Fountain encountered Brooks showed Neely wearing a
camouflage jacket, and the same or a similar jacket was later given to

* Awitness from Florida testified that he had loaned the car to Neely after Neely told him
he wanted to visit his sick grandmother.

124 ee

police by his aunt. And Neely’s own testimony placed him at the scene,
while he initially denied having been present and attempted to hide
from police. Questions of witness credibility are for the jury to decide.
Lewis v. State, 298 Ga. 889, 890 (1) (785 SE2d 520) (2016). The
evidence was sufficient to support Neely’s convictions under Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Neely claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
calla number of witnesses; he contends they would have testified that
Fountain was seen with a firearm around the time of the murder.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, Neely must prove
both that the performance of his lawyer was deficient and that he was
prejudiced by this deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U. 8. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To prove
that the performance of his lawyer was deficient, he must show that
his lawyer performed his duties at trial in an objectively unreason-
able way, considering all the circumstances, and in the light of
prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-688 (III) (A). See also
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (II) (C) (106 SCt 2574, 91
LE2d 305) (1986). And to prove that he was prejudiced by the
performance of his lawyer, Neely must show “a reasonable probabil-
ity that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strick-
land, supra, 466 U. S. at 694 (IID (B). See also Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 391 (IID) (120 SCt 1495, 146 LE2d 389) (2000). This burden
is a heavy one, see Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382 (ID (C), and Neely
has failed to meet it.

Neely argues that “numerous witnesses” could have testified on
his behalf that Fountain was seen with a gun “in close proximity of
time to the murder.” His appellate counsel examined trial counsel at
length regarding various individuals who were identified as wit-
nesses by the State or were interviewed by law enforcement during
the investigation, as shown by summaries of the interviews in the
record. According to these summaries, some individuals stated that
Fountain displayed a pistol before or after the time of the murder. But
only one potential witness, Willie Johnson, testified at the hearing on
the motion for new trial.

When a defendant claims that trial counsel performed defi-
ciently in failing to calla witness for trial, the defendant may
not rely on hearsay and speculation, including prior unsworn
statements, to prove the prejudice prong of his ineffective-
ness claim. Rather, the defendant must introduce either

eS 125

testimony from the uncalled witness or a legally recognized
substitute for his testimony, such as an affidavit.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Manriquez v. State, 285 Ga.
880, 881 (2) (684 SE2d 650) (2009). Johnson testified that Fountain
came into his house the morning of the murder or the day after and
told him, “I got something you might want,” and showed him a gun.
Johnson could describe the gun only as “a black gun,” a handgun, and
did not know what kind, size, or caliber it was.

Neely’s trial counsel testified at the hearing on Neely’s motion for
new trial that Neely sent him a list of witnesses, but that all those
individuals were listed on the State’s indictment. Counsel spoke to
the district attorney, who did not plan to subpoena all the witnesses
because some of them were not relevant to Neely’s part of the case.
Other individuals appeared in reports prepared by GBI agents, but
counsel noted, “As you well know, just because they interview a
witness, doesn’t mean a witness knows anything about the case.”
Counsel testified that, as Neely was from Florida and had not been in
the area long, he could not have known the witnesses, that any
knowledge they had would not have helped Neely, and that he was
“not prone to calling witnesses just to have people on the stand.” Trial
counsel believed that even if Fountain may have had a gun the day
before, it was not relevant to his trial strategy. With respect to
Johnson, trial counsel testified that if he had believed that his
testimony would have helped Neely’s case, he would have called him.

Moreover, trial counsel presented other evidence on Neely’s
behalf to support his theory that Fountain, not Neely, committed the
murder, and that Fountain had possession not only of “a black gun”
of unknown caliber as testified to by Johnson, but the murder weapon
itself. Trial counsel called Fountain’s cellmate, who testified that
Fountain confessed to him in jail that he had killed Brooks and could
not sleep because “I keep seeing me killing that man.” On cross-
examination, trial counsel confronted Fountain with his statement to
a GBI agent that he had lied about Neely’s involvement, and elicited
the admission from Fountain that he “had handled this gun for a
week” and hada live pistol round matching the murder weapon in his
pocket when he was arrested.

“A decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a matter of
counsel’s trial strategy and tactics and will not support a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so unreasonable that no
competent attorney would have made the decision under the circum-
stances.” Shockley v. State, 297 Ga. 661, 666 (3) (777 SE2d 245)
(2015). Here, trial counsel offered a “considered, informed, and
reasonable” explanation for the decision not to call witnesses, and

126 Pe

“this Court cannot say that this decision was outside the range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Id. Given the requirement that
our scrutiny of trial counsel’s performance “must be highly deferen-
tial,” State v. Worsley, 293 Ga. 315, 323 (3) (745 SE2d 617) (2013), we
cannot conclude that Neely has met his heavy burden of demonstrat-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.

= ” — a 7" — = appellant.

Bradfield M. Shealy, District Attorney, J. David Miller, Jessica W.
Clark, Michelle T. Harrison, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher
M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy
Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Meghan H. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

S17Y1499, S17Y1502, S17Y1623. IN THE MATTER OF
ANTHONY SYLVESTER KERR (three cases).
(805 SE2d 15)

PER CURIAM.

These disciplinary matters are before the court on the reports
filed by special master William Thomas Cable, Jr., which together
recommend the disbarment of respondent Anthony Sylvester Kerr
(State Bar No. 142346), who has been a member of the Bar since 2005.

In Case Nos. S17Y1499 and S17Y1502, the Bar filed formal
complaints regarding client representation matters arising in 2013
and 2014. In each case, Kerr answered the formal complaint but
failed to respond to the Bar’s discovery requests. The Bar then filed
motions for summary judgment in both cases, and Kerr failed to
respond. The special master granted both motions. In both cases,
Kerr was afforded the opportunity to submit an explanation of
mitigating circumstances and a recommendation of discipline, but he
did so only as to the claims in Case No. S17Y1499.

The facts underlying these matters are as follows. As to Case No.
$17Y1499, Kerr had previously received a suspension from this Court
for failing to adequately respond in an unrelated disciplinary matter;
this suspension lasted from October 6, 2014 to November 4, 2014.
During this suspension, Kerr was hired by a woman to represent her
husband in a criminal matter and was paid $1,500 toward a total fee
of $2,500. However, Kerr failed to explain to the client or his wife that

eS 127

he could not practice law because of his suspension, though the wife did
find out about the suspension from someone other than Kerr. The
client’s wife requested a refund of the money paid to Kerr, but Kerr
failed to repay the money until the client’s wife filed a grievance
against him. The Bar issued a notice of investigation as to Kerr, but he
failed to timely respond under oath until nearly three months later,
resulting in a second interim suspension from this Court.

As to Case No. S17Y1502, Kerr was hired by a different client in
2013 to represent her in a civil matter concerning an automobile
accident. The client paid Kerr $4,500 toward a $7,000 fee, and Kerr
filed on the client’s behalf an answer and counterclaim in the civil
case. Following this filing, the client contacted Kerr on numerous
occasions to inquire about the case, but Kerr either did not respond or
furnished the client with misleading information regarding the case
and his representation. The plaintiff in the civil suit then moved to
dismiss the client’s counterclaim, but Kerr failed to inform the client
of this development or to file a responsive pleading, which resulted in
the court’s grant of the motion to dismiss. During the pendency of the
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff communicated to Kerr an offer to
dismiss the client from the suit in exchange for the dismissal of her
counterclaim, but Kerr failed to communicate this offer to the client
or to offer to resolve the case. The plaintiff in the suit then filed a
dismissal without prejudice, but Kerr failed to inform the client about
this as well. The client requested a refund from Kerr, who had done
no work on the case other than submitting the answer and counter-
claim as well as some contemporaneous discovery responses, but
Kerr did not refund the fee. The Bar issued a notice of investigation
as to Kerr, but he failed to timely respond under oath until nearly
three months later and received a third interim suspension, running
in tandem with the second.

Upon consideration of these facts, the special master recom-
mended disbarment in both Case Nos. S17Y1499 and S17Y1502. In
Case No. S17Y1499, the special master concluded that Kerr had
violated Rules 1.16 (a), 1.16 (d), 5.5 (a), 8.4 (a) (4), and 9.3 of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).
The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 5.5 and 8.4 (a) (4) is
disbarment, and the maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.16
and 9.3 is a public reprimand. As to Case No. S17Y1502, the special
master concluded that Kerr had violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.16
(d), 3.2, 8.4 (a) (4), and 9.3. The maximum sanction for a violation of
Rules 1.2 and 1.3 is disbarment, while the maximum sanction for a
violation of Rules 1.4 and 3.2 is a public reprimand. As to Case No.
S17Y1499, the special master recited that Kerr had proposed in
mitigation that there were other attorneys available at his firm to

128 Ce

handle the matter, that the client had failed to pay Kerr’s fee in full,
and that no action was taken on the matter adverse to his client. In
aggravation, the special master noted Kerr’s prior disciplinary his-
tory and his substantial experience in the practice of law. As to Case
No. S17Y1502, the special master noted that there were no proposed
factors in mitigation and noted the same factors in aggravation as
were present in Case No. S17Y1499. In light of these considerations,
the special master concluded that disbarment was the appropriate
sanction in each case. Neither Kerr nor the Bar timely filed any
response in this Court to the filing of the special master’s reports in
Case No. S17Y1499 or Case No. S17Y1502.

A third action followed. In Case No. S17Y1623, the Bar filed a
petition for the appointment of a special master upon learning of
Kerr’s March 8, 2017 felony conviction, pursuant to a negotiated plea,
for client-related deposit account fraud in violation of OCGA § 16-9-20
(b). The special master held a hearing, where testimony was given by
Kerr, the client in the matter at issue, and the assistant district
attorney who had overseen Kerr’s prosecution. Based on that evi-
dence and the pleading received from the State, the special master
found that Kerr was hired by the client to represent her in a dental
malpractice case and that she paid him $5,000 as a fee. The client
asserted that Kerr did nothing on her case, as a result of which she
discharged him and requested return of the $5,000. Kerr agreed te
refund the money, but the check that he gave her could not
processed because the account associated with the check had been
closed. The client continued to attempt to address the refund matter
with Kerr, who promised to reimburse her in two installments but
failed to do so or to otherwise make the client whole.

The client reported the matter to the authorities, resulting in
Kerr’s arrest and prosecution. The State would not allow Kerr to
enter a pre-trial diversion program because his offense involved
fraud, but he was allowed to enter a first offender plea, and was
sentenced to probation and restitution; at least as of the April 14,
2017 date of the hearing on this matter, however, Kerr had failed to
make restitution. The special master noted Kerr’s testimony to the
effect that he had not realized that the account was closed when he
cut the client the check, as it had been closed without his knowledge
by his former office manager and friend, with whom Kerr subse-
quently had a falling out. However, the special master also noted that
Kerr failed to substantiate this assertion by presenting the office
manager’s testimony or by subpoenaing him to appear. The special
master further noted that Kerr did not so qualify his culpability in
entering his guilty plea to deposit account fraud. The special master
found that there were no factors in mitigation of discipline, but noted

eS 129

in aggravation of discipline that Kerr had received five interim
suspensions from this Court during the period from October 2014 to
March 2017 in unrelated matters; that Kerr had failed to fully
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct; that the victim was
vulnerable; and that Kerr had shown an indifference to making
restitution. The special master acknowledged that not every felony
conviction necessarily results in disbarment, see, e.g., In the Matter
of Calhoun, 268 Ga. 877 (494 SE2d 335) (1998) (six-month suspension
for felony conviction of serious injury by motor vehicle and driving
under the influence), but found that disbarment was appropriate
here, and should be imposed as a sanction because Kerr’s misconduct
concerned fraud against a client related to the representation.
Having reviewed the record in each of these matters, we concur
with the special master’s recommendations and conclude that dis-
barment is the appropriate sanction in each. Accordingly, it is hereby
ordered that the name of Anthony Sylvester Kerr be removed from
the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia.
Kerr is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017.
Pe
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jonathan W.
Hewett, Jenny K. Mittelman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

$17A1041. ARNOLD v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 94)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Joseph Lamar Arnold was tried by a DeKalb County jury, and he
was convicted of the murder of Gerald Osborne and the unlawful
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Arnold
appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
convictions, that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for
pretrial immunity, and that it erred when it limited his voir dire of
prospective jurors. Upon our review of the record and briefs, we see no
error, and we affirm.!

+ Osborne was killed on July 10, 2014. On October 7, 2014, a DeKalb County grand jury
indicted Arnold for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and the unlawful
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Arnold’s trial commenced on

130 es

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
shows that in the early morning hours of July 10, 2014, Arnold, his
brother, and six or seven of their friends were in the front yard of the
DeKalb County home that Arnold shared with his mother an
extended family. Arnold and a friend left the home to purchase beer
at a gas station, where they saw Osborne in the company of a woman.
Arnold knew Osborne, but they had not spoken in more than a month
because of a disagreement involving the woman accompanying Osborne.
At the gas station, the two men exchanged words. After Arnold bought
beer, his friend drove him back to his house, where they remaine
with Arnold’s brother and the other guests at the gathering in
Arnold’s front yard.

A few minutes later, Osborne drove up without his female
companion and parked his car so that it was blocking Arnold’s
driveway. Osborne got out of the car, Arnold approached him, ani
they argued for several minutes in the front yard. While the men
argued, Arnold’s brother walked up to them and displayed a shotgun.
Arnold was carrying two handguns in his back pocket, and he
eventually pulled out both handguns and shot Osborne three times in
the left leg and buttock after Osborne returned to his car. Although
Arnold testified that he shot Osborne only after Osborne grabbed a
gun from his car, two of the guests at the gathering in Arnold’s front
yard testified that they never saw Osborne with a gun. After being
shot, Osborne drove off without returning fire, but he died after
driving about a tenth of a mile.

At trial, Arnold presented a justification defense, and he princi-
pally relied on testimony that the two guests who said they never saw
Osborne with a gun were not able to see inside Osborne’s car, as well
as the fact that Osborne actually had two guns in his car at the time
he was shot, including one that was found under his thigh by first
responders. Arnold also points to evidence showing that Osborne was
aggressive and confrontational both at the gas station and in his front
yard and that Osborne was under the influence of alcohol and had
traces of cocaine metabolites in his system when he died.

February 17, 2015, and the jury returned its verdict six days later, finding him not guilty of
malice murder, but guilty on all of the other counts. Arnold was sentenced to imprisonment for
life for felony murder and imprisonment for a consecutive term of five years for the unlawful
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The aggravated assault merged with
the malice murder. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372-374 (5) (484 SE2d 479) (1993). Arnold
timely filed a motion for new trial on March 19, 2015, he amended it on January 11, 2016, and
he amended it again on June 17, 2016. The trial court denied the motion for new trial on July
27, 2016, and Arnold timely filed a notice of appeal on August 22, 2016. The case was docketed
in this Court for the April 2017 term and orally argued on August 28, 2017

eS 131

Arnold asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was not justified in shooting Osborne. But questions
about the existence of justification are for ajury to decide, see Crayton
v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 793 (1) (784 SE2d 343) (2016), and the jury’s
determination in this case that the burden was met is supported by
the evidence. The jury was able to consider Arnold’s credibility, and it
was authorized to conclude that he did not reasonably believe that it
was necessary to shoot Osborne in order to defend himself. Arnold’s
claim that he shot Osborne in self-defense was particularly dubious
given his apparent uncertainty about exactly what Osborne did that
caused him to feel threatened.” Instead, the jury was permitted to
find that Arnold shot Osborne because, as Arnold testified, Osborne
was being “disrespectful” to him “in front of his mama[’s] house.” Or
the jury could have concluded that the shooting had something to do
with what Arnold described as a “disagreement . . . concerning a
female,” especially given Arnold’s description of that disagreement
as ending his previous friendship with Osborne, the fact that it was
the same woman whom Arnold observed at the gas station with
Osborne on the morning of the shooting, and Arnold’s statement that
the video of his confrontation with Osborne at the gas station (which
was viewed by the jury) would show “why [he] shot [Osborne].”

The jury also was able to observe one of the eyewitnesses use an
overhead monitor to mark the locations and movement of individuals
during the confrontation in Arnold’s front yard and the other eyewit-
ness describe the locations and distances between those individuals
by comparing them with the locations and distances between indi-
viduals inside the courtroom. The jury could have relied on this
testimony to reject Arnold’s claims about Osborne’s conduct in gen-
eral* and specifically his claim that Osborne was the aggressor
(especially considering the testimony that Arnold’s brother was
standing by him with a loaded shotgun during the confrontation with
Osborne). The jury was charged that the State had the burden of

2 Arnold testified that Osborne did not make any verbal threats to him during the
confrontation in his front yard, he was “not sure” about whether Osborne was even turned
toward him at the time he was shot, and — when describing the particular actions Osborne took
that caused him to fear for his life — could only testify that “I believe when he grabbed the gun
[off the front seat] — because he motioned towards me, I shot him.”

® For example, one witness testified that she could not see inside the car because it was
dark and she was too far away, but the jury could have found that the vantage point from her
location was comparable to Arnold's (who also gave equivocal testimony about exactly what
Osborne was doing when he returned to the car). And the other witness testified that she could
not. see inside the car, but also that Osborne was “sitting in the car” at the time he was shot,
which could indicate that she had at least some ability to see what Osborne was doing at the
time he was shot.

182 es

proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Arnold was not justified in
killing Osborne, and the evidence was sufficient for it to do so.* See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d
560) (1979); Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 872 (1) (742 SE2d 707) (2013).

2. Before trial, Arnold filed a motion for immunity from prosecu-
tion under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. Following a hearing, the trial court
denied Arnold’s motion, finding that he failed to meet his burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably
believed himself to be in imminent danger of being subjected to
unlawful force (of the type described in OCGA § 16-3-21 (a)®) when he
shot Osborne. See Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (3) (667 SE2d 605)
(2008). Arnold claims that the trial court erred when it found that he
failed to meet this burden. But “[i]n reviewing the denial of a motion
for pretrial immunity, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling and accept the trial court’s
findings of fact and credibility determinations if there is any evidence
to support them.” Sifuentes v. State, 293 Ga. 441, 444 (2) (746 SE2d
127) (2013). The evidence presented at the immunity hearing was
substantially identical to the evidence presented at trial, andthe trial
court was authorized to find that Arnold failed to meet his burden of
showing that he was entitled to immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2.°

3. Finally, Arnold contends that the trial court improperly lim-
ited his voir dire of prospective jurors. In particular, Arnold complains

+ We note that not only did the jury find that the State had met this burden, the trial judge,
who also was able to gauge the credibility of the witnesses, came to the same conclusion when
Arnold asked her to sit as a “thirteenth juror” pursuant to OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21

® OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) provides that deadly force is justified if the defendant “reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself... or a
third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.”

© Several statements made by the trial court during the immunity hearing suggest that it
was under the mistaken impression that, even if Arnold reasonably believed himself to be in
imminent danger of being subjected to unlawful force, a jury still would need to determine
whether he ought to have retreated before shooting Osborne. But OCGA § 16-3-23.1 clearly
provides that a person who is authorized to use force to defend himself is under no obligation
to retreat, regardless of whether retreating may have been a “more reasonable” option. Arnold,
however, was not harmed by these erroneous statements during the immunity hearing. The
trial court found that Arnold failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was in
fear for his own safety or even that Osborne was reaching for a firearm, and its decision to deny
Arnold's request for immunity is wholly supported by these findings. Indeed, absent a showing
that Arnold was in fear for his own safety, the trial court could not properly have granted his
pretrial motion for immunity, even if it had correctly understood that no retreat is required. See
Sifuentes, 293 Ga. at 444-445. We note that Arnold does not suggest that the trial judge
continued to misunderstand OCGA § 16-3-23.1 at the time of his trial (and particularly at the
time that she acted as the “thirteenth juror” as described in footnote 4, supra). We see nothing
inthe record to suggest that any misunderstanding of the law affected Arnold's trial. Arnold was
allowed to repeatedly remind the jury that “there is no duty to retreat” when a person is
otherwise justified inusing force, and the trial court properly charged the juryon OCGA § 16-3-23.1

eS 133

that he was not permitted to ask prospective jurors about “stand your
ground” laws. But Arnold did not object at the time, and he has failed
to preserve this issue for appellate review. See Brockman v. State, 292
Ga. 707, 720 (8) (739 SE2d 332) (2013). Moreover, Arnold only put one
question to the prospective jurors about “stand your ground” laws
that was disallowed, and that question was confusing and almost
unintelligible.” As such, that question properly was disallowed, even
if Arnold was entitled generally to inquire about “stand your ground”
laws. Arnold never asked any question about such laws in a proper
form, and the trial court did not improperly limit his voir dire upon
this subject. See Gatlin v. State, 236 Ga. 707, 708 (2) (225 SE2d 224)
(1976).*
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED SEPTEMBER 13, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Michael W. Tarleton, for appellant.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Lenny I. Krick, Harry 8. Ruth,
Anna G. Cross, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D.
Headrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$16G1751. SPENCER v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 886)

Bocas, Justice.

After a jury trial, appellant Mellecia Spencer was convicted of
one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (less safe) and one
count of possession of an open container. She appealed the judgment
of conviction and sentence only as to the conviction for DUI. The
Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction in Spencer v. State, 337 Ga.

7 Amnold’s lawyer asked, “Is there anyone here who— basically, you keep up with the news
and you have been somewhat familiar with basically — had a recent trendy case over the last
couple of years in which there are the top of the phrase ‘stand your ground?”

® As an alternative claim, Arnold argues that his trial lawyer should have clarified his
question about “stand your ground” laws or otherwise objected to the trial court’s restriction of
voir dire. But there is no reason to believe that the jury would have been struck any differently
had Arnold been able to ask some other question of the potential jurors. As a result, Arnold is
unable to show a reasonable probability that — even if his lawyer should have acted in some
other way — the result of his trial would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U. S. 668, 694 (IID) (B) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

134 Pe

App. 360 (787 SE2d 320) (2016) (Spencer I). We granted this petition
for certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the trial court properly admitted a police officer’s
testimony correlating the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus
(“HGN’) test with a numeric blood alcohol content or “BAC.” Because
this testimony was admitted without a sufficient foundation having
been laid under Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519 (292 SE2d 389) (1982),
we reverse the judgment of conviction and sentence with respect to
the DUI.

The underlying facts are laid out in detail in Spencer I. In brief,
Spencer was stopped for a nonworking headlight, and the investigat-
ing officer noted her slurred speech, an odor of alcoholic beverage, a
wristband from a bar, and a plastic cup in the center console that
appeared to contain an alcoholic drink. The officer administered the
HGN test to Spencer, who exhibited four out of six “clues” indicating
impairment.

At trial, the officer was questioned by the solicitor-general regard-
ing the HGN test:

Q: Just based on your training and experience, have you
noticed a correlation between four out of six clues on the
HGN test that you perform in the field and a blood alcohol or
breath alcohol content that would be in a person’s system?
A: Based on my training and my experience, four out of six
clues generally indicates a blood alcohol level equal to or
greater than a .08.

Spencer objected to this testimony and, after a lengthy colloquy,
the trial court overruled the objection. The solicitor-general ques-
tioned the officer again:'

Q: Is there a correlation between what you saw on the HGN
test and, in general, a person’s alcohol content level on their
system?

A: Based off my training and my experience, generally there
is.

Q: And what is that correlation?

A: Generally, the four out of six clues indicates an alcohol
concentration equal to or greater than a .08.

Ajury found Spencer guilty, the trial court denied her motion for
new trial, and she appealed, contending inter alia that the trial court

1 Spencer moved for and was granted a continuing objection to the testimony.

eS 135

erred in allowing this testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed her
conviction, holding:

[I]t is true that an arresting officer’s testimony identifying a
specific numeric blood alcohol content based solely on a
defendant’s HGN results should be excluded. But the officer
here did not give such testimony. Rather, he testified that in
performing the test he looks for up to six clues in a subject’s
eyes, that observing four or more clues indicates impairment
due to alcohol, and that four out of six clues generally
indicates a blood alcohol level equal to or greater than .08.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Spencer I, 337 Ga. App. at
360-361 (1). The court held that, because the officer did not identify
a specific blood alcohol level for Spencer, but merely testified that a
finding of four out of six clues generally exceeds the impairing level
of .08, the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony. Id. at 361
(1). We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals
erred in so holding.

Our decision in Harper, supra, guides a trial court’s determina-
tion of whether a scientific principle or technique is competent
evidence in a criminal case:

[I]t is proper for the trial judge to decide whether the
procedure or technique in question has reached a scientific
stage of verifiable certainty, or in the words of Professor
Irving Younger, whether the procedure “rests upon the laws
of nature.” The trial court may make this determination
from evidence presented to it at trial by the parties; in this
regard expert testimony may be of value. Or the trial court
may base its determination on exhibits, treatises or the
rationale of cases in other jurisdictions. The significant
point is that the trial court makes this determination based
on the evidence available to him rather than by simply
calculating the consensus in the scientific community.

(Citations and footnote omitted.) 249 Ga. at 525-526 (1). And “[o]nce
a procedure has been recognized in a substantial number of courts, a
trial judge may judicially notice, without receiving evidence, that the
procedure has been established with verifiable certainty, or that it
rests upon the laws of nature.” Id. at 526 (1).”

2 Although Georgia’s new Evidence Code is applicable to the trial of this case, the
evidentiary requirements relating to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony
in a criminal case under the new Evidence Code (OCGA § 24-7-707) are nearly

136 Pe

Itis generally accepted that the HGN test “has reached a state of
verifiable certainty in the scientific community and is admissible as
a basis upon which an officer can determine that a driver was
impaired by alcohol.” Hawkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 34, 38 (1) (476
SE2d 803) (1996). And here, the Court of Appeals relied upon its prior
holding in Parker v. State, 307 Ga. App. 61, 64 (2) (704 SE2d 438)
(2010), that “a score of four out of six clues on an HGN test constitutes
evidence of impairment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Spencer I at 361 (1).
But whether the HGN test may properly be used as evidence that a
driver is impaired by alcohol is not the same question as whether the
HGN test has been established as an indicator of either a specific
number or a numeric range of blood alcohol content.

In Bravo v. State, 304 Ga. App. 243 (696 SE2d 79) (2010), our
Court of Appeals addressed this distinction, noting that its earlier
decision in Webb v. State, 277 Ga. App. 355 (626 SE2d 545) (2006), had
correctly framed the question:

[W]e do not wish to imply that a trial court must always
admit numerical evidence of a defendant’s blood alcohol
content adduced by an HGN test. The HGN test is a proce-
dure that has reached a state of verifiable certainty in the
scientific community and is admissible as a basis upon
which an officer can determine that a driver was impaired by
alcohol. It may be an open question, however, whether the
HGN test has reached a state of verifiable certainty in the
scientific community as a basis for determining the numeri-
cal level of a driver's blood alcohol level.

(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Bravo,
supra, 304 Ga. App. at 247 (1). After noting that numerous jurisdic-
tions have concluded that HGN tests are “not admissible to quantify
a specific BAC,” id. at 247 n. 13, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the trial court erred in admitting a police officer’s testimony that he
“estimated that Bravo’s BAC was 0.25 grams based on a mathemati-
cal calculation,” id. at 245, because the evidence “[fell] short of
establishing that the method at issue has reached a scientific stage of
verifiable certainty.” Id. at 249 (1).

Additionally, Bravo cites the Court of Appeals’ decision in Kirk-
land v. State, 253 Ga. App. 414 (559 SE2d 161) (2002), for the prop-

identical to those that applied under the former Evidence Code (OCGA § 24-9-67).

Accordingly, it is appropriate to rely, as we do in this case, on decisions under the

old Code. See Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 40, 42 (2) n. 2 (785 SE2d 886) (2016).
Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 453 (2) n. 2 (796 SEZd 277) (2017).

eS 137

osition that “field sobriety tests, including the HGN, are admissible
to show that a detainee’s BAC exceeds a particular impairing level.”
(Citation omitted.) Bravo, supra, 304 Ga. App. at 248 (1). Spencer I
likewise relies upon this statement. 337 Ga. App. at 361 (1). Kirkland,
however, was convicted under OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5), DUI per se,
rather than OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), DUI less safe. Kirkland con-
sented to a breath test, and the two samples taken showed a BAC of
0.124 grams and 0.127 grams. Id. at 415. And the officer was asked,
“[D]o you have an opinion based on what you observed in the HGN
and what you read on the Intoximeter, do you have an opinion as to
how they correlate with one another.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals relied upon the breath test to affirm
the conviction, observing that the breath test results “provide
independent support for the jury’s determination that Kirkland was
guilty of DUI by having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 grams or
more, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5).” Id. at 416-417. Because
of these unusual facts, this decision provides no support for avoiding
the application of Harper. To the extent that Kirkland could be relie!
upon to permit an estimate of blood alcohol content based on HGN
alone, without sufficient evidence to establish the scientific validity
or reliability of any correlation as required by our holding in this case,
it is disapproved.

Here, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied upon Kirkland ani
Parker, supra, without addressing its holding in Bravo that the use of
an HGN test to identify a specific numeric BAC has not “been
recognized in court as reaching the requisite scientific stage of
verifiable certainty,” id. at 248 (1), that “the State failed to establish
the scientific validity and reliability of the procedure at issue,” an
that the admission of the officer’s testimony was therefore an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 249 (1). It did not examine the reasoning of the
many jurisdictions that have rejected the use of the HGN test for this
purpose. Nor did it address the caution in Bravo that “the Harper
decision requires recognition of a procedure or technique in a sub-
stantial number of courts before a trial court may judicially notice,
without receiving evidence, that the procedure has been established
with verifiable certainty, or that it rests upon the laws of nature.”
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 248 n. 16. It avoided all of
these pertinent issues by creating an indiscernible distinction between
the officer’s testimony in Bravo and the testimony given here.

We see no valid distinction to be made between testimony that a
driver’s blood alcohol content is “estimated” at 0.25 grams, as in
Bravo, and the testimony presented here that the results of Spencer’s
HGN test generally indicate a blood alcohol content “equal to or

138 Pe

greater than .08.” In either case, only a single number was presented
to the jury, and that number established a numeric blood alcohol
content exceeding the per se legal limit. In effect, these “linguistic
gymnastics,” as noted by the Missouri Court of Appeals in State v.
Rose,* enable the State to present to the jury a blood alcohol content
that is conclusive as to the driver’s intoxication, without satisfying
the required evidentiary standard. This is improper. Before any such
evidence may be admitted, the proponent must satisfy the require-
ments established by Harper.

Here, the State failed to meet that standard, presenting less
supporting evidence than that found insufficient in Bravo. On cross-
examination, the officer testified that his knowledge of the HGN test
was based on his participation in police training totalling approxi-
mately two weeks, and that he had no medical, physiological, or other
specialist training. While the officer testified, over objection, that the
test was “scientific” because his training “has shown [him] that
there’s a correlation between the clues observed in this evaluation
and blood alcohol content. There’s a direct connection between the
two of them,” and that “several studies” supported this, he did not
identify the studies and they were not admitted into evidence.® No
scientific or medical testimony was presented at trial.

We conclude that the evidence presented by the State in this case
was insufficient to establish the scientific validity or reliability of any

® The Missouri Court of Appeals agreed in State v. Rose, 86 SW3d 90, 100-101 (I) (B)
(Mo. App. 2002), cited by our Court of Appeals in Bravo, supra, 304 Ga. App. at 247 (1) n. 13:
Although Officer MeConaha did not specifically state an opinion that Mr. Rose's
BAC would have registered at or above .10%, his testimony created a remarkable
inference that such was the case, and we find that the admission of such testimony
was an abuse of discretion. . .. [While] the use of “linguistic gymnastics”... suggests
that an officer who testifies that, in the officer's experience, persons who score six
points on the HGN test also register above .10% on the breathalyzer is not the same
as testifying that the individual defendant has a particular blood alcohol content
and is properly admissible, we think otherwise and hold that it is an abuse of
discretion for a trial court to admit such testimony absent an adequate foundation.
(Citations and emphasis omitted.) Accord State v. Bave, 258 Neb. 968, 985 (III) (4) (a) (607
NW2d 191) (2000) (prosecution may not “attempt to correlate the HGN test result with any
particular blood-alcohol level, range of blood-alcohol levels, or level of impairment” (citation and
punctuation omitted); State v, Sullivan, 310 8. C. 311, 315-316 (2) (426 SH2d 766) (1993) (“GN

tests shall not constitute evidence to establish a specific degree of blood alcohol content”)

* State v. Rose, 86 SW3d at 101 (ID) (B), see n. 3, supra

® The State has attached to its brief on appeal a 1998 report submitted to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which appears to examine the predictive correlation of
a battery of field sobriety tests that included the HGN test, not the HGN test itself. But we
express no opinion as to the validity or admissibility of this report, because this attachment is
not part of the record below and cannot be considered by this Court. “[A]ttaching documents to
briefs cannot be used as a procedural device to add evidence to the record.” Graham v. Ault, 266
Ga. 367, 368 (2) (466 SE2d 213) (1996); see also Union v. State, 273 Ga. 666, 667 n. 1 (543 SE2d
683) (2001)

eS 139

correlation between a particular number of clues on an HGN test and
a numeric blood alcohol content, whether a specific percentage or
“equal to or greater than” a specific percentage. The trial court
therefore abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. In light of
the repeated questioning regarding the offending evidence, as wellas
testimony that Spencer was not stopped for unsafe or erratic driving,
that the officer acknowledged on cross-examination that she did not
exhibit many of the usual signs of intoxication, that Spencer had had
recent surgery, and that Spencer presented evidence that she was not
less safe to drive, we cannot say that this error was harmless, and we
therefore reverse Spencer’s conviction for DUI (less safe).
Judgment reversed in part. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Thomas, Webb & Willis, Thomas J. Thomas, for appellant.
John A. Pipkin III, Solicitor-General, Meredith C. Florio, William
B. Kennedy III, Assistant Solicitors-General, for appellee.

$17A0688. PROVENZANO v. JONES.
(805 SE2d 909)

Bocas, Justice.

We granted the application for discretionary appeal filed by Lori
Provenzano (Wife) to consider whether the trial court erred in its
ruling on the petition to modify alimony filed by Forrest Scott Jones
(Husband) pursuant to Georgia’s “live-in lover” law, OCGA § 19-6-19
(b).1 For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

The record reveals that Husband and Wife were divorced in April
2014. Pursuant to the final decree, Husband was to pay Wife alimony
of $3,000 per month for sixty months and one-third of any net bonuses
or commissions earned by Husband through his employment during
that period. On January 25, 2016, Husband filed a petition for
modification of alimony pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-19 (b) on the
ground that Wife had voluntarily cohabited with her boyfriend “since

1 We note that, because Wife filed her application and notice of appeal prior to the January
1, 2017 effective date of the Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act, this Court — not the Court of
Appeals — has jurisdiction over this case. See Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, §§ 3-1, 6-1 (¢) (as of effective
date, shifting subject matter jurisdiction over “[a]ll divorce and alimony cases” from this Court
to the Court of Appeals).

140 es

at least the second half of 2014.”* Following a hearing on June 27,
2016, the trial court found that Wife was admittedly in a meretricious
relationship that was continuing, and reduced Husband's alimony
obligation to $2,000 per month for the remaining term of the pay-
ment. We granted Wife’s application for discretionary appeal posing
the following question:

Did the trial court err in concluding that Wife was
voluntarily cohabitating with a third party in a meretricious
relationship after she obtained a separate apartment from
her boyfriend but allegedly maintained an intimate relation-
ship with the boyfriend?

“We review the trial court’s decision ina modification action for abuse

of discretion and will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous.” (Citations and punctuation omit-

ted.) Strunk v. Strunk, 294 Ga. 280, 281 (1) (754 SE2d 1) (2013).
OCGA § 19-6-19 (b) provides:

Subsequent to a final judgment of divorce awarding
periodic payment of alimony for the support of a spouse, the
voluntary cohabitation of such former spouse with a third
party in a meretricious relationship shall also be grounds to
modify provisions made for periodic payments of permanent
alimony for the support of the former spouse. As used in this
subsection, the word “cohabitation” means dwelling together
continuously and openly in a meretricious relationship with
another person, regardless of the sex of the other person. In
the event the petitioner does not prevail in the petition for
modification on the ground set forth in this subsection, the
petitioner shall be liable for reasonable attorney’s fees incurred
by the respondent for the defense of the action.

In Hathcock v. Hathcock, 249 Ga. 74 (287 SE2d 19) (1982), we held
that dwelling together continuously and openly in a relationship
similar to marriage includes “either sexual intercourse or the sharing
of living expenses.” Id. at 76 (8).

During the bench trial, Wife testified that prior to the divorce she
moved to Houston, Texas, and about a month after the divorce was
final, she had a surgical procedure performed. She explained that

2 Husband originally filed his petition on November 4, 2015 in Harris County, Texas where
Wife resided, but he dismissed the petition there and filed a petition in Fulton County Superior
Court that was consolidated with Wife's pending motion for contempt.

eS M1

when her lease expired in August 2014, she moved in with her
boyfriend and lived with him until September 10, 2015, and that her
motive for doing so “was to reduce my cost as much as possible out of
fear that I was not going to be able to pay my bills.” Evidence was
presented that Wife and her boyfriend shared expenses while resid-
ing together, and that their relationship had been sexual even prior
to her moving in with him.

Husband discovered that Wife was residing with her boyfriend in
September 2015. Wife testified that she moved out of the residence on
September 10, 2015, and rented her own apartment with the lease
commencing on October 1, 2015. Although Wife testified that her
relationship with the boyfriend ended when she moved out of his
residence on September 10, she admitted that they “were sexual”
between January and April of 2016.

Wife argues on appeal that the court misapplied the cohabitation
requirement by allowing a prior cohabitation to form the basis for
modifying future alimony obligations. She asserts that she is living
alone and had been doing so for several months prior to Husband’s
filing of the modification action in Georgia. Wife argues further that
there was no showing that she and the boyfriend were dwelling
openly and that she took steps to keep her living arrangements
private and concealed her whereabouts from Husband. But OCGA §
19-6-19 (b) does not apply only to those instances where cohabitation
is occurring when the modification action is filed. Rather it applies to
voluntary cohabitation that occurs “subsequent toa final judgment of
divorce awarding periodic payment of alimony,” without any such
limitation as that proposed by Wife. And although Wife argues that
she took steps to keep her living arrangements private, the record
establishes only that she attempted to conceal her whereabouts from
Husband.

We give “due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.” (Citations and punctuation
omitted.) Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391 (1) (a) (677 SE2d 114) (2009).
The record here supports the trial court’s finding that Wife had
voluntarily cohabited in “a meretricious relationship with a third
party. [Wife] admitted the sexual nature of the relationship and that
she shared a household and related expenses with the third[ Jparty.”
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling on
Husband’s petition to modify alimony.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

M42 Pe

Meriwether & Tharp, David J. Beaudry, Joann Brown Williams,
Robin K. Love, for appellant.

Bovis, Kyle, Burch & Medlin, Charles M. Medlin, Erica F. Byrd,
Winfield L. Pollidore, for appellee.

$17A0700, $17A0701. DELONEY v. THE STATE (two cases).
(805 SE2d 881)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Facing the death penalty, in 2001 Appellant Danny Deloney pled
guilty to the felony murder of his six-year-old daughter, Porsha, and
numerous other crimes. Fourteen years later, he filed a motion for
out-of-time appeal, which the trial court denied. He appeals pro se,
arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion and in failing
to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Pretermitting whether
Appellant alleged a proper excuse for not filing a timely appeal, the
record shows that he is not entitled to an out-of-time appeal and thus
that the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on
his motion. Accordingly, we affirm.

1. (a) The State presented the following factual basis for Appel-
lant’s guilty pleas. On the night of November 16-17, 1999, Appellant
called Tiffany Dixon, Porsha’s mother, at her apartment in Decatur,
Georgia. Appellant told Dixon that he was in Madison, Wisconsin, but
30 minutes later, he crawled through a window at Dixon’s apartment,
put a screwdriver to her neck, and told her that he was there to kill
her, their daughter, Dixon’s eight-year-old daughter from a previous
relationship, and himself. Appellant retrieved a butcher knife anda
roll of duct tape from the kitchen and held Dixon and the two girls at
knife point overnight.

The next morning, for reasons that are unclear, Appellant allowed
Dixon and the girls to get up and go about their business as though
nothing were wrong. Dixon went to work, the girls went to school, and
it appeared as though the situation had somehow resolved itself.
Shortly after Dixon arrived at work, however, she called the apart-
ment to see if Appellant was still there. He was, and it became clear
to Dixon that he had checked at least one of the girls out from school.
Appellant told Dixon, “I know you won't do anything stupid.” Dixon
went home and found the apartment dark and Appellant holding both
the girls captive in a back bedroom with the butcher knife in his hand.
Alarmed, Dixon started to flee, but Appellant grabbed her and
ordered her to take off her clothes, including her underwear. Appel-
lant then struck Dixon on the left arm with the butt of the knife, and

eS M43

she began screaming. Appellant threatened to kill Dixon and said
that he was going to cut one of the girls. Soon after, Dixon managed
to call 911.

The police responded and were able to get Dixon out of the
apartment but not the girls. The police tried to talk Appellant into
letting the girls go, but Appellant, standing at the door, put the
butcher knife to each girl’s throat and demanded that Dixon return to
the apartment. When Dixon refused, Appellant said, “I am going to
turn on the gas and kill all of us,” and slammed the door. The police
then saw Appellant dragging the children around the apartment with
him as he turned on the gas and set fire to various items. The police
forced their way inside in an attempt to rescue the girls, but were
unsuccessful due to the fire and smoke. Eventually a police officer
was able to get inside the room with Appellant and the girls, but
retreated when Appellant put the knife to the girls’ throats and said,
“Come and get me and we will all die.” Soon after, flames blew out the
double glass door at the back of the apartment. Firefighters then
entered the apartment, found Appellant and the girls overcome by
smoke inhalation, and took them outside. Porsha died as a result of
smoke inhalation. Appellant survived, as did the older girl, who had
a two-inch laceration on the left side of her forehead.

(b) On December 9, 1999, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted
Appellant for the malice murder of Porsha, felony murder during the
commission of arson, first degree arson, three counts of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, the kidnapping with bodily injury of
Dixon’s older daughter, the kidnapping of Dixon and Porsha, and two
counts of cruelty to children for threatening to kill the girls. On
January 18, 2000, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty. After committing additional serious crimes while awaiting
trial, Appellant agreed to enter guilty pleas to some charges to avoid
the possibility of receiving the death penalty.'

At a hearing on March 7, 2001, Appellant entered guilty pleas
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (91 SCt 160, 27
LE2d 162) (1970), to the felony murder of Porsha, three counts of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and three counts of simple

1 While at the DeKalb County Jail awaiting trial, Appellant and another inmate devised
an escape plan. On October 8, 2000, the other inmate lured a deputy sheriff to his immediate
area, where Appellant held a toothbrush with a razor blade attached to the deputy’s throat and
overpowered him and then another deputy. The inmates removed the deputies’ clothes,
handcuffed them, donned the deputies’ clothes, and attempted to walk out of the jail. Appellant
and his associate made it from the cellblock area to the lobby. Neither of them was wearing
shoes, however, and other deputies, noticing that something was seriously amiss, stopped them
before they made it out of the building. A DeKalb County grand jury returned a second
indictment against Appellant based on this incident.

4 es

kidnapping; the malice murder, first degree arson, and cruelty to
children charges were nolle prossed. In a colloquy with the court,
Appellant acknowledged the constitutional rights that he was waiv-
ing by entering his pleas; denied that anyone had made any sort of
threat or promise to influence him to plead guilty; and said that he
had the opportunity to discuss the case thoroughly with his attorneys
and was satisfied with their services and advice. Appellant signed a
plea form with the same representations. One of Appellant’s attor-
neys explained, and Appellant agreed, that he was entering pleas
under Alford due to gaps in his memory regarding what happened in
the apartment, his review of the State’s evidence and understanding
that the State had sufficient evidence to convict him, and his belief
that there was a substantial risk that he would be found guilty of the
charges if he went to trial.
The trial court found that there was a factual basis for the guilty
pleas and that Appellant entered the pleas freely and voluntarily. The
court further found beyond a reasonable doubt that the felony murder
occurred during the commission of the offense of arson in the first
degree and that this aggravating circumstance authorized the sen-
tence of life in prison without the possibility of parole under the
then-applicable sentencing scheme. See former OCGA § 17-10-32.1
(b) (“Unless the district attorney has given notice that the state
intends to seek the death penalty pursuant to the Uniform Rules of
the Superior Courts, the judge shall sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment. In cases where such notice has been given, the judge
may sentence the defendant to death or life without parole only if the
judge finds beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance as provided in Code Section
17-10-30.”). At Appellant’s urging, the court accepted his guilty pleas
and sentenced him pursuant to the plea agreement to serve life in
prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder during the
commission of arson, with concurrent terms of years for the other
convictions.” Appellant did not file a timely notice of appeal.*
(c) In June 2015, Appellant filed a motion for out-of-time appeal,
alleging that both the trial court and his trial counsel failed to inform
him of his right to appeal from his guilty pleas related to the 1999

2 Appellant also entered negotiated guilty pleas to aggravated assault on a peace officer,
armed robbery, robbery, and false imprisonment in connection with his attempted escape from
the DeKalb County Jail, see footnote 1 above, for which he was sentenced to terms of years
running concurrently with his sentence of life without parole for felony murder.

® More than a decade later, in 2013, Appellant filed a habeas petition, which was dismissed
as untimely in 2014. On January 12, 2015, this Court denied his application for a certificate of
probable cause to appeal that ruling

eS M45

crimes. In September 2015, Appellant filed a motion to vacate void
sentence, contending that his sentence of life without parole was
improper. And in October 2015, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. On
January 27, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying Appel-
lant’s motion for out-of-time appeal, and on February 16, the court
entered separate orders denying the motion to vacate sentence and
dismissing as untimely the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. The
process by which Appellant sought to appeal those three orders was
complicated and need not be recounted here. Suffice it to say that his
appeal of the order denying his motion for out-of-time appeal is
properly before us, with the record coming under the two case
numbers, and he makes no argument regarding the orders on his
motion to vacate sentence and motion to withdraw guilty pleas, so we
deem his appeal of those orders abandoned.

2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for out-of-time appeal because when he entered his guilty
pleas in 2001, neither the trial court nor his attorneys informed him
that he had a right to file an appeal. However, a defendant is entitled
to a timely appeal from a conviction entered on a guilty plea “only to
the extent that the issues presented on appeal can be resolved by
reference to the existing record.” Mims v. State, 299 Ga. 578, 580 (787
SE2d 237) (2016). Thus, ifthe claims that a defendant belatedly seeks
to raise on appeal require factual development, an out-of-time appeal
is unavailable. See Stephens v. State, 291 Ga. 837, 838 (733 SE2d 266)
(2012). Moreover, if the claims that the defendant seeks to raise on
appeal can be resolved by reference to facts in the existing record, he
must show that the claims would be resolved in his favor, or an
out-of-time appeal is properly denied. See id. at 839. See also Grace v.
State, 295 Ga. 657, 659 (763 SE2d 461) (2014). In addition, before
being entitled to an out-of-time appeal, a defendant must allege and
prove an excuse of constitutional magnitude for failing to file a timely
direct appeal, which usually is done by showing that the delay was
caused by his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in providing advice
about or acting upon an appeal. See Stephens, 291 Ga. at 837-838. See
also Grace, 295 Ga. at 658.

Appellant seeks to raise several claims in an out-of-time appeal.
The first claim is that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his
guilty pleas, because he did not understand all the rights he was
waiving. However, as the trial court found in denying the motion for
out-of-time appeal,

the record shows that (1) [Appellant] completed and signed
the plea form, (2) the trial court confirmed that [Appellant]

146 es

understood he was waiving certain constitutional rights by
pleading guilty, (3) the trial court verified that [Appellant]
understood what he was doing and that he was entering his
plea of guilt freely and voluntarily, and (4) the State provided
the factual bases for the charges against [Appellant] during
the hearing on his guilty plea.

Appellant cannot show from the existing record that his pleas were
not knowingly and voluntarily entered, so this claim provides no
basis for an out-of-time appeal.

Appellant’s next two claims are based on the nolle prosequi
entered on the first degree arson charge of the indictment as part of
his negotiated plea agreement. According to Appellant, the entry of
the nolle prosequi meant that the State did not have enough evidence
to prove that he committed first degree arson, which supposedly
made both his guilty plea to felony murder with arson as the predicate
offense invalid for lack of a sufficient factual basis and his sentence
of life without the possibility of parole improper for lack of a statutory
aggravating circumstance.

However, Appellant’s premise — that the entry of the nolle
prosequi demonstrates that he did not set the fire that caused his
daughter’s death and that “the basis of the plea does not exist” — is
incorrect. A “[nJolle prosequi does not adjudicate innocence or guilt
unless the accused has been placed in jeopardy,” King v. State, 300 Ga.
180, 181 (794 SE2d 110) (2016), and “[t]he mere entry of nolle
prosequi does not indicate an absence of the commission of a criminal
act,” Drake v. State, 170 Ga. App. 846, 847 (1) (818 SE2d 721) (1984).
A defendant may be convicted and sentenced for felony murder
without being convicted of the predicate felony; indeed, a guilty plea
or verdict on the predicate felony merges into the felony murder
conviction for purposes of sentence and judgment. See OCGA § 16-1-7
(a) (1); White v. State, 278 Ga. 499, 501 (604 SE2d 159) (2004).

In accepting Appellant’s guilty pleas, the trial court explicitly
found that there was “a factual basis for the entry of each of [his]
pleas,” and the plea hearing transcript shows that the State outlined
in detail a sufficient factual basis for Appellant’s guilty pleas, includ-
ing his intentionally setting fire to Dixon’s apartment, which resulted
in his daughter’s death. See OCGA §§ 16-5-1 (c) (defining felony
murder to be “when, in the commission of a felony, [a person] causes
the death of another human being irrespective of malice”), 16-7-60
(a) (1) (defining arson in the first degree to include knowingly
damaging any dwelling house of another without consent by means of
fire). As for the statutory aggravating circumstance supporting Appel-
lant’s sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, the

eS ut

trial court explicitly found beyond a reasonable doubt that “the
murder as allegedin ... Count 2 [i.e., felony murder] was committed
in the offense of arson in the first degree,” and that finding too is fully
supported by the record. See OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (2) (establishing as
astatutory aggravating circumstance that “[t]he offense of murder...
was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission
of... arson in the first degree”).

Appellant’s fourth claim is that his attorneys provided ineffec-
tive assistance by failing to get him a psychiatric evaluation before he
entered his guilty pleas. However, this claim requires factual devel-
opment beyond the existing record, so it provides no basis for the
grant of an out-of-time appeal. See Grace, 295 Ga. at 659; Hagan v.
State, 294 Ga. 716, 718 (755 SE2d 734) (2014).

Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in denying his motion for out-of-time appeal without holding
an evidentiary hearing to determine why he did not file a timely
appeal. However, a hearing to determine the reason that a defendant
did not file a timely appeal from a guilty plea is not required unless
the claims that he belatedly seeks to raise on appeal can be resolved
in his favor from the existing record. See Stephens, 291 Ga. at 839;
Marion v. State, 287 Ga. 134, 135 (695 SE2d 199) (2010). In light of
what we have said above, the trial court was not required to hold a
hearing before denying Appellant’s motion for out-of-time appeal.

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Danny E. Deloney, pro se.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Anna G. Cross, Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Vanessa T: Meyerhoefer, Assistant Attor-
ney General, for appellee.

$17A0764. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 873)
PETERSON, Justice.
Derrick Williams appeals from the denial of his motion for a new
trial following his conviction for malice murder over the death of his

us es

wife, Finesse Dawson.' Williams argues that the trial court erred by
(1) excluding evidence regarding drugs found in Dawson’s blood;
(2) admitting evidence of prior bad acts by Williams; and (3) allowing
an irrelevant and prejudicial demonstration. We conclude that the
trial court committed no reversible error in excluding the toxicology
evidence and that any error in the trial court’s decisions to admit the
prior bad acts and allow the State’s demonstration was harmless.

The evidence at trial showed the following. Williams had a
history of violence toward his romantic partners, including Dawson.
In addition to the evidence about his other relationships that Wil-
liams contends is inadmissible, the jury also heard evidence about
several incidents of violence by Williams toward Dawson. Aneighbor
and two of Dawson’s former co-workers testified that, in the years
leading up to her death, they saw bruises on Dawson that she
attributed to Williams. Dawson’s former manager testified that on
one occasion she refused to allow Dawson to work (and thereby
interact with customers) due to injuries on Dawson’s face. In Febru-
ary 2012, Dawson called police and reported that Williams had struck
her in the face, slashed her tires, and smashed two cell phones. As a
result, Williams pleaded guilty to criminal charges and was on
probation at the time of Dawson’s death.

On December 5, 2012, Smyrna police performed a welfare check
at the home of Williams and Dawson in response to multiple 911 calls
placed by Williams’s uncle. The police found the home’s doors locked
and its windows, shades, and blinds closed. After a SWAT team broke
in, police found Dawson lying face down on the bed in the master
bedroom, deceased. Dawson’s body was covered with bruises. Clumps
of hair were found on the floor, and at least some of the hair was
consistent with being forcibly ripped from Dawson’s head. One of her
fingers appeared broken. Police also found a metal pipe near Daw-
son’s bed.

Williams was not home when the police arrived. He called a
friend, Dedrick Bickerstaff, who said Williams was “frantic,” and
reported that Dawson was dead. Bickerstaff picked up Williams, who
told Bickerstaff that he had struck Dawson with her purse but

+ Dawson was found dead on December 5, 2012. In April 2013, a Cobb County grand jury
indicted Williams on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and two counts of aggravated
assault. After a March 2014 trial, the jury found Williams guilty on all counts. The trial court
sentenced Williams to life without parole for malice murder on March 28, 2014. The felony
murder count was vacated by operation of aw, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault
counts into the malice murder count. On April 2, 2014, Williams filed a motion for new trial that
was amended on November 13, 2014. The trial court denied the motion for new trial in an order
entered on August 20, 2015. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal on September 8, 2015. The
case was docketed to the term beginning in April 2017 and submitted for decision on the briefs

eS lag

thought she had overdosed on drugs. At Bickerstaff’s encouragement,
Williams placed multiple 911 calls to police; although he insisted he
was “not running,” he refused to turn himself in and used disposable
phones that he would discard after a call or two.? In his phone
conversations with police, Williams said that he had been in an
altercation with his wife but had not killed her. He said he had found
Dawson cold to the touch after waking up next to her and tried to
revive her by performing CPR and placing her in the shower.* He told
police that Dawson had been taking a lot of pills and he believed the
drugs contributed to Dawson’s death. Williams also admitted to
police over the phone that he had inflicted some of the bruises and
marks on Dawson’s body.

Williams was arrested at a bus station in Nevada on December
11, 2012. Ina subsequent police interview, Williams admitted inflict-
ing some of Dawson’s injuries and explained that hitting and choking
were a normal part of the couple’s sex life, but he insisted that he did
not kill his wife. The jury heard recordings of phone calls Williams
made from jail in which he apparently referred to Dawson as an “ugly
a** h****” and wondered aloud, “out of all the b****es I done had, how
the f*** I get tied up with this b****[?]”

Adetective and the medical examiner both testified that Dawson
was bruised on virtually every part of her body. The detective esti-
mated that Dawson was struck more than 100 times. The medical
examiner testified in great detail to the extent of Dawson’s injuries,
and dozens of photos of her dead body were admitted, as well as
diagrams of Dawson’s injuries prepared by the medical examiner. He
testified that Dawson’s bruising and other injuries were consistent
with blunt force trauma, with at least some consistent with being
struck by a rod-like object. Notwithstanding the bruises all over
Dawson’s body, the medical examiner testified that the cause of her
death was strangulation, not blunt force trauma. There were no
bruises or ligature marks on Dawson’s neck, and the sort of facial
hemorrhaging sometimes associated with strangulation was absent.
But the medical examiner testified that it nonetheless was clear that
she had been strangled, given hemorrhaging in her neck and a cut on
her neck that appeared to be a defensive wound. There was no
evidence of injuries of the sort that might be caused by someone
performing CPR, the medical examiner testified. He also testified

2 In the first call, Williams requested police assistance at his residence, but the police
already were there in response to his uncle's calls.

° A detective testified that the bathrooms were dry and that there were no signs that
Dawson's body had been dragged from the master bedroom into the master bathroom and back.

150 es

that he did not think drugs played any role in Dawson’s death given
that drugs were present in her system in only “low or therapeutic”
levels, no evidence of drug overdose (like foam in the mouth) was
present, and there was clear evidence that she had been beaten and
strangled.

1. Although Williams does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, it is our customary practice in murder cases nevertheless to
review the record and determine whether the evidence was legally
sufficient. Having done so, we conclude that the evidence was suffi-
cient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Williams was guilty of malice murder. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding testimony regarding drugs found in Dawson’s blood. We
disagree. At trial, Williams offered one basis for admitting the
evidence. He now disavows that basis and offers an alternative theory
that he did not advance at trial. Reviewing exclusion of the evidence
under that alternative theory for plain error, we find that Williams
cannot obtain reversal based on the exclusion of the toxicology
evidence because he cannot show that this evidentiary ruling affected
his substantial rights.

Williams proffered the testimony of a GBI forensic toxicologist
regarding drugs found in Dawson’s system. The toxicologist testified
outside the presence of the jury that Dawson’s blood had tested
positive for Alprazolam, an anti-anxiety drug; Cyclobenzaprine, a
muscle relaxant; and Methylone, a stimulant. The toxicologist testi-
fied that Alprazolam causes drowsiness, light-headedness, confu-
sion, impaired thinking or reaction, and possibly lack of coordination.
Similarly, she testified, Cyclobenzaprine causes drowsiness, dizzi-
ness, and fatigue. The toxicologist stated that Methylone causes
euphoria and possibly confusion or hallucinations. The trial court
refused to allow the toxicologist to testify before the jury, ruling that
her testimony probably was not relevant and, even if it were, its
probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury.

Williams argues on appeal that this evidence was relevant to and
probative of his defense theory that he applied an amount of force to
Dawson’s neck that was not lethal but for an intervening variable,
such as physiological effects of a drug in Dawson’s system. But
Williams did not preserve any such argument for ordinary appellate
review. Where an appellant challenges the admission of evidence, we
are concerned with the sufficiency of the appellant’s objection; here,
however, where the appellant challenges the exclusion of evidence,

eS 151

we are concerned with the sufficiency of the showing that the appel-
lant, as proponent of the evidence, made at trial. OCGA § 24-1-103
(a) (2) provides that “[e]rror shall not be predicated upon a ruling
which ... excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected and... the substance of the evidence was made known to the
court by an offer of proof or was apparent from the context within
which questions were asked.”* “This provision does not require a
formal offer of proofin every instance, as it expressly states that error
also may be preserved if the substance of the evidence is apparent
from the record.” Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 247 (11) (794 SE2d 67)
(2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). But the rule also requires
that the reason for offering the evidence in question be apparent to
the trial court. See id. (substance of the evidence not apparent from
the record where appellant did not allude to possible bias as reason
for asking witness whether he was a member of a particular gang);
see also Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 21 Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 5040 (2d ed., April 2017 update) (“On appeal, the proponent will be
stuck with the theory of relevance advanced in the trial court.”). The
record does not show that the trial court was alerted that Williams
sought to introduce testimony to show that any of the drugs taken by
Dawson would make someone more susceptible to asphyxiation by
choking. The toxicologist said no such thing in her proffered testi-
mony. And, although Williams elicited testimony from other wit-
nesses that it was possible to accidentally kill someone by pressing on
their neck, he did not tell the trial court that he wanted to introduce
the toxicology evidence for the purpose of showing that drugs in
Dawson’s system would have made her more vulnerable to such an
“accident.” Williams instead argued to the trial court that the drugs
could have explained Dawson’s injuries in that they would have made
her both “clumsy” and “drowsy” and “explosive, hyperactive” — a
basis for admission of the evidence that he now disclaims, stating in
his brief that “the alleged victim’s behavior was irrelevant” given that
he did not claim self-defense. Accordingly, we review this claim only
for plain error pursuant to OCGA § 24-1-103 (d). See Walker v. State,
301 Ga. 482, 487 (3) (801 SE2d 804) (2017); Lupoe, 300 Ga. at 247 (11).

We may remedy an error under plain error review if (1) the error
was not affirmatively waived by the appellant; (2) the error is “clear
or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error

4 The new Evidence Code applies in cases tried on or after January 1, 2013. See Olds v.
State, 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2) n.5 (786 SE2d 633) (2016). Williams was tried in March 2014, so the
new Evidence Code applies in this case.

152 es

“affected the appellant’s substantial rights”; and (4) “the error seri-
ously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Wilson v. State, 301 Ga. 83, 88 (2) (799 SE2d 757) (2017)
(citation omitted) (applying plain error analysis under new Evidence
Code). Williams's failure to provide any evidence that any of the drugs
taken by Dawson would make someone more susceptible to asphyxi-
ation by choking dooms his claim under plain error review. Even if we
assume that the trial court’s exclusion of the toxicologist’s testimony
was an “obvious” error (notwithstanding the lack of evidence con-
necting the testimony about Dawson’s drug use to the cause of her
death), Williams cannot obtain reversal on this basis because he has
failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights. In order
to make that showing, an appellant must show that “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for [the evidence’s] exclusion at trial,
the outcome would have been more favorable to him.” Walker, 301 Ga.
at 488 (3). This requirement is similar to the showing of prejudice
required to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See
id. Given that Williams offered no evidence to support his theory that
Dawson died because drugs in her system made her more susceptible
to asphyxiation, he cannot show that there is a reasonable probability
that, if the proffered testimony about drugs in Dawson’s system had
been admitted, the outcome of the trial would have been more
favorable to him. See id. (no plain error in trial court’s exclusion of
statements by appellant’s father where appellant did not show what
the statements were); see also Woods v. State, 275 Ga. 844, 849-850 (3)
(d) (673 SE2d 394) (2002) (defendant cannot show prejudice from
counsel’s failure to use videotape at trial, where defendant never
introduced tape itself into evidence); Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillo, 265
Ga. 614, 615-616 (458 SE2d 623) (1995) (impossible for defendant to
show he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to subpoena certain
witnesses, given that defendant failed to make any proffer of the
uncalled witnesses’ testimony).®

3. Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence of his violent acts against two ex-girlfriends. We
conclude that any such abuse of discretion was harmless error.

° Williams also argues that the toxicologist should have been permitted to testify at least
to impeach the medical examiner's testimony on direct examination that drugs were found in
Dawson's system at only “low or therapeutic” levels. The toxicologist testified in her proffer that
Methylone was a controlled substance with no therapeutic level and no test to determine the
level of Methylone in Dawson's blood was performed. But the medical examiner already had
testified as much on cross-examination, so the toxicologist’s testimony on this point would have
been cumulative. Any error in excluding it to the extent it was offered for impeachment
purposes thus was harmless.

eS 153

The court admitted one ex-girlfriend’s testimony that in 2002
Williams choked her in an attempt to dissuade her from visiting her
family on Thanksgiving Day. About six weeks later, he behaved
similarly to prevent her from going out with friends, choking her and
hitting her; she called police and Williams was subsequently jailed.
She also described another incident in the summer of 2003 in which
Williams choked her, hit her, threatened to kill her, and raped her at
gun point.

The other ex-girlfriend did not testify, but the jury heard law
enforcement testimony regarding three incidents — in February
2008, May 2008, and May 2010 — in which Williams behaved
violently toward hey, and the trial court admitted pictures of some of
her resulting injuries. The trial court admitted evidence that Wil-
liams pleaded guilty to family violence battery as a result of the
February 2008 incident. The jury also received evidence that Wil-
liams was charged with battery and false imprisonment as a result of
the May 2008 incident and pleaded guilty to the latter charge. And the
trial court admitted consent orders that revoked Williams’s probation
based on his admission that he committed false imprisonment and
aggravated assault during the May 2010 incident. Additionally, the
trial court admitted a recorded phone call placed by Williams while he
was in jail in which he admitted harming his ex-girlfriend in May
2010.

The trial court ruled pre-trial that all of the above-referenced bad
acts were admissible to show motive, intent, and absence of mistake
or accident. Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting this evidence because it was neither relevant nor
probative of a permissible purpose and that, even ifit were probative,
the evidence was far more prejudicial than probative. The State
argues that Williams did not preserve this argument, contending that
Williams’s objections to the other acts evidence were too general.

But even assuming without deciding that Williams did preserve
his argument and that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence
of prior bad acts, we conclude that any such error was harmless and
thus does not merit reversal.

The new Evidence Code continues Georgia’s existing harm-
less error doctrine for erroneous evidentiary rulings. See
OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Error shall not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substan-
tial right of the party is affected ... .”) In determining
whether the error was harmless, we review the record de
novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable

154 es

jurors to have done so. The test for determining nonconsti-
tutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that
the error did not contribute to the verdict.

Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 431-432 (2) (d) (788 SE2d 433) (2016)
(citations and punctuation omitted).

The evidence against Williams was overwhelming. The jury
heard voluminous evidence of Dawson’s extensive injuries. The medi-
cal examiner testified unequivocally that her injuries were the result
of blunt force trauma (by a rod-like object, at least in some cases) an
strangulation. At the home where police found Dawson’s body, they
found a metal rod and evidence suggesting that her hair had forcibly
been torn out. There was no evidence of forced entry; rather, the house
was locked up and Williams essentially admitted that Dawson hai
died in his presence. The physical evidence contradicted Williams’s
claim that he had tried to revive her; there were no signs that he ha’
dragged her into the shower or performed CPR. Despite claiming that
he found Dawson unconscious, Williams did not seek medical assis-
tance; instead, he left the scene, ultimately fleeing across the country.
Williams told a friend that he had struck Dawson and admitted to
police that he had inflicted at least some of Dawson’s injuries. No
evidence supported Williams’s belated speculation that drugs ha’
played a role in Dawson’s death.® And the jury heard jail phone cal.
recordings in which Williams’s disdain for Dawson was apparent.

Moreover, the jury heard from several witnesses who testified to
Williams’s prior violence toward Dawson. Multiple witnesses testi-
fied to seeing, over the course of several years, bruises that Dawson
attributed to Williams. The jury heard that Williams pleaded guilty
to criminal charges after he struck Dawson in the face and was on
probation asa result at the time of Dawson’s death. Williams does not
challenge on appeal the admissibility of any of this evidence involving
his prior violence toward Dawson. Evidence that Williams had pre-
viously been violent toward other women added little to this evidence
of prior violence toward Dawson. Thus, it is highly probable that the
admission of the prior bad acts evidence that Williams challenges on
appeal did not contribute to the verdict. The trial court’s decision to
allow it therefore was not reversible error. See Hood v. State, 299 Ga.

® As detailed in Division 2, Williams enumerates as error the exclusion of testimony about
the side effects of drugs found in Dawson’s system at the time of her death. But, as we explained
above, Williams failed to provide any evidence that any of the drugs taken by Dawson would
make someone more susceptible to asphyxiation by choking, and he has disclaimed on appeal
the alternative theory that drugs may have somehow led to Dawson's injuries by affecting her
behavior.

eS 155

95, 105-106 (4) (786 SE2d 648) (2016) (error in admitting testimony
from two witnesses that they had purchased prescription drugs from
defendant in the past was harmless where evidence that defendant
committed the charged crimes was strong and another witness
testified without objection that defendant regularly sold pills); Lance
v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 24-25 (31) (560 SE2d 663) (2002) (error in
admitting hearsay was harmless in the light of cumulative, properly-
admitted evidence).

4. Williams also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by allowing the State to engage in a demonstration regarding the
crime. Again, we find that any error in allowing the demonstration
was harmless and thus does not merit reversal.

The State performed a demonstration in which one of the pros-
ecutors beat a punching bag at the direction of the detective one
hundred times (the number of blows the detective estimated Dawson
had received). The detective told the attorney how to strike the bag
and repeatedly referred to it as “her.” The stated purpose of this
demonstration was “to show the volume [of blows] and so the jury gets
an illustration.”

Williams argues on appeal that the demonstration was irrel-
evant and speculative and that its probative value was outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. The State argues that Williams did not
preserve this argument. We conclude that even if Williams did
preserve his argument and evenif the trial court abused its discretion
in allowing the demonstration, any error was harmless. As set forth
above, the evidence of Williams’s guilt was overwhelming. Moreover,
the placement and extent of Dawson’s bruises were well-documented
by the medical examiner’s diagrams and multiple photographs, and
the jury heard extensive medical and law enforcement testimony
about them. Any effect this ill-considered demonstration may have
had on thejury would have been minimal compared to the effect of the
properly-admitted evidence before it. It therefore is highly probable
that the demonstration did not contribute to the verdict, and the trial
court’s decision to allow it was not reversible error.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, J.,
who concurs in judgment only as to Division 3.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

lones, Morrison fomack, W. Carter Clayton, for appellant.
D. Victor Reynolds, District Attorney, Michael S. Carlson, Court-
ney Veal, Gregg M. Jacobson, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher

156 Pe

M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Michael A. Oldham, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A0873. THE STATE v. WILKINS.
(805 SE2d 868)
Bocas, Justice.
The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting Nathaniel
Willie Wilkins’ pretrial motion in limine to exclude incriminating
statements made by his co-defendant Michael Dontaa Jones with
regard to a 2013 double murder. The trial court held that some of
the statements, while made by a co-conspirator, were not made
“in furtherance of the conspiracy” and thus did not fall within the
exception to the hearsay rule provided by OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E).
Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so doing, we
affirm.
Wilkins and Jones were indicted by a Chatham County grand jury
for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault arising
from the execution-style shootings of Forrest Ison andAlice Stevens at
their home in Thunderbolt, Georgia. Jones’ case was severed from
that of Wilkins, and he was tried in April 2016 and found guilty on all
counts. Most of the statements complained of here were admitted into
evidence at Jones’ trial.! The State expects the evidence to show that
Wilkins, Jones, and Tracy Burgess, the driver of the getaway car,?
attempted to avoid arrest after the murders by hiding in the homes of
friends and family members in Georgia and South Carolina. During
that time, Jones allegedly made a number of incriminating state-
ments to witnesses:*

Wilkins argues on appeal that the State failed to preserve this issue for appellate review
because it consented to severance of his trial from that of Jones. But the motion to sever filed
by Wilkins was based on a potential Bruton violation, Bruton v. United States, 391 U. 8. 123 (88
SCt 1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968), and the State’s argument at the pretrial hearing referenced by
Wilkins dealt only with Bruton, not the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. These are
separate issues, see, e.g., Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 845 (2) (770 SE2d 855) (2015), and
Wilkins’ contention therefore is without merit.

2 Burgess, who is Wilkins’ sister and Jones’ former girlfriend, was indicted separately and
had not gone to trial at the time of her testimony at Jones’ trial. She testified that she was
offered a reduction in charges in exchange for her testimony.

® Inits brief, the State quotes the alleged statements, but some do not appear in the record.
Grand jury testimony and a partial transcript from Jones’ trial provide the text of some
statements, but the entire trial transcript is not part of this record; moreover, some witnesses.
did not testify at Jones’ trial. As the trial court noted, the content of some statements is available
only through police summaries or an e-mail synopsis prepared by the State in connection with
its motion in limine.

eS 157

(1) Awitness who worked with Jones testified at his trial
that Jones displayed a pistol in his waistband and told the
witness that the male victim got him fired and he and
appellee lay in wait for him, “caught them at their house and
went to rob them . . . [the male victim] went bucking so he
shot him”; his female companion “went to crying and yelling
so we shot that b---- too.”*

(2) An acquaintance of Jones and Wilkins informed the
police that, while Jones and Burgess were at the witness’
home, Jones stated that he and Wilkins were involved ina
homicide. No sworn testimony appears in the record, anda
police report narrative gives only the gist of the statement,
but the State contends that the witness saw a gun which
Jones concealed at his house.

(3) Jones’ estranged wife testified before the grand jury
that Jones told her that he “did something horrible” and
“shot somebody.” The trial testimony referenced by the State
is not included in the record.

(4) Apolice report states that Jones told another witness
that he “got messed up in Thunderbolt.” The trial court
noted in its order that this witness did not testify at Jones’
trial, but his expected testimony was provided in the State’s
brief.

(5) Another police report states that Jones told Burgess’
stepsister that an attempted robbery failed and that Wilkins
“got cold feet,” so Jones shot the male victim, and then
Wilkins shot the female victim. The trial testimony refer-
enced by the State does not appear in the record, but the
State contends the witness testified that she was trying to
get to know her stepsister, “but they used me for something
totally different.”

(6) Burgess testified at Jones’ trial that Jones told her
“he got another body.” She also testified, outside the pres-
ence of the jury, that Jones wrote her a letter from jail
instructing her to put the blame for the murders on Wilkins
and a fictitious third party.®

* This witness also testified that Jones and Wilkins together showed him the gun and a
bloody t-shirt that was used to clean the gun, hidden in the trunk of Wilkins’ car. The trial court
reserved ruling on whether these statements could be construed as adoptive admissions under
OCGA § 24-8-801 (@) (2) (B), and that question is not before us.

® After hearing this testimony, the State withdrew the line of questioning, and Jones’
counsel also declined to question the witness regarding Jones’ letter.

158 es

Before trial, Wilkins filed a motion in limine. In an omnibus
order, the trial court excluded these six statements. It held that
statements made outside Wilkins’ presence were not in furtherance
of the conspiracy and were not admissible. From this order, the State
appeals.

The admission of a co-conspirator’s statements is governed by
OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E), which provides:

(2) Admissions by party-opponent. Admissions shall
not be excluded by the hearsay rule. An admission is a state-
ment offered against a party which is:

(E) Astatement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, including a
statement made during the concealment phase of a con-
spiracy. Aconspiracy need not be charged in order to makea
statement admissible under this subparagraph.

This provision differs substantially from former OCGA § 24-3-5,
which stated: “After the fact of conspiracy is proved, the declarations
by any one of the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal
project shall be admissible against all.”

Under Georgia decisions construing the former Code section,
“[t]his exception to the hearsay rule applie[d] to statements made by
co-conspirators not only leading up to and during the underlying crime
but also afterward, during the concealment phase of the conspiracy.
[Cit]” Hassel v. State, 294 Ga. 834, 839 (3) (755 SE2d 134) (2014).
Moreover, in cases decided under the former Code section, admissible
statements included not only those in which a co-conspirator attempted
to pursue or conceal the conspiracy, but also statements which simply
recounted the conspirators’ participation in the original crime. See,
e.g., Marchman v. State, 299 Ga. 534, 544-545 (9) (787 SE2d 734)
(2016) (co-conspirator fled state and sought refuge with a friend to
whom he made incriminating statements regarding crime spree);
Franklin v. State, 298 Ga. 636, 639-640 (2) (784 SE2d 359) (2016)
(jailed co-conspirator made incriminating statement regarding
others’ participation in and motive for murder).

The new Evidence Code governing co-conspirator admissions is
by no means identical to Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d) (2) (E), although it
includes language from that rule. It departs from the text of the
federal rule in several respects, notably by explicitly incorporating
the rule, established by our case law decided under the former
Georgia Evidence Code, that statements “made during the conceal-
ment phase of a conspiracy” are included as part of the co-conspirator

eS 159

exception. OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E); see Marchman, supra, 299
Ga. at 545 (9); Hassel, supra, 294 Ga. at 839 (3). And the General
Assembly, by expressly incorporating the language of our prior
decisions, evinced its intent to adopt the principle that a conspiracy
does not necessarily terminate upon the achievement of its object. See
Varner v. Sharp, 219 Ga. App. 125, 126 (464 SE2d 388) (1995) (holding
in Prince v. Black, 256 Ga. 79 (344 SE2d 411) (1986), subsequently
incorporated as former OCGA § 53-4-4 (c) (1) (B)).

However, we interpret differently those portions of the new Code
section that track the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence. “[T]o
the extent the new Georgia evidence rules borrow from the text of the
federal evidence rules in this way, we look for guidance to the
decisions of federal appellate courts, particularly the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, interpreting the federal rules. [Cits.]” Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95,
99 (2) (786 SE2d 648) (2016). See also Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 1 (“It is the
intent of the General Assembly in enacting this Act to adopt the
Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of
the United States and the United States circuit courts of appeal as of
January 1, 2013, to the extent that such interpretation is consistent
with the Constitution of Georgia.”). Language borrowed from Rule
801 (d) (2) (E) that did not appear in the former Georgia Evidence
Code requires that, to fall within the hearsay exception, the state-
ments themselves be made “in furtherance of the conspiracy” whether
made before the object of the conspiracy is achieved or during the
concealment phase. Pretermitting whether the statements were
made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy, the dispositive
question here is whether the statements were made “in furtherance
of the conspiracy.”

In interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d) (2) (E), the Eleventh Circuit
applies

a liberal standard in determining whether a statement is
made in furtherance of a conspiracy. The statement need not
be necessary to the conspiracy, but must only further the
interests of the conspiracy in some way. Statements made to
solicit membership or participation in the conspiracy and
statements explaining the conspiracy to anew member are
made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Miles, 290 F3d
1341, 1351 (II) (C) (1) (11th Cir. 2002).

However, this liberal standard is not without limits. A “retro-
spective statement” regarding matters that have already occurred,
and that is not intended to foster involvement in the conspiracy, is not

160 es

a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Phil-
lips, 664 F2d 971, 1026 (TX) (B) (former 5th Cir. 1981), overruled on
other grounds, United States v. Huntress, 956 F2d 1309 (5th Cir.
1992). And a statement that merely “spilled the beans” to a third
party “could hardly be considered to have advanced any object of the
conspiracy. [Cit.]” United States v. Posner, 764 F2d 1535, 1538 (11th
Cir. 1985). Similarly, a statement which was not made “to conceal the
conspiracy and served only to disclose the scheme,” or which “merely
inform[ed] the listener of the declarant’s activities,” is not admissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d) (2) (E). (Citations omitted.) City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, 158 F3d 548, 559 (II) (A) (1) (11th
Cir. 1998). Moreover,

[s]tatements which simply implicate one coconspirator in an
attempt to shift the blame from another . . . cannot be
characterized as having been made to advance any objective
of the conspiracy. On the contrary, statements that implicate
a coconspirator, like statements that “spill the beans” con-
cerning the conspiracy, are not admissible under Rule 801

(d) @) ®).

(Citation omitted.) United States v. Blakey, 960 F2d 996, 998 (11th
Cir. 1992).

On appeal, we review the trial court’s grant of a motion in limine
for abuse of discretion. Wright v. State, 300 Ga. 185, 188 (3) (794 SE2d
105) (2016). But the trial court’s “determination that a statement was
made in furtherance of a conspiracy is a finding of fact subject to a
clearly erroneous standard of review. [Cit.]” Miles, supra, 290 F3d at
1351 (ID) (C) (1); see also Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 13 (3) (727 SE2d
112) (2012) (similar transaction evidence; holding that “in various
[evidentiary] contexts, we accept factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous and review a trial court’s ultimate decision on the
particular issue for abuse of discretion. [Cits.]”).

As it did at the hearing on the motion in limine and in its
pleadings below, the State to some extent conflates the issue of
whether a statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy with
the issue of whether it was made during the concealment stage of the
conspiracy. As the trial court correctly noted, most of the decisions
cited by the State predate the enactment of the new Evidence Code,
and therefore address whether the statements were made during the
“concealment phase” of the conspiracy under former OCGA § 24-3-5,
not whether they were “in furtherance of the conspiracy” under
OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E), a requirement which did not exist at the

eS 161

time. With respect to whether statements were made in furtherance
of the conspiracy, the State makes the following contentions:

With respect to the first witness, Jones’ co-worker to whom he
displayed a pistol, the State suggests that Jones “was likely attempt-
ing to gain [the witness] trust and confidence.” But the record does
not demand this conclusion. The witness testified that he did not
want to hear about it, although Jones told him, “You cool.” But his
concern was not that he was being enlisted into the crime, as the State
contends, but that he might be called to testify in court. The State
further argues that Jones “was possibl[y] threatening [the witness]
into silence.” But the only threat testified to by this witness was made
by Wilkins himself in a separate incident the following year, after the
witness went to the police with his story. The trial court’s conclusion
that the statement was merely retrospective was not clearly errone-
ous, and the court did not abuse its discretion in so holding.

The State argues with respect to Jones’ statements to his estranged
wife that Jones was “furthering his concealment” by hiding in a place
he was not likely to be. But even if Jones was attempting to avoid
apprehension, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the
incriminating statement that he made to his estranged wife did not
further the concealment in any way, but “served only to disclose the
scheme,” and “inform[ed] the listener of the declarant’s activities.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) City of Tuscaloosa, supra, 158
F3d at 559 (II) (A) (1). Similarly, the fact that Jones showed a firearm
to an acquaintance while he and Wilkins were at his home, and
attempted to conceal it there, may have indicated an attempt to hide
the murder weapon and thus avoid detection, but the trial court’s
conclusion that the revealing of this fact to the witness and Jones’
incriminating statement did not further the conspiracy was not
clearly erroneous. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding these statements.

The State also contends that statements Jones allegedly made to
Burgess’ stepsister furthered the conspiracy, because the witness
testified that “she was being used for the purpose of hiding” and thus
the statements were made to encourage her to do so. But her proposed
testimony — as described by the State in its brief — was rather that
she believed that her stepsister and Jones wanted to get to know her
better, but that she discovered that “they used [her] for something
totally different.” Moreover, this witness told the police that Jones
revealed the murders while he was drinking, and that when she
“learned of the murder, she put them out of her house.” This evidence
supports the trial court’s conclusion that Jones’ statement was not in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and it did not abuse its discretion in so
holding.

162 Pe

Finally, the State asserts that Jones’ statements to co-conspirator
Burgess that he “got another body,” were “made in an effort to keep
her in the conspiracy and on co-conspirator Jones’s side.” But, as the
trial court observed, Jones’ urging Burgess to put the blame on
Wilkins and a fictitious individual was merely a statement implicat-
ing a co-conspirator, not in furtherance of the conspiracy, and there-
fore not admissible. Blakey, supra, 960 F2d at 998-999. The State has
suggested no possible motivation to further the conspiracy in the
remaining statements presented.

In sum, from the evidence presented to the trial court, we
conclude that the trial court’s determination that certain of the
statements by Jones were not made “in furtherance of the conspiracy”
was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. It
follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in partially
granting Wilkins’ motion in limine.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Meg Heap, District Attorney, Jerome M. Rothschild, Jr., Lyndsey
H. Rudder, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-
ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Robert W. Attridge, Jr., Robert L. Persse, for appellee.

$17A0967. MORAN v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 856)
BENHAM, Justice.
Appellant Misty Sunshine Moran appeals her convictions for
crimes related to the death of Isaias Tovar-Murillo.' For the reasons
set forth below, we affirm.

1 The crimes occurred on March 15, 2015. On March 26, 2015, a Hall County grand jury
indicted appellant on charges of malice murder, felony murder (attempt to rob), felony murder
(aggravated assault), criminal attempt tocommit armed robbery, conspiracy to commit a crime,
aggravated assault (with a deadly weapon), aggravated assault (with intent to rob), aggravated
assault (with intent to murder), four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a crime, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and two counts of participation in
criminal street gang activity. Appellant was tried before a jury from October 6 to October 8,
2015, with the jury returning verdicts of guilty on all counts, except for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, which count was nolle prossed. On October 8, 2015, the trial court
sentenced appellant to life without parole for malice murder plus a number of years to serve for
counts that were not vacated as a matter of law or merged for sentencing purposes. Appellant

eS 163

1. (a) Viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the jury’s
verdicts, the record shows appellant and her friends conspired to rob
a taxi driver. Appellant called for a taxi to pick her up, while her
friends followed the taxi in a Honda which was to serve as the
“getaway” vehicle. The taxi was driven by Isaias Tovar-Murillo.
During the ride, appellant pulled a gun on the victim and demanded
money. When the victim begged for his life and then attempted to exit
the vehicle, appellant shot him in the back of the head. Although shot,
the victim’s foot remained on the gas pedal and the vehicle continued
to move, eventually crashing into a tree in a wooded area off the road.
Appellant exited the vehicle before it crashed. When appellant met up
with her friends again, she tried to get them to collect any money
inside the taxi, but they refused to do so upon seeing the carnage at
the crash site. The group then decided to burglarize a home. Later
that night, appellant and one of her compatriots hid the gun under a
cement slab in appellant’s driveway; however, appellant eventually
returned the gun, which was a 9 millimeter gun, to the person from
whom she had borrowed it.

The day after the shooting, appellant confessed to a friend that
she had killed the victim and shared details of the killing, including
details that the victim had begged for his life, was crying, and tried to
escape when appellant shot him. Appellant’s friend contacted authori-
ties. Although appellant initially denied any involvement in the
murder, she eventually admitted to police that she was in the victim’s
taxi with a gun, but she claimed the gun discharged by accident while
cradled under her arm. One of appellant’s compatriots testified that
appellant told them she shot the victim because he tried to grab the
gun. The firearms examiner testified the gun used in the shooting
was in good working order and determined it could not be discharged
without someone pulling its trigger.” The firearms examiner also
confirmed that the 9mm shell casing recovered from the taxi’s back
seat was fired from the gun appellant had possessed. The medical
examiner testified that the victim died from a single gunshot to the
back of the head and that stippling at the entrance wound indicated
the gun was fired within a foot of the victim’s head.

moved for a new trial on October 12, 2015, and amended that motion on March 15, 2016. On
April 12, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial as amended and denied
the motion on April 13, 2016. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and, upon receipt of the
record, the case was docketed to the April 2017 term of this Court and submitted for a decision
to be made on the briefs.

2 More specifically, the firearms examiner testified that over six pounds of force was
required to be applied to the gun's trigger in order for it to fire.

164 PO ]

(b) Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to convict
her for malice murder and insufficient to prove that she was guilty of
aggravated assault (intent to kill) because there was no evidence that
she intended to kill the victim. We disagree.

[I]n Georgia, the crime of malice murder is committed when
the evidence shows either an express or, in the alternative,
an implied intent to commit an unlawful homicide. This
meaning of malice murder is consistent with the generalrule
that crimes which are defined so as to require that the
defendant intentionally cause a forbidden bad result are
usually interpreted to cover one who knows that his conduct
is substantially certain to cause the result, whether or not he
desires the result to occur. Thus, a malice murder can be
shown not only by evidence that the defendant acted with
the deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of another
human being which is manifested by external circumstances
capable of proof, but also by evidence that the defendant
acted where no considerable provocation appears and where
all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart. In other words, evidence that the defen-
dant acted with implied malice is, for purposes of demon-
strating [her] guilt of the crime of malice murder, no less
probative than proof that [s]he acted with a specific intent to
kill.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256 (4)
(507 SE2d 744) (1998). See also OCGA § 16-5-1 (b). The malice neces-
sary to establish malice murder may be formed in an instant, as long
as itis present at the time of the killing. See Platt v. State, 291 Ga. 631,
633 (732 SE2d 75) (2012). Here, there was evidence of malice.
Appellant made admissions that she shot the victim as he tried to
escape and while he was begging for his life. The evidence also showed
appellant shot the victim in the back of the head at a range close
enough to cause stippling to the wound. The evidence was sufficient
to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of malice murder, as well as the other crimes for
which she was convicted. Id. at 634; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

® We note that appellant was not convicted of aggravated assault (intent to murder) because
that charge merged into the malice murder count for sentencing purposes.

eS 165

2. At trial, the trial court admitted into evidence photographs of
text messages on appellant’s cell phone. A law enforcement officer
testified she obtained the cell phone from appellant’s probation
officer and took pictures of the text messages. After the officer
testified, the State moved to admit the photographs and the following
colloquy transpired:

THE COURT: Any objection?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t have any objection based on
the foundation for the photograph[s]. But I would reserve
perhaps as it relates to how — whether or not they legally
came into possession of her cell phone.

The trial court admitted the photographs without any further dis-
cussion. Pretermitting whether defense counsel’s comment consti-
tuted a valid objection, appellant has failed to show her cell phone
was obtained unlawfully.

As an initial matter, the record is silent as to how appellant’s
probation officer came to be in possession of appellant’s cell phone and
appellant made no proffer that his possession of the cell phone was
unlawful. Furthermore, the record shows that at the time the crimes
occurred and during the investigation, appellant was on probation for
a 2006 offense. As a condition of her probated sentence, appellant had
executed a Fourth Amendment waiver whereby she agreed to be
subject to warrantless searches during the term of her probation. The
United States Supreme Court has held that probationers do not enjoy
the “absolute” liberty afforded to other citizens. United States v.
Knights, 534 U. S. 112, 119 (122 SCt 587, 151 LE2d 497) (2001). As
such, a probationer may be subject to a warrantless search if there is
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 121. “The degree of
individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of
when there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is
occurring to make the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest
reasonable.” Id. Here, at the time authorities were examining appel-
lant’s cell phone, there was reasonable suspicion that appellant was
involved in a murder. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the
trial court erred when it admitted the photographs at issue.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Debra K. Jefferson, for appellant.

16 Pe

Lee Darragh, District Attorney, Shiv Sachdeva, Laura K. Lukert,
Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A0984. HAMPTON v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 902)

HINES, Chief Justice.

Appellant Dennis Hampton was found guilty of malice murder
and other related crimes in connection with the shooting death of
Takilam Terrell.t On appeal, he contends, among other things, that
the trial court gave an impermissibly coercive jury charge and erred
in sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
malice murder. We see no reversible error and affirm.

1. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdicts, the evidence presented at trial showed that, in the early
morning hours of April 7, 2013, the victim and his girlfriend, Golden
Ananaba, went to Milo’s Bar in Cobb County. Appellant, along with
his first cousin, Ricky Hampton, and Ricky’s wife, Trina Chatman,
were also there. When the victim and his girlfriend arrived, they
ordered drinks at the bar, as well as food to go. While at the bar, the
victim accidentally bumped into Chatman. Appellant saw this hap-
pen, and he and the victim exchanged “heated words.” About 15
minutes later, as the victim and his girlfriend were preparing to
leave, they had an argument that led to the victim grabbing his

1 The crimes occurred on April 7, 2013. On June 27, 2013, a Cobb County grand jury
indicted appellant Dennis Hampton, along with his first cousin, Ricky Hampton, and Ricky's
wife, Trina Chatman, for malice murder; felony murder based on the aggravated assault of the
victim witha deadly weapon; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and aggravated assault
with abottle. Appellant was also indicted for two weapon possession offenses and felony murder
based on weapon possession. On March 16, 2015, pursuant to a consent order, the trials of
appellant’s cousin and Chatman were severed from that of appellant in exchange for the
cousin's and Chatman’s agreement to testify at appellant's trial. On March 23, 2015, the jury
found appellant guilty on all counts except the count for the aggravated assault of the vietim
with a bottle. On May 7, 2015, the trial court sentenced appellant tolife in prison without parole
for malice murder and to a term of years on a weapon possession offense. The felony murder
convietions were vacated by operation of law, see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 269, 872 (434 SE2d
479) (1993), and the trial court merged the remaining counts. On May 7, appellant filed a motion
for new trial, which he amendedon November 3, 2015. The trial court denied the motion for new
trial, as amended, on December 23, 2015. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on January 12, 2016,
and the case was docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term and submitted for decision on
the briefs,

eS 167

girlfriend. Samuel Adams, a security guard, and appellant, who
sometimes worked as a security guard at the bar but was a patron
that night, intervened in an attempt to separate the victim and
Ananaba. The victim pushed Adams and appellant, and at that point,
Ricky Hampton came up and tackled the victim, knocking him to the
floor. According to appellant’s cousin and Chatman, as well as Adams
and the owner of the bar, both of whom knew appellant well, appel-
lant then pulled out a gun and fired one shot at the victim, which
struck him in the chest and killed him.

Appellant does not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance with this
Court’s practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and
conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts,
the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient
to authorize a rational jury to find appellant guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. During its deliberations, the jury asked the trial court whether
it “need[ed] to vote unanimous on guilty or not guilty on a specific
charge?” After a discussion with the prosecutor and defense counsel,
the trial court instructed the jury, “You must reach a verdict on each
charge. And whatever your verdict is, it must be unanimous.” Appel-
lant contends that instructing the jury that it had to “reach a verdict
on each charge” was impermissibly coercive.

Because appellant failed to object to the charge, we review the
issue for plain error under OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). Plain error review
involves four steps.

First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally
relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the
appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error
must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which
in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it
affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth
and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error —
discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.

168 P|

State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) (citation,
punctuation and emphasis omitted). “Satisfying all four prongs of
this standard is difficult, as it should be.” Id. (citation and punctua-
tion omitted).

We conclude that, even assuming that the trial court clearly
erred in telling the jury that it had to reach a verdict on each count
and that appellant did not affirmatively waive this claim, appellant’s
claim regarding the charge fails the third step of the plain error
analysis. To prevail on this step, appellant has the burden to “make
an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome
below.” Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 327 (781 SE2d 772) (2016)
(citation and punctuation omitted). In this regard, if the jury question
amounted to an announcement that the jury was deadlocked, appel-
lant could perhaps carry his burden and prevail on this claim. See
Drayton v. State, 297 Ga. 748, 748 (778 SE2d 179) (2015) (explaining
that, in giving our modified Allen charge to a deadlocked jury, see
Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492, 501 (17 SCt 154, 41 LE 528)
(1896), “‘a court should not instruct a jury that it is absolutely
equired to reach a verdict, [but] it is permissible to instruct a jury
hat any verdict that it does agree on must be unanimous’ ” (citation
mitted)); United States v. Jones, 504 F3d 1218, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007)
holding that, when ajury informs the trial court that itis deadlocked,
“[a]n instruction which appears to give a jury no choice but to return
a verdict is impermissibly coercive” and constitutes reversible plain
error); Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (85 SCt 1059, 13
LE2d 957) (1965) (holding that instructing a deadlocked jury that,
“fy]ou have got to reach a decision in this case,” was coercive an
constituted reversible error).

Here, however, the jury question can easily be read as asking
whether a unanimous vote is required on a charge and not as saying
hat the jury was deadlocked on a specific charge. Courts have hel
hat a jury that is not deadlocked is less susceptible to coercion than
deadlocked jury. See Bradley v. United States, 676 Fed. Appx. 895,
02 (11th Cir. 2017); Cramer v. Fahner, 683 F2d 1376, 1389 (7th Cir.
982). In Bradley, the district court charged a non-deadlocked jury
hat it had to reach a verdict on each count of the indictment, an
appellant contended that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing
to argue on appeal that the charge was coercive. The Eleventh Circuit
held that appellant failed to carry his burden to show prejudice
because there was ample evidence to support the convictions an
because there was no indication that the jury was deadlocked ani
therefore more susceptible to a coercive charge. See Bradley, 676 Fed.
Appx. at 902. Although Bradley involved the prejudice required to
prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has

oder

aeopad

eS 169

equated the prejudice step of the plain error standard with the
prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See
Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 277-278 (779 SE2d 342) (2015).
Similarly, here, the evidence against appellant is strong, and the
record does not reliably suggest that the jury was deadlocked. Under
plain error review, appellant “bears the burden of persuasion with
respect to prejudice,” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (113
SCt 1770, 123 LE2d 508) (1993), and must affirmatively show that
“the error probably did affect the outcome below,” Gates, 298 Ga. at
327 (citation and punctuation omitted). “Such a showing demands
some level of certainty and particularity.” United States v. Bramley,
847 F3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2017). See also Jones v. United States, 527 U.S.
373, 394-395 (119 SCt 2090, 144 LE2d 370) (1999) (“Where the effect
of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his
burden of showing that the error actually affected his substantial
rights.”). Because appellant has not reliably shown that the jury was
deadlocked in this case and because the evidence against appellant is
strong, with four people who know him well identifying him as the
shooter, we conclude that he has failed to show the prejudice neces-
sary to carry his burden on the third prong of the plain error test. See
Bramley, 847 F3d at 7-8 (holding that, on plain error review, appel-
lant had not shown prejudice from the alleged error of the sentencing
court having off-the-record conversations with a probation officer
because the record did not show whether the conversations were
appropriate or inappropriate); Jones, 527 U.S. at 394-395 (on plain
error review in a case in which a capital defendant claimed that jury
instructions regarding a possible lesser sentence in the event the jury
could not unanimously agree on life or death could have inclined a
deadlocked jury toward death, the Supreme Court held that the
petitioner could not show prejudice because the effect of the error was
uncertain; “It is just as likely that the jurors, loathe to recommend a
lesser sentence, would have compromised on a sentence of life impris-
onment as on a death sentence.”).
3. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not continuing
the case after his trial counsel announced he was not ready on the
first day of trial due to appellant’s lack of cooperation and in denying
the motion for continuance that trial counsel made later in the same
day. These claims lack merit.
After the State announced that it was ready to proceed on the
morning of trial, trial counsel said that “my announcement is the
same as it was at the calendar call. I have to announce not ready due
to my client not cooperating with me in preparing a defense.” The trial
court then said, “[w]e will go forward today with the jury trial.”

170 P|

During jury selection later that same day, trial counsel moved for a
continuance, saying that appellant had just told him of a potential
witness of whom trial counsel was not previously aware. The trial
court denied this motion.

Even treating trial counsel’s announcement of not ready as a
motion for a continuance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying either that motion or the one trial counsel made later that
day. “A refusal to grant a continuance will not be disturbed by
appellate courts unless it clearly appears that the judge abused his
discretion in this regard.” Lane v. State, 299 Ga. 791, 794 (792 SE2
378) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, when tria.
counsel said that he was not ready to proceed with the trial, he ha
been representing appellant for five months. He did not, however,
offer any explanation as to the state of his preparation, simply stating
the conclusion that he was not ready to proceed because appellant
would not cooperate. Moreover, when trial counsel later moved for a
continuance as a result of appellant informing him of the potentia.
witness, he did not say what evidence this witness might offer, an
the prosecutor stated to the court that trial counsel had told him that
appellant would not share with trial counsel what knowledge the
witness had about the case. Additionally, with regard to the potentia.
new witness, the trial court told trial counsel that the court woul
“work with [him] in any way” it could during the trial “to help [him]
secure that witness.” Finally, there was also evidence that appellant
not only failed to cooperate with trial counsel, but also failed to
cooperate with his previous counsel, and we have held that a tria.
court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a continu-
ance when the motion is based on the ground that trial counsel did not
have the benefit of the defendant’s cooperation until shortly before
trial. See Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 303, 307 (298 SE2d 1) (1982) (“That
[trial counsel] did not have the benefit of the defendant’s cooperation
until shortly before trial, is the defendant’s own fault, about which he
cannot now complain.”). For all of these reasons, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in not continuing the case.

4. Appellant contends that trial counsel provided constitution-
ally ineffective assistance. We disagree.

To prevail on this claim, appellant must show both that his counsel
performed deficiently and that, but for the deficiency, there is a reason-
able probability that the outcome of his trial would have been more
favorable. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 694 (104
SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). “While the test imposed by Strickland

eS im

is not impossible to meet, the burden is a heavy one.” Wiggins v. State,
295 Ga. 684, 686 (763 SE2d 484) (2014).

To prove deficient performance, one must show that his
attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable
way considering all the circumstances and in the light of
prevailing professional norms. Courts reviewing ineffective-
ness claims must apply a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional
performance. Thus, decisions regarding trial tactics and
strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only
if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent
attorney would have followed such a course.

Capps v. State, 300 Ga. 6, 8 (792 SE2d 665) (2016) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Furthermore,

there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assis-
tance claim . .. to address both components of the inquiry if
the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In
particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficien-
cies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade
counsels’ performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffec-
tiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
which we expect will often be so, that course should be
followed.

Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697.

(a) Appellant first contends that trial counsel failed to adequately
prepare a defense because he did not call two witnesses who would
have testified that appellant was not involved in the shooting of the
victim. Both of these witnesses gave testimony to that effect at the
hearing on the motion for new trial. However, trial counsel testified
at that hearing that he did not call these two witnesses at trial
because appellant consistently maintained that he wanted to testify
at his trial and because the testimony of the two witnesses would
have been inconsistent with appellant’s testimony.” “ ‘A decision as to
which defense witnesses to call is a matter of counsel’s trial strategy
and tactics.’ ” Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613, 619 (783 SE2d 652) (2016)

® After the State rested its case, appellant told the trial court that he had decided not to
testify at his trial,

172 P|

(citation omitted). Here, given trial counsel’s concern that the testi-
mony of the two witnesses would have been inconsistent with what he
expected appellant’s testimony to be, we cannot say that the strategic
decision not to call the witnesses was “ ‘so patently unreasonable that
no competent attorney would have followed such a course.’” Capps,
300 Ga. at 8 (citation omitted).

(b) Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to object when the trial court, in response to the jury’s question,
instructed the jury that it had to reach a verdict on each count of the
indictment. However, for the same reasons that we concluded that
appellant could not carry his burden to show prejudice on plain error
review regarding this charge, we conclude that he cannot carry his
burden to show prejudice on this ineffectiveness claim. See Division
2 above; Martin, 298 Ga. at 277-278 (equating the harm prongs of the
standards for showing plain error and ineffective assistance of coun-
sel).

5. At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that the trial court
was required to sentence appellant to life without parole on the
murder count because appellant had previously been convicted of a
felony; because OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) says that, after having been
convicted of a felony, a person who “commits a felony punishable by
confinement in a penal institution shall be sentenced to undergo the
longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the subse-
quent offense of which he or she stands convicted”; and because,
under OCGA § 16-5-1 (e) (1), “the longest period of time prescribed for
the punishment” of appellant’s “subsequent offense” of murder is life
without parole. The trial court agreed with this argument and
sentenced appellant to life without parole.

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in interpreting these
statutes to mandate a sentence of life without parole. We conclude,
however, that even if the trial court erred, it was harmless. When
imposing the sentence, the trial court said that it thought that life
without parole was the statutorily mandated sentence, but that it
would have exercised its discretion to impose that sentence in any
event due to the fact that appellant was a two-time convicted felon
who executed the victim and would not accept responsibility for his
actions even though “there were eyewitnesses who have known him
for years and pointed him out.” See Smith v. State, 278 Ga. App. 858,
859 (630 SE2d 125) (2006) (explaining that a trial court’s error in
thinking that a certain sentence was statutorily mandated could
have been harmless if “the trial judge [had] indicated that he would
have” imposed the same sentence “regardless of what he believed the
statute required’).

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

eS 173
DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Raina J. Nadler, for appellant.

D. Victor Reynolds, District Attorney, Michael S. Carlson, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia
B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, S. Taylor Johnston, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

$17A0993. BLACKMON v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 899)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Appellant Isaiah Blackmon challenges his convictions for felony
murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of
Edward Cobb and the aggravated assault of Stanton Gilliam. Appel-
lant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his
convictions and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
We affirm.*

1. (a) Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence at trial showed the following. On December 6, 2011, Briana
Abner called Appellant and asked him to get her a small quantity of
marijuana. Later that day, Appellant called Abner back and told her
to pick up co-defendant Dejuan Spratlin, who had no car, because
Spratlin “knew the weed man.” Spratlin called Gilliam, whom he
knew from high school, and arranged to buy a pound of marijuana.
Abner drove Spratlin to Gilliam’s house and waited in the car while
the two men negotiated over the price inside. At some point, Spratlin
called Appellant, and Appellant drove to Gilliam’s house. Gilliam felt
uncomfortable once Appellant arrived, because he was expecting to

+ The crimes ocurred on December 6, 2011. On March 15, 2012, a DeKalb County grand
jury indicted Appellant, along with Dejuan Spratlin, for malice murder, felony murder, two
counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime. At a joint trial from October 28 to November 1, 2013, the jury acquitted
Appellant of malice murder but found him guilty of the remaining charges. (Spratlin was found
guilty of all charges except the aggravated assault of Gilliam.) The trial court sentenced
Appellant to serve life in prison for felony murder, 20 years consecutive for aggravated assault
against Gilliam, and five years consecutive for the firearm conviction; the other aggravated
assault verdict merged into the felony murder. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial,
which he amended with new counsel on April 15, 2016. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied the motion on May 25, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, which he
twice amended. The case was docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term and submitted for
decision on the briefs.

174 es

be “dealing with one person, not two people.” Gilliam called his
neighbor Edward Cobb to come over, and after Cobb arrived, an
agreement was reached. Appellant then gave Gilliam $1,025 in cash
in return for the marijuana.

Appellant walked toward the door with Cobb and Gilliam, but as
Cobb started to open the door, Appellant pulled out a gun and said,
“F**k this s**t, you know what it is, go ahead and give me every-
thing.” Gilliam threw the money onto a pool table near Spratlin as
Cobb began struggling with Appellant for the gun. Gilliam tried to
help Cobb at first, but after Appellant shot Gilliam twice in the leg, he
ran to a bedroom and hid in the closet. Gilliam heard several more
shots before Appellant and Spratlin left, taking with them the money
from the pool table as well as the marijuana.

Gilliam’s two housemates, Karalo Jackson and Rikeshia Andrews,
were awakened by the gunfire. Andrews armed himself with an iron,
because there were no guns in the house. Jackson found Cobb, who
had been shot four times, lying on the living room floor and called 911.
Gilliam eventually recovered from his injuries, but Cobb died from
gunshot wounds to his torso. Three bullets were taken from Cobb’s
body—two fired from a .38 caliber gun and one fired from a .40 caliber
gun. Several other bullets, both .38 caliber and .40 caliber, were found
at the scene, along with eight .40 caliber shell casings. A firearms
expert determined that at least two and possibly three guns were
involved in the shooting. Gilliam identified Spratlin, and ultimately
Appellant, to the police and at trial.

Police officers later located Appellant and Spratlin together at a
motel in Alabama. Both men ran from the police but were eventually
apprehended. A few days after the shooting, a cell phone associated
with Appellant had received text messages about the sale of two guns,
including a .40 caliber gun. While in jail, Appellant spoke to his
mother and told her that he “gave the gun to someone to get rid of.”
Neither Appellant nor Spratlin testified at trial. Abner testified that
when Spratlin ran out to her car after the shooting, he said, “They're
trying to rob me.” Gilliam testified that he had not tried to rob anyone.
The court charged the jury on self-defense, but the jury rejected that
defense.

(b) Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port his convictions. When properly viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdicts, however, the evidence presented at trial and summa-
rized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject Appel-
lant’s justification defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also
Anthony v. State, 298 Ga. 827, 829 (785 SE2d 277) (2016) (“The jury

eS 175

is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense
and to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in
self-defense.”); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009)
(« ‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and
to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’ ” (citation
omitted)).

2. Appellant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance in several ways. To succeed on this claim, Appellant must
prove both that his attorney’s performance was professionally defi-
cient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice to his case. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2
674) (1984). To establish deficient performance, Appellant must show
that his counsel’s acts or omissions were objectively unreasonable,
considering all the circumstances at the time and in the light of
prevailing professional norms. See id. at 687-690. To establish preju-
dice, Appellant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding woul
have been different.” Id. at 694. “This burden, though not impossible
to carry, is a heavy one.” Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 269 (737 SE2
98) (2013). Appellant has not carried his burden in this case.

Appellant points first to his trial counsel’s alleged failure to
consult adequately with him before trial. However, “there exists no
magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference
with his client,” and Appellant “does not specifically describe how
additional communications with his lawyer” would have enhance’
his defense. Henry v. State, 279 Ga. 615, 616 (619 SE2d 609) (2005)
(citations and punctuation omitted). Thus, Appellant has not suffi-
ciently alleged, much less met his burden to show, deficient perfor-
mance by his trial counsel in this regard. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690 (requiring defendants to “identify the acts or omissions of counse.
that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professiona.
judgment’).

Appellant points next to his trial counsel’s failure to file a written
request for a self-defense instruction, given that this was his sole
defense. But trial counsel orally requested a self-defense instruction
and the trial court ultimately gave that instruction to the jury. Thus,
this claim is entirely meritless.

Finally, Appellant points to his counsel’s failure to seek sever-
ance of his trial from that of his co-defendant. But trial counsel
explained at the motion for new trial hearing that he made a strategic
decision to present a unified defense of justification with Spratlin, in
part to ensure that the State would not be able to introduce a
statement by Spratlin that was harmful to Appellant. Appellant has
not demonstrated that this strategic decision was unreasonable

176 Pe

under the circumstances. See Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433, 438 (796
SE2d 242) (2017) (rejecting a claim of deficient performance for not
filing a motion to sever where defense counsel testified that his
strategy was to make the co-defendants’ statements harder to admit
due to the restrictions of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (88
SCt 1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968), and that strategy was not shown to be
unreasonable). Appellant therefore has not shown deficient perfor-
mance. Nor has he shown that a severance motion would have been
granted if requested — the trial court indicated it would not have
been — or that separate trials would in reasonable probability have
resulted in a more favorable outcome for him. We note in this respect
that Appellant was acquitted of malice murder, while Spratlin was
convicted of that charge.

For these reasons, Appellant has not shown that he received
ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Genevieve Holmes, for appellant.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Lenny I. Krick, Otobong U.
Ekpo, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1033. TAYLOR v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 851)
BENHAM, Justice.
Appellant Mark Antonio Taylor appeals his convictions related to
the death of Charles Ernest Weaver.' In the early morning hours of
December 28, 2012, appellant was wandering around Hall County,

1 The crimes occurred on December 28, 2012. On January 14, 2013, a Hall County grand
jury indicted appellant on charges of malice murder, felony murder (armed robbery), felony
murder (aggravated assault), felony murder (theft by taking), armed robbery, aggravated
assault, theft by taking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. After a
trial that took place May 5-7, 2014, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all charges. On May
8, 2014, the trial court sentenced appellant to serve life in prison without parole for malice
murder plus a term of years for the underlying felonies for which he was charged. The counts
of felony murder were vacated as a matter of law. Appellant moved for a new trial on May 21,
2014, On September 9, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial and
denied the motion on September 21, 2016. On October 4, 2016, appellant filed a notice of appeal

eS 177

trying to figure out a way to get back to Atlanta.? He entered the
parking lot of a car dealership where he came across a truck, which
had its engine running and its lights on. Seeing no one around,
appellant entered the vehicle and began driving it in reverse. The
victim, who worked at the dealership, attempted to stop appellant
from stealing the truck by pulling out a pocket knife and dialing the
police on his cell phone. Appellant got out of the truck, pulled out a
gun and forced the victim to drop his knife and cell phone. Appellant
then forced the victim to walk toward the building and shot the victim
once. The victim attempted to run away and hide inside the building,
but appellant followed him and shot him a second time. Appellant
then fled in the truck, taking the victim’s cell phone and pocket knife
with him. A significant portion of appellant’s encounter with the
victim was caught on the dealership’s video surveillance system. The
victim was found deceased by a co-worker. The medical examiner
testified the victim died from a bullet that entered and exited his arm
and then re-entered his body through his chest, damaging his lungs
and a major artery to his heart such that he bled to death.

Police tracked the stolen vehicle to an apartment complex in
Atlanta, used the apartment’s surveillance system to link appellant
to the truck, and found appellant in an apartment with some of his
relatives. Inside the apartment, police recovered the victim’s knife
and appellant’s Hi-Point .45 caliber handgun, which was determined
to be the murder weapon. They also found the victim’s cell phone in
the truck. As he was being arrested, appellant kept repeating “Yeah,
I did it” and “I killed him.” During his trial testimony, appellant
admitted the victim was unarmed both times he shot him.

1. The evidence summarized above was sufficient to authorize a
rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes for which the jury returned verdicts of guilty.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Appellant complains that trial counsel’s questioning of pro-
spective jurors was too brief to be effective and contends counsel
should have moved to strike three jurors for cause. In order to prevail
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant

must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced him to the point that a
reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors,

directed to the Court of Appeals which transferred the case to this Court. The case was docketed.
to the April 2017 term of this Court and submitted for a decision to be made on the briefs.

? On the afternoon of December 27, 2012, appellant’s girlfriend expelled him from her car
after the two had a fight.

178 eS

the outcome of the trial would have been different. A strong
presumption exists that counsel’s conduct falls within the
broad range of professional conduct.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30 (4)
(644 SE2d 837) (2007). If a defendant fails to meet his burden on one
prong of the two-prong test, then the other prong need not be
reviewed by the Court. Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869 (2) (734 SE2d 876)
(2012). The content of trial counsel’s voir dire of the jury venire can be
a matter of trial strategy and, if within the broad range of reasonable
professional assistance, will not sustain a claim that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. See Ford v. State, 298 Ga. 560 (8) (a) (783
SE2d 906) (2016); Cade v. State, 289 Ga. 805 (4) (716 SE2d 196)
(2011); Morgan v. State, 276 Ga. 72 (9) (575 SE2d 468) (2003).
Likewise, the decision as to which jurors to strike is a strategic
decision that, if reasonable, will not support an allegation that
counsel’s performance was deficient. See Brown v. State, 301 Ga. 728
(4) (804 SE2d 16) (2017); Simpson v. State, 298 Ga. 314 (4) (781 SE2d
762) (2016); Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384 (2) (782 SE2d 245) (2016).

At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that
once the prosecutor completed her voir dire, there were not many
questions that needed to be asked of the prospective jurors. He also
testified that appellant assisted with jury selection and any decisions
made as to juror strikes were strategic in nature. For example, in
reference to Juror 41, who was a domestic violence victim and stated
she “did not know” whether her experience would impact her ability
to be fair, trial counsel said he decided not to move to strike her
because he believed she might be sympathetic to appellant. Our
review of the transcript reveals that none of the jurors who were
seated on the jury expressed an opinion during voir dire that was so
fixed that they could not be fair and impartial.? Counsel’s perfor-
mance was not deficient and, accordingly, appellant’s claim of inef-
fective assistance must fail.

3. Prior to trial, the State sought admission of evidence that
appellant’s girlfriend expelled him from her car because he punched
her in the face. The trial court ruled that the details of the fight were
irrelevant and the parties agreed that the only information that

® In addition to Juror 41, appellant opines that Jurors 52 and 29 were biased. Juror 52
worked at a competing car dealership and had heard some information about the case, but was
“foggy” as to what he had heard. Juror 52 said, however, there was nothing about what he had
heard that would prevent him from being fair and impartial if selected to serve. Juror 29 was
actually removed upon motion by the State and did not serve on the jury. Appellant has
otherwise failed to prove that he was affected by any purported juror bias.

eS 179

would be provided to the jury was that, a day before the shooting,
appellant was expelled from his girlfriend’s car because of a fight. At
trial, appellant took the stand and testified as follows on direct
examination:

Q: Did [you and your girlfriend] get into an argument that
day?

A: Yes, we did.

Q: And were you riding with her?

A: Yes, I was.

Q: And what happened after [you all] got into an argument?
A: Well, when we got in an argument, I told her necessarily
I didn’t want to fight with her, and she put me out of the car.

Immediately prior to its cross-examination of appellant an
outside the presence of the jury, the State argued it was entitled to
question appellant about the reasons he was expelled from his
girlfriend’s car because appellant was dishonest when he testified,
“T told her necessarily I didn’t want to fight with her, and she put me
out of the car.” Over appellant’s objection, the trial court ruled the
prosecutor could cross-examine appellant as to whether he ha’
fought with his girlfriend. Upon this ruling, the prosecutor aske'
appellant whether he physically fought with his girlfriend and, in
response, appellant stated that he and his girlfriend had hit each
other. When the prosecutor asked whether the girlfriend had any
injuries, counsel objected, but the trial court allowed that line of
questioning to proceed. Counsel posited another objection when the
prosecutor asked whether appellant was aware his girlfriend ha’
called the police. At that point, the parties conferred outside the
presence of the jury, and defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The
trial court denied the motion for mistrial, instructed the prosecutor to
stay away from any questions regarding whether the girlfriend calle
the police,* and then informed the jury that defense counsel’s last
objection had been sustained. The prosecutor moved on to another
line of questioning. During its closing, the prosecutor referenced the
altercation without any objection from defense counsel.

Appellant asserts the trial court committed “plain error” when it
allowed the State to cross-examine appellant about the altercation
with appellant’s girlfriend. Appellant also contends trial counsel was

+ Appellant had no direct knowledge as to whether his girlfriend contacted police after she
ousted him from her car.

180

ineffective when he failed to object to the prosecutor’s mentioning the

incident during closing argument.
of error.

We disagree with both assertions

As an initial matter, since counsel objected to the testimony in
question, the matter has been preserved for appellate review and is not

subject to review for plain error. Rather, we review the propriety of the

trial court’s admission of the evidence for an abuse of discretion.

Parker v. State, 339 Ga. App. 285
prosecutor’s cross-examining appe.
cation with his girlfriend was admi:

(1) (793 SE2d 173) (2016). The
lant about the nature of the alter-
ssible for the purpose of impeach-

ment inasmuch as appellant testified dishonestly about the reasons
why he had been ejected from his girlfriend’s car. See OCGA § 24-6-621

(‘A witness may be impeached by
the witness.”).® See also Parker v. Sta

lisproving the facts testified to by
te, supra, 339 Ga. App. at 289-290.

“When the criminal defendant takes the stand, any discrepancies in
his testimony may be ‘fully explored’ on cross-examination regardless

of their relevance or the fact tha

defendant’s character.” Paul S. Mi
(September 2017). See also Francis

t it may reflect poorly on the
lich, Ga. Rules of Evidence § 14:2
v. State, 266 Ga. 69 (2) (463 SE2d

859) (1995) (“The prohibition against the State’s introduction of

character evidence unless and unt:

il the defendant places his own

character into issue ‘does not preclude use of . .. evidence to disprove

facts testified to by the defendant.’
a right to a thorough and sifting

Cit.]”). In addition, the State had
cross-examination of appellant’s

direct testimony. See Parks v. State, 300 Ga. 303 (8) (794 SE2d 623)
(2016); OCGA § 24-6-611 (b). The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion when it allowed the State to impeach appellant as it did. Francis
v. State, supra, 266 Ga. at 71. Since the testimony in question was
admissible, counsel was not deficient for failing to object when the
prosecutor mentioned the matter during closing argument. See Woods

v. State, 271 Ga. 452, 454 (3) n.9 (5

19 SE2d 918) (1999).

4. The lead investigator testified as a witness for the State’s
case-in-chief. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the
investigator several questions about his opinion about the viability of
aself-defense claim. On re-direct, the State asked follow-up questions

regarding self-defense. On appeal,

appellant complains plain error

6 The language in OCGA § 24-6-621 has ge

nerally been carried forward from the former

OCGA § 24-9-82. See Jack Goger, Ga. Handbook on Criminal Evidence § 6:18 (August 2017).

OCGA § 2
jurisprudence does recognize impeachment by ed
OCGA § 24-6-621 may be read in conjunction w

21 has no counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence; however, federal

ontradiction and there is some consensus that
ith OCGA §§ 24-6-607 and/or 24-6-613 (b), as

well as their federal counterparts. Id.; Ronald L. Carlson, Carlson on Evidence, 351-352 (5th ed.

2016).

eS 181

was committed when the investigator was allowed to testify about his
opinion on the issue of self-defense. This assertion of error is specious.
At the motion for new trial hearing, counsel testified he deliberately
asked the investigator about self-defense in order to introduce the
topic to the jury prior to appellant’s taking the stand. Appellant
cannot be heard to complain about any alleged error, including plain
error, which his actions engendered. See Adkins v. State, 301 Ga. 153
(2) (800 SE2d 341) (2017); Grimes v. State, 296 Ga. 337 (4) (a) (766
SE2d 72) (2014).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

arry L. Duttweiler, for appellant.

Lee Darragh, District Attorney, Wanda L. Vance, Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, for appellee.

$17A1040. FREEMAN v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 845)
MELTON, Presiding Justice.
Following ajury trial, David Justin Freeman was found guilty on
one count of disorderly conduct pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1).
That statute provides in relevant part that

[a] person commits the offense of disorderly conduct when
such person .. . [a]cts in a violent or tumultuous manner
toward another person whereby such person is placed in
reasonable fear of the safety of such person’s life, limb, or
health.t

On appeal, Freeman contends that his conviction cannot stand
because OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad.” For the reasons that follow, we reject Freeman’s facial

1 The State concedes that the conduct involved in this case was not “violent,” but contends
that the behavior was “tumultuous.”

2 Freeman was originally indicted for obstruction of a police officer and for disorderly conduct
pursuant toa different statute, OCGA § 16-11-34 (a), which states that “[a] person who recklessly

182 ee

challenge to OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) and conclude that Freeman’s
conviction in this case must be reversed, as the behavior for which
Freeman was prosecuted falls outside of the applicable scope of the
statute as properly construed.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence presented at trial revealed that, on August 3, 2014, Free-
man attended a church service at the Flowery Branch campus of
12 Stone Church, where at least 250 guests were in attendance.
During a portion of the service, Pastor Jason Berry asked any teachers
present to stand and be recognized so that the congregation could pray
for them to have a successful school year. About 50 people stood up,
and Freeman, who was at the back of the church, stood up as well.
When he stood up, Freeman raised his middle finger in the air and
stared angrily at the pastor. The pastor testified that he felt afraid for
his own safety at that time. Pastor Berry finished the prayer for the
teachers and dismissed the room. As people were leaving, Freeman
began yelling about sending children off to the evil public schools and
having them raised by Satan. As Freeman yelled, the music minister
at the church turned up the music in an effort to drown him out, and
Freeman then left the sanctuary. Pastor Berry followed Freeman to
speak with him in the front lobby of the church, where he told
Freeman that he should have a conversation with Pastor Berry rather
than shout in the middle of a church service. Freeman said that Pastor
Berry should be ashamed of himself and that Freeman was going to
leave, and then Freeman left the church with his family.

1. With respect to Freeman’s claim that OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1)
is unconstitutional on its face, “[a]s an appellate court, we have a duty
to construe a statute in a manner which upholds it as constitutional,
if that is possible.” (Citation omitted.) Cobb County School Dist. v.
Barker, 271 Ga. 35, 37 (1) (618 SE2d 126) (1999). With this principle

or knowingly commits any act which may reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt a lawful
meeting, gathering, or procession is guilty of a misdemeanor.” However, Freeman raised in a
motion to quash the indictment that the original accusation charging him with disorderly conduct
should have been dismissed because OCGA § 16-11-34 (a) was declared unconstitutional in 2006
by this Court. See State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444 (629 SE2d 252) (2006) (finding OCGA § 16-11-34
(a) to be unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and thus void). The State then amended the
indictment to charge Freeman with disorderly conduct pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1)
rather than OCGA § 16-11-34 (a). The obstruction of an officer count against Freeman was nolle
prossed, and the case proceeded to trial only on the disorderly conduct charge. Freeman's
counsel argued that Freeman should have been granted a directed verdict of acquittal, as
Freeman's actions constituted protected speech under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and therefore could not constitute disorderly conductunder OCGA § 16-11-39
(a) (1). The trial court expressed its belief that Freeman's actions were not protected under the
First Amendment and denied the motion for directed verdict. Freeman was thereafter found
guilty of disorderly conduct. Freeman was sentenced to 12 months of probation and ordered to
pay a $270 fine

eS 183

in mind, we address Freeman’s claims that OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1)
is both unconstitutionally vague in violation of Due Process require-
ments and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

“A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence notice of the conduct which is prohibited and
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Cit.]” John-
son v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) (449 SE2d 94) (1994). In interpreting
the language of OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) to determine whether the
statute is unconstitutionally vague, “we apply the fundamental rules
of statutory construction that require us to construe [the] statute
according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary mean-
ing, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere
surplusage.” (Citations omitted.) Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co.,
277 Ga. 189, 191 (587 SE2d 24) (2003).

Freeman contends, primarily, that because a person can be found
guilty of disorderly conduct when he or she “[a]cts ina... tumultuous
manner,” and OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) does not define the term
“tumultuous,” he or she is not sufficiently informed about what con-
duct is prohibited by the statute. However, “when the phrase chal-
lenged as vague has a commonly understood meaning, then it is
sufficiently definite to satisfy due process requirements.” (Citation
and punctuation omitted.) Bradford v. State, 285 Ga. 1, 3 (2) (673 SE2d
201) (2009). Here, at the time that the legislature enacted OCGA §
16-11-39 (a) (1) in 1995, “tumultuous” had the common meaning of
being “disorderly, turbulent{, or] uproarious.” The New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary (Vol. 2, 1993). See also Johnson, supra, 264 Ga. at
591 (1) (using standard dictionary definition of “contact” to demon-
strate that stalking statute was not unconstitutionally vague). A
person of common intelligence can ascertain from the word “tumul-
tuous” that he or she may be found guilty of disorderly conduct under
OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) when that person acts in a disorderly,
turbulent, or uproarious manner toward another person, which
places the other person in reasonable fear for his or her safety.
Johnson, supra. See also Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50 (96 SCt
243, 46 LE2d 185) (1975) (“[I]n most English words and phrases there
lurk uncertainties. ... All the Due Process Clause requires is that the
law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as
to avoid that which is forbidden”) (citation, punctuation and footnote
omitted); Wilson v. State, 245 Ga. 49, 53 (262 SE2d 810) (1980) (“A
criminal statute is sufficiently definite if its terms furnish a test
based on normal criteria which men of common intelligence who come
in contact with the statute may use with reasonable safety in deter-
mining its command”) (citation omitted). OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) is
not unconstitutionally vague due to its use of the term “tumultuous,”

184 ee

as the statute provides sufficient notice to persons of ordinary intel-
ligence of the prohibited conduct and does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.*

With regard to Freeman’s challenge to OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1)
as being unconstitutionally overbroad, “[a] statute that is clear about
what it prohibits can nevertheless be unconstitutionally overbroad if
it stifles expression or conduct that is otherwise protected by the
Constitution.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444, 445
(629 SE2d 252) (2006). Indeed, “[i]f there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
414 (IV) (109 SCt 2533, 105 LE2d 342) (1989). Accordingly, our “first
task is to ascertain whether the statute reaches a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct. However, a statute should not
be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a
narrowing construction, and its deterrent effect on legitimate expres-
sion is both real and substantial.” (Citations and punctuation omit-
ted.) State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 673 (2) (398 SE2d 547) (1990).

As explained more fully below, we find that, when properly
construed, OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) does not reach any, let alone a
substantial amount of, constitutionally protected conduct. As men-
tioned previously, a person may only be found guilty of disorderly
conduct under OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) based on allegedly tumultu-
ous conduct when he or she “[a]cts ina... tumultuous manner toward
another person whereby such person is placed in reasonable fear of
the safety of such person’s life, limb, or health.” The statute on its face
contains no prohibition against any particular message being com-
municated, and it makes clear that the level of “tumultuous” behav-
ior necessary to give rise to a sustainable charge must involve acts
that would place another person in reasonable fear for his or her
safety. In this sense, it could be argued that the statute applies only
to physical “acts” that do not implicate speech at all. State v. Cantwell,
66 Ore. App. 848, 850-852 (676 P2d 353) (1984) (Disorderly conduct

* Tothe extent that Freeman argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague due to its
use of the phrase “reasonable fear,” such argument is without merit, as there is nothing vague
about this commonly used expression that can be easily understood by persons of common
intelligence. See Johnson, supra, 264 Ga. at 592 (2) (Georgia's stalking statute (OCGA §
16-5-90) is not unconstitutionally vague, as “a person of ordinary intelligence can readily
appreciate what action, in a given context, will constitute ‘harassing and intimidating’ conduct
on his part sufficient to provoke a ‘reasonable fear of death or bodily harm’ in another person”).
See also, e.g., OCGA § 16-5-20 (simple assault committed where one “[clommits an act which
places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury”).

eS 185

statute criminalizing “fighting or . . . violent, tumultuous or threat-
ening behavior” was not unconstitutionally overbroad, as the statu-
tory language “describe[d] physical acts of aggression, not speech”).
However, we believe that, because there are several tumultuous
activities that could be used or interpreted as a form of free expres-
sion, the scope of OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) must be considered with
those possibilities in mind. In this regard, to the extent that there are
tumultuous acts that would ostensibly support a disorderly conduct
charge under OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) and that could also constitute
or involve an expressive act, the expression at issue would still have
to be of the kind that would place a person in reasonable fear for his
or her “life, limb, or health” before a defendant could be found guilty
of disorderly conduct under OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1). As many other
jurisdictions have consistently found, the type of expression that
would give rise to such a reasonable fear would not be constitutionally
protected; rather, it would have to involve “fighting words” or a
“true threat,” which are the specific forms of expression that fall
outside of the realm of constitutional protection and that could give
rise to such reasonable fears. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (62 SCt 766, 86 LE 1031) (1942); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (III) (A) (123 SCt 1536, 155 LE2d 535) (2003). See also, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 489 Pa. 254, 261 (414 A2d 54) (1980)
(Pennsylvania disorderly conduct statute was constitutional, as the
statute could “not be used to punish anyone exercising a protected
First Amendment right,” but could be used against a defendant who
used fighting words); Carr v. Bradley, No. 2:07-cv-01053, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27065 (ID) (A) (8.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2009) (“Ohio’s disorderly
conduct statute[ ] has been narrowly construed by the Ohio Supreme
Court so as to maintain its constitutionality. For speech to be the basis
for a disorderly conduct charge, the speech must amount to ‘fighting
words’ as that term is used in First Amendment jurisprudence”);
Nolan v. Krajcik, 384 FSupp.2d 447 (IID) (C) (1) (D. Mass. 2005)
(statute criminalizing “idle and disorderly conduct” narrowly con-
strued to apply to unprotected “fighting words” rather than consti-
tutionally protected speech). We agree that a narrow interpretation
of OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) such as the one that has been adopted in
other jurisdictions is appropriate here. Accordingly, we conclude that
OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) is not unconstitutionally overbroad, because
“the statute only can reach conduct which involves no lawful exercise
of a First Amendment right.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Nolan, supra, 384 FSupp.2d at 459 (IID (C) (1). Specifically, as applied
to expressive conduct, the statute only reaches expressive conduct
that amounts to “fighting words” or a “true threat.”

186 ee

2. Because there was no showing here that Freeman’s act of
silently raising his middle finger from the back of the church during
the church service constituted “fighting words” or a “true threat” that
would amount to a tumultuous act, his conviction for disorderly
conduct under OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1) cannot stand. Freeman was
specifically charged

with the offense of DISORDERLY CONDUCT for the said
accused person, on or about the 3rd day of August, 2014, did
actina...tumultuous manner toward Jason Berry whereby
said victim was placed in reasonable fear of the safety of said
person’s life, limb or health by screaming, shouting[*] or
using obscene gestures.

(Emphasis supplied.) The alleged obscene gesture in this case was the
raising of Freeman’s middle finger from the back of the church.
However, a raised middle finger, by itself, does not, without more,
amount to fighting words ora true threat. As explained by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts:

We recognize that the raising of the middle finger as a form
of insult has a long, if not illustrious, history dating back to
ancient Greece. See Robbins, Digitus Impudicus: The Middle
Finger and the Law, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1403, 1413 (2008).
Like its verbal counterpart, when it is used to express
contempt, anger, or protest, tt is a form of expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Sandul v. Larion,
119 F3d 1250, 1255 (6th Cir. 1997) (passenger yelling “f[__]k
you” and extending middle finger while passing group of
protestors entitled to First Amendment protection); Duran
v. [City of] Douglas, 904 F2d 1372, 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990)
(“obscene gesture” and profanities directed to police, while
“fiJnarticulate and crude,” “represented an expression of
disapproval toward a police officer” that “fell squarely within
the protective umbrella of the First Amendment”).

But, in certain limited circumstances, when accompa-
nied by other less expressive and more threatening conduct,
raising the middle finger may constitute fighting words or a
true threat. Compare United States v. Poocha, 259 F3d 1077,
1082 (9th Cir. 2001) (clenching fists and yelling “f[__]k you”

* It is undisputed that none of the screaming and shouting was directed toward Pastor
Berry, as the evidence reveals that Freeman only began screaming and shouting at no one in
particular as the congregants were leaving the sanctuary after the church service had ended

eS 187

to police officer not fighting words), and Cook v. County
Comm'rs of Wyandotte County, 966 F. Supp. 1049, 1051, 1052
(D. Kan. 1997) (raising middle finger at police officer parked
in patrol car not fighting words), with Gower v. Vercler, 377
F3d 661, 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2004) (repeatedly yelling “f[__]k
you” and insults, and attempting to humiliate, constitutes
fighting words where parties had brandished weapons at
each other previous night), and State v. Groves, 219 Neb.
382, 384, 386 (363 NW2d 507) (1985) (calling police officer
“motherf[__]ker” and challenging him to make arrest alone
after learning that officer had called for assistance were
fighting words).

Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) O’Brien v. Borowski, 461
ass. 415, 428-429 (3) (961 NE2d 547) (2012).

Here, Freeman raised his middle finger as a form of protest, and
here is no evidence that Freeman engaged in additional threatening
conduct that would have elevated his raised middle finger to the level
f conveying “fighting words” or a “true threat.” The evidence reveals
hat he stared angrily at Pastor Berry and did nothing more while he
‘aised his middle finger in silence from the back of the church. This
would not rise to the level of “fighting words” or a “true threat” as a
matter of law. See Poocha, supra, 259 F3d at 1082 (clenching fists and
yelling “f[__]k you” to police officer not fighting words). And, because
Freeman’s actions did not amount to such fighting words or a true
threat, the pastor could not have been placed in “reasonable fear of
he safety of [his] life, limb, or health” consistent with the parameters
of OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1). Accordingly, Freeman’s raised middle
finger constituted a constitutionally protected expression, and he
could not be found guilty of disorderly conduct under OCGA §
16-11-39 (a) (1) based on having made the gesture in the manner that
he did. The evidence was insufficient to support Freeman’s conviction
under OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (1), and, because of this, his conviction
must be reversed and he cannot be re-tried on the disorderly conduct
charge. Priest v. State, 265 Ga. 399 (1) (456 SE2d 503) (1995).

Judgment reversed. Hines, C. J., Benham, Hunstein, Nahmias,
Blackwell, Boggs, Grant, JJ., and Judge Mack Crawford concur.
Peterson, J., not participating.

3¢g¢eee 2

a

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

. Justin Freeman, pro se.

188 Pe

Stephanie D. Woodard, Solicitor-General, Daniel Sanmiguel,
Assistant Solicitor-General; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1105. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 890)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

After a six-day trial, a jury found Craig Johnson guilty of malice
murder and other crimes related to the stabbing death of Nicole
Judge. All of the original verbatim trial transcript materials were
later destroyed in a fire at the court reporter’s house. The State
ultimately provided Johnson with a 14-page, double-spaced docu-
ment purported to be a complete narrative re-creation of the trial
transcript. As explained below, we conclude that the re-created
transcript is not sufficiently detailed to allow Johnson a fair oppor-
tunity to appeal or to allow meaningful appellate review. We there-
fore reverse the trial court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for new trial."

+ The crimes occurred on the night of February 28-29, 2008. On April 29, 2008, a Lee
County grand jury indicted Johnson for malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated
assault (by assaulting the victim with a deadly weapon (a knife), and by stabbing her with
intent to kill), aggravated battery (by stabbing the victim and causing a wound on her arm),
theft by taking, financial transaction card theft, and tampering with evidence. Beginning on
September 14, 2009, Johnson was tried on all of these charges except theft by taking and
tampering with evidence. On September 21, the jury found him guilty of all counts tried. After
the trial, the court granted the State’s motion to nolle pros the two untried charges based on.
insufficient evidence.

On October 1, 2009, the trial court sentenced Johnson to serve life in prison for malice
murder and 20 years for each of the two aggravated assault counts and the aggravated battery
count, all to run concurrently with the life sentence. The sentencing order says that Johnson
was also sentenced tolife in prison on the felony murder count and two consecutive years on the
card theft. The re-created transcript says asto the “Sentence” that the felony murder count was
“merged” with the malice murder count and that Johnson was sentenced to “[t]wenty years”
concurrent on the card theft. Because we conclude that Johnson is entitled to a new trial, we
need not resolve any sentencing issues. However, we note for retrial that while the lack of a
sentence for felony murder would be proper (although the felony murder count should be
vacated asa matter of law rather than merged, see Stewart v, State, 299 Ga. 622, 627 (791 SE2d
61) (2016), the maximum sentence for the card theft is three years, see OCGA § 16-9-31 (©). In
addition, the guilty verdicts for the two aggravated assaults and the aggravated battery should
merge into the malice murder conviction unless the evidence shows that they were separated
from the murder by deliberate intervals. See Schutt v. State, 292 Ga. 625, 627 (740 SE2d 163)
(2013); Slaughter v. State, 292 Ga. 573, 575 (740 SE2d 119) (2013)

As discussed in more detail below, on October 22, 2009, Johnson filed a timely motion for
new trial, which he amended with new counsel. The trial court summarily denied the motion
on November 1, 2016. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which

eS 189

The Trial

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
available for review on appeal, which includes the re-created trial
transcript, Johnson’s videotaped custodial statement, and most of
the exhibits admitted at trial, shows the following.” On the night of
February 28-29, 2008, Judge was stabbed to death. She suffered 36
separate stab wounds, including 10 to her head, three to her neck, six
to her liver, and 14 to her back. She also had multiple cuts on her
arms. Judge was found in her apartment on the floor of her children’s
play room with a knife in her neck. Blood was found outside and
inside the apartment, including bloodstains on the driveway and
porch, projected bloodstains in the hallway and play room, bloody
footprints in the kitchen and bathroom, and blood spots in the cutlery
drawer in the kitchen. Bloody fingerprints on the door of the apart-
ment and on a toy in the apartment matched Johnson’s fingerprints.
When GBI agents searched Johnson’s house a few days after Judge’s
death, they found socks and a shirt with her blood on them. In
addition, a bank ATM video showed Johnson trying to use the victim’s
ATM card on the night of her death, and Judge’s driver’s license and
social security card were found in the bank parking lot.

Four days later, Johnson was arrested, and GBI agents inter-
viewed him for almost four hours. He was advised of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966),
and he signed a waiver of those rights. Johnson first told the agents
that he was not at Judge’s apartment when she died. He then
admitted that he had been there and claimed that he and Judge had
sex, she said she wanted to be with him, he said no, she began
stabbing herself, and he tried to stop her before running away. After
an agent told Johnson that Judge’s stab wounds were not self-
inflicted, he again changed his story, saying that while Judge was
stabbing herself, her “boyfriend” (whom Johnson identified only as
“T-man’”) arrived, Judge and her boyfriend started fighting, Johnson
ran to the kitchen to get a knife to defend himself, he returned when
he heard Judge scream, he fought with the boyfriend, he then ran
away, and the boyfriend followed him and forced him to use the
victim’s ATM card.

properly transferred the case to this Court. The case was docketed here for the April 2017 term
and orally argued on May 2, 2017.

2 Johnson's statement was played at trial and admitted as an exhibit. The originals of all
but three of the exhibits introduced at trial were stored separately from the original transcript
materials, so those exhibits were not destroyed by the fire, See footnote 5 below for more details.

190 ee

After being told that the physical evidence did not match this
account either, Johnson admitted that there was no boyfriend an
told the following story: When he rejected Judge, she threatened to
tell his wife about their affair. Judge then pulled out a knife and trie!
to stab him. While they were fighting over the knife, Judge was
stabbed and Johnson cut his hand. He then went to the kitchen to get
a knife. He returned to the room where Judge was. She had droppe:
her knife but rushed at him, and he stabbed her. She then took his
knife, and he went to the kitchen for another knife. He returned, an
they fought more. At some point, he stabbed her in the back. She
eventually fell to the floor, and he stabbed her again. He left her lying
on the floor, went to the bathroom, cleaned up, and then fled. He trie’
to use her ATM card because he wanted to get money for her children.

Johnson did not testify at trial. The jury was instructed on
self-defense and voluntary manslaughter. It found him guilty of al
counts tried. The evidence summarized above was sufficient to autho-
rize a rational jury to return those guilty verdicts. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See
also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009).

Post-Trial Procedural History

2. On October 22, 2009, Johnson’s trial counsel filed a timely
motion for new trial — a two-page document that summarily alleged
only that the verdicts were contrary to the evidence and the law. On
March 3, 2010, while presumably still represented by trial counsel,
Johnson wrote the trial court’s clerk asking for a transcript of his
trial; the clerk’s office told him to contact the court reporter. On
September 24, 2010, Johnson asked the clerk’s office for a public
defender to represent him on appeal; the clerk’s office told him to
contact the public defender’s office. On March 14, 2011, appellate
counsel from the circuit public defender’s office was finally appointed
to represent Johnson.®

Appellate counsel requested the trial transcript. Before the
verbatim transcript, which had not yet been completed, was pro-
vided, a fire at the court reporter’s house on November 13, 2011
destroyed the tapes and other materials from which the verbatim
transcript was to be prepared. At a motion for new trial hearing on
April 30, 2012, Johnson argued that he was entitled to a new trial
because the trial transcript was unavailable. The State replied that

® In October 2011, this Court suspended Johnson's trial counsel from the practice of law for
six months based on his professional misconduct in a civil matter. See In the Matter of Bonner,
289 Ga. 838 (716 SE2d 224) (2011).

eS 191

ct

he procedures of OCGA § 5-6-41 (f) and (g) should be used to re-create
he transcript. After briefing by both parties, on November 15, 2012,
he trial court ordered the State to re-create the transcript and then
rovide Johnson time to offer alterations or additions; if the parties
ould not agree on the transcript, the court would hold a hearing. The
tate ultimately produced a 14-page, double-spaced narrative tran-
cript of the six-day trial, and Johnson, while not conceding that the
e-created transcript was sufficient, filed 12 minor suggestions for
hanges.

On July 26, 2016, Johnson filed an amended motion for new trial,
‘aising five enumerations of error, including a claim that the lack of
he original trial transcript denied him a full opportunity to present
in appeal and that the re-created transcript was not complete.* More
han seven years after the trial, on October 13, 2016, the trial court
held a hearing to consider the re-created transcript as well as the
amended new trial motion. After first hearing argument regarding
t
cd

att

fea]

fel Akan

cate ct

he transcript issue, the court said that Johnson’s 12 suggested
hanges were “well taken,” but that they were “form over substance.”
The court declined to make any changes and rejected Johnson’s
argument that the re-created transcript was not complete, ruling
that “the transcript, as proposed, in and of itself is sufficient to be
made the transcript of this trial along with the evidence and
[should be] prepared by my court reporter and the clerk of court for an
appropriate appeal.”® Based on the re-created trial transcript and the
rest of the record, the trial court then heard argument on Johnson’s
remaining contentions. On November 1, 2016, the court entered a
written order summarily denying the motion for new trial. Johnson
then filed this appeal.

3. Our decision in this case rests on two fundamental principles:
a defendant convicted of a crime has a right to appeal, and a
defendant convicted of a felony has a right to a transcript of the trial
to use in bringing that appeal. See Wilson v. State, 246 Ga. 672, 675
(273 SE2d 9) (1980). If an appellant is deprived of an adequate
transcript, he has effectively been deprived of his right to appeal. See

4 Johnson also argued that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court should grant
a new trial as the thirteenth juror, that the court improperly admitted evidence following the
Jackson-Denno hearing on Johnson's custodial statement, and that the court erred in denying
his motion for a mistrial based on a witness's improper mention of the vietim’s children.

© The record on appeal also includes all but three of the trial exhibits (photographs of the
victim’s driver’s license and ATM card and a defense exhibit photograph of the victim); pre- and
post-trial motions; transcripts of two pre-trial hearings, one on a motion to suppress evidence
gathered during the search of Johnson’s house andthe other on motions to quash the indictment
because of unrepresentative jury composition and to suppress Johnson's videotaped custodial
statement; and the court's written orders.

192 ee

Sheard v. State, 300 Ga. 117, 120 (793 SE2d 386) (2016); Wade v.
State, 231 Ga. 131, 133 (200 SE2d 271) (1973). Because Johnson was
deprived of an adequate trial transcript, he has been denied his right
to appeal, and he is therefore entitled to a new trial.

(a) This is a felony case, and in felony cases the State is respon-
sible for ensuring that a correct and complete transcript is created,
preserved, and provided to the defendant upon his request. OCGA §
17-8-5 (a) says:

On the trial of all felonies the presiding judge shall have
the testimony taken down and, when directed by the judge,
the court reporter shall exactly and truly record or take
stenographic notes of the testimony and proceedings in the
case, except the argument of counsel. In the event of a verdict
of guilty, the testimony shall be entered on the minutes of the
court or in a book to be kept for that purpose. . . .

See also OCGA § 5-6-41 (a) (“In all felony cases, the transcript of
evidence and proceedings shall be reported and prepared by a court
reporter as provided in Code Section 17-8-5 or as otherwise provided
by law.”). This Court has explained that “it is the duty of the state to
file the transcript after a guilty verdict has been returned in a felony
case. Such is the law in this state, and in this legal era of numerous
appeals and numerous post-conviction reviews it is a wise and
reasonable requirement.” Wade, 231 Ga. at 133.

Although not every portion of a criminal trial is required to be
transcribed, most must be reported verbatim, with the express
purpose of creating an appropriate record for appeal:

Where a trial in any civil or criminal case is reported by
acourt reporter, all motions, colloquies, objections, rulings,
evidence, whether admitted or stricken on objection or
otherwise, copies or summaries of all documentary evidence,
the charge of the court, and all other proceedings which may
be called in question on appeal or other posttrial procedure
shall be reported; and, where the report is transcribed, all
such matters shall be included in the written transcript, it
being the intention of this article that all these matters
appear in the record. Where matters occur which were not
reported, such as objections to oral argument, misconduct of
the jury, or other like instances, the court, upon motion of
either party, shall require that a transcript of these matters
be made and included as a part of the record. ...

eS 193

OCGA § 5-6-41 (d). See also Dunlap v. State, 291 Ga. 51, 53 (727 SE2d
468) (2012) (holding that jury voir dire and the opening and closing
arguments of the attorneys are not required parts of a transcript of a
non-death-penalty felony trial).

Ifa verbatim transcript is not created or is lost before a defendant
appeals, the defendant is not automatically entitled to a new trial, as
the State can try to re-create the transcript under OCGA § 5-6-41 (f)
and (g).° If “the transcript or record does not truly or fully disclose
what transpired in the trial court,” OCGA § 5-6-41 (f) allows the
transcript to be produced by recollection. If the parties do not agree
about what occurred, “the trial court shall set the matter down for a
hearing with notice to both parties and resolve the difference so as to
make the recordconform to the truth.” Id. OCGA § 5-6-41 (g) explains
that a transcript prepared from recollection is entitled to “the same
binding effect as a transcript filed by the court reporter,” but only if
the parties agree. If the parties do not agree, the trial judge must
decide. Id.” Here, the trial court concluded that the re-created tran-
script is correct and sufficient for appeal.

® OCGA § 5-6-41 (f) and (g) say in full:

(f) Where any party contends that the transcript or record does not truly or
fully disclose what transpired in the trial court and the parties are unable to agree
thereon, the trial court shall set the matter down for a hearing with notice to both,
parties and resolve the difference so as to make the record conform to the truth. If
anything material to either party is omitted from the record on appeal or is
misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or the trial court, either before or after
the record is transmitted to the appellate court, on a proper suggestion or of its own
initiative, may direct that the omission or misstatement shall be corrected and, if.
necessary, that a supplemental record shall be certified and transmitted by the
clerk of the trial court. The trial court or the appellate court may at any time order
the clerk of the trial court to send up any original papers or exhibits in the case, to.
be returned after final disposition of the appeal.

(g) Where a trial is not reported as referred to in subsections (b) and (¢) of this
Code section or where for any other reason the transcript of the proceedings is not
obtainable and a transcript of evidence and proceedings is prepared from recollec-
tion, the agreement of the parties thereto or their counsel, entered thereon, shall
entitle such transcript to be filed as a part of the record in the same manner and
with the same binding effect as a transcript filed by the court reporter as referred
to in subsection (e) of this Code section. In case of the inability of the parties to agree
as to the correctness of such transcript, the decision of the trial judge thereon shall
be final and not subject to review; and, if the trial judge is unable to recall what
transpired, the judge shall enter an order stating that fact.

* The defendant has the responsibility to ask for the transcript when he needs it. See
OCGA § 5-6-42 (‘Where there is a transcript of evidence and proceedings to be included in the
record on appeal, the appellant shall cause the transcript to be prepared and filed as provided
by Code Section 5-6-41[.]"); State v. Hart, 246 Ga. 212, 212-213 (271 SE2d 133) (1980). Once the
State has satisfied its obligation under OCGA §§ 17-8-5 (a) and 5-6-41 (a) by providing a
verbatim transcript, if the defendant believes the transcript omits or misrepresents a necessary
part of the proceeding, he has the responsibility to seek to correct the transcript in that respect.
See Glass v, State, 289 Ga. 542, 545 (712 SE2d 851) (2011). See also State v. Nejad, 286 Ga. 695,

194 ee

(b) The first part of the trial court’s ruling — that the re-created
transcript is correct — is not reviewable by this Court. See OCGA §
5-6-41 (g) (“In case of the inability of the parties to agree as to the
correctness of such transcript, the decision of the trial judge thereon
shall be final and not subject to review[.]”); Leeks v. State, 296 Ga. 515,
518 (769 SE2d 296) (2015). Appellate review is available, however, as
to whether the re-created transcript is complete— meaning sufficient
for Johnson to identify errors and this Court to evaluate the errors
then enumerated. An appellant is entitled to a “complete and correct”
transcript, Wilson, 246 Ga. at 675, one that “disclose[s] what trans-
pired in the trial court” not only “truly” but “fully,” OCGA § 5-6-41 (f).

Complete does not always mean verbatim; “where the trial is not
reported or the transcript of the proceedings for any other reason is
not available and the evidence is prepared from recollection, it may be
prepared in narrative form.” OCGA § 5-6-41 (d). But even a narrative
transcript must be sufficiently detailed to allow the defendant to
identify alleged errors and to allow meaningful appellate review.
When extensive and important parts of the trial transcript have been
lost, re-creating a complete transcript may, for example, require
calling witnesses who testified or other individuals who were present
for the trial. See, e.g., Mosley v. State, 300 Ga. 521, 524-526 (796 SE2d
684) (2017) (concluding that Mosley was not entitled to a new trial
when the State re-created the transcript of one missing day of trial
based on a hearing at which three of the four witnesses called that day
testified along with Mosley’s trial counsel and the prosecutor).

Such measures were not taken to re-create the transcript in this
case. On the contrary, at the hearing on the re-created transcript, the
prosecutor explained that the State prepared it from the trial court’s
notes, the notes of an investigator from the district attorney’s office
who was present at the trial, and the notes of the different prosecutor
who tried the case. In evaluating the new transcript, the trial judge

698 (690 SE2d 846) (2010) (“Where the transcript is not supplemented, the complaining party
does not carry its burden of showing by the record the facts necessary to establish its point.”).
Cases like Giass and Nejad involve gap-filling in an otherwise verbatim transcript, however,
not creating a trial transcript from scratch because the original materials have been lost. See
Glass, 289 Ga. at 545 (involving one missing pretrial hearing transcript); Nejad, 286 Ga. at 696
(involving the omission from the trial transcript of the trial judge’s informing Nejad of his right
to testify and Nejad’s indication that his decision not to testify was made after consultation with
counsel). In cases where the State cannot provide a verbatim trial transcript when the
defendant requests it, the State has the burden to produce an adequate alternative transcript,
although the defendant should of course participate in the re-creation process. If the State did
not have this burden, the State could ignore its transcript-creating duty altogether and demand
that defendants in every felony case use OCGA § 5-6-41 (f) and (g) totry tocreate the transcript
they need to appeal. Thus, the trial court here properly put upon the State, and the State
appropriately accepted, the burden of trying to create a complete transcript of Johnson's trial

eS 195

relied solely on those three sets of notes and his own recollection of the
trial held more than seven years earlier.* The State apparently made
no attempt to interview or call to testify anyone who had been a
witness or present for the trial. Johnson’s appellate counsel said that
he spoke with his client about what had occurred during the trial, but
he represented to the court without objection that he was unable to
obtain any assistance from Johnson’s trial counsel, who “had no notes
and no recollection” and “basically refused and failed to assist” in
preparing the transcript; by the time of the hearing, trial counsel had
died.

The result of this lackluster information-gathering process was
a 14-page transcript — double-spaced, with wide margins and much
additional white space — purporting to summarize a six-day trial and
sentencing hearing. This elliptical transcript consists of brief sum-
maries of the trial testimony given by the State’s 14 witnesses. It
mentions the cross-examination of only two witnesses, but it is not
clear whether that is because Johnson’s trial counsel did not cross-
examine the other witnesses or because the transcript simply does
not delineate between testimony given on direct examination and
testimony given on cross-examination.® It is likely the latter, because
in the brief summary of one witness, which contains no mention of
cross-examination, the transcript notes that “Defendant’s Exhibit 1”
was admitted. More details generally are given about the 58 exhibits
offered into evidence, including which witness testified about the
exhibit and if it was admitted. All but one of the exhibits were
admitted; the exception was an ATM log tendered as a “business
record.” The re-created transcript does not explain why this evidence
was not admitted and does not indicate that Johnson raised any
objection to it.

® Johnson's counsel represents in his brief that he was given access only to the trial court's
notes and that those notes consist of only nine pages, which focus on the evidence admitted
rather than the substance of the testimony. And one may certainly question whether the sorts
of notes used by the State would identify, much less highlight, errors made by the prosecution
or the trial court to Johnson's detriment. See Hardy v. United States, 375 U. 8. 277, 290 (84 SCt
424, 11 LE2d 331) (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[A] lawyer appointed to represent the
interests of a defendant should not be required to delegate his responsibility of determining
whether error occurred at trial to participants at that trial whose conduct may have formed the
very basis for the errors.”).

° In one of the two mentions of cross-examination, the re-created transcript says that
“the defense contended” that the fingerprints being discussed by the witness could have
belonged to someone else. The State objected, and the trial court “ruled that the defense could
not raise that issue because Defendant had admitted to being at the apartment and was
claiming self-defense.” This description is perplexing, as the defense does not “contend”
anything by examination of witnesses.

196 ee

More troubling, although the re-created transcript notes that
Johnson raised 14 objections to the admission of evidence, all of which
were overruled, it does not describe the basis for any of these
objections or for any of the trial court’s rulings. The re-creation also
notes that Johnson moved for a mistrial twice based on violations of
two granted motions in limine and that the trial court denied both
motions. In one instance, the court instructed the jury to disregard
the witness’s use of the word “murder.” In the other instance, the
transcript says that after the first responding police officer testified
that he found Judge’s children when he arrived on the scene, in
violation of a motion in limine granted on the first day of trial “to
exclude any evidence of the victim’s young children being found in the
apartment with the deceased victim,” the trial court concluded there
was no prejudice from the witness's mention of the victim’s children
because the victim’s father “previously testified that the children
were with their mother, the victim.” No such testimony, however, is
reflected in the account of the father’s testimony in the re-created
transcript. The court also gave a curative instruction “crafted and
approved by counsel for both sides.” The substance of the instruction,
however, is not described.

Asimilar problem is found in the description of a GBI agent’s test-
imony. The re-created transcript says that when the agent “mentioned
that Defendant had been arrested as a juvenile,” the trial court
“objected” to this testimony (although objecting is normally done by the
opposing party, rather than the court) and “restricted him from testi-
fying as to that matter.” Again, important details are not provided,
including whether a curative instruction was requested or given.

Also unfortunately cursory is the re-created transcript’s account
of the jury charge, which consists only of a list of pattern jury
instruction numbers and titles that were given. There is noindication
as to what instructions were requested by either party or discussed at
the charge conference, whether the court denied any instructions
requested by Johnson, or whether (and if so, how) the court modified
these pattern instructions to fit the facts of the case.'° Finally, the

1° For example, the instructions on self-defense and voluntary manslaughter reflect
inconsistent defense theories, as the former posits that Johnson killed the victim out of justified
fear, while the latter asserts that Johnson killed the victim due to provocation and passion. See,
eg., Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 693, 695-696 (653 SE2d 477) (2007). Although the re-created
transcript shows that both charges were given, it does not show whether Johnson requested
both charges, whether the State requested one, or whether the trial court charged one or both
sua sponte.

eS 197

re-creation recites that no objections were made by the parties during
jury selection, opening statements, and closing arguments."

(c) For these reasons, when considered as a whole, the re-created.
narrative transcript lacks sufficient accounts of crucial parts of
Johnson’s trial. See Sheard, 300 Ga. at 121 (“[TJhe jury charge —
which is missing here — is a crucial portion of trial in which jurors are
instructed on the applicable law, on how to evaluate the evidence, and
on how to deliberate and reach a verdict[.]”); OCGA § 17-8-58 (b)
(authorizing plain error review of jury instructions not objected to at
trial). See also Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (84 SCt 424,
11 LE2d 331) (1964) (“We conclude that [new appellate] counsel’s
duty cannot be discharged unless he has a transcript of the testimony
and evidence presented by the defendant and also the court’s charge
to the jury, as well as the testimony and evidence presented by the
prosecution.”). The lack of sufficient detailis particularly problematic
because Johnson is represented by new counsel on appeal. See
Sheard, 300 Ga. at 121 (“[FJorcing appellate counsel — who was not
involved in the original trial — to divine error without the aid of a
transcript is not only fruitless but also hinders counsel’s ability to
adequately and zealously represent [his client] on appeal.”). See also
Hardy, 375 U.S. at 279-280 (“[W]hen, as here, new counsel repre-
sents the [defendant] on appeal, how can he faithfully discharge the
obligation which the court has placed on him unless he can read the
entire transcript?”).!?

Johnson asserts that there may have been errors made by the
trial court or his trial counsel during the trial, but that without an
adequate transcript he has no way of knowing. We agree. In cases
where a verbatim transcript is missing just one or a few parts of the
trial, particularly parts that are not required to be transcribed in the
first place, this Court has held that the appellant is not entitled to a
new trial unless he can point more specifically to some error that
allegedly occurred during the omitted part. See, e.g., Ruffin v. State,
283 Ga. 87, 88 (656 SE2d 140) (2008) (“[T]he absence of a transcript
of voir dire, opening statement, bench conferences and the polling of
the jury .. . ‘cannot be reversible error absent an allegation of harm
resulting from the deletion.’” (quoting Smith v. State, 251 Ga.
229, 230 (304 SE2d 716) (1983)). See also Sheard, 300 Ga. at 120

4 The re-created transcript makes no effort to deseribe the substance of those portions of
the trial, but as discussed previously, these portions of a trial are not required to be transcribed.
See Dunlap, 291 Ga. at 53.

12 Appellate counsel's difficulty in representing Johnson is further magnified by trial
counsel's death and initial unwillingness to help new counsel identify potential errors for
appeal

198 ee

(‘The mere fact that a portion of a transcript is missing does not
automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial. Such omissions
cannot be reversible error absent an allegation of harm resulting
from the deletion. However, where the missing transcript prevents
adequate review of the trial below, a new trial is warranted.” (cita-
tions and punctuation omitted)).

We do not normally assume that an error occurred during a mere
gap in a trial transcript. On the contrary, we presume that a trial
court followed the law and that trial counsel rendered adequate
assistance. See Edwards v. State, 301 Ga. 822, 827 (804 SE2d 404)
(2017); Batten v. State, 295 Ga. 442, 445 (761 SE2d 70) (2014). Those
presumptions, however, are just that — presumptions, which can be
rebutted by what is shown in the record.

An appeal is Johnson’s chance to point to the record and over-
come those presumptions. He can only do that with an adequate
transcript. In this case, where the whole original verbatim transcript
of his trial is lost and the narrative re-creation is manifestly inad-
equate, Johnson has not been given a fair opportunity to identify any
trial errors and resulting harm or deficient performance by counsel
and resulting prejudice. See Sheard, 300 Ga. at 120-121 (ordering a
new trial where the transcript of the final day of trial, which included
crucial parts of the trial, was missing and was not adequately re-
created); Wilson, 246 Ga. at 674-676 (concluding, when 21 of the 34
trial tapes were missing, that “the omissions in the transcript pre-
clude us from finding that [the omissions] were immaterial and
harmless”); Montford v. State, 164 Ga. App. 627, 628 (298 SE2d 319)
(1982) (ordering a new trial when the court reporter refused to make
the transcription and all of the tapes of the trial “were very difficult
to understand and contained much which was inaudible,” making
them impossible for another court reporter to fully transcribe). See
also McKinney v. State, 300 Ga. 562, 562 n.1 (797 SE2d 484) (2017)
(noting that McKinney was retried because the transcript of his first
trial was lost); Godbee v. State, 153 Ga. App. 115, 115 (264 SE2d 578)
(1980) (noting that Godbee’s motion for new trial was granted because
the transcript of the trial was lost).1*

18 In Cole v. United States, 478 A2d 277 (D.C. 1984), the District of Columbia's Court of
Appeals addressed a situation similar to the one in this case, including the complete loss of the
original trial transcript and the appointment of new appellate counsel for the defendant. See
id. at 279. The court held that the defendant's right to appeal was stymied when the re-created
transcript was a two and one-half double-spaced summary of a two-day trial that briefly
summarized the direct testimony of each of the witnesses and the cross-examination of one
witness, the documentary evidence presented, and closing arguments, but made no reference
tothe cross-examination of the other two witnesses and included no summary of the trial court's
instructions to the jury. See id. at 280, 286 (granting a new trial based on the insufficiency of

eS 199

(d) Besides arguing that the re-created transcript is an adequate
representation of the trial, the State contends here, as it did at the
hearing on the re-created transcript, that the narrative re-creation is
sufficient simply because it shows that the evidence that Johnson
murdered Judge was overwhelming, largely due to his videotaped
statement; thus, the State insists, any errors that trial counsel or the
trial court might have committed were necessarily harmless. But this
Court cannot evaluate the strength of the evidence without a com-
plete account of the overall evidence, and we certainly cannot evalu-
ate the effect of unknown errors. See Montford, 164 Ga. App. at 629
(‘It is true that where the transcript itself shows error is harmless, it
may so be declared. Here, however, the transcript omissions preclude
us from ascertaining if errors were made and if so, whether they were
harmless.”). Engaging in such speculation would not provide Johnson
the appeal to which he is entitled. We cannot hold that an appellant
is not entitled to a complete trial transcript simply because it appears
from the record that exists that he is clearly guilty. Because Johnson
has been deprived of the ability to appeal his convictions, the trial
court should have granted his motion for a new trial.’

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Kevin Kwashnak, for appellant.

Plez H. Hardin, District Attorney, Lewis R. Lamb, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Oldham, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

the re-created transcript, even though D.C.’s re-creation rule, unlike Georgia's, places the
burden on the appellant to create a substitute record if the verbatim transcript is lost). See also
Simmons v. State, 200 $2d 619, 621-622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (granting a new trial when
the trial transcript was lost after concluding that re-creation efforts would not produce an
adequate substitute because the appellant had new counsel on appeal, trial counsel had quit
under acrimonious circumstances and so was unlikely to cooperate, and almost two years had
passed since the trial)

+ Because the evidence in the record, in particular Johnson's videotaped statement, was
legally sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdicts, “the State may, at its option, choose to
retry [Johnson] on the offenses for which there was a guilty verdict.” Sheard, 300 Ga. at 121 n.5

200 Pe

$17A1126. CARTER v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 839)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellant D’Andre Theophlouis Carter was convicted of malice
murder and associated crimes in connection with the shooting death
of Dequavious Reed.' On appeal, Carter contends that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the trial court erro-
neously admitted a portion of a recorded conversation which captured
the statements of a third party who did not testify at trial, and that
the trial court erroneously admitted a recording of a jailhouse tele-
phone call made by Carter. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented below established as follows. On July 11, 2013,
Reed was discovered dead on the floor of his residence, with his pants
pulled down and his shirt pulled up to his neck; he had been shot twice.
Jayvias Lott, who had been arrested for armed robbery and other
assorted crimes unrelated to the murder, had heard details concerning
the crime and agreed to wear a secret recording device in order to
obtain a statement from Carter. As agreed, Lott later recorded a
conversation he had with Carter and a third party, Kavozeia Walker.
In the recorded conversation, Carter recounts the events of Reed’s
murder, explaining that: he and his two brothers, Claron and C. J.,
went to Reed’s residence under the pretense of purchasing drugs; after
pretending to leave, the trio reversed course, and Claron shot the
victim twice; Carter watched Reed die; the trio rifled through Reed’s
pockets, searched his residence, and stole marijuana and several
hundred dollars; and, the murder weapon was thrown into a nearby
pond.”

At trial, Lott testified regarding his conversation with Carter,
and the recorded conversation was played for the jury. Finally, the
State presented evidence that a firearm, later identified as the
murder weapon, was discovered in a local pond.

+ In November 2013, a Coffee County grand jury indieted Carter and his two brothers on the
charges of malice murder, felony murder predicated on burglary, felony murder predicated on
armed robbery, armed robbery, and first-degree burglary. Carter was tried alone, and, following
a trial conducted May 12-13, 2015, a jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Carter was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for malice murder, 20 years’
imprisonment for armed robbery, and a consecutive 20-year sentence for burglary, for a total
sentence of life without parole plus 40 years; the remaining counts were vacated by operation of
law. Carter filed a motion for new trial on May 20, 2015, which was amended on March 14, 2016.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the amended motion on July 21, 2016; Carter
subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. This case was docketed to the April 2017 term and was
thereafter submitted for decision on the briefs.

2 This Court has already reviewed and affirmed Claron Carter's convictions and sentences.
See Carter v. State, 299 Ga. 1 (785 SE2d 532) (2016).

eS 201

1. The evidence as summarized above was sufficient to enable a
rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Carter was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Though Carter argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
his burglary conviction, there was evidence before the jury that
Carter and his brothers entered the house under the pretense of
purchasing drugs, going so far as to pretend to leave the residence
before reversing course and committing the armed robbery that
ended in Reed’s death; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient for the
jury to conclude that Carter and his brothers entered the residence
without authority and with the intent to commit a theft therein. See
State v. Newton, 294 Ga. 767, 772 (755 SE2d 786) (2014).

2. Though Lott testified at trial, Walker did not, and Carter
asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Walker’s portion of the
recorded conversation. Specifically, Carter argues that Walker’s por-
tion of the conversation was irrelevant under OCGA § 24-4-402, that
it was inadmissible hearsay under OCGA § 24-8-801, and that the
admission of Walker’s portion of the conversation violated Carter’s
right to confrontation. We find no error.

The recording in question reflects that Walker entered the
conversation shortly after Carter and Lott began to speak, and some
of the more meaningful exchanges between the three men include the
following:

R: What are y’all taking about?
R:... Quay. Yeah.

WALKER: What? Let me tell you about this s***. That
m*****f***** there just have got everything in this b****
pockets, bro. In his pockets. They didn’t even go through the
house.

CART

&

R: Cuz, you tripping, bro.

WALKER: They ain’t even go through the house.

CARTER: That’s what we did. But I knew what the f***
I was doing. Because if we would have stayed a little bit
longer, we would have got caught.

WALKER: True. True. True.

LOTT: What y’all got?

CARTER: S***. I got money and dope.
LOTT: How much money?

WALKER: Two hundred.

202 eS

CARTER: H*** no. You a d*** liar. I got that by myself.
Me and Claron had three hundred, and C. J. had about two
hundred.

WALKER: I seen them. I was sitting on the porch. I seen
Dre coming up the road. He done whipped that bit behind
Tip’s house. I say, “oh, they done did it” — Claron say, “I shot
his a**.” I said “b**** stop b*Ils****ing.” That bit got blood
all on him, I said, man that n***** was tripping, cuz.

CARTER: I didn’t see it. I didn’t even know.

LOTT: What did you do, hold him or something?

CARTER: No, I went in his pockets. I was the one who
went in his pockets.

LOTT: When he was alive?

WALKER: When he was dying. Because he was...

CARTER: No. I watched it.

WALKER: C. J. said he was dead before he hit the floor.

CARTER: No, man, C. J. wasn’t even in the f***ing house.

LOTT: Oh man. Come on. What I’m saying when he was
trying to buck, what the h***, y’all — cuz panic or some-
thing?

CARTER: No, bro. I told lil bro.

WALKER: It was planned.

CARTER: Hunh?

WALKER: It was planned.

CARTER: It was planned.

The recording and transcript were admitted over counsel's objec-
tion, and the jury was instructed that they were not to consider
Walker’s statements as evidence of Carter’s guilt. We now review the
trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of this evidence for abuse of
discretion. See Adkins v. State, 301 Ga. 153 (2) (800 SE2d 341) (2017).

(a) Relevancy and Its Limits

“All relevant evidence [is] admissible.” OCGA § 24-4-402. Under
OCGA § 24-4-401, “relevant evidence” is defined as “evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” We have recognized before that the
relevance standard in the new Evidence Code is a “liberal one.” See
State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, n. 2 (773 SE2d 170) (2015).

Without citation to anything more than the relevancy statutes,
Carter argues that the State has failed to demonstrate that Walker’s
portion of the recorded conversation was relevant. At most, Carter

eS 208

suggests that, because the jury was instructed to “ignore” Walker’s
portion of the conversation, his statements were necessarily irrel-
evant; however, this argument is both premised on an incorrect
assessment of the trial court’s instruction and illogical. Though the
trial court instructed the jury not to consider Walker’s portion of the
conversation “as evidence of guilt of the accused” or “for the truth of
the matter asserted,” the jury was not instructed to ignore Walker’s
statements. Likewise, simply because the jury was instructed not to
consider the substance of Walker’s statements it does not follow that
his portion was irrelevant; Walker’s comments were necessary to
provide context and clarity to Carter’s responses, and the conversa-
tion as a whole was very relevant to the primary issue before the jury,
namely Carter’s guilt.

Nevertheless, “[r]Jelevant evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by consider-
ations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403. As we have noted before,
the primary purpose behind Rule 403 is to “exclud(e) matter of scant
or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of
its prejudicial effect.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hood v.
State, 299 Ga. 95, 103 (786 SE2d 648) (2016). Rule 403 is an extraor-
dinary remedy which the courts should invoke “sparingly, and the
balance . .. should be struck in favor of admissibility.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) United States v. Dodds, 347 F3d 893, 897 (11th
Cir. 2003).

Carter asserts, without exposition, that Walker’s statements in
the recorded conversation “were unfairly prejudicial, confusing and
misleading.” However, “[s]imply because the evidence is damaging or
prejudicial to a defendant’s case does not mean. . . that the evidence
should be excluded.” United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F2d
1099, 1119 (11th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 403, the extraordinary
remedy of exclusion requires that the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion, or misleading the jury substantially outweigh the proba-
tive nature of the evidence. Walker’s portion of the conversation,
however, is not of such scant evidentiary value that it would be so
outweighed, and it certainly was not introduced solely for its unfair
prejudicial impact. Accordingly, the trial court acted within its dis-
cretion to conclude that Walker’s portion of the recorded conversation
was relevant.

(b) Hearsay and Confrontation Clause

Carter also argues, again citing to little meaningful authority,
that Walker’s portion of the conversation was inadmissible hearsay

204 eS

and that the admission of Walker’s portion of the conversation ran
afoul of the Confrontation Clause. We disagree.

“Hearsay means a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801 (c). Thus,
an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for some
purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. United
States v. Parry, 649 F2d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1981). Here, Walker’s
portion of the conversation was not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. Instead, the State adduced Walker’s statements to
provide the jury with a complete, coherent conversation and to give
context to Carter’s inculpatory statements; the import of Walker’s
portion of the conversation is not derived from its substance or
accuracy but, instead, from Carter’s responses thereto.’ Accordingly,
the trial court correctly ruled that Walker’s portion of the conversa-
tion did not amount to hearsay. See United States v. Price, 792 F2
994, 997 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The single purpose for admitting the
[informant’s] statements was to make understandable to the jury the
statements made by [defendant] himself. The statements are not
hearsay, as they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.”);
United States v. Williams, 604 F2d 1102, 1118 (8th Cir. 1979) (“{T]he
tape-recorded conversation was not hearsay because it was admitte’
to provide a context for [the defendant’s] end of the conversation, not
as proof of the matters asserted therein by [the non-testifying party].”);
Jones v. State, 339 Ga. App. 95 (2) (791 SE2d 625) (2016) (informant’s
portion of recording not hearsay when offered to provide context to
defendant’s portion of conversation).‘ Further, the trial court’s instruc-
tion concerning Walker’s portion of the conversation was sound, an
we presume that the jury followed it. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 324 n. 9 (105 SCt 1965, 85 LE2d 344) (1985) (a crucial assump-
tion of our constitutional system is that jurors follow the trial court’s
instructions).

Finally, with respect to Carter’s confrontation clause argument,
even if we were to assume that Walker’s recorded statements are
testimonial, an assumption that is highly questionable, see, e.g.,
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 (126 SCt 2266, 165 LE2d 224)
(2006) (remarking that statements made unwittingly to government
informant are non-testimonial), there is no confrontation clause

® We note that Walker's statement indicating that Claron had admitted to shooting Reed
was a fact independently established at trial and emphasized by the defendant

* See also United States v. Taylor, 688 Fed. Appx. 638 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Macari, 453 F3d 926 (7th Cir. 2006); Lee v, McCaughtry, 892 F2d 1318, 1324, n. 10 (7th Cir,
1990) (collecting cases).

eS 205

violation where, like here, the out-of-court statements are used for
“purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, n. 9 (124 SCt 1354, 158
LE2d 177) (2004). See also United States v. Jiminez, 564 F3d 1280
(IIT) (11th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, this argument is without merit.

3. During trial, the trial court also admitted a 45-second recorded
telephone call that was initiated by Carter while he was in pretrial
detention; the recorded telephone call captured Carter’s voice and
laughter, and it was admitted under the business-record exception to
the hearsay rule through the testimony of Lt. Walter James, an
assistant jail commander. On appeal, Carter argues, inter alia, that
the recording was inadmissible hearsay that does not fall within
the business-record exception, that Lt. James’ testimony concerning
Carter’s calling card was inadmissible, and that the State failed to
authenticate the recorded call under OCGA §§ 24-9-901 and 24-9-923.
There is no reversible error.

Carter first argues that the telephone recording is inadmissible
hearsay and that it does not fall within the business-record exception
to the hearsay rule. See OCGA § 24-8-803 (6). As Carter himself
acknowledges on appeal, however, the recording was admitted “to
allow the jury to compare the laughter and voice on the telephone
recording with the Lott recording,” and, thus, it was not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Accordingly, the recorded
telephone conversation is not hearsay, see, e.g., OCGA § 24-8-801 (0),
and, as such, it is immaterial whether the conversation falls within
the business-record exception. Consequently, Carter’s argument that
the recording was inadmissible hearsay is without merit.®

Carter’s remaining arguments — that Lt. James’ testimony
concerning the calling card was inadmissible and that the State failed
to authenticate the recorded telephone call under OCGA §§ 24-9-901
and 24-9-923 — are being asserted for the first time on appeal, and,
thus, are not preserved for appellate review.® Accordingly, we review

® Our conclusion that the recorded telephone conversation was not hearsay renders moot
Carter's argument that the State failed to “lay a proper foundation” to show that the recording
was a business record under OCGA § 24-8-803 (6).

® While trial counsel argued below both that Lt. James was not the custodian of the phone
records and that the recorded telephone conversation was inadmissible, trial counsel made no
argument with respect to Lt. James testifying concerning the calling card numbers. Likewise,
counsel never argued that the State failed to authenticate the recorded telephone conversations
pursuant to OCGA §§ 24-9-901 and 24-9-923. Though counsel twice stated that he did not
“think the State [could] lay a proper foundation,” the lack of specificity in that argument
generally fails to preserve the argument for review, see Tolver v. State, 269 Ga. 530 (2) (500 SEZd
563) (1998), and the “foundational requirements” that counsel appears to reference, which once
controlled the admission of this type of recording, are no longer applicable now that Georgia's
new Evidence Code is in effect. See Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 40, 44 (785 SH2d 886) (2016). Thus,

206 eS

these claims for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (d); Gates v. State,
298 Ga. 324 (3) (781 SE2d 772) (2016).

In State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29 (718 SE2d 232) (2011), this Court
adopted the federal plain error standard as set out in Puckett v.
United States, 556 U. S. 129 (II) (a) (129 SCt 1423, 173 LE2d 266)
(2009), which involves the following four prongs:

First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
“{djeviation from a legal rule” — that has not been inten-
tionally relinquished or abandoned, i-e., affirmatively waived,
by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or
obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third,
the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial
rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demon-
strate that it “affected the outcome of the [trial] court
proceedings.” Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs
are satisfied, the [appellate court] has the discretion to
remedy the error — discretion which ought to be exercised
only if the error “ ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ”

(Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33.
“Reversal is authorized only if all four prongs are satisfied — a
‘difficult’ standard indeed.” (Citation omitted.) Carruth v. State, 290
Ga. 342, 348 (6) (721 SE2d 80) (2012).

Even if we were to presume that Carter satisfied the first and
second prongs of the Kelly test, there is no plain error here because he
has failed to meet his burden under the third prong. It is undisputed
that the brief recording includes nothing more than a portion of a
random conversation which was adduced by the State to allow the
jury to compare the voice and laugh on the telephone call with the
voice and laugh in the recorded conversation with Lott; nothing on
the recording directly inculpated Carter, and trial counsel acknowl-
edged below that there was nothing objectionable concerning the
content of the recording. Further, the recorded telephone conversa-
tion was not the only evidence connecting Carter with the recorded
conversation with Lott. The jury heard testimony that the robbery-
turned-murder was committed by Carter and his brothers; the speaker
in the recorded conversation with Lott makes numerous references to
his brothers, calling them by name. Though the recorded telephone

Carter's failure to raise these specific objections below failed to preserve these arguments for
appeal. See Sanchez v. State, 285 Ga. 749 (3) (684 SE2d 251) (2009).

eS 207

conversation helped the State connect Carter with the recorded
conversation with Lott, a review of the record as a whole indicates
that any error here did not affect the outcome of the proceedings.
Kelly, supra.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

lohn C. Culp, for appellant.

George E. Barnhill, District Attorney, Ian L. Sansot, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, for appellee.

$17A1170. SMITH v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 835)

GRANT, Justice.

Appellant Luther Smith, Jr., was convicted of felony murder and
other crimes in connection with the February 2007 death of 15-month-
old Deandra Turner. Smith now appeals, asserting insufficiency of
the evidence and erroneous admission of expert testimony. Because
the evidence was sufficient to enable a jury to determine that Smith
was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted, and because the
testimony in question was admissible, we affirm.’

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence at trial showed as follows. On February 14, 2007, Shakela
Turner left her two young daughters, three-year-old Shamyra and
fifteen-month-old Deandra, in the care of Smith, her boyfriend, while
Turner went to work. After Turner’s shift ended in the early evening,
she returned briefly to her apartment where Smith was watching the

+ ‘The murder was committed on February 14, 2007. Smith was indicted by a Fulton County
grand jury. At the conclusion of a trial held March 17-26, 2009, a jury found Smith guilty of felony
murder and other crimes, and he was sentenced to lifeimprisonment. Smith fileda timely motion
for new trial on April 3, 2009. A hearing was held on the motion on August 2, 2016, and the
motion was denied on August 15, 2016. Smith filed his notice of appeal on September 13, 2016.
‘The appeal was docketed to the April 2017 term of this Court and thereafter was submitted for
a decision on the briefs.

208 es

girls to retrieve her EBT card before going grocery shopping. When
Turner arrived at the apartment, it took longer than normal for Smith
to open the door; when he answered, Turner noticed that he was
sweating. Smith told Turner that Deandra was upstairs sleeping, and
Turner departed for the store.

After Turner left, Smith went to his grandmother’s home, which
was in the same apartment complex, to get some laundry detergent.
When Smith returned to Turner’s apartment, he was with his cousin,
Darnell Lawrence, and a friend, Samuel Davis. Deandra was lying
face down on the sofa when they entered the home; Smith picked her
up and took her upstairs while Lawrence and Davis settled down to
watch TV. Smith called Davis upstairs to look at Deandra. Although
she felt warm to the touch, Deandra appeared not to be breathing, so
Davis began administering CPR. Smith, too, attempted CPR. During
these attempts, a small amount of blood trickled from Deandra’s
nose. The men took Deandra downstairs, where Lawrence told them
to call 911. Smith ignored that instruction, and instead called Turner
and asked her to hurry home.

When Turner arrived back home, she jumped out of the car and
ran to Smith, who was carrying Deandra. She asked him what had
happened, but he claimedignorance. Turner called 911 andattempted
to follow the operator’s instructions for CPR, but was too distraught
to do so. Aneighbor who noticed the commotion intervened, perform-
ing CPR until paramedics arrived.

When paramedics arrived, Deandra had no pulse and was not
breathing. As Turner ran to the ambulance, Smith followed, asking
her if she was going to break up with him. Smith then approached a
paramedic and reported that Deandra had choked on a vitamin or a
piece of candy earlier that evening and had become unresponsive.

At the hospital, Smith falsely told the social worker that he had
left Turner’s children in the care of his 12-year-old sister for some
period during the day. Smith also claimed that when he returned, he
discovered that Deandra was choking and pressed on her stomach to
expel the hazard; he claimed that he then put Deandra to bed because
she seemed “woozy” afterward. After his sister denied this account,
however, Smith admitted that he had lied about leaving the children
with her.

At the time of Deandra’s arrival at the hospital, an emergency
room nurse recorded Deandra’s body temperature as approximately 91
degrees Fahrenheit. Deandra was pronounced dead approximately
one hour later.

In a statement to investigators, Smith claimed that sometime
between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m., Deandra had choked on a piece of candy;
that he had dislodged the candy by pressing lightly on her stomach;

eS 209

that he had disposed of the candy in a trash bag in the kitchen; that
he had put Deandra to bed after the choking incident; and that, when
he later checked on Deandra, he found her unresponsive. In the later
search of Turner’s apartment, investigators found no candy in any
garbage receptacles. Investigators did find several articles of blood-
stained clothing in the washing machine — clothing that included an
adult-sized T-shirt that was stained with blood matching Deandra’s
DNA and an outfit that Deandra had been wearing earlier in the day,
which, according to Turner, had been clean that morning. Investiga-
tors also found a blood-stained blanket in Deandra’s crib.

At trial, the medical examiner opined that the cause of death was
blunt force trauma to the head, and, secondarily, blunt force trauma
to the abdomen. The autopsy revealed numerous small bruises on
Deandra’s head and face, a subarachnoid hemorrhage in the brain,
and multiple hemorrhages in the retinas, neck muscles, right kidney,
and stomach. There was also a substantial amount of blood present
in Deandra’s abdominal cavity, her liver was lacerated, and she hai
a broken rib. All of these injuries were signs of significant trauma an
force. Though there were indications of an earlier brain injury — and,
indeed, there was trial evidence that during the weeks preceding her
death, Deandra had been struck in the head by a football and ha
fallen down some stairs — the medical examiner opined that any
prior injuries had not contributed to Deandra’s death, and that the
fatal brain hemorrhage had occurred at or around the time of death.

The State’s child abuse expert, Dr. Randall Alexander, testifie
that Deandra’s injuries were consistent with abusive trauma rather
than accidental trauma. His opinion was based on the evidence of
multiple impacts to Deandra’s head from different angles, the fact
that the bruising had necessarily occurred while her heart was stil
beating rather than during life-sustaining medical intervention, an
the fact that the retinal hemorrhaging and abdominal bleeding were
necessarily products of forceful shaking or other intentional impact.
Dr. Alexander opined that none of the injuries were consistent with
choking on a piece of candy.

The defense presented two experts. The first testified that Dean-
dra was repeatedly hospitalized during her short life for various
infections and that her brain hemorrhage could have been caused by
a parasitic infection or a blood clot disorder. The second defense
expert opined that increased intracranial pressure from brain swell-
ing or a lack of oxygen due to choking could have caused Deandra’s
retinal hemorrhages.

As we have explained, “[i]t was for the jury to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsis-
tencies in the evidence.” Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (1) (673 SE2d

210 es

223) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted). Contrary to Smith’s
contention, the evidence described above was sufficient to enable a
rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith was
guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

II.

Smith asserts that the trial court erred in permitting the pros-

ecutor, over objection, to elicit testimony from the State’s expert that
in his opinion the victim’s injuries were the result of abuse rather
than accident. Smith argues that this testimony was inappropriate
and inadmissible because it invaded the province of the jury and went
to the ultimate issue of fact in the case. We disagree.
The State’s expert, Dr. Alexander, was qualified as an expert in
he fields of child abuse, child fatalities, and pediatrics. Dr. Alexander
estified that based on his review of documents — which included the
utopsy report, medical records, and photographs of Deandra — he
served, among other things, multiple sharp-line bruises on differ-
nt sides of Deandra’s head, subarachnoid and retinal hemorrhaging,
nd abdominal and chest injuries, which included a rib fracture, a
lacerated liver, and bleeding in the abdomen. Dr. Alexander testified
hat these observations were consistent with multiple, high-speed
mpacts, shaking, blunt force trauma like punching, kicking, or
stomping, and violent, repeated abuse. He further testified that what
he observed was neither consistent with life-sustaining medical
intervention such as CPR, nor with Smith’s claim that Deandra had
choked on a piece of candy. Dr. Alexander concluded based on these
observations that it was his expert opinion that the cause of Dean-
dra’s death was “consistent with being abusive head trauma. It did
not appear accidental.”

Smith’s claims that these conclusions should not have been
offered to the jury are inconsistent with our prior rulings. In Dyer v.
State, 295 Ga. 173, 177 (758 SE2d 301) (2014), we made clear that a
qualified expert may provide opinion testimony as to whether a
victim’s injuries were consistent with abuse or accident. This type of
testimony does not invade the province of the jury because the
ultimate question for the jury was not the cause of Deandra’s injuries,
but whether Smith was criminally responsible for those injuries and,
ultimately, her death. Id. at 177-178 (citing McFolley v. State, 289 Ga.

pte

trp eco

eS an

890, 892 (717 SE2d 199) (2011)).2 And such testimony necessarily
remains admissible even when the defendant argues, as Smith did,
that the victim’s injuries must have resulted from some unfortunate
accident or accidents. See, e.g., McFolley, 289 Ga. at 893. Were that
not so, then defendants would also be blocked from offering expert
testimony that a victim’s injuries were consistent with an accident,
rather than from abuse; there is plainly no such limitation.

Here, as in similar cases, the question of whether Deandra’s
accidents could have produced the types of injuries she suffered
“requires the training of an expert to answer based on distance, force,
brain trauma, etc. —a complicated calculus based on biology, anatomy,
and physics. There is no question that this difficult determination
based on medical knowledge and training is beyond the ken of the
jury,” making expert testimony on the issue of abuse versus accident.
admissible. McFolley, 289 Ga. at 893. Accordingly, Dr. Alexander’s
testimony that Deandra’s injuries were consistent with abuse was
admissible, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permit-
ting Dr. Alexander’s opinion.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

lackson, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong,
Lyndsey H. Rudder, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason M.
Rea, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1177. FAUST v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 826)

HINES, Chief Justice.

Following the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended,
Andray Faust appeals his convictions for felony murder while in the
commission of an aggravated assault and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony in connection with the fatal
shooting of Marcellous Brown. He challenges the sufficiency of the

2 Dyer was decided under our old Evidence Code. Opinion testimony embracing the
ultimate issue to be decided is now governed by OCGA § 24-7-704.

212 eS

evidence, an evidentiary ruling, aspects of the trial court’s instruc-
tions to the jury, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding the
challenges to be unavailing, we affirm.’

1. Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed the
following. Brown, Drema Chamblee, and Derek Mitchell would buy
shoes at wholesale and sell them out of a car. After being robbed a
couple of times, Brown and Mitchell began carrying .38 caliber
revolvers for protection. About three days before Brown’s death, they
were selling shoes at a gas station when they met Faust, discussed
shoes, and exchanged phone numbers. On June 6, 2006, Faust called
Brown and requested shoes in a certain size. Brown and Chamblee
arrived at an apartment complex to attempt to close the sale with
Faust. Brown and Faust began to discuss the shoes and their prices.
Faust called over a friend, Kevin Milton, who began to haggle with
Brown over pricing, and then Faust walked away.

According to both Chamblee and Milton, Faust came running
back toward the car, aiming a rifle at Brown. Brown immediately
pulled his pistol out, grabbed Milton in a headlock, and put the pistol
to Milton’s head. Faust then fatally shot Brown in the chest. Milton
jumped into the back of the car and ran out the other side, and Faust
also fled,” leaving for Florida just two days later and being appre-
hended in Tampa on July 26, 2006. Although Faust explained that he
went to Florida as part of his employment with a stone mason, that
employer denied that he was doing any work out of state at the time.
At trial, Faust admitted that he killed Brown, but testified that

1 The crimes occurred on June 6, 2006, On November 15, 2006, a Fulton County grand jury
returned an indictment against Faust charging him with malice murder, felony murder while
in the commission of aggravated assault, felony murder while in the commission of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convieted felon, He
was tried before a jury April 1-6, 2009, and found not guilty of malice murder, but the jury was
unable to reach a verdict on the remaining charges, soa mistrial was declared as to those counts
of the indictment, Faust was retried before a jury on February 22-26, 2010, on the charges of
felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and found guilty of all three of those
charges. The charges of felony murder while in the commission of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were not submitted to the jury,
but placed on the dead docket. On February 26, 2010, Faust was sentenced to life in prison for
felony murder and a consecutive term of five years in prison for possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony; the aggravated assault merged with the felony murder for the
purpose of sentencing. Trial counsel filed a motion for new trial on Faust’s behalf on March 4,
2010, and the motion was amended by new counsel on July 22, 2015. The motion for new trial,
as amended, was denied on October 29, 2015. A notice of appeal was filed on November 12, 2015,
and the case was docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term. The appeal was submitted for
decision on the briefs.

2 Faust took the rifle with him, and Chamblee threw Brown's pistol into some bushes, but
neither weapon was recovered.

eS 218

during negotiations for a purchase by Brown of crack cocaine, Brown
drew his weapon first, held Milton at gunpoint, and demanded the
drugs. According to Faust, he retrieved his rifle, Brown fired at him
first, and Faust then shot Brown.

Faust argues that the evidence presents a classic example of
“he said, she said” and that the State failed to corroborate its theory
that Faust’s motive was robbery, while he presented evidence of
self-defense and defense of another. When we review the sufficiency
of the evidence, however, we do not re-weigh the evidence or resolve
conflicts in witness testimony, but instead we defer to the jury’s
assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Mosley v.
State, 300 Ga. 521, 523 (1) (796 SE2d 684) (2017). “As we have
explained many times before, conflicts in the evidence, questions
about the credibility of witnesses, and questions about the existence
of justification are for the jury to resolve.” Anthony v. State, 298 Ga.
827, 829 (1) (785 SE2d 277) (2016) (citation and punctuation omit-
ted). “And, any lack of evidence of motive . . . is not fatal to a finding
of sufficiency. Indeed, it is not necessary for the State to prove motive
to establish the crime of felony murder.” Grant v. State, 298 Ga. 835,
836 (1) (785 SE2d 285) (2016). See also Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339,
341 (1) (b) (745 SE2d 637) (2013) (“while evidence of motive for the
homicide is always relevant in a murder trial .. . , the State is not
required to prove the defendant’s motive for killing the victim to
sustain a murder conviction, since motive is not an essential element
of the crime” (emphasis in original)). Chamblee and Milton provided
eyewitness accounts that were sufficient to authorize any rational
trier of fact to find Faust guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crimes for which he was convicted.* See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Cain v. State, 300 Ga. 614,
614-615 (1) (797 SE2d 466) (2017). The jury was not required to credit
Faust’s testimony that he fired his rifle in self-defense or in defense

® As already stated, Faust was convicted and sentenced for two crimes: felony murder
while in the commission of an aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. By concluding that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to prove
felony murder, we necessarily also mean that our review of the evidence shows that it was
constitutionally sufficient to prove Faust guilty of the aggravated assault on which the felony
murder was predicated. We note, however, that in addition to his challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence of felony murder and possession of a firearm, Faust also asserts, as a separate
enumeration of error, that there was insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find him
guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. But Faust was not sentenced for that
crime, and no judgment of conviction as to that crime was entered against him. As set forth in
footnote 1, supra, the count of aggravated assault merged with the felony murder for which
Faust was sentenced, As a result, his separate claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
of aggravated assault is moot. See Anderson v. State, 299 Ga. 193, 196 (1), n. 4 (787 SE2d 202)
(2016); Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339, 340, n. 2 (781 SE2d 777) (2016).

214 eS

of Milton. See Cain, 300 Ga. at 615 (1). The question of Faust’s jus-
tification was for the jury to determine, and it was free to reject his
version of the events. See Mosley, 300 Ga. at 524 (1).

2. Faust urges that the trial court erred in excluding evidence
that Brown had methamphetamine on his person when he was killed.
According to Faust, that evidence was relevant to support his theory
of the case that Brown had been negotiating a drug deal with Milton
when Faust had to defend himself and Milton, and to disprove the
State’s theory that Brown was an innocent shoe salesman being
robbed of his hard-earned money. Under our precedent in cases like
this one that were tried under the former Evidence Code, a murder
victim’s character generally was “irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible.
Evidence that impugns a victim’s character cannot be admitted
unless it has some factual nexus with the conclusion for which it is
being offered.”4 Walker v. State, 294 Ga. 851, 853 (3) (757 SE2d 64)
(2014) (‘Sheer speculation is insufficient. Otherwise, character evi-
dence would be admitted routinely, disguised as relevant to whatever
speculative theory the proponent managed to put forth.” (citation
omitted)). And we review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an
abuse of discretion. Moore v. State, 295 Ga. 709, 712 (2) (763 SE2d
670) (2014).

In this case, the trial court admitted evidence that the drug
ecstasy was found in Brown’s system, but excluded evidence that 50
methamphetamine tablets were discovered in Brown’s underwear.
Faust did not present any evidence that Brown had taken metham-
phetamine, nor has Faust shown how Brown’s possession of meth-
amphetamine would make it more likely that he would attempt to
purchase cocaine or to rob Faust and Milton. The only other apparent
purpose of showing that Brown possessed methamphetamine and
thus was not merely an innocent shoe salesman would be to impugn
his character. We have found no connection between Brown’s posses-
sion of methamphetamine and Faust’s theory that he did not attempt
to rob Brown but instead that Faust justifiably shot Brown when
Brown attempted a robbery during a purchase of cocaine after taking
ecstasy. Because Faust offers only speculation of any such factual
nexus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
evidence of the methamphetamine found on Brown’s person. See
Moore, 295 Ga. at 712 (2). Moreover, the trial court admitted not only
evidence that Brown had taken an illegal drug, but also testimony
indicating that Brown had previously been involved in drug deals.

+ “The admissibility of evidence of a victim's characteris now governed by OCGA §§ 24-4-404
and 24-4-405.” Gibson v. State, 300 Ga. 494, 498 (3), n. 8 (796 SE2d 712) (2017).

eS 216

Consequently, even assuming that Brown’s possession of metham-
phetamine should have been admitted, the error was harmless,
especially in light of the strong eyewitness testimony of Faust’s guilt.
See Bell v. State, 280 Ga. 562, 566 (4) (629 SE2d 213) (2006).

3. Faust contends that the trial court committed plain error by
failing to charge the jury on the definition of simple assault as part of
its charge on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. His contention
is one of plain error because he concedes that this issue was not
preserved for ordinary appellate review. In order for this Court to
review the jury charge for plain error, the accused must not have
affirmatively waived the alleged error or defect. Cheddersingh v. State,
290 Ga. 680, 683 (2) (724 SE2d 366) (2012). To constitute an affirma-
tive waiver, the alleged deviation from a legal rule must have been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned. Id. at 684 (2). In this case,
the record shows that the trial court gave the charge requested by the
State on OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) (simple assault by “[a]ttemptfing] to
commit a violent injury to the person of another”). At the charge
conference, the prosecutor asked the court to include the language of
OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) (simple assault by “[clommit[ting] an act
which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately
receiving a violent injury”). Defense counsel opposed inclusion of this
second method of simple assault and, after extensive discussion of the
charge, never changed her position.®° Based on this record, even if the
failure to give a full charge on simple assault were plain error, Faust
invited that error, and any contention of plain error has been waived
for review.° See Brown v. State, 298 Ga. 880, 882 (3) (785 SE2d 512)

® At the end of the discussion, defense counsel ultimately appeared to oppose not only an
instruction on the second method of aggravated assault, but also the instruction on the first
method that was given.

® Conversely, assuming that this contention has not been affirmatively waived, we see no
plain error. “A failure to charge amounts to plain error only to the extent that the failure to
charge was erroneous, the error was obvious, the failure to charge likely affected the outcome
of the proceedings, and the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of the judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. State, 295 Ga. 615, 617-618 (2) (759 SE2d 837) (2014)
(citation and punctuation omitted). We cannot say that the omission of a full charge on simple
assault was erroneous where, as here, the jury was properly instructed on general intent and
the evidence is undisputed that an injury was intentionally inflicted, Cantera v. State, 289 Ga.
583, 584-586 (2) (718 SE2d 826) (2011), and, moreover, the jury charge did track the applicable
definition of simple assault in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 886-887 (4)
(725 SE2d 305) (2012). Finally, even if there were obvious error, Faust has not shown that it
likely affected the outcome of the proceedings because the trial court instructed the jury that
the State had the burden to prove every material allegation of the indictment beyond a
reasonable doubt, the indictment charged Faust with the felony murder and aggravated assault
of Brown “by shooting him with a rifle,” and there is no dispute that Brown died as a result of
being shot with Faust’s rifle. Johnson, 295 Ga. at 618 (2).

216 eS

(2016); Ashley v. State, 340 Ga. App. 539, 543 (4) (798 SE2d 235)
(2017). See also Walker v. State, 301 Ga. 482, 485 (2) (a) (801 SE2d
804) (2017).

For the same reason, Faust has also affirmatively waived his
further contention that the trial court erroneously gave a jury instruc-
tion on robbery. That instruction was given as part of the charge on
justification that defined “forcible felony.” See OCGA § 16-3-21 (a).
After considerable discussion of the issue with the prosecutor and the
court at the charge conference, defense counsel specifically agreed to
the inclusion of robbery, in addition to aggravated assault, in the
charge on forcible felonies. Consistent with this agreement, after the
trial court charged the jury, defense counsel objected only that the
definition of robbery was too broad and was not limited to the defense
theory of what Brown had done. Because Faust actually agreed to the
giving of a robbery charge and objected to that charge only on a
different ground from that which he now raises on appeal, appellate
review is precluded unless the robbery instruction amounted to plain
error which affected his substantial rights and was not affirmatively
waived. See Simpson v. State, 298 Ga. 314, 316 (3) (781 SE2d 762)
(2016); Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 806 (2) (771 SE2d 362) (2015);
Carruth v. State, 290 Ga. 342, 347 (6) (721 SE2d 80) (2012) (“Georgia
law requires that a criminal defendant inform the court of the specific
objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to
deliberate. OCGA § 17-8-58 (a).”). In this case, the record shows that
Faust intentionally relinquished any claim that no robbery instruc-
tion should have been given. Consequently, even if the instruction
defining robbery was plain error, the error was invited, and any
contention of plain error has been waived for review.’ See Brown, 298
Ga. at 882 (3); Woodard, 296 Ga. at 810 (8) (a); Ashley, 340 Ga. App.
at 543 (4).

7 Conversely, assuming that Faust did not affirmatively waive this contention, we fail to
see any plain error. “In order to intelligently consider th[e] defense [that the accused was using
the force necessary to prevent a forcible felony, the jury must be informed as to what constitutes
the forcible felony relied upon.” Wiseman v. State, 249 Ga, 559, 560-561 (5) (292 SE2d 670)
(1982). Moreover, even if there was obvious error, Faust has not shown that it likely affected the
outcome of the proceedings because the charge on robbery enabled the jury properly to consider
his defense that he was trying to prevent Brown's robbery of Faust and Milton. Cf. Holmes v.
State, 273 Ga. 644, 647 (4) (543 SE2d 688) (2001) (overruling a Court of Appeals holding “that
the omission of a charge on the specific forcible felony is, even without a request therefor,
substantial error which is harmful as a matter of law’). Contrary to another contention of
Faust’s, the jury charge at issue did not amount to a comment on the evidence or an expression
of the court's opinion of his guilt or innocence, as it was a neutral instruction of law and did not
imply in any way either that Faust was attempting to commit a robbery or that Brown was not.
See Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 250 (8) (773 SE2d 254) (2015).

eS 217

4. Faust asserts that his trial counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance in several respects. Under Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), to
prevail on this claim, Faust must show both that his “counsel
performed deficiently and that, but for the deficiency, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been
more favorable. While the test imposed by Strickland is not impos-
sible to meet, the burden is a heavy one.” Speziali v. State, 301 Ga.
290, 293 (2) (800 SE2d 525) (2017) (citation and punctuation omit-
ted).

To prove deficient performance, one must show that his
attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable
way considering all the circumstances and in the light of
prevailing professional norms. Courts reviewing ineffective-
ness claims must apply a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional
performance. Thus, decisions regarding trial tactics and
strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only
if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent
attorney would have followed such a course. If the defendant
fails to satisfy either the “deficient performance” or the
“prejudice” prong of the Strickland test, this Court is not
required to examine the other.

Capps v. State, 300 Ga. 6, 8 (2) (792 SE2d 665) (2016) (citation
omitted).

(a) Faust first claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the prosecutor’s use of a .38 caliber revolver and an
AK-47 as demonstrative exhibits that were intended to represent
Brown’s revolver and Faust’s rifle, which were never recovered. See
footnote 2, supra. Faust argues that the exhibits were not shown to be
sufficiently similar to the guns actually used, that Milton testified the
AK-47 did not look like Faust’s rifle, and that the prosecutor used the
exhibits to prejudice Faust by causing the jury to focus on the much
larger size of Faust’s weapon. Where, as here, there is no question
that real guns were used during the crimes but were not recovered,
the introduction of guns of the type believed to have been used was
generally permissible in cases, like this one, to which the old Evidence
Code applied. McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 570 (3) (544 SE2d 709)
(2001). In this case, it was made clear to the jury that the exhibits
were not the actual guns, and several witnesses testified to the
similarities and differences between the exhibits and the weapons
actually involved. See Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646, 654 (10) (501 SE2d

218 eS

219) (1998). Under these circumstances, an objection to the demon-
strative exhibits would have been wholly without merit, and counsel
was not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection to the
State’s introduction of those exhibits. See Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355,
356 (3) (b) (689 SE2d 280) (2010).

(b) Faust next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective when
she failed to object to a detective’s testimony that contained hearsay,
an improper conclusion, and bolstering. After Chamblee and Milton
had testified, the detective recounted the statement that Milton hai
given him. Although Faust first insists that all of that testimony
amounted to hearsay that did not come within an exception, he
admitted at the hearing on his motion for new trial that Milton’s
statement to the detective “was a little bit contradictory to what Mr.
Milton testified to.” Trial counsel testified to her opinion that Milton’s
statement was not inadmissible hearsay because he had testified an:
was subject to cross-examination. And Faust has never argued that
Milton’s statement lacked sufficient inconsistency or otherwise faile:
to fulfill the requirements to be admissible as a prior inconsistent
statement. On motion for new trial, Faust failed to make any showing
that, if his trial counsel had objected to Milton’s statement, it woul
not have been admitted as a prior inconsistent statement.® See Welch
v. State, 298 Ga. 320, 322 (4) (781 SE2d 768) (2016) (even if an
out-of-court statement was hearsay under former OCGA § 24-3-1 (a),
cf. current OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (1) (A), it may have been admissible
as a prior inconsistent statement under former OCGA § 24-9-83, cf.
current OCGA § 24-6-613). Moreover, upon review of Milton’s testi-
mony and prior statement, we conclude that, if trial counsel had
objected to the detective’s testimony about Milton’s statement, the
trial court likely would have exercised its discretion to admit the
evidence as a prior inconsistent statement. See Burney v. State, 299
Ga. 813, 824 (5) (792 SE2d 354) (2016); Edwards v. State, 293 Ga. 612,
614 (2) (748 SE2d 870) (2013); Cummings v. State, 280 Ga. 831, 832
(2) (632 SE2d 152) (2006). Because Faust has failed to show how a
hearsay objection to Milton’s statement would have had merit, trial
counsel cannot be adjudged ineffective for failing to make such an

® To the contrary, Faust complained in his amended motion for new trial and the hearing
thereon that the admission of Milton's statement allowed the State to impeach its own witness.
If Faust had raised that issue on appeal, his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to Milton's statement would still fail. As the trial court concluded, the State was
lawfully entitled to impeach its own witness, See Edwards v. State, 293 Ga. 612, 614 (2) (748
SE2d870) (2013) (under the rule of former OCGA § 24-9-81, carried forward in OCGA § 24-6-607,
a party may impeach its own witness).

eS 219

objection. See Burney, 299 Ga. at 824 (5); Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60,
65-66 (2) (c) (779 SE2d 322) (2015).

Faust further complains of the following statements in the detec-
tive’s testimony that were not part of Milton’s statement: “Apparently
[Chamblee] thought it was a robbery too”;® “That series of events was
validated through [Chamblee] as the action that took place”; and “Also,
that was consistent with pretty much what other people were saying
that they observed.” On motion for new trial, Faust contended that
these statements were objectionable because the detective was claim-
ing that Milton’s statement was corroborated by other witnesses at the
scene, thereby allowing the State to bolster the credibility of its other
witnesses. Trial counsel attacked these portions of the detective’s
testimony on cross-examination when the detective admitted that he
had not personally gone to the crime scene or conducted interviews of
Chamblee or anyone else besides Milton. Whether to object during
direct examination or instead rely on cross-examination “falls within
the ambit of reasonable trial strategy. Counsel’s performance was not
deficient in this regard.” Bragg v. State, 295 Ga. 676, 680 (4) (d) (763
SE2d 476) (2014) (citation omitted). Moreover, we do not find a
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been
changed by an objection to the detective’s brief, general statements
regarding the consistency of witness statements, when he was suc-
cessfully attacked on cross-examination and when both Milton and
Chamblee had already given far more detailed testimony, were
largely consistent with each other, and were themselves subjected to
vigorous cross-examination.

(c) Faust also claims that trial counsel provided him ineffective
assistance by failing to object or move for a mistrial in response to two
portions of the State’s closing argument. First, Faust asserts that
counsel should have objected when the prosecutor argued facts not in
evidence, specifically, that Faust was out to rob the victim. The
evidence shows, however, that Faust asked Brown to come sell him
some shoes, that Faust and then Milton discussed prices, that Faust
approached with a rifle, and that Chamblee told Faust to take the
money, the shoes, and whatever he wanted. From this evidence, the
jury was authorized to infer that, evenif Faust did not demand money
or goods, he intended to commit a robbery. See Boyd v. State, 284 Ga.
46, 47 (1) (663 SE2d 218) (2008). And “a prosecutor is granted wide
latitude in the conduct of closing argument, the bounds of which are

° Tt appears that this statement, considered in context, is not referring to Chamblee's prior
testimony, but amountstoa limited reference directly to Milton's own statement that during the
incident, Chamblee said “the money’s in the car.”

220 eS

in the trial court’s discretion|[,] ... toarguereasonable inferences from
the evidence.” Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 885 (2) (725 SE2d 305)
(2012). The prosecutor’s argument regarding robbery as Faust’s
motive was “based on permissible inferences and legitimately sup-
ported by the facts in evidence,” and, “[a]ccordingly, trial counsel’s
failure to make a meritless objection to the State’s closing argument
is not evidence of ineffective assistance.” Cooper v. State, 296 Ga. 728,
731 (3) (770 SE2d 597) (2015).

Faust’s other claim that his trial counsel was ineffective during
the State’s closing argument is that counsel should have objected
when the prosecutor asked the jurors to put themselves in the
position of the residents of the neighborhood and to speak for the
neighborhood with their verdict. The only comment that Faust quotes
from the State’s closing argument is that “you all have to have the
courage to speak up and talk for acommunity that’s too scared to talk
for itself.” It is appropriate for the prosecutor to urge the jury to speak
on behalf of the community. Gibson v. State, 283 Ga. 377, 381 (8) (659
SE2d 372) (2008). Contrary to Faust’s contention, the prosecutor’s
argument was not an impermissible “golden rule” argument, the
failure to object therefore could not have been patently unreasonable,
and Faust has not shown ineffective assistance in this regard. See
Peoples v. State, 295 Ga. 44, 61 (6) (757 SE2d 646) (2014). Faust also
cites a portion of closing argument in which the prosecutor said,
among other things, that she was tired of having to talk with the
victims of violence and see witnesses and children in neighborhoods
that are terrorized by criminals. According to Faust, such argument
inappropriately personalizes the case by discussing the neighbor-
hood in an overall societal context to inflame the jury and have it
convict not on the facts of the case but on the ills of the area. It is
appropriate, however, for the prosecutor to urge the jury to convict for
the safety of the community or to curb an epidemic of violence in the
community, and it is not improper to emphasize to the jury its
responsibility to enforce the law. See Spencer v. State, 287 Ga. 434,
440 (4) (696 SE2d 617) (2010); Wright v. State, 319 Ga. App. 723, 737
(5) (a) (738 SE2d 310) (2013). Again, therefore, Faust has not estab-
lished that his counsel’s performance was professionally deficient
when she failed to object to the State’s closing argument.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

tanley W. Schoolcraft or appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong,
Lyndsey H. Rudder, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,

eS 221

Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason M.
Rea, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1229. SHUMAN v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 824)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Ernest Shuman appeals pro se from the trial court’s order
denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal from his June 1990
guilty pleas related to the murder of seven-year-old Ronald Wyche,
Jr., whom Appellant choked to death, put in a bag, and threw into a
river in Thomas County. We affirm.

1. Appellant was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued on May
3, 1990. Later that month, Appellant’s attorney succeeded in quash-
ing a subpoena for some of his psychiatric records, which contained
incriminating statements. On June 21, 1990, the grand jury indicted
Appellant for malice murder and concealing the death of another, and
later that same day, the trial court held a hearing at which Appellant,
after an extensive colloquy, pled guilty to both charges. After con-
firming that the State was waiving the death penalty, the court
sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for murder and a concur-
rent term of 12 months for concealing a death.

More than 25 years later, on May 25, 2016, Appellant filed a pro
se motion for an out-of-time appeal, alleging that: (1) his guilty pleas
were not entered intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily, because
the transcript of the plea hearing shows that he was not advised of his
right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel at trial, and
because the State failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for his
guilty plea to malice murder; and (2) his attorney provided ineffective
assistance in connection with the entry of his guilty pleas, because
she failed to make even a minimal inquiry into the issuance of his
arrest warrant, which would have shown that the warrant was issued.
without probable cause and led to suppression of incriminating
statements that he made. On November 14, 2016, the trial court
denied Appellant’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal.

2. As this Court has repeatedly reiterated,

[o]ut-of-time appeals are designed to address the constitu-
tional concerns that arise when a criminal defendant is
denied his first appeal of right because the counsel to which

222 Pe

he was constitutionally entitled to assist him in that appeal
was professionally deficient in not advising him to file a
timely appeal and that deficiency caused prejudice.

Stephens v. State, 291 Ga. 837, 837-838 (733 SE2d 266) (2012). Appell-
ant’s motion mentioned this legal prerequisite to an out-of-time
appeal, but he did not allege that ineffective assistance by his plea
counsel was the reason that he had not filed a timely appeal.
Appellant’s allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect
to the investigation of his case and the entry of his guilty pleas is not
an allegation that ineffective assistance of counsel was the cause of
his failure to file a timely direct appeal from the judgment entered on
his guilty pleas. See Grace v. State, 295 Ga. 657, 658 (763 SE2d 461)
(2014). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion.
See id.; Kemp v. State, 292 Ga. 795, 795 (741 SE2d 652) (2013);
McMullen v. State, 292 Ga. 355, 356 (737 SE2d 102) (2013).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

mest B. Shuman, pro se.
Bradfield M. Shealy, District Attorney, Robert R. Auman, Michelle
T. Harrison, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-
ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1290. McNEAL v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 820)

Boaas, Justice.

Appellant Demetrius McNeal was tried before a jury and found
guilty of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, criminal
attempt to commit robbery, possession of a firearm during the com-
mission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a first offender
probationer.’ The charges stemmed from the shooting death of Wil-
liam Callison and the attempted robbery of David Reid. McNeal now

1 The crimes occurred in September 2010. On December 21, 2010, a Fulton County grand
jury indicted McNeal on charges of malice murder, felony murder (three counts), aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, criminal attempt to commit robbery, possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer.
Following an April 2012 jury trial, the jury found McNeal guilty on all counts. The trial court

eS 228

appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in commenting on the
evidence and in refusing to give his requested jury instruction on
accident. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
showed that McNeal had been drinking and playing cards with two
friends, Tradon Crawford and Deondre Redmon, on the front porch of
a boarding house. Crawford’s father was a tenant at the boarding
house. A female acquaintance of McNeal, Darshawna Taylor, drove
up to the house to give the three men a ride to the store. McNeal went
inside the house to retrieve shirts for them to wear, but instead went
into another tenant’s room. The tenant, David Reid, awoke to find
McNeal rummaging through his right pocket as if he was “looking for
something.” Reid got up, grabbed McNeal and got on top of him.
William Callison, the property manager of the boarding house, came
into the room and asked what was going on. Reid explained to him
that McNeal tried to rob him. Crawford and Redmon came into the
room, knocked Reid off of McNeal, and dragged Callison out into the
hall. Reid then closed and locked his door. Crawford testified that
when he went back inside to retrieve the shirts that McNeal was
supposed to retrieve, Callison locked the metal screen door to the
house from the inside and he and McNeal began to argue through the
door. McNeal pulled out a gun and fired through the screen door. The
bullet hit Callison in the left shoulder, and he died at the scene.

McNeal, Crawford, and Redmon left in Taylor’s car. As they drove
away, Crawford and Redmon asked McNeal why did “you go in there
and try to rob that man . . . why did you shoot [Callison]?,” to which
McNeal responded, “I ain’t got nothing else to live for. My grandmama
dead. I don’t care. I turn myself in right now.” When Taylor informed
McNeal that the news reported Callison had died, McNeal told her “he
was fixing to kill himself.” Taylor called 911.

McNeal was arrested, and ina recorded statement played for the
jury told police that he did not try to rob Reid but was “drunk,”
stumbled into his room, and fell on him. He stated further that Reid
and Callison attacked him, and that he shot through the screen door
because he believed that Crawford was trapped in the house.

merged the aggravated assault count, and the felony murder counts were vacated by operation
of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372-373 (5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). The court
sentenced McNeal to life plus 15 years. His motion for new trial was filed on May 2, 2012,
amended on November 4, 2015, and denied on August 11, 2016. McNeal's notice of appeal was
filed on September 9, 2016. This case was docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.

224 ]

1. McNeal does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Nevertheless, we have independently reviewed the record and con-
clude that the evidence, as outlined above, was legally sufficient to
authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that McNeal was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted
under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. McNeal argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give his
requested jury charge on accident. He argues that there was ample
evidence presented that he did not intend to shoot Callison and did
not attempt to rob Reid but only stumbled into his room and fell on
him by accident.” But the “[dJenial of a requested charge to the jury
is proper if the charge is not legal, apt, precisely adjusted to some
principle involved in the case, and authorized by the evidence.”
(Citation omitted.) Rashid v. State, 292 Ga. 414, 421 (6) (737 SE2d
692) (2013). And “[w]hether the evidence presented is sufficient to
authorize a charge on accident, or any other defense, is a question of
law. [Cit.]” Kellam v. State, 298 Ga. 520, 521 (2) (783 SE2d 117) (2016).

Although McNeal told police that he speculated he stumbled into
Reid’s room by accident, fell on him, and grabbed him because he was
intoxicated, there was no evidence that he rummaged through Reid’s
pocket by accident as Reid lay asleep on the bed. Moreover, an
affirmative defense is one “that admits the doing of the act charged
but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Kellam, supra, 298 Ga. at 522 (2). McNeal points to nothing
in the record to establish that he went through Reid’s pocket in a
manner such that he would be entitled to an instruction on accident.
Nor was there evidence that McNeal fired the shot at Callison by
accident. In fact, McNeal presented a justification defense, arguing
that he shot Callison in defense of Crawford. “Since accident was not
reasonably raised by the evidence, the trial court did not err by failing
to give a charge on that defense.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

3. McNeal contends the trial court impermissibly commented on
the evidence in violation of former OCGA § 17-8-57 in instructing the
jury that identity is not an issue with regard to the aggravated
assault and murder charges because he admitted to shooting Calli-
son.

2 As McNeal concedes, he complained of the court's failure to instruct the jury on accident
only with regard to the attempted robbery charge. We would therefore review for plain error the
court's failure to instruct the jury on accident for the murder charge. But as we hold here, there
was no error in the court’s failure to instruct the jury on accident, much less plain error. See,
e.g., Daniel v. State, 301 Ga. 783 n.1 (804 SE2d 61) (2017).

eS 225

During the charge conference, the trial court stated that it would
not charge on identification “since that’s not an issue in this case.”
Following the court’s instructions to the jury, defense counsel objected
to the court’s failure to instruct on identification. Counsel argued:
“{O]bviously, . . . there was an identification issue with regard to the
robbery or attempted robbery in Mr. Reid’s room. There was a clear
problem with identity . . . the identity of the accused is — is part of
what has to be proven.” The trial court responded: “Identity, I had
asked y’all because I didn’t think it was involved, and y’all didn’t
specifically point out the robbery. And I didn’t think about it in that
light. I don’t mind charging identity.” The court then called the jury
in and instructed as follows:

There’s one additional charge that I would like to give
you that I left out, and that’s as to identity. One of the
elements of the crime is that the identity of the perpetrator
has to be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. And as it relates
to the aggravated assault and the murder, the defendant
admits to shooting and firing the weapon, so identity is not
an issue. But as to the attempted robbery, it is an issue, and
the defendant contends he did not attempt to rob Mr. Reid.
So as to identity, as to the attempted robbery I charge you
identity is a question of fact for you to determine.

Following this instruction, defense counsel acknowledged that it
was responsive to his request, but complained “we didn’t expect you
to qualify the identity charge with the robbery, our only objection
could be that — that qualifying it like that could be construed as [a]
comment on the evidence.” The trial court responded that it “was just
trying to clarify” identity for the jury at the request of counsel and
that if there was any error in the charge, it would be harmless.

McNeal complains that although the trial court stated that any
error would be harmless, he did not testify at trial, and the jury was
instructed that it did not have to believe his statement to police and
that it had to determine whether the statement was given knowingly
and voluntarily. Former OCGA § 17-8-57, applicable at the time of
McNeal’s trial, provided in part: “It is error for any judge in any
criminal case, during its progress or in his charge to the jury, to
express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been proved
or as to the guilt of the accused.”

We have held, however, that “a statement by a trial court
concerning a fact that is uncontested or is not in dispute does not
constitute a violation of this statute.” (Citations and footnote omit-
ted.) Sawerwein v. State, 280 Ga. 438, 439 (2) (629 SE2d 235) (2006).

226 Pe

Here, defense counsel in opening and closing remarks explained to
the jury that McNeal fired the gun at Callison in defense of Crawford,
whom he thought was in danger, and the trial court charged the jury
on this principle and also instructed on self-defense. Two witnesses
observed McNeal fire the gun at Callison, and McNeal told police that
he did so. See McLean v. State, 297 Ga. 81, 83 (2) (772 SE2d 685)
(2015) (no violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 when trial court told jury that
defendant admitted shooting for purposes of defense theories of
justification and accident); see Sauerwein, supra, 280 Ga. at 440 (2)
(no violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 where court stated fact that was
established by uncontradicted testimony). Because it was undisputed
and never contradicted by any evidence that McNeal shot Callison, it
is clear that the trial court’s instruction to the jury did not violate
former OCGA § 17-8-57.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Tic J. Taylor, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong,
Lyndsey H. Rudder, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Aimee F-
Sobhani, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17Y1842. IN THE MATTER OF JAMES EDWARD
WATKINS, SR.
(805 SE2d 816)

PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommen-
dations of the special master, Joseph A. Boone, recommending that
James Edward Watkins, Sr. (State Bar No. 740430), a member of the
State Bar of Georgia since 1996, be disbarred for multiple derelictions
related to his deficient representation and abandonment of two
unrelated clients. Watkins was served with the formal complaints in
these matters, but failed to file answers as required by Bar Rule 4-212
(a). The special master therefore found Watkins in default and found
the following facts admitted by default. See id.

The first client retained Watkins in March 2015 to represent her
in connection with a contempt action against her homeowners asso-
ciation (“HOA”). The client paid Watkins $500 to represent her. Over

eS 227

several months, the client unsuccessfully tried to contact Watkins for
an update on her case. In July 2015, the client went to Watkins's office
to inquire about her case and, dissatisfied with his lack of work on the
case, asked for a refund. Watkins replied to the client’s request by
sending her a letter demanding she never come to his office again.
Subsequently, Watkins sent the client a bill for services, a copy of a
June 20, 2015 letter from him to the HOA, and a copy of an undated
contempt motion; the client was not copied on the June 20 letter
allegedly sent to the HOA. Watkins told the client that he filed the
motion for contempt and performed other work on the case that he did
not do. Watkins never filed the contempt motion, failed to communi-
cate with the client, and failed to take any action on the client’s
behalf.

In November 2015, Watkins was appointed to represent the
second client at issue in a criminal case and entered an appearance.
The client had an $8,000 bond at the time. Watkins filed a motion for
bond reduction but failed to attend the hearing on the motion.
Watkins visited the client only one time in jail and failed to respond
to the client’s multiple telephone calls and written correspondence.
Watkins has not filed any other motions on the client’s behalf. He
failed to communicate with the client. He failed to take any other
action on the client’s behalf aside from filing the bond reduction
motion. He failed to communicate with the prosecutor regarding a
plea offer on the basis that he was unsure if he represents the client
anymore; the prosecutor is unable to directly contact the client
because the client is still represented by Watkins. Watkins has failed
to properly withdraw from representing the client, and the client
apparently remains incarcerated and unindicted.

The special master concluded that by these actions, Watkins
violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (a) (4), 1.16, 3.2, and 8.4 (a) (4) of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).
The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.5 (a) (4), 1.16,
and 3.2 is a public reprimand. The maximum sanction for a violation
of Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment. The special master
noted that Watkins was disciplined with a letter of admonition in
2015 for violating Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 (d).

We agree with the special master that Watkins’s multiple offenses,
prior discipline, substantial experience in the practice of law, and
disregard of the disciplinary process are aggravating factors. We also
agree that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in these circum-
stances, especially considering Watkins’s failure to make restitution
to the first client and his abandonment of the second client in a
criminal matter, possibly resulting in a longer period ofincarceration.
See In the Matter of Raulin, 299 Ga. 283, 283-284 (787 SE2d 691)

228 Pe

(2016) (disbarring attorney who accepted $500 from client but failed
to diligently represent and communicate with client or provide
refund); In the Matter of Lea, 297 Ga. 797, 797-798 (778 SE2d 228)
(2015) (disbarring attorney who failed to file pleadings for, respond to,
or refund fees to criminal and civil clients); In the Matter of Evans, 289
Ga. 744, 744-745 (715 SE2d 131) (2011) (disbarring attorney who
accepted payments from clients, performed some work in an untimely
or incompetent manner, misrepresented to client that he filed plead-
ing that was never filed, became wholly unresponsive to clients, and
failed to return unearned fees); In the Matter of Thomas, 282 Ga. 514,
514-515 (651 SE2d 740) (2007) (disbarring attorney who accepted
payment from clients, became unresponsive, misrepresented to client
he filed pleading that was never filed, abandoned client in bond
modification case, and failed to refund fees).

Accordingly, itis hereby ordered that the name of James Edward
Watkins, Sr., be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to
practice law in the State of Georgia. Watkins is reminded of his duties
pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c). The State Bar’s General Counsel is
hereby directed to contact the prosecutor and court involved in
Watkins’s second client’s criminal case to advise them of the dispo-
sition of this matter and the need to promptly ensure new represen-
tation for that client.

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017.

Pe

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

$17A0738. OLEVIK v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 505)

PETERSON, Justice.

The Georgia Constitution protects each of us from being forced to
incriminate ourself. Unlike the similar right guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this state constitu-
tional protection applies to more than mere testimony; it also protects
us from being forced to perform acts that generate incriminating
evidence. This case calls this Court to decide whether this state
constitutional protection prohibits law enforcement from compelling

ee 229

a person suspected of DUI to blow his deep lung air into a breath-
alyzer. Anearly unbroken line of precedent dating back to 1879 leads
us to conclude that it does, although the appellant here still loses
because the language of the implied consent notice statute he chal-
lenges is not per se coercive.

Frederick Olevik was convicted of DUI less safe, failure to
maintain a lane, and no brake lights.’ Olevik appeals from his DUI
conviction, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress the
results of a state-administered breath test on the grounds that the
implied consent notice statute, OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b), is unconstitu-
tional on its face and as applied to him. Olevik argues that his right
against compelled self-incrimination preserved by the Georgia Con-
stitution was implicated when law enforcement asked him to expel
deep lung air into a breathalyzer, that the materially misleading
language of the implied consent notice is coercive per se andin fact did
compel him to perform this act, and thus the admission of his breath
test results violated his right against compelled self-incrimination
under the Georgia Constitution and his due process rights. We agree
with Olevik that submitting to a breath test implicates a person’s
right against compelled self-incrimination under the Georgia Con-
stitution, and we overrule prior decisions that held otherwise. We
nevertheless reject Olevik’s facial challenges to the implied consent
notice statute, because the language of that notice is not per se
coercive. Our previous decisions prevented the trial court from fully
considering Olevik’s argument that, based on a totality of the cir-
cumstances in this case, the language of the implied consent notice
actually coerced him to incriminate himself. Nevertheless, because
Olevik offered the trial court no evidence in support of his claim
beyond the mere language of the statute (which, standing alone, is
not coercive), he could not prevail on remand and so we affirm.

1. Background.

Before proceeding to the legal issues Olevik raises, we begin with
a brief overview of Georgia’s DUI laws. We then turn to the factual
context of this case.

(a) Georgia’s statutory framework on implied consent and DUI
arrests.

The scourge of people operating motor vehicles under the influ-
ence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances has plagued
us as long as people have been driving, leading states to enact
criminal laws to combat this problem. See Birchfield v. North Dakota,

+ Olevik also was found guilty of DUI per se, but the trial court merged this count into the
DUI less safe count.

230 rs

__US.___ (136 SCt 2160, 195 LE2d 560) (2016). In Georgia, driving
with a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of 0.08 grams or more is per se
unlawful (DUI per se), and regardless of BAC, it is unlawful for a person
to drive under the influence of alcohol or drugs to the extent it is less
safe to do so (DUI less safe). See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a). Measuring a
person’s BAC is accomplished through a chemical test of the person’s
breath, blood, or urine, and these tests typically require the cooperation
of the suspect. To elicit such cooperation, the General Assembly has
enacted an implied consent statute, providing that drivers have agreed
to submit to chemical testing as a condition of receiving a driver’s
license and that a person’s driving privilege will be suspended if he or
she refuses to take a chemical test after being arrested for a DUI offense
or having been involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries
or fatalities. OCGA §§ 40-5-55 (a); 40-5-67.1 (d). When drivers are
arrested for DUI, police officers ask them to submit to a chemical test;
the implied consent statute prescribes the language the officers are
required to use. For drivers aged 21 years or older (like Olevik), that
language is as follows:

Georgia law requires you to submit to state administered
chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily
substances for the purpose of determining if you are under
the influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing,
your Georgia driver’s license or privilege to drive on the
highways of this state will be suspended for a minimum
period of one year. Your refusal to submit to the required
testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial. If
you submit to testing and the results indicate an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 grams or more, your Georgia driver’s
license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state may
be suspended for a minimum period of one year. After first
submitting to the required state tests, you are entitled to
additional chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or
other bodily substances at your own expense and from
qualified personnel of your own choosing. Will you submit to
the state administered chemical tests of your (designate
which tests) under the implied consent law?

OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2).

(b) Olevik’s traffic stop.

The facts are largely undisputed. After observing that Olevik
failed to maintain his lane while driving and had an inoperable brake
light, police initiated a traffic stop. During the stop, police observed

eS 231

that Olevik’s eyes were bloodshot and watery, his speech was slow,
and he smelled strongly of alcohol. Olevik admitted to the police that
he had consumed four or five beers prior to driving. He agreed to
undergo field sobriety tests and exhibited six out of six clues on the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The walk-and-turn and one-leg-
stand tests were not conducted because Olevik had certain physical
limitations. After Olevik also tested positive for alcohol on a portable
alco-sensor machine, police arrested Olevik and read him the statu-
torily mandated, age-appropriate implied consent notice. Olevik
agreed to submit to a state-administered breath test, the results of
which revealed that he had a BAC of 0.113.

In support of his motion to suppress the breath test results,
Olevik stipulated that the officers were not threatening or intimidat-
ing in requesting the breath test. He nevertheless argued that his
consent to the test was invalid because the language of the implied
consent notice was misleading, coercing him to take the test in
violation of his right against compelled self-incrimination. After
several hearings, the trial court denied Olevik’s motion to suppress,
concluding that his right against compelled self-incrimination was
not violated because he voluntarily consented to the breath test. The
court found him guilty of the charged offenses following a bench trial.
Olevik then brought this appeal.

2. The Georgia Constitution’s right against compelled self-
incrimination applies to breath tests.

On appeal, Olevik argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the implied consent notice is unconsti-
tutional on its face and as applied, coercing him to submit to a breath
test in violation of his right against compelled self-incrimination
under the Georgia Constitution. As Olevik conceded at oral argu-
ment, our decision in Klink v. State, 272 Ga. 605 (533 SE2d 92) (2000),
precludes his claims. But recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States and this Court have shaken the analytical underpin-
nings of Klink, and so, as Olevik urges us to do, we reexamine whether
Klink remains good law. See Kendrick v. State, 335 Ga. App. 766, 770
n.3 (782 SE2d 842) (2016) (“[S]ubsequent development of the law may
have substantially eroded Klink’s analytical foundation[.]”). We con-
clude that Klink was wrongly decided at least to the extent that it
concluded that a breath test did not implicate the state constitutional
right against compelled self-incrimination and, after determining
that stare decisis does not counsel preserving Klink, overrule it to
that extent.

(a) Klink’s foundation has been undermined.

In Klink, we upheld the implied consent notice statute against
claims indistinguishable from Olevik’s. We did so on the basis that

“compelling a defendant to submit to [blood and] breath testing
[is not] unconstitutional under Georgia law[,]” and thus “[t]he right to
refuse to submit to state administered testing is not a constitutional
right, but one created by the legislature.” Klink, 272 Ga. at 606 (1).
Klink relied on two prior decisions — Allen v. State, 254 Ga. 433 (330
SE2d 588) (1985) and Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625 (398 SE2d 360)
(1990) — for these conclusions. In Allen, we held that, “[i]Jn Georgia,
the state may constitutionally take a blood sample from a defendant
without his consent. Our ‘Implied Consent Statute’ thus grants a
suspect an opportunity, not afforded him by our constitution, to refuse
to take a blood-alcohol test.” 254 Ga. at 434 (1) (a) (citations omitted).
And in Green, we held that urine testing did not violate the right
against self-incrimination because it was merely “the use of a sub-
stance naturally excreted by the human body.” 260 Ga. at 627 (2). We
went on in Klink to explain that the implied consent notice did not
violate the Due Process Clause because “[t]he choice provided by the
statute at question is not coercive because it is not ‘so painful,
dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs’ that no real
choice exists.” Id. at 606 (1) (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.
553, 563 (103 SCt 916, 74 LE2d 748) (1983)). Moreover, we explained,
because the General Assembly created the right to refuse the test, the
General Assembly’s limitation of that right through the implied
consent language was unobjectionable. Id. Klink’s holding rests in
part on cases that are not good law.

For the proposition that the Georgia Constitution does not
protect citizens from compelled blood testing, Klink relied on Allen,
which in turn relied on Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514 (202 SE2d 428)
(1973). Allen cited Strong for the principle that “the state may... take
a blood sample from a defendant without his consent.” Allen, 254 Ga.
at 434 (1) (a). Allen’s pronouncement that “the state may... take a
blood sample from a defendant without his consent” was an accurate
assessment of Strong, but we now understand it not to be an accurate
statement of the law.

As has been made clear in more recent decisions, Strong’s
analysis concerning warrantless blood tests was incorrect.” In Birch-
field, 136 SCt at 2186 (VID), the Supreme Court of the United States

2 In Strong, we considered a defendant's challenge to the police's withdrawal of a blood
sample from the defendant while he was unconscious on two grounds: (1) unreasonable search
and seizure and (2) violation of the right against compelled self-incrimination. As to the first
ground, we concluded that the warrantless search was proper as a search incident to an arrest,
and even if the defendant was not under arrest, the “evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood”
supported the extraction. Strong, 231 Ga. at 518. As to the second ground, we concluded that
extracting blood did not cause the defendant to be a witness against himself under the Fifth

explained that the natural dissipation of alcohol from the blood-
stream is not a per se exigent circumstance always justifying the
warrantless taking of a blood sample, and concluded that although
breath tests fall within the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement, blood tests do not. And even before Birchfield,
we held in Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 (771 SE2d 373) (2015), that
exigent circumstances are not categorically present in every DUI case
and reiterated that the constitutional protections under Article I,
Section I, Paragraph XIII (“Paragraph XIII”) of the Georgia Consti-
tution, like the Fourth Amendment which contains similar language,
require the extraction of blood to be conducted either pursuant to a
search warrant or under a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. Williams, 296 Ga. at 821. We ruled that the only
exception to the warrant requirement at issue in Williams was the
purported consent of the suspect, disapproving Strong to the extent
it held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in blood categorically
supports a finding of an exigent circumstance justifying a warrant-
less search. Williams, 296 Ga. at 821. We remanded the case for a
determination of the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent because
merely submitting to a state-administered test after having been
read the implied consent notice did not per se establish voluntary
consent for constitutional purposes. Id. at 821-823.

Thus, Georgians do have a constitutional right to refuse to
consent to warrantless blood tests, absent some other exception to the
warrant requirement. Because we now know that Klink erred in
holding that the Georgia Constitution does not preserve such a right,
doubt naturally arises about the soundness of our parallel statement
in Klink that the Georgia Constitution also does not protect against
compelled breath testing. Klink, 272 Ga. at 606 (1). We take this
opportunity to revisit Klink’s analysis regarding the applicability to
breath tests of both the state constitutional right against unreason-
able searches and seizures and the state constitutional right against
compelled self-incrimination. The latter of these rights requires a
more extended analysis.

Amendment and “similar provisions of Georgia law,” approvingly citing cases to the effect that
the removal of evidence from a defendant's body does not implicate his right against compelled
self-incrimination. Id. at 519. The holding as to the first ground is not good law, as these more
recent decisions have explained. Nothing we say here should be understood as casting any
doubt on Strong's self-inerimination holding.

234 rs

(b) Neither the Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution nor Paragraph XIII of the Georgia Constitution prohibits
warrantless breath tests as searches incident to arrest.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Paragraph XIII of the Georgia Constitution protect against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 285 (III)
(587 SE2d 605) (2003). A warrantless search is per se unreasonable
unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant require-
ment. Williams, 296 Ga. at 819. A warrant is not needed where
consent is given, and in some cases the doctrine of search incident to
lawful arrest also obviates the need for a warrant. Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 338 (129 SCt 1710, 173 LE2d 485) (2009); Williams, 296
Ga. at 821.
Here, Olevik’s claim that the language of the implied consent
notice rendered his consent invalid is not cognizable on Fourth
Amendment and Paragraph XIII grounds. The Supreme Court of the
United States concluded in Birchfield that the Fourth Amendment
permits warrantless breath tests as searches incident to a DUI
arrest. Birchfield, 1836 SCt at 2184-2185 (V) (C) (8). Because the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
applies to breath tests in that context, there is no need to obtain
consent for a breath test to support a warrantless search for Fourth
Amendment purposes after a valid arrest. Consequently, even assum-
ing that the implied consent notice was coercive, securing a breath
test after arrest based on reading the implied consent notice would
not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the warrantless breath
test is permitted as a search incident to arrest.

Because we generally interpret Paragraph XIII consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, under Birchfield, our Constitution also
would allow warrantless breath tests as searches incident to arrest.
Olevik offers no reason that we should interpret Paragraph XIII
differently in this context.

® We have said that because Paragraph XIII contains the same language as the Fourth
Amendment, it “is [to be] applied in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” See Williams, 296 Ga.
at 818 n.5. But interpreting Paragraph XIII in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment does not mean that our interpretation of Paragraph XIII must change every time the
Supreme Court of the United States changes its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
“Questions of the construction of the State Constitution are strictly matters for the highest
court of this state. The construction of similar federal constitutional provisions, though
persuasive authority, is not binding on this state’s construction of its own Constitution.” Pope
v. City of Atlanta, 240 Ga. 177, 178 (1) (240 SE2d 241) (1977). State constitutional provisions
may, of course, confer greater protections than their federal counterparts, provided that such
broader scope is rooted in the language, history, and context of the state provision. See Grady
v. United Govt. of Athens-Clarke County, 289 Ga. 726, 731 (2) (b) (715 SE2d 148) (2011). In the
same Way, a state constitution may also offer less rights than federal law, so long as it does not

eS 235

(c) Paragraph XVI, properly understood, applies to breath tests.

The Georgia Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be
compelled to give testimony tending in any manner to be self-
incriminating.” Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI (“Paragraph
XVI’). If we were construing Paragraph XVI in the first instance, we
might conclude that the scope of Georgia’s right against compelled
self-incrimination is coterminous with the right guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is limited
to evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. See Muham-
mad v. State, 282 Ga. 247, 250-251 (3) (647 SE2d 560) (2007); see also
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (86 SCt 1826, 16 LE2d
908) (1966) (right against compelled self-incrimination bars compel-
ling “communications” or “testimony,” but “compulsion which makes
a suspect or accused the source of real or physical evidence does not
violate it” (punctuation omitted)). But we are not meeting Paragraph
XVI for the first time; this constitutional provision has been carried
over from prior constitutions, and it has brought with it a long history
of interpretation. The State argues that our historical interpretation
of this provision is wrong, both as a matter of text and in the light of
the legislative history of a previous constitution. Nevertheless, this
history compels our conclusion today.

(i) Principles of constitutional interpretation counsel us to con-
strue Paragraph XVI in the light of case law interpreting similar text
prior to ratification of the 1983 Constitution.

We interpret a constitutional provision according to the original
public meaning ofits text, which is simply shorthand for the meaning
the people understood a provision to have at the time they enacted it.
This is not a new idea. Indeed, there are few principles of Georgia law
more venerable than the fundamental principle that a constitutional
provision means today what it meant at the time that it was enacted.
“(T]he Constitution, like every other instrument made by men, is to
be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the makers of

affirmatively violate federal law. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 738 (104 SCt 2085,
80 LE2d 721) (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring specially) (“The state’s law may prove to be more
protective than federal law. The state law also may be less protective. In that case the court
must go on to decide the claim under federal law, assuming it has been raised.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)); Malyon v. Pierce County, 935 P2d 1272, 1281 n.30 (Wash. 1997) (noting
“that the level of protection of rights under the state constitutions can be the same as, higher
than, or lower than that provided by the federal constitution” (citation and punctuation
omitted). Real federalism means that state constitutions are not mere shadows cast by their
federal counterparts, always subject to change at the hand of a federal court's new interpre-
tation of the federal constitution. See State v. Kennedy, 666 P2d 1316, 1823 (Ore. 1983) (state
constitutional rights were “meant to be and remain genuine guarantees against misuse of the
state's governmental powers, truly independent of the rising and falling tides of federal case law
both in method and in specifics”).

236 rs

it at the time when they made it. To deny this is to insist that a fraud
shall be perpetrated upon those makers or upon some of them.”
Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 438, 454 (1854) (emphasis
in original). “A provision of the constitution is to be construed in the
sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the
time of its adoption.” Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18, 22 (30 SE2d 866)
(1944) (citing South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (26
SCt 110, 50 LE 261) (1905) (“The Constitution is a written instru-
ment. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when
adopted it means now.”), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (105 SCt 1005, 83 LE2d
1016) (1985)).

In determining the original public meaning of a constitutional
provision, we consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the text,
viewing it in the context in which it appears and reading the text in
its most natural and reasonable manner. See Ga. Motor Trucking
Assn. v. Ga. Dept. of Revenue, 301 Ga. 354, 356 (2) (801 SE2d 9) (2017).
And although the text is always our starting point for determining
original public meaning (and often our ending point, as well), the
broader context in which that text was enacted may also be a critical
consideration. “Constitutions, like statutes, are properly to be expounded
in the light of conditions existing at the time of their adoption.” Clarke
v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 166 (83 SE2d 425) (1945) (citation and
punctuation omitted); see also DeJarnette v. Hosp. Auth. of Albany,
195 Ga. 189, 205 (7) (23 SE2d 716) (1942) (the meaning and effect of
constitutional amendments “is to be determined in connection, not
only with the common law and the constitution, but also with
reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts” (citation
and punctuation omitted)).

One key aspect of that broader context is the body of pre-
enactment decisions of this Court interpreting the meaning of certain
text that the framers of our Constitution subsequently chose to use.
In such cases, the text the framers chose had already been defini-
tively interpreted. When the framers of our Constitution considered
language that had already been definitively interpreted and kept it
without material alteration, they are strongly presumed to have kept
with the text its definitive interpretation. This principle, too, is not
new to us. In a case decided shortly before the ratification of the 1983
Constitution, Justice Gregory acknowledged in a concurrence that
this well-established principle precluded his preferred interpretation
of constitutional text:

[R]egardless of the interpretation we might now place
on these words, it is clear that our courts have in the past

eS 237

given them the meaning the majority opinion now gives
them. It is this interpretation of these words which was
incorporated into the Constitution of 1945. A constitutional
provision is to be construed in the sense in which it was
understood by the framers and the people at the time of its
adoption. Where the language in our [C]onstitution does not
indicate an intention to declare some new principle, sound
construction requires that it be construed to have intended
no more than merely to state the law as it existed at that
time. The interpretation we might give these words today is
unimportant. Only that interpretation incorporated into the
Constitution concerns us in this particular case.

McCafferty v. Med. College of Ga., 249 Ga. 62, 70 (287 SE2d 171)
(1982) (Gregory, J., concurring specially) (citations omitted), over-
ruled on other grounds by Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 79 (1)
(377 SE2d 674) (1989) (adopting special concurrence). See also Griffin
v. Vandegriff, 205 Ga. 288, 291 (1) (53 SE2d 345) (1949); Scalia &
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322-326
(West 2012) (explaining the prior-construction canon that if a provi-
sion is enacted with words or phrases that had previously received
authoritative construction by a jurisdiction’s court of last resort, the
words and phrases are to be understood according to that construc-
tion). Indeed, we have even previously applied this principle to the
self-incrimination provision of the 1945 Constitution. Because many
“decisions of this [C]ourt had construed the word ‘testimony’ to
embrace any evidence” even before “the identical clause containing
this word was written into the 1945 Constitution,” we concluded that
“the framers of that Constitution intended for it to have the meaning
theretofore given it by construction.” Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132,
135 (137 SE2d 463) (1964).

When we consider the original public meaning, we necessarily
must focus on objective indicators of meaning, not the subjective
intent of particular individuals that the language mean something
idiosyncratic. The importance of this objective approach is plain
when we consider our similar focus in statutory construction. When
we consider the meaning of statutes enacted by 236 members of the
General Assembly, we determine meaning from text and context, “not
the subjective statements of individual legislators.” Gibson v. Gibson,
301 Ga. 622, 632 (3) (c) (801 SE2d 40) (2017) (quoting Malphurs v.
State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 (785 SE2d 414) (2016)). This focus
on the objective meaning of statutory text is by necessity, for how

238 rs

can we possibly determine the subjective intent of 236 legislators
(and a governor) by any method other than focusing on the text they
enacted? Indeed,

how, putting aside the text, are we to figure out what
“intention” was in the head of the legislators when they
voted? And are we searching for the intention of the entire
legislature? A majority of the members who voted? Just the
key members or sponsors of the bill or others who spoke or
wrote about the bill at some point before (or after) passage,
in some way that was publicly reported? What if no majority
of members voted on it with the same intention? And what of
the intention of the Governor who signed the bill?

Merritt v. State, 286 Ga. 650, 656-657 (690 SE2d 835) (2010)
(Nahmias, J., concurring specially). Determining the “intent” of the
legislature by means other than considering the text and context of
properly enacted statutes would be futile.*

Our objective focus is even more important when we interpret
the Constitution. Unlike ordinary legislation, the people — not
merely elected legislators — are the “makers” of the Georgia Consti-
tution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. X, Sec. I, Par. II (proposals to
amend or replace constitution require a vote of the people); see also
Wheeler v. Bd. of Trustees of Fargo Consolidated School Dist., 200 Ga.
323, 333 (3) (87 SE2d 322) (1946) (“The fiat of the people, and only the
fiat of the people, can breathe life into a constitution.”). If the
subjective intent of one legislator out of 236 casts little light on the
meaning of ordinary legislation, such subjective views can hardly
carry more weight for a Constitution that had hundreds of thousands
of citizens who voted on its ratification. See Ga. L. 1983, p. 2070 (1983
Constitution ratified with 567,663 yes votes and 211,342 no votes).
That said, considering what the framers of our Constitution under-
stood the words they selected to mean can be a useful data point in
determining what the words meant to the public at large. See
Gwinnett County School Dist. v. Cox, 289 Ga. 265, 307-308 (710 SE2d
773) (2011) (Nahmias, J., dissenting) (“In construing our Constitu-
tion, we ... sometimes look to the understanding expressed by people
directly involved in drafting the document. . . . The best evidence
[of their intent], of course, is not what various framers said to each

+ Or worse, it would be an invitation for judges “to read their own policy preferences into
the law, as we all believe that our own policy views are wise and reasonable, which tempts us
to assume, consciously or unconsciously, that the legislature could not have intended differ-
ently.” Merritt, 286 Ga. at 656 (Nahmias, J., concurring specially).

eS 239

other at various points during the process, but what they ultimately
drafted together — the actual Constitution that the citizens of
Georgia then ratified.”).

Gi) Paragraph XVI has a nearly unbroken history of application
to compelled acts, not merely testimony.

Applying these principles, we construe the right against com-
pelled self-incrimination preserved by Paragraph XVI in the light of
the meaning of Paragraph XVI's materially identical ancestors. The
right against compelled self-incrimination achieved constitutional
status in Georgia for the first time in the 1877 Constitution. Para-
graph XVI provides that “[n]o person shall be compelled to give
testimony tending in any manner to be self-incriminating”; the 1877
provision provided that “[n]o person shall be compelled to give
testimony tending in any manner to criminate himself.” Ga. Const.
1877, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VI. Other than replacing the archaic phrase
“to criminate himself”® with the more modern phrase “to be self-
incriminating,” Paragraph XVI is identical to the constitutional
provision adopted in 1877. Acase we decided just two years after the
1877 Constitution was adopted (and have never since overruled) is
thus critical to the understanding of the scope of the right against
compelled self-incrimination. In Day v. State, 63 Ga. 668, 669 (2)
(1879), we held that this constitutional right protected a defendant
from being compelled to incriminate himself by acts, not merely
testimony.

Although Day did not explain its broad interpretation,® see id.,
several years later we more fully explained the basis for such a broad
scope. In Calhoun v. State, 144 Ga. 679, 680-681 (87 SE 893) (1916),
we explained that the self-incrimination provision of the 1877 Geor-
gia Constitution was modeled after the common law principle that
“no man is bound to accuse himself of any crime or to furnish any

© At the time of the 1877 Constitution, the word “criminate” was defined as “[t]o accuse or
charge with a crime; to impeach.” Noah Webster, A Dictionary of the English Language 98
(1878). This is the same meaning that “incriminate” had at the time our 1983 Constitution was
adopted. See Webster's New World Dictionary 713 (2d College ed. 1980) (defining “incriminate”
“() to charge with a crime; accuse; (2) to involve in, or make appear guilty of, a crime or
fault’). Although usage of “criminate” was common through the 19th century, the word has
since become merely an archaic variant of “incriminate.” See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of
Modern American Usage 366 (1998). And notes from the drafting of the 1983 Constitution also
reflect this understanding. See Select Committee on Constitutional Revisions, 1977-1981,
Transcript of Meetings, Committee to Revise Article I, meeting of the Subcommittee on Origin
and Structures of Government, October 26, 1979, pp. 38-34
© There is no indication that “testimony” had a substantially broader definition in 1877.
See Noah Webster, A Dictionary of the English Language 434 (1878) (defining “testify” as
“[t]o make a solemn declaration; to establish some fact; to give testimony” and “[t]o witness to;
to affirm or declare solemnly, or under oath”).

240 rs

evidence to convict himself of any crime[.]” Recognizing that the
constitutional guaranty against compelled self-incrimination was as
broad as the common law right from which it was derived, we noted
that the right “protects one from being compelled to furnish evidence
against himself, either in the form of oral confessions or incriminat-
ing admissions of an involuntary character, or of doing an act against
his will which is incriminating in its nature.” Id. at 681.

The self-incrimination provision has been carried forward with
no material change from the 1877 Constitution through several
intervening constitutions to our current 1983 Constitution. See Ga.
Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VI (“No person shall be compelled to
give testimony tending in any manner to criminate himself.”); Ga.
Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII (same); Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I,
Sec. I, Par. XVI (“No person shall be compelled to give testimony
tending in any manner to be self-incriminating.”). At no point through
this history was the constitutional language changed to abrogate
Day’s interpretation, nor did we reconsider Day. To the contrary, we
have consistently and repeatedly applied the state constitutional
protection against compelled self-incrimination in accord with Day.
See, e.g., Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 833, 836 (10) (426 SE2d 559) (1993)
(1983 Constitution); Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406 (284 SE2d 7) (1981)
(1976 Constitution); Aldrich, 220 Ga. at 135 (1945 Constitution);
Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76, 78-79 (1) (1881) (1877 Constitution).
Thus, although Paragraph XVI refers only to testimony, its protection
against compelled self-incrimination was long ago construed to also
cover incriminating acts and, thus, is more extensive than the
Supreme Court of the United States’s interpretation of the right
against compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment.

Notwithstanding this well-aged precedent recognizing that the
state right against compelled self-incrimination applies beyond mere
testimony, the State argues that we should construe Paragraph XVI
according to its plain text and limit the right to only what iscommonly
understood today to be “testimony,” i.e., spoken or written statements
of certain kinds. The State argues that we erred in Day by ignoring
the plain language of the constitutional provision and cites legislative
history surrounding the creation of the 1877 Constitution as evidence
that the framers of that constitution intended for the right against
self-incrimination to be limited to testimony.”

7 In its well-researched briefing, the State points us to comments made by John Matthews
Guerard, a delegate to the 1877 Constitutional Convention, in proposing the self-incrimination
provision. The State focuses particularly on Guerard’s statement that the provision would

eS 2a

But even if the State were right that Day (and all the other cases
that have since followed it) misread the constitutional text, we are no
longer governed by the 1877 Constitution that Day interpreted. Since
issuing our decisions in Day (1879) and Calhoun (1916), the people of
Georgia have adopted three new constitutions (1945, 1976, and
1983). Our current constitution adopted in 1983 contains self-
incrimination language that is identical in all material respects to the
language interpreted in Day and Calhoun. Thus, even if we were
wrong in Day and Calhoun to extend the right against compelled
self-incrimination beyond spoken and written statements, the sub-
sequent ratifications of new constitutions with the same language are
strongly presumed to have carried forward the interpretation of that
language provided by Day and Calhoun. See Aldrich, 220 Ga. at 135
(framers of 1945 Constitution intended for constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination to have same meaning as that given by our
construction in Day, Calhoun, and other cases). As we explained
above, the adoption of a new constitution containing materially
identical language already clearly and authoritatively construed by
this Court is strongly presumed to have brought with that language
our previous interpretation. This is so regardless of whether those
holdings were well-reasoned at the time they were decided. The
people of Georgia, by ratifying that constitutional text, ratified the
scope of Paragraph XVI as Day explained it.

(iii) Breathing deep lung air into a breathalyzer is a self-
incriminating act that Paragraph XVI prevents the State from com-
pelling.

Although the scope of our right against compelled self-
incrimination extends to acts, it is only compelled acts of the defen-
dant that fall within the protections of Paragraph XVI. For example,
we have held that a defendant’s right against compelled self-
incrimination was violated when he was compelled to place his foot in
certain footprints located near the crime scene. Day, 63 Ga. at
668-669 (2). We also have held that a defendant’s right against
compelled self-incrimination was violated when he was required to
stand up at trial so that a witness could verify that the defendant’s leg
had been amputated in a way that corresponded to tracks left at the
crime scene. Blackwell, 67 Ga. at 78-79 (1). We have concluded that
adefendant’s right against compelled self-incrimination was violated
when he was required to drive his truck onto scales in order to

ensure that, at trial, a citizen “shall not be compelled to testify to anything tending to criminate
himself.” Because Guerard used the term “testify,” the State argues, he meant for the
self-inerimination provision to apply only to testimony.

242, rs

determine whether he was operating a vehicle weighing more than
permitted by law. Aldrich, 220 Ga. at 135. We have also ruled that
requiring a defendant to produce a handwriting exemplar violates
the self-incrimination provision. Brown, 262 Ga. at 836 (10); see also
State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56, 57 (2) (262 SE2d 233) (1979)
(same).*

Incontrast, the right against compelled self-incrimination is not
violated where a defendant is compelled only to be present so that
certain incriminating evidence may be procured from him. Batton v.
State, 260 Ga. 127, 130 (3) (391 SE2d 914) (1990).° Consequently, we
have ruled that the right is not violated by removing clothing from a
defendant. See, e.g., id. (taking shoes from defendant); Drake v. State,
75 Ga. 413, 414-415 (2) (1885) (taking blood-stained clothes from
defendant); Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 36, 43-44 (3) (1882) (pulling
boots off a defendant). Similarly, the right is not violated when
evidence is taken from a defendant’s body or photographs of the
defendant are taken. See, e.g., Quarterman v. State, 282 Ga. 383, 386
(4) (651 SE2d 32) (2007) (statutory requirement that convicted felon
provide DNA sample did not violate his right against compelled
self-incrimination because it does not force the convicted felon to
remove incriminating DNA evidence from his body himself but only
to submit to having the evidence removed); Ingram v. State, 253 Ga.
622, 634 (7) (323 SE2d 801) (1984) (right was not violated by requiring
defendant to strip to the waist to allow police to photograph tattoos on
his body); State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524, 525 (2) (322 SE2d 711)
(1984) (taking impression of defendant’s teeth did not compel defen-
dant to perform an act); Strong, 231 Ga. at 519 (withdrawal of blood
from unconscious defendant did not violate right); Creamer v. State,
229 Ga. 511, 517-518 (3) (192 SE2d 350) (1972) (right not violated
where defendant required to undergo surgery to remove a bullet from
his body because the defendant was not forced to remove the bullet
himself).

Inother instances, evenifthe right was implicated, we concluded
that no violation had occurred where the defendant consented to the
act rather than being compelled. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 274 Ga. 476,

® Given our conclusion in Brown that compelling a defendant to provide a handwriting
exemplar violates the defendant's right against self-incrimination under the Georgia Consti-
tution, the Court of Appeals's earlier decision in Davis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 549, 552 (6) 281
SE2d 305) (1981), that compelled voice exemplars do not violate that right seems something of
an outlier. But the continued validity of Davis is not before us today.

° It is important to recognize that while these situations do not implicate the right against
compelled self-incrimination, the taking of physical evidence from a suspect often will consti-
tute a search under the Fourth Amendment and Paragraph XIII, for which a warrant or an
exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent or search incident to arrest, is required.

eS 248

478 (2) (b) (554 SE2d 488) (2001) (accused’s right against compelled
self-incrimination was not violated when he agreed to hold up sleeve
to allow police to photograph tattoos on his arm); Whippler v. State,
218 Ga. 198, 203 (6) (126 SE2d 744) (1962) (defendant’s right against
compelled self-incrimination not violated where he voluntarily and
without objection cooperated in giving fingerprints to police); Foster
uv. State, 213 Ga. 601, 604 (3) (100 SE2d 426) (1957) (suspect’s right
was not violated when he agreed to go with police to the crime scene
for identification purposes); see also State v. J. T:, 155 Ga. App. 812
(273 SE2d 214) (1980) (student complied with assistant principal’s
instruction to “empty her pockets”).

In sum, Paragraph XVI prohibits compelling a suspect to per-
form an act that itself generates incriminating evidence; it does not
prohibit compelling a suspect to be present so that another person
may perform an act generating such evidence. See Creamer, 229 Ga.
at 517 (8) (“You cannot force a defendant to act, but you can, under
proper circumstances, produce evidence from his person.”). And, like
other constitutional rights, a suspect may consent to take actions that
Paragraph XVI would prevent the State from compelling. Having set
forth the scope of Georgia's right against compelled self-incrimination,
we now consider whether Klink was correct to hold that compelling a
suspect to submit to a breath test does not violate that right. The
answer to this question depends on the details of the test.

The police officer who administered the test in this case testified
that a proper breath test requires deep lung breath, and that a
suspect has to “blow sufficient volume to get the deep, inner-lung
breath” to provide a sufficient sample for testing. Deep lung or
alveolar air provides the most reliable sample because it is in the
alveolar region of the lungs where “alcohol vapor and other gases are
exchanged between blood and breath.” Birchfield, 136 SCt at 2168 (I).
As the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, obtaining
this deep lung breath requires the cooperation of the person being
tested because a suspect must blow deeply into a breathalyzer for
several seconds in order to produce an adequate sample. See id. As the
State conceded at oral argument, merely breathing normally is not
sufficient.

The State argues that no compelled act is involved because a
breath test only captures a “substance” naturally excreted by the
human body, in the same way that collecting a urine sample does not
violate a defendant’s right against compelled self-incrimination. See
Green, 260 Ga. at 627 (2); see also Robinson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 43,
50-51 (3) (848 SE2d 662) (1986), reversed on other grounds by
Robinson v. State, 256 Ga. 564 (8350 SE2d 464) (1986) (concluding that
“procurement” of defendant’s urine did not violate the defendant’s

244 rs

right because there was no evidence that he was “forced” to produce
the urine sample). But Green and Robinson do not apply here.'°
Although a person generally expels breath from his body involun-
tarily and automatically, the State is not merely collecting breath
expelled in a natural manner. For a breath test, deep lung breath is
required.

Itis true that “all the air that is breathed into a breath analyzing
machine, including deep lung air, sooner or later would be exhaled
even without the test.” Birchfield, 136 SCt at 2177 (V) (B) (1). If the
State sought to capture and test a person’s naturally exhaled breath,
this might well be a different case. But this is not how a breath test
is performed. Sustained strong blowing into a machine for several
seconds requires a suspect to breathe unnaturally for the purpose of
generating evidence against himself. Indeed, for the State to be able
to test an individual’s breath for alcohol content, it is required that
the defendant cooperate by performing an act. See Birchfield, 186 SCt
at 2168 (1) (“Measurement of BAC based on a breath test requires the
cooperation of the person being tested.”). Compelling a defendant to
perform an act that is incriminating in nature is precisely what
Paragraph XVI prohibits. Calhoun, 144 Ga. at 681 (the right against
compelled self-incrimination protects one from “doing an act against
his will which is incriminating in its nature”).

To the extent we said otherwise in Klink, we did so with no
analysis. With a mere citation to Green’s “natural excretion” prin-
ciple, we summarily concluded in Klink that “compelling a defendant
to submit to breath testing [is not] unconstitutional under Georgia
law.” Klink, 272 Ga. at 606 (1). As discussed above, Green cannot
support a conclusion that the forced and unnatural breathing required
here does not implicate a person’s right against compelled self-
incrimination. Klink’s reasoning, therefore, is unsound. But because
Klink is still binding precedent, we must decide whether the doctrine
of stare decisis nevertheless counsels against overruling Klink.

(iv) We overrule Klink.

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, courts generally stand by
their prior decisions, because “it promotes the evenhanded, predict-
able, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance
on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656, 661
(748 SE2d 910) (2013) (citation omitted). Stare decisis, however, is
not an “inexorable command.” Id. “Courts, like individuals, but with

1 Given their inapplicability, we do not consider whether Green and Robinson were rightly
decided.

eS 245

more caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has
been already carefully considered, and rectify their own mistakes.”
City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730, 733 (13 SE
252) (1891). In reconsidering our prior decisions, we must balance
“the importance of having the question decided against the impor-
tance of having it decided right.” State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 (5)
(697 SE2d 757) (2010) (emphasis in original). To that end, we have
developed a test that considers “the age of precedent, the reliance
interests at stake, the workability of the decision, and, most impor-
tantly, the soundness of its reasoning.” Id. The soundness of a
precedent’s reasoning is the most important factor. Id.

We have also said that stare decisis carries less weight when our
prior precedent involved the interpretation of the Constitution, which
is more difficult than statutory interpretation for the legislative
process to correct. See Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a
Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. 593, 601 (2) (755 SE2d 184) (2014).
This doesn’t mean that we disregard stare decisis altogether, though;
what it actually means is that the first stare decisis factor (soundness
of reasoning) becomes even more critical. The more wrong a prior
precedent got the Constitution, the less room there is for the other
factors to preserve it.

The stare decisis factors counsel that we overrule Klink. We
already have established that the reasoning of Klink was unsound,
cutting heavily in favor of overruling it. On the second factor, Klink
was decided 17 years ago, and we have overruled decisions older than
that. See, e.g., Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 808-814 (771 SE2d 362)
(2015) (overruling 24-year-old interpretation of justification defense
statute); Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. at 601-602 (2) (reversing 19-year-
old decision on sovereign immunity); Jackson, 287 Ga. at 659-660 (5),
(6) (overruling nearly 29-year-old interpretation of felony murder
statute).

Klink also does not involve substantial reliance interests. Sub-
stantial reliance interests are an important consideration for prec-
edents involving contract and property rights, “where parties may
have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to
conduct transactions.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm., 558
U.S. 310, 365 (130 SCt 876, 175 LE2d 753) (2010); see also Savage v.
State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) (774 SE2d 624) (2015) (substantial
reliance interests are most common in contract and property cases).
To be sure, the State has some sort of interest in preserving Klink so
that pending DUI cases are not disturbed. And in the wake of
Williams and Birchfield, police officers may have relied on Klink to
ask more drivers to submit to breath tests as opposed to blood tests,

246 rs

believing that compelled breath tests are unprotected by the Georgia
Constitution. But these sorts of reliance interests do not

outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals
share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. If
itis clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals’ interest in
its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement
entitlement to its persistence. “The mere fact that law
enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself
justify disregard of [constitutional rights].”

Gant, 556 U.S. at 349-350 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
393 (98 SCt 2408, 57 LE2d 290) (1978) (punctuation omitted)).

The remaining factor of workability is not reason enough to
preserve Klink. Under Klink, compelled breath tests are permitted
regardless of how coercively cooperation may have been obtained. By
rejecting Klink, law enforcement may have to consider whether a
suspect has validly waived his right against self-incrimination under
the totality of the circumstances. We recognize that requiring this
determination before administering a breath test is more difficult
than simply waiting for an affirmative response after reading the
implied consent notice. But this difficulty is not reason enough to
persist in Klink’s constitutional error.

Accordingly, we overrule Klink and other cases to the extent they
hold that Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution does not protect
against compelled breath tests or that the right to refuse to submit to
such testing is not a constitutional right.1' We next must decide
whether Olevik’s claims prevail under the applicable law.

3. We reject Olevik’s facial and “as-applied” challenges to the
implied consent notice.

Olevik raises several challenges to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) in
claiming that he did not validly consent to the breath test. First, he
argues that the statute is unconstitutionally coercive, both on its face
and as applied, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Paragraph XIII
of the Georgia Constitution, because it is materially misleading and
did not adequately inform him of his rights. Olevik also raises what
he describes as an as-applied challenge to the implied consent notice

1 See, e.g., Sauls v. State, 293 Ga. 165, 167 (744 SE2d 735) (2013); Cooper, 277 Ga. at 290
(V); Lutz v. State, 274 Ga. 71, 73 (1) (548 SE2d 323) (2001); Fantasia v. State, 268 Ga. 512, 514
(2) (491 SE2d 318) (1997); Oliver v. State, 268 Ga. App. 290, 294 (2) (601 SE2d 774) (2004); State
v. Coe, 243 Ga. App. 232, 234 (2) (533 SE2d 104) (2000); State v. Lord, 236 Ga. App. 868, 870 (513
SE2d 25) (1999); Nawrocki v. State, 235 Ga. App. 416, 417 (1) (610 SE2d 301) (1998).

eS 2a

statute, claiming that the notice language coerced him to submit toa
breath test in violation of Paragraph XVI; this claim isn’t really a
challenge to the statute itself, but is instead merely a claim that
his breath test results are inadmissible. We reject Olevik’s facial
challenges because the statute is not per se coercive. We reject his
as-applied claim because he offers no basis for a finding of coercion
beyond the language of the notice.

(a) Olevik’s facial challenges fail.

Olevik’s argument that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) is facially coercive
is essentially a claim that the implied consent notice is so misleading
and inaccurate that no person can validly consent to a state-
administered test once the notice has been read. Outside the First
Amendment context, a plaintiff faces a difficult task in mounting a
successful facial challenge to a statute, “because it requires one to
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute
would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its
applications, or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate
sweep.” Bello v. State, 300 Ga. 682, 686 (1) (797 SE2d 882) (2017)
(citation and punctuation omitted); see also Blevins v. Dade County
Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 118, 118 (3) (702 SE2d 145) (2010).
Where a statute has a “plainly legitimate sweep,” a facial challenge
must fail. See Washington State Grange v. Washington State Repub-
lican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (128 SCt 1184, 170 LE2d 151) (2008).
Olevik has failed to satisfy this exacting standard.

The implied consent notice is not per se coercive on its face. Olevik
argues that the misleading language of the implied consent notice
violates the due process guarantees of the United States and Georgia
Constitutions.!* Specifically, Olevik argues that the implied consent
notice inaccurately tells suspects that Georgia law requires them to
submit to a state-administered chemical test and provides mislead-
ing information about the consequences for submitting or refusing to
submit to a test.

Before addressing Olevik’s specific arguments, we note that the
implied consent statute has a “plainly legitimate sweep,” practically
dooming Olevik’s facial challenge. All 50 states have adopted some
form of an implied consent law that requires “motorists, as a condition
of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing
if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-
driving offense.” Birchfield, 136 SCt at 2169 (1) (quoting Missouri

1 Although Olevik cites both federal and state constitutional due process provisions, he
does not argue that they offer different protections or that his claims are to be analyzed
differently in this context.

248 rs

v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 161 (133 SCt 1552, 185 LE2d 696) (2013)
(punctuation omitted)). The Supreme Court of the United States has
approved the “general concept of implied-consent laws that impose
civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse
to comply.” 136 SCt at 2185 (VI). The Birchfield Court, however,
struck down implied consent laws that impose criminal penalties for
refusing to submit to blood testing. Id. at 2184-2185 (V) (C) (3).
Georgia's implied consent statute does not impose criminal penalties
for refusing to submit to chemical testing, squarely putting our
implied consent notice within the category of statutes that the
Supreme Court of the United States has deemed not unconstitution-
ally coercive.

Aside from failing to show a lack of a legitimate sweep, Olevik
has failed to demonstrate that the implied consent notice is uncon-
stitutional in all of its applications. “In determining whether a
defendant’s statement was voluntary as a matter of constitutional
due process, a trial court must consider the totality of the circum-
stances.” Welbon v. State, 301 Ga. 106, 109 (2) (799 SE2d 793) (2017);
see also State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 779 (3) (b) (770 SE2d 808)
(2015) (violation of a statute rendering a confession inadmissible does
not automatically amount to a constitutional violation). As we explain
below in Division 3 (b), the totality of the circumstances test to
determine the voluntariness of an incriminating statement or act for
due process purposes is the same test used to determine the volun-
tariness of a consent to chemical testing in the DUI context. After our
decision in Williams, mere acquiescence to a blood test after being
read the implied consent notice is not per se voluntary consent to a
warrantless search; the State must show that a suspect voluntarily
consented to a blood test under the totality of the circumstances.
Williams, 296 Ga. at 822-823.

Because evaluating whether self-incrimination was compelled
depends on the totality of the circumstances, Olevik cannot establish
that the implied consent notice is materially misleading and sub-
stantively inaccurate in every application such that the notice invari-
ably compels submission to the requested breath test. For example,
Olevik argues that the implied consent notice misinforms a defen-
dant that he is required to submit to a state-administered chemical
test without informing suspects about their right to refuse testing. By
its plain terms, the first sentence of the notice (“Georgia law requires
you to submit to state administered chemical tests”) tells a suspect
that Georgia law requires him to take a chemical test of his blood,
breath, urine, or other bodily substance. This warning is, of course,
true in the sense that the implied consent law has provided that

eS 249

drivers have agreed to submit to chemical tests as a condition of
having a driver’s license. If you don’t submit to a test, you lose your
license.

The implied consent notice also refers to the testing as “required”
twice more. See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2). Olevik would have us
accept that every suspect would focus only on the notice’s repeated
references to “required” testing at the exclusion of other language
contained in the notice. But following the first instruction that
“Georgia law requires you to submit to state administered chemical
tests,” the notice states, “Jf you refuse this testing, your Georgia
driver’s license or privilege to drive . . . will be suspended for a
minimum period of one year.” The next sentence begins “Your refusal
to submit to the required testing may be offered into evidence against
you at trial.” After giving other information, the notice ends with,
“Will you submit to the state administered chemical tests of your

designate which tests) under the implied consent law?” Because the

notice refers to a right to refuse, advises suspects of the consequences
for doing so, and concludes with a request to submit to testing, a
reasonable suspect relying solely on the notice should understand
that the State is asking for a suspect’s cooperation, rather than
demanding it, and that they have a right to refuse to cooperate.

Olevik next asserts that the notice is per se coercive because it
contains misleading information about the consequences of taking a
chemical test or refusing to do so. Specifically, Olevik observes that
the notice warns suspects that a refusal to submit to testing will
result in a license suspension and that a test result indicating a BAC
of 0.08 grams or more only may result in a suspension. Olevik is
correct that this information is not entirely accurate, as suspensions
are mandated in either case. See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (c) (providing
that the Department of Public Safety “shall suspend” the license of a
driver (21 or older) who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or
more), (d) (the department “shall suspend” for a period of one year the
license of a person who refuses to submit to a chemical test). But the
mere fact that the notice misstates the likelihood of a license suspen-
sion does not, by itself, render the notice per se coercive regardless of
other circumstances. We cannot say that the notice’s use of “may”
instead of “shall” with respect to the likelihood of license suspension
is likely to play a dispositive role in a reasonable person’s decision;
when arrested and facing jail, the relative likelihood of also facing a
civil administrative penalty may well recede into the background.

Olevik also challenges OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b)’s failure to advise
suspects that the test results will be used against him at trial. But he
concedes that the primary purpose of seeking the test is to collect
evidence to support a criminal prosecution. Olevik points to no law

250 rs

requiring a full and explicit explanation of all possible consequences
no matter how obvious.'* The Supreme Court of the United States has
rejected the claim that the admission of evidence that a defendant
refused to take a chemical test violated a defendant’s due process
rights where he was not fully warned of the consequences of refusal.
See Neville, 459 U.S. at 564-566. In rejecting a claim that an implied
consent statute, similar to the one at issue here, was coercive, the
Neville Court concluded that the statute did not create a situation “so
painful, dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs, that
almost inevitably a person would prefer ‘confession’ ” via submission
to a chemical test. Neville, 459 U.S. at 563.
Olevik’s facial claim rests on the premise that the notice would
deceive a reasonable person. On the record before us, although Olevik
ints out deficiencies in the implied consent notice," there is no
vidence that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) creates widespread confusion
out drivers’ rights and the consequences for refusing to submit to
chemical test or for taking and failing that test. Because we cannot
ssume that the implied consent notice standing alone will coerce
easonable people to whom it is read, Olevik’s facial challenge fails.
ee Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 457 (rejecting facial
hallenge to primary election system initiative because each of the
plaintiffs’ arguments “rests on factual assumptions about voter con-
fusion, and each fails for the same reason: In the absence of evidence,
we cannot assume that Washington’s voters will be misled”).
(b) Olevik’s “as-applied” self-incrimination claim also fails.
Olevik also raises an “as-applied” challenge to the implied con-
sent notice, arguing that the application of the statute violated his
due process rights. Regardless of whether the reading of a notice
compels a defendant to incriminate himself, itis not the reading of the
notice that would constitute a due process violation or a violation of
the right against compelled self-incrimination. Instead, it is the
admission of a compelled breath test that would amount to a consti-
tutional violation. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (123 SCt
1994, 155 LE2d 984) (2003) (“Statements compelled by police inter-
rogations of course may not be used against a defendant at trial, but

os

Rp pp

QD

°

18 To the extent Olevik argues that we should impose a Miranda-style prophylactic rule to
protect suspects’ Paragraph XVI rights (rights the scope of which, as we have explained, were
well-established long before the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda), he does not point us to
a single decision of this Court or any textual or historical basis supporting such a step. In the
absence of a more complete argument, we decline to address this issue.

14 The General Assembly may wish to amend the implied consent notice statute; if it does,
among the changes it may consider would be a clearer explication of the right to refuse testing,
and a more accurate articulation of the likelihood of license suspension.

eS 251

it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.” (citation omitted; emphasis sup-
plied)); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561 (78 SCt 844, 2 LE2d 975)
(1958) (the use of a defendant's confession obtained by coercion,
whether physical or mental, violates due process). Accordingly, this
claim isn’t really a challenge to the statute, but is instead a challenge
to the admission of the results of the breath test against him.

As stated above, whether a defendant is compelled to provide
self-incriminating evidence in violation of Paragraph XVI is deter-
mined under the totality of the circumstances. Determining the
voluntariness of (or lack of compulsion surrounding) a defendant’s
incriminating statement or act involves considerations similar to
those employed in determining whether a defendant voluntarily
consented to a search. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
227 (93 SCt 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1973). We have said that the
voluntariness of a consent to search is determined by such factors as

the age of the accused, his education, his intelligence, the
length of detention, whether the accused was advised of his
constitutional rights, the prolonged nature of questioning,
the use of physical punishment, and the psychological impact
of all these factors on the accused. In determining voluntari-
ness, no single factor is controlling.

Dean v. State, 250 Ga. 77, 80 (2) (a) (295 SE2d 306) (1982); see also
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (noting that in considering whether a
defendant voluntarily incriminated himself, the Court “determined
the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the
psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal signifi-
cance of how the accused reacted”). Just as the voluntariness of
consent to search includes an assessment of the “psychological impact
of all the factors on a defendant,” a significant factor in a due process
inquiry is whether a deceptive police practice caused a defendant to
confess or provide an incriminating statement. See United States v.
Lall, 607 F3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While we look to the
totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of
[a defendant’s] confession, a significant aspect of that inquiry here
involves the effect of deception in obtaining a confession.”); Chul-
payev, 296 Ga. at 779 (8) (a) (citing Lall, 607 F3d at 1285). And
although “knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be
taken into account, the government need not establish such knowl-
edge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” State v. Tye, 276 Ga.
559, 560 (1) (580 SE2d 528) (2003) (citation and punctuation omit-
ted); see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (“While the state of the

22 rs

accused’s mind, and the failure of the police to advise the accused of
his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the
‘voluntariness’ of an accused’s responses, they were not in and of
themselves determinative.”).

This totality test is not foreign to trial courts. Trial courts already
use the test to determine the voluntariness of a defendant’s consent
to chemical testing as an exception to the warrant requirement under
the Fourth Amendment and Paragraph XIII. The trial court here in
fact considered the totality of the circumstances in concluding that
Olevik consented to the breath test under Fourth Amendment prin-
ciples.

Although the trial court erred in concluding that Olevik’s con-
stitutional right against compelled self-incrimination was not at
issue, its ruling is understandable; indeed, the outcome was required
by binding case law. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI
(‘The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as
precedents.”). But we have now overturned that case law because it
erred in stating that breath tests do not implicate the right against
self-incrimination. Paragraph XVI protects against compelled breath
tests and affords individuals a constitutional right to refuse testing.

Nevertheless, the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that Olevik
was not compelled into submitting to the breath test must be affirmed.
The court said it considered all the relevant factors to determine the
voluntariness to consent to search, and these same factors are used in
determining whether an incriminating act or statement was volun-
tary. The only consideration that Olevik argues the court failed to
consider properly is the allegedly coercive and misleading nature of
the implied consent notice. But we have already concluded above in
rejecting his facial challenge that the notice, standing alone, is not
per se coercive. Olevik identifies no other factors surrounding his
arrest that, in combination with the reading of the implied consent
notice, coerced him into performing a self-incriminating act. Indeed,
Olevik stipulated that the officer’s actions were not threatening or
intimidating. Because the reading of the implied consent notice is
not, by itself, coercive, and Olevik has offered nothing else, Olevik’s
claim must fail. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying
Olevik’s motion to suppress and affirm his convictions.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

ance W. Tyler, for appellant.

eS 258

Rosanna M. Szabo, Solicitor-General, Samuel R. d’Entremont,
Joelle M. Nazaire, Assistant Solicitors-General, for appellee.

$17A0767. PATTON v. VANTERPOOL.
(806 SE2d 493)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

OCGA § 19-7-21 creates an “irrebuttable presumption” of legiti-
macy with respect to “[a]ll children born within wedlock or within the
usual period of gestation thereafter who [were] conceived by means of
artificial insemination.” (Emphasis supplied.) This appeal presents
the question of whether that irrebuttable presumption applies to
children so conceived by means of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”). We
conclude that it does not and reverse the judgment of the superior
court.

In January 2014, after approximately three years of marriage,
David Patton (“Appellant”) filed a complaint for divorce against
Jocelyn Vanterpool, M.D. (“Appellee”). During the pendency of the
divorce, the parties consented to Appellee undergoing IVF treat-
ment,' which would eventually utilize both donor ova and donor
sperm; on November 10, 2014, Appellee traveled to the Czech Repub-
lic for the IVF procedure. Four days later, on November 14, 2014, a
final judgment and decree of divorce was entered in the divorce
action. The divorce decree incorporated the parties’ settlement agree-
ment, which reflects that, at the time of the agreement, the parties
neither had nor were expecting children produced of the marriage.

Approximately 29 weeks later, on June 6, 2015, Appellee gave
birth as a result of the November 2014 IVF procedure. Appellee
subsequently moved the superior court to set aside the decree of
divorce, seeking to include the minor child in the divorce agreement;
this motion was denied. Appellee thereafter instituted a paternity
action against Appellant, alleging that he gave written, informed
consent for IVF and that OCGA § 19-7-21 created an irrebuttable
presumption of paternity; Appellee also sought child support. In
response, Appellant argued that he did not meaningfully consent to
IVF and that, evenifhe did, OCGA § 19-7-21is unconstitutional. The
trial court sided with Appellee, granting her summary judgment on
the issue of paternity. In September 2016, this Court granted Appel-
lant’s application for discretionary appeal, asking the parties to

1 The record suggests that Appellee wanted to have a child but could not undergo the
procedure without Appellant's consent.

254 A

address whether OCGA § 19-7-21 applies to children conceived by
means of IVF and, if so, whether OCGA § 19-7-21 is unconstitu-
tional.”

We are tasked with interpreting the text of OCGA § 19-7-21 to
discern whether the irrebuttable presumption created with respect to
children conceived by means of “artificial insemination” extends to
children conceived by IVF therapy. “A statute draws its meaning, of
course, from its text.” (Citation omitted.) Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838,
839 (770 SE2d 851) (2015). Under our well-established rules of
statutory construction, we

presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and
said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory
text its “plain and ordinary meaning,” we must view the
statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we
must read the statutory text in its most natural and reason-
able way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language
would.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170,
172-173 (751 SE2d 337) (2013). Though we may review the “text of the
provision in question and its context within the larger legal frame-
work to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it,” Scott v.
State, 299 Ga. 568, 571 (788 SE2d 468) (2016), where the statutory
text is “clear and unambiguous,” we attribute to the statute its plain
meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends. See Deal, 294
Ga. at 173. With these principles in mind, we begin our analysis,
applying a de novo standard of review to the judgment of the trial
court. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731 (2)
(691 SE2d 218) (2010).

OCGA § 19-7-21 concerns the parent-child relationship gener-
ally, stating as follows: “All children born within wedlock or within
the usual period of gestation thereafter who have been conceived by
means of artificial insemination are irrebuttably presumed legiti-
mate if both spouses have consented in writing to the use and
administration of artificial insemination.” At issue here is the term
“artificial insemination,” which is not defined by statute.? Artificial
insemination, which has been in use since the late eighteenth century
and has been so named since the early nineteenth century, see Kara

2 Because we conclude that the plain language of OCGA § 19-7-21 has no application here,
we pretermit any consideration of the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-21.

® There is no dispute that the child was born “within the usual period of gestation”
following the marriage.

eS 255

W. Swanson, Adultery By Doctor: Artificial Insemination, 1890-1945,
87 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 591 (2012), has been consistently defined as the
“introduction of semen into the uterus or oviduct by other than
natural means... in order to increase the probability of conception.”
Webster’s Third International Dictionary 124 (1967). See also Black’s
Medical Dictionary 65 (26th ed. 1965) (defining artificial insemina-
tion as “the introduction of semen into the vagina by artificial
means”); Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (28th ed.) (updated Nov.
2014) (defining artificial insemination as “introduction of semen into
the vagina other than by coitus”); 59 AmJur2d Parent and Child § 7
(“Artificial insemination is the introduction of semen into the female
reproductive tract by mechanical means in order to effect pregnancy
without sexual intercourse.”); 8 Attorneys Medical Advisor § 83:12
(“Artificial insemination . . . refers to the artificial injection of semen
into the female’s reproductive tract.”). Thus, as the procedure has
been understood for over 150 years, see, e.g., J. Marion Sims, Clinical
Notes on Uterine Surgery: With Special Reference to the Manage-
ment of the Sterile Condition 372 (1866), artificial insemination
involves the introduction of semen to the female reproductive tract to
further the purpose of in vivo‘ fertilization of an ovum. See In re Baby
Doe, 353 SE2d 877, 878 (S.C. 1987) (‘Artificial insemination is the
introduction of semen into the reproductive tract of a female by
artificial means.”). We conclude, given the history and well-
established meaning and use of the term “artificial insemination,”
that the term is not ambiguous as it is used in OCGA § 19-7-21.° We
now must address whether artificial insemination includes IVF.

In vitro fertilization was first described in the 1970s, see Janet L.
Dolgin, The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations,
7 Yale J. L. & Feminism 37 (1995), and involves “[a] procedure [in]

+ “In vivo" means to “take place in the body,” while “in vitro” means “in glass” and refers to
an artificial environment rather than the body. Black's Law Dictionary 956 (10th ed. 2014).

© Appellee contends that this Court should adopt the reasoning of Maryland's highest
court, which has concluded that the phrase “artificial insemination” is “ambiguous” because
there are numerous ways in which artificial insemination may be accomplished. See Sieglein
v. Schmidt, 136 A3d 751, 759-761 (Md. 2016). The Sieglein decision explains that sperm may be
introduced via intrafollicular insemination (injecting semen directly into an ovarian follicle),
intraperitoneal insemination (injecting semen intothe peritoneal cavity), intratubal/intrafallopian
insemination (injecting semen into the fallopian tube) or intrauterine insemination (injecting
semen directly into the uterus). Id. at 760, n. 13. The Maryland court also noted that artificial
insemination could be used with sperm from a spouse (homologous insemination), commonly
known as Artificial Insemination by Husband (“AIH”), or from a donor (heterologous insemi-
nation), otherwise known as Artificial Insemination by Donor (“AID").

We cannot agree that a decades-old term is rendered ambiguous simply because the
procedure may utilize donor sperm or various locations in the female reproductive tract;
irrespective of the use of donor sperm or the location of injection, sperm is being introduced to
the female reproductive tract for the purpose of encouraging in vivo fertilization.

256 A

which an egg is fertilized outside a woman’s body and then inserted
into the womb for gestation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 956 (10th ed.
2014). See also Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (28th ed.) (online
database updated Nov. 2014) (describing IVF as “a process whereby
(usually multiple) ova are placed in a medium to which sperm are
added for fertilization, the zygote thus produced then being intro-
duced into the uterus with the objective of full-term development”);
Gale Encyclopedia of Medicine (2008) (Retrieved October 4, 2017 from
https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/in+vitrotfertil-
ization) (“In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a procedure in which eggs (ova)
from a woman’s ovary are removed. They are fertilized with sperm in
a laboratory procedure, and then the fertilized egg (embryo) is returned
to the woman’s uterus.”); 8 Attorneys Medical Advisor § 83:14 (“In
vitro fertilization (IVF) consists of . . . fertilization of the oocytes in the
laboratory[ ] and the transfer of resultant embryos back to the
woman’s uterus.”). Two of the primary stages of the IVF process
involve the fertilization of the ovum outside the body and the subse-
quent transfer of that embryo into the recipient’s uterus. See Marvin
A. Milich, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medical Tech-
nology — Social Values = Legislative Solutions, 30 J. Fam. L. 875, 876
(1991/1992). To summarize, while artificialinsemination involves the
introduction of sperm to the female reproductive tract to encourage
fertilization, IVF involves implanting a fertilized egg into a female;
though each procedure aims for pregnancy, the procedures are dis-
tinct, and we conclude that the term “artificial insemination” does not
encompass IVF. Other courts have reached this same conclusion.° See
Finley v. Astrue, 270 SW3d 849, 850 n. 2 (Ark. 2008) (recognizing a
distinction between artificial insemination and IVF); In the Interest
of O. G. M.,, 988 SW2d 473 (II) (C) (Tex. App. Ist Dist. 1999)
(concluding that a statute regarding artificial insemination was
inapplicable to case involving IVF).

We are unswayed by Appellee’s argument that such a plain-
language construction of OCGA § 19-7-21 is unnecessarily restric-
tive. While Georgia law favors legitimation, OCGA § 19-7-21 creates
an irrebuttable presumption, whichis generally disfavored in the law,

® In support of her position that “artificial insemination” encompasses “in vitro fertiliza-
tion,” Appellee points to In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 NE3d 830 (Mass. 2015), a decision out of
the highest court in Massachusetts interpreting MGLA 46 § 4B, which is similar to OCGA §
19-7-21. That decision, however, along with others from that state, including Okoli v. Okoli, 963
NE2d 730 (Mass. Ct. App. 2012), simply conclude, without significant discussion or analysis,
that, under MGLA 46 § 4B, the term “artificial insemination” encompasses IVF. See Okoli, 963
NU2d at 734-735 (equating conception through sexual intercourse, artificial insemination, and
IVF because, in each scenario, the “volitional actions” of the putative father resulted in the
creation of a child). We do not find these decisions persuasive.

eS 267

see Viandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (93 SCt 2230, 37 LE2d 63) (1973),
and our interpretation maintains the bounds of the plain language of
the statute. Further, the irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy in
OCGA § 19-7-21is an exception to the general rule, foundin OCGA §
19-7-20 (b), that legitimacy may be disputed, and an expansive
reading of OCGA § 19-7-21 would allow the exception to swallow the
rule.”

Appellee also contends that when the General Assembly enacted
OCGA § 19-7-21 in 1964, that body could not have conceived of the
advent of IVF (and related medical advancements) and that a plain-
language construction of OCGA § 19-7-21 is at odds with the plain
purpose of the statute, which is to legitimate children born by means
of reproductive technology. This argument, too, fails.

Although OCGA § 19-7-21 was enacted over 50 years ago— ata
time when IVF and various assisted reproductive technologies were
not yet developed — recent amendments to other portions of Title 19
make plain that the General Assembly is now well acquainted with
the developments in reproductive medicine. In May 2009, the Gen-
eral Assembly passed the “Domestic Relations — Guardian — Social
Services — Options to Adoption Act,” which amended Chapter 8 of
Title 19 to address, among other things, the custody, relinquishment,
and adoption of embryos. See Ga. L. 2009, pp. 800-803. OCGA § 19-8-40,
which was created by the 2009 Act, defines both embryo and embryo
transfer, which “means the medical procedure of physically placing
an embryo into the uterus of a female.” OCGA § 19-8-40 (8). As
discussed above, “embryo transfer” is a key component of IVF, and
the language employed in the definition of “embryo transfer” tracks
the standard definition of IVF. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 956
(10th ed. 2014) (defining IVF as “[a] procedure [in] which an egg is
fertilized outside a woman’s body and then inserted into the womb for
gestation”).®

We presume that, when the General Assembly passed the 2009
Act, it “‘had full knowledge of the existing state of the law and
enacted [the Act] with reference to it.’” (Citation omitted.) Fair v.
State, 288 Ga. 244, 252 (702 SE2d 420) (2010). Thus, as late as 2009,

* Though Appellee may not establish legitimacy through OCGA § 19-7-21, we do not speak
towhetherAppellee may establish legal paternity through other means, such as OCGA § 19-7-20

® It appears that the General Assembly has been familiar with advances in reproductive
technologies since as early as the late 1980s. In 1988, the Senate considered a bill that would
have amended Chapter 7 of Title 19 to address, among other things, IVF. See SB 493 (1988
Session). In the 1995-1996 session, the House entertained similar legislation. See H.B. 1073
(1996 Session). Likewise, other portions of the 1964 Act have been amended since the
development of IVF technology and continue to include the term “artificial insemination”
without expansion. See OCGA § 31-10-9 (amended 2005); OCGA § 43-34-37 (amended 2010).

258 A

the General Assembly was aware of the existing language of OCGA §
19-7-21 and was familiar with advances in reproductive technology,
yet chose to leave the statute unchanged. Accordingly, this is not a
case in which the General Assembly has failed to anticipate scientific
and medical advancements, but, instead, the General Assembly has
chosen not to act; we must, therefore, presume that OCGA § 19-7-21
remains the will of the legislature.®

Judgment reversed. Hines, C. J., Melton, P. J., Benham, Nah-
mias, Blackwell, Peterson, and Grant, JJ., concur. Presiding Judge
Christopher J. McFadden dissents. Boggs, J., not participating.

McFaDDEN, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

OCGA § 19-7-21 contains alatent ambiguity. The ambiguity arose
because the General Assembly failed to anticipate subsequent advances
in medical technology when it described the class of children under the
statute’s protection. In resolving that ambiguity we are required to
apply a rule that is in our current Code, was in our first Code, can be
traced back to Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of England, and
so was part of the “common law and statutes of England in force prior
to May 14, 1776 [that, in 1784,] were adopted in this [s]tate by statute.”
Hannah v. State, 212 Ga. 313, 321-322 (6) (92 SE2d 89) (1956)
(citations omitted). Often called the “mischief rule,” as Blackstone’s
Commentaries refer to “the old law, the mischief, and the remedy,” see
Charles M. Cork III, Reading Law in Georgia 6-8, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2520296 (2014), that rule is now codified at OCGA § 1-3-1
(a): “In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently
for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view at all times
the old law, the evil, and the remedy. .. .”

That rule directs us to the conclusion that the intention of the
General Assembly was to protect children like S., the child in this
case. So I respectfully dissent.

1. Resolution of the latent ambiguity in OCGA § 19-7-21 under
OCGA § 1-3-1 (a).

Georgia law has long recognized latent ambiguities. “[T]his court
has approved Lord Bacon’s definition of a latent ambiguity, as one
which seems certain and without ambiguity for anything that appeareth

® As we have said before, “courts cannot construe [statutes] to force an outcome that the
legislature did not expressly authorize.” Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297 Ga. 306, 308 (73
SE2d706) (2015). Tothe extent that the dissent argues otherwise, it misunderstands OCGA § 1-3-1
and the nature of our role in interpreting statutes. In order to address the legitimacy of children
conceived by means of various reproductive technologies other than artificial insemination, the
General Assembly will need to act.

eS 259

upon the deed or instrument, but there is some collateral matter,
outside of the deed, that breedeth the ambiguity.” Citizens & South-
ern Nat. Bank v. Clark, 172 Ga. 625, 630 (158 SE 297) (1931) (citation
and punctuation omitted). In interpretations of contracts, the possi-
bility of latent ambiguities is recognized by statute. OCGA § 13-2-2
(1).

As for interpretations of statutes, our case law recognizes that
sometimes “the facts of [a] case[ ]... reveal a latent ambiguity in the
language of [a statute].” Daugherty v. Norville Indus., 174 Ga. App.
89, 90 (329 SE2d 202) (1985). In such cases, “[o]ur duty is to consider
the results and consequences of any proposed construction and, based
upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case, not so
construe a statute as will produce unreasonable or absurd conse-
quences not contemplated by the legislature.” Id. (citing State v.
Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 (312 SE2d 601) (1984)). See Randolph
County v. Bantz, 270 Ga. 66, 66-67 (508 SE2d 169) (1998) (rejecting
Randolph County’s argument that it could require its chief magis-
trate to perform, without compensation, the duties of a clerk of court
because the statute that entitled chief magistrates to additional
compensation for such services applied only to counties not autho-
rized by local law to hire a clerk, whereas Randolph County was
authorized to hire a clerk but preferred to have its chief magistrate do
the work for free); Sirmans v. Sirmans, 222 Ga. 202, 204 (149 SE2d
101) (1966) (trial court erred in dismissing answer and holding
defendant to be in default; although, due to clerk’s mistake in
calculating costs, defendant did not pay full court costs to open
default, it was not legislature’s intent to deprive defendant of ability
to present defense over “trifling mistake”); Transworld Financing
Corp. v. Coastal Tire and Container Repair, 298 Ga. App. 286, 288-289
(1) (680 SE2d 143) (2009) (declining to construe term “called for,” in
law allowing repairman to charge storage fees for vehicles unless
“called for” by owner, to extend to owner’s “call” to promise to retrieve
vehicle; preferring a “reasonable and sensible interpretation to carry
out the legislative intent” over the “literal meaning” of the terms);
Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30, 42-43 (187 SE 371) (1936) (local legisla-
tion requiring the chief judge of the municipal court of Savannah to
have practiced law for five years or more held not to prevent the
elevation of an associate judge of that court who had served for over
ten years, but before that had practiced law for less than two years).
See generally Cork, Reading Law in Georgia at 43-47 (discussing
cases in which Georgia courts applied mischief rule to construe
statutes with latent ambiguities and noting similarity of other cases
applying mischief rule in conjunction with absurdity doctrine).

260 A

Turning to the statute before us, OCGA § 19-7-21, it was enacted
in 1964. In distinguishing the children who are under its protection
from children who are not, it references only children conceived of
artificial insemination, which is a type of assisted reproductive
technology. Id. S. was conceived by means of in vitro fertilization,
another type of assisted reproductive technology that was not devel-
oped until a decade later. The statute therefore contains a latent
ambiguity: into which category does a child like S. fall? Is a child like
S. under the statute’s protection or not? The statute must be con-
strued to resolve that latent ambiguity.

Our interpretation of statutes is guided by a series of statutes.
The first of these, OCGA § 1-3-1, provides in part:

(a) In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall
look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly,
keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the
remedy. Grammatical errors shall not vitiate a law. A trans-
position of words and clauses may be resorted to when a
sentence or clause is without meaning as it stands.

(b) In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary sig-
nification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or
words connected with a particular trade or subject matter,
which shall have the signification attached to them by
experts in such trade or with reference to such subject
matter.

OCGA § 1-3-1 directs us to perform two distinct inquiries. Sub-
section (a), as noted above, is our codification of the mischief rule; it
directs us to find the intention of the General Assembly by examining
“the old law, the evil, and the remedy.” Subsection (b) directs our
attention to the text, the words in the statute.

The textual analysis required by subsection (b) leads us only to
the conclusion that, when the legislature enacted the statute before
us, it failed to anticipate medical advances that would be made more
than a decade later. But that should not be the end of our analysis. It
has long been understood that the nature of our role in interpreting
statutes requires more. “The very office of construction is to work out,
from what is expressly said and done, what would have been said with
regard to events not definitely before the minds of the parties, if those
events had been considered.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Com-
mon Law 237 (1881). “As nearly as we can, we must put ourselves in
the place of those who uttered the words, and try to divine how they
would have dealt with the unforeseen situation; and, although their

eS 261

words are by far the most decisive evidence of what they would have
done, they are by no means final.” Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F2d 608,
624 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J., concurring), aff’d sub nom. Gemsco,
Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. 8. 244 (65 SCt 605, 89 LE 921) (1945).

The analysis required by subsection (a) clearly directs us to the
conclusion that S. does come under the protection of OCGA § 19-7-21.
The old law was that a child’s legitimacy or illegitimacy at birth
turned on biological connection to the father. The evil, or mischief,
arose from the fact that artificial insemination, like in vitro fertiliza-
tion, could use donated sperm: a father therefore could consent to the
procedure but later deny the child. The remedy was to authorize
binding written consent from the father. S. was conceived of donated
sperm. Before her conception, the parties executed a written consent
to assure her legitimacy.

Construing OCGA § 19-7-21’s reference to artificial insemina-
tion to encompass subsequently-developed methods of assisted repro-
ductive technology is consistent with the way Georgia courts have
applied the mischief rule in other cases. The Court of Appeals’
decision in Daugherty v. Norville Indus., supra, 174 Ga. App. 89, for
example, construed a statute that required a party to pay court costs
as a precondition for filing a new action after dismissing a prior
lawsuit. The plaintiffs in the consolidated cases on appeal failed to
pay court costs because the clerk’s office erroneously told their
attorney that no costs were due. Holding that it was not the intent of
the legislature to deny such parties the ability to file their new actions
under the statute, the court in Daugherty defined “costs” to exclude
costs unknown to the party after a good faith inquiry. Daugherty, 174
Ga. App. at 91. Likewise, construing OCGA § 19-7-21 to protect S.
involves defining “artificial insemination” to include subsequently-
developed forms of assisted reproductive technology.

The majority infers a contrary intent from the General Assem-
bly’s failure to amend OCGA § 19-7-21, and in particular from its
failure to pass proposed legislation that would have done so. But
while inferences about intent behind legislative inaction are no more
categorically improper than inferences about the intent behind enacted
legislation, inferences from inaction are inherently weaker. The
legislative process is difficult by design. It requires an expenditure of
finite resources, time, energy, and political capital, to get a bill out of
committee and onto the floor of both houses. So when an appellate
court frustrates an imperfectly-expressed legislative intent, it is not
a satisfactory answer that they can pass another bill. The necessary
resources may no longer be available.

262 A

And an inference from inaction is particularly unpersuasive

here. Before today OCGA § 19-7-21 had been cited in only two pub-
lished Georgia opinions, one of them a dissent. Brown v. Gadson, 288
Ga. App. 323, 324, n. 2 (654 SE2d 179) (2007); Noggle v. Arnold, 177
Ga. App. 119, 121 (838 SE2d 763) (1985) (Beasley, J., dissenting). The
facts that brought the statute before us today are so unusual that
appellant’s counsel wisely began his oral argument by telling us that
he would not be able to explain the parties’ motives. So other
priorities or a failure of the issue to come toa legislator’s attention are
the most probable explanations of the General Assembly’s failure to
update OCGA § 19-7-21.
The parties have not identified, and I can’t think of, any policy
reason for choosing to exclude children like S. from the protection of
the statute. On the contrary, the law and policy in this state favor
legitimating children. See Miller v. Miller, 258 Ga. 168, 169 (366
SE2d 682) (1988); Harrison v. Odum, 148 Ga. 489, 495 (96 SE 1038)
(1918).
The majority’s construction of the statute provides legitimacy to
children conceived of one form of assisted reproductive technology
but withholds it from children conceived of another. This reading does
not take into account OCGA § 1-3-1’s requirement that we examine
“the old law, the evil, and the remedy.” Under that requirement, we
must construe the statute before us to extend its protection to S. and
children like her. To hold otherwise would frustrate the manifest
intention of the General Assembly.

2. Status of OCGA § 1-3-1 (a).

The analysis above presupposes that OCGA § 1-3-1 (a) is still
good law — that it still means what is says and says what it means.
Acasual observer might think it self-evident that OCGA § 1-3-1 (a) is
still good law. Its roots are extraordinarily deep, and we have not
struck it down.

But that proposition is no longer self-evident. Nationally, the
mischief rule has become controversial. It is condemned in a popular
and influential treatise under the general heading, “Thirteen Falsi-
ties Exposed,” and under the topic heading, “The false notion that the
purpose of interpretation is to discover intent.” Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
341, 391 (2012).

That characterization is audacious. Other treatises often sug-
gest that a case or line of cases is wrongly decided or identify the
author’s preference among conflicting lines of cases. Itis one thing for
a treatise to be, as Reading Law declares itself, “unapologetically
normative.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 9. But it is something
else entirely to declare that duly enacted statutes and case law

eS 268

binding within its jurisdiction are not law. Reading Law can be read
to imply that such statutes and case law should simply be ignored.

This Court does, of course, have the power to strike down
OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). And Reading Law suggests that it would be appro-
priate for us to do so on the basis that such statutes are invasions of
the province of the judiciary. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 43-44,
244-245. But “[e]ach state, the District of Columbia, and the United
States have a set of laws directing interpreters as to how the legis-
lature wishes its statutes to be construed.” Scott, “Codified Canons
and the Common Law of Interpretation,” 98 Geo. L.J. 341, 350 (II)
(2010) (citations omitted). As noted above and detailed below, the
Georgia statutes setting out the mischief rule are codifications of
common law. And in the last few years this Court has repeatedly
embraced our General Assembly’s instruction that in construing our
new Evidence Code, we follow Eleventh Circuit precedent. See, e.g.,
Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) (769 SE2d 329) (2015).

As for the merits of the mischief rule, Reading Law argues it isa
falsity because its foundation is unsound. Reading Law makes some
cogent arguments about the perils and possible excesses of inquiries
into legislative intent. But its central argument is that the very idea
of intention of a legislature — as well as of parties to a contract — is
incoherent, that a search for legislative intention is a “search for the
nonexistent.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 394.

To make this point, Reading Law offers a hypothetical about
contract construction. Reading Law describes negotiations over a
contract clause setting a deadline: one side prefers forty-five days; the
other prefers five; they compromise on “a reasonable time.” Scalia &
Garner, Reading Law at 391. According to Reading Law, “The lawyer
on one side privately told the client that a court would probably say
that 30 days would be commercially reasonable; the other lawyer
privately told the client that a court would probably say that 48 hours
would be commercially reasonable (a week at the outside).” Id. at
391-392. This, we are told, illustrates the proposition that the idea of
the necessity of a meeting of the minds is a “myth.” Id. at 392.

I question the soundness of this argument. The imagined advice
would be unsound. The hypothetical parties compromised on — their
minds met on — an indeterminate deadline. Each would be free to
argue; neither could be sure of the outcome. More fundamentally,
Reading Law’s argument conflates the parties’ negotiating objectives
with their eventual agreement.

Regardless of the soundness of that argument, the more salient
question is whether Reading Law’s conclusion can be reconciled with
the Georgia law we are duty-bound to administer. It cannot. Georgia
law differs in a number of respects from Reading Law’s prescriptions.

264 A

See Cork, Reading Law in Georgia at 18 (detailing those differences
and identifying as among the most prominent, Reading Law’s rejec-
tion of legislative intent and its narrow version of the absurdity
doctrine). Indeed, for contracts (the specific subject of the above
hypothetical), our General Assembly has embraced the idea of inten-
tion even more emphatically than for statutes. In the interpretation
of contracts, OCGA § 13-2-3 declares, “[t]he cardinal rule of construc-
tion is to ascertain the intention of the parties. If that intention is
clear and it contravenes no rule of law and sufficient words are used
to arrive at the intention, it shall be enforced irrespective of all
technical or arbitrary rules of construction.” See also OCGA § 13-2-2
(rules of interpretation of contracts, referring three times to the
parties’ “intention” or “intended” meaning); § 13-2-4 (addressing
intention of one party known to the other).

Westlaw searches indicate that OCGA § 1-3-1 (a), OCGA § 13-2-3,
or the principle set out in those Code sections has been cited hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of times by this Court and by our Court of
Appeals.'° Very often the authority cited for the mischief rule is case
law rather than statutes. See, e.g., Cox v. Fowler, 279 Ga. 501, 502
(614 SE2d 59) (2005) (citing Carringer v. Rodgers, 279 Ga. 359, 363
(578 SE2d 841) (2003) for the proposition that “[t]he cardinal rule in
construing a legislative act, is to ascertain the legislative intent and
purpose in enacting the law, and then to give it that construction
which will effectuate the legislative intent and purpose”) (punctua-
tion omitted); TermNet Merchant Svcs. v. Phillips, 277 Ga. 342, 344
(1) (688 SE2d 745) (2003) (citing Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Brooks, 242
Ga. 109, 112 (249 SE2d 596) (1978) for the proposition that “[w]hen
construing statutory phrases, of course, we look diligently for the
General Assembly’s intention, bearing in mind relevant old laws,
evils sought to be addressed and remedies interposed”); Holcim (US),
Inc. v. AMDG, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 818, 820 (596 SE2d 197) (2004)
(citing Nguyen v. Talisman Roswell, LLC, 262 Ga. App. 480, 482 (585
SE2d 911) (2003) for the proposition that “[t]he cardinal rule of
contract construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties”)
(punctuation omitted); Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Blackmon, 129
Ga. App. 342, 344 (199 SE2d 581) (1973) (citing Barrett & Caswell v.
Pulliam, 77 Ga. 552, 554 (1886) and Jenkins v. State, 93 Ga. App. 630
(92 SE2d 43) (1956) for the proposition that in interpreting legislative
acts, “the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General

10 A Westlaw search for “legislature,” “legislative,” “General Assembly,” or “parties” in the
same sentence as “intent” or “intended” brings up over 9,500 cases.

eS 265

Assembly keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil and the
remedy”).

The statutes that direct us to consider the intention of the
legislature and of the parties to a contract were in the first Georgia
Code. Current OCGA § 1-3-1 (a) was Section 5 of the Code of 1863.
Current OCGA § 13-2-3 was Section 2719 of that Code. And the
mischief rule is older still. A few years after that first Code was
adopted, this Court wrote: “The Code directs that statutes be con-
strued with reference to the intention of the legislature, and that the
old law, the mischief and the remedy, be considered to arrive at that
intention (Code, § 4, par. 9); and such was the rule long before there
was any code of laws compiled for this state.” Everett v. Planters’
Bank, 61 Ga. 38, 41 (1878). See also Forman v. Troup, 30 Ga. 496,
498-499 (1860) (“[O]ur Act of 1854 seems to me conclusive. Look at
[the statute in question] by the old rule of construction — the old law
— the mischief and the remedy.”).

Indeed, the line of Georgia authority for the mischiefrule stretches
back to Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England and so,
as noted above, the mischief rule was a part of the deposit of English
common law on which the law of this state was founded. (The rule did
not originate with Blackstone; its first appearance was apparently in
Heydon’s Case, 3 Co Rep 7a, 76 ER 637 (1584).)

The mischief rule’s earliest recorded appearance in Georgia law
was in the second volume of the Georgia Reports. Booth v. Williams,
2 Ga. 252 (1847). There we held, “One of the fundamental common
law rules for the construction of remedial statutes is, to consider the
old law, the mischief, and the remedy; and it is the business of the
Judges so to construe the statute, as to suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy. 1 Black. Com. 87.” Id. at 254. See also Persons v.
Hight, 4 Ga. 474, 501 (1848) (Warner, J., dissenting) (“ “There are
three points,’ says Blackstone, ‘to be considered in the construction of
allremedial statutes; the old law, the mischief, and the remedy; that
is, how the old law stood at the making the Act; what the mischief was
for which the Common Law did not provide; and what remedy the
Legislature hath provided to cure this mischief. And it is the business
of the Judge so to construe the Act as to suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy.’ 1 Bl. Com. 87.”) (emphasis omitted).

But the mischief rule became settled law in Georgia only after
vigorous debate. Less than six months after our opinion in Booth,
Justice Lumpkin criticized the mischief rule in Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Ga.
146 (1847), stating that he “never can subscribe” to a doctrine
authorizing judges to give statutes “such construction as will not only
carry out the mind of the makers, but even to apply the rule to cases
which, it is admitted, they did not contemplate, but which, it is

266 A

supposed, the lawgiver would have provided for, if he had seen fully
the mischief and the remedy.” Id. at 152. But by 1856, Justice
Lumpkin had yielded, albeit reluctantly, to the mischief rule. “I never
yielded more reluctantly to any judgment pronounced by this Court,
than that of Booth vs. Williams,” he wrote; and he went on to make a
more general point, “believing it to be the first duty of a Judge, as it
is of every good citizen, to yield to authority, I surrendered my
individual opinion, especially as the question involved was the con-
struction of a Statute which had been acted upon so long.” Worthy v.
Lowry, 19 Ga. 517, 519 (1856).

Seven years later the rule was codifiedin whatisnow OCGA § 1-3-1.

For the next century-and-a-half the mischief rule was settled
law, albeit cautiously applied. For example in 1914 we wrote:

Seeking secret legislative meanings at variance with
the language used is a perilous undertaking which is quite
as apt to lead to an amendment of the law by judicial
construction as it is to arrive at the actual thought in the
legislative mind. 25 R. C. L. 961, § 217. But where an
ambiguity exists either because of uncertainty in the mean-
ing of words, conflicts with previous laws, or conflicts between
different clauses in the same statute, courts should look
beyond the verbiage and discover the intent. While all parts
of the statute should be preserved, yet a cardinal rule of
construction is that the legislative intent shall be effectu-
ated, even though some verbiage may have to be eliminated.
The legislative intent will prevail over the literal import of
the words.

Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 (15 SE2d 210) (1914) (citing
American Security & Trust Co. v. Commrs. of District of Columbia,
224U.S. 491 (32 SCt 553, 56 LE 856) (1912); Pickett v. United States,
216 U. 8. 456 (30 SCt 265, 54 LE 566) (1910); United States v.
Farenholt, 206 U.S. 226 (27 SCt 629, 51 LE 1036) (1907); Washington
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 186 Ga. 638 (71 SE 1066) (1911);
Youmans v. State, 7 Ga. App. 101 (66 SE 383) (1909); State v. Pay, 146
P 300 (Utah 1915)). We continued, “The statute must be examined as
a whole, and its different provisions reconciled if possible.” Carroll,
192 Ga. at 121 (citing Cairo Banking Co. v. Ponder, 131 Ga. 708 (63
SE 218) (1908); Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207 (60 SE 1082) (1908);
State v. Burnett, 91 SE 597 (N.C. 1917); Bd. of Supervisors v. Cox, 156
SE 755 (Va. 1931); Moss Iron Works v. County Court, 109 SE 343
(W. Va. 1921)). We went on to hold, “The general scheme and purpose
of the legislation is a proper criterion for the construction thereof.”

eS 267

Carroll, 192 Ga. at 121 (citing Singleton v. Close, 130 Ga. 716 (61 SE
722) (1908); Pennington & Evans v. Douglas, Augusta & Gulf R. Co.,
3 Ga. App. 665 (60 SE 485) (1908).

And in 1936, we wrote:

Though we distinctly disavow any intention to place our
decision upon the spirit of the law — for we are endeavoring
to confine ourselves to the proper construction of the letter of
the law [at issue] considered as a whole[ ] — still there are
cases in which the following language taken from Plowden’s
Commentaries has been properly applicable: “It is not the
words of the law, but the internal sense of it, that makes the
law; and our law consists of two parts, viz., of body and soul;
the letter of the law is the body of the law, and the sense and
reason of the law are the soul of the law, quia ratio legis est
anima legis. And the law may be resembled to a nut, which
has a shell and a kernel within; the letter of the law repre-
sents the shell, and the sense of it the kernel; and as you will
be no better for the nut if you make use only of the shell, so
you will receive no benefit from the law if you rely upon the
letter; and as the fruit and profit of the nut lie in the kernel
and not in the shell, so the fruit and profit of the law consist
in the sense more than in the letter. And it often happens,
that when you know the letter, you know not the sense, for
sometimes the sense is more confined than the letter, and
sometimes it is more large and extensive.”

Gazan v. Heery, supra, 183 Ga. at 41-42 (punctuation omitted).

In addition to Plowden’s metaphor of a nut, we have adopted
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s less terrestrial metaphor: “A word is
not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245
U.S. 418, 425 (38 SCt 158, 62 LE 372) (1918) (citation omitted),
quoted in Everitt v. LaSpeyre, 195 Ga. 377, 379 (24 SE2d 381) (1943)
and Robbins v. Vanbrackle, 267 Ga. 871, 872 (485 SE2d 468) (1997)
(Carley, J., dissenting). What both metaphors illustrate is that the
words used to express an idea are intertwined with that idea, but
distinct from it. So the words used to express an idea sometimes, and
perhaps always, do so imperfectly.

But Justice Lumpkin was not compelled to surrender his indi-
vidual opinions. And neither are we. We do not have the authority to
ignore the law of this state. But we have the power to change it. We
can adopt Chief Judge Dillard’s concurring opinion in Bellsouth

268 A

Telecommunications, LLC v. Cobb County, 342 Ga. App. 323, 334 (1)
n. 16 (802 SE2d 686) (2017) (Dillard, P. J., concurring):

[O]ur appellate courts should stop referencing alto-
gether the ethereal fiction of “legislative intent” in the
context of statutory interpretation. A judge should not care
about what any legislator intended but did not expressly
provide for in the statutory text. ... [T]he General Assembly
can no more tell the judiciary how to generally interpret the
law than we can direct them how to legislate.

(Emphasis omitted.) So we can strike down the statutes that adopt
the mischief rule. We can strike down the ones that embrace the idea
of intent of the parties to a contract. And, with the stroke of a pen, we
can disapprove every one of the hundreds, if not thousands of Georgia
cases that hold with those statutes. All that we can do. But before we
do, what else might fall should give us pause. The roots of that rule
and of that idea run deep and wide. It is difficult to foresee, for
example, the consequences of undermining every contract case that
references intent or meeting of the minds. And undermining the
contract and statutory construction cases that reference intent may
have implications for trust and estate law in which intent is central.
See OCGA § 53-4-55.

Rather than grasp that nettle, we have taken an indirect course.
Consistent with Reading Law’s declaration that invocations of the
mischief rule are not law, but merely repetitions of a false notion, our
recent opinions have instead undermined OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). Those
opinions suggest that the mischief rule has never been a part of our
law:

But “the legislature’s intent is discerned from the text of
a duly enacted statute and the statute’s context within the
larger legal framework.” State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 67 (2)
(799 SE2d 770) (2017). “[W]hen judges start discussing not
the meaning of the statutes the legislature actually enacted,
as determined from the text of those laws, but rather the
unexpressed ‘spirit’ or ‘reason’ of the legislation, and the
need to make sure the law does not cause unreasonable
consequences, we venture into dangerously undemocratic,
unfair, and impractical territory.” Merritt v. State, 286 Ga.
650, 656 (630 SE2d 835) (2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring
specially) (punctuation omitted). See also Malphurs v. State,
336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 (785 SE2d 414) (2016) (“[O]ur
concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective

eS 269

statements of individual legislators expressing their per-
sonal intent in voting for or against a bill”); Walters v. State,
335 Ga. App. 12, 15 n. 3 (780 SE2d 720) (2015); Day v. Floyd
County. Bd. of Ed., 333 Ga. App. 144, 150-151 (775 SE2d 622)
(2015) (Dillard, J., concurring fully and specially); Rutter v.
Rutter, 316 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) n.5 (730 SE2d 626) (2012);
Keaton v. State, 331 Ga. App. 14, 26 n.17 (714 SE2d 693)
(2011) (Blackwell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

Gibson v. Gibson, 301 Ga. 622, 631-632 (3) (c) (801 SE2d 40) (2017)
(footnote omitted). See also Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, 342
Ga. App. at 334 (1) n. 16 (Dillard, P. J., concurring); State v. Riggs, 301
Ga. 63, 67 (2) n. 6 (799 SE2d 770) (2017).

In taking that indirect course we have suggested that one can
reconcile OCGA § 1-3-1 (a) with the undertaking in Gibson, supra,
and the other recent cases in its line to narrowly confine the scope of
consideration of the intention of the General Assembly. See also
Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, 342 Ga. App. at 334 (1) n. 16
(Dillard, P. J., concurring) (“I realize, of course, that OCGA § 1-3-1 (a)
provides that ‘in all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look
diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view
at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy,’ but this statutory
directive must be read in conjunction with OCGA § 1-3-1 (b), which
provides that ‘in all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signifi-
cation shall be applied to all words.’”) (punctuation omitted). That
reading of OCGA § 1-3-1 (a) violates the principles of textualism to
advance the cause of textualism. The only fair reading of OCGA § 1-3-1
(a) is that it is a codification of the mischief rule.

The only fair reading of Gibson and the similar cases it cites is
that the mischief rule has been quietly excised from our law, that we
no longer inquire into “the old law, the evil, and the remedy,” and that
while OCGA § 1-3-1 (a) is still on the books, it is a dead letter. That is
not how we should operate. We should either strike down OCGA § 1-3-1
(a), as well as the statutes that enforce the intent of parties to a
contract, and let fall all that must fall with them — or we should
faithfully administer them.

I would faithfully administer them — albeit with the perils and
temptations of such analysis firmly in mind. Administering OCGA §
1-3-1 (a) here requires us to construe OCGA § 19-7-21 so that S.
comes under its protection. So I would affirm.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

270 Pe

Andrews & Sanders Law Offices, Richard A. Sanders, Jr., for
appellant.

The Manely Firm, Michael E. Manely, David B. Purvis, for
appellee.

$17A0782. PICCIONE et al. v. ARP et al.
(806 SE2d 589)

HINES, Chief Justice.

Gregory and Adam Piccione (“the Picciones”), grandchildren of
testator Virginia Arp (“Virginia”) and children of Donna Piccione
(“Donna”), appeal from the superior court’s denial of their motion for
summary judgment in this action against their three uncles, Sam and
Dwayne Arp, individually and in their capacities as executors of
Virginia’s estate, and David Arp. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.

Virginia executed a will in 2002. It provides for her burial and the
payment of her debts, and the sole paragraph that sets forth the
disposition of her property states in toto: “I give, bequeath and devise
unto my children, Sam Arp, Donna Piccione, David Arp and Dwayne
Arp, all of the property that I may own at the time of my death, both
real and personal, of every kind and description and wherever
located, PER CAPITA.” (Emphasis in original.) Donna died in 2006,
and Virginia died in 2013. The executors of Virginia’s estate divided
it among Virginia’s three surviving children (i.e., themselves and
David). The Picciones, contending that they had a combined one-
fourth interest in the property that comprised Virginia’s estate, sued
in superior court, asserting actions for conversion, fraud, and tres-
pass regarding those property interests,1 and moved for summary
judgment, which the trial court denied, concluding that Virginia’s use
of the words “PER CAPITA” was a “limitation” under the anti-lapse
statute, OCGA § 53-4-64 (a);? the anti-lapse provisions of the statute
therefore did not apply to the gifts to Virginia’s children; as Donna

1 ‘The final order of the superior court states that the will “was probated without objection
inthe Probate Court of Polk County, Georgia.” Noorder or other part of the record of the probate
court is included in the record of the superior court case.

2 OCGA § 53-4-64 reads:

(a) If abeneficiary is dead when the will is executed or otherwise dies before the
testator, but has any descendants living at the death of the testator, the testamentary
gift, if absolute and without remainder or limitation, shall not lapse but shall vest in
the descendants of the beneficiary in the same proportions as if inherited directly
from the deceased beneficiary under the intestacy laws of this state.

eS an

predeceased Virginia, the testamentary gift to Donna lapsed; and
thus, the Picciones had no property interest upon which to base their
claims. The trial court issued a certificate of immediate review, and
this Court granted the Picciones’ application for interlocutory appeal.
See OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).

The trial court was correct that Donna’s predeceasing Virginia
constituted a lapse. “A lapsed legacy or devise is one, unrevoked by
the testator, which was good at the time the will was made but which
fails to take effect because of the death without issue or other
incapacity of the beneficiary in the lifetime of the testator.” 1 Sara-
jane Love, Redfearn, Wills and Administration in Georgia, § 156
(5th ed. 1988). See also Collier v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 206
Ga. 857, 858-859 (2) (59 SE2d 385) (1950).

Atcommon law, and under the law of this State before the act
of 1836 ([former] Code, § 113-812), if the legatee died before
the death of the testator the legacy lapsed, whether the
legatee left issue or not. [Since 1836], if there be issue, it
takes as substituting legatee [under the provisions of the
anti-lapse statute]. [Cit.]

Sanders v. First Nat. Bank, 189 Ga. 450, 453 (1) (6 SE2d 294) (1939).
The purpose of the anti-lapse statute is to “obviate the effect of lapse
by carrying out what the legislature has presumed the testator’s
intent would have been as to the disposition of the [testamentary] gift
had [the testator] foreseen the possibility that the taker named in the
will would die during the [testator’s] lifetime.” Verner F. Chaffin,
Studies in the Georgia Law of Decedents’ Estates and Future Inter-
ests, p. 212 (1978). See also Robinson v. Ray, 254 Ga. 237, 238 (1) (327
SE2d 721) (1985). When first enacted, Georgia’s anti-lapse statute
was not as it is now, and notably it did not apply to class gifts until it
was set forth in the Revised Probate Code of 1998, which enacted
OCGA § 53-4-64 in its current form; the anti-lapse statute now
applies to testamentary gifts to both individuals and classes, albeit
with differing language regarding the types of gifts. See 1 Mary F.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section shall also apply to a
testamentary gift to a class unless there appears a clear intent to the contrary.

(©) If a beneficiary is treated as having predeceased the testator due to a
divorce or annulment, as provided in Code Section 53-4-49, or due to the beneficiary
being responsible for the death of the testator, as provided in Code Section 53-1-5,
the provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section shall apply only to vest the
testamentary gift in descendants of the beneficiary who are also descendants of the
testator.

272 ee

Radford, Redfearn, Wills and Administration in Georgia, § 8:5 (n. 5)
(6th ed. 2000) (“Prior to the enactment of the Revised Probate Code of
1998, case law would have directed a different result — that is, that
the lapsed gift would be shared among the other members of the class
of the testator’s children rather than pass to the deceased child’s
descendants. [Cits.]”); 1 Sarajane Love, supra.

The trial court was correct in determining that the bequests in
Virginia’s willconstituted individual gifts to her four named children,
and thus were governed by OCGA § 53-4-63 (a).

In determining whether a devise is to individuals or to a
class, while it is true that a designation of the beneficiaries
by names is not always and in itself conclusive, it is an
earmark strongly indicative that the devise is to the named
individuals as such; and unless a contrary intent of the
testator can be gathered from the entire instrument, such
individual designation will control.

Snellings v. Downer, 193 Ga. 340, 341 (2) (b) (18 SE2d 531) (1942).

Ifa gift is made to beneficiaries by name, prima facie the gift
is not one to a class, but to the beneficiaries as individuals,
even though the persons named may possess some quality in
common; and if no contrary intention appears from the
context or other parts of the instrument, the beneficiaries
will take as individuals, and not as a class.

Id. at 345 (2) (b). No contrary intention indicating a class gift appears
in Virginia’s will. Thus, as these are individual gifts, the question is
whether the statement that her named children take “PER CAPITA”
includes a requirement that each child survive her in order for that
child to receive the bequest, inasmuch as a requirement that the
taker of a testamentary gift survive the testator is a “limitation”
under OCGA § 53-4-63 (a). See Graham v. Patton, 231 Ga. 391,
393-395 (1) (202 SE2d 58) (1973); Powell v. Watkins, 221 Ga. 851, 852
(148 SE2d 303) (1966).
Of course,

[t]he primary objective in will interpretation is to ascertain
the testator’s intent. See OCGA § 53-4-55; Hood v. Todd, 287
Ga. 164, 166 (695 SE2d 31) (2010). To discover that intent,
“{t]he court must look first to the ‘four corners’ of the will,”
and “[w]here the language of a will is clear .. . and can be

eS 278

given legal effect as it stands, the court will not, by construc-
tion, give the will a different effect.” Hood, 287 Ga. at 166
(citations and punctuation omitted).

Stewart v. Ray, 289 Ga. 679, 680 (2) (715 SE2d 679) (2011). And,

[ijn the construction of a will, the courts should look to that
interpretation which carries out the provisions of the statute
of distribution, rather than that which defeats them; that, in
the absence of anything in the will to the contrary, the
presumption is that the ancestor intended that her property
should go where the law [of intestacy] carries it, which is
supposed to be the channel of natural descent. To interrupt
or disturb this descent or direct it in a different course,
should require plain words to that effect.

Fleming v. First Union Nat. Bank, 274 Ga. 527, 529 (555 SE2d 728)
(2001) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Georgia’s statutory scheme
governing intestacy provides that the heirs “in the first degree” of one
who dies without a will, and who is not survived by a spouse, shall be
the children of the decedent, “with the descendants of any deceased
child taking, per stirpes, the share that child would have taken if in
life.” OCGA § 53-2-1 (©) (8).? See also In re Will of Lewis, 263 Ga. 349,
351 (1) (484 SE2d 472) (1993) (“In the absence of anything in the will

2 OCGA § 53-2-1 reads in pertinent part

(©) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section, when a decedent
died without a will, the following rules shall determine such decedent’s heirs:

(1) Upon the death of an individual who is survived by a spouse but not
by any child or other descendant, the spouse is the sole heir. If the decedent
is also survived by any child or other descendant, the spouse shall share
equally with the children, with the descendants of any deceased child taking
that child’s share, per stirpes; provided, however, that the spouse's portion
shall not be less than a one-third share:

(2) If the decedent is not survived by a spouse, the heirs shall be those
relatives, as provided in this Code section, who are in the nearest degree to
the decedent in which there is any survivor;

(8) Children of the decedent are in the first degree, and those who
survive the decedent shall share the estate equally, with the descendants of
any deceased child taking, per stirpes, the share that child would have taken
if in life;

(4) Parents of the decedent are in the second degree, and those who
survive the decedent shall share the estate equally;

(5) Siblings of the decedent are in the third degree, and those who
survive the decedent shall share the estate equally, with the descendants of
any deceased sibling taking, per stirpes, the share that sibling would have
taken ifin life; provided, however, that, subject to the provisions of paragraph
(1) of subsection (f) of Code Section 53-1-20, if no sibling survives the
decedent, the nieces and nephews who survive the decedent shall take the

2m ee

indicating a contrary intent . . . it will be presumed that the testator
intended a per stirpes distribution as would occur by law in the event
ofintestacy.”). Thus, there must be “plain language in [Virginia’s] will
to overcome the presumption that she intended a per stirpes distri-
bution as would occur by lawin the event ofintestacy.” Fleming, supra
at 529. Here, there is such language.

As the trial court noted, Virginia wrote the will with the words
“PER CAPITA” in all capital letters; no other substantive portion of the
will was so emphasized.* “Per capita” is Latin for “by the head,” and is
stated in Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) to mean “[d]ivided
equally among all individuals, [usually] in the same class.” By con-
trast, “per stirpes” which is also from Latin, means “by roots or stocks,”
andis defined as “[p]roportionally divided between beneficiaries accord-
ing to their deceased ancestor's share.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.
1999) (Emphasis supplied.) As our precedent has stated,

“[p]er capita” is defined: “By the heads or polls; according to
the number of individuals; share and share alike.” 48 C. J.
807, § 2. “When descendants take as individuals, and not by
right of representation, .. . they are said to take per capita.”
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary. (Italics ours.)

MacGregor v. Roux, 198 Ga. 520, 522 (1) (32 SE2d 289) (1944). By
contrast,

“{w]hen issue are said to take per stirpes it is meant that the
descendants of a deceased person take the property to which

estate in equal shares, with the descendants of any deceased niece or nephew
taking, per stirpes, the share that niece or nephew would have taken if in life;

(6) Grandparents of the decedent are in the fourth degree, and those
who survive the decedent shall share the estate equally;

(7) Uncles and aunts of the decedent are in the fifth degree, and those
who survive the decedent shall share the estate equally, with the children of
any deceased uncle or aunt taking, per stirpes, the share that uncle or aunt
would have taken if in life; provided, however, that, subject to the provisions
of paragraph (1) of subsection (f) of Code Section 53-1-20, ifno uncle or aunt
of the decedent survives the decedent, the first cousins who survive the
decedent shall share the estate equally; and

(8) The more remote degrees of kinship shall be determined by count-
ing the number of steps in the chain from the relative to the closest common
ancestor of the relative and decedent and the number of steps in the chain
from the common ancestor to the decedent. The sum of the steps in the two
chains shall be the degree of kinship, and the surviving relatives with the
lowest sum shall be in the nearest degree and shall share the estate equally.

+ Other than headings and “PER CAPITA,” the only words in the will that are displayed in
all capital letters are the testator'sname, and those which appear in the phrase, “IN WITNESS
WHEREOE, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal . . ..”

eS 275

he was entitled or would have been entitled if living. Rot-
manskey v. Heiss, 86 Md. 633 (39 Atl. 415)” 32 Words &
Phrases (Perm. ed.), p. 459. “By or according to stock or root;
by right of representation.” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary; 48
C. J. 808, § 2.

Id. at 521-522. Further,

[t]he terms “per capita” and “per stirpes” have a definite
meaning in law and are presumed always to be used in their
technical sense unless a contrary intention appears in the
context of the will. “Per capita” means “by the head” or share
and share alike, according to the number of individuals.
“Per stirpes” means “by the roots” or “stocks,” or by repre-
sentation. It denotes that method of distribution where a
class or group of individuals or distributees take the share
which their “stock” (deceased ancestor) would have been
able to take in per capita distribution. The technical mean-
ing of these words may be changed or even reversed by the
manner in which the testator uses them in the will, as the
testator’s intention always controls.

1 Mary F. Radford, supra at § 7:9 (Citations omitted.) As noted, in
Virginia’s will the only individuals named as recipients of the testa-
mentary gifts are her four children; they alone take as individuals,
and if their children took the gifts in their stead, it would be by
representation.

The Picciones contend that in the will, “per capita” simply means
“equally,” i.e., that the bequests to the four named children were to be
in equal amounts, and thus, as the legacy to Donna would ordinarily
be considered to have lapsed, the anti-lapse provision of OCGA §
53-4-64 (a) requires that the testamentary gift to Donna does not
lapse, but rather vests in them as Donna’s descendants. Certainly, if
Virginia had used the term “equally,” that would be the case; the gift
to Donna would be considered to have lapsed, and under OCGA § 53-4-64
(a), the Picciones would have taken her gift by representation. And, of
course, if Virginia had designated the gifts for her named children
“per stirpes,” the Picciones would also receive the bequest made to
Donna, although not by operation of OCGA § 53-4-64 (a), but by the
specifics of the gift itself, as the descendants of a primary legatee. See
Stewart, supra. But, Virginia did not use either of those terms;
she stated that her testamentary gifts to her children were to be
“PER CAPITA,” and that language must be given effect. Fleming,
supra at 528.

276 Pe

The plain language of the will indicates that Virginia did not
intend that her bequests follow the law ofintestacy, and the presump-
tion in favor of a per stirpes distribution is thus overcome. Fleming,
supra at 528. The choice of “PER CAPITA” in this circumstance
imposes a requirement that the individuals named take the bequests
in their own stead, that those bequests not pass through represen-
tation, and accordingly, that the named individuals must survive
Virginia. Thus, there is a limitation within the meaning of OCGA §
53-4-64 (a), and that Code section does not apply.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the Picciones’
motion for summary judgment.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

ee

Gammon, Anderson & McFall, W. Wright Gammon, Jr., for
appellants.

Vickey R. Atkins; J. Steven Astin, for appellees.

$17A0858. GLENN v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 564)

GRANT, Justice.

A DeKalb County jury found appellant Delron Glenn guilty of
malice murder in connection with the shooting death of John Tanner.!
Glenn raises four enumerations of error pertaining to his trial: (1) the
trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to prevent lay
witness identification testimony; (2) the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the search of his sister’s apartment because
the magistrate judge lacked probable cause to issue the search
warrant; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a

1 The crimes ocurred on February 3, 2015. On April 28, 2015, a DeKalb County grand jury
indicted Glenn for malice murder, among other crimes. After a trial held August 17-21, 2015,
the jury found Glenn guilty of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of armed
robbery, one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and one count of possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court sentenced Glenn tolife in prison for
the malice murder conviction and five years to be served consecutively for possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court vacated the remaining counts
Though the trial court’s nomenclature was incorrect, the result was proper. See Malcolm v.
State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (4)-(5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). On August 28, 2015, Glenn filed a
motion for new trial, which was amended with new counsel on March 16, 2016. Following a
hearing on July 26, 2016, the trial court denied his motion on September 26, 2016. Glenn filed
a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court to the April 2017 term and
was orally argued on April 18, 2017.

eS aT

cell phone seized during that search, and; (4) his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to identify and redact references to Glenn’s gang
affiliation that were contained in a co-defendant’s videotaped state-
ment which was played for the jury. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

The facts, in the light most favorable to the verdicts, show the
following. On February 3, 2015, John Tanner, accompanied by an
unknown female, went to an Affordable Inn motel. When he arrived
at his room, he encountered Denard Pryor, who was there with
another man nicknamed “Black.” Tanner left with Pryor to get a
laptop out of Tanner’s car, which was parked in the motel parking lot.
Tanner then moved his car around the corner of the building.

Meanwhile, Glenn’s ex-girlfriend, Teneshia Johnson, drove Glenn
to the same Affordable Inn motel. She dropped Glenn off at the back
of the motel, where he met his brother and eventual co-defendant,
Calvin Glenn, co-indictee Stanley Kitchens,? and another man. When
Tanner and Pryor came around the corner in Tanner’s car, Pryor
recognized the four men standing in the parking lot. Calvin and his
entourage, including Glenn, had come to the motel to confront Tanner
because Tanner allegedly owed Calvin some money. When Calvin saw
Tanner, Calvin became angry and said he was going to “go handle
this.” Glenn then asked Calvin to give him a gun.

Tanner was out of his car, with Calvin and Glenn following him,
when the two men began “roughing up” Tanner. Tanner then man-
aged to get back inside his car, but Calvin and Glenn followed Tanner
to his car and proceeded to steal Tanner’s briefcase, keys to his home,
and an LG MS3895 cell phone. During the “roughing up” and the
robbery, witnesses heard a gunshot. Calvin and Glenn then got out of
Tanner’s car and ran away. Glenn was spotted with a small silver gun
in his handas he ran. The men droppeda red cell phone anda key ring
during their flight.

In response to a 911 call, police arrived at the Affordable Inn
shortly after the shot was fired. They found a car that was still
running with the door open. Tanner was found unresponsive in the
driver’s seat. Officers collected a .25 caliber cartridge casing, a
number of business cards, a video surveillance recording, and several
fingerprints from the crime scene. Officers also noticed that Tanner’s
cell phone holder was empty and that there was an empty box for an

® Kitchens was indicted with the Glenn brothers but entered a guilty plea and testified at
their trial.

278 |

LG MS395 phone in the car’s back seat. Tanner died from a single .25
caliber gunshot wound to his abdomen; no firearm connected to that
casing or bullet was ever recovered.

The motel manager gave police the video surveillance recording
that captured Tanner’s last moments. The recording showed Tanner
being taken to the ground by two men on the car’s left side while two
other men ransacked the car from the right side. The manager
thought she recognized two of the people in the video, whom she knew
by their nicknames “Fat” and “Man.” “Fat” was later determined to be
Pryor, and “Man” was later determined to be Kitchens. The manager
identified Kitchens because he stuck his face into the camera and
because he was known to her since he had been banned from motel
property. The video also showed Kitchens and three other men fleeing
the parking lot via a “cut path” that led to the Hidden Woods
apartments on the other side of the motel. A search of the path turned
up the key ring and red cell phone. Police issued a BOLO (be on the
lookout) notice describing the suspects; minutes later, Calvin was
arrested near the Hidden Woods apartments. The red phone turned
out to belong to Calvin.

Six days after the crime, Kitchens was arrested. He admitted to
serving as a lookout at the corner of the motel building, but pinned the
murder on Calvin and Glenn despite denying that he ever saw the
actual shooting. Kitchens identified the fourth male by the nickname
“Red.” He told police that Calvin went by the street name “Kirkwood,”
while Glenn went by the name “Uzi.” Kitchens illuminated a motive:
money. Calvin had seen Tanner at a nearby gas station earlier that
day and became upset because Tanner owed him money for drugs.
Calvin called his brother to meet him and confront Tanner over the
money.

Johnson was shown the video recording, along with still photos,
and identified Glenn as being one of the men shown. She acknowl-
edged, both before and during trial, that she could not see his face
well, but “could just tell” the man in the video was Glenn. She, like
Kitchens, denied being present when the shooting occurred.

DeKalb County police arrested Glenn at his sister’s apartment.
He had resided there for two or three weeks. In addition to the arrest
warrant issued for Glenn, Detective Keith McQuilkin obtained a
search warrant for the apartment. The warrant is discussed more
fully below in relation to one of Glenn’s enumerations of error.
Although the warrant did not include a cell phone as one of the items
to be seized, Detective McQuilkin seized an LG MS395 cell phone
from the floor of the apartment. At police headquarters, he removed

eS 279

the cell phone’s battery and confirmed that the serial number matched
the serial number on the empty box that was found in the back seat
of Tanner’s car.

Prior to trial, Calvin and Glenn filed a motion in limine seeking
to block lay witnesses from identifying them as the two men shown on
the motel surveillance video or still photographs taken from that
video. The trial court denied the motion, and Pryor, Johnson, and
Kitchens were all questioned about Glenn’s appearance in the video.
Glenn also moved to suppress the search of his sister’s apartment and
the resulting seizure of the LG MS395 cell phone. After a hearing, the
trial court denied Glenn’s motion to suppress.

Once trial began, the defense maintained that the video did not
show Calvin or Glenn. Over Glenn’s objection, the jury heard from
Pryor, Kitchens, and Johnson that Glenn was the person in the
video.* Johnson also told the jury she received a phone call from
Glenn on the night of Tanner’s murder. She stated that Glenn told her
he “f**ked up,” but did not elaborate. Glenn’s sister, Tierra Curtis,
testified to her belief that Johnson had planted the cell phone to help
the police. Neither Calvin nor Glenn testified. The jury, as stated,
found Glenn guilty on all counts.

Although Glenn has not challenged the sufficiency of the evi-
dence in this case, we have reviewed the record and find that the
evidence is sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that Glenn was guilty of the crimes of which
he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979).

II.

Glenn first contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion in limine to exclude testimony by lay witnesses identifying
him as one of the perpetrators in the video surveillance and photo-
graphs. Glenn contends that Georgia law prohibits lay witness
identification based on photos or video.

Georgia’s new Evidence Code permits lay witness testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the
witness’s perception, helpful to a clear understanding of the deter-
mination of a fact in issue, and not based on scientific, technical, or

® Forhis part, Kitchens refused to identify Glenn asone of the people in the video. The State
countered with an impeachment witness who averred that Kitchens had previously identified
all of the people, including Glenn, in the video.

280 |

other specialized knowledge. OCGA § 24-7-701 (a). That rule is mod-
eled on Federal Rule of Evidence 701 (a), and when we consider the
meaning of such provisions, “we look to decisions of the federal
appellate courts construing and applying the Federal Rules, espe-
cially the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the
Eleventh Circuit.” Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2) (786 SE2d 633)
(2016).*

In United States v. Pierce, 136 F3d 770, 774 (11th Cir. 1998), the
Eleventh Circuit held that where there is “some basis for concluding
that [a] witness is more likely to correctly identify” a defendant as
“the individual depicted in surveillance photographs,” then “lay
opinion testimony identifying a defendant in surveillance photo-
graphs is admissible under Rule 701.” In so holding, the Pierce court
rejected the defendant’s argument that lay witnesses were no better
equipped than juries to compare the defendant’s appearance with the
individual depicted in surveillance images. Id. at 773. The Pierce
court acknowledged that a number of factors may determine if a
witness is better suited to identify the defendant in such instances,
and that perhaps the “most critical [factor] to this determination is
the witness’s level of familiarity with the defendant’s appearance.”
Id.

Under the circumstances of this case, we find no meaningful
distinction between lay witness testimony identifying the defendant
in either photographs or in video recordings. See, e.g., United States
v. Gholikhan, 370 Fed. Appx. 987, 991 (II) (11th Cir. 2010) (relying on
Pierce to find no error in admitting lay witness testimony under Rule
701 identifying defendant’s voice on monitored telephone calls); see
also United States v. Contreras, 536 F3d 1167, 1170 (I) (A) (10th Cir.
2008) (finding no error in admitting, under Rule 701, witness’s
identification of defendant from security footage because witness’s
familiarity with defendant better equipped witness to identify defen-
dant from that footage than jury). Indeed, in most cases, the oppor-
tunity to observe a person’s mannerisms, gait, and similar charac-
teristics depicted in video footage will increase the likelihood that a
lay witness familiar with a defendant will be better equipped than
jurors to identify the defendant from such images.

4 Glenn’s argument that Georgia case law on this matter prior to enactment of the new
Evidence Code constitutes a common law rule that must still be applied is unavailing. By using
language nearly identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 701 (a), which case law shows addressed
the matter at issue, the enactment of OCGA § 24-7-701 (a) was a statutory modification to the
admissibility of such evidence and displaced prior precedent on the matter. After all, to the
extent that the General Assembly adopted the federal rules, it did so with an “understanding
of how those rules are applied in federal courts.” Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 1:3
at p. 26 (2016-2017 ed.).

eS 281

In this case, the video recording was of such poor quality that the
average juror would not be able to distinguish the faces by them-
selves. The witnesses, who had known Glenn prior to the crime, were
in a better position to correctly identify Glenn in the video than the
jurors. Further, the ex-girlfriend’s identification testimony was required
to identify Glenn in the video because his appearance had changed
since the time of the crime. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in permitting lay witnesses to give testimony
identifying Glenn as one of the people in the motel surveillance video.

III.

Glenn’s second contention is that the trial court committed
reversible error by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized
during the search of his sister’s apartment. The State must prove that
the challenged search was supported by a factually sufficient war-
rant. Here, Glenn contends that the State failed to satisfy its burden
in two separate ways: (a) because the underlying affidavit does not
demonstrate probable cause that Glenn murdered Tanner, and (b)
because the State failed to establish the required nexus between the
items particularized in the search warrant and the place to be
searched. We disagree.

The duty of an appellate court reviewing a search warrant is to
determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether the
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed to issue the search warrant. State v. Palmer, 285 Ga. 75, 78
(673 SE2d 237) (2009). A magistrate’s task in determining if probable
cause exists to issue a search warrant is to make a “practical,
common-sense decision” whether, given all the circumstances, “there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” Sullivan v. State, 284 Ga. 358, 360 (2)
(667 SE2d 32) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). “A magis-
trate’s decision to issue a search warrant based on a finding of
probable cause is ‘entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing
court.’” Id. (quoting McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 388 (477 SE2d
814) (1996)). “Even doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of
upholding a magistrate’s determination that a warrant is proper.” Id.

Glenn’s first attack on the warrant, that it did not show probable
cause that he was the murderer, does not succeed. “The test of
probable cause requires merely a probability — less than a certainty
but more than a mere suspicion or possibility.” Brown v. State, 269 Ga.
830, 831 (2) (504 SE2d 443) (1998) (citations and punctuation omit-
ted). A warrant to search a murder suspect’s home thus need not
prove that the suspect was in fact the killer. See State v. Stephens, 252

282 |

Ga. 181, 184 (311 SE2d 823) (1984) (“By no means is probable cause
to be equated with proof even by so much as a preponderance of
evidence.”). It must only show that “there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found ina particular place.”
Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 465 (704 SE2d 794) (2010) (citation and
punctuation omitted).

The “fair probability” standard is easily reached here. As recounted
in the affidavit supporting the search warrant, Glenn had been
identified through still photographs taken from the surveillance
video of the robbery and shooting. In addition, Glenn had been
identified as the actual shooter by another person involved in the
crime, and a warrant for Glenn’s arrest had been issued. Based on the
totality of the circumstances, the magistrate judge was authorized to
conclude that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search
warrant.

Glenn’s second argument, that there was an insufficient nexus
between the items to be seized and the location of the search, fares no
better than his first. Glenn agrees that several witnesses had iden-
tified him as the shooter before officers applied for a search warrant,
and numerous items relating to the killing had not yet been recov-
ered, including both the gun used to kill Tanner and Tanner’s
personal effects. Moreover, Glenn does not dispute that he had been
residing in his sister’s apartment that was targeted by the warrant or
that the warrant so stated. Under these circumstances, the fact that
Glenn, a suspect who had been arrested for the crime under investi-
gation, lived at the address listed in the search warrant meant that
there was at least a “fair probability” that items related to the crime
would be found there. See Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 727-28 (234
SE2d 911) (1997). Moreover, the search warrant particularized items
that were related to the commission of the crime. We conclude that
there was a fair probability that the items listed in the search
warrant would be found at the place that was searched.®

IV.

Glenn next contends, citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. 8. 321 (107
SCt 1149, 94 LE2d 347) (1987), that the removal of the LG cell phone’s
battery to discover the serial number on the phone constituted an
independent search that required a warrant. He is incorrect. Because

© We reject Glenn's contention that the affidavit lacked probable cause because there were
two men involved in Tanner's murder and Glenn's “sole participation” was firing the weapon
that killed the victim and not stealing items from the victim. The search warrant specifically
sought firearms and ammunition related to the murder.

eS 283

the cell phone was found in plain view during a lawful search, and the
incriminating nature of the phone was “immediately apparent,” the
officer had authority to seize the phone and remove its battery to
determine the serial number. State v. Tye, 276 Ga. 559, 562-563 (3)
(580 SE2d 528) (2003).

Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may seize
evidence of a crime that is in plain view without a warrant and even
if discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent. Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 130 (110 SCt 2301, 110 LE2d 112) (1990); see also State
v. Tye, 276 Ga. at 563 (3) (holding that there is no requirement that an
officer know with certainty that an item seized is evidence of a crime
at the time of the seizure, only that there be probable cause to believe
that this is the case). And Hicks itself described the question in that
case as “whether the ‘plain view’ doctrine may be invoked when the
police have less than probable cause to believe the item in question is
evidence of a crime or is contraband.” Hicks, 480 U. S. at 323.

Here, officers were lawfully executing both a search warrant and
arrest warrant. The LG phone at issue was clearly visible on the floor
near the door. The officer who seized the phone knew that a phone of
the same model was missing from the victim’s car, and thus had
probable cause to believe that the cell phone he saw had been stolen
from the victim and was evidence of a crime. The existence of probable
cause to believe that the phone was stolen, combined with the fact
that the phone was in plain view, rendered the seizure reasonable
even though the phone was not particularized in the search warrant.
See State v. Hill, 338 Ga. App. 57, 60-61 (789 SE2d 317) (2016)
(finding that an officer “can remove the battery from the phone to
acquire an identifying subscriber number, analogous to a serial
number, without implicating the Fourth Amendment, because the
subscriber has no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy in the serial
number of his cell(ular) phone or other identifying information’ ”)
(citation omitted). No additional warrant was required before officers
removed the battery to ascertain the serial number. See United States
v. Green, 2011 WL 86681, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 2011), aff’d, 698 F3d
48 (1st Cir. 2012) (“There is nothing wrong with an agent’s examining
an item lawfully seized to determine its particular identifying num-
ber.”). In Hicks, on the other hand, the state at some point conceded
that the officer had no reason to suspect that the stereo equipment he
found would be evidence of a crime until he manipulated it to reveal
the serial number. Hicks, 480 U. S. at 331 (Powell, J., dissenting).
This Court, moreover, has already explained that the search in Hicks
would have been reasonable if the officer had probable cause to
believe the stereo equipment had been stolen. See Moss v. State, 275
Ga. 96, 105 (561 SE2d 382) (2002).

284 Pe
Vv.

Finally, Glenn contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffec-
tive assistance by failing to redact statements, which the jury heard,
directly communicating Kitchens’s belief that Glenn was affiliated
with the Bloods gang. Specifically, in his interview, Kitchens stated
that Uzi was Glenn’s “gang name” and that on the night of the crime
Glenn told his brother “let me be that,” which Kitchens took to mean
“give me the gun” in Blood code. Glenn cannot succeed on this claim
either.

As an initial matter, Glenn failed to raise his ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim in his motion for a new trial, which was
amended with new counsel, which means that it is not preserved for
review. “To preserve the issue of ineffective assistance of previous
counsel, new counsel must raise the issue at the earliest practicable
opportunity of post-conviction review or the issue is waived.” Ruiz v.
State, 286 Ga. 146, 148 (2) (b) (686 SE2d 253) (2009); see also Prince
v. State, 295 Ga. 788, 793 (2) (b) (764 SE2d 362) (2014). Accordingly,
he has not preserved this issue for review on direct appeal.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

latthew K. Winchester, for appellant.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Lenny I. Krick, Harry S. Ruth,
Anna G. Cross, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Meghan H.
Hill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A0924, $17X0925. KAMMERER REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS,
LLC v. FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS et al.;
and vice versa.
(806 SE2d 561)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Kammerer Real Estate Holdings, LLC owns a lot on the corner of
Peachtree Parkway and Stoney Point Road in Forsyth County. Seek-
ing to construct an automotive service facility on that lot, Kammerer
applied for a site development permit. The lot is subject to a zoning
condition under the Forsyth County Unified Development Code that
certain “open space” on the lot remain undeveloped. The Director of

eS 285

the Forsyth County Department of Planning and Community Devel-
opment concluded that the proposed construction would not comply
with this condition, and so, he refused to issue a site development
permit. Kammerer then asked the Forsyth County Board of Commis-
sioners to amend the zoning condition, but the Board declined to do
so. At that point, Kammerer filed this lawsuit against the County, the
Board, and the Director, alleging that the Director had misconstrued
the “open space” condition, andifit actually means what the Director
said it means, it is unconstitutional in several respects. The defen-
dants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), and the trial court granted the motion in part
and denied it in part. Kammerer appeals from the dismissal of certain
claims, and the defendants cross-appeal from the refusal of the trial
court to dismiss other claims. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

1. Inits pleadings, Kammerer sought declaratory relief concern-
ing the constitutionality of the “open space” condition, as well as a
writ of mandamus to compel the Director to issue the site develop-
ment permit. The trial court dismissed these claims because it
concluded that Kammerer lacks standing to assert the unconstitu-
tionality of the zoning condition, inasmuch as the condition already
was in effect when Kammerer acquired the lot. As the defendants now
concede, this conclusion was in error. In City of Rome v. Pilgrim, 246
Ga. 281, 283 (2) (271 SE2d 189) (1980), this Court held that “the mere
fact that a zoning regulation is in effect at the time property is
purchased does not preclude the purchaser from attacking its con-
stitutionality.” The trial court dismissed the claims for declaratory
relief and a writ of mandamus upon a ground foreclosed by our
decision in Pilgrim,' and we reverse the dismissal of those claims.”

Although the defendants note that a few jurisdictions have adopted an approach at odds
with our decision in Pilgrim, they do not ask us to reconsider Pilgrim or overrule it.

2 The defendants urge us to affirm the dismissal of the claim for declaratory relief as right
for other reasons, but we decline to do so. See Hardin v. Hardin, 301 Ga. 582, 587 (801 SE2d 774)
(2017) (noting that application of the right-for-any-reason rule is discretionary). First, the
defendants argue that the claim for declaratory relief is barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The question of sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional one, and a court should
resolve it before proceeding to enter a judgment on the merits. See McConnell v. Ga. Dept. of
Labor, 302 Ga. 18 (805 SH2d 79) (2017). But even if sovereign immunity bars some of the
declaratory relief that Kammerer seeks, Kammerer sued the Director in both his official and
individual capacities, and it is clear that sovereign immunity would not bar declaratory relief
against the Director in his individual capacity. See Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 443-444 (IID
(©) (801 $E2d 867) (2017). Accordingly, sovereign immunity would not dispose of the claim for
declaratory relief in its entirety, it would not dispose of the claim for a writ of mandamus in any
respect, see SJN Properties v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 799 (2) (b) (ii) (770
SE2d 832) (2015), and we would have to reach the correctness of the dismissal on the merits of
these claims in any event. Because we are setting aside the dismissal of the claim for declaratory
relief, there now is no judgment on the merits of that claim, the claim remains pending, and the

2. Kammerer sought judicial review of the decision of the Direc-
tor to refuse a site development permit by writ of certiorari. The trial
court dismissed this claim for judicial review, apparently based on its
conclusion that Kammerer did not say much about the claim in its
brief in response to the motion to dismiss.* Perhaps Kammerer could
have defended this claim more forcefully, but that is not the test for
dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6). When presented with a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must examine
the sufficiency of the pleadings. See Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498,
501 (2) (480 SE2d 10) (1997).4 In its amended pleading, Kammerer
quite clearly complained that the Director had refused a site devel-
opment permit based on his alleged misinterpretation of the
“open space” zoning condition, and Kammerer sought “a writ of
certiorari . . . for the correction of errors committed by... the.
Director.” The trial court dismissed the claim against the Director for
judicial review by writ of certiorari upon an improper ground, and we
reverse the dismissal of that claim.

3. Kammerer also sought judicial review of the determination of
the Board to leave the “open space” zoning condition in place by writ
of certiorari. The Board moved to dismiss this claim for judicial
review, but the trial court declined to dismiss it, reasoning that the

trial court can take up the question of sovereign immunity on remand. We caution, however,
that the trial court should resolve that question before entering any further judgment on the
merits. See McConnell, 302 Ga. at 19. Second, the defendants argue that declaratory relief is
to remedy a present uncertainty, not to afford a remedy for past wrongs. That is true, see Baker
v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 214 (1) (518 SE2d 879) (1999), but here, the lot remains subject
to the “open space” zoning condition, and the uncertainty about the constitutionality of that
condition is a continuing one.
® Inits order of dismissal, the trial court said: “[T]he Court finds that [Kammerer] does not
specifically challenge [the Director's] administrative determination. While [Kammerer] refer-
ences a potential argument as to his determination, [Kammerer’s] entire argument focuses
upon the [Board's] decision [to leave the zoning condition in place}, not [the Director's] [decision
to deny the site development permit].” In support of these findings, the trial court cited only to
Kammerer's brief in response to the motion to dismiss
+ In Anderson, we explained the standard for dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6) as.
follows
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose
with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. If, within the frame-
work of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustain a grant of the
relief sought by the claimant, the complaint is sufficient and a motion to dismiss
should be denied. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed
most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings
must be resolved in the filing party's favor:
267 Ga. at 501 (2) (footnotes omitted).

eS 287

Forsyth County zoning ordinance provides specifically that the acts
of the Board in connection with zoning matters may be reviewed by
writ of certiorari. Earlier this year, we held in City of Cumming v.
Flowers, 300 Ga. 820, 823-824 (3) (797 SE2d 846) (2017), that the
scope of review by writ of certiorari is defined by state law, see
OCGA § 5-4-1, and its scope cannot be enlarged by local ordinance.
That the zoning ordinance provides specifically for review by writ of
certiorari is immaterial, and the trial court refused upon an improper
ground to dismiss the claim against the Board for judicial review by
writ of certiorari. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the motion to
dismiss this claim. On remand, the trial court should reconsider the
motion to dismiss this claim in light of Flowers and OCGA § 5-4-1.

4. Finally, Kammerer sought attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11,
and the trial court refused to dismiss the claim for attorney fees. In
their cross-appeal, the defendants note (correctly) that a claim for
attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 is a derivative claim, see Ga.
Dept. of Corrections v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469, 474-475 (2) (a) (759 SE2d
804) (2014), and they urge that it cannot be brought as a claim
derivative of a claim only for judicial review by writ of certiorari. That
argument is understandable, considering that the trial court dis-
missed everything except the claims for certiorari review and attor-
ney fees. But we have reversed the dismissal of the claims for
declaratory and mandamus relief, and the parties have not briefed
whether attorney fees are available under OCGA § 13-6-11 in con-
nection with declaratory and mandamus relief.° Accordingly, at least
for now, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it declined to
dismiss the claim for attorney fees, and we affirm the denial of the
motion to dismiss with respect to that claim.

5. We do not decide definitively whether Kammerer states any
claim upon which relief may properly be granted. We decide only that
the trial court erroneously dismissed the claims for declaratory and
mandamus relief by way ofa legal analysis foreclosed by our decision
in Pilgrim; erroneously dismissed the claim against the Director for
judicial review by writ of certiorari by way of a misapplication of the
proper standard for dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6); errone-
ously denied dismissal of the claim against the Board for judicial
review by writ of certiorari by way of a legal analysis inconsistent
with our decision in Flowers; and did not err in rejecting the argu-
ment that the claim for attorney fees is due to be dismissed because

® There is at least some authority for the proposition that they are available in declaratory
judgment and mandamus cases. See, e.g., Forsyth County v, Martin, 279 Ga. 215 (610 SE2d 512)
(2005) (attorney fees available against a county under OCGA § 13-6-11 asa claim derivative of
claims for mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief).

288 Pe

it cannot properly be premised only on a claim for judicial review by
certiorari (since other claims remain in the case, at least for now).
Much is left to be resolved on remand. But based upon the particular
rationales employed by the trial court below and the specific argu-
ments of the parties on appeal, the judgment of the trial court on the
motion to dismiss is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part in Case No.
S17X0925. Judgment reversed in Case No. S17A0924. All the Justices
concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

iles Hansfor ‘allant, J. Ethan Underwood, Joshua A.
Scoggins, Jennifer S. Ray, for appellant.

Jarrard & Davis, Kenneth E. Jarrard, Jeffrey J. Costolnick; The

Gore Law Firm, Jesse A. Van Sant; Larry W. Ramsey, Jr., for appel-

lees.

$17A1014. OLSEN v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 556)

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Robert Olsen was formerly a police officer who was
indicted for felony murder and other charges related to the shooting
death of an unarmed suspect. The shooting occurred when Olsen
responded to a suspicious person report at a DeKalb County apart-
ment complex and ultimately shot the individual who was the subject
of the report. Olsen asserts he acted in self-defense. Olsen filed a
motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that unauthorized
persons were present in the grand jury room during the prosecutor’s
presentation of evidence. After conducting a hearing, the trial court
denied this motion in a detailed order setting forth the circumstances
of the evidentiary proceedings before the grand jury and the appli-
cable law, and then granted a certificate of immediate review. This
Court granted appellant’s request for interlocutory appeal in an order
identifying the following questions as being of particular concern:

1. Whether the presence of witnesses, non-lawyer and law-
yer spectators during the presentation of evidence to the
grand jury during the proceedings leading to the defen-
dant’s indictment in this case violated the recognized need
for grand jury secrecy and compromised the grand jury’s
independence from outside influence?

eS 289

2. Whether the defendant was prejudiced by the presence of
these individuals such that the trial court erred in refus-
ing to dismiss his indictment?

After reviewing the record and considering the parties’ arguments,
we affirm.

1. As Olsen points out, the subjects of grand jury proceedings
usually have no insight into the conduct of the proceedings because,
in most cases, the subject has no right to be present. At the time of the
proceeding in question, however, former OCGA § 17-7-52 permitted
law enforcement officers facing criminal charges arising out of the
performance of their duties to be present during the presentation of
evidence to the grand jury, along with counsel.’ As a result, Olsen
witnessed the presentation of evidence to the grand jury that ulti-
mately returned an indictment against him, and observed the man-
ner in which the proceedings were conducted. The parties stipulated
at the motion hearing that as many as twelve to fourteen individuals
were present during some or all of the presentation of evidence to the
grand jury in this case: appellant and his three attorneys, who were
permitted to be present two at a time; the then-serving DeKalb
County district attorney who planned to try the case; five assistant
district attorneys, one or more of whom were present at various times
during the proceedings for the purpose, according to the State, of
handling witnesses and observing testimony; several staff members
of the district attorney’s office who, according to the State, assisted
with audio visual equipment and facilitated the orderly presentation
of witnesses; a court reporter who was present for the duration of the
proceedings but recorded only Olsen’s testimony; and an expert
retained by the State who observed the proceedings and testified
after Olsen had testified.

Clearly, neither the district attorney nor members of the district
attorney’s staff may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or
voting. See Colon v. State, 275 Ga. App. 73, 77 (3) (619 SE2d 773)
(2005). The issue in this case, however, concerns the secrecy and
confidentiality of the evidentiary stage of grand jury proceedings.
While federal rules strictly specify what persons are authorized to be

* Prior to its amendment in 2016 (see Ga. L. 2016, p. 186, § 6/HB 941), OCGA § 17-7-52
afforded the same rights to law enforcement officers facing grand jury charges as were afforded
to certain municipal, county, and state officers to be present, along with counsel, at the
presentation of evidence to a grand jury by OCGA § 45-11-4, That Code section was also
amended in 2016 to, among other things, delete that provision. See Ga. L. 2016, p. 186, § 8/HB
941

290 ee

present during the presentation of evidence to the grand jury,? no
such limitation exists pursuant to Georgia statutory law or proce-
dural rules. Olsen urges that, even absent a statutory basis for such
a limitation, this Court should look to the common law and the
historical importance of grand jury secrecy and should impose a limit
on the number of people who may be present during the presentation
of evidence to the grand jury. At the least, Olsen asks this Court to
hold that the indictment in this case should be set aside as a result of
the number of individuals present during the proceedings.

Despite the absence of express rules in this state governing who
may be present during the presentation of evidence to the grand jury,
law does exist addressing the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, and
we look to that law for guidance. “There is no doubt that the
preservation of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is a well-
recognized principle in Georgia.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Inre Gwinnett County Grand Jury, 284 Ga. 510, 512 (668 SE2d 682)
(2008) (reviewing a civil investigative matter of the grand jury, but
noting that no distinction is drawn between the grand jury secrecy
requirements applicable to its civil investigative role and its criminal
accusatory role). Toward that end, Georgia common law clearly
recognizes the secrecy of grand jury deliberations and, as noted
above, establishes that no members of the prosecutorial staff may be
present during this stage of the proceedings. See Colon, supra.
Statutory law addressing the secrecy of grand jury proceedings,
however, has changed over time. Commencing in 1812, the legisla-
ture provided an oath for grand jurors that required all matters
presented to the grand jury to be kept secret. See Laws 1812, Cobb’s
1851 Digest, p. 551. That law remained essentially intact until 1994,
when the legislature substantially expanded the secrecy rule by
enacting a law that required the prosecuting attorney as well as
members of the grand jury to “keep secret anything occurring in the
grand jury room... .” Ga. L. 1994, p. 874, § 1. In 1995, the current
version of the grand jury secrecy statute, codified at OCGA § 15-12-67,
was enacted which requires each member of the grand jury to take an
oath to “keep the deliberations of the grand jury secret . . . .”* Notably,

2 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (@) (1).
® OCGA § 15-12-67 (b) requires each member of the grand jury to take the following oath:
You, as foreperson (or member) of the grand jury for the County of
shall diligently inquire and true presentment make of all such matters and things
as shall be given you in the court's charge or shall come to your knowledge touching
the present service; and you shall keep the deliberations of the grand jury secret
unless called upon to give evidence thereof in some court of law in this state. You
shall present no one from envy, hatred, or malice, nor shall you leave anyone

eS 291

the oath of secrecy no longer extends to the State’s attorney, and even
the grand jurors’ oath encompasses only deliberations and not all
things occurring in the grand jury room.*

We have identified no limitation in Georgia law on the number of
persons in the prosecutor’s staff that may be present during the
evidentiary stage of proceedings. The legislature’s change in the oath
of secrecy with respect to the grand jury, however, bears significance
to the inquiry of whether the law of Georgia requires such a limita-
tion. When this Court considers the meaning of a statute we “presume
that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it
meant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294
Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). Accordingly, had the
General Assembly intended to provide a new limitation on the
number of people who could be present at the evidentiary stage of a
grand jury proceeding it could have done so, but it did not. It did,
however, change the law to make the secrecy requirement less
restrictive than was previously the case. Additionally, we note that
the oath of secrecy applicable to court reporters who attend grand
jury proceedings requires the court reporter to keep secret all things
coming to that person’s knowledge as a result of grand jury atten-
dance. See OCGA § 15-12-83 (a).° The legislature clearly knew, at the
time of this proceeding, how to make explicit its intent to require
secrecy of persons attending the evidentiary stage of a grand jury
proceeding, but it did not impose that requirement on either the
grand jurors or the prosecuting attorney. We must presume the
legislature’s failure to impose such a requirement “was a matter of
considered choice.” Pandora Franchising, LLC v. Kingdom Retail
Group, LLLP, 299 Ga. 723, 726 (1) (a) (791 SE2d 786) (2016). Given
that presumption, we decline to extend the requirement of secrecy
applicable to grand jury proceedings in Georgia beyond that which is
currently imposed by statute. The expansion of grand jury secrecy
requirements, if an expansion is to be made, is properly the domain
of the legislature or the appropriate procedural rule-making body. We
similarly conclude that any strict limitation on the number of persons

unpresented from fear, favor, affection, reward, or the hope thereof, but you shall
present all things truly and as they come to your knowledge. So help you God

* Additionally, grand jury witnesses are not sworn to secrecy, but are required only to swear
to give truthful testimony. See OCGA § 15-12-68.

® Both the former version of the oath that was in effect at the time this grand jury was
convened (former OCGA § 15-12-83 (b) (see Ga. L. 1982, p. 2107, §13)) and the current
OCGA § 15-12-83 (a) contain an identical oath for court reporters attending a grand jury
proceeding: “I do solemnly swear that I will keep secret all things and matters coming to my
knowledge while in attendance upon the grand jury, so help me God.”

292 ee

who may be present during the presentation of evidence to the grand
jury is an issue for the legislature, not the courts.

We are not convinced that the presence of a state expert witness,
along with lawyer and non-lawyer members of the district attorney’s
staff, during the presentation of evidence to the grand jury in this
case violated the need for grand jury secrecy or compromised the
grand jury’s independence from outside influences. The United States
Supreme Court has noted several interests served by the confiden-
tiality of grand jury proceedings.

First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many
prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward
voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify
would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who
appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify
fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well
as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those
about to be indicted would flee, or would try to influence
individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Finally,
by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that
persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury
will not be held up to public ridicule.

Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (ID
(99 SCt 1667, 60 LE2d 156) (1979).° Primarily, these interests relate
to promoting free and frank disclosure of information to the grand
jury, and Olsen fails to demonstrate how the presence of individuals
from the prosecutor’s office or the presence of an expert witness
throughout the evidentiary presentation impaired the ability of the
grand jury to obtain the frank testimony of grand jury witnesses. For
example, he fails to demonstrate that their presence was intimidat-
ing or that it squelched or influenced any witness’ testimony. Cer-
tainly, the concern that witnesses might not be forthcoming if they
knew the accused would become aware of their testimony due to the
presence of these individuals is not applicable in a case where, as
here, the accused himself was present during the presentation of
testimony, as allowed by then-applicable law. Even in the more

® See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 493 F3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
Grand jury investigations are conducted in strict secrecy to encourage witnesses to
testify fully and frankly, to prevent those about to be indicted from fleeing, and to
ensure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be
held up to public ridicule.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.)

eS 2983

typical case in which the accused may not attend the proceedings
(which, at this time, includes all criminal grand jury proceedings
regardless of the official status of the targeted individual), we decline
to create a rule by case law about who may be present during the
evidentiary stage of grand jury proceedings that might constrain the
district attorney’s flexibility in conducting the proceedings. The State
acknowledged at the motion to dismiss hearing that some of the
individuals were present to assist in evaluating the effectiveness and
credibility of grand jury witnesses who might be called at trial. As
a result, Olsen characterizes the proceedings in this case as a
“mock trial.” Regardless of the purpose these individuals served,
Olsen has not demonstrated that, in general, the presence of addi-
tional members of a prosecutor’s staff or the presence of an expert
witness during the evidentiary stage of grand jury proceedings
compromises grand jury secrecy or makes the grand jury more
vulnerable to outside influences.

This does not mean that prosecutors have unfettered discretion
to invite mere spectators to grand jury proceedings. Olsen asks
whether, if no limits are imposed by this Court with respect to who
may attend the evidentiary stage of grand jury proceedings, a district
attorney could invite, for example, a news reporter to observe the
proceedings, or a high school or law school class. While such extreme
hypotheticals may well violate the confidentiality and purpose of
grand jury proceedings, such concerns are not present in a case, such
as here, where each individual present at the evidentiary stage of the
grand jury proceeding was either a member of the district attorney’s
staff brought in to assist or participate in the proceedings, or, in the
case of the expert witness, was an individual retained by the district
attorney to testify. That an expert witness observed the testimony of
other witnesses violates no express rule in Georgia. Nevertheless, we
caution prosecutors to take care to conduct grand jury proceedings in
amanner that does not discourage witnesses from testifying fully and
frankly, that protects against the risk that the accused might flee to
avoid prosecution, and that ensures persons who are ultimately not
indicted are not the subject of public ridicule. See In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Judith Miller, 493 F3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

2. Olsen admits he cannot present evidence of actual prejudice as
aresult of the presence, during the evidentiary stage of the grand jury
proceeding, of those individuals that are the subject of his objection.
Even under the more restrictive rules governing federal grand jury
proceedings, an indictment may not be dismissed for errors in the
proceedings that violate those rules unless the errors prejudiced the
defendant. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,
254 (1) (108 SCt 2369, 101 LE2d 228) (1988) (holding an indictment

294 ee

was not subject to dismissal even though, under applicable federal
rules, unauthorized persons were present during the presentation of
evidence to the grand jury because no prejudice was demonstrated).”
Pursuant to Georgia statutory law, neither grand jury members,
prosecutors, nor grand jury witnesses are bound to secrecy regarding
the evidence presented to the grand jury. See OCGA §§ 15-12-67 (b)
and 15-12-68. As noted in Division 1, the interests served by the
confidentiality of grandjury proceedings primarily include the State’s
interests in preventing witnesses from being reluctant to come
forward with incriminating testimony, preventing witnesses from
being in fear of retribution from the accused, and preventing the
person at risk of indictment from fleeing or influencing witnesses or
grand jurors. See Douglas Oil, supra, 441 U.S. at 219 (ID); see also
Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229 (4 SE2d 418) (1939). The record does
not reveal any such interests were compromised in this case. And the
interest of the accused in assuring that persons who are accused but
not indicted by the grand jury are not held up to public ridicule is not
present in this case because Olsen was indicted. Consequently, Olsen
can demonstrate no prejudice by the number of persons from the
prosecutor’s office who were present at these proceedings, or by the
presence of the expert witness who also testified.

Dismissal of an indictment is an extreme sanction, “used only
sparingly as [a remedy] for unlawful government conduct.” State v.
Lampl, 296 Ga. 892, 896 (2) (770 SE2d 629) (2015). No unlawful
conduct is shown in this case, and no prejudice is demonstrated by the
manner in which the prosecutor conducted the evidentiary stage of
the grand jury proceedings. Accordingly, the order denying Olsen’s
motion to dismiss the indictment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

|
Garland, Samuel & Loeb, Donald F. Samuel, Amanda R. Clark
Palmer, Donald C. English, for appellant.

7 Several state courts have also required a showing of prejudice in order to support the
dismissal of an indictment because of the presence of an unauthorized person before the grand
jury. See, e.g., State v. Summer, 76 P3d 963, 967-968 (Idaho 2003); Hubbell v. State, 754 NE2d
884, 888 (Ind. 2001).

eS 295

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Anna G. Cross, Christopher W.
Timmons, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1020. FAZIO v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 544)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Stephen Fazio was convicted after a bench trial of driving under
the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe to do so, in
violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), and driving with an unlawful
blood alcohol concentration, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5).
He now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to
suppress the results of his alcohol breath tests because, he contends,
they were obtained in violation of the United States and Georgia
Constitutions. Finding no error, we affirm.

1. Fazio was arrested following a road-block stop of his vehicle in
Gwinnett County during the early morning hours of March 28, 2015.
During the initial stop, the officer talked with Fazio and observed
signs of intoxication, including slurred speech and the odor of alcohol.
When Fazio failed several field sobriety tests, the officer placed Fazio
under arrest, handcuffed him, and read him the following Georgia
“fi]Jmplied consent notice,” as stated in OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2):

Georgia law requires you to submit to state administered
chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily
substances for the purpose of determining if you are under
the influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing,
your Georgia driver’s license or privilege to drive on the
highways of this state will be suspended for a minimum
period of one year. Your refusal to submit to the required
testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial. If
you submit to testing and the results indicate an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 grams or more, your Georgia driver’s
license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state may
be suspended for a minimum period of one year. After first
submitting to the required state tests, you are entitled to
additional chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or
other bodily substances at your own expense and from

296 P|

qualified personnel of your own choosing. Will you submit to
the state administered chemical tests of your [breath] under
the implied consent law?

Fazio verbally agreed to the breath test by saying “yes.” The officer
then escorted Fazio to an Intoxilyzer 9000 machine inside a police
vehicle at the scene, prepared the machine, and instructed Fazio to
take a deep breath and blow as hardas he couldinto the machine until
told to stop. The officer obtained two breath samples from Fazio, both
of which showed a blood alcohol level above the legal limit. At no point
during the testing did Fazio express any objections or unwillingness
to take the tests.

2. On appeal, Fazio makes several arguments as to why his
motion to suppress should have been granted. All are without merit.
First, he argues that the implied consent notice statute, OCGA §
40-5-67.1 (b), violates the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment and its Georgia
analogue found in Article I, Section I, Paragraph XIII of the Georgia
Constitution of 1983.1 But in another case decided today, Olevik v.
State, 302 Ga. 228, 234 (2) (b) (806 SE2d 505) (2017), we hold that the
implied consent statute is not unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment or Paragraph XIII because, even if the statute were
coercive, police may obtain a breath test without a warrant as a
search incident to arrest. See also Birchfield v. North Dakota, ___
U.S. __ (136 SCt 2160, 2184 (V) (C) (3), 195 LE2d 560) (2016)
(holding that a breath test (but not a blood test) can be conducted
categorically, without a warrant, as a search incident to arrest).

Second, Fazio argues that the implied consent statute is uncon-
stitutionally misleading and coercive on its face, in violation of due
process. He asserts that the statute does not fully and accurately
inform a suspect of his rights or the consequences of his refusal to
consent to a breath test. But we consider and reject just such an
argument in Olevik, holding that, although the statute may contain
some deficiencies, “there is no evidence that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b)
creates widespread confusion about drivers’ rights and the conse-
quences for refusing to submit to a chemical test or for taking and
failing that test.” See Olevik, 302 Ga. at 250 (3) (a). “Because we
cannot assume that the implied consent notice standing alone will
coerce reasonable people to whom it is read, [Fazio’s] facial challenge
fails.” Id.

1 Paragraph XIII contains the same language as the Fourth Amendment.

eS 297

Finally, Fazio contends that the taking of a breath test violates
his constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination because,
he argues, a breath test requires the active participation of the
suspect — blowing hard into a tube. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I,
Sec. I, Par. XVI. But, as Fazio concedes, he did not raise this
constitutional argument below, and so we cannot review it on appeal.
See Amos v. State, 298 Ga. 804, 807 (2) (783 SE2d 900) (2016) (“We
have consistently adhered to the requirement that a constitutional
challenge must be made as soon as possible.” (citation and punctua-
tion omitted)); Bohannon v. State, 269 Ga. 130, 137 (5) (497 SE2d 552)
(1998) (declining to review a constitutional challenge to a statute
because defendant’s argument “was not properly raised before the
trial court, and was not ruled on by the trial court,” even though other
constitutional challenges to the same statute were preserved).?

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

Lance W. Tyler, for appellant.
Rosanna M. Szabo, Solicitor-General, Samuel R. d’Entremont,
Joelle M. Nazaire, Assistant Solicitors-General, for appellee.

$17A1064. SHELLEY v. TOWN OF TYRONE.
(806 SE2d 535)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

This case arises from a long-running battle that appellant Rich-
ard Shelley has been waging against the Town of Tyrone’s zoning
ordinances. Because Shelley failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies before seeking relief in the trial court, his as-applied
challenges to the zoning ordinances are not ripe for judicial review.
We therefore affirm the superior court’s order granting Tyrone par-
tial summary judgment on those claims. And because the town has
enacted a new zoning ordinance, Shelley’s facial challenges to the

2 We note that, even if Fazio had preserved his compelled self-incrimination argument, it
would not have benefitted him. We hold in Olevik that, while the taking of a breath test does
implicate the right against self-incrimination under the Georgia Constitution, the implied
consent statute, standing alone, is not unconstitutionally coercive. Olevik, 302 Ga. at 252 (3) ).
And Fazio, like the defendant in Olevik, has identified “no other factors surrounding his arrest
that, incombination with the reading of the implied consent notice, coerced him into performing
a self-incriminating act.” Id. Thus, Fazio's self-incrimination claim would have failed

298 Pe

previous ordinances are moot. We therefore vacate the superior
court’s order addressing the merits of those claims and remand the
case with direction to dismiss those claims unless Shelley properly
amends his complaint to challenge the ordinance now in effect.

1. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Shelley as
the party opposing summary judgment, see Cowart v. Widener, 287
Ga. 622, 624 (697 SE2d 779) (2010), the record shows the following.
In 1999, Shelley purchased commercial property with four renta.
units on Senoia Road in Tyrone.' In 2003, he purchased another
commercial property in Tyrone, this one with eight rental units an
located on Palmetto Road. Both properties include industrial-type
buildings with high ceilings, limited parking, limited storefront, an
truck docks. At the time of each purchase, the properties were zone’
C-2 commercial district, but according to Shelley the properties ha
preexisting tenants with grandfathered nonconforming uses, mean-
ing the right to use the properties in those ways was allegedly veste:
at the time Tyrone adopted zoning restrictions removing them as
permitted or conditional uses.

C-2 was the middle commercial zoning designation. It replace
C-H (commercial highway district) in 1989 but kept the same primary
uses. A new zoning ordinance was passed in 1997; it is unclear if that
ordinance made any changes to C-2. The tenants when Shelley
bought the properties included an automobile repair and sales shop,
a landscaper, and a furniture upholsterer. It appears that at least
these three were permitted uses under C-2 at the time of Shelley’s
purchases.

In 2004, Tyrone amended its zoning ordinance and eliminated
some of the permitted uses under C-2. The deleted uses included some
that Shelley had on his property at least at some point, including
major automobile repair, automobile dealer, landscaping, and furni-
ture upholstery. Shelley sent several letters to Tyrone alleging that
this amendment deprived him of all economically feasible uses of his
properties and requesting that the town either restore a number of
uses that had been deleted or pay him almost $2 million to make up
for lost rents. The town council denied Shelley’s requests.

In 2007, Shelley, representing himself, sued Tyrone in superior
court, arguing that the 2004 zoning amendment violated his federal
and state due process rights because it eliminated all economically
feasible uses of his property and because it was passed without proper

+ Shelley sold this property in May 2014 but still seeks damages based on its allegedly
depressed sale price and reduced rents during the period he owned it

eS 299

notice or investigation. He asked for, among other things, a declara-
tory judgment that the town’s 1989 zoning ordinance was controlling
and the 1997 ordinance and 2004 amendment were invalid; injunc-
tive relief preventing the town from refusing to issue legal business
use licenses to him; and damages for inverse condemnation. Tyrone
removed the case to federal district court on the ground that it
involved a federal question.

On April 6, 2009, the federal court issued an order that summa-
rized the history of the enactment of Tyrone’s zoning ordinances and
found that the 1997 ordinance was the controlling zoning ordinance
for Shelley’s case and that Tyrone validly amended that ordinance in
2004. The court then explained that to do business in Tyrone, entities
must submit an application for and obtain an Occupation Tax
Certificate (OTC). The court held that Shelley’s as-applied constitu-
tional challenges to the 2004 amendment were not ripe because he
had not applied for an OTC or obtained any final decision from the
zoning authority depriving him of a tenant or hindering an existing
tenant based on the 2004 amendment. The federal court further hel
that to the extent Shelley was raising a takings claim, he would have
to raise that in state court. The court dismissed these as-applie’
claims without prejudice.

The federal court then held that Shelley’s facial challenge to the
2004 ordinance amendment on federal due process grounds was ripe
but failed because property owners generally do not have due process
claims for legislative decisions like that one and to the extent Shelley
was entitled to some level of due process, the town council complie:
with Tyrone’s local notice and hearing requirements. Thus, the court
dismissed that claim with prejudice and granted Tyrone’s motion for
partial summary judgment. The federal court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims an‘
closed the case.

Shelley then hired two attorneys, who reopened the case so the
state-law claims could be remanded to the superior court. Following
some negotiations, Tyrone’s attorney sent a letter to Shelley’s attor-
neys on May 3, 2010, advising that Shelley's “petition for recognition
of rights to nonconforming uses and vested rights” was not something
that the town could grant. The town attorney noted that he was not
aware of any decisions made by Tyrone that failed to recognize any of
Shelley’s nonconforming uses or vested rights. He promised that the
town would not “make any decision which would impact the vested
rights of [Shelley], if any” and added, “the Town stands ready to issue

300 Pe

appropriate permits to [Shelley] for which he is qualified.” On Octo-
ber 21, 2010, the parties filed a mutual dismissal with prejudice of all
of Shelley’s remaining claims.”

About a year later, in October 2011, Tyrone held two public
hearings to discuss proposed Ordinance 2011-13. This ordinance was
intended to streamline the 1997 zoning ordinance and consolidate the
zoning designations; the town council thought the town was too small
for the number of different designations it had. As relevant for
Shelley’s properties, which had been designated C-2, the 2011 ordi-
nance merged the three commercial designations into two: C-1 (down-
town commercial) and C-2 (highway commercial). The ordinance
incorporated all of the permitted and conditional uses of the former
C-2 into C-1, redesignated all property that was C-2 as C-1, and
redesignated all property that was C-3 as C-2. Thus, under Ordi-
nance 2011-13, Shelley’s properties would be zoned C-1.° The pro-
posed ordinance also allowed legal nonconforming uses to preserve
vested rights but said that if a nonconforming use of a property was
discontinued and that nonconforming use was not resumed within six
months, the property would lose permission for the nonconforming
use.

Shelley attended both October 2011 meetings and personally
objected to Ordinance 2011-13 as unconstitutionally restricting his
property use. Shelley’s attorney also spoke at the first meeting, held
on October 6, asserting that it would cost Shelley one to two million
dollars to change his buildings to fit the new zoning restrictions. The
town attorney asked everyone at the meeting, and Shelley specifi-
cally, to name any uses they believed had been covered under the old
zoning ordinance but would not be covered under the new one. The
ordinance was then tabled until the second meeting, which was held
two weeks later. At that meeting, Shelley said that the automobile
brokers use had been eliminated in the C-1/C-2 merger. The town

2 In 2013, Shelley sued his attorneys for malpractice, claiming that he had fired them
before they signed the dismissal and therefore they acted without authority. The court in that
case did not decide that question because it found that, even if the attorneys acted without
authority, they caused Shelley no harm, because his due process claim had not been viable since
the requisite public notice had been published and a hearing held before the 2004 zoning
amendment was adopted, there was no evidence that Tyrone’s decision had deprived Shelley of
any tenants, and Shelley failed to give timely ante litem notice.

® Shelley seems to allege that some uses found in former C-2 were not carried over into new
C-1, but he does not identify specific examples. It appears that his issue is really the uses
eliminated earlier by the 2004 zoning amendment. The new C-1 designation had a list of over
100 permitted uses and a dozen or so conditional uses. The town had no discretion in allowing
conditional uses; a property owner was allowed a conditional use as long as certain conditions
were met.

eS 301

council agreed and revised the new ordinance to add it as a condi-
tional use in C-1. Shelley also suggested that the time to preserve a
nonconforming use be increased from six months to one year, which
the council did. The town council then passed Ordinance 2011-13 with
those two amendments.*

On March 28, 2013, Shelley learned that the Tyrone planning
commission and zoning administrator had informed a prospective
tenant that furniture assembly would not be allowed on Shelley’s
property because it was not permitted under C-1 zoning and the
planning commission “saw no reason to add such a use to the C-1
Zoning District.” The furniture assembler therefore rented else-
where. On September 18, 2013, another prospective tenant decided
not to rent from Shelley after she was told by the town clerk and
zoning administrator that her plan for a beauty parlor would not be
allowed on Shelley’s property because the property already had one
beauty parlor, and two would overtax the septic system. On Septem-
ber 27, 2013, Shelley sent a letter to Tyrone indicating that he
planned to file a lawsuit for inverse condemnation based on the loss
of rent from these two potential tenants, claiming he suffered $36,900
in lost rent due to the town’s “illegal denials of permitted land uses in
the C-1 District.” He also alleged that Tyrone had reneged on the
agreement made in the 2010 letter to his attorneys that the town
would not do anything to impact his vested rights.

On March 28, 2014, Shelley filed the lawsuit at issue in this
appeal in superior court, asking for a declaratory judgment that the
permitted uses of his properties are the same as those permitted in
1977. He alleged that Tyrone’s 1977 zoning ordinance governed his
properties because that was the ordinance in place when the build-
ings on his properties were constructed, and thus all uses available
then but not now should be grandfathered, nonconforming uses.
Shelley also asked for a preliminary and permanent injunction
prohibiting Tyrone from denying him any of these uses. He alleged

4 Shelley asserts that the council did not have the final text of the ordinance before it at the
time of this vote and that the text of the ordinance had not been made available to the public.
There does appear to be some confusion about what was available to the council and the public
at the time, and, based on the record, it is unclear what the final version of Ordinance 2011-13
actually was. The record includes drafts of the ordinance and at least one version with revisions
made after the vote. Affidavits from the town attorney and a member of the town council say
that the only changes made between the ordinance they were considering, which was published
for the public on Tyrone’s website, and the ordinance that was passed were the additions of
these two suggestions by Shelley.

® On October 25, 2013, the town attorney, writing on behalf of the town planning
commission and zoning administrator, told Shelley that furniture assembly was not permitted
under C-1 and was not a grandfathered legal nonconforming use because to his knowledge,
there was no furniture assembly taking place on Shelley's property.

302 Pe

generally that all zoning ordinances passed since 1977 are facially
void “because of the[ir] defective adoption and content” and more
specifically that Ordinance 2011-13 was void because it was adopted
without compliance with Georgia’s Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL), see
OCGA §§ 36-66-1 to 36-66-6, or the zoning procedures codified in
Tyrone’s ordinances. Shelley also alleged that Ordinance 2011-13 as
well as the 2004 amendment to the 1997 zoning ordinance dramati-
cally limited the uses of his properties, while not promoting the
welfare of the town. Finally, he asked for attorney fees and expenses
of litigation.

Shelley later amended his complaint twice, adding an inverse
condemnation claim, which alleges that he “has not been paid
adequate compensation for the Town of Tyrone’s limitations of uses
on [his properties]” and requesting damages. In April 2015, Shelley
moved for summary judgment on his facial challenges, and in June,
Tyrone moved for summary judgment on those challenges as well as
the claims regarding the application of the zoning ordinances to
Shelley’s properties.

On October 1, 2015, Tyrone enacted a completely new zoning
ordinance and zoning map with Ordinance 2015-07. The zoning map
was attached to the new ordinance and handed out to the public for
its consideration at the advertised public hearing on the ordinance.
Based on this development, Tyrone filed a suggestion of partial
mootness of this case on November 6, 2015, attaching a certified copy
of the new zoning ordinance. Shelley responded, arguing that none of
his claims are moot.

On June 26, 2016, the superior court denied Shelley's motion for
summary judgment and granted Tyrone’s motion. The court con-
cluded that Shelley's inverse condemnation claim was barred by his
failure to provide ante litem notice to the town and noted that Shelley
had failed to prove any violation of his vested rights. The court also
held that although the only zoning map Tyrone had produced was
dated well after the adoption of the 1997 zoning map, which was the
map Ordinance 2011-13 amended, there was in fact an official map in
1997.° The court said that there is no precedent requiring a zoning
map to be amended at the same time as the zoning ordinance text.
The court next concluded that Tyrone did not violate the ZPL when
enacting Ordinance 2011-13 and that the town was not required to
follow the town-created procedures because they were preempted by

® The superior court's statement that the 1997 map was deemed valid by Georgia's Court
of Appeals was a scrivener’s error; as made clear by the associated footnote in its order, the
superior court meant to refer to the federal district court.

eS 308

the ZPL. Finally, the court held that any challenges to ordinances
before Ordinance 2011-13 were barred by res judicata and collateral
estoppel based on the dismissed 2007 case. The superior court’s order
did not address the mootness issue.”

Shelley then filed both a notice of appeal to and an application for
discretionary appeal in this Court. On August 12, 2016, we dismissed
Shelley’s application on the ground that he was entitled to a direct
appeal.®

2. Shelley’s declaratory judgment and inverse condemnation
claims — his as-applied challenges to Tyrone’s zoning scheme — fail
because he did not properly seek relief from the town council or other
appropriate town zoning authority before filing this lawsuit in court.
Although Shelley opposed Ordinance 2011-13 before its enactment,
once the ordinance passed, he never sought permission through the
town’s established zoning processes to use his properties for any of
the uses that he now claims were improperly taken away by the 2011
ordinance.®

This Court has explained that “[w]here the basis of the claim
arises from its effect upon a particular parcel of land because of
features unique to that property, the owner may not bring an action
for declaratory judgment without first having exhausted the admin-
istrative remedies provided by law.” O S Advertising Co. of Georgia,
Ine. v. Rubin, 263 Ga. 761, 762 (438 SE2d 907) (1994), overruled on
other grounds by Ashkouti v. City of Suwanee, 271 Ga. 154 (516 SE2d
785) (1999). See also Little v. City of Lawrenceville, 272 Ga. 340, 342
(528 SE2d 515) (2000) (explaining that Little was required to exhaust
his available administrative remedies “with regard to the issue of
whether the activities conducted on the property violated the zoning
ordinance even after the rezoning”). Furthermore, Shelley’s as-applied
claim is essentially that

the rezoning of [his] property effectively resulted in the
taking of the property under the eminent domain concept of

* ‘The grant of summary judgment to Tyrone was only partial because it appears that the
issues of the injunction and the attorney fees Shelley is seeking have not yet been decided. On
June 30, 2016, Tyrone filed a motion in the superior court for final judgment on those issues.
‘The court had not ruled on this motion before Shelley filed his notice of appeal on July 22, 2016,
but those pending matters did not. prevent Shelley's immediate appeal of the order granting
partial summary judgment. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).

® In footnote 13 below, we discuss in greater detail why Shelley was not required to file a
discretionary application.

® As discussed further in Division 3 below, Ordinance 2015-07 is the zoning ordinance now
in effect in Tyrone. Shelley has not amended his complaint to extend his as-applied claims to
address that new ordinance, nor does the record show that he has petitioned for any kind of
relief from the new ordinance.

304 Pe

inverse condemnation, thereby entitling [him] to compensa-
tion. Even assuming that inverse condemnation is an avail-
able remedy in this type of rezoning case, that does not end
the inquiry.

Mayor & Aldermen of City of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette &
Amusement Svces., Inc., 267 Ga. 173, 174 (476 SE2d 581) (1996)
(citations and footnote omitted). As a general rule, before seeking a
judicial determination that a local regulation has unconstitutionally
taken property,

aparty must first apply to local authorities for relief. Requir-
ing exhaustion of administrative remedies “prevents unnec-
essary judicial intervention into local affairs and promotes
judicial economy because local authorities, unlike the court,
have the power to grant the zoning relief sought.”

City of Suwanee v. Settles Bridge Farm, LLC, 292 Ga. 434, 437 (738
SE2d 597) (2013) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also
Village Centers, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 248 Ga. 177, 178-179 (281
SE2d 522) (1981).1°

Shelley contends that it would be too cumbersome for him to seek
permission for a certain use not authorized by the zoning ordinance
every time he rented to a new tenant who desired such a use. But
seeking that kind of permission from the local government through
established channels, like variance or conditional use requests or
rezoning petitions, is exactly what is required. See Settles Bridge
Farm, 292 Ga. at 438 (petitioner must apply for a special use permit);
Savannah Cigarette, 267 Ga. at 174 (petitioner must seek rezoning).

The obligation to exhaust available administrative remedies
before going to court may be excused if “the litigant establishes that
submitting to the administrative process would be ‘futile.’” Settles
Bridge Farm, 292 Ga. at 437. Shelley asserts, but has not demon-
strated, such futility. He specifically complains about only two deni-
als of potential tenants’ planned uses. Both tenants were advised
informally that their planned uses of Shelley’s rental properties

10 The exhaustion requirement applies both to claims requesting compensation for an
alleged taking of particular property, see Settles Bridge Farm, 292 Ga. at 437, and for claims
requesting that the ordinance be struck down as unconstitutional as applied to the property at
issue, see Village Centers, 248 Ga. at 178-179. Shelley's taking allegations focus mostly on a
request for compensation, but to the extent he argues that the zoning ordinances should be
declared void because they deprive his properties of their value or take away his vested rights,
the exhaustion requirement is the same, and Shelley has failed to meet it.

eS 305

would not be allowed. As to the furniture assembler, the proposed
tenant and Shelley were told by the planning commission and zoning
administrator that furniture assembly was not a permitted use under
C-1 or a grandfathered nonconforming use and that the planning
commission saw no need to add this use to the C-1 zoning designation.
The town council, however, not the planning commission, was the
body authorized to make a final decision on rezoning, and Shelley did
not formally ask the council to add that use to C-1 or to rezone the
property in question. In fact, Shelley and the tenant did not formally
apply for any kind of zoning relief, such as a conditional use permit,
avariance, or a rezoning." As for the proposed beauty parlor, that use
was informally rejected by the zoning administrator and town clerk
based not on the zoning ordinance but on county and state rules about
sewage systems.

To the extent Shelley contends, as part of his declaratory judg-
ment claim, that the uses proposed by these tenants and other uses
were required to be permitted on his properties as grandfathered
nonconforming uses — and thus did not require any zoning relief —
the administrative remedy was to seek an Occupational Tax Certifi-
cate to open and operate such a business.!? Because neither Shelley
nor his tenants pursued this remedy, Tyrone had no opportunity to
formally decide whether these uses were permitted under the zoning
ordinance or to amend the ordinance if they were not. Shelley should
have been aware of this defect in his claim, as it was the reason the
federal court ruled that his similar claim in the earlier lawsuit was
not ripe for judicial review.

Even if the prospective tenants’ plans were rejected by some of
the same people who would be involved in the final local government
decision if Shelley made a formal request, we would not assume from
their answer to the prospective tenants what their answer would be
in the formal process. See Settles Bridge Farm, 292 Ga. at 439 (“As we
have recently held, the conduct of an administrative decision-maker
‘outside of and prior to the normal administrative process do[es] not

1 Under Ordinance 2011-13, conditional use permits were issued by the zoning adminis-
trator, variance requests were approved by the mayor and town council, and rezoning
applications were ultimately approved by the town council (after a recommendation from the
planning commission).

¥ Shelley points out that the town clerk explained in her deposition that she could issue
an OTC to a business even if the business had not yet obtained approval from the zoning
coordinator. She also explained, however, that as part of the OTC application process, the
business was required to seck approval from the zoning coordinator and if it did not receive that
approval, it would not be allowed to open. In this way, the OTC application process allowed the
town to monitor businesses and inform them if they violated the town’s zoning ordinances.

306 es
ordinarily demonstrate futility.” (citation omitted)). Furthermore,
although Ordinance 2011-13 was approved in a formal process by the
town council after Shelley expressed his opposition, that legislative
decision does not demonstrate that it would have been futile for
Shelley to seek individualized relief, because the council’s decision to
change the zoning designation for all areas zoned C-2 to C-1is not the
same as a decision about whether to grant a limited zoning change for
Shelley’s properties to allow a particular requested use. See id. at 438
(‘Even where a litigant would be required to return to the same
administrative body that had already denied it relief, . . . the futility
exception does not apply if the issue presented is not the same as the
issue previously decided adversely to the litigant.”)."*

Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s grant of summary
judgment to Tyrone on Shelley’s as-applied claims, although we do so
for a different reason than that relied on by the superior court. See
Reed v. Reed, 295 Ga. 574, 578 (761 SE2d 326) (2014) (“We ‘may affirm
the judgment of a lower court so long as it is right for any reason.’ ”
(citation omitted)).14

18 Shelley's failure to seek or obtain a decision from a local administrative agency
influences the process by which he can appeal the superior court’s decision to this Court.
Challenges to zoning ordinances as applied to specific property generally require an application
for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), because the appellant is seeking review
of a“decision[ | of the superior court[ | reviewing [a] decision{ ] of ... [a] local administrative
agenc[y],” such as the denial of a zoning variance. See Schumacher v. City of Roswell, 301 Ga
635, 637 (803 SE2d 66) (2017) (explaining that “decision” as used in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) refers
to adjudicative rather than legislative or executive decisions and that *‘[dJeterminations of an
adjudicative nature . . . are immediate in application, specific in application, and commonly
involve an assessment of facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and proper-
ties, ” (quoting State of Ga. v. Intl. Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 401
(788 SE2d 455) (2016))). In this ease, however, because Shelley did not formally seek individu-
alized zoning-related relief from any town agency, there was no adjudicative decision of a local
administrative agency for the superior court to review. Accordingly, Shelley is entitled to a
direct appeal. Compare Hamryka v. City of Dawsonville, 291 Ga. 124, 126 (728 SE2d 197) (2012)
(explaining that an appellant who does obtain an adjudicative zoning decision from a local
administrative agency cannot circumvent the discretionary appeal process by bringing a
collateral challenge to that decision in the superior court). Circumventing the discretionary
application requirement by not seeking a local administrative decision on as-applied zoning
issues will not lead to success on appeal, however, because the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies will usually result in the simple rejection of the appeal on that ground

14 The superior court based its ruling on Shelley's inverse condemnation claim on its
conclusion that he failed to give proper ante litem notice to the town. Our recent decision in West
v. City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743 (797 SE2d 809) (2017), however, construed the ante litem notice
requirement in OCGA § 36-33-5 as limited to negligence cases brought against municipalities
and specifically overruled Brownlow v. City of Calhoun, 198 Ga. App. 710 (402 SE2d 788) (1991),
in which the Court of Appeals held that ante litem notice was required for a claim of inverse
condemnation. See West, 300 Ga. at 748. We note that the town raised Shelley's failure to
exhaust available administrative remedies in its motion for summary judgment as well as in
its brief on appeal.

eS 307

3. Unlike his as-applied challenges, Shelley’s claims that Ordi-
nance 2011-13 and earlier zoning ordinances and amendments are
void because they were enacted in violation of the procedural require-
ments of the ZPL or local ordinances — his facial challenges — did not
need to be raised before the town council or other local administrative
body. See King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427, 428 (531 SE2d 350)
(2000) (“ ‘There is . . . no exhaustion requirement when, as in the
present case, the property owner challenges the constitutionality of
an ordinance on its face.’” (citations omitted)). Nevertheless, Shel-
ley’s facial challenges fail for a different reason: they are moot.

As noted above, on October 15, 2015, Tyrone enacted an entirely
new zoning ordinance, Ordinance 2015-07, which expressly repealed
and replaced Ordinance 2011-13 and its zoning map as well as all
other prior zoning ordinances that conflicted with the new ordinance.
Because Ordinance 2011-13 no longer has any effect, judicial resolu-
tion of Shelley’s challenge to it “ ‘would amount to the determination
of an abstract question’ ” that would give him no relief. Scarbrough
Group v. Worley, 290 Ga. 234, 236 (719 SE2d 430) (2011) (citation
omitted). “[T]he existence of litigation does not, in and of itself,
preclude a municipality or county from rectifying the deficiency
highlighted by the litigation.” Id. at 237. See also Douglas County v.
Hasty, 237 Ga. 646, 646 (229 SE2d 435) (1976) (dismissing appeal as
moot because a new zoning ordinance and map had been adopted an
replaced the ordinance being challenged).

Shelley argues that his challenge to Ordinance 2011-13, as wel
as his less-defined challenges to the town’s older zoning ordinances
and amendments, are not moot because “[a] ruling on which ordi-
nance, if any, was in effect at each time relevant to Shelley’s claims is
essential to determine Shelley’s pending declaratory rights an
damages claims.” This argument hinges on Shelley’s contention that
all of the zoning ordinances Tyrone has enacted since 1977 are
invalid, so if we decided that Ordinance 2011-13 was void, we woul
need to consider the validity of the 2004 amendment, the 1997 zoning
ordinance, and so forth. But Shelley cannot get beyond the most
recent ordinance in that line, which is now Ordinance 2015-07,
because he has not properly challenged that ordinance.

Shelley asserts that he properly tried to challenge Ordinance
2015-07 in the superior court by arguing in a document captione
“amended proposed pretrial order” that the ordinance was not law-
fully passed under the procedural requirements set out in Tyrone’s
ordinances, but the clerk of the superior court removed his filing from
the record because it appeared to be a proposed order and thus
improperly filed. Shelley has since tried again to file the propose’
order into the superior court record, but apparently to no avail. A

308 Pe

proper challenge to the new ordinance, however, would require an
amendment of Shelley's complaint — which he could have done by
right because no pretrial order has been entered yet, seeOCGA § 9-11-15
(a) — not an amendment to the not-yet-filed pretrial order.

In any event, the superior court’s order now on appeal did not
rule on the validity of Ordinance 2015-07, and an appellant may not
“on appeal raise questions or issues neither raised nor ruled upon by
the trial court.” Zant v. Moon, 264 Ga. 93, 94 (440 SE2d 657) (1994).
Whether or not Shelley may be able to challenge Ordinance 2015-07
later in this proceeding or in a different proceeding, as things now
stand, Ordinance 2015-07 is Tyrone’s effective zoning ordinance and
it is presumed to be valid. See City of Atlanta v. Tap Associates, 273
Ga. 681, 683 (544 SE2d 433) (2001).1° As for Shelley’s request for
damages based on the town’s alleged taking of his property, as
explained in Division 2 above, regardless of the ordinance or ordi-
nances on which it is based, that claim fails because Shelley did not
exhaust his administrative remedies.

Consequently, the question of which of Tyrone’s prior zoning
ordinances was properly in effect at various times in the past has no
present relevance in this case, and the superior court should have
dismissed Shelley’s facial challenges to the pre-2015 ordinances as
moot; mootness is an issue of jurisdiction and thus must be deter-
mined before a court addresses the merits of a claim. See Collins v.
Lombard Corp., 270 Ga. 120, 121 (508 SE2d 653) (1998). We therefore
vacate the superior court’s judgment to the extent that it addresses
those challenges and remand for them to be dismissed unless they are
properly amended to raise a challenge to the 2015 ordinance.'*

1© We note that even if the validity of some of the town's older zoning ordinances may
become relevant, the superior court was correct in concluding that any challenges to the 1997
zoning ordinance and 2004 zoning amendment are barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel.
In the lawsuit he filed against ‘Tyrone in 2007, Shelley challenged the constitutionality of the
1997 ordinance and 2004 amendment and asked for a declaratory judgment that the 1989
zoning ordinance was controlling. As explained above, the federal court ruled against Shelley
on some of his claims, and the parties mutually dismissed with prejudice the remaining claims.
“In cases in which there has been a voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice upon
agreement of the parties and accomplished with an order of court, we have held that the
dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits and bars the right to bring another action
on the same claim [against the same parties].” Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 456 (405 SE2d
678) (1991). See also Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 272 Ga. 209, 211
(528 SE2d 508) (2000). That Shelley was later unhappy with the dismissal and sued his
attorneys for malpractice does not change the preclusive effects of the prior adjudication; the
malpractice action could only have given Shelley relief from his attorneys.

16 The superior court did not address this mootness issue when it was raised by the town,
instead ruling that Shelley's facial challenges failed because the town council followed the ZPL
and, to the extent it did not follow Tyrone’s additional local procedural requirements for
enacting an ordinance, the council did not have to because, quoting Little, 272 Ga. at 341,

eS 309

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded
with direction. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

OO —e

Taylor English Duma, Henry M. Quillian III, Diane F- LaRoss,
for appellant.

Laurel E. Henderson, Theodore P. Meeker III, for appellee.

$17A1079. GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL
PROCESS SERVERS et al. v. JACKSON et al.
(806 SE2d 550)

Bocas, Justice.

In this appeal, we consider the application of OCGA § 9-11-4.1,
providing for statewide certified process servers. The Georgia Asso-
ciation of Professional Process Servers and several of its members, who
are private process servers, (collectively, “the Association”) filed this
action seeking mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief
against the sheriffs of Fulton, Cobb, Gwinnett, DeKalb, Clayton,
Forsyth, and Paulding Counties (collectively, “the Sheriffs”). In its
petition, the Association alleged that the Sheriffs have conspired to
thwart the use of certified process servers statewide, and have wrong-
fully failed to consider members’ individual petitions to become certi-
fied process servers under OCGA § 9-11-4.1, thus rendering the Code
section null and of no effect. The Sheriffs responded that the Code
section explicitly gives them the power to make a threshold decision
whether to permit certified process servers to serve process in their
counties. After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Sheriffs and denied the Association’s motion, finding that under a

“the ZPL has preempted the provisions in the City Charter for the purposes of the adoption and
amendment of zoning ordinances.’ ” This pronouncement in Little may have been overbroad,
because OCGA § 36-66-2 (b) (2) — a provision of the ZPL not mentioned in Little — says that
local governments may “[plrovide by ordinance or resolution for procedures and requirements
in addition to or supplemental to those required by this chapter,” although it is not clear from
the opinion what the local procedures at issue in Little were. Because the superior court should
have dismissed Shelley's challenges to the prior ordinances as moot, we do not decide the
validity or limitations of this statement in Little or whether the superior court applied it
correctly.

310 a

plain reading of the Code section, the Association was not entitled to
any of the relief sought. From this order, the Association appeals.’

The trial court should not have ruled on the merits of the
Association’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Sheriffs in their official capacities, because those claims are barred by
sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial
court’s order and remand for dismissal. Because the trial court
correctly granted summary judgment as to the Association’s other
claims, we affirm the remainder of the trial court’s order.

As the trial court correctly observed, the relevant provisions of
OCGA § 9-11-4.1 are found in subsection (a) and paragraph (h) (1):

(a) Certified process servers. A person at least 18
years of age who files with a sheriff of any county of this state
an application stating that the movant complies with this
Code section and any procedures and requirements set forth
in any rules or regulations promulgated by the Judicial
Council of Georgia regarding this Code section shall, absent
good cause shown, be certified as a process server. Such
certification shall be effective for a period of three years or
until such approval is withdrawn by a superior court judge
upon good cause shown, whichever shall first occur. Such
certified process server shall be entitled to serve in such
capacity for any court of the state, anywhere within the
state, provided that the sheriff of the county for which process
is to be served allows such servers to serve process in such
county.

(h) Notice to sheriff.

(1) Prior to the first time that a certified process
server serves process in any county, he or she shall file
with the sheriff of the county a written notice, in such
form as shall be prescribed by the Georgia Sheriffs’
Association, of his or her intent to serve process in that
county. Such notice shall only be accepted by a sheriff
who allows certified process servers to serve process in
his or her county. Such notice shall be effective for a
period of one year; and a new notice shall be filed before
the certified process server again serves process in that
county after expiration of the one-year period.

+ This appeal initially was filed with the Court of Appeals, which transferred it to this
Court as a case involving the extraordinary remedy of mandamus in which the notice of appeal
was filed before January 1, 2017. See OCGA § 15-3-3.1, enacted by Ga, L. 2016, p. 883, § 8-1

eS ail

(Emphasis supplied.) The trial court found that the plain language of
the statute barred declaratory and injunctive relief.? The court also
found that mandamus is inappropriate because the members of the
Association have an alternative course of action: “seeking appoint-
ments from the various courts of the State to become permanent
process servers as providedin OCGA § 9-11-4 (¢) (4).” Alternatively, it
held that mandamus is not appropriate because the plain language of
the statute gives the Sheriffs the discretion to choose whether to
allow certified process servers, and the court cannot force them to do
so.* Finally, the trial court denied appellants’ request for attorney
fees. This appeal followed.

1. Despite the ruling on the merits in the Sheriffs’ favor on the
Association’s claims for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment,
as a threshold matter for our analysis, it is important to note that the
Sheriffs have raised the defense of sovereign immunity. To the extent
applicable, this defense would preclude the trial court’s consideration
of the merits of these claims. This Court has repeatedly ruled on the
scope of sovereign immunity under the Georgia Constitution, finding
that it bars claims for injunctive relief, Georgia Dept. of Natural
Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. 593, 596 (2) (755
SE2d 184) (2014), and claims for declaratory judgment, Olvera v.
Univ. System of Ga. Bd. of Regents, 298 Ga. 425, 427 (782 SE2d 436)
(2016), even if based upon constitutional claims. Lathrop v. Deal, 301
Ga. 408, 425 (IID (801 SE2d 867) (2017).

The Sheriffs raised the defense of sovereign immunity in their
answers, but not in their joint motion for summary judgment.*
However,

[t]he applicability of sovereign immunity to claims brought
against the State is a jurisdictional issue. Indeed, sovereign
immunity [—] like various other rules of jurisdiction and
justiciability [—] is concerned with the extent to which a
case properly may come before a court at all. Therefore, the

2 The trial court also held in the alternative that the Association failed to serve the
Attorney General with a copy of a petition challenging the constitutionality of the statute as
required by OCGA § 9-4-7 (©). The Association asserts that the trial court erred in so doing, but
we need not reach that claim.

® The trial court also found moot the contention that several of the Sheriff's had refused to
process applications under OCGA § 9-11-4.1 (b), because those sheriff's submitted affidavits
showing that they “understand their duties and obligations and that any need to mandate
action has passed.” But that ruling is not enumerated as error.

* This may explain why the trial court failed to address this defense in granting summary
judgment to the Sheriffs in the first instance

312

applicability of sovereign immunity is a threshold determi-
nation, and, if it does apply, a court lacks jurisdiction over
the case and, concomitantly, lacks authority to decide the
merits of a claim that is barred.

(Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) McConnell v. Ga. Dept.
of Labor, 302 Ga. 18, 18-19 (805 SE2d 79) (2017). A “court’s lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at
any time either in the trial court, in a collateral attack on a judgment,
or in an appeal. [Cit.]” Abushmais v. Erby, 282 Ga. 619, 622 (3) (652
SE2d 549) (2007).

Because the Association’s claims for declaratory judgment an
injunctive relief are barred by sovereign immunity under Lathrop,
Olvera, and Sustainable Coast, supra, the trial court should have
dismissed those claims. We therefore vacate that portion of the tria.
court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.®

2. As we have noted before, however, “sovereign immunity is no
bar to petitions for writs of mandamus. [Cit.]” Lathrop, supra, 301 Ga.
at 434 (III) (C). We therefore consider whether the trial court erre’
in granting summary judgment on the merits with respect to the
Association’s mandamus claims.

“Mandamus is a remedy for improper government inaction — the
failure of a public official to perform a clear legal duty. The writ of
mandamus is properly issued only if (1) no other adequate lega.
remedy is available to effectuate the relief sought; and (2) the
applicant has a clear legal right to such relief.” (Citations an
punctuation omitted.) Bibb County v. Monroe County, 294 Ga. 730,
734 (2) (755 SE2d 760) (2014). Pretermitting the existence of the first
requirement, the trial court correctly found that the Association has
failed to show a “clear legal right” to mandamus relief. With respect
to this second requirement,

[a] clear legal right to the relief sought may be found only
where the claimant seeks to compel the performance of a
public duty that an official or agency is required by law to
perform. [F]or mandamus to issue, the law must not only

® The Sheriff's were not sued individually, but “in their official capacities as Sheriff of their
respective counties.” Our previous decisions have made clear the distinction between an action
for injunctive or declaratory relief against public officials in their official capacities, which is
barred by sovereign immunity, and cases “in which state officers in their individual capacities
were alleged to have acted without legal authority, even if they acted under color of their offices.
[Cit]” Lathrop, supra, 301 Ga. at 414-415 (11) (A).

eS 318

authorize the act to be done, but must require its perfor-
mance. Where performance is required by law, a clear legal
right to relief will exist either where the official or agency
fails entirely to act or where, in taking such required action,
the official or agency commits a gross abuse of discretion.
The determination of whether official action is required
depends on the law governing the subject matter in ques-
tion. Thus, where the applicable law vests the official or
agency with discretion with regard to whether action is
required in a particular circumstance, mandamus will not
lie, because there is no clear legal right to the performance
of such an act.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 735 (2) (b). Moreover,
when the law requires an official to exercise discretion, mandamus
will lie to compel that discretion be exercised, but not to dictate the
result:

Where the act required by law to be done involves the
exercise of some degree of official discretion and judgment
upon the part of the officer charged with its performance, the
writ of mandamus may properly command him to act, or, as
is otherwise expressed, may set him in motion; it will not
further control or interfere with his action, nor will it direct
him to act in any specific manner.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 736 (2) (b). In Bibb
County, we held that, while mandamus would lie to compel the
Secretary of State to comply with his statutory obligation to deter-
mine the true boundary line between two counties, it would not lie to
dictate a particular location for that line. Id. at 738 (2) (b).

Here, the Association asserts that the Sheriffs have “a clear legal
duty” to permit the Association’s members to serve process once they
have met the statewide qualifications under OCGA § 9-11-4.1 (b). It
contends that the trial court erred in holding that the Code section
gives the Sheriffs “absolute discretion to permit or deny” certified
process servers in their counties, as that “renders the Statute mean-
ingless,” and that mandamus will lie “to require the Sheriffs to adhere
to their clear statutory duty to review the Notices of Intent and allow
qualified Certified Servers to serve process in their counties where
the requirements for such service are met.” We disagree.

When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must pre-
sume that the General Assembly meant what it said an

311 rs

said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory
text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the
statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we
must read the statutory text in its most natural and reason-
able way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language
would.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170,
172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). Here, a plain reading of the
statute shows that each Sheriff is authorized to decide, as a threshold
matter, whether to “allow[ ] certified process servers to serve process
in his or her county.” OCGA § 9-11-4.1 (h) (1); see also OCGA § 9-11-4.1
(a). As the trial court correctly noted, that is a separate issue from the
Sheriff’s duty to process applications for certification under OCGA §
9-11-4.1 (b). The Code section therefore is not “meaningless,” as
process servers may be certified under OCGA § 9-11-4.1 (b), and may
serve process in those counties which approve their employment.®

Under these circumstances, the Association has failed to show
that the Sheriffs violated any “clear legal duty” by exercising their
statutorily-granted discretion to determine, as a threshold matter,
whether certified process servers may act in their respective counties.
The trial court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment
to the Sheriffs on the Association’s petition for mandamus.”

3. Because the Association did not prevail on its claims, the trial
court correctly concluded that it was not entitled to attorney fees
under OCGA § 13-6-11. O'Connor v. Fulton County, 302 Ga. 70, 74 (3)
(805 SE2d 56) (2017).

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded
with direction. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

arks, Chesin falbert, Allan L. Parks, Jr., Michael T: Foust,

for appellants.
Steven E. Rosenberg, Ashley J. Palmer; Carothers & Mitchell,
Richard A. Carothers, Rebecca J. Schmidt; Deborah L. Dance, Lauren

® The trial court found that two Georgia sheriff's allowed certified process servers at the
time it entered its order, and two others either have permitted it in the past or expressed an
intention to do so.

7 We do not reach the question of whether, under some factual showing, a particular
sheriff's decision not to “allow[ ] certified process servers to act in his or her county” could be
challenged as wilful, malicious, or a gross abuse of discretion. No such focused challenge has
been raised here.

S. Bruce; O’'Quinn & Cronin, Donald A. Cronin, Jr; Jarrard & Davis,
Kenneth E. Jarrard, Kenneth P. Robin; Freeman, Mathis & Gary,
Jack R. Hancock, A. Ali Sabzevari; Nikisha L. McDonald, for appel-
lees.

$17A1083. WHITE v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 489)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Appellant Wardell Deloun White entered guilty pleas to felony
murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of
Victor Martinez and Mauricio Maldonado, and the trial court entere
judgments of conviction and sentence on the guilty pleas that did not
merge. During the same term of court, Appellant filed two pro se
motions to withdraw guilty pleas. The State moved to dismiss the pro
se motions on the ground that Appellant was represented by counse.
when he filed them, and the trial court granted the State’s motion.
Appellant, assisted by counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal. We
affirm.

1. On the night of April 28-29, 2012, Appellant participated in a
home invasion in Eastanollee, Georgia, that resulted in the deaths of
Martinez and Maldonado. On April 30, Appellant was arrested, an
on May 3, attorney Drew W. Powell of the Mountain Judicial Circuit
Public Defender’s Office filed an entry of appearance in the trial court
on Appellant’s behalf. On July 17, a Stephens County grand jury
indicted Appellant, along with two other defendants, on two counts of
malice murder, two counts of felony murder, burglary, attempte
armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, violation of the
Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, and three counts
of possession ofa firearm during the commission ofa felony. Appellant
was also charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
two related counts of felony murder, and making a false statement
during an official investigation. On October 16, the State filed a notice
of intent to seek the death penalty against Appellant.

On January 16, 2013, attorney Jerilyn Bell of the Office of the
Georgia Capital Defender filed an entry of appearance on Appellant’s
behalf, and on February 15, Emily Gilbert of the same office filed an
entry of appearance. On October 15, 2014, Joseph W. Vigneri, another
attorney with the Capital Defender’s office, filed a notice of substi-
tution for Bell as lead counsel.

316 es

On September 18, 2015, during the July 2015 term of the

Stephens County Superior Court,’ Appellant entered negotiated
guilty pleas to one count of felony murder against Martinez, burglary,
attempted armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, violation
of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, one count
of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon, and making a false statement;
the other charges were nolle prossed. On the same day, the trial court
entered a final judgment noting the charges that were nolle prossed,
merging Appellant’s guilty plea to burglary into his guilty plea to
felony murder predicated on burglary, and sentencing Appellant to
serve life in prison with the possibility of parole plus a total of 15
consecutive years.
The following month, on October 15, 2015, the trialcourt received
a handwritten letter from Appellant in which he requested to with-
draw his guilty pleas.” The court treated the letter as a pro se motion
to withdraw guilty pleas. On October 21, the court served the letter
on the District Attorney and defense counsel and issued a rule nisi,
copied to the “Georgia Public Defender Standards Council,” setting a
hearing on December 1 to consider whether conflict counsel should be
appointed for Appellant in light of the allegations in his handwritten
letter against his present counsel. On November 5, Appellant, acting
pro se, filed a motion to withdraw guilty pleas, claiming that the
indictment was void, his pleas were invalid, the trial court erred in
accepting the guilty pleas, and he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. On November 12, Vigneri and Gilbert filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel for Appellant.

On December 1, 2015, the case appeared on the trial court’s 1:30
p.m. hearing calendar, but Appellant was unavailable, so the hearing

1 ‘The terms for the Stephens County Superior Court begin each year on January 1 and July
1. See OCGA § 15-6-3 (25) (C).
2 Appellant's letter said:
Honorable Caudell, 10-11-2015
My name is Wardell Deloun White. My case and Indictment No. is 2012-SU-
CR-110CC. The purpose of this is to inform you that i would like to withdraw my
plea for the following reasons: 1) 'm not guilty. 2) Before and during the signing of
my plea agreement, iwas prescribe anti-psychotic mental health medicine, Zyprexa.
Which causes confusion, distraughtness as well as irrational thinking. I was
pressured to believe that if i didn’t take the plea agreement that i was going to
receive the “Death Penalty”. I have also written the DA and Clerk of Court.
Sincerely,

PS. I was pressured by my defense team to take the plea while on mental
health medicine. The medicine clouded my judgment and lead me to believe that i
was guilty. Which I'm not

eS 317

was continued. At 1:45 p.m., the chief legal officer for the Georgia
Public Defender Council (‘“GPDC”) filed an Objection to Jurisdiction
and Statement of Interest that objected to the trial court's effort to
control who represented Appellant and reported that

the [GPDC] director has appointed Defendant White’s case
to William A. (Bill) Morrison. The Council has contracted
with Mr. Morrison before on capital matters, and Mr. Mor-
rison has had the necessary training to advise Defendant
White on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

On December 11, the trial court granted Vigneri and Gilbert’s motion
to withdraw as counsel for Appellant and entered a separate order
rescheduling the December 1 hearing to February 9, 2016, “for the
purpose of hearing the merits of [Appellant’s] Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea.” The hearing was later continued to February 12, 2016.

At the outset of the February 12 hearing, the State orally moved
to dismiss Appellant’s pro se motions to withdraw guilty pleas on the
ground that he was represented by counsel when he filed them.
Morrison, who appeared as counsel for Appellant at the hearing,
complained of the lack of notice that the State was going to move to
dismiss. The court gave Morrison 10 days to respond to the State’s
motion and suspended the hearing for 60 days to allow Morrison time
to investigate the medications that Appellant was on and his state of
mind when he entered his guilty pleas. On February 23, Morrison
filed an amended motion to withdraw guilty pleas, asking that
Appellant’s letter to the court and pro se motion to withdraw guilty
pleas be amended by adding Morrison as Appellant’s attorney of
record and that the amendments “relate back” to the time of the
original filings. On March 7, 2016, the trial court entered an order
dismissing Appellant’s pro se motions.

Morrison filed a timely notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf.
After the trial court transmitted the record to this Court, the appeal
was docketed to the April 2017 term and submitted for decision on the
briefs.

2. Appellant contends that a defendant in a capital case
should be “deemed unrepresented” after the entry of sentence.
Appellant cites no authority, however, for the novel proposition that
a lawyer’s representation of a criminal defendant, whether facing
the death penalty or otherwise, terminates the moment that a
judgment of conviction and sentence is entered. Instead, he plucks a
phrase from the last sentence of a Uniform Superior Court Rule on
arraignment and argues that it means that a criminal defendant’s
attorney at arraignment represents the defendant from that point

318 es

“throughout the trial,” but if the defendant chooses after the trial to
file a pro se motion, the defendant is no longer represented by
counsel.* This far-fetched argument, even if correct, would not apply
to Appellant, because here there was no trial; Appellant entered
guilty pleas before his trial ever started. Moreover, OCGA § 17-12-12
(d) says: “The Georgia capital defender division or appointed coun-
sel’s defense of a defendant in a case in which the death penalty is
sought shall include all proceedings in the trial court and any appeals
to the Supreme Court of Georgia. . . .” We need not decide how this
statute applies to a case like Appellant’s in which the death penalty
was sought but ultimately not pursued due to guilty pleas, but that
statute certainly at least offsets Appellant’s rule-based argument.

More fundamentally, and contrary to Appellant’s assertion, a
holding that criminal defendants’ representation by counsel termi-
nates automatically on the entry of a judgment and sentence —
whether following the return of a jury verdict or the entry of a guilty
plea — would make little sense. It would deprive defendants of the
“guiding hand of counsel,” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (53 SCt
55, 77 LE 158) (1932), at a point in the proceeding when important
decisions need to be made and actions potentially taken, often with
short deadlines, regarding the filing of a post-trial motion (e.g., a
motion for new trial), a post-plea motion (e.g., a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea), or a notice of appeal. Such a holding also would
contradict this Court’s precedents on out-of-time appeals, which
recognize that defense counsel's duties toward their clients extend for
at least the 30 days after the entry of judgment when a notice of
appeal may be filed. See, e.g., Grace v. State, 295 Ga. 657, 658 (763
SE2d 461) (2014); Stephens v. State, 291 Ga. 837, 837-838 (733 SE2d
266) (2012).

Atrial court in a criminal case has “plenary power over its orders
and judgments during the term at which they are entered and may

2 USCR 30.2, which is entitled “Call for Arraignment,” says in its entirety:

Before arraignment the court shall inquire whether the accused is represented by
counsel and, if not, inquire into the defendant's desires and financial circum-
stances. If the defendant desires an attorney and is indigent, the court shall
authorize the immediate appointment of counsel. Upon the call of a case for
arraignment, unless continued for good cause, the accused, or the attorney for the
accused, shall answer whether the accused pleads “guilty,” “not guilty” or desires
to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the offense or offenses charged; a plea of not
guilty shall constitute the joining of the issue. Upon arraignment, the attorney, if
any, who announces for or on behalf of an accused, or who is entered as counsel of
record, shall represent the accused in that case throughout the trial, unless other
counsel and the defendant notify the judge prior to trial that such other counsel
represents the accused and is ready to proceed, or counsel is otherwise relieved by
the judge.

eS 319

amend, correct, or revoke them, for the purpose of promoting justice,”
as long as no notice of appeal has been filed. Hipp v. State, 293 Ga.
415, 416 (746 SE2d 95) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).
This authority “‘extends to all orders and judgments save those
which are founded upon verdicts.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, we
conclude that, at a minimum, legal representation continues —
unless interrupted by entry of an order allowing counsel to withdraw
or compliance with the requirements for substitution of counsel, see
USCR 4.3 (1)-(3) — through the end of the term at which a trial court
enters a judgment of conviction and sentence on a guilty plea, during
which time the court retains authority to change its prior orders and
judgments on motion or sua sponte for the purpose of promoting
justice. See Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357, 362 (767 SE2d 24) (2014) (“A
formal withdrawal of counsel cannot be accomplished until after the
trial court issues an order permitting the withdrawal. Until such an
order properly is made and entered, no formal withdrawal can occur
and counsel remains counsel of record.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).

There may be some period of time after which it no longer would
be reasonable to treat a convicted defendant who has not filed a timely
appeal or motion extending the time to appeal, or a timely motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, as still represented by his trial or plea
counsel. See, e.g., OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) (listing three post-judgment
motions that reset the time for appeal). See also Christopher J.
McFadden et al., Georgia Appellate Practice § 11:1 (Nov. 2016 update)
(discussing resetting and non-resetting post-judgment motions).
However, we need not decide today exactly what that periodis, because
Appellant filed his pro se motions seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas
well before the end of the term in which the judgments of conviction
and sentence on his guilty pleas were entered. The trial court therefore
correctly treated his October 15 and November 5, 2015 pro se filings as
legal nullities, because he was represented by counsel when he made
them. See Tolbert, 296 Ga. at 363 (“A criminal defendant in Georgia
does not have the right to represent himself and also be represented
by an attorney, and pro se filings by represented parties are therefore
‘unauthorized and without effect.’ ” (quoting Cotton v. State, 279 Ga.
358, 361 (613 SE2d 628) (2005))); Williams v. Moody, 287 Ga. 665, 669
(697 SE2d 199) (2010) (“Apro se motion filed by a convicted defendant
while represented by counsel is ‘unauthorized and without effect.’ ”
(quoting Cotton)).

Appellant attempts to distinguish Tolbert, Williams, and Cotton
on their facts, asserting that in those cases, the pro se filings treated
as nullities were filed during the course of litigation, and the criminal
defendants were represented by counsel both before and after the pro

320 es

se filings. But Appellant also was represented by counsel both before
and after his pro se filings, and like his motions, the pro se filings
treated as nullities in Cotton and Williams were made after the entry
of judgments of conviction and sentence in those cases. Thus, the
factual distinctions Appellant attempts to draw are illusory.

The only filing that could be treated as a valid motion to with-
draw Appellant’s guilty pleas was the amended motion that his new
counsel, Morrison, filed on February 23, 2016. By that time, however,
the term of court during which Appellant entered his guilty pleas had
ended, so the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to grant a motion
to withdraw guilty pleas. See Rubiani v. State, 279 Ga. 299, 299 (612
SE2d 798) (2005) (“ ‘It is well settled that when the term of court has
expired in which a defendant was sentenced pursuant toa guilty plea,
the trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the plea.’ ”
(citation omitted)). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the
State’s motion to dismiss.

3. Appellant contends next that the February 23 amended motion
to withdraw guilty pleas transformed his previous October 15 and
November 5 pro se filings into filings made by his later-appointed
counsel. But an amended motion is not a time machine that allows a
litigant to change past events. Appellant invokes the “relation back”
doctrine for amendments of pleadings in civil actions, see OCGA §
9-11-15 (c), but he cites no authority for applying that doctrine in this
criminal context. Moreover, even in the civil context, a pleading
purporting to amend a prior filing that was a nullity — as Appellant’s
pro se motions to withdraw guilty pleas were — does not relate back
in time to the date of the non-filing, as the trial court here recognized.
See GC Quality Lubricants, Inc. v. Doherty, Duggan & Rouse Insur-
ors, 304 Ga. App. 767, 770-771 (697 SE2d 871) (2010).

4. Finally, Appellant contends that Vigneri and Gilbert provided
ineffective assistance by filing their motion to withdraw as his
counsel without first filing a motion to withdraw guilty pleas or a
motion to stay the proceedings until substitute counsel was appointed.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective
assistance of counsel in connection with his entry of a guilty plea. See
Lee v. United States, 582 U.S.__,___ (187 SCt 1958, 1964, 198 LE2d
476) (2017). To demonstrate that Vigneri and Gilbert were constitu-
tionally ineffective, Appellant was required to show that their “rep-
resentation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ and
that he was prejudiced as a result.” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).
Whatever the merits of this ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
Appellant did not raise it in the trial court and the trial court did not

eS 321

rule on it, and we therefore will not consider it for the first time on
appeal. See Herbert v. State, 288 Ga. 843, 849 (708 SE2d 260) (2011).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

William A. Morrison, for appellant.

George R. Christian, District Attorney, Richard K. Bridgeman,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1108. WIMBERLY v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 599)

Boaas, Justice.

Following a bench trial, appellant William Leroy Wimberly was
found guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony, in the death of Christo-
pher Strickland.! He now appeals, asserting that the evidence was
insufficient, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and
that he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude these asser-
tions are without merit and affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
showed that Josh Strickland lived with and dated Wimberly’s daugh-
ter Brittney. A few days before July 29, 2014, Wimberly, while
somewhat intoxicated, said in the presence of others that he would
kill Josh if he “whipped” his minor granddaughter again. On July 29,
Wimberly went to Josh and Brittney’s home appearing intoxicated
from alcohol and drugs. He sat and spoke with Josh, Brittney, and the
victim, Josh’s brother Christopher Strickland. At one point the four
began arguing, and Brittney ordered Wimberly out of her home before
she left for work.

1 The erimes occurred on July 29, 2014. On November 10, 2014, a Decatur County grand
jury indicted Wimberly on charges of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. Following an August 14, 2015 bench trial, the trial
court found him guilty on all counts, and sentenced him to life plus five years in prison. The
court merged the aggravated assault count. Wimberly's motion for new trial was filed on
October 6, 2015, refiled by new counsel on October 13, amended on April 12, 2016, and denied
on August 19, 2016. His notice of appeal was filed on September 19, 2016. This case was
docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

322 eS

Afew minutes after Brittney left, the victim went to Wimberly’s

residence, and after a while, the two returned to Josh and Brittney’s
home where Wimberly apologized to Josh for his earlier behavior. Not
long after Wimberly, Josh, and the victim sat down to talk, Wimberly
and Josh began arguing again. Wimberly pulled out a pocket knife,
but Josh and the victim were able to disarm him and eject him from
the home.
About 15 minutes later, Wimberly returned to Josh and Britt-
ney’s home in his stepbrother’s truck.” The victim went outside to talk
with Wimberly while Josh stayed inside. About two minutes later, the
victim asked Josh to come outside, saying Wimberly wanted to talk.
After Josh came out and stood in the doorway, he apologized to
Wimberly for the fighting. The victim stood in between Josh an
Wimberly throughout the conversation. Josh noticed that Wimberly
had his hands behind his back. Wimberly stared at Josh the entire
time and, after the conversation escalated, said, “well, I reckon I’m
going to have to take both of you out.” The victim rushed off the porch
and tackled Wimberly. Josh rushed to help, but when he approache’
Wimberly and the victim, they had already separated. When Josh
noticed Wimberly was holding a handgun, he began to wrestle with
him and noticed blood on the ground. Josh was able to gain control of
the gun, and after warning Wimberly “to stop several times,” shot
Wimberly. Josh got up, looked at the victim who was on the groun
and mumbling, and asked him “if he was shot and he told me, yes. He
said, [Wimberly] shot me.”
Wimberly’s father, who lived nearby with Wimberly, heard the
commotion and came running. Josh made him get on his knees an
held Wimberly and his father at gunpoint. Seconds later, a passerby
pulled his vehicle up to the house. Josh ordered the driver out an
instructed the passenger to call 911. The victim died at the scene of a
gunshot wound to the center of his chest that pierced his heart an:
liver. The medical examiner testified that the entrance wound indi-
cated that the range of fire was “intermediate,” meaning in genera.
that the gun was fired at arm’s length from the victim.

1. Wimberly argues that the evidence is insufficient that he
committed aggravated assault because there was no evidence that he
is the one who shot the victim. He points to Josh’s statement to police
that Josh did not see him shoot the victim, and that Josh, the victim,

2 The stepbrother testified that Wimberly had been driving his truck on the night of the
incident and identified the gun used to shoot the victim as the weapon he kept in the glove
compartment of the truck.

See a28
and Wimberly were all struggling over the gun when he saw blood.

On appeal from a bench trial resulting in a criminal convic-
tion, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the
presumption of innocence. We do not re-weigh testimony,
determine witness credibility, or address assertions of con-
flicting evidence; our role is to determine whether the evi-
dence presented is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dougherty v. State, 341 Ga. App.
120, 123 (799 SE2d 257) (2017).

Josh testified that when he jumped off the front porch, the victim
and Wimberly “had already started to separate. And I went to jump
on [Wimberly] and that’s when I saw the gun in his hand.” Josh
testified that he did not hear a shot, but as he began to tussle with
Wimberly, the victim was already lying on the ground, not moving,
‘Gust kind of rolling a little bit,” and that is when he noticed blood on
the ground. Josh stated further that his finger was not on the trigger
because Wimberly’s hand was on the gun and that he had to twist the
gun out of Wimberly’s hand. The evidence also showed that the gun
was fired at the victim’s chest at arm’s length. The evidence therefore
was sufficient for the trier of fact to find that it was Wimberly who
fired the shot that killed the victim. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (IID) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Wimberly asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC[t]
2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), an appellant must show both that
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dunn v. State, 291 Ga. 551, 553
(4) (732 SE2d 524) (2012).

(a) Wimberly argues that counsel should have called four wit-
nesses who testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial.
“Decisions about which witnesses to call at trial are matters of trial
strategy and tactics, and such strategic and tactical decisions do not
amount to deficient performance unless they are so unreasonable
that no competent attorney would have made them under similar
circumstances.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McDuffie v.
State, 298 Ga. 112, 116 (2) (779 SE2d 620) (2015).

324 eS

The first witness, who was working at a convenience store across
the road on the night of the shooting, testified that she heard a
commotion and then a gunshot, looked out the door andsaw a manon
his knees with another man holding a gun on him. She explained that
five or ten minutes later, she heard two more gunshots. She did not
recall seeing anyone lying on the ground. A second witness, who
worked at the same convenience store, testified that she heard a
gunshot, and when she looked across the street, she saw “one man
standing with a gun and two on their knees,” and moments later
heard a second shot while she was on the phone with 911. This
witness also testified that she did not see anyone lying on the ground.
Trial counsel testified that he did not call these witnesses because he
did not believe that their testimony “would add [to] or help” the
defense. We cannot say that counsel’s decision not to call them was
unreasonable in light of the fact that neither witness saw anyone get
shot, and the witnesses provided different testimony about the
number of shots they heard and when they heard them. The deter-
mination of which defense witnesses to call is a matter of trial
strategy and tactics, and does not “amount to deficient performance
unless they are so unreasonable that no competent attorney would
have made them under similar circumstances.” (Citation omitted.)
Washington v. State, 294 Ga. 560, 566 (3) (755 SE2d 160) (2014).

Wimberly argues that counsel should have called a third witness
who testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that when he
pulled up to the home during the incident, Josh ordered the witness
out and held him at gunpoint on his knees until police arrived. The
witness explained that he observed both Wimberly and the victim
lying on the ground to his left while the witness was on his knees in
front of the truck Wimberly drove. Wimberly asserts that this evi-
dence contradicts an investigator’s testimony “that nothing hap-
pened in or near the truck.” While the investigator did explain that he
did not believe that the victim was shot in the truck because no blood
was found there, he did not testify that nothing happened near the
truck. In fact, he testified that the truck was parked close to the porch
— about 15 feet away from where the victim was lying.* Trial counsel
was not asked why he chose not to call this witness, and “in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed
to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Clements
v. State, 301 Ga. 267, 271 (3) (a) (800 SE2d 552) (2017). This witness’s

8 Wimberly told police that he was in the truck when Josh and the victim “beat[ ] him up
bad”

eS 325

testimony was consistent with Josh’s testimony about what occurred
after the witness pulled up to the home, and the witness did not see
anyone get shot. In this circumstance, Wimberly has not shown that
counsel’s failure to call this witness was so patently unreasonable
that no competent attorney would have done the same. Moreover,
even if we concluded that counsel should have called this witness at
trial, Wimberly has not shown that there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counse
done so. See Daughtry v. State, 296 Ga. 849, 858 (2) (d) (770 SE2d 862)
(2015).

Finally, Wimberly argues that trial counsel should have calle
his father, who testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that
Wimberly did not appear upset on the night of the shooting, and that
there was no indication that he had been in a physical altercation
with Josh and the victim earlier in the evening. The father testifie:
further that the victim and Josh came to the home he shared with
Wimberly and said that they wanted to talk to Wimberly, who
willingly went next door to Josh’s home. He explained that moments
later, he heard “screaming and hollering,” and when he walked over
to Josh’s home, Josh ordered him to get on his knees. Trial counse.
testified that he did not call Wimberly’s father because he did not
believe his testimony would have aided the defense: “Things just at
the time felt like any additional testimony he could provide ha
already been presented to the Court. Just thought it would just really
have been a waste of time, in my opinion. | didn’t think he ha’
anything new to add.” But Wimberly argues that his father’s testi-
mony would have contradicted Josh’s testimony about his demeanor.
However, we cannot say that counsel’s decision was unreasonable in
light of similar testimony presented by Wimberly’s stepbrother that
Wimberly seemed “norma!” in the evening prior to the shooting. See
Jackson v. Virginia, supra.

(b) Wimberly asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to object to the introduction of prior difficulties between him and Josh
because the evidence was irrelevant and the State failed to comply
with the notice requirement of OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). He complains of
the testimony of two witnesses who stated that Wimberly threatened
to kill Josh if Josh disciplined Wimberly’s granddaughter. But evi-
dence of Wimberly’s statement was admissible as intrinsic evidence,
bearing directly on the charged conduct, and not subject to the 404 (b)
notice requirements. See Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence
§ 11:3, at pp. 243-253 (2017-2018 ed.) (intrinsic, or inextricably
intertwined, evidence consists of those facts that bear directly on the
charged conduct and is not subject to the notice provisions of OCGA §
24-4-404 (b); “[w]hen the facts and circumstances of the case show

326 eS

that the subject crime was directly related to or motivated by other,
uncharged wrongs, the other wrongs are admissible”); Brooks v.
State, 298 Ga. 722, 726 (2), n.11 (783 SE2d 895) (2016) (“Evidence is
intrinsic if it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same
transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2)
necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably
intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. [Cit.]”).
And, because Wimberly’s statement was “integral to the narrative
surrounding the crimes, its probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.” (Citation, punctuation
and footnote omitted.) Brewner v. State, 302 Ga. 6, 14 (IID (804 SE2d
94) (2017).

3. Wimberly argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
OCGA § 5-5-23 provides:

A new trial may be granted in any case where any
material evidence, not merely cumulative or impeaching in its
character but relating to new and material facts, is discovered
by the applicant after the rendition of a verdict against him
and is brought to the notice of the court within the time
allowed by law for entertaining a motion for a new trial.

This Court in Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 491 (271 SE2d 792)
(1980), set forth the requirements that a defendant must show to
obtain a new trial on newly discovered evidence:

(1) that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the
trial; (2) that it was not owing to the want of due diligence
that he did not acquire it sooner; (3) that itis so material that
it would probably produce a different verdict; (4) thatitis not
cumulative only; (5) that the affidavit of the witness himself
should be procured or its absence accounted for; and (6) that
a new trial will not be granted if the only effect of the
evidence will be to impeach the credit of a witness.

See Glover v. State, 296 Ga. 13, 15 (2) (764 SE2d 826) (2014).

At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Wimberly produced
the testimony of a witness, his father’s brother-in-law, who had done
some work on a cylinder for Josh’s uncle. This witness testified that
when Josh arrived to pick up the cylinder, Josh became upset about
the amount of the bill and told the witness, “I ain’t paying you that
damn much, old man, for that damn — for that cylinder . . . old man,
I shot and killed my damn brother, thinking it was old Leroy, and I

eS 327

shot old Leroy. But... I don’t mind shooting a damn ‘nother one.”
Wimberly argues that this evidence of Josh admitting that he shot the
victim is clearly material and would have likely produced a different
verdict. The witness testified that Josh made this statement to him
on or about June 23, 2015, prior to Wimberly’s August 2015 trial, but
before sentencing, and that he informed trial counsel of the statement
after Wimberly was sentenced.

Assuming without deciding that Wimberly has satisfied the first
five requirements of Timberlake, this witness’s post-trial testimony
would only have had the effect of impeaching Josh’s testimony. See
Chance v. State, 291 Ga. 241, 245-246 (6) (728 SE2d 635) (2012)
(testimony presented at new trial hearing — that co-indictee con-
fessed to witness that he, not the defendant, shot victim — was
impeaching testimony and did not establish as fact that co-indictee’s
trial testimony was knowingly and wilfully false). Because Wimberly
failed to satisfy the sixth requirement of Timberlake, the trial court
did not err in denying his motion for new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Grant, J., who
concurs in judgment only as to Division 3.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

leghan A. Lane, for appellant.

Joseph K. Mulholland, District Attorney, Moruf O. Oseni, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patri-
cia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1127. CANNON v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 584)
BENHAM, Justice.
Appellant Juan Antonio Cannon stabbed the victim Terrence
Wiggins in the neck because appellant believed Wiggins owed him
money.' The record shows the stabbing took place in a DeKalb County

1 The crimes occurred on July 15, 2012. On October 18, 2012, a DeKalb County grand jury
indicted appellant on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. From
June 16-19, 2014, appellant was tried before a jury which returned verdicts of guilty on the
charges of felony murder and aggravated assault. The jury acquitted appellant of malice

328 P|

restaurant. Anthony Daniels, who was closing up the restaurant,
witnessed the stabbing. Shaquanna Fields, who was sitting inside
the restaurant, was also alleged to have witnessed the events of that
night. Immediately after being stabbed, the victim ran away from
appellant and ran toward a police officer who was conducting a traffic
stop across the street from the restaurant. According to the officer,
Wiggins was bleeding, grasping at his shirt, and uttering the words
“He stabbed me,” and “I’m dying,” before finally collapsing near the
officer. The officer asked Wiggins who stabbed him, but Wiggins was
running out of breath and was unable to answer. Wiggins eventually
died from the injury he sustained to his neck. At trial, Daniels said he
saw appellant hit the victim immediately before the victim ran out of
the restaurant toward the police officer. Daniels also testified he saw
appellant stab the victim.” Fields, who was the other alleged eye-
witness to the incident, could not be located and did not testify at trial.
Appellant represented himself for the first day and a half of trial.
On the second day of trial, during his cross-examination of Daniels,
who was the fourth witness for the State, appellant decided he
wanted to be represented by the public defender who had been
standing by to represent him if requested. Trial counsel took over the
cross-examination of Daniels and continued to represent appellant
for the remainder of the trial.
1. The evidence summarized above was sufficient to authorize a
rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes for which the jury returned verdicts of guilty.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Appellant alleges counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
his alleged failure to object to the testimony of the district attorney’s
investigator and for his failure to request a jury instruction concern-
ing appellant’s wearing prison attire during his trial. In order to
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant

must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced him to the point that a
reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors,

murder. On June 20, 2014, the trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison for felony murder.
The count of aggravated assault merged for sentencing purposes. Appellant moved for a new
trial on July 16, 2014, and amended the motion for new trial on June 29, 2015. The trial court
held a hearing on the motion, as amended, on May 20, 2016, and denied the motion on November
4, 2016. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on December 2, 2016. Upon receipt of the record, the
case was docketed to the April 2017 term of this Court and submitted for a decision to be made
on the briefs.

2 During appellant's presentation of evidence, the investigator who interviewed Daniels
testified that Daniels told him that he had not seen the stabbing.

eS 329

the outcome of the trial would have been different. A strong
presumption exists that counsel’s conduct falls within the
broad range of professional conduct.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30 (4)
(644 SE2d 837) (2007). If a defendant fails to meet his burden on one
prong of the two-prong test, then the other prong need not be
reviewed by the Court. Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869 (2) (734 SE2d 876)
(2012). In this case, appellant has failed to meet his burden.

(a) The State proffered its investigator to testify about her
unsuccessful efforts to locate Fields, who allegedly witnessed the
crime along with Daniels. During her testimony, the investigator
stated that Fields had no criminal record other than an arrest for the
violation of a city ordinance. Defense counsel made an objection
which the trial court sustained.* In addition, the trial court instructed.
the jury to disregard the testimony in question. On appeal, appellant
complains about this very same testimony on a theory of deficient
performance. Since the record clearly shows defense counsel success-
fully objected to the testimony in question, counsel was not deficient.
Appellant urges that the trial court’s curative instruction was not
sufficient to clear the testimony from the jurors’ minds. Yet, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed the
trial court’s instructions to disregard the testimony at issue. See
Coleman v. State, 301 Ga. 721 (3) (804 SE2d 24) (2017). This allega-
tion of error cannot be sustained.

(b) On the first day of trial, prior to jury selection and while
appellant was representing himself pro se, the trial court inquired
whether it was appellant’s choice to wear his orange prison attire,
and appellant responded in the affirmative. At the beginning of the
second day of trial, when appellant was still representing himself, the
trial court again inquired as to whether he wanted to wear his prison
attire, and appellant again responded in the affirmative. During

® The relevant colloquy is as follows
WITNESS: I eventually did a criminal history and realized that [Fields] had been
arrested in May in New York, Brooklyn, she had been released, it was just a city
ordinance, a public [lewdness]. Made contact with the district attorney's office as
well as the police precinct. No one was very familiar with her. She does not have a
lengthy criminal history at all. Actually that was the only arrest.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, your honor. I think that was a gratuitous
statement about someone who is not even here. Ask the jury to ignore that part.
TRIAL COURT: Sustained. Ladies and gentlemen, please disregard the last
statements. Please ask questions, please don’t go into a lengthy narrative. Thank
you.

330 P|

closing argument, the prosecutor argued that appellant wore his
prison attire in order to garner the jury’s sympathy.

On appeal, appellant argues that defense counsel was deficient
for failing to request an instruction informing the jury that no
“negative or harmful considerations” could be made from appellant’s
prison attire. At the motion for new trial hearing, however, appellate
counsel did not ask trial counsel about why he did not request such an
instruction upon taking over the trial from appellant. In the absence
of such questions, we presume that counsel’s decision not to request
such ajury instruction was strategic. See Cantu v. State, 304 Ga. App.
655 (2) (b) (697 SE2d 310) (2010). Astrategic decision about what jury
instruction to request will be deemed deficient performance only if it
is patently unreasonable. See id.; Jessie v. State, 294 Ga. 375 (2) (a)
(754 SE2d 46) (2014). Given the situation trial counsel faced, in which
appellant had made the voluntary decision to wear his jail clothes in
court before counsel took over his representation, we cannot say
counsel’s decision not to call further attention to the issue was
patently unreasonable.

3. Appellant contends the trial court erred when it failed to give
his requested charge on impeachment by prior conviction. This
allegation of error concerns Daniels’s testimony. Oncross-examination,
defense counsel was able to elicit an admission from Daniels that he
had a 1988 felony drug conviction. The State objected to the admis-
sion of the evidence, in particular because the requirements of
OCGA § 24-6-609 (b)* had not been met; however, the trial court
allowed the evidence to come in. The trial court declined appellant’s
request for a charge on impeachment by prior conviction, but said
trial counsel could reference the prior conviction in his closing
argument.° The trial court did, however, give the following instruc-
tion regarding impeachment as part of its charge on witness cred-
ibility: “To impeach a witness is to show that the witness is unworthy
of belief. A witness may be impeached by disproving the facts to which
the witness testified.”

Since the requirements of OCGA § 24-6-609 (b) had not been
met, Daniels’s 1988 conviction should not have been admitted. Thus,
the fact that appellant was allowed to use the prior conviction
evidence at all, inured to his benefit. The attendant failure of the trial
court to give the charge requested was harmless error because it is

+ Since appellant was tried after January 1, 2013, the new Evidence Code is applicable.

® Tyial counsel did in fact mention the prior conviction during his closing argument as
follows: “I remind you that Mr. Daniels has served a prison term involving a cocaine charge,
conviction, That's the person you are asked to put all your faith in. Prison.”

eS 381

not highly probable that the error contributed to the verdict. See
Reddick v. State, 301 Ga. 90 (1) (799 SE2d 754) (2017). Indeed, despite
not having specific instructions on impeachment by conviction, the
trial court did properly instruct the jury on impeachment in general,
and, during closing argument, defense counsel was able to use the
prior conviction, as well as other evidence,° to argue to the jury that
Daniels’s testimony was not worthy of belief. Accordingly, reversal of
appellant’s convictions is unwarranted.

4. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion when
it gave the Allen’ charge after a juror stated his unwillingness to
continue listening and discussing the case with the other jurors.
During the course of its deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a
note that two of the jurors had made up their minds and that one of
those two jurors had stated an unwillingness to deliberate any
further. The trial court made inquiries of the juror who was identified
as unwilling to deliberate and confirmed that the juror had come toa
conclusion and was not willing to listen or discuss the evidence with
the other jurors any further. The trial court announced that it would
be striking the juror and replacing him with the alternate. Appellant
objected and requested the trial court to continue to make inquiry or
to give the Allen charge. The trial court inquired of the juror once
again, and the juror again confirmed that he was unwilling to
deliberate further. At that point the State also requested the Allen
charge, and the trial court gave the charge as the parties requested.
Since appellant requested the Allen charge, he cannot now be heard
to complain of any purported error which his conduct engendered. See
Grimes v. State, 296 Ga. 337 (4) (a) (766 SE2d 72) (2014).

To the extent appellant complains counsel was deficient for
requesting the Allen charge, rather than requesting some other
action by the trial court, such claim also cannot be sustained. At the
motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he asks for an
Allen charge in such circumstances, rather than juror removal or
mistrial, because, in his experience, requesting the Allen charge
hastens jury deadlock and increases the chance the trial court will
grant a mistrial. Thus, counsel's requesting the charge was a strate-
gic decision which was not outside the broad range of professional
conduct so as to render his performance deficient. See State v. Mobley,
296 Ga. 876, 881-882 (770 SE2d 1) (2015).

® Trial counsel reminded the jury that Daniels initially told police he had not seen the
stabbing and that Daniels had been drinking on the night in question.
7 Allen v. United States, 164 U. $. 492 (17 SCt 154, 41 LE 528) (1896).

5. During its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court,
asking the following question: “If we find the defendant guilty of
aggravated assault, must we also . . . find [him] guilty of felony
murder or are the two charges independent?” The trial court responded
as follows: “Each count must be considered separately. However,
Count 3 is identified as the underlying felony stated in Count 2.
Please continue to deliberate.” Appellant objected, arguing that the
trial court should add the words: “Yes, you can find the defendant
guilty of one, not guilty of the other.” The trial court refused appel-
lant’s request because it believed adding such language would con-
stitute improper commenting on the evidence. However, the trial
court noted appellant’s objection for the record. On appeal, appellant
complains the trial court’s response improperly emphasized the
count of felony murder such that the jury would conclude it was
required to find appellant guilty of felony murder if it found him
guilty of aggravated assault. We disagree.

We review the initial jury charges and the recharge as a whole to
discern any alleged error regarding the recharge. See Glover v. State,
296 Ga. 13 (4) (764 SE2d 826) (2014). There is no dispute that the
initial charges given concerning each count in the indictment were
proper. The jury was also properly admonished to treat each count in
the indictment separately. The recharge at issue reiterated that each
count was to be considered separately and, as such, constituted a
correct statement of the law. The recharge also correctly stated that
Count 3 (aggravated assault) was the underlying felony mentioned in
Count 2 (felony murder). The fact that the jury acquitted appellant of
malice murder indicates it understood the concept of considering
each count in the indictment separately. There was no reversible
error.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

Dell Jackson, for appellant.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Anna G. Cross, Gerald Mason,
Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, S. Taylor Johnston, Assis-
tant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1153. ANGLIN v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 573)

PETERSON, Justice.

Nehemiah Anglin appeals his conviction for felony murder and
marijuana possession following the death of Damion Wright.’ Anglin
argues that the trial court erred by admitting (1) testimony that he
put a “hit” on the State’s primary witness; (2) evidence of his alleged
membership in a gang, including evidence of his tattoos; (3) other
evidence he says is hearsay; (4) security camera footage; and (5) tes-
timony concerning the credibility of a witness. He also argues that
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to
certain jury charges and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his convictions. We find that the evidentiary decisions of which
Anglin complains either did not amount to an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion or were harmless error. We also find that Anglin’s claims of
deficient performance by counsel are either without merit or aban-
doned, we reject his argument that the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions, and we affirm.

The evidence presented at trial showed as follows. Wright was
fatally shot outside of an apartment complex in late March 2014, after
meeting Anglin.” Daniel Squires, indicted with Anglin on all of the
charges, testified for the State.* According to Squires, Anglin had a
telephone conversation with Wright in which Anglin agreed to pur-
chase three ounces of marijuana for $800. Wright’s wife, Latoya
Wright, testified that she overheard her husband talking on the
telephone and arranging a meeting before he went out the night he
was killed. She said she heard her husband complain that the other
party had not shown up for a meeting planned for earlier that day and

* Wright was killed in March 2014. Anglin was indicted on June 26, 2014 on seven counts:
malice murder, felony murder (aggravated assault), felony murder (possession of marijuana),
aggravated assault, possession of marijuana (more than one ounce), and two counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission ofa felony. At an August 2015 trial, the jury found
Anglin not guilty of five counts, but guilty of Count 3 (felony murder, with marijuana possession
as the predicate felony) and Count 5 (marijuana possession). The trial court sentenced Anglin
to life in prison on the felony murder count and merged the possession of marijuana count into
felony murder. Anglin filed a motion for new trial, which he subsequently amended. The judge
denied Anglin's motion for new trial on July 1, 2016. Anglin filed a notice of appeal on July 11,
2016, and this appeal was docketed to the term beginning in April 2017 and submitted for
decision on the briefs.

2 Police began getting calls about the shooting on March 27, 2014, shortly after midnight

* Squires testified that, as a result of being arrested for Wright's murder, his probation on.
a burglary conviction was revoked and he was resentenced to twenty years, to serve ten in
prison, with the proviso that he would testify truthfully in Anglin’s case. Squires said he
anticipated receiving a plea deal of a ten-year concurrent sentence for one count of aggravated
assault in the case stemming from Wright’s death.

aad es

tell the caller that he would have his gun with him, lest the other
person “try anything funny[.]”

Squires testified that James Valentine drove him and Anglin to
meet with Wright. Squires and Anglin got into Wright’s car at a
QuikTrip convenience store (“QT”), and Wright drove the car to a
nearby apartment complex. Anglin gave Wright money in exchange
for the drugs but complained that he could not smell the marijuana
and handed it back to Wright. Wright pulled out a gun and told
Squires and Anglin to get out of the car. Astruggle ensued, andAnglin
grabbed the gun and hit Wright in the head with it a few times before
Wright got out of the car, saying “y’all got it.” At that point, Squires
testified, Anglin exited the car, pointed the gun at Wright, and fired
a single shot toward Wright, from a distance of ten to twenty feet.
Leaving the drugs behind, Squires and Anglin ran to the nearby QT,
where Valentine picked them up.

The State tried to establish, in part through Squires’s testimony,
that the circumstances of the murder could be explained by Anglin’s
affiliation with the Bloods gang. Squires testified at trial about a
prior drug transaction in which Wright pulled a gun on Anglin and
Valentine, angering Anglin. Squires also testified that Valentine was
a member of the Bloods gang, while Anglin (like Squires) was merely
an affiliate, still in need of earning the gang’s trust before he could
become a member. Additionally, during a recorded interview that was
played for the jury, Squires described an incident after the shooting
in which he was beaten by several fellow inmates on a jail bus. In this
interview, Squires mentioned rumors that he heard that Anglin was
trying to “get [him] eight,” meaning hurt Squires. Squires also
reported the words of an unidentified inmate in the Bloods gang, who
told him that the reason for the beating was that Anglin said Squires
was “snitchin’ on him.”

The State also called Irungo Tate, who said he had spoken with
Anglin after the shooting while both of them were in jail. Tate
testified that Anglin had told him about the shooting, saying that he
and Squires‘ “ran up on” a drug dealer as he was getting out of his car
and “there was some shots fired,” although Anglin did not say who
shot the dealer. Tate recalled hearing Anglin say that Squires was
“snitching” and he was arranging a hit on Squires. Tate also testified
that Anglin told him about being in the Bloods gang and that he had
seen tattoos on Anglin, one of which was “M.O.B.,” a tattoo that Tate
said Anglin told him meant “Member of Blood.”

+ Tate testified about Squires using Squires’s nickname, “Block.”

eS 336

Two other eyewitnesses to the shooting, Llasman Felix and
Laporscha Mitchell, also testified. Felix testified for the State that he
saw one person start running away from an argument, and another
person follow and shoot him from about 30 feet away, but he was not
able to identify the shooter at trial. Mitchell, called by the defense,
also testified that she saw the shooting. She testified that she had
known Anglin® through a mutual friend for two years prior to the
shooting and that he was not one of the men that she saw at the
apartment complex that night.

Police found a bag containing 2.93 ounces of marijuana on the
driver’s side floorboard of Wright’s car. A detective testified that
Anglin’s fingerprint was on the bag. The medical examiner testified
that Wright, who wore eye glasses, had a deep laceration in the web
space of his right hand, consistent with someone wrenching a gun out
of it, and a small abrasion over the left forehead, consistent with
someone knocking his glasses off. Forensic evidence indicated that
Wright was killed by his own gun from a distance of greater than ten
feet; the gun was found in a wooded area behind the QT.

Anglin did not testify at trial, but the State played an audio
recording of a police interview of him. After being dropped off by
Valentine, Anglin told police, he met Wright at the QT. Anglin then got
into the car with Wright and purchased a small amount of marijuana.
Afterward, Anglin said, he went into the QT, leaving Wright — still
alive — behind in the parking lot. Anglin said he was not present
when Wright was shot.

1. Anglin first argues conclusorily that the evidence against him
was insufficient. Having reviewed the evidence presented at trial, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier
of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Anglin was guilty of the
crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Anglin argues that the trial court erred by admitting state-
ments by Squires that Anglin had put a hit out on him. We find that
these statements were cumulative of other evidence, and thus any
error in their admission was harmless.

The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and the trial court’s decision whether to admit or
exclude evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. See Young v. State, 297 Ga. 737, 739 (2) (778 SE2d 162)
(2015). Anglin argues that Squires’s testimony about the attack on
the bus was hearsay because he lacked personal knowledge of Anglin

® Mitchell testified that she knew Anglin by his nickname “Miami.”

336 es

being involved, while the State argues that the statements at issue
were admissible for nonhearsay purposes such as to explain the
motivations of Squires’s attackers. But even assuming without decid-
ing that the admission of the statements was an abuse of discretion,
we conclude that any such error was harmless and thus does not
merit reversal. Under the new Evidence Code, applicable to the 2015
trial of this case, “[e]rror shall not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits . . . evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected[.]” OCGA § 24-1-103 (a). And the erroneous admission of
hearsay is harmless where substantial, cumulative, legally admis-
sible evidence of the same fact is introduced. See United States v.
Means, 695 F2d 811, 818 (5th Cir. 1983) (erroneous admission of
hearsay was harmless where cumulative of testimony by numerous
witnesses).° Here, the trial court admitted the recording of Squires’s
interview based on the State’s proffer that Squires would testify, and
that Tate would testify that Anglin told him he arranged for the hit on
Squires. Tate testified as much later; the references in Squires’s
interview to “rumors” anda statement by another inmate that Anglin
had arranged a hit on him thus were cumulative of Tate’s testimony.
Tate’s testimony — based on Anglin’s own statements — was at least
as compelling as those references in Squires’s interview. And Anglin
does not challenge the admission of Tate’s testimony on this point.
Thus, even if Squires’s recorded statements included speculation and
hearsay, any error in their admission was harmless.

3. Anglin argues that evidence of his alleged membership in a
gang should have been excluded because there was no evidence the
crime was gang-related, and the evidence of gang membership was
highly prejudicial to him. The decision to admit the gang evidence
was a question committed to the discretion of the trial court, see
Young, 297 Ga. at 739 (2), and we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in this regard.

Anglin acknowledges that evidence regarding gang membership
may be relevant to show motive. See United States v. Harrell, 737 F2d
971, 978 (11th Cir. 1984); Wolfe v. State, 273 Ga. 670, 674 (4) (a) (544
SE2d 148) (2001).7 But he contends there was no evidence presented

© Where provisions of the new Evidence Code are borrowed from the Federal Rules of
Evidence, we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and applying the
Federal Rules, especially the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh
Circuit. See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016).

7 OCGA § 24-4-418 provides for the admission of “evidence of the accused's commission of
criminal gang activity” where the defendant is charged under OCGA § 16-15-4, which is not at
issue here. But OCGA § 24-4-418 (c) provides that this evidentiary rule is not the exclusive
means to admit evidence of criminal gang activity. See Lingo v. State, 329 Ga. App. 528, 531

eS 337

at trial to show that the charged crimes were motivated by gang
membership. We do not read the record this way. Squires testifie
that Anglin was seeking membership into the Bloods gang and thus
in need of earning the gang’s trust. The State later called an expert
witness who testified that the “code” of being in a gang require’
violent responses to being threatened. Squires testified that Wright
pulled a gun on Anglin in a prior meeting.* Wright’s widow testifie:
that Wright warned a caller just before setting out the night he was
killed that he would have his gun in case the caller tried “anything
funny.” And Squires testified that Wright, indeed, brought a gun to
the fatal meeting with Anglin. This testimony enabled the State to
explain why Anglin shot Wright, while leaving the drugs behind at
the scene. The evidence of gang membership thus was relevant to an
probative of motive.

Under OCGA § 24-4-403, “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice[.]” It is true that evidence of gang membership can
be highly prejudicial. See Lingo v. State, 329 Ga. App. 528, 532 (765
SE2d 696) (2014) (physical precedent only), cited in Shaw v. State,
301 Ga. 14, 19 (2) (799 SE2d 186) (2017). But in a criminal trial,
inculpatory evidence is inherently prejudicial; “it is only when unfair
prejudice substantially outweighs probative value that the rule
permits exclusion.” United States v. Edouard, 485 F3d 1324, 1346
(11th Cir. 2007) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in
original). And

Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy, which should be used
only sparingly, and the balance should be struck in favor of
admissibility. Thus, in reviewing issues under Rule 403, we
look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admis-
sion, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
undue prejudicial impact.

Id. at 1344 n.8 (citations and punctuation omitted). We cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion in performing the balancing
required by the rule.

(765 SE2d 696) (2014) (physical precedent only) (analyzing the admission of evidence of gang
affiliation under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)).

® Although his testimony was confusing on this point, Tate also suggested that Anglin
informed him that the vietim previously had pulled a gun on him

338 es

4. Anglin also argues that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of his tattoos. We disagree.

Anglin argues that evidence of his tattoos should not have been
admitted for the same reasons we already have rejected in Division 3.
He also argues that the photographic evidence should not have been
admitted because there was no probable cause for the warrant. In
considering this argument on appeal, we must assess whether the
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed to issue the search warrant by reviewing the search warrant
application to determine the existence of probable cause under the
totality of the circumstances. Glispie v. State, 300 Ga. 128, 132 (2)
(793 SE2d 381) (2016). We give “substantial deference” to the mag-
istrate’s decision to issue the warrant, which need only to have been
“a practical, common-sense decision” as to whether “there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found ina
particular place.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

After Anglin had been arrested for Wright’s murder, an officer
sought a search warrant to view and photograph tattoos on Anglin’s
body and averred that Anglin had been identified as the person who
shot Wright, that the suspects in the case were identifying them-
selves as members of the Bloods gang, and that Anglin had several
gang tattoos on his body. The officer stated that he was requesting the
ability to photograph Anglin’s body “to identify known gang tattoos to
conduct a follow up and possibly charge Anglin under the Georgia
Street Gang Act.”

This information was sufficient to establish probable cause. The
State can prove a violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and
Prevention Act by showing that a defendant is a member of a
“criminal street gang” and committed a violent act intended to
further the interests of that gang. See Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 659
(1) (b) (740 SE2d 590) (2013); OCGA § 16-15-3 (1) (J); OCGA § 16-15-4
(a). Although the officer may have had further work to do in order to
make a case that Wright’s murder was committed in furtherance of
the gang’s interests, his information that gang members were involved
created a “fair probability” of such, and evidence of Anglin’s tattoos
then would be relevant to establish that he was a member of the gang.
The trial court did not err in declining to suppress the photographs on
the basis of the inadequacy of the warrant.

Anglin also argues that the warrant was improper because com-
pelling Anglin to lift up his shirt to be photographed violated his right
against self-incrimination under the Georgia Constitution. See Ga.
Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI. Assuming Anglin even preserved

ee 339

this ground for appeal,° we previously have rejected an indistinguish-
able argument in another case. See Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 634
(7) (323 SE2d 801) (1984) (right against self-incrimination was not
violated by requiring defendant to strip to the waist to allow police to
photograph tattoos on his body).

5. Anglin next argues that the trial court erred by permitting
hearsay testimony by Latoya Wright, the victim’s widow. We find that
any error was harmless.

The State argues that the widow’s testimony regarding a tele-
phone conversation between her husband and another person was
admissible under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. See Hick-
man v. State, 299 Ga. 267, 272 (4) (787 SE2d 700) (2016) (citing
OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (5)). Anglin argues that this doctrine does not
apply because there is no evidence that he acted with the purpose of
preventing Wright from appearing against him as a witness, but we
need not resolve the question. In its closing argument, the State
relied on this testimony to argue that Wright had shown disrespect
toward Anglin’s gang by complaining about the caller not appearing
for a previously-scheduled meeting and by threatening to bring a gun
to their planned drug transaction, causing Anglin to respond vio-
lently pursuant to the gang’s code of conduct. In that sense, it was not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted (that Wright actually
brought a gun) and thus was not hearsay. See Strickland v. State, 257
Ga. 230, 232 (3) (857 SE2d 85) (1987) (error to exclude on hearsay
grounds testimony regarding death threat made against the defen-
dant, as it was not offered to prove the truth of the substance of the
threats but to show why defendant purchased a gun). To the extent it
was offered to show that Wright actually brought a gun to the meeting
with Anglin, Latoya Wright’s testimony was cumulative of other
evidence from multiple sources — Squires’s testimony that Wright
pulled a gun on him and Anglin, the medical examiner’s testimony
Wright had an injury consistent with someone wrenching a gun out
of his hand, and forensic evidence indicating that Wright was killed
by his own gun. Thus, to the extent that Latoya Wright’s testimony
about what she heard was offered for the truth of the matter asserted,
its admission could not have been harmful. See Means, 695 F2d at
818.

6. Anglin also raises multiple challenges to evidence that the
State presented regarding whether he was seen on security camera
recordings from the QT that he claimed to have visited after buying

® The record does not appear to reflect any objection to admission of the photographs on
that basis.

340 es

drugs from Wright. We find that any error regarding the admission of
this evidence was harmless.

The security video was admitted as an exhibit — over a defense
objection for lack of foundation — but was not played for the jury.
Instead, the State elicited Detective Michael Freer’s testimony that
Anglin did not appear on the video. Freer testified that another
detective (not Freer) reviewed the video. The State attempted to ask
Freer whether the other detective told him whether or not Anglin is
seen on the video, but the defense objected on hearsay grounds before
Freer responded to the question. The trial court overruled the objec-
tion, but the prosecutor nonetheless rephrased his question:

Q. Maybe if I ask it this way. Was there any evidence
developed during the investigation that Mr. Nehemiah Ang-
lin was in the QT as he claimed during his interview when
this murder happened?

A. Not according to that video.

Q. And other than his own claim to be there, any other
evidence that supports that?

A. No, sir.

Anglin argues that the admission of the security video footage
from the QT was error because the State failed to authenticate the
videotape or lay a proper foundation for its admission. But the record
indicates that the video was never played for the jury. Any error in its
admission thus was harmless. See Huckeba v. State, 217 Ga. App.
A472, 476 (4) (458 SE2d 131) (1995) (no reversible error where appel-
lant did not show harm from introduction of videotape that was never
played for the jury).

Anglin also argues that the admission of Freer’s testimony was
error because it was hearsay. He appears to be correct; the record
indicates that Freer’s testimony about the contents of the security
video was not based on his personal knowledge, but based on what a
different officer, who reviewed the video, told him. See Jackson v.
State, 301 Ga. 866, 870 (4) (804 SE2d 367) (2017) (noting, in case
applying new Evidence Code, that “an investigating officer may not
testify about what others told him during his investigation merely
under the guise of explaining the officer’s conduct”) (citation and
punctuation omitted); compare United States v. Perez-Lopez, 262 Fed.
Appx. 974, 980 (11th Cir. 2008) (no hearsay where agent’s testimony
“did not include any statements from other agents” and “appear[ed]
to have been based on her personal participation in the coordinated

eS 341

investigation”). But we conclude that any error in admission of
Freer’s testimony was harmless, given the strength of the State’s
case.

“The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is
whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
verdict.” Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 432 (2) (d) (788 SE2d 433) (2016)
(citations and punctuation omitted). It is highly probable that the
admission of Freer’s testimony did not contribute to the verdict. The
State’s case against Anglin was strong. Squires testified that, during
a purported drug transaction, he saw Anglin grab Wright’s gun, hit
him in the head, then shoot him. Squires’s testimony was corrobo-
rated by that of Tate, who testified that Anglin admitted to being
involved in an encounter in which he and Squires “ran up on” a drug
dealer. Other evidence corroborated the accounts of Squires and Tate:
Felix’s eyewitness testimony that he saw one person start running
away from an argument, and another follow and shoot from about 30
feet away; Anglin’s fingerprint found on the bag of marijuana found
in Wright’s car; medical evidence that Wright had been hit on the
head; and forensic evidence that Wright was killed by his own gun,
fired from more than ten feet away.

Additionally, the State presented evidence that Anglin had ar-
ranged for a “hit” on Squires. Squires’s and Tate’s testimony to that
effect was corroborated by testimony from sheriff’s deputies who saw
Squires after he was apparently beaten on a bus. “[E]vidence of a
defendant’s attempt to influence or intimidate a witness can serve as
circumstantial evidence of guilt.” Kell v. State, 280 Ga. 669, 671 (2) (a)
(631 SE2d 679) (2006); see also United States v. Hammond, 781 F2d
1536, 1540 (11th Cir. 1996) (considering evidence under Rule 404 (b)).
The State also presented evidence that Anglin’s motive to kill Wright
was gang-related. Evidence that the killing was gang violence likely
struck a powerful blow to the defense case. Given that evidence, as
well as the rest of the State’s strong case, it is highly probable that
Freer’s testimony about the security camera footage did not contrib-
ute to the verdict. See Dawson v. State, 300 Ga. 332, 335 (8) (794 SE2d
132) (2016) (any error in admitting factual basis for similar transac-
tion via hearsay was harmless given overwhelming evidence of guilt
directly inconsistent with appellant’s defense); Soto v. State, 285 Ga.
367, 371-372 (2) (c) (677 SE2d 95) (2009) (any error in admitting
hearsay statements harmless given overwhelming evidence of defen-
dant’s guilt).

7. Anglin argues that the trial court erred by admitting testi-
mony by Detective Freer concerning the credibility of Laporscha
Mitchell, the eyewitness whom Anglin called at trial. We disagree.

3g es

After the defense rested its case, the State recalled Freer as a
rebuttal witness, asking him several questions about his interview of
Mitchell the night of the murder. On cross-examination, the defense
asked Freer about his failure to include his interview of Mitchell in
the case file that he provided to prosecutors. Defense counsel asked
Freer whether he had ever “disregard[ed] the testimony of your only
eyewitness because you didn’t feel like they were sober enough” and
if there was “any other evidence out there of who shot Damion Wright
that you have just decided wasn’t good enough to go in your report?”
On redirect, the State elicited the testimony that is the subject of
Anglin’s argument on appeal, asking Freer whether he thought the
information that Mitchell had was reliable enough to identify any
perpetrator. Over a defense objection that this asked Freer to com-
ment on Mitchell’s credibility and invade the province of the jury,
Freer testified that he thought Mitchell’s opinion as to the identity of
the perpetrators was not reliable given factors such as darkness and
her vantage point, and that he was particularly unwilling to rely on
what she said given that she refused to give the name of the person
she was with.

“(The c]redibility of a witness is not beyond the ken of the jurors
but, to the contrary, is a matter solely within the province of the jury.”
Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 560 (3) (b) (651 SE2d 661) (2007)
(citations and punctuation omitted); see also OCGA § 24-6-620 (“The
credibility of a witness shall be a matter to be determined by the trier
of fact, and if the case is being heard by a jury, the court shall give the
jury proper instructions as to the credibility of a witness.”); Adkins v.
State, 301 Ga. 153, 158 (3) (a) (800 SE2d 341) (2017) (applying
no-bolstering rule under new Evidence Code). But a trial court does
not abuse its discretion in allowing an officer to explain his course of
conduct when it is challenged, even when that incidentally results in
what might be read as a comment on the veracity of a witness. See
Adkins, 301 Ga. at 159-160 (3) (b) (no abuse of discretion in allowing
officer to testify that his “instinct” was that witness knew the shooter
despite her statements to the contrary, subsequent to defense ques-
tioning as to why officer did not ask witness to describe specific facial
features of the suspect). To the extent that Freer’s testimony could
have been understood to comment on Mitchell’s credibility, the defense
by its questioning of Freer opened the door to the testimony of which
Anglin complains. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the testimony in question.

8. Finally, Anglin argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel by failing to object to certain jury instruc-
tions. Anglin makes no meritorious argument that any of the refer-
enced actions of counsel constituted deficient performance.

eS 348

In order to establish that trial counsel was ineffective, Anglin
must show both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and
that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
“The failure to pursue a futile objection does not amount to ineffective
assistance.” Ventura v. State, 284 Ga. 215, 218 (4) (663 SE2d 149)
(2008). In considering a claim of ineffective assistance, “we indepen-
dently apply the legal principles to the facts.” Robinson v. State, 277
Ga. 75, 76 (586 SE2d 313) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(a) Anglin finds fault with his counsel’s failure to object to various
aspects of the trial court’s instruction to the jury under Allen v. United
States, 164 U.S. 492 (17 SCt 154, 41 LE 528) (1896). For one, he notes
that the charge did not include language “that no juror is required to
surrender his or her opinion because of the honest different opinion
with another juror or other jurors, for the purpose of reaching a
unanimous verdict,” arguing that such language was required by the
Court of Appeals’ decision in Greeson v. State, 138 Ga. App. 572,
573-574 (3) (226 SE2d 769) (1976). But we subsequently reversed that
holding as inconsistent with Spaulding v. State, 232 Ga. 411, 413-414
(4) (207 SE2d 43) (1974), in which we approved an Allen charge that
did not include such language. See State v. Greeson, 237 Ga. 193, 193
(1) (227 SE2d 324) (1976). Anglin also argues that counsel should
have objected to the portion of the trial court’s Allen charge in which
the court told jurors, “Each of you took an oath to render a verdict.
Each of you must come to a decision on each count. There is no, I can’t
make a decision. You must make a decision on each count individu-
ally.” Anglin argues that this language, coupled with the instruction
that “a unanimous verdict is required[,]” was too coercive because it
suggested to jurors that they were violating their oath if they did not
reach a verdict. But a charge is erroneous only if “considered as a
whole, [it] was so coercive as to cause a juror to abandon an honest
conviction for reasons other than those based upon the trial or the
arguments of other jurors.” Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 81 (9) (b)
(694 SE2d 316) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). In its Allen
charge, the trial court also told jurors that “this verdict must be the
conclusion of each juror and not a mere acquiescence of jurors in order
to reach an agreement[.]” The trial court told jurors the case had been
submitted to them for a verdict “if possible” and that their duty was
to decide the issues “if [they could] conscientiously do so.” The trial
court’s admonition that “each” juror must reach a decision, with no
option to conclude that they “can’t make a decision,” appears to
have been in response to an earlier indication that one juror was
“undecided” as to one of the charges. Considering the charge as a
whole, we conclude that it was not erroneous and any objection by

aad es

counsel would have been futile. See Drayton v. State, 297 Ga. 743,
748-750 (2) (b) (778 SE2d 179) (2015) (given instruction as a whole
andcircumstances of cases, “a unanimous verdict is required” instruc-
tion not unduly coercive).

(b) Anglin argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the charge on his alleged affiliation with a gang. He contends that
the instruction was “highly prejudicial,” did not fit the evidence in the
case, and amounted to an improper comment on the evidence by
telling jurors that they had heard “testimony as to the Defendant’s
alleged affiliation with a violent gang.” But this was a limiting
instruction that evidence of gang affiliation could be considered only
for the purpose of establishing or explaining the motives of Anglin or
other witnesses. The jury did hear “testimony as to the Defendant’s
alleged affiliation with a violent gang.” Far from a comment on the
evidence, the instruction told jurors that the trial court’s decision to
admit this evidence “in no way” suggested whether Anglin was in fact
affiliated with a violent gang or that such affiliation explained
anyone’s motives. Trial counsel’s failure to object was not deficient
performance.

(c) Anglin also argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to object to the trial court’s statement
to the jury after recharging on party to a crime, “Now I want you to
remember — I know that there’s a lot of counts. There’s a lot of
evidence.” Anglin contends that this was an improper comment that
bolstered the State’s case in a matter in which, in fact, there was not
a lot of evidence. Butin context, itis clear that this was not acomment
on the strength of the State’s case but a word of encouragement to
jurors, who already had asked multiple questions, including asking
less than an hour into their deliberations what would happen if they
were hung on every count, and appeared puzzled as the trial court
gave the recharge on party to acrime. The trial court continued after
the remarks Anglin challenges on appeal, “We’ve been working long
and hard and the law is confusing. But I hope that helps you.” Trial
counsel’s failure to object was not deficient performance.

(d) Finally, Anglin argues that trial counsel also rendered inef-
fective assistance for failing to object to the court’s failure to give
Anglin’s requested charge regarding what may serve as a predicate
felony for felony murder. But the trial court gave a modified version
of the requested charge, and Anglin does not attempt to explain on
appeal why the alterations amounted to error, other than a conclu-
sory assertion that his requested charge was necessary and properly
tailored to the evidence and that no other charge adequately covered
the issue that it addressed. Anglin also fails to make any argument
that he was prejudiced by the charge as given by the court. We thus

eS 345

deem this claim abandoned. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (“Any
enumerated error not supported by argument or citation of authority
in the brief shall be deemed abandoned.”).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

FCCC

The Merchant Law Firm, Ashleigh B. Merchant, John B. Mer-
chant III, for appellant.

D. Victor Reynolds, District Attorney, Michael S. Carlson, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patri-
cia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Oldham, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1164. PARKS v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 529)

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Lewis Parks a/k/a Harris appeals his convictions
related to the death of Lyndon “Pookie” Tucker.! Appellant’s sole
enumeration of error is that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of the crimes for which the jury returned verdicts of guilty. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the jury’s verdicts,
the evidence shows as follows. At approximately 8:00 in the evening
of December 17, 2010, the victim’s girlfriend dropped him off at
Midtown Towing where the victim worked as a security guard. Later
that night, the victim’s girlfriend went to a party hosted by her sister
at a club called “The Yard,” which was about five minutes from the
victim’s worksite. The party lasted into the early morning hours of

1 The crimes occurred on December 18, 2010. On July 22, 2011, a Fulton County grand jury
indicted appellant, along with co-indictee Matthew Doyle, on charges of malice murder, two
counts of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Appellant
and Doyle were tried jointly from June 11-14, 2013, with the jury returning verdicts of guilty
on all charges in the indictment. On June 24, 2013, the trial court sentenced appellant to life
in prison without parole plus a number of years. Appellant moved for a new trial on June 27,
2013, and filed an amended motion for new trial on October 27, 2015. On December 17, 2015,
the trial court held a hearing on the motion, as amended, and denied the motion on September
30, 2016. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on October 11, 2016, and, upon receipt of the record,
the appeal was docketed to the April 2017 term of this Court and submitted for a decision to be
made on the briefs.

346 es

December 18. During the party, a fight broke out between two groups
of young men. One of the groups fighting included a young man who
went by the nickname “Poochie” and who was the cousin of the
victim’s girlfriend.

Keith Richardson testified at trial. At the time of the events in
this case, Richardson said he was addicted to drugs and would
sometimes drive appellant to different places in exchange for cash or
drugs. On the night in question, Richardson testified appellant called
him to ask for a ride purportedly to pick up appellant’s son from a
club. When Richardson arrived at appellant’s house, three men
entered Richardson’s four-door, blue Ford Explorer. Appellant sat in
the passenger seat, co-defendant Doyle sat behind Richardson, and
another male, who was allegedly appellant’s stepson, sat behind
appellant. Appellant directed Richardson to drive to The Yard. When
they arrived, the men did not exit Richardson’s vehicle. While sitting
for about 20 minutes in the parking lot of the club, Richardson
overheard appellant and Doyle discussing making someone pay for
something.

Eventually, appellant directed Richardson to drive the group toa
place Richardson described as a junkyard. At that location, Richardson
said Doyle exited the vehicle and then he heard gunshots. At trial,
Richardson also stated he did not see anyone with a weapon; however,
the lead detective who investigated the killing testified that Richard-
son told him he saw appellant racking a gun while in the car and that
Doyle had a gun when he exited the vehicle. After the first shots were
fired, a witness, who lived near Midtown Towing, testified he looked
out of his living room window and saw a blue Ford “truck” with a man
standing outside the vehicle and another man hanging outside the
passenger window making motions with his arms as if he was shooting.
Richardson testified he tried to drive away as soon as he heard
gunshots, but appellant told him to slow down so that Doyle could get
back into the vehicle. Appellant directed Richardson where to drive
and eventually Richardson drove the men back to appellant’s house.

At Midtown Towing, the victim worked in a small shack, check-
ing cars in and out of the tow yard. One of his co-workers worked
inside a nearby building, processing paperwork. On the night in
question, the co-worker said she was working when she heard a
tapping sound. She stepped outside, found the victim on the ground
saying he had been shot, and called 911. The co-worker did not see the
shooting and said she did not see anyone else around when she found
the wounded victim.

The State introduced cell phone records which placed appellant’s
cell phone near Midtown Towing around the time the shooting occurred.
The cell phone records also showed that the cell phone towers that

eS 347

received the signal from appellant’s cell phone were in locations
consistent with the route Richardson said he took after leaving the
scene of the shooting and taking appellant back to his house.

Kerry Henderson, who was the cousin of appellant’s girlfriend,
testified at trial. She said that on the night in question, her cousins
had borrowed her vehicle to go to the party at The Yard. Later that
evening, her cousins contacted her to tell her that her vehicle had
been damaged and a friend took her to inspect her vehicle. While
inspecting her vehicle, Henderson said she saw appellant riding in
the passenger seat of a blue “SUV.” Henderson also admitted she had
met with a police detective about the shooting, but claimed she could
not recall the details of any conversation she had with him. The lead
detective testified that Henderson contacted him about the case in
April 2011, and that he met with her in person. He said Henderson
told him that on the day after the shooting, appellant and Doyle made
admissions to her that they had killed the victim as some form of
retribution related to the fight that occurred at The Yard. Henderson
told the detective that appellant and Doyle had mistakenly believed
that the victim was the brother of Poochie, who was one of the young
men involved in the fight and who was actually the cousin of the
victim’s girlfriend.

The medical examiner testified the victim died from approxi-
mately eight gunshot wounds. He said the characteristics of the
wounds were consistent with being caused by bullets fired from a high
velocity weapon. The crime scene investigator collected nine shell
casings from the scene. The firearms expert testified that the shell
casings, which were 7.62 mm caliber, had been fired from the same
firearm which was either an SKS or AK-47 type of rifle. The firearms
expert also testified that the bullet recovered from the victim’s body
during the autopsy was consistent with being fired from either an
SKS or AK-47 rifle.

Appellant contends that Richardson was an accomplice to the
murder and, as such, argues the evidence was insufficient to convict
him because Richardson’s testimony was uncorroborated. We will
assume for the sake of this appeal that Richardson was an accomplice
subject to the rule announced in OCGA § 24-14-8 which states in
pertinent part:

The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient
to establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including . . .
felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the

2 Appellant was tried after the effective date of Georgia's new Evidence Code.

348 es

testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient. Never-
theless, corroborating circumstances may dispense with the
necessity for the testimony of a second witness. .. .

The evidence necessary to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice
“may be circumstantial and slight, and need not be sufficient in and
of itself to warrant a conviction, so long as it is independent of the
accomplice’s testimony and directly connects the defendant to the
crime or leads to the inference of guilt.” Lewis v. State, 301 Ga. 759,
761 (1) (804 SE2d 82) (2017). See also Huff v. State, 300 Ga. 807 (1)
(796 SE2d 688) (2017). The sufficiency of the corroboration is a matter
for the jury to decide. See id. at 809.

In this case there was evidence independent of Richardson’s
testimony connecting appellant to the crime. Cell phone records
showed appellant’s cell phone was near Midtown Towing around the
time the shooting occurred; cell phone records showed appellant’s cell
phone connected with cell phone towers that were in locations con-
sistent with the route Richardson said he drove after leaving the
scene of the shooting; Henderson saw appellant in the passenger seat
of a blue “SUV” on the night in question; a witness, who lived near
Midtown Towing, heard gunshots and saw a blue Ford “truck” with a
man standing outside and a man hanging out of the passenger
window with his arms formed as if shooting; and Henderson reported
to police that appellant and Doyle admitted to her that they had killed
the victim.?

The evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was suffi-
cient as a matter of due process to authorize a rational trier of fact to
find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for
which he was convicted either as a direct participant or as a party to

® Appellant asserts that Henderson's out-of-court statement to a police detective that the
defendants admitted to killing the victim cannot be considered for the purpose of corroborating
Richardson's testimony. We disagree. Henderson never denied making this statement to the
detective, but, rather, stated that she could not recall what she said to the detective and stated
her memory could not be refreshed upon being shown the statement she made. She also stated
she could not remember what the defendants told her after the shooting and could not
remember telling the detective about the defendants’ involvement. Upon testifying she had no
recollection of these conversations, the trial court allowed the State to treat Henderson as a
hostile witness. The inconsistent statement Henderson made to police is not hearsay inasmuch
as Henderson testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. See OCGA §§ 24-6-613;
24-8-801 () and (a); Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685 (5) (740 SE2d 609) (2013). Regardless of
Henderson’s stated inability to recall what she said to the detective, her out-of-court statements
were admissible for both impeachment purposes and as substantive evidence. See Brewner v.
State, 302 Ga. 6 (V) (804 SE2d 94) (2017); Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95 (2) (786 SE2d 648) (2016);
MeNair v. State, 330 Ga. App. 478 (1) (a) (767 SE2d 290) (2014). Accordingly, Henderson's
statements to police could be considered for the purpose of corroborating Richardson's testi-
mony.

eS 349

the crimes for which he was charged. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Terrell v. State, 300 Ga.
81 (1) (793 SE2d 411) (2016).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

Genevieve Holmes, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Marc A. Mallon, Lyndsey
H. Rudder, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-
ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M.
Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1317, $17X1318. WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, LLC
et al. v. BERRY et al.; and vice versa.
(806 SE2d 606)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

Women’s Surgical Center, LLC d/b/a Georgia Advanced Surgery
Center for Women (hereinafter referred to as the “Center”) provides
outpatient surgery services in Cartersville, Georgia. The Center has
immediate plans to add a second operating room to its premises in
order to create opportunities to form contracts with additional sur-
geons who could then use the Center in connection with their medical
practices. However, any such change to the Center could only be
legally accomplished if the Center sought and was granted a certifi-
cate of need (“CON”)! by the Georgia Department of Community
Health (the “Department”). Specifically, pursuant to OCGA § 31-6-40
(a) 1) (C):

On and after July 1, 2008, any new institutional health
service shall be required to obtain a certificate of need
pursuant to this chapter. New institutional health services
include . . . [c]linical health services which are offered in or
through a diagnostic, treatment, or rehabilitation center
which were not offered on a regular basis in or through that
center within the 12 month period prior to the time such

+ See OCGA §§ 31-6-1 through 31-6-70; Ga. Comp. R. and Regs., rr. 111-2-2-.01 through .42;
Ga. Comp. R. and Regs., rr. 274-1-.01 through .20. The Center sought and was denied a CON
in 2014, but the denial of the CON is not what is at issue in the current appeal.

350 a

services would be offered, but only if the clinical health
services [involve] . . . [s]urgery in an operating room envi-
ronment, including but not limited to ambulatory surgery.

Because the Center believed that it should not be subject to the
CON requirements, on June 30, 2015, the Center filed an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department? in an effort
to have Georgia’s applicable CON law and the regulations authoriz-
ing it declared unconstitutional.? On August 20, 2015, the Depart-
ment moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things,
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the
Center failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its
lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on February 10,
2016. On September 16, 2016 both the Center and the Department
filed motions for summary judgment with regard to the Center’s
constitutional claims. In an October 31, 2016 order, the trial court
rejected all of the Center’s constitutional challenges and granted
summary judgment to the Department. In Case No. $17A1317, the
Center appeals from this ruling, and in Case No. $17X1318, the
Department appeals from the denial of its August 2015 motion to
dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in both cases.

Case No. S17X1318"

1. The Department argues that the trial court erred in failing to
dismiss the Center’s declaratory action because the Center failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its declaratory
action and did not have standing to bring such an action at this point.
We disagree.

An action for declaratory judgment is available to test the
validity of an alleged unconstitutional law, in order that a
person desiring to practice his vocation may know whether

2 ‘The Center originally filed its action against the previous Commissioner of the Depart-
ment, Clyde Reese III, and the Health Planning Director of the Department, Rachel King, in
their individual and official capacities. Since that time, Frank Berry has replaced Reese as
Commissioner, and the style of this case has been changed to reflect that Berry, rather than
Reese, is the current Commissioner. For ease of reference, all of the defendants shall simply be
referred to collectively as the “Department.”

® While the Center initially appeared to be attempting to challenge the entire CON law
statutory scheme in the trial court and in its brief to this Court, the Center conceded at oral
argument before this Court that it is only seeking to challenge OCGA § 31-6-40 (a) (7) (C)

+ We are addressing the cross-appeal first, because, if the trial court had erred in denying
the Department's motion to dismiss, there would be no need for us to reach the constitutional
issues.

eS 361

he may proceed in disregard of the requirements of the law,
or whether he must refuse to [advance his interests that are]
regulated by the law until he can comply with its provisions.

Jenkins v. Manry, 216 Ga. 538, 540-541 (118 SE2d 91) (1961). While
an entity may not seek a declaratory judgment where no “actual
controversy” exists between the relevant parties (see OCGA § 9-4-2
(a)), a party has standing to pursue a declaratory action where the
threat of an injury in fact is “actual and imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (ID
(129 SCt 1142, 173 LE2d 1) (2009). See also GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v.
Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 299 Ga. 26 (785 SE2d 874) (2016).

Here, itis undisputed that the Center’s imminent plans to adda
second operating room would be subject to the approval of the Depart-
ment under the CON laws. In fact, the Center had already been
denied a CON for this same proposed expansion in 2014.° However,
even without filing a new application for a CON, the Center is still
currently “faced with the prospect of either punishment if [it expands
its facilities] without a [CON] or enduring much expense and effort to
obtain the [new CON].” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bruner
v. Zawacki, 997 FSupp.2d 691, 696 (III) (A) (E.D. Ky. 2014). Under
such circumstances, we find that the Center is confronted with an
injury in fact that is “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
thetical” (Summers, supra), such that it has standing to pursue its
declaratory action here. See Bruner, supra.

Because the Center has standing to pursue, and is in fact
pursuing, a direct facial constitutional challenge to OCGA § 31-6-40
(a) (7) (C) (see Division 2, infra), the Center was not required to
exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its declaratory
action. Unlike in situations where a constitutional claim is raised in
the context of actual administrative proceedings or where the con-
stitutional challenge is as applied (see, e.g., Dept. of Public Safety v.
Foreman, 130 Ga. App. 71 (202 SE2d 196) (1973)), “[t]here is ... no
exhaustion requirement when, as in the present case, the [plaintiff]
challenges the constitutionality of [a statute] on its face.” (Citation
and punctuation omitted.) King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427,
428 (2) (531 SE2d 350) (2000).

The trial court did not err in denying the Department’s motion to
dismiss.

® The denial of that CON is not what is at issue in the current appeal.

a2 a
Case No. S17A1317

2. The Center contends that OCGA § 31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) is uncon-
stitutional on its face because the statute (a) violates the Anti-
Competitive Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution (see Ga.
Const. of 1983 Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. V (c) (1)), and (b) violates the Due
Process Clauses of the Georgia and United States Constitutions (see
U.S. Const. Amend. 14 and Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I).¢
As explained more fully below, both of these contentions are without
merit.

In reviewing the Center’s facial challenges to OCGA § 31-6-40

(a) (©),

we recognize at the outset that all presumptions are in favor
of the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature and that
before an Act of the legislature can be declared unconstitu-
tional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must
be clear and palpable and this Court must be clearly satis-
fied of its unconstitutionality. Moreover, because statutes
are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary appears,
the burden is on the party alleging a statute to be unconsti-
tutional to prove it.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) JIG Real Estate, LLC v. Country-
wide Home Loans, Inc., 289 Ga. 488, 490 (2) (712 SE2d 820) (2011).
Additionally,

[a] facial challenge “is, of course, the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (II) (107 SCt 2095, 95 LE2d 697) (1987), because it
requires one to establish “that no set of circumstances exists
under which the statute would be valid, i-e., that the law is
unconstitutional in all of its applications, or at least that the
statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep.” Blevins v. Dade

® The Center also raised an argument below with respect to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VIL. However,
in footnote 3 of its appellate brief, the Center “concede[s] that [its] cause of action under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is foreclosed by the Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U. 8. 36 (21 LE 394)] (1872).’ Furthermore, with respect to Georgia's
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Center only mentions the Clause in one sentence in
footnote 9 of its brief without developing any substantive argument on the issue. Accordingly,
we find the purported claim relating to Georgia's Privileges and Immunities Clause to have
been abandoned on appeal. See Ga, Supreme Court Rule 22.

eS 368

County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113, 118 (3) (702 SE2d
145) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(Punctuation omitted.) Bello v. State, 300 Ga. 682, 685-686 (1) (797
SE2d 882) (2017).

With these principles in mind, we address each argument in
turn:

(a) Anti-Competitive Contracts Clause: The Center asserts that
OCGA § 31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) violates the Anti-Competitive Contracts
Clause of the Georgia Constitution because the Center is not allowed
to effectively compete in the healthcare market by expanding its
facilities if the Center does not first obtain the approval of the
Department to receive a CON. However, the Center’s argument
shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of the Anti-
Competitive Contracts Clause. That Clause provides:

The General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize
any contract or agreement which may have the effect of or
which is intended to have the effect of encouraging a monopoly,
which is hereby declared to be unlawful and void. Except as
otherwise provided in subparagraph (c) (2) of this Paragraph
[providing for judicial enforcement of contracts regulating
competitive activities between certain entities], the General
Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any contract
or agreement which may have the effect of or which is
intended to have the effect of defeating or lessening compe-
tition, which is hereby declared to be unlawful and void.

(Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. ITI, Sec. VI, Par. V () (1).
As the text of this constitutional provision indicates, and as this
Court has previously held, the Anti-Competitive Contracts Clause
“is an embodiment of the common-law rule which prohibited con-
tracts in general restraint of trade,” and is “limited expressly to
contracts and agreements.” (Emphasis supplied.) Executive Town &
Country Svcs. v. Young, 258 Ga. 860, 863 (2) (876 SE2d 190) (1989).
See also Ga. Franchise Practices Comm. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,
244 Ga. 800, 801 (2) (262 SE2d 106) (1979) (striking down provisions
of Franchise Practices Act that authorized franchise agreements that
permitted “franchised dealers to restrict competition and create a
monopoly in the retail sale of motor vehicles”).

By its plain terms, OCGA § 31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) does not authorize
monopolistic “contracts” relating to providers of new institutional
health services. It only requires that all such providers obtain a CON
before adding new services. While the CON requirement could have

364 a

an impact on the expansion plans of certain providers within an
existing market, this does not implicate the Anti-Competitive Con-
tracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution in any way, as the require-
ment does not authorize contracts between service providers or
anyone else that would encourage a monopoly. Because the Anti-
Competitive Contracts Clause simply does not apply here, the Cen-
ter’s constitutional claim on this ground must fail. Young, supra, 258
Ga. at 863 (2).

(b) Due Process: The Center claims that OCGA § 31-6-40
(a) (7) (C) violates substantive due process under the Georgia Con-
stitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution because it restricts competition among healthcare providers
by requiring them to seek a CON before adding new services. Because
these substantive due process challenges do not involve a

fundamental right or suspect class .. . we examine them
under the lenient “rational basis” test. See State v. Nanker-
vis, 295 Ga. 406, 409 (761 SE2d 1) (2014)... . Under this test,
astatute does not violate due process in substance as long as
it “bear[s] a rational relationship to a legitimate objective of
the government.” Id.

Barzey v. City of Cuthbert, 295 Ga. 641, 645 (4) (a) (763 SE2d 447)
(2014). See also Quiller v. Bowman, 262 Ga. 769 (425 SE2d 641)
(1993) (Where a due process challenge under the Georgia Constitu-
tion does not involve “a fundamental right, the rational basis test
applies. Under this analysis, if the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied”) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Pursuant to OCGA § 31-6-1, the purpose of the CON laws is

to ensure access to quality health care services and to ensure
that health care services and facilities are developed in an
orderly and economical manner and are made available to
all citizens and that only those health care services found to
be in the public interest shall be provided in this state. To
achieve such public policy and purposes, it is essential that
appropriate health planning activities be undertaken and
implemented and that a system of mandatory review of new
institutional health services be provided. Health care ser-
vices and facilities should be provided in a manner that
avoids unnecessary duplication of services, that is cost effec-
tive, that provides quality health care services, and that is

eS 365

compatible with the health care needs of the various areas
and populations of the state.

This Court has previously found that “promoting the availability
of quality health care services [is] certainly [a] legitimate legislative
purpose[ ].” Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 11 (694 SE2d 75)
(2010). Furthermore, we agree with courts in other jurisdictions with
similar CON laws to Georgia’s that have concluded that CON pro-
grams serve the legitimate purpose of “ensuring geographically
convenient access to healthcare for [state] residents at a reasonable
cost.” Colon Health Centers of America, LLC v. Hazel, 733 F3d 535,
548 (IID (B) (4th Cir. 2013); Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F2d 251, 253
(II) (9th Cir. 1989). The government objectives with respect to Geor-
gia’s CON laws as stated in OCGA § 31-6-1 are indeed legitimate.

Furthermore, on the record before us, the Center has not shown
that OCGA § 31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) does not bear a rational relationship to
the legitimate government objectives outlined in OCGA § 31-6-1. By
incorporating a review and approval process for the addition of new
healthcare services in existing markets that might already have such
services and those markets that may need such services, OCGA §
31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) potentially allows the Department to avoid the
“unnecessary duplication of services,” which can in turn make health
care more “cost effective” and “compatible with the . . . needs of the
various areas and populations of the state.” OCGA § 31-6-1. The
Center has not shown under the record that the requirements of
OCGA § 31-6-40 (a) (7) (C) are arbitrary or discriminatory, and the fact
that the legislature could have potentially come up with a different
statute with a theoretically more effective means of accomplishing the
stated goals of OCGA § 31-6-1 is irrelevant. Advanced Disposal Svcs.
Middle Georgia v. Deep South Sanitation, 296 Ga. 103, 107 (2), n. 5
(765 SE2d 364) (2014) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not empower
the judiciary to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of
legislation”) (citation and punctuation omitted). OCGA § 31-6-40
(a) (7) (C) is the vehicle that was chosen, and the record before us does
not show that this statute does not bear a rational relationship to the
legitimate goals of government expressed in OCGA § 31-6-1.7 Accord-
ingly, the Center’s due process challenges to OCGA § 31-6-40 (a) (7) (C)

* Inthis regard, we must emphasize that thisis a case about the General Assembly's ability
to regulate healthcare. The record in this case makes quite clear that the market for healthcare
is not normal; indeed, there are few (if any) other private sector markets so dominated by
government regulation. Much of that regulation is federal in nature, which limits the General
Assembly's range of legislative options on healthcare issues. And in Georgia, some state
healtheare regulation is also the natural result of state constitutional mandates. See Ga, Const

356 Pe

are without merit. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc.
v. Atchison, 126 F3d 1042, 1048 (IV) (8th Cir. 1997) (“CON laws in
general have been recognized as a valid means of furthering a
legitimate state interest”).*

Judgments affirmed. Hines, C. J., Benham, Hunstein, Nahmias,
Blackwell, Peterson, JJ., and Judge Charles J. Bethel concur. Boggs,
J., concurs in judgment only as to Division 2 (b). Grant, J., disquali-
fied.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

ightmas elk,
Thorson, for appellant.

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Isaac Byrd, Deputy Attor-
ney General, Daniel S. Walsh, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Forrest G. Pearce, Monica A. Sullivan, Assistant Attorneys General,
for appellees.

Strickland Brockington Lewis, Anne W. Lewis; Pacific Legal
Foundation, Jeffrey W. McCoy; Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs,
John H. Parker, Jr., J. Marbury Rainer; Heidari Power Law Group,
Yasha Heidari, amici curiae.

$17A1406. WALKER v. THE STATE.
(806 SE2d 598)
GRANT, Justice.
Appellant Kelvin Dejuan Walker appeals the denial of his motion
for out-of-time appeal. We find no error and affirm.
In January 2001, Walker entered a counseled guilty plea to felony
murder and aggravated assault in connection with a shooting

of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Par. I (“Provision shall be made by law for the regulation of
insurance.”). Nothing in today’s opinion should be understood to support sweeping economic
regulation of this sort beyond this unique context.

® To the extent that the Center argues that OCGA § 31.6-40 (a) (7) violates due process
pursuant to case law indicating that “a State legislature is without constitutional power to fix
prices at which commodities may be sold, services rendered, or property used, unless the
business or property involved is ‘affected with a public interest’ ” citation and punctuation
omitted) Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 564 (67 SE2d 692) (1951), such arguments are
misplaced. This Court held in Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Bushee, 250 Ga. 252, 256-257 (2) (297
SE2d 250) (1982), that “[t]he ‘affected by a public interest’ test . .. applies only to price controls
enacted by the legislature.” (Emphasis supplied.) The statute involved in this case is not a price
control being implemented by the legislature to directly fix the prices at which health services
may be rendered.

eS 367

resulting in the death of his estranged wife, Martina Walker, and
injuries to another victim. The trial court sentenced Walker to life
imprisonment for murder and a consecutive ten-year sentence for the
aggravated assault; the State nolle prossed the remaining six counts in
the indictment. In April 2001, during the following term of court,
Walker filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was
denied for untimeliness, among other reasons. In August 2007, Walker
filed a pro se motion in arrest of judgment, which was also denied.

In October 2016, Walker filed a pro se motion for out-of-time
appeal, in which he claimed his convictions and sentences were void
due to the trial court’s failure to merge his convictions. Walker also
sought the appointment of counsel. In a single order, the trial court
denied both motions. Walker now appeals.

It is well established that

[iJn order to receive an out-of-time appeal from a judgment
entered ona guilty plea, an appellant must show (1) that the
claims he seeks to raise on appeal can be resolved on the
existing record; and (2) that the failure to pursue a timely
appeal was due to the ineffective assistance of his plea
counsel. But if the claims the appellant seeks to raise can be
resolved against him on the face of the record, so that even
a timely appeal would not have been successful, then plea
counsel cannot be said to have rendered ineffective assis-
tance in failing to advise the appellant or otherwise assist
him in pursuing an appeal.

Waye v. State, 301 Ga. 469 (801 SE2d 818) (2017) (citations omitted).
Thus, we must examine the facial validity of the claims Walker would
raise were he permitted to appeal.

Walker asserted in his motion for out-of-time appeal that his
convictions and sentences were “void because they merged.” It is clear
from the face of the record, however, that Walker’s convictions and
sentences were proper. The facts set forth at Walker’s plea hearing
established that Walker fatally shot his estranged wife inside their
home, then exited the home and shot the second victim as she stood
in the driveway calling 911. “[MJurder and aggravated assault upon
different victims do not merge as a matter of law.” Biddy v. State, 253
Ga. 289, 292 (2) (319 SE2d 842) (1984). Accordingly, these two
offenses did not merge, and the sentences imposed on each were
proper. See OCGA §§ 16-5-1 (e) (1) (authorizing life sentence for
murder); 16-5-21 (b) (authorizing term of one to twenty years for
aggravated assault). Walker’s claims therefore lack merit, and the
trial court properly denied his motion for an out-of-time appeal.

358 Pe

Additionally, because Walker had no constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel in pursuing his motion for out-of-time appeal,
there was no error in the trial court’s denial of Walker’s motion
seeking appointment of counsel. See Brooks v. State, 301 Ga. 748, 753
(3) (804 SE2d 1) (2017).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

elvin D. Walker, pro se.

Tracy Graham Lawson, District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17G0091. COLUMBUS BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS et al.
v. THE MEDICAL CENTER HOSPITAL AUTHORITY.
(806 SE2d 525)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

In May 2007, The Medical Center Hospital Authority
(‘Hospital Authority”) filed an action against the Columbus Board of
Tax Assessors and related parties (together, “the Tax Board”) in
which it sought a declaration that its leasehold interest in a building
located on real property owned by a private entity constituted public
property exempt from ad valorem taxation under OCGA § 48-5-41 (a)
(1). The superior court granted summary judgment to the Hospital
Authority, finding that the Hospital Authority’s leasehold interest
qualified as “public property,” and was thus exempt from ad valorem
property taxation. The Tax Board appealed this decision to the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judg-
ment.' See Columbus, Ga. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Med. Center Hosp.
Auth., 338 Ga. App. 302 (788 SE2d 879) (2016).

We granted certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals
erred in determining that two prior bond validation orders conclu-
sively determined, for purposes of OCGA § 48-5-41 (a) (1) (A), that the

1 The Hospital Authority further alleged that it was tax exempt because it met the
requirements as a home for the aged pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-40 (2). The Court of Appeals did
not reach this issue on appeal as it affirmed summary judgment on the “public property”
exemption. See Columbus, Ga. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Med. Center Hosp. Auth., 338 Ga. App
302 (788 SE2d 879) (2016). We did not grant certiorari on this question, and, therefore, we do
not review it.

eS 359

property at issue is “public property” exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion. For the reasons that follow, we hold that these orders did not
conclusively establish that the Hospital Authority’s leasehold inter-
est was “public property” exempt from ad valorem taxes and therefore
reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further
proceedings.

1. Factual and Procedural Background

This is a decade old case that has a rich and detailed factual
background and procedural history. We address the pertinent parts of
that history below, including the lease agreement, the bond valida-
tions, the superior court’s grant of summary judgment regarding ad
valorem taxes, and the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming that
judgment.

(a) Creation of Lease Agreement

On June 1, 2004, Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc.
(“Columbus Regional”),” as the lessor, and the Hospital Authority, as
the lessee, entered into a long-term lease agreement. Specifically, the
lease stated that the Hospital Authority wanted “to construct, own,
and operate” on land owned by Columbus Regional a facility known
as Spring Harbor at Green Island, a continuing care retirement
center. At the conclusion of the lease term, all improvements would
become the absolute property of Columbus Regional, including the
Spring Harbor facility. To further the goals of the lease, the Hospital
Authority subsequently issued revenue bonds to finance construction
of Spring Harbor. At the same time, the Hospital Authority entered
into a management agreement with another private entity, a subsidi-
ary of Columbus Regional, to develop, market, and manage the
operation of Spring Harbor on behalf of the Hospital Authority. See
Columbus, 338 Ga. App. at 302-304.

(b) Bond Validation Orders

Later in 2004, the superior court validated the financing of the
Hospital Authority’s bonds, finding, in pertinent part, “that the
purposes for which the Bonds are being issued, as described in the
petition and complaint, are in furtherance of the public purposes for
which Defendant Authority was established.” Following a 2007 bond
refinancing, the superior court again was tasked with considering the
validity of the revenue bonds, and was specifically “requested to rule
on which entity did in fact build, manage and own[ ] Spring Harbor
at Green Island.” In its detailed, 27-page order, the superior court
both validated the refinancing of the bonds, and also concluded, in
relevant part, that clear and convincing evidence “demonstrate[d]

2 Columbus Regional is a private non-profit organization

60a

that the [Hospital] Authority ha[d] transferred and delegated [its]
rights and duties to a private company.” Specifically, the court noted
that, though the bond documents stated that Columbus Regional
would “have little participation in the Project,” the court found it
“apparent [that] Columbus Regional ha[d] acquired the site, built
Spring Harbor, prepared all legal documents and financial transfers,
and [would] own, manage and control Spring Harbor.” Indeed, the
court found that the Hospital Authority “ha[d] transferred all the
bond proceeds, acquisition, construction, management, and total
control of this Project to a private company, Columbus Regional
Healthcare System Inc., and/or ‘affiliates.’ ”
Subsequently, the superior court explained that it

cannot rule as a matter of fact and as a matter of law [that]
Spring Harbor is a project which originated with the
[Hospital] Authority, or as one which will only benefit the
[Hospital] Authority and the public, or that “no person,
partnership, association, or corporation shall have any rights
hereunder, or that the [Hospital] Authority will ‘own’ and
‘manage’ the Spring Harbor at Green Island project.”

The court reiterated that “the entire project is owned, managed, and
controlled by [a private entity], and once the bonds are paid, the
[Hospital] Authority has agreed that [Columbus Regional] will take
possession and will own everything on site . . . all property of every
kind, real or personal.” Nevertheless, as referenced above, the court
validated the 2007 bond refinancing, finding that the project itself
served a public purpose as contemplated under the Hospital Authori-
ties Law.?

(c) Proceedings Regarding Ad Valorem Taxation

Between the validation of the 2004 and 2007 bonds, the Tax
Board sent the Hospital Authority a bill for its Spring Harbor
property tax obligation, which included taxes for all improvements
made to the facility. The Hospital Authority refused to pay, contend-
ing that its property interest in Spring Harbor was exempt from ad
valorem property taxation and subsequently filed for declaratory and
injunctive relief in Muscogee County Superior Court.

At the request of the trial court, the parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment regarding the taxability of Spring Harbor.
Specifically, the Hospital Authority contended, inter alia, that its

8 ‘The trial courts’ bond validation rulings were not appealed, and we express no opinion on
their merits.

eS 361

leasehold interest was exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to
OCGA § 48-5-41 (a) (1) (A). The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to the Hospital Authority finding, in relevant part, that

the validity of Plaintiff Hospital Authority's property inter-
est in Spring Harbor under the ground lease, and the valid-
ity of the ground lease itself, has been established by the
Superior Court of Muscogee County in two separate Bond
Validation orders, one in 2004 and another in 2007. While
these Bond Validation orders did not specifically resolve the
issue of taxation regarding the Spring Harbor property, the
orders did confirm the Hospital Authority’s ownership of
Spring Harbor. [*]

These two Bond Validation orders also determined that
Spring Harbor was a valid and proper project of the Hospital
Authority that advances the Hospital Authority’s pur-
poses .... In the instant case, income derived from the
operation of Spring Harbor would not only go toward sup-
porting its continued operation, but would necessarily be
used to satisfy the Hospital Authority's revenue bond indebt-
edness. On both counts, said income would be used in
furtherance of the functions and purposes of the Hospital
Authority.

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that Plain-
tiff Hospital Authority’s property interest in the facilities
and improvements constituting Spring Harbor qualifies as
public property, and therefore, it is exempt from ad valorem
property taxation.

(Emphasis supplied.) The Tax Board appealed this decision to the
Court of Appeals.

(d) Court of Appeals Opinion

Relying on the 2004 and 2007 bond validation orders, which the
Court of Appeals determined were conclusive on the question of
ownership and taxation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment. Specifically, relying upon the
bond validation’s “conclusive findings,” the court concluded that the
Hospital Authority’s leasehold interest was public property because,
in part, “ ‘the purposes for which the (b)onds (were) being issued, as

4 The superior court's conclusion regarding the Hospital Authority's ownership of Spring
Harbor is inconsistent with the lengthy factual findings made by the trial court in the 2007 bond
validation order. However, the superior court order does not address these inconsistencies,

62 aS

described in the petition and complaint, (were) in furtherance of the
public purposes for which (the Hospital) Authority was established.’ ”
Columbus, 338 Ga. App. at 305. We granted the petition for certiorari
to review that holding and now reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

2. Analysis

Bond validation decisions are “incontestable and conclusive.” Ga
Const. of 1983 Art. IX, Sec. VI, Par. IV. See also OCGA § 36-82-78
(“[T]he judgment of the superior court confirming and validating the
issuance of the bonds and the security therefor shall be forever
conclusive against the governmental body upon the validity of such
bonds and the security therefor.”). However, this restriction “only
attaches to those matters that are referenced and adjudicated in
[the bond] proceedings.” Sherman v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors,
288 Ga. 88, 94 (701 SE2d 472) (2010).
As the Tax Board argues, and the superior court correctly recog-
nized below, the bond validation orders “[do] not specifically resolve
the issue of taxation regarding Spring Harbor.” Indeed, the bond
validation orders include factual determinations regarding the own-
ership, control, and management of the property, and the Court of
Appeals appears to have misconstrued the bond validation orders in
this respect.
t is well established that “[a]ll public property is exempt from
taxation . . . but it is exempt only so long as it remains in public
ownership.” Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Coleman, 219 Ga. 12, 16 (131
SE2d 768) (1963) (recognizing that where an entity owns a leasehold
interest, that estate can be severed from the fee interest and classi-
fied separately for ad valorem tax purposes). Though OCGA § 48-5-41
(a) (1) (A) does not define “public property,” this Court has established
its meaning as property which “is owned by the State, or some
political division thereof, and title to which is vested directly in the
State, or one of its subordinate political divisions, or in some person
holding exclusively for the benefit of the State, or a subordinate
public corporation.” Sigman v. Brunswick Port Auth., 214 Ga. 332,
335 (104 SE2d 467) (1958). When property is held not by the State
itself, but instead by an instrumentality such as a hospital authority,
whether it is “public property” depends on whether the instrumen-
tality “holds title only for the benefit of the State and the public.”
Hosp. Auth. of Albany v. Stewart, 226 Ga. 530, 537 (175 SE2d 857)
(1970). Put another way, the question in this case is whether the
Hospital Authority holds the leasehold interest for “public pur-
poses ... in the furtherance of the legitimate functions of the hospital
authority,” id. at 531, rather than for “private gain or income.” Id. at
537. As the Court of Appeals previously observed, “the mere fact that

eS 368

property is owned by a Hospital Authority does not exempt it from
property taxes.” Columbus, Ga. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Med. Center
Hosp. Auth., 336 Ga. App. 746, 752 (783 SE2d 182) (2016).

Just like the superior court below, the Court of Appeals presumed
that the Hospital Authority’s leasehold interest was public property
because the bonds issued were found to have a public purpose in both
the 2004 and 2007 bond validations. It may be that in many cases —
perhaps even most cases — facts establishing that bonds have a
public purpose also will tend to show that property associated with
those bonds is public property, but it is not inevitably so. The question
of whether a hospital authority’s property interest qualifies for ad
valorem tax exemption as “public property” is a separate and distinct
question from the issues presented in a bond validation proceeding.
Instead, the standard to be applied in order to determine whether a
hospital authority’s property interest qualifies as “public property” is
set forth in our decisions in Stewart and Sigman.

Consequently, the bond validation proceedings did not conclu-
sively establish whether the leasehold interest of the Hospital Author-
ity is “public property” for tax purposes, and the superior court below
should have drawn its own conclusions about taxability.° To the
extent that the Court of Appeals and superior court considered the
bond validation judgments conclusive on the question of taxability,
we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

a — — " a _—_ = —_ —_ "

Lomax, for appellants.

Dentons US, J. Randolph Evans, Keshia W. Lipscomb; Roths-
child & Rothschild, Jerome M. Rothschild, Andrew A. Rothschild;
Scott C. Crowley; Brown & Adams, Jeffrey A. Brown, for appellee.

® This Court of Appeals decision arose from a separate action that involved the same
parties but different property.

® We do not foreclose the possibility that the superior court might consider facts found in
the bond validation proceedings. Indeed, because this issue was presented tothe superior court
in the form of a motion for summary judgment, the court should review all submitted record
materials in support of and opposing the motion in order to determine whether a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to the ad valorem tax exemption.

364 Pe

$17G1491. JORDAN v. EVERSON et al.
(806 SE2d 533)

PER CURIAM.

Following the death of Ben Everson, his parents sued Brian
Jordan, the emergency room physician who attended to Ben two days
before his death. Jordan’s motion for summary judgment was denied
by the trial court, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals. In Everson
uv. Phoebe Sumter Med. Center, 341 Ga. App. 182, 192-193 (5) (b) (798
SE2d 667) (2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of sum-
mary judgment. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals held
that an independent, intervening act breaks the chain of causation in
a wrongful death case only to the extent that the independent,
intervening act is “wrongful or negligent.” Because this holding was
erroneous and is in conflict with longstanding precedent of this
Court, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari filed by Jordan and
reverse that portion of Everson.'

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Eversons, the evidence
shows that Mrs. Everson took Ben to the emergency room on April 29,
2008 because he was hearing voices and hallucinating. Dr. Jordan
diagnosed Ben with obsessive-compulsive disorder and ordered that
he be discharged that afternoon. When Mrs. Everson asked if there
was anything else that should be done for Ben, she was told that she
could call to make an appointment to have him evaluated at a nearby
mental health facility. Mrs. Everson then asked if she would have
better luck securing a timely appointment if someone from the
emergency room made the phone call for her, someone did so, and Ben
was scheduled with an appointment at the nearby mental health
facility for the afternoon of May 1. But the Eversons had lived in
Durham, North Carolina for 17 years and had numerous contacts at
Duke University Hospital. Mr. Everson spoke with a psychiatrist at
Duke, made an appointment for Ben for the afternoon of May 1, and
began the drive to Durham with Ben in lieu of taking him to the
nearby facility. On the morning of May 1, as Mr. Everson was driving
on the interstate, Ben took off his seat belt, jumped out of the moving
car, and ran down the highway. He was ultimately struck by a vehicle
and killed.

In affirming the denial of summary judgment to Jordan, the
Court of Appeals found that a jury would have to determine that the
action of driving Ben to Durham was “wrongful or negligent” before

+ Jordan's petition for certiorari also asks this Court to review other aspects of the decision
of the Court of Appeals in Everson. We decline to do so, and we leave its judgment undisturbed
other than as reflected herein.

eS 365

it could determine that such action broke any causal chain between
Jordan’s conduct and Ben’s death. That was incorrect, as there is no
requirement in Georgia that an intervening act be “wrongful or
negligent” to break the causal chain. As we explained more than 100
years ago in Southern R. Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152, 156 (1) (42 SE 395)
(1902):

Some authorities have formulated rules on this subject
designed for general application, as that the defendant is not
responsible where there has intervened the wilful wrong of
a third person, or is liable where such act is of a negligent
character merely. But the better doctrine is believed to be
that whether or not the intervening act ofa third person will
render the earlier act too remote depends simply upon
whether the concurrence of such intervening act might
reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant.

(citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted). In order to assess
whether the act of driving Ben on the interstate severed any causal
chain in this case, the jury would not have to determine whether the
act was wrongful or negligent but only whether it was reasonably
foreseeable by Jordan or if it was triggered by his conduct. See
Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 601 (2) (774 SE2d 688) (2015). This
is consistent with the usual understanding in American law. See 57A
AmJur2d Negligence § 618.

In holding that an intervening act must be “wrongful or negli-
gent” to break the causal chain, the Court of Appeals relied upon a
single sentence plucked from our recent decision in Goldstein, Garber
& Salama v. J. B., 300 Ga. 840 (797 SE2d 87) (2017), in which we said

that its negligence is not the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff’s injuries, but that an act of a third party intervened to
cause those injuries, the rule is that an intervening and
independent wrongful act of a third person producing the
injury, and without which it would not have occurred, should
be treated as the proximate cause, insulating and excluding
the negligence of the defendant.

(citation and punctuation omitted). The Court of Appeals read too
much into that sentence. In Goldstein, we were addressing whether
an indisputably wrongful act — a sexual assault — intervened to
break the causal chain. We did not consider whether an intervening
act always must be wrongful, and we certainly did not overrule Webb.
To the extent that the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment

366 Pe

was properly denied to Jordan because the alleged intervening act
was not “wrongful or negligent,” its judgment is reversed.”

Certiorari granted, and judgment reversed in part. All the Jus-
tices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

—_— a ” —_ _ 7 —_ = appellant.

Neal H. Howard; Simon Weinstein, for appellees.

$17Y1536. INTHE MATTER OF BRENDEN E. MILLER.
(806 SE2d 596)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Notice of
Discipline seeking the disbarment of Brenden E. Miller (State Bar
No. 506214). The State Bar attempted to serve Miller at the address
listed with the Bar, but he did not acknowledge service of the
disciplinary pleadings within 20 days of mailing and the sheriff filed
a return of service non est inventus when personal service was
attempted. The State Bar then properly served Miller by publication,
pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). Miller failed to file a Notice
of Rejection as to this disciplinary matter. He is therefore in default,
has waived his rights to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such
discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this
Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b).
The facts, as deemed admitted by virtue of his default, show that
Miller, who has been a member of the Bar since 2000, filed on behalf
of a client a petition for relief in federal bankruptcy proceedings, but
the client was thereafter unable to reach Miller. The client then
contacted the bankruptcy trustee, who wrote to Miller, requesting
that he contact his client regarding matters as to which the client
needed assistance, but the client, who was hospitalized at the time
and continued to be unable to reach Miller, was allowed to file a
motion pro se. The bankruptcy court entered an order directing Miller
toconfer with his client and, ifnecessary, filean amended motion, and

2 Our rules contemplate that we may, in some cases, grant a petition for certiorari and
dispose of the case summarily, without full briefing and oral argument. See Supreme Court Rule
50 (2). Here, Jordan and the Eversons agree that the Court of Appeals was wrong when it held
that an intervening act always must be “wrongful or negligent,” and given longstanding
precedent of this Court, the issue is not close. More briefs or oral argument would not aid the
decisional process, and a summary disposition is appropriate here.

eS 367

the trustee again sought to contact Miller about the status of the
matter, but he failed to respond. The court then entered a show cause
order as to why Miller should not be sanctioned for his conduct, but
he again failed to respond to this order or to appear at a hearing on the
matter. The court then entered an order sanctioning Miller and
suspending him from filing cases until he appears and shows cause,
but he has failed to respond to the order, contact his client, or seek to
be removed from the case.

Based on these facts, the Investigative Panel found probable
cause to believe that Miller’s conduct violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4,
1.16 (¢), and 3.2 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in
Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2
and 1.3 is disbarment, and the maximum sanction for a violation of
Rules 1.4, 1.16, and 3.2 is a public reprimand. In aggravation of
discipline, the Bar notes that Miller received a prior 12-month
suspension from this Court for his neglect of another client’s bank-
ruptcy matter, see In the Matter of Miller, 291 Ga. 30 (727 SE2d 124)
(2012); that he failed to respond to the Notice of Investigation, for
which failure he is currently under suspension, see In the Matter of
Miller, S1TY0713 (Dec. 8, 2016); and that he possesses considerable
experience in the practice of law.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered
that the name of Brenden E. Miller be removed from the rolls of
persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Miller is
reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

|

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Wolanda R. Shelton, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

$17Y1831. IN THE MATTER OF JAMES EDWARD
RAMBEAU, JR.
(806 SE2d 572)
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a Notice of
Discipline seeking the disbarment of Respondent James Edward
Rambeau, Jr. (State Bar No. 592845) based on three underlying

368 A

grievances. After Rambeau failed to acknowledge service of the
Notice of Discipline mailed to the post office address on file with the
State Bar’s membership department, the Bar served him by publi-
cation, see Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). However, Rambeau failed to
file a Notice of Rejection. Therefore, he is in default, has waived his
rights to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such discipline and
further proceedings as may be determined by this Court. See Bar
Rule 4-208.1 (b). Rambeau, who was admitted to the State Bar in
1995, is currently under an interim suspension for his failure to
respond to the State Bar’s investigation with regard to one of the
grievances addressed in this matter, and he has since failed to pay his
Bar dues such that he is not currently in good standing with the State
Bar. We agree that disbarment is appropriate.

The facts, as deemed admitted by virtue of Rambeau’s default,
show with regard to State Disciplinary Board (“SDB”) Docket No.
7020 that, in April 2015, a client hired Rambeau to represent her in
acivil suit filedin Fayette County Superior Court. Rambeau entered
an appearance on the client’s behalf but thereafter failed to take any
action or appear at any hearing in the case. The client attempted to
contact him about his efforts and the status of her case, but Rambeau
never responded and the client was forced to take action on her own
to protect her interests. Rambeau never sought permission to with-
draw from the representation and effectively abandoned the client’s
case. The client filed a grievance with the State Bar and, although
properly served with the Notice of Investigation based on that
grievance, Rambeau failed to timely respond.

With regard to SDB Docket No. 7021, the record shows that, in
April 2015, a client hired Rambeau to represent her in an employ-
ment discrimination case. Although Rambeau filed suit on the client’s
behalf against her employer, he never served the employer with the
summons and complaint and therefore the magistrate judge issued a
report recommending that the action be dismissed. After prodding
from the client, who learned of the recommendation on her own,
Rambeau filed an objection to the report and was granted additional
time in which to serve the client’s employer. Despite the fact that the
client had furnished Rambeau with the funds to pay for the expenses
of service, Rambeau failed to serve the employer, and the case was
dismissed in September 2016. Rambeau never told the client about
the dismissal order, nor did he refund the money she gave him for
service expenses or otherwise account to her for those funds. The
client filed a grievance and once again, although properly served with
the resulting Notice of Investigation, Rambeau failed to timely
respond thereto.

eS 369

With regard to SDB Docket No. 7022, the record shows that
Rambeau maintained an IOLTA account at BB&T Bank. In 2016, the
Bank twice notified the Bar that checks written by Rambeau were not
paid because his account had insufficient funds to pay the checks.
Thereafter, Rambeau failed to respond to the Bar’s Trust Account
Overdraft Coordinator’s request for an explanation, leading the
Investigative Panel to initiate a grievance, to which Rambeau faile:
torespond. Thereafter, Rambeau was properly served with the Notice
of Investigation based on the grievance, but he did not properly
respond thereto.

Based on those facts, the Investigative Panel found, in connec-
tion with SDB Docket No. 7020, that Rambeau violated Rules 1.2 (a),
1.3, 1.4 (a) (4), 1.16 (0), and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professiona
Conduct. See Bar Rule 4-102 (d). In connection with SDB Docket No.
7021, the Investigative Panel found violations of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4
(a) (4), 1.15 () (©), 1.16 (d), and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professiona.
Conduct. Finally, in connection with SDB Docket No. 7022, the
Investigative Panel found violations of Rules 1.15 (J) (a), 1.15 @ ©),
1.15 (I) (a) and (b), and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professiona
Conduct. The maximum sanction for a single violation of Rules 1.2,
1.8, 1.15 (1), and 1.15 (II) (a) and (b) is disbarment, while the
maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.16, and 9.3is a public
reprimand.

Based on our review of the record, we agree with the State Bar
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accord-
ingly, the name of James Edward Rambeau, Jr., is hereby removed
from the rolls of attorneys authorized to practice law in the State of
Georgia. He is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.
Pe
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-

man, Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

370 Pe

$17Y1980. IN THE MATTER OF DAVID WESLER FRY.
(806 SE2d 604)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court pursuant to the new
report and recommendation of special master Joseph A. Boone fol-
lowing this Court’s opinion rejecting an earlier request by Respon-
dent David Wesler Fry (State Bar No. 278690) that he be allowed to
resign his membership in the Georgia Bar, pursuant to Rule 1-208 of
the State Bar’s Governance Rules. See In the Matter of Fry, 300 Ga.
862 (800 SE2d 514) (2017). The special master now recommends that
Fry be suspended for one year with conditions on his reinstatement,
and represents that all parties have consented to this resolution. We,
however, find this resolution to be too lenient under the circum-
stances of this matter, and we order that Fry be disbarred.

As set out in the earlier opinion, in March 2012, in the Superior
Court of Richmond County, Georgia, Fry entered a guilty plea under
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. 8. 25 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162)
(1970), and the First Offender Act, see OCGA § 42-8-60, to two felony
counts of bribery of county commissioners. He was sentenced to five
years probation on each count to be served concurrently. Fry’s pro-
bation was terminated in October 2016, and he was discharged
without an adjudication of guilt, as is allowed by the First Offender
Act, see OCGA § 42-8-60 (e). Although the State Bar received a
certified copy of Fry’s convictions in 2012, the Bar failed to act on
those convictions until 2016 when it initiated this disciplinary mat-
ter.

Initially, Fry agreed that if the disciplinary matter was dis-
missed, he would then “resign” his Bar membership and would not
seek reinstatement to the State Bar of Georgia. Although the State
Bar hadno objection to that unusual resolution, this Court rejected it,
noting that Georgia’s Bar Rules do not allow for dismissal/resignation
in the face of an unresolved disciplinary matter; that the accepted
method in Georgia for the cessation of a law practice in exchange for
the resolution of a pending disciplinary matter would be through the
voluntary surrender of one’s license; and that Fry had not presented
this Court with sufficient evidence or policy support for creating an
alternative to that standard practice. See Fry, 300 Ga. at 865-866.
The Court remanded the matter for further proceedings.

After remand, the special master held a hearing at which Fry
testified and presented evidence. The special master then issued his
report and recommendation in which he found that, by virtue of his
plea, Fry had violated Rule 8.4 (a) (2), see Bar Rule 4-102 (d), the
maximum penalty for which is disbarment. The special master found,
in aggravation of punishment, that Fry was a long-term, experienced

eS am

member of the Bar and, in mitigation, that Fry lacked a prior
disciplinary history; that he suffered personal and emotional prob-
lems; and that there was delay in the disciplinary process. See
Standard 9.32 of the American Bar Association’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The special master also acknowledged
an affidavit from the judge who accepted Fry’s guilty plea attesting to
Fry’s good character and to Fry’s successful participation in the
mental health court program following his plea. Noting that this case
involved no potential or actual injury to a client in the traditional
sense, the special master nevertheless recognized that there had
been a violation of the ethical standards of the legal profession and
recommended that Fry be suspended from the practice of law for a
minimum term of one year, with his reinstatement conditioned on his
providing the State Bar with an acceptable written certification from
a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist stating that Fry is mentally
competent to return to the practice of law. Both Fry and the State Bar
agreed with his recommendation, and neither side has filed excep-
tions.

After consideration of the record in this case, the Court finds that
the discipline recommended by the special master is an unacceptable
sanction in this matter. It is true that the “primary purpose of a
disciplinary action is to protect the public from attorneys who are not
qualified to practice law due to incompetence or unprofessional
conduct.” In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865, 866 (621 SE2d
750) (2005) (“disbarment is the typical discipline imposed in cases...
where a lawyer engages in criminal conduct involving interference
with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresenta-
tion, or fraud”). Another important purpose, however, involves the
protection of the public’s confidence in the legal system. In the Matter
of Blitch, 288 Ga. 690, 692 (706 SE2d 461) (2011). In this case, Fry
committed more than one felony by bribing public officials. Moreover,
Fry has shown no remorse for his crimes. His acts not only indicate
that he is unqualified to practice law due to unprofessional conduct,
but they also gravely denigrate public confidence in the legal system.
Despite the Bar’s slow prosecution of this case, Fry’s conduct must be
met with strong discipline, not merely a one-year suspension. See,
e.g., In the Matter of Csehy, 296 Ga. 492 (769 SE2d 93) (2015) (lawyer
disbarred for felonies involving drug and gun possession); In the
Matter of Hutto, 292 Ga. 556 (739 SE2d 385) (2013) (lawyer disbarred
for withholding information of crime); In the Matter of Vickers, 291
Ga. 354 (729 SE2d 355) (2012) (lawyer disbarred for felony charges of
fraud). Accordingly, we hereby order that David Wesler Fry be
disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys

372 Pe

licensed to practice law in this State. Fry is reminded of his duties
under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

|

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

James P. Theodocion, for Fry.

$17Y2000. IN THE MATTER OF MELISSA M. CLYATT.
(806 SE2d 594)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of special master Jack J. Helms, who recommends
that this Court impose a Review Panel reprimand on Melissa M.
Clyatt (State Bar No. 006110) for the misconduct underlying this
matter. This matter began when a former client of Clyatt, who has
been a member of the Bar since 1988, recorded a videotaped state-
ment conveying her grievance in May 2014. The client died, however,
in May 2015, and the formal complaint against Clyatt was not filed
until May 2016. Although the parties engaged in extensive discovery,
the death of Clyatt’s former client greatly impacted the ability of the
parties to marshal the relevant evidence and left several issues about
the admissibility of certain evidence. As a result, the parties agreed
ona set of stipulated facts under which they agreed the matter would
be adjudicated. Following presentation of these stipulated facts as
the Bar’s case, Clyatt moved for dismissal of certain counts of the
formal complaint alleging several violations of Bar Rules, but con-
ceded that her conduct had violated Rule 1.8 (a), the maximum
sanction for a violation of which is a public reprimand. The Bar did
not concede to the dismissal of the various counts, but acknowledged
that, based on the stipulated facts, there was not case law with which
it could oppose the motion. The special master did not rule on the
motion at the hearing.

As recounted by the special master, the facts underlying this
matter began in 2006 with Clyatt’s representation of the former client
in acatastrophic workers’ compensation case, which settledin Novem-
ber 2013. During the course of her representation, Clyatt’s relation-
ship with the client evolved into a more personal relationship, with
Clyatt and her staff assisting the client with personal matters, in

eS ams

addition to legal matters, including helping the client locate and
move to a new residence in a safer area, monitoring the client’s
medical and home health care, and including the client in family and
office socialization. At the client’s request, Clyatt assisted the client
in setting up accounts for the settlement proceeds and had her name,
again at the client’s request, placed on the accounts. Clyatt and the
client agreed that the client would allow Clyatt to use the settlement
money, in return for which the client would receive a set monthly fee
for interest payments and Clyatt would return any principal amount
borrowed upon request. However, this agreement was never reduced
to writing, and the client was not informed that she could and should
seek the advice of independent counsel before entering into such an
arrangement. In any case, in February and March of 2014, Clyatt
wrote several checks for large dollar amounts against the account and
paid the client the agreed-upon amounts in interest. In late March,
the client suffered a severe health event that necessitated a hospi-
talization and additional nursing and hospice care from the time she
was discharged until her death in May 2015. In May 2014, the client
called Clyatt and asked her to return the principal amounts she had
withdrawn, which Clyatt did in May and June 2014.

Based on these facts, the special master agreed with Clyatt’s
admission of having violated only Rule 1.8 (a), as the evidence reflects
that Clyatt knowingly acquired a pecuniary interest in the client’s
funds while still representing the client, and without having ensured:
that the terms of the arrangement were committed to writing; that
the client was advised of the desirability of seeking the advice of
independent counsel; or that the client’s consent was informed and in
writing. In mitigation of discipline, the special master noted that
Clyatt had no prior disciplinary record, that she did not have a
dishonest or selfish motive, that she made a timely good faith effort
to make restitution to the client of the principal amounts used to that
point and had paid interest per their agreement in the interim, that
she displayed a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceed-
ings, and that she has exhibited remorse; in aggravation, the special
master noted only Clyatt’s considerable experience in the practice of
law. Because of the greater weight of the collected mitigating factors;
because of the rare, personal relationship that developed between
Clyatt and the client and which benefitted the client greatly; and
because of the absence of evidence of malice, deceit, or bad faith, the
special master found that a Review Panel reprimand is the appro-
priate sanction in this matter. Neither Clyatt nor the Bar has
responded in this Court to the submission of the special master’s
report.

374 Pe

Having reviewed the record, we agree that a Review Panel
reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, the
Court hereby orders that Clyatt receive a Review Panel reprimand in
accordance with Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (4) and 4-220 for her violation of
Rule 1.8 (a).

Review Panel reprimand. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

ee

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William J. Cobb,
Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

Warren R. Hinds, for Clyatt.

$18Y0141. IN THE MATTER OF VINCENT C. OTUONYE.
(806 SE2d 524)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition filed
by Vincent C. Otuonye (State Bar No. 555470) seeking the voluntary
suspension of his license to practice law pending the outcome of an
appeal of his criminal conviction, see Bar Rule 4-106 (f). Because we
agree that such a suspension is appropriate, we accept Otuonye’s
petition.

On April 20, 2017, Vincent C. Otuonye was convicted in the
Superior Court of Mitchell County, Georgia, on one felony count of
Criminal Attempt to Furnish Prohibited Items to Inmates in viola-
tion of OCGA § 42-5-18. Otuonye, who has been a member of the Bar
since 2000, recognizes that his conviction, which constitutes a viola-
tion of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of Bar Rule 4-102 (d), would make him subject
to the provisions of Bar Rule 4-106. Stating that he has initiated an
appeal of his conviction, however, Otuonye filed this petition request-
ing that the Court suspend his license pending the resolution of his
appeal. The Bar has indicated that it has no objection to Otuonye’s
petition, and the special master, Margaret G. Washburn, recom-
mends that we accept it.

Based on our review of the record, we agree that the petition
should be accepted. Accordingly, Otuonye hereby is suspended from
the practice of law in this State until further order of this Court. He
is directed to notify the State Bar of the final disposition of his direct
appeal within ten days of that disposition and is reminded of his
duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

eS am

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Suspended until fur-
ther order of the Court. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017.

| Srl Ga ;
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

$17A0765. COMMUNITY & SOUTHERN BANK v. LOVELL et al.
(807 SE2d 444)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

In December 2011, Georgia Trust Bank secured a judgment
against Virgil Lovell for $1.2 million. The next year, Georgia Trust
failed, and its assets went into receivership with the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, which later sold the judgment against Lovell
to Community & Southern Bank (CSB). When CSB was unable to
collect the full amount of the judgment, it discovered a number of
recent transactions in which Lovell and his companies had conveyed
their respective interests in properties that, CSB believed, otherwise
would have been available to satisfy the judgment. In January 2015,
CSB filed a lawsuit against Lovell, his wife, and several of his
companies, asserting claims under the Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fers Act (UFTA)! to set aside those conveyances as fraudulent trans-
fers. The trialcourt dismissed some of those claims on the ground that
they did not state claims upon which relief might properly be granted,
see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), and CSB appeals.” We affirm in part,
reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

1. CSB contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed two
claims against Focus on Design, Inc. and Ward Land Holdings, LLC.?

1 See former OCGA § 18-2-70 et seq. In 2015, the General Assembly enacted the Uniform
Voidable Transactions Act, which has superseded the UFTA with respect to transfers made on
or after July 1, 2015. See Ga. L. 2015, p. 996, §§ 4A-1, 7-1 (a) (1). The allegedly fraudulent
transfers at issue in this case, however, were made before that time, and as to those transfers,
the UFTA still applies.

2 The trial court issued a certificate of immediate review, CSB filed an application for leave
to take an interlocutory appeal, and that application was granted. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). This
Court properly has jurisdiction of this appeal because it presents a question about the
constitutionality of a statute, see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1), namely, whether
a Georgia statute is preempted by federal law. See Babies Right Start, Inc. v. Georgia Dept. of
Public Health, 293 Ga. 553, 554 (1) (748 SE2d 404) (2013)

2 These claims are set forth in Counts XI and XII of the complaint.

376 a

In connection with these claims, CSB alleged that Lovell owns Focus
on Design, that his wife is a member of Ward Land Holdings, and that
Focus on Design conveyed a certain property in Habersham County
to Ward Land Holdings with the intent to defraud Lovell’s creditors.
CSB sought to avoid and set aside that conveyance.

As the trial court recognized, however, the UFTA only permits
the avoidance of a fraudulent transfer of a debtor’s property.* Lovell
himself is indebted by judgment to CSB, but there is no allegation
that Focus on Design is so indebted. It is settled in Georgia that a
creditor generally cannot reach the assets of a corporation to satisfy
the debt of a shareholder, see Acree v. McMahan, 276 Ga. 880, 881
(585 SE2d 873) (2003), and CSB identifies no basis in this case for
departing from that settled rule. The UFTA affords no such basis. Cf.
Merrill Ranch Props. v. Austell, 336 Ga. App. 722, 730-731 (2) (784
SE2d 125) (2016) (UFTA affords no basis for creditor to avoid trans-
fers of property by limited liability company of which debtor is a
member). The trial court properly dismissed the claims by which CSB
sought to avoid and set aside the conveyance from Focus on Design to
Ward Land Holdings, and we affirm the dismissal of those claims.

2. CSB also contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed
two claims involving a property in Volusia County, Florida, which
Lovell conveyed to his wife, allegedly with the intent to defraud his
creditors.° Although CSB asserted those claims in its original com-
plaint, it later filed an amended complaint, purporting to withdraw
the claims relating to the property in Florida. CSB filed its amended
complaint before the trial court entered or announced its decision to
dismiss those claims. Accordingly, CSB argues, those claims were not
properly before the trial court, and it had no authority to dismiss
them for failure to state a claim upon which relief might properly be
granted. We agree.

As Lovell and his wife correctly note, OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) (1) (A)
only allows a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss “an action” by notice of
dismissal, and it makes no provision for a plaintiff to voluntarily
dismiss fewer than all ofits claims. But OCGA § 9-11-15 (a) expressly
permits a plaintiff to “amend his pleading as a matter of course and
without leave of court at any time before the entry of a pretrial order.”
Here, CSB withdrew the claims relating to the Florida property by
amendment pursuant to § 9-11-15, not by a notice of dismissal under

“ The UFTA authorizes the avoidance of “transfers,” see former OCGA § 18-2-77 (a), it
defines a “transfer” as “disposing or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset,” former
OCGA § 18-2-71 (12), and it defines an “asset” as “property ofa debtor.” Former OCGA § 18-2-71
@)

© These claims are set forth in Counts I and II of the complaint.

eS 377

§ 9-11-41. Our Court of Appeals has recognized that an amendment
under § 9-11-15 is the proper means for a plaintiff to voluntarily
withdraw fewer than all ofits claims. See Young v. Rider, 208 Ga. App.
147, 148 (2) (480 SE2d 117) (1993) (“Where less than all ofa plaintiff’s
claims are added or dropped, the additions and deletions are not
dismissals and renewals governed by OCGA §[] 9-11-41 (a)... but
simply amendments governed by the liberal amendment rules of
OCGA § 9-11-15 (a)... .”). In cases interpreting and applying Rules
15 and 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,* the federal courts
likewise have held that a plaintiff may withdraw fewer than all of its
claims by way of Rule 15. See Klay v. United Healthgroup, 376 F3d
1092, 1106 (III) (11th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff wishing to eliminate
particular claims or issues from the action should amend the com-
plaint under Rule 15 (a) rather than dismiss under Rule 41 (a)... .”
(citation and punctuation omitted)). Because CSB effectively with-
drew the claims about the Florida property prior to the entry or
announcement of any decision to dismiss those claims, the trial court
had no authority to pass on the legal sufficiency of the claims. We
vacate the dismissal of the claims relating to the Florida property.

3. CSB contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed a
claim under the UFTA against Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land,
LLC, relating to another property in Habersham County.’ According
to the complaint, Ankony Land is affiliated with Lovell, and Lovell
and Ankony Land both held interests in the property. In January
2010, Lovell and Ankony Land conveyed their interests to Lovell’s
wife, allegedly with the intent to defraud Lovell’s creditors. CSB
sought to avoid the conveyance pursuant to former OCGA § 18-2-74
(a) 1).

Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land moved to dismiss this claim
upon three grounds. First, they said, the UFTA claim is time barred
under former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), which provides in pertinent part:

Acause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer . . .
under [the UFTA] is extinguished unless action is brought...
[u]nder [OCGA § 18-2-74 (a) (1)] within four years after the

® OCGA §§ 9-11-15 (a) and 9-11-41 (a) are modeled after Rules 15 (a) and 41 (a), and
although there are some differences between the state and federal provisions, those differences
are not material to the question presented here. We may, therefore, look for guidance in
decisions of the federal courts interpreting and applying Rules 15 (a) and 41 (a). See Ambler v.
Archer, 230 Ga, 281, 287-288 (1) (196 SE2d 858) (1973).

7 This claim is set forth in Count III of the complaint. By the way, the property at issue in
Count IIT and the Habersham property discussed in Division 1 of this opinion are different
properties.

378 a

transfer was made. .. or, if later, within one year after the
transfer ... was or could reasonably have been discovered by
the claimant[.]

Second, they argued, the UFTA claim arose prior to any assignment
of Georgia Trust assets to CSB, and under OCGA § 44-12-24, “{a]
right of action for . . . injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may
not be assigned.” Third, CSB had actual or constructive notice of the
allegedly fraudulent transfer when it acquired the assets of Georgia
Trust from the FDIC, they said, and for that reason, the UFTA claim
fails as a matter of law.

In response, CSB relied in significant part on the Financial Insti-
tutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
noting that CSB asserted its UFTA claims as the successor by assign-
ment of the FDIC in its capacity as receiver of a failed bank. As for the
timeliness of its UFTA claim, CSB argued that FIRREA preempts
former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), and its assertion of the UFTA claim was
timely under FIRREA. As for whether a UFTA claim can be assigned,
CSB urged that a UFTA claim is not “[a] right of action . . . for injuries
arising from fraud,” and OCGA § 44-12-24 does not apply at all to
UFTAclaims. Ifit does apply, CSB added, it too is preempted by federal
law. Finally, as for actual or constructive notice of the allegedly fraudu-
lent transfer, CSB argued that such notice would not defeat its UFTA
claim in any event.

The trial court rested its dismissal of the claim upon the time bar
of former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), and it did not consider the other
grounds asserted by Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land for dismissing
the claim. The trial court reasoned that former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1) is
a statute of repose, not a statute of limitation, and FIRREA does not,
it concluded, preempt statutes of repose. On appeal, CSB contends
that this conclusion was in error, and with that contention, we agree.

To begin, we note some uncertainty about the extent to which the
relevant provision of FIRREA, 12 USC § 1821 (d) (14), applies at all
in this case. Commonly known as the “FDIC Extender Statute,”
Section 1821 (d) (14) (A) Gi) provides that “the applicable statute of
limitations with regard to any action brought by the [FDIC] as
conservator or receiver shall be... in the case of any tort claim... the
longer of . . . the 3-year period beginning on the date the claim
accrues[ ] or...the period applicable under State law.” For purposes
of the FDIC Extender Statute, a tort claim accrues on “the later of...
the date of the appointment of the [FDIC] as conservator or receiver[ ]
or... the date on which the cause of action accrues.” 12 USC § 1821
(d) (14) (B). If the FDIC Extender Statute applies, and if it preempts
former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), CSB timely asserted the UFTA claim in

eS 379

question, inasmuch as it asserted that claim within three years of the
date that the FDIC was appointed as the receiver for Georgia Trust.

But as we noted, it is not clear that the FDIC Extender Statute
applies at all. For it to apply, CSB would have to stand as the
successor by assignment to the FDIC. We hold today in RES-GA
McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP, 302 Ga. 444 (807
SE2d 381) (2017), that the Georgia bar against the assignment of
fraud claims applies to claims under the UFTA, raising a question in
this case about whether federal law preempts that bar as to direct
assignees of the FDIC.* If CSB stands, in fact, as the successor by
assignment to the FDIC, questions would arise about the extent to
which the FDIC Extender Statute extends to assignees of the FDIC,
whether asa matter of FIRREA itself, federal common law, or Georgia
law generally governing the rights of assignees.® Before this Court
passes upon the constitutionality of a statute, we usually try to
resolve the case on other grounds, especially when, as here, it is not
entirely clear that the case squarely presents the constitutional
question resolved by the trial court. See Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170,
171 (1), n.7 (751 SE2d 337) (2013). But resolving the predicate
questions in this case about the applicability of the FDIC Extender
Statute could lead only to questions about the constitutionality of
another Georgia statute (OCGA § 44-12-24), as well as other difficult
issues of both state and federal law. None of those other issues was
resolved by the trial court, and none has been fully briefed by both
parties on appeal. Accordingly, we will address the question resolved
by the trial court, and we will confine our analysis to that question.

The trial court concluded, and Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land
argue on appeal, that a federal extender statute (like the FDIC
Extender Statute) does not preempt state statutes of repose. How-
ever, “[e]very circuit that has heard this argument has disagreed and
held that it does.” FDIC v. RBS Securities, 798 F3d 244, 250 (I]) (5th
Cir. 2015). See also Nat. Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home
Equity Loan, Inc., 764 F3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2014); Fed. Housing Fin.
Agency v. UBS Ams. Inc., 712 F3d 136, 142-144 (2nd Cir. 2013). In
concluding otherwise, the trial court relied on CTS Corp. v. Wald-
burger, ___ U.S. ____ (184 SCt 2175, 189 LE2d 62) (2014), a case in

* In a number of cases, “[flederal courts have upheld the FDIC’s assignment of assets
pursuant to FIRREA that would have otherwise been barred by state law anti-assignment
statutes.” First State Bank of NW Ark. v. McClelland Qualified Personal Residence Trust, No.
5:14-CV-130, 2014 WL 6801803 at *5 (M.D. Ga. 2014) (citing cases).

® See generally Federal Fin. Co. v. Hall, 108 F3d 46 (4th Cir. 1997) (considering whether
federal or state law governs the extent to which the FDIC Extender Statute applies to claims
asserted by assignees of FDIC).

380 a

which the United States Supreme Court held that the limitations
provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) does not preempt state statutes
of repose. But the federal circuit courts have examined at length the
reach of the FDIC Extender Statute and other extender statutes like
it in light of CTS, and they have concluded that the extender statutes
are materially unlike the CERCLA limitations provision at issue in
CTS and displace conflicting statutes of repose. See RBS Securities,
798 F3d at 254-262 (IV). See also Nat. Credit Union Admin. Bad. v.
RBS Securities, 833 F3d 1125, 1133-1135 (1) (a) (8) (9th Cir. 2016);
Nomura, 764 F3d at 1208-1217 (II). We find these decisions of the
federal circuit courts persuasive, and “[w]e join all appellate courts to
have considered the question of whether an extender statute like the
one in FIRREA applies to both statutes of limitations and statutes of
repose and find that it does.” RBS Securities, 833 F3d at 1130 (D (a).

Even if former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1) is a statute of repose, the trial
court was wrong to conclude that the FDIC Extender Statute could
not possibly preempt a statute of repose. Whether the FDIC Extender
Statute applies at all in this case, and whether it actually preempts
former OCGA § 18-2-79 (1), are matters that we leave for the trial
court to resolve on remand. The dismissal of the UFTA claim relating
to the conveyance from Lovell and Ankony Land to his wife is
reversed, and this case is remanded for the trial court to reconsider
whether CSB states a claim with respect to that conveyance upon
which relief might properly be granted.

4. The trial court also dismissed derivative claims for attorney
fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 and punitive damages, reasoning that it
had dismissed all of the substantive claims upon which the derivative
claims depended. But the trial court was mistaken — it did not
dismiss all of the substantive claims. Moreover, in Division 3 above,
we explained that the trial court erred when it dismissed the UFTA
claim against Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land relating to a prop-
erty in Habersham County. As things stand now, substantive claims
remain pursuant to which attorney fees and punitive damages may
be available. See In the Matter of Southern Home and Ranch Supply,
Inc., 561 BR 810, 818-819 (B) (N.D. Ga. 2016). We therefore reverse
the dismissal of the derivative claims.

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part,
and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur, except
Peterson, J., not participating.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

381

Thompson, O'Brien, Kemp & Nasuti, Bret T. Thrasher; Jones
Walker, William J. Shaughnessy; Barnes & Thornburg, Sarah H.
Newman, for appellant.

Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, John A. Christy, Andrew J. Lavoie;
The Carr Law Group, James H. Cox, for appellees.

$17A0788. EDWARDS et al. v. CITY OF WARNER ROBINS et al.
(807 SE2d 438)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

This case presents challenges to a municipal zoning ordinance.
Because the property owners have abandoned their claim that the
ordinance was unconstitutionally enacted and have not shown that it
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to them or that it unconstitu-
tionally interferes with their property rights, we affirm the superior
court’s grant of summary judgment to the city.

1. In 1973, Charles Edwards acquired 794 Oak Avenue in the City
of Warner Robins (“the City”). This property was subdivided into
three lots, each with a mobile home that he and his wife, Carol
Edwards, rent out; they also have sometimes lived in one of the
homes. In June 1997, the Edwardses (“Appellants”) bought proper-
ties adjoining 794 Oak Avenue: 790, 791, and 793 Oak Avenue, which
together comprise seven acres with 36 lots. Each lot either had a

mobile home on it or was being
Appellants allege that they purc!
“manufactured home park.” At t

held out for use by a mobile home.
hased these properties for use as a
he time of the 1997 purchase, how-

ever, mobile homes were prohibited on the properties by the restric-
tions of the City’s Base Environs Overlay District (“BEOD”) ordinance,

except where permitted as a lega’
The City Council added the
ordinance on February 22, 1994

nonconforming use.
BEOD to the City’s overall zoning
, with the enactment of Ordinance

12-94. As explained in § 74.4 of the zoning ordinance, the BEOD is

“an overlay district that applies

additional standards and require-

ments to properties located within an underlying zoning district.”

Section 74.4.1 explains that:

Proposed developments
trict shall comply with these

located within this zoning dis-
requirements and the require-

ments of the underlying zoning district and any other over-
lay districts that apply to lands within this zone. In the case

of conflicting standards and

requirements, the more strin-

gent standards and requirements shall apply.

382 Cee ee
That section also lists the purposes of the BEOD:

To protect the public health, safety, and welfare by
regulating development and land uses within noise-
sensitive areas and accident potential zones;

To ensure compatibility between and surrounding land
uses and Robins Air Force Base; and

To protect RAFB from encroachment by incompatible
development.

Table 74.4-A was adopted as part of the BEOD ordinance, and it
prohibited “manufactured housing” or “mobile homes” in the dis-
trict.

Section 74.4.4.1 provides an exemption to the BEOD restrictions
for existing uses:

Uses existing on the effective date of these regulations
shall not be required to change in order to comply with the
requirements specified herein. The nonconforming use require-
ments of these regulations shall apply to the future appli-
cability of the standards and requirements contained herein.

The nonconforming use rules are laid out in §§ 61.5 and 61.6 of the
City’s zoning ordinance. Section 61.5.1 says, “No such nonconforming
uses shall be enlarged or increased, nor extended to occupy a greater
area of land than was occupied at the effective date of adoption or
amendment of these regulations.” Section 61.5.4 says, “No additional
structures not conforming to the requirements of these regulations
shall be erected in connection with such nonconforming use of land.”
And § 61.6.2 says that if a nonconforming structure is “destroyed by
any means to the extent of more than fifty (50) percent of its current
replacement value, it shall not be reconstructed except in conformity
with the provisions of these regulations[.]”?

1 The City’s zoning ordinance uses “manufactured housing,” “manufactured home,” and
“mobile home.” The parties use the terms interchangeably with regard tothe homes Appellants
have on and want to add to their properties.

2 ‘The City’s full zoning ordinance is not in the record. A certified copy of Section 74 of the
ordinance, which includes the BEOD ordinance, is in the record. Appellants included an
uncertified copy of the pertinent provisions of §§ 61.5 and 61.6 as an attachment to their
complaint. The full zoning ordinance can be accessed online through the City’s website, but this
document does not appear to be certified as required for the trial court to take judicial notice of
itunder OCGA § 24-2-221. See id. (“When certified by a public officer, clerk, or keeper of county
or municipal records in this state in a manner as specified for county records in Code Section
24-9-920 or ina manner as specified for municipal records in paragraph (1) or (2) of Code Section
24-9-902 and in the absence of contrary evidence, judicial notice may be taken of a certified copy

eS 388

Itis undisputed that all of Appellants’ Oak Avenue properties are
within the BEOD. The three mobile homes on the 794 Oak Avenue
lots have been permitted since 1994 as nonconforming uses. In July
1997, Appellants asked the City for rezoning of their other Oak
Avenue lots, and the City Council granted this request and rezoned
the properties from R-3 to R-MH.*

On June 18, 2008, the City allegedly published in The Telegraph
newspaper, the City’s legal organ, notice of a July 8 hearing to be held
by the City planning and zoning commission on a proposed amend-
ment to the BEOD ordinance.‘ The minutes of the July 8 hearing
show that the amendment to the BEOD ordinance was discussed, no
one expressed opposition, and the commission voted to recommend
passing the amendment. On July 21, the City Council adopted
Ordinance 27-08, which amended the zoning ordinance by replacing
Table 74.4-A with a new table. The new table says that “mobile home
parks or courts” and “related structures” are prohibited.

On February 17, 2009, the City’s director of development sent
Appellants an e-mail explaining that even though the underlying
R-MH zoning of Appellants’ properties allows mobile homes, the
BEOD takes precedence and does not allow them. On August 16,
2011, Appellants submitted a formal request to the City’s building
inspector asking to be allowed (1) to upgrade the current mobile home
on one lot in the 794 Oak Avenue property, explaining that a newer,
more energy efficient unit would result in a better return on their

of any ordinance or resolution included within a general codification required by paragraph (1)
of subsection (b) of Code Section 36-80-19 as representing an ordinance or resolution duly
approved by the governing authority and currently in force as presented. Any such certified
copy shall be self-authenticating and shall be admissible as prima-facie proof of any such
ordinance or resolution before any court or administrative body.”); former OCGA § 24-7-22
(same). See also Whitfield v. City of Atlanta, 296 Ga. 641, 641 (769 SE2d 76) (2015) (“City and
county ordinances must be alleged and proven in order to be considered by the superior and
appellate courts of this State. The proper method of proving a city ordinance is production of the
original ordinance or a certified copy thereof.” (citations omitted) (decided under the new
Evidence Code)).

® Uncertified zoning ordinance excerpts in the record show that R-8 property is limited to
residential uses. The uncertified City zoning ordinance not in the record but accessible online
says R-MH means “manufactured home residential district.”

* The only evidence of this notice in the record on appeal is an affidavit that is ostensibly
from the classified/legal supervisor of The Telegraph, but that is signed by a different person
“on behalf of” her, making the affidavit invalid. See Sumbor v. Kelley, 271 Ga. 133, 134 (518 SE2d
120) (1999). In its order granting summary judgment in favor of the City on the constitutional
issues, the superior court recognized that the affidavit was invalid, but held that the invalid
affidavit “does not invalidate the ordinance” and noted that the City “provided copies of the
newspaper showing that the ordinance did in fact run as necessary.” The newspaper copies,
however, donot appear tobe in the record on appeal, and although the City notes in its brief that
the superior court said that the City was able to provide copies, it cites only the superior court’s
order, not the record, for this point.

384 es

investment, and (2) to put additional mobile homes on lots on the 790,
791, and 793 Oak Avenue properties.® After this request was denied,
Appellants appealed to the City planning and zoning commission,
arguing that Ordinance 27-08 was unlawfully enacted and that
Section 74 is unconstitutionally vague and effected an unconstitu-
tional taking of their properties. The commission considered and
denied the appeal at a special meeting on April 24, 2012. Appellants
then appealed to the board of zoning appeals, which denied their
appeal after a meeting on May 24, 2012.

On June 19, 2012, Appellants sought judicial review of this
denial in the superior court.® They claimed that the 1994 and 2008
BEOD ordinances were unconstitutionally enacted because insuffi-
cient notice was given, in violation of the Zoning Procedures Law
(ZPL), see OCGA §§ 36-66-1 to 36-66-6, and their procedural due
process rights, and that the City’s denial of their request to build
mobile homes was improper because the BEOD ordinance is uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to them. Appellants also
claimed that the zoning scheme constitutes a taking of their proper-
ties and impermissibly interferes with their contracts, and they
requested attorney fees.

On March 5, 2013, after discovery, Appellants moved for sum-
mary judgment. On June 28, 2013, the superior court denied that
motion, explaining that the BEOD ordinance prohibits mobile homes
on Appellants’ properties; that the 2008 BEOD ordinance “appears”
to be validly enacted; that even if it was not, mobile homes are still
prohibited under the 1994 BEOD ordinance; and that Appellants
cannot expand their nonconforming use by removing a mobile home
and replacing it with a new one or by placing new mobile homes on
previously vacant lots. On October 3, 2013, the City moved for
summary judgment. After obtaining new counsel, Appellants filed a
response and an amended complaint. Appellants added a claim that
the BEOD ordinance deprives them of their vested right to use their
properties for mobile homes and amended the taking claim to allege
that the BEOD ordinance has taken their properties without just
compensation and to request money damages under 42 USC § 1983.
After a hearing, the superior court granted the City’s motion for

® Appellants have represented that 12 out of 36 lots in their planned mobile home park on
those properties are occupied by mobile homes. It appears that these 12 mobile homes have been
permitted as nonconforming uses.

© Appellants named as defendants the City as well as the City’s mayor, building official,
and director of the department of development in their individual and official capacities. None
of these individuals has filed anything separately from the City, so the defendant/appellees are
referred to collectively as “the City.”

eS 385

summary judgment on October 1, 2014. In its order, the court
explained that most of the issues had been decided in the June 2013
order and found that notice of the 2008 BEOD amendment had been
published as required.

Appellants sought to appeal that order, filing a notice of appeal
to this Court. We concluded that the superior court had not distinctly
ruled on the constitutional issues and so transferred the case to the
Court of Appeals, which in August 2015 dismissed the direct appeal
for failure to file an application for discretionary appeal. We then
denied Appellants’ petition for certiorari. When the case returned to
the superior court, Appellants moved for a ruling on the remaining
issues in the case, namely their constitutional challenges. On July 7,
2016, the court granted the City summary judgment, expressly ruling
that the City’s zoning ordinance is not unconstitutional and that
Appellants’ claims of deprivation of rights under 42 USC § 1983 and
regulatory taking are without merit. This appeal followed.

2. Appellants argue that the City did not comply with the notice
requirement imposed by the ZPL before enacting Ordinances 27-08
and 12-94. See OCGA § 36-66-4 (requiring that the local government
provide for a hearing on a proposed zoning action and publish notice of
the hearing in the local newspaper “[a]t least 15 but not more than 45
days prior to the date of the hearing”). As discussed in footnote 4 above,
nocompetent evidence in the record currently on appeal shows that the
City published notice as required by the ZPL before passing Ordinance
27-08. And the record contains no evidence at all about a hearing or
notice of a hearing on Ordinance 12-94. Whether the City met the ZPL
notice requirement is not an issue to be decided in this appeal,
however, because as explained above, Appellants already had their
opportunity to appeal the superior court’s October 2014 order ruling on
their statutory claims, including their contention that the City vio-
lated the ZPL. That appeal was dismissed in August 2015, and
Appellants are not entitled to a second appeal from the October 2014
order. See Massey v. Massey, 294 Ga. 163, 164-165 (751 SE2d 330)
(2013). Appellants may raise in this appeal only the constitutional
claims on which the superior court first distinctly ruled in its July
2016 order.

Appellants label their notice argument as a constitutional one;
this enumeration of error and the heading of the pertinent section of
their brief say that the zoning ordinances were “unconstitutionally
enacted.” The substance of the argument, however, focuses entirely
on the alleged failure to meet the notice requirement of the ZPL, and
Appellants make no argument and cite no authority that by failing to
meet that statutory requirement, the City violated constitutional due
process. Cf. Sikes v. Pierce, 212 Ga. 567, 568 (94 SE2d 427) (1956)

386 es

(explaining, before the enactment of the ZPL, that the Constitution
requires “notice and hearing” regarding a zoning ordinance but not
imposing any specific timing or manner requirements on the notice).
Indeed, the concluding sentence of this argument in Appellants’ brief
says (with emphasis supplied): “Since the City failed to comply with
Georgia law in enacting the ordinances, they are invalid and contrary
to general Georgia statutory law.” Accordingly, Appellants’ constitu-
tional challenge to the City’s ordinances based on their enactment
process has been abandoned. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (“Any
enumerated error not supported by argument or citation of authority
in the brief shall be deemed abandoned. . . .”); McFarlane v. McFar-
lane, 298 Ga. 361, 363 (782 SE2d 29) (2016).

3. Appellants argue that the term “mobile park or court” in the
2008 BEOD ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, and that it is
unclear if the ordinance precludes them from placing additional
mobile homes on their properties. As a matter of due process, a law is
void if it is “so vague that persons of ‘common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ ”
Gouge v. City of Snellville, 249 Ga. 91, 93 (287 SE2d 539) (1982)
(citation omitted). Appellants are seeking to add several mobile
homes on their four adjoining properties, which already have at least
15 other mobile homes. Persons of common intelligence would under-
stand that the term “mobile home park or court” encompasses this
kind of aggregation of commonly owned mobile homes. Indeed, in
their amended complaint and in their brief to this Court, Appellants
explain that they want to develop a “manufactured home park” or a
“mobile home park” on their properties. Accordingly, the ordinance is
not vague as applied to Appellants’ situation.

Appellants argue that even if it is clear that a large group of
related mobile homes would qualify as a “mobile home park or court,”
the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it is not clear
whether this language prohibits the placement of a single mobile
home in the BEOD area. We need not decide whether the ordinance
might be confusing for the owner of a single mobile home, however,
because Appellants are not in that situation. “‘(E)ven if the outer-
most boundaries of the applicable section of the ordinance may
be imprecise in certain situations . . . , one to whose conduct
(an ordinance) clearly applies may not challenge it on the basis that
it may be unconstitutionally vague when applied to others.’” Burton
v. Glynn County, 297 Ga. 544, 548 (776 SE2d 179) (2015) (citation
omitted). Thus, Appellants lack standing to raise this argument. See
Catoosa County v. R.N. Talley Properties, LLC, 282 Ga. 373, 375 (651
SE2d 7) (2007).

eS 387

4. Appellants contend that the BEOD ordinance unconstitution-
ally hampers the use of their properties by violating their vested
rights to use the properties for mobile homes and by depriving the
properties of value so as to effect a taking for which they should
receive compensation.”

(a) Appellants’ mobile homes on the 794 Oak Avenue property
have been allowed by the City as legal nonconforming uses because
they were in place before the first BEOD ordinance was enacted in
1994. Appellants are not satisfied with this and contend that they
should be allowed to expand their nonconforming use by replacing
one of these mobile homes with an upgraded unit. However, as
Appellants acknowledge in their complaint, §§ 61.5 and 61.6 of the
City’s zoning ordinance prohibit expansion of nonconforming uses,
including through the erection of new nonconforming structures.
This restriction is not unreasonable, and “ (a) governing authority
can require a nonconforming use to be terminated in a reasonable
time.’ ” BBC Land & Dev., Inc. v. Butts County, 281 Ga. 472, 473 (640
SE2d 33) (2007) (citation omitted). See also Ralston Purina Co. v.
Acrey, 220 Ga. 788, 791 (142 SE2d 66) (1965) (“[P]rior nonconforming
uses are not absolutely protected from subsequent zoning regula-
tions.”); Flippen Alliance for Community Empowerment, Inc. v. Bran-
nan, 267 Ga. App. 134, 137 (601 SE2d 106) (2004) (“[C]ourts have
consistently held that ordinances prohibiting the expansion of a
nonconforming use to new lands are enforceable.”). Thus, the City’s
denial of Appellants’ request to replace an existing mobile home with
a newer one was not unconstitutional.

As for Appellants’ request to put additional mobile homes on the
790, 791, and 793 Oak Avenue properties, Appellants acquired that
land after the BEOD ordinance took effect. Ordinance 12-94 was
enacted in February 1994, and Appellants purchased the properties
more than three years later, in June 1997. The BEOD ordinance in
place at that time clearly prohibited “manufactured housing” and
“mobile homes” in the area. Thus, Appellants did not acquire a vested
right to put mobile homes on these properties. Although Appellants
allege generally that they have incurred expenses related to owning
and developing their manufactured home park, they have not shown
that they made “expenditures, in addition to paying the purchase
price, in reliance on the existing zoning and assurances by zoning
officials.” WMM Properties, Inc. v. Cobb County, 255 Ga. 436, 439 (339
SE2d 252) (1986). Compare Spalding County v. East Enterprises,

* Appellants make essentially the same argument in different terms in their contention
that the BEOD ordinance is “overbroad” because it has harmed their vested property rights.

388 es

Inc., 232 Ga. 887, 888-889 (209 SE2d 215) (1974) (explaining that the
property owner acquired “a vested interest in the mobile home park
classification” that existed when the owner bought the property an
on which the owner relied to expend time and money developing a
mobile home park). Appellants suggest that they have a vested right
in the zoning that existed before they bought the properties, but
unlike nonconforming uses, “vested rights to develop property in
accordance with prior zoning are personal to the owner of them an
are not transferable with the land.” BBC Land, 281 Ga. at 474.

The fact that the City granted Appellants’ petition to rezone the
properties to R-MH in July 1997 does not change this result. This
Court has held that a property owner may acquire a vested right
based on a government-issued building permit that violated the
subsequently revised zoning ordinance when the owner “obtaine
approval for detailed development plans of all relevant [local govern-
ment] departments ... and expended large sums of money to go ahea
with development from that point.” WMM Properties, 255 Ga. at 439.
In this case, however, the City did not formally approve a plan by
Appellants to develop a mobile home park. It granted only a rezoning.
That rezoning changed only the underlying zoning classification; it
did not change the BEOD ordinance, which has always prohibite
mobile home parks and which clearly explains in § 74.4.1 that:
“Proposed developments located within this zoning district shal
comply with these requirements and the requirements of the under-
lying zoning district ... . In the case of conflicting standards an
requirements, the more stringent standards and requirements shal.
apply.” (Emphasis supplied.) In light of this clear language, Appel-
lants could not have reasonably relied on the rezoning to erect mobile
homes on the properties.

(b) Finally, Appellants argue that the BEOD ordinance has
effectively taken their properties without just compensation in vio-
lation of the Federal Constitution, see U.S. Const. amend. V, and that
they are therefore entitled to damages. Appellants assert that because
their properties are now zoned R-MH — as they requested — the only
use permitted by this zoning designation is mobile homes. As dis-
cussed in footnotes 2 and 3 above, however, Appellants did not put in
the record a certified copy of the relevant zoning ordinance provi-
sions, and they therefore have presented no competent evidence to
support this assertion. See Whitfield v. City of Atlanta, 296 Ga. 641,
641 (769 SE2d 76) (2015).* Appellants have offered evidence only that

® Although it is not competent evidence for a court to consider, we note that the City's
zoning ordinance accessible online undermines Appellants’ claim, as it indicates that properties

eS 389

it would be more expensive to build something other than mobile

homes on their vacant lots and that the lots are surrounded by mobile

homes (although it appears that these surrounding mobile homes are

nonconforming uses). This is insufficient to prove a regulatory taking

under the Fifth Amendment. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New

York City, 438 U. S. 104, 131-137 (98 SCt 2646, 57 LE2d 631) (1978).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

lac larris, Robert L. Maci
appellants.
Chambless, Higdon, Richardson, Katz & Griggs, Jason D. Lewis,
for appellees.

loe M. Harris, Jr., for

$17A0828. PIERCE v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 425)

Bocas, Justice.

Appellant Matthew Caleb Pierce was tried before a jury and
found guilty on six counts of aggravated child molestation, two counts
of child molestation, two counts of sexual battery, and one count each
of sexual exploitation of a child, distribution of Hydromorphone, and
distribution of Alprazolam.’ The crimes involved acts with three
teenage boys, B. M., M. T., and D. D. Pierce filed his appeal in the
Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court because it

zoned R-MH have numerous permitted uses beyond mobile homes: single-family dwellings,
accessory buildings to the main structure, home swimming pools, public utility structures and
buildings, signs, modular homes, and service and auxiliary buildings to serve the residents of
a manufactured home park. Additionally, the planning and zoning commission may grant a
special exception to use R-MH land for churches and related accessory buildings; golf,
swimming, tennis, or country clubs; community clubs or associations; athletic fields, parks, and
recreation areas; home businesses; public and private schools and libraries; and group and
personal care homes.

1 The crimes occurred between June 25 and July 9, 2011. On July 16, 2013, a Houston
County grand jury indicted Pierce on charges of aggravated child molestation, child molesta-
tion, sexual battery, sexual exploitation of a child, distribution of Hydromorphone and distri-
bution of Alprazolam. Following a November 2014 jury trial, Pierce was found guilty on all
counts with the exception of one count of child molestation for which he was acquitted, and one
count of sexual exploitation of a child that was nolle prossed. He was sentenced to life in prison,
with 30 years to serve and the remainder of the life sentence on probation. The court merged
one of the sexual battery counts. Pierce's motion for new trial was filed on December 30, 2014,
amended on August 17, 2015, and denied on March 21, 2016. His notice of appeal was filed on
April 12, 2016. This case was docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term and orally argued
on April 17, 2017.

390 ]

raises the issue of the constitutionality of a statute, an issue over
which this Court has exclusive jurisdiction. See Ga. Const. of 1983,
Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1). In addition to his constitutional claims,
Pierce argues that the trial court erred in admitting a videotaped
interview of B. M. and photographs of text messages from D. D.’s cell
phone. For the following reasons, we hold that all of Pierce’s claims
are without merit, and therefore affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
showed that in June and July of 2011, B. M., M. T., and D. D., then all
14 years old, “hung out” with Pierce, who was then 31 years old, and
drank beer and liquor at Pierce’s apartment. Pierce lived in the same
apartment building as B. M. On one occasion when Pierce invited the
teens into his apartment and offered them liquor and beer, B. M.
“started not to feel good” and asked Pierce if he “had anything to give
[him].” Pierce gave B. M. “something” and all B. M. remembered was
passing out on Pierce’s couch until later in the evening.

D. D. testified that Pierce gave him and M. T. a pill that he
believed was Xanax, and on another occasion, he texted Pierce a
picture of his penis in order “to get pills.” The State admitted pictures
of the text messages from D. D.’s cell phone including the picture that
D. D. testified he exchanged with Pierce in order to get the pills.

M. T. testified that he met Pierce through D. D., and that D. D.
told him Pierce could get them “free beer and Xanax.” M. T. explained
further that he spent two nights at Pierce’s apartment in July 2011.
During that time, Pierce “started... coming on to [M. T.],” and when
M. T. asked about getting Xanax, Pierce told him that he did not
give Xanax pills away, but would exchange them for pictures or a
“sexual act.” M. T. explained that he was reluctant to agree to the
exchange, but “Xanax makes you do things you'd never do sober.” On
one of the nights M. T. stayed at Pierce’s apartment, Pierce gave M. T.
a handful of Xanax pills, pulled out his penis, and fondled M. T.’s
penis. After M. T. and Pierce performed oral sex on one another, Pierce
retrieved more Xanax pills for M. T. from a safe in his bedroom.

When M. T. later left Pierce’s apartment, he was stopped by a
courtesy officer from the apartment complex. The officer noticed that
M. T’s speech was slurred and that he smelled of an alcoholic
beverage. After asking M. T. a few questions, the officer asked M. T.
for consent to search his person. M. T. consented, and in his pocket the
officer found Hydromorphone and Alprazolam (Xanax) pills that
M. T. told the officer he obtained from Pierce. M. T. explained to police
that Pierce gave him pills in exchange for M. T. performing oral sex
on Pierce.

eS 391

Investigators subsequently interviewed all three teens and con-
ducted a search of Pierce’s apartment where they found prescription
bottles of Hydromorphone and Alprazolam, some empty and some
containing pills, in a safe in the closet of his bedroom. B. M. told police
in avideotaped statement that he and Pierce engagedin oral and anal
sex while at Pierce’s apartment, although at trial he testified he did
not remember the sex acts.

Following the presentation of this evidence, the jury found Pierce
guilty of aggravated child molestation for performing both anal and
oral sodomy on B. M. and having B. M. perform such acts on him;
aggravated child molestation for performing oral sodomy on M. T. and
having M. T. perform oral sodomy on him; child molestation and
sexual battery for placing his hands on B. M.’s penis and M. T.’s penis;
sexual exploitation of a child for enticing D. D. to take a picture of his
penis and send the picture to Pierce; and distribution of Hydromor-
phone and Alprazolam to M. T.

1. Pierce argues that the trial court erred in allowing the admis-
sion of B. M.’s videotaped interview. “We review the trial court’s
decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.” (Citation
omitted.) Bolling v. State, 300 Ga. 694, 698 (2) (797 SE2d 872) (2017).

When first questioned at trial about this statement to police,
B. M. testified that he did not remember talking to police, even after
having watched his videotaped statement about a week before trial.
The prosecutor asked that B. M. be allowed to watch his videotaped
interview again to refresh his memory. After discussion with both
counsel and further testimony by B. M. that he did not recall what
happened on the occasion he was in Pierce’s bedroom, the trial court
allowed B. M. to watch his videotaped interview outside the presence
of the jury.

When B. M. returned to the witness stand, he testified that he
remembered going to Pierce’s apartment and being in his bedroom
but did not remember what happened in the bedroom. The prosecutor
then moved for admission of the videotaped interview pursuant to
OCGA § 24-8-803 (5), past recollection recorded. In establishing the
foundation for the video’s admission, B. M. confirmed that he was the
person in the video, testified that he remembered giving the video-
taped statement to police, that he had knowledge as to what he was
talking about in the video, and that when he gave the statement to
police, the things he discussed were fresh in his memory. B. M. stated
further that he told the truth when he gave the statement. The trial
court ruled that it would allow the jury to watch B. M.’s videotaped
interview, and it was then played for the jury.

(a) Pierce argues that B. M.’s videotaped statement was not
admissible under the past recollection recorded exception to the

392 ]

hearsay rule because B. M. was “a reluctant witness who did not
want to testify,” and the purpose of the exception is to assist witnesses
who genuinely cannot remember events previously recorded. A
“recorded recollection” under the applicable exception to the hearsay
rule is defined as:

Amemorandum or record concerning a matter about which a
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recol-
lection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately
shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the
matter was fresh in the witness’s memory and to reflect that
knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record
may be read into evidence but shall not itself be received as an
exhibit unless offered by an adverse party[.]

OCGA § 24-8-803 (5). This Code section mirrors Federal Rule of
Evidence 803 (5). “And where the new Georgia rules mirror their
federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended
for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal
appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.” Parker v.
State, 296 Ga. 586, 593 (3) (a) (769 SE2d 329) (2015).”

An Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case presents facts similar
to those adduced here. In United States v. Jones, 601 F3d 1247 (11th
Cir. 2010), the witness “lacked ‘clear and distinct’ recollection in (her)
response to the question(s).” Id. at 1262 (V) (A). Once she viewed her
videotaped statement outside the presence of the jury, and was asked
if she then remembered more than before she watched the video, the
witnessed responded “I remember what was just said.” Id. Neverthe-
less, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the videotape to be played for the jury where
the witness affirmed that the things she said in the video were true
and accurate to the best of her knowledge, that it was “[her] talking”
on the video, and that her memory was better then. Id.

Here, after viewing the videotaped statement at trial, B. M.
stated that he was the person in the video, he remembered giving the
statement, he had knowledge as to what he was talking about in the
video, he told the truth when he gave the statement, and the things
he discussed were fresh in his memory then. This was sufficient to
establish under OCGA § 24-8-803 (5) that the videotaped statement

2 The same is true for our consideration of OCGA §§ 24-4-403 and 24-4-404 in Divisions
1(c) and (d), and OCGA § 24-9-901 in Division 2 (a). See, e.g., Brewner v, State, 302 Ga. 6, 12 (IID)
(804 SE2d 94) (2017).

eS 398

concerned a matter about which B. M. once had knowledge but at trial
had insufficient recollection, which was made or adopted when the
matter was fresh in his memory, and which correctly reflected his
knowledge. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the admission of this evidence. See Jones, supra.

(b) Pierce also argues that the admission of B. M.’s videotaped
statement was a violation of the Confrontation Clause, because he
was effectively denied any opportunity to cross-examine B. M. in light
of the teen’s claim of no memory of the sexual offenses. But the

Sixth Amendment guarantees only an opportunity for effec-
tive cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effec-
tive in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (107 SCt
2658, 2664, 96 LE2d 631) (1987). ... Ordinarily a witness is
regarded as subject to cross-examination when he is placed
on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to ques-
tions. United States v. Owens, 484 U. S. 554, 556, 561 (108
SCt 838, 841, 844, 98 LE2d 951) (1988).

(Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Jones, supra, 601 F3d at
1263 (V) (B). Although B. M. stated that he did not remember what
occurred while he was in Pierce’s bedroom, he recalled several other
details about the nature of his relationship with Pierce and his
presence in Pierce’s apartment. The record also reveals that after
B. M. watched his videotaped statement at trial, he testified that he
recalled giving the statement to police and that he told the truth in
the statement. However, defense counsel posed no questions concern-
ing this testimony. Counsel’s cross-examination of B. M. involved only
questions about B. M. speaking to his mother during a lunch break in
the trial and whether B. M. told the truth when he testified “before
lunch that [he] didn’t remember.” B. M. was present at trial and
available for cross-examination. There was no violation of Pierce’s
right of confrontation here.

(c) Pierce argues that portions of the videotaped interview con-
tained evidence of his character inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-404
(‘Rule 404”), and that it was unfairly prejudicial and therefore also
inadmissible under the balancing test of OCGA § 24-4-403
(“Rule 403”). However, Pierce did not specifically object on these
grounds prior to the videotape being played for the jury. See OCGA §
24-1-103 (a) (1) (no error in rulings on admission of evidence unless
timely objection is made stating the specific ground of objection). We

304 ]

therefore review the trial court’s admission of this evidence for plain
error. OCGA § 24-1-103 (d); see Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 245 (8)
(794 SE2d 67) (2016).

Pierce argues that B. M.’s statement could not be admitted to
prove Pierce’s character and that the State failed to provide the
required notice under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). Pierce complains that in
B. M.’s statement to police, he mentioned that Pierce provided a
controlled substance to D. D. and B. M. when the indictment charged
him only with distributing to M. T. However, B. M.’s statement was
not admitted as evidence of other crimes or wrongs under Rule 404
(b), but as evidence of the crimes against B. M.* And the mention of
another bad act within B. M.’s statement is admissible without notice
under Rule 404 (b) as a circumstance immediately surrounding the
charged crime. See Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 484 (IV) (d) (807
SE2d 350) (2017). There was therefore no error here, much less plain
error, in the admission of the videotape on this ground.

(d) Finally, Pierce argues that B. M.’s videotaped statement was
inadmissible under the balancing test of OCGA § 24-4-403. He asserts
that it “undeniably and unfairly aroused the jury’s emotions of
sympathy for B. M.,” who sobbed during the video while describing
the sexual acts between himself and Pierce.

“TR]elevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. And “[r]elevant direct evi-
dence of a crime charged is always admissible unless it falls under a
rule of exclusion.” (Citations omitted.) United States v. Troya, 733 F3d
1125, 1131 (II) (A) (11th Cir. 2013). OCGA § 24-4-403 provides that
relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
“Unfair prejudice” under this rule “means an undue tendency to

® The standard for plain error review of rulings on evidence is that there must be an error
or defect that has not been affirmatively waived by the appellant, the legal error is clear or
obvious, the error must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, and if the aforemen-
tioned three requirements are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the
found error, but should do so only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings; consequently, beyond showing a clear or obvious error,
the appellant must affirmatively show that the error probably did affect the outcome below.
State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011).

+ Pierce does not argue here and did not argue below that the statement should have been
redacted to remove the references to his distribution of a controlled substance to B. M. and D. D.
In fact, when the trial court ruled that it would allow the playing of the videotape for the jury,
trial counsel insisted that the State was required to play the videotape in its entirety.

eS 395

suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not neces-
sarily, an emotional one.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) United
States v. Smalls, 605 F3d 765, 787 (II) (C) (10th Cir. 2010). We have
held that this rule of exclusion is “an extraordinary remedy which the
courts should invoke sparingly, and the balance should be struck in
favor of admissibility.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Carter v.
State, 302 Ga. 200, 203 (2) (a) (805 SE2d 839) (2017). “The ‘major
function’ of Rule 403 is to ‘exclude matter of scant or cumulative
probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial
effect.’” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hood v. State, 299 Ga.
95, 108 (4) (786 SE2d 648) (2016). B. M.’s statement to police was
relevant as evidence of the crimes charged. And the highly probative
value of this evidence, the only direct evidence of the sex acts Pierce
committed against B. M., outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice.
The videotaped statement was therefore admissible under the bal-
ancing test of OCGA § 24-4-403.

2. Pierce contends that the court erred in admitting the photo-
graphs of text messages from the screen of D. D.’s cell phone. He
argues that this evidence was not properly authenticated, was in
violation of the best evidence rule, and was improper character
evidence.

(a) With regard to authentication, Pierce asserts that the State
failed to link him to the pictures of the text messages on D. D.’s phone.
Pierce argues that the State did not introduce his cell phone records,
he denied sending the messages, and no one testified that they
observed him send them.

Atissue here is the authentication of a photograph of the display
on an electronic device. OCGA § 24-9-901 (a) provides: “The require-
ment of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility shall be satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” An
example of authentication conforming to the requirements of this
subsection is the “[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a
matter is what it is claimed to be[.]” OCGA § 24-9-901 (b) (1). We have
held that documents from electronic sources “are subject to the same
rules of authentication as other more traditional documentary evi-
dence and may be authenticated through circumstantial evidence.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cotton v. State, 297 Ga. 257, 259
(3) (773 SE2d 242) (2015). As explained by Professor Milich,

[w]ith all electronic sources of information there often are
two authentication issues: what computer or other digital
device generated the communication and second, who was
using the device at that time. Although there may exist

396 ]

evidence that a specific phone sent a certain text message,
that does not prove who used the phone... . Every form of
electronic communication can be “spoofed,” “hacked,” or
“forged.” But this does not and can not mean that courts
should reject any and all such communications. Indeed the
vast majority of these communications are just as they
appear to be — quite authentic. The goal is to supply
sufficient, nonhearsay evidence as the identity of the source
such that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
evidence is what it is claimed to be.

Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 7:6, at 194 (2017-2018).

The State introduced a sheriff’s lieutenant who testified that he
was not able to conduct a forensic exam of D. D.’s cell phone because
it “was not compatible with any of the software we had at the time for
cell phone forensics.” Instead, he used a digital camera to photograph
what was shown on the screen of the phone. The lieutenant explained
that the images were a fair and accurate representation of what
appeared on D. D.’s cell phone screen. Pierce denied sending D. D. the
text messages shown in the photographs, testified that the phone
number shown in D. D.’s cell phone under his name was the number
assigned to one of four cell phones for his business, Matthew Caleb
Salon, and that family members or anyone connected to his business
could have used the cell phone. D. D. testified that the phone number
shown for the text messages he received was Pierce’s phone number
and that he exchanged several text messages with Pierce. When
asked how he knew that the phone number belonged to Pierce, he
explained that he received the phone number from one of the other
teens and in one of the messages he received from the number “it
specifically says, Hey, it’s Caleb [Pierce].” And, the text messages
were consistent with D. D.’s and M. T.’s testimony that Pierce offered
them “pills” in exchange for texting pictures of their genitals or sex
acts.

The evidence presented here was sufficient to support a finding
that the photographs are what they claim to be, text messages
between D. D. and Pierce. The trial court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that they were properly authenticated. See
United States v. Arnold, 696 Fed. Appx. 903 (IT) (A) (2) (10th Cir. 2017)
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting screen shots of
text messages between defendant and witness who testified concern-
ing the messages exchanged); United States v. Ramirez, 658 Fed.
Appx. 949, 952 (IT) (A) (11th Cir. 2016) (court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing admission of photographs of text messages
when witness testified they were text messages between her and the

eS 397

defendant, law enforcement agent was present for some of the text
messages between them, and the subscriber information listed defen-
dant as the user for the phone number).

(b) Pierce argues that the admission of the photographs of the
text messages violated the “best evidence” rule. See OCGA §§
24-10-1002, 24-10-1003, 24-10-1004.° He contends that there was no
evidence that D. D.’s phone had been lost or destroyed, so the State
should have been made to produce the original phone rather than
photographs from the screen, and that the evidence did not meet the
exception in OCGA § 24-10-1004 because a genuine question was
raised as to the authenticity of the original.

“The purpose of the best evidence rule is to prevent inaccuracy
and fraud when attempting to prove the contents of a writing.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Trotter, 837 F3d
864, 867 (II) (8th Cir. 2016). OCGA § 24-10-1001 (3) provides that
“original” for purposes of the chapter means

the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to
have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An
original of a photograph includes the negative or any print
therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or similar device,
any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to
reflect the data accurately, is an original.

And OCGA § 24-10-1003 provides: “A duplicate shall be admissible to
the same extent as an original unless: (1) A genuine question is raised
as to the authenticity of the original; or (2) A circumstance exists
where it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.”
The lieutenant testified that the photographs were accurate images,
captured by a digital camera, of what appeared on D. D.’s cell phone.
What appeared on the screen of the cell phone was analogous to a

® OCGA § 24-10-1002 provides: “To prove the contents of a writing, recording, or photo-
graph, the original writing, recording, or photograph shall be required.” OCGA § 24-10-1003
provides: “A duplicate shall be admissible to the same extent as an original unless: (1) A genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or (2) A circumstance exists where it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.” And OCGA § 24-10-1004 provides:

‘The original shall not be required and other evidence of the contents of a

writing, recording, or photograph shall be admissible if: (1) All originals are lost or

have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith;

(2) No original can be obtained by any available judicial process or procedure; (3) At

atime when an original was under the control of the party against whom offered,

that party was put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would

be a subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does not produce the original at

the hearing; or (4) The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a

controlling issue.

398 ]

“printout or other output [of the cell phone] readable by sight,” and
therefore an original within the meaning of OCGA §§ 24-10-1001 (3)
and 24-10-1002. See State v. Giacomantonio, 885 NW2d 394, 402 (1) (b)
(Wisc. App. 2016) (photographs of text messages complied with best
evidence rule; “[a] cell phone is a ‘computer or similar device,’ the
screen shots are ‘output readable by sight,’ and according to testi-
mony, the screen shots reflected the data accurately”). And the digital
photographs of what appeared on the screen of the cell phone are
duplicates within the meaning of OCGA § 24-10-1003, and admis-
sible to the same extent as the original. Pierce does not argue that the
photographs were not an accurate representation of what appeared
on D. D.’s cell phone screen. Rather, he challenges the authenticity of
the text messages that appeared on the screen, an issue we have
addressed above in Division 2 (a).°

3. Pierce asserts that Georgia’s statutory sentencing scheme for
aggravated child molestation is unconstitutional both per se and as
applied. He argues that the sentencing scheme violates the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Georgia Constitution
and the United States Constitution, and violates the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and Article I of the Georgia
Constitution.

(a) With regard to his due process and equal protection claims,
Pierce points to the interplay between OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1) and
OCGA § 17-10-6.1. OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1) provides in relevant part:

[A] person convicted of the offense of aggravated child moles-
tation shall be punished by imprisonment for life or by a split
sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25
years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by
probation for life, and shall be subject to the sentencing
and punishment provisions of Code Sections 17-10-6.1 and
17-10-7.

OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (b) (2) provides that the sentence of a person
convicted of aggravated child molestation shall, unless the person is
sentenced to life imprisonment, “be a split sentence which shall
include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years,
followed by probation for life, and no portion of the mandatory
minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated,

° For the reasons explained in Division 1 (¢), Pierce's argument that the photographs
constituted improper character evidence is without merit.

eS 399

deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court.” OCGA § 17-10-6.1
(c) (1) provides that for a first conviction of a serious violent felony,
including aggravated child molestation, see OCGA § 17-10-6.1
(b) (2) (C), “in which the accused has been sentenced to life impris-
onment, that person shall not be eligible for any form of parole or
early release administered by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles
until that person has served a minimum of 30 years in prison.” And
paragraph (c) (4) of the Code section provides that any sentence
imposed for a first conviction “shall be served in its entirety as
imposed by the sentencing court and shall not be reduced by any form
of parole or early release.”

Pierce argues that this sentencing scheme violates his right to
due process because it allows a court to impose a term of years

that could far exceed a person’s life expectancy, for example,
300 years, but yet would still theoretically “not exceed life
imprisonment.” When combined with OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (©) (4),
which requires that such defendant serve one hundred
percent of the time imposed without any possibility of parole
or early release, such a 300-year sentence, if imposed would
constitute a de facto life sentence without the possibility of
parole.

An identical argument was raised in Merritt v. State, 286 Ga. 650 (690
SE2d 835) (2010), where the defendant challenged as unconstitu-
tional a similar sentencing scheme for rape. Id. at 652. Just as we
concluded in Merritt with regard to the rape sentencing statutes, the
sentencing scheme here gives fair warning and puts a defendant on
notice of the potential sentence that for a first conviction of aggra-
vated child molestation he or she can be sentenced to either life or a
split sentence that includes not less than 25 years in prison; that if life
is imposed, he or she is not eligible for parole until after having served
30 years in confinement; and that if a term not less than 25 years is
imposed, it must be served in its entirety. Such unambiguous notice
of the potential punishment for the crime precludes Pierce's “de facto”
sentence of life argument. See id. The sentencing scheme here did not
violate due process on this ground. See id.”

(b) Pierce argues that the aggravated child molestation sentenc-
ing scheme violates equal protection because a defendant could

* For the same reason, we reject Pierce’s assertion that the sentencing scheme for
aggravated child molestation is vague and ambiguous.

400 ]

“be subjected to maximum terms of imprisonment substantially
different than others charged in the same manner with the exact
same offenses.” Pierce presents the example of an individual sen-
tenced to 50 years of incarceration for a first time conviction who
would have to serve every day of the 50-year term, while an individual
in the same situation sentenced to life, “a theoretically longer sen-
tence,” would be eligible for parole after having served 30 years.

“Where a criminal statute does not discriminate on racial grounds
or against a suspect class, equal protection and due process concerns
are satisfied if the statute bears a ‘reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose’ and is ‘neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.’ ”
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 5 (3)
(690 SE2d 804) (2010). OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1) and OCGA § 17-10-6.1
do not discriminate on racial grounds, and defendants sentenced
under those Code sections “are neither a suspect class nor a semi-
suspect class. And while (those statutes) affect[ ] an individual’s
physical liberty interest, physical liberty, in this sentencing context,
is not a fundamental right.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.
We therefore apply the most lenient level of judicial review, the
“rational basis” test. See Pitts v. State, 293 Ga. 511, 516 (2) (748 SE2d
426) (2013). Under this test,

the claimant must establish that he is similarly situated to
members of the class who are treated differently from him.
Next, the claimant must establish that there is no rational
basis for such different treatment. And because the legisla-
tion is presumptively valid, the claimant has the burden of
proof as to both prongs.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Harper v. State of Ga., 292 Ga.
557, 560 (1) (738 SE2d 584) (2013)

“For equal protection purposes, criminal defendants are simi-
larly situated if they are charged with the same crime.” (Citation
omitted.) Pitts, supra, 293 Ga. at 516 (2). Pierce complains here of the
possibility of a disparity in incarceration time under the statutory
scheme for defendants charged with aggravated child molestation,
but he “fails to show that any such potential variation in application
of the statute is without a rational basis. [Cit.]” Id. As we have held
with regard to other sentencing statutes, allowing the court flexibil-
ity to fix sentences furthers the goal of individualized treatment at
the punishment stage. Such flexibility includes the ability to decide
whether under the facts presented a defendant should be sentenced
to life or to a split sentence with a term of no less than 25 years, with

eS 401

full knowledge of the minimum period of incarceration required
under each option. Moreover, a

statutory difference in treatment is not to be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it; if
there is some rational basis for the classification, it does not
offend constitutional safeguards merely because the classi-
fication is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it may result in some inequality.

Id. Pierce has failed to meet his burden of showing that there is no
rational basis for the sentencing options including different manda-
tory incarceration periods for defendants charged with aggravated
child molestation.

(c) Pierce asserts that the sentencing scheme for aggravated
child molestation “on its face and as applied to him individually,”
violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found
in both the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution.

Pierce argues that the sentencing scheme for aggravated child
molestation is unconstitutional per se because the punishment is
“grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime, given the
mandatory minimum requirement of 25 years in prison followed by
probation for life” and given that no portion of the 25 years may be
suspended, probated or paroled. He argues further that under the
sentencing scheme, “[a]n adult male defendant in Georgia could be
required to spend the remainder of his life in prison, without the
possibility of parole, if a consenting male teenager places his mouth
on the penis of the adult defendant, without any other aggravating
circumstances or harmful conduct.” Pierce then compares Georgia’s
sentencing scheme for aggravated child molestation with the sen-
tencing schemes for the crime in other southern states.

Traditionally, it is the task of the legislature, not the
courts, to define crimes and set the range of sentences. The
legislature’s choice of sentence is insulated from judicial
review unless it is wholly irrational or so grossly dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crime that it constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rooney, supra, 287 Ga. at 6. As
the United States Supreme Court has explained, “outside the context
of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences have been exceedingly rare .... [W]e stated that
the proportionality principle would come into play in the extreme

402 ]

example if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable
by life imprisonment.” (Citations omitted.) Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 21 (ID) (A) (123 SCt 1179, 155 LE2d 108) (2003). “Severe,
mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the
constitutional sense.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (IV)
(111 SCt 2680, 115 LE2d 836) (1991).

We hold here that the sentencing scheme, life or a minimum of 25
years to serve, is not so grossly disproportionate to the crime of
aggravated child molestation, which involves molestation that physi-
cally injures the child or involves an act of sodomy, that would require
us to find it “per se” cruel and unusual. See, e.g., United States v.
Rolon, 445 Fed. Appx. 314, 332 (ID (H) (11th Cir. 2011) (life impris-
onment on drug charges not per se cruel and unusual).

Pierce’s “as-applied” argument also fails. He contends that his
life sentence with 30 years to be served and the remainder on
probation was cruel and unusual because the evidence showed that
the sexual intercourse was not forced, no violence was involved, he
did not kidnap or restrain the teens and they were not physically
injured, and he had no prior convictions.

Where, as here, no categorical Eighth Amendment restric-
tion applies, we must in the following manner determine
whether a sentence for [life with 30 years to serve] is grossly
disproportionate for [Pierce’s] crime[s]. A court must begin
by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of
the sentence. In the rare case in which this threshold com-
parison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality the
court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with
the sentences received by other offenders in the same juris-
diction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in
other jurisdictions. We have emphasized that it is the rare
case in which the threshold inference of gross disproportion-
ality will be met anda rarer case stillin which that threshold
inference stands after further scrutiny.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 290 Ga. 670, 675
(3) (725 SE2d 236) (2012).

Pierce was charged with six counts of aggravated child molesta-
tion, and the evidence showed that he engaged in acts of anal and oral
sodomy with two 14-year-old boys. The evidence also showed that he
offered M. T. and B. M. prescription medication just prior to engaging
in sex acts with them. The trial court sentenced Pierce to a life term

eS 408

on each count of aggravated child molestation to be served concur-
rently to the first count, resulting in a sentence of life with the first 30
years to be served in confinement.

Pierce’s argument that his punishment was too severe because
the boys were 14 and there was no force involved is unavailing. “A
fourteen-year-old boy is not legally able to consent to sexual relations
with an adult male.” Ray v. State, 259 Ga. 868, 869 (3) (389 SE2d 326)
(1990), overruled on other grounds, Wilson v. State, 277 Ga. 195 (586
SE2d 669) (2003). Where the legislature saw fit to carve out a
sentencing exception where the victim is at least 13 years old but less
than 16, and the defendant is under age 18 and no more than four
years older than the victim, it didso. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (2). There
is no such sentencing exception for a 31-year-old defendant who
commits the offense of aggravated child molestation upon two 14-year-
old children.
Under the facts presented here, Pierce’s concurrent life sen-
tences with a total of 30 years to serve for multiple acts of aggravated
child molestation do not raise even a threshold inference of gross
disproportionality. See Jones, supra, 290 Ga. at 676 (3) (concurrent
25-year sentences for child kidnapping do not raise threshold infer-
ence of gross disproportionality; “[s]imilarly severe punishments for
crimes against children have withstood previous attacks on consti-
tutional grounds” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)); see also
Pepe-Frazier v. State, 331 Ga. App. 263, 273 (3) (c) (770 SE2d 654)
(2015) (noineffective assistance for failing to object to life sentence for
one act of oral sex with 14-year-old because it did not “raise threshold
inference of gross disproportionality”). Accordingly, we reject Pierce’s
claim that his sentence was cruel and unusual “as applied.”

Judgment affirmed. Hines, C. J., Melton, P. J., Benham, Hun-
stein, Nahmias, Blackwell, Grant, JJ., and Chief Judge Dwayne H.
Gillis concur. Peterson, J., disqualified.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

Hogue & Hogue, Laura D. Hogue, Susan D. Raymond, for appel-
lant.

George H. Hartwig III, District Attorney, Thomas C. Woody II,
Alicia D. Gassett, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

404 Pe

$17A1036. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 418)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Appellant Brodrick Williams was convicted of malice murder,
armed robbery, and a firearm offense in connection with the shooting
death of Daniel McGee. Appellant contends that the evidence pre-
sented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that he
was deprived of his right to conflict-free counsel. We conclude that the
evidence was legally sufficient to support Appellant’s murder and
firearm convictions, but not his armed robbery conviction. We also
conclude that Appellant has not shown that his trial counsel had an
actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s represen-
tation. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment
of the trial court.

1. (a) Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at Appellant’s trial showed the following. In the
early morning hours of December 9, 2008, Tavaris Samuels, who was
20 years old, was driving in his mother’s car through Harrisburg,
Georgia, with Appellant, who was 16, Tanya Landers, and Sierra
Burns. Landers, who was Samuels’s girlfriend, rode in the passenger
seat while Appellant and Burns rode in the back seat. Appellant was
carrying a 9-millimeter pistol, and Samuels was carrying a .22-
caliber revolver. When the car passed Daniel McGee, who was riding
his bicycle down Starnes Street, Landers pointed out the gold chain
necklace that McGee was wearing. Samuels turned the car around,
rolled down his window, and stopped the car beside McGee. Landers
asked McGee where he got his necklace. While McGee answered,
Appellant told Samuels that he wanted the chain, and Samuels
replied, “I hope you know what you're getting into.”

Appellant then got out of the car, walked over to McGee, pointed
his gun at McGee, and told McGee to give him the chain. McGee
instead grabbed Appellant by the shirt, and the two started tussling.
Samuels, Landers, and Burns, who remained in the car, heard a
gunshot. After one of the women encouraged Samuels to help Appel-
lant, Samuels got out of the car with his gun drawn, walked over to
where Appellant and McGee continued to grapple, and fired a shot
into McGee’s head.' McGee fell to the ground. Appellant then went
through McGee’s pockets before he and Samuels returned to the car
and drove away. While they were driving off, Appellant told the others

+ Samuels initially testified that he intended to shoot the ground by their feet to “scare
them apart” and the bullet ricocheted and hit McGee in the head, but Samuels eventually
admitted that he pointed his gun at McGee and fired the fatal shot

eS 405

that he had dropped the clip from his gun. Samuels later threw one
or both of the guns into a river.

Acouple hours after the shooting, the Richmond County Sheriff’s
Department received a call that a man appearing to be drunk had
fallen off his bicycle. A deputy sheriff responded and found McGee on
the ground next to his bike, which did not have a seat. McGee had
great difficulty responding to the deputy’s questions, but eventually
he mumbled his name and shook his head “yes” when the deputy
asked if he had fallen off the bike. The deputy called an ambulance,
and McGee was taken to a hospital, where he was placed on mechani-
cal ventilation and life support. He died later that day. A .22-caliber
bullet was found in McGee’s brain; the cause of his death was a single
shot to the head. Investigators determined that the shooting occurred
about a block from where McGee was found; he had attempted to ride
his bicycle after Appellant and his friends fled, but only made it a
short distance. At the shooting location, investigators found blood,
vomit, a magazine for a 9-millimeter pistol, McGee’s bicycle seat, his
black cap, and the charm pendant from his necklace. The broken
necklace chain was found at the hospital with McGee’s clothing.

About ten weeks later, Samuels was arrested on other charges,
and he gave a statement to law enforcement regarding McGee’s
murder, which led to Appellant’s arrest. In a post-arrest interview,
the audio recording of which was played at trial, Appellant admitted
that he got out of the car, pointed his gun at McGee, and said, “Empty
out your pockets”; that his clip fell out of the gun when he was tussling
with McGee; and that Samuels then got out of the car and shot McGee
in the head.

(b) Appellant and Samuels were indicted together for malice
murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime. Prior to trial, on January 13, 2010,
Samuels pled guilty to all of those charges as well as robbery under
a separate indictment, and he agreed to testify against Appellant as
part of a negotiated plea agreement.” On February 23, 2010, after
learning of Samuels’s plea deal, Appellant’s trial counsel moved to
withdraw from further representation because both Appellant and
Samuels were represented by attorneys from the Augusta Judicial

2 Samuels was sentenced to life in prison for the murder plus twenty years concurrent for
the armed robbery, ten years concurrent for the separate robbery, and five years consecutive for
the firearm offense. In exchange for his guilty plea and testimony, the State agreed to dismiss
some of the charges against Samuels from the separate robbery indictment and to write a
favorable letter on his behalf tothe parole board. Samuels also retained the right to file a motion.
to remold his sentence to suspend his consecutive five-year sentence.

406 es

Circuit Public Defender’s Office and such representation might con-
stitute a conflict of interest under a proposed formal advisory opinion
regarding the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. After a hearing,
the trial court denied the motion. Before trial began on June 1, 2010,
Appellant’s counsel renewed the motion to withdraw, and the trial
court again denied it. Samuels testified against Appellant at trial.
Appellant did not testify. On June 3, the jury found Appellant guilty
on all charges.*

2. Appellant argues that the evidence summarized above was
insufficient to support his convictions.

When we consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we
must “put aside any questions about conflicting evidence,
the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence,
leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of the
trier of fact.” White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 523 (1) (753 SE2d
115) (2013) (citation omitted). Instead, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, id., and
we inquire only whether any rational trier of fact might find
beyond a reasonable doubt from that evidence that the
defendant is guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (IID) (B) (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). With this standard in mind, we
now turn to the sufficiency of the evidence in this case.

Walker v. State, 296 Ga. 161, 163 (766 SE2d 28) (2014).

(a) As to the convictions for malice murder and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime, the evidence showed that
Appellant was carrying a pistol, told Samuels that he wanted the gold
chain before he approached McGee, and pointed his gun at McGee
and demanded the chain; after McGee and Appellant began fighting,
Samuels and the two women in the car heard a gunshot. Samuels
then got out of the car with his own gun drawn, walked over to where
Appellant and McGee were fighting, and fired the fatal shot into
McGee’s head. Appellant then went through McGee’s pockets and left
with Samuels. From this evidence, a rational jury could find beyond

* The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve two terms of life in prison, running
concurrently, for malice murder and armed robbery, and a consecutive term of five years for the
firearm offense. The felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of law. On June 24, 2010,
Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial with new counsel, which he amended on May 6 and
November 30, 2011. After an evidentiary hearing on February 21, 2013, the trial court denied
the motion on March 15, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was
docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.

eS 407

a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of malice murder and
firearm possession as a party with Samuels, particularly given
Appellant’s own possession of a gun and attempt to rob and appar-
ently to shoot McGee before Samuels came to Appellant’s assistance.
Seeid.; OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining parties to a crime); Dublin v. State,
302 Ga. 60, 65 (3) (805 SE2d 27) (2017) (“ ‘Whether a person was a
party to a crime can be inferred from his presence, companionship,
and conduct before and after the crime was committed.’” (citation
omitted)).

(b) There was not, however, sufficient evidence to support Appel-
lant’s armed robbery conviction. “A person commits the offense of
armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes
property of another from the person or the immediate presence of
another by use of an offensive weapon. . . .” OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). To
prove the “taking” element of armed robbery, the State must show
both that the defendant caused the “slightest change of location” of
the property allegedly taken and that “complete dominion” over the
property was transferred at least temporarily from the victim to the
defendant. Gutierrez v. State, 290 Ga. 643, 644 (723 SE2d 658) (2012).
The indictment in this case alleged that Appellant took “a chain and
charm” from McGee. But the chain was found with McGee’s clothing
at the hospital, and the necklace’s pendant was found on the ground
at the shooting site. Because the chain was still with McGee’s
clothing, there is no evidence that Appellant ever moved the chain or
exercised control over it. And while the movement of the pendant
from the chain around McGee’s neck to the ground might satisfy the
slight change of location requirement, there is no evidence that
Appellant ever had complete dominion over the pendant.

Because the evidence showed that McGee refused to comply
when Appellant demanded the chain, this case is different from cases
like Gutierrez, where the defendant’s complete dominion over the
cash within the victims’ cash register was demonstrated when the
victims opened and moved the cash drawer after they were directed
to do so by the armed intruder. See Gutierrez, 290 Ga. at 645. See also
State v. Watson, 239 Ga. App. 482, 486 (520 SE2d 911) (1999) (“At the
time the barber obeyed King’s order at gunpoint to drop the money,
King exercised complete control over not only the barber but allitems
within the barber’s control, including the money dropped at King’s
direction.”). There also is no evidence that Appellant ever successfully
grabbed the chain or pendant away from McGee and moved either
item himself, making this case different from cases like Harris v.
State, 334 Ga. App. 299 (779 SE2d 83) (2015), where the evidence
showed that the defendant snatched the victim’s necklace from his
neck and carried it 30 yards away before dropping it. See id. at 300.

408 es

See also Igle v. State, 223 Ga. App. 498, 500 (478 SE2d 622) (1996)
(holding that the victim’s testimony that the gunman grabbed the
stolen box and then dropped it was sufficient to demonstrate move-
ment and dominion).

Accordingly, we reverse Appellant’s conviction for armed rob-
bery.*

3. Appellant argues that his constitutional right to counsel was
violated because his trial counsel was not permitted to withdraw
after Samuels, who was represented by an attorney from the same
public defender’s office, entered a negotiated guilty plea and agreed
to testify at Appellant’s trial. See U.S. Const., Amend. VI; Ga. Const.
of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIV. “One component of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel is the right to representation that is
free of actual conflicts of interest.” Edwards v. Lewis, 283 Ga. 345, 348
(658 SE2d 116) (2008). To show a violation of his right to counsel on
this ground, Appellant must establish an actual conflict of interest.
See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (100 SCt 1708, 64 LE2d 333)
(1980) (“[U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel actively repre-
sented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional
predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.”). “An ‘actual con-
flict,’ for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that
adversely affects counsel's performance,” not just “a mere theoretical
division of loyalties.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. 162, 171, 172 n.5
(122 SCt 1237, 152 LE2d 291) (2002). See also State v. Abernathy, 289
Ga. 603, 607 (715 SE2d 48) (2011) (“[I]n order to establish ineffective
assistance arising from a conflict of interest, a defendant must show
the existence of an actual conflict that adversely affected counsel’s
performance.”).®

4 We note that Appellant could have been charged with — or the jury could have been
instructed on the possibility of returning a verdict for — attempted armed robbery, for which the
evidence was readily sufficient, although such a conviction would have carried a lesser sentence
than the sentence for the completed crime. See OCGA §§ 16-4-1 (defining criminal attempt);
16-4-3 (‘Aperson charged with commission of a crime may be convicted of the offense of criminal
attempt as to that crime without being specifically charged with the criminal attempt in the
accusation, indictment, or presentment.”); 16-4-6 (providing the sentence for an attempted
crime). The State, however, sought only a conviction for a completed armed robbery.

® The question of whether counsel's representation of the defendant was affected is
different from the question of whether the outcome of the trial was affected, which is the issue
in most ineffective assistance of counsel cases, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 684
(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). Once a defendant shows that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his counsel's representation, he is entitled to a new trial without the need to
show actual prejudice. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487-491 (98 SCt 1173, 55 LE2d
426) (1978). See also Edwards, 289 Ga. at 351 (“[T]he critical question is whether the conflict
significantly affected the representation, not whether it affected the outcome of the underlying
proceedings.” (emphasis in original).

eS 409

When defense counsel advises the trial court before or at trial
that he is laboring under an actual conflict of interest, the court
usually must defer to that representation and appoint new counsel
for the defendant, as the attorney is in the best position to be aware
of conflicting interests and makes the representation as an officer of
the court. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-486 (98 SCt
1173, 55 LE2d 426) (1978). See also Smith v. Anderson, 689 F2d 59,
62-63 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Due to the attorney-client privilege, counsel for
the defendant is normally the individual best able to evaluate whether
he may represent more than one defendant with his effectiveness
unimpaired by the duality of his trial allegiance. Accordingly, the rule
developed by the federal courts in this area afford[s] the trial attor-
ney’s judgment near decisive weight in the calculus of conflict when
counsel’s perception of a conflict is brought to the court’s attention.”).

The trial court may, however, “explor[e] the adequacy of the basis
of defense counsel’s representation regarding a conflict of interests
without improperly requiring disclosure of the confidential commu-
nications of the client.” Holloway, 435 U.S. at 487. If the trial court
does not determine that no real conflict of interest exists but still
denies a request for new counsel based on an attorney’s representa-
tion that a conflict of interest exists, reversal is required. See Mick-
ens, 535 U.S. at 167 (“Holloway . .. creates an automatic reversal rule
only [explaining that reversal of a conviction is automatic] where
defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his timely
objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no
conflict.”); United States v. Punch, 722 F2d 146, 151 (5th Cir. 1983)
(granting a new trial because after defense counsel timely asserted a
conflict of interest, the district court did not take “ ‘adequate steps to
ascertain whether the risk [of conflict] was too remote to warrant
separate counsel’ ” (quoting Holloway, 435 U. S. at 484)).

In this case, however, Appellant’s trial counsel did not represent
that he was laboring under a conflict ofinterest. In his written motion
to withdraw, counsel said only that his office represented both
Appellant and Samuels and that Samuels had pled guilty and was
expected to testify at trial against Appellant. He then explained that
a proposed State Bar formal advisory opinion had indicated that
conflicts of interest were to be imputed to lawyers in a circuit public
defender’s office like they were to lawyers in a law firm.®

® ‘The proposed formal advisory opinion was later approved by this Court — with important
limitations and clarifications — in Formal Advisory Opinion No. 10-1, 293 Ga. 397, 400 (744
SE2d 798) (2013). The opinion interprets Rule 1.10 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for
Georgia lawyers, which says that conflicts of interest are imputed to lawyers “associated in a
firm,’ to apply to lawyers in a public defender’s office. Rule 1.7, the general conflict of interest

410 es

At the hearing on the motion, counsel argued that the proposed
formal advisory opinion, “if taken at face value[,] would require our
withdrawal from the case when in instances like this where the . . .
co-defendant was represented by an attorney in our office and has
pled guilty and will be testifying in the case.” Trial counsel again did
not assert that his representation of Appellant might be adversely
affected in any way, such as by limiting his ability to cross-examine
Samuels or raise defenses for Appellant. Compare Holloway, 435
U.S. at 476 (explaining that the three co-defendants “made timely
motions for appointment of separate counsel, based on the represen-
tations of their appointed counsel that, because of confidential infor-
mation received from the codefendants, he was confronted with the
risk of representing conflicting interests”); Smith, 689 F2d at 60-61
(quoting counsel’s statement to the trial court that his two clients’
defenses differed and so he “would not be able to properly defend
both of them in the same action”); Punch, 722 F2d at 149 (quoting
counsel’s explanation to the court that his clients had inconsistent
defenses). And in renewing the motion to withdraw on the first day
of trial, Appellant’s counsel said that it was based only “upon the
[public defender’s office’s] representation of the co-defendant, who
may or may not testify at trial.””

“Holloway requires state trial courts to investigate timely objec-
tions to multiple representation[s].” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346. The trial
court in this case held a hearing on the motion to withdraw, and it
considered defense counsel’s only argument — that under the pro-
posed formal advisory opinion, his continued representation of Appel-
lant was prohibited. The court denied the motion because it was
unconvinced that representation of co-defendants by a single public
defender’s office automatically creates a disqualifying conflict of
interest. The court’s ruling, although it may have warranted a more
thorough explication, was not incorrect. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 178
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The constitutional question must turn on
whether trial counsel had a conflict of interest that hampered the
representation, not on whether the trial judge should have been more
assiduous in taking prophylactic measures.”).

rule, says that a lawyer cannot ethically “represent or continue to represent a client if there is
a significant risk that . .. the lawyer's duties to another client... . will materially and adversely
affect the representation of the client[.]”

7 To be sure, an attorney's representation that he faces a conflict of interest need not be
detailed, particularly if the attorney must be vague to protect confidential information. See
McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F3d 688, 703 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Holloway does not require counsel to
disclose trial strategy or to breach his duty of loyalty to either client in order to substantiate the
existence of a conflict{.]”). Counsel here, however, did not even suggest that his representation
of Appellant could actually be affected by his office's representation of Samuels.

eS aul

That attorneys from one public defender’s office were represent-
ing Appellant and Samuels was not sufficient, standing alone, to
demonstrate an impermissible conflict of interest. Indeed, the advi-
sory opinion expressly states that such lawyers are not automatically
disqualified; rather, the trial court must determine if, because of the
imputed joint representation, “an impermissible conflict of interest
exists and cannot be waived or otherwise overcome.” Formal Advisory
Opinion No. 10-1, 293 Ga. 397, 400 (744 SE2d 798) (2013). Put
another way, the imputed conflict rule “does not become relevant or
applicable until after an impermissible conflict of interest has been
found to exist” — or, in this context, has been represented to exist by
counsel without contrary findings by the trial court. Id. (emphasis in
original). See also Thomas v. State, 298 Ga. 106, 111-112 (779 SE2d
616) (2015).8

Not only did Appellant’s counsel not represent to the court before
trial that a conflict of interest existed that could adversely affect his
representation, counsel’s conduct during the trial demonstrated that
there was no actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his
representation of Appellant. Such a conflict may be shown, for
example,

where counsel is shown to have refrained from raising a
potentially meritorious issue due to the conflict; where
counsel negotiates a plea bargain for more than one defen-
dant in a case conditioned on acceptance of the plea by all
such defendants; or where one of the State’s witnesses was
a current client of defense counsel in an unrelated criminal
matter, thereby constraining counsel’s ability to cross-
examine the witness.

Abernathy, 289 Ga. at 605 (citations omitted). See also Edwards, 283
Ga. at 350 (holding that an actual conflict of interest existed when
defense counsel did not pursue a jury array issue due to conflicting
interests); Burns v. State, 281 Ga. 338, 341 (638 SE2d 299) (2006)

® As the Supreme Court said in Cuyler:
Holloway reaffirmed that multiple representation does not violate the Sixth
Amendment unless it gives rise to a conflict of interest. Since a possible conflict
inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation, a defendant who
objects to multiple representation must have the opportunity to show that potential
conflicts impermissibly imperil his right to a fair trial. But unless the trial court
fails to afford such an opportunity, a reviewing court cannot presume that the
possibility for conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.
Cugler, 446 U. 8. at 348 (citation omitted),

412 Pe

(explaining that an actual conflict of interest may exist when the
co-defendants present antagonistic defenses at trial).

Nothing in the record indicates that Appellant’s counsel bypassed
any meritorious defenses, that Samuels’s plea bargain was negoti-
ated at the expense of Appellant, or that counsel’s ability to cross-
examine Samuels was constrained in any way. In fact, Appellant’s
counsel conducted a vigorous cross-examination, highlighting Samu-
els’s past convictions and inconsistent statements to the police. See
Pryor v. State, 333 Ga. App. 408, 413 (776 SE2d 474) (2015) (noting
that the allegedly conflicted public defender did not “pull any punches”
in cross-examination). Compare Holloway, 435 U. S. at 479-481
(explaining that the attorney who represented three co-defendants
who all testified was unable to cross-examine them or object to their
testimony to protect his other clients’ interests and could not subject
them to a direct examination that might elicit information that hurt
his other clients). There also is no evidence that Appellant’s counsel
shared any privileged or confidential information with or obtained
such information from the attorney representing Samuels. See Lytle
v. State, 290 Ga. 177, 178-179 (718 SE2d 296) (2011) (noting that the
defendant’s public defender did not share any information about the
defendant’s case with the public defenders of his co-defendants).
Under these circumstances, Appellant has not established a success-
ful ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices
concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

Robert L. Persse, Amy L. Ihrig, for appellant.

Natalie 8. Paine, District Attorney, Joshua B. Smith, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason M. Rea, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, for appellee.

$17A1046. THE STATE v. ADDAQUAY.
(807 SE2d 413)
HINES, Chief Justice.
The State appeals from the habeas court’s order granting relief to
appellee Thomas Addaquay on the ground that his plea counsel was

eS a8

constitutionally ineffective in incorrectly advising him of the immi-
gration consequences of his plea of guilty. For the reasons that follow,
we reverse.

1. In 2012, Addaquay pled guilty to criminal damage to property
in the second degree under OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1)! for conduct that
occurred in 2002 and was sentenced as for a misdemeanor, as
permitted under OCGA § 17-10-5, to 11 months and 29 days on
probation. At that time, Addaquay was a lawful permanent resident
of the United States, a status evidenced by the issuance of a
“green card” to him. See United States v. Sonmez, 777 F3d 684, 686,
n.1 (4th Cir. 2015) (“If the alien is granted lawful permanent resident
status, the government issues the alien a Permanent Resident Card,
commonly called a ‘green card.’”); Ramirez-Chacon v. Holder, 397
Fed. Appx. 179, 182, n.1 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a “green card”
is “merely evidence or proof” of an alien’s status as a lawful perma-
nent resident and that the expiration of a “green card” does not alter
that status). In 2015, Addaquay filed a petition for habeas corpus
relief, contending that his plea counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance because he misinformed Addaquay that his
plea of guilty to a felony would not affect his immigration status. At
the February 2016 habeas hearing, Addaquay testified that he had
been a legal resident of the United States since 1995 and that his
current “green card” was up for renewal. He added that, during the
plea negotiations, he told his plea counsel that his “primary concern
was remaining in the country legally,” and that his counsel told him
that if he pled guilty under OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1) and was sentenced
as for a misdemeanor, “it wasn’t going to affect [his] immigration
consequences, and [he] wasn’t going to be deportable.” According to
Addaquay, he had recently spoken to an immigration attorney who
told him that the guilty plea would prevent him from being able to
renew his “green card” and to pursue an application for citizenship.
At the hearing, Addaquay’s counsel argued that, although Addaquay
was sentenced as for a misdemeanor, he pled guilty to a felony and
that under immigration law, he could not renew his “green card” and
was deportable and that counsel performed deficiently in misinform-
ing him about that consequence. Emphasizing that, where “the law is
clear that deportation is mandatory . .. , an attorney has a duty to
accurately advise his client of that fact,” the habeas court ruled that

1 Subsection (a) (1) says that “[a] person commits the offense of criminal damage to
property in the second degree when he . . . [i]ntentionally damages any property of another
person without his consent and the damage thereto exceeds $500.00[.]”

414 es

Addaquay was deportable as a result of his plea of guilty, that plea
counsel performed deficiently in telling Addaquay that he would not
be deportable, and that, but for plea counsel’s misinformation, there
is a reasonable probability that Addaquay would not have pled guilty
but rather would have proceeded to trial.

2. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must show that his
counsel’s performance “ ‘was deficient, and that absent the deficiency,
there is a reasonable probability that he would have proceeded to trial
rather than pleading guilty.’ ” Frazier v. Mathis, 286 Ga. 647, 648 (690
SE2d 840) (2010) (citation omitted). The burden to “show that coun-
sel’s performance was deficient rests squarely on the defendant.”
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U. 8. 12, 22-23 (134 SCt 10, 187 LE2d 348) (2013)
(citation and punctuation omitted).

With regard to immigration consequences, the United States
Supreme Court held, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356
(130 SCt 1473, 176 LE2d 284) (2010), that the Sixth Amend-
ment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel protects
acriminal defendant from erroneous advice about deporta-
tion, id. at 366, and that a defendant establishes Strick-
land’s deficient performance prong by showing that counsel
failed to accurately advise the defendant when the immi-
gration consequences of a guilty plea “could be easily deter-
mined from reading the removal statute [8 USC § 1227].” Id.
at 368-369. In that case, counsel provided his client with the
false assurance that his guilty plea would not lead to his
deportation. The Supreme Court acknowledged that immi-
gration law can be “complex,” and that where the law is
unclear or discretionary, it may be sufficient to advise a
client that he “may” face deportation. The Padilla Court
emphasized, however, that where the deportation conse-
quences of a plea are “truly clear . . . the duty to give correct
advice is equally clear.” Id.

Encarnacion v. State, 295 Ga. 660, 661 (763 SE2d 463) (2014).
Here, based on Padilla, Addaquay did not claim that the depor-
tation consequences of his plea were unclear or uncertain, but instead
claimed that he was clearly deportable based on his plea of guilty to
criminal damage to property in the second degree and that plea
counsel performed deficiently in telling him that he would not be
deported. The State argues, however, that Addaquay failed to show

eS 415

that he is deportable under the removal statute, 8 USC § 1227,” and
we agree.

To begin, in response to the State’s merits brief, Addaquay fails
to discuss the removal statute or argue that any provision of it
requires his deportation. His arguments to the habeas court suffered
from the same fault, and the habeas court’s order did not cite to any
statute that supported its finding that Addaquay was deportable.
Addaquay hinged his case on his testimony that an immigration
lawyer told him that he could not renew his “green card” because of
the conviction, and the habeas court concluded that he therefore
could be deported. However, whether an offense constitutes a deport-
able crime “is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Ildefonso-
Candelario v. Atty. Gen. of the United States, 866 F3d 102, 104 (3d Cir.
2017).

(a) The removal statute authorizes the removal of an alien on
numerous grounds, and a conviction for violating OCGA § 16-7-23
(a) (1) could perhaps constitute a deportable offense under two
provisions of 8 USC § 1227. First, under 8 USC § 1227 (a) (2) (A) (iii),
“{a)ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable.” The Immigration and Naturalization Act
(INA) contains a long list of offenses that constitute aggravated
felonies. See 8 USC § 1101 (a) (48) (A)-(U). The one relevant to a
conviction under OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1) is “a crime of violence (as
defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, but not including
a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at
least one year.” 8 USC § 1101 (a) (43) (F). Even assuming that
criminal damage to property in the second degree constitutes a crime
of violence, because Addaquay was only sentenced to 11 months and
29 days in prison, the conviction is not considered an aggravated
felony under 8 USC § 1101 (a) (43) (F). See, e.g., United States v.
Garza-Mendez, 735 F3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that, for
purposes of subsection (a) (43) (F), “ ‘an aggravated felony is defined
by the sentence actually imposed’ ” (citation omitted)); United States
v. Gonzalez-Coronado, 419 F3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir. 2005) (explain-
ing that, “[t]o determine whether a prior conviction involved at least
a one-year prison sentence [under 8 USC § 1101 (a) (43) (F)], this
court looks to the actual sentence imposed”).

(b) In addition to authorizing removal of an alien for conviction of
an aggravated felony, an alien may be deported under 8 USC § 1227

2 We invited amici curiae to file briefs on the deportability question, and their briefing has
been most helpful to the Court.

416 es
for committing a crime of moral turpitude.

Any alien who — (J) is convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the
case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status
under section 245 (j) [8 USC § 1255 (j)]) after the date of
admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a
sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable.

8 USC § 1227 (a) (2) (A) @). Even assuming that criminal damage to
property in the second degree is a crime of moral turpitude under the
removal statute, deportation is triggered for a single conviction of a
crime of moral turpitude only if the crime was committed within five
years of the “date of admission” and a sentence of at least one year
could be imposed.® See id. Here, a sentence of more than one year
may be imposed for Addaquay’s conviction. See OCGA § 16-7-23 (b)
(“A person convicted of the offense of criminal damage to property in
the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment for not less
than one nor more than five years.”).

Accordingly, the decisive issue is whether Addaquay committed
the crime within five years of his “date of admission” to this country.
For purposes of the five-year period of 8 USC § 1227 (a) (2) (A) @ ),
the Board of Immigration Appeals has determined that “the phrase
‘the date of admission’ refers to the date of the admission by virtue of
which the alien was present in the United States when he committed
his crime.” Matter of Alyazji, 25 I. & N. Dec. 397, 406 (BIA 2011).
Under this definition, for example, an alien who was lawfully admit-
ted to the United States in 2000, who returned to his home country in
2002, who was lawfully admitted again to the United States in 2004,
and who then committed a crime of moral turpitude in 2006 for which
he was convicted in 2007 would be deportable, because, when he
committed the offense in 2006, he was in the United States pursuant
to his admission in 2004, less than five years earlier. See id. at
407-408. We note that aliens who, like Addaquay, have become a
lawful permanent resident of the United States have the privilege,
unlike other noncitizens, of traveling outside the United States and
returning without applying for admission on their return, except in
certain limited circumstances. See 8 USC § 1101 (a) (13) (C) (i)-(vi).
See generally Sijapati v. Boente, 848 F3d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 2017).

® The ten-year period for aliens provided lawful permanent resident status under 8 USC
§ 1255 (j) is inapplicable to this case.

eS a7

For Addaquay to be deportable because the crime of criminal
damage to property in the second degree was a crime of moral
turpitude under 8 USC § 1227 (a) (2) (A) @ (D, he necessarily had to
show that he committed the crime within five years of “the date of the
admission by virtue of which [Addaquay] was present in the United
States when he committed his crime.” Matter of Alyazji, 25 1. & N.
Dec. at 406. However, Addaquay offered evidence of only one date of
admission, which was in 1995, and that date of admission was not
within five years of the date of the commission of the crime in 2002.
Accordingly, Addaquay failed to prove that he was deportable by
virtue of having committed a crime of moral turpitude.

(c) The State also correctly argues that the habeas court erred
in concluding that Addaquay’s plea makes him deportable because
it will prevent him from renewing his “green card.” Addaquay’s
“green card” is “merely evidence or proof” of his status as a lawful
permanent resident, Ramirez-Chacon, 397 Fed. Appx. at 182, a status
which he has had since at least 2005, and that status does not
terminate until “entry of a final administrative order of exclusion,
deportation, or removal.” Savoury v. United States Atty. Gen., 449 F3
1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting then 8 CFR § 1.1 (p), now 8 CFR
§ 1.2). Moreover, “[a] person in deportation, exclusion, or removal pro-
ceedings is entitled to evidence of permanent resident status unti
ordered excluded, deported, or removed. [U. S. Citizenship and Imm-
igration Services] willissue such evidence in the form of a temporary
permanent resident document that will remain valid until the pro-
ceedings are concluded.” 8 CFR § 264.5 (g). Accordingly, the decision
that will make Addaquay deportable does not concern his “green
card,” but the order of deportation itself, and, as we have explaine’
above, Addaquay did not adequately prove that he is deportable.

(d) Finally, the State argues that the habeas court erred to the
extent it granted relief on the ground that Addaquay’s plea counse.
was constitutionally ineffective because he misinformed Addaquay
about the impact the plea might have on an application for citizen-
ship. We agree. First, Addaquay testified at the habeas hearing that
he told his plea counsel that his primary concern in taking the plea
was to ensure that he could remain in the United States legally, not
that he be able to obtain citizenship in the future. Moreover, there is
no controlling authority extending the reasoning of Padilla and
holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance
of counsel encompasses advice about applications for citizenship or
naturalization. See Padilla, 559 U. S. at 360, 364, 366, 369 (empha-
sizing that, because deportation or removal is a “ ‘drastic measure’ ”
that is “sometimes the most important part . . . of the penalty” for
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to a crime and is “close[ly]

A18 Pe

connect[ed] to the criminal process,” advice about a deportation
consequence that is “truly clear” falls within the scope of represen-
tation required by the Sixth Amendment); Escoffery v. United States,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160160, *4 (E.D. N.C. Nov. 8, 2013), affirmed
by United States v. Escoffery, 572 Fed. Appx. 213 (4th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that the court was not “aware of a judicial decision
extending Padilla to the context here — the denial of a citizenship
application” and declining to extend Padilla to that context). We
therefore conclude that this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is without merit.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

a 7 _ Attorney — — " _

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Assistant Attorney General, for
appellant.
Law Office of Andre Johnson, Jesse N. Bacon, for appellee.
Russell C. Gabriel; Jason A. Cade; Suparna M. Joshi, amici
curiae.

$17A1061. UNDISCLOSED LLC v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 393)

PETERSON, Justice.

Alexander Hamilton famously observed in Federalist 78 that
courts “have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”
Notwithstanding this general principle, the Georgia Constitution
does confer on us some carefully defined room for the exercise of will:
it vests in this Court the power to approve rules for each class of court
in this State. That is a policymaking power. We can approve or
disapprove a proposed rule based on whether we think it’s a good idea.
But once we’ve approved a rule, our policymaking roleis atanendand
Hamilton’s observation applies with full force. And so, when a case
(like this one) calls us to decide what a rule means, our role is no
different than when we interpret the Georgia Constitution or a state
statute; we simply determine what the text of the rule meant at the
time it was adopted, and apply it accordingly, without considering
whether we like the policy implications that meaning may have.

More than a decade ago, Joseph Watkins was convicted of felony
murder and other crimes following a jury trial, and we affirmed

eS 419

Watkins’s convictions on appeal. Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578 (581
SE2d 23) (2003). In late 2015, Undisclosed LLC, a producer of a legal
documentary podcast, began investigating Watkins’s case and, as
part of that investigation, sought access to audio recordings of several
hearings and the trial. Undisclosed filed a motion in Watkins’s case
under Uniform Superior Court Rule 21 (Rule 21”) to obtain copies of
the audio recordings, arguing that our decision in Green v. Drinnon,
Inc., 262 Ga. 264 (417 SE2d 11) (1992) held that a court reporter’s
audio recordings are “court records” under Rule 21 and the rule
provided the right to copy court records. The State did not oppose the
motion; the trial court denied it to the extent Undisclosed wanted to
make copies of the audio recordings, holding Rule 21 did not confer
the right to copy. We granted Undisclosed’s application for discre-
tionary appeal. Interpreting Rule 21 in the light of the common law
right that it preserved, we conclude that the trial court erred: Rule 21
does include a right to copy court records. We nevertheless affirm the
trial court’s order because Green’s limited holding does not apply
here, and a review of the common law shows that “court records”
within the historic right include only those materials filed with the
court, which the recording in question was not.
1. Rule 21 provides the process for non-parties to seek access to
court records.
Rule 21 provides that “[a]Il court records are public and are to be
available for public inspection unless public access is limited by law
or by the procedure set forth [in the rule].” The State argues that a
Rule 21 motion is not the proper vehicle for a non-party to access court
records, and that Undisclosed should have instead sought manda-
mus. Undisclosed argues that its Rule 21 motion was the proper
vehicle. Undisclosed is right. See Merchant Law Firm v. Emerson,
301 Ga. 609, 610 (1) (800 SE2d 557) (2017).
2. Rule 21’s right of public inspection includes the right to copy.
Undisclosed argues that a Rule 21 analysis generally requires a
threshold determination of whether the requested material is a court
record, a determination Undisclosed contends has been resolved in its
favor by our opinion in Green. Undisclosed argues that we need only
address whether Rule 21 includes the right to copy, arguing that Rule
21’s right of access to court records includes the right to copy them,
and so the court erred in concluding that Undisclosed did not have the

. This opinion should not be read as requiring the filing of a Rule 21 motion in order to
obtain access to court records, because nothing precludes a trial court clerk from making them
available upon request. The necessity of a motion arises, however, when a judge is inclined to
seal a record or otherwise prohibit its release or in cases like this one where there is a dispute
about whether something qualifies as a court record.

420 |

right to make copies of the court reporter’s audio recordings. We first
review the trial court’s ruling that Rule 21 does not include a right to
copy court records, and then consider the import of Green’s statement
that a court reporter’s audio recordings are court records.

(a) Because Rule 21 is derived from the common law, we construe
its text in the light of the common law.

Whether Rule 21's right of access to court records includes the
right to copy is a matter of first impression. Rule 21 expressly states
that court records are available for “public inspection,” but does not
specifically address the ability to copy records. The State asks us to
construe the term “inspection” according to its plain and ordinary
meaning, as we ordinarily do when construing statutes and court
rules. See, e.g., Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 364 (1) (729
SE2d 378) (2012) (“[T]he basic rule used by courts across the country
is to apply [a] word’s ordinary, everyday meaning.”); Beneke v. Parker,
285 Ga. 733, 734 (684 SE2d 243) (2009) (“The fundamental rules of
statutory construction require us to construe a statute according to
its terms [and] to give words their plain and ordinary meaning[.]”
(citation and punctuation omitted)); Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464,
464 (519 SE2d 687) (1999) (evaluating plain meaning of a Uniform
Superior Court Rule). The State contends that such consideration
will show that the definition of “inspection” — “critical examination”
or “official examination or review” — does not include “copy,” “dupli-
cate,” or “reproduce.” See Webster’s New World Dictionary 729 (2d
College ed. 1980).

But the State’s argument ignores that in interpreting the plain
meaning of Rule 21, we do not look at the text in isolation. See May
v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 391 (761 SE2d 38) (2014). Rather, to determine
its meaning, we also consider its context. Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566,
573 (8) (a) (731 SE2d 731) (2012) (“In construing statutes, however,
we do not read words in isolation, but rather in context.”). This
context includes the immediate context of other provisions of Rule 21
and the other rules. It also includes the broader legal context in which
Rule 21 was drafted, including other law that forms the legal back-
ground of Rule 21. May, 295 Ga. at 391-392 (“[C]ontext is a primary
determinant of meaning. For context, we may look to other provisions
of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute,
and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike
— that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in
question.” (citations and punctuation omitted)).

2 The State also points us to numerous statutory examples where the legislature has made
a distinction between “inspect” and “copy.”

eS 421

Here, the common law is not only part of the relevant legal
background regarding the right of access, it is the mold in which Rule
21 was cast. “It is well settled that the right of access under Rule 21
is coextensive with the common law right of access to court proceed-
ings.” Merchant, 301 Ga. at 613 (1) (b) (citing cases). Through Rule 21,
the common law remains in effect, and although the common law may
be amended, such changes must be clear. See Fortner v. Town of
Register, 278 Ga. 625, 626 (1) (604 SE2d 175) (2004) (“The common-
law rules are still of force and effect in this State, except where they
have been changed by express statutory enactment or by necessary
implication.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Scalia &
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 318 (2012)
(“The better view is that statutes will not be interpreted as changing
the common law unless they effect the change with clarity.”).

There is no indication that Rule 21 changed the common law in
any way at issue here. Indeed, the preamble to the Uniform Superior
Court Rules provides:

It is not the intention, nor shall it be the effect, of these rules
to conflict with the Constitution or substantive law, either per
se or in individual actions and these rules shall be so con-
strued and in case of conflict shall yield to substantive law.

256 Ga. at 865.° The common law right of access was the substantive
law when Rule 21 was adopted. Consequently, we construe Rule 21
consistent with the common law. See May, 295 Ga. at 397 (“Where
there is limitation by a statute which is capable of more than one
construction, the statute must be given that construction which is
consistent with the common law.” (citation and punctuation omit-
ted)). With that in mind, we turn to a review of the common law.

(b) The common law right of access includes the right to inspect
and copy.

The right of access to court records that we consider here is based
on the common law and predates the Constitution. See Belo Broad-
casting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981). Under the

® We note that the preamble became part of the Uniform Superior Court Rules after Rule
21 and other rules were initially adopted. See 256 Ga. at 865 (providing that preamble is
adopted effective September 19, 1986); 253 Ga. at 800, 832 (adopting rules). Although the
preamble was approved subsequent to the rules, it shows that the rules were not intended to
alter substantive law, such as the common law, and therefore provides guidance on the
interpretation of Rule 21. Prior to passage of the preamble, we had not interpreted the scope of
Rule 21, much less provided an interpretation in conflict with the common law. Even if we had,
the preamble would have functioned as an amendment to the rules that returned the scope of
Rule 21 to conform to the common law.

422 |

common law, the right of access to public records was generally
restricted to those persons with a sufficient interest in them, such as
those needing the records to prosecute or defend a legal action. See
Colscott v. King, 57 NE 535, 537 (Ind. 1900); Ferry v. Williams, 41 NJL
332, 334 (1879); 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law 521-523 (1892); see also
Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 183 (2) (b) (751 SE2d 337) (2013)
(“[MJost founding-era English cases provided that only those persons
who hada personal interest in non-judicial records were permitted to
access them.”) (citing McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 233 (133 SCt
1709, 185 LE2d 758) (2013)). The right of access to court records,
however, did not require a special interest.‘ Instead, the common law
provided that the right of access to court records was aright belonging
to every individual:

It has been admitted, from a very early period, that the
inspection and exemplification of the records of the King’s
courts is the common right of the subject. This right was
extended by an ancient statute to cases where the subject
was concerned against the King. The exercise of the right
does not appear to have been restrained until the reign of
Charles II, when, in consequence of the frequency of actions
for malicious prosecution, which could not be supported
without a copy of the record, the judges made an order for the
regulation of the sessions of the Old Bailey, prohibiting the
granting of any copy of an indictment for felony without a
special order, upon motion in open court, at the general jail
delivery. This order, it is to be observed, relates only to
indictments for felony. In cases of misdemeanor, the right to
a copy has never been questioned. But in the United States,
no regulation of this kind is known to have been expressly
made; and any limitation of the right to a copy of a judicial
record or paper, when applied for by any person having an
interest in it, would probably be deemed repugnant to the
genius of American institutions.

Ex Parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404, 406-407 (D.C. Cir. 1894)
(quoting Simon Greenleaf, Treatise on the Law of Evidence, Vol. 1
§ 471) (citation and emphasis omitted).°

+ The rights of access to public records and court records were historically distinct and
separate, Accordingly, the Open Records Act (which regards the right of access to public records)
is not relevant to the meaning of the right of access to court records under Rule 21

6 Ex Parte Drawbaugh noted English case law questioning the dubious validity of the
“special order” restriction imposed by judges on the grounds that judges lacked the power to

eS 428

In addition to establishing that every citizen has a right to
inspect judicial records, Ex Parte Drawbaugh also demonstrates the
parallel right to copy those records.® Ex Parte Drawbaugh is not alone
in observing that the common law right of access includes the right to
copy court records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435
U.S. 589, 597 (98 SCt 1306, 55 LE2d 570) (1978) (“It is clear that the
courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy
public records and documents, including judicial records and docu-
ments.” (footnotes omitted)); Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 263 F3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Beyond establishing a
general presumption that criminal and civil actions should be con-
ducted publicly, the common-law right of access includes the right to
inspect and copy public records and documents.”); United States v.
Hickey, 767 F2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1985) (“We begin by acknowledg-
ing the axiom that a common law right exists to inspect and copy
judicial records.”); United States v. Criden, 648 F2d 814, 819 (3d Cir.
1981) (“The right to inspect and copy, sometimes termed the right to
access, antedates the Constitution.”); Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299,
304 (1882) (a custodian of judicial records is “bound to furnish copies”
of judicial records upon payment of any fees, whereas an individual
requesting access to other public records must show an interest in the
document and that the request is for a legitimate purpose); cf. Clay v.
Ballard, 13 SE 262, 263 (Va. 1891) (“The authorities on the subject are
very numerous, and they uniformly hold that such a right [to inspect]
includes the right, when necessary to the attainment of justice, to
take copies.”). The State has not identified — nor have we found —
any contrary authority.

The right of access to court records serves vital purposes:

As James Madison warned, “A popular Government
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is
but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy: or perhaps both... .
A people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.” ... . [T]he
right of inspection serves to produce an informed and enlight-
ened public opinion. Like the public trial guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment, the right serves to safeguard against any

alter the law. 2 App. D.C. at 407. But even if the restriction was valid, subjects still could obtain
copies of judicial records in felony cases by making a motion. Id

® The court's reference to “exemplification” meant copying. See Noah Webster, A Dictionary
of the English Language 153 (1878) (defining “exemplify” as “(1) To show by example; (2) To
make an attested copy of; (3) To prove or show by an attested copy’).

424 |

attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution,
to promote the search for truth, and to assure confidence in
judicial remedies.

United States v. Mitchell, 551 F2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(punctuation and footnotes omitted) (quoting Letter from James
Madison to W. T. Barry, August 4, 1822, in 9 The Writings of James
Madison 103 (Hunt ed. 1910)), reversed on other grounds by Nixon,
435 U.S. 589. A right to read but not copy court records would be of
limited use to this purpose. Indeed, the right of access is not complete
unless it includes the right to copy. See Whorton v. Gaspard, 393
SW2d 773, 774 (Ark. 1965) (“The right to inspect . .. carries with it the
right to make copies, without which the right to inspect would be
practically valueless.”); Fuller v. State, 17 So2d 607, 607 (Fla. 1994)
(“[T]he right to inspect would in many cases be valueless without the
right to make copies.”); 37 Cent. L. Journal 399 (1893) (“[T]he right of
examination must necessarily carry with it the right to make what-
ever copies or other memoranda are necessary to effectuate the
purpose for which the examination is sought, or else the grant of the
mere right of inspection is nugatory.”).

This line of authority uniformly accepting that the common law
right of access to judicial records encompasses a right to copy provides
important context for the scope of the right Rule 21 preserved.
Consistent with the common law, we conclude that Rule 21’s right to
“inspect” includes the right to copy, and the trial court erred in ruling
otherwise.

But our inquiry does not end here, as we may affirm the trial
court’s judgment ifit is right for any reason. See Reed v. Reed, 295 Ga.
574, 578 (761 SE2d 326) (2014). Our review of the common law
reveals some tension between it and our statement in Green that a
court reporter’s audio recordings are court records for purposes of
Rule 21. We now take the opportunity to revisit the issue.

3. “Court records” under Rule 21 include only records filed with
the court.

Although “[a] body of case law has developed around [Rule] 21,...
only a handful of decisions [have] focused on whether an item
constitutes a ‘court record’” under the meaning of Rule 21. In re
Gwinnett County Grand Jury, 284 Ga. 510, 511 (668 SE2d 682) (2008)
(citation omitted). In none of these cases have we expressly defined
what constitutes a court record. Rule 21 became effective July 1,
1985. See 253 Ga. 800, 832. In one of our first decisions applying it, we
explained that the public’s “presumptive right of access” to all court
records “includes pre-judgment records in civil cases, and begins
when a judicial document is filed.” Atlanta Journal & Constitution v.

eS 425

Long, 258 Ga. 410, 413-414 (3) (869 SE2d 755) (1988). Our statement
in Long appears inconsistent with our statement in Green that
“[a]n official court reporter’s tape of a judge’s remarks in open court
is acourt record.” 262 Ga. at 265 (1). The parties disagree about much,
but one thing they seem to agree on is that court reporters rarely, if
ever, file their audio recordings with the court. It is the transcript of
the court proceedings that is the public record of the proceedings once
it is filed. See OCGA § 5-6-41 (e) (“Upon filing by the reporter, the
transcript shall become a part of the record in the case[.]”); Kent v.
Kent, 289 Ga. 821, 823 (2) (a) (716 SE2d 212) (2011) (“Upon filing, the
transcript becomes a public document that is equally available to all
parties.”). So our statement in Green that a court reporter’s audio
recording, which is not usually filed with the court, appears at odds
with our statement in Long that the right of access enshrined in Rule
21 “begins when a judicial document is filed.” 258 Ga. at 413-414 (8).
To resolve this confusion, we consider what a “court record” was at
common law. But the definition of a “court record” at the time Rule 21
was adopted requires us to look beyond the common law, as subse-
quent statutes may also be relevant.

(a) The common law understanding of court records was limited
to matters enrolled in parchment that provided a history of the case.

Case law and leading common law authorities have defined a
court record as a history of the proceedings and actions of the court
from the commencement of the suit to its termination. Sir Edward
Coke, “one of the greatest of English jurists,”’ defined court records as

“memorials or remembrances, in rolls of parchment, of the
proceedings and acts of a court of justice, which hath power
to hold plea according to the course of the common law;” and
are of “such .. . credit and verity as that they admit no
averment, plea or proof to the contrary; andif such record be
alleged, andit be pleaded that there is no such record, it shall
be tried only by itself.”

Davidson v. Murphy, 13 Conn. 213, 218 (1839) (quoting Coke on
Littleton); see also Noble v. Shearer, 6 Ohio 426, 427 (1834) (‘Arecord
is the history of the cause from its commencement, the issuing of the
writ, until final judgment is rendered.”). Similarly, Sir William
Blackstone, the leading authority on the common law,* in comparing

7 Davison v. Reynolds, 150 Ga. 182, 183 (103 SE 248) (1920).
® Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 n. 2 (88 SCt 1477, 20 LE2d 522) (1968) (accepting
Blackstone's Commentaries as the most satisfactory exposition of common law); see also

426 |

courts of record (the king’s courts) and “others not of record,”® stated:

A court of record is that where the acts and judicial
proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memo-
rial and testimony, which rolls are called the records of the
court, and are of such high and supereminent authority, that
their truth is not to be called in question.

(Emphasis supplied.) 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 24 (Robert Bell ed., 1772); see also DeKalb County
v. Deason, 221 Ga. 237, 238 (144 SE2d 446) (1965) (citing Blackstone
and providing full definition of a “court of record”).

As to what was “enrolled in parchment” at common law, the
record generally contained at least the following: the most material
pleadings, including the original complaint (or writ), answers or
responses, and continuances; the verdict if there was a jury trial; and
the court’s judgment. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 317 (“The
record is a history of the most material proceedings in the cause...
in which must be stated the original writ and summons, all the
pleadings, the declaration, view or oyer prayed, the imparlances,
plea, replication, rejoinder, continuances, and whatever further pro-
ceedings have been had; all entered verbatim on the roll, and also the
issue or demurrer, and joinder therein.”); id. at 378 (“When the jury
have delivered in their verdict, and it is recorded in court, they are
then discharged.”); id. at 395 (“If judgment is not by some of these
means arrested within the first four days of the next term after the
trial, it is then to be entered on the roll or record.”); see also White v.
Newton Mfg. Co., 38 Ga. 587, 593 (3) (1869) (“The proceedings which
the Clerk should record, and which make up the record, are, the
declaration, process, return of service by the sheriff, and other official
entries, the plea, verdict, judgment, and all interlocutory orders
passed by the Court during the pendency of the case; and in case of a
motion for a new trial after verdict, the order nisi, together with any
order passed by the Court, setting it down for a hearing in vacation,
or adjourning the hearing from time to time; and in case the new trial
is granted, all subsequent orders passed by the Court, including the

Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 300 Ga. 848, 853 (2) (a) (797 SE2d 814) (2017); Tucker v.
Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 203 (1) (65 SE2d 909) (1951)

° Only the king's courts had the authority to fine or imprison, while a “court not of record
is the court of a private man; whom the law will not [e]ntrust with any discretionary power over
the fortune or liberty of his fellow-subjects.” 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 24-25 (Robert Bell ed., 1772).

eS 427

final judgment.”). Thus, materials that were filed and enrolled in
parchment became the court record at common law.

The filing of a document, while necessary, was not a sufficient
condition to make the matter part of the court record at common law.
Depositions, exhibits, and other documentary evidence filed in the
case, as well as the court’s opinions, were not typically considered part
of the court record. See Puckett v. Graves, 14 Miss. 384, 391 (1846)
(“Every motion made in a cause constitutes part of its history, and is
as much apart of the record as the declaration, plea, or judgment. The
evidence offered is no part of the record, unless made so by bill of
exceptions.”); Lenox v. Pike, 2 Ark. 14, 20 (1839) (“Whatever else that
is not necessarily enrolled, such, for example, as oral and written
testimony, and exceptions taken to the opinion and judgment of the
court, constitutes no part of the record, unless they are expressly
made so by order of the court, by the agreement of the parties, by
demurrer to evidence, by oyer, by bill of exceptions, or by special
verdict. These are the usual and only legitimate modes by which
matters of fact may be spread upon the record.”); Coolidge v. Inglee,
13 Mass. 26, 50 (1816) (“Neither the report of the judge of the
proceedings at the trial, nor the reasons given for the opinion of the
Court, nor the papers and documents filed in the case, are a part of the
record.”).

In Williams v. Norris, 25 U.S. 117 (6 LE 571) (1827), the Supreme
Court of the United States noted that although a judge’s opinion,
depositions, and evidence are not generally considered court records,
they may be included in the court record if specifically provided.
Specifically, the Supreme Court stated:

Depositions, and exhibits of every description, are papers
in the cause, and, in one sense of the word, form a part of the
record. In some States they are recorded by direction of law.
But, in a jury cause, they constitute no part of the record on
which the judgment of an appellate Court is to be exercised,
unless made a part of it by bill of exceptions, or in some other
manner recognised by law.

Id. at 119.

Our own precedent reflects the common law principle that many
documents and other papers filed with or considered by the court are
not automatically part of the court record, but that statutes could
provide a method for making them so. In Smith v. Burn, 2 Ga. 262, 263
(1847), we examined a statute that required for written evidence to be
included in the bill of exceptions in order for the material to be part
of the court record, and concluded that certain testimony was not

428 |

made part of the record because the party did not meet the statutory
requirements for creating a bill of exceptions. Although Smith did not
expressly discuss the common law, Smith implicitly recognized the
common law rule that evidence does not form part of the court record,
which was limited to the pleadings, verdicts, and judgments under
the common law. Smith also reflects an understanding that our laws
can amend the definition of a “court record” to include materials in
addition to those provided by the common law. Consequently, with the
common law as the backdrop, we must evaluate what materials were
considered to be part of the court record at the time Rule 21 was
adopted.

(b) “Court record” at the time Rule 21 was adopted meant mate-
rials filed with the court.

As we have already explained, Rule 21 formalized the common
law right of access to court records, and we interpret the rule in the
light of that context. The common law is not the only context we
consider, however. See Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838, 839 (1) (770 SE2d
851) (2015) (the meaning of a provision is often based on context,
which includes the constitutional, statutory, and common law frame-
work). We interpret court rules in the same manner we interpret
other written instruments, which mean now what they meant when
they were enacted. See Warren v. State, 294 Ga. 589, 590 (755 SE2d
171) (2014) (when considering the text and relevant context of the
statute, a statute is to be construed as understood at the time of its
enactment); Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor and Aldermen of City of
Savannah, 14 Ga. 438, 454 (1854) (“[T]he Constitution, like every
other instrument made by men, is to be construed in the sense in
which it was understood by the makers of it at the time when they made
it. To deny this is to insist that a fraud shall be perpetrated upon those
makers or upon some of them.” (emphasis in original)).

By the time Rule 21 was adopted in 1985, the General Assembly
had statutorily mandated the contents of the formal record of the
court. In 1965, the General Assembly enacted the Appellate Practice
Act (“the Act”). Ga. L. 1965, p. 18. The Act prescribed the matters that
are to appear in a court’s record and abolished the process noted in
Smith that parties had to create a bill of exceptions in order to make
certain materials part of the court record. See Bishop v. Lamkin, 221
Ga. 691 (146 SE2d 769) (1966). Although the Act, as its full name
suggests, generally governs the appellate process, it does provide
guidance on the scope of the record in the trial court, and distin-
guishes between that record and the record on appeal. See, e.g.,
OCGA §§ 5-6-41 (d) (defining trial court record); 5-6-37 (“The notice
[of appeal] shall set forth . . . a designation of those portions of the
record to be omitted from the record on appeal[.]”); 5-6-38 (a)

eS 429

(‘The notice of cross appeal shall set forth . . . a designation of any
portions of the record or transcript designated for omission by the
appellant and which the appellee desires included .. . . In all cases
where the notice of appeal did not specify that a transcript of evidence
and proceedings was to be transmitted as part of the record on appeal,
the notice of cross appeal shall state whether such transcript is to be
filed for inclusion in the record on appeal.”); 5-6-41 (f) (providing a
process by which the parties may seek to correct the record to
“conform to the truth” and stating that “[i]f anything material to
either party is omitted from the record on appeal or is misstated
therein, the parties by stipulation, or the trial court, either before or
after the record is transmitted to the appellate court . .. may direct
that the omission or misstatement shall be corrected and, if neces-
sary, that a supplemental record” be transmitted by the clerk of the
trial court).

Turning to the materials that the Act includes in the court’s
record, the Act, as it existed at the time of Rule 21’s adoption,'°
provided:

Where a trial in any civil or criminal case is reported by
a court reporter, all motions, colloquies, objections, rulings,
all evidence — whether admitted or stricken on objection or
otherwise — copies or summaries of all documentary evi-
dence, the charge of the court, and all other proceedings
which may be called in question on appeal or other post-trial
procedure shall be reported, and where the report is tran-
scribed, all such matter shall be included in the written
transcript, it being the intention of this act that all these
matters appear in the record, rather than in assignments of
error on appeal or otherwise, which are abolished by this
Act. Where matters occur which were not reported, such as
objections to oral argument, misconduct of the jury, or other
like instances, the court, upon motion of either party, shall
require that a transcript of these matters be made and
included as a part of the record. The transcript of proceed-
ings shall not be reduced to narrative form unless by agree-
ment of counsel, but where the trial is not reported or the
transcript of the proceedings for any other reason is not
available and the evidence is prepared from recollection, it
may be prepared in narrative form.

1 OCGA § 5-6-41 was amended in 1993, after the adoption of Rule 21, with mostly stylistic
changes. See Ga, L. 1993, p. 1315, § 1

430 |

Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 24-25, § 10 (d) (codifiedat OCGA § 5-6-41 (d)). The
Act also provided that the transcript becomes part of the recordin the
case upon filing by the court reporter, and outlined a procedure for the
parties to correct any alleged misstatements or omissions in the
transcript or record or to create a stipulated statement of facts in lieu
of a transcript. Id., pp. 25-26, § 10 (f)-@). With the passage of the Act
in 1965, the General Assembly thus provided that all motions,
colloquies, objections, rulings, and evidence are to be reported and are
to appear in a court’s record, and that a transcript filed by the court
reporter is also included in the court record. Id., pp. 18, 24-25, § 10 (d)
(“it being the intention of this act that all these matters appear in the
record”). Categorizing this list of items, we can see the materials
required to be made part of the record by the Act are those items that
reflect requests for the court to take action (motions and objections)
or are central to or reflect any adjudicative action (evidence, filed
transcripts, colloquies, and rulings). Notably, by their very nature, all
of these items become court records only upon filing with the court.

Because the Act relates to a subject matter at issue here — what
is reported in a court record and, thus, made public — we construe
Rule 21’s use of the phrase “court record” consistent with the meaning
of court record supplied by the Act."! See Willis v. City of Atlanta, 285
Ga. 775, 776 (2) (684 SE2d 271) (2009) (statutes relating to the same
subject matter must be construed together).

Construing the term “court record” as used in Rule 21 to be
consistent with the Act’s definition of a court’s record does not alter
the fundamental meaning of the common law definition of a court
record. Rather, it only supplements the common law. The common
law definition of a court record was that which provided a history of
the court’s actions and proceedings. The Act merely requires a more
expansive and detailed account of the court’s actions, but it results in
a history of the court’s actions just the same. More significant for
these purposes, both the common law and the Act reflect the same
basic principle: for something to be a court record, it must be filed with
the court.

In the light of all this context, then, a “court record” for Rule 21
purposes includes those materials that set forth the cause of action

¥ We note that in 1978, before enactment of Rule 21, the General Assembly provided a
different definition of a “court record” as part of the Georgia Records Act. See Ga. L. 1978,
pp. 1872, 1375, § 4 (codified in OCGA § 50-18-91 (2)). That definition is expansive, departs
dramatically from the common law and the Act's definitions we have discussed, and may well
cover the audio recordings at issue here. The Georgia Records Act, however, merely governs
state agency record retention and, unlike the Act, does not address what is made available for
public access and, thus, does not concern the subject matter at issue in this case.

eS 431

(pleadings), reflect requests for the court to take action (motions and
objections), are an adjudicative action (rulings, judgment, orders), or
are central to such rulings (evidence, filed transcripts, and collo-
quies). All of these items must be on file with the court before
becoming a court record. See, e.g., OCGA § 5-6-41 (e) (only upon filing
does the transcript become part of the record). This is in accord with
what we said in Long that the right of access begins when a “judicial
document is filed.” Long, 258 Ga. at 413-414 (8).

Defining the scope of a “court record” to require filing with the
court is also consistent with conclusions drawn by other jurisdictions
that have considered the right of access derived from the common law.
Materials admitted into evidence, that call for court action, or play a
central role in the adjudicative process are part of the judicial record,
so long as such materials are on file with the court. See, e.g., United
States v. Amodeo, 44 F3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he item filed
must be relevant to the performance of the judicial function and
useful in the judicial process in order for it to be designated a judicial
document.”); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949
F2d 653, 660 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting decisions that have concluded
court records to be transcripts of a civil trial, exhibits admitted at
trial, settlement documents filed with the district court, and tran-
scripts of hearings, and ruling that materials filed with summary
judgment motion were court records because it was a motion for relief
that would have disposed of the case); In re Alexander Grant & Co.
Litigation, 820 F2d 352, 355 (11th Cir. 1987) (right of access extends
to “pleadings, docket entries, orders, affidavits or depositions duly
filed” but not to documents collected during discovery (emphasis
omitted)); RT-C. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F2d 404, 410 (1st
Cir. 1987) (financial statements referred to in a proposed consent
decree were public records because they were material filed and
considered by court in its approval of decree); State v. Komisarjeusky,
25 A3d 613, 622 (Conn. 2011) (“A judicial document is any document
filed that a court reasonably may rely on in support ofits adjudicatory
function[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Commonwealth v.
Long, 922 A2d 892, 898 (Pa. 2007) (“Documents that are filed with the
court and, in particular, those that are used by the judge in rendering
a decision are clearly considered public judicial documents.”).

Given the Act’s directives about what is to appear in a trial court’s
record and the cited authority defining “court records” for which the
common law right of access applies, we conclude that the right of
access under Rule 21 applies only to those materials that are filed
with the court.

432 |

4. The court reporter's audio recordings in this case are not court
records.

(a) Because the recordings are not filed with the court, they are not
court records under Rule 21.

The audio recordings at issue here are not court records under

the definitions established above because they were not filed with the
court. And, indeed, they rarely are; court reporters use the recordings
(which they are not legally required to create in the first place) to
prepare the transcript. It is the transcript itself, not any recordings
or notes made by the court reporter, that becomes part of the court
record that is reported. See OCGA § 5-6-41 (e) (“Upon filing by the
reporter, the transcript shall become a part of the record in the case
and need not be approved by the trial judge.”); Kent, 289 Ga. at 823
(2) (a) “Upon filing, the transcript becomes a public document that is
equally available to all parties.”).
Our conclusion that a court reporter’s recordings not filed with
the court are not court records is in accord with other courts that have
considered the issue. Federal courts of appeals have denied access to
audiotapes, ruling that the recordings should not be deemed judicial
records, although they may be made available if “some reason is
shown to distrust the accuracy of the stenographic transcript.” Smith
v. U.S. Dist. Court Officers, 203 F3d 440, 442 (7th Cir. 2000) (backup
tapes are not an original record of proceedings, nor are they filed with
the court); see also Choy v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 629
Fed. Appx. 362, 366 (3d Cir. 2015); In the Matter of Pratt, 511 F3d 483,
485 (5th Cir. 2007). Under these authorities, a court reporter’s audio
recordings are not court records.”

(b) Green holds that a court reporter’s audio recordings are court
records available for public access only under limited circumstances
not present here.

Undisclosed relies on Green as authority that the audio record-
ings are court records that it has the right to access under Rule 21.
But Undisclosed confuses a stray sentence of the opinion with our
holding in that case. In Green, a state court judge “made opening

+ Our ruling here does not preclude a party from accessing a court reporter's audio
recordings in some situations. The Act provides a party who believes that the transcript “does
not truly or fully disclose what transpired in the trial court” with the ability to correct the
transcript, and the matter would be set for a hearing. See OCGA § 5-6-41 (f). Nothing in the Act
would preclude a party from filing a subpoena to obtain the recordings for the purpose of
correcting the transcript. The audio recordings may be relevant and material to the issue of
what transpired at court and complying with a subpoena for the recordings would not generally
be oppressive. See Price v. State, 269 Ga. 24 (2) (498 SE2d 262) (1998) (trial court erred
in quashing subpoena for documents that were relevant to issue because complying with the
subpoena was not unreasonable and oppressive).

eS 438

remarks . . . after court was called into session but before the call of
any case.” 262 Ga. at 264. The remarks were recorded by the court
reporter, but were not transcribed as part of any case. The local
newspaper requested a transcript of the remarks, which the judge
denied. The newspaper then sued the judge in superior court, assert-
ing claims to the court reporter’s tape under both the Open Records
Act and the right of access to court records under Rule 21. The super-
ior court ruled for the newspaper, requiring provision of the tape to
the paper. We disapproved the trial court’s ruling to the extent that
it relied on the Open Records Act, id. at 265 (2), but affirmed on other
grounds.

In ruling for the newspaper, we stated initially that “[a]n official
court reporter’s tape of a judge’s remarks in open court is a court
record.” Green, 262 Ga. at 265 (1). It is this statement that Undis-
closed focuses on. But Green did not stop there, and its additional
explanation of that statement demonstrates that Undisclosed con-
fuses the opinion’s broad phrasing with our actual holding. After
quoting as the sole support for our holding R. W. Page Corp. v.
Kilgore, 257 Ga. 179 (356 SE2d 870) (1987), a case about a transcript
(not a tape) of an inquest by a coroner (not a court), we went on to
articulate our holding more precisely:

Judge Green waived any right to claim that the tape of
his comments is not a court record when he made public
comments from the bench that were recorded while court
was in session. No law limits public access to the judge’s
taped comments nor can access to them be denied under the
procedure set out in Rule 21, which he has not invoked.
Therefore, the tape or its transcript must be made available
for public inspection under Rule 21.

Green, 262 Ga. at 265 (1) (emphasis supplied).

We must consider Green in the context of its own unique facts and
the facts of the sole authority it relied upon for its holding (Kilgore, a
case about transcripts), as well as the total absence of any discussion
of the meaning of the text of Rule 21. See Johns v. League, Duvall &
Powell, 202 Ga. 868, 873 (1) (45 SE2d 211) (1947) (“[A] decision is to
be treated as a precedent . . . on the facts as the court construed or
assumed them to be for the purpose of decision.”); see also Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (6 Wheat. 264, 5 LE 257) (1821) (“It is a
maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit

434 |

when the very point is presented for decision.”); Natson v. United
States, 494 Fed. Appx. 3, 5 n. 2 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The opinions of the
Supreme Court are not the United States Code. Every sentence in a
Supreme Court opinion is not law. Only the holdings of Supreme
Court decisions are law.”). Had we held in Green that court reporter
tapes always are court records under Rule 21, then the newspaper
would have been entitled to the tapes. But instead we said that the
newspaper was entitled to the tapes or a transcript. Considered in
that context, it is plain that Green did not decide whether court
reporter tapes are always court records as that term is used in Rule
21; rather, it simply decided that the only available record of the
judge’s public comments made “from the bench. . . while court was in
session” but not in relation to any case was, indeed, open to the public
under Rule 21.

Of course, at common law, court records are only those docu-
ments filed with the court. But our law presumes that a transcript of
each case’s proceedings in open court will be created and filed, and
upon filing become the publicly available record of those proceedings.
Green confronted the rare occasion on which a judge makes public
comments from the bench in open court, but there is no case in which
to file a transcript. As a result, a member of the public would have no
ability through Rule 21 to request access to a transcript of those
statements. Green, therefore, is properly understood only as provid-
ing a solution to that unique circumstance.

Properly understood, Green does not apply here; there is a filed
transcript of the proceedings for which Undisclosed seeks the court
reporter’s tapes. Accordingly, the tapes Undisclosed seeks are not
court records under Rule 21. We affirm the trial court’s order.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Melton, P. J.,
who concurs specially, and Grant, J., who concurs in judgment only as
to Division 4 (b).

MELTON, Presiding Justice, concurring specially.

While I agree with the end result reached by the majority, I also
believe that the majority did not have to go to the lengths that it did
to distinguish the instant case from Green v. Drinnon, Inc., 262 Ga.
264 (417 SE2d 11) (1992) in order to reach the proper result. Nor am
I convinced by the distinction. In my view, Green was simply wrongly
decided and should be overruled.

Specifically, pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 21, “[a]ll
court records are public and are to be available for public inspection
unless public access is limited by law or by the procedure set forth
[in the rule].” (Emphasis supplied.) The judge’s tape-recorded com-

eS 436

ments in Green were made “after court was called into session but
before the call of any case.” (Emphasis supplied) Green, supra, 262 Ga.
at 264. The comments were not part of the official court record of any
case. Nor were the comments transcribed or the tapes themselves
made a part of any official court record. For these reasons, I believe
that Rule 21, which is applicable to court “records,” simply cannot be
read so broadly as to reach tapes such as those of the judge’s
comments in Green that were not transcribed and that were not made
a part of the official record of any court case. Accordingly, I believe
that the broad statement in Green that “[a]n official court reporter’s
tape of a judge’s remarks in open court is a court record” is wrong.
Green, supra, 262 Ga. at 265 (1). Under the circumstances presented
in Green, the tapes were not court records and should not have been
subject to public inspection, at least not pursuant to Rule 21.

Because Green was wrongly decided, this Court should overrule
it rather than go to strained and unnecessary lengths to distinguish
it from the instant case.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

Caplan Cobb, Michael A. Caplan, James W. Cobb, Sarah Brewerton-
Palmer, for appellant.

Leigh E. Patterson, District Attorney, John F. McClellan, Jr.,
Assistant District Attorney; Clare M. Gilbert, for appellee.

Stuckey & Manheimer, Hollie G. Manheimer, amicus curiae.

$17A1085. THE STATE v. JEFFERSON et al.
(807 SE2d 387)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

On June 4, 2015, Brenton Jefferson, his brother Santez Jeffer-
son, Demarcus Cawthorne, Jamal Arnold, and Lee Davis (collectively
“Appellees”) were charged with, among other things, attempted mur-
der, aggravated battery, kidnapping, and violations of the Georgia
Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (OCGA § 16-15-1 et seq.).
In connection with the State’s efforts to build a case against Appel-
lees, the State gave notice of its intention to introduce into evidence
at trial four certified copies of convictions relating to various gang

436 es

members’ pursuant to OCGA § 16-15-9
provides:

2 That statute, as amended,

For the purpose of proving the existence of a criminal street
gang and criminal gang activity, the commission, adjudica-
tion, or conviction of any offense enumerated in paragraph
(1) of Code Section 16-15-3 [criminal gang activity’] by any
member or associate of a criminal street gang shall be
admissible in any trial or proceeding. Evidence offered under
this Code section shall not be subject to the restrictions in
paragraph (22) of Code Section 24-8-803.*

1 One of the convictions related to defendant Cawthorne, while the other three related to
third parties who were not involved in the case against Appellees.
2 The State originally gave notice of its intention to introduce evidence of criminal
convictions relating to sixteen individuals. However, at the September 19, 2016 hearing on
Appellees’ joint motion to have OCGA § 16-15-9 declared unconstitutional, the State only
sought the admission of four certified convictions.
® Pursuant to OCGA § 16-15-3 (1):
“Criminal gang activity” means the commission, attempted commission, con-
spiracy to commit, or solicitation, coercion, or intimidation of another person to
commit any of the following offenses on or after July 1, 2006

(A) Any offense defined as racketeering activity by Code Section
16-14-

(B) Any offense defined in Article 7 of Chapter 5 of this title, relating to
stalking;

(C) Any offense defined in Code Section 16-6-1 as rape, 16-6-2 as
aggravated sodomy, 16-6-8 as statutory rape, or 16-6-22.2 as aggravated
sexual battery;

(D) Any offense defined in Article 3 of Chapter 10 of this title, relating
to escape and other offenses related to confinement;

(E) Any offense defined in Article 4 of Chapter 11 of this title, relating
to dangerous instrumentalities and practices;

(F) Any offense defined in Code Section 42-5-15, 42-5-16, 42-5-17,
42-5-18, or 42-5-19, relating to the security of state or county correctional
facilities;

(G) Any offense defined in Code Section 49-4A-11, relating to aiding or
encouraging a child to escape from custody;

(H) Any offense of criminal trespass or criminal damage to property
resulting from any act of gang related painting on, tagging, marking on,
writing on, or creating any form of graffiti on the property of another;

(D Any criminal offense committed in violation of the laws of the United
States or its territories, dominions, or possessions, any of the several states,
or any foreign nation which, if committed in this state, would be considered
criminal gang activity under this Code section; and

(J) Any criminal offense in the State of Georgia, any other state, or the
United States that involves violence, possession of a weapon, or use of a
weapon, whether designated as a felony or not, and regardless of the
maximum sentence that could be imposed or actually was imposed

+ OCGA § 24-8-803 (22) states in relevant part:
‘The following shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness: .. . Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or
upon a plea of guilty but not upon a plea of nolo contendere, adjudging a person

eS 437

On August 18, 2016, Santez filed a “Motion in Limine to Declare
OCGA § 16-15-9 Unconstitutional and to Bar the Introduction of
Third Party Convictions,” arguing that the statute on its face violates
the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. Arnold
filed an identical motion in limine on September 9, 2016, and the
remaining Appellees adopted the motion at the September 19, 2016
hearing on the matter.

On September 23, 2016, the trial court entered an order finding
that the admission of the third party convictions and the prior
conviction of Cawthorne in the Appellees’ trial would violate their
Sixth Amendment rights to confront the witnesses against them. See
Kirby v. United States, 174 U. 8. 47 (19 SCt 574, 43 LE 890) (1899)
(An attempt by the United States to introduce certified copies of
convictions of three individuals for theft of government property as
evidence in the prosecution of Kirby for being in receipt of that stolen
property was improper, as the introduction of such evidence violated
Kirby’s Sixth Amendment rights). Accordingly, the trial court granted
Appellees’ motion to declare OCGA § 16-15-9 unconstitutional, and
excluded the use of any of the third party convictions against the
Appellees.®

The State appeals from this ruling, and, for the reasons that
follow, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that
OCGA § 16-15-9 is unconstitutional on its face to the extent that it
authorizes the admission of the convictions of non-testifying non-
parties as evidence of a criminal street gang. We therefore affirm the
decision of the trial court.

guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year to prove

any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the

state in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments

against persons other than the accused. .

OCGA § 16-15-9 was amended to ensure that convictions of third party gang members
that were introduced into evidence for purposes of proving the existence of a criminal street
gang and street gang activity would not be excluded based on the limitations set forth in
OCGA § 24-8-803 (22). See Ga. L. 2016, p. 811, § 5/HB 874.

© The trial court also excluded the use of Cawthorne’s prior conviction against any of the
Appellees besides Cawthorne (as it would violate those other Appellees’ rights of confrontation),
and excluded the use of Cawthorne’s prior conviction against Cawthorne himself if he were to
be tried with the other Appellees (because it would be “unusually difficult for a curative
instruction to prevent the jury from misusing the Cawthorne evidence against the other
defendants” to prove the existence of gang affiliation, not only for Cawthorne, but for all of the
remaining Appellees as well). However, because the only issue presented on appeal deals with
the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-15-9 as it relates to the admission of third party convictions
to prove the alleged existence of a street gang, and not any issue relating to the admissibility
of Cawthorne’s individual conviction against Cawthorne himself, the constitutional issue is the
only one that will be addressed in this opinion.

438 es

In reviewing the State’s claim that the trial court erred in
concluding that OCGA § 16-15-9 is unconstitutional on its face,

we recognize at the outset that all presumptions are in favor
of the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature and that
before an Act of the legislature can be declared unconstitu-
tional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must
be clear and palpable and this Court must be clearly satis-
fied of its unconstitutionality. Moreover, because statutes
are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary appears,
the burden is on the party alleging a statute to be unconsti-
tutional to prove it.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) JIG Real Estate, LLC v. Country-
wide Home Loans, Inc., 289 Ga. 488, 490 (2) (712 SE2d 820) (2011).
Additionally,

[a] facial challenge “is, of course, the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (II) (107 SCt 2095, 95 LE2d 697) (1987), because it
requires one to establish “that no set of circumstances exists
under which the statute would be valid, i.e., that the law is
unconstitutional in all of its applications, or at least that the
statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep.” Blevins v. Dade
County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113, 118 (8) (702 SE2d
145) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(Punctuation omitted.) Bello v. State, 300 Ga. 682, 685-686 (1) (797
SE2d 882) (2017).

With these principles in mind, our analysis begins with the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states in
relevant part that “[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him|[.]”
U. S. Const. Amend. 6. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized for over 100 years that this right of confrontation con-
tained in the Sixth Amendment is “[o]ne of the fundamental guaran-
tees of life and liberty.” Kirby, supra, 174 U. S. at 55. And, in this
connection, the high Court has established through its ruling in Kirby
that a criminal defendant is unconstitutionally deprived of his fun-
damental right of confrontation when third party convictions are
used as a substitute for testimony against that defendant to prove an
element of a criminal charge against him. Id. at 61.

eS 439

In Kirby, the defendant was accused of theft by receiving stolen
property. In order to prove the essential element of the crime that the
property received by Kirby had actually been stolen, the prosecution
relied on a portion of 18 Stat. 479 — a federal statute which stated
that the receiver of the stolen property

may be tried either before or after the conviction of the
principal felon [who stole the property in question], but ifthe
party has been convicted, then the judgment against him
shall be conclusive evidence in the prosecution against such
receiver that the property of the United States therein
described has been embezzled, stolen or purloined.

Id. at 48, quoting 18 Stat. 479. Based on this federal statute, the
prosecution introduced into evidence the guilty pleas of two individu-
als and the judgment of conviction of a third who had allegedly stolen
the property that was later received by Kirby. However, the high
Court concluded that the admission of this evidence to prove an
element of the crime for which Kirby had been charged violated
Kirby’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against
him. Indeed,

[iJnstead of confronting Kirby with witnesses to establish
the vital fact that the property alleged to have been received
by him had been stolen from the United States, he was
confronted only with the record of another criminal prosecu-
tion, with which he had no connection and the evidence in
which was not given in his presence. The record showing the
result of the trial of the principal felons was undoubtedly
evidence, as against them, in respect of every fact essential
to show their guilt. But a fact which can be primarily
established only by witnesses cannot be proved against an
accused — charged with a different offense for which he may
be convicted without reference to the principal offender —
except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon
whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to
cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in
every mode authorized by the established rules governing
the trial or conduct of criminal cases.

Id. at 55.

440 es

The Supreme Court went on to conclude that, to allow such
evidence to be used to prove an element of the crime with which Kirby
had been charged would

impair the very substance of [the] right [of confrontation]
long deemed so essential for the due protection of life and
liberty that it is guarded against legislative and judicial
action by provisions in the Constitution of the United States
and in the constitutions of most if not of all the States
composing the Union.

Id. at 56. Accordingly, the high Court found that the portion of 18 Stat.
479 that allowed such evidence to be admitted was unconstitutional,
because the statute operated “in violation of the clause of the Con-
stitution of the United States declaring that in all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” Id. at 61.

Here, OCGA § 16-15-9 does exactly what the United States
Supreme Court declared was constitutionally forbidden in Kirby.
Again, the Georgia statute states in relevant part:

For the purpose of proving the existence of a criminal street
gang and criminal gang activity, the commission, adjudica-
tion, or conviction of any offense enumerated in paragraph
(1) of Code Section 16-15-3 by any member or associate of a
criminal street gang shall be admissible in any trial or
proceeding.

Emphasis supplied.) By its plain language, the statute allows for
hird party convictions of any alleged street gang members who have
ommitted any of the enumerated offenses in OCGA § 16-15-3 (1) to
e used as proof against other individuals in any proceeding in which
hose other individuals are charged with the crime of participating in
viminal gang activity. Specifically, in order to prove that an indi-
idual has participated in criminal gang activity, the State must show
hat the individual is, in fact, “employed by or associated with a
criminal street gang,” and that the individual in question has com-
mitted “any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of Code Section
16-15-3.” OCGA § 16-15-4 (a). Without proof of the existence of a
relevant street gang with which the defendant is affiliated, the State
obviously cannot satisfy its burden of proving that the criminal
defendant is “employed by or associated with” such a gang in connec-
tion with any gang-related crimes that he has allegedly committed.

eavredsa

as

eS 441

See OCGA § 16-15-3. In this connection,

“Criminal street gang” means any organization, association,
or group of three or more persons associated in fact, whether
formal or informal, which engages in criminal gang activity
as defined in [OCGA § 16-15-3 (1)]. The existence of such
organization, association, or group of individuals associated
in fact may be established by evidence of a common name or
common identifying signs, symbols, tattoos, graffiti, or attire
or other distinguishing characteristics, including, but not
limited to, common activities, customs, or behaviors. Such
term shall not include three or more persons, associated in
fact, whether formal or informal, who are not engaged in
criminal gang activity.

OCGA § 16-15-3 (2). Pursuant toOCGA § 16-15-9, the State is allowed
to meet its burden of proving the existence of a criminal street gang
and criminal gang activity, not only by

confronting [the defendant] with witnesses to establish the
vital fact that [a street gang exists that is engaged in
criminal gang activity, but by confronting the defendant] .. .
with the record of another criminal prosecution, with which
he had no connection and the evidence in which was not
given in his presence.

Kirby, supra, 174 U.S. at 55. In this fundamental way, OCGA § 16-15-9
operates “in violation of the clause of the Constitution of the United
States declaring that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be
confronted with the witnesses against him.” Id. at 61.

Contrary to the State’s assertions, the third party criminal
convictions of other alleged gang members admitted pursuant to
OCGA § 16-15-9 cannot be classified as merely business or public
records that are not “testimonial” in nature. See Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 659 (II) n.6 (131 SCt 2705, 180 LE2d 610) (2011)
(“[BJusiness and public records ‘are generally admissible absent
confrontation . . . because — having been created for the administra-
tion of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact at trial — they are not testimonial’ ”), quoting
Melendez-Diazv. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (IIT) (C) (129 SCt
2527, 174 LE2d 314) (2009); OCGA § 24-8-803 (8) (public records
exception to rule against hearsay). Unlike administrative records, all
third party convictions introduced pursuant to OCGA § 16-15-9 are
created based on the results of a trial where testimony and evidence

oe) es

was taken to show the underlying basis for the conviction or based on
a plea in which a factual basis and record was established to support
the existence of the plea. Additionally, the third party convictions are
used to prove facts underlying the crimes charged against entirely
different defendants in their separate cases — specifically, that a
particular gang exists with which the defendants are allegedly
associated and that will allow their commission of certain crimes to be
considered to have been done in the furtherance of gang activity. See
United States v. Causevic, 636 F3d 998 (II) (8th Cir. 2011). As the
United States Supreme Court determined in Kirby and reaffirmed in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177)
(2004), convictions from non-testifying witnesses that are used to
show an underlying element of another defendant’s crime are among
the types of “plainly testimonial statements” that cannot be admitted
into evidence without running afoul of Sixth Amendment protections
where the defendant has not had a prior opportunity to conduct
cross-examination and the witness is unavailable.* See Crawford,
541 U.S. at 64 (V) (B) (citing United States v. Aguilar, 295 F3d 1018,
1021-1023 (9th Cir. 2002) — in which guilty pleas of non-testifying
co-defendants were used to show existence of a drug conspiracy — to
make clear that evidence presented in that case fell within realm of
“plainly testimonial statements” that cannot be admitted into evi-
dence without prior opportunity for cross-examination). See also
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 (III) (A) (126 SCt 2266, 165
LE2d 224) (2006) (citing Kirby with approval and reaffirming that the
Kirby case “clearly” dealt with “testimony” for purposes of Confron-
tation Clause analysis). This is the case because

“testimonial evidence” encompasses not only “prior testi-
mony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine,”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, but also judgments of convic-
tion based on trials during which the defendant was unable
to cross-examine, when those convictions are used as proof of
facts underlying the crime charged.

(Emphasis supplied.) Causevic, supra, 636 F3d at 1003-1004. See also
Kirby, supra. Because third party convictions introduced pursuant to
OCGA § 16-15-9 are used to “prov[e] the existence of a criminal street
gang and criminal gang activity” in the cases of other defendants

® Ofcourse, nothing about this scenario can be read to suggest that a particular defendant's
prior conviction could not be used against that same defendant in his or her own case under the
proper circumstances.

eS 448

accused of engaging in criminal gang activity, the prior convictions
are testimonial in nature and subject to the limits imposed upon their
admissibility by the Sixth Amendment.”

As shown above, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Kirby is controlling in this case, and the Supreme Court has not
abandoned its prior holding in Kirby in the 100 plus years since that
case was decided. See Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at 64 (V) (B);
Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U. S. at 314 (IID (A) (citing Kirby with
approval); Davis, supra, 547 U. S. at 825 (III) (A) (same). To the
contrary, the high Court has consistently reaffirmed its holding in
Kirby, and the continued viability and importance of that case is only
made more evident under the circumstances created by OCGA §
16-15-9. Because OCGA § 16-15-9 on its face deprives criminal defen-
dants of their fundamental right of confrontation in violation of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the statute
cannot pass constitutional muster and must be declared void to the
extent that it authorizes the admission of the convictions of non-
testifying non-parties as evidence of a criminal street gang. See Ga.
Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Anna G. Cross, C. Lance Cross,
Dwayne A. Brown, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appel-
lant.

Clegg & Daniels, Thomas S. Clegg; Gerald A. Griggs; Victor A.
Cuvo; Maurice G. Kenner; Beverly J. Taylor; Bryan J. Henderson, for
appellees.

* The fact that the State claims that it would introduce the third party convictions through
the testimony of an expert on street gangs does not change the analysis. An expert would not
serve as a substitute for the convictions themselves; nor would any cross-examination of the
expert serve as a means of testing the underlying facts or validity of the convictions. Yet, the
convictions would still be admitted as proof against Appellees to show that a gang existed that
could ultimately connect them to criminal gang activity. In short, the existence of an expert does
nothing to change the fundamental Sixth Amendment problem created by the introduction of
the third party convictions themselves

444 Pe

$17A1125. RES-GA McDONOUGH, LLC v. TAYLOR ENGLISH
DUMA LLP et al.
(807 SE2d 381)

Boaas, Justice.

Plaintiff RES-GA McDonough, LLC (“RES-GA”) brought this
legal malpractice action against Taylor English Duma LLP and two
ofits attorneys (collectively, “Taylor English”). RES-GAcontends that
Taylor English failed to timely assert a Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fers Act claim, thus damaging RES-GA’s ability to satisfy its judg-
ment against a debtor. Taylor English moved to dismiss the com-
plaint, contending that RES-GA had failed to allege a viable underlying
cause of action to supportits malpractice claim. The trialcourt agreed
and granted Taylor English’s motion to dismiss. From this order,
RES-GA appeals. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

The facts, as alleged in RES-GA’s amended complaint, show that
in November 2006, Greenleaf Developers and Construction, Inc. executed
a promissory note and deed to secure debt in favor of FirstCity Bank.
In connection with that loan, Michael Langino, the personal guaran-
tor, executed a total of three personal guaranties for the repayment of
the note. In 2009, FirstCity Bank was declared insolvent, and the
FDIC was appointed as receiver. In February 2010, the FDIC assigned
the Greenleaf note, deed to secure debt, and guaranties to Multibank
2009-1 RES-ADC Venture, LLC (“Multibank’).

In April 2010, Taylor English began representing Multibank in
collection efforts on the note against Greenleaf and Langino. In
September 2010, Taylor English filed suit on behalf of Multibank
against Langino on the guaranties (“the underlying action”). On
September 13, 2010, Multibank assigned the note, guaranties and
security deed to RES-GA. After a stay pursuant to Langino’s bank-
ruptcy petition was lifted, in June 2012, RES-GA was substituted as
the plaintiff in the underlying action.

RES-GA alleges that “[a]Jround the time that [RES-GA] was
substituted as the plaintiff in the [uJnderlying [al]ction,” RES-GA
informed Taylor English that in October 2008, Langino had trans-
ferred real property to his wife, Debbie Langino, in an apparent

+ This appeal initially was filed with the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which transferred
it to this Court because RES-GA asserts that OCGA § 44-12-24 is preempted by federal law.
“The preemption doctrine is a product of the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. Const., Art. VI, CL. 2,
which invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) Norfolh S. Ry. v. Zeagler, 293 Ga. 582, 598 (3) (a) (748 SE2d 846) (2013).
The preemption argument invokes this Court's constitutional question jurisdiction. See Ga
Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1); Babies Right Start, Inc. v. Ga. Dept. of Public Health,
293 Ga. 558, 554 (1) (748 SE2d 404) (2013); Ward v. MeFall, 277 Ga. 649, 651 (1) (593 SE2d 340)
(2004).

eS 445

fraudulent transfer. Taylor English agreed to pursue setting aside
that transfer under the former Georgia Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fers Act, OCGA § 18-2-70 et seq. (““(UFTA”).? On August 10, 2012, the
complaint in the underlying action was amended to assert UFTA
claims against Michael Langino and to seek to set aside the transfer.
In January 2013, Taylor English recorded a notice of lis pendens
regarding the UFTA claims, and also filed a motion to add Debbie
Langino as a defendant in the underlying action. On February 21,
2013, however, while the motion remained pending, Debbie Langino
sold the property to a third party.* The trial court refused to add the
third party as a defendant in the underlying action, finding that he
was a bona fide purchaser who took without notice of the UFTA
claims against Debbie Langino. On May 24, 2013, RES-GA obtained
a judgment against Michael Langino.

In 2015, RES-GA filed this action asserting claims of legal
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, attorney fees, and punitive
damages. It contends that because of Taylor English’s failure to
assert an UFTA claim against Debbie Langino in a timely manner, it
lost the opportunity to execute its judgment against the transferred
property. The parties filed numerous additional pleadings. Taylor
English moved to dismiss the complaint; RES-GA responded and
filed a supplementary response and amended its complaint; Taylor
English filed an additional brief in support of its motion to dismiss
and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and RES-GA filed a
motion to strike. After oral argument, the trial court granted the
motion to dismiss on the basis that RES-GA lacked standing to
pursue the UFTA claim. It also denied the motion to strike and the
motion for judgment on the pleadings as moot. This appeal followed.

We begin with the well-settled standard that a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of
the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant
would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable
facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant estab-
lishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evi-
dence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to
warrant a grant of the relief sought. If, within the frame-
work of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which

2 The Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act was superseded by Ga. L. 2015, p. 996, effective
July 1, 2015, and is now known as the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA")

® Debbie Langino was added to the underlying action as a party defendant on March 7,
2013

will sustain a grant of the relief sought by the claimant, the
complaint is sufficient and a motion to dismiss should be
denied. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to
be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and
all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the
filing party’s favor. On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief
may be granted is reviewed de novo.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Abramyan v. State of Ga., 301
Ga. 308, 309-310 (800 SE2d 366) (2017). We therefore look at the
elements of RES-GA’s legal malpractice claim in light of the under-
lying UFTA claims, in order to determine whether the trial court
erred in dismissing the action.

1. “In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish
three elements: (1) employment of the defendant attorney, (2) failure
of the attorney to exercise ordinary care, skill and diligence, and
(3) that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the
plaintiff.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Leibel v. Johnson,
291 Ga. 180, 181 (728 SE2d 554) (2012). And “[iJn order to establish
the final element, the plaintiff must show that, but for the attorney’s
negligence in the underlying case, the plaintiff would have pre-
vailed.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 182. The validity
of RES-GA’s legal malpractice claim therefore turns upon the merits
of the underlying UFTA claim, which RES-GA contends that Taylor
English did not timely pursue.

At the time relevant to this action, former OCGA § 18-2-74 (a)
provided in part:

A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim
arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation
was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation... [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any creditor of the debtor[.]

Such a transfer could be avoided, or other remedies pursued, if the
transferee did not take the property in good faith and for a reasonably
equivalent value. See former OCGA §§ 18-2-77, 18-2-78.

However, the provisions applicable here defined a “creditor” only
as “a person who has a claim,” see former OCGA § 18-2-71 (4), and
“claim” as “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,

eS a7

unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unse-
cured.”4 Former OCGA § 18-2-71 (3). And, as the trial court correctly
noted, we must also consider the separate nonassignment provision
of OCGA § 44-12-24 (What rights of action may and may not be
assigned):

Except for those situations governed by Code Sections
11-2-210 and 11-9-406, a right of action is assignable if it
involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property. A right of
action for personal torts, for legal malpractice, or for injuries
arising from fraud to the assignor may not be assigned.

Our Court of Appeals recently considered this Code section and
its effect on a claim under UFTA in RES-GA Hightower, LLC v.
Golshani, 334 Ga. App. 176 (778 SE2d 805) (2015). In a remarkably
similar fact situation, Golshani personally guaranteed a note for a
limited liability company and later defaulted. When the lender
became insolvent, the FDIC, as receiver for the bank, assigned its
interest in the debt to Multibank 2009-1 RES-ADC Venture, LLC,
which in turn assigned its interest to RES-GA Hightower, LLC.
Before that assignment occurred, Golshani had conveyed real prop-
erty to his relatives in apparently fraudulent transfers. RES-GA filed
suit seeking to set aside the conveyances under UFTA, and the trial
court granted summary judgment on the basis that RES-GA lacked
standing due to the nonassignment provisions of OCGA § 44-12-24.
Id. at 177-178.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying upon the nonassignment
statute and this Court’s decision in Security Feed & Seed Co. of
Thomasville, Inc. v. NeSmith, 213 Ga. 783 (102 SE2d 37) (1958), to
hold that Multibank’s claim was a “right of action . . . arising from
fraud” and thus not assignable. 334 Ga. App. at 178-179 (1) (a). While
NeSmith predated the enactment of UFTA, the Court of Appeals
concluded that NeSmith had not been superseded by UFTA because
the plain language of UFTAevincedno intent to “displace[ ] NeSmith’s
construction of the nonassignment statute, which fraud provisions
have not been amended in any material way. [Cit.]” Id. at 179-180
(1) (a). Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that when the General

* Those definitions now provide that “ ‘Creditor’ means a person who has a claim,
regardless of when the person acquired the claim, together with any successors or assigns,”
(emphasis supplied) OCGA § 18-2-71 (4), and that “ ‘Claim,’ except for claim for relief, means a
right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 18-2-71 (3).

118 ms

Assembly replaced UFTA in 2015, it for the first time expressly
allowed subsequent assignees to pursue fraudulent transfer claims
under UVTA, thus presumptively indicating a change in the existing
law. Id. at 181-182 (1) (b). The court therefore concluded that RES-GA
lacked standing under UFTA to pursue the fraudulent transfer claim,
and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The Court
of Appeals has relied upon the nonassignment statute and NeSmith
in subsequent decisions. See Callaway Blue Springs, LLLP v. West
Basin Capital, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 535 (801 SE2d 325) (2017); Merrill
Ranch Props., LLC v. Austell, 336 Ga. App. 722, 732 (3) (784 SE2d
125) (2016).

We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Golshani,
Callaway, and Merrill, that our decision in NeSmith correctly stated
the law until it was changed by the enactment of UVTA, which
expressly states that it does “[nJot apply to a transfer made or
obligation incurred before July 1, 2015” or “to a right of action that
has accrued before July 1, 2015.” Ga. L. 2015, pp. 996, 1029. RES-GA
therefore had no standing to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim, and
accordingly cannot demonstrate that “but for the attorney’s negli-
gence in the underlying case, [it] would have prevailed.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Leibel, supra, 291 Ga. at 182.°

2. RES-GA argues that OCGA § 44-12-24 conflicts with the Uni-
form Commercial Code because the note and guaranties were nego-
tiable instruments. Therefore, RES-GA contends, its rights under the
UCC, liberally construed as provided in OCGA § 11-1-103, preempt the
nonassignment statute. RES-GA’s underlying claim, however, was not
made upon the note and guaranties, but pursuant to UFTAasa petition
to set aside a fraudulent transaction. UFTA and the UCC contain
identical language expressing the General Assembly’s intent to retain
“the principles of law and equity,” including those pertaining to fraud,
“{u]nless displaced by the provisions of this article.” See former OCGA §
18-2-80 (a); OCGA § 11-1-103 (b). Just as the plain language of UFTA
shows no “clear indication in its language that displaces NeSmith’s

® RES-GA’s argument that it should not be bound by Golshani because that decision
changed the applicable law is therefore without merit.

® While acknowledging that “the trial court did not explicitly state it was using that
analysis,” RES-GA argues that the trial court improperly evaluated its legal malpractice claim
by considering evidence and “reached a fact-based conclusion” inappropriate for a motion to
dismiss. RES-GA also argues that dismissal was inappropriate because standing was never
challenged in the underlying action, and whether a challenge would have been asserted and
would have been successful, was a question of fact. But in the absence of standing, as a matter
of law RES-GA could not have prevailed in the underlying action, Consequently, RES-GA
cannot show the third element of its claim for legal malpractice under any state of provable facts
asserted in support of its allegations.

eS 449

construction of the nonassignment statute, which fraud provisions
have not been amended in any material way,” Golshani, supra, 334
Ga. App. at 179-180 (1) (a), the plain language of the UCC shows no
intent to displace the provisions of OCGA § 44-12-24. Moreover, in
the first sentence of that Code section, the General Assembly expressly
removed two provisions of the UCC from its scope: “Except for those
situations governed by Code Sections 11-2-210 and 11-9-406....”
Applying the rules of statutory construction,

“Expressum facit cessare tacitum” (if some things are ex-
pressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those
omitted were intended to be excluded) and its companion,
the venerable principle, “Expressio unius est exclusio alte-
rius” (“The express mention of one thing implies the exclu-
sion of another”), the list of actions in OCGA § [44-12-24] is
presumed to exclude actions not specifically listed. [Cits.]

Alexander Properties Group v. Doe, 280 Ga. 306, 309 (1) (626 SE2d
497) (2006). The UCC therefore does not preempt the application of
OCGA § 44-12-24 to RES-GA’s underlying claim under UFTA.

3. Finally, RES-GA asserts that OCGA § 44-12-24 is preempted
by the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 “FIRREA”).” It relies
upon 12 USC § 1821 (d) (2) (A) @), which provides:

(A) Successor to institution. The Corporation[*] shall, as

conservator or receiver, and by operation of law, succeed to —

(i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the

insured depository institution, and of any stockholder,

member, accountholder, depositor, officer, or director of

such institution with respect to the institution and the
assets of the institution[.]

Acknowledging that FIRREA contains no language “stating that
[its application] extended to subsequent assignees,” RES-GA never-
theless asserts that it “stepped into the shoes” of the bank as a
downstream or subsequent assignee, and therefore is not subject to
the nonassignment provisions of OCGA § 44-12-24. We disagree.

* RES-GA Hightower, LLC attempted to assert preemption by FIRREA in Golshani, supra,
but the Court of Appeals found that the argument was waived because it was raised for the first
time on appeal. 334 Ga. App. at 182 (2).

® The term “Corporation” means the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 12 USC
§ 1811 (a).

150 ees

FIRREA and the decisions cited by RES-GA expressly refer
only to the power of the FDIC to assign or transfer assets of the
institution. RES-GA’s lengthy discussion of the rights and powers of
the FDIC and the public policy questions involved therefore is wholly
irrelevant to the question of whether powers granted to the FDIC
may be extended to subsequent downstream assignments or trans-
fers between private entities or individuals.®

RES-GA argues that, because FIRREA “is silent on that issue,” it
therefore “is not plain from its face that it does not extend to the
FDIC’s subsequent assignees” (emphasis in original), and the trial
court should have concluded that FIRREA preempted OCGA §
44-12-24. But this contention runs directly counter to the well-
established rule that “Georgia law is preempted only (1) where there
is direct conflict between state and federal regulation; (2) where state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress; or (3) where Congress has
occupied the field in a given area so as to oust all state regulation.
[Cits.]” Castillo-Solis v. State, 292 Ga. 755, 763 (5) (740 SE2d 583)
(2013). As the United States Supreme Court has noted,

we of course would not contradict an explicit federal statu-
tory provision. Nor would we adopt a court-made rule to
supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehen-
sive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme
are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by
state law. [Cits.]

O'Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 85 (II) (114
SCt 2048, 129 LE2d 67) (1994). “Thus, to prevail on [its] preemption
claim, Appellant was required to show the ‘clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress’ to preempt [OCGA § 44-12-24]” with respect to
downstream assignees. Castillo-Solis, supra, 292 Ga. at 763 (5). This
RES-GA has failed to do, and OCGA § 44-12-24 therefore bars the
underlying claim. RES-GA is therefore unable to establish a claim for
legal malpractice as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in
dismissing its complaint.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

° Another case decided today, Community & Southern Bank v. Lovell, 302 Ga. 375 (807
SE2d 444) (2017), is distinguished on its facts because it involves a direct assignee of the FDIC
rather than a subsequent downstream assignee such as RES-GA.

eS 461

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

Neel, Robinson & Stafford, Shawn D. Stafford, Emilie O. Den-
mark, Kate B. Klug, for appellant.

Freeman Mathis & Gary, Dana K. Maine, Kevin R. Stone, for
appellees.

$17A1135. HOWARD v. HOWARD.
(807 SE2d 379)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

This case arises out of a divorce settlement agreement between
Anita Howard (“Wife”) and Benjamin Howard (“Husband”).’ After
the final divorce decree was issued on April 28, 2016, Wife filed a
petition for contempt against Husband, alleging that he failed to
comply with the terms of the settlement agreement that was incor-
porated into the decree. The trial court denied the petition, and we
granted Wife’s application for discretionary review. The issue on
appeal is whether the trial court erred when it ruled that Husband
was not in contempt for failing to ensure that Wife was designated as
the survivor beneficiary of his pension plan. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm.

1. The parties had been married for nearly forty years when, on
December 19, 2014, Wife filed a petition for divorce on grounds of
adultery with no hope of reconciliation. Husband was a dentist, and
he had earned a military pension while working at the Bureau of
Prisons as a commissioned officer of the U. S. Public Health Service.
He began receiving his military pension payments after retiring in
2004. These payments included a sizeable deduction for the survivor
benefit premium, which entitled Wife to continue receiving pension
payments if Husband predeceased her. At the time of divorce, the
parties had no minor children, but their oldest son is autistic, and,
despite being in his thirties, he has the cognitive abilities of a
seven-year-old. Wife has been the primary caretaker of their son and
has not worked outside the home for approximately thirty years. The

+ We note that the Court of Appeals, rather than this Court, has subject matter jurisdiction
over “[alll divorce and alimony cases” in which a notice of appeal or application to appeal is filed
on or after January 1, 2017. Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of 2016, Ga. L. 2016, p. 883,
§§ 3-1 Codified at OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (6), 6-1 (0); Merrill v. Lee, 301 Ga. 34, 36 (1) n.1 (799
SE2d 169) (2017). Because Wife filed her application to appeal before January 1, 2017, we have
jurisdiction over this case.

462 es

parties mediated and eventually signed a “Partial Settlement Agree-
ment” on April 26, 2016 (hereinafter the “settlement agreement”),
which was incorporated into the April 28, 2016 final judgment and
decree of divorce.

In the settlement agreement, the parties agreed to share equally
in Husband’s military pension plan, as follows:

The parties agree that Husband currently receives a monthly
retirement benefit with the military (“Military Pension”).
Beginning May 1, 2015 and being due and payable on the
first day of each consecutive month thereafter pursuant to
direct deposit, Wife shall receive 50% (one-half) of the total
monthly benefits paid out for the duration of the plan.

Husband was also required to “inform the Military Pension plan of
Wife’s interest in said plan” and timely complete all paperwork to
ensure Wife’s receipt of her monthly share. The settlement agree-
ment provided that the pension plan payments “shall not be taxable
alimony but shall be equitable division of property.” The settlement
agreement did not expressly mention the survivor benefit.

Throughout the divorce proceedings, and for months after the final
divorce decree was issued, the survivor benefit premium continued to
be deducted from the pension plan. In October 2016, Wife filed a
petition for contempt against Husband, alleging, among other things,
that Husband had not completed the paperwork necessary to continue
her designation as the survivor beneficiary under the pension plan.
Wife also argued that the survivor benefit was part of the “total monthly
benefits” of the pension plan to which she was entitled. Husband filed
a counterclaim for contempt on various grounds. At a hearing on
October 24, 2016, Wife asked the trial court to at least clarify that the
“total monthly benefits” included the survivor benefit. After the hear-
ing, the trial court issued an order denying the claims of each party.
With regard to the survivor benefit, the trial court stated simply: “On
the question of whether [Husband] is required by the parties’ settle-
ment agreement to complete the necessary paperwork making [Wife]
the beneficiary of [Husband]’s military’s survivor benefit plan, the
parties’ settlement agreement is entirely silent on this. The Motion
[for contempt] is therefore DENIED.” This appeal followed.

2. To begin, we understand the trial court to have meant by its
ruling that the settlement agreement did not expressly and unam-
biguously include the survivor benefit as part of the “total monthly
benefits,” thereby precluding a finding of contempt. So understood, the
trial court was correct. The plain language of the settlement agree-

eS 468

ment references the military “retirement benefit” that Husband
“currently receives” and requires Husband to pay Wife “50% (one-half)
of the total monthly benefits paid out for the duration of the plan.” On
one hand, the survivor benefit is clearly a “benefit” of the pension plan,
as it provides insurance against the death of the pension recipient.
See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “benefit” as
“(t]he advantage or privilege something gives; the helpful or useful
effect something has”). On the other hand, the survivor benefit is not
an intrinsic part of the pension plan, but is contingent on the plan
recipient paying a monthly premium that is automatically deducted
from the pension payments. The survivor benefit will be “paid out,” if
at all, only upon Husband’s death, and the “duration of the plan” thus
depends on whether the premium is paid and whether Husband
predeceases the beneficiary. In this light, the plain language of the
settlement agreement is ambiguous as to whether it entitles Wife to a
share in the survivor benefit in addition to the pension payments.

Because the settlement agreement was facially ambiguous on the
survivor benefit issue, Husband could not be held in contempt for his
failure to ensure Wife’s receipt of this benefit. See Coppedge v. Coppedge,
298 Ga. 494, 498 (1) (783 SE2d 94) (2016) (a trial court may not hold
a party in contempt for violating a provision that is deemed ambigu-
ous); Farris v. Farris, 285 Ga. 331, 333 (1) (676 SE2d 212) (2009)
(“Before a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order,
the order should inform him in definite terms as to the duties thereby
imposed upon him, and the command must therefore be express
rather than implied.” (citation omitted)). Thus, we discern no error in
the trial court’s denial of Wife’s contempt motion on this ground.

3. Although we affirm the trial court’s ruling on contempt, Wife
is not completely without recourse. The trial court’s order does not
appear to address, either expressly or implicitly, Wife’s verbal request
for clarification that she made during the contempt hearing. The trial
court had before it only a written motion for contempt, and its finding
on the settlement agreement’s facial ambiguity, as discussed above,
was sufficient to decide this motion. The ultimate question of whether
Wife is entitled to survivor benefits has not been settled, and Wife still
might move the trial court to resolve this ambiguity.”

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

2 Resolution of this ambiguity would require the trial court to apply well-settled rules of
contract construction. See Hall v. Day, 273 Ga. 838, 839-840 (1) (546 SE2d 469) (2001) (“A settle-
ment agreement incorporated into a divorce decree is construed according to the same rules
that govern contractual interpretation in general, with the cardinal rule being to ascertain the
intention of the parties.”). Because the settlement agreement is facially ambiguous, the trial

464 Pe

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

Smith & Lake, Dawn R. Smith, for appellant.
Benjamin F. Howard, pro se.

$17A1141. BROWN v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 369)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Appellant Ahmad Edward Brown challenges his convictions for
malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting
death of Deonta Moore. Appellant contends that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial court improp-
erly commented on the evidence. We reject these contentions and
affirm Appellant’s convictions, but we vacate the trial court’s judg-
ment in part and remand the case for correction of a sentencing error.!

court may look to outside circumstances to determine the parties’ intent. See OCGA § 13-2-2
(1); Hortman v. Childress, 162 Ga. App. 536, 537 (292 SE2d 200) (1982). And the record here
contains at least some evidence to suggest that the parties did intend the “total monthly
benefits” to include the survivor benefit. For example, the survivor benefit had been part of the
pension plan since Husband's retirement in 2004, and this benefit was included in the plan at
the time the parties executed the settlement agreement. Moreover, after the parties first agreed
to split the pension payments during mediation, Husband started paying Wife 50% of the
pension payments, and in splitting those payments, he only considered the net sum received —
after the deduction of the survivor benefit premium — which meant that Wife essentially paid
50% of the premium. This arrangement continued even after the divorce was finalized, and it
was still in place as of the date of the October 2016 hearing. See City of Baldwin v. Woodard &
Curran, Inc., 293 Ga. 19, 31 (8) (743 SE2d 381) (2013) (“The construction placed upon a contract
by the parties thereto, as shown by their acts and conduct, is entitled to much weight and may
be conclusive upon them.” (citation and punctuation omitted). Other factors, including the
parties’ roles during marriage and their financial circumstances, may also bear upon this
question. But we leave these matters to the trial court to decide in the first instance.

1 Moore was killed on June 10, 2010. On September 9, 2010, Appellant and Andre Allen
were indicted by a Gwinnett County grand jury for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated
assault, and selling marijuana. Allen later agreed to testify against Appellant as part of a plea
deal. Appellant was re-indieted on April 16, 2014, for malice murder, two counts of felony
murder, aggravated assault, selling marijuana, two counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At a trial from May 19
to 28, 2014, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. On June 6, 2014, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder
and consecutive terms of five years for each of the three firearm convictions. The trial court
purported to merge the aggravated assault and selling marijuana verdicts into the felony
murder verdicts, and then to merge the felony murder verdicts into the malice murder
conviction. The court’s merger analysis was erroneous, as explained in Division 1 (¢) below. On
June 30, 2014, Appellant's new counsel filed a motion for new trial, which was amended on
January 19, 2016. On June 8, 2016, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, and on
September 6, 2016, the court denied the motion. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and
the case was docketed in this Court for the April 2017 term and orally argued on June 26, 2017

eS 466

1. (a) Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence at trial showed the following. On June 10, 2010, Moore
obtained $1,100 in counterfeit currency from a friend; Moore told the
friend that he was going to “finesse” (trick) someone with the fake
money and share the proceeds with the friend. Using his cousin’s cell
phone, Moore then contacted Andre Allen to buy three ounces of
marijuana. Allen did not have that much marijuana on hand, so he
contacted Appellant, who agreed to provide the drugs and to meet
Allen and Moore at Moore’s apartment complex in Duluth.

Allen drove to Moore’s apartment complex, parked his car, and
met with Moore. When Appellant arrived, Moore got into Appellant’s
car and exchanged the counterfeit money for three bags of marijuana
as Allen waited by his own car. Moore got out of Appellant’s car and
began walking away quickly. When Appellant realized that Moore
gave him counterfeit money, Appellant yelled at Moore, who ran
through the breezeway of Building 1600 and intoa grassy field. Allen,
who had arranged the drug deal, did not want Appellant to think that
he was involved in the scam, so he chased after Moore. Allen caught
Moore in the field, held him down, and told him to return Appellant’s
“stuff.” Carrying a gun, Appellant also chased Moore. When Appel-
lant reached Allen and Moore, Appellant told Allen to get out of the
way and started scuffling with Moore. Appellant then fired his gun
once into Moore’s head, killing him. Appellant and Allen fled, leaving
the apartment complex in separate cars.

Shamika Hubbard, who lived in Building 1600, testified that she
saw a car pull into a parking spot and later saw two men exit the car,
one of whom had a gun and was chasing the other. She heard a
gunshot and then saw the car leave the apartment complex. Rafael
Rodriguez, who was 17 and lived with his mother at the apartment
complex, testified that he saw a man chasing another man near
Building 1600, saw the man being chased fall down, and then heard
a gunshot and saw two men running away. Rodriguez went home and
told his mother that he saw a man get shot, but she did not believe
him. The next morning, however, he and his mother discovered
Moore’s body lying in the bushes and called the police. Near Moore’s
body, police located a shell casing along with three bags of marijuana
weighing a total of 2.6 ounces.

Information from a cell phone found in Moore’s pocket led the
police to Allen. Allen was scheduled to meet with his probation officer
on June 21, 11 days after the shooting. Detective John Richter of the
Gwinnett County Police Department went to the meeting to question
Allen about Moore’s death. During the interview, the video recording
of which was played for the jury at trial, Allen described Appellant’s
role in the shooting while downplaying his own role. Allen was

456 PO ]

arrested after the interview. Cell phone records showed about 20 calls
between Appellant and Allen on the evening of the shooting, and cell
tower data showed that for about ten minutes that night, Appellant’s
cell phone, Allen’s cell phone, and the cell phone taken from Moore’s
pocket were in range of the cell tower covering the apartment
complex. Appellant cancelled his cell phone service the day after the
shooting.

Appellant was arrested in late July. A jail cellmate testified that
Appellant said he shot a man near an apartment complex breezeway
after meeting with the man to sell him drugs, that he always kept a
gun on him in case something went wrong, and that he disconnected
his cell phone number after the shooting.

Allen pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced
to 20 years with the last ten to be served on probation. He testified
against Appellant, as did his sister and his children’s mother, to
whom he had described Appellant’s role in the shooting in the days
after the murder. Appellant did not testify at trial. The defense theory
was that Allen lied about Appellant’s involvement in the crimes, with
defense counsel emphasizing that nobody but Allen identified Appel-
lant at the crime scene.

(b) Appellant does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance
with this Court’s practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the
record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above
was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which a judgment of
conviction was entered, as well as selling marijuana, see footnote 1
above. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61
LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d
223) (2009) (“ ‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the
evidence.’ ” (citation omitted)).

(c) In sentencing Appellant, the trial court purported to merge
the aggravated assault and selling marijuana verdicts into the felony
murder verdicts, and then to merge the felony murder verdicts into
the malice murder conviction. This merger analysis was erroneous,
as Appellant properly acknowledges in his brief. The felony murder
counts were actually vacated by operation of law, and therefore the
aggravated assault and selling marijuana counts could not be merged
into the felony murder counts. See Graves v. State, 298 Ga. 551, 556
(783 SE2d 891) (2016). See also Southall v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 462n.1
(796 SE2d 261) (2017). The trial court should have merged the
aggravated assault verdict into the malice murder conviction, and

eS 467

Appellant should have been sentenced on the selling marijuana count
(Count 5), which the court is directed to do on remand.

2. Appellant’s primary claim on appeal is that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel at trial due to his counsel’s failure to
make several objections.

To establish that his trial counsel was constitutionally inef-
fective, Appellant must prove both deficient performance by
counsel and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
To show that his lawyer’s performance was deficient, Appel-
lant must demonstrate that the lawyer performed his duties
in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the
circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional
norms. See id. at 687-690. This is no easy showing, as the law
recognizes a “strong presumption” that counsel performed
reasonably, and Appellant bears the burden of overcoming
this presumption. Id. at 689. To carry this burden, he must
show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his
lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did
not. See Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 192 (744 SE2d
706) (2013). In particular, “decisions regarding trial tactics
and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim
only if they were so patently unreasonable that no compe-
tent attorney would have followed such a course.” Reed v.
State, 294 Ga. 877, 882 (757 SE2d 84) (2014).

Even when a defendant has proved that his counsel's
performance was deficient in this constitutional sense, he
also must prove prejudice by showing “a reasonable prob-
ability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strick-
land, 466 U.S. at 694. “It is not enough to show that the
errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 104 (131
SCt 770, 178 LE2d 624) (2011) (Citation and punctuation
omitted). Rather, Appellant must demonstrate a “reason-
able probability” of a different result, which, the United
States Supreme Court has explained, is “a probability suf-
ficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694.

The reviewing court need not “address both components
of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient show-
ing on one.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697. In all, the burden
of proving a denial of effective assistance of counsel is a

458 PO ]

heavy one, see Wells v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 164 (758 SE2d
598) (2014), and Appellant has failed to carry that burden.

Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 182-183 (787 SE2d 221) (2016).

(a) Appellant claims first that his trial counsel performed defi-
ciently by failing to object on the grounds of hearsay and improper
bolstering when two witnesses testified that Allen told them within
days of the shooting that Appellant shot Moore. Such objections,
however, would likely have been overruled, and a “lawyer is not
required to make an objection that he reasonably believes will fail.”
Davis, 299 Ga. at 190 (citing Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (131
SCt 733, 178 LE2d 649) (2011)).

During cross-examination of Allen, Appellant’s counsel attacked
Allen’s credibility in various ways, including by insinuating that
Allen fabricated the story of Appellant’s involvement in the shooting
in order to receive a favorable plea deal and lower sentence from the
State. For example, Appellant’s counsel asked Allen if he “cut a deal,”
“told the police ‘[w]hatever you need me to do... I’m a hundred
percent on your side,’” and received a greatly reduced sentence
because he was allowed to “plead guilty to manslaughter.” The State
later called as witnesses Allen’s sister, Latoya Allen, and the mother
of Allen’s two children, Qwiana Bailey; Allen spoke with his sister
two days after the shooting, and to Bailey eight days after the
shooting. Allen’s sister and Bailey both testified that Allen told them
that he was the middle man in a drug deal gone bad and that
Appellant shot Moore.

Under Georgia’s new Evidence Code, which applied to the trial of
this case, an out-of-court statement made by a witness is not hearsay
if the witness “testifies at the time of trial or hearing, is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is
admissible as . . . a prior consistent statement under Code Section
24-6-613[.]” OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (1) (A). In turn, OCGA § 24-6-613
(c) says:

A prior consistent statement shall be admissible to
rehabilitate a witness if the prior consistent statement
logically rebuts an attack made on the witness’s credibility.
A general attack on a witness’s credibility with evidence
offered under Code Section 24-6-608 [evidence of character
and conduct of witness] or 24-6-609 [impeachment by evi-
dence of conviction of a crime] shall not permit rehabilitation
under this subsection. If a prior consistent statement is
offered to rebut an expressed or implied charge against the
witness of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,

eS 459

the prior consistent statement shall have been made before
the alleged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive
arose.

See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (115 SCt 696, 130 LE2d
574) (1995) (adopting a similar standard for admission of prior
consistent statements under the Federal Rules of Evidence).

During Allen’s cross-examination, Appellant’s counsel clearly
implied that Allen fabricated the story of Appellant’s role in the
shooting that Allen told Detective Richter 11 days after the shooting
and repeated on direct examination at trial.? But Allen’s sister and
Bailey testified that Allen told them the same story before he went to
the meeting with his probation officer and ended up speaking with
Detective Richter, and their testimony logically rebutted the attack
that Appellant’s counsel made on Allen’s credibility. Thus, Allen’s
statements to his sister and to Bailey were prior consistent state-
ments, not hearsay, and were admissible to rehabilitate, rather than
improperly bolster, Allen’s credibility. See Bolling v. State, 300 Ga.
694, 701 (797 SE2d 872) (2017); Mosley v. State, 298 Ga. 849, 853 (785
SE2d 297) (2016).

Appellant now suggests that Allen’s improper motive arose
earlier, before he met with his probation officer and was interviewed
by Detective Richter, before he spoke with his children’s mother a few
days earlier, and even before he spoke with his sister just two days
after the shooting. Appellant points to evidence that shortly after the
shooting, and before he spoke with his sister and Bailey, Allen
consulted with an attorney who was a family friend about how to
voluntarily give the police information that he had about the shoot-
ing. Therefore, according to Appellant, Allen’s statements to the two
women were not prior consistent statements, because by the time
Allen made them he “had already made the decision to cooperate with
law enforcement against [Appellant] in order to secure a better
sentence for himself.”

But there is no evidence that Allen discussed the possibility of a
plea agreement or a reduced sentence with the family friend; indeed,
the hours-long interview with Detective Richter included no discus-
sion of a plea deal or a more lenient sentence. All the record shows is
that Allen was considering providing information about the shooting
to the police, and a suspect’s desire to voluntarily disclose informa-
tion to the police does not, without more, equate to an improper

? On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the admission of the video recording of Allen's
police interview.

460 PO ]

motive to testify untruthfully for the State in exchange for a reduced
sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Prieto, 232 F3d 816, 821 (11th Cir.
2000) (declining to adopt a bright-line rule that statements made to
the police after arrest are “automatically and necessarily contami-
nated by a motive to fabricate in order to curry favor with the
government”).*

If objections had been made and the trial court had ruled on
them, we would accord great deference to the court’s findings regard-
ing when Allen’s motive to fabricate arose. See Prieto, 232 F3d at
820-821. But as we have explained, the record certainly would
support a finding that the motive to fabricate implied on cross-
examination had not developed at the time Allen discussed the
shooting with his sister and Bailey. We therefore cannot say that
Appellant’s trial counsel acted unreasonably in not raising objections
that the trial court could properly have overruled. See Davis, 299 Ga.
at 183.

(b) Appellant also contends that his trial counsel performed
deficiently by failing to object to three statements made during
Detective Richter’s testimony, which Appellant claims improperly
bolstered Allen’s testimony. Appellant argues that his counsel should
have objected when the detective testified on direct examination that
in interviewing suspects, oftentimes “it'll take several hours . .. to get
to the actual ultimate truth”; when he testified on cross-examination
that “after I interviewed Allen, I was confident Allen was telling me
the truth”; and when he testified on redirect examination that “I
think [Allen] was telling the truth, but I had to at least pry to see.”

OCGA § 24-6-620 says that the “credibility of a witness shall be
a matter to be determined by the trier of fact ... .” Under this rule, as
we recently reiterated, “‘[a] witness, even an expert, can never
bolster the credibility of another witness as to whether the witness is
telling the truth. Credibility of a witness is not beyond the ken of the
jurors but, to the contrary, is a matter solely within the province of the
jury.” Adkins v. State, 301 Ga. 153, 158 (800 SE2d 341) (2017)
(citation omitted). When a witness’s statement does not directly

® As the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Prieto:

[A] variety of motives may drive a person's decision to disgorge the details of a
crime he has committed. For one, as this Court's predecessor recognized, a man's
conduct is often controlled by his conscience. For another, itis certainly true that “the
world’s great religions teach in one form or another that confession is good for the soul
and that by making confession one may be absolved . . . . To many people telling the
truth and ‘coming clean’ satisfies a basic spiritual need of one who has transgressed
and provides a measure of relief.” Confession may also be an emotional response
triggered by feelings of remorse and sorrow.

232 F3d at 821 (citations omitted).

eS 461

address the credibility of another witness, however, there is no
improper bolstering. See Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 40, 44 (785 SE2d 886)
(2016); Anderson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 739, 748 (788 SE2d 831)
(2016). See also Adkins, 301 Ga. at 159-160. And when we evaluate
whether testimony constitutes improper bolstering, we consider the
disputed testimony in context. See id. at 158.

Detective Richter’s first disputed statement was not specifically
about Allen. Read in context, the detective did not say that Allen told
him the ultimate truth; instead, the detective was explaining that in
general, when interviewing suspects, they often make inconsistent
statements and it often takes considerable time to get them to provide
the complete story. See Adkins, 301 Ga. at 160. Appellant’s counsel
could reasonably have believed that an objection to this part of
Detective Richter’s testimony would fail, and counsel thus was not
ineffective in not making such an objection. See Davis, 299 Ga. at 190.

The statements by Detective Richter on cross and redirect exami-
nation were subject to valid objection, but Appellant did not ask his
trial counsel at the motion for new trial hearing why counsel did not
object to them. The United States Supreme Court has instructed that
courts reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims “must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Strick-
land, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). Thus, “when ‘trial counsel
does not testify at the motion for new trial hearing about the subject,
itis extremely difficult to overcome’ the presumption that his conduct
was reasonable.” Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 876 (742 SE2d 707)
(2013) (citation omitted).

The record shows that in cross-examining Detective Richter,
Appellant’s trial counsel pursued a line of questioning designed to
show the jury that the police did not conduct a thorough investigation
of the murder andinstead simply took Allen’s version of events at face
value; counsel then returned to this point in closing argument.
Accordingly, counsel reasonably could have chosen not to object to the
detective’s statements regarding his personal beliefin Allen’s account
because that testimony supported the defense theory that the State
cut short its investigation based on blind faith in Allen, whose
credibility Appellant’s trial counsel had already thoroughly attacked
on cross-examination.

We have explained in the context of defense counsel’s failure to
object to an investigator’s bolstering testimony that “a sound defense
strategy is to show that the law enforcement investigation that led to
the prosecution was not as thorough or objective as it should have

462 PO ]

been, and one way to make such a showing is by evidence that the
investigators put too much faith in an unreliable witness.” Jones v.
State, 292 Ga. 593, 601 (740 SE2d 147) (2013). Indeed,

a reasonable lawyer might have concluded that the bolster-
ing testimony was not likely to be very harmful, inasmuch
as “[i]t hardly would have surprised anyone observing the
trial to learn” that law enforcement believed [the witness’s]
accounts, “and any rational juror could have surmised as
much without being told explicitly.”

Id. at 601-602 (citation omitted). Thus, Appellant has not shown that
his trial counsel performed in a patently unreasonable way by not
objecting to these aspects of Detective Richter’s testimony as improper
bolstering. See id. at 602.

(c) Finally, Appellant argues that his trial counsel was deficient
in failing to object to two statements made by the prosecutor during
closing argument, which Appellant claims improperly vouched for
Allen’s credibility. Specifically, Appellant complains that his counsel
should have objected when the prosecutor told the jury, referring to
Allen’s plea deal, “sometimes you have to make that kind of deal as a
prosecutor to get to the truth,” and when she said that Allen “event-
ually came forward with the truth .... Not all the truth, granted. But
he told you that [Appellant] was the shooter.”

A prosecutor may not express to the jury her personal belief
about the veracity ofa witness. See Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 443, 445 (754
SE2d 327) (2014). It is not improper, however, for counsel to urge
“the jurors to come to the conclusion that the witnesses were believ-
able based on the evidence presented.” Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505,
515 (801 SE2d 782) (2017). See also Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 384
(519 SE2d 221) (1999) (holding that a prosecutor can urge a jury to
find a witness credible so long as the attorney does not give a personal
opinion as to the witness’s credibility). Moreover, attorneys are
“generally afforded wide latitude in making closing arguments.”
Menefee, 301 Ga. at 510.

At the motion for new trial hearing, Appellant’s trial counsel
testified that he did not object to the prosecutor’s statements because
he did not think they were objectionable — and they were not obviously
over the line in our view — and because he did not want to draw the
jury’s attention to them. See Jones, 292 Ga. at 602 (“[A] reasonable
lawyer might have concluded that objecting to [bolstering] testimony
could signal to the jury that the defense was worried about such
testimony, thereby emphasizing the testimony and magnifying the
harmful implications of it.”). We cannot say that this tactical decision

eS 468

was “so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would
have followed such a course.” Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883, 887
(757 SE2d 90) (2014). Accordingly, Appellant has not shown that his
trial counsel was professionally deficient in this respect either.

3. Appellant contends that the trial court violated OCGA §
17-8-57 by making an impermissible comment on the evidence when
the court explained to the jury that Allen’s video recorded interview
with the police had been redacted so that it included only the
“relevant portions.” The court’s comment did not violate the statute.
At the time of Appellant’s trial, OCGA § 17-8-57 said in relevant part
that it was “error for any judge in any criminal case, during its
progress or in his charge to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion
as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the
accused.”* To violate the statute in this respect, the court’s comment
had to pertain to a disputed issue of fact and express an opinion on
whether that fact had or had not been proved at trial. See State v.
Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634-635 (690 SE2d 164) (2010).

At trial, as Appellant requested, the irrelevant and objectionable
portions of Allen’s lengthy interview were redacted from the record-
ing that the jury watched; even now Appellant does not dispute that
the portions of the video that were played were relevant, and indeed
irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. See OCGA § 24-4-402. The trial
court did not express or suggest any opinion it had regarding Appel-
lant’s guilt or innocence or about what had or had not been proved.
The challenged comment was meant simply to explain to the jury that
the reduced length and the discernible interruptions in the video it
saw were due to the agreed-upon redactions to leave what was
relevant to the case. Accordingly, the comment was in the nature of a
permissible clarification of procedure. See Linson v. State, 287 Ga.
881, 884 (700 SE2d 394) (2010) (holding that because the court’s
comments regarding the playing of a videotaped interview were
limited to “a clarification of procedures and did not address the
credibility of witnesses or any fact at issue in the trial,” they did not
violate OCGA § 17-8-57). The trial court’s comment to the jury did not
violate OCGA § 17-8-57.

* OCGA § 17-8-57 was amended in 2015, primarily to change the standard of appellate
review and remedy for judicial comments on whether facts at issue have or have not been proved
where no objection to the comment was made at trial. See Burney v. State, 299 Ga. 813, 822 &
1.9 (792 SE2d 354) (2016). Appellant did not object at trial to the court’s comment that he now
disputes, but because we conclude that the comment did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57, we need
not decide whether the old or new version of the statute would apply to our review. See Burney,
299 Ga. at 823 n.10; Pyatt v, State, 298 Ga. 742, 747 n.9 (784 SE2d 759) (2016).

464 Pe

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded
with direction. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

Brian Steel, for appellant.

Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Lee F. Tittsworth, Charissa R.
Henrich, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Aimee F. Sobhani,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1149. TIMMONS v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 363)

HINES, Chief Justice.

Kyle Devonte Timmons appeals his convictions and sentences for
felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery, in con-
nection with the shooting death of Dominique Alexander Spears. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and vacate in part.’

Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed that a
month before Spears was killed, Timmons visited Marshawn Hamil-
ton in Rome, Georgia, a town in which Timmons had lived before
moving away. During that visit, Timmons and Hamilton went to a
sports bar, which Spears and some friends were patronizing. When
Timmons began tolight acigarette, Spears snatched it from his mouth.
Timmons asked that his cigarette be returned; Spears refused and
pushed Timmons against a wall; Timmons punched Spears in the face;
Hamilton intervened; and he and Timmons left the bar. The next day,
Spears telephoned Hamilton and said he wanted to fight Timmons; on
a speaker phone, Timmons said he did not want to fight Spears, and
Spears said that he would fight Timmons the next time he saw him.

1 The crimes occurred on September 23, 2014. On December 5, 2014, a Floyd County grand
jury indicted Timmons for malice murder; felony murder while in the commission of aggravated
assault and aggravated battery; aggravated assault; and aggravated battery. Timmons was
tried before a jury October 5-7, 2015, and found not guilty of malice murder, but guilty of all
other charges; on December 15, 2015, Timmons was sentenced to life in prison for felony
murder, and two concurrent sentences of 20 years in prison for aggravated assault and
aggravated battery. On January 4, 2016, Timmons filed a motion for new trial, which he
amended on August 15, 2016; the motion, as amended, was denied on August 29, 2016
‘Timmons filed a notice of appeal on September 6, 2016; his appeal was docketed in this Court
for the April 2017 term and submitted for decision on the briefs

eS 465

During a visit to Rome on September 23, 2014, Timmons arranged
for Tiffany Chambers to drive him, Lamar Lashley, and Aspen
Donaldson to Donaldson’s apartment; Spears lived in the same
apartment complex, in a building near Donaldson’s building. When
they arrived at the apartment complex, Donaldson went into her
apartment and the others stayed in the car. After a short period,
Donaldson returned to the car, and told Timmons to join her in the
apartment. At that time, Spears was walking near the front of the car;
Timmons exited the car, and the two men quickly confronted each
other. Lashley testified that the men “scuffled”; Chambers could not
confirm a physical fight, but saw Timmons “raise his arm toward Mr.
Spears.” Spears was shot twice with a .22 caliber pistol. One projectile
entered the front left side of his chest, traveled slightly upward, and
lodged in the muscles of his back; the other projectile entered the
right side of the back of his neck, and traveled upward into Spears’s
brain; either of the bullet wounds would have proved fatal. After the
shooting, Timmons ran, throwing the pistol aside as he did so; he
arrived at a nearby house, asked the occupant to call 911, saying that
he had shot a man, and was soon arrested. Later, Donaldson made a
Facebook post stating that she believed the shooting was in self-
defense, that Spears should not have “ran up on Kyle,” that Spears
had repeatedly told her that he would beat up Timmons, and that
“T guess he got what he deserves but at the wrong time when call [sic]
had that tool on him”; she testified that the reference to “call” in the
Facebook post was “meant to say Kyle.” When asked during an
interview with an investigator about this Facebook post, Donaldson
said that, while in the car, Timmons had a small pistol in his pocket,
that he pulled it out of his pocket when he got out of the car, and that
this was the first time Donaldson had seen Timmons with a pistol.
She also told the investigator that Timmons knew that Spears lived
in the complex, that Timmons stated that there were some hostile
people who lived there, and, in the car before the shooting, she heard
Timmons slide the action on the pistol.

Timmons testified in his defense that he did not know that
Spears lived in the apartment complex; Spears saw him in the car;
Spears came up to him as he exited the car and struck him in the face;
dazed, he grabbed Spears and felt something at Spears’s waistband;
he pulled the object from Spears’s waistband; he realized by both feel
and vision that the object was a handgun; he pushed Spears away,
closed his eyes, and fired twice; and, he feared for his life during the
confrontation. However, in statements to police investigators made
the day of the shooting, Timmons said that Spears lived across from
the building in which Donaldson lived, Spears was coming from
“his house” when the confrontation at the car occurred, and that as

466 Pe

Spears arrived at the car, he exited it. Timmons also told the inves-
tigators that as he exited, Donaldson urged that he “don’t do nothing”
regarding his poor relationship with Spears.

1. Timmons does not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence
of his guilt as to the charges of which he was convicted. Nevertheless,
in accordance with this Court’s general practice in appeals of murder
cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence at
trial authorized the jury to find Timmons guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U. 8. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

However, Timmons was charged with one count of felony murder
“during the commission of a felony, to wit: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
AND AGGRAVATED BATTERY.” He was found guilty of that crime,
as well as separate counts of aggravated assault and aggravated
battery, and sentenced for all three of those crimes. “This was error as
the underlying felonies of aggravated assault [and] aggravated bat-
tery ... merged as a matter of fact into the felony murder. [Cits.]”
Smith v. State, 300 Ga. 538, 542 (4) (796 SE2d 666) (2017). Conse-
quently, the sentences for aggravated assault and aggravated battery
must be vacated. Id.

2. (a) The State was permitted to introduce, in its case-in-chief,
evidence of posts Timmons had made on Facebook (“the Facebook
evidence”) as evidence of his allegedly violent character and behavior
in conformity therewith. The posts were on Timmons’s Facebook
page, were not part of any conversation with another person on
Facebook, and did not refer to Spears or any other individual. The
posts used racially charged terms, expressed that Timmons was not
afraid to die or go to jail, referred to shooting or killing someone,
asserted that if someone “play[ed]” with him “ya family missing ya,”
and included the text “#lifeshortdontmakeitshorter.”? The trial court
determined that, as Timmons was claiming the defense of self-

2 ‘The State presented the evidence in a printed exhibit that showed the following posts, in
the order presented in the exhibit:
“September 11 [2014] at 1:48am
My leather so soft but my gun so hard nigga play with me shoot his ass in broad day”
“September 11 [2014] at 1:25am
For you niggaz playing with young i ain't scared to die #lifeshortdontmakeitshorter”
“September 22 [2014] at 7:26am
You a pussy ass nigga and u show it nigga”
“September 20 [2014] at 2:24pm
‘This shit personal i been waiting on this day”
“September 20 [2014] at 2:37am
Niggaz say they got a ticket on me haha biteh i still do what the fuhk i wanna one thing about
LT ain't scared to die play wit it”

eS 467

defense, whether Spears had a propensity for violence was an issue
necessarily “pertinent” to the case, and thus, by virtue of the fact that
Timmons claimed self-defense, the State would be allowed under
OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2)? to show Timmons’s own character for
violence, and could do so by introducing Timmons’s Facebook posts
demonstrating that “character.” However, this ruling represents a
misunderstanding of OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2).

For trials that take place after January 1, 2013, “[t]he admissi-
bility of evidence of a victim’s character is governed by OCGA §§
24-4-404 and 24-4-405.4 See Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532, 535 (3)

“September 14 [2014] at 8:58pm
They was some real niggaz that i would kill a nigga about we where the money team until they
started acting like some bitchez #CantTrustNiggaz”
“Ain't scared to die go to jail it ain't shit put it on ma dukes these niggas ain’t seeing me take
care home for you play wit me young man have ya family missing ya bitch ass. Sat. at 2:07pm”
(No testimony providing a more definite date regarding this post was presented.)
8 OCGA § 24-4-404 reads
(a) Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character shall not be

admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular

oceasion, except for:

(1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused or
by the prosecution to rebut the same; or if evidence of a trait of character of
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted under
paragraph (2) of this subsection, evidence of the same trait of character of the
accused offered by the prosecution;

(2) Subject to the limitations imposed by Code Section 24-4-412,
evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime
offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same; or evidence of
a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecu-
tion in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor; or

(3) Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Code Sections

24.6-607, 24-6-608, and 24-6-609.

(b) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. The prosecution in a criminal proceeding shall provide
reasonable notice to the defense in advance of trial, unless pretrial notice is excused
by the court upon good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial. Notice shall not be required when the evidence of prior
crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered to prove the circumstances immediately si
rounding the charged crime, motive, or prior difficulties between the accused and
the alleged victim.

4 OCGA § 24-4-405 reads:

(a) Inall proceedings in which evidence of character or a trait of character of
a person is admissible, proof shall be made by testimony as to reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion.

(b) In proceedings in which character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense or when an accused testifies to his
or her own character, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s
conduct. The character of the accused, including specific instances of the accused's

468 Pe

(773 SE2d 755) (2015).” Gibson v. State, 300 Ga. 494, 498 n. 8 (796
SE2d 712) (2017). And, OCGA §§ 24-4-404 and 24-4-405 govern not
only the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s character, but more
generally the admissibility of “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a
trait of character[.]” OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (Emphasis supplied.) See
also OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) (“In all proceedings in which evidence of
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof shall
be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of
an opinion.”) (Emphasis supplied.)
In 2011,

our General Assembly enacted a new Evidence Code, of
which [OCGA §§ 24-4-404 and 24-4-405 are] part. Many
provisions of the new Evidence Code were borrowed from the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and when we consider the mean-
ing of these provisions, we look to decisions of the federal
appellate courts construing and applying the Federal Rules,
especially the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and the Eleventh Circuit. [Cit.]

Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016) (Footnote
omitted.) And, as in the similar Federal Rules 404 and 405, OCGA §
24-4-404 deals with whether character evidence is to be admitted, and
OCGA § 24-4-405 deals with the methods by which character may be
proved. See United States v. Keiser, 57 F3d 847, 855-856 (III) (B) (9th
Cir. 1995). See also Oliver v. State, 329 Ga. App. 377 (765 SE2d 606)
(2014). Thus, OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) provides that evidence of a per-
son’s character is generally not admissible, except in the circum-
stances set forth in subsections (a) (1), (a) (2), and (a) (8).° And, if
evidence “of a person’s character or a trait of character [is to be
admitted] for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith
ona particular occasion” under OCGA § 24-4-404 (a), itis required by
OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) that proof of such “character or a trait of
character . . . be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony
in the form of an opinion.” As we have stated,

OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) . . . provides: “In all proceedings in
which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person

conduct, shall also be admissible in a presentencing hearing subject to the
provisions of Code Section 17-10-2
(© On cross-examination, inquiry shall be allowable into relevant specific
instances of conduct.
® OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (3) specifically addresses impeachment of witnesses, a matter not
pertinent to this appeal.

eS 469

is admissible, proof shall be made by testimony as to repu-
tation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.” Therefore,
as a general rule, character evidence of a victim is limited to
reputation or opinion, not specific bad acts.

Mohamud v. State, supra at 536 (Footnote omitted; emphasis in
original.) See also United States v. Talamante, 981 F2d 1153, 1156 (1)
(10th Cir. 1992) (“[TJestimony describing specific instances of the
victim’s conduct, as opposed to reputation or opinion evidence .. . [is]
not admissible under [Federal] Rule 404 (a) (2) to prove that the
victim acted in conformity with the conduct.”) And, such is the case
whether the character evidence at issue is that of an accused such as
Timmons, or of a victim such as Spears.

The State argued at trial that the Facebook evidence was admis-
sible due to the interplay of OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (1) and (a) (2), an
argument that the trial court accepted. Under OCGA § 24-4-404
(a) (1), “if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the
crime is offered by an accused and admitted under [OCGA § 24-4-404
(a)] (2),” the prosecution may offer “evidence of the same trait of
character of the accused.” The State asserts that Timmons, through
cross-examination, introduced “evidence of a pertinent trait of char-
acter of the alleged victim of the crime” (i.e., Spears’s violent char-
acter) within the meaning of OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2),° and that this
fact entitled the State to offer “evidence of the same trait of character
of the accused” under OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (1). But, as noted above,
OCGA § 24-4-405 requires that proof of a pertinent character trait of
an alleged victim “shall be made by testimony as to reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion.” The Facebook evidence was not
such “testimony as to reputation or . . . testimony in the form of an
opinion.” Thus, even if, through cross-examination, Timmons elicited
testimony touching upon Spears’s character, it was not evidence of
the victim’s character within the meaning of OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (1),
and not “evidence of a trait of character [i.e., violence] of the alleged
victim of the crime . . . offered by [the] accused and admitted under
[OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2)].” Accordingly, it did not open the door to
“evidence of the same trait of character of the accused [i.e., violence]
offered by the prosecution” under OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (1).

To be clear, the relevant Code sections show that we must reject
the specific argument that the State made, and that the trial court

® Evidence admitted under OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2) is “[s]ubject to the limitations imposed
by Code Section 24-4-412.” That Code section addresses admissibility of a complainant's prior
sexual behavior in prosecutions of certain sexual offenses, and is not pertinent here.

470 Pe

accepted, i.e., that, as Timmons raised self-defense, it would neces-
sarily be an issue in the case whether Spears hada violent “character
or a trait of character” for violence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (a), and
thus, the very fact that Timmons raised the defense meant that the
State could introduce evidence to show Timmons’s general character
for violence, under the guise of admissibility pursuant to OCGA §
24-4-404 (a) (1) and (2). Indeed, we recently addressed the admissi-
bility of character evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (a), and made it
apparent that the Code section mandates certain timing, in that for
the State to be able to introduce character evidence, “a defendant
[must] first introduce evidence of a pertinent character trait of the
victim or evidence that the victim was the first aggressor before the
State may introduce [proper character] evidence to rebut that which
was presented by the defendant.” Revere v. State, 302 Ga. 44, 48-49
(2) (a) (805 SE2d 69) (2017) (Emphasis in original.) Under OCGA §
24-4-404 (a), the accused may certainly open the door to the State’s
introduction of character evidence — evidence of his own character, or
that of the victim — but it must be by the strictures of that Code
subsection, which did not occur.

Timmons properly objected to the Facebook evidence when the
State offered it as character evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (a),
and the evidence should have been excluded on the ground raised.

(b) Despite the erroneous admission of the Facebook evidence,
the State nonetheless contends that the error must be considered
harmless. Faced with such an evidentiary ruling,

“fiJn determining whether the error was harmless, we review
the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would
expect reasonable jurors to have done so.” [Cit.] “The test for
determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it
is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
verdict.”

Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 432 (2) (788 SE2d 433) (2016) (Footnote
omitted.) And, under that review, it is clear from Timmons’s state-
ments to investigating law enforcement officers that he knew that
Spears lived across from the building in which Donaldson lived, as he
indicated Spears’s apartment on a sketch of the area he made for the
officers and stated that Spears was coming from “his house” when he
arrived at the car; he also told the investigators that as he got out of
the car, Donaldson said to him “don’t do nothing” regarding his prior

eS an

bad blood with Spears.” Despite Timmons’s self-serving testimony
that he took the pistol that he used to shoot Spears from the victim’s
waistband, Donaldson reported that he had taken the pistol with him
to Spears’s apartment complex, and prepared it for use before exiting
the car. And, even from Timmons, there was no evidence that after
the time Timmons stated that he removed a pistol from Spears’s
waistband, Spears produced, or attempted to produce, any weapon.
Further, the physical evidence demonstrated that Timmons shot
Spears not only in the chest, but in the back of the neck.

Considering the evidence presented at trial, and weighing it as
we believe that reasonable jurors would have done, we conclude that
the erroneous admission of the Facebook evidence did not contribute
to the jury’s verdicts. Smith v. State, supra at 432 (2). See also Rivera
v. State, 295 Ga. 380, 382 (2) (761 SE2d 30) (2014). Accordingly, a new
trial is not authorized on this ground.

Judgments affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur, except Hunstein and Nahmias, JJ., who concur in part and
dissent in part.

HUNSTEIN, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Tagree that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions
here, and I fully concur with Divisions 1 and 2 (a); however, I disagree
that the admission of the Facebook evidence was harmless, and, thus,
I dissent as to Division 2 (b).

There is no doubt that “[t]he [Facebook] evidence is classic
evidence of bad character, which was offered by the [State] to prove
only ‘action in conformity therewith.” (Citation omitted.) United
States v. Phaknikone, 605 F3d 1099, 1109 (11th Cir. 2010). The
question then becomes whether such error is harmless. The majority
concludes, after ostensibly “weigh[ing] the evidence as [they] would
expect reasonable jurors to have done so,” Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424,
432 (788 SE2d 433) (2016), that “the erroneous admission of the
Facebook evidence did not contribute to the jury’s verdicts.” I dis-
agree with this harmless-error analysis.

The review of the facts included in Division 2 is seemingly
nothing more than a second sufficiency analysis wherein the majority
merely reiterates the facts and again draws all reasonable inferences
in favor of the verdict. This, however, is not the standard. See, e.g.,
Boothe v. State, 293 Ga. 285, 289 (745 SE2d 594) (2013) (“In doing so,

7 Pretermitting whether the erroneous admission of the evidence caused Timmons to
decide to testify when he otherwise may have decided not to, see Childress v. State, 266 Ga. 425,
434-438 (4) (467 SE2d 865) (1996), the evidence of his statement to investigators was admitted
without regard to whether Timmons decided to testify.

472 Pe

we weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have
done so, as opposed to assuming that they took the most pro-guilt
possible view of every bit of evidence in the case.” (Emphasis sup-
plied.)). This is especially troubling because the evidence underlying
Timmons’ guilt is not particularly overwhelming and because Tim-
mons was acquitted of malice murder. Though there is no dispute that
Timmons and Spears had previous altercations and that Timmons
eventually shot Spears, there is conflicting evidence concerning the
underlying altercation on the night of the murder. Indeed, the jury
was required to glean from the trial testimony whether Timmons was
actually seeking out Spears on the night in question, whether Tim-
mons was, in fact, armed, and whether Timmons was the aggressor
or acted out of fear for his life; notably, Timmons was discovered to
have a cut on his lip following the altercation, and he immediately
asked nearby neighbors to report the shooting to 911. The evidence
requires factfinders to draw numerous inferences from the evidence,
and the error here is harmless only if a// reasonable inferences are
drawn in favor of the verdicts, which this Court simply must not do.
Boothe, supra.

The State must have known that this case would come down to
inferences and credibility, and the Facebook evidence — which the
State suggested below portrayed Timmons as a “gangster” — indeed
pushes the jury to conclude that Timmons had a propensity for
violence and was willing to go to prison (or die) for shooting his foes.
In light of the nature of the evidence presented below and the potent
content of the Facebook evidence, I cannot agree that it is “highly
probable” that the erroneous admission of the Facebook evidence did
not contribute to the verdict.

I am authorized to state that Justice Nahmias joins in this
partial concurrence and partial dissent.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

David L. Lumpkin, for appellant.

Leigh E. Patterson, District Attorney, Natalee L. Staats, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Aimee F: Sobhani, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

eS A738

$17A1199. SCHMITZ v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 361)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

Following a May 18, 2015 traffic stop, John F. Schmitz was
arrested for DUI and failure to maintain lane. The arresting officer
read Schmitz the required implied consent warning in accordance
with OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2), and Schmitz agreed to a test of his
deep lung breath, which revealed that Schmitz’s blood alcohol con-
centration was above the legal limit. Prior to going to trial on the
charges against him, Schmitz filed initial and amended motions to
suppress, arguing that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) was unconstitu-
tional both on its face and as applied to him. The trial court applied
the balancing test on actual voluntariness to find that Schmitz had
consented to the breath test, and denied Schmitz’s motions and
constitutional challenges on May 31, 2016. Following a September
15, 2016 bench trial, Schmitz was found guilty of DUI per se, DUI less
safe, and failure to maintain lane. Schmitz appeals his conviction,”
arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
and finding OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) to be constitutional, as his
consent to a search of his deep lung breath violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983
(“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due
process of law”). However, because this Court has recently rejected
identical constitutional challenges to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2) in
Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228 (806 SE2d 505) (2017), Schmitz’s current
claims have no merit, and we affirm.

Schmitz contends that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2), on its face and
as applied to him, violates Due Process because the warning in the
statute, by itself, is false and misleading to the point where an

1 The implied consent warning for suspects like Schmitz who are age 21 and over states:
Georgia law requires you to submit to state administered chemical tests of your
blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining if
you are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. If you refuse this testing, your
Georgia driver's license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state will be
suspended for a minimum period of one year. Your refusal to submit to the required
testing may be offered into evidence against you at trial. If you submit to testing
and the results indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or more, your
Georgia driver's license or privilege to drive on the highways of this state may be
suspended for a minimum period of one year. After first submitting to the required
state tests, you are entitled to additional chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine,
or other bodily substances at your own expense and from qualified personnel of
your own choosing. Will you submit tothe state administered chemical tests of your
(designate which tests [— in this case, breath —]) under the implied consent law?

2 The DUI less safe count was merged into the DUI per se count for sentencing purposes,
and Schmitz does not challenge on appeal his conviction for failure to maintain lane.

a7 Pe

individual’s consent to a breath test can never be considered to be
voluntary. With respect to our rejection of identical constitutional
arguments in Olevik, supra, this Court explained:

The implied consent notice is not per se coercive on its face... .
[as the] implied consent statute [has a plainly legitimate
sweep in that it] does not impose criminal penalties for
refusing to submit to chemical testing .. . [and the statute is
not] unconstitutional in all of its applications. ... [A]Ithough
[there may be] deficiencies in the implied consent notice,
there is no evidence that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) creates wide-
spread confusion about drivers’ rights and the consequences
for refusing to submit to a chemical test or for taking and
failing that test. ...[Furthermore, an “as applied” challenge
fails where, as here, the trial court] considered all the
relevant factors to determine the voluntariness [of Schmitz’s]
consent to search, and . . . [t]he only consideration that
[Schmitz] argues the court failed to consider properly is the
allegedly coercive and misleading nature of the implied
consent notice. . . . Because the reading of the implied
consent notice is not, by itself, coercive, and [Schmitz] has
offered nothing else, [Schmitz’s] claim must fail.

Id. at 247-252 (3) (a) and (b) (citation, punctuation and emphasis
omitted).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

ance er, for appellant
Donna C. Stribling, Solicitor-General, Wystan B. Getz, K. Tyler
Edgerton, Assistant Solicitors-General; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-
ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1216. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 350)
GRANT, Justice.
Appellant Temon Jarmell Williams was convicted of malice
murder and other crimes in connection with the October 2012 stab-
bing death of Shawn Doughty. Williams now appeals, asserting

eS a7

insufficiency of the evidence, erroneous admission of expert testi-
mony, erroneous admission of evidence seized during a search of his
residence, and ineffectiveness of his trial counsel for various reasons.
Although we find no error regarding Williams’s contentions, we
affirm in part and vacate in part due to a sentencing error."

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence at trial showed as follows. On the evening of October 22,
2012, Clarke County police responded to a call of two males fighting
in a neighborhood street and a possible stabbing. Upon arrival, the
responding officer found Shawn Doughty lying in the street, bleeding
heavily. Shawn’s twin sister and another witness, a male neighbor,
were watching over Shawn when the responding officer arrived.
When the officer asked the sister who stabbed Shawn, she replied
that her ex-boyfriend Temon Williams had done so. The sister and the
neighbor pointed toward 227 Woody Lane, indicating that Williams
was inside. Shawn was unable to make any statements. Officers
attempted to aid Shawn until EMTs arrived and transported him to
the hospital where he was pronounced dead. Shawn was stabbed once
through the heart and once in the back; both wounds were sharp force
injuries.

1. The murder was committed on October 22, 2012. Williams was indicted by a Clarke County
grand jury. At the conclusion of a trial held June 3-7, 2013, a jury found Williams guilty of malice
murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 3 and 4),
criminal attempt to commit the murder of Shawn's sister (Count 5), aggravated assault (family
violence) (Count 7), and six counts of possession of a knife during the commission of a crime
(Counts 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15). The trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment without
parole for malice murder, twenty years to serve for the aggravated assault conviction on Count 4,
thirty years to serve for criminal attempt to commit murder, and five years to serve for three of
the convictions for possession of a knife during the commission of a crime (Counts 9, 12, and 13),
all running consecutively; the trial court merged the remaining convictions for sentencing. The
aggravated assault count for which Williams was sentenced to twenty years to serve, however, was
predicated on the same attack for which he was convicted of malice murder, and although that
attack involved two separate stabbings, “there was no evidence that the [stabbings] occurred in
a manner other than in a single transaction, with no ‘deliberate interval’ separating . . . the
[stabs].” Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713, 718 (3) (770 SE2d 585) (2015) (quoting Ortiz v. State, 291
Ga. 3, 6 (3) (727 SH2d 103) (2012)). Therefore, the trial court should have merged Count 4’s
aggravated assault conviction with Count 1’s malice murder conviction for sentencing pur-
poses. Consequently, Count 13's conviction for possession of a knife during the commission of
acrime, which was predicated on Count 4, also should have merged. Accordingly, we vacate that
portion of the trial court’s sentencing order in which it purported to impose sentences of twenty
years and five years to serve on Counts 4 and 13, respectively. Williams filed a timely motion
for new trial on June 17, 2013, which was subsequently amended. A hearing was held on the
motion on June 1, 2016, and the motion was denied on October 26, 201 6. Williams filed his notice
of appeal on November 16, 2016. The appeal was docketed to the April 2017 term of this Court
and thereafter was submitted for a decision on the briefs.

476 es

At the scene, police saw that the sister was also bleeding, and she
told them that Williams had stabbed her as well. She had been
stabbed in the back and had a cut on the left side of her face. Officers
knocked on Williams’s door and loudly announced their presence, but
there was no response. Additional officers arrived, including SWAT
members, and after a standoff, which included telephone conversa-
tions between Williams and his cousin in which Williams claimed he
was dying, Williams exited the duplex and was handcuffed. Williams
had cut wounds to his wrist and upper chest. While arresting Wil-
liams, officers found a handwritten note in his possession, which
prompted Williams to say, “That’s what’s wrong with me right there,
that letter right there. Keep that for evidence.”?

Upon his arrest, Williams was transported to the hospital where
his injuries were treated; they did not require sutures. Williams told
medical staff that after he had read the letter, his girlfriend got mad
and stabbed him with a kitchen knife. In response to a nurse’s
question of whether anyone was hurting or threatening him, Wil-
liams replied no. The emergency room physician who examined
Williams’s wounds, Dr. Lewis Earnest, believed the wounds were
self-inflicted based on his observations, discussed more fully below.

When police arrested Williams, they immediately conducted a
“protective sweep” of his residence and saw a bloody T-shirt in the
living room and a knife in the bedroom, both in plain sight. After
exiting the residence, officers obtained a search warrant for the
residence (the supporting affidavit referenced the protective sweep
and observation of the bloody shirt and knife). These items were then
seized when the search warrant was executed. The knife found in the
bedroom had blood on it, which matched Williams’s DNA. A bent
knife was also found outside the residence with blood on it that
matched Shawn and his sister’s DNA.

Six days prior to Shawn’s murder, on October 16, Williams was
released from prison. Shawn’s sister had previously been in a rela-
tionship with Williams, and maintained that relationship for some
time during his incarceration. But she eventually decided to end their
relationship, and she informed him of her decision. She agreed to help
him as a friend, however, and shortly before his release, secured a
residence for him to live in. Around that time, Williams’s parole
officer contacted Shawn’s sister to verify Williams’s new address and
to advise her of various things concerning his release, including the

2 The letter was written by the sister in 2009 after an argument in which Williams had
accused her of cheating on him, but it was never delivered to Williams. Apparently, Williams
found it among her personal items and he also wrote on it the name and number of a person he
accused her of having a romantic relationship with.

eS am

fact that Williams was HIV positive. The sister confronted Williams
about this revelation on the phone, and he assured her that he was
going to tell her, and also that if she would just help him out as a
friend, then they could go their separate ways. She reluctantly
agreed, and had personal items of hers that were in storage moved
into the residence to furnish it for Williams (presumably, the 2009
letter was among the items in storage that were moved into Wil-
liams’s residence). In the days following Williams’s release, the sister
helped him run several errands, such as visiting his parole officer and
being fitted with his ankle monitor. Williams repeatedly asked the
sister if she was dating anyone and if she would get back together
with him, but she continuously rebuffed him, which made him
noticeably upset and angry. On Friday, October 19, after she again
refused Williams’s advances, he threatened her with a butter knife
and forced her to have sex with him. She played along long enough to
flee when she had the opportunity the next morning, leaving behind
her purse and other personal items. That day, she told him on the
phone that “it was over” and she would never be alone with him again.

She did not disclose these facts to her brother Shawn, who was
Williams’s good friend. Shawn and Williams “hung out” as friends
over the weekend, and on Monday, October 22 (the day of the murder),
they arrived at the home of Shawn and his sister’s grandmother to
retrieve a grill their grandmother was giving Williams. Williams then
told them that he lost his ride home and needed a ride back home
before his curfew. The sister agreed to take Williams home, but only
if Shawn would accompany them; which he agreed to do. On the ride
home, Williams sat in the front seat, telling the sister that he loved
her and trying to hold her hand, but she told him to stop. When they
arrived at Williams’s residence, and after Shawn and Williams took
the grill into the residence and returned, Williams told the sister that
she could go retrieve the items she had left at his residence and that
no one would bother her. She went into the residence, but her items
had been moved, and, sensing something was wrong, she quickly left.
As she walked back outside, she heard Shawn screaming her name
from the street, and then saw Williams advancing toward her. She
ran, but Williams caught her, stabbing her in the back and then
beating and strangling her. Two neighbors heard the commotion. A
female neighbor heard the sister screaming. That neighbor then saw
the sister running from Williams; Williams caught her and began
punching and hitting her. He then pulled something from his pocket,
stood behind her, and stabbed her. The other neighbor, the male
whom officers encountered when arriving at the scene, heard the
sister screaming and saw Williams manhandling her and lifting her

478 es

off the ground. That neighbor yelled for Williams to stop and told him
the police were coming, at which point Williams ran into his resi-
dence.

At trial, Dr. Earnest testified that based on Williams’s behavior
and the pattern of his wounds — the wrist wounds were of similar
depth; the cut to the left wrist was common for a right-handed person
cutting himself; the cuts to the wrist were running toward the body,
also common for people cutting themselves; the chest wounds’ loca-
tion on the left side of the chest were consistent with a right-handed
person stabbing himself; the chest wounds were in two orientations
of vertical and horizontal, indicating wrist movement but not defen-
sive wounds; and all the wounds were shallow — it was Dr. Earnest’s
opinion that Williams’s injuries were self-inflicted. He testified that
he had only seen wrist injuries like Williams’s from self-inflicted
injuries.

Williams also testified in his own defense as follows. While he
was down on his knees inside the car looking for a key, Shawn
attacked him from behind. Shawn was holding two knives, and
Williams snatched one of the knives from Shawn and hit him in the
front and then in the back as Shawn came at him. Williams then
noticed the other knife was “in me.” Shawn ran away. The sister then
came out of the residence, saw Williams, and “took off hollering like
she fixin’ to go tell a lie,” so he chased her, and accidentally cut her
with the knife he was holding while he was trying to help her up after
she fell. Williams then went into his residence because the male
neighbor arrived and told Williams to stop hitting the sister, even
though he was not. The trial court charged the jury on self-defense.

As we have explained, “[i]t was for the jury to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsis-
tencies in the evidence.” Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (1) (673 SE2d
223) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted). Contrary to Wil-
liams’s contention, the evidence described above was sufficient to
enable a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Williams was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

Il.

Williams asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his
objection to emergency room doctor Lewis Earnest’s opinion testi-
mony because the State failed to satisfy the conditions of OCGA §
17-16-4 (a) (4). “We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under an
abuse of discretion standard of review.” Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 304,
306 (3) (667 SE2d 65) (2008) (footnote omitted).

eS 479

Georgia law requires the prosecution to reduce any relevant oral
portions of physical examination reports to writing, and to timely
serve the reports on opposing counsel. See OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4).
Williams contends that the State failed to comply with this rule, and
that ifthe State had complied, then Williams could have retained his
own expert to review a written report of Dr. Earnest’s opinion and
possibly rebut his testimony. He further argues that the trial court’s
admission of Dr. Earnest’s opinion testimony was harmful because
Dr. Earnest’s opinion that Williams’s wounds appeared self-inflicted
undercut Williams’s assertion of self-defense.

OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4) requires timely disclosure of

report[s] of any physical or mental examinations and of
scientific tests or experiments, including a summary of the
basis for the expert opinion rendered in the report, or copies
thereof, if the state intends to introduce in evidence in its
case-in-chief or in rebuttal the results of the physical or
mental examination or scientific test or experiment.

The statute further provides that “[iJf the report is oral or
partially oral, the prosecuting attorney shall reduce all relevant and
material oral portions of such report to writing and shall [timely]
serve opposing counsel with such portions.” Williams claims error
under these provisions, but the evidence shows that the State pro-
vided Williams’s trial counsel with all of his medical records arising
out of the incident, including Dr. Earnest’s written medical reports
and records. There is no evidence that Dr. Earnest made a “report
[that] is oral or partially oral.” The State was under no duty to reduce
to writing a non-existent oral report. Heywood v. State, 292 Ga. 771,
777 (4) (b) (743 SE2d 12) (2013) (“Appellant has pointed to nothing in
the record to prove that [the expert] ever made such an oral report
before he testified. In the absence of such a showing, Appellant cannot
establish a violation ... of... OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4).”). There was no
violation of OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4), and Williams’s argument to the
contrary fails.

III.

Williams next contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence, including a bloody shirt and knife,
seized during the execution of the search warrant on his residence
because the police first unlawfully searched the residence under the
pretense of a “protective sweep” and used observations from that
sweep to obtain the search warrant. This argument also fails.

480 es

“On appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial
court’s findings on disputed facts will be upheld unless clearly
erroneous, and its application of the law to undisputed facts is subject
to de novo review.” Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 695, 697 (763 SE2d 710)
(2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
and Article I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. See U. S. Const. Amend. IV; Ga.
Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII. Acursory warrantless search
limited to spaces where a person may be found, known as a “protective
sweep,” is permissible when officers reasonably believe, based on
articulable facts known to them at the time together with rational
inferences drawn from those facts, that the sweep is necessary to
protect or preserve life or to avoid serious injury to officers or others
because of the potential presence of other dangerous persons or of
additional victims. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (110 SCt 1093,
108 LE2d 276) (1990); Lawler v. State, 276 Ga. 229, 233 (576 SE2d
841) (2003) (protective sweep of murder suspect’s home after stand-
off with police and arrest to look for other possible suspects or victims
was reasonable). Evidence observed in plain view during a lawful
protective sweep may be seized or used to support the swearing out of
asearch warrant. Lawler, 276 Ga. at 233; Harris v. State, 298 Ga. 588,
590-591 (783 SE2d 632) (2016).

The evidence here supports the trial court’s finding that the
officers’ sweep of Williams’s home immediately after he was taken
into custody was lawful. Williams’s arrest was part of a rapidly
unfolding situation in which officers responded toa 911 callregarding
people fighting in the street and a possible stabbing. They found a
dying victim in the street upon arrival at the scene with another
victim in hysterics. Williams had locked himself inside his residence
causing a brief standoff with law enforcement, and when Williams
exited the residence, he too had cuts to his body. Officers on the scene
testified that they did not know whether other assailants or victims
remained inside the residence, and they swept the residence to make
sure no one else was inside. Under these circumstances, the officers
acted reasonably in conducting a protective sweep, and their sweep
was no more extensive than necessary to detect immediate danger.
No illegal search occurred, the items officers observed in plain view
were permissibly used in obtaining a search warrant, and the trial
court properly admitted the subject evidence.

eS 481

IV.

Williams contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to: (1) impeach the male neighbor witness with his 1990
murder conviction; (2) request a continuance upon learning of Dr.
Earnest’s opinion testimony or interview Dr. Earnest before trial;
(3) fully cross-examine the emergency room nurse who treated Wil-
liams; and (4) object to certain statements made by the State during
opening statements that Williams had allegedly raped the victim’s
sister and was HIV positive, as well as trial testimony from State
witnesses regarding the alleged rape, Williams’s HIV status, and
Williams’s “belligerent” and “hostile” behavior while receiving medi-
cal treatment at the hospital.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
defendant must satisfy the familiar standard set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). Under
the Strickland standard, a defendant must prove both that the
performance of his lawyer was deficient and that he was prejudiced
by the deficient performance. Mims v. State, 299 Ga. 578, 579-580 (1)
(787 SE2d 237) (2016). We review each of Williams’s claims of
ineffectiveness below.

(a) Williams first contends his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to impeach the male neighbor with a 1990 murder conviction.
OCGA § 24-6-609 (a) provides:

For the purpose of attacking the character for truthful-
ness of a witness:

(1) Evidence that a witness other than an accused
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted subject
to the provisions of Code Section 24-4-403 if the crime
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted... .

Subsection (b) further provides:

Evidence of a conviction under this Code section shall
not be admissible if a period of more than ten years has
elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the
witness from the confinement imposed for such conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in
the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evi-
dence of a conviction more than ten years old, as calculated

482 es

in this subsection, shall not be admissible unless the propo-
nent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such
evidence.

During trial, Williams’s counsel did seek to impeach the neighbor
with his 1990 murder conviction. The State moved in limine to
prevent the use of the conviction for impeachment purposes because
it was beyond the ten-year time limit set forth in OCGA § 24-6-609 (b)
(Rule 609). The neighbor testified that he was released from confine-
ment in 1995 or 1996. Williams’s counsel did not challenge the
neighbor’s statement regarding his release date. The trial court ruled
that the conviction was inadmissible because it was beyond the
statutory ten-year limit, and also noted that Williams’s counsel had
not given the requisite notice to the State as required for attempts to
admit convictions older than ten years.

On appeal, Williams argues that the 1990 murder conviction was
admissible for impeachment purposes because the neighbor’s Georgia
Crime Information Center criminal history indicates the neighbor
was arrested in 2008 for a parole violation, and that the arrest was a
“confinement” within ten years of his 2013 trial testimony. Williams
cites a Fourth Circuit case and a Ninth Circuit case in support of his
argument that a parole revocation arrest constitutes a “confinement”
imposed for the original conviction and should be used as the date for
time computation pursuant to Rule 609. See United States v. Gray,
852 F2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. McClintock, 748 F2d
1278 (9th Cir. 1984). Georgia’s Rule 609 and the Federal Rule on
which it was modeled are both silent on the issue of whether confine-
ment pursuant to a parole revocation is confinement imposed for the
original conviction within the meaning of the rule. Addressing that
issue in the context of a probation violation, McClintock made the
“narrow holding” that “confinement imposed for substantive proba-
tion violations that implicate the original . . . activity is ‘confinement’
for the original offense within the meaning of 609(b).” 748 F2d at 1289
(emphasis supplied). Gray, likewise, involved “prior criminal activity
followed by subsequent criminal activity.” 852 F2d at 139 (punctua-
tion omitted). It does not appear that this Court, the Eleventh Circuit,
or the United States Supreme Court have addressed the question,
and trial counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient for not
raising an unsettled question of law.

We also need not decide the question today because Williams
fails to provide sufficient evidence of the neighbor’s confinement
within ten years of the 2013 trial. Williams provides nothing more

eS 488

than a printout of the neighbor’s criminal history, which merely
indicates that he was arrested on September 3, 2008 for a parole
violation. It provides no disposition or outcome. Williams presents no
other documentation from either the court that would have handled
any revocation or the Department of Corrections showing what, if
anything, happened regarding any parole violation. Nor did Williams
call the neighbor as a witness at the motion for new trial hearing to
inquire into the facts surrounding any violation. In short, Williams
provides no evidence at all establishing that the neighbor’s parole
was ever revoked, much less that the neighbor was actually confined
pursuant to any revocation. We cannot assume, based on nothing
more than an indication on the neighbor’s criminal history that he
was arrested for a parole violation, that his parole was actually
revoked and additional confinement imposed. See Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U. 8. 471, 488-489 (III) (b) (92 SCt 2593, 33 LE2d 484) (1972)
(due process required to revoke parole). Accordingly, Williams has not
presented evidence that would even arguably bring his confinement
within Rule 609 (b)’s ten-year period. Therefore, Williams has not
shown that trial counsel’s performance was deficient in this respect.
Relatedly, even if the neighbor’s murder conviction had been admit-
ted for impeachment purposes and the jury completely disregarded
his testimony as a result — which seems highly unlikely — the
verdict still has “‘overwhelming record support’” and there is no
“reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
different.” Daughtry v. State, 296 Ga. 849, 862 (2) (k) (770 SE2d 862)
(2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).

(b) Second, Williams contends his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to request a continuance upon learning of Dr. Earnest’s
opinion testimony or to interview Dr. Earnest before trial. Williams
argues that if his trial counsel would have done either, then he could
have sought out and retained his own expert to review and potentially
rebut Dr. Earnest’s conclusions.

To this day, however, Williams has presented no evidence that
any expert would contradict Dr. Earnest’s conclusions. Because
Williams “did not make any proffer whatever to show that the
testimony of such witness[ ] would have been relevant and favorable,
and, thus, would have resulted in a different verdict,” he cannot
establish prejudice. Wells v. State, 281 Ga. 253, 255 (2) (a) (637 SE2d
8) (2006) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to
request continuance to locate potential exculpatory evidence); see
also Harvey v. State, 284 Ga. 8, 11 (4) (c) (660 SE2d 528) (2008)
(rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to interview
witness where defendant failed to show what a more thorough

484 es

investigation would have uncovered). His ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, therefore, fails in this regard as well.

(c) Third, Williams contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
in failing to fully cross-examine the emergency room nurse who
treated Williams while he was in police custody at the hospital.
Although Williams couches this contention as an ineffective assis-
tance claim, the thrust of his argument is that because he was in
custody and law enforcement personnel were present at the time the
nurse spoke to him, and because the medical records note that
Williams did not want to speak with medical staff without a lawyer,
it was a violation of his Miranda rights to admit statements he made
to the medical staff. His apparent contention is that had trial counsel
cross-examined the nurse regarding the medical record notations
that Williams did not want to speak with medical staff without a
lawyer, then the Miranda violation would have become apparent and
the trial court would have granted trial counsel’s objection to these
statements. We disagree.

First, cross-examinations are quintessential trial strategy and
will rarely constitute ineffective assistance. Butler v. State, 273 Ga.
380, 385 (10) (541 SE2d 653) (2001) (“[A] matter such as the cross-
examination of a witness is most often grounded in matters of trial
tactics and strategy.”). And Williams’s trial counsel did object to the
admission of statements Williams made to the nurse, arguing that
those statements were inadmissible because Williams was in custody
at the time; the trial court correctly overruled the objection.

Miranda does not govern questioning by private citizens who are
not acting at the behest of law enforcement. Mitchell v. State, 282 Ga.
416, 421 (6) (f) (651 SE2d 49) (2007); see also Cook v. State, 270 Ga.
820, 826 (514 SE2d 657) (1999) (holding that “[t]he coercion pro-
scribed by Miranda must be caused by the police,” and collecting
“{njumerous cases hold[ing] that Miranda is not implicated when a
suspect in custody is questioned or encouraged to confess by [private
actors]”). Williams’s statements made to the emergency room nurse
were admissible because they “were not made in response to inter-
rogation by police but instead were answers he provided to the nurse
treating him at the hospital after” the incident. Mitchell, 282 Ga. at
421 (6) (f). The evidence shows that the nurse spoke with Williams for
the sole purpose of providing medical assistance and treatment,
simply asking questions from a checklist according to protocol with-
out conversing with police beforehand; she was not a police actor
conducting a custodial interrogation. Williams’s trial counsel was not
deficient and caused no prejudice in this respect.

(d) Finally, Williams contends that his trial counsel was ineffec-
tive when he failed to object under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (Rule 404 (b))

eS 485

to statements made by the State during its opening that Williams was
HIV positive and that he forced the victim’s sister to have sex with
him, as well as trial testimony from State witnesses regarding the
alleged sexual assault, Williams’s HIV status, and Williams’s
“belligerent” and “hostile” behavior while receiving medical treat-
ment at the hospital. Williams argues that trial counsel should have
objected to these statements and testimony because they were inad-
missible under Rule 404 (b). In the alternative, Williams argues that
if these statements and testimony were intrinsic to the crimes
charged, as the trial court held in its order denying Williams’s motion
for new trial, they were still inadmissible under Rule 403 because
their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. He asserts that because trial counsel failed to object,
the trial court did not conduct the requisite hearing and balancing
analysis before admitting the evidence.

Williams’s contentions are incorrect. The limitations and prohi-
bition on “other acts” evidence set out in OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)? do not
apply to “intrinsic evidence.” See United States v. Edouard, 485 F3d
1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007); Brewner v. State, 302 Ga. 6 (804 SE2d 94)
(2017). This Court and the Eleventh Circuit have both set out factors
defining this type of evidence: Evidence is admissible as intrinsic
evidence when it is “(1) an uncharged offense arising from the same
transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) nec-
essary to ‘complete the story of the crime’; or (3) ‘inextricably inter-
twined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.’” Brewner,
302 Ga. at 14, n.3 (quoting Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 726 (2), n.11
(783 SE2d 895) (2016)); accord Edouard, 485 F3d at 1344. Intrinsic
evidence must also satisfy Rule 403. Id.

In applying these factors, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that
evidence “pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context,
motive, and set-up of the crime is properly admitted if [it is] linked in
time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral
and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to

® For evidence of other crimes or acts to be admissible under Rule 404 (b), (1) it must be
relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character; (2) it must be supported by sufficient
proof to enable a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed
the act(s) in question; and (3) it must satisfy Rule 403. See State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 158-159
(1) (773 SE2d 170) (2015) (citing Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 656 (769 SEZd 892) (2015);
United States v. Edouard, 485 3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Delgado, 56 F3d
1357, 1365 (IID) (B) (11th Cir, 1995). And when evidence is entered under Rule 404 (b), the
prosecution is generally required to provide “reasonable notice” to the defense before the trial
OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). Notice is not required, on the other hand, when other acts evidence is
introduced as intrinsic evidence, as evidence of motive, or as evidence of “prior difficulties
between the accused and the alleged victim.” Id.

486 es

complete the story of the crime for the jury.” Edouard, 485 F3d at
1344. The court went on to explain that evidence of other acts is
“inextricably intertwined” with the evidence regarding the charged
offense if it forms an “integral and natural part of the witness’s
accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the
defendant was indicted.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). And
this sort of intrinsic evidence remains admissible “even if it inciden-
tally places [the defendant’s] character at issue.” Davis v. State, 301
Ga. 397, 401 (3) (801 SE2d 897) (2017) (citing Edouard, 485 F3d at
1344; United States v. Foster, 889 F2d 1049, 1053 (11th Cir. 1989)).

With these principles in mind, we reject Williams’s 404 (b)
arguments. First, regarding the statement and testimony concerning
Williams’s HIV status and his sexual assault of the victim’s sister,
Williams’s trial counsel did object when the prosecutor mentioned
Williams’s HIV status in the opening statement, resulting in a bench
conference where the sexual assault was also discussed. The trial
court permitted the statements — and correctly instructed the jury
that attorney statements are not evidence. As to the actual testimony,
Williams’s trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing
that he considered the challenged evidence intrinsic to the story of the
crimes; he thus concluded that an objection would not be valid or
sustained. This assessment was reasonable, and “[r]easonable deci-
sions as to whether to raise a specific objection are ordinarily matters
of trial strategy and provide no ground for reversal.” Ballard v. State,
297 Ga. 248, 254 (6) (h) (773 SE2d 254) (2015) (citation and punctua-
tion omitted).

The challenged evidence plainly pertained to the chain of events
in the case and was linked by time and circumstance with the charged
crimes, making the information necessary to complete the story for
the jury. Williams’s HIV status and sexual assault of the victim’s
sister helped explain to the jury why she refused his advances, the
impetus for her declaration to him that it was over and they would
never be alone again, and the increasing friction and conflict between
the two that culminated in the crimes — including why she so feared
him that she insisted that Shawn accompany her to Williams’s home
on the night of the murder. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 564
Fed. Appx. 568, 574 (11th Cir. 2014) (testimony that defendant had
sex with minor victims and gave them drugs was intrinsic to charges
that he recruited them into his prostitution business, and was not
unduly prejudicial); United States v. Hill, 518 Fed. Appx. 744, 748
(11th Cir. 2013) (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence
that defendant participated in drive-by shooting of confidential infor-

eS 487

mant’s home as intrinsic to possession of drugs with intent to dis-
tribute charge because shooting occurred six days after police discov-
ered defendant with drugs and large sum of cash, showing shooting
was connected in time and circumstances); United States v. Forten-
berry, 971 F2d717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse of discretion
in admitting evidence of defendant’s participation in uncharged
double murder as intrinsic to firearm possession charges because it
was part of chain of events, explained context, and was not unduly
prejudicial).

Because this evidence was intrinsic to the crimes charged, it was
neither barred by Rule 404 (b) nor subject to the Rule’s notice
requirement. See United States v. Herre, 930 F2d 836, 838, n.1 (11th
Cir. 1991). And although the evidence may have incidentally placed
Williams’s character at issue, its probative value was not substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under these
circumstances.

As for Williams’s second Rule 404 (b) argument, pretermitting
whether testimony regarding Williams’s behavior while receiving
medical treatment at the hospital was intrinsic to the crimes charged,
Williams’s trial counsel raised that behavior on cross-examination,
eliciting testimony that Williams’s behavior was not consistent with
suicidal ideations — thus undercutting other testimony that his
wounds appeared self-inflicted. This choice clearly fell within the
ambit of reasonable trial strategy, even though the trial court, in
overruling a subsequent objection by Williams’s trial counsel, held
that the defense had opened the door to further inquiry on the matter
by the State. Moreover, this result would not have changed if trial
counsel had based his objection on Rule 404 (b). Trial counsel was not
ineffective in this respect.

Accordingly, Williams’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, like his other contentions, fail.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

vid D. Marshall, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Brian V. Patterson, Jon
R. Forwood, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-
ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M.
Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

488 Pe

$17A1298. JONES v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 344)

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Marlon Jones appeals his convictions stemming from
the death of his daughter Jania Parker-Jones.' In his assertions of
error, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to convict, his
trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance, and the
trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm on the merits and vacate in part to
correct a sentencing error.

1. (a) Viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the jury’s
verdicts, the evidence shows as follows. At the time of the events in
question, appellant had four children: a ten-year-old daughter, two
toddlers — a boy anda girl, and the victim who had just turned a year
old. At any given time, three of the children lived with appellant in his
house.? The children all went to the same daycare facility. The
daycare owner testified that appellant was a good parent, but that his
demeanor changed shortly after obtaining custody of the victim. The
daycare owner stated appellant cursed at her over the phone and in
person when she attempted to address health concerns relating to the
victim? such that she eventually banned appellant from the property.
Appellant’s children remained enrolled at the daycare, but were
dropped off or picked up by someone other than appellant. On two
occasions in January 2012, the victim’s daycare teacher noted the
victim had some bruises on her body; however, no one from the
daycare center contacted authorities regarding those injuries. The

+ The erimes occurred on or about March 10-11, 2012. On March 6, 2013, a Clayton County
grand jury indicted appellant on three counts of felony murder, aggravated battery, aggravated
assault, cruelty to children in the first degree, two counts of “cruelty to children,” cruelty to
children in the second degree, and contributing to the deprivation of a minor. Appellant was
tried from October 21-25, 2013, with the jury acquitting appellant of two felony murder counts,
aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children in the first degree; but
returning verdicts of guilty on the remaining counts for which he was indicted. On October 29,
2013, the trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison for felony murder plus a number of
years. Appellant moved for a new trial on December 2, 2013, and amended his motion on
August 22, 2014, and on July 18, 2016. The trial court held hearings on the motion for new trial,
as amended, on September 30, 2016, and on October 11, 2016. The trial court denied the motion
as amended on October 14, 2016. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and, upon receipt of
the record, the case was docketed to the April 2017 term of this Court and submitted for a
decision to be made on the briefs

2 The two toddlers were the children of appellant and his girlfriend Marshana Saddler.
According to Saddler’s testimony, she and appellant would alternate custody of each of the
toddlers every other week. On the night in question, appellant had the victim, the ten-year-old,
and his toddler son at his house. His toddler daughter was at Saddler’s house.

® On one occasion, the vietim had a fever and on the other occasion, in October 2011, the
victim had a severe diaper rash.

eS 489

victim’s pediatrician testified the victim was healthy as of her last
“well baby” visit on March 6, 2012, which was five days before her
death.

At trial, appellant’s eldest daughter testified that on the night of
March 10, 2012, she and her toddler brother were in her room
watching television while appellant was in his bedroom with the
victim. The daughter said she heard a bump and then heard the
victim crying. The daughter said it sounded like the victim had fallen
onto the floor. According to an investigator, who testified at trial, the
daughter said she ate some cereal that night around 10:00 after
hearing the bump and the victim’s cry. The daughter said she fell
asleep and was later awakened by appellant telling her to get
dressed. In the early morning hours of March 11, appellant gathered
the children into his truck and drove to the house of his girlfriend
Marshana Saddler. Before leaving appellant’s house to go to Sad-
dler’s home, the daughter said she touched the victim and noticed she
was not breathing.

Saddler testified that she and appellant lived within 10 to 15
minutes of each other. On March 11, she said she was awakened by
the arrival of appellant and the children at 4:49 a.m. She said she
dressed in about five minutes and then she, appellant, and all four
children got into her minivan to drive to the hospital.

The emergency room registration clerk who first encountere
ippellant when he brought the victim to the hospital, testified that
ppellant told her the victim had fallen from a dressing table. He also
old the registration clerk the victim had fallen from his arms to the
loor. An emergency room nurse testified appellant walked into the
ospital at about 4:55 a.m. The nurse said the victim was not
breathing and her jaw was stiff, indicating that rigor mortis ha
already set in. The nurse said the victim had blood in her mouth an
nostrils, a bruise on the back of her right ear, and a large hematoma
onthe top of her head. Although life-saving measures were attempted,
the victim could not be revived and was pronounced dead. At that
point, the nurse said she called the police, who arrived at the hospita.
at about 5:25 a.m.

As part of investigating the victim’s death, the police searche
Saddler’s minivan and appellant’s house. Nothing of evidentiary
value was found in the minivan. An officer testified that when
searching appellant’s bedroom, there was a strong odor of vomit. The
police found a fitted bedsheet which appeared to have vomit on it;
some bedsheets which appeared to have blood on them; anda playpen
blanket which appeared to have fecal matter on it. In addition, an
officer testified that the playpen, which is where the victim slept, had
a strong smell of vomit.

gP2 ep

poh

490 PO ]

The State’s expert medical examiner testified the cause of the
victim’s death was blunt force trauma to the head and the manner of
death was homicide. The victim’s autopsy revealed a large amount of
bruising on the right side of her scalp; bruising on the corner of her
right eye; hemorrhaging around the optic nerves; hemorrhaging in
the retinas; a skull fracture; hemorrhaging on the brain’s surface;
and bruising of the brain. The medical examiner opined that the
victim’s head had been impacted four times. She said the victim’s
injuries were consistent with a high energy impact and inconsistent
with a household fall. She also noted that vomiting would be a
manifestation of head trauma and testified that, based on the cells
forming around the victim’s injuries, it was likely the victim was alive
for three hours following the trauma.

Appellant took the stand at trial, testifying he had the victim in
his arms and was on his way from his bedroom to the kitchen to get
a diaper when he tripped and fell with the victim, dropping her. He
said the victim hit the wall and then fell to the floor. He picked the
victim up, she cried and then stopped. He changed the victim’s diaper,
put the victim in her playpen with a bottle of milk that she did not
drink, and then fell asleep. Appellant woke up in the early hours of
the morning and when he checked on the victim, he saw she had blood
in her nostrils. At that point, he woke up the other children, made
sure they dressed, and drove with the three children to Saddler’s
house. Appellant admitted he did not call 911 from his house although
he had a working phone; admitted he passed at least one fire station
on the way to Saddler’s house; and admitted that he did not heed
Saddler’s admonitions to call an ambulance when he arrived at her
house. Appellant told his eldest daughter that he was afraid he would
get into trouble regarding the victim.

(b) The jury returned verdicts of guilty on the counts of felony
murder, predicated on cruelty to children in the second degree for
failing to obtain medical treatment for the victim; deprivation of a
minor for failing to obtain medical treatment for the victim; and two
counts of “cruelty to children” for maliciously causing the victim
excessive pain.* Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to
convict because the incident was an accident and he took the victim
to the hospital. We disagree. First, appellant was not convicted of
deprivation of a minor because the guilty verdict on that count
merged for sentencing purposes. Second, the evidence supported the

4 These last two counts related to the bleeding of the victim’s brain and the hemorrhaging
of her retinas.

eS 491

crimes for which appellant was convicted. Appellant’s oldest daugh-
ter heard a bump and the infant cry sometime before 10:00 on the
evening of March 10. Appellant testified that he tripped and fell,
causing the victim to fall, hitting the wall and the floor. He put the
victim to bed and went to sleep. The medical examiner said the victim
was alive for approximately three hours after experiencing the
trauma to her head. In addition to the physical evidence revealed in
the autopsy, it was evident that the victim experienced head trauma
because of the vomit in appellant’s bedroom. Rather than calling 911
or driving immediately to the hospital in the early morning hours of
March 11 when appellant said he observed blood coming from the
victim’s nostrils, appellant drove 10 to 15 minutes to his girlfriend’s
house, passed a fire station on the way there, ignored his girlfriend’s
admonitions to call an ambulance, and then drove to the hospital.
Appellant’s oldest daughter noted the victim was not breathing
before appellant drove the children to his girlfriend’s house, and
appellant made an admission to his daughter that he believed he was
in trouble. In addition, the medical examiner testified the victim
sustained four impacts to her head and the injuries sustained were
inconsistent with a household fall. A rational jury was authorized to
reject appellant’s defense that the victim’s injuries were accidental
and authorized to find that appellant maliciously caused cruel and
excessive physical pain to the victim and unreasonably failed to
obtain medical treatment for the victim after the injuries occurred,
thereby proximately causing her death. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Castro v. State, 295 Ga.
105 (1), (3) (757 SE2d 853) (2014); Brown v. State, 292 Ga. 454 (1) (738
SE2d 591) (2013).

(c) The crimes at issue were committed in 2012 and appellant
was sentenced in 2013. Prior to 2014, the sentences for causing a
death, including a death caused by cruelty to children in the second
degree, were imprisonment for life (with the possibility of parole),
imprisonment for life without parole, or death. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (d)
(2011). Effective July 1, 2014, the legislature amended OCGA §
16-5-1 to create the offense of murder in the second degree and to
make the sentence for a death caused by cruelty to children in the
second degree no less than ten years and no more than 30 years in
length. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (d) and (e) (2); Ga. L. 2014, p. 444, § 1-1.
Appellant argues he is entitled to be resentenced in accordance with
this amendment. However, since the General Assembly did not make
the amendments to OCGA § 16-5-1 retroactive, appellant was prop-
erly sentenced in conformity with the law as it was when the crime
was committed. See Fleming v. State, 271 Ga. 587, 590 (523 SE2d 315)

492 PO ]

(1999) (“[A] crime is to be construed and punished according to the
provisions of the law existing at the time of its commission.”).

(d) There is a merger error concerning Counts 7 and 8, which are
the two counts of “cruelty to children,” for which the jury returned
verdicts of guilty. Because there was no evidence of a deliberate inter-
val of time between the acts of cruelty causing bleeding of the victim’s
brain (Count 7) and causing retinal hemorrhages (Count 8), the trial
court erred when it sentenced appellant on both of these counts. See
Gomez v. State, 301 Ga. 445 (4) (c) (801 SE2d 847) (2017). Rather, one
of these counts should have merged into the other for sentencing
purposes. Id. Accordingly the conviction for Count 8 is vacated.

2. Appellant contends trial counsel rendered constitutionally
ineffective assistance when he failed to object to leading questions
posed by the State to its witnesses and when he failed to secure a
medical expert. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, appellant

must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced him to the point that a
reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors,
the outcome of the trial would have been different. A strong
presumption exists that counsel’s conduct falls within the
broad range of professional conduct.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30 (4)
(644 SE2d 837) (2007). If a defendant fails to meet his burden on one
prong of the two-prong test, then the other prong need not be
reviewed by the Court. Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869 (2) (734 SE2d 876)
(2012). Appellant has failed to show counsel was constitutionally
ineffective.

(a) At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that
it is his practice not to object to leading questions if they pose no harm
to his client and if they move the trial along. A reasonable attorney
would have thought that the leading questions did not pose any harm
to his client. Since trial counsel’s decision not to object to leading
questions was a matter of strategy and not outside the broad range of
reasonable professional conduct, we cannot say his performance was
deficient. See Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561 (5) (a) (651 SE2d 674)
(2007) (“An attorney’s decision to forego objecting to . . . leading quest-
ions used to establish routine points constitutes reasonable trial
strategy.”); Christian v. State, 277 Ga. 775 (2) (6596 SE2d 6) (2004).

(b) The record shows trial counsel made an attempt to secure a
medical expert to testify at trial, but found out days before trial was
to commence that the expert he was pursuing was not a viable option

eS 498

for testifying on behalf of the defense. Trial counsel moved for a
continuance on the first day of trial for the express purpose of finding
another expert, but the trial court denied the motion. At the motion
for new trial hearing, appellant presented an expert medical witness
who agreed with the State’s expert medical examiner that the vic-
tim’s death was caused by blunt force trauma to the head. As to the
manner of death, appellant’s medical expert testified that he could
not rule out an accidental manner of death; however, he also testified
that he could not rule out a non-accidental manner of death. Given
the equivocal nature of the testimony of appellant’s proffered medical
expert, appellant has failed to meet his burden of showing that there
was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been
different had his trial counsel been able to secure an expertina timely
manner to testify at trial. See Richardson-Bethea v. State, 301 Ga.
859 (2) (804 SE2d 372) (2017). Accordingly, appellant’s claim of
ineffective assistance cannot be sustained.

3. Appellant alleges the trial court erred when it failed to grant
appellant’s request for a mistrial. The record shows that a break was
taken during appellant’s cross-examination of the State’s expert
medical examiner. During the break, the prosecutor was seen talking
to the medical examiner, and trial counsel raised the matter outside
the presence of the jury. The trial court allowed appellant and the
prosecutor to voir dire the medical examiner as to what transpired
during the break. In sum, during the conversation at issue, the
prosecutor confirmed the medical examiner’s testimony that the
victim’s head was impacted four times; discussed a possible schedul-
ing conflict; and discussed the manner in which defense counsel was
asking questions — namely that, although the medical examiner
stated she had no problem with defense counsel’s questions, the
prosecutor had a legal basis for positing his objections. Defense
counsel moved for a mistrial, not based on the “nature” of what was
discussed, but based on the “stark difference” between the medical
examiner’s responses when she was questioned by defense counsel
and her responses when she was questioned by the prosecutor.
According to defense counsel, the “stark difference” in “explanation
tends to suggest that something further was discussed. . . .” The State
argued there were no grounds for a mistrial because there was no
coaching of the witness or other impropriety.® The trial court denied

® There was some discussion among the trial court and counsel for the parties that the rule
of sequestration had been violated. That rule, however, was not implicated because there was
no allegation that the medical examiner was in the courtroom while other trial witnesses were
testifying or that the medical examiner colluded with another trial witness to shape or fabricate
testimony, See, e.g., Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180 (2) (a) (2) (787 SE2d 221) (2016) (* ‘[T]he purpose

494 Pe

the motion for mistrial, but advised defense counsel he could, in front
of the jury, ask the medical examiner about the conversation she had
with the prosecutor; however, defense counsel declined to do so and
simply renewed his request for a mistrial. When the jury returned
from break, defense counsel continued his cross-examination of the
medical examiner.

Whether to grant a mistrial is a matter of the trial court’s
discretion. Jackson v. State, 292 Ga. 685 (4) (740 SE2d 609) (2013).
The trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed
unless there is a showing that a mistrial is essential to the preser-
vation of the right to a fair trial. Id. at 689. Whether the prosecutor
improperly coached the witness was a question of fact, and there was
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding on that point.
Appellant’s right to a fair trial was not impacted as trial counsel was
able to conduct a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the
medical expert after the break. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it declined to call a mistrial.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

Darrell B. Reynolds, Sr., for appellant.

Tracy Graham Lawson, District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker,
Kathryn L. Powers, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott O.
Teague, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1305. MEADOWS v. BEAM et al.
(807 SE2d 339)

PETERSON, Justice.

This case involves a dispute among the children of Dorothy Rita
Beam (“Decedent”) concerning the distribution of her estate. Dece-
dent’s daughter, Dorothy Marian Meadows (“Marian”), filed a peti-
tion to probate Decedent’s 2014 will and codicil, and Marian’s siblings
— John Beam, Jr., Margaret Beam, and Jayne Heggen (collectively,

of the sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of
another, and to discourage fabrication and collusion. [Cit,]’.

ee 495

“Caveators”) — filed a caveat alleging that Decedent lacked testa-
mentary capacity to execute the will and codicil. After a trial, a jury
returned a verdict in favor of Caveators, finding that Decedent lacked
testamentary capacity and awarding attorneys’ fees to Caveators.’
Marian appeals and argues, among other things, that the evidence
does not support a finding that Decedent lacked testamentary capac-
ity. We agree and we reverse.

1. Trial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Caveators.

On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. See Patterson-Fowlkes v. Chancey, 291 Ga. 601, 602
(732 SE2d 252) (2012). Although the focus is on a testator’s capacity
at the time a will is executed, evidence of a testator’s condition before
and after the execution of the will may be relevant for this purpose.
Id.

Viewed in this manner, the evidence shows that Decedent suf-
fered from many medical problems, including arthritis, congestive
heart failure, diabetes, and hypertension. In September 2013, Dece-
dent, then 90 years old, was admitted into a hospital and exhibite
confusion and forgetfulness during her hospitalization.

Before her hospitalization, Decedent began to express certain
beliefs that Caveators found strange. She said that she had been
offered a job with the West Lumber Company, but she had stoppe:
working there many years earlier. Decedent continued to make this
assertion through 2014. In August 2013, Decedent also claimed she
was offered a job at a Kroger grocery store where she and her husban:
played bingo, but her husband was dead and bingo was no longer
played at the Kroger store.

Following her September 2013 hospitalization and during her
short stay ata rehabilitation facility in October 2013, Decedent aske
Jayne to do some cleaning at Decedent’s house and to donate some of
Decedent’s belongings to charity. Jayne explained that many items
were already marked for donation and she identified additional items
of clothing that could be donated. Before Jayne donated clothing that
was not already marked, Jayne brought the clothing to Decedent for
her approval. Jayne also reorganized her mother’s house to make it
safer upon Decedent’s return from the rehabilitation center, explain-
ing to Decedent where she moved things. Later, Decedent accused
Jayne of stealing her clothes and also removing documents from her
house without permission.

1 The jury rejected Caveators’ claims the will was invalid due to fraud, duress, or undue
influence. Those claims are not before us on appeal.

496 P|

Decedent also came to believe that her son John stole originals of
her certificates of deposit and attempted to withdraw the money. In
March 2014, as a result of her belief that John was stealing from her
and mismanaging her funds, Decedent revoked John’s power of
attorney that she executed in 2004, asked him to return several
estate documents, and questioned why the hospital asked for Dece-
dent’s 2004 will. John testified that he accessed a safe deposit box
while Decedent was hospitalized because the hospital requested the
executed power of attorney and her living will (which were in the
same envelope as her will), and that he did not know where the
original certificates were located and never touched them. John
asked his mother about the certificates and why she believed he took
them, but she could not answer any of his questions.

In March 2014, Decedent told people that H&R Block offered her
a job because she did a “good job” preparing her own taxes that year,
but her taxes actually had been prepared by a third party. Decedent
also believed she broke her ankle by tripping over an extension cord
at her church, but her family testified that the incident did not
happen and her family doctor had no record of it either. Around this
time, Decedent told Jayne that a nurse had visited her house to draw
blood in preparation for an upcoming gallbladder surgery and that an
ambulance would pick her up for the surgery and bring her back home
afterward, but her family doctor had no history of the surgery.

Also in 2014, Decedent began complaining about her sister-in-
law, called her names, and blamed her for causing Decedent’s medica.
problems, but Decedent’s sister-in-law had been dead for over 15
years. Decedent also asked Jayne to move back home to finish her
college degree even though Jayne had obtained her degree about 40
years prior. Beginning in April 2014, Decedent sometimes woul
become confused in phone conversations with Margaret, asking who
she was and confusing her for Jayne even though Margaret ha
previously identified herself.

Decedent's sister, Norma Aballo, with whom she was very close,
stated that when she visited Decedent in November 2013, Decedent
was showing signs of confusion and memory failure. Sometime after
March 2014, Decedent told Aballo that she was going to sell her house
in Georgia and move to North Carolina with Marian because she ha’
no family or friends in Georgia. Decedent also told her daughter
Margaret that she had no family in Georgia. Aballo also testified that,
around this time, Decedent was not acting rationally and began to
accuse Caveators of stealing things from her and began to isolate
Caveators, which surprised Aballo because Caveators had been the

eS 497

ones who had done everything for Decedent. Aballo said that Dece-
dent had become a different person because of her behavior, memory
loss, and confusion.

In April 2014, Decedent executed a will naming Marian as execu-
tor and devising property to her children, except to John, with a
majority of her estate going to Marian. In the 2014 will, as amended by
a July 2014 codicil, Decedent provided that she would not directly give
John any assets since “he is a successful business man, financially
astute, [and] independently wealthy,” and instead bequeathed $10,000
to a charity in his honor. Decedent had previously executed a will in
2004 in which she devised her property to her four children in equal
shares. Shortly after signing the codicil in July 2014, Decedent died.

Aballo stated that she was shocked to hear about the contents of
Decedent’s 2014 will.* Aballo testified that she believed that Dece-
dent’s “mind was going” because she thought Decedent always had
intended to divide her property equally among her children on
account of the “strife” Decedent and her siblings had experienced
during the distribution of their mother’s estate, something Decedent
told Aballo she “never” wanted her children to experience.

At trial, Caveators introduced the testimony of Dr. Matthew
Norman, a board-certified forensic psychiatrist, to the effect that he
reviewed Decedent’s medical records, various depositions, affidavits
from people that knew her, and other material in the case. Based on
this review, Dr. Norman opined that Decedent had a “potentially”
weakened state of mind, lacked testamentary capacity in that she was
operating under a “fixed false belief” that Caveators were stealing
from her, and was unduly influenced into executing the 2014 will and
codicil.

2. The evidence was legally insufficient to sustain thejury’s verdict.

Marian argues that the evidence, even when viewed in Cave-
ators’ favor, does not show that Decedent lacked testamentary capac-
ity. We agree.

Generally, our review of a jury’s verdict is for any evidence, and
we lack the power to interfere with the jury’s finding if it is supported
by any evidence. See Cook v. Huff, 274 Ga. 186, 186 (552 SE2d 83)
(2001). But whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a
jury’s finding is a question of law. See Lockwood v. Daniel, 194 Ga.
544, 548 (22 SE2d 85) (1942). And in reviewing this question in the
context of a challenge to a will, a stringent standard must be met in

2 Aballo also was shocked to discover upon arriving for Decedent's funeral that Decedent's
body had been cremated despite the fact that Decedent had “never, ever” discussed her
cremation. Decedent's 2014 will expressly provided that she be cremated.

498 P|

order to set aside a will, as this deprives a person of the valuable right
to make a will. Holland v. Holland, 277 Ga. 792, 795 (4) (596 SE2d
123) (2004). Thus, there must be some evidence to support the jury’s
finding that this stringent standard was met.

Under Georgia law, “[t]estamentary capacity exists when the test-
ator has a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property.”
OCGA § 53-4-11 (a). A showing of testamentary capacity requires a
showing that the testator was sane or of sound mind. See, e.g., Evans
v. Arnold, 52 Ga. 169, 181 (1874) (“[I]fthe testator appear[s] to be aware
of what he is doing, and acts as sane men do, I am of the opinion that
a prima facie case is made out, at least that a verdict for the will would
be justified[.]”). We have explained that this requirement is fulfilled
with a showing that the testator “understood that the will had the effect
of disposing of her property at the time of her death, was capable of
remembering generally what property was subject to disposition by
will, was capable of remembering those persons related to her, and was
capable of expressing an intelligent scheme of disposition.” Odom v.
Hughes, 293 Ga. 447, 454 (748 SE2d 839) (2013) (citation and punc-
tuation omitted). This is a modest requirement, as “testamentary
capacity may be possessed by weak-minded or feeble individuals. And
anything less than a total absence of mind does not destroy testa-
mentary capacity.” Patterson-Fowlkes, 291 Ga. at 602 (citations and
punctuation omitted); see also OCGA § 53-4-11 (d).

A person who is not sane does not have the capacity to make a
will, except during a lucid interval. OCGA § 53-4-11 (c). Aperson who
is partially insane, a condition known as monomania, may make a
will if the will “is in no way connected with the monomania.” Id.; see
also Boney v. Boney, 265 Ga. 839, 840 (1) (462 SE2d 725) (1995). To set
aside a will based on an unsound mind, it must be shown that the
testator was insane or, if partially so, that the will was connected with
that partial insanity. OCGA § 53-4-11 (c); see also Nodvin v. Arogeti,
277 Ga. 602, 602 (1) (592 SE2d 846) (2004); Powell v. Thigpen, 230 Ga.
760, 760-761 (2) (199 SE2d 251) (1973).

Here, Caveators accepted that Decedent’s 2014 will and codicil
were “self-proved,” as they contained affidavits complying with
OCGA § 53-4-24. As aresult, Caveators admitted that a presumption
existed that the will and codicil were executed with the requisite
testamentary formalities, including that they were executed by a
person apparently with sufficient mental capacity to do so, and they
had a burden to rebut this presumption. See Reeves v. Webb, 297 Ga.
405, 408-409 (774 SE2d 641) (2015); see also Skelton v. Skelton, 251
Ga. 631, 632 (2) (308 SE2d 838) (1983). Caveators failed to introduce
evidence from which the jury could have concluded that this burden
was carried.

ee 499

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Caveators, there was no evidence that the decedent lacked the ability
to form a “decided and rational desire as to the disposition of [her]
property.” OCGA § 53-4-11 (a). Notably, at trial, Caveators expressly
disclaimed that Decedent was insane or suffered from monomania.
That is, in addition to accepting the presumption that Decedent had
testamentary capacity, the Caveators failed to claim that Decedent
was not of sound mind. Instead, they merely argued that she suffered
from delusions. Assuming, without deciding, that delusions alone,
distinguishable from insanity or monomania, were a basis upon
which to establish a lack of testamentary capacity, Caveators’ claim
nevertheless fails. Our case law is clear that not every delusion
deprives one of testamentary capacity; rather, it must be an insane
delusion. Boney, 265 Ga. at 840 (1).* But Caveators effectively con-
ceded that none of Decedent's delusions were insane ones.* Conse-
quently, the Caveators’ claim that Decedent lacked testamentary
capacity failed as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the trial
court’s judgment, including the award of attorneys’ fees to Caveators.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.
Stanley M. Lefco, for appellant.

Mahaffey Pickens Tucker, Gerald Davidson, Jr., Christopher D.
Holbrook, for appellees.

® We have defined an insane delusion as existing
wherever a person conceives something extravagant to exist which has no existence
whatever, and [s}he is incapable of being permanently reasoned out of that
conception. The subject-matter of the insane delusion must have no foundation in
fact, and must spring from a diseased condition of mind.
Boney, 265 Ga. at 840 (citations and punctuation omitted).

4 Indeed, the evidence does not establish that Decedent's will was affected by any insane
delusions. Decedent’s false beliefs about employment offers or injuries had nothing to do with
her will. Although her false belief that Caveators were stealing from her and mismanaging her
finances angered Decedent and caused her to execute a new will in 2014, the evidence shows
that Decedent came to this belief based on false information Marian provided. That Decedent
may have been duped by Marian does not establish that her mind was unsound. See Brumbelow
v. Hopkins, 197 Ga. 247, 250 (1) (29 SE2d 42) (1944); see also Boney, 265 Ga. at 840 (1)
(An insane delusion does not mean a mistaken conclusion from a given state of facts, nor a
mistaken belief as to the existence of facts.” (citation and punctuation omitted). Caveators’
allegations that Marian was a bad actor and caused strife among her family such that Decedent
changed her will are beside the point; the claims predicated upon those allegations were
rejected by the jury and are not on appeal here.

500 Pe

$17F0985. LUTZ v. LUTZ.
(807 SE2d 336)

BENHAM, Justice.

This appeal stems from a discretionary application for review
which we granted pursuant to former Supreme Court Rule 34 (4).1
Appellant Leland Lutz (“Husband”) appeals the final judgment and
decree of divorce, as well as the trial court’s order granting attorney
fees to appellee Deborah Lutz (“Wife”). For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with direction.

The relevant facts are set forth as follows. The parties were
married in 1997. Husband worked as an attorney during the course
of the marriage and Wife worked primarily at home caring for the
parties’ three children; however, Wife had a master’s degree in
education and returned to the workforce as a teacher in 2013. In July
2014, the parties separated and Husband filed for divorce in April
2015. The trial court granted the parties a divorce after a four-day
bench trial in May and June of 2016.

Trial Evidence Regarding Husband’s Income

At trial, Husband testified as follows about his income. He stated.
on direct examination that his gross monthly income was $36,477.50,
or $437,730 annually, which was the amount he provided in his
financial affidavit dated May 1, 2016. Husband stated this income
amount was based on an annual base salary of $325,000, as wellasa
bonus he received in 2016 in the amount of $104,412.” In addition, the
evidence showed Husband received fringe benefits from his employer,
including a car allowance. Husband testified that he had placed the
2016 bonus check, which was for a net amount of approximately
$67,000 after taxes, in a drawer for safekeeping and had not depos-
ited or spent it. In regard to his annual base salary of $325,000,
Husband stated that amount reflected raises he received in January
and April of 2016.

On the child support worksheet, Husband stated his gross monthly
salary was $35,515.92, or $426,191.04 annually, inclusive of the 2016
bonus. Husband testified this gross salary amount was different from
the gross salary amount he listed in his income affidavit because it

1 The notice of appeal was filed prior to January 1, 2017, the effective date of the Appellate
Jurisdiction Reform Act, and so this Court — not the Court of Appeals — has jurisdiction over
this case. See Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, §§ 3-1, 6-1 (©) (as of effective date, shifting subject matter
jurisdiction over “alll divorce and alimony cases” from this Court to the Court of Appeals).

2 Although not guaranteed, Husband had earned an annual bonus from his employer from
2011 through to 2016. The bonus amount increased year-to-year.

eS 501

reflected the amount he had actually earned during the year-to-date.
That is, the gross monthly salary Husband listed on the child support
worksheet only reflected the pro rata portions of the increases he
received to his base salary in January and April of 2016.

The Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce and Attorney Fees Order

The trial court issued the final judgment and decree of divorce on
July 11, 2016. In the body of the divorce decree, the trial court made
the following factual findings as to Husband’s income:

Husband now works as General Counsel for a large and
successful corporation earning approximately $437,724 annu-
ally. Additionally, Husband is eligible for an annual bonus.
In 2016, he has been given a bonus of $104,000.?

As stated previously, Husband earns $437,724 per year,
plus the opportunity for an annual bonus.*

The trial court found that Wife’s annual income, as a teacher, was
$42,000.

The trial court awarded Wife monthly alimony in the amount of
$6,850 to be payable until July 1, 2024, or Wife’s remarriage, or the
death of either party.° As part of the equitable division of the marital
property, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife a lump sum
payment of $35,000 from his 2016 bonus.® Finally, the trial court
ordered Husband to pay $4,089 in monthly child support consistent
with the child support worksheet that listed Husband’s gross year-
to-date income as $426,191.04. The child support worksheet was
incorporated into and attached to the final judgment and decree of
divorce.

At trial, there was evidence that both parties used their joint
bank account to pay some of their attorney fees. The total amount of
attorney fees spent from the joint bank account was approximately
$90,000. The parties filed cross-motions for attorney fees and the trial
court held a hearing on the issue on August 29, 2016. Pursuant to

® This language appears in a paragraph included in the trial court's “Findings of Fact.”

* This language appears in the paragraph awarding alimony to Wife

® At trial, Husband testified he was willing to pay Wife $5,300 a month as alimony for a
period of five years. Wife requested monthly alimony in the amount of $6,850, testifying that
some of the funds would be used for private school for the parties’ two youngest children if the
parties could agree.

® The transcript from the hearing on attorney fees shows Husband has already paid this
amount to Wife.

502 Pe

OCGA § 19-6-2, the trial court awarded Wife attorney fees in the
amount of $48,116.80’ and ordered Husband to pay the award to
Wife’s attorney in 36 monthly installments of $1,337.

1. Husband complains the trial court abused its discretion when
it declined to grant his motion in limine, requesting that Wife’s
forensic accounting expert be excluded from testifying at trial because
of Wife’s failure to identify the expert in a supplemental interroga-
tory response. Husband did not raise this issue in his application for
discretionary review and so it is not properly before us for review. See
Zekser v. Zekser, 293 Ga. 366 (2) (744 SE2d 698) (2013).

2. “In the appellate review of a bench trial, this Court will not
disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. [Cit.]” Ellis v. Ellis, 290 Ga. 616 (1) (724 SE2d 384) (2012).
Husband complains that the trial court misstated his income in the
body of the final judgment and decree of divorce and argues, there-
fore, its decisions regarding alimony and the award of attorney fees
are also erroneous. Both parties assert in their briefs that the proper
statement of Husband’s gross income is set forth in the child support
worksheet as $426,191.04, and agree that the income stated in the
body of the final judgment and decree of divorce and the incorporated
child support worksheet should match. Husband also takes issue
with the language of the divorce decree, to the extent that it states
that his 2016 bonus is in addition to, rather than included in, his gross
annual income.

We note that the figure of $437,724, which the trial court states
as Husband’s annual income, does have some factual support in the
record. Husband testified at trial and stated in his financial affidavit
that his gross monthly income was $36,477.50, which annualizes to
$437,730. Husband testified this amount recognized increases he
received to his base salary in January and April 2016, but which had
not been in effect for a full year at the time of trial. Although the trial
court found the income was $437,724, as the parties concede, Hus-
band’s income is $426,191.04, the amount the trial court used to
calculate child support.

Whatis more problematic than the difference between the salary
amount listed in the divorce decree and the salary amount listed in
the child support worksheet is the language in the divorce decree that
states Husband’s 2016 bonus was in addition to, rather than inclusive
of, his gross annual salary. This language has the effect of making
Husband’s gross annual income more than $100,000 greater than

? The trial court found that Wife had actually incurred a total of $77,818.50 in attorney fees
and found that the total amount of these fees was reasonable.

eS 508

what the evidence shows. While the language in question could
simply be a scrivener’s error, as Wife argues, we can only take the
language at face value, and a $100,000 discrepancy is too large to
ignore. Because the language in the body of the divorce decree
misrepresents Husband’s salary, the divorce decree is reversed in
part.

Georgia’s alimony statute requires a trial court to consider the
parties’ “financial resources” when making an award. See OCGA
§ 19-6-5 (a) (4). Similarly, OCGA § 19-6-2 (a) (1) requires a trial court
to consider the parties’ “financial circumstances” when awarding
attorney fees under that statute. While the gross income of the
parties is only one of many factors that may be considered in evalu-
ating the parties’ respective financial resources or circumstances, it
is an important one and should be based on accurate information.
See, e.g., Franklin v. Franklin, 294 Ga. 204 (1) (751 SE2d 411) (2013)
(trial court’s erroneous statement of wife’s gross income required
partial reversal of the final decree of divorce). Since the final judg-
ment and decree of divorce is partially reversed to the extent it relies
on an inaccurate statement of Husband’s income, the alimony award
and the attorney fee order are also reversed.* The matter is remanded
so that the trial court may reconsider its rulings on alimony and
attorney fees, taking into account that Husband’s gross annual
salary is $426,191.04, inclusive of his 2016 bonus.

3. Abonus received from an employer for work performed must be
included in the child support calculation because it is a source of
income. See OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (1) (A) (iv). Husband contends it was
error for the trial court to use his 2016 bonus to calculate his child
support obligation and to also make an equitable division and distri-
bution of a portion of the bonus as a lump sum payment to Wife.
Husband does not dispute that his 2016 bonus was for work per-
formed during the parties’ marriage. As such, it is marital property
and may be subject to equitable division. See, e.g., Brock v. Brock, 279
Ga. 119 (2) (610 SE2d 29) (2005). The fact that the bonus is a source
of income for Husband for the purposes of calculating child support
does not prohibit the trial court from equitably dividing and distrib-
uting it as marital property. See Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274 (1) (705
SE2d 839) (2010) (“We join those courts which have rejected outright
a double-dipping claim with respect to child support, reasoning that
as between parent and child, the. . . asset subject to property division

® We need not reach Husband’s enumeration of error that the trial court's award of attorney
fees to Wife was an abuse of discretion based on the argument that the rulings made in the final
divorce decree “reversed” any “substantial financial disparity” between the parties

504 Pe

is not being counted twice.” (Citations and punctuation omitted)). See
also Hughes v. Hughes, 95 Conn. App. 200 (IIT) (895 A2d 274) (2006).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Wife
$35,000 of Husband’s 2016 bonus.

4. All other rulings of the trial court not specifically addressed
herein are affirmed.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and caseremanded
with direction. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017.

ill-Macdonald, Vic B. Hill, Brad £. Macdonald, for appellant.
Bovis, Kyle, Burch & Medlin, Charles M. Medlin, Erica F. Byrd;
Bonnie M. Rich, for appellee.

$17A1314. JONES et al. v. PEACH TRADER INC. et al.
(807 SE2d 840)

GRANT, Justice.

This appeal arises from an order modifying an existing inter-
locutory injunction. After a somewhat convoluted path brought the
case to our Court, we now vacate the trial court’s order dismissing
appellants’ initial notice of appeal because Georgia law vests appel-
late courts with the sole authority to determine if a decision or
judgment is appealable. But that is not the end of the matter. Because
an order modifying an interlocutory injunction is not subject to direct
appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4), we dismiss the appeal.

I.

In December 2015, appellee Peach Trader Inc. d/b/a A City
Discount and A City Discount Inc. (“Peach Trader”), filed a complaint
against appellants Jeffery Glenn Jones and Sharon Kelley Jones, a
married couple, alleging that Mr. Jones used his position as an
employee to embezzle or misappropriate over $1 million from Peach
Trader and take advantage of business opportunities for personal
gain to the detriment of his employer. Along with its complaint, Peach
Trader sought a temporary restraining order against the Joneses,
and the order was granted in December 2015. The Joneses then filed
a motion to dissolve the order. One month later, on January 15, 2016,
the trial court held a hearing where both parties presented evidence.
The trial court entered an order granting an interlocutory injunction

eS 505

against the Joneses that prohibited them from selling, transferring,
altering, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of any assets within
their custody, control, or possession. The Joneses did not attempt to
appeal the January 15 order.

Six months later, in July, the Joneses filed a second motion to
dissolve the interlocutory injunction. During a hearing on several
outstanding issues, Peach Trader’s counsel consented to certain
accounts being removed from the purview of the interlocutory injunc-
tion.’ In line with the agreement between the parties, on September
9, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying the Joneses’ motion
to dissolve the interlocutory injunction but granting the motion to
modify the injunction by removing the restrictions on at least one of
the Joneses’ accounts.”

The Joneses initially sought a certificate of immediate review
from the September 9 order. The trial court denied their request,
concluding that the order did not warrant immediate review. The
Joneses then filed a timely notice of direct appeal from the September
9 order. But the trial court dismissed the notice of direct appeal as an
unauthorized attempt to appeal an interlocutory order without a
certificate of immediate review. The Joneses then filed a notice of
appeal from the trial court’s dismissal order. The trial court dis-
missed that notice of appeal as well. The Joneses timely filed an
application for discretionary appeal with this Court seeking review of
the trial court’s September 9 order and the two orders dismissing
their notices of appeal.

This Court construed the application for discretionary appeal asa
motion to stay the trial court’s December 9 order dismissing the
Joneses’ notice of appeal (which, again, sought to appeal the trial
court’s prior dismissal of their direct appeal). We granted the stay and
asked the parties to brief two issues: First, whether the trial court
erred when it dismissed the notice of appeal stemming from the order
dismissing the Joneses’ notice of direct appeal; and second, whether
the September 9 order was final or interlocutory under OCGA §§ 5-6-34
and 5-6-35. In addition to answering those two questions, the Joneses
presented several arguments on the merits of the trial court’s refusal
to dissolve the interlocutory injunction at issue.

1 The parties agreed that the Joneses should have access to a particular checking account
with a balance of approximately $11,000 in order to purchase food, gas, and other necessary
items.

2 For clarity’s sake, this order is referred to as the September 9 order.

506 A
Il.

We begin with an examination of whether the trial court erred in
dismissing the Joneses’ notice of appeal based on its own conclusion
that the underlying order was not appealable. We conclude that the
trial court did err because Georgia law generally reserves to the
appellate courts the authority to dismiss appeals. SeeOCGA § 5-6-48.

We have indicated before that trial courts ought not dismiss
appeals: “An appellate court is the sole authority in determining
whether a filed notice of appeal or discretionary application is suffi-
cient to invoke its jurisdiction.” Rollins v. Rollins, 300 Ga. 485, 488 (1)
(796 SE2d 721) (2017) (punctuation omitted); see also Islamkhan
v. Khan, 299 Ga. 548 (787 SE2d 731) (2016); Sotter v. Stephens, 291
Ga. 79 (727 SE2d 484) (2012); Lamb v. Salvation Army, 301 Ga. App.
325 (687 SE2d 615) (2009); Hughes v. Sikes, 273 Ga. 804 (546 SE2d
518) (2001); Azar v. Baird, 232 Ga. 81 (205 SE2d 273) (1974). But our
cases have also generated some confusion on that question by approv-
ing trial court dismissals in some instances and by describing differ-
ent standards for appealing the dismissal of “properly filed” and
“improperly filed” notices of appeal. Compare Sotter, 291 Ga. at 81
(appellants were entitled to appeal from dismissal of properly filed
notices of appeal), with American Med. Sec. Group, Inc. v. Parker, 284
Ga. 102, 103 (2) (663 SE2d 697) (2008) (a trial court’s order dismissing
an improperly filed direct appeal is considered interlocutory and is
not itself subject to direct appeal). We now take this opportunity to
reiterate the parameters ofa trial court’s authority to dismiss a notice
of appeal under OCGA § 5-6-48.?

8 OCGA § 5-6-48 provides, in relevant part
(a) Failure of any party to perfect service of any notice or other paper
hereunder shall not work dismissal; but the trial and appellate courts shall at any
stage of the proceeding require that parties be served in such manner as will permit
ajust and expeditious determination of the appeal and shall, when necessary, grant.
such continuance as may be required under the circumstances

(b) No appeal shall be dismissed or its validity affected for any cause nor shall
consideration of any enumerated error be refused, except:

(1) For failure to file notice of appeal within the time required as
provided in this article or within any extension of time granted hereunder;

(2) Where the decision or judgment is not then appealable; or

(3) Where the questions presented have become moot.

(©) No appeal shall be dismissed by the appellate court nor consideration of
any error therein refused because of failure of any party to cause the transcript of
evidence and proceedings tobe filed within the time allowed by law or order of court;
but the trial court may, after notice and opportunity for hearing, order that the
appeal be dismissed where there has been an unreasonable delay in the filing of the
transcript and it is shown that the delay was inexcusable and was caused by such
party, In like manner, the trial court may order the appeal dismissed where there has
been an unreasonable delay in the transmission of the record to the appellate court,

eS 507

Georgia law provides that, as a matter of statute, no appeal shall
be dismissed except where the notice of appeal is not filed in a timely
manner, where the decision or judgment is not appealable, or where
the question presented has become moot. OCGA § 5-6-48 (b). Here,
the question is whether the trial court was permitted to dismiss the
Joneses’ notice of appeal based on its own conclusion that the
underlying decision or judgment was not appealable, but the analysis
below applies equally to questions of timeliness or mootness. Mem-
bers of this Court, in the past, have expressed concerns that trial
courts have exceeded their statutory authority in this arena. See, e.g.,
American Med. Sec. Group, Inc., 284 Ga. at 108 (Benham, J., concur-
ring) (questioning the trial court’s authority to dismiss a notice of
appeal “on the ground that the order being appealed is not subject to
direct appeal” and concluding that the three grounds for dismissal in
OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) all pertain to dismissal by the appellate court). We
now reiterate that Georgia law does not contemplate such a dismissal
by the trial court under OCGA § 5-6-48 (b).

In reaching this conclusion, we look first to the statute’s text,
which we read both for its plain meaning and in the context in which
it appears. Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d
337) (2013). At first blush, the text of OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) does not state
which courts may determine whether an order is appealable, timely,
or moot. Yet other parts of the statute distinguish between trial courts
and appellate courts. In this way, subsection (b) is ambiguous. See,
e.g., Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1)
(775 SE2d 527) (2015) (“When such a genuine ambiguity appears
[in a statute], it usually is for the courts to resolve the ambiguity by

and it is seen that the delay was inexcusable and was caused by the failure of a
party to pay costs in the trial court or file an affidavit of indigence; provided,
however, that no appeal shall be dismissed for failure to pay costs if costs are paid
within 20 days (exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) of receipt by
the appellant of notice, mailed by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight
delivery, of the amount of costs.

(d) At any stage of the proceedings, either before or after argument, the court
shall by order, either with or without motion, provide for all necessary amend-
ments, require the trial court to make corrections in the record or transcript or
certify what transpired below which does not appear from the record on appeal,
require that additional portions of the record or transcript of proceedings be sent
up, or require that a complete transcript of evidence and proceedings be prepared
and sent up, or take any other action to perfect the appeal and record so that the
appellate court can and will pass upon the appeal and not dismiss it. If an error
appears in the notice of appeal, the court shall allow the notice of appeal to be
amended at any time prior to judgment to perfect the appeal so that the appellate
court can and will pass upon the appeal and not dismiss it.

(emphasis supplied).

508 A

ascertaining the most natural and reasonable understanding of the
text.”).

Our reading reveals that the trial court’s procedural and sub-
stantive authority over a notice of appeal is decidedly limited. For
example, subsection (a) provides that the failure of any party to
perfect service of a notice of appeal will not result in dismissal;
instead, the “trial and appellate courts shall at any stage of the
proceeding require that parties be served” to permit a “just and
expeditious determination of the appeal.” OCGA § 5-6-48 (a). More-
over, a portion of subsection (c) is directed specifically to trial courts
and provides that a “trial court may, after notice and opportunity for
hearing, order that the appeal be dismissed where there has been an
unreasonable delay in the filing of the transcript and it is shown that
the delay was inexcusable and was caused by such party.” OCGA §
5-6-48 (c).4 The trial court’s authority under the statute is directed to
tasks that ensure an appeal can proceed to the appellate court for
decision. The statute’s directives to appellate courts also counsel in
favor of a reading that assures that dismissal authority lies with the
appellate courts. First, as a general matter, supersedeas is presumed
to attach in civilcases as soon as a notice of appeal is filed. Rollins, 300
Ga. at 486 (1); see also OCGA § 5-6-46. This deprives the trial court
of the authority to act on the judgment on appeal. Id. Even if an
appeal is jurisdictionally defective from the outset, a notice of appeal
generally acts as supersedeas until the appeal is dismissed. Id.
Additionally, subsection (d) refers to “the court” when providing that
the appellate courts can require record corrections and other actions
from “the trial court.” OCGA § 5-6-48 (d). Subsection (d) also permits
amendment of a notice of appeal “so that the appellate court can and
will pass upon the appeal and not dismiss it.” Subsection (d) further
shows that, when the statute is considered as a whole, the dismissal
authority in subsection (b) is granted to the appellate courts, whereas
the authority granted to trial courts is to take the necessary steps to
permit an appeal to proceed. Trial courts are authorized to dismiss an
appeal only when there “has been an unreasonable delay in the filing
of the transcript” or where “there has been an unreasonable delay in

* This conclusion does not undermine the trial court's authority to certify that an
interlocutory order should be subject to immediate review. That authority is provided for by
statute in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35, 37 (2) (734 SE2d 362) (2012)
(The usual remedy for a party aggrieved by an order that does not terminate the case in the
trial court, and is not authorized for direct appeal by OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (2)-(12), is to seek a
certificate of immediate review from the trial court and then file an application for interlocutory
appeal.”). Moreover, we encourage trial courts to use that procedure when mmediate
importance appear to be present. See, e.g., Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 7 (784 SE2d
775) (2016).

eS 509

the transmission of the record to the appellate court” caused by the
failure ofa party to pay costs or file anindigency affidavit. OCGA § 5-6-48
(c). Other dismissals are reserved to the appellate courts.

This statutory directive is in line with the significant weight of
our cases. The Appellate Practice Act was adopted in 1965, and, at
that time, the Act provided four reasons to dismiss an appeal.° Less
than ten years after the Appellate Practice Act was adopted, we first
recognized that “the dismissal of an appeal is not mandatory except
for the three specific instances,” and that “fa]ll three relate to
dismissals by the appellate courts.” Young v. Climatrol Southeast
Distrib. Corp., 237 Ga. 53, 54 (226 SE2d 737) (1976). Although we
have reiterated this view, we have done so inconsistently. Compare
Bad. of Commrs. of Atkinson County v. Guthrie, 273 Ga. 1, 2 (1) (637
SE2d 329) (2000) (“OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) lists three grounds for an
appellate court to dismiss an appeal.”) (emphasis supplied), with
Riley v. State, 280 Ga. 267, 268 (626 SE2d 116) (2006) (trial court did
not err in granting the State’s motion to dismiss notice of appeal as
untimely under the statutory authority in OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (1),
Grant v. Gaines, 265 Ga. 159, 159 (454 SE2d 481) (1995) (trial judge
was authorized to dismiss unauthorized notice of appeal), and Jones
v. Singleton, 253 Ga. 41, 42 (1) (816 SE2d 154) (1984) (affirming the
trial court’s dismissal of two notices of appeal where the underlying
order was interlocutory and the case was not certified for immediate
review under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b)).

In Jones v. Singleton, we stated without any analysis that the
trial court had properly dismissed appellant’s first two notices of
appeal since, at the time they were filed, there was no final judgment.
Jones, 253 Ga. at 42 (1). Trial courts have viewed Jones and its
progeny as permitting them to dismiss notices of appeals for the
reasons set forth in OCGA § 5-6-48 (b). And our Court of Appeals has
likewise applied Jones to permit a trial court to dismiss an appeal for
the reasons set forth in OCGA § 5-6-48 (b). See, e.g., Mashburn

® Those four statutory reasons were

(1) failure to file notice of appeal within the time required as provided in this Act

or within any extension of time granted hereunder; (2) where the decision or

judgment is not then appealable; (3) where the questions presented have become

moot; or (4) where no brief is filed on behalf of the appellant within the time

prescribed by the rules of the appellate court.
Ga. L. 1965, p. 29, § 13 (b). After some minor changes, the fourth reason, relating to filing the
appellant’s brief, was stricken in 1966. Ga. L. 1966, p. 493, § 10. The statutory reasons for
dismissing an appeal have remained largely unchanged since then. ‘The Supreme Court andthe
Court of Appeals also have internally-promulgated rules that may result in the dismissal of an
appeal after docketing, but those rules are not of concern here because they only apply, by their
nature, to appellate courts and not to trial courts.

510 A

Family Trusts v. City of Cumming, 340 Ga. App. 616, 617 (797 SE2d
925) (2017) (affirming superior court dismissal of notice of appeal as
moot under OCGA § 5-6-48 (b)); Northen v. Frolick & Assocs., 235 Ga.
App. 804, 805 (1) (510 SE2d 122) (1998) (affirming trial court’s dis-
missal of a notice of appeal); Dept. of Human Resources v. Chambers,
211 Ga. App. 763, 765 (1) (441 SE2d 77) (1994) (affirming trial court’s
dismissal of an appeal for mootness); Attwell v. Lane Co., 182 Ga. App.
813, 814 (1) (857 SE2d 142) (1987) (same); Crumbley v. Wyant, 183
Ga. App. 802, 803 (8360 SE2d 276) (1987) (reversing a trial court order
dismissing a notice of appeal as untimely). But these cases, like
Jones, contain no analysis suggesting that our statute actually
commits the authority to dismiss an appeal to the trial court in these
circumstances. Because we again hold that the “appellate court is the
sole authority in determining whether a filed notice of appeal or
discretionary application is sufficient to invoke its jurisdiction,” we
disapprove of these cases® and others to the extent that they suggest
otherwise. Islamkhan, 299 Ga. at 552 (2), n.7 (citing Hughes, 273 Ga.
at 805); see also Rollins, 300 Ga. at 488 (1) (same).

We pause to note that trial courts need not be stymied by the
repetitive filing of notices of appeal challenging interlocutory deci-
sions solely for the purpose of creating disruption and delay.’ As we
have recognized, if an appellate court determines that an appeal was
not authorized because the decision at issue was interlocutory rather
than final, and, therefore, subject to therequirementsin OCGA § 5-6-34
(b), then supersedeas never attached because the case was not truly
on appeal; accordingly, the trial court’s intervening decisions will
stand. See Cohran v. Carlin, 249 Ga. 510, 511-512 (291 SE2d 538)
(1982) (trial judge loses jurisdiction over order on appeal but does not
lose jurisdiction over matters independent and distinct from that
order). Because “an attempt to appeal an interlocutory order without
following the procedures statutorily mandated is ineffective in con-
ferring jurisdiction on the appellate court,” a trial court does not need
toissue an order dismissing an unauthorized notice of appeal in order
to prevent supersedeas from attaching under those circumstances.
Islamkhan, 299 Ga. at 552 (2), n.7.*

® Riley, 280 Ga. 267; Grant, 265 Ga. 159; Jones, 253 Ga. 41

7 Frivolous, delay-oriented appeals are also less likely because parties can be sanctioned
for filing appeals for purposes of delay. Rollins, 300 Ga. at 487 (1) (citing OCGA § 5-6-6,
Supreme Court Rule 6, and Court of Appeals Rule 7 (e)). We emphasize that this authority,
much like the dismissal authority in OCGA § 5-6-48 (b), is reserved to the appellate courts.

® We note that our discussion concerns only supersedeas in civil cases, not criminal cases.
There may be instances in which supersedeas does not attach automatically in.a criminal case
and those are beyond the scope of this opinion. See, e.g., Harvey v. State, 296 Ga. 823, 829 (1),
n.2 (770 SE2d 840) (2015) (“Where a defendant files a notice of appeal challenging the denial

eS pil

Because the trial court did not have the authority to dismiss the
Joneses’ notice of appeal, we vacate the October 28, 2016 order
dismissing their direct appeal based on the trial court’s conclusion
that the underlying order was not appealable. We likewise vacate the
trial court’s December 9, 2016 order dismissing the Joneses’ appeal
from its October 28 order. Accordingly, the Joneses’ notice of appeal
challenging the September 9, 2016 order is now before us.

Ill.

Having concluded that the trial court exceeded its authority
when it dismissed the Joneses’ direct appeal, we now turn to the
question of whether the September 9 order, which modified an
interlocutory injunction, was directly appealable or, instead, was
subject to the requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) or § 5-6-35. This
question requires that we determine whether the order falls within
OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4), which permits a direct appeal from “[a]]l judg-
ments or orders granting or refusing applications for receivers or for
interlocutory or final injunctions.” (emphasis supplied). The Joneses
contend that an order modifying an interlocutory injunction is directly
appealable as a logical extension of the statutory text. But we hold
that this provision means just what it says — that is, orders granting
or refusing applications for interlocutory injunctions are eligible for
direct appeal— and that orders modifying or dissolving interlocutory
injunctions are appealable only on an interlocutory basis pursuant to
OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).

Georgia law is well settled that the right to appeal is not
constitutional, but instead depends on statutory authority. Islam-
khan, 299 Ga. at 550 (2). Our statutes set out a particular set of cases
as eligible for direct appealin OCGA § 5-6-34 (a). Such review may be
mandatory or discretionary. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a). Other cases can be
appealed with permission from both the trial court and the appellate
court. OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). As we already noted, “[t]he grant of a
temporary injunction is appealable.” Pizza Hut of America, Inc. v.
Kesler, 254 Ga. 360, 360 (1) (829 SE2d 133) (1985) (per curiam).
Likewise, the denial of injunctive relief authorizes a direct appeal.
See Fountain v. DeKalb County, 238 Ga. 14, 15 (231 SE2d 49) (1976).
We turn now to whether the statute embraces a direct appeal from an
order modifying an interlocutory injunction. It does not.

of aplea in bar that the trial court finds to be frivolous or dilatory, the defendant may be retried,
convieted, and sentenced despite the pendency of the defendant's appeal.”

512 A

Our rules of statutory interpretation are clear:

When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must
presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and
said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory
text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the
statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we
must read the statutory text in its most natural and reason-
able way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language
would.

Coleman, 294 Ga. at 172-173 (citations and punctuation omitted).
The plain and ordinary meaning of “granting or refusing applications
for...interlocutory ... injunctions” does not include orders modifying
the same. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4). And a historical examination of
both our statutes and this Court’s treatment of the issue supports the
conclusion that an order modifying an interlocutory injunction is not
directly appealable within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a).
Injunctions — and temporary restraining orders — have a
longstanding history in Georgia law. Prior to 1873, this Court held
that interlocutory rulings on injunctions were not final judgments
and could not be appealed by a separate writ of error® while the main
cause was pending. See, e.g., Camfield v. Shaw, 40 Ga. 492 (1869)
(holding that a writ of error does not lie to an ex parte order for
injunction granted in chambers). The General Assembly’s response
to these holdings was to “put[ ] an end to all ex parte injunctions” and
provide for “temporary restraining orders in urgent cases until a
hearing could be had.” Kaufman v. M. Ferst & Co., 55 Ga. 350, 352
(1875). The statute provided for a “fast writ,” or immediate review, for
the grant or denial of an application for injunction. It did not,
however, provide for any review of temporary restraining orders,
which could be issued ex parte and would remain in place until a
hearing on the application for injunction could be held. Code of 1873,
§ 3211. Such orders were considered “definite and distinct” from
orders granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions. Mayor of Savan-
nah v. Grayson, 104 Ga. 105, 105 (1) (30 SE 693) (1898). Important for
our analysis here, this Court held in 1875 that a writ of error
“4s confined to granting or refusing injunction . .. and does not extend
to dissolving, vacating or setting aside what has been already granted.”
Kaufman, 55 Ga. at 353; see also Bacon & Co. v. Capital City Bank,

® A writ of error is “[a] writ issued by an appellate court directing a lower court to deliver
the record in the case for review.” Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

eS 518

105 Ga. 700, 700 (31 SE 588) (1898) (order modifying previously
granted order for injunction and appointment of receiver is not
subject to a fast bill of exception); Harris v. City of Sparta, 130 Ga. 60,
61 (60 SE 192) (1908) (“[T]his court cannot, on a fast writ of error,
review an order granting or refusing a temporary restraining order,
or dissolving or refusing to dissolve one when granted.”).

In 1910, the General Assembly retained direct review for injunc-
tions, providing that “either party may have writ of error” to the
Supreme Court from a decision made after a hearing to “grant or
refuse [an] injunction.” Code of 1910, § 5502. Just two decades later,
our statutory scheme still provided for a “fast writ of error” in cases
“granting or refusing applications for injunction,” but still made no
provision for immediate appeal of orders modifying, dissolving, or
vacating an injunction. Code of 1933, § 6-903. Our precedents, like-
wise, continued to acknowledge that orders modifying interlocutory
injunctions or temporary restraining orders were not immediately
appealable by a fast writ of error. Eagle Publishing Co. v. Mercer, 154
Ga. 246 (114 SE 26) (1922) (acknowledging that the refusal to vacate
or modify an interlocutory injunction is not a final adjudication which
will support a writ of error); Johnson v. Troup County Rural Electri-
fication Corp., 184 Ga. 527, 527 (192 SE 15) (1937) (this Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear a fast writ of exception from an order dissolving
or modifying a temporary restraining order even though the issue
was decided after a hearing); Akers Motor Lines v. Cook, 211 Ga. 23,
24 (1) (83 SE2d 586) (1954) (acknowledging that fast bill of exceptions
will lie from cases granting or refusing applications for injunction but
not from an order dissolving, vacating, or modifying a temporary
restraining order).'°

In 1965, our state’s modern appellate practices began to take
shape, and the General Assembly passed the Appellate Practice Act
of 1965 with the purpose of “comprehensively and exhaustively”
modernizing appellate procedure in civil cases. Ga. L. 1965, p. 18. The
1965 Act retained the procedure for direct appeal from all judgments
or orders “granting or refusing an application for interlocutory injunc-
tion,” and also added a new provision to permit a direct appeal from

10 In Moore v. Selman, 219 Ga, 865 (136 SE2d 829) (1964), this Court held that orders
“dissolving, revoking, or setting aside a previously granted temporary injunction, which would
in effect constitute a denial of the temporary injunction,” were reviewable on the same basis as
orders denying temporary injunctions. To the extent that Moore recognized a narrow exception
along the lines that a decision that was tantamount to the original grant or denial of an
injunction can be subject to immediate review, we need not decide today whether that exception
remains viable after the enactment of the Appellate Practice Act. This case is not one in which
the modification and refusal to dissolve the existing injunction could be fairly characterized as
the grant or refusal of injunctive relief.

514 A

“all judgments or orders rendered after hearing, continuing in effect,
modifying, vacating, or refusing to continue, modify or vacate a
temporary restraining order.” Ga. L. 1965, p. 19, § 1 (a) 3. Of course,
“changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change
the meaning of the statute.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F3d 1276,
1299 (11th Cir. 2010) (punctuation omitted). And here, the 1965 Act
sets forth a response to case law permitting direct appeals from
orders granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions — but not from
orders dissolving, modifying, or vacating temporary restraining orders.
What the text also evidences is the ability of the General Assembly to
distinguish between lower court orders that grant or refuse an initial
application versus those orders that modify or vacate an existing
order. “Where, as here, ‘the legislature uses certain language in one
part of the statute and different language in another, the court
assumes different meanings were intended.’” Berryhill v. Ga. Com-
munity Support & Solutions, Inc., 281 Ga. 439, 442 (638 SE2d 278)
(2006) (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Con-
struction § 46:06, p. 194 (6th ed. 2000)).

Between 1965 and 1984, the statutory scheme remained rela-
tively unchanged and permitted direct appeals both from orders
“ranting or refusing” interlocutory injunctions and from orders
(rendered after a hearing) “continuing in effect, modifying, vacating,
or refusing to continue, modify or vacate” a temporary restraining
order. Consequently, during this interval our cases recognized that
orders dissolving or modifying temporary restraining orders were
directly appealable, though appellate courts sought to mold the
parameters of such appeals. See, e.g., Coffey Enterprises Realty &
Dev. Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 248 Ga. 224, 224 (281 SE2d 611) (1981)
(appeal from order granting temporary restraining order was moot
because the temporary restraining orders expired by operation of law
30 days after entry); see also Clements v. Kushinka, 233 Ga. 273 (210
SE2d 804) (1974) (the issue of dissolving a temporary restraining
order must have been heard and determined on its merits, rather
than happening by operation of law, before a judgment dissolving or
refusing to dissolve such an order is subject to appeal). Cases during
that period sometimes intermingled their evaluation of temporary
restraining orders and interlocutory injunctions. These cases were
decided during the relatively brief time when the Appellate Practice
Act’s temporary restraining order provision permitted direct appeal.
See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Amberjack
Ltd., 253 Ga. 438, 438 (821 SE2d 736) (1984) (an appeal from the
denial of a motion to dissolve a temporary restraining order when
coupled with the grant of an interlocutory injunction is subject to

eS 515

direct appeal).!' But the General Assembly has since amended our
Appellate Practice Act, and it no longer provides for direct appeal
from temporary restraining orders.

In 1984, the legislature amended the Appellate Practice Act to
require applications to appeal in certain cases as part of an overhaul
of Georgia’s appellate procedures. Ga. L. 1984, p. 599. This enactment
resembles the modern structure of OCGA §§ 5-6-34 and 5-6-35. Under
the 1984 Act, orders granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions
remained subject to direct appeal. Ga. L. 1984, p. 600, § 1. But appeals
from orders granting or denying temporary restraining orders moved
to the discretionary application statute. Ga. L. 1984, p. 601, § 2. And,
strikingly, the legislature eliminated the language permitting appeals
from orders “continuing in effect, modifying, vacating, or refusing to
continue, modify or vacate” temporary restraining orders.

Our rules of statutory interpretation demand that we attach
significance to this action. See Transp. Ins. Co. v. El Chico Restau-
rants, Inc., 271 Ga. 774, 776 (524 SE2d 486) (1999) (acknowledging
that the rules of statutory interpretation attach significance to the
legislature’s action in removing certain limiting language from the
statute at issue). To this day, interlocutory injunctions and temporary
restraining orders have remained subject to different appellate pro-
cedures. Compare OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4) (direct appeal from orders
granting or refusing an application for interlocutory injunction), with
OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (9) (appeals from order granting or refusing a
temporary restraining order must come by application). And while
orders modifying temporary restraining orders were appealable for
some period of time, no similar provision ever existed for appeals from
orders modifying interlocutory or final injunctions. In fact, the lang-
uage permitting an appeal from orders “granting or refusing” appli-
cations for an injunction has remained constant for over 100 years.
The necessary conclusion from the statutory scheme is that orders
granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions are subject to direct
appeal, but that orders merely modifying interlocutory injunctions

11 We note that the Court of Appeals, at least in one case, has permitted a direct appeal
from an order merely modifying an interlocutory injunction on the basis that such an order
constitutes the grant of a separate interlocutory injunction. Am. Mgmt. Sves. East, Inc. v. Fort
Benning Family Communities, LLC, 318 Ga. App. 827, 827 (1) (734 SE2d 833) (2012) (deter-
mining, without any citation to authority, that an order modifying a previously granted
interlocutory injunction in order to lift one restriction is itself a separate interlocutory
injunction that is directly appealable even when other restrictions remain unchanged).
Because our statutory analysis demonstrates that this violates the language of OCGA § 5-6-34
(a) (4), we overrule that case tothe extent that it holds that the modification of an interlocutory
injunction constitutes the grant of a new interlocutory injunction and is therefore subject to
direct appeal.

516 A

are not. The statutory history demonstrates that the General Assem-
bly appreciates the difference between lower court actions granting,
refusing, modifying, dissolving, or vacating an order. That point is
reaffirmed by the fact that our current Code, for instance, permits a
direct appeal from an order “modifying” a child custody award. See
OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11). And while the General Assembly differenti-
ates between granting or refusing and modifying, it has never extended
our direct appeal statute to embrace direct appeal from orders
modifying interlocutory injunctions. This Court likewise has not
announced any expansion of the statutory text.

We again conclude that an order modifying an interlocutory
injunction is not directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4).
This Court has recognized for more than a century that this rule
could, in certain instances, be unfortunate from a policy perspective:
“This may in some instances amount to a great hardship, as is
claimed to be true in the present case, but this court has no jurisdic-
tion to entertain such a bill of exceptions as the present, however
great may be the injustice to the party complaining.” Bacon, 105 Ga.
at 703. Fortunately for today’s litigants, the modern Code permits
parties to seek immediate review of questions of importance or
urgency even where no direct appeal is otherwise available. OCGA §
5-6-34 (b). And, of course, the General Assembly can choose to change
the scheme for appellate review should it deem a different policy
choice more appropriate. Cf. Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 778
(784 SE2d 775) (2016) (“The scheme for appellate interlocutory
review is legislative in nature, and provides ample opportunity for
review in appropriate cases when a defense of immunity is raised. In
the event that the General Assembly determines that the established
framework does not adequately safeguard the interests of those who
assert those defenses, it is for that body to change it.”).

In sum, the Joneses seek a direct appeal from an order that
modifies, or partially dissolves, an existing interlocutory injunction.
That type of order is not directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34
(a) (4), nor is it subject to the discretionary application procedure for
temporary restraining orders. Any review would have needed tocome
under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), but the Joneses did not obtain a certificate
of immediate review from the trial court. We therefore dismiss the
Joneses’ appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
need not reach the Joneses’ remaining enumerations of error, all of
which relate to the merits of the underlying injunction.

Order vacated and appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur.

eS 517
DECIDED OCTOBER 31, 2017.

David A. Powell, for appellants.
Teresa E. Adams, for appellees.

$16G1463. SMITH v. NORTHSIDE HOSPITAL, INC. et al.
(807 SE2d 909)

PETERSON, Justice.

A government agency owns and operates a large and complex
hospital as part of its mission to provide healthcare throughout
Fulton County. Perhaps concerned that providing healthcare might
not be the sweet spot of government competence, the agency decides
that a private, nonprofit corporation should be created to do it
instead. The agency leases its considerable assets (including the
hospital) to the newly-created corporation for 40 years at a relatively
minimal rent, and delegates to the corporation nearly all of its
governmental powers and responsibilities. The corporation’s orga-
nizing documents reflect that its purpose aligns very well with the
agency’s: to provide healthcare for the benefit of the public.

Thirty years later, the corporation has become massive, with
considerable assets in surrounding counties. With the agency barely
even a dwindling dot in the rear-view mirror, the corporation now
argues that it doesn’t really do anything on behalf of the agency
(in part because the now nearly-nonexistent agency has no idea what
the corporation is doing), and thus the corporation’s records of a series
of healthcare-related acquisitions aren’t subject to public inspection.
If the corporation’s aggressive position were wholly correct, it may
well cast serious doubt on the legality of the whole arrangement
between the corporation and the agency. A lawyer who seeks records
from the corporation under this state’s sunshine laws, on the other
hand, takes the opposite (but equally aggressive) position, contend-
ing that everything the corporation does is for the agency’s benefit
and thus all of its records are public. Both are wrong. The corpora-
tion’s operation of the hospital and other leased facilities is a service
it performs on behalf of the agency, and so records related to that
operation are public records. But whether the acquisition-related
records sought here are also public records depends on how closely
related the acquisition was to the operation of the leased facilities, a
factual question for the trial court to determine on remand.

E. Kendrick Smith, an Atlanta lawyer, brought this action to
compel the corporation — Northside Hospital, Inc. and its parent

518 Pe

company, Northside Health Services, Inc. (collectively, “Northside”)
—to provide him with access to certain documents in response to his
request under the Georgia Open Records Act (“the Act”). The trial
court dismissed Smith’s action after a bench trial, anda divided Court
of Appeals affirmed. Smith v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 336 Ga. App. 843
(783 SE2d 480) (2016). We granted certiorari to consider whether the
lower courts erred in concluding that the documents in question were
not “public records” within the meaning of the Act. After oral argu-
ment and considerable briefing, we conclude that the Court of Appeals
and trial court applied the wrong legal standard, reverse the opinion
of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for the trial court to
apply the correct legal standard.

The facts relevant to this appeal are largely undisputed. In
1966, the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Fulton County
passed a resolution creating the Fulton County Hospital Authority
(the “Authority”), which would “have and exercise all of the powers
granted and prescribed in the Hospital Authority Laws.” The
Authority was created because of the need in Fulton County for
improved and increased hospital facilities to serve the community.
And to that end, the Authority opened Northside Hospital, which it
owned and operated for approximately the next 25 years. In the early
1990s, the Authority, recognizing “the rapidly changing healthcare
environment in which it operate[d],” undertook a study to determine
how best to improve the hospital’s operations. Ultimately, the Author-
ity concluded that the best option to achieve its goals was to restruc-
ture through a long-term lease of the hospital and related assets for
operation by a private, charitable, nonprofit corporation. The Author-
ity further determined that “[r]ecent developments and opportunities
affecting the ability of the [hJospital to remain competitive and to
enhance its position as a principal provider of specialty healthcare
services... reinforced the importance of restructuring to the long term
competitive position of the [hJospital.”

Based on the foregoing assessments, the Authority on November
1, 1991, executed a lease and transfer agreement (“the Agreement”)
with the newly-formed Northside Hospital, Inc., a private, nonprofit
corporation. Under the Agreement, the Authority leased the hospi-
tal’s facilities and transferred all of its “Operating Assets” and

“Existing Operations” — terms defined in the Agreement as dis-
cussed in detail below — to Northside for a term of 40 years. The
“Leased Facilities” — again, a defined term in the Agreement —

included certain tracts of real property in Fulton County and the
facilities located thereon: Northside Hospital, a surgery center, office
buildings, and improvements. The Authority agreed to use its best
efforts to cause the issuance of tax-exempt revenue anticipation

eS 519

certificates or other evidences of indebtedness in order to fund
Northside’s operation and expansion of the hospital system. The
Authority also gave Northside the power to act for the Authority.
Northside was to operate the hospital subject to certain restrictions,
pay all of the Authority’s debts and assume all of its liabilities
incurred in connection with the Leased Facilities, Operating Assets,
and Existing Operations, and make a yearly rent payment of $100,000.
It appears from the record that the Authority and Northside have
continued to renew their 40-year agreement each year. In so doing,
the Authority reaffirms its determination that its agreement with
Northside will promote the public health needs of the community and
gives the Authority sufficient control to ensure compliance with the
law and the fulfillment of its mission.

To the extent the Authority has maintained a post-lease exis-
tence apart from Northside, itis minimal. Northside board members
and officers serve as Authority members. The Authority has no
employees or staff of its own. Northside’s director of legal services
serves as the Authority’s secretary and maintains the Authority’s
records, which are stored at Northside’s legal offices. The Authority
generally holds quarterly meetings (usually at Northside) of about 30
minutes each.

Relevant to this dispute, between 2011 and 2013, Northside
entered into transactions to acquire four privately-owned physician
groups.' In 2013, after learning of these transactions, Smith sent a
letter to Northside and the Authority, entitled “Open Records Request,”
seeking access to financial statements and other documents related to
the acquisitions.” The Authority responded by informing Smith that it
did not possess any records or documents that were responsive to his
request. Northside also responded to Smith, declining to comply with
his request. Northside told Smith that it is a private, nonprofit hospital
that is not subject to the Act and that even if it were subject to the
Act, the requested documents, which are “highly sensitive,” would be

Northside asserts that only some of the practices’ assets have been acquired and that the
practices remain independent, for-profit entities. But Northside acknowledges it has a fee
simple interest in assets and/or operations related to the transactions,

2 Specifically, the letter identified 15 different categories of requested documents related
toeach acquisition, including, for example, “[a]ll contracts, agreements, instruments, and other
documents by which the [aJequisition was effected in whole or in part”; “any indemnification
agreements and any agreements concerning the management or operation . . . of any medical
or health care practice acquired . . .”; documents that “constitute, evidence or reflect any
consideration, compensation, or remuneration of any type provided by or on behalf of North-
side”; and “[a]ll documents that constitute, evidence, or reflect any strategic plan or business
forecast for assets, membership interests, or any other property or interest acquired in the
[alequisition” for the 24 months preceding the acquisition.

520 Pe

exempt under various provisions of the Act, including the trade secrets
exemption. In addition, Northside informed Smith that it had entered
into binding confidentiality agreements that prohibited disclosure of
the requested documents.

Smith subsequently filed this lawsuit against Northside, request-
ing that the trial court compel Northside to comply with his open
records request. The trial court later permitted three of the four
private practices that Northside acquired to intervene in the case, two
as defendants and the third as a third-party plaintiff seeking declara-
tory relief. The case ultimately proceeded to a bench trial, which was
bifurcated to resolve the two dispositive issues before the trial court:
(1) whether the documents in question were “publicrecords” under the
Act; and (2) if so, whether the records contained exempt trade secrets.
After Smith presented his evidence as to the first issue, Northside and
the intervenors moved for an involuntary dismissal of the case, and
the trial court denied the motion. But when Northside and the
intervenors renewed the motion after the close of all the evidence on
the first issue, the court granted it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and
we granted certiorari.

“In reviewing a bench trial, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s rulings, defer to the trial court’s cred-
ibility judgments, and will not set aside the trial court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Gibson v. Gibson, 301 Ga.
622, 624 (801 SE2d 40) (2017). Atrial court’s involuntary dismissal of
aclaim pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) “may be reversed only if the
evidence demands a contrary finding.” Id. (citation and punctuation
omitted). But a trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to de novo
review. Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Inc. v. Lollar,
282 Ga. 721, 724 (2) (653 SE2d 462) (2007). And the application of the
wrong legal standard may be reversible error. See Great American
Dream, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 290 Ga. 749, 752 (1) (727 SE2d 667)
(2012).

1. A public agency need not always have direct involvement in or
even knowledge of a particular action of a private entity for that action
to qualify as the performance of a service or function “on behalf of” the
agency.

Under the Act, “[a]ll public records shall be open for personal
inspection and copying, except those which by order of a court of this
state or by law are specifically exempted from disclosure. . . .”
OCGA § 50-18-71 (a). The Act previously defined “public records” as
only those records “prepared and maintained or received in the course
of the operation of a public office or agency” or “received or main-
tained by a private person or entity on behalf of a public office or
agency[.]” See Ga. L. 1992, pp. 1061, 1064, § 5 (codified at prior

eS 21

version of OCGA § 50-18-70 (a)). In 1999, the legislature amended
the statute to include records “received or maintained by a private
person, firm, corporation or other private entity in the performance of
a service or function for or on behalf of an agency[.]” Ga. L. 1999,
pp. 552, 553, § 1. OCGA § 50-18-70 has since been amended, see Ga.
L. 2012, pp. 218, 226, § 2, but the legislature retained the “in the
performance of a service or function for or on behalf of an agency”
language; it now defines “public records” to include “all documents...
prepared and maintained or received by an agency or by a private
person or entity in the performance of a service or function for or on
behalf of an agency[.]” OCGA § 50-18-70 (b) (2). The definition of
“agency” employed by the statute includes “[e]very . . . authority” of
“every county . . . of this state.” See OCGA §§ 50-14-1 (a) (1) (B), (©);
50-18-70 (b) (1).

The parties agree that the Authority is an “agency” and North-
side is not; the only question posed by this appeal is whether the
documents sought by Smith were “prepared and maintained or
received by” Northside “in the performance of a service or function for
or on behalf of” the Authority. In construing a statute, “we must afford
the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the
statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read
the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an
ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Deal v. Coleman,
294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citations omit-
ted).? Dictionaries define “on behalf of” as including “as the agent or
representative of,” “on the part of,” and “in the name of.” See Black’s
Law Dictionary 184 (10th ed. 2014); Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of
Modern American Usage 78 (1998); see also Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary 141 (9th ed. 1991). In the context of the statute, a private
entity acts “on behalf of” a government agency when the agency
arranges for the private entity to perform a government function that
the agency would otherwise have to perform. But nothing in this
statutory text requires that the agency direct the private entity in the
specific details of its work, or even know those details, in order for the
records of that work to be public records; it is certainly possible for an

® The General Assembly has directed us to construe the Act broadly in favor of making
“governmental records” available to the public. OCGA § 50-18-70 (a). Drawing a distinction
between the terms “public” and “governmental,” Northside argues that a private entity's
records could never be deemed “governmental records,” and urges us to construe the statute
nartowly in its favor given the availability of criminal penalties for noncompliance. We need not
resolve this question of statutory construction here; instead, we simply construe the Act
reasonably.

522 Pe

entity that has been given a broad charge to work on an agency’s
behalf to do that work without informing the agency about every-
thing.*

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals employed a nar-
rower standard, requiring Smith to show that the Authority approved,
directed, or was involved with the specific transactions at issue. In
concluding that Smith had not shown that the documents that he
sought were public records, the trial court stated that there was no
evidence that Northside “entered into or performed any of the trans-
actions for or on behalf of the Authority, or exercised any of the
Authority’s powers when doing so[,]” no evidence “that the Authority
discussed in advance, requested, approved, or authorized Northside
to enter into the transactions at issue[,]” and no evidence that “the
Authority was involved in any way in the negotiating of the transac-
tions or preparing, executing, maintaining, or receiving the docu-
ments sought.” The trial court found that it could not conclude

that Northside functioned under the direction and control of
the Authority as its vehicle to implement the Authority’s
duty to provide public health, or that there is a shared
ownership and control between the Authority and Northside
such that the documents at issue were generated or main-
tained by Northside on behalf of the Authority.

In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals wrote:

Smith seeks documents related to commercial transac-
tions between private entities, which the Authority had no
knowledge, interest, or involvement in to any degree. Indeed,
these acquisitions were negotiated and executed solely by
Northside for its own private purposes, and it did not seek
the Authority’s approval or even inform the Authority of its
plans in advance. Moreover, Smith presented no evidence
that any public officials participated in the negotiations, and
it was undisputed that no public funds were used to finance
the acquisitions.

Northside Hosp., 336 Ga. App. at 856-857 (1).

+ Inthe analogous context of a principaVagent relationship, an agent may bind its principal
without the principal's knowledge. See OCGA § 10-6-56 (“The principal shall be bound by all
representations made by his agent in the business of his agency and also by his willful
concealment of material facts, although they are unknown to the principal and known only by
the agent.”).

eS 528

Evidence that a public official directed or had knowledge of a
particular action may be one way to determine that the action was
undertaken on behalf of a public agency, but it isn’t always necessary.
When the work a private entity does for an agency is a relatively
discrete task, looking for specific government involvement or approval
may well be appropriate. But when the scope of the task given to a
private entity is much broader, it’s less reasonable to require specific
government involvement at every step as the sine qua non of whether
the private entity is performing a service or function on behalf of the
agency.

Considering a hypothetical example of a more typical contractual
arrangement between a public agency and a private entity helps
explain how this is so. Acity ordinance charges city government with
collecting trash in city parks. The city elects to contract with a private
waste management company to perform that function; records related
to the company’s performance of that contract would be public
records. The company also collects trash from nearby residents; a
rumor gets out that the city is paying for it. To determine whether the
company’s records related to the collection from residents are public,
acourt would consider whether the government had approved, knew
about, or was otherwise involved in extending the company’s service
from city parks to the residents.

On the other hand, an arrangement with a broader scope would
entail a different analysis. The same city is charged with providing
waste management services to its residents, but determines that the
private sector would do the job more effectively. The city contracts
with the private company to provide waste management services for
all the city’s residents. The city’s direction to the company is both
broad and simple: pick up the trash. Records of the private company
related to the company’s provision of waste management services to
the city’s residents pursuant to the contract with the city would be
public records under the Act (while, of course, other records of the
private company would not). And if the private company decided it
needed more help and hired subcontractors to assist on the city
contract, records related to that arrangement would be public records
regardless of whether the city council knew about it.

It’s difficult to imagine an arrangement with a broader scope
than the Authority’s lease of virtually all of its property and delega-
tion of nearly all of its authority to Northside, for the stated purpose
of better fulfilling the Authority’s mission. And so whether evidence
of specific Authority involvement in a particular transaction is pres-
ent here is the wrong question to ask, given the nature of the
relationship between the Authority and Northside and the complex
task with which Northside is charged under that relationship.

524 Pe

2. At least some of what Northside does is “on behalf of” the
Authority.

Northside would have us believe that the Act applies even less to
its work than to the work of our hypothetical waste management
company, because Northside isn’t doing anything on behalf of the
Authority; it simply is a tenant of the landlord Authority. Northside
is wrong. And we see why when we consider Northside’s account of its
relationship with the Authority: that, “[a]s the Hospital Authorities
Law authorized it to do, the Authority privatized the hospital and got
out of the healthcare business altogether — removing politics and
itself from hospital operations — and allowed Northside to indepen-
dently conduct its private operations without interference, input,
oversight, direction, or control.” This is simply not a correct state-
ment of the law or of what the Authority actually did.

To understand the nature of the Authority’s relationship with
Northside, itisimportant to understand the Georgia Hospital Authori-
ties Law (OCGA § 31-7-70 et seq.), the statute authorizing their
arrangement. Known for the name of our decision explaining the
parameters under which they are properly established, see Rich-
mond County Hosp. Auth. v. Richmond County, 255 Ga. 183 (336
SE2d 562) (1985), “Richmond County hospitals” are permissible
under a provision in the statute that allows county hospital authori-
ties “[t]o lease for any number of years up to a maximum of 40 years
for operation by others any project[.]” OCGA § 31-7-75 (7). The stat-
ute requires that the hospital authority must first determine that the
lease “will promote the public health needs of the community by
making additional facilities available in the community or by lower-
ing the cost of health care in the community.” Id. The authority also
must retain “sufficient control over any project so leased so as to
ensure that the lessee will not in any event obtain more than a
reasonable rate of return on its investment in the project,” in keeping
with the statutory prohibition on hospital authorities operating or
constructing any project for profit. Id.

The law thus does not permit the Authority to get “out of the
healthcare business altogether.” The Hospital Authorities Law does
not allow the Authority to surrender all “input, oversight, direction,
[and] control” of its public assets to a private entity. And we must reject
any interpretation of Northside’s relationship with the Authority that
is contrary to the Hospital Authorities Law. It is axiomatic that
government officials are presumed to act in accordance with the law;
we said as much in the first case decided by this Court. See Doe ex dem.
Truluck v. Peeples, 1 Ga. 1, 1 (1846) (“the court will presume in favor
of public officers, in the absence of all proof to the contrary, that they
discharge their duty in compliance with the law”). “[U]ntil the

eS 525

contrary appears, it will be conclusively presumed that .. . a public
officer[ ] not only acted within the scope of his legal authority but
acted properly in the performance of such duty and only when
authorized so to act.” Brantley v. Thompson, 216 Ga. 164, 166 (115
SE2d 533) (1960) (evidence that clerk marked bills of exception
“tendered” on certain date created presumption that judge was
absent from circuit at that time, given that clerk was authorized to
accept the bills of exception only when the judge was absent); see also
Fine v. Dade County, 198 Ga. 655, 663 (32 SE2d 246) (1944) (presum-
ing that governor was acting upon a request from a grand jury from
one of two counties when he ordered a survey to fix the boundary
between the two, even though there was no evidence that he received
such a request, as such a request was required by law). As the
Authority’s decision to enter the Agreement with Northside was an
act of public officials, we assume that the particulars of the agree-
ment are legal, absent evidence to the contrary. At any rate, by its
terms the arrangement between the Authority and Northside does
not amount to the Authority’s complete exit from the business of
healthcare.*

In our first decision blessing a hospital authority’s lease of its
hospital to a private corporation, we made clear the corporation was
promoting the purpose of the government: “There is no apparent
reason why a suitable private corporation could not properly operate
the hospital, either as lessee or as owner, so as to likewise promote the
public health functions of government.” Bradfield v. Hosp. Auth. of
Muscogee County, 226 Ga. 575, 583 (1) (176 SE2d 92) (1970). The
same is true here; notwithstanding Northside’s arguments to the
contrary, the Authority has entrusted Northside with far more than
simply an ordinary lease of premises.

As set forth in resolutions adopted by the Authority in August
1991, Northside was created because the Authority had

concluded that the accomplishment of its mission and its
responsibilities under the Hospital Authorities Law, as well
as the continuation of the high quality and level of its health
care services, can best be accomplished by the lease and

© Completely apart from the requirements of the Hospital Authorities Law, any suggestion
that a lease of an exceptionally valuable hospital and related assets for minimal rent and the
promise to operate the hospital wholly for its own purposes renders Northside simply an
ordinary tenant might well raise constitutional questions. See, e.g., Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IIT,
See. VI, Par. VI (a) (“Except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, ... the General Assembly
shall not have the power to grant any donation or gratuity or to forgive any debt or obligation
owing to the public[).

526 Pe

transfer of its projects, including its assets and operations to,
subject to the assumption of its liabilities and other obliga-
tions by, a Georgia nonprofit corporation|[.]

In accordance with that conclusion, the Authority gave Northside a
broad mandate: operate and expand the Authority’s health system in
the Authority’s stead. In the original Agreement, the Authority
delegated to Northside “the power and authority to stand in the place
of the Authority and to do and perform all things that the Authority
is authorized or empowered to do by law in the transaction of all
business in connection with the operation of the Leased Facilities”
and provided that “Northside shall have full power to act for the
Authority, in the Authority’s name, place and stead in any and all
circumstances, except as prohibited by law or otherwise provided in
this Agreement.” Northside notes that the Agreement provided that
Northside would operate the hospital system “in furtherance of
Northside’s purposes[.]” But the Agreement identified the only per-
missible such purposes as those “set forth in [Northside’s] Articles of
Incorporation and as otherwise permitted by this Agreement.” Those
Articles of Incorporation require Northside to “operate, directly and
indirectly, health care facilities for the benefit of the general public[.]”

Moreover, in assenting to its arrangement with Northside, the
Authority affirmed in multiple instances that Northside’s work was
fulfilling the mission of the Authority:

+ Inthe August 1991 resolutions, the Authority certified that the
arrangement with Northside would “promote the public health
needs of the community by making additional facilities an
services available in the community and by lowering the cost of
health care in the community, and the proposed restructuring
plan retains sufficient public control of the Authority’s projects

as is contemplated by the Hospital Authorities Law to ensure

the continued fulfillment of the Authority's mission of providing
quality health care at reasonable costs to the community serve
by the Authority.”

+ The Authority also certified in those resolutions that North-
side’s Articles of Incorporation and bylaws were “sufficient to
promote the operation of the Authority's projects consistent
with the Hospital Authorities Law, to safeguard the assets an
operations of the Authority, and to carry out the mission of the
Authority.”

+ The original Agreement dated November 1, 1991, reiterated the
Authority’s determination that the Agreement would “promote

eS 527

the public health needs of the community by making additional
facilities available in the community and by lowering the cost of
health care in the community, . . . that this Agreement retains
sufficient control by the Authority over the Hospital as is
contemplated by the Hospital Authorities Law[,]” and that
“continuation of the high quality and level of health care ser-
vices currently rendered at the Hospital can best be accom-
plished by transferring the operations, assets and liabilities of
the Hospital, as well as other Authority facilities and assets, to
a nonprofit corporation[.]”

+ ANovember 1, 1991, assumption agreement among the Author-
ity, Northside, and Wachovia Bank of Georgia, NA, whereby
Northside agreed to assume the Authority’s debt to Wachovia,
said the Authority had determined that it could “best accom-
plish its mission and responsibilities under the Hospital Authori-
ties Law” through its arrangement with Northside.

The Authority has continued to reaffirm that its arrangement with
Northside fulfills the Authority's mission, and that it retains suffi-
cient control over the arrangement to ensure that continues to be the
case:

+ Ina February 2, 2010 resolution approving the renewal of the
lease, the Authority confirmed that it “retains sufficient control
of the Authority’s objects as is contemplated by the Hospital
Authorities Law to ensure the continued fulfillment of the
Authority’s mission of providing quality health care at reason-

able costs to the community serviced by the Authority and to
ensure that all such leased projects are operated in a manner
consistent with the mandate in the Hospital Authorities Law
specifying that no authority shall operate or construct any
project for profit.”

+ The renewal agreement dated January 7, 2013, included the
Authority’s reaffirmation that the agreement “will promote the
public health needs of the community by making additional
facilities available in the community or by lowering the cost of
healthcare in the community, and that this Agreement retains
sufficient control by the Authority over the Hospital as contem-
plated by” the Georgia Hospital Authorities Law and that “the
Authority believes that continuation of the high quality and
level of healthcare services currently rendered at the Hospital
can best be accomplished by transferring the operations, assets

528 Pe

and liabilities of the Hospital, as well as other Authority facili-
ties and assets, to a nonprofit corporation[.]”

Although the Authority may not be involved in the day-to-day
operations of the hospital system it leases to Northside, Northside
remains accountable to the Authority — at least if it wants the
relationship to continue. The Agreement between the two places a
host of obligations on Northside, including that it will never attempt
to operate the hospital as a for-profit business entity, and that it will
charge rates consistent with that constraint. The Authority may
terminate the Agreement prior to its expiration if Northside fails
to fulfill any of those obligations. In addition, a reversion provision in
the Agreement requires that in the event of termination or expira-
tion, Northside must return more than just the real property and
buildings that the Authority leased to it. It also requires the return of
“Operating Assets,” defined in the Agreement by a list that includes,
with the exception of certain retirement plans, “[a]ll cash, bank
accounts, savings and loan accounts, certificates of deposit, money
market accounts, treasury bills, other investments and revenues...
owned by the Authority in connection with the Leased Facilities or
otherwise[.]” The Agreement specifies that the term “Operating
Assets” includes “all subsequent accumulations and additions thereto,
and less all deletions and deductions therefrom, as may have occurred
in the ordinary course of business of Northside or as otherwise may
have been permitted by the terms of this Agreement.” The reversion
provision also requires the return of “Existing Operations,” defined

s “all of the hospital, health care, administrative and related activi-
ties conducted by” the Authority or Northside “in the ordinary course
of owning and operating the Leased Facilities.” The reversion provi-
sion specifically provides for the disposition of assets the Authority
cannot legally own or operate, with the proceeds going to the Author-
ity. The reversion provision also provides that the Authority will
assume Northside’s liabilities at the termination of the lease, to the
extent it can legally do so. Thus, Northside stands to lose much of its
efforts at the expiration of the Agreement — or sooner if it does not
comply with the Agreement — and the Authority stands to gain.® It

® Northside emphasizes that the Hospital Authorities Law allows a county hospital
authority to not only lease, but sell, its facilities. See OCGA § 31-7-75 (6). Smith points out that
ahospital authority's ability to sell assets is constrained, such as by a requirement for a hearing
with the opportunity for public comment. See id.; OCGA § 31-7-400 et seq. But putting aside
Northside’s troubling suggestion that a hospital authority could truly “remove itself from the
provision of healthcare services altogether|,]” that is not what has happened here. As detailed
above, the Agreement provides that the Authority will retain control over the arrangement
sufficient to ensure compliance with the law. The Agreement and Northside’s Articles of

eS 529

follows that, even if the Authority has no day-to-day involvement in
the healthcare system’s operations, at least some of what Northside
does is “on behalf of” the Authority.

Nothing in the case law on which the Court of Appeals focused
requires a different conclusion. Prior to this case, the Court of Appeals’
case law was in accord with the notion that the records of Richmond
County hospitals generally are considered “public records” under the
Act, even under a prior, narrower definition of “public records.” See
Northwest Ga. Health System, Inc. v. Times-Journal, Inc., 218 Ga.
App. 336, 339 (1) (461 SE2d 297) (1995) (records of a private entity, its
holding company, and subsidiaries were subject to the Act given that
the subsidiaries contractually agreed to operate public hospital author-
ity assets for the public good and the entity’s stated corporate purpose
was in part to operate those assets for the benefit of and performing
the function of several hospital authorities). See also Richmond
County Hosp. Auth., 255 Ga. at 192 (2) (c) (noting that open records
and open meetings issues did not arise because the lease agreement
made clear the corporation would comply with the laws).

In this case, the Court of Appeals relied primarily on The Corp.
of Mercer Univ. v. Barrett & Farahany, LLP, 271 Ga. App. 501 (610
SE2d 138) (2005), but that decision, later superseded by a statute
that specifically addressed campus police records, see Ga. L. 2006,
pp. 519, 522-523, § 5, came in a case in which the police force whose
records were sought was established by an indisputably private
entity, a private university; although the plaintiff pointed to the
police force’s obligations to report certain matters to other law
enforcement agencies, there was “no evidence that any public office or
agency ha[d] expressly requested the [police force] to perform a
service or function on its behalf.” Mercer Univ., 271 Ga. App. at 505
(1) (). In the other cases relied on by the Court of Appeals here, the
appellate court ruled that the records sought were “public records,”
even though many of those were decided under a previous, narrower
definition of that term. See Macon Telegraph Pub. Co. v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. System of Ga., 256 Ga. 443, 445 (850 SE2d 23)
(1986) (accounting records of association to which public university
assigned task of operating its athletics program were “prepared and
maintained in the course of the operation of a public office”) (citation
and punctuation omitted); Hackworth v. Bd. of Ed. for City of Atlanta,

Incorporation provide that Northside will operate so as to promote the health of the general
public, and the Authority continues to certify that its arrangement with Northside is sufficient
to carry out the Authority's mission. Moreover, as detailed above, the Agreement contains a
broad reversion provision under which the Authority stands to recoup a wide variety of assets
beyond the facilities that it leased to Northside.

530 Pe

214 Ga. App. 17, 20 (1) (a) (447 SE2d 78) (1994) (records of school bus
drivers employed by private company were public records because
they were “an integral part of the course of the operation of a public
agency”); Clayton County Hosp. Auth. v. Webb, 208 Ga. App. 91, 94-95
(1) (430 SE2d 89) (1993) (records of county hospital authority’s
corporate affiliates “received or maintained by a private person or
entity on behalf of a public office or agency”; authority admittedly had
the documents in its possession) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The Court of Appeals also distinguished more recent cases in which
records were deemed public under the current language and implied
that those cases involved factors not present here. See United Health-
care of Ga., Inc. v. Ga. Dept. of Community Health, 293 Ga. App. 84,
87-89 (1) (666 SE2d 472) (2008) (records of private corporation
relating to its contract with state agency for administration of state
health benefits plan were public where administration of the plan
involved “current and future expenditure of substantial public funds”
and public officials were “actively” involved in plan issues even after
contract executed); Central Atlanta Progress, Inc. v. Baker, 278 Ga.
App. 733, 735-738 (1), 739-740 (3) (629 SE2d 840) (2006) (bids for
NASCAR Hall of Fame and 2009 Super Bowl were public records
where public officials involved in preparation and promotion of bids
and significant public funds were involved in preparation and/or
ultimate success of bids). But the presence of certain factors ina given
case in which records were deemed public does not mean that those
factors are necessary for such a finding.

3. A remand is required for the trial court to apply the correct
standard.

Which of Northside’s actions qualify as “on behalf of” the Author-
ity may be a trickier question. As alluded to by our earlier city trash
collection hypothetical, the question would be easier to answer if the
Authority had contracted an established nonprofit to manage North-
side Hospital’s operations; the nonprofit’s other endeavors would not
be subject to the Act. But here Northside was created for the purpose
of carrying out the Authority’s mission. Moreover, as we observed in
Richmond County Hosp. Auth., seemingly tangential operations may
actually be closely tied to the operation of a hospital:

A hospital must attract private paying patients or else it
will become a deficit-ridden, indigent-only hospital, dependent
upon tax dollars to keep its doors open. The private paying
patientis often located outside the bounds of Richmond County,
and innovative health-care delivery systems are needed to
attract these patients and their dollars to University Hospital.

eS 81

Maintaining physicians on the staff of University Hospital is
essential toretaining a private-paying-patient base and ensur-
ing the continued viability of the hospital. Joint ventures with
physicians of University Hospital, permissible under the lease,
are essential to maintaining the loyalty of such physicians.
Joint ventures with physicians in health care, permissible
under the lease, would allow the development of additional
health-care facilities without the need to raise all of the capital
in the public sector, thereby saving taxpayer dollars.

Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 255 Ga. at 191 (2) (a).

It is plain that Northside’s work in operating the “Leased Facili-
ties,” i.e., the original leased hospital complex in Fulton County and
any improvements thereto, is work “on behalf of” the Authority. The
Authority owns those facilities, and the definitions of the “Operating
Assets” and “Existing Operations” that will revert to the Authority
upon expiration or termination of the Agreement are tied to operation
of those facilities. But other actions may meet that definition as well,
depending on how closely related those actions are to operation of the
Leased Facilities.

In dismissing Smith’s action, the trial court decided no disputed
issues of fact but, rather, resolved a legal dispute about the proper
application of the Act to the undisputed facts. Because the trial court
applied the wrong legal standard in so doing, remandis required. See
Great American Dream, 290 Ga. at 752 (1). Moreover, application of
the right standard requires a fact-intensive inquiry made difficult in
this appeal given the divergent, all-or-nothing positions taken by the
parties. Northside argues that nothing it does is for or on behalf of the
Authority. At the very least, however, Northside’s operation of the
Leased Facilities is done on behalf of the Authority. How closely the
transactions at issue are tied to operating the Leased Facilities will
determine whether documents are “public records.” Smith argues
that everything Northside does is for or on behalf of the Authority and
thus all of its records are public. Because of this position, he has not
endeavored to connect the particular records he seeks to the opera-
tion of the Leased Facilities. This is not an issue the parties have
briefed in any meaningful way. We remand for the trial court to
consider in the first instance whether the records in question are
sufficiently connected to the operation of the Leased Facilities to
constitute public records under OCGA § 50-18-70 (b) (2), and, if so,
whether the records may nevertheless be withheld pursuant to a
statutory exemption.

532 Pe

Judgment reversed and case remanded. Hines, C. J., Melton,
P.J., Benham, Hunstein, Nahmias, Blackwell, Boggs, JJ., and Judge
Meng H. Lim concur. Grant, J., disqualified.

MELTON, Presiding Justice, concurring.

I concur fully in the majority opinion. However, I write sepa-
rately to emphasize that the Authority in this case has so blurred the
lines between its public functions and those that it has seemingly
delegated to Northside that it cannot be credibly stated that North-
side is so completely separated from the Authority that none of the
records sought in this case could even possibly be classified as “public
records.” Indeed, it defies credulity that Northside could be com-
pletely separate from and do nothing “on behalf of” the Authority
when it was the Authority itself that “created” Northside for the
purpose of carrying out virtually all ofits public duties. I question the
extent to which the Authority itself, as opposed to its principals acting
in their individual capacities, can legally create a private entity that
is wholly independent of the Authority’s legislatively imposed duties
and responsibilities. However, at times, the Authority has hinted that
it has done just that, perhaps relying on an overly broad reading of
Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Richmond County, 255 Ga. 183 (336
SE2d 562) (1985), and the language in the Lease and Transfer
Agreement through which the Authority established its ongoing
relationship with Northside. Specifically, according to the Lease and
Transfer Agreement:

The restructuring plan adopted by the Authority is autho-
rized under Georgia law. Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law
(0.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-70 et seq.), as confirmed by the Georgia
Supreme Court’s decision in Richmond County Hospital
Authority v. Richmond County, 255 Ga. 183, 336 S.E.2d 562
(1985), authorizes a corporate restructuring of a hospital
authority through a lease and transfer of hospital assets to
anew 501(c) (3) nonprofit corporation formed by the hospital
authority.

(Emphasis supplied.) However, nothing in Richmond County Hosp.
Auth. stands for the proposition that an Authority itself can create a
private entity to fulfill its public mission, or that any records gener-
ated by that private entity in connection with the Authority’s public
mission would not be subject to the Georgia Open Records Act. Nor
could the Authority, by delegating the bulk of its responsibilities to a
private entity to fulfill its public mission, avoid its other statutory
responsibilities under the law. And where, as here, Northside was

eS 538

basically a de facto replacement for the Authority with respect to its
public mission of providing health care throughout Fulton County, I
believe that there may be several records related to Northside’s
fulfillment of that public mission that would be properly classified as
“public records.” See OCGA § 50-18-70 (b) (2) (“ ‘Public record’ means
all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs,
computer based or generated information, data, data fields, or simi-
lar material prepared and maintained or received by an agency or by
a private person or entity in the performance of a service or function
for or on behalf of an agency or when such documents have been
transferred to a private person or entity by an agency for storage or
future governmental use”). However, I agree with the majority that it
is for the trial court to engage in the appropriate factual inquiry on
remand to decide whether the records in question in this case
constitute public records.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 2, 2017.

Jones Day, Peter C. Canfield, Brian C. Lea, for appellant.

Dentons US, Thurbert E. Baker, J. Randolph Evans, Bryan E.
Bates, Nathan L. Garroway; Baker & Hostetler, S. Derek Bauer, Ian K.
Byrnside, James C. Rawls; Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
Charles T: Huddleston, S. Wade Malone, Jessica R. Watson; Polsinelli,
PC., Jeremy P. Burnette, Sidney S. Welch; Edward C. Konieczny, for
appellees.

Hull Barrett, David E. Hudson, James B. Ellington; Scheer
Montgomery & Call, Steven E. Scheer; Akerman LLP. Sarah R. Craig;
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Annette M. Cowart, Russell D.
Willard, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Sarah H. Warren, Solicitor-
General; Brinson, Askew, Berry, Seigler, Richardson & Davis, Lee B.
Carter, Norman S. Fletcher; Peters & Monyak, Jonathan C. Peters;
Smith, Gilliam, Williams & Miles, Steven P. Gilliam, Roger B. Hatcher,
Jr; Kelly Jean L. Pridgen, G. Joseph Scheuer, amici curiae.

$17A0935. THOMPSON v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 899)
GRANT, Justice.
A Fulton County jury found appellant Eric Thompson guilty of
two counts of malice murder in connection with the deaths of Andre

5a es

Geddis and Melody Keller.’ On appeal, Thompson contends that the
trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, including character
evidence and hearsay evidence, and denying his motion for continu-
ance. Thompson also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sup-
porting the guilty verdicts and alleges that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to a portion of the State’s closing
argument. We agree that some of the challenged character evidence
was improperly admitted and that the admission was not harmless.
We therefore reverse.

I.

Police performing a welfare check found the bodies of Andre
Geddis and his fiancée Melody Keller inside their home; someone
wielding a .40 caliber gun had shot Geddis and Melody to death.
Although there was no sign of forced entry, police suspected robbery
because the victims’ cars and electronic equipment were missing and
the house was in disarray. Police recovered several shell casings and
prescription pills from the home.

Police then canvassed the neighborhood surrounding the vic-
tims’ home, but their efforts yielded little evidence. A few days later,
one of the victims’ cars, a white Chevy Malibu, was recovered. The
second car, a Chevy Tahoe, was found ina different location a few days
later. Both cars had been “stripped.”
Lacking leads, the police obtained a court order for Geddis’s cell
phone records. As it turns out, Geddis had exchanged phone calls with
Thompson’s co-defendant, Vincent Russell, on the day of the murders.
Police were able to determine Russell’s phone number from a police
report that Russell filed less than one month after the murders.
Russell had reported his .40 caliber Smith & Wesson handgun as
stolen and had included a phone number — which matched the phone
number in Geddis’s phone records — in the police reportas his contact
number. By examining Russell’s phone records, police learned that

+ The crimes took place on May 15, 2008. Thompson was charged with two counts of malice
murder, two counts of felony murder (predicated on armed robbery), two counts of armed
robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Thompson received a life
sentence for each of the malice murder counts and a five-year sentence for the possession of a
firearm count. Although the trial court improperly merged Thompson's armed robbery convic-
tions, we do not address that error in light of the reversal in Division IIL. Thompson filed a
motion for new trial, which was amended with new counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court,
denied his motion on January 27, 2015. Thompson filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case
was docketed in this Court to the April 2017 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

eS 536

Russell and Thompson? made phone calls to each other the same day
Geddis and Melody were murdered.* Thompson’s cell phone records
revealed that on the night of the murders, his cell phone pinged off a
tower near the victims’ house around 9:00 p.m. Roughly a half-hour
later, Thompson’s phone repeatedly called Russell's phone. Notably,
these calls from Thompson’s phone to Russell’s phone took place
while Thompson’s phone was located in the same area as the victims’
home. Meanwhile, no outgoing calls were made from Geddis’s phone
after 9:25 that night. At 11:30 p.m., however, an incoming call to
Geddis’s phone went unanswered. At that point, Geddis’s phone —
which was never recovered after his killing — pinged off a cell tower
located near Thompson’s home, rather than a tower near Geddis’s
own home and the site of his murder.

Aphone call between Geddis and Coey Keller, Melody’s brother,
sheds additional light on the timeline and events surrounding the
murders. Geddis called Coey around the same time that Thompson’s
phone approached the victims’ home. During the conversation, Ged-
dis told Coey that he had arranged to purchase a .40 caliber gun.
Though he did not mention any names, Geddis said he was waiting on
someone to come over with the gun. Geddis and Melody were shot to
death with a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson gun.

In addition to the cell phone evidence, the police developed a lead
on a man named Ronnie Heath. Heath eventually pled guilty to
voluntary manslaughter in connection with the murders after police
learned that he stole a car from the victims’ house on the night of the
murders. In 2009, Heath gave two statements to police implicating
Thompson as one of the people involved in Geddis and Melody’s
murders. At trial, Heath claimed that he had no memory of the night
of the murders or of his prior statements to police. But Heath did
testify that he had known Thompson for a long time. He denied that
he had ever met or known Russell. The State impeached Heath with
his 2009 statements to police, and a copy of the transcripts of his
statements were admitted into evidence. That night, according to
Heath’s 2009 statements, Thompson, along with two other men,
recruited him to go to a house and “test drugs.” When the group

2 Thompson was the registered subscriber for his cell phone.

® Testimony at trial established that Russell and Thompson knew each other prior to the
murders. Russell's sister was dating Thompson prior to the crimes. Russell's former girlfriend
testified that Thompson was the godfather to two of her three children and that Russell's sister
was the godmother to those children.

+ On the stand, Heath admitted that he had agreed to testify truthfully as part of his own.
plea agreement. But he also testified that he was dissatisfied with his plea deal. Heath claimed
at trial that he did not participate in the murders and did not see anyone else participate in the
murders.

536 es

arrived at the victims’ home, Heath and another man, who was
dressed in a security guard uniform, got out of the car while Thomp-
son and another associate stayed behind.® Thompson told Heath that
the security guard hada gun. The security guard knocked on the door
and a man who appeared to know the security guard let Heath and
the security guard inside. Heath stayed at the front of the house until
the security guard returned and gave him a set of keys to a white
Chevrolet and told Heath to take the car and leave, which he did.®
Heath took the white car back to Thompson’s house where he,
Thompson, and the other man who had ridden with them to Geddis’s
home began taking certain items from the car (such as the radio and
speakers). Melody’s brother testified that she drove a white Chevy
Malibu. Police officers later recovered Melody’s abandoned car, which
was missing its radio, wheels, rims, and other items.

II.

Thompson contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the State presented
insufficient evidence to convict Thompson of the charged crimes
beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

Adirected verdict of acquittal should be entered where there is no
conflict in the evidence and the evidence demands a verdict of
acquittal with allreasonable deductions and inferences. OCGA § 17-9-1
(a). This Court applies the same standard of review to a denied motion
for directed verdict as that which is used to determine the sufficiency
of the evidence. Kitchen v. State, 287 Ga. 833, 834 (700 SE2d 563)
(2010) (iting Yat v. State, 279 Ga. 611, 613 (619 SE2d 637) (2005)).
That means that we apply the standard demanded by Jackson v.
Virginia: Whether the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational
trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thompson was
guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

The evidence as set out above is sufficient to support Thompson’s
convictions in this case. While Heath’s 2009 statement to police did
make up a significant portion of the testimony connecting Thompson

© Russell testified at trial. He admitted that in 2008 he was working asa security guard for
aclub. Russell admitted that he and a friend went to Geddis's home one Friday night, and he
witnessed Geddis giving “weed” to another person. Russell's girlfriend also testified that he was
working as a security guard in 2008.

® During the 2009 statements, police asked Heath to draw a picture of the interior of the
victims’ home. Other witnesses at trial confirmed that Heath’s picture accurately represented
the interior of the victims’ home.

eS 587

to the murders, it was not the only evidence against Thompson. Cell
phone evidence indicates Thompson was near the victims’ home near
the time the crimes took place. Direct testimony establishes that
Thompson recruited at least one participant in the robbery scheme
that resulted in the murders of Geddis and Melody. There is evidence
that Thompson knew the security guard was carrying a gun when
they drove to the victims’ home for the robbery. Police recovered the
victims’ white Malibunear Thompson’s home, and the car was “stripped”
in the manner described by Heath. And an unanswered call to
Geddis’s cell phone pinged off a tower near Thompson’s house just a
couple of hours after the murders took place. Slight evidence from an
extraneous source identifying the accused as a participant in the
criminal act is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony to
support a verdict. Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 22 (785 SE2d 869)
(2016). The evidence was sufficient to corroborate Heath’s testimony
under OCGA § 24-14-8. Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898, 901-902 (757
SE2d 102) (2014) (phone records that provide circumstantial evi-
dence of the crimes sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony).
The evidence presented was also constitutionally sufficient for the
jury to find Thompson guilty with respect to these charges. Jones v.
State, 299 Ga. 377, 379 (788 SE2d 477) (2016).

Ill.

Thompson contends that the trial court erred by admitting
character evidence alleging that Thompson had participated in an
attempted armed robbery three-and-a-half years after the murders
and that he was a drug dealer who had purchased an assault rifle.”
We agree that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the
evidence of the subsequent attempted armed robbery. And we cannot
say that the evidence of guilt was such that “there [is] no reasonable
probability that the verdicts of the jury would have been different in
the absence of such error.” Nichols v. State, 282 Ga. 401, 405 (651
SE2d 15) (2007). On the other hand, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of Thompson’s

* Attrial, and over Thompson's objection, the State called Darious Bell to testify about the
attempted armed robbery of Jason Ward, an incident that occurred about three-and-a-half
years after the murders. Specifically, Bell was impeached with a prior statement in which he
alleged that Thompson and some of his associates were supposed to rob Ward, but when
Thompson and his partner approached Ward's car, Thompson’s partner unexpectedly started
shooting and Thompson fled without robbing Ward. Additionally, and again over Thompson's
objection, the jury watched a video of Heath’s prior police interview in which he claimed that
Thompson was a drug dealer and had purchased a rifle from Russell.

538 es

drug activities or the evidence that Thompson purchased a firearm
from his co-defendant Russell. We address each contention more fully
below.

A. Other Acts Evidence: Subsequent Attempted Armed Robbery.
Thompson’s case straddles the divide between Georgia’s former
Evidence Code and the date our current Evidence Code became
effective, January 1, 2013. The hearing on the State’s motion to admit
evidence was held on February 29, 2012. During that hearing, the
State posited that evidence of Thompson’s participation in the sub-
sequent attempted armed robbery of Ward was admissible to show
Thompson’s motive, course of conduct, intent, and lack of mistake.
The trial court entered a written order dated March 9, 2012, denying
in part and granting in part the State’s motion and determining that
evidence of the subsequent attempted armed robbery of Ward was
admissible for the purpose of showing motive, plan, course of conduct,
and lack of mistake. Noticeably absent from that order is intent. The
trial court’s order notes the following similarities between the cir-
cumstances surrounding the murders and the attempted armed
robbery of Ward: armed robbery of the victims; shots fired; possession
of a firearm by the assailants; groups of young men involved; occur-
rences in the same area; and occurrences close in time.

Before Thompson’s April 2013 trial, the trial court revisited its
order at Thompson’s request. Thompson specifically asked the trial
court to reconsider its ruling in light of the changes to our Evidence
Code. Ruling from the bench and outside the presence of the jury, the
trial court again determined that the evidence was admissible to
show motive, plan, and lack of mistake. Although the trial court
maintained that its original findings were correct, it conceded that,
under the new Evidence Code, course of conduct was no longer a
permissible purpose for other acts evidence. The trial court reiterated
its findings that the State could show that Thompson committed the
Ward attempted armed robbery, that there was sufficient similarity
between the charged murder and the subsequent attempted armed
robbery, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its
prejudicial effect. In sum, the trial court ruled that evidence of
Thompson’s involvement in the attempted armed robbery of Ward
would be admissible to show motive, plan, and lack of mistake under
our new Evidence Code at the time of Thompson’s trial.

During Thompson’s trial, the State offered testimony about the
attempted armed robbery of Ward. Before that testimony was entered,
the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence
for plan, motive, and to negate or disprove mistake. The jury was not
instructed that it could consider the evidence for purposes of intent.
In fact, Thompson’s counsel objected to including an intent instruc-

eS 539

tion because the trial court had not previously identified intent as a
permissible purpose in its written order or in its ruling from the
bench. The State agreed that intent would not be included in the jury
instruction. At trial, the State’s witness changed his story and denied
that Thompson had been involved in the attempted armed robbery.
The State proceeded to impeach its witness with a transcript of
prior statements he made nine months earlier while pleading guilty
to the attempted armed robbery. At the time of his plea, the witness
hadidentified Thompson as one of the people involved in the attempted
armed robbery. In addition to the witness’s testimony and impeach-
ment, the State presented a document showing that Thompson was
indicted in connection with the attempted armed robbery of Ward and
that Thompson pled guilty to charges including criminal attempt to
commit armed robbery in connection with that crime. The trial court
admitted a copy of the indictment and Thompson’s plea agreement as
exhibits.*
In evaluating the admission of this evidence, we start with the
proposition that OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”) is, on its face,
“an evidentiary rule of inclusion which contains a non-exhaustive list
of purposes other than bad character for which other acts evidence is
deemed relevant and may be properly offered into evidence.” State v.
Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 159 (773 SE2d 170) (2015) (citing United States
v. Jernigan, 341 F3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003)). Despite its inclu-
sive nature, Rule 404 (b) “prohibits the admission of such evidence
when it is offered solely for the impermissible purpose of showing a
defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit a crime.” Id.
(emphasis in original). Consequently, we use a three-part test to
determine if evidence of other uncharged acts is admissible. Id.; see
also Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 655 (769 SE2d 892) (2015). Our
threshold inquiry is whether the evidence is probative of a material
issue other than character. Bradshaw, 296 Ga. at 655; see also Jones,
297 Ga. at 159; Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (108
SCt 1496, 99 LE2d 771) (1988). Common examples include “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident.” OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). Second, the evidence
must meet the requirements of OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) — its
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its undue
prejudice. Bradshaw, 296 Ga. at 655. And, third, the State must offer
sufficient proof that the defendant committed the act. Id. “A trial

® The record reflects that Thompson, along with the State's witness and two other men, was
indicted on charges stemming from the attempted armed robbery of Ward. Thompson eventu-
ally pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated battery, aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

540 es

court’s decision to admit other acts evidence will be overturned only
where there is a clear abuse of discretion.” Jones, 297 Ga. at 159. We
address the purported rationales for the admission of the subsequent
robbery evidence in turn.

The trial court concluded that the Ward attempted armed rob-
bery was admissible to show Thompson’s motive to commit the
murders. Evidence of the defendant’s motive is of course relevant,
even though it may incidentally place the defendant’s character in
evidence. “Motive has been defined as ‘the reason that nudges the will
and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent.’ ” Bradshaw, 296
Ga. at 657 (citation omitted). “Overall similarity between the charged
crime and the extrinsic offense is not required when the offense is
introduced to show motive.” Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 726 (783
SE2d 895) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Even so, to be
admitted to prove motive, extrinsic evidence must be ‘logically rel-
evant and necessary to prove something other than the accused’s
propensity to commit the crime charged.’” Id. (citation omitted;
emphasis supplied).

The fact that Thompson may have committed a similar type of
crime — an armed robbery coordinated with a group of perpetrators
—is not enough to show motive for the murders at issue under Rule
404 (b). United States v. Ricks, 643 Fed. Appx. 894, 897 (11th Cir.
2016) (evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for robbery should not
have been admitted under Rule 404 (b) during his carjacking trial; the
alleged similarities between the two crimes — use of guns, physical
force, masks, and co-conspirators fleeing police in a car — are all
common in robberies); see also Brooks, 298 Ga. at 726-727.

The State alleged that the murders and the subsequent attempted
armed robbery showed that Thompson would shoot at people when he
was angry. But the witness to the attempted armed robbery did not
testify that Thompson used a gun during that crime. And the evidence
in this murder trial did not indicate that Thompson was inside the
apartment when the victims were shot. We are particularly unper-
suaded that the presence of a gun at the scene of each crime is
sufficient, without more, to show motive when there is no implication
that the defendant was the one who used a gun during the crimes.
There is no apparent reason that the subsequent attempted armed
robbery shows evidence of motive rather than propensity. That later
act was not connected to the murders, and the only similarities it
shares with the murders are the all-too-common elements of guns and
an assortment of co-conspirators. Thompson’s participation in a crime
that involved a gun, attempted armed robbery, and co-conspirators is
therefore not enough to show motive for the earlier unrelated crime.

eS al

The fact that the subsequent attempted armed robbery was not
admissible to show motive is not the end of our inquiry because the
jury was also instructed that it could consider the subsequent act as
evidence of plan or lack of mistake. But there is nothing in the record
to suggest that the two crimes were part of a common plan. United
States v. McNair, 605 F3d 1152, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010) (unindicted acts
of bribery involving same defendants admissible to show common
plan of bribing officials); see also United States v. Dothard, 666 F2d
498, 502 (11th Cir. 1982) (Rule 404 (b) requires more than simply
showing a propensity to plan to commit the type of crime charged).
Here, again, the attempted armed robbery shows, if anything, merely
a propensity to commit robbery, and not acommon scheme or plan to
commit robberies in a certain way.

Moreover, there is no allegation that Thompson accidentally or
mistakenly shot the victims or that he accidentally or mistakenly
stole their property. See Parks v. State, 300 Ga. 303, 306 (794 SE2
623) (2016) (prior extrinsic act inadmissible to show knowledge ani
absence of mistake or accident where there was no question as to
defendant’s knowledge and defendant made no claim that he acci-
dentally or mistakenly shot victim). Nor do the two crimes share
common perpetrators such that the subsequent crime demonstrates
that Thompson knew during the first crime that one of the other
perpetrators would use a gun. See United States v. Sterling, 738 F3:
228, 239 (11th Cir. 2013) (prior armed robbery involving defendant
and co-defendant admissible to show defendant’s knowledge that
co-defendant would use a gun in a subsequent armed robbery). Set-
ting aside whether a defense of mistake or accident is a pre-
requisite to admission of evidence under Rule 404 (b) for this purpose,
the circumstances here do not support admission. The attempte’
armed robbery occurred three-and-a-half years after the murders at
issue and did not involve the same group of people. Consequently, the
attempted armed robbery evidence does little, if anything, to she
any light on whether Thompson knew that his alleged co-conspirators
intended to rob and murder the victims in this case.

On appeal, the State contends that the evidence at issue was
properly admitted to show intent. Whether it could have been or not,
it was not. The trial court did not instruct the jury on intent. Ani
before the evidence was admitted, Thompson specifically objected to
any instruction on intent, and the State agreed to remove the
language. Under these circumstances, we decline to consider whether
the evidence would have been admissible to show intent, although
this declination should not be read as a suggestion that the answer
would be different if we did consider intent. Accordingly, we conclude

5g es

that the evidence of Thompson’s subsequent attempted armed rob-
bery was not properly admitted.

The trial court’s error in admitting the subsequent attempted
armed robbery requires that Thompson be given a new trial unless we
can conclude that the test for nonconstitutional harmless error has
been satisfied. In other words, we must examine “whether itis highly
probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Smith v.
State, 299 Ga. 424, 432 (788 SE2d 433) (2016) (citation omitted).
Where evidentiary error is deemed harmless, it is often true that the
evidence was only “marginal” to the prosecution’s case. Johnson v.
State, 301 Ga. 277, 280 (800 SE2d 545) (2017). “In determining
whether trial court error was harmless, we review the record de novo,
and we weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to
have done so as opposed to viewing it all in the light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict.” Peoples v. State, 295 Ga. 44, 55 (757 SE2d 646)
(2014) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Rivera v. State,
295 Ga. 380, 382 (761 SE2d 30) (2014). That standard has not been
met in this case.

Tobe sure, there is evidence that Thompson’s phone was near the
crime scene at about the time the murders took place. But the phone
records are not precise enough to pinpoint exactly where Thompson
was the night of the murders. Likewise, the evidence that Geddis’s
phone pinged off a tower near Thompson’s house sometime after the
murder took place does not establish that Thompson had the victim’s
phone. But unlike in cases where other direct or circumstantial
evidence connects the defendant to the crime — thus making it highly
unlikely that improper evidence influenced the jury’s verdict — here
the testimony of an ever-shifting witness (Heath), and the fact that
the stripped Malibu was found near Thompson’s home is the only
other evidence tying Thompson to the crime. Moreover, the prosecu-
tion emphasized in closing that Thompson had a history of armed
robbery — precisely the kind of propensity argument that Rule 404
(b) is designed to guard against.

So, although the properly admitted evidence is sufficient to
convict Thompson, we cannot say that it is so overwhelming, or that
the improper character evidence was so marginal, that the jury’s
verdict was not likely to be impacted. We must reverse.

B. Other Acts Evidence: Thompson’s Drug and Gun Activities.
Although Thompson’s convictions in this case will stand reversed,
because the same issue may arise on retrial, we still address Thomp-
son’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion under Rule
404 (b) by admitting evidence that he was a drug dealer and sold his

eS bas

co-defendant, Russell, an AK-47. This time, however, we disagree
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged
evidence.

Heath’s statement to officers that Thompson was a drug dealer
was used to prove the motive and circumstances immediately sur-
rounding the murders. The evidence also provides context to Heath’s
testimony that he entered the car under the pretense that Thompson
wanted Heath to test drugs. Evidence that Thompson was a drug
dealer went directly to explaining why he would ask Heath to come
with him to “test drugs,” and was, therefore, admissible “even if it
incidentally places [the defendant’s] character at issue.” Davis v.
State, 301 Ga. 397, 401 (801 SE2d 897) (2017) (citing United States v.
Edouard, 485 F3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Foster,
889 F2d 1049, 1053 (11th Cir. 1989)).° The trial court, therefore, did
not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.

And contrary to Thompson’s contention before this Court, the
jury heard Heath claim in a video interview that Thompson pur-
chased a gun from Russell. Heath did not claim that Thompson sold
the gun to Russell. Purchasing a gun is not the type of act that relates
to Thompson’s character. Williams v. State, 284 Ga. 849, 850 (672
SE2d 619) (2009) (“[E]vidence of gun ownership does not, in and of
itself, impute bad character to a defendant.”). We therefore find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to permit the jury to
hear evidence that Thompson purchased a gun from his co-defendant.

IV.

Thompson also contends that the trial court erred when it
allowed Coey to testify about a conversation he had with Geddis on
the night Geddis and Melody were murdered because the statement
did not have the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness to be admis-
sible pursuant to OCGA § 24-8-807 (“Rule 807”). In that conversa-
tion, Geddis told Coey that he was waiting on someone to come over
to sell him a .40 caliber gun. As it turns out, the same caliber gun was
used to kill Geddis and Melody. We conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it determined that Coey’s testimony
was admissible.

® Because this evidence was used to explain the sequence of events leading up to the crime,
notice was not required. OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (requiring a party to give notice when it intends
to seek the admission of extrinsic act evidence). Instead, the evidence is intrinsic evidence
because it forms an “integral and natural part of the witness's accounts of the circumstances
surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was indicted.” Edouard, 485 F3d at 1344
(citation and punctuation omitted).

54 es

Under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, a statement not
specifically covered by any law but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness is admissible if the court determines
that:

(1) The statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact;

(2) The statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the pro-
ponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and

(3) The general purposes of the rules of evidence and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.

OCGA § 24-8-807. A Rule 807 analysis must consider whether the
statements have guarantees of trustworthiness given the circum-
stances under which they were made. Rivers v. United States, 777 F3d
1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2015). We examine the trustworthiness of the
declarant who originally made the statements, not the trustworthi-
ness of the witness reciting the statements. Id. The standard of
review for the admission of evidence under the residual exception is
abuse of discretion. See id. And the standard of review is meaningful:
we are “particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s admissibility
ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a definite and
firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the
conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.”
Id. at 1312 (citation and punctuation omitted).

Much of the Rule 807 analysis is easily satisfied here. The
statement that Geddis was waiting on someone to come to their home
and sell him a .40 caliber gun was a material fact given that Geddis
and Melody were later shot to death with a .40 caliber gun and there
was no forced entry into their home. There was no comparable
evidence available on this point; during the hearing, the State averred
that it did not have any other evidence to show that one of the victims
was planning to buy a handgun that night or that the victims expected
someone to come by their home. Admitting the otherwise unavailable
evidence that established Geddis was waiting for someone to come
over on that day and sell him a gun of the same caliber that was used
to kill him is consistent with the general requirement of providing a
fair trial designed to reach the truth. See United States v. Munoz, 16
F3d 1116, 1122 (11th Cir. 1994). And circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness exist because this was an innocent phone call between
the victim and a member of his fiancée’s family, and the other
evidence before the trial court corroborated Geddis’s call to Coey.

eS 545

See Tanner v. State, 301 Ga. 852, 856 (804 SE2d 377) (2017) (decla-
ration to mother consistent with other evidence was admissible under
Rule 807).

Thompson urges that, even if Coey’s statement is otherwise
admissible under Rule 807, the trial court should have excluded the
statement because the State failed to provide appropriate notice of its
intent to use Coey’s statement or testimony. The State counters that
Coey’s statement was included in the pretrial discovery materials
given to Thompson in 2010. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent,
failure to provide pretrial notice of Rule 807 evidence is not fatalifthe
defendant is not harmed by the lack of notice and had a fair oppor-
tunity to address the statements. See United States v. Parker, 749
F2d 628, 633 (11th Cir. 1984). But that issue of notice is unlikely to
arise during a retrial, so we leave for another day the determination
of what constitutes “harm” and “fair opportunity” within the context
of Rule 807.

V.

Likewise, we decline to address Thompson’s remaining conten-
tions concerning the trial court’s denial of his request for a continu-
ance to locate a witness and the effectiveness of trial counsel.

Although we reverse Thompson’s criminal convictions based on
the incorrect admission of evidence, we again note that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s guilty verdicts. Double jeop-
ardy therefore would not bar a retrial in this instance.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 2, 2017.

Eric J. Taylor, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Kevin C. Armstrong,
Lyndsey H. Rudder, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, S. Taylor
Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

546 Pe

$17A0989. ANTHONY v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 891)

GRANT, Justice.

Appellant Jelani Asim Anthony was convicted of malice murder
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.’ On
appeal, Anthony contends that the trial court erred by (1) refusing to
suppress an identification obtained as the result of an allegedly
flawed lineup and (2) failing to grant his motion for new trial after
new evidence relating to an alternate suspect was revealed. Anthony
further contends that his trial counsel and post-trial counsel were
ineffective in a number of ways. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

In the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence pre-
sented at trial shows the following. Late one night, Eric Scales drove
a burgundy Toyota Highlander into the Wyndcliff Apartment com-
plex with appellant Jelani Anthony in the passenger seat. Anthony
got out of the SUV, walked over toward the curb and shot Warren
Broadnax eight times with a .40 caliber Sig Sauer semi-automatic
pistol. Anthony then got back into Scales’s car, and the two drove
away. Broadnax died from the gunshot wounds.

Roommates Redd Coker and Brandon Love were living in an
apartment at Wyndcliff with a sliding door that faced a parking lot.
On the night Broadnax was murdered, Coker had just returned from
work when he saw headlights flash across his sliding door. Thinking
that the headlights might belong to his girlfriend’s car, Coker looked
out the sliding glass door of his balcony and watched as a man got out
of a dark colored SUV. Coker and Love then heard ten to fifteen
gunshots. From the same sliding glass door, Coker watched as a
person walked back to the SUV while putting a gun in his waistband.

+ On December 2, 2011, a Cobb County grand jury indicted Anthony and his co-defendant
Erie Scales for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and three counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the shooting death
of Warren Broadnax. After a joint trial, a jury found Anthony guilty on all counts. Anthony was
sentenced to life for malice murder and aconsecutive five-year sentence for one of the possession
counts. The trial court purported to merge the remaining counts for sentencing purposes.
Though the trial court's nomenclature is wrong, see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (434
SE2d 479) (1993), neither party urges this Court to correct any errors with regard to Anthony's
sentence and the result is proper. Anthony filed a timely motion for new trial, which was
subsequently amended through new counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied Anthony's
motion for new trial. Anthony filed a timely notice of appeal, which was amended by new
appellate counsel, and his appeal was docketed in this Court to the April 2017 term and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.

eS 547

When the SUV door opened, the interior lights came on and illumi-
nated the person’s face. As a result, Coker got a good look at the
shooter before the SUV drove away. Coker would later identify the
shooter as Anthony.

After the SUV left, Coker and Love went outside and found
Broadnax. Coker called 911, but left the scene before officers arrived
because he had an outstanding arrest warrant for violating his
probation. Police arrived and found Broadnax, who was bleeding
heavily from multiple gunshot wounds. Detective Ron Waddell recov-
ered the victim’s cell phone and called the numbers listed in the
recent call log. Detective Waddell spoke to people associated with
every number except for one — a number listed simply as V-A. In an
attempt to identify the person listed as V-A, Detective Waddell spoke
toa woman who was a resident at Wyndcliff and who had previously
allowed Broadnax to find shelter in her apartment when he was in the
complex parking lot without another place to go. The resident reported
that a young man driving a burgundy Toyota Highlander attempted
to pick her up in the parking lot on the night of Broadnax’s murder.
The young man gave her a phone number, which she kept. That phone
number matched the number listed as V-A in Broadnax’s phone. After
speaking to another resident, Detective Waddell determined that the
man who spoke to the resident was Eric Scales. In the meantime,
Atlanta police located a burgundy Toyota Highlander that had been
reported stolen. Inside the SUV, they found personal property belong-
ing to Broadnax and a security guard uniform with the name
E. Scales.

Detective Waddell obtained a court order for the subscriber
information, call details, and cell tower information for Scales’s cell
phone number. Detective Waddell learned that Scales had made
multiple calls to Broadnax; the two men appeared to speak almost
daily. More importantly, cell tower information showed that Scales’s
cell phone was near the murder scene the night Broadnax died. Scales
had not called Broadnax since the murder.

Through a series of leads, Detective Waddell obtained a second
court order for information relating to another phone number, which
turned out to be Anthony’s. The cell phone records showed that
Scales’s phone had stopped near Anthony’s residence the night of the
murder. Then both Scales’s cell phone and Anthony’s cell phone
traveled to the Wyndcliff apartments at about the time Broadnax was
killed. Anthony’s cell phone was turned off while he was at the
apartment complex, but it was turned back on a few days later.

Coker agreed to come to the police station and try to identify the
man he saw in the parking lot on the night Broadnax was murdered.
Detective Waddell assured Coker that if he came to the station he

58 P|

would not be arrested on his outstanding probation warrant at that
time. Coker agreed, and a detective who was not involved in the
investigation, Detective Turner, conducted the photographic lineup
with Coker. Detective Turner and Coker went through two sequential
lineups.? The first sequential lineup included a photograph of Scales.
Coker did not make any identification when shown that lineup. Coker
was then shown a second sequential lineup that contained a picture
of Anthony. Coker identified Anthony as the man from the parking
lot.

Police then arrested Anthony, who provided a statement after he
was advised of his Miranda rights. In his statement, Anthony admit-
ted that he owned a .40 caliber Sig Sauer semi-automatic pistol. He
admitted that he was friends with Scales, and that he knew Broad-
nax. Anthony confessed to being with Scales the night Broadnax was
murdered, but insisted that he had gone to a different apartment
complex than the one where the murder took place. When confronted
with the evidence that his cell phone was at Wyndcliff, Anthony
hedged that he knew Scales was driving the burgundy Toyota High-
lander, but still denied being in the car at the time of the crime. When
informed that a witness had identified him as being in the Wyndcliff
parking lot at the time of the crime, Anthony said “maybe” he had
been there, but maintained that he was nothing more than a passen-
ger in Scales’s SUV.

Scales, for his part, testified that he shot Broadnax in self-defense.
In Scales’s version of events, Broadnax and another man, identified
only as Little C, were in his SUV at the Wyndcliff Apartments.
Broadnax found a gun inside the SUV and pointed it at Scales. Scales
then wrestled the gun away from Broadnax and shot him with it.

At trial, a jury found Anthony guilty of malice murder among
other crimes, and Anthony filed a motion for new trial, which he later
amended. The trial court denied his motion. We note that three
different attorneys have represented Anthony. First, trial counsel —
who conducted the trial and filed the first motion for new trial. Next,
post-trial counsel — who amended the motion for new trial, con-
ducted the motion for new trial hearing, and then filed the first notice
of appeal. Finally, appellate counsel — who filed an amended notice
of appeal and the briefs before this Court and currently represents
Anthony.

2 In a sequential lineup, the witness is shown each photograph individually instead of
being shown six photographs at the same time. The alternative procedure, in which six
photographs are shown at the same time, is referred to as a six pack.

eS 549

Although Anthony does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, we find that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier
of fact to find Anthony guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes
for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. 8. 307
(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

II.

Anthony’s first contention is that the trial court erred by refusing
to suppress evidence of Coker’s identification of Anthony as the
shooter because the photographic lineup was flawed.* We disagree.

At trial, Detective Turner testified that he conducted two sequen-
tial lineups with Coker. Anthony objected and asked to approach the
bench. During a bench conference conducted outside the presence of
the jury, Anthony contended that in discovery the State had provided
him with a single six-pack style lineup and not with any individual
pictures from sequential lineups. When the State tendered the sequen-
tial lineups into evidence, Anthony again objected that the State did
not provide those lineups to him during discovery. After a brief recess
to permit Anthony to look at the pictures, the trial court admitted the
evidence as State’s exhibits 7 and 8 over the objection.

The objection that Anthony now raises is different from the one
he raised in his motion to suppress or at trial. Anthony’s sole objection
at trial was based on his belief that he had not been provided with the
sequential lineup pictures during discovery. Anthony’s counsel sub-
sequently informed the trial court that the State had provided a copy
of the sequential lineup pictures. He made no further objections to the
lineup identification evidence. In order to preserve an objection for
appellate review, the specific ground of the objection must be made at
the time the challenged evidence is offered. Hurt v. State, 298 Ga. 51,
53-54 (779 SE2d 313) (2015). An issue that is not presented or ruled
on by the trial court is not preserved for appellate review.t McClendon
v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 616 (791 SE2d 69) (2016). We conclude that
Anthony’s objection at trial did not specifically raise the issue of
whether the photographic lineup procedures were flawed and resulted

® Prior to his trial, Anthony filed a motion to suppress photographic identifications and
argued that the identification procedures were “so unreliable as to give rise to a substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” The record does not contain any pretrial ruling on
that motion; nor does it appear that Anthony renewed his motion during trial.

+ Anthony's trial occurred before January 1, 2013 and was controlled by a prior version of
our Evidence Code, Under our new Evidence Code, we can conduct a plain error review of
certain unpreserved evidentiary errors affecting substantial rights. See OCGA § 24-1-103 (d).
But we cannot do so here.

550 P|

in an unreliable identification by Coker whether in-court or out-of-
court. Similarly, the issue was not raised or ruled upon by the order
denying Anthony’s motion for new trial. The issue therefore is not
preserved for our review.

Ill.

Anthony’s next contention is that the trial court erred in failing
to grant his motion for new trial. Anthony claims that he introduce’
new evidence of an undisclosed police suspect, Anthony Carmon, who
was the subject of a “Be On the Lookout” (“BOLO”) bulletin created by
Detective Waddell. Anthony mounts a two-pronged attack based on
the BOLO. First, he asserts that the BOLO bulletin for Carmon fits
the statutory parameters for a new trial based on newly discovere’
evidence under OCGA § 5-5-23.° Second, he asserts that the BOLO
demonstrates that police had another suspect or potential witness to
the crime and the State’s failure to disclose that evidence constitutes
aclear Brady violation. Both of these claims fail.

A. The standard for granting a new trial based on newly discov-
ered evidence is well established. A party who asks for a new tria.
based on newly discovered evidence must satisfy the court:

(1) that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the
trial; (2) that it was not owing to the want of due diligence
that he did not acquire it sooner; (3) that itis so material that
it would probably produce a different verdict; (4) that it is not
cumulative only; (5) that the affidavit of the witness himself
should be procured or its absence accounted for; and (6) that
a new trial will not be granted if the only effect of the
evidence will be to impeach the credit of a witness.

Wimberly v. State, 302 Ga. 321, 326 (8) (806 SE2d 599) (2017) (quoting
Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 491 (271 SE2d 792) (1980)) (citation
omitted). Here, Anthony has not demonstrated that the Carmon
BOLO was not known to him at or prior to his trial. He has also failed
to establish that the BOLO is so material that it would probably have
produced a different verdict — it is not.

® Under OCGA § 5-5-23:
‘A new trial may be granted in any case where any material evidence, not
merely cumulative or impeaching in its character but relating to new and material
facts, is discovered by the applicant after the rendition of a verdict against him and
is brought to the notice of the court within the time allowed by law for entertaining
a motion for a new trial.

ee 551

At trial, Anthony testified for the first time that a man named

“Little C” was in Scales’s SUV the night of the murder — neither he
nor Scales had ever mentioned Little C to police before — and that he
himself exited the SUV after Scales and Little C started smoking
marijuana inside. Scales’s testimony was somewhat different; he
contended that Little C was already at the Wyndcliff apartments on
the night of the murders. Scales testified that he hada gun in his SUV
and that Broadnax had picked up that gun. According to Scales, he
then took the gun away from Broadnax and shot Broadnax as
Broadnax was reaching for his waistband. Neither Anthony nor
Scales ever testified that Little C was the actual shooter.
On appeal, Anthony contends that the BOLO for Carmon is
relevant because Carmon is Little C, and the BOLO demonstrates
that police must have suspected that Little C was the shooter or was
involved in the murder. Because the Carmon BOLO was not intro-
duced at trial, Anthony now presumes that trial counsel did not know
about it. But there is no indication, other than Anthony’s own
speculation, that the BOLO was not provided to Anthony’s trial
counsel during discovery. It was Bates stamped, and he has provided
no explanation of where it might have come from other than the
original case file. The mere fact that trial counsel did not use it during
trial does not establish that it was not available.

Andin any event, the BOLO is not so material that it would have
produced a different outcome at trial. As an initial matter, until now,
Anthony has never suggested that Little C was Carmon. But even
assuming that Little C and Carmon are the same person, neither
Anthony nor Scales claimed that Little C was the shooter. None of the
other witnesses testified to seeing a third person in the SUV on the
night of the murder. Thus — even if the jury believed Scales and
Anthony that a third person was present and that Little C was
Carmon — the jury never heard any testimony that Little C was the
shooter. Consequently, there is no likelihood that the jury would have
produced a different verdict had it known of the Carmon BOLO. We
therefore conclude that Anthony is not entitled to a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence.

B. Anthony maintains that the State’s failure to produce the
BOLO prior to his trial also constituted a Brady violation.®

We first note that Anthony did not raise this issue at trial or as
a part of his motion for new trial. Because he has raised his Brady

° A Brady violation refers to “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request” and such suppression “violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. 8. 83, 87 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963).

562 P|

claim for the first time on appeal, Anthony has waived the right to
raise this objection on appeal. Pierce v. State, 286 Ga. 194, 196 (686
SE2d 656) (2009) (failure to raise available Brady claim at trial or in
motion for new trial waives right to raise this objection on appeal).
Nevertheless, we note that even if Anthony had not waived this
contention, his claim would still fail because the analysis related to
his “new evidence” claim shows that he cannot meet any of the four
Brady factors.
Four factors must be present to establish a Brady violation:

(1) the State, including any part of the prosecution team,
possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) the defen-
dant did not possess the favorable evidence and could not
obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) the State
suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have
been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense.

State v. James, 292 Ga. 440, 441 (738 SE2d 601) (2013) (citation and
footnote omitted).

As previously mentioned, there is no evidence that Anthony’s
trial counsel did not possess the BOLO prior to trial. The fact that trial
counsel did not refer to Carmon at trial does not establish that the
State failed to disclose the BOLO, or that the State actively sup-
pressed it. Nor is there any probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been any different with the BOLO. Anthony’s Brady claim
fails.

IV.

Anthony contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in a
myriad of ways. Specifically, Anthony contends that his trial counsel
failed to effectively investigate the lineup method and failed to
cross-examine Detectives Turner and Waddell effectively about incon-
sistencies in the lineup method. He contends that trial counsel failed
to investigate Carmon as a potential witness involved in the incident;
failed to effectively cross-examine Detective Waddell and permitted
him to speculate about Anthony’s motive; abandoned a pretrial
Jackson-Denno’ motion; failed to call character witnesses; and failed
to object and move to strike the State’s closing argument references

7 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

eS 568

to Little C. Anthony’s post-trial counsel raised two claims of ineffec-
tive assistance below: trial counsel’s failure to investigate Carmon
and trial counsel’s failure to effectively cross-examine Detective
Waddell. Anthony’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel are procedurally barred because they were not raised “at the
earliest practicable moment.” Williams v. Moody, 287 Ga. 665, 666
(697 SE2d 199) (2010); see also Wilson v. State, 286 Ga. 141, 144 (686
SE2d 104) (2009) (“A defendant cannot resuscitate claims of ineffec-
tiveness that are procedurally barred simply by bootstrapping them
to a claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel.”) (citation and
punctuation omitted). We turn now to Anthony’s preserved claims.

We have recognized that our evaluation of ineffective assistance
claims is controlled by the standard established by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). “The Strickland v. Washington
standard consists of a two-prong analysis: first, counsel's perfor-
mance must have been deficient, and second, the deficiency must
have prejudiced the defense.” Hooks v. Walley, 299 Ga. 589, 590-591
(791 SE2d 88) (2016) (punctuation omitted). “If an appellant fails to
meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test,
the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.”
Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 533-534 (690 SE2d 801) (2010).

Anthony contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assis-
tance by failing to investigate Carmon as a potential witness involved
in the incident. A failure to adequately investigate a case may indeed
constitute ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Zant v. Hamilton, 251 Ga. 553
(307 SE2d 667) (1983) (trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
alibi witnesses who could have testified that defendant was at work
— approximately three-and-a-half hours distant from the crime
scene — only an hour after the robbery occurred).

Here, Anthony bases his ineffective assistance claim on trial
counsel's failure to investigate Carmon. But at trial Anthony failed to
claim that Carmon and Little C were the same person. Nonetheless,
trial counsel attempted to cast doubt on Anthony’s involvement in the
crime and on the completeness of the police investigation by question-
ing witnesses about Little C. And Anthony did not show that Carmon,
who did not testify at the motion for a new trial hearing, would have
been a relevant witness. Instead, the evidence presented at the motion
for new trial hearing indicated that Carmon was not a suspect in the
crime. The evidence thus supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Anthony did not meet his burden to show ineffective assistance of
counsel in this regard. See Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga. 576, 579 (669 SE2d
133) (2008) (appellant did not demonstrate ineffective assistance

564 P|

based on trial counsel’s failure to call an alibi witness where no
testimony substantiated the claim that the witness’s testimony would
have been favorable).

Anthony also contends that trial counsel was ineffective when he
failed to conduct effective cross-examination of Detective Waddell.
Anthony appears to believe that trial counsel permitted Detective
Waddell to speculate about Anthony’s perceived motive to murder a
man whom he had never met. At trial, Detective Waddell’s testimony
indicated that as far as he could tell, Anthony was taking care of some
business for Scales. Trial counsel followed up with several questions
emphasizing the lack of prior connection between the victim and
Anthony.

[rial counsel’s tactical decisions about cross-examination will
not constitute ineffective assistance unless they are so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen that
approach. Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344-345 (745 SE2d 637)
(20138). We cannot say that trial counsel’s decision here was patently
unreasonable. In fact, trial counsel’s inquiries about motive may have
emphasized that there was no evidence of any prior connection
between Anthony and the victim. Anthony has again failed to show
deficiency.

V.

In addition to his arguments regarding trial counsel, Anthony
contends that his post-trial counsel was ineffective in a variety of
ways, including the failure to subpoena trial counsel, failure to
develop a record surrounding the Carmon BOLO, and, in general,
because of her subsequent disbarment.

To preserve the issue of ineffective assistance of post-trial coun-
sel, Anthony’s appellate counsel had to “raise the issue at the earliest
practicable opportunity of post-conviction review or the issue is
waived.” Ruiz v. State, 286 Ga. 146, 148 (686 SE2d 253) (2009).
Anthony has met that standard because his current appellate counsel
did not represent him prior to this appeal. Generally, when a pre-
served ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised for the first
time on appeal, we must remand for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue. Id. But “[r]jemandis not mandated if we can determine from the
record that the defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of
counsel under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland[.]” Id. at 149
(citation omitted); see also Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 51 (771 SE2d
879) (2015). We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary
in this case because we have already concluded that each of Anthony’s
preserved claims of trial error or ineffective assistance of trial counsel

eS 565

lacks merit. Accordingly, the failure of post-trial counsel to subpoena
trial counsel does not demonstrate prejudice as required under
Strickland.

Lastly, the fact that post-trial counsel was subsequently dis-
barred* does not itself show ineffective assistance in Anthony’s
particular case. Cross v. State, 271 Ga. 427, 432 (520 SE2d 457)
(1999). Disbarment alone is not sufficient to change the standard for
ineffective assistance, and Anthony has not shown that post-trial
counsel’s disciplinary matters were related to this case or that
post-trial counsel performed deficiently.

In sum, we affirm Anthony’s convictions and find that Anthony
has failed to meet his burden to show that his trial counsel or
post-trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 2, 2017.

Reid G. Kennedy, for appellant.

D. Victor Reynolds, District Attorney, John R. Edwards, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patri-
cia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Aimee F: Sobhani, Assistant Attor-
ney General, for appellee.

$17A1291. JONES v. MEDLIN.
$17A1292. GARDINER v. MEDLIN.
$17A1293. LUCCI v. MEDLIN.
(807 SE2d 849)

HINES, Chief Justice.

This Court granted applications for certificates of probable
cause from Mark Jason Jones, Kenneth Eric Gardiner, and Dominic
Brian Lucci to appeal the denials of their petitions for writs of habeas
corpus. The cases are consolidated, and for the reasons that follow, we
reverse in each.

Jones, Gardiner, and Lucci were tried and found guilty of malice
murder in the shooting death of Stanley Jackson, as well as of
possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. See Gardiner v.

® Jennifer L. Wright, Anthony's post-trial counsel, was disbarred by order of this Court on
May 23, 2016, well after Anthony's 2012 trial, for issues unrelated to her representation of him.
In the Matter of Wright, 299 Ga. 139 (786 SH2d 686) (2016).

556 es

State, 264 Ga. 329 (444 SE2d 300) (1994). The three defendants were
Army servicemen stationed at Fort Stewart, near Savannah, and are
Caucasian; Jackson was African-American. Evidence presented at
the November 1992 trial showed that, during the day of January 31,
1992, Jones sought to borrow some equipment from a fellow soldier,
Sylvia Ann Wallace, after an inspection, and told Wallace that he was
going to Savannah that night because “he had somebody that he was
going to shoot.” When Wallace inquired who that would be, Jones
replied, “I got a black guy up there I got to get.”

Shortly after 10:00 that night, near the intersection of 33rd Street
and East Broad Street, James White saw two men fire military-type
automatic or semiautomatic rifles! through the window of a 1992 black
Chevrolet Cavalier while a third man drove the car; Jackson was killed
in the shooting. White met investigating officers at the scene and went
with an officer to a police station. There, outside a topless bar named
Club Asia, which was across the street from the station, he saw a car
carrying Jones, Gardiner, and Lucci and told the officer accompanying
him that the car appeared to be the one he saw at the scene of Jackson’s
shooting.? The three men went into Club Asia, and were shortly
removed by officers and caused to stand under a light outside the bar.
From some distance away, White said that he could not be sure that
they were the men from the car, but reiterated his identification of it.?
Later, when White was subpoenaed to appear at a preliminary hear-
ing, he viewed the men more closely and stated that he recognized
Jones and Gardiner as the shooters. At the defendants’ trial, White
identified Jones and Gardiner as the shooters.

After production of records from the police file about the case in
response to a 2010 open records request, the three men filed habeas
petitions asserting that, contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), exculpatory evidence was not
provided to the defense team by the State, namely that (1) prior to
trial, White made statements to police officers that he could not
identify the shooters, contradicting his positive identification of
Jones and Gardiner at trial; (2) White was coerced into testifying at
trial that he could, in fact, positively identify the men; and (3) a police
report of an incident that took place shortly after the shooting,
namely that a man told a patrol officer that, at 1:00 a.m. on February
1, 1992, in the Yamacraw Village public housing complex, Caucasian

1 Ballistic evidence presented at trial indicated the weapons were possibly AK-47s

2 ‘The car he identified was a black Chevrolet Cavalier with a prominent white stripe on the
side.

® The officer who accompanied White during this time filed her report on the matter at
11:40 p.m. on January 31, 1992.

eS 567

males in a white Chevrolet pickup truck and a silver Ford Thunder-
bird, with military style haircuts and semiautomatic weapons, were
“threaten[ing] to shoot blacks who hang out on street corners”
(the “Yamacraw Report”); it is uncontroverted that at 1:00 a.m. on
February 1, 1992, Jones, Gardiner, and Lucci were in police custody.
As the habeas petitions of each of the three men presented the
same assertions, the petitions were consolidated. After an eviden-
tiary hearing, the habeas court determined that the claims were
procedurally defaulted and denied relief. The three men applied to
this Court for certificates of probable cause to appeal from the habeas
court’s order. In 2014, this Court determined that the claims were not
procedurally defaulted, granted the petitions, and remanded the case
to the habeas court, directing it to perform a Brady analysis.
Upon remand, the habeas court denied relief, determining that
he Yamacraw Report would not have been admissible at trial and
hus would not qualify as Brady material; the habeas court rejected
he argument that, if the report had been produced to the defense at
vial, “additional exculpatory evidence could have been gathered” as
imply speculation, and ruled that there was no reasonable probabil-
ity that producing the Yamacraw Report would have changed the
outcome of the trial. As to White’s habeas testimony, which was
contrary to his trial testimony as discussed below, the court noted
that there was considerable evidence presented at trial regarding the
level of certainty of White’s identification, and specifically discredited
White’s habeas testimony. The petitioners again sought certificates of
probable cause to appeal, and these appeals followed.
“Tn reviewing the grant or denial of a petition for habeas corpus,
this Court accepts the habeas court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we indepen-
dently apply the law to the facts.’ [Cit.]” Humphrey v. Lewis, 291 Ga.
202, 204 (II) (728 SE2d 603) (2012).

tata

a

To prevail on a Brady claim, appellant[s] must demonstrate
that the prosecution wilfully or inadvertently suppressed
evidence favorable to the accused, either because it is excul-
patory or impeaching. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. at 87.
However, “the Constitution is not violated every time the
government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that
might prove helpful to the defense.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 436-437 (115 SC 1555, 131 LE2d 490) (1995).
Brady comes into play only when the suppressed evidence is
material, i.e., “only if there is a reasonable probability that,

568 es

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
682 (105 SC 3375, 87 LE2d 481) (1985).

Young v. State, 290 Ga. 441, 443 (2) (721 SE2d 839) (2012).

1. During the habeas hearing, White testified that: he told the
investigator outside Club Asia that the car the defendants were in
“looked like” the shooters’ car, but that he did not recognize the three
suspects and could not identify any of them as the shooters; he aske
investigators to provide him a lineup for identification purposes, but
they would not; he was pressured by investigators, prosecutors, an
members of the community — including clergymen — to identify the
defendants as the shooters; he received anonymous telephone calls to
his house that included threats to his family if he did not identify the
defendants as the shooters; at a preliminary hearing, he identifie
Jones and Gardiner as the shooters; when he subsequently told an
investigator that he could not truly identify them, he was threatene’

with being prosecuted for perjury if
at the preliminary hearing, and
“be rioting in the city” if the defen:

he did not testify at trialas he ha
he was told that there would
ants were not convicted; he then

testified at trial, identifying Jones and Gardiner as the shooters;* in
the years since the trial, he suffered significant mental and physica.
problems that he traced to his trial testimony; and, until approache:
in 2010 by a representative of a nonprofit organization that investi-
gates claims of actual innocence of those incarcerated for life or under
a death sentence, he told no one that he had testified falsely but his
wife, who died before the habeas hearing.

The habeas court specifically found that White’s habeas testimony
“lacked credibility.” The court further noted that the defense had
information that a detective noted that White’s identification was
incomplete or uncertain, and the uncertainty of his identification was
fully explored on cross-examination at trial. Although the petitioners
contend that the result of the trial would have been different if the
defense had known that White definitively informed investigators that
he could not identify the defendants, and that he had been coerced by
the State to make a definitive identification at trial, this ignores the
factual findings of the habeas court that White’s testimony that these

* His trial testimony included the statement that he was “positive” that Gardiner and
Jones were the men he saw shooting from the car.

eS 559

events occurred was not credible.® These contentions were rebutted by
other evidence, the court’s credibility determination on these matters
was not clearly erroneous, and the unestablished contentions do not
form the basis for a Brady claim. See Humphrey, supra.

2. At the time Jackson was killed, Officer B. J. Herron was
assigned to patrol Yamacraw Village, a housing project in Savannah.
The Yamacraw Report is handwritten, and was filled out on a
Savannah Police Department form by Herron. The report shows
Herron as the writer, with a preparation date of February 1, 1992,
and the report is addressed to police precincts “1 & 2.” The report
form’s field for “Reference” is filled in with: “Threats on citizen in
‘Yamacraw.” The body of the report states:

I was advised by a subject that on 2/1/92 [at 1:00 a.m.]
two vehicles entered Yamacraw, silver 2 door 89-91 Ford
Thunderbird and a white Chevy pick-up. Both vehicles were
occupied by white males who were supposedly armed with
semi-automatic weapons. All suspects appeared to have
military style haircuts. Any contact with these suspects in
any housing area, retain information. 10-0.[*] Suspects threaten
to shoot blacks who hang out on corners.

Herron testified during the habeas hearing that, while he was on foot
patrol on February 1, 1992, a man he knew in the community came up
to him and gave him the information he placed in the report; Herron
could not remember exactly who gave him the information, but
believed that, at the time Jackson’s killing was being investigated in
1992, he “probably could have found [him] again.” At the top of the
report, in an unknown handwriting, was written, “Lt. Ragan”; at the
time, Ragan was the lieutenant who oversaw the violent crime unit of
the police department. In his testimony during the habeas hearing,
Lt. Ragan said that he had no memory of the report being routed to
him. The report was ultimately included in the police file about this
case.

The habeas court found that the defendants were not provided
the Yamacraw Report “and could not have reasonably obtained it”;

® While the petitioners note that the habeas court's written order does not specifically
address testimony presented regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony in the circum-
stances faced by White, neither the testimony, nor the habeas court's failure to specifically
address it, renders the court's credibility determination clearly erroneous. See Humphrey,
supra.

® Testimony established that this was a police department code meaning that officers
approaching the suspects should use caution.

560 es

the court also stated in its order that there was no indication the State
actively suppressed it.? However, such a finding does not eliminate
the claim from our consideration; as noted, a Brady claim can rest
upon a “demonstrat[ion] that the prosecution wilfully or inadver-
tently suppressed evidence favorable to the accused, either because it
is exculpatory or impeaching. [Cit.]” Young, supra (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Further, Brady’s disclosure requirement even

encompasses evidence “known only to police investigators
and not to the prosecutor.” [Cit.] In order to comply with
Brady, therefore, “the individual prosecutor has a duty to
learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting
on the government’s behalfin this case, including the police.”
[Cit.]

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (II) (119 SCt 1936, 144 LE2d
286) (1999). See also Danforth v. Chapman, 297 Ga. 29, 29 (2) (771
SE2d 886) (2015) (“ (T)he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ [Cit.]”); Schofield v.
Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 852 (2) (621 SE2d 726) (2005) (“It is irrelevant
that a police agency may have possessed the favorable evidence
without the knowledge of the prosecutor; the law places the respon-
sibility and ultimate burden on the prosecutor for the failure to
provide the favorable evidence to the defendant if any part of the
prosecution team possessed and suppressed the favorable evidence.
[Cits.]”)

The habeas court also stated in its order that, “in order to be
considered Brady material, the Yamacraw Report would have to be
admissible evidence.” However, this is a misstatement of the appro-
priate standard. The admissibility of the undisclosed material itself
is not a prerequisite to finding a Brady violation; the question is
whether, had the material “been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different,” in reasonable probability.
Young, supra (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thus, “inadmis-
sible evidence may be material [under Brady] if it... could have led
to the discovery of [material] admissible evidence. [Cit.]” Johnson v.
Folino, 705 F3d 117, 130 (3rd Cir. 2013). See also Bradley v. Nagle,
212 F3d 559, 567 (II) (11th Cir. 2000) (“{I]n order to find that actual

* ‘Testimony presented during the habeas hearing indicated that the report only surfaced
in response to the 2010 open records request for the police file about the case.

eS 561

prejudice occurred — that our confidence in the outcome of the trial
has been undermined — we must find that the evidence in question,
although inadmissible, would have led the defense to some admis-
sible material exculpatory evidence. [Cit.]”); Young, supra (“Because
the report was hearsay and inadmissible, and appellant has not
shown how its disclosure would have led to admissible evidence, it did
not constitute Brady material. [Cit.]”) (Emphasis supplied.)

As to whether the Yamacraw Report is material within the
meaning of Brady, the question is whether in the absence of the
production of the report, the defendants

received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a
different result is accordingly shown when the government’s
evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in the out-
come of the trial.” [Cit.]

Brownlow v. Schofield, 277 Ga. 237, 239 (2) (687 SE2d 647) (2003).
Accord Young, supra.

During the habeas hearing, investigating detectives recognized
that the incident reported in the Yamacraw Report presented certain
similarities to the allegations against the defendants, and would
have warranted further investigation as to that incident’s relation to
Jackson’s slaying. The prosecutor who conducted the trial testified
that, had the Yamacraw Report been in his file, he would have either
disclosed it to the defense, “or been specific about why I was with-
holding it.” And, the Yamacraw Report clearly would have been
helpful to the defense; it was evidence that others similar in appear-
ance were threatening a racial attack similar to that alleged to have
been suffered by Jackson, but three hours after his slaying,® when the
defendants were already in custody. Compare Upton v. Parks, 284 Ga.
254, 255-256 (1) (664 SE2d 196) (2008). Herron’s habeas testimony
indicated that, at the relevant time, he could have identified the
subject who gave him the information in the Yamacraw Report. The
attorneys who represented the defendants at trial testified that, if
they had been provided the report, they would have followed up with
Herron, would have sought other residents of the area who might
have witnessed or received the threats, argued to the jury that the
fact that the defendants were in custody at the time meant that they
could not have been those who committed the acts reported, and thus

® During the habeas hearing testimony regarding the distance from Yamacraw Village to
the scene of Jackson's killing varied from a few blocks to “approximately five miles.”

362 es

there were other potential assailants who the police had not sought.
Thus, the report would have also enabled the defense attorneys to
further their attack on the thoroughness of the police investigation,
see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 (IV) (B) (115 SCt 1555, 131
LE2d 490) (1995), and allowed them to present an alternative theory
regarding the actors responsible for the shooting. See Walker v.
Johnson, 282 Ga. 168, 170 (2) (646 SE2d 44) (2007).

It is certainly true that, due to the passage of time, the man who
provided the information in the Yamacraw Report was not located so
as to enable him to testify at the habeas hearing, and thus the
information that he might have given if his existence had been known
to the defense at the time of trial— and what further information this
might have produced —is unknown. However, even if he had merely
testified at trial to a repetition of that which he had told Herron, the
information would have been impactful, given how the case would
have proceeded at trial.

Although White’s subsequent claims about his trial testimony do
not constitute Brady violations, and thus are not grounds for habeas
relief, we must consider the importance of identity testimony on the
course of the trial. The State’s case was heavily dependent on White’s
testimony and his eyewitness identification of the defendants. That
testimony was attacked as unreliable at trial, as was the quality of
the police investigation into White’s identification; the defense attor-
neys elicited testimony that the investigators failed to ask on the
night of the shooting whether White could identify the suspects by
their faces, and that the investigators conducted no identification
lineup, then or later, either in person or by photograph, even though
the detective who coordinated White’s view of the suspects the night
of the shooting testified that the preferred method of establishing an
identification of a suspect at that point in an investigation was to do
a photographic lineup.

Jackson was killed shortly after 10:00 p.m. on January 31, 1992.
There was trial testimony from several witnesses that, until 9:15 or
9:30 p.m., the petitioners were at the rehearsal of Jones’s wedding,®
which was to take place the next day, and a dinner afterward, which
took place in a town that was over a 50-minute drive away from the
relevant areas of Savannah. No murder weapon was ever recovered;

® Regarding Wallace's testimony of her encounter with Jones on January 31, 1992, Jones's
commanding officer testified that Jones had signed out of the battalion on leave at 12:55 a.m.
on January 30, 1992, was not due to return to duty until February 12, 1992, and would not be
on base for any inspections. Wallace also testified that she saw Jones on a television news
broadcast that started at 11:00 p.m.on January 31, 1992, and that he was then reported to have
been accused in Jackson's shooting.

eS 568

no firearm was found in the defendants’ car, no casings from an
automatic weapon were found there, and the forensic scientist who
vacuumed the interior of the car looking for gunshot residue found
none.’°

There were also significant racial overtones to the trial;
in addition to those factors mentioned in our prior opinion, see
Gardiner, supra at 330 (1), 332 (2), 333 (4), and 334 (9), witnesses
were regularly asked about the defendants’ attitudes toward mem-
bers of other races; had the jury been presented with information that
other persons, not the defendants, were in the area that same night,
apparently ready to engage in racially motivated violence, the out-
come of the trial might well have been different. Thus, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, confidence in the outcome of the trial
was undermined by the State’s failure to provide the Yamacraw
Report to the defense. See Walker, supra. Certainly, in the face of
the Yamacraw Report, the jury “could have voted to convict
[the defendants], [but] we have ‘no confidence that it would have
done so.’ [Cit.]” Wearry v. Cain, __ U.S. __, ___ (II) (136 SCt 1002,
194 LE2d 78) (2016). Accordingly, the habeas court’s denial of the
petitions for writs of habeas corpus must be reversed.

Judgments reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 2, 2017.

Steven L. Sparger; Camiel & Chaney, Peter A. Camiel, for appel-
lants.

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General;
Daniel M. King, Jr., for appellees.

10 The only physical evidence presented against the defendants was that a swab from
Jones's hand tested positive for the presence of gunshot residue; despite prominent directives
on the swab collection form stating otherwise, the person who took the sample from Jones did
not “thoroughly wash and dry” his hands, did not wear gloves, and cartridge cases from the
scene of the shooting were not included with the swab sample sent to the laboratory, and thus
no comparison test was done between the gunshot residue from Jones's hand and the residue
from the cartridge cases. There was also evidence that Jones had handled clothing that had
been worn during a machine gun range exercise the previous day, and that a transfer of gunshot
residue could have occurred at that time.

564 Pe

$17A0711. HODGES v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 856)

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Davoris D. Hodges was found guilty of two counts of
felony murder, armed robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault
related to the shooting death of Khristal Wright, a Johnson County
deputy sheriff. He was found not guilty of malice murder.

Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
shows that prior to the date the victim was murdered, appellant
suggested to his friend Kelvin Rozier that they rob the victim, but
Rozier declined since he did not want to target a member of law
enforcement. At about 9:00 p.m. on March 22, 2013, the victim’s body
was discovered by passing motorists on a road in Laurens County,
just over the county line from Johnson County where appellant
picked up the victim that same evening. Apparently, news of the
victim’s death spread around the community the night of her murder,
and appellant’s aunt, with whom he was living, knew that appellant
had been with the victim that evening. Accordingly, at around 5:00
a.m., appellant’s aunt telephoned the victim’s aunt, handed appel-
lant the telephone, and instructed him to tell the victim’s aunt what
he knew about the victim’s whereabouts the previous evening. The
victim’s aunt testified appellant told her the victim had offered him
money to drive her from Wrightsville to Dublin and he agreed to do so,
but on the way to Dublin, the victim received a phone call and told
appellant she no longer needed him to drive there because she had
another ride. According to the victim’s aunt, appellant told her he
turned around, and at about 8:00 or 8:30 p.m., he let her out of his car
and watched her get into a vehicle that appeared to be either an SUV
or a truck. After speaking to the victim’s aunt, appellant voluntarily
appeared at the police department at about 5:30 a.m. to give his
statement. The audio recording of appellant’s first interview was
played to the jury, in which appellant gave investigators an account
similar to the one he gave the victim’s aunt. Additionally, appellant

1 The crimes occurred on March 22, 2013. On May 16, 2013, a Laurens County grand jury
returned an indictment charging appellant with (Count 1) armed robbery; (Count 2) malice
murder; (Count 3) felony murder (armed robbery); (Count 4) felony murder (aggravated
assault); and (Count 5 and Count 6) two counts of aggravated assault. Appellant's first jury trial
ended with a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. A second jury trial was
condueted December 8-12, 2014. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the Count 2 (malice
murder), and a guilty verdict on all other counts. The trial court sentenced appellant to life
without parole plus a term of 20 years to be served consecutive with the life sentence. Appellant
filed a timely motion for new trial that was later amended. After conducting a hearing, the trial
court denied appellant's motion for new trial by order dated May 6, 2016. Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal, and this case was docketed to the April 2017 term of court for a decision
to be made on the briefs.

eS 565

told investigators that he sold the victim some marijuana before
agreeing to drive the victim to Dublin, and that he dropped the victim
off at the home of one of the victim’s friends, where he saw her get into
a vehicle that appeared to be either a truck or an SUV with others he
could not identify. During this first interview, appellant stated no
other person was with him and the victim as they drove towar
Dublin.

After an investigation into his cell phone records revealed his
location was inconsistent with his statement, the authorities con-
tacted appellant a couple of hours after he gave his first statement
and asked him to return to the police headquarters for a secon!
interview because his earlier story did not check out. The audio
recording of this interview was also played to the jury, and it reflects
that appellant changed his story and became upset and emotiona
when he eventually told the investigators that he had witnessed his
friend’s murder. After he was informed of his rights, he implicate’
Rozier and told the investigators that Rozier had flagged him down as
he was driving to pick up the victim. According to appellant, once the
victim was in the car with them, Rozier pulled out a gun and force
appellant and the victim to get out of the vehicle, forced appellant to
go through the victim’s pockets and take her money, and shot the
victim two or three times. Appellant acknowledged that the gun
belonged to him, but explained that Rozier had it on the night in
question because Rozier had wanted to buy it from him. According to
appellant’s statement, Rozier forced appellant to take him back to the
place appellant picked him up and ordered appellant to discard the
evidence. Appellant told the investigators that Rozier threatened to
kill him and his family if he implicated Rozier in the crimes. Appel-
lant directed law enforcement to a wooded area where a gun was
recovered, and then to a separate location where shell casings were
recovered. He also directed them to cash and other property belong-
ing to the victim hidden at the home of his aunt where he was living
as well as at other nearby locations. The authorities then charged
appellant with the victim’s murder.

Despite appellant’s statements to the authorities on Rozier’s
involvement in the crimes, Rozier had an alibi for the night of the
murder. In fact, cell phone records revealed that while the phones of
appellant and the victim appeared to be at the same spot around the
time of the murder, Rozier’s phone appeared to be in Wrightsville,
where he testified he was on the evening of the murder. At 8:49 p.m.,
Rozier texted appellant asking him where he was, and the two carried
on a text message conversation between 9:42 p.m. and 9:45 p.m. At
trial, appellant called a witness who was the grandmother of one of
appellant’s friends. She testified that on the night of the victim’s

566 es

murder, appellant came to her door and asked to see her grandson,
but the grandson was not at home. She testified that she saw two
other people in the vehicle appellant was driving, and while she could
not identify the other individuals, she believed they were male. On
the other hand, appellant told investigators that he and Rozier had
been seen together that evening at a dumpster on high school
property and he gave them the names of two witnesses who could
confirm that he and Rozier were together. When the investigators
interviewed those witnesses they confirmed seeing appellant near
the dumpster but said he was alone.

The medical examiner testified that the victim died from two
gunshot wounds to her face fired from less than six inches away.
Appellant’s clothing tested positive for the presence of gunshot
primer residue, whereas the test on clothing Rozier said he was
wearing on the night of the murder was not conclusive. Bullet casings
and jackets recovered from the victim’s body matched the gun to
which appellant led the authorities, which belonged to appellant.

1. Although appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the convictions, it is this Court’s practice to
conduct an examination of the record to determine the legal suffi-
ciency of the evidence in murder cases. Having done so, we conclude
the evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to
authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (II) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d
560) (1979).

2. The State sought to introduce a compilation of text messages
between Rozier and appellant on the night the victim was murdered.
Rozier, who was a participant in the text conversation, testified and
authenticated the document’s contents. Evidence may be authenti-
cated by the “[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter
is what it is claimed to be.” OCGA § 24-9-901 (b) (1). This rule applies
to the authentication of text messages retrieved from cell phone
records. See Glispie v. State, 335 Ga. App. 177, 184-185 (1) (b) @) (779
SE2d 767) (2015), rev’d in part on other grounds, 300 Ga. 128 (793
SE2d 381) (2016), and vacated in part on other grounds on remand,
341 Ga. App. 817 (801 SE2d 910) (2017). The trial court did not err by
admitting into evidence this authenticated compilation of messages
between appellant and the authenticating witness.

3. Appellant’s primary defense is coercion, and since he did not
testify at trial, the evidence of this defense consists of appellant’s
statements to police that were recorded and played to the jury. From
the second recorded statement a reasonable juror could conclude that
appellant stated he did not shoot the victim but that he was forced at

eS 367

gunpoint to gather the victim’s property before Rozier allegedly shot
her. Appellant’s counsel made an oral request for a charge on coercion,
but the trial court denied the request. Appellant’s counsel renewed
the request by raising an exception to the instructions after they were
read to the jury, but the trial court again denied the request. Even
assuming that the denial of this request for a coercion instruction was
error, it was harmless.

Even if a trial court errs in failing to give a warranted instruc-
tion, such an error does not necessarily demand reversal. See Hamm
v. State, 294 Ga. 791, 797 (2) (756 SE2d 507) (2014) (addressing the
trial court’s erroneous refusal to give an instruction regarding the
need for corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony). “A conviction in
acriminal case will not be reversed when itis highly probable that an
erroneous jury instruction did not contribute to the verdict.” (Citation
and punctuation omitted.) Id. See also Reddick v. State, 301 Ga. 90,
92-98 (1) (799 SE2d 754) (2017) (addressing the trial court’s alleged
error in refusing to give a requested charge on involuntary man-
slaughter in a murder case). The failure to give a requested charge,
even if authorized by the evidence, can be harmless error. See Brown
v. State, 289 Ga. 259, 261 (2) (710 SE2d 751) (2011) (addressing the
trial court’s failure to give a requested charge on impeachment of a
State’s witness by prior conviction).

The evidence of appellant’s guilt, as summarized above, was
compelling. Among other things, cell phone records placed appellant
at or near the location of the murder at the time it occurred, whereas
phone records belied appellant’s claim that Rozier was with appellant
and the victim. Appellant was in possession of property taken from
the victim, and led the authorities to the location of the murder
weapon and shell casings. Appellant’s clothing tested positive for the
presence of gunshot primer residue, whereas Rozier’s clothes did not.
Appellant first told the victim’s aunt, and then the authorities, a
similar story about the victim’s paying appellant to drive her to
another town, but after commencing the trip, being told by the victim
that she no longer needed the ride. After the investigators told
appellant his story did not add up, appellant changed it to relate the
improbable account that, while on his way to pick up the victim,
Rozier flagged him down, and when the victim entered the car, Rozier
pulled a gun belonging to appellant on appellant and the victim and
forced appellant to take the victim’s property. Appellant also told
investigators that instead of taking possession of the stolen property
himself, however, Rozier forced appellant to take him back to the
place he was picked up and left appellant with the property along
with the responsibility to dispose of the murder weapon. Although a
friend’s grandmother testified she saw two other unidentifiable

568 es

persons in appellant’s vehicle the night of the murder, this evidence
was inconsistent with appellant’s version of events and, in any event,
did not require the jury to accept appellant’s statement that only
Rozier was the perpetrator of the crimes and that appellant was
coerced to act.

The jury heard appellant's statement regarding how the crimes
occurred and was properly instructed, among other things, on the
presumption of innocence, circumstantial evidence, credibility of
witnesses, mere presence, the State’s burden to prove every essential
element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
required element of intent. The jury was instructed:

Aperson is a party toa crime only if that person directly
commits the crime, intentionally helps in the commission of
the crime, intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels
or procures another to commit the crime or intentionally
causes some other person to commit the crime under such
circumstances that the other person is not guilty of any
crime either in fact or because of legal incapacity.

In this case, “we conclude it is highly probable that the trial court’s
refusal to charge on [coercion] did not contribute to the verdict, and
we affirm appellant’s conviction.” (Citation and punctuation omit-
ted.) Reddick v. State, supra, 301 Ga. at 93 (1). Assuming, without
deciding, that the failure to give a charge on coercion was erroneous,
it was harmless error which does not require a new trial. See Duvall
v. State, 259 Ga. 801, 802 (4) (8387 SE2d 880) (1990).

4. Appellant contends he is entitled to a new trial as a result of
juror misconduct. One of the jurors testified at the motion for new
trial hearing that, during the trial, and while at home, she looked up
some words on the dictionary application of an electronic device. She
could not remember the words, but testified that she was trying to
understand some things on which the jury was attempting to make a
decision. She testified, however, that her dictionary search had no
impact upon her “as a juror.” No evidence was presented that she
shared the result of her dictionary search with other jurors. Given
these facts, appellant’s reliance upon Chambers v. State? is mis-
placed. In Chambers, one of the jurors had conducted an on-line
search relating to Georgia law on a subject that was relevant to the
defendant’s defense and shared the result of that search with other
jurors during jury deliberations. The Court of Appeals concluded the

2 321 Ga. App. 512 (739 SE2d 512) (2013).

eS 569

appellant’s motion for new trial should have been granted because
the State did not overcome by proof beyond a reasonable doubt the
presumption of prejudice that arose from the juror’s misconduct in
injecting extrajudicial information into the jury’s deliberations. Id. at
518 (1). Here, no evidence was presented that the juror’s conduct
contributed to the conviction such that the verdict is inherently
lacking in due process. See Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100, 103 (2) (485
SE2d 192) (1997); Bobo v. State, 254 Ga. 146 (327 SE2d 208) (1985).
We are satisfied that the juror’s conduct was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the trial court did not err in denying the motion
for new trial on this ground.

5. Appellant mischaracterizes the juror excusal process the judge
employed in this case as the grant of a blanket and indiscriminate
excusal of those jurors who sought to be excused. Instead, the
transcript demonstrates that after advising potential jurors of the
legal qualifications necessary to serve on a jury, the judge invited any
who may have a problem meeting the qualifications to come forwar
to discuss the matter with him. Several potential jurors came for-
ward, and their discussions with the judge appear in the record. The
record reflects that some jurors were excused and others who requeste
excusal were not excused. Appellant fails to demonstrate any abuse
of trial court discretion in the excusal of any jurors. See Young v. State,
290 Ga. 392, 394-395 (2) (721 SE2d 855) (2012).

6. This Court may resolve a sentencing error even if it was not
raised below or in the appeal. See Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 54 (2)
(766 SE2d 1) (2014). We note such a sentencing error in this case, ant
we vacate the sentence.

Appellant was charged with and found guilty of one count of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 6), and the guilty
ver dict for that charge was merged for purposes of sentencing into the
felony murder conviction for armed robbery. Appellant was charge’
with and found guilty of another count of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon (Count 5). For this guilty verdict, appellant was
sentenced to a term of 20 years to be served consecutive with the life
without parole sentence for felony murder predicated upon arme'
robbery. Appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon as set forth in Count 5 also should have merged into his
armed robbery conviction. See Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 889 (2) (700
SE2d 399) (2010). Instead, the trial court imposed a sentence of 20
years for the guilty verdict on this count. Accordingly, the sentence of
an additional term of years for the guilty verdict for Count 5 is
vacated.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur.

570 Pe

DECIDED NOVEMBER 2, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED NOVEMBER 14, 2017.

Wanda S. Jackson, for appellant.

L. Craig Fraser, District Attorney, Kelli M. Adams, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, for appellee.

$17A0754. BENTON v. THE STATE.
(807 SE2d 450)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Matthew Benton was convicted by a Fulton County jury of malice
murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of
Christopher “Black Magic” Ramsay and the wounding of several
others.! Benton’s motion for a new trial was denied, and he appeals.
Benton argues, among other things, that the trial court erred when it
refused to suppress incriminating statements he made while in police
custody. Because we conclude that Benton’s custodial statements were
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SCt
1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

1. Construed most strongly in support of the verdicts, the evidence
shows that, on the night of July 17, 2008, while Ramsay and the other
victims were drinking, smoking, and socializing outside of an apart-
ment building in the Trafalgar Square Apartments, Benton and his

1 The erimes occurred on or around July 17, 2008. On October 28, 2008, a Fulton County
grand jury indicted Benton along with Maurice Badie and Domonique Hodo. Benton was
charged with malice murder (Count 1); felony murder predicated on aggravated assault
(Count 2); aggravated assault on Ramsay (Count 4); aggravated assault on Quionez Mabry,
Demoroe Paggett, Tyrone Freckleton, and Larry Feggins (Counts 5-8); aggravated battery on
Larry Feggins (Count 9); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Count 10). Benton was tried along with Badie from June 14 through June 22, 2010, anda jury
returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The trial court sentenced Benton to life imprisonment
for malice murder, a twenty-year consecutive term for the aggravated assault of Mabry, two
twenty-year concurrent terms for the aggravated assaults of Paggett and Freckleton, a
twenty-year concurrent term for the aggravated battery of Feggins, and a five-year consecutive
term for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The aggravated assault
on Feggins merged with the aggravated battery on Feggins. The aggravated assault on Ramsay
merged into the malice murder, and the felony murder count was vacated by operation of law.
See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 373 (6) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). On June 23, 2010, Benton
moved for a new trial, and he amended his motion on May 7, 2014. This motion was denied on
March 10, 2015, and Benton timely appealed on March 24, 2015. This case was submitted for
a decision on the briefs and docketed to the term of this Court beginning in April 2017.

eS om

accomplices began shooting at the group, killing Ramsay and wound-
ing four others. Some of the victims returned fire, and the shooting
stopped only after law enforcement and emergency response personnel
arrived on the scene. Despite the large number of people in the area,
investigators had difficulty obtaining statements from eyewitnesses.
Eventually, one eyewitness came forward and identified Benton as one
of the shooters. The eyewitness had been at Trafalgar Square on the
day of the shooting, observed the events leading up to the shooting, and
was present throughout the shooting itself.

Around noon on the day of the shooting, the eyewitness saw
Benton’s younger brother, Drique, riding a four-wheeler. About this
time, the eyewitness overheard a confrontation between Drique and
Ramsay concerning the four-wheeler.? The eyewitness testified that,
following this confrontation, Drique met up with a group of Benton’s
acquaintances, and they all gathered to talk for around four or five
minutes before dispersing. Later that afternoon, the eyewitness saw a
group of men approach Ramsay. They confronted Ramsay about draw-
ing a gun on a “young kid” and asked him if he would “try to draw one
on a man.” The eyewitness also heard other people yelling at Ramsay
that at “12:00... we going to see how much of a man... are you.”

Around 11:45 that same night, the eyewitness heard some rus-
tling noise (like a “stray dog or a stray cat”) coming from acut-through
that connected the Trafalgar Square Apartments with a neighboring
apartment complex. At midnight, he heard gunfire coming from the
same direction as the noise and saw people running and screaming.
The eyewitness identified Benton and Maurice Badie as two of the
shooters, and he saw Ramsay get shot in the head and other people
get struck while they were taking cover and returning fire. Later, the
eyewitness identified Benton as one of the shooters from a photo-
graphic lineup.

Benton was arrested on September 9, 2008, and he was inter-
viewed by an officer about Ramsay’s murder. During the videotaped
interview, Benton denied any involvement in the shooting that killed
Ramsay, but he admitted to shooting at Ramsay on two previous
occasions. Benton also expressed knowledge about the four-wheeler
dispute and about Ramsay pointing a gun at his brother Drique.
Benton moved to suppress the statements, and the trial court held a
Jackson- Denno? hearing on the matter and reviewed a video record-
ing of the interview. The court found that Benton was advised of his

2 The eyewitness mentioned that Ramsay allegedly pointed a gun at Drique during this
confrontation, but then the eyewitness testified that he never actually saw Ramsay with a gun.
2 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964)

572 es

Miranda rights,‘ that he understood them and voluntarily waived
them, and that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Benton
gave his statements freely and voluntarily, without any hope of
benefit or fear of injury. Consequently, Benton’s entire interview was
played for the jury at trial, accompanied by the testimony of the
officer who interrogated him.

Benton does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain his convictions. Nevertheless, as is our customary practice in
murder cases, we independently have reviewed the record with an
eye toward the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude that the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier
of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Benton was guilty of
malice murder and the other offenses of which he ultimately was
convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (IID) (B) (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. As his first enumeration of error, Benton argues that his
incriminating statements to police should have been suppressed
because they were elicited without his full understanding of the
Miranda warnings and made under threat of physical violence.®
“When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress
evidence of a defendant’s custodial statement to investigators, we
must accept the factual findings and credibility determinations of the
trial court unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Smith, 299 Ga. 901, 903
(2) (792 SE2d 677) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). But
“where controlling facts are not in dispute, such as those facts
discernible from a videotape, our review is de novo.” Vergara v. State,
283 Ga. 175, 178 (657 SE2d 863) (2008) (citation and punctuation
omitted); see also Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 826 (1) (A) n.1(725 SE2d
260) (2012) (“This Court owes no deference to a trial court’s factual
findings gleaned from a review of a videotape that are not the subject
of testimony requiring the trial court’s weighing of credibility or
resolving of conflicts in the evidence.”). We look to the “totality of the
circumstances” to determine whether a defendant has waived his
rights under Miranda and whether his incriminating statements to

4 See Miranda, 384 U. 8. at 479 (IID) (an individual who is taken into police custody “must
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him ina court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning
if he so desires”)

© See State v. Chulpayev, 206 Ga. 764, 71 (2) (770 SE2d 808) (2015) (“Although [OCGA §
24-8-824] uses the term ‘confession, it has long been the law in this State that the rule as tothe
admissibility of an incriminatory statement is the same as that applied to a full confession.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)).

eS 578

the police were voluntary. Bunnell v. State, 292 Ga. 253, 255 (2) (735
SE2d 281) (2013).

With these standards in mind, we turn to Benton’s contention
that his statements should have been suppressed because he did not
fully understand his Mirandarights. Miranda warnings are intended
to preserve a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and “must be administered to an accused who is in
custody and subject to interrogation.” State v. Troutman, 300 Ga. 616,
617 (1) (797 SE2d 72) (2017). Only if the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waives his rights under Miranda are any of his custodial
statements admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Clay, 290
Ga. at 825-826 (1) (A); Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 215 (2) (675 SE2d
1) (2009) (“A statement obtained in violation of Miranda is inadmis-
sible in the State’s case-in-chief, regardless of whether said state-
ment is incriminating, because Miranda covers any response —
whether inculpatory or exculpatory — that the prosecution may seek
to introduce at trial.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Looking at the totality of the circumstances in this case, we
conclude that Benton did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
rights under Miranda, and the trial court erred when it concluded
otherwise. The videotape shows that, prior to beginning the inter-
view, the interrogating officer read Benton the Miranda warnings
from a card, as follows:

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say
willbe used against you in the court of law. You're entitled to
have a lawyer present now or at any time during question-
ing. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for
you without cost, and he may be present at all times during
your questioning. You can decide at any time to exercise
these rights and not answer any questions or make any
statements.

After reading these warnings, the officer asked, “do you under-
stand what I just explained to you?,” and Benton nodded. The officer
then asked Benton how far he went in school and whether he could
read, to which Benton replied that he was “kicked out” of school in
ninth grade and that he could read, but “not that much.” The officer
then asked Benton to explain what the officer just read to him, “so
we're on the same page,” and Benton responded something like this:
“T go to court, and I can’t answer no questions or ask no questions.”®

® [tis difficult to discern from the video the precise words Benton spoke, but it seems clear
that he did not initially understand the rights read to him

574 es

The officer said “no,” and then tried to explain the substance of the
Miranda warnings to Benton in simpler terms.
Specifically, the officer told Benton, “right now we're here to talk,

on why you're here... you don’t have to talk to me right now, if you don’t
want to, or youcan explain your side of what we're talking about.” The
officer again repeated that “you don’t have to [talk] if you don’t want
to,” and said “it ain’t like the TV where I’m slamming you all around
and trying to get you to talk .. . nah, it ain’t like that . . . or where I hit
you with telephone books. .. .” This last comment elicited a smile from
Benton. The officer then told Benton that he just wanted to have a
conversation “man to man,” that he wanted to know the truth about.
what Benton knew, and that Benton had the option of refusing to talk.
The officer concluded, “so you understand what I’m talking about
now?,” to which Benton responded, “yeah.” At this point, the officer
proceeded to question Benton about the events surrounding Ramsay’s
illing.
The above colloquy shows that Benton did not understand the
Miranda warnings as read to him initially. Although Benton at first
indicated by nodding that he understood them, when the officer asked
him to characterize those warnings, Benton’s response was patently
inaccurate. Indeed, the interrogating officer testified at trial that
“{t was obvious [Benton] didn’t understand his rights at that time.””
t was for this reason that the officer attempted to explain the
Miranda warnings to Benton in “layman terms” by telling him that
he did not have to talk. To be sure, this explanation may have been
sufficient to apprise Benton of his right to remain silent. See Duck-
worth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 202 (109 SCt 2875, 106 LE2d 166)
(1989) (‘We have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in
the exact form described in that decision.”). But the officer’s expla-
nation was nevertheless inadequate because it failed to include three
of the four Miranda warnings — that anything Benton said could be
used against him in court, that he had a right to an attorney’s
presence, and that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be
appointed to represent him. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (IID;
United States v. Street, 472 F3d 1298, 1311 (IV) (B) (11th Cir. 2006)
(officer’s Miranda warning was defective because it “omitted the
advice that anything [defendant] said could be used against him ina
court of law and that if he could not afford an attorney one would be

7 <TW]hen a question is raised on appeal about the voluntariness of a statement, the
appellate court is not limited to the evidence adduced at a Jackson-Denno hearing, and it
instead may look to all the evidence of record in determining the admissibility of a confession.”
Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 404 (2) n.7 (738 SE2d 74) (2013) (citation and punctuation
omitted).

eS 575

appointed for him”). When the officer began to question Benton after
explaining his right to remain silent in layman’s terms, the officer did
not even refer back to his initial reading of the Miranda warnings to
make sure Benton understood the other components of the warnings.
As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, an incomplete Miranda warning
“4s one instance in which halfway is not close enough.” Street, 472 F3d
at 1311 (IV) (B). See also Delacruz v. Commonwealth, 324 SW3d 418,
420 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that officer’s explanation of Miranda
warnings was “incomplete and insufficient” because the officer “only
asked if [defendant] understood that he did not have to answer
questions” and “never ascertained that [defendant] understood all of
his Miranda rights”).

Needless to say, a person must understand his rights in order to
knowingly and intelligently waive them. See Berghuis v. Thompkins,
560 U.S. 370, 382-383 (III) (B) (130 SCt 2250, 176 LE2d 1098) (2010)
(“[W]aiver must be... made with a full awareness of both the nature
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it.” (citations and punctuation omitted)); Clay, 290 Ga. at
825-826 (1) (A) (“It is axiomatic that a rendering of the Miranda
warnings must be intelligible before a defendant can knowingly and
intelligently waive the rights involved.”); State v. Floyd, 306 Ga. App.
402, 405-406 (702 SE2d 467) (2010) (trial court did not err in
suppressing statements where evidence showed defendant did not
understand his Miranda rights, even though the officer read those
rights to defendant and had him sign the Miranda waiver form).
Here, the record clearly demonstrates that Benton did not under-
stand the Miranda warnings as initially read to him — the interro-
gating officer concluded that Benton did not understand, and our
review of the recorded interview confirms that conclusion. Because
the interrogating officer’s subsequent explanation of those warnings
was incomplete, we cannot say that Benton knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his rights under Miranda. Accordingly, the trial court
erred when it refused to suppress the statements Benton made
during the interrogation, and Benton must be granted a new trial.*

3. Because we reverse the judgment of conviction, we do not
address Benton’s remaining claims, as those claims are either moot

® We acknowledge that an error based on a violation of Miranda is not reversible if it was
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Spears v. State, 296 Ga. 598, 604 (4) (769 SE2d 337)
(2015). But the State does not allege harmless error here. Indeed, the State's evidence against
Benton came primarily from one witness — the only one who saw Benton participate in the
shooting — and the statements Benton made during the interview provided substantial
supporting evidence of guilt. Thus, we cannot say that the Miranda violation was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

56 Pe

or unlikely to arise again upon retrial. See Willingham v. State, 279
Ga. 886, 889 (3) (622 SE2d 343) (2005).°
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED NOVEMBER 14, 2017.

James K. Luttrell, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Teri B.
Walker, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary C. Greaber, Assis-
tant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A0949. DAVIS v. THE STATE.
(805 SE2d 859)

HINES, Chief Justice.

Following the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended,
Darius Jamal Davis appeals his convictions and sentences for malice
murder, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection
with the fatal shooting of Anton Johnson and the wounding of Jamal
Makanjoula. Davis challenges the trial court’s permitting cross-
examination of alibi witnesses about prior altercations with him, the
failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction regarding the
evidence of prior altercations, the admission into evidence of certain
other testimony at trial, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel.
Finding the challenges to be without merit, we affirm."

® Benton's other enumerations of error raise the following issues: (1) whether the trial
court erred in excluding Benton's statement to police as a self-serving declaration; (2) whether
the prosecutor improperly vouched for the veracity of the State's key witness (the eyewitness)
during closing argument; (3) whether the State violated the “ultimate issue rule” when it
questioned the interrogating officer about Benton's custodial statements; (4) whether the trial
court improperly allowed the eyewitness’s statement to detectives to be read to the jury, as that
statement, Benton asserts, contained inadmissible hearsay; (5) whether the trial court erred
when it ruled that part of the eyewitness's testimony fell within the “res gestae” exception tothe
hearsay rule (the new Evidence Code, effective January 1, 2013, which would apply in the event
of Benton’s retrial, does not use the term “res gestae”); and (6) whether this case should be
remanded to the trial court for a hearing on Benton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

+ The crimes occurred on January 16, 2013. On April 26, 2013, a Fulton County grand jury
returned a twelve-count indictment against Davis, Armond Gibson, Clifford Harris, and Rolandus

eS 817

Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed the
following. Co-indictees Armond Gibson, Rolandus White, and Clif-
ford Harris discussed how they could make money on a stolen
television; Harris needed to sell it quickly in order to make a payment
involved in his probation. In an attempt to find a buyer, Harris drove
the men around in his sister-in-law’s red Pontiac Grand Prix and at
one point they stopped in West End to offer the television to a
restaurant employee known to Gibson. They could not make the sale
and as they were leaving the restaurant they ran into Davis and
another man. Davis and the other man said that they were trying to
rob someone who sold drugs, and that they had successfully robbed
him in the past. Davis described the potential robbery as “sweet.”
Gibson was concerned that the potential robbery victim might be
armed, so he volunteered to enter the target’s shop to see if that was
the case. Harris walked back to the car while the others walked to a
nearby tattoo shop. Gibson entered the shop first, let in by employee
Makanjoula; the shop was kept locked because three weeks earlier
the shop owner, Johnson, was shot and robbed in his apartment, and
also the shop had previously been the scene of a robbery.

Deandre White: Count 1 (Davis, Gibson, Harris, White) — the malice murder of Johnson by fatally
shooting him with a handgun; Count 2 Davis, Gibson, Harris, White) — the felony murder of
Johnson during the commission of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery; Count 3 (Davis,
Gibson, Harris, White) — the felony murder of Johnson during the commission of his aggravated
assault; Count 4 (Davis, Gibson) — the felony murder of Johnson during the commission of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; Count 5 (White) the felony murder of Johnson during
the commission of possession of a firearm by a First Offender probationer; Count 6 (Davis, Gibson,
Harris, White) — the criminal attempt to commit armed robbery of Johnson; Count 7 (Davis, Gibson,
Harris, White) — the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Johnson; Count 8 (Davis, Gibson,
Harris, White) — the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Makanjoula; Count 9 (Davis) —
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; Count 10 (Gibson) ~ possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon; Count 11 (White) — possession of a firearm by a First Offender probationer; and
Count 12 (Davis, Gibson, Harris, White) — possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

Davis was tried before a jury March 26— April 1, 2014, and found guilty of all charges against him.

On April 2, 2014, Davis was sentenced to life in prison on Count 1; five years in prison on Count 8,
to be served consecutively to the sentence on Count 1; and five years in prison on Count 12, to be
served consecutively to the sentence on Count 8. For the purpose of sentencing, the verdicts on
Counts 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 were found to merge with Count 1 and the verdict on Count 9 was found to
merge with Count 4. A motion for new trial was filed by trial counsel on April 2, 2014, and new counsel
filed an amended motion for new trial on April 1, 2016. Following a hearing in the matter, the motion
for new trial, as amended, was denied on October 7, 2016; however, the trial court ordered that Davis
be resentenced due to the improper merging of his sentences. On November 15, 2016, Davis was
resentenced to life in prison on Count 1; ten years in prison on Count 6, tobe served concurrently with
the sentence on Count 1; five years in prison on Count 8, to be served consecutively to the sentence
on Count 1; five years in prison on Count 9, to be served consecutively to the sentence on Count 8;
and five years in prison on Count 12, to be served consecutively to the sentence on Count 9. The
verdicts on Counts 2, 3, and 4 stood vacated by operation of law. Counsel filed a notice of appeal on
November 7, 2016, and an amended notice of appeal on November 28, 2016. The case was docketed
to the April 2017 term of this Court, and the appeal was orally argued on June 19, 2017.

578 ]

Gibson approached Johnson, asking about his rates, and at some
point during this exchange, Gibson received a call from Harris. Five
to fifteen minutes later, as Gibson was walking to the door to leave,
Davis, who was wearing a dark blue hoodie, and White approached
outside the door. The two men were let inside the shop, and one of
them drew a handgun and said, “Give it up!” Davis and White each
hada handgun. As Johnson attempted to reach for a handgun he kept
in the shop, Davis fired multiple shots, hitting Johnson and Makan-
joula. Davis, Gibson, and White fled the shop together, ran to the car,
got inside, and told Harris to drive away. Moments later, Davis got a
calland then informed the group “one alive and one dead.” Gibson and
White asked Davis why he shot Johnson, and Davis replied, “He
moved. That’s the procedure when you move.”

When police arrived at the crime scene, they found Johnson dead;
he had sustained two gunshot wounds— one to his head and the other
to his torso. The shot causing the torso wound entered through his
back, and the murder weapon was likely fired from over three feet
away. Makanjoula was shot in the shoulder. Police found three ounces
of marijuana and ten grams of methamphetamine in the tattoo shop,
and over a thousand dollars in Johnson’s pocket. A license plate
number provided by a witness was substantially similar to that of the
red Pontiac driven by Harris.

After Harris was arrested, Gibson and White went to Harris’s
apartment and told his girlfriend that White, Gibson, and Davis went
into the tattoo parlor without Harris and that Davis was the one that
killed somebody.

When Davis and Harris were housed in jail together, Davis
threatened Harris; he asked Harris if he wanted to change his story,
and said that “all rats must die.”

1. Davis does not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence of
his guilt. Nevertheless, as is this Court’s general practice in appeals
of murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that the
evidence at trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find
Davis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was
convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d
560) (1979).

2. Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting the State to cross-examine his mother and sister, who
were his alibi witnesses, about prior altercations with his family and
consequent interventions by police. He argues that such questioning
improperly put his character at issue to his prejudice and that the
resulting testimony was inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)

eS 579

(‘Rule 404 (b)”),? and if not improper under Rule 404 (b), then
inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”).* But, the argument
is unavailing.

Davis called his mother and his sister to testify to establish his
alibi defense. Collectively, the women testified on direct examination
that on January 16, 2013, Davis went to school and was home by 5:15
p.m. or 5:30 p.m.; that his girlfriend came over around 7:30 p.m.-8:00
p.m. and that Davis and his girlfriend walked in the neighborhood
and were home by 9:00 p.m.; that Davis was home the entire time
between 5:00 p.m.-7:30 p.m., when the shooting occurred; that Davis’s
mother took him to school every day because he did not have a car;
that they left roughly around 8:15 every morning; and that Davis and
his girlfriend usually walked up and down the street or went to the
park together. When the mother was asked how she remembered the
events of January 16, 2013, as they related to Davis, she answered,
“[b]ecause that was a daily routine. Nothing changed, period.” The
mother further testified that she did not contact the police with the
alibi information at the time of her son’s arrest because she felt that
it would not have made a difference and that she was waiting to relate
the information at trial; the sister also testified that she did not call
the police to provide any of this alibi information because she was
waiting until Davis had his day in court.

On cross-examination of Davis’s mother, the State sought to
explore her statement that providing the alibi information to police
would not have made a difference; the State offered that the reason
she felt that way was because she had called the police on numerous
occasions regarding altercations involving Davis and that in her view
it had not made any difference. The mother responded that she felt
that the police “just don’t do the job.” Defense counsel objected on the

2 OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) provides
Evidence of other erimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. The prosecution in a criminal proceeding shall provide reasonable notice to
the defense in advance of trial, unless pretrial notice is excused by the court upon good
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Notice shall not be required when the evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is
offered to prove the circumstances immediately surrounding the charged crime,
motive, or prior difficulties between the accused and the alleged vietim.
2 OCGA § 24-4-403 provides:

Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.

580 ]

basis of relevance, arguing that such questioning was just a way for
the State to get in bad character evidence, which would be prejudicial
to Davis. The State responded that the sought testimony was rel-
evant to test the mother’s knowledge as to where her son was on
specific dates based on police reports of Davis beating her or another
family member; the State wanted to demonstrate that the mother
generally did not know about Davis’s whereabouts and to show her
bias and lack of veracity, specifically that she was afraid of physical
consequences at the hand of her son if she did not testify favorably for
him. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted the
questioning. The State then cross-examined the mother and sister
about various incidents, asking whether the witness knew where
Davis was on a given date and/or time; although the State mentioned
a few specifics of some of the incidents the focus was on whether the
witness knew where Davis was on the date in question, and whether
it was credible that Davis was living with his mother and/or sister at
the time of the crimes on trial because of Davis’s history of alterca-
tions with his family.*

* The other incidents of specific dates mentioned collectively in cross-examination of
Davis's mother and sister were:

(1) March 14, 2007 ~ altercation between Davis and his mother in which he
allegedly punched his mother with a closed fist, causing swelling in her eye and her
forearm;

(2) September 13, 2007 ~ altereation between Davis and a cousin of the
mother with whom Davis was living at the time;

(3) December 8, 2007 — altercation between Davis and his mother in which
Davis threw a brick through the rear driver's side window of his mother’s vehicle;

(4) February 4, 2008 — unspecified incident involving Davis in the general
area of the crimes on trial;

(6) August 27, 2009 ~ altercation between Davis and his mother;

(6) October 4, 2009 — unspecified incident involving Davis;

(7) January 23, 2010 — incident between Davis and his mother in which he
kicked in the front door of the residence;

(8) March 4, 2010 — incident involving Davis and a vehicular accident;

(9) April 1, 2011 — unspecified incident involving Davis at Grant Park
Commons;

(10) September 14, 2011 ~ altercation between Davis and his mother;

(11) December 5, 2011 — incident involving Davis and his sister, in which it
was reported that Davis had beaten his sister;

(12) September 6, 2012 ~ incident in which Davis was allegedly “basically
attacking everybody in the family,” including his sister;

(13) October, 2012 — incident of police intervention involving Davis, the
mother, and the mother's brother;

(14) December 17, 2012 — incident involving Davis requiring police interven-
tion; and

(15) January 16, 2013 — incident in which a woman reported that Davis had
stayed at her home the previous night and then had stolen a gaming console from
her apartment in the morning.

On cross-examination, Davis's mother was also asked why her son was not staying with
her on February 14, 2013.

eS 581

First, in objecting below to the cross-examination, Davis did not
invoke the provisions of either Rule 404 (b) or Rule 403 regarding
alleged other acts. See Gibbs v. State, 341 Ga. App. 316, 318 (1) (800
SE2d 385) (2017). Accordingly, his argument is considered under
plain error review,” and the argument fails. The general require-
ments for the admission of evidence of other acts under Rule 404 (b)
are relevance to an issue other than character, admissibility to the
extent that the evidence is sufficient to permit a jury to conclude by
a preponderance of proof that the defendant actually committed the
other acts, and passing muster under Rule 403, which weighs the
relevance of evidence of other acts against, inter alia, unfair prejudice
to the defendant; application of the bar of Rule 403 is principally a
matter of the trial court’s discretion but is an extraordinary remedy
which should be used only sparingly. Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-70
(2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016).

Here, the purpose of the cross-examination was not to introduce
into evidence other acts or transactions involving Davis for the uses
outlined in Rule 404 (b). Indeed, the incidents briefly described in
cross-examination were not similar to the crimes on trial; rather, they
were examples of family violence involving or known by Davis’s mother
and/or sister. The cross-examinations of the mother and sister were for
the purpose of impeaching their testimony about Davis’s whereabouts
at the time of the crimes on trial and demonstrating their motives for
offering alibi testimony, i.e., that they feared violent reprisal from
Davis. While Rule 404 (b) is applicable to impeachment evidence,* the
rule did not prevent the cross-examination at issue. Indeed,

[i]t is proper for the State when cross-examining a defense
witness to bring out the relationship between the witness
and the accused for the purpose of showing bias or to show
the probability that the witness is testifying out of fear or
under duress.

Rivers v. State, 296 Ga. 396, 402 (6) (768 SE2d 486) (2015) (Citation
omitted). The fact that the evidence may have incidentally placed

® The standard for a plain error review of rulings on evidence is that there must be an error
or defect that has not been affirmatively waived by the appellant, the legal error is clear or
obvious, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, and if the afore-
mentioned three requirements are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy
the found error but should do so only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of the judicial proceedings; consequently, beyond showing a clear or obvious
error, the appellant must affirmatively show that the error probably did affect the outcome
below. Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 227 (8) (781 SE2d 772) (2016).

® See United States v. Bradley, 644 F3d 1218, 1273 (HD) (B) (1) (&) (1th Cir. 2011).

582 ]

Davis’s character in issue did not proscribe it. Id. And regarding Rule
403, given the strength of this evidence it cannot be said that the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the value of the
sought impeachment evidence.

3. Davis further contends that the trial court plainly erred by
failing to issue a limiting instruction to ensure that the jury did not
consider evidence related to Davis’s prior altercations with his family
involving the police as evidence of his guilt of the crimes on trial. He
argues that Rule 404 (b) evidence is properly admissible only when a
limiting instruction is given, and that such instruction was necessary
in this case in order to cure the prejudicial effect of the evidence. He
acknowledges that there was no request below for a limiting instruc-
tion but urges that this Court conduct a review for plain error.

The failure to give a limiting instruction was not plain error in
this case. As noted, in order for there to be plain error,

[flirst, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
[dJeviation from a legal rule — that has not been intention-
ally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived,
by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or
obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third,
the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial
rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demon-
strate that it affected the outcome of the [trial] court pro-
ceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are
satisfied, the [appellate court] has the discretion to remedy
the error — discretion which ought to be exercised only ifthe
error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.

State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) (Citation and
punctuation omitted). Davis does not satisfy the test for plain error.
In order to prevail on this third element of prejudice, Davis has the
burden to “make an affirmative showing that the error probably did
affect the outcome below.” Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 327 (781 SE2d
772) (2016) (Citation and punctuation omitted). This Court has equated
this part of the plain error standard with the prejudice prong of the
test for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Martin v. State,
298 Ga. 259, 277-278 (779 SE2d 342) (2015). Indeed, this showing
requires “some level of certainty and particularity.” Hampton v. State,
302 Ga. 166, 169 (2) (805 SE2d 902) (2017), quoting United States v.
Bramley, 847 F3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2017). And, Davis simply has not met

eS 588

his burden in light of the strong evidence against him at trial, which
included eyewitness identifications of him as a would-be armed
robber.

4. Davis next contends that the trial court erred by permitting,
over objection, Harris’s then girlfriend to testify that White told her
that Davis was the shooter. But, there was no error in admitting the
testimony.

The co-conspirator exception to the admission of hearsay con-
tained in OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E) “Rule 801 (d) (2) (E)”) governs
here. It provides that an admission, i.e., “a statement offered against
a party” is not to be excluded under the hearsay rule if it is

[a] statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy, including a statement
made during the concealment phase of a conspiracy. A
conspiracy need not be charged in order to make a statement
admissible under this subparagraph.

Thus, Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) provides explicitly that a statement made
during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, including a statement
made during the concealment phase of a conspiracy, is admissible in
evidence.

Davis urges that there was no conspiracy or concealment phase
of a conspiracy at the time the statement was made. However, a
conspiracy may be established when conduct discloses a common
design, even without proof of an express agreement between the
parties. Grissom v. State, 296 Ga. 406, 409 (1) (768 SE2d 494) (2015).
The statement of a co-conspirator is admissible when the State
establishes a prima facie case of conspiracy independent of the
co-conspirator’s statement before the close of the evidence at trial. Id.
at 410 (2).

Here, there was ample evidence of a conspiracy among Davis and
his three co-indictees to go to the tattoo shop to commit a robbery,
including a concealment phase. The four men discussed committing
the robbery just prior to the shootings, and each member had a role
in it. Gibson was the lookout, Davis and White were the armed
robbers, and Harris provided the transportation to the crime scene
and was the getaway driver. All four men left the scene together, and
Davis and the declarant White discussed the fatal incident after its
occurrence. White’s statement to Harris’s girlfriend was made when
only Harris had been arrested, and was in conjunction with other
statements attempting to communicate to Harris through his girl-
friend that the group would be looking out for him; therefore, the
statement was actually made in an attempt to keep the members of

584 ]

the conspiracy united, thus preserving or furthering it. See United
States v. Holt, 777 F3d 1234, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (liberal standard
applied in determining whether statement is in furtherance of a
conspiracy; statement need only have furthered interests of the
conspiracy in some way including if statement could have been
intended to affect future dealings between the parties).

Even if the statement to Harris’s girlfriend was deemed to be
outside the co-conspirator exception to hearsay, its admission into
evidence was harmless as it was merely cumulative of other evidence
at trial including testimony from Gibson, Harris, and victim Makan-
joula that Davis was the shooter.

5. At the time of the shooting, a woman, N. N., was stopped at a
nearby stoplight and saw a flash of light, heard a loud popping noise,
and witnessed people running in the middle of the street by the tattoo
parlor. She saw a man matching Davis’s physical description and
dress firing a handgun. She then saw three men fleeing and getting
into a red Grand Am or Grand Prix automobile. She called the police
and gave them the number on the red car’s license plate. Later, during
a photographic lineup, N. N. identified Harris as the driver of the
vehicle. During another photographic lineup, she stated that Davis
and another man “looked familiar,” but could not make a positive
identification; she said that Davis possibly was one of the men she
saw running to the red car.

Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion under
Rule 403 by admitting N. N.’s statement that he “looked familiar,”
because it was unduly prejudicial to him and minimally probative of
whether he committed the crimes as he could have “looked familiar”
for any number of reasons, there was contradiction in her testimony
regarding Davis’s role, there was inconsistency and confusion in her
physical descriptions of the three men, and there was no credibility in
regard to her description of Davis.

First, matters of witness credibility and inconsistency in testi-
mony affect the weight the evidence is to be given at trial and are
questions for the jury to determine, not this Court. Kuhn v. State, 301
Ga. 741 (804 SE2d 9) (2017). Second, Davis did not object to this
testimony at trial on the basis of Rule 403, so any review of his present
complaint is one of plain error, and plain error has not been shown.
See footnote 5, supra. There is no clear or obvious legal error, much
less any affirmative showing by Davis that the subject testimony
affected the outcome of his trial. See Gates v. State, supra at 327 (3).
As noted, there was testimony from at least three other witnesses at
trial that Davis was not only one of the armed robbers but was, in fact,
the shooter. See Division 4, supra. Thus, there is no support for a
finding of the danger of unfair prejudice as contemplated by Rule 403.

eS 585

6. Finally, Davis contends that his trial counsel provided ineffec-
tive assistance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104
SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). He urges that counsel’s alleged errors
permeated the trial, and while the prejudice resulting from each error
individually provides a sufficient basis for reversal, this Court should
consider the combined prejudice resulting from such errors. See
Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809 (642 SE2d 56) (2007). However, in
order for Davis to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, he must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and
that such deficiency prejudiced him so that a reasonable probability
exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of his trial would
have been different. Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505 (801 SE2d 782)
(2017). And, this is to be done in the face of the strong presumption
that counsel’s actions fall within the broad range of professional
conduct. Id. Davis does not carry his burden.

(a) Davis first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the introduction of the alleged Rule 404 (b) evidence, i.e.,
the impeachment of the alibi witnesses, for lack of notice.’? However,
Davis cannot show the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel on the basis
urged. When a defendant fails to demonstrate one prong of the
two-prong Strickland test, then there is no need to examine the other
prong. Gomez v. State, 300 Ga. 571, 573 (797 SE2d 478) (2017). Here,
Davis simply cannot show the reasonable probability that, but for the
attempt at impeachment of the alibi witnesses, the outcome of his
trial would have been different. The evidence of his guilt was over-
whelming, including Davis’s own statements and behavior following
the crimes and the eyewitness identifications of Davis, which included
the in-court identification by the surviving shooting victim.

(b) Davis claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to adequately investigate his alibi defense prior to calling the alibi
witnesses to testify because based solely on information that trial
counsel had available to her in her own file, she should have known
that the alibi testimony presented by Davis’s mother and sister was
subject to serious impeachment. But, counsel’s actions have not been
shown to be deficient given what was affirmatively told to her and

7 In denying Davis a new trial, the trial court found that the cross-examination was
intrinsie to Davis's alibi and relevant for purposes other than showing his character, and thus,
Rule 404 (b) and its notice requirement were inapplicable; that prior to trial the State had only
the written notice of alibi, which did not describe the alibi with any meaningful detail, and the
State developed its cross-examination of the alibi witnesses and rebuttal of the alibi during trial
after it was revealed what the alibi specifically was; and that even had the State been required
to provide notice under normal circumstances, the State’s inability to provide pretrial notice
would have been excused under these facts

586 ]

withheld from her by Davis and his family. At the motion-for-new-
trial hearing, trial counsel testified that neither Davis nor his family
members mentioned a history of violence within the family. Counsel
testified that she would have requested police reports had she been
informed that they were relevant. Counsel had no reason to suspect
that Davis’s alibi would fail given the information she was provided
by Davis and his mother and sister. And, most significantly, they did
not inform counsel that there was a temporary restraining order in
place which had prevented Davis from being at the family home ina
time frame prior to the crimes on trial.

(c) Davis further claims that trial counsel was ineffective for
presenting evidence that opened the door to evidence of his prior
altercations with his family, which resulted in prejudice to him. But,
counsel had no reason to suspect that Davis’s alibi defense would be
undermined because of the limited information she was given.

(d) Lastly, Davis claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to request a limiting instruction that would preclude the jury
from considering the evidence of Davis’s prior familial disputes as
evidence of his guilt of the crimes charged. He urges that he was
prejudiced because if the jury’s consideration of the Rule 404 (b)
evidence would have been properly confined to the purposes of such
rule, there is areasonable probability that the result of his trial would
have been different. But as noted, Davis has not shown that the lack
ofa limiting instruction affected the outcome of his trial. See Division
3, supra.

Inasmuch as Davis has failed to demonstrate any prejudice
resulting from counsel’s alleged errors, his reliance on Schofield v.
Holsey for the proposition that the cumulative effect of the alleged
errors warrants reversal is meritless. Schofield v. Holsey, supra at
812 (II), n. 1; see Perez v. State, 331 Ga. App. 164, 170 (3) (e) (770 SE2d
260) (2015).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED NOVEMBER 14, 2017.

trickland Webster, Leigh Ann Webster, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Kevin
C. Armstrong, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth M.
Haase, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

eS 587

$17A1059. THE STATE v. CASH et al.
(807 SE2d 405)

HINES, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the State from an order of the superior court
sustaining a motion by mother and daughter murder defendants
Elgerie Mary Cash and Jennifer Michelle Weathington denominated
‘Double Jeopardy Plea in Bar,” which challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence of their guilt at trial.’ For the reasons that follow, we
reverse and remand with direction.

Procedural History

Cash and her daughter Weathington were tried jointly before a
jury in the Superior Court of Paulding County in October 2013 and
found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggra-
vated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony in connection with the fatal shooting of Lennis Jones. Each
woman was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and a
consecutive term of five years in prison for the firearm possession.
Claiming that Jones accidentally shot himself, Cash and Weathing-
ton each filed a motion for new trial, which motions were subse-
quently amended. Following a joint hearing on the motions, as
amended, in May 2014 the superior court entered separate orders
granting each defendant a new trial, and then approximately a week
later issued a joint amended order granting new trials to the defen-
dants and vacating their convictions and sentences. The superior
court did so after finding that the defendants received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial and based upon the general grounds, i.e.,
that the verdicts were contrary to the principles of justice and equity
and decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence. See
OCGA §§ 5-5-20,? 5-5-21.2 The State appealed the grants of new

1 In this same document, the superior court also reconsidered a previous order on
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial, set aside such order,
and issued an amended order denying the motion to dismiss based upon the alleged violation
of the right to a speedy trial. However, this appeal addresses only the sustaining of the
“Double Jeopardy Plea in Bax.”

2 OCGA § 5-5-20 provides:

In any case when the verdict of a jury is found contrary to evidence and the
principles of justice and equity, the judge presiding may grant a new trial before
another jury.

2 OCGA § 5-5-21 provides:

The presiding judge may exercise a sound discretion in granting or refusing
new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the
weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some slight evidence in
favor of the finding.

588 eS

trials to the defendants, and this Court affirmed, determining that
the superior court “who observed the trial and who had the duty to
examine the conflicts in the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses in ruling on the general grounds, did not abuse its broad
discretion in granting [defendants] new trials on the general grounds.”
State v. Cash, 298 Ga. 90, 97 (2) (c) (779 SE2d 603) (2015) (“Cash I”).*
Upon return of the remittiturs, Weathington filed her “Double Jeop-
ardy Plea in Bar,” claiming that the evidence at trial was insufficient
under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979), and consequently, that the State could not again
put her in jeopardy for the same offenses; Cash adopted her daugh-
ter’s motion as her own. The superior court sustained the motion,
finding that the defendants had not waived their rights to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence of their guilt of the crimes charged
under Jackson v. Virginia, and that the evidence was insufficient
under such standard; it expressly directed that a judgment of acquit-
tal be entered as to both defendants on all counts of the charging
indictment.*

Jurisdiction of the Appeal

As this Court reaffirmed in Cash I, “[a]ppeals by the State in
criminal cases are construed strictly against the State and ‘the State
may not appeal any issue in a criminal case, whether by direct or
discretionary appeal, unless that issue is listed in OCGA § 5-7-1.’ "6

* Prior to the scheduled hearing on the new trial motions, the State filed a motion to recuse
the trial judge, and the trial judge dismissed the recusal motion as legally insufficient without
referring it to another judge, and orally denied the State’s request for a certificate of immediate
review, In Cash I, the State also attempted to appeal the denial of its motion to recuse, but this
Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to review that ruling and dismissed that
portion of the State's appeal. Id. at 93-4 (1)

® Defendants had filed cross-appeals to the State's original appeal in Cash I, challenging
the denial of their motions for new trial on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence; however,
they were permitted to withdraw the cross-appeals because the superior court had not entered
a written order on that ground but had merely remarked in its oral ruling from the bench at the
motion-for-new-trial hearing that the evidence was legally sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia
to support the defendants’ convictions.

® Former OCGA § 5-7-1 in effect at the times of filing the judgment at issue and the notice
of appeal in 2016 provided:

(a) An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the State of Georgia from the
superior courts, state courts, and juvenile courts and such other courts from which
a direct appeal is authorized to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
criminal cases and adjudication of delinquency cases in the following instances:
(1) From an order, decision, or judgment setting aside or dismissing
any indictment, accusation, or a petition alleging that a child has committed
a delinquent act, or any count thereof;

eS 589

Id. at 91 (1) (a) (citation omitted). Applicable OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (3)?
provides that the State may appeal to this Court from “an order,
decision, or judgment sustaining a plea or motion in bar, when
the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Weathington has moved to dismiss the State’s appeal, arguing that in
Cash I this Court already ruled that jeopardy attached at her first
trial. But, the argument is unavailing.

It is true that in Cash I this Court held that the State was not
allowed to appeal the denial of its motion to recuse the trial judge

(2) From an order, decision, or judgment arresting judgment of convie-
tion or adjudication of delinquency upon legal grounds;

(3) From an order, decision, or judgment sustaining a plea or motion in
bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy;

(4) From an order, decision, or judgment suppressing or excluding
evidence illegally seized or excluding the results of any test for aleohol or
drugs in the case of motions made and ruled upon prior to the impaneling of
a jury or the defendant being put in jeopardy, whichever occurs first;

(5) From an order, decision, or judgment excluding any other evidence
to be used by the state at trial on any motion filed by the state or defendant
at least 30 days prior to trial and ruled on prior to the impaneling of a jury or
the defendant being put in jeopardy, whichever occurs first, if:

(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of Code Section 5-6-38, the
notice of appeal filed pursuant to this paragraph ie filed within two
days of such order, decision, or judgment; and

(B) The prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that such
appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a
substantial proof of a material fact in the proceeding;

(6) From an order, decision, or judgment of a court where the court does
not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the Constitution or
laws of this state;

(7) From an order, decision, or judgment of a superior court transfer-
ring a case to the juvenile court pursuant to Code Section 15-11-560 or
subsection (b) of Code Section 17-7-50.1;

(8) From an order, decision, or judgment of a court granting a motion
for new trial or an extraordinary motion for new trial;

(9) From an order, decision, or judgment denying a motion by the state
to recuse or disqualify a judge made and ruled upon prior to the defendant
being put in jeopardy; or

(10) From an order, decision, or judgment issued pursuant to subsee-
tion (0) of Code Section 17-10-6.2
(b) In any instance in which any appeal is taken by and on behalf of the State

of Georgia in a criminal case, the defendant shall have the right to cross appeal.
Such cross appeal shall be subject to the same rules of practice and procedure as
provided for in civil cases under Code Section 5-6-38.

(©) In any instance in which the defendant in a criminal case applies for and
is granted an interlocutory appeal as provided in Code Section 5-6-34 or an appeal
is taken pursuant to Code Section 17-10-35.1, the state shall have the right to cross
appeal on any matter ruled on prior to the impaneling of a jury or the defendant
being put in jeopardy. Such cross appeal shall be subject to the same rules of
practice and procedure as provided for in civil eases under Code Section 5-6-38. The
state shall not be required to obtain a certificate of immediate review for such cross
appeal.

7 The language of current OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (8), effective January 1, 2017 is the same.

590 eS

under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (9), which authorizes the State to appeal an
order denying a motion by the State to recuse a judge only when the
motion is made and ruled upon prior to the defendant being put in
jeopardy; because the State did not file its motion to recuse until after
the defendants were convicted and shortly before the hearing on their
motions for new trial, jeopardy had attached. Cash I at 91-92 (1) (a).
Compare State v. Caffee, 291 Ga. 31, 33-35 (3) (728 SE2d 171) (2012)
(holding that OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (8) gives this Court authority to
consider State’s appeal of order sustaining plea in bar entered after
trial court granted motion for new trial due to improper admission of
evidence). But, this does not answer the question of whether the
defendants have been put in jeopardy in their retrial for the purpose
of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (3).

Before 1973 there was no statutory provision in Georgia for the
State to appeal rulings in criminal cases; however, in 1973 the
General Assembly enacted a law,* then codified in part as Code
Ann. § 6-100la (now OCGA § 5-7-1), substantially similar to the
pre-1971 version of 18 USC § 3731, a part of the federal Criminal
Appeals Act. See State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152, 153, n.6 (635 SE2d 716)
(2006). The new statute provided the State with limited avenues of
appeal in criminal cases. State v. Martin, 278 Ga. 418, 419 (603 SE2d
249) (2004). The United States Supreme Court interpreted the pre-
1971 version of 18 USC § 3731 in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470
(91 SCt 547, 27 LE2d 548) (1971). In Jorn, the government sought to
appeal an order of the District Court which dismissed, on the ground
of former jeopardy, an information charging the defendant-appellee
Jorn with crimes involving fraudulent income tax returns. After the
impaneling of the jury for the initial trial, the prosecutor called to the
stand a taxpayer whom Jorn allegedly had aided in tax preparation;
however, the trial judge refused to permit the witness and other
similar witnesses to testify because the judge did not believe the
witnesses had been adequately advised of their rights. Consequently,
the judge discharged the jury and ended the trial. The case was then
set for retrial before another jury, but Jorn filed a pretrial motion to
dismiss the charges against him, and the trial judge did so on the
basis of former jeopardy. The government filed a direct appeal from
the dismissal, and the threshold question was whether the govern-
ment had such a right of appeal from the adverse ruling. The issue
was governed by the “motion-in-bar” provisions of applicable
18 USC § 3731, which provided, in language similar to that of OCGA
§ 5-7-1 (a) (3), that the government had a direct right of appeal from

8 Ga. L. 1973, p. 297, § 1

eS 591

“the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the
defendant has not been put in jeopardy.”® The question then became
whether Jorn had been put in jeopardy for the purpose of the govern-
ment’s right to appeal by virtue of the impaneling of the jury in the first
proceeding before the declaration of a mistrial. United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. at 475. The Supreme Court concluded that “the sustaining
of a motion in bar based on a plea of former jeopardy would be
appealable as long as the motion in bar was sustained prior to the
impaneling of the jury in the subsequent proceeding.” Id. at 477.

There is no dispute that the “Double Jeopardy Plea in Bar” in the
present case was sustained prior to any impaneling of a jury for a
retrial; thus, OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (8) allows the State’s appeal.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Asa threshold matter, the State contends that the superior court
erred in sustaining defendants’ “Double Jeopardy Plea in Bar” and
then dismissing the charges against them on the ground of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence because defendants had abandoned the suffi-
ciency issue in Cash I and because the superior court was without
jurisdiction to entertain the motion in the first place. Indeed, defen-
dants filed cross-appeals to the State’s original appeal in Cash I,
challenging the denial of their motions for new trial on the basis of
insufficiency of the evidence; however, they were permitted to with-
draw the cross-appeals after they moved to do so on the basis that the
superior court had not entered a written order on the sufficiency
ground but had merely stated in its oral ruling from the bench at the
motion-for-new-trial hearing that the evidence was legally sufficient
to support the defendants’ convictions under Jackson v. Virginia.” In
general, an oralruling is neither final nor appealable until and unless
it is reduced to writing. Hill v. State, 281 Ga. 795, 799 (3) (642 SE2d
64) (2007). Thus, the oral ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence was
not the appropriate focus of a cross-appeal, and defendants did not
abandon the issue by virtue of their withdrawals of their cross-
appealsin Cash I. Nor was there any ruling in Cash Iwhich precluded
the filing and consideration of defendants’ “Double Jeopardy Plea in
Bar.” Consequently, this Court will review the legal sufficiency of the
evidence at defendants’ trial. See State v. Caffee, supra at 34-35 (3).

° It was conceded that the plea of former jeopardy constituted a “motion in bar” within the
meaning of the statute. United States v. Jorn, 400 U. 8. at 475.

1° [t is undisputed that the superior court stated from the bench that the evidence at trial
satisfied the Jackson v. Virginia standard. The motion at issue in the present appeal was heard
before, and ruled upon by, a different judge than the one that issued the rulings in Cash L

592 eS

The standard of Jackson v. Virginia for assessing the legal
sufficiency of the evidence is different than the discretion given a trial
court in an evidentiary challenge based upon the general grounds.
Manuel v. State, 289 Ga. 383, 386-387 (2) (711 SE2d 676) (2011).
Indeed,

[e]lvidence may be less than overwhelming, but still suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction. When we consider the legal
sufficiency of the evidence, we must put aside any questions
about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or
the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such
things to the discretion of the trier of fact. Instead, we must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
and we inquire only whether any rational trier of fact might
find beyond a reasonable doubt from that evidence that the
defendant is guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted.

Walker v. State, 296 Ga. 161, 163 (1) (766 SE2d 28) (2014) (citations
and punctuation omitted).

The evidence construed in favor of the verdicts showed the
following. At about 2:30 p.m. on May 30, 2011, Cash telephoned 911
to report a shooting at her home. A police officer was in the area and
arrived at the scene within one to two minutes of the 911 call. Cash
was standing on her front porch, crying and screaming for help; she
said, “My daughter’s boyfriend just shot himself.” Cash directed the
police officer to an upstairs bedroom, where he found Weathington
cradling Jones’s head, which had a towel wrapped around it. Jones
was lying on the floor with his “legs somewhat propped” as if he had
“pulled [his] feet up to [him]” with his “knees in the air, slightly to his
left side with his left hand and arm laying” alongside. There was a
large amount of blood on the floor. Weathington was hysterical,
crying for help, and telling Jones to “hang on.” Jones had a single
gunshot wound to the head but was still breathing. A handgun was
lying near Jones’s feet and underneath a bench in the room. There
was acan of beer and a bottle of liquor on the dresser; both appeared
to be cold and full of liquid. Cash was standing next to the bed near
the bedpost and between it and the wall. She appeared to be upset and
“almost angry.”

Jones was taken to the hospital and died later that day. Before
Jones was removed from the home, the officer asked Cash what
happened, and she responded that “she was standing in-between the
bed and the wall where the bullet hole was,” and that she “wanted to
show [Jones] the gun.” Cash stated, “I came back here. I grabbed it.
I charged it. Nothing came out. He grabbed it, and he said it’s not

eS 598

loaded. I told him it was loaded. And he stuck the gun to his head and
pulled the trigger, and he shot himself.” She then said only one shot
had been fired. She also indicated that only she, Weathington, and
Jones were in the room at the time of the shooting. Weathington did
not describe what happened in any detail or differently from what
Cash related, but simply agreed completely with her mother’s version
of events.

The police officer thought the crime scene “unusual” in relation
to the defendants’ story in that he saw a bullet hole through the wall
but no physical evidence of injury around the bullet hole; in his
experience when someone shot himselfin the head there were usually
large amounts of blood, brain matter, bones, fragments, or skin on or
about the bullet hole, but such markers were not present there.
Instead, blood was coming out of Jones’s nose and a significant
amount of blood and brain matter was on the floor underneath his
head. Also unusual was the fact that when the officer entered the
bedroom and knelt down and observed Weathington she was covered
with a consistent and large amount of high velocity blood spatter.
Cash had a large amount of blood on her hands. After Jones was
transported from the scene, the police officer noticed that both Cash
and Weathington had “cleaned themselves up,” washing off all traces
of Jones’s blood. Weathington was seated on a couch in the livingroom
and made a phone call to someone, telling that person that Jones had
shot himself; the conversation turned into an argument with Weath-
ington yelling at the person.

Other police officers arrived at the scene, and Cash then spoke
with one of those detectives; she related a somewhat different version
of events, including notably that she accidentally fired a shot into the
wall before Jones asked for the weapon. Cash told another officer that
she was Weathington’s mother; that Jones was Weathington’s boy-
friend; that Jones had just finished mowing Cash’s lawn; that he
came inside the house and consumed approximately three alcoholic
beverages; and that Jones then asked to see her new gun. She stated
that she then took the handgun out of the nightstand next to the bed;
that she dropped the magazine onto the bed and pulled back the slide;
that a bullet did not eject; that she pointed the handgun toward the
wall, pulled the trigger, and the firearm discharged; and that she
threw the handgun on the bed. She claimed that Jones then picked up
the handgun and said, “there’s nothing wrong with this gun”; that he
slammed the magazine into the handgun and racked the slide back
three times, discharging three rounds onto her bed; that she took the
handgun from Jones and could see a glint of the metal bullet and told
him it was still loaded; that Jones responded, “no it’s not”; and that he
took the handgun from her, put it to his head and pulled the trigger.

594 eS

A Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”) firearms examiner,
expert in firearms identification and function, testified that when the
handgun at issue, a Glock .40 caliber pistol, is loaded and the slide is
closed you cannot see the bullet, not even a glimmer of metal of the
shell; however, that one could see the bullet if the slide is open, but
that the handgun will not fire in that state.

Later in the day on May 30, Cash went to the sheriff’s office for
an interview. There she demonstrated how Jones allegedly shot
himself. She pointed at her temple; however, the investigation had
already revealed that the entry gunshot wound was behind and below
Jones’s right ear. The bullet entered the back of Jones’s head and it
traveled forward and exited the head near the hairline on the left
side. The police viewed this inconsistency as suspicious. Conse-
quently, they asked that an autopsy be performed to determine
“muzzle to impact or the target range” and direction of the bullet once
it entered Jones’s head.

Although there was a hat on the dresser in the bedroom where
the shooting occurred, the police did not take it on the day of the crime
despite a thorough investigation of the crime scene. It was recovered
a week later after police noticed it in a photograph of the crime scene
they were reviewing. Before it was recovered, Cash had at one time
placed it in the garbage but then retrieved it; at another time, she had
put it in her laundry room with some dirty clothes. The hat bore a
“minute amount” of blood and had a bullet hole that matched the
location of the entry wound to the victim’s head, but it had no exit
hole.

The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy of Jones
determined that Jones was shot from an indeterminate range but
more than eighteen inches away, and that it was not a close or
contact-range gunshot wound, inasmuch as there was a lack of
stippling or fouling at the wound site and no gunshot residue inside
the skull or on the skin. The medical examiner concluded that the
cause of death was an indeterminate range gunshot wound to the
head with perforations of the skull and brain and that the manner of
death was not self-inflicted but was a homicide. The autopsy was
conducted before the hat was discovered by the police; however, at
trial the medical examiner testified that if Jones had been wearing
the hat at the time of the fatal shooting, there would have been
biologic material on the inner brim of the hat underlying the entrance
gunshot wound and on the under surface of the front brim near the
exit wound, but there was nothing of such significance found. He

eS 595

concluded that there was no possibility that the hat was on Jones’s
head when he sustained the fatal head wound."?

Jones’s son testified at trial that his father “took gun safety to an
extreme,” telling the son to “always keep the gun in front of you,
pointing away.” He further testified that Jones was left-handed and
“could do almost nothing with his right hand.”

Cash and Jones had been childhood friends from the age of fifteen
and Jones had lived with Cash, but for a period of time prior to the
shooting there had been a rift between the two as a result of Jones
dating Weathington and the age difference between him and Cash’s
daughter. A friend of Jones testified that at one point he helped Jones
move his “stuff” out of Cash’s house, and that at that time there was
a big confrontation between Cash and Jones; Cash threatened Jones
and said “how much she hated him.”

Weathington told the police that Cash called her the night before
the shooting and informed her that she had just bought a new gun.
But, the purchase of the handgun at issue took place at least a month
or two prior to Jones’s death, and Weathington had accompanied
Cash when she went to make the purchase.

A vice president of the company that employed Jones testified
that a couple of days after the shooting, he received a phone call from
a young woman who said that she was Jones’s girlfriend. The woman
inquired about Jones’s life insurance, stating that Jones had told her
that she was the beneficiary.

Here, there was ample evidence, forensic and otherwise, to
support the determination that the shooting was a homicide. And,
contrary to findings by the superior court in making the ruling at
issue, there was evidence from which the factfinder could conclude
that Cash rather than Weathington likely fired the fatal shot, and
that the mother and daughter cooperated, even conspired, with each
other to accomplish the killing and then portray the shooting as
self-inflicted, and that each intentionally aided and abetted the other
in the commission of the crimes.” Indeed, when “the crimes ‘involve
relatives, slight circumstances can support the inference that the
parties colluded.’” Teasley v. State, 288 Ga. 468, 469 (704 SE2d 800)
(2010), quoting Adamson v. State, 238 Ga. App. 105, 106 (2) (516 SE2d
310) (1999). Moreover, if a defendant has knowledge of the crime
which is intended and shares in the criminal intent of the principal
actor, that defendant is an aider and abettor. Ratana v. State, 297 Ga.

1 The State's theory presented to the jury was that Weathington held the hat while Cash
fired a round through it, which accounted for the bullet hole in the wall.
1 The jury was charged on the law of conspiracy and accomplice culpability.

596 eS

App. 747, 749 (678 SE2d 193) (2009). Consequently, if such defendant
is at the scene and does not oppose the commission of the crime, the
trier of fact may consider such conduct in connection with prior
knowledge and is authorized to conclude that the defendant assented
and lent approval to the commission of the crime, and thus, was
aiding and abetting it. Id. Here, the evidence that Weathington
accompanied her mother to purchase the murder weapon well prior
to the shooting, that Weathington actively lied to police about the
timing of its acquisition, and that she not only affirmed her mother’s
varying versions of events, but immediately following the shooting
began to promote to third parties their joint stories that Jones shot
himself support the finding that she aided and abetted the killing.
Compare Bullard v. State, 263 Ga. 682, 685 (1) (486 SE2d 647) (1993)
(neither direct nor sufficient circumstantial evidence that non-
shooter was a party to the murder, but cooperated and concealed the
death out of fear of the shooter); Moore v. State, 255 Ga. 519, 521 (340
SE2d 888) (1986) (some circumstantial evidence of motive, presence,
and flight but no direct evidence that defendant was even present at
time of murder); Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862 (302 SE2d 347) (1983)
(no direct evidence of one defendant’s participation in murder and no
circumstantial evidence aside from presence at the scene). Evenif the
evidence did not conclusively establish which of the women actually
shot Jones, there was evidence of a common criminal intent, includ-
ing the women’s presence, companionship, and conduct before and
immediately after the fatal shooting. Shockley v. State, 297 Ga. 661,
664-665 (1) (777 SE2d 245) (2015). Consequently, the evidence was
sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find both Cash and
Weathington guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which
they were convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, supra.

Accordingly, the judgment sustaining the “Double Jeopardy Plea
in Bar” on the basis of insufficient evidence in the first trial is
reversed and the case is remanded to the superior court for proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED NOVEMBER 14, 2017.

nald R. Donovan, District Attorney, Steven J. Messinger, Anthony
B. Williams, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-
ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B.
Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

eS 597

Ross & Pines, Andrew S. Fleischman; Henrickson & Sereebutra,
Aaron §. Henrickson, for appellees.

$17A1140, S17X1235. DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS, LLP v. CITY
OF SUWANEE; and vice versa.
(807 SE2d 876)

GRANT, Justice.

This case presents a zoning dispute between the Appellant
Diversified Holdings, LLP (“Diversified”) and the City of Suwanee
(‘the City”) regarding the status of 30 acres of undeveloped land
located in the City (“Property”). We hold that because Diversified
seeks review from an adjudicative decision made by a local govern-
ment body acting in an administrative role, an application for dis-
cretionary appeal was required. Because Diversified did file an
application for discretionary review, which we granted, we have
jurisdiction over its appeal. On the merits of the issues presented, we
affirm the trial court’s decision that there was no error in denying
Diversified’s application to rezone the Property. But we clarify that
the “substantially advances” standard that derives from constitu-
tional due process guarantees has no place in an eminent domain or
inverse condemnation proceeding. Consequently, where a landowner
claims harm from a particular zoning classification, inverse condem-
nation is not an available remedy unless the landowner can meet the
separate and distinct requirements for such a claim. Because we
affirm the trial court’s decision that the denial of Diversified’s appli-
cation was not arbitrary or capricious, we do not reach the City’s
contention on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in concluding
that Diversified showed a substantial detriment based on the value
of the Property as currently zoned versus its value if rezoned.

I.

The Property is zoned for commercial use in accordance with the
City’s 2030 Comprehensive Plan. The City’s comprehensive plan
envisions that the Property will be used for high density, high
intensity office space. Although the Property is in a largely commer-
cial area, Diversified insists that for the past 26 years it has been
unable to sell the Property as zoned, but has received multiple
purchase offers contingent upon the Property being rezoned for

59S Es

multi-family use.’ Consequently, Diversified sought to have the
Property rezoned in that manner, claiming, among other things, that
the existing zoning regulation was unconstitutional as applied to the
Property. The City Council, on recommendation from the City’s
Planning Commission, denied Diversified’s application to rezone the
Property from commercial, C2 or C2A, to RM-8, which would have
permitted multi-family us
Diversified then filed suit in Gwinnett County Superior Court,
alleging that the City’s decision constituted an unconstitutional
taking of the Property.* Diversified requested that the trial court
enjoin the City from interfering with Diversified’s use of the Property
in the manner represented in its rezoning application. Diversified
also requested that the court find and declare the City’s acts in
denying its rezoning application were “unlawful, irrational, a mani-
fest abuse of discretion, a taking of property, unconstitutional, null,
and void.” Although Diversified sought an award of attorney fees and
litigation expenses, the complaint did not seek other damages.
After a bench trial, the trial court made the following findings.
Since 2012, Diversified has used a broker who undertook a marketing
campaign to sell the Property. Although it has not had success
marketing the Property as a commercial property, Diversified has
received numerous inquiries from potential purchasers who are
interested in developing the Property for multi-family use. Every
contract that Diversified has entered into contained contingencies
that required the City to rezone or grant a special use permit.
Ultimately, none of those contracts closed. The parties agree that due
to steep topography and streams, not all of the Property can be
feasibly developed, and rezoning would permit Diversified to develop
the most acreage possible. Indeed, the trial court concluded that the
fair market value of the Property would increase tremendously if it
were rezoned: As currently zoned, the Property has a fair market

1 Diversified acquired 26 acres of the Property in the late 80s or early 90s. Those 26 acres
are zoned C2. According to the parties, C2 zoning does not allow for alcohol consumption or for
the commercial sale of beer and wine. Diversified acquired approximately four acres of the
Property in 2012. Those four acres are zoned C2A, which allows for the sale or consumption of
alcohol.

2 The areas surrounding the Property are largely commercial and include a Super 8 Motel,
Red Roof Inn, Walmart, office warehouse, and liquor store. Across the street there is property
zoned for mixed-use development to include residential, commercial, and office development.
Diversified seeks rezoning in order to sell the Property for development as an apartment
complex.

® Diversified specifically argued that the City’s “C-2 and C-2A zoning classification as
applied to this specific property is unconstitutional and that RM-8 is the only zoning classifi-
cation that would be constitutional given the particular characteristics of this unique property.”
(emphasis supplied).

eS 599

value between $600,000 and $1.5 million; if rezoned for multi-family
use, the Property would have a fair market value of approximately
$5.9 million.

The trial court found that Diversified carried its burden to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the City’s current zoning of the
Property has caused Diversified a significant detriment. The trial
court also found, however, that the current zoning is substantially
related to the public health, safety, morality, and welfare, because the
existing commercial zoning is compatible with surrounding commer-
cial uses and is consistent with the City’s comprehensive plan and
economic development. The trial court concluded that the consistency
of the existing zoning with the City’s long-term planning goals
demonstrates a substantial benefit to the public welfare. For example,
in the trial court’s view, the lack of sidewalks on the Property would
pose an unreasonable and unsafe risk for persons who would reside
in the proposed apartment development, and there is a reasonable
and valid concern that apartment dwellers would face a potential for
increased nighttime crimes because the complex would be adjacent to
a liquor store, two motels, and a Walmart.

In sum, the trial court found that Diversified had not carried its
burden to show that the current zoning was not substantially related
to public health, safety, and welfare. Accordingly, the trial court’s
order concluded that the City’s determination that the current zoning
regulation was not improper as applied to Diversified’s property was
not arbitrary, capricious, or without rational basis. The trial court
specifically stated that the City’s decision did not constitute an abuse
of discretion and did not work an unconstitutional taking.

Out of an abundance of caution, Diversified then filed both a
direct appeal and an application for discretionary appeal from the
trial court’s order. The City filed a cross-appeal. This Court granted
Diversified’s application for discretionary appeal and posed a single
question: Is a party seeking to appeal a superior court’s ruling on an
inverse condemnation claim required to file a discretionary applica-
tion if that claim is based on a local board’s zoning decision? In
addition to answering that question by asserting that direct appeal is
lawful, Diversified contends that (1) the trial court erred in deter-
mining that the Property’s current zoning is substantially related to
public health, safety, and welfare, and (2) the trial court erred in
concluding that the City had demonstrated a justification for the
current zoning that is reasonably related to the public interest. In its
cross-appeal, the City contends that the trial court erred in deter-
mining that Diversified showed a significant detriment based on the
Property’s value as currently zoned when compared to its value if
rezoned.

II.

We turn first to the question of jurisdiction and appellate proce-
dure that was presented to the parties, that is, whether a party
seeking to appeal a superior court’s ruling on an inverse condemna-
tion claim is required to file a discretionary application when that
claim is based on a local board’s zoning decision.* The trial court’s
order affirming the City’s denial of Diversified’s application for
rezoning is a final order; we are not hindered by any interlocutory
appeal questions. OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). Generally, final orders are
subject to direct appeal. Nevertheless, here and for any “final order,”
OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) directs that we consider whether that order is
subject to the discretionary application procedure outlinedin OCGA §
5-6-35 (a) (1).

That provision requires an application for a certain class of cases:

Appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing
decisions of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation, the
State Board of Education, auditors, state and local admin-
istrative agencies, and lower courts by certiorari or de novo
proceedings; provided, however, that this provision shall not
apply to decisions of the Public Service Commission and
probate courts and to cases involving ad valorem taxes and
condemnations[.]

We recently reiterated that boards of commissioners are acting
as administrative agencies under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) when they
are “performing a function that is ‘the equivalent of the function of an
administrative agency.’ ” Schumacher v. City of Roswell, 301 Ga. 635,
638 (803 SE2d 66) (2017) (quoting Swafford v. Dade County Bd.
of Commrs., 266 Ga. 646, 647 (469 SE2d 666) (1996)); Bentley v.
Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 349, n. 4 (249 SE2d 38) (1978) (characterizing
a Board of Zoning Appeals as an administrative agency with both

4 Tt bears noting here that the type of claim initially raised by Diversified is often
characterized, both before the local authorities and in the courts, as an “application for
rezoning.” But that description, while perhaps a helpful shorthand, does not accurately convey
the complete nature of the decision that the zoning authority is being asked to make in the first
instance—or the complete set of remedial measures that may be available to a zoning authority
ina given case. At its heart, the application that gave rise to this case sought a conclusion that
the current zoning ordinance was unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful with respect to the
Diversified property. In order to avoid confusion, we continue to use the “application for
rezoning” shorthand, but do so with the understanding that it connotes a broader inquiry into
whether the current zoning is appropriately applied to the property at issue. We do not address
whether an application sounding purely in policy rationales may lead to a different. analysis.

eS 601

quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties, which include determin-
ing “whether the factual situation of a given individual’s property
warrants relief from the general zoning ordinance under the stan-
dards set out by the delegating authority”). And we have explained
that the discretionary application procedure applies to adjudicative
or quasi-judicial decisions by local administrative agencies. See State
of Ga. v. Intl. Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392,
402 (788 SE2d 455) (2016) (“Both the text and immediate context of
OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) indicate that a ‘decision,’ as it is used with
reference to administrative agencies, is a determination of an adju-
dicative nature.”).

As the opinion in International Knights recognized, “ ‘the line
between legislation and adjudication is not always easy to draw.’ ” Id.
at 401 (quoting LC&S, Inc. v. Warren County Area Plan Comm., 244
F3d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 2001)). And generally speaking, while

[a]dministrative determinations of a legislative nature are
prospective in application, general in application, and often
marked by a general factual inquiry that is not specific to the
unique character, activities or circumstances of any particu-
lar person, . . . [dJeterminations of an adjudicative nature, on
the other hand, are immediate in application, specific in
application, and commonly involve an assessment of facts
about the parties and their activities, businesses, and proper-
ties.

Intl. Knights, 299 Ga. at 401 (citations and punctuation omitted).
An adjudicative decision can be quasi-judicial in nature and is
characterized by proceedings that inquire into the facts and circum-
stances of the party (or parties) appearing before the decision maker.®
Intl. Knights, 299 Ga. at 401 (citing RR Village Assn. v. Denver Sewer
Corp., 826 F2d 1197, 1204 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The test for determining
whether official action is adjudicative or legislative focuses on the
function performed by the decisionmaker.”)). Generally, an adjudica-
tive decision operates to address a specific dispute or determine
rights and obligations of a particular party or parties. The resulting
decision seeks to establish those rights and obligations or otherwise
resolve the dispute and is immediate in application. A legislative
decision, on the other hand, is usually marked by a general inquiry,

© The parameters of executive decisions are beyond the scope of this opinion. Suffice it to
say that, as we recognized in International Knights, administrative agencies may make
adjudicative, legislative, or executive decisions. Intl. Knights, 299 Ga. at 400-401.

602

often not limited to the facts and circumstances of specific people or
properties, which results in a rule of law or course of policy that will
apply in the future. Id. at 401 (citing Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line
Co., 211 U. 8. 210, 226 (29 SCt 67, 53 LE 150) (1908) (“Legislation on
the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions by
making a newrule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power.”)).

‘Years before we focused on the distinction between adjudicative,
legislative, and executive decisions in the context of OCGA § 5-6-35
(a), this Court announced that “all zoning cases appealed either to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Georgia must... come by
application.” Trend Dev. Corp. v. Douglas County, 259 Ga. 425, 426
(383 SE2d 123) (1989). And in Rubin, we reiterated that all appeals
in zoning cases require an application. O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v.
Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 725 (482 SE2d 295) (1997). Like this case, Trend
was an appeal of a superior court decision rejecting a landowner’s
argument that a zoning regulation should not apply to a particular
piece of property. Trend, 259 Ga. at 426. Andin the decades since that
case was decided, Trend’s mandate that “all zoning cases” must be
appealed through the discretionary process has been consistently
followed by this Court and the Court of Appeals in numerous cases
challenging the application of a zoning ordinance toa particular piece
of property. See, e.g., Hamryka v. City of Dawsonville, 291 Ga. 124,
126 (728 SE2d 197) (2012) (“Appellants [challenging the rezoning of
aneighbor’s property] then were able to obtain review in the superior
court of the issues they raised or could have raised before the
administrative agency. Appellants therefore already had the oppor-
tunity to be heard by two tribunals—a local administrative agency
anda superior court—and now ask this appellate court to consider the
administrative decision yet again.”) (emphasis supplied); Jervey v.
City of Marietta, 274 Ga. 754 (559 SE2d 457) (2002) (discretionary
application granted to consider appeal from denial of application to
rezone); Powell v. City of Snellville, 275 Ga. 207 (563 SE2d 860) (2002)
(dismissing direct appeal and granting application for discretionary
review of refusal to rezone property); City of Atlanta v. Tap Assocs.,
273 Ga. 681, 683 (544 SE2d 433) (2001) (concluding, after granting
discretionary application to appeal denial of rezoning, that
“legislative judgment” of zoning ordinance must be allowed to control
where petitioner had not met its burden); Cobb County v. McColister,
261 Ga. 876 (413 SE2d 441) (1992) (denial of application to rezone
property requires application for discretionary review under Trend);
Waffle House v. DeKalb County, 261 Ga. 324 (406 SE2d 477) (1991);
Delta Cascade Partners, Iv. Fulton County, 260 Ga. 99 (390 SE2d 45)

eS 603

(1990) (appeal from superior court’s judgment upholding denial of
zoning request requires discretionary application).

Recently, in Schumacher, we determined that certain challenges
to the exercise of legislative power do not fit within Trena’s definition
of “zoning cases,” although we noted that Trend itself involved the
sort of individualized determination that we would generally con-
sider a “decision” under the discretionary application statute. Schu-
macher, 301 Ga. at 637 (citing Intl. Knights, supra). In doing so, we
further clarified the contours of our zoning jurisprudence by estab-
lishing that a “zoning case,” refers to “a case involving a ‘decision’ by
an ‘administrative agenc(y)’ dealing with the zoning or allowed use of
a particular parcel of land.” Id. at 683.

Schumacher found that “a stand-alone lawsuit challenging an
ordinance as facially invalid—unconnected to any individualized
determination about a particular property—is not a ‘zoning case.’”
Id. at 635. But an appeal from a superior court order reviewing a local
government decision denying an application to rezone a specific
property differs from an appeal from a lawsuit that challenges the
enactment of a code of development or zoning code. See id. (contrast-
ing lawsuits challenging the legislative decision underlying the
enactment of a development code with suits seeking individualized
zoning-related relief). These distinctions are relevant. The enact-
ment of a development or zoning code is, quintessentially, a legisla-
tive action that is prospective in application. Id. at 637. In contrast,
an application to rezone a particular parcel like the application
involved here involves an individualized determination based on the
character and circumstances of that particular parcel of land. A
Jandowner’s challenge that seeks recognition that a zoning ordinance
is unlawful with respect to a particular parcel of land thus is the type
of individualized application of law to facts and circumstances that
constitutes an adjudicative decision and requires a discretionary
application. See Jervey, 274 Ga. 754 (granting discretionary appeal to
review superior court decision reviewing the denial of a rezoning
application).

Here, the superior court’s order contains a lengthy description of
the Property, details Diversified’s efforts to sell the Property, dis-
cusses the topography and surrounding areas, and analyzes factors
relating to the use and value of the Property. Diversified’s complaint
alleges that the current zoning is unlawful for this property, not that
the adopted zoning scheme is unlawful for any property. And the
City’s decision to reject that claim was immediate in application,
specific in effect, and involved an individualized assessment of the
Property. City of Cumming v. Flowers, 300 Ga. 820, 824 (797 SE2d
846) (2017) (citing Intl. Knights, 299 Ga. at 401). That argument

601

differs significantly from the one presented in Schumacher, in which
the appellant challenged the adoption of the development code itself
but did not challenge any “individualized decision to change the
zoning of any particular property.” Id. at 639.

What’s more, Diversified has had the opportunity to be heard by
two tribunals in this case. Diversified filed an application to amend
the official zoning map of the City requesting that the Property be
rezoned from commercial to a use permitting multi-family develop-
ment, claiming that the zoning would otherwise be unconstitutional
as applied to that property. The Suwanee City Council filed a response
to that rezoning application. Diversified provided documents sup-
porting its application to amend the zoning ordinance and purporting
to raise both a due process claim and an inverse condemnation claim.”
The City of Suwanee Planning Department reviewed the application
and recommended that Diversified’s request to rezone the Property
be denied based, in part, on conflicts with the City’s comprehensive
plan. Subsequently, the City Council unanimously denied the appli-
cation. Diversified then filed suit in superior court alleging that the
City’s decision was unconstitutional. Diversified’s complaint asked
the superior court to review a decision of a local administrative
agency. This falls squarely within the discretionary appeal proce-
dures that give appellate courts the discretion not to entertain an
appeal where the superior court had reviewed the acts of certain
lower tribunals. Hamryka, 291 Ga. at 126-127.

The analysis in Division IV below only confirms that the local
authority’s decision is adjudicative in nature. The inquiry in this type
of request is a fact-specific one, evaluating the balance between
factors to conclude whether a zoning ordinance substantially burdens
a property owner in the first place, and, if it does, whether that same
ordinance is also substantially related to the public health, safety,
morality, or general welfare. See infra pp. 611-614. And this Court
plainly has no authority to “legislate” for a local zoning authority
should we determine that the authority’s decision was incorrect. But

® We have not held that adjudication by two tribunals is a requirement for the discretionary
application procedure. Instead, review by a local tribunal and a superior court is one factor that
this Court has considered in determining whether rezoning cases, such as this one, involve the
type of administrative decision that requires a discretionary application to appeal. See, e.g.,
Ladzinske v. Allen, 280 Ga. 264, 265-266 (626 SE2d 83) (2006) (neighboring landowner seeking
to challenge a zoning decision was required to file a discretionary appeal despite the fact that
the superior court dismissed the complaint without reaching the merits); see also Trend, 259
Ga. at 426 (discretionary application necessary from superior court order affirming county
board of commissioners’ decision to deny rezoning request); Ross v. Mullis Tree Sve., 183 Ga.
App. 627, 628 (360 SE2d 288) (1987) (the discretionary application procedure is “applicable to
appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of local zoning tribunals”)

7 We discuss the merits of these claims more fully in Division IV, infra.

eS 605

what we can do, and what petitioners ask for us to do, is adjudicate
whether a particular zoning ordinance is unconstitutional as applied
to a particular piece of land. That leaves the ultimate remedial
measures open to the judgment of the zoning authority, which may or
may not choose to take (or recommend) legislative action. Nonethe-
less, its decision in the first instance, just like ours, was adjudicative
in nature.

Accordingly, and without addressing whether an appeal from a
true inverse condemnation proceeding would require a discretionary
application, we conclude that the present appeal, which is from a
superior court order affirming a local zoning board’s decision that the
zoning regulations applied to a particular piece of property are not
unlawful, is the type of individualized determination that remains
subject to the application procedure set out in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1).

Ill.

We now turn to the proper application of the law to the claims in
this case, which have been characterized by the parties as sounding
in inverse condemnation. Inverse condemnation claims draw their
meaning and remedies from the eminent domain provisions in the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section III, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution, each of which
protects against uncompensated “takings.” But, as the United States
Supreme Court has appropriately noted, “[t]he question of what
constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved
to be a problem of considerable difficulty.” Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (98 SCt 2646, 57 LE2d 631)
(1978). We need not answer that question in full today, nor could we,
given the “ad hoc” nature of the tests that courts have applied. Id. at
124. But what we can do is provide some needed clarity about the
nature of inverse condemnation claims in Georgia.

At the outset, our cases and those of the federal courts have
articulated a distinction between eminent domain and the police
power; the two powers serve a different set of purposes and are
subject to different limitations. As we have explained, “There is a
basic distinction between police power and that of eminent domain.
The police power of the governing authority is properly used to
regulate property to prevent its use in a manner detrimental to the
public interest, while the exercise of eminent domain involves the
taking of property because it is needed for public use.” Mayor &
Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette & Amuse-
ment Sucs., 267 Ga. 173, 174 (476 SE2d 581) (1996); see also Pope v.

606

City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331, 334 (249 SE2d 16) (1978) (“The distince-
tion between use of eminent domain and use of the police power is
that the former involves the taking of property because it is needed
for public use while the latter involves the regulation of the property
to prevent its use in a manner detrimental to the public interest.”).

Moreover, “[i]t is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment’s just com-
pensation provision is ‘designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.’” First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S.304,
318-319 (107 SCt 2378, 96 LE2d 250) (1987) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (80 SCt 1563, 4 LE2d 1554) (1960));
Woodside v. City of Atlanta, 214 Ga. 75 (103 SE2d 108) (1958) (while
Georgia’s Constitution provides that the right of eminent domain
shall “never be abridged,” that power cannot be exercised absent just
compensation). Accordingly, the eminent domain language in the
federal Constitution and our state Constitution is clear that those
provisions do not provide an independent bar to the government
exercising eminent domain over lands needed for public uses: “As its
text makes plain, the Takings Clause ‘does not prohibit the taking of
private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power.” Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (125 SCt
2074, 161 LE2d 876) (2005) (quoting First English Evangelical, 482
U.S. at 314). That condition, generally, is the payment of fair market
value or “just compensation.” Wright v. MARTA, 248 Ga. 372, 373
(283 SE2d 466) (1981).

The classic application of eminent domain is the actual and
complete taking of property by the government in order to use that
property for a public purpose. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 617 (121 SCt 2448, 150 LE2d 592) (2001). But as the regulatory
state increased in size and scope, so did the range of actions that could
constitute a “taking.” After all, if compensation were required for a
standard condemnation but not for a regulatory infringement, “the
natural tendency of human nature would be to extend regulations
‘until at last private property disappears.’” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137
SCt 1933, 1951 (198 LE2d 497) (2017) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting)
(citation and punctuation omitted). The United States Supreme
Court first applied the Takings Clause to regulatory action in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (43 SCt 158, 67 LE2d 322)
(1922). There, petitioner had sold surface rights to land but retained
mining rights; because the relevant statute made it commercially
impracticable to mine the coal on petitioner’s land, it had nearly the
same effect as the complete destruction of the rights claimant had
reserved, so the government had effectively taken the land without

eS 607

providing just compensation. Id. at 414-415. That type of regulatory
taking has become known as “inverse condemnation,” and although
federal and state courts have struggled with how to determine what
constitutes a taking in the regulatory context, the claim is acommon
and constitutionally appropriate one.

Federal cases have coalesced around the idea that two categories
of regulatory action will be deemed per se takings under the Fifth
Amendment. First is the permanent physical infringement of prop-
erty. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. 8.
419 (102 SCt 3164, 73 LE2d 868) (1982). The second is where a
regulation deprives the property owner of “all economically benefi-
cial uses.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003,
1019 (112 SCt 2886, 120 LE2d 798) (1992) (emphasis in original).
Cases that fall outside these two categories have been analyzed
according to the factors set out in Penn Central, including the
“economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
Penn Central also describes the importance of the “character of the
governmental action” in the analysis, noting that an act is more likely
to be considered a taking when it constitutes a physical invasion
rather than “when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.” Id.

We have followed suit. A plaintiff seeking to challenge a govern-
ment regulation as an uncompensated exercise of the government’s
eminent domain power must show that the regulation is “so onerous
that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.”
Mann v. Ga. Dept. of Corrections, 282 Ga. 754, 757 (653 SE2d 740)
(2007) (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539). And this Court has explained
the contours of the most straightforward inverse condemnation
claim—the permanent, physical occupation of (or impact on) prop-
erty:

[P]rivate property owners may be compensated in inverse
condemnation actions for the temporary taking of land for
the paving of a turn lane, increased noise and odor from a
county’s sewage plant, and flooding, siltation, and pollution
from surface water diverted by roadway maintenance.

Rabun County v. Mountain Creek Estates, 280 Ga. 855, 856 (632 SE2d
140) (2006) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Dept. of
Transp. v. Edwards, 267 Ga. 733, 736 (482 SE2d 260) (1997) (tempo-
rary taking of land for the paving of a turn lane); Duffield v. DeKalb

OS

County, 242 Ga. 432, 433-434 (249 SE2d 235) (1978) (increased noise
and odor from a county’s sewage plant); Powell v. Ledbetter Bros., 251
Ga. 649, 650 (307 SE2d 663) (1983) (flooding, siltation, and pollution
from surface water diverted by roadway maintenance). In all of these
cases, a county took some affirmative action for public purposes
causing a nuisance or trespass that, in turn, resulted in the dimin-
ished utility and functionality of a private owner’s land. That dimin-
ished functionality and utility, in turn, interfered with the owner’s
use and enjoyment of the land. We have also suggested that, for an
alleged regulatory taking, inverse condemnation will apply when the
owner was completely deprived of the use of the property. See, e.g.,
Threatt v. Fulton County, 266 Ga. 466, 470 (467 SE2d 546) (1996);
Cobb County v. McColister, 261 Ga. 876, 876 (413 SE2d 441) (1992).
We have also invoked Penn Central to analyze asserted regulatory
takings that did not fall within these two categories. See, e.g., Mann,
282 Ga. at 757.

Inverse condemnation cases that do not fall within the per se
categories outlined above have been notoriously hard to adjudicate,
and even the Penn Central factors have led to “vexing subsidiary
questions.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. In turn, the initial uncertainty
about how to handle cases on the margins of inverse condemnation
allowed a due process analysis to invade the takings jurisprudence.
Id. at 540. Our precedents thus have not always been clear that
eminent domain and due process are distinct constitutional inquir-
ies, and have instead converted inverse condemnation into a species
of due process claim. See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 260
Ga. 699, 704 (398 SE2d 567) (1990) (“Substantive due process pro-
tects property owners from the arbitrary and capricious exercise of
the power of eminent domain.”). In addressing claims of inverse
condemnation, our prior cases from time to time have veered into an
articulation of two different theories of “takings.”

The first, and most natural, formulation is the taking of property
by eminent domain for public use, whether through regulation or
condemnation. “The clearest sort of taking occurs when the govern-
ment encroaches upon or occupies private land for its own proposed
use.” Palazzolo, 533 U. S. at 617 (recognizing both physical and
regulatory invasions). The second, more troublesome theory is that a
regulation of property that violates constitutional due process guar-
antees constitutes a taking. The remedial aim of this latter type of
claim is not just compensation; instead, litigants seek relief from the
challenged regulation. Under this rubric, a plaintiff seeks to prove
that a regulation has caused him to suffer “a significant deprivation
insubstantially related to the public health, safety, morality[,] or
welfare.” Gradous v. Bd. of Commrs. of Richmond County, 256 Ga.

eS 609

469, 470 (349 SE2d 707) (1986); Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Road Corp.,
238 Ga. 322, 323 (232 SE2d 830) (1977). Once the plaintiff has met
that burden, the government may try to justify the regulation as
“reasonably related to the public interest.” Gradous at 471.

The problem is that this balancing approach is not consistent
with the differentiation we have recognized between the police power
and the power of eminent domain. Nor does it follow from the text of
the Takings Clause, which mandates a remedy where the govern-
ment takes private property for public use, but does not inquire into
the wisdom of the policy at issue.* Federal law now reflects that a
distinction exists between cases alleging a due process violation and
cases seeking just compensation, and that the “substantially advances”
formula applied so often in inverse condemnation cases “prescribes
an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and...
has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at
540. As the Lingle Court explained, “the ‘substantially advances’
inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the
burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights.
Nor does it provide any information about how any regulatory burden
is distributed among property owners.” Id. at 542 (emphasis in
original). In other words, rather than advancing an understanding of
whether the effect of a regulation is “functionally comparable to
government appropriation or invasion of private property,” this test
evaluates a regulatory policy to determine whether its ends are
sufficient to justify the means. Id. And that type of substantive
inquiry “is tethered neither to the text of the Takings Clause nor to
the basic justification for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged
under the Clause.” Id.

Although we've not been so direct about our own conclusion, this
Court has already recognized the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Lingle, and the potential inaptitude of the “substantially
advances” test for regulatory takings. See Mann, 282 Ga. at 759-760
& n. 7 (citing Lingle and presuming “arguendo, that the substanti-
ality of the public purpose advanced by a regulation is still pertinent
to a takings challenge”). Under a true takings challenge, we recog-
nized, “the focus of the takings analysis is on whether the government

® Ofcourse, an exercise of eminent domain is only proper where the government acts to put
the property to a public use. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U. S. 216,
231-232 (123 SCt 1406, 155 LE2d 376) (2003) (“While it confirms the State's authority to
confiscate private property, the text of the Fifth Amendment imposes two conditions on the
exercise of such authority: the taking must be for a ‘public use’ and ‘just compensation’ must be
paid tothe owner.”); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U. 8.229, 240 (104 SCt 2321, 81 LEZd
186) (1984). But the question of whether a taking is for a public purpose is different than
whether that public purpose is a wise one.

610

act takes property, not on whether the government has a good or bad
reason for its action.” Id. (quoting Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The
Potential Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation
of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 343, 354
(2005)).

We have also acknowledged that zoning is unlikely to be a fertile
ground for inverse condemnation claims. See, e.g., Alexander v.
DeKalb County, 264 Ga. 362, 363 (444 SE2d 743) (1994), overruled on
other grounds by In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667 (324 SE2d 443) (1985);
Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah, 267 Ga. at 174 (assuming,
only arguendo, that inverse condemnation is an available remedy in
rezoning cases); see also City of Tybee Island v. Live Oak Group, 324
Ga. App. 476, 479 (751 SE2d 123) (2013) (“While the theory of inverse
condemnation arises out of the eminent domain paragraph of the
Georgia Constitution, ... itis not synonymous with a claim attacking
the constitutionality of an existing zoning ordinance following the
denial of an application to rezone.”). Indeed the majority in the
seminal Penn Central case rejected zoning regulations as a likely
source of inverse condemnation. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125
(citing zoning as “the classic example” of the Court upholding
“land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized
real property interests”).° Zoning, in short, does not ordinarily pre-
sent the kind of affirmative public use at the expense of the property
owner that effects a taking, and we have previously recognized as
much. See, e.g., McColister, 261 Ga. at 877 (finding no compensable
taking occurred during the period between the filing of an application
to rezone property and the final decision approving the rezoning
when the landowner had not been deprived of all use of his property).

None of this means that the “substantially advances” test out-
lined in Gradous, Guhl, and other cases—including this one—is an
invalid way to analyze whether a zoning regulation is constitution-
ally arbitrary and capricious as applied to a particular parcel of land.
It only means that this type of claim is rooted in due process
guarantees against arbitrary exertion of the police power rather
than in the government’s authority to take private property through
eminent domain. “There is no question that the ‘substantially
advances’ formula was derived from due process, not takings,
precedents.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540-541 (noting that in support of the
“substantially advances” test outlined in Agins v. City of Tiburon,

® Tt bears noting that, although we do not endorse this alternative view, the dissenting
opinion in Penn Central would have entirely barred zoning from serving as the source of a
takings claim. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[ZJoning does not constitute a ‘taking.’ ”)

eS 6il

447 U.S. 255 (100 SCt 2138, 65 LE2d 106) (1980), the Court had cite:
toa due process case, Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (48 SCt 447,
72 LE 842) (1928)); see also Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262 (219 SE2
399) (1975) (citing Nectow to support “substantial relation” balancing
test for zoning claims).

When the property owner’s right to the unfettered use of his
property confronts the police power under which zoning is effected,
due process guarantees act as a check against the arbitrary ani
capricious use of that police power. See, e.g., Dept. of Transp., 260 Ga.
699. The balance our law strikes is that a zoning classification that
substantially burdens a property owner may be justified if it bears a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morality, or genera.
welfare. Guhl, 238 Ga. at 323; see also Holy Cross Lutheran Church
v. Clayton County, 257 Ga. 21, 23 (854 SE2d 151) (1987). Lacking that
kind of justification, the zoning may be set aside as arbitrary or
capricious. Id. If a land-use regulation is arbitrary and capricious
then the regulation cannot stand. The remedies available in such
cases include declaring the regulation unlawful as applied to the
property at issue, although we’ve been clear that courts should give
local governing bodies a reasonable opportunity to reconsider rezon-
ing applications or otherwise take action to conform their regulations
to the law. See Town of Tyrone v. Tyrone, LLC, 275 Ga. 383, 384 (565
SE2d 806) (2002) (citing Cobb County v. Wilson, 259 Ga. 685, 686 (386
SE2d 128) (1989)). But we have identified no zoning case where the
party claiming inverse condemnation received a “takings” remedy,
that is, financial damages to compensate for the loss of their property.

IV.

Diversified’s complaint alleges both an inverse condemnation
and a due process violation. But because Diversified requested relief
in the form of rezoning without seeking damages for a taking, its
claim is properly understood as sounding in due process. Regardless
of its language intermixing due process and inverse condemnation
claims (understandable given our own lack of precision in the past),
the trial court applied the correct standard and concluded, in part,
that the Property’s current zoning is substantially related to the
public’s health, safety, morality, and welfare. We agree.!”

1 We do not reach the issue of whether Diversified could have stated a claim for inverse
condemnation under these facts, but as noted, a local government's zoning decision does not
ordinarily give rise to a successful inverse condemnation claim. See Division III, supra. We
answer only the question of whether the zoning decision at issue violated constitutional
guarantees of due process

2

We start with the proposition that a zoning ordinance is pre-
sumptively valid. Guhl, 238 Ga. at 323-324. To overcome this pre-
sumption, the party challenging a zoning ordinance must show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the zoning at issue presents a
significant detriment to the landowner and is insubstantially related
to—in other words, does not “substantially advance” — the public
health, safety, morality, and welfare. Parking Assn. of Ga. v. City of
Atlanta, 264 Ga. 764, 765 (450 SE2d 200) (1994). Although the
validity of a zoning ordinance’s application to a particular property
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the following factors are
considered:

(1) existing uses and zoning of nearby property; (2) the
extent to which property values are diminished by the
particular zoning restrictions; (3) the extent to which the
destruction of property values of the plaintiffs promotes the
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public; (4) the
relative gain to the public, as compared to the hardship
imposed upon the individual property owner; (5) the suit-
ability of the subject property for the zoned purposes; and
(6) the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned,
considered in the context of land development in the area in
the vicinity of the property.

Guhl, 238 Ga. at 323-324 (citation and punctuation omitted). And we
have previously acknowledged a number of interests that will sup-
port a restriction on land use, including aesthetics, environmental
impact, injury to neighboring property, traffic impacts and potential
hazards to pedestrians, and the long-range planning goals for the
area. City of Atlanta v. Awtry & Lowndes Co., 205 Ga. 296, 296 (53
SE2d 358) (1949) (injury to neighboring property); Pope, 242 Ga. at
336 (environmental impact); Westbrook v. Bd. of Adjustment, 245 Ga.
15 (262 SE2d 785) (1980) (traffic impact and pedestrian hazards);
Parking Assn., 264 Ga. at 765-766 (aesthetics); Tap, 273 Ga. at 685
(long-range planning goals). Balancing the Guhl factors, as the trial
court did, leads to the conclusion that the City’s denial of Diversified’s
petition to rezone the Property should be affirmed.

Like much of the area surrounding it, Diversified’s property is
currently zoned for commercial use. Although the Property abuts a
roadway, it has no sidewalks. The trial court specifically noted that
the lack of sidewalks poses an “unreasonable and unsafe risk” to
pedestrians who would be accessing the Property if it were rezoned.
The potential increase in pedestrian hazards if a rezoning request is
granted is a valid consideration supporting the denial of rezoning.

eS 618

See Westbrook, 245 Ga. at 16 (denial of the landowner’s request to
rezone his property from residential to commercial was not uncon-
stitutional when the surrounding area was largely residential and
there was evidence that an increase in traffic volume would create a
hazard for pedestrians).

The trial court also noted that the surrounding conditions,
including the commercial nature of the businesses abutting the
Property, support the current commercial zoning. Andit also acknowl-
edged that the City’s comprehensive plan (which provides for the
Property’s commercial zoning) is a detailed and thorough plan for
economic development within the City. Whether the current zoning is
consistent with the policies and long-range planning goals for the
area is a factor courts consider in determining whether the zoning
substantially benefits the public health, safety, and welfare.'' Tap,
273 Ga. at 685. This is particularly relevant when the zoning ordi-
nance at issue was adopted after extensive study and public debate.
Id. The trial court ultimately concluded that the current zoning was
substantially related to the public health, safety, and welfare. We see
no error in that conclusion.

Diversified contends that the trial court did not undertake an
appropriate analysis of whether the Property is suitable for develop-
ment in accordance with the City’s comprehensive plan. In other
words, Diversified maintains that the Property cannot be developed
for commercial use and cannot realistically be developed for high-
density office space as the City envisions—meaning, one assumes,
that the current zoning restriction is arbitrary and capricious. But, as
the City points out, there was evidence that the Property could be
developed for some commercial use, including low-intensity office
space. And, as both parties concede, much of the difficulty in devel-
oping the Property stems from the Property’s topography—which, of
course, remains unchanged by its zoning classification. It is not for
this Court to determine whether the City could have made a different
or better zoning classification. Tap, 273 Ga. at 685. When the validity
of the legislative classification for zoning purposes is debatable, that
judgment must be allowed to control. Id. at 683.1”

41 We find no merit to Diversified’s claim that the trial court relied exclusively on the
presence of the comprehensive plan as evidence of substantial public benefit. The trial court
made numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law and cited to public benefits and
detriments unrelated to the comprehensive plan.

2 Because we conclude that the current zoning classification is substantially related to the
public health, safety, and welfare, we need not reach the City's contention on cross-appeal that
the trial court erred in determining that Diversified showed a “substantial detriment” based on
the refusal to rezone the Property, See Holy Cross, 257 Ga. at 21 (party requesting rezoning
must show by clear and convincing evidence both a significant detriment and that the existing

The cases Diversified relies on do not lead to a different conclu-
sion. The surrounding area near the Property, perhaps with the
exception of a proposed development across the street, do not have
residential uses (pre-existing or otherwise). The Property abuts the
road and surrounding commercial zones with no buffer. And there is
no indication that the City has sanctioned any violations of the
comprehensive plan in the areas surrounding the Property. Thus,
even accepting that the Property has been vacant for many years, this
case does not present facts that support invalidating the current
zoning classification on due process grounds. Cf. DeKalb County v.
Albritton Properties, 256 Ga. 103, 109 (344 SE2d 653) (1986) (finding
that a comprehensive development plan was a “less effective plan-
ning tool” when the county violated its own plan to permit commercial
development in residential areas and when the property in question
abutted a “radically different land use approach” in a neighboring
county); see also Bd. of Commrs. of Hall County v. Skelton, 248 Ga.
855, 855 (286 SE2d 729) (1982) (finding that a highway business
zoning classification was not substantially related to public health,
safety, and welfare, when many of the areas surrounding the property
were used for mobile homes and residential purpose and the property
itself did not front the highway).

Vv.

In sum, we conclude that an appeal from a trial court’s order
reviewing a local authority’s decision regarding an application to
rezone property—an application that, more precisely, is seeking an
administrative determination that zoning is unconstitutional or other-
wise unlawful because of the particular factual circumstances sur-
rounding a given party's desired use of its land—is subject to the
discretionary application procedure set out in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a). We
affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the denial of Diversified’s
application to rezone the Property was not arbitrary or capricious.
Having already determined that the application to rezone the Property
was properly denied, we do not reach the merits of the cross-appeal.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

zoning bears an insubstantial relationship to the public interest). We note that, in zoning
challenges, the pertinent question is not whether rezoning would increase the value of property,
but rather whether the existing zoning classification serves to deprive a landowner of property
rights without due process of law. DeKalb County v. Dobson, 267 Ga. 624, 626 (482 SE2d 239)
(1997). That the property would be more valuable if rezoned borders on being irrelevant. Id
Instead, the only relevant evidence regarding the value of the subject property is its value as
it currently is zoned. Id

eS 615

PETERSON, Justice, concurring.

Iconcur fully in the opinion of this Court, which I understand to
be a faithful application (and careful explanation) of unchallenged
precedent. I write separately to observe that our precedent regarding
takings and inverse condemnation claims arising under the Georgia
Constitution has rarely grappled with the actual text of the Just
Compensation Clause from which they arise. Instead, we have relied
primarily on federal precedents applying the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It’s not at all
clear to me that the Just Compensation Clause and the Takings
Clause have the same scope and meaning.

The text of our Just Compensation Clause appears broader than
the federal Takings Clause. The Takings Clause reads “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
U.S. Const. Amend. V. But the Just Compensation Clause provides
(subject to a variety of subsequent textual exceptions) that “private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public purposes without
just and adequate compensation being first paid.” Ga. Const. of 1983,
Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I (a) (emphasis supplied). This textual difference
between the Clauses seems to me significant enough to raise ques-
tions about the validity of our case law often interpreting the Clauses
as essentially the same. Answering those questions would require
our careful consideration of text, context, and history. And this
provision of the Georgia Constitution has a particularly complex
history; although present in every Constitution since 1861, its form
has changed in some fashion in each new Constitution. But no party
has raised or briefed such issues here, and so I leave them for another
day.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 2, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED NOVEMBER 14, 2017.

ee

Mahaffey Pickens Tucker, Matthew P. Benson, Amanda F.
Henningsen, for appellant.

Carothers & Mitchell, Richard A. Carothers, Thomas M. Mitchell,
Amy B. Cowan, for appellee.

a
hey
o

$17A1265. THE STATE v. COHEN et al.
(807 SE2d 861)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

According to the briefs, Mye Brindle worked as a housekeeper
and personal assistant to Joe Rogers, who was married. During her
employment with Rogers, the two became involved sexually.! In June
2012, Brindle hired attorneys David Cohen and John Butters to
represent her on a potential claim of sexual harassment. On June 20,
2012, without Rogers’ knowledge or consent to be video recorded,
Brindle allegedly used a “spy” camera to secretly record video of
Rogers naked in his bathroom and bedroom, as well as video of a
sexual encounter between Rogers and herself inside his bedroom. The
video recording was delivered to attorney Cohen, and Brindle resigned
from her position with Rogers. On or about July 16, 2012, Rogers
received a demand letter from attorney Cohen relating to the poten-
tial sexual harassment claim that he and Butters were prepared to
file on Brindle’s behalf.
After extensive civil litigation between Rogers and Brindle
that is not relevant to the current appeal, on June 17, 2016,
Brindle and her attorneys (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
“defendants”) were charged in the Superior Court of Fulton County
with conspiracy to commit extortion under OCGA § 16-8-16 (Count 1),
conspiracy to commit unlawful surveillance (Count 2), and conducting
unlawful surveillance under OCGA § 16-11-62 (Count 3). Brindle
was also charged individually with one additional count of conducting
unlawful surveillance under OCGA § 16-11-62 (Count 4).? The indict-
ment was largely based on the defendants’ prior actions involving
an alleged conspiracy to secretly video record and then actually record
Rogers in the bathroom and bedroom of his home on June 20, 2012,
and then sending Rogers the July 16, 2012 litigation demand letter.
Through multiple motions filed on September 19, 2016 and
October 19, 2016, the defendants filed a general demurrer to dismiss
the indictment against them and to have OCGA §§ 16-8-16 (a) (3),*

1 The parties dispute the extent to which this relationship was consensual. Rogers claims
that the relationship was consensual, whereas Brindle went to police in late September 2012
to report that Rogers had forced himself upon her sexually on numerous occasions.

2 The demand letter does not appear in the record.

® Count 4 of the indictment, relating only to Brindle, involved the recording of another
individual who was also at Rogers’ home on the day that Brindle was recording the sexual
encounter with Rogers.

+ “A person commits the offense of theft by extortion when he unlawfully obtains property
of or from another person by threateningto. . . [d]isseminate any information tending to subject
any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to impair his credit or business repute.”

eS 6I7

16-11-62 (2),® and 16-11-66 (a)* declared unconstitutional. Following a
hearing, on November 30, 2016, the trial court issued an order grant-
ing the defendants’ general demurrer to the indictment. After finding
that the indictment failed to allege that the defendants had committed
any crimes under the relevant statutes, the trial court went on to
conclude that OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) was unconstitutionally over-
broad on its face, and further declared that OCGA §§ 16-11-62 (2) and
16-11-66 (a) were unconstitutionally vague because “persons of ordi-
nary intelligence [could not] be expected to determine what is permit-
ted and prohibited by these [two] statutes.” Accordingly, the trial court
dismissed all counts of the indictment against all of the defendants.

The State appeals from this ruling, and, for the reasons that
follow, we conclude that (1) while the trial court properly dismissed
Count 1 of the indictment, the trial court erred by reaching the
constitutional issue relating to OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) in support of
this result; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing Counts 2, 3, and
4 of the indictment and in concluding that OCGA §§ 16-11-62 (2) and
16-11-66 (a) are unconstitutionally vague. We therefore affirm the
portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Count 1 of the indictment,
vacate the portion of the trial court order’s finding OCGA § 16-8-16
(a) (3) to be unconstitutionally overbroad on its face, and reverse the
portion of the trial court’s order dismissing Counts 2-4 of the indict-
ment.

1. The State contends that the trial court erred in granting the
defendants’ general demurrer to Count 1 of the indictment. We
disagree.

“A general demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the substance
of the indictment, whereas a special demurrer challenges the suffi-
ciency of the form of the indictment. [Cits.]” Bramblett v. State, 239
Ga. 336, 337 (1) (236 SE2d 580) (1977).

The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment that will
withstand a general demurrer is as follows: If all the facts
which the indictment charges can be admitted [as true], and
still the accused be innocent, the indictment is bad; but if,

6 “Tt shall be unlawful for. . . [alny person, through the use of any device, without the
consent of all persons observed, to observe, photograph, or record the activities of another which
occur in any private place and out of public view [except where certain statutory exceptions
contained in subsections (2) (A)-(D) apply].”

® “Nothing in Code Section 16-11-62 shall prohibit a person from intercepting a wire, oral,
or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.”

68 es

taking the facts alleged as premises, the guilt of the accused
follows as a legal conclusion, the indictment is good.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 539
(2) (579 SE2d 728) (2003). We “review[ ] a trial court’s ruling on a
general . . . demurrer de novo in order to determine whether the
allegations in the indictment are legally sufficient.” (Punctuation and
footnote omitted.) Smith v. State, 340 Ga. App. 457, 459 (797 SE2d
679) (2017).

Count 1 of the indictment states that the defendants were being
charged

with the offense of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A FELONY
0.C.G.A. §16-4-8,["] for the said accused, in the County of
Fulton and State of Georgia, on the 6th day of June, 2012, did
unlawfully, together, conspire to commit the crime of EXTOR-
TION 0O.C.G.A. §16-8-16, and at least one of those persons
did an overt act to effect the object of said conspiracy, to wit:

OVERT ACTS

1.
On or about the 8rd day of June, 2012, JOHN BUTTERS, an
attorney authorized to practice law in Georgia, contacted
Thomas Hawkins, a private investigator, to arrange a meet-
ing to discuss making a covert video recording of a wealthy
individual without that person’s knowledge or consent.

2.

On or about the 4th day of June, 2012, attorneys JOHN
BUTTERS and DAVID COHEN met with private investiga-
tors Michael Deegan and Thomas Hawkins at the offices of
Hawk Private Investigations (“Hawk P.1.”) in Fulton County
to discuss making a covert video recording of a wealthy
person inside his residence without that person’s knowledge
or consent. BUTTERS and COHEN did not reveal the name
of the wealthy person.

7 “A person commits the offense of conspiracy to commit a crime when he together with one
or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy.”

3.
At the conclusion of this meeting, Michael Deegan and
Thomas Hawkins agreed to help JOHN BUTTERS and
DAVID COHEN purchase the spy camera even after expressly
stating to BUTTERS and COHEN that it would be illegal to
covertly record someone in their residence without that
person’s knowledge or consent.

4.
On or about the 6th day of June, 2012, attorneys JOHN
BUTTERS and DAVID COHEN met with investigator Michael
Deegan a second time at the offices of Hawk P.I. in Fulton
County. Accompanying BUTTERS and COHEN to this meet-
ing was a person they identified as their client “Sam” and
another person they identified as “Sam’s mother.” The pur-
pose of this meeting was to further discuss the making of a
covert video recording of a wealthy individual without that
person’s knowledge or consent.

5.
At the conclusion of the meeting at the offices of Hawk P.I. in
Fulton County, DAVID COHEN purchased a spy camera
made to look like a cell phone and designed to create covert
video recordings.

6.
On or about the 11th day of June, 2012, Michael Deegan
delivered the spy camera to MYE BRINDLE, the person
previously identified as “Sam,” and showed her how to use it.
7.
On or about the 20th day of June, 2012, MYE BRINDLE
secretly videotaped the victim, later identified as JOE ROG-
ERS, without his knowledge or consent, naked in the bath-
room of his residence at [his home address] in Fulton County.

8.
On or about the 20th day of June, 2012, MYE BRINDLE
secretly videotaped JOE ROGERS, without his knowledge
or consent, naked in the bedroom of his residence. . . .

9.
On or about the 20th day of June, 2012, MYE BRINDLE
secretly videotaped a sexual encounter between her and

619

620

JOE ROGERS, without his knowledge or consent, which
took place in the bedroom of his residence. .. .

10.
On or about the 22nd day of June, 2012, MYE BRINDLE
delivered the spy camera and the video recordings refer-
enced in Overt Acts 7 through 9 to Michael Deegan.

11.
On or about the 22nd day of June, 2012, Michael Deegan had
the video recording made by MYE BRINDLE of JOE ROG-
ERS on June 20, 2012 placed on DVD(s) and then delivered
the DVD(s) to DAVID COHEN in Marietta, Georgia.

12.
On or about the 16th day of July, 2012, DAVID COHEN sent
a letter to JOE ROGERS threatening a lawsuit on behalf of
MYE BRINDLE. Said letter stated that there were “[n]umer-
ous audio and video recordings” of sexual harassment and
abuse by ROGERS upon BRINDLE. This letter sought to
settle the matter before public litigation so that Joe Rogers
may avoid potential “media attention .. . intrusive govern-
mental investigations, Department of Justice, Attorneys
General or SEC involvement, as well as civil and criminal
charges... .”

13.
On or about the 2nd day of August, 2012, JOHN BUTTERS,
DAVID COHEN, and Hylton Dupree, attorneys for MYE
BRINDLE met with Robert Ingram and Jeffrey Daxe, attor-
neys for JOE ROGERS, to discuss the claims listed in the
July 16, 2012 letter addressed to ROGERS. COHEN played
an edited video of the sexual encounter that was secretly
recorded by MYE BRINDLE on June 20, 2012, in the bed-
room of Joe Rogers’ residence, without his knowledge or
consent, at [his home address] in Fulton County. BUTTERS
informed Robert Ingram and Jeffrey Daxe that MYE
BRINDLE wanted “millions” of dollars to settle her claim.

14.

On or about the 2nd day of August, 2012, DAVID COHEN
told attorneys Robert Ingram and Jeffrey Daxe that he
possessed videos of other sexual encounters between JOE
ROGERS and MYE BRINDLE. Said statements made by

COHEN furthered the extortion plot by asserting that there
was another embarrassing video of ROGERS, which would
tend to subject ROGERS to even more contempt and ridicule.

15.
On or about the 14th day of September, 2012, mediation was
held in which, JOHN BUTTERS, DAVID COHEN, and
Hylton Dupree asked for twelve million dollars to settle
MYE BRINDLE’ claims which they argued were supported
by the June 20, 2012 video of JOE ROGERS taken without
his knowledge or consent.

16.
On or about the 19th day of September, 2012, DAVID COHEN
filed a civil lawsuit in Fulton County on behalf of MYE
BRINDLE, which stated that BRINDLE “made audio and
video recordings of some of the incidents of sexual harass-
ment and battery” which occurred in Fulton County and at
Sea Island in Glynn County, Georgia.

17.
On or about midnight of the 28th day of September, 2012,
MYE BRINDLE and one of her attorneys went to the Atlanta
Police Department, hours before a court order sealing the
record in Cobb County took effect, to report that JOE ROG-
ERS physically forced himself sexually upon BRINDLE on
numerous occasions.

18.

On or about the 9th day of October, 2012, the Honorable
Judge Susan Forsling of Fulton County State Court, ques-
tioned DAVID COHEN during a hearing about the existence
of another covert videotape of JOE ROGERS and MYE
BRINDLE engagedin a sexual encounter. COHEN responded
that ROGERS was “[p]artially naked” in the videotape. Said
statements made by COHEN furthered the extortion plot by
asserting that there was another embarrassing video of
ROGERS, which would tend to subject ROGERS to even
more contempt and ridicule.

19.
On or about the 24th day of October, 2012, JOHN BUT-
TERS, DAVID COHEN, and MYE BRINDLE served discov-
ery requests on JOE ROGERS asking him to admit that a

622 es

particular video recording labeled as “Exhibit 1 hereto is a
true and correct video recording of a sexual encounter involv-
ing ROGERS and BRINDLE at the Roger’s [sic] Sea Island
residence.” Saidrequest was made by BUTTERS and COHEN
to further the extortion plot by asserting that there was
another embarrassing video of ROGERS, which would tend
to subject ROGERS to even more contempt and ridicule.

Said offense in the County of Fulton and State of Georgia —
contrary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace and
dignity thereof[.]

With respect to the alleged crime that formed the basis for the
purported conspiracy under Count 1 in this case:

A person commits the offense of theft by extortion when he
unlawfully obtains property of or from another person by
threatening to . . . [d]isseminate any information tending to
subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to
impair his credit or business repute.

(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3). Accordingly, in order to
be found guilty of conspiracy to commit extortion under Count 1, the
defendants had to conspire to unlawfully obtain property by “threaten-
ing to... [d]isseminate any information tending to subject [Rogers]
to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to impair his credit or business
repute” and commit an overt act to effect the objective of obtaining
property from Rogers. OCGA §§ 16-8-16 (a) (3) and 16-4-8. However,
a review of the indictment reveals that, regardless of any of the
alleged overt acts that could have otherwise shown the existence of a
conspiracy to commit some other crime (see discussion in Division 2,
infra), there was no agreement to unlawfully obtain property from
Rogers by “threatening” him in this case in any manner that could
serve as a proper basis for a charge of illegal extortion under OCGA §
16-8-16 (a) (3). As explained more fully below, for this reason, the
allegations in the indictment are legally insufficient to support a
charge of conspiracy to commit extortion.

The alleged threat in this case is covered in “Overt Act number 12
of Count 1,” which, again, states that

[o]n or about the 16th day of July, 2012, DAVID COHEN sent
a letter to JOE ROGERS threatening a lawsuit on behalf of
MYE BRINDLE{, and that this] letter stated that there were
“{njumerous audio and video recordings” of sexual harass-
ment and abuse by ROGERS upon BRINDLE. This letter

eS 628

sought to settle the matter before public litigation so that Joe
Rogers may avoid potential “media attention . . . intrusive
governmental investigations, Department of Justice, Attor-
neys General or SEC involvement, as well as civil and
criminal charges... .”

(Emphasis supplied.) From the plain language of the indictment, the
alleged threat here was to file a lawsuit against Rogers and use the
video as evidence in a court of law in the context of possible litigation.
The indictment does not allege any threat (express or implied) to
release the information to anyone outside of the potential court
proceedings if Rogers did not pay Brindle a certain amount of money.*
Compare Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P3d 2, 21 (II) (B) (8) (Cal. 2006)
(attorney committed extortion under California law where he threat-
ened “to publicly accuse [the defending party] of rape and to report
and publicly accuse him of other unspecified [crimes] unless he
‘settled’ by paying” at least $1 million to the attorney’s client).

However, because any threat to “[d]isseminate any information
tending to subject [another] person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or
to impair his credit or business repute” could, in theory, amount to
extortion under OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3), the language of OCGA §
16-8-16 could be read to be broad enough to include “threats” of public
litigation as unlawful and extortionate actions that could subject a
person to criminal liability under the statute. But, a threat of
litigation, by itself, is not unlawful. For this reason, we find that,
based on the authority of other courts that have examined similar
issues, mere “threats to sue cannot constitute criminal extortion.”
United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F3d 1198, 1205 (IV) (A) (1) (11th Cir.
2002). See also Buckley v. DIRECTV, Inc., 276 FSupp.2d 1271,
1275-1276 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (“[T]he Court is not aware of any authority
holding that a demand to settle a claim before pursuing litigation
amounts to extortion. In fact, such demand letters do not fit the legal
definition of extortion [under OCGA § 16-8-16 (a)]”).

Our construction of OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) is consistent with this
Court’s “duty to construe a statute in a manner which upholds it as
constitutional, if that is possible.” (Citation omitted.) Cobb County
School Dist. v. Barker, 271 Ga. 35, 37 (1) (618 SE2d 126) (1999).
Indeed, ifa mere threat of legitimate litigation could serve as a proper
basis for a charge of extortion, OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (8) could be

® In this regard, we note that the remaining Overt Acts mentioned in Count 1 that deal
with the creation and existence of alleged secret recordings and efforts to settle the case before
commencing litigation also do not contain any agreement to threaten Rogers with the release
of the recordings outside of litigation.

624 es

applied in an overbroad and unconstitutional manner that wouldrun
afoul of First Amendment principles protecting the right of individu-
als to petition the government for a redress of grievances. See
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (ID (131 SCt 2488,
180 LE2d 408) (2011) (“The right of access to courts for redress of
wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the
government .. . [and] the Petition Clause protects the right of
individuals to appeal to courts and other forums established by the
government for resolution of legal disputes”) (citations and punctua-
tion omitted). We decline to adopt such a broad and potentially
unconstitutional construction of the statute.

Because the alleged extortion in this case was based on a mere
threat to file a lawsuit, and because there is no allegation in the
indictment that the threatened litigation itself was somehow unlaw-
ful, the defendants could admit to all of the allegations in Count 1 of
the indictment and still be innocent of the crime of conspiracy to
commit extortion.® See, e.g., Brown v. State, 322 Ga. App. 446, 455 (3)
(745 SE2d 699) (2018) (“[E]xercising one’s right to file a lawsuit, or...
conspiring with others to file a lawsuit, in and of itself, does not
constitute a ‘threat’ as required to support the crimes [of influencing
or threatening witnesses in official proceedings]”). Accordingly, the
trial court properly granted the defendants’ general demurrer to this

®° This is not to say that a charge of extortion could not be “based on intentional falsehoods
or on knowingly frivolous claims.” See Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd.,
461 U. S. 731, 743 (ILD) (B) (103 SCt 2161, 76 LE2d 277) (1983) (“The first amendment interests
involved in private litigation . . . are not advanced when the litigation is based on intentional
falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims") (punctuation and footnote omitted). However,
where private litigation is not based on such intentional falsehoods or the like, a demand letter
that merely threatens a lawsuit in connection with that potential litigation could not serve as
a proper basis for a charge of extortion, as a party's right to pursue such litigation is protected
by the First Amendment. See Borough of Duryea, supra. Here, again, there is no allegation in
the indictment that the legal grounds supporting the threatened litigation in this case were
based on intentional falsehoods or that the lawsuit was otherwise somehow unlawful such that
the protection typically afforded to private litigation by the First Amendment right to petition
the government for a redress of grievances would no longer be available. Thus, we need not
decide any issue in this case relating to potentially baseless litigation, as that question is not
properly before us based on the indictment as written. See Davis & Brandon v. Seaboard
Air-Line R., 136 Ga. 278, 282 (71 SE 428) (1911) (“We think it would be a bad precedent to have
the decision of this court invoked upon mere theoretical questions’). If, however, the defendants
had been charged with threatening baseless litigation as a means of unlawfully obtaining
property from Rogers, although this might serve as a proper basis for a charge of extortion, the
defendants would still have an opportunity to defend against such an accusation at trial by
proving that they had an honest claim to the property in question. See OCGA § 16-8-16 (c)
(It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraph . . . (8)... of subsection (a) of
this Code section that the property obtained by threat of accusation, exposure, legal action, or
other invocation of official action was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for
harm done in the circumstance to which such accusation, exposure, legal action, or other official
action relates or as compensation for property or lawful services”)

eS 625

Count. See Lowe, supra. In light of the trial court’s proper conclusion
that Count 1 of the indictment failed to sufficiently allege a crime
against the defendants under OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (8) as a matter of
law, the trial court did not need to decide any issue regarding the
constitutionality of OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3). See, e.g., Bd. of Tax
Assessors v. Tom’s Foods, Inc., 264 Ga. 309, 310 (444 SE2d 771) (1994)
(It “is well established that this court will never decide a constitu-
tional question if the decision of the case presented can be made upon
other grounds”) (citations and punctuation omitted). We therefore
vacate that portion of the trial court’s order purporting to declare
OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3) to be unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.

2. The State also urges that the trial court erred in granting the
defendants’ general demurrer to Counts 2-4 of the indictment. With
respect to these Counts, the State is correct.

Count 2 of the indictment charged the defendants with

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A FELONY 0O.C.G.A. §16-4-8,
for the said accused, in the County of Fulton and State of
Georgia, on the 20th day of June, 2012, did unlawfully,
together, conspire to commit the crime of UNLAWFUL
EAVESDROPPING OR SURVEILLANCE 0.C.G.A. §
16-11-62, and at least one of [the defendants] did [one of the
Overt Acts alleged in numbers 1-13 of Count 1] to effect the
object of said conspiracy[.]

Count 3 charged the defendants with

UNLAWFUL EAVESDROPPING OR SURVEILLANCE
0.C.G.A. §16-11-62, for the said accused, in the County of
Fulton and State of Georgia, on the 20th day of June, 2012,
through the use of a SPY CAMERA, a device, without the
consent of all persons observed, did unlawfully record the
activities of JOE ROGERS which occurred at [his home
address], a private place, out of the public view[.]

Finally, Count 4 charged Brindle individually with

UNLAWFUL EAVESDROPPING OR SURVEILLANCE
0.C.G.A. §16-11-62, for the said accused, in the County of
Fulton and State of Georgia, on the 20th day of June, 2012,
through the use of a SPY CAMERA, a device, without the
consent of all persons observed, did unlawfully record the

Py
S
o

activities of KATHERINE MARIE MAYNARD which occurred.
at [Rogers’ home address], a private place, out of the public
view[.]

All of these Counts, whether based on a conspiracy involving a
prior agreement and certain overt acts or based on direct violations of
OCGA § 16-11-62, hinge upon whether the facts alleged would show
a potential violation of or an agreement to violate OCGA § 16-11-62
(2). That statute states in relevant part that

[i]t shall be unlawful for . . . [a]ny person, through the use of
any device, without the consent of all persons observed, to
observe, photograph, or record the activities of another
which occur in any private place and out of public view
[except where certain statutory exceptions contained in
subsections (2) (A)-(D) apply].

The defendants contend that no violation of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) has
been sufficiently alleged in the indictment because (a) the defendants
did not have to seek the consent of all persons observed in the video
created by Brindle in order to video record Rogers or any other person
in his home; and (b) the video recording itself did not take place in a
private place and out of the public view. Both of these contentions are
unavailing.

(a) OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) requires the consent of all persons who
will be video recorded before such persons can be video recorded in a
private place and out of the public view.

Under the plain language of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2), except when
certain specific exceptions listed in the statute apply, a person cannot
lawfully “use . . . any device” to “photograph . . . or record the
activities” of others that occur in any private place and out of public
view “without the consent of all persons observed.” Setting aside for
a moment the question whether the indictment sufficiently alleged
that the video recordings here were made in a “private place and out
of public view” (which we will address in Division 2 (b), infra),
OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) states in no uncertain terms that “all persons
observed” must consent to observational activities such as being
photographed or having their own activities recorded with any device
before someone else can legally record them through any means that
allow them to be observed. (Emphasis supplied.) The statute is
written in terms that cover the types of observational surveillance
that involve the capturing of images of another person on a spy
camera without that person’s consent. Here, the indictment alleges
that Rogers and another person were video recorded with a hidden

eS 627

spy camera in Rogers’ home without their consent. Because video
recording someone in such a manner falls into the category of
surveillance activities covered by OCGA § 16-11-62 (2), and because
Brindle and her attorneys allegedly took actions to agree to make a
secret video and actually video record others without the consent of
all of the persons being recorded, the defendants’ actions fall within
the purview of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) and any alleged conspiracy to
violate that statute (assuming that the video recordings were made in
a “private place and out of public view”).

However, the defendants contend that they were not legally
required to obtain the consent of “all” of the persons being video
recorded as required by the plain language of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2).
Instead, they claim that they only needed to obtain the consent of one
of the parties being recorded (Brindle) to avoid criminal liability in
light of Georgia’s “one-party-consent rule” contained in OCGA §
16-11-66 (a). The defendants are incorrect.

OCGA § 16-11-66 (a) states that

[nothing in Code Section 16-11-62 shall prohibit a person
from intercepting a wire, oral, or electronic communication
where such person is a party to the communication or one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception.

(Emphasis supplied.) By its terms, OCGA § 16-11-66 (a) applies to
intercepted “communications,” such as voices involved in a telephone
conversation or an electronic communication to which the intercept-
ing person is a party. See Fetty v. State, 268 Ga. 365 (3) (489 SE2d 813)
(1997); OCGA § 16-11-66 (a). The statute does not refer to observa-
tional surveillance such as video recording or photographing another
person’s activities, and it does not apply to nullify the clear statutory
requirement of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) that the consent of all parties is
needed before a person may use any sort of spying device to photo-
graph or video record the activities of another person in a private
place and out of the public view. See Gavin v. State, 292 Ga. App. 402
(664 SE2d 797) (2008) (one-party-consent rule of OCGA § 16-11-66
did not apply to prevent prosecution of defendant for violation of
OCGA § 16-11-62 where defendant did not obtain consent of person
he video recorded). OCGA § 16-11-66 (a) only applies to intercepted
wire, oral, or electronic communications, and does not authorize the
creation of any secretly produced photograph or video of observed
activities without the consent of all persons being photographed or

628 es

video recorded in a private place and out of the public view.'° See
Sims v. State, 297 Ga. 401 (2) n.2 (774 SE2d 620) (2015) (recognizing
distinction between audible communication in recording that is sub-
ject to one-party-consent rule and video recording that is not). To the
extent that the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Madison, 311 Ga.
App. 31 (2) (a) (714 SE2d 714) (2011), can be read to support the
conclusion that the one-party-consent rule of OCGA § 16-11-66 (a)
can apply to video recordings made without the consent of all persons
observed in private places and out of the public view, the case is
overruled.

The indictment here does not fail based on OCGA § 16-11-66 (a)
because the one-party-consent rule does not apply in this case to
shield the defendants from potential criminal liability for conspiring
to and creating a secret video recording of others with a hidden
camera in an ostensibly private place and out of the public view
without the consent of those other people whose activities were being
recorded.

(b) The indictment sufficiently alleges that the video recording
took place in a private place and outside of the public view.

As stated above, pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-62 (2), a person may
not use any device “to observe, photograph, or record the activities of
another which occur in any private place and out of public view”
without the consent of all persons being observed. Despite the fact
that the indictment here indicates that the video recording in this
case took place at a private home, outside of the public view, and
without the consent of all persons recorded, the defendants contend
that the recording could not have taken place in a “private” place
because Rogers could not have had any expectation of privacy in a
place in which he had allowed Brindle to enter for purposes of
carrying on a sexual relationship with her. We disagree.

At the time Brindle secretly video recorded Rogers and another
person in Rogers’ home in June 2012, a “private place” for purposes of
OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) was defined as “a place where one is entitled
reasonably to expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or
surveillance.” See former OCGA § 16-11-60 (3)."' Based on the indict-
ment as written, and based on the plain language of the former

1© In this regard, OCGA § 16-11-66 (a) would apply to those aspects of OCGA § 16-11-62
that deal with, for example, a person consenting to the recording of a conversation to which he
or she was a party. See, e.g., OCGA § 16-11-62 (1). However, the allegations in this case do not
deal with electronic or other “communications,” but with video surveillance that would not be
subject to the one-party-consent exception created by OCGA § 16-11-66 (a)

1 The statute was amended in 2015 to define “private place” as “a place where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy.” OCGA § 16-11-60 (3).

eS 629

version of OCGA § 16-11-60 (3), both Rogers and the other person
who was secretly video recorded in the residence in this case would
have had a reasonable expectation to be safe from “hostile intrusion
or surveillance” in the places where they were video recorded. The
indictment also indicates that all video recording activities took place
in spaces within the residence that were outside of the public view.
Accordingly, for these reasons alone, the places involved in this case
would meet the statutory definition of “private place[s]” that were
“out of public view.” OCGA §§ 16-11-62 (2); 16-11-60 (3).

Although there is nothing in the plain language of former
OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) to indicate that Rogers and the other person in
the residence would no longer have a reasonable expectation to be
safe from the “hostile intrusion” of having their activities secretly
video recorded once Brindle entered the residence, and although
there is nothing in the former version of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) to show
that the reasonable expectation to be safe from “hostile intrusion or
surveillance” under the statute is coextensive with one’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, we have in the past looked to Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence as a guide when interpreting the scope of privacy
protected by OCGA § 16-11-62. See Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102
(3) (d) (475 SE2d 580) (1996).'? See also Quintrell v. State, 231 Ga.
App. 268 (1) (499 SE2d 117) (1998). This may be the case, in part,
because the language from the former version of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2)
tracks much of the language from the Model Penal Code, which states
that a “‘[p]rivate place’ means a place where one may reasonably
expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance, but

2 This is not to say, however, that our analysis of one’s reasonable expectation to be safe
from “hostile or intrusive surveillance” under the former version of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) is
limited to the parameters set forth in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the Fourth
Amendment is concerned with stopping unauthorized intrusion by the government by any
means into areas where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whereas OCGA §
16-11-62 (2) is concerned with stopping unauthorized intrusion by all persons through the
specific means of non-consensual photographing or video recording of their activities. It may
very well be true that a person had a greater expectation to be free from the specific hostile
intrusions of being video recorded or photographed under Georgia statutory law than he or she
would have to be free from government intrusion for Fourth Amendment purposes. However,
we need not decide that issue in this case, as our analysis above ultimately reveals that, even
with the Fourth Amendment as a guide, Rogers and the other person who was video recorded
in the residence did not lose their reasonable expectation to be free from the hostile intrusion
of being secretly video recorded after Brindle entered the residence. Nor do we need to
determine whether, by amending the statute in 2015 to define “private place” as “a place where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” (OCGA § 16-11-60 (3)), the legislature intended for
the definition of “private place” under OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) to only reference the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” that one would have under the Fourth Amendment, as the language
under the 2015 amendment is not at issue in this case.

630 es

does not include a place to which the public or a substantial group
thereof has access.” Model Penal Code § 250.12 (1). Later commen-
taries to the Model Penal Code give further context to the meaning of
“private place”:

[T]he notion of a “private place” focuses on the presence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy rather than the generic
category of location. In doubtful cases, it is left to the court
to determine in functional terms whether the [surveillance]
occurred in a “private place” sufficient to invoke the provi-
sions of [the anti-surveillance statute].

Model Penal Code Part II Commentaries, vol. 3, at 434.
In this regard,

the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether
the person invoking its protection can claim a “justifiable,” a
“reasonable,” or a “legitimate expectation of privacy” that
has been invaded. ...Thisinquiry...normally embraces two
discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his
conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy — whether . . . the individual has shown that he
seeks to preserve something as private. The second question
is whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy
is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable .. .
— whether . . . the individual’s expectation, viewed objec-
tively, is “justifiable” under the circumstances.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 (ID (A) (99 SCt 2577, 61 LE2d 220) (1979). See also Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347 (88 SCt 507, 19 LE2d 576) (1967).

For Fourth Amendment purposes, one who begins with a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in a particular area such as his or her
residence can lose that expectation of privacy by inviting a guest into
that otherwise private place. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 326 F3d
361 (2d Cir. 2003) (defendant did not have reasonable expectation of
privacy to prevent being video recorded with hidden camera in jacket
of confidential informant after inviting confidential informant into
his residence to sell drugs to the informant).'* However, a person does

18 We note that this case has nothing to do with a person inviting police or other
government officials into his home by consenting to a search or for other purposes. However, to
the extent that OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) could have been construed to apply to the actions of police
officers making video recordings of others without their consent after being invited into

eS 631

not lose one’s reasonable expectation of privacy simply when he or she
invites a family member or someone who is more akin to being a
member of the household into a place where one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. See Kelley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 244 (2) (503
SE2d 881) (1998) (sixteen-year-old girl had a reasonable expectation
of privacy against her own family members when she was passed
out nude in the family’s home bathroom in the act of or following
bathing). See alsoOCGA § 16-1-3 (15) (defining “public place” as used
in Title 16 as “any place where the conduct involved may reasonably
be expected to be viewed by people other than members of the actor’s
family or household”) (emphasis supplied).

Here, the indictment as written does not establish that Brindle
was not a member of or akin to being a member of Rogers’ household;
it indicates that Brindle was not a stranger or casual guest to Rogers
or the residence in Fulton County where the alleged video recording
took place. In fact, the indictment emphasized that Brindle’s attorneys
allegedly had “[nJumerous audio and video recordings” of sexual
encounters between Brindle and Rogers;" that Brindle was expected
to have the ability to make a “covert video recording of [Rogers] inside
his residence”; that there were “videos of other sexual encounters
between [Rogers] and [Brindle]”; that Brindle was able to make “audio
and video recordings of some of the [sexual] incidents . . . which
occurred in Fulton County and at Sea Island in Glynn County, Geor-
gia”; that there may have been “another covert videotape of [Rogers]
and [Brindle] engaged in a sexual encounter . . . [where Rogers] was
‘[plartially naked’ ”; and that Brindle had another “embarrassing . . .
video recording of a sexual encounter involving [Rogers] and [Brindle]
at [Rogers’] Sea Island residence.” These allegations do not point to the
activities of someone who was a stranger to Rogers or the residential
address at which the surreptitious video recording is alleged to have
occurred. To the contrary, the indictment shows that Brindle and
Rogers were involved to a point where Brindle may have been the type

someone's home, the legislature made clear through a 2015 amendment to OCGA § 16-11-62 (2)
that police donot have to obtain the consent of all parties being video recorded in a private place
and outside of the public view when they record such persons in connection with their duties as
police officers. Pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) (D):

[I]t shall not be unlawful . .. [fJor a law enforcement officer or his or her agent to

use a device in the lawful performance of his or her official duties to observe,

photograph, videotape, or record the activities of persons that occur in the presence

of such officer or his or her agent.

\4 We note that, although the indictment alleges that Brindle’s attorneys characterized the
relationship between Rogers and Brindle as non-consensual, the indictment does not state that
this characterization was true or that the actual sexual relationship between Rogers and
Brindle was not consensual. If the indictment showed that the sexual relationship in this case
was not consensual, our analysis might be different.

632 es

of household member who could be allowed into Rogers’ residence
without Rogers or the other members of the household losing their
reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas of the home that they
intended to remain private. See Moses v. State, 328 Ga. App. 625, 628
(2) (a) (760 SE2d 217) (2014) (homeowner did not lose reasonable
expectation of privacy “by allowing persons such as household resi-
dents, family members of residents, or housecleaners access to the
house”).'° Accordingly, even when we use the Fourth Amendment as
a guide, the indictment here sufficiently alleges that the video
recording took place in a “private place.” The fact that the indictment
also indicates that these areas were outside of public view is sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2). Because the
indictment here alleged facts showing that the defendants could be
found guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 2-4 based ona conspiracy
to violate, and the actual violation of, OCGA § 16-11-62 (2), the trial
court erred in holding otherwise.

3. The trial court also erred in concluding that OCGA §§ 16-11-62
(2) and 16-11-66 (a) are unconstitutionally vague. “A statute is
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence notice of the conduct which is prohibited and encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Cit.]” Johnson v. State,
264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) (449 SE2d 94) (1994). As explained more fully in
Division 2 (a), supra, there is nothing unclear about the requirement
in OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) that “all” persons being observed must give
their consent to be photographed or video recorded before such
persons can be photographed or video recorded in a private place and
out of public view. Nor is it unclear that the one-party-consent rule of
OCGA § 16-11-66 (a) does not apply to eliminate the requirement
for “all” persons to give their consent to be legally photographed or
video recorded in a private place and out of the public view consistent
with the requirements of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2). People of ordinary
intelligence can understand that they can be found guilty of illegal
surveillance if they use a device to secretly photograph or video record
others in private places and out of the public view without the consent
of all persons being photographed or video recorded, and neither
OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) nor OCGA § 16-11-66 (a) encourages arbitrary
or discriminatory enforcement of their respective provisions.

1 We need not address the Appellees’ argument that Rogers no longer had a reasonable
expectation of privacy because he was carrying on an adulterous relationship with Brindle,
because there is no allegation in the indictment that the relationship between Rogers and
Brindle was adulterous.

eS 633

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, Nahmias, Blackwell, Peter-
son, and Grant, JJ., who concur specially.

NAHMIAS, Justice, concurring in part and concurring specially in
part.

Iconcur fully in Divisions 1, 2 (a), and 3 of the Court’s opinion. As
for Division 2 (b), I agree with the Court’s result but not all of its
reasoning. It should be emphasized as to the result that we are now
reviewing a general demurrer to the indictment, which limits us to
the allegations of the indictment and requires us to treat them as
true. With regard to the unlawful surveillance charges we allow to
stand, the analysis might be different if we ever consider a full
evidentiary record after trial.

Most significantly, I have serious doubts about looking even for
guidance to modern “reasonable expectation of privacy” Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence in interpreting the pre-2015 statutory language
defining a “private place” for purposes of OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) as
“a place where one is entitled reasonably to expect to be safe from
casualor hostile intrusion or surveillance.” See former OCGA § 16-11-60
(3). That language was approved by the General Assembly in April
1967, see Ga. L. 1967, pp. 844, 852, and appears to be based on similar
language in § 250.12 (1) of the 1962 Model Penal Code. It clearly did
not refer to the revolution in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that
occurred only later that year, when in December the United States
Supreme Court ushered in a new standard for determining the reach
of the constitutional privacy protection and first used the term
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (88 SCt 507, 19 LE2d 576) (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405-406 (132 SCt 945, 181
LE2d 911) (2012) (discussing the “deviation” from the traditional
property-based approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence aligned
with common-law trespass doctrine that was effectuated by Katz’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy” approach). See also Hudson v.
State, 127 Ga. App. 452, 455 (193 SE2d 919) (1972) (Hall, P. J.,
dissenting) (using the phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” for
the first time in a Georgia appellate decision).

Nevertheless, without acknowledging the real roots of former
OCGA § 16-11-60 (3), this Court and the Court of Appeals have looked
to modern Fourth Amendment case law to determine the scope of the
protection against surveillance devices provided by OCGA § 16-11-62
(2), as the Court’s opinion explains. We need not decide today if doing
so is really appropriate, because the end result in this case, at least on
general demurrer, is the same. And this Court may never need to

634 es

resolve the issue, because in 2015 the General Assembly redefined
“private place” in OCGA § 16-11-60 (3) as “a place where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy,” thereby abandoning the Model
Penal Code formulation and squarely invoking the modern Fourth
Amendment test. See Ga. L. 2015, p. 1046, § 1.

I do not agree with everything said in the text and footnotes of
Division 2 (b), but it reaches the right result, so I concur specially in
that portion of the Court’s opinion.

BLACKWELL, Justice, concurring specially.

I donot agree with all that is saidin the opinion for the Court, and
so, I do not join it. I do agree, however, that the indictment is not
sufficient to survive a general demurrer with respect to conspiracy to
commit extortion because it does not allege that Mye Brindle and her
lawyers conspired to unlawfully obtain property from Joe Rogers by
means of a threat to disseminate embarrassing information. See
OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (3). Although the indictment alleges that Brindle
and her lawyers demanded that Rogers settle certain claims and
threatened to sue him if he did not, there is no allegation that the
threatened lawsuit was baseless (much less that Brindle and her
lawyers knew it to be baseless), nor is there any allegation that the
settlement demanded had no reasonable connection with the threat-
ened lawsuit.'¢ A proper application of the extortion statute is enough
to resolve this case, and we need not address the First Amendment.

As for the unlawful surveillance counts, I agree that they survive
a general demurrer. Irrespective of whether Rogers had a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in the place in
which he was subjected to video recording, it appears from the facts
alleged in the indictment that he had a reasonable expectation that
he would not be subjected to casual or hostile photographic or video

16 A simple hypothetical illustrates my understanding of the extortion statute. Like
threats to disseminate embarrassing information, threats to accuse someone of a crime may, if
used to obtain property from another, amount to extortion. See OCGA § 16-8-16 (a) (2). If I
obtain property from you by threatening to call law enforcement and accuse you of a crime, it
might be extortion, but not necessarily. If the property that I obtain is mine, I only threaten to
accuse you of having stolen it, and the accusation is not baseless, there is nothing unlawful
about my obtaining the property in question by means of the particular threat employed. On the
other hand, if [ obtain property from you to which I have no claim of right by threatening to
accuse you ofa crime (irrespective of whether the accusation is baseless) — “Unless you pay me
$10,000, I will tell the police (truthfully) that you're a drug dealer” — it might be extortion.
Likewise, if | obtain property from you (whether or not I have a claim of right to it) by means
of a threat to falsely accuse you of a crime, knowing the accusation to be baseless — “Pay me
back the money that you owe me, or | will tell the police (falsely) that you are a drug dealer” —
it might be extortion.

eS 635

surveillance in that place. The State has adequately alleged that
Rogers was in a private place under former OCGA § 16-11-60 and
OCGA § 16-11-62 (2).

Iam authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Peter-
son join this special concurrence.

GRANT, Justice, concurring specially in part.

While I do not agree with all that is said in Division 2 (b) of the
Court’s opinion (and thus cannot join it), I do agree in full with the
following statement: “[T]here is nothing in the former version of
OCGA § 16-11-62 (2) to show that the reasonable expectation to be
safe from ‘hostile intrusion or surveillance’ under the statute is
coextensive with one’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Maj. op. at
629.

It is also true that we and the Court of Appeals have looked to the
Fourth Amendment as a guide in interpreting the statute, but we
have done so in remarkably different circumstances than the ones
before us today. In both Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102 (475 SE2d 580)
(1996) and Quintrell v. State, 231 Ga. App. 268 (499 SE2d 117) (1998),
government agents were alleged to have illegally surveilled criminal
defendants. In that context, it is no surprise at all to look toward the
Fourth Amendment, which serves as a constitutional boundary to the
behavior of the government. But here, in analyzing the actions taken
by private parties, the Fourth Amendment provides something less
than a useful guide; in fact, applying Fourth Amendment rules may
even serve to confuse rather than clarify the meaning of the statute.!7

To begin, much of what the majority applies as seminal Fourth
Amendment law had not yet been announced by the United States
Supreme Court at the time that OCGA § 16-11-62 was drafted. See Ga.
L. 1967, pp. 844, 852. The “private place” definition at issue here was
passed by the General Assembly in April 1967, while the United States
Supreme Court did not issue its Katz decision until December of that
same year. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (88 SCt 507, 19
LE2d 576) (1967). And the Smith v. Maryland decision that the
majority quotes and applies was not issued until more than a decade

17 Apart from the Fourth Amendment issues outlined more fully in this special eoneur-
rence, and in contrast to the majority opinion, I also note that the statutory text provides no
reason that the recording of consensual and nonconsensual conduct would be treated differ-
ently under the statute. See Maj. op. at 631 n.14, Additionally, one would expect that the
indictment would include an allegation that the sexual activities at issue were consensual if
that were an important factor in the interpretation of the statute—particularly where, as here,
it was commonly understood that the activities were alleged by Ms. Brindle to be nonconsen-
sual.

636 es

later. See 442 U. S. 735 (99 SCt 2577, 61 LE2d 220) (1979)
(“In determining whether a particular form of government-initiated
electronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, our lodestar is Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347
(1967).” (emphasis supplied)). Relying on these cases leads to the odd
conclusion that perhaps if Ms. Brindle had been a stranger rather
than a guest, her surveillance would have been lawful. Maj. op. at
631. Or, perhaps, that Mr. Rogers would have had a lessened expec-
tation of privacy for the same activities in Ms. Brindle’s home rather
than in his own. Id.

The statute cannot bear the weight that the Fourth Amendment
puts on it when addressing the behavior of private parties and not of
the government. In fact, the one Georgia case cited to support the
potential distinction between privacy from strangers and privacy
from family members or other close parties, is one that specifically
concluded that “there is almost a total lack of authority” addressing
parental wiretapping, which was the closest Fourth Amendment
analog that the court could identify. Kelley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 244,
248-249 (503 SE2d 881) (1998). The court instead looked to an earlier
Georgia case interpreting OCGA § 16-11-62 without any reference at
all to the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Ransom v. Ransom, 253 Ga.
656 (324 SE2d 437) (1985).

Nor am I as certain as my colleague that when the General
Assembly redefined “private place” to constitute “a place where there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy,” the legislature was “squarely
invoking the modern Fourth Amendment test.” Concurring op. at 634
(Nahmias, J., concurring in part and concurring specially in part).
Perhaps Fourth Amendment tests are more relevant under the new
version of the statute — or perhaps not. After all, the amended statute
still addresses a privacy interest quite different than the one that we
all share against government search and seizure. But we need not
make that determination until the proper case is before us, and I would
decline to do so here.

I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice
Blackwell join this concurrence.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 2, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED NOVEMBER 14, 2017.

‘aul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Marc A. Mallon, Lyndsey
H. Rudder, F McDonald Wakeford, Assistant District Attorneys, for
appellant.

eS 637

Brian Steel; Finestone, Morris & White, Bruce H. Morris; Jimmy
D. Berry; Reid Thompson, for appellees.

$17A1302. VARGO v. ADAMS.
(805 SE2d 817)

BENHAM, Justice.

The parties to this appeal were previously a couple, though
unmarried. Appellant Adam Vargo purchased the real property in
which the parties formerly resided in his own name as sole owner, and
executed a purchase money mortgage on it. Shortly thereafter, Vargo
executed a warranty deed conveying the property to himself and
appellee Brittany E. Adams as joint tenants with the right of survi-
vorship. The couple broke up, and Vargo filed a petition for statutory
partition, which was later amended to dismiss that claim and sub-
stitute a claim for equitable partition. Vargo testified at the bench
trial in this matter that he contributed the down payment to purchase
the property and nearly all the mortgage payments made on the loan,
and claimed that an inequity exists, requiring equitable partition of
the property, due to the disparity of funds he paid toward the
purchase of the property compared to that paid by Adams. After
conducting a bench trial, the judge found that equitable partition is
not an available remedy to parties who hold property as joint tenants
with right of survivorship except in actions for divorce. In the order
denying Vargo’s petition for equitable partition, the trial judge advised
Vargo that he may sever the joint tenancy and then seek either a
statutory partition under OCGA § 44-6-160, or equitable partition if
no sufficient remedy at law exists. The order also granted Vargo
certain of his claims for conversion of items of personal property
retained by Adams, but denied Vargo’s claim for attorney fees. Vargo
filed this appeal.' For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. When Vargo dismissed his original claim for statutory parti-
tion, he correctly concluded that partition pursuant to OCGA §
44.6-160, known as statutory partition, is available only to tenants in

1 ‘The notice of appeal was filed prior to January 1, 2017, and consequently jurisdiction for
this appeal involving issues of equity is properly in this Court and not the Court of Appeals. See
OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a), effective January 1, 2017 (Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, § 6-1 (c)/HB 927). Appeals
in future cases of this sort in which the notice of appeal was filed on or after January 1, 2017
will go to the Court of Appeals.

638 eS

common.” Because Vargo and Adams are owners of the subject
property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, statutory
partition is unavailable to Vargo. See Wallace v. Wallace, 260 Ga. 400
(396 SE2d 208) (1990). Under the circumstances of this case, equi-
table partition is also unavailable. OCGA § 44-6-140 states: “Equity
has jurisdiction in cases of partition whenever the remedy at law is
insufficient or peculiar circumstances render the proceeding in equity
more suitable and just.” Vargo asserts he is entitled to equitable
partition under one or both of the requirements described in OCGA §
44.6-140 because, since the parties hold the property as joint tenants
with the right of survivorship, they lack a remedy at law, and because
the accounting issues regarding the parties’ respective contributions
to the property represent “peculiar circumstances” that render pro-
ceedings in equity appropriate. He claims the trial court’s conclusion
that, because the property is not marital property, he must sever the
joint tenancy to create a tenancy in common before seeking equitable
partition is unsupported by law or logic. Vargo is mistaken.

The trial court properly applied well-settled property law when
it concluded Vargo may seek a partition of the subject property only
after the joint tenancy is severed. For example, in Reed v. McCon-
athy,® Reed was, like Vargo, originally the sole owner of the subject
property who later conveyed the property to a person to whom she
was not married in a manner that resulted in the two titleholders
owning the property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.
Several years later, Reed executed a quitclaim deed transferring all
her interest in the property to a third party, who then immediately
executed a quitclaim deed transferring back to Reed all interest the
third party held in the property. A number of years afterward, Reed
filed a petition for equitable partition and an accounting. This Court
reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the petition, finding that
because the joint tenancy had been severed, the conclusion that the
property could not be equitably partitioned because it was held in a
joint tenancy was erroneous. Id. at 473. Pursuant to what is now
OCGA § 44-6-190 (a) (3), a transfer during the life of one of the joint
tenants of all or part of his or her interest in the property serves to
sever the joint tenancy. At that point, it becomes property held by
tenants in common, which is subject to equitable partition. Accord
Reed, id.

2 Pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-160, when persons are “common owners of land” for which no
provision is made by will or otherwise concerning the division of the land, any owner may apply
by petition to the superior court in the county in which the land is located for a writ of partition.

2 299 Ga. 471, 472-473 (788 SE2d 769) (2016)

eS 639

The trial court did not err by denying the equitable relief Vargo
sought. Further, it offered Vargo a proper solution for severing the
joint tenancy with the right of survivorship he created and creating
insteada tenancy in common, for which equitable partition may be an
available remedy.

2. Vargo sought the equitable partition of real property owned by
unmarried parties as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. In
her initial response to Vargo’s petition, Adams raised the defense that
the petition should be dismissed because it failed to state aclaim upon
which relief can be granted. Vargo was granted a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue of whether he was entitled to
equitable partition pursuant to the circumstances of this case in a
two-day bench trial. The trial court noted in its order denying the
petition for equitable partition that Vargo had failed to present any
authority for equitable partition of property held as joint tenants with
the right of survivorship except in actions for divorce. As noted in
Division 1, the trial court properly concluded that equitable partition
is not available to unmarried parties who own property as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship. This distinction between
married and unmarried joint tenants is because divorce and the
division of marital property have always been regarded as equitable.
See Gorman v. Gorman, 239 Ga. 312, 314 (236 SE2d 652) (1977).
Generally speaking, marital property is to be equitably divided upon
the divorce of married persons, and this includes real property that is
marital property whether owned in common by the parties to the
marriage or as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Cf.
Gorman, id.*

Adams did not specifically assert this argument as grounds for
the dismissal of Vargo’s petition. Nevertheless, we reject Vargo’s
assertion that the trial court’s ruling was made “sua sponte” in such
a manner that it denied him the fundamental right of due process
because it amounted to a dispositive ruling on an issue not raised by
the parties, and on which he was not granted the opportunity to be
heard. The trial court simply applied the well-settled law of Georgia.
In this state, the general rule is that parties who own property as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship are not entitled to equitable

4 In Mallard v. Mallard, 297 Ga. 274 (773 SE2d 274) (2015), certain real property that was
originally owned solely by the wife was conveyed by her, prior to the marriage, to the parties as
joint tenants with the right of survivorship. For the purposes of equitable division of the
property, this Court drew a distinction between the property itself, in which the parties owned
a premarital joint interest and was thus not a marital asset, and the retired debt on the
property, which was retired by the sole contribution of the husband during the marriage for the
express purpose of benefiting both parties, and wasthus a marital asset to be equitably divided

640 Pe

partitioning, the exception being for married parties who are seeking
the equitable division of marital property in a divorce proceeding.
That circumstance does not exist in this case, and the trial court
properly denied the petition.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED OCTOBER 2, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED NOVEMBER 14, 2017.

ichard S. Alembik, for appellant.
Cowsert Heath, David F. Ellison; Wanda L. Barnett & Associates,
Wanda L. Barnett; RCO Legal, Lori L. McGowan, Susan B. Shaw;
Russell & Mingledorff, John D. Russell, for appellee.

$17G0038. OCMULGEE EMC et al. v. MCDUFFIE.
(806 SE2d 546)
NAHMIAS, Justice.
We granted the petition for certiorari filed by Ocmulgee EMC? in
this workers’ compensation case to answer this question:

Must an employer show the availability of suitable
employment to justify suspension of workers’ compensation
benefits after already establishing that an employee’s work-
related aggravation to a preexisting condition has ceased to
be the cause of the employee’s disability?

The Court of Appeals held that the answer is yes. See McDuffie v.
Ocmulgee EMC, 338 Ga. App. 200, 203 (789 SE2d 415) (2016). Because
the answer is no, we reverse that part of the Court of Appeals’
opinion.

1. The Court of Appeals recited the relevant facts, as viewed
in the light most favorable to the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) from the State Board of Workers’ Compensation
(“Board”):

[Kasabian] McDuffie suffered an injury to his right knee
in 2002 (“2002 injury”) when he was employed by Eastman

1 The other appellant in this case is Georgia Administrative Services, the third party
administrative service for Ocmulgee EMC’s workers’ compensation insurance. We refer to the
parties collectively as “EMC.”

Youth Detention Center (““EYDC”). McDuffie settled his claim
for workers’ compensation benefits with EYDC, and by July
2003, he had undergone three knee surgeries. McDuffie
admitted in his settlement agreement that he was partially
disabled, his condition would not improve, and there was no
possibility of his being able to perform the same type of
gainful employment on a regular basis in the future. McDuff-
ie’s doctor gave him a 20 percent permanent impairment
rating for his right knee and placed him on permanent
sedentary work restrictions. As a result, McDuffie was out of
work from 2002 until 2006.

In March 2007, McDuffie applied for a job at EMC and
he was hired to work as a meter reader/right-of-way laborer.
When he filled out his EMC job application, McDuffie omit-
ted relevant information that would have shown that he was
physically unable to do the job for which he was applying.
Specifically, McDuffie failed to disclose his 2002 injury, his
employment with EYDC, or his permanent sedentary work
restrictions. Moreover, McDuffie indicated on his applica-
tion that he was physically able to perform the job functions
of a meter reader/right-of-way laborer, which required him
to stand, walk, and carry parts, and required him to have the
ability to get an injured person off a pole within a short
period of time.

In September 2009, while working on the job for EMC,

McDuffie stepped in a hole and re-injured his right knee
(the “2009 injury”). McDuffie’s indemnity benefits com-
menced shortly after his injury. In March 2010, EMC dis-
covered that McDuffie had provided false information on his
job application when he stated that he was physically able to
do the job and failed to disclose his prior injury or sedentary
work restrictions. After learning this, EMC fired McDuffie
and suspended his indemnity benefits. It is undisputed that,
in February 2011, EMC reinstated McDuffie’s indemnity
benefits once McDuffie’s doctor, Dr. Pope, recommended an
additional surgery. That surgery was performed in March
2011, and after that surgery, Dr. Pope released McDuffie to
return to work with sedentary restrictions.
InJuly 2011, Dr. Pope opined that McDuffie had returned
to his pre-injury baseline, i.e., his pre-2009 sedentary work
restrictions, and EMC again suspended McDuffie’s indem-
nity benefits. Another physician, Dr. Gupta, who also exam-
ined McDuffie, similarly opined that McDuffie’s knee had
been restored to its pre-2009 injury status.

642 eS

McDuffie, 338 Ga. App. at 200-201.

The ALJ who heard McDuffie’s request to reinstate his benefits
specifically found the opinions of Dr. Pope and Dr. Gupta to be
credible and held that EMC “has shown and proven the employee’s
restrictions are the same as prior to the 2009 injury” and that
McDuffie “has no restrictions other than those he already was under
at the time he was hired by [EMC].” Accordingly, the ALJ denied
McDuffie’s request for reinstatement of benefits. McDuffie appealed
that decision to the Board’s Appellate Division, which accepted the
ALJ’s findings as supported by the evidence and further explained:

Generally, if an employer/insurer can show by a prepon-
derance of the competent and credible evidence that an
employee no longer suffers any disability due to his work-
related injury, then the employer/insurer need not show the
specific availability of suitable employment to justify sus-
pending temporary total disability benefits for change of
condition. Pierce v. AAA Cabinet Co., 173 Ga. App. 463 [(326
SE2d 575)] (1985). Even where an employee has neither
actually returned to work nor become capable of returning to
work, an employer/insurer may satisfy their burden, if the
employer/insurer can demonstrate that the employee’s cur-
rent disability is not casually connected with his employ-
ment. See Southwire Co. v. Molden, 223 Ga. App. 389 [(477
SE2d 646)] (1996); Raley v. Lanco Paint & Drywall, 190 Ga.
App. 462 [(879 SE2d 196)] (1989).

Once the administrative law judge established by a
preponderance of the competent and credible evidence that
[McDuffie] had been restored to his pre-injury baseline
condition, so that he no longer suffered any work-related
disability, no further findings in this regard were requiredin
order for the administrative law judge to conclude that
[EMC] had carried [its] burden of proof to justify suspending
[McDuffie]’s income benefits.

McDuffie then appealed to the superior court, which summarily
affirmed the Appellate Division’s order in June 2015.7

2 ‘This case first came before the AL# in 2012. After the ALJ and then the Appellate Division
held that McDuffie was not entitled to benefits, McDuffie appealed to the superior court. The
superior court concluded that the ALd erred in not making findings of fact with regard to
McDuffie’s ability to return to work and the availability of such work. The court therefore
remanded the case to the ALd to make such findings. Both parties filed applications for

eS 648

McDuffie filed an application for discretionary appeal in the
Court of Appeals, which was granted. Division 1 of the court’s
subsequent opinion, which was joined fully by six of the nine judges
deciding the case, affirmed the ALJ’s finding that EMC proved that
McDuffie “had improved to the extent that he had no work restric-
tions other than the permanent sedentary work restrictions he was
under when he was hired by EMC.” McDuffie, 338 Ga. App. at 202.°
Division 3, which was joined fully by only three judges, concluded that
the ALJ erred when she “failed to make factual findings regarding
whether EMC met its burden of proving that suitable work was
available for McDuffie” and therefore vacated the judgment in part
and remanded the case for those additional findings. Id. at 200. See
also id. at 203 (citing Jones County Bd. of Ed. v. Patterson, 255 Ga.
App. 166, 168 (564 SE2d 777) (2002), and Smith v. Brown Steel, 232
Ga. App. 698, 699 (503 SE2d 592) (1998)). The opinion did not cite or
distinguish Pierce, Molden, or Raley, the cases on which the Board’s
Appellate Division had relied.*

Both McDuffie and EMC filed a petition for certiorari, McDuffie
challenging Division 1 and EMC challenging Division 3. This Court
denied McDuffie’s petition, but granted EMC’s petition, asking the
question set forth above.

2. Because McDuffie had a preexisting disability at the time of
his injury in 2009 while working at EMC, the relevant question is
whether he returned to his pre-2009-injury condition, not whether he
returned to full capacity. In cases where a job-related injury has
merely improved but the employee is still suffering from effects of the
injury that limit his capacity to work — the factual scenario in the
cases the Court of Appeals here cited as controlling — the employer
must show the availability of suitable employment before terminat-
ing benefits. See, e.g., Patterson, 255 Ga. App. at 168; Smith, 232 Ga.
App. at 699.

However, as the Court of Appeals has repeatedly explained in
cases similar to this one and as the Board’s Appellate Division recog-
nized, when an employee has a preexisting condition that limits his
work capacity before the on-the-job injury, as soon as the effects of the

discretionary appeal in the Court of Appeals, which were both granted, but the appeals were
later dismissed as improvidently granted.

® Judge McFadden alone dissented on this point, arguing that it was error for the ALJ to
find that McDuffie had returned to his baseline condition. See McDuffie, 338 Ga. App. at 204.

4 In Division 2, which six judges also joined, the court rejected McDuffie’s contention that
the two doctors’ expert opinions did not constitute competent evidence to support the ALJ's
findings. See McDuffie, 338 Ga. App. at 202-203. Three judges concurred in judgment only as
to Divisions 2 and 3, and two judges joined the entire opinion in judgment only.

6a eS

on-the-job injury cease, the employer’s responsibility for workers’
compensation also ceases. The employer is not responsible for com-
pensating the employee until the preexisting condition improves as
well or for showing that work exists suitable for an employee with that
preexisting disability. See Pierce, 173 Ga. App. at 464 (“Since appel-
lJant’s continued unemployment is not due to his former disability, the
employer has no further responsibility for appellant’s economic con-
dition. That being so, there was no necessity that appellee show that
work is available to appellant.”). See also Molden, 223 Ga. App. at 391
(“[The employer] needed only establish that benefits were terminated
because [the employee’s] present disability was not causally con-
nected with his employment.”); Raley, 190 Ga. App. at 464 (“[T]he
issue to be resolved is whether the evidence demanded a finding that
appellant’s current [disability] is not attributable to his original
work-related accident. If, but only if, the evidence demanded such a
finding, appellant has no right to continued compensation... .”). This
is true whether the other condition causing a disability has existed
since birth, see Molden, 223 Ga. App. at 389, or, like here, was caused
by an accident unrelated to the employee’s work with the compen-
sating employer, see Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Magee, 162 Ga.
App. 865, 865 (292 SE2d 477) (1982).

The holding in these cases accords with the current text of the
Workers’ Compensation Act. In relevant part and with emphasis added,
OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) defines the term “injury” as used in the Act as

only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment and shall not, except as provided in this chap-
ter, include a disease in any form except where it results
naturally and unavoidably from the accident. Except as
otherwise provided in this chapter, “injury” and “personal
injury” shall include the aggravation of a preexisting condi-
tion by accident arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment, but only for so long as the aggravation of the preexist-
ing condition continues to be the cause of the disability; the
preexisting condition shall no longer meet this criteria when
the aggravation ceases to be the cause of the disability... .

Here, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ’s finding that EMC
had met its burden of showing that McDuffie had returned to his
pre-2009-injury status when EMC suspended his indemnity benefits,
and we did not grant McDuffie’s certiorari petition seeking review of
that fact-specific conclusion. It follows from that ruling that EMC was
no longer required to pay McDuffie workers’ compensation indemnity
benefits. No further factfinding is needed, so the Court of Appeals

eS 645

erred in remanding this case for the ALJ court to determine if EMC
demonstrated suitable employment for McDuffie. See, e.g., Pierce,
173 Ga. App. at 464. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals’
judgment on that issue and thereby affirm in full the decision reached
by the ALJ, the Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers’
Compensation, and the superior court.

Judgment reversed in part. Hines, C. J., Melton, P. J., Benham,
Hunstein, Blackwell, Boggs, Grant, JJ.,and Judge Cynthia C. Adams
concur. Peterson, J., disqualified.

DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2017 —

a. oot, ‘mith, Frederick L. Hubbs, Jr., vl . Dix, for
appellants.
Nelson & Smith, Blake J. Smith, David B. Ricks, for appellee.
Drew Eckl & Farnham, John G. Blackmon, Jr.; Sponsler, Bishop,
Koren & Hammer, Ann B. Bishop, amici curiae.

$17G0057. CITY OF MARIETTA v. SUMMEROUR.
(807 SE2d 324)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

This case concerns a small grocery store on Allgood Road in
Marietta and, more particularly, the parcel of land on which that
store sits. Ray Summerour has owned the land for nearly three
decades. The City of Marietta wants to acquire the land for the
purpose of building a public park. When the City was unable to
negotiate a voluntary sale of the parcel, it resolved to take the land by
eminent domain, and it filed a petition in the Superior Court of Cobb
County to condemn the property. Following an evidentiary hearing
before a special master, see OCGA § 22-2-100 et seq., the superior
court adopted the return of the special master and entered an order
of condemnation.

Summerour appealed, andin Summerour v. City of Marietta, 338
Ga. App. 259 (788 SE2d 921) (2016), the Court of Appeals set aside the
condemnation order. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, when the
City attempted to negotiate a voluntary sale of the land, it failed to
fulfill its obligations under OCGA § 22-1-9, and the Court of Appeals
directed that the case be remanded for the superior court to consider
whether the failure to comply with Section 22-1-9 amounted to bad
faith. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court

646 Pe

of Appeals, and we now hold that compliance with Section 22-1-9 is an
essential prerequisite to the filing of a petition to condemn, that the
City failed in this case to fulfill that prerequisite, and that its petition
to condemn, therefore, must be dismissed, irrespective of bad faith.
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the
extent that it set aside the order of condemnation, but we reverse its
direction to the superior court to inquire into bad faith.

1. The relevant facts are not in dispute. In 2009, Marietta voters
approved the issuance of bonds for, among other purposes, the
improvement and expansion ofa park located at the site of an existing
recreation center near the intersection of Allgood Road and North
Marietta Parkway. Soon thereafter, the City commenced efforts to
acquire several parcels of land in the vicinity of that recreation center,
including the parcel owned by Summerour. On June 1, 2010, the City
sent a letter to Summerour, informing him that the City had an
interest in his property, that it had hired an appraiser to determine
the value of the land, and that an offer to purchase the property was
forthcoming. Three weeks later, the City sent a written offer to
Summerour, which said:

The City of Marietta has employed a Certified Appraiser
to appraise your property. The Certified Appraiser has valued
your property at $85,000.00. The purpose of this letter is to
offer you the appraised value of your property. Please review
this offer and let me know if you are willing to sell your prop-
erty to the City of Marietta for the certified appraised value.

Summerour did not respond to this offer. On October 6, 2010, the City
sent another offer letter to Summerour, identical to its earlier written
offer. Again, Summerour did not respond.

For the next two-and-a-half years, the City did not correspond
further with Summerour. But then, on May 23, 2013, the City resumed
its efforts to acquire his land. That day, the City sent a letter to Summer-
our in which it expressed its continuing interest in the land and sug-
gested that, if Summerour had any interest in selling the property, he
ought to contact the City. In that letter, however, the City did not offer to
purchase the land for any particular amount. Summerour again did not
respond. The City hired a real estate appraiser to reappraise the land,
and it engaged a business appraiser to assess the value of the grocery
store that sits on the property. On July 26, 2013, a lawyer for the City
sent another written offer to Summerour, which said:

This firm represents the City of Marietta which has an
interest in purchasing your property located at the above

eS 647

referenced address. The city has engaged a professional cert-
ified real estate appraiser to conduct a current appraisal on
your property and the current appraised value is $95,000.00.
In addition, the certified business appraiser has placed a
value of $46,700.00 on the business located on the property.
Therefore, the total value of the property is believed to be
$141,700.00. Please accept this letter as an official request
by the City of Marietta to purchase your property at the
above address for the above stated value. At your conve-
nience, please contact the undersigned regarding this matter.

On August 13, 2013, Summerour responded. In a letter to the
City, he explained that he had cooperated with the appraisers hired
by the City, meeting with them and giving them the information that
they requested. Summerour asked for a summary of the appraisals
done for the City or “some form of documentation to show me how
[the appraisers] came up with the numbers,” and he noted that the
offer was less than he expected. Summerour said that he intended to
obtain his own appraisal of the property, and he expressed his
willingness to discuss the matter with the City.

On December 4, 2013, Summerour sent another letter to the City,
in which he made a counteroffer to sell the property for $375,000. The
next day, Summerour met with a lawyer for the City to discuss his
counteroffer. The City rejected the counteroffer on December 10,
2013. Two days later, the City offered $152,000 for the property and
warned that, unless Summerour obtained his own appraisal and
shared it with the City, “this is likely to be the [C]ity’s highest offer.”
On December 17, 2013, Summerour rejected the latest offer but
proposed a meeting to discuss the differences in how he and the City
valued the property. Following the December negotiations, Summer-
our hired an attorney, and at some point, he obtained his own
appraisal of the land.

In April 2014, the lawyers for the City and Summerour corre-
sponded about the property on several occasions, although the City
refused to schedule a meeting with Summerour until he had his own
“written signed appraisal” in hand. On May 8, 2014, Summerour’s
lawyer sent a letter to the City, reminding the City that it never had
provided Summerour with a summary of its appraisals, notwith-
standing its repeated demands that Summerour produce his own
appraisal report. At that point, the City finally provided a summary
of its appraisals to Summerour, and on May 16, 2014, the City
produced a copy of an appraisal report. That report was dated July 17,
2013, almost ten months prior to its production.

648 Pe

On May 21, 2014, the City notified Summerour that the mayor
and city council soon would meet to consider whether to acquire the
property by eminent domain. The City again offered to purchase the
property based on its 2013 appraisal. A flurry of negotiations fol-
lowed, in the course of which the City eventually offered $160,000 for
the land, but Summerour rejected the City’s final offer. On June 11,
2014, the city council approved a motion for the City to acquire the
land by eminent domain.

On October 2, 2014, the City filed a petition in the Superior Court
of Cobb County to condemn the parcel of land owned by Summerour.
Summerour filed an answer, and the trial court appointed a special
master to conduct an evidentiary hearing. For three days, the special
master heard evidence from both parties regarding their respective
valuations of the land. In addition, Summerour argued to the special
master that the petition should be dismissed because the City had
failed to comply with OCGA § 22-1-9 when it attempted to negotiate
avoluntary sale of the land. On January 20, 2015, less than one week
after the conclusion of the hearing, the special master issued written
findings that the City had complied with its statutory obligations and
had negotiated with Summerour in good faith. The special master
also found that the fair market value of Summerour’s land was
$225,000. The findings of the special master were returned to the
superior court, and the parties filed exceptions to the return. After a
hearing, the trial court adopted the special master’s return as its own
judgment, and it ordered the condemnation of the land.

Summerour appealed, and the Court of Appeals set aside the
condemnation order. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals pointed to
OCGA § 22-1-9 (3), which, it said, required the City to provide
Summerour with a written summary of the basis for its valuation of
his land before, or at least around the time that, negotiations com-
menced. See Summerour, 338 Ga. App. at 265 (1). Upon its review of
the record, the Court of Appeals concluded that the City did not
provide Summerour with any such summary in a timely manner, and
indeed, the City only provided a summary in May 2014, “long after
the initiation of negotiations.” Id. (punctuation omitted). Noting that
the failure of the City to fulfill its obligations under Section 22-1-9 (3)
might be indicative of bad faith, the Court of Appeals directed the
superior court on remand to reconsider the question of bad faith. See
id. at 267 (2). The Court of Appeals declined to decide whether
noncompliance with Section 22-1-9 (3) is remediable, irrespective of
bad faith. See id. at 268 (3).

eS 649

The City timely filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted
that petition, directing the parties to address three questions:

(1) To what extent are the provisions of OCGA § 22-1-9
mandatory requirements?

(2) Did the Court of Appeals err in determining that
[the City] failed to comply with OCGA § 22-1-9 (8)?

(3) If the provisions of OCGA § 22-1-9 are mandatory and
the Court of Appeals correctly determined that [the City]
failed to comply, what is the proper remedy?

We turn now to these questions.

2. To begin, we consider the extent to which the provisions of
OCGA § 22-1-9 are mandatory. The City contends that Section 22-1-9
sets forth merely suggested guidelines for condemnations, which are
not mandatory or, at the least, judicially enforceable. Summerour
responds that the provisions of Section 22-1-9 are mandatory except
to the extent that compliance with those provisions is impracticable,
and he says that the statute imposes meaningful and judicially
enforceable limits upon condemnations, even if it leaves some mat-
ters to the discretion of the condemning authority. Each side finds
some support for its position in the statutory text and context, but in
the end, we conclude that Summerour has the better argument.

“A statute draws its meaning from its text.” Grange Mut. Cas. Co.
v. Woodard, 300 Ga. 848, 857 n.8 (797 SE2d 814) (2017) (citation and
punctuation omitted). When we read the statutory text, “we must
presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said
what it meant,” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d
337) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted), and so, “we mustread
the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an
ordinary speaker of the English language would.” FDIC v. Louder-
milk, 295 Ga. 579, 588 (2) (761 SE2d 332) (2014) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “The common and customary usages of the
words are important, but so is their context.” Tibbles v. Teachers
Retirement Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) (775 SE2d 527) (2015)
(citation and punctuation omitted). “For context, we may look to other
provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole
statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common
law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provi-
sion in question.” Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (1) (774 SE2d
688) (2015) (citation omitted).

Adopted in response to perceived abuses of eminent domain,
Section 22-1-9 is a part of the Landowner’s Bill of Rights and Private
Property Protection Act of 2006. See Ga. L. 2006, p. 40. See also

650 Pe

Stephen D. Morrison, Jr., Protecting Private Property: An Analysis of
Georgia’s Response to Kelo v. City of New London, 2 J. Marshall L. J.
51, 70 (2009).1 Section 22-1-9 sets forth a number of “policies and
practices” by which “all condemnations and potential condemnations
shall, to the greatest extent practicable, be guided.” When a govern-
ment seeks to acquire real property, Section 22-1-9 calls for the
government to, among other things, pursue negotiations before resort-
ing to the power of eminent domain, obtain an independent appraisal
of the real property to establish its fair market value, offer no less
than the value established by the independent appraisal, disclose the
basis for that valuation to the owner of the real property, and
negotiate in good faith. In full, Section 22-1-9 provides:

In order to encourage and expedite the acquisition of
real property by agreements with owners, to avoid litigation
and relieve congestion in the courts, to assure consistent
treatment for property owners, and to promote public con-
fidence in land acquisition practices, all condemnations and
potential condemnations shall, to the greatest extent prac-
ticable, be guided by the following policies and practices:

(1) The condemning authority shall make every
reasonable effort to acquire expeditiously real property
by negotiation;

(2) Where the condemning authority seeks to obtain

a fee simple interest in real property, real property shall
be appraised before the initiation of negotiations, and
the owner or his or her designated representatives shall
be given an opportunity to accompany the appraiser
during his or her inspection of the property, except that
the condemning authority may, by law, rule, regulation,
or ordinance, prescribe a procedure to waive the appraisal
in cases involving the acquisition by sale or donation of
property with a low fair market value;

1 The Act appears to have been adopted largely in response to the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U. 8. 469 (125 SCt 2655, 162 LE2d
439) (2005). See Morrison, supra, at 70. In Kelo, the Supreme Court held that economic
development qualifies as a “public use” under the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution, and therefore, a city could use its power of eminent domain to acquire private
property for redevelopment by private industry. See Kelo, 545 U. S. at 483-484 (IV). Kelo
sparked widespread concern throughout the nation about the potential abuse of eminent
domain and the limited protections afforded by the Takings Clause. Around the time of the Kelo
decision, there also were other concerns about the misuse of eminent domain in Georgia. See
Morrison, supra, at 63-67 (noting concerns about a condemnation by the City of Stockbridge,
which culminated in City of Stockbridge v. Meeks, 283 Ga. App. 343 (641 SE2d 584) (2007).

(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for fee simple
interest for real property, the condemning authority
shall establish an amount which it believes to be just
compensation and shall make a prompt offer to acquire
the property for the full amount so established. In no
event shall such amount be less than the condemning
authority’s independent appraisal of the fair market
value of such property. The condemning authority shall
provide the owner of real property to be acquired witha
written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the
amount it established as just compensation. Where
appropriate, the just compensation for the real property
acquired and for damages to remaining real property
shall be separately stated. The condemning authority
shall consider alternative sites suggested by the owner
of the property as of the compensation offered;

(4) No owner shall be required to surrender posses-
sion of real property before the condemning authority
pays the agreed purchase price or deposits with the
court in accordance with this title, for the benefit of the
owner, an amount not less than the condemning authori-
ty’s appraisal of the fair market value of such property
or the amount of the award of compensation in the
condemnation proceeding for such property;

(5) The construction or development of a project for
public use shall be so scheduled that, to the greatest
extent practicable, no person lawfully occupying rea
property shall be required to move from a dwelling or to
move his or her business or farm operation without at
least 90 days’ written notice from the condemning auth-
ority of the date by which such move is required;

(6) Ifthe condemning authority permits an owner or
tenant to occupy the real property acquired on a renta
basis for a short term or for a period subject to termina-
tion by the condemning authority on short notice, the
amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair renta’
value of the property to a short-term occupier;

(7) Inno event shall the condemnor act in bad faith
in order to compel an agreement on the price to be pai
for the property;

(8) If any legal interest in real property is to be
acquired by exercise of the power of eminent domain, the
condemning authority shall institute formal condemna-
tion proceedings. Nocondemnor shall intentionally make

602 Pe

it necessary for an owner to institute legal proceedings to
prove the fact of the taking of his or her real property; and

(9) A person whose real property is being acquired
in accordance with this title may, after the person has
been fully informed of his or her right to receive just
compensation for such property, donate such property,
any part thereof, any legal interest therein, or any
compensation paid to a condemning authority, as such
person shall determine.

When a government is unable to acquire property by a voluntary
sale negotiated as provided in Section 22-1-9, and it must resort to
formal condemnation proceedings, other provisions of the Act set forth
additional protections for property owners. OCGA § 22-1-10, for instance,
imposes certain notice requirements with which a condemning author-
ity must comply before initiating formal condemnation proceedings.
OCGA § 22-1-11 expressly authorizes a superior court in condemna-
tion proceedings to decide, before title vests in the condemning author-
ity, whether the condemnation is legally authorized,? and it permits
the superior court to stay condemnation proceedings pending that
decision. OCGA § 22-1-12 allows a property owner to recoup attorney
fees and other costs if a condemnation is abandoned or determined to
be unauthorized. And OCGA § 22-1-13 entitles landowners displaced
by condemnation to recover certain relocation expenses. The text,
structure, and history of the statute as a whole indicate that this
statutory scheme is to protect property owners from abuse of the power
of eminent domain at all stages of the condemnation process. See
Morrison, supra, at 70-71. See also Jody Arogeti et al., Legislative
Review, Eminent Domain, 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 157, 190 (2006) (noting
that the Act was understood at the time of its adoption “to increase
due process for property owners and in effect give them a ‘bill of
rights’ ”). Its protections are meant to, among other things, “assure
consistent treatment for property owners [and] promote public con-
fidence in land acquisition practices[.]” OCGA § 22-1-9.*

2 Even before the adoption of Section 22-1-11, a superior court in condemnation proceed-
ings was authorized to consider whether the condemnation was within the lawful authority of
the condemning authority. See City of Atlanta v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 246 Ga. 424, 424
&n.1 271 SE2d 821) (1980); Scarlett v. Georgia Ports Auth., 223 Ga. 417, 418 (1) (156 SE2d 77)
(1967). Section 22-1-11 reinforces that longstanding rule.

® This statement of legislative purpose appears in the codified preamble of Section 2-1-9.
As our Court of Appeals has explained, “codified preambles are part of the act and appropriate
toread in pari materia.” Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 400 (2) (b) (788 SE2d 872) (2016)
(Peterson, J.) (citations omitted; emphasis in original).

eS 658

In this case, the heart of the dispute about the meaning of Section
22-1-9 owes to its introductory provision, specifically these words:
“{A]ll condemnations and potential condemnations shall, to the great-
est extent practicable, be guided by the following policies and prac-
tices[.]” Because the statute provides that a condemning authority is to
be “guided” only “to the greatest extent practicable” by the provisions
of Section 22-1-9, the City says, those provisions are effectively nothing
more than suggestions from which a condemning authority may
depart whenever it concludes that another course would be better. This
understanding of Section 22-1-9 is confirmed, the City contends, by a
contrast with the language of Section 22-1-10, which provides in
unequivocal terms that “a governmental condemnor shall... .” Finally,
the City points to cases in which the federal courts have addressed a
federal statute from which many provisions of Section 22-1-9 were
borrowed, noting that the federal courts have concluded that the
federal statute is not mandatory or judicially enforceable.

Summerour, on the other hand, notes that the provisions of
Section 22-1-9 are introduced not in terms of a suggestion, butinstead
by words of command (“shall . . . be guided”). He points as well to
OCGA § 22-1-8, a statute that predates the Act of 2006 but provides
that “[a]ll persons authorized to take or damage private property for
public purposes shall proceed as set forth in this title,” a title that now
includes, of course, the provisions of the Act. That Section 22-1-9
offers relief to condemning authorities in instances in which strict
compliance is not practicable, Summerour says, makes its provisions
no less mandatory in cases in which compliance is practicable. As for
the federal case law cited by the City, Summerour argues that it not
only fails to support the City’s interpretation of Section 22-1-9, but
confirms the interpretation that he urges.

As Summerour argues, the City makes too much, we think, of the
introductory provision of Section 22-1-9. To the extent that the
statute demands compliance, we acknowledge that it does so, gener-
ally speaking, only “to the greatest extent practicable.” That feature
alone, however, is hardly proof that the provisions are entirely
optional for a government condemnor. “Practicable” is a word sus-
ceptible of a limited range of meanings — as we will discuss in
Division 3 — and to say that one must comply with a requirement
“to the greatest extent practicable” is not to say that he must comply
with it only “if he feels like complying” or “if he thinks it a good idea.”
Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (75 SCt 753, 99
LE 1083) (1955) (desegregation decrees ought to require “admission
to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis,”
and constitutional imperative to desegregate could not be overcome
“simply because of disagreement with [it]”). That the statute leaves

some flexibility to condemning authorities in cases in which strict
compliance would be impracticable does not indicate that the provi-
sions of Section 22-1-9 are not mandatory. Indeed, if the statute were
entirely optional, there would be no need for a provision affording
such flexibility.

As for the fact that the introductory provision of Section 22-1-9
uses the phrase “shall . . . be guided,” we concede that this phrasing
is less certain than the simple “shall” that appears in the introduction
of Section 22-1-10.4 Even so, Section 22-1-9 still uses a word of
command to introduce the provisions that follow. At most, the intro-
ductory provision is somewhat ambiguous about the extent to which
the provisions that follow are mandatory. Important context, how-
ever, resolves any such ambiguity and establishes that the statute is
most reasonably understood as mandatory.

We noted earlier that the text, structure, and history of the 2006
Act as a whole reveals a remedial purpose of protecting property
owners against abuse of the power of eminent domain at every stage
of the condemnation process and thereby promoting public confi-
dence in the exercise of that power. Within this statutory scheme,
Section 22-1-9 serves the important function of addressing abusive
practices in negotiations prior to the commencement of formal con-
demnation proceedings, a stage at which no contemporaneous judi-
cial oversight is available and property owners may be most vulner-
able. If Section 22-1-9 were entirely optional, as the City urges, the
protective function of the Act as a whole would be impaired signifi-
cantly. It is a settled principle of our law of statutory interpretation
that, when confronted with ambiguities in a remedial statute, and in
the absence of contrary indicia of meaning, we commonly construe
the statutory provisions broadly “to apply to all cases [consistent with
the remedial purpose] which, under a fair construction of their terms,
they can be made to reach.” East Ga. Land & Dev. Co. v. Baker, 286
Ga. 551, 553 (2) (690 SE2d 145) (2010) (citation and punctuation
omitted).

+ We note, however, that a simple “shall” suffices in Section 22-1-10 (“a governmental
condemnor shall”) because all of the provisions that follow are directed specifically to the
condemning authority. The provisions of Section 22-1-9, on the other hand, are directed to
“all condemnations and potential condemnations,” not always the condemning authority in
particular. See, e.g., OCGA § 22-1-9 (9) (“A person whose real property is being acquired in
accordance with this title may, after the person has been fully informed of his or her right to
receive just compensation for such property, donate such property, any part thereof, any legal
interest therein, or any compensation paid to a condemning authority, as such person shall
determine.’).

eS 655

More significantly, the federal cases to which the City points are
instructive, but they lead to a conclusion at odds with the interpre-
tation that the City urges. In large part, the provisions of Section
22-1-9 were borrowed from 42 USC § 4651, a part of the Federal
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970. Indeed, the preamble and introductory provision of Section
22-1-9 is virtually identical to that of the federal statute, and many of
the provisions that follow essentially mirror those found in the
federal statute. And as the City notes, the federal courts consistently
have understood 42 USC § 4651 as discretionary and affording no
judicially enforceable rights to property owners. But there is a crucial
difference. Another provision of the federal law, 42 USC § 4602 (a),
states unequivocally that “[t]he provisions of section 4651 of this title
create no rights or liabilities and shall not affect the validity of any
property acquisitions by purchase or condemnation.” All of the fed-
eral cases cited by the City rely not on the preamble and introductory
provision of 42 USC § 4651 to conclude that it is not mandatory, but
rather, on the express disclaimer in 42 USC § 4602. See, e.g., United
States v. 410.69 Acres of Land, 608 F2d 1073, 1074 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979)
(citing 42 USC § 4602 for the proposition that “Congress ... made it
clear that [42 USC § 4651] creates no rights in landowners”); Port-
land Nat. Gas Transmission Sys. v. 4.83 Acres of Land, 26 FSupp.2d
332, 336 (II) (A) (D.N.H. 1998) (citing 42 USC § 4602 (a) for the
proposition that 42 USC § 4651 “does not create any substantive
rights” in condemnees); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. New England
Power, C.T.L., Inc., 6 FSupp.2d 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing 42
USC § 4602 (a)). See also United States v. 416.81 Acres of Land, 525
F2d 450, 454 (IID) (7th Cir. 1975) (landowners’ argument about
government’s failure to comply with 42 USC § 4651 “might have some
force were it not for the language of [42 USC § 4602]”); State v.
Costich, 98 P3d 795, 799 (Wash. 2004) (“While it is true the quoted
provisions of [state version of 42 USC § 4651] seemingly impose...
mandatory obligations on the condemning authority, the legislature
expressly rejected this approach.” (citing state version of 42 USC
§ 4602)).

When our General Assembly borrowed from 42 USC § 4651 in its
adoption of Section 22-1-9, it did not borrow the disclaimer from 42
USC § 4602. “We must presume that its failure to do so was a matter
of considered choice.” Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 168 (2) (b) (664 SE2d
227) (2008) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Summerlin
v. Ga. Pines Community Svc. Bd., 286 Ga. 593, 594 (2) (690 SE2d 401)
(2010) (“The General Assembly is presumed to enact all statutes with
full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference
to it.”). This important context, as much as anything else, suggests

656 Pe

that Section 22-1-9 is understood most reasonably as mandatory, not
optional. We hold that compliance with the provisions of Section
22-1-9 is required to the extent that compliance is “practicable.”

3. We now consider whether the City complied with Section
22-1-9 (3), which provides:

Before the initiation of negotiations for fee simple inter-
est for real property, the condemning authority shall estab-
lish an amount which it believes to be just compensation and
shall make a prompt offer to acquire the property for the full
amount so established. In no event shall such amount be less
than the condemning authority’s independent appraisal of
the fair market value of such property. The condemning
authority shall provide the owner of real property to be
acquired with a written statement of, and summary of the
basis for, the amount it established as just compensation.
Where appropriate, the just compensation for the real prop-
erty acquired and for damages to remaining real property
shall be separately stated. The condemning authority shall
consider alternative sites suggested by the owner of the
property as of the compensation offered|.]

OCGA § 22-1-9 (3) (emphasis supplied). We agree with the Court of
Appeals that the City violated this provision because it failed to
disclose the appraisal summary to Summerour in a timely manner.®

The City’s main argument is that the clause “[bJefore the
initiation of negotiations for fee simple interest for real property”
applies only to the first sentence of Section 22-1-9 (3), concerning a
“prompt offer,” and that the sentence requiring an appraisal sum-
mary — appearing in the middle of that subsection — does not
contain an express timing requirement. Thus, the City contends, it
was required to provide an appraisal summary (if at all) not before
beginning negotiations, but at whatever time it deemed necessary
and practicable. The City’s reading of the statute, however, is too
narrow. “When we consider the meaning of a statutory provision, we
do not read it in isolation, but rather, we read it in the context of the
other statutory provisions of which it is a part.” Hartley v. Agnes Scott

5 The City argues, among other things, that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied a de
novo standard of review and failed to give proper deference to the fact findings of the trial court
and the special master. But the facts relevant to the Court of Appeals’s decision were not in
dispute, and thus a de novo review was proper. See Trax-Fax, Inc. v. Hobba, 277 Ga. App. 464,
464 (627 SE2d 90) (2006) (“[E]rroneous applications of law to undisputed facts . . . are subject
to a de novo standard of review.”).

eS 657

College, 295 Ga. 458, 462 (2) (b) (759 SE2d 857) (2014); Hendry v.
Hendry, 292 Ga. 1, 3 (1) (734 SE2d 46) (2012). See also Houston
v. Lowes of Savannah, Inc., 235 Ga. 201, 203 (219 SE2d 115) (1975)
(“[A] statute must be viewed so as to make allits parts harmonize and
to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part.”). Viewed in
context with the rest of Section 22-1-9, the provision at issue is best
understood to ensure that the landowner receives enough accurate
appraisal information to enable a fair negotiation of the property
sale. As the Court of Appeals explained below, “the summary envi-
sioned by the statute requires, at a minimum, information suffi-
cient . . . to provide the property owner with the ability to meaning-
fully evaluate the offer.” Summerour, 338 Ga. App. at 266 (1). Without
appraisal information, a landowner cannot know whether an offer is
fair and whether it reflects the true market value of the property. As
to timing, the stated statutory goal of promoting fair and expeditious
negotiations is best served if the appraisal summary is provided as
early in the negotiation process as possible. Section 22-1-9 (3) requires
acondemning authority to obtain an appraisal “[bJefore the initiation
of negotiations,” and so, it is reasonable to conclude that the govern-
ment must also provide the appraisal summary at that time, or at
least as soon thereafter as practicable.

If we interpret the provision at issue to contain no timing
requirement whatsoever, the city could wait even until after formally
condemning the property before providing the summary — an absurd
result that would defeat the purpose of this provision. See Roberts v.
Deal, 290 Ga. 705, 709 (2) (723 SE2d 901) (2012) (statutes generally
should be construed to “avoid absurd results”). Thus, we give this
provision its most sensible and reasonable meaning: a condemning
authority must provide the appraisal summary prior to the initiation
of negotiations or as soon thereafter as “practicable.”

In this case, the City sent Summerour three letters in 2010, one
of which expressed interest in purchasing the property, and two of
which communicated a specific offer — $85,000. Three years later, in
July 2013, the City sent Summerour a slightly more detailed letter,
breaking down the offer amount into $95,000 for the property and
$46,700 for the store business. While each of these letters contained
an offer and purported to be based on an appraisal, none of them
constituted a “summary of the basis for” the offer amount as contem-
plated by Section 22-1-9 (8). See Summerour, 338 Ga. App. at 266 (1).
The City did not send Summerour an appraisal summary until May
2014. Evenif we consider the July 2013 appraisal as the only relevant
appraisal and the July 2013 letter as the true start of negotiations,
the appraisal summary came nearly 10 months later. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that “the 2010 and 2013 offers do not contain a

658 Pe

sufficient summary of the basis for the amount the City established
as just compensation, and the sufficient summary that was provided
in 2014 came far too late.”® Summerour, 338 Ga. App. at 265 (1).
We understand that the City may have had its reasons for
withholding the appraisal summary. The City explains that it was, at
the time, attempting to negotiate the sale not only of the land owned
by Summerour, but several neighboring parcels. If the City had
provided each of the several owners with information about the basis
for their respective appraisals, the owners might have compared
information, and those with parcels that had been appraised lower
than neighboring parcels might misapprehend that their parcels had
been undervalued. Such misapprehensions, the City worries, would
have driven up the prices at which the owners would voluntarily agree
to sell their land. This argument is unavailing. In the first place, the
idea on which it is based strikes us as highly implausible. There was
nothing to stop the owners of the neighboring parcels from comparing
offers, and any such comparison would have revealed any substantial
disparities in the valuations. The notion that any misgivings arising
from these disparities would be dispelled by withholding information
about the basis for the appraisals — information that presumably, of
course, would have explained the disparities — seems far-fetched.
More important, “practicable” does not mean convenient. In
modern usage, “practicable” is commonly understood to mean
“reasonably capable of being accomplished” or “feasible in a particu-
lar situation.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). See also 2 New
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 2317 (1993 ed.) (“practicable”
means “[a]ble to be put into practice; able to be effected, accom-
plished, or done; feasible”). To say that something is impracticable is
to say that it reasonably cannot be done; it does not mean merely that
it is inconvenient. The reasons offered by the City for withholding
information about the appraisal for as long as it did go to the
convenience of the City, not the feasibility of disclosing that informa-
tion to Summerour. It was entirely feasible for the City to provide the

® Appraisals are opinions about valuation at a particular point in time, and they become
stale over time. We cannot say with confidence that the July 2013 appraisal had not grown stale
by the time a summary of the basis for that appraisal was disclosed in May 2014. Cf. Fannie
Mae, Selling Guide (Single Family), Appraisal Age and Use Requirements, § B4-1.2-02 (2017)
(available at: https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/sel092617.pdf, last visited on Oct. 23,
2017) (‘When an appraisal report will be more than four months old on the date of the note and
mortgage ...the appraiser must inspect the exterior of the property and review current market
data to determine whether the property has declined in value since the date of the original
appraisal.”).

eS 659

appraisal summary to Summerour long before it actually did so.
Thus, the City failed to comply with the dictates of Section 22-1-9 (3).”
4. We now turn to the issue of what remedy is available to
Summerour asa result of the City’s violation of Section 22-1-9 (3). The
City contends that, even if it violated subsection (3), no remedy is
available to Summerour, except upon a showing of bad faith, because
Section 22-1-9 itself does not contain a remedial provision, and “it is
well settled that violating statutes and regulations does not auto-
matically give rise to a civil cause of action by an individual claiming
to have been injured from a violation thereof.” Govea v. City of
Norcross, 271 Ga. App. 36, 41 (1) (608 SE2d 677) (2004). But a “cause
of action” is just one type of remedy. It may well be true that a
violation of Section 22-1-9 will not, by itself, allow the aggrieved
individual to sue the condemning authority. But we need not decide
the issue here because that is not what Summerour is trying to do.
Summerour is simply requesting a defensive remedy — the dismissal
of the City’s condemnation petition. And dismissing the condemna-
tion petition is an appropriate remedy where a condemning authority
has acted outside its authority by violating the law, irrespective ofbad
faith. See City of Atlanta v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 246 Ga. 424,
425 (271 SE2d 821) (1980) (reversing the disallowance of condemna-
tion because the landowner failed to show that the city either acted in
bad faith or “exceeded its lawful authority”); Miles v. Brown, 223 Ga.
557, 559 (156 SE2d 898) (1967) (condemnation was authorized where
landowner “produced no evidence to show that the action of the
defendants was in bad faith or beyond the powers conferred upon them
by law” (emphasis supplied)).
Georgia law has always required governments to comply strictly
with condemnation procedures when exercising the power of eminent
domain, and the procedures listed in Section 22-1-9 are no exception.
See OCGA § 22-1-8 (“All persons authorized to take or damage
private property for public purposes shall proceed as set forth in this

* The City also argues that interpreting subsection (3) to require disclosure of an appraisal
summary before condemnation proceedings are commenced would be inconsistent with the
Open Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-72 (a) (9), which, at the time Section 22-1-9 was enacted,
exempted real estate appraisals from public disclosure until condemnation proceedings have
been concluded, i.e., “until such time as the property has been acquired or the proposed
transaction has been terminated or abandoned.” Black v. Dept. of Transp., 262 Ga. 342, 342 (417
SE2d 655) (1992) (citation omitted). The City’s argument, however, is unavailing. The Open
Records Act governs the disclosure of government records to members of the general publie who
seek such records — it has nothing to do with the flow of information between parties to a
transaction. Requiring a government buyer to disclose certain information to the seller does not
conflict with the government's option to prevent disclosure of this information pursuant to an
Open Records Act request from a third party.

660 eee
title.”). As we explained over a century ago,

[t]he taking or injuring of private property for the public
benefit is the exercise of a high power, and all the conditions
and limitations provided by law, under which it may be done,
should be closely followed. Too much caution in this respect
cannot be observed to prevent abuse and oppression.

Frank v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. 428, 432 (2) (1884); Sims v. City of
Toccoa, 256 Ga. 368, 369 (349 SE2d 385) (1986) (same); Dept. of
Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 132 (3) (b) (837 SE2d 327)
(1985) (“[W]hile the procedure for condemnation under OCGA §
32-3-2 et seq. does not violate due process, the statute must be strictly
conformed to by the condemning body.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)). See also Thomas v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 336, 338 (57 SE2d
192) (1950) (“The power of eminent domain should never be exercised
unless and until there has been a strict compliance with the provi-
sions of the law by the condemnor.”); D’Antignac v. City Council of
Augusta, 31 Ga. 700, 710 (1861) (“[I]n proceedings by statute author-
ity, whereby a man may be deprived of his property, the statute must
be strictly pursued. Compliance with all its prerequisites must be
shown.”). Indeed, we previously have countenanced equitable rem-
edies to halt condemnation proceedings in cases in which the con-
demnor failed to comply with statutory obligations to attempt nego-
tiations before resorting to the exercise of eminent domain. See, e.g.,
City of Atlanta v. Austell, 146 Ga. 456, 456 (91 SE 478) (1917) (“In not
giving petitioner notice in his representative capacity, and in not
attempting to agree with him in a representative capacity as to the
price to be paid for the land, the city had failed to comply with the
provision of the statutory requisite to the condemnation of property
for public purposes.”); City of Elberton v. Hobbs, 121 Ga. 750 (49 SE
780) (1905) (“Failure to secure the property by contract, by reason of
the inability of the parties to agree upon the compensation to be paid
therefor, is an essential prerequisite to the condemnation of private
property for public uses.”).

Because the City failed to comply with Section 22-1-9 (3), and
because there is no evidence in the record that Summerour acqui-
esced in or waived strict compliance with the statute, the City acted
outside its authority by condemning Summerour’s property, and
the City’s condemnation petition must be dismissed.* See Thomas,

*® We do not decide today whether a minor, technical, and clearly harmless violation of
Section 22-1-9 requires dismissal. The violation in this case was neither minor, technical, nor

eS 661

206 Ga. at 338 (trial court erred in refusing to enjoin condemnation
proceedings where, by attempting to limit its liability for payment of
compensation, city “has not sufficiently complied with the law in
order to exercise the high power of eminent domain”); Suburban
Investment Co. v. City of Atlanta, 148 Ga. 593, 594-596 (97 SE 542)
(1918) (condemnation should have been enjoined where city failed to
comply with condemnation procedure by passing an ordinance in an
untimely manner). See also Stafford v. Bryan County Bd. of Ed., 267
Ga. 274, 275 (476 SE2d 727) (1996) (trial court erred by entering
judgment on condemnation award where “the plain language of
OCGA § 22-2-112 was not followed and the record is clear that there
was no acquiescence in or waiver of strict compliance with the
statute”); Wrege v. Cobb County, 186 Ga. App. 512, 514 (1) (867 SE2d
817) (1988) (“strict statutory requirements mandated by the Legis-
lature” cannot be “ignored or deliberately sidestepped with impunity
by the condemning authority,” even if the landowners “arguably”
benefitted from the violation).° There is no need for the trial court to
reconsider the question of bad faith, and to the extent that the Court
of Appeals directed the trial court to do so on remand, its judgment is
reversed.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Hines, C. J.,
Melton, P. J., Benham, Hunstein, Nahmias, Boggs, Grant, JJ., and
Judge David L. Cannon, Jr., concur. Peterson, J., disqualified.

clearly harmless. The City's failure to timely provide an appraisal summary to Summerour
substantially undermined fair negotiations. The July 2013 appraisal was nearly eleven months
old by the time the City provided it to Summerour, and this appraisal may not have accurately
reflected the current value of the property. Moreover, the City’s long delay in providing a
sufficient basis for its offer increased at least the appearance of bad faith, undermining trust
and increasing the potential for litigation. Indeed, by the time the City provided the appraisal,
mistrust and frustration on both sides were high enough that negotiations effectively ceased
within a matter of days. This is exactly what Section 22-1-9 was designed to prevent.

We also note that a failure to comply with Section 22-1-9 — even when that failure
requires the dismissal of a condemnation petition — does not permanently foreclose efforts to
acquire a particular property. If a condemnor violates some provision of Section 22-1-9 — for
example, by failing to provide an appraisal summary at or before the initiation of negotiations
and failing to rectify that failure for a long period of time — it might effectively reset its
opportunity to comply with the statute by obtaining a new appraisal and reinitiating negotia-
tions, giving a summary of that appraisal to the landowner at thetime negotiations recommence.

* Section 22-1-12 provides additional remedies, including attorney fees, when “final
judgment is that the condemning authority cannot acquire the real property by condemna-
tion[]” Having concluded that the City’s condemnation petition must be dismissed, we leave it
to the trial court to determine the appropriate costs and expenses to which Summerour may be
entitled under Section 22-1-12.

662 Pe

DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED NOVEMBER 14, 2017.

ee

Haynie, Litchfield, Crane & White, Douglas R. Haynie, Daniel W.
White, Sarah G. Hegener, for appellant.

Donald C. Evans, Jr., for appellee.

Richard N. Hubert, amicus curiae.

$17A0683, $17A0684. McBEE et al. v. ASPIRE AT WEST
MIDTOWN APARTMENTS, L.P.; and vice versa.
(807 SE2d 455)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Thomas R. McBee and his wife Mary A. McBee (the “McBees”)
and Aspire at West Midtown Apartments, L.P. (“Aspire”) are adjoin-
ing landowners on Green Street in Atlanta. The McBees claim title by
prescription — adverse possession for more than 20 years — toa
rectangular strip of land measuring about 24 feet by 58 feet
(the “Disputed Area”) located on a lot to which Aspire holds record
title (the “Aspire Lot”). Aspire used this lot and several adjoining
properties it owns to develop an apartment complex, thereby depriv-
ing the McBees of the use of the Disputed Area. The McBees sued
Aspire, and the trial court granted Aspire’s motion for summary
judgment on the McBees’ adverse possession claim. These two appeals
followed.

As explained below, in Aspire’s appeal (Case No. S17A0684), we
summarily affirm the trial court’s order denying Aspire’s motion to
dismiss the McBees’ appeal for delay in filing the record appendix. As
for the McBees’ appeal (Case No. $17A0683), the trial court ruled that
a deed signed by Thomas McBee in 1974 shows conclusively that the
McBees lack a good faith claim of right to the Disputed Area.
However, the law presumes the existence of a good faith claim of
right, and the evidence in the existing record does not conclusively
rebut this presumption. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting
summary judgment to Aspire on the McBees’ adverse possession
claim, and we remand the case for the trial court to consider Aspire’s
other arguments for summary judgment.

1. This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo.
See Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 624 (697 SE2d 779) (2010).
Summary judgment is proper only “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

eS 663

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law[.]” OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Thus,

to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving
party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, so that the party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. A defendant may do this by either presenting
evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiff’s
claims or establishing from the record an absence of evi-
dence to support such claims.

Cowart, 287 Ga. at 623 (citations and punctuation omitted). The
McBees, as the parties opposing summary judgment, are entitled to
have the evidence in the record viewed in the light most favorable to
them and to have all reasonable inferences from the evidence drawn
in their favor. See id. at 624.

So viewed, the record shows the following. Thomas’s grand-
mother, Dorine McBee, once owned both the lot where the McBees live
(the “McBee Lot”) and the Aspire Lot, and she lived in a house on the
Aspire Lot. She conveyed the McBee Lot to her son, James 8. McBee,
in two deeds executed in 1948 and 1955, and he built a house there,
where he and his wife Earlene McBee raised their two sons, Thomas
and his older brother James R. McBee. When James S. McBee died in
1961, the McBee Lot passed to his wife Earlene and their two sons.
Around that time, when Thomas was seven or eight years old, he began
maintaining and landscaping the Aspire Lot in addition to the McBee
Lot. On October 18, 1965, Dorine McBee executed a will nominating
her daughter, Betty McBee Taylor (“Aunt Betty”), as executrix; leaving
half of her estate (minus $1,000) to Aunt Betty; and leaving the other
half to Aunt Betty as trustee for Thomas and his brother James R. until
Thomas turned 21.

On December 26, 1973, Dorine McBee died. At the time, Aunt
Betty and her husband were living with Dorine on the Aspire Lot;
Thomas was living in Savannah. On March 9, 1974, three deeds were
executed: Aunt Betty executed a deed in her capacity as executrix
conveying the Aspire Lot to herself for $12,433.34; Aunt Betty executed
another deed, individually and in her capacity as executrix, that
quitclaimed any interest she had in the McBee Lot (it appears there
was none) to “Earlene Cain McBee, Thomas R. McBee, [and] James R.
McBee”; and Thomas, his mother Earlene, and his brother James R.
executed a deed, “[i]Jndividually and as sole surviving heirs of James

664 |

S. McBee, deceased, each of grantors being sui juris,” quitclaiming any
interest they had in the Aspire Lot to Aunt Betty."
The quitclaim deed to the Aspire Lot described the property as:

BEGINNING at a point on the south side of Green
Street 394 [feet] west of the intersection of the west side of
Hemphill Avenue with the south side of Green Street; thence
west along the south side of Green Street, 71.5 feet; thence
south 125 feet; thence east 71.5 feet; thence north 125 feet to
the south side of Green Street and the point of the beginning.

It then said:

THE PURPOSE of this deed is to establish proper
boundary lines between properties owned by Grantors and
Grantee and to correct descriptions contained in [the 1948
and 1955 warranty deeds].

The quitclaim deed to the McBee Lot contained a similarly worded
description of that property's boundaries and a similar purpose
provision. Thomas deposed that he did not understand the legal
import of the deed he signed; he signed it because his mother told him
that it was necessary in order to settle his grandmother’s estate.

Aunt Betty and her husband continued to live on the Aspire Lot,
and Earlene McBee continued to live on the McBee Lot. In 1977,
Thomas and his wife Mary moved in with Earlene. Thomas main-
tained and landscaped both the McBee Lot and the Aspire Lot,
including the Disputed Area.” That spring, Thomas acquired a large
trailer with a 16-foot bed that he stored in the Disputed Area. From
that point on, he used the Disputed Area for parking and to store his
trailer, vehicles, machinery, automobile engines and other parts, and
lumber.*

Earlene McBee died in 1990. When Aunt Betty and her husband
moved to Florida in the early 1990s, they allowed a friend from the
neighborhood to stay in the house on the Aspire Lot. The woman was
allowed to stay for a short time after Aunt Betty conveyed the Aspire

1 James R. McBee died in 2013

2 Based on the survey the McBees commissioned for this litigation, Thomas deposed that
the Disputed Area is bounded on the east by the driveway on the Aspire Lot, on the south by a
fence that no longer exists, on the west by the McBee Lot, and on the north by Green Street.

® The family, including Thomas's brother and Aunt Betty and her husband, used the
Disputed Area for parking as far back as the 1960s. Thomas used the area for storage as early
as 1967 or 1965, before he moved to Savannah, and when he got his first car in 1972, he parked
it there.

eS 665

Lot to an investor on February 18, 1993, but when the woman moved
out, the house was torn down. Due to problems with vagrancy and
thefts, Thomas posted “No Trespassing” signs on trees in the Dis-
puted Area (and the McBee Lot), called the police to report trespass-
ers, and put down concrete parking stops to prevent others from using
the Disputed Area for dumping or other purposes. On June 20, 2005,
the investor who bought the Aspire Lot conveyed it to a company that
conveyed it and several contiguous lots to Aspire on September 29,
2014. Aspire then began construction of the apartment complex. In
December 2014, with construction ongoing, Aspire sued Mary McBee
and obtained a court order directing the McBees to remove the 16-foot
trailer and all other items they owned from the Disputed Area.*

On May 22, 2015, the McBees filed a complaint against Aspire to
quiet title to the Disputed Area in them based on adverse possession.
The McBees also alleged trespass and nuisance and sought an award
of damages and attorney fees. Aspire filed an answer and counter-
claims to quiet title in it and for trespass and slander of title. After
discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in
March 2016, and after a hearing in June, the trial court entered an
order on July 5, 2016, denying summary judgment to the McBees and
granting partial summary judgment to Aspire.® On July 27, 2016, the
McBees filed a notice of appeal to this Court, invoking our then-
existing jurisdiction over cases involving title to land.° Their appeal
was docketed here as Case No. S17A0683.

Case No. S17A0684 (Aspire’s Appeal)

2. The McBees elected to prepare a record appendix for their
appeal, which this Court’s Rule 67 then allowed. Aspire later filed a
motion to dismiss the McBees’ appeal due to their delay in filing the
record appendix. The trial court denied Aspire’s motion, and Aspire
appealed that order; Aspire’s appeal was docketed in this Court as
Case No. $17A0684. The trial court’s order denying Aspire’s motion
to dismiss the McBees’ appeal adequately explains the decision,
which was not erroneous, and an opinion on this issue by this Court

+ The record of this prior lawsuit is not included in the record in this case, and Aspire has
not claimed res judicata.

® Aspire did not seek summary judgment on its claims for trespass and slander of title.

® We note that the Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of 2016 gives the Court of Appeals
subject matter jurisdiction over “[clases involving title to land” in which a notice of appeal or
application to appeal is filed on or after January 1, 2017. Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, §§ 3-1 (codified at
OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (1)), 6-1 (©) (effective date). Thus, appeals in future cases of this sort will
go to the Court of Appeals instead of this Court.

666 |

would have no meaningful precedential value in light of the amend-
ment to Rule 67 eliminating the record appendix procedure as of
December 31, 2016. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial
court’s judgment in Case No. $17A0684. See Supreme Court Rule 59.

Case No. S17A0683 (The McBees’ Appeal)

3. “Title by prescription is the right to property which a possessor
acquires by reason of the continuance of his possession for a period of
time fixed by law.” OCGA § 44-5-160. Adverse possession — the type
of possession that can ripen into title by prescription — is describe’
in OCGA § 44-5-161; among other things, the possession “[m]ust be
accompanied by a claim of right.” OCGA § 44-5-161 (a) (4).”7 Adverse
possession of real property “for a period of 20 years shall confer goo!
title by prescription to the property against everyone except the state
and those persons laboring under [certain statutory] disabilities[.]”
OCGA § 44-5-163.*

Properly viewed, the record shows that the McBees possessed the
Disputed Area by maintaining it and using it for parking vehicles an
storing personal property for far longer than the 20-year prescriptive
period before Aspire filed its separate lawsuit against Mary in
December 2014 to force them off the land. See Murray v. Stone, 283
Ga. 6, 6 (655 SE2d 821) (2008) (affirming a jury verdict in favor of title
by adverse possession where the evidence showed that the plaintiff
used the two tracts of land for the 20-year prescriptive perio:
“by mowing, maintaining, fencing, and placing old cars, boats, a
chicken coop, basketball goals, and a driveway on them”); Burgin v.

7 OCGA § 44-5-161 says in full:
(a) In order for possession to be the foundation of prescriptive title, it:
(1) Must be in the right of the possessor and not of another;
(2) Must not have originated in fraud except as provided in Code

Section 44-5-162;

(3) Must be public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted, and peace-
able; and
(4) Must be accompanied by a claim of right.

(b) Permissive possession cannot be the foundation of a prescription until an

adverse claim and actual notice to the other party.
OCGA § 44-5-162 says:

(a) In order for fraud to prevent the possession of property from being the
foundation of prescription, such fraud must be actual or positive and not merely
constructive or legal.

(b) When actual or positive fraud prevents or deters another party from
acting, prescription shall not run until such fraud is discovered,

® The prescriptive period is shortened to seven years if the possession of real property is
“under written evidence of title.” OCGA § 44-5-164. The McBees do not claim to have written
evidence of title to the Disputed Area.

eS 667

Moye, 212 Ga. 370, 374 (93 SE2d 9) (1956) (“The word ‘possession’
‘denotes the corporeal control of property, a state of actual occupancy,
evidenced by things capable of being seen by the eye or of being
ascertained by the use of the primary senses.’ ” (citation omitted)).

The law presumes that this possession was in good faith and
accompanied by a claim of right. See Crawford v. Simpson, 279 Ga.
280, 282 (612 SE2d 783) (2005) (citing Halpern v. The Lacy Inv. Corp.,
259 Ga. 264, 265 (379 SE2d 519) (1989), for the proposition that an
“inference of good faith claim of right [is] proper absent [a] contrary
showing”); Chancey v. Ga. Power Co., 238 Ga. 397, 398 (233 SE2d 365)
(1977) (“A claim of right will be presumed from the assertion of
dominion .. ..”); Barfield v. Vickers, 200 Ga. 279, 281 (36 SE2d 766)
(1946) (“Direct evidence of bona fides is not required. A presumption
of good faith arises from adverse possession.”). See also David F.
Hinkel, Pindar’s Georgia Real Estate Law and Procedure § 12-14
(7th ed. updated Apr. 2017) (discussing the good faith claim of right
requirement).

Aspire argues that the McBees’ adverse possession claim fails
because in 1974, Thomas, who was then living in Savannah, signed
a quitclaim deed for the Aspire Lot to his Aunt Betty, the stated
purpose of which was “to establish proper boundary lines” between
the Aspire Lot and the McBee Lot. The trial court accepted this
argument. Relying primarily on Simmons v. Community Renewal
and Redemption, LLC, 286 Ga. 6 (685 SE2d 75) (2009), the court ruled
that this deed alone proved that the McBees’ possession of the
Disputed Area was not under a good faith claim of right, thereby
dooming their claim of prescriptive title and entitling Aspire to
summary judgment.

Thomas’s signing of the 1974 deed may be some evidence of a lack
of a good faith claim of right to possession of the Disputed Area, but
it is not dispositive. Because he signed the deed, Thomas may be
charged with knowledge of what it said. But knowing what the deed
said about the boundaries of the Aspire Lot does not automatically
demonstrate knowledge of precisely where all those boundaries lie in
relation to the 24-foot-wide Disputed Area on the land south of Green
Street. This Court has held that the “notice which will prevent a
purchaser from acquiring a valid title by prescription must be more
than constructive notice.” Dyal v. Sanders, 194 Ga. 228, 235 (21 SE2d
596) (1942). See also Bridges v. Brackett, 205 Ga. 637, 641 (54 SE2d
642) (1949) (“That the [claimant] may have entered into possession of
the land under the mistaken idea that the boundaries recited in the
deed under which he claims included the land would not prevent such
actual adverse possession ripening into a prescriptive title in 20

668 |

years, nor would such mistake render the possession fraudulent, for
an honest mistake as to the true line is not fraud.”).

Even assuming Thomas read and understood what the quitclaim
deed said, the record contains no evidence that the line separating the
Aspire and McBee lots was marked in any way on the ground when
Thomas signed the deed in 1974 or that before this dispute arose, he
or anyone else ever walked or otherwise measured the land using the
metes and bounds description tied to artificial monuments (Green
Street and Hemphill Avenue as they existed in 1974) to translate the
contents of the deed into actual knowledge of the location of the
relevant boundary line. Viewing the evidence currently in the record
in the light most favorable to the McBees — which is how we must
view the evidence at this summary judgment stage of the proceeding
—a jury could find that Thomas did not actually know where the
boundary line was and thus was not a mere “squatter” acting in bad
faith three years later in 1977 when he parked a large trailer in the
Disputed Area and then continued using that area, along with his
wife Mary, for the next three-and-a-half decades.

The trial court’s reliance on Simmons was misplaced, because in
that case the claimant testified that he knew all along that the land
in question belonged to someone else but nevertheless entered it with
the “hostile . . . intent to use it as a parking area.” (Punctuation
omitted.) 286 Ga. at 7. The law presumes that the McBees’ possession
of the Disputed Area was under a good faith claim of right, and a
question of fact remains about whether they knew the location of the
actual boundary line on the ground in 1977 and thus entered the
Disputed Area in bad faith. See Bridges, 205 Ga. at 641. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in ruling that there was no genuine issue
regarding the McBees’ lack ofa good faith claim of right and therefore
granting summary judgment to Aspire. Because of that erroneous
ruling, the court did not address Aspire’s arguments that the McBees
cannot establish other elements of their adverse possession claim.
The trial court should consider those arguments on remand.

Judgment affirmed in Case No. S17A0684. Judgment reversed
and case remanded with direction in Case No. S17A0683. All the
Justices concur.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 14, 2017.

umar, Prabhu, Pate anerjee, Roy A. Banerjee, for appel-
lants.

eS 669

S16Y1816. IN THE MATTER OF MICHELLE ANN HICKERSON.
(808 SE2d 229)

PER CURIAM.

The Court having reviewed the Notice of Compliance with Con-
ditions submitted by the Office of the General Counsel of the State
Bar of Georgia, and it appearing that Michelle Ann Hickerson has
complied with all of the conditions for reinstatement following her
suspension by this Court, see In the Matter of Hickerson, 299 Ga. 857
(792 SE2d 321) (2016), it is hereby ordered that Michelle Ann
Hickerson be reinstated to the practice of law in the State of Georgia.

Reinstated. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED NOVEMBER 15, 2017.

Let

Giacoma Schleicher Roberts & Daughdrill, Gene Chapman, for
Hickerson.

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Wolanda R.
Shelton, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Geor-
gia.

$17Y1470. IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL BERNARD KING.
(808 SE2d 559)

PER CURIAM.

The Court having reviewed the Notice of Compliance submitted
by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, and
it appearing that Michael Bernard King has appeared for and received
a public reprimandas ordered by this Court (see In the Matter of King,
301 Ga. 791 (804 SE2d 116) (2017)), itis hereby ordered that Michael
Bernard King be reinstated to practice law in the State of Georgia.

Reinstated. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 4, 2017.

Pe

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jonathan W.
Hewett, Jenny K. Mittelman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

$17A1350. DONALDSON v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 720)
BLACKWELL, Justice.
Thyrell Depree Donaldson was tried by a Clayton County jury
and convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, andtwo counts of
unlawful possession ofa firearm during the commission of a felony, all

672 es

in connection with the shooting death of Robert White, Jr.' Donaldson
appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions and that the trial court erred when it refused to grant him
a new trial on the “general grounds” under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and
5-5-21.? Upon our review of the record and briefs, we affirm Donald-
son’s convictions for felony murder and one of the firearm-possession
counts, but due to a merger error, we vacate his convictions for
aggravated assault and the other firearm-possession count.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
at trial shows the following. On the evening of June 14, 2015, White,
along with his cousin and another friend, walked to the Foxhall
apartment complex in Forest Park to buy marijuana. Upon arrival,
the three friends congregated near the laundry room — located near
the apartment building where Donaldson lived— and there they met
another friend from high school. White then left the group and went
up the stairs to Donaldson’s apartment, where he stood outside of
Donaldson’s front door and briefly spoke to Donaldson through the
door about purchasing marijuana. White then came back down the
stairs and joined the group again.

Ashort time later, White went back up to Donaldson’s apartment
and again spoke to Donaldson outside the front door. According to an
eyewitness, White was sitting on the top of the stairs outside the
apartment when Donaldson came out and fired two shots at White
from behind. One of the bullets missed, but the other hit White in the

1 The crimes were committed on June 14, 2015. On September 30, 2015, a Clayton County
grand jury indicted Donaldson for the malice murder of White (Count 1); felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2); aggravated assault based on “shooting [White] in
the back” (Count 3); aggravated assault based on “shooting at [White]” (Count 4); possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony (murder) (Count 5); and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (aggravated assault) (Count 6). Donaldson stood trial from
February 22 through February 25, 2016, and he was acquitted of malice murder but found
guilty on all other counts. The trial court sentenced Donaldson to life imprisonment for felony
murder; a twenty-year consecutive term for aggravated assault in Count 4; a consecutive
var term for possession of a firearm during the commission of murder; and a coneurrent
five-year term for possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault. The
trial court merged the aggravated assault in Count 3 with the felony murder. Donaldson moved
for a new trial on March 4, 2016, and he amended the motion on June 23, 2016. The trial court
denied the motion on October 25, 2016. Donaldson timely appealed, and this case was docketed
to the August 2017 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2 Section 5-5-20 allows a trial judge to grant a new trial “{iJn any case when the verdict of
a jury is found contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity.” OCGA § 5-5-20
Section 5-5-21 allows the trial judge to “exercise a sound discretion in granting or refusing new
trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence
even though there may appear to be some slight evidence in favor of the finding.” OCGA § 5-5-21.
Grounds for a new trial under these Code sections are commonly known as the “general grounds”
and “require the trial judge to exercise a broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’ ” White v.
State, 293 Ga, 523, 524 (2) (753 SE2d 115) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

es 678

back, and he fell down the stairs, yelling for help. Witnesses heard
White say, “why did you shoot me?” or “[a]re you really going to kill
me?” Although several people rushed to White’s aid and tried to put
pressure on the wound, he later died from blood loss. An autopsy
revealed that the bullet entered White’s vertebrae, severed portions
of his spinal cord — immediately rendering his legs useless — and
perforated his aorta. After the shooting, Donaldson threw the gun
into a ditch and fled the scene. He was apprehended the next day.

Donaldson testified in his own defense and also presented the
testimony of his girlfriend, Crystal Sutton, who was in the apartment
with Donaldson and their baby at the time of the incident. Donaldson
testified, essentially, that he kept a gun for protection and shot White
after White and another man forcibly entered Donaldson’s apartment
and punched Donaldson in the face. Donaldson explained that he
threw away the gun after the incident because he saw the police
approaching and was afraid they might shoot him. Sutton largely
corroborated Donaldson’s testimony.

2. Donaldson argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain his convictions because it shows that he lawfully possessed a
weapon and shot White in defense of himself, his family, and his
home. But as we have explained time and again, “it is the role of the
jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the cred-
ibility of witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts adversely to
the defendant does not render the evidence insufficient.” Graham v.
State, 301 Ga. 675, 677 (1) (804 SE2d 113) (2017) (citation and punc-
tuation omitted); Chapa v. State, 288 Ga. 505, 506 (1) (705 SE2d 646)
(2011) (same). Here, the State’s evidence showed that Donaldson shot
White in the back while the latter was sitting on the stairs outside
Donaldson’s apartment. Although Donaldson presented contrary
evidence of self-defense, the jury was free to disbelieve his evidence
and to credit the State’s evidence instead. See Graham, 301 Ga. at 677
(1); Wright v. State, 296 Ga. 276, 284 (3) (766 SE2d 439) (2014) (“It is
for the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and questions of
witness credibility, not this Court.”). Thus, the evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond
a reasonable doubt that Donaldson was guilty of felony murder and
the other offenses for which he was ultimately convicted. See Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (IIT) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979).

3. Donaldson next argues that the trial court erroneously failed
to exercise its discretion as the thirteenth juror and grant him a new
trial under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. But the record belies this
assertion. In its order denying Donaldson’s motion for a new trial, the

6m es

trial court expressly acknowledgedits authority under OCGA §§ 5-5-20
and 5-5-21 and stated:

Having performed this duty to sit as a thirteenth juror
and having weighed the evidence and considered the cred-
ibility of the witnesses, the Court finds that the verdicts are
amply supported by the evidence, not contrary to the evidence,
not strongly and decidedly against the weight of the evidence
and not contrary to the principles of justice and equity.

The trial court “did not state the incorrect standard in its order, and
nothing in the record indicates that the court was unaware of its
responsibility.” Allen v. State, 296 Ga. 738, 741 (2) (770 SE2d 625)
(2015) (citations omitted). And, once we have determined that the
trial court properly exercised its authority in refusing to grant a new
trial on the general grounds, we cannot review the merits of that
decision by the trial court. Simpson v. State, 298 Ga. 314, 315 (1), n.2
(781 SE2d 762) (2016) (“This Court .. . does not have the authority
and discretion to grant a new trial on . . . the ‘general grounds.’”
(citation and punctuation omitted)); Slaton v. State, 296 Ga. 122, 125
(2) (765 SE2d 332) (2014). This enumeration of error, therefore, lacks
merit.

4. Although Donaldson does not raise the issue on appeal, we
notice two merger errors in his sentencing. See Hulett v. State, 296
Ga. 49, 54 (2) (766 SE2d 1) (2014) (“[I]f we notice a merger issue ina
direct appeal, . .. we regularly resolve that issue, even where it was
not raised in the trial court andis not enumerated as error on appeal.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)). The indictment charged Donald-
son with two aggravated assaults — one for “shooting [White] in the
back” (Count 3) and one for “shooting at him” (Count 4). At sentenc-
ing, the trial court properly merged the aggravated assault in
Count 3 — the fatal shot — with the felony murder count.® But the
trial court imposed a separate, 20-year consecutive sentence on the
aggravated assault in Count 4 — the shot that missed White. This
was error. The evidence (viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict) showed that the two shots were fired “[b]ack to back,” as part
of a single incident, and so the two aggravated assault counts both
should have merged into felony murder for sentencing purposes. See
Gomez v. State, 301 Ga. 445, 455-456 (4) (b) (801 SE2d 847) (2017)

°“[f a defendant is convicted of felony murder as well as the underlying felony, the
underlying felony merges into the felony murder conviction.” Carter v. State, 285 Ga. 394, 399
(8) 677 SE2d 71) (2009).

es 675

(both aggravated assault convictions should have merged into felony
murder where there was no evidence of a deliberate interval between.
the infliction of separate injuries underlying the aggravated assault
convictions); Grell v. State, 291 Ga. 615, 617 (1) (732 SE2d 741) (2012)
(‘The two gunshots that struck [victim], fired without a deliberate
interval ... , did not constitute separate aggravated assaults.”);
Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 295 (3) (687 SE2d 427) (2009) (“When
a victim suffers multiple wounds inflicted in quick succession, each
infliction of injury does not constitute a separate assault.”).

Ina similar vein, the trial court also erred when it failed to merge
Donaldson’s two convictions on Counts 5 and 6 for possession of a
firearm during the commission ofa felony. See Abdullah v. State, 284
Ga. 399, 401 (4) (667 SE2d 584) (2008) (“[W]here multiple crimes are
committed together during the course of one continuous crime spree,
a defendant may only be convicted once for possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime as to each individual victim.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)). See also Stovall v. State, 287 Ga.
415, 421 (5) (696 SE2d 633) (2010) (“Because only one victim was
involved in appellant’s crime spree, . . . he may be convicted only once
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.”).
Accordingly, we vacate Donaldson’s convictions and sentences on
Count 4 (aggravated assault) and Count 6 (firearm possession), but
we affirm his remaining convictions and sentences.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

Darrell B. Reynolds, Sr., for appellant.

Tracy Graham Lawson, District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker,
Elizabeth R. Rosenwasser, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher
M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy
Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
for appellee.

$17A1363. MUCKLE v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 713)
NAHMIAS, Justice.
Appellant Malcolm Muckle was convicted of felony murder in
connection with the shooting death of Travis Callaway, his accomplice
in an attempted armed robbery. In this appeal, he claims that the

676 P|

evidence at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction and
that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Neither of those
claims has merit, so we affirm.’

1. Appellant first argues that the evidence presented at his trial
was legally insufficient to support his conviction.

(a) Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evi-
dence showed the following. Appellant and Callaway were friends. In
the days before the murder, Appellant frequently visited Callaway at
the house of Callaway’s fiancée, Latrice Yearby. On April 3, 2012,
Callaway, Yearby, and Appellant drove together to an Avis rental car
location. An acquaintance of Callaway rented a Dodge Avenger for
them, with Callaway promising to reimburse him. Callaway said that
he needed the rental car because Yearby’s car had broken down, but
Yearby testified that her car was working at the time. At Avis, Yearby
overheard Appellant and Callaway discussing their plan to pick up
Desmond Hill. After renting the car, Appellant, Callaway, and Yearby
drove to Yearby’s apartment. Appellant and Callaway left soon after-
wards in the rental car. Callaway returned to Yearby’s apartment for
dinner, and then called Appellant from Yearby’s phone. He left shortly
after, telling Yearby that he had to make sure Appellant had a ride
home. Callaway returned to Yearby’s apartment again later that
evening and changed into dark colored pants and white tennis shoes
before leaving.

At about 2:00 a.m. that night, Appellant’s cousin Quinici Lati-
more, who was known as “Bipolar,” received a call from Wilma Scott
asking Latimore to give her some synthetic marijuana.” When Scott

* Callaway was killed on April 4, 2012. On July 3, 2012, an Athens-Clarke County grand
jury indicted Appellant, Wilma Scott, and Desmond Hill for three counts of felony murder,
attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated
assault with intent to rob, and six counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of
acrime. Appellant and Hill were each also indicted for one additional count of felony murder
and one additional count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as well
asone count of possession of a firearm by a convieted felon. Scott and Hill pled guilty, but neither
of them testified at Appellant's trial. Appellant was tried from August 25 to September 3, 2013
‘The jury found him guilty of three counts of felony murder, attempt to commit armed robbery,
and both aggravated assault counts; it acquitted him of the remaining charges. The trial court
sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for felony murder based on attempt to commit armed
robbery and merged the remaining guilty verdicts (although it should have vacated the felony
murder counts, see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 374 (434 SE2d 479) (1999)). Appellant filed
a timely motion for new trial, which he amended with new counsel on March 4, 2016. After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion on May 18, 2016. Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the August 2017 term and
submitted for decision on the briefs.

2 Four months earlier, Scott, Hill, and Callaway had robbed Latimore of $1,000 at
gunpoint. In that robbery, Scott called Latimore asking him to meet her outside his apartment.
Hill and Callaway drove up and exited the car with guns drawn. Latimore did not report the
robbery to the police at the time.

es 677

arrived at Latimore’s apartment complex, he met her outside an
gave her the requested drugs. Scott then drove away and Latimore
began walking back to his apartment. He heard footsteps behind him
right before someone grabbed him, put an arm around his neck, an
pointed a gun at his neck. Latimore described the assailant as a
“thick and heavyset” person wearing a ski mask.* Latimore scuffle:
with the assailant, grabbed the gun, and started walking quickly
back to his apartment with the gun.

As Latimore approached the apartment breezeway, a secon

masked assailant wearing a green and black coat jumped out from
behind the building and shot at Latimore twice. Latimore shot back
five times before he ran out of bullets. He then ran to his apartment
and went inside. Latimore told both his mother and his brother, who
were in the apartment, that he believed he had killed someone, but he
did not call the police, because as a convicted felon, he was worrie
that he could not legally defend himself.
At around 6:00 a.m., Yearby heard beating at her door. She
opened the door and found Appellant there. Appellant asked Yearby
whether she had heard from Callaway, and Yearby said no. Appellant
hen said that Callaway was dead. Appellant told her that he, Hill,
and Callaway had driven to an apartment complex to buy some
marijuana and that Callaway had gotten out of the car acting as if he
did not want the others to know where he was going. Appellant then
heard five gunshots, and he and Hill drove away. Hill called 911 and
then took the battery out of the phone and threw the phone out of the
window at a stop sign because he did not want the police to “see where
they were.”
Appellant and Yearby then drove to the apartment of Callaway’s
brother, Tavarius, and told him that Callaway was dead. Appellant
gave the following account to Tavarius. He, Hill, and Callaway were
“going to hit Bipolar,” meaning they were going to rob him. Once they
arrived at the apartment complex, all three men got into position.4
Hill gave the signal on his phone for Callaway to approach Latimore.
Then Appellant heard gunshots, he saw Callaway fall to the ground,
and he and Hill ran away. When he and Hill returned to the scene and
saw that the rental car was still in the parking lot, they knew that
Callaway was dead, so they got in the other car and drove away.

a

® At trial, Latimore described Appellant as “slim and skinny.”

4 The evidence indicates that Appellant, Hill, and Callaway took two cars to Latimore's
apartment complex. One car was the Dodge Avenger that Appellant and Callaway had rented
the day before; the other vehicle was not described.

678 P|

The police officers who responded to Hill’s 911 call found Calla-
way dead, lying face down in the breezeway. He was wearing a green
and black camouflage jacket, white shoes and blue jeans, and he had
a gun in his hand and car keys for the rental car in his front pocket.
Appellant’s and Callaway’s fingerprints were found in the rental car.
An autopsy revealed that Callaway died from a gunshot wound to the
back of his head.

The day after the crimes, the police interviewed Tavarius. Dur-
ing the interview, Tavarius called Appellant and the conversation
was recorded by the police. Appellant repeated some details of the
crimes, including that the shooting had taken place in the breezeway
of the apartment complex, a fact that had not yet been made public.
Appellant also said that Callaway had said that he was carrying a
gun, and that he met Scott at the scene.

Appellant did not testify during his trial. His main defense was
that he was merely present at the crime scene and did not participate
in the commission of the crimes.

(b) Appellant argues first that the evidence he participated in the
crimes was solely circumstantial and the State did not “exclude every
other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused” as
required by OCGA § 24-14-6.° Appellant asserts that another rea-
sonable hypothesis was that Hill was the other assailant Latimore
saw and Appellant was merely present in the vicinity. However,
Appellant told Tavarius that he, Hill, and Callaway went together to
Latimore’s apartment complex with the intent to rob Latimore; he
knew Callaway was armed; they all got into position when they
arrived; Hill signaled for Callaway to approach Latimore; and Call-
away was shot during the confrontation with the putative armed
robbery victim. Even if the evidence indicated that Hill was the other
assailant Latimore saw, “a person may be convicted of commission of
a crime even if he or she does not directly commit the crime but,
instead, ‘[i]ntentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime.’”
Flournoy v. State, 294 Ga. 741, 745 (755 SE2d 777) (2014) (quoting
OCGA § 16-2-20 (b), which defines parties to a crime). See also
Shepard v. State, 300 Ga. 167, 168 (794 SE2d 121) (2016). In his
discussions with Tavarius, Appellant admitted the main fact of the

6 OOGA § 24-14-6 says in full: “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the
proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every
other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” This provision of Georgia's
new Evidence Code, which was in effect when this case was tried, was carried over without
substantive change from OCGA § 24-4-6 of the old Code, and thus our cases applying the old
provision remain good law. See, ¢.g., Allaben v. State, 299 Ga. 253, 5 (787 SE2d 711)
(2016). See also Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 653-654 (769 SE2d 892) (2015).

es 679

felony murder charge of which he was convicted — that he was a party
to the attempted armed robbery that resulted in Callaway’s death.
Accordingly, Appellant made not “‘a mere incriminating admis-
sion,’ ” but “‘a confession,’ ” which is direct evidence of his guilt, and
“[t]his is not, therefore, a purely circumstantial case.” Merritt v. State,
292 Ga. 327, 329 (737 SE2d 673) (2013) (citation omitted).

Appellant also argues, however, that the jury should have dis-
counted his confession because it was not corroborated by evidence
that he was more than merely present. Appellant is wrong. “A confes-
sion alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, shall not justify a
conviction,” OCGA § 24-8-823, but “‘no specific manner of corrobora-
tion (of the confession) is required, and corroboration in any particular
is sufficient.’” Graham v. State, 301 Ga. 675, 676 (804 SE2d 113)
(2017) (citation omitted).* The evidence corroborating Appellant’s
confession includes his frequent association with Callaway in the
days prior to the murder; his participation with Callaway in renting
the car found at the crime scene — in which both their fingerprints
were found — and their discussion of picking up Hill later on;
Latimore’s testimony that he exchanged gunfire with Callaway;
Appellant’s statement to Yearby following the shooting; and the
evidence that the shooting occurred at the specific breezeway location
that he identified. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts,
this evidence was sufficient to corroborate Appellant’s confession. See
Norman v. State, 298 Ga. 344, 346 (781 SE2d 784) (2016).

Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient as a matter of consti-
tutional due process, as a rational jury could conclude from the
evidence that Appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a
party to felony murder based on attempted armed robbery. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979). See also OCGA § 16-2-20; Sapp v. State, 300 Ga. 768, 769 (798
SE2d 226) (2017) (‘While mere presence at the scene of the crime is
not sufficient evidence to convict one of being a party to a crime,
criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, and
conduct before, during and after the offense.” (citation and punctua-
tion omitted)); Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 228) (2009)
(« ‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and
to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’ ” (citation
omitted)).

© Like the circumstantial evidence provision, the confession corroboration requirement of
OCGA § 24-8-823 was carried forward from OCGA § 24-3-53 of the old Evidence Code, and we
may therefore properly rely on our precedents applying the old provision. See, e.g., Graham, 301
Ga. at 676.

680 P|

2. Appellant contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance in failing to subpoena Hill to testify at trial. We disagree.

To prevail on [this claim], Appellant has the burden of
proving both that the performance of his lawyer was profes-
sionally deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052,
80 LE2d 674) (1984). To prove deficient performance, Appel-
lant must show that his trial counsel acted or failed to act in
an objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the cir-
cumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.
See Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 239-240 (794 SE2d 67)
(2016). .. . “[[]n examining an ineffectiveness claim, a court
need not ‘address both components of the inquiry if the
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.’” Id.
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

Stuckey v. State, 301 Ga. 767, 771 (804 SE2d 76) (2017). In particular,
trial counsel’s “ ‘decision as to which defense witnesses to call is a
matter of trial strategy and tactics,’” and “ ‘tactical errors in that
regard will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless
those errors are unreasonable ones no competent attorney would
have made under similar circumstances.’” Watkins v. State, 285 Ga.
355, 358 (676 SE2d 196) (2009) (citation omitted).

At the motion for new trial hearing, both Hill and Appellant’s
trial counsel testified. Hillclaimed that if he had been called to testify
at Appellant’s trial, he would have said that he did not see Appellant
on the night of the crimes. Trial counsel explained that he was
concerned that this testimony would have conflicted with the defense
strategy of convincing the jury that Appellant was merely present at
the scene of the crimes; indeed, Hill’s putative testimony was incon-
sistent with Appellant’s own statements to Yearby and Tavarius, one
of which was recorded. Counsel was also concerned about Hill’s
credibility due to his extensive criminal history; in addition, Hill had
face tattoos that said “F*ck Y’all, Doing Me!” The decision not to call
Hill was a reasonable strategic one under the circumstances, not
deficient performance. See Watkins, supra. Thus, Appellant’s ineffec-
tive assistance claim fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

largaret k. Heinen, for appellant.

es 681

Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Brian V. Patterson, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patri-
cia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason M. Rea, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

$17A1385. WOMAC v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 709)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellant Lawrence Edward Womac appeals his convictions and
sentences for aggravated sexual battery, child molestation, cruelty to
children in the first degree, and false imprisonment.' On appeal,
Womac argues, among other things, that his life sentence for aggra-
vated sexual battery constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Georgia Constitution. For the reasons that follow, and
finding no additional error, we affirm.

Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
shows that, on July 19, 2013, Womac invited the minor victim, K. W.,
and her siblings into his motel room. While watching television,
Womac placed his hand down K. W.’s shorts and the tip of his finger
penetrated her vagina. K. W. removed Womac’s hand and then ran
into the bathroom to get away from him; Womac followed. Once
inside, Womac put his left hand on K. W.’s throat, his right hand on
her mouth and squeezed. Womac held K. W. against the toilet to keep
her from leaving, kissing her on her neck and shoulders, placing his
hands on her buttocks and vaginal area. Womac licked K. W.’s vagina,
stating that “he was getting it ready.” Then he proceeded to place his

1 In June 2014, a Whitfield County grand jury indicted Womac on the following thirteen
charges: rape (Count 1); aggravated sodomy (Counts 2 through 4); aggravated sexual battery
(Count 5); aggravated child molestation (Counts 6 through 8); child molestation (Count 9);
enticing a child for indecent purposes (Count 10); cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 11);
false imprisonment (Count 12); and aggravated assault (Count 13).

Following a trial conducted September 29, 2014, through October 3, 2014, the trial court
granted a directed verdict of acquittal as to Count 10. The jury found Womac guilty of Counts
5, 9, 11, and 12, and acquitted him on the remaining counts. On November 4, 2014, the trial
court sentenced Womac to life imprisonment on Count 5; ten years confinement on Count 12 to
run concurrent with Count 5; 20 years confinement on Count 11 to run consecutive to Count 12
and concurrent with Count 5; and 19 years confinement with one year of probation on Count 9
to run consecutive to Counts 11 and 12 and concurrent with Count 5.

Womac filed a motion for new trial on December 29, 2014, which he subsequently
amended on August 30, 2016. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Womac’s motion on
November 7, 2016. This case was docketed to the August 2017 term of this court, and oral
argument was held on August 15, 2017.

682 es

penis in her vagina, mouth and buttocks.

After the incident, K. W. left and, eventually, reported the assault
to her father and another motel resident. K. W. also disclosed another
incident with Womac that had occurred a few days prior, wherein
Womac grabbed K. W. while she was walking outside, pulled her into
a nearby building and made her touch his penis with her hands and
mouth.

K. W. was taken to the hospital where a sexual assault exami-
nation revealed bruising and abrasions on her arm, leg, andneck, and
abrasions and redness around and inside her vagina. The nurse
testified that these injuries were consistent with K. W.’s description
of what had occurred during the sexual assault.

Meanwhile, Womac left his motel room and later told his daugh-
ter about his plans to leave Georgia and travel to Illinois because he
needed to “get away.” Law enforcement subsequently searched
Womac’s room, and though the bedroom had animal feces, urine
spots, cockroaches, food, and open containers, the bathroom appeared
to have been cleaned with bleach, netting negative results to fluores-
cence testing for bodily fluids. Officers obtained surveillance footage
from the day in question showing K. W. and her siblings entering
Womac’s room and K. W. later leaving by herself. The State also
presented other acts evidence from two witnesses who described
previous sexual assaults on minors committed by Womac.

1. Womac first argues that his life sentence for aggravated sexual
battery? violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Georgia Constitution. According to Womac, his
sentence is unconstitutional because K. W.’s lack of consent was
presumed by law without the State having to prove that the criminal
act of aggravated sexual battery occurred without the victim’s con-
sent, and thus aggravated sexual battery is a strict liability crime for
which he received an overly harsh life sentence. Cf. Watson v. State,
297 Ga. 718 (2) (777 SE2d 677) (2015) (holding that the offense of
sexual battery requires the State prove the victim’s lack of consent,
regardless of the victim’s age, and charge the jury on the same). We
disagree. In this case, unlike the jury in Watson, the jury was not
instructed that a minor is legally incapable of consenting to sexual
contact as it applied to aggravated sexual battery.* The jury charge on

2 Pursuant to OCGA § 16-6-22.2 (b), “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated sexual
battery when he or she intentionally penetrates with a foreign object the sexual organ or anus
of another person without the consent of that person.”

® Instead, the jury was instructed that “a person under the age of 16 is legally incapable of
giving consent to sexual intercourse” regarding Womac’s rape charge. Sexual intercourse was
not an element of aggravated sexual battery and was, therefore, not included in the jury charge

es 683

aggravated sexual battery did not suggest that the element of “with-
out consent” was established based solely upon the victim’s age; thus,
contrary to Womac’s assertion, the aggravated sexual battery charge
was not a strict liability crime as the jury was required to find that K.
W. did not, in fact, consent to the penetration alleged in the indict-
ment. Consequently, we find Womac’s constitutional challenge to be
without merit.

2. During its case-in-chief, the State called Womac’s daughter,
A. W., as an other acts witness; A. W. testified that she had been
sexually abused by her father. During direct examination, the follow-
ing exchange occurred:

Q: Up until the time he was arrested last year did you have
any sort of relationship with [Womac]?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: And why was that?

A: Lused him for marijuana.

Womac objected to this testimony and moved for a mistrial. The trial
court denied the motion and instructed the jury to disregard A. W.’s
statement. Womac contends that this was error. We disagree.

As a general rule,

[a] trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial based on the
improper admission of bad character evidence is reviewed
for abuse of discretion by examining factors and circum-
stances, including the nature of the statement, the other
evidence in the case, and the action taken by the court and
counsel concerning the impropriety.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Graves v. State, 298 Ga. 551, 555
(783 SE2d 891) (2016).

The record shows that A. W.’s reference to marijuana was fleet-
ing. Additionally, the trial judge promptly instructed the jury to
disregard the testimony, and “[q]ualified jurors are presumed to
follow the instructions of the trial court.” Sampson v. State, 282 Ga.
82, 84 (646 SE2d 60) (2007). Finally, in light of the other evidence in
this case, including the evidence of sexual assault against K. W. and
that of the two other act witnesses, we cannot say that A. W.’s state-
ment is so highly prejudicial as to be incurable by the trial court’s

of that crime. Moreover, the aggravated sexual battery count listed in the indictment charged
that Womac had “intentionally penetrated with a foreign object, to wit: his finger, the sexual
organ of another person, to wit: [K. W.], without the consent of that person, contrary to the law
of said State, the good order, peace and dignity thereof.”

684 es

admonition. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial.

3. Finally, Womac argues that the trial court erred in failing to
merge his convictions for aggravated sexual battery (Count 5), child
molestation (Count 9), and cruelty to children in the first degree
(Count 11) for sentencing purposes. We find no error.

OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) provides:

When the same conduct of an accused may establish the
commission of more than one crime, the accused may be
prosecuted for each crime. He may not, however, be con-
victed of more than one crime if: (1) One crime is included in
the other; or (2) The crimes differ only in that one is defined
to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the
other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct.

“Whether offenses merge is a legal question, which we review de
novo.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Regent v. State, 299 Ga.
172, 174 (787 SE2d 217) (2016). To determine whether two crimes
merge, we must apply the “required evidence” test embraced in
Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (636 SE2d 530) (2006), which
instructs that “where the same act or transaction constitutes the
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” (Citation
and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 215. If so, then two offenses exist,
and one is not “included in” the other. Id. See also Favors v. State, 296
Ga. 842 (5) (770 SE2d 855) (2015) (discussing requirements for merg-
ing offenses as a matter of law versus as a matter of fact).

Count 5 of the indictment charged Womac with aggravated sexual
battery alleging that he “did intentionally penetrate with a foreign
object, to wit: his finger, the sexual organ of another person, to wit:
[K. W.], without the consent of that person.” Count 9 of the indictment
charged Womac with child molestation, alleging that he had commit-
ted an immoral and indecent act with the intent to arouse and satisfy
his sexual desires by “placing his hands into contact with [K. W.’s]
vaginal area and buttocks and kissing her.” Finally, Count 11 charged
Womac with cruelty to children in the first degree in that he “did
maliciously cause [K. W.], a child under the age of eighteen (18) years,
cruel and excessive mental pain by raping and sodomizing and molest-
ing [K. W.].”

Based on the facts discussed above, Womac completed the crime of
aggravated sexual battery on the bed prior to molesting and causing
K. W. cruel or excessive physical or mental pain in the bathroom. Where

es 685

facts show one crime was completed before the commission of a subse-
quent crime, the crimes are separate as a matter of law, and there is no
merger. Gaither v. Cannida, 258 Ga. 557, 557-558 (372 SE2d 429)
(1988). Therefore, Womac’s contention that the trial court erred in
failing to merge the aggravated sexual battery count into the child
molestation and cruelty to children counts is without merit.

Moreover, the child molestation and cruelty counts required proof
of an element which the other did not. The offense of child molestation
required proof that Womac placed his hands into contact with K. W.’s
vaginal area and buttocks and kissed her with the intent to arouse his
own sexual desires. See OCGA § 16-6-4. The cruelty to children in the
first degree charge required proof that Womac maliciously caused
K. W. cruel or excessive physical or mental pain. See OCGA § 16-5-70
(b). Because these crimes required proof of an element that the other
did not, the trial court properly sentenced Womac.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

Michael R. McCarthy, tor appellant.
Herbert M. Poston, Jr., District Attorney, Victoria K. Parker,
Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

$17A1412. CARTER v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 704)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

James Marlon Carter was tried by a Jeff Davis County jury and
convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the
shooting death of Chandler Johnson. Carter appeals, contending that
the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions and that
the trial court erred when it struck two prospective jurors, when it
refused to strike a third juror, when it admitted evidence of his
pretrial statements, and when it allowed Johnson’s mother to testify
about certain text messages, which she said that she had received
from Carter. Upon our review of the record and briefs, we see no error,
and we affirm.!

1 Johnson was killed on September 25, 2011. On November 3, 2011, a Jeff Davis County
grand jury indicted Carter, charging him with malice murder, two counts of felony murder,
aggravated assault, cruelty to children in the first degree, concealing the death of another, and

Py
eS
o

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
shows that Carter fatally shot Johnson on September 25, 2011.
Johnson was 15 years of age, and he was the son of a woman with
whom Carter had been involved in a romantic relationship. About a
week before Johnson was killed, his mother broke off her relationship
with Carter, expressing a desire to devote more time to Johnson.
Carter claimed that he took Johnson into the woods on September 25
to let Johnson shoot a rifle. As Carter was holding the rifle, he said,
Johnson turned toward him and said something that surprised
Carter, which caused Carter to accidentally discharge the rifle,
fatally shooting Johnson. Carter then buried Johnson’s body and told
no one about what had happened until October 5. At trial, Carter
presented a defense of accident, but his claim that Johnson turned
toward him before he fired the fatal shot was belied by the medical
evidence, which showed that Johnson was shot in the back. In any
event, it was for the jury to consider the credibility of Carter’s claim
that the shooting was accidental. See Morrison v. State, 300 Ga. 426,
427 (1) (796 SE2d 293) (2017). We conclude that the evidence autho-
rized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter was
guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).2

2. Carter claims that the trial court erred when it struck two
prospective jurors and when it refused to strike a third. Whether to
strike a juror for cause is a matter committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and we will not find error in an exercise of that
discretion absent a showing that the discretion was manifestly
abused. See Gray v. State, 298 Ga. 885, 887 (2) (785 SE2d 517) (2016).
We see no abuse of discretion here.

The trial court struck the first prospective juror on its own
motion after the court determined that the prospective juror no

the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. His trial began on
November 26, 2012, and the jury returned its verdict on November 29, finding him guilty on all
counts. The trial court sentenced Carter to imprisonment for life without parole for malice
murder, a consecutive term of imprisonment for 20 years for cruelty to children, a consecutive
term of imprisonment for ten years for concealing the death of another, and a consecutive term
of imprisonment for five years for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
‘The aggravated assault merged into the malice murder, and the felony murder counts were
vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372-373 (4), (5) (434 SE2d 479)
(1993). On December 28, 2012, Carter filed a motion for new trial, and he amended the motion
on February 10, 2016 and April 13, 2016. The trial court denied the motion for new trial on
September 6, 2016, and Carter timely filed a notice of appeal that same day, and he amended
it on September 19, 2016. This case was docketed to the August 2017 term of this Court and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2 For the same reasons, we reject Carter's claim that the trial court erred when it failed to
direct a verdict of acquittal. See Lewis v. State, 296 Ga. 259, 261 (3) (765 SE2d 911) (2014).

es 687

longer resided in Jeff Davis County. Under OCGA § 15-12-163 (b) (1),
a person who is “not a citizen, resident in the county,” is not qualified
to sit as a juror and may be struck for cause. Anda trial court does not
abuse its discretion when it excuses an unqualified juror on its own
motion. See Norris v. State, 250 Ga. 38, 39 (1) (295 SE2d 321) (1982).
Here, the prospective juror testified that he was living in Appling
County, that he was continuing to store some of his possessions in Jeff
Davis County only because he had not yet secured permanent hous-
ing in Appling County, and that he intended to live permanently in
Appling County. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that the prospective juror was not a resident of Jeff Davis
County.

The second prospective juror in question had a close relationship
with Carter’s son and expressed an inability to render an unbiased
verdict, and he was struck upon the motion of the State. This
prospective juror testified that his daughter and Carter’s son had
dated for at least four years, and he explained that Carter’s son had
lived with his family and was like a son to him. He felt that his
relationship with Carter’s son would be a “problem” if he sat on the
jury, that his mind was “halfway made up” before he heard any
evidence, that he had formed an opinion about Carter’s guilt, that he
did not think there was “any way . . . that [he] could come to... an
unbiased conclusion,” that he would not be able to make a decision in
the case based solely upon the evidence, and that — if he were Carter
— he would not want someone who knew what he knew to serve on the
jury in any event. The trial court did not err when it struck this
prospective juror for cause. See Krause v. State, 286 Ga. 745, 748 (3)
(691 SE2d 211) (2010).
Carter sought to exclude the third prospective juror based upon
the juror’s relationship with numerous witnesses and the fact that he,
re

at one point during voir dire, said that he thought Carter should be
equired to prove his innocence. But this prospective juror agreed
that anything he had heard about the case in the community was not
evidence, said that he had not formed an opinion about the case,
assured that he would “try to” make a decision based solely on what
was proven incourt, and said that he would “have to be fair” to Carter.
As to his statement that Carter should have to prove his innocence,
the juror clarified that he didn’t “know . . . how this court system
works,” and when the trial court explained that the law was that
“he’s innocent until proven guilty,” the prospective juror responded
that he understood and agreed. “The trial court was particularly well
suited to determine if the prospective juror was merely confused
about the burden of proof and capable of rehabilitation, on the one
hand, or biased against [Carter] in a way that could not be cured, on

688 eS

the other.” Gray, 298 Ga. at 888 (2). The trial court acted within its
discretion when it found that the prospective juror did not have a
fixed opinion about Carter’s guilt or innocence and that he “had only
been confused about the burden of proof, and it did not err when it
refused to strike the prospective juror for cause.” Id.

3. Carter asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted
evidence of pretrial statements that he made on October 5 and
October 12, 2011. These statements were the subject of a Jackson-
Denno hearing,* at which it was revealed that Carter was first
interviewed on October 4 after being arrested on an unrelated charge.
At that time, investigators read the Miranda warnings‘ to Carter,
and in the course of the interview that followed, Carter identified his
red Chevrolet Beretta in a photograph that investigators showed
him. This photograph was taken from a video recording that showed
Carter picking up Johnson from his home around noon on
September 25. After the investigators concluded their interview of
Carter, they allowed him to meet with Johnson’s mother in the
interrogation room. Johnson’s mother reminded Carter that she
knew that he had picked up Johnson from their home on September
25, and she repeatedly asked Carter to tell her where he had taken
her son. About halfway through their 26-minute conversation, John-
son’s mother told Carter that he was “not going to get out of here
until . . . you tell us where [Johnson’s] at.”

The next day, police officers drove Carter to Dublin, and he
spontaneously told them that Johnson was dead and that they shoul
drive him back to Hazlehurst so he could show them Johnson’s body.
The officers again read the Miranda warnings to Carter, and he
subsequently led them to the shallow grave in which he had burie
Johnson. Carter claims that the incriminating statements that he
made on October 5, and additional statements that he made on
October 12, were improperly induced by the “threat” made by John-
son’s mother on October 4 about him not “get[ting] out” until he tol
her where he had taken Johnson.

Former OCGA § 24-3-50, which was effective as of the time of
Carter’s trial,® provided that, “[t]o make a confession admissible, it
must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another
by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.”* The tria

2 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. 8. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LEZd 908) (1964).

4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. $. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966)

© The provisions of former OCGA § 24-3-50 were carried forward into the new Evidence
Code, and they now are codified at OCGA § 24-8-824.

® Although the statute uses the term “confession,” “[i]t has long been the law in this State
that the rule as to the admissibility of an incriminatory statement is the same as that applied

es 689

court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Carter’s state-
ments were voluntarily made (and not improperly induced by any-
thing said to him by Johnson’s mother). That finding was not clearly
erroneous. See Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 279-280 (1) (695 SE2d
604) (2010).

The conversation between Carter and Johnson’s mother was
recorded and viewed by the trial court. Her statement about Carter
not getting out ofjail was a small part of a 26-minute conversation, in
which she repeatedly asked Carter to tell her where he took her son
after picking him up from their home. Carter does not point to any
evidence indicating that he was threatened by the statement that
Johnson’s mother made, that he believed she had any power to
prevent him from getting out ofjail, or that she was acting as an agent
of the State when she made that statement. And Carter acknowl-
edges that he did not make any incriminating statements on
October 4 after speaking with Johnson’s mother.

There also does not appear to be any connection between the
conversation with Johnson’s mother on October 4 and Carter’s incrimi-
nating statements on October 5 and 12. Instead, the undisputed
evidence is that the police officers who were with Carter on
October 5 had not asked him any questions about the case either
before, during, or after their drive to Dublin, that he had been waiting
in the lobby of a Georgia State Patrol post in Dublin for about ten
minutes when he asked one of the officers if he could speak to him
outside, and that Carter then told the officer that “you guys have been
real good to me, just bring me back to Hazlehurst and I'll take you to
where [Johnson] is.” The police officer then read the Miranda warn-
ings to Carter, and the remaining conversations between the police
officers and Carter were recorded and reviewed by the trial court.
Similarly, Carter was read the Miranda warnings again on October
12, his interview with investigators on that day was recorded, and the
trial court reviewed that recording too. Nothing in those recordings
suggests that Carter was concerned about the “threat” made by
Johnson’s mother on October 4, he repeatedly acknowledged that he
had not been threatened to make a statement, and the trial court did
not err when it found that his statements were voluntarily made as
required by former OCGA § 24-3-50.

4. Finally, Carter contends that the trial court erred when it
allowed Johnson’s mother to testify about text messages that she said

toa [full] confess ara. State, 283 Ga. 175, 177 (1) (657 SE2d 863) (2008). See also State
v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 771 (2) (770 SE2d 808) (2015) (finding that the same rule applies to
OCGA § 24-8-824 under the new Evidence Code),

690 eS

she had received from Carter during the time that Johnson’s where-
abouts were unknown. According to Johnson’s mother, Carter’s text
messages invited her on dates and explained why he was not partici-
pating in the search for Johnson. This testimony was properly
admitted under the “[a]dmissions by a real party in interest” excep-
tion to the hearsay rule under former OCGA § 24-3-34.’ Johnson’s
mother also provided evidence that identified Carter as the person
who sent the text messages at issue: she had been involved in a
romantic relationship with him for around eight months, she had
saved his phone number in her “contacts” under his name, and the
messages included information that was known to Carter (and not
many other people) that identified him as the sender of the messages.
Cf. Brown v. State, 266 Ga. 723, 725 (3) (470 SE2d 652) (1996)
(“Georgia law requires that there be a sufficient basis for a witness to
identify a person with whom he spoke over the telephone, before
testifying as to the contents of the conversation.”).* Carter was free to
cross-examine Johnson’s mother about the possibility that someone
else sent the text messages (although he did not do so), and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted her testimony.
See id.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

Jonathan P. Lockwood, for appellant.

Jacquelyn L. Johnson, District Attorney, Andrew J. Ekonomou,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M. Youn, Assis-
tant Attorney General, for appellee.

7 We note that admissions of a party opponent are admissible under the new Evidence
Code. See OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2)

® The rules for authentication or identification under the new Evidence Code are found in
OCGA § 24-9-901

es 691

$17A1475. DIXON v. THE STATE.
$17A1476. CAMPS v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 696)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Bernard Dixon and Arrick Camps were tried by a Bartow County
jury and found guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection
with the shooting death of Robert Carr.' They appeal, both contend-
ing that the trial court erred when it refused to declare a mistrial for
prosecutorial misconduct in the cross-examination of a defense wit-
ness. They also argue, each for different reasons, that the trial court
erred when it refused to grant them new trials based on jury miscon-
duct. We affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence at trial shows that Dixon, Camps, and three others —
Elizabeth Kelley, Stephanie Gardner, and Rebecca Dover — made
plans to rob Carr. The plan originated with Dover; she told Gardner
about the opportunity, and Gardner invited Dixon and Kelley to
participate. Some time later, Camps also joined the scheme. The
robbery was to occur in Cartersville, and so, in the early morning
hours of April 7, 2015, Kelley drove Dixon and Gardner from Marietta
to a Chevron gas station in Cartersville. There, they met up with
Dover and Carr. Dover was highly intoxicated and seemed to have lost
interest in the robbery; she instead expressed a desire to play
“ding-dings,” which apparently are gaming devices similar to slot
machines. The group then drove Dover (but not Carr) to a Sunoco gas
station down the road to play ding-dings. Dover and Gardner stayed
at the Sunoco, and Dixon and Kelley then picked up Camps from his
house not far away. When they returned to the Sunoco, Gardner got
in the car with Kelley, Dixon, and Camps, and the four drove back to

1 The crimes were committed on April 7, 2015. On October 21, 2015, a Bartow County
grand jury indicted Dixon and Camps (along with three others) for malice murder (Count 1),
felony murder (Counts 2-5), kidnapping with bodily injury (Count 6), armed robbery (Count 7),
aggravated assault (Counts 8-11), conspiracy to commit robbery (Count 12), false imprisonment
(Count 13), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 14-17). After
their first trial ended in a hung jury, Dixon and Camps were retried jointly from March 28
through April 4, 2016. The trial court granted a directed verdict to both Dixon and Camps on
Count 2 (felony murder), Count 6 (kidnapping with bodily injury), Count 13 (false imprison-
ment), and Count 15 (possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony). The jury found
each defendant guilty on all other counts. After merging several counts for sentencing
purposes, the trial court sentenced both Dixon and Camps to imprisonment for life plus five
years. Dixon filed his motion for new trial on May 31, 2016, and his amended motion on
November 22, 2016. Camps filed his motion for new trial on June 24, 2016, and he amended the
motion on November 9, 2016. The trial court held a hearing and denied both defendants
motions in a combined order dated December 7, 2016. Dixon and Camps timely filed their
notices of appeal on December 27 and 29, 2016, respectively. Their cases were docketed in this
Court for the August 2017 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

692 A

the Chevron to look for Carr with the intent to rob him (Dover ha
remained at the Sunoco). They did not find Carr at the station but got
in touch with him via a cell phone and arranged to meet him outside
a nearby hotel.

When the group arrived at the hotel, Gardner invited Carr into
the vehicle, ostensibly to take him to rejoin Dover back at the Sunoco,
and he sat in the back seat next to Gardner and Camps. But instea'
of going to the Sunoco, Dixon (who was in the front passenger seat)
directed Kelley to drive to a secluded area with what looked like an
abandoned warehouse. Dixon then pointed a gun at Carr and toldhim
to get out. Carr obeyed, and Dixon followed him out. After a verba
exchange, Dixon shot Carr in the leg. Dixon then jumped back in the
car, and the group drove off. Before going very far, however, Dixon
said he forgot to check Carr’s pockets, and then either Dixon or
Camps said that they could not simply leave Carr lying there but ha:
to go back and “finish him,” as he could identify them. Kelley drove
back to where Carr was shot, and she saw him walking and talking
on the phone, saying “they shot me, they shot me.” Camps grabbed the
gun and jumped out of the car. Kelley heard gunshots and then saw
Camps standing over Carr, with his arm angled toward the victim.
Dixon then urged Camps to get back in the car, and the group drove
off hurriedly and went back to Marietta. During the course of the
robbery, the group took Carr’s backpack, but it was found to contain
little of value. Carr’s body was discovered later that morning. An
autopsy revealed that he died of multiple gunshot wounds to the face,
chest, and extremities.

Dixon and Camps do not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to
sustain their convictions. Nevertheless, as is our customary practice
in murder cases, we independently have reviewed the record with an
eye toward the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude that the
evidence presented at trial is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of
fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixon and Camps are
guilty of the crimes of which they were convicted. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. 8. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979).

2. Both Dixon and Camps argue that the trial court erred when
it refused to declare a mistrial for prosecutorial misconduct. On the
fifth day of trial, Camps called a witness who was a close friend of
Carr. On cross-examination, the prosecuting attorney asked the
witness why he was upset. When the witness replied that he was
upset at the death of his “best friend” Carr, the prosecutor asked:
“Now, this is a murder trial. Did you see [Dixon and Camps] talking
and laughing a while ago?” The witness replied, “Yes I did.” The
alleged “talking and laughing” referenced by the prosecutor occurred

es 693

during a break in trial, outside the jury’s presence. The defendants
contend that this question by the prosecutor was irrelevant, preju-
dicial, and impermissibly placed the defendants’ character at issue.

We generally review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial
for abuse of discretion. Rivers v. State, 296 Ga. 396, 402 (6) (768 SE2d
486) (2015); McKibbins v. State, 293 Ga. 843, 848 (3) (750 SE2d 314)
(2013). “[T]he denial of a mistrial is reversible error only if it appears
that a mistrial was essential to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair
trial.” McKibbins, 293 Ga. at 848 (3) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Moreover, with regard to prosecutorial misconduct, OCGA §
17-8-75 provides:

Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make state-
ments of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is
the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On
objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and
by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to
remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his
discretion, he may order a mistrial if the prosecuting attor-
ney is the offender.

In this case, pretermitting whether the prosecutor’s question
was, in fact, improper, the trial court fully complied with OCGA §
17-8-75 and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.
The defense objected immediately after the cross-examination in
question, at which point the trial court held a bench conference
outside the jury’s presence and rebuked the prosecutor, telling him
that the question was “totally inappropriate” and “it’s not going to
happen in this courtroom.” The court then brought the jury back, told
them that the prosecution had been admonished, and instructed
them “to disregard the question or any response that was elicited as
a result of that question.”

“We ordinarily presume that a jury follows such instructions.”
Coleman v. State, 301 Ga. 720, 722 (3) (804 SE2d 24) (2017). Nothing
in this case undercuts that presumption. To the contrary, the trial
court specifically asked the jurors to “indicate by raising your hand if
you feel that you would be unable to disregard the previous question
and response elicited by the State,” and none of the jurors raised their
hand. In light of the foregoing, a mistrial was not necessary to
preserve the defendants’ right to a fair trial. See McKibbins, 293 Ga.
at 850 (8) (©) (trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a
mistrial after improper statement by prosecutor, “especially because
the trial court promptly admonished the prosecuting attorney and
told the jury to disregard the statement”).

694 A

3. Both Dixon and Camps ask for a new trial due to juror
misconduct. The record reflects the following issues with the jury. On
the morning of the fourth day of trial, four jurors came before the court
for questioning. Two of the jurors, R. M. and A. H., had expressed
concern about a suspicious individual who was observed in the parking
lot writing down jurors’ license plate numbers. Camps had raised
concerns about two other jurors, juror A. S. and alternate juror S. S.,
who had been seen talking during the trial. A. S. and S. S. were
questioned separately to determine whether they had overheard any-
thing about the suspicious activity and whether the jurors discussed
the case among themselves. When A. S. was asked whether there had
been “any discussion amongst the jurors about this case, about what’s
going on,” she replied in the negative, and both defendants said they
had no further questions of her. Juror S. 8. also denied talking to A. S.
(who had sat next to her) about the case, but admitted commenting
that Camps’s attorney was “monotonous.” S. 8. insisted that this was
the only comment she made, even when both defense counsel pointed
out that they had observed as much as 20 seconds of conversation
between her and A. S. during trial.

After a bench conference, both defendants moved for a mistrial
and, alternatively, for 8. S.’s removal. Dixon moved for the removal of
juror A. S. as well. The trial court refused to grant a mistrial, but did
remove juror S. S. without objection from the State on the ground that
she arrived late for court, slept during trial, and audibly conversed
with A. S. But the trial court refused to remove A. S., explaining:

I did observe communication between those two jurors.
Now, I don’t know what the communication was. I don’t
know if the communication was [A. S.] telling [S. S.], you
know, please be quiet, you're talking too loud. I don’t know
what the communication was. But when asked this morning,
[A. S.] said here that she didn’t have any conversation about
the case. So I'll just reemphasize that with the jurors again.
That’s all I can do.

When the jury was brought back in, the trial court instructed the
jurors, among other things, not to talk to each other or with anyone
else about the case until they retired for deliberations.

(a) On appeal, Dixon argues that the trial court should have
granted a mistrial, or alternatively removed juror A. S., based on the
audible conversation between her and. S. We disagree. “To set aside
a jury verdict solely because of irregular jury conduct, this Court
must conclude that the conduct was so prejudicial that the verdict is
inherently lacking in due process.” Butler v. State, 270 Ga. 441, 444

es 695

(2) (511 SE2d 180) (1999); Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417, 419 (3) (467 SE2d
574) (1996) (“Our inquiry . . . must be directed to whether this [jury
irregularity] is so inherently prejudicial as to require a new trial, or
whether it is an immaterial irregularity without opportunity for
injury.”). Here, the trial court gave Dixon the opportunity to question
jurors A. 8. and 8. S., and both denied any discussion about the case.
And there is no evidence that the jurors actually discussed any
impermissible topics. To be sure, as Dixon points out, “[w]hen irregu-
lar juror conduct is shown, there is a presumption of prejudice to the
defendant, and the prosecution carries the burden of establishing
beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred.” Holcomb v. State,
268 Ga. 100, 103 (2) (485 SE2d 192) (1997). But as we have explained,

the type of irregularity that gives rise to such a presumption
of prejudice involves juror misconduct that has the potential
to injure a defendant’s due process rights, e.g., making an
unauthorized visit to the crime scene and then presenting
the findings to the jury panel; privately discussing the
defendant’s guilt prior to deliberations in violation of the
court’s instructions; or improperly accessing outside news
sources.

Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 47, 50 (3) (644 SE2d 853) (2007) (citations and
punctuation omitted). As mentioned above, there is simply no evi-
dence that the conversation at issue between jurors A. S. and S. S.
concerned Dixon’s guilt or other impermissible subjects. In any event,
after this conversation came to light, juror S. S. was dismissed and
the trial court reminded the jurors that they were not to discuss this
case with anyone, including each other. Thus, “[w]e are satisfied that
[A. S.’s and. S.’s] actions were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Sims, 266 Ga. at 420 (8).

(b) Camps contends that his Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury was violated by cumulative instances ofirregular juror
conduct, although he concedes that no particular incident alone
would require reversal. Specifically, Camps points out that (1) two
jurors expressed concern about being stalked and communicated this
concern to other jurors; (2) alternate juror S. S. was questioned about
inappropriate activity and then dismissed; and (3) juror A. S. sent a
“strongly worded” note to the trial court upon her election as fore-
person.” Camps also notes that juror A. S. was arrested for possession

® The note was sent on Friday, April 1, 2016, after the presentation of evidence and before
jury deliberations began. The note was titled “Jury Requests,” and it asked for an easel or white

696 A

of hashish oil about two weeks after the trial.

As with the conversation between the two jurors, while the above
incidents may have been unusual, they do not warrant a reversal.
Concerning suspicious activity, the trial court assured the jurors that
“we do everything, everything, to make sure that we're all safe and
comfortable while we're here at this courthouse” and that “nothing
that has happened in any way has been an indication to me or to any
of the officials here that there has been a breach of security in any
way.” The record does not indicate that this instruction failed to
alleviate the jurors’ concerns or that their worries impacted their
ability to listen to the evidence or decide the case. With regard to the
note sent by juror A. S., while it might have been more deferential, it
does not suggest to us that juror A. S. or any other jurors failed to take
their duties seriously. As to A. S.’s post-trial arrest, she testified at
the motion for new trial hearing that she consumed no illegal
substances during trial, and the record does not suggest otherwise.
Finally, concerning juror 8. S., she was an alternate who was dis-
missed prior to deliberations, and nothing indicates that her behavior
materially impacted other jurors. Simply put, the record contains no
evidence that the above irregularities, even taken together, under-
mined the fairness of the trial or infringed Camps’s right to due
process. See Butler, 270 Ga. at 444 (2).

4. The jury found Dixon and Camps guilty of malice murder and
armed robbery, among other crimes. At sentencing, the trial court
merged the armed robbery into the murder and did not sentence
Dixon and Camps for the armed robbery. That was error. See Cul-
pepper v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 739 (2) (b) (715 SE2d 155) (2011). The
State, however, does not raise this error by cross-appeal.

Even when no party raises a merger error, if we note such an
error, we have the discretion to correct it on direct appeal. See
Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 486-487 (2) (b) (746 SE2d 109) (2013).
We have no obligation “to scour the record searching for merger
issues” that no party has raised, and when a party fails to raise a
merger error, “he risks that the court too may overlook the issue.” Id.
at 488 (2) (d). But sometimes a merger error is so clear and obvious
that it comes to our attention even without the help of any party, and
in those instances, we have the discretion to correct the error upon
our own initiative. Most commonly, we have exercised that discretion
in cases in which the error harms the defendant — cases in which the
trial court erroneously convicted and sentenced a defendant for a

board, written and audio statements from defendants, and cell phone maps. The note also
stated that the “Jury will dismiss at 5pm, 4/1/16 and Jury will resume 9am, 4/4.”

es 697

crime that ought to have been merged, resulting in a conviction and
sentence that were not legally authorized. See id. at 486-487 (2) (b);
see also Donaldson v. State, 302 Ga. 671, 674 (4) (808 SE2d 720)
(2017). Three years ago, however, we recognized in Hulett v. State,
296 Ga. 49, 54 (2) (766 SE2d 1) (2014), that our discretion to correct
merger errors that no party has raised is not limited to cases in which
the error is harmful to a defendant. Since Hulett, we have exercised.
this discretion in a number of cases to vacate the erroneous merger of
crimes for which defendants should have been sentenced, and we
have remanded those cases for trial courts to sentence the defendants
for the improperly merged crimes. See, e.g., Brannon v. State, 298 Ga.
601, 603 (2) (783 SE2d 642) (2016); Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 377, 381 (2)
(788 SE2d 477) (2016).

We have the discretion to correct merger errors sua sponte —
regardless of who is harmed by the error and who benefits from its
correction — because a merger error results in an illegal and void
judgment of conviction and sentence. See Hulett, 296 Ga. at 53-54 (2).
There are powerful reasons to exercise that discretion when a merger
error leads to an unauthorized conviction and sentence, particularly
when it may cause the defendant to serve a total sentence that is
longer than the law allows. A deprivation of liberty for even a moment
more than the law permits is a serious wrong of constitutional
magnitude:

Where a case challenging criminal convictions is prop-
erly brought before a court and the court realizes, on its own
or based on the defendant’s argument, that the record shows
that certain convictions merged, to disregard that determi-
nation and allow the defendant to serve a sentence for a
criminal conviction that has been identified as illegal and
void would not comport with fundamental fairness and due
process of law.

Nazario, 293 Ga. at 487 (2) (c). Moreover, the illegality of a void
sentence cannot be waived, see id. at 485-486 (2) (b), and a merger
error may form the grounds for habeas relief long after the judgment
of conviction has become final. See id. at 488 (2) (d). For this reason,
an exercise of our discretion on direct appeal to correct a merger error
that harms a defendant (but of which he has not complained) may
avoid unnecessary habeas proceedings and thereby promotes judicial
economy.

But when a merger error benefits a defendant — resulting in a
lesser sentence than the law required — and the State does not raise
the error, it is not so clear that we ought to routinely exercise our

698 A

discretion to correct the error. Such an error implicates no liberty
interest. It poses no danger of unnecessary habeas proceedings, and
judicial economy is not advanced by its correction. (Indeed, our
correction of such an error only prolongs the judicial proceedings,
inasmuch as it inevitably requires a remand for further sentencing.)
And an exercise of our discretion to correct such an error effectively
penalizes the defendant for having brought his case before us. Although
a defendant “who has been convicted of a crime has neither a vested
right to nor a reasonable expectation of finality as to a pronounced
sentence which is nulland void,” Hulett, 296 Ga. at 54 (2) (citation and
punctuation omitted), we nonetheless perceive some unfairness in a
practice that effectively penalizes defendants for exercising their
right to seek appellate review of their convictions and sentences. For
these reasons, we have determined that, when a merger error ben-
efits a defendant and the State fails to raise it by cross-appeal, we
henceforth will exercise our discretion to correct the error upon our
own initiative only in exceptional circumstances.* Seeing no such
exceptional circumstances here, we decline to exercise our discretion
to correct the erroneous merger of the armed robbery, and we affirm
the judgment below.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

John W. Howe, for appellant (case no. $17A1475).

Daniel D. Morgan, for appellant (case no. $17A1476).

Rosemary M. Greene, District Attorney, Sharon M. Fox, Andrew
D. Garland, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-
ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B.
Crowder, Aimee F. Sobhani, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

2 As in this case, the State ordinarily is represented by competent counsel, and if the
correction of a merger error were important to promote the law enforcement and correctional
interests of the State, we would expect the prosecuting attorneys to properly bring the error to
our attention by cross-appeal.

es 699

$17A1490. SMITH v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 692)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellant Orlando Smith was convicted of felony murder and
related offenses in connection with the May 2010 shooting death of
Demetra Smith.’ On appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions. Appellant also contends that
the trial court erred by: failing to suppress illegally obtained evi-
dence; denying his motion for a mistrial; and allowing inadmissible
hearsay pursuant to the necessity exception. Finding no error, we
affirm.

1. Viewed in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence adduced at trial established that, three months prior to her
death, Demetra Smith married Appellant. The two had a volatile
history that included verbal and physical assaults. At trial, the State
introduced evidence of numerous incidents between the pair through
many of the victim’s close friends, and also of the victim’s intention to
leave Appellant the day before she was murdered.

On May 24, 2010, at approximately 6:30 p.m., the Smiths were
seen at their shared apartment. At 1:40 a.m. on May 25, law enforce-
ment responded to a home security alarm at the Smiths’ residence.
Appellant was not at the apartment as he had, admittedly, left for his
daughter’s house by that time. Upon their arrival, the police saw no
signs of forced entry into the Smiths’ apartment; consequently, they
did not enter the residence.

Appellant and his daughter returned to the apartment later in
the morning on May 25. When they entered, they found Demetra
unresponsive with a single gunshot wound to the back of her head.

‘In August 2010, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder
(Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), felony murder predicated
on possession of a firearm by a convieted felon (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 4),
possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 5), and possession of a firearm
by aconvicted felon Count 6). Following a trial held from October 17-21, 2011, a jury acquitted
Appellant of malice murder and aggravated assault, but found him guilty of all remaining
counts. The trial court initially sentenced Appellant to life in prison on both felony murder
counts and five years consecutive for both weapons charges.

Appellant filed a motion for new trial on November 18, 2011, which was amended through
new counsel on August 4, 2015, and March 22, 2016. Initially, the trial court denied the motion
as amended in an order dated April 25, 2016. However, the trial court subsequently determined
that Appellant's sentence was improper and granted Appellant's motion for new trial in part.
On September 13, 2016, the trial court amended Appellant's sentence to life for felony murder
predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3) and five years consecutive
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 5). The remaining charges
were either merged or vacated by operation of law. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal to
this Court. The case was docketed to the August 2017 term of this Court, and oral argument was
heard on October 3, 2017.

700 es

During their investigation, law enforcement found two bloody wed-
ding rings on the kitchen sink next to a wash rag that was also
covered in blood. Appellant told police that he had been with his
daughter since 5:00 p.m. on May 24. At first, Appellant’s daughter
corroborated this story. However, she eventually admitted that she
had lied, telling officers that Appellant arrived at her house around
2:00 a.m. on May 25. Phone records introduced at trial confirmed that
Appellant was at or near his apartment between 5:00 p.m. on May 24
and 1:30 a.m. on May 25.

Upon his arrival at his daughter’s home, Appellant took a
shower, changed his clothes, and was generally acting nervous.
Appellant requested that his daughter tell anyone who asked that he
had been with her since 5:00 p.m. the prior evening. According to
Appellant’s daughter, her father had her throw a bag of clothes out
the car window on their way back to the Smiths’ residence. She le’
police to the bag of clothing and identified the clothes inside as the
same that her father was wearing when he first arrived at her house.
Testing of this clothing revealed both the presence of gun powder an:
of Demetra’s DNA.

Ballistics testing revealed that Demetra was shot at close range
with either a Beretta or a Taurus pistol. Though Demetra owneda .40
caliber Taurus pistol, no weapon was located at the crime scene, an!
her pistol was never recovered. At trial, the State introduced photo-
graphs that were taken six months prior to Demetra’s death showing
Appellant holding a pistol that matched the description of his wife’s
gun. The parties stipulated that Appellant was a convicted felon at
the time of his wife’s murder.

We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to enable a rationa
trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was
guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U. 8. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting
the bloody wedding rings and the photographs of him holding a gun
because, he claims, they were seized pursuant to a deficient search
warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

In order for Appellant to have preserved this issue for review, he
had to have obtained a ruling from the trial court on his motion to
suppress. See Higuera-Hernandez v. State, 289 Ga. 553, 555 (714
SE2d 236) (2011) (“Standard practice in Georgia has long required a
party to make and obtain a ruling on an objection to evidence in the
trial court, before or as the evidence is admitted, in order to preserve
the objection for appeal, and standard practice also allows parties to
raise on appeal only the same objections that were properly preserved
below.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Instead, the trial court

es 701

reserved ruling on Appellant’s motion at the pre-trial hearing and did
not enter an order at a later date. Appellant did not object to the
introduction of the wedding rings at trial; although he did object to
the introduction of the photographs, he did not object to the admission
of the evidence based upon Fourth Amendment grounds. Because
Appellant did not obtain a ruling on his pre-trial motion to suppress
the evidence and did not object to the admission of the evidence at
trial, he has not preserved this issue for appellate review. See
McClendon v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 616 (4) (A) (791 SE2d 69) (2016).

3. Prior to trial, the court instructed the parties and witnesses
not to reference Appellant’s alleged drug dealing. During the State’s
case-in-chief, the following exchange occurred while lay witness Ali
Hassan was on direct examination:

Q: What did [the victim] say — why was she not happy?
A:I don’t know what — they have some kind of dispute on the
relationship and the work ... and 1 heard about him doing,
[Appellant] doing the drugs, selling the drugs.

Appellant objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the State
improperly introduced evidence of his bad character without the
defense first opening the door to allow such evidence. The trial court
denied the motion and instructed the jury as follows:

All right. Ladies and gentlemen, right before you left,
something happened. This witness blurted out a statement
about drugs and the defendant. There is no evidence what-
soever in this case about any of that. This came out of the total
blue, and, you know, it is very detrimental to the defendant to
have that said. But there is no evidence in this case whatso-
ever about the defendant being involved in drugs, dealing
drugs, and I don’t know where that came from. I just sort of
felt like I got hit by a baseball bat when I heard that because
it was inappropriate, totally inappropriate, and I’m instruct-
ing you that there is no evidence in this case about the
defendant and drugs; and I’m instructing you to disregard
that statement entirely so we can proceed with this trial. And
if you can’t set that aside, I need for you to raise your hand
right now. That is not part of this case. Should not be
considered in any way part of this case. Is there anybody that
can’t follow that instruction? Okay. There is no response.

Appellant alleges that the trial court’s failure to grant his motion
for mistrial was erroneous. We disagree.

702 es

As a general rule,

[a] trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial based on the
improper admission of bad character evidence is reviewed
for abuse of discretion by examining factors and circum-
stances, including the nature of the statement, the other
evidence in the case, and the action taken by the court and
counsel concerning the impropriety.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Graves v. State, 298 Ga. 551, 555
(783 SE2d 891) (2016). The trial court’s discretion will not be dis-
turbed on appeal “unless it is apparent that a mistrial is essential to
the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” (Citations and punctua-
tion omitted.) Rafi v. State, 289 Ga. 716, 720 (715 SE2d 113) (2011).

As an initial matter, because Appellant failed to renew his
motion for mistrial after the trial court denied it and then took other
corrective action, this argument is waived. Graves, 298 Ga. at 555.
Even if the issue was preserved, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial as the trial court’s
thorough curative instruction was sufficient to counter any alleged
harm caused by the witness’s brief statement.

4. Finally, the trial court did not err in admitting hearsay
statements pursuant to the necessity exception. At a pre-trial hear-
ing, the State adduced evidence from six lay witnesses — Ali Hassan,
Alphonso Ross, Kristian Harbor, Mildred Smith, Fran Cooper, and
Tilishia Johnson — regarding numerous prior statements made by
the victim concerning her violent and tumultuous relationship with
Appellant. The trial court ruled the hearsay testimony admissible,
which Appellant contends was error.

Our old Evidence Code provided

three basic requirements for the admission of hearsay under
the necessity exception: (1) the declarant of the statement is
“unavailable,” (2) the declarant’s statement “is relevant toa
material fact and .. . more probative on that material fact
than other evidence that may be procured and offered,” and
(3) the statement exhibits specific indicia of reliability.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828, 831
(700 SE2d 544) (2010). Appellant does not claim that the first two
prongs are not met. Instead, he contends that the victim’s statements
did not exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability because the victim was
having an affair with Ali Hassan and Alphonso Ross at the time she

es 708

described Appellant’s volatility to them, and because the witnesses’
collective testimony of the victim’s reports of violence were inconsis-
tent. We find no error.

“A married person’s complaints about that person’s spouse, made
to one with whom the married person is conducting an adulterous
affair, are subject to the possibility of exaggeration if not outright
falsehood.” Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 705-706 (482 SE2d 314) (1997),
overruled on other grounds, Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 10 (515 SE2d
155) (1999). This is because “the need to justify the act of adultery
might well lead to untruthfulness.” Carr, 267 Ga. at 706. However,
the record is devoid of any evidence that the victim was having an
affair with either Hassan or Ross at the time she disclosed Appellant’s
violence toward her.

Even if the trial court did err in admitting the testimony of
Hassan and Ross, the error was harmless due to the strength of the
other evidence presented. It is therefore highly improbable that the
alleged error contributed to the verdict. See Mills, 287 Ga. at 831.

We are also not swayed by Appellant’s concern that the witnesses
provided inconsistent testimony regarding the victim’s allegations of
physical and verbal abuse, thus rendering the hearsay inadmissible.
Appellant has cherry-picked excerpts of witness testimony from the
record in an attempt to establish their alleged inconsistencies; how-
ever, the test for trustworthiness considers the totality of the circum-
stances under which the statements were made. Gibson v. State, 290
Ga. 6 (8) (717 SE2d 447) (2011). “Whether a statement is trustworthy
is a matter for the trial court’s discretion, and the exercise of such
discretion will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” Id.

Reviewing the record as a whole, the record shows the victim
made these statements to her close friends and confidants, and that
the statements were consistent in her overall message that Appellant
was violent, abusive, and controlling, and that she had planned to
leave him prior to her death. Appellant’s choice snippets of the record
are inconsequential to our analysis. See Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550
(2) (©) (670 SE2d 269) (2002) (although courts have sometimes relied
on corroborating evidence as indicia of reliability, existence of cor-
roborating evidence is more properly considered in deciding whether
error in admitting statement was harmless). Based on the foregoing,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the testimony of these six witnesses pursuant to the
necessity exception.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

704 es
DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

Jessica A. Seares, Nazish A. Ahmed, for appellant.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder,
Joshua D. Morrison, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M.
Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney
General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew
B. Crowder, S. Taylor Johnston, Assistant Attorneys General, for
appellee.

$17A1539. BOZZIE v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 671)

PETERSON, Justice.

Frank Scott Bozzie was convicted of malice murder and other
crimes in connection with the death of Richard Morgan.' Bozzie
appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
malice murder conviction, the trial court made numerous evidentiary
errors, he should be granted a new trial due to alleged juror miscon-
duct, he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the trial
court erred in refusing to secure his attendance for the motion for new
trial hearing. Because none of these claims is meritorious, we affirm
Bozzie’s convictions.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial
evidence showed the following. On a night in June 2013, Jennifer
Verner was with Morgan at a bar when she met and talked to Bozzie.
Within days, Verner and Bozzie began a romantic relationship, and

+ Thecrimes occurred on June 10,2013. On August 29, 2013, a Whitfield County grand jury
indicted Bozzie for malice murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), ten
counts of aggravated assault (Counts 4-13), criminal damage to property in the first degree
(Count 14), criminal damage to property in the second degree (Count 15), and family violence
battery (Count 16). At a jury trial held in June 2014, the trial court entered a directed verdict
of acquittal on criminal damage to property in the second degree (Count 15). The jury acquitted
Bozzie on two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 12 and 13), but found him guilty on all other
counts. The trial court sentenced Bozzie as follows: life without parole for Count 1; 20-year
sentences for Counts 6 and 8 to run concurrently with each other and consecutive to Count 1;
a 20-year sentence on Count 10 to run concurrent with Count 1; a 10-year sentence on Count
to run consecutive to Count 1 and concurrent with Counts 6 and 8; and a 12-month sentence on.
Count 16 to run consecutive to Count 1 and concurrent with Counts 6, 8, and 14. The court.
merged the remaining counts, although it should have vacated the felony murder counts
(Counts 2 and 3), see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Bozzie filed
a timely motion for new trial, which he subsequently amended. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied the motion on December 7, 2016. Bozzie filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case
was docketed to this Court for the August 2017 term and orally argued on August 15, 2017.

705

she soon agreed to move in with him. Verner quickly decided to move
out, however, finding Bozzie controlling. Not wanting to reveal her
true plans to Bozzie, Verner asked him for a ride to her parents’ house,
telling Bozzie that she was going out with her cousin. Verner actually
planned to meet Morgan and Richard Holbrook, a man Verner had
previously dated intermittently. Bozzie became angry when Verner
asked him for a ride, but he ultimately agreed.

Bozzie drove Verner to her parents’ house and initially refused to
leave until Verner’s cousin arrived. Verner tried to convince Bozzie to
leave and began to tell him that she didn’t think their relationship
was working, but stopped when she sensed he was getting angry.
After Bozzie left, Verner called Morgan and Holbrook, who picked her
up and took her to Morgan’s house.

Bozzie returned to Verner’s parents’ house later that night,
expecting to pick up Verner. He waited for Verner until the following
morning, attempting to reach her by phone and exchanging several
text messages with her. Verner told Bozzie that she didn’t want to be
with him and asked him to pack up her things. Bozzie begged her to
return and said that he loved her and that he was hurting. Seeking to
quell his anger, Verner replied that she loved him, she would never
leave him, and she would see him soon.

Bozzie drove around looking for Verner after he left her parents’
house. Bozzie went to Morgan’s residence, got into a physical alter-
cation with Morgan, and learned from Morgan that Verner and
Holbrook had gone to a nearby McDonald’s. Bozzie drove to the

restaurant and, when he saw Ho.
gan’s van, rammed his truck into
side where Holbrook was sitting. H
passenger’s door because he thoug

brook and Verner sitting in Mor-
the driver’s side door, hitting the
olbrook rushed to exit through the
ht Bozzie was going to ram the van

again. Bozzie got out of his truck carrying a baseball bat and walked
around the van. Verner, who was out of the van at this point, asked

Bozzie to stop, but he struck her
Holbrook. Bozzie swung the basel

in the mouth and moved toward
all bat at Holbrook, struck him

twice, and briefly followed Holbrook as Holbrook ran away. Bozzie
then returned to the van and smashed a window. Bozzie told Verner
to get in his truck and left in his vehicle when she refused.
Holbrook returned to the van once he saw Bozzie leave and drove
Verner to Morgan’s house. Standing on the driveway of Morgan’s
house, Verner and Holbrook told Morgan about their violent encoun-
ter with Bozzie. Morgan called 911. While Morgan was on the phone,
Bozzie drove onto Morgan’s driveway. Morgan asked Bozzie to leave
and shook a bat at Bozzie when he got out of his truck. Bozzie
returned to his truck and began revving the engine. Morgan started
to run away, but Bozzie chased him down, hit him with his truck, and

706 es

dragged him under his truck for about 32 feet before trees stopped the
vehicle’s movement.

Holbrook, who went across the street when Morgan called 911,
immediately ran back to assist Morgan and noticed that the wheels
of Bozzie’s truck were still spinning. Holbrook grabbed the baseball
bat that Morgan had dropped and tried to hit Bozzie through the
window. Holbrook ran away when it appeared that Bozzie was
reaching for a gun. Bozzie exited his truck, tried unsuccessfully to
open the front door of Morgan’s house, and then fled on foot. Police
arrived and attempted to lift the truck off Morgan, but were too late.
Morgan died as a result of asphyxiation.

1. Bozzie argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
malice murder conviction, because the evidence does not show that he
had the intent to kill Morgan. We disagree.

The crime of malice murder is committed when the evidence
shows either an express or implied intent to commit an unlawful
homicide. Kitchen v. State, 287 Ga. 833, 834 (700 SE2d 563) (2010);
see also OCGA § 16-5-1 (a).

This meaning of malice murder is consistent with the gen-
eral rule that crimes which are defined so as to require that
the defendant intentionally cause a forbidden bad result are
usually interpreted to cover one who knows that his conduct
is substantially certain to cause the result, whether or not he
desires the result to occur.

Kitchen, 287 Ga. at 834 (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, a
specific intent to kill is express malice, whereas an intent to commit
acts with such a reckless disregard for human life as to show
“an abandoned and malignant heart” amounts to implied malice.
OCGA § 16-5-1 (b); see Browder v. State, 294 Ga. 188, 190 (1) (751
SE2d 354) (2013).

Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Bozzie
intended to strike Morgan with his vehicle, an act that was substan-
tially certain to cause Morgan’s death. Eyewitnesses testified that
Bozzie revved the engine of his truck several times while Morgan was
standing in front of it. Although Morgan tried to run away, Bozzie
chased Morgan down, hit him with the truck, and then dragged him
for 32 feet. Although Bozzie testified at trial that he simply lost
control of his truck, the jury was free to reject Bozzie’s version of
events, especially where the evidence showed that Bozzie kept his
foot on the gas pedal while dragging Morgan, even after his truck
crashed into trees and could no longer move forward. See Brannon v.
State, 266 Ga. 667, 668 (469 SE2d 676) (1996) (the jury determines

es 707

witness credibility and is free to reject a defendant’s testimony,
including the denial of intent). The evidence was therefore sufficient
to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Bozzie was guilty of malice murder, as well as the other crimes
for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Bozzie argues that the trial court erred in its admission of
photographs of Morgan — an in-life photograph and numerous
photographs of his dead body — and certain hearsay statements. As
Bozzie concedes, no objection was made when this evidence was
introduced at trial, so we review his claim only for plain error. See
OCGA § 24-1-103 (d). To establish plain error,

[Bozzie] must point to an error that was not affirmatively
waived, the error must have been clear and not open to
reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substan-
tial rights, and the error must have seriously affected the fair-
ness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 243 (4) (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (citation and
punctuation omitted). To show that the error affected his substantial
rights, Bozzie is required to show that error probably affected the
outcome of his trial. See Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 40, 43 (2) (785 SE2d
886) (2016).

(a) Relying primarily on our opinion in Ragan v. State, 299 Ga.
828 (792 SE2d 342) (2016), Bozzie argues that the trial court erred in
admitting a single photograph of Morgan with his wife and grand-
children because Morgan’s existence or identity was not in question
and the State failed to show, as a condition of admission, that it made
every effort to proffer a photograph of the victim alone. The error in
Ragan, however, was the admission of five in-life photographs of the
victim depicting her alone or with her children. Ragan, 299 Ga. at 833
(3) (With no serious question as to the victim’s existence or identity,
any probative value of the photographs was outweighed by the
cumulative prejudicial effect therefrom, and the trial court erred
when it admitted the photographs.” (emphasis supplied)). Here, only
one in-life photograph was admitted.

But even if we were to assume that the probative value of one
photograph was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice and, thus, that the photograph’s admission was erroneous,
Ragan does not compel reversal of Bozzie’s convictions. The error in
Ragan was found to be harmless because the evidence of the defen-
dant’s guilt was strong, the jury was “well aware — independent of
the photographs — that [the victim] was both a wife and a mother,”

708 es

and “[p]retty pictures of enticing domestic scenes . . . were not likely
to influence a jury’s determination in the case[.]” Ragan, 299 Ga. at
833 (8) (citation and punctuation omitted).

The test for nonconstitutional harmless error is similar to the
determination of prejudice under plain error review, with the prin-
cipal difference being the party that bears the burden of proof. See
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (113 SCt 1770, 123 LE2d
508) (1993); United States v. Mathenia, 409 F3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir.
2005).2 For nonconstitutional harmless error, the State has the
burden to show that it was highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict. See Rivera v. State, 295 Ga. 380, 382 (761
SE2d 30) (2014); see also Mathenia, 409 F3d at 1292. But to establish
plain error, a defendant has the burden of making “an affirmative
showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below.” Shaw
uv. State, 292 Ga. 871, 873 (2) (742 SE2d 707) (2013) (citations and
punctuation omitted). In both circumstances, we review whether the
error prejudiced the outcome of the trial. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.
Like Ragan, where we concluded that the admission of five photo-
graphs did not affect the outcome of the trial, the admission of one
photograph here also did not affect the outcome of the trial given the
strength of the evidence against Bozzie. Therefore, there was no plain
error in admitting the photograph.

(b) Bozzie argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to
see 15 photographs of the victim’s dead body. Several photographs
show the victim’s body at the scene of the crime and the remaining
photographs show the victim’s body before the autopsy. A trial court
generally does not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of a
murdered victim to establish the identity of the victim, the manner of
death, or other elements of the crime. See United States v. De Parias,
805 F2d 1447, 1453-1454 (11th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds
by United States v. Kaplan, 171 F3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 1999).
There was no error, plain or otherwise, in admitting the challenged
photographs.

(c) Bozzie also claims that the court erred in admitting several
hearsay statements introduced by Verner and by a police detective.
The introduction of these statements was not plain error.

In the first set of statements, Verner testified without objection
that, after returning from their violent encounter with Bozzie at
McDonald’s, Morgan said to Verner and Holbrook that Bozzie had

2 Our plain error review of evidentiary rulings tracks the federal plain-error test set forth
by the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Cireuit. See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 224,
326-327 (8) (781 SE2d 772) (2016).

es 709

been by the house earlier that morning. Even if these statements
constituted hearsay, no harm resulted from their admission, as Bozzie
testified at trial that he went to McDonald’s after having a violent
encounter with Morgan at Morgan’s house. See United States v.
Weinstein, 762 F2d 1522, 1535-1536 (11th Cir. 1985) (error in admit-
ting hearsay may be harmless where the evidence is cumulative).

The second set of statements was made when a detective testified
about Verner’s statements to police at the crime scene. Verner’s
statements to the police were consistent with and cumulative of her
trial testimony, and so any error in admitting her statements to the
police was harmless.

3. Bozzie next argues that his convictions must be overturned
due to the improper conduct of a juror who spoke to Holbrook’s
girlfriend. The incident occurred at the close of the first day of the
trial, after Holbrook had testified, while Holbrook and his girlfriend
were being escorted to the courthouse elevator by the State’s chief
investigator. The investigator quickly stopped the conversation once
he realized the woman was a juror, and the incident was relayed to
trial counsel and to the court. Trial counsel declined to make any
motion or pursue the matter further, telling the court that he did not
believe anything inappropriate was done and thought the investiga-
tor took the appropriate action.

Bozzie now complains that the trial court failed to interrogate
the juror to determine the substance of her conversation with Hol-
brook’s girlfriend and failed to ask the other jurors if they knew about
the improper contact. Bozzie argues that, because of the limited
inquiry into the incident, the State failed to rebut the presumption
that the juror irregularity prejudiced him. See Henry v. State, 265 Ga.
732, 738 (7) (a) (462 SE2d 737) (1995) (“There is a presumption of
prejudice to the defendant when an irregularity in the conduct of a
juror is shown and the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that no harm has occurred.” (citation and punc-
tuation omitted)).* But Bozzie cannot complain about the alleged
juror misconduct where trial counsel elected not to investigate the
matter further because he did not believe anything inappropriate
occurred. See Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100, 103 (2) (485 SE2d 192)
(1997) (defendant could not complain about trial court’s failure to
investigate alleged juror misconduct where trial counsel stated that
defendant suffered no harm from the misconduct).

® This presumption arises only when a juror engages in misconduct that has the potential
to injure a defendant's due process rights, such as where the juror discusses the defendant's
guilt with another juror prior to deliberations or obtains information about the case from
outside sources. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 694-695 (3) (a) (808 SE2d 696) (2017).

710 es

4. Bozzie argues that trial counsel was ineffective on several
grounds. To prevail on any of his claims, Bozzie must show both that
his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that, but
for this deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the trial would have been more favorable to him. Armour v. State,
290 Ga. 553, 554 (2) (722 SE2d 751) (2012) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). To
establish deficient performance, Bozzie must overcome the strong
presumption that his counsel performed reasonably by establishing
that “no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or
would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Davis v. State, 299
Ga. 180, 183 (2) (787 SE2d 221) (2016). A reviewing court need not
examine both Strickland prongs if an appellant fails to make a
sufficient showing on one. Id. We review the trial court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Arnold v.
State, 292 Ga. 95, 96 (1) (734 SE2d 382) (2012).

(a) Bozzie argues that trial counsel was deficient for introducing
Bozzie’s prior felony convictions during his direct testimony because
the trial court had previously ruled that the State was prohibited
from introducing his convictions as “other acts” evidence under
OCGA § 24-4-404 (“Rule 404”).4 The four convictions included three
convictions for domestic violence from 1993, 1996, and 2006° and one
1996 conviction for felony reckless evasion for directing a car toward
a sheriff’s vehicle while attempting to elude officers. In denying the
State’s Rule 404 motion, the trial court ruled that any probative value
of the prior convictions was outweighed by the risk of unfair preju-
dice.

Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that
Bozzie insisted on testifying, counsel thought the prior convictions
would be “in play” for impeachment purposes, and it would look worse
to the jury if he did not introduce the convictions and the court later
ruled that the convictions were admissible for impeachment pur-
poses.

Even assuming that trial counsel’s decision to introduce Bozzie’s
convictions was objectively unreasonable particularly given the trial
court’s prior ruling,® Bozzie cannot establish prejudice. Multiple

+ Bozzie made no separate claim that trial counsel was deficient for failing to consult with
him about introducing his prior convictions; therefore, any such claim has been waived. See
Prince v, State, 295 Ga. 788, 793 (2) (b) (764 SE2d 362) (2014),

© Attrial, Bozzie stated that the conviction was in 2008, but there appears to be no dispute
on appeal that the convietion was in 2006.

® Compare Collier v. State, 288 Ga. 756, 758 (3) (707 SE2d 102) (2011) (trial counsel did not
act unreasonably in “placing the damaging information before the jury through [defendant's]

es m1

eyewitnesses testified about Bozzie’s actions at the McDonald’s an
in intentionally running over Morgan. Given this strong evidence of
guilt, Bozzie has failed to show that he was prejudiced by any
deficient performance of trial counsel. See Toomer v. State, 292 Ga.
49, 59 (4) (734 SE2d 333) (2012) (given strong evidence of guilt,
defendant failed to establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s allege
errors related to bad character evidence).

(b) Bozzie next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the introduction of photographs of the victim an
to certain hearsay statements. We concluded above in Division 2 (b)
that the photographs of the victim at the crime scene and prior to the
autopsy were admissible, and thus counsel was not ineffective for
failing to make a meritless objection. See Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355,
357 (3) (689 SE2d 280) (2010).

As to the challenged in-life photograph and the challenge:
statements, we concluded above in Divisions 2 (a) and (c) that there
was no plain error in admitting this evidence because the evidence
had no effect on the outcome of Bozzie’s trial. The prejudice step of the
plain-error standard is equivalent to the prejudice prong for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Martin v. State, 298 Ga.
259, 277-278 (6) (c) (779 SE2d 342) (2015). Even considering cumu-
latively the evidence alleged to be improperly admitted, Bozzie’s
ineffective assistance claim fails.

(c) Bozzie also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to pursue the issue of the juror’s contact with Holbrook’s girlfriend
after the first day of the trial. We disagree.

Trial counsel explained at the motion for new trial hearing that he
believed the conversation was generally harmless given the lack of
evidence that anything inappropriate happened. Counsel also testified
that he did not want to single out the juror because he considered her
agood juror for the defense, noting that he was surprised that the State
allowed her on the jury. Trial counsel’s decision was not unreasonable
and, thus, did not amount to deficient performance. See Taylor v. State,
302 Ga. 176, 178 (2) (805 SE2d 851) (2017) (trial counsel’s decision not
to strike domestic violence victim from jury because counsel thought
she might be sympathetic to defense was not deficient).

(d) Bozzie also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to cross-examine five witnesses. One witness was Verner’s
mother, who testified about her conversation with Bozzie on the night
before Morgan’s death. Two witnesses testified about observing the

direct testimony, rather than risk having the information extracted from him on cross-
examination.” (citation and punctuation omitted)

712 es

incident at the McDonald’s. The last two witnesses were police
officers: a detective who retrieved an image from a security video
showing Bozzie shortly after Morgan died; and a police officer who
arrested Bozzie. Bozzie asserts that trial counsel should have cross-
examined these witnesses to test their recollections and to see if they
would “slip up with any lies or inconsistencies.” This type of specu-
lation about what the witnesses might have said on cross-
examination is insufficient to establish prejudice, even if Bozzie could
have shown deficient performance. See Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga.
364, 369 (2) (f) (711 SE2d 660) (2011) (prejudice prong not satisfied
where defendant failed to offer evidence that would have been elicited
on re-cross-examination).

(e) Bozzie argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
confront Holbrook with a letter he wrote to Bozzie. In the letter,
Holbrook stated:

Between you and me | am the person you assaulted with
your truck and the bat that morning at McDonalds. I have no
hard feelings toward you about that. I don’t want any
problems about it. I also know I’m a witness about the
murder. I can help you with this. You should talk with me
about this if you want less time in prison. [A] lot less. Just
talk to me [q]uietly. Your choice.

Trial counsel explained that he thought the letter was meaning-
less, Bozzie could not benefit from it, and Holbrook was trying to help
himself more than help Bozzie, although counsel didn’t understand
what Holbrook had to gain. Trial counsel also stated that Holbrook
did not do well when testifying at trial (a reasonable assessment in
the light of the record), and counsel did not confront Holbrook with
the letter because it would have made Holbrook more important to
the prosecution, which would not have helped the defense. Deciding
what evidence to present or forego in defending a client charged with
acrime is a matter of strategy and tactics, and such decisions do not
amount to deficient performance unless they are so unreasonable
that no competent attorney would have made them under similar
circumstances. See Washington v. State, 294 Ga. 560, 566 (3) (755
SE2d 160) (2014); Nichols v. State, 281 Ga. 483, 485 (2) (a) (640 SE2d
40) (2007). Trial counsel’s decision not to confront Holbrook with the
letter was not unreasonable and, thus, was not deficient perfor-
mance.

5. Bozzie also argues that the trial court violated his due process
rights by denying his request to be present at the motion for new trial
hearing. We disagree.

es 113

At a hearing on Bozzie’s request, appellate counsel provide:
three reasons why Bozzie’s presence would contribute to the fairness
of the hearing. First, Bozzie raised an ineffective assistance claim
and, as aresult, Bozzie might have to testify “if there is any difference
of opinion between Mr. Bozzie and defense counsel as to why certain
things were done.” Appellate counsel also argued that Bozzie’s pres-
ence was required to authenticate the letter written by Holbrook an:
to testify about it. Finally, appellate counsel argued that Bozzie’s
presence was required because counsel had not had an opportunity to
meet with Bozzie in person. The State argued that none of Bozzie’s
claims required his presence, he was not the right person to authen-
ticate the letter, and it might be willing to admit the letter into
evidence without witness authentication. When pressed by the tria.
court, appellate counsel argued that the strongest argument for
securing Bozzie’s attendance was so that Bozzie could authenticate
and offer his interpretation of the letter. The trial court ruled that
appellate counsel had not made a sufficient showing to require
Bozzie’s attendance. At the motion for new trial hearing, appellate
counsel offered a proffer of Bozzie’s testimony and the Holbrook
letter, which were both admitted as exhibits, with the State stipu-
lating that the letter was written by Holbrook to Bozzie.

As Bozzie concedes, he had no unqualified right to be present at
the motion for new trial hearing. See Rosser v. State, 284 Ga. 335, 336
(2) (667 SE2d 62) (2008); Sims v. Smith, 228 Ga. 136, 137 (184 SE2d
347) (1971). Citing case law from our Court of Appeals, which in turn
relies on case law from the Eleventh Circuit considering federal due
process concerns, Bozzie argues that due process required his pres-
ence because he would have offered testimony that was relevant to
the issues presented in his motion. Specifically, he argues that he
would have testified about the relevance of Holbrook’s letter and trial
counsel’s failure to discuss strategic decisions with Bozzie.

As to Holbrook’s letter, the State stipulated to its admission, and
thus the trial court was aware of its contents. Appellate counsel was
more than capable of making an argumentas to the significance of the
letter without Bozzie’s testimony.

Bozzie’s testimony was also unnecessary to any of his ineffective
assistance claims. Bozzie argues that his testimony would have been
relevant to trial counsel’s failure to discuss strategic decisions with
him, and that counsel’s failure to consult with Bozzie reflects that
counsel’s actions were not strategic. But Bozzie did not raise a claim
below that counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with him, and
he may not now argue grounds on appeal that he did not argue below.
See Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 894 (13) (b) (708 SE2d 362) (2011).

74 es

To the extent Bozzie argues that counsel’s failure to consult
showed that counsel did not actually think about certain issues and,
thus, his decisions were not strategic, the determination of counsel’s
performance is based on the objective reasonableness of his actions,
not his subjective state of mind. See Hartsfield v. State, 294 Ga. 883,
888 (3) (b) (757 SE2d 90) (2014). Therefore, even if Bozzie’s testimony
was relevant toward a determination of counsel’s state of mind,
Bozzie’s testimony was not relevant to the task before the trial court:
assessing the objective reasonableness of counsel’s actions. He has
thus failed to establish that his due process rights were violated when
he was denied presence at the motion for new trial hearing.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

Micah J. Gates, for appellant.

Herbert M. Poston, Jr., District Attorney, Susan A. Beck, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patri-
cia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant Attor-

ney General, for appellee.

$17A1682. HOLMES-BRACY v. BRACY.
(808 SE2d 669)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

Following the denial of her motion to hold John Paul Bracy
(Husband) in contempt, Linda Holmes-Bracy (Wife) filed an applica-
tion for discretionary appeal with this Court. We granted Wife’s
application and posed the following question to the parties: “Did the
trial court err in concluding that husband could not be held in
contempt for failing to make any of the monthly payments of 50% of
his military retirement that he was required to make under the terms
of the parties’ final divorce decree because the judgment had become
dormant?” For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part and
remand with direction.

1 As a matter of current law, the Court of Appeals, rather than this Court, has subject
matter jurisdiction over “alll divorce and alimony cases” in which a notice of appeal or
application to appeal is filed on or after January 1, 2017. Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of
2016, Ga. L. 2016, p. 883, §§ 3-1 (codified at OCGA § 15-3-3.1 (a) (5)), 6-1 (©); Merrill v. Lee, 301
Ga. 34, 36 (1) n.1 (799 SE2d 169) (2017). Because Wife filed her application to appeal before
January 1, 2017, we have jurisdiction over this case

es 115

The pertinent facts of this case are not disputed. Wife and
Husband were divorced in 1995. The final decree of divorce incorpo-
rated a settlement agreement providing, in relevant part: “At such
time as the husband shall no longer be obligated to pay child support,
then the husband shall pay unto the wife fifty (60%) percent of his
Armed Services retirement pay per month. This money shall be the
property of the wife and the husband shall be obligated to pay this
sum until her death.” Husband’s child support obligation terminated
in June of 2006, and his first payment of retirement benefits was due
to Wife the following month. Husband, however, has never paid Wife
any amount of his retirement benefits. (Because Husband was in
active service for less than ten years, the military informed Wife that
it could not pay the benefits directly to her.) Although Wife employed
attorneys to demand payment from Husband, Wife took no court
action until February 25, 2016, when she filed a motion for contempt.
The trial court denied Wife’s motion, finding that, although the
divorce decree clearly entitled Wife to the payments, the trial court
could not enforce those payments because the decree, in its entirety,
had become dormant pursuant to OCGA § 9-12-60 (a) (1) (judgment
becomes dormant seven years after its rendition). Specifically, the
trial court held that the first payment of retirement benefits became
due on July 1, 2006, and the judgment went dormant on July 1, 2013.
Although filing a scire facias within three years of dormancy woul
have revived the judgment if it were dormant, see OCGA § 9-12-61,
Wife made no such filing. Therefore, the trial court held: “[This c]ourt
finds that although [Husband] has clearly and knowingly failed to
uphold his obligations under the decree, this [c]ourt may not hold him
in [c]ontempt.”

This ruling is incorrect. As an initial matter, the trial court di
properly find that the dormancy period of the judgment does begin to
run from the time when the judgment could first be enforced. See
Corvin v. Debter, 281 Ga. 500, 500-501 (639 SE2d 477) (2007). In this
case, Wife’s first viable opportunity to enforce the judgment occurre’
in July of 2006, when the initial payment became due. In order to
properly analyze the application of the dormancy statute to the
award of military pay extended to Wife, it must first be recognize’
that Wife is entitled to installment payments, not a lump sum
amount. In a number of previous cases (especially with regard to
installment payments of alimony), we have held that the dormancy
period does not begin to run until each installment is due. In other
words, each installment payment is treated as a new and separate
judgment. See Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 163 (205 SE2d 223)
(1974) (“[W]ith respect to instal[]] ment-payment alimony judgments,
instal[l]ments that became due within seven years preceding the

716

issuance and recording of the execution are collectible and enforce-
able, and instal[l]ments that are dormant, having become due seven
to ten years prior to the filing of a revival action, are subject to being
revived through the applicable statutory revival procedure.”). See
also Heakes v. Heakes, 157 Ga. 863, 868 (122 SE 777) (1924).? This
method of applying the dormancy statute to installment payments,
however, has not been limited solely to alimony payments and child
support, as Husband contends. To the contrary, in Taylor v. Peachbelt
Properties, 293 Ga. App. 335 (2) (667 SE2d 117) (2008), the Court of
Appeals applied the dormancy rules set forth in Bryant, supra, to
disability installment payments from a workers’ compensation award.
Without support, Husband bases his case on an overly narrow
reading of Bryant, supra, which he contends applies solely to install-
ment payments of alimony or child support. Nothing in the text of
Bryant or its subsequent consideration supports or requires such a
limited application.

Accordingly, we find that the rule set forth in Bryant is applicable
to the installment payments of Husband’s military retirement here.
As such, installments that became due within seven years preceding

the issuance and recording of tl
enforceable. Installments that are
pursuant to OCGA § 9-12-61. We

he execution are collectible and
dormant remain subject to revival
must, therefore, reverse the trial

court’s ruling that any and all installment payments due to Wife
cannot be enforced,? and we remand this case in order to allow the
trial court to properly apply the dormancy statute pursuant to the
manner set forth in Bryant, supra.

Judgment reversed in part and case remanded with direction. All
the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

Rodney E. Davis, for appellant.
Carmel W. Sanders, for appellee.

2 OCGA § 9-12-60 was amended in 1997 to explicitly exempt child support and spousal
support from the dormancy provisions of subsection (a). The amendment applies prospectively
to judgments entered after July 1, 1997. See Brown v. Brown, 269 Ga. 724, 726 (2) (506 SEZA
108) (1998).

® We affirm the trial court's ruling that “[Husband] has clearly and knowingly failed to
uphold his obligations under the decree.”

es 17

$17A1757. SMITH v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 661)

HINES, Chief Justice.

Following the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended,
Herman Smith appeals his convictions for felony murder while in the
commission of aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, and carrying a weapon without a license, all in connection
with the fatal shooting of Cardarius Steagall and an assault upon
Chaserah Horton. Smith challenges the trial court’s refusal to grant
a mistrial and two evidentiary rulings. Finding the challenges to be
unavailing, we affirm.’

1. Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed the
following. On November 18, 2012, at approximately 2:30 a.m., police
responded to a nightclub where they found Steagall dead on the floor.
Next to the body, the officers discovered a .22 caliber revolver, with
one empty shell casing and two live bullets in it. The spent shell
casing was the final round in the cylinder, and the trigger would have
to be pulled five times for the next live round to fire. Officers also
recovered four .45 caliber shell casings and two .45 caliber bullets
from the crime scene, and a third .45 caliber bullet from Steagall’s
body during the autopsy. The cause of death was determined to be
three gunshot wounds to the neck, head, and chest, which were
consistent with a large caliber gun being fired from some distance
away.

Later on the day of the shooting, investigators interviewed
Smith, who admitted that he was at the nightclub when Steagall was
shot. Smith also stated that he had used cocaine, a street drug he
called “Molly,” and alcohol the previous night and that the whole

1 ‘The crimes occurred on November 18, 2012. On June 18, 2013, a Carroll County grand
jury indicted Smith for malice murder, felony murder while in the commission of the aggravated
assault of Steagall, the aggravated assault of Steagall with a deadly weapon, two counts of the
aggravated assault of Horton with a deadly weapon, two counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, and carrying a weapon without a license. He was tried before
a jury July 29-August 6, 2013, and found not guilty of malice murder and one count of the
aggravated assault of Horton, but guilty of all other charges. On August 22, 2013, Smith was
sentenced to life in prison for felony murder, a concurrent term of twenty years in prison for the
other count of aggravated assault of Horton, consecutive terms of five years in prison for each
count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and a concurrent term of
twelve months in prison for carrying a weapon without a license; the remaining count of
aggravated assault upon Steagall merged with the felony murder for the purpose of sentencing.
Trial counsel filed a motion for new trial on Smith's behalf on August 26, 2013, and the motion
was amended by new counsel on July 25, 2014. The motion for new trial, as amended, was
denied on March 15, 2017. A notice of appeal was filed on April 12, 2017, and the case was
docketed in this Court for the August 2017 term. The appeal was submitted for decision on the
briefs.

718 es

night was a “blur.” Smith said that he had heard a single gunshot and
ran from the building. During a second interview on December 6,
2012, Smith claimed that Steagall had brandished a weapon, causing
Smith to fire in self-defense.

At trial, witnesses called by the State testified that Steagall was
not holding a gun when he was shot. Horton testified that he was next
to Steagall, that he heard three shots, that he thought for a moment
that he had been shot, and that he saw Steagall fall and did not see
him with a gun. Horton also testified that he made eye contact with
the shooter, whom he positively identified as Smith, and saw him put
the gun away. Witnesses called by Smith, however, testified that, at
various times during the night, they had seen Steagall with a gun.

Smith does not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, as is this Court’s practice in
murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to
find Smith guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which
he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Smith contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant
motions for mistrial he made during jury deliberations on the ground
that notes from the jury showed that it was hopelessly deadlocked.
Instead of declaring a mistrial, the trial court instructed the jury
several times to continue deliberations, and the court eventually gave
a modified Allen charge. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492
(17 SCt 154, 41 LE 528) (1896). These actions, Smith complains,
coerced a holdout juror into changing his or her vote. However, the
trial court’s determination of whether the jury was hopelessly dead-
locked “will be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of . . . discretion,”
Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 78-79 (8) (b) (694 SE2d 316) (2010),
and “[w]hether a verdict was reached as the result of coercion
depends upon the totality of the circumstances.” Sears v. State, 270
Ga. 834, 837 (1) (614 SE2d 426) (1999). Accordingly, we will now
review the totality of the circumstances surrounding Smith’s motions
for mistrial and the trial court’s actions during deliberations.

Early in the jury’s deliberations, which began at 1:30 p.m. on
Monday, August 5, 2013, the jurors sent various notes to the trial
court containing requests for certain exhibits and asking questions
about the evidence and the law. These were followed late Monday
afternoon and Tuesday by a number of notes from the jury regarding
its deliberations. The first of these notes said, “What happens if the
jury vote is at 11 guilty and one not guilty on count one and count

es 719

two?” At 6:00 p.m. that Monday, the jury was instructed to keep
deliberating. About an hour later, the jury sent another note reading,
“We are in stalemate on counts one and two. The vote is currently ten
guilty two not guilty.” Smith moved for a mistrial, and the State
requested an Allen charge. The judge denied both, and the court went
into recess for the night. The next day, the jury returned at 9:00 a.m.
and later wrote the following:

We continue to deliberate count one and count two. There
are still ten guilty and two not guilty. One not guilty is
reviewing the evidence, and one refuses to change her vote.
The ten guilty votes agree to compromise for count one not
guilty for a unanimous guilty verdict on count two. Would
you like for us to continue to deliberate??

Smith again moved for a mistrial, and the State again requested an
Allen charge. At 9:55 a.m., the judge denied both and instructed the
jury to continue deliberating. A subsequent note from the jury stated,
“We have continued to deliberate and review the evidence. There are
still two not guilty votes on counts one and two. Thereis one not guilty
that is still reviewing the evidence. The other not guilty will not
waiver [sic] and has not and is not willing to review the evidence.”
Smith again moved for a mistrial, and the State requested that the
alternate juror be substituted for the juror refusing to deliberate or,
in the alternative, that an Allen charge be given. The judge denied
these requests and, at 11:00 a.m., instructed the jurors to continue to
deliberate. A later note from the jury read, “Are there suggestions
from the Court on how to continue deliberations? We have still got the
same dilemma.” Smith, once more, requested a mistrial, which was
denied.

After lunch, the foreperson, at her request, was brought into the
courtroom, and she stated, “We still have one that’s continuing to read
the evidence, but we have one juror that refuses to review the
evidence, the indictment, the instructions. So I’m looking for guid-
ance from the Court on how to get past that stalemate.” In response
to questions from the court, the foreperson stated that all 12 jurors
had participated in the deliberations at the start and continued for a
period of time. When the foreperson was excused, Smith moved for a
mistrial, and the court denied it and instructed the jurors to resume

2 Count 1 of the indictment charged malice murder, while Count 2 charged felony murder
while in the commission of aggravated assault.

® Smith does not raise any claim of error based on the possibility that the jury may have
negotiated and reached a “compromise” verdict.

720 es

their deliberations. The next note from the jury read, “Deliberations
continue. Count one is guilty three, not guilty nine. Count two is
guilty 11, not guilty one. The compromise during deliberation from
foreperson was for each person to reconsider based on evidence. One
juror continues to refuse to participate.” Smith moved for a mistrial,
noting that the jury had deliberated for close to ten hours, and the
State requested an Allen charge. The judge denied both requests and
instructed the jury to keep deliberating. Another note from the jury
read, “The vote remains count one not guilty, nine[;] guilty, three.
Count two 11 guilty, one not guilty.” The court permitted the jury to
take a break and resume its deliberations upon returning. There-
after, the jury sent a note saying, “Deliberations continue. Current
jury vote, count one, one guilty, 11 not guilty. Count two, 11 guilty, one
not guilty. Each of the number one on both counts that are making the
votes non-unanimous are visibly not willing to change their vote.”
Once again, Smith moved for a mistrial. The judge denied it and
instructed the jury to keep deliberating.

At 3:20 p.m., another note from the jury stated, “We have the one
guilty count on count one willing to change their vote to not guilty if
the juror that’s voting not guilty on count two will change their vote
to guilty. The juror with the not guilty remains unchanged. Sugges-
tions?” The State again requested an Allen charge. The court decided
not to give the pattern charge but, over Smith’s objection, did admin-
ister an Allen-like charge drawn from ABA Standard for Criminal
Justice 15-5.4 (8d ed. 1996) (formerly 15-4.4).4 The jury subsequently
sent a note requesting use of an empty room with similar dimensions
to the crime scene for a re-enactment. After consulting with counsel
for both parties, the trial court permitted the jurors to use the jury
assembly room and granted their additional request for a tape
measure. At 7:30 p.m., the jury returned its verdicts, confirmed by a
jury poll, finding Smith not guilty of malice murder and one count of
aggravated assault upon Horton, but guilty of the other charges. See
footnote 1, supra.

4 That charge, as administered by the court, reads as follows:

The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to
return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your verdict must be
unanimous. It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate
with a view toreaching an agreement if you can do so without violence to individual
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an
impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your
deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine your own views, and change your
opinion if convinced it is erroneous, but do not surrender your honest conviction as
to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors
or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. You are not partisans. Your sole
interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.

es 721

As this review demonstrates, the jury did not simply announce
that it was “deadlocked.” Rather, the jury reported its numerical
division and the lack of continued participation by one juror, solicited
suggestions and guidance from the court, and described its position
with the terms “stalemate” and “dilemma.” Even assuming that the
jury had more strongly described itself as “hopelessly deadlocked” or
some equivalent description, “the trial court was not bound by those
pronouncements. On the contrary, the trial court, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, was required to make its own determination as to
whether further deliberations were in order.” Sears, 270 Ga. at 838
(1). See also Porras v. State, 295 Ga. 412, 420 (3) (761 SE2d 6) (2014)
(trial court’s instructions were not “coercive simply because they
compelled the jury to continue deliberating after it reported a dead-
lock”). That determination is a “sensitive” one “best made by the trial
court that has observed the trial and the jury.” Humphreys, 287 Ga.
at 78 (8) (b). Factors in determining whether requiring further
deliberations was coercive include the length of trial, the length of
deliberations before the jury indicates that it is deadlocked, the
language of the jury’s notes, the progress of the jury, the language of
the Allen charge and other instructions regarding deliberations, the
length of additional deliberations after the alleged coercion, whether
the jury found the defendant not guilty of any charges, and the polling
of the jury.° See Drayton v. State, 297 Ga. 743, 749 (2) (b) (778 SE2d
179) (2015); Porras, 295 Ga. at 420 (3); Sharpe v. State, 288 Ga. 565,
568 (5) (707 SE2d 338) (2011); Humphreys, 287 Ga. at 79 (8) (b); Sears,
270 Ga. at 837-838 (1); Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521, 525-526 (1) (c)
(350 SE2d 446) (1986).

In the case at bar, the trial lasted nearly a week,® and the jury
deliberated only one afternoon before first indicating that it was in
“stalemate.” The jury was quite communicative, having submitted a
number of questions to the court unrelated to deliberations, and the
jury began regularly updating the court on the progress of its delib-
erations. The trial court learned, without inquiring of the jurors, that
a majority of them were voting guilty on at least one murder count,
but that circumstance does not demonstrate error “since the jury

° The ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 15-5.4 emt. (8d ed. 1996) states that the
conditions under which a jury is forced to deliberate are often the key factor, Examples given
by that commentary include sleep deprivation and a threat to keep the jurors together for an
unreasonable or indefinite period of time until they agree on a verdict. We note, however, that
there is no indication in this case of that kind of difficult condition for deliberations.

® The jury was selected on Tuesday, July 30, 2013, the presentation of evidence began on
Wednesday morning, July 31, and the trial court completed its charge to the jury at 1:30 p.m.
on Monday, August 5.

722 es

volunteered this information without prompting by the judge.” Jones
v. State, 273 Ga. 231, 234 (5) (639 SE2d 154) (2000). Nevertheless, it
would have been much better for the trial court to tell the jurors to
stop revealing the nature of their numerical division, as well as the
content of their deliberations, and we again encourage trial judges
“to inform jurors not to reveal that information.” Sears, 270 Ga. at 839
(1), n. 1. After the jury first broached the subject of its numerical
division late in the day on Monday, it repeatedly reported continuing
progress, consisting of review of the evidence and shifting votes on the
murder counts. Although the jury posed a question in hypothetical
form late Monday regarding a split vote of eleven to one, and although
the jury began expressing concern Tuesday morning that one of its
members was no longer participating, it was not until Tuesday
afternoon that the jury reported that only one juror’s vote on both
murder counts was different from all the other jurors.

The modified Allen charge that the trial court gave in the middle
of the afternoon on Tuesday used the language from the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice that this Court approved as “fair and
accurate” in Romine, 256 Ga. at 527 (1) (d), and that has been
recognized as less potentially coercive than the more typical Allen
charge. See ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 15-5.4 cmt. (3d ed.
1996); Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Instructions Urging Dissenting
Jurors in State Criminal Case to Give Due Consideration to Opinion
of Majority, 97 ALR3d 96, § 2 [a] (1980). Cf. Suggested Pattern Jury
Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases § 1.70.70 (4th ed. 2007). As for
the trial court’s prior instructions directing the jury to continue
deliberations, their sheer number was problematic, potentially hav-
ing some coercive effect. But the simple content of those instructions
was not coercive. “They did not put pressure on the jurors one way or
the other; they did not exhort the minority to reexamine its views in
deference to the majority, or . . . suggest that the majority’s position
is correct.” Sears, 270 Ga. at 838 (1) (citations and punctuation
omitted). See also 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure
§ 24.9 (d) (4th ed. Dec. 2016 update) (“Except in a few states where
statutes limit the number of times a judge may order a jury to renew
deliberations, the rule is that the judge may send the jury back for
further deliberations once, twice or several times.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Standard for Criminal Justice 15-5.4 cmt. (8d ed. 1996)
(“[t]he general view is that a court may send the jury back for
additional deliberations even though the jury has indicated once,
twice, or several times that it cannot agree”).

After those instructions and the modified Allen charge, the jury
decided to review the evidence again in a different way, asking for a
room suitable for a re-enactment, and then spent a few additional

es 728

hours of deliberation before returning unanimous verdicts, including
ver dicts of not guilty on two of the most serious charges. Moreover, the
jurors were polled and individually confirmed their verdicts. Consid-
ering the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the trial
court’s actions did not coerce the jury’s verdicts. See Drayton, 297 Ga.
at 749 (2) (b); Porras, 295 Ga. at 420 (3); Sharpe, 288 Ga. at 568 (5);
Humphreys, 287 Ga. at 79 (8) (b); Sears, 270 Ga. at 837-838 (1). And
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to find that the
jury was hopelessly deadlocked and denying Smith’s motions for
mistrial. See Humphreys, 287 Ga. at 80 (9) (a); Romine, 256 Ga. at
525-526 (1) (c). Cf. Mason v. State, 244 Ga. App. 247 (535 SE2d 497)
(2000).

3. Smith urges that the trial court erred in admitting an audio
recording of a five-minute phone call that Smith made from jail to a
friend.’ During trial, Smith objected to the recording under OCGA §
24-4-403 on the ground that it had little or no probative value and was
unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and needlessly cumulative. The trial
court overruled the objection. The State argues that this claim is
subject only to plain error review because defense counsel stated that
he had “no objection” when the recording was later tendered. How-
ever, pretermitting whether Smith properly preserved this issue for
review,® we have determined that his claim lacks merit for the
following reasons.

Smith argues that during much of his phone call from jail, he
made derogatory references to Caucasians (“crackers”), women
(“bitches”), and police officers (“pigs”) that were highly prejudicial,
serving only to inflame the passions of the jury against him. That
prejudicial effect, Smith asserts, substantially outweighed the pro-
bative value of the audio recording, as the only arguably relevant
portions of the phone call were his denials that he committed any
crimes, and those denials were cumulative of his initial statement to
police and thus barely probative at best. “Generally, ‘[a]ll relevant
evidence shall be admissible,’ OCGA § 24-4-402.” Davis v. State, 301
Ga. 397, 399 (2) (801 SE2d 897) (2017). Under OCGA § 24-4-403,
however, “[rJelevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-

7 The entire recording was played for the jury, except for brief references to Smith as
“Hit Man” at the very beginning of the phone call. See Carroll v. State, 261 Ga. 553, 554 (2) (408
SE2d 412) (1991).

® We note that, as the State argued, if defense counsel's statement of “no objection” did
amount to a forfeiture of ordinary appellate review, we still would review admission of the
evidence in question for plain error under OCGA § 24-1-103 (d), see Crayton v. State, 298 Ga.
792, 799 (5) (784 SE2d 343) (2016).

TA es

sion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence.” “The application of [OCGA § 24-4-403] is a matter committed
principally to the discretion of the trial courts, and as we have
explained before, the exclusion of relevant evidence under [OCGA §
24-4-403] is an extraordinary remedy that should be used only spar-
ingly.” Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505, 507-508 (3) (796 SE2d 704) (2017).

We have carefully reviewed the audio recording. Although
parts of it are difficult to understand, it is clear that Smith said he
“didn’t do it,” that he denied the existence of any evidence against
him, and that he did not claim self-defense at that time. Thus, the
recording showed that Smith made statements that were not consis-
tent with either his statements at his second police interview or the
defense theory of justification presented at trial. “Certainly, the
relevance of defendant’s own statements about the crime cannot be
disputed.” Carroll v. State, 261 Ga. 553, 554 (2) (408 SE2d 412) (1991).
And the statements at issue were not needlessly cumulative, as they
showed that Smith’s denials of the crimes were made not only in his
first statement to investigators, but also to a friend at a later time,
and that he again did not mention self-defense. See United States v.
Cardona-Castillo, 648 Fed. Appx. 782, 786 (II) (B) (11th Cir. 2016)
(a statement is not needlessly cumulative simply because another
individual's testimony can prove the same fact). As for the claimed
unfair prejudice, the question before us is not whether the telephone
call containing the derogatory language was prejudicial, but rather
whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the
probative value of the recording. See Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 337
(3) (806 SE2d 573) (2017). Unfortunate though it may be, the words
that Smith used “have lost much of their shock value in contemporary
culture.” State v. Alzaga, 352 P3d 107, 119 (Utah App. 2015). See also
People v. Edelbacher, 766 P2d 1, 16 (Cal. 1989) (“[j]urors today are not
likely to be shocked by offensive language”). “These words alone were
unlikely to induce the jury to return a conviction based on a gener-
alized assessment of character.” Alzaga, 352 P3d at 119 (citation and
punctuation omitted). Accordingly, we cannot say that the derogatory
terms used by Smith created a risk of unfair prejudice that substan-
tially outweighed the recording’s probative value, and we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it performed the
balancing required by OCGA § 24-4-403 and admitted the audio
recording of Smith’s phone call from jail.

4. Finally, Smith contends that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to redact his first statement to police to exclude portions
that mention his illicit drug use because those portions involved
unrelated criminal acts that constituted irrelevant character evi-

es 725

dence. As we recently recognized, “[t]he limitations and prohibition
on ‘other acts’ evidence set out in OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) do not apply to
‘intrinsic evidence.’”® Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (IV) (d)
(807 SE2d 350) (2017) (footnote omitted). “Evidence is admissible as
intrinsic evidence when itis (1) an uncharged offense arising from the
same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense;
(2) necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably
intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” Id.
(citation and punctuation omitted).

[E]vidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining the
context, motive, and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted
if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged
crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of
the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime
for the jury. . . . [E]vidence of other acts is “inextricably
intertwined” with the evidence regarding the charged offense
if it forms an integral and natural part of the witness’s
accounts of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for
which the defendant was indicted. And this sort of intrinsic
evidence remains admissible even if it incidentally places
the defendant’s character at issue.

Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).

In this case, Smith used his consumption of drugs to explain his
condition on the night of the murder, to excuse his partial lack of
recollection, and to deny his involvement in the shooting. Therefore,
the portions of Smith’s initial statement to police that admit his illicit
drug use were inextricably intertwined with evidence regarding the
charged offenses, as such portions formed an integral and natural
part of his account of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for
which he was indicted, and the same portions of Smith’s first state-
ment were relevant to his defense of justification. Accordingly, we
conclude that, although Smith’s character may have been inciden-
tally placed into evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the portions of Smith’s statement at issue as intrinsic

° Although our new Evidence Code applies to this case, we observe that, under the former
Evidence Code, “evidence as to whether a defendant was under the influence of alcohol or
drugs at the time a crime was committed [was] deemed part of the res gestae and [was]
admissible as such even though it may [have] incidentally place[d] the defendant's character in
evidence.’ ” Hamilton v. State, 295 Ga. 295, 298 (2) (759 SE2d 530) (2014) (quoting Cunningham
v. State, 279 Ga. 694, 695 (3) (620 SE2d 374) (2005), which held that the trial court did not err
in admitting the defendant’s un-redacted statement to police because the portions relating to
his purchase and use of drugs before the crime were an integral part of his criminal confession),

726 es

evidence. See Williams, 302 Ga. at 485 (IV) (d); see also Satterfield v.
State, 339 Ga. App. 15, 19-20 (1) (a) (792 SE2d 451) (2016). Smith also
argues that his admissions of illegal drug use were substantially
more prejudicial than probative. See OCGA § 24-4-403 (discussed in
Division 3, supra). Under the circumstances, however, the probative
value of such evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. See Williams, 302 Ga. at 485 (IV) (d);
Sanford v. State, 284 Ga. 785, 787 (2) (671 SE2d 820) (2009) (preju-
dicial effect of unredacted portions of the defendant’s statements
about his intoxication did not outweigh their probative value because
they explained his condition at the time of the crime and his inability
to remember certain aspects of the events surrounding the crime).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

ichael W. Tarleton, for appellant.

Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Jeffery W. Hunt, Chris-
topher R. Keegan, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason M.
Rea, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1912. FORTE v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 658)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

Following a jury trial, Donnie McQuinn Forte appeals his con-
victions for murder and kidnapping, among other crimes, contending
that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that the
trial court gave the jurors an incomplete charge on malice murder.’

1 On July 3, 2012, Forte was indicted for malice murder, felony murder predicated on
kidnapping, felony murder predicated on armed robbery, kidnapping with bodily injury, armed
robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a
convieted felon, and possession of cocaine. The State subsequently nolle prossed the counts for
felony murder predicated on armed robbery, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Following a jury trial beginning on October 16, 2013, Forte was found guilty of
malice murder, felony murder predicated on kidnapping, kidnapping with bodily injury,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and the lesser included offense of
possession of a drug-related object. Forte was sentenced as a recidivist to concurrent terms of
life imprisonment without parole for malice murder and kidnapping with bodily injury, five
consecutive years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and 12
concurrent months for possession of a drug-related object. Although the trial court purported

es 127

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the recor
shows that, on March 7, 2011, Isaiah Davis borrowed Shendora
Thomas’s car. At the time, Davis and Shendora were dating. Davis di
not return the car, and the next day, in response to a phone call, Davis
informed Shendora that the car had broken down at his mother’s
house in Alabama. Shendora then asked her brother, Blanchar
Thomas, to drive her to retrieve her car, which Blanchard did. At
Davis’s mother’s home, Blanchard and Shendora encountered Davis,
but Shendora’s car was not there. While Blanchard and Shendora
were standing outside, N. B. walked up the road. N. B. was distraught
and had the keys to Shendora’s car in her hand. Shendora recognize’
her keys, and N. B. offered to show Shendora where her car had been
abandoned. On the way, N. B. explained to Shendora that Davis ha’
held her against her will the previous day and had raped her. At one
point on the day of the alleged rape, N. B. was able to contact a frien
and tell him that Davis was holding her against her will. That frien
contacted N. B.’s family, and family members became so upset an
agitated that a police officer had to call for backup when he met with
the family to take their report of N. B.’s abduction.

When Shendora, Blanchard, and N. B. arrived at Shendora’s car,
the engine would not turn over. Shendora decided to stay with her car
in order to have it jump started, and Blanchard offered to drive N. B.
to her grandmother’s home in Columbus. In the meantime, a large
group of N. B.’s relatives and friends had gathered at N. B.’s grand-
mother’s home. Some of them, including Forte, had been searching
for Davis earlier in the day. Testimony indicated that Forte worked
for N. B. by selling drugs. When N. B. and Blanchard arrived, N. B.
ran inside her grandmother’s house. At that point, a group of at least
six men, including Joel Thomas, Michael Ingram, and Forte, con-
fronted Blanchard and demanded to know where they could find
Davis. Joel testified that, prior to the time he joined the confronta-
tion, “Forte and Ingram had [Blanchard’s] truck.” The crowd of N. B.’s
friends and relatives was angry and emotions were raging. Joel,
Ingram, Forte, and others, were yelling at Blanchard. Joel testified
that Forte, who was very angry, told Blanchard “he . . . was going to
take him to [Davis]” and threatened that it was “either going to be

to merge felony murder into the malice murder convietion, the former was actually vacated by
operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). On November 12,
2013, Forte filed a motion for new trial, which was amended by new counsel on August 30, 2016
The trial court denied the motion on January 11, 2017, and Forte timely filed a notice of appeal
Thereafter, this case was docketed to the August 2017 term of this Court and submitted for
decision on the briefs.

728 A

[Blanchard] or [Davis].” Keedra Brummit, who was also on the scene,
testified that Jody Perry was one of the men in the group around
Blanchard’s truck. She further testified that Jody pointed his finger
at Blanchard and demanded that Blanchard take them to find Davis.
Joel, Ingram, and Forte then got into Blanchard’s SUV, with Forte in
the front passenger’s seat. Keedra and Jody followed in Keedra’s
white Buick. Several blocks later, Joel and Ingram exited Blanchard’s
car and got into Keedra’s car, leaving Forte alone with Blanchard.
Shortly thereafter, Blanchard’s SUV stopped under a bridge, and
Keedra heard a gunshot. She then saw Forte running away from
Blanchard’s car. An employee of a nearby business also saw someone
running away and described the person he saw running in a manner
that was consistent with Forte’s characteristics. Both Keedra and
Joel identified Forte as the one who shot Blanchard, though they did
not see the event occur. When Forte was eventually apprehended by
police, he was witnessed placing a white substance in his mouth, and
a glass smoking device was found in his pocket.

This evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find Forte guilty
of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
This remains the case despite Forte’s contention that the evidence
was insufficient to support the charge of kidnapping and, concomi-
tantly, the charge of felony murder predicated on kidnapping. The
indictment charged Forte, along with Joel and Keedra, with felony
murder predicated on kidnapping, which occurs when a person
“abducts or steals away another person without lawful authority or
warrant and holds such other person against his or her will,” and with
kidnapping with bodily injury based on the victim’s murder. See
OCGA § 16-5-40 (a) and (d) (4). Here, there was evidence that, in the
midst of an emotionally volatile situation, Forte and a group of men
“had Blanchard’s truck,” screamed at Blanchard, ordered Blanchard
to take them to Davis, and threatened Blanchard that it was “either
going to be Blanchard or Davis” if Blanchard failed to do so. There-
fore, contrary to Forte’s argument, there was sufficient evidence to
enable the jury to find that Forte was guilty of kidnapping Blanchard
and forcing him to transport Forte and the others against his will
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra.

2. Forte contends that the trial court erred by giving the jury an
incomplete charge on malice murder. The record shows that, in its
oral charge to the jury, the trial court apparently forgot to read the
final paragraph of the standard charge on malice murder which
defines the concept of malice. The record further shows, however, that
a written copy of charges was sent out with the jury, and, in this
written copy, the charge on malice murder was complete. Forte did

es 729

not object to the jury charge, so his contention must be considered
under the plain error doctrine. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b).

In State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32-33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011),
we explained that, to determine plain error in jury instructions under
OCGA § 17-8-58 (b), there are four things which must be considered.

First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
deviation from a legal rule— that has not been intentionally
relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the
appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error
must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which
in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it
affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth
and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error —
discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.

(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Id. at 33 (2) (a). Even
if we assume that Forte could satisfy the first two requirements, he
has not shown that the trial court’s mistake in reading the charge
affected his substantial rights in such a manner as to affect the
outcome of the trial court proceedings. The jury, during its delibera-
tions, had the entire charge to consider. Therefore, the jury did, in
fact, have a full set of instructions with which to reach a decision.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

Victoria L. Novak, for appellant.

Julia F. Slater, District Attorney, Matthew J. Landreau, William
D. Kelly, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-
ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D.
Headrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

730 es

$17G0118. JONES v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 655)

Boaas, Justice.

Ajury found Randall Lee Jones guilty of bringing stolen property
into the State of Georgia and theft by conversion of the same property.
The Court of Appeals rejected Jones’ claim that the two verdicts are
mutually exclusive. Jones v. State, 337 Ga. App. 687 (787 SE2d 330)
(2016). We granted Jones’ petition for certiorari, directing the parties
to address two questions:

1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly construe OCGA §
16-8-11?

2. Was the Court of Appeals correct in holding that
guilty verdicts for theft by conversion and theft by bringing
stolen property into Georgia were not mutually exclusive?

We answer both questions in the negative and therefore reverse.
The evidence at trial showed that on December 5, 2013, Jones
rented a 2004 Mazda sedan for five days from an auto rental business
in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The rental agreement provided that
Jones was to return the vehicle four days later, on December 9, and
provided “800 weekly” under “miles allowed.”' However, Jones drove
the vehicle to California intending to visit his son, stayed only a
couple of hours, and then proceeded back. He testified that on
December 9, he ran out of money, gas, and power for his cell phone
while driving through Atlanta,” and that when his mother wired him
funds, he resumed his trip to Chattanooga to return the vehicle.
When Jones did not return the vehicle on December 9, the auto rental
agency, after failed attempts to contact him, reported it stolen on
December 10. On December 11, as Jones was driving north on
Interstate 75 through Gordon County, he was stopped and arrested
by patrol officers who had received a “BOLO” for the vehicle.? He was
charged with theft by conversion and theft by bringing stolen prop-
erty into Georgia. The jury found Jones guilty on both counts, and the

1 'The rental agreement also provided a rate of $0.35 per mile that was circled, presumably
for mileage in excess of the 800 miles allowed, Also circled on the agreement were the rental fee
per day and per week, the collision damage waiver fee per day, the sales tax, and the clean up
fee. Jones testified that the rental agent told him that if he went over 800 miles, he would be
charged $0.35 per mile, and that he knew he would not be able to make it to California and back
in less than 800 miles. However, we do not address the sufficiency of the evidence here.

2 Jones was not asked and did not explain why his route to California from Chattanooga
took him through Atlanta.

® When the vehicle was recovered the odometer showed that Jones had driven it 5,109 miles.

es 731

trial court imposed concurrent five-year terms to serve two, and
$1,472 in restitution.

Jones’ motion for new trial was denied, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed his convictions, rejecting his argument that the verdicts
were mutually exclusive. 337 Ga. App. at 687. The court held that the
jury was entitled to infer fraudulent intent to convert the vehicle from
Jones “setting out for a destination thousands of miles away from
Chattanooga even though the rental agreement specified that he
drive the vehicle no more than 800 miles,” and that, when he later
returned to Georgia in the same converted vehicle, the evidence
authorized the jury to conclude that he committed the crime of
bringing stolen property into the state. Id. at 689. The court held
further that, although conversion took place well before Jones arrived
in Georgia, venue was established in Gordon County, where Jones
exercised control over the vehicle, as the trial court properly charged
the jury on OCGA § 16-8-11 (venue for theft). Id.

OCGA § 16-8-9 provides that “[a] person commits the offense of
theft by bringing stolen property into this state when he brings into
this state any property which he knows or should know has been
stolen in another state.” One count of the accusation charged Jones
with bringing into the State of Georgia the Mazda he rented which he
“knew was stolen in another state, to wit: the state of Tennessee.”
OCGA § 16-8-4 (a) provides:

A person commits the offense of theft by conversion
when, having lawfully obtained funds or other property of
another including, but not limited to, leased or rented per-
sonal property, under an agreement or other known legal
obligation to make a specified application of such funds or a
specified disposition of such property, he knowingly converts
the funds or property to his own use in violation of the
agreement or legal obligation.

A second count charged Jones with converting the Mazda to his own
use in violation of the rental agreement.

“{VJerdicts are mutually exclusive where it is legally and logi-
cally impossible to convict the accused of both counts.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 378 (1) (774
SE2d 106) (2015). To find Jones guilty of theft by bringing the stolen
Mazda into Georgia, the jury must have determined that he knew or
should have known the Mazda was stolen (by him) in another state.
If Jones stole or converted the Mazda in another state, he could not at
the same time have stolen or converted it in Georgia. Cf. Thomas v.
United States, 314 F2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1963) (under evidence

732 PO ]

presented, guilty verdicts for both smuggling marijuana into the
United States and obtaining the marijuana within the United States
could not stand). Conversely, if Jones stole or converted the Mazda in
Georgia, he could not have brought stolen property into the state
under OCGA § 16-8-9, because that Code section applies to property
stolen in another state. In finding Jones guilty on both counts, the
jury “necessarily reached two positive findings of fact that cannot
logically mutually exist.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Springer,
supra, 297 Ga. at 379. The verdicts were therefore mutually exclu-
sive.

The State argues that “the result of the theft by conversion was
possessing the stolen motor vehicle in Gordon County, Georgia, which
occurred within this state. The theft by conversion in the case was
essentially a continuing offense.” The State asserts further that
Jones committed the theft by conversion before he entered Georgia,
but because he “exercised control” over the already-converted vehicle
in Gordon County, venue for the theft by conversion was proper
there.‘ But the State conflates venue with the elements of the crimes,
and the Court of Appeals likewise improperly applied the applicable
venue statute in its analysis.®

In general, “[c]riminal actions shall be tried in the county where
the crime was committed, except as otherwise provided by law.”
OCGA § 17-2-2 (a). OCGA § 16-8-11, the venue statute specified for
theft crimes, provides:

In a prosecution under Code Sections 16-8-2 through
16-8-9 and 16-8-13 through 16-8-15, the crime shall be
considered as having been committed in any county in which
the accused exercised control over the property which was
the subject of the theft. In addition, in any prosecution under
Code Section 16-8-4 in which there is a written rental
agreement for personal property, the crime shall also be
considered to have been committed in the county in which
the accused signed the rental agreement.

* The State argues that Jones converted the vehicle by driving in excess of 800 miles, but
such a broad theory could lead to the conclusion that any breach of contract constitutes the
crime of theft by conversion.

® We note that the trial court instructed the jury:

Now, in this case, for prosecution of a charge of theft by conversion or theft by
bringing stolen property into the state, for purposes of venue the crime shall be
considered as having been committed in any county in which the accused exercised
control over the property which was the subject of the theft

Intent is also an essential element of any crime and must be proved by the
State beyond a reasonable doubt

es 738

The purpose of these Code sections “is to provide for establishment of
venue in situations in which there is either some doubt as to which
county was the scene of the crime or where the crime in fact occurred
in more than one county.” Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 180 (1) (274
SE2d 455) (1981) (decided under former Ga. Code Ann. § 26-302 and
former Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1811). Whether two verdicts are mutually
exclusive is an altogether different question than whether the State
has met its burden of proving venue for the crimes charged. Jones’
exercise of control over the already-converted Mazda for purposes of
establishing venue is only relevant to a charge of theft by conversion
if the conversion took place within the state.

Because the verdicts for theft by conversion and theft by bringing
stolen property into the state are mutually exclusive here, reversal of
both verdicts is required. See Springer, supra, 297 Ga. at 378 (1),
citing Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 800 (2) (471 SE2d 508) (1996). We
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

James C. Bonner, Jr., Tyler R. Conklin, for appellant.
Rosemary M. Greene, District Attorney, Sharon M. Fox, Assistant
District Attorney, for appellee.

$17G0429. EDOKPOLOR et al. v. GRADY MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL CORPORATION.
(808 SE2d 653)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

When a trial court enters a judgment that resolves all of the
issues in a case except the amount to be awarded for the expenses of
service of process under OCGA § 9-11-4 (d), is the judgment final? In
Edokpolor v. Grady Mem. Hosp. Corp., 338 Ga. App. 704 (791 SE2d
589) (2016), the Court of Appeals decided that such a judgment is
final. We issued a writ of certiorari to review that decision, and we
now reverse.

In 2010, Patrick Edokpolor and Linda lyahea filed a lawsuit
against Grady Memorial Hospital Corporation for the wrongful death
of their decedent, Rose Edokpolor. Grady failed to waive formal
service of process, and in 2013, the trial court granted a motion under
OCGA § 9-11-4 for an award of the expenses that the plaintiffs
incurred in perfecting service. The trial court, however, reserved the

731 es

amount of the award for determination at some later date. In October
2014, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Grady,
but it continued to reserve the amount of the expenses of service
award. Three months later, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider
and modify the summary judgment, asserting that the case was still
pending — and the summary judgment was only interlocutory and,
therefore, subject to reconsideration and modification — because the
award of expenses remained outstanding. In September 2015, the
trial court entered an order establishing the amount of the expenses
to which the plaintiffs were entitled, but concluding that the sum-
mary judgment was final and no longer subject to reconsideration or
modification.

The plaintiffs promptly filed a notice of appeal, claiming that the
trial court erred when it awarded summary judgment to Grady, and
arguing that the summary judgment still was appealable because the
expenses award remained outstanding until September 2015. The
Court of Appeals disagreed and dismissed the appeal, concluding that
the reserved issue about expenses under OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) (4) was
“ancillary” to the case and, therefore, the summary judgment was a
final judgment that had to be appealed within 30 days. See Edokpolor,
338 Ga. App. at 707. See also OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) (“[a] notice of appeal
shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or
judgment complained of”). The plaintiffs petitioned this Court for a
writ of certiorari, which we granted to consider if the Court of Appeals
erred when it determined that the summary judgment was a final
judgment.

Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), appeals may be taken within 30
days from “[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no
longer pending in the court below,” except in certain cases not
applicable here and as described in OCGA § 5-6-35. The failure to
timely appeal from a final judgment ordinarily forfeits the right of
appellate review. See Jordan v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 343, 344 (191 SE2d
530) (1972). The question here is whether the summary judgment
was a final judgment or whether the case instead remained pending
in the trial court until the expenses award was finally determined.

In Sotter v. Stephens, 291 Ga. 79, 84 (727 SE2d 484) (2012), we
considered whether a case remained pending in the trial court when
that court had explicitly reserved the issue of the amount of attorney
fees to be awarded under OCGA § 13-6-11. We concluded that, because
the amount of fees was reserved for future determination by the trial
court, “one cannot claim that ‘the case is no longer pending in the
court below’ as required by OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).” Id. at 84.

Similarly, we have concluded in other appeals that a case remains
pending in the trial court where that court has explicitly reserved

es 735

issues related to costs and attorney fees for future judgment. See
Islamkhan v. Khan, 299 Ga. 548, 550 (1) (787 SE2d 731) (2016)
(‘despite being titled ‘Final Order of Divorce,’ the trial court’s . . .
order, which specifically reserved resolution of the attorney fees issue
for further order of the court, was not a final judgment”); Jarvis v.
Jarvis, 291 Ga. 818, 819 (1) (733 SE2d 747) (2012) (“[b]ecause the trial
court reserved the matter of attorney’s fees, the final decree of divorce
was not a final judgment as of its issuance”); Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga.
274, 282 (4) (705 SE2d 839) (2010) (“[t]here was no final judgment
until the reserved issues of attorney fees [sought under both OCGA
§ 19-6-2 and OCGA § 9-15-14] and guardian ad litem fees were
resolved on the day before the clarification order”). Here, the trial
court explicitly reserved the final resolution of the motion for expenses
under OCGA § 9-11-4 (d), stating that it would conduct a hearing to
determine “the reasonable amount of attorney fees expended.”
Because this reserved issue remained pending at the time the trial
court awarded summary judgment to Grady, the summary judgment
was not a “final judgment[ ]” under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), and the
plaintiffs were not required to bring their appeal within 30 days of
that judgment."

In finding that this case did not remain pending in the trial court
despite its explicit reservation of the issue of the amount of expenses,
the Court of Appeals appears to have been misled by dicta in Sotter,
where we said that “an attorney fees award pursuant to OCGA
§ 9-15-14 may be considered ancillary and post-judgment.” Sotter,
291 Ga. at 83. But a claim for attorney fees under that statute may be
asserted post-judgment — up to “45 days after the final disposition of
the action,” OCGA § 9-15-14 (e) — and appeals of awards under
OCGA § 9-15-14 are among the exceptions to OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)
enumerated in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a), which must be taken by applica-
tion. In contrast, the motion for expenses of service in this case was
made during the pendency of the action and as part of the plaintiffs’
then-live litigation against Grady, the resolution of the motion was
explicitly reserved by the trial court, and the amount of attorney fees
remained pending at the time that the trial court awarded summary
judgment to Grady. The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded
that the pre-judgment filing of a motion under OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) is

1 It is undisputed that the plaintiff's could have immediately appealed the order that
granted summary judgment to Grady even though the issue of expenses remained pending. See
OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). But this entitlement did not preclude them from waiting to appeal until a
final judgment was rendered, See Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242, 243 (248 SE2d
641) (1978) (“The party against whom summary judgment was granted may appeal either after
the grant of summary judgment or after the rendition of the final judgment.”).

736 es

analogous to a post-judgment filing of a motion for attorney fees
under OCGA § 9-15-14. We reverse the dismissal of the plaintiffs’
appeal, and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals to determine
the merits of the plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erroneously
awarded summary judgment to Grady.

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

loseph H. King, Jr., for appellants.
Thomas, Kennedy, Sampson & Tompkins, Jeffrey E. Tompkins,
LaTisha D. Jackson, Gerond J. Lawrence, for appellee.

$17U0553. IN RE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16-2.
(812 SE2d 484)

PER CURIAM.

In January 2012, this Court approved Formal Advisory Opinion
No. 10-2, which clarified the ethical responsibilities of an attorney
serving as both legal counsel and guardian ad litem to a child in a case
involving the termination of parental rights. In re Formal Advisory
Opinion No. 10-2, 290 Ga. 363 (720 SE2d 647) (2012). FAO 10-2 inter-
prets and discusses various provisions of the Georgia Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, including Rule 1.14; however, that rule was amended
around the same time that FAO 10-2 was approved, and the Formal
Advisory Opinion Board determined that the amendment to Rule 1.14
substantively altered the analysis and conclusion of FAO 10-2.

On June 14, 2016, the Board issued Formal Advisory Opinion
16-2, which redrafts FAO 10-2 and interprets the amended Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct to address the same issue. FAO 16-2
was filed in this Court on November 10, 2016, see State Bar Rule 4-403
(d), and, on January 18, 2017, we granted the State Bar of Georgia’s
petition for discretionary review, see id. After considering the record
and the State Bar’s brief, we hereby retract Formal Advisory Opinion
No. 10-2 and approve Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-2, which is
attached to this opinion as an appendix.'

Formal Advisory Opinion 16-2 approved. All the Justices concur.

1 FAO 16-2 eliminates language concerning the specific areas of continued confidentiality
following the attorney's withdrawal. Instead, FAO 16-2 simply directs the attorney to “consider
Rule 1.6 before disclosing any confidential client information.” The Court notes that in addition to
the proposed FAO's directive to consider Rule 1.6, the attorney should also consider all applicable
Jaw, including Rule 1.14 (0).

OOS 737

APPENDIX.

STATE BAR OF GOERGIA

ISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD
PURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON JUNE 14, 2016

FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16-2

QUESTION PRESENTED:

May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem
for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's
objection?

SUMMARY ANSWER:

When it becomes clear that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the child's wishes and the
attorney's considered opinion of the child's best interests, the attorney must withdraw from his or
her role as the child's guardian ad litem.

OPINION:
Relevant Rules

This question squarely implicates several of Georgia's Rules of Professional Conduct,
particularly, Rule 1.14. Rule 1.14, dealing with an attorney's ethical duties towards a child or
other client with diminished capacity, provides that "the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably
possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client." Comment | to Rule 1.14
goes on to note that "children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or
twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings
concerning their custody."!!!

This question also involves Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation, and Rule 1.7, governing conflicts
of interest.7) Comment 2 to Rule 1.7 indicates that "[lJoyalty to a client is also impaired when a
lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client
because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect
forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.""!

This situation also implicates Rule 3.7, the lawyer as a witness, to the extent that the guardian ad
litem must testify and may need to advise the court of the conflict between the child's expressed
wishes and what he deems the best interests of the child. Finally, Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of
Information, may also be violated if the attorney presents the disagreement to the Court.

Statutory Background

Georgia law requires the appointment of an attorney for a child as the child's counsel in a
termination of parental rights proceeding.) The statute also provides that the court shall
additionally appoint a guardian ad litem for the child, and that the child's counsel is eligible to
serve as the guardian ad litem unless there is a conflict of interest between the lawyer’s duty as
an attorney for the child and the lawyer’s “considered opinion” of the child’s best interest as the
guardian ad litem.!5! In addition to the child's statutory right to counsel, a child in a termination
of parental rights proceedings also has a federal constitutional right to counsel.

738 a

In Georgia, a guardian ad litem's role is "to protect the interests of the child and to investigate
and present evidence to the court on the child's behalf." The best interests of the child standard
is paramount in considering changes or termination of parental custody. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott,
276 Ga. 372, 377 (2003) ("[t]he paramount concern in any change of custody must be the best
interests and welfare of the minor child"). The Georgia Court of Appeals held in In re A.P.
based on the facts of that case that the attorney-guardian ad litem dual representation provided
for under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(a) (the predecessor to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d)) does not result
in an inherent conflict of interest, given that "the fundamental duty of both a guardian ad litem
and an attorney is to act in the best interests of the [child].""*)

This advisory opinion is necessarily limited to the ethical obligations of an attorney once a
conflict of interest in the representation has already arisen. Therefore, we need not address
whether or not the dual representation provided for under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d) results in an
inherent conflict of interest.”!

Discussion

The child's attorney's first responsibility is to his or her client.!"") Rule 1.2 makes clear that an
attorney in a normal attorney-client relationship is bound to defer to a client's wishes regarding
the ultimate objectives of the representation."'] Rule 1.14 requires the attorney to maintain, "as
far as reasonably possible . . . a normal client-lawyer relationship with the [child].""2) An
attorney who "reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest" may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action."3! Importantly,
the Rule does not simply direct the attorney to act in the client's best interests, as determined
solely by the attorney. At the point that the attorney concludes that the child's wishes and best
interests are in conflict, the attorney must petition the court for removal as the child's guardian ad
litem. The attorney must consider Rule 1.6 before disclosing any confidential client information
other than that there is a conflict which requires such removal. If the conflict between the
attorney's view of the child's best interests and the child's view of his or her own interests is
severe, the attorney may seek to withdraw entirely under Rule 1.16(b)(3).!4

The attorney may not withdraw as the child's counsel and then seek appointment as the child's
guardian ad litem, as the child would then be a former client to whom the former
attorey/guardian ad litem would owe a continuing duty of confidentiality.'*

This conclusion is in accord with many other states.'° For instance, Ohio permits an attorney to
be appointed both as a child's counsel and as the child's guardian ad litem.'” Ohio ethics rules
prohibit continued service in the dual roles when there is a conflict between the attorney's
determination of best interests and the child's express wishes.'® Court rules and applicable
statutes require the court to appoint another person as guardian ad litem for the child.!? An
attorney who perceives a conflict between his role as counsel and as guardian ad litem is
expressly instructed to notify the court of the conflict and seek withdrawal as guardian ad litem.”°
This solution (withdrawal from the guardian ad litem role once it conflicts with the role as
counsel) is in accord with an attorney's duty to the client.7!

Connecticut's Bar Association provided similar advice to its attorneys, and Connecticut's
legislature subsequently codified that position into law.” Similarly, in Massachusetts, an
attorney representing a child must represent the child's expressed preferences, assuming that the
child is reasonably able to make "an adequately considered decision . . . even if the attorney

Se 739

believes the child's position to be unwise or not in the child's best interest."”? Even if a child is
unable to make an adequately considered decision, the attorney still has the duty to represent the
child's expressed preferences unless doing so would "place the child at risk of substantial
harm.'"”* In New Jersey, a court-appointed attorney needs to be "a zealous advocate for the
wishes of the client . . . unless the decisions are patently absurd or pose an undue risk of harm.
New Jersey's Supreme Court was skeptical that an attorney's duty of advocacy could be
successfully reconciled with concern for the client's best interests.”

25

In contrast, other states have developed a “hybrid" model for attorneys in child custody cases
serving simultaneously as counsel for the child and as their guardian ad litem.”” This "hybrid"
approach "necessitates a modified application of the Rules of Professional Conduct."** That is,
the states following the hybrid model, acknowledge the hybrid’ nature of the role of
attorney/guardian ad litem which necessitates a modified application of the Rules of Professional
Conduct,” excusing strict adherence to those rules.” The attorney under this approach is bound
by the client's best interests, not the client's expressed interests.°° The attorney must present the
child's wishes and the reasons the attorney disagrees to the court?!

Although acknowledging that this approach has practical benefits, we conclude that strict
adherence to the Rules of Professional Conduct is the sounder approach.

Conclusion

At the point that the attorney concludes that the child's wishes and best interests are in conflict,
the attorney must petition the court for removal as the child's guardian ad litem and must
consider Rule 1.6 before disclosing any confidential client information other than that there is a
conflict which requires such removal. If the conflict between the attorney's view of the child's
best interests and the child's view of his or her own interests is severe, the attorney may seek to
withdraw entirely following Rule 1.16(b)(3).

1. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14, Comment 1.
2. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.2, 1.7.
3. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, Comment 4.

4. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(b) (“The court shall appoint an attorney for a child in a termination of
parental rights proceeding. The appointment shall be made as soon as practicable to ensure
adequate representation of such child and, in any event, before the first court hearing that may
substantially affect the interests of such child”).

5. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d) (“The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child in a
termination proceeding; provided, however, that such guardian ad litem may be the same person
as the child's attorney unless or until there is a conflict of interest between the attorney's duty to
such child as such child's attorney and the attorney's considered opinion of such child's best
interests as guardian ad litem”).

6. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359-61 (N.D. Ga. 2005), rev'd on other grounds,
2010 WL 1558980 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2010).

740 eS

7. See Padilla v. Melendez, 228 Ga. App. 460, 462 (1997).
8. Inre A.P., 291 Ga. App. 690, 691 (2008).

9. See, e.g., Wis. Ethics Op. E-89-13 (finding no inherent conflict of interest with the dual
representation of an attorney and guardian but concluding that if a conflict does arise based on
specific facts, the attorney's ethical responsibility is to resign as the guardian).

10. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2.

11. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2, Comment 1.
12, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14.

13, Id.

14. Rule 1.16 (6)(3) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a lawyer may
seek to withdraw if “the client insists upon pusuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent.”

15. See Rule 1.6(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.

16. See, e.g., Wis. Ethics Op. E-89-13, Conflicts of Interests; Guardians (1989) (providing that
dual representation as counsel and guardian ad litem is permitted until conflict between the roles
occurs, and then the attorney must petition the court for a new guardian ad litem); Ariz. Ethics
Op. 86-13, Juvenile Proceedings; Guardians (1986) (providing that a "lawyer may serve as
counsel and guardian ad litem for a minor child in a dependency proceeding so long as there is
no conflict between the child's wishes and the best interests of the child").

17. Ohio Board of Comm'rs. on Griev. and Discipline, Op. 2006-5, 2006 WL 2000108, at*1
(2006).

18. Id. at *2,
19. Id.

20. Id., quoting In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St. 3d 229, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985) (superseded
by statute on other grounds).

21. Id. See also Baxter, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 232 ("[w]hen an attorney is appointed to represent a
person and is also appointed guardian ad litem for that person, his first and highest duty is to
zealously represent his client within the bounds of the law and to champion his client's cause").

22. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, CT Eth. Op. 94-29, 1994 WL 780846, at *3
(1994); In re Tayquon, 821 A.2d 796, 803-04 (Conn. App. 2003) (discussing revisions to Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 46b-129a).

23. See Mass Comm. For Public Counsel Servs., Performance Standards, Standard 1.6(b), at 8-
10, available at

http://www. publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_manual/private_counsel_manual_pdf/chapters/ch
apter_4_sections/civil/trial_panel_standards.pdf; See also In re Georgette, 785 N.E.2d 356, 368
(Mass. 2003).

ee 741

24, Mass Comm. For Public Counsel Servs., Performance Standards, Standard 1.6(d) at 11.
25. Inre Mason, 701 A.2d 979, 982 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
26. See In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1285 (N.J. 1994).

27. See Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 153-54 (Wyo. 1998); In re Marriage of Rolfe, 216
Mont. 39, 51-53, 699 P.2d 79, 86-87 (Mont. 1985); In re Christina W., 639 S.E.2d at 777
(requiring the guardian to give the child's opinions consideration "where the child has
demonstrated an adequate level of competency [but] there is no requirement that the child's
wishes govern."); see also Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 390 (Alaska 1977) ("[I]t is equally
plain that the guardian is not required to advocate whatever placement might seem preferable to
a client of tender years.") (superseded by statute on other grounds); Alaska Bar Assn Ethics
Committee Op. 85-4 (November 8, 1985)(concluding that duty of confidentiality is modified in
order to effectuate the child's best interests); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee
Op. No. 07-02 (June 7, 2007) (noting that Utah statute requires a guardian ad litem to notify the
Court if the minor's wishes differ from the attorney's determination of best interests).

28. Clark, 953 P.2d at 153.

29. Id.

30. Id.

31. Id, at 153-54; Rolfe, 699 P.2d at 87.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, William D. NeSmith

IH, John J. Shiptenko, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State
Bar of Georgia.

m2 es

$17Y1593. IN THE MATTER OF JOHN F. MEYERS.
(808 SE2d 650)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report of the
Review Panel, which recommends rejecting the special master’s
recommendation of disbarment and instead imposing a two-year
suspension on respondent John F. Meyers (State Bar No. 503692) for
his violations of various Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, see
Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Both the State Bar and Meyers have timely filed
exceptions to the Review Panel’s report and recommendation. We
agree with the Review Panel that the circumstances of this case
warrant a two-year suspension.

The evidence presented in this case is significant and conflicting,
but the following appears to be undisputed. A member of the Georgia
Bar since 1983, Meyers was at all relevant times an equity partner at
a large law firm. He had billing responsibilities for many clients,
including the large corporate client at issue in this case. For a number
of years, Meyers’s law firm performed legal services for the corporate
client and its subsidiaries. The contact person for the corporate
account was in-house counsel for one of the corporation’s wholly-
owned subsidiaries.

At some point, in-house counsel told Meyers that his employer
permitted its in-house attorneys to perform outside legal work as long
as it was not on company time and did not raise any conflicts of
interest with company matters, and in-house counsel indicated a
desire for Meyers’s law firm to do some of the work for his own outside
clients. As a result, beginning in 2011, attorneys at the firm did legal
work for the benefit of in-house counsel’s personal clients and for his
private practice. When difficulties arose in collecting the fees for
those services from the in-house counsel’s personal clients, the amounts
due were rolled into the bills sent to the law firm’s corporate client,
with the descriptions of the work that had been performed edited to
eliminate information that would make clear that the work was not
performed directly for the corporate client.' The corporate client
discovered the practice and fired in-house counsel in August 2012.?
The client then initiated an inquiry with the law firm, which reim-
bursed the corporate client for the amounts it had actually paid,

1 In-house counsel testified that Meyers initially had agreed to write off the cost of those
services as “client development,” then came back to in-house counsel saying that he needed to
recoup the fees somehow. Meyers denies ever agreeing to write off the fees. It does not appear
that the special master resolved this dispute.

2 Ultimately, in-house counsel was allowed to voluntarily surrender his license to practice
law in Georgia. See In the Matter of Ditano, 293 Ga. 79 (743 SE2d 427) (2013).

es 743

wrote off the other invoices, and confronted Meyers.

From the start, Meyers admitted that he submitted the altered
bills but asserted, as he still does, that he did so at the behest of
in-house counsel, who Meyers contended advised him that the proce-
dure was acceptable because much of the work performed ultimately
would be beneficial to the corporate client and because in-house
counsel would reimburse the corporate client for any work that was
not beneficial to it. When confronted, Meyers immediately offered to
reimburse the firm or the client, and he did ultimately repay the law
firm.’ Meyers, who resigned within a few weeks of being confronted,
now acknowledges that the alterations to the bills could have helped
conceal from the corporate client the fact that the legal work was
performed on behalf of the in-house counsel and his clients, but
nevertheless steadfastly denies any knowing participation in a scheme
to defraud the client. Instead, Meyers claims that he was duped and
misled by in-house counsel, whom he reasonably trusted.

Based on this conduct, the State Bar charged Meyers with
violating Rules 1.4, 1.5 (a), 7.1 (a) (1), 8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4) of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The
maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.4 or 1.5 (a) is a public
reprimand, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 7.1
(a) (1), 8.1 (a), or 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment.

The matter was heard by special master David Anthony LaMalva,
who issued a report and recommendation finding that Meyers had
violated all of the Rules with which he had been charged and
recommending disbarment as the appropriate remedy. Meyers filed
exceptions to the special master’s report and recommendation and
the case proceeded to the Review Panel, which subsequently issued
its own report and recommendation. The Review Panel agreed with
the special master that the clear and convincing evidence showed
that Meyers had violated Rules 1.4, 1.5 (a), and 7.1 (a) (1) and further
agreed that Meyers had violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by preparing and
submitting false and misleading invoices to the corporate client for
work done by the law firm for other clients. The Review Panel
rejected, however, the special master’s conclusion that Meyers’s
continued denial during the disciplinary proceedings that he was
complicit in any scheme to defraud the corporate client amounted to
a violation of Rule 8.1 (a). The Review Panel reasoned that the Bar
Rules do not require an attorney to choose between admitting an

® In its formal complaint, the State Bar avers that Meyers paid the firm $95,310.31 —
$38,055.73 for improper billings that the client had paid, $55,295.88 for the firm's write-off of
time that had been billed to the client but not paid, and $1,958.70 for the firm's write-off of work
that had not been billed.

74 a

intentional violation of the Rules in the disciplinary action or facing
a Rule 8.1 (a) violation. Similarly, although the Review Panel found
that Meyers violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) based on the bills he submitted
to the client, the Review Panel, unlike the special master, did not rely
on any dishonesty by Meyers during the disciplinary process in
finding a violation of this rule.

n considering the appropriate disciplinary sanction, the Review
Panel agreed with the special master’s determination that Meyers’s
lack of prior disciplinary history and the good character witnesses he
presented were mitigating factors. The Panel recognized as a miti-
gating factor Meyers’s having reimbursed his firm for both the fees
that the firm had refunded to the corporate client and those fees that
had been billed but not paid. The Panel also said that there was no
indication in the record that Meyers had failed to respond to the
disciplinary investigation, saying that Meyers’s failure to admit
every violation alleged during the investigation or “the conclusions to
be drawn” from the evidence should not be deemed an uncooperative
attitude. In aggravation, Meyers did not challenge the special mas-
ter’s findings that the case involved multiple offenses and that he had
substantial experience in the practice of law. But the Review Panel
rejected the special master’s findings in aggravation that Meyers did
not acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct and that he
submitted false statements to a tribunal by refusing to concede that
he intentionally defrauded his client.

Ultimately, the Review Panel concluded that, although the vio-
lations in the case were extremely serious, the special master’s
proposed punishment of disbarment was too harsh under the circum-
stances. The Review Panel sought to distinguish cases relied on by
the special master in which lawyers had been disbarred after being
found to have been dishonest during the disciplinary process.t The

* The Review Panel distinguished In the Matter of Majette, 295 Ga. 4 (757 SE2d 114) (2014)
on the ground that Majette involved the purposeful submission of wholly unsupported and
materially misleading time sheets and invoices to her client, misrepresenting her hours and
fees to a court, creating inflated invoices for work after the fact despite the failure to maintain
contemporaneous time records, failing to credit retainer fees to a client’s account, charging a
client for attending a CLE seminar unrelated to the client's case, protracting settlement of the
client's case by filing an unsupportable lien against the client, and refusing to admit the
wrongful nature of her conduct or to express remorse. It distinguished In the Matter of
Friedman, 270 Ga. 5, 6-7 (505 SE2d 727) (1998), as involving an attorney's failure to disclose
tothe bankruptcy court the payment of $1,500 in attorney fees, which was prohibited and illegal
under bankruptcy rules, his submission to the bankruptcy court of documents riddled with
other falsehoods and misrepresentations meant to mislead the court, and his fabrication during
the disciplinary proceedings of information about the involvement of his associate. It distin-
guished In the Matter of Mays, 269 Ga. 100 (495 SE2d 30) (1998), as involving the purposeful
misrepresentation of facts to a client and to disciplinary authorities by an attorney with a

es 745

Panel held that although Meyers’s conduct in this matter was unac-
ceptable and in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
cases resulting in disbarment for misleading and fraudulent fee
statements typically include more aggravating factors not present in
this case. And, after taking into consideration the facts that Meyers
had made full restitution to his firm, that the client was reimbursed
for any loss, and that Meyers has never been the subject of a
disciplinary complaint in his extensive 30-year-plus legal career, the
Review Panel unanimously concluded that a two-year suspension
from the practice of law was a more appropriate discipline.
Both Meyers and the State Bar have filed exceptions to the
Review Panel’s report, challenging at length its conclusions as to the
various disciplinary violations, its consideration of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, and its recommendation as to the appro-
priate level of discipline. After this Court’s extensive review of the
record in this case, we agree with the Review Panel’s findings and
conclusions as to the various Rules violations and as to the mitigating
and aggravating factors. In particular, we agree with the Review
Panel’s implicit conclusion that a lawyer’s decision to put up a defense
ina disciplinary proceeding — whether by disputing evidence against
him or refusing to concede whatever inferences the State Bar argues
may be drawn therefrom — is not always an aggravating factor that
counsels imposition of harsher discipline. Further, this Court agrees
that a two-year suspension from the practice of law is a sufficient
sanction for Meyers’s conduct in this case. See In the Matter of Moore,
300 Ga. 407 (792 SE2d 324) (2016) (one-year suspension with condi-
tions for violations of Rules 3.3, 4.1, and 8.4 (a) (4) where attorney
failed to serve opposing party with pleadings, falsely stated in
certificates of service that he had done so, misrepresented commu-
nications with the opposing party, denied wrongdoing in the disci-
plinary proceedings, and expressed neither remorse nor acceptance
of responsibility); In the Matter of Reddick-Hood, 296 Ga. 95 (764
SE2d 416) (2014) (three-year suspension with conditions for viola-
tions of various Rules including 1.4, 8.1, and 8.4 (a) (4), despite prior
disciplinary history, where attorney provided restitution and expressed
remorse and other mitigating factors were present); In the Matter of
Lang, 292 Ga. 894 (741 SE2d 152) (2013) (accepting petition for

significant prior disciplinary history. It distinguished In the Matter of Shehane, 276 Ga. 168
(675 SE2d 503) (2003), as involving a lawyer who had fabricated documentary evidence to
deceive the Investigative Panel. Finally, it distinguished In the Matter of Davis, 290 Ga. 857
(725 SE2d 216) (2012), in that the lawyer there provided what the Panel termed a “factually
inaccurate” response in a disciplinary proceeding — to the effect that she was present in court
when she was not — that was refuted by the client and several witnesses.

146 es

voluntary discipline and imposing a 12-month suspension with con-
ditions — while recognizing substantial mitigating circumstances —
for violations of Rules 1.4, 1.15 (II), and 4.1 based on misuse of trust
account and prolonged effort to deceive client and opposing counsel);
In the Matter of Wright, 291 Ga. 841 (732 SE2d 275) (2012) (public
reprimand and six-month suspension where attorney violated Rules
3.3 and 8.4 by making false statements to the Court of Appeals and
continued to deny wrongdoing throughout the disciplinary proceed-
ings). Accordingly, John F. Meyers hereby is suspended from the
practice of law in the State of Georgia for a period of two years.
Because there are no conditions on Meyers’s reinstatement other
than the passage of time, there is no need for him to take any action
either through the State Bar or through this Court to effectuate his
return to the practice of law. Instead, the suspension based on this
opinion will take effect as of the date this opinion is issued and will
expire by its own terms two years later. Meyers is reminded of his
duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).
Two-year suspension. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

= 7 MD ovicn, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

Akin & Tate, S. Lester Tate III, W. Matthew Wilson, for Meyers.

$17Y1823. IN THE MATTER OF APRIL DABNEY-FROE.
(808 SE2d 649)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a petition for
voluntary surrender of license filed by respondent April Dabney-Froe
(State Bar No. 202987) pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2) before the
filing of formal complaints on four underlying grievances.

In her petition, Dabney-Froe, who has been a member of the
State Bar since 2000, admits that on multiple occasions she failed
promptly to give clients an accounting of settlement proceeds, dis-
burse settlement funds, and/or pay medical bills in her clients’ cases.
She acknowledges that by these failures she violated Georgia Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.15 (1) on more than one occasion, but asserts
that she has now properly accounted to each client who filed a
grievance for the total amount due from his or her respective settle-

es 7

ment. Dabney-Froe acknowledges that the maximum penalty for a
single violation of Rule 1.15 (J) is disbarment and prays that the
Court accept her petition for voluntary surrender of her license. The
Bar responds that Dabney-Froe’s petition includes admissions of fact
sufficient to authorize the imposition of the discipline requested and
that acceptance of the petition is in the best interests of the Bar and
the public.

Having reviewed the record, the Court agrees that acceptance of
Dabney-Froe’s petition for the voluntary surrender of her license,
which is tantamount to disbarment, is in the best interests of the Bar
and the public. Accordingly, the name of April Dabney-Froe is hereby
removed from the rolls of persons entitled to practice law in the State
of Georgia. Dabney-Froe is reminded of her duties under Bar Rule
4-219 (c).

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

Warren R. Hinds, for Dabney-Froe.

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

$17Y1988. IN THE MATTER OF NOLEN ARTHUR HAMER.
(808 SE2d 647)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before this Court on the report of the
special master, who recommends the disbarment of Nolen Arthur
Hamer (State Bar No. 320360). This report resulted from the pro-
ceedings associated with the Bar’s filing of a formal complaint against
Hamer, who has been a member of the Bar since 1989, after this Court
rejected his petition for voluntary discipline, in which he sought a
Review Panel reprimand as sanction for his conduct. See In the
Matter of Hamer, 300 Ga. 70 (792 SE2d 707) (2016). As we recounted.
in our opinion rejecting Hamer’s petition, the facts underlying this
matter are:

As to State Disciplinary Board (“SDB”) Docket No. 6813,
Hamer admitted that a client retained him to file a divorce

1 We appointed Thomas L. Holder as special master in this matter.

48 eS

action on her behalf, which he did, but that he thereafter
took virtually no action to advance the case for several
months despite inquiries from the client and opposing coun-
sel; that he did not act as diligently as he should have in
arranging mediation of the case; that following mediation,
he failed to draft the final order after stating he would do so;
that he did not act to schedule a final hearing; that through-
out the representation, he delegated most of the communi-
cation with the client to his non-lawyer assistant; that even
after the client herself obtained a file-stamped request for a
hearing, Hamer failed to serve the request on opposing
counsel, and as a result, opposing counsel did not appear at
the scheduled hearing; that at the hearing, Hamer and the
client had an oral dispute in the presence of the judge; that
Hamer erroneously included a statement in his written
notice of intent to withdraw as the client’s counsel that a
specific motion had been filed when it had not been filed; and
that the client obtained her final divorce decree with other
counsel.

As to SDB Docket No. 6814, Hamer admitted that
another client retained him to file an uncontested divorce;
that he did not have a trust account and deposited the
client’s cash payments in his firm’s operating account; that
he delegated most of the communication with the client to
his non-lawyer assistant; that the client made several inqui-
ries about the court date for her case, and the evening before
the scheduled court date, Hamer’s non-lawyer assistant sent
a text to the client stating that the court date had been
moved; that the next day, on December 17, 2014, the client
met with Hamer, and Hamer told her that her husband’s
refusal to sign a settlement agreement meant that the case
was contested, would take longer, and would cost more but
that he would work to bring the case to conclusion; that
about a week later, on December 24, 2014, Hamer received
an e-mail from the court stating that the case had been
placed on an uncontested calendar for January 6, 2015; that
neither he nor his assistant tried contacting the client to
notify her of the January 6, 2015 setting; that on January 6,
2015, Hamer’s non-lawyer assistant tried unsuccessfully to
contact the client and then sent her a text; that the client
stated she tried unsuccessfully to call Hamer’s office in
response to the text on January 6, 2015; that a few days later,
the client informed Hamer that she had been traveling out of
the country from December 24, 2014 until January 9, 2015

es 749

and had previously informed him of her travel plans at their
December 17, 2014 meeting; that Hamer tried unsuccess-
fully to persuade the judge to reopen the case but it was
dismissed for want of prosecution on January 14, 2015; that
he offered to file a new case for the client if she would pay the
court filing fee but she refused and demanded a refund,
which Hamer declined to provide.

Regarding SDB Docket No. 6815, Hamer admitted that
a third client retained him to represent her in a legitimation
and custody action and paid half of his fee upfront; that after
successfully defending the client in an emergency hearing,
he thereafter delegated communication with her to his
non-lawyer assistant; that over the next few months, both he
and his assistant failed to adequately respond to the client’s
requests to speak or meet with them, failed to maintain
reasonable communication with the client, and failed to
adequately and accurately inform the client about the status
of her case; that he did not serve written discovery in the
case; that he failed to adequately communicate with the
client regarding the written discovery served by opposing
counsel and failed to file any responses on the client’s behalf;
that he filed a motion to withdraw from representation but
failed to give the client prior notice of his intent to withdraw
or to serve her with a copy of the motion to withdraw; that
the client learned of the withdrawal after entry of an order
permitting withdrawal; and that the client requested a
partial refund of the fee, which Hamer declined to provide.

Hamer, 300 Ga. at 70-71.

The special master found that Hamer’s conduct in SDB Docket
No. 6813 violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 (d) of the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct. As to SDB Docket No. 6814, the special
master found Hamer’s conduct to have violated Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15
(I) (a), 1.16 (d), 3.2, and 5.3 (b). As to SDB Docket No. 6815, the
special master found that Hamer violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (a),
1.16 (d), 3.2, and 8.4 (a) (4). The maximum sanction for a violation of
Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.15 (II) (a), 5.3, and 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment, and the
maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, and 3.2 is a
public reprimand.

In his report, the special master notes that this Court looks to the
ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for guidance in
determining the appropriate sanction, see In the Matter of Morse, 266
Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232) (1996), and he concludes — based on the
factors enumerated in ABA Standards 4.41 (b), 4.41 (c), 4.61, 4.12,

750 es

and 7.1, respectively — that disbarment is appropriate in this matter
because Hamer knowingly failed to provide services to a client,
engaged in a pattern of neglect of client matters, knowingly deceived
a client with the intent to benefit himself, dealt improperly with
client property, and engaged in conduct in violation of his duties as a
lawyer with the intent to benefit himself. In aggravation of discipline,
the special master notes that Hamer’s conduct demonstrates a pat-
tern of misconduct consisting of multiple offenses, that he obstructed
the disciplinary proceeding in bad faith, and that he has substantial
experience in the practice of law. Hamer did not respond in this Court
to the filing of the special master’s report.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered
that the name of Nolen Arthur Hamer be removed from the rolls of
persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Hamer is
reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017.

|
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

$17A0948. LEBIS v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 724)

GRANT, Justice.

Following a jury trial, Lisa Ann Lebis appeals her convictions of
felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of
Officer Sean Callahan. Lebis contends that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support the verdict with regard to a number of counts

+ OnJune 19, 2013, Lebis was indicted for the felony murder of Officer Callahan predicated
on the felony of possession, as a party to the crime, of a firearm by a convicted felon; two counts
of disorderly conduct; second degree criminal damage to property; four counts of misdemeanor
obstruction of a police officer; one count of felony obstruction of a police officer; one count of
simple battery; one count of theft by receiving stolen property; two counts of possession of a
dangerous weapon; and three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following
a jury trial, Lebis was found guilty of felony murder, criminal trespass to property as a lesser
included offense of criminal damage to property, all five counts of obstruction, simple battery,
all counts of possession of a dangerous weapon, and all counts of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. Lebis was acquitted of the remaining counts of the indictment. The trial court
sentenced Lebis to life imprisonment for felony murder, twelve months for criminal trespass to
run consecutively to felony murder, twelve months to serve for each of the four counts of
misdemeanor obstruction consecutive to each other and to criminal trespass, five years for

es 761

against her and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
the case. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse
in part—affirming Lebis’s convictions of two of the misdemeanor
obstruction counts, all of the counts regarding possession of firearms
and dangerous weapons, and of felony murder; but reversing her
conviction of the other two misdemeanor obstructions.

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record
shows that Lebis and her husband, Tremaine, had been staying in a
rented motel room near their home for eight days, but they were
asked to vacate the room after failure to pay. Lebis cursed at motel
staff, who called 911 to report Lebis’s unruly behavior. Shortly
thereafter, Officer Waymondo Brown and Officer Callahan arrived to
investigate. After talking to motel staff, they proceeded to Lebis’s
room, where they discovered Lebis and Tremaine moving items into
the motel breezeway. Officer Brown asked them to stop what they
were doing, and he discovered that the room that they had been
staying in was severely soiled and damaged. After inspecting the
motel room, Officer Brown walked out and gave a hand signal to
Officer Callahan to indicate that they were going to place Lebis and
Tremaine under arrest. Officer Brown did not see the fanny pack that
Tremaine was wearing at that time, and neither officer knew that
Tremaine was carrying a handgun in the fanny pack.

Officer Brown grabbed Tremaine’s right arm and told Tremaine
to put his left arm behind his back and keep it there. Lebis became
irate, and started yelling very loudly at Officer Brown to leave
Tremaine alone. Officer Brown testified that Lebis’s screaming was
“not assisting” with the execution of the arrest. Tremaine struggled,
was ultimately tasered without full effect, and broke free and ran
behind the motel. Officers Brown and Callahan pursued, with Officer
Callahan in the lead. During the pursuit, Tremaine pulled his gun, a
.357 caliber Glock, from the fanny pack and began shooting, fatally
wounding Officer Callahan. Officer Brown returned fire, killing

felony obstruction consecutive to the misdemeanor obstruction counts, five years for each
possession of a dangerous weapon count to run consecutively to each other and the count of
felony obstruction, and five years for each count of possession of a firearm by a convieted felon
to run consecutively to each other and to the counts of possession of a dangerous weapon. The
count of simple battery was merged with felony obstruction for purposes of sentencing. On
March 4, 2014, Lebis filed a motion for new trial and amended it on January 12, 2016. On May
20, 2016, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. On June 6, 2016, Lebis timely filed a
notice of appeal, and her case was assigned to the April 2017 term of this Court. The case was
orally argued on August 14, 2017.

752 ]

Tremaine. Officer Brown ran to Tremaine, kicked away his gun, and
went to assist Officer Callahan, who had fallen over a retaining wall.

Officer Brown tried to move Officer Callahan, but was unable to
do so. Instead, he began to administer CPR, which he continued to do
for approximately two minutes. At that point, Lebis appeared at the
top of the retaining wall and started yelling at Officer Brown, asking
him if he killed her husband. At that moment, Officer Brown realized
that he had not secured Tremaine’s weapon, making him vulnerable.
Officer Brown pointed his gun at Lebis with one hand while trying to
maintain pressure on Officer Callahan’s gunshot wound with the
other. Officer Brown yelled at Lebis repeatedly until she showed him
her hands so he could see that she was unarmed. Officer Brown then
resumed CPR on Officer Callahan.
In response to an emergency alert sent by Officer Brown, Officer
Alex Frazier next reported to the scene and found Lebis, who had
come back from behind the building, standing next to the patrol cars
parked in front of the motel. Officer Frazier pointed his firearm at
Lebis and ordered her to show him her hands. At the time, she was
talking on a cell phone, with one hand holding the cell phone and the
other down by her pocket area. Lebis did not comply with Officer
Frazier’s commands. Instead, she began to move in his direction.
Officer Frazier instructed Lebis to get on the ground, but she did not
comply and kept advancing. Another officer, who had then arrived at
the scene, approached Lebis from behind, took her to the ground, and
restrained her. Later, Officer Joshua Waites arrived on the scene. By
that time, Lebis was being held in the back of a patrol car. Officer
Waites opened the door in an attempt to search Lebis for weapons,
and she started kicking him wildly.

Numerous dangerous weapons and firearms were recovered
from the scene. The weapon that Tremaine used to shoot Officer
Callahan was a modified .357 caliber Glock handgun. The following
guns and ammunition were removed from the motel room shared by
Lebis and Tremaine: a shotgun, a modified 9mm handgun, 20 live
rounds of .357 Winchester ammunition, 30 live rounds of 9mm
ammunition, and 16 shotgun shells. Additional weaponry taken from
the motel room included harpoon-like rocket motors with attached
razor tips, a homemade silencer, a razor blade, two knives, a laser
scope, and a homemade bandolier for shotgun shells. The weapons
were found inside boxes and luggage, with some wrapped in clothing
and several others in plain view. When interviewed by police after
Officer Callahan’s shooting, Lebis admitted that she knew that
Tremaine carried a gun in his fanny pack during his flight from police,
but she denied knowledge of the other weapons in the motel room. She

es 768

did admit that she knew the person from whom Tremaine purchased
weapons.

With regard to the convictions Lebis does not challenge in this
appeal,” the evidence was sufficient to enable a jury to find her guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99
SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). As for the convictions Lebis does
challenge, we consider each one in turn.

II.

Lebis’s challenge to her convictions of all five possession counts
and of felony murder are interrelated because the felony murder
charge’s predicate felony was the alleged possession of a firearm—
the murder weapon—by a convicted felon. Lebis contends that there
was insufficient evidence to support her convictions on Counts XI
and XIII charging her with possession of dangerous weapons and on
Counts XIV, XV, and XVI charging her with possession of firearms by
a convicted felon. The possession counts all concerned the various
weapons and firearms recovered after the murder, which occurred
when Tremaine fled from the motel room he and Lebis shared for
eight days. Lebis also argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support her conviction, as a party to the crime, of felony murder
predicated on possession of the weapon Tremaine pulled from his
fanny pack at the time of the killing. We find that the evidence was
sufficient to support Lebis’s convictions on all of these counts.

Before turning back to the facts of this case, some background is
appropriate. It is true that “[p]ossession of contraband may be joint
or exclusive, and actual or constructive.” In the Interest of D. H., 285
Ga. 51, 52 (1) (673 SE2d 191) (2009) (punctuation omitted). Actual
possession means knowing, direct physical control over something at
a given time. Id. For constructive possession, the standard is also
well-understood: if a person has both the “power and the intention at
a given time to exercise dominion or control” over a thing, then the
person is in constructive possession of that thing. State v. Lewis, 249
Ga. 565, 567 (292 SE2d 667) (1982); Jones v. State, 339 Ga. App. 95,
98 (1) (a) (791 SE2d 625) (2016); Holiman v. State, 313 Ga. App. 76, 78
(1) (720 SE2d 363) (2011) (“A person who, though not in actual
possession, knowingly has both the power and intention at a given
time to exercise dominion and control over a thing is then in con-
structive possession of it.”) (citation and punctuation omitted);

2 ‘These counts include criminal damage to property, felony obstruction of a police officer,
and simple battery.

74 ]

Murray v. State, 309 Ga. App. 828, 830 (711 SE2d 387) (2011)
(applying same standard to possession of a weapon). Mere proximity
to contraband, absent other evidence connecting a suspect with that
contraband, is not enough to establish constructive possession. Mitch-
ell v. State, 268 Ga. 592 (492 SE2d 204) (1997). If one person alone has
actual or constructive possession of a thing, then the person is in sole
possession of it. Lewis, 249 Ga. at 567. If two or more people share
actual or constructive possession of a thing, then their possession is
joint. Id.

Constructive possession can be proven—and very oftenis proven—by
circumstantial evidence. See Holiman, 313 Ga. App. at 80 (1) (b). Of
course, as with any charge based on purely circumstantial evidence,
in order to support a conviction “the evidence must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis, save that of constructive possession by the
defendant.” Id.; see also Smiley v. State, 300 Ga. 582, 586 (1) (797
SE2d 472) (2017) (citing OCGA § 24-14-6 (2013)). As we have noted,
proximity to contraband is plainly not enough. Stacey v. State, 292
Ga. 838, 840 (1) (a) (741 SE2d 881) (2013). But as this Court has also
held, consistent with OCGA § 24-14-6, “questions as to the reason-
ableness of hypotheses are generally to be decided by the jury which
heard the evidence and .. . that finding will not be disturbed unless
the verdict of guilty is unsupportable as a matter of law.” Robbins v.
State, 269 Ga. 500, 501 (1) (499 SE2d 323) (1998); see also Dixon v.
State, 298 Ga. 200, 202 (1) (779 SE2d 290) (2015). In other words,

whether the evidence shows something more than mere
presence or proximity, and whether it excludes every other
reasonable hypothesis, are questions committed principally
to the trier of fact, and we [should] not disturb the decisions
of the trier of fact about these things unless they cannot be
supported as a matter of law.

Holiman, 313 Ga. App. at 80 (1) (b).

A. Giving appropriate deference to the factfinder’s assessment of
the weight and credibility of the evidence, the direct evidence shows
that Lebis had been cohabitating with Tremaine in proximity with
the five weapons that she was convicted of possessing. But the
circumstantial evidence shows far more, and the jury’s evaluation of
the totality of the evidence should be respected.

The evidence introduced at trial plainly supports the inference
that Lebis and her husband Tremaine were prepared to resist arrest
with firearms and other dangerous weapons in the event that they
were detected at the motel. The jury heard and saw evidence that the

es 765

couple, along with their three dogs, occupied a small motel room for
eight days prior to the crimes in order to evade the husband's arrest.
Lebis gave a variety of unsupportable answers when asked why she
and her husband had stayed in the tiny room rather than in their
nearby home. Lebis was the one who procured money—cash only—to
pay for their stay at the motel. The room was registered in the name
of Lebis’s son, although he never stayed there, and was only listed as
having a single occupant. And Lebis herself was the only one who
communicated with motel staff; in fact, staff were surprised to find
her husband Tremaine in the room when they entered to check its
condition. Lebis was clear with police officers investigating the
crimes after the fact that Tremaine had told her that he was never
going back to prison. The ready inference from these facts is that
Lebis did not want anyone to know that her husband was at the motel
because there was a warrant out for his arrest. See Whaley v. State,
337 Ga. App. 50, 55-56 (2) (785 SE2d 685) (2016) (relying on fact that
two individuals had acted in concert on the night of the crime to
support finding of constructive possession).

The evidence presented regarding the state of the room shared by
Lebis and her husband further supports the jury’s finding of con-
structive possession. The pair’s belongings were intermixed in the
room and outside of the room; Lebis herself repeatedly explained to
investigators that she and her husband were in the process of getting
“our stuff” out of the motel room when police came. Lebis’s references
to “our stuff” goes beyond admitting mere control of the premises, and
the jury may well have taken her comments as an admission of
control of the contrabanditself. Cf. Holiman, 313 Ga. App. at 81 (1) (b)
(because defendant referred to apartment as “our house,” a “rational
trier of fact might take this reference as an admission of his control
of the premises” as well as a presumption of possession). Motel
management also testified that Lebis stated that her life was in that
room. In addition, the jury was shown multiple pictures of the
weapons and bags inside the room. Those photographs show the
small size of the room and the close proximity in which Lebis and her
husband were living. That too supports the jury’s conclusion that
Lebis was guilty of constructive possession. See Stacey, 292 Ga. at 840
(1) (a) (recognizing rebuttable presumption of joint possession of
contraband found in a bedroom between parties who live together in
that same bedroom); see also Mantooth v. State, 335 Ga. App. 734, 736
(1) (a) (783 SE2d 133) (2016) (evidence that defendant was “more than
merely present” in apartment where firearm was found supported
finding of constructive possession); Jones, 339 Ga. App. at 99 & n.17
(evidence that defendant had control over residence supported jury’s
finding of constructive possession).

756 ]

The photographs also show that some of the weapons were
contained in clear plastic boxes or otherwise highly visible. For
example, there was testimony and photographic evidence that the
barrel of a shotgun was visible and sticking out from one of the bags.
An empty long gun case was pulled out from under the sole bed in the
room. Some of the weapons were found on the top of the crate for the
dogs that Lebis and her husband owned and kept with them in the
small room. See Stacey, 292 Ga. at 840 (1) (a) (plain view of contra-
band supports finding of constructive possession); Whaley, 337 Ga.
App. at 56 (2) (presence of contrabandin plain sight supported finding
of joint possession, as did circumstantial evidence of equal access);
Holiman, 313 Ga. App. at 81 (1) (b) (same). In fact, one handgun had
been acquired and extensively modified during the eight-day period
that Lebis and her husband were staying in the small room.

Officers stated that nothing about any of the items in the room
indicated that they were in the sole possession of a particular person.
Moreover, in spite of the small size of the room, the fact that the
couple’s belongings were intermixed, and the fact that many of the
weapons were in plain sight in the room, Lebis (rather implausibly)
denied that she was aware that they were there. Lebis eventually
confessed that she knew about at least one weapon, and the jury
watched a video recording of her explaining to an investigator that her
husband carried a gun inside his fanny pack that he had modified
because he was in the military and “he did all kinds of stuff like that.”
She was able to draw a picture of the gun when asked and she
described the scope and the “little packs for extra ammo.” The shifting
narrative from Lebis regarding her knowledge of the items in the
room, as wellas her reasons for living there instead of in her own home
could also support an inference by the jury that she exercised domin-
ion over the weapons. Cf. Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 814 (1)
(746 SE2d 280) (2013) (giving false name to officers among the factors
supporting constructive possession finding). Indeed, the jury heard
that Lebis knew her husband owned guns, knew who he bought them
from and where he bought them, and that she had previously attempted.
to conceal the presence of firearms in the home she shared with her
husband after he shot himself in the hand with a gun he illegally
owned. That evidence too supports the jury’s verdict on constructive
possession. See Stacey, 292 Ga. at 840 (1) (a) (defendant’s admission
that he was aware of roommate’s drug sales supported constructive
possession finding).

Significant evidence, therefore, connects Lebis to the weapons in
the motel room. The State was not required to show that Lebis solely
or actually possessed the weapons at any point. Nor was it required
to offer direct evidence that she possessed them. Instead, the State

es 167

had to put forward enough evidence so that a properly-instructed jury
could reasonably conclude that Lebis at least jointly and construc-
tively possessed the weapons in her motel room. The State did just
that. As in Holiman, the circumstantial evidence in this case shows
a connection between Lebis and the weapons in her motel room
“beyond mere presence and spatial proximity, or at least a rational
trier of fact could find that it does.” 313 Ga. App. at 83 (1) (b) (emphasis
supplied). Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict on the constructive possession charges in
this case, and we affirm her convictions of those crimes.

B. The evidence was also sufficient to support the jury’s verdict
that Lebis was guilty of felony murder as a party to her husband’s
possession of a firearm as a convicted felon—a criminal act that
proximately caused the death of Officer Callahan. See, e.g., Metts v.
State, 270 Ga. 481, 482 (511 SE2d 508) (1999) (“Appellant’s posses-
sion of the firearm was dangerous and life-threatening, and had
‘an undeniable connection to the homicide.’”) (citation and punc-
tuation omitted). Lebis argued at trial and before this Court that
she could not be convicted of felony murder because she was not
in possession of the gun with which Officer Callahan was killed
at the time he was shot. But her argument misunderstands the
party-to-a-crime doctrine; because the jury had sufficient evidence to
conclude that she was a party to her husband’s crime of possessing a
firearm as a convicted felon, and because that crime was the proxi-
mate cause of Officer Callahan’s death, Lebis is accountable.

In order to understand why this is so, we again recount some of
the facts of the crime. At the time that Tremaine shot Officer
Callahan, the evidence shows that Tremaine, not Lebis, had actual
and sole possession of the .357 caliber Glock that he pulled from the
fanny pack he wore. It is true that a person who knowingly has direct
physical control over a thing at a given time is in actual possession of
it. See In the Interest of D. H., 285 Ga. at 52. Constructive possession,
on the other hand, requires that a person who does not have physical
control of a thing does have both the “power and the intention at a
given time to exercise dominion or control” over it. Lewis, 249 Ga. at
567; Jones, 339 Ga. App. at 98 (1) (a). If two or more people share
possession of a thing, then their possession is joint, but if, as here, one
person alone has possession of a thing, then the person is in sole
possession of it. See Lewis, 249 Ga. at 567. In the view of Lebis, this
is enough to clear her of the crime of felony murder. She notes that
Tremaine had left the motel room at the time of the shooting, and
indeed there is no evidence that Lebis had the intention or ability to
exercise control over the murder weapon at that point. But that does
not mean that she was not responsible, as a party to the crime, for the

758 ]

actions taken by her husband; that is, she did not need to have had
actual or even constructive possession of the handgun in order to be
responsible for the killing of Officer Callahan.

Can parties to a crime be guilty of illegal possession of a weapon
even when they themselves exercise no physical control over the
weapon, or even potential access to the weapon? Both the Court of
Appeals and this Court have, in the past, reached the right answer
on that question, albeit for the wrong reason. The Court of Appeals
has held that because the act of one conspirator is the act of all
co-conspirators, a defendant may constructively possess a firearm at
the time that a co-conspirator alone actually possessed and used it in
the execution or furtherance of the conspiracy. See Davis v. State, 287
Ga. App. 783, 785 (1) (653 SE2d 107) (2007) (citing Moses v. State, 265
Ga. App. 203, 213 (6) (c) (693 SE2d 372) (2004)). And this Court has
held likewise. See Aikens v. State, 297 Ga. 229, 230 (1) (773 SE2d 229)
(2015). But we read those cases as ones that should have instead
determined that a defendant can be held responsible for the actions
of another as a party to the crime or as a co-conspirator, without also
concluding that the defendant constructively possessed the contra-
band actually and solely possessed by another. So even though Lebis
did not jointly possess that firearm with Tremaine at the moment of
the murder, it remains true that she can be held to account for the
actions of another—here, her husband—as a party to the crime or as
a co-conspirator. Accordingly, her arguments that she did not con-
structively possess the firearm do not help her escape responsibility
for the crime.

That is because Tremaine’s possession of the firearm as a con-
victed felon was the proximate cause of Officer Callahan’s shooting—
““(t)hat which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.’” Black’s Law Dictionary 1103
(5th ed. 1979) (cited in State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 648 (697 SE2d
757) (2010)). As we explained in Jackson, proximate cause for murder
exists if “the felony the defendants committed ‘directly and materi-
ally contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immedi-
ate cause of death.’” 287 Ga. at 652 (citation omitted).

It is plain enough that the shooting would not have happened but
for Tremaine’s possession of the firearm. And, as noted above, the jury
had sufficient evidence before it to conclude that Lebis and Tremaine
had together hidden out in the motel room with a stockpile of weapons
in order to escape or defend against Tremaine’s arrest. Indeed, when
“the crimes ‘involve relatives, slight circumstances can support the
inference that the parties colluded.’” Teasley v. State, 288 Ga. 468,
469 (704 SE2d 800) (2011) (quoting Adamson v. State, 238 Ga. App.

es 759

105, 106 (516 SE2d 310) (1999)); see also Dublin v. State, 302 Ga. 60,
65 (3) (805 SE2d 27) (2017) (“Whether a person was a party to acrime
can be inferred from his presence, companionship, and conduct before
and after the crime was committed.”) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Lebis also argues that “even if there had been previous joint
ownership,” her husband's act of fleeing from officers “constitute[d] a
superseding intervening variable,” severing her responsibility for his
actions. It did not. In fact, the flight from the officers appears to be
entirely consistent with the shared purpose of Lebis and Tremaine.
The jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that Tremaine’s posses-
sion of the firearm at the time he shot the officer was a part of their
scheme; indeed, that was the theory the State set before the jury,
which received instructions on conspiracy and party-to-a-crime in
addition to the substantive instructions related to the specific offenses
charged.* In short, because the jury could have reasonably concluded
that Lebis was a party to the crime of her husband’s possession of the
firearm, she also bears responsibility for the consequences of that
crime.

Although Lebis raised sufficiency of the evidence rather than a
“fatal variance” between the language of the indictment, which
charged joint possession, and the proof at trial, we also note that any
suggestion of such a fatal variance would also fail. “Our courts no
longer employ an overly technical application of the fatal variance
rule, focusing instead on materiality. The true inquiry, therefore, is
not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has
been such a variance as to affect the substantial rights of the
accused.” Roscoe v. State, 288 Ga. 775, 776 (3) (707 SE2d 90) (2011)
(quoting Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 396 (3) (627 SE2d 579)
(2006)). A variance, in turn, is only fatal if: (1) the allegations fail to
“definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to
enable him to present his defense and not be taken by surprise,” and
(2) the allegations are not “adequate to protect the accused against
another prosecution for the same offense.” Id.

As prior cases in this Court and the Court of Appeals show, no
fatal variance existed here between the evidence and the indictment.
In the factually similar case of Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 786 (653
SE2d 104) (2007), the accused argued that “because the indictment
charged him with possession of a firearm ‘on his person,’ it varied

® Although useful in demonstrating that Lebis was aware of the nature of the charges
against her, it was not necessary for the indictment to charge Lebis with being a party to the
crime in order to prove her culpability in that manner. See Butler v, State, 273 Ga. 380, 384 (541
SE2d 653) (2001); see also Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 786, 787 (653 SE2d 104) (2001) (finding
no fatal variance even where defendant not charged as party to a crime).

760 ]

fatally from the evidence presented at trial that the other perpetrator
actually possessed the handgun.” Id. at 787. The Court of Appeals
rejected that argument, properly noting that although the evidence
may not have shown the accused “was in physical possession” of the
firearm during the underlying crime, the evidence “authorized a
finding that he was a party to the crime and that he and his
co-defendants were joint conspirators. The act of either was the act of
the other and each is as fully responsible for the act of the other as if
he had committed that act.” Id. And in Roscoe, we affirmed the
defendant’s conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
even assuming that the underlying felony conviction used by the
State was a variance from the allegations in the indictment; because
the indictment sufficiently informed the accused of the charges
against him, he failed to show that he was unable to present a viable
defense or that he was surprised at trial. 288 Ga. at 776 (3). The same
is true here.

In sum, because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
prove that Lebis was guilty of felony murder, we affirm her conviction
of this crime.

III.

Lebis was found guilty of four misdemeanor counts of obstructing
a police officer, and she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting each of them. “A person commits the offense of obstruction
of an officer when he knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any
law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties.
Flight after a lawful command to halt constitutes obstruction of an
officer.” Cofield v. State, 304 Ga. App. 165, 168 (695 SE2d 696) (2010)
(citing OCGA § 16-10-24 (a)). As to two of the misdemeanor obstruc-
tion convictions that Lebis challenges—her alleged obstruction of
Officers Brown and Callahan in their attempt to arrest Tremaine, as
charged in Counts V and VI of the indictment—we agree that the
evidence was insufficient to support those convictions; as to the other
two misdemeanor obstruction convictions that she challenges—her
alleged obstruction of Officer Brown in his attempt to perform
life-saving efforts on Officer Callahan, as charged in Count VII of the
indictment, and her alleged obstruction of Officer Frazier by refusing
to comply with his lawful commands during the incident, as charged
in Count VIII of the indictment—we disagree with Lebis and find that
the evidence was sufficient to support those convictions.

A. At trial, Officer Brown testified that Lebis repeatedly yelled,
“Leave him alone,” when he and Officer Callahan were attempting to
handcuff Tremaine. When asked about the effect of Lebis’s scream-

es 761

ing, Officer Brown testified that it was “not assisting” with the arrest
of Tremaine. He did not testify, however, and the evidence did not
show, that Lebis intentionally hindered the arrest by her protesta-
tions. And there was no evidence that Lebis refused or failed to
comply with any directives from either officer at this time.

Under certain circumstances, words alone can constitute obstruc-
tion. See Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 495-496 (677 SE2d 680)
(2009). This case, however, is different than those in which our courts
have found obstruction based solely on words or remonstrations.
Misdemeanor obstruction convictions based on a defendant’s words
have survived appellate review where the defendant’s words affir-
matively interfered with the officers’ actions. Harris v. State, 314 Ga.
App. 816, 820-821 (726 SE2d 455) (2012). In those cases, the defen-
dant: instructed someone to remove evidence from a crime scene;
refused to leave a scene and yelled so loudly so as to interfere with an
officer’s ability to conduct a witness interview; deliberately misled an
officer about the defendant’s identity; lied to officers about the
whereabouts of suspects; and deliberately misled a responding officer
about the defendant’s role in a car wreck. See id. (gathering cases).

The fact that Lebis was “not assisting” with the arrest in this case
when she yelled at officers to leave Tremaine alone, without anything
more, did not rise to the level of obstruction, and so her convictions for
obstruction under Counts V and VI of the indictment must be
reversed.

B. Lebis next contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support her obstruction conviction for “hinder[ing Officer] Brown...
by diverting [his] attention from performing life saving efforts on
wounded Officer Sean Callahan.” For this count of obstruction, the
evidence does indicate that Lebis failed to immediately comply with
Officer Brown’s directive to show him her hands so that he could
determine that she was not carrying a weapon. Accordingly, there
was evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Lebis committed
obstruction when she failed to comply with an officer’s lawful com-
mand and hindered him in the performance of his duties. We affirm
that conviction.

C. Lebis also maintains that the evidence was insufficient to
support her conviction for “obstruct[ing Officer] Alex Frazier ... by
refusing to comply with his commands to stop moving and get on the
ground, while officers were investigating a police involved shooting.”®
Here, the record shows that, despite Officer Frazier’s repeated requests

* This charge is set forth in Count VII of the indictment
® This charge is set forth in Count VIII of the indictment.

762 ]

to put away her cell phone, stop walking toward him, and show him
her hands, Lebis deliberately and intentionally disobeyed his lawful
requests. In fact, there is evidence that Lebis actively approached
Officer Frazier to the extent that the other officer was required to
take Lebis to the ground. The evidence was sufficient to support this
count of obstruction, and we affirm it as well.

IV.

Lebis contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to (a) request that opening and closing arguments be
transcribed and (b) procure an expert to testify that the short time
that Lebis distracted Officer Brown from providing life-saving pro-
cedures to Officer Callahan did not contribute to his death. We
disagree.

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
defendant must satisfy the familiar standard set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). Under
the Strickland standard, a defendant must prove both that the
performance of his lawyer was deficient and that he was prejudiced
by the deficient performance. Mims v. State, 299 Ga. 578, 579-580
(787 SE2d 237) (2016). If an appellant fails to satisfy either prong of
the Strickland test, the other prong need not be examined, and in
reviewing the trial court’s decision, “‘[w]e accept the trial court’s
factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erro-
neous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.’ ”
Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (734 SE2d 876) (2012) (quoting
Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 SE2d 313) (2003)).

First, Lebis fails to make an adequate showing as to why trial
counsel’s decision not to request that opening statements and closing
arguments be transcribed may have harmed her. As such, she has
made no showing of prejudice at all, and this claim of ineffective
assistance necessarily fails. Wright, 291 Ga. at 870 (2).

Lebis next contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assis-
tance by failing to procure an expert to testify that Lebis’s obstruction
of Officer Brown as he attempted to provide life-saving procedures to
Officer Callahan did not contribute to Officer Callahan’s death. The
State was not required, however, to prove that Lebis’s obstruction
actually contributed to Officer Callahan’s death, but merely to prove
that Lebis hindered Officer Brown’s performance of life-saving efforts.
Accordingly, this asserted ground of ineffective assistance is merit-
less and fails.

Because we have reversed Lebis’s convictions of two misde-
meanor obstruction counts, and affirmed the other convictions, we

es 768

remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and caseremanded
for resentencing. All the Justices concur, except Melton, P. J., who
concurs fully in Divisions I, III, and IV and in judgment only in
Division II.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED JANUARY 16, 2018.

— a —_ " om — " ——— a appel-

lant.

Tracy Graham Lawson, District Attorney, Jeffrey M. Gore, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patri-
cia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

$16H1197. REDMON v. JOHNSON.
(809 SE2d 468)

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-14-52, we hereby summarily deny peti-
tioner’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the
habeas court’s final order denying his petition for habeas corpus
challenging his criminal convictions. The Court similarly denies
summarily the applications of another 20 habeas petitioners today, as
we have denied thousands of such applications in the past (while
granting a few each year, including two today).

We normally issue these summary denials of habeas applications
by unpublished order. However, there appears to be significant
misunderstanding of the process by which this Court renders these
decisions and the import of our decisions, both among repeat litigants
in state habeas proceedings and among the federal courts that
sometimes see the same cases — particularly death penalty cases —
later in federal habeas corpus proceedings brought under 28 USC
§ 2254. See Wilson v. Warden, 834 F3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc),
cert. granted sub nom. Wilson v. Sellers, __ U.S. ___ (187 SCt 1203,
197 LE2d 245) (2017) (No. 16-6855). While we offer no view on the
question of federal habeas law presented in Wilson, the answer to that
question appears to depend in part on presumptions about this
Court’s summary denials of habeas applications, and those presump-
tions should be founded on reality rather than supposition, inference,

764 es

or misinformation. We therefore take this opportunity to explain.

1. Our Habeas Application Review Process.

This Court gives every habeas application careful and indepen-
dent consideration. A habeas corpus petitioner seeking to appeal a
final superior court order denying his petition must file not only a
timely application in this Court for a certificate of probable cause to
appeal, but also a timely notice of appeal in the habeas court. See
OCGA § 9-14-52 (b); Fullwood v. Siviey, 271 Ga. 248, 250 (517 SE2d
511) (1999). The latter requirement leads to the record being for-
warded to this Court so that it may be considered along with the
application.’

In every habeas case, an attorney from our Central Staff, under
the general supervision of the Justice to whom the case is assigned,
reviews the application and drafts a memorandum for the Court.
Where there is an obvious procedural defect that will result in the
application being dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, such as
an untimely application or notice of appeal, the memorandum may be
just a paragraph. But in most cases, the memoranda are based on a
review of all pertinent portions of the record and present a detailed,
multi-page discussion of the proceedings below, the habeas court’s
order, the arguments presented in the application, and the factual
and legal merits of each argument. In habeas applications in death
penalty cases, which are drafted by Central Staff attorneys who
specialize in death penalty matters, the memoranda regularly exceed
50 single-spaced pages.

Unless recused, every Justice reviews and votes on every habeas
application. Until recently, every habeas case was discussed at a bane
conference of the Court. Now, using a process modeled on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s process for discussing petitions for certiorari, our
Court discusses any habeas case that a single Justice lists for
discussion, with the other cases placed on a unanimous consent list
voted on collectively. The discussions sometimes lead to further
consideration and additional memoranda on cases, which are then
brought back for discussion at subsequent conferences. At the end of
this process, the Court decides whether to grant the habeas applica-
tion and thus initiate the full appeal process, which includes briefing,
the opportunity for oral argument, and the drafting, consideration,
approval, and issuance of a published, precedential opinion.

. The statutory requirements that habeas hearings must be transcribed, see OCGA § 9-14-50,
that the habeas court's order must include written findings of fact and conclusions of law as part
of the record, see OCGA § 9-14-49, and that the record (including the transcript, if designated)
must be sent to this Court all serve the purpose of enabling us “to consider fully the request for
a certificate” authorizing an appeal, OCGA § 9-14-52 (b)..

es 765

2. The Import of Our Summary Denial of a Habeas Application.

Under this Court’s Rule 36, if a majority of the Justices deter-
mine that the application shows that the habeas case has “arguable
merit,” the application will be granted. It is important to understan:
what “arguable merit” means in this context: it means that the
petitioner has a fair probability of ultimately prevailing in his case by
obtaining habeas relief. Our decision to deny a habeas application is
therefore squarely a decision on the merits of the case.”

Our determination of whether a full appeal should be granted is
focused primarily on the correctness of the habeas court’s fina
judgment denying relief, not on the quality of the habeas court’s order
explaining that judgment. If it is clear that the habeas court’s
judgment would be affirmed after the full appellate process, then —
except in the rare circumstances discussed below — this Court wil
deny the petitioner’s application to initiate that extensive process
and will devote our limited decisional resources to other matters. We
do not consider only the substantive merits of the case. Ifa procedura
defect under Georgia statutory or decisional law would prevent the
habeas court from properly granting relief to the petitioner, or woul
prevent this Court from properly granting relief on appeal, then the
application lacks arguable merit. See generally Tolbert v. Toole, 296
Ga. 357, 361 n.8 (767 SE2d 24) (2014).

In the course of our independent review of the applications an
records in habeas cases, the Court occasionally identifies factual an:
legal errors in habeas court orders — as we have in this case. In death
penalty cases, which typically involve extensive factual records an!
present a multitude of complicated legal issues addressed in lengthy
habeas court orders, identifying at least a few such errors is a routine
occurrence. If the Court decides that such errors, separately or
collectively, would arguably result in the order in question being
reversed or vacated if an appeal were granted, the disposition is
straightforward: the Court grants the application.* On many occa-

2 Appeals in Georgia habeas cases are sometimes referred to as “discretionary,” but that
means only that a full appeal is not provided as of right in every habeas case. If the Court
determines based upon its review of an application and the record that a habeas case has
arguable merit, then the Court has no discretion: the application must be granted. The same
is true of the many appeals subject to OCGA § 5-6-35, under which the appellate court must
grant an application to appeal before a full appeal may proceed. While commonly called
“discretionary appeals,” under this Court's Rule 34 (1), if the application in such a case shows
that “[rJeversible error appears to exist,” the application “shall be granted.” See Northwest
Social and Civie Club, Inc. v. Franklin, 276 Ga. 859, 860 (583 SE2d 858) (2003)

® After engaging in the full appellate process, the Court may determine that the issue that
had arguable merit did not have actual merit and therefore may affirm the habeas court’s order
denying relief. See, e.g., Trim v. Shepard, 300 Ga. 176 (794 SE2d 114) (2016); Rozier v. Caldwell,
300 Ga. 30 (793 SE2d 73) (2016).

766 es

sions, however, including in this case, the factual discrepancies
identified are immaterial, and the legal mistakes the habeas court
appears to have made — or even obviously made — would not amount
to reversible error. Indeed, in many such cases, the errors would not
even need to be addressed in an opinion affirming the habeas court’s
order.*

There are many examples of inconsequential errors, but among
the most common are the following:

+ The habeas court rejects a claim both on a procedural
ground and, alternatively, on the substantive merits. This
Court determines that one of those rulings appears factu-
ally or legally erroneous, but the other is correct, so an
appeal would result in the habeas court’s judgment being
affirmed on the correct ground.

+ In addressing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt
2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), the habeas court rules that
counsel did not perform deficiently as alleged. That ruling
appears to be erroneous, but this Court determines based
on our review of the record that no prejudice resulted from
the deficient performance, so an appeal would result in
affirming the habeas court’s judgment. See id. at 697;
Rozier v. Caldwell, 300 Ga. 30, 31-32 (793 SE2d 73) (2016).

+ In addressing other claims that require the petitioner to
prove each element of a multi-part test, such as a claim
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. 8. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10
LE2d 215) (1963), the habeas court makes factual or legal
errors regarding the petitioner’s proof of one element but
correctly concludes (or the record clearly shows) that the
petitioner has not proved another required element. An
appeal would result in this Court’s affirming the habeas
court’s judgment.

+ The habeas court misstates a legal standard in one part of
its order, but recites the standard correctly elsewhere in
the order, and it is clear that the judgment is correct
applying the right standard.

* This Court's ability to spot errors made by habeas judges casts no aspersions on our
hardworking colleagues in the superior courts. A primary purpose of multi-member appellate
courts — particularly ones as large as this Court and with the subject-matter expertise we have
developed regarding habeas corpus cases — is to bring our collective competence to the review
of decisions made by individual trial court judges. Indeed, the harmless-error and right-for-
any-reason doctrines routinely applied in American appellate law are recognitions that trial
courts may make a variety of errors identified by appellate courts that do not undermine the
correctness of the ultimate judgments.

es 167

+ Inaddressing a habeas petition with multitudinous claims,
the habeas court’s order fails to explicitly rule on a claim,
but the record shows that the claim is entirely meritless.

In these and similar situations, the habeas application is prop-
erly denied as lacking arguable merit, as an appeal would have no
realistic chance of succeeding. This Court still has discretion to grant
an application in such a case — as well as in cases where the habeas
court has made no apparent error. We may grant an appeal if the case
presents an issue of great concern, gravity, or importance to the
public; or if there is a need to establish precedent on an issue; or if the
Court has noticed that a number of habeas judges have made a
similar mistake, indicating the need for existing precedent to be
reiterated or clarified even though the mistake was harmless in the
case at hand.®

However, in the mine run of cases where the governing law is
settled and the habeas court’s judgment denying relief would stand
notwithstanding the apparent factual or legal errors in its order, this
Court does not grant the habeas application. No habeas court order
has precedential authority; indeed, Georgia habeas court orders are
almost never even posted by legal research services. And the burdens
of invoking the full appellate process, including writing opinions
simply to point out factual or legal errors that do not affect the
judgment, are significant for this Court. We issue about 350 pub-
lished opinions each year, all en banc, meaning that each Justice
(seven of us until 2017, nine now) must evaluate an opinion a day and
author 35 to 50 majority opinions a year, with the help of only two law
clerks in each chambers.* Moreover, the Georgia Constitution requires
this Court to issue its decision within the two terms of court after an
appeal is docketed (which means within about eight months, given
our three terms per year). See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX,

® Sometimes the Court also notices that a specific habeas judge has repeatedly made a
non-reversible error and issues a “speaking” denial order identifying the error, which will be
received by the judge but not published. The Court also occasionally issues short unpublished
orders granting an application, vacating the habeas court's order, and remanding the case with
direction to comply witha procedural requirement such as holding a hearing to resolve disputed
facts, preparing a transcript of the hearing, or including adequate findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the order.

® By way of comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued 80 or fewer merits opinions in
recent years, with the Justices there (each assisted by four or five law clerks) authoring fewer
than 10 majority opinions per year, In addition to deciding cases by opinion, each year this
Court's Justices also review and vote on hundreds of petitions for certiorari and applications for
discretionary and interlocutory appeal as well as habeas applications, and we also have
extensive administrative duties related to the Court's role in administering Georgia's justice
system.

768 es

Par. IT. And our reasoned decisions are precedent binding on all other
Georgia courts, see id., Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. VI, so issuing opinions
where the relevant law is already well-established runs the risk of
creating inconsistencies.

For these reasons, it should not be presumed that when this
Court summarily denies an application to appeal an order denying
habeas corpus relief, we necessarily agree with everything said in
that order. Our silence does not imply consent to every aspect of the
habeas court’s reasoning, and this Court does not have a “practice of
issuing a reasoned decision denying an application for a certificate of
probable cause when it disagrees with the superior court’s reason-
ing.” Wilson, 834 F3d at 1248 (Jill Pryor, J., dissenting). Instead,
based upon our careful and independent review of habeas applica-
tions and records, we regularly identify factual and legal errors in
orders that would not, on proper application of the governing law to
the factual record, result in different judgments were we to grant full
appeals and issue fully reasoned opinions. Put another way, our
summary denials of habeas applications should be understood, like
summary affirmances by the Supreme Court of the United States and
the federal circuit courts, as approving only the judgment of the court
below, not all of its reasoning. See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury of
Maryland v. Wynne, __ U.S. __ (185 SCt 1787, 1801, 191 LE2d 813)
(2015) (“ [A] summary affirmance is an affirmance of the judgment
only,’ and ‘the rationale of the affirmance may not be gleaned solely
from the opinion below.’” (citation omitted)); DeShong v. Seaboard
Coast Line R. Co., 737 F2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining
that a summary affirmance “only approve[s] the result reached in the
district court without expressly approving the opinion or adopting its
reasons”).

Noting the confusion that was emerging in the federal courts, we
have alluded in some recent unpublished orders to the nature of our
review of habeas applications, but without the detail provided in this
opinion.’ It has also been suggested that we could revise our standard

7 ‘The handling of habeas cases described in this opinion is not new, however; it has been
this Court's practice for as long as can be recalled by the current Justices and by staff attorneys
who have served here going back to the 1980s. In this regard, we note that a handful of retired
Justices from the supreme courts of three other states, who have no knowledge of the operations
of this Court, and one former Justice of this Court, who retired in 2005 and has not since had
anactive habeas practice, have asserted that in their experience, “silent denial of discretionary
review can fairly be read to signal agreement with the underlying decision — not just the
result . . . but the reasoning [of the habeas trial court] as well. And where [they] disagreed,
either with the result or the reasoning, [they] would say so.” Brief of Retired State Supreme
Court Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners in Wilson v. Sellers, No. 16-6855, at
9. They also endorse a “presumption that in cases where [the Georgia Supreme Court] issues

es 769

order so that, instead of simply saying that the habeas application is
“denied,” it says something like “denied based upon our independent
review of the application, any response, and the entire record, not-
withstanding any factual or legal errors in the habeas court’s order
that we may have identified but which would not result in a different
judgment.” But we see no value added by such verbiage, especially
now that we have explained what we mean when we say summarily
that an application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the
denial of habeas corpus is “denied.”

Application denied. All the Justices concur, except Grant, J., not
participating.

DECIDED JANUARY 16, 2018.

Jarvis Redmon, pro se.
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1399. PROTHRO v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 787)

GRANT, Justice.

After a bench trial, Appellant Anthony Prothro was found guilty
of malice murder and other crimes associated with the violent death
of his grandfather, Alvin Driver.! On direct appeal, Prothro claims

summary denials it has adopted the trial courts reasoning — a presumption that is fully in
accord with [their] own experience.” Id. at 14. We cannot speak to the practices in other states,
but as explained in this opinion, this Court's summary denial of a habeas application is — and
has long been — a decision on the merits of the habeas case rather than a “discretionary”
decision, and the proposition that “in cases where [the Georgia Supreme Court] issues summary
denials it has adopted the trial court's reasoning” is simply incorrect.

1 The crimes took place between January 16 and 19, 2013. On October 7, 2013, a Carroll
County grand jury indicted Prothro for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on
aggravated assault by striking Driver on the head with a dumbbell (Count 2), aggravated
assault (Count 3) and aggravated assault on a person over the age of 65 (Count 6) by striking
Driver on the head with a dumbbell, burglary in the first degree (Counts 4, 5, and 9), armed
robbery (Count 7), theft by taking (Count 8), arson in the first degree (Count 10), concealing the
death of another (Count 11), and financial transaction card fraud (Count 12). Prothro pled
guilty to Counts 8 through 12. He waived his right to a jury trial on the remaining counts in the
indictment, and after a bench trial held November 5 through 7, 2013, the court found Prothro
guilty of Counts 1 through 5 and 7 and granted his motion for directed verdict of acquittal on
Count 6. The trial court sentenced Prothro to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

770 es

that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We disagree
and affirm.

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
admitted at trial showed the following. On January 16, 2013, Anthony
Prothro climbed into his grandfather’s house through the window of
what used to be Prothro’s bedroom.” Knowing his grandfather’s usual
schedule, Prothro expected him to be in the shower and planned to
steal money from his wallet to buy drugs. When he found that his
grandfather was not in the shower, Prothro waited for a time and then
climbed back out of the window and entered the house through the
front door. He made upa story about needing to see a doctor andasked
his grandfather for money. The two argued. Prothro went back to his
old bedroom and returned to the living room with a 30-pound dumb-
bell that he used to strike his grandfather several times on the head.
After bludgeoning his grandfather with the dumbbell, Prothro went
outside and vomited into the bushes. He sat on the back porch for a
while and smoked a cigarette, and then went back into the house
where his grandfather lay on the living room floor to take the wallet
out of his injured grandfather’s pocket. He also took his grandfather’s
keys and left in his truck. When Prothro departed, his grandfather
was bleeding from the head and “snoring.” Prothro later used his
grandfather’s debit card to rent movies.

A few days later, Prothro returned to the house late at night,
poured gas around the house and on his grandfather’s body, and set
the house on fire. A neighbor saw the flames and called 911. After
firefighters responded and eventually extinguished the fire, they
found the grandfather's body inside on the living room floor. Samples
taken from the house and from the grandfather's clothes tested
positive for gasoline; an arson investigation determined that the fire
had been intentionally started in Prothro’s bedroom.

for malice murder; 20 years’ imprisonment each for Counts 4, 5, 9, and 10, to run concurrently;
10 years each for Counts 8 and 11, to run concurrently; and three years for Count 12, to run
concurrently. The felony murder count (Count 2) was vacated by operation of law. The trial court
initially merged Counts 3 and 7 with the malice murder count for sentencing, although the court
later found that Count 7 did not merge. Prothro filed a motion for new trial on November 18,
2013, which he amended on August 4, 2014, after the appearance of new counsel. The trial court
held a hearing and denied the motion for new trial on February 23, 2016. On July 17, 2016,
Prothro filed a motion for out-of-time appeal, which the trial court granted on August 18, 2016,
after finding that Prothro had not been served with the order denying his motion for new trial.
Prothro filed a notice of appeal on August 19, 2016. This case was assigned to the August 2017
term of this Court and submitted for decision on the briefs

2 At the time of the murder, Prothro had moved out of the house and lived with his mother.

es 7m

Adeputy medical examiner performed an autopsy and concluded
hat Prothro’s grandfather had died of blunt force trauma to the head
mvolving multiple skull fractures, as well as bruising and bleeding of
he brain. The medical examiner identified at least eight forceful
mpacts to the top, back, and right side of the victim’s head, though
she conceded that it was possible that each blow with a dumbbell
ould cause more than one impact. The medical examiner also
served fractured bone and cartilage in the victim’s neck, consistent
with direct compression or “squeezing” of the neck. A forensic patholo-
gist found no soot in the victim’s airway and no carbon monoxide in
the victim’s lungs, indicating that he was dead before the fire started.
Police canvassed the grandfather’s neighborhood and inter-
viewed a neighbor who reported seeing Prothro climb through his
grandfather’s window a few days before the fire. After obtaining a
search warrant, investigators searched the apartment where Prothro
and his mother lived and found the movies that had been rented with
the victim’s debit card.

The lead police investigator interviewed Prothro at the Carroll-
ton Police Department on three occasions. Each time, Prothro went
voluntarily to the police station with his mother; he was not under
arrest. During the third interview, Prothro admitted that he had
gotten into a fight with his grandfather the week before, after his
grandfather refused to give him money. Prothro confessed that he hit
him with a dumbbell three or four times on the head, took his money
and debit card, and left him to die. He also confessed that he returned.
three days later to set fire to the house. Although Prothro has not
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions,
we have independently examined the record according to our usual
practice and conclude that the evidence admitted at trial was suffi-
cient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Prothro was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d
560) (1979).

OCOmtatas

Il.

Prothro claims that his trial counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance by waiting until the eve of trial to file a motion
for the assistance of a forensic psychologist at trial. He argues that
the trial court would have granted the motion if it had been filed
earlier, in compliance with the Uniform Superior Court Rules. Accord-
ing to Prothro, the trial testimony of a forensic psychologist would
have persuaded the trier of fact to find him guilty of the lesser offense

772 es

of voluntary manslaughter, rather than malice murder. We are
unconvinced.

In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Prothro must show both that his attorney’s performance was
deficient and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
(1984). To demonstrate prejudice, Prothro “must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. at 694. The failure to satisfy either prong of the
Strickland test is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
See Speziali v. State, 301 Ga. 290, 293 (800 SE2d 525) (2017) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also Schmidt v. State, 297 Ga. 692,
697 (778 SE2d 152) (2015).

While Prothro’s trial counsel admitted at the motion for new trial
hearing that his motion for expert assistance was untimely, there is
no evidence that the outcome of the trial would have been different if
the motion had been filed earlier. To begin, the trial court evidently
considered the motion on its merits, despite the late filing. The court
even held a hearing on the motion, where Prothro’s mother, one of
Prothro’s friends, and forensic psychologist Dr. Lauren Reba-
Harrelson testified. Dr. Harrelson had evaluated Prothro before tria
and determined that he was competent to stand trial, that he coul:
tell the difference between right and wrong at the time of the allege’
offense, and that he did not experience a delusional compulsion that
overmastered his will to resist committing the act. In denying
Prothro’s request for the assistance of a forensic psychologist at trial,
the court ruled that Prothro had not met his burden of showing that
his sanity at the time of the offense would be a significant factor at
trial. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 83 (105 SCt 1087, 84 LE2
53) (1985). Although the court also noted in its order that the motion
had been filed late, Prothro has presented no evidence that the tria
court would have ruled differently if the motion had been filed earlier.

Nor has Prothro shown that the requested expert assistance
would have changed the outcome at trial, even if the motion had been
granted. At the hearing on Prothro’s motion for new trial, Prothro
proffered the testimony of psychologist James Stark, Ph.D. Dr. Stark
evaluated Prothro after trial in order to determine his current menta
state and make “educated guesses” as to what his mental state was at
the time of the crimes. Dr. Stark made no determination regarding
Prothro’s legal sanity at the time of the offenses or his competence to
stand trial. Based on his evaluation, Dr. Stark testified that severa
factors, including Prothro’s alcohol and drug use and suicidal depres-

es 778

sion, led to Prothro being “very upset” generally in the time period
leading up to his grandfather’s killing. He also testified that Prothro
said he was “out of [his] mind” on drugs on the day of the killing, and
that Prothro argued with his grandfather when he refused to give
Prothro money to buy more drugs.

Contrary to Prothro’s assertions, we cannot agree that there isa
reasonable probability that the proffered testimony would have led
the trier of fact to find Prothro guilty of voluntary manslaughter
rather than murder. The offense of voluntary manslaughter is com-
mitted when the accused kills “solely as the result of a sudden,
violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation
sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person[.]” OCGA §
16-5-2 (a). “[T]he provocation required to mitigate malice is that
which would arouse a heat of passion in a reasonable person”;
whether the provocation was sufficient to provoke deadly passion in
the particular defendant is irrelevant. Johnson v. State, 297 Ga. 839,
842 (778 SE2d 769) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted; empha-
sis in original); see Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 832 (483 SE2d
582) (1997) (psychologist’s expert testimony regarding the defen-
dant’s mental state properly excluded as irrelevant to claim of
voluntary manslaughter). In finding Prothro guilty of malice murder
rather than voluntary manslaughter, the trial court specifically
stated that it had considered the evidence and arguments about
provocation and did not believe that killing someone “because you're
not able to get money to buy drugs” fit within the objective reasonable
person standard for voluntary manslaughter.

Inshort, Prothro has not shown a reasonable probability that the
requested expert testimony would have been admitted if the motion
had been filed earlier, or if admitted, would have led the court to a
different conclusion. Accordingly, his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim fails. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Barge v. State, 294 Ga.
567, 569 (755 SE2d 166) (2014).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

LT

Swindle Law Group, Jason W. Swindle, Sr., Dane M. Garland,
for appellant.

Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Anne C. Allen, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.

774 es

Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Oldham, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

$17A1479. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.
$17A1480. LEE v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 769)

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Jonathan Johnson and Joshua Anthony Lee appeal their convic-
tions for malice murder in connection with the shooting death of
Robert Cannon. Johnson also appeals his conviction for possession of
marijuana, and Lee appeals his conviction for family violence battery
in connection with the beating of his wife, Kimberly Walker Lee
(Walker).1 Both appellants contend that the trial court erred in
denying their claim of racial discrimination in jury selection under
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (106 SCt 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986).
Lee also disputes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions, the trial court’s denial of two motions for mistrial, and
three instructions the court gave the jury. Finding no reversible error,
we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
at trial showed the following. Lee and Walker knew each other from
childhood and had an on-and-off romantic relationship. They had one
child together, and they married in November 2013. Shortly after
their marriage, Lee began spending nights with Latoya Harris, with
whom he also had a child, and Walker began a relationship with

1 The crimes occurred on August 16 and 17, 2014, On November 10, 2014, a Decatur
County grand jury indicted Johnson, Lee, and Marquis Scott for malice murder, criminal
attempt to commit kidnapping, and aggravated assault. Johnson was also charged with
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of less than an ounce of marijuana,
and Lee was also charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and family
violence battery. As part of a negotiated plea, Scott pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder
and was sentenced to ten years in prison; the other charges against him were dismissed. He
testified for the State at Johnson and Lee's trial, which was held from November 2 to November
6, 2015. Johnson and Lee were found guilty of malice murder and aggravated assault and not
guilty of attempted kidnapping. Johnson was also found guilty of possession of marijuana, and
Lee of family violence battery. Johnson's firearm charge was nolle prossed, and the court
directed a verdict of not guilty on Lee’s drug charge. Johnson and Lee were each sentenced to
life in prison for malice murder and 12 concurrent months for their additional convietion; the
aggravated assault count merged. They filed timely motions for a new trial, which they each
later amended. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motions on December
30, 2016. Johnson and Lee filed timely notices of appeal, and their cases were docketed in this
Court for the August 2017 term. Johnson's case was orally argued on August 14, 2017, and Lee’s
case was submitted on the briefs. They have been consolidated for opinion.

es 75

Cannon. Walker was saving up money to pay for a divorce. Despite
their separation, Lee, who had beaten Walker in the past, continued
to monitor her and got angry when she was with other men, including
threatening to kill her.

On the night of August 16, 2014, Lee left Harris’s house in her
green Ford Explorer. Although Lee said he was going to the store,
Harris suspected he was going after Walker or Cannon; she sent a text
message toa friend saying, “[Lee] done took my sh*t once again trying
to go either kill kim or cannonball.” A few minutes after Lee left,
Johnson and Marquis Scott arrived at Harris’s house looking for Lee.
Since he was not there, they called him and then left the house. Later
that night, Lee drove the Explorer to Scott’s sister’s house and picked
up Johnson and Scott. Scott, who was sitting in the back seat, saw a
long gun on the floorboard.

Lee stopped the car shortly before midnight. All three men got
out and walked across a field toward a Chevrolet, which was parked
in front of Cannon’s mother’s house. Lee told Scott to go behind the car
to see if Walker was there. Scott reported back that Walker was in the
car having sex with a man. Lee, Johnson, and Scott then approached
the Chevrolet together. Lee went to the passenger’s side, pulled
Walker out of the car by her hair, and began to hit her head with
something she could not identify, causing a large knot on her head.
Johnson and Scott went to the driver’s side and attacked Cannon,
putting him in a headlock. Cannon said, “Let me up” and “Don’t
shoot.” Lee ran to the other side of the car, joining Johnson and Scott.
Walker heard someone say “Shoot his ass,” and then gunshots were
fired. Cannon was shot at least six times. Lee, Johnson, and Scott ran
back to the Explorer and drove away.
A man who lived near the crime scene heard gunshots around
midnight and saw three men get into an Explorer; he recognized two
of the men as Lee and Johnson. When he went outside, the neighbor
found Cannon and Walker wounded and stayed until an ambulance
arrived. When the neighbor asked Cannon who shot him, Cannon
said “Josh Lee” and “Josh Lee d’em,” which the neighbor understood
to mean that Lee had been with other people. Walker said that her
husband was the one who hit her. Officers from the Decatur County
Sheriff’s Office soon arrived at the scene. An officer asked Cannon
who shot him, and Cannon again said “Josh Lee.” Walker also again
identified Lee as her attacker, and she said she saw two other
shadowy figures whom she could not identify. Cannon was taken to
the hospital, where he died from his gunshot wounds.

Meanwhile, Lee drove Johnson and Scott a short distance before
parking in a residential area. Scott called his cousin to pick them up.
A woman in the area, who knew Lee, saw him and two other people

776 ee

run from her backyard shed and get into a car around this time.
Scott’s cousin drove them to Ashton Moore’s house, where Scott was
staying. Moore made Lee leave because she did not know him.

Several hours after the shooting, officers went to Harris’s house
looking for Lee. While they were there, Lee called Harris asking for
a ride. One of Harris’s friends agreed to pick Lee up and to let the
officers follow her. After Lee got in her car, the officers pulled them
over and found Lee lying on the back seat floorboard.

Around noon on August 17, officers went to Moore’s house. Scott
yelled a warning when he saw them and dropped a magazine clip on
a table; Johnson picked it up; and both men ran to a back bedroom.
Officers found Scott on the bed pretending to be asleep and Johnson
hiding in a closet under a pile of clothes. When officers searched
Johnson, they found some marijuana as well as the magazine clip,
which matched a 9mm rifle found at the house. Ballistics testing later
showed that shell casings and projectiles found at the shooting scene
and inside the Chevrolet were fired from that rifle. Moore said that
she did not keep guns in the house. Black Polo and Nike Air Force One
shoes were found at Moore’s house that matched shoeprints found at
the house where Lee and the two other people were seen running from
the shed. Moore said she had seen Johnson wearing the Polo shoes
and Scott wearing the Nike shoes the day before the shooting.
Additionally, a cell phone with “selfies” of Johnson was found between
the abandoned Explorer and the shed. Lee’s fingerprints were found
in the Chevrolet, and Scott’s and Johnson’s fingerprints were found
in the Explorer.

Lee and Scott were interviewed while in custody. Lee admitted
that he went to the area where Cannon was shot. Scott nodded his
head affirmatively when he was asked if Johnson had shot the victim,
and he said they brought the gun “to scare.” Scott testified at trial that
he did not see Johnson or Lee take a gun out of the Explorer and he
did not know which one shot Cannon. Johnson and Lee did not testify
at trial.

2. Although only Lee has raised a challenge to the legal suffi-
ciency of the evidence under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), as is our practice in murder cases,
we have considered the sufficiency of the evidence to support both
appellants’ convictions. As summarized in Division 1 above, sufficient
evidence was presented at trial to prove that either Johnson or Lee
shot and killed Cannon and that the other appellant was a party to
the crime. See OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining parties to a crime).

“While proof of a shared criminal intent with the actual perpe-
trator is necessary to establish that one isa party to the crime, ‘shared
criminal intent may be inferred from the person’s conduct before,

es 17

during, and after the crime.’” Bowen v. State, 299 Ga. 875, 877 (792
SE2d 691) (2016) (citation omitted). Johnson, Lee, and Scott traveled
together with a rifle to the scene of the shooting; Lee had a motive to
kill Cannon; Cannon was first attacked by Johnson and Scott and
then shot repeatedly once Lee joined them on Cannon’s side of the car;
Johnson, Lee, and Scott left the scene together and tried to hide in
Moore’s house; Johnson and Lee both were found attempting to hide
from the police, Johnson under a pile of clothes and Lee on a car
floorboard; and Cannon said that Lee shot him, while Johnson was
found in the same house as, and with a clip for, the murder weapon.
This evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that both men were guilty of murder. See Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319. The evidence was also sufficient to support Johnson’s
conviction for marijuana possession, as police officers found mari-
juana when they searched him, and Lee’s conviction for family
violence battery, as his estranged wife identified him as her assailant.
See id.

Contention Raised by Both Appellants

3. Both Johnson and Lee contend that the trial court erred when
it denied their Batson challenge alleging racial discrimination in the
selection of the jury. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (106 SCt
1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). This contention fails because the court’s
finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory jury strikes were not racially
motivated was not clearly erroneous.”

(a) At trial, the jury venire was composed of 40 people — 16 black
potential jurors (40%) and 24 white potential jurors (60%). The State
used its peremptory strikes to remove nine black potential jurors and
one white potential juror. The jury ultimately selected had three
black jurors (25%) and nine white jurors (75%). When the appellants
raised a Batson challenge, the trial court ruled that they had failed to
show a prima facie case of discrimination, but asked the State to offer
its reasons for striking each juror anyway. The district attorney said
that he struck seven of the nine black potential jurors because they
had family members who had been arrested or tried for criminal

2 Only Johnson presents an argument in his brief in support of this enumeration of error;
Lee's brief merely “adopts and incorporates” Johnson’s argument and citations. Because this
claim is without merit, we may assume without deciding that Lee has sufficiently raised the
claim. We note, however, that this Court's Rule 22 says, with emphasis supplied: “Any
enumerated error not supported by argument or citation of authority in the brief shall be
deemed abandoned. . . .” See Humphrey v. Riley, 291 Ga. 584, 546 (731 SE2d 740) (2012)
Additionally, incorporation of arguments from other sources may not be used to avoid the page
limitation for briefs set by Rule 20.

778 ee

offenses.* The district attorney also said that he had identified five
white potential jurors with negative law enforcement experiences,
either personally or through their family. One of those was the white
juror he struck. He didnot strike the other four because one hada son
whose criminal charges were later dropped and the other three were
in the alternate portion of the juror panel.

During voir dire, the prosecutor had not questioned any of these
potential jurors about their family experiences with law enforcement.
Instead, the district attorney explained to the trial court that he
obtained this information when he reviewed the juror list with an
assistant district attorney, members of the Bainbridge Police Depart-
ment and Probation Office and the Decatur County Sheriff’s Office,
and a former employee of the Sheriff’s Office. The district attorney
also ran the names on the juror list through a computer program
showing any prior arrests in the county. Johnson and Lee did not
dispute the district attorney’s information or seek to recall any jurors
to question them further. Based on the prosecutor’s explanation, the
trial court ruled that “the State has articulated race-neutral reasons
for the exercise of its peremptory challenges” and denied the Batson
motion.

After trial, at the motion for new trial hearing, Lee called four of
the black potential jurors whom the State struck, and they each
testified that the State’s claim about their familial relationship to
someone who had been arrested was inaccurate.4 The first juror
explained that the man to whom the prosecutor said she was related
was actually part of a different family with the same last name. The
second juror said she did not know the person to whom she was
allegedly related. The third juror said she was not related to one
person the prosecutor claimed was her relative, and while she had
been related by marriage to the other person the prosecutor identi-
fied, she had never met him and had been divorced for about 17 years.
The final juror, who the district attorney said hada son who had been
prosecuted for drug crimes, testified that she had no children.

The trial court considered this testimony, but concluded that the
district attorney’s intention in striking these jurors was not racially
discriminatory:

® The district attorney gave other reasons for striking the remaining two black jurors.
Those reasons were based on information elicited during voir dire and are not disputed on
appeal,

* As to the three other black potential jurors the State struck on this ground, Johnson's
attorney told the court at the motion for new trial hearing that one of them did have the family
ties asserted by the State and he was unable to make contact with the other two.

es 779

At trial the State provided legitimate reasons for [the]

strikes which were in no way racially motivated. The fact
that some [of] the information provided by law enforcement
to the State later proved to be inaccurate is irrelevant since
there was a good faith basis for the State to rely on informa-
tion provided to them prior to trial. The Defendants have
failed to show any scintilla of ill will or deceitful motive on
behalf of State or law enforcement to purposefully attempt to
strike any traverse juror based on race or any other Batson
related demographic.
(b) A Batson challenge involves three steps: “ ‘(1) the opponent of
a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must then provide a
race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) the court must decide
whether the opponent of the strike has proven the proponent’s
discriminatory intent.’” Coleman v. State, 301 Ga. 720, 723 (804
SE2d 24) (2017) (citation omitted). As to the first step, the trial court
determined that the appellants had not made a prima facie showing
of racial discrimination, but the court proceeded to the second step
anyway. We therefore need not address whether the court correctly
decided the prima facie issue, because the question is moot. See
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (111 SCt 1859, 114 LE2d
395) (1991) (plurality) (“Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral
explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has
ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the
preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie
showing becomes moot.”); Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679, 680 (424 SE2d
626) (1993) (same).

“At the second step, all that is required is for the proponent of the
strike to provide a facially race-neutral explanation for the strike;
this explanation need not be ‘persuasive, or even plausible.’ ” Cole-
man, 301 Ga. at 723 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). The
appellants acknowledge that the trial court correctly found that a
negative experience with law enforcement by a juror’s family member
is arace-neutral explanation for a peremptory strike of the juror. See,
e.g., Alexander v. State, 273 Ga. 311, 312 (540 SE2d 196) (2001)
(“Our precedent shows that the criminal arrest history of a prospec-
tive juror’s family members is a sufficiently race-neutral reason to
satisfy the dictates of Batson.”).

At the third step of the Batson analysis, the trial court “ ‘makes
credibility determinations, evaluates the persuasiveness of the strike
opponent’s prima facie showing and the explanations given by the
strike proponent, and examines all other circumstances that bear

780 ee

upon the issue of racial animosity.’ ” Coleman, 301 Ga. at 723 (citation
omitted). “‘A trial court’s finding as to whether the opponent of a
strike has proven discriminatory intent is entitled to great deference
and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.’” (citation omit-
ted) Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 627 (754 SE2d 335) (2014). In this
case, it appears that the trial court improperly skipped step three at
trial, denying the Batson motion after ruling that the State had
“articulated race-neutral reasons,” without further argument from
the parties or a finding regarding discriminatory intent. Compare
Coleman, 301 Ga. at 723-724 (explaining that the trial court
“{mplicitly engaged in the third step” of Batson by hearing arguments
from the defense as to why each reason proffered by the prosecutor
was inadequate and then making its own findings as to each juror).

Any error the court made in missing step three at trial was cured,
however, by the court’s resolution of the appellants’ motions for new
trial. See Staples v. State, 209 Ga. App. 802, 802-803 (434 SE2d 757)
(1993) (explaining that the trial court’s error in not completing the
third step at trial “may be cured by a post-trial hearing on the Batson
challenge”). See also Weems v. State, 262 Ga. 101, 102 (416 SE2d 84)
(1992) (remanding for the trial court to determine at a post-trial
hearing whether peremptory strikes were racially motivated).’ After
hearing testimony from potential jurors who were struck and the
appellants’ arguments against the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for
striking the challenged jurors, the trial court expressly found that
the district attorney’s reasons for the peremptory strikes were
“legitimate” and “in no way racially motivated.” This finding, like
most Batson decisions, turned largely on an evaluation of the cred-
ibility of the attorney who made the strikes, and “evaluation of the
prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies
peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Smith v. State, 264 Ga.
449, 454 (448 SE2d 179) (1994) (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365
(punctuation omitted)). See also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472,
ATT (128 SCt 1203, 170 LE2d 175) (2008) (“The trial court has a
pivotal role in evaluating Batson claims. Step three of the Batson
inquiry involves an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility, and ‘the
best evidence (of discriminatory intent) often will be the demeanor of
the attorney who exercises the challenge.’ ” (citations omitted)).

It is troubling that the information on which the district attorney
relied in making four of his ten peremptory strikes was later shown

® It is certainly preferable, however, for the trial court to respond to a Batson challenge by
clearly following the three-step analysis when the challenge is raised at trial and * ‘clearly
stat[ing] on the record its reasoning and conclusions as to each step of the inquiry: ” Coleman,
301 Ga. at 724 n.7 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).

es 781

to be incorrect, but such later-revealed inaccuracy does not establish
that the prosecutor’s professed reasons for the strikes were neces-
sarily a pretext for invidious discrimination. “Batson is only about
racial discrimination — it does not prevent the prosecution from
relying on inaccurate (but race-neutral) information in striking
jurors.” Coleman, 301 Ga. at 725 (emphasis in original). See also Lee
v. Commr., Ala. Dept. of Corr., 726 F3d 1172, 1226 (11th Cir. 2013)
(‘The conclusion that an honestly mistaken but race-neutral reason
for striking a black venire member did not violate Batson was not
unreasonable.”); Lamon v. Boatwright, 467 F3d 1097, 1101 (7th Cir.
2006) (“Batson and its progeny direct trial judges to assess the
honesty — not the accuracy — of a proffered race-neutral explana-
tion.” (emphasis in original)).

Of course, a prosecutor who gives false reasons for peremptory
strikes may quickly lose credibility with the court, and reasons that
are knowingly or patently false when given will likely be found to be
pretextual. But in this case there is no evidence that the district
attorney knew or even suspected that the information on which he
relied in making the disputed strikes was inaccurate, and there was
no suggestion at trial that the information was inaccurate. In fact, the
confusion regarding two of the struck jurors’ alleged family members
appears to stem from a shared family name and a divorce. What
happened regarding the other alleged family ties that the testifying
jurors said did not exist is less understandable — but that alone does
not establish that the trial court’s first-hand evaluation of the district
attorney’s credibility was clearly erroneous.

The appellants also argue that the district attorney’s choice not
to question the prospective jurors about their family links to arrests
or prosecutions is evidence that he acted in bad faith. Although the
prosecutor could have posed such questions, he was not required to
prolong voir dire and potentially embarrass the prospective jurors by
interrogating them about their criminally inclined family members.
Batson does not require that the reasons for striking a jury come only
from voir dire. See Alexander, 273 Ga. at 312 (“[I]n exercising a
peremptory strike, the prosecution ‘may rely on information and
advice provided by others so long as this input is not predicated upon
the race of the prospective juror.’” (citation omitted)). See also
Coleman, 301 Ga. at 725-726 (explaining that “a defendant is not
entitled to ‘discover directly the information obtained by the State in
preparing for its jury selection.’ ” (citation omitted)).®

© The appellants ask this Court to require attorneys to offer “competent evidence” to
support their proffered race-neutral reasons for striking jurors. The appellants acknowledge

782 ee

The trial court’s finding that the district attorney’s professed
reason for striking the disputed jurors was not a pretext for racial
discrimination is supported by the evidence that he applied the same
criterion to potential jurors of all races. The prosecutor identified five
white potential jurors with negative law enforcement experiences,
struck one of them, and gave legitimate explanations for not striking
the other four. The appellants have not shown that the State treated
potential jurors known to be similarly situated differently because of
their race. See United States v. Houston, 456 F3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir.
2006) (“ ‘[C]omparing the attributes of the black and white venire
persons will aid the trier of fact and a reviewing court in determining
whether the asserted reasons are pretextual or not.’” (citation omit-
ted)). Recognizing the “great deference” we owe to the trial court’s
finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes were not racially
motivated, we cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous. Wood-
all, 294 Ga. at 627.7

Contentions Raised Only by Lee

4. Lee argues that the trial court erred in denying his two motions
for mistrial. “‘Whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the
trial court’s sound discretion, and the trial court’s exercise of that
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless a mistrial is essen-
tial to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” Grissom v. State,
296 Ga. 406, 414 (768 SE2d 494) (2015) (citation omitted).

(a) On the evening of the first day of trial, a local television
station broadcast and posted a story about the case. The next morn-

that such proof has not been required asa matter of federal constitutional law under Batson and
its progeny, but they ask us to impose such a requirement pursuant to Georgia’s constitutional
equal protection guarantee, see Ga, Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. IL. We will not consider this issue
because neither appellant raised it in or obtained a ruling on it from the trial court when the
State proffered its race-neutral reasons. See Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 731 (739 SE2d
332) (2013) (“Because the State constitutional issue was not raised or ruled on below, it is
waived on appeal.” (emphasis omitted)).

7 We note that attorneys must be cautious when striking prospective jurors using criteria
that may disproportionately impact a certain race. See Houston, 456 F3d at 1336 (“Houston
inelude[d] in his briefs sociological data indicating that significantly more blacks than whites,
asa percentage of their relative subgroups, are convicted of crimes in the United States.”). “The
Supreme Court has held that evidence that the prosecutor used a sorting device with a
disparate impact on different races may be considered as evidence of purposeful discrimination
at Batson’s third step.” Id. at 1337. But the trial court is not required to find discriminatory
intent based on such circumstantial evidence, see id., andthe court here did not. Again, the trial
court's finding based on the totality of the circumstances is entitled to great deference, and it
was not clearly erroneous. In fact, family members’ negative experiences with law enforcement
are reasons for striking prospective jurors frequently given by prosecutors and found not
racially discriminatory by courts. See, ¢.g., Alexander, 273 Ga. at 312; Houston, 456 F3d at 1337

es 788
ing, Lee moved for a mistrial. The trial court asked the jurors:

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Court would like to inquire
whether any of you observed any program on WALB last
night or this morning regarding this case. Did any of you
view any such matter that was regarding this case that was
on Channel 10? None of you? Okay. Have any of you had any
communication on any social media regarding this case? If
you have had any, please raise your hand. It appears to the
court that the answers to both of those questions was no.

Because none of the jurors indicated that they had seen the story or
had any discussion on social media about the case, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial motion. See Allen v. State,
296 Ga. 785, 787 (770 SE2d 824) (2015).

(b) Lee also moved for a mistrial after the following exchange
occurred when his counsel was cross-examining an officer the State
had called near the end of its case-in-chief:

COUNSEL: [Walker] didn’t see who had the gun though?
WITNESS: No. Iasked her point-blank, did you see Josh Lee
with the gun, and she said, no. I asked her did she see the
other individuals with a gun and she said, no. But then I
asked her, I said, well, who shot Cannonball? And she said,
I don’t know. Josh Lee, he pulled a gun on me in the past. He
probably shot him.

Lee’s counsel stopped questioning the witness, asked to address a
matter outside of the jury’s presence, and then moved for a mistrial
on the ground that this testimony improperly put Lee’s character into
evidence and had no probative value. The trial court denied the
motion. The jury had already heard Walker’s testimony that Lee was
violent toward her, threatened to kill her, and continued to monitor
her after she ended their relationship, as well as Harris’s testimony
that she suspected on the night of the murder that Lee had left to kill
Walker or Cannon. Thus, while the officer’s response was objection-
able, a mistrial was not essential to preserve Lee’s right to a fair trial,
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial
motion. See Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 100 (786 SE2d 648) (2016).®

® Inhis brief, Lee also complains that the trial court gave no curative instruction. At trial,
the State asked for a curative instruction if the court found the comment to be prejudicial, but
Lee did not join that request. It may have been advisable for the trial court to give a curative
instruction to address the portion of the officer's answer that went beyond the scope of the

784 ee

5. Lee also argues that the State failed to prove venue beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Thompson v. Brown, 288 Ga. 855, 855 (708
SE2d 270) (2011) (explaining that venue is a jurisdictional element of
every crime that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt).
However, the State elicited evidence that the crimes occurred in
Decatur County from the witness who lived near the crime scene and
waited with Cannon and Walker for the ambulance:

Q: Where do you live, Mr. Casteel?

A: 175 Andrews Road, Attapulgus.

Q: Is that down off Fowlstown Road, down in there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is that near a place called 121 Philyaw [the crime scene]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how long have you lived down there?

A: Twenty-something years.

Q: Okay. You pretty much know everybody down there?

A: Yes, sir, I do.

Q: And were you living down there and present down there
back on the early morning hours of August 17th, 2014?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Is that located here in Decatur County, that area?

A: Yes, sir.

The jury could derive from this testimony that the crime scene
was part of “that area” that the witness said was located in Decatur
County. See Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 1, 4 (799 SE2d 196) (2017)
(« {T]he determination of whether venue has been established is an
issue soundly within the province of the jury.’” (citation omitted)).
Additional evidence of venue was provided by several witnesses who
testified that they were employed by the Decatur County Sheriff’s
Office when they worked on the case, where nothing in the record
suggested that any such official had multi-jurisdictional authority.
See Propst v. State, 299 Ga. 557, 561 (788 SE2d 484) (2016). Thus, the
evidence proving venue was sufficient.

6. Finally, Lee argues that the trial court erred in its instructions
to the jury on alibi, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault.
Although the court made mistakes as to each of these charges, there
was no reversible error.

question. See, e.g., Dublin v, State, 302 Ga. 60, 67 (805 SE2d 27) (2017) (noting the trial court's
curative instruction). However, even assuming that the court erred in not giving such an
instruction, the error was harmless, as the evidence of Lee's guilt was strong, including Cannon
and Walker identifying him as their attacker. See Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 190, 194 (758 SE2d
808) (2014)

es 785

(a) The trial court gave the following jury instruction on alibi:
“Now the Defendants contend that they were not present at the scene
of the alleged offense at the time of its commission.” Lee argues that
this was error because alibi was only Johnson’s defense; Lee never
denied being at the scene of the shooting. Although the court should
not have attributed Johnson’s defense to Lee as well, this error was
harmless, because there was no evidence or argument presented by
any party suggesting that Lee was not at the crime scene, so the jury
would not have been misled by the charge. See Wetzel v. State, 298 Ga.
20, 36 n.17 (779 SE2d 263) (2015).

(b) The trial court also made a mistake when it gave the following
charge on voluntary manslaughter:

If the evidence shows that the defendant killed the
alleged victim beyond — with malice and not in a spirit of
revenge but under a violent, sudden impulse of passion
created in the defendant’s mind by ongoing adultery or the
recent discovery of past adultery on the part of the victim,
you would be authorized to consider whether or not the
defendant is guilty of voluntarily, as I will define it.

This slip of the tongue — saying “voluntarily” instead of “voluntary
manslaughter” — also was not likely to have misled the jury. The
court went on to correctly explain that the jury should “determine
whether mitigating circumstances, if any, would cause the offense
to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter” and correctly defined
voluntary manslaughter. The court also instructed as to the murder
count that the jury should indicate on the verdict form if it found
either appellant “guilty of the lesser crime of voluntary manslaugh-
ter.” Thus, in the context of the entire charge, the jury was adequately
apprised of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
See Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 398 (627 SE2d 579) (2006)
(“ ‘A mere verbal inaccuracy resulting from a slip of the tongue which
does not clearly mislead or confuse the jury is not reversible error.’ ”
(citation omitted)).

(c) Finally, the trial court gave the wrong aggravated assault
instruction when it first instructed the jury, defining aggravated
assault as assault with a deadly weapon rather than as assault with
intent to murder, the crime for which Lee and Johnson were indicted.
After Lee objected to this instruction, however, the court recalled the
jury, advised the jury that the court misspoke in defining aggravated
assault, instructed the jury to disregard the first definition, and then
charged the jury on aggravated assault with intent to murder. The
court also instructed the jury that the State was required “to prove

786 es

every material allegation of the indictment and every essential

element of the crime.” This was sufficient to cure any confusion. See

Simpson v. State, 302 Ga. 875, 877 (808 SE2d 718) (2017). Moreover,

Lee’s aggravated assault verdict merged into his malice murder

conviction, so even if any harm had been done, it would be moot. See

Hickman v. State, 299 Ga. 267, 272 (787 SE2d 700) (2016).
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

ee

Patrick E. Chisholm, for appellant (case no. $17A1479).

Megan A. Lane, for appellant (case no. $17A1480).

Joseph K. Mulholland, District Attorney, Craig E. Miller, Moruf
O. Oseni, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth H. Brock,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1495. BURKE v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 765)

PETERSON, Justice.

William Burke appeals his convictions for felony murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, charges
stemming from the death of Andrew Daly.' He argues that the trial
court improperly limited the jury’s consideration of voluntary man-
slaughter to a lesser offense of only malice murder, both in its oral
instructions and on the verdict form, so that the jury had no option to
consider the lesser offense in relation to the felony murder charge.
Finding that the trial court committed no plain error in this regard
because the evidence did not support a finding of voluntary man-
slaughter, we affirm.

+ Daly was killed on November 25, 2012. Burke was indicted on February 14, 2013, for
malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of afelony.An August 2014 trial resulted ina mistrial when the jury could not reach
a unanimous verdict. Burke stood trial again from September 29 to October 3, 2014, and was
acquitted of malice murder but found guilty of the other counts. The trial court sentenced Burke
to life for the felony murder conviction plus a five-year consecutive sentence for the firearm
possession count, merging the aggravated assault count into the felony murder count. Burke
filed a motion for new trial that he later amended. The trial court denied the motion on October
11, 2016. Burke filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the August 2017
term and submitted for decision on the briefs.

es 787

The victim in this case was the boyfriend of Burke’s ex-girlfriend
and landlord, Evangeline Sotus. Burke and Sotus had a long-term
romantic involvement before breaking up in early 2011. Sotus testi-
fied that she was concerned about Burke’s belligerence when he
drank. After their break-up, Burke moved into the top level of Sotus’s
home. In the summer of 2012, Sotus met Daly, and the two became
romantically involved. Sotus observed that the two men were civil to
one another.

On November 20, 2012, Sotus traveled to New York. She informed
Burke that Daly would be checking on her cats and had permission to
be in the house. Burke and Daly apparently continued to be civil to
one another; Daly even made breakfast for Burke the morning of
November 25.

In phone conversations with Sotus later that day, Burke seemed
to be intoxicated. At one point, Burke called Sotus and informed her
that his ex-wife had died. She urged Burke to sober up, leading Burke
to become belligerent and call and text her repeatedly. Sotus called
Daly and warned him to stay away from her house, but Daly did not
seem concerned, and said he wanted to go there to do laundry.

Meanwhile, Burke posted on Facebook that Sotus “was a total
waste” when he needed her and that her boyfriends should “watch out.”
Burke called a friend, Gerald Landers, who noted that Burke seemed
extremely intoxicated. Burke cut off their conversation, indicating that
he had an unexpected visitor; Landers heard Burke say, “Who’s there,
who’s there.”

The lower-level tenant of Sotus’s house, Valetta Anderson, heard
footsteps above, then arguing and shouting. Anderson heard some-
one other than Burke say “motherf***er.” She heard a “pop” sound,
then someone falling. Burke promptly knocked on Anderson’s door
and asked her to accompany him upstairs to the main level, where she
saw Daly lying on the floor. Burke told Anderson that Daly “came at”
him and asked her to call 911.

Police who arrived at the home found Daly dead of a gunshot
wound to the head. They observed nunchucks on the kitchen table
and found a loaded revolver (that belonged to Sotus) underneath
Daly’s body. Burke told police, “I didn’t mean to. He threatened me
with some nunchucks.” Law enforcement found another gun lying on
a bed in Burke’s apartment.

Burke testified at trial? that he had no problem with Daly. Burke
testified that on the night of Daly’s death, he was in his own
apartment when he heard a voice that he did not recognize yell from

® Although Burke declined to testify at his first trial, he took the stand at the retrial.

788 |

downstairs, “Hey, motherf***er, I know you're up there. You better
come down or I’m coming to get your a**.” When he went downstairs
with his gun into the main level of the house, Burke testified, most of
the lights were off and he saw only a hand holding nunchucks. Burke
said he heard the person say, “Motherf***er, I’m going to kill you.” He
testified that he heard something like a chair or table move and thought
the person was swinging the nunchucks at him, so he “threw up” his
hands and “[t]he gun went off.” Burke acknowledged taking that gun
back up to his apartment before going to Anderson’s apartment. He
testified that he did not intend to shoot anyone and did not know the
identity of the victim until Anderson told him it was Daly.

1. Although Burke does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, it is our customary practice in murder cases to review the
record independently to determine whether the evidence was legally
sufficient. Having done so, we conclude that the evidence was suffi-
cient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Burke was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979).

2. Burke argues that the trial court committed plain error by
limiting the jury’s consideration of voluntary manslaughter, such
that it could find it a lesser included offense of only malice murder. We
disagree.

The State requested a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter as
a lesser included offense. Burke objected to the requested instruction,
arguing that the State should not have charged him with malice
murder and felony murder if it did not think it could convict him of
those charges. The trial court agreed to give the voluntary manslaugh-
ter instruction, telling jurors:

A person commits voluntary manslaughter when that
person causes the death of another human being under
circumstances that would otherwise be murder if that per-
son acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irre-
sistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient
to excite such passion in a reasonable person. If there should
have been an interval between the provocation and the
killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be
heard, which the jury in all cases shall decide, the killing
may be attributed to revenge and punished as for murder.

The court read that instruction after the malice murder charge but
before the felony murder and aggravated assault charges. The
verdict form clearly limited the jury’s consideration of manslaughter

es 789

to the malice murder charge, giving the options of “Not Guilty,”
“Guilty,” and “Guilty, of the Lesser Included Charge of Voluntary
Manslaughter” under the malice murder count but listing only
“Not Guilty” and “Guilty” options under the other counts. During
deliberations, the jury asked, “Are voluntary manslaughter and
aggravated assault/felony murder mutually exclusive?” The trial
court responded, “[N]o. You should consider each count.”

In his amended motion for new trial, Burke contended that the
jury should have been able to consider whether the charged aggra-
vated assault was provoked, thus mitigating the felony murder count
to voluntary manslaughter. He also argued that the trial court’s error
in presenting the jury with a verdict form that precluded it from
considering voluntary manslaughter as an alternative to the felony
murder count exacerbated the trial court’s erroneous jury instruc-
tion. The trial court rejected that argument, concluding that a
voluntary manslaughter charge was not supported by the evidence —
and thus should never have been given at all — and that the jury’s
rejection of voluntary manslaughter as an alternative to malice
murder meant that it also would have rejected that option if it had
been given as an alternative to a felony murder conviction. Conceding
that he did not object to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury
that it also could consider voluntary manslaughter as a lesser charge
to felony murder or to its predicate felony of aggravated assault,
Burke argues on appeal that we nonetheless should grant him a new
trial because the trial court’s instructions amounted to plain error.

“{A] failure to charge amounts to plain error only to the extent
that the failure to charge was erroneous, the error was obvious, the
failure to charge likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and
the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputa-
tion of judicial proceedings.” Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 873 (2) (742
SE2d 707) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). Burke cites our
case law to the effect that it may in some circumstances be error to fail
to instruct a jury to consider evidence of provocation before finding a
defendant guilty of felony murder. Specifically, he cites Edge v. State,
261 Ga. 865 (414 SE2d 463) (1992), in which we reversed a felony
murder conviction where the jury also found the defendant guilty of
voluntary manslaughter based on the same aggravated assault. Id. at
867 (2). We also said in dicta that when (1) an aggravated assault is
perpetrated against the homicide victim “and is an integral part of
the killing” and (2) the evidence authorizes a voluntary manslaugh-
ter charge, “the jury should be admonished that ifit finds provocation
and passion with respect to the act which caused the killing, it could
not find felony murder, but would be authorized to find voluntary
manslaughter.” Id. at 867 (2) n. 3. But regardless of the continued

790 |

validity of our dicta in Edge,* itis clear that Edge’s admonitions about
curtailing a jury’s consideration of voluntary manslaughter apply
only where there is evidence that would authorize a voluntary
manslaughter charge. See id. at 866-867 (2); see also McGill v. State,
263 Ga. 81, 83 (3) (428 SE2d 341) (1993). “A voluntary manslaughter
charge is required when there is slight evidence that the defendant
acted ‘solely as the result of a sudden, violent, andirresistible passion
resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in
areasonable person.’ ” Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 1, 5-6 (2) (799 SE2d 196)
(2017) (quoting OCGA § 16-5-2 (a)); see also Merritt v. State, 292 Ga.
327, 331 (2) (737 SE2d 673) (2013). Considering the evidence pre-
sented at trial, we agree with the trial court’s belated conclusion that
no voluntary manslaughter instruction was warranted at all, so there
was no error, let alone an obvious one.

Burke points to evidence that he was distraught and angry on the
night of the shooting for various reasons, including the death of his
ex-wife and his argument with Sotus, when Daly appeared and twice
called him a “motherf***er” in his own home. But, “[a]s a matter of
law, angry statements alone ordinarily do not amount to ‘serious
provocation’ within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).” Merritt, 292
Ga. at 331 (2); see also Jones, 301 Ga. at 6-7 (2) (evidence that
appellant appeared to exchange angry words with rival gang mem-
bers prior to shooting didnot support voluntary manslaughter instruc-
tion); Davidson v. State, 289 Ga. 194, 195-197 (2) (709 SE2d 814)
(2011) (heated or angry statements by child victim’s parents, such as,
“you dead,” and “I’m going to kill you,” could not constitute provoca-
tion requiring voluntary manslaughter instruction; defendant testi-
fied that he fired not out of anger, but out of fear and to defend his and
his mother’s life); compare Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 421, 423-424 (2)
(721 SE2d 886) (2012) (indicating that words alone may be sufficient
to support voluntary manslaughter instruction where victim, who
was married to accused, recounted her adultery and taunted the
accused with descriptions of her adulterous conduct).

Burke also argues that the uncertainty regarding the reason for
Daly’s visit the night of his death, as well as uncertainty regarding
the origin of the nunchucks and other firearm, would have supported
a voluntary manslaughter charge. But acting out of fear of bodily

® We since have clarified that the referenced instruction called for in Edge is not required
and that, although a trial court must instruct the jury that it must consider whether passion
or provocation mitigates the killing before making a decision on felony murder, there is no error
in failing to charge that a finding of passion or provocation precludes a finding of guilt on felony
murder. See Terry v. State, 291 Ga. 508, 510-511 (2) (b) (731 SE2d 669) (2012); see also Morgan
v. Slate, 290 Ga. 788, 792-798 (2) (725 SEZd 255) (2012)

es 791

harm is not the same as acting in the heat of passion, and only
evidence of the latter supports a voluntary manslaughter conviction.
See Dugger v. State, 297 Ga. 120, 123-124 (7) (772 SE2d 695) (2015)
(fear of weapons or fighting is not the type of provocation demanding
a voluntary manslaughter instruction); Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731,
737-738 (3) (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (mo error in refusing to give
voluntary manslaughter instruction given lack of evidence defendant
was subjected to any conduct that would excite the passions of a
reasonable person); Baugh v. State, 293 Ga. 52, 55 (3) (743 SE2d 407)
(2013) (no error in denying voluntary manslaughter instruction
where defendant claimed he was scared by the victim firing a gun in
his direction); Funes v. State, 289 Ga. 793, 795 (2) (716 SE2d 183)
(2011) (evidence did not support a voluntary manslaughter instruc-
tion where defendant testified that he fired gun out of fear); Bell v.
State, 280 Ga. 562, 566-567 (5) (a) (629 SE2d 213) (2006) (voluntary
manslaughter instruction unwarranted where evidence at best showed
that defendant was trying to repel an attack, not that he acted in
anger). For these reasons, there was no error in the trial court’s
failure to instruct the jury that it might consider voluntary man-
slaughter as an alternative to felony murder.

Burke contends that the trial court’s conclusion (in rejecting his
motion for new trial) that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was
not warranted at all was unfair given that the State had asked for the
instruction and the trial court in giving the charge had agreed with
the State that the evidence was sufficient to support such a charge.
We find this argument unavailing. Even if the State were somehow
estopped from arguing that an instruction that the State itself
requested was not warranted, we can reverse Burke’s conviction
under plain error review only if the alleged errors in the trial court’s
instructions “likely affected the outcome of the proceedings[.]” Shaw,
292 Ga. at 873 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). Given there
was no evidence to support a verdict that Burke was guilty of
voluntary manslaughter, any error in the trial court’s instructions
that limited the jury’s consideration of voluntary manslaughter could
not have affected the outcome of the trial. See Fulcher v. State, 297
Ga. 733, 735 (2) (778 SE2d 159) (2015). We thus find that the trial
court did not commit plain error in this regard.*

3. Burke raises as a separate enumeration of error the trial
court’s provision of a jury form that precluded the jury from consid-

+ Given our conclusion under the plain error framework, we find it unnecessary toconsider
the State's argument that Burke affirmatively waived his argument by objecting to a voluntary
manslaughter instruction being given at all.

792 es

ering voluntary manslaughter as an alternative to the felony murder
count. Burke did not object to the verdict form andimplicitly concedes
that his claim of error regarding the form is subject to only plain error
review. See Harvey v. State, 300 Ga. 598, 606 (8) (797 SE2d 75) (2017)
(contention that verdict form was erroneous can be reviewed only for
plain error where appellant did not object). As we explained in
Division 2, there was no error in failing to give the jury the option to
consider voluntary manslaughter as an alternative to felony murder,
given there was no evidence to support such a charge. We therefore
findno plain error in the aspect of the verdict form about which Burke
complains.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

ong D. Vo, for appellant.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Anna G. Cross, Lenny I. Krick,
Helen V. Peters, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael A.
Oldham, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1516. WARE v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 762)
BENHAM, Justice.
Jermaine Ware was convicted of malice murder and other offenses
arising out of the shooting death of Rodney Mitchell, Jr., and the
aggravated assault of two other individuals.! Viewed in the light most

1 The crimes occurred on January 1, 2011. On July 18, 2011, a Polk County grand jury
returned an indictment charging appellant with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
(aggravated assault) (Count 2), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon the murder
victim (Count 8), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon Jana Stocks (Count 4),
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon Deundra Cummings (Count 5), and possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). After a jury trial conducted from December 3 to
December 6, 2012, the jury found appellant guilty of Counts 1 through 5 of the indictment.
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial on Count 6, which was bifurcated, and the trial court
also found appellant guilty on that charge. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for
malice murder, and the trial court merged the convictions for Counts 2 and 3 into the malice
murder convietion. In fact, the felony murder guilty verdict should have been vacated as a
matter of law instead of merged into the sentence for malice murder, and this sentencing error
is addressed in Division 3 of this opinion. The trial court imposed three concurrent sentences
of five years for each of the remaining convictions. After conducting a hearing, appellant's
motion for new trial was denied by order dated June 28, 2016. On March 16, 2017, a consent

es 798

favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that the events leading
up to the shooting occurred at a New Year's Eve party that Ware an
others had attended at a residence in Polk County. At the party, Ware
and others were drinking. During the night, Ware fell asleep on the
sofa and someone at the party painted his fingernails with nail polish
and applied lip gloss to his lips. He was angry when he woke up to
discover this prank. As the partygoers were leaving at about 8:30 a.m.
on January 1, 2011, Ware continued to complain about the prank an
asked Mitchell if he was the one who painted his nails, but Mitchel
denied it. Mitchell borrowed a semi-automatic pistol from another
partygoer, walked into the road, and shot into the air several times to
celebrate the New Year. As Mitchell was turning to give the gun back
to his friend, Ware stepped out of a car that was parked near the house
where the party had taken place, aimed a revolver in Mitchell’s
direction, and shot him. The bullet struck Mitchell in the head, ani
Mitchell died from his wounds. The gun Ware fired that morning was
not recovered, but according to an expert witness, the bullet recov-
ered from Mitchell’s head during an autopsy was a .38-caliber metal-
jacketed bullet that would have been shot from a revolver. Ware also
aimed the gun at two others and started shooting, but they ran from
him and were not hit. Shortly thereafter, Ware arrived at his
ex-girlfriend’s house, and, at his request, she gave him a ride to
Alabama.

The jury convicted Ware, rejecting his counsel’s theory that the
shooter could have been an unidentified person who was seen firing a
gun near the house where Ware and others were partying. As set forth
below, this Court rejects Ware’s argument that the trial court erred in
failing to rebuke the prosecutor for statements made during the
closing argument. We agree, however, that the trial court committed a
sentencing error, though it does not require the sentence to be vacated.

1. Although Ware does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict him, it is this Court’s practice to conduct an
examination of the record to determine the legal sufficiency of the
evidence in murder cases. Having done so, we conclude the evidence
presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize
a rational trier of fact to find Ware guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (IID) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. During closing argument, the prosecutor made a statement
indicating that, as a result of his experience in both prosecuting and

order was entered, nune pro tunc to March 9, 2017, granting appellant's out-of-time appeal.
This case was docketed to the August 2017 term of court for a decision to be made on the briefs

794 ]

defending criminal cases, he could predict from the outset in this case
that the defendant would present one of two different defenses: either
self-defense or a claim that someone else committed the act. The
prosecutor stated that since a self-defense theory was not available
under the facts of the case, it was predictable that the defendant
would attempt to defend the charges by claiming someone else
committed the act that killed the victim. Ware’s trial counsel objected
on the ground that this argument was improper, but the trial court
overruled the objection. On appeal, Ware asserts the trial court erred
by failing to rebuke the prosecutor for violating OCGA § 17-8-75,
which prohibits trial counsel from making statements within the
hearing of the jury regarding prejudicial matters not in evidence.”

We conclude the trial court’s failure to rebuke the prosecutor for
the comment was, at most, harmless error. In the context of this case,
the jury could not have been misled with respect to the prosecutor’s
reference to a defense that was not pursued by the defendant since
the statement merely reflected the prosecutor's opinion that a defense
Ware did not pursue — self-defense — was not available to the
defendant based on the evidence presented at trial. He then went on
to argue that the defense Ware did present was not credible. In the
jury instructions that followed closing arguments, the trial court
stated that neither the opening statements or closing arguments of
the lawyers, nor the questions they asked, constituted evidence. In
light of the substantial evidence of guilt in this case, as well as the
trial court’s jury instructions, “it is highly probable that neither this
statement by the prosecutor in closing argument, nor any alleged
failure of the trial court to comply with OCGA § 17-8-75, contributed
to the verdict.” Anderson v. State, 302 Ga. 74, 86 (6) (805 SE2d 47)
(2017). See also Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 345 (16) (a) (687 SE2d
438) (2009) (even a prosecutor’s misstatement of the evidence is
subject to harmless error analysis).

3. The State agrees with Ware that the trial court committed a
sentencing error. The sentencing order purported to merge the felony
murder guilty verdict into the malice murder guilty verdict. In fact,
the felony murder verdict stands vacated as a matter of law. See
Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713, 717-719 (3) (770 SE2d 585) (2015); Hulett

2 OCGA § 17-8-75 states:

Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial
matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and
prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel and
by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper
impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the
prosecuting attorney is the offender.

es 795

uv. State, 296 Ga. 49, 53 (2) (766 SE2d 1) (2014). Because that error
does not affect the sentence actually imposed, however, it is not
necessary to vacate the sentencing order.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

OSs ines, Andrew S. Fleischman, for appellant.

Oliver J. Browning, Jr. District Attorney, Ryan H. Remsen,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1541. PIKE v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 756)

HINES, Chief Justice.

Matthew Jacob Pike appeals his conviction and sentence for
malice murder and related crimes in connection with the death of
Justin Klaffka. He challenges the denial of severance of his trial from
that of his co-indictees, the admission of certain evidence, and the
legal sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt. For the reasons that
follow, the challenges are without merit and we affirm.’

The evidence construed in favor of the verdicts showed the
following. On the evening of April 8, 2012, Pike, William Slaton
(“Slaton”), and Klaffka entered the Houston County mobile home
residence of Garrett Fluellen (“Fluellen”) and committed armed

+ ‘The crimes occurred on April 10, 2012. On June 5, 2012, a Houston County grand jury
returned an indictment against Pike, William Slaton, and Daniel Slaton charging them jointly
with nine counts: Count 1 — malice murder; Count 2 — felony murder while in the commission
of aggravated battery; Count 3 — aggravated battery; Count 4 — felony murder while in
the commission of kidnapping with bodily injury; Count 5 — kidnapping with bodily injury;
Count 6 — felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault; Count 7 — aggravated
assault; Count 8 — tampering with evidence by removing and burning the vietim’s clothing; and
Count 9— tampering with evidence by removing blood from the crime scene. Pike and William
Slaton were tried jointly before a jury July 15-18, 2013, and Pike was found guilty of Counts 1
through 7; Counts 8 and 9 were nolle prossed. On July 19, 2013, Pike was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1— malice murder; the trial court ruled the
yemaining counts either merged for the purpose of sentencing or stood vacated by operation of
law and the rulings have not been challenged. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691 (808 SE2d 696)
(2017). He filed a motion for new trial on July 22, 2013, and an amended motion for new trial
on October 7, 2016. The motion for new trial, as amended, was denied on January 4, 2017. A
notice of appeal was filed on February 2, 2017, and the case was docketed to the August 2017
term of this Court. The appeal was submitted for decision on the briefs.

796 es

robbery. Slaton’s brother, Daniel Slaton (“Daniel”), had driven the
men to and from the crime scene. Anthony Scott and others were at
Fluellen’s residence at the time of the armed robbery; Scott knew
Klaffka as he had previously traded drugs with him. During the
armed robbery, Fluellen got a glimpse of one attacker’s face, and was
able to run away and call 911. When Pike, Slaton, and Klaffka
returned to Daniel’s car, Pike cut Klaffka on the right thigh and was
“cussing him out” because Pike was angry at Klaffka for letting
Fluellen escape. Pike and Slaton became worried that Klaffka would
implicate them in the armed robbery.

On April 10, 2012, Klaffka’s girlfriend, Amanda Mitchell, wit-
nessed a fight between Pike, Slaton, and Klaffka at 119 Dixie Trail in
Houston County, where Pike was living along with Slaton, Daniel,
and Pike’s brother, David Pike (“David”). Pike and Slaton confronted
Klaffka and began to beat him; Pike hit Klaffka on the right side of his
head. After the beating, Klaffka was bleeding very badly and was
taken into the bathroom shower to be cleaned up. Then Pike, Slaton,
and Daniel walked Klaffka to Daniel’s car and Pike directed Daniel
where to drive; the three men drove Klaffka to a Houston County boat
ramp on the Ocmulgee River, an area known as Knowles Landing.
After arriving at the boat ramp, Klaffka was taken out of the vehicle;
Pike held a knife to Klaffka’s neck. The men began to argue and then
Slaton, who was standing behind Klaffka, put his arm around Klaff-
ka’s neck and started to choke him. After a couple of minutes, Pike
told Slaton to “get out of the way” because he was “doing no good” even
though Klaffka “had the fight already out of him” and was “hardly
doing anything.” Pike put his hands around Klaffka’s neck and Pike
and Slaton took Klaffka down to the river. Pike began to simultane-
ously choke and attempt to drown Klaffka, and then left Klaffka in
the water. Pike and Slaton got back in the car and removed their
clothing. Pike reached over with his knife to Daniel, threatening
Daniel that if he said anything he would kill him. Pike stated that “it
went too far, that he couldn't just let [Klaffka] go because he would go
tell the cops.” The three men drove back to 119 Dixie Trail; David had
cleaned up the bathroom with bleach. That night, Pike and Slaton
burned their clothes. They told David that they “threw [Klaffka’s] ass
off of [Highway] 96,” and that they had killed Klaffka and floated him
down the river.

On April 15, 2012, fishermen at Knowles Landing discovered
Klaffka’s body floating in the river. The medical examiner deter-
mined that Klaffka’s injuries were consistent with manual strangu-
lation and that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation
in conjunction with blunt force head trauma.

es 197

1. In separate enumerations of error, Pike contends that the
State’s evidence as a whole was legally insufficient to support his
murder conviction, and that the trial court erred in refusing to direct
verdicts of acquittal on all of the charges against him because the
State failed to establish venue in Houston County. But, such conten-
tions are wholly without merit.

The State presented ample evidence of the elements of the crimes
charged, including that of venue, which is a jurisdictional element of
every crime requiring that the State prove it beyond a reasonable
doubt. Bulloch v. State, 293 Ga. 179, 187 (4) (744 SE2d 763) (2013).
Consequently, we view the evidence of venue as we do in a challenge
to the general sufficiency of the evidence, that is, the evidence of
venue is viewed in a light most favorable to supporting the verdicts in
order to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a
rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime
or crimes were committed in the county in which the defendant was
indicted. Propst v. State, 299 Ga. 557, 561 (1) (b) (788 SE2d 484)
(2016). In general, a criminal action is to be tried in the county in
which the crime or crimes were committed. Id.; see Ga. Const. 1983,
Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI; OCGA § 17-2-2 (a).2 However, OCGA § 17-2-2
(h) provides that “[i]f in any case it cannot be determined in what
county a crime was committed, it shall be considered to have been
committed in any county in which the evidence shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that it might have been committed.” And, the
provisions of subsection (h) may be used to determine venue in
homicide cases. See Bulloch v. State, supra at 187 (4). What is more,
the State can prove venue by both direct and circumstantial evidence.
Propst v. State, supra at 561 (1) (b).

In this case, the State presented testimony at trial establishing
that the crimes against Klaffka culminating in his murder were
committed in Houston County. Such testimony included, inter alia,
that Knowles Landing, the place where Klaffka’s body was discov-
ered, was in Houston County, that Klaffka was severely beaten at
119 Dixie Trail, which was in Houston County, and that he was then
taken to Knowles Landing where he was strangled to death. The
evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was
properly in Houston County. Bulloch v. State, supra at 187 (4). Thus,
the failure to prove venue was not a meritorious basis for granting
directed verdicts of acquittal. What is more, the evidence as a whole

2 OCGA § 17-2-2 (a) provides:
In general. Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the crime was
committed, except as otherwise provided by law.

798 es

was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Pike was guilty of the crime for which he was
convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d
560) (1979).

2. Pike next contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to sever because his defense, which was that the State’s
evidence did not overcome his presumption of innocence, was antago-
nistic to that of his co-defendant, Slaton;* Pike argues this was so
because in the joint trial with Slaton he was forced to defend himself
against not only the proof offered by the State, but also the alibi
defense argued by Slaton’s counsel,* i.e., that only Pike and Daniel
killed Klaffka and Slaton was not present, so that he suffered
prejudice amounting to a denial of due process. But, the argument is
unavailing.

First, the transcript of the hearing in the matter reveals that
Pike failed to make the present argument to the trial court. His
argued basis below for severance was the likelihood that at trial the
State would “get into” Slaton’s extensive prior criminal history, and
that Pike would get “lumped up with that,” and thus, prejudice the
jury against him. In any event, even if the present challenge of
antagonistic defenses is preserved for our review, “antagonistic
defenses are insufficient to require severance in a non-death penalty
case absent a showing of prejudice.” Johnson v. State, 301 Ga. 205,
208 (IIT) (800 SE2d 296) (2017).

[I]tis not enough for a defendant to raise the possibility that
a separate trial would have given him a better chance of
acquittal; a defendant is entitled to severance only where
there is a clear showing of harm or prejudice and a showing
that failure to sever wouldresult in the denial of due process.
[Cit.] A defendant cannot rely upon antagonism between
co-defendants to show prejudice and the consequent denial
of due process; a defendant must show that the failure to
sever harmed him.

Kelly v. State, 267 Ga. 252, 253 (2) (477 SE2d 110) (1996). Pike’s claim
that the joint trial with Slaton forced him not only to defend against
the proof offered by the State, but also to defend against the defense
pressed by Slaton does not demonstrate the required prejudice and
denial of due process because such a situation exists in any case in

8 Co-indictee Daniel entered guilty pleas prior to trial and testified as a witness for the
State.
4 Neither Pike nor Slaton testified at trial.

es 799

which co-defendants have antagonistic defenses. Marquez v. State,
298 Ga. 448, 450-451 (2) (782 SE2d 648) (2016). What is more, despite
Slaton’s argued alibi defense, the jury arrived at guilty verdicts
against Slaton as well as Pike, obviously accepting the State’s case
which was substantially the same for Pike and Slaton. There is
nothing to suggest that the outcome of Pike’s trial would have been
different had he been tried separately from Slaton. Simply, Pike has
failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the joint trial so that
he was denied due process; consequently, there is no showing that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying severance. Id.

3. Pike also contends that the trial court erred in allowing, over
objection, certain autopsy photographs of Klaffka, maintaining that
the photographs were not only gruesome, but had no independent
probative value and served only to prejudice and inflame the jury.
But, there was no error in admitting the photographs at issue.

Inasmuch as Pike’s trial occurred after January 1, 2013, the
effective date of Georgia’s new Evidence Code, the Code is applicable
to the admissibility of the photographs.

Pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-402, “{a]ll relevant evidence shall
be admissible[.]” To evaluate relevancy, this Court relies
on OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” However, relevant evidence may be excluded
under OCGA § 24-4-403 [“Rule 403”] “if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id. “The ‘major func-
tion’ of Rule 403 is to ‘exclud[e] matter of scant or cumulative
probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its
prejudicial effect.’ ”

Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 832 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016) (citations
omitted). Moreover, “the exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule
403 is an extraordinary remedy that should be used only sparingly.”
Benton v. State, 301 Ga. 100, 103 (4) (799 SE2d 748) (2017) (citation
and punctuation omitted).

The challenged photographs do not depict the victim’s autopsy
incisions, and they are not especially gory or gruesome in the context
of autopsy photographs in a murder case; furthermore, they were
relevant to show the nature and location of the victim’s injuries,

800 es

which corroborated the State’s evidence of the circumstances of the
killing. Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613, 617-618 (5) (b) (783 SE2d 652)
(2016). Contrary to Pike’s assertion, Klaffka did not die solely from
manual strangulation, but also from blunt force head trauma, and
the photographs illustrated the nature and extent of the physical
beating and resulting trauma sustained by Klaffka. What is more,
the state in which Klaffka’s body was found was the result of the
crimes committed against him, including the dumping of his body
into the river.

The challenged photographs were relevant and admissible and
there is no showing that exclusion under Rule 403 was warranted.

4. Finally, Pike contends that the trial court erred in granting the
State’s motion to present evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts
pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”),® specifically in
permitting evidence of the armed robbery at Fluellen’s residence two
days before Klaffka’s murder.

Rule 404 (b) is, on its face, an evidentiary rule of inclusion
which contains a non-exhaustive list of purposes other than
bad character for which other acts evidence is deemed
relevant and may be properly offered into evidence. Despite
its inclusive nature, Rule 404 (b) prohibits the admission of
such evidence when it is offered solely for the impermissible
purpose of showing a defendant’s bad character or propen-
sity to commit a crime. Consequently, we use a three-part
test to determine if evidence of other uncharged acts is
admissible. Our threshold inquiry is whether the evidence is
probative of a material issue other than character. Common
examples include motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Second, the evidence must meet the requirements of Rule
403 — its probative value must not be substantially out-
weighed by its undue prejudice. And, third, the State must

® OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. The prosecution in a criminal proceeding shall provide
reasonable notice to the defense in advance of trial, unless pretrial notice is excused
by the court upon good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial. Notice shall not be required when the evidence of prior
crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered to prove the circumstances immediately sur-
rounding the charged crime, motive, or prior difficulties between the accused and
the alleged victim

es 801

offer sufficient proof that the defendant committed the act.
Atrial court’s decision to admit other acts evidence will be
overturned only where there is a clear abuse of discretion.

Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 539-540 (3) (A) (807 SE2d 899) (2017)
(citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted).

The trial court found that evidence of the armed robbery was
admissible to show the motive to commit Klaffka’s murder, and
evidence of motive is relevant even if it incidentally places a defen-
dant’s character in issue. Id. And, contrary to Pike’s assertion, there
was ample evidence of the connection between the armed robbery and
the killing of Klaffka, i.e., that Klaffka’s actions during and after the
armed robbery caused concern that he would turn in his cohorts to
police, leading to his killing.

As to the second prong of the test for admission under Rule 404
(b), which is scrutiny under Rule 403, the trial court found that the
probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice from its
admission. And, this determination is within the discretion of the
trialcourt after “a common sense assessment of all the circumstances
surrounding the extrinsic offense.” Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650,
657 (3) (769 SE2d 892) (2015), quoting United States v. Perez, 443 F3d
772, 780 (11th Cir. 2006). What is more, the prohibition of evidence
under the Rule 403 balancing test is an extraordinary remedy which,
as has been noted, should be used only sparingly inasmuch as it
permits the exclusion of concededly relevant evidence; in close cases,
balancing under Rule 403 should be in favor of admissibility of the
evidence. State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 164 (3) (773 SE2d 170) (2015),
citing United States v. Merrill, 513 F3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008)
and United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F2d 1099, 1119 (11th Cir.
1990). There was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its Rule 403
determination.

Lastly, contrary to Pike’s assertion, the trial court found, and
properly so, that there was sufficient proof that Pike committed the
prior armed robbery. Consequently, there was no abuse of the trial
court’s discretion in admitting evidence of it at trial.

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

Jeffrey L. Grube, for appellant.
George H. Hartwig III, District Attorney, Daniel P. Bibler, Alicia
D. Gassett, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attor-

802 es

ney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M.
Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1587. NORRIS v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 752)

GRANT, Justice.

Joseph Norris was convicted of felony murder, one count of
aggravated assault by shooting the victim with a gun (the predicate
offense for the felony murder charge), and one count of aggravated
assault with the intent to rob, all in connection with the shooting
death of Michael Patton. In this appeal, Norris argues that the trial
court erred when it failed to suppress his three videotaped state-
ments to police, and that both of the aggravated assault convictions
should have merged into the felony murder conviction. We agree that
the conviction for aggravated assault by shooting should have merged
into the felony murder conviction, but otherwise find no error. We
therefore affirm in part and vacate in part.

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
introduced at trial showed the following. In the early morning hours
of Sunday, April 20, 2014, Norris and Rachel Strauch broke into the
house where Patton lived with Tonia Gantt, through a rear door that
Gantt had deliberately left unbolted. Norris, Strauch, and Gantt
planned to rob Patton, who they believed would have methamphet-
amine and several thousand dollars in cash.” That night, Norris and
Strauch waited inside the house until Gantt and Patton arrived

+ ‘The victim was killed on April 20, 2014. On duly 10, 2014, Norris was indicted by a Henry
County grand jury for malice murder, felony murder based on aggravated assault by shooting
the victim with a gun, aggravated assault by shooting the victim with a gun, and aggravated
assault with the intent to rob. At the conclusion of a trial held April 25 through May 5, 2016, the
jury acquitted Norris of malice murder, but found him guilty on the other three counts. The trial
court sentenced Norris to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder
and twenty years’ imprisonment for each of the aggravated assault convictions, to be served
consecutively to the felony murder sentence and to each other. On May 9, 2016, Norris filed a
motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on February 24, 2017. Norris filed a timely
notice of appeal on March 3, 2017, and the case was docketed in this Court for the August 2017
term and submitted for a decision on the briefs

2 Strauch and Gantt were indicted for the same offenses as Norris, but pled guilty to lesser
crimes after Norris's trial

es 808

home, and then Norris attacked with an expandable baton, hitting
Gantt in the forehead and Patton in the shoulder; the plan had been
for Gantt to be “victimized” in the robbery so that her complicity
would not be suspected. Patton ducked and ran toward the front door.
Norris shot at Patton with a .380 handgun, hitting him in the head
and killing him. After Patton collapsed, Norris grabbed a bag off the
floor® as he and Strauch ran out of the house toward their car. Norris
cut through the woods, ran into a tree, and lost his hat and glasses.
Norris later threw the .380 pistol out of the car window over a
highway exit ramp.

Investigating officers found a tote bag containing drugs and
money in the master bedroom of Gantt’s house. They also found an
expandable baton with Patton’s blood onitin the neighbor’s yard, and
discovered Norris’s baseball cap and glasses in the woods about 150
feet away from Gantt’s house.

The next night, officers from the Butts County Sheriff’s Depart-
ment arrested Norris based on a tip. Once in custody, Norris was
interviewed three separate times on the same day: once at the Butts
County jail by Henry County police detective Gerald Marshall; once
by Henry County police detective René Swanson, again at the Butts
County jail; and once more by Detective Marshall at the Henry
County Police Department. All three interviews were videotaped.
During these interviews, Norris confessed to the events described
above and told police where to find the .380 pistol he used to shoot
Patton. Although Norris does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his convictions, as is our practice, we have
reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence presented at trial
and summarized above was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find
Norris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he
was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

II.

Norris challenges the admission into evidence of the three video-
taped statements he made to police after his arrest, claiming that the
statements were non-voluntary because he was intoxicated at the
time of the police interviews. We disagree.

® Norris thought that he had grabbed the bag full of drugs and money, but later realized
that the bag was actually Gantt’s purse

804 eS

The trial court held a Jackson-Denno* hearing to determine the
voluntariness and admissibility of Norris’s statements. Detectives
Marshall and Swanson testified at the hearing, and the trial court
viewed portions of the videotapes. The videotapes showed that Norris
was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86
SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), and confirmed his understanding and
willingness to speak with police both orally and in writing. Although
Norris told police that he and Strauch had stayed up “doing dope” on
the night of the shooting, and that he was “out of his mind” when he
shot Patton, he gave no indication that he was still intoxicated at the
time of the interviews, which took place more than twenty-four hours
after the shooting and began about six hours after Norris’s arrest.

Even if Norris was intoxicated at the time of the interviews, that
fact alone does not render the statements inadmissible. See Wallace
v. State, 296 Ga. 388, 390 (768 SE2d 480) (2015). In deciding the
admissibility of Norris’s statements at the Jackson-Denno hearing,
the trial court was required to consider the totality of the circum-
stances and determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether
the statements were knowingly and voluntarily given. Lewis v. State,
298 Ga. 889, 890-891 (785 SE2d 520) (2016). On appeal, we accept the
trial court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations unless
they are clearly erroneous; but “where controlling facts are not in
dispute, such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review
is de novo.” Benton v. State, 302 Ga. 570, 572 (807 SE2d 450) (2017).
We independently apply the legal principles to the facts. Lewis, 298
Ga. at 890-891. Where the evidence is sufficient to establish that a
defendant’s statement was “the product of rational intellect and free
will,” the statement may be admitted even if the defendant was
intoxicated when he gave it. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. 328, 329 (676
SE2d 225) (2009).

Here, Norris appeared calm, coherent, and alert during all three
interviews. Detectives Marshall and Swanson testified, and the
videotapes show, that Norris was oriented to time and place, appeared
to understand his rights and waived them orally and in writing,
answered questions appropriately, and gave a clear and detailed
description of events. Norris was not promised anything in exchange
for his statements or threatened or coerced into speaking. This
evidence sufficiently supports the trial court’s determination that
Norris knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and
gave his statements. See Lewis, 298 Ga. at 890-892; Jones, 285 Ga. at
329-330.

* See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

es 805

Ill.

Norris contends that his convictions and sentences for the aggra-
vated assault charges should have merged with the felony murder
conviction. Under OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) (1), “[w]hen the same conduct of
an accused may establish the commission of more than one crime,” a
defendant may be convicted of each crime separately unless “[o]ne
crime is included in the other[.]” One crime is “included in” the other
so that convictions for the two offenses must merge for sentencing
purposes when one of the crimes is “established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts or a less culpable mental state than is
required to establish the commission of [the other crime]” or the two
crimes differ only in that one is established by “less serious injury or
risk of injury to the same person” or “a lesser kind of culpability” than
the other. OCGA § 16-1-6; see Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 213
(636 SE2d 530) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted). Where, on
the other hand, each offense requires an element of proof beyond the
degree of injury or culpability that the other does not, neither of the
offenses is included in the other, and the crimes do not merge under
OCGA §§ 16-1-7 (a) (1) and 16-1-6. See Dublin v. State, 302 Ga. 60, 68
(805 SE2d 27) (2017); Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 848 (770 SE2d 855)
(2015).

Here, because the crime of aggravated assault by shooting
Patton with a gun was the underlying felony for the felony murder
conviction, it should have merged with the felony murder conviction
for sentencing purposes. See, e.g., McNeely v. State, 296 Ga. 422, 426
(768 SE2d 751) (2015). Accordingly, we vacate Norris’s conviction and
sentence for aggravated assault by shooting the victim with a gun.

We do not agree, however, with Norris’s contention that the
conviction for aggravated assault with the intent to rob also should
have merged into the felony murder conviction. To prove the crime of
aggravated assault with the intent to rob, the State was required to
show that Norris had the intent to rob. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1).
And to prove the felony murder charge as indicted, the State had to
prove that Norris caused Patton’s death, see OCGA § 16-5-1 (c), and
that he used a deadly weapon, see OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). Because
the two crimes each required proof of one or more facts not required
by the other and did not differ only in the degree of injury or
culpability, these convictions did not merge, and the trial court did not
err in sentencing Norris on both convictions. See Thomas v. State, 292
Ga. 429, 433 (738 SE2d 571) (2013).

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur.

806 es
DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

Long D. Vo, for appellant.

Darius T. Pattillo, District Attorney, Sharon L. Hopkins, Blair D.
Mahaffey, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Aimee F. Sobhani,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1588. WHITE v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 749)

Boaas, Justice.

Appellant Tracey Bernard White was tried before a jury and
found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the
shooting death of Larry Miller.1 He now appeals, asserting error in
the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt, and claiming
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to be effectively
present at trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
showed that White suffered a bloody and swollen lip when the victim
and another man “jumped on [him]” at a club one night. Witnesses
testified that when they saw White hours later, he was angry and told
them he was “going to get them.” The next day, White went to confront
the victim. When he found the victim, the two argued for a few
moments, then White pulled out a gun and shot the victim as the
victim started to run away. As White walked away from the scene, a
bystander heard him say, “I told y’all I was going to get y’all one by
one.” The bullet struck the victim in the back, killing him. White
turned himself in later the same day.

White testified at trial that he shot the victim because he was
scared and angry when, upon confronting him, the victim told White

1 The crimes occurred on August 16, 2003. On November 3, 2003, an Upson County grand
jury indicted White on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime. Following a March 2004 jury trial, White was found guilty
on all counts, He was sentenced to life in prison plus five years. Although the trial court
purported to merge felony murder into the malice murder conviction, the former was actually
vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (4) (434 SE2d 479)
(1993). White's motion for new trial was filed on April 23, 2004, amended by new counsel on
September 29, 2005, amended by a third counsel on December 30, 2014 and February
and denied on May 18, 2015. His notice of appeal was filed on June 8, 2015. This case was
docketed in this Court for the August 2017 term and orally argued on September 18, 2017.

es 807

that he was going to “finish him off” and “reached in his pants like he
had something.” The State presented evidence that some years
earlier, White shot another man in the back when the man refused to
give him his money back after White lost a poker game.

White does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain his conviction. Nevertheless, as is this Court’s practice in
murder cases, we have reviewed the evidence summarized above and
conclude that it was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find him
guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (IID (B) (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. White contends that he was deprived of the right to a fair trial
because the trial court, in instructing the jury, defined reasonable
doubt as not meaning the possibility that the defendant may be
innocent. White is correct that the language used by the trial court
here was disapproved in Coleman v. State, 271 Ga. 800, 804-805 (8)
(523 SE2d 852) (1999). However, reversal is not required if, when
viewing the charge asa whole, the State’s burden of proofis adequately
defined. Anderson v. State, 286 Ga. 57, 59 (5) (685 SE2d 716) (2009).
Here, the court instructed the jury on White’s presumption of inno-
cence, that White had no burden of proof, and that the burden of proof
rested with the State to prove the allegations and elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the instructions did not
go out with the jury, and although the jurors requested further
instruction on the elements of some of the crimes charged, they posed
no questions with regard to the State’s burden of proof. We therefore
conclude that, viewing the charge as a whole, the jury instruction did
not mislead the jury as to the standard of proof required by due
process. Mangum v. State, 274 Ga. 573, 577 (3) (a) (655 SE2d 451)
(2001).

3. White argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right
to be effectively present at trial because he was unable to hear due to
the poor acoustics in the courtroom. “Violations of this due process
right are presumed prejudicial, and, absent a waiver by the defen-
dant, require a new trial.” (Citation omitted.) Brewner v. State, 302
Ga. 6, 9 (IT) (804 SE2d 94) (2017).

Just prior to the start of trial, following a hearing ona motion, the
following colloquy took place between the court and White’s counsel:

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Your Honor, may I have my client
seated with my assistant?

THE COURT: I can’t hear you.

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: May I have my client, who is seated
over there, move with my assistant so he can hear also?

808 es

THE COURT: I’m sorry?

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: May I have my client seated with my
assistant so he —

THE COURT: No. No. I'll let you and your assistant move
anywhere you want but I’m not going to let the defendant
move.

White asserts that this request by his counsel was an implied motion
for remedial action that the court refused. He also points to instances
in the record where someone complained that they could not hear or
where witnesses were asked to speak more clearly and loudly.

Although at the hearing on the motion for new trial White
claimed that he had trouble hearing during the proceedings, at no
time did he object at trial or move for a mistrial on that ground. As the
Court of Appeals has held specifically with regard to a complaint
concerning unacceptable acoustics in the courtroom, a defendant
must make an objection at trial.? See Jones v. State, 190 Ga. App. 416,
418 (3) (b) (8379 SE2d 189) (1989); see also Burney v. State, 299 Ga.
813, 821 (8) (792 SE2d 354) (2016) (where defendant failed to ask to
see juror notes or complain to counsel, he acquiesced in court’s
handling of notes); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 807-808 (6) (505
SE2d 731) (1998) (defendant waived right to appellate review by
failing to voice objection after being informed of trial court’s visit with
jury outside of her presence).

Moreover, White has not shown that he was deprived of his right
to be present due to an inability to hear. In each instance White points
to where a witness or counsel was asked to speak louder or repeat a
question or answer, they did so. In some of those instances it appears
that the problem was not that the speaker could not be heard, but that
the speaker’s question or answer was not understood. Although both
assistant counsel for the State and an attorney at counsel table
testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that the acoustics
in the courtroom were poor and it was difficult to hear, White has
pointed to no portion of the trial he missed because he was unable to
hear. When asked during the hearing on the motion for new trial at
what point he told trial counsel that he could not hear, White referred
only to an instance prior to the start of trial, and explained that it
prompted trial counsel’s request that he be allowed to move. Although

2 White concedes in a reply brief that he “formally raised the issue for the first time at his
motion for new trial hearing.” White's counsel was deceased at the time of the hearing on the
motion for new trial. When another attorney at counsel table was asked during the hearing if
trial counsel's failure to object or move for a mistrial was strategic, he responded that he “would
not know that part.”

es 809

he asserted he still could not hear after the court refused to allow him
to move, he was not asked and did not explain whether at any time
after that he informed counsel that he was unable to hear.

On the record here, White has failed to show that he was deprived
of his constitutional right to be effectively present.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

, for appellant.

Benjamin D. Coker, District Attorney, Marie G. Broder, Brittany
A. Fallin, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason M. Rea, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1728. ANDREWS v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 746)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellant Javin Rashad Andrews was tried and convicted of
malice murder anda related offense in connection with the November
2010 shooting death of Ricardo Francois.’ Andrews appeals, alleging
the trial court erroneously admitted his custodial statements at trial.
Finding no error, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence adduced at trial established that, on November 20, 2010, cab

1 On May 10, 2012, a Cobb County grand jury jointly indicted Andrews and James Levone
Mitchell for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault
(Count 2), felony murder predicated on armed robbery (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 4),
armed robbery (Counts 5 and 6), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime
(Counts 7-9). Andrews’ first trial took place from February 25-28, 2013; he was tried alone. At
the close of the State’s case, the trial court directed a verdict of acquittal as to Count 5 (armed
robbery). The case was subsequently submitted to the jury, which was unable to reach a verdict,
and a mistrial was declared.

Prior to Andrews’ second trial, the State nolle prossed Counts 3, 6, and 9. On May 13-16,
2018, Andrews was re-tried on his remaining counts, and the jury found him guilty of all
charges. Andrews was sentenced to life for malice murder (Count 1) and five years consecutive
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 7). The remaining charges
were either vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. Andrews timely filed
a motion for new trial on May 29, 2013, which he amended on July 13, 2016, through new
counsel. Andrews waived an evidentiary hearing; the trial court subsequently denied the
motion as amended in an order filed on November 17, 2016. Andrews timely filed a notice of
appeal; this case was docketed to the August 2017 term of this Court and was thereafter
submitted for decision on the briefs.

810 es

driver Ricardo Francois picked up Andrews and his co-indictee James
Mitchell? from a Walmart parking lot. Andrews sat behind Francois,
while Mitchell sat behind the empty front passenger seat. Francois
drove Andrews and Mitchell to Cumberland Mall but, by the time
they arrived, it had closed. Andrews subsequently requested that
Francois take them to Lincoln Hills Apartments in Cobb County,
Georgia, which was adjacent to an apartment complex where Andrews
resided with his mother. Upon their arrival, Andrews shot Francois in
the back of the head. Francois died as a result of the gunshot wound.
At the crime scene, officers located a .25 caliber shell casing on
he floor of the cab. A GBI firearms examiner determined that the
ullet was fired from either a FIE or Tanfoglio .25 ACP pistol.

The case went cold until late January 2012, when law enforce-
ment received information that, around the time of the murder,
Andrews had confessed to shooting a cab driver. Specifically, Andrews
had told others that: he rode to the mall in a cab with a friend; he had
the cab take him home; he shot the driver in the back of the head; and.
the shooting was for money.

This information led law enforcement to apply for a search
warrant for Andrews’ DNA, as well as his finger and palm prints.
On February 6, 2012, detectives executed the warrant at the Cobb
County Detention Center where Andrews was being held on unrelated
charges. While speaking with officers, Andrews eventually admitted
to taking a cab to Cumberland Mall with Mitchell on the night
Francois was killed and to previously possessing a .25 caliber semi-
automatic handgun; however, he denied being involved in the murder.
Officers subsequently obtained a search warrant for Andrews’
residence. There, they spoke with Calandrial Afriyie, Andrews’
mother. She provided officers with photographs of a .25 caliber Titan
pistol (a weapon that is manufactured by FIE) that she had taken in
January 2011 after discovering the pistol in Andrews’ jacket. Accord-
ing to Afriyie, when she confronted Andrews about the weapon, he
took the gun from the house; it was never recovered. Officers also
located cell phones at the residence belonging to Andrews. One cell
phone contained photographs of Andrews taken less than a week
after the murder holding a .25 caliber gun.

Andrews was interviewed by law enforcement a second time on
February 14, 2012, during which he admitted to being in the cab the
night the driver was murdered, but implicated Mitchell as the
shooter.

ot

2 Mitchell testified as a witness for the State at Andrews’ second trial.

es 81

1. Though not enumerated by Andrews, we find that the evidence
as summarized above was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Andrews was guilty of the
crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Prior to trial, Andrews moved to suppress his February 6 and
February 14 custodial statements to law enforcement, alleging that
the statements were not made freely and voluntarily. After holding a
Jackson-Denno® hearing, the trial court found the statements to be
freely and voluntarily given without hope of benefit, coercion, or fear
of injury. Andrews argues now, as he did below, that the trial court
erred in admitting both February statements because they were not
freely and voluntarily given. We find this argument to be without merit.

“The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant’s
statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard consid-
ering the totality of the circumstances.” Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175,
176 (657 SE2d 863) (2008). “Although we defer to the trial court’s
findings of disputed facts, we review de novo the trial court’s appli-
cation of the law to the facts.” Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 823 (725
SE2d 260) (2012). We “will not disturb the trial court’s factual and
credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous.” Wright
v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 432 (677 SE2d 82) (2009).

The record supports the trial court’s findings that Andrews’
statements were made freely and voluntarily. Andrews was informed
of and understood his Miranda‘ rights. Although he refused to sign
the written waiver, the audio recordings of both interviews establish
that Andrews was verbally advised of these rights. See Thomas v.
State, 268 Ga. 135, 138 (485 SE2d 783) (1997) (“[T]he mere fact that
there was no written waiver of Miranda rights or other written record
of such waiver did not render his statement inadmissible.”). After
receiving the verbal warnings, Andrews agreed to speak with law
enforcement without an attorney, never requested to stop the inter-
view, was not promised a hope of benefit, and was not coerced into
making his statements. Based on the totality of the circumstances,®

8 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. 8. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. 8. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

® Andrews argues that the nine factors laid out by this Court in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124
(226 SE2d 922) (1976) should control our analysis regarding voluntariness. However, as we
have repeatedly explained, the Riley test only applies to evaluating custodial statements made
by juveniles, not adults. See, e.g., Vergara, 288 Ga. at 177 (1). At the time of his custodial
interview, Andrews was 17 years old, and “we have recognized that Riley does not apply to the
admissibility of statements by persons who have reached the age of 17 becat
no longer considered juveniles by our criminal justice system.” Woodard v. St
(2) (86 SE2d 330) (2003). See also Reynolds v. State, 275 Ga. 548, 549 (3) (569 SE2d 847) (2002).

812 es

and providing the proper deference to the findings of the trial court,
we find no error.

Andrews also claims that, because the February 6 interrogation
began prior to the reading of his Miranda rights, his admission that
he was in acab at the mall on the night of the murder was the product
of an improper “two-stage interrogation” in violation of Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (124 SCt 2601, 159 LE2d 643) (2004) and State
v. Pye, 282 Ga. 796 (653 SE2d 450) (2007). We disagree.

We previously described the two-stage technique as

an “interrogation procedure in which police first question a
suspect without administering Miranda warnings, gain a
statement from the suspect, then administer Miranda warn-
ings, and have the suspect repeat that which the suspect has
already related, often with little interruption in time.” [Cit.]
Under such circumstances, post-warning statements must
be suppressed because it is unlikely that the Miranda
warnings will effectively advise a suspect of his rights.
Cits.]

Fennell v. State, 292 Ga. 834, 836 (3) (741 SE2d 877) (2013).

Here, Andrews “was not enticed to admit to the crime, given
Miranda rights, and asked to repeat the pre-Miranda admission.”
State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105, 110 (2) (686 SE2d 239) (2009). Compare
Pye, 282 Ga. at 801-802 (statement made as a product of improper
two-stage technique where initial pre-Miranda questions led to
defendant “implicating himself in the crimes, and then, without any
break in the proceedings, was given Miranda warnings . .. and gave
a statement that was essentially identical to the version of events he
had already revealed to the detectives”). Indeed, it is questionable as
to whether Andrews’ pre-Miranda statement was incriminating.
Even if we assume it was, Andrews continued to deny involvement in
the murder, and the topics he discussed with the officers after he was
read his rights were markedly different than in their pre-Miranda
conversation. See Fennell, 292 Ga. at 836 (8) (finding officers did not
use improper two-stage interrogation technique where “the post-
Miranda interrogation differed not only in the completeness and
detail of the questions asked by the detectives but also in the content
of appellant’s statements”). Based on the foregoing, we find no error.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.
Murder. Cobb Superior Court. Before Judge Leonard.
Strickland Webster, Sydney R. Strickland, for appellant.

es 818

D. Victor Reynolds, District Attorney, Michael S. Carlson, Amelia
G. Pray, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, S. Taylor Johnston,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1755. BROWN v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 742)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellant Patricia Ann Brown was convicted of murder and
related offenses in connection with the beating death of Eugene
Clark. On appeal, Brown contends that trial counsel was constitu-
tionally ineffective. Though we conclude that Brown was erroneously
sentenced, we otherwise affirm.!

We begin by examining the evidence adduced during Brown’s
trial, reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdicts.
Brown and her friend, Gussie Moore, met the victim, Eugene Clark,
at a Sumter County bar. Clark was flush with cash from his tax
refund, which he was flashing around the bar, and purchasing drinks
for bar patrons. Brown attempted to engage Clark, but he was not
interested; Clark was, however, interested in Moore, and, much to
Brown’s dismay, the pair left the bar for Moore’s house. Several hours
later, Brown visited her boyfriend, Fred Hoston, and advised him that
someone had tried to rape her; at the time she made the accusation,
Brown was observed — apparently uninjured — dancing in the street
with a drink in her hand. The pair proceeded to Moore’s house where
Brown reignited an earlier argument with Moore and identified
Clark as her assailant; Clark subsequently left Moore’s house on foot.
According to Hoston, he and Brown followed Clark to a nearby
community center where they physically assaulted Clark, took his
wallet, and then left him to die. Hoston testified that it was Brown
who took Clark’s wallet, and a number of witnesses later observed.

1 In January 2008, a Sumter County grand jury indicted Patricia Ann Brown on the
charges of malice murder, felony murder predicated on robbery, and robbery. Following a trial
condueted July 16-18, 2008, a jury acquitted Brown of malice murder but found her guilty of
felony murder and robbery; the trial court sentenced Brown to life imprisonment for felony
murder and to twenty years’ probation for robbery (to run concurrent with the life sentence).
Brown filed a motion for new trial in August 2008 and then filed an amended motion in
September 2016. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the amended motion in April 2017;
Brown subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. This case was docketed to the August 2017
term and was thereafter submitted on the briefs.

814 PO ]

Brown with a large amount of cash.

1. Though Brown does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the
evidence supporting her conviction, we have reviewed the record an
conclude that the evidence as summarized above was sufficient to
enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that she was guilty of the crimes of which she was convicted. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. In her sole enumeration of error, Brown alleges that tria.
counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to
voice his concern regarding Brown’s mental competency and seek a
continuance to secure a mental evaluation.

In order to prevail on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective,
Brown must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient an
that the deficient performance was prejudicial. See Terry v. State, 284
Ga. 119, 120 (2) (663 SE2d 704) (2008). To prove deficient perfor-
mance, one must show that his attorney “performed at trial in an
objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances an
in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga.
339, 344 (3) (745 SE2d 637) (2013). With respect to the secon
Strickland? prong, “to show that he was prejudiced by the perfor-
mance of his lawyer, [Appellant] must prove ‘a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”
Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 269 (737 SE2d 98) (2013) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Here, Brown has failed to satisfy either
prong.

In September 2007, the trial court ordered that Brown undergo
a mental evaluation, specifically requesting that her competency to
stand trial be evaluated. Brown was subsequently evaluated at West
Central Georgia Regional Hospital in February 2008, less than five
months before trial; a forensic psychologist determined that Brown
was competent to stand trial, noting that Brown exhibited no
“symptoms or deficits that would preclude a productive working
relationship with an attorney .. . [or] that would prevent her from
following the course of a trial and participating meaningfully in the
process.” Trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new
trial that, in the months leading up to trial, Brown displayed no
indication that she was impaired or unable to assist in her defense but
that, on the first day of trial, Brown’s mental state seemed to change.
According to trial counsel, Brown was unable to assist with trial, and,

2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

es 815

as a consequence, he “sailed through [the trial] without much help
from [her].” Trial counsel testified that, in his opinion, Brown was not
competent to stand trial and that he should have requested an
additional evaluation. Though Brown did not testify at the hearing on
the motion for new trial, the trial court engaged with her on the
record. The trial court’s colloquy with Brown reveals that she was
able to recall specific dates and events and, further, that she was able
to articulate her understanding of the proceedings and the individu-
als involved.

Though trial counsel opined that he should have sought an
dditional mental examination, Strickland “calls for an inquiry into
he objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s
ubjective state of mind.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110 (131
Ct 770, 178 LE2d 624) (2011). Here, in light of the results of the
mental evaluation conducted just months prior to trial, trial counsel’s
observations of Brown leading up to trial, and the curious timing of
the alleged change in Brown’s mental status, it was not objectively
unreasonable for trial counsel to decide not to seek a second mental
evaluation. See Whitus v. State, 287 Ga. 801 (2) (700 SE2d 377) (2010)
(ordinarily in a non-capital case the decision to forego or curtail an
investigation of the accused’s mental health is reasonable when an
expert has determined that the defendant is fit to stand trial).

Moreover, Brown has not demonstrated prejudice. “The burden
is on the defendant to show that [her] attorney’s omissions have
prejudiced [her] case.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jennings
v. State, 282 Ga. 679, 680 (653 SE2d 17) (2007). “Ifa defendant wishes
to claim ineffectiveness based on trial counsel’s failure to request a
psychiatric evaluation . . . [s]he must show a likelihood that such an
evaluation would have affected the outcome at trial.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) Haygood v. State, 289 Ga. App. 187, 193 (656
SE2d 541) (2008). Strickland requires “more than speculation to
establish prejudice.” Hambrick v. Brannen, 289 Ga. 682, 684 (715
SE2d 89) (2011).

Here, other than the original mental evaluation, the record fails
to include any medical records, expert testimony, or other evidence of
diagnosis or treatment that would cast light on the question of
Brown’s competency. “Accordingly, we conclude that [Brown] has
failed to carry [her] burden to prove the prejudice prong of [her] claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an [additional]
psychiatric examination.” Bergeson v. State, 272 Ga. 382, 383 (530
SE2d 190) (2000). Compare Martin v. Barrett, 279 Ga. 593, 595-596
(619 SE2d 656) (2005) (expert testimony supported habeas court
finding of reasonable probability that defendant might have been
found incompetent to stand trial, legally insane, or guilty but men-

Weare

816 es

tally ill if counsel had adequately investigated his mental illness).
Accordingly, this argument is without merit.

3. Though not raised by either party, our review of the record
reveals that the trial court erred in sentencing Brown. Brown was
indicted on the charges of malice murder, felony murder predicated
on robbery, and robbery; though Brown was acquitted of malice
murder, guilty verdicts were returned on the remaining charges and
she was sentenced for each offense. This was error.

“When the only murder conviction is for felony murder and a
defendant is convicted of both felony murder and the predicate felony
of the felony murder charge, the conviction for the predicate felony
merges into the felony murder conviction.” Culpepper v. State, 289
Ga. 736, 737 (715 SE2d 155) (2011). Because Brown’s “robbery
conviction was the underlying felony for [her] conviction of felony
murder, it merged into the felony murder conviction. The conviction
and sentence for . .. robbery must, therefore, be vacated.” Hawkins v.
State, 267 Ga. 124, 124 (475 SE2d 625) (1996).

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

vid T: Winheim, for appellant.

Plez H. Hardin, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Aimee F. Sobhani,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1872. GREEN v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 738)

Bocas, Justice.

Appellant Neddrick Green was charged along with Jeremy Rey-
nolds, Jr. andAllen Williams for the malice murder of Barry Bullard.
Green and Reynolds (who was also charged with possession of cocaine)
were tried together and found guilty. Green now appeals, asserting

1 The crime occurred on July 30, 2008. On September 8, 2008, a Tift County grand jury
indicted Green for malice murder. Following a November 2010 trial, a jury found Green guilty,
and he was sentenced to life in prison. His motion for new trial was filed on November 26, 2010,
amended by new counsel on September 9, 2014, and denied on June 16, 2015. His notice of
appeal was filedon June 17, 2015. This case was docketed in this Court for the August 2017 term
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

es 817

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at
trial showed the following. The victim, Green, and Williams were
friends who grew up together, and Reynolds “had just started hang-
ing with” the three of them. At some point, the victim and Williams
had had an argument or “a beef” because Williams believed the victim
had stolen a gun from him. On July 30, 2008, Williams repeatedly
drove by the victim’s home with a frown on his face. As a witness
explained, Williams “was riding through mugging or whatever.” The
victim’s friend knocked on the victim’s door to tell him that Williams
was driving by his home “mean mugging.” The victim came outside
with a “big gun” and kept it at his side.

At some point, Williams parked his car across the street from the
victim’s apartment. Green, who was riding in the back seat of
Williams’s car, got out and retrieved a “long gun.” Green got back in
the car and the men drove up to the victim’s apartment, got out hold-
ing guns, and approached the victim. Green and Williams exchanged
words with the victim and his friend while Reynolds was leaning
against the hood of a car. Williams and Green then began punching
the victim in the face while attempting to take his gun. The victim
responded by telling the men to “chill.” As Williams and Green began
to walk off, Reynolds walked up to the victim and shot him in the face.
The victim fell but got up and exchanged gunfire with the three men,
but died shortly thereafter.

1. Green does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain his conviction. Nevertheless, as is this Court’s practice in
murder cases, we have reviewed the evidence summarized above and
conclude that it was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find
Green guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crime of
malice murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. 8. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979); OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining parties to a crime).

2. Green argues that he was denied his right under the Consti-
tution to effective assistance of counsel. To succeed on a claim that
counsel was constitutionally ineffective, Green must show both that
his attorney’s performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced
asaresult. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (IIT) (104 SCt
2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). Under the first prong of this test, counsel’s
performance will be found deficient only if it was objectively unrea-
sonable under the circumstances and in light of prevailing profes-
sional norms. Id. at 688-690 (III) (A). And under the second prong,
prejudice is demonstrated only where there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that, absent counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have
been different. A “reasonable probability” is defined as “a probability

818 |

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694 (IIT) (B).
“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to
defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon
this Court to examine the other prong.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015).
And “although both the performance and prejudice components of an
ineffectiveness inquiry involve mixed questions of law and fact, a trial
court’s factual findings made in the course of deciding an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim will be affirmed by the reviewing court
unless clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

(a) Green asserts that although it may have run counter to trial
counsel’s principal trial strategy that he was present but not a party
to the crime, counsel should have pursued instructions on mutual
combat or self-defense because “[i]t is permissible to rely upon two
seemingly inconsistent defenses.”

“To authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be
slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge. Whether the
evidence presented is sufficient to authorize the giving of a charge is
a question of law. It is not error to refuse a justification charge where
there is no evidence to support it.” (Citations and punctuation omit-
ted.) Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. 260, 262 (2) (695 SE2d 195) (2010). Green
argues that evidence of “bad blood” between the parties, evidence that
the building behind him was “shot up” during the fight, and evidence
that the victim was carrying a gun, show that mutual combat applies
here. But “(a) charge on mutual combat generally is proper when
there is evidence of a mutual intention or agreement to fight.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 665,
669 (4) (c) (797 SE2d 903) (2017). There is no evidence that the victim
had an intention to fight Green. Rather the evidence showed that the
“beef” was between the victim and Williams, that the victim came out
with the gun after being told that Williams was driving by his home,
but kept it by his side and did not attempt to use it even while
Williams and Green punched him in the face, and that the victim
exchanged gunfire with Green, Williams, and Reynolds only after
being shot. See Carruth v. State, 290 Ga. 342, 348-349 (6) (721 SE2d
80) (2012) (charge on mutual combat not authorized by the evidence
showing either unprovoked fist fight or ambush by defendant).”

Because trial counsel could not render ineffective assistance for
failing to request charges that would not have been adjusted to the
evidence, Green has failed to make the necessary showing to estab-

2 Green presents no argument regarding his claim that he acted in self-defense, and we
have found no evidence to support a jury instruction on that theory.

es 819

lish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.

(b) Green asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
seek severance of his trial from that of his co-defendant Reynolds.*
“Whether to seek severance is a matter of trial strategy, and in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are presumed
to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lupoe v.
State, 300 Ga. 233, 241 (2) () (794 SE2d 67) (2016); see also OCGA §
17-8-4 (procedure for jointly indicted defendants). Moreover, if sev-
erance had been requested, Green would have had the “burden of
making a clear showing of prejudice and a denial of due process in the
absence of severance.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Adkins v.
State, 279 Ga. 424, 426 (3) (614 SE2d 67) (2005).

Green asserts that it was not possible for the jury to separate the
facts because the evidence against Reynolds was stronger as it
showed Reynolds had the gun used to kill the victim and was facing
an additional charge — possession of cocaine. But “the mere fact
that the case against one defendant was stronger than the case
against the other does not necessitate a separate trial.” (Citations
and punctuation omitted.) Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 510 (2) (705
SE2d 649) (2011). Green points to no evidence with regard to the
murder that would have been excluded had his severance motion
been granted and he were tried alone. Butler v. State, 290 Ga. 412, 413
(2) (721 SE2d 876) (2012). He “was being tried under the theory that
he was a party to the crime[ ] and there was ample evidence to show
that he was a party to the crime[ ]. Where, as here, there is sufficient
evidence of a ‘common scheme or plan’ to commit . . . [a] criminal
offense[ ], joinder is authorized and severance is not mandatory.”
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 414 (2).

The evidence of Reynolds’ drug possession clearly did not directly
implicate Green as the evidence showed that the drugs were found in
a plastic bag in Reynolds’ mouth. Although the trial court did not
specifically instruct the jury that the possession evidence “could be
considered only against” Reynolds, see Billings v. State, 293 Ga. 99,
106 (6) (745 SE2d 583) (2013), the court made it clear to the jury that
“Mr. Reynolds and only Mr. Reynolds” was charged with possession of
cocaine.

Trial counsel’s decision not to seek severance is presumed stra-
tegic. Even if counsel had filed a motion to sever, the court would not

® Trial counsel was deceased at the time of the hearing on the motion for new trial.
However, “[e]ven where, as here, trial counsel is no longer available to testify regarding the
manner in which he conducted appellant's defense at trial, appellant must still overcome this
presumption.” Jones v. State, 296 Ga. 561, 564 (2) (769 SE2d 307) (2015).

820 es

have abused its discretion in denying the motion as Green would not
have been able to show prejudice from the joint trial. See Lupoe,
supra, 300 Ga. at 242-243 (2) (c); Glenn v. State, 279 Ga. 277, 279 (2)
(c) (612 SE2d 478) (2005) (because defendant could not show joint
trial caused him harm, defense counsel not ineffective for failing to
move for severance). Green’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
on this ground therefore fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

‘onger mith, Gregory D. Smith, for appellant.

C. Paul Bowden, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew D. O’Brien,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1928, $17A1929. BLACKWELL v. THE STATE;
and vice versa.
(809 SE2d 727)

HINES, Chief Justice.

In Case No. $17A1928, Samuel Rickey Blackwell appeals his
convictions for malice murder, two counts of aggravated assault, two
counts of cruelty to children in the first degree, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, all in connection with the
fatal shooting of Deirdre Smith and the wounding of two children.
Blackwell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt, the
effectiveness of his trial counsel, and certain instructions to the jury.
In Case No. $17A1929, the State appeals the trial court’s denial ofits
motion to vacate Blackwell’s sentence of life in prison for murder as
void and to enter a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in both cases."

1 The crimes occurred on September 16, 2013. On December 13, 2013, a Cobb County grand
jury indicted Blackwell, along with Khalil Kelly, for malice murder, two counts of felony murder,
four counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of cruelty to children inthe
first degree, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Blackwell was also
charged with a third count of felony murder, and Kelly was additionally charged with a fifth
count of aggravated assault and possession of a handgun by a minor. Blackwell was tried jointly
with Kelly before a jury January 26-30, 2015, and both were found guilty on all counts. On
February 4, 2015, Blackwell was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, two consecutive
terms of twenty years in prison for aggravated assault upon the two children, consecutive terms

es 821

Case No. S17A1928

1. Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed the
following. On the evening of September 16, 2013, Dionna Jackson and
Takeisha Lindsey began to physically fight in the parking lot of an
apartment complex. As the two girls fought, Jackson’s boyfriend,
Khalil Kelly, walked about the scene with his arms folded and a gun
tucked into his pants. Several witnesses felt that Kelly presented a
threat to those in the parking lot, and one neighbor called 911. Smith,
who was the mother of Lindsey’s boyfriend, Darrold Hadley, went out
to break up the fight. Blackwell also came outside and asked about
breaking up the fight. Kelly began arguing with Blackwell and told
him to “get the ‘F’ back inside before some stuff goes down.” This
expression was understood by those in the neighborhood to be a very
serious threat that would generally include fighting or shooting.
Blackwell returned to his apartment for about one minute. When he
came back outside, Blackwell asked Hadley if Kelly was in his family,
and Hadley answered that he did not know Kelly. Blackwell imme-
diately began shooting a .40 caliber pistol at Kelly, who fired back
with a 9-millimeter pistol. The two continued to shoot at each other
from some distance with other people caught in the middle. Smith
died at the scene from gunshot wounds. Lindsey’s four-year-old
brother was wounded in his upper right leg, and her ten-year-old
sister was wounded in her right hip. After the gunfight, Blackwell fled
in an automobile and, four days later, turned himself in to police.
Kelly also fled and subsequently was taken to a hospital for treatment
of gunshot wounds to his chin and left foot.

Blackwell argues that there was no evidence that he knew Smith
at all or intended any harm to her, much less that he acted with
express or implied malice toward her. From the circumstances proven
in this case, however, a rational jury could have inferred that Black-
well shared a common criminal intent with Kelly to engage in a
gunfight in the presence of innocent bystanders, and even though
Smith evidently was not an intended victim of the gunfight and Kelly

of twenty years on probation for the two counts of cruelty to children, and a consecutive term
of five years in prison for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The felony
murder verdicts were vacated by operation of law, and the remaining counts of aggravated
assault merged with the malice murder for the purpose of sentencing. Trial counsel filed a
motion for new trial on Blackwell's behalf on February 11, 2015, and the motion was amended
by new counsel on May 16, 2016 and again on July 21, 2016. The State's motion to vacate
Blackwell's sentence as void was filed on February 19, 2016 and denied on October 18, 2016. The
motion for new trial, as amended, was denied on October 19, 2016. Blackwell filed a notice of
appeal on October 27, 2016, and the State filed one on November 9, 2016. The case was docketed
in this Court for the August 2017 term. The appeal was orally argued on November 13, 2017.

822 eS

fired the fatal shot, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of
fact to find that Blackwell was a party to the crime of malice murder
under the doctrine of transferred intent. See Coe v. State, 293 Ga. 233,
235 (1) (748 SE2d 824) (2013); see also Giddens v. State, 299 Ga. 109,
111 (1) (b) (786 SE2d 659) (2016); Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 658
(1) (a) (740 SE2d 590) (2013). Moreover, we conclude that, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
presented at trial authorized the jury to find Blackwell guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt of all crimes for which he was convicted. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

Blackwell also argues that when the trial court instructed the
jury what was required to find Blackwell guilty of felony murder, it
used the term “murder” instead of “felony murder,”? thereby convey-
ing the notion that the jury would be authorized to convict Blackwell
of malice murder even without evidence of malice toward Smith. But
any deficiency in the jury charge does not control the separate
question of whether the proof of malice was sufficient, and Black-
well’s complaint about the jury charge is not itself properly before us
because he failed to object to that charge at trial and, “unlike the
allegedly insufficient evidence of [malice murder], it was not enu-
merated as error.” Faulkner v. State, 295 Ga. 321, 323-324 (1) (b) (758
SE2d 817) (2014). See also Terry v. State, 291 Ga. 508, 509 (2) (731
SE2d 669) (2012) (review of a jury instruction for plain error is
available only “if the error is properly enumerated and argued on
appeal”). Even assuming that Blackwell has properly complained
about the jury instruction, it was taken from the pattern charge,
Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases
§ 2.10.30 (4th ed. 2007); the trial court specifically indicated that it
was defining felony murder; and, read as a whole, the jury charge
“clearly did not commingle malice murder and felony murder together
and confuse the jury into believing that the two are the same.” Parker
v. State, 282 Ga. 897, 900 (7) (655 SE2d 582) (2008).

2. Blackwell does enumerate as error the trial court’s jury
charges on accident and transferred intent, asserting that, taken
together, they were misleading and contradictory. But he “did not
object to [those] instruction[s] [at trial], and for that reason, we
review [them] only for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). See also

2 Blackwell specifically complains of the following sentence in the trial court's charge:
Ifyou find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed the
homicide alleged in this bill of indictment at the time a defendant was engaged in
the commission of the felonies of aggravated assault or possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, then you would be authorized to find the defendant guilty of
murder, whether the homicide was intended or not.

es 828

State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 31-32 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011).” Faulkner,
295 Ga. at 327 (5). As we have often explained, review for plain error
means that we will reverse the trial court only if there was an
instructional error that “was not affirmatively waived, was obvious
beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the pro-
ceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Herrington v. State, 300 Ga. 149,
151 (2) (794 SE2d 145) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). The
appellant has the burden of showing a clear or obvious error and
further making an affirmative showing that the error probably did
affect the outcome below. Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 317 (2) (800
SE2d 333) (2017).

With these principles in mind, we turn now to examine the
language of the charges that we must review for plain error. The
charge on the affirmative defense of accident began as follows: “No
person shall be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or
accident in which there was no criminal scheme, undertaking or
intention.” This language was correct in substance. See Hamilton v.
State, 260 Ga. 3, 5 (5) (889 SE2d 225) (1990). Immediately before that
accident charge, the instruction on transferred intent stated that,
“filf one intentionally commits an unlawful act, yet the act harmed a
victim other than the one intended, it is not a defense that the
defendant did not intend to harm the actual person injured.” This
charge also fairly covered the correct legal principles related to
transferred intent. See Armstrong v. State, 250 Ga. App. 784, 785-786
(552 SE2d 920) (2001).

Blackwell contends, however, that these successive charges effec-
tively negated the accident instruction by telling the jury that there
could be an accident if Blackwell had no intent, but that under the
legal fiction of transferred intent, it did not matter if he had no intent.
But it is not difficult to understand the difference in the two instruc-
tions at issue. The charge on transferred intent addresses the cir-
cumstance of an intentional act by which the defendant intended to
harm someone other than the injured person, while the charge on
accident deals with the absence of any criminal intention whatsoever.
See Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 476, 478 (3) (480 SE2d 32) (1997) (relating
in part to the difference between charges on accident and transferred
intent).

Moreover, where, as here, a defendant complains of the juxta-
position of correct statements of law in the charge to the jury, we apply
the usual rule that they must be read in context of the whole jury
charge. See Pollard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 159, 160 (3) (495 SE2d 629)
(1998). In this case, the trial court thoroughly charged the jury on the
presumption of innocence, the burden to prove each element of the

824 eS

crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and the definition of a crime as
being a joint operation of an act and intention. The court specifically
instructed the jury that “intent is an essential element of any crime
and must be proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.” And the
court later charged that, “in order to prove its case, the state must
show intent [and] must negate or disprove mistake, accident and lack
of justification.” It therefore does not appear that the charges on
accident and transferred intent, assessed in the context of the entire
charge and not from isolated excerpts, were confusing or misleading
with respect to criminal intent. See Berry, 267 Ga. at 478 (3).
Accordingly, Blackwell has failed to show either an obvious instruc-
tional error or an error that likely affected the outcome of his trial,
and it follows that there was no plain error.

3. Blackwell asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by pursuing an all-or-nothing trial strategy and waiving a
jury charge on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense
without consulting Blackwell. To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), “a defendant must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient perfor-
mance so prejudiced the defendant that there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have
been different.” Harvey v. State, 300 Ga. 598, 606 (9) (797 SE2d 75)
(2017) (citations omitted). “While the test imposed by Strickland is
not impossible to meet, the burden is a heavy one.” Faust v. State, 302
Ga. 211, 217 (4) (805 SE2d 826) (2017) (citation and punctuation
omitted). For Blackwell “to satisfy the first requirement of Strick-
land, he has to overcome the strong presumption that his trial
counsel’s performance was within the wide range of reasonable
professional conduct, and that counsel's decisions were the result of
reasonable professional judgment.” Schmidt v. State, 297 Ga. 692,
696 (3) (778 SE2d 152) (2015) (citation omitted). The reasonableness
of counsel’s conduct must be evaluated “from counsel's perspective at
the time of trial and under the particular circumstances of the case,
and decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis
for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreason-
able that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.”
Daniels v. State, 302 Ga. 90, 94 (2) (805 SE2d 80) (2017) (citations
omitted).

“An attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a
question of trial strategy.” Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60, 62 (2) (a) (779
SE2d 322) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). More specifi-
cally, “[p]ursuit of an ‘all or nothing’ defense [generally] is a permis-
sible trial strategy.” Smith v. State, 301 Ga. 348, 353 (IID (b)

es 825

(801 SE2d 18) (2017). “[T]he decision not to request a jury charge on
a lesser included offense in order to pursue an ‘all-or-nothing’ defense
is a matter of trial strategy.” Wells v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 166 (2) (b)
(758 SE2d 598) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). Further-
more, although “attorneys do have an affirmative duty to consult with
their clients” about what defense to present, “an attorney’s failure to
fulfill the duty to consult regarding trial strategy does not in and of
itself constitute ineffective assistance.” Hendrix, 298 Ga. at 63-64
(2) (a) (citations omitted). As authority for this principle, Hendrix
cited Van Alstine v. State, 263 Ga. 1, 3-4 (426 SE2d 360) (1993), which
relied on the portion of the commentary to ABA Standard for Criminal
Justice 4-5.2 (2nd ed. 1980) that recognized the defense lawyer’s duty
to consult fully with the accused about submission of lesser included
offenses to the jury, but which rejected the same commentary’s
statement that the defendant rather than the lawyer should decide
whether to seek such submission. Since Van Alstine, we are not aware
of any development that would cause us to reconsider its holding. To
the contrary, the commentary to the next edition of that same ABA
Standard continued to recognize the duty to consult with the defen-
dant about lesser included offenses but removed the language assign-
ing the ultimate decision to the defendant, see ABA Standard for
Criminal Justice 4-5.2 cmt. (8rd ed. 1993), and afterward “courts
have uniformly decided that whether or not to ask the trial judge to
instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses is a matter of strategy
and tactics ceded by a defendant to his lawyer.” People v. Colville, 979
NE2d 1125, 1130 (N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases). See also Rule 1.2 (a)
of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102
(d) (also omitting such decision from its list of decisions reserved to
criminal defendants). Accordingly, we adhere to our decision in Van
Alstine that the failure to consult fully with the accused about
whether to pursue an all-or-nothing defense or request a jury charge
ona lesser included offense should be rigorously scrutinized, but that
such failure does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in
every case as a matter of law. 263 Ga. at 4. See also Roberts v. State,
263 Ga. 807, 808-809 (2) (c) (439 SE2d 911) (1994).

At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Blackwell’s trial
counsel explained that he requested jury charges on justification and
accident, but not voluntary manslaughter, based on his discussions
with Blackwell, the evidence supporting the self-defense charge, and
the lack of evidence supporting a charge on voluntary manslaughter.
Counsel believed that it would have been inconsistent under the
evidence to claim self-defense, but then also to ask for a charge on vol-
untary manslaughter. Throughout the case, including in his testimony
on motion for new trial, Blackwell himself consistently maintained

826 eS

that he acted in self-defense. In this case, therefore, asin Van Alstine, the
transcript of the hearing on Blackwell’s motion for new trial estab-
lishes that a charge on voluntary manslaughter “was declined pur-
suant to an informed strategic choice by trial counsel which com-
ported with [Blackwell]’s strong feelings about the justification defense.”
263 Ga. at 4. It was not patently unreasonable for trial counsel, rather
than risk losing credibility, to make the strategic decision not to seek
a voluntary manslaughter charge and not “to convince [Blackwell]
that it was the preferable way to proceed.” Wells, 295 Ga. at 165 (2) (b).
See also Savior v. State, 284 Ga. 488, 493 (4) (668 SE2d 695) (2008)
(“counsel is entitled to base the defense on the veracity of the client’s
assertions” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Moreover, even assuming that trial counsel’s performance was
deficient, Blackwell has not shown resulting prejudice. “In the con-
text of a failure-to-consult claim such as that alleged here, the
defendant must establish that his counsel’s failure to consult was
prejudicial to his defense, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s failure to consult, the result of his trial would
have been different.” Hendrix, 298 Ga. at 64 (2) (a) (citation and
punctuation omitted). Blackwell relies on his testimony that, had
counsel explained the offense of voluntary manslaughter and its
penalty, he would have asked trial counsel to request a charge on that
offense. To demonstrate prejudice, however, Blackwell would have to
establish a reasonable probability that, had counsel consulted with
him, counsel would have opted to pursue a charge on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter and that such a strategy
would in reasonable probability have resulted in a different outcome.
See id. In the first place, there is no evidence that counsel would have
requested a charge on voluntary manslaughter, a decision that was
his to make, even if he had properly consulted Blackwell. To the
contrary, counsel's testimony shows that he reasonably viewed such
a charge as inappropriate and unhelpful. Second, had trial counsel
consulted with Blackwell and requested a charge on voluntary man-
slaughter, there could be no ineffective assistance if the charge was
not supported by even slight evidence that he was seriously provoked,
causing him to begin shooting solely as the result of a sudden, violent,
andirresistible passion. See Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713, 716 (2) (770
SE2d 585) (2015). There was some evidence, on which Blackwell
relies, that he had been injured by numerous gunshots on two prior
occasions, that he did not go back inside his apartment on this
occasion, and that he may have acted in self-defense after Kelly made
a verbal threat and cocked his pistol. But Blackwell did not testify at
trial, and there is no evidence that he reacted passionately to Kelly’s
threat and pistol-wielding. See Allen v. State, 290 Ga. 743, 746-747 (4)

es 827

(723 SE2d 684) (2012); see also Dugger v. State, 297 Ga. 120, 124 (7)
(772 SE2d 695) (2015). Finally, even if the record could be construed
to include slight evidence of voluntary manslaughter so as to warrant
a charge thereon, Blackwell was not prejudiced unless there is a
reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s alleged error in failing
to consult with Blackwell and request that charge, the jury would
have reached a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter. See
Hendrix, 298 Ga. at 64 (2) (a); Jeffrey, 296 Ga. at 716 (2); Hung v.
State, 284 Ga. 796, 796-797 (1) (671 SE2d 811) (2009). Any such slight
evidence of voluntary manslaughter was insufficient, especially in
light of the strong evidence of Blackwell’s guilt of malice murder, to
establish a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned
a guilty verdict on voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. See
Darville v. State, 289 Ga. 698, 701-702 (4) (a) (715 SE2d 110) (2011).

Case No. S17A1929

4. Before trial, the State filed notice of its intention to introduce
evidence of Blackwell's prior conviction for the felony of entering an
automobile, see OCGA § 16-8-18, and to seek punishment of Black-
well as a repeat offender pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (a). Acertified
copy of the prior conviction was admitted for sentencing purposes,
and the State argued that a sentence of lifeimprisonment without the
possibility of parole was therefore mandatory for murder under
OCGA § 17-10-7 (a). Inrelevant part, subsection (a) of OCGA § 17-10-7
provides that, after having been convicted of a felony, a person who
commits another felony “shall be sentenced to undergo the longest
period of time prescribed for the punishment of the subsequent
offense of which he or she stands convicted.” The State argued that
“the longest period of time prescribed for the punishment” of Black-
well’s “subsequent offense” of murder was life without parole under
OCGA § 16-5-1 (e) (1) (“A person convicted of the offense of murder
shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole,
or by imprisonment for life.”). The trial court disagreed, sentenced
Blackwell to life in prison for murder, and entered an order denying
the State’s subsequent motion to vacate that sentence as void and
enter a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. It
is from that order that the State appeals. See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6);

2 In another recent appeal by a criminal defendant, the same issue was presented but did
not have to be resolved. See Hampton v. State, 302 Ga. 166, 172 (5) (805 SE2d 902) (2017)
(holding that ifthe trial court erred in saying that life without parole was statutorily mandated,
the error was harmless because of the court's further statement that, in any event, it would have
exercised its discretion to impose that sentence).

828 eS

State v. Barrow, 332 Ga. App. 353, n. 2 (772 SE2d 802) (2015); State
v. Jones, 265 Ga. App. 493, 493-494 (1) (594 SE2d 706) (2004).

In construing OCGA § 17-10-7 (a), “we must presume that the
General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant and so
we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable
way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. The
common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is
their context.” State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 64 (1) (799 SE2d 770) (2017)
(citation omitted). And in this case, we begin our analysis by consid-
ering the context of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a). “For context we look to other
provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole
statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common
law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provi-
sion in question.” Riggs, 301 Ga. at 68 (2) (a) (citation and punctua-
tion omitted).

We first summarize general principles of law that relate to the
determination of sentencing, particularly as they pertain to murder
and habitual offenders. “In a case in which a jury finds a defendant
guilty of murder, except where the prosecutor seeks the death pen-
alty, sentencing is determined by the judge. See OCGA § 17-9-2.”
Lewis v. State, 301 Ga. 759, 765 (4) (804 SE2d 82) (2017). “Although
the legislature defines crimes and sets the ranges of sentences ...,
trial courts generally have the discretion to fashion sentences that fit
the crimes for which the defendant is convicted, so long as the
sentences fall within the statutory ranges.” Riggs, 301 Ga. at 68
(2) (a). Itis, however, “within the power of the legislature to direct the
punishment to be prescribed for second offenders and to leave no
discretion to the trial judge.” Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 771 (1) (257
SE2d 182) (1979). See also Isom v. State, 261 Ga. 596, 597 (1) (408
SE2d 701) (1991) (“a legislature may constitutionally limit judicial
discretion in sentencing”).

In OCGA § 17-10-7,* the General Assembly has limited the discre-
tion of trial judges in sentencing habitual offenders. The language at

4 OCGA § 17-10-7 provides

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (b.1) of this Code section,
any person who, after having been convicted of a felony offense in this state or having
been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States of a crime
which if committed within this state would be a felony and sentenced to confinement
in a penal institution, commits a felony punishable by confinement in a penal
institution shall be sentenced to undergo the longest period of time prescribed for the
punishment of the subsequent offense of which he or she stands convicted, provided
that, unless otherwise provided by law, the trial judge may, in his or her discretion,
probate or suspend the maximum sentence prescribed for the offense.

(b)(1) As used in this subsection, the term “serious violent felony” means a

serious violent felony as defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 17-10-6.1.

es 829

issue in subsection (a) has been part of Georgia law for well over 150
years, long before parole was initially used in this state or any other.
See Laws 1833, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, § 339, p. 840 (requiring that the
second offender “be sentenced to undergo and suffer the longest perio
of time and labor prescribed for the punishment of such [second]
offense”); Penal Code of 1910, § 1222 et seq. (codifying Ga. L. 1908, p.
264, which created a system of parole); Neil P. Cohen, The Law of
Probation and Parole § 1:12 (June 2017 Update) (“Parole’s initial use
[in the United States] came in 1876... . By 1898, half the states ha
adopted a parole system.”). Subsection (c) of OCGA § 17-10-7 further
limits judicial sentencing discretion by providing that a person con-
victed of three felonies shall, upon subsequent conviction for a fourth
felony, “serve the maximum time provided in the sentence of the judge
based upon such conviction and shall not be eligible for parole until the
maximum sentence has been served.” The General Assembly adde
this provision in 1953 in the same paragraph as the provision currently
codified as subsection (a). Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 289; Knight,
243 Ga. at 774 (2), n. 1; State v. Carter, 175 Ga. App. 38, 39 (332 SE2

(2) Except as provided in subsection (¢) of Code Section 17-10-6.1, any
person who has been convieted of a serious violent felony in this state or who
has been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States of
acrime which if committed in this state would be a serious violent felony and
who after such first convietion subsequently commits and is convieted of a
serious violent felony for which such person is not sentenced to death shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for life without parole. Any such sentence of life
without parole shall not be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld,
and any such person sentenced pursuant to this paragraph shall not be eligible
for any form of pardon, parole, or early release administered by the State Board
of Pardons and Paroles or for any earned time, early release, work release,
leave, or any other sentence-reducing measures under programs administered
by the Department of Corrections, the effect of which would be to reduce the
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, except as may be
authorized by any existing or future provisions of the Constitution.

(b.1) Subsections (a) and (©) of this Code section shall not apply to a second or
any subsequent convietion for any violation of subsection (a), paragraph (1) of
subsection (i), or subsection (j) of Code Section 16-13-30.

(© Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or (b.1) of this Code section
and subsection (b) of Code Section 42-9-45, any person who, after having been
convicted under the laws of this state for three felonies or having been convicted
under the laws of any other state or of the United States of three crimes which if
committed within this state would be felonies, commits a felony within this state
shall, upon convietion for such fourth offense or for subsequent offenses, serve the
maximum time provided in the sentence of the judge based upon such conviction
and shall not be eligible for parole until the maximum sentence has been served.

(d) For the purpose of this Code section, conviction of two or more crimes
charged on separate counts of one indictment or accusation, or in two or more
indictments or accusations consolidated for trial, shall be deemed to be only one
conviction.

(c) This Code section is supplemental to other provisions relating to recidi-
vous offenders.

830 eS

349) (1985). The Sentence Reform Act of 1994 added the provision
currently codified as subsection (b), which mandates a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole for a person who is convicted of a
“serious violent felony” after having previously been convicted of a
“serious violent felony.” Ga. L. 1994, p. 1959, § 12. All of these subsec-
tions of OCGA § 17-10-7 must be read together. See Barney v. State,
333 Ga. App. 807, 814 (4) (777 SE2d 490) (2015); State v. Jones, 253
Ga. App. 630, 632 (560 SE2d 112) (2002). See also Knight, 243 Ga. at
773 (2).

When the provisions now included in subsections (b) and (c) were
added to OCGA § 17-10-7, they expressly proscribed parole eligibility
for those recidivists convicted of a fourth felony or a second
“serious violent felony,” as there is no such proscription in the
language of subsection (a).° The enactment of subsections (b) and (c)
expanded the reach of Georgia’s habitual offender statute to specify
when parole would be unavailable, but the converse is not true.
Subsection (a) has never been understood to expand the instances of
parole ineligibility set forth in subsections (b) and (c).° To the con-
trary, subsection (a) has always been understood not to affect parole.
See Coleman v. State, 337 Ga. App. 732, 736 (2) (788 SE2d 826) (2016)
(OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) “does not prevent the Board of Pardons and
Paroles from granting [the defendant] parole at some point during
his sentence”); Moore v. State, 263 Ga. App. 548, 551-552 (4) (588
SE2d 327) (2003); Jack Goger, Daniel's Georgia Criminal Trial Prac-
tice Appendix B (December 2017 Update) (“Any sentence under
[OCGA § 17-10-7] (a) is parole eligible.”). While subsection (c) requires
the recidivist to “serve the maximum time provided in the sentence of
the judge” and not be eligible for parole, this is quite different from
saying in subsection (a) that the recidivist shall be sentenced to “the

® We note that, unlike its effect on parole eligibility, the language of OCGA § 17-10-7 ©
aves in place the trial court’s discretion to probate or suspend sentences that is
nized in subsection (a). See Page v. State, 287 Ga. App. 182, 184 (8) (651 SE2d
131) (2007); Carter, 175 Ga. App. at 38-41, But trial courts have no such discretion where the
sentence is for life imprisonment. See Singleton v. State, 293 Ga. App. 755, 757 (2) (667 SE2d
711) (2008) (by acknowledging the trial court’s discretion to probate or suspend sentences
“unless otherwise provided by law,” OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) recognizes the express abrogation in
OCGA § 17-10-1 of the trial court’s discretionary power to grant probation or suspension in
cases in which life imprisonment is imposed).

® One consequence of construing OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) to mandate ineligibility for parole in
this case and other murder cases would be to make subsections (b) and (c) meaningless in such
cases, as a repeat offender would be sentenced to life without parole for his subsequent murder
convietion regardless of whether his prior conviction was a “serious violent felony” and
regardless of whether he had three prior felony convictions. Regarding the current applicability
of subsections (b) and (c) to murder cases, see generally Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 516,
517-518 (2) (796 SE2d 694) (2017).

es 831

longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the subse-
quent offense.” See Carter, 175 Ga. App. at 40 (contrasting the
wording of these two subsections).

In context, this language of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a), dating back to
1833 and repeatedly reenacted in recent times, is most naturally and
reasonably understood to mean the greatest measure of duration
authoritatively expressed for punishment. See Noah Webster, Ameri-
can Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (defining “long” as
“fe]xtended to any certain measure expressed”; defining “period” to
include “[lJength or usual length of duration”; defining “time” to include
“{a] space or measured portion of duration”; and defining “prescribe” as
“{t]o set or lay down authoritatively for direction”); New Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary (1993 ed.) (defining “long” as “having a great extent
in duration”; defining “period” to include “time of duration”; defining
“time” to include “[a] finite extent of continued existence; e.g. the
interval between two events”; and defining “prescribe” as “[w]rite or lay
down as a rule or direction; impose authoritatively”). Neither that
language nor the context of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) gives any indication
that it encompasses parole ineligibility or mandates the use of any
available sentencing option that prohibits parole.

The State argues that subsection (a) requires the most severe
sentence prescribed for punishment of the subsequent offense, i.e., life
without parole in the case of murder for which the death penalty is not
sought. But subsection (a) does not refer to the “maximum” sentence
prescribed or to any synonym such as “harshest” or “most severe.” Nor
does subsection (a) focus on the period of time that the defendant will
“serve” or be “eligible” to serve. Instead, the sentence required by
subsection (a) is the longest period of time prescribed for the subse-
quent offense. Such language does not encompass parole ineligibility
because, although it is a drastic penalty about which a criminal
defendant should be informed by his counsel prior to entering a guilty
plea, see Alexander v. State, 297 Ga. 59, 65 (772 SE2d 655) (2015),
parole ineligibility “in no way lengthens the sentence itself.” Smith v.
State, 287 Ga. 391, 394 (2) (a) (697 SE2d 177) (2010) (citation and
punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to sentence
Blackwell for murder to life in prison with the possibility of paroleand
that it correctly denied the State’s subsequent motion to vacate that
sentence as void.

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

rary W. Jones, for appellant.

832 es

D. Victor Reynolds, District Attorney, Michael 8. Carlson, John
R. Edwards, Theresa M. Schiefer, Assistant District Attorneys; Chris-
topher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy
Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
for appellee.

$17A1938. HARRIS v. THE STATE.
(809 SE2d 723)

PETERSON, Justice.

Blake Ramone Harris appeals his convictions for malice murder
and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Ray
Murphy.' Harris argues that the trial court improperly commente:
ona witness’s credibility and that the trial court erred by not allowing
him toask a GBI investigator whether he used a waiver of rights form
before interviewing Harris. We conclude that the trial court’s isolate
statement, which Harris did not object to, had no effect on the
outcome of the trial. We also conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in limiting Harris’s cross-examination because
his intended questions were not relevant to any issues at trial.
Therefore, we affirm Harris’s convictions.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the tria.
evidence shows that Harris, Kevin Boyd (Harris’s cousin), and Adrian
Ansley (Boyd’s girlfriend) were members of the same gang. Boyd an
Ansley, along with other gang members, regularly gathered at a
house on Ewing Street in Atlanta during the summer of 2013. Boy
obtained a gun from someone at the house and had it with him on the
night of August 10, 2013.

1 Murphy was killed on August 10, 2013. On October 25, 2013, a Walton County grand jury
indicted Harris for malice murder, two counts of felony murder, armed robbery, three counts of
aggravated assault, a violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a
convieted felon. At the conclusion of a trial held in October 2015, the jury found Harris guilty
onall counts except for the gang and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charges, which
were nolle prossed. The trial court sentenced Harris to life without parole for malice murder,
a concurrent life sentence for armed robbery, concurrent 20-year sentences for two of the
aggravated assault counts, and a consecutive five-year sentence for the firearm possession. The
trial court merged the remaining aggravated assault charge and purported to merge the felony
murder counts, which were actually vacated by operation of law. See Favors v. State, 296 Ga.
842, 847-848 (770 SE2d 855) (2015). Harris filed a timely motion for new trial, which he
subsequently amended. The trial court denied the motion on June 19, 2017. Harris filed a timely
notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court for the August 2017 term and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.

es 838

That night, Harris, Boyd, Ansley, BJ Crutchfield, and his son, BJ
Jr., were at a house known as the “Studio” in Monroe, Georgia. At
about 9:00 p.m., Ansley drove Harris and Boyd to pick up some meth
that they planned to sell. Boyd had previously placed the gun under
the passenger seat of Ansley’s car, and the gun was in the car during
the trip. After picking up the meth, Boyd called Jurshia Jones and
told her he would be coming by her house, which was located next door
to the Studio. At 9:15 p.m., Ansley dropped Harris and Boyd off at the
Studio and left. At some point, Harris and Boyd went next door to
Jones’s house.

Meanwhile, Ray Murphy arranged to buy an ounce of meth from
someone named “BJ.” Murphy asked his friend, Eric Mann, for a loan
to buy the meth. Mann’s wife drove Murphy and Mann to Jones’s
house, and she waited in the car while Murphy and Mann went inside
the house.

Once inside, Murphy and Mann sat in the living room with Boyd
and talked about the video game Boyd had been playing. When Harris
walked into the room, he pulled out a gun, cocked it, and pointed it at
Murphy and Mann. Mann said he did not have any money. Boyd and
Murphy began arguing, and Boyd reached into Murphy’s pockets.
While Boyd and Murphy argued, Mann made his way to the door,
unlocked it, and started to open it before Boyd grabbed him and
Harris hit him on the head with a gun, which discharged. Murphy
tried to escape by pushing through a window. Harris shot Murphy in
response. Mann managed to escape and ran to his wife’s car as she
was starting to leave. Murphy exited the house and tried to reach
Mann’s car, but fell when additional gunshots were fired. Murphy
was found unresponsive by police and died during surgery.

Police later stopped and arrested Ansley while she was driving
other people from the Ewing Street residence. During the stop, police
recovered a gun that Ansley identified at trial as the one that Boy
had previously placed in her car. AGBI firearm examiner testified the
gun was used to fire the shell casings found at the crime scene.

A few days after the shooting, Harris admitted to a fellow gang
member that he shot Murphy. Harris said that Boyd initially shot
Murphy because he thought Murphy was going to rob them. Harris
also said that, once Murphy made it outside the house, Harris fire’
another shot at him. Harris also spoke to a GBI investigator after
being advised of his rights. Harris initially denied any involvement in
Murphy’s death. He later admitted to the GBI investigator that he
was present for the crime but denied shooting anyone.

1. Although Harris does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, it is our practice in murder cases to review the record an!
determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient. Having done

84 PO ]

so, we conclude that the evidence outlined above was legally suffi-
cient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Harris was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted
under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Harris argues that the trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57 by
commenting on the credibility of co-defendant Boyd when telling him,
“You said you were going to stand up and be credible and be a man.”
Boyd had agreed prior to trial to be a State’s witness in exchange for
a grant of derivative use immunity, but indicated to a prosecutor
during the trial that he had changed his mind. The State called him
anyway, and he testified that Harris had nothing to do with the
shooting. The State attempted to impeach Boyd with his prior con-
tradictory statements. When the State attempted to ask additional
questions on re-direct, the following occurred:

BOYD: I plead the Fifth.

COURT: You can’t plead the Fifth because you’ve been given
immunity.

BOYD: Well — oh, I’ve been — oh, so that means not [sic]
nothing to me.

COURT: What?

BOYD: So immunity means — I want to be clear about you,
Judge, because he told me something else.

COURT: Listen to me, then. I signed an order saying any-
thing you said up here cannot be used against you. The Fifth
Amendment is about the right not to incriminate yourself and
say something that can be used against you. I took that power
away from the State. You have no right to claim the Fifth
Amendment because you cannot incriminate you[rself]. He’s
asked you a simple question.

BOYD: Okay. I’m sorry, Judge.

COURT: You said you were going to stand up and be credible
and be a man.

Harris complains that the court’s comments about being credible
were a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57. He concedes that he did not
object to the trial court’s statement and that, as a result, our review
is only for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-57 (b).?

2 Under the prior version of OCGA § 17-8-57, a trial judge’s violation of the statute required
automatic reversal, even if the defendant failed to object. Under the amended version of the
statute, which went into effect in July 2015, a failure to object allows review only for plain error
(unless the trial judge expresses an opinion “as to the guilt of the accused,” in which case reversal

es 835
There are four prongs in the test for plain error.

First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally
relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the
appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error
must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which
in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it
affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth
and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error —
discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.

State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011) (citations,
punctuation and emphasis omitted).

Assuming without deciding that the court’s instructions to Boyd
about his immunity reflected a comment about his credibility in
violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, Harris has failed to establish that the
error affected his substantial rights, given the strong evidence of guilt
against him. Mann and Jones’s daughter placed Harris with Boyd
inside the residence on the night of the shooting. Harris admitted
that he was present for the shooting, although he claimed that he did
not participate in the crime. Mann testified that Harris shot Murphy
in the house, and Harris admitted to a fellow gang member that he
shot Murphy, although he said he fired only outside the house. In the
light of this strong evidence of guilt, Harris has failed to carry his
burden of demonstrating that the court’s comments affected the
outcome of the trial. See Hampton v. State, 302 Ga. 166, 169 (2) (805
SE2d 902) (2017) (no plain error where the evidence of guilt, includ-
ing the identification of the defendant as the shooter, was strong).

3. Harris next argues that the trial court erred in preventing him
from cross-examining the GBI agent who interviewed him about the
agent’s failure to use a Miranda® waiver form. We disagree.

is still automatic). OCGA § 17-8-57 (b), (©. In previous cases, we declined to address whether the
new statutory standard of appellate review applied to cases tried before the effective date of the
amendment, because in those cases no error occurred even under the former version of the statute.
; urney v. State, 299 Ga. 813, 823 (4) n.10 (792 SE2d 354) (2016); Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga
8) n.9 (784 SE2d 759) (2016). Here, Harris's trial occurred after the effective date of
the amendment, and so the question of which standard applies is not at issue.
® Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. 8. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

836 PO ]

On cross-examination, Harris asked the GBI agent why, after

advising Harris of his rights, the agent did not use a Miranda waiver
form. The agent replied that he was trained to use a GBI-issued card
for reading rights, prompting Harris to ask whether the agent knew
that “great deals of local law enforcement” used Miranda waiver
forms. The agent responded that he had seen waivers used at times.
Harris began to ask the agent, “[d]on’t you feel, as an investigator,
that ...,” before the trial court interjected and excused the jury. In
response to questioning by the trial court, Harris’s counsel acknowl-
edged that Harris did not claim that his custodial statements were
involuntary and conceded that the use of a waiver form was not
required. The trial court ruled that Harris could not ask about the
failure to use a waiver form, finding that the prejudice created by his
insinuation that the GBI agent did something wrong for failing to use
a waiver form “far outweigh[ed]” any probative value of the evidence.
Although Harris’s counsel argued that the GBI agent “put a whole
bunch of words in my client’s mouth,” the trial court responded that
Harris could inquire about that by cross-examining the agent with a
transcript of the interview.
Reviewing the trial court’s limitation of cross-examination for an
abuse of discretion, see Smith v. State, 300 Ga. 538, 541-542 (8) (796
E2d 666) (2017), we conclude that no error occurred. Although a
defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses is secured by the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution, that right does not allow for unlim-
ited questioning. Id. Trial courts retain wide latitude to impose
reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about,
among other things, “interrogation that is .. . only marginally
relevant.” State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 639 (1) (571 SE2d 752)
(2002) (citation omitted).

Here, the GBI agent’s failure to use a waiver form was not
relevant to any issue at trial. Harris was not challenging the volun-
tariness of his custodial statements, a challenge for which a waiver of
rights form might have been relevant. See Humphreys v. State, 287
Ga. 63, 74 (6) (694 SE2d 316) (2010) (an express written or oral
statement of a waiver of rights is “usually strong proof of the validity
of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to
establish waiver”) (citation and punctuation omitted). To the extent
Harris wished to challenge the accuracy of the GBI agent’s testimony
regarding Harris’s custodial statements, the trial court permitted
Harris to do so, but he elected not to. Under these circumstances, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a reasonable limit
on the cross-examination of the GBI agent.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

wn

es 837

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.
ee

Crawford & Boyle, Eric C. Crawford, for appellant.

Layla H. Zon, District Attorney, W. Cliff Howard, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Aimee F. Sobhani, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

$17A1992. THE STATE v. SMITH et al.
(809 SE2d 720)

Boaas, Justice.

The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting Roderick
Parrish’s pretrial motion in limine to exclude a statement made
by one of his co-defendants, Kevin Smith.’ The trial court granted
the motion, concluding that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004), precluded the admissibility of
Smith’s statement. For the following reasons, we reverse andremand.
Parrish and several others were charged in a 59-count indict-
ment for various crimes, including murder and attempted robbery, in
the shooting death of Rebecca Foley. The State expects the evidence
to show that Parrish, Smith, and Jordan Campbell approached Foley
s she arrived home to her apartment, attempted to rob her, and then
shot and killed her as she attempted to drive away. The three then
fled the scene in a vehicle driven by James Pastures.” The State also
plans to show that the perpetrators were all members of the Bloods
g
a

2

ang. Smith was later arrested for an unrelated aggravated assault
nd had in his possession a firearm that ballistics testing matched to
he one used to kill Foley. During questioning by police, Smith was
asked where he bought the gun. He explained that he purchased it in
March 2013, which was two months after Foley’s murder, from
someone he met “on the street” named “Jarod or Rod” Parrish.
Parrish moved to prohibit the use of Smith’s custodial statement at
trial on the ground that he was implicated in the statement and had

a

+ Although the style of this case is as shown on the amended notice of appeal, the State
appeals from the trial court's order on Parrish’s motion in limine, and it does not appear that
any of the other defendants joined in that motion, including Henry Speaks, who has filed a brief
in this appeal.

2 Shacqeal Sanders and Henry Speaks were charged in connection with the subsequent
murder of Pastures, who was believed to have provided police with information concerning the
murder of Foley.

838 es

a right to confront Smith.

Following a hearing, the trial court ruled that because Smith’s
statement was not clearly inculpatory, severance of defendants under
Bruton v. United States, 391 U. 8. 123 (88 SCt 1620, 20 LE2d 476)
(1968) was not required, but that Crawford, supra, precludes admis-
sibility in the event Smith does not testify and Parrish has no
opportunity to cross-examine him. It is from this order that the State
appeals.*

“On appeal, we review the trial court’s grant of a motion in limine
for abuse of discretion.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Wilkins, 302 Ga.
156, 160 (805 SE2d 868) (2017). The State argues that Crawford has
no application here because Smith’s statement does not facially
incriminate Parrish, and under Bruton, the statement is admissible
against Smith with an appropriate limiting instruction. Parrish
argues that Crawford applies to prohibit Smith’s testimonial state-
ment to police, “regardless of whether it is inculpatory or not.”

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause

provides that, “[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” . . . [I]n Crawford, the Court adopted a funda-
mentally new interpretation of the confrontation right, hold-
ing that “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from
trial [can be] admitted only where the declarant is unavail-
able, and only where the defendant has had a prior oppor-
tunity to cross-examine.”

(Citation omitted.) Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 64-65 (II) (A) (132
SCt 2221, 183 LE2d 89) (2012) (plurality opinion). Crawford states
the general rule governing the admissibility of an out-of-court testi-
monial statement. Here, Smith’s statement to officers was clearly
testimonial in nature, and as the trial court found, pursuant to
Crawford, it would be inadmissible against Parrish if Smith were
unavailable and Parrish not given an opportunity to cross-examine
him. See Colton v. State, 292 Ga. 509, 512 (2) (739 SE2d 380) (2013)
(error to admit co-defendant’s testimonial statement against defen-

® Smith’s complete statement to police contains numerous statements that could be
considered incriminatory to Parrish and that relate to Parrish’s character. At the hearing on
Parrish's motion in limine, the State focused its argument for the admission of Smith's
statement on the portions in which Smith explained that he purchased the gun from Parrish.
In its brief on appeal, the State asserts that the portions of the statement it seeks to admit “only
contain statements that [Smith] bought a gun from Jarod or Rod Parrish, a person he doesn't
know well, in March of 2013.” Our analysis here is therefore limited to only those portions of
Smith's statement which the State asserts it will seek to admit.

es 839

dant in joint trial). Smith’s statement would be admissible, however,
against Smith himself. See OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (A) (a statement
offered against a party which is the party’s own statement is an
admission not excluded by the hearsay rule). However, because the
State seeks to try Smith and Parrish together, we must consider
whether the admission of the statement against Smith would violate
Bruton.

In the context of a joint trial, the United States Supreme Court
held in Bruton that a co-defendant’s confession to police that power-
fully incriminates the defendant may be barred if the co-defendant
does not testify and face cross-examination. 391 U.S. at 132-137. The
high court later recognized, however, “that in many circumstances a
limiting instruction will adequately protect one defendant from the
prejudicial effects of the introduction at a joint trial of evidence
intended for use only against a different defendant.” Gray v. Mary-
land, 523 U.S. 185, 190 (II) (118 SCt 1151, 140 LE2d 294) (1998).

In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (I) (107 SCt 1702,
95 LE2d 176) (1987), the Supreme Court held that the Confront-
ation Clause was not violated by the admission of a non-testifying
co-defendant’s confession that was redacted to remove all references
to the defendant, and when the trial court instructed the jury not to
consider the confession against the defendant. The court held further
that where the “confession was not incriminating on its face, and
became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial...
it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the
instruction to disregard the evidence.” Id. at 208 (ID).

Federal courts and this Court have interpreted Bruton and
Richardson “to exclude only those statements by a non-testifying
defendant which directly inculpate a co-defendant.” (Citations and
punctuation omitted.) United States v. Arias, 984 F2d 1139, 1142
(I) (B) (11th Cir. 1993); see Sutton v. State, 295 Ga. 350, 353 (3) (759
SE2d 846) (2014); Owen v. State, 266 Ga. 312, 314 (4) (467 SE2d 325)
(1996).

The trial court found that because Smith’s statement was not
“clearly inculpatory” of Parrish, severance of Smith’s trial from
Parrish’s trial was not mandated. See Moss v. State, 275 Ga. 96, 98-99
(2) (561 SE2d 382) (2002) (no Bruton violation where statements by
co-defendant did not directly inculpate defendant and only later
became incriminating when linked with other evidence at trial);
Thomas v. State, 268 Ga. 135, 137-138 (6) (485 SE2d 783) (1997)
(no Bruton violation when co-defendant’s statement, that Thomas
had bought gun later determined to be murder weapon, did not
clearly inculpate defendant). But the trial court’s analysis should not
have ended there. Since the court found that Smith’s statement did

840 es

not directly inculpate Parrish, it should have concluded further that
the statement would be admissible against Smith with an instruction
to the jury to consider the statement only against him. See Richard-
son, supra, 481 U. S. at 206 (II) (Ordinarily, a witness whose
testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a
witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that
testimony only against a co[-]defendant.”). As explained in Richard-
son, even where the co-defendant’s statement is facially incriminat-
ing, in some circumstances, if the statement is redacted to remove all
references to the defendant, and the court instructs the jury not to
consider the confession against the defendant, there may be no
Confrontation Clause violation. Id. at 211 (II).

Here, Smith’s statement that he bought the gun from Parrish
after the murder is not directly inculpatory of Parrish, and soit would
be admissible against Smith with an instruction to the jury to
consider the statement only against Smith. The trial court therefore
erred in ruling that the statement is wholly inadmissible. The court
may wish to consider whether the references to Parrish’s name
should be redacted.

We therefore reverse the trial court’s ruling on the motion in
limine and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

leg k. Heap, District Attorney, ristine S. Barker, Frank M.
Pennington IL, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.

Darden Law Firm, Richard M. Darden, Caroline H. Bradley;

Solomon A. Amusan; Thomas R. Bateski; Martin G. Hilliard; Steven

L. Sparger, for appellee.

$17G0433. SUNTRUST BANK v. LILLISTON et al.
(809 SE2d 819)

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Despite the strong presumption against the waiver of the right to
arbitrate, such a right may be waived by a party who acts inconsis-
tently with that right and, in so doing, prejudices the other party to
the contract. See, e.g., S & H Contractors v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F2d
1507 (II) (11th Cir. 1990); McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Whitehead

es 841

Elec. Co., 179 Ga. App. 10, 12 (845 SE2d 53) (1986). The question
presented in this case is whether a party’s demand for arbitration in
a renewal action, see OCGA § 9-2-61 (a), may be deemed waived
based on that party’s conduct in the earlier, original litigation; the
Court of Appeals answered this question in the affirmative. See
SunTrust Bank v. Lilliston, 338 Ga. App. 738 (791 SE2d 614) (2016).
We conclude, however, that a renewal suit filed pursuant to OCGA §
9-2-61 (a) is a de novo action, see, e.g., Cleveland v. Skandalakis, 268
Ga. 133 (485 SE2d 777) (1997), and, thus, that a party’s conduct in the
original action has no bearing on the question of waiver in the
recommenced action. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

The pertinent facts and procedural history are not in dispute. In
2001, appellant SunTrust Bank entered into a loan agreement with
L-T Adventures, Inc. (“LTA”); this agreement did not include an
arbitration provision. In 2005, SunTrust entered into a subsequent
agreement with Jedon Lilliston (a co-owner of LTA) and her former
husband in a transaction guaranteed by LTA. In connection with this
second loan, the parties entered into an “ISDA Master Agreement,”
also known as the “Swap Agreement.” The Swap Agreement included
an arbitration clause, providing, inter alia, that “any party may
demand arbitration.” Following a dispute concerning interest charges
associated with both transactions, Lilliston and LTA filed suit against
SunTrust in April 2013. In January 2015, the plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their action; at no point before the action was dismissed did
SunTrust demand arbitration. On June 19, 2015, Lilliston and LTA
filed a renewal action, pursuant to OCGA § 9-2-61 (a), inthe Superior
Court of Fulton County. SunTrust answered the complaint and
moved to compel arbitration based on the provision in the Swap
Agreement.

In denying the motion, the trial court concluded that SunTrust
had waived the otherwise valid and enforceable arbitration provision
by actively participating in the original litigation. The trial court noted
that SunTrust had participated in the original litigation for more than
a year and a half without raising the issue of arbitration, which
included engaging in discovery and moving for summary judgment.
Thus, the trial court concluded, SunTrust had “acted inconsistently
with the right to arbitrate,” and “[t]he delay and cost associated with
conducting discovery prejudiced the Plaintiffs.” The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court, concluding that the motion to compel was
properly considered in light of SunTrust’s conduct in the original
action, which was inconsistent with the right to arbitrate. SunTrust
Bank, 338 Ga. App. at 741-742. This Court subsequently granted
certiorari review, posing the following question: Did the Court of

8412 Fe

Appeals err in holding that a defendant may be deemed to have
waived its right to assert an agreement to arbitrate as an affirmative
defense in a renewal action filed under OCGA § 9-2-61 based on that
party’s conduct in the original action? For the reasons discussed
below, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial court’s determination that SunTrust had waived its right to
demand arbitration.

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “applies in state and federal
courts to all contracts containing an arbitration clause that involves
or affects interstate commerce.” See American Gen. Financial Svcs. v.
Jape, 291 Ga. 637, 638 (732 SE2d 746) (2012). When the FAA applies,
as it does here, “it must be applied using federal substantive law.”
Wise v. Tidal Constr. Co., 261 Ga. App. 670, 676 (583 SE2d 466) (2003).
See also American Gen. Financial Sucs., 291 Ga. at 640. Relevant
here, Section 2 of the FAA states as follows:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.

9USC§ 2. Asthe Supreme Court of the United States has recognized,
this provision reflects a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”
and “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (IV) (B) (103 SCt 927, 74
LE2d 765) (1983).

Though there is a strong presumption against waiver under the
FAA, see, e.g., Subway Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Forte, 169 F3d 324 (II)
(5th Cir. 1999), that presumption is not without bounds, and
“the right to arbitration, like any contractual right, may be waived,”
Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir.
1986). As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,

despite the strong policy in favor of arbitration, a party may,
by its conduct, waive its right to arbitration. Thus, a party
that substantially invokes the litigation machinery prior to

es 848

demanding arbitration may waive its right to arbitrate. A
party has waived its right to arbitrate if, under the totality
of the circumstances, the party has acted inconsistently with
the arbitration right, and in so acting, has in some way
prejudiced the other party.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) S & H Contractors, 906 F2d at
1514. In the appeal below, the Court of Appeals — relying on
SunTrust’s conduct before the initial action was dismissed — deter-
mined that the trial court had properly applied this waiver-by-
conduct standard to conclude that SunTrust had waived its right to
demand arbitration. SunTrust Bank, 338 Ga. App. at 741-742. How-
ever, we agree with SunTrust that the Court of Appeals’ focus on the
original action is misplaced where the arbitration demand was made
in a renewal action.

The statute governing renewal actions, OCGA § 9-2-61 (a), states,
in relevant part:

When any case has been commenced in either a state or
federal court within the applicable statute of limitations and
the plaintiff discontinues or dismisses the same, it may be
recommenced in a court of this state or in a federal court
either within the original applicable period of limitations or
within six months after the discontinuance or dismissal,
whichever is later[.]

By its plain language, “OCGA § 9-2-61... merely tolls the statute of
limitation.” Hornsby v. Hancock, 165 Ga. App. 543, 544 (301 SE2d
900) (1983). It is well settled that the “recommenced” case envisioned
by that statute is an action de novo, see Hobbs v. Arthur, 264 Ga. 359,
360 (444 SE2d 322) (1994), and is “not a continuance of the original
action,” Archie v. Scott, 190 Ga. App. 145, 146 (378 SE2d 182) (1989).
See also Cleveland, 268 Ga. at 134 (rejecting argument that renewal
action is merely a continuation of the original action). In a renewal
action, “a plaintiff... may allege additional facts or contentions, and
the defendant likewise can interpose such defensive pleadings as he
may deem best.” (Emphasis supplied.) Hornsby, 165 Ga. App. at 544.
Claims and defenses that are raised in a renewal action “will be
adjudicated only with respect to that which occurred subsequent to
refiling.” (Emphasis supplied.) Hobbs, 264 Ga. at 360.

Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have consistently held
that, outside of issues concerning the statute of limitation, claims and
defenses raised in a renewal action are considered independently of
that which occurred in the original action. See Cleveland, 268 Ga. at

84 Fe

134 (Fulton County not obligated to defend employee in renewal
action where notice of the suit was provided to County in original
action but was not timely provided in subsequent renewal action);
Hobbs, 264 Ga. at 360-361 (“[A]ny delay in service in a valid first
action is not available as an affirmative defense in the renewal
action.”); Granite State Ins. Co. v. Nord Bitumi U. S., 262 Ga. 502, 505
(422 SE2d 191) (1992) (insured’s failure to provide prompt notice to
insurer in original suit as required by insurance contract did not
relieve insurer from subsequently defending insured where notice
requirement was satisfied with respect to renewal action); Adams v.
Gluckman, 183 Ga. App. 666, 666 (359 SE2d 710) (1987) (failure to
raise defense of insufficient service in original action did not preclude
defense in renewal action); Hornsby, 165 Ga. App. at 544 (failure to
raise defense of improper venue in original action did not preclude
defense in renewal action); Robinson v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 55 Ga.
App. 141, 142 (1) (189 SE 555) (1937) (concluding, under renewal
statute then in effect, that “a suit which has been dismissed and
renewed, even in the same court, may be demurred to on renewal,
although no demurrer was interposed in the original action”). As to
this case, the right to arbitrate, though created through contract, is
an affirmative defense in this State, see, e.g., United Health Svcs. of
Ga. v. Norton, 300 Ga. 736 (2) (797 SE2d 825) (2017), and, like other
affirmative defenses, it is subject to waiver; however, we must treat
arbitration and its waiver in the same manner as other such claims
and defenses. Cf. Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687
(ID) (116 SCt 1652, 134 LE2d 902) (1996).

In an apparent attempt to reconcile our precedent with the tria.
court’s waiver-by-conduct conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasone’
that SunTrust had not been barred from demanding arbitration in
the renewal action, but, instead, that the demand for arbitration
simply had to be considered in conjunction with SunTrust’s conduct
in the original litigation. SunTrust Bank, 338 Ga. App. at 742.
However, there is no meaningful distinction between barring
SunTrust from asserting a demand for arbitration in the renewa.
action (because it was not raised in the original action) and deciding
the question of waiver in the renewal action based on SunTrust’s
conduct in the original suit. In either instance, the Court of Appeals’
logic dictates that the original case — which has since been dismisse’
— controls the question of arbitration in the renewal action; this is
plainly inconsistent with our case law. When questions of estoppel or
waiver are presented in renewal actions, the focus of the analysis
must be on the renewal action, not on the conduct in the origina
action. See Adams, 183 Ga. App. at 666 (“A defendant is not estoppe'
from raising a proper defense in a renewal action simply because that

es 845

defense was not raised in the original action.”). Consequently, the

trial court erred when it denied the motion to compel arbitration

based upon SunTrust’s conduct in the original action, and the Court

of Appeals’ affirmance of that judgment was likewise erroneous.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

OE

Morris, Manning & Martin, David W. Cranshaw, Simon R.
Malko, for appellant.

Savage Turner & Pinckney, Brent J. Savage, Brent J. Savage, Jr.,
Kathryn H. Pinckney, for appellees.

$17G0641. BARNETT et al. vy. CALDWELL.
(809 SE2d 8138)

GRANT, Justice.

High school student Antoine Williams tragically died after engag-
ing in horseplay with another student while his teacher was out of
their classroom. Appellants Jena Barnett and Marc Antoine Williams,
Antoine’s parents, filed a complaint against Appellee Phyllis Caldwell,
who was Antoine’s teacher at the time of his death. They alleged that
Caldwell was liable in her individual capacity for Antoine’s wrongful
death because she had been negligent in supervising his classroom.
The trial court granted Caldwell’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that she was entitled to official immunity because her acts
were the product of discretionary decisions concerning the supervision
of students. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Barnett v. Atlanta Inde-
pendent School System, 339 Ga. App. 533 (792 SE2d 474) (2016). We
granted certiorari to consider this ruling. We conclude that student
supervision is not unalterably discretionary in all respects, but here,
because the school’s policy was not so definite as to render Caldwell’s
actions ministerial, she is entitled to official immunity. We therefore
affirm.

I.

On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, legal questions
are reviewed de novo, Atlanta Dev. v. Emerald Capital Investments,
258 Ga. App. 472, 477 (574 SE2d 585) (2002), and this Court also
conducts a de novo review of the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, to determine if there is a genuine

846 eS

issue of material fact. Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 469 (746
SE2d 89) (2013). So viewed, the evidence shows as follows.

On the afternoon of October 14, 2008 at Benjamin E. Mays High
School, teacher Phyllis Caldwell left her classroom. Caldwell’s class-
room was in acluster system that shared a common entrance with the
classroom of another teacher, Gibril Kanu, and their classrooms were
divided by a bifold wall. Antoine Williams was a student in Caldwell’s
seventh-period class, the final class of the school day. At approxi-
mately 2:45 p.m., Caldwell asked Kanu to “listen out” for her class,
and left the classroom—for what purpose, it remains unclear. The
rooms were connected, but Kanu could not see into Caldwell’s class-
room from where he sat. There was also a hall monitor who was a
retired assistant principal nearby, but Caldwell chose not to ask the
hall monitor to supervise the class.

While Caldwell was gone, Antoine and another student engaged
in horseplay that caused Antoine to fall to the floor; the other student
landed on top of him. Antoine subsequently collapsed and was lying
unconscious on the ground when Caldwell returned to the classroom
at about 3:15 p.m.' Caldwell called 911. Emergency medical techni-
cians took Antoine to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead.
The medical examiner determined that he died from blood loss
resulting from the laceration of a major blood vessel by a dislocated
collarbone.

After he learned that Antoine had been pronounced dead, the
school principal called Caldwell and other school staff into his office
to get details about the incident. Caldwell told the principal that she
was in the classroom the entire time. But a few days later, he learned
that Caldwell was in fact not in the classroom when Antoine col-
lapsed, anda subsequent investigation carried out by an independent
company also concluded that Caldwell was away from her classroom
when Antoine was injured. When the principal confronted Caldwell
about her lie, Caldwell gave several different explanations for why
she left the classroom—to use the telephone, to make copies, and to
find another student. Later, in her deposition, Caldwell said she left
the classroom to use the restroom.

Section 6.5 of the school’s faculty handbook provides supervision
guidelines for teachers: “The classroom teacher is solely responsible for
the supervision of any student in his or her classroom. Students are
never to be left in the classroom unsupervised by an APS certificated
employee.” (Emphasis in original.) Nowhere does the faculty hand-

+ There is conflicting evidence as to whether Kanu ever came into the classroom to tell the
students to stop their activities.

es 817

book define “supervise” or “unsupervised.” Caldwell, though, was aware
of the policy, and the principal explained that supervision means “close
proximity to” students, and told investigators that he had provided
examples to teachers demonstrating that students should not be out of
their eyesight. He believed the policy was unambiguous and nondis-
cretionary, and emphasized that school employees would be disciplined
if they did not follow it. He also acknowledged, however, that there
could be circumstances requiring a teacher to leave a classroom,
including for up to 15 minutes. He further stated that a teacher (or
another certified employee) may be able to supervise students even if
the teacher could not see them; instead, if the teacher could hear and
have a “general understanding” of what was going on in a classroom,
that “would still constitute supervision.” The principal at one point
summarized the policy as requiring “a visible, auditory or physical
awareness of what someone is doing at a particular time.”

After Antoine’s death, his parents sued Caldwell, among others,
for wrongful death based on negligent supervision, alleging that she
was liable in her individual capacity because she left her classroom
unsupervised in violation of the school’s policy. The trial court granted
summary judgment to Caldwell, concluding that because the allega-
tions of negligence involved a duty to supervise students in the
classroom, her absence was a discretionary act entitled to official
immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that “well-
established precedent makes clear that decisions relating to the
control and supervision of students are discretionary actions for
which teachers are entitled to official immunity.” Barnett, 339 Ga.
App. at 533. This Court thereafter granted the parents’ petition for
certiorari, posing a single question: Did the Court of Appeals err in
concluding that the classroom teacher in this case was entitled to
official immunity?

Il.

The question of whether Caldwell can be held liable for a viola-
tion of the school’s policy on supervision turns on the doctrine of
official immunity. That immunity, originally a creature of case law in
Georgia, see Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752 (452 SE2d 476)
(1994), now arises out of Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX (d) of the
Georgia Constitution, which establishes that public employees may
be subject to suit for negligent performance or nonperformance of
their “ministerial functions” or “if they act with actual malice or with
actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official
functions”; otherwise, they “shall not be subject to suit or liability,
and no judgment shall be entered against them, for the performance
or nonperformance of their official functions.” Put more plainly,

818 eS

teachers may be held personally liable for negligence relating to
their official duties only when performing “ministerial” acts;
“discretionary” acts are only subject to suit when performed with
actual malice or intent to cause injury. McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga.
592, 593 (678 SE2d 922) (2009); Daniels v. Gordon, 232 Ga. App. 811,
813 (503 SE2d 72) (1998); Davis v. Dublin City Bd. of Ed., 219 Ga.
App. 121, 122 (464 SE2d 251) (1995).

Accordingly, in cases like this one where there is no evidence of
malice or intent to injure, the determination of whether official
immunity bars the suit against the defendant turns on the issue of
whether the defendant’s actions were discretionary or ministerial.
McDowell, 285 Ga. at 593. We have defined a ministerial act as
“commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the
execution of a specific duty.” Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 199 (647
SE2d 54) (2007). A discretionary act, on the other hand, “calls for the
exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails
examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on
them in a way not specifically directed.” Id.

The Court of Appeals has long held that student supervision is
typically a discretionary function. See, e.g., Leake v. Murphy, 274 Ga.
App. 219, 225 (617 SE2d 575) (2005), overruled on other grounds by
Murphy, 282 Ga. at 199; Butler v. Doe, 328 Ga. App. 431, 433 (762
SE2d 145) (2014). But the determination of whether the action at
issue is discretionary or ministerial is made on a case-by-case basis,
and the dispositive issue is the character of the specific actions
complained of, not the general nature of the job. McDowell, 285 Ga. at
594-595. In short, “the important question in the context of official
immunity is not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but
rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and
certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.” Eshleman v.
Key, 297 Ga. 364, 367 (774 SE2d 96) (2015).

Even in the context of functions that are typically discretionary,
a written (or unwritten) policy, a supervisor’s specific directive, or a
statute may establish a ministerial duty—but only if the directives
are so clear, definite, and certain as to merely require the execution
of a specific, simple, absolute, and definite duty, task, or action ina
specified situation without any exercise of discretion. Roper v. Green-
way, 294 Ga. 112, 114-115 (751 SE2d 351) (2013); Grammens v.
Dollar, 287 Ga. 618, 620 (697 SE2d 775) (2010); McDowell, 285 Ga. at
593-594. As we said in Eshleman, “even when an officer clearly owes
a duty of care and is absolutely required to do something, unless she
has been commanded—by law or by the policy or directive of her
employer—to do a particular thing, she still is engaged in the

es 819

performance of a discretionary function.” 297 Ga. at 366 (emphasis in
original). It is undisputed that the complained-of actions in this case
related to student supervision, typically a discretionary function. So
the question here is whether the school’s policy—or the principal’s
interpretation of that policy as expressed to Caldwell and other
teachers—was so clear, definite, and certain in directing Caldwell’s
actions that it established a ministerial duty requiring no exercise of
discretion whatsoever. This the plaintiffs cannot show.

To begin, the terms “unsupervised,” “supervise,” or “supervision”
are not defined or otherwise explained anywhere in the policy or
handbook. See Grammens, 287 Ga. at 620-621 (holding teacher
shielded by official immunity because school policy did not define key
term, therefore requiring teacher to exercise discretion in implemen-
tation of the policy). Offering no specificity in the general duty of
student supervision, the written policy cannot be read to require an
absolute or definite duty of teachers to be physically present in the
classroom, having their students within eyesight at all times. Cf.
Eshleman, 297 Ga. at 367, 369. Indeed, common experience tells us
that there can be a wide range of appropriate supervision in different
contexts. Moreover, the policy does not state that a teacher may never
leave the classroom, but allows that a teacher may do just that, so
long as the students are supervised “by anAPS certificated employee.”

Nor do the principal’s statements to the private investigator that
the policy was explained to teachers by telling them that they “should
never leave students unsupervised,” and demonstrating that stu-
dents should not be out of the teacher’s eyesight reveal sufficient
clarity. Although his explanations provide some additional direction
regarding the school’s expectations, the principal’s instructions and
examples are not enough to render the otherwise general policy
sufficiently specific and definite. That fact is evidenced by the prin-
cipal’s acknowledgement in his deposition that a teacher could leave
a classroom unsupervised “[i]f a teacher had an emergent situation
and she had to run out of the classroom to a restroom or something,”
and in his statement that although it “would not be the ideal
situation,” it “would still constitute supervision” if a teacher was not
able to see her students but could hear and have a “general under-
standing of what is going on in that classroom.” It is true that the
principal also stated that the policy was unambiguous in its require-
ments, but his opinion does not make it so.

Under both the text of the handbook and the explanation of the
principal, the policy calls for a teacher to exercise personal delibera-
tion and judgment in determining whether to leave a classroom, and
if so, how to go about providing for supervision of the class during the
absence. That sort of room for discretion is meaningful. See, e.g.,

850 eS

Eshleman, 297 Ga. at 369 (explaining that officer required to take
reasonable measures to restrain police dog must exercise personal
deliberation and judgment in deciding how much of a danger dog
presented; if fence was sufficient; how high fence needed to be; if
tether was required; whether rope or chain was strong enough; how
to protect visitors; and what sort of portable kennel was sufficient to
restrain dog during transport). Caldwell had to examine the facts
before her—why she needed to leave her classroom, the amount of
time she contemplated being gone, the grade-level, age, and tempera-
ment of her students, and the fact that Kanu was alone on the other
side of a bifold partition. She then needed to reach a conclusion based
on those facts—deciding whether to leave at all, whom to ask for
assistance (Kanu, the hall monitor, or someone else), and what to
request that person to do. The policy requires a teacher supervising
students to engage in these deliberations, but it does not supply
simple answers. As a court, the wisdom of an employee’s conclusion is
not the question we evaluate; instead, we are tasked with discerning
whether the employee had a range of options to choose from based on
her own judgment. And in a situation where an official has that sort
of discretion, the official is shielded from personal liability for the
choices she makes, even if they are poor ones, so long as the official
does not act with actual malice or intent to cause injury.

To be sure, officials are still subject to workplace policies, and can
suffer a range of consequences for violating those policies. But the
judgment that Georgia’s Constitution makes is that official immunity
will protect those who make bad decisions in order to also protect those
who make good ones, and to ensure that public officials can carry out
their day-to-day service to the people of this State without fear of
litigation. See Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 750 (“[The basis of the immunity
has been not so much a desire to protect an erring officer as it has been
arecognition of the need of preserving independence of action without
deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and
vexatious suits.”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D
cmt. b). Under the policy at issue here, “[w]hat should be done always
will depend to some extent on the circumstances. And that means
that the duty cannot—when applied to a public officer—be charac-
terized properly as a ministerial one.” Eshleman, 297 Ga. at 369. The
school policy on student supervision was not so definite as to require
of Caldwell a simple and absolute action in the specific situation she
faced. Instead, she was required to exercise discretion.”

2 Although we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, we disagree with the opinion
below that Caldwell did “just enough for her actions to be discretionary” when she asked

es 861

That is not to say that there could never be a policy on student
supervision so definite as to render a school employee’s acts minis-
terial. See, e.g., McDowell, 285 Ga. at 593 (school receptionist’s acts
ministerial because “she was merely required to execute specific
duties as dictated by the school checkout policies”). And of course,
“[t]here should be no special category of absolute immunity for school
employees.” Smith v. McDowell, 292 Ga. App. 731, 736 (666 SE2d 94)
(2008), aff'd by McDowell, 285 Ga. 592. To the extent that language
used in prior Court of Appeals’s decisions may suggest that school
employees’ supervision of students is always and inalterably discre-
tionary, that conclusion would be overbroad.* But here, the policy’s

another teacher to listen out for her class. Barnett, 339 Ga. App. at 537. A duty is either
discretionary or not, and an official cannot alter that fact by performing it well, poorly, or not
at all. Our Constitution itself demands that result. The text specifically provides that for
discretionary duties, so long as officials do not “act with actual malice or actual intent to cause
injury,” they “shall not be subject to suit or liability, and no judgment shall be entered against
them, for the performance or nonperformance of their official functions.” Art. I, Sec. IL,
Par. IX (d) (emphasis supplied). And this Court has unanimously rejected the evaluation of the
defendant's actions as a method of determining whether the duty at issue was ministerial or
discretionary. Here, as in Roper, “[T]he discretionary act to which official immunity attached
cannot be parsed in the manner that the Court of Appeals’s opinion suggests; it attempts to
divide the decision to act from the act itself, and attempts to provide immunity to one of the
resulting bifurcations, but not the other.” Roper, 294 Ga. at 115. Consistent with that authority,
we have repeatedly applied official immunity when an official entirely failed to act. See, e.g.,
Grammens, 287 Ga. at 618 (teacher failed to offer eye protection to student, who was
subsequently injured during science experiment); Murphy, 282 Ga. at 199 (school officials failed
to create a school safety plan, even considering statutory mandate that school officials “shall”
create a school safety plan); Henderman v. Walton County Water & Sewerage Auth., 271 Ga. 192,
193 (515 SE2d 617) (1999) (water authority manager failed to flush water lines after complaint
by a customer), These holdings make sense because the analysis of whether a function is
ministerial or discretionary necessarily turns on whether “mandated actions were simple,
absolute and definite, and required the execution of specific tasks without any exercise of
discretion’—not whether an employee performed the function “just enough” or not at all.
McDowell, 285 Ga. at 593-594; Barnett, 339 Ga. App. at 537. The Court of Appeals has
recognized in other cases that inaction cannot render a diseretionary duty ministerial. See, e.g.,
Kelly v. Lewis, 221 Ga. App. 506, 509 (471 SE2d 583) (1996) (“[T]he complete failure to perform
a discretionary act is the same as the negligent performance of that act for the purposes of
determining whether such action was diseretionary or ministerial.”); Davis, 219 Ga. App. at 122
[T]he act or failure to act is not ministerial in nature, but is, rather, discretionary.” (citation
and punetuation omitted). In this case, on the other hand, the necessary implication of the
approach taken below is that the trial court needed to evaluate whether Caldwell had done
“something” or “anything” in order to determine whether the school's supervision policy was
discretionary or ministerial. That is plainly incorrect, and would invite unnecessary parsing
over whether an official made any minute step in the direction of a discretionary policy’s goals,
subjecting officials to burdensome lawsuits for their discretionary decisions—exactly the
problem that official immunity sets out to avoid.

® See, e.g., Barnett, 339 Ga. App. at 539 (“[B]inding precedents of our Court are clear that
discretionary decisions related to supervision are entitled to official immunity ‘even where
specific school policies designed to help control and monitor students have been violated.’ ”)
(on motion for reconsideration) (quoting Reece v. Turner, 284 Ga. App. 282, 286 (643 SE2d 814)
(2007); Butler, 328 Ga. App. at 433 (“Georgia law is well established that the ‘monitoring,
supervising, and controlling the activities of students is a discretionary action protected by the

862 eS

general requirement that students are never to be left in the class-
room “unsupervised” by a certified school employee is not so definite
as to render Caldwell’s judgment regarding the supervision of her
class ministerial.

Because the complained-of actions were discretionary and no
evidence of actual malice or intent to injure has been presented,
Caldwell is entitled to official immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the
Court of Appeals’s decision affirming the trial court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in Caldwell’s favor.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Melton, P. J.,
and Hunstein, J., who concur specially in part. Peterson, J., disquali-
fied.

MELTON, Presiding Justice, concurring specially in part.

Although I concur with the analysis in the body of the majority
opinion, I must write separately because I believe that dicta in
footnote 2 sets forth an overly broad rule that is not applicable to the
facts of this case. The majority suggests: “A duty is either discretion-
ary or not, and an official cannot alter that fact by performing it well,
poorly, or not at all.” Maj. op., p. 851. I disagree with this statement,
and, more fundamentally, I disagree with the majority’s decision to
expound upon the issue at all. The judicial process is served neither
by inserting unnecessary and complicated issues into a case, nor by
proclaiming unwavering rules to govern such complicatedissues. The
majority does both. I believe that this issue was handled more
appropriately by Justice Peterson, who authored the opinion below.
Justice Peterson reasoned as follows:

Caldwell suggests that a total failure to comply with Section
6.5 would nevertheless be a discretionary act entitled to
official immunity. We view such an argument through skep-
tical eyes, because a total failure to perform an act may
involve no exercise of discretion or deliberation whatsoever,
and it is not clear that such a failure would be considered a
discretionary act covered by officialimmunity. But given our
resolution of this appeal, it is not necessary to decide this
question.

Barnett v. Atlanta Independent School System, 339 Ga. App. 533, 538
n. 3 (792 SE2d 474) (2016). Far reaching (and, in this case, overly
broad) rules like the one proposed by the majority should not be

doctrine of official immunity.’ ") (quoting Perkins v. Morgan County School Dist., 222 Ga. App.
831, 835 (476 SE2d 592) (1996)); Leake, 274 Ga. App. at 225.

es 868

created in dicta, especially in an area of the law that requires an
in-depth consideration of the law and facts on a case-by-case basis.
For this reason, I cannot concur with the analysis set forth in footnote
2.

I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this
special concurrence.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

. Leighton Moore LL; The Cochran Firm, Shean D. iams, for
appellants.
McGuire Woods, Cheryl L. Haas, Kurt E. Lentz, Matthew A.
Fitzgerald, Halima Horton, for appellee.
Harben, Hartley & Hawkins, Phillip L. Hartley, amicus curiae.

$17G0692. THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF
GARDEN CITY v. HARRIS et al.
(809 SE2d 806)

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

This case concerns the proper statutory interpretation of the
Recreational Property Act, OCGA § 51-3-20 et seq. (RPA), which
shields from potential liability landowners who “either directly or
indirectly invite[ ] or permit[ ] without charge any person to use
the[ir] property for recreational purposes.” OCGA § 51-3-23. We granted
certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that a landowner would not be shielded from
potential liability by the RPA where that landowner charged a fee to
some people who used the landowner’s property for recreational
purposes, but did not charge any fee to the injured party who used the
property for such purposes. The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of
Garden City v. Harris, 339 Ga. App. 452 (793 SE2d 628) (2016). As
explained more fully below, because the plain language of the RPA
shields a landowner from potential liability under the circumstances
presented here, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise,
and we must reverse.

By way of background, on November 10, 2012, Willie and Kristy
Harris, along with their six-year-old daughter, Riley, attended a
youth football game at the Garden City Stadium, a facility owned and
maintained by the City of Garden City. Willie and Kristy each paid
the required $2 admission fee for spectators over the age of six.
However, because Riley was only six years old, the Harrises were not

$1 es

required to pay an entrance fee for her, and Riley was admitted to the
event free of charge. At one point during the game, while Riley was
walking across the bleachers to return to her seat after visiting the
concession stand, she slipped and fell between the bench seats and
suffered serious injuries after falling to the ground nearly thirty feet
below.

The Harrises sued the City to recover for Riley’s injuries, and the
City moved for summary judgment, relying on the immunity pro-
vided by the RPA. Specifically, OCGA § 51-3-23 states:

Except as specifically recognized by or provided in Code
Section 51-3-25, an owner of land who either directly or
indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to
use the property for recreational purposes does not thereby:
(1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any
purpose; (2) Confer upon such person the legal status of an
invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or
(3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury
to person or property caused by an act of omission of such
persons.

And, with respect to the exceptions specifically recognizedin OCGA §
51-3-25, that Code section states in relevant part:

Nothing in this article limits in any way any liability which
otherwise exists . . . [fJor injury suffered in any case when the
owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go
on the land for the recreational use thereof. . . .

OCGA § 51-3-25 (2).

The City argued that, because Riley was not one of the persons
who was charged a fee to use the City’s property for recreational
purposes, the City could not be held liable for Riley’s injuries as a
matter of law. However, the trial court denied the City’s motion for
summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling on appeal.

In order to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the trial court’s ruling, we must analyze the relevant
provisions of the RPA mentioned above. In interpreting these statu-
tory provisions, we must presume

that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what
it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its
plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory

es 865

text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the
statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an
ordinary speaker of the English language would. . . [and] if
the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to
the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory
meaning is at an end.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170,
172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013).

With these principles in mind, a natural reading of the plain
language of OCGA § 51-3-23 indicates that a landowner remains free
from potential liability to any individual person who is injured on the
landowner’s property who has been allowed to use the property for
recreational purposes free of charge. Indeed, a landowner

who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without
charge any person to use the property for recreational pur-
poses does not thereby ... [clonfer upon such person the legal
status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is
owed; or . . . [aJssume responsibility for or incur liability for
any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission
of such persons.

(Emphasis supplied.) The statute specifically and unambiguously
references “any person” who is not charged a fee to use a landowner’s
property for recreational purposes as being such a “person” to whom
the landowner does not owe a duty of care. Because the statutory text
of OCGA § 51-3-23 is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the
statute its plain meaning of shielding landowners from potential
liability to individual persons whom they have invited to use their
property for recreational purposes free of charge, “and our search for
statutory meaning is at an end.” Deal, supra, 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a).

Our interpretation of the plain meaning of OCGA § 51-3-23is not
diminished when the statute is considered in the context of the
exceptions to the statute set forth in OCGA § 51-3-25. Again, pursu-
ant to OCGA § 51-3-25 (2): “Nothing in this article limits in any way
any liability which otherwise exists . . . [fJor injury suffered in any
case when the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter
or go on the land for the recreational use thereof[.J” (Emphasis
supplied.) Read in conjunction with the other provisions of the
statute, itis plain that, in any case where the injured party is a person
who has been charged a fee to use the landowner’s property for
recreational purposes, the landowner would not be immune from
potential liability to such paying persons, because the landowner

$56 ns

only receives the protections of OCGA § 51-3-23 with respect to those
persons who have not been charged a fee to use the property for
recreational purposes. This is the case because any individual person
who has been or persons who have been charged a fee to use the
landowner’s property for recreational purposes obviously could not
qualify as “any person [who has been invited] to use the property for
recreational purposes” “without charge” and to whom the landowner
could not be liable based on the plain language of OCGA § 51-3-23.1

This is also consistent with the stated legislative purpose of the
RPA, which “is to encourage owners of land to make land and water
areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting the
owners’ liability toward persons entering thereon for recreational
purposes.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 51-3-20. A landowner’s
liability is limited to those injured persons who have paid to use the
landowner’s property for recreational purposes, and there is nothing
in the natural reading of the plain text of OCGA §§ 51-3-23 and
51-3-25 to suggest that the legislature intended instead to leave in
place the potential liability of landowners to persons who have not
paid to use an owner’s property for recreational purposes just because
the landowner would be potentially liable to others who have paid to
use the property for such purposes. Nothing in the RPA requires that
all participants in recreational activities on a landowner’s property
must enter free of charge for the landowner to enjoy immunity as to
any of them. Indeed, providing free admission on a select basis
(for example, by inviting special groups such as the Boy Scouts or Girl
Scouts, honor roll students, veterans, etc., to events where others
have paid to enter) is a common practice that fits within the stated
legislative purpose of the RPA “to encourage owners of land to make
land and water areas available to the public for recreational pur-
poses” while at the same time limiting the landowner’s potential
legal liability to only the “person or persons” who the landowner

1 Contrary to the assertions of the dissent, we have done nothing in our ruling today to
overrule any of our prior case law. We do not specifically address any of the case law referenced
by the dissent because (1) not a single one of those cases involves a scenario where some
members of the public were charged a fee to use a landowner’s property for recreational
purposes but other injured persons were not, and (2) the plain language of the RPA simply
controls here. Deal, supra, 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a) C[I]f the statutory text is clear and
unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory
meaning is at an end.”) (punctuation omitted). In any event, to adopt the position of the dissent
would require us to rewrite the RPA to insert additional language about how many members of
the “general public” must be charged a fee before a landowner would no longer enjoy immunity
from liability with respect to someone injured on the property whoused the land for recreational
purposes but was not charged a fee. This Court is forbidden from engaging in such a task. State
v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444, 448 (629 SE2d 252) (2006) (“[U]nder our system of separation of powers
this Court does not have the authority to rewrite statutes.”),

es 867

“charges . . . [to] enter or go on the land for the recreational use
thereof.” OCGA §§ 51-3-20 and 51-3-25.

Because the injured party in this case was not charged a fee to
use the City’s property for recreational purposes, the City was
shielded from liability for that party’s injuries as a matter of law by
the RPA. Accordingly, the City was entitled to summary judgment in
this case, and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that it was
not.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Benham and
Hunstein, JJ., who dissent.

HUNSTEIN, Justice, dissenting.

For decades the Georgia courts have held that a landowner is
shielded from liability pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-23 only where its
property is open to the public for a recreational purpose without
charge. Here, there is no question that the City’s football stadium was
open to the public for a recreational purpose and that the City
charged an admission fee to enter the premises. Applying OCGA §
51-3-25 (2) and Georgia’s well-established case law, I would conclude
that the City is not exempted from liability under the RPA. The
contrary decision reached by the majority circumvents the limita-
tions placed on the RPA’s liability waiver by the General Assembly
and effectively overturns well-settled case law without explanation.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

“As in all appeals involving the construction of statutes, our
review is conducted under a de novo standard.” Hankla v. Postell, 293
Ga. 692, 693 (749 SE2d 726) (2013). “A statute draws its meaning, of
course, from its text.” (Citation omitted.) Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838,
839 (770 SE2d 851) (2015). “The common and customary usages of the
words are important, but so is their context.” (Citation omitted.)
Tibbles v. Teachers Retirement System of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1) (775
SE2d 527) (2015). “For context, we may look to other provisions of the
same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the
other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that
forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589,
591 (1) (774 SE2d 688) (2015). With these principles in mind, I turn
to the relevant portions of the RPA.

The RPA was first drafted and published by the Council of State
Governments in 1965, explaining that the act “is designed to encour-
age availability of private lands by limiting the liability of owners to
situations in which they are compensated for the use of their property
and those in which injury results from malicious or willful acts of
the owner.” (Emphasis supplied.) Council of State Governments,

$58 ns

Suggested State Legislation 150 (24th ed. 1965). A few months later,
the General Assembly adopted the proposed legislation, virtually
unchanged, underlining the importance of encouraging landowners
to open their lands to the general public free of charge. SeeOCGA § 51-3-20
(‘The purpose of this article is to encourage owners of land to make
land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes
by limiting the owners’ liability toward persons entering thereon for
recreational purposes.”). When looking at the relevant provisions of
the RPA, we must keep in mind that it is a statute in derogation of
common law, and thus, must be strictly and narrowly construed.”
Couch v. Red Roof Inns, 291 Ga. 359, 374 (729 SE2d 378) (2012)
(“[A] statute in derogation of the common law [should] be construed
strictly by the courts.” (citation omitted) (Benham, J., dissenting)).

The General Assembly codified the RPA’s liability waiver in
OCGA § 51-3-23, which provides:

Except as specifically recognized by or provided in Code
Section 51-3-25, an owner of land who either directly or
indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to
use the property for recreational purposes does not thereby:

(1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for
any purpose;

(2) Confer upon such person the legal status of an
invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or

(3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any
injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of
such persons.

Id. This liability waiver is subject to a companion statute, OCGA §
51-3-25, which provides:

Nothing in this article limits in any way any liability
which otherwise exists:

(2) For injury suffered in any case when the owner of
land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the

2 Atcommon law, persons classified as licensees or invitees were entitled to legal protection
because the landowner had a duty of care to them, see OCGA §§ 51-3-1, 51-3-2 (2017), which
this Court has recognized, see Atlanta & West Point R. Co. v. Wise, 190 Ga. 254, 256-257 (9 SE2d
63) (1940), Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 123 (516 SE2d 66) (1999), Johnson Street
Properties v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51, 65 (805 SE2d 60) (2017). However, recreational-use statutes,
like the RPA, “carve out an area of land-possessor liability from the common law of tort and
specify instead a statutory standard for liability.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and
Emotional Harm § 51 emt. q (Am. Law. Inst. 2012).

es 859

land for the recreational use thereof, except that, in the case
of land leased to the state or a subdivision thereof, any
consideration received by the owner for the lease shall not be
deemed a charge within the meaning of this Code section.

Id.

The majority concludes, after ostensibly applying the “plain
language” of the above-quoted provisions without citation to mean-
ingful authority, that the liability waiver of OCGA § 51-3-23 applies
(and, consequently, that OCGA § 51-3-25 does not) because Riley did
not pay the admission fee. At first glance, such a reading appears
correct. However, simply parsing the language of OCGA § 51-3-23
does not end the analysis. The plain language of that Code section —
indeed the first sentence — states that the RPA’s general liability
protection is expressly controlled by the provisions of OCGA § 51-3-25.
See OCGA § 51-3-23 (“Except as specifically recognized by or pro-
vided in Code Section 51-3-25. .. .”). Accordingly, we must read the
two statutes together, see Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283, 290 (794
SE2d 31) (2016), giving effect to all parts of the statute, see Bibb
County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 440 (86 SE2d 511) (1955), so as to
avoid “a construction that makes some language mere surplusage,”
Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191 (587 SE2d 24)
(2003).

Turning to the relevant portion of OCGA § 51-3-25, the liability
protections of the RPA do not apply “[fJor injury suffered in any case
when the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go
on the land for the recreational use thereof.” Id. at (2). Georgia courts
have consistently held that this provision is applicable where (1) the
property was open to the public, (2) the property was used for a
recreational purpose, and (3) the landowner charged a fee in exchange
for permission for the public to enter the premises. See Anderson v.
Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games, 273 Ga. 113, 114 (1) (a)
(537 SE2d 345) (2000) (“The RPA limits, with certain exceptions, the
liability of an owner of land who has made property available without
charge to the public for recreational purposes.”); Cedeno v. Lockwood,
Inc., 250 Ga. 799 (301 SE2d 265) (1983) (interpreting OCGA § 51-3-25),
disapproved on other grounds, Atlanta Committee for the Olympic
Games v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116, 118, n.3 (598 SE2d 471) (2004). See
also Stone Mountain Mem. Assn. v. Amestoy, 337 Ga. App. 467 (788
SE2d 110) (2016); Gayle v. Frank Callen Boys & Girls Club, 322 Ga.
App. 412 (745 SE2d 695) (2013); Martin v. Dempsey Funeral Svcs. of
Ga., 319 Ga. App. 348, 345 (735 SE2d 59) (2012); Carroll v. City of
Carrollton, 280 Ga. App. 172 (633 SE2d 591) (2006); Spivey v. City of
Baxley, 210 Ga. App. 772, 774 (437 SE2d 623) (1993); Edmondson v.

$60

Brooks County Bd. of Ed., 205 Ga. App. 662, 664 (423 SE2d 413)
(1992).

The parties agree that the first two factors are met; this leaves
open the question of whether the landowner chargeda fee in exchange
for permission for the public to enter the premises. The majority
concludes that this provision is only satisfied where the injured party
is “the person or persons” who have been charged to enter. This,
however, is but one way to interpret this portion of OCGA § 51-3-25
(2). Atissue is whether the phrase “charges the person or persons who
enter or go on the land” refers specifically to the injured person who
has been charged or, instead, refers to a landowner who generally
charges for entry onto the land. Our precedent clearly answers this
question.

Almost 35 years ago, this Court held in Cedeno that, “[a]s a
prerequisite to immunity under the RPA, the owner cannot charge a
fee for admission to the property.” 250 Ga. at 801 (2) (citing OCGA §
51-3-25) (emphasis supplied). See also City of Tybee Island v. God-
inho, 270 Ga. 567 (511 SE2d 517) (1999) (“The RPA, with certain
exceptions, shields property owners from tort liability for property
that they permit the public to use without charge for ‘recreational
purposes’ ” (emphasis supplied)), disapproved on other grounds, Haw-
thorne, 278 Ga. 116. Later, the Court of Appeals reiterated this
principle in Carroll, holding that “ [t]he important criterion is the
purpose for which the public is permitted on the property,’ ie.,
whether ‘the property is open to the public for recreational purposes
free of charge.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis sup-
plied.) 280 Ga. App. at 175.

Consistent with these long-standing decisions, as well as a
natural reading of the statute, I conclude that it is the fee associated
with the use of the property that controls our analysis, not whether a
specific individual was charged.’ Such a resolution of the ambiguity

2 Even in “business interest” cases, where the recreational purpose of the property is
questioned, this Court's analysis is not controlled by the individual plaintiff. See Anderson, 273
Ga. at 117 (2) (the test to determine whether an activity is “recreational” despite possible profit
motive of owner “does not preclude consideration of the user’s subjective assessment of the
activity,” though “the user’s assessment is not the controlling factor”) (punctuation omitted)
(citing Quick v. Stone Mountain Mem. Assn., 204 Ga. App. 598, 599 (420 SE2d 36) (1992) and
Hogue v. Stone Mountain Mem. Assn., 183 Ga. App. 378 (358 SE2d 852) (1987); Godinko, 270
Ga. at 568, n.12 (plaintiff's admission that she used sidewalk for recreational purpose
considered, but not determinative factor in concluding that RPA shielded city from liability
because public allowed onto city sidewalk for recreational purpose). Instead, the balancing test
used by this Court in such cases requires examination of “all social and economic aspects of the
activity” that occur on the property onto which the public was invited, including “the intrinsic
nature of the activity, the type of service or commodity offered to the public, and the activity’s
purpose and consequence.” Anderson, 273 Ga. at 117 (2). See also Carroll, 280 Ga. App. at

es 861

between OCGA §§ 51-3-23 and 51-3-25 (2) is consistent with the
requirement that we narrowly construe the liability waiver, which
abrogates the common law right of an invitee to sue a landowner.
Furthermore, this construction maintains the liability shield envi-
sioned by the General Assembly in OCGA § 51-3-23, encouraging
landowners to allow the public to use their lands free of charge, while
also protecting the waiver exemption codified in OCGA § 51-3-25 (2).
See Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 869 (785 SE2d 414) (2016)
(‘When the courts are called upon to determine if there is a conflict
between statutes they are required to undertake to construe them
together and seek to give full effect to both laws as representing all of
the legislative intention.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Finally, my interpretation is bolstered by the General Assembly’s
inclusion of the phrase “in any case” in OCGA § 51-3-25 (2). This
all-encompassing phrase illustrates the General Assembly’s intent to
grant greater liability rights to the public when a landowner assesses
a fee to enter onto its land. In other words, where a landowner levies
acharge in exchange for permission to enter its land for a recreational
purpose, then the landowner is liable for an injury suffered on its
property in any case, no matter whether that person paid the admis-
sion fee or not.‘ This construction further avoids the patently absurd
result of permitting landowners to cherry-pick groups of potential
plaintiffs, resulting in similarly injured individuals having unequal
rights of recovery. See Roberts v. Deal, 290 Ga. 705, 709 (723 SE2d
901) (2012) (explaining that “this Court may construe statutes to
avoid absurd results”) (citing Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 12 (1) (644
SE2d 814) (2007)).

In this case, the record clearly supports the trial court’s finding
that the public was charged a fee to enter the premises. See OCGA §
51-3-21 (1) (defines a “charge” as “the admission price or fee asked in
return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land”).
Compare Stone Mountain Mem. Assn. v. Herrington, 225 Ga. 746 (1)
(171 SE2d 521) (1969) (where public was paid a fee to park their cars
but not to enter the premises, parking fee did not qualify as charge
pursuant to RPA); Brannon v. Stone Mountain Mem. Assn., 165 Ga.
App. 120 (299 SE2d 176) (1983) (same); South Gwinnett Athletic
Assn. v. Nash, 220 Ga. App. 116 (1) (469 SE2d 276) (1996) (baseball

175-176, n.3 (where the parties do not dispute the purely recreational purpose of the property,
then no need to review individual plaintiff's use of premises)

+ By this interpretation, I do not mean to imply that a landowner would lose the RPA’s
liability protection simply by charging a single person, Indeed, the focus of our case law has been
on a landowner that generally charges a fee for permission to enter its land for a recreational
purpose.

862 es

registration fee did not qualify as a charge under RPA).

Pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-25 (2), and applying Georgia’s well-
established case law, I would conclude that by generally charging a
fee for admission, the City is excluded from the RPA’s liability
protection, no matter that the individual injured was relieved from
paying the admission fee because of her age. If the City wished to be
protected by the RPA’s liability waiver, it could have allowed all Rebel
Bowl spectators to enter the stadium free of charge as the City does
for its regular season games. See Spivey, 210 Ga. App. at 775
(concluding that “the RPA applies to spectators at athletic events,
when no admission charge is imposed”). Consequently, I would affirm
the Court of Appeals’ determination that the City was exempted from
the RPA’s protection pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-25 (2).

I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins me in this
dissent.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

—_ —_ — ' 7 em —_ em —_ _

Mullens III, for appellant.
Karsman, McKenzie & Hart, Christopher D. Britt, for appellees.

$17Y1329. IN THE MATTER OF RICKY W. MORRIS, JR.
(809 SE2d 799)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a Notice of
Discipline seeking the disbarment of Ricky W. Morris, Jr. (State Bar
No. 525160), based on eleven underlying grievances.’ On April 21,
2017, the Bar personally served Morris with the Notice of Discipline,
see Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (@). Morris filed a Notice of Rejection on
May 24, 2017, but the State Bar responded, arguing to this Court that
the Rejection was untimely. This Court issued an order on August 1,
2017 directing the Coordinating Special Master to determine in the
first instance whether the Notice of Rejection was timely and that
special master, H. Maddox Kilgore, subsequently issued his report
finding that the rejection had not been timely filed. As Morris filed no

1 Morris, who was admitted to the State Bar in 1998, is currently under suspension
pursuant tothis Court's acceptance of his voluntary petition for emergency suspension pending
resolution of the disciplinary and criminal matters then filed against him, see Bar Rule 4-108.
See In the Matter of Morris, 298 Ga. 864 (785 SE2d 408) (2016).

es 868

response or objection to the special master’s report, this Court accepts
the special master’s finding and holds that Morris is in default, has
waived his rights to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such
discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this
Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b).

The facts, as deemed admitted by virtue of Morris's default, show
with regard to State Disciplinary Board (“SDB”) Docket Nos. 6935,
6938, 6940-6944 and 6982 that between August 2013 and January
2016 Morris took retainers ranging from between $1,000 and $15,000
to represent clients in criminal matters in various counties; that in
one case (SDB Docket No. 6941), Morris made direct personal contact
with the prospective client in the hallway of a courthouse and offered
to handle his case for a fee, even though that client had not sought any
advice or legal representation from Morris; that Morris either aban-
doned the cases at issue in the above-listed disciplinary matters or
failed to properly handle them; that he failed to contact the clients or
respond to their efforts to contact him with regard to their cases;? that
he failed to return the unearned portion of retainers when his
services were terminated; and that he failed to respond timely to the
properly-served Notices of Investigation that resulted from these
grievances.

With regard to SDB Docket Nos. 6936 and 6939, the record shows
that in April 2013, Morris was paid a $17,500 retainer to represent a
defendant in a criminal matter in Henry County, Georgia. Although
the client paid an additional $400 to cover expenses for an expert
witness, Morris never hired the expert. Morris appeared at the call of
the criminal jury trial calendar on January 25, 2016, and announced
that he was ready for the trial, which was then set to begin with jury
selection the next morning. Later that afternoon, the Assistant
District Attorney (“ADA”) on the case overheard Morris on a tele-
phone call in the courthouse men’s restroom, apparently attempting
to purchase controlled substances for himself. The ADA brought
Morris’s behavior to the presiding judge’s attention. The next morn-
ing, Morris appeared in court for jury selection but seemed to be
under the influence of a controlled substance. He had bloodshot eyes
and welts and bruises on his face, and he fell asleep at counsel’s table.
The court recessed the trial and held a hearing on Morris's fitness to

2 In SDB Docket No, 6982, Morris's client had a bench warrant issued for his arrest after
the client failed to appear at a hearing about which Morris failed to advise him; that client
learned that Morris was in custody and was able to resolve the warrant on hisown and have his
case rescheduled. Morris responded to that client's termination letter, explaining that his law
license had been suspended, but he failed to refund any part of the $2,250 retainer that client
had paid

864 Pe

proceed as defense counsel. At that hearing, Morris declined the
court’s request that he submit to a drug test; denied he was under the
influence or that he had made the phone call the prior day; and
threatened the ADA with bodily harm. The court held Morris in
contempt and imposed jail time that was to be immediately served.
As a result, when Morris’s client returned to court, she was advised
by the presiding judge that Morris was unable to represent her and
she would need to seek new counsel. Morris took no further action on
behalf of the client and failed to refund the unearned portion of the
retainer. In addition, Morris was charged with felony intimidation of
a court officer and felony terroristic threats for threatening the ADA.
In November 2016, Morris resolved the charges by pleading guilty to
disorderly conduct and simple assault. Morris was properly served
with the Notice of Investigation arising from the grievance filed by
this client (SDB Docket No. 3936), but failed to timely respond.

With regard to SDB Docket No. 6937, the record shows that
Morris appeared at the Spalding County jail allegedly to have his
client sign a Power of Attorney, but he did not have the proper
identification to enter the jail. The Booking Clerk reported that
Morris was acting erratically and appeared under the influence of an
unknown substance. Morris told the clerk that his paralegal was
present with proper identification and would meet with his client in
booking first. Although Morris falsely identified the person with him
as his paralegal, jail staff knew her to be the wife of Morris’s client —
a fact Morris attempted to conceal. Morris was allowed to meet with
the client for the sole purpose of having him sign the Power of
Attorney, but as Morris was observed sleeping during that meeting,
the visit was interrupted and Morris was asked to leave the jail. Once
again, Morris was properly served with the Notice of Investigation
arising from the grievance filed in this case but failed to timely
respond.

We agree with the Bar that these facts clearly demonstrate that
Morris violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 (d), 3.5 (d), 4.1 (a), 7.3 (d),
and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, as found
in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).? The maximum penalty for a single violation of
Rule 1.2 (a), 1.3, 4.1 (a), 7.3 (d), or 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment, while the
maximum penalty for a single violation of Rule 1.4, 1.16 (d), or 3.5 (d)

® The Bar also charged Morris with a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (8) Gawyer shall not be
convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to
his fitness to practice law) based on his convictions for disorderly conduct and simple assault,
but we need not reach the question of whether that charge can be sustained in this case because,
by virtue of Morris’s other admitted conduct, he clearly violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 4.1 (a), 7.3
(@, 8.4 (a) (4), all of which carry the same maximum penalty of disbarment

es 865

is a public reprimand. In aggravation, we note that Morris’s conduct
involves multiple offenses and evidences a pattern of misconduct and
that he failed to timely respond to the Notices of Investigation
relating to these disciplinary matters.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that disbarment is the
appropriate sanction in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered
that the name of Ricky W. Morris, Jr., be removed from the rolls of
persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Morris is
reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

Pe

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Wolanda R. Shelton, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

Dwayne C. Singleton, for Morris.

$17Y1918. IN THE MATTER OF CLARENCE R. JOHNSON, JR.
(809 SE2d 797)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on this second
petition for voluntary discipline filed by Clarence R. Johnson, Jr.
(State Bar No. 392870), prior to the issuance of a formal complaint.
See Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2). This Court rejected Johnson’s first petition
for voluntary discipline, concluding that the suggested discipline of
a public or Review Panel reprimand was insufficient to address
Johnson’s conduct. See In the Matter of Johnson, 299 Ga. 744 (791
SE2d 779) (2016). Johnson, who became a member of the Bar in 1984,
admits in this petition, as he did in his prior petition, that he became
subject to collection efforts after he was hospitalized due to illness
and unable to work while on bed rest, that he deposited personal
funds into his trust account to conceal them from his creditors, and
that he made withdrawals for personal expenses from the trust
account.

As this Court noted in its opinion rejecting Johnson’s first
petition, the relevant facts are as follows:

In December 2013, Wells Fargo Bank, Johnson’s trust
account holder, notified the Bar that Johnson’s trust account
held insufficient funds for a check presented for payment.

866 A

Johnson responded to the Bar’s inquiry regarding the insuf-
ficient funds and provided copies of bank statements for his
trust, operating, and payroll accounts. In a letter to the Bar
dated May 9, 2014, Johnson admitted to transferring earned
fees from his operating account to his trust account to
conceal personal funds from creditors seeking satisfaction of
outstanding personal debts. The Bar advised Johnson to
attend a general consultation on trust account management
with the Bar’s Law Practice Management Program, which
Johnson did. On February 27, 2015, Johnson filed a volun-
tary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and he was granted
a discharge of his personal debts on June 25, 2015.

Johnson also admitted he failed to maintain records for
client funds held in his trust account and deposited settle-
ment funds into his operating accounts which exposed his
clients’ funds to his creditors’ collection efforts. The Bar’s
Investigative Panel initiated a grievance against Johnson
on August 19, 2015, and on October 19, 2015, Johnson
submitted to the Investigative Panel a petition for voluntary
discipline requesting the imposition of an Investigative
Panel reprimand. The Investigative Panel determined that
the appropriate discipline would be a Review Panel repri-
mand, which prompted the filing of Johnson’s petition for
voluntary discipline in this Court.

Id. at 744-745.

As before, Johnson admits that his conduct violated Bar Rules
1.15 (D (a), 1.15 (ID (a), 1.15 (ID (b), and 8.4 (a) (4), of the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct. See Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum
sanction for a violation of each of these Bar Rules is disbarment. In
mitigation of discipline, Johnson offers that he has no prior disciplin-
ary history, has cooperated by submitting a detailed letter concerning
his misconduct to the State Bar and consulting with the Law Practice
Management Program as advised, has otherwise good character and
reputation as shown by submitted letters of support from the legal
community, and has expressed remorse for his conduct. Johnson
suggests that the appropriate discipline in his case should fall
somewhere in a range between a suspension for one month and a
suspension for one year, although he requests a suspension of no more
than three months. The Bar recommends a suspension of one year,
and notes in aggravation that Johnson’s conduct was dishonest and
selfishly motivated.

Having reviewed the record as a whole, we decide that the
imposition of a six-month suspension is the appropriate sanction in

es 867

this matter, see In the Matter of Carragher, 289 Ga. 826 (716 SE2d
216) (2011), and we therefore accept Johnson’s petition for voluntary
discipline. Accordingly, we hereby order that he be suspended from
the practice of law in this State for six months. Because there are no
conditions on Johnson’s reinstatement other than the passage of
time, there is no need for him to take any action either through the
State Bar or through this Court to effectuate his return to the practice
of law. Instead, the suspension based on this opinion will take effect
as of the date this opinion is issued and will expire by its own terms
six months later. Johnson is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar
Rule 4-219 ().

Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Six-month suspension.
All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

3 _ =... for Johnson.

Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Wolanda R. Shelton, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for

State Bar of Georgia.

S$17Y2016. IN THE MATTER OF CAMERON SHAHAB.
(809 SE2d 795)

PER CURIAM.

A special master was appointed over this disciplinary matter
after we rejected a petition for voluntary discipline filed by Cameron
Shahab (State Bar No. 135087). See In the Matter of Shahab, 300 Ga.
411 (794 SE2d 651) (2016). The special master issued a report
recommending that Shahab be disbarred for multiple violations of
the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in relation to his deficient
representation and neglect of two unrelated clients. We accept that
recommendation.

The record shows that Shahab acknowledged service of the
complaint but failed to file a response, and is thus deemed to have
admitted the facts alleged in the complaint, including the following.
On or about July 14, 2014, one client paid Shahab $2,500 to help him
apply for asylum. The client expressed that he wanted the application
filed before his legal student resident status expired in early October
2014. Shahab said he would have a draft application ready for the
client’s review by early August. In late August, the client asked about
the delay, and Shahab responded that he would provide an update

868 re

within a few days. Having not heard from Shahab, the client emaile:
Shahab on September 3, 2014, and asked why Shahab had not
provided an update or a draft asylum application as promised. The
client then sent a text message to Shahab in late September after
Shahab failed to respond to the client’s emails. Shahab responde
and exchanged several text messages with the client, who reminde’
Shahab that the asylum application was due by October 2, 2014.
Shahab replied, “No problem at all.”

On September 30, 2014, Shahab told the client that he was
dealing with a family health matter in another state, and reassure
the client that he would submit the asylum application on time an
would supplement the application afterward if necessary. Shahab
later told the client that the application would be filed at the end of
October. When no application was filed by January 5, 2015, the client
emailed Shahab and threatened to file a report with the State Bar an!
take other actions if Shahab did not start the application within ten
days. Shahab emailed the client weeks later and told the client that
he would provide a draft application and file it by January 31, 2015.
When January 31 arrived, Shahab promised to provide a draft
application within three days. Shahab never sent a draft application
to the client, never filed an application for the client, and refused the
client’s demand for a full refund. The client later received a fee refund
award through the State Bar’s fee arbitration program.!

In May 2013, a second client paid Shahab $11,750 to help the
client establish legal residence in the United States. The client
provided Shahab with requested documentation over the succeeding
months. In January 2014, the client made several phone calls to
Shahab but could not reach Shahab because the number had been
disconnected with no prior notice to the client. The client also sent a
number of emails to Shahab. Shahab eventually responded, claiming
to be out of the state caring for an ailing family member. During this
time, Shahab failed to notify the client of a December 2013 immigra-
tion hearing, causing the client to miss it and resulting in a depor-
tation order being issued against the client.

Shahab later told the client that he would file a motion to reopen
the client’s case and advised the client not to report for deportation in
April 2014, because the motion to reopen would be the equivalent of
an appearance. At approximately 2:30 p.m. on the scheduled date of
deportation, Shahab contacted the client’s wife and told her that the

At the time we rejected Shahab’s petition for voluntary discipline in December 2016, we
noted that the State Bar had confirmed that Shahab had not made payments toward satisfying
this arbitration award. See In the Matter of Shahab, 300 Ga. at 412. There is no evidence in the
record showing that he has since made any payments.

es 869

client had to appear in immigration court by 4:00 p.m., which the
client did. Shahab had assured the client that he had filed the motion
to reopen the client’s case, but immigration authorities had no record
of any such filing. The client’s wife twice requested to meet with
Shahab in May 2014, but he declined.
In July 2014, the second client met with another attorney, who
asked Shahab to provide an accounting and copies of the documents
filed in the case. In response, Shahab offered a partial refund to the
client if the client did not terminate representation. Because the
client had no money and had a newborn baby, he allowed Shahab to
continue representing him. When the client’s wife learned in Decem-
ber 2014 that immigration authorities had no record of a motion to
reopen ever being filed, she asked Shahab to provide proof of filing.
Shahab responded more than a month later, sending the client’s wife
an email with a PDF attachment that Shahab claimed showed the
label for the packet he sent to immigration authorities. Using the
tracking number on the label, the client’s wife determined that, as of
January 26, 2015, the postal service had obtained an electronic
notification that mail was to be sent to the postal service but no
package had actually been delivered to the postal service. The client’s
wife sent Shahab a document from immigration authorities giving
the client until March 24, 2015, to prove that a motion to reopen had
been filed or face deportation. Shahab told the client’s wife that he
would provide proof to immigration authorities, there was no urgency
in providing the documentation, and the client need not do anything
in response to the immigration notice. Shahab also told the client’s
wife on March 16, 2015, that he would visit the immigration office
that week to file the necessary motion. By March 20, the client
obtained new counsel. Responding to new counsel’s email, Shahab
initially promised to deliver the paid filing fees ($3,000) to new
counsel, but later refused to do so. The client later received a $11,750
fee refund award through the State Bar’s fee arbitration program.”

Based on these facts, the special master concluded that Shahab’s
conduct violated Rule 1.2 (lawyer shall consult with client on scope
and objectives of representation), Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing client and shall
not willfully abandon or disregard matter to detriment of client
without just cause), Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall keep client reasonably
informed about status and promptly comply with reasonable requests

2 Aswith the first client, the State Bar confirmed that Shahab had not made any payments
against the second client’s fee award when Shahab’s case was last before us. See In the Matter
of Shahab, 300 Ga. at 412. There is no evidence in the record showing that he has since made
any payments.

870 re

for information), Rule 1.16 (lawyer shall protect a client’s interests
when withdrawing representation), Rule 3.2 (lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with client’s inter-
ests), and Rule 8.4 (a) (4) (awyer shall not engage in professional
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4, 1.16, and 3.2isa
publicreprimand. The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.2,
1.3, and 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment.

Citing the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the
special master recommended that Shahab be disbarred because,
inter alia, he committed multiple offenses of abandoning or neglect-
ing his clients, his conduct caused or potentially caused serious injury
to his clients, he knowingly deceived clients, and he ignored the
gravity of the disciplinary process by failing to respond to the com-
plaint. Shahab received notice of the special master’s report but failed
to file a response.

Having reviewed the record and the special master’s report, we
agree that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in these circum-
stances, especially considering Shahab’s refusal to make restitution
to either client and dereliction of duties in matters of legal residence
in this country, causing the second client to miss a court date and face
deportation. See generally In the Matter of Raulin, 299 Ga. 283 (787
SE2d 691) (2016) (disbarring attorney who failed to diligently repre-
sent and communicate with client or provide refund); In the Matter of
Lea, 297 Ga. 797 (778 SE2d 229) (2015) (disbarring attorney who
failed to file pleadings for, respond to, or refund fees to clients); In the
Matter of Lieb, 289 Ga. 168 (709 SE2d 800) (2011) (disbarring
attorney who failed to take action on matters for, respond to, or refund
fees to clients). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the name of
Cameron Shahab be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to
practice law in the State of Georgia. Shahab is reminded of his duties
pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.
Pe
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Andreea N. Morrison, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

es 81

$18Y0142. IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT JUTZI HOWELL.
(809 SE2d 794)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Report and
Recommendation of special master H. Maddox Kilgore, who recom-
mends that the Court accept the petition for voluntary surrender of
license filed by Robert Jutzi Howell (State Bar No. 561931). In his
petition, Howell, who has been a member of the State Bar of Georgia
since 2010, admitted that in June 2016, he pled guilty in South
Carolina to one felony count of pointing/presenting a firearm, in
violation of SC Code § 16-23-410; one misdemeanor count of unlaw-
ful carrying of a pistol, in violation of SC Code § 16-23-20; and one
misdemeanor count of possession of cocaine, in violation of SC Code
§ 44-53-370 (d) (3). Howell admitted that, by virtue of his felony
conviction, he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct. See Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Thus, he requested
acceptance of the voluntary surrender of his license to practice law,
which he acknowledged was tantamount to disbarment.

The special master states that the State Bar supports Howell’s
petition and concludes that a felony conviction generally warrants
disbarment. Therefore, the special master recommends disbarment.
Nevertheless, recognizing that surrender of a license to practice law
is tantamount to disbarment, the special master also recommends
acceptance of Howell’s petition for voluntary surrender of license.

We have reviewed the record and agree to accept Howell’s
petition for the voluntary surrender of his license. Accordingly, the
name of Robert Jutzi Howell hereby is removed from the rolls of
persons entitled to practice law in the State of Georgia. Howell is
reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

aula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Wolanda R.
Shelton, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Geor-
gia.

S18Y0256. IN THE MATTER OF LARRY BUSH HILL.
(809 SE2d 793)
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary surrender of license filed by Larry Bush Hill (State Bar No.

872 es

354360) pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2). In his petition, Hill, who
was admitted to the Bar in 1994, admits that in September 2017
he entered a guilty plea in the Superior Court of Walker County,
Georgia, to one count of influencing a witness in violation of OCGA §
16-10-93 (a) and one count of criminal attempt to suborn perjury in
violation of OCGA § 16-10-72. As both offenses are felonies, Hill’s
convictions violate Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), the maximum penalty for which
is disbarment. Hill acknowledges that his proposed voluntary sur-
render of license is tantamount to disbarment and asks this Court to
accept his petition.

The State Bar recommends that this Court accept Hill’s petition
for voluntary surrender of his license, and based upon our review of
the petition, we agree that acceptance of Hill’s petition is in the best
interests of the Bar and the public. Accordingly, the name of Larry
Bush Hill is hereby removed from the rolls of persons entitled to
practice law in the State of Georgia. Hill is reminded of his duties
under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

wnley indsay, Christopher A. Townley, for Hill.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

S$18Y0264. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER
MARK MILLER.
(809 SE2d 793)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition of
Christopher Mark Miller (State Bar No. 506428) for voluntary sur-
render of license, pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b). On November 7,
2016, this Court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline filed by
Miller, who has been a member of the Bar since 1990, in which
petition he proposed that he be suspended pending the resolution of
multiple felony charges then pending against him. See In the Matter
of Miller, 300 Ga. 139 (793 SE2d 376) (2016). In the present petition,
Miller recounts that these felony charges have now been resolved
through his entry of guilty pleas to counts of financial transaction
card fraud, financial transaction card theft, theft by taking, theft by

es 878

conversion, and theft by deception. Miller admits that, by entering
these pleas, he is in violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct, the maximum sanction for a violation of
which is disbarment. The State Bar has not responded to this
petition.

We have reviewed the record and agree to accept Miller’s petition
for the voluntary surrender of his license, which is tantamount to
disbarment. Accordingly, the name of Christopher Mark Miller is
hereby removed from the rolls of persons entitled to practice law in
the State of Georgia. Miller is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule
4-219 (c).

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

‘aula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Wolanda R. Shelton, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

$18Y0269. IN THE MATTER OF LORNE HOWARD CRAGG.
(809 SE2d 792)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary surrender of license filed by Lorne Howard Cragg (State
Bar No. 697876) pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2). In his petition,
Cragg, who has been a member of the Bar since 2004, admitted that
he received client funds and that he should have preserved those
funds in his trust account, but that he misappropriated those funds
for his personal use and did not otherwise account to his client for the
funds. He further admitted that the bank at which he maintained his
attorney trust account notified the State Bar about checks he had
written on that account, which checks had to be returned as the
account held insufficient funds to pay the checks. Finally, Cragg
admitted that he provided false and misleading information to the
Office of General Counsel during its investigation of this matter.

Cragg acknowledged that the above described conduct violates
Rules 1.15 (II) (b), 8.1 (a), and 8.4 (a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum
penalty for a single violation of any of those rules is disbarment.
Given his admissions, Cragg requested that the Court accept his
petition for the voluntary surrender of his license, which would be

874 es

tantamount to disbarment.

The State Bar recommends that this Court accept Cragg’s peti-
tion for voluntary surrender of his license, and based upon our review
of the petition, we agree that acceptance of Cragg’s petition is in the
best interests of the Bar and the public. Accordingly, the name of
Lorne Howard Cragg is hereby removed from the rolls of persons
entitled to practice law in the State of Georgia. Cragg is reminded of
his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

—_ 7 ame a acl State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-

man, Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for
State Bar of Georgia.

$18Y0387. IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD V. MERRITT.
(809 SE2d 791)

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for
voluntary surrender of license filed by Richard V. Merritt (State Bar
No. 503105) pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2), before the issuance of
a formal complaint. In his petition, Merritt, who has been a member of
the Bar since 2000, admits that in February 2017 he settled a client’s
personal injury matter for $75,000, but failed to promptly disburse
those funds to his client or her medical providers and failed to render
a full accounting of the funds to his client. Merritt acknowledges that
the above-described conduct violated Rule 1.15 (1) (c) of the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The
maximum penalty for a single violation of Rule 1.15 (1) is disbarment.

Given his admissions, Merritt requests that the Court accept
his petition for the voluntary surrender of his license, which he
acknowledges would be tantamount to disbarment. The State Bar
has responded, stating its belief that the best interests of the public
and the Bar would be served by this Court accepting the petition for
voluntary surrender of license.

We have reviewed the record and agree to accept Merritt’s
petition for the voluntary surrender of his license. Accordingly, the
name of Richard V. Merritt hereby is removed from the rolls of
persons entitled to practice law in the State of Georgia. Merritt is
reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

es 875

Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2018.

PO
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittel-
man, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.

$17A1352. SIMPSON v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 718)

PETERSON, Justice.

Carlo Simpson was convicted of felony murder and other crimes
in relation to the shooting death of Shakhira Dunson.' Simpson
appeals and argues that the trial court plainly erred in instructing
the jury on a method of committing aggravated assault that was not
alleged in the indictment. Because the trial court specifically instructed
the jury that the State was required to prove every material allega-
tion of the indictment, we affirm Simpson’s convictions.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial
evidence showed the following. Dunson had a child with Simpson,
whom she had been dating since 2010. In February 2013, Dunson was
pregnant with their second child.
On February 17, 2013, Dunson hada heated phone conversation
with Simpson. Dunson’s cousin overheard the argument because
Dunson placed the call on speaker phone. According to Dunson’s
cousin, Dunson told Simpson that she no longer wanted to be in a
relationship with him, and Simpson said in response, “[I]f I can’t have
you I will make sure nobody else will.”
The next night, Dunson was having dinner with her brother
when she received multiple phone calls from Simpson. Dunson
ignored the calls at first, but finally answered and told Simpson to
stop calling her. After ending the phone call with Simpson, Dunson
told her brother that she was leaving Simpson. Dunson dropped her

1 The crimes occurred on February 18, 2013. On February 17, 2015, a DeKalb County
grand jury indicted Simpson for felony murder, feticide, aggravated assault, and possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony. After a trial held in March 2015, the jury found
Simpson guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Simpson to life in prison for felony
murder, a consecutive life term for feticide, and a consecutive five-year term for the firearm
count. The court merged the aggravated assault count into the felony murder conviction.
Simpson filed a timely motion for new trial, which he subsequently amended. Following a
hearing, the trial court denied the motion on November 8, 2016. Simpson filed a timely notice
of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court for the August 2017 term and submitted for
a decision on the briefs.

876 ee

brother off after dinner and told him that she would see him after
collecting her belongings from Simpson’s house.

Simpson was not home when Dunson arrived, but members of his
family and several friends were at the residence. After Simpson
arrived, he and several others, including his sisters Victoria and
Lawanna, got into Dunson’s car and began to smoke marijuana.
Dunson came out of the house and went to the car window where
Simpson was sitting and began talking to him. Simpson told Dunson
to go inside the house and retrieve their infant son, but she refused.
Simpson then grabbed his gun and began waving it in Dunson’s face.
Dunson, who was about two feet away from Simpson, tried to move
the gun away, but Simpson shot her in the face. Dunson died at the
scene. The medical examiner testified that Dunson was in the second
trimester of her pregnancy, and her fetus would have been viable but
for Dunson’s death.

A responding officer spoke to Simpson’s sisters Victoria and
Lawanna, who both reported that Dunson was shot during a drive-by
shooting. Simpson told Dunson’s family the same and also told the
police that he was inside the residence at the time of the shooting.
Upon further investigation, police suspected that Simpson shot Dun-
son because they saw blood on Simpson’s shirt and a shell casing on
the dashboard of Dunson’s vehicle. Officers also located a 9mm
firearm in the yard that had a roundin the chamber and more rounds
in the magazine. A GBI firearms expert testified that the recovered
shell casing was fired from that gun, the firearm was in working
condition, and the gun required intentional action — about 13.5
pounds of force — to pull the trigger.

Simpson testified at trial, admitting that he shot Dunson, but
claiming it was an accident.

1. Although Simpson does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, it is our customary practice in murder cases to indepen-
dently review the record to determine whether the evidence was
legally sufficient. Having done so, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Simpson was guilty of the crimes for which he
was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Simpson was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon by shooting the victim, and the other charges of felony
murder, feticide, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony were predicated on the aggravated assault charge. Simp-
son argues that the trial court erred by charging the jury on other
forms of aggravated assault, which he contends could have allowed
the jury to find him guilty of aggravated assault based on the victim’s

es 877

apprehension of violent injury rather than on the indicted crime of
shooting Dunson.

Simpson did not object at trial, and so his challenge to the jury
charge is to be reviewed for plain error only. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b).
Under plain error review, reversal of a conviction is authorized if the
trial court’s instruction was erroneous, the error was obvious, the
instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. See Green v. State, 291 Ga. 287, 294 (8) (728 SE2d 668)
(2012). It is error to charge the jury that an aggravated assault may
be committed in a method not charged in the indictment. Chapman
v. State, 273 Ga. 865, 868 (2) (5648 SE2d 278) (2001). Here, even if the
trial court provided a charge on aggravated assault that included a
method not charged in the indictment, any error in its instruction was
cured. The court provided the jury with the indictment andinstructed
the jury that the State was required to prove every material allega-
tion of the indictment and every essential element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See Williams v. Kelley, 291 Ga.
285, 286-287 (728 SE2d 666) (2012) (a limiting instruction cures a
defect in the court’s charge). Under these circumstances, Simpson
cannot establish reversible error, plain or otherwise. See, e.g., Faulks
v. State, 296 Ga. 38, 39 (2) (764 SE2d 846) (2014).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED FEBRUARY 5, 2018.

Tyler R. Conklin, for appellant.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Deborah D. Wellborn, Zina B.
Gumbs, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Oldham,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1519. MANNER v. THE STATE.
(808 SE2d 681)
GRANT, Justice.
Appellant Paul Manner was convicted of malice murder and
related offenses in connection with the shooting death of Tracey

878 A

Kingcannon.' On appeal, Manner contends that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by withdrawing a request for a jury
charge on the requirement for evidence corroborating accomplice
testimony, and by failing to introduce evidence of the confessions of
two of the State’s witnesses to an earlier aggravated assault on the
victim. Manner also contends that the trial court’s failure to instruct
the jury on impeachment by prior conviction related to a first offender
guilty plea by State’s witness Jermaine Davis was plain error; or, in
the alternative, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
preserve her objection to the court’s denial of her request for that
instruction. For the reasons set forth below, we find that counsel’s
strategic decision to withdraw her request for an accomplice corrobo-
ration instruction was not objectively unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances of this case. Similarly, counsel’s decision to rely on
testimony about the State’s witnesses’ involvement in and confes-
sions to an earlier aggravated assault on the victim, rather than
seeking to admit the witnesses’ written statements, fell within the
broad range of reasonable trial strategy. And we find no error in the
trial court’s refusal to give the instruction on impeachment by prior
conviction, and thus, no deficiency in counsel’s failure to make a
specific objection on this issue after the jury instructions were given.

Last, Manner contends—and we agree—that the trial court
erred in merging the two felony murder verdicts into the malice
murder verdict, when the felony murder convictions should have
been vacated by operation of law. We affirm.

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
evidence shows the following. Kingcannon lived with his mother in
the same neighborhood as Manner and several of the trial witnesses.
On August 23, 2013, at about 1:00 a.m., Kingcannon’s mother heard

+ The victim was killed on August 23, 2013. On February 6, 2014, Manner was indicted by
a DeKalb County grand jury for malice murder, two counts of felony murder, aggravated
assault, criminal damage to property in the first degree, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. At the conclusion of a trial held May 11 through 18, 2015, the jury found
Manner guilty on all six counts. The trial court sentenced Manner to serve life in prison for
malice murder, ten years consecutive for criminal damage to property in the first degree, and
five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the
remaining verdicts merged or were vacated by operation of law. See Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842,
847-848 (770 SE2d 855) (2015). On August 3, 2015, Manner filed a motion for new trial, which
he amended on November 21, 2016, and on February 1, 2017. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied the motion for new trial on February 22, 2017. Manner filed a timely notice of
appeal on March 6, 2017, and the case was docketed in this Court to the August 2017 term and
was orally argued on August 14, 2017.

es 879

gunshots outside her home. When she ran to see what was happening,
she saw Kingcannon come out of his bedroom into the hallway. He
said he had been shot and asked her to call 911, and then fell to the
floor. Kingcannon’s mother called 911, and Kingcannon was trans-
ported to the hospital, but he could not be saved. He died of a gunshot
wound from a 9 millimeter bullet that entered his right arm, pen-
etrated his right lung, and damaged his diaphragm and liver.

Investigating police officers observed bullet holes in the victim’s
bedroom wall and recovered 17 shell casings from the street outside
the victim’s home. Sixteen of those shell casings were from 9 milli-
meter rounds, while one was from a .380 round. Police also found a
High-Point 9 millimeter handgun in Kingcannon’s bedroom. About
two weeks before he was killed, Kingcannon had admitted to a friend
that he had stolen a High-Point 9 millimeter firearm from Manner.

Earlier that night, Manner pulled up to the home of two brothers,
Brandon and Quintavius Hishida, who lived less than a mile from
Kingcannon. Manner was driving an SUV with three passengers.
According to Brandon, one of Manner’s passengers was a man known
to him as “YG,” later identified by police as DeMarcus Abrams. Both
Brandon and Quintavius saw a firearm in the front area of the SUV;
Quintavius identified the firearm as a black 9 millimeter handgun.
Manner told the brothers that he was “fixing to go back there and get”
Kingcannon because Kingcannon had stolen a pistol from him.

A few hours later, minutes after the shooting, Brandon Hishida
called Manner and asked where he was. Manner “said he was on his
deck and he said he killed Tracey.” When asked if Manner had used
those very words, Brandon responded, “Said he killed that ni—a, T
got the ni—a.’”

The Hishida brothers had their own recent history of violent
exchanges with the victim. In May 2013, the Hishida brothers and
one of their cousins got into an altercation with Kingcannon. Imme-
diately after the fight, a shot was fired—by whom it was not clear.
Kingcannon’s friend Darian Ross was present for the altercation and
saw Brandon holding a gun. Reginald Vinson, who lived nearby, also
witnessed the fight and heard the shot. Sergeant S.J. Rainey from the
DeKalb County Police Department responded to the scene of the
altercation and collected 9 millimeter bullet fragments from the
garage wall of Vinson’s house. Brandon and Quintavius were later
arrested and charged with aggravated assault for their involvement
in the altercation. Those charges were still pending against both
brothers at the time of Manner’s trial.

In early June 2013, the Hishidas reported to police that shots
were fired outside their house and that they believed that King-
cannon was responsible. And on the evening Kingcannon was killed,

880 A

not long before Manner drove by and spoke with the Hishidas,
Kingcannon and two others fired guns at the Hishida brothers and
their mother, Kyna Hishida, as the Hishidas were standing outside
their home.” Both Brandon and Quintavius testified at trial and
denied shooting into Kingcannon’s house on the night he was killed.
At trial, the State’s sole eyewitness was Jermaine Davis. Davis
testified that, near midnight on the night of the fatal shooting,
Manner contacted him and asked if his .380 pistol was still for sale.
When Davis confirmed that the gun was still available, Manner
asked Davis to come by to sell him the pistol and give him a ride
around the corner. Davis drove to Manner’s house to pick him up.
When Davis arrived, Manner was standing outside with Abrams.
Davis gave Manner the .380 pistol and Manner paid him for it, and
then they all got into Davis’s white Mercury Grand Marquis and
Davis drove through the neighborhood.
When Davis passed the victim’s house, Manner and Abrams told
Davis to stop the car. Manner and Abrams then got out of the car and
ran back toward the victim’s home. Davis heard gunshots, and when he
looked in the rearview mirror, he saw both Manner and Abrams firing
toward the victim’s house. Manner had the .380 pistol he had pur-
chased from Davis, and Abrams hada larger silver and black handgun.
Davis observed Manner hitting the .380 as though it had jammed.
After firing at the victim’s house, Manner and Abrams returned to
Davis’s car and got in, telling him to “drive, drive, drive.” As he was
returning to Davis’s car, Manner “cocked” the .380 pistol and a bullet
came out, confirming Davis’s suspicion that the pistol had jammed.
Vinson, who lived two houses away from Kingcannon, heard shots fired
and looked out his window. He saw a white car, which he described as
a Crown Victoria,’ drive slowly away from the victim’s home.
Manner, Davis, and Abrams returned to Davis’s house. Davis
testified that he repeatedly asked Manner and Abrams why they had
shot into the victim’s house, but Manner did not say anything except
that it “had to be done.” Abrams said that the victim had stolen
something, and that they had to “teach him a lesson.” Davis told
Manner that he did not feel safe around him while Manner hada gun;
he asked Manner for the .380 pistol back, and Manner complied.
Cellular telephone records line up with this chain of events. The
records show that Manner received calls placing his cell phone in the
area of the shooting—also, to be fair, the area of Manner’s home—

2 Noone was hurt in the shooting at the Hishidas’
8 Detective McLendon testified that Vinson's description of a Crown Victoria was consis-
tent with Davis's Grand Marquis, as the two models are similar in appearance.

es 881

about 15 minutes before the shooting, and again at 1:09 a.m., a few
minutes after the 911 call from Kingcannon’s mother was dispatched.
The 1:09 a.m. call was from Brandon Hishida’s cell phone. A call
placed from Manner’s phone at 1:14 a.m. was routed through a
cellular tower located outside Manner and Kingcannon’s neighbor-
hood and close to Davis’s home; this evidence is consistent with
Davis’s testimony that he drove Manner and Abrams back to his
house after the shooting.
The day after the shooting, Abrams filed a police report stating
that his 9 millimeter pistol had been stolen from his vehicle the night
before. After Manner was taken into custody and charged with
murder in connection with Kingcannon’s death, Abrams visited
Manner several times at the jail.4

Although Manner does not challenge the sufficiency of the evi-
dence supporting his convictions, it is our practice to review the
record and assess the legal sufficiency of the evidence under the
standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia.® We find that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find
Manner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he
was convicted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

II.

Manner contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in withdrawing her request for a jury instruction on the
requirement for corroboration of accomplice testimony, while permit-
ting without objection the court’s instruction that generally, the
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish a fact; and in
failing to introduce evidence that the Hishida brothers confessed to
aggravated assault charges stemming from the May 2013 altercation
with the victim. To succeed on his claim that counsel was constitu-
tionally ineffective, Manner must show both that his attorney’s
performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced as a result.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80
LE2d 674) (1984).

Under the first prong of this test, counsel’s performance will be
found deficient only if it was objectively unreasonable under the
circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms. Strick-
land, 466 U. 8. at 687-690. And to meet the second prong, prejudice

+ Nothing in the record indicates that Abrams had been apprehended as of the time of
Manner's trial,
® 443 U.S. 207 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)

882 A

is demonstrated only where there is a reasonable probability that,
absent counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been
different. A “reasonable probability” is defined as “a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

A. Accomplice Corroboration. Section 24-14-8 of the Georgia
Evidence Code provides that although “[t]he testimony of a single
witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact,” in felony cases
where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of the accom-
plice alone is insufficient. In such cases, evidence corroborating the
accomplice’s testimony is required to support a guilty verdict. See
Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 22 (785 SE2d 869) (2016). The corrobo-
rating evidence may be “slight,” and may be entirely circumstantial,
as long as it is independent of the accomplice’s testimony and either
connects the defendant directly with the crime or leads to the
inference that he is guilty. Id.

Here, as Manner now posits, there was evidence that the State’s
sole eyewitness, Davis, was an accomplice to the murder. Davis's own
testimony established that he provided one of the guns used in the
shooting, drove Manner and Abrams to the scene, waited while
Manner and Abrams shot into Kingcannon’s house, and drove the two
away from the scene afterward. This was sufficient to warrant a jury
instruction on the requirement for other evidence to corroborate an
accomplice’s testimony. See Hornbuckle v. State, 300 Ga. 750, 754
(797 SE2d 113) (2017) (“{T]o authorize a requested jury instruction,
there need only be slight evidence supporting the theory of the
charge.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Manner’s attorney initially requested a jury charge on accom-
plice corroboration; at the charge conference, however, she withdrew
that request. The trial court gave the State’s requested pattern
instruction that “[t]he testimony of a single witness, if believed, is
sufficient to establish a fact. Generally, there is no legal requirement
of corroboration of a witness, provided you find the evidence to be
sufficient.” Under the circumstances of this case—absent counsel’s
affirmative withdrawal of her request—the trial court should have
also given the accomplice corroboration instruction as an exception
to this general rule.® See Stanbury v. State, 299 Ga. 125, 180-131

© The pattern instruction on accomplice corroboration reads in relevant part:

An exception to this rule is made in the case of (specify felony charge), where
the witness is an accomplice. The testimony of the accomplice alone is not sufficient
to warrant a conviction. The accomplice’s testimony must be supported by other
evidence of some type, and that evidence must be such as would lead to the
inference of the guilt of the accused independent of the testimony of the accomplice.

Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. IT: Criminal Cases, § 1.31.92 (2014).

es 888

(786 SE2d 672) (2016) (trial court’s failure to give warranted accom-
plice corroboration charge was plain error where thejury wasinstructed
that the testimony of a single witness generally is sufficient to
establish a fact).

Manner was represented at trial by a seasoned criminal defense
attorney, Duana Sanson. At the time, Sanson had been practicing for
more than 20 years and had tried approximately 60 felony cases. At
the hearing on Manner’s motion for a new trial, Sanson testified that
her theory of defense was that Davis and Abrams were the actual
shooters, with the possible involvement of the Hishida brothers, and
that Davis and the Hishida brothers were lying about Manner’s
participation in order to shift blame from themselves. She withdrew
her request for the accomplice corroboration instruction “because it
was not something [she] was going to be arguing in [her] closing,” and
because she was concerned that the language of the instruction
suggested that Davis was an accomplice to Manner, thus implying
that Manner was involved in the crime. In short, she decided that the
accomplice corroboration charge was harmful rather than helpful.
She therefore withdrew her request for the instruction, but argued in
closing that the jury should not trust Davis’s testimony because, as
the getaway driver and the owner of the murder weapon, Davis could
have been charged with murder as a party to the crime if he had not
identified Manner as the shooter and become a witness for the
prosecution.

In determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient
under the Strickland standard, we do not judge counsel's actions in
hindsight or by the ultimate result of the trial; instead, we consider
whether a reasonable attorney could have taken the same action
when faced with the same circumstances. See Freeman v. State, 295
Ga. 820, 824-825 (764 SE2d 390) (2014). “[OJur purpose in making
this determination is not to grade trial counsel's performance, but
simply to ensure that the adversarial process at trial worked adequately.
We are therefore highly deferential to the choices made by trial
counsel during a trial that are arguably dictated by a reasonable trial
strategy.” Head v. Taylor, 273 Ga. 69, 79 (538 SE2d 416) (2000)
(citation and punctuation omitted). In reviewing counsel’s perfor-
mance under the Strickland standard, we “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A
decision made for purposes of trial tactics and strategy may form the
basis for an ineffective assistance claim only if it “was so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made it under
the circumstances at the time.” Clark v. State, 300 Ga. 899, 903
(799 SE2d 200) (2017).

884 A

Inthe context of this case, we cannot say that the decision to forgo
the accomplice corroboration instruction was an error “so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the
Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see Huff v. State,
300 Ga. 807, 813 (796 SE2d 688) (2017) (trial attorney’s strategic
decision not to request accomplice corroboration charge did not
amount to deficient performance). The evidence and circumstances
are different than they were in Fisher v. State, 299 Ga. 478 (788 SE2d
757) (2016), which Manner argues should control here. In Fisher, we
noted that, under the circumstances of that case, it would have been
“entirely unreasonable” for Fisher’s counsel to choose not to request
a jury charge on accomplice corroboration as a matter of strategy. Id.
at 485. But in Fisher, only one witness—the one alleged to have been
an accomplice—positively connected the defendant to the crime.
Although the State presented circumstantial evidence corroborating
its witness’s account of the crime, the evidence independent of the
accomplice’s testimony was weak, and could not have supported
Fisher’s conviction on its own.” See id. at 485-487.

Here, on the other hand, testimony by the Hishida brothers
provided evidence that Manner was seen shortly before the shooting,
armed with a 9 millimeter pistol and stating his intention to go “get”
the victim. Brandon Hishida testified that Manner confessed to
killing the victim immediately after the crime. Additional testimony
by the Hishida brothers and testimony by the victim’s friend Ross
provided evidence of motive (the victim stole a gun from Manner), and
cellular telephone data placed Manner near the scene of the crime at
the time of the shooting. And here, unlike in Fisher, the trial record
demonstrates that counsel pursued a strategy of undercutting all of
the State witnesses’ testimony as self-serving. Under the circum-
stances, it was not objectively unreasonable for counsel to conclude
that any benefit to Manner in instructing the jury that Davis’s
testimony required corroboration was outweighed by the instruc-
tion’s potential conflict with the theory of defense.

As Manner has not shown that his lawyer’s performance was
deficient under the first prong of the Strickland standard, his inef-
fective assistance claim on this ground fails. See Grissom v. State, 296
Ga. 406, 412-413 (768 SE2d 494) (2015) (“If either prong of the
Strickland test is not met, then this Court need look no further, and
ineffective assistance of counsel is not shown.”). Although we need

7 Indeed, a key element of Fisher's ineffective assistance claim was that his trial counsel
failed to subpoena a defense witness who could have cast doubt on the testimony of the
accomplice, who was the “linchpin” of the State's case, See Fisher, 299 Ga. at 485, 486

es 885

not reach the question of prejudice where the defendant has not made
he required showing of deficient performance, we note that the
trength of the evidence against Manner apart from Davis's testimony—
-vidence of Manner’s motive, his stated intent to “get” the victim, and
hat he admitted to the killing—also makes it unlikely that the
utcome of the trial would have been different if the accomplice
orroboration instruction had been requested and given. See Strick-
land, 466 U.S. at 694 (prejudice prong requires defendant to show a
‘easonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of
he proceeding would have been different); Mosley v. State, 295 Ga.
23, 125 (757 SE2d 828) (2014) (defendant not prejudiced by counsel’s
lleged errors where the weight of the evidence of his guilt provided
onfidence in the basis for the jury’s verdict). And as discussed in
more detail below, the impact of Davis’s testimony was weakened by
evidence that he initially gave several false statements to police, and
that his testimony against Manner was part of a negotiated plea
bargain.

B. Evidence of the Hishida Brothers’ Confessions. Next, Manner
argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce
evidence of the Hishida brothers’ confessions to aggravated assault
charges arising from the May 2013 altercation with the victim. When
asked at trial about the incident, Brandon and Quintavius Hishida
each refused to answer questions and, in light of the still-pending
charges arising from the incident, asserted the Fifth Amendment
right to avoid self-incrimination. Evidence of the altercation was
instead provided through the testimony of two witnesses to the fight,
Ross and Vinson, and of the responding police officer.

At the motion for new trial hearing, Manner’s trial counsel
testified that she believed that she had introduced evidence that the
Hishida brothers confessed to their involvement in the May 2013
shooting through the testimony of Detective McLendon, who inter-
viewed the Hishida brothers after Kingcannon’s death. Counsel
explained that she chose to have the fact of the Hishidas’ confessions
presented to the jury through the detective rather than introduce the
written statements themselves because the Hishidas had “waffled” in
their written statements, minimizing the seriousness of the alterca-
tion and their own involvement.

Manner contends that, contrary to counsel's recollection, neither
Detective McLendon nor any other witness testified that the Hishida
brothers had confessed to their involvement in the May 2013 fight
and shooting, and that absent such testimony, the failure to introduce
the brothers’ written statements left the jury with no idea that the
Hishidas had confessed to shooting a 9 millimeter handgun in a
previous altercation with the victim.

Prete eeotoundg

fey

886 A

Manner’s argument falls short, because there was in fact testimony
—albeit somewhat oblique—regarding the brothers’ confessions. Dur-
ing defense counsel’s cross-examination of Detective McLendon, while
discussing the detective’s initial interviews with Brandon and Quin-
tavius Hishida, Detective McLendon testified regarding the Hishida
brothers’ confessions:

Q: And at the time that you were interviewing Brandon, you
already knew about that pending aggravated assault, the
shooting case, right?

A: Yes.

Q: And you knew that Brandon and Quintavius both had
confessed in that case. Do you have those yet or you didn’t
have that yet?

A: No, I did not have that yet. I just had the initial police
report.

Q: Okay. So you didn’t get the rest of the documentation until
later?

A: Yes.

Detective McLendon’s response that he did not have the Hishida
brothers’ confessions “yet,” while not perhaps as direct a statement as
counsel may have wished, nonetheless demands the inference that he
did have the confessions at a later time. We conclude that counsel’s
decision to accept this response and forgo the introduction of the
Hishidas’ written statements fell “within the wide range of reason-
able professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. As counsel
indicated at the motion for new trial hearing, the Hishida brothers
downplayed their conflict with the victim in their written statements.
Quintavius’s statement indicates that he fired the gun during the
incident by “mistake,” and that he never had any intention of hurting
Kingcannon. Brandon’s statement similarly minimizes his involve-
ment in the altercation, suggesting that he and Kingcannon were
attempting to resolve their “beef” when the Hishidas’ cousin got into
a fight with Kingcannon. Given the qualifiers that the brothers
included in their written statements, it was not unreasonable for
counsel to conclude that those statements may have detracted from
the evidence the jury was considering—Detective McLendon’s testi-
mony indicating that Brandon and Quintavius eventually confessed
to aggravated assault against the victim, along with the witness
accounts by Vinson and Ross that the Hishida brothers and the victim
were fighting when a shot was fired, and that Ross saw Brandon

es 887

holding a gun.* Manner has not overcome the strong presumption
that counsel’s decision was an exercise of reasonable professional
judgment, and so his ineffective assistance claim on this ground fails.

Ill.

Manner contends that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct
the jury on impeachment by prior conviction in relation to Davis’s
first offender guilty plea to the felony charge of giving a false
statement. Because Davis had not yet completed his first offender
sentence at the time of Manner’s trial, Manner argues that the guilty
plea qualified as a felony conviction that could be considered by the
jury as impeachment evidence. As discussed below, we find no error
in the trial court’s ruling that Davis’s first offender guilty plea was
not a “conviction” for purposes of OCGA § 24-6-609 (“Rule 609”), and
so the impeachment instruction was unwarranted. Counsel is not
ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection, so Manner’s
ineffective assistance claim fails in this regard as well. See Wesley v.
State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (689 SE2d 280) (2010). Because we find no
error, plain or otherwise, in the trial court’s refusal to give this
instruction, we need not consider Manner’s alternative claim that his
counsel was ineffective if she failed to preserve her objection.

At trial, Davis admitted in his initial discussions with police that
he lied about his involvement in the shooting, first stating that he did
not know Manner, and then telling police that Manner anda fictitious
person named “Jason” borrowed his car on the night Kingcannon was
killed. Davis also admitted that he was arrested for making those
false statements, and was in custody on that charge when he finally
confessed to his own involvement and named Manner as the shooter.
Additionally, Davis testified that he could have received a sentence of
five years’ imprisonment for the charge of making a false statement,
but that he eventually entered a guilty plea as a first offender and
received a sentence of probation, with his testimony at Manner’s trial
being a condition of his sentence.

In light of Davis’s guilty plea, Manner’s trial counsel requested a
jury instruction on impeachment by prior conviction.® The trial court

® Manner argues that the written statements would have provided evidence that the
Hishida brothers had previously fired a 9 millimeter gun, like the one used in the fatal shooting,
at the victim. But a careful review of the Hishidas’ statements reveals no mention of the caliber
of weapon used in the May 2013 shooting

° The requested instruction would have informed the jury that, in determining the
credibility of witnesses, it was permissible to consider “[plroof that the witness has been
convieted of the [felony] offense of [making a false statement]” and “[p}roof that the witness has

888 A

declined to give the charge, reasoning that the instruction was
unwarranted because Davis’s first offender guilty plea was not a
“conviction.”

Davis was sentenced pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-60 (a), a portion
of Georgia’s First Offender Act. That section provides that a first-time
felony offender who enters a guilty plea may be sentenced to probation
or confinement “before an adjudication of guilt” and “without entering
a judgment of guilt.” Upon satisfactory completion of a sentence
imposed pursuant to this section, the defendant is discharged and
exonerated of guilt. OCGA § 42-8-60 (e).'°

We have previously explained that a defendant whois sentenced
as a first offender without an adjudication of guilt has not been
“convicted” within the meaning of the statute providing for impeach-
ment by prior conviction, and so the first offender’s guilty plea is not
admissible as general impeachment evidence. See, e.g., Williams v.
State, 301 Ga. 829, 831 (804 SE2d 398) (2017) (interpreting former
OCGA § 24-9-84.1). Manner points out that the statute was changed
in 2013, when the new Evidence Code became effective, and argues
that the statute now permits the use of a first offender guilty plea as
general impeachment evidence at any time until the first offender
sentence is complete and the defendant is discharged.

Specifically, Manner points to language in OCGA § 24-6-609 (c),
which provides an exception to the general rule for otherwise admis-
sible convictions that have been pardoned or annulled, or for which
the defendant has received a certificate of rehabilitation or discharge
under any first offender statute. That subsection states, in relevant
part, that “[e]vidence of a final adjudication of guilt and subsequent
discharge under any first offender statute shall not be used to
impeach any witness.” OCGA § 24-6-609 (c). Because Davis had just
begun his five-year sentence of probation, Manner argues, his
“subsequent discharge” had not yet occurred, meaning that the first
offender plea was admissible as general impeachment evidence."
Manner contends that any other reading of the statute would render
the phrase “and subsequent discharge” meaningless. We disagree—
the statutory change highlighted by Manner has a different impact
than he suggests.

been convicted of a crime involving (dishonesty) or (making a false statement).”

1° At the time Davis's first offender sentence was imposed, provisions for exoneration and
discharge were contained in OCGA § 42-8-62 (2003).

4. We note that the jury was instructed on impeachment by bias, and evidence of Davis's
first offender guilty plea was introduced for purposes of impeaching his credibility on that
ground.

es 889

At the outset, we note that under Mannevr’s interpretation, even
witnesses who had successfully complied with their sentencing orders
and been “exonerated of guilt and discharged as a matter of law”
under the first offender statute would not be exempt from having
their first offender pleas used against them. OCGA § 42-8-60 (¢) (1).
That is because not a single defendant who successfully completed
Georgia’s first offender program at the time of the statutory amend-
ment at issue in this case could show an “adjudication of guilt” as
required for exemption under OCGA § 24-6-609 (c).

Some statutory background is helpful in understanding why this
is so. This Court first held in 1997 that first offender pleas could not
be used as general impeachment evidence because successful comple-
tion of a first offender sentence means that there has been no
adjudication of guilt and thus no criminal “conviction.” Matthews v.
State, 268 Ga. 798, 801-803 (493 SE2d 136) (1997). As noted above,
that holding has been reiterated many times. See, e.g., Williams, 301
Ga. at 831; Butler v. State, 285 Ga. 518, 520 (678 SE2d 92) (2009)
(‘unless there is an adjudication of guilt, a witness may not be
impeached on general credibility grounds by evidence of a first
offender record”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Smith v. State,
276 Ga. 263 (577 SE2d 548) (2003) (first offender record inadmissible
to impeach witness still serving first offender sentence); Davis v.
State, 269 Ga. 276, 277 (496 SE2d 699) (1998) (first offender guilty
plea is not a “conviction”).

The enactment of the new Evidence Code did not change this
well-established rule. To begin, the general rule permitting admis-
sion of evidence of certain prior convictions as impeachment was
carried over from OCGA § 24-9-84.1 into the new Evidence Code with
no relevant substantive changes. Compare OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a)
(2006) with OCGA § 24-6-609 (a) (2013). The new rule provides for
the admission of evidence that a witness “has been convicted of a
crime,” just as the old one did. Id. (emphasis supplied). Accordingly,
we begin with the presumption that the new impeachment statute,
like the old one, applies only to “convictions,” and that the legislature
was aware that this Court has repeatedly held that first offender
sentences were not “convictions” admissible as general impeachment
evidence under the statute. See State v. Kachwalla, 274 Ga. 886, 889
(561 SE2d 403) (2002) (legislature is presumed to know what this
Court has held the law to be on a particular subject when it enacts
statutes).

The first offender language included in Rule 609 with the adop-
tion of the new Evidence Code does not change the longstanding rule
that an adjudication of guilt is required for a conviction—and that a
conviction is required to warrant a jury instruction on impeachment

890 A

by prior conviction. Instead, it provides that, as for a pardoned or
annulled conviction, any conviction subsequently discharged under a
first offender statute may not be used as impeachment evidence on
general grounds. See OCGA § 24-6-609 (c).

Rule 609 (c) applies to first offender records where there has been
both “a final adjudication of guilt and subsequent discharge under
any first offender statute.” OCGA § 24-6-609 (c) (emphasis supplied).
This new language applies where—unlike here—an adjudication ofa
witness’s guilt has occurred, and the witness thus has a “conviction.”
The statute provides that in that instance, if the witness subse-
quently completed and was discharged from a first offender program,
that earlier conviction may no longer be used as impeachment
evidence. Thus, rather than penalizing first offenders by somehow
creating “convictions” where there are none, the statute puts all first
offender witnesses on equal footing, including those who were ini-
tially convicted but subsequently discharged.'? We reiterate that,
without an adjudication of guilt, there is no conviction, and the
statute providing for impeachment by prior conviction simply does
not apply.

Because no adjudication of guilt had been entered in Davis’s case,
he had not been “convicted” of making a false statement, and his first
offender guilty plea was not admissible for purposes of impeachment
by prior conviction. Accordingly, the requested jury instruction on
impeachment by prior conviction was unwarranted, and the trial
court properly declined to give it.

IV.

Finally, Manner contends that the trial court erred by merging
the felony murder verdicts into the malice murder verdict for sen-
tencing, rather than ruling that the felony murder verdicts were
vacated by operation of law. The State concedes this point, and we
agree. As noted above, Manner was indicted for malice murder, two
counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, criminal damage to
property in the first degree, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all six
counts. Because the verdicts for malice murder and felony murder
involved the same victim, the felony murder verdicts are vacated by

12 The Evidence Code’s amendment notes that it applies to “final adjudication of guilt and
subsequent discharge under any first offender statute.” OCGA § 24-6-609 (c) (emphasis sup-
plied).

Ga) ee

operation of law. See Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 847-848 (770 SE2d
855) (2015).

Nonetheless, although the trial court’s nomenclature was incor-
rect, the error does not affect Manner’s sentence. The court properly
merged the aggravated assault into the malice murder verdict, as
those two counts of the indictment were both premised on the act of
shooting Kingcannon. See Favors, supra. The court then sentenced
Manner for malice murder and the two remaining counts, and
Manner does not raise any allegations of error in those sentences. As
there is no sentencing error to correct, we simply note that the felony
murder verdicts were vacated by operation of law, rather than
“merged” as the trial court stated.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2017 —
RECONSIDERATION DENIED FEBRUARY 5, 2018.

ronica M. O'Grady, for appellant.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Anna G. Cross, Lenny I. Krick,
Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1453. ADAMS v. THE STATE.
(810 SE2d 134)

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Alvin Adams entered a guilty plea to charges of malice
murder and armed robbery in 1993, and the trial court sentenced him
to two consecutive life sentences on October 12, 1993. On June 30,
2016, Adams filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The
trial court promptly denied the motion on the ground that, because
the term of court in which Adams was sentenced had expired, the
court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion. Finding no error, we
affirm.

A trial court lacks jurisdiction to permit the withdrawal of a
guilty plea once the term of court has expired in which the defendant
was sentenced. See Davis v. State, 274 Ga. 865 (561 SE2d 119) (2002).
In Davis, this Court stated that the only means available to withdraw
a plea in such a circumstance is through a habeas corpus proceeding.
Id. See also Smith v. State, 298 Ga. 487, 488 (782 SE2d 17) (2016).

892 es

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion
to withdraw the plea he entered many years ago.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED FEBRUARY 5, 2018.

Alvin Adams II, pro se.

Herbert M. Poston, Jr., District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

$17A1526. JONES v. THE STATE.
(810 SE2d 140)

BLACKWELL, Justice.

Hiram Jones was tried by a Dougherty County jury and convicted
of felony murder and armed robbery in connection with the stabbing
death of J.M. “Jake” King.’ On appeal, Jones contends that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer
opened a door for the prosecution to elicit otherwise inadmissible
evidence of his bad character. Jones also argues that the trial court
erred when it instructed the jury about the consistency (or lack
thereof) of his pretrial statements. After reviewing the record and
briefs, we find no reversible error, and we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
presented at trial shows that Jones and Javario Beach talked about
going to a fair on the evening of November 3, 2005, but Jones said that
he could not go because he had no money. Beach went to the fair
without Jones, and while he was there, Beach received several calls
from Jones, asking Beach to pick him up. Beach left the fair and drove
with two other friends to a home on Tremont Avenue in Albany, where

1 King was killed on November 3, 2005. On January 25, 2006, a Dougherty County grand
jury indicted Jones, charging him with malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated
assault, and armed robbery. Jones stood trial from March 12 to March 15, 2007. There was a
mistrial as to malice murder (because the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on that
count), but the jury found Jones guilty of the other crimes with which he was charged. The trial
court sentenced Jones to imprisonment for life for felony murder and a consecutive term of
imprisonment for life for armed robbery. The trial court merged the aggravated assaults into
the felony murder and armed robbery. Jones filed a motion for new trial on April 10, 2007, and
he amended that motion several times, filing his final amendment on March 16, 2015. Following
a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on February 2, 2017. Jones timely appealed, and
this case was docketed to the August 2017 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.

es 898

they found Jones. They observed that Jones was “acting weird,”
“looked like something was wrong,” was carrying a bag of clothes, and
also was carrying between 80 and 100 dollars. They agreed to drive
Jones to a home on North Madison Street.

The next day, King was found dead in a wooded area off Watkins
Avenue. King was lying next to his taxicab, which had been wrecked,
and the interior of which was covered in blood. The taxi meter
indicated that one passenger was in the cab at the time it was
wrecked. An autopsy later revealed that King had been stabbed 34
times, suffering five major wounds. His wallet, cell phone, and most
of the cash that he was known to carry could not be found at the scene.
Law enforcement officers did find, however, a bloody pair of pants. In
the course of their investigation, officers traced the pants to Jones,
and they searched the home on Tremont Avenue, where they found a
knife — which belonged to King and had King’s blood on it — anda
paper with the name of King’s wife written on it.

Officers interviewed Jones on three occasions. In the first an

second interviews, Jones offered that he was walking through the
woods when he happened upon the wrecked taxicab. Jones said that
he tried to help King, got blood on his hands as a result, and wiped his
hands on the interior of the cab and his own pants. Jones explaine’
that he was wearing gym shorts under his pants, and so, he simply
took off his bloody pants and left them at the scene. After these
interviews, officers let Jones speak with his father and uncle, an
then with his mother. His mother urged Jones to tell the truth and to
disclose if anyone else was with him on the evening in question. Jones
told his mother that he did not know anything and that no one was
with him. But after talking with his mother, Jones volunteered for
another interview with the investigating officers.
n this third interview, Jones completely changed his story an
admitted to being present when King was stabbed. Jones said that a
man named “Allen” approached him on November 3 at the home on
North Madison and invited him to join Allen for a robbery. Jones
agreed, Allen called for a taxicab, and King picked up Jones and Allen
in his cab. King drove them to the south side of Albany, where he
asked them to pay the fare. When they said that they had no money,
King locked the doors of the cab and called his dispatcher. At that
point, Jones said, Allen attacked King with a knife, and the cab went
into the woods, where it crashed. Jones was unable to give a fullname
or address for Allen, but Jones told the officers that Allen lived in the
neighborhood of the home on North Madison, that he had dark skin
and dreadlocks, that he liked to wear camouflage clothing, and that
he often rode a bicycle.

80 PO ]

Officers subsequently found a man who lived in that neighbor-
hood, matched the description given by Jones, and went by the name
“Allen.” That man cooperated with the investigating officers, submit-
ting to an interview, a search of his home, and the taking of his
fingerprints and a blood sample. But the officers found no evidence
(aside from Jones’s story) linking the man to the crimes. Beach had
known Jones for many years and had never heard of an “Allen.”

Jones testified at trial, where he told thejury that Allen approached
him at the North Madison home on November 3. According to Jones,
Allen mentioned that he intended to rob some drug dealers at some
later point, but Jones only agreed to accompany Allen to a party ata
location known as “Mt. Zion.” Before proceeding to Mt. Zion, however,
Jones wanted to drop by the home on Tremont Avenue to get a bottle
of gin. Allen called for a taxicab, King picked them up, and he drove
them first to Tremont Avenue and then toward Mt. Zion. Along the
way, King stopped the cab, locked the doors, and told Jones and Allen:
“Y’all go on and give me my money, and I finish taking y’all to y’all
destination.” At that point, Jones said, Allen lunged forward and
began stabbing King. The cab lurched into the woods and crashed into
a tree. Jones and Allen exited the cab, and Jones said that Allen then
threatened him with the knife, warning him to keep quiet. Allen
followed Jones to the home on Tremont Avenue, where Allen changed
clothes before leaving. Jones explained that he initially gave a false
account of the evening to the investigating officers because he was
concerned about his grandmother (who lived at the Tremont house)
and feared retribution from Allen and his associates.

Jones does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to sustain
his convictions. Nevertheless, as is our customary practice in murder
cases, we independently have reviewed the record with an eye toward
the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones was guilty of the crimes of
which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(IIT) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Jones argues that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel when his trial lawyer questioned him on direct examination
about his disciplinary record in jail, thereby opening a door for the
prosecution to elicit testimony on cross-examination about his numer-
ous bad acts while incarcerated. On direct, Jones volunteered that
he had been in jail for a year and a half. His lawyer then asked:
“Since you mentioned being at the jail for a year anda half, [have] you
been in some trouble since you've been out there?” Jones answered in
the affirmative, and his lawyer then asked about how many times
Jones had been “written up.” When Jones tried to explain himself and

es 895

mentioned fighting officers in the jail, his lawyer moved on to another
line of questioning. On cross, however, the prosecuting attorney
questioned Jones extensively about his disciplinary history at the
jail, revealing that Jones was disciplined for possession of contraban
tobacco, that Jones had as many as 30 disciplinary write-ups, that a
psychiatrist at the jail may have told Jones that he was malingering,
that Jones cursed at a female officer and called her a “b***h,” that
Jones purportedly attacked someone with a dustpan handle, that
Jones was shackled and handcuffed in his cell because he “attacke
so many people,” and that, on one occasion, Jones smashed a video
camera out of an officer’s hand. Jones contends that this information
was highly prejudicial, and he speculates that it may have led the jury
to return a verdict based on its perception that he has a genera
propensity for violence.

To obtain relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Jones
must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that
this deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U. S. 668, 687 (IIT) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To prove
deficient performance, Jones must show that his attorney “performe
at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the cir-
cumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Jessie
v. State, 294 Ga. 375, 377 (2) (754 SE2d 46) (2014) (citation an
punctuation omitted)). To show prejudice, Jones must prove that his
counsel’s error was “so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a tria.
whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687 (III). To that
end, Jones must show “a reasonable probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome that, but for counsel’s alleged unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.” Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 286 (676 SE2d 173) (2009) (citation
and punctuation omitted). “Ifthe defendant fails to satisfy either the
‘deficient performance’ or the ‘prejudice’ prong of the Strickland test,
this Court is not required to examine the other.” Jessie, 294 Ga. at 377
(2). See also Jones v. State, 290 Ga. 576, 578 (3) (722 SE2d 853) (2012).

Even assuming that Jones’s trial lawyer performed unreason-
ably when she asked Jones on direct examination about his disciplin-
ary history without knowing the answer, Jones has failed to prove
that he was prejudiced as a result. No doubt, his disciplinary history
at the jail does not cast Jones in a positive light, but the evidence of
his guilt was very strong. There is no doubt that Jones was in the cab
with King at the time King was killed. Although Jones tried to lay the
blame for the killing upon Allen, the varying accounts that he gave in
his pretrial interviews and at trial undercut his credibility. It is
uncontroverted that Jones lied to officers in his first and second
interviews when he denied being at the scene when King was

896 PO ]

stabbed, he only identified Allen as the killer in his third interview
after speaking with his mother, and although he continued at trial to
identify Allen as the killer, his trial testimony was not entirely
consistent with his third interview.” Aside from Jones’s self-serving
accounts, no evidence linked Allen to the killing. The taxi meter
showed that the cab was occupied by only one passenger when it was
wrecked. Before the killing, Jones said he could not go to a fair
because he had no money; later that evening, he was seen with 80 to
100 dollars. Jones’s bloody pants were found at the scene of the
killing, and King’s knife and paper were found at the home on
Tremont Avenue, where Jones’s grandmother lived.

In short, Jones admitted to being present when King was killed,
the physical evidence suggested that Jones (and no one else) was
present at the time of the killing, Jones needed money shortly before
the killing, he came into possession of money around the time of the
robbery and killing, and there were ample grounds for a reasonable
jury to discredit Jones’s self-serving accounts.* Considering the
whole record, we find no reasonable probability that the jury would
have acquitted Jones if only it had not heard about his disciplinary
history at the jail, some of which may suggest a propensity for
violence, but much of which merely concerns nonviolent mischief.
Jones has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the performance
of his trial lawyer, and his claim of ineffective assistance fails. See
Whitaker v. State, 291 Ga. 139, 142 (2) (728 SE2d 209) (2012)
(allegedly improper testimony and argument about defendant's behav-
ior did not result in prejudice under Strickland, given “strong evi-
dence” of defendant’s guilt).

2 Most notably, Jones said in his third interview that he agreed to commit a robbery with
Allen. At trial, Jones said that he agreed only to accompany Allen to a party.

® We note that, even ifthe jury might have given some credit to Jones's account about Allen
stabbing King —a proposition that strikes us as far-fetched in light of the entire record — it still
might properly have found Jones guilty of murder and armed robbery as an accomplice. After
all, Jones said in his third interview that he had agreed to help Allen commit a robbery; at trial,
although he said that he had only agreed to go with Allen to a party, Jones admitted that Allen
had mentioned a robbery. Jones lied to investigating officers and withheld any mention of Allen
until his third interview. And it was Jones — not Allen — who was observed with money after
the robbery and killing, suggesting that Jones wound up with the proceeds of the crime. See
OCGA § 16-2-20 (a person is a party to the crime if he [intentionally aids or abets in the
commission of the crime”); Stewart v. State, 299 Ga. 622, 627 (2) (c) (791 SE2d 61) (2016)
(evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder as party toa crime where he was
present during the planning of the robbery that led to the murder, was seen walking with armed
co-defendants toward the victims’ room, fled the scene after shots were fired, and later
participated in dividing the spoils of the robbery). See also Ross v. State, 276 Ga. 747, 748 (2)
(583 SE2d 850) (2003) (“Unlike malice murder, felony murder does not require intent to kill;
rather, the defendant only must have intended to commit the underlying felony.” (citation and
punctuation omitted). The trial court instructed the jury on the relevant law.

es 897

3. Jones contends that the trial court erred when it charged the
jury that, “[w]hen a defendant’s statements are not consistent with
and do not explain other direct and circumstantial evidence, the
defendant’s explanation may be rejected by you, the jury, as triers of
fact.” Jones concedes that this charge is a correct statement of the law,
but he complains that the trial court gave the charge in the midst of
other instructions about the admissibility of his pretrial statements.4
By the sequence of the charges, Jones argues, the jury may have been
misled to believe that, if his statements were inconsistent, they were
inadmissible and could not be considered at all, regardless of their
credibility. In addition, Jones complains that the consistency instruc-
tion — taken together with another instruction that the jury could
consider that “the defendant is interested in the outcome of the
prosecution” — might have suggested to the jury that Jones had a
greater motivation to lie than other witnesses and that his testimony
should, therefore, be given greater scrutiny. These arguments afford
no ground for reversal.

Even when we find error in a jury charge, we will not reverse
when the error is harmless, that is, when “it is highly probable that
[the] instruction did not contribute to the verdict.” Hodges v. State,
302 Ga. 564, 567 (3) (807 SE2d 856) (2017). See also Francis v. State,
266 Ga. 69, 72 (3) (463 SE2d 859) (1995). Any error in the consistency
charge here was harmless. To begin, the trial court plainly instructed
the jury that it could — not that it had to — disregard Jones’s
statements if they were inconsistent with other evidence. We doubt
that the sequencing of the charges altered the plain import of this
instruction in the minds of the jurors. Moreover, the trial court also
charged the jury that they were to consider the court’s instructions
“as a whole,” and it gave other specific instructions on the credibility
of witnesses, including that the defendant’s credibility “is to be tested
by and subject to the same tests as are legally applied to any other
witness.” See Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 490, 492 (8) (629 SE2d 816)
(2006) (an allegedly erroneous jury instruction “must be considered
in the context of the court’s instruction as a whole”). Finally, as
discussed above, the evidence of Jones’s guilt was very strong. In this
regard, if the jury had refused altogether to consider Jones’s pretrial
statements, it more likely would have helped Jones, as his pretrial
statements were incriminating. Not only did they show that he lied to
the police in his first two interviews, thereby undermining his

+ The charge in question was given close in time to instructions about the voluntariness of
statements and violations of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. 8. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966).

898 PO ]

credibility, but the most favorable of these statements (given in the
third interview) was also inconsistent with his trial testimony and
portrayed him as a willing participant in a robbery. In light of the
foregoing, it is highly improbable that the consistency instruction
contributed to the verdict, and we will not reverse on this ground. See
Hodges, 302 Ga. at 567 (3) (any error in omitting a requested jury
instruction was harmless where the evidence of defendant’s guilt was
“compelling” and where other instructions mitigated the omission).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED FeBruary 5, 2018.

catherine L. Do or appellant.
Gregory W. Edwards, District Attorney, Kathryn O. Fallin, Assis-
tant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patri-
cia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew D. O’Brien, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.